THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 RIVERSIDE 
 
 IN MEMORY OF 
 
 Professor Hairy J. Quqyle 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 '"Mrs Fannie Q. Paul 
 Mrs Annie Q. Hadley 
 Mrs Elizabeth Q. Flowers

 
 J] CO) S E tPM D ft E
 
 HISTOEY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE 
 
 OP 
 
 FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON. 
 
 BY 
 
 M. ADOLPHE THIEES, 
 
 LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FBANCE; 
 
 MEMBER OF TEE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE, ETC. ETC. ETC., AUTHOB OF "TEE HISTORY OF TEE 
 
 FRINGE REVOLUTION." 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND H. W. HERBERT. 
 
 WITH NOTES AND ADDITIONS. 
 
 VOL. II. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 J. B, LIPPING OTT & CO. 
 
 1861.
 
 in i 
 
 ^ 
 
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1861, by 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT 4 CO., 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
 
 HISTORY 
 
 or 
 
 THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE 
 
 or 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 UNDER 
 
 NAPOLEON. 
 
 BOOK XXII. 
 
 ULM AND TRAFALGAR. 
 
 Consequences of the Union of Genoa with the Empire That Union, though a Fault, is attended with beneficia. 
 Results A vast Field opened to the Military Combinations of Napoleon Four Attacks directed against France 
 Napoleon directs his serious Attention to one only, and by the Manner in which he intends to repel it, he 
 purposes to defeat the other three Explanation of his Plan Movement of the six Corps d'Armee from the 
 Shores of the Ocean to the Sources of the Danube Napoleon keeps his Dispositions a profound Secret, and 
 communicates them to the Elector of Bavaria alone, in order to attach that Prince by relieving him from 
 Apprehension Precautions taken by him for the Preservation of the Flotilla His return to Paris Change in 
 the Public Opinion in regard to him Censures passed upon him State of the Finances Commencement of 
 Arrears Difficult Situation of the principal commercial Towns Scarcity of Specie Efforts of Commerce to 
 procure the Precious Metals Association of the Company of the United Merchants with the Court of Spain 
 Speculation with Dollars Danger of that Speculation The Company of United Merchants, having blended in 
 their Hands the Affairs of France and Spain, extend the Embarrassment of one to the other Consequences of 
 this Situation for the Bank of France Irritation of Napoleon against the Men of Business Important Sums in 
 Silver and Gold sent to Strasburg and Italy Levy of the Conscription by a Decree of the Senate Organization 
 of the Reserves Employment of the National Guard Meeting of the Senate Coldness shown towards Napo- 
 leon by the People of Paris Napoleon is somewhat vexed at it, but sets out for the Army, certain of soon 
 changing that Coldness into Transports of Enthusiasm Dispositions of the Coalition March of two Russian 
 Armies, one into Gallicia to assist the Austrians, the other into Poland to threaten Prussia The Emperor 
 Alexander at Pulawi His Negotiations with the Court of Berlin March of the Austrians into Lombardy and 
 Bavaria Passage of the Inn by General Mack The Elector of Bavaria, after great Perplexities, throws 
 himself into the Arms of France, and retires to Wurzburg with his Court and Army General Mack takes 
 Position at Ulm Conduct of the Court of Naples Commencement of Military Operations on the Part of the 
 French Organization of the Grand Army Passage of the Rhine March of Napoleon with Six Corps along 
 the Suabian Alps to turn General Mack Napoleon reaches the Danube near Donauwerth before General Mack 
 has any Suspicion of the Presence of the French General Passage of the Danube General Mack is enve- 
 loped Battles of Wertingen and Giinsburg Napoleon, at Augsburg, makes his Dispositions whh the two^fold 
 Object of investing Ulm and occupying Munich, for the Purpose of separating the Russians from Ihe Austrians 
 Error committed by Murat Danger of Dupont's Division Battle of Haslach Napoleon hastens beneath the 
 Walls of Ulm. and repairs the Faults committed Battle of Elchingen on the 14th of October Investment of 
 Ulm Despair of General Mack and Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand The Austrian Army is obliged to 
 capitulate Unexampled Triumph of Napoleon He destroys in twenty Days an army of Eighty Thousand Men 
 without a general Engagement Naval Operations after the Return of AdmiralVilleneuve to Cadiz Severity 
 of Napoleon towards that Admiral Admiral Rosilly is sent to supersede him, and Orders are given to the 
 Fleet to leave Cadiz and proceed into the Mediterranean Vexation of Admiral Villeneuve, who resolves to 
 fight a desperate Battle The two Fleets meet off Cape Trafalgar Attack of the English in Two Columns 
 They break the French line of Battle Heroic Conflicts of the Rerloutable. Bueentaure, Fauguevx. Algesiras, Pluton, 
 AchiUe. and Prince of Asturias Death of Nelson, Captivity of Villeneuve Defeat of our Fleet after a memorable 
 Struggle Tremendous Storm after the Engagement Shipwrecks succeed Fights Conduct of the Imperial 
 Government towards the French Navy Silence ordered respecting the late Events Ulm causes Trafalgar to> 
 be forgotten. 
 
 IT was an egregious fault to unite Genoa 
 with France, on the very eve of the expedition 
 against England, and thus to furnish Austria 
 with the last reason that must decide her to 
 war. It was provoking and drawing upon one's 
 self a formidable coalition at a moment when 
 one had need of absolute peace upon the Con- 
 tinent, in order to have the utmost freedom of 
 action ajrainst England. Napoleon, it is true, 
 had not foreseen the consequences of the union 
 of Genoa ; his error consisted in despising 
 Austria too much, and in believing her to be 
 incapable of acting, whatever liberty he might 
 
 Vol. II. 2 
 
 take with her. Though he has been justly 
 censured for this union, effected under such 
 circumstances, still it was in reality a fortu 
 nate event. No doubt, had Admiral Villeneuve 
 been able to sail up the Channel, and to appear 
 off Boulogne, there would be reason to regret 
 for ever the derangement of the execution'of 
 the most gigantic plan ; but as that admiral* 
 did not arrive, Napoleon, reduced once more- 
 to inaction, unless he had been rash enough to 
 cross the Strait without the protection of a 
 fleet, Napoleon would have found himself in 
 extreme embarrassment. This expedition, so 
 
 9
 
 10 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1805. 
 
 frequently announced, and which had miscar- 
 ried thrice successively, would at last have 
 exposed him to a sort of ridicule, and would 
 have exhibited him to the eyes of Europe as 
 in a real state of impotence in opposition to 
 England. The continental coalition, furnish- 
 ing him with a field of battle which he needed, 
 repaired the fault that he had committed by 
 coming itself to commit one, and drew him 
 most seasonably from an indecisive and un- 
 pleasant situation. The chain which links to- 
 gether the affairs of this world is sometimes 
 a very strange one. Frequently, the judicious 
 combination fails, and that which is faulty 
 succeeds This, however, is not an absolute 
 motive for declaring all prudence vain, and for 
 preferring to it the impulsions of caprice in 
 the government of empires. No, we ought 
 always to prefer calculation to impulse in the 
 conduct of affairs; but we cannot help ac- 
 knowledging that the designs of man are over- 
 ruled by the designs of Providence, more sure, 
 more profound, than his. It is a reason for 
 modesty, not for abdication, to human wisdom. 
 One must have had a close view of the dif- 
 ficulties of government, one must have felt 
 how difficult it is to form great determinations, 
 to prepare them, to accomplish them, to move 
 men and things, in order to appreciate the re- 
 solution which Napoleon took on this occasion. 
 The mortification of witnessing the miscar- 
 riage of the Boulogne expedition having once 
 passed off, he turned his whole attention to his 
 new plan of continental war. Never had he 
 greater resources at his disposal; never had a 
 wider lield of operations opened to his view. 
 When he commanded the army of Italy, he 
 found his movements bounded by the plain of 
 Lombardy and the circle of the Alps; and if 
 he thought of extending his views beyond that 
 circle, the alarmed prudence of Carnot, the 
 director, stepped forward to check him in his 
 combinations. When, as First Consul, he con- 
 ceived the plan of the campaign of 1800, he 
 was obliged to humour lieutenants who were 
 still his equals ; and if, for example, he de- 
 vised for Moreau a plan which would proba- 
 bly have been attended with the most fortunate 
 consequi nces, he was stopped by the timid 
 spirit of that general ; he was forced to allow 
 him to act in his own sure but limited manner, 
 and to confine himself within the sequestered 
 field of Piedmont. It is true that he signalized 
 his presence there by an operation which will 
 for ever remain a prodigy of the art of war, 
 but still his genius, in striving to expand itself, 
 had met with obstacles. For the first time he 
 was free, free as Caesar and Alexander had 
 been. Such of his companions in arms, whose 
 jealousy or whose reputation rendered them 
 troublesome, had excluded themselves from the 
 lists by their imprudent and guilty conduct. 
 He had left him none but lieutenants submis- 
 sive to his will, and combining in the highest 
 degree all the qualities necessary for the ex- 
 ecution of his designs. His army, weary of 
 long inaction, eager for glory and battle, trained 
 by ten years of war and three of encampment, 
 was prepared for the most difficult enterprises, 
 for liie most daring marches. All Europe was 
 >pen to his combinations. He was in the 
 
 West, on the shores of the North Sea and the 
 Channel; and Austria, assisted by Russian, 
 Swedish, Italian, and English forces, was in the 
 East, pushing upon France masses which a sort 
 of European conspiracy had placed at her dis- 
 posal. The situation, the means, every thing, 
 were grand. But if France had never been better 
 able to cope with sudden and serious dangers, 
 so never had the difficulty been equally great 
 That army, so prepared that we may affirm such 
 another never existed, that army was on the 
 shores of the Ocean, far from the Rhine, the 
 Danube, the Alps, which explains why the con- 
 tinental powers had suffered it to assemble 
 without remonstrating, and it was necessary to 
 transport it all at once to the centre of the con- 
 tinent. There was the problem to be resolved. 
 We shall see how Napoleon managed to tra- 
 verse the space that separated him from his 
 enemies, and to throw himself among them at 
 the most suitable point for dissolving their for- 
 midable coalition. 
 
 Although he had persisted in believing that 
 the war was not so near at hand as it really 
 was, he had completely settled the preparations 
 and the plan. Sweden was making arma- 
 ments at Stralsund in Swedish Pomcrania; 
 Russia, at Revel, in the Gulf of Finland. Two 
 strong Russian armies were alleged to be con- 
 centrating themselves, one in Poland, in order 
 to hurry away Prussia, the other in Gallicia, 
 to assist Austria. It was not merely suspected 
 but known with certainty that two Austrian 
 armies were forming, one of 80,000 men in 
 Bavaria, the other of 100,000 men in Italy, 
 both connected by a corps of 25 or 30 thou- 
 sand in Tyrol. Lastly, Russians, assembled at 
 Corfu, English at Malta, and symptoms of 
 agitation in the court of Naples, left no room 
 to doubt that some attempt would be made to- 
 wards the south of Italy. 
 
 Four attacks then were preparing: the first, 
 in the North, from Pomerania, on Hanover and 
 Holland, was to be executed by Swedes, Rus- 
 sians, and English ; the second, in the East, by 
 the valley of the Danube, assigned to Austrians 
 and Russians united; the third in Lombardy, 
 reserved for Austrians alone; the fourth on the 
 south of Italy, was to be undertaken, rather 
 later, by a force composed of Russians, Eng- 
 lish, and Neapolitans. 
 
 Napoleon had as complete a comprehension 
 of this plan as if he had been present at the 
 military conferences of M. de Winzingerode at 
 Vienna, to which we have already adverted. 
 There was but one more circumstance yet un- 
 known to him, likewise to his enemies should 
 they gain Prussia? Napoleon did not think so. 
 The coalesced powers hoped to effect this by 
 intimidating King Frederick William. In this 
 case, the attack in the North, instead of being 
 an accessory attempt, greatly cramped by ihe 
 neutrality of Prussia, would become a threat- 
 ening enterprise against the empire, from Co- 
 logne to the mouths of the Rhine. This, how- 
 ever, was not at all probable, and Napoleon 
 considered only the two grand attacks from 
 Bavaria and Lombardy as serious, and re- 
 garded those preparing in Pomerania and to- 
 wards the kingdom of Naples as at most 
 deserving of some precautions.
 
 Aug. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 II 
 
 He resolved to direct the bulk of his forces 
 into the valley of t.ie Danube, and to frustrate 
 all the secondary attacks by the manner in 
 which he should repulse the principal. His 
 profound conception was based on a very sim- 
 ple fact, the distance of the Russians, which 
 would be likely to make them arrive late to 
 the assistance of the Austrians. He thought 
 that the Austrians, impatient to fall upon Ba- 
 varia, and to occupy, according to their cus- 
 tom, the favourite position of Ulm, would, by 
 acting in that manner, add to the distance 
 which naturally separated them from the Rus- 
 sians ; that the latter would consequently ap- 
 pear late in line, ascending the Danube with 
 their principal army united to the Austrian 
 reserves. Crushing the Austrians before the 
 arrival of the Russians, Napoleon then pur- 
 posed to fall upon the latter, deprived of the 
 aid of the principal Austrian army, and in- 
 tended to employ the expedient, extremely easy 
 in theory, extremely difficult in practice, to 
 beat his enemies one after the other. 
 
 In order to its success, this plan required a 
 particular mode of moving his army to the 
 theatre of operations, that is to say, to the 
 valley of the Danube. If, after the example 
 of Moreau, Napoleon should ascend the Rhine, 
 for the purpose of crossing it at Strasburg and 
 Schaffhausen, and were then to debouch by 
 the defiles of the Black Forest between the 
 Suabian Alps and the Lake of Constance, and 
 thus attack in front the Austrians posted be- 
 hind the Iller, from Ulm to Memmingen, he 
 should not completely fulfil his object. Even 
 in beating the Austrians, as he was more cer- 
 tain than ever of doing with the army trained 
 in the camp of Boulogne, he should drive them 
 before him upon the Russians, and should 
 cause them, weakened merely, to form a junc- 
 tion with their northern allies. It behoved 
 him, therefore, as at Marengo, and still more 
 than at Marengo, to turn the Austrians, and 
 not to be satisfied with beating them, but to 
 surround them, so as to send them all prison- 
 ers into France. Then Napoleon could throw 
 himself upon the Russians, who would have 
 no other support but the Austrian reserves. 
 
 To this end, a perfectly simple march oc- 
 curred to his mind. One of his corps d'armee, 
 that of Marshal Bernadotte, was in Hanover, 
 a second, General Marmont's, in Holland, the 
 others at Boulogne. He conceived the idea of 
 making the first descend through Hesse, into 
 Franconia, upon Wurzburg and the Danube; 
 of making the second advance along the Rhine, 
 taking advantage of the facilities afforded by 
 thru river, and of uniting it at Mayence and 
 Wurzburg with the corps coming from Hano- 
 ver. While these two great detachments were 
 to descend from north to south, Napoleon re- 
 solved to transport, by a movement from west 
 to east, from Boulogne to Strasburg, the corps 
 encamped on the shores of the Channel, to 
 feign with these latter a direct attack by the 
 Black Forest, but in reality to leave that forest 
 on the right, to pass to the leA through Wur- 
 temburg, in order to join in Franconia the 
 corps of Bernadolte and Marmont, to cross the 
 Danube below Ulm, in the environs of Donau- 
 werth, to get thus into the rear of the Aus- 
 
 trians, to surround them, to take them, and, 
 after getting rid of them, march upon Vienna 
 to meet the Russians. 
 
 The position of Marshal Bernadotte coming 
 from Hanover, of General Marmont coming 
 from Holland, was an advantage, for it took 
 one of them but seventeen days, the other only 
 fourteen or fifteen, to reach Wurzburg, on the 
 flank of the hostile army encamped at Ulm. 
 The movement of the troops starting from 
 Boulognefor Strasburg required about twenty- 
 four days, and this was to fix the attention of 
 the Austrians on the ordinary debouche of the 
 Black Forest. In the space of twenty-four 
 days, that is to say about the 25th of Septem- 
 ber, Napoleon might therefore have arrived at 
 the decisive point. By adopting an immediate 
 resolution, by concealing his movements as 
 long as possible, by his further stay at Bou- 
 logne, by circulating false reports, by disguis- 
 ing his intentions with that art for deceiving 
 an enemy which he possessed in a supreme 
 degree, he could have passed the Danube in 
 the rear of the Austrians before they had any 
 suspicion of his presence. If he succeeded, 
 he should rid himself in the month of October 
 of the first hostile army; he would employ 
 that of November in marching upon Vienna, 
 and in the environs of that capital he should 
 meet with the Russians, whom he had never 
 seen, whom he knew to be steady foot-soldiers, 
 but not invincible, for Moreau and Massena 
 had already beaten them, and he promised 
 himself to beat them still more severely. 
 Having reached Vienna, he should have got 
 far beyond the Austrian army of Italy, which 
 would become an urgent motive for that army 
 to retreat. 
 
 The plan of Napoleon was to give Massena, 
 the most energetic of his lieutenants, and the 
 one who was best acquainted with Italy, the 
 command of the French army on the Adige. 
 It was to consist of no more than 50,000 men, 
 but choice troops, for they had made all the 
 campaigns beyond the Alps from Montenotte 
 to Marengo. Provided that Massena could 
 detain the Archduke Charles on the Adige for 
 a month, which seemed beyond doubt, with 
 soldiers accustomed to conquer the Austrians, 
 whatever might be their number, and under a 
 general who never fell back, Napoleon, having 
 arrived at Vienna, would relieve Lombardy as 
 he had relieved Bavaria. He would draw the 
 archduke upon himself, but at the same time 
 he would draw Massena; and then, uniting 
 the 50,000 men from the banks of the Adige 
 with the 150,000 with whom he had marched 
 along the Danube, he should find himself at 
 Vienna at the head of 200,000 victorious 
 French. Disposing directly of such a mass 
 of forces, having thwarted the two principal 
 attacks, those of Bavaria and Lombardy, what 
 need he care about the two others prepared in 
 the north and south, towards Hanover and 
 towards Naples 1 Were all Europe in arms, 
 he would have nothing to fear from the whole 
 of its forces. 
 
 Still he omitted not to take certain preca? 
 tions in regard to Lower Italy. General St 
 Cyr occupied Calabria with 20,000 men. Na- 
 poleon gave him instructions to march upon
 
 12 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1805. 
 
 Naples and make himself master of that capi- 
 tal on the first symptom of hostility. It would, 
 no doubt, have been more consistent with his 
 principles not to cut the army of Italy in two, 
 not to place 50,000 men under Massena on the 
 banks of the Adige, and 520,000 under General 
 St. Cyr in Calabria; to unite the whole, on the 
 contrary, into one mass of 70,000 men, which, 
 certain to conquer in the north of Italy, would 
 have little to fear from the south. But he con- 
 ceived that Massena, with 50,000 men and his 
 character, would be sufficient to detain the 
 Archduke Charles for a month, and he deemed 
 it dangerous to permit the Russians and the 
 English to gain a footing at Naples, and to 
 foment in Calabria a war of insurrection, 
 which it would be difficult to extinguish. For 
 this reason he left General St. Cyr and 20,000 
 men in the gulf of Tarento, with orders to 
 march on the first signal to Naples, and to 
 throw the Russians and the English into the 
 sea, before they had time to establish them- 
 selves on the continent of Italy. As for the 
 attack prepared in the north of Europe, at such 
 a distance from the frontiers of the Empire, 
 Napoleon was content to provide against it by 
 merely continuing the negotiation begun at 
 Berlin relative to the kingdom of Hanover. 
 He had offered that kingdom to Prussia as the 
 price of her alliance ; but, having scarcely 
 any hope of a formal alliance on the part of 
 so timid a court, he proposed to place Hano- 
 ver in its hands in pledge, if it would not 
 receive it as a definitive gift. In either case, it 
 would be obliged to keep the belligerent troops 
 out of the country, and its neutrality would 
 consequently suffice to cover the north of 
 Europe. 
 
 Such was the plan conceived by Napoleon. 
 Moving his corps d'armee by rapid and unex- 
 pected marches from Hanover, Holland, and 
 Flanders, into the heart of Germany, passing 
 the Danube, below Ulm, separating the Aus- 
 trians from the Russians, enveloping the 
 former, overthrowing the latter, then pushing 
 on through the valley of the Danube to Vienna, 
 and by this movement relieving Massena in 
 Italy, he should soon have repulsed the two 
 principal attacks directed against his Empire. 
 His victorious armies being thus united under 
 the walls of Vienna, he should no longer need 
 o give himself any concern about an attempt 
 m the south of Italy, which, besides, General 
 St. Cyr would frustrate, and another in the 
 north of Germany, which would be cramped 
 on all sides by the Prussian neutrality. 
 
 Never had captain either in ancient or mo- 
 dern times conceived and executed plans on 
 such a scale. Never, indeed, had a more 
 mighty mind, possessing greater freedom of 
 will, commanding means more prodigious, 
 had to operate on such an extent of country. 
 What is it, in fact, that we see on most occa- 
 sions 1 Irresolute governments, deliberating 
 when they ought to act, improvident govern- 
 ments, which think of organizing their forces 
 when they ought to be on the field of battle, 
 and under them subordinate generals, scarcely 
 capable of stirring on the circumscribed theatre 
 assigned to their operations. Here, on the 
 contrary, genius, decision, foresight, absolute 
 
 freedom of action, all concurred in the same 
 man and to the same end. It is rarely that 
 such circumstances are combined, but when 
 they do meet together, the world has a master. 
 In the last days of the month of August, the 
 Austrians were already on the banks of the 
 Adige and the Inn, the Russians on the fron- 
 tiers of Gallicia. It seemed as if they should 
 surprise Napoleon ; but that was not the case* 
 He gave all his orders at Boulogne on the 26th 
 of August, but with the recommendation not to 
 issue them till ten at night on the 27th. His 
 object in this was to reserve for himself the 
 whole of the 27th before he definitively re- 
 nounced his grand maritime expedition. The 
 courier despatched on the 27th would not 
 reach Hanover before the 1st of September. 
 Marshal Bernadotte, already forewarned, was 
 to commence his movement on the 2d of Sep- 
 tember, to have collected his corps on the 6th 
 at Gottingen, and to reach Wiirzburg by the 
 20th. He had orders to collect in the fortress 
 of Hameln the artillery taken from the Hano- 
 verians, the military stores of all kinds, the 
 sick, the depots of his corps d'armee, and a 
 garrison of 6000 men, commanded by an ener- 
 getic officer, who could be relied upon. This 
 garrison was to be provisioned for a year. If 
 an arrangement were concluded with Prussia 
 for Hanover, the troops left at Hameln were 
 immediately to rejoin Bernadotte's corps ; if 
 not, they were to remain in that fortress, and 
 to defend it to the death, in case the English 
 should send an expedition to the Weser, which 
 the Prussian neutrality could not prevent. "I 
 shall be," wrote Napoleon, " as prompt as 
 Frederick, when he went from Prague to 
 Dresden and Berlin. I will run fast enough 
 to the relief of the French defending my eagles 
 in Hanover, and fling into the Weser the ene- 
 mies who shall have come from that quarter." 
 Bernadotte had orders to traverse the two 
 Hesses, to tell the governments of those two 
 principalities that he was returning to France 
 by Mayence, to force a passage if it were re- 
 fused, but to march with money in his hand, 
 to pay for every thing, and to observe rigid 
 discipline. 
 
 On the same evening of the 27th of August, 
 a courier set off with orders for General Mar- 
 mont to march with 20,000 men and 40 pieces 
 of cannon well horsed, to follow the banks of 
 the Rhine to Mayence, and to proceed by 
 Mayence and Frankfort to Wiirzburg. This 
 order was to reach Utrecht on the 30th of Au- 
 gust. General Marmont, having received a 
 previous intimation, was to set himself in mo- 
 tion on the 1st of September, to arrive at Ma- 
 yence on the 15th or 16th, and at Wiirzburg 
 on the 18th or 19th. Thus these two corps 
 from Hanover and Holland were to be amidst 
 the Franconian principalities of the elector of 
 Bavaria from the 18th to the 20th of Septem- 
 ber, and to form there a force of 40,000 men. 
 As the elector had been recommended to retire 
 to Wiirzburg, if the Austrians should attempt 
 to do him violence, he was sure of finding 
 there a succour ready prepared for his person 
 and for his army. 
 
 Lastly, on the evening of the 27th were is- 
 sued the orders for the camps of Ambleteuse,
 
 Aug. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 13 
 
 Boulogne, and Montreuil. These orders were 
 to begin to be executed on the morning of the 
 29th. On the first day, the first divisions of 
 each corps were to march by three different 
 romes, on the second day the second divisions, 
 on the third day the last; consequently, they 
 followed each other at twenty-four hours' dis- 
 tance. The three routes specified were for 
 ihe camp of Ambleteuse, Cassel, Lille, Namur, 
 Luxemburg, Deux-Ponts, Manheim ; for the 
 tamp of Boulogne, St. Omer, Douai, Cambrai, 
 Mezieres, Verdun, Metz, Spire ; for the camp 
 if Montreuil, Arras, La Fere, Reims, Nancy, 
 Saverne, Strasburg. As it would require 
 twenty-four marches, the whole army might 
 be upon the Rhine between the 21st and the 
 24th of September. That would be timely 
 enoush to be of use (here; for the Austrians, 
 unwilling to make any stir in order to be the 
 more sure of surprising the French, had con- 
 tinued in the camp of Wels near Linz, and 
 consequently could not be in line before Na- 
 poleon. Besides, the further they advanced 
 upon the Upper Danube, the nearer they ap- 
 proached to the frontier of France between the 
 lake of Constance and Schaffhausen, the more 
 chances Napoleon had of enveloping them. 
 Officers, despatched with funds to all the roads 
 which the troops were to travel, were directed 
 to get provisions prepared for them at every 
 station. Formal and several times repeated 
 orders, like all those given by Napoleon, en- 
 joined that each soldier should be furnished 
 with a great coat and two pair of shoes. 
 
 Napoleon, closely keeping his secret, which 
 was intrusted to none but Berthier and M. 
 Daru, said to those about him that he was 
 sending 30,000 men to the Rhine. He wrote 
 to the same effect to most of his ministers. 
 He communicated nothing more to M. de Mar- 
 bois, and merely directed him to collect as 
 much money as possible in the chests at Stras- 
 burg, which the avowed mission of 30,000 men 
 to Alsace was sufficient to account for. He 
 ordered M. Daru to set out immediately for Pa- 
 ris, to go to M. Dejean, minister of the materiel 
 of war, to write with his own hand all the ac- 
 ce>sory orders required by the displacing of 
 the army, and not to let a sing'e clerk into the 
 secret. Napoleon resolved to stay himself six 
 or seven days longer at Boulogne, ihe better to 
 deceive ihe public in regard to his plans. 
 
 As all these corps were to traverse France, 
 excepting that of Marshal Bernadotte, which 
 was to give itself out in Germany for a corps 
 destined to recross the frontiers, it was certain 
 that they must be in full march before they 
 gave any signs of their presence, before these 
 signs were transmuted lo Paris, sent from Pa- 
 ris abroad, and that many davs must elapse 
 before the enemy could be acquainted with the 
 
 breaking up of the camp of Boulogne. Be- 
 sides, as the tidings of these movements could 
 be accounted for by the mission of 30,000 men 
 to the Rhine, of which no secret was made, 
 they left the most perspicacious minds in doubt ; 
 and there was a great chance of being upon 
 the Rhine, the Neckar, or the Mayn, while the 
 army was supposed to be still on the shores 
 of the Channel. Napoleon at the same time 
 sent away Murat and his aides-de-camp, Sa- 
 vary and Bertrand,' to Franconia, Suabia, and 
 Bavaria. They had orders to explore all the 
 roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube, 
 to observe the nature of each of these roads, 
 the military positions to be found upon them, 
 the means of subsistence which they afforded; 
 lastly, all the suitable points for crossing the 
 Danube. Murat was to travel under a fic- 
 titious name, and, having finished his survey, 
 to return to Strasburg, and there take the com- 
 mand of the first columns that should reach 
 the Rhine. 
 
 To leave the Russians in ignorance of his 
 resolutions as long as possible. Napoleon 
 moreover recommended to M. de Talleyrand 
 to delay the manifesto destined for the cabinet 
 of Vienna, and the purport of which was to 
 summon that cabinet to explain itself defini- 
 tively. In reply to this summons he expected 
 from it nothing but falsehoods, and, as for con- 
 victing it of duplicity before the face of Eu- 
 rope, it would be time enough to do that at the 
 moment of the first hostilities. He despatched 
 General Thiard, who had entered into the ser- 
 vice of France on the return of the emigrants, 
 to Carlsruhe, and charged him to negotiate an 
 alliance with the grand duchy of Baden. He 
 addressed offers of the like nature to Wurtem- 
 berg, alleging that he foresaw war, judging 
 from the preparations of Austria, but never 
 hinting how far he was ready to commence it. 
 In short, it was to the elector of Bavaria alone 
 that he communicated the whole secret of his 
 plans. That unfortunate prince, hesitating 
 between Austria, which was his enemy, and 
 France, which was his friend, but the one 
 near, the other distant; recollecting too that in 
 preceding wars, invariably trampled upon by 
 both, he had always been forgotten at the 
 peace, this unfortunate prince knew not to 
 which to attach himself. He was aware that, 
 if he gave himself up to France, he might ex- 
 pect accessions of territory; but, still ignorant 
 of the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne, 
 he beheld her, at the period of which we are 
 treating, wholly occupied by her struggle with 
 England, importuned by her German allies, 
 and unable to assist them. Accordingly, he 
 was incessantly talking of an alliance to our 
 minister, M. Otto, without ever daring to con- 
 clude one. This state of things was soon 
 
 1 BERTRAXD. HENRI GRATIEN, COUNT General of di- 
 vision, aid-de-rnmp to Napuleon, grand-marshal of the 
 palare. &c. He was born of parents in the mi<tdle ranks, 
 entered the military service as An engineer and rose to 
 the rank of general of brigade. In the camp at Boulogne, 
 in 1801, Napoleon became acquainted with his merit, and 
 from that time Bertrand was constantly wilh him. He 
 was his aid-de-camp at Atisterlitz. In 1806, took Span- 
 dau after an. attack of a few days. In 1607, contributed 
 largely to the victory at Friedland. In 1809, bridged 
 
 the Danube in a most masterly manner after Aspern. 
 Oi-itingnished himself at I.ut/en, Bautzen, and Leipsic, 
 in 1812 and 1S13; after Leipsic, defended Lindennu against 
 Grulay, and covered Mentz after the battle of Hanau, till 
 Ihe army had passed the Rhine. He took part in the 
 campaign of 1814, accompanied Napoleon to Elba, sHared 
 the 100 days wilh him, and going with him to St. Helena, 
 remained with him until his death, after which be re- 
 turned to France. Encyclopaedia Americana. u 
 
 B
 
 14 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1--5. 
 
 changed, in consequence of the letters of Napo- 
 leon. The latter wrote directly to the elector, 
 informing him (as a secret of state intrusted 
 to his honour) that he had deferred his plans 
 against England, and should march immedi- 
 ately with 200,000 men into the heart of Ger- 
 many. " You shall be succoured in time," he 
 sent him word, "and the vanquished house of 
 Austria shall be forced to compose for you a 
 considerable state with the wrecks of its patri- 
 mony." Napoleon made a point of gaining 
 that elector, who had 25,000 well organized 
 soldiers, and magazines, abundantly supplied, 
 in Bavaria. It would be an important advan- 
 tage to snatch these 25,000 soldiers from the 
 coalition, and to secure them for himself. For 
 the rest, the secret was not in danger, for that 
 prince felt a real hatred for the Austrians; 
 and, when once set at ease, he desired no bet- 
 ter than to ally himself with France. 
 
 Napoleon then turned his attention to the 
 army of Italy. He ordered the troops dispersed 
 in Parma, Genoa, Piedmont, and Lombardy, to 
 be assembled under the walls of Verona. He 
 withdrew the command of those troops from 
 Marshal Jourdan, observing the greatest deli- 
 cacy towards that personage, whom he es- 
 teemed, but whose character he deemed un- 
 equal to the circumstances, and who moreover 
 was wholly unacquainted with the country 
 situated between the Po and the Alps. He 
 promised to employ him on the Rhine, where 
 he had always fought, and directed Massena 
 to set off without delay. The distance at 
 which Italy was, caused the divulging of these 
 orders to be attended with little danger, for it 
 could not but be late. 
 
 These dispositions arranged, he devoted the 
 remaining time that he had to pass at Bou- 
 logne in prescribing himself the most minute 
 precautions for securing the flotilla from all 
 attacks on the part of the English. It was na- 
 tural to suppose that they would take advan- 
 tage of the departure of the army to attempt a 
 landing, and to burn the stores accumulated 
 in the basins. Napoleon, who had not re- 
 nounced the intention of returning soon to the 
 coasts of the ocean, after a successful war, 
 and who moreover was most unwilling to ex- 
 pose himself to so mortifying an insult as the 
 burning of the flotilla, enjoined the following 
 precautions to the ministers Decres and Ber- 
 thier. The divisions of Etaples and Vimereux 
 were to be united with those of Boulogne and 
 all placed at the extremity of the basin of the 
 Liane, out of reach of the enemy's projectiles. 
 The same precaution could not be taken for 
 the Dutch flotilla which was at Ambleteuse, 
 but every thing was so arranged that the troops 
 stationed at Boulogne could hasten to that 
 point in two or three hours. Netting of a par- 
 ticular kind, attached to a heavy anchor, pre- 
 vented the introduction of the incendiary ma- 
 chines which might be launched under the 
 form of floating bodies. 
 
 Three entire regiments, including their third 
 battalion, were left at Boulogne. To these 
 were added twelve third battalions of the regi- 
 ments which set out for Germany. The sail- 
 ors belonging to the flotilla were formed into 
 fifteen battalions of a thousand men each. 
 
 They were armed with muskets, and officers 
 of infantry appointed to train them. They 
 were to do duty alternately either on board 
 the vessels continuing afloat, or about those 
 aground in the port This assemblage of land 
 troops and seamen formed a force of thirty-six 
 battalions, commanded by generals and a 
 marshal, Marshal Brune, the same who, in 
 1799, had thrown the Russians and the Eng- 
 lish into the sea. Napoleon gave orders for 
 the construction of entrenchments on land all 
 round Boulogne, to cover the flotilla and the 
 immense magazines which he had formed. 
 He desired that picked officers should be at- 
 tached to each entrenched position, and that 
 they should remain constantly at the same 
 post, in order that, answering for its safety, 
 they might study incessantly to improve its 
 defences. 
 
 He then charged M. Decres to assemble the 
 naval officers, Marshal Berthier to assemble 
 the military officers, to explain to both the im- 
 portance of the post confided to their honour, 
 to console them for being left inactive while 
 their comrades were gone to fight, to promise 
 that they should be employed in their turn, 
 that they should even have before long the 
 glory of concurring in the expedition to Eng 
 land ; for, after punishing the continent for its 
 aggression, Napoleon would come back to 
 the shores of the Channel, perhaps the next 
 spring. 
 
 Napoleon was personally present at the de- 
 parture of all the divisions of the army. It 
 would be difficult to form any conception of 
 their joy, of their ardour, when they learned 
 that they were going to be employed in a great 
 war. It was five years since they had been 
 in battle ; and for two and a half they had 
 been waiting in vain for an opportunity to 
 cross over to England. Old and young sol- 
 diers, become equals from living several years 
 together, confident in their officers, enthusiasts 
 for the chief who was to lead them to victory, 
 hoping for the highest rewards from a system 
 which had raised a fortunate soldier to the 
 throne, full, in short, of the sentiment which 
 at that period had superseded every other, the 
 love of glory all, old and young, ardently 
 longed for war, battles, dangers, and distant 
 expeditions. They had. conquered the Austri- 
 ans, the Prussians, the Russians; they de- 
 spised all the soldiers of Europe, and did not 
 imagine that there was an army in the 
 world capable of resisting them. Broken to 
 fatigue, like real Roman legions, they felt no 
 horror of long marches which were to lead to 
 the conquest of the continent. They set off 
 singing and shouting " Vive VEmpereur!" beg- 
 ging for as speedy a meeting as possible with 
 the enemy. It is true that, in those hearts, 
 boiling over with courage, there was less pure 
 patriotism than in the soldiers of '92 ; there 
 was more ambition, but a noble ambition, that 
 of glory, of rewards legitimately acquired, 
 and a confidence, a contempt of dangers and 
 difficulties, which constitute the soldier des- 
 tined for great things. The volunteers of '92 
 were eager to defend their country against an, 
 unjust invasion ; the veteran soldiers of 1805, 
 to render it the first power in 'he world. Lei
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 15 
 
 us not make a distinction between such senti- 
 ments : it is praiseworthy to hasten to the de- 
 v.nce of one's country when in danger; it is 
 equally praiseworthy to devote one's self that 
 
 may be great and glorious. 
 
 After seeing, with his own eyes, his army 
 commence its march, Napoleon set out from 
 Boulogne, on the 2d of September, and arrived 
 on the 3d at Malmaison. Nobody was in- 
 formed of his resolutions ; he was supposed 
 to be still engaged with his plans against 
 England: people merely felt uneasy respect- 
 ing the intentions of Austria, and they ac- 
 counted for the march of troops which began 
 to be talked of by the mission already pub- 
 lished of a corps of 30,000 men, which was to 
 watch the Austrians on the upper Rhine. 
 
 The public, not correctly acquainted with 
 facts, ignorant to what a point a profound 
 English intrigue had knitted the bonds of a 
 new coalition, censured Napoleon for having 
 pushed Austria to extremity by placing the 
 crown of Italy on his head, uniting Genoa to 
 the Empire, and giving Lucca to the Princess 
 Elisa. They ceased not to admire him; they 
 deemed themselves extremely fortunate in liv- 
 ing under a government so firm, so just, as his ; 
 but they found fault with his excessive fondness 
 for that in which he so highly excelled, his fond- 
 ness for war. No one could believe that he was 
 unfortunate under such a captain ; but people 
 heard talk of Austria, of Russia, of part of 
 Germany being in the pay of England: they 
 knew not whether this new struggle would be 
 of short or long duration, and they recollected 
 involuntarily the distresses of the first wars 
 of the Revolution. Confidence, however, pre- 
 dominated far overall other sentiments ; but 
 a slight murmur of disapprobation, extremely 
 perceptible to the sensitive ears of Napoleon, 
 was nevertheless heard. 
 
 What contributed more particularly to ren- 
 der the sensations experienced by the public 
 the more painful, was the extreme financial 
 embarrassment. It was produced by different 
 causes. Napoleon had persisted in his plan of 
 never borrowing. " While I live," he wrote to 
 M. de Marbois, " I will not issue any paper." 
 (Milan, May 18, 1805.) In fact, the discredit 
 produced by the assignats, the mandats, and 
 ail ihe issues of paper, still continued, and all- 
 powerful, all-dreaded as the Emperor of the 
 French then was, he could not have forced an 
 annuity of 5 francs to be accepted for a capi- 
 tal of more than 50 francs, which would have 
 constituted a loan at 10 per cent. Serious 
 embarrassments, however, resulted from this 
 situation, for the wealthiest country could not 
 defray the expenses of war without throwing 
 part of them upon the future. 
 
 We have already explained the state of the 
 budgets. That of the year XII. (September, 
 1803 to September, 1804,) estimated at 700 
 millions, exclusive of the costs of collection, 
 had amounted to 762. Fortunately, the taxes 
 had received from the public prosperity, which 
 war did not interrupt under this powerful go- 
 vernment, an increase of about 40 millions. 
 The produce of the registration amounted to 
 18 millions, that of the customs to 16; in this 
 increase of the revenue, there was still a defi- 
 
 cit of 20 and odd millions to be provided 
 for. 
 
 The ways and means of the year XIII. (Sep- 
 tember, 1804 to September, 1805,) which ended 
 at this moment, exhibited a still greater defi- 
 ciency. The naval works were partly finished : 
 it had been at first thought that the expenses 
 of this year might be considerably reduced. 
 Though those of the year XII. amounted to 
 762 millions, it was hoped that the year XIII. 
 would not require more than 684 millions. 
 But the past months exhibited thus far a 
 monthly expenditure of about 60 millions, 
 which supposed a yearly expenditure of 720. 
 To meet this there were the taxes and the ex- 
 traordinary resources. The taxes, which pro- 
 duced 500 millions in 1801, had risen, by the 
 mere effect of the general wealth and without 
 any change in the tariffs, to a produce of 560 
 millions. The indirect contributions recently 
 established having yielded this year very 
 nearly 25 millions, the voluntary donations of 
 the communes and departments, converted 
 into additional centimes, furnishing very little 
 short of 20 millions more, the permanent re- 
 venue had reached 600 millions. It was ne- 
 cessary, therefore, to find 120 millions to 
 complete the budget of the year XIII. The 
 Italian subsidy of 22 millions would supply a 
 part; but then the Spanish subsidy of 48 mil- 
 lions had ceased in December, 1804, in conse- 
 quence of the brutal declaration of war which 
 England had issued against Spain. The lat- 
 ter, thenceforward serving the common cause 
 by her fleets, had no longer to serve it by her 
 finances. The American fund, the price of 
 Louisiana, was consumed. To supply the 
 place of these resources, there had been added 
 to the Italian subsidy of 22 millions a sum of 
 36 millions in new securities, a species of loan, 
 the mechanism of which we have explained 
 elsewhere; then, an alienation of national 
 domains to the amount of 20 millions; and 
 lastly, some reimbursements due from Pied- 
 mont and amounting to 6 millions. The 
 whole made, with the ordinary imposts, 684 
 millions. From 36 to 40 millions more were 
 therefore wanting to reach 720. 
 
 Thus there was an arrear of 20 millions for 
 the year XII. and of 40 for the year XIII. But 
 this was not all. The accounts, being still in 
 a crude state, did not exhibit, as they now do, 
 all the facts at a glance: there had just been 
 discovered some balances of expenses not 
 discharged, and some deficiencies in the re- 
 ceipts belonging to the service of preceding 
 years, which constituted a further charge of 
 about 20 millions. On adding all these defi- 
 cits, 20 millions for the year XII., 40 for the 
 year XIII., 20 recently discovered, one migh r 
 estimate at about 80 millions the arrear that 
 began to accrue since the renewal of the war 
 
 Various means had been employed to pro- 
 vide for it. In the first place, a debt had been 
 incurred with the Sinking Fund. The securi- 
 ties, of which a resource had been made, ought 
 to have been repaid to that fund at the rate of 
 5 millions per annum. It ought to have been 
 paid at the rate of 10 millions per annum, for 
 the 70 millions' worth of national domains 
 which the law of the year IX. had assigned to
 
 16 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1805 
 
 it, to compensate the augtnenta:ion of the 
 public debt. It had not been paid either of 
 these two sums. It is true that security had 
 been given for them in national domains, and 
 that it was not a very importunate creditor. 
 The Treasury owed it about 30 millions at the 
 end of the year XIII. (September, 1805.) 
 
 Some other resources had been found in 
 various improvements introduced into the ser- 
 vice of the Treasury. If the state did not in- 
 spire in general any great confidence in finan- 
 cial matters, certain agents of the finances 
 inspired much within the sphere of their offi- 
 cial duties. Thus the central cashier of the 
 Treasury, established in Paris, superintending 
 all the remittances of funds between Paris and 
 the provinces, issued bills upon himself or 
 upon accountable persons, his correspondents, 
 which were always paid in the open office ; 
 because the payments were made, even amidst 
 those interruptions, with perfect punctuality. 
 This species of bank had been able to put into 
 circulation not less than 15 millions in bills 
 taken as ready money. 
 
 Lastly, a real melioration in the service of 
 the receivers-general had procured a resource 
 of nearly the like amount. For the direct 
 contributions imposed upon land and build- 
 ings, the value of which was known before- 
 hand, and the payment fixed like a rent, the 
 persons accountable were required to subscribe 
 bills payable month by month into their chest, 
 by the oft-mentioned title of Obligations of the 
 receivers-general. But, for the indirect contribu- 
 tions, discharged irregularly, in proportion to 
 the consumption or the transactions upon 
 which they were imposed, it was necessary to 
 wait till the produce was realized, before draw- 
 ing upon the receivers-general what were called 
 Bills at sight. Thus they enjoyed this part of 
 the funds of the state for about fifty days. It 
 was settled that, in future, the Treasury should 
 draw upon them in advance, and every month, 
 orders for two-thirds of the known amount of 
 the indirect contributions (that amount was 
 190 millions;) that the last third should re- 
 main in their hands to meet the variations of 
 ther eturns, and should be remitted to the 
 Treasury only in the old accustomed form of 
 Bills at sight. This more prompt payment of 
 part of the funds of the state was equivalent 
 to an aid of about 15 millions. 
 
 Thus by running into debt with the Sinking 
 Fund, by creating the bills of the central 
 cashier of the Treasury, by accelerating cer- 
 tain returns, there had been found resources 
 for about GO millions. Taking the deficit at 
 80 or 90, there would still be wanting about 
 30 millions. This had been supplied either 
 by means uf arrears with the contractors, that 
 is to say with the famous company of the 
 United Merchants, whose supplies were not 
 punctually paid for, or by discounting a larger 
 amount in obligations of the receivers-general than 
 ougm to have been done. 
 
 Napoleon, who was unwilling to enter too 
 far into this system of arrear, had devised, 
 while in Italy, an operation, which, according 
 to him, had nothing of the nature of a paper 
 currency. Of the 300 or 400 millions' worth 
 of national domains remainir^ in 1800, no- 
 
 thing was left in 1805; not that the whole of 
 that valuable resource had been expended, 
 but, on the contrary, because, with the view to 
 its preservation, it had been applied to the en- 
 dowment of the Sinking Fund, the Senate, the 
 Legion of Honour, the Invalides, and the Pub- 
 lic Instruction. The few portions which were 
 still seen figuring in the budgets composed a 
 last remnant which was assigned to the Sink- 
 ing Fund, in discharge of what was owing and 
 of what was not paid to it. Napoleon had an 
 idea to take back from the Legion of Honour 
 and the Senate the national domains which he 
 lad assigned to them, to give them rentes in- 
 stead, and to dispose of those domains for an 
 operation with the contractors. Accordingly, 
 entes were actually delivered to the Senate 
 and the Legion of Honour in exchange for 
 their immovables. For an income of 1000 
 francs in land there was granted them a reve- 
 nue of 1720 francs in rentes; in order to com- 
 pensate the difference between the price of 
 the one and the other. The Senate and the 
 Legion of Honour thus gained a considerable 
 increase of their annual income. Possession 
 was again taken of the national domains, and 
 they began to be disposed of to the contractors 
 at a price agreed upon. The latter, obliged to 
 borrow of capitalists, who lent them funds for 
 which they had no occasion, found in the im- 
 movables a pledge by the aid of which they 
 obtaided credit and procured the means of 
 continuing their service. It was the Sinking 
 Fund to which this whole operation was com- 
 mitted, and which took from the redeemed 
 rentes the sum necessary for indemnifying the 
 Senate and the Legion of Honour. The 
 state, in its turn, was obliged to indemnify it 
 by creating for its profit a sum in rentes cor- 
 responding to that of which it had deprived 
 itself. It was with these various expedients, 
 some of them legitimate, as the improvements 
 of service, others injurious, as the delays of 
 payment to the contractors, and the resump- 
 tion of the domains given to different esta- 
 blishments it was with these expedients, we 
 say, that means were found to supply the de- 
 ficit produced during the last two years. At 
 the present day, the floating debt which is 
 provided for with Ports royaux would permit a 
 charge four or five times as considerable to be 
 contracted. 
 
 All this w.ould have produced but a mode- 
 rate embarrassment, if the state of commerce 
 had been good; but that was not the case. 
 The French merchants, in 1802, reckoning 
 upon the duration of the maritime peace, had 
 embarked in considerable speculations, and 
 sent out goods to all countries. The violent 
 conduct of England, rushing upon our flag 
 before the declaration of war, had caused them 
 immense losses. Many houses had concealed 
 their distress, and, making up their minds to 
 great sacrifices, assisting each other wilh their 
 credit, had got over the first blow. But the 
 new shock resulting from the continental war 
 could not fail to complete their ruin. Bank- 
 ruptcies began already to take place in the 
 principal commercial towns, and produced 
 there general distress. This was not the sole 
 cause of the stagnation of business. Ever
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 17 
 
 since the fall < f the assignats, specie, though 
 it soon made its appearance again, had always 
 been insufficient, owing to a cause easy of com- 
 prehension. Paper money, though discredited 
 from the very first day of its issue, had never- 
 theless performed the service of specie for 
 some part of the exchanges, and had driven 
 part of the metallic currencies out of France. 
 The public prosperity, suddenly restored under 
 the Consulate, had not lasted long enough to 
 bring hack the gold and silver which had been 
 carried out of the country. The want of it 
 was felt in all sorts of transactions. To pro- 
 cure it was at this period one of the incessant 
 cares of commerce. The bank of France, 
 which had acquired rapid prosperity, because 
 it furnished by means of its perfectly ac- 
 credited notes a supplementary currency 
 the bank of France had the greatest difficulty 
 to keep in its coffers a metallic reserve pro- 
 portioned to the issue of its notes. For this 
 purpose, it had made praiseworthy efforts and 
 drawn from Spain a prodigious sum in dollars. 
 Unluckily, a drain, then opened for specie, 
 carried it away as fast as it was brought in : 
 this was the payment for colonial produce. 
 Formerly, that is to say in 1788 and 1789, 
 when we possessed St. Domingo, France 
 drew from her colonies sugar, coffee, and 
 other colonial productions to the amount of 
 220 million francs, of which she consumed 
 70 or 80 millions' worth and exported as 
 much as 150, particularly in the form of re- 
 fined sugar. If we consider the difference in 
 the value of all things, a difference not less 
 than double, between that time and the pre- 
 sent, we shall conceive what an immense 
 source of prosperity was dried up. It was 
 necessary to go abroad for what we wanted, 
 and to receive from our very enemies the 
 colonial commodities which, twenty years 
 before, we sold to all Europe. A considerable 
 portion of our specie was carried to Ham- 
 burg, Amsterdam, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, 
 Trieste, to pay for the sugar and coffee which 
 the English introduced there by means of the | 
 free trade or by smuggling. To Italy was i 
 sent much more than the 22 millions paid us 
 by that country. All the mercantile men of 
 the time complained of this state of things, i 
 and this subject was daily discussed at the 
 bank by the most enlightened men of business 
 in France. 
 
 It was to Spain that all Europe was accus- j 
 tomed to apply for the metals. That cele- j 
 brated nation, for which Columbus had pro- 
 cured ages of wealthy and fatal sloth by open- 
 ing to it the mines of America, had suffered 
 itself to run in debt through ignorance and 
 negligence. The calamities of war were 
 added to a vicious administration ; it was 
 then the most distressed of powers, and ex- 
 hibited that so melancholy spectacle in all 
 cases, of opulence reduced to poverty. The 
 loss of the galleons, intercepted by the English 
 cruisers, was felt not only by Spain hut by all 
 Europe. Though the export of dollars was j 
 prohibited in the Peninsula, yet France con- j 
 trived to extract them by smuggling, thanks ' 
 to a long contiguity of territory, and neigh- : 
 touring countries frequently car ied them out i 
 
 VOL. II. 3 
 
 of France by the same means. This contra- 
 band trade was as solidly established and as 
 widely extended as a lawful traffic. But at 
 this period it was much obstructed by the in- 
 terruption of the arrivals from America, and 
 it is a singular fact that England herself suf- 
 fered from that cause. The money hoarded in 
 the cellars of the Spanish governors of Mexico 
 and Peru, ceased to come either to Cadiz or 
 Bayonne, to London or Paris. England was in 
 want of the metals for all purposes, but par- 
 ticularly for the payment of the European 
 coalition; for the colonial produce and other 
 merchandise with which she supplied either 
 Russia or Austria no longer sufficed to dis- 
 charge the subsidies which she had engaged 
 to pay them. Pitt had himself alleged this 
 reason for contesting with the coalesced pow- 
 ers part of the sums which they demanded. 
 After giving for next to nothing enormous 
 quantities of sugar and coffee to the allies, 
 the British cabinet sent them notes of the 
 bank of England. Some were actually found 
 in the hands of Austrian officers. 
 
 Such were the principal causes of the com- 
 mercial and financial distress. If the compa- 
 ny of United Merchants, which then transacted 
 all the business of the Treasury, supply of 
 provisions, discount of obligations, discount of 
 Spanish subsidy, had confined itself to the ser- 
 vice which it had undertaken, it might, though 
 not without difficulty, have supported the bur- 
 den. It could no longer get the obligations of 
 the receivers-general discounted at one half per 
 cent, per month (6 per cent, per annum) ; it 
 was as much as it could do to find capitalists 
 who discounted them for itself at three quar- 
 ters per cent, per month (9 per cent, per an- 
 num,) which exposed it to an enormous loss. 
 The Treasury, it is true, entered into an agree- 
 ment with it, and, by indemnifying it for the 
 usury practised by the capitalists, would have 
 had means to facilitate the countinuance of its 
 service. But its chief director, M. Ouvrard, 
 had based on this situation an immense plan, 
 certainly very ingenious, and which would 
 have been very advantageous too, if this plan 
 had combined with the merit of invention the 
 still more necessary merit of accurate calcula- 
 tion. As we have seen, the three contractors 
 forming the company of United Merchants had 
 divided the parts among them. M. Desprez, 
 formerly a cashier to a banker, enriched by 
 his extraordinary skill in the traffic in paper, 
 was charged with the discount of the paper of 
 the Treasury. To M. Vanlerberghe, whc was 
 thoroughly acquainted with the corn trade, 
 was assigned the supply of provisions. M. 
 Ouvrard, the boldest of the three, the most fer- 
 tile in resources, had reserved the grand spe- 
 culations for himself. Having accepted from 
 France the paper with which Spain paid her sub- 
 sidy, and promised to discount it, which had se- 
 duced M. de Marbois, he conceived the idea 
 of forming a great connection with Spain, the 
 mistress of Mexico and Peru, from whos" 
 hands issued the metals, the object of univer- 
 sal ambition. He had gone to Madrid, where 
 he found a court saddened by the war, by the 
 yellow fever, by a frightfifl dearth, and by the 
 importunate demands of Napoleon, whos; 
 B 2
 
 18 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1805. 
 
 debtor it was. Nothing of all this appeared to 
 surprise or to embarrass M. Ouvrard. He had 
 charmed by his ease, by his assurance, the old 
 people who reigned at theEscurial, as he had 
 charmed M. de Marbois by procuring for him the 
 resources that he could not procure for himself. 
 He had at first offered to pay the subsidy due 
 to France for the end of 1803 and for the 
 whole of the year 1804, which was a first re- 
 lief that came very seasonably. He had then 
 furnished several immediate aids in money, 
 of which the court was in urgent need. He 
 had undertaken, moreover, to ship corn for the 
 Spanish ports, and to procure for the Spanish 
 squadrons provisions which they were in want 
 of. All these services had been accepted with 
 cordial acknowledgments. M. Ouvrard wrote 
 immediately to Paris, and through M. de Mar- 
 bois, whose favour he possessed, he had ob- 
 tained the permission usually refused to export 
 from France some cargoes of wheat to Spain. 
 These sudden arrivals had stopped the mo- 
 nopolizing of corn in the ports of the Peninsula, 
 and, by putting an end to the dearth, which 
 consisted rather in a fictitious elevation of 
 prices than in the scarcity of grain, M. Ouv- 
 rard had relieved, as by enchantment, the se- 
 verest distresses of the Spanish people. This 
 was more than enough to seduce and to capti- 
 vate the not very clear-sighted administrators 
 of Spain. 
 
 It will naturally be asked with what resources 
 could the court of Madrid pay M. Ouvrard for 
 all the services which it received from him. 
 The means were simple. M. Ouvrard desired 
 that the privilege of bringing over dollars from 
 Mexico should be granted to him. He actually 
 obtained the privilege of shipping them from 
 the Spanish colonies, at the rate of 3 francs 
 % 75 centimes, while in France, in Holland, in 
 Spain, they were worth 5 francs at least. This 
 was an extraordinary profit, but assuredly well 
 deserved, if M. Ouvrard could contrive to 
 elude the British cruisers, and to transport 
 from the new world to the old those metals 
 which had become so precious. Spain, which 
 was sinking under her distresses, was ex- 
 tremely happy to realize three-fourths of her 
 treasures with the sacrifice of the other fourth. 
 It is not always that the sons of indolent and 
 prodigal families make such advantageous 
 bargains with the stewards who pay ransom 
 for their prodigality. 
 
 But how bring over these dollars in spite of 
 Pitt and the English fleets ? M. Ouvrard was 
 not more embarrassed by this difficulty than by 
 the others. He conceived the idea of making 
 use of Pitt himself by means of the most sin- 
 gular of combinations. There were Dutch 
 houses, particularly that of Hope & Co., which 
 had establishments both in Holland and Eng- 
 land. He devised the scheme of selling them 
 r.he Spanish dollars at a price which still en- 
 sured a considerable profit to his company. It 
 w?s for these houses to persuade Mr. Pitt to 
 allow them to come from Mexico. As Pitt 
 was in want of them for his own purposes, 
 it was possible that he would permit a certain 
 sum to pass, although he knew that he was to 
 share it with his enemies. It was a kind of 
 tacit contract, which the Dutch houses in part- 
 
 nership with English houses were to nego- 
 tiate. Experience subsequently proved that 
 this contract was practicable for part, if not 
 for the whole. M. Ouvrard had also an idea 
 of employing American houses, which, with 
 his delegation, and thanks to the neutral flag, 
 could go and ship the dollars in the Spanish 
 colonies and carry them to Europe. But the 
 question was to ascertain how many of these 
 dollars Pitt would suffer to be brought, and how 
 many the Americans could bring by favour of 
 their neutrality. If there had been time, such 
 a speculation might have succeeded, have ren- 
 dered important services to France and Spain, 
 and afforded the company abundant and legiti- 
 mate profits. Unfortunately, the necessities 
 were extremely urgent. Out of an arrear of 
 80 or 90 millions, which the French Treasury 
 was obliged to meet with expedients, there 
 were about 30 millions which it owed to the 
 company of United Merchants, and which it paid 
 with immovables. It had, therefore to bear 
 this first charge. It had, moreover, to furnish 
 this same French Treasury with the amount 
 for a year at least of the Spanish subsidy ; that 
 is to say from 40 to 50 millions; it had to dis- 
 count for it the obligations of the receivers-gene- 
 ral ; it had, lastly, to pay for the corn sent to 
 the ports of the Peninsula and the provisions 
 procured for the Spanish fleets. This was a 
 situation which would not permit the compa- 
 ny to await the success of hazardous and dis- 
 tant speculations. Until that success it was 
 obliged to live by expedients. It had pawned 
 to lenders the immovables received in pay- 
 ment. Having contrived, thanks to the com- 
 plaisance of M. de Marbois, to gain almost 
 complete possession of the portfolio of the 
 Treasury, it extracted from it handfuls of obli- 
 gations of the receivers-general, which it placed in 
 the hands of capitalists, lending their money 
 on pledge at usurious interest. It got part 
 of these same obligations discounted by the 
 Bank of France, which, induced by its inti- 
 mate connection with the government, refused 
 nothing that was applied for in behalf of the 
 public service. The company received the 
 amount of these discounts in bank notes, 
 and the situation then resolved itself into an 
 issue, more considerable from day to day, of 
 these bank notes. But, the metallic reserve 
 not increasing in proportion to the mass of 
 notes issued,, the consequence was a positive 
 danger; and it was the bank, in reality, which 
 had to sustain the weight of everybody's em- 
 barrassments. Hence voices were raised in 
 the bosom of the council of regency, requiring 
 that a stop should be put to the assistance 
 granted to M. Desprez, representing the com- 
 pany of the United Merchants. But other voices, 
 less prudent and more patriotic, that of M. 
 Peregaux in particular, declared against such 
 a proposal, and caused the assistance applied 
 for by M. Desprez to be granted. 
 
 The French Treasury, the Spanish Treasury, 
 the company of United Merchants, which served 
 to link them together, were like embarrassed 
 houses, which lend each other their signature 
 and assist one another with a credit which 
 they do not possess. But, it must be confessed 
 the French Treasury was the least cramped
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 19 
 
 of these three associated houses, and it was 
 least liable to suffer much from such a part- 
 nership ; for, in reality, it was with its sole 
 resources, that is to say, with the obligations of 
 the receivers-general discounted by the bank, that 
 all demands were met, and that the Spanish 
 armies as well as the French armies were fed. 
 For the rest, the secret of this extraordinary 
 situation was not known. The partners of M. 
 Ouvrard, whose engagements with him have 
 never been clearly denned, though those en- 
 gagements have been the subject of long legal 
 proceedings, knew not themselves the full ex- 
 tent of the burden that was about to crush 
 them. Finding themselves already much 
 cramped, they called loudly for M. Ouvrard, ; 
 and induced M. Marbois to order his imme- ; 
 diate return to Paris. M. de Marbois, not very 
 capable of judging with his eyes of all the ! 
 details of a vast management of funds, de- 
 ceived moreover by a dishonest clerk, had no 
 suspicion to what an extent the resources of | 
 the Treasury were abandoned to the company. 
 Napoleon himself, though he extended his in- 1 
 defatigable vigilance to every thing, perceiving j 
 in the services a real deficit of no more than 
 about 60 millions, which .could be supplied ' 
 with national domains and different expe- 
 dients, ignorant of the confusion which had 
 crept in between the operations of the Trea- 
 sury and those of the United Merchants, was not 
 aware of the real cause of the embarrassments 
 and uneasiness that began to be felt. He 
 attributed the pressure prevailing everywhere 
 to the false speculations of French commerce, 
 to the usury which the possessors of capital 
 strove to practise, and railed against men of 
 business nearly in the same manner as he 
 railed against ideologues, when he met with 
 ideas that displeased him. Be this as it may, 
 he would not suffer objections to the execution 
 of his orders to be drawn from this state of 
 things. He had demanded 12 millions in specie 
 at Strasburg, and demanded them so impera- 
 tively that recourse was had to extreme means 
 to procure them. He had required 10 more 
 millions in Italy, and the company, obliged 
 to buy them at Hamburg, transmitted them 
 to Milan either in specie or in gold, across 
 the Rhine and the Alps. Besides, Napoleon 
 reckoned upon having struck such blows in 
 fifteen or twenty days, as to put an end to all 
 embarrassments. 
 
 These resources obtained rightly or wrongly 
 from the Treasury, he turned his attention to 
 the conscription and the organization of the! 
 reserve. The annual contingent was then 
 divided into two halves of 30,000 men each, 
 the first called into active service, the second j 
 left in the bosom of the population, but liable ! 
 to be called to join the army on the mere sum- j 
 rnons of the government. There was still left 
 a great part of the contingent of the years, 
 IX., X., XL, XII., and XIII. 
 
 These were grown men, whom the govern- 
 ment could dispose of by decree. Napoleon 
 called them all, but he determined also to 
 anticipate the levy of the year XIV., compre- 
 hending the individuals who would attain the 
 required age between the 23d of September, 
 1805, and the 23d of September, 1806; and as 
 
 the use of the Gregorian calendar was to be 
 resumed on the 1st of the following January, 
 he directed the young men who would attain 
 the legal age between the 23d of September 
 and the 31st of December, 1806, to be included 
 in this levy. He resolved therefore to comprise 
 in a single levy of fifteen months all the con- 
 scripts to whom the law should be applicable 
 from the month of September, 1805, to the 
 month of December, 1806. This measure 
 would furnish him with 80,000 men, the last 
 of whom would not have completely attained 
 the age of twenty years. But he had no inten- 
 tion of employing them immediately in mili- 
 tary service. He purposed to prepare them 
 for the profession of arms by placing them in 
 the third battalions, which composed the depot 
 of each regiment. These men would thus 
 have a year or two as well to acquire instruc- 
 tion as to gain their full strength, and would 
 form, in fifteen or eighteen months, excellent 
 soldiers, almost as well trained as those of the 
 camp of Boulogne. This was a combination 
 beneficial at once for the health of the men 
 and for their military instruction ; for the con- 
 script of twenty, if sent immediately into the 
 field, is soon in the hospital. But this combi- 
 nation was practicable only for a government 
 which, having an army completely organized 
 to meet the enemy with, had no need of the 
 annual contingent but by way of a reserve. 
 
 The Legislative Body not being assembled, 
 time must have been lost in calling it together. 
 Napoleon would not consent to such a delay, 
 and conceived the idea of addressing himself 
 to the Senate, on the ground of two motives: 
 the first, the irregularity of a contingent which 
 comprised more than twelve months and some 
 conscripts under twenty years of age; the 
 second, the urgency of the circumstances. It 
 was overstepping the bounds of legality to act 
 in this manner, for the Senate could not vote 
 either any contribution in money or any con- 
 tribution in men. It was invested with func- 
 tions of a different order, such as to prevent 
 the adoption of unconstitutional laws, to fill up 
 gaps in the Constitution, and to watch the acts 
 of the government having an arbitrary taint. 
 To the Legislative Body belonged exclusively 
 the voting of imposts and levies of men. It 
 was a fault to violate that Constitution already 
 too flexible, and to render it a great deal too 
 illusory, by neglecting so easily to observe its 
 forms. It was another fault, not to be more 
 sparing of the employment of the Senate, which 
 had been made the ordinary resource in all 
 difficult cases, and to indicate but too clearly 
 that more dependence was placed on its doci- 
 lity than on that of the Legislative Body. The 
 Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, who disliked ex 
 cesses of power that were not indispensable, 
 made these remarks, and maintained that it 
 was necessary, at least for the observance of 
 forms, to attribute by an organic measure the 
 vote of the contingents to the Senate. Napo- 
 leon, who, without despising the views of pru- 
 dence, deferred them to another time when he 
 was in a hurry, would neither lay down a 
 general rule nor postpone the levy of the con 
 tingent. In consequence, he ordered a senatus 
 consultum grounded on two extraordinary
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept 1805 
 
 considerations to be prepared: those consi- 
 derations were the irregularity of the con- 
 tingent, embracing more than an entire year, 
 and the urgency of the circumstances, which 
 would not admit of the delay required for as- 
 sembling the Legislative Body. 
 
 He thought, also, of having recourse to the 
 national guards, instituted by virtue of the 
 laws of 1790, 1791, and 1795. This third 
 coalition having all the characteristics of the 
 two former, though times were changed, though 
 Europe was less adverse to the principles of 
 France, but much more to her greatness, he 
 conceived that the nation owed its government 
 a concurrence as energetic, as unanimous, as 
 formerly. He could not expect ardour, for the 
 revolutionary enthusiasm no longer existed; 
 but he could reckon upon perfect submission 
 to the law on the part of the citizens, and on a 
 deep sense of honour in such of them as the 
 law should summon. He therefore ordered 
 the reorganization of the national guards, but 
 aimed at the same time to render them more 
 obedient and more soldier-like. To this end, 
 he caused a senatus consultum to be prepared, 
 authorizing their reorganization by imperial 
 decrees. He resolved to reserve for himself 
 the nomination of the officers, and to collect in 
 the chasseur and grenadier companies the 
 youngest and most warlike portion of the popu- 
 lation. This he destined for the defence of 
 fortresses, and for occasional assemblages at 
 threatened points, such as Boulogne, Antwerp, 
 La Vendee. 
 
 These different elements were disposed of 
 in the following manner. Nearly 200,000 
 soldiers were marching to Germany ; 70,000 
 defended Italy; twenty-one battalions of in- 
 fantry, and more than fifteen battalions of sea- 
 men guarded Boulogne. We have already 
 Feen that the regiments were composed of 
 three battalions, two for war, one for the depot, 
 the latter charged to receive sick and con- 
 valescent soldiers, and to train the conscripts. 
 A certain number of these third battalions had 
 already been stationed at Boulogne. All the 
 others were distributed from Mayence to Stras- 
 burg. Towards these three points were di- 
 rected the men remaining to be levied for the 
 years IX.,X.,XL, XII., and XIII., and the 80,000 
 conscripts for 1806. They were to be incor- 
 porated with the third battalions, in order to be 
 trained and to acquire their full strength. The 
 oldest, when they should be formed, were after- 
 wards to be organized into marching corps, 
 for filling the gaps which war should have j 
 made in the ranks of the army. This would , 
 be a reserve of 150,000 men, at least, guarding 
 the frontier, and serving to recruit the corps. 
 The national guards, supporting this reserve, 
 were to be organized in the North and the 
 
 1 KEM.ERMANN. The elder, Duke of Valmy, Marshal 
 and I'eer of France. Born at Strasburg. in 1735, entered 
 the Conflans legion ag a hussar in 1752, and performed in 
 it the first campaigns of the Seven Years' war. He went 
 through all ihe grades of service up to the rank of mar- 
 shal de camp. At the breaking out of the Revolution, he 
 look the patriotic side, arid distinguished himself so much 
 that he received a civic crown from the citizens of Lan- 
 dau. Al the commencement of the war he received the 
 ommaml of the army of the Moselle, formed a junction 
 
 West, to be in readiness to hasten to the 
 coasts, and in particular to repair to Boulogne 
 and Antwerp, if the English should attempt to 
 burn the flotilla, or to destroy the docks con- 
 structed on the Scheldt. Marshal Brune had 
 already been appointed to command at Bou- 
 logne. Marshal Lefebvre was to command at 
 Mayence, Marshal Kellermann 1 at Strasburg. 
 These nominations attested the admirable tact 
 of Napoleon. Marshal Brune had a reputa- 
 tion acquired in 1799, by having repulsed a 
 descent of the Russians and English. Marshals 
 Lefebvre and Kellermann, old soldiers, who 
 had been rewarded for their services by a 
 place in the Senate and the honorary baton of 
 marshal, were capable of superintending the 
 organization of the reserve, while their younger 
 companions in arms were engaged in active 
 warfare. . They gave occasion, at the same 
 time, to an infringement of the law which for- 
 bade senators to hold public appointments 
 This law was extremely displeasing to the 
 Senate, and it was very ingeniously evaded 
 by calling some of its members to train the 
 rear-guard of the national defence. 
 
 These arrangements completed, Napoleon 
 directed the measures just enumerated to be 
 carried to the Senate, and presented them him- 
 self in an imperial sitting held at the Luxem- 
 bourg on the 23d of September. He there 
 spoke, in firm and precise terms, of the conti- 
 nental war, which had come upon him una- 
 wares, while he was engaged with the expedition 
 against England, of the explanations demanded 
 from Austria, of the ambiguous answers of 
 that court, of its now demonstrated falsehoods, 
 since its armies had passed the Inn on the 8th 
 of September, at the moment when it was 
 most strongly protesting its love of peace. He 
 appealed to the attachment of France, and 
 promised to have soon annihilated the new co- 
 alition. The senators gave him strong tokens 
 of assent, though, in the bottom of their hearts, 
 they attributed the new continental war to the 
 incorporations of states which had been ef- 
 fected in Italy. In the streets through which 
 the imperial train had to pass, from the Lux- 
 embourg to the Tuileries, the popular enthu- 
 siasm, damped by distress, was less expressive 
 than usual. Napoleon perceived and was 
 piqued at it, and expressed some vexation to 
 the Arch-Chancellor Cambaceres. He regarded 
 it as an injustice done him by the people of 
 Paris; hut ft seemed to inspire him with a de- 
 termination to excite, before long, shouts of 
 enthusiasm louder and more vehement than 
 had yet rung so frequently in his ears; and he 
 turned his thoughts, which had not time to 
 dwell upon any subject, to the events that 
 were preparing on the banks of the Danube. 
 In haste to depart, he made a regulation for the 
 
 in September with the main army of Diimouriez, and 
 sustained, September 20, 1793, the celebrated attack of the 
 Duke of Brunswick. The cannonade of Valmy caused 
 the allies to retreat, and decided the fate of Europe till 
 1813. After the 18ih Brumaire, he was made a senator 
 of France by Napoleon, and a marshal of France on the 
 first creation of that dignity. He must not be confounded 
 with his son, the younger Kellermann, who won the 
 battle of Marengo by a brilliant but unrewarded charge 
 of cavalry. Encyclopedia dincricavi. H.
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 organization of the government in his absence. 
 His brother Joseph was appointed president 
 of the Senate; his brother Louis, in quality of 
 constable, was to attend to the levies of men 
 and the formation of the national guards. The 
 Arch-Chancellor Cambaceres was intrusted 
 with the presidency of the Council of State. 
 All matters of business were to be discussed 
 in a council composed of the ministers and j 
 the grand dignitaries, under the presidency of 
 the Grand-Elector Joseph. It was setiled thai | 
 couriers, despatched every day, should carry ! 
 to Napoleon a report on every affair, with the 
 personal opinion of the Arch-Chancellor Cam- 
 baceres. The latter, apprehensive lest Joseph 
 Bonaparte, presiding over the council of the 
 government, might be hurt at this allotment 
 of the part of supreme critic to one of the 
 members of that council, made an observation 
 on the subject to Napoleon ; but Napoleon 
 suddenly interrupted him, declaring that he 
 would not deprive himself of the aid of most 
 valuable abilities to humour any man's vanity. 
 He persisted. His decisions were to be trans- 
 mitted to Paris after he had received the report 
 sent by the arch-chancellor. It was only in 
 urgent cases that the council was authorized 
 not to wait for the decision of the Emperor, 
 and to issue orders which each minister was 
 to execute on his personal responsibility. Thus 
 Napoleon reserved to himself the decision of 
 all matters even during his absence, and made 
 the Arch-Chancellor Cambaceres the eye of his 
 government, while he was far away from the 
 centre of the empire. 
 
 All about him witnessed his departure with 
 sorrow. They knew not yet the secret of his 
 genius ; they were not aware how much he 
 would shorten the war. They feared that it 
 might be long, and they were sure that it would 
 be bloody. They asked themselves what would 
 be the lot of France, if that head should 
 chance to be struck by the bullet that pierced 
 the breast of Turenne, or the ball that fractured 
 the skull of Charles XII. 1 Besides, all who 
 approached him, abrupt and absolute as he 
 was, could not help loving him. It was, there- 
 fore, with deep regret that they saw him de- 
 part. He consented to be accompanied as far 
 as Strasburg by the empress, who was the 
 more strongly attached to him the more fear 
 she felt about the duration of her union with 
 him. He took with him Marshal Berthier, 
 leaving orders for M. de Talleyrand, with a 
 few clerks, to follow the head-quarters at a 
 certain distance. Setting out from Paris on 
 the 24th, Napoleon arrived at Strasburg on the 
 26th. 
 
 To the great astonishment of Europe, the 
 army, which twenty days before was on the 
 
 1 TOLSTOY, COUNT. A Russian general of some ability. 
 He served throughout all the wars of this period, and was 
 severely defeated by St. Cyr before Dresden, in 1813. Ali- 
 ton's Hutory of Europe. H. 
 
 2 KUTUSOF, GOLENISCHITSCHOFF, PRINCE SMOLEN8- 
 
 KY. A Russian field-marshal, born 1745; entered the 
 army in 1759; served in Poland from 1764 to 1769, and 
 afterwards against the Turks under RomanzofT. In 1788, 
 he was wounded near the right eye at the siege of Ocza- 
 kov, having been appointed governor of the Crimea the 
 year before. He assisted the Prince of Coburg to gain 
 
 shores of the Ocean, was already in the heart 
 of Germany, on the banks of the Mayn, the 
 Neckar, and the Rhine. Never had march 
 more secret, more rapid, been performed in 
 any age. The heads of columns got sight of 
 each other everywhere, at Wiirzburg, at May- 
 ence, at Strasburg. The joy of the soldiers 
 was at its height, and when they beheld Na- 
 poleon, they greeted him with shouts a thou- 
 sand times repeated of " Vive L'Empereur!" 
 That innumerable multitude of troops, in- 
 fantry, artillery, cavalry, suddenly collected; 
 those convoys of provisions, of ammunition, 
 formed in haste ; those long files of horses 
 bought in Switzerland and in Suabia; in short, 
 all these movements of an army that was not 
 expected a few days before, and which had 
 suddenly made its appearance, presented an 
 unparalleled spectacle, heightened by a mili- 
 tary court, at once stern and brilliant, and by 
 an immense concourse of persons curious to 
 see the Emperor of the French setting out for 
 war. 
 
 The coalition had hastened on its parts, but 
 it was not so well prepared as Napoleon, nor 
 above all so active, though animated by the 
 most ardent passions. It had been agreed be- 
 tween the coalesced powers that they should 
 march their principal forces towards the Dan- 
 ube before winter, that Napoleon might not be 
 able to take advantage of the difficulty of the 
 communications during the bad season for 
 crushing Austria separated from her allies. 
 All the orders of the movement had, therefore, 
 been given for the end of August and the 
 beginning of September. In acting thus, the 
 allies expected to be far in the advance of 
 Napoleon, and flattered themselves that they 
 should have it in their power to commence 
 hostilities at any moment which they should 
 deem most seasonable. They had no concep- 
 tion that they should find the French trans- 
 ported so suddenly to the theatre of war. 
 
 A Russian force was collecting at Revel, 
 and embarked in the first days of September 
 for Stralsund. It was composed of 16,000 
 men under the command of General Tolstoy.' 
 Twelve thousand Swedes had preceded them to 
 Stralsund. They were to march together 
 through Mecklenburg into Hanover, and to be 
 there joined by 15,000 English; who were to 
 come up the Elbe and land at Cuxhaven. 
 This would form an army of 43,000 men, des- 
 tined to make an attack from the north. This 
 attack was to be either principal or accessory, 
 according as Prussia joined or did not join 
 in it. 
 
 Two large Russian armies, of 60,000 men 
 each, were advancing, the one through Galli 
 cia, under General Kutusof, 2 the other through 
 
 the victories of Focksi h mi and of Rimnik, in 1789. II* 
 was present wilh Suwaroff at the storming of Ismail 
 In 1793, he was ambassador at Constantinople, and served 
 in the subsequent Polish war under Suwaroff. After the 
 restoration of peace, he was first appointed commander- 
 in-chief of Finland, and afterwards governor-gene's" of 
 Lithuania, by Paul. He resided several years at ttliua, 
 , endeavouring by constant study to remedy the deficiencies 
 of his early education. In 1801, he was appointed gover- 
 nor-general of St. Petersburg. In 1S08, at the age of sixty, 
 Alexander gave him the command of the first Russia*
 
 22 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1805 
 
 Poland, under General Buxhb'vden. 1 The 
 Russian guard, 12,000 strong, picked men, 
 under the Grand-duke Constantine, 2 followed 
 the first. An army of reserve, under General 
 Michelson, was forming at Wilna. The young 
 Emperor Alexander, 3 hurried by levity into 
 war, clear-sighted enough to perceive his 
 error, but not possessing resolution enough to 
 abandon or correct it by energy of execution j 
 the Emperor Alexander, haunted, though he | 
 would not avow it, by a secret dread, had not 
 decided till very late upon making the last 
 preparations. The corps of Gallicia, which, 
 under General Kutusof, was to come to the 
 assistance of the Austrians, had not reached 
 the frontier of Austria till towards the end of 
 August. It had traversed Gallicia from Brody 
 to Olmutz, Moravia from Olmiitz to Vienna, 
 and Bavaria from Vienna to Ulm. This was 
 a much greater distance than the French had 
 to travel from Boulogne to Ulm, and the Rus- 
 sians were not such adepts at distant marches 
 as the French. Europe, which has seen our 
 soldiers march, well knows that never were 
 any so expeditious. The presage of Napo- 
 leon, therefore, was accomplished, and already 
 the Russians were behindhand. 
 
 The second Russian army, placed between 
 Warsaw and Cracow, in the environs of 
 Pulawi, amounting, with the Russian guards, 
 to 70,000 men, awaited the arrival of the Em- 
 peror Alexander to receive his directions in 
 regard to Prussia. That monarch had gone 
 to Revel to see the embarkation of his troops 
 before he set out for the army in Poland, and 
 had proceeded to Pulawi, a beautiful residence 
 of the illustrious family of Czartoryski, at 
 some distance from Warsaw. He was there 
 with his young minister for foreign affairs, 
 Prince Adam Czartoryski, to communicate the 
 'more readily with the court of Berlin. 
 
 In company with Alexander was Prince 
 Peter Dolgorouki, an officer just starting in 
 the career of arms, full, of presumption and 
 
 corps against the French. He is most celebrated for the 
 masterly ability, coolness, and conduct with which he 
 pressed the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow; and was 
 perhaps the ablest of the Russian generals o'that day. 
 Encyclopaedia Americana, Alison. H. 
 
 1 BUXHOVDEN, FREDERIC WILLIAM. COUNT OF. Born 
 of an ancient Livonian family on the isle of Moen near 
 Osel ; was educated at St. Petersburg, and engaged in 
 the war against the Turks in 1769. In 1790, he defeated 
 the Swedish generals Hamilton and Meyerfeld, and res- 
 cued Frederickshaven and Viborg. In Poland he com- 
 manded a Russian division in 1792 and 1791. While mi- 
 litary governor of St. Petersburg, he was disgraced by 
 the Emperor Paul ; but was made governor-general of 
 Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland, by Alexander. In 1805, 
 he commanded the left wing at Austerlitz, which advanced 
 while the centre and right were beaten, Sec., &c. Ency- 
 clopedia Americana. H. 
 
 2 CONSTANTINE, C^ESAROVITCH PAULOVITCH. Grand- 
 prince of Russia, second son of Paul I. Was born May 9, 
 1799. His great characterises were energy, activity, 
 daring courage, and rudeness approaching almost to bar- 
 barism. In 1799, he distinguished himself so much under 
 Suwaroff that Paul I. bestowed on him the honorary 
 title of Ciegnrovitch. At Ansterlitz, in 1808, he distin- 
 guished himself greatly for his courage. In 1812, 1813, 
 1814, he attended his brother, the Emperor Alexander, in 
 all his campaigns. After the war he was made military 
 governor of Poland, and resided at Warsaw in great 
 plendoirr. During the life of the Emperor Alexander, he 
 
 ambition, an enemy of that coterie of young 
 wits who governed the empire, striving to 
 persuade the emperor that those young inep 
 were faithless Russians, who betrayed Russia 
 to benefit Poland. The fickleness of Alexan 
 der gave Prince Dolgorouki more than one 
 chance of success. It was false that Prince 
 Adam, the most honourable of men, was capa- 
 ble of betraying Alexander. But he hated the 
 court of Prussia, the weakness of which he 
 took for duplicity ; he wished, from a senti- 
 ment entirely Polish, that the design of using 
 force with that court, if it did not adhere to 
 the views of the coalition, should be rigorously 
 executed, that Russia should break with it, 
 and that, trampling down its scarcely formed 
 armies, the Russians should take from >* 
 Warsaw and Posen, and proclaim Alexander 
 king of reconstituted Poland. This was a 
 perfectly natural wish for a Pole, but an in- 
 considerate one for a Russian statesman. Na- 
 poleon alone was sufficient to beat the coali- 
 tion ; how would it be if the forced alliance of 
 Prussia were given to him] 
 
 Besides, it was requiring too much from the 
 irresolute character of Alexander. He had 
 sent his ambassador, M. d'Alopeus, to Berlin, 
 to make an appeal to the friendship of Fred- 
 erick William, to demand of him in the first 
 place a passage through Silesia for the Rus- 
 sian army, and then to insinuate that no doubt 
 was entertained of the concurrence of Prussia 
 in the meritorious work of European deliver- 
 ance. The negotiator was even authorized to 
 declare to the Prussian cabinet that there 
 must be no hesitation, that neutrality was im- 
 possible, that if a passage were not granted 
 with a good grace it would be taken by force. 
 M. d'Alopeus was to be seconded by Prince 
 Dolgorouki, aide-de-camp of Alexander. The 
 latter was instructed to let it be clearly per- 
 ceived at Berlin that there was a fixed deter- 
 mination to win Prussia by caresses or to 
 decide her by violence. Things had even 
 
 had renounced all pretensions to the throne by a secret 
 instrument, dated January 14, 1822; but on the death of 
 Alexander he was notwithstanding proclaimed emperor. 
 He preferred, however, to abide by his renunciation, and 
 Nicholas, his younger brother, the present Emperor of 
 Russia, succeeded Alexander. Encyc. Americana. H. 
 3 ALEXANDER I. PAULOVITCH. Son of Paul I.. Auto- 
 crat of all the Russias, and King of Poland. He was 
 born December 23, 1777, ascended the throne March 24, 
 1801, was crowned 27th of September, 1801, in Moscow, 
 and die'' December 1, 1825. He was one of the most im- 
 portant men of modern time, and a great benefactor of 
 his native land. He had great natural talents, which had 
 been judiciously cultivated by his mother and instructors. 
 He recognised the spirit of the age, and frequently acted 
 with very liberal views. The history of his government 
 may be divided into three periods, the first from 1801 lo 
 1805, which was peaceful and devoted to the execution 
 of the schemes of Peter the Great and Catharine respect- 
 ing the internal administration. The second from 1805 
 to 1814, which was a time of war with France, Sweden, 
 Turkey, and Persia, by which the resources and national 
 feelings of his people were wonderfully developed. The 
 third from 1814 to 1825, devoted to the constant and un- 
 interrupted aggrandizement of Russia. He was, as a 
 man, amiable, peaceful, kind, generous, frank, open, chi- 
 valric, and firm ; as a ruler, resolute, able, and enlight- 
 ened; and as a military leader, far above mediocrity. 
 Encyclopaedia Americana. a.
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 been carried to such a length at Pulawi, that 
 the manifesto which was to precede hostilities 
 was drawn up. 
 
 While these strong representations were 
 addressed to Prussia by the Russian agents, 
 she found herself face to face with the French 
 negotiators, Messrs. Duroc and Laforest, com- 
 missioned by Napoleon to offer her Hanover. 
 It will be recollected that the grand-marshal of 
 the palace, Duroc, had left Boulogne to carry 
 this offer to Berlin. The integrity of the young 
 kinsr had not been proof against it; neither 
 had the sentiments of M. de Hardenberg, who 
 was called in Europe the right-thinking minis- 
 ter. M. de Hardenberg perceived but one diffi- 
 culty in this affair, that was, to find a form 
 which should save the honour of his master 
 in the eyes of Europe. Two months, July and 
 Au?ust, had been spent in seeking this form. 
 One had been devised which was ingenious 
 enough. It was the same that the coalition 
 had contrived on its part for commencing the 
 war against Napoleon, that is to say, an armed 
 mediation. The King of Prussia was, for the 
 sake of peace, which, it was alleged, was 
 needed by all the powers, to declare on what 
 conditions the balance of Europe would ap- 
 pear to him sufficiently guarantied, to state 
 those conditions, and then give it to be under- 
 stood that he should pronounce in favour of 
 those who should admit them, against those 
 who should refuse to admit them, which signi- 
 fied that he would make half-war along with 
 France in order to gain Hanover. He was, in 
 fact, to adopt in his declaration most of Napo- 
 leon's conditions, such as the creation of the 
 kingdom of Italy, with separation of the two 
 crowns at the period of the general peace, the 
 annexation of Piedmont and Genoa to the Em- 
 pire, the free disposal of Parma and Placentia 
 left to France, the independence of Switzer- 
 land and Holland, lastly, the evacuation of 
 Tarento and Hanover at the peace. There 
 was no difficulty but as to the construction to 
 be put upon the independence of Switzerland 
 and Holland. Napoleon, who had then no 
 view upon those two countries, would never- 
 theless not guaranty their independence in 
 terms which would allow the enemies of 
 France to effect a counter-revolution there. 
 The discussions on this subject were prolonged 
 till the end of the month of September, and the 
 young King of Prussia was about to make up 
 his mind to the violence with which he was 
 threatened, when he clearly perceived from 
 the march of the Russian, Austrian, and 
 French armies that war was inevitable and 
 near at hand. Terrified at this prospect, he 
 fell back, and talked no more either about 
 armed mediation or the acquisition of Hano- 
 
 1 BRUNSWICK, CIIAHLES WILLIAM FERDINAND, DUKE 
 OF. He commanded the allied army of 70,000 Prussians 
 and 68,000 Austrian-), which invaded France in 1792, in 
 the hope of conquering the release of Louis XVI. from 
 prison, and re-establishing the monarchy ; hut was 
 checked at Valiny by Kellermann anil Diiinoiiriez, and 
 forced to retreat after a few unimportant successes. He 
 commanded the Prussian army during the movements 
 previous to the battle of Jena, in 1806, and by his false 
 manoeuvres did much towards their fatal defeat. A few 
 days later, at Auersladt, he was killed by a ball in 
 the breast while leading a charge gallantly against the 
 
 ver, as the price of that mediation. He re- 
 turned to his ordinary system of neutrality of 
 the north of Germany. Then Messrs. Duroc 
 and Laforest offered him, agreeably to the or- 
 ders of Napoleon, what the cabinet of Berlin 
 had itself so often demanded, the delivery of 
 Hanover to Prussia, by way of deposit, on con- 
 dition that the latter should insure the posses- 
 sion of it to France. But, gratified as King 
 Frederick William would have been by the 
 retreat of the French and the delivery to him 
 of so valuable a deposit, he saw that he should 
 be obliged to oppose the northern expedition, 
 and he still refused. He made a thousand 
 protestations of attachment to Napoleon, to his 
 dynasty, to his government, adding that, if he 
 did viole'nce to his sympathies, it was because 
 he was defenceless against Russia on the side 
 of Poland. To this Messrs. Duroc and La- 
 forest replied by the offer of an army of 80,000 
 French, ready to join the Prussians. But this 
 would still be war, and Frederick William re- 
 jected it under this new form. It was at this 
 moment that M. d'Alopeus and Prince Dolgo- 
 rouki arrived at Berlin to require Prussia to 
 declare herself for the coalition. The king 
 was not less frightened at the demands of the 
 one than at the proposals of the others. He 
 replied by protestations exactly like those 
 which he had addressed to the French negotia- 
 tors. He was, he said, full of attachment for 
 the young friend whose acquaintance he had 
 made at Memel, but he should be the first to in- 
 cur the vengeance of Napoleon, and he could 
 not expose his subjects to such great dangers, 
 without making himself culpable towards 
 them. The Russian envoys, insisting, told 
 him that the army collected between Warsaw 
 and Cracow, was placed there expressly to 
 succour him ; and that it was a friendly fore- 
 thought of the Ernperor Alexander; that the 
 70,000 Russians composing that army were 
 about to cross Silesia and Saxony, on their 
 way to the Rhine, to receive the first shock of 
 the French armies. Frederick William was 
 not to be persuaded by these reasons. The 
 envoys then proceeded still further, and gave 
 him to understand that it was too late ; that, 
 not doubting his adhesion, the Russian troops 
 had been already ordered to pass through the 
 Prussian territory. At this kind 'of violence, 
 Frederick William could no longer contain 
 himself. People were mistaken respecting 
 his character. He wa^ irtesolute, which fre- 
 quently gave him the appearance ot weakness 
 and duplicity ; but, when driven to extremity, 
 he became obstinate and choleric. Filled with 
 indignation, he convoked a council, to which 
 were summoned the old Duke of Brunswick 1 
 and Marshal de Mollendorf, 2 and, notwithstand- 
 
 French infantry. He was a noble-minded, chivalric, and 
 gallant man, but lacked the decision of character and ra- 
 pidity of conception and action necessary to make a great 
 commander. He left to his son the duty of vengeance on 
 Hi French, and he, /ike his father, met his death on the 
 field, though not like him of defeat. Encyclopedia Ame- 
 ricana. H. 
 MOLLENDORF, RICHARD JOACHIM HENRY, COUNT 
 VON. A Prussian general, born in 1724, educated at 
 Brandenburg, and in 1740 admitted among the pages of 
 | Frederic II., whom he accompanied in the first Silesian 
 war. and with whom he was present at the battles of
 
 24 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1805. 
 
 ing his parsimony, decided on putting the 
 Prussian army upon the war footing. Seeing 
 that he was on the point of suffering violence 
 from both, he resolved to take his precautions, 
 and ordered the assembling of 80,000 men, 
 which would cost him 16 million Prussian 
 dollars (64 million francs) to be taken partly 
 from the revenues of the state, partly from the 
 treasury of the greaf Frederick, a treasury 
 drained during the preceding year, but reple- 
 nished during the present by dint of savings. 
 
 M. d'Alopeus, alarmed at these dispositions, 
 hastened to write to Pulawi, to advise his em- 
 peror, with the most earnest entreaties, to hu- 
 mour the King of Prussia, if he wished not to 
 have all the forces of the Prussian monarchy 
 upon his hands. 
 
 When these tidings reached Pulawi, they 
 shook the resolution of Alexander. Prince 
 Adam Czartoryski had warmly urged him to 
 decide not to give Prussia time to defend her- 
 self, and to take a passage instead of soliciting 
 it for such a length of time. If Prussia turns 
 to war, said Prince Adam, let us declare Alex- 
 ander king of Poland and organize that king- 
 dom, in the rear of the Russian armies. If, 
 on the contrary, she complies, we shall have 
 realized the plan of the coalesced powers and 
 gained one more ally. But Alexander, en- 
 lightened by the correspondence of M. d'Alo- 
 peus, withstood the counsels of his young 
 minister, sent his aide-de-camp Dolgorouki to 
 Berlin to affirm to his royal friend that it had 
 never been his intention to coerce his will, 
 that, on the contrary, he had just given orders 
 for his army to halt on the Prussian frontiers, 
 that this was done in deference to him, but 
 that affairs of such importance could not be 
 settled by means of agents, and that therefore 
 he requested an interview. Frederick Wil- 
 liam, fearing lest he should suffer as much 
 compulsion from the caresses of Alexander as 
 he could have done from his armies, would 
 rather have declined this interview. His 
 court, however, which leaned to the coalition 
 and to war, and the queen, whose sentiments 
 corresponded with those of the young empe- 
 ror, persuaded him that he could not refuse it. 
 The interview was fixed for the first days of 
 October. Meanwhile Messrs. Duroc and La- 
 forest were in Berlin, receiving all sorts of 
 assurances of neutrality. 
 
 While the Russians were thus employing 
 the month of September, Austria was making 
 better use of that valuable time. She commis. 
 
 Molwitz and Chotusitz. In 1746, he obtained a company 
 in the guards, and rose regularly in the service, until in 
 1783 tin was made governor of Berlin. In the reign of 
 Frederic William II. he was made general of infantry, 
 and commanded the Russian troops employed in 1793, in 
 the dismemberment of Poland. On his return home, he 
 was created a field-marshal, and soon afterwards gover- 
 nor of South Russia. He subsequently succeeded the 
 Duke of Brunswick in the command of the Prussian army 
 on the Rhine, in 1794, when he gained the victory of Kai- 
 SHrslauten. In 1799, he was one of the principal advisers 
 of the treaty Of Bach, after which he was made grand- 
 marshal. In 1806, though very old, he accepted a com- 
 mand under the l)uke of Brunswick, and was present at 
 '.i-iia and Auerstadt; at the last of which actions he was 
 Bounded. After this he retired from service and died in 
 January 28, 1816. Encyclopedia Americana. 
 
 ioned M. de Cobentzel to repeat incessantly in 
 Paris that her sole desire was to negotiate and 
 to obtain guarantees for the future state of 
 Italy, and was meanwhile availing herself of 
 the English subsidies with the utmost activity. 
 She had, in the first place, assembled 100,000 
 men in Italy, under the Archduke Charles. It 
 was there that she placed her best general and 
 her strongest army, to recover her most re- 
 gretted provinces. Twenty-five thousand men, 
 under the Archduke John, who had command- 
 ed at Hohenlinden, guarded the Tyrol ; 80 or 
 90,000 men were destined to enter Bavaria, 
 proceed to Suabia, and take the famous posi- 
 tion of Ulm, where, in 1800, M. de Kray 1 had 
 so long detained General Moreau. The 50 or 
 60 thousand Russians under General Kutusof, 
 coming to join the Austrian army, would form 
 a mass of 140 or 150 thousand fighting men, 
 which, it was hoped, would give the French 
 occupation enough to afford the other Russian 
 armies time to arrive, the Archduke Charles 
 time to reconquer Italy, and the troops sent to 
 Hanover and Naples time to produce a useful 
 diversion. It was the famous General Mack, 
 the same who had formed all the plans of cam- 
 paign against France, and who came, with 
 great activity, and a certain skill in military 
 details, to replace the Austrian army on a war 
 footing it was this same general who had 
 been appointed to the command of the army 
 of Suabia, in conjunction with the Archduke 
 Ferdinand. 
 
 Advantage had been taken of the towns be- 
 longing to Austria in that country to prepare 
 magazines between the lake of Constance and 
 the Upper Danube. The city of Memmingen, 
 situated on the Iller, and forming the left of the 
 position of which Ulm forms the right, was 
 one of these places. Immense stores of pro- 
 visions had been collected there and some en- 
 trenchments thrown up, which could not have 
 been done at Ulm, because it belonged to Ba- 
 varia. 
 
 All this had been accomplished by the last 
 days of August. But Austria had, by a preci- 
 pitation not usual with her, committed here an 
 egregious blunder. The position of Ulm could 
 not be occupied without crossing the Bavarian 
 frontier. Besides, Bavaria possessed an army 
 of 25,000 men, large magazines, the line of the 
 Inn, and thus there were all sorts of reasons 
 for being the first to seize such a valuable 
 prey. Aus-tria conceived the idea of acting 
 towards her as Russia was doing towards 
 Prussia, that is to say to surprise and hurry 
 her away. It was easier, it is true, but the 
 
 1 KRAY, General. A Hungarian by birth, and one of 
 the most distinguished officers of the empire. Active, 
 intrepid, and indefatigable; gifted with cool head and an 
 admirable coup d'oeil, in danger he was one of the most 
 illustrious generals of the imperial army, and, after the 
 Archduke Charles, has left the most brilliant reputation 
 in its military archives of the last century. In 1799, he 
 gained the decisive victory of Magnano over the French 
 under Scherer. In the same year he besieged and took 
 the strong fortress of Mantua; and afterwards greatly 
 distinguished himself at the battle of Novi. In 1800, he 
 commanded against Moreau in the celebrated Rhine cam* 
 paign, and though unsuccessful displayed great ability 
 and conduct. Alison' a Europe. H-,
 
 bept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 25 
 
 consequences, in case of failure, would be dis- 
 astrous. 
 
 On the arrival of General Mack 1 upon the 
 banks of the Inn, Prince de Schwarzenberg 
 was sent to Munich to make the strongest so- 
 licitations to the elecior on the part of the em- 
 peror of Germany. He was commissioned to 
 urge him to pronounce in favour of the coali- 
 tion, to unite his troops with those of Austria, 
 to consent to their being incorporated into the 
 imperial army, dispersed regiment by regiment 
 in the Austrian divisions, to give up his terri- 
 tory, his magazines, to the allies, to join, in 
 short, in the new crusade against the common 
 enemy of Germany and Europe. The Prince 
 of Schwarzenberg was even authorized, in 
 case of necessity, to offer to Bavaria, in Salz- 
 burg, in the Tyrol itself, the fairest aggran- 
 dizements, provided that, on the reconquest of 
 Italy by their joint arms, the collateral branches 
 of the imperial house, which had been ex- 
 pelled from that country, could be re-esta- 
 blished there. 
 
 When Prince de Schwarzenberg arrived at 
 Munich, the elector was in much the same 
 situation as Prussia herself. M. Otto, the 
 same who, in 1801, had so ably negotiated the 
 peace of London, was our minister at Munich. 
 Affecting, amidst that capital, to be neglected 
 by the court, he had, nevertheless, secret in- 
 terviews with the elector, and strove to prove 
 to him that Bavaria existed solely through the 
 protection of Napoleon. It is certain that, on 
 this, as on many other occasions, she could 
 not save herself from Austrian rapacity with- 
 out the support of France. If, even in 1803, 
 she had obtained a reasonable share of the 
 Germanic indemnities, she owed it entirely to 
 French intervention. M. Otto, by insisting on 
 these considerations, had put an end to the 
 hesitation of the elector, and had induced him 
 to bind himself, on the 24th of August, by a 
 treaty of alliance. It was a few days after- 
 wards, on the 7th of September, that Prince de 
 Schwarzenberg made his appearance at Mu- 
 nich. The elector, who was very feeble, had 
 about him a* fresh cause for feebleness, in the 
 electress his wife, one of those three beautiful 
 princesses of Baden who had ascended the 
 thrones of Russia, of Sweden, and of Bavaria, 
 and who all three were distinguished for their 
 animosity against France. Of the three, the 
 electress of Bavaria was the most vehement. 
 She fretted, she wept, she manifested extreme 
 vexation, at seeing her husband chained to 
 Napoleon, and rendered him more miserable 
 than he would naturally have been from his 
 own agitation. M. de Schwarzenberg, fol- 
 lowed at the distance of two days' march by 
 the Austrian army, and seconded by the tears 
 of the electress, succeeded in shaking the 
 
 1 MACK, CHARLES, BARON VON. An Austrian general, 
 born in Franconia in 1752. He enlisted as a private dra- 
 goon, but soon rose to be a petty officer, and in the war 
 with Turkey obtained a captain's commission. When 
 (he war with France broke out he was appointed quarter- 
 master-general in the Prince of Coburg's army, and di- 
 rected its operations in the campaign of 1793. In 1797, 
 ne succeeded the Archduke Charles in the command of 
 the army of the Rhine. The next year he was sent to 
 Naples, then invaded by the French, was beaten in the 
 VOL. II. 4 
 
 ! elector, and extorting from him a promise to 
 | give himself up to Austria. This prince, how- 
 ever, dreading the consequences of this sudden 
 change, fearing General Mack, who was near 
 at hand, and Napoleon too, though he was at a 
 distance, thought it right to inform M. Otto of 
 the circumstance, to excuse his conduct by 
 I alleging his unfortunate position, and to solicit 
 the indulgence of France. 
 
 M. Otto, being thus apprized of the fact, 
 hastened to the elector, represented to him the 
 danger of such a defection and the certainty 
 of soon having Napoleon as conqueror at 
 Munich, making peace by the sacrifice of 
 Bavaria to Austria. Certain circumstances 
 seconded the arguments of M. Otto. The re- 
 quisition to dislocate the army and to disperse 
 it among the Austrian divisions had roused 
 indignation in the Bavarian generals and offi- 
 cers. News arrived, at the same time, that 
 the Austrians, without waiting for the consent 
 solicited at Munich, had passed the Inn, and 
 public opinion was revolted by such a viola- 
 tion of the territory. People remarked pub- 
 licly that, if Napoleon was ambitious, Pitt 
 was not less so ; that the latter had bought the 
 cabinet of Vienna, and that, thanks to the 
 gold of England, Germany was to be again 
 trampled under foot by the soldiers of all Eu- 
 rope. Independently of these circumstances 
 favourable to M. Otto, the elector had an able 
 minister, M. de Monlgelas, fired with ambition 
 for his country, dreaming of securing for Ba- 
 varia in the nineteenth century those aggran- 
 dizements which Prussia had acquired in the 
 eighteenth, seeking incessantly whether it was 
 in Vienna or in Paris that there was most 
 chance of obtaining them, and having finally 
 concluded that it would be from the most in- 
 novating power, that is to say from France. 
 He had, therefore, been in favour of the treaty 
 of alliance signed with M. Otto. Touched, 
 however by the offers of Prince Schwarzen- 
 berg, he was shaken for a moment under the 
 influence of ambition, as his master had been 
 under that of weakness. But he was soon 
 brought back, and the solicitations of M. Otto, 
 seconded by the public opinion, by the irrita- 
 tion of the Bavarian army, by the counsels of 
 M. de Montgelas, once more gained the as- 
 cendency. The elector was again won for 
 France. In the agitated state of mind in 
 which that prince was, he did every thing that 
 he was advised to do. It was proposed that 
 he should retire to Wurzburg, a bishopric 
 secularized for Bavaria in 1803, and that his 
 army should follow him. He approved this 
 proposal. In order to gain time, he informed 
 M. de Schwarzenberg, that he was going to 
 send to Vienna a Bavarian general, M. de No- 
 garola, a known partisan of Austria, commis- 
 
 fleld, fell intosuspicion with the Neapolitans, fled into the 
 French lines, and was sent as a prisoner to Dijon. la 
 1801, he was appointed by the emperor commander-in 
 chief in the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and Italy. In 1805, he wan 
 driven beyond the Danube by Napoleon and submitted to 
 the capitulation of Ulm, by which 28,000 Austrians laid 
 down their arms, for which he was subsequently sen- 
 tenced to death as a traitor. His sentence was, however, 
 commuted to imprisonment, and he died in obscurity in 
 1828. Encyclopedia Americana. 
 
 c
 
 36 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept 1805. 
 
 sioned to treat there. This done, the elector 
 set out with his whole court, in the night be- 
 tween the 8th and the 9th of September, and 
 proceeded first to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon 
 to Wurzburg, where he arrived on the 12th 
 of September. The Bavarian troops collected 
 at Amberg and at Ulm received orders to con- 
 centrate themselves at Wurzburg. The elec- 
 tor, on leaving Wurzburg, published a mani- 
 festo, denouncing to Bavaria and Germany the 
 violence of which he was the victim. 
 
 M. de Schwarzenberg and General Mack, 
 who had passed the Inn, thus saw the elector, 
 his court, and his army, slip out of their hands, 
 and found themselves objects of ridicule as 
 well as of indignation. The Austrians ad- 
 vanced by forced marches, without being able 
 to overtake the Bavarians, and everywhere 
 found the opinion of the country exasperated 
 against them. One circumstance contributed 
 more particularly to irritate the people in Ba- 
 varia. The Austrians had their hands full of 
 paper money, not current at Vienna without a 
 great loss. They obliged the inhabitants to 
 take this discredited paper as money. Thus 
 a serious pecuniary injury was added to the 
 galled national feelings to incense the Bava- 
 rians. 
 
 General Mack, after this pitiful expedition, 
 for which, however, he was less responsible 
 than the Austrian negotiator, marched for the 
 upper Danube, and took the position which 
 had long been assigned him, the right at Ulm, 
 the left on Memmingen, the front covered by 
 the Iller, which runs to Memmingen and falls 
 into the Danube at Ulm. The officers of the 
 Austrian staff had been for some years past 
 incessantly extolling this position as the best 
 that could be occupied for making head 
 against the French debouching from the Black 
 Forest. Here they had one of their wings 
 supported on the Tyrol, the other on the Da- 
 nube. They thought themselves, therefore, 
 quite secure on both sides, and, as for their 
 rear, they never gave it a thought, not imagin- 
 ing that the French could ever come by any 
 other than the ordinary route. General Mack 
 had drawn to him General Jellachich, 1 with 
 the division of the Vorarlberg. He had 
 65,000 men, immediately at hand, and, on his 
 rear, to connect him with the Russians, Gene- 
 ral Kienmayer at the head of 20,000. This 
 formed a total of 85,000 combatants. 
 
 General Mack then was just where Napo- 
 leon had supposed and wished, that is to say 
 on the upper Danube, separated from the Rus- 
 sians by the distance from Vienna to Ulm. 
 The elector of Bavaria was at Wurzburg, 
 with his tearful court, with his army indig- 
 nant against the Austrians, and in expectation 
 of the speedy arrival of the French. 
 
 In order to form a complete idea of ~the 
 state of Europe during this great crisis, all we 
 have to do now is to cast our eyes on what 
 was passing in the south of Italy. The su- 
 preme counsellors of the coalition, unwill- 
 ing that the court of Naples, watched by the 
 
 20,000 French under General St. Cyr, should 
 compromise itself too early, had suggested to 
 it a real treachery, which that court, blinded 
 and demoralized by hatred, was not likely to 
 be very scrupulous about. It had been ad- 
 vised to sign a treaty of neutrality with 
 France, in order to obtain the withdrawal of 
 the corps which was at Tarento. When this 
 corps should have retired, the court of Naples, 
 less closely watched, would have, it was told, 
 time to declare itself, and to receive the Rus- 
 sians and the English. The Russian general, 
 Lascy, a prudent and considerate man, was 
 at Naples, commissioned to make secret pre- 
 parations, and to bring in the allies when the 
 moment should be deemed seasonable. There 
 were 12,000 Russians at Corfu, besides a re- 
 serve at Odessa, and 6000 English at Malta. 
 They reckoned further upon 36,000 Neapoli- 
 tans, somewhat less wretchedly organized 
 than usual, and on the levy en masse of the 
 banditti of Calabria. 
 
 This treaty, proposed to Napoleon just be- 
 fore his departure from Paris, had appeared 
 acceptable to him, for he did not conceive that 
 so weak a court would risk with him the con- 
 sequences of such a treachery. He imagined 
 that the terrible example which he had made 
 of Venice in 1797 would have cured the 
 Italian governments of their propensity to 
 knavery. In a treaty of neutrality, excluding 
 the Russians and the English from the south 
 of Italy, he found the advantage of being en- 
 abled to give Massena 20,000 more men, if 
 the 50,000 under his command were not suffi- 
 cient to defend the Adige. 
 
 He accepted, therefore, this proposal, ant* 
 by a treaty signed at Paris on the 21st of Sep 
 tember, he consented to withdraw his troops 
 from Tarento, on the promise made him by 
 the court of Naples not to suffer any landing 
 of the Russians and the English. On this 
 condition, General St. Cyr had orders to march 
 towards Lombardy, and Queen Caroline and 
 her weak husband were left at liberty to pre- 
 pare a sudden levy of troops on the rear of the 
 French. 
 
 Such was the situation of the allied powers 
 from the 20th to the 25th of September. The 
 Russians and the Swedes, charged with the 
 attack on the north, joined at Stralsund, to 
 combine with a landing of the English at the 
 mouth of the Elbe ; a Russian army was or- 
 ganizing at Wilna, under General Michelson ; 
 the Emperor Alexander, with his corps of 
 guards and Buxhu'vden's army, was at Pulawi, 
 on the Vistula, soliciting an interview with 
 the King of Prussia ; another Russian army, 
 under General Kutusof, had penetrated through 
 Gallicia into Moravia, to join the Austrians. 
 This latter was parallel to Vienna, and was 
 about to ascend the Danube. General Mack, 
 a hundred leagues in advance, had taken po- 
 sition, at Ulm, at the head of 85,000 men, 
 awaiting the French at the outlet of the Black 
 Forest. The Archduke Charles was on the 
 Adige with 100,000 men. The court of Na- 
 
 1 JELLACHICH. An Austrian general of more ability 
 than good fortune. He was defeated and forced to sur- 
 render with the Prince de Rohan in the Tyrol in 1805, 
 
 and was again totally defeated in the valley of the Mnhr 
 by the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais in 1603. .Iliton't 
 Europe H.
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 27 
 
 pies was meditating a surprise, which was to 
 be executed with the Russians from Corfu and 
 the English from Malta. 
 
 Napoleon, as we have already seen, had 
 arrived at Strasburg on the 26th of September. 
 His columns had strictly followed his orders 
 and pursued the routes which he had pre- 
 scribed them. Marshal Bernadotte, having 
 furnished Hameln with stores, provisions, and 
 a strong garrison, and left there the men least 
 capable of taking the field, had set out from 
 Giittingen with 17,000 soldiers, all fit to en- 
 counter any hardship. He had forewarned 
 the elector of Hesse of his passage, with the 
 formalities enjoined by Napoleon. He had at 
 first met with a consent, afterwards with a 
 refusal, to which he had paid no heed, and 
 had crossed Hesse without experiencing any 
 resistance. Officers of administration, pre- 
 ceding his corps, ordered provisions at every 
 station, and, paying for every thing in ready 
 money, found speculators eager to supply the 
 wants of our troops. An army that carries 
 its travelling expenses along with it, can live 
 without magazines, without loss of time, with- 
 out annoyance to the country through which 
 it is passing, if that country is but moderately 
 stocked with articles of consumption. With 
 this auxiliary, Bernadotte traversed without 
 difficulty the two Hesses, the principality of 
 Fulda, the territories of the prince arch-chan- 
 cellor, to Bavaria. He marched perpendicu- 
 larly from north to south. He arrived on the 
 17th of September near Cassel, on the 20th 
 at Giessen, on the 27th at Wurzburg, to the 
 great joy of the elector of Bavaria, who was 
 dying of fright amidst the contradictory 
 tidings of the Austrians and the French. A 
 minister of the Emperor of Germany had 
 hastened to that prince, to make excuses for 
 what had happened, and to endeavour to con- 
 ciliate him. The Austrian minister knew 
 nothing of the march of Bernadotte's corps, 
 till the French cavalry appeared on the heights 
 of Wiirzburg. He set out immediately, leav- 
 ing the elector for ever, that is for the whole 
 time that our prosperity lasted. 
 
 M. de Montgelas, the better to colour the 
 conduct of his master, solicited from us a pre- 
 caution far from honourable for Bavaria; 
 which was to alter the date of the treaty of 
 alliance concluded with France. That treaty 
 was signed in reality on the 24th of August. 
 M. de Montgelas expressed a wish to give it 
 another date, that of the 23d of September. 
 This was assented to, and he was enabled to 
 assert to his confederates at Ratisbon, that he 
 had not given himself up to France till the 
 day after the violences done him by Austria. 
 
 General Marmont, ascending the Rhine, 
 and availing himself of it for the conveyance 
 of his materiel, had marched along the fine 
 road which Napoleon had opened on the left 
 bank of the river, and which is one of the me- 
 morable works of his reign. On the 12th of 
 September he was at Nimeguen, on the 18th 
 at Cologne, on the 25th at Mayence, on the 
 26th at Frankfurt, on the 29th in the environs 
 of Wurzburg. He brought a corps of 20,000 
 men, a park of 40 pieces of cannon well 
 horsed, and a considerable supply of ammu- 
 
 nition. These 20,000 men included a division 
 
 of Dutch troops commanded by General Du- 
 
 monceau. As for the 15,000 French who 
 
 composed this corps, a fact unexampled in the 
 
 history of the war will afford a correct idea 
 
 of their quality. They had just traversed part 
 
 of France and Germany, and marched twenty 
 
 successive days without halting : and on their 
 
 ! arrival at Wurzburg nine men only were miss- 
 
 , ing. There was not a general who would 
 
 not have deemed himself fortunate if he had 
 
 1 lost no more than two or three hundred, for it 
 
 | is the entering upon a campaign, and the 
 
 effects of the first marches, that try weakly 
 
 constitutions, and cause men to lag behind. 
 
 Towards the end of September, then, Napo- 
 leon had, in the heart of Franconia, six days' 
 march from the Danube, and threatening the 
 flank of the Austrians, Marshal Bernadotte 
 with 17,000 men, General Marmont, with 
 20,000. To these forces must be added 25,000 
 Bavarians, collected at Wurzburg, and ani- 
 mated with real enthusiasm for the cause of 
 the French, which, for the moment, had be- 
 come their own. They clapped their hands on 
 seeing our regiments appear in sight. 
 
 Marshal Davout, with the corps that had 
 marched from Ambleteuse, Marshal Soult, with 
 that from Boulogne, Marshal Ney, with that 
 from Montreuil, traversing Flanders, Picardy, 
 Champagne, and Lorraine, were on the Rhine 
 on the 23d and 24th of September, preceded 
 by the cavalry, which Napoleon had set in mo- 
 tion four days before the infantry. All marched 
 with unparalleled ardour. Dupont's division, 
 in passing through the department of the 
 Aisne, had left behind about fifty men belong- 
 ing to that department. They had gone to see 
 their families, and by the day after the next 
 they had all of them rejoined. After travel- 
 ling 150 leagues, in the middle of autumn, 
 without resting for a single day, this army had 
 neither sick, nor stragglers, an unexampled 
 circumstance, owing to the spirit of the troops 
 and to a long encampment. 
 
 Marshal Augereau had formed his division 
 in Bretagne. Setting out from Brest, passing 
 through Alencon, Sens, Langres, Befort, he 
 had to cross France in its greatest breadth, 
 and was to be on the Rhine a fortnight after 
 the other corps. Thus, he was destined to act 
 as a reserve. 
 
 Never was astonishment equal to that whicn 
 filled all Europe on the unexpected arrival of 
 this army. It was supposed to be on the 
 shores of the ocean, and in twenty days, that 
 is to say, in the time required for the report 
 of its march to begin to spread, it appeared on 
 the Rhine, and inundated South Germany. It 
 was the effect of extreme promptness in de~ 
 ciding, and of profound art in concealing, the 
 determinations that were taken. 
 
 The news of the appearance of the French 
 spread immediately, and produced in the Aus- 
 trian generals no other idea than this, that the 
 principal theatre of the war would be in Ba- 
 varia and not in Italy, since Napoleon and the 
 army of the Ocean were proceeding thither. 
 The only consequences were an application to 
 augment the Austrian forces in Suabia, and 
 an order, highly displeasing to the Archduke
 
 28 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1805 
 
 Charles, to send a detachment from Italy into 
 the Tyrol, which was then to proceed through 
 the Vorarlberg to the assistance of General 
 Mack. But the real design of Napoleon con- 
 tinued to be a profound secret. The troops 
 which had joined at Wiirzburg seemed to have 
 no other errand but to pick up the Bavarians 
 and to protect the elector. The principal force, 
 placed at the upper Rhine, at the entrance of 
 the defiles of the Black Forest, seemed des- 
 tined to enter there. General Mack, there- 
 fore, was more and more confirmed everyday 
 in his idea of keeping the position of Ulm, 
 which had been assigned to him. 
 
 Napoleon, having collected his whole army, 
 gave it an organization which it has ever since 
 retained, and a name which it will for ever re- 
 tain in history, that of the GRAND ARMY. 
 
 He divided it into seven corps. Marshal 
 Bernadotte, with the troops brought from Han- 
 over, formed the first corps, 17,000 strong. 
 General Marmont, with the troops from Hol- 
 land, formed the second, which numbered 
 20,000 men present under arms. The troops 
 of Marshal Davout, encamped at Ambleteuse, 
 and occupying the third place along the coast 
 of the Ocean, had received the designation of 
 third corps, and amounted to an effective force 
 of 26,000 fighting men. Marshal Soult, with 
 the centre of the grand army of the Ocean, 
 encamped at Boulogne, and composed of 40,000 
 infantry and artillery, formed the fourth corps. 
 Suchet's division was destined to be soon de- 
 tached from it, in order to form part of the 
 fifth corps, with Gazan's division and the 
 grenadiers of Arras, which were henceforward 
 known by the appellation of Oudinot's grena- 
 diers, after the name of their gallant leader. 
 This fifth corps was to consist of 18,000 men 
 besides Suchet's division. It was assigned to 
 the faithful and heroic friend of Napoleon, 
 Marshal Lannes, who had been recalled from 
 Portugal to take part in the perilous expedition 
 of Boulogne, and was now summoned to fol- 
 low the Emperor to the banks of the Morawa, 
 the Vistula, and the Niemen. Under the in- 
 trepid Ney, the camp of Montreuil composed 
 the sixth corps, and amounted to 24,000 sol- 
 diers. Augereau, with two divisions, 14,000 
 strong at most, placed last on the line of coast 
 he was at Brest composed the seventh 
 corps. The name of eighth corps was subse- 
 quently given to the Italian troops, when they 
 came to act in Germany. This organization 
 was that of the army of the Rhine, but with 
 important modifications, adapted to the genius 
 of Napoleon, and necessary for the execution 
 of the great things which he meditated. 
 
 In the army of the Rhine, each corps, com- 
 plete in all arms, formed of itself a little 
 army, having every thing within itself, and 
 capable of giving battle. Hence these corps 
 had a tendency to separate, especially under a 
 general like Moreau, who commanded only in 
 proportion to his genius and character. Na- 
 poleon had organized his army in such a man- 
 ner that it was entirely in his hand. Each 
 corps was complete in infantry only; it had 
 the necessary artillery, and of cavalry just 
 what was requisite to guard itself well, that is 
 to say, some squadrons of hussars or chas- 
 
 seurs. Napoleon reserved to himself to com- 
 plete them afterwards by the aid of a reserve 
 of those two arms, which he alone disposed of. 
 According to the ground and circumstances, 
 he withdrew from one to give to another, either 
 a reinforcement of artillery or a mass of 
 cuirassiers. 
 
 Above all, he made a point of keeping 
 together under one chief, and in immediate 
 dependence on his will, the principal mass of 
 his cavalry. As it is with this that one ob- 
 serves the enemy by running incessantly 
 around him, that one completes his defeat 
 when he is staggered, that one pursues and 
 envelopes him when in flight, Napoleon re- 
 solved to reserve to himself exclusively this 
 means of preparing victory, of deciding it, 
 and of reaping its fruits. He had therefore 
 collected into a single corps the heavy caval- 
 ry, composed of cuirassiers and carabineers, 
 commanded by Generals Nansouty and d'Haur- 
 poul ; to these he had added dragoons on foot 
 as well as mounted, under Generals Klein, 
 Walther, Beaumont, Bourcier, and Baraguay 
 d'Hilliers, and had given the command of the 
 whole to his brother-in-law, Murat, who was 
 the most dashing cavalry officer of that day, 
 and who, under his orders, represented the 
 magister equitum of the Roman armies. Bat- 
 teries of flying artillery followed this cavalry, 
 and procured for him, in addition to the might 
 of swords, that of fires. We shall soon see 
 it spreading over the valley of the Danube, 
 upsetting the Austrians and the Russians, 
 entering astonished Vienna pell-mell with 
 them ; presently, hastening back to the plains 
 of Saxony and Prussia, pursuing to the shores 
 of the Baltic and carrying off the entire Prus- 
 sian army, or rushing at Eylau upon the Rus- 
 sian infantry, saving the fortune of Napoleon 
 by one of the most impetuous shocks that 
 ever armed masses have given or received. 
 This reserve numbered 22,000 horsemen, of 
 whom 6000 were cuirassiers, 9 to 10 thousand 
 mounted dragoons, 6000 dragoons on foot, 
 and a thousand horse artillery. 
 
 Lastly, the general reserve of the grand 
 army was the imperial guard, the finest corps 
 d'clite in the world, serving at once for a means 
 of emulation and a means of reward for such 
 soldiers as distinguished themselves ; for they 
 were not introduced into the ranks of this 
 guard till they had proved their prowess. The 
 imperial guard was composed, like the consu- 
 lar guard, of mounted grenadiers and chas-- 
 seurs, much the same as a regiment, where 
 the companies of elite only have been retained. 
 It comprised, moreover, a fine Italian battalion, 
 representing the royal guard of the king of 
 Italy, a superior squadron of Mamelukes, the 
 last memorial of Egypt, and two squadrons of 
 gendarmerie d'elite, to perform the police duty 
 of the head-quarters, in all 7000 men. Napo- 
 leon had added to it, in large proportion, the 
 arm to which he was partial, because, on cer- 
 tain occasions, it made amends for all the 
 others artillery. He had formed a park of 
 24 pieces of cannon, manned and horsed with 
 particular care, which made nearly four pieces 
 to every thousand men. 
 
 The guard scarcely ever quitted the head'
 
 Sept. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 29 
 
 quarters ; it riarched almost always beside the 
 Emperor, with Lannes' and Oudinot's grena- 
 diers. 
 
 Such was the grand army. It presented a 
 mass of 186,000 combatants really present 
 under the colours. It numbered 38,000 horse- 
 men, and 340 pieces of cannon. If we add 
 to these Massena's 50,000 men, and General 
 St. Cyr's 20,000, we shall have a total of 
 256,000 French spread from the gulf of Ta- 
 rento to the mouths of the Elbe, with a reserve 
 of 150,000 young soldiers in the interior. If 
 we further add 25,000 Bavarians, 7 or 8 thou- 
 sand subjects of the sovereigns of Baden and 
 Wurtemberg ready to fall into line, we may say 
 that Napoleon was going, with 250,000 French, 
 30 and odd thousand Germans, to fight about 
 500,000 men belonging to the coalition, 
 250,000 of whom were Austrians, 200,000 
 Russians, 50,000 English, Swedes, Neapoli- 
 tans, having also their reserve in the interior 
 of Austria, of Russia, and in the English 
 fleets. The coalition hoped to join to them 
 200,000 Prussians. This would not be im- 
 possible, if Napoleon did not make haste to 
 conquer. 
 
 It was, in fact, urgent for him to commence 
 operations, and he gave orders for passing the 
 Rhine on the 25th and 26th of September, 
 after sacrificing two or three days to rest the 
 men, to repair some damages to the harness 
 of the cavalry, to exchange some wounded 
 and jaded horses for fresh horses, a great 
 number of which had been collected in Alsace, 
 and lastly to prepare a large park and a con- 
 siderable quantity of biscuit. His disposi- 
 tions for turning the Black Forest, behind 
 which General Mack, encamped at Ulm, was 
 waiting for the French, were these. 
 
 If we fix our eyes upon that country so 
 often traversed by our armies, and for that 
 reason so frequently described in this history, 
 we see the Rhine issuing from the Lake of 
 Constance, running westward as far as Basle, 
 then suddenly turning and running almost 
 direct north. We see the Danube, on the con- 
 trary, rising from some petty springs very near 
 the point where the Rhine issues from the 
 Lake of Constance, taking its course to the 
 east, and following that direction with very 
 few deviations to the Black Sea. It is a chain 
 of mountains of very moderate height, most 
 improperly called the Suabian Alps, that thus 
 separates the two rivers, and sends the Rhine 
 to the seas of the North, the Danube to the 
 seas of the East. These mountains turn their 
 steepest declivities towards France, and sub- 
 side by a gradual slope, in the plains of Fran- 
 conia, between Nordlingen and Donauwerth. 
 From their riven flank, clothed with woods, 
 called by the general name of Black Forest, 
 run to the left, .that is to say, towards the 
 Rhine, the Neckar and the Mayn ; to the right, 
 the Danube, which runs along the back of them, 
 nearly bare of wood and formed into terraces. 
 Through them run narrow defiles which you 
 must necessarily traverse in going from the 
 Rhine to the Danube, unless you choose to 
 avoid those mountains, either by ascending 
 the Rhine, to above Schaffhausen, or by travel- 
 ling along the foot of them from Strasburg to 
 
 Nordlingen and into the plains of Franconia, 
 where they disappear. In the preceding war, 
 the French had alternately taken two routes. 
 Sometimes debouching from the Rhine, be- 
 tween Strasburg, and Huningen, they had 
 traversed the defiles of the Black Forest; 
 sometimes ascending the Rhine to Schaffhau- 
 sen, they had crossed that river near the Lake 
 of Constance, and found themselves at the 
 sources of the Danube, without passing 
 through the defiles. 
 
 Napoleon, purposing to place himself be- 
 tween the Austrians who were posted at Ulm, 
 and the Russians who were coming to their 
 assistance, was obliged to take another route. 
 Studying in the first place to fix the attention 
 of the Austrians on the defiles of the Black 
 Forest by the appearance of his columns 
 ready to enter it, he meant then to proceed 
 along the foot of the Suabian Alps, without 
 crossing them, as far as Nordlingen, to turn, 
 with all his united columns, their lowered ex- 
 tremity, and to pass the Danube at Donau- 
 wenh. By this "novement he should form a 
 junction on the way with the corps of Berna- 
 dotte and Marmont, which would have already 
 reached Wiirzburg, he should turn the posi- 
 tion of Ulm, debouch on the rear of General 
 Mack, and execute the plan long settled in his 
 mind, and from which he expected immense 
 results. 
 
 On the 25th of September, he ordered Mural 
 and Lannes to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, 
 with the reserve of cavalry, Oudinot's grena- 
 diers, and Gazan's division. Murat was to 
 proceed with his dragoons from Oberkirch to 
 Freudenstadt, from Offenburg to Rothweil, 
 from Freiburg to Neustadt, and thus appear 
 at the head of the principal defiles, so as to 
 induce a supposition that the army itself was 
 to pass through them. Provisions were be- 
 spoken along this route, to complete the delu- 
 sion of the enemy. Lannes was to support 
 these reconnaissances by a few battalions of 
 grenadiers, but, in reality, placed with the 
 bulk of his corps in advance of Strasburg, on 
 the Stuttgard road, he had orders to cover the 
 movement of Marshals Ney, Soult, and Da- 
 vout, who were directed to cross the Rhine 
 lower down. General Songis, who command- 
 ed the artillery, had thrown two bridges of 
 boats, the first between Lauterburg and Carls- 
 ruhe for the corps of Marshal Ney, the second 
 in the environs of Spire for the corps of Mar- 
 shal Soult. Marshal D;ivout had at his dis- 
 posal the bridge of Manheim. These mar- 
 shals were to cross the valleys which descend 
 from the chain of the Suabian Alps and to 
 skirt that chain, supporting themselves one 
 upon the other, so as to be able to assist each 
 other in case of the sudden appearance of the, 
 enemy. All of them had orders to be pro- 
 vided with four days' bread in the soldiers' 
 knapsacks, and four days' biscuit in the bag- 
 gage-wagons, in case they should be obliged 
 to make forced marches. Napoleon did not 
 leave Strasburg till he saw his parks and his 
 reserves move off under the escort of a divi- 
 sion of infantry. He passed the Rhine on the 
 1st of October, accompanied by his guard, 
 after taking leave of the empress who re- 
 r. 2
 
 30 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805, 
 
 mained at Strasburg, with the imperial court, 
 aiid the chancellery of M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 On reaching the territory of the Grand-duke 
 of Baden, Napoleon found the reigning family, 
 which had come to meet and pay him homage. 
 The old elector presented himself surrounded 
 by three generations of princes. Like all the 
 second and third-rate sovereigns of Germany, 
 he had been desirous to obtain the boon of 
 neutrality, an absolute chimera under such 
 circumstances; for when the petty German 
 powers are not able to prevent war by resist- 
 ing the great powers which are intent on it, 
 they must not flatter themselves that they can 
 obviate its calamities by a neutrality which is 
 impossible, because they are almost all in the 
 obligatory track of tfie belligerent armies. 
 Napoleon had offered them his alliance in- 
 stead of neutrality, promising to settle to their 
 advantage the questions of territory or of 
 sovereignty which separated them from Aus- 
 tria ever since the unfinished arrangements 
 of 1803. The Grand-duke of Baden concluded 
 to. accept that alliance, and promised to fur- 
 nish 3000 men, besides provisions and means 
 of conveyance, to be paid for in the country 
 itself. Napoleon, after sleeping at Ettlingen, 
 set out on the 2d of October for Stuttgard. 
 Before his arrival, a collision had wellnigh 
 taken place between the Elector of Wurtem- 
 berg and Marshal Ney. That elector, known 
 throughout Europe for the extreme warmth of 
 his temper and disposition, was at that mo- 
 ment discussing with the minister of France 
 the conditions of an alliance which he greatly 
 disliked. But he insisted that, till the conclu- 
 sion of this business, no French troops should 
 enter either Louisburg, which was his country 
 residence, or Stuttgard, which was his capital. 
 Marshal Ney did consent not to enter Louis- 
 burg, but he ordered his artillery to be pointed 
 against the gates of Stuttgard, and by these 
 means obtained admission. Napoleon arrived 
 opportunely to appease the anger of the elec- 
 tor. He was received by him with great 
 magnificence, and stipulated with him an 
 alliance, which has founded the greatness of 
 that house, as similar alliances have founded 
 that of all the princes of the south of Ger- 
 many. The treaty was signed on the 5th of 
 October, and contains an engagement on the 
 part of France to aggrandize the house of 
 Wurtemberg, and, on the part of that house, 
 to furnish 10,000 men, besides provisions, 
 horses, and carriages, which were to be paid 
 for when taken. 
 
 Napoleon stayed three or four days at Louis- 
 burg, to allow his corps on the left time to get 
 into line. It was a most delicate position to 
 brush, for forty leagues, the skirts of an enemy 
 80 or 90 thousand strong, without rousing 
 him too much, and at the risk of seeing him 
 debouch on a sudden upon one of his wings. 
 Napoleon provided against this with admirable 
 art and foresight. Three routes ran across 
 Wurtemberg and terminated at those lowered 
 extremities of the Suabian Alps, which it was 
 necessary 10 reach in order to arrive at the 
 Danube between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt. 
 The principal was that of Pforzheim, Stutt- 
 aard, Heidenheim, which skirted the very 
 
 flanks of the mountains, and which was ir? 
 communication, by a great number of defiles, 
 with the position of the Austrians at Ulm. Il 
 was this that required to be traversed with the 
 greatest precaution, on account of the proxi- 
 mity of the enemy. Napoleon occupied it 
 with Mural's cavalry, the corps of Marshal 
 Lannes, that of Marshal Ney, and the guard. 
 The second, which, running from Spire, passed 
 through Heilbronn, Hall, Ellwangen, and ter- 
 minated in the plain of Nordlingen, was occu- 
 pied by the corps of Marshal Soult. The 
 third, running from Manheim, passing through 
 Heidelberg, Neckar-Elz, and Ingelfingen, ter- 
 minated at Oettingen. It was by this that 
 Marshal Davout marched. It approached 
 towards the direction which the corps of Ber- 
 nadotte and Marmont were to follow, in pro- 
 ceeding from Wurzburg to the Danube. Na- 
 poleon arranged the march of these different 
 columns so as that they should all arrive 
 from the 6th and 7th of October in the plain 
 extending along the Danube, between Nordlin- 
 gen, Donauwerlh, and Ingolstadt. But in this 
 revolving movement, his left wheeling upon 
 his right, the latter had to describe a less ex- 
 tensive circle than the former. He was there- 
 fore obliged to make his right slacken its pace, 
 in order to give the corps of Marmont and Ber- 
 nadotte, which formed the extreme left, Marshal 
 Davout's which came next to them, lastly, Mar- 
 shal Souk's, which came after MarshalDavout's, 
 and connected them all with the head-quarters, 
 time to finish their revolving movement. 
 
 After waiting sufficiently, Napoleon set him- 
 self in march on the 4th of October, with the 
 whole of his right. Murat, galloping inces- 
 santly at the head of his cavalry, appeared by 
 turns at the entrance of each of the defiles 
 which run through the mountains, merely 
 showing himself there and then withdrawing 
 his squadrons as soon as the artillery and 
 baggage had made so much way as to have 
 nothing to fear. Napoleon, with the corps of 
 Lannes, Ney, and the guards, followed the 
 Stuttgard route, ready to hasten with 50,000 
 men to the assistance of Murat, if the enemy 
 should appear in force in one of the defiles. 
 As for the corps of Soult, Davout, Marmont, 
 and Bernadotte, forming the centre and the 
 left of the army, their danger did not begin till 
 the movement that was executing, by march- 
 ing along the foot of the Suabian Alps, was 
 finished, and they should debouch in the plain 
 of Nordlingen. It was possible, in fact, that 
 General Mack being timely apprized, might 
 fall back from Ulm upon Donauwerth, cross the 
 Danube, and come to this plain of Nordlingen 
 to fight, for the purpose of stopping the French. 
 Napoleon had so arranged things that Murat. 
 Ney, Lannes, and with them the corps of Mar- 
 shals Soult and Devout, at least, should con- 
 verge together on the 6th of October between 
 Heidenheim, Oettingen, and Nordlingen, in such 
 a manner as to present an imposing mass to 
 the enemy. But till then his incessant study 
 was to deceive General Mack so long that he 
 should not think of decamping, and that Ihe 
 French might reach the Danube at Donau- 
 werth before he had quitted his position at 
 Ulm. On the 4th and ou the 6th of October,
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE 
 
 every thing continued to wear the best aspect. 
 The weather was splendid; the soldiers, well 
 provided with shoes and great-coats, marched 
 merrily. One hundred and twenty-four thou- 
 sand French advanced thus on a line of battle 
 of 26 leagues, the right touching upon the 
 mountains, the left converging towards the 
 plains of the Upper Palatinate, capable of be- 
 ing collected in a few hours to the number of 
 90 or 100 thousand men on one or the other 
 of their wings, and, what is more extraordi- 
 nary, without the Austrians having the least 
 idea of this vast operation. 
 
 " The Austrians," wrote Napoleon to M. de 
 Talleyrand and to Marshal Augereau, " are 
 on the debouches of the Black Forest. God j 
 grant that they may remain there ! My only 
 fear is that we shall frighten them too much j 
 .... If they allow me to gain a few more 
 marches, I hope to have turned them and to find 
 myself, with my whole army, between the Lech j 
 and the Isar." He wrote to the minister of the 
 police: "Forbid the newspapers of the Rhine 
 to make any more mention of the army than 
 if it did not exist." To reach the points indi- 
 cated to them, the corps of Bernadotte and 
 Marmont were to cross one of the provinces 
 which Prussia possessed in Franconia, that 
 of Anspach. By drawing them nearer to the 
 corps of Marshal Davout, Napoleon could in 
 fact have brought them closer to him, and thus 
 avoided entering the Prussian territory. But 
 the roads were already encumbered; to have 
 accumulated more troops in them would have 
 occasioned inconvenience for the order of the 
 movement and for the supply of provisions. 
 Besides, by contracting the circle described 
 by the army, he would have diminished the 
 chances, of enveloping the enemy. Napoleon 
 purposed to embrace in his movement the 
 course of the Danube as far as Ingolstadt, in 
 order to debouch as far as possible in the rear 
 of the Austrians, and to be able to stop them, 
 in case they should fall back from the Iller to 
 the Lech. Not imagining, from the state of 
 his relations with Prussia, that she could make 
 any difficulty towards him, reckoning upon 
 the custom established in the late wars of tra- 
 versing the Prussian provinces in Franconia, 
 because they were out of the line of neutrality, 
 having received no intimation that a different 
 course would be adopted in this, Napoleon 
 made no scruple to borrow the territory of An- 
 spach, and gave orders to Marmont's and Ber- 
 nadotte's corps accordingly. The Prussian 
 magistrates appeared on the frontier, to protest 
 in the name of their sovereign against the vio- 
 lence that was done them. In reply, the orders 
 of Napoleon were produced, and the troops 
 passed on, paying in specie lor all that was 
 taken, and observing the strictest discipline. 
 The Prussian subjects, well paid for the bread 
 and the meat with which they supplied our 
 soldiers, did not appear to be much irritated 
 at the alleged violation of their territory. 
 
 On the 6th of October, our six corps d'armee 
 had arrived without accident beyond the Sua- 
 bian Alps, Marshal Ney at Heidenheim, Mar- 
 shal Lannes at Neresheim, Marshal Davout 
 at Oettingen, General Marmont and Marshal 
 Bernadotte on the Aichstadt road, all in sight 
 
 of the Danube, considerably beyond the posi- 
 tion of Ulm. 
 
 What, meanwhile, were General Mack, the 
 Archduke Ferdinand, and all the officers of the 
 Austrian staff, about? Most fortunately, the 
 intention of Napoleon was not revealed to 
 them. Forty thousand men, who had passed 
 the Rhine at Strasburg, and who had plunged 
 at once into the defiles of the Black Forest, 
 had confirmed them in the idea that the French 
 would pursue the accustomed track. False 
 reports of spies, artfully despatched by Napo- 
 leon, had confirmed them still more in this 
 opinion. They had heard, indeed, of some 
 French troops spread in Wurtemberg, but they 
 supposed that they were coming to occupy the 
 petty states of Germany, and perhaps to assist 
 the Bavarians. Besides, nothing is more con- 
 tradictory, more perplexing, than that multi- 
 tude of reports of spies or of officers sent on 
 reconnaissance. Some of them place corps 
 d'armee where they have met with detach- 
 ments only, others mere detachments where 
 they ought to have found corps d'armee. 
 Frequently they have not seen with their own 
 eyes what they report, and they have merely 
 picked up the hearsays of terrified, surprised, 
 or astonished persons. The military, like the 
 civil police, lies, exaggerates, contradicts itself. 
 In the chaos of its reports the superior mind 
 discerns the truth, while the weak mind is lost. 
 And, above all, if any anterior prepossession 
 exists, if one is disposed to believe that the 
 enemy will come by one point rather than by 
 another, the facts collected are all interpreted 
 in a single sense, how far soever they may be 
 from admitting of it. In this manner are pro- 
 duced great errors, which sometimes ruin 
 armies and even empires. 
 
 Such was at this moment General Mack's 
 state of mind. The Austrian officers had long 
 extolled the position which, supporting its 
 right at Ulm, its left at Memmingen, faced the 
 French debouching from the Black Forest. 
 Authorized by an opinion which was general, 
 and in obedience, moreover, to positive in- 
 structions. General Mack had established him- 
 self in this position. He had there his provi- 
 sions, his military stores, and nothing would 
 have persuaded him that he was n.ot most con- 
 veniently placed there. The only precaution 
 which he had taken upon his rear consisted in 
 sending General Kienmayer, with a few thou- 
 sand men, to Ingolstadt, to observe the Bava 
 rians who had fled to the Upper Palatinate, 
 and to connect himself with the Russians, 
 whom he expected by the high road from 
 Munich. 
 
 While General Mack, with a mind prepos 
 sessed with an opinion formed beforehand, re 
 mained motionless at Ulm, the six corps of 
 the French army debouched on the 6lh of Oc- 
 tober in the plain of Nordlingen, beyond the 
 mountains of Suabia, which they had turned, 
 and on the banks of the Danube, which they 
 were about to cross. On the evening of~th 
 6th, Vandamme's division, belonging to Mar- 
 shal Soult's corps, outstripping all the others, 
 reached the Danube, and surprised the bridgt 
 of Miinster, a league above Donauwerth. On 
 the 7th of October, the corps of Marshal Soult
 
 82 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 took the bridge of Donauwerth itself, faintly 
 disputed by a battalion of Colloredo's, 1 which, 
 unable to defend, endeavoured in vain, to de- 
 stroy it. The troops of Marshal Soult speed- 
 ily repaired it, and passed over in the greatest 
 haste. Murat, with his division of dragoons, 
 preceding the right wing, formed of the corps 
 of Marshals Lannes and Ney, had proceeded 
 to the bridge of Miinster, already surprised by 
 Vandamme. He claimed that bridge for his 
 troops and those which were following him, 
 left that of Donauwerth to Marshal Soult's 
 troops, passed instantly with a division of dra- 
 goons, and dashed off on the other side of the 
 Danube, in pursuit of an object of great inte- 
 rest, the occupation of the bridge of Rain on the 
 Lech. The Lech, which runs behind the Iller, 
 nearly parallel to the latter, and falls into the 
 Danube near Donauwerth, forms a position 
 situated beyond that of Ulm, and, by occupy- 
 ing the bridge of Rain, the French would have 
 turned both the Iller and the Lech, and left 
 General Mack few chances of falling back to 
 good purpose. It took but the time required 
 for Murat's dragoons to gallop the distance, to 
 make themselves masters of Rain and the 
 bridge over the Lech. Two hundred horse 
 overturned all the patroles of Kienmayer's 
 corps, while Marshal Soult established him- 
 self in force at Donauwerth, and Marshal Da- 
 vout came in sight of the bridge of Neuburg. 
 
 Napoleon repaired the same day to Donau- 
 werth. His hopes were now realized, but he 
 did not consider himself completely sure of 
 success till he had won the very last result of 
 his admirable manoeuvre. Some hundreds of 
 prisoners had been already taken, and their 
 reports were unanimous. General Mack was 
 at Ulm on the Iller: it was his rear-guard, 
 commanded by General Kienmayer, and in- 
 tended to connect him with the Russians, 
 which the French had just fallen in with and 
 driven across the Danube. Napoleon imme- 
 diately determined to take a position between 
 the Austrians and the Russians, so as to pre- 
 vent their junction. The first movement of 
 General Mack's, had he been capable of a 
 timely resolve, ought to have been to quit the 
 banks of the Iller, to fall back upon the Lech, 
 to pass through Augsburg, in order to join 
 General Kienmayer on the Munich road. Na- 
 poleon, without losing a moment, ordered the 
 following dispositions: He would not throw 
 Ney's corps beyond the Danube, but left it on 
 the roads running from Wurtemberg to Ulm, 
 to guard the left bank of the Danube, by which 
 we arrived. He directed Murat and Lannes 
 to pass to the right bank by the two bridges 
 which the French were masters of, those of 
 Miinster and Donauwerth, to ascend the river, 
 and to place themselves between Ulm and 
 Augsburg, to prevent General Mack from re- 
 treating by the high road from Augsburg to 
 Munich. The intermediate point which they 
 had to occupy was Burgau. Napoleon or- 
 dered Marshal Soult to leave the mouth of the 
 Lech, where he was in position, to ascend that 
 
 tributary of the Danube to Augsburg, with the 
 three divisions of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and 
 Legrand. Suchet's division, the fourth of 
 Marshal Soult's, was already placed under the 
 command of Lannes. Thus Marshal Ney, 
 with 20,000 men on the left bank of the Da- 
 nube, which had been abandoned, Murat and 
 Lannes, with 40,000 on the right, which had 
 just been taken possession of, Marshal Soult, 
 with 30,000 on the Lech, surrounded General 
 Mack, by whatever outlet he might attempt to 
 escape. 
 
 Turning his immediate attention from this 
 point to others, Napoleon ordered Marshal 
 Davout to hasten and cross the Danube at 
 Neuburg, and to clear Ingolstadt, towards 
 which Marmont and Bernadotte were proceed- 
 ing. The route followed by these latter was 
 longer; they were two marches behindhand. 
 Marshal Davout was then to proceed to Aich- 
 ach on the Munich road, to push General Kien- 
 mayer before him, and to form the rear-guard 
 of the masses which were accumulating 
 around Ulm. The corps of Marmont and Ber- 
 nadotle had orders to quicken their pace, to 
 cross the Danube at Ingolstadt, and to march 
 for Munich, in order to replace the elector in 
 his capital, barely a month after he had quitted 
 it. It was for Marshal Bernadotte, at this mo- 
 ment the companion of the Bavarians, that 
 Napoleon reserved the honour of reinstating 
 them in their country. By this disposition, 
 Napoleon would present to the Russians com- 
 ing from Munich, Bernadotte and the Bava- 
 rians, then, in case of emergency, Marmont and 
 Davout, who were to march, according to cir- 
 cumstances, either upon Munich or Ulm, to 
 assist in the complete investment of General 
 Mack. 
 
 On the following day, the 8th of October, 
 Marshal Soult ascended the Lech, on his way 
 to Augsburg. He found no enemies before 
 him. Murat and Lannes, destined to occupy 
 the space comprised between the Lech and 
 the Iller, ascended from Donauwerth to Bur- 
 gau, through a country presenting some slight" 
 obstructions, covered here and there with 
 woods, and traversed by several small rivers, 
 tributaries of the Danube. The dragoons were 
 marching at the head, when they met with a 
 hostile corps, more numerous than any which 
 they had yet seen, posted around and in ad- 
 vance of a large village called Wertingen. 
 This hostile corps was composed of six bat- 
 talions of grenadiers and three of fusileers, 
 commanded by Baron d'Auffenberg, of two 
 squadrons of Duke Albert's cuirassiers, and 
 two squadrons of Latour's light horse. They 
 had been sent on reconnaissance by General 
 Mack, on the circulation of a vague rumour 
 of the appearance of Frenchmen on the banks 
 of the Danube. He still conceived that these 
 French must belong to Bernadotte's corps, 
 posted, it was said, at Wilrzburg, to assist the 
 Bavarians. The Austrian officers were at 
 dinner when they were informed that the 
 French were in sight. They were extremely 
 
 ' COLLOREDO, JEROME, COUKT. A member of one of 
 the most distinguished families of Austria, born in 1775. 
 He was master-general of the ordnance in 1813, com- 
 
 manded the first division of the army at Him, and died in 
 1822 while commander-in-chief in Bohemia. Kncyelopa- 
 dia Americana. H.
 
 Oct. 1805.1 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 surprised, refused at first to believe the report, 
 but could not long doubt its accuracy, and 
 they mounted their horses precipitately, to put 
 themselves at the head of their troops. In ad- 
 /ance of Wertingen, there was a hamlet named 
 Hohenreichen, guarded by a few hundred Aus- 
 trians, foot and horse. Sheltered by the houses 
 of this hamlet, they kept up a galling fire, and 
 held in check a regiment of dragoons which 
 first arrived on the spot. The chef d'cscadron 
 Excellmans, the same who has since signalized 
 his name by so many brilliant acts, then no 
 more than aide-de-camp to Murat, had hastened 
 up at the sound of the firing. He induced two 
 hundred dragoons to dismount cheerfully, 
 when, musket in hand, they rushed into the 
 hamlet, and dislodged those who occupied it. 
 Fresh detachments of dragoons had mean- 
 while come up; the Austrians were pressed 
 more warmly; the assailants penetrated in 
 pursuit of them into Wertingen, passed that 
 village, and found, on a sort of plateau, the : 
 nine battalions formed into a single square, 
 of small extent, but close and deep, hav- ! 
 ing cannon and cavalry on its wings. The 
 brave chef d'escadron Excellmans immediately 
 charged this square with extraordinary bold- 
 ness, and had a horse killed under him. At 
 his side Colonel Meaupetit was upset by the 
 thrust of a bayonet. But, vigorous as was the 
 attack, there was no breaking this compact 
 mass. Some time was thus spent, the French 
 dragoons endeavouring to cut down the Aus- 
 trian grenadiers, who returned their efforts 
 with thrusts of the bayonet and the fire of their 
 pieces. Murat at length came up with the 
 bulk of his cavalry, and Lannes with Oudi- 
 not's grenadiers, both drawn in haste by the 
 reports- of the cannon. Murat immediately 
 ordered his squadrons to charge the enemy's 
 square, and Lannes directed his grenadiers 
 upon the margin of a wood which was seen 
 in the background, so as to cut off the retreat 
 of the Austrians. The latter, charged in front, 
 threatened in rear, fell back at first in a close 
 mass, but presently in disorder. If Oudinot's 
 grenadiers could have reached the ground a 
 few moments earlier, the whole of the nine 
 battalions would have been made captive. 
 Two thousand prisoners, several pieces of 
 cannon, and several colours, were nevertheless 
 taken. 
 
 Lannes and Murat, who had seen the chef 
 fescadron Excellmans at the point of the hos- 
 tile bayonets, determined to send him to Na- 
 poleon with the news of the first success ob- 
 tained, and the colours taken from the enemy. 
 The Emperor received the young and dashing 
 officer at Donauwerth, granted him rank in the 
 Legion of Honour, and delivered the insignia 
 to him in the presence of his staff, to give the 
 greater eclat to the first rewards earned in this 
 war. 
 
 On this same day, October the 8th, Marshal 
 Soult entered Augsburg, without striking a 
 blow. Marshal Davout had crossed the Danube 
 at Neuburg, and proceeded to Aichach to take 
 the intermediate position assigned to him, be- 
 tween the French corps going to invest Ulm, 
 and those going to Munich to make head 
 against the Russians. Marshal Bernadotte 
 VOL. II. 5 
 
 and General Marmont made preparations for 
 passing the Danube towards Ingolstadt, with 
 the intention of repairing to Munich. 
 
 Napoleon ordered the position of Ulm to be 
 straitened. He enjoined Marshal Ney to as- 
 cend the left bank of the Danube, and to make 
 himself master of all the bridges over the 
 river, in order to be enabled to act on both 
 banks. He directed Murat and Lannes, on 
 their side, to ascend the right bank, and to 
 contribute with Ney to the closer investment 
 of the Austrians. Next day, Marshal Ney, 
 prompt at executing the orders which he re- 
 ceived, especially when those orders brought 
 him nearer to the enemy, reached the bank of 
 the Danube, and ascended it till he was oppo- 
 site to Ulm. The first bridges that he met 
 with were those of Ganzburg. He charged 
 Malher's division to take them. 
 
 These bridges were three in number. The 
 principal was before the small town of Gilnz- 
 burg; the second above, at the village of 
 Leipheim ; the third below, at the small ham- 
 let of Reisensburg. General Malher ordered 
 them all to be attacked at once. He charged 
 the staff-officer Lefol to attack that of Leip- 
 heim with a detachment, and General Labassee 
 to attack that of Reisensburg with the 59th of 
 the line. He reserved for himself, at the head 
 of Marcognet's brigade, the attack of the prin- 
 cipal bridge, that of Giinzburg. The bed of 
 the Danube not being regularly formed in this 
 part of its course, it was necessary to cross a 
 multitude of islands and petty channels, bor- 
 dered with willows and poplars. The ad- 
 vanced guards fushed resolutely forward, 
 forded all the waters that impeded their pro- 
 gress, and took two or three hundred Tyrolese, 
 with major-general Baron d'Aspre, who com- 
 manded at this point. Our troops soon ar- 
 rived at the principal arm, over which was 
 erected the bridge of Giinzburg. The Aus- 
 trians, on retiring, had destroyed part of the 
 flooring of the bridge. General Malher would 
 have had it repaired ; but on the other bank 
 were posted several Austrian regiments, a 
 numerous artillery, and the Archduke Ferdi- 
 nand himself, who had hastened thither with 
 considerable reinforcements. The Austrians 
 began to comprehend how serious was the 
 operation undertaken on their rear, and they 
 resolved to make a strong effort to save at 
 least the bridges nearest to Ulm. They pour- 
 ed a murderous fire of musketry and artillery 
 upon the French. These, being no longer 
 screened by woody islands, and remaining un- 
 covered on the strand, endured this fire with 
 extraordinary firmness. To ford the river was 
 impossible. They clambered up the piles of 
 the bridge for the purpose of repairing it with 
 planks. But the workmen, picked off one by 
 one by the balls of the enemy, could not ac- 
 complish it, and the French lines, exposed 
 meanwhile to the fire of the Austrians, sus- 
 tained a heavy loss. General Malher made 
 them fall back to the wooded islands, in order 
 not to prolong a useless temerity. 
 
 This fruitless attempt had cost some hun- 
 dreds of men. The two other attacks were 
 made simultaneously. Impassable marshes 
 had rendered that of Leipheim impracticably
 
 34 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 That of Reisensburg had been more successful. 
 General Labassee, having at his side Colonel 
 Lacuee, commandant of the 59th, had ad- 
 vanced with this regiment to the margin of the 
 great arm of the Danube. Here also the 
 Austrians had destroyed part of the planks of 
 the bridge, but not so completely as to pre- 
 vent our soldiers from repairing and passing 
 it. The 59th crossed the bridge, took Reisens- 
 burg and the surrounding heights, in spite of 
 at least treble their force. Its colonel, La- 
 cuee, was killed there, fighting at the head of 
 his soldierts. On seeing a French regiment 
 thrown unsupported across the Danube, the 
 Austrian cavalry hastened up to the assistance 
 of the infantry, and most furiously charged the 
 39th, formed into a square. Thrice did it rush 
 upon the bayonets of that brave regiment, and 
 thrice was it stopped by the fire close to the 
 muzzles of the guns. The 59th remained 
 master of the field of battle after efforts the 
 memory of which deserves to be perpetuated. 
 
 One of the three bridges being crossed, 
 General Malher moved his whole division 
 upon Reisensburg towards evening. The 
 Austrians then did not care to persist in dis- 
 puting Giinzburg. They fell back upon Ulm 
 in the night, leaving the French 1000 prison- 
 ers and 300 wounded. Great honours were 
 paid to Colonel Lacuee. The divisions of 
 Ney's corps, assembled at Giinzburg, attended 
 his funeral on the 8th, and paid unanimous 
 regrets to his memory. Marshal Ney placed 
 Dupont's division on the left bank of the river, 
 and sent Malher's and Loison's divisions to 
 the right bank, to keep up Ae communication 
 with Lannes. 
 
 Napoleon remained till the evening of the 
 9th at Donauwerth. He then set out for Augs- 
 burg, because that was the centre for collect- 
 ing intelligence and for issuing directions. At 
 Augsburg he was between Ulm on one side 
 and Munich on the other, between the army 
 of Suabia which he was about to envelop, and 
 the Russians whose approach general rumour 
 was proclaiming. His object in staying away 
 from Ulm for a day or two was to concentrate 
 the command there ; and, from a reason of 
 relationship much more than from a reason 
 of superiority, he placed Marshals Ney and 
 Lannes under the orders of Murat, which 
 highly displeased them, and produced sad 
 bickering. These were embarrassments inse- 
 parable from the new system established in 
 France. A republic has its inconveniences, 
 which are sanguinary rivalships; and mo- 
 narchy has its inconveniences, which are fa- 
 mily compliances. Thus Murat had at his 
 disposal about 60,000 men, to keep General 
 Mack in check under the walls of Ulm. 
 
 On his arrival at Augsburg, Napoleon 
 found Marshal Soult there with the fourth 
 corps. Marshal Davoul had established him- 
 self at Aichach ; General Marmont followed 
 him ; Bernadotte was on the road to Munich. 
 The French army was in nearly the same 
 situation as it had been at Milan, when, after 
 miraculously crossing the St. Bernard it was 
 in the rear of General Melas. seeking to en- 
 vlop him, but ignorant of the route by which 
 it might catch him. The same uncertainty 
 
 prevailed in regard to the plans of General 
 Mack. Napoleon set about studying what he 
 might be templed to do in so urgent a danger, 
 and was puzzled to guess ; in fact, General 
 Mack himself did noi know it. You have 
 greater difficulty to guess the intentions of an 
 irresolute than of a resolute adversary, and if 
 the uncertainty were not likely to ruin you 
 to-morrow, it might serve you to deceive the 
 enemy to-night. In this state of doubt, Napo- 
 leon attributed to General Mack the most rea- 
 sonable design, that of retreating through the 
 Tyrol. That general, in fact, if he directed 
 his course to Memmingen, on the left of the 
 position of Ulm, would have but two or three 
 marches to make in order to reach the Tyrol 
 by way of Kempten. He would thus connect 
 himself with the army which was guarding 
 the chain of the Alps, and with that which 
 occupied Italy. He would save himself and 
 contribute to form a mass of 200,000 men, a 
 mass always formidable, what position soever 
 it occupies on the genera) theatre of opera- 
 tions. He would, at any rate, escape a catas- 
 trophe for ever celebrated in the annals of 
 war. 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, attributed to him this 
 design, without dwelling upon another idea 
 which General Mack might have conceived, 
 and which he did conceive for a moment, that 
 of fleeing by the left bank of the Danube, 
 guarded by only one of the divisions of Mar- 
 shal Ney, Dupont's division. This desperate 
 step was the least supposable, for it required 
 extraordinary boldness. It could not be taken 
 without crossing the route which the French 
 had followed, and which was still covered 
 with their equipages and their depots; and it 
 would perhaps expose those who had to exe- 
 cute it to the danger of meeting with them 
 en masse, and fighting their way through them 
 in order to retreat into Bohemia. Napoleon 
 did not admit such a probability, and con- 
 cerned himself only about barring the routes 
 to the Tyrol. Accordingly, he ordered Mar- 
 shal Soult to ascend the Lech to Landsberg, 
 for the purpose of occupying Memmingen, 
 and intercepting the road from Memmingen to 
 Kempten. He sent General Marmont's corps 
 to Augsburg, to take the place of Marshal 
 Soult's. In that city he likewise established 
 his guard, which habitually accompanied the 
 head-quarters. There he awaited the move- 
 ments of his different corps-d'armee, rectify- 
 ing their march whenever that was needed. 
 
 Bernadolte, pushing the rear-guard of Kien- 
 mayer, entered Munich on the morning of the 
 12th, precisely a month after the invasion of 
 the Austrians and the retreat of the Bavari- 
 ans. He took about a thousand prisoners 
 from the enemy's detachment, which he 
 pushed before him. The Bavarians, trans- 
 ported with joy, received the French with ve- 
 hement applause. It was impossible to come 
 either more expeditiously or more surely to 
 the aid of their allies, especially when they 
 had been a few days before at the extremity 
 of the continent, on the shores of the Chan- 
 nel. Napoleon wrote immediately to the elec- 
 tor, to induce him to return to his capital. 
 He invited him to come back with the whole
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 Bavarian army, which would have been use- 
 less a* Wurzburg, and which was destined to 
 occupy the line of the Inn conjointly with Ber- 
 nadotte's corps. Napoleon recommended that 
 it should be employed in making reconnais- 
 sances, because the country was familiar to it, 
 and it could give the best intelligence respect- 
 ing the march of the Russians, who were com- 
 ing by the road from Vienna to Munich. 
 
 Marshal Soult, sent towards Landsberg, met 
 with nothing there but Prince Ferdinand's 
 cuirassiers, who fell back upon UJm by forced 
 marches. So great was the ardour of our 
 troops, that the 26th chasseurs were not afraid 
 to measure their strength with the Austrian 
 heavy cavalry, and took from it an entire 
 squadron, with two pieces of cannon. This 
 rencounter evidently proved that the Austri- 
 ans, instead of running away towards the 
 Tyrol, were concentrating themselves behind 
 the I-ller, between the Memmingen and Ulm, 
 and that they would there find a new bat- 
 tle of Marengo. Napoleon prepared to fight 
 it with the greatest possible mass of his 
 forces. He supposed that it might take place 
 on the 13th or 14th of October, but not being 
 hurried, as the Austrians did not take the 
 initiative, he preferred the 14th, that he might 
 have more time for collecting his troops. 
 He first modified the position of Marshal Da- 
 vout, whom he moved from Aichach to Da- 
 chau, so that this marshal, in an advantageous 
 post between Augsburg and Munich, could, in 
 three or four hours, either advance to Munich, to 
 oppose, with Bernadotte and the Bavarians, 
 60,000 combatants to the Russians, or fall back 
 towards Augsburg, to second Napoleon in his 
 operations against the army of General Mack. 
 Having taken these precautions on his rear, 
 Napoleon made the following dispositions on 
 his front, with a view to that supposed battle 
 of the 14th. He ordered Marshal Soult to be 
 established on the 13th at Memmingen, press- 
 ing that position with his left, and connecting 
 himself by his right with the corps which 
 were about to be moved upon the Iller. He 
 sent his guard to Weissenhorn, whither he 
 resolved to proceed himself. He hoped in 
 this manner to assemble 100,000 men in a 
 space of ten leagues, from Memmingen to 
 Ulm. The troops, in fact, being able in one 
 day to make a march of five leagues and to 
 fight, it was easy for him to collect on one and 
 the same field of battle, the corps of Ney, 
 Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Soult, and the guard. 
 Fate, however, reserved for him a totally dif- 
 ferent triumph, from that which he anticipated, 
 a newer triumph, and not less astonishing for 
 its vast consequences. 
 
 Napoleon left Augsburg on the 12th, at 11 
 o'clock at night, for Weissenhorn. On the 
 road he fell in with Marmont's troops, com- 
 posed of French and Dutch, overwhelmed 
 with fatigue, laden at once with their arms, 
 and their rations of provisions for several 
 
 UIJPONT. A French general of division of some abi- 
 lity and high renown, which at a later period he lost in 
 Spain, by the surrender of Baylen, in 180S, in which twen- 
 ty thousand of the bst troops of France laid down their 
 arms to the Spaniards under Reding and Castanos. On 
 his return to France thereafter, he, with all the other uiii- 
 
 days. The weather, which had been fine till 
 the passage of the Danube, had become fright- 
 ful. Thick snow, melting as it fell, was con- 
 verted into mud, and rendered the roads im- 
 passable. All the little streams which run 
 into the Danube were overflowed. The sol- 
 diers proceeded through absolute bogs, fre- 
 quently impeded in their march by convoys 
 of artillery. Nevertheless, not a murmur 
 was heard. Napoleon stopped to harangue 
 them : he made them form a circle around 
 him, explained to them the situation of the 
 enemy, and the manoeuvre by which he had 
 surrounded them, and promised them a tri- 
 umph as glorious as that of Marengo. The 
 soldiers, intoxicated by his speech, proud of 
 seeing the greatest captain of the age explain 
 his plans to them, burst forth into the most 
 vehement transports of enthusiasm, and re- 
 plied by unanimous shouts of " Vive CEmpe- 
 reur .'" They resumed their march, impatient 
 to assist in the great battle. Those who had 
 heard the words of the Emperor repeated 
 them to those who had not heard them, and 
 they cried, with joy, that it was all over with 
 the Austrians, and that they would be taken 
 to the last man. 
 
 It was high time for Napoleon to return to 
 the Danube, for his orders, misunderstood by 
 Murat, would have led to disasters if the Aus- 
 trians had been more enterprising. 
 
 While Lannes and Murat were investing 
 Ulm on the right bank of the Danube, Ney, 
 continuing a cheval on the river, had two divi- 
 sions on the right bank, and one only, that of 
 General Dupont,' on the left bank. On ap- 
 proaching Ulm, to invest it, Ney had perceived 
 the defect of such a situation. Enlightened 
 by incidents of which he had a closer view, 
 guided by a happy instinct for war, confirmed 
 in his opinion by Colonel Jomini, a staff-offi- 
 cer of the highest merit, Ney had discovered 
 the danger of leaving but one division on the 
 left bank of the river. Why, said he, should 
 not the Austrians seize the opportunity for 
 flight on the left bank, trampling under foot 
 our equipages and our parks, which would 
 certainly not oppose any great resistance to 
 them 1 Murat would not admit that such a 
 thing could happen, and, appealing to the mis- 
 construed letters of the Emperor, who, expect- 
 ing a serious affair on the Iller, ordered all the 
 troops to be concentrated there, he was even 
 on the point of concluding that it was wrong 
 to leave Dupont's division on the left bank, 
 since that division must be away from the 
 place of action on the day of the great battle. 
 This difference of opinion gave rise to a warm 
 altercation between Ney and Murat. Ney was 
 mortified to have to obey a superior, whom he 
 thought below himself by his talents, if he 
 was above him by the imperial relationship. 
 Murat, filled with pride at his new rank, proud 
 above all of being admitted to a more particu- 
 lar acquaintance with the intentions of Napo- 
 
 cers, was cast into prison, where he lingered many years, 
 without trial or investigation, until 1812, when a court of 
 inquiry sat on the generals, and condemned them all. It 
 is, perhaps, but just here to add that public opinion did 
 not support their decision. Alison's Europe. H.
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 leon, made Marshal Ney feel his official supe- 
 riority, and at last went so far as to give him 
 absolute orders. But for mutual friends, these 
 two lieutenants of the Emperor would have 
 decided their quarrel in a manner not at all 
 consistent with their position. This alterca- 
 tion led to the issue of contradictory orders to. ' 
 Dupont's division, and to a situation that was ! 
 perilous for it. But, fortunately, while the 
 dispute respecting the post fittest for it to oc- 
 cupy was going forward, it was extricated 
 from the danger into which an error of Murat's { 
 had thrown it by an ever memorable battle. 
 
 General Mack, who could not entertain 
 further doubt of his fate, had made a change 
 of front. Instead of having his right at Ulm, 
 he had his left there ; instead of having his I 
 left at Memmingen, he had his right there. 
 Still supported on the Iller, he turned his back 
 to France, as if he had come from it, while . 
 Napoleon turned his on Austria, as if that had ' 
 been the point from which he started. This ! 
 would be the natural position of the two gene- 
 rals, one of whom has turned the other. Gene- 
 ral Mack, after drawing to him the troops dis- 
 persed in Suabia, as well as those which had 
 returned beaten from Wertingen and Giinzburg, 
 had left some detachments on the Iller from 
 Memmingen to Ulm, and had assembled the 
 greater part of his forces at Ulm itself, in the 
 entrenched camp which overlooks that city. 
 
 The reader is acquainted with the situation 
 and the formof this camp, which has been 
 already described in this history. At this 
 point the left bank of the Danube is much 
 higher than the right bank. While the right 
 bank presents a marshy plain, slightly inclined 
 towards the river, the left bank, on the con- 
 trary, presents a series of heights laid out 
 terrace-fashion, and washed by the Danube, 
 nearly in the same manner as the terrace of 
 St. Germain is washed by the Seine. The 
 Michaelsberg is the principal of these heights. 
 The Austrians were encamped there to the 
 number of about 60,000, having the city of 
 Ulm at their feet. 
 
 General Dupont, who was left alone on the 
 left bank, and who, agreeably to the orders of 
 Marshal Ney, was to approach nearer to Ulm 
 on the morning of the 1 1th of October, had 
 advanced within sight of that place by the 
 Albeck road. It was the very moment which 
 Murat and Ney, meeting at Giinzburg, were 
 spending in contention, and which Napoleon, 
 hastening to Augsburg, was employing in 
 making his general dispositions. General Du- 
 pont, on reaching the village of Haslach, from 
 which the Michaelsberg is seen in its full 
 extent, discovered there 60,000 Austrians in an 
 imposing attitude. The last marches, per- 
 formed in the worst weather and with extreme 
 rapidity, had reduced his division to 6000 
 men. There had, however, been left him Ba- 
 raguay d'Hillier's dismounted dragoons, who, 
 during the journey from the Rhine to the 
 Danube, had been assigned not to Murat, but 
 to Marshal Ney. This was a reinforcement 
 of 5000 men, which might have been of great 
 service, if it had not remained at Languenau, 
 three leagues in the rear. 
 General Dupont, having come in sight of the 
 
 Michaelsberg and the 60,000 Austrians who 
 occupied it, found himself before them, with 
 three regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, 
 and a few pieces of cannon. That officer, 
 since so unfortunate, was seized at this sight 
 by an inspiration, which would do honour to 
 the greatest generals. He judged that, if he 
 fell back, he should betray his weakness, and 
 be soon surrounded by 10,000 horse, despatched 
 in pursuit of him ; that if, on the contrary, he 
 performed an act of daring, he might deceive 
 the Austrians, persuade them that he was the 
 advanced-guard of the French army, oblige 
 them to be circumspect, and thus gain time 
 to retrieve the wrong step into which he had 
 been led. 
 
 In consequence, he immediately made his 
 dispositions for fighting. On his left he had 
 the village of Haslach, surrounded by a small 
 wood. There he placed the 32d, which had 
 become celebrated in Italy, and commanded, 
 at this period, by Colonel Darricau, the 1st 
 hussars, and part of his artillery. On his 
 right, backed in like manner upon a wood, he 
 placed the 96th of the line, commanded by 
 Colonel Meunier, and the 17th dragoons. A 
 little in advance of his right, he had the village 
 of Jungingen, surrounded also by a few clumps 
 of wood, and he ordered it to be occupied by a 
 detachment. 
 
 In this position General Dupont received 
 the Austrians, detached to the number of 
 25,000, under the Archduke Ferdinand, to fight 
 a division of 6000 French. General Dupont, 
 still under the influence of a happy inspiration 
 on this occasion, soon perceived that his divi- 
 sion would be destroyed by the musketry alone, 
 if he suffered the Austrians to deploy their line 
 and to extend their fire. Then, combining the 
 daring of a vigorous execution with the daring 
 of a great resolution, he ordered the two regi- 
 ments of his right, the 96th of the line and the 
 9th light, to charge with the bayonet. At the 
 signal given by him, these two brave regiments 
 moved off", and marched with bayonet lowered, 
 upon the first Austrian line. They overturned 
 it, threw it into disorder, and took 1500 pri- 
 soners, who were sent to the left, to be shut up 
 in the village of Haslach. General Dupont, 
 after this feat, placed himself again in position 
 with his two regiments, and awaited immov- 
 ably the sequel of this extraordinary combat. 
 But the Aastrians, not choosing to admit them- 
 selves to be beaten, returned to the attack with 
 fresh troops. Our soldiers advanced a second 
 time with the bayonet, repulsed the assailants, 
 and again took numerous prisoners. Dis- 
 gusted with these useless attacks in front, the 
 Austrians directed all their efforts against our 
 wings. They marched upon the village of 
 Haslach, which covered. the left of Dupont's 
 division, and which contained their prisoners. 
 The 32d, whose turn was come to fight, vigor- 
 ously disputed that village with them, and 
 drove them from it, while the 1st hussars, 
 vying with the infantry, made impetuous 
 charges on the repulsed columns. The Aus- 
 trians did not confine themselves to the attack 
 of Haslach ; they made an attempt on the other 
 wing, and endeavoured to take the village of 
 Jungingen, situated on the right of General
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 37 
 
 Dnpont. Favoured by numbers, they pene- 
 trated into it and made themselves masters of 
 the place for a moment. General Dupont, 
 appreciating the danger, caused Jungingen to 
 be attacked by the 9th, by which it was re- 
 taken. Again it was wrested from him, and 
 again he retook it. This village was thus 
 carried by main force five times consecutively, 
 and in the confusion of these repeated attacks, 
 the French made each time some prisoners. 
 Buf while the Austrians were exhausting 
 themselves in impotent efforts against this 
 handful of soldiers, their immense cavalry, 
 dashing away in all directions, fell upon the 
 7th dragoons, charged it several times, killed 
 its colonel, the gallant St. Dizier, and obliged 
 it to retire into the wood against which it was 
 backed. A host of Austrian horse then spread 
 itself over the surrounding plateaux, galloped 
 to the village of Albeck, from which Dupont's 
 division had started, took its baggage, which 
 Baraguay d'Hilliers' dragoons ought to have 
 defended, and thus picked up some vulgar 
 trophies, a sad consolation for a defeat sus- 
 tained by 25,000 men against 6000. 
 
 It became urgent to put an end to so perilous 
 an engagement. General Dupont, having fa- 
 tigued the Austrians by an obstinate fight of 
 five hours, hastened to take advantage of the 
 night to retire upon Albeck. Thither he 
 inarched in good order, preceded by 4000 pri- 
 soners. 
 
 If General Dupont, in fighting this extra- 
 ordinary battle, had not stopped the Austrians, 
 they would have fled into Bohemia, and one 
 of Napoleon's most splendid combinations 
 would have been completely frustrated. It is 
 a proof that great generals ought to have great 
 soldiers ; for the most illustrious captains 
 often need their troops to repair by their 
 heroism either the hazards of war or the errors 
 which genius itself is liable to commit. 
 
 This rencounter with a part of the French 
 army produced stormy deliberations at the 
 head-quarters of the Austrians. They were 
 informed of the presence of Marshal Soult at 
 Landsberg; they supposed that General Du- 
 pont was not alone at Albeck, and they began 
 to believe that they were surrounded on all 
 sides. General Mack, on whom the Austrians 
 have endeavoured to throw all the shame of 
 their disaster, had fallen into a perturbation of 
 mind easily to be conceived. Whatever judges 
 who have reasoned after the event may say, it 
 would have required nothing less to save him 
 than an inspiration from Heaven, to reveal to 
 him all at once the weakness of the corps 
 v/hich was before him, and the possibility, by 
 crushing it, of retiring to Bohemia. The un- 
 fortunate general, who knew not what has 
 since become known, and who had no reason 
 to think that the French were so weak on the 
 left bank, fell to deliberating with the illustri- 
 ous companion of his melancholy fate, the 
 Archduke Ferdinand. He wasted precious 
 time in agitations of mind, and could not re- 
 solve either to flee towards Bohemia by cutting 
 his way through Dupont's division, or to re- 
 treat towards the Tyrol by forcing a passage 
 at Memmingen. The measure which to him 
 appeared the safest was to establish himself 
 
 still more solidly in the position of Ulm, to 
 concentrate his army there, and there await, 
 in a large mass difficult to be carried by as- 
 sault, the arrival of the Russians by Munich, 
 or of the Archduke Charles by the Tyrol. He 
 said to himself that General Kienmayer with 
 20,000 Austrians, General Kutusof with 60,000 
 Russians, would soon appear on the road from 
 Munich ; that the Archduke John, with the 
 corps of the Tyrol, and even the Archduke 
 Charles, with the army of Italy, could not fail 
 to hasten to his succour by way of Kempten, 
 and that then it would be Napoleon who would 
 be in danger, for he would be pressed between 
 80,000 Austro-Russians, coming from Austria, 
 25,000 Austrians descending from the Tyrol, 
 and 70,000 Austrians encamped below Ulm, 
 which would make 175,000 men. But it would 
 have been necessary that all these different 
 junctions should be effected in spite of Napo- 
 leon, placed in the centre, with 160,000 French 
 accustomed to conquer. In misfortune, one 
 catches eagerly at the slightest glimmer of 
 hope ; and General Mack believed even the 
 false reports made to him by the spies sent by 
 Napoleon. These spies told him sometimes 
 that a landing of English at Boulogne would 
 recall the French immediately to the Rhine, 
 sometimes that the Russians and the Archduke 
 Charles were debouching by the Munich roacL 
 
 In difficult situations, subordinate persons 
 become bold and talkative ; they censure their 
 superiors and form opinions of their own. 
 General Mack had about him subordinates, 
 who were nobles of high distinction, and who 
 were not afraid to raise their voices. Some 
 were for making off into Tyrol, others into 
 Wurtemberg, and others into Bohemia. These 
 last, who were right by accident, adduced the 
 battle of Haslach to prove that the route to 
 Bohemia was open. The usual effect of con- 
 tradiction on an agitated mind is to weaken it 
 still more, and to produce half-measures, always 
 the most fatal of any. General Mack, in order 
 to grant something to the opinions which 
 he combated, took two very singular resolu- 
 tions for a man who had decided to remain at 
 Ulm. He sent Jellachich's division to Mem- 
 mingen, to reinforce that post which General 
 Spangen w&s guarding with 5000 men, with 
 the intention of thus keeping himself in com- 
 munication with the Tyrol. He despatched 
 General Riesc to occupy the heights of Elch- 
 ingen, with an entire division, in order to ex- 
 tend himself on the left bank, and to attempt 
 a strong reconnaissance on the communica- 
 tions of the French. 
 
 To remain at Ulm and wait for succours, 
 and to fight a defensive battle there in case 
 of emergency, he ought to have remained 
 there en masse, and not to have sent corps to 
 the two extremities of the line which he oc- 
 cupied, for that was the way to expose them 
 to be destroyed one after another. Be this as 
 it may, General Mack directed General Riesc 
 to occupy the convent of Elchingen, which is 
 situated on the heights of the left bank, quite 
 close to Haslach, where the fight of the llth 
 had taken place. At the foot of these heights, 
 and below the convent, was a bridge whjch 
 Murat had sent a French detachment to occu- 
 1)
 
 38 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 py. The Austrians had previously attempted ' 
 to destroy it. Murat's detachment, in order to ' 
 cover itself on the approach of the troops of 
 General Riesc, completed its destruction by 
 burning it. There were still left, however, the 
 piles driven into the river, and which the wa- 
 ter had saved from the conflagration. Thus 
 the French army was without communication 
 with the left bank otherwise than by the 
 bridges of Giinzburg, situated far below 
 Elchingen. Dupont's division had retired to 
 Langenau. Retreat was, therefore, open to 
 the Austrians. Luckily they were ignorant 
 of that. 
 
 It was during these transactions that Napo- 
 leon, leaving Augsburg in the night of the 
 12th of October, reached Ulm on the 13th. 
 No sooner had he arrived than he visited on 
 horseback, in terrible weather, all the posi- 
 tions occupied by his lieutenants. He found 
 them extremely irritated against one another, 
 and maintaining totally different opinions. 
 Lannes, whose judgment was sound and per- 
 spicacious in war, had concluded, like Mar- 
 shal Ney, that, instead of intending to accept 
 battle on the Iller, the Austrians were rather 
 meditating an escape into Bohemia, on the 
 left bank, by fighting their way through Du- 
 pont's division. If Napoleon could entertain 
 any doubts when at a distance from the spot, 
 he had none whatever when on the spot itself. 
 Besides, in ordering the left bank to be 
 watched, and Dupont's division to be placed 
 there, he went away without saying that One 
 ought not to leave this division there without 
 support, without securing, above all things, 
 the means of passing from one bank to the 
 other, for the purpose of succouring it if it 
 were attacked. Thus the instructions of Na- 
 poleon had not been better understood than 
 the situation itself. He coincided, therefore, 
 entirely with Marshals Ney and Lannes 
 against Murat, and gave instructions for re- 
 pairing immediately the egregious blunders 
 committed during the preceding days. He 
 resolved to re-establish the communications 
 of the right bank with the left bank by the 
 bridge nearest to Ulm, that of Elchingen. 
 One might have descended as far as Giinz- 
 burg, which belonged to us, repassed the Da- 
 nube there, and ascended again, with Dupont's 
 division reinforced, to Ulm. But this would 
 have been a very lengthened movement, 
 which would have left the Austrians abun- 
 dant time to escape. It was far preferable, at 
 break of day on the 14th, to re-establish by 
 main force the bridge of Elchingen, which 
 was close at hand, and to cross in sufficient 
 
 1 LOISON, OLIVER. A native of Domvilliers, the son of 
 an attorney. He entered the French guards and was one 
 of the first in that regiment who deserted the king. On 
 the formation of the National Guard, he desired to be 
 nominated an officer, but being refused by Lafayette, in 
 consequence of his inability to read or write, he accused 
 him at the Jacobins. On the 10th of Augnst, 1792, he led 
 the mob which attacked tlu Tuileries. In 1795, he was 
 general of brigade, and served Napoleon in the affair of 
 the Sections. He subsequently joined Massena's army in 
 Switzerland and was made general of division. In the 
 campaign of 1805, he distinguished himself so much that 
 he was made governor of Munster and Osnabruck, in 
 A liirh office he greatly enriched himself. In 1808, he 
 
 number to the left bank, while General Du- 
 pont, instructed to that effect, should ascend 
 from Langenau towards Albeck and Ulm. 
 
 Napoleon gave his orders in consequence 
 for the next day, the 14th. Marshal Soulthad 
 been moved to the extremity of the line of the 
 Iller towards Memmingen ; General Marmont 
 advanced intermediately on the Iller. Lannes, 
 Ney, and Murat, united below Ulm, were to 
 place themselves a cheval on both banks of the 
 Danube, in order to give a hand to Dupont's 
 division, alone on the left bank. But for this 
 purpose it was requisite to re-establish the 
 bridge of Elchingen. For Ney was reserved 
 the honour of executing, in the morning of 
 the 14th, the vigorous operation which was to 
 put us again in possession of both banks of 
 the river. 
 
 This intrepid marshal was deeply mortified 
 by some indiscreet expressions used by Murat 
 in the recent altercation which he had with 
 him. Murat, as if impatient of too long argu- 
 ments, had told him that he understood nothing 
 of all the plans that were explained to him, 
 and that it was his own custom not to make 
 his till he was facing the enemy. This was the 
 proud answer which a man of action might 
 have addressed to an empty babbler. Marshal 
 Ney, on horseback early in the morning of the 
 14th, in full uniform, and wearing his decora- 
 tions, laid hold of Murat's arm, and shaking 
 him violently before the whole staff, and be- 
 fore the Emperor himself, said haughtily, 
 "Come, prince, come along with me and make 
 your plans in face of the enemy." Then, gal- 
 loping to the Danube, he went, amidst a shower 
 of balls and grape, having the water up to his 
 horse's bdly, to direct the perilous operation 
 ! assigned to him. 
 
 This operation consisted in repairing the 
 bridge, of^vhich nothing was left but the piles 
 without flooring, passing it, crossing a small 
 meadow that lay between the Danube and the) 
 foot of the eminence, then making himself 
 master of the village with the convent of El- 
 chingen, which rose amphitheatrically, and 
 was guarded by 20,000 men and a formidable 
 artillery. 
 
 Marshal Ney, undaunted by all these ob- 
 stacles, ordered an aide-de-camp of General 
 Loison's, 1 Captain Coisel, and a sapper to lay 
 hold of the first plank and carry it to the piles 
 of the bridge, for the purpose of re-establish- 
 ing the pas'sage, under the fire of the Aus- 
 trians. The brave sapper had a leg carried 
 away by a grape-shot, but his place was im- 
 mediately supplied. One plank was first thrown 
 in the form of flooring, then a second and a 
 
 served under Junot in his invasion of Portugal, in which 
 he distinguished himself equally by his ability and by his 
 atrocious barbarity and shameful rapacity. The massa- 
 cre of Evora, in which 8000 Portuguese men, women, 
 and children, and thirty-eight priests were butchered in 
 cold blood, will never be forgotten. In 1813, he was em- 
 ployed under Davout in Hamburg, where his cruelty and 
 his skill were equally apparent. In 1814, he was serving 
 under Soult, and with that marshal gave in his adhesion 
 to Louis. He served Napoleon zealously during the hun- 
 dred days, and after Waterloo fled to Liege, near which 
 town he had a valuable estate on which he died in 1816. 
 Court and Camp of JVajioleon. B.
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 30 
 
 third. Having finished one length, they pro- 
 ceeded to the next, till they had covered the 
 last piles under a murderous fire of small 
 arms, poured upon our labourers by skilful 
 marksmen on the opposite bank. Immediately 
 the voltigeurs of the 6th light, the grenadiers 
 of the 30th, and a company of carabineers, 
 without waiting for the bridge to be made com- 
 pletely firm, threw themselves to the other side 
 of the Danube, dispersed the Austrians who 
 guarded the left bank, and cleared a sufficient 
 space for Loison's division to come to their 
 assistance. 
 
 Marshal Ney then ordered the 39th and the 
 6lh light to cross to the other bank of the river. 
 He directed General Villatte to put himself at 
 the head of the 39th, and to extend himself on 
 the right in the meadow, in order to make the 
 Austrians evacuate it, while he himself, with 
 the 6th light, would take the convent. The 
 39th stopped while passing the bridge by the 
 French cavalry, which rushed across it with 
 ardour, was prevented from getting over entire. 
 The 1st battalion alone of that regiment was 
 able to execute the order which it had received. 
 It had to sustain the charges of the Austrian 
 cavalry and the attack of three hostile bat- 
 talions; it was even forced back for a mo- 
 ment, after an obstinate resistance, to the head 
 of the bridge. But, being soon succoured by 
 its second battalion, joined by the 69th and 
 the 76th of the line, it recovered the lost 
 ground, remained master of the whole of the 
 meadow on the right, and obliged the Aus- ! 
 trians to regain the heights. Meanwhile Ney, ; 
 at the head of the 6th light, was pushing on 
 through the steep and crooked streets of the ! 
 village of Elchingen, under a downward fire 
 from the houses, which were full of infantry. , 
 He wrested the village, house by house, from 
 the hands of the Austrians, and stormed the 
 convent, which is on the summit of the height. 
 Arrived at this place, he had before him the 
 undulateu plateaux, interspersed with wood, on 
 which Dupont's division had fought on the 
 1 1th. These plateaux extend to the Michaels- 
 berg, above the very city of Ulna. Ney re- 
 solved to establish himself there, lest he might 
 he tumbled into the Danube by an offensive 
 return of the enemy. A large patch of wood 
 came 10 the margin of the height, close 'up to 
 the convent and the village of Elchingen. 
 Ney determined to make himself master of it, 
 in oider to appuy his left there. He purposed, 
 his left being well secured, to revolve upon it 
 and to move forward his right. He threw 
 into the wood the 69th of the line, which 
 plunged into it in spite of a brisk fire of 
 musketry. While a furious fight was kept up 
 in that quarter, the rest of the Austrian corps 
 was formed into several squares of two or 
 three thousand men each. Ney ordered them 
 to be attacked by the dragoons, followed by 
 the infantry in column. The 18th dragoons 
 made so vigorous a charge upon one of them 
 as to break it and to compel it to lay down its 
 arms. At this sight, the Austrians retired in 
 great haste, and fled at first towards Haslach, 
 and then proceeded to rally on the Michaels- 
 berg. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Duo< nt. marching from 
 
 Langenau towards Albeck, had fallen in with 
 the corps of Werneck, one of those which had 
 left Ulm on the preceding day, with the inten- 
 tion of pushing reconnaissances on the left 
 bank of the Danube, and seeking means of 
 retreat for the Austrian army. On hearing 
 the cannon on his rear, General Werneck had 
 turned back and proceeded to the Michaels- 
 berg by the road from Albeck to Ulm. He ar- 
 rived there at the very moment when Dupout's 
 division was repairing thither on its side, and 
 when Marshal Ney was taking the heights of 
 Elchingen. A new combat ensued at this 
 point between General Werneck, who wished 
 to get back to Ulm, and General Dupont, who 
 wished, on the contrary, to prevent him. The 
 32d and the 9th light rushed in close column 
 upon the infantry of the Austrians and re- 
 pulsed it, while the 96th received in square 
 the charges of their cavalry. The day closed 
 amidst this fray, Marshal Nay having glori- 
 ously reconquered the left bank, and General 
 Dupont having cut off the retreat of Wer- 
 neck's corps to Ulm. Three thousand pri- 
 soners and a great quantity of artillery had 
 been taken. But what was still more import- 
 ant, the Austrians were definitively shut up in 
 Ulm, and this time without any chance of 
 escape, should even the happiest inspiration 
 visit them at this last moment. 
 
 During these occurrences on the left bank, 
 Lannes had approached Ulm on the right bank, 
 General Marmont had advanced towards the 
 Iller, and Marshal Soult, pressing the extremity 
 of the position of the Austrians, had taken 
 Memmingen. The enemy was still engaged in 
 palisading that city when Marshal Soult arrived 
 there. He had rapidly invested it, and obliged 
 General Spangen to lay down his arms with 
 5000 men, the whole of his artillery, and a 
 great number of horses. General Jellachich, 
 hastening up, but loo late, to the relief of Mem- 
 mingen with his division, finding himself in 
 face of a corps-d'armee of 30,000 men, retired, 
 not upon Ulm, fearing that he should not be 
 able to regain it, but upon Kempten and the 
 Tyrol. Marshal Soult immediately proceeded 
 towards Ochsenhausen, to complete on all sides 
 the investment of the fortress and the en- 
 trenched camp of Ulm. 
 
 Such was the situation at the close of day 
 on the 14th of October. After the departure 
 of General Jellachich and the different actions 
 which had been fought, General Mack was re- 
 duced to 50,000 men. From this must be de- 
 ducted Werneck's corps, separated from him by 
 Dupont's division. That unfortunate general 
 found himself, therefore, in a desperate posi- 
 tion. There was no elegible course for him 
 to pursue. His only resource was to rush 
 sword in hand upon one of the points of the 
 circle of iron in which he had been enclosed, 
 and to perish or to open an outlet for himself. 
 To throw himself upon Ney and Dupont would 
 still have b-en the least disastrous step to take. 
 To a certainty he would have been beaten, for 
 Lannes and Murat would have hastened by 
 the bridge of Elchingen to the assistance of 
 Ney and Dupont, and there needed not such 
 an assemblage of forces to conquer disheart- 
 ened soldiers. Still the honour of the arms
 
 40 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 would have been saved, and, next to victory, 
 that is the most important result that one can 
 obtain. But General Mack persisted in his 
 resolution of concentrating himself in Ulm, 
 and waiting there for the succour of the Rus- 
 sians. He had to endure violent attacks from 
 Prince Schwarzenberg and the Archduke Fer- 
 dinand. The latter, in particular, was deter- 
 mined to escape at any risk the misfortune of 
 being made prisoner. General Mack produced 
 the powers of the Emperor, which, in case of 
 difference of opinion, conferred on him the su- 
 preme authority. This was enough to render 
 him responsible, not to make him be obeyed. 
 The Archduke Ferdinand resolved, thanks to 
 his less dependent position, to withdraw him- 
 self from the authority of the general-in-chief. 
 When night came on, he chose that gate of 
 Ulm which exposed him to the least risk of 
 encountering the French, and started with six 
 or seven thousand horse and a corps of infan- 
 try, with the intention of joining General Wer- 
 neck and escaping through the Upper Palati- 
 nate to Bohemia. By uniting General Wer- 
 neck's corps to the detachment which accom- 
 panied him he took from General Mack about 
 20,000 men, and left him in Ulm with 30,000 
 only, blockaded on all sides and forced to lay 
 down his arms in the most ignominious man- 
 ner. 
 
 It has been falsely alleged that the depar- 
 ture of the prince proved the possibility of es- 
 caping from Ulm. In the first place, it is 
 most improbable that the whole army, with its 
 artillery and its matdriel, could slip away like 
 a mere detachment, composed for the greater 
 part of horse soldiers. But what happened a 
 few days afterwards to the Archduke Ferdi- 
 nand proves that the army itself would have 
 plunged into ruin in this flight. The grand 
 fault lay in dividing itself. It ought to have 
 remained or gone forth altogether remained 
 to fight an obstinate battle with 70,000 men ; 
 gone forth to rush with these 70,000 men 
 upon one of the points of the investment, and 
 there to find either death or the success which 
 fortune sometimes grants to despair. But to 
 divide, some to flee with Jellachich to the Ty- 
 rol, others to escort the flight of a prince into 
 Bohemia, others again to sign a capitulation at 
 Ulm, was of all modes of proceeding the most 
 deplorable. For the rest, experience teaches 
 that, in these situations, the dejected human 
 mind, when it has begun to descend, descends 
 so low that among all courses it takes the 
 worst. It is right to add that General Mack 
 has since invariably asserted that he disap- 
 
 proved of this division of the Austrian forces 
 and of these separate retreats.' 
 
 Napoleon passed the night between the 14th 
 and 15th in the convent of Elchingen. On 
 the morning of the 15th, he resolved to bring 
 the affair to a close, and gave orders to Mar- 
 shal Ney to storm the heights of Michaelsberg. 
 These heights, situated in advance of Ulm 
 when you go along the left bank, overlook 
 that city, which, as we have said, is seated at 
 their foot, on the very margin of the Danube. 
 Lannes had passed with his corps by the 
 bridge of Elchingen, and flanked the attack 
 of Ney. He was to take the Frauenberg, a 
 neighbouring height to the Michaelsberg. Na- 
 poleon was on the ground, having Lannes 
 near him, observing, on the one hand, the 
 positions which Ney was going to attack at 
 the head of his regiments, and on the other, 
 casting his eyes down on the city of Ulm, 
 situated in the bottom. All at once, a battery 
 ! unmasked by the Austrians poured its grape- 
 shot upon the imperial group. Lannes abruptly 
 seized the reins of Napoleon's horse, to lead 
 him out of the galling fire. Napoleon, who 
 did not seek the fire, neither did he shun it, 
 who approached it no nearer than was neces- 
 sary in order to judge of things by his own 
 eyes, placed himself in such a manner as to 
 see the action with less danger. Ney set his 
 columns in motion, climbed the entrench- 
 ments raised on the Michaelsberg, and carried 
 them with the bayonet. Napoleon, fearing 
 that Ney's attack would be too prompt, wished 
 to slacken it, in order to give Lannes time to 
 assault the Frauenberg, and thus to divide the 
 enemy's attention. " Glory is not to be divided," 
 was Ney's answer to General Dumas, who 
 brought him the order to wait for the assist- 
 ance of Lannes, and he continued his march, 
 surmounted all obstacles, and reached with 
 his corps the back of the heights just above 
 the city of Ulm. Lannes, on his part, carried 
 the Frauenberg, and, joining, they descended 
 together to approach the walls of the place. 
 In the ardour which hurried away the attack- 
 ing columns, the 17th light, under the com- 
 mand of Colonel Vedel, of Suchet's division, 
 scaled the bastion of the place nearest to the 
 river, and established itself there. But the 
 Austrians, perceiving the hazardous position 
 of that regiment, fell upon it, repulsed it, and 
 took from it some prisoners. 
 
 Napoleon thought it right to suspend the 
 combat, and to defer till the morrow the busi- 
 ness of summoning the place, and, if it re- 
 sisted, to take it by assault. In the course of 
 
 1 The Austrians have never published any account of 
 their operations in this first part of the compaign of 1805. 
 Many works, however, have appeared in Germany, the 
 writers of which have made a point of abusing General 
 Mack and extolling the Archduke Ferdinand, in order to 
 account by the silliness of a single individual for the 
 disaster of the Austrian army, and to diminish at the 
 same time the glory of the French. These works are all 
 inaccurate and unjust, a,nd are grounded for the most part 
 on false circumstances, the impossibility of which even is 
 demonstrated. I procured with great difficulty one of the 
 scarce copies of the defence presented by General Mack 
 to the council of war, before which he was summoned to 
 appear. This defence, of a singular form, in a tone of 
 
 constraint, especially in what relates to the Archduke 
 Ferdinand, fuller of declamatory reflections than facts, 
 has nevertheless furnished me with the meane of ascer- 
 taining what were the intentions of the Austrian general, 
 and rectifying a great number of absurd conjectures. I 
 think, therefore, that I have arrived in this narrative at 
 the truth, at least as nearly as one can reasonably hope 
 to do in regard to occurrences which have not been veri- 
 fied in writing, even in Austria, and of which there are 
 now scarcely any living witnesses. The principal per- 
 sonages arc actually dead, and in Germany there has been 
 a very natural, very excusable, motive for disfiguring the 
 truth, that of sparing the national self-love by sacrificing 
 a single man.
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 41 
 
 this day, General Dupont, who had been ever 
 since the preceding day in face of Werneck's 
 corps, had again engaged him, to prevent his 
 gelling back to Ulm. Napoleon had sent 
 Mural to see what was passing in that quarter, 
 for he was extremely puzzled to conjecture, 
 ignorant of the departure of a portion of the 
 Austrian army. It soon became evident to 
 him that several detachments had succeeded 
 in stealing off by one of the gates of Ulm, the 
 one that was the least exposed to the view 
 and the action of the French. He immediately 
 directed Murat, wilh the reserve cavalry, Du- 
 pont's. division, and Oudinot's grenadiers, to 
 pursue to the utmost that part of the enemy's 
 army which had escaped from the place. 
 
 Next day, the 16th, he ordered a few shells 
 to be thrown into Ulm, and in the evening he 
 enjoined M. de Segur, one of the officers of 
 his staff, to go to General Mack and summon 
 him to lay down his arms. Obliged to pro- 
 ceed in the dark, and in very bad weather, he 
 had the greatest difficulty to get into the place. 
 He was led, blindfold, before General Mack, 
 who, striving to conceal his profound anxiety, 
 was nevertheless unable to dissemble his sur- 
 prise and his grief on learning the whole ex- 
 tent of his disaster. He was not fully ac- 
 quainted with it, for he knew not yet that he 
 was encompassed by 100,000 French, that 
 60,000 more occupied the line of the Inn, that 
 the Russians, on the contrary, were at a great 
 distance, and that the Archduke Charles,-de- 
 tained on the Adige by Marshal Massena, 
 could not come. Each of these pieces of in- 
 telligence, which at first he would not believe, 
 but which he was soon obliged to admit on the 
 repeated and solemn assertion of M. de Segur, 
 cut him to the heart. After much exclamation 
 against the proposal to capitulate, General 
 Mack began by degrees to endure the idea, on 
 condition of waiting a few days for the suc- 
 cour of the Russians. He would be ready, he 
 said, to surrender in eight days, if the Rus- 
 sians should not make their appearance be- 
 fore Ulm. M. de Segur had orders to grant 
 him no more than five, or, at the utmost, six. 
 In case of refusal, he was to threaten him 
 with an assault, and the most rigorous treat- 
 ment for the troops under his command. 
 
 This unfortunate general thought that it 
 concerned his honour, already lost, to obtain 
 eight days instead of six. M. de Segur retired 
 to carry his answer to the Emperor. The par- 
 leys continued, and at length Berlhier, having 
 introduced himself into the place, agreed with 
 General Mack to the following conditions. If, 
 on the 25th of October, before midnight, an 
 Austro-Russian corps capable of raising the 
 blockade of Ulm did not make its appearance, 
 the Austrian army was to lay down its arms, 
 the men to be prisoners of war and to be con- 
 ducted to France. The Austrian officers were 
 to be at liberty to return to Austria, on condi- 
 tion of never again serving against France. 
 Horses, arms, ammunition, colours, were all 
 to belong to the French army. 
 
 This agreement was concluded on the 19th 
 of October, but the convention was to be dated 
 the 17th, which gave in appearance to General 
 
 VOL. II. 6 
 
 Mack the eight days demanded. That un- 
 fortunate man, having arrived at the Emperor's 
 head-quarters and been received with the at- 
 tentions due to adversity, affirmed repeatedly 
 that he was not to blame for the disasters of 
 his army, that he had established himself at 
 Ulm by order of the Aulic Council, and that 
 since the investment his force had been divided 
 contrary to his express desire. 
 
 This, it will be seen, was a new convention 
 of Alexandria, without the dreadful bloodshed 
 of Marengo. 
 
 Meanwhile Murat, at the head of Dupont's 
 division, Oudinot's grenadiers, and the cavalry 
 reserve, atoned for his recent fault by pursu- 
 ing the Austrians with truly prodigious rapidity. 
 He followed General Werneck and Prince Fer- 
 dinand unremittingly, swearing not to let a 
 single man escape. Setting out on the morn- 
 ing of the 16th of October, he had a rear- 
 guard action with General Werneck in the 
 evening and took from him 2000 prisoners. 
 Next day, the 17th, he took the road to Heiden- 
 heim, striving to harass the enemy's flanks by 
 the rapid march of his cavalry. General 
 Werneck and the Archduke Ferdinand, having 
 joined, made their retreat together. In the 
 course of the day, the French passed Heiden- 
 heim and arrived at Neresheim at night, at the 
 same time as the rear-guard of Werneck's 
 corps. It was thrown into disorder and ob- 
 liged to disperse in the woods. On the follow- 
 ing day, the 18th, Murat, marching without 
 intermission, followed the enemy towards 
 Nordlingen. The regiment of Stuart, being 
 enveloped, surrendered entire. General Wer- 
 neck, finding himself surrounded on all sides, 
 and unable to advance further with a harassed 
 infantry, having no longer any hope, or even 
 any wish, to escape, offered to capitulate. The 
 capitulation was accepted, and this general 
 laid down his arms with 8000 men. Three 
 Austrian generals, taking with them part of 
 the cavalry, resolved to escape, in spite of the 
 capitulation. Murat sent an officer to them to 
 summon them to execute their engagement. 
 They would not listen to him, and went off to 
 rejoin Prince Ferdinand. Murat, intent on 
 punishing such a breach of faith, pursued 
 them with still greater activity on- the follow- 
 ing day. In the night, the great park, com- 
 posed of 500 carriages, fell into the hands of 
 the pursuers. 
 
 This route presented a scene of unparalleled 
 confusion. The Austrians had thrown them- 
 selves upon our communications; they had 
 taken a great number of our carriages, of OUT 
 stragglers, and part of Napoleon's treasure. 
 All that they had conquered for a moment was 
 retaken from them, besides their artillery, their 
 equipages, and their own treasure. There were 
 to be seen soldiers and employes of both armies, 
 running away in disorder, without knowing 
 whither they were going, ignorant which was 
 the victor and which the vanquished. The 
 peasants of the Upper Palatinate ran after the 
 fugitives, stripped them, and cut the traces of 
 the Austrian artillery, to possess themselves 
 of the horses. Murat, continuing his pursuit, 
 arrived on the 19th at Gunzenhauscn, the 
 D 2
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 Prussian frontier of Anspach. A Prussian 
 officer had the boldness to come and insist 
 upon the neutrality, though the Austrian fugi- 
 tives had obtained permission to pass through 
 the country. Murat's only answer was to 
 enter Gunzenhausen by main force, and to fol- 
 low the archduke beyond it. Next day, the 
 20th, he passed through Nuremberg. The 
 enemy, finding his strength exhausted, at 
 length halted. An action ensued between the 
 two cavalries. After numerous charges re- 
 ceived and returned, the squadrons of the 
 archduke dispersed, and the greater part of 
 them laid down their arms. Some infantry 
 that was left also surrendered. Prince Ferdi- 
 nand was indebted for the advantage of saving 
 his person to the attachment of a subaltern, 
 who gave him his horse. He gained, with 
 two or three thousand horse, the road to Bo- 
 hemia. 
 
 Murat thought that he ought not to push on 
 any further. He had marched four days with- 
 out resting, at the rate of more than ten 
 leagues a day. His troops were harassed with 
 fatigue. This pursuit, prolonged beyond Nu- 
 remberg, would have carried him beyond the 
 circle of the operations of the army. Besides, 
 all that Prince Ferdinand had left was not 
 worth an additional march. In this memora- 
 ble expedition, Murat had taken 12,000 pri- 
 soners, 120 pieces of cannon, 500 carriages, 
 11 colours, 200 officers, 7 generals, besides the 
 treasure of the Austrian army. He had, 
 therefore, his ample share in this glorious 
 campaign. 
 
 The plan of Napoleon was completely re- 
 alized. It was the 20th of October, and in 
 twenty days, without giving battle, by a series 
 of marches and some combats, an army of 
 80,000 men was destroyed. None had escaped 
 but General Kienmayer. with about a dozen 
 thousand men, General Jellachich, with five 
 or six thousand, Prince Ferdinand, with two 
 or three thousand horse. At Wertingen, 
 Gunzburg, Haslach, Munich, Elchingen, in 
 the pursuit conducted by Murat, about 30,000 
 prisoners had been picked up.' There were 
 left 30,000, who would soon be found in Ulm. 
 These made a total of 60,000 men taken, with 
 their artillery, consisting of 200 pieces of 
 cannon, with four or five thousand horses, 
 well adapted for remounting our cavalry, 
 together with all the materiel of the Austrian 
 army, and 80 colours. 
 
 The French army had a few thousand lame, 
 in consequence of forced marches, and it 
 numbered at most 2000 men bars de combat. 
 
 Napoleon, satisfied respecting the Russians, 
 had not been displeased to halt four or five 
 days before Ulm, to give his soldiers time to 
 rest themselves, and particularly to rejoin their 
 colours; for the last operations had been so 
 rapid that a certain number of them had been 
 left behind. Our Emperor, said they, has 
 found out a new way of making war; he no 
 longer makes it with our arms but with our 
 legs. 
 
 1 Here is an approximated enumeration, but rather re 
 duced than exaggerated, of these prisoners : Taken at 
 Wertingen, 2000; at GUnsburg, 2000; at Haslach, 4000 ; 
 
 Napoleon, however, would not wait any 
 longer, and he was desirous to gain the three 
 or four days which were yet to run, in virtue 
 of the capitulation signed with General Mack. 
 He sent for him, and pouring some consola- 
 tions into his heart, obtained from him a new 
 concession, which was to deliver the place on 
 the 20th, on condition that Ney should remain 
 below Ulm till the 25th of October. General 
 Mack conceived that he had performed his last 
 duties by paralyzing a French corps till the 
 eighth day. In truth, in the situation to which 
 he was reduced, all that he could do was 
 very little. He consented, therefore, to leave 
 the place on the following day. 
 
 Accordingly, on the next day, October the 
 20th, 1805, an ever-memorable day, Napoleon, 
 placed at the foot of the Michaelsberg, facing 
 Ulm, saw the Austrian army file away before 
 him. He occupied an elevated slope, having 
 behind him his infantry, drawn up in semicir- 
 cle on the hill side, and, opposite, his cavalry 
 deployed in a right line. The Austrians filed 
 ofF between the two, laying down their arms at 
 the entrance of this sort of amphitheatre. A 
 large watch-fire had been made, near which 
 Bonaparte posted himself to witness the cere- 
 mony. General Mack first came forward and 
 delivered his sword to him, exclaiming with 
 grief, "Here is the unfortunate Mack!" Napo- 
 leon received him, himself and his officers, with 
 the greatest courtesy, and directed them to be 
 ranged on either side of him. The Austrian 
 soldiers, before they came into his presence, 
 flung down their arms with a vexation honour- 
 able to them, and that feeling gave way only to 
 the curiosity which seized them on approach- 
 ing Napoleon. All devoured with their eyes 
 that terrible conqueror, from whom their co- 
 lours had received, for the last two years, such 
 cruel affronts. 
 
 Napoleon, conversing with the Austrian offi- 
 cers, said to them loud enough to be heard by 
 all, "I know not why we are at war. It was 
 not my wish. I thought only of warring with 
 the English, when your master came to pro- 
 voke me. You see my army: I have 200,000 
 men in Germany; your soldiers who are pri- 
 soners will see 200,000 more, traversing France 
 to come in aid of the first I need not, you well 
 know, have so many to conquer. Your master 
 ought to think of peace, otherwise the fall of 
 the house of Lorraine may possibly arrive. It 
 is not new territories on the continent that I 
 desire, it is ships, colonies, and commerce that 
 I wish to possess, and this ambition is as pro- 
 fitable to you as to myself." 
 
 These words, delivered with some haughti- 
 ness, were met by silence only from those offi- 
 cers, and sorrow to think that they were de- 
 served. Napoleon afterwards conversed with 
 the most noted of the Austrian generals, and 
 watched for five hours this extraordinary sight. 
 Twenty-seven thousand men filed away before 
 him. From three to four thousand wounded 
 were left in the place. 
 
 On the following day, according to his cus- 
 
 at Munich, 1000; at Elchingen, 3000 ; at Memminpen, 
 5000 ; in the pursuit by Murat, 12 to 13,000. Total, 29 or 
 30,000.
 
 0;* 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 43 
 
 torn, he addressed a proclamation to his sol- 
 diers. I> tfas couched in the following 
 terms. 
 
 "Imperial head-quarters, Elehingen, 
 " 29 Vendemiaire, year XIV (21 October, 1805). 
 
 " Soldiers of the Grand Army. 
 
 "In a fortnight we have made a campaign: 
 we have accomplished what we intended. We 
 have driven the troops of the house of Austria 
 out of Bavaria, and reinstated our ally in the 
 sovereignty of his dominions. That army, 
 which, with equal ostentation and imprudence, 
 came and placed itself on our frontiers, is an- 
 nihilated. But what cares England 1 her object 
 is attained ; we are no longer at Boulogne ! . . . 
 * " Out of the hundred thousand men who com- 
 posed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners ; 
 they shall go and replace our conscripts in the 
 labours of our fields. Two hundred pieces of 
 cannon, ninety colours, all the generals, are in 
 our power; not fifteen thousand men of that 
 army have escaped. Soldiers, I had announced 
 to you a great battle; but, thanks to the vi- 
 cious combinations of the enemy, I have been 
 enabled to obtain the same success without 
 running any risk; and, what is unexampled in 
 the history of nations, so great a result has 
 diminished our force by no more than fifteen 
 hundred men hors de combat. 
 
 " Soldiers, this success is owing to your un- 
 bounded confidence in your Emperor, to your 
 patience in enduring fatigues and privations of 
 every kind, and to your extraordinary intre- 
 pidity. 
 
 " But we shall not stop there ; you are im- 
 patient to commence a second campaign. That 
 Russian army, which the gold of England has 
 brought from the extremities of the earth, shall 
 share the same fate. 
 
 " In this new struggle the honour of the in- 
 fantry is more especially concerned. Here is 
 to be decided, for the second time, that ques- 
 tion which has already been decided in Swit- 
 zerland and Holland, whether the French infan- 
 try is the second or the first in Europe. There 
 are no generals here against whom I can have 
 any glory to acquire : all my care will be to 
 obtain victory with the least possible effusion 
 of your blood. My soldiers are my children." 
 
 The day after the surrender of Ulm, Napo- 
 leon set out for Augsburg, with the intention 
 of reaching the Inn before the Russians, march- 
 ing to Vienna, and, as he had resolved, frus- 
 trating the four attacks which were directed 
 against the Empire by the single march of the 
 grand army for the capital of Austria. 
 
 Wherefore are we obliged to follow up im- 
 mediately this glorious recital with one that is 
 so afflicting! In the very same days of the 
 month of October, 1805, for ever glorious for 
 France, Providence inflicted on our fleets a 
 cruel compensation for the victories of our ar- 
 mies. History, on which is imposed the task 
 of recording alternately the triumphs and the 
 disasters of nations, and of imparting to curi- 
 ous posterity those same emotions of joy or 
 grief which were felt in their time by the gene- 
 rations whose vicissitudes she relates History 
 
 1 THE SWIFTSURE, "4, commanded by Captain (after- 
 wards Sir Benjamin) Hallowell, fell in on the 24th of June, 
 
 must make up her mind to describe, after the 
 marvels of Ulm, the terrific scene of destruction 
 that was passing, at the same moment, oflf the 
 coast of Spain, in sight of Cape Trafalgar. 
 
 The unfortunate Villeneuve, in leaving Fer- 
 rol, was agitated by the desire of proceeding 
 to the Channel, in conformity with the grand 
 schemes of Napoleon ; but he was urged by an 
 irresistible impulse towards Cadiz. The news 
 of the junction of Nelson with Admirals Cal- 
 der and Cornwallis had filled him with a sort 
 of terror. This intelligence, true in some re- 
 spects, for Nelson, on his return to England, 
 had visited Admiral Cornwallis ofTBrest, was 
 false in the most important point, for Nelson 
 had not stopped off Brest but had sailed for 
 Portsmouth. Admiral Calder had been sent 
 alone to Ferrol, and had not appeared there till 
 after the departure of Villeneuve. They were, 
 therefore, running after one another in vain, as 
 is often the case on the wide expanse of the 
 ocean; and Villeneuve, if he had persisted, 
 would have found Cornwallis, separate both 
 from Nelson and Calder, off Brest. He thus 
 lost the grandest of opportunities, and caused 
 France to lose it ; though, indeed, it is impos- 
 sible to say what would have been the result 
 of that extraordinary expedition, if Napoleon 
 had been at the gates of London, while the Aus- 
 trian armies would have been on the frontiers 
 of the Rhine. The rapidity of his blows, usually 
 swift as lightning, would alone have decided 
 whether forty days, from the 20th of August 
 to the 30th of September, were sufficient for 
 subjugating England, and for giving to France 
 the conjoined sceptres of earth and ocean. 
 
 On leaving Ferrol, Villeneuve had not 
 dared to tell Lauriston that he was going to 
 Cadiz; but, when once at sea, he no longer 
 concealed from him the apprehensions by 
 which he was tormented, and which urged 
 him to get away from the Channel, and to 
 steer for the furthest point of the Peninsula. 
 On the earnest remonstrances of General 
 Lauriston, who endeavoured to represent to 
 him the full magnitude of the designs, of the 
 miscarriage of which he would be the cause, 
 he resumed for a moment the intention of 
 steering for the Channel, and put the head of 
 the ship to the north-east. But the wind, being 
 right in his teeth, blowing precisely from the 
 north-east, forbade this route, and he resolved 
 definitively to steer for Cadiz, his heart ha- 
 rassed by a new apprehension, that of incur- 
 ring the anger of Napoleon. He came in 
 sight of Cadiz about the 20th of August. An 
 English squadron of moderate force usually 
 blockaded that port. Arriving at the head of 
 the combined fleet, he might have taken this 
 squadron, had he come rapidly upon it with 
 his united strength. But, still haunted by the 
 same terrors, he despatched an advanced 
 guard, to ascertain whether there was not oft' 
 Cadiz a naval force capable of giving battle; 
 the English ships, taking the alarm, had time 
 to sheer off. Admiral Ganteaume, in 1801, 
 having failed in the object of his expedition 
 to Egypt, at least took the Swiftsure. 1 Ville- 
 
 1801, between the coast of Africa and the Isle of Candia, 
 with Ganteaume's squadron, consisting of L'Indomptable,
 
 44 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct 180& 
 
 neuve had not even the slight consolation to 
 enter Cadiz bringing with him two or three 
 English ships, as some indemnification for 
 his useless campaign. 
 
 He naturally expected a violent explosion 
 of anger on the part of Napoleon, and he 
 passed some days in deep despair. Nor was 
 he mistaken. Napoleon, on receiving from 
 Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, a detailed report 
 of all that had taken place, regarding as an act 
 of duplicity the double language held on leav- 
 ing Ferrol, and as a sort of treason the igno- 
 rance in which Lallemand had been left of 
 the return of the fleet to Cadiz, which ex- 
 posed the latter to the danger of presenting 
 himself singly before Brest, above all, imput- 
 ing to Villeneuve the frustration of the grand- 
 est design that he had ever conceived, applied 
 to him, in the presence of the minister De- 
 cres, the most disparaging expressions, and 
 even called him a coward and a traitor. He 
 was a good soldier and a good citizen ; but 
 too much discouraged by inexperience of the 
 French naval service and by the imperfection 
 of his materiel, and frightened at the complete 
 disorganization of the Spanish navy, he anti- 
 cipated only certain defeat in any rencounter 
 with the enemy, and he was inexpressibly 
 grieved at the pan of the vanquished to which 
 he was necessarily doomed by Napoleon. 
 He had not thoroughly comprehended that 
 what Napoleon required of him was not to 
 conquer, but to devote himself to destruction, 
 provided that the Channel was opened. Or, 
 very likely, if he had comprehended this 
 terrible destination, he might not have been 
 able to make up his mind to it. We shall 
 presently see how soon he was to be led 
 to the same sacrifice, and this time without 
 any result that could shed lustre on his de- 
 feat. 
 
 Napoleon, in the torrent of great things 
 which hurried him along, soon lost sight of 
 Admiral Villeneuve and his conduct. Never- 
 theless, before he set out for the banks of the 
 Danube, he cast a last look at his navy, and 
 on the way in which he should think fit to 
 employ it. He gave orders for the separation 
 of the Brest fleet, and for the division of that 
 fleet into several squadrons, agreeably to the 
 plan of M. Decres, which consisted in avoid- 
 ing great naval engagements, and meanwhile 
 undertaking distant expeditions composed of 
 a few ships, more likely to escape the English, 
 and as injurious to their commerce as advan- 
 tageous for the instruction of our seamen. 
 He determined, moreover, to give General St. 
 Cyr, who occupied Tarento, the support of the 
 Cadiz fleet and the land-troops which it had 
 on board. He calculated that this fleet, 
 amounting to forty and even forty-six ships, 
 after it should have rallied the Carthagena 
 division, would for some time have the mas- 
 tery of the Mediterranean, as that of Bruix 
 had formerly had, take the weak English 
 
 squadron stationed off Naples, and furnish 
 General St. Cyr with the useful aid of the 
 4000 soldiers whom it had been carrying 
 about over all the seas. He ordered it, there- 
 fore, to leave Cadiz, to enter the Mediterra- 
 nean, to call for the Carthagena division, then 
 to proceed to Tarento, and, in case the Eng- 
 lish squadrons should have united off" Cadiz, 
 not to let itself be shut up there, but to get out 
 if it should be superior in number, for it was 
 better to be beaten than disgraced by pusilla- 
 nimous conduct. 
 
 These resolutions being taken by Napoleon, 
 under the impression produced upon him by 
 the timidity of Villeneuve, not sufficiently 
 matured, and above all not sufficiently con- 
 tested by the minister Decres, who durst no 
 longer repeat what he feared he had gone too 
 far in saying, were immediately transmitted 
 to Cadiz. Admiral Decres did not report to 
 Villeneuve all the expressions of Napoleon, 
 but, suppressing only the contumelious lan- 
 guage, he repeated to him the animadversions 
 made on his conduct from his leaving Toulon 
 till his return to Spain, intimating that he 
 must perform great things before he could 
 recover the esteem of the Emperor. Inform- 
 ing him of his new destination, he ordered 
 him to sail, and to proceed successively to 
 Carthagena, Naples, and Tarento, to execute 
 there the instructions which we have just de- 
 tailed. Without enjoining him to sail at all 
 hazards, he told him that the Emperor desired 
 that the French navy, when the English 
 were inferior in force, should never refuse to 
 fight. There he stopped short, not daring to 
 declare the whole truth to Villeneuve, or to 
 renew his remonstrances with the Emperor to 
 prevent a great naval engagement, which then 
 had no longer the excuse of necessity. Thus 
 all parties contributed their share to produce 
 a great disaster, Napoleon by his anger, the 
 minister Decres by his concealment, and Vil- 
 leneuve by his despair. 
 
 When on the point of setting out for Stras- 
 burg, Napoleon gave M. Decres a last order 
 relative to the naval operations "Your friend 
 Villeneuve," said he, " will probably be too 
 cowardly to venture out of Cadiz. Despatch 
 Admiral Rosilly to take the command of the 
 squadron, if it has not already sailed, and or- 
 der Admiral Villeneuve to come to Paris to 
 account to me for his conduct." M. Decres 
 had not the courage to acquaint Villeneuve 
 with this new misfortune, which deprived him 
 of all means of redeeming his character, and 
 merely informed him of the departure of Ro- 
 silly, without communicating the motive for it. 
 He did not advise Villeneuve to sail before 
 Admiral Rosilly should reach Cadiz, but he 
 hoped that this would be the case; and, in 
 his embarrassment between an unfortunate 
 friend, whose faults he was aware of, and the 
 Emperor, whose resolutions he deemed impru- 
 dent, he too frequently committed the error of 
 
 90; Le Formidable, 80; I.' Indivisible, 80; La Constitution, 
 74 ; Le Dix Aofit, 74 ; Le Dessaix, 74 ; Le Jean Bart, 74 ; 
 La Brivoure, 40; La Creole, 40; Le Vanteur lugger. 
 
 rrecit des Kucncmcns Militairt*. 
 
 She engaged the squadron in close action for one hour, 
 
 when, finding further resistance vain, he surrendered. 
 
 Ganteaume received his prisoner with a nobleness that 
 
 1 wa creditable to both parties. Brtnton't Jfaval Hut. H.
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 leaving things to themselves, instead of tak- 
 ing upon him the responsibility of directing 
 them. 1 
 
 Villeneuve, on receiving the letters of M. 
 Decres, guessed all that was not told him, and 
 was as miserable as he had reason to be on 
 account of the reproaches which he had in- 
 curred. What touched him most was the im- 
 putation of cowardice, which he well knew 
 th.t he had never deserved, and which he fan- 
 cied that he could perceive in the very reser- 
 vations of the minister, his patron arid his 
 friend. He wrote in answer to M. Decres : 
 "The seamen of Paris and the departments 
 will be very unworthy and very silly if they 
 cast a stone at me. Let them come on board 
 our squadrons, and then they will see with 
 what elements they are liable to have to fight. 
 For the rest, if the French navy has been deficient 
 in nothing but courage, as it is alleged, the Emperor 
 skull soon be satisfied, and he may reckon upon the 
 most splendid success." 
 
 These bitter words contained the prognostic 
 of what was soon to happen. Villeneuve 
 made preparations for sailing again, landed 
 the troops that they might rest themselves, 
 and the sick that they might get well. He 
 availed himself of the very reduced means of 
 Spain to refit his ships, which had suffered 
 from a long navigation ; to procure at least 
 three months' provisions: lastly, to re-organize 
 the various departments of his fleet. Admiral 
 Gravina, by his advice, got rid of his bad 
 ships, and exchanged them for the best in the 
 dockyard of Cadiz. The whole month of Sep- 
 tember was devoted to these duties. The fleet 
 gained much in materiel : the personnel remained 
 as it was. The French crews had acquired 
 some experience during a navigation of nearly 
 eight months. They were full of ardour and 
 zeal. Some of the captains were excellent. 
 But among the officers there was too great a 
 number borrowed recently from commerce, 
 and having neither the spirit nor skill of the im- 
 perial navy. Instruction, especially in regard 
 to the artillery, was far too much neglected. 
 Our seamen were not then such skilful gun- 
 ners as in these later times, thanks to the spe- 
 cial attention bestowed on this part of their 
 military education. What our navy also 
 wanted was a system of naval tactics adapted 
 to the new mode of fighting the English. In- 
 stead of placing themselves in order of battle 
 in two opposite lines, as formerly, of ad- 
 vancing methodically, each ship keeping her 
 rank, and taking for her antagonist the ship 
 facing her in the opposite line, the English, 
 directed by Rodney 1 in the American war, and 
 by Nelson in the war of the Revolution, had 
 contracted the habit of advancing boldly, with- 
 
 1 Abundance of conjectures have been made respecting 
 the causes which led tn the sailing en masse of the fleet 
 from Cadiz and the battle of Traf ilgar. On this subject 
 nothing is true hut what is here stated. Our account is 
 taken from the authentic correspondence of Napoleon 
 and th.it of Admirals Dei res and Villeneuve. All lint 
 can be said concerning that melancholy event U here 
 given. 
 
 2 UODNB-Y, GEORGE BKYDGES. Born in 171", the son of 
 a captain in the royal navy. He had his first ship in 1M-.J. 
 In 1749, wag governor of Newfoundland. In 1759, was 
 
 out observing any order but that which result- 
 ed from the relative swiftness of the ships, of 
 dashing upon the enemy's fleet, breaking the 
 line, and cutting off a portion to place it be- 
 tween two fires; in short, of not shrinking 
 from the fray at the risk of sending their shot 
 into one another. The experience, the skill 
 of their crews, the confidence which they 
 owed to their successes, always insured to 
 them in these rash enterprises the advantage 
 over their adversaries, less agile, less confi- 
 dent, though having as much bravery, and 
 often more. The English, then, had affected 
 at sea a revolution very much like that which 
 Napoleon had effected on land. Nelson, who 
 had contributed to this revolution, was not a 
 superior and universal genius like Napoleon; 
 far from it: he was even narrow-minded in 
 things foreign to his art; but he had the ge- 
 nius of his profession; he was intelligent, 
 resolute, and possessed in a high degree the 
 qualities suited to offensive war, activity, 
 hardihood, and judgment. 
 
 Villeneuve, who was endowed with spirit 
 and courage, but not that firmness ef mind 
 which befits a military chief, was perfectly 
 acquainted with the defects of our mode of 
 fighting. On this subject he had written let- 
 ters, full of good sense, to M. Decres, who 
 agreed with him in opinion, as all seamen 
 did. But he thought it impossible to prepare, 
 while on active service, new instructions, and 
 to render them sufficiently familiar to his cap- 
 tains for them to be able to apply them in any 
 speedy encounter. At the battle of Ferrol, 
 however, he had opposed to the English, as 
 the reader will no doubt remember, an unex- 
 pected manoeuvre, highly approved by Napo- 
 leon and by M. Decres. Admiral Calder, ad- 
 vancing in column upon the end of his line, 
 with the intention of cutting it off, he had had 
 the art to withdraw it with great promptness. 
 But, when the battle had once begun, he had 
 not known how to manoeuvre ; he had left part 
 of his force inactive, and, when a forward 
 movement of his whole line would have been 
 sufficient for retaking the two disabled Spa- 
 nish ships, he had not ventured to order it. 
 Villeneuve, nevertheless, displayed in that 
 battle real talents, in the judgment of Napo- 
 leon, but not decision equal to the intelligence 
 which he possessed. Subsequently, he ad- 
 dressed no other instructions to his captains 
 but to obey the signals which he should make 
 in the moment of action, if the state of the 
 wind admitted of manoeuvring, and, if it did not, 
 to do their best to get into the fire, and to seek 
 an adversary. " You must not wait," said he, 
 " for the signals of the admiral, who, in the 
 confusion of a sea-fight, frequently cannot see 
 
 admiral, and commanded the expedition which success 
 fully bombarded H.ivre. In 1701, he reduced Martinique 
 and was made a baronet. In 1780, he utterly defeated the 
 Spanish Admiral L.iugare in the famous action of Cape 
 St. Vincent. In 1782, he obtained a complete victory over 
 al IV Grasse, capturing five and sinking 
 vessels. He was created a baron, and 
 
 the French Admi 
 one of his larges 
 pensioned, and a 
 said by some wri 
 practised the ma 
 
 his death buried in St. Paul's. He 'a 
 era to have been the firM admiral wno 
 ceuvre of breaking :he lire; to wuich 
 
 M. Ttiiers here makes allusion. Encyc.
 
 46 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct 180J. 
 
 what is passing, nor give his orders, nor, 
 above all, find means to transmit them. Each 
 must listen only to the voice of honour, and 
 press on into the hottest of the fight EVERY 
 
 CAPTAIX IS AT HIS POST IF HE IS I3C THE 
 FIRE." 
 
 Such were his instructions, and, for the rest, 
 Admiral Bruir himself, so superior to Ville- 
 neuve, had not addressed any others to the 
 officers whom he commanded. If, in our 
 great sea-fights, every captain had followed 
 these simple directions, dictated by honour as 
 much as by experience, the English would 
 have numbered fewer triumphs, or paid dearer 
 for them. 
 
 What particularly alarmed Admiral Villne- 
 neuve was the state of the Spanish fleet It 
 was composed of fine large ships, one of them 
 especially, the Santissima Trinidad, of 1 40 guns, 
 the largest ever built in Europe. But these 
 vast machines of war, which reminded one 
 of the ancient splendour of the Spanish mo- 
 narchy under Charles III., were, like the Turk- 
 ish ships, superb in appearance, useless in 
 danger. The penury of the Spanish arsenals 
 had not allowed them to be properly rigged, 
 and the weakness of the crews was distressing. 
 They were manned by an assemblage of peo- 
 ple of all sorts, picked up at random in the 
 maritime towns of the Peninsula, untrained, 
 unaccustomed to the sea, and incapable in all 
 respects of coping with the old sailors of Eng- 
 land, though the generous Spanish blood 
 flowed in their veins. The officers, for the 
 most part, were no better than the seamen. 
 Some of them, however, such as Admiral Gra- 
 vina, Vice-admiral Alava, Captains Valdez, 
 Churruca, and Galiano, were worthy of the 
 most glorious times of the Spanish navy. 
 
 Villeneuve, most determined to prove that 
 he was not a coward, employed the month of 
 September and the first days of October in 
 introducing some system and better order into 
 this compound of the two navies. He formed 
 two squadrons, the one for battle, the other of 
 reserve. He assumed himself the command 
 of the squadron of battle, composed of twenty- 
 one ships, and formed with it three divisions 
 of seven ships each. He had under his im- 
 mediate command the centre division ; Ad- 
 miral Dumanoir, whose flag was hoisted in 
 the Formidable, commanded the rear-division ; 
 Vice-admiral Alava, who had his flag in the 
 Sjnta Anna, commanded the van. The reserve 
 squadron was composed of twelve ships, and 
 formed into two divisions of six ships each. 
 Admiral Gravina was the commander of this 
 squadron, and had under him, to direct the 
 second division, Rear-admiral Magon, in the 
 dlgesiras. It was with this squadron of re- 
 serve, detached from the line of battle and 
 acting apart, that Villeneuve intended to parry 
 any unforeseen manoeuvres of the enemy, that 
 is, if the wind permitted himself to manoauvre. 
 In the contrary case, he trusted to the duty of 
 honour imposed on all his captains to press 
 into the fire. 
 
 The combined fleet, therefore, was com- 
 posed of thirty-three ships, five frigates, and 
 two brigs. In his impatience to sail, Ville- 
 neuve resolved, on the 8th of October, (16 
 
 Vendemiaire,) 10 take advantage of an east 
 wind to get out of the road, for, to work out 
 of Cadiz, you require winds from north-east to 
 south-east But three of the Spanish ships 
 had just left the basin, and their crews had 
 embarked on the preceding day : these were 
 the Santa Anna, the Rayo, and the San Justo. 
 Fit, at most, to sail with the fleet, they were 
 incapable of keeping their place in a line of 
 battle. This remark was urged by the Spa- 
 nish officers. Villeneuve, to cover his respon- 
 sibility, resolved to assemble a council of war. 
 The bravest officers of the two fleets declared 
 that they were ready to go wherever it was 
 required, to second the views of the Emperor 
 Napoleon, but that to rush into the immediate 
 presence of the enemy, in the state in which 
 most of the ships were, would be a most peril- 
 ous imprudence ; that the fleet, on quitting the 
 road, having had scarcely time to manoauvre 
 for a few hours, would fall in with the Eng- 
 lish fleet, of equal or superior force, and would 
 be infallibly destroyed ; that it would be better 
 to wait for some favourable opportunity, such 
 as a separation of the English forces, pro- 
 duced by any cause whatever, and till then to 
 complete the organization of the ships which 
 had been last manned. 
 
 Villeneuve sent the result of this delibera- 
 tion to Paris, adding to the opinion of the 
 council his own, which was contrary to any 
 great battle, in the actual state of the two 
 fleets. But he sent these useless documents, 
 as if to make his quiet resignation the more 
 conspicuous ; and he added that he had taken 
 the resolution to sail with the first east wind 
 that should allow him to get out of the road 
 with the fleet. 
 
 He waited therefore with impatience for the 
 propitious moment for quitting Cadiz at all 
 risks. He had at length before him that formi- 
 dable Nelson, whose image, pursuing him 
 over all the seas, had caused him to fail 
 of fulfilling the most important of missions 
 through fear of meeting with him. And now 
 he no longer feared his presence, though it 
 was more to be dreaded than ever, because his 
 mind, worked up by despair, longed for dan- 
 ger, almost for defeat, in order to prove that 
 he was right in avoiding an encounter with 
 the British fleet 
 
 Nelson, after touching for a moment at the 
 British shores, which he was never to behold 
 again, had sailed for Cadiz. He took with 
 him one of the fleets which the Admiralty, pene- 
 trating, after the lapse of two years, the de- 
 signs of Napoleon, had collected in the Chan- 
 nel. He was naturally conducted to Cadiz by 
 the report spread over the ocean of the return 
 of Villeneuve to the extremity of the Penin- 
 sula. 
 
 Nelson had at his disposal a naval force of 
 about the same strength as Villeneuve, that is 
 to say, 33 or 34 ships, but all seasoned by long 
 cruises, and having that superiority over the 
 combined fleet of France and Spain which 
 blockading squadrons always have over block- 
 aded squadrons. Not doubting, from the pre- 
 parations of which he was accurately informed 
 by Spanish spies, that he should soon catch 
 Villeneuve on the passage, he observed his
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 47 
 
 movements with the greatest attention, and ad- 
 dressed to the English officers, preparatory to 
 the engagement which he foresaw, instructions 
 made public since, and admired by all sea- 
 men. 
 
 He described to them his favourite manoeu- 
 vre, taking care to explain the motives for it. 
 To form in line, he said, occasioned a loss of 
 too much time, for all the ships were not alike 
 affected by the wind, and then a squadron 
 would have to regulate its movements by those 
 of the worst sailers. An enemy who wished 
 to avoid a battle would thus be allowed time 
 to slip away. On this occasion, care must be 
 taken not to let the combined French and 
 Spanish fleet escape. Nelson supposed that 
 Villeneuve had been joined by Lallemand's 
 division and perhaps by that of Carthagena 
 also, which would have composed a squadron 
 of 46 ships. He hoped himself to have 40, 
 including those whose speedy arrival was an- 
 nounced; and the more numerous his fleet 
 should be, the less would he attempt to draw 
 it up in line. He therefore ordered two co- 
 lumns to be formed, one immediately under his 
 own command, the other under the command 
 of Vice-admiral Collingwood, 1 to bear down 
 briskly on the enemy's line, without observing 
 any order but that of swiftness, and to cut 
 through that line in two places, at the centre 
 and towards the rear, and then to envelop the 
 portions so cut off and to destroy them. That 
 part of the enemy's fleet which you will have 
 excluded from the fight, he added, grounding 
 himself on the numerous experiences of the 
 age, will scarcely be able to succour the part 
 attacked, and you will have conquered before 
 it arrives. It was impossible to foresee with 
 greater sagacity and accuracy the conse- 
 quences of such a mano3uvre. Nelson had 
 previously impressed the idea upon the mind 
 of each of his officers, and he expected from 
 one moment to another the opportunity for 
 realizing it. That he might not intimidate his 
 adversary too much, he had even taken care 
 not to blockade Cadiz too closely. He merely 
 stationed frigates to watch the road, and, for 
 his own part, cruised with ships of-the line in 
 the wide mouth of the Strait, tacking from 
 west to east far out of sight of the coast. 
 
 Being informed of the real state of the forces 
 of Villeneuve, who had not been joined either 
 by Salcedo or Lallemand, he had not scrupled 
 to leave four ships of the line at Gibraltar, to 
 give one to Admiral Calder, who had been re- 
 called to England, and to send another to Gib- 
 raltar to take in water. This circumstance, 
 known at Cadiz, confirmed Villeneuve in his 
 resolution to sail. He conceived the English 
 to be stronger, for he supposed them to have 
 33 or 34 ships, and he was rejoiced to learn that 
 they had not so many. He even believed that 
 they numbered fewer than they really had, 
 that is to say 23 or 24. 
 
 1 COLLINGWOOD, CUTHBERT. He was a native of New- 
 castle-upon-Tyne, and was educated in the same school 
 with Lord Eldon. Ho entered the navy in 1761, and in the 
 action of June 1, 1794, was flag-captain of the Prince. 
 To enumerate his services would require three times the 
 pace that can be spared here. Wherever BritUh squa- 
 
 Meanwhile, the last despatches from Paris, 
 announcing the coming of Admiral Ro>sily, 
 arrived at Cadiz. At first this gave Vilie- 
 neuve no great concern. The idea of serving 
 honourably under an officer, his superior in 
 age and rank, and behaving like a valiant lieu- 
 tenant at his side, soothed his mind, oppressed 
 by the weight of too great a responsibility. 
 But Admiral Rosilly was already at Madrid, 
 and no despatch from the minister had ex- 
 plained to Villeneuve the lot reserved for him 
 under the new admiral. Villeneuve soon be- 
 gan to think that he was purely and simply dis- 
 placed from the command of the fleet, and that 
 he should not have the consolation of redeem- 
 ing his character by fighting in the second 
 rank in a conspicuous manner. Anxious to 
 escape this dishonour, and availing himself 
 of his instructions, which authorized him, 
 nay, even made it a duty for him, to sail when 
 the enemy should be inferior in force, he con- 
 sidered the advices recently received as an 
 authorization to weigh. He immediately made 
 the signal for so doing. On the 19th of Oc- 
 tober (27 Vendemiaire), a slight breeze from 
 the south-east having sprung up, he sent Rear- 
 admiral Magon out of the road with a division. 
 Magon gave chase to a ship of the line and 
 some frigates of the enemy's, and came to an 
 anchor for the night outside the road. Next 
 day, the 20th (28 Vendemiaire), Villeneuve 
 himself weighed, with the whole fleet. The 
 light and variable winds came from the east 
 quarter. He put the ship's head to the south, 
 having the reserve squadron under Admiral 
 Gravina ahead and somewhat to larboard. The 
 combined fleet consisted, as we have said, of 
 33 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 2 brigs. It 
 made a fine appearance. The French ships 
 manoeuvred well, but the Spanish, most of 
 them at least, very ill. 
 
 Though the enemy was not yet in sight, the 
 movement of his frigates gave reason to be- 
 lieve that he was not far off. One ship, the 
 jlrhille, at length perceived him, but descried 
 and signalled only 18 sail. For a moment the 
 French flattered themselves that they should 
 meet the English in far inferior force. A spark 
 of hope glimmered in the mind of Villeneuve 
 the last that was to cheer his- life. 
 
 He gave orders in the evening for the ships 
 to get into line in order of swiftness, forming 
 the line from the ship most to leeward, which 
 signified that each ship was to take her place 
 according to her speed, not according to her 
 accustomed rank, and to get into line from 
 that which had given way most to the wind. 
 The breeze had varied. The heads of the 
 ships were to the south-east, that is, towards 
 the entrance of (he Strait. The signal for 
 battle was given on board all the ships of the 
 fleet. 
 
 During the whole night there were seen and 
 heard the signals of the English frigates, 
 
 drons fought or ftVited, here he served with indefatigable 
 energy, and almost unequalled skill and courage. After 
 Nelson onlv, he was the best and greatest of English ad- 
 mirals, and was distinguished not more for his excellence 
 as a commander than for his admirable virtues as a man. 
 Brenton't JVaval History.
 
 48, 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 180 
 
 which, by rockets and cannon, acquainted 
 Nelson with the direction of our. course. At 
 daybreak the wind was west, still light and 
 variable, with a rolling sea, high waves but 
 no breakers, the sun bright; the enemy was at 
 length perceived formed into several groups, 
 which appeared to some to be two in number, 
 to others three. He was steering towards the 
 French fleet, and still five or six leagues dis- 
 tant. 
 
 Villeneuve immediately ordered the line to 
 be regularly formed, each vessel retaining the 
 place which she had taken in the night, keep- 
 ing as close as possible to her neighbour, and 
 being on the starboard tack, a disposition in 
 which the wind was received on the right, 
 which was natural, since they had west winds 
 to sail to the south-east from Cadiz to the 
 Strait. The line was very ill-formed. The 
 waves ran high, the breeze light, and the ships 
 manoeuvred with difficulty, a circumstance 
 which rendered the inexperience of part of the 
 crews the more to be regretted. 
 
 The reserve squadron, composed of twelve 
 ships, sailed apart from the principal squadron. 
 It had kept constantly to windward before the 
 latter, which was an advantage, for by going 
 with the wind it could always rejoin the other, 
 taking such a position as was suitable for it 
 to take, as for instance to place the enemy 
 between two fires, when he should be occupied 
 in fighting us. If ever there was a sufficient 
 motive for the creation of a squadron of reserve, 
 it was on this occasion. Admiral Gravina, 
 whose mind was prompt and clear in the midst 
 of action, made a signal to Villeneuve, apply- 
 ing for leave to manoeuvre in an independent 
 manner. Villeneuve refused it, for what rea- 
 sons it is difficult to conceive. Perhaps he 
 feared that the reserve squadron might be 
 compromised by its advanced position, and 
 despaired of being able to succour ii, since he 
 was to leeward of it. This reason itself was 
 not sufficient, for, if he was not sure that he 
 should be able to go to it, he was at least sure 
 that he could bring it to him; and, by making 
 it return immediately into line, he deprived 
 himself irretrievably of a movable detachment 
 very usefully placed for manoeuvring ; he 
 lengthened without advantage his line already 
 too long, since it consisted of 21 ships, and 
 was about to be increased to 33. He never- 
 theless ordered Admiral Gravina to rejoin and 
 range himself in the line of the principal fleet. 
 These signals were visible to the whole squa- 
 dron. Real-admiral Magon, who was not less 
 happily endowed than Admiral Gravina, des- 
 crying the question and the answer on the 
 masts of the two admirals, exclaimed that it 
 was a blunder, and warmly expressed his vexa- 
 tion in such a manner as to be heard by all 
 his officers. 
 
 About half-past eight o'clock, the intention 
 of the enemy became more manifest. The 
 different groups of the English squadron, less 
 difficult to distinguish as they approached, 
 now appeared to form but two. They clearly 
 revealed Nelson's intention of breaking our 
 line at two points. They advanced, with all 
 sail hoisted, before the wind, peculiarly fa- 
 voured in their plan of throwing themselves 
 
 across our course, since they came with a 
 west wind upon us, who formed a long line 
 from north to south, a little inclined to east. 
 The first column, placed to the north of our 
 position, consisting of 12 ships commanded 
 by Nelson, threatened our rear. The second, 
 placed to the southward of the former, compre- 
 hending 15 ships commanded by Admiral 
 Collingwood, threatened our centre. Ville- 
 neuve, by that instinctive movement which 
 always causes us to screen a threatened part, 
 wished to go to the succour of his rear-guard, 
 and at the same time to keep himself in com- 
 munication with Cadiz, which was behind him 
 to the north, that he might have a secure re- 
 fuge in case of defeat. He therefore made the 
 signal to wear all at once, each vessel by this 
 manoeuvre revolving upon herself, the line 
 remaining as it was, long and straight, but 
 ascending to the north, instead of descending 
 to the south. 
 
 This manoeuvre would not have any other 
 advantage than that of bringing him nearer to 
 Cadiz. Our fleet, ascending in a column to- 
 wards the north, instead of descending towards 
 the south, was to be assailed at two different 
 points, but still assailed by two hostile columns, 
 which were coming to break through it. It was 
 a case to excite more regret than ever for the 
 loss of the independent position, and to wind- 
 ward, which the squadron of reserve had 
 shortly before occupied, a position which, at 
 this moment, would have permitted it to ma- 
 noeuvre against one of the two groups of the 
 English fleet. In this state of things, all that 
 could be done was to close the line, to render 
 it regular, and, if possible, to bring back to 
 their post the ships which, having fallen to lee- 
 ward, left gaps through which the enemy could 
 pass. 
 
 But it was no easy matter for the ships that 
 were out of line to get into it again, especially 
 in the state of the wind, and with the inexpe- 
 rience of the crews. They might all have gone 
 before the wind together for the purpose of 
 trying to get into line with the leeward ships, 
 which would have occasioned a general change 
 of position and fresh irregularities greater than 
 those which it was designed to correct. It was 
 not deemed right to make it. The line, there- 
 fore, remained ill-formed, the distance not be- 
 ing equal between all the ships, several being 
 either on the right, or astern of their post. The 
 variable breeze, having acted more upon the 
 rear and the centre, had produced a slight cur- 
 vature in those divisions. Villeneuve had or- 
 dered the head-sails to be crowded with a view 
 to enable the curved parts to straighten them- 
 selves. In this manner he multiplied signals 
 for the purpose of bringing each ship into her 
 place, and could scarcely succeed, notwith- 
 standing the universal alacrity and obedience. 
 The frigates, ranged on the starboard and to 
 leeward of the squadron, each opposite to her 
 admiral's ship, were rather too distant to ren- 
 der any other service than that of repeating 
 signals. 
 
 At length, about eleven o'clock in the fore- 
 noon, the two hostile columns advancing, with 
 the wind and all sail crowded, came up to our 
 fleet. They followed each other in the order of
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 49 
 
 swiftness, with the single precaution of putting 
 their three-deckers at the head. They had 
 seven and we four only, unfortunately Spanish, 
 that is, less capable of rendering their superi- 
 ority serviceable. Thus, though the English 
 had but 27 ships and we 33, they had the same 
 number of guns and consequently they were 
 nearly equal in force. They had on their side 
 experience of the sea, the habit of conquering, 
 a great commander, and on that day even the 
 favours of Fortune, since the advantage of the 
 wind was for them. We lacked all these con- 
 ditions of success, but we had a virtue, which 
 can sometimes control Fate, the resolution to 
 fight to the death. 
 
 The fleets were within cannon-shot. Ville- 
 neuve, by a precaution frequently ordered at 
 sea, but far from desirable on this occasion, 
 had given directions not to fire till the enemy 
 was within good range. The English columns 
 presenting a great accumulation of ships, each 
 shot would have done considerable damage. 
 Be this as it may, about noon, the southern 
 column, commanded by Admiral Collingwood, 
 outstripping a little the northern, commanded 
 by Nelson, reached the centre of our line at 
 the position of the Santa Anna*, a Spanish three- 
 decker. The French ship Fougueux hastened to 
 fire at the Royal Sovereign, the leading ship of 
 the English column, carrying 120 guns, and 
 the flag of Admiral Collingwood. The whole 
 French line followed this example, and opened 
 a heavy fire upon the enemy's squadron. The 
 damage done to it afforded reason to regret that 
 the firing had not commenced before. The 
 Royal Sovereign, continuing her movement, 
 attempted to get between the S.inta Anna and 
 the Fougueux in order to pass between these 
 two vessels, which were not sufficiently close 
 to each other. The Fougueux crowded sail to 
 fill the gap, but did not arrive in time. The 
 Royal Sovereign, passing astern of the Santa 
 Anna and ahead of the Fougueiuc, poured into 
 the Santa Anna a broadside from her larboard 
 guns, double-shotted with ball and grape, rak- 
 ing her fore and aft, which made great havoc 
 in the Spanish vessel. At the same moment 
 she sent her starboard broadside into the Fou- 
 gueux, but without much effect, while she re- 
 ceived considerable damage from the latter. 
 The other English ships of that column, which 
 had closely followed their admiral, fell upon 
 the French line from north to south, sought to 
 cut it, by penetrating into the intervals, and to 
 place it between two fires by proceeding to- 
 wards its extremity. They were fifteen, and 
 were engaged against sixteen. If then every 
 one had done his duty, these 16 French and 
 Spanish ships would have made head against 
 the 15 English, independently of any succour 
 from the van. But several ships, ill-managed, 
 had already suffered themselves to be carried 
 away from their post. The Bahama, the Mon- 
 tanez, the Argonauta, all of them Spanish, were 
 either on the right, or astern of the place which 
 they should have occupied in the line of battle. 
 L'Argonau'e, a French ship, did not follow a 
 better example. On the contrary, the Fougueux, 
 the Plu'nn, and the Algesiras were fighting with 
 extraordinary vigour, and by their energy had 
 drawn upon themselves the greater number of 
 VOL. II. 7 
 
 the enemy's ships, so that each of them was 
 engaged with several at once. The Algerirat in 
 particular, in which was Rear-admiral Magon, 
 was engaged hand to hand wilh the Tonnant, 
 which he cannonaded with extreme violence, 
 and made preparations for boarding. The 
 Prince of the Asturias, commanded by Admiral 
 Gravina, terminated our line, and surrounded 
 by enemies, avenged the honour of the Span- 
 ish flag for the misconduct of most of her com- 
 panions. 
 
 Scarcely half an hour had elapsed from the 
 commencement of the action, and the smoke 
 which the subsiding breeze ceased to carry 
 away, already enveloped the two fleets. From 
 this dense cloud issued tremendous and con- 
 tinual thunders, while all around floated wrecks 
 of masts and numbers of horribly mangled 
 corpses. 
 
 The north column, commanded by Nelson, 
 came up twenty or thirty minutes after that of 
 Collingwood, to our centre, athwart the Uucen- 
 taure. There were at this part seven ships 
 ranged in the following order: the Santiuima 
 \ Trinidad, having on board Vice-admiral Cisne- 
 1 ros, next to the Bucentaure, bearing the flag of 
 I Admiral Villeneuve, both in line, and so close 
 i that the bowsprit of the latter touched the stern 
 j of the former; the Neptune, a French ship, the 
 1 San Leandro, Spanish, both fallen to leeward, 
 and having left a double vacancy in the line ; 
 the Redoutable, precisely at her post and in the 
 waters of the Bucentaure, but placed in regard 
 to the latter at the distance of two ships ; lastly 
 the San Juslo and the Indomptalk, fallen to lee- 
 ward, and leaving two more posts vacant be- 
 tween this group and the Santa Anna, which 
 was the first of the group attacked by Colling- 
 wood. Of these seven ships, then, the Santitst- 
 ma Trinidad and the Bucentaure alone were in 
 line, very close to each other, and the Redouta- 
 ble, having two vacant posts ahead of her and 
 two astern. Fortunately, not for the success 
 of the battle but for the honour of our arms, 
 there were here men whose courage was supe- 
 rior to all dangers. It was these three ships 
 which alone, out of seven, remained at their 
 posts, that had to bear the brunt of Nelson's 
 entire column, composed of twelve ships, seve- 
 ral of them three-deckers. 
 
 The Victory, in which Nelson had his flag, 
 | was to have been preceded by the Temeraire. 
 The English officers, expecting to see their 
 j first ship furiously attacked, besought Nelson 
 ! to permit the Temeraire to precede the Victo- 
 ' ry, that so invaluable a life as his might not 
 be too much exposed. " By all means," re- 
 plied Nelson, " let the Temeraire go first if 
 she can." He then crowded all sail in the 
 ! Victory, and thus kept at the head of the co- 
 1 lumn. No sooner was the Victory within 
 cannon-shot than the Santittima Trinidad, the 
 Bucentaure, and the Redoutable, opened a tre- 
 mendous fire upon her. In a few minutes they 
 carried away one of her top-masts, cut up her 
 rigging, and killed and wounded fifty of her 
 crew. Nelson, who was seeking the French 
 admiral's ship, imagined that he had discover- 
 ed her, not in the gigantic Spaniard, the Sun- 
 tissima Trinidad, but in the Bucentaure, a French 
 , 80-gun ship ; and he endeavoured f> luru her 
 E
 
 00 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Ocl. 1805. 
 
 by passing between her and the Redoutable. 
 But an intrepid officer commanded the Re- 
 doutable : it was Captain Lucas. Compre- 
 hending Nelson's intention from the manner 
 of his ship, he had bent all his sails to catch 
 the least breath of wind, and had been fortu- 
 nate enough to come up in time, so that with 
 his bowsprit he dashed against and shattered 
 the ornamental work which crowned the stern 
 of the Bucentaure. Nelson, therefore, found 
 the space closed. He was not a man to draw 
 back. He persisted, and unable to part with 
 his prow, the two ships so strongly locked to- 
 gether, he let the Victory fall with her side 
 against that of the Redoutable. From the 
 shock, and a relic of the breeze, the two ships 
 were carried out of the line, and the way was 
 again clear astern of the Eucentaure. Several 
 English ships came up at once to surround 
 the Bucentaure and the Santissima Trinidad. 
 Others ascended along the French line, where 
 ten ships were left without antagonists, fired a 
 few broadsides at them, and immediately fell 
 upon the French ships of the centre, three of 
 which made an heroic resistance against their 
 assailants. 
 
 The ten French ships of the van became 
 therefore nearly useless, as Nelson had fore- 
 seen. Villeneuve ordered the flags signifying 
 that any captain was not at his post if he was 
 not in the fire, to be hoisted on his fore and 
 mizen-mast. The frigates, according to rule, 
 repeated the signal, which was more visible 
 Irom their masts than from the admiral's, still 
 shrouded in a cloud of smoke ; and, agreeably 
 to the same rule, they added to the signal the 
 numbers of the vessels which had remained 
 out of fire, till those which were thus desig- 
 nated responded to the voice of honour. 
 
 While those were thus called to danger 
 whom Nelson's manoeuvre had separated from 
 it, an unexampled contest was going on at the 
 centre. The Redoutable had to fight not only 
 the Victory, laid along her larboard side, but 
 also the Temeraire, which had placed herself 
 a little astern of her starboard side, and kept 
 up a furious combat with these two foes. 
 Captain Lucas, after several broadsides from 
 his larboard guns, which had made terrible 
 havoc on board the Victory, had been obliged 
 to give up firing "his lower tier, because in this 
 part the protruding sides of the ships meeting 
 prevented the use of those guns. The men 
 who had thus becpme disposable he sent up 
 into the tops and shrouds, to pour a destruc- 
 tive fire of grenadoes and musketry upon the 
 deck of the Victory. At the same time, all 
 his starboard guns were employed against the 
 Temeraire, placed at some distance. To finish 
 the contest with the Victory, he had given or- 
 ders to board ; but, his ship having only two 
 decks and the Victory three, there was the 
 height of one deck to climb, and a sort of 
 ditch to cross in passing from one to the 
 other ; for the receding form of the ships left 
 a vacancy between them, though they touched 
 at the water line. Captain Lucas immediately 
 ordered his yards to be brought to form a 
 bridge for passing from ship to ship. JVIean- 
 while the firing was continued from the tops 
 and shrouds of the Redoutable upon the deck 
 
 of the Victory. Nelson, dressed in an old 
 frock coat which he wore on days of battle, 
 having Captain Hardy, his flag-captain by his 
 side, would not withdraw himself from the 
 danger for a moment. His secretary had 
 already been killed near him; Captain Hardy 
 had had a shoe-buckle carried away: and a 
 chain-shot had swept off eight men at once. 
 This great seaman, a just object of our hate 
 and of our admiration, unmoved upon his 
 quarter-deck, was observing this horrible 
 scene, when a ball from the tops of the Re- 
 doutable struck him on the left shoulder and 
 lodged in his loins. Sinking upon his knees, 
 he fell upon the deck, making an effort to 
 support himself with his only hand. In fall- 
 ing, he said to Captain Hardy, " They have 
 done for me at last, Hardy." " I hope not," 
 replied the captain. " Yes," rejoined Nelson, 
 "I have but a short time to live." He was 
 conveyed to the place to which the wounded 
 are carried, but he was almost insensible: he 
 had, indeed, but a few hours to live. Rallying 
 at times, he inquired how the battle went, and 
 gave a piece of advice which soon proved his 
 profound foresight. " Anchor," said he, " bring 
 the fleet to an anchor." 
 
 His death produced extraordinary agitation 
 on board the Victory. The moment was fa- 
 vourable for boarding. The gallant Lucas, at 
 the head of a band of picked men, had already 
 mounted upon the yards laid from one ship to 
 the other, when the Temeraire, never ceasing 
 to second the Victory, fired a tremendous 
 broadside of grape. Nearly two hundred 
 French fell dead or wounded. These were 
 almost all that were about to make the attempt 
 to board. There were not hands enough left 
 to persist in it. The men returned to the star- 
 board guns and renewed an avenging fire 
 against the Temeraire, which dismasted and 
 did her prodigious damage. But, as if it was 
 not enough to have two three-deckers to fight 
 a ship of two decks, a new enemy came to 
 join the former in crushing the Redoutable. 
 The English ship Neptune, attacking her at 
 the stern, poured into her broadsides which 
 soon reduced her to a deplorable condition. 
 Two masts of the Redoutable had fallen upon 
 the deck; part of her guns were dismounted; 
 one of her sides, nearly demolished, formed 
 but one vast aperture; the helm was rendered 
 unserviceable; while several shot-holes, just 
 at the surface of the water, let it into the hold 
 in torrents. The whole of the officers were 
 wounded; ten midshipmen out of eleven were 
 killed. Out of a crew of 640 men, 522 were 
 hors de combat ; 300 killed, 222 wounded. In 
 such a state, this heroic ship could no longer 
 defend herself. Her flag was hauled down, 
 but, before she struck, she avenged on the 
 person of Nelson the disasters of the French 
 navy. 
 
 The Victory and the Redoutable having been 
 carried out of the line in meeting, the way 
 was clear for the enemy's ships, which came 
 to surround the Eucentaure and the Santissima 
 Trinidad. These two ships were still strongly 
 linked together, for the Eucentaure had her 
 bowsprit jammed in the stern gallery of the 
 Santissima Trinidad. Ahead of them,
 
 Oet 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 51 
 
 which was the nearest of the ten ships that 
 had remained inactive, had at first lent them 
 some succour; but, after receiving a violent 
 cannonade, she suffered herself to drive before 
 the wind, and left the Santissima Trinidad and 
 the Bucentaure to their deplorable fate. The 
 Bucentaure, at the commencement of the action, 
 had received from the Victory some broad- 
 sides, which, raking her from the stern, had 
 done her much mischief. Soon afterwards 
 she was surrounded by several English ships, 
 which took the place of the Victory. Some 
 laid themselves abaft the stern, others, turning 
 the line, on her starboard side. She was thus 
 attacked in rear and on the right by four ships, 
 two of which were three-deckers. Villeneuve, 
 as firm amidst the fire as irresolute under the 
 anxieties of command, remained on his quar- 
 ter-deck, hoping that, among so many French 
 and Spanish ships that surrounded him, some 
 one would come forward to succour their ad- 
 miral. He fought with the utmost energy, 
 and not without some hope. Having no ene- 
 mies on the left, and several astern and on the 
 right, in consequence of the movement which 
 the English had made in passing within the 
 line, he would have changed his position, to 
 withdraw his stern, as well as his starboard 
 tier of guns, which had sustained great dam- 
 age, and turn his larboard side to the enemy. 
 But, his bowsprit being fast in the gallery of 
 the Santissima Trinidad, he could not stir. He 
 directed the Santissima Trinidad to be ordered, 
 by word of mouth, to let herself drive, in 
 order to produce a separation of the two ships. 
 The order was not executed, because the 
 Spanish ship, having lost her masts, lay ab- 
 solutely immovable on the water. 
 
 The Bucentaure, nailed to her position, was 
 therefore obliged to endure a raking fire astern 
 and on the right, without being able to use her 
 starboard guns. However, nobly supporting 
 the honour of the flag, she replied by a fire 
 quite as active as that which she received. 
 This combat had lasted an hour, when the 
 flag-captain Magendie was wounded. Lieu- 
 tenant Daudignon, taking his place, was 
 wounded also, and succeeded in his turn by 
 Lieutenant Fournier. Before long the main- 
 mast and the mizen-mast went by the board, 
 and produced frightful confusion on deck. 
 The flag was hoisted upon the fore-mast. 
 Buried in a thick cloud of smoke, the admiral 
 could not distinguish what was passing in the 
 rest of the fleet. The smoke clearing off a 
 little, he perceived the ships of the van still 
 motionless, and ordered them, by hoisting his 
 signals on his oniy remaining mast, to wear 
 all at once, and to come into the fire. Enve- 
 loped afresh in that murderous cloud, which 
 launched forth death and destruction, he con- 
 tinued the fight, foreseeing that he should be 
 obliged in a few moments to quit his flag-ship, 
 ir\l to prosecute his duties in another. About 
 three o'clock his third mast went by the board, 
 and the deck was completely encumbered with 
 wrecks. 
 
 The Bucentaure, with her starboad side torn 
 to pieces, her stern demolished, her masts gone, 
 was reduced to a sheT hulk. " My part in the 
 Bucentaure is finished I" exclaimed the hapless 
 
 Villeneuve ; " I will try to charm fortune on 
 board another ship." He purposed then to 
 get into a boat and go to the van to bring it 
 himself to the fight. But the boats, placed on 
 the deck of the Bucentaure, had been dashed 
 to pieces by the successive fall of all the 
 masts, and those which were on the bows had 
 been riddled by balls. The Santissima Trinidad 
 was hailed, and a boat applied for. Vain 
 efforts ! no human voice could be heard amidst 
 this confusion. The French admiral, there- 
 fore, found himself confined to the hull of his 
 ship, which was ready to sink, no longer able 
 to give orders or to make any attempt to save 
 the fleet committed to his charge. His frigate, 
 F Hortense, which ought to have come to his 
 assistance, never stirred, whether prevented 
 by the winds or terrified by this appalling 
 sight. The admiral had nothing left him but 
 death, and more than once he had made up 
 his mind to it. The chief of his staff, M. de 
 Prigny, had just been wounded by his side. 
 Nearly the whole of his crew were hors de com- 
 bat. The Bucentaure, completely dismasted, 
 riddled with balls, unable to use her guns, 
 which were dismounted or obstructed by the 
 wrecks of the rigging, had not even the cruel 
 satisfaction of returning one of the blows 
 which she received. It was a quarter past 
 four; no assistance arriving, the admiral was 
 obliged to strike his flag. An English pin- 
 nace came to fetch him and to carry him on 
 board the Mars. There he was received with 
 the attentions due to his rank, his misfortunes, 
 and his bravery a slender compensation for 
 so severe a calamity. He had at length found 
 that disastrous fate which he had dreaded 
 meeting, sometimes in the West Indies, some- 
 times in the Channel. He found it at the very 
 spot where he expected to avoid it, at Cadiz, 
 and he submitted to it, without the consolation 
 of perishing for the accomplishment of a great 
 design. 
 
 During this engagement, the Santissima. Tri- 
 nidad, surrounded by enemies, had been taken. 
 Thus, of the seven ships of the centre attacked 
 by Nelson's column, three, the Redoutable, the 
 Bucentaure, the Santissima Trinidad, had been 
 overpowered without receiving assistance from 
 the four others, the Neptune, the San Leandro, 
 the San Justo, and the Indomptable. These lat- 
 ter, having fallen to leeward at the commence- 
 ment of the action, could not get back into the 
 fight. They had, therefore, no other means of 
 being serviceable than to descend within the 
 line, under the impulsion of a slight breeze, 
 which continued to blow from the west, and to 
 join the sixteen ships attacked by Colling- 
 wood. One only, the French ship, the Nep- 
 tune, commanded by a good officer, Captain 
 Maistral, executed this manosuvre, keeping al- 
 ways close to danger. He gave broadsides 
 successively to the Victory and to the Royai 
 Sovereign, and endeavoured to afford some as- 
 sistance to the rear, engaged with Colling- 
 wood's column. The three others, the San 
 Leandro, the San Jutto, and the Indomptable, 
 permitted themselves to be carried by the ex- 
 piring breeze far away .Vom the field of battle. 
 
 There were, however, still left the ten ships 
 of the van, which, after exchanging a few shoU
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 i 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 with Nelson's column, had remained without 
 antagonists. The signal which called them 
 to the post of honour had found them already 
 drifted to leeward, or unable to stir from the 
 lightness of the breeze. VHeros, placed near- 
 est to the centre, after having supported for a 
 moment, as we have seen, her two neighbours, 
 the Eurentaure and the Santisnma Trinidad, had 
 suffered herself to drift by the slight breath of 
 air which still prevailed, and the impulsion of 
 which unluckily served to carry her only out 
 of the fight. At any rate, blood had flowed 
 upon the deck of that ship; but her gallant 
 captain, Poulain, killed at the first onset, had 
 taken away with him the spirit by which he 
 was animated. The San Augustino, placed 
 above the Heros, having Isst her post very 
 early, had been followed and taken by the 
 English conquerors of the Bucentaure. The 
 San Francisco fared no better. Ascending this 
 line of the van, there came successively the 
 Mont Blanc, the Duguny-Trouin, the Formidable, 
 the Kayo, the Intrepirfe, the Scipion, and the 
 Neptune. Admiral Dumanoir had repeated to 
 them the signal to wear and to bear down upon 
 the centre. Most of them had continued mo- 
 tionless, from want of knowing how to ma- 
 noeuvre, or for want of the ability or the will 
 to comply. At length, there were four which 
 obeyed the signal of the commander of the di- 
 vision, by hoisting all their boats and employ- 
 ing them in assisting to wear. These were 
 the Mont Elanr, the Duguay-Trouin, the Formi- 
 dable, and the Scipion. Rear-admiral Duma- 
 noir had prescribed to them a good manoeuvre ; 
 this was, instead of wearing before the wind, 
 which must carry them within the line, to 
 wear against the wind, which, on the contrary, 
 must carry them outside, and enable them, by 
 letting themselves drift before it, to join in the 
 fight whenever they thought proper. 
 
 Rear-admiral Dumanoir, on board the For- 
 midable, which had won so much glory in the 
 battle of Algesiras, with the Sripion, the Du- 
 guay-Trouin, and the Mont Blanc, prepared 
 therefore to descend from north to south, 
 along the line of battle. At that pajt to which 
 he was proceeding, he should have it in his 
 power to place the English between two fires. 
 But it was late, three o'clock at least. He 
 perceived almost everywhere disasters con- 
 summated, and not having the resolution to 
 share the general fate of the French fleet, he 
 could be at no loss for good reasons for not 
 involving himself inextricably. Having ar- 
 rived opposite to the centre, he saw the Bu- 
 centaure in the possession of the enemy, the 
 Kantissima Trinidad taken, the Redoutable con- 
 quered long before, and the English, though 
 tney had themselves suffered severely, run- 
 ning after the ships which had fallen to lee- 
 ward. In his progress he sustained a very 
 brisk fire, which damaged his four ships and 
 rendered them less fit for action. Warmly 
 received by Nelson's victorious column, and 
 seeing nothing to assist, he continued his 
 course, and came to the rear, where the six- 
 .een French and Spanish ships engaged with 
 Collingwood's column were fighting. There, 
 by devoting himself, he might have saved 
 some ships or added glorious deaths to those 
 
 which were to console us for a great defeat. 
 Disheartened by the fire which had just da- 
 maged his division, consulting prudence ra- 
 ther than despair, he did nothing of the kind. 
 Treated by Fortune like Villeneuve, he was 
 soon doomed, for having endeavoured to avoid 
 a glorious catastrophe, to be overtaken else- 
 where by a useless disaster. 
 
 At this extremity of the line, which had 
 been engaged the first with Collingwood's co- 
 lumn, the French ships, the Argonaute alone 
 excepted, fought with a courage worthy of im- 
 mortal glory. And as for the Spanish ships, 
 two, the Santa Anna and the Prince of the Aslu- 
 n'as, gallantly seconded the conduct of the 
 French. 
 
 After a conflict of two hours, the Santa Anna, 
 which was the first of the rear, having lost all 
 her masts, and inflicted on the Royal Sovereign 
 almost as much damage as she had received, 
 struck her flag. Vice-admiral Alava, severely 
 wounded, had behaved nobly. The Fougueux, 
 next neighbour to the Santa Anna, after making 
 great efforts to assist her by preventing the 
 Royal Sovereign from forcing the line, had 
 been deserted by the Monarca, the ship astern 
 of her. Being then turned and attacked by 
 two English ships, the Fougueux had disabled 
 both of them. Engaged afterwards, side by 
 side with the Temeraire, she had had to repel 
 several attempts at boarding, and had lost 
 about 400 out of 700 men. Captain Beau- 
 doin, who commanded her, having been killed, 
 Lieutenant Bazin had immediately taken his 
 place, and resisted two assaults of the English 
 as valiantly as his predecessor. The enemy, 
 returning to the charge, and having gained 
 possession of the forecastle, the gallant Bazin, 
 wounded and covered with blood, having but 
 a few men left about him, and confined to the 
 quarter-deck, found himself compelled to sur- 
 render the Fougueux after the most glorious re- 
 sistance. 
 
 Astern of the Fougittux, on the very spot 
 abandoned by the Monarca, the French ship, 
 ' the Pluton, commanded by Captain Cosmao, 
 manoeuvred with equal daring and dexterity. 
 Hastening to fill the space left vacant by the 
 Monarca, she had stopped short an enemy's 
 ship, the Mars, which attempted to pass there, 
 riddled hec with shot, and was preparing to 
 carry her by boarding, when a three-decker 
 came up astern and cannonaded her. She had 
 cleverly slipped away from this new adver- 
 sary, and, turning her bows instead of her 
 stern, had avoided the enemy's fire while- 
 sending into her several furious broadsides. 
 Returning to her first antagonist, and contriving 
 to get the weathergage, she had succeeded in 
 raking her astern, carrying away two of her 
 masts, and -putting her hors de combat. Having 
 got rid of these two assailants, the Pluton 
 I sought to hasten to the assistance of the French, 
 who were overwhelmed by numbers, owing to 
 the retreat of the ships unfaithful to their 
 duty. 
 
 Astern of the Pluton, the Algesiras, bearing 
 the flag of Rear-admiral Magon, was engaged 
 in a memorable fight, worthy of that which 
 the Redoutable had sustained, and quite as san- 
 guinary. Rear-admiral Magon, born in the
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 53 
 
 Isle of France, of a family from St. Malo, was 
 still young, and as handsome as he was brave. 
 At the commencement of the action, he had 
 called together his crew, and promised to give 
 the man who should be first to head the board- 
 ers, a splendid shoulder-belt, presented to him 
 by the Philippine Company. All were eager 
 to earn such a reward from his hand. Be- 
 having as the commanders of the Redoutable, 
 the Fougutux, the P/uto,had done, Rear-admiral 
 Magon first carried the Jllgesiras forward to 
 close the way against the English, who in- 
 tended to cut the line. In this movement, he 
 fell in with the Tonnant, an 80-gun ship, for- 
 merly French, taken by the English at Aboukir, 
 and commanded by a courageous officer, Cap- 
 tain Tyler. He approached very near to her, 
 fired, and then, wearing, ran his bowsprit to a 
 great depth into the shrouds of the enemy's 
 ship. The shrouls, as everybody knows, are 
 those ladders of ropes, which, binding ihe 
 masts to the hull of the ship, serve to steady 
 and to ascend them. Thus locked to his an- 
 tagonist, Magon collected around him the 
 stoutest of his crew, to lead them to board. 
 But the same thing happened to them that had 
 befallen the crew of the Redoutabk. Already 
 assembled on the deck and on the bowsprit, 
 they were about to rush upon the Tonnant, 
 when another English ship, lying athwart the 
 dlgesiras, poured into her several rounds of 
 grape, which mowed down a great number of 
 the boarders. It was then necessary, before 
 prosecuting the attempt, to reply to the new 
 enemy that had fallen upon her, and also to a 
 third which had just joined the two others in 
 cannonading the already shattered sides of the 
 jllgesirat. While thus defending himself against 
 three ships, Magon was boarded by Captain 
 Tyler, who resolved, in his turn, to show him- 
 self on the deck of the Jllgesiras. He received 
 him at the head of his crew, and he himself, 
 with a boarding-axe in his hand, setting the 
 example to his men, they repulsed the English. 
 Thrice they returned to the charge, and thrice 
 were they driven off the deck of the dlgesiras. 
 His flag-captain, Leiourneur, was killed by his 
 side. Lieutenant Plassan, who took the com- 
 mand, was immediately wounded also. Magon, 
 whose brilliant uniform rendered him a con- 
 spicuous mark to the enemy, received a ball 
 in the arm, which bled profusely. He took no 
 heed of this wound, and continued at his post. 
 But a second struck him on the thigh. His 
 strength then began to fail him. As he could 
 scarcely support himself on the deck of his 
 ship, covered with wrecks and corpses, Jhe 
 officer who, after the death of all the others, 
 had become flag-captain, M. de la Bretonniere, 
 begged him to go down for a moment to the 
 cockpit, at least to have his wounds dressed, 
 that he might not lose his strength along with 
 his blood. The hope of being able to return 
 to the combat decided Magon to listen to the 
 solicitations of M. de la Bretonniere. He went 
 down to the lower deck, supported by two 
 sailors. But the sides of the ship being shat- 
 tered, afforded a free passage to the grape-shot 
 Magon received a ball from a musketoon in 
 his chest, and dropped dead immediately. This 
 event filled his crew with consternation. They 
 
 fought with fury, to avenge a commander whom 
 hey had alike loved and admired. But the 
 three masts of the Jllgesiras were gone, and the 
 uns dismounted or obstructed by the wrecks 
 of the masts. Out of 641 men, 150 were 
 killed, and 180 wounded. The crew, cooped 
 up on the quarter-deck, held possession of only 
 part of the ship. They were without hope, 
 without resource: they poured a last discharge 
 into the enemy, and surrendered that rear- 
 admiral's flag which had been so valiantly 
 defended. 
 
 Astern of the jllzesiras, others were still en- 
 gaged, though the day was far advanced. The 
 Bahama had withdrawn, but the Jligle fought 
 gallantly, and did not surrender till after severe 
 losses and the death of her commander, Cap- 
 tain Gourrege. The Stciftsure, which the ene- 
 my made a particular point of retaking, be- 
 cause she had been English, behaved with 
 equal bravery, and yielded only to numbers, 
 having seven feet water in her hold. Beyond 
 the Swiftsurc, the French ship the Jlrgonau'e, 
 after receiving some damage, sheered off. The 
 Berwirk fought honourably in her place. The 
 Spanish ships, Jlrgonauta, San Nejtomureno, and 
 San Ildefonso, had quitted the field of battle. On, 
 the contrary, Admiral Gravina, in the Prince of 
 the Jlsturias, surrounded by the English ships 
 which had doubled the extremity of the line, 
 defended himself alone against them with ex- 
 traordinary energy. Encompassed on every 
 side, riddled with shot, he held out stoutly, and 
 must have been overpowered, had he not been 
 assisted by the Neptune, which we have seen 
 exerting herself to get to windward to make 
 herself useful, and by the Pluton, which, hav- 
 ing succeeded in getting rid of her adversaries, 
 had come to seek fresh dangers. Unfortu- 
 nately, at the end of this fight, Admiral Gra- 
 vina received a mortal wound. Lastly, at the 
 extremity of this long line, marked by flames, 
 by floating wrecks of ships, by thousands of 
 mutilated bodies, a last scene occurred to fill 
 the combatants with horror, and our very ene- 
 mies with admiration. The dchille, attacked 
 on several sides, defended herself with obsti- 
 nacy. Amidst the cannonade, a fire broke out 
 in the ship. It would have been but natural 
 to leave the guns and hasten to the fire, which 
 already began to spread with alarming activity. 
 But the sailors of the dchtllc, fearing that while 
 they were extinguishing it, the enemy might 
 profit by the inaction of their artillery to gain 
 the advantage, chose rather to be invaded by 
 the flames than to forsake their guns. Pre- 
 sently, volumes of smoke, issuing from the 
 hull of the ship, frightened the English, and 
 decided them to move away from this volcano, 
 which threatened every moment to explode and 
 to engulph alike assailants and defenders. 
 They left it, therefore, all alone amidst the 
 abyss, and began to contemplate this spectacle, 
 which, from one moment to another, must ter- 
 minate in a horrible catastrophe. The French 
 crew, already much thinned by the grape-shot, 
 finding themselves delivered from their ene- 
 mies, directed all their efforts to the extinction 
 of the flames which were consuming theii 
 ship. But it was too lale: they were forced to 
 think of saving their lives, they threw into 
 s ?
 
 54 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct 1805. 
 
 the sea every thing capable of floating, casks, 
 masts, yards, and sought upon them a preca- 
 rious refuge from the explosion expected 
 every minute. Scarcely had a few of the 
 sailors committed themselves to the sea, when 
 the fire, having reached the powder, caused the 
 Jlchille to blow up with a tremendous crash, 
 which terrified the conquerors themselves. The 
 English hastened to send off their boats to 
 pick up the unfortunate men who had so nobly 
 defended themselves. A very small number 
 found means to save their lives. Most of them, 
 remaining on board, were hurled into the air 
 along with the wounded who encumbered the 
 ship. 
 
 It was five o'clock. The fighting was over 
 almost everywhere. The line, broken at first 
 in two places, and presently in three or four, 
 from the absence of the ships which had not 
 been able to keep in their positions, was 
 ravaged from one extremity to the other. At 
 the sight of that fleet, either destroyed or in 
 flight, Admiral Gravina, extricated by the 
 Neptune and the Pluton, and having become 
 commander-in-chief, gave the signal for re- 
 treat. Besides the two French ships which 
 came to his assistance, and the Prince of the 
 Jlsturias, which he was on board of, he was 
 able to rally eight more, three French; the 
 Hcros, the Indomptuble, and the Jlrgonaute, and 
 five Spanish, the Rayo, the San Francisco de 
 dssisi, the San Justo, the Montanez, and the 
 Leandro. These latter, we must confess, had 
 saved themselves much rather than their 
 honour. These were eleven which escaped 
 from the disaster, besides the four with Rear- 
 admiral Dumanoir, which made a separate 
 retreat in all, fifteen. To this number must 
 be added the frigates, which, placed to leeward, 
 had not done what might have been expected 
 of them to assist the fleet. Seventeen French 
 and Spanish ships had been taken by the 
 English; one had blown up. The combined 
 fleet had lost six or seven thousand men, 
 killed, wounded, drowned, or prisoners. Never 
 had so vast a scene of horror been beheld 
 upon the seas. 
 
 The English had obtained a complete vic- 
 tory, but a sanguinary, a dear-bought victory. 
 Of the twenty-seven ships composing their 
 fleet, almost all had lost masts; some were 
 unfitted for service, either for ever, or till they 
 had received considerable repairs. They had 
 to regret the loss of about 3000 men, a great 
 number of their officers, and the illustrious 
 Nelson, more to be regretted by them than an 
 army. They took in low seventeen ships, al- 
 most all dismasted or near foundering, and an 
 admiral prisoner. They had ihe glory of skill, 
 of experience, combined with incontestable 
 bravery. We had the glory of a heroic de- 
 feat, unequalled perhaps in history for the 
 devotedness of the vanquished. 
 
 At nightfall Gravina stood away for Cadiz 
 with eleven ships and five frigates. Rear- 
 admiral Dumanoir, fearful of finding the ene- 
 my between him and France, steered towards 
 the Sirait. 
 
 Admiral Collingwood assumed the signs of 
 mourning for his deceased commander, but he 
 did not think proper to follow the injunction 
 
 of that dying officer, and resolved, instead of 
 anchoring the fleet, to pass the night under 
 sail. The coast and the disastrous cape of 
 Trafalgar, which has given name to the battle, 
 were in sight. A dangerous wind began to 
 spring up, the night to become dark, and the 
 English ships, manreuvring with difficulty, on 
 account of their damages, were obliged to tow 
 or to escort seventeen captured ships. The 
 wind soon increased in violence, and the hor- 
 rors of a bloody battle were succeeded by a 
 tremendous storm, as if Heaven had designed 
 to punish the two most civilized nations of the 
 globe, and the most worthy to rule it bene- 
 ficially by their union, for the fury in which 
 they had just been indulging. Admiral Gra- 
 vina and his eleven ships had a secure and 
 speedy retreat in Cadiz. But Admiral Col- 
 lingwood, too far distant from Gibraltar, had 
 but the bosom of the ocean whereon to rest 
 from the fatigues and the sufferings of victory. 
 In a few moments, night, more cruel than the 
 day itself, mingled conquered and conquerors, 
 and made them all tremble beneath a hand 
 mightier than that of victorious man, the hand 
 of Nature in wrath. The English were 
 obliged to throw off the ships which they were 
 towing, and to give up watching those which 
 they had under their escort. Singular vicissi- 
 tudes of naval warfare ! Some of the prison- 
 ers, overjoyed at the terrific aspect of the 
 tempest, conceived a hope of reconquering 
 their ships and their liberty. The English 
 who guarded the Bucentaure, finding themselves 
 without assistance, gave up of their own ac- 
 cord our admiral's ship to the remnant of the 
 French crew. These, delighted at being de- 
 livered by an appalling danger, set up jury- 
 masts in their dismasted ship, fastened to them 
 fragments of sails, and steered for Cadiz, pro- 
 pelled by the hurricane. The Jilgesiras, wor- 
 thy of the unfortunate Magon, who^e corpse 
 she carried, resolved also tc rwe her deliver 
 ance to the storm. Seventy English officers 
 and seamen guarded this noble prize. Shat- 
 tered as she was, the jilgesiras, recently built, 
 bore herself up on the waves, in spite of her 
 extensive damages. But her three masts were 
 cut down; the mainmast fifteen feet from the 
 deck, the fore, nine, and the mizen, five feet. 
 The ship which towed her, flung off the cable 
 that held her prisoner. The English left in 
 charge of her had fired guns to demand assist- 
 ance, but obtained no answer. Then, address- 
 ing themselves to M. de la Bretonniere, they 
 begged him to assist them with his crew in 
 saving the ship, and with the ship the lives of 
 all on board. M. de la Bretonniere, struck at 
 this application by a gleam of hope, desired 
 to confer with his countrymen shut up in the 
 1 hold. He went to the French officers, and 
 communicated to them his hope of wresting 
 the jilgesiras from her conquerors. They 
 unanimously agreed to comply with the pro- 
 posal that was made to them, and, when once 
 in possession of the ship, to fall upon the 
 English, to disarm them, to fight them to the 
 last extremity amidst the horrors of that night, 
 and afterwards to provide as they best could 
 for their own safety. There were left 270 
 French, disarmed, but ready for any attempt
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 55 
 
 to recover their ship from the hands of the 
 enemy. The officers went about among them, 
 and imparted their plan, which was received 
 with transport. It was agreed that M. de la 
 Bretonniere should first summon the English, 
 and that, if they refused to surrender, the 
 French, at a given signal, should fall upon 
 them. The terrors of the tempest, the fears 
 of the coast, which was not far off, were all 
 forgotten : nothing was thought of but this 
 new fight, a species of civil war, in presence 
 of the incensed elements. 
 
 M. de la Bretonniere went back to the Eng- 
 lish, and told them that the state of neglect in 
 which the ship was left amidst so great a dan- 
 ger had dissolved all their engagements; that 
 from that moment the French looked upon 
 themselves as free ; and that, if their guards 
 conceived their honour interested in fighting, 
 they could do so; that the French crew, 
 though unarmed, would rush upon them at the 
 first signal. Two French seamen, in their 
 impatient ardour, actually fell upon the Eng- 
 lish sentinels, and received large wounds 
 from them. M. de la Bretonniere repressed 
 the tumult, and gave the English officers time 
 for reflection. The latter, after deliberating 
 for a moment, considering their small number, 
 the cruelty of their countrymen, the common 
 danger threatening the conquered and the 
 conquerors, surrendered to the French, on 
 condition that they should be again free as 
 soon as they should reach the shore of 
 France. M. de la Bretonniere promised to 
 demand their liberty from his government, if 
 they succeeded in getting into Cadiz. Shouts 
 of joy rang through the ship : all hands fell 
 to work: topmasts were sought out from 
 among the spare stores; they were hoisted, 
 fixed upon the stumps of the large masts, 
 sails were fitted to them, and in this state the 
 ship stood for Cadiz. 
 
 Daylight appeared, but, instead of bringing 
 any improvement in the weather, it was worse 
 than before. Admiral Gravina had returned 
 to Cadiz with the remnant of the combined 
 fleet. The English fleet was in sight of that 
 port, accompanied by some of its prizes, 
 which it kept at the muzzle of its guns. 
 After struggling the whole day against the 
 storm, the commanding officer. La Breton- 
 niere, though without a pilot, but assisted by 
 a seaman who was familiar with the waters 
 of Cadiz, arrived at the entrance of the road. 
 He had but a single bower anchor left and 
 one thick cable, to resist the wind which blew 
 with violence towards the coast. He threw 
 out that anchor, and trusted himself to it, a 
 prey at the same time to keen anxiety ; for, 
 if that gave way, the Algesirus must perish on 
 the rocks. Unacquainted with the road, he 
 had anchored near a formidable reef called 
 Diamond Point. The night was passed in the 
 most painful apprehension. At length day 
 returned and shed a fearful light on that deso- 
 late beach. The Bucentavre, always unfortu- 
 nate, had gone ashore there. Part of her 
 crew had, indeed, been saved by the Indompt- 
 able, anchored not far off. The latter, which 
 had sustained little damage, because she had 
 fought but little, was secured by good anchors 
 
 and good cable.*. During the whole day the 
 Mgesiras fired signals of distress, to claim as- 
 sistance. A few boats perished before they 
 could reach her. One only succeeded in 
 bringing to her a very small grapnal. The 
 JHgesirax remained at anchor near thelndompt- 
 able, applying to the latter to tow her, which 
 she promised to do as soon as it was possible 
 to get in.io Cadiz. Night again shrouded the 
 sea and the two ships anchored one beside 
 the other : it was the second since the fatal 
 battle. The crew of the dlgesiras looked with 
 terror on the two weak anchors on which 
 their salvation depended, and with envy on 
 those of the Indomptablc. The violence of the 
 tempest increased, and all at once a thrilling 
 shriek was heard. The Indomptable, her 
 strong anchors having given way, came on 
 suddenly, covered with her lanterns, having 
 on deck her crew in despair, passed within a 
 few feet of the Jllgesiras, and struck with a 
 horrible crash upon Diamond Point. The 
 lanterns which lighted her, the cries which 
 rang, were buried in the billows. Fifteen 
 hundred men perished at once, for the In- 
 domptable had on board her own crew nearly 
 entire, that of the Bucentaure, sound and 
 wounded, and part of the troops embarked in 
 the admiral's ship. 
 
 After this afflicting sight and the painful re- 
 flections which it occasioned, the Jllgcs-irus saw 
 day return and the storm abate. She entered 
 at last the road of Cadiz, and, proceeding at 
 random, grounded in a bed of mud, where she 
 was thenceforward out of danger. Just reward 
 of the most admirable heroism! 
 
 While these tragic adventures marked the 
 miraculous return of the Jilgesiras, the Redout' 
 able, the ship which had so gloriously fought 
 the Victory, and from which proceeded the 
 bullet that had killed Nelson, foundered. Her 
 stern, undermined by the balls, had suddenly 
 fallen in, and there had been scarcely time to 
 take out of her 119 Frenchmen. The Fougufux, 
 disabled, struck on the coast of Spain and was 
 lost. 
 
 The Monarca, abandoned in like manner, 
 had gone to pieces off the rocks of San Lucar. 
 
 The English had but few of their prizes left, 
 and with the least damaged of their ships they 
 kept at sea, within sight of Cadiz, constantly 
 struggling against contrary winds, which had 
 prevented them from regaining Gibraltar. At 
 this sight the brave commander of the Pluton, 
 Captain Cosmao, could not repress the zeal 
 with which he was animated. His ship was 
 riddled, his crew reduced to half, but none of 
 these reasons could stop him. Borrowing 
 some hands from the Hermione frigate, he re- 
 paired his rigging in haste, and, exercising the 
 command which belonged to him, for all the 
 admirals and rear-admirals were dead, wound- 
 ed, or prisoners, he made a signal to the ships 
 capable of putting to sea to weigh, in order to 
 take from Collingwood's fleet the French whom 
 it was dragging away with it. The intrepid 
 Cosmao accordingly sailed in company with 
 the Neptune, which during the battle had done 
 her best to get into the fire, and with thre 
 other French and Spanish ships, which ) 
 not had the honour of taking parr j 7 the
 
 56 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 of Trafalgar. They were five in all, accom- 
 panied by five frigates, which had also to make 
 amends for their recent conduct. In spite of 
 the foul weather, these ten ships approached 
 the English fleet. Collingwood, taking them 
 for so many ships of the line, immediately 
 sent ten of his least damaged ships to meet 
 them. In this movement some of the prizes 
 were abandoned. The frigates availed them- 
 selves of the opportunity to seize and take in 
 tow the Santa Jlnna and the Neptune. Cosmao, 
 who had not sufficient force, and had against 
 him the wind blowing towards Cadiz, returned, 
 carrying off with him the two reconquered 
 ships, the only trophy that he could gain after 
 such disasters. That was not the only result 
 of this effort. Admiral Collingwood, apprehen- 
 sive that he should not be able to keep his 
 prizes, sunk or burned the Santissima Trinidad, 
 the Jlrgonauta, the San Augustine, and the In- 
 trepide. 
 
 The Mgle escaped from the English ship, 
 the Defiance, and ran aground off Port St. 
 Mary. The Eenrick was lost by an act of de- 
 votedness similar to that which had saved the 
 Mgcsiras. Among the ships which accom- 
 panied Captain Cosmao, there was one which 
 could not get back: that was the Spanish ship, 
 the Eayo, which perished between Rota and 
 San Lucar. 
 
 The English admiral at length reached Gib- 
 raltar, carrying with him but four prizes out 
 of seventeen, one French, the Swiftsure, and 
 three Spanish; and he was afterwards obliged 
 to sink the Swiftsure also. 
 
 Such was that fatal battle of Trafalgar. In- 
 experienced seamen, allies still more inex- 
 perienced, a lax discipline, a neglected materiel, 
 everywhere precipitation, with its conse- 
 quences ; a commander too deeply impressed 
 with these disadvantages, conceiving from 
 them sinister presentiments, carrying these 
 with him over all the seas, suffering their in- 
 fluence to thwart the great plans of his sove- 
 reign; that irritated sovereign underrating 
 material obstacles, less difficult to surmount 
 on land than at sea, mortifying by the bitter- 
 ness of his reproaches an admiral whom he 
 ought rather to have pitied than blamed; this 
 admiral fighting from despair, and Fortune, 
 cruel to adversity, refusing him even the ad- 
 vantage of the wind; half of a fleet paralyzed 
 by ignorance and by the elements, the other 
 half fighting with fury; on one side a bravery 
 founded on calculation and skill, on the other 
 an heroic inexperience, sublime deaths, a 
 frightful carnage, an unparalleled destruction ; 
 after the ravages of men, the ravages of the 
 tempest; the abyss ingulphing the trophies of 
 the conqueror; lastly, the triumphant chief 
 buried in his triumph, and the vanquished 
 chief projecting suicide as the only refuge 
 from his affliction such was, we repeat it, that 
 fatal battle of Trafalgar, with its causes, its 
 results, its tragic aspects. 
 
 From this great disaster there could, how- 
 ever, be drawn useful consequences for our 
 navy It was requisite to relate to the world 
 what had happened. The combats of the Re- 
 doubtable, the Mgesiras, the jlchille, deserve to be 
 recorded with pride, beside the triumphs of 
 
 Ulm. Unsuccessful courage is not less admi- 
 rable than successful courage: it is more 
 touching. Besides, the favours of Fortune to 
 us were great enough to permit us to avow 
 publicly some of her severities. Then liberal 
 rewards ought to have been bestowed on the 
 men who had so worthily done their duty, and 
 those to have been brought before a council 
 of war, who, daunted by the horror of the 
 scene, had kept out of the fire. And, had they 
 even behaved well on other occasions, it would 
 have been right to sacrifice them to the neces- 
 sity of establishing discipline by terrible ex- 
 amples. Above all, government ought to fin<? 
 in this sanguinary defeat a lesson for itself; it 
 ought to impress it with the conviction that 
 nothing should be hurried, particularly where 
 the navy is concerned; it ought to make it 
 abstain from presenting in line of battle squa- 
 drons not sufficiently tried at sea, and to apply 
 itself mean while to train them by frequent and 
 distant cruises. 
 
 The excellent King of Spain, without enter- 
 ing into all these calculations, wrapped up in 
 one and the same measure rewards for the 
 brave and for the cowards, unwilling to bring 
 to light any thing but the honour done to his 
 flag by the conduct of some of his seamen. 
 It was a weakness natural to a court that had 
 grown old, but a weakness arising from be- 
 nignity. Our sailors, sonvwhat recruited 
 after their hardships, had mingled with the. 
 Spanish seamen in the port of Cadiz, when 
 they were informed that the King of Spain 
 gave a step in rank to every Spaniard who 
 had been present at the battle of Trafalgar, 
 besides particular distinctions to those who 
 had behaved best. The Spaniards, almost 
 ashamed of being rewarded when the French 
 were not, said to the latter that probably they 
 would soon receive the recompense of their 
 courage. This was not the case : the brave 
 and the cowards among the French also 
 shared the same treatment, and that treatment 
 was oblivion. 
 
 When the news of the disasters of Trafal- 
 gar reached Admiral Decres, he was intensely 
 grieved. That minister, notwithstanding his 
 intelligence, notwithstanding his intimate ac- 
 quaintance with naval matters, never had any 
 thing but reverses to report to a sovereign 
 who, in every other line, obtained only suc- 
 cesses. He transmitted these melancholy de- 
 tails to Napoleon, who was already advancing 
 with eagle's speed upon Vienna. Though 
 bad tidings had scarcely power to affect a 
 mind intoxicated with triumphs, the news of 
 Trafalgar mortified Napoleon, and excited his 
 profound displeasure. On this occasion, how- 
 ever, he was less severe than usual toward 
 Admiral Villeneuve, for that unfortunate chief 
 had fought bravely, though very imprudently. 
 Napoleon acted in this instance as men of the 
 strongest as well as of the weakest minds fre- 
 quently act ; he strove to forget this vexation, 
 and to make others forget it. He desired that 
 little should be said about Trafalgar in the 
 French newspapers, and that it should be 
 mentioned as an imprudent fight, in which 
 we had suffered more from the tempest than 
 from the enemy. He resolved neither to re
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 57 
 
 ward nor to punish, which was a cruel injus- 
 uoe, unworthy of him and of the spirit of his 
 government. At that time there was some- 
 thing passing in his mind which contributed 
 powerfully to produce this so niggardly con- 
 duct: he began to despair of the French navy. 
 He was devising a more sure, a more practi- 
 cable way of fighting England ; this was to 
 fight her in the allies whom she paid; to take 
 the continent from her, to exclude from it her 
 commerce and her influence. It was natural 
 for him to prefer this method, in the employ- 
 ment of which he excelled, and which, well 
 managed, would certainly have conducted him 
 to the aim of his efforts. From that day, Na- 
 poleon thought less of the navy, and wished 
 everybody else to think less of it too. 
 
 With respect to the battle of Trafalgar, Eu- 
 rope itself was willing enough to observe 
 that silence which he desired. The mighty 
 resonance of his steps on the continent 
 drowned the echoes of the cannon of Trafal- 
 gar. The powers who had the sword of Na- 
 poleon at their breast were but little cheered 
 by a naval victory, profitable to England alone, 
 without any other result than a new extension 
 of her commercial domination, a domination 
 which they disliked and tolerated only from 
 jealousy of France. Besides, British glory 
 did not console them for their own humilia- 
 tion. Trafalgar, then, eclipsed not the splen- 
 dour of Ulm, and, as we shall presently see, 
 lessened none of its consequences. 
 
 BOOK XXIII. 
 
 ADSTERLITZ. 
 
 THE tidings from the banks of the Danube 
 had filled France with satisfaction ; those from 
 Cadiz grieved her, but neither gave her any 
 surprise. Every thing was hoped for from our 
 land forces, constantly victorious ever since 
 the commencement of the Revolution, and 
 scarcely any thing from our fleets, so unfor- 
 tunate for the last fifteen years. But conse- 
 quences of minor importance only were 
 attached to naval events; on the contrary, 
 our prodigious successes on the continent 
 were regarded as completely decisive. There 
 people beheld hostilities kept at a great dis- 
 tance from our frontiers, the coalition discon- 
 certed at its outset, the duration of the war 
 greatly abridged, and the continental peace 
 rendered speedy, bringing with it the hope of 
 a maritime peace. Meanwhile, the army, 
 
 Vox.. II. 8 
 
 pushing on towards Austria to meet the Rus- 
 sians, afforded a presage of new and great 
 events, which were awaited with keen impa- 
 tience. For the rest, confidence in the genius 
 of Napoleon tempered all anxieties. 
 
 This confidence was needed to support cre- 
 dit, which was violently shaken. We have 
 already described the embarrassing situation 
 of our finances. An arrear, owing to the re- 
 solution of Napoleon to provide without loan 
 for the expenses of the war; the embarrass- 
 ments of the Spanish Treasury, extended to 
 the French Treasury by the speculations of 
 the company of the United Merchants ; the port 
 folio of the Treasury given up entirely to thac 
 company, by the fault of an honest but de 
 luded minister such were the causes of thai 
 situation. They had finally produced iue cri-
 
 58 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 '"is which had long been foreseen. An inci- 
 tent had contributed to hasten it. The court 
 f Madrid, which was debtor to the company of 
 :he United Merchants for the subsidy, the amount 
 >f which the latter had undertaken to dis- 
 charge, for the cargoes of corn sent to the dif- 
 erent ports of the Peninsula, for the supplies 
 furnished for the Spanish fleets and armies 
 the court of Madrid had just had recourse in 
 its distress to a disastrous measure. Being 
 obliged to suspend the payments of the Chest 
 f Consolidation, a species of bank dedicated to 
 rhe service of the public debt, it had given a 
 :brced currency as money to the notes of that 
 chest. Such a measure must necessarily cause 
 all the specie to disappear. M. Ouvrard, who, 
 till he could bring over the piastres of Mexico, 
 assigned to him by the court of Madrid, had 
 no other means of supplying the wants of his 
 partners but the cash which he was to draw 
 t'rom the Chest of Consolidation, found him- 
 self suddenly stopped short in his operations. 
 There had been promised in particular to M. 
 Desprez four millions of piastres, which he 
 had promised in his turn to the bank of 
 France, in order to obtain from it the assist- 
 ance that he needed. These four millions 
 were no longer to be depended upon. On the 
 sums to be drawn from Mexico, a loan of ten 
 millions had been negotiated with the house 
 of Hope, of which two at most could be hoped 
 for, in time to be useful. These unfortunate 
 circumstances had increased beyond measure 
 the embarrassments of M. Desprez, who was 
 charged with the operations of the Treasury, 
 -inr 3 of M. Vanlerberghe, who was charged 
 with the supply of provisions, and the embar- 
 rassments of both had fallen back upon the 
 bank. We have already explained how they 
 induced the bank to discount either their own 
 paper or the obligations of the receivers-general. 
 The bank gave them the amount in notes, the 
 issue of which was thus increased in an im- 
 moderate manner. This would have been 
 only an evil very speedily reparable if the 
 promised piastres had arrived to bring back 
 the metallic reserve of the bank to a suitable 
 rate. But things had come to such a point 
 that the bank had not more than fifteen mil- 
 . lion francs in its coffers, against seventy-two 
 millions in notes issued, and twenty millions 
 in running accounts, that is to say against 
 ninety-two millions demandable immediately. 
 A strange circumstance, which had recently 
 come to light, greatly aggravated this situa- 
 tion. M. de Marbois, in his unlimited confi- 
 dence in the company, had granted a faculty 
 entirely unexceptionable, which he had at first 
 viewed only as a facility of service, and which 
 had become the cause of a great abuse. The 
 company having in its possession the greater 
 part of the obligations of the receivers-general, 
 since it discounted them to the bank, having 
 to pay itself for services of all kinds which it 
 executed in different parts of the territory, 
 found itself obliged to draw incessantly upon 
 the chests of the Treasury ; and, for the great- 
 er convenience, M. de Marbois had ordered 
 the receivers-general to pay the funds which 
 came into their hands to the mere receipt of 
 M. Desprez. The company had immediately 
 
 made use of this faculty. While, on the one 
 hand, it endeavoured to procure cash at Paris 
 by discounting with the bank the obligations of 
 the receivers-general of which it was possessed, 
 on the other, it took from the chest of the re- 
 ceivers-general the money destined for the 
 discharge of those same obligations, and the 
 bank, when they became due, on sending them 
 to the receivers-general, found in payment 
 nothing but receipts of Desprez's. Thus the 
 bank received paper in payment of other pa- 
 per. In this manner it was led to so great an 
 issue of notes with so small a reserve. A 
 treacherous clerk, betraying the confidence of 
 M. de Marbois, was the principal cause of the 
 compliances of which such a deplorable use 
 was made. 
 
 This situation, unknown to the minister, 
 not duly appreciated even by the company, 
 which, in its embarrassment, not measuring 
 either the extent of the operations in which it 
 had been induced to engage, or the gravity of 
 the acts which it committed this situation re- 
 vealed itself gradually by a universal scarcity 
 of money. The public, in particular, eager 
 after metallic specie, apprised of its rarity at 
 the Bank, thronged to its offices to convert 
 notes into cash. Malevolent persons joining 
 those who were alarmed, the crisis soon be- 
 came general. 
 
 Circumstances so aggravated produced 
 avowals long delayed and distressing elucida- 
 tions. M. Vanlerberghe, to whom any thing 
 that there was blamable in the conduct of the 
 company could not be imputed, for he was 
 solely occupied with the corn-trade, without 
 knowing to what embarrassments he was ex- 
 posed by his partners M. Vanlerberghe went 
 to M. de Marbois, and declared to him that it 
 was impossible for him to provide both for the 
 service of the Treasury and for the victualling 
 service, and that it was quite as much as he 
 could do to continue the latter. He did not 
 disguise from him that the supplies furnished 
 for Spain, and still unpaid for, were the prin- 
 cipal cause of his straitened situation. M. de 
 Marbois, dreading lest the victualling service 
 should be at a stand, encouraged, moreover, 
 by some expressions of the Emperor, who, 
 satisfied with M. Vanlerberghe, had intimated 
 an intention of supporting him, granted to that 
 contractor an aid of 20 millions. He placed 
 them to the account of former supplies which 
 the administrations of war and the navy had 
 not yet paid for, and he gave them by return- 
 ing to M. Vanlerberghe personal engage- 
 ments of his to the amount of 20 millions, 
 contracted on account of the service of the 
 Treasury. But no sooner was this aid granted 
 than M. Vanlerberghe came to apply for a 
 second. This contractor had at his back a 
 multitude of sub-contractors, who usually gave 
 him credit, but who, no longer obtaining the 
 confidence of the capitalists, could not make 
 any further advances. He was, therefore, re- 
 duced to the last extremity. M. de Marbois, 
 alarmed at these communications, soon re- 
 ceived others still more serious. The bank 
 sent to him a deputation to acquaint the go- 
 vernment with its situation. The piastres 
 promised by M. Desprez were not forthcoming,
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 and yet he applied for further discounts ; the 
 Treasury, on its part, -wanted discounts, and 
 the bank had not two millions of crowns in 
 its coffers against an amount of 92 millions 
 demandable. What was it to do in such a 
 predicament? M. Desprez declared, on his 
 part, that he was at the end of his resources, 
 especially if the bank refused its assistance. 
 He, too, confessed that it was the counter- 
 check given by the affairs of Spain which 
 threw him into these distressing embarrass- 
 ments. It became unfortunately evident to the 
 minister that M. Vanlerberghe, supported on 
 M. Desprez, M. Desprez upon the Treasury, 
 and the bank bore the burden of the affairs 
 of Spain, which was thus transferred to France 
 herself by the rash combinations of M. Ouv- 
 rard. 
 
 It was too late to recede, and quite useless 
 to complain. It was requisite for the govern- 
 ment to extricate itself from this peril, and 
 to that end to extricate those who had impru- 
 dently involved themselves in it ; for to leave 
 them to perish would be to run the risk of 
 perishing with them. M. de Marbois did not 
 hesitate in deciding to support Messieurs Van- 
 lerberghe and Desprez; and he did right. But 
 he could no longer venture to act on his sole 
 responsibility, and a council of government, 
 summoned at his instigation, met under the 
 presidency of Prince Joseph. Prince Louis, 
 the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, and all the 
 ministers attended. Some of the superior 
 employes in the finances were sent for, and 
 among others M. Mollien, director of the 
 Sinking Fund. The council deliberated long 
 on the subject. After much general and idle 
 discussion, it was necessary to come to a con- 
 clusion, and each hesitated, in presence of a 
 responsibility equally great, whatever course 
 should be adopted, for it was as serious a 
 matter to let the contractors sink as to support 
 them. The Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, who 
 had sense enough to comprehend the exigen- 
 cies of this situation, and influence enough to 
 induce the Emperor to admit them, led a 
 majority to decide in favour of an immediate 
 aid to M. Vanlerberghe, to the amount of ten 
 millions at first, and afterwards of ten more, 
 when an approving answer should be received 
 from head-quarters. As for M. Desprez, it was 
 a question to be settled with the bank, for that 
 alone could assist the latter, by continuing to 
 discount for him. But the means proposed by 
 it to parry the exhaustion of its coffers and to 
 keep up the credit of its notes, without which 
 the establishment must fall, were taken into con- 
 sideration. Nobody was of opinion that it was 
 possible to give them a forced cash currency, 
 both on account of the impossibility of esta- 
 blishing a paper money in France, and on ac- 
 count of the impossibility of prevailing upon 
 the Emperor to consent to such a resolution. 
 But certain measures, designed to render pay- 
 ments slower and the drain of specie less 
 rapid, were adopted. The ministry of the 
 Treasury and the prefect of the police were 
 left to arrange the detail of these measures 
 with the bank. 
 
 M. de Marbois had some very warm discus- 
 sions with the council of the bank. He com- 
 
 plained of the manner in which it had managed 
 its affairs a very unjust reproach ; for if it 
 had been embarrassed, it was solely through 
 the fault of the Treasury. Its portfolio con- 
 tained nothing but excellent commercial paper, 
 
 ' the regular payment of which became for the 
 moment its only effective resource. It had 
 
 . even diminished its discounts to individuals 
 
 I so far as to reduce its portfolio below the ordi- 
 nary proportions. It had nothing in dispro- 
 
 1 portionate quantity, but M. Desprez's paper and 
 obligations of the receivers-general, which brought 
 back no money. It was suffering, therefore, 
 for the sake of the government itself. But 
 the bankers who directed it were in general so 
 
 ' devoted ro the Emperor, in whom they loved, 
 if not the glorious warrior, at least the restorer 
 
 i of order, that they allowed themselves to be 
 treated by the agents of power with a harsh- 
 ness which at this day the most vulgar com- 
 panies cf speculators would not endure. On 
 their part, it is true, this was the effect of 
 patriotism rather than of servility. To sup- 
 
 \ port the government of the Emperor was in 
 their eyes an imperative duty to France, whom 
 
 i he alone preserved from anarchy. They would 
 not feel irritated at very undeserved reproaches, 
 and they showed a devotedness to the cause 
 
 1 of the Treasury worthy of serving for an ex- 
 ample under similar circumstances. The fol- 
 lowing measures were adopted as most capable 
 of alleviating the crisis. 
 
 M. de Marbois was to send off post, into the 
 departments nearest to the capital, clerks with 
 orders to the paymasters to give up all the 
 funds which were not indispensably required 
 for the seryice of the rentes, of the pay of the 
 salaries of the functionaries, and to transmit 
 these funds to the bank. It was hoped that ia 
 
 | this manner five or six millions in specie 
 
 I would be brought in. Orders were given to 
 the receivers-general who had not delivered to 
 M. Desprez all the sums in their chests, to pay 
 them immediately into the bank. The clerks 
 sent out were likewise directed to ascertain 
 whether some of these accountable persons 
 were not employing the funds of the Treasury 
 for their private interest. To these means of 
 bringing in cash were added others for pro 
 venting the drain of it. Notes beginning to 
 fall in value, the public hurried to the bank, 
 impatient to convert them into money. Had 
 not stock-jobbers and ill-disposed persons in 
 terfered, a loss of 1 or 2 per cent., which notes 
 were sustaining, would have been sufficient to 
 induce the mass of holders to demand their 
 conversion into specie. The bank was author- 
 ized not to convert into money more than five 
 or six hundred thousand francs' worth of notes 
 per day. This was all the specie that was 
 needed when confidence existed. Another pre- 
 caution was taken in order to retard pay- 
 ments: this was to count the money. The 
 applicants for payment would gladly have 
 dispensed with this formality, for they were 
 not afraid that the bank would cheat the public 
 by putting a piece short in a bag of a thousand 
 francs. The cashiers, with an affectation ol 
 accuracy, nevertheless took the trouble tr 
 count them. It was decided, moreover, that 
 cash should be given for a single note only to
 
 60 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 one and the same person, and that each should 
 be admitted in turn. At length, the concourse 
 increasing every day, a last expedient was de- 
 vised, that of distributing numbers to the 
 holders of notes, in the proportion of five or 
 six hundred thousand francs, which were in- 
 tended to be paid per day. These numbers, 
 deposited at the mairies of Paris, were to be 
 distributed by the maires among persons no- 
 toriously unconnected with the commerce in 
 money, and having recourse to the payment 
 of their notes merely for the purpose of satis- 
 fying real wants. 
 
 These measures put an end at least to the 
 material disturbance about the offices of the 
 bank, and reduced the issue of specie to the 
 most urgent wants of the population. Jobbers, 
 who sought to extract specie from the bank, 
 to make the public pay 6 or 7 per cent, for it, 
 were thwarted in their manoeuvres. It was 
 nevertheless a real suspension of payment, 
 under the guise of a more cautious system. It 
 was unfortunately inevitable. Under these 
 circumstances, it is not the measure itself 
 which is to be blamed, but the anterior con- 
 duct which rendered it necessary. 
 
 The clerks sent out procured the remittance 
 of two millions at most. The daily expiry of 
 commercial effects brought more notes than 
 crowns, for traders paid in specie only when 
 they had sums of less than 500 francs to pay. 
 The bank resolved therefore to buy piastres at 
 any price in Holland, and thus take to its own 
 account part of the costs of the crisis. Thanks 
 to these conjoint means, the embarrassment 
 would soon have been surmounted, had not 
 M. Desprez suddenly come to plead still greater 
 necessities, and to solicit further aid. 
 
 This banker, charged by the company to 
 furnish the Treasury with the funds necessary 
 for the service, and for this purpose to discount 
 the obligations of the receivers-general, the bills at 
 sight, &c., had engaged to do this discount at a 
 half per cent, per month, that is to say, at 6 
 per cent, per annum. The capitalists having 
 refused to discount them for him at less than 
 1 per cent, per month, that is at 12 per cent, 
 per annum, he was exposed to ruinous losses. 
 He had devised a scheme for sparing himself 
 these losses, which was to pledge the obliga- 
 tions and the bills at sight to lenders, and to 
 borrow on these securities instead of getting 
 them sub-discounted. The speculators, de- 
 sirous to make an advantage of the circum- 
 stance, had at last refused to renew this species 
 of operations, in order to oblige him to give 
 up the securities of the Treasury, and thus to 
 obtain them at a low price. " The embarrass- 
 ments of the place," wrote M. de Marbois to 
 the Emperor, " afford many people a pretext 
 for employing them like corsairs towards the 
 United Merchants, and I know great patriots who 
 have withdrawn 12 or 14 hundred thousand 
 francs from the agent of the Treasury, in order 
 to make a better bargain." (Letter of the 28th 
 of September Depot of the Secretary of 
 State's office.) 
 
 M. Desprez, who had already received an aid 
 of 14 millions from the bank, wished to obtain 
 30 immediately, and 70 in the month of Bru- 
 maire: consequently, he wanted a sum of 100 
 
 millions. This situation, avowed at the bank 
 caused an absolute consternation there, and 
 produced an explosion of complaints on the 
 part of men who were not disposed to espouse 
 the fortune of the government, be it what it 
 might. They asked what M. Desprez was, and 
 by what title such great sacrifices were claimed 
 for him. The commercial world was ignoram 
 of the partnership subsisting between him ann 
 the company of contractors, which was la 
 bouring at once for Spain and for France. Bu r 
 the directors of the bank, though ignorant o, 
 his real situation, proposed to oblige the minis 
 ter to avow him as tha agent of the Treasury 
 were it only to have one security the more 
 The minister, apprized of their intention, hac 
 sent a note in hi? O-^R handwriting to the pre- 
 sident of the regency to say that M. Despre- 
 was acting oiJy on benalf of the Treasury 
 From an over.ight, M. de Marbois had neglected 
 to sign this rclt. He wa.', required to sign it 
 He complieJ and it was impossible to denj 
 that they v<r; in presence of the Emperoi 
 himself, the creator of the oanV, the saviou. 
 and master j,C France, b^f gir.g th?m not to re 
 duce his gov :rnment to txtreraity by refusing 
 the resources which i. had urgent need of. 
 
 The voice of patriotism prevailed, and this 
 result was chiefly 'iwing to M. Per/egaux, thr 
 celebrated banker whose influence v/as alwayv 
 exerted for the bfnefit of the State. It was de 
 cided that all necessary aid should be affordeo 
 to M. Dusprez; that the obligations whicK 
 served for borrow ing upon pledge, and which 
 he had avoided discounting to spare himseH 
 too great lo&sej, should be discounted, no ma< 
 ter at what rate, whether they belonged to M 
 Desprez or to the bank; that he should tak.- 
 upon himself this operation, as more capabk. 
 than any other to execute it ; that the losses 
 should be borne, half by the company and half 
 by the bank; that metals should be bought at 
 Amsterdam and Hamburg, at joint cost; and 
 that M. Desprez should be requested not to ve 
 new his engagements, in order to put an end 
 to such a situation. It was lastly resolved to 
 diminish the discounts to commerce, to devote 
 all the existing resources to the Treasury, and 
 to issue no notes but for it. The daily pay- 
 ment of commercial paper had brought back a 
 considerable quantity of notes, which it was at 
 first proposed to destroy, but M hich were soon 
 put into circulation again, to satisfy the wants 
 of M. Desprez. The first issue was even far 
 surpassed, and it was raised to 80 millions, be- 
 sides the 20 millions of current accounts. But 
 the extraordinary purchases of piastres, and 
 the effective discount of the obligations, procured 
 the five or six hundred thousand francs per 
 day, which were indispensable for satisfying 
 the public; and there appeared a flattering 
 prospect of getting over this crisis without 
 compromising the services, and without bring- 
 ing bankruptcy upon the contractors, which 
 would have led to that of the Treasury itself. 
 
 There was, however, no preventing indivi- 
 dual bankruptcies, which, following one an- 
 other in rapid succession, added greatly to the 
 national dejection. The failure of M. Reca- 
 mier, a banker renowned for his integrity, his 
 extensive business, and the high style in which
 
 Oct 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 fil 
 
 he lived, and who fell a victim to circumstan- 
 ces, much more than to his financial conduct, 
 produced the most painful sensation. Malevo- 
 lent persons attributed it to business transac- 
 tions with the Treasury, which had no exist- 
 ence. Many failures of less importance fol- 
 lowed that of M. Recamier, both in Paris and 
 in the provinces, and produced a sort of panic 
 terror. Under a government less firm and less 
 powerful than that of Napoleon, this crisis 
 might have been attended with the most seri- 
 ous consequences. But people relied upon his 
 fortune and upon his genius ; nobody felt any 
 uneasiness about the maintenance of public 
 order; they looked every moment for some 
 grand stroke which should raise sinking cre- 
 dit ; and that detestable species of speculators 
 who aggravate all situations by founding their 
 calculations on the depreciation of assets, 
 durst not venture upon the game of lowering, 
 for fear of the victories of Napoleon. 
 
 AH eyes were fixed upon the Danube, where 
 the destinies of Europe were about to be de- 
 cided. Thence were to proceed the events 
 that could put an end to that financial and po- 
 litical crisis. People hoped for them with full 
 confidence, especially after seeing in a few 
 days a whole army taken, almost without strik- 
 ing a blow, by the sole effect of a manoeuvre. 
 One circumstance of this very manoeuvre, 
 however, had just produced an unfortunate 
 complication with Prussia, and given us rea- 
 son to fear an additional foe. This circum- 
 stance was the march of Marshal Bernadotte's 
 corps through the Prussian province of Ans- 
 pach. 
 
 Napoleon, in directing the movement of his 
 columns upon the flank of the Austrian army, 
 had not considered for a moment that any ob- 
 jection would be made to passing through the 
 provinces which Prussia possessed in Franco- 
 nia. In fact, according to the convention of 
 neutrality stipulated by Prussia with the belli- 
 gerent powers, during the last war, the pro- 
 vinces of Anspach and Bayreuth had not been 
 comprehended in the neutrality of the north of 
 Germany. The reason was simple, namely, 
 that these provinces, lying in the obligatory 
 route of the French and Austrian armies, it was 
 almost impossible to withdraw them from their 
 passage. All that could be required was that 
 they should not become a theatre of hostilities, 
 that they should be traversed rapidly, and that 
 both parties should pay for what they took 
 there. If Prussia had desired that a different 
 system should be adopted on this occasion, she 
 ought to have said so. Besides, when quite 
 recently, she had entered into negotiations of 
 alliance with France, when she had proceeded 
 in this track so far as to listen to and assent to 
 the offer of Hanover, she scarcely had a right 
 to change the old rules of her neutrality, in or- 
 der to render them more stringent for France 
 than in 1796. This would have been incon- 
 ceivable : on this point, therefore, she had kept 
 a silence, which, decently, she would not have 
 ventured to break, especially to declare that, in 
 full negotiation of an alliance, she was deter- 
 mined to be less condescending to us than in 
 times of extreme coldness. Be this as it may, 
 Napoleon, grounding himself on the old conven- 
 
 ' tion and on an appearance of friendship which 
 he could not but believe, had not considered the 
 passage through the province of Anspach as a 
 violation of territory. What proves his sin- 
 cerity in regard to this point is that strictly he 
 might have made shift without borrowing the 
 roads of that province; and that, by keeping 
 his columns closer to one another, it would 
 have been very easy for him to avoid the Prus- 
 sian territory, without losing many chances of 
 enveloping General Mack. 
 
 But the situation of Prussia was daily be- 
 coming more embarrassing, between the Em- 
 peror Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander. 
 The first offered him Hanover and his alli- 
 ance ; the second solicited of him a passage 
 through Silesia for one of his armies, and 
 seemed to declare to him that he must join in 
 the coalition, either willingly or by force. As 
 soon as he comprehended the true state of the 
 case, Frederick William was seized with an 
 extraordinary agitation. That prince, some- 
 
 I times swayed by the avidity natural to the 
 Prussian power, which impelled him towards 
 Napoleon, sometimes by court influences, 
 which drew him towards the coalition, had 
 made promises to everybody, and had thus 
 involved himself in an embarrassing position 
 from which he saw no outlet but war with 
 Russia or with France. He was exasperated 
 in the highest degree at this, for he was dissa- 
 tisfied both with others and with himself, and 
 he could not contemplate war without appre- 
 hension. Indignant, however, at the violence 
 with which Russia threatened him, he had or- 
 dered 80,000 men to be placed on the war 
 footing. In this state of things, news of the 
 alleged violation of the Prussian territory 
 reached Berlin. This was a new subject of 
 vexation to the King of Prussia, because it 
 diminished the force of the arguments which 
 he was opposing to the urgent representations 
 of Alexander. It is true that there were rea- 
 sons for opening the province of Anspach to 
 the French, which did not exist for opening 
 Silesia to the Russians. But in moments of 
 effervescence, it is not justice of argument 
 that prevails; and, on learning at Berlin the 
 passage of the French through the territory 
 of Anspach, the court cried oufthat Napoleon 
 had offered an unworthy insult to Prussia in 
 treating her as he was accustomed to treat 
 Naples or Baden ; that she could not possibly 
 submit to it without dishonouring herself; 
 that, for the rest, if they were not to have 
 war with Napoleon, they should be obliged to 
 have it with Alexander, for that prince would 
 not suffer them to act in so partial a manner 
 towards him, to refuse him what had been 
 granted to his adversary : and, finally, that, if 
 they were forced to choose, it would be ex- 
 tremely strange, most unworthy of the senti- 
 ments of the king, to espouse the cause of 
 the oppressors of Europe against its defenders. 
 Frederick William, it was added, had always 
 professed other sentiments at Memel in his 
 confidential intercourse with his youns friend 
 Alexander. Such was the way in which peo- 
 ple talked openly at Berlin, and particularly 
 in the royal family, swayed by a queen, affec- 
 tionate, beautiful, and stirring.
 
 G2 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1805. 
 
 Frederick William, though sincerely irritated 
 at the violation of the territory of Anspach, 
 which deprived him of his best argument 
 against the urgent solicitations of Russia, be- 
 haved as men false through weakness are ac- 
 customed to do : he made a resource of his 
 anger, and pretended to be more irritated than 
 he was. His conduct towards the two repre- 
 sentatives of France was ridiculously af- 
 fected. Not only did he refuse to receive them, 
 but M. de Hardenberg would not admit them 
 into his cabinet to hear their explanations. 
 Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc were laid 
 under a sort of interdict, and cut off from all 
 communication even with the private secre- 
 tary, M. Lombard, through whom passed the 
 confidential communications when the ques- 
 tion either of German indemnities or of Han- 
 over was under discussion. The secret inter- 
 mediate agents usually employed declared 
 that, in the state of the king's mind in regard 
 to the French, they durst not see any of them. 
 All this anger was evidently assumed. The 
 intention was to draw from it a solution of the 
 embarrassments in which Prussia had in- 
 volved herself; to be able to tell France that 
 the engagements made with her were broken 
 through her own fault. These engagements, 
 renewed so often and substituted for various 
 plans of alliance which had failed, consisted 
 in promising formally that the Prussian terri- 
 tory should never subserve any aggression 
 against France, that Hanover itself should be 
 secured against all invasion. The French 
 having forcibly passed through the Prussian 
 territory, it was proposed thence to conclude 
 that they had given Prussia a right to open it 
 to whomsoever she pleased. Here was an 
 outlet miraculously discovered to escape from 
 the difficulties of all kinds accumulated 
 around her. In consequence, it was resolved 
 to declare that Prussia was, by the violation 
 of her territory, released from every engage- 
 ment, and that she granted a passage to the 
 Russians through Silesia, in compensation of 
 the passage taken through Anspach by the 
 French. The intention was to do much bet- 
 ter than to get out of a great embarrassment; 
 it was hoped to obtain a profit from all this. 
 It was decided to seize Hanover, where no 
 more than 6000 French were left shut up in 
 the fortress of Hameln, and to colour that, in- 
 vasion by a spurious pretext, that of provid- 
 ing against fresh violations of territory, for an 
 Anglo-Russian army was marching for Han- 
 over, and by occupying it Prussia prevented 
 the theatre of hostilities from being transferred 
 to her provinces, by which Hanover was en- 
 closed on all sides. 
 
 The king summoned an extraordinary coun- 
 cil, to which the Duke of Brunswick and 
 Marshal Mollendorf were called. M. de Haug- 
 witz, drawn from his retirement for these 
 momentous circumstances, attended it also. 
 There the resolutions which we have just re- 
 capitulated were agreed upon, but they were 
 left for a few days enveloped in a sort of cloud, 
 to terrify still more the two representatives of 
 France. Though neither they nor their mas- 
 ter were thought to be easily frightened, it 
 was imagined that, at a moment when Napo- 
 
 leon had so many enemies on his hands, the 
 fear of adding Prussia to them, which would 
 have rendered the coalition universal, as in 
 1792, would act powerfully upon their minds. 
 
 Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc had long 
 applied in vain for an interview with M 
 de Hardenberg. At length they saw hire 
 found in him the studied attitude of a man 
 who is making an effort to repress his indig- 
 nation, and obtained from him, amidst manj 
 bitter complaints, nothing but the declaration, 
 that the engagements of Prussia were broken, 
 and that she should thenceforth be guided 
 solely by the interest of her own safety. The 
 cabinet suffered the resolution of opening Si- 
 lesia to the Russians, and of occupying Hano- 
 ver with a Russian army, upon pretext of 
 preventing the flames of war from spreading 
 to the very heart of the kingdom, to reach by 
 degrees the ears of the two French negotiators. 
 It seemed to intimate that France ought to 
 deem herself fortunate to get off so easily. 
 
 All this was very unworthy of the upright- 
 ness of the king and the power of Prussia. 
 However, after this first explosion, forms began 
 to improve, not only because it was part of the 
 Prussian plan to soften down, but also because 
 the astonishing successes of Napoleon had 
 suggested serious reflections to all courts. 
 
 What was passing in Berlin had been car- 
 ried to Pulawi with the speed of lightening. 
 Alexander, who had desired to see Frederick 
 William before France had given Prussia 
 causes of complaint, could not but be still more 
 desirous to do so afterwards. He hoped to find 
 that prince disposed to receive all kinds of in- 
 fluences. Instead, therefore, of fixing upon 
 such a place of meeting that the distance to 
 be travelled should be equally divided, Alexan- 
 der performed the entire journey himself, and 
 proceeded immediately to Berlin. 
 
 Frederick William, on hearing of the arrival 
 of the tzar, was sorry that he had made so 
 much fuss, and thus drawn upon himself a flat- 
 tering but compromising visit. Napoleon com- 
 menced the war in a manner so rapid and de- 
 cisive as to hold out little encouragement to a 
 connection with his enemies. However, it 
 was not possible to refuse the attentions of a 
 prince for whom one professed such a warm 
 affection. The necessary orders were, there- 
 fore, given for receiving him with all befitting 
 ceremony. On the 25th of October, Alexan- 
 der made his entry into the Prussian capital, 
 amidst the thunder of the cannon, and between 
 Hies of the royal Prussian guard. The young 
 King hastening to meet him, embraced him 
 ordially amidst the applause of the people, 
 who, having at first been favourable to the 
 French, began to allow themselves to be hur- 
 ried away by the impulsion of the court, and 
 
 the assertion, a thousand times repeated, 
 that Napoleon had violated the territory of 
 Anspach out of contempt for Prussia. Alex- 
 ander had promised himself to employ on this 
 occasion all the means of seduction that he 
 Dossessed to bring the court of Berlin into his 
 nterests. He did not fail to do so, and began 
 with the beautiful queen of Prussia, who was 
 easy to gain, for, sprung from the house of ' 
 VIecklenburg, she snared all the passions of
 
 Oct. 1805.] 
 
 CONSU1 ATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 63 
 
 the German nobility against the French Re- 
 volution. Alexander paid her a sort of chival- 
 rous worship, which might be taken at plea- 
 sure for a mere homage rendered to her merit, 
 or for a much warmer sentiment. Though at 
 that time very attentive to a distinguished lady 
 of the Russian nobility, Alexander was a man 
 and a prince to feign on a seasonable occasion 
 a sentiment useful to his views. There was 
 nothing, however, in these demonstrations that 
 was capable of offending either decorum or 
 the jealous susceptibility of Frederick Wil- 
 liam. He had not been two days in Berlin be- 
 fore the whole court was full of him, and ex- 
 tolled his gracefulness, his intelligence, his 
 generous ardour for the cause of Europe. He 
 had paid particular attentions to all the rela- 
 tions of the great Frederick : he had visited 
 the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mullen- 
 dorf, and honoured in them the chiefs of the 
 Prussian army. The young prince, Louis, 1 
 who was remarkable for his violent hatred of 
 the French and an ardent passion for glory 
 Prince Louis, gained over beforehand to the 
 cause of Russia, manifested more vehemence 
 than usual. A sort of general fascination gave 
 up the court of Prussia to Alexander. Fred- 
 erick William perceived the effect produced 
 around him, and began to be alarmed at it. 
 He waited with painful anxiety for the propo- 
 sals that were to spring from all this enthu- 
 siasm, and he kept silence for fear of hasten- 
 ing the moment of the explanations. We have 
 already said that, in his extreme embarrass- 
 ment, he had summoned to him his old coun- 
 sellor de Haugwitz, whose mind, too acute for 
 his own, sometimes annoyed him by his very 
 superiority, but whose shrewd, evasive policy, 
 always inclined to a neutrality, perfectly 
 suited him. They both deplored the fatal con- 
 catenation of things, which, under the im- 
 passioned and unequal direction of M. de Har- 
 denberg, had brought Prussia to a point from 
 which there was absolutely no outlet. M. de 
 Hardenberg, at first the friend and creature of 
 M. de Haugwitz, soon the jealous rival of that 
 statesman, had begun by following his policy, 
 which consisted in keeping himself neuter be- 
 tween the two European parties, and in making 
 the most of that neutrality; but he had done 
 so with his impassioned character, sometimes 
 overturning on one side, sometimes on the 
 other, favourable to the French when the ques- 
 tion concerned Hanover, to such a degree as 
 to be disposed to give himself wholly up to 
 them, and, since the affair of Anspach, so hur- 
 ried away by the general movement, that he 
 was ready to go halves with Russia making 
 war upon them. M. de Haugwitz, censuring, 
 but with delicacy, an ungrateful disciple, 
 said that Prussia had been too French a few 
 months before and that now she was too Rus- 
 sian. But how was she to extricate herself 
 from the dilemma 7 how escape from the grasp 
 of the young Emperor 1 The difficulty in- 
 creased hourly, and it was not to be resolved 
 
 1 PRINCE f.oois OF PRUSSIA, brother of Frederick Wil- 
 liam II. of Prussia, and a resolute supporter of his realm 
 against Napoleon. He was one of the most gallant princes 
 of the day ; enthusiastic, high-spirited, and noble-minded, 
 
 by incessantly eluding it. Time was precious 
 for Alexander, for every day that elapsed 
 brought tidings of a new success of Napoleon's 
 on the Danube, and a new peril for Austria, as 
 well as for the Russian armies, which had 
 reached the Inn. He therefore addressed him- 
 self to the King of Prussia, and induced his 
 minister for foreign affairs, the able and astute 
 Count de Haugwitz, to address him also. The 
 theme which both of them developed may 
 easily be inferred from what precedes. Prus- 
 sia, said they, could not separate herself from 
 the cause of Europe; she could not contribute 
 by her inaction to render the common enemy 
 triumphant; she had some respect paid her 
 by him for the moment, and not a great deal, 
 to judge from what had recently happened at 
 Anspach, but she would soon be crushed when, 
 delivered from Austria and Russia, he should 
 have nobody else to settle with. Prussia, it is 
 true, was a much nearer object for the attacks 
 of Napoleon; but then an army of 80,000 men 
 was marching to her assistance, and it had ap- 
 proached so near to her solely for that purpose. 
 This army, assembled at Pulawi, on the fron- 
 tier of Silesia, was not a threat but a generous 
 attention on the part of Alexander, who had not 
 desired to urge his friend into a serious war 
 without offering him the means of defying its 
 perils. Besides, Napoleon had many enemies 
 on his hands ; he would be in great danger on 
 the Danube, if, while the united Austrians and 
 Russians should oppose a solid barrier to 
 him, Prussia were to throw herself upon his 
 rear by Franconia ; he would then find him- 
 self between two fires, and be infallibly over- 
 come. In this very probable case, the com- 
 mon deliverance would be due to Prussia, and 
 then there should be done for her all that Napo- 
 leon promised, all that he meant not to perform ; 
 then there should be given to her that comple- 
 ment of territory with which he had flattered 
 the just ambition of the house of Brandenburg 
 Hanover. (Letters had actually been des- 
 patched to London to decide England to thi> 
 sacrifice.) And it would be much better to 
 receive so valuable a gift from the legitimate 
 owner, as the price of the salvation of all, thav. 
 from a usurper giving away the property of 
 another as a reward for treachery. 
 
 To these representations was added a new 
 influence; this was the presence of the Arch- 
 duke Anthony, who had travelled in the utmost 
 haste from Vienna to Berlin. That prince 
 came to report the disasters of Ulin, the rapid 
 progress of the French, the perils of the Aus- 
 trian monarchy, too great not to be common 
 to all Germany, and he earnestly solicited the 
 reconciliation at any price of the two principal 
 German powers. 
 
 This diplomatic machination was too well 
 planned for the unfortunate King of Prussia to 
 esca-pe from it. Nevertheless, he and M. de 
 Haugwitz made an obstinate resistance, as if 
 they had had a presentiment of the disasters 
 that were soon to befall the Prussian mo- 
 
 Ihough he somewhat sullied these high characteristics by 
 debauchery and dissipation. He died fighting gallantly 
 at Jena, in defence of his native kingdom, on the lOtu ol 
 October, 1806. million's Europe. B
 
 64 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 narchy. There were many interviews, many 
 controversies, many bitter complaints. The 
 king and his minister declared that the two 
 emperors were bent on the ruin of Prussia, 
 that they would ruin her to a certainty, for 
 all Europe, were it united, would be incapable 
 of withstanding Napoleon ; that, if they did 
 yield, it was because violence was done to 
 their reason, their prudence, their patriotism, 
 and they should not fail to recriminate against 
 the plan which had been laid to hurry them 
 away, either with their good will or by force, a 
 plan of which the Russian army collected on 
 the frontier of Silesia was to be the instru- 
 ment. To this the Emperor Alexander replied, 
 by giving up his minister Prince Czartoryski. 
 Swayed by his natural inconstancy, he began 
 already to listen much to the Dolgoroulds, 
 who went about asserting everywhere that 
 Prince Czartoryski was a perfidious minister, 
 betraying his Emperor for the sake of Poland, 
 of which he intended to make himself king, 
 and striving, with this object, to set Russia 
 upon Prussia. Alexander, who had not suffi- 
 cient firmness for the plan that had been pro- 
 posed to him, was alarmed, even at Pulawi, at 
 the idea of marching against France, by pass- 
 ing over the body of Prussia, were even the 
 crown of Poland to be the reward of that te- 
 merity. Enlightened by M. de Alopeus, ex- 
 cited by the Dolgoroukis, he said that an at- 
 tempt had been made to lead him to commit a 
 great fault, and he even keenly reproached 
 Prince Czartoryski, whose grave and austere 
 character began to be annoying to him, be- 
 cause, with the freedom of a friend and an 
 independent minister, he sometimes blamed 
 his sovereign for his foibles and his fickleness. 
 
 By dint of application, of disavowals, and 
 above all of accessory influences, such as the 
 solicitations of the queen, the language of 
 Prince Louis, the cries of the young Prussian 
 staff, the king was at length appeased, M. de 
 Haugwitz overcome, and both led to enter into 
 the views of the coalition. But, swayed as 
 Frederick William was, he determined to re- 
 serve for himself a last resource for escaping 
 from these new engagements ; and, by the ad- 
 vice of M. de Haugwiiz, he adopted a plan 
 which could still hold forth some illusion to 
 his vanquished integrity, and which consisted 
 in a project of mediation, a grand hypocrisy 
 employed at that time by all the powers to dis- 
 guise the plan of coalition against France. It 
 was the form which Prussia had thought of 
 employing three months before, when the ques- 
 tion of allying herself with France at the price 
 of Hanover was under discussion; it was the 
 form which she employed now when discuss- 
 ing the question of allying herself with Alex- 
 ander; and, unluckily for her honour, again at 
 the price of Hanover. 
 
 It was agreed that Prussia, alleging the im- 
 possibility of living at peace between impla- 
 cable adversaries, who did not even respect 
 her territory, should decide to intervene for 
 the purpose of forcing them to peace. So far, 
 so good; but what were to be the conditions 
 of this peace 1 Therein lay the whole ques- 
 tion. If Prussia conformed to the treaties 
 signed with Napoleon, and by which she had 
 
 guarantied the present state of the French em- 
 pire, in exchange for what she had received in 
 Germany, there was nothing to be said. But 
 she was not firm enough to stop at this limit, 
 which was that of honour. She agreed to pro- 
 pose as conditions of peace anew demarcation 
 of the Austrian possessions in Lombardy, 
 which would extend the latter from the Adige 
 to the Mincio, (which must lead to a dismem- 
 berment of the kingdom of Italy,) an indemnity 
 for the King of Sardinia, and, besides these, 
 the conditions usually admitted by Napoleon 
 himself, in case of a general pacification, that 
 is to say the independence of Naples, of Swit- 
 zerland, of Holland. This was a formal viola- 
 tion of the reciprocal guarantees which Prussia 
 had stipulated with France, not in plans of al- 
 liance which had miscarried, but in authentic 
 conventions signed on occasion of the German 
 indemnities. 
 
 The Russians and the Austrians would have 
 desired more, but, as they knew that Napoleon 
 would never consent to these conditions, they 
 were certain, even with what they had obtained, 
 to drag Prussia into the war. 
 
 There was another difficulty, which also 
 they passed over, in order to remove all ob- 
 stacles. Frederick William would not pre- 
 sent himself to Napoleon in the name of all 
 his enemies, especially England, after so much 
 confidential communication with him against 
 that power. He expressed, therefore, a desire 
 to say not a single word relative to Great Bri- 
 tain in the declaration of mediation, intending, 
 he said, to interfere only in regard to the peace 
 of the continent. This again was assented to, 
 as it was still thought that there was sufficient 
 in what had been agreed upon to plunge him 
 into the war. Further, he required a last pre- 
 caution, the most captious and the most im- 
 portant of all, the postponement for a month 
 of the term at which Prussia should be obliged 
 to act On the other hand, the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick, always consulted, always heard without 
 appeal, when the matter in hand related to 
 military affairs, declared that the Prussian 
 army would not be ready till the first days in 
 December, and on the other M. de Haugwitz 
 recommended delay, to see how things went 
 on the Danube between the French and the 
 Russians. With a captain such as Napoleon, 
 events could not lag, and, in gaining a month 
 only, there was a chance of being extricated 
 from embarrassment by some unforeseen and 
 decisive solution. It was settled, therefore, 
 that, at the expiration of a month, reckon- 
 ing from the day on which M. de Haugwitz, 
 commissioned to propose the mediation, should 
 have left Berlin, Prussia should be required 
 to take the field, if Napoleon had not returned 
 a satisfactory answer. It would be easy to 
 add a few days to that month, by retarding the 
 departure of M. de Haugwitz upon various pre- 
 texts, and, besides, Frederick William trusted 
 to that negotiator, to his prudence and his ad- 
 dress, that the first words exchanged with Na- 
 poleon should not render the rupture inevitable 
 and immediate. 
 
 These conditions, unworthy of Prussian 
 honour, for they were contrary, we repeat it, 
 to formal stipulations, the price of which Prus
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 65 
 
 sia had received in fine territories, contrary 
 especially to an intimacy which Napoleon 
 must have believed to be sincere these con- 
 ditions were inserted in a double declaration, 
 signed at Potsdam on the 3d of November. 
 The text of it has never been published, but 
 Napoleon found means subsequently to learn 
 its purport. This declaration has retained the 
 title of treaty to Potsdam. No doubt Napo- 
 leon had committed faults in regard to Prus- 
 sia: while caressing her and benefiting her 
 much, he had let slip more than one occasion 
 to bind her irrevocably. But he had loaded 
 her with solid favours, and he had always be- 
 haved honourably in his transactions with her. 
 
 Alexander and Frederick William were re- 
 siding at Potsdam. It was in this beautiful 
 retreat of the great Frederick, that they recipro- 
 cally heightened each other's enthusiasm, and 
 concluded that treaty so contrary to the policy 
 and the interests of Prussia. The able Count 
 de Haugwitz was deeply grieved at it, and ex- 
 cused himself in his own eyes for having 
 signed it, solely in the 'hope of eluding its con- 
 sequences. The king, bewildered, confounded, 
 knew not whither he was going. To complete 
 his perturbation of mind, Alexander, in con- 
 cert it is said with the queen, and probably in 
 consequence of her fondness for studied scenes, 
 desired to see the little vault which contains 
 the remains of the great Frederick in the Pro- 
 testant church of Potsdam. There, at the bot- 
 tom of this vault, hollowed out of a pillar of 
 the church, narrow, simple even to negligence, 
 lay two wooden coffins, the one that of Frede- 
 rick William I., the other the great Frederick's. 
 Alexander went thither with the young king, 
 shed tears, and, clasping his friend in his arms, 
 swore to him and begged him to swear an oath 
 of everlasting friendship on the coffin of the 
 great Frederick. Never were they to separate 
 either their cause or their fortunes. Tilsit 
 was destined ere long to show the solidity of 
 such an oath, probably sincere at the moment 
 when it was taken. 
 
 This scene, related in Berlin, published 
 throughout all Europe, confirmed the opinion 
 that there existed a close alliance between the 
 two young monarchs. 
 
 England, apprised of the change of things 
 in Prussia, and of the negotiations so happily 
 conducted with that court, regarded it as a 
 capital event, which might decide the fate of 
 Europe. She despatched immediately Lord 
 Harrowby himself, the minister for foreign 
 affairs, to negotiate. The cabinet of London 
 was not difficult with the court of Berlin; it 
 accepted its accession, no matter at what price. 
 It consented that England should not even be 
 mentioned in the negotiation which Count de 
 Haugwitz was about to undertake in the camp 
 of Napoleon, and it kept subsidies ready for 
 the Prussian army, not doubting that she 
 would take part in the war at the end of a 
 month. With respect to the aggrandizements 
 of territory promised to the house of Branden- 
 burg, it was disposed to concede much, but it 
 did not depend on the English cabinet to give 
 up Hanover, the highly-prized patrimony of 
 George III. Mr. Pitt would cheerfully have 
 sacrificed it, for the British ministers have al- 
 
 VOL. II. 9 
 
 ways taken it into their heads to regard Han- 
 over as a burden to England. But they would 
 sooner have persuaded King George to re- 
 nounce the three kingdoms than Hanover. 
 To make amends, an offer was made of some- 
 thing not so contiguous, it is true, to the Prus- 
 sian monarch, but more considerable Holland 
 itself." That Holland, which all the courts 
 declared to be the slave of France, and whose 
 independence they claimed with such energy, 
 was flung at the feet of Prussia to attach her 
 to the coalition and to release Hanover. It is 
 for the illustrious Dutch nation to judge what 
 value it ought to set on the sincerity of Euro- 
 pean affections in regard to it. 
 
 These were so many points to be settled 
 afterwards between the courts of Prussia and 
 England. In the interim it was requisite to 
 draw from the treaty of Potsdam its essential 
 consequence, that is to say, the accession of 
 Prussia to the coalition. The Austrians and 
 the Russians urged the departure of M. de 
 Haugwitz, and, while he was making his pre- 
 parations, the Emperor Alexander set out on 
 the 5th of November, after a stay of ten days 
 at Berlin, for Weimar, to see his sister, the 
 grand-duchess, a princess of high merit, who 
 lived in that city surrounded by the greatest 
 geniuses of Germany, happy in that noble 
 intercourse which she was worthy to enjoy. 
 The parting of the two monarchs was, like 
 their first meeting at the gales of Berlin, mark- 
 ed by embraces and demonstrations of friend- 
 ship; which one of the parties at least seemed 
 to wish to render conspicuous. Alexander 
 set out for the army surrounded by the inte- 
 rest which usually attaches to such a depar- 
 ture. People saluted in him a young hero, 
 ready to confront the greatest dangers, for the 
 triumph of the common cause of kings. 
 
 Meanwhile, M. de Laforest, minister of 
 France, Duroc, grand-marshal of the imperial 
 palace, were totally forsaken. The court con- 
 tinued to treat them with affronting coldness. 
 Though the most profound secrecy had been 
 promised between the Russians and the Prus- 
 sians relative to the stipulations of Potsdam, 
 the Russians, unable to conceal' their satisfac- 
 tion, had told everybody that Prussia was 
 irrevocably bound to them. Their joy, indeed, 
 revealed this plainly enough, and, joined to 
 the military preparations which were making, 
 to the bustle, rather unsuited to his age into 
 which the old Duke of Brunswick put himself, 
 it attested the success which Alexander's pre- 
 sence at Potsdam had obtained. M. de Har- 
 den berg, who shared with M. de Haugwitz the 
 direction of the foreign affairs, scarcely show- 
 ed himself to the French negotiators, but M. 
 de Haugwitz had more frequent interviews 
 with them. Being asked by them what im- 
 portance ought to be attached to the Russian 
 indiscretions, he defended himself against all 
 the suppositions that were publicly circulated. 
 He avowed a project, which, he said, could 
 have nothing new for them, that of a media- 
 tion. When they wished to learn whether that 
 mediation was to be an armed one, which sig- 
 
 1 It is on authentic documents that I found this aswr 
 tioo. 
 
 r 2
 
 C6 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 nified imposed, he evaded the question, saying 
 that the representations of his court to Napo- 
 leon would be proportioned to the urgency of 
 the moment. When, at last, they asked what 
 were to be the conditions of this mediation, he 
 replied that they would be just, discreet, con- 
 formable to the glory of France, and of this 
 he had given the best proof by undertaking 
 himself to carry them to Napoleon. He could 
 not, the first time of his visiting that great 
 man, expose himself to the hazard of being 
 roughly repulsed. 
 
 Such were the explanations obtained from 
 the cabinet of Berlin. The only thing which 
 was evident was that Silesia was open to the 
 Russians, as a punishment for the passage of 
 our troops through the territory of Anspach, 
 and that Hanover was about to be occupied 
 by a Prussian army. As France had a garri- 
 son of 6000 men in the fortress of Hameln, 
 M. de Haugwitz, without saying whether or- 
 ders would be given for besieging that place, 
 promised the greatest civility to the French, 
 adding that he hoped for the same from them. 
 
 The Grand-marshal Duroc, seeing nothing 
 further to do in Berlin, set out for Napoleon's 
 head-quarters. At this period, the end of Oc- 
 tober, and the beginning of November, Napo- 
 leon, having finished with the first Austrian ar- 
 my, was preparing to fall upon the Russians, 
 according to the plan which he had conceived. 
 
 When he learned what was passing in Ber- 
 lin, he was confounded with amazement, for it 
 was in perfect good faith, and believing in the 
 maintenance of the former custom, that he 
 had ordered troops to pass through the pro- 
 vinces of Anspach. He could not think that 
 the irritation of Prussia was sincere, and he 
 was convinced that it was assumed to cover 
 the weaknesses of that court towards the coali- 
 tion. But nothing that he could conjecture on 
 that subject was capable of shaking him, and 
 on this occasion he displayed all the greatness 
 of his character. 
 
 The reader is already acquainted with the 
 general plan of his operations. In presence 
 of four attacks directed against the French 
 Empire, one in the north, by Hanover, the 
 second in the south, by Lower Italy, the two 
 others from the east, by Lombardy and Bava- 
 ria, he had taken account of the last two only. 
 Leaving to Massena the task of parrying that 
 from Lombardy, and detaining the archdukes 
 for a few weeks, he had reserved for himself 
 the most important, that which threatened 
 Bavaria. Taking advantage, as we have seen, 
 of the distance which separated the Austrians 
 from the Russians, he had by an unexampled 
 march enclosed the former, and sent them 
 prisoners to France. Now he was about to 
 march upon the second, and' to hurl them 
 back upon Vienna. By this movement Italy 
 would be released, and the attacks prepared 
 in the north and south of Europe would be- 
 come insignificant diversions. 
 
 It was, however, in the power of Prussia to 
 give serious obstructions to this plan by throw- 
 ing herself, by way of Franconia or Bohemia, 
 upon the rear of Napoleon, while he was 
 marching upon Vienna. An ordinary general, 
 on the news of what was passing in Berlin, 
 
 would have stopped short and fallen back, to 
 take a position nearer to the Rhine, so as not 
 to be turned, and would have awaited in this 
 position, at the head of his collected forces, 
 the consequences of the treaty of Potsdam. 
 But, in acting thus, he would have rendered 
 certain the dangers that were only probable; 
 he would have given the two Russian armies 
 of Kutusof and Alexander time to effect their 
 junction, the Archduke Charles time to pass 
 from Lombardy into Bavaria, to join the Rus 
 sians, the Prussians time and the courage to 
 make unacceptable proposals and to enter the 
 lists. He might in a month have had upon 
 his hands 120,000 Austrians, 100,000 Rus- 
 sians, 150,000 Prussians, assembled in the 
 Upper Palatinate or Bavaria, and been over- 
 whelmed by a mass of forces double his own. 
 To persist more than ever in his ideas, that is 
 to say to march forward, to fling back to one 
 extremity of Germany the principal armies 
 of the coalition, to listen in Vienna to the 
 complaints of Prussia, and to give her his 
 triumphs for an answer such was the wisest, 
 though apparently the rashest, determination. 
 Let us add that these great resolutions are 
 made for great men, that ordinary men would 
 sink under them; that, moreover, they require 
 not only a superior genius but an absolute 
 authority; for, to have the power of advancing 
 or falling back according to circumstances, it 
 is requisite to be the centre of all movements, 
 of all intelligence, of all wills ; it is requisite 
 to be general and head of the empire; it is 
 requisite to be Napoleon and Emperor. 
 
 The language of Napoleon to Prussia was 
 conformable to the resolution which he had 
 just taken. So far from offering excuses for 
 the violation of the territory of Anspach, he 
 merely referred to anterior conventions, saying 
 that, if these conventions had been set aside, 
 he should have been informed of it; that, for 
 the rest, these were mere pretexts; that his 
 enemies, he clearly perceived, had the ascend- 
 ency in Berlin: that it no longer became him 
 to enter thenceforward into friendly explana- 
 tions with a prince for whom his friendship 
 seemed to be of no value; that he should leave 
 to time and events the business of answering 
 for him, but that on a single point he should 
 be inflexible, that of honour; that never had 
 his eagles put up with an affront; that they 
 were in one of the fortresses of Hanover, that 
 of Hameln : that if any attempt should be 
 made to drag them out of it, General Barbou 
 would defend them to the last extremity, and 
 should be succoured before he would yield; 
 that it was no new or alarming thing for France 
 to have all Europe upon her hands; that he, 
 Napoleon, would soon come, if he was called 
 thither, from the banks of the Danube to the 
 banks of the Elbe, and force his new enemies 
 to repent, like the old ones, of having insulted 
 the dignity of his empire. The order given to 
 General Barbou, and communicated to the 
 Prussian government, was as follows: 
 
 " To THE GEXERAL OF DIVISION, BARBOU. 
 
 " Augsburg, October 21. 
 
 " I know not what is preparing, but whatever 
 may be the power whose armies should attempt
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 87 
 
 to enter Hanover, were it even a power that 
 has not declared war against me, you must op- 
 pose it. Not having forces sufficient to with- 
 stand an army, shut yourself up in the for- 
 tresses, and let nobody approach within gun- 
 shot of those fortresses. I shall come to the 
 relief of the troops shut up in Hameln. My 
 eagles have never yet put up with an affront. 
 I hope that the soldiers whom you command 
 will be worthy of their comrades, and that 
 they will know how to preserve honour, the 
 best and most valuable property of nations. 
 
 "You must not surrender the place without 
 an order from me, which shall be brought to 
 you by one of my aides-de-camp. 
 
 " NAPOLEON." 
 
 Napoleon had gone from Ulm to Augsburg, 
 and from Augsburg to Munich, to make there 
 his dispositions for the march. Before we 
 follow him into that long and immense valley 
 of the Danube, surmounting all the obstacles 
 thrown in his way by winter and the enemy, 
 let us cast our eyes for a moment on Lom- 
 bardy, where Massena was charged to make 
 head against the Austrians till Napoleon had 
 nullified their position oh the Adige by ad- 
 vancing upon Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon and Massena were both thoroughly 
 acquainted with Italy, since both had acquired 
 glory there. The instructions given for this 
 campaign were worthy of both. Napoleon had 
 first laid it down as a principle that 50,000 
 French, appuyed on a river, had nothing to 
 fear from 80,000 enemies whoever they might 
 be; that, at any rate, he should only ask them 
 to guard the Adige till, penetratinginto Bavaria, 
 (which forms the northern slope of the Alps, 
 as Lombardy forms the southern) he had turned 
 the position of the Austrians and obliged them 
 to fall back ; that for this it was necessary to 
 keep together on the upper part of the river, 
 the left wing to the Alps, according to the ex- 
 ample which he had always given, to hurl 
 back the Austrians into the mountains, if they 
 should come by the gorges of the Tyrol; or, 
 if they should pass the lower Adige, to let them 
 do so, and only to keep themselves concen- 
 trated, and when they should have entered the 
 marshy country of the lower Adige and of the 
 Po, from Legnago to Venice, to rush upon their 
 flank and drown them in the lagoons ; that, by 
 remaining thus in a mass at the foot of the 
 Alps, they would have nothing to fear either 
 from above or below; but that, if the enemy 
 appeared to renounce the offensive, they must 
 take it against him, carry by night the bridge 
 of Verona over the Adige, and then proceed 
 to the attack of the heights of Caldiero. The 
 campaigns of Napoleon would furnish models 
 for every mode of acting on this part of the 
 theatre of war. 
 
 Massena was not a man to hesitate between 
 the offensive and the defensive. The first sys- 
 tem of war was alone suited to his character 
 and genius. He had arrived at such a degree 
 of confidence that he did not conceive himself 
 to be doomed to keep the defensive before 
 80,000 Austrians, even though commanded by 
 the Archduke Charles. In consequence, in the 
 tiight between the 17th and the 18th of October, 
 after bavin? received news of the first move- 
 
 ments of the grand army, he had advanced in. 
 silence towards the bridge of ChSteau-Vieur, 
 situated in the interior of Verona. That city, 
 as the reader knows, is divided by the Adige 
 into two parts. One belonged to the French, 
 the other to the Austrians. The bridges were 
 cut, and the approaches defended by palisades 
 and walls. Having blown up the wall which 
 barred the approach to the bridge of Chateau- 
 Vieux, Massena, on reaching the bank of the 
 river, had despatched a party of brave volti- 
 geurs in boats, some to ascertain whether the 
 piles of the bridge were undermined, the 
 others to throw themselves on the opposite 
 bank. Certain that the piles were not under- 
 mined, he had caused a sort of passage to be 
 made with thick planks, and then, crossing the 
 Adige, had fought, the whole of the 18th, with 
 the Austrians. The secrecy, the vigour, the 
 promptness of this attack, had been worthy of 
 Napoleon's first lieutenant in the campaigns 
 of Italy. Massena found himself, by this ope- 
 ration, master of the course of the Adige, able, 
 in case of need, to operate on both banks, and 
 having scarcely any fear of being surprised 
 by a passage by main force, for he was strong 
 enough to interrupt such an operation at what- 
 ever point it might have been attempted. Be- 
 fore he took a determined offensive and ad- 
 vanced definitively into the Austrian territory, 
 he wished to receive decisive tidings from the 
 banks of the Danube. 
 
 These tidings arrived on the 28th of Octo- 
 ber, and filled the army of Italy with joy and 
 emulation. Massena caused them to be com- 
 municated to his troops, accompanied with the 
 discharge of the artillery, and resolved to 
 march forward immediately. On the follow- 
 ing day, the 29th of October, he took three of 
 his divisions, Gardanne's, Duhesme's, and 
 Molitor's, 1 beyond the Adige, beat back the 
 Austrians, and extended himself in the plain 
 called St. Michael's, between the citadel of 
 Verona and the entrenched camp of Caldiero. 
 His design was to attack that formidable camp, 
 though he had before him an army far supe- 
 rior in number, and appuyed on posiiions 
 which nature and art had rendered extremely 
 strong. The archduke, on his 'part, informed 
 of the extraordinary successes of the French 
 grand army, presuming that he should soon 
 be obliged to retreat and march to the relief 
 of Vienna, thought that he ought not to give 
 up the ground as if vanquished. He purposed 
 to gain a decisive advantage, which should 
 enable him to retire quietly, and to take that 
 route which was best suited to the general 
 situation of the allies. 
 
 The two adversaries, then, were about to 
 fall upon each other with the greater violence, 
 since they met* both with the same resolution 
 to fight to extremity. 
 
 Massena had before him the last steegs of 
 the Tyrolese Alps, subsiding gradually into 
 the plain of Verona, near the village of Cal- 
 diero. On his left the heights, called the 
 
 I GARDAMNE MOLITOR DUHESME ; all three French 
 generals of division of ability. Their names will occur 
 continually hereafter in the accounts of the various war 
 of the empire. H -
 
 68 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 heights of Colognola, were covered with en- 
 trenchments, regularly constructed, and armed 
 with a numerous artillery. In the centre, and 
 in the plain, was the village of Caldiero, 
 through which ran the high road of Lombardy, 
 leading through the Friule into Austria. At 
 this point an obstacle presented itself, in 
 grounds enclosed and built on, occupied by a 
 great part of the Austrian infantry. Lastly, on 
 his right, Massena saw spread out before him 
 the flat and marshy banks of the Adige, tra- 
 versed in all directions by ditches and dykes 
 bristling with cannon. Thus, on the left, en- 
 trenched mountains; in the centre, a high-road 
 bordered with buildings, marshes, and the 
 Adige ; everywhere works adapted to the 
 ground, covered with artillery, and 80,000 men 
 to defend them such was the entrenched 
 camp which Massena was to attack with 
 50,000 men. Nothing was capable of intimi- 
 dating the hero of Rivoli, of Zurich, and of 
 Genoa. On the morning of the 30th, he ad- 
 vanced in column on the high-road. On his 
 left, he directed General Molitor to take the 
 formidable heights of Colognola; with Du- 
 hesme's and Gardanne's divisions, he under- 
 took himself the attack of the centre, along 
 the high-road; and, as he judged that, to dis- 
 lodge an enemy superior in number and posi- 
 tion, it was necessary to threaten him with a 
 serious danger on one of his wings, he directed 
 General Verdier to proceed to the extreme 
 right of the French army, there to cross the 
 Adige with 10,000 men, to turn the left wing 
 of the archduke, and then fall upon his rear. 
 If this operation was well executed, it would 
 be worth such a detachment, but it was hazard- 
 ous to commit the passage of a river to a 
 lieutenant; and those 10,000 men, if they were 
 not well employed on the right, would be sorely 
 missed at the centre. 
 
 At break of day, Massena, marching vigo- 
 rously upon the enemy, ovenhrew him at all 
 points. General Molitor, one of the ablest and 
 firmest officers of the army, advanced coolly 
 to the foot of the heights of Colognola, and 
 ascended the first steeps in spite of a tremend- 
 ous fire. While Colonel Teste, advancing at 
 the head of the 5th of the line, was ready to 
 climb them, Count de Bellegarde, sallying from 
 the redoubts with all his forces, came forward 
 to overwhelm that regiment. General Molitor, 
 instantly aware of the seriousness of the dan- 
 ger, without stopping to count the enemy, 
 rushed upon General Bellegarde's column 
 with the 6th of the line, the only regiment that 
 he had at hand. He attacked that column with 
 such violence, that he surprised it, and obliged 
 it to halt. Meanwhile, Colonel Teste had en- 
 tered one of the redoubts and hoisted there the 
 colours of the 5th, the eagle *of which was 
 carried away by a ball. But the Austrians, 
 nshamed to see their positions wrested from 
 tihem by so small a number of men, returned 
 to the charge and retook the redoubt. The 
 French, at this point, remained opposite to the 
 enemy's entrenchments, without being able to 
 take them. It was miraculous to have dared 
 so much with so few men, and without sus- 
 taining a defeat. 
 
 At the centre, Prince Charles had placed the 
 
 bulk of his forces. He had pul at the head a 
 reserve of grenadiers, in whose ranks fought 
 three archdukes. General Duhesme and Gard- 
 anne, sweeping the high-road, and carrying, 
 one after another, the enclosures that bordered 
 it, had already arrived near Caldiero. The 
 Archduke Charles chose this moment for tak- 
 ing the offensive. He repulsed the assailants, 
 and marched along the road in close column, 
 at the head of the best Austrian infantry. This 
 column continuing to advance, as did of old 
 that of Fontenoy, had already passed the de- 
 tachments of French troops spread on the 
 right and left in the enclosures, came on to 
 possess itself of Vago, which was to the 
 French what Caldiero was to the Austrians, 
 the appui of their centre. But Massena 
 hastened to the spot. He rallied his divisions, 
 placed all his disposable artillery in the road, 
 and, facing the enemy, poured the grape-shot 
 at point-blank range, upon the brave Austrian 
 grenadiers, then ordered them to be charged 
 with the bayonet and attacked on the flank, 
 and, after an obstinate fight, in which he was 
 continually in the midst of the fire, like a 
 common soldier, he forced the column to re- 
 treat. He pushed it beyond Caldiero, and 
 gained so much ground as to penetrate into 
 the first Austrian entrenchments. If, at this 
 moment, General Verdier, accomplishing his 
 mission, had crossed the Adige, or even had 
 Massena had the 10,000 men uselessly em- 
 ployed at his extreme right, he would have 
 taken the formidable camp of Caldiero. But 
 General Verdier, mismanaging his operation, 
 had thrown one of his regiments beyond the 
 river, without having it in his power to sup- 
 port it, and had completely failed in his de- 
 sign of passing. Night alone parted the com- 
 batants, and covered with its shades one of the 
 bloodiest fields of battle of the age. 
 
 It required the character of Massena to 
 undertake and to come off from such a conflict 
 without check. The Austrians had lost 3000 
 men, killed and wounded, and 4000 of them 
 had been taken prisoners. The French had 
 not lost more than 3000, killed, wounded, and 
 prisoners. They bivouacked on the field of 
 battle, mingled the one with the other, amidst 
 terrible confusion. But, in the night, the 
 archduke sent off his baggage and his artil- 
 lery, and next morning, occupying the French 
 by means of a rear-guard, he commenced his 
 retrograde movement. A corps of 5000 men, 
 commanded by General Hillinger, was sacri- 
 ficed to the interest of this retreat. It had been 
 ordered down from the heights to alarm Ve- 
 rona, on the rear of our army, while the arch- 
 duke was setting himself in march. General 
 Hillinger had not time to return from this de- 
 monstration, perhaps pushed too far, and was 
 taken with his whole corps. Thus, in these 
 three days, Massena had deprived the enemy of 
 eleven or twelve thousand men, 8000 of whom 
 were prisoners, and 3000 left hors de combat. 
 
 He immediately set out in close pursuit of 
 the archduke. But the Austrian prince had in 
 his favour the best soldiers of Austria, to the 
 number of 70,000, his experience, his talents, 
 winter, over-flowed rivers, the bridges over 
 which he broke down, in retiring. Massena
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 69 
 
 could not flatter himself with the hope of in- 
 volving him in a catastrophe ; nevertheless, 
 he occupied him sufficiently by pursuing him, 
 not to leave him the facility of manoeuvring 
 at pleasure against the grand army. 
 
 This other part of Napoleon's plan was 
 therefore accomplished as punctually as the 
 preceding; the Archduke Charles, falling back 
 upon Austria, was obliged to maintain a run- 
 ning fight while going to the succour of the 
 threatened capital. 
 
 Napoleon had not lost a moment at Munich 
 in making his dispositions. He was anxious 
 to cross the Inn, to fight the Russians, and to 
 disconcert the underhand manoeuvres of Ber- 
 lin by fresh successes as prompt as those of 
 Ulm. The corps of General Kutusof, which 
 he had before him, numbered scarcely 50,000 
 men on taking the field, though it was to have 
 been far more numerous according to the pro- 
 mises of Russia. From Moravia to Bavaria 
 this corps had left behind five or six thousand 
 stragglers and sick, but it had been joined by 
 the Austrian detachment of Kienmayer, which 
 had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, before 
 the investment of that place. M. de Meerfeld 1 
 had added some troops to this detachment, and 
 taken the command of it. The whole together 
 might amount to about 65,000 soldiers, Rus- 
 sian and Austrian. This was but little for 
 saving the monarchy against 150,000 French, 
 100,000 of whom at least were marching in a 
 single mass. General Kutusof commanded this 
 army. He was an elderly man, had lost the 
 sight of one eye in consequence of a wound 
 on the head, very corpulent, indolent, dissolute, 
 greedy, but intelligent ; as active in mind as 
 he was heavy in body, lucky in war, a clever 
 courtier, and capable enough of commanding 
 in a situation that required prudence and good 
 fortune. His lieutenants were men of mode- 
 rate talents, excepting three, Prince Bagration 2 
 and Generals Doctorow and Miloradovich.3 
 Prince Bagration was a Georgian, of heroic 
 courage, making amends by experience for the j 
 lack of early instruction, and always charged, j 
 whether at the advanced-guard or at the rear- 
 guard, with the most difficult duty. General 
 Doctorow was a discreet, modest, firm, and 
 well-informed officer. General Miloradovich 
 was a Servian, of brilliant valour, but absolu- 
 tely destitute of military knowledge, dissolute 
 in manners, uniting all the vices of civiliza- 
 tion with all the vices of barbarism. The 
 character of the Russian soldiers corresponded 
 with that of their generals. They had a sa- 
 vage, ill-directed bravery. Their artillery was 
 clumsy, their cavalry indifferent. Altogether, 
 generals, officers, and soldiers, composed an 
 ignorant army, but singularly formidable from 
 its devotedness. The Russian troops have since 
 learned the art of war by waging it with us, and 
 have begun to add knowledge to courage. 
 
 General Kutusof had been ignorant till the 
 
 1 MEERFELD. An Austrian general of some distinc- 
 tion. He served throughout the war, and distinguished 
 himself, although repulsed and made prisoner at Leipsic. 
 Alison's History. H. 
 
 2 BAORATION, PRINCE. A Russian general of the first 
 class, and of one of the noblest families of the empire. 
 In point of ability and bravery he was second to scarce 
 
 last moment of the disaster of Ulm ; for the 
 Archduke Ferdinand and General Mack, the 
 day before their catastrophe, announced to him 
 nothing but successes. The truth was no: 
 known till the arrival of General Mack, who 
 came in person to report the destruction of 
 the principal Austrian army. Kutusof, then 
 despairing with reason of saving Vienna, did 
 not disguise from the Emperor Francis, who 
 had hastened to the Russian head-quarters, 
 that it was necessary to make a sacrifice of 
 that capital. He would fain have withdrawn 
 as speedily as possible from the danger wnich 
 threatened himself, by passing to the left bank 
 of the Danube, in order to join the Russian 
 reserves coming through Bohemia and Mo- 
 ravia. The Emperor Francis and his council, 
 however, made a point of not sacrificing 
 Vienna till at the last extremity, and nattered 
 themselves that, by retarding the march of 
 Napoleon by all the means which defensive 
 war was capable of furnishing, time might be 
 given to the Archduke Charles to reach Aus- 
 tria, to the Russian reserves to arrive on the 
 Danube, and to effect a general junction of 
 the allied forces, for the purpose of fighting a 
 battle, which might perhaps prove the salva- 
 tion of the capital and of the monarchy. 
 General Kutusof, in compliance with the de- 
 sires of the principal ally of his master, pro- 
 mised to oppose to the French every resist- 
 ance that did not go so far as to involve a 
 general action ; and, to slacken their move- 
 ment, he determined to avail himself of all the 
 tributaries of the Danube coming from the 
 Alps and throwing themselves into that great 
 river. For this purpose, it was sufficient to 
 break down the bridges, and to obstruct by 
 strong rear-guards the passages by main force 
 which the French should attempt, passages 
 difficult in a season when all the waters were 
 high, and laden with flakes of ice. 
 
 Napoleon had made the following disposi- 
 tions for his march : He was obliged to direct 
 his course between the Danube and the chain 
 of the Alps, by a route cramped between the 
 river and the mountains. To advance with a 
 numerous army by this narrow route would 
 have been attended with difficulty of subsist- 
 ing and danger for marching, for, besides the 
 Archduke Charles, who might pass from Lom- 
 bardy into Bavaria, and throw himself upon 
 our flank, there were in Tyrol about 25,000 
 men under the Archduke John. Napoleon, 
 therefore, took the wise precaution to commit 
 to Ney's corps the conquest of the Tyrol. 
 He directed the marshal to leave Ulm, to 
 ascend by Kempten, and to penetrate into the 
 Tyrol, in such a manner as to cut in two the 
 troops scattered through that long country. 
 Those which -were to the right of Marshal 
 Ney were to be flung back upon the Vorarl- 
 berg and the Lake of Constance, where Auge- 
 reau's corps would arrive, after traversing the 
 
 any in the service of Alexander. He died fighting nobly 
 at Borodino on the 7th of September, 1812. JUiton't En- 
 rope. a - 
 3 DocTOBOMrMiLOBADovicH Russian general* of 
 distinction. Both acquired great renown for their con- 
 duct at Borodino, and subsequently during the disastrous 
 retreat of the French to the Beresina. Ibid.
 
 70 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 whole extent of France from Brest to Huningen. ' quiring the speedy execution of them, and 
 Ney, deprived of Dupont's division, which had : paying for the articles, of which those made 
 concurred with Murat in the pursuit of the up were to be collected at Augsburg. As that 
 Archduke Ferdinand, was reduced to about ! city became the principal point of the route 
 10,000 men. But Napoleon, trusting to his of the army, all the detachments were to pass 
 vigour and to the 14,000 men, whom Augereau ! through it in order to supply themselves with 
 was bringing, believed that he would have j what they needed. These precautions taken, 
 
 force enough for the task which he had to 
 perform. The Tyrol thus occupied, he des- 
 tined Bernadotte to penetrate into the country 
 of Salzburg. He directed the latter to proceed 
 from Munich towards the Inn, and to cross it 
 either at Wasserburg or Rosenheim. General 
 Marmont was to support Bernadotte. In this 
 manner Napoleon ensured two advantages, 
 
 Napoleon set out to follow his corps, which 
 preceded him by one or two marches. 
 
 The movementsof his army were executed as 
 prescribed by him. On the 26th of October, the 
 whole of it was advancing towards the Inn. The 
 Austro-Russians had not left a single bridge 
 standing. But the soldiers, throwing themselves 
 everywhere into boats, and crossing in large de- 
 
 that of covering himself completely towards j tachments, under musketry and grape, forced the 
 the Alps, and that of gaining possession of the j enemy to evacuate the opposite bank, and set 
 upper course of the Inn, which would prevent j about repairing the bridges, seldom totally de- 
 the Austro-Russians from defending its lower | stroyed, owing to the precipitation of his retreat, 
 course against the main body of our army. Bernadotte, meeting with but few obstacles, 
 As for himself, with the corps of Marshals passed the Inn on the 28th of October, at Was- 
 Davout, Soult, and Lannes, with the reserve serburg. Marshals Soult, Murat, and Davout 
 cavalry and the guard, he should take in front . passed it at Muhldorf and Neu-Oettingen. 
 the great barrier of the Inn, with the intention i Lannes proceeded towards Braunau, and, find- 
 of crossing from Muhldorf to Braunau. Mu- ing the bridge broken down, sent a detachment 
 
 rat had orders to set off on the 26th of October, 
 with the dragoons of Generals Walther and 
 Beaumont, General d'Hautpoul's heavy ca- 
 valry, and a bridge equipage, to proceed direct 
 to Muhldorf, following the high road from Mu- 
 
 to the other bank by means of some craft which 
 had been seized. This detachment crossed the 
 river and appeared at the gates of Braunau. 
 What was the astonishment of our soldiers to 
 find that place open, though in a perfect state 
 
 nich through Hohenlinden, and thus travers- of defence, completely armed, and provided with 
 ing the scenes of Moreati's glory. Marshal considerable resources! Immediate possession 
 Soult was to support him at the distance of 
 one march in rear. Marshal Davout took the 
 
 route on the left, through Freisingen, Dorfen, 
 and Neu-Oettingen. Lannes, who had con- 
 tributed with Murat to the pursuit of the Arch- 
 duke Ferdinand, was to march still more to 
 
 wastaken, and from a fact so extraordinary it 
 was inferred that the enemy was retreating 
 
 with a precipitation bordering on disorder. 
 
 Napoleon, delighted with such an acquisi- 
 tion, hastened in person to Braunau, to ascer- 
 tain the strength of the place and what bene- 
 
 the left than Davout, through Landshut, Wils- fit he might derive from it. Having inspected 
 burg, and Braunau. Lastly, Dupont's divi- it, he ordered a great portion of the resources 
 sion, which had proceeded far in the same ' which he meant at first to collect at Augs- 
 
 direction, descended the Danube, for the pur- 
 pose of going to take Passau. Napoleon, 
 with the guard, followed Murat and Soult on 
 the high-road from Munich. 
 
 Before he left Augsburg, Napoleon pre- 
 
 scribed there a system of precautions to 
 which we shall find him paying more and 
 
 burg, to be removed thither ; judging it to be 
 preferable for the use to which he destined it 
 He left a garrison there, and gave the com- 
 mand of it to his aide-de-camp Lauriston, who 
 had returned from the naval campaign which 
 
 he had made with Admiral Villeneuve. It was 
 not the mere command of a fortress that he 
 
 more attention, in proportion as the sphere I committed to him ; it was a government, com- 
 of his operations increased, and in which he j prising all the rear of the army. The wounded, 
 has never been equalled for the extent of his ! the ammunition, the prisoners, the recruits, 
 foresight and the activity of his care. The ' coming from France, the prisoners who were 
 object of this system of precautions was to going thither, were all to pass through Brau- 
 create upon his line of operation points of i nau, under the superintendence of General 
 support, which should serve him alike to ad- ' Lauriston. 
 
 vance or to fall back, if he should be com- I From the 29th to the 30th of October, the 
 pelled to the latter course. These points of j army had crossed the Inn, left Bavaria behind, 
 support, besides the advantage of presenting and invaded Upper Austria. It was no longer 
 a certain force, were to have that of contain- i a burden to allies, but to the. hereditary States 
 ing immense stores of all kinds, very useful of the imperial house. It was marching for- 
 to an army marching forward, indispensable j ward, covered against any movement of the 
 lor a retreating army. He chose in Bavaria, archdukes by Bernadotte and Marmont at 
 on the Lech, Augsburg, which afforded some Salzburg, by Ney in the Tyrol. Napoleon, 
 means of defence and the resources suited to j not losing a moment, resolved to proceed from 
 a great population. He gave directions for ; the line of the Ion to that of the Traun. 
 
 the works necessary to secure it against a coup 
 de main, and desired that corn, cattle, cloth, 
 shoes, ammunition, and, above all, hospitals, 
 should be found there. He ordered commis- 
 sion'? for cloth and shoes to be given at 
 Nuremberg, at Ratisbon, and at Munich, re- 
 
 From the Inn to the Traun, you have, as 
 everywhere in this country, the Danube on 
 the left, the Alps on the right It is a magni- 
 ficent country, resembling Lombard}', only 
 more stern, because it is to the north instead 
 of to the south of the Alps, and would be as
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 level as a plain, but for a large mountain 
 called the Hausriick which rises abruptly in 
 the midst of it. This mountain is peaked, 
 totally detached from the Alps, and would 
 form an island, if the country were covered 
 with water. But having passed the Haus- 
 rJlck, you have nothing before you but an un- 
 dulating and wooded plain, extendin^-to the 
 bank of the Traun and called the plain of 
 Wels. The Traun runs over gravel and 
 among fine trees, and throws itself into the 
 Danube near Linz, the capital of the province, 
 militarily as important as the city of Ulm, 
 and for that reason, bristling, since our great 
 wars, with fortifications on a new system. 
 
 Napoleon directed Lannes by Efferding, 
 upon Linz, Marshals Davout and Soult, by the 
 road to Ried and Lambach, upon Wels, along 
 the foot of the Hausriick. Murat always pre- 
 ceding them with his cavalry. The guard fol- 
 lowed with the head-quarters. Apprehending, 
 however, that the plain of Wels might be 
 chosen by the enemy for a field of battle, he 
 directed Marmont to leave Bernadotte at Salz- 
 burg, and to rejoin the main body of the army, 
 by passing behind the Hausriick, along the road 
 through Strasswalchen and Wocklabriick to 
 Wels, so as to take the Austro-Russians in 
 flank, if they should be disposed to halt with 
 the intention of fighting. 
 
 The 1st chasseurs came up with them in 
 advance of Ried, charged them gallantly, and 
 put them to the rout. The French marched 
 upon Lembach, which the enemy made a show 
 of defending, solely to gain time to save their 
 baggage. Davout overtook them and had a 
 brilliant rear-guard action with them, but pre- 
 parations for a battle were nowhere perceived. 
 The enemy covered himself with the Traun 
 in passing it at Wels. We entered Linz 
 without striking a blow. Though the Austri- 
 ans had made use of the Danube for evacuat- 
 ing their principal magazines, they neverthe- 
 less left us valuable resources. Napoleon 
 arrived and established his head-quarters at 
 Linz on the 15th of November. 
 
 Being established in this town, Napoleon 
 moved forward his corps-d'armee from the 
 Traun to the Ens, which is easy, for the coun- 
 try between these two tributaries of the Da- 
 nube offered no position of which the enemy 
 could be tempted to avail himself. This 
 country presents a slightly elevated plain, in- 
 tersected by ravines, covered with wood, hav- 
 ing two steep slopes, one forward, which you 
 must ascend when you have passed the Traun, 
 the other at the further extremity, which you 
 must descend, if you mean to pass the Ens. 
 Not having defended it on the side next to the 
 Traun, the Austro-Russians could not think 
 of defending it on the side next to the Ens, 
 since they would have been everywhere com- 
 manded. The Ens was therefore passed with- 
 out obstacle. 
 
 Having his head-quarters at Linz and his 
 advanced guards on the Ens, Napoleon made 
 new dispositions for the continuation of this 
 offensive march, performed, as we have said, 
 upon a narrow road between the Danube and 
 the Alps. The difficulty of advancing thus in 
 a long column, the tail of which could never 
 
 come to the assistance of the head, if it were 
 surprised by the enemy, with the dangers 
 always to be apprehended of an attack in flank, 
 if the archdukes should suddenly leave Italy 
 and march into Austria this difficulty, further 
 increased by the scarcity of provisions, already 
 consumed or destroyed by the Russians, re- 
 quired great precautions before reaching Vi- 
 enna. 
 
 The most serious inconvenience of this 
 march was certainly the possibility of a sud- 
 den appearance of the archdukes. The two 
 belligerent masses, acting in Austria and in 
 Lombardy, were moving from west to east, the 
 one under Napoleon and Kutusof to the north 
 of the Alps, the other to the south of them un- 
 der Massena and the Archduke Charles. Was 
 it possible that the Archduke Charles, suddenly 
 stealing away from Massena, and leaving be- 
 fore him a mere rear-guard to delude him, 
 should cross the Alps, pick up by the way his 
 brother John with the corps in the Tyrol, and 
 penetrate into Bavaria, either to join the Aus- 
 tro-Russians behind one of the defensive posi- 
 tions which are met with on the Danube, or 
 merely to throw himself on the flank of the 
 French grand army? Though possible, this 
 was scarcely probable. The Archduke Charles 
 had two routes : the first, by the Tyrol, Verona, 
 Trent, Inspruck, would have led him behind 
 the Inn ; the second, more circuitous, through 
 Carinthia and Styria, by Tarvis, Leoben, and 
 Lilienfeld, would have led him to the well- 
 known position of St. PGlten, in advance of 
 Vienna. With respect to the first, supposing 
 that the archduke had decided at the very mo- 
 ment of Mack's capitulation, which took place 
 on the 20th, which was not known at Verona 
 by the French till the 28th, which could not be 
 known by the Austrians before the 25th or the 
 26th supposing that, before leaving Italy, the 
 archduke had not chosen to fight a battle for 
 the purpose of restraining the French army, he 
 would have had from the 25th to the 28th to 
 traverse the Tyrol and arrive upon the Inn, 
 which Napoleon passed on the 28th and 29th. 
 He would evidently not have time enough for 
 such a march. As for the route through Sty- 
 ria, which he would have had it in his power 
 to take after the battle of Caldiero. he would 
 have had to traverse the Friule, Carinthia, and 
 Styria, and to march a hundred leagues in the 
 Alps, between the 30th of October, the day of 
 the battle of Caldiero and the 6th or'th of 
 November, the day on which Napoleon crossed 
 the Ens to move forward. He would not have 
 had time for such an operation either. If the 
 Archduke Charles could not anticipate Napo- 
 leon, upon one of the defensive positions of 
 the Danube, for the purpose of opposing to him 
 150,000 united Austrians and Russians, he 
 might, without anticipating him, suffer himself 
 to be outstripped, on the contrary, and cross 
 the chain of the Alps, to attempt a flank attack 
 upon the grand army. No doubt, with soldiers 
 accustomed to conquer, prepared for daring 
 enterprises, capable of clearing their way any- 
 where, he would have had it in his power to 
 make such an attempt, and to produce a sud- 
 den and serious derangement in the march of 
 Napoleon, perhaps even to change the face of
 
 72 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 events, but running the risk himself of being! 
 enclosed between two armies, that of Massena 
 and that of Napoleon, as had formerly happen- 
 ed to Suwarow in the St. Gothard. This would 
 have been one of the most hazardous of reso- 
 lutions, and one does not take such resolutions 
 when one has in one's hands an army, which 
 is the last resource of a monarchy. 
 
 Napoleon, nevertheless, conducted himself 
 as if such a resolution had been probable. The 
 only position which the enemy could occupy 
 for covering Vienna, whether the army of Ku- 
 tusof was there alone, or whether the arch- 
 dukes were there with it, was that of St. Polten. 
 This position is well known. The Alps of 
 Styria, pushing the Danube to the north, from 
 Mulk to Krems, throw out a spur which is 
 called the Kahlenberg, and which subsides only 
 at the very brink of the river, where it leaves 
 scarcely room for a road. As the Kahlenberg 
 covers with its mass the city of Vienna, you 
 must cross it breadthwise to reach that capital. 
 In advance of this spur, half-way up, is a very 
 spacious position, which has received its name 
 from a large village situated near it, that of St. 
 Polten, and upon which a retreating Austrian 
 army might fight a defensive battle with ad- 
 vantage. A branch of the high road from Italy 
 to Vienna, running through Lilienfeld, termi- 
 nates near St. Polten and might bring the arch- 
 dukes thither. A vast wooden bridge over the 
 Danube, that of Krems, placed this position in 
 communication with the two banks of the river, 
 and would have permitted the Prussian and 
 Austrian reserves to hasten thither through 
 Bohemia. It was there consequently that Na- 
 poleon must have met with the conjoined forces 
 of the allies, if such a junction of forces had 
 been possible in advance of Vienna. He there- 
 fore took, in approaching this point, the pre- 
 cautions which might be expected of a general 
 who has combined calculation and daring in 
 a superior degree to any celebrated captains. 
 Having General Marmont's corps on his right, 
 he resolved to send him to Leoben by a road 
 passable for carriages, which runs from Lintz 
 to Leoben, through Styria. General Marmont, 
 if he received intelligence of the approach of 
 the archdukes, was to fall back upon the grand 
 army and to become the extreme right, or, if the 
 archdukes proceeded directly from the Friule 
 into Hungary, to establish himself in Leoben 
 in order to give a hand to Massena. Between 
 this road, which Marmont was to take, and the 
 high road along the Danube, which the bulk 
 of the army was following, there was a moun- 
 tain road, which, running through Waidhofen 
 and St. Gaming, descended to Lilienfeld, be- 
 yond the position of St. Polten, and thus fur- 
 nished the means of turning it. This Napo- 
 leon directed Marshal Davout's corps to pursue. 
 The corps of Bernadotte was no longer neces- 
 sary at Salzburg, since Ney occupied the Ty- 
 rol. Napoleon enjoined him to draw nearer 
 to the army, detaching the Bavarians towards 
 Ney's corps, which could not fail to be par- 
 ticularly gratifying to these latter, always ex- 
 tremely ambitious to possess the Tyrol. He 
 reserved for himself, for the direct attack of 
 the position of St. Polten, the corps of Marshals 
 8oult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, besides Murat's 
 
 cavalry and the guaM; these were sufficient, 
 the corps of Davout being sent to turn that po- 
 sition. 
 
 Napoleon did not stop there, but resolved to 
 take some precautions on the left bank of the 
 Danube. So far he had marched on the right 
 bank only, taking no heed of the left bank. 
 There as talk, however, of an assemblage of 
 troops in Bohemia, formed by the Archduke 
 Ferdinand, who escaped from Ulm with some 
 thousand horse. There was also a rumour of 
 the approach of the second Russian army, 
 conducted into Moravia by Alexander. It 
 was necessary, therefore, to guard himself on 
 this side also. Napoleon, who had detached 
 the division of Dupont to Passau, ordered him 
 to advance upon the left bank of the Danube, 
 keeping up with the army, and sending out 
 reconnaissances upon the roads from Bohe- 
 mia to learn what was passing there. The 
 Dutch, who had left Marmont, were to join 
 Dupont's division. Judging th-is not to be 
 sufficient, Napoleon detached Gazan's division 
 from the corps of Lannes, and made it march 
 with Dupont's division on the left bank. He 
 placed both under the command of Marshal 
 Mortier, and, not to leave them cut off from 
 the grand army, which continued to occupy 
 the right bank, he conceived the idea of form- 
 ing, with the craft collected on the Inn, the 
 Traun, the Enns, and the Danube, a numerous 
 flotilla, into which he put provisions, ammu- 
 nition, all the fatigued men, and which, de- 
 scending the Danube with the army, could in 
 an hour throw ten thousand men on the right 
 or on the left, connected the two banks, and 
 served at once for a medium of communica- 
 tion and of conveyance. At the head of this 
 flotilla he put Captain Lostanges, an officer of 
 the seamen of the guard. 
 
 It was by such a combination of precautions 
 that Napoleon provided against the inconve- 
 nience of that offensive march, performed up- 
 on a long and narrow road between the Alps 
 and the Danube. He had thus on the summit 
 of the Alps Marmont's corps, half-way up Da- 
 vout's corps, at their foot, along the Danube, 
 the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, 
 and the cavalry of Murat; on the other side of 
 the Danube Mortier's corps, and, lastly, a flo- 
 tilla to connect all the forces marching on both 
 banks of the river, and to carry whatever it 
 was difficult to drag along with them. It was 
 with this imposing train that he approached 
 Vienna. 
 
 At the moment when he was about to leave 
 Linz, an emissary from the Emperor of Ger- 
 many arrived at the head-quarters. This was 
 General Giulay, one of the officers taken at 
 Ulm, since, released, and who, having heard 
 Napoleon speak of his pacific dispositions, 
 had so represented the matter to his master as 
 to make some impression upon him. In con- 
 sequence, the Emperor Francis sent him to 
 propose an armistice. General Giulay did not 
 explain himself clearly, but it was evident that 
 he wished Napoleon to halt before entering 
 Vienna; yet he offered in return no guarantee 
 of a speedy and acceptable peace. Napoleon 
 consented, indeed, to treat of peace imme- 
 diately with a plenipotentiary sufficiently ac-
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 credited, and authorized to consent to the ne- 
 cessary sacrifices; but to grant an armistice 
 without guarantee to obtain what was due to 
 him as an indemnification for the war, was 
 giving the second Russian army time to join 
 the first, and the archduke time to join the 
 Russians under the walls of Vienna. Napo- 
 leon was not the man to commit such a fault. 
 He declared, therefore, that he would stop at 
 the very gates of Vienna, and not pass them, 
 if an envoy should come to him with sincere 
 proposals of peace, but that otherwise he 
 should proceed direct to his goal, which was 
 the capital of the empire. M.deGiulay alleged 
 the necessity of consulting with the Emperor 
 Alexander, before conditions acceptable by all 
 the belligerent powers could be fixed. Napo- 
 leon replied, that the Emperor Francis, who 
 was in danger, would be wrong to make his 
 resolutions dependent on the Emperor Alex- 
 ander, who was not there ; that he ought to 
 think of saving his monarchy, and to that end 
 to arrange with France, leaving it to the French 
 army to send the Russians home. Napoleon 
 had not entered into any explanation respect- 
 ing the conditions capable of satisfying him ; 
 still everybody knew that he wanted the Ve- 
 netian states. Those states formed the com- 
 plement of Italy ; he would not have provoked 
 a war to acquire them ; but, war having been 
 raised by Austria, it was natural that he 
 should claim this the legitimate price of his 
 victories. He delivered, moreover, to M. de 
 Giulay a mild and polite letter for the Empe- 
 ror Francis, at the same time sufficiently ex- 
 plicit, relative to the conditions of peace. 
 
 Before he set off", Napoleon received also a 
 visit from the Elector of Bavaria, who, unable 
 to join him at Munich, came to Linz to express 
 his gratitude, his admiration, his joy, and, 
 above all, his hopes of aggrandizement. 
 
 Napoleon had stayed at Linz but three days, 
 that is to say, precisely the time necessary for 
 giving his orders. But his corps had never 
 ceased marching; for, after passing the Inn on 
 the 28th and 29th of October, the Traun on the 
 3lst, the Ens on the 4th and 5ih of November, 
 they advanced the same day upon Amstetten 
 and St. Pollen. At Atnsletten, the Russians 
 determined to have a rear-guard action in or- 
 der to gain time to save their baggage. The 
 high road to Vienna ran through a forest of 
 firs. The Russians took position on a clear- 
 ing in the forest, which left a certain space 
 open on the right and left of the road. In the 
 centre of this space, and in front of it, was 
 drawn up the artillery of the Russians, sup- 
 ported by their cavalry ; in rear, and backed 
 upon the wood, their best infantry. Murat 
 and Lannes, debouching with the dragoons 
 and Oudinot's grenadiers, perceived these dis- 
 positions. It was the first time that they had 
 met the Russians, and they were desirous to 
 teach them how the French fought. They 
 despatched the dragoons and the chasseurs at 
 a gallop along the high road, to take the ene- 
 my's artillery and cavalry. Our brave horse, 
 in spite of the grape-shot, had soon taken the 
 guns, cut in pieces the Russian cavalry, and 
 cleared the ground. But it was necessary to 
 break the infantry backed upon the fir wood. 
 
 Voi. II 10 
 
 Oudinot's grenadiers undertook that task. Af- 
 ter an extremely brisk fire of musketry, they 
 advanced with bayonets fixed upon the Rus- 
 sians. The latter, displaying extraordinary 
 bravery, fought hand to hand, and took advan- 
 tage for a long time of the thickness of the 
 wood to resist. At last our grenadiers forced 
 them in this position and put them to flight, 
 after killing, wounding, or taking about a thou- 
 sand men. 
 
 Murat and Lannes, proceeding together, the 
 first with his cavalry, always going, though 
 overwhelmed with fatigue, the second with his 
 formidable grenadiers, continued the pursuit 
 of the enemy on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of No- 
 vember, without being able to overtake him 
 anywhere. "The Russians," wrote Lannes to 
 Napoleon, " run away faster than we follow 
 them; those wretches will not even stop to 
 fight." Arriving on the 8th before St. Pollen, 
 Lannes and Murat found them in order of bat- 
 tle, putting on a bold look, as if they meant to 
 make a serious affair of it. The two leaders 
 of our advanced-guard, notwithstanding their 
 ardour, durst not hazard a battle without the 
 Emperor. Besides, they had not sufficient 
 means for fighting one. The hostile troops 
 remained in presence of each other the whole 
 of the 8th. They were near the beautiful ab- 
 bey of Molk. That wealthy abbey, situated on 
 the steep bank of the Danube, and overlooking 
 the broad bed of the river, with its magnificent 
 domes, presents one of the finest views in the 
 world. It was reserved for the head-quarters 
 of the Emperor. It contained abundant re- 
 sources, especially for the sick and the 
 wounded. 
 
 Murat was lodged at the chateau of Mittran, 
 with a Count de Montecuculli. There he 
 learned from various reports, that the Russians 
 had no intention to make a stand at St. Pollen. 
 They had actually taken a very important re- 
 solution. After having delayed the march of 
 the French, either by breaking down the 
 bridges or by rear-guard fights, and complied 
 with the wishes of the Emperor of Austria, 
 who was desirous that the high road lo Vienna 
 should be disputed as long as possible, the 
 Russians conceived that ihey had done enough, 
 and thought of their own safety. They re- 
 passed the Danube at Krems, the point where 
 that river, terminaling its bend to the north, 
 resumes its eastern direction. The motive 
 which especially instigated this determination 
 was the intelligence that part of the French 
 army had passed to the left bank of the Dan- 
 ube. They had reason to apprehend, in fact, 
 that Napoleon, throwing, by some unforeseen 
 manoeuvre, the bulk of his forces on the left 
 bank, might cut them off from Bohemia and 
 Moravia. In consequence, they crossed the 
 Danube at Krems, and burned the bridge after 
 they had passed it. The works which would 
 have enabled them to defend it, and to insure 
 its exclusive possession, being scarcely begun, 
 they had no other resource but to destroy it 
 They effected their passage on the 9lh, leav- 
 ing, throughout the whole archduchy of Aus- 
 tria, frightful traces of their presence. They 
 plundered, ravaged, and even murdered, be- 
 having like downright barbarians, so that the 
 6
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 French were almost regarded as deliverers by : 
 the people of the country. Their conduct in j 
 particular towards the Austrian troops was I 
 any thing but friendly. They treated them I 
 with extreme arrogance, affecting to impute to 
 them the disasters of this campaign. The lan- 
 guage of the Russian officers and generals on 
 this subject was insultingly offensive, and by 
 no means deserved; for, if the Austrians 
 showed less firmness than the Russian infant- 
 ry, in all other respects they were far superior. 
 
 The Austrians, living on very bad terms 
 with the Russians, separated from them, to go 
 and concur in the defence of the bridges of 
 Vienna; and M. de Meerfeld, with his corps, 
 retired by the road from Steyer to Leoben. 
 He marched, followed by Marshal Marmont, 
 on the road from Waidhofen to Leoben, and 
 by Marshal Davout on that from St. Gaming 
 to Lilienfeld. The direct road to Vienna was, 
 therefore, open to the French, and they had 
 but two marches to make in order to be at the 
 gates of that capital, and no enemy before 
 them who could dispute their entry. 
 
 The temptation could not but be great for 
 Murat. It was difficult for him to withstand 
 the desire to dash forward and to show the 
 Austrian capital his person, always the most 
 conspicuous at reviews as in dangers. Never 
 had an army from the West penetrated into 
 this metropolis of the Germanic empire. Mo- 
 reau in 1800, General Bonaparte in 1797, had 
 signed armistices when nearly arrived there. 
 The Turks alone had reached its walls with- 
 out passing them. Murat could not resist this 
 temptation, and marched on the 10th and llth 
 for Vienna, urging Marshals Soult and Lannes 
 to accompany him. He took care, it is true, 
 not to enter, and halted at Burkersdorf, in the 
 mountainous defile of the Kahlenberg, two 
 leagues from Vienna. 
 
 This was a useless and even a dangerous 
 haste. A change so unforeseen as that which 
 had just manifested itself in the march of the 
 enemy, made it worth while to halt and wait 
 for the Emperor's orders. Besides, it was pre- 
 ceding too far the corps of Marshal Marmont, 
 as well as the flotilla destined to keep that 
 corps in communication with the army, and 
 running blindly between the Russians, who 
 had passed to the other side of the Danube, 
 and the Austrians who were beaten back into 
 the mountains. 
 
 At this instant, in fact, peril threatened 
 Marshal Mortier, 1 placed on the left bank of 
 the Danube, and coming near Stein, into the 
 presence of the Russians, who had crossed 
 the river at Krems. The danger of Marshal 
 Mortier was not precisely imputable to Murat, 
 though the latter had contributed to produce 
 and to aggravate it by his precipitate move- 
 ment upon Vienna, but to a negligence scarce- 
 ly ever to be met with in the operations di- 
 
 1 MORTIER, ADOLPHE CASIMIR JOSEPH. Born at Cam- 
 bray in 1768. His father, a wealthy farmer, gave him a 
 good education. He entered a cavalry regiment in 1791, 
 and soon fought his way to the rank of adjutant-general. 
 Under Pichegru, Moreau, and Massena, on the Rhine and 
 in Switzerland, he fought his way to the command of a 
 division. In 1804, he was rewarded for his capture of 
 Hanover by a marshal's baton. In 1808, he wai made 
 
 reeled by Napoleon, and which, nevertheless 
 did occur in this instance, for there are inter- 
 vals even in the most unremitting and most 
 indefatigable vigilance. 
 
 Distracted by a thousand things, Napoleon 
 had omitted to follow one of his most inva- 
 riable habits, which consisted in always as- 
 suring himself of the execution of his orders, 
 after he had given them. He had prescribed, 
 in a general manner, the union of Gazan's, 
 Dupont's and Dumonceau's divisions into a 
 single corps, the formation of a flotilla under 
 Captain Lostanges, to connect the columns 
 marching on the left bank with those march- 
 ing on the right bank, and he had depended 
 too much upon his lieutenants to make all 
 these things harmonize. Murat had advanced 
 too rapidly : Mortier, whether drawn along by 
 Murat's movement, or whether he had not 
 given General Dupont instructions sufficiently 
 precise, had left the interval of a march be- 
 tween Gazan's division, which he had with 
 him, and Dupont's and Dumonceau's divisions, 
 which were to join him. The flotilla, difficult 
 to collect, was left far behind. 
 
 Meanwhile, Napoleon, quick at discovering 
 negligences, hastened to Molk, and, guessing 
 the danger of Marshal Mortier, though not yet 
 apprized of it, he stopped Marshal Soult's 
 corps, which Murat had wanted to take with 
 him, and sent aides-de-camp to Murat and 
 Lannes to slacken their movement. He was 
 fearful not only of what might happen to the 
 corps thrown upon the left bank of the Da- 
 nube, but what might befall the advanced- 
 guard itself, imprudently carried into the de- 
 files of the Kahlenberg. 
 
 Nowhere are faults so speedily punished as 
 in war, for nowhere do causes and effects so 
 speedily follow each other. The Russians, 
 guided, upon the Austrian territory, by an 
 officer of the Austrian staff of the highest 
 merit, Colonel Schmidt, soon perceived the 
 existence of a solitary French division on the 
 left bank of the Danube, and resolved to cut it 
 off. Feeling secure, from the destruction of 
 the bridge of Krems, which prevented the 
 French army from coming to the assistance 
 of the compromised division, not perceiving a 
 mass of boats which might make amends for 
 the want' of a bridge, they halted to procure 
 for themselves an apparently easy triumph. 
 Gazan's division numbered scarcely 5000 
 men; the Russians, since their separation 
 from the Austrians, were still nearly 40,000. 
 The ground was favourable to their designs. 
 The Danube, at this point, runs between 
 steep banks, contracted by the mountains of 
 Bohemia on the one hand, and by the Alps of 
 Styria on the other. From Dirnstein to Stein 
 and to Krems, the road on the left bank, nar- 
 row, frequently hewn out of the rock, is bor- 
 dered by the Danube and the mountains, which 
 
 Duke of Treviso, and served in Spain, where he took Ba- 
 dajos. He fought well at Dresden and Lutzen in the 
 campaign of 1813, and in 1814 at Monlmirail, Troyes, and 
 under the walls of Paris. Illness prevented his serving 
 at Waterloo. He was killed by the discharge of the in- 
 fernal machine prepared for the destruction of Louil 
 Philippe in 1836. Court and Camp of Napoleon H
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 75 
 
 overlook the river. It is difficult for carriages, eyes, not one, either officer or soldier, ever 
 Marshal Mortier, who was marching upon it thought of capitulating. To die to the last 
 with Gazan's division, had, therefore, put into j man rather than surrender was the only alter- 
 boats the only battery that he had at his dis- I native which presented itself to these brave 
 posal. The horses, led by hand, followed the | fellows, so heroic was the spirit which an- 
 
 ' imated this army ! Marshal Mortier thought 
 like his soldiers, and like them he was resolved 
 to perish rather than surrender his marshal's 
 sword to the Russians. He therefore ordered 
 
 division. 
 
 On the llth of November, while Murat, on 
 the right bank, was running to the gates of 
 Vienna, Mortier, on the left bank, had passed 
 Dirnstein, where are the ruins of a castle in 
 which Richard Cceur de Lion was kept pri- 
 soner. At this point of Dirnstein, the moun- 
 
 tains recede a little, and leave a space be- 
 tween their foot and the river. The road runs 
 
 them to march in close column and to force 
 their way with the bayonet, while retreating to 
 Dirnstein, where they should be rejoined by 
 
 Dupont's division. It was dark. The battle 
 which they had fought with the Russians in 
 through this space, sometimes imbedded in the ' the morning was renewed in the obscurity of 
 ground, sometimes raised above it by a cause- ' night, but in an opposite direction. Again 
 way. The French division, having entered ' they were engaged hand to hand in this nar- 
 
 upon this road, perceived the smoke of the 
 bridge of Krems, which was still burning. 
 Presently it descried the Russians, and con- 
 jectured that they had passed the Danube over 
 this bridge. Without considering what there 
 might be before it, impelled by the ardour 
 common to the whole army, it thought only of 
 pushing forward and of fighting. Mortier 
 gave the order for it, which was instantly ex- 
 ecuted. An officer of artillery, since General 
 Fabvier, who commanded the battery attached 
 to Gazan's division, had his pieces landed and 
 placed them in position. The Russians ad- 
 vanced in a close mass towards the French 
 division. The fire of the artillery made dread- 
 ful havoc in their ranks. They rushed upon 
 the guns to take them. The infantry of the 
 100th and 103d regiments of the line defended 
 them with extreme vigour. A most obstinate 
 fight, hand to hand, ensued in this narrow 
 road. The cannon were taken, but immedi- 
 ately retaken. No sooner were they wrested 
 from the Russians, than they were fired at 
 them, almost close to the muzzles, with terri- 
 bly destructive effect. The French, posted on 
 the slightest rising grounds, kept up a fire of 
 musketry, which did not less execution than 
 their artillery. The fight was kept up at this 
 point for half a day, and, to judge from the 
 wounded found on the morrow, the enemy 
 must have sustained great loss. Fifteen hun- 
 dred prisoners were taken. The French were 
 at last left masters of the ground, and thought 
 that they might rest themselves there. 
 
 They had advanced while fighting as far as 
 Stein. The 4th light, spread over the heights 
 which overlook the river, kept up a well-sus- 
 tained tirailleur fire, which became every mo- 
 ment more and more brisk. The cause of it, 
 which it had been at first difficult to account 
 for, was soon explained. The Russians had 
 turned the heights. With two columns, form- 
 ing a mass of twelve or fifteen thousand men, 
 they had descended on the rear of Gazan's 
 division and entered Dirnstein, through which 
 this division had passed in the morning. It 
 was, therefore, enveloped and separated from 
 Dupont's division, which had been left a march 
 behind. No part of the flotilla was to be seen 
 on the Danube, and consequently they had 
 very little, hope of escape left them. Night 
 was approaching ; the situation was frightful, 
 and no doubt they should have a whole army 
 upon them. In this extremity, evident to all 
 
 row road, the men being so close that they 
 frequently seized each other by the throat. 
 While fighting in this manner, the French 
 gained ground towards Dirnstein. However, 
 after penetrating through several masses of 
 enemies, they began to despair of accomplish- 
 ing their object, or of opening themselves a 
 passage that was incessantly closed again. 
 Some of Mortier's officers, perceiving no fur- 
 ther chance of saving themselves, proposed to 
 him to embark alone, and to withdraw his 
 person at least from the Russians, that such a 
 trophy as a marshal of France might not be 
 left in their hands. 
 
 " No," replied the illustrious marshal, " we 
 must not forsake such brave fellows. We 
 must be saved or perish with them." 
 
 There he was sword in hand, fighting at the 
 head of his grenadiers, and making repeated 
 assaults to get back to Dirnstein, when, all at 
 once, a most violent firing was heard in the 
 rear of Dirnstein. Hope instantly revived, for, 
 according to all probabilities, this must be Du- 
 pont's division arriving. In fact, that brave 
 division, which had marched all day, had 
 learned in advancing, the dangerous situation 
 of Marshal Mortier, and was hastening to his 
 assistance. General Marchand, with the 9th 
 light, supported by the 96th and 32d regiments 
 of the line, the same that had distinguished 
 themselves at Haslach, plunged into that 
 gorge. Some pushed on direct for Dirnstein, 
 others entered the ravines which descend from 
 the mountains, to drive back the Russians. A 
 battle, quite as obstinate as that which the sol- 
 diers of Gazan's division were at this moment 
 fighting, ensued in these defiles. At length, 
 the 9th light penetrated to Dirnstein, while 
 Marshal Mortier was entering on the opposite 
 side. The two columns rejoined and recog- 
 nised each other, by the fire-light. The sol- 
 diers embraced one another, overjoyed at hav- 
 ing escaped such a disaster. 
 
 The losses were cruel on both sides, but the 
 glory was not equal, for 5000 French had re- 
 sisted more than 30,000 Russians, and had 
 saved their colours by fighting their way 
 through. These are examples which ought 
 for ever to be recommended to a nation. Sol 
 diers who have resolved to die can always 
 save their honour, and frequently succeed in 
 saving their liberty and their lives. 
 
 Marshal Mortier found in Dirnstein the 1500 
 prisoners whom he had taken in the morning.
 
 76 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 The Russians lost, in killed, wounded, and 
 prisoners, about 4000 men. In that number 
 was Colonel Schmidt. The enemy could not 
 sustain a more severe loss, and they soon had 
 reason to regret it bitterly. The French num- 
 bered 3000 men hors de combat, either killed or 
 wounded. Half of the effective force of Ga- 
 zan's division had fallen. 
 
 When Napoleon, who was at Molk, learned 
 the issue of this rencounter, he was relieved 
 from the apprehensions which he had enter- 
 tained of the entire destruction of Gazan's di- 
 vision. He was delighted with the conduct of 
 Marshal Mortier and his soldiers, and he sent 
 the most signal rewards to the two divisions 
 of Gazan and Dupont He recalled them to 
 the right bank of the Danube, to give time for 
 their wounds to heal, and destined Bernadotte 
 to succeed them on the left bank. He cen- 
 sured Murat for the un connectedness which 
 had prevailed in the different columns of the 
 army. The character of Napoleon was indul- 
 gent, his mind stern. He preferred simple, 
 solid, sedate bravery to brilliant bravery, 
 though he employed all sorts, such as nature 
 presented them to him, in his armies. He 
 was in general severe towards Murat, whose 
 levity, ostentation, and restless ambition, he 
 disliked, though at the same time he did jus- 
 tice to his excellent heart and his transcen- 
 dent courage. "My cousin," he wrote to him, 
 "I cannot approve of your manner of marching. 
 You go like a hare-brained fellow, without 
 weighing the orders that I send you. The Rus- 
 sians, instead of covering Vienna, have re- 
 crossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordi- 
 nary circumstance ought to have suggested to 
 you that you could not act without fresh instruc- 
 tions. Without knowing what plans the ene- 
 my may have, or inquiring what was my plea- 
 sure in this new order of things, you go and 
 draw away my army towards Vienna. You 
 have consulted only the petty vanity of enter- 
 ing Vienna. There is no glory but where 
 there is danger. There is none in entering a 
 defenceless capital." (Molk,the llth of Novem- 
 ber.) 
 
 Murat, on this occasion, expiated the faults 
 of everybody. He had, it is true, marched 
 too rapidly ; but, had he remained before 
 Krems, without bridges and without boats, he 
 would have been of no great assistance to 
 Mortier, who had been compromised chiefly 
 by the distance left between Dupont' s and Ga- 
 zan's divisions, by the absence of the flotilla. 
 Murat was deeply grieved. Napoleon, ap- 
 prized by his aide-de-camp, Bertrand, of his 
 brother-in-law's affliction, corrected by a few 
 soothing expressions the effect of this harsh 
 reprimand. 
 
 Napoleon, desirous at the moment of deriv- 
 ing advantage from the very fault of Murat, 
 enjoined him, since he was in sight of Vienna, 
 not to enter it, but to go along the walls and 
 seize the great bridge of the Danube, which is 
 thrown across that river, outside the suburbs 
 This bridge occupied, Napoleon further directed 
 him to advance with all expedition upon the 
 road to Moravia, in order to arrive before the 
 Russians at the point where the road from 
 Krems joins the high road to Olmutz. If he 
 
 secured the bridge and marched rapidly, it 
 might be possible to cut off the retreat of Ge- 
 neral Kutusof towards Moravia, and to subject 
 lira to a disaster nearly equal to that of Ge- 
 neral Mack. Murat had now an opportunity 
 to repair his faults, and he seized it eagerly. 
 
 Still it was scarcely to be supposed that the 
 Austrians had committed such a blunder as to 
 leave standing the bridges of Vienna, which 
 must render the French masters of both banks 
 of the river, or that, if they had left them 
 standing, they had not made every preparation 
 for destroying them at the first signal. No- 
 thing, therefore, was more doubtful than the 
 operation wished for rather than ordered by 
 Napoleon. 
 
 The Austrians had no intention to defend 
 Vienna. That fine and large capital has a 
 regular enclosure, that which resisted the 
 Turks in 1683, and as, in time, the city in- 
 creased too much to remain shut up in that 
 space, and extensive suburbs arose all round 
 it, the whole was encompassed with a wall of 
 no great height, in the form of redans, sur- 
 rounding the whole of the ground built upon. 
 All this was but a slight defence, for the wall 
 which covers the suburbs was easy to force; 
 and, once master of the suburbs, one might, 
 with a few shells, oblige the body of the place 
 to surrender. The Emperor Francis had 
 charged Count Wurbna, a discreet and con- 
 ciliatory man, to receive the French, and to 
 concert with them for the peaceable posses- 
 sion of the capital. But it was decided that 
 the passage of the river should be disputed. 
 
 Vienna is situated at a certain distance from 
 the Danube, which runs to the left of that city, 
 between wooded islands. The great bridge, 
 of wood, crossing several arms of the river, 
 forms a communication from one bank to the 
 other. The Austrians had placed combustibles 
 under the flooring of the bridge, and were 
 ready to blow it up the moment that the French 
 should make their appearance. They were 
 posted on the left bank, with their artillery 
 pointed, and a corps of seven or eight thou- 
 sand men, commanded by Count Auersper?. 
 
 Murat had approached near to the bridge, 
 without entering the city, which, owing to the 
 localities, it was easy to do. At this moment 
 the rumour, of an armistice was universally 
 circulated. Napoleon, having arrived at the 
 palace of Schiinbrunn, situated on the high 
 road, before you come to Vienna, had been 
 wailed upon by a deputation of the inhabitants 
 of that capital, who had hastened thither to 
 implore his clemency. He received them 
 with all the attentions due to an excellent 
 people, and from civilized nations towards 
 each other. He had also received and ap- 
 peared to listen to M. Giulay, who came to 
 repeat the overtures previously made at Linz. 
 The idea of an armistice, appearing likely to 
 lead to peace, had, therefore, spread rapidly. 
 Napoleon had, at the same time, sent General 
 Bertrand to renew the order to Murat and 
 Lannes to get possession of the bridges if pos- 
 sible. Murat and Lannes needed no spurring. 
 They had placed Oudinot's grenadiers behind 
 the umbrageous plantations that border the 
 Danube, and advanced themselves with some
 
 NOT. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 77 
 
 aides-de-camp to the tcte de pont. General 
 Bertrand and an officer of the engineers, Co- 
 lonel Dode de la Brunerie, had repaired thither 
 also. 
 
 A wooden barrier closed this tele de pont. 
 Orders were given to throw it down. Behind,] 
 at some distance, was posted an hussar, as I 
 vidette, who fired his carbine, and galloped 
 off. He was followed over the long and sinu- 
 ous line of the small bridges thrown across 
 the several arms of the river, till his pursuers 
 came to the great bridge over the principal 
 arm. Instead of planks, nothing was to be j 
 seen but a bed of fascines spread on the floor- 
 ing. At that very moment an Austrian sub- ; 
 officer of artillery appeared with a match in I 
 his hand. Colonel Dode seized and slopped 
 him just as he was about to fire the train com- ' 
 municating with the fire-works placed under 
 the arches. In this manner the French officers 
 reached the other bank : they addressed the 
 Austrian artillerymen, told them that an armis- 
 tice was signed, or on the point of being 
 signed, that peace was negotiating, and desired 
 to speak with the general, commanding the 
 troops. 
 
 The Austrians, taken by surprise, hesitated, 
 and conducted General Bertrand to Count 
 Auersperg. Meanwhile, a column of grenadiers 
 advanced by Murat's order. It could not be seen, ; 
 owing to the large trees by the river, and the ; 
 windings of that route, which alternately cross- , 
 ed bridges and wooded islands. While awaiting 
 their arrival, the French chiefs continued to 
 converse with the Austrians under the mouths 
 of their cannon. All at once the long-con- 
 cealed column of grenadiers came in sight. ! 
 The Austrians, beginning to perceive that they 
 had been tricked, prepared to fire. Lannes 
 and Murat, with the officers who accompanied 
 them, rushed upon the gunners, talked to them, 
 made them hesitate afresh, and thus gave the 
 column time to come up. The grenadiers at 
 length fell upon the cannon, seized them, and 
 disarmed the Austrians. 
 
 Meanwhile, Count Auersperg came up ac- 
 companied by General Bertrand and Colonel 
 Dode. He was painfully surprised to see the 
 bridge in the hands of the French, and these 
 collected in considerable number on the left 
 bank of the Danube. He had some thousands 
 of infantry left to dispute the possession of: 
 what they had wrested from him. But the | 
 French officers repeated to him all the stories j 
 by which they had already lulled the guard of, 
 the bridge, and persuaded him that he ought' 
 to retire with his soldiers to a certain distance 
 from the river. Besides, fresh French troops 
 were every moment arriving, and it was too 
 late to resort to force. M. Auersperg therefore 
 withdrew, agitated, confounded, appearing 
 scarcely to comprehend what had just occurred. 
 
 It was by means of this audacious trick, 
 seconded by the unparalleled courage of those 
 who played it, and with complete success, 
 that the bridges of Vienna fell into our hands. 
 Four years later, for want of these bridges, 
 the passage of the Danube cost us sanguinary 
 battles, which had wellnigh proved fatal to 
 us. 
 
 The joy of Napoleon, on hearing of this 
 
 success, was extreme. He thought no longer 
 of snubbing Murat, but sent him off immedi- 
 ately, with the reserve cavalry, the corps of 
 Lannes, and that of Marshal Soult, to proceed 
 by the road of Stockerau and Hollabrunn, to 
 cut off the retreat of General Kutusof. 
 
 Having despatched these orders, he directed 
 all his attention to the police of Vienna and 
 the military occupation of that capital. It 
 was a glorious triumph to enter that ancient 
 metropolis of the Germanic empire, in the 
 bosom of which the enemy had never ap- 
 peared but as master. During the last two 
 centuries considerable wars had been waged, 
 memorable battles won and lost, but never 
 had a great general been yet seen planting 
 his standard in the capitals of mighty States. 
 Men were obliged to go back to the times of 
 the conquerors to find examples of such vast 
 results. 
 
 Napoleon, for his part, took up his abode at 
 the imperial palace of Schonbrunn. He gave 
 the command of the city of Vienna to Gene- 
 ral Clarke, and left the police to the city mili- 
 tia. He ordered and enforced the observance 
 of the strictest military discipline, and suf- 
 fered no property to be touched but the public 
 property, such as the chests of the govern- 
 ment and the arsenals. The great arsenal of 
 Vienna contained immense stores 100,000 
 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon, ammunition 
 of every kind. It was surprising that the 
 Emperor Francis bad not caused it to be eva- 
 cuated by means of the Danube. Possession 
 was taken of all that it contained for the ac- 
 count of the army. 
 
 Napoleon then distributed his forces in such 
 a manner as to guard the capital duly, and to 
 observe the road from the Alps by which the 
 archdukes might soon arrive, that of Hungary, 
 by which they might come somewhat later, 
 lastly, that of Moravia, on which the Russians 
 were in force. 
 
 We have seen that he had despatched General 
 Marmont by the Leoben road, to occupy the 
 pass of the Alps, and Marshal Davout by the 
 road of St. Gaming, to turn the position of 
 St. Pollen. The latter laboriously climbed the 
 steepest mountains amidst the snow and ice 
 of a precocious winter, and, thanks to the de- 
 votedness of the soldiers and the energy of 
 the officers, he had surmounted all obstacles, 
 when, near Mariazell, on the high road from 
 Leoben to St. Piilten, he fell in with the corps 
 of General Meerfeld in flight from General 
 Marmont. An action of the same kind that 
 Massena had formerly fought in the Alps, im- 
 mediately ensued between the French and the 
 Austrians. Marshal Davout overthrew the 
 latter, took from them 4000 men, and drove 
 the rest in disorder into the mountains. He 
 then descended upon Vienna. General Mar- 
 mont, on reaching Leoben, almost without 
 striking a blow, halted there and waited for 
 new instructions from the Emperor. 
 
 Events were not less favourable in the Ty- 
 rol and Italy. Marshal Ney, sent, after the 
 occupation of Ulm, to take possession of the 
 Tyrol, had luckily chosen the debtnu-M of 
 Scharnits, the Por/a Clawiin of the ancients, 
 for penetrating into it. This was one of the 
 
 G 2
 
 78 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 most difficult passes of that country, but it 
 had the advantage of leading straight to Ins- 
 pruck, amidst the dispersed troops of the Aus- 
 trians, which, not expecting this attack, were 
 scattered from the Lake of Constance to the 
 sources of the Drave. Marshal Ney had not 
 more than nine or ten thousand men, intrepid 
 soldiers like their commander, and with whom 
 any thing might be undertaken. He made 
 them scale in the month of November the 
 highest peaks of the Alps, in spite of the rocks, 
 which the inhabitants tumbled upon their 
 heads ; for the Tyrolese, strongly attached to 
 the House of Austria, would not be subjects 
 of Bavaria, to which they were threatened to 
 be transferred. He stormed the entrench- 
 ments of Scharnitz, entered Inspruck, dis- 
 persed the surprised Austrians, and drove 
 some of them into the Vorarlberg, the others 
 into Italian Tyrol. General Jellachich and 
 Prince de Rohan were beaten back towards 
 the Vorarlberg, and from the Vorarlberg 
 towards the Lake of Constance, along the 
 very route by which Augereau was coming. 
 As though Fate had decreed that none of the 
 wrecks of the army of Ulm should escape 
 the French, General Jellachich, the same who 
 at the surrender of Memmingen had evaded 
 the pursuit of Marshal Soult, came full butt 
 upon Augereau's corps. Seeing no chance 
 of escape, he laid down his arms with a de- 
 tachment of 6000 men. The Prince de Ro- 
 han, less advanced towards the Vorarlberg, 
 had time to fall back. He made an audacious 
 march through the cantonments of our troops, 
 which, after the taking of Inspruck, were neg- 
 ligently guarding the Brenner, beguiled the 
 vigilance of Loison, one of Marshal Ney's 
 divisionary generals, passed close to Botzen, 
 almost before his eyes, and then fell upon Ve- 
 rona and Venice, while Massena was pursu- 
 ing the rear of the Archduke Charles. Mas- 
 sena had charged General St. Cyr, with the 
 troops brought back from Naples, to blockade 
 Venice, in which the Archduke Charles had 
 left a strong garrison. General St. Cyr, asto- 
 nished at the presence of a hostile corps on 
 the rear of Massena, when the latter was al- 
 ready at the foot of the Julian Alps, marched 
 with the utmost expedition, and enveloped the 
 Prince de Rohan, who was obliged, like Gene- 
 ral Jellachich, to lay down his arms. On this 
 occasion General St. Cyr took about 5000 
 men. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Archduke Charles was con- 
 tinuing his arduous retreat through the Friule 
 and beyond the Julian Alps. His brother, the 
 Archduke John, passing from the Italian Tyrol 
 into Carinthia, followed in the interior of the 
 Alps a line exactly parallel to his. The two 
 archdukes, despairing with reason of arriving 
 in useful time atone of the defensive positions 
 of the Danube, and judging it too rash to fall 
 upon the flank of Napoleon, had decided to 
 meet at Layback, the one by Villach, the other 
 by Udine, and then to proceed to Hungary. 
 There they might with the utmost safety join 
 the Russians who occupied Moravia, and, 
 having effected their junction with these latter, 
 they might resume the offensive, if the allied 
 armies had not been compromised by any 
 
 fault, and if the two sovereigns of Austria and 
 Russia had still the courage to prolong the 
 contest. 
 
 General Marmont, placed in advance of 
 Leoben, on the crests which separate the val- 
 ley of the Danube from that of the Drave, 
 almost saw with mortification the troops of the 
 Archduke John filing away before him, and 
 burned with impatience to fight them. But a 
 precise order chained his ardour, and enjoined 
 him to confine himself to guarding the defiles 
 of the Alps. 
 
 Massena, after pursuing the Archduke 
 Charles as far as the Julian Alps, had halted 
 at the foot of them, and conceived that he 
 ought not to venture into Hungary in pursuit 
 of the archdukes. He gave a hand to General 
 Marmont, and waited for orders from the Em- 
 peror. 
 
 All these movements were finished by the 
 middle of November, nearly at the same time 
 that the grand army was performing its march 
 upon Vienna. Assuredly, if one had devised 
 a plan in the tranquillity qf the closet, with 
 the facilities which abound for tracing projects 
 on the map, one would not have arranged mat- 
 ters with greater ease. In six weeks that 
 army, passing the Rhine and the Danube, in- 
 terposing between the Austrian posts in Suabia 
 and the Russians arriving upon the Inn, had 
 enveloped the one, beaten back the other, sur- 
 prised the Tyrol by a detachment, then oc- 
 cupied Vienna, and turned the position of the 
 archdukes in Italy, which had obliged the lat- 
 ter to seek refuge in Hungary. History no- 
 where presents such another spectacle : in 
 twenty days from the Ocean to the Rhine, in. 
 forty from the Rhine to Vienna! And though 
 separations of forces, so dangerous in war, are 
 most frequently attended with reverses only; 
 here corps had been seen detached to a dis- 
 tance, which, without running any risk, had 
 accomplished their object, because at the cen- 
 tre a mighty mass, striking opportunely deci- 
 sive blows at the principal bodies assembled 
 by the enemy, had imparted an impulsion to 
 which every thing gave way, and had not left, 
 either upon its rear or upon its wings, any 
 consequences which might not easily be ga- 
 thered : so that this dispersion was, in reality, 
 nothing but a skilful distribution of accesso- 
 ries beside the principal action, regulated with 
 wonderful precision. But, after admiring that 
 profound, that incomparable art, which aston- 
 ishes by its very simplicity, we must admire 
 also in this manner of operating another con- 
 dition, without which every combination, how- 
 ever judicious, may become a peril that is, 
 such a vigour in the soldiers and lieutenants 
 that, when they were overtaken by an unfore- 
 seen accident, they knew how, by their energy, 
 as the soldiers of General Dupont at Haslach, 
 of Marshal Mortier at Dirnstein, of Marshal 
 Ney at Elchingen, to give the supreme intelli- 
 gence which directed them time to come to 
 their assistance, and to repair the inevitable 
 errors in even the best conducted operations. 
 Let us repeat what we have already remarked 
 a great captain wants valiant soldiers, and 
 valiant soldiers want in like manner a great 
 captain. The glory ought to be theirs in com.
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 79 
 
 mon, as well as the merit of the great things 
 which they accomplish. 
 
 Napoleon, at Vienna, would not feast him- 
 self there with the vain-glory of occupying 
 the capital of the Germanic empire. He 
 wanted to put an end to the war. If he can 
 be reproached with having in his career 
 abused fortune, he will never be reproached, 
 like Hannibal, with not having known how to 
 take advantage of it, and with having fallen 
 asleep amidst the delights of Capua. He pre- 
 pared, therefore, to speed his march against 
 the Russians, in order to beat them in Moravia, 
 before they had time to effect their junction 
 with the archdukes. These, however, on the 
 15th of November, had proceeded no further 
 than Laybach. They would have to make a 
 very great circuit to reach Hungary, then to 
 traverse it, and to enter Moravia towards 01- 
 miltz. This was a long march of more than 
 150 leagues to make. Twenty days would not 
 have sufficed for it. Napoleon, at this period, 
 was at Vienna, and had only 40 leagues to 
 travel to reach Briinn, ihe capital of Moravia. 
 
 He drew nearer to him General Marmont, 
 who was too far off, and assigned to him a 
 position a little in rear, on the very summit 
 of the Alps of Styria, in order to guard the 
 high road from Italy to Vienna. He enjoined 
 him, in case the archdukes should attempt to 
 take that way back, to destroy the bridges, and 
 to break up the roads, which, in the moun- 
 tains, enables a corps that is not numerous to 
 stop a superior enemy for some time. He 
 forbade him to give way to the desire to fight, 
 unless he was forced to do so. He drew Mas- 
 sena towards General Marmont, and put them 
 into immediate communication with each 
 other. The troops commanded by Massena 
 thenceforward assumed the title of the eighth 
 corps of the grand army. Napoleon placed 
 the corps of Marshal Davout all round Vienna ; 
 one division, that of General Gudiu, in rear 
 of Vienna, towards Neustadt, where it could 
 in a short time give a hand to Marmont; an- 
 other, that of General Friant, in the direction 
 of Presburg, observing the debouches of Hun- 
 gary ; the third that of General Bisson (which 
 had become Caffarelli's division) in advance 
 of Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Dupont's 
 and Gazan's division were established in 
 Vienna itself, to recover from their fatigues 
 and their wounds. Lastly, Marshals Soult, 
 Lannes, and Murat marched towards Moravia, 
 while Marshal Bernadotte, having passed the 
 Danube at Krems, followed the track of Gene- 
 ral Kutusof, and was preparing to rejoin, by 
 the same route which that general had taken, 
 the three French corps that were going to fight 
 the Russians. 
 
 Thus Napoleon at Vienna, in the centre of 
 a web skilfully spread around him, could give 
 assistance wherever the slightest agitation 
 might indicate the presence of the enemy. If 
 the archdukes attempted any thing towards 
 Italy, Massena and Marmont, in connection 
 with one another, were backed upon the Alps 
 of Styria, and Napoleon, marching Davout's 
 corps towards Neustadt, was in force to sup- 
 port them. If the archdukes advanced by way 
 of Presburg and Hungary, Napoleon, could de- 
 
 spatch thither Davout's entire corps, a little 
 after Marmont, who, at Neustadt, was not far 
 off, and, in case of need, hasten thither him- 
 self, with the bulk of the army. Lastly, if it 
 were necessary to make head against the Rus- 
 sians in Moravia, he could in three days unite 
 with the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Murat, 
 which were already there, that of Davout, 
 easily withdrawn from Vienna, and that of 
 Bernadotte, quite as easily brought back from 
 Bohemia. He was, therefore, duly prepared 
 on every side, and fulfilled in the highest de- 
 gree the conditions of that art of war which, 
 in conversation with his lieutenants, he defined 
 in these terms: THE ART OF DIVIDING ONE'S 
 
 SELF TO SUBSIST, AND OF CONCENTRATING ONE'S 
 
 SELF TO FIGHT. Never have the precepts of 
 that formidable art which destroys or founds 
 empires been better defined or better practised. 
 
 Napoleon had hastened to avail himself of 
 the conquest of the bridges of Vienna, to send 
 Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat beyond the 
 Danube, in the hope of cutting off the retreat 
 of General Kutusof, and arriving before him 
 at Hollabriinn, where that general, who had 
 passed the Danube at Krems, would strike off 
 into the road to Moravia. General Kutusof 
 directed his inarch towards Moravia, and not 
 towards Bohemia, because it was upon Ol- 
 miitz, the frontier of Moravia and Gallicia, 
 that the second Russian army was directing 
 its course. While he was advancing upon 
 Hollabriin, having Prince Bagration at the 
 head, he was astonished and dismayed on 
 learning the presence of the French on the 
 high road which he designed to follow, and 
 thus acquiring the certainty of being cut off. 
 He then laid the same snare for Murat which 
 Murat had laid for the Austrians, in order to 
 take from them the bridges of the Danube. 
 He had with him General Winzingerode, the 
 same who had negotiated all the conditions of 
 the plan of the campaign. He despatched 
 him to Murat to retail to him the inventions 
 by which Count Auersperg had been deceived, 
 and which consisted in saying that there were 
 no negotiators at Schonbrunn on the point of 
 signing a peace. In consequence, he directed 
 an armistice to be proposed to. him, the prin 
 cipal condition of which was to halt both of 
 them on the ground which they occupied, so 
 that nothing whatever should be changed by 
 the suspension of the operations. If they 
 were to be resumed, six hours' notice was to 
 be given. Murat, artfully flattered by M. de 
 Winzingerode, proud, moreover, of the honour 
 of being the first intermediate agent of the 
 peace, accepted the armistice, saving the ap- 
 probation of the Emperor. We mast add, in 
 order to be just, that a consideration, which 
 was not without weight, contributed greatly to 
 lead him into this false step. The corps of 
 Marshal Soult was not yet on the ground, and 
 he was fearful that, with his cavalry and Ou- 
 dinot's grenadiers, he should not have a suffi- 
 cient force to bar the way against the Rus- 
 sians. He despatched, therefore, an aide-de- 
 camp to the head-quarters with the draft of 
 the armistice. 
 
 Next day the commanders on both sides 
 visited one another. Prince Bagration went
 
 80 
 
 HISTORY OH 1HE 
 
 [Nov. 1805 
 
 to see Murat, and manifested great interest 
 and curiosity respecting the French generals, 
 and especially respecting the illustrious Mar- 
 shal Lannes. The latter, simple in his man- 
 ners, without being on that account deficient 
 in military courtesy, told Prince Bagration 
 that if he had been alone they should have 
 been at that moment fighting instead of ex- 
 changing compliments. At this moment, in 
 fact, the Russian army, covering itself with 
 Bagration's rear-guard, which affected to keep 
 motionless, marched rapidly behind this cur- 
 tain and regained the road to Moravia. Thus 
 Murat, duped in his turn, gave the enemy oc- 
 casion to revenge himself for the bridge of 
 Vienna. 
 
 Presently there arrived an aide-de-camp of 
 the Emperor's, Gen eral Lemarrois, who brought 
 a severe reprimand to Murat for the fault that he 
 had committed,' and which gave an order, as 
 well to him as to Marshal Lannes, to attack 
 immediately, whatever the hour might be at 
 which this communication reached them. 
 Lannes, however, took care to send an officer 
 to Prince Bagration to acquaint him with the 
 orders which he had just received. Disposi- 
 tions for attack were instantly made. Prince 
 Bagration had seven or eight thousand men. 
 Determined to cover completely the movement 
 of Kutusof, he took the noble resolution to pe- 
 rish rather than stir from the spot. Lannes 
 pushed his grenadiers upon him. The only 
 disposition that was possible was that of two 
 lines of infantry, deployed facing one another, 
 and attacking on nearly level ground. For 
 some time they exchanged a very brisk and 
 very destructive fire of musketry, then charged 
 * with the bayonet, and, what is rare in war, the 
 two masses of infantry marched resolutely to- 
 wards each other, without either giving way 
 before they met. They closed, and then, after 
 a fight, man to man, Oudinot's grenadiers 
 broke Bagration's foot-soldiers and cut them 
 in pieces. They then disputed, till after night- 
 fall, by the light of the flames, the burning 
 village of Schiingraben, which was finally left 
 in the hands of the French. The Russians 
 behaved valiantly. They lost on this occasion 
 nearly half their rear-guard, about 3000 men, 
 more than 1500 of whom strewed the field of 
 battle. Prince Bagration had proved himself 
 by his resolution the worthy rival of Marshal 
 Mortier at Dirnstein. This sanguinary action 
 was fought on the 16th of November. 
 
 The French advanced on the following days, 
 taking prisoners at every step, and at length 
 entered, on the 19th, the town of Briinn, the 
 capital of Moravia. The place was found 
 armed and provided with abundant resources. 
 The enemy had not even thought of defending 
 
 it. They thus abandoned to Napoleon an im- 
 portant position, where he commanded Mo- 
 ravia, and could at his ease observe and await 
 the movements of the Russians. 
 
 Napoleon, on receiving intelligence of this 
 last combat, resolved to proceed to Briinn, for, 
 the news from Italy announcing the protracted 
 retreat which the archdukes were making into 
 Hungary, he concluded that it would be with 
 the Russians that he should chiefly have to do. 
 He made some slight changes in the distribu- 
 tion of Marshal Davout's corps around Vienna. 
 He despatched towards Presburg Gudin's divi- 
 sion, which seemed to be no longer necessary 
 on the road to Styria, since the retreat of the 
 archdukes. He established Friant's division, 
 belonging to the same corps, in advance of 
 Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Bisson's divi- 
 sion (which had for a moment become CafFa- 
 relli's) was detached from Davout's corps and 
 marched to Briinn, to supply in Lannes' corps 
 the place of Gazan's division, left at Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon, on his arrival at Briinn, fixed his 
 head-quarters there on the 20th of November. 
 General Giulay, accompanied this time by M. 
 de Stadion, came to visit him again, and to 
 talk of peace more seriously than in his pre- 
 ceding missions. Napoleon expressed to both 
 of them a desire to lay aside arms and return 
 to France, but did not leave them in ignorance 
 of the conditions on which he should consent 
 to do so. He would no longer, he said, allow 
 Italy, divided between France and Austria, to 
 continue to be a subject of jealousy and war 
 between them. He was resolved to have the 
 whole of it as far as the Isonzo, that is to say, 
 he required the Venetian States, the only part 
 of Italy which remained for him to conquer. 
 He entered into no explanations respecting 
 what he should have to demand for his allies, 
 the Electors of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and 
 Baden ; but he declared in general terms that 
 he must secure their situation in Germany, 
 and put an end to all the questions left pend- 
 ing between them and the emperor, since the 
 new Germanic constitution of 1803. Mes- 
 sieurs de Stadion and De Giulay cried out 
 vehemently against the hardness of these con- 
 ditions. But Napoleon showed no disposition 
 to depart from them, and he gave them to 
 understand that, wholly engrossed by the du- 
 ties of war, he had no desire to keep about 
 him negotiators, who were in reality nothing 
 but military spies, directed to watch his move- 
 ments. He therefore recommended to them 
 to go to Vienna, to M. de Talleyrand, who had 
 just arrived there. Napoleon, caring little 
 about the tastes of his minister, who was not 
 fond either of business or of the fatigues of 
 head-quarters, had first summoned him to 
 
 ' u To PRINCB MURAT. 
 
 " SchSnbrunn, 25 Brumaire, year XIV., 
 "November 16, 1805, eight in the morning. 
 "It is impossible to find terms to express my displeasure. 
 You command only my advanced-guard, and yon have no 
 right to make an armistice without my order. You cause 
 me to lose the fruit of a campaign. Break the armistice 
 immediately and march against the enemy. Send and 
 declare to him that the general who signed that capitula- 
 
 tion had no right to do it; that none but the Emperor of 
 Russia has that right. 
 
 " If, however, the Emperor of Russia would ratify the 
 snid convention, I would ratify it; but it is only a strata- 
 gem. March; destroy the Russian army; you are in a 
 position to take the baggage and its artillery. The aide- 
 de-camp of the Emperor of Russia is a Officer! 
 
 are nothing when they have not powers : this had none. 
 The Austrians let themselves be duped for the passage 
 of the bridge of Vienna, you let yourself be duped by an 
 aide-de-camp of the emperor."
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 81 
 
 Strasburg, then to Munich, and now to Vienna. 
 He shifted to him those interminable parleys, 
 which in negotiations always precede serious 
 results. 
 
 During the conferences which Napoleon had 
 held with the two Austrian negotiators, one of 
 them, unable to contain himself, had dropped 
 an imprudent word, from which it might evi- 
 dently be inferred that Prussia was bound by 
 a treaty with Russia and Austria. Something 
 of that kind had been intimated to him from 
 Berlin, but nothing so precise as what he had 
 just learned. This discovery suggested new 
 reflections, and rendered him more disposed 
 to peace, without, however, inducing him to 
 desist from his essential pretensions. It could 
 not suit him to follow the Russians beyond 
 Moravia, that is to say into Poland, for that 
 would be running the risk of seeing the arch- 
 dukes cut off his communications with Vi- 
 enna. In consequence, he resolved to await 
 the arrival of M. de Haugwitz and the further 
 development of the military projects of the 
 Russians. He was equally ready either to 
 treat, if the proposed conditions seems accept- 
 able to him, or to cut in a great battle the 
 Gordian knot of the coalition, if his enemies 
 afforded a favourable occasion for it He 
 therefore suffered a few days to elapse, employ- 
 ing himself in studying with extreme care, 
 and in making his generals study, the ground 
 upon which he was, and upon which a secret 
 presentiment told him that he might be fated to 
 fight a decisive battle. At the same time, he 
 rested his troops, worn out with fatigue, suffer- 
 ing from cold, sometimes from hunger, and 
 having traversed in three months nearly 500 
 leagues. Hence the ranks of his soldiers were 
 much thinned, though fewer stragglers were 
 seen among them than in the train of any 
 army. The effectives had lost nearly one- 
 fifth, since taking the field. All military men 
 will acknowledge that this was very little after 
 such fatigues. For the rest, whenever the 
 army halted anywhere, the ranks were soon 
 completed, owing to the anxiety of the men 
 who remained behind to rejoin their corps. 
 
 The two emperors of Russia and Germany, 
 on their part, meeting at Olmutz, employed 
 their time in deliberating upon the course 
 which they ought to pursue. General Kutu- 
 sof, after a retreat, in which he had sustained 
 only rear-guard defeats, nevertheless brought 
 back no more than thirty andodd thousand men, 
 already inured to fighting, but exhausted with 
 fatigue. He had, therefore, lost twelve or fifteen 
 thousand killed, wounded, prisoners, or lame. 
 Alexander, with Buxhovden's corps and the 
 imgerial Russian guard, brought 40,000, which 
 made about 75,000 Russians. Fifteen thou- 
 sand Austrians, comprising the wrecks of 
 Kienmayer's and Meerfeld's corps, and a fine 
 division of cavalry, completed the Austro- 
 Russian army beneath Olmutz, and made it 
 amount to a total force of 90,000 men. 1 
 
 This is a fit place for remarking how exag- 
 
 1 The R;is>i ins made it amount to much less the day 
 after their defeat, Napoleon to much more in his bulle- 
 tin*. After comparing a great number of testimonies 
 and authentic accounts, we think that we here give the 
 most accurate statement. 
 VOL. II. 11 
 
 gerated were at that time the pretensions of 
 Russia in Europe, on comparing them with 
 the real state of her forces. She affected to 
 hold the balance between the powers, and the 
 real number of soldiers brought by her upon 
 the fields of battle where the destinies of the 
 world were decided, was as follows : She had 
 sent from 45 to 50 thousand men, under Kutu- 
 sof, she brought 40,000 under Buxhovden and 
 the Grand-duke Constantine, and 10,000 under 
 General Essen. If we set down those acting 
 in the north with the Swedes and the English 
 at 15,000, and those preparing to act towards 
 Naples at 10,000, we shall have a total of 
 125,000 men, figuring in reality in this war, 
 and 100,000 at most, if we are to believe the 
 accounts of the Russians after their defeat. 
 Austria had assembled more than 200,000, 
 Prussia could bring into line 150,000, France, 
 by herself, 300,000. We do not speak of 
 soldiers rated on the effectives, (which makes 
 a difference of nearly half,) but of soldiers 
 present in the fire on the day of battle. Though 
 the Russians were steady infantry, yet it was 
 not with 100,000 men, brave and ignorant, 
 that one could then pretend to control Europe. 
 
 The Russians, always extremely contemptu- 
 ous towards their allies the Austrians, whom 
 they accused of being cowardly soldiers, in- 
 capable officers, continued to commit horrible 
 ravages in the country. The eastern provinces 
 of the Austrian monarchy were afflicted with 
 dearth. Necessaries ran short at Olmiitz, and 
 the Russians procured themselves provisions, 
 not with the dexterity of the French soldier, 
 an intelligent, rarely cruel, marauder, but with 
 the brutality of a savage horde. They ex- 
 tended their pillage to the distance of several 
 leagues round, and completely laid waste the 
 country which they occupied. Discipline, 
 usually so strict among them, was visibly 
 affected by it, and they appeared much dissat- 
 isfied with their emperor. 
 
 In the Austro-Russian camp, therefore, peo- 
 ple were not disposed to take wise determina- 
 tions. The levity of youth concurred with a 
 feeling of great discomfort to impel them to 
 act, no matter how, to change their place, 
 were it merely for the sake of change. We 
 have said that the Emperor Alexander began 
 to fall under new influences. He was not 
 satisfied with the direction given to his affairs; 
 for this war, notwithstanding the flatteries with 
 which a coterie had surrounded him at Berlin, 
 did not seem to turn out well, and, according 
 to the custom of princes, he was glad to throw 
 upon his ministers the results of a policy 
 which he had himself decreed, but which he 
 could not uphold with the perseverance that 
 could alone correct its faultiness. What had 
 occurred at Berlin had confirmed him stili 
 more in his dispositions. He should have 
 committed very different faults, he said, if he 
 had listened to his friends. By persisting tc 
 do violence to Prussia, he should hav 'hrcwc 
 her into the arms of Napoleon, whereas by 
 his personal address he had induced that 
 court to enter, on the contrary, into engage- 
 ments which were equivalent to a declaration 
 of war against France. Hence the young 
 emoeror would no longer listen to advice, lor
 
 82 
 
 HISTORY OF 'THE 
 
 [Nov. 1805. 
 
 he fancied himself more clever than his ad- 
 visers. Prince Adam Czartoryski, honest, 
 grave, having warm passions under a cold 
 exterior, become, as we Lave seen, the trouble- 
 some censor of the weaknesses and the fickle- 
 ness of his master, supported an opinion which 
 could not fail to alienate him completely. Ac- 
 cording to this minister, the emperor had no 
 business with the army. That was not his 
 place. He had never served; he could not 
 know how to command. His presence at the 
 head-quarters, surrounded by young, giddy, 
 ignorant, presumptuous men, would annul the 
 authority of the generals, and at the same time 
 their responsibility. In a war, into which they 
 all entered with a certain apprehension, they 
 desired nothing more than to have no opinion, 
 to take nothing upon themselves, and to let 
 hot-headed youth command, that they might 
 no longer be responsible for the defeats which 
 they expected. In this manner there would 
 be nothing but the worst of commands for an 
 army that of a court. This war, moreover, 
 would be fertile in lost battles, and to main- 
 tain it there was required perseverance, and 
 perseverance depended on the magnitude of 
 the means which should be provided. It was 
 requisite, therefore, to leave the generals to 
 act the part which belonged to them at the 
 head of the troops, and for the emperor to per- 
 form his at the centre of the government, by 
 upholding the public spirit, by administering 
 with energy and application, so as to furnish 
 the armies with the necessary resources for 
 prolonging the struggle, the only means, if not 
 to conquer, at least to balance fortune. 
 , It was impossible to express a sentiment 
 either more sensible or more disagreeable to 
 the Emperor Alexander. He had tried to play 
 a political part in Europe, but had not yet suc- 
 ceeded according to his wish. He found him- 
 self hurried into a contest which would have 
 filled him with dismay, if the remoteness of his 
 empire had not cheered him. He had need to 
 drown his thoughts in the tumult of camps ; he 
 had need to silence the murmurs of his reason, 
 by hearing himself called at Berlin, at Dres- 
 den, at Weimar, at Vienna, the saviour of kings. 
 This monarch, moreover, asked himself whe- 
 ther he could not, in his turn, shine on fields 
 of battle ; whether, with his intelligence, he 
 might not have higher inspirations there than 
 those old generals, whose experience impru- 
 dent youth encouraged him too much to de- 
 spise; lastly, whether he could not have his 
 share in that glory of arms so dear to princes, 
 and at that time exclusively decreed by fortune 
 to a single individual and to a single nation. 
 
 In these ideas he was confirmed by the mili- 
 tary coterie which already surrounded him, and 
 at the head of which was Prince Dolgorouki. 
 This latter, in order to gain the better an as- 
 cendency over the emperor, was desirous to 
 draw him to the army. He strove to persuade 
 him that he had the qualities for command, and 
 that he had but to show himself in order to 
 change the fortune of the war ; that his pre- 
 sence would double the valour of the soldiers, 
 by filling them with enthusiasm ; that his gene- 
 rals were common-place men without abilities ; 
 'Jiat Napoleon had triumphed over their timi- 
 
 dity and their antiquated science, but that he 
 would not triumph so easily over a young no- 
 bility, intelligent and devoted, led by an adored 
 emperor. These warriors, such novices in the 
 profession of arms, dared to maintain that at 
 Dirnstein, at Hollabrunn, the Russians had con- 
 quered the French, that the Austrians were 
 cowards, that there were no brave men but the 
 Russians, and that if Alexander would but 
 come and animate them with his presence, 
 they should soon put a stop to the arrogant 
 and undeserved prosperity of Napoleon. 
 
 The wily Kutusof ventured timidly to say 
 that this was not absolutely the case ; but, too 
 servile to maintain courageously his own opi- 
 nion, he took care not to contradict the new 
 possessors of the imperial favour, and had the 
 meanness to permit his old experience to be 
 insulted. The intrepid Bagration, the vicious 
 but brave Miloradovich, the discreet Doctorow, 
 were officers whose opinion deserved some 
 attention. None of these men was heeded. 
 A German adviser of the Archduke John at 
 Hohenlinden, General Weirother, had alone a 
 real authority over the military youth who sur- 
 rounded Alexander. Since Frederick the Great, 
 in the last century, had beaten the Austrian 
 army by attacking it on one of its wings, the 
 theory of oblique order, which Frederick had 
 never thought of, had been invented, and to 
 this theory had been attributed all the successes 
 of that great man. Since General Bonaparte 
 had shown himself so superior in the high com- 
 binations of war, since he had been seen so 
 often surprising, enveloping the generals op- 
 posed to him, other commentators made the 
 whole art of war consist in a certain manoau- 
 vre, and talked about nothing but turning the 
 enemy. They had invented, so they asserted, 
 a naw science, and for this science a word 
 then new, that of strategy, and they hastened to 
 offer it to the princes who would submit to be 
 directed by them. The German Weirother had 
 persuaded the friends of Alexander that he had 
 a plan, one of the most excellent and most sure, 
 for destroying Napoleon. It consisted in a 
 grand manoeuvre, by which they were to turn 
 the Emperor of the French, cut him off from 
 the road to Vienna, and throw him into Bohe- 
 mia, beaten and separated for ever from the 
 forces which he had in Austria and in Italy. 
 
 The susceptible mind of Alexander was 
 wholly won by these ideas, wholly under the 
 influence of the Dolgoroukis, and showed no 
 inclination to listen to Prince Czartoryski 
 when the latter advised him to return to Pe- 
 tersburg, and to govern there, instead of com- 
 ing to fight battles in Moravia. 
 
 Amidst this mutual agitation of the young 
 
 court of Russia, the Emperor of Germany was 
 
 scarcely thought of. Neither his army nor his 
 
 person seemed to be held in any estimation. 
 
 His army, it was said, had compromised at 
 
 Ulm the issue of that war. As for himself, 
 
 they were coming to his aid ; he ought to deem 
 
 himself fortunate in being assisted, and not to 
 
 ! interfere in any thing. It is true that he did not 
 
 ! interfere in many things, and made no effort 
 
 to stem this torrent of presumption. He looked 
 
 \ for more lost battles, reckoned only upon time, 
 
 i if he then reckoned upon any thing, and weighed,
 
 Nov. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 83 
 
 without saying so, what the silly pride of his 
 allies was worth. This prince, simple and 
 unostentatious, possessed the two great quali- 
 ties of his government, shrewdness and con- 
 stancy. 
 
 It may easily be conceived in what manner 
 the grave question which was to be resolved, 
 that is, whether it was right to give battle to 
 Napoleon or not, would be treated by so many 
 vain minds. Those admirable pictures which 
 antiquity has bequeathed to us, and which re- 
 present the young Roman aristocracy doing 
 violence by its silly presumption to the wisdom 
 of Pompey, and obliging him to fight the battle 
 of Pharsalia those pictures have nothing 
 more grand, nothing more instructive, than 
 what was passing at Olmiitz in 1805, about 
 the Emperor Alexander. Everybody had an 
 opinion on the question, whether a battle was 
 to be sought or shunned, and everybody ex- 
 pressed it. The coterie, at the head of which 
 were the Dolgoroukis, had no hesitation. Ac- 
 cording to it, not to fight would be a cowardice, 
 and an egregious blunder. In the first place, 
 there was no living any longer at Olmiitz ; the 
 army was perishing there of want; it was be- 
 coming demoralized. By remaining at Olmiitz, 
 they relinquished to Napoleon not only the 
 honour of the arms, but also three-fourths of 
 the Austrian monarchy, and all the resources 
 in which it abounded. By advancing, on the 
 contrary, they should recover at one blow the 
 means of subsistence, confidence, and the as- 
 cendency, always so powerful, of the offensive. 
 And then, was it not plain that the moment for 
 changing parts had arrived; that Napoleon, 
 usually so prompt, so pressing when pursuing 
 his enemies, had suddenly stopped short, that 
 he hesitated, that he was intimidated, for, fixed 
 at Brunn, he durst not come to Olmiitz to meet 
 the Russian army 1 It was what he thought at 
 Dirnstein, at Hollabrunn ; it was because his 
 army was shaken like himself. It was known, 
 beyond the possibility of doubt, that it was 
 worn out with fatigue, reduced one half, a prey 
 to discontent and ever murmuring. 
 
 Such was the language held by the young 
 courtiers with incredible assurance. Some 
 wise men, Prince Czartoryski, in particu- 
 lar, quite as young, but far more conside- 
 rate than the Dolgoroukis, opposed to them 
 a small number of simple reasons that must 
 have been decisive with minds which the 
 strangest blindness had not completely be- 
 wildered. In taking no account of those sol- 
 diers who, after all, had remained masters of 
 the ground at Dirnstein as well as at Holla- 
 brunn, before whom the Russians had inces- 
 santly fallen back from Munich to Olmiitz; by 
 taking no account of that general who had 
 conquered all the generals in Europe, the most 
 experienced at least of all living captains, if 
 he was not the greatest, for he had command- 
 ed in a hundred battles, and his present adver- 
 saries had never commanded in one ; in tak- 
 ing no account either of these soldiers or of 
 this general, there were two peremptory rea- 
 sons for not being in haste. The first and the 
 most striking was that, by waiting a few days 
 longer, the month stipulated with Prussia 
 would have elapsed, and that she would be 
 
 obliged to declare herself. Who knows, iu 
 fact, if in previously losing a great battle one 
 may not furnish her with occasion to release 
 herself! By allowing, on the contrary, the 
 term of a month to expire, 150,000 Prussians 
 would enter Bohemia, Napoleon would be 
 obliged to fall back without our having to run 
 j the risk of a battle with him. The second 
 reason for delay is that, by giving a little time 
 ' to the archdukes, they would arrive with 
 80,000 Austrians from Hungary, and one 
 | might then fight Napoleon in the proportion 
 1 of two, perhaps three, to one. It was certainly 
 difficult to live without provisions at Olmiitz, 
 j but if it was true that they could not stay 
 there a few days longer, the only thing that 
 could be done was to march into Hungary to 
 meet the archdukes. There they should find 
 bread and a reinforcement of 80,000 men. By 
 adding thus to the distances which Napoleon 
 would have to traverse, they should oppose to 
 him the most formidable of all obstacles. 
 They had a proof of this truth in his inaction 
 ever since he occupied Briinn. If he did not 
 advance it was not because he was afraid to 
 do so. Inexperienced soldiers only could pre- 
 tend that such a man was afraid. If he did 
 not advance, it was because he found the dis- 
 tance already very great. He was, in fact, 
 forty leagues beyond, not his capital, but that 
 which he had conquered, and, in removing to 
 a distance from it, he felt it tremble under his 
 hand. 
 
 What reply could be made to such reasons? 
 Assuredly none. But with prejudiced minds 
 the quality of reasons is of no effect. Evi- 
 dence irritates instead of persuading them. 
 It was decided, therefore, about Alexander that 
 a battle must be fought. The Emperor Fran- 
 cis assented to it on his part He had every 
 thing to gain from a speedy decision of the 
 question, for his country was suffering cruelly 
 by the war, and he was not sorry to see the 
 Russians pitted against the French and afford- 
 ing occasion for an opinion to be formed of 
 them in their turn. It was decided to leave 
 the position of Olmiitz, which was very good, 
 on which it would have been easy to repulse 
 an assailing army, how superior soever in 
 number, for the purpose of going to attack 
 Napoleon in the position of Briinn, which he 
 had been carefully studying for several days. 
 The Russians marched in five columns by 
 road from Olmiitz to Briinn in order to approach 
 the French army. On arriving on the 18th of 
 November at Wischau, one march from 
 Briinn, they surprised an advanced-guard of 
 cavalry and a small detachment of infantry, 
 placed in that village by Marshal Soult. 
 Three thousand horse were employed to sur- 
 round them, and then, with a battalion of in- 
 fantry the Russians penetrated into Wischau 
 itself. About a hundred French prisoners 
 I were picked up there. The aide-de-camp 
 i Dolgorouki had the chief hand in this exploiu 
 I The Emperor Alexander had been persuaded 
 to be present, and was made to believe that 
 j this skirmish was war, and that his presence 
 j had doubled the valour of his soldiers. This 
 slight advantage completely turned all the 
 young heads of the Russian staff, and the r^
 
 84 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 solution to fight was thenceforward irrevoca- 
 ble. Fresh observations of Prince Czar- 
 toryski's were very unfavourably received. 
 General Kutusof, under whose name the battle 
 was to be fought, no longer commanded, and 
 had the culpable weakness to adopt resolu- 
 tions which he disapproved. It was agreed, 
 then, to attack Napoleon in his position at 
 Briinn, according to the plan which should be 
 formed by General Weirother. Another march 
 was made, and the Russians established them- 
 selves in advance of the mansion of Aus- 
 terlitz. 
 
 Napoleon, who possessed extraordinary sa- 
 gacity in guessing the designs of an enemy, 
 was well aware that the allies were seeking a 
 decisive engagement with him, and was highly 
 pleased at it. His attention was nevertheless 
 occupied with the projects of Prussia, which 
 recent accounts from Berlin represented as 
 definitively hostile, and with the movements 
 of the Prussian army, which was advancing 
 towards Bohemia. He had no time to lose : 
 he wanted either an overwhelming battle or 
 peace. He had no doubt of the result of a 
 battle ; still peace would be the safer of the 
 two. The Austrians proposed it with a certain 
 appearance of sincerity, but always referring, 
 on the subject of the conditions to the approval 
 of Russia. Napoleon would fain have dis- 
 covered what was passing in the head of 
 Alexander, and sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, 
 to the Russian head-quarters, to compliment 
 that prince, to get into conversation with him, 
 and to ascertain precisely what he desired. 
 
 General Savary set out immediately, pre- 
 sented himself with a flag of truce at the ad- 
 vanced posts, and had some difficulty to gain 
 access to the Emperor Alexander. While he 
 was waiting to be introduced, he had oppor- 
 tunities to judge of the dispositions of the 
 young Muscovite nobles, of their silly infa- 
 tuation, and of their desire to be present at a 
 great battle. They counted upon nothing less 
 than beating the French and driving their 
 vanquished army to the frontiers of France. 
 General Savary listened calmly to this lan- 
 guage, was at length admitted to the Emperor, 
 delivered his master's message, found him 
 mild and polite, but evasive, and far from 
 capable of appreciating the chances of the 
 present war. On the repeated assurance that 
 Napoleon was animated with very pacific dis- 
 positions, Alexander inquired on what condi- 
 tions peace would be possible. General Sa- 
 vary was not prepared to answer, and advised 
 the Emperor Alexander to send one of his 
 aides-de-camp to the French head-quarters to 
 confer with Napoleon. He affirmed that the 
 result of this step would be most satisfactory. 
 After much parleying, in which General Sa- 
 vary, in the warmth of zeal, said more than 
 he was commissioned to do, Alexander sent 
 with him Prince Dolgorouki himself, the prin- 
 cipal personage of the new coterie, which dis- 
 puted the favour of the czar with Messieurs 
 de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Novo- 
 siltzoff. This Prince Dolgorouki, though one 
 of the most vehement declaim ers of the Rus- 
 sian staff, was nevertheless extraordinarily 
 flattered to be charged with a commission to 
 
 the Emperor of the French. He accompani^] 
 General Savary, and was presented to Napo- 
 leon at a moment when the latter, having just 
 finished the inspection of his advanced posts, 
 had about him nothing to strike a vulgar 
 mind. Napoleon listened to this young man, 
 destitute of tact and discretion, who had pick- 
 ed up here and there some of the ideas with 
 which the Russian cabinet feasted itself, and 
 which we have recapitulated in explaining the 
 plan of the new European balance of power, 
 expressed them awkwardly, and lugged them 
 in unseasonably. France, he declared, must, 
 if she desired to have an immediate peace, 
 and if she continued the war and was not 
 successful, would be required to restore Bel- 
 gium. Savoy, and Piedmont, to form defensive 
 barriers around and against her. These ideas, 
 clumsily expressed, appeared to Napoleon a 
 formal demand of the immediate restitution of 
 Belgium, ceded to France by so many treaties, 
 and excited in him a violent irritation, which, 
 however, he repressed, conceiving that his 
 dignity did not permit him to give vent to it 
 before such a negotiator. He dismissed him 
 drily, observing that they should settle else- 
 where than in diplomatic conferences the 
 quarrel which divided the policy of the two 
 empires. Napoleon was exasperated, and 
 could think of nothing but fighting to the last 
 extremity. 
 
 Ever since the surprise at Wischau, he had 
 drawn back his army into a position wonder- 
 fully well chosen for fighting. He manifested 
 in his movements a certain hesitation which 
 contrasted with the accustomed boldness of 
 his proceedings. This circumstance, coupled 
 with the mission of Savary, contributed still 
 further to work upon the weak understandings 
 which swayed the Russian staff. There was 
 soon but one cry for war around Alexander. 
 Napoleon is falling back, said they; he is in 
 full retreat ; we must rush upon him and over- 
 whelm him. 
 
 The French soldiers, who were not deficient 
 in intelligence, perceived, on their part, clearly 
 enough that they should have to do with the 
 Russians, and their joy was extreme. Prepa- 
 rations were made on both sides for a decisive 
 engagement. - 
 
 Napoleon, with that milita'ry tact which he 
 had received from nature, and which he had 
 so greatly improved by experience, had adopt- 
 ed among other positions which he might 
 have taken about Briinn, one which could not 
 fail to insure to him the most important re- 
 sults, under the supposition that he should be 
 attacked a supposition which had become a 
 certainty. 
 
 The mountains of Moravia, which eonnect 
 the mountains of Bohemia with those of Hun- 
 gary, subside successively towards the Danube, 
 so completely that near that river Moravia 
 presents but one wide plain. In the environs 
 of Briinn, the capital of the province, they are 
 not of greater altitude than high hills, and are 
 covered with dark firs. Their waters, retained 
 for want of drains, form numerous ponds, and 
 throw themselves by various streams into me 
 Morawa, or March, and by the Morawa int 
 the Danube.
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 85 
 
 All these characters are found together in 
 the position between Brunn and Austerlitz, 
 which Napoleon has rendered for ever cele- 
 brated. The high road of Moravia, running 
 from Vienna to Briinn, rises in a direct line to 
 the northward, then, in passing from Brunn to 
 Olmiitz, descends abruptly to the right, that is 
 to the east, thus forming a right angle with 
 its first direction. In the angle is situated the 
 position in question. It commences on the 
 left towards the Olmiitz road, with heights 
 studded with firs; it then runs off to the 
 right in an oblique direction towards the 
 Vienna road, and after subsiding gradually, 
 terminates in ponds full of deep water in 
 winter. Along this position, and in front of 
 it, runs a rivulet, which has no name known 
 in geography, but which, in part of its course, 
 is called Goldbach by the people of the coun- 
 try. It runs through the little villages of 
 Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, 
 and Telnitz, and, sometimes forming marshes, 
 sometimes confined in channels, terminates in 
 the ponds above-mentioned, which are called 
 the ponds of Satschau and Menitz. 
 
 Concentrated with all his forces on this 
 ground, appuyed on the one hand upon the 
 wooded hills of Moravia, and particularly upon 
 a rounded knoll to which the soldiers of Egypt 
 gave the name of the Santon, appuyed, on the 
 other, upon the ponds of Satschau and Menitz 
 thus covering by his left the Olmiitz road, 
 by his right the Vienna road Napoleon was in 
 a condition to accept with advantage a decisive 
 battle. He meant not, however, to confine his 
 operations to self-defence, for he was accus- 
 tomed to reckon upon greater results ; he had 
 divined, as though he had read them, the plans 
 framed at great length by General Weirother. 
 The Auslro-Russians, having no chance of 
 wresting from him the point cCappui which he 
 found for his left in the high wooded hills, 
 would be tempted to turn his right, which was 
 not close to the ponds, and to take the Vienna 
 road from him. There was sufficient induce- 
 ment for this step; for Napoleon, if he lost 
 that road, would have no other resource but to 
 retire into Bohemia. The rest of his forces, 
 hazarded towards Vienna, would be obliged to 
 ascend separately the valley of the Danube. 
 The French army, thus divided, would find it- 
 self doomed to a retreat, eccentric, perilous, 
 nay, even disastrous, if it should fall in with 
 the Prussians by the way. 
 
 Napoleon was perfectly aware that such 
 must be the plan of the enemy. Accordingly, 
 after concentrating his army towards his left 
 and the heights, he left towards his right, that 
 is towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and the ponds, a 
 space almost unguarded. He thus invited the 
 
 Russians to persevere in their plans. But it 
 was not precisely there that he prepared the 
 mortal stroke for them. The ground facing 
 him presented a feature from which he hoped 
 to derive a decisive result. 
 
 Beyond the stream lhat ran in front of our 
 position, the ground spread at first, opposite to 
 our left, into a slightly undulated plain, through 
 which passed the Olmiitz road ; then, opposite 
 to our centre, it rose successively, and at last 
 formed facing our right a plateau, called the 
 plateau of Pratzen, after the name of a village 
 situated half-way up, in the hollow of a ravine. 
 This plateau terminated on the right in rapid 
 declivities towards the ponds, and at the back 
 in a gentle slope towards Austerlitz, the cha- 
 teau of which appeared at some distance. 
 
 There were to be seen considerable forces ; 
 there a multitude of fires blazed at night, and 
 a great movement of men and horses was ob- 
 servable by day. On these appearances, Na- 
 poleon had no longer any doubt of the designs 
 of the Austro-Russians. 1 They intended evi- 
 dently to descend from the position which they 
 occupied, and, crossing the Goldbach rivulet, 
 between the ponds and our right, to cut us off 
 from the Vienna road. But, for this reason, it 
 was resolved to take the offensive in our turn, 
 to cross the rivulet at the villages of Girziko- 
 witz and Puntowitz, to ascend to the plateau 
 of Pratzen while the Russians were leaving it, 
 and to take possession of it ourselves. In 
 case we succeeded, the enemy's army would 
 be cut in two; one part would be thrown to 
 the left into the plain crossed by the Olmiitz 
 road; the other to the right into the ponds. 
 Thenceforward the battle could not fail to be 
 disastrous for the Austro-Russians. But, for 
 this effect, it was requisite that they should 
 not blunder by halves. The prudent, nay even 
 timid attitude of Napoleon, exciting their silly 
 confidence, would induce them to commit the 
 entire blunder. 
 
 Agreeably to these ideas, Napoleon made his 
 dispositions. Expecting for two days past to 
 be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit 
 Iglau on the frontier of Bohemia, to leave 
 there the Bavarian division which he had 
 brought with him, and to hasten by forced 
 marches to Brunn. He had ordered Marshal 
 Davout to march Friant's and if possible Gu- 
 din's division towards the abbey of Gross Rai- 
 gern, situated on the road from Vienna to 
 Brunn, opposite to the ponds. In consequence 
 of these orders Bernadotte marched, and had 
 arrived on the 1st of December. General Fri- 
 ant, being alone apprized ;n time, because Ge- 
 neral Gudin was at a greater distance towards 
 Presburg, had set out immediately, and tra- 
 velled in forty-eight hours the thirty-six leagues 
 
 ' There has been recently published a work translated 
 from the Russian by M. Leon de Narischkine, which con- 
 tains a great number of inaccurate assertions, though 
 proceeding from an author in a situation to be correctly 
 informed. In this work it is alleged that, before the 
 battle of. Austerlitz, the plan of General Weirother was 
 . communicated to Napoleon. This assertion Is totally 
 erroneous. Such a communication would imply that the 
 plan, communicated long beforehand to the commanders 
 of the different corps, could have been liable to be di- 
 vulged. We shall see presently, from the report of an 
 
 eye-witness, that it was not till the night preceding the 
 battle that the plan was communicated to the command- 
 ers of corps. Besides, all the details of the orders and 
 correspondence proved that Napoleon foresaw and was 
 not apprized of the enemy's plan. Our resolution being 
 to avoid all controversy with contemporary writers, we 
 shall confine o. rselves to the correction of this er.or, 
 without noticing many others contained in the work in 
 question, the real merit, and to a certain point the impar- 
 tiality, of which we are ready to acknowledge. 
 
 H
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 >-~ 1805 
 
 which separate Vienna from Gross Raigern. 
 The soldiers sometimes dropped on the road, 
 exhausted with fatigue; but at the least sound, 
 imagining that they heard the cannon, they 
 rose with ardour to hasten to the assistance 
 of their comrades, engaged, they said, in a 
 bloody battle. On the night of the 1st of De- 
 cember, which was extremely cold, they bi- 
 vouacked at Gross Raigern, a league and a half 
 from the field of battle. Never did troops on 
 foot perform so astonishing a march ; for it is 
 a march of eighteen leagues a day for two suc- 
 cessive days. 
 
 On the 1st of December, Napoleon, rein- 
 forced by Bernadotte's corps and Friant's divi- 
 sion, could number 65 or 70 thousand men, 
 present under arms, against 90,000 men, Rus- 
 sians and Austrians, likewise present under 
 arms. 
 
 At his left he placed Lannes, in whose corps 
 Caffarelli's division supplied the place of Ga- 
 zan's. Lannes, with the two divisions of 
 Suchet and Caffarelli, was to occupy the Ol- 
 miitz road, and to fight in the undulated plain 
 outspread on either side of that road. Napo- 
 leon gave him, moreover, Murat's cavalry, 
 comprising the cuirassiers of Generals d'Haut- 
 poul and Nansouty, the dragoons of Generals 
 Walther and Beaumont, and the chasseurs of 
 Generals Milhaud and Kellermann. The level 
 surface of the ground led him to expect a pro- 
 digious engagement of cavalry on this spot. 
 On the knoll of the Santon, which commands 
 this part of the ground, and is topped by a 
 chapel called the chapel of Bosenitz, he placed 
 the 17th light, commanded by General Clapa- 
 rede, with eighteen pieces of cannon, and made 
 him take an oath to defend this position to the 
 death. This knoll was, in fact, the point 
 d'appui of the left. 
 
 At the centre, behind the Goldbach rivulet, 
 he ranged Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's divi- 
 sions, which belong to the corps of Marshal 
 Soult. He destined them to cross that stream 
 at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, 
 and to gain possession of the plateau of Prat- 
 zen, when the proper moment should arrive. 
 A little further behind the marsh of Kobelnitz 
 and the chateau of Kobelnitz, he placed Mar- 
 shal Soult's third division, that of General Le- 
 grand. He reinforced it with two battalions 
 of tirailleurs, known by the names of chas- 
 seurs of the Po and Corsican chasseurs, and 
 by a detachment of light cavalry, under Gene- 
 ral Margaron. This division was to have only 
 the 3d of the line and the Corsican chasseurs 
 at Telnitz, the nearest point to the ponds, and 
 to which Napoleon was desirous of drawing 
 the Russians. Far in rear, at the distance of 
 a league and a half, was posted Friant's divi- 
 sion at Gross Raigern. 
 
 Having ten divisions of infantry, Napoleon, 
 therefore presented but six of them in line. 
 Behind Marshals Lannes and Soult, he kept in 
 reserve Oudinot's grenadiers, separated on this 
 occasion from Lannes' corps, the corps of 
 Bernadotte, composed of Drouet's and Riv- 
 aud's divisions, and, lastly, the imperial guard. 
 He thus kept at hand a mass of 25,000 men, to 
 move to any point where they might be needed, 
 ai'd particularly to the heights of Pratzen, in 
 
 order to take those heights at any cost, if the 
 Russians should not have cleared them suffi 
 ciently. He bivouacked himself amidst this 
 reserve. 
 
 These dispositions completed, he carried his 
 confidence so far as to make them known tc 
 his army in a proclamation imbued with the 
 grandeur of the events that were preparing 
 It is subjoined, just as it was read to the troops 
 on the evening before the battle. 
 
 " SOLDIEHS, 
 
 "The Russian army appears before you 
 to avenge the Austrian army of Ulm. They 
 are the same battalions that you beat at Holla- 
 briinn, and that you have since been constantly 
 pursuing to this spot. 
 
 " The positions which we occupy are formi- 
 dable ; and while they are marching to turn 
 my right, they will present their flank to me. 
 
 " Soldiers, I shall myself direct your batta- 
 lions. I shall keep out of the fire, if, with your 
 usual bravery, you throw disorder and confu- 
 sion into the enemy's ranks. But, if the victory 
 should be for a moment uncertain, you will see 
 your Emperor the foremost to expose himself 
 to danger. For victory must not hang doubt- 
 ful on this day, most particularly, when the 
 honour of the French infantry, which so deeply 
 concerns the honour of the whole nation, is at 
 stake. 
 
 " Let not the ranks be thinned upon pretext 
 of carrying away the wounded, and let every 
 one be thoroughly impressed with this thought, 
 that it behoves us to conquer these hirelings 
 of England, who are animated with such bitter 
 hatred against our nation. 
 
 " This victory will put an end to the cam- 
 paign, and we shall then be able to return to 
 our winter-quarters, where we shall be joined 
 by the new armies which are forming in 
 France, and then the peace which I shall make 
 will be worthy of my people, of you, and of 
 myself. " NAPOLEON." 
 
 On this same day he received M. de Haug- 
 witz, who had at length reached the French 
 head-quarters, discerned in his wheedling con- 
 versation all the falseness of Prussia, and felt 
 more convinced than ever of the necessity of 
 gaining a signal victory. He received the 
 Prussian envoy most graciously, told him that 
 he was going to fight on the morrow, and that 
 he would see him again afterwards, if he was 
 not swept ofF by some cannon-ball, and that 
 then it would be time to arrange matters with 
 the cabinet of Berlin. He advised him to set out 
 that very night for Vienna, and he gave him a 
 letter to M. de Talleyrand, taking care to let 
 him be conducted through the field of battle 
 of Hollabriinn, which presented a horrible 
 sight. It is right, he wrote M. de Talleyrand, 
 that this Prussian should learn by his own 
 eyes in what manner we make war. 
 
 Having passed the evening at the bivouac 
 with his marshals, he resolved to visit the sol- 
 diers and to judge for himself of their moral 
 disposition. It was the evening of the 1st of 
 December, the eve of the anniversary of his 
 coronation. The coincidence of these dates 
 was singular, and Napoleon had not contrived 
 it, for he accepted battle, but did not offer it. 
 The night was cold and dark.
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 The first soldiers who perceived him, eager ' 
 to light him on his way, picked up the straw 
 of their bivouac and made it into torches 
 which they placed blazing on the top of their 
 muskets. In a few minutes this example was 
 followed by the whole army, and along the 
 vast front of our position was displayed this 
 singular illumination. The soldiers accom- 
 panied the steps of Napoleon with shouts of 
 " Vive VEmpereur '." promising to prove on the 
 morrow that they were worthy of him and of 
 themselves. Enthusiasm pervaded all the ; 
 ranks. They went as men ought to go into 
 danger, with hearts full of content and confi- 
 dence. 
 
 Napoleon retired to oblige his soldiers to 
 take some rest, and awaited in his tent the 
 dawn of that day which was to be one of the 
 most glorious of his life, one of the most glo- 
 rious in history. 
 
 Those lights, those shouts, had been early 
 distinguished from the heights occupied by the 
 Russian army, and in a small number of dis- 
 creet officers they had produced a sinister pre- 
 sentment. They asked one another if these 
 were signs of an army disheartened and in 
 retreat. 
 
 Meanwhile, ihe commanders of the Russian 
 corps, assembled at the quarters of General 
 Kutusof, in the village of Kreznowitz, were 
 receiving their instructions for the following 
 day. Old Kutusof was fast asleep, and Gene- 
 ral Weirother, having spread out a map of the 
 country before those who did listen to him, 
 read with emphasis a memorial containing the . 
 whole plan of the battle. 1 We have nearly i 
 explained it already in describing the disposi- i 
 lions of Napoleon. The right of the Russians, J 
 under Prince Bagration, faced our left, as it j 
 was destined to advance against Lannes, on ! 
 both sides of the Olmiitz road, to take the ; 
 Santon from us, and to march direct for Bruun. 
 The cavalry, collected into a single mass be- 
 tween the corps of Bagration and the centre 
 of the Russian army, was to occupy the same ( 
 plain in which Napoleon had placed Murat, \ 
 and to connect the left of the Russians with 
 
 1 We think it useful to quote here a fragment of the 
 manuscript memoirs of General Langeron, an eye-wit- 
 ness, since he commanded one of the corps of the Russian 
 army. Here follows the account of that officer. 
 
 " We havH seen that on the 19th of November (De- 
 eember the 1st) our columns did not reach their destina- 
 tion till about ten o'clock at night. 
 
 " About eleven, all the commanders of those columns, 
 excepting Prince Bagrntion, who was too far off, received 
 orders to repair to General Kutusof 's quarters at Krez- 
 nowitz, to have the dispositions for the battle of the fol- 
 lowing day read to them. 
 
 "At one in the morning, when we had all assembled, 
 General Weirother arrived, unfolded upon a large table 
 an immense and most accurate map of the environs of 
 Briinn and Austerlitz, and read the dispositions to us in 
 a loud tone, and with a self-sufficient air, which indicated 
 a thorough persuasion of his own merit and that of our 
 incapacity. He was like a college teacher reading a 
 lesson to young scholars. Perhaps we really were scho- 
 lars ; but he was far from being a clever schoolmaster. 
 Kutusof, seated and half asleep when we arrived, at 
 length fell into a sound nap before our departure. Buz- 
 hSvden, standing, listened but most assuredly compre- 
 hended not a word ; Miloradovich held his tongue ; I'ri- 
 hyicbewski kept in the background, and Doctorow alone 
 
 their centre. The main body of the army, 
 composed of four columns, commanded by 
 Generals Doctorow, Langeron, Pribyschewski, 
 and Kollowrath, established at the moment on 
 the heights of Pratzen, was to descend from 
 them, to cross the swampy stream which has 
 been previously mentioned, to take Telnitz, 
 Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, to turn the right of 
 the French, and to advance upon their rear, to 
 wrest the Vienna road from them. The ren- 
 de?vous of all the corps was fixed under the 
 walls of Brunn. The Archduke Constantine, 
 with the Russian guard, nine or ten thousand 
 strong, was to start from Austerlitz at day- 
 break, and to place himself in reserve behind 
 the centre of the combined army. 
 
 When General Weirother had finished his 
 lecture to the commanders of the Russian 
 corps, only one of whom, General Doctorow, 
 was attentive, and only one, General Langeron, 
 inclined to contradict, the latter ventured to 
 make some objections. General Langeron, a 
 French emigrant, who served against his coun- 
 try, who was a grumbler but a good officer, 
 asked General Weirother, if he imagined that 
 circumstances would turn out precisely as he 
 had written, and showed himself strongly dis- 
 posed to doubt it. General Weirother would 
 never admit any other idea than that current 
 in the Russian staff, namely that Napoleon 
 was retreating, and that the instructions for 
 this case were excellent. But General Kutu- 
 sof put an end to all discussion by sending the 
 commanders of the corps to their quarters, and 
 ordering a copy of the instructions to be for- 
 warded to each. That experienced chief knew 
 in what estimation plans of battles conceived 
 and arranged in that manner ought to be held, 
 and yet he suffered the thing to be done, though 
 it was in his name that the transaction took 
 place. 
 
 By four in the morning Napoleon had left 
 his tent, to judge with his own eyes if the 
 Russians were committing the blunder into 
 which he had been so dexterously leading 
 them. He descended to the village of Punto- 
 witz, situated on the bank of the brook which 
 
 examined the map attentively. When Weirother had 
 finished his lecture, I was the only one who spoke. 
 'General,' I said to him, 'this is all very well, but if the 
 enemy should anticipate us and attack us at Pratzen, 
 what are we to do then V 'The case is not foreseen,' he 
 replied. 'You know how daring Bonaparte is. If he 
 could have attacked us, he would have done so to-day.' 
 'Then you do not think him strong 7' I rejoined. 'It is 
 much if he has 40,000 men.' 'In this case, he is plung- 
 ing himself into ruin by awaiting our attack : hut I look 
 upon him to be too able to be imprudent, for if, as you 
 wish and believe, we cut him off from Vienna, he will 
 have no other retreat but the mountains of Bohemia. I 
 conjecture, however, that he has a different design. He 
 has put out his fires, and not a sound is heard in his 
 camp.' 'That is because he is retiring or changing posi- 
 tion ; and, even supposing he takes that of Turas, he will 
 spare us a great deal of trouble, and the disposilions will 
 remain the same.' 
 
 "Kutusof, having then wakened up, dismissed us, or- 
 dering us to leave an adjutant to copy the dispositions 
 which Lieutenant-Colonel Toll, of the staff, was going to 
 translate out of German into Russian. It was three in 
 the morning, and we did not receive copies of these fc- 
 
 I moug dispositions till near eight, when we were already 
 
 I on march."
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 separated the two armies, and perceived the 
 fires of the Russians nearly extinguished on 
 the heights of Pratzen. A very distinguish- 
 able sound of cannon and horses indicated a 
 march from left to right towards the ponds, 
 the very way that he wished the Russians to 
 take. Great was his joy on finding his fore- 
 sight so fully justified ; he returned and placed 
 himself on the high ground where he had 
 bivouacked, and where the eye embraced the 
 whole extent of that field of battle. His mar- 
 shals were on horseback at his side. Day 
 began to dawn. A wintry fog covered the 
 country to a distance, the most prominent 
 points only being visible and rising above the 
 mist like islands out of the sea. The differ- 
 ent corps of the French army were in motion, 
 and were descending from the position which 
 they had occupied during the night to cross 
 the rivulet which separated them from the 
 Russians. But they halted in the bottom, 
 where they were concealed by the fog and 
 kept by the Emperor till the opportune mo- 
 ment for the attack. 
 
 A very brisk fire was already heard at the 
 extremity of the line towards the ponds. The 
 movement of the Russians against our left 
 was evident. Marshal Davont had gone in all 
 haste to direct Friant's division from Gross 
 Raigern upon Telnitz, and to support the 3d 
 of the line and the Corsican chasseurs, who 
 would soon have upon their hands a consider- 
 able portion of the enemy's army. Marshals 
 Lannes, Murat, and Soult, with their aides-de- 
 camp surrounded the Emperor, awaiting his 
 'order to commence the combat at the centre 
 and on the left. Napoleon moderated their 
 ardour, wishing to let the Russians consum- 
 mate the fault which they were committing on 
 our right, so completely that they should not 
 have it in their power to get back out of those 
 bottoms which they were seen entering. The 
 sun at length burst forth, and dispelling the 
 fog, poured a flood of radiance upon the vast 
 field of battle. It was the sun of Austerlitz, 
 a sun the recollections of which have been so 
 frequently submitted to the present generation, 
 that assuredly they will not be forgotten by 
 future generations. The heights of Pratzen 
 were cleared of troops. The Russians, in 
 execution of the plan agreed upon, had de- 
 scended to the bed of the Goldbach, to gain 
 possession of thu villages of Telnitz and So- 
 kolnitz, situated along that rivulet. Napoleon 
 then gave the signal for the attack, and his 
 marshals gallopped off" to put themselves at 
 the head of their respective corps d'armee. 
 
 The three Russian columns directed to at- 
 tack Telnitz and Sokolnitz, had broken up at 
 seven o'clock in the morning. They were 
 under the immediate command of Generals 
 Poctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski, and 
 under the superior command of General Bux- 
 hovden.an officer of inferior abilities, inactive, 
 puffed up by the favour which he owed to a 
 court marriage, and who no more commanded 
 the left of the Russian army than General 
 Kutusof commanded the whole. He marched 
 himself along with General Doctorow's co- 
 lumn, forming the extremity of the Russian 
 line, and which would have to engage first. 
 
 He paid no attention to the other columns, or 
 to the harmony which ought to have been in- 
 troduced into their different movements; which 
 was very lucky for us; for, if they had acted 
 together, and attacked Telnitz and Sokolnitz 
 en masse, as Friant's division had not yet ar- 
 rived at that point, they might have gained 
 much more ground upon our right than it 
 would have suited us to give up to them. 
 
 Doctorow's column had bivouacked, like 
 the others, on the height of Pratzen. At the 
 foot of this height, in the bottom which sepa- 
 rated it from our right, there was a village 
 called Augezd, and in that village an advanced 
 guard under the command of General Kien- 
 mayer, composed of five Austrian battalions, 
 and fourteen squadrons. This advanced 
 guard was to sweep the plain between Au- 
 gezd and Telnitz, while Doctorow's column 
 was descending from the heights. The Aus- 
 trians, eager to show the Russians that they 
 could fight as well as they, attacked "the village 
 of Telnitz with great resolution. It was ne- 
 cessary to cross at once the rivulet running 
 here in channels, and then a height covered 
 with vines and houses. We had in this 
 place, besides the 3d of the line, the battalion 
 of the Corsican chasseurs, concealed from 
 view by the nature of the ground. These 
 skilful marksmen, coolly taking aim at the 
 hussars who had been sent forward, picked 
 off a great number of them. They received 
 in the same manner the Szekler regiment 
 (infantry), and in half an hour strewed the 
 ground with part of that regiment. The Aus- 
 trians, tired of a destructive combat, and one 
 that was productive of no result, attacked en 
 masse the village of Telnitz, with their five 
 united battalions, but were not able to pene- 
 trate into it, thanks to the firmness of the 3d 
 of the line, which received them with the 
 vigour of a tried band. While Kienmayer's 
 advanced guard was thus exhausting itself in 
 impotent efforts, Doctorow's column, twenty- 
 four battalions strong, led by General Bux- 
 hovden, made its appearance, an hour later 
 than was xpected, and proceeded to assist 
 the Austrians to take Telnitz, which the 3d 
 of the line was no longer sufficient to defend. 
 The bed of the stream was crossed, aud Gene- 
 ral Kienmayer threw his fourteen squadrons 
 into the plain beyond Telnitz, against the 
 light cavalry of General Margaron. The 
 latter bravely stood several charges, but could 
 not maintain its ground against such a mass 
 of cavalry. Friant's division, conducted by 
 Marshal Davont, having not yet arrived from 
 Gross Raigern, our right was greatly over- 
 matched. But General Buxhovdeu, after 
 being long waited for, was obliged in his 
 turn to wait for the second column, com- 
 manded by General Langeron. This latter 
 had been delayed by a singular accident 
 The mass of the cavalry, destined to occupy 
 the plain which was on the right of the Rus- 
 sians and on the left of the French, had mis- 
 conceived the order prescribing that it should 
 take that position : it had therefore gone and 
 taken post at Pratzen, amidst the bivouacs of 
 Langeron's column. Having discovered its 
 error, this cavalry, in repairing to its proper
 
 D C. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 89 
 
 place, had cut and long retarded Langeron's ! 
 and Pribyschewski's columns. General Lan- 
 geron, having at length arrived before Sokol- 
 nitz, commenced an attack on it. But mean- . 
 while General Friant had come up in the ut- 
 most haste, with his division, composed of five 
 regiments of infantry and six regiments of 
 dragoons. The 1st regiment of dragoons, at- 
 tached for this occasion toBourcier's division, 
 was despatched at full trot upon Telnitz. The 
 Austro-Russians, already victorious at this 
 point, began to cross the Goldbach, and to 
 press the 3d of the light as well as Margaron's 
 light cavalry. The dragoons of the first regi- 
 ment, on approaching the enemy, broke into a 
 gallop, and drove back into Telnitz all who 
 had attempted to debouch from it. Generals 
 Friant and Heudelet, arriving with the 1st 
 brigade, composed of the 108th of the line 
 and the voltigeurs of the 15th light, entered , 
 Telnitz with bayonets fixed, expelled the Aus- ', 
 trians and Russians, and drove them pell-mell 
 beyond the channels which form the bed of 
 the Goldbach, and remained masters of the 
 ground, after they had strewed it with dead 
 and wounded. Unluckily, the fog, dispersed 
 nearly everywhere, prevailed in the bottoms. 
 It enveloped Telnitz as in a sort of cloud. The 
 26th light, of Legrand's division, which had i 
 come to the assistance of the 3d of the line, | 
 perceiving indistinctly masses of troops on the 
 other side of the stream, without being able to ' 
 discern the colour of their uniform, fired upon ; 
 the 108th, under the impression that it was the 
 enemy. This unexpected attack staggered the 
 108th, which fell back, for fear of being turned. 
 Taking advantage of this circumstance, the 
 Russians and Austrian?, having twenty-nine \ 
 battalions at this point, resumed the offensive, 
 and dislodged Heudelet's brigade from Telnitz, ; 
 while General Langeron, attacking with twelve 
 Russian battalions the village of Sokolnitz, 
 situated on the Goldbach, a little above Tel- j 
 nitz, had penetrated into it. The two hostile 
 columns of Doctorow and Langeron then be- 
 gan to debouch, the one from Telnitz, the other , 
 from Sokolnitz. At the same time General | 
 Pribyschew^ki's column had attacked and j 
 taken the chateau of Sokolnitz, situated above 
 the village of that name. At this sight General 
 Friant, who on that day, as on so many others, 
 behaved like a hero, flung General Bourcier, 
 with his six regiments of dragoons, upon Doc- 
 torow's column, at the moment when the latter 
 was deploying beyond Telnilz. The Russians 
 presented their bayonets to our dragoons ; but 
 the charges of our horse, repeated with the 
 utmost fury, prevented them from extending 
 themselves, and supported Heudelet's brigade, 
 which was opposed to them. General Friant 
 afterwards put himself at the head of Lochet's 
 brigade, composed of the 18th and the lllth 1 
 of the line, and rushed upon Langeron's co- 
 lumn, which was already beyond the village 
 of Sokolnitz, drove it back to that place, en- 
 tered it at its heels, expelled it again, and 
 
 1 Prince Czartoryski, placed between the two empe- At this sight that prince lost all the confidence which he 
 rnrs, remarked to the Emperor Alexander the nimble and had till then felt, and conceived a sinister presentiment 
 decided step with which the French were ascending to : which never left him during the engagement, 
 the plate i;, without returning the fire of the Russians. 1 2 The same who died lately. 
 VOL. II. 12 H 2 
 
 hurled it to the other side of the Goldbach. 
 Having occupied Sokolnitz, General Friant 
 committed it to the guard of the 48th, and 
 marched with his 3d brigade, that of Kister, 
 composed of the 33d of the line and the 15th 
 light, to recover the chdteau of Sokolnitz from 
 Pribyschewski's column. He forced it to fall 
 back. But while he was engaged with Priby- 
 schewski's troops, in front of the chateau of 
 Sokolnitz, Langeron's column, attacking anew 
 the village dependent on this chateau, had 
 wellnigh overwhelmed the 48th, which, retir- 
 ing into the houses of the village, defended 
 itself with admirable gallantry. General Friant 
 returned, and extricated the 48th. That brave 
 general and his illustrious chief, Marshal Da- 
 vout, hastened incessantly from one point to 
 another, on this line of the Goldbach, so warmly 
 disputed, and with seven or eight thousand 
 foot and 2800 horse, engaged 35,000 Russians. 
 Indeed, Friant's division was reduced, by a 
 march of thirty-six hours which it had per- 
 formed, to 6000 men at most, and with the 3d 
 of the line formed no more than seven or eight 
 thousand combatants. But the men who had 
 lagged behind, arriving every moment at the 
 report of the cannon, successively filled up 
 the gaps made by the enemy's fire in its ranks. 
 
 During this obstinate combat towards our 
 right, Marshal Soult, at the centre, had attacked 
 the position on which depended the issue of 
 the battle. At a signal given by Napoleon, 
 the two divisions of Vandamme and St. Hi- 
 laire, formed into close column, ascended at a 
 rapid pace the acclivities .of the plateau of 
 Pratzen. Vandamme's division had proceeded 
 to the left, St. Hilaire's to the right of the vil- 
 lage of Pratzen, which is deeply imbedded in 
 a ravine that terminates at the Goldbach 
 rivulet, near Puntowitz. While the French 
 were pushing forward, the centre of the ene- 
 my's army, composed of Kollowrath's Austrian 
 infantry and the Russian infantry of Milora- 
 dovich, twenty-seven battalions strong, under 
 the immediate command of General Kutusof 
 and the two emperors, had come and deployed 
 on the plateau of Pratzen, to take the place 
 of Buxhovden's three columns, which had de- 
 scended into the bottoms. Our soldiers, with- 
 out returning the fire of musketry which they 
 sustained, continued to climb the height, sur- 
 prising by their nimble and resolute step the 
 enemy's generals who expected to find them 
 retreating. 1 
 
 On reaching the village of Pratzen they 
 passed on without halting there. General 
 Morand, putting himself at the head of the 10th 
 light, went and drew up on the plateau. Ge- 
 neral Thiebault 2 followed him with his brigade, 
 composed of the 14th and 36th of the line, 
 and, while he was advancing, suddenly re- 
 ceived in rear a volley of musketry, which 
 proceeded from two Russian battalions con- 
 cealed in the ravine, at the bottom of which 
 the village of Pratzen is situated. Genera) 
 Thiebault halted for a moment, returned at
 
 90 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805 
 
 point-blank range the volley which he had re- 
 ceived, and entered the village with one of his 
 battalions. He dispersed and took the Rus- 
 sians who occupied it, and then returned to 
 support General Morand, deployed on the pla- 
 teau. Vare's brigade, the second of St. Hi- 
 laire's division, passing on its part to the left 
 of the village, drew up facing the enemy, while 
 Vandamme, with his whole division, took a 
 position still further to the left, near a small 
 knoll, called Stari Winobradi, which com- 
 mands the plateau of Pratzen. Upon this 
 knoll the Russians had posted five battalions 
 and a numerous artillery. 
 
 The Austrian infantry of Kollowrath and 
 the Russian infantry of Miloradovich were 
 drawn up in two lines. Marshal Soult, with- 
 out loss of time, brought forward St. Hilaire's 
 and Vandamme's divisions. General Thie- 
 bault, forming with his brigade the right of St. 
 Hilaire's division, had a battery of twelve 
 pieces. He ordered them to be charged with 
 balls and grape, and opened a destructive fire 
 upon the infantry opposed to him. This fire, 
 kept up briskly and directed with precision, 
 soon threw the Austrian ranks into disorder, 
 and they hurried in confusion to the back of 
 the plateau. Vandamme immediately attacked 
 the enemy drawn up opposite to him. His 
 brave infantry coolly advanced, halted, fired 
 several murderous volleys, and marched upon 
 the Russians with the bayonet. It flung back 
 their first line upon their second, put both to 
 flight, and obliged them to retreat to the back 
 of the plateau of Pratzen, leaving their artillery 
 behind them. In this movement, Vandamme 
 had left the knoll of Stari Winobradi, defended 
 by several Russian battalions and bristling 
 with artillery, on his left. He went back to it, 
 and, directing General Schiner to turn it with 
 the 24th light, he ascended it himself with the 
 4th of the line. In spite of a downward fire, 
 he climbed the knoll, overturned the Russians 
 who guarded it, and took their cannon. 
 
 Thus in less than an hour the two divisions 
 of Marshal Soult's corps had made themselves 
 masters of the plateau of Pratzen, and were 
 pursuing the Russians and Austrian?, hurled 
 pell-mell down the declivities of that plateau, 
 which inclines towards the chateau of Auster- 
 litz. 
 
 The two Emperors of Austria and Russia, 
 witnesses of this rapid action, strove in vain 
 to rally their soldiers. They were scarcely 
 listened to amidst that confusion, and Alex- 
 ander could already perceive that the presence 
 of a sovereign is not, in such circumstances, 
 worth that of a good general. Miloradovich, 
 always conspicuous in the fire, traversed on 
 horseback that field of battle, ploughed with 
 balls, and strove to bring back the fugitives. 
 General Kutusof, wounded on the cheek by a 
 rnusket-ball, beheld the realization of the dis- 
 aster which he had foreseen, and which he 
 had not the firmness to prevent. He had 
 hastened to send for the Russian imperial 
 guard, which had bivouacked in advance of 
 Austerlitz, in order to rally his routed centre 
 behind it. If this commander of the Austro- 
 Russian army, whose merit was limited to 
 great astuteness disguised by great indolence, 
 
 lad been capable of just and prompt resolu- 
 tions, he would have hurried at this moment 
 :o his left, engaged with our right, drawn 
 Buxhovden's three columns from the bottoms 
 into which they had been plunged, brought 
 them back to the plateau of Pratzen, and with 
 a collected force of 50,000 men have made a 
 decisive effort to recover a position, without 
 which the Russian army must be cut in two 
 [f even he had not succeeded, he might aJ 
 least have retired in order upon Austerlitz by 
 a safe road, and not have left his left backed 
 upon an abyss. But, content to parry the evil 
 of which he was an eye-witness, he did nothing 
 more than rally his centre upon the Russian 
 imperial guard, nine or ten thousand strong, 
 while Napoleon, on the contrary, with his 
 eyes riveted on the plateau of Pratzen, was 
 bringing forward to the support of Marshal 
 Soult, already victorious, the corps of Berna- 
 dotte, the guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, that 
 is to say 25,000 choice troops. 
 
 While our right was thus disputing the line 
 of the Goldbach with the Russians, and our 
 centre was wresting from them the plateau of 
 Pratzen, Lannes and Murat, on our left, were 
 engaged with Prince Bagration and all the 
 cavalry of the Austro-Russians. 
 
 Lannes, with Suchet's and Caffarelli's divi- 
 sions, deployed on both sides of the Olmiitz 
 road, was to march straight forward. On the 
 left of the road, the same near which rose the 
 Santon, the ground, on approaching the wooded 
 heights of Moravia, was very uneven, some- 
 times hilly, sometimes intersected by deep 
 ravines. There Suchet's division was placed. 
 On the right, more level ground was connected 
 by very gentle rises with the plateau of Prat- 
 zen. Caffarelli marched on that side, pro- 
 tected by Murat's cavalry, against the mass 
 of the Austro-Russian cavalry. 
 
 At this point, a sort of Egyptian battle was 
 anticipated, for here were seen eighty-two 
 Russian and Austrian squadrons, drawn up in 
 two lines, commanded by Prince John of 
 Lichtenstein. For this reason, Suchet's and 
 Caffarelli's divisions presented several bat- 
 talions deployed, and behind the intervals of 
 these battalions, other battalions in close co- 
 lumn, to appuy and flank the former. The 
 artillery was spread over the front of the two 
 divisions. General Kellermann's light cavalry, 
 as also the divisions of dragoons, were on the 
 right in the plain, Nansouty's and d'Haut- 
 poul's heavy cavalry in reserve in rear. 
 
 In this imposing order, Lasmes moved off as 
 soon as he heard the cannon at Pratzen, and 
 traversed at a foot pace, as though it had been 
 a parade ground, that plain illumined by a 
 bright winter's sun. 
 
 Prince John of Lichtenstein had not arrived 
 upon the ground till late, owing to a mistake 
 which had caused the Austro-Russian cavalry 
 to run from the right to the left of the field of 
 battle. In his absence, Alexander's imperial 
 guard had filled the gap left between the cen- 
 tre and the right of the combined army. When 
 he at length arrived, perceiving the movement 
 of Lannes' corps, he directed the Grand-duke 
 Constantine's Hulans against Caffarelli's divi- 
 sion. Those bold horse rushed upon that di-
 
 Dec. 1SU5.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 91 
 
 vision, before which Kellermann was placed 
 with his brigade of light cavalry. General 
 Kellermann, one of our ablest cavalry officers, 
 judging that he should be flung back upon the 
 French infantry, and perhaps throw it into 
 confusion, if he awaited, without moving, that 
 formidable charge, drew back his squadrons, 
 and making them pass through the intervals 
 of Caffarelli's battalions, drew them up again 
 on the left, in order to seize a favourable op- 
 portunity for charging. The Hulans, coming 
 up at a gallop, no longer found our light ca- 
 valry, but encountered in its stead a line of 
 infantry, which was not to be broken, and 
 which, even without forming into square, re- 
 ceived it with a murderous fire of musketry. 
 Four hundred of these assailants were soon 
 stretched on the ground in front of the division. 
 The Russian General Essen was mortally 
 wounded fighting at their head. The others 
 dispersed in disorder to the right and left. 
 Kellermann, who had reformed his squadrons 
 on the left of CafTarelli, seizing the opportune 
 moment, charged the Hulans, and cut in pieces 
 a considerable number of them. Prince John 
 of Lichtenstein sent a fresh portion of his 
 squadrons to the assistance of the Hulans. 
 Our division of dragoons dashed off in their 
 turn upon the enemy's cavalry, and for a while 
 nothing was to be seen but an awful fray, in 
 which all the combatants were fighting hand 
 to hand. This cloud of horsemen at length 
 dispersed, and each rejoined his line of battle, 
 'caving the ground covered with dead and 
 wounded, mostly Russians and Austrians. 
 Our two masses of infantry then advanced 
 with firm and measured step upon the ground 
 abandoned by the cavalry. The Russians op- 
 posed to them forty pieces of cannon, which 
 poured forth a shower of projectiles. One 
 discharge swept away the whole group of 
 drummers of Caffarelli's first regiment. This 
 fierce cannonade was returned by the fire of all 
 our artillery. In this combat with great guns, 
 General Valhabert had a thigh fractured by a 
 ball. Some soldiers would have carried him 
 away; "Remain at your post," said he, "I shall 
 know how to die all alone; six men must not 
 be taken away for the sake of one." The French 
 then marched for the village of Blaziowitz, 
 situated on the right of the plain, where the 
 ground begins to rise towards Platzen. Of 
 this village, seated like all those of the coun- 
 try, in a deep ravine, nothing was to be seen 
 but the flames that were consuming it. A de- 
 tachment of the Russian imperial guard had 
 occupied it in the morning, till Prince Lichten- 
 stein's cavalry should arrive. Lannes ordered 
 the 13th light to take it. Colonel Castex, who 
 commanded the 13th, advanced with the first 
 ba"' n in column of attack, and as soon as 
 he arrived before the village, he was struck by 
 a ball in the forehead. The battalion rushed 
 forward, and revenged with the bayonet the 
 death of its colonel. Blaziowitz was carried, 
 and some hundreds of prisoners, picked up 
 there, were sent to the rear. 
 
 'At the other wing of Lannes' corps, the 
 Russians, led by Prince Bagration, strove to 
 take the little eminence, called by our soldiers 
 ihe Santon. They had descended into a valley 
 
 which skirts the foot of this eminence, taken 
 the village of Bosenitz, and exchanged balls 
 to no purpose with the numerous artillery 
 planted on the height. But the Russians did 
 not care to encounter the musketry of the 17th 
 of the line, too advantageously posted for them 
 to dare to approach too near. 
 
 Prince Bagration had drawn up the rest of 
 his infantry on the Olmutz road, facing Suchet's 
 division. Being obliged to fall back, he retired 
 slowly before the corps of Lannes, which 
 marched without precipitation, but with im- 
 posing compactness, and kept constantly gain- 
 ing ground. Blaziowitz being carried, Lannes 
 caused the villages of Holubitz and Kruch, 
 situated on the Olmutz road, to be taken also, 
 and at length came upon Bagration's infantry. 
 At this moment he broke the line formed by 
 his two divisions. He directed Suchet's divi- 
 sion obliquely to the left, Caffarelli's division 
 obliquely to the right. By this diverging move- 
 ment, he separated Bagration's infantry from 
 Prince Lichtenstein's cavalry, and threw back 
 the first to the left of the Olmutz road, the se- 
 cond to the right, towards the slopes of the 
 plateau of Pratzen. 
 
 That cavalry then determined to make a last 
 effort, and rushed in a mass upon Caffarelli's 
 I division, which received it with its usual firm- 
 | ness, and brought it to a stand by the fire of 
 I its musketry. Numerous squadrons of Lich- 
 tenstein's, at first dispersed, then, rallied by 
 their officers, were led back against our batta- 
 lions. By order of Lannes, the cuirassiers of 
 Generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty, who fol- 
 lowed Caffarelli's infantry, filed away at full 
 trot behind the ranks of that infantry, formed 
 upon its right, deployed there, and dashed off 
 at a gallop. The earth quaked under those 
 four thousand horsemen cased in iron. They 
 rushed sword in hand upon the mass of the 
 new-formed Austro-Russian squadrons, over- 
 threw them by the shock, dispersed, and obliged 
 them to flee towards Austerlilz, whither they 
 retired, to appear no more during the engage- 
 ment. 
 
 Meanwhile, Suchel's division -had attacked 
 Prince Bagration's infantry. After pouring 
 upon the Russians those quiet and sure vol- 
 leys, which our troops, not less intelligent than 
 inured to war, executed with extreme precision, 
 Suchet's division had advanced upon them 
 with the bayonet. The Russians, giving way 
 to the impetuosity of our battalions, had re 
 tired, but unbroken and without surrendering. 
 They formed a confused mass bristling with 
 muskets, which the French could only drive 
 before them, without being able to take them 
 prisoners. Lannes, having got rid of Prince 
 Lichtenstein's eighty-two squadrons, had has- 
 tened to bring back General d'Hautpoul's heavy 
 cavalry from the right to the left of that plain, 
 and directed it upon the Russians in order to 
 decide their retreat. The cuirassiers, charg- 
 ing on all sides those obstinate foot-soldiers 
 who were retiring in large bodies, had obliged 
 some thousands of them to lay down their 
 arms. 
 
 Thus, on our left, Lannes had fought a real 
 battle by himself. He had taken 4000 prison 
 ers. The ground around him was strewed
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 with 4000 Russians and Austrians dead or 
 Bounded. 
 
 But, on the plateau of Pratzen, the conflict 
 was renewed between the enemy and the corps 
 of Marshal Soult, reinforced by all the re- 
 serves, which Napoleon brought up in person. 
 General Kutusof, without having any idea, as 
 we have observed, of calling to him the three 
 columns of Doctorow, Langeron, and Priby- 
 schewski, posted in the bottoms, thought only 
 of rallying his centre upon the imperial Rus- 
 sian guard. The single brigade of Kamenski, 
 belonging to Langeron's corps, hearing a very 
 brisk fire on its rear, had halted, and then 
 spontaneously fallen back, in order to return 
 to the plateau of Platzen. General Langeron, 
 apprized of the circumstance, had come up to 
 put himself at the head of this brigade, leaving 
 the rest of his column at Sokolnitz. 
 
 The French, in this renewed combat at the 
 centre, were about to find themselves engaged 
 with Kamenski's brigade, with the infantry of 
 Kollowrath and Miloradovich, and with the 
 imperial Russian guard. Thiebault's brigade, 
 occupying the extreme right of Marshal Soult's 
 corps, and separated from Vare's brigade by 
 the village of Pratzen, found itself amidst a 
 square of fires, for it had in front the reformed 
 line of the Austrians, and on its right part of 
 Langeron's troops. This brigade, consisting 
 of the 10th light, and of the 14th and 36th of 
 the line, was soon exposed to the most serious 
 danger. As it was deploying and forming it- 
 self into a square to face the enemy, Adjutant 
 Labadie, fearing that his battalion, under a fire 
 of musketry and grape, discharged at the dis- 
 tance of thirty paces, might be staggered in its 
 movement, seized the colours, and, planting 
 himself upon the ground, cried, "Soldiers, 
 here is your line of battle!" The battalion 
 deployed with perfect steadiness. The others 
 imitated it, the brigade took position, and for 
 some moments exchanged a destructive fire of 
 musketry at half-range. These three regi- 
 ments, however, would soon have sunk under 
 a mass of cross-fires, had the conflict been j 
 prolonged. General St. Hilaire, admired by j 
 the army for his chivalrous valour, was con- 
 versing with Generals Thiebault and Morand 
 on the course proper to be pursued, when Co- 
 lonel Pouzel of the 10th said, " General, let us 
 advance with the bayonet, or we are undone." 
 "Yes, forward!" replied General St. Hilaire. 
 The bayonets were immediately crossed, and 
 the men, falling on Kramenski's Russians on 
 the right and on Kollowrath's Austrians in 
 front, precipitated the first into the bottoms of 
 Sokolnitz and Telnitz, and the second down 
 he back of the plateau of Pratzen, towards the 
 Austerlitz road. 
 
 While Thiebaull's brigade, left for some 
 ime unsupported, extricated itself with such 
 valour and success, Vare's brigade and Van- 
 damme's division, placed on the other side of 
 the village of Pratzen, had not near so much 
 trouble to repulse the offensive return of the 
 Austro-Russians, and had soon flung them to 
 the foot of the plateau, which they strove in vain 
 to ascend. In the ardour that hurried away our 
 troops, the first battalion of the 4th of the line, 
 belonging to Vandamme's division, had yield- 
 
 ed to the temptation to pursue the L issians 
 over the sloping ground covered with vines. 
 The Grand-duke Constantine had immediately 
 sent a detachment of the cavalry of the guard, 
 which, surprising that battalion among the 
 vines, had overthrown it before it could form 
 into square. In this confusion the colour- 
 bearer of the regiment had been killed. A 
 subaltern, endeavouring to save the eagle, had 
 also been killed. A soldier had then snatched 
 it out of the hands of the officer, and, being 
 himself put hors de combat, had not been able to 
 prevent Constantine's horse from carrying off" 
 the trophy. 
 
 Napoleon, who had come to reinforce the 
 centre with the infantry of his guard, the 
 whole corps of Bernadotte, and Oudinot's gre- 
 nadiers, witnessed the rash proceeding of this 
 battalion from the height on which he was 
 posted. " They are in disorder yonder," said 
 he to Rapp ; " that must be set to rights." At 
 the head of the Mamelukes and the horse 
 chasseurs of the guard, Rapp instantly flew to 
 the succour of the compromised battalion. 
 Marshal Bessieres followed Rapp with the 
 horse grenadiers. Drouet's division of Berna- 
 dotte's corps, formed of the 94th and 95th regi- 
 ments and of the '27th light, advanced in se- 
 cond line, headed by Colonel Gerard, Berna- 
 dotte's aid-de-carnp, and an officer of great 
 energy, to oppose the infantry of the Russian 
 guard. 
 
 Rapp, on making his appearance, drew upon 
 him the enemy's cavalry, who were slaughter- 
 ing our foot soldiers extended on the ground. 
 This cavalry turned against him with four un- 
 horsed pieces of cannon. In spite of a dis- 
 charge of grape, Rapp rushed forward, and 
 broke through the imperial cavalry. He 
 pushed on, and passed beyond the ground 
 covered by the wrecks of the battalion of the 
 4th. The soldiers of that battalion imme- 
 diately rallied, and formed anew to revenge 
 the check which they had received. Rapp, on 
 reaching the lines of the Russian guard, was 
 assailed with a second charge of cavalry. 
 These were Alexander's horse-guards, who, 
 Headed by their colonel, Prince Repnin, fell 
 upon him. The brave Morland, colonel of the 
 chasseurs of the French imperial guard, was 
 killed; the chasseurs were driven back. But 
 at this moment the horse-grenadiers, led by 
 Marshal Bessieres, came up at a gallop to the 
 assistance of Rapp. This splendid body of 
 men, mounted on powerful horses, was eager 
 to measure its strength with the horse-guards 
 of Alexander. A conflict of several minutes 
 ensued between them. The infantry of the 
 Russian guard, witnessing this fierce encoun- 
 ter, durst not fire, for fear of slaughtering its 
 own countrymen. At length Napoleon's horse- 
 grenadiers, veterans tried in a hundred battles, 
 triumphed over the young soldiers of Alexan- 
 der, dispersed them, after extending a number 
 of them upon the ground, and returned con- 
 querors to their master. 
 
 Napoleon, who was present at this engage- 
 ment, was delighted to see the Russian youth 
 punished for their boasting. Surrounded by 
 his staff", he received Rapp,who returned wound- 
 ed, covered with blood, followed by Prince
 
 Dec. 1801.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 Repnin a prisoner, and gave him signal testi- 
 monies ',? satisfaction. Meanwhile, the three 
 regiments of Drouet's division, brought by 
 Colonel Gerard, pushed the infantry of the 
 Russian guard upon the village of Kreznowitz, 
 carried that village, and took many prisoners. 
 It was one o'clock ; victory appeared no longer 
 doubtful, for, Lannes and Murat being masters 
 of the plain on the left, Marshal Soult, supported 
 by the whole of the reserve, being master of 
 the plateau of Pratzen, there was nothing left 
 to be done but to fall upon the right, and fling 
 Buxhovden's three Russian columns, which 
 had so vainly striven to cut us off from the 
 road to Vienna, into the ponds. Napoleon, 
 then leaving Bernadotte's corps on the plateau 
 of Pratzen, and turning to the right with Mar- 
 shal Soult's corps, the guard, and Oudinot's 
 grenadiers, resolved himself to seize the prize 
 of his profound combinations, and proceed by 
 the route which Buxhoven's three columns 
 had taken when descending from the plateau 
 of Pratzen, to attack them in rear. It was 
 high time for him to arrive, for Marshal Da- 
 vout and his Lieutenant-general Friant, hurry- 
 ing incessantly from Kobelnitz to Telnitz to 
 prevent the Russians from crossing the Gold- 
 bach, were almost knocked up. The brave 
 Friant had had four horses killed under him 
 in the fight. But, while he was making the 
 last efforts, Napoleon suddenly appeared at 
 the head of an overwhelming mass of forces. 
 Prodigious confusion then took place among 
 the surprised and despairing Russians. Pri- 
 byschewski's entire column, and half of Lan- 
 geron's left before Sokolnitz, found themselves 
 surrounded without any hope of escape, for 
 the French were coming upon their rear by 
 the routes which they had themselves pursued 
 in the morning. These two columns dispersed; 
 part were made prisoners in Sokolnitz ; others 
 fled towards Kobelnitz, and were enveloped 
 near the marshes of that name. Lastly, a 
 third portion made off towards Briinn, but 
 was obliged to lay down its arms near the 
 Vienna road, the same which the Russians had 
 appointed for rendezvous in the hope of vic- 
 tory. 
 
 General Langeron, with the relics of Ka- 
 menski's brigade and some battalions which 
 he had withdrawn from Sokolnitz before the 
 disaster, had fled towards Telnitz and the 
 ponds, near to the spot where Buxhovden was 
 with Doctorow's column. The silly comman- 
 der of the left wing of the Russians, quite 
 proud of having, with twenty-nine battalions 
 and twenty-two squadrons, disputed the village 
 of Telnitz against five or six French batta- 
 lions, continued motionless, awaiting the suc- 
 cess of Langeron's and Pribyschewski's 
 column. His face, according to an eye-wit- 
 ness, exhibited evidence of the excess in 
 which he was accustomed to indulge. Lange- 
 ron, hastening to this point, related to him 
 with warmth what was passing. " You see 
 nothing but enemies everywhere," was the 
 brutal answer of Buxh&vden. " And you," re- 
 plied Langeron, " are not in a state to see them 
 anywhere." At this instant Marshal Soult's 
 column appeared on the slope of the plateau 
 towards the ponds, advancing towards Doc- 
 
 torow's column to drive it into them. It was 
 no longer possible to doubt the danger. Bux- 
 hovden, with four regiments, which he had 
 most unskilfully left inactive about him, en- 
 deavoured to regain the route by which he had 
 come, and which ran through the village of 
 Augezd, between the foot of the plateau of 
 Pratzen and the pond of Satschau. Thither 
 he proceeded precipitately, ordering General 
 Doctorow to save himself as he best could. 
 Langeron joined him with the remains of his 
 column. Buxhovden was passing through 
 Augezd, at the very moment when Vandam- 
 me's division, descending from the height, 
 arrived there on its side. He sustained in his 
 flight the fire of the French, and succeeded in 
 gaining a place of safety with a portion of his 
 troops. The greater part, accompanied by 
 Langeron's wrecks, was stopped short by 
 Vandamme's division, which was in posses- 
 sion of Augezd. Then all together rushed 
 towards the frozen ponds and strove to clear 
 themselves a way there. The ice which co- 
 vered these ponds, weakened by the warmth 
 of a fine day, could not bear the weight of 
 men, horses, and cannon. It gave way at 
 some points beneath the Russians, who were 
 ingulphed ; at others it was strong enough to 
 afford a retreat to the fugitives who thronged 
 across it 
 
 Napoleon, having reached the slopes of the 
 plateau of Pratzen, towards the ponds, per- 
 ceived the disaster, which he had so skilfully 
 prepared. He ordered a battery of the guard 
 to fire with ball upon those parts of the ice 
 which still held firm, and completed the de- 
 struction of those who were upon it. Nearly 
 2000 perished beneath the broken ice. 
 
 Between the French army and these inacces- 
 sible ponds, was still left Doctorow's unfortu- 
 nate column, one detachment of which had 
 escaped with Buxhovden, and another found a 
 grave under the ice. General Doctorow, left 
 in this cruel situation, behaved with the no- 
 blest courage. The ground, in approaching the 
 lakes, rose so as to offer a sort of appui. 
 General Doctorow, backing himself against 
 this rising ground, formed his troops into three 
 lines, placing the cavalry in the first line, the 
 artillery in the second, and the infantry in the 
 third. Thus deployed, he opposed a bold face 
 to the French, while he sent a few squadrons 
 in search of a route between the pond of Sats- 
 chau and that of Menitz. 
 
 A last and a severe combat ensued on this 
 ground. The dragoons of Beaumont's divi- 
 sion, borrowed from Murat, and brought from 
 the left to the right, charged Kienmayer's Aus- 
 trian cavalry, which, after doing its duty, 
 retired under the protection of the Russian 
 artillery. The latter, sticking close to its 
 guns, poured a shower of grape upon the dra- 
 goons, who endeavoured in vain to take it 
 Marshal Soult's infantry marched up, in its 
 turn, to this artillery, in spite of a fire at 
 point-blank range, took it and drove the Rus- 
 sian infantry towards Telnitz. Marshal Da 
 vout, on his part, with Friant's division, was 
 entering Telnitz. The Russians, therefore, 
 had no other retreat but a narrow pass be- 
 tween Telnitz and the ?onds. Some rushed
 
 94 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 upon them pell-mell, and shared the fate of 
 those who had preceded them. Others found 
 means to escape by a route which had been 
 discovered between the ponds of Satschau and 
 Menitz. The French cavalry pursued them 
 along this track, and harassed them in their 
 retreat. The sun in the daytime had converted 
 the clayey soil of these parts from ice into 
 thick mud, into which men and horses sunk. 
 The artillery of the Russians stuck fast in it. 
 Their horses, fitted rather for speed than for 
 draught, being unable to extricate the guns, 
 were objiged to leave them there. Amidst 
 this rout, our horses picked up 3000 prisoners 
 and a great number of cannon. "I had pre- 
 viously seen some lost battles," says an eye- 
 witness of this frightful scene, General Lan- 
 geron, " but I had no conception of such a 
 defeat." 
 
 In fact, from one wing to the other of the 
 Russian army, no part of it was in order but 
 the corps of Prince Bagration, which Lannes 
 had not ventured to pursue, being ignorant of 
 what was passing on the right of the army. 
 All the rest was in a state of frightful disorder, 
 setting up wild shouts, and plundering the 
 villages scattered upon its route, to procure 
 provisions. The two sovereigns of Russia 
 and Austria fled from that field of battle upon 
 which they heard the French crying "Vive 
 I" Empereur !" Alexander was deeply dejected. 
 The Emperor Francis, more tranquil, bore the 
 disaster with great composure. Under the 
 common misfortune, he had at least one con- 
 solation : the Russians could no longer allege 
 that the cowardice of the Austrians constituted 
 all the glory of Napoleon. The two princes 
 retreated precipitately over the plains of Mo- 
 ravia, amidst profound darkness, separated 
 from their household, and liable to be insulted, 
 through the barbarity of their own soldiers. 
 The Emperor Francis seeing that all was lost, 
 took it upon him to send Prince John of Lich- 
 tenstein to Napoleon, to solicit an armistice, 
 with a promise to sign a peace in a few days. 
 He commissioned him, moreover, to express 
 to Napoleon his wish to have an interview 
 with him at the advanced posts. 
 
 Prince John, who had well performed his 
 duty in the engagement, could appear with 
 honour before the conqueror. He repaired 
 with the utmost expedition to the French head- 
 quarters. The victorious Napoleon was en- 
 gaged in going over the field of battle, to have 
 the wounded picked up. He would not take 
 rest himself till he had paid to his soldiers 
 those attentions to which they had such good 
 right. In obedience to his orders, none of 
 them had quitted the ranks to carry away the 
 wounded. The ground was, in consequence, 
 strewed with them for a space of more than 
 three leagues. It was covered more especially 
 with Russian corpses. The field of battle was 
 an awful spectacle. But this sight affected 
 >ur old soldiers of the Revolution very slightly. 
 Accustomed to the horrors of war, they re- 
 garded wounds, death, as a natural conse- 
 quence of battles, and as trifles in the bosom 
 of victory. They were intoxicated with joy, 
 and raised boisterous acclamations, when they 
 oerceivcJ the group of officers which marked 
 
 the presence of Napoleon. His return to the 
 head-quarters, which had been established at 
 the post-house of Posoritz, had the appearance 
 of a triumphal procession. 
 
 That spirit, in which such bitter pangs were 
 one day to succeed such exquisite joys, tasted 
 at that moment the delights of the most mag- 
 nificent and the most deserved success; for, 
 if victory is frequently a pure favour of chance, 
 it was in this instance the reward of admi- 
 rable combinations. Napoleon, in fact, guess- 
 ing with the penetration of genius, that the 
 Russians designed to wrest the Vienna road 
 from him, and that they would then place 
 themselves between him and the ponds, had, 
 by his very attitude, encouraged them to come 
 thither; since, weakening his right, reinforc- 
 ing his centre, he had thrown himself upon 
 the heights of Pratzen, abandoned by them, 
 cut them thus in two, and flung them into a 
 gulf, which they could not get out of. The 
 greater part of his troops, kept in reserve, had 
 scarcely been brought into action, so strong 
 did a just conclusion render his position, and 
 so well also did the valour of his soldiers per- 
 mit him to bring them forward in inferior 
 number before the enemy. It may be said 
 that, out of 65,000 French, 40 or 45 thousand, 
 at most, had been engaged; for Bernadotte's 
 corps, the grenadiers, and the infantry of the 
 guard had exchanged only a few musket-shots. 
 Thus 45,000 French had beaten 90,000 Austro- 
 Russians. 
 
 The results of the battle were immense : 
 15,000 killed or wounded, about 20,000 prison- 
 ers, among whom were 10 colonels and 8 
 generals, 180 pieces of cannon, an immense 
 quantity of artillery and baggage-wagons 
 such were the losses of the enemy and the 
 trophies of the French. The latter had to 
 regret about 7000 men killed and wounded. 
 
 Napoleon, having returned to his head- 
 quarters at Posoritz, there received Prince 
 John of Lichtenstein. He treated him as a 
 conqueror full of courtesy, and agreed to an 
 interview with the Emperor of Austria on the 
 day after the next, at the advanced posts of the 
 two armies; but an armistice was not to be 
 granted till the two Emperors of France and 
 Austria had met and explained themselves. 
 
 On the morrow, Napoleon transferred his 
 head-quarters to Austerlitz, a mansion belong- 
 ing to the family of Kaunitz. There he esla- 
 blished himself, and determined to give the 
 name of that mansion to the battle which the 
 soldiers already called the battle of the three 
 emperors. It has borne and will bear for ages 
 the name which it received from the immortal 
 captain who won it He addressed to his sol 
 diers the following proclamation: 
 
 "Aufterlitz, 12 Frimaire. 
 
 " Soldiers, I am satisfied with you : in the 
 battle of Austerlitz you have justified all that 
 I expected from your intrepidity. You have 
 decorated your eagles with immortal glory. 
 An army of one hundred thousand men, com- 
 manded by the Emperors of Russia and Aus- 
 tria, has been in less than four hours either 
 cut in pieces or dispersed. Those who escaped 
 your weapons are drowned in the lakes.
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 95 
 
 "Forty colours, the standards of the impe- 
 rial guard of Russia, one hundred and twenty 
 pieces of cannon, more than thirty thousand 
 prisoners, 1 are the result of this ever-celebrated 
 battle. That infantry, so highly vaunted and 
 superior in number, could not withstand your 
 shocks, and thenceforward you have no rivals 
 to fear. Thus, in two months, this third coa- 
 lition has been vanquished and dissolved. 
 Peace cannot now be far distant, but, as I pro- 
 mised my people before I passed the Rhine, I 
 will make only such a peace as gives us gua- 
 rantees and insures rewards to our allies. 
 
 " Soldiers, when all that is necessary to se- 
 cure the welfare and the prosperity of our 
 country is accomplished, I will lead you back 
 to France : there you will be the object of my 
 tenderest concern. My people will see you 
 again with joy, and it will be sufficient to say, 
 I was at the battle of Austerlitz, for them to 
 reply, There is a brave man. 
 
 " NAPOLEOS." 
 
 It was necessary to follow the enemy, whom 
 all accounts represented as being in disorderly 
 retreat. In this confusion, Napoleon, misled 
 by Murat, conjectured that the fugitive army 
 was directing its course towards Olmutz, and 
 he had sent off the cavalry and the corps of 
 Lannes to that point But, on the following 
 day, the 3d of December, more accurate intel- 
 ligence, collected by General Thiard, apprized 
 him that the enemy was proceeding by the 
 road to Hungary for the Morava. Napoleon 
 hastened to recall his columns to Nasiedlowitz 
 and Coding. Marshal Davout, reinforced by 
 the junction of Friant's whole division, and by 
 the arrival in line of Gudin's division, had lost 
 no time, thanks to his nearer position to the 
 Hungary road. He set out in pursuit of the 
 Russians and pressed them closely. He in- 
 tended to overtake them before the passage of 
 the Morava, and to cut off perhaps a part of 
 their army. After marching on the 3d, he was, 
 on the morning of the 4th, in sight of Goding 
 and nearly up with them. The greatest con- 
 fusion prevailed in Goding. Beyond that 
 place there was a mansion belonging to the 
 Emperor of Germany, that of Holitsch, where 
 the two allied sovereigns had taken refuge. 
 The perturbation there was as great as at 
 Goding. The Russian officers continued to 
 hold the most unbecoming language respecting 
 the Austrians. They laid the blame of the 
 common defeat on them, as if they ought not 
 to have attributed it to their own presumption, 
 to the incapacity of their generals, and to the 
 levity of their government. The Austrians, 
 moreover, had behaved quite as well as the 
 Russians on the field of battle. 
 
 The two vanquished monarchs were very 
 cool towards each other. The Emperor Fran- 
 cis wished to confer with the Emperor Alex- 
 ander, before he went to the interview agreed 
 upon with Napoleon. Both thought that they 
 ought to solicit an armistice and peace, for it 
 was impossible to continue the struggle. Alex- 
 ander was desirous, though he did not acknow- 
 ledge it, that himself and his army should be 
 
 ' The exact number was not yet known. 
 
 saved as soon as possible from the conse- 
 quences of an impetuous pursuit, such as 
 might be apprehended from Napoleon. As 
 for the conditions, he left his ally to settle 
 them as he pleased. The Emperor Francis 
 alone having to defray the expenses of the 
 war, the conditions on which peace should be 
 signed concerned him exclusively. Some time 
 before, the Emperor Alexander, setting himself 
 up for the arbiter of Europe, would have in- 
 sisted that those conditions concerned him 
 also. His pride was less exigent since the 
 battle of the 2d of December. 
 
 The Emperor Francis accordingly set out 
 for Nasiedlowitz, a village situated midway to 
 the mansion of Austerlitz, and there, near the 
 mill of Paleny, between Nasiedlowitz and Ur- 
 schitz, amidst the French and the Austrian 
 advanced posts, he found Napoleon waiting 
 for him before a bivouac fire kindled by his 
 soldiers. Napoleon had had the politeness to 
 arrive first. He went to meet the Emperor 
 Francis, received him as he alighted from his 
 carriage and embraced him. The Austrian 
 monarch, encouraged by the welcome of his 
 all-powerful foe, had a long conversation with 
 him. The principal officers of the two armies, 
 standing aside, beheld with great curiosity the 
 extraordinary spectacle of the successor of the 
 Caesars vanquished and soliciting peace of the 
 crowned soldier, whom the French Revolution 
 had raised to the pinnacle of human greatness. 
 
 Napoleon apologized to the Emperor Francis 
 for receiving him in such a place. " Such are 
 the palaces," said he, " which your majesty has 
 obliged me to inhabit for these three months." 
 " The abode in them," replied the Austrian 
 monarch, " makes you so thriving, that you 
 have no right to be angry with me for it." 
 The conversation then turned upon the general 
 state of affairs, Napoleon insisting that he had 
 been forced into the war against his will at a 
 moment when he least expected it, and when 
 he was exclusively engaged with England, the 
 Emperor of Austria affirming that he had been 
 urged to take arms solely by the designs of 
 France in regard to Italy. Napoleon declared 
 that, on the conditions already specified to M. 
 de Giulay, and which he had no need to re- 
 peat, he was ready to sign a peace. The Em- 
 peror Francis, without explaining himself on 
 this subject, wished to know how Napoleon 
 was disposed in regard to the Russian army. 
 Napoleon first required that the Emperor Fran- 
 cis should separate his cause from that of the 
 Emperor Alexander, and that the Russian army 
 should retire by regulated marches from the 
 Austrian territories, and promised to grant him 
 an armistice on this condition. As for peace 
 with Russia, he added, that would be settled 
 afterwards, for this peace concerned him alone. 
 " Take my advice," said Napoleon to the 
 Emperor Francis, "do not mix up your cause 
 with that of the Emperor Alexander. Russia 
 alone can now wage only a fancy war in Eu- 
 rope. Vanquished, she retires to her deserts, 
 and you, you pay with your provinces thf 
 costs of the war." The forcible language of 
 Napoleon expressed but too. well the state of 
 ! things in Europe between that great 
 i and the rest of the continent. The
 
 96 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 Francis pledged his word as a man and a sove- 
 reign not to renew the war, and above all to 
 listen no more to the suggestions of powers 
 which had nothing to lose in the struggle. He 
 agreed to an armistice for himself and for the 
 Emperor Alexander, an armistice, the condition 
 of which was that the Russians should retire 
 by regulated marches, and that the Austrian 
 cabinet should immediately send negotiators 
 empowered to sign a separate peace with 
 France. 
 
 The two emperors parted with reiterated de- 
 monstrations of cordiality. Napoleon handed 
 into his carriage that monarch whom he had 
 just called his brother, and remounted his horse 
 to return to Austerlitz. 
 
 General Savary was sent to suspend the 
 march of Davout's corps. He first proceeded 
 to Holitsch, with the suite of the Emperor 
 Francis, to learn whether the Emperor Alex- 
 ander acceded to the proposed conditions. He 
 saw the latter, around whom every thing was 
 much changed since the mission on which he 
 was sent to him a few days before. " Your 
 master," said Alexander to him, " has shown 
 himself very great. I acknowledge all the 
 power of his genius, and, as for myself, I shall 
 retire, since my ally is satisfied." General 
 Savary conversed for some time with the young 
 czar on the late battle, explained to him how 
 the French army, inferior in number to the 
 Russian army, had nevertheless appeared su- 
 perior on all points, owing to the art of ma- 
 noauvring which Napoleon possessed in so 
 eminent a degree. He courteously added that 
 with experience Alexander, in his turn, would 
 ber ime a warrior, but that so difficult an art 
 v AH not to be learned in a day. After these 
 flatteries to the vanquished monarch, he set 
 out for Coding to stop Marshal Davout, who 
 had rejected all the proposals fora suspension 
 of arms, and was ready to attack the relics of 
 the Russian army. To no purpose he had been 
 assured in the name of the Emperor of Russia 
 himself that an armistice was negotiating be- 
 tween Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria. 
 He would not on any account abandon his 
 prey. But General Savary stopped him with 
 a formal order from Napoleon. These were 
 the last musket-shots fired during that unex- 
 ampled campaign. The troops of the several 
 nations separated to go into winter-quarters, 
 awaiting what should be decided by the nego- 
 tiators of the belligerent powers. 
 
 Napoleon proceeded from the mansion of 
 Austerliiz to Briinn, to which place he had re- 
 quired M. de Talleyrand to repair, in order to 
 settle the conditions of the peace, which could 
 be no longer doubtful, since the resources of 
 Austria were exhausted; and Russia, eager to 
 obtain an armistice, was drawing off her army 
 in the utmost haste into Poland. While the 
 war of the first coalition had lasted five years, 
 that of the second coalition, two, the war raised 
 by the third had lasted three months, so irre- 
 sistible had become the power of revolutionary 
 Fiance, concentrated in a single hand, and so 
 able and prompt was that hand to strike those 
 whom it purposed to reach. The course of 
 events had actually been such as Napoleon had 
 Barked >u' beforehand in his cabinet at Bou- 
 
 logne. He had taken the Austrians at Ulm 
 almost without striking a blow ; he had crushed 
 the Russians at Austerlitz, and extricated Italy 
 by the mere effect of his offensive march upon 
 Vienna, and reduced the attacks on Hanover 
 and Naples to mere acts of imprudence. The 
 latter, in particular, after the battle of Auster- 
 litz, was but a disastrous folly for ihe house 
 of Bourbon. Europe was at the feet of Napo- 
 leon, and Prussia, hurried away for a moment 
 by the coalition, was soon destined to find her- 
 self at the mercy of the captain whom she had 
 offended and betrayed. 
 
 Still it required great skill to negotiate, for, 
 if our enemies, recovering from their terror, 
 and abusing the engagements into which they 
 had obliged Prussia to enter, forced her to in- 
 tervene in the negotiations, they might still, 
 being three to one, dispute the conditions of 
 the peace, and rob the conqueror of part of the 
 advantages of the victory. Napoleon, there- 
 fore, determined that the negotiations should 
 be carried on at Briinn, far from M. de Haug- 
 witz, whom he had sent to Vienna, and whom 
 he obliged to stay there by promising to meet 
 him in that capital. 
 
 While the armies were engaged in fighting, 
 Messieurs de Giulay and De Stadion had held 
 conferences at Vienna with M. de Talleyrand, 
 and they had desired to negotiate in common 
 for Russia and Austria, under the mediation of 
 Prussia. Since the arrival of M. de Haugwitz, 
 they had politely but earnestly urged him to 
 execute the convention of Potsdam, judging 
 that, if Prussia were comprehended in the 
 negotiations, she would be obliged either to 
 enforce the conditions of peace settled at Pots- 
 dam or take part in the war. M. de Haugwitz 
 had refused to treat in that manner, on the 
 ground of the nature of his mission, which 
 obliged him not to take his seat in a congress, 
 but to treat directly with Napoleon, in order to 
 bring him into the ideas adopted by the Prus- 
 sian cabinet. Besides, M. de Talleyrand had 
 cut short these pretensions by declaring that 
 Austria alone would be admitted to the nego- 
 tiation. He signified this resolution at Vienna 
 on the 2d of December, the very day on which 
 the battle of Austerlitz was fought. 
 
 That battle being won, and the armistice 
 demanded and granted at the bivouac of the 
 conqueror, the separate negotiation was a 
 condition accepted beforehand. Napoleon re- 
 quired, as we have related, that it should be 
 opened immediately at Briinn with M. de Tal- 
 leyrand. He caused it to be intimated that he 
 consented to admit M. de Giulay to treat, but 
 not M. de Stadion, formerly ambassador of 
 Austria in Russia, full of the prejudices of the 
 coalition, and raising, from the very nature 
 of his genius, incessantly recurring difficulties. 
 He pointed out for negotiator Prince John of 
 Lichtenstein, who had pleased him by his 
 frank and military manners. The latter was 
 immediately sent to Briinn with M. de Giulay. 
 The Emperor Francis being at Holitsch, it 
 was possible to communicate with him in a 
 few hours, and to settle very promptly any 
 contested points. The negotiation was, there- 
 fore, opened at Briinn, between Messieurs de 
 Talleyrand, De Giulay, and De Lichtenstein
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 97 
 
 Napoleon, after he had fixed the basis, pur- 
 posed to repair immediately to Vienna, to 
 wring from M. de Haugwitz a confession of 
 the weaknesses and the falseness of Prussia, 
 and to make him bear the punishment for them. 
 
 But what were to be the bases of the peace ? 
 This was what Napoleon and M. de Talley- 
 rand discussed at Brunn, and what had been 
 the subject of frequent and profound conversa- 
 tions between them. 
 
 The moment was perilous for the wisdom 
 of Napoleon. Victorious in three months 
 over a powerful coalition, having seen the 
 most renowned soldiers of the continent flee 
 before his soldiers, though inferior in number, 
 was he not likely to acquire from his power 
 an exaggerated sentiment, and to conceive a 
 contempt for all European resistances ? During 
 the Consulate, when he wished to conciliate 
 France and Europe, he had been seen at home 
 indulging parties, abroad overcoming Austria 
 by victories, Russia by delicate caresses, 
 Prussia by the skilfully employed bait of Ger- 
 manic indemnities, England by the state of 
 exclusion to which he had reduced her, pacify- 
 ing the world in an almost miraculous man- 
 ner, and displaying the most admirable of 
 abilities, that of the force which knows how 
 to restrain itself. But he had soon been seen 
 also irritated by the ingratitude of parties, no 
 longer keeping measures with them, and 
 striking cruelly in the person of the Duke 
 d'Enghien. He had been seen, exasperated at 
 the provoking jealousy of England, throwing 
 down the gauntlet which she had picked up, 
 and collecting all human means to overwhelm 
 her. Now, the powers of the continent, having 
 without sufficient motive called him away from 
 his struggle with England, and having drawn 
 upon themselves defeats which were absolute 
 disasters, was he not to deal with them as with 
 his other enemies, and set aside those courte- 
 sies indispensable even to might, and which 
 constitute the whole art of politics] Would 
 a man who could always draw from his genius 
 and the bravery of his soldiers such an event 
 as Marengo or Austerlitz be accountable to 
 any one on earth 1 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, to whose character and to 
 the part which he played during this reign we 
 have already adverted, again made on this 
 occasion some efforts to moderate Napoleon, 
 but without much success. Fonder of pleas- 
 ing than contradicting, having, in regard to 
 European politics, inclinations rather than 
 opinions, incessantly patronizing Austria, 
 doing ill offices to Prussia, from an old tradi- 
 tion of the cabinet of Versailles, he had ren- 
 dered himself suspected of complaisance for 
 the one and aversion for the other, and had 
 not that credit with his sovereign which a firm 
 and convinced mind could have obtained. 
 However, on this as on other occasions, if he 
 had not the merif of securing the ascendency 
 for moderation, he had that of recommend- 
 ing it. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, on the day after the battle 
 of Austerlitz, gave to the intoxicated conqueror 
 of Europe such advice as this. 
 
 It was requisite, according to him, to treat 
 Austria with moderation and generosity. That 
 
 VOL. II. 12 
 
 power, considerably diminished during the 
 last two centuries, ought to be much less an 
 object of our jealousy than formerly. A new 
 power ought to take its place in our prepos- 
 sessions that was Russia, and against this 
 latter, Austria, so far from being a danger, was 
 a useful barrier. Austria, a vast aggregation 
 of nations foreign to each other, as Austrians, 
 Sclavonians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Italians, 
 might easily fall to pieces, if the bond, already 
 feeble, that held together the heterogeneous 
 elements of which it was composed, were to 
 be further weakened; and its wrecks would 
 have more tendency to attach themselves to 
 Russia than to France. We ought, therefore, 
 to desist from inflicting blows upon Austria, 
 nay, to indemnify her for the new losses which 
 she was about to sustain, and to indemnify 
 her in a manner beneficial to Europe, which 
 was not only possible, but easy. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand proposed an ingenious 
 combination, but premature, indeed, in the 
 then state of Europe : it was to give Austria 
 the banks of the Danube, that is to say, Wal- 
 lachia and Moldavia. These provinces, he 
 said, would be wijrth more than Italy itself; 
 they would console Austria for her losses, 
 alienate her from Russia, render her, in regard 
 to the latter, the bulwark of the Ottoman em- 
 pire, as she already was that of Europe. These 
 provinces, after embroiling her with Russia, 
 would embroil her with England, and make 
 her thenceforward the obliged ally of France. 
 
 As for Prussia, there was no need to put 
 one's self out of the way on her account: we 
 were at liberty to treat her as we pleased. 
 It was decidedly a false, faint-hearted court, 
 on which no reliance was to be placed. In 
 order to please it, we ought not again to es- 
 trange Austria, the only ally whom we could 
 think of in future. 
 
 Such were the opinions of M. de Talley- 
 rand on this occasion. The advice to spare 
 Austria, to console her, nay even to indemnify 
 her with well chosen equivalents, was excel- 
 lent; for the true policy of Napoteon ought to 
 have been to conquer and to spare everybody 
 on the morrow of the victory. But the coun- 
 sel to treat Prussia slightingly was pernicious, 
 and proceeded from a false policy, to which 
 we have already adverted. Assuredly, it 
 would have been desirable to have it in our 
 power to gain the provinces of the Danube to 
 Austria, and above all to make her consider 
 them as a sufficient compensation for her 
 losses in Italy ; but it is doubtful whether she 
 would have assented to such a combination ; 
 for Wallachia and Moldavia, by alienating 
 Russia and England from her, would have 
 rendered her dependent on us. It is doubtful, 
 besides, if one could, at this period, have dis- 
 tributed European territories so freely as was 
 done two years 'ater at Tilsit. Be this as it 
 may, in determining to sway Italy, it was ne- 
 cessary to make up one's mind to find Aus- 
 tria an enemy, whatever consideration might 
 be shown for her: and then what ally would 
 there be to choose 1 We have already ob- 
 served more than once, that, embroiled .vi'h, 
 England from the desire of equality at sea, 
 with Russia from the- desire of supremacy OP
 
 98 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 the continent, unable to derive any benefit ! 
 from disorganized Spain, what was left us but 
 Prussia Prussia, vacillating, it is true, but 
 much more from the scruples of her sove- 
 reign than from the natural falseness of her 
 cabinet Prussia, having no interest contrary 
 to ours, since she had not yet the Rhenish 
 provinces, already compromised in our sys- 
 tem, having her hands full of the spoils of the 
 church received from us, wishing for nothing 
 better than to receive more of them, and 1 
 ready to accept any conquest that would chain 
 her for ever to our policy 1 
 
 It was an egregious mistake, therefore, 
 not to wish to spare Austria, but to believe 
 that we could attach her seriously and so 
 strongly that there was no longer any danger 
 in ill-treating or neglecting Prussia. 
 
 Napoleon did not share the errors of Tal- 
 leyrand, but he committed others, from the 
 passion for dominion, which the hatred of his 
 enemies, and the prodigious success of his 
 armies began to excite in him beyond all rea- 
 sonable bounds. 
 
 He had not sought a quarrel on the conti- 
 nent : they had come, on the contrary, to di- 
 vert him from his grand enterprise against 
 England, to declare war against him. Those 
 who had begun that war, and who had got 
 beaten, ought, according to him, to bear the 
 consequences. He resolved, therefore, to ob- 
 tain, by the peace, the complement of Italy, 
 that is to say, the Venetian States, then in the 
 possession of Austria, and likewise the defini- 
 tive solution of the Germanic questions in 
 favour of his allies, Bavaria, Baden, Wurtem- 
 berg. 
 
 On these two points Napoleon was peremp- 
 tory ; it was not wrong of him to be so. He 
 wanted Venice, the Friule, Istria, Dalmatia, 
 in short, Italy as far as the Julian Alps, and 
 the Adriatic with both its coasts, which would 
 insure him an action upon the Ottoman Em- 
 pire. As to Germany, he purposed first to 
 confine Austria with her natural frontiers, the 
 Inn and the Salza, to take from her the terri- 
 tories which she possessed in Suabia, and 
 which were designated by the title of Hither 
 Austria, territories which afforded her the 
 means of annoying the German States in alli- 
 ance with France, and of making, whenever 
 she pleased, military preparations on the 
 Upper Danube. He meant to deprive her of 
 the communications of the Tyrol with the 
 Lake of Constance and Switzerland, that is to 
 say, off the Vorarlberg. He even intended, 
 if possible, to wrest from her the Tyrol, which 
 gave her possession of the Alps and an ever 
 sure passage into Italy. But this last point 
 was difficult to be obtained, because the Ty- 
 rol was an old possession of Austria's, as 
 dear to her affections as valuable to her inte- 
 rests. It was inflicting on Austria a loss of 
 about four millions of subjects out of twenty- 
 four, and of fifteen million florins out a reve- 
 nue of one hundred and rnree. These were, 
 therefore, cruel sacrifices to require of her. 
 
 With all that he purposed to take from her 
 in Germany, Napoleon intended to complete 
 the patrimony of the three German States 
 which had been his auxiliaries Bavaria, 
 
 Baden, and Wurtemberg. He intended also 
 to procure for himself by means of these three 
 States an action on the Diet, a road to the 
 Danube, and to show in a signal manner that 
 his alliance was beneficial to those who em- 
 braced it. 
 
 He purposed also to resolve favourably for 
 those allied princes the question of the im- 
 mediate nobility, and to abolish that nobility, 
 which created them enemies in their domi- 
 nions. He meant likewise to resolve all 
 questions of paramountship, and to suppress 
 by that means a great number of rights of the 
 feudal kind, very slavish and onerous to the 
 Germanic States. 
 
 Lastly, Napoleon proposed, in order to at- 
 tach solidly to himself the three princes of 
 South Germany, to add the bond of matri- 
 mony to the bond of benefit. He wanted 
 princes and princesses to unite with members 
 of his dynasty. He calculated on finding 
 them in Germany, and on thus joining to 
 princely establishments the influence of fa- 
 mily alliances. 
 
 Prince Eugene de Beauharnais was dear to 
 his heart. He had made him viceroy of Italy : 
 he was seeking a wife for him. He had cast 
 his eyes on the daughter of the elector of Ba- 
 varia, a remarkable princess, and worthy of 
 him for whom she was destined. As he re- 
 served the greater part of the spoils of Austria 
 for Bavaria, which the situation and the dan- 
 gers of that electorate sufficiently justified, he 
 wished that part of those spoils should be the 
 dowry for the French prince. 
 
 But the Princess Augusta was promised to 
 the heir of Baden, and her mother, the elec- 
 tress of Bavaria, a violent enemy of France, 
 alleged that engagement for rejecting an al- 
 liance which she disliked. General Thiard, 
 having contracted intimacies with several of 
 the minor German courts, while serving in the 
 army of Conde, had been sent to Munich and 
 Baden to remove the obstacles which opposed 
 the projected unions. That officer, a clever 
 negotiator, had made use of the Countess of 
 Hochberg, who was united by a left-handed 
 marriage with the reigning Elector of Baden, 
 and who had need of France to obtain the ac- 
 knowledgment of her children. Through the 
 influence of this lady, he had induced the 
 court of Baden to a very delicate step, namely, 
 to desist from all views on the hand of the 
 the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. This point 
 gained, the elector and the Electress of Bava- 
 ria were left without pretext for refusing an 
 alliance which brought them a dowry of the 
 Tyrol and part of Suabia. 
 
 This was not the only German union which 
 i Napoleon thought of. The heir of Baden, from 
 ' whom the Princess Augusta of Bavaria had 
 just been taken, was yet to be provided for, 
 Napoleon destined for him Mademoiselle Ste- 
 phanie de Beauharnais, a person endowed 
 with grace and a superior understanding, and 
 whom he intended to create imperial princess. 
 He charged General Thiard to conclude this 
 match also. Lastly, the old Duke of Wurtera- 
 berg had a daughter, the Princess Catharine, 
 whose noble jualities have since been con 
 spicuously called forth by adversity. Napo-
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 99 
 
 Icon wished to obtain her for his brother Je- 
 rome. But a marriage contracted by the latter 
 in America, without the authorization of his 
 family, was an obstacle which could not yet 
 be removed. It was necessary, therefore, to 
 defer this last establishment. To all the ag- 
 grandizements of territory, which he was pre- 
 paring for the houses of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, 
 and Baden, Napoleon purposed to add the title 
 of king, leaving to those houses the place 
 which they had in the Germanic confedera- 
 tion. 
 
 Such were the advantages which Napoleon 
 intended to derive from his late victories. To 
 require the whole of Italy was, on his part, 
 natural and consistent. To seek in the Aus- 
 trian possessions in Saubia means of aggran- 
 dizing the princes, his allies, was extremely ju- 
 dicious, for Austria was thus thrust back be- 
 hind the Inn, and the alliance of France was 
 rendered manifestly beneficial. To take the 
 Vorarlberg from Austria, in order to give it to 
 Bavaria, was also wise, for she was then 
 separated from Switzerland. But to take the 
 Tyrol from her, though it was a good combi- 
 nation in reference to Italy, was filling her 
 heart with implacable resentment ; it was re- 
 ducing her to a despair, which, concealed for 
 the moment, would break forth sooner or later ; 
 it was condemning one's self more than ever 
 to cautious policy, clever at finding and at 
 keeping alliances, since it rendered the princi- 
 pal of the powers of the continent an irrecon- 
 cilable foe. To resolve the question of the 
 immediate nobility, and several other feudal 
 questions, might be a useful simplification in 
 regard to the internal organization of Germany. 
 But to aggrandize in an extraordinary degree 
 the Princes of Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtem- 
 berg, to connect them with France so closely 
 as to render them suspected to Germany, was 
 to create for them a false position, from which 
 they would some day be tempted to extricate 
 themselves by becoming unfaithful to their 
 protector; it was making enemies of all the 
 German princes who were not favoured; il 
 was wounding in a new fashion Austria, 
 already wounded in so many ways, and, what 
 was still worse, disobliging Prussia herself; 
 in short, it was interfering further than was 
 becoming in the affairs of Germany, and rais- 
 ing up against one's self jealous spirits and 
 petty in grates. Napoleon ought not to have 
 forgotten that he had caused cannon to be 
 pointed at the gates of Stuttgard in order to 
 break them open ; that he was obilged at that 
 moment to make use of a foreign woman to ob- 
 tain a marriage at Baden, and almost to wring 
 from the Elector of Bavaria his daughter, who 
 had been obtained only by appearing with the 
 keys of the Tyrol in one hand and the sword 
 of France in the other. 
 
 Napoleon, then, overstepped the true limit 
 of French policy in Germany, in creating for 
 himself allies too much detached from the 
 German system, and by no means sure, be- 
 cause their position would be false. But it is 
 difficult to observe moderation in victory ; be- 
 sides, he was a new monarch : he was an ex- 
 cellent head of a family ; he wanted alliances 
 and marriages. 
 
 Such were the ideas that served for the 
 foundation of the instructions left with M. de 
 Talleyrand for the negotiation commenced 
 with Messieurs de Giulay and Lichtenstein. 
 He added one condition for the benefit of the 
 army, which was not less dear to him than his 
 brothers and nieces; he demanded 100 mil- 
 lions, for the purpose of forming a provision 
 not only for the officers of all ranks, but also 
 for the widows and children of those who had 
 fallen in battle ; without losing time, he signed 
 three treaties of alliance with Baden, Wurtem- 
 berg, and Bavaria. He gave to Baden the 
 Ortenau and part of the Brisgau, several towns 
 on the shore of the Lake of Constance, that 
 is to say 113,000 inhabitants, which was an 
 augmentation of about one-fourth to the terri- 
 tories of that house. He gave to the house of 
 Wurtemburg the rest of the Brisgau, and con- 
 siderable portions of Suabia, that is to say 
 183,000 inhabitants, which formed an aug- 
 mentation of more than a fourth, and raised the 
 population of that principality to nearly a mil- 
 lion. Lastly, to Bavaria he gave the Vorarl- 
 berg, the bishoprics of Eichstidt and Passau, 
 recently allotted to the Elector of Salzburg, all 
 Austrian Saubia, the city and bishopric of 
 Augsburg, that is to say a million inhabitants, 
 which raised Bavaria from two millions to 
 three, and added a third to her possessions. 
 The progress of the negotiations with Austria 
 did not admit of any mention being yet made 
 of the Tyrol. 
 
 To these princes were, moreover, attributed 
 all the rights of sovereignty over the imme- 
 diate nobility, and they were relieved from the 
 feudal services claimed by the Emperor of 
 Germany on account of certain portions of 
 their territories. 
 
 The Elector of Baden, having the modesty 
 to refuse the title of king, as too superior to 
 his revenues, the title of elector was left him ; 
 but that of king was immediately conferred on 
 the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. 
 
 In return for these advantages, those three 
 princes engaged to assist France in any war 
 which she might have to wage in future in 
 support of her state at this time, and in any 
 which might result from the treaty about to be 
 concluded with Austria. France, on her part, 
 engaged, whenever it should be necessary, to 
 take up arms to maintain these princes in 
 their new situation. 
 
 These treaties were signed on the 10th, 12th, 
 and 20th of December. They were delivered 
 to General Thiard when he set off to negotiate 
 the projected marriages. 
 
 Thus a portion of the territories of Austria 
 had been disposed of beforehand, and without 
 the consent of that power. But the conqueror 
 gave himself little concern about the conse- 
 quences to which this proceeding exposed him. 
 
 Napoleon, after attending to his wounded, 
 after sending off for Vienna those at least 
 who were capable of being removed, after 
 despatching to France the prisoners and the 
 cannon taken from the enemy, quitted Brunr. 
 leaving M. de Talleyrand to discuss the pre- 
 scribed conditions with Messieurs de Giulay 
 and De Dichtenstein. He was impatient to 
 have a long conversation at Vienna with M.
 
 100 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805. 
 
 le Haugwitz and to dive to the bottom of the 
 secret of Prussia. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand entered immediately into 
 conference with the two Austrian negotiators. 
 They strongly remonstrated when they were 
 made acquainted with the pretensions of the 
 French minister, and as yet there had been 
 no explanation respecting the Tyrol; nothing 
 had been said but about the desire to separate 
 Austria from Italy and Switzerland, to cut 
 short all causes for rivalry and war. 
 
 Messieurs de Lichtenstein and De Giulay 
 communicated, on their part, the conditions to 
 which Austria was ready to consent She 
 saw clearly that she must relinquish the Ve- 
 netian States, the possessions which she had 
 in Suabia, and litigious pretensions between 
 the Empire and the German princes. She 
 consented, therefore, to cede Venice and the 
 terra firma as far as the Izonzo ; but she 
 wished to keep Istria and Albania and to gain 
 Ragusa, as debouches necessary for Hungary. 
 These were, besides, the last remains of the 
 acquisitions obtained by the reigning emperor, 
 and he made it a point of honour to preserve 
 them. 
 
 As for the Tyrol, she was almost disposed 
 to give that up, but by transferring it to the 
 then Elector of Salzburg, the Archduke Fer- 
 dinand, who had been compensated in 1803 
 for Tuscany by the bishopric Of Salzburg and 
 the provostship of Berchtolsgaden. She want- 
 ed Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden in exchange, 
 and moreover she required that the Vorarl- 
 berg, Lindau, and the shores of the Lake of 
 Constance should be given to the same arch- 
 duke, as dependencies of the Tyrol. 
 
 By this arrangement, Austria would have 
 acquired Salzburg and kept the Tyrol and the 
 Vorarlberg, in the person of one of her arch- 
 dukes. 
 
 For the rest, she consented to cede the Aus- 
 trian possessions in Suabia, likewise the Or- 
 tenau, the Brisgau, the bishoprics of Eichstiidt 
 and Passau. But she demanded for the 
 princes of her house who would lose those 
 possessions a large compensation, which will 
 appear singularly devised, and show with what 
 sentiments the members of the European coa- 
 lition were animated towards one another 
 she demanded Hanover. 
 
 Thus this patrimony of the King of Eng- 
 land, which Napoleon had been censured for 
 offering to Prussia, and Prussia for accepting 
 from Napoleon, which Russia came herself to 
 propose to Prussia in order to detach her from 
 France, Austria, in her turn, demanded for an 
 archduke ! 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, delighted to find such 
 claims brought forward, made no remonstrance 
 on hearing them expressed, and promised to 
 communicate them to Napoleon. 
 
 Lastly, with regard to the contribution of 
 one hundred millions, Austria declared it im- 
 possible for her to pay ten, so completely was 
 she exhausted. In compensation for such a 
 sum, she offered to give up the immense ma- 
 tirid in arms and ammunition of all kinds, 
 which were in the Venetian States, and which 
 she would have had a right to carry away, if 
 she had not stipulated to leave it. 
 
 After warm debates, which lasted but three 
 or four days, since both parties were in haste 
 to bring matters to a close, it was agreed that 
 the Prince de Lichtenstein should go to the 
 Emperor Francis at Holitsch, to obtain fresh 
 instructions, as those with which he was fur- 
 nished did not authorize him to subscribe to 
 the sacrifices required by Napoleon. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand was to remain at Brunn 
 till his return. It was a great fault of the A us- 
 trians to lose time ; for what was passing at 
 Vienna between Napoleon and M. de Haug- 
 witz was about to place them in a still worse 
 situation. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, who from Briinn corre- 
 sponded daily with Vienna, had informed Na- 
 poleon that he was not near settling with the 
 Austrian negotiators. This resistance, which 
 would have deserved serious attention if it had 
 been combined with the resistance of Prussia, 
 annoyed Napoleon. The archdukes were ap- 
 proaching Presburg, followed by 100,000 men. 
 The Prussian troops were assembling in Sax- 
 ony and in Franconia; the Anglo-Russians 
 were advancing in Hanover. These conjoint 
 circumstances did not alarm the victor of Aus- 
 terlitz. He was ready, if need were, to fight 
 the archdukes under the walls of Presburg, 
 and then to fall upon Prussia by way of Bohe- 
 mia. But it was beginning afresh a dangerous 
 game with Europe, coalesced this time whole 
 and entire, and he would not have been wise 
 to expose himself to the risk for a few square 
 leagues more or less. Though the position of 
 Napoleon was that of an all-powerful conque- 
 ror, it did not dispense him from the duty of 
 behaving like an able politician. It was Prus- 
 sia that it particularly behoved his skill to keep 
 sight of; for, profiting by the terror with which 
 the recent events of the war had filled her, he 
 might take her away from the coalition, attach 
 her again to France, and add to the victory of 
 Austerlitz a diplomatic victory not less deci- 
 sive. He was, therefore, extremely impatient 
 to see and to converse with M. de Haugwitz. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz, who had come to impose 
 conditions on Napoleon, under the false ap- 
 pearance of an officious mediation, found him 
 triumphant and almost master of Europe. No 
 doubt, with firmness, union, perseverance, it 
 would still be possible to make head againt- 
 the Emperor of the French. But Russia had 
 passed from the delirium of pride to the de 
 spondency of defeat. And, besides, all the 
 allies, distrusting one another, communicated 
 but little among themselves. M. de Haugwitz 
 frequented incessantly and exclusively the 
 French legation, and carried flattery to such a 
 length as to wear every day in Vienna the 
 grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, 1 never 
 spoke but with admiration of Austerlitz and of 
 the genius of Napoleon, and could not help 
 feeling a strong agitation when thinking of the 
 reception which he was about to meet with. 
 
 Napoleon, having arrived on the 13th of 
 December at Vienna, sent the same evening for 
 M. de Haugwitz to Schonbrunn, and gave au- 
 dience to him in the cabinet of Maria Theresa. 
 
 1 It is M. de Talieyrand who relates these particulars ii 
 one of his letters to Napoleon.
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND TH.t] EMPIRE. 
 
 101 
 
 He knew not yet all that had taken place at 
 Potsdam; he knew more, however, than when 
 he saw M. de Haugwitz at Brunn, the day be- 
 fore the battle. He was informed of the exist- 
 ence of a treaty signed on the 3d of November, 
 by which Prussia engaged eventually to join 
 the coalition. He was warm and easily irri- 
 tated, but frequently he feigned anger rather 
 than felt it. Striving on this occasion to inti- 
 midate his visitor, he reproached M. de Haug- 
 witz most vehemently for having, he, the minis- 
 ter, who was the friend of peace, he who had 
 placed his glory in the system of neutrality, 
 who had even desired to convert that neutrali- 
 ty into a plan of alliance with France he re- 
 proached him for having had the weakness to 
 unite himself at Potsdam with Russia and 
 Austria, for having contracted with those two 
 powers engagements which could lead him to 
 nothing but war. He complained bitterly of 
 the duplicity of his cabinet, of the hesitations 
 of his sovereign, of the empire of women over 
 his court, and gave him to understand that, 
 being now rid of the enemies whom he had 
 upon his hands, he was at liberty to do what 
 he pleased wilh Prussia. He then asked with 
 vehemence what the Prussian cabinet wanted, 
 what system it calculated on pursuing, and 
 seemed to require complete, categorical, im- 
 mediate explanations upon all these points. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz, agitated at first, soon reco- 
 vered himself, for he had not less presence of 
 mind than intelligence. Amidst all this bois- 
 terous passion, he imagined that he could per- 
 ceive that Napoleon, at bottom, was desirous 
 of a reconciliation, and that, if the engage- 
 ments entered into with the coalition were very 
 speedily broken, this conqueror, apparently so 
 incensed, would consent to be appeased. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz then gave his artful, spe- 
 cious, fawning explanations of the circum- 
 stances which had overpowered and hurried 
 Prussia away ; mentioned, not indiscreetly, 
 those who had suffered themselves to be con- 
 trolled by pure accident to such a degree as to 
 depart from the true system which was suita- 
 ble for their country; and concluded with in- 
 sinuating plainly enough that all would be 
 speedily repaired, and even that the alliance 
 which had so often miscarried might become 
 the instantaneous price of an immediate re- 
 conciliation. 
 
 Napoleon, casting a piercing look into the 
 soul of M. de Haugwiiz, perceived that the 
 Prussians desired nothing better than to face 
 about and come back to him. To all the blows 
 that he had inflicted on Europe, he had taken 
 pleasure in adding a piece of arch-raillery ; 
 and he took it into his head to offer on the spot 
 to M. de Haugwitz the plan which Duroc had 
 been ordered to present at Berlin, that is to 
 say, the formal alliance of Prussia with France, 
 on the so oft-renewed condition of Hanover. 
 This was certainly carrying the attempt upon 
 the honour of the Prussian cabinet to a great 
 length ; for Napoleon proposed to it, for the 
 sake of money, one may say, to dissolve the 
 ties recently contracted over the coffin of the 
 great Frederick ; and he proposed to it, af er 
 deserting France at Potsdam for the benefit of 
 Europe, to desert Europe at Vienna for the 
 
 benefit of France. Napoleon did not hesitate, 
 and, while uttering this proposal, he kept his 
 eyes long fixed on the face of M. de Haug- 
 witz. 
 
 The Prussian minister appeared neither an- 
 gry nor surprised. He seemed delighted, on 
 the contrary, to carry back from Vienna, in- 
 stead of a declaration of war, Hanover, with 
 the alliance of France, which was his favour- 
 ite system. It should be observed, in excuse 
 for M. de Haugwitz, that, having left Berlin at 
 a moment when people there were flattering 
 themselves that Napoleon would not reach 
 Vienna, he had seen, even in this supposition, 
 the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollen- 
 dorf uneasy about the consequences of a war 
 against France, and insisting that no declara- 
 tion should be issued before the end of Decem- 
 ber. Now Napoleon had taken Vienna, crushed 
 all the allies at Austerlitz, and it was only the 
 13th of December. M. de Haugwitz had rea- 
 son to apprehend that the conqueror might 
 make a rapid incursion into Bohemia and fall 
 like lightning upon Berlin. He thought himself 
 fortunate, therefore, in terminating with a con- 
 quest a situation which threatened to terminate 
 in a disaster. As for fidelity towards the coa- 
 lesced powers, he treated them as they treated 
 each other. Besides, for the line of conduct 
 which he had pursued at Vienna, we must find 
 fault not so much with him as with those who, 
 in his absence, had entangled Prussia in a de- 
 file, having no outlet. He accepted, therefore, 
 the offer of Napoleon without further consider- 
 ation. 
 
 The latter, gratified to see that his proposal 
 was successful, said to M. de Haugwitz, " Well, 
 then, the thing is decided, you shall have Han- 
 over. You will give me in return some patches 
 of territory that I want, and sign a treaty of 
 alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. 
 But, on your arrival in Berlin, you will impose 
 silence on the coteries; you will treat them 
 with the contempt which they deserve; you 
 will make the policy of the ministry predomi- 
 nate over that of the court." The allusions 
 of Napoleon pointed to the queen, to Prince 
 Louis, and to those about them. He then en- 
 joined Duroc to confer with M. de Haugwitz, 
 and to prepare immediately the draft of the 
 treaty. 
 
 No sooner was this arrangement concluded 
 than Napoleon, delighted with his work, wote 
 to M. de Talleyrand, desiring him not to bring 
 matters to a conclusion at Brunn, to protract 
 the negotiation for a few days longer, for he 
 was certain of settling with Prussia, which he 
 had conquered at the price of Hanover, and 
 thenceforward he had no need, to concern him- 
 self either about the threats of the Anglo-Rus- 
 sians against Holland, or the movements c-f 
 the archdukes from the direction of Hungarv. 
 He added that he would now peremptorily in- 
 sist on the Tyrol, on the war contribution 
 more resolutely than ever, and that, for the 
 rest, he must leave Brunn and come to Vienna. 
 The negotiation was too far from him at Briinn : 
 he wished to have it nearer, af Presburg for 
 instance. 
 
 It, was on the 13th of December when Na- 
 poleon had the interview with M de Haugwitz. 
 i 2
 
 103 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805 
 
 The treaty was drawn up on the 14th, and 
 signed on the 15th at Schonbrunn. The prin- 
 cipal conditions were the following : 
 
 France, considering Hanover as her own 
 conquest, ceded it to Prussia. Prussia, in re- 
 turn, ceded to Bavaria the margravate of An- 
 spach, that province which it was so difficult 
 to_avoid passing through when at war with 
 Austria. She ceded, moreover, to France the 
 principality of Neufchatel, and the duchy of 
 Cleves, containing the fortress of Wesel. The 
 two powers guarantied all their possessions ; 
 that is to say, Prussia guarantied to France 
 her present limits, with the new acquisitions 
 made in Italy and the new arrangements con- 
 cluded in Germany; and France guarantied to 
 Prussia her state at that time, including the 
 additions of 1803 and the new addition of Han- 
 over. It was an absolute treaty of alliance, 
 offensive and defensive, which moreover bore 
 that formal title, a title repudiated in all ante- 
 rior treaties. 
 
 Napoleon had demanded Neufchatel, Cleves. 
 and particularly Anspach, which he meant to 
 exchange with Bavaria for the duchy of Berg, 
 in order to have endowments to confer on his 
 best servants. To Prussia these were very 
 small sacrifices, and to him valuable means 
 of reward ; for, in his vast designs, he would 
 not be great without making all about him 
 great his ministers, his generals, as well as 
 his relations. 
 
 This negotiation was a master-stroke: it 
 covered the allies with confusion ; it placed 
 Austria at the discretion of Napoleon ; and, 
 above all, it secured to the latter the only de- 
 sirable and possible alliance, the alliance of 
 Prussia. But it contained a serious engage- 
 ment, the engagement to wring Hanover from 
 England, which might some day be found ex- 
 tremely troublesome, as it was to be appre- 
 hended that it might prevent a maritime peace, 
 if sooner or later circumstances rendered such 
 a peace possible. 
 
 Napoleon wrote immediately afterwards to 
 M. de Talleyrand that the treaty with Prussia 
 was signed, and that he must leave Brtinn, if 
 the Austrians did not accept the conditions 
 which he meant to impose upon them. 
 M. de Talleyrand, who would have been 
 glad if peace had been already concluded, who 
 disliked above all to maltreat Austria, was 
 deeply vexed. As for the Austrian negotiators, 
 they were thunderstruck. They brought from 
 Holitsch fresh concessions, but not so exten- 
 sive as those which had been required of them. 
 They knew that Prussia, in order to obtain 
 Hanover, exposed them to the loss of the Ty- 
 ro}, and, notwithstanding the danger of further 
 delay, and of seeing Napoleon make perhaps 
 fresh demands, a danger of which M. de Tal- 
 leyrand took pains to convince them, they 
 were obliged to refer to their sovereign. 
 
 They parted, therefore, at Briinn, promising 
 to meet again at Presburg. The abode at 
 Brunn had become unwholesome from the 
 effluvia exhaled by a soil crowded with corpses 
 and a town filled with hospitals. 
 
 M. de TalleyraTic returned to Vienna and 
 found Napoleon ready to renew the war if his 
 leroii were not agreed tu. He had actually 
 
 ordered General Songis to repair the materiel of 
 the artillery, and to augment it at the expense 
 of the arsenal of Vienna. He had even ad- 
 dressed a severe reprimand to Fouche, the 
 minister of police, for having allowed peace 
 to be announced too soon as certain. 
 
 One very recent circumstance had contri- 
 buted to incense him more. He had just re 
 ceived intelligence of what was occurring at 
 Naples. That senseless court, after stipulat- 
 ing (by the advice of Russia, it is true) a 
 treaty of neutrality, had all at once thrown oft 
 the mask and taken up arms. When informed 
 of the battle of Trafalgar and the engagements 
 contracted by Prussia, Queen Caroline had 
 concluded that Napoleon was ruined, and had 
 determined to send for the Russians. On the 
 19th of November, a naval division had landed 
 on the coast of Naples 12,000 Russians and 
 6,000 English. The court of Naples had en- 
 gaged to add 40,000 Neapolitans to the Anglo- 
 Russian army. The plan was to raise Italy 
 in the rear of the French, while Massena was 
 at the foot of the Julian Alps and Napoleon 
 almost on the frontiers of ancient Poland, 
 That court of emigrants had given way to the 
 habitual weakness of emigrants, which is to 
 believe always what they wish and to act ac- 
 cordingly. 
 
 Napoleon, when apprized of this scandalous 
 violation of faith pledged, was at once irritated 
 and pleased. His resolution was taken ; the 
 Queen of Naples should pay with her kingdom 
 for the conduct which she had pursued, and 
 leave vacant a crown which would be ex- 
 tremely well placed in the Bonaparte family. 
 Nobody in Europe could tax with injustice the 
 sovereign act that should strike this branch 
 of the house of Bourbon ; and, as for its 
 natural protectors, Napoleon had no need to 
 care about them. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Austrian negotiators at 
 Briinn had endeavoured to obtain the insertion 
 in the treaty of peace of some article which 
 should cover the court of Naples, of whose 
 secret, though yet unknown to Napoleon, they 
 were apprized. But the latter, when once in- 
 formed, gave a positive order to M. de Talley- 
 rand not to listen to any thing on that subject 
 I should be too weak, said he, were I to put 
 up with the insults of that wretched court of 
 Naples. You know with what generosity I 
 have treated it, but that is over now, Queen 
 Caroline shall cease to reign in Italy. Hap- 
 pen what will, never mention it in the treaty. 
 That is my absolute will. 
 
 The negotiators were waiting at Presburg 
 for M. de Talleyrand, He repaired thither 
 The negotiations were held at the advanced 
 posts of the two armies. The archdukes had 
 approached Presburg: they were within two 
 marches of Vienna. Napoleon had collected 
 there the greater part of his troops. He had 
 brought Massena by the route of Styria. Nearly 
 200,000 French were concentrated around the 
 capital of Austria. Napoleon, extremely in- 
 censed, had determined to resume hostilities 
 But it would have been too great a folly on 
 the part of the court of Vienna to permit that, 
 especially after the defection of Prussia, and 
 in the disheartened state of the Russian caoi-
 
 Dec. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 103 
 
 net. Great as were the sacrifices required of 
 the Austrian cabinet, though affecting at first 
 to repeal the idea, it had made up its mind to 
 submit to them. It was therefore agreed that 
 Austria should give up the state of Venice, 
 with the provinces of the terra firma, such as 
 Friule, Istria, and Dalmatia. Trieste and the 
 Bocca di Cattaro were also to be ceded to 
 France. These territories were to be annexed 
 to the kingdom of Italy. The separation of 
 the crowns of France and Italy was anew 
 stipulated, but with a vagueness of expression 
 which left the faculty of deferring that separa- 
 tion till the general peace, or till the death of 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Bavaria obtained the Tyrol, the object of her 
 everlasting longing, the German Tyrol'as well 
 as the Italian Tyrol. Austria, in return, ob- 
 tained the principalities of Salzburg and 
 Berchtolsgaden, given in 1803 to the Archduke 
 Ferdinand, previously Grand-duke of Tuscany ; 
 and Bavaria indemnified the archduke by 
 ceding to him the ecclesiastical principality 
 of Wurzburg, which she likewise had obtained 
 in 1803, in consequence of the secularizations. 
 
 The territory of Austria was thus rendered 
 more compact ; but, with the Tyrol, she lost 
 all influence over Switzerland and Italy, and 
 the Archduke Ferdinand, removed into the 
 centre of Franconia, ceased to be under her 
 immediate influence. The state granted to 
 that prince was not, as before, a mere depen- 
 dency of the Austrian monarchy. 
 
 To this indemnity, found in the country of 
 Salzburg, was added for Austria the secular- 
 ization of the possessions of the Teutonic 
 Order, and their conversion to hereditary 
 property in favour of any of the archdukes 
 whom she should point out. The importance 
 of these possessions consisted in a popula- 
 tion of 120,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 
 150,000 florins. 
 
 The electoral title of the Archduke Ferdi- 
 nand was upheld, and transferred from the 
 principality of Salzburg to the principality of 
 Wurzburg. 
 
 Austria, recognising the royalty of the elec- 
 tors of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, consented 
 that the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, 
 and Bavaria, should have the same preroga- 
 tives over the immediate nobility in their terri- 
 tories as the emperor had over the immediate 
 nobility in his. This was equivalent to the 
 suppression of that nobility in the three states 
 in question, for, the powers of the emperor 
 over that nobility being complete, those of the 
 three princes became equally so. 
 
 Lastly, the imperial chancellery renounced 
 all rights of feudal origin in the three states 
 favoured by France. 
 
 The approbation of the Diet was,however, for- 
 mally reserved. France effected in this manner 
 a social revolution in a considerable part of 
 Germany ; for she centralized power there for 
 the benefit of the territorial sovereign, and put 
 an end to all external feudal dependence. She 
 continued also the system of secularizations, 
 for with the Teutonic Order disappeared one 
 of the last two ecclesiastical principalities re- 
 maining, and the only one then left was that 
 of the prince arch-chancellor, ecclesiastical 
 
 elector of Ratisbon. Conformably with what 
 had previously been done, this secularization 
 also was effected for the benefit of one of the 
 principal courts of Germany. 
 
 Austria, definitively excluded from Italy, de- 
 spoiled by the loss of the Tyrol of the com- 
 manding positions which she had in the Alps, 
 thrust back behind the Inn, deprived of every 
 advanced post in Suabia, and of the feudal 
 rights which subjected the states of South 
 Germany to her, had sustained immense losses, 
 material and political. She lost, as we have 
 already observed, four millions of subjects out 
 of twenty-four, fifteen millions of florins out 
 of a revenue of 103. 
 
 The treaty was well conceived for the peace 
 of Italy and Germany. There was only one 
 objection to be made to it, namely, that the 
 ; vanquished, too ill-treated, could not submit 
 sincerely. It was for Napoleon, by great dis- 
 cretion, by judicious alliances, to leave Aus- 
 j tria without hope and without means of 
 | revolting against the decisions of victory. 
 
 At the moment of signing such a treaty, the 
 hands of the plenipotentiaries hesitated. They 
 stood out on two points, the war contribution 
 of 100 millions and Naples. Napoleon had 
 reduced the contribution demanded to 50 mil- 
 lions, on account of the sums in the chests of 
 Austria, to which he had already helped him- 
 self. As for Naples, he would not hear a word 
 about her. 
 
 In order to overcome him, a proceeding of 
 pure courtesy was devised, namely, to send to 
 him the Archduke Charles, a prince whose 
 character and talents he honoured, and whom 
 | he had never seen. He was solicited to re- 
 i ceive him at Vienna, and assented very cheer- 
 fully, but firmly resolved to abate nothing. It 
 was expected that this prince, one of the first 
 generals in Europe, explaining to him the re- 
 sources which the Austrian monarchy still 
 possessed, expressing the sentiments of the 
 army, ready to sacrifice itself in rejecting a 
 humiliating peace, joining adroit solicitations 
 to these remonstrances, might perhaps soften 
 Napoleon. Hence, when M. de Talleyrand 
 urged the negotiators to bring the business to 
 a conclusion, they replied that they should be 
 accused of having betrayed their country, if 
 they gave their signatures before the interview 
 which Napoleon was to have with the Arch- 
 duke. 
 
 However, M. de Talleyrand having taken it 
 upon himself to relinquish 10 millions more 
 of the war contribution, they signed on the 
 26th of December the treaty of Presburg, one 
 of the most glorious that Napoleon ever con- 
 cluded, and certainly the best conceived; for, 
 if France afterwards obtained more extensive 
 territories, it was at the price of arrangements 
 less acceptable to Europe, and therefore less 
 durable. The Austrian negotiators confined 
 themselves to the recommendation of the 
 reigning house of Naples to the generosity of 
 the conqueror, in a letter signed by them both. 
 The archduke visited Napoleon on the 27th, 
 in one of the imperial palaces, was received 
 by him with the respect due to his rank and 
 his renown, conversed with him on the mili- 
 tary art, which was perfectly natural betweeu
 
 104 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1805 
 
 two captains of such merit, and then retired 
 without having said a word about the affairs 
 of the two empires. 
 
 Napoleon made preparations for leaving 
 Austria immediately. He ordered 2000 pieces 
 of cannon and 100,000 muskets, found in the 
 arsenal of Vienna, to be shipped on the Da- 
 nube; he despatched 150 pieces to Palma 
 Nova, to arm that important fortress, which 
 commanded the Venetian states of the terra 
 firma. He regulated the return of his soldiers 
 in such a manner that it should take place by 
 short marches, for he would not have them go 
 back as they had come, on the run. The ne- 
 cessary arrangements were made on the route 
 for their abundant supply. He ordered two 
 millions to be distributed forthwith among the 
 officers of all ranks, that every one might im- 
 mediately enjoy the fruits of the victory. Ber- 
 thier was appointed to superintend the return 
 of the army to the territory of France. It was 
 to evacuate Vienna in five days, and to repass 
 the Inn in twenty. It was stipulated that the 
 fortress of Braunau should remain in the 
 hands of the French till the complete payment 
 of the contribution of 40 millions. 
 
 This done, Napoleon set out for Munich, 
 where he was received with transport. The 
 Bavarians, who were one day to betray him 
 in his defeat, and to oblige the French army to 
 fight its way through them at Hanau, covered 
 with their applause, pursued with ardent cu- 
 riosity, the conqueror who had saved them 
 from in-vasion, constituted them into a king- 
 dom, enriched them with the spoils of van- 
 quished Austria. Napoleon, after attending 
 the wedding of Eugene Beauharnais and the 
 Princess Augusta, after enjoying the happiness 
 
 of a son whom he loved, the admiration of 
 the people, eager to see him, the flatteries of 
 an enemy, the Electress of Bavaria, set out for 
 Paris, where the enthusiasm of France awaited 
 him. 
 
 A campaign of three months, instead of a 
 war of several years, as it had at first been 
 feared, the continent disarmed, the French em- 
 pire extended to limits which it ought never 
 to have passed, a dazzling glory added to our 
 arms, public and private credit miraculously 
 restored, new prospects of peace and pros- 
 perity opened to the nation, under a govern- 
 ment powerful and respected by the world 
 that was what the people meant to thank him 
 for by a thousand times repeated shouts of 
 " Vive I'Empereur /" With these cries he was 
 greeted even at Strasburg on crossing the 
 Rhine, and they accompanied him to Paris, 
 which he entered on the 26th of January, 1806. 
 It was a second return from Marengo. Aus- 
 terlitz was in fact for the Empire what Ma- 
 rengo had been for the Consulate. Marengo 
 had confirmed the consular power in the hands 
 of Napoleon; Austerlitz secured the imperial 
 crown upon his head. Marengo had caused 
 France to pass in one day from a threatening 
 situation to a tranquil and grand situation : 
 Austerlitz, by crushing in a day a formidable 
 coalition, produced a not less important result. 
 For calm and reflecting minds, if any such 
 were left in presence of these events, there 
 was but one subject for fear the inconstancy 
 of Fortune, and what is still more to be 
 dreaded, the weakness of the human mind, 
 which sometimes bears adversity without 
 quailing, rarely prosperity without committing 
 great faults.
 
 Jan. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 105 
 
 BOOK XXIV. 
 
 CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE. 
 
 Return of Napoleon to Paris Public Joy Distribution of the Colours taken from the Enemy Decree of the 
 Senate ordaining the Erection of a triumphal Monument Napoleon devotes his first Attention to the Finance* 
 The Company of United Merchants is ascertained to be indebted to the Treasury the Sum of 141 Millions- 
 Napoleon, dissatisfied with M. de Marbois, appoints M. Mollien to supersede him Re-establishment of Public 
 Credit A fund formed with the Contributions levied in conquered Countries Orders relative to the Returii of the 
 Army, to the Occupation of Dalmatia, to the Conquest of Naples Affairs of Prussia Ratification of the Treaty 
 of Schonbrunn given with Reservations New Mission of M. de Haugwitz to Napoleon The Treaty of Schon- 
 brunn remodelled in Paris, but with more Obligations and fewer Advantages for Prussia M. de Lucchesini is 
 ent to Berlin to explain these new Changes The Treaty of Schonbrunn, transformed into the Treaty of Paris, 
 is at length ratified, and M. de Haugwitz returns to Prussia Predominant Ascendency of France Entry of 
 Joseph Bonaparte into Naples Occupation of Venice Delay in the Delivery of Dalmatia The French Army 
 is halted on the Inn till the Delivery of Dalmatia, and distributed in the German Provinces most capaole of 
 subsisting it Distress of the occupied Countries Situation of the Court of Prussia, after the Return of M. de 
 Haugwitz to Berlin Mission of the Duke of Brunswick to St. Petersburg, to explain the Conduct of the Prus- 
 sian Cabinet State of the Court of Russia Dispositions of Alexander since Austerlitz Reception given to the 
 Duke of Brunswick Useless Efforts of Prussia to induce Russia and England to approve the Occupation of 
 Hanover England declares War against Prussia Death of Mr. Pitt, and Accession of Mr. Fox to the Minis- 
 try Hopes of Peace Correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. de Talleyrand Mission of Lord Yarmouth 
 to Paris in Quality of confidential Negotiator Bases of a Maritime Peace The Agents of Austria, instead of 
 giving up the Bocca di Cattaro to the French, put it into the Hands of the Russians Threats of Napoleon 
 against the Court of Vienna Russia sends M. d'Oubril to Paris, with a Commission to prevent a Movement of 
 the French Army against Austria, and to propose Peace Lord Yarmouth and M. d'Oubril negotiate jointly at 
 Paris Possibility of a general Peace Calculation of Napoleon tending to protract the Negotiation System 
 of the French Empire Vassal Kingdoms, Grand-Duchies, and Duchies Joseph King of Naples, Louis King of 
 Holland Dissolution of the Germanic Empire Confederation of the Rhine Movements of the French Army 
 Internal Administration Public Works The Column of the Place Venddme. the Louvre, the Rue Imperiale, 
 the Arc de 1'Etoile Roads and Canals Council of State Institution of the University Budget of 1806 Re- 
 establishment of the Tax on Salt New System of the Treasury Reorganization of the Bank of France Con- 
 tinuation of the Negotiations with Russia and England Treaty of Peace with Russia signed on the 20th of 
 July, by M. d'Oubril The Signature of this Treaty decides Lord Yarmouth to produce his Powers Lord Lan- 
 derdale is associated with Ix>rd Yarmouth Difficulties of the Negotiation with England Some indiscretions 
 committed by the English Negotiators on the Subject of the Restitution of Hanover, excite great Uneasiness at 
 Berlin False Reports inflame the Court of Prussia New Infatuation at Berlin and Resolution to arm Sur- 
 prise and Distrust of Napoleon Russia refuses to ratify the Treaty signed by M. d'Oubril. and proposes new 
 Conditions Napoleon refuses to admit them General Tendency to War The King of Prussia insists on the 
 French Army being withdrawn Napoleon replies by insisting on the Prussian Army being withdrawn Long 
 Silence on both Sides Both Sovereigns set out for the Army War declared between Prussia and France. 
 
 WHILE Napoleon was staying a few days at j 
 Munich to celebrate the marriage of Eugene I 
 de Beauharnais with the Princess Augusta of 
 Bavaria ; while he was stopping one day at 
 Stuttgard, another at Carlsruhe, to receive the 
 congratulations of his new allies, and to con- 
 clude family alliances there; the people of 
 Paris were waiting with the utmost impa- 
 tience to testify their joy and their admiration. 
 France, thoroughly satisfied with the conduct 
 of the public affairs, though no longer taking 
 any part in them, seemed to have recovered 
 the vivacity of the first days of the Revolution 
 to applaud the marvellous exploits of her 
 armies and of her chief. Napoleon, who with 
 the genius for great things combined the art to 
 set them off, had sent before him the colours 
 taken from the enemy. He had given orders 
 for a distribution of them that was very skil- 
 fully calculated. He had divided them among 
 the Senate, the Tribunate, the city of Paris, 
 and the ancient church of Notre Dame, which 
 had witnessed his coronation. He gave eight 
 to the Tribunate, eight to the city of Paris, 
 fifty-four to the Senate, fifty to the church of 
 Notre Dame. During the whole of the cam- 
 paign, he had never ceased to inform the 
 Senate of all the events of the war, and when 
 peace was signed, he had hastened to com- 
 municate to it by a message the treaty of 
 Presburg. In this manner he repaid by con- 
 tinual attentions the confidence of that great 
 body, and, in acting thus, he was consistent 
 with his policy ; for he kept in a high rank 
 loose old authors of the Revolution, whom the 
 
 Voi. II. 14 
 
 new generation was glad to get rid of, when 
 the elections furnished it with the means of 
 doing so. These were his own aristocracy, 
 which he hoped to melt down by degrees into 
 the old one. 
 
 These colours passed through Paris on the 
 15th of January, 1806, and were borne tri- 
 umphantly along the streets of the capital, to 
 be placed under the roofs of the edifices which 
 were to contain them. An immense con- 
 course collected to witness this spectacle. 
 
 The cool and unimpassioned CambaceVes 
 himself says, in his grave Memoirs, that the 
 joy of the people resembled intoxication. And 
 wherefore, indeed, should they rejoice if not 
 on such occasions! Four hundred thousand 
 Russians, Swedes, English, Austrians, were 
 marching from all points of the horizon against 
 France, two hundred thousand Prussians pro- 
 mising to join them, and, all at once, a hun- 
 dred thousand French, starting from the coasts 
 of the Ocean, traversing in two months a great 
 part of the European continent, taking the first 
 army opposed to them without fighting, in- 
 flicting redoubled blows on the others, entering 
 the astonished capital of the ancient Germanic 
 empire, passing beyond Vienna and going to 
 the frontiers of Poland, to break in one great 
 battle the bond of the coalition ; sending back 
 the vanquished Russians to their frozen plain.,, 
 and chaining the disconcerted Prussians to 
 their frontiers; the dread of a war which 
 might be expected to last long terminated in 
 three months ; the peace of the continent sud- 
 denly restored, the peace of the seas justly
 
 106 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1806. 
 
 noped for ; all the prospects of prosperity 
 given back to France, delighted and placed at 
 the head of the nations for what should peo- 
 ple rejoice, we repeat, if not for such marvels ? 
 And as at that time none could foresee the too 
 speedy end of this greatness, or yet discern, in 
 the too fertile genius that produced it, the too 
 ardent genius also that was destined to com- 
 promise it, one sympathized in the public 
 happiness without any mixture of sinister 
 presentiments. 
 
 The men who are particularly affected by 
 the material prosperity of States, the mer- 
 chants, the capitalists, were not less moved 
 than the rest of the nation. The great com- 
 mercial houses, which in victory applauded 
 the speedy return of peace the great com- 
 mercial houses were delighted to see the 
 double crisis of public and private credit ter- 
 minated in a day, and to have reason to hope 
 anew for that profound tranquillity, which for 
 five years the Consulate had conferred on 
 France. The Senate, on receiving the colours 
 destined for it, ordained by a decree that a 
 triumphal monument should be erected to Na- 
 poleon the Great. Conformably with the wish 
 of the Tribunate, this monument was to be a 
 column surmounted by the statue of Napo- 
 leon. His birthday was placed among the 
 national festivals, and it was, moreover, de- 
 termined that a spacious edifice should be 
 erected in one of the public places of the 
 capital, to receive, along with a series of 
 sculptures and paintings, dedicated to the 
 glory of the French armies, the sword which 
 Napoleon used at the battle of Austerlitz. 
 
 The colours destined for Notre Dame were 
 delivered to the clergy of that cathedral by the 
 municipal authorities. "These colours," said 
 the venerable Archbishop of Paris, "suspend- 
 ed from the roof of our church, will attest to 
 our latest posterity the efforts of Europe in 
 arms against us, the great achievements of 
 our soldiers, the protection of Heaven over 
 France, the prodigious successes of our in- 
 vincible Emperor, and the homage which he 
 pays to God of his victories." 
 
 It was amidst this profound and universal 
 satisfaction that Napoleon entered Paris, ac- 
 companied by the Empress. The heads of the 
 bank, desirous that his presence should be the 
 signal of the public prosperity, had waited till 
 the day before his arrival to resume their pay- 
 ments in cash. Since the late events, reviving 
 confidence had poured abundance of specie 
 into its coffers. Of the temporary embarrass- 
 ments of the month of December not a trace 
 was left 
 
 With Napoleon joy on account of success 
 never interrupted business. His indefatigable 
 spirit could unite at once business and plea- 
 sure. Having arrived in the evening of the 
 26th of January, on the morning of the 27th he 
 was wholly absorbed in the cares of govern- 
 ment The Arch-chancellor Cambaceres was 
 the first personage of the Empire with whom 
 he conversed on that day. After some moments 
 given to the pleasure of receiving his congra- 
 tulations, and seeing his prudence confounded 
 by the prodigies of the late war, he spoke to 
 him about the financial crisis, so speedily and 
 
 so happily terminated. He believed, and with 
 reason, the accuracy, the equity, of the reports 
 of the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres ; he wish- 
 ed therefore to hear him before any other per- 
 son. He was extremely irritated against M. 
 de Marbois, whose gravity had always imposed 
 upon him, and whom he had deemed incapa- 
 ble of carelessness in business. He was far 
 from suspecting the high integrity of that mi- 
 nister, but he could not forgive him for having 
 delivered up all the resources of the Treasury 
 to adventurous speculators, and he was re- 
 solved to display great severity. The arch- 
 chancellor contrived to pacify him, and to de- 
 monstrate that, instead of using rigour, it would 
 be better to treat with the United Merchants for 
 the transfer of all their assets, in order to wind 
 up this strange transaction with the least pos- 
 sible loss. 
 
 Napoleon immediately summoned a council 
 to the Tuileries, and desired to be furnished 
 with a detailed report of the operations of the 
 Company, which were still obscure to him. He 
 required the attendance of all the ministers, 
 and also of M. Mollien, director of the Sinking 
 Fund, whose management he approved, and 
 whom he thought to possess in a much higher 
 degree than M. de Marbois the dexterity neces- 
 sary for the administration of funds on a great 
 scale. He sent an authoritative order to Mes- 
 sieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, 
 and to the clerk who was accused of having 
 deceived the minister of the Treasury, to come 
 to the Tuileries. 
 
 All the persons who attended were intimi- 
 dated by the presence of the Emperor, who did 
 not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois 
 began reading a long report which he had 
 drawn up relative to the subject under discus- 
 sion. He had not read far before Napoleon, 
 interrupting him, said, " I see how it is. It was 
 with the funds of the Treasury and those of 
 the bank that the company of United Merchant* 
 calculated on providing supplies for France 
 and Spain. And, as Spain had nothing to give 
 but promises of piastres, it is with the money 
 of France that the wants of both countries have 
 been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy, and 
 it is I who have furnished her with one. Now 
 Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouv- 
 rard, must give up to me all they possess; 
 Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I 
 will shut up those gentlemen in Vincennes 
 and send an army to Madrid." 
 
 Napoleon appeared cold and stern towards 
 M. de Marbois. "I esteem your character," 
 said he, " but you have been the dupe of men 
 against whom I warned you to be upon your 
 guard. You have given up to them all the 
 effects in the portfolio, over the employment of 
 which you ought to have been more watchful. 
 I regret to find myself obliged to withdraw from 
 you the administration of the Treasury, for, 
 after what has happened, I cannot leave it to 
 you any longer." Napoleon then ordered the 
 members of the Company, who had been sum- 
 moned to the Tuileries, to be introduced. Mes- 
 sieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, though the 
 least reprehensible, melted into tears. M. Ouv- 
 rard, who had compromised the Company by 
 hazardous speculations, was perfectly calm.
 
 Jan. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 107 
 
 He endeavoured to persuade Napoleon that he 
 ought to permit him to wind up himself the 
 very complicated affairs in which he had in- 
 volved his partners, and that he should bring 
 over from Mexico, by way of Holland and Eng- 
 land, considerable sums, and far superior to 
 those which France had advanced.' 
 
 It is probable that he would have managed 
 the winding up of these affairs much better 
 than any other person ; but Napoleon was too 
 incensed, and too impatient to get out of the 
 hands of speculators, to trust to his promises. 
 He left M. Ouvrard and his partners the alter- 
 native of a criminal prosecution or the imme- 
 diate surrender of all they possessed, whether 
 stores, paper securities, immovables, or pledges 
 received from Spain. They submitted to this 
 cruel sacrifice. 
 
 This was sure to prove a ruinous liquidation 
 for them, but they had rendered themselves 
 liable to it by abusing the resources of the 
 Treasury. The most to be pitied of the three 
 was M. Vanlerberghe, who, without intermed- 
 dling in the speculations of his partners, had 
 confined himself to the operations of a corn 
 trade, carried on actively and honestly through- 
 out all Europe, for the service of the French 
 armies.2 
 
 On dismissing the council, Napoleon de- 
 tained M. Mollien, and without waiting either 
 for any observation from him or for his con- 
 sent, he said, "You will to-day take the oath 
 as minister of the Treasury." M. Mollien, in- 
 timidated, though flattered by such confidence, 
 hesitated to reply. "Have you any objection 
 to be minister then 1 ?" added Napoleon, and re- 
 quired him to take the oath the same day. 
 
 It was requisite to get out of the embarrass- 
 ments of all sorts created by the company of 
 the United Merchants. M. de Marbois had al- 
 ready withdrawn the service of the Treasury 
 from the hands of that Company, and had 
 committed it for a few days to M. Desprez, 
 who had continued it from that moment for 
 the account of the state. He had finally en- 
 trusted it to the receivers-general, on moderate 
 but temporary conditions. The course to be 
 definitively pursued on this subject was not 
 yet decided : nothing was fixed but the resolu- 
 tion not to charge speculators, how able or 
 how upright soever they might be, with a ser- 
 vice so extensive and so important as the 
 general negotiation of the assets of the Trea- 
 sury. 
 
 This service consisted, as we have seen, in 
 discounting the obligations of the receivers-general, ' 
 the bills of the customs and coupes de bois, papers J 
 which had all twelve, fifteen, and eighteen 
 months to run. Till the institution of the 
 company of the United Merchants, the only 
 
 practice was to make partial and specific dis- 
 counts of those papers, to the amount of twen- 
 ty or thirty millions at a time. In exchange 
 for the effects themselves, the funds proceed- 
 J ing from the discount were immediately re- 
 ! ceived. It was gradually, under the growing 
 I empire of necessity, which soon supersedes 
 confidence, that this service had successively 
 been wholly relinquished to a single company, 
 that the portfolio of the Treasury had been left 
 in some measure at its discretion, and that, so 
 great was the infatuation, the chests of ac- 
 countable persons were placed at its disposal. 
 \ Had the minister merely transferred to it spe- 
 cific sums in paper for equivalent sums in 
 cash, allowing it to receive the amount of the 
 discounted effects only when they became due, 
 i no confusion would have taken place between 
 | its affairs and those of the state. But there 
 had been given up to the United Merchants so 
 ' much as 470 millions at once, in obligations of 
 i the receivers-general, bills at sight, bills of the cus- 
 I toms, which they had got discounted either by 
 the bank or by French and foreign bankers. 
 At the same time, for greater convenience, 
 they had been authorized to take directly from 
 the chests of the receivers-general all the 
 funds paid into them, to be afterwards ac- 
 counted for; so that the bank, as we have 
 | seen, when it presented the effects which it 
 had discounted and which were due, had found 
 in the chests nothing but receipts of M. Des- 
 prez's, attesting that he had already been paid 
 them. But these strange facilities had not 
 j stopped there. When M. Desprez, acting for 
 the United Merchants, discounted the effects of 
 the Treasury, he furnished the amount not in 
 cash, but in paper, which he had been allowed 
 to introduce, and which was called M. Desprez's 
 bills. Thus the Company had been enabled to 
 fill the chests of the state and of the bank with 
 these bills, and to create a circulating paper 
 by the aid of which it had for some time met 
 its speculations as well with France as with 
 Spain. 
 
 The real fault of M. de Marbois had been to 
 lend himself to this confusion of affairs, in 
 consequence of which it was no longer possi- 
 ble to distinguish the property of the state 
 from that of the Company. Add to this 
 abusive complaisance, the dishonesty of a 
 clerk, who alone was in the secret respecting 
 the portfolio, and who had deceived M. de 
 Marbois, by exaggerating continually to him 
 the need that he had of the United Merchants ; 
 and we shall have an explanation of this in- 
 credible financial adventure. For this, that 
 clerk had received one million, which Napo- 
 leon ordered to be thrown into the general 
 mass of the assets of the Company. The ter- 
 
 1 In justice to the memory of my deceased friend, M. 
 Gabriel Julien Ouvrard, I feel called upon to state that, 
 in his memoirs, published in 1826, he gives a very dif- 
 ferent version of these transactions and of his interview 
 with Napoleon on the above occasion. M. Ouvrard 
 expired in London on the 21st of October, 1846, aged 
 seventy-six years. The manuscript memoirs which he 
 has left, and which form the sequel of his published 
 autobiography, are replete with interesting matter, and 
 contain some startling disclosures respecting the French 
 Revolution of 1830, and the intrigues which preceded, 
 attended, and followed it. It is likely that the English 
 
 public will soon be enabled to peruse in print these 
 piquant revelations. D. F. C. 
 
 2 I borrow this account from the most authentic sources ; 
 in the first place, from the memoirs of Prince Cambac6r6s ; 
 next from the interesting and instructive memoirs of M 
 le Comte Mollien, which are not yet published ; and last 
 ly, from the Archives of the Treasury. I have had in my 
 hands, and read myself with great attention, the docu- 
 ments of the proceedings (procis), and especially a long 
 and interesting report which the minister of thn Treasury 
 drew up for the Emperor. Here, then, I advance nothing 
 but from official and incontestable evidence.
 
 108 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 ror excited by the Emperor was so great, that 
 the parties readily confessed and restored 
 every thing.. 
 
 However, in order to be just towards every 
 one, we must say, that Napoleon had himself 
 a share in the faults committed on this occa- 
 sion, by persisting in leaving M. de Marbois 
 under the pressure of enormous charges, by 
 deferring too long the creation of extraordinary 
 means. It would have been requisite, in fact, 
 that M. de Marbois should provide for a first 
 arrear, resulting from anterior budgets and the 
 insolvency of Spain, who, not paying her sub- 
 sidy, was the cause of a fresh deficit of about 
 50 millions. It was under the weight of these 
 different burdens, that this upright but too in- 
 considerate minister had become the slave of 
 adventurous men, who rendered him some ser- 
 vices, who might have even rendered him very 
 great ones, if their calculations had been made 
 with greater precision. Their speculations 
 were, in fact, based on a real foundation, 
 namely, the piastres of Mexico, which abso- 
 lutely existed in the chests of the captains- 
 general of Spain. But these piastres could 
 not be so easily brought to Europe as M. Ouv- 
 rard had hoped, and this had led to the embar- 
 rassments of the Treasury and the ruin of the 
 Company. 
 
 What proves the height of the confusion to 
 which things had arrived, was the difficulty 
 that was found to fix the amount of the debit of 
 the Company to the Treasury. It was at first 
 supposed to be 73 millions. A new examina- 
 tion raised it to 84. Lastly, M. Mollien, re- 
 solving on his entry into office, to make a strict 
 investigation into the state of the finances, dis- 
 covered that the Company had contrived to 
 possess itself of the sum of 141 millions, for 
 which it remained debtor lo the state. 
 
 This enormous sum of 141 millions was 
 made up in the following manner. The United 
 Merchants had drawn directly from the chests 
 of the receivers-general so much as 55 millions 
 at once ; and, by means of various repay- 
 ments, their debt to the accountable persons 
 was reduced on the day of ihe catastrophe to 
 23 millions. There were in the chest, to the 
 amount of 73 millions, bills of M. Detprez's, a 
 species of money which M. Desprez gave 
 instead of cash, and which was current so 
 long as his credit, upheld by the bank, re- 
 mained intact, but which had now become 
 worthless paper. The Company owed 14 
 millions more for bills of the central cashier. 
 (We have adverted elsewhere to these effects, 
 devised for the purpose of facilitating the 
 movements of funds between Paris and the 
 provinces.) These 14 millions, taken from 
 the portfolio, had not been followed by any 
 payment either of M. Desprez's bills or any 
 other assets. M. Desprez, for his personal 
 management during the few days of his par- 
 ticular service, remained debtor of 17 mil- 
 lions. Lastly, among the commercial effects 
 with which the Company had furnished the 
 Treasury, for various payments made at a 
 distance, there was bad paper to the amount 
 of 13 or 14 millions. These five different 
 sums, of 23 millions, taken directly from the 
 accountable persons, 73 millions in Desprez's 
 
 [Jan. i&06. 
 
 bills, now worth nothing, 14 millions in fcifl* 
 of the central cashier, for which no equivalent 
 had been furnished, 17 millions of M. Des 
 prez's personal debit, lastly, 14 millions in pro 
 tested bills of exchange, composed the 141 
 millions of the total debit of the Company. 
 
 The state, however, was not doomed to lose 
 this important sum, because the operations of 
 the Company, as we have just said, had a real 
 foundation, the commerce in piastres, which 
 had lacked nothing but precision in the cal- 
 culations. It had furnished supplies to the 
 French land and naval forces to the amount 
 of 40 millions. The house of Hope had 
 bought about 10 millions' worth of those 
 famous piastres of Mexico, and was at this 
 moment transmitting the amount to Paris. 
 The Company possessed, besides immovable 
 property, Spanish wool, corn, some good cre- 
 dits, the whole amounting to about 30 mil 
 lions. These various sums comprehended 
 real effects to the worth of 80 millions. Thus 
 60 millions yet remained to be found in order 
 to balance the debt. The equivalent of this 
 sum really existed in the portfolio of the Com- 
 pany in credits upon Spain. 
 
 Napoleon, after obliging the United Mer- 
 chants to give up to him all that they possess- 
 ed, required that the French Treasury should 
 be put into the Company's place in regard to 
 Spain. He enjoined M. Mollien to treat with 
 a particular agent of the Prince of the Peace, 
 M. Isquierdo, who had been for some time in 
 Paris, and performed the functions of ambas 
 sador, much more than Messieurs d'Azara and 
 Gravina, who had nothing but the title. The 
 court of Madrid had no refusal to oppose to 
 the conqueror of Austerlitz ; besides, it was 
 really debtor to the Company, and conse- 
 quently to France herself. Negotiations were, 
 therefore, commenced with her, to secure the 
 repayment of those 60 millions, which repre- 
 sented not only the subsidies left unpaid, but 
 the provisions with which her armies had 
 been supplied, and the corn which had been 
 sent to her people. 
 
 The Treasury was likely, in consequence, 
 to be entirely reimbursed, thanks to the 40 
 millions in anterior supplies, the 10 millions 
 coming from Holland, the stores existing in 
 the warehouses, the immovables seized, and 
 the securities which Spain was about to give, 
 and part of which the house of Hope offered 
 to discount There remained, nevertheless, a 
 double gap to fill, arising from the old arrear 
 of the budgets, which we have estimated at 
 80 or 90 millions, and from resources which 
 the Company had absorbed for its use. But 
 every thing had become easy since the victo- 
 ries of Napoleon, and since the peace, which 
 had been the fruit of them. The capitalists, 
 who had ruined the Company, by requiring 
 1 per cent per month, (that is to say, 18 per 
 cent, per annum) to discount the effects of the 
 Treasury, offered to take them at per cent, 
 and soon began to dispute them with each 
 other at $, that is to say at 6 per cent per an- 
 num. The bank, which had withdrawn part 
 of its notes from circulation, since it had done 
 with M. Desprez, which, besides, saw the me- 
 tals ordered to be purchased all over Europe
 
 Jan. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 109 
 
 daring the great distress pouring into its cof- 
 fers the bank was enabled to discount all that 
 was desired at a moderate, yet sufficiently ad- 
 Viirtageous rate. Though a certain amount 
 of ihe effects of the Treasury, belonging to 
 1606, had been previously alienated for the 
 use of the Company, the greater part of the 
 effects corresponding to that service remained 
 intact, and were about to be discounted on the 
 best conditions. But victory had not only 
 procured credit for Napoleon; it had also pro- 
 cured for him material wealth. He had im- 
 posed upon Austria a contribution of 40 mil- 
 lions ; adding to this sum 30 millions, which 
 he had taken directly from the chests of that 
 power, the sum which the war had brought 
 him in, may be computed at 70 millions. 
 Twenty millions had been expended on Ihe 
 spot, for the subsistence of the army, but at 
 the charge of the Treasury, with which Na- 
 poleon purposed to make a regulation, the 
 spirit and disposition of which we shall pre- 
 sently explain. There remained, then, 50 
 millions, which were coming, partly in gold 
 and silver, in the artillery wagons, partly in 
 good bills of exchange on Frankfort, Leipzig, 
 Hamburg, and Bremen. As the garrison of 
 Hameln was to return to France, in conse- 
 quence of the cession of Hanover to Prussia, 
 it was ordered to bring, along with the Eng- 
 lish mri'eriel taken in Hanover, the produce of 
 the bills of exchange due at Hamburg and 
 Bremen. An imposition of 4 millions had 
 been laid on the city of Frankfort, instead of 
 the contingent which it should have furnished, 
 like Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. France 
 was, therefore, about to receive, besides con- 
 siderable effects, large quantities of the pre- 
 cious metals, and, in regard to specie as to 
 every thing else, abundance was about to suc- 
 ceed the momentary distress, which the sin- 
 cere alarms of commerce and the affected 
 alarms of jobbers had produced. 
 
 Napoleon, whose organizing genius would 
 neveY leave to things the character of accident, 
 and tended incessant'y to convert them into 
 durable institutions, had projected a noble and 
 beneficent creation, founded on the most legi- 
 timate profits of his victories. He had re- 
 solved to create with the war contributions a 
 fund for the army, which he would not touch 
 from any motive whatever, not even for his 
 own use: for his civil list, administered with 
 perfect order, was adequate to all the expenses 
 of a magnificent court, and even to the for- 
 mation of a particular fund. It was from this 
 army fund that he proposed to take pensions 
 for his generals, for his officers, for his sol- 
 diers, and for their widows and children. He 
 desired not to enjoy his victories alone; he 
 purposed that all those who served France 
 and her vast designs should acquire not glory 
 only, but prosperity ; that those who, by dint 
 of heroism, had got so far as to have no con- 
 cern for themselves on the field of battle, 
 should have none on account of their families. 
 Finding, in the inexhaustible fertility of his 
 mind, The art of multiplying the utility of 
 things, Napoleon had invented a combination, 
 which rendered that fund quite as profitable 
 to the finances as to the army itself. What 
 
 had hitherto been wanting was a lender, to 
 lend to the government on good conditions. 
 The army fund would be that lender, whose 
 demands upon the state Napoleon would him- 
 self regulate. The army was to have 50 mil- 
 lions in gold and silver, besides 20 millions 
 which the budget owed it for arrears of pay 
 and, lastly, besides a large amount in materiel 
 of war conquered by it. The artillery wagons 
 were bringing from Vienna 100,000 muskets, 
 2000 pieces of cannon. The whole of the 
 materiel of war and contributions formed a 
 sum of about 80 millions, of which the army 
 was the proprietor, and which it could lend to 
 the state. Napoleon purposed that all that 
 was disposable should be paid over to the 
 Sinking Fund, which should open a separate 
 account, and employ this sum either in dis- 
 counting obligations of receivers-general, bills at 
 sight, bills of customs, when the capitalists should 
 require more than 6 per cent., or in buying up 
 national domains when they were at a low 
 price, or even in taking rentes, if it thought 
 fit to make a loan to fill up the arrear. 
 
 This combination, therefore, was to have 
 the double utility of procuring for the army an 
 advantageous interest for its money, and for 
 the government all the sums that it should 
 have need of, at a rate which would not be 
 usurious. 
 
 Napoleon immediately gave orders for the 
 execution of various important measures by 
 means of the funds which he had at his dis- 
 posal. One consisted in collecting a dozen 
 millions in cash at Strasburg, in case of the 
 renewal of military operations; for, if Austria 
 had signed the peace, Russia had not begun 
 to negotiate, Prussia had not yet sent the ratifi- 
 cation of the treaty of Schonbrunn, and Eng- 
 land continued to be actively engaged in her 
 diplomatic intrigues. He enjoined, moreover, 
 that some millions should be kept in reserve 
 at the Sinking Fund, and that the number of 
 these millions should remain unknown, to be 
 employed on a sudden, whenever speculators 
 were disposed to be extortionate. The thought 
 that the Treasury ought to take upon itself 
 this sort of expense, as a man submits to that 
 of a spare granary, in order to be provided 
 against the seasons of dearth, and that the in- 
 terest lost by this kind of hoard would be a 
 useful sacrifice, and one by no means to be 
 regretted. Lastly, the foreign moneys which 
 were brought back requiring to be recoined 
 and converted into French money, he ordered 
 them to be divided among the different mints, 
 in proportion to the want of specie in each 
 locality. 
 
 These first dispositions commanded by the 
 moment being carried into effect, Napoleon 
 desired that attention should be paid without 
 delay to a new organization of the Treasury, 
 to a new constitution of the Bank of France, 
 and gave this twofold commission to M. Mol- 
 lien, who had become minister of the Trea- 
 sury. M. Gaudin, who still retained the port- 
 folio of the finances, for we must bear it in 
 mind that, at this period, the Treasury and the 
 Finances formed two distinct ministries M. 
 Gaudin received orders to present a plan for 
 liquidating the arrear, for definitively equaliz- 
 K
 
 110 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1806. 
 
 ing the receipts and the expenditure, in the 
 double hypothesis of peace and war, even 
 though for this purpose it should be necessary 
 to recur to the imposition of new taxes. 
 
 After attending to the finances, Napoleon 
 busied himself about bringing the army back 
 to France, but slowly, so that it should not 
 march further than four leagues a day. He had 
 ordered that the wounded and the sick should 
 be kept till spring in the places where they had 
 received the first attendance, and that officers 
 should stay with them to superintend their cure ; 
 and for this essential object he had recourse 
 to the chests of the army. He had left Ber- 
 thier at Munich with instructions to attend to 
 all these details, and to preside over the ex- 
 changes of territory, always so difficult among 
 the German princes. On this latter point 
 Berthier was to concert with M. Otto, our 
 representative at the court of Bavaria. 
 
 Napoleon then thought of taking measures 
 against the kingdom of Naples. Massena, 
 taking with him 40,000 men drawn from Lom- 
 bardy, received orders to march through Tus- 
 cany and the southernmost part of the Roman 
 State to the kingdom of Naples, without list- 
 ening to any proposal of peace or armistice. 
 Napoleon, uncertain whether Joseph, who had 
 refused the vice-royalty of Italy, would accept 
 the crown of the Two Sicilies, gave him only 
 the title of his lieutenant-general. Joseph 
 was not to command the army ; it was Mas- 
 sena alone who had that commission; for Na- 
 poleon, though he sacrificed the interests of 
 policy to family considerations, did not so 
 easily sacrifice to them the interests of mili- 
 tary operations. But Joseph, once introduced 
 into Naples by Massena, was to seize the civil 
 government of the country and to exercise 
 there all the powers of royalty. 
 
 General Molitor was at the same time de- 
 spatched towards Dalmatia. On his rear he 
 had General Marmont to support him. The 
 latter was commissioned to receive Venice 
 and the Venetian state from the hands of the 
 Austrians. Prince Eugene had orders to go 
 to Venice, and to take upon himself the admin- 
 istration of the conquered provinces, without 
 yet annexing them to the kingdom of Italy, 
 though they were subsequently to be united 
 with it. Before he decided upon this defini- 
 tively, Napoleon wished to conclude various 
 arrangements with the representatives of the 
 kingdom of Italy, which would have run 
 counter to an immediate union. 
 
 Lastly, Napoleon, wishing to excite the 
 spirit of his soldiers, and to communicate that 
 excitement to all France, ordered that the 
 grand army should be assembled at Paris, to 
 receive there a magnificent fete, which was to 
 be given by the authorities of the capital. It 
 was impossible to convey a better conception 
 of the nation treating the army than by charg- 
 ing the citizens of Paris to treat the soldiers 
 of Austerlitz. 
 
 While he was thus engaged in the adminis- 
 tration of his vast empire, and attending to the 
 concerns of peace, after having been engaged 
 in those of war, Napoleon had also his eyes 
 fixed on the consequences of the treaties of 
 Presburg and Schonbrunn. Pruspia, in par- 
 
 ticular, had to ratify a treaty most unforeseen 
 by her, since M. de Haugwitz, who came to 
 Vienna to dictate conditions, had submitted on 
 the contrary to receive them, and, instead of 
 any constraint imposed upon Napoleon, had 
 brought back a treaty of alliance offensive and 
 defensive with him; all this compensated, it is 
 true, by a rich present, that of Hanover. 
 
 It would be difficult to form a conception of 
 the astonishment of Europe, and of the differ- 
 ent sentiments, satisfaction and chagrin, grati- 
 fied avidity and confusion, which prevailed in 
 Prussia when made acquainted with the treaty 
 of Schonbrunn. Hints had frequently been 
 thrown out to the public in Berlin, that ai one 
 time France, at another Russia, was offering 
 to the king the electorate of Hanover, which, 
 besides having the advantage of rounding the 
 so irregularly defined territory of Prussia, had 
 the advantage of securing to her the control 
 of the Elbe and the Weser, as well as a deci- 
 sive influence over the Hanseatic cities of 
 Bremen and Hamburg. This offer, so fre- 
 quently announced, was now a realized acqui- 
 sition, a certainty. It was a subject of great 
 satisfaction for a country which is one of the 
 most ambitious in Europe. But, to counter- 
 balance this gift, what confusion we must 
 not mince the matter what disgrace, would 
 attend the conduct of the court of Prussia! 
 While yielding against its will to the solicita- 
 tions of the coalition, it had engaged to unite 
 itself with it, if in a month Napoleon had not 
 accepted the mediation of Prussia, and sub- 
 mitted to the conditions which she pretended 
 to impose upon him, and this was equivalent 
 to an engagement to declare war against him. 
 And, all at once, finding Napoleon in Moravia, 
 not embarrassed but all-powerful, she had 
 turned to him, accepted his alliance, and re- 
 ceived from his hands the fairest of the spoils 
 of the coalition Hanover, the ancient patri- 
 mony of the Kings of England. 
 
 We must confess that honour is banished 
 from the world, if such things are not punished 
 with a signal reprobation. Accordingly, the 
 Prussian nation, we must do it this justice, 
 felt how severely such conduct was to be con- 
 demned, and, notwithstanding the value of the 
 present brought by M. Haugwitz, received it 
 with chagrin in its heart and humiliation on 
 its brow. The disgrace, however, would have 
 been effaced from the memory of the Prus- 
 sians, and would have left place only for plea- 
 sure at the conquest, if other sentiments had 
 not come and mingled with that of remorse, to 
 poison the satisfaction which they ought to 
 have felt. Though profoundly jealous of the 
 Austrians, still the Prussians, seeing them 
 beaten, felt themselves Germans; and, as Ger- 
 mans are not less jealous of the French than 
 the Russians, or the English, they beheld our 
 extraordinary triumphs with mortification. 
 Their patriotism, therefore, began to awake in 
 favour of the Austrians, and this sentiment, 
 united with that of remorse, filled the nation 
 with intense discomfort. Of all the classes, 
 the army was the one which manifested these 
 dispositions the most openly. In Prussia, the 
 army is not impassible as .in Austria; it re- 
 flects the national passions with extreme vivid
 
 Jan. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 ness ; it represents the nation much more than 
 the army represents it in the other countries 
 of Europe, France excepted; and it then re- 
 presented a nation whose opinion was already 
 very independent of its sovereigns. The Prus- 
 sian army, which felt to a high degree the sen- 
 timent of German jealousy, which had hoped 
 for a moment that the career of war would be 
 opened to it, and which found it suddenly 
 closed by an act difficult to be justified, cen- 
 sured the cabinet without reserve. The Ger- 
 man aristocracy, which saw the Germanic 
 empire ruined by the peace of Presburg, and 
 the cause of the immediate nobility sacrificed 
 to the sovereigns of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, 
 and Baden, the German aristocracy, occupy- 
 ing all the high military ranks, contributed 
 greatly to excite discontent in the army, and 
 carried back the exaggerated expression of this 
 discontent either to Berlin or to Potsdam. 
 These passions burst forth more especially 
 about the queen, and had converted her coterie 
 into a focus of boisterous opposition. Prince 
 Louis, who reigned in this coterie, launched 
 out more than ever into chivalrous declama- 
 tions. All is not done for the alliance of two 
 countries, when their interests do not agree : 
 the self-love of both ought also to harmonize, 
 and this last condition is not very easily re- 
 alized. The Prussians were then the only 
 people in Europe whose policy could agree 
 with ours, but great indulgence would have 
 been needed for the excessive pride of these 
 heirs of the great Frederick, and, unluckily, ' 
 the weak, ambiguous, sometimes dishonoura- 
 ble conduct of their cabinet did not command 
 that respect which their susceptibility required. 
 
 Napoleon, after six years' fruitless relations ; 
 with Prussia, had accustomed himself to have 
 no consideration for her. He had recently 
 proved it by passing through one of her pro- 
 vinces (authorized, it is true, by precedents) 
 without even giving her notice. He had just 
 proved it still more strongly, in appearing so 
 little hurt by her wrongs, that, after the con- 
 vention of Potsdam, when he would have had 
 a right to be incensed, he gave her Hanover, 
 thus treating her as fit only to be bought. She 
 was, and ought to have been, deeply wounded 
 by this proceeding. 
 
 The human conscience feels all the re- 
 proaches that it has deserved, especially when , 
 it is spared them. All the severe things to i 
 which she had exposed herself on the part of 
 Napoleon, Prussia imagined that he had ex- 
 pressed. It was asserted in Berlin that he had ; 
 said to the Austrian negotiators, when they ! 
 propped themselves upon the support of 
 Prussia "Prussia! why she is to be had by 
 the best bidder ; I will give her more than you, 
 and bring her over to my side." He had 
 thought so, perhaps said so, to M. de Talley- 
 rand, but he affirmed that he had not said so to 
 the Austrians. Be this as it may, this expres- 
 sion was repeated everywhere in Berlin as true. 
 The fault of Prussia in all this was not to have 
 deserved the respect which she desired to ob- 
 tain ; that of Napoleon, not to grant it her 
 without her having deserved it. One has not 
 allies any more than friends, unless upon con- 
 dition of sparing their pride as much as their 
 
 I interest, upon condition of perceiving their 
 faults, nay of feeling them deeply, and not 
 committing the like against them. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz, though he came with full 
 hands, was therefore received with very dif- 
 ferent feelings, with anger by the court, with 
 pain by the king, with a mixture of content 
 and confusion by the public, and by nobody 
 with complete satisfaction. As for M. de Haug- 
 witz himself, he made his appearance without 
 embarrassment before all these judges. He 
 brought back from Schonbrunn what he had 
 invariably advised, the aggrandizement of 
 Prussia founded on the alliance of France. 
 His only fault lay in having given way for a 
 moment to the empire of circumstances, which 
 subjected him to the grievous contrast of be- 
 ing now the signer of the treaty of Schonbrunn. 
 But it was his unskilful successor, his ungrate- 
 ful disciple, M.de Hardenberg, who had brought 
 about these circumstances by so complicating 
 the relations of Prussia, in the space of a few 
 months, that she could \iot extricate herself 
 from these complications but by clashing con- 
 tradictions. Besides, M. de Haugwitz, if he 
 had been hurried away for a moment, had been 
 less so than anybody ; and, after all, he had 
 just saved Prussia from the abyss into which 
 she had been wellnigh plunged. Neither must 
 it be forgotten that at Potsdam, seduced as the 
 court was by the presence of Alexander, it had 
 been strongly recommended to M. de Haug- 
 witz not to hurry Prussia into a war before 
 the end of December, and that, on the 2d of 
 December, he had found him whom he came 
 to control or to fight, victorious, irresistible. 
 He had been placed between the danger of a 
 fatal war and a contradiction amply paid for: 
 what would they have him do? For the rest, 
 he said, nothing was compromised. Ground- 
 ing himself on the extraordinary nature and 
 the unforeseen circumstances of the situation, 
 he had entered with Napoleon into such en- 
 gagements only as were conditional, subject 
 more expressly than usual to the ratification 
 of his court. People might, if they were so 
 bold as they boasted of being, as alive to ho- 
 nour, as insensible to interest, as they pretended 
 to be, they might refuse to ratify the treaty 
 of Schonbrunn. He had- forewarned Napo- 
 leon; he had told him that, treating without 
 having instructions, he treated without binding 
 himself. They might choose between Hanover 
 and war with Napoleon. The position was 
 still the same as it had been at Schonbrunn, 
 save that he had gained the month, which had 
 been declared necessary for the organization 
 of the Prussian army. 
 
 Such was the language of M. de Haugwitz, 
 exaggerated on a single point, namely where 
 he alleged that he had been placed between the 
 acceptance of Hanover and war. He would, 
 in fact, have been able to reconcile Prussia 
 with Napoleon without accepting Hanover. It 
 is true that Napoleon would have distrusted 
 this demi-reconciliation, and that from defiance 
 to war it was but a step. The enemies of M. 
 de Haugwitz censured him on another point. 
 In keeping himself at Vienna, they said, less 
 aloof from the Austrian negotiators, in making 
 common cause with them, he would have been
 
 112 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1806. 
 
 better able to withstand Napoleon, and to de- 
 sert less ostensibly the European interests 
 espoused at Potsdam, or not to desert them 
 but with the consent of all. But that presup- 
 posed a collective negotiation, and to this Na- 
 poleon objected so strongly that to have insisted 
 upon this point would have been another way 
 to lead to war. It was therefore war, and no- 
 thing but war, wiih a terrible adversary, before 
 the fixed term of the end of December, against 
 the well-known wish of the king, and against 
 the most positive interests of Prussia, that, as 
 M. de Haugwitz alleged, had stared him in the 
 face at Schonbrunn. 
 
 The embarrassment of this position, then, 
 was much greater for others than for himself; 
 and, besides, he had an imperturbable firmness, 
 mixed with tranquillity and urbanity, which 
 would have sufficed to support him in presence 
 of his adversaries, had he even committed the 
 blunders which he had not. 
 
 Thus M. de Haugwitz, without being discon- 
 ceVted by the cries that rang around him, with- 
 out even insisting on the adoption of the treaty, 
 as a negotiator attached to the work of which 
 he was the author might have done, never 
 ceased repeating that the cabinet was free, 
 that it could choose, but with a perfect know- 
 ledge that it must choose between Hanover 
 and war. He left to others the embarrassment 
 of the contradictions of Prussian policy, and 
 reserved for himself nothing but the honour 
 of. having brought back his country into the 
 track, from which it ought never to have been 
 made to swerve. Happy this minister had he 
 continued in that line, and not subsequently 
 marred that situation himself, by inconsisten- 
 cies, which ruined him, and wellnigh ruined 
 his country. 
 
 The enthusiasts, whether sincere or affected, 
 of Berlin, said that this gift of Hanover was 
 a perfidious gift, which would involve Prussia 
 in an everlasting war with England, and ruin 
 the national commerce ; that it was purchased, 
 besides, by the sacrifice of fine provinces long 
 attached to the monarchy, such as Cleves, 
 Anspach, and Neufchatel. They asserted that 
 Prussia, which, in ceding Anspach, Cleves, 
 and Neufchatel, had ceded a population of 
 '300,000 inhabitants to obtain one of 900,000, 
 had made a bad bargain. According to them, 
 if she had obtained Hanover without giving 
 up any thing, without losing either Neufchatel, 
 or Anspach, or Cleves, and even acquired 
 something to boot, the Hanseatic cities, for 
 instance, then there would be nothing to re- 
 gret. The defection, thus paid for, would have 
 been worth the while ; but Hanover was no- 
 thing since they had it. At any rate, they 
 added, Prussia was disgraced, covered with 
 infamy in the eyes of Europe. The common 
 country, Germany, was given up to foreigners. 
 These last censures were more specious ; but 
 yet it might have been urged in reply that still 
 vorse things had been done in the last parti- 
 >ion of Poland, and almost as bad in the re- 
 ceut partition of the Germanic indemnities. 
 And yet nobody had cried shame upon them ! 
 
 Moderate persons, very numerous among 
 the wealthy population of Berlin, without re- 
 peating all these declamations, dreaded the 
 
 reprisals of England upon Prussian com- 
 merce, were pained for the character of Prussia, 
 felt real mortification at the triumph of the 
 French armies over the German armies, but 
 dreaded above all a war with France. 
 
 Such were at bottom the sentiments of the 
 king, who, with the heart of a sound, patriotic, 
 but moderate German, hesitated between these 
 contrary considerations. He was racked with 
 regret at the thought of the fault which he had 
 committed at Potsdam, which reduced him to 
 the necessity of an absolutely disgraceful in- 
 consistency, the only objection that could be 
 alleged against the fine present of Napoleon. 
 And then, though he was not deficient in per- 
 sonal courage, he dreaded war as the greatest 
 of calamities ; he beheld in it the ruin of the 
 treasure of Frederick, foolishly squandered by 
 his father, carefully collected again by himself, 
 and already broken into by the late armament ; 
 above all he beheld in it, with a sagacity which 
 fear often imparts, the ruin of the monarchy. 
 Frederick William besought Count Haugwitz 
 to enlighten him with his intelligence, and 
 Count Haugwitz incessantly repeated to him, 
 not knowing what else to say, that they had 
 the choice between Hanover and war, and that, 
 in his opinion, any war against Napoleon 
 would be attended with disaster ; that the Rus- 
 sian and Austrian armies were not inferior, 
 whatever people might say, to the Prussian 
 army, which would not do better, perhaps not 
 so well as they, for at this moment it was 
 much less habituated to war. 
 
 A council was held, to which were sum- 
 moned the principal personages of the mon- 
 archy, Messieurs de Haugwitz, De Hardenberg, 
 De Schulenburg, and the two most illustrious 
 representatives of the army, Marshal de Mol- 
 lendorf, and the Duke of Brunswick. The 
 discussion was very animated, though without 
 any mixture of court passions ; and, yielding 
 to the force of the everlasting argument of 
 Count Haugwitz, which consisted in repeating 
 j that they could refuse Hanover if they chose 
 I to go to war, the council adopted a middle 
 course, that is to say the very worst they could 
 have done. They decided to adopt the treaty 
 with modifications. M. de Haugwitz strongly 
 opposed this resolution. He said that he had 
 taken advantage of circumstances at Schon- 
 j brunn, and that he had obtained of Napoleon 
 what he should not obtain a second time ; that 
 the latter would regard the modifications made 
 in the treaty as a last success of the party ini- 
 mical to France ; that he would at last cease 
 ! to reckon at all upon the Prussian alliance, 
 j that he would act in conseqence, and that, hold- 
 ing himself to be disengaged by a ratification 
 ! given with reservations, he would place Prussia 
 between worse conditions and war. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz was not listened to. It was 
 alleged that" the modifications introduced, 
 whether good or bad, saved the honour of 
 Prussia, for they proved that they did not 
 aw up treaties from the dictation of Napoleon. 
 This reason, of so little value, made an im- 
 pression upon those who had need to deceive 
 themselves ; and, after several alterations had 
 been made in it, the treaty was adopted. 
 The first of these altercations plainly indi-
 
 Feb. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 11.' 
 
 cated the sentiments of those who had pro- 
 posed them, and the nature of their embarrass- 
 ment. The expression offensive and defensive 
 given to the alliance contracted with France 
 was struck out of the treaty, in order that the 
 Prussian cabinet might appear before Russia 
 with less confusion. Comments were added 
 to explain in what cases it would deem itself 
 obliged to make common cause with France. 
 It demanded information concerning the late 
 arrangements projected in Italy, and which 
 were to be comprehended in the reciprocal 
 guarantees stipulated by the treaty of Schon- 
 brunn ; for it made a point of not formally 
 approving what was about to be consummated 
 at Naples, that is to say, the dethronement of the 
 Bourbons, the clients and proteges of Russia. 
 
 These modifications signified that though 
 obliged to enter into the policy of France, Prus- 
 sia would not enter frankly into it ; that, above 
 all, she would not enter into it so far as not to be 
 able to explain her conduct at St. Petersburg 
 and at Vienna. The intention was too visible 
 to be favourably interpreted at Paris. To these 
 modifications were added some others still less 
 honourable. These were not written, it is 
 true, in the new treaty, but M. de Haugwitz 
 was commissioned to propose them verbally. 
 The Prussian cabinet desired, in gaining 
 Hanover, not to cede Anspach, which was the 
 only concession of any importance required 
 by Napoleon, and which formed the Franco- 
 nian patrimony of the house of Brandenburg. 
 It desired the annexation of the Hanseatic 
 cities, a valuable accession from its commer- 
 cial importance, and, in thus filling the mea- 
 sure of the greediness of the Prussian nation, 
 it flattered itself that it should stifle the voice 
 of honour in it and disarm the public opinion. 
 
 This done, M. de Laforest, minister of France, 
 charged as such with the exchange of the rati- 
 fications, was sent for. This minister knew 
 his sovereign too well to venture to ratify a 
 treaty in which such alterations had been 
 made. He refused at first to do so, but the 
 solicitations addressed to him became so press- 
 ing, and M. de Haugwitz represented to him 
 so forcibly the necessity of chaining the court 
 of Berlin, to save it from its continual varia- 
 tions, and to snatch it from the suggestions of 
 the enemies of France, that M. de Laforest con- 
 sented to ratify the modified treaty, sub spe rati, a 
 usual precaution in diplomacy, when one is de- 
 sirous to reserve the pleasure of the sovereign. 
 
 It was, therefore, necessary to refer to Paris, 
 to obtain the approval of these new tergiver- 
 sations of the court of Prussia. M. de Haug- 
 witz seemed to have succeeded with Napoleon, 
 and he was considered as the fittest person to 
 be sent to France to allay the storm that was 
 foreseen. M. de Haugwitz long declined such 
 a mission ; but the king assailed him with such 
 urgent entreaties, that he could not forbear to 
 make up his mind to go to Paris, and to con- 
 front a second time that crowned and victori- 
 ous negotiator, with whom he had treated at 
 fechOnbrunn. He set out, therefore, sending 
 before him letters couched in the mildest and 
 most obsequious language, to prepare for him- 
 self a less unfavourable reception than that 
 which he had reason to apprehend. 
 
 Voi.. II. 15 
 
 Napoleon, when apprized of these last shuf- 
 fling tricks of Prussian politics, saw in them 
 what he could not help seeing, new weaknesses 
 towards his enemies, new efforts to keep on 
 good terms with them, while taking occasion 
 at the same time to make some advantage by 
 him. He felt, on account of this policy, less 
 consideration than before, and, what was a 
 great misfortune for Prussia and for France, he 
 utterly despaired from this time of a Prussian 
 alliance. Add, to this, that, upon reflection, 
 he was sorry for what he had granted at Schon- 
 brunn. The gift of Hanover, indeed, had been 
 granted with too great precipitation, not that it 
 could be better placed than in the hands of 
 Prussia, but to dispose of it definitively was 
 rendering the struggle with England more 
 rancorous ; it was adding to irreconcilable in- 
 terests at sea irreconcilable interests on 
 land, for old King George III. would have 
 sacrificed the richest colonies of England 
 rather than his German patrimony. Assuredly, 
 if it was ascertained that England was for 
 ever implacable, and could not be pacified but 
 by force, it would then be right to go all 
 lengths against her, and Hanover would be 
 extremely well bestowed, if it were to cement 
 a powerful and sincere alliance, capable of 
 rendering continental coalitions impossible. 
 But none of these suppositions appeared ac- 
 tually true. There were rumours of great 
 discouragement in England, of the speedy 
 death of Mr. Pitt, of the probable accession of 
 Mr. Fox, and an immediate change of system. 
 Napoleon, therefore, on learning the last pro- 
 ceedings in Prussia, was disposed to replace 
 every thing on the old footing with her ; that 
 is to say, to restore Anspach, Cleves, and 
 Neufchatel, and to take back Hanover from 
 her, to be kept in reserve. At the point to 
 which things had arrived, either through the 
 fault of men or through the fault of events, the 
 best thing that could be done was, in fact, 
 to revert to terms of civility without intimacy, 
 and to take back what each had given to the 
 other. Napoleon, in recovering Hanover, 
 would have in his hands the means of treat- 
 ing with England, and of seizing the only oc- 
 casion that was likely to present itself, foi 
 putting an end to an inauspicious war, the per- 
 manent cause of universal war. 
 
 This was his first idea, and would to heaven 
 that he had acted upon it ! He gave instruc- 
 tions in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand. He 
 desired that he might be represented to M. de 
 Haugwitz, as more irritated than he was at the 
 liberties taken with France ; that France 
 should be declared to be completely disen- 
 gaged, and that she would keep herself free, 
 either to take back Hanover, to make it a 
 pledge of peace with England, or to place 
 every thing on a new footing with Prussia, 
 for concluding a more comprehensive and 
 more solid treaty with her. 1 
 
 1 We quote the following letter which precisely ex- 
 presses the idea of Napoleon on this occasion. 
 " To M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 " Paris, Feb. 4, 1806. 
 
 "The ministry in England hag been entirely changed 
 since the death of Mr. Pitt ; Mr. Fox baa the portfolio of
 
 114 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1806. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz arrived at Paris on the 1st 
 of February. He employed, both with M. de 
 Talleyrand and with the Emperor, all the art 
 with which he was endowed, and that art was 
 great. He laid great stress on the embarrass- 
 ments of his government, placed between 
 France and coalesced Europe, inclining more 
 frequently toward the first than hurried away 
 sometimes towards the second by court pas- 
 sions; which must be comprehended and ex- 
 cused. He exhibited the Prussian govern- 
 ment, painfully returning from the fault com- 
 mitted at Potsdam, needing for this to be 
 supported, encouraged, by the courtesy of the 
 French government ; he so well depicted him- 
 self as the man who was striving alone in 
 Berlin to bring back Prussia to France, and 
 having a right on this account to be aided by 
 the kindness of Napoleon, that the latter gave 
 way, and unfortunately consented to renew 
 the treaty of Schonbrunn, but on somewhat 
 harder conditions than those which King 
 Frederick William had just refused. 
 
 " I will not constrain you," said Napoleon, 
 to M. de Haugwitz; "I still offer you to replace 
 things on their former footing, that is, to take 
 back Hanover, and to restore Anspach, Cleves, 
 and Neufchatel to you. But, if we treat, if I 
 cede Hanover to you anew, I shall not cede it 
 on the same conditions, and I shall require 
 you, moreover, to promise me to become a 
 faithful ally of France. If Prussia is frankly, 
 publicly on my side, I have no more European 
 coalitions to fear, and, without a European 
 coalition on my hands, I will soon settle mat- 
 ters with England. But I want nothing short 
 of this certainty to induce me to make you a 
 present of Hanover, and to feel convinced 
 that I act wisely in giving it to you." 
 
 Napoleon was right, saving on one point, 
 that was in making Prussia pay for Hanover 
 by new compensations, in not giving it to her, 
 on the contrary, on the most advantageous 
 conditions ; for there are no better allies than 
 those who are fully satisfied. M. de Haugwitz, 
 who was sincere in his desire to unite France 
 and Prussia, promised Napoleon all that he 
 
 Mhe foreign affairs. I desire you to present to ine this 
 evening a note founded on this idea: 
 
 "The undersigned minister of foreign relations has 
 received express orders from his majesty the Emperor to 
 informM.de Haugwitz,at his first interview, that his ma- 
 jesty cannot consider the treaty concluded at Vienna as 
 existing, from default of ratification within the prescribed 
 tiiije ; that his majesty does not allow to any power, and 
 least of all to Prussia for experience proves that he 
 must speak plainly and without circumlocution a right 
 to modify and interpret according to its own interest the 
 different articles of a treaty ; that it is not exchanging 
 ratifications to have two different versions of the same 
 treaty, and that the irregularity appears still greater if 
 one considers the three or four pages of memorial added 
 to the ratifications of Prussia ; that M. de Laforest, his 
 majesty's minister charged with the ratifications, would 
 be culpable had he not himself observed all the irregular- 
 ity of the proceeding of the court of Prussia, but that he 
 had accepted the exchange only on condition of the ap- 
 probation of the Emperor. 
 
 ' The undersigned is, therefore, charged to declare tb.it 
 his majesty does not approve it, in consideration of the 
 sanctity due to the execution of treaties. 
 
 "But, at the same time, the undersigned ia charged to 
 ueciare that his inajety is still desirous that the differences 
 
 required, and promised it with all the appear- 
 ances of the greatest sincerity. To his pro- 
 mises he added some very pertinent insinua- 
 tions respecting certain slights of Napoleon 
 towards Prussia, the necessity of paying some 
 regard to the dignity of the king, in the first 
 place for the sake of the king himself, who, 
 notwithstanding his timidity, was at bottom 
 susceptible and irritable, and also for the sake 
 of the nation and the army, which identified 
 themselves with the sovereign, and took highly 
 amiss whatever looked, like a want of respect 
 for him. M. de Haugwitz said, that the viola- 
 tion of the territory of Anspach in particular 
 had on this account an effect that was to be 
 I extremely regretted, and caused the nation to 
 I go halves with the court in the excitement 
 j wh ch had led to the deplorable treaty of 
 Potsdam. 
 
 These observations were just and striking. 
 ;But, if Prussia needed to have respect paid 
 her, Napoleon needed to be satisfied with her 
 I before he paid her respect, and to experience 
 : esteem before he showed it. Here was a 
 '. double difficulty, which none had yet found 
 j means to surmount: would they be more suo 
 ' cessful after this accommodation 1 That was 
 \ unfortunately very doubtful. 
 
 A second treaty, more explicit and more 
 | stringent than the former, was drawn up. 
 I Hanover was given to Prussia as formally as 
 ! at Schonbrunn, but on condition of occupying 
 | it immediately and in right of sovereignty. A 
 i new and arduous obligation was the price of 
 jthis gift: it consisted in closing the Weser 
 ! and the Elbe against the English, and in clos- 
 ing those rivers as straightly as the Fiench had 
 i done when they occupied Hanover. In ex- 
 change, Prussia granted the same cessions as 
 at Schonbrunn ; she gave the Franconian 
 principality of Anspach, the remnant of the 
 duchy of Cleves, situated on the right of the 
 | Rhine, and the principality of Neufchatel, 
 forming one of the cantons of Switzerland. 
 An advantage promised to the King of Prussia 
 in the treaty of Schonbrunn was suppressed 
 in this, for the benefit of the King of Bavaria. 
 
 which have arisen in recent circumstances between 
 France and Prussia should be amicably settled, and that 
 the old friendship which existed between them should 
 subsist as formerly ; he is even desirous that the treaty 
 of alliance, offensive and defensive, if it is compatible 
 with the other engagements of Prussia, should subsist 
 between the two countries and insure their connection." 
 
 This note, which you will present to me this evening, 
 shall be delivered to-morrow in the conference, and on no 
 pretext whatever do I leave you at liberty to ouiit to de 
 liver it. 
 
 You comprehend, yourself, that it has two objects : to 
 leave me free to make peace with England, if, a few 
 days hence, the accounts which I am receiving are con- 
 firmed, or to conclude a treaty with Prussia on a wider 
 basis. 
 
 Let the wording be stern and plain, but you will add 
 viva vote all the modifications, all the softenings, all 
 the illusions, which shall make M. de Haugwitz believe 
 that it is an effect of my temper which is irritated at this 
 form, but that, at bottom, I am in the same sentiments as 
 ever towards Prussia. My opinion is that, in the present 
 circumstances, if Mr. Fox is really at the head of th 
 foreign affairs, we cannot cede Hanover to Prussia but 
 by a comprehensive system, capable of securing us from 
 the fear of a continuance of hostilities.
 
 Feb. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 115 
 
 According to the first treaty, the Franconian 
 principality of Bayreuth, contiguous to that 
 of Anspach, and to be retained by Prussia, 
 was to be limited in a more regular manner 
 by taking out of that of Anspach a district 
 containing 20,000 inhabitants. There was no 
 further question about this district. Lastly, 
 the obligations imposed upon Prussia were 
 extended. She was obliged to guarantee not 
 only the French empire as it was, with the 
 new arrangements concluded in Germany and 
 Italy, but she was further required to guaran- 
 tee explicitly the future results of the war 
 commenced against Naples, that is to say, the 
 dethronement of the Bourbons and the then 
 presumed establishment of a branch of the 
 Bonaparte family on the throne of the Two 
 Sicilies. This was certainly the most disa- 
 greeable of the recent conditions imposed 
 upon Prussia, for it rendered the situation of 
 the king towards the Emperor Alexander more 
 difficult than ever, on account of the professed 
 protectorship of Russia, in respect to the 
 Bourbons of Naples. It is unnecessary to 
 say that the guarantees were reciprocal, and 
 that France promised to support Prussia with 
 her armies, and to insure to her all her acqui- 
 sitions past and present, including Hanover. 
 
 This second treaty was signed on the 15th 
 of February. 
 
 Thus all that Prussia had gained by attempt- 
 ing to modify the treaty of Schonbrunn, was to 
 be deprived of the additions of territory which 
 were at first to have been added to Bayreuth, 
 to be compelled to a very dangerous act, the 
 closing of the Elbe and Weser, lastly to be 
 obliged to avow publicly what was about to 
 be consummated at Naples. The only results, 
 in short, were more obligations and fewer ad- 
 vantages. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz could not have done better, 
 unless he had placed things in Iheir former state, 
 which would assuredly have been preferable, 
 for he would have spared Prussia the embar- 
 rassing engagements of a patched up and insin- 
 cere alliance. It is true that he would then 
 have deprived her of the illusion of a brilliant 
 acquisition, extremely useful for covering in 
 a moment all the meanness of Prussian policy. 
 Be this as it may, M. de Haugwitz would not 
 himself carry to Berlin this bitter fruit of the 
 tergiversations of his court, and he resolved 
 to send thither M. de Lucchesini, minister of 
 Prussia in Paris. It did not suit him to solicit 
 the adoption of a spoiled work, and to take 
 upon himself alone the responsibility of the 
 resolution which was proposed to be adopted. 
 He wished to leave to his sovereign, to his col- 
 ^agues, and to the royal family, who interfered 
 in so indiscreet a manner in affairs of state, 
 the business of choosing between the treaty of 
 Schonbrunn, made a great deal worse, and 
 war; for it was evident this time that Napo- 
 leon, put out of patience by a new rejection, 
 ii' he did not take fire immediately, on account 
 of a refused alliance, would treat Prussia in 
 such a manner in all the European arrange- 
 ments that war would very soon become 
 inevitable. 
 
 He therefore sent M. de Lucchesini, whose 
 luperior he was, to Berlin, and for a few days 
 
 took his place as minister at Paris. He 
 charged him to carry the treaty to his court 
 to explain to it the exact state of thihgs in 
 France, to represent the real dispositions of 
 Napoleon, who was ready to become, accord- 
 ing to the manner in which it behaved, either 
 a powerful and sincere ally, though embarrass- 
 ing from his spirit of enterprise, or a formi- 
 dable enemy, if he was forced to regard Prus- 
 sia as a second Austria. M. de Haugwitz did 
 not commission M. de Lucchesini to solicit in 
 his name the adoption of the new treaty. He 
 wished for nothing more, for he was already 
 disgusted with a task which had become too 
 ungrateful, and with the fatigue of a responsi- 
 bility that was too vexatious. 
 
 He remained therefore in Paris, treated with 
 the highest distinction by Napoleon, studying 
 attentively that extraordinary man, and per- 
 suading himself more and more every day of 
 the justice of his own policy, and of the pre- 
 sent and future interests which Prussia and 
 France alike compromised by not knowing 
 how to agree. 
 
 In Europe, every thing was going on accord- 
 ing to the wishes of the fortunate victor of 
 Austerlitz. The army which he had sent to 
 Naples, under the apparent command of Jo- 
 seph Napoleon, and under the real command 
 of Massena, marched directly for the goal. 
 The Queen of Naples, striving once more to 
 dispel the storm gathered by her faults, im- 
 plored all the courts, and successively de- 
 spatched Cardinal Ruffo and the heir-apparent 
 to the crown to meet Joseph, and to try to 
 make a treaty, whatever might be the condi- 
 tions. Joseph, bound by the imperative com- 
 mands of his brother, refused Cardinal Ruffo, 
 received with respect the solicitations of 
 Prince Ferdinand, but did not halt for a mo- 
 ment in his march for Naples. The French 
 army, 40,000 strong, passed the Garigliano on 
 the 8th of February, and advanced, formed 
 into three corps. One, that of the right, under 
 General Reynier, went to blockade Gaeta; an- 
 other, that of the centre, under Marshal Mas- 
 sena, marched upon Capua ; the third, that of 
 the left, under General St. Cyr, directed its 
 course through Apulia and the Abruzzi, to- 
 wards the Gulf of Tarento. On this intelli- 
 gence, the English embarked with such preci- 
 pitation, that they had wellnigh brought their 
 allies, the Russians, into danger. The former 
 fled to Sicily, the latter to Corfu. The court 
 of Naples took refuge at Palermo, after having 
 completely emptied the public coffers, and even 
 those of the Bank. The prince royal, with the 
 best troops that were left in the Neapolitan 
 army, had betaken himself to the Calabrias. 
 Two Neapolitan gentlemen were sent to Capua 
 to treat for the surrender of the capital. A 
 convention was signed, and Joseph, escorted by 
 Massena's corps, appeared before Naples. He 
 entered the city on the 15th of February, with- 
 out any disturbance of order, the population 
 of the lazzaroni having made no resistance. 
 
 The fortress of Gaeta, though included in 
 the convention of Capua, was not surrendered 
 by the Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, who was 
 governor of it. He declared that he won'd de- 
 fend himself there to the last extremity Tbf
 
 116 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1806. 
 
 strength of this place, a sort of Gibraltar, con- 
 nected only by an isthmus with the continent 
 of Italy, rendered it, in fact, capable of a long 
 resistance. General Reynier carried the ex- 
 ternal positions with great boldness, and strove 
 to coop up the enemy closely in the place, till 
 he should be supplied with the materiel neces- 
 sary for undertaking a regular siege. 
 
 Joseph, master of Naples, was only at the 
 beginning of the difficulties which he had to 
 encounter. Though he assumed as yet only 
 the quality of Napoleon's lieutenant, he was 
 not the less in all eyes the designated sovereign 
 of the new kingdom. There was not a ducat 
 in the chests ; all the military stores had been 
 carried off; the principal functionaries were 
 pone. It was requisite to create at once 
 finances and an administration. Joseph had 
 good sense, mildness, but no part of that pro- 
 digious activity with which his brother Napo- 
 leon was endued, and which would have been 
 necessary here to found a government. 
 
 He fell, nevertheless, to work. The gran- 
 dees of the kingdom, more enlightened than the 
 rest of the nation, as is the case in all countries 
 at all civilized, had been ill-treated by the 
 queen, who reproached them with being too 
 much inclined to liberal opinions, and who 
 kept them in fear of the lazzaroni, ignorant and 
 fanatic, whom she incessantly threatened to 
 let loose upon them: the usual conduct of roy- 
 alty, which everywhere props itself upon the 
 people against the aristocracy, when symp- 
 toms of resistance appear among the latter. 
 The grandees, therefore, gave a good reception 
 to the new government, for which they hoped 
 for a discreetly reforming administration, and 
 one determined to, afford equal protection to 
 all classes. Joseph, finding them animatec 
 with favourable sentiments, studied still more 
 to draw them to him, and restrained the lazza- 
 roni by the dread of severe executions. Be- 
 sides, the naipe of Massena made disturber 
 tremble. A gale drove a Neapolitan frigate 
 and cutter, with several transports, into Na 
 pies. In this manner some military stores 
 and other things of considerable value were 
 recovered. The forts were armed, contribu 
 butions were levied, and a very clever Corsi 
 can, M. Salicette, sent by Napoleon to Naples 
 was placed at the head of the police. Joseph 
 applied to his brother for assistance in money 
 to enable him to overcome these first diffi 
 culties 
 
 Eugene, viceroy of upper Italy, had receivec 
 the Venetian States from the hands of Austria 
 He had entered Venice, to the great satisfac 
 tion of the inhabitants of that ancient queen 
 of the seas, who found in their annexation to 
 an Italian kingdom, constituted on wise prin- 
 ciples, a certain compensation for their lost 
 independence. General Marmont's corps, de- 
 scending from the Styrian Alps into Italy, had 
 proceeded to the Izonzn. and formed a reserve 
 ready to penetrate into Dalmatia, if this junc- 
 tion of forces should become necessary. Ge- 
 neral Molitor, with his division, had made a 
 'apid march towards Dalmatia, to take posses- 
 ;ion of a country to which Napoleon attached 
 great value, because it was contiguous to the 
 Turkish empire. That general had entered 
 
 he town of Zara, the capital of Dalmatia. 
 3ut he had still a great extent of coast to tra- 
 verse before he reached the celebrated mouths 
 of the Cattaro, the southernmost and the most 
 mportant of the positions of the Adriatic, and 
 he hastened his march, in order to awe by the 
 error of his approach the Montenegrins, who 
 lad long been in the pay of Russia. 
 
 For the rest, the court of Vienna, sighing for 
 :he retreat of the French army, was disposed 
 to execute faithfully the treaty of Presburg. 
 That court, exhausted by the last war, which 
 was the third since the French Revolution, 
 terrified by the blows which it had received at 
 Ulm and at Austerlilz, had, undoubtedly, not 
 renounced the hope of raising itself again 
 someday; but, for the present, it was resolved 
 to introduce some order into its finances, and 
 to let many years elapse before it again tried 
 the fortune of arms. The Archduke Charles, 
 having again become minister of war, was di- 
 rected to seek a new system of military orga- 
 nization, which, without too great a reduction 
 offeree, should produce savings that could be 
 no longer deferred. The government, there- 
 fore, lost no time in executing the late treaty 
 of peace, in paying the contribution of 40 mil- 
 lions, either in specie or bills of exchange, in 
 seconding the removal of the cannon and of 
 the muskets taken at Vienna, that the succes- 
 sive retreat of the French troops might speed- 
 ily be accomplished. This retreat was to ter- 
 minate on the 1st of March, with the evacua- 
 tion of Braunau. 
 
 Napoleon, who had left Berthier at Munich 
 to superintend the return of the army, a return 
 which he purposed to render slow and com- 
 modious, had enjoined that faithful performer 
 of his orders to repair to Braunau, and not to 
 restore that fortress till he had received posi- 
 tive intelligence of the delivery of the mouths 
 of Cattaro. He had established Marshal Ney, 
 with his corps, in the country of Salzburg, 
 that he might live there as long as possible at 
 the expense of a province destined to become 
 Austrian. He had established Marshal Soult's 
 corps on the Inn, a cheval on the archduchy of 
 Austria and Bavaria, and living upon both. 
 The corps of Marshals Davout, Lannes, an 
 Bernadotte, being too great a burden to Bava- 
 ria, whose inhabitants began to be weary of it, 
 were marched towards the new countries 
 ceded to the German princes our allies: and, 
 as no term was fixed for the delivery of these 
 countries, still dependent on litigious arrange- 
 ments, there was a founded pretext for keep- 
 ing them there for some time. Bernadotte's 
 | corps was therefore removed into the province 
 ! of Anspach, ceded by Prussia to Bavaria. It 
 there had space to extend itself and to subsist 
 Marshal Davout's corps was transferred to the 
 bishopric of Eichstudt and the principality of 
 ! Oettingen. The cavalry was divided among 
 ' the different corps. Those which had not suf- 
 | ficient space to supply them with subsistence, 
 had permission to spread themselves among 
 the petty princes of Suabia, whose existence 
 I was rendered problematical by the treaty of 
 Presburg, which required new changes in the 
 Germanic constitution. The troops of Lannes, 
 divided between Marshal Mortier and General
 
 Feb. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 117 
 
 Oudinot, were quartered in Suabia. Oudi- 
 not's grenadiers proceeded through Switzer- 
 land towards the principality of Neufchatel, to 
 take possession of it. Lastly, Augereau's 
 corps, reinforced by Dupont's division and 
 General Dumonceau's Batavian division, was 
 cantoned around Frankfort, ready to march 
 for Prussia, if the last arrangements concluded 
 with her were not followed up by sincere and 
 definitive proceedings. 
 
 These different corps were in excellent con- 
 dition. They began to feel the effect of the 
 rest which had been granted them ; they were 
 recruited by the arrival of young conscripts, in- 
 cessantly setting out from the banks of the 
 Rhine, where the depots had been united under 
 Marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann. Our sol- 
 diers were fitter, if possible, for war, than be- 
 fore the late campaign, and excessively proud 
 of their recent victories. They proved them- 
 selves humane towards the people of Germany, 
 rather boisterous, it is true, prone to boast of 
 their exploits ; but, this noise over, sociable to 
 the highest degree, and presenting a singular 
 contrast to the German auxiliaries, who were 
 much harder towards their countrymen than 
 we ourselves were. Unfortunately, Napoleon, 
 from a spirit of economy, useful to his army, 
 detrimental to his policy, allowed the soldiers 
 to be paid only part of their pay, retaining the 
 remainder for their benefit, to be paid them 
 subsequently after their return to France. He 
 required that provisions should be furnished 
 them by the countries in which they were en- 
 camped, in lieu of that part of their pay which 
 was withheld, and this was a very heavy bur- 
 den to the inhabitants. If the provisions had 
 been paid for, the presence of our troops, in- 
 stead of being a burden, would have become 
 an advantage; and Germany, which knew that 
 they had been brought upon its soil through 
 the fault of the coalition, would have had on 
 that account none but kindly feelings towards 
 us. It was, therefore, an ill-judged saving, and 
 the benefit resulting from it for the army was 
 not equivalent to the inconveniences that were 
 liable to arise from the sufferings of the occu- 
 pied countries. Napoleon like wise caused the 
 expenditure for clothing to be deferred, in order 
 to new clothe the soldiers when they should 
 repass the Rhine, and come to participate in the 
 festivities which he was preparing for them. 
 They, for their part, were perfectly satisfied, 
 and cheerfully submitted to wear their old 
 clothes, and to receive but little money, saying 
 that, when they returned to France, they should 
 have new clothes and plenty of savings to 
 spend. 
 
 For the rest, if the people complained of the 
 prolonged stay of our troops, the petty princes 
 had finally invoked their presence as a benefit, 
 for nothing was to be compared with the vio- 
 lence and the spoliations committed by the 
 German governments, especially those which 
 possessed any strength. The Grand-duke of 
 Baden and the King of Bavaria had laid their 
 hands on the possessions of the immediate no- 
 bility, and, though they acted without any con- 
 sideration, their haste was humanity compared 
 with the violence of the King of Wurtemberg, 
 who carried rapacity to such a length as to 
 
 cause all the fiefs to be seized and plundered, 
 as at the time when the cry in France was, War 
 with the mansions, peace urith the cottages. His 
 troops entered the domains of princes, enclosed 
 in his kingdom, upon pretext of seizing the 
 possessions of the immediate nobility. Having 
 a right to a portion only of the Brisgau, the 
 King of Wurtemberg had occupied nearly the 
 whole of it But for the French troops, the 
 Wurtembergers and the Badenars would have 
 come to blows. 
 
 Napoleon had appointed M. Otto, minister of 
 France, at Munich, and Berthier, major-general 
 I of the grand army, arbiters of the differences 
 ; which he foresaw between the German princes, 
 great and small. These latter had all hastened 
 ' to Munich, whither the Diet of Ratisbon ap- 
 | peared to have transferred its seat, and there 
 solicited the justice of France, and even the 
 presence, how burdensome soever it might be, 
 of French troops. On all sides arose inextri- 
 I cable disputes, which apparently it would be 
 impossible to settle without new moulding the 
 I Germanic constitution. Meanwhile detach- 
 ments of our soldiers held possession of the 
 places in litigation, and every thing was refer- 
 red to the arbitration of France and her minis 
 I ters. At any rate, Napoleon did not make a 
 i handle of these disputes to prolong the stay of 
 his troops in Germany, for he was impatient to 
 ; order the return of the army, and to collect it 
 l around him at Paris ; and for this he awaited 
 only the entire occupation of Dalmatia, and the 
 definitive answer of the court of Prussia. 
 
 That court, obliged to decide definitively 
 upon the modified treaty of Schonbrunn, at 
 length took its resolution. It accepted this 
 treaty, which had become less advantageous 
 since its double remodelling in Berlin and in 
 Paris, and received, with confusion on its brow, 
 with ingratitude in its heart, the gift of Hano- 
 ver, which at any other time would have filled 
 it with joy. What, indeed, could be done? 
 There was no other course to take but to close 
 the business by acceding to the 'proposals of 
 France, or to make up its mind at once to war, 
 war, for which the Prussian army boastingly 
 cried out, and which its leaders, more consi- 
 derate, and above all the king, dreaded as a 
 ruinous experiment. 
 
 As for choosing war, it ought to have decid- 
 ed on this when Napoleon quitted Ulm, to bury 
 himself in the long valley of the Danube, and 
 to have fallen upon his rear, while the Austro- 
 Russians, concentrated at Olmutz, were draw- 
 ing him into Moravia. But the Prussian army 
 was not ready then ; and, after the 2d of De- 
 cember, when Count Haugwitz conversed with 
 Napoleon, it was too late. It was much later 
 now that the French, assembled in Suabia and 
 Franconia, had but a step to take to invade 
 Prussia, now that the Russians were in Poland, 
 and the Austrians in a completely disarmed 
 state. 
 
 To accept the gift of Hanover on the con- 
 ditions attached to it by France was, therefore, 
 the only possible resolution. But this was a 
 singular mode of commencing an intimate 
 alliance. The treaty of the 15th of February 
 was ratified on the 24th. M. de Lucchesini 
 set out immediately for Paris with the ratifi-
 
 118 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1S06. 
 
 cations. M. ae Haugwitz, on his part, left 
 Paris to return to Berlin, highly pleased with 
 the personal treatment which he had received 
 from Napoleon, promising him anew the faith- 
 ful alliance of Prussia, but anticipating most 
 arduous trials, at sight of all the difficulties 
 which then swarmed in Germany, at the sight, 
 more especially, of those petty German princes 
 prostrate at the feet of France, to save them- 
 selves from the exactions with which they 
 were overwhelmed by the more powerful or 
 the more favoured princes. 
 
 On his arrival in Berlin, M. de Haugwitz 
 found the king deeply dejected at his situation, 
 deeply afflicted by the difficulties opposed to 
 him by the court, more excited and more in- 
 temperate than ever. The audacity of the 
 discontented was carried to such a length, 
 that, one night, all the windows in the house 
 of M. de Haugwitz were broken by rioters, 
 who were generally believed to belong to the 
 army, and who were publicly, but falsely, 
 said to be agents of Prince Louis. M. de 
 Haugwitz affected to disdain these manifesta- 
 tions, which, very insignificant in free coun- 
 tries, where one winks at while despising 
 these excesses of the multitude, were strange 
 and serious in an absolute monarchy, espe- 
 cially when they could be imputed to the 
 army. The king considered them as a serious 
 matter, and declared publicly his intention to 
 be severe. He gave formal orders for a search 
 after the culprits, whom the police, either from 
 being implicated itself or powerless, did not 
 succeed in discovering. The king, driven to 
 extremity, manifested a firm and decided de- 
 termination, which overawed the discontented, 
 and particularly the queen. He gave the lat- 
 ter to understand that his resolution was 
 taken, that the welfare of the monarchy had 
 commanded him to take it, and that every 
 body about him must assume an attitude con- 
 formable to his policy. The queen, who, for 
 the rest, was devoted to the interest of the 
 king, her husband, was silent, and, for a mo- 
 ment, the court presented a decorous aspect. 
 
 M. de Hardenberg quitted the ministry. 
 This personage had become the idol of the 
 opposition. He had been the creature of M. 
 de Haugwitz, his partisan, his imitator, and 
 the most zealous advocate of the French alli- 
 ance, particularly in 1805, when Napoleon, 
 from his camp at Boulogne, offered Hanover 
 to Prussia. Then M. de Hardenberg regarded 
 it as the most brilliant of glories to ensure 
 this aggrandizement to his country, and com- 
 plained to the French ministers of the hesita- 
 tions of his sovereign, who was too back- 
 ward, he said, in attaching himself to France. 
 Since then, having seen that scheme mis- 
 carry, he had thrown himself, with the impe- 
 tuosity of an intemperate character, into the 
 arms of Russia, and, unable to extricate him- 
 self from this error, he loudly declaimed 
 against France. Napoleon, informed of his 
 conduct, committed a great fault in regard to 
 him, which he repeated more than once, and 
 which was to mention him in his bulletins, by 
 making an offensive allusion to a Prussian min- 
 ister, seduced by the gold of England. The im- 
 putation was unjust. M. de Hardenberg was no 
 
 more seduced by the gold of the English than 
 was M. de Haugwitz by the gold of the French : 
 it was most indecent in an official document, 
 and bespoke too strongly the license of the sol- 
 dier conqueror. It was this attack which pro- 
 cured for M. de Hardenberg the immense po- 
 pularity which he enjoyed. The king allowed 
 him to retire with testimonies of considera- 
 tion, which did not take the character of a po- 
 litical disgrace from his retirement. 
 
 But, while he removed M. de Hardenberg, 
 Frederick William associated with M. de 
 Haugwitz, a second, who was not much bet- 
 ter: this was M. de Keller, whom the court 
 considered as one of its own, and who gave 
 himself out publicly as inspector over his 
 superior. It was a sort of satisfaction granted 
 to the party hostile to France ; for, in absolute 
 governments, rulers are frequently obliged to 
 give way to opposition, just as in free govern- 
 ments. Frederick William did still more; he 
 endeavoured to keep on good terms with Rus- 
 sia, to explain honourably to her the interested 
 inconsistencies which he had committed. 
 
 Since Austerlitz, the cabinet of Berlin had 
 been very chary of communications with St. 
 Petersburg. After all the boastings of Pots- 
 dam, Russia could not but be ashamed of her 
 defeat, and Prussia of the manner in which 
 she had kept the oath sworn on the tomb of 
 the great Frederick. Silence was for the mo- 
 ment the only fitting relation between the two 
 courts. Russia, however, had once broken it 
 to declare that her forces were at the disposal 
 of Prussia, if the treaty of Potsdam, divulged, 
 should bring a war upon her. Since that time 
 she had said nothing, nor Prussia either. 
 
 It was requisite at last to come to an expla- 
 nation. The king pressed the old Duke of 
 Brunswick to go to St. Petersburg, to oppose 
 his glory to the censures which the conduct 
 pursued at SchOnbrunn and continued in Paris 
 could not fail to call forth. This respectable 
 prince, devoted to the house of Brandenburg, 
 set out, therefore, notwithstanding his age, for 
 Russia. He went not to declare frankly that 
 Prussia had at length espoused the French 
 alliance, which would have been difficult, but 
 yet preferable to a continuation of ambiguities, 
 already very pernicious : he went to say that 
 if Prussia had taken Hanover, it was that it 
 might not be left in the hands of France, and 
 to spare herself the mortification and danger 
 of seeing the French appear again in the north 
 of Germany; that, if she had accepted the 
 term alliance, it was to avoid war, and that 
 this term was intended to signify nothing but 
 neutrality: that neutrality was the best course 
 for both of them; that Russia and Prussia had 
 nothing to gain by war; that, by persisting in 
 that system of implacable hostility against 
 France, they fostered the commercial mono- 
 poly of England, and that it was not very sure 
 that they were not also fostering the conti- 
 nental domination of Napoleon. 
 
 Such was the language which the Duke of 
 Brunswick was to hold at St. Petersburg. 
 
 We must return to the young emperor, who, 
 hurried into war by vanity and against the 
 secret whispers of his reason, had served at 
 Austerlitz such a sorry apprenticeship to arms.
 
 Feb. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 119 
 
 He had given little cause for being talked of 
 during the last three months, and had hidden in 
 his distant empire the confusion of his defeat. 
 
 A general outcry was raised in Russia 
 against the young men who, it was alleged, 
 governed and compromised the empire. These 
 young men, placed, some in the army, others 
 in the cabinet, had fallen out with one another. 
 The party of the Dolgoroukis accused the 
 party of the Czartoryskis, and reproached it 
 with having ruined every thing by its misbe- 
 haviour towards Prussia. They would have 
 done violence to her, said the Dolgoroukis : 
 they had, therefore, estranged instead of draw- 
 ing her nearer, and her refusal to join the 
 coalition had prevented its success. It was in 
 a particular interest that they had so acted; it 
 was to wrest the Polish provinces from Prus- 
 sia, and to reconstitute Poland, a mischievous 
 dream, for which the Polish Prince Czartoryski 
 was evidently betraying the emperor. 
 
 Prince Czartoryski and his friends main- 
 tained with much more reason that it was 
 those presumptuous soldiers, who could not 
 wait at Olmutz for the expiration of the term 
 fixed for the intervention of Prussia, that had 
 insisted prematurely on giving battle, and op- 
 posing their twenty-five years' experience to 
 the skill of the most consummate general of 
 modern times that it was these presumptuous 
 and incapable soldiers who were the real 
 authors of the disasters of Russia. 
 
 The old Russians, dissatisfied, condemned 
 both the youthful parties ; and Alexander, ac- 
 cused of allowing himself to be guided some- 
 times by the one, sometimes by the other, had 
 become, at this period, an object of little consi- 
 deration for his subjects. 
 
 He had been deeply dejected in the first days 
 after his defeat, and, if Prince Czartoryski had 
 not several times roused him to a sense of his 
 own dignity, he would have manifested too 
 plainly the profound despondency of his spirit. 
 Prince Czartoryski, though he had his share 
 in the inexperience common to the young men 
 who governed the empire, was nevertheless 
 consistent and serious in his views. He was 
 the principal author of that system of European 
 arbitration which had led Russia to take arms 
 against France. That system, which, with 
 Russian statesmen, was in reality but a mask 
 thrown over their national ambition, was with 
 that young Pole a sincere and cordially em- 
 braced idea. He wished Alexander to per- 
 severe in it; and, if it was a great presump- 
 tion in men so young to pretend to control 
 Europe, especially in presence of the powers 
 which were then disputing the empire over it, 
 it was a still greater levity to give up so soon 
 what had been so rashly undertaken. 
 
 Prince Czartoryski had addressed to the 
 young emperor, once his friend and beginning 
 to become again his master, noble and re- 
 spectful remonstrances which would do honour 
 to a minister of a free country, which must do 
 him much more honour where resistance to 
 power is an act of rare devotedness and des- 
 tined to remain unknown. Prince Czartoryski, 
 recapitulating to Alexander his hesitations, 
 his weaknesses, said, " Austria is abased, but 
 she detests her conqueror; Prussia is divided 
 
 between two parties, but she will finally yield 
 herself up to the German sentiment which 
 predominates in her. In managing these 
 powers, wait till the moment arrives when 
 one or the other shall be ready to act. Till 
 then you are out of reach : you can remain 
 some time without making either peace or 
 war, and thus wait till circumstances permit 
 you either to resume arms or to retreat with 
 advantage. Cease not to be allied with Eng- 
 land, and you will oblige Napoleon to concede 
 to you what is your due." 
 
 Deeply sensible of the greatness of Napo- 
 leon, since he had met him on the field of 
 battle of Austerlitz, Alexander thus replied to 
 Prince Czartoryski : " When we pretend to 
 assail this man we are children presuming to 
 tackle a giant." And he added that, without 
 Prussia it would be impossible to renew the 
 war, for without her there was no chance of 
 maintaining a successful war. Alexander had 
 conceived a singular esteem for the Prussian 
 army, for this single reason, that it had not yet 
 been beaten by Napoleon. That army, in fact, 
 was then the illusion and the hope of Europe. 
 With that Alexander was ready to commence 
 the struggle afresh, but not without it. As for 
 England, he ceased to hope for any very 
 efficacious support from her. He feared that, 
 after the deaih of Mr. Pitt, announced as cer- 
 tain, after the accession of Mr. Fox, announced 
 as near at hand, hatred of France would be 
 extinguished, if not in the hearts of the Eng- 
 lish, at least in their policy. However, the 
 remonstrances of Prince Czartoryski, stimu- 
 lating the pride of Alexander, had raised his 
 spirit, and he was resolved, before he delivered 
 his sword to Napoleon, to make him wait for 
 it. But though useful, the lessons of his young 
 censor were annoying to him, and that to such 
 a degree as to induce him to seek, among the 
 aged persons of his empire, a complaisant 
 servant without capacity, to cover with a great 
 age and to execute with submission his per- 
 sonal will. It was already said that his fa- 
 vour was fixed on General Budberg. 
 
 The conduct recommended by Prince Czar- 
 toryski was, nevertheless, followed very punc- 
 tually. Russia again placed herself in com- 
 munication with Austria; she seemed to have 
 forgotten the coolness of Holitsch, expressed 
 to that court great sympathy in its misfortunes, 
 and high consideration for the power that was 
 yet left it ; she even undertook to negotiate in 
 London to obtain payment for her of a year's 
 subsidy, though the war had lasted only three 
 months. As for Prussia, she avoided every 
 thing that could have offended her, abstaining, 
 nevertheless, from approving her acts. The 
 Duke of Brunswick had arrived in the first 
 days of the month of March. He was most 
 cordially received, he was loaded with atten- 
 tions, which seemed to be addressed to his 
 person, to his age, to his military glory, and by 
 no means to the court of which he was the re- 
 presentative. His reception was cooler when 
 he began to converse on political affairs. He 
 was told that Russia could not approve of the 
 conduct of Prussia in accepting Hanover from 
 the hand of the enemy of Europe ; that, for the 
 rest, the peace which she had made with
 
 120 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1806. 
 
 France was a false peace, neither solid nor 
 durable; that Prussia would soon be forced to 
 adopt a resolution too long delayed, and at last 
 to draw the sword of the great Frederick 
 " Then," said the Emperor Alexander to the 
 Duke of Brunswick, " I will serve under your 
 command, and glory in learning the art of war 
 in your school." 
 
 An attempt, however, was made to com- 
 mence with the old duke a negotiation destined 
 to be kept profoundly secret. Upon pretext 
 that the conditions would not be faithfully 
 kept by France, it was proposed to conclude a 
 sub-alliance with Russia, by means of which 
 Prussia, if she were dissatisfied with her French 
 ally, might have recourse to her Russian ally, 
 and would have at her disposal all the forces 
 of the Muscovite emperor. What was offered 
 was nothing less than treason against France. 
 The Duke of Brunswick, wishing to leave be- 
 hind at St. Petersburg dispositions favourable 
 to Prussia, consented not to conclude such an 
 engagement, but to propose it to the king. It 
 was agreed that this negotiation should be left 
 open, and that it should be carried on secretly 
 and unknown to M. de Haugwitz, thr&ugh the 
 medium of M.de Hardenberg,the same minister 
 who was apparently disgraced, and who con- 
 tinued under hand to treat upon the most im- 
 portant affairs of the monarchy. 
 
 While Prussia Avas thus seeking to explain 
 her conduct to Russia, she attempted also to 
 excuse herself in London for the occupation 
 of Hanover. Nothing was more singular than 
 her manifesto to the Hanoverian people and 
 her despatch to the court of London. To the 
 Hanoverians she said that it was with pain 
 she took possession of that kingdom posses- 
 sion for which she paid by a severe sacrifice, 
 that of her provinces on the Rhine, in Franco- 
 nia, and in Switzerland; but that she did so to 
 insure peace to Germany, and to spare Han- 
 over the presence of foreign armies. After 
 addressing to the Hanoverian people these 
 words without frankness and without dignity, 
 she said to the English cabinet that she did 
 not take Hanover from England, but that she 
 received it from Napoleon, whose conquest 
 Hanover was. She received it, she added, 
 against her will, and as an exchange that was 
 'forced upon her for provinces which were the 
 object of her keenest regret; that it was one 
 of the consequences of the imprudent war 
 which Prussia had always blamed, which had 
 been undertaken contrary to her advice, and 
 the consequences of which the allies must im- 
 pute to themselves, for, in combating it unsea- 
 sonably, they had raised up that colossal power 
 which took from one to give to another, and 
 which did violence as well to those whom it 
 favoured with its gifts as to those whom it 
 despoiled. 
 
 England was not to be satisfied with such 
 reasons. She replied in a manifesto, in which 
 she overwhelmed the court of Prussia with in- 
 vectives, declared it miserably fallen under the 
 yoke of Napoleon, unworthy of being listened 
 to, and as contemptible for its greediness as 
 foi its dependence. Still the British cabinet, 
 that it might not appear in the eyes of the na- 
 tion to bring an additional enemy upon its 
 
 hands, for an interest belonging exclusively to 
 the royal family, said that it would have suffered 
 this new invasion of Hanover, the inevitable 
 result of the continental war, if Prussia had 
 confined herself to a mere occupation; but that 
 this power, having announced the closing of 
 the rivers, had committed a hostile act, an act 
 supremely injurious to English commerce, and 
 that in consequence it declared war against 
 her. Orders were given to all the ships of the 
 royal navy to take all vessels sailing under 
 the Prussian flag. Great was the consequent 
 perturbation in Germany; for the vessels of 
 the Baltic usually covered themselves with 
 that flag, which was more respected than the 
 others by the lords of the sea. 
 
 The ascendency of the battle of Marengo 
 had reconciled England with Napoleon, the 
 ascendency of that of Austerlitz brought her 
 back to him once more, for the victories of our 
 land armies were means of disarming her quite 
 as sure though less direct. The first of these 
 victories had produced the resignation of Mr. 
 Pitt, the second caused his death. This great 
 minister, having resumed his seat in the cabi- 
 net in 1803, for no more than two years, ap- 
 peared there only to drink deeply of mortifica- 
 tions. Having returned without Mr. Wyndham 
 and Lord Grenville, his former colleagues, 
 without Mr. Fox, his recent ally, he had had to 
 fight in parliament his old and his new friends, 
 in Europe Napoleon, become emperor, and 
 more powerful than ever. At his voice, so 
 well known to the enemies of France, the cry 
 of arms had rung on all sides ; a third coali- 
 tion had been formed, and the French army 
 had been drawn away from Dover to Vienna. 
 But this third coalition once dissolved at Aus- 
 terlitz, Mr. Pitt had seen his plans frustrated, 
 Napoleon at liberty to return to Boulogne, and 
 the keen anxieties of England about to be 
 renewed. 
 
 The idea of again seeing Napoleon on the 
 shores of the Channel engrossed all minds in 
 England. Reliance was still placed, it is true, 
 on the immense difficulty of the passage, but 
 people began to fear that nothing was impos- 
 sible with the extraordinary man who shook 
 the world; and they asked if it was worth 
 while to^risk such chances, for the sake of ac- 
 quiring an island more, when they already had 
 all India, when they held the Cape of Good 
 Hope and Malta too firmly to be dispossessed 
 of them. They said to themselves that the 
 battle of Trafalgar had definitively insured the 
 superiority of England on the seas, but that 
 the European continent was left to Napoleon, 
 that he was about to close all its outlets, that 
 this continent, after all, was the world, and 
 that one could not live cut off from it for ever; 
 that the most splendid naval victories would 
 not prevent Napoleon, taking advantage some 
 day of some accidental circumstance, from 
 leaving that continent to invade England. 
 The system of war to the utmost extremity 
 was, therefore, universally discredited among 
 rational Englishmen, and, though that system 
 was subsequently successful, yet they were 
 then sensible of the danger which was great, 
 too great for the advantages that might be 
 gained by a prolonged struggle.
 
 March, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 12' 
 
 Now, as men are the slaves of fortune, and 
 readily take her momentary caprices for eter- 
 nal, they were cruel towards Mr. Pitt ; they 
 forgot the services which for twenty years 
 that minister had rendered to his country, and 
 the degree of greatness to which he had 
 raised it by the energy of his patriotism, and 
 by the parliamentary talents by which he had 
 subjugated the House of Commons. They 
 considered him as vanquished, and treated 
 him as such. His enemies railed at his policy 
 and the results which it had produced. They 
 imputed to him the faults of General Mack, 
 the precipitation of the Austrians in. taking 
 the field without waiting for the Russians, and 
 the precipitation of the Russians in giving 
 battle without waiting for the Prussians. All 
 this they imputed to the vehement impatience 
 of Mr. Pitt; they affected great sympathy for 
 Austria, while they accused him of having 
 ruined her, and of having ruined in her the 
 only genuine friend of England. 
 
 Mr. Pitt, nevertheless, was a stranger to the 
 plan of the campaign, and had participated in 
 nothing but the coalition. It was he who had 
 principally knitted it, and in knitting it he had 
 prevented the Boulogne expedition. People 
 gave him no thanks for it. 
 
 A singular circumstance had rendered the 
 effect of Napoleon's late victory more painful. 
 On the day after Austerliiz, as on the day aAer 
 Marengo, it was asserted for a few moments, 
 before the truth was known, that Napoleon 
 had lost in a great battle twenty-seven thou- 
 sand men and all his artillery. But accurate 
 information had very soon been circulated, 
 and the members of the opposition, getting 
 the French bulletins translated and printed, 
 distributed and sent them to the door of Mr. 
 Pitt and the Russian ambassador. 
 
 In order to the enjoyment of all his glory, 
 Napoleon would have had only to pass the 
 Strait, and listen to what was said of him, of 
 his genius, of his fortune. Melancholy vicis- 
 situdes of this world ! what Mr. Pitt under- 
 went at this period, Napoleon had to undergo 
 later, and with a greatness of injustice and of 
 passion proportioned to the greatness of his 
 genius and of his destiny. 
 
 Twenty-five years' parliamentary conflicts, 
 consuming conflicts, which wear out soul and 
 body, had ruined the health of Mr. Pitt. An 
 hereditary disorder, which business, fatigues, 
 and recent vexations had rendered mortal, 
 caused his premature end on the 23d of Janu- 
 ary, 1806, after having governed his country 
 more than twenty years, with as much power 
 as can be exercised in an absolute monarchy; 
 and yet he lived in a free country, and yet he 
 enjoyed not the favour of his sovereign, and 
 had to conquer the suffrages of the most in- 
 dependent assembly in the world. 
 
 If we admire those ministers who in abso- 
 lute monarchies have the skill to chain for a 
 long time the weakness of the prince, the in- 
 stability of the court, and to reign in the name 
 of their master over an enslaved country, 
 what admiration ought we not to feel for a 
 man, whose power, established over a free na- 
 tion, lasted twenty years ! Courts are ex- 
 tremely capricious no doubt : they are not 
 
 VOL. II. 16 
 
 more so than great deliberative assemblies. 
 All the caprices of public opinion, excited by 
 the thousand stimulants of the daily press, 
 and reflected in a parliament where they as- 
 sume the authority of the national sovereignty, 
 compose that variable will, alternately servile 
 and despotic, which it is necessary to capti- 
 ! vate in order to reign one's self over that mul- 
 i titude of heads which pretend to reign. To 
 : hold sway there, it requires not only the art 
 of flattery which wins success in courts, but 
 also that very different art of public speaking, 
 sometimes vulgar, sometimes sublime, which 
 is indispensable to obtain a hearing from an 
 ' assembly; it requires, further, that which is 
 not an art, which is a gift, the temper with 
 I which one succeeds in quelling and control- 
 i ling the excited passions. All these natural 
 j or acquired qualities Mr. Pitt possessed in the 
 I highest degree. Never in modern times has 
 there existed a more able leader of an assem- 
 bly. Exposed for a quarter of a century to 
 the impetuous vehemence of Mr. Fox, to the 
 cutting sarcasms of Mr. Sheridan, he bore 
 himself up with imperturbable composure, 
 spoke at all times justly, opportunely, tempe- 
 rately, and, when the ringing voice of his 
 adversaries was joined by the still more power- 
 ful voice of events, when the French Revolu- 
 tion, incessantly disconcerting the most expe- 
 rienced statesman and general in Europe, 
 flung across his way either Fleurusor Zurich, 
 or Marengo, he always knew how to restrain 
 the excited minds of the British parliament 
 by his firmness and by the pertinence of his 
 answers. It is for this more particularly that 
 Mr. Pitt was remarkable, for he had not, as 
 we have elsewhere observed, either the organ- 
 izing genius or the profound faculties of the 
 statesman. With the exception of some 
 financial institutions of disputed merit, he 
 created nothing in England ; he was often 
 mistaken respecting the relative strength of 
 the European powers and the course of events, 
 but to the talents of a great political orator he 
 added ardent love for his country, and a pas- 
 sionate hatred of the French Revolution. 
 Representing in England not the titled aris- 
 tocracy, but the commercial aristocracy, 
 which lavished its treasures upon him in 
 the way of loans, he resisted the greatness 
 of France and the contagion of democratic 
 disorders with immovable perseverance, and 
 maintained order in his country without di- 
 minishing liberty. He left it burdened with 
 debt, it is true, but quiet possessor of the seas 
 and of India. He used and abused the 
 strength of England, but she was the sect nd 
 power in the world when he died, and the 
 first, eight years after his death. And what 
 would the strength of nations be good for 
 unless to endeavour to control one another! 
 Vast dominations are among the designs of 
 Providence. What a man of genius is to a na- 
 tion, a great nation is to mankind. Great na- 
 tions civilize, enlighten the world, and acce 
 lerate its progress in every way. Only it is ne- 
 cessary to counsel them to unite with strength 
 the prudence which gives success to strength, 
 and the justice which honours it. 
 Mr. Pitt, so prosperous for eighteen years.
 
 122 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 was unfortunate in the last days of his life. 
 We were avenged, we French, on that cruel 
 enemy ; for he had reason to conclude that we 
 should be victorious forever, to doubt the ex- 
 cellence of his policy, and to tremble for the 
 futurity of his country. It was one of the 
 least gifted of his successors, Lord Castle- 
 reagh, who was destined to enjoy our disas- 
 ters. 
 
 Amidst accusations the most diverse and the 
 most violent, Mr. Pitt had the good fortune not 
 to see his integrity assailed. He lived upon 
 his emoluments, which were considerable, and 
 without being poor, was reputed to be so. 
 When his death was made known, one of the 
 ministerial majority proposed to pay his debts. 
 This motion, being submitted to parliament, 
 was received with respect, but resisted by his 
 old friends, who had become his enemies, and 
 particularly by Mr. Wyndham, who had so 
 long been his colleague in the ministry. His 
 noble antagonist, Mr. Fox, refused to support 
 the motion, but with grief. " I honour," he 
 exclaimed, in a tone that moved the assembled 
 Commons, " I honour my illustrious adver- 
 sary, and I account it the glory of my life to 
 have been sometimes called his rival. But 
 for twenty years I have opposed his policy, 
 and what would the present generation say 
 of me if it were to see me approving a propo- 
 sal designed to be the last and the most sig- 
 nal homage to that policy, which I have be- 
 lieved, which I still believe, to be prejudicial 
 to England." Everybody comprehended the 
 vote of Mr. Fox, and applauded the noble spirit 
 of his language. 
 
 A few days afterwards, the motion having 
 assumed another character, parliament unani- 
 mously voted 50,000/. sterling (1,250,000 
 francs) to pay Mr. Pitt's debts. It was de- 
 cided that he should be buried at Westminster. 
 
 Mr. Pitt left vacant the offices of first lord 
 of the treasury, chancellor of the exchequer, 
 lord warden of the Cinque ports, chancellor of 
 the university of Cambridge, and several 
 others of less importance. 
 
 It was very difficult to supply his place, not 
 in these different offices, for which numerous 
 , ambitions were ready to dispute, but in that 
 of prime minister, in which there was some- 
 thing awful in presence of Napoleon, conque- 
 ror of the European coalition. One idea had 
 taken possession of all minds immediately 
 after the renewal of the war in 1803, and at 
 the sight of the weak ministry of Mr. Adding- 
 ton, who then governed. The concerted op- 
 position of Pitt and Fox against the Addington 
 cabinet, rendered this coalition of talents more 
 natural and more easy. Mr. Pitt desired it, 
 but not so strongly as to overcome George III. 
 He entered upon the ministry without Mr. Fox, 
 and, by a sort of compensation, without his 
 stanchest friends in the old tory system, with- 
 out Lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham, whom 
 he had found too ardent to associate them 
 again with himself. 
 
 These, left out by Mr. Pitt, had been gradu- 
 ally drawing nearer to Mr. Fox by the way of 
 opposition, though, from the nature of their 
 opinions, they were further from him than Mr. 
 P'tt him^e.'.l. A common struggle of two years 
 
 had contributed to unite them, and few differ- 
 ences divided them when Mr. Pitt died. A 
 general opinion called them together to the 
 ministry, to replace by their combined talents 
 the great minister whom the country had just 
 lost; to endeavour to make peace by means of 
 the friendly relations between Mr. Fox and 
 Napoleon ; and to continue the struggle with 
 all the known energy of the Grenvilles and the 
 Wyndhams, if they did not succeed in arrang- 
 ing with France. 
 
 If, in 1803, George III. had taken Mr. Pitt, 
 whom he disliked, in order to dispense with 
 Mr. Fox, whom he disliked still more, he was 
 forced after Mr. Pitt's death to submit to the 
 empire of public opinion, and to call into one 
 and the same cabinet, Fox, Grenville, Wynd- 
 ham, and their friends. Lord Grenville had 
 the office of first lord of the treasury, that is to 
 say, prime minister ; Mr. Wyndham, that which 
 he had always occupied, the administration of 
 war; Mr. Fox, the foreign affairs; Mr. Grey, 
 the Admiralty. The other departments were 
 distributed among the friends of these political 
 personages, but in such a manner that Mr. 
 Fox numbered most votes in the new minis- 
 try. 
 
 This cabinet, thus formed, obtained a great 
 majority, notwithstanding the attacks of the 
 ousted colleagues of Mr. Pitt, Lord Castlereagh 
 and Mr. Canning. It directed its immediate 
 attention to two essential objects, the organi- 
 zation of the army, and the relations with 
 France. 
 
 As for the army, it was not possible to leave 
 it as it had been since 1803, that is to say, 
 composed of an insufficient regular force, and 
 of 300,000 volunteers, as expensive as they 
 were ill disciplined. It was an organization 
 of emergency, devised for the moment of dan- 
 ger. Mr. Wyndham, who had always been 
 sarcastic upon the volunteers, had maintained 
 that nothing great could be done but with 
 regular armies, which had furnished him with 
 occasion to speak in magnificent terms of 
 the French army Mr. Wyndham could less 
 than any other retain the present organiza- 
 tion. He proposed, therefore, a sort of dis- 
 guised disbanding of the volunteers, and cer- 
 tain changes in the troops of the line, which 
 were designed to facilitate the recruiting of the 
 latter. We have already seen that the Eng- 
 lish army, like all mercenary armies, was re- 
 cruited by voluntary enlistment. But this en- 
 listment was for life, and rendered recruiting 
 difficult. Mr. Wyndham proposed to convert 
 it into temporary enlistment for a term of seven 
 to twenty-one years, and to add to it consider- 
 able advantages of pay. He contributed thus 
 to procure a much stronger organization for the 
 English army ; but he had to contend wi*h the 
 prejudice which standing armies excite in all 
 free natkns, with the favour which the volun- 
 teers had acquired, and above all with the in- 
 terests created by that institution; for it had 
 been necessary to form a corps of officers for the 
 volunteers, which government was now obliged 
 to dissolve. An attempt had been made to set 
 Mr. Wyndham at variance with his new col- 
 league, Mr. Fox, who, participating in the po 
 pular prejudices of his party, had formerly
 
 March, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 123 
 
 shown a greater predilection for the institution 
 of the volunteers than for the extension of the 
 regular army. Notwithstanding all these ob- 
 stacles, the ministerial plan was adopted. A 
 large augmentation to the regular army was 
 voted; till the complete development of the 
 new system, it was to consist of 267,000 men, 
 75,000 of whom were local militia, and 1 92,000 
 troops of the line, distributed throughout the 
 three kingdoms and colonies. The total ex- 
 pense of the budget still amounted to about 83 
 millions sterling, that is, more than two thou- 
 sand million francs, made up by taxes to the 
 amount of 1500 millions, and a loan, to be 
 contracted in the course of the year, for 500. 
 
 It was with these mighty resources that 
 England purposed to appear before Napoleon, 
 in order to negotiate. From Mr. For, from his 
 situation, from his friendly relations with the 
 Emperor, were expected facilities which no 
 other could possess for tendering pacific over- 
 tures. A fortunate accident, which Providence 
 owed to that honest man, furnished him with 
 a most honourable and most natural opportu- 
 nity. A wretch, judging of the new English 
 administration from the preceding, introduced 
 himself to Mr. Fox, and offered to assassinate 
 Napoleon. Mr. Fox indignantly ordered him 
 to be seized by the door-keepers, and delivered 
 up to the English police. He wrote immedi- 
 ately a very noble letter to M. de Talleyrand, 
 denouncing the odious proposal which he had 
 just received, and offering to place at his dis- 
 posal all the means for prosecuting the author, 
 if his scheme appeared to involve any thing 
 serious. 
 
 Napoleon was touched, as well he might be, 
 at so generous a procedure, and ordered M. de 
 Talleyrand to address to Mr. Fox such an 
 answer as the latter deserved. "I have laid 
 your excellency's letter before his majesty," 
 wrote M. de Talleyrand. " There," he ex- 
 claimed, " I recognise the principles of honour 
 and virtue which have always animated Mr. 
 Fox. Thank him in my name, he added, and 
 tell him that, whether the policy of his sove- 
 reign causes us to continue much longer at 
 war, or whether as speedy an end as the two 
 nations can desire is put to a quarrel useless 
 for humanity, I rejoice at the new character 
 which, from this proceeding, the war has al- 
 ready taken, and which is an omen of what 
 may be expected from a cabinet, of the prin- 
 ciples of which I am delighted to judge from 
 those of Mr. Fox, who is one of the men most 
 fitted to feel in every thing what is excellent, 
 what is truly great." 
 
 M. de Talleyrand said nothing more, and this 
 was sufficient to produce a continuation of 
 communications so nobly commenced. Mr. 
 Fox immediately answered by a frank and 
 cordial letter, in which, without circumlocu- 
 tion, without diplomatic quirk, he offered peace 
 on safe and honourable conditions, and by 
 means as simple as they were prompt. The 
 bases of the treaty of Amiens were much 
 changed, according to Mr. Fox ; they were so 
 in consequence of the very advantages obtained 
 by France and England, on the two elements 
 which were the ordinary theatre of their suc- 
 cesses. It was, therefore, necessary to seek 
 
 new conditions, which should not hurt the 
 pride of either of the two nations, and which 
 should procure for Europe guarantees of future 
 tranquillity and safety. These conditions, if 
 both sides chose to be reasonable, were not 
 difficult to be found. According to anterior 
 treaties, England could not negotiate separately 
 from Russia, but, till the latter could be con- 
 sulted, it was allowable to commit to chosen 
 agents the task of discussing the interests of 
 the belligerent powers, and paving the way to 
 their adjustment. Mr. Fox offered to appoint 
 immediately the persons who should be charged 
 with this mission, and the place where they 
 were to meet. 
 
 This proposal delighted Napoleon, who, at 
 bottom, wished for a reconciliation with Great 
 Britain, for from her every war proceeded, 
 like water from its source, and there were few 
 direct means of conquering her, one alone 
 excepted, extremely decisive, but extremely 
 precarious, and practicable for him only, an 
 invasion. He was sincerely rejoiced at this 
 frank overture, and accepted it with the great- 
 est cordiality. 
 
 Without entering into any explanation of 
 the conditions, he intimated in his reply that 
 France would not dispute much with England 
 the conquests which she had made, (she had 
 retained Malta, as it will be recollected, and 
 taken the Cape,) that France, on her side, had 
 said her last word to Europe in the treaty of 
 Presburg, and that she claimed nothing further; 
 that it would, therefore, be easy to lay down 
 the bases, if England had not particular and 
 inadmissible views relative to commercial 
 interests. "The Emperor is persuaded," said 
 M. de Talleyrand, " that the real cause of the 
 rupture of the peace of Amiens was no other 
 than the refusal to conclude a commercial 
 treat}'. Be assured that the Emperor, without 
 refusing certain commercial advantages, if 
 they are possible, will not admit of any treaty 
 prejudicial to French industry, which he means 
 to protect by all duties or prohibitions that 
 can favour its development. He insists oa 
 having liberty to do at home all that he pleases, 
 all that is deemed beneficial, without any rival 
 nation having a right to find fault with him." 
 
 As for the intervention of Russia in tht 
 treaty, Napoleon directed a positive declara- 
 tion to be made that he would not permit it. 
 The principle of his diplomacy was that of 
 separate peace, and this principle was equally 
 just and ably conceived. Europe had always 
 employed the medium of coalitions against 
 France; it would be favouring them to admit 
 of collective negotiations, for it would be lend- 
 ing one's self to the essential condition of 
 every coalition, that which forbids its members 
 to treat separately. Napoleon, who, in war, 
 strove to meet his enemies separated from 
 each other, in order to beat them in detail, 
 could do no other than strive in diplomacy to 
 meet with them in the same position. Accord 
 ingly, he had opposed absolute refusals to all 
 offers of negotiating collectively, and he was 
 right, with the salvo to depart from this prin- 
 ciple of conduct, in case Mr. Fox should be 
 bound by engagements which wou.d not per- 
 mit him to trat -yithout Russiv Napoleou,
 
 124 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808 
 
 after he had laid down the principle of a sepa- 
 rate negotiation, enjoined his minister to inti- 
 mate further that he was ready to choose for 
 the place of the negotiation, not that Amiens 
 which reminded one of bases of peace hence- 
 forward abandoned, but Lille, and to send a 
 minister plenipotentiary thither immediately. 
 
 Mr. Fox instantly replied that the first con- 
 dition which had been agreed upon at the 
 outset of these parleys was, that the peace 
 should be equally honourable for both nations, 
 and that it would not be so for England, if she 
 treated without Russia, for she had formally 
 engaged by an article of a treaty (that which 
 had constituted the coalition of 1805) not to 
 conclude a separate peace. This obligation 
 was absolute, according to Mr. Fox, and could 
 not be eluded. He said that, if France had a 
 principle, that of not authorizing coalitions by 
 her manner of negotiating, England had an- 
 other, that of not suffering herself to be excluded 
 from the continent by lending herself to the 
 dissolution of her continental alliances; that, 
 on this point, people in England were quite as 
 jealous as they could be in France on the sub- 
 ject of coalitions. Mr. Fox, who accompanied 
 each of his official despatches with a private 
 letter full of frankness and honour, an example 
 which M. de Talleyrand followed on his side 
 Mr. Fox finished with saying that the negotia- 
 tion would perhaps be stopped by an absolute 
 obstacle, which he sincerely regretted, but 
 that, at any rate, the war would be honourable 
 and worthy of the two great nations which 
 waged it. He added these remarkable words: 
 " I am sensible to the highest degree, as I ought 
 to be, to the obliging expressions which the 
 great man whom you serve has used in regard 
 to me. Regret is unavailing, but, if he could 
 see, with the same eye that I behold it, the true 
 glory which he would have a right to acquire 
 by a just and moderate peace, what happiness 
 would not result from it for France and for all 
 Europe! 
 
 " C. J. Fox. 
 
 " London, April 23, 1806.'' 
 
 Amidst this rancorous, one might say fero- 
 cious contest, when one reviews the sangui- 
 nary scenes which have marked it, the mind 
 loves to dwell on that noble and kindly inter- 
 course, to which a man as generous as he was 
 eloquent gave rise for a moment, between the 
 two greatest nations of the globe, and the 
 heart is filled with painful, inconsolable regret. 
 
 Napoleon was himself deeply touched by 
 the language of Mr. Fox, and he was i-incerely 
 desirous of peace. M. de Talleyrand, though 
 mistaken in regard to the system of our al- 
 liances, was never wrong on the main point 
 of the policy of the time, and he ceased not 
 for a moment to believe that, at the height of 
 greatness to which we had attained, peace was 
 our primary interest. He found a courage to 
 say this which he had not in general, and he 
 earnestly pressed Napoleon to seize the unique 
 occasion offered by the presence of Mr. Fox 
 in office, to negotiate with Great Britain. For 
 the rest, he had no difficulty to gain a hearing, 
 for Napoleon was not less disposed than him- 
 seif to profit by this alike fortunate and unex- 
 pected occasion. 
 
 Circumstances, moreover, assisted to over- 
 come the obstacle which seemed to stop the 
 negotiation at its outset. There was more 
 than one reason to believe, from reports which 
 came from the Duke of Brunswick and from 
 the consul of France at St. Petersburg, that 
 Alexander, uneasy about the consequences of 
 the war, mistrusting the silence of the British 
 cabinet towards him, and the personal disposi- 
 tions of Mr. Fox, wished for the re-establish- 
 ment of peace. The consul of France had 
 sent to Paris the chancellor of the consulate 
 to report what he had learned, and every thing 
 seemed to encourage a hope of opening a 
 direct negotiation with Russia. In this case, 
 Mr. Fox could no longer insist on the principle 
 of a collective negotiation, since Russia would 
 herself have set the example of renouncing it. 
 
 It was determined, therefore, to prosecute 
 the parleys commenced by Mr. Fox, and for 
 this purpose there was employed an agent, 
 whom a lucky chance had just presented. To 
 the generous words exchanged with Mr. Fox 
 were added proceedings not less generous. 
 Ever since the apprehension of the English, 
 ordered by Napoleon, at the time of the rup- 
 ture of the peace of Amiens, by way of re- 
 prisals for the seizure of French vessels, 
 many members of the highest families in Eng- 
 land had been detained at Verdun. Mr. Fox 
 had applied for the release of several of them 
 on parole. His solicitations had been cheer- 
 fully complied with, and though, not daring to 
 insist upon all of them in an equal degree, he 
 had classed them according to the interest 
 which he felt for them, Napoleon resolved to 
 grant them all, and the English designated by 
 him had been released without any exception. 
 In return for this noble proceeding, Mr. Fox 
 had selected, for the purpose of releasing 
 them, the most distinguished prisoners taken 
 at the battle of Trafalgar, the unfortunate 
 Villeneuve, Captain Lucas, the heroic com- 
 mander of the Redoutable, and many others, 
 equal in number to the English set at liberty. 
 
 Among the prisoners restored to Mr. Fox 
 was one of the richest and one of the cleverest 
 English noblemen, Lord Yarmouth, afterwards 
 Marquis of Hertford, a stanch Tory, but an 
 intimate friend of Mr. Fox's, a decided parti- 
 san of peace, which enabled him to live abroad 
 and enjoy the pleasures of the Continent, of 
 which he was deprived by the war. This 
 young nobleman, acquainted with the most 
 brilliant of the youth of Paris, in whose dis- 
 sipations he partook, was well known to M. 
 de Talleyrand, who liked the English nobility, 
 especially such of them as had talents, ele- 
 gance, and dissolute habits. Lord Yarmouth 
 was pointed out to him as particularly con- 
 nected with Mr. Fox, and as well worthy of 
 the confidence of both governments. He sent 
 for him, told him that the Emperor was sin- 
 cerely desirous of peace, that they must set 
 aside the ceremony of diplomatic forms, and 
 come to a frank explanation upon the condi- 
 tions acceptable on both sides ; that these con- 
 ditians could not be very difficult to find, since 
 France would no longer dispute with England 
 what she had conquered, that is to say, Malta 
 and the Cape ; that the question, therefore, was
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 125 
 
 reduced to a few islands of little importance ; 
 that, in regard to France, she spoke out in a 
 clear and straightforward manner ; she desired 
 that, besides her natural territory, the Rhine 
 and the Alps.no power should henceforth con- 
 test with her the whole of Italy, including the 
 kingdom of Naples, and her alliances in Ger- 
 many, on condition of restoring their independ- 
 ence to Switzerland and Holland, as .soon as 
 peace should be signed ; thai, consequently, 
 there was no serious obstacle to an immediate 
 reconciliation of the two countries, since both 
 must be disposed to concede the things just 
 specified ; that, relative to the difficulty arising 
 from the form of the negotiation, collective or 
 separate, they should soon find a solution of that, 
 thanks to the inclination shown by Russia to 
 treat directly with France. 
 
 There was one capital point on which no 
 explanation was given, but respecting which 
 France gave to understand that in the end she 
 should tell her secret, and tell it in such a 
 manner as to satisfy the royal family of Eng- 
 land that was Hanover. 
 
 Napoleon had actually determined to restore 
 it to George III., and it was the recent conduct 
 of Prussia which had provoked him to this 
 serious resolution. The hypocritical language 
 of that court in its manifestoes, tending to re- 
 present it to the Hanoverians and to the Eng- 
 !i.-h as an oppressed power which had been 
 forced with the sword at its throat, to accept a 
 fine kingdom, had transported him with anger. 
 He was for tearing that moment the treaty of 
 the 15th of February, and obliging Prussia to 
 replace every thing on the former footing. 
 But for the reflections which time and M. de 
 Talleyrand suggested, he would have made a 
 disturbance. Another more recent circum- 
 stance had contributed to detach him entirely 
 from Prussia, that was the publication by Lord 
 Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt's retiring colleagues, 
 of the negotiations of 1805. The latter were 
 intent on avenging the memory of their illus- 
 trious leader, by showing that he had had no- 
 thing to do with the military operations, though 
 he had had the greatest share in the formation 
 of the coalition of 1805, which had saved Eng- 
 land, by causing the breaking up of the camp 
 of Boulogne. But, in defending the memory 
 of their leader, they had compromised most of 
 the courts. Mr. Fox had reproached them with 
 it in the House of Commons with extreme 
 vehemence, and had attributed to them the 
 change in all the relations of England with 
 the European powers. There was in fact a 
 universal outcry against English diplomacy 
 in the cabinets, which found themselves de- 
 nounced to France by this imprudent publica- 
 tion. On this occasion, an unlucky light had 
 been thrown on the conduct of Prussia. Her 
 hyp< critical and recentdeclarations to England 
 relative to Hanover, the hopes which she had 
 held out to the coalition, before and after the 
 events of Potsdam, were all divulged. Napo- 
 leon, without complaining, had ordered the in- 
 sertion of these documents in the Moniteur, 
 leaving every one to guess what he ought to 
 think of them. 
 
 But the opinion of Napoleon in regard to ! Napoleon ordered it to halt on the Inn, to re- 
 Prussia was formed. He no longer considered ' arm Brannau, to re-establish itself, and lo 
 
 1.2 
 
 her worth the trouble of a prolonged contest 
 with England : he was determined lo restore 
 Hanover to the latter, and to offer Prussia one 
 of two things, either an equivalent to Hanover 
 to be found in Germany, or the restitution of 
 what he had received from her, Anspach, 
 Cleves, and Neufchatel. There the cabinet of 
 Berlin would reap what it had sown, and would 
 meet with no more fidelity than it had mani- 
 fested. Still Napoleon was ignorant of the 
 secret negotiation begun with Russia through 
 the medium of the Duke of Brunswick and M. 
 de Hardenberg. 
 
 Without completely explaining, the French 
 government gave Lord Yarmouth to under- 
 stand that the peace would not depend on 
 Hanover, and he set out, promising to return 
 soon with the secret of Mr. Fox's intentions. 
 
 A singular event, which for some days im- 
 parted to things a strong appearance of war, 
 contributed on the contrary to turn them to 
 peace, by accelerating the resolutions of the 
 Russian cabinet. The French troops ordered 
 to occupy Dalmatia, had hastened their march 
 to the mouths of the Cattaro, to preserve them 
 from the danger with which they were threat- 
 ened. The Montenegrins, whose bishop and 
 principal chief subsisted on the bounty of 
 Russia, were greatly agitated on learning the 
 approach of the French, and had sent for 
 Admiral Siniavin, the same who had conveyed 
 from Corfu to Naples and from Naples to 
 Corfu the Russians sent to overrun the south 
 of Italy. That admiral, informed of the oppor- 
 tunity which offered to seize the mouths of the 
 Cattaro, had hastily embarked a few hundred 
 Russians, joined them to a body of Montene- 
 grins who had descended from their moun- 
 tains and appeared before the forts. An Aus- 
 trian officer who occupied them, and a com- 
 missioner charged by Austria to surrender 
 them to the French, declaring that they were 
 constrained by a superior force, delivered them 
 up to the Russians. This allegation of a su- 
 perior force was wholly unfounded, for, in the 
 forts of Cattaro there were two Austrian bat- 
 talions very capable of defending them even 
 against a regular army possessing the means 
 of siege, of which the Russians were destitute. 
 This perfidy was chiefly the deed of the Aus- 
 trian commissioner, Marquis de Ghisilieri, a 
 most artful Italian, blamed afterwards by his 
 government, and put upon his trial for this 
 dishonourable act. 
 
 When the report of this fact, transmitted to 
 Paris by an extraordinary courier, reached 
 Napoleon, he was extremely irritated, for he 
 attached infinite importance to the mouths of 
 the Cattaro, not so much on account of the 
 advantages, though very positive, of their ma- 
 ritime position, as for their vicinity to Turkey, 
 on which they enabled the holder to exercise 
 an influence, either protective or repressive. 
 But he was angry with the cabinet of Vienna 
 alone, for it was that cabinet which ought to 
 deliver the territory of Dalmatia to him, and 
 which was the only debtor in regard to him. 
 The corps of Marshal Sonlt was on the point 
 of repassing the Inn and evacuating Brnunau.
 
 126 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, I80a 
 
 create an absolute place d'armes there. At the 
 same time he declared to Austria that the 
 French troops should turn back, that the Aus- 
 trian prisoners on their march home should 
 be detained, and that, if need were, things 
 should be carried so far as the renewal of hos- 
 tilities, unless one of these two satisfactions 
 were given him ; either the immediate restitu- 
 tion of the mouths of the Cattaro or the de- 
 spatch of an Austrian military force to retake 
 them from the Russians in conjunction with 
 the French. This second alternative was not 
 the one that he should have liked least, for it 
 would set Austria at variance with Russia. 
 When these declarations, made with the 
 peremptory tone usual with Napoleon, had 
 reached Vienna, they produced real consterna- 
 tion there. The Austrian cabinet was in no 
 wise implicated in this treachery of an infe- 
 rior agent. The latter had acted without 
 order, thinking to please his government by a 
 perfidy against the French. Letters were im- 
 mediately despatched from Vienna to St. Pe- 
 tersburg, to inform the Emperor Alexander of 
 the new perils to which Austria found herself 
 exposed, and to declare that, unwilling on any 
 account to see the French again at Vienna, 
 she would rather submit to the painful neces- 
 sity of attacking the Russians in the forts of 
 the Cattaro. 
 
 Admiral Siniavin, who had taken possession 
 of the mouths of the Cattaro, had acted with- 
 out orders, as well as the Marquis de Ghisilieri 
 who had delivered them. Alexander was 
 grieved at the position in which his ally the 
 Emperor Francis had been placed; he was 
 grieved at the position in which he was him- 
 self placed, between the embarrassment of 
 restoring and that of retaining. He was more 
 and more annoyed by the solicitations of his 
 young friends, who talked to him incessantly 
 about perseverance in conduct; he was un- 
 easy respecting the negotiations begun by 
 Napoleon with England ; and, though the lat- 
 ter had at length broken the silence which she 
 had observed during the ministerial crisis, he 
 distrusted his allies, and was inclined to fol- 
 low the general example and to reconcile him- 
 self with France. Accordingly, he took occa- 
 sion from the very circumstance of the mouths 
 of the Cattaro, which seemed rather an occa- 
 sion for war than for peace, to commence a 
 pacific negotiation. He had at hand the for- 
 mer secretary of the Russian legation at Pa- 
 ris, M. d'Oubril, who had conducted himself 
 there to the satisfaction of both governments 
 and who had, moreover, the advantage of 
 being well-known in France. He was direct- 
 ed to proceed to Vienna, and to apply there 
 for passports to Paris. The ostensible pretex 
 was to be business relating to the Russian 
 prisoners, but his real errand was to treat ol 
 the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, and to 
 include it in a general settlement of all the 
 questions which had divided the two empires 
 M. d'Oubril had orders to delay as long as 
 possible the restitution of the mouths of the 
 Cattaro, to give them up, nevertheless, if ther 
 were no means of preventing a renewal o 
 'lostilicies against Austria; and to manage 
 above all to re-establish an. honourable peac 
 
 >etween Russia and France. It will be thought 
 lonourable, he was told, if something, no mat- 
 er what, is obtained for the two habitual pro- 
 eges of the Russian cabinet, Naples and 
 i'iedmont; for the two empires had, for the 
 rest, nothing to dispute with each other, and 
 were carrying on merely a war of influence. 
 3efore he set off, M. d'Oubril conversed with 
 he Emperor Alexander, and it became mani- 
 est to him that this prince was visibly much 
 more disposed to peace than the Russian min- 
 stry, which besides was tottering, and on the 
 )oint of being dismissed. He set out, there- 
 ore, inclining to that side to which his master 
 nclined. He was furnished with double 
 >owers, the one limited, the other complete, 
 and embracing all the questions that he could 
 lave to resolve. He had orders to concert 
 with the English negotiator relative to the 
 conditions of peace, but without requiring a 
 collective negotiation, which, in fact, did away 
 with the difficulties that had arisen between 
 France and England. 
 
 M. d'Oubril set out for Vienna and by his 
 aresence restored composure to the Emperor 
 Francis, who feared that he should either see 
 the French come back to his country, or that 
 ic should have to fight the Russians. The 
 second alternative alarming him much less 
 than the first, that prince had sent off an Aus- 
 trian corps for the mouths of the Cattaro, with 
 orders to second the French troops, if neces- 
 sary. M. d'Oubril cheered him by showing his 
 powers, and applied for passports through 
 Count Rausmousky, in order to proceed as> 
 speedily as possible to Paris. 
 
 Napoleon desired that an immediate and 
 favourable answer should be given to the de- 
 mand of M. d'Oubril, but at the same time he 
 took care to make a distinction between the 
 affair of the mouths of the Cattaro and that of 
 the re-establishment of peace. The affair of 
 the mouths of the Cattaro, according to what 
 was said on his behalf, could not be the sub- 
 ject of any negotiation, since it related to an 
 engagement of Austria's which remained un- 
 executed, and respecting which France had 
 nothing to discuss with Russia. As to the re- 
 establishment of peace, the French govern- 
 ment was ready to listen most cheerfully to 
 the proposals of M. d'Oubril, for it was sin- 
 cerely desirous to put an end to a war, alike 
 without object and without interest for the two 
 empires. The passports of M. d'Oubril were 
 immediately despatched to Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon thus saw Austria, exhausted by 
 three wars, striving to avoid any new hostility 
 against France; Russia, disgusted with a con- 
 test too lightly undertaken, and determined 
 not to prolong it; England, satisfied with her 
 naval successes, thinking it not worih while to 
 expose herself again to some formidable ex- 
 pedition ; lastly, Prussia, stripped of all re 
 spect, of no value in the estimation of any 
 one. and in this state, the whole world desirous 
 to preserve or to obtain peace, on conditions, 
 it is true, which were not yet clearly defined, 
 but which, whatever they were, would leave 
 France in the rank of the first power in the 
 world. 
 Napoleon keenly enjoyed this situation, and
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 127 
 
 had no inclination whatever to compromise it 
 even to gain new victories. But he meditated 
 vast projects which he conceived that he could 
 cause 10 spring naturally and immediately 
 from the treaty of Presburg. These projects 
 seemed to him to be so generally foreseen, 
 that, upon the single condition of accomplish- 
 ing them forthwith, he hoped to get them com- 
 prehended in the double peace which was 
 negotiating with Russia and England. Then 
 his empire, such as he had conceived it in his 
 mighty mind, would be definitively constituted 
 and accepted by Europe. These results ob- 
 tained, he considered peace as the completion 
 and the ratification of his work, as the prize 
 due to his labours and to those of his people, 
 as the accomplishment of his fondest wishes. 
 He was a man, in short, as he had already 
 sent word to Mr. Fox, and he was far from 
 being insensible to the charms of repose. With 
 the powerful versatility of his mind, he was as 
 much disposed to enjoy the sweets of peace 
 and the glory of the useful arts as to transport 
 himself again to fields of battle, to bivouac 
 among his soldiers upon the snow. 
 
 Lord Yarmouth had returned from London, 
 with a private letter from Mr. Fox, attesting 
 that he possessed the entire confidence of that 
 minister, and that he might be talked to with- 
 out reserve. This letter added, that Lord Yar- 
 mouth should receive powers, as soon as there 
 should be a well-founded hope of an arrange- 
 ment. M. de Talleyrand had then informed 
 him of the communications established with 
 Russia, and had thus proved the inutility of 
 insisting on a collective negotiation, when 
 Russia lent herself to a separate negotiation. 
 As for the pretension of England not to be ex- 
 cluded from the affairs of the continent, M. de 
 Talleyrand offered Lord Yarmouth an official 
 recognition of an equal right for both, powers of 
 intervention and guarantee in continental and 
 maritime uffnirs. 1 Thus the question of a sepa- 
 rate negotiation seemed to be a question no 
 longer, and the conditions of peace themselves 
 appeared to present no further insoluble diffi- 
 culties. England wished to retain the Cape 
 and Malta ; she also showed a desire to keep 
 our establishments in India, such as Chander- 
 nagor and Pondicherry, the French islands of 
 Tobago and St. Lucia, and above all the Dutch 
 colony of Surinam, Mtuated on the American 
 continent. Among these different possessions, 
 Surinam alone was of any importance, Pondi- 
 cherry being but a mere wreck of our ancient 
 power in India ; Tobago and St. Lacia were 
 not of sufficient value to induce a refusal. 
 Respecting Surinam, England did not abso- 
 lutely insist. As for our continental con- 
 quests, assuredly as important as our maritime 
 conquests, she was ready to concede all of 
 them to us, without excepting Genoa, Venice, 
 Dalmatia, and Naples. Sicily alone appeared 
 to form a difficulty. Lord Yarmouth, explain- 
 ing himself confidentially, said that England 
 was tired of protecting those Bourbons of 
 Naples, that imbecile king, that mad queen ; 
 that, nevertheless, since they possessed Sicily 
 de facto, for Joseph had not yet conquered it, 
 
 1 The words of the despatch. 
 
 one would be obliged to demand it for them, 
 but that this would be a question which would 
 depend on the result of the military operations 
 already undertaken. In case, however, Sicily 
 should be taken from them, Lord Yarmouth 
 added, that an indemnity must somewhere be 
 found for them. It was tacitly implied that, 
 in return for these various concessions, Han- 
 over should be restored to England. But on. 
 both sides the matter was reserved without 
 being formally mentioned. 
 
 Sicily, therefore, was the only serious diffi- 
 culty, and yet the immediate conquest of the 
 island, upon condition of an indemnity, how- 
 ever insignificant it might be, would be capa- 
 ble of arranging every thing. Passports had 
 been sent to M. d'Oubril; it was not known 
 what pretensions he might bring, but they 
 could not be essentially different from the Eng- 
 lish pretensions. 
 
 Napoleon clearly perceived that, by not hur- 
 rying the negotiations and by accelerating, on. 
 the other hand, the execution of his plans, he 
 should attain his twofold aim, that of consti- 
 tuting his empire as he pleased, and of obtain- 
 ing the confirmation of its establishment by 
 the general peace. 
 
 From the first, in preferring the title of em- 
 peror to that of king, he had conceived a vast 
 system of empire, on which vassal royalties 
 should be dependent, in imitation of the Ger- 
 manic empire, an empire so enfeebled that it 
 no longer existed but in name, and which held 
 out a temptation to replace it in Europe. The 
 late victories of Napoleon had heated his ima- 
 gination, and he dreamed of nothing else but of 
 reviving the empire of the West, placing its 
 crown on his head, and thus re-establishing it 
 for the advantage of France. The new vassal 
 royalties were all found, and they were to be 
 distributed among the members of the Bona- 
 parte family. Eugene de Beauharnais, adopted 
 as son, become the husband of a Bavarian 
 princess, was already viceroy of Italy, and this 
 viceroyalty comprehended the more important 
 half of the Italian peninsula, since it extended 
 from Tuscany to the Julian Alps. Joseph, 
 elder brother of Napoleon, was destined for 
 king of Naples. Nothing more was required 
 but to procure Sicily for him, in order to put 
 him in possession of one of the finest kingdoms 
 of the second order. Holland, which had great 
 difficulty to govern itself as a republic, was 
 under the absolute dependence of Napoleon; 
 and he thought that he could include it in his 
 system, by constituting it a kingdom in favour 
 of his brother Louis. These made three king- 
 doms to be placed under the paramountship of 
 his empire. Sometimes, when he extended the 
 dream of his greatness further, he thought of 
 Spain and Portugal, which were daily giving 
 him signs, Spain of a secret hostility, Portugal 
 of an open hostility. But this was yet placed 
 at a great distance in the wide horizon of his 
 imagination. It was requisite that Europe 
 should oblige him by some new startling 
 achievement, like that of Austerlitz, to decide 
 upon the complete expulsion of the house of 
 Bourbon. It is certain, however, that this ex- 
 pulsion began to be a systematic idea with 
 him. Since he had been led to proclaim the
 
 128 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 180ft. 
 
 dethronement of the Bourbons of Naples, he 
 considered the family of Bonaparte as destined 
 to replace the house of Bourbon on all the 
 thrones of the south of Europe. 
 
 In this vast hierarchy of vassal states de- 
 pendent on the French Empire, he planned a 
 second and a third rank, composed of great 
 and small duchies, after the model of the fiefs 
 of the Germanic empire. He had already con- 
 stituted for the benefit of his eldest sister the 
 duchy of Lucca, which he purposed to aug- 
 ment by the addition of the principality of 
 Massa, detached from the kingdom of Italy. 
 He projected the creation of another, that of 
 Guastalla, by detaching it also from the king- 
 dom of Italy. These two dismemberments 
 were very insignificant, in comparison with 
 the magnificent accession of the Venetian 
 States. Napoleon had just obtained from Prus- 
 sia, Neufchatel. Anspach, and the remnant of 
 the duchy of Cleves. He had given Anspach 
 to Bavaria, in order to procure the duchy of ! 
 Berg, a fine country, situated on the right of 
 the Rhine, below Cologne, and comprehending 
 the important fortress of Wesel. Strasburg, 
 Mayence, and Wesel, said Napoleon, are the 
 three bridles of the Rhine. 
 
 He had still, in Upper Italy, Parma and Pla- 
 centia, in the kingdom of Naples, Ponte Corvo 
 and Benevento, fiefs disputed between Naples 
 and the Pope, who gave him at this moment 
 the most serious causes of displeasure. Pius 
 VII. had not carried with him from Paris the 
 satisfactions which he expected. Flattered by 
 the attentions of Napoleon, he had deceived 
 himself in his hopes of a territorial compensa- 
 tion. Besides, the invasion of .ill Italy by the 
 French, now that they had spread themselves 
 from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, 
 had appeared to him to complete the depend- 
 ence of the Roman States. He was excessively 
 mortified at this, and showed it in all ways. 
 He would not organize the church of Germany, 
 which was left without prelates, without chap- 
 ters, ever since the secularizations. He ad- ! 
 rnitted of none of the religious arrangements j 
 adopted for Italy. On occasion of the marriage j 
 which Jerome Bonaparte had contracted in the 
 United States with a Protestant, and which ! 
 N*apoleon wished to get dissolved, the Pope ' 
 opposed an insincere but obstinate resistance, 
 thus employing his spiritual arms in default 
 of temporal arms. Napoleon had sent him 
 word that he considered himself as master 
 of Italy, including Rome, and that he would j 
 not suffer any secret enemy there; that he! 
 should follow the example of those princes 
 who, continuing faithful to the Church, had 
 known how to control it; that he was a real 
 Charlemagne for the Church of Rome, for he 
 had re-established it, and he claimed to be 
 treated as such. Meanwhile, he expressed his 
 displeasure by taking Ponte Corvo and Bene- 
 vento. This was the deplorable commence- 
 ment of a baneful misunderstanding, to which 
 Napoleon then conceived that he could set any 
 bounds he pleased, for the interests of religion 
 and the empire. 
 
 Thus, besides several thrones to give away, 
 ne had Lucca, Guastalla, Benevento, Ponte 
 Corvo, Placentia, Parma, Neufchatel, and Berg, ! 
 
 1 to distribute among his sisters and his most 
 faithful servants, with the titles of principali- 
 ties or duchies. While giving kingdoms such 
 as Naples to Joseph, augmentations such as 
 the Venetian States to Eugene, he thought of 
 creating a score of minor duchies, destined as 
 well for his generals as for his best servants 
 of the civil order, to form a third rank in his 
 imperial hierarchy, and to reward in a signal 
 manner those men to whom he owed the throne, 
 and to whom France owed her greatness. 
 
 While, in placing the imperial crown on his 
 head, he had adjudged to himself the prize of 
 the marvellous exploits performed by the con- 
 temporary generation, he had raised longings 
 in the companions of his glory, and they, too, 
 aspired to obtain the reward of their exertions. 
 Unfortunately, they no longer imitated the 
 abstinence of the generals of the Republic, 
 and frequently took what he was in no haste 
 to give them. In Italy, and especially in the 
 Venetian States, had recently been committed 
 scandalous extortions, which Napoleon made 
 a point of repressing with the utmost rigour. 
 He had, with incredible vigilance, sought and 
 discovered the secret of those exactions, sum- 
 moned before him the persons who had been 
 guilty of them, wrung from them a confession 
 of the sums appropriated, and required the 
 immediate restitution of those amounts, be- 
 ginning with the general-in-chief, who was 
 obliged to pay a considerable sum into the 
 chest of the army. 
 
 But he meant not to impose strict integrity 
 on his generals, without rewarding their hero- 
 ism. Tell them, he wrote to Eugene and to 
 Joseph, about whom were employed several 
 of the officers whose conduct he had just 
 corrected, tell them that I will give them all 
 much more than they could ever take them- 
 selves; that what they would take would 
 cover them with shame, that what I shall give 
 them will do them honour, and will be an 
 everlasting testimony of their glory; that, in 
 paying themselves with their own hands, they 
 would vex my subjects, make France the ob- 
 ject of the maledictions of the conquered, and 
 that what I shall give them, on the contrary, 
 accumulated by my foresight, will not be a 
 robbery of any one. Let them wait, he added, 
 and they shall be rich and honoured, without 
 having to blush for any extortion. 
 
 Profound ideas were mingled, as we see, 
 with his conceptions, apparently the most 
 vain. He was, therefore, resolved to gratify 
 the desire of his generals for enjoyments, but 
 to direct it towards noble rewards legitimately 
 acquired. Under the Consulate, when every 
 thing still had the republican form, he had de- 
 vised the Legion of Honour. Now that all 
 about him assumed the monarchical form, and 
 that he was perceptibly growing greater, he 
 wished every one to grow great along with 
 him. He meditated the creation of kings, 
 grand-dukes, dukes, counts, &c. M. de Tal- 
 leyrand, a warm advocate for creations of this 
 kind, had, during the last campaign, assisted 
 Napoleon much in his business, and had con- 
 versed with him on this subject as well as 
 upon the arrangement of Europe, which he 
 was commissioned to negotiate at Presburg.
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 129 
 
 They two had conceived an extensive system 
 of vassalage, comprehending dukes, grand- 
 dukes, kings, under the paramountship of the 
 Emperor, and possessing not empty titles but 
 real principalities, either in territorial domains 
 or in ample revenues. 
 
 The new kings were, for the sake of the 
 greater conformity with the Germanic empire, 
 to retain upon the thrones which they were 
 about to occupy, their quality of grand digni- 
 taries of the French Empire. Joseph was to 
 remain grand-elector, Louis constable, Eugene 
 arch-chancellor of state, Murat grand-admiral, 
 when they should become kings or grand-dukes. 
 Supplementary dignitaries, such as a vice- 
 constable, a vicegrand-elector, &c., taken from 
 among the principal personages of the state, 
 were to perform their functions when they 
 were absent, and would thus multiply the 
 offices to be distributed. The kings, who con- 
 tinued dignitaries of the French Empire, were 
 to reside frequently in France, and to have a 
 royal establishment in the Louvre appropri- 
 ated to their use. They were to form the 
 council of the imperial family, to perform 
 certain special functions in it during minori- 
 ties, and even to elect the Emperor, in case the 
 male line should become extinct, which some- 
 times happens in reigning families. 
 
 The assimilation with the German Empire 
 was complete, and. that empire falling to ruin 
 on all sides, liable itself to be swept away by 
 a mere effect of the will of Napoleon, the 
 French Empire would be there, quite ready to 
 take its place in Europe. The empire of the 
 Franks might again become what it was under 
 Charlemagne, the empire of the West, and 
 even assume that title. This was the final 
 wish of that immense ambition, the only one 
 which it did not realize, that for which it tor- 
 mented the world, for which perhaps it perished. 
 M. de Talleyrand, who, while recommending 
 peace, sometimes flattered the passions which 
 lead to war, frequently presented this idea to 
 Napoleon, knowing what a profound emotion 
 it excited in his soul. Whenever he men- 
 tioned it to him, he saw all the fire of ambition 
 flashing in his eyes, sparkling with genius. 
 Swayed, however, by a sort of modesty, as on 
 the day before that when he assumed the su- 
 preme power, Napoleon durst not avow the 
 full extent of his desires. The Arch-chancellor 
 Cambaceres, to whom he opened himself more, 
 because he was more sure of his absolute dis- 
 cretion, had been half-intrusted with his secret 
 wishes, and had taken care not to encourage 
 them, because in him attachment never si- 
 lenced prudence. But it was evident that, at 
 the summit of human greatness, having ar- 
 rived at that point beyond which Alexander, 
 Caesar, Charlemagne had not passed, the rest- 
 less and insatiable spirit of Napoleon longed 
 for something more, and that was the title of 
 Emperor of the West, which nobody in the 
 world had borne for a thousand years. 
 
 Between the nations of the south and the 
 west, the French, the Italians, the Spaniards, 
 all children of Roman civilization, there exists 
 a certain conformity of genius, manners, inte- 
 rests, sometimes of territory, which is not 
 
 Voi. IL 17 
 
 found beyond the Channel, the Rhine, and the 
 circle of the Alps, among the English and the 
 Germans. This conformity is an indication 
 of a natural alliance, which the house of 
 Bourbon, by uniting under its royal sceptre 
 Paris, Madrid, Naples, and sometimes Milan, 
 Parma, Florence, had partly realized. If that 
 was what Napoleon meant, if, master of 
 France, of that which terminated at the mouths 
 of the Meuse and of the Rhine and at the sum- 
 mit of the Alps, if, master of all Italy, having 
 it in his power soon to become so of Spain, 
 he purposed only to reconstitute that alliance 
 of nations of Latin origin, by giving to it the 
 symbolical form, sublime for its memorials, of 
 the empire of the West, the nature of things, 
 though strained, was not much outraged. 
 The family of Bonaparte stepped into the 
 place of the house of Bourbon, to reign in a 
 more complete manner over the extent of the 
 countries which that ancient house had as- 
 pired to rule, in order to attach them by a 
 simple bond of paramountship to the head of 
 the family, a bond which left each of the 
 southern nations its independence, by giving 
 greater strength to the useful bundle of their 
 alliance. With the genius of Napoleon, by 
 transfusing into his policy the prudence which 
 he displayed in war, with a very long reign, 
 it might not perhaps have been impossible to 
 realize this conception. But that nature of 
 things which always avenges itself severely 
 on those who disregard it, was foolishly out- 
 raged, when, in his ambition, Napoleon ceased 
 to respect the boundary of the Rhine, when he 
 set about uniting the Germans to the Gauls, 
 subjecting the nations of the north to the na- 
 tions of the south, placing French princes in 
 Germany, in spite of the invincible antipathies 
 of manners ; and he then set before all eyes 
 the phantom of that universal monarchy 
 which Europe dreads and detests, which it has 
 combated, which it will do well to combat in- 
 cessantly, but to which it will some day per- 
 haps be subjected, by the nations of the north, 
 after having refused to submit to it from the 
 hand of the nations of the west. 
 
 A concatenation of events, unforeseen even 
 by the vast and provident ambition of Napo- 
 leon, led at this moment to the dissolution of 
 the Germanic empire, and was about to render 
 vacant that noble title of Emperor of Germa- 
 ny, which had been assumed by the successors 
 of Charlemagne instead of the title of Em- 
 peror of the West. It was a new and fatal 
 encouragement for the projects which Napo- 
 leon cherished in his soul, without yet daring 
 to reveal them. 
 
 When Napoleon, in his late treaties with 
 Austria, thought of recompensing his three* 
 allies in South Germany, the Princes of Bava- 
 ria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, and of putting 
 an end to all subject of collision between 
 them and the head of the empire by the solu- 
 tion of certain questions left undecided in 
 1803, he had pronounced, but without being 
 aware of it, the speedy dissolution of the old 
 German empire. The providential, sometimes 
 involuntary, almost always misconceived in- 
 strument of that French Revolution wbJc>
 
 130 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1806. 
 
 was to change the face of the world, he had 
 prepared, unknown to himself, one of the 
 greatest European reforms. 
 
 It will be recollected how, in 1803, France 
 had been called upon to interfere in the inter- 
 nal government of Germany ; how the princes, 
 who had lost all or part of their territories by 
 the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, had 
 resolved to indemnify themselves by secular- 
 izing the ecclesiastical principalities. Unable 
 to agree about the division of these principali- 
 ties, they had called Napoleon to their aid, in 
 order to effect with equity and decision that 
 partition which otherwise was impossible. 
 Prussia and Austria had received possessions 
 of the Church from his own hand, with a sin- 
 gle motive for displeasure, that they had not 
 received more. The suppression of the eccle- 
 siastical principalities had led to the modifica- 
 tion of the three colleges composing the Diet. 
 About the college of the electors they had 
 agreed, but not about that of the princes, in 
 which Austria claimed a greater number of 
 Catholic votes than had been granted to her. 
 They had also agreed respecting the college 
 of the cities, reducing the number to six, and 
 almost entirely destroying their influence. No- 
 thing had been decided respecting a new or- 
 ganization of the circles charged to uphold 
 respect for the laws in each great German 
 province, relative to a new religious organiza- 
 tion, rendered necessary since the suppression 
 of a great number of sees, and indefinitely de- 
 ferred through the ill-will of the Pope. Lastly, 
 the serious question respecting the immediate 
 nobility had not been resolved, because it in- 
 terested the whole German aristocracy, and 
 particularly Austria, which had in the mem- 
 bers of that nobility vassals dependent on the 
 empire, independent of the territorial princes, 
 and rendering a number of services, of which 
 the recruiting, authorized in their possessions, 
 was not the least. 
 
 The mediating powers of France and Rus- 
 sia, tired of this long mediation, occupied else- 
 where by other circumstances, had no sooner 
 withdrawn their hands, leaving Germany half j 
 remodelled, than anarchy seized that unhappy 
 country. Austria, upon pretext of a right of 
 waifs, had usurped the dependencies of the 
 ecclesiastical possessions given as indemni- 
 ties, and had deprived the indemnified princes 
 of a considerable portion of what was their 
 due. These princes, on their part, had seized 
 the lands of the immediate nobility, and had 
 availed themselves for this of the uncertainties 
 of the last recess. 
 
 The war of 1805 having again brought Na- 
 poleon beyond the Rhine, he had taken advan- 
 tage of the occasion to resolve the questions 
 left undecided for the benefit of the princes, 
 his allies, and he had thus created in the 
 countries of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bava- 
 ria, a sort of dissonance with the rest of Ger- 
 many. But the greediness of these same 
 allies had given rise to difficulties which ex- 
 tended to the whole of Germany. The King 
 of Wur'mberg, observing no moderation, had 
 usurped the land? of the immediate nobility, 
 as well those which had that quality as those 
 which had not. He had arrogated to himself 
 
 more than the rights of the territorial sove- 
 reign, and had seized many of the mansions 
 of the nobility, as if he had been their real 
 owner. Of all those rights of feudal origin, 
 which Austria had insisted on exercising in 
 Suabia, and the nature of which was danger- 
 ously arbitrary, he had declared himself the 
 new possessor in virtue of the possession of 
 certain feudal chief towns which the partition 
 of Austria and Suabia had procured him, and 
 he began to exercise them with greater vigour 
 than the Austrian chancellery itself. The 
 houses of Baden and Bavaria, annoyed by 
 him, and authorized by his example, com- 
 mitted the like excesses in their territories. 
 The contempt of right had been carried so far 
 as to penetrate into the sovereign principali- 
 ties enclosed in the dominions of the three 
 princes, upon pretext of searching in them 
 for domains of the immediate nobility, which 
 could not in any case belong to them, for, if 
 those domains belonged to any other than the 
 immediate nobles themselves, it must have 
 been to the sovereign prince on whom they 
 were immediately dependent. 
 
 Napoleon had charged M. Otto, his minister 
 at Munich, as umpire, and Berthier, as head 
 of the executive power, to settle all disputes 
 between Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, 
 arising out of the partition of the Austrian 
 territories in Suabia. The difficulties becom- 
 ing more complicated, Napoleon had associ- 
 ated with them General Clarke, to assist them 
 in reducing this chaos to order. This all of 
 them alike despaired of accomplishing. The 
 princes who had suffered this violence first 
 carried their complaints to Ratisbon ; but the 
 ministers at the Diet, having neither courage 
 nor authority since Austria no longer gave it 
 to them, declared themselves unable to check 
 the disorder spreading on all sides. Austria 
 herself had almost reduced them to this im- 
 potence, of which they complained, by refus- 
 ing in the preceding year to authorize any 
 serious deliberation, so long as the college of 
 princes was not reconstituted according to her 
 pleasure, and the number of Catholic votes 
 which she claimed were not added to it. And 
 now, definitively conquered, wholly engrossed 
 with her own welfare, she completed the anni- 
 hilation of the Diet, by showing that she was 
 no further to be relied on for any efficacious 
 aid. The Diet, therefore, was a destroyed 
 body, receiving at most the communications 
 that were made to it, scarcely acknowledging 
 the receipt of them, but not deliberating oil 
 any subject whatever. 
 
 At this sight, the petty sovereign princes, 
 the immediate nobles, exposed to all sorts of 
 usurpations, the free cities, reduced to six or 
 five by the gift of Augsburg to Bavaria, the 
 secularized ecclesiastical princes, whose pen- 
 sions were noJ paid, hastened to Munich to 
 claim from Messieurs Otto, Berthier, and 
 Clarke, the protection of France. These 
 gentlemen, indignant at the spectacle of op- 
 pression which they witnessed, had at first 
 formed a sort of congress to reconcile all 
 interests, and to prevent the commission of 
 unjust acts under the shadow of the protection 
 of France. M. Otto had conceived a plan of
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 arrangement, which France was to submit to 
 the principal oppressors, the sovereigns of 
 Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. But he 
 had soon discovered that he had done nothing 
 less than frame a new plan for a Germanic 
 constitution; and, moreover, the agents of the 
 King of Wurtemberg, when he had submitted 
 this plan to them, had loudly cried out against 
 it, and declared that their master would never 
 consent to the proposed concessions. One 
 would have said that this prince, whom France 
 had just made a king, whose dominions she 
 had augmented, whose sovereign prerogatives 
 she had doubled, was robbed by her, because 
 she required some respect for property, and 
 some neighbourly regard for the weakest of 
 his neighbours. Not knowing what more to 
 do, M. Otto had sent all to Paris, both claims 
 and claimants, and the plan of arrangement 
 which he had devised with the intention of 
 justice. This reference had taken place at 
 the end of March. 
 
 Ever since that period, oppressed and op- 
 pressors were at the foot of the throne of Na- 
 poleon. It became evident that the sceptre of 
 Charlemagne had passed from the Germans to 
 the French. 
 
 This was what had been said and written in 
 all forms by the prince arch-chancellor, the 
 last ecclesiastical elector retained by Napo- 
 leon, and transferred by him, as it will be re- 
 collected, from Mayence to Ratisbon. This 
 prince, whose amiable and fickle character, 
 and whose sumptuous propensities we have 
 elsewhere sketched, seeking force where it 
 existed, never ceased to beseech Napoleon to 
 take in hand the sceptre of Germany ; and if 
 any one had made the dangerous name of 
 Charlemagne ring in Napoleon's ears, it was 
 certainly he. You are Charlemagne, said he 
 to him ; be the nthe master, the regulator, the 
 saviour of Germany. If that name, which 
 was not the one that best pleased the pride of 
 Napoleon, for he had in Alexander and Caesar 
 rivals more worthy of his genius, but which 
 particularly flattered his ambition, because it 
 established more relations with his plans re- 
 lative to Europe if that name was always 
 blended with his own, it was less from his 
 doing than from the doing of all those who 
 had recourse to his protecting power. If the 
 Church wanted something of him, You are 
 
 Charlemagne, said she, give us what he gave 
 us. When the German princes of all the 
 states were oppressed, they said to him, You 
 are Charlemagne, protect us as he would have 
 done. 
 
 Thus ideas were suggested to him, which 
 his ambition might not so soon have conceived, 
 if it had been slow in its desires. But the 
 wants of nations and his ambition then kept 
 pace with one another. 
 
 In all ages, the princes of Germany, besides 
 the Germanic confederation, a legal authority 
 and recognised by them, had formed particular 
 leagues to defend such rights or such interests 
 as were common to certain of them. All that 
 were left of these leagues addressed them- 
 selves to Napoleon, soliciting him to interfere 
 in their favour, both as author and guarantee 
 of the act of mediation of 1803, and as the 
 signer and executor of the treaty of Presburg. 
 Some proposed to form new leagues under his 
 protection, others to form a new Germanic 
 confederation under his imperial sceptre. The 
 princes whose possessions were usurped, the 
 immediate nobles whose lands were seized, 
 the free cities threatened with suppression, 
 proposed various plans, but were ready, on 
 condition of protection, to adopt the plan that 
 should be most generally approved. 
 
 The prince arch-chancellor, fearing lest his 
 ecclesiastical electorate, the last relic of the 
 wreck, should be swept away in this second 
 tempest, devised a plan to save it ; this was to 
 form a new Germanic confederation, called to 
 deliberate under his presidency and compre- 
 hending all the German States, excepting 
 Prussia and Austria. In order to interest Na- 
 poleon in this creation, he invented two ex- 
 pedients. The first consisted in creating an 
 electorate attached to the Duchy of Berg, which 
 was known to be destined for Murat, and the 
 second to appoint immediately a coadjutor for 
 the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and 10 choose 
 him from the imperial family. This coadjutor, 
 being archbishop elect of Ratisbon, future arch- 
 chancellor of the confederation, would of 
 course place the new Diet under the control 
 of Napoleon. The member of the Bonaparte 
 family was plainly pointed out by his eccle- 
 siastical profession: it was Cardinal Fesch, 
 Archbishop of Lyons, ambassador at Rome. 1 
 
 Without waiting for such a plan to be pro- 
 
 1 We quote the curious document which was addressed 
 to Napoleon. 
 
 " Ratisbo*, ApriH9, 1806. 
 "Sire, 
 
 The genius of Napoleon is not limited to creating the 
 happiness of France ; Providence grants the superior j 
 man (o the universe. The estimable German nation 
 groans under the miseries of political and religious anar- 
 chy : be, sire, the regenerator of its constitution. Here 
 are some wishes dictated by the state of things ; let the j 
 Duke of Cleves become elector, let him obtain the toll of ; 
 the Rhine on the whole of the right bank ; let Cardinal 
 Fesch be my coadjutor; let the annuities settled on 
 twelve states of the empire out of the toll, be founded 
 on some other basis. Your imperial and royal majesty 
 will judge in your sublimity whether it is conducive to 
 the general welfare to realize these ideas. If any ideo- 
 logic error misleads me on this point, my heart at least 
 attests the purity of my intentions. 
 
 ' I am, with an inviolable attachment and the most , 
 
 profound respect, sire, your imperial and royal majesty's 
 most humble and most devoted admirer, 
 
 "CHARLES, 
 
 " Ejector Jlrch-chancellor." 
 
 " The Germanic nation needs that its constitution should 
 be regenerated ; the greater part of its laws consist only 
 of words devoid of meaning, since the tribunal, the cir- 
 cles, the diet of the empire, no longer -possess the means 
 necessary to uphold the rights of property and the perso- 
 nal safety of the individuals who compose the nation, and 
 since these institutions can no longer protect the op- 
 pressed against the encroachments of arbitrary power 
 and rapacity. Such a state is anarchical ; the noonle 
 bear the burdens of the civil condition, without enjoying 
 its principal advantages a disastrous position for a na 
 tion thoroughly estimable for its loyalty, its industry, it* 
 primitive energy. The Germanic constitution can be 
 regenerated only by a head of the empire of a great cha- 
 racter, who shall restore vigour to the laws by concen- 
 trating the executive power in his hands. The states of
 
 132 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1806. 
 
 posed, discussed, and accepted, the arch-chan- 
 cellor, anxious to insure the preservation of his 
 see by an adoption which would render its de- 
 struction impossible, unless Napoleon chose 
 to do an injury to the interests of his family, 
 which it would not quietly endure, and which 
 he was not fond of doing, the arch-chancellor, 
 without consulting an}' person, to the great 
 astonishment of his co-estates, chose Cardinal 
 Fesch coadjutor of the archbishopric of Ratis- 
 bon, and wrote to Napoleon to acquaint him 
 wi'h this choice. 
 
 Napoleon had no reason to love Cardinal 
 Fesch, a vain and obstinate man, who was not 
 the least troublesome of his relations, and he 
 had no particular desire to place him at the 
 head of the German empire. However, he 
 permitted this strange appointment, without 
 explanation. It was a striking symptom of 
 that disposition of the oppressed German 
 princes to put the new imperial sceptre into 
 his hands. 
 
 Napoleon had no intention to take, in a di- 
 rect manner, that sceptre from ihe head of the 
 house of Austria. It was an enterprise, which 
 seemed to him too great for the moment, though 
 there was little that would have frightened him 
 since Austerlitz. But he was enlightened as to 
 how far he might venture at that moment in 
 Germany, and fixed as to what it was proper 
 for him to do. For the present, he resolved to 
 dislocate, to weaken, the German empire in 
 such a manner that the French empire alone 
 should shine in the west. He purposed then 
 to unite the princes of South Germany, situated 
 on the banks of the Rhine, in Franconia, Sua- 
 bia, Bavaria, and to form them into a confede- 
 ration under his avowed protectorship. This 
 confederation should declare its connection 
 with the German empire dissolved. As for 
 the other princes of Germany, they might 
 either continue in the old confederation, under 
 the authority of Austria, or, what was more 
 probable, they would leave it and group them- 
 selves at pleasure, some about Prussia, others 
 about Austria. Then the French empire, hav- 
 ing under its formal paramountship Italy, Na- 
 ples, Holland, perhaps some day the Spanish 
 peninsula, under its protectorship the south of 
 Germany, would comprehend nearly the same 
 states which belonged to Charlemagne, and 
 
 would take the place of the Empire of the 
 West. To give it this title was no longer a 
 mere affair of words, but yet a serious one on 
 account of the jealousies of Europe, but to be 
 realized some day by victory or successful 
 negotiation. 
 
 To accomplish such a project there was bat 
 little to do, for Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, 
 were then treating at Paris, in order to arrive 
 at some settlement of their situation, aggran- 
 dized but uncertain. All the other princes ap- 
 plied to be included, no matter under what ti- 
 tle, no matter upon what condition, in the new 
 federative system, which was foreseen and des- 
 cried as inevitable. To be comprehended in 
 it was to live, to be excluded from it was to 
 perish. It was, therefore, unnecessary to ne- 
 gotiate with any others than with the sovereigns 
 of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, and care 
 was taken to consult them only with a certain 
 degree of caution, and to exclude all excepting 
 them from the negotiation. It was~propo^ed to 
 present the treaty ready drawn up, to such of the 
 princes as one was desirous to retain, and to 
 admit them to sign purely and simply. The 
 new confederation was to bear the title of Con- 
 federation of the Rhine, and Napoleon that of 
 Protector. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand was charged, with a very 
 clever first clerk, M. de Labesnaudiere, to 
 draw up the plan of the new confederation, 
 and then to submit it to the Emperor. 1 
 
 Such was, as we see, the chain of events, 
 which led France twice to intermeddle in the 
 affairs of Germany. The first time, the inevi- 
 table jsartition of the ecclesiastical possessions 
 threatening Germany with a convulsion, its 
 princes came themselves to solicit Napoleon 
 to make this partition himself, and to add such 
 changes as were to result from it in the Ger- 
 manic constitution. The second time, Napo- 
 leon called away from the shores of the ocean 
 to the banks of the Danube, by the irruption 
 of the Austrians into Bavaria, obliged to cre- 
 ate allies for himself in the south of Germany, 
 to recompense them, to aggrandize them, to 
 restrain them at the same time when they at- 
 tempted to abuse his alliance, was again 
 obliged to interfere in order- to regulate the 
 situation of the German princes who geogra- 
 phically interested France. 
 
 the empire will enjoy their domains all the better, when 
 the wishes of the people shall be expressed and discussed 
 in the diet, the tribunals better organized and justice ad- 
 ministered in a more efficacious manner. His majesty, 
 the Emperor of Austria, Francis II., would be a reputable 
 individual for his personal qualities, but in point of fact 
 the sceptre of Germany is slipping out of his hands, be- 
 cause he (vis now the majority ef the diet against him; 
 because he has violated his capitulation by occupying 
 Bavaria, by introducing the Russians into Germany, by 
 dismembering portions nf ihe empire to pay for faults 
 committed in the private quarrels of his house. Let him 
 be emperor of the east to withstand the Russians, and let 
 the empire of ihe vest revive in the empire of Napoleon, 
 tuck as it was under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, 
 France, and Germany! It appears not impossible that 
 the evils of anarchy may render the majority of the elec- 
 tors sensible of the necessity of such a regeneration; it 
 was thus that they chose Rodolph of flapsburg after the 
 troubles of a long interregnum. The means of the arch- 
 rliancellor arc extremely limited, but it is at least with a 
 
 pure intention thit he reckons upon the understanding 
 of the Emperor Napoleon, particularly on matters likely 
 to agitate the south of Germany, more especially devoted 
 to that monarch. The regeneration of the Germanic 
 constitution has always been the object of ihe wishes of 
 the elector arch-chancellor; he neither asks for nor would 
 accept any thing for himself; he thinks that, if his ma- 
 jesty, the Emperor Napoleon, could for a ft-w weeks, 
 every year, personally meet the princes, who a re attached 
 to him, at Mayence, or some other place, the seeds of 
 Germanic regeneration would soon be developed. M. 
 d'Hedouville has gained the entire confidence of the 
 elector arch-chancellor, who would be glad if he wc.uld be 
 pleased to submit these ideas in all their purity to hia 
 majesty, the Emperor of the French, arid to his minister 
 M. de Tallevrand. "CHARLES, 
 
 " Elector Arch -chancellor." 
 
 1 It is from M. de Labesnaudiere himself, the only con 
 tidaiit of this new creation, that we derive all these pat 
 ticulars, supported besides by a multitude of authentic 
 documents.
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 133 
 
 [f he had any personal view in all that he 
 did on this occasion, it was to render vacant 
 an august title by the dissolution of the Ger- 
 manic empire, and to suffer the French em- 
 pire alone to exist in the eyes of the nations. 
 Nevertheless, the essential causes of his inter- 
 vention were no other than the violence of the 
 strong, the cries of the weak, and the two-fold 
 desire, reasonable enough, to repress injustice 
 committed in his name, and to remodel Ger- 
 many in a manner conformable to the sugges- 
 tions of his good sense, since he could no lon- 
 ger withhold his interference. 
 
 This intervention in the affairs of Germany, 
 carried beyond certain bounds, was none the 
 less a grievous fault on the part of Napoleon; 
 to pretend to exercise a predominant influence 
 over the south of Europe, over Italy, even over 
 Spain, was consistent with French policy in 
 all ages; and vast as was this ambition, sig- 
 nal victories might justify its magnitude. But 
 to attempt to extend his power to the north of 
 Europe, that is to say into Germany, was driv- 
 ing the despair of Austria to extremity ; it was 
 kindling in Prussia a species of jealousy 
 which France had not yet excited in her. It 
 was taking upon himself the difficulties which 
 were arising from the dissensions of all those 
 petty princes among themselves; it was pass- 
 ing for the supporter and accomplice of the 
 oppressors, when he was the defender of the 
 oppressed; it was setting against him those 
 who were not favoured, without setting for him 
 those who were ; for these latter already ex- 
 pressed themselves in such a manner as to 
 foreshow that, after they had enriched them- 
 selves by us, they would be capable of turning 
 against us, in order to purchase the preserva- 
 tion of what they had acquired. And as for 
 the assistance which he anticipated find- 
 ing in their troops, it was a dangerous decep- 
 tion ; for he might be induced to consider as 
 auxiliaries soldiers quite ready upon occasion 
 to turn traitors. It was a still greater fault to 
 change the old combinations of Germany, 
 which made Prussia an ever jealous rival of 
 Austria, and consequently an ally of France, 
 and all the petty princes of Germany, filled 
 with envy of each other, thenceforward clients 
 of our policy from which they sought support. 
 Had France added something to the influence 
 of Prussia, and retrenched something from 
 that of Austria, that would have been doing 
 enough for a century, nay it would have been 
 all that Germany needed. Beyond this, there 
 was nothing but an overturning of European 
 policy, baneful rather than beneficial. If these 
 changes were carried so far as to render 
 Prussia all-powerful, it would be merely re- 
 moving the danger from one place to another, 
 transferring to Berlin the enemy whom we 
 had always had at Vienna: if they went so 
 far as to destroy Prussia and Austria, the ef- 
 fect would be to rouse all Germany ; and, as 
 for the small states, all that went beyond a just 
 protection for certain second-rate princes, as 
 Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, usually allies 
 of France, all that went beyond, given after a 
 war for their alliance, was a dangerous inter- 
 ference in the affairs of others, a gratuitous 
 acceptance of difficulties not our own, and, 
 
 under an apparent violation of foreign inde- 
 pendence, an egregious cheat. There was but 
 one greater fault to commit; that was to found 
 French kingdoms in Germany. Napoleon had 
 not yet arrived at this degree of power and of 
 error. The old Germanic constitution, modi- 
 fied by the recess of 1803, with some additional 
 solutions, neglected at the time of that recess, 
 with the former influences modified merely in 
 their proportion, was all that was suitable for 
 France, for Europe, and for Germany. We 
 undertook more for the welfare of Germany 
 than for our own ; she cherished a deep re- 
 sentment for it, and awaited ihe moment of our 
 final retreat to fire in rear upon our soldiers, 
 overwhelmed by numbers. Such is the price 
 that must be paid for faults ! 
 
 Napoleon left M. de Talleyrand and M. de 
 Labesnaudiere to arrange in secret the details 
 of the new plan of Germanic confederation 
 with the ministers of Baden, Wurtemberg, 
 and Bavaria, before he began to proceed to 
 the execution of his general plan, particularly 
 relative to Italy and Holland, in order that the 
 English and Russian negotiators, treating each 
 on their own part, might find consummated and 
 irrevocable resolutions relative to the new roy- 
 alties which he purposed to create. 
 
 The crown of Naples had been destined for 
 Joseph, that of Holland for Louis. The insti- 
 tution of these royalties was for Napoleon at 
 once a political calculation and a gratification 
 of feeling. He was not only great, he was 
 good, and sensible to the affections of blood, 
 sometimes even to weakness. He did not al- 
 ways reap the reward of his sentiments; for 
 there is nothing so exigent as an upstart family. 
 There was not one of his relations, who, though 
 acknowledging that it was the conqueror of 
 Rivoli, of the Pyramids, and of Austerlitz, who 
 had founded the greatness of the Bonapartes, 
 nevertheless fancied that he was somebody, 
 and looked upon himself as treated unjustly, 
 hardly, or in a manner disproportioned to his 
 merits. His mother, incessantly repeating 
 that she had given him birth, complained that 
 she was not surrounded with sufficient homage 
 and respect; and she was nevertheless the 
 most moderate and the least intoxicated of the 
 females of that family. lucien Bonaparte 
 had placed, he said, the crown upon the head 
 of his brother, for he alone had been unshaken 
 on the 18th of Brumaire, and for the reward 
 of this service he lived in exile. Joseph, the 
 meekest and the most sensible of all, said in his 
 turn that he was the eldest, and that the def3- 
 rence due to that title was not paid him. He 
 was even somewhat disposed to believe that 
 the treaties of Luneville, of Amiens, of the 
 Concordat, which Napoleon had complaisantly 
 commissioned him to sign, to the detriment of 
 M. de Talleyrand, were the work of his per- 
 sonal ability, as well as the great exploits of 
 his brother. Louis, sickly, mistrustful, fillet 
 with pride, affecting virtue, pretended that he 
 was sacrificed to an infamous office, that of 
 cloaking, by marrying her, the weaknesses of 
 Hortense de Beauharnais for Napoleon an 
 odious calumny, invented by the emigrants, 
 repeated in a thousand pamphlets, and by 
 which Louis wrongfully showed himself to be
 
 134 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 180. 
 
 so prepossessed, as to cause it to be supposed ' 
 that he himself believed it. Thus each of 
 them conceived himself to be a victim in some 
 way, and ill paid for the part which he had 
 taken in his brother's greatness. The sisters 
 of Napoleon, not daring to have such preten- 
 sions, were restless around him, and by their 
 rivalries, sometimes by their discontent, ruffled 
 his spirit, a prey to a thousand other inquiet- 
 udes. Caroline was incessantly soliciting for 
 Murat, who, with all his levity, at least repaid 
 the bounty of his brother-in-law with an at- 
 tachment which at that time afforded no reason 
 to augur his subsequent conduct, though, it is 
 true, one may expect any thing from levity. 
 Elisa, the eldest, transferred to Lucca, where 
 she aspired to the personal glory of well ma- 
 naging a little state, and who really conducted 
 it with great ability, desired an augmentation 
 of her duchy. 
 
 In this whole family, Jerome as the young- 
 est, Pauline as the most dissipated, were ex- 
 empt from those exigencies, those resentments, 
 those jealousies, which disturb the interior of 
 the imperial house. Jerome, the irregularities 
 of whose youth had frequently provoked the 
 severity of Napoleon, considered him as a fa- 
 ther rather than a brother, and received his 
 bounty with a heart full of unmixed gratitude. 
 Pauline, given up to her pleasures, like a 
 princess of the family of the Caesars, beautiful 
 as an antique Venus, sought in the greatness 
 of her brother only the means of gratifying 
 her loose propensities, desired no higher titles 
 than those of the Borgheses, whose name she 
 bore, was disposed to prefer fortune, the source 
 of pleasure, to greatness, the satisfaction of 
 pride. She was so fond of her brother that, 
 when he was at war, the Arch-chancellor Cam- 
 baceres, commissioned to govern the reigning 
 family and the state, was obliged to send this 
 princess news the moment he received it, for 
 the least delay threw her into the most painful 
 anxiety. 
 
 It was the fear of seeing the children of the 
 Beauharnais family preferred to themselves 
 that had urged the Bonapartes to be enemies 
 to Josephine. In this they paid no regard 
 even to the heart of Napoleon, and tormented 
 him in a thousand ways. The precocious 
 
 greatness of Eugene, who had become viceroy 
 and destined heir to the fine kingdom of Italy, 
 singularly eclipsed them, and yet this crown 
 had been offered to Joseph, who had declined it 
 because it placed him too immediately under 
 the control of the Emperor of the French. He 
 wanted to reign, he said, in an independent 
 manner. We shall see by and by inio what 
 difficulties this fondness for independence, 
 common to all the members of the imperial 
 family, combined with the tendencies of the 
 nations over whom they were called to reign, 
 was destined to bring the government of Na- 
 poleon, and what new causes of misfortune it 
 added to our misfortunes. 
 
 It was among all the members of his family 
 that he had to distribute the kingdoms and the 
 duchies of new creation. The crown of Na- 
 ples insured to Joseph a situation sufficiently 
 independent, and was, besides, brilliant enough 
 to be accepted. One feels some surprise to be 
 obliged to employ such words to characterize 
 the sentiments with which these fine kingdoms 
 were received by princes born so far from the 
 throne, and so far even from that greatness 
 which individuals sometimes owe to birth and 
 fortune. But it is one of the singularities of 
 the fantastic spectacle exhibited by the French 
 Revolution and by the extraordinary man whom 
 it placed at its head, that these refusals, these 
 hesitations, almost this disdain of anticipated 
 satiety, should be expressed for the fairest 
 crowns by personages who in their youth 
 could never have expected to wear them. Na- 
 poleon, who had seen Joseph disdain at one 
 time the presidency of the Senate, at another 
 the viceroyalty of Italy, was not sure that he 
 would accept the throne of Naples, and had at 
 first conferred on him only the title of his 
 lieutenant. 1 Having afterwards ascertained 
 his acceptance of it, he had inserted his name 
 in the decrees destined to be presented to the 
 Senate. 
 
 As for Holland, he had designated Louis, 
 who has since told all Europe, in a book re- 
 flecting upon his brother, how highly he was 
 offended because he had scarcely been con- 
 sulted upon this arrangement. In fact, Napo- 
 leon, without concerning himself about Louis, 
 whose will seemed to him not to be an obsta- 
 
 1 We quote the following letters, which show how Na- 
 poleon gave crowns and how they were received : 
 
 " To the Minister of War. 
 
 " Munich, January 6, 1806. 
 
 " Despatch General Berthier, your brother, with the 
 decree appointing Prince Joseph to the command of the 
 army of Italy. He will observe the most profound se- 
 crecy, and he must not deliver the decree till the prince 
 arrives. I say he must observe the most profound se- 
 crecy, because I am not sure that Prince Joseph will go 
 thither, and on this point I desire that nothing may be 
 known." 
 
 " To Prince Joseph. 
 
 " Stuttgart, January 12, 1806. 
 
 "My intention is that in the first days of February you 
 should enter the kingdom of Naples, and that I should be 
 informed in the course of February that my eagles hang 
 over that capital. You will not make any suspension of 
 arms or capitulation. My intention is that the Bourbons 
 should have ceased to reign in Naples, and I wish to seat 
 on hat throne a prince of my house, you in the first 
 olic*. if that suits you, .another if that does not suit you. 
 
 " I repeat to you not to divide your forces ; let all your 
 army cross the Apennines, and let your three corps d'ar- 
 mee proceed direct fr Naples, so as to meet in one day 
 on the same field of battle. 
 
 " Leave a general of the depots, of victualling, and a 
 few artillerymen at Annum to defend that place. When 
 Naples is taken, the extremities will fall of themselves; 
 all that shall be in the Abruzzi must be taken en revere, 
 and you will send a division to Tarento and one towards 
 Sicily, to complete the conquest of the kingdom. 
 
 " My intention is to leave under your command during 
 the year, till I have made new dispositions, 14 regiments 
 of infantry competed to the full complement of war, and 
 12 of French cavalry also at the full complement. 
 
 "The country must supply you with provisions, cloth- 
 ing, remounts, and all that is necessary, so as nut to cost 
 me a sou. My troops of the kingdom of Italy shall re- 
 main there no longer than you shall judge necesiary, 
 after which time they shall return home. 
 
 "You will raise a Neapolitan legion, into which you 
 will admit none but Neapolitan officers and soldiers na- 
 tives of the country, willing to attach themselves to mjr 
 cause."
 
 April, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 135 
 
 cle to foresee" and to conquer, had sent word 
 lo some of the principal citizens of Holland, 
 particularly to Admiral Verhuel, the valiant 
 and able commander of the flotilla, to dispose 
 Holland to renounce at length its ancient re- 
 publican government, and to constitute itself 
 a monarchy. This is another trait of the pic- 
 ture which we are here presenting, that French 
 Revolution, of setting out with endeavouring ] 
 to convert all thrones into republics, and now 
 exerting itself to convert the most ancient re- 
 publics into monarchies. The republics of 
 Venice and Genoa, become provinces of dif- 
 ferent kingdoms, the free cities of Germany 
 absorbed into various principalities, had al- 
 ready demonstrated that singular tendency. 
 The royalty of Holland was its last and most 
 striking phenomenon. Holland, after throw- 
 ing herself into the arms of France to escape 
 the Stadtholder, was discontented to find her- 
 self doomed to an everlasting war, and was 
 deficient in. gratitude to Napoleon, who had 
 made at Amiens and daily renewed the great- 
 est efforts for insuring to her the restitution of 
 her colonies. The Dutch, half English by 
 their religion, their manners, their mercantile 
 spirit, though enemies of England, in conse- 
 quence of their maritime interests, had no 
 sympathy with the government of Napoleon 
 and his exclusively continental greatness. The 
 most insignificant victory at sea would have 
 charmed them much more than the most splen- 
 did victory on land. They showed sufficient 
 disdain for the semi-monarchical government 
 of a grand-pensionary, which Napoleon had 
 induced them to adopt, when he was instituting 
 a sort of first consul in all the countries under 
 the influence of France. This grand-pension- 
 ary, who was M. de Schimmelpenninck, a good 
 citizen and an honourable man, was in their 
 eyes nothing but a French prefect, charged to 
 commit extortions, because he demanded taxes 
 and loans in order to defray the expenses of a 
 war establishment. The dislike excited by 
 this government of a grand-pensionary was 
 the only facility which the situation of Holland 
 afforded for procuring the acceptance of a 
 king. Though overtaken by that weariness 
 which, at the end of revolutions, renders peo- 
 ple indifferent to every thing, the Dutch ex- 
 perienced a painful feeling, on finding them- 
 selves deprived of their republican system. 
 However, the assurance that their laws, espe- 
 cially their municipal laws, should be left them, 
 the favourable reports made to them of Louis 
 Bonaparte, of the regularity of his manners, 
 of his disposition to economy, of the independ- 
 ence of his character, lastly the usual resigna- 
 tion to things long foreseen, decided the prin- 
 cipal representatives of Holland to accede to 
 the institution of royalty. A treaty was to 
 convert the new situation of Holland in regard 
 to France into an alliance between state and 
 state. 
 
 The Venetian provinces which Napoleon 
 had not immediately united to the kingdom of 
 Italy, that he might be more at liberty to study 
 their resources and to employ them according 
 to his designs the Venetian provinces, in- 
 cluding Dalmatia, were annexed to the king- 
 dom of Italy, upon condition of ceding the 
 
 country of Massa to the Princess Elisa, to aug- 
 ment the duchy of Lucca, and the duchy of 
 Guastalla to the Princess Pauline Borghese, 
 who had not yet received any thing from her 
 brother's munificence. The latter would not 
 keep her duchy, and sold it back to the king- 
 dom of Italy for some millions. 
 
 It was now, perhaps, the time to think of the 
 Pope and the real cause of his discontent. At 
 the moment when Italy was a twelfth-cake, 
 divided with the sword, it would have been 
 easy to reserve a share for St. Peter, and to 
 conciliate by some temporal advantages that 
 spiritual power, which it is dangerous to quar- 
 rel with, even in our times of doubtful faith, 
 and which is far more to be dreaded when it 
 is oppressed than when it oppresses. These 
 new monarchs ought to have been very glad 
 to receive their states, even with a province 
 the fewer; and Pius VII.. indemnified, might 
 have been induced to submit with more pa- 
 tience to be completely invested by the French 
 power, as he was after the establishment of 
 Joseph at Naples. At any rate, Napoleon had 
 still Parma and Placentia to give away, and he 
 could not have made a better use of them than 
 by employing them to console the court of 
 Rome. But Napoleon began to care much 
 less for either physical or moral resistance 
 since Austerlitz. He was extremely displeased 
 with the Pope for his hostile underhand pro- 
 ceedings against the new king of Naples, and 
 he felt more disposed to reduce than to aug- 
 ment the patrimony of St. Peter. Besides, he 
 reserved Parma and Placentia for a use which 
 had also its merit. He thought to make them 
 an indemnity for some of the princes protected 
 by Russia or England, such as the sovereigns 
 of Naples and Piedmont, old dethroned kings, 
 to whom he meant to throw a few crumbs from 
 the sumptuous board around which the new 
 kings were seated. This idea was certainly 
 good, but there was still the fault of leaving 
 the Pope discontented, ready to break out with 
 vehemence, and whom it would have been so 
 easy to satisfy, without any great detriment to 
 the recently instituted kingdoms. 
 
 It was necessary to provide for Murat, the 
 husband of Caroline Bonaparte, and who had 
 at least deserved by war what was about to be 
 done for him on the score of relationship. But 
 he, too, had his exigencies, which were rather 
 his wife's than his own. Napoleon had thought 
 of giving them the principality of Neufchatel, 
 which neither husband nor wife would accept. 
 The Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, who usually 
 interposed between Napoleon and his family 
 with that conciliatory patience which allays 
 reciprocal irritations, which listens to every 
 thing and repeats nothing but what is fit to be 
 repeated the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres 
 was informed in confidence of their violent 
 displeasure. They thought themselves treat- 
 ed with a cutting inequality. Napoleon then 
 thought of the duchy of Berg, ceded to France 
 by Bavaria in exchange for Anspach, increas- 
 ed by the remnant of the duchy of Cleves, a 
 fine country, happily situated on the right ol 
 the Rhine, containing 320,000 inhabitants, pro 
 ducing, all costs of administration paid, a re 
 venue of 400,000 florins, allowing tn^ <grj
 
 136 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 380ft. 
 
 ments to be kept on foot, and capable of con- 
 ferring on its possessor a certain importance 
 in the new confederation. The fertile imagi- 
 nation of Murat and of his wife failed not, in 
 fact, to dream of some very distinguished part 
 decorated externally by some renewed high 
 title of the Holy Empire. 
 
 The reigning family was provided for. But 
 the brother and sisters of Napoleon were not 
 all that he loved. There yet remained his com- 
 panions in arms and the fellow-labourers in 
 his civil toils. His natural kindness, in ac- 
 cordance here with his policy, took delight in 
 paying those for their blood, these for their 
 vigils. He required them to be brave, labori- 
 ous, upright, and for this he thought that he 
 ought to reward them amply. To see the smile 
 on the countenance of his. servants, the smile, 
 not of gratitude, upon which he reckoned but 
 little in general, but of content, was one of the 
 greatest pleasures of his noble heart. 
 
 He consulted the Arch-chancellor Cambace- 
 res upon the distribution of the new favours, 
 and he, seeing how great soever might be the 
 booty to be divided, the extent of the services 
 and of the ambitions was still greater, guessed 
 the embarrassment of Napoleon, and began by 
 putting an end to that embarrassment, as far 
 as concerned himself. He begged Napoleon 
 not to think of him for the new duchies. No 
 man knew so well that when one has attained 
 a certain degree of fortune, it is better to pre- 
 serve than to acquire; and an empire, having 
 him to direct its policy, Napoleon to direct the 
 administration and the armies, would have 
 continued the greatest of all, after it had be- 
 come so. The arch-chancellor desired but one 
 thing, to retain his present greatness ; and the 
 certainty of retaining it appeared to him pre- 
 ferable to the finest duchies. He had acquired 
 this certainty on the following occasion. For a 
 moment he had feared, when he saw Napoleon 
 requiring that the new kings should retain their 
 French dignities, that it was his intention to have 
 kings exclusively for dignitaries of the Empire, 
 and that the titles of arch-chancellor, which he 
 possessed, and of arch-treasurer, which Prince 
 Lebrun enjoyed, would soon be transferred to 
 one of the monarchs newly created, or to be 
 created. Wishing to ascertain the intention of 
 Napoleon on this point, he said to him, " When 
 you have a king quite ready to receive the title 
 of arch-chancellor, let me know, and I will give 
 my resignation." " Be easy," replied Napo- 
 leon, " I must have a lawyer for that post, and 
 you shall keep it." In fact, among the crown- 
 ed heads which formerly composed the Ger- 
 nanic empire, there were three places for mere 
 prelates, the electors of Mayence, Treves, and 
 Cologne. In like manner, amidst those kings, 
 iignJlanes of his empire, Napoleon took plea- 
 sure in reserving one place for the first, the 
 gravest magistrate of his time, called to intro- 
 duce into his councils that wisdom which 
 could not always enter them along with kings. 
 Nothing more was required to give complete 
 content to the prudent arch-chancellor. Thence- 
 torward desiring, soliciting nothing for him- 
 self, he assisted Napoleon most usefully in the 
 distribution which he had to make. They both 
 agreed about the first personage to be largely 
 
 recompensed: this was Berthier, the most as- 
 siduous, the most punctual, the most enlight- 
 ened perhaps, of Napoleon's lieutenants, he 
 who was always about him amidst the balls, 
 and who submitted without any appearance of 
 displeasure to a life, the perils of which were 
 not above his great courage, but the fatigues 
 of which he began to dislike. Napoleon felt 
 sincere satisfaction in having it in his power 
 to pay him for his service*. He granted to 
 him the principality of Neufchatel, which con- 
 stituted him a sovereign prince. 
 
 There was one of his servants who occupied 
 a higher rank in Europe than any other, M. de 
 Talleyrand, who served him much more by 
 his art in treating with foreign ministers, and 
 the elegance of his manners, than by his 
 abilities in the council, in which, however, he 
 had the merit of always recommending a mo- 
 derate policy. Napoleon was not fond of him, 
 and he mistrusted him; but he was grieved to 
 see him dissatisfied, and M. de Talleyrand was 
 \ so because he had not been included among 
 the grand dignitaries. Napoleon, to compen- 
 i sate him, conferred on him the fine principality 
 of Benevento, one of the two which had re- 
 cently been taken from the pope as districts 
 enclosed in the kingdom of Naples. 
 
 Napoleon still had left that of Ponte Corvo, 
 
 likewise enclosed in the kingdom of Naples, 
 
 and, like the preceding, taken from the pope. 
 
 He determined to give it to a personage who 
 
 had rendered no considerable service, who had 
 
 treachery in his heart, but who was the brother- 
 
 i in-law of Joseph: this was Marshal Berna- 
 
 j dotte. In granting this dignity, Napoleon was 
 
 | obliged to do violence to himself. He made up 
 
 his mind to it, influenced by expediency, family 
 
 motives, and oblivion of injuries. 
 
 It would have been doing but little to reward 
 these three or four servants, if Napoleon had 
 not thought of others, more numerous and 
 more deserving, Berthier excepted, whom he 
 had about him, and who expected their share 
 of the fruits of victory. He provided for what 
 concerned them by means of an institution 
 very cleverly conceived. In giving kingdoms, 
 he granted them to the new kings on one con- 
 dition, namely, to institute duchies, with ample 
 revenues, and to give up to him a certain por- 
 tion of the national domains. Thus, in adding 
 the Venetian States to the kingdom of Italy, he 
 reserved the creation of twelve duchies, under 
 the following titles: duchies of Dalmatia, Is- 
 tria, Friule, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Tre- 
 viso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and 
 Rovigo. These duchies conferred no power, 
 bul they insured a yearly income, taken out 
 of the reserved fifteenth of the revenues of the 
 I country. He gave the kingdom of Naples to 
 i Joseph, on condition to reserve six fiefs in it, 
 of which the two principalities of Benevento 
 and Ponte Corvo already mentioned formed a 
 part, and which were completed by the duchies 
 of Gaeta, Otranto, Tarento, and Reggio. In, 
 adding to the principality of Massa that of 
 Lucca, Napoleon stipulated the creation of the 
 duchy of Massa. He insiiluted three others in 
 the countries of Parma and Placentia. One 
 of the three was granted to the Arch-treasurer 
 1 Lebrun. Among all these titles which we
 
 one, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 137 
 
 have just enumerated, we find those figuring 
 which were soon borne by the most illustrious 
 servants of the Empire, and which are still 
 borne by their children, the last and living 
 memorials of our past greatness. All these 
 duchies were instituted on the same conditions 
 as the twelve which had been created in the 
 Venetian States, without any power, but with 
 a share in the fifteenth of the revenues. Na- 
 poleon designed that there should be rewards 
 for every rank, and he required that there 
 should be assigned to him in each of these 
 countries national domains and annuities, in 
 order to create endowments. Thus he secured 
 30 millions' worth of national domains in the 
 State of Venice, and an inscription of rente to 
 the amount of 1200 thousand francs, in the 
 great book of the kingdom of Italy. He re- 
 served for himself, for the same purpose, the 
 national domains of Parma and Placentia, a 
 rente of a million upon the kingdom of Naples, 
 and four millions' worth of national domains 
 in the principality of Lucca and Massa. The 
 whole formed 22 duchies, 34 millions in na- 
 tional property, 2,400,000 francs in rentes, and, 
 added to the treasure of the army, which a 
 first war contribution had already raised to 
 70 millions, and which new victories were 
 about to increase indefinitely, would serve for 
 granting pensions to all ranks, from the com- 
 mon soldier to the marshal. The civil func- 
 tionaries were to have their share in these 
 pensions. Napoleon had already discussed 
 with M. de Talleyrand a plan for the reconsti- 
 tution of the nobility, for he found that the 
 Legion of Honour and the duchies were not 
 sufficient. He purposed to create counts, 
 barons, believing in the necessity of these 
 social distinctions, and desiring that every one 
 should grow great with him, in proportion to 
 his merits. But he intended to correct the 
 profound vanity of these titles in two ways, by 
 making them the reward of great services, 
 and by endowing them with revenues, securing 
 a permanent provision to the families. 
 
 These various resolutions were successively 
 presented to the Senate, to be converted into 
 articles of the constitutions of the Empire, in 
 the months of March, April, and June. 
 
 On the 15th of March, in this year 1806, 
 Murat was proclaimed Grand-duke of Cleves 
 and Berg. On the 30th of March, Joseph was 
 proclaimed King of Naples and Sicily ; Pauline 
 Borghese, Duchess of Guastalla ; Berthier, 
 Prince of Neufchatel. On the 5th of June 
 only (the negotiations with Holland having 
 occasioned some delay), Louis was proclaim- 
 ed King of Holland, M. de Talleyrand Prince 
 of Benevento, Bernadotte Prince of Ponte 
 Corvo. One might have imagined one's self 
 carried back to the times of the Roman Em- 
 pire, when a mere decree of the Senate took 
 away or conferred crowns. 
 
 This series of extraordinary acts was termi- 
 nated by the definitive creation of the new 
 confederation of the Rhine. The negotiation 
 had secretly passed between M. de Talleyrand 
 and the ministers of Bavaria, Baden, and 
 Wurtemberg. From the visible agitation of 
 the German princes, everybody suspected 
 that another new constitution for Germany 
 
 Voi. II. 18 
 
 was preparing. Those who, from the geo- 
 graphical situation of their territories, could 
 be included in the new confederation, soli- 
 cited the favour of being admitted into it, 
 in order to preserve their existence. Those 
 who were likely to border upon it strove to 
 fathom the secret of its constitution, in order 
 to ascertain what would be their relations 
 with this new power, and desired nothing 
 belter than to become members of it on condi- 
 tion of certain advantages. Austria, for some 
 time past considering the empire as dissolved, 
 and thenceforth useless for her, beheld this 
 spectacle with apparent indifference. Prussia, 
 on the contrary, which regarded the fall of the 
 old Germanic confederation as an immeuse 
 revolution, would fain have shared at least 
 with France the imperial power wrested from 
 the house of Austria, and had the patronage 
 of the north of Germany, while France arro- 
 gated to herself that of the south Prussia was 
 listening to find out what was going forward. 
 The manner in which she had just taken pos- 
 session of Hanover, the despatches published 
 in London, had so cooled Napoleon towards 
 her, that he did not even take the trouble to 
 apprize her of things which ought not to have 
 been done but in concert with her. Not only 
 was she excluded from the affairs of Germany, 
 which were her own ; a thousand rumours 
 were circulated of changes of territory, changes 
 by which provinces were taken from her and 
 others given to her, but always smaller than 
 those that were taken. 
 
 Two Germanic princes, the one as ancient 
 as the other was new, gave rise to all these 
 rumours by their impatient ambition. The 
 one was the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, a wily 
 prince, avaricious, rich, from the produce of 
 his mines and the blood of his subjects sold 
 to foreigners, striving to keep on good terms 
 with England, where he had large capitals 
 deposited, with Prussia, whose neighbour he 
 was and one of her generals, lastly with 
 France, which at this moment was building 
 up or throwing down the fortune of all the 
 sovereign houses. There was no artifice that 
 he did not employ with M. de Talleyrand to be 
 j comprehended in the new arrangements, and 
 to gain some advantage by them. Thus he 
 offered to join the projected confederation, and 
 to place in consequence under our influence 
 one of the most important portions of Ger- 
 many, namely, Hesse, but on one condition, 
 that of putting him in possession of a great 
 part of the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt, which 
 he detested with that hatred of the direct branch 
 for the collateral branch so frequent in German 
 families. He insisted strongly on this point, 
 and had submitted a very extensive and very 
 detailed plan. At the same time, he wrote to 
 the King of Prussia to denounce to him what 
 was scheming at Paris, to tell him that a con- 
 federation was preparing, which would ruin 
 the influence of Prussia as much as that of 
 Austria, and that they were employing all 
 sorts of means to induce him to enter into it. 
 
 The new German Prince, Murat, took a dif- 
 ferent course. Not content with the fine 
 Duchy of Berg, containing, as we have said, 
 320,000 inhabitants, and yielding a revenue of 
 x 2
 
 138 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1808. 
 
 400,000 florins, which furnished him with the would have- accepted the Hanseatic cities, for 
 means of keeping two regiments, and put into which she was applying every day. This 
 his hands the important fortress of Wesel, he scheme, which was kept a secret from Euro- 
 wanted to be at least the equal of the sove- pean diplomacy, and which was the price of 
 reign of Wurtemberg, or of Baden, and to the continual intrigues of the house of Hesse- 
 attain this end he desired that a State with a Cassel with the enemies of France, was the 
 million of inhabitants should be created for cause of the refusals unexplained at the time, 
 him in Westphalia. For this purpose he beset given to the solicitations of the elector to be 
 M. de Talleyrand, who was always extremely admitted into the new confederation, and of 
 solicitous to please members of the imperial fa- the false fidelity towards Prussia which he 
 mily. He framed plans upon plans for compos- soon made a boast of. 
 
 ing a territory for him. Of course Prussia fur- Every thing being agreed upon with the 
 nished the materials with Munster, Osnabriick, sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bava- 
 and East Friesland. It was contemplated, it is ria, the only princes who were consulted, the 
 true, to give this power in exchange the treaty was presented for signature to the other 
 Hanseatic cities, which would form a fine princes, who were comprehended at their re- 
 compensation, if not in territory, at least in quest in the new confederation, but without 
 wealth and importance. | taking their opinion on the nature of the act 
 
 All these plans, prepared without the know- I by which it was constituted. This treaty, 
 ledge of Napoleon, were disapproved by him dated the 12th of July, contained the following 
 as soon as he was made acquainted with dispositions : 
 
 them. He had it not so much at heart to i The new confederation was to bear a re- 
 gratify the ambition of Murat as to set about j stricted and well-chosen title, that of Confede- 
 fresh dismemberments in Germany: he was ; ration of the Rhine, a title which excluded the 
 determined in particular not to incorporate ' pretension of comprehending all Germany, and 
 the Hanseatic cities with any great European applied exclusively to the states bordering on 
 state. His last combinations had already France, and having incontestible relations of 
 swept away Augsburg, and were about to interest with her. The title, then, corrected in 
 sweep away Nuremberg, cities through which some degree the fault of the institution. The 
 passed the commerce of France with the centre princes who signed it formed a confederation 
 and the south of Germany. Our commerce under the presidency of the prince arch-chan- 
 with the north passed through Hamburg, Bre- cellor, and under the protectorship of the Em- 
 men, Lubeck. Napoleon would take good ' peror of the French. All disputes among them 
 care not to sacrifice cities whose independ- j were to be settled in a diet meeting at Frank- 
 ence interested France and Europe. French j fort, and composed of two colleges only, one 
 wines and stuffs penetrated into Germany and called the college of the kings, the other the 
 into Russia under the neutral flag of the college of the princes. The first corresponded 
 Hanseatic cities, and under the same flag with the old college of the electors, which 
 were returned naval stores, sometimes corn, would have had no meaning now that there 
 when the state of the crops in France required was no longer an emperor to elect; the second, 
 it To shut up these cities by the custom- by the title and the thing, was the old college 
 houses of a great state would have been fet- of the princes. There was no college answer- 
 tering their trade and ours. It was quite , ing to the former college of the cities. 
 enough to deprive ourselves of Nuremberg The confederated princes were in a perpe- 
 and Augsburg, which sent their mercery and tual state of alliance, offensive and defensive, 
 their hardware to France, and took back our ; with France. Any war in which the confede- 
 wines, our stuffs, our colonial produce, which ration or France might be engaged, should be 
 they afterwards distributed over the whole common to both. France was to furnish 
 south of Germany. 200,000 men, and the confederation 63,000, in 
 
 Napoleon, firmly resolved not to sacrifice these proportions : Bavaria 30,000, Wurtem- 
 the Hanseatic cities, rejected every combina- berg 12, the grand-duchy of Baden 8, the grand- 
 tion that would have tended to give them to duchy of Berg 5, that of Hesse-Darmstadt 4 ; 
 any state whatever, great or small. Of course, lastly the petty states 4000 among them. On 
 he approved of none of Murat's plans. As for the death of the prince arch-chancellor, the 
 the Elector of Hesse, he detested that false, Emperor of the French had the right of nomi- 
 greedy prince, cloaking an implacable enmity nating his successor. 
 
 under the exterior of a sort of indifference, and The confederates declared themselves sepa- 
 purposed on the first occasion to repay the rated for ever from the German empire, and 
 sentiments which he cherished for France, were to make an immediate and solemn decla- 
 Napoleon would not, therefore, bind himself ration to that effect to the Diet of Ratisbon. 
 towards him by introducing him into the con- They were to govern themselves in their rela- 
 federation, which he was organizing, for it tions with each other, and relatively to thei 
 would have been rendering impossible an German affairs, upon which the Diet of Frank 
 eventual plan for bringing about the speedy fort would be called speedily to deliberate, 
 and well-merited ruin of that prince. If France By a special article, all the German houses 
 were induced to restore Hanover to England, had the faculty of adhering in the sequel to 
 it would be necessary to find a compensation this treaty, upon condition of a pure and siia- 
 4br Prussia, and Napoleon was determined to pie adhesion. 
 
 offer, her Hesse, which she would certainly j For the present, the Confederation of the 
 have accepted, as she had accepted the eccle- Rhine comprehended the Kings of Bavaria and 
 iiastical principalities and Hanover, as she j Wurtemberg, the prince arch-chancellor Arch
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 189 
 
 bishop of Ratisbon, the Grand-dukes of Baden, 
 Berg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Dukes of Nas- 
 sau-Usingen, and Nassau Weilburg, the Princes 
 of Hohenzollern-Hechingen,and Hohenzollern- 
 Sigmaringen, of Salm-Salm and Salm-Kirburg, ' 
 of Isenburg, Aremberg, Lichtenstein, and De la 
 Leyen. 
 
 The Hohenzollerns and the Salms were ad- 
 mitted into the new confederation on account of 
 the long residence of several of the members 
 of those families in France, and of the attach- 
 ment which they had professed to our interests. 
 Prince Lichtenstein obtained his admission, 
 and thus retained his quality of reigning prince, 
 though an Austrian prince, on account of the 
 treaty of Presburg which he had signed. To 
 his principality and to several of those which 
 were preserved, greedy claims had been pre- 
 ferred, but rejected by France. 
 
 The geographical boundaries of the Con- ' 
 federation of the Rhine included the territories | 
 situated between the Sieg, the Lahn, the Mayn, ' 
 the Neckar, the Upper Danube, the Isar, and j 
 the Inn, that is to say, the countries of Nassau ; 
 and Baden, Franconia, Suabia, the Upper Pa- 
 latinate, and Bavaria. Any prince, compre- 
 hended within these boundaries, if he was not 
 named in the constitutive act, lost the quality 
 of reigning prince. He was mediatised, an ex- 
 pression borrowed from ancient Germanic law, 
 signifying that a prince ceased to depend im- 
 mediately on the supreme head of the Empire, 
 so as to depend on him only mediately, that he 
 fell in consequence under the authority of the 
 territorial sovereign in whose territories he 
 was enclosed, and was thus stripped of his ! 
 sovereignty. 
 
 The mediatised princes and counts retained 
 certain princely rights and lost only the sove- 
 reign rights, which were transferred to the 
 prince whose subjects they became. The 
 transferred sovereign rights were those of 
 legislation, of supreme jurisdiction, of high 
 police, of taxation, and of recruiting. The 
 lower and middle justice, the forest police, the 
 rights of fishing, hunting, pasturage, the work- 
 ing of mines, and all dues of a feudal nature, 
 without including personal property, composed 
 the prerogatives left to the mediatised, 
 
 They retained the right to be tried by their 
 peers, called austregues in the ancient German 
 constitution. 
 
 The immediate nobility was definitively in- 
 corporated. 
 
 The mediatised, reduced from the state of 
 reigning princes to that of privilized subjects, 
 were very numerous, and would have been 
 more so, but for the intervention of France. 
 Among the number were the Princes of Fiirs- 
 tenberg, attached to Austria, of Hohenlohe to 
 Prussia, the Prince of Tour and Taxis, who 
 was deprived of the monopoly of the German 
 posts, the Princes of Lowenstein-Wertheim, ; 
 Linange, Loos, Schwarzenberg, Solms, Witt- 
 genstein-Perleberg, and some others. The ; 
 house of Nassau-Fulda, that of the late Stadt- 
 holder, lost some portions of its domains in 
 consequence of its contiguity of territory to 
 the new confederation. The court of Berlin, 
 independently of the serious uneasiness which 
 such a confederation could not fail to excite in i 
 
 it, found two causes of personal mortification 
 in the losses sustained by the two houses of 
 Nassau-Fulda, and Tour and Taxis, whose 
 near relationship to the royal family of Prussia 
 we have already explained. 
 
 To these fundamental dispositions, the treaty 
 added the regulations of territory wnich were 
 necessary to produce harmony between the 
 sovereigns of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Ba- 
 varia, irreconcilable co-sharers in Austrian 
 Suabia, in the domains of the immediate no- 
 bility, in the territories belonging to the medico 
 tised princes. 
 
 The free city of Nuremberg, the condition 
 of which one knew not how to regulate, what 
 with a restless population of citizens which 
 agitated it, and what with a patrician nobility 
 which ruined it by the most expensive admin- 
 istration, was given to Bavaria, as well as the 
 city of Ratisbon, in return for some cessions 
 made in the Tyrol to the kingdom of Italy. 
 The prince arch-chancellor found an ample 
 compensation in the city and territory of 
 Frankfort It was in Frankfort that the new 
 diet was to be held. 
 
 This celebrated treaty of the Confederation 
 of the Rhine put an end to the ancient German 
 empire after an existence of 1006 years, from 
 Charlemagne crowned in 800, to Francis IL, 
 dispossessed in 1806. It furnished the new 
 model, after which modern Germany was to 
 be constituted ; it was on this ground the 
 social reform of it, and for the present it placed 
 the states of the south of Germany under the 
 temporary influence of France, leaving those 
 of the north to wander among the protectors 
 whom tKey should think fit to choose. 
 
 This treaty, published on the 12th of July 
 with great ceremony, caused no surprise, but 
 completed obviously to all eyes the European 
 system of Napoleon. Holding all the south 
 of Europe under his imperial paramountship 
 by the family royalties, having the princes of 
 the Rhine under his protectorship, he lacked 
 nothing of the empire of the west but the title. 
 
 It was necessary to communicate this re- 
 sult to the parties interested, that is, to the 
 Diet of Ratisbon, to the Emperor of Austria, 
 and to the King of Prussia. The declaration 
 to the Diet was simple ; it merely notified that 
 it was no longer acknowledged by the Confed- 
 eration. To the Emperor of Austria was ad- 
 dressed a note, in which without dictating to 
 him the conduct which he had to pursue, and 
 which was clearly foreseen, the German empire 
 was spoken of as an institution as completely 
 worn out as the republic of Venice, crumbling 
 to ruin in all its parts, no longer giving pro- 
 tection to weak states, influence to strong 
 states, not corresponding either with the wants 
 of the time or with the relative proportion of 
 the German states to each other; lastly, con- 
 ferring on the house of Austria itself but an 
 empty title, that cf Emperor of Germany, 
 which had released the court of Vienna from 
 all dependence in regard to the electoral houses 
 The Confederation seemed, therefore, to hope 
 without demanding it, that the Emperor Frail- 
 cis would abdicate a title which was about to 
 cease de facto in a great part of Germany, in 
 all that comprising the Confederation of tb
 
 140 
 
 HISTORY O* THE 
 
 [July, 1806. 
 
 Rhine, and which would be no longer recog- 
 nised by France. 
 
 As for Prussia, the French cabinet congratu- 
 lated her on being delivered from the trammels 
 of that German empire, usually under the 
 control of Austria, and, to compensate her for 
 having taken the south of Germany under its 
 dependence, it recommended to her to place 
 the north under the like dependence. " The 
 Emperor Napoleon," wrote that cabinet, " will 
 see without pain, nay even with pleasure, 
 Prussia ranging under her influence all the 
 states of the north of Germany by means of a 
 confederation similar to that of the Rhine." 
 The princes were not designated, consequently 
 none of them were excluded, but the number 
 could not be great and their importance not 
 greater. They were Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, 
 with its various branches, the two houses of 
 Mecklenburg ; lastly, the petty princes of the 
 north, whom it would be superfluous to enu- 
 merate. A promise was given not to throw 
 any impediment in the way of a confederation 
 of that kind. 
 
 Napoleon, however, had not ventured upon 
 such things without taking energetic and os- 
 tensible precautions. Watching with his usual 
 activity what was passing at Naples, at Ven- 
 ice, in Dalmatia, without taking off his atten- 
 tion from the internal administration of the 
 Empire, he had applied himself to putting the 
 grand army on a formidable footing. That 
 army, scattered as we have seen, over Bava- 
 ria, Franconia, andSaubia, living in good can- 
 tonments, had rested itself, and was ready to 
 march again, either if it was obliged to pour 
 back through Bavaria towards Austria, or to 
 traverse Franconia and Saxony, and fall upon 
 Russia. Napoleon had strengthened his ranks 
 with the two reserves formed at Strasburg and 
 Mayence under Marshals-senators Kellermann 
 and Lefebvre. It was an increase of about 
 40,000 men, perfectly disciplined, trained, pre- 
 pared for fatigue. Some of them even, who 
 belonged to the reserves of the preceding years, 
 had attained the age of full strength, that is to 
 say, twenty-four or twenty-five years. The 
 army, diminished in consequence of the late 
 campaign by about 20,000 men, a fourth of 
 whom had rejoined the ranks, found itself, 
 thanks to this reinforcement, augmented and 
 invigorated. Napoleon, taking advantage of 
 the circumstance that part of his troops were 
 subsisted abroad, had raised the total force of 
 France to 450,000 men, 152,000 of them in the 
 interior, (the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, 
 and depots, being included in that number,) 
 40,000 at Naples, 50,000 in Lombardy, 20,000 
 in Dalmatia, 6000 in Holland, 12.000 at the 
 camp of Boulogne, and 170,000 at the grand 
 army. These latter, collected into a single mass, 
 on the complete war footing, numbering 30,000 
 horse, 10,000 artillerymen, and 130,000 foot, 
 had arrived at the highest degree of perfection 
 which it is possible to attain by discipline and 
 war, and was under the direction of the great- 
 est of captains. It should be observed that from 
 this army General Marmont had been detached 
 to' Dalmatia, and the Dutch to Holland, and 
 that it no longer included any Bavarians in its 
 
 ranks, which explains why it was not more 
 numerous after the junction of the reserves. 
 
 In this imposing situation, Napoleon could 
 await the effects produced in Ber._i and Vienna 
 by the whole of his plans, and the result of 
 the negotiations opened at Paris with England 
 and Russia. 
 
 For the rest, he had no inclination to pro 
 long the war, if he were not obliged to do so for 
 the execution of his designs. He was impa- 
 tient, on the contrary, to assemble his soldiers 
 about him at the magnificent entertainment 
 which the city of Paris was to give to the grand 
 army. It was a happy and a fine idea to let 
 that heroic army be feasted by that noble cap- 
 ital, which feels so strongly all the emotions 
 of France, and which, if it does not feel them 
 in a more powerful manner, communicates 
 them at least more rapidly and energetically, 
 thanks to the might of number and to the habit 
 of taking the lead in all things, and of speak- 
 ing for the country on all occasions. 
 
 Disposed to greatness by nature and also by 
 success, which elevated his imagination, Na- 
 poleon, amidst those negotiations, so vast and 
 so varied, those military cares, which extended 
 from Naples to Illyria, from Illyria to Germany, 
 and from Germany to Holland, devoted himself 
 with ardent fondness to magnificent creations 
 of art and public utility. Having visited, 
 during the brief snatches of leisure left him by 
 war, almost all the places of the capital, he 
 had not beheld one of them without being 
 struck at the moment by some grand, moral, 
 or useful idea, the realization of which we see 
 at this day on the soil of Paris. He had been 
 to St. Denis, and finding that ancient church 
 in a deplorable state of dilapidation, especially 
 since the violation of the royal tombs, he or- 
 dered by a decree the repair of that vene- 
 rable edifice. He decided that four chapels 
 should be erected; three for the kings of the 
 first races, and one for the princes of his own 
 dynas^v. Marbles bearing the names of the 
 kings ouriea there and whose sepulchres had 
 been profaned, were to replace their dispersed 
 relics. He instituted a chapter of ten aged 
 bishops to pray perpetually in that funereal asy- 
 lum of our royal races. 
 
 After he had visited St. Genevieve, he or- 
 dered that beautiful church to be finished 
 and restored to public worship, but retaining 
 the destination which the Constituent Assem- 
 bly had assigned to it, that of receiving the 
 illustrious men of France. The chapter of the 
 cathedral, augmented, was to chant the service 
 there every day. 
 
 A triumphal monument had been ordered 
 by the Senate on the proposition of the Tribu- 
 nate. After many rejected plans, Napoleon 
 fixed upon the idea of erecting in the finest Place 
 in Paris, a bronze pillar, similar in form and 
 dimensions to Trajan's pillar, consecrated to the 
 grand army, and displaying on a long basso re- 
 lievo winding round its magnificent shaft, the 
 exploits of the campaign of 1 805. It was decided 
 that the cannon taken from the enemy should 
 furnish the material for it. The statue of Na- 
 poleon, in imperial costume, was to surmount 
 the capital. It is that very column in the
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 141 
 
 x'lace Vendome, at the foot of which pass and 
 will pass the present and future generations, 
 the subject of a generous emulation for them, 
 so long as they shall cherish the love of na- 
 tional glory, the subject of everlasting reproach 
 if they were ever capable of losing that noble 
 sentiment. 
 
 Napoleon afterwards settled the plan of a 
 triumphal arch on the Place du Carrousel, the 
 same that exists at this day. That arch formed 
 part of the plan for completing the Louvre 
 and the Tuileries. He purposed to join those 
 two palaces, and to compose out of them but 
 one, which should be the most extensive ever 
 seen in any country. Placing himself one day 
 under the porch of the Louvre and looking to- 
 wards the Hotel de Ville, he conceived the idea 
 of an immense street, which was to be uni- 
 formly built, wide as the Rue de la Paix, run- 
 ning to the Barriere du Trone, so that the eye 
 might penetrate on one side to the Champs 
 Elysees, on the other to the first trees of Vin- 
 cennes. The name destined for this street 
 was that of RUE IMPERIALS. A monument 
 had long ago been decreed on the site of the 
 ancient Bastile. Napoleon proposed that it 
 should be a triumphal arch, spacious enough 
 to afford a passage through the centre portal 
 to the great projected street, and placed at the 
 intersection of that street and the Canal of St. 
 Martin. The architects having declared it to 
 be impossible to erect such a structure on such 
 a base, Napoleon determined to transfer that 
 arch to the Place de 1'Etoile, that it might face 
 the Tuileries and become one of the extremi- 
 ties of the immense line which he meant to 
 form in the heart of his capital. The present 
 generation has completed most of the monu- 
 ments which Napoleon had not time to finish. 
 It has neither completed the Louvre nor cre- 
 ated that magnificent street which he pro- 
 jected. 
 
 It was not to works of mere embellishment 
 that he limited his cares for the city of Paris. 
 He deemed it unworthy of the prosperity of 
 the Empire that the capital should be destitute 
 of water, while a fine, limpid stream ran 
 through the heart of it. The fountains were 
 open in the daytime only : he ordered works 
 to be executed immediately at the pumps of 
 Notre-Dame, of the Pont-Neuf, of Chaillot, 
 and of Gros-Chaillot, to make the water run 
 day and night. He ordered, moreover, the 
 erection of fifteen new fountains. That of 
 the Chateau d'Eau was included in this crea- 
 tion. In two months, a part of these orders 
 was executed, and the water sprang up night 
 and day from the sixty-five ancient fountain.". 
 On the site of those which were recently de- 
 creed, temporary channels distributed the 
 water till the fountains themselves should be 
 erected. It was the public Treasury which 
 furnished the funds necessary for this ex- 
 pense. 
 
 Napoleon prescribed the continuation of 
 the quays of the Seine, and decided that the 
 bridge of the Jardin des Plantes, then build- 
 ing, should bear the glorious name of Auster- 
 litz. Having, lastly, perceived, when visiting 
 the Champ de Mars, to determine the plan of 
 the fetes for which preparations were making, 
 
 that a communication between the two banks 
 of the Seine was indispensable at this point, 
 ic ordered the construction of a stone bridge, 
 which was to be the finest in the capital, and 
 las borne the name of the Bridge of Jena. 
 
 The most distant departments of the Em- 
 pire shared in his munificence. He decreed 
 :his year the canal from the Rhone to the 
 Rhine, the canal from the Scheldt to the 
 Rhine, and ordered surveys for the canal from 
 Nantes to Brest. He devoted funds to the 
 continuation of the canals of the Ourcq, of 
 St. Quentin, and of Burgundy. He pre- 
 scribed the construction of a high road, sixty 
 leagues in length, from Metz to Mayence, 
 through the valley of the Moselle. He gave 
 orders for commencing the road from Roanne 
 to Lyons, where there is that fine descent of 
 Tarare, almost worthy of the Simplon ; the 
 celebrated road of La Corniche, running from 
 Nice to Genoa, along the flanks of the Apen- 
 nines, between the sea and the summits of 
 those mountains. He directed that of the 
 Simplon, already nearly finished, those of 
 Mont Cenis and Mont Genevre, that along the 
 banks of the Rhine, to be continued. Napo- 
 leon ordered, besides, new works at the arse- 
 nal of Antwerp. 
 
 It seems as if victory had fecundated his 
 spirit, for most of his great creations date 
 from this memorable year, placed between the 
 first half of his career, that so glorious half, 
 when wisdom almost always guided his steps, 
 and that second half, so extraordinary and so 
 sad, when his genius, intoxicated by success, 
 overleaped all the limits of the possible, to 
 perish in an abyss. 
 
 The Legislative Body, which was assembled, 
 quietly adopted the plans projected by Napo- 
 leon, and discussed by the council of state. 
 None of those stormy scenes of the Revolu- 
 tion were now witnessed, neither were yet the 
 scenes of a free parliament. The assembly 
 was seen adopting with confidence plans 
 which it knew to be as ably conceived as they 
 were ably explained. 
 
 A new code was presented this year, the 
 fruit of long conferences between the tribunes* 
 and the councillors of state, under the direc- 
 tion of the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres: it 
 was the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing 
 the manner of proceeding before our tribu- 
 nals, in consequence of their new form and 
 the simplification of our laws. This code 
 was adopted without difficulty, the questions 
 liable to produce disputes having been settled 
 beforehand in the preparatory discussions of 
 the Council of State and the Tribunate. 
 
 A great improvement was made in the or 
 gaiization of the Council of State. Hitherto 
 that body had examined the projets de hi, dis- 
 cussed great measures of government, such 
 as the Concordat, the coronation, the Pope's 
 journey to Paris, the grave diplomatic ques- 
 tion of St. Julien's preliminaries not ratified 
 by Austria. Initiated into all the affairs of 
 state, it was rather a council of government 
 than a council of administration. But these 
 high questions became every day more rare 
 in its bosom, and gave place to purely admi- 
 nistrative questions, which the progress of
 
 142 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1806- 
 
 time and the increasing extent of the Empire 
 were incessantly multiplying. The council- 
 lors of state, important personages, almost 
 the equals of the ministers, were too high in 
 rank and too few in number to trouble them- 
 selves with all the reports. While the quan- 
 tity of business increased, and they assumed 
 the exclusively administrative character, an- 
 other necessity was felt, that of training per- 
 sons for the Council of State, of creating a 
 ladder for them to climb to it, and, above all, 
 for employing young men of high rank, whom 
 Napoleon was desirous to draw to him by all 
 ways at once, those of war and of civil func- 
 tions. After conferring on the subject with 
 the arch-chancellor, he created masters of re- 
 quests, holding an intermediate rank between 
 the auditors and the councillors of state, 
 charged with the greater number of the re- 
 ports, having the faculty of deliberating upon 
 the questions on which they had reported, and 
 receiving a salary proportioned to the import- 
 ance of their attributions. Messieurs Portalis, 
 junior, Mole, and Pasquier, then very young, 
 and nominated immediately masters of re- 
 quests, indicated the utility and the intention 
 of the plan. The Emperor cherished that 
 merit to which recollections were attached, 
 without excluding that merit which awakened 
 none. 
 
 To this wise innovation, which has created 
 a nursery of able administrators, Napoleon 
 immediately added another. There was no 
 jurisdiction for the contractors who treated 
 with the state, whether they executed public 
 works, furnished supplies, or made financial 
 engagements. It was the affair of the United 
 Merchants which had revealed this deficiency; 
 for Napoleon, not knowing to whom to con- 
 sign it, had thought for a moment of sending 
 it before the Legislative Body. This jurisdic- 
 tion could not be attributed to the tribunals, as 
 well on account of the special knowledge 
 which it presupposes, as the turn of mind 
 which it requires, and which ought to be 
 administrative rather than judicial. It was 
 for this reason that all the bargains made by 
 the government were referred to the Council 
 of State. This was the principal origin of the 
 contentious attributions. Hence there were 
 *at the same time created advocates to the council, 
 charged to defend by written memorials the 
 interests of the parties about to be summoned 
 before this new jurisdiction. 
 
 To all these creations, Napoleon added one 
 more, the best perhaps of his reign, the Uni- 
 versity. We have seen what system of edu- 
 cation he adopted in 1802, when he laid the 
 foundations of new French society. Amidst 
 the old generations, which the Revolution had 
 made, enemies of, some of which regretted the 
 old system, while others were disgusted with 
 the new without being disposed to return to 
 the old, he purposed to form by education a 
 young generation made for our modern insti- 
 tutions and by them. Instead of those central 
 schools, which were public courses, attended 
 by youths brought up at home or in private 
 boarding-schools, and in which they heard 
 professors teach, at the pleasure of their ca- 
 price, or of the caprice of the time, the physical 
 
 sciences much more than letters, Napoleon 
 nstituted, as we have seen, houses where 
 youth, lodged and fed, received from the hands 
 of the state instruction and education, and 
 where letters resumed the place which they 
 ought never to have lost, and where the sci- 
 ences had nevertheless not lost the place 
 which they had gained. Napoleon, clearly 
 foreseeing that prejudice and malevolence 
 would assail the establishments which he was 
 instituting, had founded six thousand exhibi- 
 tions, and had thus composed by authority 
 (but by the authority of bounty) the popula- 
 tion of the new colleges, called by the name 
 of Lyceums. Some, very recently opened, 
 others, being only old houses transformed, 
 exhibited already in 1806 the spectacle of 
 order, good morals, and sound studies. There 
 were twenty-nine of them. Napoleon pur- 
 posed to extend the number, and to raise it to 
 a hundred. Three hundred and ten secondary 
 schools established by the communes, a like 
 number of secondary schools opened by indi- 
 viduals, the former restricted to follow the 
 rules of the Lyceums, the latter to send their 
 pupils thither, made up the whole of the new 
 establishments. This system had completely 
 succeeded. The masters of private schools, 
 parents infatuated with old prejudices, priests 
 dreaming of the conquest of the public edu- 
 cation, calumniated the Lyceums. They said 
 nothing was taught in them but mathematics, 
 because the government desired to train up 
 soldiers only, that religion was neglected, and 
 that morals were corrupt there. Nothing was 
 further from the truth, for government had the 
 express intention to bring letters into credit 
 again, and had attained the proposed end. 
 Religion was taught there by chaplains, as 
 seriously as the will of the author of the Con- 
 cordat could cause it to be done, and with as 
 much success as the spirit of the age per- 
 mitted. Lastly, a hard, almost military life, 
 and continual exercises preserved youth there 
 from precocious passions; and, in regard to 
 morals, the Lyceums were certainly preferable 
 to private schools. For the rest, notwithstand- 
 ing the slanders of the peevish partisans of 
 the past, these establishments had made rapid 
 progress. Youth brought by the bounty of 
 the exhibitions and by the confidence of pa- 
 rents began to throng to them. 
 
 But, according to Napoleon, the work was 
 scarcely begun. It was not enough to attract 
 pupils, it was necessary to give them profes- 
 sors : a corps of teachers was to be created. 
 This was a great question, on which Napoleon 
 was fixed with the same firmness of mind 
 that he applied himself to every thing. To 
 resign education again to priests was inad- 
 missible in his eyes. He had restored public 
 worship, and had done so with a deep convic- 
 tion that a religion is necessary for every 
 society, not as an additional instrument of 
 police, but as a satisfaction due to the noblest 
 wants of the human soul. Nevertheless, he 
 would not relinquish the duty of forming the 
 new society to the clergy, who, by their obsti- 
 nate prejudices, by their fondness for the past, 
 by their hatred of the present, by their dread 
 of the future, could only prppagate iu youth
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 143 
 
 the sad passions of the generations that were 
 dying off. It is requisite that youth should be 
 formed after the model of the society in which 
 it is destined to live ; it is necessary that ii 
 should find in the college the family spirit, in 
 the family the spirit of society, with purer 
 morals, more regular habits, more steady dili- 
 gence. It is requisite, in short, that the col- 
 ege should be society itself improved. If 
 there is any difference whatever between the 
 two, if youth hear masters and parents speak- 
 ing discordantly, and hear these praise what 
 those censure, there arises a mischievous con- 
 trast which disturbs the mind, and which 
 causes them to despise their masters, if they 
 have more confidence in their parents; their 
 parents, if (hey have more confidence in their 
 masters. The second part of life is in this 
 case employed in believing nothing of what 
 has been learned in the first Religion itself, 
 if it is imposed with affectation, instead of 
 being professed with respect in the presence 
 of youth religion becomes nothing but a 
 yoke, from which the young man, as soon as 
 he is free, hastens to escape, as from all the 
 college yokes. Such were considerations 
 which made Napoleon averse to the idea of 
 giving up youth to the clergy. Another rea- 
 son completely decided him. Was the clergy 
 'fit to educate Jews, Protestants ] Certainly 
 not. Then one could not have Jews, Protest- 
 ants, Catholics educated together, to compose 
 with them an enlightened, tolerant youth, fond 
 of its country, fit for all careers, ONE, in short, 
 as new France ought to be. 
 
 If, however, the clergy had not the qualities 
 necessary for this task, it had some which 
 were highly valuable, and which one ought to 
 strive to borrow from it. A regular, laborious, 
 sober, modest life was an indispensable con- 
 dition for educating youth ; for one ought not 
 to be content, for such a charge, with the first 
 comers, formed by the hazards of the times 
 and of a dissipated society. But was it im- 
 possible to give to laymen certain qualities of 
 the clergy 1 Napoleon thought not, and expe- 
 rience has proved that he was right. Studious 
 life has more than one analogy with religious 
 life; it is compatible with regularity of man- 
 ners and mediocrity of fortune. Napoleon 
 conceived that one might, by regulations, cre- 
 ate a corps of teachers, who, without observ- 
 ing celibacy, would bring to the education of 
 youth the same application, the same perse- 
 verance, the same professional constancy as 
 the clergy. There is every year in the gene- 
 rations arriving at the adult state, like crops 
 growing on the ground arriving at maturity, a 
 portion of young minds having a fondness 
 for study, and belonging to families without 
 fortune. To collect these minds, to subject 
 them to preparatory trials, to a common disci- 
 pline, to draw them and to retain them by the 
 attraction of a moderate but sure provision 
 such was the problem to be resolved ; and Na- 
 poleon did not consider it incapable of being 
 solved. He had faith in the esprit de corps, and 
 he was fond of it. One of the expressions 
 which he most frequently repeated, because it 
 expressed one of the ideas by which he was 
 most frequently struck, was, that society was in 
 
 the dust. It was natural that he should feel 
 that sentiment at the sight of a country where 
 there existed no longer either nobility, or 
 clergy, or parliament, or corporations. He 
 was continually saying to the men of the Re- 
 volution, Learn to constitute yourselves, if you 
 would defend yourselves, for see how the 
 priests and the emigrants, animated by the 
 last breath of the great bodies destroyed, de- 
 fend themselves ! He designed, therefore, to 
 commit to a body which would Jive and defend 
 itself the office of educating future genera- 
 tions. He has resolved it, he has done it, and 
 he has succeeded. 
 
 Napoleon established the University on the 
 following principles: A special education for 
 the men destined for the professorship; pre- 
 paratory examinations before becoming pro- 
 fessors; the entry after these examinations 
 into a vast body, by whose sentence alone 
 their career could be either suspended or cut 
 short, and in which they would rise in time 
 and by their merits to the head of that corps, 
 a superior council composed of professors, 
 who should have distinguished themselves by 
 their talents, applying the rules, directing the 
 instruction ; lastly, the privilege of public 
 education attributed exclusively to the new 
 institution, with an endowment in rentes on 
 the state, which would add to the energy of 
 the esprit de corps and to the energy of the 
 spirit of property. Such were the ideas ac- 
 cording to which Napoleon designed the Uni- 
 versity to be organized. But he had too much 
 experience to insert all these dispositions in a 
 law. Availing himself with profound intelli- 
 gence of the public confidence, which per- 
 mitted him to present very general laws, 
 which he afterwards completed by decrees, 
 when experience called for them, he charged 
 M. Fourcroy, the administrator of public in- 
 struction under the minister of the interior, tc 
 draw up a projet de hi which should be com 
 prised in three articles only. By the first i' 
 was said that there should be formed, undei 
 the name of Imperial University, a teaching 
 body, charged with the public education 
 throughout the whole empire; by the second 
 that the members of the teaching body should 
 contract obligations, civil, special, and temporary 
 (this word was employed to exclude the idea 
 of monastic vows ;) by the third, that the or- 
 ganization of the teaching corps, modified 
 from experience, should be converted into a 
 law in the session of 1810. It is only with 
 this latitude of action that great things are to 
 be accomplished. 
 
 This projet, presented on the 6th of May, 
 was adopted, like all the others, with confi- 
 dence and silence. We shall not advise the 
 adoption in this manner of laws, but when 
 there shall be such a man, such acts, and, 
 what is still more cogent, such a situation. 
 
 This brief and fertile session was termi- 
 nated by the financial laws. Napoleon justly 
 considered the finances as a foundation quite 
 as indispensable as the army, to the greatness 
 of an empire. The late crisis, though past, 
 was a serious warning to decree at length a 
 complete system of finances, to raise the 
 resources to the level of the necessities, and
 
 144 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1806 
 
 to establish a service of the Treasury, which 
 should render it needless to resort to jobbing 
 men of business. As for the creation of the 
 resources necessary to defray the expenses of 
 the war, Napoleon persisted in his determina- 
 tion not to make a loan. In fact, even amidst 
 the prosperity which he caused France to 
 enjoy, the 5 per cent, rente had never risen 
 above 60. Had a loan been announced, the 
 course would have sunk lower, perhaps to 50, 
 and there would have been a perpetual interest 
 of 10 per cent, to provide for. It was neces- 
 sary, however, lo make up the deficit of the 
 last budgets, and to place the resources defi- 
 nitively in equilibrium with the state of war, 
 which for fifteen years past seemed to have 
 become the usual state of France. It was a 
 bold attempt, which has never been realized, 
 to defray the expenses of an obstinate strug- 
 gle with the permanent imposts. Napoleon 
 had not renounced it, and he had the courage 
 to propose to the country, or rather to impose 
 upon it, the burdens which were to furnish 
 the means of attaining that result. 
 
 The arrear of the last budgets might be li- 
 quidated with 60 millions, the debt to the Sink- 
 ing Fund being deducted from it. This debt 
 consisted, as it will be recollected, of securities 
 which had been disposed of, and produce of 
 the sale of 'national domains, which the Trea- 
 sury had absorbed for its use, though they be- 
 longed to the Sinking Fund. It was necessary, 
 therefore, to provide for these 60 millions, for 
 the debt contracted with the Sinking Fund, and 
 for an annual budget, which, from the expe- 
 rience of 1806, could not amount to less than 
 700 millions in time of war, (820 with the costs 
 of collection.) 
 
 The means devised were the following: 
 
 It was perceived that the Sinking Fund had 
 Kold, very advantageously, the domains, the 
 alienation of which had been intrusted to it by 
 way of experiment. At that time, instead of 
 selling for itself the 70 millions' worth, which 
 the law of the year IX. attributed to it, with a 
 view to indemnify it for the rentes then cre- 
 ated, and for which it was to be paid at the 
 rate of 10 millions per annum, those domains 
 themselves had been given up to them. As to 
 4he securities for reimbursing it, government 
 had decided to pay them to the same amount, 
 that is to say in domains, on condition that it 
 should dispose of them with the necessary pre- 
 cautions, which had already been so eminently 
 successful. This same observation had led 
 Napoleon, who was the inventor of that liqui- 
 dation, to find the means of covering the 60 
 millions of arrear. 
 
 He had endowed the Senate, the Legion of 
 Honour, the Public Instruction, and certain in- 
 stitutions, with the remainder of the national 
 domains. His intention, in acting thus, had 
 heen to save them from the waste of disadvan- 
 tageous alienations. But, on the one hand, it 
 had been perceived that the alienations could 
 be effected in an advantageous manner, by in- 
 trusting them to the Sinking Fund ; and on the 
 other, there had been discovered in that system 
 of endowments the vice peculiar to estates in 
 mortmain, the condition of which is to be ill- 
 coltivated and far from productive. Napoleon 
 
 resolved to take back those domains from the 
 Senate and the Legion of Honour, and to give 
 them an equivalent by creating three millions 
 of rentes at 5 per cent to the capital of 60 mil- 
 lions. If the rentes delivered to the public 
 were threatened with an immediate deprecia- 
 tion, assigned as endowments to permanent 
 bodies which would not alienate them, they 
 would have none of the inconveniences of 
 loans, they would occasion no fall of the 
 course, and they would even procure an ad- 
 vantage for the public establishments which 
 should receive them, that is to insure them an 
 income of 5, instead of an income of 2$ or 3 
 per cent, which the national domains yielded. 
 These domains, transferred afterwards to the 
 Sinking Fund, which would dispose of them 
 gradually, would procure the GO millions which 
 were needed. 
 
 It is true that the amount of these 60 mil- 
 lions was required immediately to pay the ar- 
 rears of anterior budgets. The idea was con- 
 ceived of creating temporary effects, yielding 
 from 6 to 7 per cent., according to the period 
 of their payment, due at a fixed term, payable 
 to the Sinking Fund, at the rate of a million 
 per month, from the 1st of July, 1806, to the 
 first of July, 1811, mortgaged on the capital 
 of the said Fund, which would have, with 
 what it already possessed, and what it was go- 
 ing to acquire, about 130 millions' worth of 
 national domains, and which, lastly, combined 
 a well-established credit with this immovable 
 property. 
 
 These effects, bearing an advantageous but 
 not usurious interest, and repayable at short 
 fixed terms, could not fall like a rente, for their 
 monthly and sure expiration for the period of 
 five years, would tend to raise them by the 
 certainty of recovering the entire capital from 
 month to month. It is a combination which 
 has since succeeded several times, and which 
 was excellent. 
 
 The process for liquidating the arrear con- 
 sisted then in taking back the domains as- 
 signed to the great bodies, in giving them 
 rentes instead, which gave them the advantage 
 of an immediate increase of revenue, in caus- 
 ing these domains to be sold by the Sinking 
 Fund, which it could accomplish with success 
 in five years, and in realizing their value be- 
 forehand, by means of paper due at a fixed 
 term, which could not be depreciated, thanks 
 to the certain and not distant reimbursement, 
 thanks, in short, to an interest of G or 7 per 
 cent. 
 
 The only difficulty, and that not a very se- 
 rious one, of this combination was that the 
 sum of the rentes composing the public debt, 
 was about to be increased to 51 millions, in- 
 stead of 50, as prescribed by anterior laws. 
 But the infraction was unimportant, and go- 
 vernment satisfied the law, by establishing a 
 more rapid extinction for that surplus mil- 
 lion. 
 
 There was still left to provide for future 
 budgets, by creating sufficient resources either 
 for peace or war. Napoleon made a bold and 
 at the same time a very wise declaration, in a 
 financial point of view, to the Legislative Body 
 and to Europe. He was desirous of peace, for
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 145 
 
 ne proudly said that he had exhausted military 
 glory : he was -desirous of peace, for he had 
 given it to Austria. He was ready at this mo- 
 ment to conclude it with Russia, and he was 
 engaged in negotiatigns with England. But 
 the powers had become accustomed to consi- 
 der treaties as truces, which they could break 
 at the first signal from London. It was requi- 
 site, till they could be brought to respect their 
 engagements and to endure with resignation 
 the greatness of France it was requisite to be 
 ready to bear the charges of war so long as it 
 should be necessar}'. Great Britain pretended 
 to defray them by loans. Let her do so, while 
 she continued to hold that resource in her 
 hands. It behoved France to provide for them 
 in a different manner, with means which were 
 her own, that is to say, with the taxes, a re- 
 source far otherwise durable, and which left 
 no burden behind it. In consequence he de- 
 clared that the sum of 600 millions was re- 
 quired for peace, 700 millions for war (720 
 and 820 millions, including the costs of collec- 
 tion.) The budget of the most peaceful year 
 of the present government, that of 1802, had 
 confined itself to an expenditure of 500 mil- 
 lions. But, since 1802, the increase of the 
 debt, the extension given to works of public 
 utility, the endowment of the clergy conse- 
 quent on the Concordat, the re-establishment 
 of the monarchy which had led to the creation 
 of a civil list, augmented to 600 millions the 
 fixed expenses of a state of peace. The ordi- 
 nary resources far exceeded that sum. As for 
 the expenses of a state of war, which Napo- 
 leon was determined to keep up as long as it 
 should be necessary, they raised the budget to 
 700 millions. At this rate 130 millions could 
 be devoted annually to the navy, about 300 
 millions to the army, 50 armed ships kept, 
 and 450,000 men always ready to march. 
 France, on this footing, was able to face all 
 dangers. Now, she could, without injuring 
 herself, impose this burden, for her ordinary 
 revenues already supplied above 600 mil- 
 lions. The kingdom of Italy furnished 30 
 millions of that sum for the French army 
 which attended to its safety, and it would be 
 easy to obtain 60 or 70 millions more by the 
 ordinary taxes. 
 
 After this bold declaration, Napoleon had 
 the courage to develop the great resource of 
 the indirect contributions, which he had al- 
 ready restored to the country, and to create a 
 new resource, not less useful, not less abun- 
 dant, and which had no other inconvenience 
 but that of affecting the generality of the peo- 
 ple, but affecting them slightly, the tax on salt. 
 In consequence, he proposed, besides the dnty 
 on liquors, called droit ifmvcniaire, (a duty 
 levied at the proprietor's at the moment of 
 their being taken away,) another duty on the 
 wholesale trade, and on the retail sale, and 
 for that purpose the exercise, that is to say, 
 the superintendence, over liquors upon the 
 roads, and ihe admission of agents of the ex- 
 cise into the cellars of the dealers in wine. 
 The indirect taxes, which already produced 25 
 millions, were expected to produce more than 
 30 in consequence of this extension. 
 
 As for the tax on salt, its re-establishment 
 
 Voi II. 19 
 
 was occasioned by the suppression of another 
 tax which had become insupportable, the turn- 
 pike toll on the roads. This tax was so incon- 
 gruous with our habits, and so annoying to 
 agriculture, that all the councils-general had 
 solicited its abolition. It brought in but 15 
 millions, which was insufficient for the main- 
 tenance of the roads of the Empire, which 
 cost the state an additional 10 millions a year, 
 and still the roads were not brought into a 
 desirable condition: for the sum necessary for 
 keeping them in a proper state was estimated * 
 at 35 millions at least. By imposing a very 
 light tax, two decimes per kilogramme (two 
 sous per pound) on salt, to be levied at the 
 salt-marshes by the custom-house officers sur- 
 rounding those marshes, almost all of them 
 situated on the frontier, one might hope for a 
 produce of 35 millions, that is to say, suffi- 
 cient to keep the roads in a real state of per- 
 fection, and to ease the Treasury of an expense 
 of 10 millions. This tax was of a totally dif- 
 ferent nature from the ancient gabellcs, un- 
 equally assessed, aggravated by the collection, 
 and sometimes raising salt to 14 sous per 
 pound; a price which, for the lower class of 
 people, was exorbitant. 
 
 With the annually increasing produce of 
 these new taxes, and with some accidental 
 resources, which enabled the government to 
 wait for their complete development, France 
 would find herself capable of supporting a 
 state of war, so long as it should last, and as 
 soon as it was over, to bestow on the people 
 of the Empire the blessings of peace, by the 
 diminution of the land-tax, the only one that 
 was really burdensome. 
 
 By this creation Napoleon completed the 
 re-establishment of our finances, which the 
 suppression of the indirect taxes had ruined in 
 1789; and he exhibited to Europe a picture 
 discouraging to our enemies, that is to say, 50 
 ships, 450,000 men, maintained without loan, 
 and for the whole time that the war should 
 last. 
 
 The budget of 1806 was, therefore, fixed at 
 700 millions for expenditure and receipts (820 
 with the expenses of collection.) An acci- 
 dental circumstance, the restoration of the 
 Gregorian calendar, raised it to 15 months in- 
 stead of 12, and to 900 millions instead of 
 700. In fact, the preceding budget, that of the 
 year XIII., stopping at the 21st of September, 
 1805, it was necessary, in order to comprehend 
 the time to January 1st, 1806, to add about 
 three months, which must of course raise the 
 budget of 1806 to fifteen months and to 900 
 millions. 
 
 There was yet left a task to be performed, 
 that was to organize the Treasury and the 
 Bank of France. Enlightened by recent 
 events, Napoleon resolved to reform both. 
 
 We have already repeated several times in 
 this history that the amount of the taxes was 
 sent to the Treasury, in the form of obliga- 
 tions at a certain date, or bills at sight, signed 
 by the receivers-general, and payable month 
 by month at their office. The discount of this 
 paper procured cash, when there was a ne- 
 cessity to anticipate its falling due. To leaves 
 this discount to a company had proved an un-
 
 140 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1806. 
 
 safe course. It had been intrusted anew to an 
 agency of the receivers-general which acted 
 in Paris for the whole body. Ever since the 
 relurn of credit, capitals were plentiful, and the 
 receivers-general could procure for the state, 
 by discounting their own engagements, all the 
 funds that it needed. Nevertheless, a long 
 discussion took place before Napoleon, in the 
 council of finances, whether this service ought 
 not to be assigned to the bank, more powerful 
 than the agency of the receivers-general ever 
 could be. Napoleon was at first of opinion 
 that for this and for other services the bank 
 was not constituted strongly enough. He re- 
 solved therefore to double its capital by raising 
 the number of shares from 45.COO to 90,000, 
 which, at 1000 francs per share, would form a 
 capital of 90 millions. He resolved, moreover, 
 to render its organization monarchical, by 
 converting the elected president who was at 
 his head into a governor nominated by the 
 Emperor, who would direct it for the twofold 
 interest of commerce and of the Treasury, to 
 place three receivers-general in its council, to 
 connect it more closely with the government; 
 lastly, to suppress the regulation according to 
 which the discounts were proportioned to the 
 number of shares held by the presenters of 
 effects, and to adopt in its stead a much more 
 judicious arrangement, consisting in propor- 
 tioning these discounts to the known credit of 
 the mercantile men who applied for them. 
 These changes, proposed in a law, were 
 adopted by the Legislative Body, and, under 
 this strong and excellent constitution, the Bank 
 of France is become one of the most solid 
 establishments in the world, for it has been 
 seen in our days assisting the Bank of Eng- 
 land itself, and getting over, without flinching, 
 the greatest political catastrophes. 
 
 Even after he had thus enlarged it, Napoleon 
 would not consign, in a constant and definitive 
 manner, the service of the Treasury to the 
 Bank of France. He intended, in case of need, 
 and accidentally, to make use of the new power 
 which he had insured to himself for discount- 
 ing this or that sum, in obligations of the receiv- 
 ers-zeneral or bills at sight, but he could not de- 
 cide to deliver up to it definitively the portfolio 
 \)f the Treasury. It was a company of com- 
 mercial men, deliberating, it is true, under a 
 president appointed by him, but placed out of 
 his government, and he would not, he said, 
 commit to them the secret of his military ope- 
 rations, in committing to them the secret of his 
 financial operations. "I will have it in my 
 power," he added, " to move a body of troops, 
 without the bank knowing it, and it would 
 know it, if it were acquainted with my pecu- 
 niary wants." 
 
 However, he had a trial made, but only a 
 trial, of a new system for payment of funds 
 by accountable persons. Though the system 
 of obligations had rendered great services, it 
 was not the last term of perfection in the way 
 of recovery. It frequently happened that the 
 receivers-general had considerable funds in 
 hand, of which they made a profit, till their 
 obligations became due. These obligations, 
 moreover, gave rise to a very active jobbing. 
 A mere, account current kept between the state 
 
 and the accountable persons, by means of 
 which, every amount that entefed their chests 
 should belong to the state, should bear interest 
 for its profit, and every amount that came out 
 of the chest should bear interest for the profit 
 of the accountable person who had paid it. 
 An account current so regulated, was a much 
 more simple, more true system, which did not 
 prevent granting to the receivers-general the 
 advantages which it had been deemed neces- 
 sary to allow them to enjoy. But there was 
 required, in the first place, a system of entry 
 which admitted not of error; there was required 
 in the accounts of the Treasury the introduc- 
 tion of double-entry, which is employed by 
 commerce. M. Mollien proposed the account 
 current and the double-entry. Napoleon readi- 
 ly assented to it, but he wished this system to 
 be tried with some of the receivers-general, in 
 order to judge of its merit from experience. 
 
 Such were the civil labours of Napoleon in 
 that memorable year 1806, the moM glorious 
 of the Empire, as 1802 was the most glorious 
 of the Consulate : years fecundated the one by 
 the other; in which France was constituted a 
 dictatorial republic in 1802, and a vast federa- 
 tive empire in 1806. In this latter year, Na- 
 poleon founded at once vassal royalties for his 
 brothers, duchies for his generals and his ser- 
 vants, rich ^endowments for his soldiers, sup- 
 pressed the German empire, and left the French 
 empire to fill the West by itself. He continued 
 the roads, the bridges, the canals, the works, 
 already begun, and commenced still more im- 
 portant ones, the canals from the Rhone to the 
 Rhine, from the Rhine to the Scheldt, the roads 
 of La Corniche and Tarare, and from Metz to 
 Mayence. He projected the great monuments 
 of the capital, the column of the Place Ven- 
 dome, the arch of 1'Etoile, the completion of 
 the Louvre, the street to be called Rue Impe- 
 riale, and the principal fountains of Paris. 
 He commenced the restoration of St. Denis, he 
 ordered the finishing of the Pantheon ; he pro- 
 mulgated the Code of Civil Proceeding, im- 
 proved the organization of the Council of State, 
 created the University, liquidated definitively 
 the financial arrears, completed the system of 
 the taxes, reorganized the Bank of France, and 
 prepared the new system of the French Trea- 
 sury. All this, undertaken in January, 1806, 
 was finished in July the same year. What 
 mind ever conceived more things, more vast, 
 more profound, and ever realized them in less 
 time] It is true that we approach the acme 
 of this prodigious reign, a height of elevation 
 that has not been equalled, and of which one 
 may say, while surveying the entire catalogue 
 of human greatness, that none surpasses, if 
 there be any that comes up to it. 
 
 Unfortunately, this incomparable year, in- 
 stead of concluding amidst peace, as one might 
 have hoped, concluded amidst war, half through 
 the fault of Europe, half through that of Na- 
 poleon, and also through a cruel stroke of 
 death, which carried off" Mr. Fox, in this very 
 same year that he had already carried off Mr. 
 Pitt. 
 
 The negotiations opened with Russia and 
 England had been continued during the la- 
 bours of all kinds, of which we have iust given
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 147 
 
 a sketch. Lord Yarmouth, the conferences 
 with whom had been purposely prolonged, 
 adhered to the first proposals. England pur- 
 posed to keep most of her maritime conquests, 
 gave up to us our continental conquests, Hano- 
 ver always excepted, and confined herself to 
 inquiring what we should do to indemnify the 
 King of Naples. As for the new royalties, as 
 for the Confederation of the Rhine, she ap- 
 peared not to care about them. Napoleon, 
 who no longer had reason to defer the term of 
 the negotiations, his principal projects being 
 accomplished, pressed Lord Yarmouth to pro- 
 cure powers, in order to come to a conclusion. 
 Lord Yarmouth had at length received them, 
 but with orders not to produce them till he 
 should perceive a possibility of arranging 
 with France, and after he had come to an un- 
 derstanding with the Russian negotiator. 
 
 M. d'Oubril had arrived in June, with powers 
 in due form, and with double instructions, first 
 to gain time for the mouths of the Cattaro, and 
 thus to spare Austria the military execution 
 with which she was threatened; secondly, to 
 put an end to all existing differences by a 
 treaty of peace, if France acceded to conditions 
 which would save the dignity of the Russian 
 empire. One circumstance had confirmed M. 
 d'Oubril in the idea of settling matters by a 
 treaty of peace. While he was on the way, 
 the Russian ministry had been changed. 
 Prince Czartoryski and his friends, being de- 
 sirous that Russia should connect herself more 
 closely with England, not precisely to continue 
 the war, but to treat with greater advantage, 
 Alexander, weary of their remonstrances, 
 dreading too strict engagements with the Bri- 
 tish cabinet, had at length accepted the resig- 
 nations so frequently offered, and replaced 
 Prince Czartoryski by General Budberg. The 
 latter had formerly been the governor of the 
 Emperor, a friend of the empress-mother's, 
 and had neither energy or humour to resist 
 his master. M. d'Oubril, having found the 
 Emperor more inclined to peace than his minis- 
 ters, could not but deem himself authorized by 
 this change to incline more towards a pacific 
 conclusion. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand had no difficulty to per- 
 suade M. d'Oubril, when he maintained that 
 there was no serious interest to discuss be- 
 tween the two empires, at most only a ques- 
 tion of influence to consider, on account of 
 two or three petty powers, which Russia 
 had taken under her protection. But, as for 
 these latter, Russia, beaten at Austerlitz, and 
 not disposed to begin again, since Austria had 
 surrendered her sword, since Prussia was de- 
 pendent, and since England appeared wearied 
 out Russia could not be very exigent. She 
 desired merely to save her pride from too rude 
 a shock. She was ready, therefore, to take 
 no notice of the new arrangements made in 
 Germany, and those relative to the annexation 
 of Genoa and the Venetian States; she was even 
 determined to be silent respecting the conquest 
 of Naples, for the arming of the Neapolitans 
 after a convention of neutrality justified all the 
 severity of Napoleon. Still, in regard to Pied-! 
 raont and the Bourbons of Naples, Russia hadi 
 written engagements, and she could do no less! 
 
 than demand something for them, were it ever 
 so little. The engagements in regard to Pied- 
 mont began to be antiquated, but those which 
 had been contracted with Queen Caroline and 
 pushed her into the abyss, were too recent and 
 too authentic for Russia not to interfere in hei 
 favour. 
 
 Hence this was the essential and difficult 
 question to resolve between M. de Talleyrand 
 and M. d'Oubril. The latter would have 
 wished to obtain some compensation, however 
 small, for the King of Piedmont, to insure Si- 
 cily to the Bourbons of Naples, and to intro- 
 duce into the treaty certain expressions, which 
 should give Russia an appearance of useful 
 and honourable intervention in the affairs of 
 Europe. Though Napoleon had at first pur- 
 posed to have a dry and empty treaty, which 
 should purely and simply re-establish peace 
 between the t\vo empires, in order to demon- 
 strate that he did not recognise the influence 
 which Russia pretended to arrogate to herself, 
 this rigorous intention could not but give way 
 before the possibility of an -immediate peace, 
 which by its reaction would bring England 
 per force to treat on reasonable conditions. 
 Napoleon, therefore, permitted M. de Talley- 
 rand to grant all the semblances of influence 
 which could save the dignity of the Russian 
 cabinet. Accordingly that minister was au- 
 thorized in the patent treaty to guarantee the 
 evacuation of Germany, the integrity of the 
 Ottoman empire, the independence of the re- 
 public of Ragusa, to promise the good offices 
 of France for reconciling Prussia and Sweden, 
 and lastly, to accept the good offices of Russia 
 for the re-establishment of peace between 
 France and England. Here was sufficient to 
 form a treaty less insignificant than that which 
 Napoleon had at first contemplated, and con- 
 sequently, more flattering for the pride of Rus- 
 sia. But some compensation or other was 
 required for the Kings of Piedmont and Naples. 
 W ; th respect to the King of Piedmont, Napo- 
 leon gave a positive refusal, and Russia was 
 obliged to renounce that. As for Naples, he 
 would never consent to cede Sicily, and he 
 required that island to be restored to Naples, 
 now possessed by Joseph. By dint of seek- 
 ing a combination to reconcile the opposite 
 pretensions, a middle term was hit upon, 
 which consisted in giving the Balearic Islands 
 to the Prince-royal of Naples, and a pecuniary 
 indemnity to the dethroned king and queen. 
 The Balearic Islands belonged, it is true, to 
 Spain, but Napoleon had wherewithal to fur- 
 nish an equivalent for the latter, by aggrandiz- 
 ing the little kingdom of Etruria with some 
 fragments of the duchies of Parma and Pla- 
 centia. He had, moreover, an -excellent and 
 highly moral lesson to impress upon the court 
 of Madrid, namely, that the Prince-royal of 
 Naples had become the son-in-law of Charles 
 IV., on the same day that a princess of Naples 
 had married the Prince of the Asturias. To 
 crown his excellent reasons, Napoleon pos 
 sessed power. He could therefore venture 10 
 contract a serious engagement respecting tb* 
 Balearic Islands. 
 
 This combination devis ^d, it was requisite 
 to bring the affair to a conclusion. M. d'Oubril
 
 148 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1806. 
 
 had placed himself in communication with 
 Lord Yarmouth, who, though professing: very 
 friendly sentiments towards France, neverthe- 
 less thought that there was weakness in con- 
 ceding every thing that M. de Talleyrand de- 
 manded. Like a good Englishman as he was, 
 he would have had Sicily left to Queen Caro- 
 line, for to preserve it for that queen was 
 giving it to England. Accordingly, he did not 
 fail to urge M. d'Oubril to prolong the resist- 
 ance of Russia. 
 
 But M. de Talleyrand had an expedient, 
 which Napoleon had suggested to him, and of 
 which he skilfully availed himself, namely, 
 to threaten Austria to act immediately unless 
 the mouths of the Cattaro were given up. 
 Napoleon, as we have said, set a great value 
 on these mouths of the Cattaro, for their happy 
 situation in the Adriatic, and above all fur 
 their vicinity to the Turkish frontiers. He 
 was therefore fully determined to require their 
 restitution, and it was the easier for him to 
 threaten because he had the resolution to act. 
 For this purpose, moreover, he had but a step 
 to go, for his troops were still on the Inn and 
 occupied Braunau. In consequence, M. de 
 Talleyrand declared to M. d'Onbril that he 
 must conclude the business and sign the treaty 
 which would lead to the surrender of the 
 mouths of the Cattaro, or leave Paris, after 
 which Austria would be attacked, unless she 
 united her efforts with those of France to re- 
 take the position so dishonourably delivered 
 up to the Russians. 
 
 M. d'Oubril, intimidated by this peremptory 
 declaration, communicated his embarrass- 
 ment to Lord Yarmouth, saying that his in- 
 structions enjoined him to save Austria from 
 immediate constraint, and that he was obliged 
 to conform to them ; that, for the rest, nothing 
 would be gained by delay with such a cha- 
 racter as that of Napoleon, for every day he 
 committed some fresh act, which was after- 
 wards to be considered as a decided thing, if 
 one did not choose to break with him ; that if 
 one had treated before the month of April, 
 Joseph Bonaparte would not have been pro- 
 claimed King of Naples; if one had treated 
 before the month of June, Louis Bonaparte 
 would not have become King of Holland ; 
 that, lastly, if one had treated before the month 
 of July, the German empire would not have 
 been dissolved. M. d'Oubril therefore made 
 up his mind, and signed on the 20th of July, 
 notwithstanding the solicitations of Lord Yar- 
 mouth, a treaty of peace with France. 
 
 In the patent, articles were stipulated, as we 
 have already shown, the evacuation of Ger- 
 many, the independence of the republic of 
 Ragusa, the integrity of the Turkish empire. 
 In these same articles were promised the good 
 offices of the two contracting powers for put- 
 ting an end to the difference which had arisen 
 between Prussia and Sweden ; and France 
 formally accepted the good offices of Russia 
 for the re-establishment of peace with Eng- 
 land, all of them things which gave Russia an 
 appearance of influence which she was desi- 
 rous not to lose. The independence of the 
 Beveu Islands and the immediate evacuation 
 of the mouths of the Cattaro were promised 
 
 anew. In the secret articles, the Balearic 
 Islands were given to the Prince-royal of 
 Naples; but upon condition of not admitting 
 the English into them in time of war; a pen- 
 sion was insured to his mother and father; 
 and there was a stipulation that Swedish 
 Pomerania should be assured to Sweden in 
 the engagements which were to be negotiated 
 between Sweden and Prussia. 
 
 This treaty, in the situation of Europe, was 
 acceptable on the part of Russia, unless, for 
 the sake of the Queen of Naples, she preferred 
 war, which could bring her nothing but dis- 
 asters. 
 
 M. d'Oubril, after concluding it, set out im- 
 mediately for St. Petersburg in order to obtain 
 the ratificaiions of his government. He ima- 
 gined that he had cleverly performed his task; 
 for, if the peace which he had concluded were 
 rejected by his cabinet, he had at least delayed 
 for six weeks the execution with which Aus- 
 tria was threatened On this point, there is 
 ground for asserting that the peace was not 
 signed with perfect sincerity. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand had now to deal with 
 Lord Yarmouth only, who was much weak- 
 ened since the return of M. d'Oubril. The 
 French minister understood how to follow up 
 his advantages, and to make the most of the 
 treaty with Russia, in order to oblige Yar- 
 mouth to produce his powers which he had 
 always refused to do. M. de Talleyrand told 
 him that it was impossible to prolong this kind 
 of comedy of an accredited negotiator, who 
 would not show his powers ; that if he deferred 
 producing them much longer, one would be 
 authorized to believe that he had none, and 
 that his presence in Paris had but a delusive 
 object, that of gaining the bad season, in order 
 to prevent France from acting either against 
 England or against her other enemies. Those 
 enemies were not specified, but some move- 
 ments of troops towards Bayonne might excite 
 apprehension that Portugal was one of them. 
 M. de Talleyrand added that he must come to 
 an immediate decision, quit Paris, or give a 
 serious character to the negotiation by pro- 
 ducing his powers, for they had at last awak- 
 ened the suspicions of Prussia, who required 
 a satisfactory declaration in regard to Han- 
 over; that, unwilling to lose such an ally, the 
 French cabinet was ready to make the declara- 
 tion demanded, and that, once made, it would 
 not be possible to recede from it; that the war 
 then would be everlastin?, or that peace must 
 be concluded without the restitution of Han- 
 over; that, for the rest, nothing would be 
 gained by fresh delays, and that two or three 
 months later England would be obliged to 
 consent perhaps to the conquest of Portugal, 
 as she had consented to the conquest of 
 Naples. 
 
 Overcome by these reasons, by the signa- 
 ture given by M. d'Oubril, by the love of peace, 
 and also by the very natural ambition of 
 writing his name at the foot of such a treaty, 
 Lord Yarmouth at length determined to ex- 
 hibit his powers. It was the first advantage 
 that M. de Talleyrand desired to gain, and he 
 hastened to make it irrevocable, by getting a 
 French plenipotentiary nominated to new
 
 Ju.y, \%06.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 149 
 
 tiate publicly with Lord Yarmouth. Napoleon 
 chose General Clarke, and conferred on him 
 formal and patent powers. From that mo- 
 ment, the 22d of July, the negotiation was 
 officially opened. 
 
 General Clarke and Lord Yarmouth confer- 
 red, an.i, with the exception of Sicily, the two 
 negotiators were agreed. France granted Mal- 
 ta, the Cape, the conquest of India; she in- 
 sisted on the restitution of the factories of 
 Pondicherry and Chandernagor, consenting to 
 limit the number of troops that she should keep 
 there; she demanded also that St. Lucia and 
 Tobago should be restored to her, but she made 
 an especial point only of the restitution of 
 Surinam, a point on which the instructions 
 of the English negotiator were not peremptory. 
 The only serious difficulty still consisted in 
 Sicily, which Lord Yarmouth was not formally 
 authorized to cede, especially for so insignifi- 
 cant an indemnity as the Balearic Islands. 
 Napoleon was desirous to obtain Sicily for his 
 brother Joseph, for very "weighty reasons. Ac- 
 cording to him, so long as Queen Caroline 
 should reside at Palermo, Joseph would not be 
 firmly established in Naples ; there would be 
 everlasting war between those two portions of 
 the late kingdom of the Two Sicilies ; the Ca- 
 labrias would always be exposed to underhand 
 excitement, and, what was still worse, Queen 
 Caroline, confined at Palermo, unable to stand 
 her ground in her island without the support 
 of the English, would give it up entirely to 
 them. It would therefore be securing the en- 
 joyment of Sicily to the English to leave it to 
 the Bourbons, an infinitely disastrous conse- 
 quence for the Mediterranean. 
 
 Lord Yarmouth, on his part, notwithstand- 
 ing his desire to conclude, durst not venture. 
 But a new obstacle soon intervened to fetter 
 his good will. 
 
 The British cabinet, when apprized of the 
 conduct of M. d'Oubril, was extremely irritated, 
 and hastened to send couriers to St. Peters- 
 burg, to complain of the Russian negotiator for 
 having deserted the English negotiator. It did 
 not stop there, but blamed Lord Yarmouth, its 
 own negotiator, for having so soon produced 
 his powers. Fearful even of the influences to 
 which Lord Yarmouth migjit be exposed by his 
 personal intimacy with the French diplomat- 
 ists, it made choice of a Whig, Lord Lauder- 
 dale, a personage very hard to please, to asso- 
 ciate him in the negotiation. This second ple- 
 nipotentiary was immediately despatched, with 
 precise instructions, but which nevertheless 
 left certain facilities relative to Sicily with 
 which Lord Yarmouth was not furnished. 
 Lord Lauderdale was an exact and formal di- 
 plomatist He had orders to require the fixing 
 of a basis of negotiation, the uti possidetit, which 
 covered the maritime conquests of the Eng- 
 lish, and particularly Sicily, which had not yet 
 been conquered by Joseph Bonaparte. It is 
 true that this same basis excluded the restitu- 
 tion of Hanover, but that kingdom was out of 
 the discussion, the English having always 
 declared that they would not even allow any 
 debate on that point The basis being admit- 
 ted, Lord Lauderdale was to agree that the uti 
 pottidetis should be applied in an absolute man- 
 
 ner, especially in regard to Sicily, and that 
 this island might be relinquished for a com- 
 pensation. Thus a sacrifice in Dalmatia, add- 
 ed to the cession of the Balearic Islands, might 
 furnish a medium of accommodation. 
 
 Lord Lauderdale proceeded without delay to 
 Paris. He was a Whig, consequently a friend, 
 rather than a foe, to peace. But he had been 
 warned to be on his guard against the seduc- 
 tions of M. de Talleyrand, which, it was fear- 
 ed, Lord Yarmouth was not capable of resisting. 
 
 Lord Lauderdale was received politely and 
 coldly, for it had been guessed that he was 
 sent over to serve as a corrective of Lord Yar- 
 mouth's too easy temper, as it was judged to 
 be. Napoleon, in reply to the mission of Lord 
 Lauderdale, appointed M. de Champagny se- 
 cond French negotiator. From that moment 
 they were two against two: Messieurs Clarke 
 and Champagny against Lord Yarmouth and 
 Lord Lauderdale. 
 
 No sooner had Lord Lauderdale entered this 
 congress than he set out with a long, absolute 
 note, in which he recapitulated the confidential 
 and official negotiation, and required, before 
 proceeding any further, that the principle of 
 the uti possidetis should be admitted. Napoleon 
 was frankly desirous of peace, and imagined 
 that he had it in his grasp ever since he had 
 guided the hand of M. d'Oubril so far as to sign 
 the treaty of the 20th of July. But it was 
 wrong, nevertheless, to provoke his susceptible 
 and by no means patient temper. He caused 
 the answer to be deferred as the first sign 
 of dissatisfaction. Lord Lauderdale did not 
 consider himself beaten, and repeated his de- 
 claration. He was then answered in an ener- 
 getic and dignified despatch, in which he was 
 told that so far the negotiation had proceeded 
 with frankness and cordiality, and without 
 those pedantic forms which the new negotiator 
 desired to introduce into it; that, if the inten- 
 tions were changed, if all this diplomatic pa- 
 rade disguised a secret intention of breaking 
 off, after procuring a few papers to produce to 
 parliament, the sooner Lord Lauderdale was 
 gone the better, for the French cabinet was not 
 disposed to lend itself to the parliamentary 
 calculations of the British cabinet. Lord Lau- 
 derdale had no desire to produce a rupture ; he 
 was awkward, that was all. Explanations en- 
 sued. It was understood that the production of 
 Lord Lauderdale's note was an aflair of mere 
 formality, which, at bottom, excluded none of 
 the conditions previously admitted by Lord 
 Yarmouth ; that even the relinquishment of 
 Sicily on condition of a more extensive indem- 
 nity than the Balearic Islands, had become 
 more explicit since the arrival of Lord Lauder- 
 dale, and the negotiators then began to confer 
 on the subject of Pondicherry, Surinam, Toba- 
 go, and St. Lucia. 
 
 The English negotiators seemed persuaded 
 that Russia, touched by the representations of 
 the British cabinet, would not ratify D'Ou jril's 
 treaty. Napoleon, on the contrary, could not 
 believe that M. d'Oubril would have gone so 
 far as to conclude such a treaty, if his instruc 
 tions had not authorized him to do so ; still less 
 did he believe that Russia dared cancel an acl 
 which she had authorized her representative 
 x 2
 
 150 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1806. 
 
 ro sign. He thought, therefore, that it would 
 be advantageous to wait for the new Russian 
 ratifications, which to him appeared certain, 
 and that England would then be obliged to 
 submit to the conditions which he had it so 
 much at heart to see her accept. In conse- 
 quence, he ordered the two French negotiators 
 to continue to gain time, till the day when the 
 answer from St. Petersburg should reach Paris. 
 M. d'Oubril had set out on the 22d of July; 
 that answer must arrive by the end of August. 
 
 Napoleon was mistaken, and this was one 
 of the very rare occasions on which he had 
 not divined the thoughts of his adversaries. 
 Nothing, in fact, was more doubtfdl than the 
 Russian ratifications, and besides, the then 
 failing health of Mr. Fox was a new peril for 
 the negotiation. If this generous friend of 
 humanity were to sink under the cares of 
 government, to which he had long been unac- 
 customed, the war party might get the better 
 of the peace party in the British cabinet. 
 
 But, at the moment, a serious circumstance 
 put peace in much greater jeopardy than the 
 temporizing enjoined by Napoleon. Prussia 
 had fallen into a melancholy state of despond- 
 ency. Since her occupation of Hanover, and 
 the publication in London of her communica- 
 tions with England, Napoleon, as we have 
 said, had taken no account of her, and treated 
 her as an ally from whom there was nothing 
 to hope for. Thus every creature in Europe 
 knew that he was engaged in the organization 
 of the new Germanic body, and Prussia was 
 as uninformed on this subject as the petty 
 German powers. Everybody knew that France 
 was negotiating with England, that conse- 
 quently the question of Hanover must come 
 under Liscussion, and she had not received a 
 single communication on this subject capable 
 of rendering her easy. King Frederick Wil- 
 liam was obliged to appear informed of that 
 which he was ignorant of, that he might not 
 make the state of neglect in which he was left 
 too evident. Though keeping up secret and 
 not very honourable relations with Russia, he 
 was treated by the latter without much consi- 
 deration, and he could perceive that she prized 
 him less every day, in proportion as she be- 
 came more reconciled with France. In cold- 
 ness with Austria, who did not forgive him for 
 having deserted her on the eve of Austerlitz, 
 at war with England, which had just seized 
 three hundred Prussian merchantmen, he 
 found himself alone in Europe, and so little 
 respected that even the King of Sweden him- 
 self had not been afraid to oflfer him the most 
 grievous of affronts. When the Prussian 
 troops had appeared to occupy the dependen- 
 cies of Hanover bordering on Swedish Pcme- 
 rania, the King of Sweden, who held them, as 
 ne said, on behalf of the King of England, his 
 ally, had defended himself there, and fired 
 upon tue troops that were sent. It was the 
 last degree of humiliation to be thus treated 
 by a prince who had no other strength but his 
 insanity, protected by his alliances. 
 
 This situation produced in the Prussian 
 cabinet reflections equally painful and alarm- 
 ing. Russia, England herself, were, at this 
 moment taking steps towards France. The 
 
 coalition must soon find itself dissolved, and, 
 as Prussia had been courted only because she 
 formed the necessary complement of that 
 coalition, what would become of her at the 
 time of the general disarming? Would she 
 not be delivered up defenceless to Napoleon, 
 who, highly dissatisfied with her conduct, 
 would treat her as he pleased, either in order 
 to purchase peace with England and Russia, 
 or to aggrandize the states that he should think 
 fit to found ? and, whatever he might do, he 
 was sure not to have one disapprover in 
 Europe, for nobody now felt the slightest in- 
 terest for Prussia. 
 
 The strangest reports confirmed these cut- 
 ting reflections. The idea of restoring Han- 
 over to England, in order to have a maritime 
 peace, was so natural and so simple that it 
 sprang up in all minds at once. So little was 
 Prussia esteemed, that, notwithstanding the 
 virtues of her king, it was not taken amiss 
 that Napoleon should act thus towards a court 
 which knew not how to be either friend or 
 enemy to any one. The allies of France, 
 Spain in particular, who suffered cruelly by 
 the war, said aloud that Prussia did not de- 
 serve to have the calamities of war prolonged 
 a single day on her account. General Pardo, 
 ambassador of Spain in Berlin, repeated this 
 so publicly, that people everywhere inquired 
 the cause of such bold language. Thus, with- 
 out being informed on the subject, every one 
 related circumstances as they were passing in 
 Paris between Lord Yarmouth and M. de Tal- 
 leyrand. 
 
 Then came the malevolent, who, adding the 
 improbable to the probable, took delight in the 
 most mischievous inventions. Some pretended 
 that France was about to reconcile herself 
 with Russia by reconstituting the kingdom of 
 Poland in behalf of the Grand-duke Constan- 
 tine, and that for this purpose the Polish pro- 
 vinces, ceded to Prussia at the time of the last 
 partition, would be taken from her. Others 
 maintained that Murat was about to be pro- 
 claimed King of Westphalia, and that it was 
 in contemplation to give him Miinster, Osna- 
 brilck, and East Friesland. 
 
 It is a mixture of falsehood and truth of 
 which all rumours are usually composed, and 
 there is always sufficient of the latter mingled 
 with them to gain belief for the lie. This may 
 be perceived in the present instance, when ac- 
 curate but distorted facts had served for a 
 foundation to the falsest reports. Napoleon 
 was, in fact, thinking of restoring Hanover to 
 England, since Prussia no longer seemed to 
 him an ally that could be relied on, but secur- 
 ing an indemnity for the latter or restoring to 
 her all that he had received from her. The 
 plan for taking the Polish provinces from her 
 had been entertained for a moment, but by the 
 Russians and not by the French. Lastly, 
 Murat's pretended kingdom was an invention 
 of M. de Talleyrand's clerks, for the purpose 
 of flattering the imperial family ; and as yet 
 Napoleon had thought of this only on condition 
 of giving Prussia the Hanseatic cities, which 
 she eagerly coveted. At any rate, he had 
 never wished to hear such a scheme talked ofi 
 
 But it is not with this scrupulous accuracy
 
 July, 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 151 
 
 that newsmongers construct their inventions. 
 To ridicule those whom they suppose to be 
 deceived, to affect indignation against those 
 whom they suppose to be deceivers, is suffi- 
 cient for their malevolent idleness, and this is 
 a species of persons not more rare in the di- 
 plomatic circles than in the curious and igno- 
 rant public of great capitals. 
 
 Soldierly imprudences gave a certain pro- 
 bability to these rumours. Murat kept in his 
 duchy of Berg a military court, where the 
 most extraordinar}' language was used. 
 
 His was, observed his comrades in war, ; 
 who had become his courtiers his was a ( 
 very small state for a brother-in-law of the ! 
 Emperor's. By and by, no doubt, he would be 
 king of Westphalia, and a fine kingdom would 
 be composed for him, at the expense of that 
 scurvy court of Prussia, which betrayed every- 
 body. It was not only those about Murat who 
 talked thus. The French troops, brought back 
 into the country of Darmstadt, into Franconia ' 
 and Suabia, had but a step to take to overrun 
 Saxony and Prussia. All these military men, : 
 who had a desire to continue the war, and who 
 attributed the same desire to their master, 
 flattered themselves that they should soon be- 
 gin it again, and enter Berlin as they had en- 
 tered Vienna. The new Prince of Ponte 
 Corvo, Bernadotte, established at Anspach, 
 devised plans, ridiculous enough, which he 
 showed publicly, and which he ascribed to 
 Napoleon. Augereau, caring still less what 
 he said, drank at table with his staff, to the 
 success of the approaching war with Prussia. 
 
 These extravagances of idle soldiers, re- 
 ported in Berlin, naturally produced the most 
 unpleasant sensation. Related at court, they 
 were then transmitted to the entire population, : 
 and excited the pride, always ready to take 
 fire, of the Prussian nation. The king was 
 more especially affected by them, on account 
 of the effect which they could not fail to pro- 
 duce on the public opinion. The queen, dis- 
 tressed about what had befallen her sister, the 
 Princess of Tour and Taxis, who had been 
 included in the recent mediatisation, said no- 
 thing, having for some time made up her mind 
 to be silent, and quite aware that she had no 
 claim upon Napoleon, to induce him to favour 
 the princes of her family. But her silence was 
 signiiicant. M. de Haugwitz was more dis- 
 heartened than he chose to confess to his mas- 
 ter. The faults committed during his absence, 
 and contrary to his advice, at length produced 
 their irresistible consequences. He was, never- ' 
 theless, blamed for all events, as though he had 
 been their real cause. The seizure of three hun- 
 dred vessels, so injurious to Prussian commerce, 
 was imputed to him as one of his works. The 
 minister of the finances had reproached him 
 with it in full council, and with the greatest 
 asperity. A general of renown in the army, 
 General Ruchel, had carried rudeness towards 
 him to the length of insult. Public opinion in 
 Prussia rose from hour to hour against M. de 
 Haugwitz, who, however, had done nothing 
 wrong but in returning to business at the soli- 
 citation of the king, when his system of alli- 
 ance with France was so compromised that it 
 s rendered impossible The sentiment of 
 
 German patriotism combined with all the rest 
 to hasten a crisis. Some booksellers of Nu- 
 remberg, having circulated pamphlets against 
 France, Napoleon had ordered them to be ap- 
 prehended, and, applying to one of them the 
 severity of the military laws, which treat as 
 an enemy any one who endeavours to excite 
 a country against the army that occupies it, 
 had caused him to be shot. This deplorable 
 act had inflamed the public opinion against 
 the French and their partisans. 
 
 King Frederick William, and M. de Haug- 
 witz, had reckoned upon a success for calm- 
 ing the public mind : they hoped that a con- 
 federation o'f the German powers of the north 
 under the protectorship of Prussia, would 
 form a counterpoise to the confederation of the 
 Rhine ; Napoleon himself had suggested the 
 idea of it. An aide-de-camp of the king had 
 been sent to Dresden, to decide Saxony to en- 
 ter into this confederation, and the chief min- 
 ister of the Elector of Hesse Cassel had 
 come himself to Berlin to confer on the sub- 
 ject. But these two courts manifested ex- 
 treme coldness towards the proposal. Sax- 
 ony, the most honest of the German powers, 
 had a natural mistrust of Prussia, and, if she 
 had resolved to join any new confederacy, she 
 would rather have inclined to Austria, which 
 had never coveted her states, than Prussia, 
 which, surrounding them on all sides, was 
 evidently longing for them. She was, there- 
 fore, not disposed to do what was asked of 
 her, and regulated her conduct by that of the 
 other powers of the north of Germany. Hesse, 
 dissatisfied with Prussia, which, in 1803, had 
 caused the country of Fulda to be given to 
 the house of Nassau-Orange, dissatisfied with 
 France, which had refused to include her in 
 the confederation of the Rhine, and at the 
 same time to aggrandize her, deceiving, be- 
 sides, all those with whom she treated, would 
 not decide in favour of Prussia any more than 
 of France, for to her the danger appeared 
 equal. To excuse herself to Prussia, to whom 
 she owed an at least apparent attachment, she 
 had invented an odious lie, and pretended that 
 France had thrown out violent underhand 
 threats if she joined the confederation of the 
 north. This was not the case; the most 
 secret despatches of the French government' 
 enjoined its agents on the contrary not to op- 
 pose any obstacle to the formation of this 
 confederation, to be silent on the subject, and, 
 if consulted, to declare that France would see 
 it without displeasure. It was the Hanseatic 
 cities only to which France resolved to forbid 
 that accession, for purely commercial reasons; 
 and this she had not concealed. 
 
 The Hessian minister, then, carried to Ber- 
 lin the falsest assertions ; and, all that his 
 sovereign had demanded of France, when 
 offering to join the confederation of the Rhine, 
 he pretended that France had offered him to 
 draw him away from the confederation of the 
 north. He even accused M. Bignon, our 
 
 1 I have read all these despatches with the greatest 
 attention ; and, as I .e(l the truth in regard to all the 
 courts, great and small, 1 should tell it in regard to Hesse, 
 were that truth favourable to it, and unfavourable to 
 France.
 
 152 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1806. 
 
 minister at Cassel, of language which the 
 latter had not used, and which he contradicted 
 most energetically. It is possible that M. Big- 
 non, before the confederation of the north was 
 contemplated, and when all the German diplo- 
 matists were talking of the confederation of 
 the Rhine, had extolled in general terms the 
 advantages to be derived from the French al- 
 liance, that in his language he had even gone 
 beyond his instructions, but this was from in- 
 discreet zeal ; and a proof that he acted with- 
 out orders is that Napoleen had enjoined M. 
 de Talleyrand by a letter to refuse the junction 
 of the Elector of Hesse. 1 Nevertheless, the 
 minister of the Elector of Hesse, sent ex- 
 traordinarily to Berlin, with a view to justify 
 an unexpected refusal, came to report in the 
 falsest manner the pretended threats and the 
 pretended offers between which France had 
 placed the petty court of Hesse. 
 
 On this utterly false representation, the 
 King of Prussia conceived that he had disco- 
 vered the blackest treachery in the conduct 
 of Napoleon, thought himself tricked, op- 
 pressed, and gave way to a violent irritation. 
 While these reports were reaching him from 
 the court of Cassel, a despatch from M. de 
 Lucchesini arrived from France. That am- 
 bassador, a man of talent, but unsteady, insin- 
 cere, living in Paris with all the enemies of 
 the government, and being, nevertheless, one 
 of the most assiduous courtiers of M. de Tal- 
 leyrand, had picked up, some days before, the ! 
 reports circulated respecting the lot reserved 
 for Prussia. A confidential intimation ob- 
 tained from the English negotiators relative to 
 Hanover, the restitution of which had been 
 tacitly promised, appeared to him to crown all 
 the threatening circumstances of the moment, 
 and as, in his ambiguous conduct, alternately 
 the adversary or the partisan of M. de Haug- 
 witz, he had very recently supported the treaty 
 of the 15th of February, as he had even car- 
 ried it to Berlin, he considered his responsi- 
 bility as deeply involved, if the last attempt 
 at an alliance with France turned out ill. He 
 therefore exaggerated in his reports in the 
 most imprudent manner. An agent ought 
 to conceal nothing from his government, but 
 Vie ought to weigh his assertions, to add no- 
 thing to the truth, to retrench nothing from it, 
 especially when baneful resolutions may be 
 the consequence. 
 
 The courier who left Paris on the 29th of 
 July, arrived at Berlin oa the 5th or 6th of 
 August. He caused an extraordinary sensa- 
 tion there. A second, bringing the despatches 
 of the 2d of August, who arrived on the 9th, 
 only added to the effect produced by the first. 
 The explosion was instantaneous. 
 
 As a heart, full of long repressed senti- 
 ments, suddenly breaks forth, if a last impres- 
 sion comes to aggravate what it has felt, the 
 king and his ministers burst into sudden pas- 
 sions against France. Both of them equalled 
 in their external demonstrations the most vio- 
 lent members of the party which desired war. 
 M. de Haugwitz, usually calm, certainly could, 
 
 ! This letter exists in the dep6t of the secretary of 
 state's office in the Louvre. 
 
 in reviewing the past, call to mind the faults 
 of the court of Berlin, explain to himself the 
 consequences of those faults on the irritable 
 mind of Napoleon, comprehend from that 
 time the neglect with which the latter repaid 
 an unfaithful alliance, reduce thus to their 
 true value the alleged plans with which Prus- 
 sia was threatened, and wait for more accu- 
 rate reports, before the Prussian cabinet pro- 
 ceeded to form an opinion and to decide upon 
 a line of conduct. Here commence the real 
 faults of M. de Haugwitz. Believing only a 
 part of what was told him, but desiring to 
 cover his responsibility, and above all flatter- 
 ing himself that he could control the violent 
 party by putting himself at the head of the 
 military demonstrations, he assented to all 
 that was proposed in this moment of agitation. 
 His system being thus overthrown, he ought 
 to have retired and left to others the chances 
 of a rupture with France, which he foresaw 
 must be disastrous. But he gave way to the 
 general movement of minds, and all the parti- 
 sans he had about the king, M. Lombard in 
 particular, studiously imitated him. We shall 
 discover that there is no need of a free go- 
 vernment, for nations to furnish the spectacle 
 of the most inconceivable popular excitements. 
 
 A council was called at Potsdam. The old 
 generals, such as the Duke of Brunswick and 
 Marshal de Mollendorf, formed part of it. 
 When these men, who till then had shown 
 such discretion, saw the king and M. de Haug- 
 witz himself consider the treachery attributed 
 to France as possible and even as true, they 
 hesitated no longer, and the resolution to re- 
 place the whole Prussian army on the war 
 footing, as it had been six months before, was 
 unanimously adopted. The majority of the 
 council, the king included, regarded this as a 
 measure of safety, M. de Haugwitz as an an- 
 swer to all those who alleged that Prussia 
 was given up to Napoleon. 
 
 All at once, a report was circulated in Ber- 
 lin, on the 10th of August, that the king had de- 
 cided to arm, that great difficulties had arisen 
 between Prussia and France, that hidden dan- 
 gers had even been discovered, a sort of medi- 
 tated treachery, which accounted for the stay of 
 the French troops in Suabia, Franconia, and 
 Westphalia. The opinion frequently agitated, 
 but always repressed by the example of the 
 king, in which people had confidence, was 
 violently expressed. The hearts of the subjects 
 overflowed like that of the princes. We may 
 well say, was the cry on all sides, that France 
 would not spare Prussia any more than Aus- 
 tria ; that she is determined to overrun and 
 ravage all Germany ; that the partisans of 
 French alliance were either dupes or traitors ; 
 that it was not M. de Hardenberg who was 
 sold to England, but M. de Haugwitz to 
 France ; that it was well to find him out at 
 last, only it was finding him out too late ; that 
 it was not to-day, but six months ago, on the 
 eve or the morrow of Austerlitz, that Prussia 
 ought to have armed ; that, besides, it was of 
 little consequence, if they must, though late, 
 defend themselves or perish ; that England 
 and Russia would no doubt hasten to tht as- 
 sistance of any one who would resist Napo
 
 Aug. 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 153 
 
 Icon ; that, after all, the French had vanquished 
 the Austrians without energy, the Russians 
 without instruction, but they would find it 
 a more difficult task to beat the soldiers of the 
 great Frederick. 
 
 Persons who saw Berlin at this period say, 
 that there never was an instance of such fer- 
 mentation and excitement. M. de Haugwitz 
 already perceived with dread that he had been 
 urged far beyond the goal which he meant to 
 reach, for he had contemplated mere demon- 
 strations, and the nation demanded war. The 
 army, in particular, called aloud for it. The 
 queen, Prince Louis, the court, recently con- 
 trolled by the express will of the king, now 
 broke out without restraint. According to them, 
 they were not German, they were not Prus- 
 sian, till that day; people listened at last to the 
 troice of interest and honour; they were throw- 
 ing off the illusions of a perfidious and dis- 
 graceful alliance ; they were worthy of them- 
 selves, of the founder of the Prussian mon- 
 archy, of the great Frederick. Never has 
 such infatuation been witnessed, but where 
 the multitude leads the wise, where courts lead 
 weak kings. 
 
 Yet, what had happened to justify this out- 
 burst! Prussia, on the point of signing in 
 1805 a treaty of close alliance with France, 
 had, under the false pretext of the violation of 
 the territory of Anspach, yielded to the solici- 
 tations of the European coalition, to the cries 
 of the German aristocracy, to the caresses of 
 Alexander, which was a sort of treachery. 
 Finding France victorious at Austerlitz, she 
 had abruptly changed sides, and accepted Han- 
 over from Napoleon, after accepting it from 
 Alexander a few days before. Napoleon had 
 sincerely desired to attach her to himself by 
 such a gift, and he waited for this last trial to 
 see whether he could be trusted. But this gift, 
 accepted with confusion, Prussia had not dared 
 to avow to the world; she had almost excused 
 herself to the English for the occupation of 
 Hanover ; she had not taken that frank posi- 
 tion between Napoleon and his enemies which 
 the ought to have taken to inspire confidence. 
 Disgusted with such relations, Napoleon had 
 formed the secret design to take back Hanover, 
 in order to obtain from England a peace, which 
 he had no longer any hope of imposing on her by 
 the alliance of Prussia. But he had thought 
 of a compensation, he had prepared in his mind, 
 but he had said nothing, fearful of opening 
 himself to a court for which he no longer felt 
 any esteem. Was this a proceeding to be 
 compared to the conduct of Prussia, continu- 
 ing in secret connection with Russia, through 
 M. de Hardenberg, notwithstanding the formal 
 treaty of alliance signed at Schiinbrunn, and 
 renewed at Paris on the 15th of February ? 
 Certainly not. The faults of Napoleon are 
 confined to want of respect, which he ought 
 not to have shown, but which the equivocal con- 
 duct of Prussia excused, if it did not justify. 
 
 In reality, Prussia felt humbled by the part 
 which she, had acted, alarmed at the lonely 
 situation in which she would find herself, if 
 England and Russia should reconcile them- 
 selves with France, confusedly troubled about 
 the treatment which she should then be liable to 
 
 VOL. II. 20 
 
 experience from Napoleon, without having a 
 person to complain to ; and in this state she was 
 ready to take the falsest, the most improbable 
 rumours for real. In all that was passing in 
 Berlin, one thing only was true and honourable, 
 that was German patriotism humiliated by the 
 successes of France, bursting out on the first 
 pretext, founded or not. But this sentiment 
 burst forth unseasonably. In 1805, when Na- 
 poleon left Boulogne, Prussia ought either to 
 have declared herself loudly for France, stat- 
 ing her motives for acting thus, and pledging 
 Prussian honour in this sense, or declared her- 
 self against France from that time, and strug- 
 gle against her, while Austria and Russia were 
 in arms. Now she was rushing into ruin by 
 a way that was not even honourable. 
 
 The despatches of M. de Lucchesini had 
 been intercepted by Napoleon's police, and he 
 was acquainted with their contents. Incensed 
 at them, he had immediately ordered a letter 
 to be written to M. de Laforest, to apprize him 
 of the sending of these despatches, to charge 
 him to contradict all the allegations of the 
 Prussian minister, and to require his recall. 
 Unfortunately, it was too late, for already the 
 impulsion given to the public opinion in Prus- 
 sia was not to be controlled. M. de Haug- 
 wilz, moreover, embarrassed by the so differ- 
 rent parts which he had been forced to act for 
 a year past, had no longer the courage of good 
 resolutions. He durst neither see the minister 
 of France, nor declare to the fools whose folly 
 he had flattered, that he should leave them once 
 more to join the wise, who were then extremely 
 rare in Berlin. 
 
 M. de Laforest found him reserved and shun- 
 ning explanations. However, after several 
 attempts, he obtained an interview, and asked 
 how he could be deficient to such a degree of 
 his usual presence of mind; how he could 
 believe the lying tales invented by Hesse, the 
 giddy expressions picked up by M. de Lucche- 
 sini; why he had not waited, or sought for 
 more accurate information, before he took 
 such serious resolutions as were publicly an- 
 nounced. M. de Haugwitz, distressed in pro- 
 portion as the light, obscured for a moment in 
 his mind, began to shine forth again, appeared 
 grieved at the conduct which he had pursued, 
 acknowledged candidly the impetuosity of the 
 current which had carried away the king, the 
 court, and himself; and, lastly, declared that 
 unless they received assistance, they should 
 run perhaps to perish upon the rock of war; 
 that nothing was yet lost, if Napoleon would 
 take any step whatever that would be a satis- 
 faction for the pride of the multitude, for the 
 prudence of the cabinet a reason to take cou- 
 rage; that the removal of the French army, 
 accumulated for some time on the roads lead- 
 ing to Prussia, would fulfil this twofold object ; 
 that the armaments might then be counter- 
 manded, the government alleging as a reason 
 for having armed the assemblage of French 
 troops, and as a reason for disarming their re- 
 tirement beyond the Rhine. M. de Haugwitz 
 added that, to facilitate the explanations, M.de 
 Lucchesini should be recalled, and a discreet 
 and safe man, M. de Knobelsdorf, sent if 
 I Paris.
 
 154 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 180. 
 
 Napoleon could have consented to the pro- 
 posed step without compromising his glory, 
 for he had never thought of invading Prussia. 
 He had merely taken some precautions on the 
 refusal to ratify the treaty of Schonbruun. 
 But, since then, he had thought only of Austria 
 and the mouths of the Cattaro; he thought 
 only of obtaining restitution of them by some 
 threat, and, since the treaty signed with M. 
 d'Oubril, he was even strongly disposed to 
 bring his troops back to France. He had 
 given orders for a vast camp at Meudon, with 
 the intention of assembling the grand army 
 there, and holding magnificent fetes in Sep- 
 tember. The order for this purpose was al- 
 ready despatched. But a serious and unfore- 
 seen event intervened, to render this conduct 
 difficult on his part. Contrary to his expecta- 
 tion, the Emperor Alexander had refused to 
 ratify the treaty of peace signed by M. d'Oubril. 
 He had adopted this resolution at the urgent 
 representations of England, which had laid 
 stress on her fidelity, referred to her recent 
 refusal to treat without Russia, and desired, in 
 return for this fidelity, that he should reject a 
 treaty too hastily concluded, and on evidently 
 disadvantageous conditions. The Emperor 
 Alexander, though greatly dreading the conse- 
 quences of war with Napoleon, dreaded them 
 rather less on seeing England more backward 
 than he had imagined to throw herself into the 
 arms of France. It would even appear, that 
 something had already transpired respecting 
 the agitations of the court of Prussia, and the 
 possibility of drawing that court into a war. 
 Lastly, the recently acquired knowledge of the 
 dissolution of the Germanic empire, adding to 
 the jealousies of Russia, as to those of all the 
 powers, and producing an expectation of re- 
 doubled hatred against Napoleon, Alexander 
 had decided not to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty. 
 He replied, however, that he was ready to re- 
 sume ihe negotiations, but in concert with 
 England; that he even charged the latter with 
 his powers for treating, on condition that not 
 only Sicily should be left to the royal family 
 of Naples, but the whole of Dalmatia, and 
 that the Balearic Islands should be given to 
 the King of Piedmont. 
 
 The courier, who brought this communica- 
 tion, arrived at Paris on ihe 3d of September, 
 at the very moment when the armaments of 
 Prussia were engaging the attention of all 
 Europe, and when Napoleon was desired to 
 extricate M. de Haugwitz, and King Frederick 
 William, from embarrassment, by ordering 
 the French troops to fall back. Napoleon, in 
 his turn, conceived a most profound mistrust, 
 and imagined that he was betrayed. The re- 
 collection of the conduct of Austria, in the 
 preceding year, the recollection of her arma- 
 ments, so frequently and so obstinately denied, 
 even when her troops were marching, this re- 
 collection recurring to his mind, persuaded 
 him thai the same would be the case this time, 
 that the sudden armaments of Prussia were 
 but a perfidy, and that he was in danger of 
 being surprised in September, 1806, as he had 
 wellnigh been in September, 1805. He was, 
 therefore, not at all disposed to withdraw his 
 troops from Franconia, a very important mili- 
 
 tary position, as we shall soon see, for a war 
 against Prussia. Another circumstance led 
 him to believe in a coalition. Mr. Fox, after 
 an illness of two months, was just dead. 
 Thus, in the same year, the fatigues of long 
 power had killed Mr. Pitt, and the first trials 
 of a power which had become new to him had 
 hastened the end of Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox carried 
 with him the peace of the world, and the pos- 
 sibility of a fertile alliance between France 
 and England. If England had sustained a 
 great loss in Mr. Pitt, Europe and humanity 
 suffered an immense loss in Mr. Fox. He 
 being dead, the war party was about to triumph 
 over the peace party in the bosom of th 
 British cabinet. 
 
 That cabinet, however, durst not make any 
 considerable change in the conditions of peace 
 previously sent to Paris. Lord Yarmouth had 
 relinquished the negotiation in disgust. Lord 
 Lauderdale was left alone. He received or- 
 ders from London to present the demands of 
 Russia, consisting in the claim of Sicily and 
 Dalmatia for the court of Naples, and the 
 Balearic Islands for the King of Piedmonu 
 Lord Lauderdale, in presenting these new con- 
 ditions, acted in the name of both courts, and 
 as having the powers of both. Thus, by wait- 
 ing for the effect of the ratifications of St 
 Petersburg, Napoleon had missed the decisive 
 occasion for having peace. The greatest 
 minds are liable to these mistakes in the field 
 of politics, as in the field of war. 
 
 Napoleon felt on this account a sort of irri- 
 tation, which induced him still more to sup- 
 pose the existence of a European conspiracy. 
 He was, therefore, much more inclined to ap- 
 peal to arms than to give way. He received 
 about this time M. de Knobelsdorf, who had 
 come in the utmost haste to supply the place 
 of M. de Lucchesini. He gave him personally 
 an obliging reception, affirmed positively that 
 he had no design against Prussia, that he 
 could not comprehend what she wanted of 
 him, for he wanted nothing of her but the 
 execution of treaties ; that he had no thoughts 
 of taking any thing from her, and that all that 
 had been published on this subject was false ; 
 and he alluded in these words to the reports 
 of M. de Lucchesini, who had on the same 
 day delivered his letters of recall. Then, with 
 a candour worthy of his greatness, he added 
 that, in the false rumours which were circu- 
 lated, one thing was true, namely, what was 
 said about Hanover; that, in fact, he had 
 heard England on that subject; that, seeing 
 the peace of the world involved in that ques- 
 tion, he had purposed to address himself to 
 Prussia, to explain his situation, in its naked 
 truth, to give her the choice of a general peace 
 purchased by the restitution of Hanover, on 
 condition of a compensation, or the continu- 
 ance of the War against England, but war to 
 the last extremity, and after an explanation, 
 indeed, of the degree of energy which King 
 Frederick William intended to exert in it. 
 He affirmed, moreover, that, at any rate, he 
 should not have taken any resolution without 
 opening his mind frankly and completely to 
 Prussia. 
 
 An explanation so candid ought to hava
 
 Sept. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 15$ 
 
 banished all doubts. But Prussia wanted 
 more ; she wanted an act of deference, which 
 should save her pride. Napoleon might, per- 
 haps, have complied, if he had not been at 
 this moment full of mistrust, and if he had 
 not believed that there was a new coalition, 
 which had as yet no existence, though it was 
 not long before it did exist. But, in that ex- 
 citement of mind which events occasion, we 
 cannot always judge correctly what is passing 
 among our adversaries. In consequence, he 
 ordered M. de Laforest, to conduct himself 
 with reserve, to tell M. de Haugwitz that 
 Prussia should have no other explanations 
 than what he had given to Messieurs de Kno- 
 belsd rf and De Lucchesini ; that as for the 
 demand relative to the armies, he replied by a 
 demand exactly similar, and that, if Prussia 
 countermanded her armaments, he would en- 
 gage to give immediate orders to his troops to 
 repass the Rhine. He enjoined M. de Laforest 
 to be silent afterwards, and to watch events. 
 "In such a situation," he wrote, "one ought 
 not to believe protestations, how sincere so- 
 ever they may appear. We have been de- 
 ceived too often. We must have facts ; let 
 Prussia disarm, and the French shall repass 
 the Rhine, not before." 
 
 M. de Laforest punctually obeyed the injunc- 
 tions of his sovereign, had no difficulty to con- 
 vince M. de Haugwitz who was previously 
 convinced, but overruled by events; and then 
 he was silent. It was not enough for the 
 Prussian cabinet to be enlightened respecting 
 the intentions of Napoleon ; it wanted a pal- 
 pable explanation to give to the public opinion, 
 and for itself also facts, but clear and positive' 
 facts, such as the retirement of the French. 
 Even then, the excited imaginations would 
 scarcely have been pacified even by a soothing 
 act. Prussian pride claimed a satisfaction. 
 
 One has as much, even more need of satisfac- 
 tion, when one is in the wrong, than when 
 one is in the right. 
 
 The king and M. de Haugwitz suffered a 
 few more days to elapse, to see if Napoleon 
 would communicate any thing more explicit, 
 more satisfactory. This silence ruins every 
 thing, saidM.de Haugwitz toM.de Laforest. But 
 the die was cast : Prussia, by tergiversations, 
 which had alienated from her the confidence 
 of Napoleon, France by too slighting conduct, 
 were both to be led into a destructive war, the 
 more to be regretted, as, in the state of the 
 world, they were the only two powers whose 
 interests were reconcilable. The silence en- 
 joined by M. de Laforest was invariably main- 
 tained by him ; but the grief in his counte- 
 nance, an expressive grief and sufficiently 
 significant, if the court of Prussia had chosen 
 to comprehend it, and to guide itself by what 
 it had comprehended. But such was no longer 
 the case, either with King Frederick William 
 or with his ministers. Regiments passed 
 every day through Berlin singing patriotic 
 songs, which were repeated by the crowds 
 collected in the streets. People were every- 
 where inquiring when the king would set out 
 for the army, and if it was true that he would 
 remain at Potsdam, with the intention of 
 changing his first determination. So great 
 became the outcry that it was necessary to 
 satisfy the public opinion. The unfortunate 
 Frederick William set out on the 21st of Sep- 
 tember for Magdeburg. This was the signal 
 for war, which was expected in Germany, and 
 which Napoleon was waiting for in Paris. 
 We shall see in the next book the terrible 
 vicissitudes, the disastrous consequences for 
 Prussia and the glorious results for Napoleon, 
 results which would excite unmixed satisfac- 
 tion, if policy had harmonized with victory.
 
 156 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept 1808. 
 
 BOOK XXV. 
 
 JENA. 
 
 Situation of the French Empire at the Moment of the War with Prussia Affairs of Naples, Dalmatia, and Hol- 
 land Means of Defence prepared by Napoleon, in case of a general Coalition Napoleon leaves Paris, and 
 repairs to Wurzburg The Court of Prussia also joins the Army The King, the Queen, Prince Louis, the Duke 
 of Brunswick, the Prince of Hohenlohe First Military Operations Actions at Schleiz and Saalfeld Death of 
 Prince Louis Perturbation in the Prussian Staff The Duke of Brunswick resolves to retire upon the Elbe, 
 covering himself with the Saale Memorable Battles of Jena and Auerstadt Rout and Disorganization of the 
 Prussian Army Capitulation of Erfurt The Prince of Wirtemberg's Corps of Reserve surprised and beaten 
 at Halle Divergent and precipitate Retreat of the Duke of Weimar, General Blucher, the Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe, Marshal Kalkreuth Offensive March of Napoleon Occupation of Leipzig, Wittenberg, Dessau Pas- 
 sage of the Elbe Investment of Magdeburg Triumphal Entry of Napoleon into Berlin His Disposition? in 
 regard to the Prussians Pardon granted to the Prince de Hatzfeld Occupation of the Line of the Oder Pur- 
 suit of the Wrecks of the Prussian Army by Murat's Cavalry, and by the Infantry of Marshals Lannes. Soult. 
 and Bernadotte Capitulation of Prenzlau and Liibeck Surrender of the Fortresses of Magdeburg, Stettin, and 
 Ciistrin Napoleon Master in a Month of therwhole Prussian Monarchy. 
 
 IT was the height of imprudence on the part 
 cf Prussia to enter into a contest with Napo- 
 /eon, at a moment when the French army, re- 
 turning from Austerlitz, was still in the heart 
 of Germany, and more capable of acting than 
 any army ever was. It was above all an ex- 
 treme inconsistency in her to rush into a war, 
 single-handed, after she had not dared venture 
 upon it in the preceding year, when she would 
 have had Austria, Russia, England, Sweden, 
 and Naples for allies. Now, on the contrary, 
 Austria, exhausted by her late efforts, irritated 
 by the indifference manifested towards her, 
 was resolved to remain in her turn a quiet 
 spectator of the disasters of another. Russia 
 was again placed at her natural distance by 
 the retreat of her troops upon the Vistula. 
 England, exasperated at the occupation of 
 Hanover, had declared war against Prussia. 
 Sweden had followed her example. Naples 
 no longer existed. It is true that every friend 
 of France, on becoming her enemy, might 
 reckon with certainty on a speedy reconciliation 
 with England, and with the auxiliaries whom 
 she had in her pay. But it would have been 
 necessary to enter into explanations with the 
 British cabinet, and to set out with the imme- 
 diate restitution of Hanover, which would 
 never have taken place, at least without com- 
 pensation, from the very worst terms on 
 which Prussia could be with France. Russia, 
 though awakened from her first dreams of 
 glory, was nevertheless disposed to try once 
 more the fortune of arms in company with 
 the Prussian troops, the only troops in Europe 
 in which she had any confidence. But several 
 months must elapse before her armies could 
 get into line, and, besides, she had no inclina- 
 tion whatever to push them on so far as in 
 
 1805. Prussia, therefore, was liable to find 
 herself for some time opposed unaided to Na- 
 poleon. She went to meet him in October, 
 
 1806, in the heart of Saxony, as Austria had 
 met him in 1805 in the heart of Bavaria, but 
 with this most disadvantageous difference for 
 her, that he had not now to overcome the ob- 
 stacle of distance, for, instead of being en- 
 camped on the shores of the ocean, he was in 
 the very centre of Germany, within two or 
 three marches only of the Prussian frontier. 
 
 Nothing short of the most fatal infatuation 
 could account for the conduct of Prussia; but 
 
 such is party spirit, such are its incurable illu- 
 sions, that in all quarters this war was con- 
 sidered as likely to offer unforeseen chances, 
 and to open new prospects to vanquished Eu- 
 rope. Napoleon, it was alleged, had triumphed 
 over the weakness of the Austrians and the 
 ignorance of the Russians, but this time he 
 would have to encounter disciples of the great 
 Frederick, the sole heirs of genuine military 
 traditions, and perhaps instead of Austerlit? 
 he might find a Rosbach. By dint of repeat- 
 ing such language, people had wellnigh con- 
 vinced themselves that it would be verified; 
 and the Prussians, who ought to have trem- 
 bled at the idea of a rencounter with the 
 French, had conceived the most extravagant 
 confidence in their own strength. Discreet 
 minds, nevertheless, knew what was to be 
 thought of these silly hopes; and a mixture 
 of surprise and satisfaction was felt at Vienna 
 on seeing those vaunted Prussians put to the 
 test in their turn, and opposed to that captain, 
 who owed his glory, so it was asserted, solely to 
 the degeneracy of the Austrian army. A momen- 
 tary joy, therefore, pervaded the enemies of 
 France, who believed that the term of her great- 
 ness had arrived. Unfortunately, that term was 
 destined to arrive, but not so soon, not till after 
 faults, none of which had then been committed. 
 Napoleon, on his part, felt not the least con- 
 cern about the approaching war. ,He was un- 
 acquainted with the Prussians, for he had 
 never yet met them on the field of battle. But 
 he said to himself, that those Prussians to 
 whom all sorts of merit were attributed since 
 they had become his adversaries, had gained 
 fewer advantages over the raw French troops 
 of 1792 than the Austrians; and that, if they 
 could not beat volunteers raised in haste, still 
 less would they beat an accomplished army, 
 of which he was the general. Accordingly, 
 he wrote to his brothers at Naples and in Hol- 
 land, assuring them that they need not give 
 themselves any uneasiness, that the present 
 struggle would be terminated more speedily 
 than the preceding; that Prussia and her 
 allies, be they who they might, would be 
 crushed, but that this time he would settle 
 finally with Europe, and put it out, of the power 
 of his enemies to stir for ten years. Such are the 
 very expressions which he used in his letters 
 to the kings of Holland and Naples.
 
 Sept 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 157 
 
 A leader not less prudent than bold, he took 
 as great pains to-succeed as if he had been 
 about to fight soldiers and generals equal or 
 
 growing extent of his empire. He had to at- 
 tend to Italy, from the Strait of Messina to the 
 Izonzo, and even beyond it, since Dalmatia 
 
 superior to his own. Though he could not ; belonged to him. He had to attend to Holland, 
 give the Prussians credit for all that rumour j turned from an allied state into a family king- 
 aflected to publish concerning them, s^jll he i dom. He was obliged to provide for the guard 
 followed that wise precept of prudence which of these numerous countries, and for their go- 
 
 enjoins us to estimate at his full value the 
 enemy whom we know, and the enemy whom 
 we do not know, still more highly than he de- 
 serves. With this consideration was coupled 
 
 vernment to boot, since his brothers were 
 seated upon their thrones. 
 
 It is not to be denied that, by placing the 
 crown of the Two Sicilies in his family, Na- 
 
 another for stimulating his active forecast: he j poleon had added as much to his difficulties as 
 
 was resolved to push to extremity the conflict 
 with the continent, and, despairing of his 
 maritime means, he determined to conquer 
 England in her allies, by following them up 
 till he had forced them to drop their arms. 
 Without being decided respecting the extent 
 and the duration of this new war, he pre- 
 sumed that he should have to advance very far 
 northward, and perhaps be obliged to seek 
 Russia in her own territory. Astonished at 
 the last proceedings of Prussia, unable to 
 guess, at the distance of Paris from Berlin, 
 
 to his power. On closely considering the anxi- 
 eties and the expenses in men and money 
 which his brother Joseph's new establishment 
 at Naples cost him, one is led to believe that, 
 instead of driving the Bourbons from the 
 south of Italy, he had better have left them 
 there submissive, trembling, punished for their 
 last treachery by heavy war contributions, by 
 reductions of territory, and by the hard obli- 
 gation to exclude the English from the ports 
 of Calabria and Sicily. It is true that ho 
 would not then have completed the regenera- 
 
 the various and complicated causes which in- tion of Italy; he would not have entirely 
 duced her to act, he imagined that, in Septeni- j wrested that noble and beautiful country from 
 ber, 1806, as in September, 1805, a great coa- , the barbarous system under which it lived op- 
 lition, secretly formed, was about to burst | pressed ; he would not have wholly associated 
 forth; thai the unaccustomed boldness of i it with the social and political system of 
 King Frederick William was but the first ( France ; it is true that he would still have had 
 symptom of it ; and he expected to see all I in the courts of Naples and Rome two secret 
 Europe rush upon him, Austria included, not- | enemies, ready to call in the English and the 
 
 withstanding the pacific protestations of this 
 latter. The very natural mistrust excited in 
 him by the aggression of the preceding year 
 was, nevertheless, unfounded. A new coali- 
 tion was certainly destined to result from the 
 resolution just taken by Prussia, but it would 
 be the effect instead of being the cause of it. 
 For the rest, everybody in Europe was as 
 much surprised as Napoleon at what was 
 passing in Berlin, for in cabinets people are 
 determined to see calculations only, never 
 passions. They are not free from them, how- 
 ever, and those sudden irritations which, in 
 
 Russians. But these reasons, which were cer- 
 tainly powerful, and which justified Napoleon 
 for having undertaken the conquest of the 
 Italian peninsula from the Izonzo to Tarento, 
 then became decisive reasons, not for limiting 
 his enterprises in the south of Europe, but for 
 limiting them in the north : for Dalmatia re- 
 quired 20,000 men, Lombardy, 50,000, Naples, 
 50,000, that is to say, 120,000 for Italy alone; 
 and if there should be still wanted two or 
 three hundred thousand more from the Danube 
 to the Elbe, it was to be feared that such 
 charges could not long continue to be defrayed, 
 
 private life, sometimes seize two men and put ( and that he would fail in the north because he 
 
 weapons into their hands, are quite as often, 
 more often than a maturely weighed interest, 
 the cause that urges two nations to attack 
 each other. The moral soreness of Prussia 
 arose from her faults, and the treatment which 
 those faults had drawn upon her on the part 
 
 had extended himself too far in the south, or 
 in the south by attempting too much in the 
 north. We will repeat on this occasion what 
 we have said elsewhere, that, if he limited him- 
 self in any quarter, it was better to limit him- 
 self in the north, for the Bonaparte family, 
 
 of Napoleon was, far more than any meditated striving to extend itself in Italy or in Spain, as 
 treachery, the real cause of her sudden, unin- I the ancient house of Bourbon had done, was 
 
 telligible exasperation, which nobody knew 
 how to account for. 
 
 Impressed, therefore, with the idea of a new 
 coalition, and determined this time to pursue 
 it into the recesses of the frozen regions of 
 the north, Napoleon proportioned his prepa- 
 rations to the circumstances which he fore- 
 
 acting in the genuine spirit of French policy 
 much more than in labouring to create for iV 
 self establishments in Germany. 
 
 Joseph, favourably received by the enlight- 
 ened and wealthy population which Queen 
 Caroline had ill-treated, applauded even for a 
 moment by the people as a novelty, especially 
 
 saw. He provided not only for the means of I in the Calabrias, through which he had made 
 attack upon his adversaries means which j a progress Joseph was nevertheless sooii 
 were to be found ready prepared in the great aware of the immense difficulty of his task 
 
 army collected in the heart of Germany but 
 also for the means of defence for the vast 
 countries which he would have to leave be- 
 hind him while he was proceeding to the Elbe, 
 the Oder, perhaps to the Vistula and the Nie- 
 men. As his dominion increased, he was 
 obliged to proportion his solicitude to the 
 
 Having neither stores in the magazines and 
 the arsenals, nor funds in the public coffers, 
 for the late government had not left a ducat, 
 obliged to create all that was wanting, and 
 fearful of loading with imposts a people whose 
 attachment he coveted, Joseph was involved 
 in cruel embarrassments. To ask a country
 
 158 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1806. 
 
 for its money, when he had also to solicit its ! 
 love, was perhaps the way to cause both to be 
 refused. It was necessary, however, to pro- 
 vide for the wants of the French army, which 
 Napoleon was not accustomed to pay when it 
 was employed out of France, and Joseph drew 
 bills upon the imperial treasury, which he be- 
 sought his brother to honour. He was inces- 
 santly soliciting subsidies and troops, and Na- 
 poleon replied that he had all Europe, secretly 
 or publicly leagued, upon his hands ; that he 
 could not pay the army of the allied kingdoms 
 besides the army of the Empire ; that it was 
 quite enough to lend soldiers to his brothers, 
 and that he could not lend them his finances 
 too. However, the events which took place 
 in the kingdom of Naples had obliged Napo- 
 leon to supply him with all that he solicited. 
 
 Gaeta, the fortress of the Neapolitan conti- 
 nent, was the only town in the kingdom that 
 had not surrendered to the French army. 
 That fortress, erected at the extremity of a 
 promontory washed on three sides by the sea, 
 connected on the fourth only with the land, 
 and commanding on that side the neighbour- 
 ing district, defended, moreover, by regular 
 works, with three tier of cannon, was very 
 difficult to besiege. It kept before its walls 
 one part of the French army at work upon 
 ways (chemirwments') which they were fre- 
 quently obliged to cut in the rock; while an- 
 other portion of that army guarded Naples, 
 and the rest, dispersed in the Calabrias, to 
 prevent revolt ready to break out, consisted 
 entirely of scattered forces. The end of the 
 summer, so fatal in Italy to foreigners, had 
 decimated the French troops, so that 6000 
 men could not have been collected at any one 
 point. 
 
 Napoleon, whose correspondence with his 
 brothers who had become kings would de- 
 serve to be studied as a series of profound 
 lessons in the art of reigning, sometimes 
 scolded Joseph with a severity springing from 
 his reason, not at all from his heart. He re- 
 proached him with being weak, inactive, ad- 
 dicted to all the illusions of a good-natured 
 and vain disposition. Joseph durst not levy 
 imposts, and yet he was desirous to raise a 
 .Neapolitan army; he pretended to form a 
 body-guard ; he kept about him for his per- 
 sonal safety a great part of the troops placed 
 at his disposal ; he misconducted the siege of 
 Gaeta ; and lastly, he made no preparations 
 for the expedition to Sicily. 
 
 " What you owe to your people," wrote Na- 
 poleon to him, "is order in the finances; but 
 you cannot spare them the charges of the war, 
 for there must be taxes in order to pay the 
 public force. Naples ought to furnish a hun- 
 dred millions, like the vice-royalty of Italy, 
 and thirty of these hundred millions are suffi- 
 cient to pay 40,000 men." (Letter of the 6th 
 of March, 1806.) "Hope not to render your- 
 self beloved through weakness, especially by 
 Neapolitans. They tell you that Queen Caro- 
 line is o>Lous, and that your good nature is 
 already making you popular a chimera of 
 your flatterers ! If I were to lose a battle to- 
 morrow on the Izonzo, you "vould soon learn 
 vhat was to be thought of your popularity, 
 
 and of the pretended unpopularity of Queen 
 Caroline. Those men are mean, cringing, 
 submissive to force alone. Suppose a reverse, 
 (which is always liable to befall me,) and you 
 would see that people rise all together and 
 shout,.' Death to the French ! death to Joseph ! 
 Caroline for ever !' You would come to my 
 camp." (Letter of the 9th of August, 1806.) 
 " An exiled and vagabond king is a silly personage 
 You must govern with justice and severity 
 suppress the abuses of the old system; esta- 
 blish order everywhere ; prevent the dilapida- 
 tions of Frenchmen as well as of Neapolitans . 
 create finances, and pay my army, by which 
 you exist." (Letter of the 22d of April, 1806.) 
 "As for a royal guard, it is a luxury, worthy 
 at most of the vast empire which I govern, 
 and which would appear too expensive even 
 to me, if it were not my duty to make sacri- 
 fices to the majesty of that empire, and to the 
 interests of my old soldiers, who find. a means 
 of comfortable subsistence in the institution 
 of a body of elite. As for raising a Neapolitan 
 army, don't think of it. It would desert you 
 at the first danger, and betray you for another 
 master. Form, if you will, three or four regi- 
 ments, and send them to me. I will enable 
 them to acquire what is to be acquired only in 
 war discipline, bravery, the sentiment of ho- 
 nour, fidelity and I will send them back to 
 you worthy to form the nucleus of the Neapo- 
 litan army. Meanwhile, take Swiss, for I 
 could not long leave you fifty thousand French, 
 even if you were able to pay them. The Swiss 
 are the only foreign soldiers who are brave 
 and faithful." (Letter of the 9th of August.) 
 " Have in the Calabrias some movable co- 
 lumns composed of Corsicans. They are ex- 
 cellent for that kind of warfare, and will carry 
 it on with zeal for our family." (Letter of 
 22d of April, 180fi.) "Do not disperse your 
 forces. You have fifty thousand men a great 
 many more than are needed, if you know how 
 to make use of them. With twenty-five thou- 
 sand only, I would guard every part of your 
 kingdom, and on the day of battle be stronger 
 than the enemy in the field. The first care of 
 a general ought to be, so to distribute his 
 forces as to be ready everywhere. But," add- 
 ed Napoleon, " therein lies the real secret of 
 the art which nobody possesses nobody not 
 even Massena, great as he nevertheless is in 
 dangers." 
 
 Napoleon would have had the guard of Na- 
 ples confined to two regiments of cavalry and 
 a few batteries of light artillery; he would 
 then have had the rest of the army posted en 
 echelons from Naples to the extremity of the Ca- 
 labrias, with a strong detachment placed facing 
 Sicily, from which side an English army was 
 liable to come, so that it might at any time be 
 possible to collect in three marches a consi- 
 derable body of troops either at Naples, or in 
 the Calabrias, or at the presumed point of 
 landing. He wished, above all, that haste 
 should be made to reduce Gaeta, the siege of 
 which absorbed part of the disposable forces ; 
 that, on terminating this siege, attention should 
 be paid to the creation of a large fortress, 
 which might serve for a support to the new 
 royalty, which should be situated in the verj
 
 Sept. 1806] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 159 
 
 heart of the kingdom, into which a king of Na- ' 
 pies might throw himself with his treasure, his 
 archives, the Neapolitans who adhered to his | 
 cause, and the wrecks of his armies, and ' 
 where he might for six months resist a besieg- 
 ing force of sixty thousand Anglo-Russians. 
 (Letter of 2d September, 1 806.) Napoleon was 
 of opinion that the position of Naples was not 
 adapted to such a destination ; besides, accord- 
 ing to him, a foreigner king could not, without 
 some danger, place himself amidst a numerous 
 and necessarily inimical population. He de- 
 sired that this fortress should have action upon 
 the capital, upon the sea, and upon the interior 
 of the kingdom. On due examination, after 
 discussing various points, particularly Naples 
 and Capua, he had preferred Castellamare, on 
 account of its proximity to Naples, its mari- 
 time site, and its central position. Having 
 made this choice upon the map, he had given 
 directions for surveys of the ground, in order 
 to decide upon the nature of the works. Five j 
 or six millions a year ought to be devoted for 
 ten years to this great creation, in such a man- 
 ner that, with each expenditure of six millions, 
 a degree of strength should be gained ; and 
 that, so early as the second or third year, you 
 might be able to shut yourself up in this vast 
 fortress ; for neither you nor I know what is to 
 befall us in two, three, or four years. Centuries 
 are not for us. And if you are energetic, you 
 may hold out in such an asylum long enough 
 to defy the rigours of Fortune, and to await 
 the return of her favour. 
 
 Lastly, Napoleon was desirous that means 
 should gradually be prepared for crossing the 
 Strait of Messina with 10,000 men, a force 
 sufficient, in his opinion, to conquer Sicily, 
 and moreover easily transportable in the feluc- 
 cas with which the sea of Italy abound. In 
 consequenc he had recommended defensive 
 works to be immenced immediately either at 
 Scylla or at Messina, in order to collect there 
 in safety the little naval force which would be 
 needed. But above all he urged the siege of 
 Gaeta, the reduction of which would render 
 half the army disposable; he besought his 
 brother to make a different distribution of his 
 forces, for, he incessantly repeated to him, you 
 will have before long a landing and an insur- 
 rection, and you will no more be able to repel 
 the one than to suppress the other. 
 
 Joseph comprehended these wise counsels, 
 complained sometimes of the language in 
 which they were conveyed, and followed them 
 according to the measure of his talents. Sur- 
 rounded by some Frenchmen, his personal 
 friends, by M. Rcederer, who was actively en- 
 gaged in administrative and financial reforms, 
 by General Mathieu Dumas, who applied him- 
 self with intelligence to the organization of the 
 public force, he did his best to create a govern- 
 ment and to regenerate the fine country com- 
 mitted to his care. Salicetti, the Corsican, a 
 man of ability and courage, directed his police 
 with the vigour which circumstances demand- 
 ed. But while Joseph was striving to perform 
 tus royal task, the English, verifying the anti- 
 cipations of Napoleon, took advantage of the 
 length of the siege of Gaeta, which divided the 
 army, and of the fever which decimated it, to 
 
 land in the Gulf of St. Euphemia, and appeared 
 there to the number of 8000 men, under Gen- 
 eral Stuart. General Reynier, posted at Co- 
 senza, could scarcely collect 4000 French, and 
 boldly proceeded to the point of disembarka- 
 tion. That officer, skilful and brave, but un 
 lucky, whom Napoleon had consented to 
 employ in Naples, notwithstanding the re- 
 membrance of the faults committed in Egypt. 
 was not more favoured by fortune on this oc- 
 .casion than he had been formerly in the plains 
 of Alexandria. Attacking General Stuart 
 amidst a marshy ground, where it was impos- 
 sible for him to make his 4000 men act with 
 a unity which might have compensated for 
 their numerical inferiority, he was repulsed 
 and forced to retire into the interior of the Ca- 
 labrias. This miscarriage, though it ought 
 not to be considered as a lost battle, was 
 nevertheless attended with the consequences 
 of one, and excited a rising of the Calabrese 
 in the rear of the French. General Reynier 
 had to fight obstinate battles in order to re- 
 unite his scattered detachments; he beheld 
 his sick and his wounded basely murdered 
 without being able to afford them assistance ; 
 and he was obliged to cut his way through the 
 insurgents, to burn villages, and to put the in- 
 j habitants to the sword. For the rest he con- 
 I ducted himself with energy and promptness, 
 and contrived to maintain himself amidst a 
 frightful conflagration. General Stuart's con- 
 duct on this occasion deserves to be recorded 
 with honour. The massacre of the French 
 was so general and so horrible, that he was 
 revolted at it. Striving to make the love of 
 money supply the place of humanity in those 
 ferocious mountaineers, he promised ten du- 
 cats for each soldier, and fifteen for each offi- 
 cer, brought to him alive, and those whom he 
 succeeded in saving he treated with the atten- 
 tion due from one civilized nation to another, 
 when they are doomed to make war. 
 
 These events, which proved so strongly the 
 wisdom of Napoleon's advice, became an ac- 
 tive stimulant to the new Neapolitan govern- 
 ment. Joseph accelerated the siege of Gaeta, 
 in order that he might be able to carry 
 back the entire army to the Calabnas. He 
 had with him Massena, whose mere name 
 made the Neapolitan populace tremble. He 
 had committed to him the task of taking 
 Gaeta, but, having delayed sending him till 
 the day on which the works of approach were 
 finished, it was necessary to exert great vigour. 
 Generals Campredon and Vallongue, of the 
 engineers, were charged with the direction of 
 the operations of the siege. They followed the 
 prescriptions of Napoleon, who desired that 
 the action of the heavy artillery should be re- 
 served till the besiegers should have approached 
 quite close to the body of the place. Oblige* 1 , 
 to open the trenches in ground where stone 
 was frequently met with, they proceeded 
 slowly, and endured the fire of an enormous 
 quantity of cannon and mortars without re- 
 turning it. The besiegers received 120,000 
 balls and 21,000 bombs before they once re- 
 plied to this mass of projectiles. Having at 
 length approached within a proper distance 
 | for establishing breaching batteries, they com
 
 160 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1806. 
 
 menced a destructive fire. The solid walls of 
 Gaeta, founded on the rock, after having at 
 first resisted, at length fell all at once, and pre- 
 sented two wide and practicable breaches. 
 The soldiers earnestly called for the assault as 
 the reward of their long exertions, and Mas- 
 sena, having formed two columns of attack, 
 was about to grant it to them, when the be- 
 sieged offered to capitulate. The place was 
 delivered upon the eighteenth of July, with all 
 the materiel thai it contained. The garrison 
 embarked for Sicily, after engaging not to 
 serve any more against King Joseph. This 
 siege had cost the besiegers 1,000 men, and 
 the besieged as many. General Vallongue, of 
 the engineers, one of the most distinguished 
 officers of his arm, lost his life there; and the 
 prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, governor of the 
 place, was severely wounded. 
 
 Massena set out immediately with the troops 
 which the reduction of Gatta rendered dis- 
 posable, passed through Naples on the first of 
 August, and hastened to the assistance of 
 General Reynier, who maintained his ground 
 at Cosenza, amidst the insurgent Calabrese. 
 The reinforcement brought by Massena in- 
 creased our principal corps to 13 or 14 thou- 
 sand men. It was more than were required, 
 without reckoning the presence of Massena, 
 to throw the English into the sea. Of this they 
 were so well aware, that, on the mere news of 
 the approach of the illustrious marshal, they 
 embarked on the 5th of September. Massena 
 had then none but the insurgents to fight. He 
 found them more numerous, more implacable, 
 than he had at first expected. He was reduced 
 to the necessity of burning several villages and 
 putting to the sword the troops of banditti 
 which slaughtered the French. He displayed 
 on this occasion his accustomed vigour, and 
 succeeded in a few weeks in reducing very 
 considerably the flames of insurrection. At 
 the moment when the great events which we 
 are about to relate, commenced in Prussia, 
 tranquillity began to be restored in the south 
 of Italy, and King Joseph might consider him- 
 self established, for some time at least, in his 
 new kingdom. 
 
 At the same period, important events were 
 passing in Dalmatia; the Russians still re- 
 .ained the mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon, 
 Jaking pattern from their conduct on this point, 
 and in particular from the manner in which 
 they had occupied Corfu, and usurped the 
 sovereignty of it, had resolved to seize the 
 'ittle republic of Ragusa, which separated Cal- 
 taro from the rest of Dalmatia. He had sent 
 thither his aide-de-camp Lauriston, with a 
 brigade of infantry, for the purpose of esta- 
 blishing himself there. Lauriston was pre- 
 sently surrounded by the insurgent Montene- 
 grins and by a Russian corps of some thousand 
 men. Blockaded by the English on the sea 
 side, besieged by ferocious mountaineers and 
 a regular Russian force on the land side, he 
 found himself in real danger, which, however, 
 he faced with courage. Fortunately, General 
 Molitor, an equally faithful companion in arms, 
 and firm and skilful officer in presence of the 
 enemj, Hew to his relief. That general, not 
 following the example too frequent in the army 
 
 of the Rhine, of leaving in the lurch a neigh- 
 bour whom one dislikes, proceeded sponta- 
 neously by forced marches to Ragusa, with a 
 corps of 4000 men, resolutely attacked the camp 
 of the Russians and the Montenegrins, carried 
 it though - strongly intrenched, and thus extri- 
 cated the French who were in the place. He 
 put to the sword a great number of Montene- 
 grins, and deterred them for a long time from 
 their incursions into Dalmatia. 
 
 It was not without difficulty, as we see, that 
 the French sway was established over these 
 distant countries. It had required great bat- 
 tles to obtain them from Europe; it required 
 daily fights to gain them from the inhabitants. 
 At the other extremfty of the empire, the foun- 
 dation of a second family kingdom, thai of Hol- 
 land, was attended with difficulties of a different 
 kind, but quite as serious. The grave and 
 peaceful Hollanders were not the people to 
 raise an insurrection like the mountaineers of 
 the Calabrias and of Illyria; but they opposed 
 their inertness lo King Louis, and gave him 
 not less embarrassment than did the Calabrese 
 to Joseph. The government of the Stadtholder 
 had left Holland many debts. The govern- 
 ments which had since followed, had, in turn, 
 contracted others to a very considerable 
 amount, to defray the expenses of the war, so 
 that King Louis, on his arrival in Holland, had 
 found a budget composed of an expenditure of 
 78 million florins and a revenue of 35. In this 
 expenditure of 78 millions, the charge for the 
 interest of the debt amounted alone to 35 mil- 
 lions of florins. The surplus was allotted to 
 the service of the army, the navy, and the 
 dikes. Notwithstanding this situation, the 
 Dutch would not hear either of new taxes or 
 of any reduction whatever of the interest of the 
 debt; for these lenders by profession, accus- 
 tomed to lend their capitals to all governments, 
 national and foreign, considered the debt as the 
 most sacred of properties. The idea of a con- 
 tribution on the rentes, to which the govern- 
 ment had been led, because the rentes in Holland 
 were the most widely diffused and important 
 of assets, and consequently formed the largest 
 basis for impost this idea shocked them. It 
 was found necessary to give it up. Here, then, 
 the new government was threatened not with 
 an insurrection as in Naples, but with an in- 
 terruption of all the services. For the rest, the 
 Dutch were not inimical to the new royally, 
 from hatred to monarchy, or in consequence 
 of their attachment to the house of Orange ; 
 but they ardently longed for a maritime peace 
 and regretted that peace, the source of all their 
 wealth, much more than the republic or the 
 Stadtholdership. Linked to the English by 
 strong bonds of interest, and not less strong 
 conformities of manners, they would have been 
 attracted towards England had she not noto- 
 riously coveted -their colonies. To no purpose 
 they were told that, but for the difficulty arising 
 from these colonies, peace would be easier by 
 half; that their participation in the expenses 
 of the war was the just price of the efforts 
 made by France in all the negotiations to re- 
 cover their maritime possessions ; and that 
 one would be justified in abandoning them if 
 they would not contribute to keep up the con-
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 Sept 1806.] 
 
 'est to no purpose was all this said to them ; 
 hey replied that they were ready to renounce 
 their colonies, in order to obtain peace. They 
 spoke thus, though ready to raise just clamours, 
 if France had treated on such a basis. From 
 the riches of Java at this day, one may judge 
 whether it was an inconsiderable interest that 
 France defended in defending their colonies. 
 King Louis decided to pursue the course that 
 seemed to him to be the easiest, that is, to fall 
 in with the views of the Dutch, and to attach 
 them lo him by acceding to their desires. Most 
 assuredly, when a person accepts the govern- 
 ment of a country, he ought to espouse its 
 interests ; but a distinction must be made 
 between its permanent and its temporary in- 
 terests ; he must serve the one, place himself 
 above the other; and if he has become king 
 of a foreign nation, through the army of his 
 country, he must renounce a part which would 
 oblige him to betray the one or the other. 
 King Louis was not reduced to this hard ne- 
 cessity, for the true policy of the Dutch ought 
 to have consisted in uniting themselves firmly 
 with France, in order to combat the maritime 
 supremacy of England. On the triumph of 
 that supremacy, they could not fail to lose the 
 freedom of the seas on which their lives were 
 passed, and their colonies, without which they 
 could not subsist. Striving rather to please 
 than to serve them, King Louis accepted a sys- 
 tem of finance conformable to their views at 
 the moment. To the revenue of 35 millions 
 of florins were added new contributions of 
 about 15 millions, which made the total amount 
 of the revenue 50 millions of florins, and, to 
 reduce the expenditure of 78 millions to 50, a 
 proportionable reduction was made in the 
 army and navy. The king of Holland wrote 
 to Paris that he would abdicate royalty if these 
 reductions were not agreed to. Napoleon thus 
 had to encounter in his own brothers the spirit 
 of resistance of the allied nations, which he 
 had expected to attach more closely to him- 
 self by the institution of family royalties. 
 He was deeply hurt at it, for under this spirit 
 of resistance lurked great ingratitude, both on 
 the part of the nations which France had 
 emancipated, and of the kings whom she had 
 crowned. Repressing his sentiments, how- 
 ever, he replied that he assented to the pro- 
 posed reductions, but that Holland ought not to 
 be astonished, if in present or future negotia- 
 tions, she were left to her own means. Hol- 
 land, he said, had certainly a right to refuse 
 her resources, but France had also a right to 
 refuse her support. f 
 
 The closest secrets are soon penetrated by 
 the malice of enemies. From a certain alti- 
 tude of King Louis, his resistance to Napo- 
 leon was inferred, and he became extremely 
 popular for it. That monarch, moreover, 
 affected a severity of manners, which coin- 
 cided with the tastes of an economical and 
 discreet country, and he became on that ac- 
 count still more agreeable to the Dutch peo- 
 ple. This same king, while making a show 
 of simplicity, resolved, nevertheless, to go to 
 the expense of a coronation and of a royal 
 guard, hoping by these double means to se- 
 cure the more firmly to himself the possession 
 
 VOL. II. 21 
 
 1G1 
 
 of the throne of Holland, of which he was 
 more tenacious than he chose to acknowledge. 
 Napoleon censured the institution of a royal 
 guard, for the reasons already given to Jo- 
 seph, and peremptorily opposed the ceremony 
 of a coronation, at a moment when Europe 
 was about to be involved in the flames of a 
 general war. Thus, from the very first days, 
 the difficulties inherent in these family royal- 
 ties, which Napoleon had resolved to found 
 out of affection or from system, began to make 
 their appearance. Independent allies, treated 
 according to the services which he might have 
 received from them, would certainly have 
 proved much better for his power and for his 
 heart. 
 
 Such was the general state of things in the 
 vast extent of the French Empire at the very 
 moment of the rupture with Prussia. Exclu- 
 sively of the troops of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine and of the kingdom of Italy, Napoleon 
 had about 500,000 men, among whom must 
 be comprehended the Swiss, serving in virtue 
 of capitulations, besides some Valaisans, 
 Poles, and Germans, who had entered into 
 the service of France. After the usual de- 
 duction of the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, 
 there remained active troops amounting to 
 450,000 men. Of this number, 130,000 were 
 beyond the Alps, including depots, 170,000 in 
 the grand army, cantoned in the Upper Pala- 
 tinate and Franconia, 5000 left in Holland, 
 5000 placed in garrison on board the ships, 
 and, lastly, 140,000 dispersed in tht interior. 
 These last comprehended the imperial guard, 
 the regiments not employed abroad, and the 
 depots. Excepting some regiments of infan- 
 try consisting of four battalions, all the others 
 had three, two of which were war battalions 
 destined to take the field, and one a depot bat- 
 talion, placed in general on the frontier. The 
 depot battalions of the grand army were 
 ranged along the Rhine, from Huningen to 
 Wesel ; some were at the camp of Boulogne. 
 Those of the army of Italy were m Piedmont 
 and Lombardy. Napoleon paid extreme at- 
 tention to the organization of the depots. He 
 resolved to make the conscripts repair thither 
 a year beforehand, that, during this year, in- 
 structed, trained, inured to fatigue, they might 
 be rendered capable of replacing the old sol- 
 diers carried off by time or war. The entire 
 conscription of 1805, called out at the end of 
 
 1805, and half of that of 1806, called out at 
 the commencement of 1806, had filled up the 
 skeletons with men fit for service, and a good 
 number of whom, already trained, had been 
 sent to Germany and Italy. Napoleon, more- 
 over, caused the second half of the class of 
 
 1806, designated by the name of reserve in 
 the laws of that period, to be called out. The 
 annual contingent then furnished 60,000 men, 
 actually fit to be embodied; and it is a cir- 
 cumstance worthy of remark, that the govern- 
 ment still refrained from enforcing the con- 
 scription law in the seven or eight departments 
 of Bretagne and La Vendee. Thirty thousand 
 more men would thus be poured into the 
 skeletons. But the departure of the men 
 already trained would produce a sufficient 
 vacancy in them to make room for th rew 
 
 o 2
 
 162 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1806. 
 
 comers. Napoleon, besides, designed to send 
 a great part of these latter towards Italy. In 
 regard to the conscripts destined to pass the 
 Alps, he took particular precautions. Even 
 before their incorporation, he despatched 
 them in large detachments, under the conduct 
 of officers, and cvr'hed in military uniform, 
 that they might no* appear out of the Empire, 
 like stragglers travelling in the attire of pea- 
 sants. 
 
 Having ptovided for the increase of the 
 army, Napoleon distributed the whole of his 
 resources with consummate skill. 
 
 Austria protested her pacific intentions. 
 Napoleon replied by similar protestations : he, 
 nevertheless, resolved to take his measures 
 as if, profiting by his absence, she should 
 think of falling upon Italy. General Marmont 
 occupied Dalmatia with 20,000 men. Napo- 
 leon directed him, after placing some detach- 
 ments en echelon from the centre of the pro- 
 vince to Ragusa, to keep the bulk of his forces 
 in Zara itself, a fortified town and the capital 
 of the country; to collect there stores of pro- 
 visions, arms, ammunition, in short, to make 
 it the pivot of all his operations, defensive or 
 offensive. 
 
 If he should be attacked, Zara was to serve 
 him for a point cTappui, and to enable him to 
 make a long resistance. If, on the contrary, 
 he should be obliged to withdraw from it for 
 the purpose of concurring in the operations 
 of the army of Italy, he had in that fortress a 
 safe place for depositing his materiel, his 
 wounded, his sick, whatever was unfit for 
 active war, and every thing that he could not 
 take along with him. 
 
 Eugene, viceroy of Italy, who was in the 
 secret of Napoleon's intentions, had orders to 
 leave in Dalmatia nothing more, either in 
 materiel or men, than was absolutely indispen- 
 sable there, and to collect all the rest in the 
 fortresses of Italy. Since the conquest of the 
 Venetian slates, these places had been sub- 
 jected to a new ably calculated classification, 
 and they were covered with labourers, engaged 
 in constructing works proposed by General 
 Chasseloup, and ordered by Napoleon. The 
 principal of them, and the nearest to Austria, 
 % was Palma-Nova. Next to the famous citadel 
 of Alexandria, it was the works of this place 
 that Napoleon pushed forward with most 
 activity, because it commanded the plain of 
 the Friuli Next came, a little to the left, 
 closing the gorges of the Julian Alps, Osopo, 
 then I/egnago, on the Adige, Mantua, on the 
 Mincio, lastly, on the Tanaro, Alexandria, the 
 essential base of the French power in Italy. 
 Orders had been given to shut up in these 
 fortresses the artillery, amounting to more 
 than 800 pieces, and not to leave outside them 
 any article whatever, cannon, musket, projec- 
 tile, likely to be carried off" in case of surprise 
 from the enemy. Venice, whose defences 
 were not yet completed, but which had its 
 lagoons in its favour, was added to this clas- 
 sification. Napoleon had selected General 
 Miollis, an officer of extraordinary energy, to 
 command it. He had enjoined him to execute 
 in haste the works necessary for turning to 
 account the advantages of the situation, till 
 
 1 the regular works, which were to render thf 
 places impregnable, could be constructed. It 
 i was among these retreats of Osopo, Palma 
 | Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, Alexandria 
 that Napoleon had distributed the depots. 
 Such as belonged to the armies in Dalmatia 
 and Lombardy were divided among the for 
 tresses from Palma-Nova to Alexandria, in 
 order to keep garrison in them and to be 
 trained. Those which belonged to the army 
 of Naples had been assembled in the Lega 
 tions. To these depots, the fifteen or twenty 
 thousand conscripts destined for Italy were to 
 direct their course. Napoleon, incessantly 
 repeating that on the attention paid to the 
 depot battalions depended the quality and the 
 duration of an army, had prescribed the mea- 
 sures necessary in order that the health and 
 training of the men might be alike attended 
 to, and that these battalions might at all times 
 be able to furnish, not only the regular recruits 
 for the war-battalions, and the garrisons of the 
 fortresses, but likewise one or two divisions 
 of reinforcements, ready to be despatched to 
 the points where an unforeseen want might 
 happen to be felt. The defence of the fort- 
 resses being thus ensured, the whole of the 
 active army became disposable. It consisted 
 for Lombardy of 15,000 men, scattered in the 
 Friule, and of 25,000 en echelons from Milan 
 to Turin, both ready for marching. There 
 remained the army of Naples, about 50,000 
 strong, a great part of which was fit for acting 
 immediately. Massena was on the spot: if 
 war broke out with Austria, he had instruc- 
 tions to fall back upon Upper Italy with 
 30,000 men, and to unite them with the 40,000 
 | who occupied Piedmont and Lombardy. 
 There was no Austrian army capable of 
 forcing the obstinate Massena, having 70,000 
 French at his disposal, having, moreover, 
 such appms as Palma-Nova, Osopo, Venice, 
 Mantua, and Alexandria. Lastly, in this case, 
 General Marmont himself was to play a use- 
 ful part; for, if he was blockaded in Dalma- 
 tia, he was sure to keep before him 30,000 
 Austrians at least, and, if he was not, he could 
 fall upon the flank or the rear of the enemy. 
 
 Such were the instructions addressed to 
 Prince Eugene for the defence of Italy. They 
 concluded with the following recommendation : 
 " Read all these instructions, and at night 
 call yourself to account for what you have 
 done in the day towards their execution, but 
 without noise, without effervescence of head, 
 and without exciting alarm in any quarter.'' 
 ($t. Cloud, 18th of September, 1806.) 
 
 Napoleon, always thinking of what Austria 
 might attempt while he was in Prussia, ordered 
 similar precautions in regard to Bavaria. He 
 had enjoined Marshal Soult to leave a strong 
 1 garrison at Braunau, a fortress of some im- 
 portance, on account of its situation upon the 
 Inn. He had recommended that the most ur- 
 gent works should be constructed, and the 
 timber floated down from the Alps by the Inn 
 collected there, saying that with arms and 
 wood one might create a fortress where no- 
 thing whatever existed. He had placed the 3d 
 ! of the line, a fine regiment of four battalions, 
 three of them war battalions, in garrison there,
 
 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 163 
 
 besides 500 artillery, 500 cavalry, a Bavarian 
 detachment, numerous engineer officers, the 
 whole forming a force of about 5000 men. He 
 had amassed there provisions for eight months, 
 a great quantity of ammunition, and a consi- 
 derable sum of money; to these precautions he 
 had added the appointment of an energetic 
 commandant, to whom he gave instructions 
 worthy to serve for a lesson to all the go- 
 vernors of besieged towns. These instructions 
 contained an order to defend himself to the 
 last extremity, not to surrender unless in case 
 of absolute necessity, and after withstanding 
 three repeated assaults on the body of the 
 place. 
 
 Napoleon had, moreover, decided that a part 
 f the Bavarian army, which was at his dis- 
 posal in virtue of the treaty of the Confedera- 
 tion of the Rhine, should be assembled on the 
 banks of the Inn. He had ordered a division 
 of 15,000 men of all arms to be formed and 
 placed under the guns of Braunau. Such 
 forces, if they could not keep the field, were, 
 nevertheless, a first obstacle opposed to an 
 enemy debouching unawares, and a ready pre- 
 pared point (fappui for the army coming to the 
 assistance of Bavaria. Napoleon, in fact, how 
 advanced soever he might be in Germany, 
 would always have it in his power, after beat- 
 ing off the Prussians and the Russians by 
 gaining a battle, to face about, fall by Silesia 
 or by Saxony upon Bohemia, and severely 
 punish Austria, if she durst attempt a fresh 
 aggression. After guarding against Austria, 
 he thought of those parts of the empire which 
 the English threatened with a landing. 
 
 He directed his brother Louis to form a 
 camp at Utrecht, composed of twelve or fif- 
 teen thousand Dutch, and of the 5000 French 
 left in Holland. He assembled around the 
 fortress of Wesel, recently annexed to France, 
 since the assignment of the duchy of Berg to 
 Murat, a French division of ten or twelve 
 thousand men. King Louis was to proceed to 
 Wesel, to assume the command of this divi- 
 sion, and, joining it with the troops in the 
 camp of Utrecht, feign, with 30,000 men, an 
 attack on Westphalia. It was even recom- 
 mended to him to spread a report of an assem- 
 blage of 80,000 men, and to make some pre- 
 parations in materiel calculated to accredit that 
 rumour. For reasons which the reader will 
 presently appreciate, Napoleon certainly did 
 wish to draw the attention of the Prussians to 
 that quarter, but, in reality, he desired that 
 King Louis, without removing too far from 
 Holland, should be constantly ready, either to 
 defend his kingdom against the English, or to 
 connect his movements with those of the 
 French corps placed on the Rhine or at Bou- 
 logne. Besides the seven corps of the grand 
 army destined to distant warfare, Napoleon 
 had resolved to form an eighth under Marshal 
 Mortier, who should be charged to turn as upon 
 a pivot round Mayence, to watch Hesse, to en- 
 courage by his presence the German Confe- 
 derates, and lastly to give a hand to King Louis 
 about Wesel. This corps, taken from the 
 troops in the interior, was to be 20,000 strong. 
 It required all Napoleon's ingenuity to raise it 
 to that number; for, out of the 140,000 men 
 
 stationed in the interior, on deducting the de- 
 pots and the imperial guard, very few dispos- 
 able troops were left. Besides this eighth 
 corps, Marshal Brune was directed this year, 
 as the last, to guard the Boulogne flotilla, by 
 employing in this duty the seamen and some 
 depot battalions amounting to about 18,000 
 men. It was only with extreme circumspec- 
 tion that Napoleon purposed to make use of 
 the national guards, because he was fearful 
 of agitating the country, and particularly of 
 extending the burdens of the war to too large 
 a proportion of the population. Reckoning, 
 nevertheless, on the warlike spirit of certain 
 frontier provinces, he had no scruple to raise 
 in Lorraine, in Alsace, and in Flanders, a few, 
 not numerous, select detachments, composed 
 of companies of elite, that is of grenadiers and 
 voltigeurs, and paid at the moment of their re- 
 moval. He had fixed their number at 6000 for 
 th north and 6000 for the east. The 6000 
 national guards of the north assembled under 
 General Rampon, established at St. Omer, or- 
 ganized with care at but little distance from 
 their homes, furnished a useful reserve, al- 
 ways ready to hasten to Marshal Brune, and 
 to afford him the aid of its patriotism. The 
 6000 national guards of the east were to as- 
 semble at Mayence, to form the garrison of 
 that place, and thus to render Marshal Mor- 
 tier's troops more disposable. 
 
 Marshal Kellermann, one of the veterans 
 whom Napoleon was accustomed to put at the 
 head of the reserves, commanded the depots 
 stationed along the Rhine ; and, while attend- 
 ing to their instruction, he could, by making 
 use of soldiers already trained, form a corps 
 of some value, and if danger threatened the 
 Upper Rhine, proceed rapidly to that quarter. 
 
 Thanks to this combination of means, there 
 was wherewithal to provide against all con- 
 tingencies. Suppose that Hesse, for example, 
 instigated by the Prussians, excited uneasi- 
 ness, Marshal Mortier, starting from Mayence, 
 was ready to proceed thither with the eighth 
 corps. King Louis, placed en echelon, was to 
 bring to him part of the camp of Utrecht and 
 of Wesel. If danger threatened Holland, King 
 Louis and Marshal Mortier had orders to unite 
 their forces. Marshal Brune also was to pro- 
 ceed to that quarter. If, on the contrary, Bou- 
 logne was in peril, Marshal Brune was to re- 
 ceive succour from King Louis, who was 
 directed by his instructions to hasten, in case 
 of need, towards that part of the frontiers of 
 the Empire. By this system of echelons, calcu- 
 lated with strict precision, all the points ex- 
 posed to any accident whatever, from the 
 Upper Rhine to Holland, from Holland to Bou- 
 logne, could be assisted in useful time, and as 
 promptly as the march of the most expeditious 
 enemy would require. 
 
 The French coast from Normandy to Bre- 
 tagne yet remained to be guarded. Napoleon 
 had left several regiments in these provinces, 
 and, according to his custom, he had assem- 
 bled the companies of elite in a flying camp at 
 Pontivy, to the number of 2100 grenadiers 
 and voltigeurs. General Boyer was appointed 
 to command them. He had at his disposal 
 secret funds, spies, and detachments of gen
 
 104 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 180& 
 
 darmes. He was to keep patroles in suspi- 
 cious places, and, if a landing threatened 
 Cherbourg or Brest, to hasten thither with the 
 2400 men under his command. Napoleon 
 kept in Paris only a corps of 8000 men, com- 
 posed of three regiments of infantry and some 
 squadrons of cavalry. These regiments had 
 received their contingent of conscripts. Ju- 
 not, governor of Paris, had special orders to 
 attend incessantly to their training, and to 
 consider that as the first of his duties. These 
 8000 men were a last reserve, ready to pro- 
 ceed whithersoever their presence might be 
 needed. Napoleon had recently conceived the 
 idea of making the troops travel post, and he 
 had employed this method for tne imperial 
 guard, which was conveyed in six days from 
 Paris to the Rhine. The troops destined to 
 travel in that way made, on the day of their 
 departure, a forced march on foot; they were 
 then put into carts, each carrying ten men, 
 and which were drawn up en echelon at ten 
 leagues' distance, so as to travel twenty 
 leagues per day. The carts were paid for at 
 the rate of five francs per horse, and the far- 
 mers required for this service were far from 
 complaining. Napoleon had had a carriage 
 made for the roads of Picardy, Normandy, and 
 Bretagne, for the purpose of conveying in four, 
 five, or six days, to Boulogne, Cherbourg, or 
 Brest, the 8000 men left in Paris. "We 
 must," said Napoleon to Prince Cambaceres, 
 who was expressing his uneasiness on this 
 subject " we must accustom Paris not to see 
 so many sentinels at every corner of a street." 
 There was to be left in Paris nothing but the 
 municipal guard, then amounting to 3000 
 men. The name of Napoleon, the tranquillity 
 of the time, rendered it needless to devote a 
 greater force to the guard of the capital. 
 
 As for the ports of Toulon and Genoa, Na- 
 poleon had left sufficient garrisons there. But 
 well he knew that the English were not so 
 silly as to hazard any attempt upon places of 
 such strength. It was concerning Boulogne 
 alone that he had any serious apprehensions. 
 
 Thus, in the vast circle of his foresight, he 
 had parried all possible dangers. If Austria, 
 extending to Prussia a succour which she had 
 not received from her, took part in the war, 
 the army of Italy, concentrated under Massena, 
 and appuyed upon fortresses of the first order, 
 alma-Nova, Mantua, Venice, Alexandria, 
 <vouid be able to oppose 70.000 men to the 
 Austrians, while General Marmont, with 
 twelve or fifteen thousand, would throw him- 
 self into their flank by the Dalmatia road. 
 The Inn, Braunau, and the Bavarians, would 
 suffice in the first moment for the defence of 
 Bavaria. Marshal Kellermann had the depots 
 for covering the Upper Rhine. Marshal Mor- 
 tier, King Louis, Marshal Brune, by a move- 
 ment towards each other, would be enabled to 
 assemble 50,000 men on any point that might 
 be threatened, from Mayence to the Helder, 
 from the Helder to Boulogne. Lastly, Paris 
 might, in urgent danger, confine itself to its 
 police troops, and despatch a corps of reserve 
 to the coasts of Normandy or Bretagne. 
 
 These various combinations, described with 
 striking perspicuity, with the most minute at- 
 
 tention to details, had been communicated to 
 Prince Eugene, to King Joseph, to King Louis, 
 to Marshals Kellermann, Mortier, and Brune, 
 to all those, in short, who were to concur in 
 their execution. Each of them knew all that 
 was necessary for the due performance of his 
 
 \ task. The whole had been communicated to 
 the Archchancellor Cambaceres alone, who, 
 placed at the centre, was charged to give or- 
 ders in the name of the Emperor. 
 
 Twenty-four or forty-eight hours were suffi- 
 cient for Napoleon to form his plans and to 
 arrange the details, when he had once resolved 
 to act. He then dictated, for one or two days, 
 almost without intermission, so many as one 
 hundred or two hundred letters, all of which 
 have been preserved, all of which will remain 
 everlasting models of the art of administering 
 armies and empires. Prince Berthier, the 
 usual interpreter of his commands, having 
 had to stay at Munich on business of the Con- 
 federation of the Rhine, he sent for General 
 Clarke, and passed the 18th and 19th of Sep- 
 tember in dictating his orders to him. Napo- 
 leon foresaw that twenty days might yet pass 
 in vain explanations with Prussia, after which 
 war would inevitably commence, for explana- 
 tions would thenceforth be powerless for ter- 
 minating such a quarrel. He resolved there- 
 fore to employ those twenty days in completing 
 the grand army, and in providing it with every 
 thing that might yet be necessary for it. 
 
 It is not in twenty days that it is possible to 
 place a numerous army on the war fooling, 
 were even the regiments destined to compose 
 it completely organized each for itself. To 
 collect it on the principal point of assembly, 
 to distribute it into brigades and divisions, to 
 form a staff, to procure for it parks, equipages, 
 materiel of all sorts, would still require a series 
 of long and complicated operations. But Na- 
 poleon, surprised in the preceding year by 
 Austria at the moment of passing over to 
 England, and this year by Prussia, on his 
 return from Austerlitz, had his army quite 
 ready, and this time even transported to the 
 theatre of war, since it was in the Upper Pa- 
 latinate and Fraconia. It left nothing to be 
 desired in any respect. Discipline, training, 
 habit of war recently renewed in an astound- 
 ing campaign, strength recruited by a rest of 
 several months, perfect health, ardour for fight- 
 ing, love of glory, unbounded devotedness to 
 its leader, nothing was wanting. If it had lost 
 somewhat of that regularity of manoeuvres 
 
 | which distinguished it when leaving Boulogne, 
 it had gained, in place of that more showy than 
 solid quality, an assurance and freedom of 
 
 I movements, whicn are not to be acquired but 
 
 I in fields of battle. The uniforms, worn, but 
 neat, added to its martial air. As we have 
 said elsewhere, it had refrained from taking 
 either its new clothes or its pay from the de- 
 
 i pots, reserving the enjoyment of all this for 
 the fetes which Napoleon was preparing for il 
 
 I in September superb, but chimerical fetes, 
 alas ! like the thousand millions formerly pro- 
 mised by the Convention. That heroic army, 
 
 ! thenceforth doomed to an everlasting war, was 
 no longer to know any other fetes than battles, 
 
 i entries of conquered capitals, the admiration
 
 Sept. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 165 
 
 of the vanquished. How few of the brave 
 men who composed it were destined to behold 
 tKeir homes again, and to die in the quiet of 
 peace! And even those, as they grew old, 
 were doomed to see their country invaded, 
 dismembered, stripped of that greatness which 
 she owed to the effusion of their generous 
 blood ! 
 
 Still, how well prepared soever an army 
 may be, it never can be prepared to such a 
 degree as not to feel any want. With his pro- 
 found experience of thu organization of the 
 troops, Napoleon united a personal knowledge 
 of his army that was truly extraordinary. He 
 knew the residence, the state, the strength of 
 all his regiments. He knew what each of 
 them was deficient in men or in materiel; and, 
 if they had left anywhere a detachment which 
 weakened them, he knew where to find it. 
 His first care was always for the foot-clothing 
 of the soldier, and to secure him from cold. 
 He ordered shoes and great coats to be imme- 
 diately despatched. He required that each 
 man should have a pair of shoes on his feet 
 and two pair in his knapsack. One of these 
 two pair was given as a gratuity to all the 
 corps, and the soldier's fortune is so slender 
 that even this small donation had its value. 
 He ordered all the saddle and draught-horses 
 that could be procured to be bought up in 
 France and abroad. The army was not in 
 actual need of them, but, in his solicitude for 
 the depots, he desired that there should not be 
 a deficiency of horses any more than of men. 
 He then ordered three or four hundred men 
 per regiment to be despatched from the depots, 
 which were about to be replenished with con- 
 scripts, in order to increase the war battalions 
 to an effective of eight or nine hundred men 
 each, well knowing that, in two months' cam- 
 paign, they would presently be reduced to that 
 of six or seven hundred. The force of the 
 grand army would thus be increased by 20,000 
 fighting men, and it would then be possible to 
 discharge, without weakening it too much, the 
 soldiers worn out with fatigue; for, with this 
 army of the Revolution, there had hitherto 
 been no other term to its devotedness to the 
 service than wounds or death. There were to 
 be seen in the ranks old soldiers attached to 
 their regiment as to a family, exempted from 
 all duty, but ever ready, in any danger, to dis- 
 play their ancient valour, and taking advan- 
 tage of their leisure to relate to their young 
 successors the marvels in which they had 
 borne a part. In the rank of captain in par- 
 ticular, there were many officers who were 
 incapacitated for service. Napoleon ordered 
 all the young men whose age rendered them 
 fit for war to be removed from the military 
 schools and trained for officers. He highly 
 appreciated the materials furnished by those 
 schools; he found their pupils not only well- 
 informed but brave, for education elevates the 
 heart as much as the mind. 
 
 After taking the means of infusing new vi- 
 gour into the army, he turned his attention to 
 the organization of its equipages. He wished 
 that it should gain in celerity, and not be too 
 much encumbered with baggage. His expe- 
 rience did not incline him to dispense with 
 
 magazines, as it has sometimes been asserted, 
 for he disdained no kind of providence, and 
 j he no more neglected the laying up of stores 
 than the fortresses. But offensive war, which 
 he preferred to any other, scarcely admitted of 
 the creation of magazines, since they must 
 have been formed in the enemy's territory, 
 which it was his custom to overrun at the 
 very commencement of the operations. His 
 
 system of alimentation consisted in living 
 every night upon the country occupied, in 
 spreading himself sufficiently to find subsist- 
 ence, but not so much as to be dispersed, and 
 in taking along with him in caissons bread for 
 several days. This kind of supply, managed 
 with care, and renewed whenever the army 
 halted, served for cases of extraordinary con- 
 centrations, which preceded and followed bat- 
 tles. For its conveyance Napoleon had cal- 
 culated that two caissons per battalion were 
 required, and one caisson per squadron. Add- 
 ing to these the vehicles necessary for the 
 
 ! sick and wounded, four or five hundred cais- 
 
 j sons would be sufficient for all the wants of 
 
 ! the army. He express!)' forbade any officer, 
 
 | any general, to appropriate to his use the car- 
 
 j riages destined for the troops. The transport 
 
 ' was at that time executed by a company which 
 
 i let to the State its caissons ready horsed. 
 
 Having discovered that one of the marshals, 
 
 favoured by this company, had several cais- 
 
 , sons at his disposal, Napoleon repressed this 
 
 I infraction of the rules with the utmost seve- 
 
 | rity, and made Prince Berthier responsible fcr 
 
 the fulfilment of his orders. The army was 
 
 then free from the abuses, which time and the 
 
 increasing wealth of its chiefs soon afterwards 
 
 introduced. 
 
 Napoleon then ordered large purchases of 
 I corn to be made all along the Rhine, and an 
 | immense quantity of biscuit to be made. 
 These provisions were to be collected at May- 
 ence, and from Mayence sent by the navigation 
 of the Mayn to Wiirzburg. Situated in Upper 
 Franconia, quite close to the defiles that lead 
 into Saxony, and commanded by an excellent 
 citadel, Wiirzburg was to be our base of ope- 
 ration. Napoleon wished to ascertain whether 
 there were not other fortified posts in the en- 
 virons. The officers secretly sent to recon- 
 noitre, having pointed out Forchheim and 
 Kronach, he ordered them to be armed, and 
 the provisions, ammunition, and tools col- 
 lected by his direction, to be deposited there 
 in safety. 
 
 Wurzburg had belonged for some months to 
 the Archduke Ferdinand, the same who had 
 
 been successively grand-duke of Tuscany, 
 elector of Salzburgh, and finally, since the 
 
 , last peace with Austria, duke of Wiirzburg. 
 This prince solicited his admission into the 
 Confederation of the Rhine, by the states of 
 which his new dominion was enclosed. He 
 was mild, discreet, and as well disposed to- 
 wards France as an Austrian prince could be, 
 and the Emperor was sure of obtaining from 
 him all the facilities desirable for the prep-- 
 tions that he purposed to make. Wurzbi 
 thus became the centre of the assemblages of 
 men and materiel ordered by Napoleon. 
 There had been no want of money since th
 
 166 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1806. 
 
 financial crisis of the preceding winter. In 
 the treasure of the army, Napoleon had, more- 
 over, a precious resource. Without expending 
 this treasure, exclusively devoted to the en- 
 dowments (dotations') of his soldiers, he made 
 loans with it which the state was afterwards 
 to reimburse by paying the interest and the 
 principal of the sums borrowed. Napoleon 
 had sent a great quantity of specie to Stras- 
 burg, and consigned funds to Prince Berthier, 
 in order to conquer by the power of ready 
 money the obstacles which might oppose the 
 execution of his designs. 
 
 The imperial guard had travelled post, as 
 we have seen, thanks to the relays of carts 
 prepared upon the road. In this manner, 
 3000 grenadiers and dismounted chasseurs 
 had been despatched. As this mode of con- 
 veyance could not be employed for the cavalry 
 and the artillery, the mounted grenadiers and 
 chasseurs, forming nearly 3000 horse, as well 
 as the park of artillery of the guard, amount- 
 ing to forty pieces, were forwarded by the 
 usual way. This was a reserve of 7000 men, 
 fit for warding off all unforeseen accidents. 
 Napoleon, as prudent in the execution as he 
 was bold in the conception of his plans, set a 
 high value upon reserves, and it was chiefly 
 for the purpose of creating one that he had in- 
 stituted the imperial guard. But, quick in dis- 
 covering the inconveniences attached to the 
 most excellent things, he found the keeping up 
 of this guard too expensive, and he was fear- 
 ful that the recruiting of it would drain the 
 army of choice men. The velites, a sort of en- 
 listed volunteers, the creation of which he had 
 devised, for the purpose of augmenting the 
 guard without drafting from the army, had ap- 
 peared too costly also, and not numerous 
 enough. He therefore ordered the formation 
 of a new regiment of infantry, under the title 
 of fusiliers of the guard, all the soldiers of which 
 should be selected from the annual contingent, 
 and the officers and subalterns taken out of the 
 guard, which should wear the uniform of the 
 latter, which should serve with it, only be 
 treated as young troops, that is to say, less 
 spared under fire, have a slight increase of 
 pay, and soon acquire all the qualities of the 
 guard itself, without costing as much, and with- 
 out depriving the army of its best soldiers. 
 While awaiting the result of this ingenious com- 
 bination. Napoleon had recourse to an expe- 
 dient already practised, of separating the com- 
 panies of the grenadiers and those of the 
 voltigeurs from the corps, and to collect them 
 into battalions. In this manner there had 
 been formed in 1804 the grenadiers of Arras, 
 afterwards called Oudinot's grenadiers. At 
 that time, there had been taken the grenadier 
 companies of all the regiments which were not 
 destined to form part of the Boulogne expedi- 
 tion. After Austerlitz, several of these com- 
 panies had been sent back to their corps. 
 With those which had continued together, Na- 
 poleon gave orders for joining the grenadiers 
 and voltigeurs of the depots and regiments 
 stationed in the 25th and 26th military divi- 
 sions, (the country comprised between the 
 Khine, the Meuse, and the Sambre,) for orga- 
 uizing them in battalions of six companies 
 
 each, and for despatching them to Mayence. 
 This was a new corps of 7000 men, which, 
 united with the imperial guard, would make 
 the reserve of the army amount to 14,000 men. 
 He added to it 2400 dragoons of elite, formed 
 into battalions of four companies or squadrons, 
 and destined to serve, either on foot or mount- 
 ed, always by the side of the guard. These 
 dragoons, drawn from Champagne, Burgundy, 
 Lorraine, and Alsace, might be transported in 
 twenty days to the Mayn. 
 
 The reserves, whose composition we have 
 just described, added to the conscripts taken 
 from the depots, would form a considerable 
 accession to the forces ready to march for 
 Prussia. The grand army was composed of 
 seven corps, six only of which were in Ger- 
 many, the second, under General Marmont, 
 
 I having gone to Dalmatia. These corps con- 
 tinued to be commanded by the same officers. 
 Marshal Bernadotte commanded the first corps, 
 20,000 strong; Marshal Davout,the third, 27,000 
 strong; Marshal Soult was at the head of the 
 
 ! fourth, the force of which amounted to 32,000 
 men. Marshal Lannes, always devoted, but 
 always sensitive and irritable, had for a mo- 
 ment quitted the fifth corps, in consequence of 
 a transient discontent On the first rumor of 
 war, he came to resume the command of it. 
 This corps amounted to 22,000 men, even after 
 Oudinot's grenadiers ceased to form part of it. 
 Marshal Ney had remained at the head of the 
 sixth, which continued at an effective of 20,000 
 men present under colours. The seventh, under 
 Marshal Augereau, numbered 17,000. The 
 cavalry reserve, scattered through districts 
 abounding in forage, could assemble 28,000 
 horse. Murat, still continued in the command 
 cf it, had received orders to quit the duchy of 
 Berg : he hastened, overjoyed, to recommence 
 a species of war in which he so eminently 
 distinguished himself, and to gain a glimpse, 
 not of a duchy but of a kingdom as the prize 
 of his exploits. 
 
 These six corps, with the reserve of cavalry, 
 comprehended no fewer than 170,000 fighting 
 men. If we add the guard, the troops of elite, 
 the staffs, the park of reserve, we may say that 
 the grand army amounted to about 190,000 
 men. It was to be presumed that in the first 
 days it would not be completely assembled, for, 
 out of the guard and the companies of elite, the 
 foot guard only would have arrived. But 
 170,000 men were sufficient, and more than 
 sufficient, for the commencement of that war. 
 The corps were composed of the same divi- 
 sions, the same brigades, the same regiments, 
 as in the last campaign a very wise arrange- 
 ment, for officers and soldiers had learned to 
 know and to have confidence in each other. 
 As for the general organization, it continued 
 to be the same. It was that which Napoleon 
 had substituted for the organization of the 
 army of the Rhine, and the excellence of which 
 he had proved in the Austrian campaign, the 
 very first in which 200,000 men had been seen 
 marching under a single commander. The 
 army was still divided into corps which were 
 complete in infantry and artillery, but which, 
 as to eavalry, had only a few chasseurs and 
 hussars to guard it The bulk of the cavalry
 
 Sept. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 167 
 
 was still concentrated under Murat, and placed 
 directly under the hand of Napoleon, from mo- 
 tives which we have assigned elsewhere. The 
 guard and the companies of elite formed a ge- 
 neral reserve of all arms, never quitting Na- 
 poleon, and marching close to him, not to 
 ensure the safety of his person, but to execute 
 his commands the more expeditiously. 
 
 Orders for moving were given so as to be 
 executed in the first days of October. Napo- 
 leon enjoined Marshals Ney and Soult to unite 
 in the country of Bayreuth, in order to form 
 the right of the army; Marshals Davout and 
 Bernadotte to join about Bamberg, to form its 
 centre; Marshals Lannes and Augereau to 
 form a junction in the environs of Coburg, to 
 compose its left. He thus concentrated his 
 forces on the frontiers of Saxony, in military 
 views, the extent and profundity of which the 
 reader will soon appreciate. Murat had orders 
 to assemble the cavalry at Wurzburg. The 
 foot guard, conveyed in six days to the Rhine, 
 marched towards the same point. These dif- 
 ferent corps were to reach their posts by the 
 3d or 4th of October. It was expressly re- 
 commended to them not to pass the frontiers 
 of Saxony. 
 
 Every thing being prepared, both for the ' 
 safety of the Empire and for the active war in , 
 which Napoleon was about to engage, he left 
 Paris. Nothing new had taken place in the 
 relations with Prussia. Laforest, the minister, 
 had kept the silence enjoined by Napoleon, but 
 he wrote that the king, swayed by the passions | 
 of the court and of the young aristocracy, hav- 
 ing set out for his army, no hope was left of 
 preventing war, unless the two monarchs, pre- 
 sent in their head-quarters, should exchange 
 some direct explanations, which should put an 
 end to a deplorable misunderstanding, and suf- 
 fice to satisfy the pride of the two governments. 
 Unfortunately, such explanations were not to 
 be expected. M. de Knobelsdorf, who continued 
 in Paris, protested the pacific intentions of his 
 cabinet. But little initiated into the secret of 
 affairs, neither sharing nor comprehending the 
 passions which ran away with his court, he 
 performed at that of Napoleon, the part of a 
 respected but useless personage. The news 
 from the north represented Russia as anxious 
 to comply with the wishes of Prussia, and en- 
 gaged in preparing her armies. The intelli- 
 gence from Austria described her as exhausted, 
 full of rancour against Prussia, and not to be 
 feared by France, unless in case of a great re- 
 verse. As for England, when once Mr. Fox 
 was dead, the war party, thenceforth triumph- 
 ant, had resumed its pretensions in inadmissi- 
 ble propositions, such as the cession of the 
 Balearic Islands, Sicily and Dalmatia, to the 
 Bourbons of Naples, that is to say, to the Eng- 
 lish themselves propositions which Lord Lau- 
 derdale, a sincere friend of peace, supported 
 methodically, and with a simple ignorance of 
 the real intentions of his cabinet. Napoleon 
 did not choose to dismiss him abruptly, but he 
 directed an answer equivalent to the sending 
 of his passports to be addressed to him. He 
 then prescribed a communication to the Senate 
 detailing the long negotiations of France with 
 Prussia, and the melancholy conclusion which 
 
 had terminated them. This communication, 
 however, he ordered to be deferred till war was 
 irrevocably declared between the two courts. 
 Nevertheless, as it was necessary to assign a 
 motive for his departure from Paris, he caused 
 it to be intimated that, at a moment when the 
 powers of the north were assuming a threat- 
 ening attitude, he deemed it expedient to put 
 himself at the head of his army, to be ready 
 for whatever might happen. He held a last 
 council, to explain to the dignitaries of the 
 Empire their duty, and the part they had to 
 act in the various cases that might occur. 
 The Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, a man for 
 whom he reserved all his confidence, even 
 when he left his two brothers, Louis and 
 Joseph, in Paris, must of course have pos- 
 sessed it in a still greater degree when he left 
 not one of the princes of his family in the 
 capital. Napoleon conferred on him the most 
 extensive powers under the different titles of 
 president of the Senate, president of the Coun- 
 cil of State, and president of the Council of 
 the Empire. Junot, one of the men most at- 
 tached to the Emperor, had the command of 
 the troops cantoned in the capital. None of 
 the imperial family but the females were left 
 in Paris. Again Josephine, terrified to see 
 Napoleon exposed to new dangers, had soli- 
 cited and obtained permission to accompany 
 him to the banks of the Rhine. She hoped, by 
 establishing herself at Mayence, to be more 
 speedily and more frequently informed of what 
 was passing. Besides the government of the 
 Empire, the arch-chancellor was to have that 
 of the imperial family. He was charged to 
 advise and to restrain the individuals of that 
 family who should in any way offend against 
 the laws of decorum, or against the rules pre- 
 scribed by the Emperor himself. 
 
 Napoleon set out in the night between the 
 24th and 25th of September, accompanied by 
 the empress and M. de Talleyrand, stopped a 
 few hours at Metz, to see the place, and then 
 directed his course towards Mayence, where 
 he arrived on the 28th. In that city he learned 
 that a courier from Berlin, with the final ex- 
 planations of the court of Prussia, had crossed 
 him in his course, and continued his journey 
 to Paris. It was not, therefore, till he advanced 
 further into Germany, that he was able to ob- 
 tain the definitive explanations which he ex- 
 pected. At Mayence he saw Marshal Keller- 
 mann, who superintended the organization of 
 the depots, and Marshal Mortier, appointed to 
 the command of the eighth corps, and again 
 explained to them how they were to conduct 
 themselves according to circumstances. He 
 directed the provisioning of Mayence to be 
 completed; he made some alterations in the 
 arming of the place; he hastened the depart- 
 ure of the young soldiers taken from the de- 
 pots, the transport of the provisions and am- 
 munition destined to pass out of the Rhine 
 into the Mayn, and then to ascend the Mayn 
 to Wurzburg. A troop of orderly officers, run- 
 ning in all directions, came every moment to 
 report upon the missions which they had ful- 
 filled ; and, accustomed not to affirm any more 
 than they had seen with their own eyes, they 
 went and came incessantlj, to acquaint him
 
 Ififl 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 with th real state of things, and what progress ' 
 had bei u made in the execution of his orders. ' 
 At Mayence, Napoleon sent back his civil es- 
 tablishment, retaining about him his military 
 household alone. He could not for a moment i 
 control his emotion on seeing the tears shed j 
 by the empress. Though full of confidence, I 
 he at length gave way himself to the general 
 uneasiness excited around him by the prospect 
 of a long war in the north, in distant regions, ; 
 against new nations. He parted, therefore, ' 
 with some pain from Josephine and M. de Tal- 
 leyrand, and advanced beyond the Rhine : ab- 
 sorbed by his vast thoughts, by the spectacle 
 of immense preparations, he was soon diverted 
 from a species of emotion, which he was glad 
 to banish from his heart, and still more so from 
 his calm and imperious countenance. 
 
 A great concourse of German generals and 
 princes were waiting at Wurzburg to pay their 
 respects to him. The new Duke of Wurzburg, 
 proprietor and sovereign of the place, had pre- 
 ceded all the others. This prince, whom he 
 had known in Italy, reminded Napoleon of the 
 first days of his glory, as well as of the most 
 friendly relations ; for he was the only one of 
 the Italian sovereigns whom he had not found 
 intent on injuring the French army. Hence 
 it was not without pain that he had found him- 
 self obliged to make him bear his part in the 
 general vicissitudes. Napoleon was received 
 in the palace of the former bishops of Wurz- 
 burg, a magnificent palace, little inferior to 
 that of Versailles, a pompous monument of 
 the wealth of the Germanic church, formerly 
 so powerful and so largely endowed, now so 
 poor and so decayed. He had a long conver- 
 sation with the Archduke Ferdinand, on the 
 general state of things, and particularly on the 
 dispositions of the court of Austria, to which 
 this prince was most nearly allied, for he was 
 the brother of the Emperor Francis, and with 
 which he was perfectly acquainted. The Duke 
 of Wurzburg, a friend of peace, possessing 
 the intelligence of the German princes edu- 
 cated in Tuscany, was solicitous, for the sake 
 of his own quiet, for a good understanding be- 
 
 t We quote the following letter written to M. de La 
 Rochefoucauld by Napoleon, as a proof of the disposi- 
 tions which we attribute to him at this moment. The 
 violent expressions which he uses in speaking of Prus- 
 sia must be ascribed solely to the irritation excited by 
 the unexpecied conduct of that court towards him. It 
 was not in these terms that he usually expressed him- 
 self, especially in regard to the King of Prussia, for 
 whom he had never ceased to feel and to profess a real 
 esteem. 
 
 To M. de /-.a Rochtfoucaultl. my ambassador to his 
 Majesty, the Emperor of Austria. 
 
 Wurzburg. the 6th of October. 1906. 
 I have been since yesterday at Wiir/.burg. which has 
 riven me occasion lo converse for a long time with H. 
 R. H. I have acqua-'nted him with my firm resolution 
 lo break all the ties of alliance which bind me to Prus- 
 sia, be the result of the present affairs what it may. 
 \ccoid:ngto my last accounts from Berlin, it is possible 
 mat war may not take place; but I am resolved not 10 
 be the ally of a power so versatile and so despicable. 
 I shall be at peace with her. no doubt, because I have 
 no right to spill the blood of my people under vain pre- 
 texts. Still, the necessity for directing my efforts to- 
 wards my navy renders an alliance upon the continent 
 Indispensable for me. Circumstances had led me to an 
 alliance with Prussia, but that power is at ih s day what 
 ,t was in 1740, and what it has been at all times, with- 
 out consistency and without honour. I have esteemed 
 
 tween Austria and France. He took occasion 
 from the late events to speak to Napoleon on 
 the grave question of alliances, to decry that 
 of Prussia, and to extol that of Austria He 
 strove to insinuate some ideas which had pre- 
 vailed in the last century, when the two cabi- 
 nets of Versailles and Vienna, united against 
 that of Berlin, were connected at once by a 
 common war and by marriages. He reminded 
 him that this alliance had been the brilliant 
 period of the French navy, and took pains to 
 demonstrate to him that France, more power- 
 ful on the continent than she had need to be, 
 was at present destitute of the maritime force 
 necessary for re-establishing and protecting 
 her commerce, destroyed for the last fifteen 
 years. This language had nothing new for 
 Napoleon, for M. de Talleyrand daily dinned 
 his ears with it. The Duke of Wurzburg ap- 
 peared to believe that the court of Vienna 
 would gladly seize this occasion of courting 
 the friendship of France, and of creating in 
 her a support instead of an incessantly threat- 
 ening enemy. Napoleon, disposed by the cir- 
 cumstances of the moment to entertain such 
 ideas, was so touched by them that he wrote 
 himself to his ambassador, M. de La Roche- 
 foucauld, and ordered him to make amica- 
 ; ble overtures at Vienna overtures reserved 
 enough not to compromise his dignity, signi- 
 ficant enough for Austria to know that it de- 
 1 pended upon herself to form a close connection 
 with France. 1 
 
 Powerful and confident as he was, Napo- 
 j leon began to believe that, without a great 
 continental alliance, he should always be 
 liable to fresh coalitions, diverted from his 
 contest with England, and obliged to expend 
 : upon land resources which he ought to expend 
 exclusively upon sea. The alliance of Prus- 
 sia, which he had cultivated, unfortunately 
 with too little care, having slipped through his 
 hands, he was naturally led to the idea of an 
 alliance with Austria. But this idea, very 
 recent with him, was the illusion of a moment, 
 unworthy of the firm perspicacity of his mind. 
 No doubt, had he been willing to pay with a 
 
 the Emperor of Austria, even amidst his reverses and 
 the events which have divided us; I believe him to be 
 constant and faithful to his word. You must explain 
 yourself in this spirit, without, however, employing a 
 t-jo misplaced urgency. My position and my forces are 
 such that 1 need not fear anybody ; but all these efforts 
 press at last upon my people Of the three powers, 
 Russia, Prussia, and Austria. I must have one tor my 
 ally. In no case can Prussia be trusted: Russia and 
 Austria alone are left me. The navy flourished for- 
 merly in France through the benefit which we derived 
 from the alliance of Austria. That power, hes.des, 
 I feels a necessity for remaining quiet, a sentiment in 
 winch I also heartily join. An alliance founded on the 
 independence of the Ottoman empire, on the guarantee 
 of our dominions, and on amicable arrangements which 
 would consolidate the peace of Europe, and would 
 enable me to throw my efforts upon my navy, would 
 suit me. The house of Austria having frequently made 
 insinuations to^nu-, the present moment, if it knows liow 
 to profit by it, is the most favourable of all. 1 shall say 
 no more to you. I have explained my sentiments moro 
 at length to ihe Prince of ttenevento, who will not fail 
 to inibrm you of them. For the rest, your mission will 
 be fulfilled whenever you signify in the slightest possible 
 manner that 1 am not averse from adhering to a system, 
 which should knit more firmly my lies with Austria. 
 Fail not to keep an eye on Moldavia and Wallach-a, 
 and to inform me of the movements of the Russians 
 against the Ottoman empire. Whereupon, &c., Ice. 
 
 NAI'OLEOX.
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 169 
 
 sacrifice for this new alliance, and to restore ! 
 to Austria some of the spoils which he had 
 wrested from her, the agreement might have 
 been possible and sincere but God knows ! 
 But how propose to Austria, stripped in ten 
 years of the Netherlands, of Lombardy, of the 
 duchies of Modena and Tuscany, of Suabia, 
 of the Tyrol, of the Germanic crown how 
 propose to her to ally herself to the conqueror, 
 who had wrested from her such territories and 
 such power! One might, indeed, hope for her 
 neutrality after the word given at the bivouac 
 of Urschitz, and under the influence of the re- 
 membrance of Rivoli, of Marengo, of Auster- 
 litz; but to induce her to an alliance was a 
 chimera of M. de Talleyrand and of the Duke 
 of Wiirzburg, the one giving way to his per- 
 sonal predilections, the other swayed by the 
 interests of his new position. This tendency 
 to seek an impossible alliance clearly proves 
 what a fault had been committed in treating 
 lightly the alliance of Prussia, which was at 
 once possible, easy, founded on great common 
 interests. For the rest, this accommodation 
 with Austria was an experiment which Napo- 
 leon hazarded en passant, in order not to 
 neglect a useful idea, but the success of which 
 he did not consider as indispensable, in the 
 high degree of power to which he had attained. 
 He hoped, in fact, notwithstanding all that was 
 said of the Prussian?, to beat them so com- 
 pletely and so quickly, that he should soon 
 have all Europe at his feet, and for ally the 
 exhaustion of his enemies, in default of their 
 good-will. 
 
 An important member of the Confederation 
 of the Rhine arrived also at Wiirzburg: this 
 was the king of Wirtemberg, formerly a mere 
 elector, now a king of Napoleon's creation, a 
 prince known for the warmth of his temper 
 and the penetration of his mind. Napoleon 
 had to settle with him the details of a marriage 
 already agreed upon between Prince Jerome 
 Bonaparte and the Princess Catherine of Wir- 
 temberg. After attending to this family busi- 
 ness, Napoleon arranged with the King of 
 Wirtemberg concerning the meeting of the 
 Confederates of the Rhine, who, among them, 
 were to furnish about 40,000 men, indepen- 
 dently of the 15,000 Bavarians concentrated 
 around Braunau. The Germans had found 
 themselves harshly used when serving under 
 Marshal Bernadotte in the Austrian campaign. 
 The Bavarians, in particular, had solicited as 
 a special favour that they might not be again 
 placed under that marshal. It was decided 
 that all the German auxiliaries should be col- 
 lected into a single corps, and that they should 
 be placed in the rear,of the grand army under 
 the command of Prince Jerome, who had quitted 
 the naval service for the land service. This 
 prince being destined to marry a German prin- 
 cess, and probably to receive her dowry in Ger- 
 many, it was wise to familiarize him with the 
 Germans, and to familiarize the Germans with 
 him. 
 
 The conversation of the Emperor of the 
 French and the German monarch then turned 
 upon the court of Prussia. The King of Wir- 
 temberg had it in his power to give Napoleon 
 useful information, for he had handfuls of let- 
 Vox.. IL 22 
 
 ters from Berlin, which gave a lively account 
 of the vertigo which had seized all heads, and 
 even those which were to be supposed the 
 soundest. The Duke of Brunswick, whose age 
 and whose enlightened reason ought to have 
 preserved him from the general infatuation, 
 lad himself given way to it, and he had writ- 
 en to the King of Wirtemberg, threatening 
 that he would soon plant the Prussian eagles 
 n Stuttgard, if that prince did not abandon the 
 Confederation of the Rhine. The King of Wir- 
 temberg, unintiinidated by such threats, showed 
 all these letters to Napoleon, who turned them 
 to account, and felt redoubled irritation against 
 the court of Prussia. Napoleon made much 
 inquiry concerning the Prussian army and its 
 real merit. The King of Wirtemberg extolled 
 the Prussian cavalry beyond measure, and 
 represented it as so formidable that Napoleon, 
 struck with what he was told, spoke upon the 
 subject himself to all his officers, took good 
 care to prepare them for this rencounter, re- 
 minded them of the manner of manoeuvring in 
 Egypt, and said to them with that vivacity of 
 expression which was peculiar to him, that 
 they must march to Berlin in a square of two 
 hundred thousand men. 
 
 Though Napoleon received no definitive 
 declaration from the court of Prussia, he de- 
 cided, upon the mere fact of the invasion of 
 Saxony by a Prussian army, to consider war 
 as declared. In the preceding year he had 
 designated as hostility the invasion of Bavaria 
 by Austria; this year, in like manner, he de- 
 signated as hostility the invasion of Saxony 
 by Prussia. This was a skilful way of stating 
 the question, for he appeared to interfere in 
 Germany solely for the purpose of protecting 
 the second-rate German princes against those 
 of the first order. On these conditions, for the 
 rest, war was completely declared at the mo- 
 ment, for the Prussians had crossed the Elbe 
 by the bridge of Dresden, and they already lined 
 the extreme frontier of Saxony, as the French 
 lined it by occupying the Franconian territory. 
 
 The reader would not comprehend Napo- 
 leon's plan of campaign against Prussia, one 
 of the finest and grandest that was ever con- 
 ceived and executed, without casting a look at 
 the general configuration of Germany. 
 
 Austria and Prussia divide the soil of Ger- 
 many, as they divide its wealth, its dominion, 
 and its politics, leaving between them a cer 
 tain number of petty states, whose geograph 
 cal situation, the laws of the Empire, and 
 French influence have hitheru maintained in 
 their dependence. Austria is in the east ol' 
 Germany, Prussia in the north. Austria oc 
 cupies and fills almost entirely that beautiful 
 valley of the Danube, long, winding, at firsl 
 contracted by the Alps and the mountains of 
 Bohemia, then opening below Vienna, and be- 
 coming a hundred leagues wide between the 
 Carpathians and the mountains of Illy ria, em- 
 bracing in these vast slopes the superb king- 
 dom of Hungary. It is to the extremity of this 
 valley that you must go to look for Austria, 
 crossing the Upper Rhine between Strasburg 
 and Basle, then traversing the defiles of Suabia, 
 and descending by a perilous progress thr 
 course of the Danube, to the basin amidst
 
 170 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1800. 
 
 which rises Vienna, and which it overlooks 
 Prussia, on the contrary, has established her- 
 self in the vast plains of the north, the entrance 
 of which she occupies hence her old appella- 
 tion of the March or Mark of Brandenburg. To 
 reach her, you must not ascend the Upper 
 Rhine to Basle, but pass it at about the middle 
 of its course, at Mayence.or descend to Wesel, 
 and thus cross or turn the mountainous centre 
 of Germany. No sooner are you beyond the 
 moderately elevated mountains of Franconia, 
 Thuringia, and Hesse, than you enter an im- 
 mense plain, traversed successively by the 
 Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the 
 Niemen, terminating to the north at the North 
 Sea, and to the east at the foot of the Uralian 
 mountains. This plain is called Westphalia, 
 Hanover, Prussia, along the North Sea, Poland, 
 in the interior of the continent, Russia as far 
 as the Ural. On the slope of the mountains 
 of Germany, by which you arrive at it, that is 
 to say, in Saxony, in Thuringia, in Hesse, it is 
 covered with a solid, vegetable mould, and on 
 the banks of the rivers with a rich, alluvial 
 soil. But, in the intervals which separate 
 these rivers, and especially along the sea, it is 
 invariably sandy; the waters, having no drain, 
 there form innumerable lakes and marshes. 
 The only feature that varies the surface is 
 sand-hills ; the only vegetation, the fir, the birch, 
 and a few oaks. It is grave and gloomy like 
 the sea, of the aspect of which it frequently 
 reminds you, like the slender and dark vegeta- 
 tion with which it is covered, like the sky of 
 the north. It is extremely fertile on the banks 
 of the rivers, but in the interior scanty crops 
 are raised here and there amidst the clearings 
 of the pine forests ; and if at times it exhibits 
 the spectacle of abundance, it is where nu- 
 merous cattle have enriched the soil. But 
 such is the power of economy, of courage, of] 
 perseverance, that among these sands has been 
 formed a state of the first order, if not wealthy, 
 at least in easy circumstances Prussia, the | 
 bold and patient work of a great man, Frede- 
 rick II., and of a succession of princes, who, 
 before or after him, though not possessing his 
 genius, were animated by the same spirit. And 
 such, too, is the power of civilization, that, 
 from amidst these marshes, surrounded by 
 sand-hills, the great Frederick caused the 
 royal mansion of Potsdam to spring forth, that 
 Versailles of the north, where the genius of 
 the arts has had the skill to impress the sad- 
 ness of these cold and dreary regions with 
 grace and elegance. 
 
 The Elbe, the first great river which you 
 meet with in this plain, when you descend 
 from the mountains of Central Germany, is 
 the principal seat of the power of Prussia, the 
 bulwark which covers her, the vehicle which 
 conveys her productions. In its upper course, 
 it waters the plains of Saxony, runs through 
 Dresden, and washes the foot of the formerly 
 Saxon fortress of Torgau. It then proceeds 
 into the heart of Prussia, runs round Magde- 
 burg, her principal fortress, protects Berlin, 
 her capital, situated beyond it, at an equal 
 distance from the Elbe and the Oder, among 
 lakes, sand-hills, and canals. Lastly, before 
 il falls into the North Sea, it forms the port of 
 
 the wealthy city of Hamburg, which intro- 
 duces into Germany, by the waters of this 
 river, the productions of the whole world. 
 From this brief sketch of the Elbe, one may 
 easily comprehend the ambition of Prussia to 
 possess its entire course, and to absorb Sax- 
 ony on the one side, the Hanseatic towns and 
 Hanover on the other an ambition which 
 slumbers at the present moment: for all the 
 European ambitions, glutted at the expense 
 of France in 1815, appear to be asleep for a 
 time. But, at the period to which this history 
 relates, the convulsion of states had inflamed 
 and made manifest all desires. Prussia had 
 demanded of us the Hanseatic towns; as for 
 Saxony, she had never ventured to claim 
 more than its dependence under the title of 
 Confederation of the North; and it is natural 
 that Napoleon should have felt all that jea- 
 lousy which he felt on account of Bavaria, 
 when he committed the fault of being jealous 
 of Prussia. 
 
 The Elbe, then, is the river which you must 
 reach and cross, when you would make war 
 upon Prussia, as the Danube is that, the course 
 of which you must descend when you want to 
 make war upon Austria. As soon as you 
 have succeeded in forcing the Elbe, the de- 
 fences of Prussia fall, for you take Saxony 
 from her, you annul Magdeburg, and Berlin is 
 left unprotected. The channels of commerce 
 themselves are occupied by the assailant, and 
 this becomes a serious matter if the war is 
 prolonged. Thus, while you are obliged, in 
 the case of the Danube, after reaching its 
 sources, to descend its course to Vienna, in 
 the case of the Elbe, in order to attain your 
 principal object, it is sufficient to have crossed 
 it; and if you have a conception of the vast 
 designs of Napoleon, it then becomes neces- 
 sary to push on to the Oder, in order to inter- 
 pose between Prussia and Russia, to intercept 
 succours from one to the other. You must 
 even advance to the Vistula, beat Russia in 
 Poland, where so many resentments are 
 brooding against her, and follow the example 
 of Hannibal, who carried the war into the 
 heart of the Italian provinces, trembling under 
 the insecurely riveted yoke of ancient Rome. 
 Such are the steps of that immense march to 
 the north, which has hitherto been attempted 
 by one man only, by Napoleon. Will it ever 
 be attempted again ? That the world knows 
 not. If such be the will of Providence, may 
 it be at last a serious attempt, conducive to 
 the freedom and the independence of the west! 
 
 But, to reach that northern plain, at the en- 
 trance of which Prussia is situated, you must 
 traverse the mountainous country which forms 
 the centre of Germany, or turn it, by proceed- 
 ing to that level beach which, under the name 
 of Westphalia, extends from the mountains to 
 the North Sea. 
 
 This country, which closes the entrance to 
 Prussia, is composed of a long and broad 
 group of wooded heights, connecting on the 
 one side with Bohemia, extending northward 
 to the plains of Westphalia, amidst which it 
 terminates, after rising for a moment, to form 
 the summits of the Harz, so rich in metals. 
 This mountainous group, which separates
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 1T1 
 
 the waters of the Rhine from those of the Elbe, 
 covered in its upper part with forests, throws 
 into the Rhine, the Mayn, the Lahn, the Sieg, 
 the Ruhr, the Lippe, into the Elbe, the Elster, 
 the Saale, the Unstrut, and, lastly, directly into 
 the North Sea, the Ems, and the Weser. 
 
 Various routes for traversing this tract 
 present themselves. In the first place, setting 
 out from Mayence, you can proceed to the 
 right, and ascend the winding valley of the 
 Mayn to above Wurzburg, and even to its 
 sources. There, in the environs of Coburg, 
 you meet with wood-covered heights, which, 
 under the name of the forest of Thuringia, 
 separate Franconia from Saxony, and from 
 which flow the Mayn on the one side, the 
 Saale on the other. They are traversed by 
 three defiles, those from Bayreuth to Hof, from 
 Kronach to Schleiz, from Coburg to Saalfeld ; 
 then you descend into Saxony through the 
 valley of the Saale. Such is the first route. 
 The second is to the left of those wooded 
 heights which form the forest of Thuringia. 
 If you take this, you ascend the Mayn from 
 Mayence to Hanau ; there you leave it, throw 
 yourself into the valley of the Werra, or coun- 
 try of Fulde, leave the forest of Thuringia to 
 the right, descend by Eisenach, Gotha, Wei- 
 mar, into the plain of Thuringia and Saxony, 
 and arrive on the banks of the Elbe. The 
 latter has always been the main road of Ger- 
 many, that from Frankfurt to Leipzig. 
 
 The third and last route consists in turning 
 the mountainous centre of Germany, and 
 proceeding northward till you have reached 
 (he plain of Westphalia, which you do by fol- 
 lowing the course of the Rhine to Wesel, 
 crossing at Wesel, then traversing Westphalia 
 and Hanover, having the mountains on the 
 right, the sea on the left. You meet, by the 
 way, with the Ems, the Weser, and lastly the 
 Elbe, become, at this extremity of its course, 
 one of the most considerable rivers in Europe. 
 
 Of these various ways of penetrating into 
 the plain of the north, Napoleon had chosen 
 the first, that leading from the sources of the 
 Mayn to the sources of the Saale by traversing 
 the defiles of Franconia. 
 
 The motives for his choice were profound. 
 In the first place, he had his troops in Upper 
 Franconia, and, if he had marched them 
 northward to reach Westphalia, he would 
 have exposed himself to the inconvenience of 
 travelling double or treble the distance, and to 
 the risk of unmasking his movements by the 
 mere length of his journey. Independently 
 of the length and meaning of this journey, he 
 would have met with the Ems, the Weser, the 
 Elbe, and been obliged to cross those rivers in 
 the lower part of their courses, when they 
 have become formidable obstacles. These 
 reasons left a choice between two courses 
 only: either to take the great central road of 
 Germany, which runs through Frankfurt, 
 Hanau, Fulda, Gotha, Weimar, to Leipzig, 
 and passes to the left of the forest of Thu- 
 ringia; or to ascend the Mayn to its source, 
 and to throw himself out of the valley of the 
 Mayn into the valley of the Saale, which con- 
 sisted in passing to the right of the forest of 
 Thuringia. Of these two routes, however, 
 
 the second was far preferable, for a reason 
 pertaining to the general plan of Napoleon, 
 and to his system of warfare. The farther 
 he passed to the right, the more chance he 
 had of turning the Prussians by their left, to 
 reach the Elbe before them, to cut them off 
 from Saxony, to deprive them of its resources 
 and its soldiers, to cross the Elbe in the part 
 of its course where it is easiest to cross, to 
 make himself master of Berlin, and lastly, 
 after outstripping the Prussians at the Elbe, to 
 get before them to the Oder, on which side the 
 Russians might be coming to their assistance. 
 If Napoleon attained this object he would do 
 something like what he had accomplished in 
 the preceding year, by turning the Austrian 
 general, Mack, by separating him from the 
 Russian succours, and by cutting in two the 
 forces of the coalition, and beating one por- 
 tion after the other. To be first at the Elbe 
 and the Oder was therefore the grand problem 
 to be resolved in this war. With this object, 
 the defiles leading from Franconia into Sax- 
 ony, and passing through the forest of Thu- 
 ringia, were the route that Napoleon must pre- 
 fer, without taking into account that his troops 
 were all brought thither, and that they had 
 only to set out from the point where they were 
 to get into action. 
 
 But a point in which it behoved him to 
 take especial pains to succeed, was to leave 
 the Prussians in doubt respecting his real de- 
 sign, to persuade them that he should take the 
 road through Fulda, Eisenach, and Weimar, 
 that is to say, the central road of Germany, 
 that which runs to the left of the forest of Thu- 
 ringia. To this end, he had placed part of his 
 left wing, composed of the fifth and seventh 
 corps, commanded by Marshals Lannes and 
 Augereau, about Konigshoffen and Hildburg- 
 hausen, on the Werra, to induce a belief that 
 he was going into Upper Hesse. And, in fact, 
 there was enough in this to mislead them. 
 Napoleon had not confined himself to this de- 
 monstration ; with a view to increase their 
 uncertainty, he had ordered other demonstra- 
 tions towards Westphalia. The march of the 
 King of Holland, preceded by false reports, 
 had had that object. Nevertheless, it could 
 not deceive the Prussians so much as to per- 
 suade them that Napoleon would attack by 
 Westphalia. Besides the presence of the 
 French army in Franconia, an accessory cir- 
 cumstance had been sufficient to enlighten 
 them. Dupont's division, always employed 
 separately since the battles of Haslach and 
 Albeck, had been sent to the Lower Rhine 
 to occupy the grand-duchy of Berg. On the 
 approach of war, it had been brought back s -y 
 the way of Mayence and Frankfurt. This 
 movement from left to right contradicted th : 
 probability of any offensive operation in the 
 quarter of Westphalia, and led to a belief "hat 
 the attack would take place either frcm the 
 country of Fulda or from Franconia, either l 
 the left or to the right of the forest of Thuriu- 
 gia. But which of these two passages wouhl 
 be preferred by Napoleon, there lay the doubt, 
 which that profound calculator took infinite 
 pains to keep up in the minds of he Prussian 
 generals.
 
 172 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 Nothing can give an idea of the agitation 
 which prevailed among those unfortunate 
 generals. They were all assembled at Erfurt, 
 at the back of the forest of Thuringia, with 
 the ministers, the king, the queen, and the 
 court, deliberating in a sort of confusion diffi- 
 cult to describe. The Prussian forces, first 
 assembled in each military district, had been 
 afterwards concentrated in two masses, one in 
 the environs of Magdeburg, under the Duke 
 of Brunswick, the other in the environs of 
 Dresden, under the Prince of Hohenlohe. The 
 principal army, moved from Magdeburg to 
 Naumburg on the Saale, then to Weimar and 
 Erfurt, was at this moment around the latter 
 town, ranged behind the forest of Thuringia, 
 its front covered by the length of the forest, 
 and its left by the steep banks of the Saale. 
 The Duke of Weimar, with a strong detach- 
 ment of light troops, occupied the interior of 
 the forest, and pushed reconnoissances beyond 
 it. General Ruchel formed the right of this 
 army, with the troops of Westphalia. 
 
 This principal army might be computed at 
 93,000 men, including the corps of General . 
 Ruchel. The second army, organized in Sile- j 
 sia, had been marched to Saxony for the pur- : 
 pose of gaining over the unfortunate elector, j 
 who had neither interest in the war, nor liking i 
 for it, partly by persuasion, partly by fear. 
 Yielding, at length, after much hesitation, he 
 had just promised 20,000 Saxons, very good j 
 troops, and to deliver the bridge of Dresden , 
 to the Prussians, on condition that they should . 
 cover Saxony, by placing one of the two act- j 
 ing armies there. The 20,000 Saxons were 
 not ready, and detained the Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe, who was slowly ascending the Saale, to 
 take a position opposite to the defiles leading 
 from Franconia into Saxony, facing the assem- : 
 blage of the French troops. The Prussian 
 contingent of the country of Beyreuth, under 
 the command of General Tauenzien, had fallen 
 back upon Schleiz on our approach, and thus 
 formed the advanced guard of Prince Hohen- j 
 lohe. The latter, with the 20.000 Saxons, 
 whom he was waiting for, and the thirty and 
 odd thousand Prussians from Silesia, would 
 have under him a corps of more than 50,000 
 men. 
 
 Such were the two Prussian armies. For 
 the whole reserve there was at Magdeburg a 
 corps of about 15,000 men, placed under the 
 command of the Prince of Wirtemberg, who j 
 had quarrelled with his family. To this enu- 
 meration must be added the garrisons of the fort- ' 
 reuses of the Oder and the Vistula, amounting 1 
 to about 25,000 men. Thus the Prussians had 
 not more than 180,000 or 185,000 soldiers, 
 including the Saxons, at their disposal, and 
 numbered of their own not more than 160,000 
 vi 165,000.' 
 
 Thus 180,000 Germans were about to be 
 
 The following is, we believe, a most accurate state- 
 ment of the Prussian forces : 
 
 Men. 
 10.000 
 66,000 
 
 17,000 
 
 opposed to 190,000 French, who were soon to 
 be followed by 100,000 more, and who were 
 so inured to war, that they might be pitted in 
 '. the proportion of one to two, sometimes even 
 of one to three, against the best troops in Eu- 
 I rope. We say nothing of the weight thrown 
 ! into the scale by the genius and the presence 
 ; of Napoleon. The folly of such a contest on 
 the part of the Prussians was consequently 
 , very great, without reckoning the political 
 j fault of a war between Prussia and France, a 
 j fault, it is true, equal on both sides. For the 
 i rest, the Prussians were brave, as the Ger- 
 mans always have been; but, since the Seven 
 Years' War, that is to say, ever since 1763, 
 they had not been engaged in any serious 
 | war; for their intervention in 1792, in the first 
 '. struggle of Europe against the French Revo- 
 lution, had not been either very long or very 
 energetic. Hence they had taken no share 
 in the changes introduced during the last fif- 
 teen years into the organization of the Euro- 
 ; pean troops ; they deemed the art of war to 
 consist in a regularity of movements which 
 is much more serviceable at a review than in a 
 field of battle ; they were followed by a quan- 
 tity of baggage, sufficient of itself to undo an 
 army by the obstacles which it throws in the 
 way of its march. For the rest, pride, which 
 is a great moral force, was extreme in the 
 Prussians, especially among the officers ; and 
 in them it was accompanied by a still nobler 
 sentiment, an inconsiderate but ardent patriot- 
 ism. 
 
 Their army was not less to be found fault 
 with for the confusion of its councils than for 
 the quality of the troops. The king had com- 
 mitted the direction of this war to the Duke 
 of Brunswick, out of deference to the old re-" 
 nown of his nephew, this disciple of the great 
 Frederick. There are established reputations, 
 which are sometimes destined to ruin empires; 
 the command, in fact, cannot be refused them; 
 and when it has been conferred, the public, 
 which perceives the insufficiency under the 
 glory, censures the choice which it has im- 
 posed, and renders it still more mischievous, 
 by weakening with its animadversions the 
 moral authority of command, without which 
 material authority is nothing. Such was the 
 case with the Duke of Brunswick. This choice 
 was generally deplored among the Prussians, 
 and they expressed themselves on the subject 
 with a boldness, of which it would be impos- 
 sible to find an example elsewhere, for it 
 seemed that in this nation freedom of mind 
 and language was to spring from the bosom 
 of the army. The Duke of Brunswick, en- 
 dowed with an enlightened understanding, (an 
 advantage not always possessed by men whose 
 merit fame has exaggerated,) deemed himself 
 unfit for the so active and so terrible wars of 
 the time. "He had accepted the command, out 
 
 Advanced guard under the Duke of Weimar- 10,000 
 Principal corps under the Duke of Brunswick- 
 Hoops of Westphalia under General Ruchel, 
 'irming the right of the Duke of Brunswick 
 
 Total of the principal army 93,000 
 
 Corps of Cie Prince of Hohenlohe, including 
 
 Saxons 50,000 
 
 Reserve under the Prince of Wirtemberg 15,000 
 
 Garrisons of the Oder and Vistula 35,000 
 
 Total of the Prussian forces 183,000 
 
 They may. however, be set down at 185,000: for the 
 corps of the Prince of Hohenlohe wa in general com- 
 puted at more than 50,000 men.
 
 Oct 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 173 
 
 of an old man's weakness, thai he might not j 
 have the mortification of leaving it to rivals, 
 and he fell overwhelmed by this burden. 
 Judging of others as justly as of himself, he 
 appreciated as it deserved the folly of the court 
 and that of the young military nobility, and he 
 was not less alarmed at it than at his own in- 
 sufficiency. Beside the Duke of Brunswick, 
 was another relic of the reign of the great 
 Frederick old Marshal Mollendorf; he, too, 
 bowed by years, but modest, devoted, exercis- 
 ing no authority, and called solely to give his 
 opinion ; for, the king, uncertain in every 
 thing, not daring to assume the command, and 
 unable to resolve to commit it entirely to an- 
 other, wished to consult upon every resolution 
 of his staff, and to judge of every order, before 
 he permitted its execution. To the weakness 
 of the old men were added the pretensions of 
 the young, convinced that to them alone be- 
 longed the talent and the right to command 
 armies. The principal of them was the Prince 
 of Hohenlohe, commander of the second army, ' 
 and one of the German sovereigns stripped of 
 their dominions by the new Confederation of j 
 the Rhine. Full of passions and pride, he ' 
 owed to a few daring acts in the war of 1792 ' 
 the reputation of an able and enterprising ge- 
 neral. That reputation, not very justly de- 
 served, was sufficient to excite in him an am- 
 bition to be independent of the generalissimo, ; 
 and to act according to his personal notions. 
 He had addressed an application to the king, 
 who, not daring either to accede to his wishes, 
 or to refuse them, had suffered a secondary 
 command, ill-defined, tending to separation 
 and insubordination, to spring up beside the 
 command-in-chief. Desirous to draw the war 
 to himself, the Prince of Hohenlohe strove to 
 establish the theatre of the principal operations 
 on the Upper Saale, where he was, while the 
 Duke of Brunswick endeavoured to fix it at 
 the back of the forest of Thuringia, where he 
 had placed himself. From this deplorable 
 squabble, the most mischievous consequences 
 could not fail very soon to arise. Then came 
 the declaimers, General Rachel, who had not 
 scrupled to insult M. de Haugwitz ; Prince 
 Louis, who had so mainly contributed to in- 
 fatuate the court, alike decided to favour no 
 plan but what tended to an immediate offen- 
 sive, out of fear of a return to pacific ideas 
 and of an accommodation between Frederick 
 William and Napoleon. Among these gene- ! 
 rals, and forming a contrast to them, Marshal 
 Kalkreuth was conspicuous. Not so aged as 
 the one, not so young as the others, superior I 
 to all by his talents, still adequate to fatigue, 
 though he had borne a glorious part in the 
 campaigns of the great Frederick, enjoying 
 and deserving the confidence of the army, he 
 considered the present war as extravagant, the 
 commander appointed to direct it incapable;; 
 declaring his opinion, moreover, wilh a bold- j 
 ness which contributed to shake profoundly 
 the authority of the generalissimo. It was by 
 him that the army would have wished to be 
 commanded ; though, in the presence of 
 French soldiers and Napoleon, he might have 
 done no better than the Duke of Brunswick 
 himself. To these military personages were 
 
 added several civil personages M. de Haug- 
 witz, first minister, M. Lombard, the king's 
 secretary, M. de Lacchesini, minister of Prus- 
 sia at Paris, besides a great number of Ger- 
 man princes, among the rest, the Elector of 
 Hesse, whom vain efforts were made to drag 
 into the war ; and lastly, completing this med- 
 ley, the queen, with some of her ladies, riding 
 on horseback, and showing herself to the 
 troops, who greeted her with their acclama- 
 tions. When sensible people inquired what 
 that august personage did there she, who by 
 her position and rank seemed so out of place 
 in head-quarters 1 the reply was, that her en- 
 ergy was useful that she alone kept the king 
 steady prevented his swerving; and thus, 
 there was alleged, in excuse for her presence, 
 a reason not less indecorous that her pre- 
 sence itself. 
 
 M. de Haugwitz, M. Lombard, and all the 
 old partisans of French alliance, strove to ob- 
 tain their pardon by not the most honourable 
 disavowal of their anterior conduct. Messrs, 
 de Haugwitz and Lombard, who had sufficient 
 intelligence to judge of what was passing be- 
 fore their faces, and who ought to have re- 
 tired when peace politics had become impossi- 
 ble, and have left to M. de Hardenberg the con- 
 sequences of war politics, affected, on the con- 
 trary, the greatest warmth of sentiments, in 
 order to gain credit for the sincerity of their 
 change. They carried their weakness to such 
 a length as to calumniate themselves, by in- 
 sinuating that their attachment to French alli- 
 ance had been but a feint on their part to de- 
 ceive Napoleon, and to defer a rupture, which 
 they foresaw, but which the king, always a 
 friend to peace, had 'imperatively commanded 
 them to postpone. To give themselves the 
 character of knaves in times past, in order to 
 pass for honest men at the present moment, 
 was neither very clever nor very honourable. 
 All that M. de Haugwitz gained by this sort of 
 conduct was, to lose in a day the merit of a 
 wise policy which belonged to him, to assume 
 the responsibility of a disastrous policy with 
 which he had nothing to do. 
 
 There was at that time, in Germany, an able 
 and eloquent pamphleteer, a bitter enemy to 
 France, and whose patriotic passions, though 
 genuine, were not disinterested, for he was 
 paid for his attacks by the courts of Vienna and 
 London : this pamphleteer was M. de Gentz. 
 It was he who, for several years, wrote the 
 manifestoes of the coalition, and filled the 
 journals of Europe with virulent declamations 
 against France. MM. de Haugwitz and Lom- 
 bard had invited him to the Prussian head- 
 quarters, to beg him to draw up the Prussian 
 manifesto; and there were they, before this 
 scribbler of libels, imploring, coaxing, wheed- 
 ling, loading him with attentions and marks 
 of distinction, even presenting him to the 
 queen herself, and procuring him interviews 
 with that princess. After they had frequently 
 denounced him to Fiance as a firebrand sold 
 to England, they besought him at this moment 
 to inflame all German hearts against that same 
 France. They had requested him, moreover, 
 to be surety to Austria for their sincerity, ox- 
 cusins; themselves for being so late to fight toe 
 p 2
 
 1Y4 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 common enemy, by the assurance that they 
 had always detested him. 
 
 It was amidst this strange medley of mili- 
 tary officers, princes, ministers, men, women, 
 all obtruding their opinion, advice, approba- 
 tion or censure, that politics and war were dis- 
 cussed. M. de Haugwitz, who had sought to 
 prolong his illusions as he had sought to pro- 
 long his power, strove to persuade every body 
 that all was going on well very well, better 
 than could have been hoped for. He boasted 
 of having found very amicable dispositions in 
 Austria, and even talked of secret communi- 
 cations, which encouraged an expectation of 
 the speedy concurrence of that power. He 
 extolled the generosity of the emperor Alexan- 
 der, and published as authentic news the im- 
 mediate arrival of the Russian troops on the 
 Elbe. He represented the adhesion of the 
 elector of Hesse as secured, and the junction 
 of 30,000 Hessians, the best soldiers of the 
 Confederation, to the Prussian army. Lastly, 
 he announced the sudden reconciliation of 
 Prussia with England, and the departure of a 
 British plenipotentiary for the Prussian head- 
 quarters. M. de Haugwitz, however, could not 
 believe such news to be true; for he knew 
 that Austria, well remembering the conduct 
 held towards her, would not join Prussia till 
 the day when Napoleon should be vanquished, 
 that is to say, when there would be no further 
 need of her assistance; that the Russian 
 troops would not reach the Elbe for three or 
 four months, that is to say, not till the question 
 would be decided ; that the elector of Hesse, 
 always crafty, awaited the issue of the first 
 battle to declare himself; that, lastly, England, 
 whose reconciliation with Prussia was in fact 
 certain, could furnish nothing but money, 
 whereas Prussia wanted soldiers to oppose 
 to the terrible soldiers of Napoleon. He knew 
 that the question still consisted in conquering 
 with the Prussian army, limited to its own 
 force, enervated by a long peace, commanded 
 by an old man, the French army, constantly 
 victorious for fifteen years past, and com- 
 manded by Napoleon. But, striving to deceive 
 himself for a day, for an hour longer, he cir- 
 culated reports which he disbelieved, and en- 
 deavoured to throw some shade over the pre- 
 cipice towards which all were rushing. 
 
 No better disposition of mind was manifest- 
 ed in discussing the plans of the campaign. All 
 the conclusion drawn from the grand lessons 
 in the military art given by Napoleon to Europe 
 was, that it was necessary to take the offensive 
 immediately, to beat the French with their own 
 weapons, that is, with daring and celerity, and, 
 as Prussia was not capable of supporting for 
 any long time the expense of so great an ar- 
 mament, to lose no time in settling (he business 
 by fighting a decisive battle with the whole 
 collected force of the monarchy. The Prus- 
 sians seriously persuaded themselves, even 
 after Austerlitz, even after Hohenlinden and a 
 hundred other pitched battles, that the French, 
 brisk and adroit, were chiefly fit for a war of 
 posts, but that, in a general action, in which 
 large masses are engaged, the solid and scien- 
 tific tactics of the Prussian army would get 
 me belter of their inconsistent agility. What 
 
 was requisite above all to please these agitated 
 people, to be favourably listened to by them 
 was to talk of offensive war. Whoever had 
 brought a plan of defensive war, let the 
 grounds on which that plan was founded be 
 ever so sound ; whoever, appealing to the ever- 
 lasting rules of prudence, had dared to say 
 that, to an enemy profoundly experienced, 
 singularly impetuous, till then invincible, it 
 was necessary to oppose time, space, natural 
 obstacles judiciously chosen, and to wait for 
 suitable occasions, that Fortune yields neither 
 to the rash who outrun her, nor to the timid 
 who flee from her, but to the skilful who grasp 
 her when she presents herself whoever had 
 dared to give such advice, would have been 
 regarded as a coward or a traitor, sold to Na- 
 poleon. Still, as the Prussian army could not 
 then make head against the French army, the 
 plainest common sense suggested that other 
 obstacles than the bosoms of soldiers ought to 
 be opposed to Napoleon. These obstacles, such 
 as one already had a glimpse of them, and 
 such as experience soon revealed them, were 
 the distance, the climate, the junction of the 
 German and Russian forces in the frost-bound 
 recesses of the north. There was no need, 
 then, by moving forward, to spare Napoleon 
 half the distance, to transfer the war to a tem- 
 perate climate, and to afford him the advantage 
 of fighting the Prussians before the arrival of 
 the Russians. There was no need, especially 
 in presence of an enemy so prompt, so adroit, 
 so skilful in profiting by a false movement, 
 for the former, by taking a too advanced posi- 
 tion, to run the risk of being cut off from their 
 line of operation, separated from the Elbe or 
 the Oder, enveloped, annihilated, at the very 
 outset of the war. The Austrians, whom they 
 had so severely censured in the preceding 
 year, ought to have served for a lesson, and to 
 have prevented them by the remembrance of 
 their disasters from exhibiting a second time 
 the spectacle of Germans, surprised, beaten, 
 disarmed, before the arrival of their auxiliaries 
 from the north. 
 
 Thus prudence taught that, instead of ad- 
 vancing to the woody mountains which sepa- 
 rate the valley of the Elbe from that of the 
 Rhine, they ought merely to keep, en masse, 
 behind the Elbe (the only obstacle capable of 
 stopping the French) to dispute the passage 
 of it to the best of their power; then, when 
 they had crossed the Elbe, to fall back to the 
 Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, till 
 they had joined the Russians, avoiding any 
 but partial actions, which, without compro- 
 mising any thing, would have renewed in the 
 Prussians the long-lost habit of war. When 
 150,000 Prussians should be joined by 150,000 
 Russians, in the alternately muddy or frozen 
 plains of Poland, then serious difficulties 
 would commence for Napoleon. 
 
 It required no genius, we repeat it, but only 
 plain common sense, to conceive such a plan. 
 Besides, a Frenchman, a great general, Du- 
 mouriez, who had formerly saved France 
 against that same Duke of Brunswick, and 
 who, corrupted since by exile, was taking 
 pains to advise our enemies, but without being 
 listened to by them Dumouriez sent memo-
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 175 
 
 rials upon memorials to the European cabinets, 
 urging that to fall back, and to oppose to Na- 
 poleon distances, climate, hunger, rains, were 
 the safe means of fighting him. Napoleon 
 himself was so convinced of this, that, when 
 he was informed that the Prussians were ad- 
 vancing beyond the Elbe, he refused at first 
 to believe it' 
 
 It is true, that by the adoption of such a 
 plan, they would lose the concurrence of Hesse 
 and Saxony, the finest provinces of the monar- 
 chy, abandoned without fighting to the enemy, 
 the resources in which those provinces abound- 
 ed, the capital, and, lastly, the honour of their 
 arms, compromised by so rapid a retreat. 
 But these objections, serious, it is true, were 
 more specious than solid. Hesse, in fact, 
 would not give herself up to men who already 
 had the stamp of defeat on their brow. Twenty 
 thousand Saxons were not worth the sacrifice 
 of a good system of war. The provinces 
 which they scrupled to abandon were liable 
 to be lost, either willingly or by force, by an 
 offensive movement of Napoleon's ; and, after 
 he had been seen traversing Austria with giant 
 strides, without being stopped by mountains or 
 rivers, it was puerile to compute space with 
 him. Those lines of the forest of Thuringia, 
 of the Elbe, of the Oder, which they were 
 afraid to give up to him, they were certain to 
 see wrested from them by a single manoeuvre 
 of Napoleon's, without their being able to take 
 the successive steps of a well-calculated re- 
 treat, and losing at the same time not only 
 the provinces contained between those lines, 
 but the army itself, that is to say, the mo- 
 narchy. Lastly, as for the.honour of the arms, 
 little account must be taken of appearances: 
 a retreat which can be imputed to calculation 
 has never compromised the reputation of an 
 army. 
 
 For the rest, none of these ideas had been 
 discussed in the tumultuous council, where 
 king, princes, ministers, generals, deliberated 
 upon the operations of the impending war. 
 Such was the ardour prevailing in it, that no 
 discussion of any but offensive plans was 
 allowed ; and all these plans tended to transfer 
 the Prussian army to Francoma, amidst the 
 cantonments of the French army, for the pur- 
 pose of surprising the latter, and driving it to 
 the Rhine, before it had time to concentrate 
 itself. 
 
 The plan which would have agreed best 
 with the prudence of the Duke of Brunswick, 
 would have been to continue to lie close at the 
 back of the forest of Thuringia, and to wait in 
 this position for Napoleon to debouch by one 
 side of that forest or the other, by the defiles 
 of Franconia in Saxony, or by the central 
 route of Germany, which goes from Frankfurt 
 
 to Weimar In the first case, the Prussians, 
 with their right at that forest of Thuringia, 
 their front covered by the Saale, had only to 
 allow Napoleon to advance. If he purposed 
 to attack them before he went further, they 
 would oppose to him the banks of the Saale, 
 which it was almost impossible to cross be- 
 fore an army of 140,000 men. If he were to 
 hasten to the Elbe, they would follow him, 
 still covered by those same banks of the Saale. 
 If, on the contrary, what was less probable, 
 considering the place chosen for the assem- 
 bling of his troops, Napoleon, traversing all 
 Franconia, should gain the central route of 
 Germany, the way was so long, that they 
 would have time to collect en masse, and 
 choose a suitable spot for giving him battle at 
 the moment when he should debouch from the 
 mountains. Certainly, if the line of the Elbe 
 were not adopted from the outset as the first 
 theatre of defensive war, the next best thing 
 to be done was to place themselves behind 
 the forest of Thuringia, as the Duke of Bruns- 
 : wick was disposed to do. 
 
 But though this was his opinion, he durst 
 not propose it. Giving way to the general 
 impulsion, he devised one plan of offensive 
 j warfare. The Prince of Hohenlohe, usually 
 ; in contradiction to him, devised another. To 
 ! take the position which they occupied, the 
 Duke of Brunswick had set out from Magde- 
 burg, the Prince of Hohenlohe from Dresden 
 the first ascending the left bank, the second 
 ascending the right bank of the Saale. In the 
 system of offensive warfare, the Prussians 
 might pass, as we have observed, on either 
 i side of the forest of Thuringia, or ascend the 
 Upper Saale, and traverse the defiles that 
 place Saxony in communication with Fran- 
 conia, before which the French were then 
 assembling; or, taking the opposite side, tra- 
 verse Upper Hesse, and march from Eisenach 
 upon Fulda, Schweinfurt, and Wilrzburg. 
 , The Prince of Hohenlohe, desiring to play 
 the principal part, proposed to leave the Duke 
 of Brunswick where he was, to ascend the 
 Upper Saale, to pass through the defiles of 
 j Franconia, to throw himself upon the Upper 
 | Mayn, to surprise the French before they 
 were quite assembled, and to make them fall 
 back upon the Upper Mayn, upon WQrzburg, 
 Frankfurt, and Mayence. As soon as the 
 retreat commenced, the Duke of Brunswick 
 was to join him, no matter by what road, to 
 complete the rout of the French, with the 
 whole mass of the Prussian forces. 
 
 The Duke of Brunswick's plan for acting on 
 the opposite side was to advance by Eisenach, 
 Fulda, Schweinfurt, WQrzburg, that is to say, 
 by the central route of Germany, to fall upon 
 Wiirzburg itself, and thus to cutoff from May- 
 
 i Here is a fragment of a letter which reveals Napo- 
 leou's way of thinking on this point : 
 
 To SI. the Marshal Prince of Neu/chatel. 
 
 St. Cloud. 24th September, 1S06. 
 
 My Cousin, I send the copy of the orders of move- 
 ment of the army, which I addressed to you on the 
 morning of the 20th instant, and which I am sorry not 
 to have sent you twelve hours after the departure of my 
 courier of the 2()th of September, because he was 
 liable to be intercepted. However, I have no reason to 
 apprehend it. You must have received by noon on the 
 94tk the first courier of the 20th. Wheu this reaches 
 
 you, which will no doubt be on the 27th. orders will 
 have been given to Marshal Soult. who will have set 
 out on the 26th; and as it will take him three or four 
 days' march to get to Amberg. he would be able to get 
 there by the 30th. though he has orders not to do so till 
 the 3d. You will receive the present courier on the 
 27lh, in order that you may accelerate the movement of 
 | Marshal Soult. It is of importance that he should 
 I speedily reach Amberg, because the enemy is at Hof, 
 un extravagance of which 1 did not believe him to be 
 capable, conceiving that he wo>ld remain on the ilefeil- 
 . give along the Elbe. 
 
 NA.POUW-
 
 176 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1808 
 
 ence all the French who were in Franconia. 
 This plan was assuredly the better of the two; 
 for, while the Prince of Hohenlohe, proposing 
 to debouch upon the Upper Mayn, would have 
 flung the French back upon the Upper Mayn, 
 from Coburg upon Wurzburg, and would have 
 tended to rally them as they fell back, the Duke 
 of Brunswick, on the contrary, directing his 
 course upon Wurzburg itself, would have cut 
 off the French who were on the Upper Mayn 
 from those who were on the Lower Mayn, and 
 placed himself between Wurzburg, which was 
 the centre of their assemblages, and Mayence, 
 which was their base of operation. Besides, 
 he would have acted with a united force of 
 140,000 men, and have entered upon the offen- 
 sive with the mass of troops that ought to be 
 devoted to the purpose when one does venture 
 to take it. But, whichever plan were adopted, 
 that there might be some chance of succeed- 
 ing, it would have been requisite, in the first 
 place, that the Prussian army should be, if not 
 equal in quality to the French army, at least 
 capable of withstanding its shock; in the se- 
 cond place, that it should anticipate Napoleon, 
 and surprise him before he had concentrated 
 all his forces upon Wurzburg. Now the Duke 
 of Brunswick had given orders for moving on 
 the 10th of October, and Napoleon was at 
 Wurzburg on the 3d, at the head of his assem- 
 bled forces, and ready to meet all events. 
 
 While the Prussians were thus disputing 
 about these offensive plans, all founded on the 
 ridiculous datum of surprising the French on 
 the 10th of October, when Napoleon was so 
 early as on the 3d in the midst of his assem- 
 bled troops, they received intelligence of his 
 arrival at Wurzburg, and began to get a 
 glimpse of his dispositions. They were then 
 aware that they had miscalculated in measur- 
 ing his activity by that which they had them- 
 selves ; and the Duke of Brunswick, who, 
 without possessing the rapid comprehension, 
 the resolution, the activity of a great general, 
 was nevertheless endowed with a practised 
 judgment, was more keenly sensible of the 
 danger of confronting the French army, al- 
 ready formed, and having Napoleon at its 
 head. From that moment he renounced all 
 the plans of offensive operations adopted out 
 of condescension, and confined himself more 
 and more to the defensive position taken at the 
 back of the forest of Thuringia. He strove 
 to demonstrate to all around him the advan- 
 tages of this position ; for, he incessantly re- 
 peated to them that, if Napoleon should direct 
 his course by Kiinigshofen, Eisenach, Gotha 
 and Erfurt, which would bring him into Ger- 
 many by the great central road, they might 
 take him in flank at the moment when he 
 was debouching from the mountains; if, on 
 the contrary, passing through the defiles lead- 
 ing from Franconia into Saxony, he appeared 
 upon the Upper Sa>. they would occupy the 
 course of that river, and await him without 
 stirring, behind its steep banks. Other rea- 
 sons, not avowed by the Duke of Brunswick, 
 inspired him with a decided preference for 
 this position. At bottom he disapproved the 
 war, and he had just discovered with joy a 
 chance of preventing it. According to the re- 
 
 ports of the spies, Napoleon was having great 
 defensive works executed towards Schwein 
 furt, on the very road from Wurzburg to Ko- 
 nigshofen and Eisenach. It was true that 
 Napoleon had ordered works in different direc- 
 tions, especially in the direction of Schweinfurt, 
 Konigshofen, Hildburghausen, and Eisenach. 
 The Duke of Brunswick thence concluded not 
 that Napoleon purposed to advance by the. 
 great central road from Frankfurt to Weimar, 
 but that he meant to establish himself about 
 Wurzburg, and there take a defensive position 
 His conversations with M. de Lucchesini con 
 tributed equally to produce this persuasion. 
 That ambassador, who had unfortunately irri- 
 tated his cabinet two months before by exag- 
 gerated reports, now mixing a little truth with 
 much that was false, affirmed that, at bottom, 
 Napoleon was not desirous of war; that he 
 had, no doubt, treated Prussia slightingly, but 
 that he had never harboured any design of 
 aggression against her ; and that it was very 
 possible that he had come to post himself at 
 Wurzburg, in order to await there, behind good 
 intrenchments, the final decision of King Fre- 
 derick William. 
 
 It was very late to dare to bring forward 
 this truth, and it was choosing a moment to 
 bring it forward when it had ceased to be ac- 
 curate. If, in fact, Napoleon, before he left 
 Paris, had been disposed to settle matters with 
 Prussia by means of amicable explanations, 
 now that he was at the head of his army and 
 his sword half unsheathed, he was ready to 
 draw it completely, and to act with the prompt- 
 ness which was natural to him. Nothing was 
 less in unison with his character than the plan 
 of establishing himself in a defensive position 
 before Wurzburg. But, from this plan, falsely 
 attributed to Napoleon, and the reports of M. 
 de Lucchesini, the Duke of Brunswick con- 
 cluded with secret joy that it would be possi- 
 ble to avoid war, especially if the precaution 
 were taken to remain at the back of the forest 
 of Thuringia, and to leave between the two 
 armies that obstacle to their collision. 
 
 The king, without avowing it, was of the 
 same opinion. A last council was therefore 
 held at Erfurt on the 5th of October, at which 
 the Duke of Brunswick, the Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe, Marshal Mollendorf, several officers of 
 the staff, the commanders of corps, the king 
 himself and his ministers, were present. This 
 council lasted for two whole days. The duke 
 proposed the following question : " Was it 
 prudent to go and seek Napoleon in an unas- 
 sailable position, when they no longer enter- 
 tained, as according to the first offensive plan, 
 any hope of surprising him ?" Long and 
 violent discussions ensued on this point. The 
 Prince of Hohenlohe again put forward, through 
 the medium of the chief of his staff, the idea 
 of operating by the Upper Saale, and of pass- 
 ing through the defiles at the outlets of which 
 Napoleon had assembled his troops. This idea 
 was combatted on the part of the Duke of 
 Brunswick, and the advantages of the position 
 taken behind the forest of Thuringia were 
 again expatiated upon. Thus the two generals- 
 in-chief kept up an obstinate contest by means 
 of their staff-officers. For the" rest, there was
 
 Oct 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 177 
 
 no harmony anywhere. While the Duke of 
 Brunswick was engaged in warm contention 
 with the Prince of Hohenlohe, M. de Haug- 
 witz was disputing with M. de Lucchesini, and 
 maintaining, in regard to the pacific disposi- 
 tions attributed to Napoleon, that they were no 
 longer to be reckoned upon. To the clash of 
 ideas was added the clash of passions, and 
 General Ruchel ventured to offer a new affront 
 to M. de. Haugwitz. From this debate each 
 carried away only a greater confusion of mind 
 and a deeper bitterness of heart. The king in 
 particular, who earnestly sought to enlighten 
 himself, not daring to trust to his own judg- 
 ment, and who was sensible of the imminence 
 of the danger ihe king was grieved to the 
 very heart. As it was impossible to come to 
 any decision, the council, feeling the necessity 
 for learning more precisely the real resolutions 
 of Napoleon, adopted the plan of a general 
 reconnoissance, to be executed simultaneously 
 by the three principal corps of the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe, the Duke of Brunswick, and Ge- 
 neral Ruchel. The king caused a modification 
 of this singular resolution by reducing the 
 three reconnoissances to one only, directed by 
 Colonel de Muffling, an officer of the Duke of 
 Brunswick's staff, on that same road from 
 Eisenach to Schweinfurt, towards which Na- 
 poleon seemed to be making some prepara- 
 tions of defence. Orders were given to the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe to continue the concen- 
 tration of the army of Silesia on the Upper 
 Saale, leaving General Tauenzien, with the 
 detachment of Bayreuth, in observation to- 
 wards the defiles of Franconia. To this mili- 
 tary measure was added a political measure, 
 namely, to send a definite note to Napoleon, 
 signifying the irrevocable resolutions of the 
 court of Prussia. This note was to set forth 
 the relations which had existed between the 
 two courts, the harsh usage with which France 
 had repaid the friendly conduct of Prussia, the 
 obligation imposed upon the cabinet of Berlin 
 to demand an explanation bearing upon all the 
 points at issue, and which ought to be preceded 
 by a step for the satisfaction of Germany, 
 namely, the immediate retreat of the French 
 troops to the other side of the Rhine. This 
 retreat was required to be effected by a speci- 
 fied day, and to commence on the 8th of Oc- 
 tober. 
 
 Assuredly, if Prussia was still desirous of 
 peace, the projected note was a very ill-con- 
 trived expedient for maintaining it; for it was 
 mistaking the character of Napoleon most 
 egregiously to send him a summons to retire 
 by a certain day. But while the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick and the king were striving to save for 
 themselves a last chance of peace, by con- 
 tinuing at the back of the forest of Thuringia, 
 they were forced, in order to satisfy the furious 
 partisans of war, to make some apparent de- 
 monstrations of haughtiness, thus submitting 
 to the caprices of an army, which had trans- 
 formed itself into a popular multitude, and 
 which shouted, dictated, ordered, like the mob, 
 when the reins are resigned to it. 
 
 Such was the way in which the Prussians 
 spent the time that Napoleon, on his part, was 
 devoting to preparations so active and so ably 
 
 VOL. II. 23 
 
 conceived. Without tarrying at Wurzburg, he 
 had proceeded to Bamberg, where he deferred 
 his entry into Saxony for the final explanations 
 of Prussia, with whom, and not with him, lay 
 the wrong of the aggression. His right, com- 
 posed of the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney, 
 was in advance of Bayreuth, ready to debouch, 
 by the road from Bayreuth to Hof, upon the 
 Upper Saale. His centre, formed by the corps 
 of Marshals Bernadotte and Davout, preceded 
 by the reserve of cavalry, and followed by the 
 foot-guard, was at Kronach, waiting only for 
 orders to advance by Lobenstein upon Saal- 
 burg and Schleiz. His left, consisting of the 
 corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, 
 making deceitful demonstrations towards Hild- 
 burghausen, was, at the first signal, to move 
 from left to right, from Coburg towards Neu- 
 stadt, in order to debouch by Grafenthal upon 
 Saalfield. These three columns had to tra- 
 verse the narrow defiles, bordered with woods 
 and rocks, which place Franconia in commu- 
 nication with Saxony, and run to the Upper 
 Saale. The frontier of Saxony, however, was 
 not yet passed, and they continued on the 
 Franconian territory, with one foot raised for 
 marching. The imperial guard was not, it is 
 true, completely assembled: the cavalry and 
 artillery of that guard were still wanting, be- 
 cause they could not travel post, like the in- 
 fantry; the companies of elite and the great 
 park also were still deficient. But Napoleon 
 had at hand about 170,000 men, and those 
 were more than he needed to crush the Prus- 
 sian army. 
 
 When he received, on the 7th, the note of 
 Prussia, he was extremely exasperated. Ma- 
 jor-general Berthier was wilh him. " Prince," 
 said he, " we will be punctual to the appoint- 
 ment, and on the 8th, instead of being in 
 France, we shall be in Saxony." He immedi- 
 ately addressed to his army the following pro- 
 clamation : 
 
 " Soldiers, 
 
 "The order for your return to France was 
 issued ; you had already made several marches; 
 triumphal festivities awaited you ! But while 
 we were indulging in this too confident secu- 
 rity, fresh plots were hatching under the mask 
 of friendship and alliance. Cries of war were 
 raised in Berlin. The same spirit of infatua- 
 tion which, by favour of our intestine dissen- 
 sions, led the Prussians, fourteen years ago, 
 into the plains of Champagne, still pervades 
 their counsels. If it is not Paris that they 
 would fain raze to its foundations, it is now 
 their flags that they would boast of planting in 
 the capitals of our allies; it is our laurels that 
 they would snatch from our brows ! They 
 insist that we should evacuate Germany at 
 
 sight of their army Soldiers, there 
 
 is not one of you who would wish to return to 
 France by any other way than that of honour. 
 { It behoves us not to enter it again, but under 
 arches of triumph. Should we then have de- 
 fied seasons, seas, deserts, conquered Europe, 
 several times leagued against us, carried our 
 1 glory from east to west, to return this day to 
 our country as fugitives, after deserting our 
 allies, and to hear it said that the French 
 eagle had fled, affrighted at the sight of Ihe
 
 173 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct 180. 
 
 Prussian eagles 1 Woe, then, be to those 
 who provoke us ! Let the Prussians meet 
 with the same fate which they experienced 
 fourteen years ago ! Let them learn that 
 it is easy to acquire an increase of terri- 
 tory and of power, with the friendship of the 
 great nation : its enmity is more terrible than 
 the tempests of the ocean." 
 
 On the following day, the 8th of October, 
 Napoleon gave orders for the whole army to 
 cross the frontier of Saxony. The three co- 
 lumns of which it was composed broke up 
 simultaneously. Murat, who preceded the cen- 
 tre, entered first, at the head of the light cavalry, 
 and of the 27th light, and pushed his squad- 
 rons by the central defile, that of Kronach,.to 
 Lobenstein. No sooner was he past the woody 
 heights which separate Franconia from Sax- 
 ony, than he despatched several detachments 
 upon the right towards Hof, upon the left 
 towards Saalfeld to clear the outlet of the de- 
 bouches, by which tne otner columns of the 
 army would nave 10 penetrate. He then 
 marched direct from Lobenstein for Saalburg. 
 There he found posted upon the Saale a body 
 of infantry and cavalry belonging to the corps 
 of General Tauenzien. The enemy at first 
 seemed disposed to defend the Saale, which is 
 a feeble obstacle in this part of its course, and 
 sent several rounds of cannon-shot at our 
 horse. He was answered by several pieces 
 of light artillery, usually attached to the re- 
 serve of the cavalry ; he was then shown some 
 companies of infantry, of the 27th light. He 
 defended neither the passage of the Saale, nor 
 Saalburg, and retreated towards Schleiz, at 
 some distance from the place of this first ren- 
 counter. Towards Hof, on our right, the ca- 
 valry discovered nothing that could impede 
 the inarch of Marshals Soult and Ney, who, 
 however, were sufficiently strong to clear a 
 way for themselves. On the left, on the con- 
 trary, towards Saalfeld, it perceived at a dis- 
 tance a considerable body, commanded by 
 Prince Louis. These two corps of General 
 Tauenzien and Prince Louis formed part of 
 the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, who, in 
 spite of the formal order which he had re- 
 ceived to cross to the left bank of the Saale, 
 and to support himself upon the Duke of 
 Brunswick, delayed obeying, and remained 
 dispersed in the hilly country which the Saale 
 traverses at its source. 
 
 The three columns of the French army kept 
 advancing simultaneously by the defiles al- 
 ready specified, that of the left, however, being 
 a little behind, because it had to go back from 
 Ooburg towards Grafenthal, which obliged it 
 to travel twelve leagues upon roads scarcely 
 passable for artillery. For the rest, no serious 
 obstacle checked the march of our troops. 
 The spirit of the army was excellent : the sol- 
 dier displayed the greatest cheerfulness, and 
 seemed to make light of some hardships, in- 
 evitable in a poor and difficult country. Vic- 
 tory, of which he had no doubt, was for him a 
 compensation for all sufferings. 
 
 On tho next day, the 9th of October, the 
 centre left Saalburg, and advanced upon 
 8chl*iz, after crossing the Saale. Murat, with 
 two regiments of light cavalry, and Berna- 
 
 dotte, with Drouet's division, marched at the 
 head. They arrived before Schleiz about noon. 
 Schleiz is a small town situated on a stream, 
 which is called the Wiesenthal, and which 
 discharges itself into the Saale. At the foot 
 of a height beyond Schleiz and the Wiesen- 
 thal was perceived General Tauenzien's corps, 
 drawn up in order of battle. It was backed 
 upon the height, its infantry deployed, its ca- 
 valry disposed on the wings, the artillery on 
 its front. It appeared to consist of about 8000 
 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. Napoleon, who 
 had slept in the environs of Saalburg, hastened 
 to the spot in the morning, and, at sight of the 
 enemy, gave orders for the attack. Marshal 
 Bernadotte directed some companies of the 
 27th light, commanded by General Maison, 
 upon Schleiz. General Tauenzien, apprized 
 that the bulk of the French army was follow- 
 ing this advanced guard, had no idea of de- 
 fending the ground which he occupied. He 
 contented himself with reinforcing the detach- 
 ment which guarded Schleiz, in order to gaia 
 time by a petty action for the rear-guard to 
 retire. General Maison entered Schleiz with 
 Ihe 27th light, and drove out the Prussians. 
 At that moment the 94th and 95th regiments 
 of the line, of Drouet's division, were crossing 
 the Weisenthal, the one below Schleiz, the 
 other at Schleiz itself, and contributed to hasten 
 the retreat of the enemy, who proceeded to- 
 wards the heights in rear of Schleiz. He was 
 briskly pursued upon these heights, and, on 
 reaching their summit, followed down the back 
 of them. Murat, accompanied by the 4th hus- 
 sars and 5th chasseurs, (the latter being a little 
 behind,) closely pressed the enemy's infantry, 
 which was escorted by 2000 horse. Perceiv- 
 ing the small number of the force at the dis- 
 posal of Murat, some Prussian squadrons 
 rushed towards it. Murat got the start of them, 
 charged them, sword in hand, at the head of 
 the 4th hussars, and repulsed them. But, 
 being soon driven back by a more numerous 
 cavalry, he sent in all haste for the 5th chas- 
 seurs, as well as General Maison's light infan- 
 try, which had not yet been able to join him. 
 He had meanwhile several charges to sustain, 
 and he met them with his accustomed valour. 
 Luckily, the 5th chasseurs came up at a gal- 
 lop, rallied the 4th hussars, and made a vigor- 
 ous charge in its turn. But General Tauen- 
 zien, wishing to rid himself of these two 
 regiments of light cavalry, sent the Saxon red 
 dragoons and the Prussian hussars against 
 them. At this moment, five companies of the 
 27th light, headed by General Maison, came 
 up. Not having time to form them in square, he 
 halted them on the spot in such a manner as 
 to cover the flank of our cavalry, and then 
 caused a volley to be discharged within point 
 blank range with such precision as to extend 
 two hundred of the red dragoons upon the 
 pavement. The whole of the Prussian cavalry 
 then betook itself to flight. Murat, with the 
 4th hussars and the 5th chasseurs, dashed 
 after it, and drove General Tauenzien's cavalry 
 and infantry pell-mell into the woods. The 
 enerny retreated in the utmost haste, throwing 
 away upon the roads a. great number of mus- 
 kets and hats, and leaving in our hands about
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 179 
 
 400 prisoners, besides 300 killed or wounded. 
 But the moral effect of the action was greater 
 than the material effect, and the Prussians 
 could then see what sort of soldiers they had 
 to deal with. If Murat, as Napoleon remarked 
 to him, had had at hand a few more cavalry, 
 he would not have been obliged to expose 
 himself so much, and the results would have 
 been more considerable.' 
 
 Napoleon was extremely pleased with this 
 first action, which proved how little the Prus- 
 sian cavalry, though excellently mounted, and 
 very skilful in the management of its horses, 
 was to be feared for the sake of his solid in- 
 fantry and his bold horse-soldiers. He esta- 
 blished his head-quarters at Schleiz, in order 
 to wait there for the rest of the column of the 
 centre, in order more especially to give his 
 right, headed by Marshals Ney and Soult, his 
 left, led by Marshals Lannes and Augereau, 
 time to clear the defiles, and to come and take 
 a position of battle upon its wings. From 
 what he saw, and from what was reported to 
 him by his spies, who had found the country 
 covered by detached columns, he judged that 
 he had surprised the enemy in a movement of 
 concentration, and that he was likely to give 
 him a great deal of trouble. The reports from 
 the right wing, sent by Marshals Soult and 
 
 Ney, stated that they had nothing before them, 
 and that they perceived only occasional de- 
 tachments of cavalry, retiring on their ap- 
 proach. The tidings from the left, on the 
 contrary, made mention of a corps at Saal- 
 feld, before which Marshal Lannes would 
 arrive on the following day, the 10th. 
 
 Napoleon thence concluded that the enemy 
 was then retiring towards the Saale, and leav- 
 ing the high road to Dresden open. He was 
 resolved not to venture upon it till he had 
 beaten the Prussians, and to beat them with- 
 out delay, whether they came to meet him with 
 the intention of barring his way, or he was 
 obliged to seek them behind the steep banks 
 of the Saale.z 
 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe, persuaded that he 
 alone had penetrated the plans of Napoleon, 
 that he alone had devised the true means of 
 thwarting them, by proposing to get to the de- 
 files of Franconia before him, fluctuated amidst 
 a thousand different ideas. Sometimes he in- 
 clined to execute the orders of the Duke of 
 Brunswick and to recross the Saale; at others 
 he formed the silly resolution of proceeding to 
 Mittel-Pollnitz and giving battle there, and thus 
 issued orders and counter-orders which ha- 
 rassed his troops, not in the best condition for 
 marching, laden with baggage, and ill provi- 
 
 To the Grand-duke of Berg and Cleves, at Schleiz. 
 Imperial and Royal Head-quarters, 
 October 10, 1806, 5 A. M. 
 
 General Rapp has acquainted ine with the successful 
 result of yesterday. It appears to me that you had not 
 a sufficient collected force of cavalry at hand. If you 
 scatter it all. you will have none left. You have six 
 regiments; I have recommended to you to have at least 
 four at hand. I do not see that you had yesterday more 
 than two. Reconnoissances on the right are now be- 
 coming much less important : on the arrival of Marshal 
 Soult at Plauen, it is upon Prosneck and Saalfeld that 
 strong reconnoissances must be directed, to learn what 
 is passing there. Marshal Lannes arrived on the even- 
 ing of the 9th at Grafenthal. He will attack Saalfeld 
 to-morrow. You know how important it is to me to be 
 informed during the day of the movement upon Saalfeld. 
 that, if the enemy had assembled there more than 25,000 
 men. I might be able to march reinforcements thither by 
 Possheim, and take them in rear. I have ordered Du- 
 pont's and Beaumont's divisions to proceed to Schleiz. 
 We must, at all events, find a good position in advance 
 of Schleiz, suitable for a field of battle for more than 
 80.000 men. This need not prevent you from taking 
 advantage of day-break to push strong reconnoissances 
 upon Aunia and Possneck, and to let them even be sup- 
 ported by Drouet's division. Marshal Dayqust's first 
 division will be at Saalburg, the two other divisions will 
 be in advance, near Obersdorf, and his light cavalry 
 beyond. I am giving orders to Marshal Ney to inarch 
 to Tanna. Your chief business to-day ought to be, in 
 the first place, to profit by yesterday's advantage to pick 
 up as many prisoners as possible, and to get from them 
 all the information you can : in the second place, to re- 
 connoitre Aurna and Saalfeld in order to ascertain 
 positively what are the movements of the enemy. 
 Whereupon, ic. NAPOLEON. 
 
 * We quote the following letter, illustrative of Napo- 
 leon's ideas at this moment. 
 
 To Marshal Soult, at Plauen. 
 Obersdorf. the 10th October, 1S06, 8 A. M. 
 
 We yesterday thrashed the 6000 men who had retired 
 from hpf to Schleiz, where they expected reinforce- 
 ments in the night. Their cavalry has been cut in 
 pieces, and a colonel taken. More than 2000 muskets 
 and caps were found on the field of battle. The Prus- 
 sian infantry did not stand it* ground. We have picked 
 up but two or three hundred prisoners, because it was 
 dark, and they dispersed in the woods. I reckon upon 
 a good number this morning. 
 
 What seems to me perfectly clear is this: it appears 
 that the Prussians designed to attack ; that their left 
 will debouch to-morrow by Jena, Saalfeld, and Coburg; 
 that the Prince of Hohenlohe had his head-quarters at 
 
 tun. and Prince Louis at Saalfeld. The other column 
 
 debouches by Meiningen upon Fulda. So that I am in- 
 clined to think that you have nobody before you, per- 
 haps not a thousand men as far as Dresden. If you can 
 crush a corps of theirs, do so. Such are my plans for 
 to-day. I cannot march; I have too many things in 
 arrear. I shall push my advanced guard to Auma. I 
 have discovered a good field of battle for K) or 100 thou- 
 sand men, in advance of Schleiz. I am making Mar- 
 shal Ney march to Tanna : there he will be two leagues 
 from Schleiz. At Plauen you will yourself not be so 
 far off as not to be able to come thither in twenty-four 
 hours. 
 
 On the 5th, the Prussian army again made a move- 
 ment upon Thuringia, so that I believe it to be a great 
 number of days behindhand. My junction with my left 
 is not yet made, unless it be by posts of cavalry, which 
 signify nothing. 
 
 Marshal Lannes is not to arrive till to-day at Saalfeld, 
 unless the enemy is there in considerable force. 
 
 Thus the 10th and llth will be lost for marching for- 
 ward. If my junction is made, I shall push on to Neu- 
 stadt and Triplitz. After thai, whatever the enemy may 
 do, I shall be delighted : if he suffers himself to be at- 
 tacked, I will not fail to be at him ; if he files off by 
 Magdeburg, you will be at Dresden before him. I long 
 for a battle. If the enemy has been desirous to attack 
 me. it is because he has great confidence in his stre/igth. 
 In this case, it is not impossible that he may attack. 
 He could do nothing that would please me better. After 
 that battle, I shall be at Dresden and Berlin before him. 
 
 I am waiting impatiently for my horse-guards; 40 
 pieces of artillery and 3000 horse, such as they, are no'. 
 to be disdained. You now see my plans for to-day and 
 to-morrow. You are at liberty to act as you judge beft, 
 but procure bread for yourself, that, if you come a,id 
 join me, you may have sufficient for some days. 
 
 If you find something to do against the enemy at thr. 
 distance of one march from you, you may do it boldly. 
 Establish litt'e posts of cavalry, to communicate rapidly 
 between Schleiz and Plauen. Up to this hour, it seems 
 to me that the campaign commences under the happiest 
 auspices. 
 
 I imagine that you are at Plauen. It is highly expe- 
 dient that you should get possession of it. 
 
 Let me know what you believe you have before you. 
 None of the troops that were at Hof have retired upon 
 Dresden. 
 
 P.S. I receive this moment your despatch of the 9th 
 at 6 P.M. 1 approve the dispositions which vu have 
 made. The intelligence that the thousand ho^e who 
 were at Plauen have retired to Gera, leaves rne in no 
 doubt that Gera will be the point of concentration of the 
 enemy's army. However, in the COUTH: at the day, I 
 shall receive further information ; I shall have more pre- 
 cise ideas. You. being at Plauen, will be furnished wi'h 
 them by letters intercepted at the post.
 
 180 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 sioned. Meanwhile, Prince Louis, impatient 
 to meet the French, and insisting at any rate 
 on forming the advanced guard of the Prussian 
 arm}% had, on his solicitation, been left at 
 Saalfeld, where he still was on the morning 
 of the 10th of October. 
 
 It was towards this point that the French left 
 column was to march, as soon as it should 
 have debouched from Grafenthal. Having 
 reached Grafenthal on the 9th, Lannes, who 
 formed the head of that column, marched for 
 Saalfeld on the morning of the 10th. He had 
 set out at a very early hour. The wooded 
 heights, which generally skirt the Saale, re- 
 ceding at this point from its bed, leave a 
 marshy plain, on which rises the little town 
 of Saalfeld, surrounded by walls, and seated 
 on the very margin of the river. On reaching 
 the circumference of these heights, which over- 
 look Saalfeld, Lannes perceived, in advance 
 of the town, the corps of Prince Louis, con- 
 sisting of about 7000 foot and 2000 horse. 
 The prince had taken a rather unmilitary posi- 
 tion. His left, composed of infantry, was 
 appuyed upon the town and the river; his 
 right, composed of cavalry, extended into the 
 plain. Commanded in front by the circle of 
 the heights, whence the French artillery could 
 pour its fire upon him, he had in his rear a 
 little marshy stream, the Schwartza, which 
 falls into the Saale below Saalfeld, and which 
 is rather difficult to cross. His retreat was 
 consequently very ill secured. Had he been 
 capable of any prudence, and less obliged by 
 his preceding bravadoes to appear rash, he 
 should have retired as speedily as possible, 
 and descended the Saale toRudolstadt or Jena. 
 Unfortunately, it was not consistent either 
 with his character or his part, to recoil from 
 the first meeting with the French. Lannes 
 had not at hand either Augereau's corps, form- 
 ing with him the left column, or even his own 
 entire corps. He was reduced to the mere 
 division of Suchet, and two regiments of light 
 cavalry, the 9th and 10th hussars. He never- 
 theless commenced the attack immediately. 
 In the first place, he ranged his artillery upon 
 the heights, which commanded the line of 
 battle of Prince Louis, and opened a brisk can- 
 nonade upon it. He then threw part of Suchet's 
 division upon his left, with orders to file along 
 the woods which crowned the heights, and to 
 turn the right of Prince Louis, by descending 
 to the banks of the Schwartza. In a few mo- 
 ments this movement was executed. While 
 the artillery, placed in battery on the front of 
 the Prussians, occupied them by sweeping off 
 their men, our tirailleurs, slipping through the 
 woods, commenced an unexpected and destruc- 
 tively well-aimed fire upon their rear. Lannes 
 then made his infantry descend en masse into 
 the plain to overturn the enemy's infantry. In 
 this position there was no judicious course for 
 Prince Louis to adopt, had he even had that 
 experience in war of which he was not pos- 
 sessed. He began by moving towards his in- 
 fantry, in order to meet the shock of Suchet's 
 division. Bui, after efforts of bravery, worthy 
 of being better employed, he saw his battalions 
 broken and driven back in confusion upon the 
 walls of Saalfeld. Not knowing what to ,do, 
 
 he hastened to his cavalry, with the intention 
 of charging the two regiments of hussars, 
 which had followed the movements of our 
 tirailleurs. He charged them with impetuosity, 
 and at first repulsed them. But those two 
 regiments, having rallied, dashed vigorously 
 forward, broke his numerous cavalry, and pur- 
 sued it with such ardour, that, finding it im- 
 possible to form again, it threw itself in dis- 
 order into the marshes of the Schwartza. The 
 prince, in a brilliant uniform, adorned with all 
 his decorations, behaved during the action with 
 the valour befitting his birth and character 
 Two of his aides-de-camp were killed by hit 
 side. Being soon surrounded, he tried to 
 escape, but his horse having entangled him- 
 self in a hedge, he was forced to stop. A quar- 
 termaster of the 10th hussars, taking him for 
 an officer of high rank, but by no means for a 
 prince of the blood-royal, ran up to him, cry- 
 ing, "General, surrender!" To this summons 
 the prince replied by a lunge with his sword. 
 The quartermaster then gave him a thrust in 
 the middle of the chest, and he dropped dead 
 at the foot of his horse. A concourse collected 
 round the body of the prince, which was recog- 
 nised and deposiled, with all the honours due 
 to his rank and his misfortune, in the town of 
 Saalfeld. The Prussian and Saxon troops, for 
 there were both at this point, deprived of their 
 commander, and enclosed in a spot having no 
 outlet, escaped as they best could, leaving 
 behind 20 pieces of cannon, 400 killed or 
 wounded, and about a thousand prisoners. 
 
 Such was the opening of the campaign. 
 The first blow of the war, as Napoleon ob- 
 served next day in the bulletin of the action, 
 had killed one of its authors. So near were 
 the two armies to each other, that Napoleon 
 at Schleiz heard the cannon of Saalfeld, that 
 the Prince of Hohenlohe heard them on his 
 side upon the heights of Mitlel-Pollnitz, and 
 that, towards Jena, on the line occupied by the 
 Prussian main army, their distant rolling was 
 distinctly perceptible. All sensible men in 
 the Prussian army shuddered at it as a signal 
 which announced tragic events. Napoleon, 
 detecting the point whence these reports pro- 
 ceeded, sent off a reinforcement to Lannes, 
 and a great number of officers in quest of 
 news. The Prince of Hohenlohe, on his part, 
 roamed about on horseback, without giving 
 any orders, and questioning goers and comers 
 concerning what was passing. It was a la- 
 mentable sight to see such incapacity and im- 
 prudence battling with such vigilance and 
 genius. 
 
 A few hours afterwards, the fugitives in- 
 formed both armies of the result of the first 
 encounter, and the tragic end of Prince Louis, 
 an end well worthy of his life, on the double 
 score of imprudence and courage. The Prus- 
 sians were enabled to judge what was to be 
 expected from their scientific tactics, opposed 
 to the simple, practical, and rapid mode of 
 acting pursued by the French generals. 
 
 The consternation spread from Saalfeld to 
 Jena and Weimar. The Prince of Hohenlohe, 
 already informed by his own eyes of the dis- 
 couragement which had seized General Tauen- 
 zien's troops, his mind impressed with the rash
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 181 
 
 adventure of Saalfeld, repaired in person to 
 Jena, and despatched orders in all directions 
 to fall back upon the Saale, in order to cover 
 himself with that river, if, however, after so 
 many contradictory movements, the Prussians ' 
 could flatter themselves with the hope of reach- ; 
 ing it in time. It was the third counter-order 
 given to those unfortunate men, who knew not j 
 what was wanted of them, and who were not 
 habituated, like the French, to make several 
 marches in a day, and to live upon what they 
 procured for themselves on march. Some fu- 
 gitives of the corps beaten at Saalfeld, hurry- 
 ing towards Jena, and firing without motive, 
 like soldiers going upon the stroll, were mis- 
 taken for French tirailleurs. At sight of them, 
 an inexpressible terror pervaded the troops 
 marching towards Jena, and the numerous 
 drivers of the baggage train. They fled in 
 disorder, rushing towards the bridges over the 
 Saale, and from those bridges into the streets 
 of Jena. In a few moments all was frightful 
 confusion a luckless omen of the events that 
 were about to follow. 
 
 Napoleon, apprized of the action at Saalfeld, 
 and anxious to bring his wings again nearer 
 to the centre, in proportion as it issued from 
 the defiles by which it had entered Saxony, 
 directed Lannes not to ascend the Saale, which 
 would have removed him too far from himself 
 and brought him too near to the enemy, but to 
 make a movement to the right, and to proceed 
 by Posneck and Neustadt to Auma, where the 
 head-quarters were fixed. Augereau was to 
 fill the vacancy left between the Saale and the 
 corps of Lannes. Ordering a like movement 
 of concentration on his right, Napoleon had 
 despatched Marshal Soult upon Weida and 
 Gera, along the Elster, and sent word for Mar- 
 shal Ney to occupy Auma, when the head- 
 quarters should have left. He would thus 
 have 170,000 men at hand, within the distance 
 of seven or eight leagues, with the faculty of 
 collecting 100,000 of them in a few hours; 
 and, while concentrating himself, he kept ad- 
 vancing, ready to cross the Saale, if it were 
 necessary to force the enemy's position there, 
 or to push on to the Elbe, if he wanted to get 
 thither before him. For the rest, he had not 
 marched more than four or five leagues a day, 
 in order to give his corps time to rejoin ; for 
 his reserves were still behind-hand, especially 
 the artillery and the cavalry of the guard, as 
 well as the battalions of elite. Though he 
 knew from the two actions of the preceding 
 days what he ought to think of the Prussian 
 troops, he marched with the prudence of 
 great captains, in presence of an army which 
 could have opposed to him from 130,000 to 
 140,000 men, collected into a single mass. 
 In the evening of the 12th he left Auma for 
 Gera. 
 
 The cavalry, moving about in all directions 
 among the baggage columns of the unfortu- 
 nate Saxons, made rich and numerous prizes. 
 Five hundred carriages were taken at one 
 blow. The cavalry, as Napoleon wrote, was 
 " seamed with gold" (cousue d'or.) At length, 
 intercepted letters and the reports of spies be- 
 gan to agree, and to represent the Prussian 
 grand army as changing position, and advanc- 
 
 ing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to 
 approach the banks of the Saale. It might be 
 coming thither with one of the two following 
 intentions : either to occupy the bridge ovei 
 the Saale at Naumburg, over which passes the 
 great central road of Germany, in order to re- 
 tire upon the Elbe, while covering Leipzig and 
 Dresden ; or to approach the course of the 
 Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks 
 against the French. To meet this double con- 
 tingency, Napoleon took a first precaution, 
 which was to despatch Marshal Davout imme- 
 diately to Naumburg with orders to bar the 
 passage of the bridge there with the 26,000 
 men of the third corps. He sent Murat, with 
 the cavalry, along the banks of the Saale, to 
 watch its course, and to push reconnoissances 
 as far as Leipzig. He directed Marshal Ber- 
 nadotte upon Naumburg, with instructions to 
 support Marshal Davout in case of need. He 
 sent Marshals Lannes and Augereau to Jena 
 itself. His object was to make himself mas- 
 ter immediately of the two principal passages 
 of the Saale, those at Naumburg and Jena, 
 either to stop the Prussian army there, if it 
 should design to cross and to retire to the 
 Elbe, or to go and seek it on the heights bor- 
 dering that river, if it purposed to remain 
 there on the defensive. As for himself, he 
 continued with Marshals Ney and Soult, with- 
 in reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to 
 march for either point according to circum- 
 stances. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, he learned by 
 more circumstantial accounts that the enemy 
 was definitively approaching the Saale, with 
 the yet uncertain resolution of fighting a de- 
 fensive battle on its banks, or of crossing and 
 pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direc- 
 tion from Weimar to Jena that the largest as- 
 semblage appeared. Without losing a moment, 
 Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. 
 He gave himself his instructions to Marshals 
 Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena 
 in the evening, or at latest in the night. He 
 directed Murat to bring his cavalry towards 
 Jena, and Marshal Bernadotte to take at Dorn- 
 burg an intermediate position between Jena 
 and Naumburg. He set out immediately, send- 
 ing officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, 
 and to make them turn back for Jena. 
 
 In the evening of the preceding day, Mar- 
 shal Davout had entered Naumburg, occupiel 
 the bridge of the Saale, and taken considera- 
 ble magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. 
 Marshal Bernadotte had joined him. Murat 
 had sent his light cavalry as far as Leipzig, 
 and surprised the gates of that great commer- 
 cial city. Lannes had proceeded towards Jena, 
 a small university town, seated on the very 
 banks of the Saale, and had driven back pell- 
 mell the enemy's troops left beyond the river, 
 as well as the baggage, which encumbered the 
 road. He had taken possession of Jena, and 
 immediately pushed his advanced posts upon 
 the heights which command it. From theso 
 ; heights he had perceived the army of the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe, which, after recrossing 
 the Saale, encamped between Jena and Wei- 
 j mar, and he had reason to suspect that a grea' 
 I assemblage was collecting in that place.
 
 182 
 
 HISTORY 0F THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 The Prussian army was, in fact, concen- 
 trated here, and ready to take its final deter- 
 minations. The Prince of Hohenlohe had 
 decided to obey the orders of the Duke of 
 Brunswick, and to recross the Saale, for the 
 purpose of rejoining the Prussian grand army. 
 He would have reached that position in better 
 order, and without losing his baggage, had he 
 obeyed sooner. His troops were assembled 
 there confusedly, and without provisions, not 
 knowing where to procure any, applying for 
 them in vain to the principal army, which pos- 
 sessed only just enough for itself. The Sax- 
 ons, whose conduct had been honourable, but 
 whom the chances of events had put forward 
 conspicuously in the first two encounters, 
 <ind who saw their country delivered over 
 without defence to the French, complained bit- 
 lerly of being ill-treated, ill-fed, and dragged 
 into a war which set out with the most sinis- 
 ter prospects. Great pains were taken to pa- 
 cify them ; and this time they were placed in 
 second line behind the Prussians. However, 
 in spite of this deplorable commencement, the 
 Prussians were assembled along the forest of 
 Thuringia, in advance of the Saale, to stop the 
 French, if they attempted to cross it, or to 
 descend in safety to the Elbe, if they were in 
 haste to reach that river. This was the case, 
 since they had attached such value to this po- 
 sition as to persevere in the idea that had been 
 formed of it, and to avail themselves of the 
 advantages which it offered. The Saale, in 
 fact, though fordable, runs in a bed which 
 forms a sort of continuous gorge. The left 
 bank, on which the Prussians were encamped, 
 is covered by abrupt heights, the foot of which 
 is washed by the river, and the summit clothed 
 with a series of woods. Beyond are undulated 
 plateaux, well adapted to receive an army. In 
 descending from Jena to Naumburg, the diffi- 
 culties become greater than anywhere else. 
 Besides Jena and Naumburg, there were but 
 three avenues by which access could be gained, 
 those of Lobstedt, Dornburg, and Camburg, 
 about two leagues distant from each other, and 
 very easy to defend. Since, instead of esta- 
 blishing themselves behind the Elbe, the Prus- 
 ,sians had determined to go and meet the 
 French, and fight them en masse, there was not 
 a more advantageous site than the left bank 
 of the Saale, for a general action. They had 
 deprived themselves, it is true, of 10,000 men, 
 composing the advanced guard of the Duke 
 of Weimar, and sent to reconnoitre beyond 
 the forest of Thuringia; they had lost five or 
 six thousand in killed, prisoners and fugitives, 
 in the actions of Schleiz and Saalfeld; but the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe had still 50,000 men left, 
 the Duke of Brunswick 66,000, General Ru- 
 chel seventeen or eighteen thousand, that is to 
 say, 134,000 men a very formidable army, 
 behind such a position as that of the Saale 
 from Jena to Naumburg. By placing strong 
 detachments before the principal passages, 
 and the mass a little in rear, in a central posi- 
 tion, so as to be able to hasten in force to the 
 point attacked, they would be capable of fight- 
 ing a dangerous battle for the French army 
 and if not to wrest victory from it, to dispute 
 
 t with such effect as to render retreat easy 
 and the issue of the war uncertain. 
 
 But the perturbation of mind continued only 
 o increase in the Prussian staff". The Duke 
 of Brunswick, who had hitherto displayed 
 sound reasoning powers, and who had ap- 
 jeared to appreciate the position occupied in 
 he different possible cases the Duke of 
 Brunswick, now that one of those cases, and 
 the most foreseen, was realized, seemed sud- 
 denly to have lost his senses, and was for de- 
 camping with the utmost expedition. The 
 movement of Marshal Davout upon Naum- 
 jurg had been a flash of light for him. He 
 lad concluded, from the appearance of that 
 marshal on the way to Naumburg, that it was 
 Vapoleon's intention not to give battle, but to 
 lasten his march to the Elbe, to cut off the 
 Prussians from Saxony, and even from Prus- 
 sia, as he had cut oft' General Mack from Ba- 
 varia and Austria. The fear of being sur- 
 rounded, as General Mack had been, and 
 forced, like him, to lay down his arms, dis- 
 turbed the generally just judgment of this un- 
 fortunate old man. He resolved, therefore, to 
 set off instantly for the Elbe. In Prussia the 
 unfortunate Mack had been jeered so merci- 
 lessly and with so little justice, that people 
 lost their reason at the bare idea of finding 
 themselves in the same situation, and that, in 
 order to avoid it, they ran the risk of falling 
 into other positions which were not better. 
 The present situation was, nevertheless, far 
 from resembling that of the Austrian general. 
 The Duke of Brunswick might, it is true, be 
 turned, separated from Saxony by /a rapid 
 movement of Napoleon's toward the Elbe ; 
 perhaps the French might reach Berlin before 
 him, but it was impossible that he could be 
 enveloped and obliged to capitulate. Whe- 
 ther he lost a battle on the Saale, whether Na- 
 poleon got the start of him on the Elbe, he had 
 a sure retreat to Magdeburg and the Lower 
 Elbe, and though he was liable to arrive there 
 in bad plight, he could not be taken in the vast 
 plains of the north, like the Austrians in that 
 close gorge of the valley of the Danube. Be- 
 sides, while General Mack's army numbered 
 at most 70,000 men, that of the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick would amount to 144,000, if the Duke of 
 Weimar were called in ; and such an army is 
 not easily surrounded so completely as to be 
 obliged to lay down its arms. But, since the 
 Prussians had been so intent on fighting, had 
 so earnestly desired to meet the French, even 
 thought of crossing the mountains, in order to 
 go and seek them in Franconia, when they at 
 length fell in with them on a ground excellent 
 for themselves, very difficult for the enemy, 
 wherefore not establish themselves upon it en 
 masse, and fling them into the deep and rocky 
 bed of the Saale, the moment they should at- 
 tempt to ascend its heights ? But they had 
 lost all presence of mind, since the enemy 
 whom they defied at a distance, was so close 
 to them, since it had been shown at Schleiz 
 and Saalfeld that the quality of the Prussian 
 army was so little superior to that of the Aus- 
 trian and Russian armies. 
 Tic Duke of Brunswick, impatient to secure
 
 Oct 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 1SS 
 
 himself from the so dreaded fate of General 
 Mack, determined to decamp immediately, and 
 to push on by forced marches for the Elbe, 
 covering himself with the Saale, which course 
 would entail the relinquishment of Leipzig, 
 of Dresden, and of all Saxony, to the French. 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe, having tardily de- 
 cided on recrossing the Saale, encamped upon 
 the heights of Jena. The Duke of Brunswick 
 enjoined him to remain there, to close that 
 debouche, while the principal army, filing behind 
 the army of Silesia, should join the Saale at 
 Naumburg, and descend it to the Elbe. 
 
 He ordered general Ruchel to stay at Wei- 
 mar for the time required to rally the advanced 
 guard, engaged in a useless reconnoissance 
 beyond the forest of Thuringia ; and, as for 
 himself, taking with him the five divisions of 
 the principal army, he resolved to decamp on 
 the 13th, to follow the high road from Weimar 
 to Leipzig as far as the bridge of Naumburg, 
 to leave three divisions at that bridge to guard 
 it, while he should go with the two others to 
 secure the passage of the Unstrut, one of the 
 tributaries of the Saale; then, that obstacle 
 overcome, to fall back upon the three divisions 
 posted at Naumburg, to draw to him the Prince 
 of Hohenlohe and General Ruchel, left in rear, 
 and to march along the banks of the Saale to 
 the junction of that river with the Elbe in the 
 environs of Magdeburg. 
 
 Such was the plan of retreat adopted by 
 the Duke of Brunswick. It was not worth 
 while to quit the defensive line of the Elbe, 
 which ought never to have been left, for the 
 purpose of regaining it so soon and with such 
 great dangers. 
 
 In consequence, the principal army received 
 orders to break up on the same day, the 13th 
 of October. The Prince of Hohenlohe was 
 directed to occupy the heights of Jena, and to 
 close that passage, while the five divisions of 
 the Duke of Brunswick, leaving Weimar, 
 were to go and pass the night at Naumburg. 
 These five divisions were to follow one another 
 at the distance of a league, and to march six 
 leagues that day. It is not thus that the 
 French march, when they have an important 
 end to attain. Weimar being evacuated, Gen- 
 eral Ruchel was to proceed thither immediate- 
 ly. All these dispositions being settled and 
 communicated to those who were appointed to 
 execute them, the army of the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick commenced its march, having at its head 
 the king, the princes, the queen herself, and 
 followed by such a mass of baggage as to ren- 
 der any manoeuvre impossible. The cannon 
 were heard so near that the queen could not 
 be allowed to continue at the head-quarters. 
 Her presence, after being indecorous, became 
 perilous for herself and a subject of uneasi- 
 ness for the king. It required a formal injunc- 
 tion from the latter to decide her to leave. At 
 length she departed, her eyes full of tears, no 
 longer doubting, since the actions of Schleiz 
 and Saalfeld, the fatal consequences of a 
 policy of which she was the hapless insti- 
 gator. 
 
 While the Duke of Brunswick was thus 
 marching towards Naumburg, the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe, left upon the heights of Jena with 
 
 50,000 men, and having as rear-guard General 
 Ruchel with 18,000, endeavoured to restore a 
 little order among his troops, sent out wagons 
 to scour the country in quest of provisions, 
 and in particular to procure some relief for 
 the Saxons, whose discontent was extreme. 
 Coinciding in opinion with the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick, that the French were hastening to Leip- 
 zig and Dresden, in order to get first to the 
 Elbe, he gave himself little concern about the 
 town of Jena, and paid little attention to the 
 heights situated behind it. 
 
 During this same afternoon of the 13th of 
 October, Napoleon, as we have seen, had 
 moved rapidly from Gera towards Jena, fol- 
 lowed by all his forces. He arrived there 
 himself about noon : Marshal Lannes, who 
 had outstripped him, was waiting for him with 
 impatience. Without losing a moment, both 
 mounted their horses to reconnoitre the locali- 
 ties. At Jena itself, the valley of the Saale 
 begins to widen. The right bank, on which 
 we were marching, is low, damp, and covered 
 with meadows. The left bank, on the con- 
 trary, that which the Prussians occupied, pre- 
 sents steep heights, whose peaked tops over- 
 look the town of Jena, and which are ascend- 
 ed by narrow, winding ravines, overhung with 
 wood. On the left of Jena, a gorge more open, 
 less abrupt, called the Muhltnal, has become 
 the passage through which the high road from 
 Jena to Weimar has been carried. This road 
 first keeps along the bottom of the Miihlthal. 
 then rises in form of a spiral staircase, and 
 opens upon the plateaux in rear. It would 
 have required a fierce assault to force this pass; 
 more open, it is true, but guarded by a great 
 portion of the Prussian army. Of course, to 
 climb the plateaux at this point, in order to 
 give battle there to the Prussians, was wholly 
 out of the question. 
 
 But another resource presented itself. The 
 bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines 
 which are met with on going out of Jena, had 
 succeeded in ascending the principal height, 
 and all at once perceived the Prussian army 
 encamped on the plateaux of the left bank. 
 Followed presently by some detachments of 
 Suchet's division, they had made room for 
 themselves by driving in General Tauenzien's 
 advanced posts. Thus, thanks to the boldness 
 of our soldiers, the heights which command 
 the left bank of the Saale were conquered, but 
 by a route which, unfortunately, was scarcely 
 accessible to artillery. Thither Lannes con- 
 ducted Napoleon, amidst an incessant fire of 
 tirailleurs which rendered reconnoissances 
 extremely dangerous. 
 
 The principal of the heights that overlook 
 the town of Jena is called Landgrafenberg, 
 and, since the memorable events of which it 
 ! has been the theatre, it has received from the 
 inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg. It is 
 | the highest in these parts. Napoleon and 
 Lannes, surveying from that height the sur- 
 rounding country, with their backs tnrned to 
 Jena, beheld on their right the Saale running 
 in a deep, winding, wooded gorge, to Naum- 
 burg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. 
 Before them they saw undulated plateaux, ex- 
 tending to a distance, and subsiding by a
 
 184 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct 1806. 
 
 gentle slope to the little valley of the llm, at 
 the extremity of which is situated the town of , 
 Weimar. They perceived on their left the ! 
 high road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a j 
 series of slopes from the gorge of the Muhl- 
 thal to these plateaux, and running in a straight . 
 line to Weimar. These slopes, somewhat re- 
 sembling a sort of snail's shell, have thence 
 received in German the appellation of the 
 Schnecke (snail). On this same road from Jena . 
 to Weimar was posted en echelons the Prussian 
 army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, but it was 
 not possible to judge precisely of its number. 
 As for the corps of General Ruchel posted at 
 Weimar, the distance did not permit that to 
 be discerned. In the same predicament was 
 the grand army of the Duke of Brunswick, 
 which, marching from Weimar to Naumburg, 
 was hidden in the bottoms of the valley of the 
 llm. 
 
 Napoleon, having before him a mass of 
 troops, the force of which could scarcely be 
 estimated, supposed that the Prussian army 
 had chosen this ground for a field of battle, 
 and immediately made his dispositions, so as 
 to debouch with his army on the Landgrafen- 
 berg, before the enemy should hasten up, en 
 masse, to hurl him into the precipices of the 
 Saale. He was obliged to make the best use 
 of his time, and to take advantage of the space 
 gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself 
 on the height. He had, it is true, no more of 
 it than the summit, for, only a few paces off, 
 there was the corps of General Tauenzien, 
 separated from our troops only by a slight 
 ridge of ground. This corps was appuyed on 
 two villages, one on our right, that of Close- 
 witz, surrounded by a small wood, the other , 
 on our left, that of Cospoda, likewise sur- j 
 rounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon 
 purposed to leave the Prussians quiet in this 
 position till the next day, and meanwhile to 
 lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. 
 The space which it occupied was capable of 
 containing the corps of Lanntes and the guard. 
 He ordered them to be led up immediately 
 through the steep ravines which serve to j 
 ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On j 
 the left he placed Gazan's division ; on the j 
 right, Suchet's division ; in the centre, and a j 
 little in rear, the foot-guard. He made the 
 latter encamp in a square of four thousand ; 
 men, and in the centre of this square he esta- 
 blished his own bivouac. Ever since that 
 lime, the people of the country have called 
 that height the Napoleonsberg, marking by a 
 heap of rough stones the spot where this per- 
 sonage, popular everywhere, even in places 
 where he has only shown himself terrible, 
 passed that memorable night. 
 
 But it was not enough to bring infantry 
 upon the Landgrafenberg it was necessary 
 to mount artillery too upon it. Napoleon, 
 riding about in all directions, discovered a 
 passage less steep than the others, and by 
 which the artillery might be dragged up with 
 great exertion. Unjuckily, the way was too 
 narrow. Napoleon sent forthwith for a detach- 
 ment of the engineers, and had it widened by 
 cutting the rock ; he himself, in his impatience, 
 directed the works, torch in hand. He did not 
 
 retire till the night was far advanced, when he 
 had seen the first pieces of cannon rolled up. 
 It required twelve horses to draw each gun- 
 carriage to the top of the Landgrafenberg. 
 Napoleon proposed to attack General Tauen- 
 zien at day-break, and, by pushing him briskly, 
 to conquer the space necessary for deploying 
 his army. Fearful, however, of debouching 
 by a single outlet, wishing also to divide the 
 attention of the enemy, he directed Augereau 
 towards the left, to enter the gorge of the 
 Muhlthal, to march one of his two divisions 
 upon the Weimar road, and to gain with the 
 other the back of the Landgrafenberg, in order 
 to fall upon the rear of General Tauenzien. 
 On the right, he ordered Marshal Soult, whose 
 corps, breaking up from Gera, was to arrive in 
 the night, to ascend the other ravines, which, 
 running fromLobstedt and Dornburg, debouch 
 upon Closewitz, likewise for the purpose of 
 falling upon the rear of General Tauenzien. 
 With this double diversion, on the right and 
 on the left, Napoleon had no doubt of forcing 
 the Prussians in their position, and gaining 
 for himself the space needed by his army for 
 deploying. Marshals Ney and Murat were to 
 ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route which 
 Lannes and the guard had followed. 
 
 The day of the 13th had closed ; profound 
 darkness enveloped the field of battle. Napo- 
 leon had placed his tent in the centre of the 
 square formed by his guard, and had suffered 
 only a few fires to be lighted; but all those of 
 the Prussian army were kindled. The fires of 
 the Prince of Hohenlohe were to be seen over 
 the whole extent of the plateaux, and at the 
 horizon on the right, topped by the old castle 
 of Eckartsberg, those of the army of the Duke 
 of Brunswick, which had all at once become 
 visible for Napoleon; He conceived that, so 
 far from retiring, the whole of the Prussian 
 forces had come to take part in the battle. He 
 sent immediately fresh orders to Marshals Da- 
 vout and Bernadotte. He enjoined Marshal 
 Davout to guard strictly the bridge of Naum- 
 burg, even to cross it, if possible, and to fall 
 upon the rear of the Prussians, while they were 
 engaged in front. He ordered Marshal Berna- 
 dotte, placed intermediately, to concur in the 
 projected movement, either by joining Marshal 
 Davout, if he was near the latter, or by throw- 
 ing himself directly on the flank of the Prus- 
 sians, if he had already taken at Dornburg a 
 position nearer to Jena. Lastly, he desired 
 Murat to arrive as speedily as possible with 
 his cavalry. 
 
 While Napoleon was making these disposi- 
 tions, the Prince of Hohenlohe was in com- 
 plete ignorance of the lot which awaited him. 
 Still persuaded that the bulk of the French 
 army, instead of halting before Jena, was 
 hurrying to Leipzig and Dresden, he sup- 
 posed that he should at most have to deal with 
 the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, 
 which, having passed the Saale after the action 
 at Saalfeld, would, he imagined, make their 
 appearance between Jena and Weimar, as if 
 they had descended from the heights of the 
 forest of Thuringia. Under this idea, not 
 thinking of making front towards Jena, he 
 had on that side opposed only the corps of
 
 Oct. 1806.J 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 135 
 
 General Tauenzien, and ranged his army 
 along the road from Jena to Weimar. His 
 left, composed of Saxons, guarded the summit 
 of the Schnecke ; his right extended to Wei- 
 mar, and connected itself with General Ru- 
 chel's corps. However, a fire of tirailleurs, 
 which was heard on the Landgra fen berg, hav- 
 ing excited a sort of alarm, and General Tau- 
 enzien applying for succour, the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe ordered the Saxon brigade of Cer- 
 rini, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, and seve- 
 ral squadrons of cavalry, to get under arms, 
 and despatched these forces to the Landgra- 
 fenberg, to dislodge from it the French, whom 
 he conceived to be scarcely established on that 
 point. At the moment when he was about to 
 execute this resolution, Colonel de Massenbach 
 brought him from the Duke of Brunswick a 
 reiterated order not to involve himself in any 
 serious action, to guard well the passages of 
 the Saale, and particularly that of Dornburg, 
 which excited uneasiness because some light 
 troops had been perceived there. The Prince 
 of Hohenlohe, who had become one of the 
 most obedient of lieutenants, when he ought 
 not to have been so, desisted at once, in com- 
 pliance with these injunctions from the head- 
 quarters. It was singular, nevertheless, that, 
 in obeying the order not to fight, he should 
 abandon the debouche by which, on the morrow, 
 a disastrous battle was to be forced upon him. 
 Be this as it may, relinquishing the idea of re- 
 taking the Landgrafenbcrg, he contented him- 
 self with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerrini 
 to General Tauenzien, and with placing at 
 Nerkwitz, facing Dornburg, the Prussian bri- 
 gade of Sanitz, the Pelet fusiliers, a battalion 
 of Schemmelpfennig, lastly several detach- 
 ments of cavalry and artillery, under the com- 
 mand of General Holzendorf. He sent some 
 light horse to Dornburg itself, to learn what 
 was passing there. The Prince of Hohenlohe 
 confined himself to these dispositions : he re- 
 turned to his head-quarters at Capellendorf, 
 near Weimar, saying that, with 50,000 men, 
 and even 70,000, including Ruchel's corps, 
 kept towards Dornburg by General Holzendorf, 
 towards Jena by General Tauenzien, fronting 
 to the road from Jena to Weimar, he would 
 punish the two Marshals Lannes and Auge- 
 reau for their audacity, if they dared to attack 
 him with the 30 or 40 thousand French at 
 their disposal, and retrieve the honour of the 
 Prussian arms, seriously compromised at 
 Schleiz and Saalfeld. 
 
 Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his 
 last instructions to his lieutenants, and orders 
 for his soldiers to get under arms. The night 
 was cold, the country covered to a distance 
 with a thick fog, like that which for some 
 hours enveloped the field of Austerlitz. Es- 
 corted by men carrying torches, Napoleon 
 went along the front of the troops, talking to 
 the officers and soldiers. He explained the 
 position of the two armies, demonstrated to 
 them that the Prussians were as deeply com- 
 promised as the Austrians in the preceding 
 year; that, if vanquished in that engagement, 
 they would be cut off from the Elbe and the 
 Oder, separated from the Russians, and forced 
 to abandon to the French the whole Prussian 
 
 VOL. II. 24 
 
 monarchy; that, in such a situation, the 
 French corps which should suffer itself to be 
 beaten would frustrate the grandest designs, 
 and disgrace itself for ever. He exhorted 
 them to keep on their guard against the Prus- 
 sian cavalry, and to receive it in square with 
 their usual firmness. His words everywhere 
 drew forth shouts of " Forward ! vive I'Empe- 
 reurf" Though the fog was thick, yet through 
 its veil the enemy's advanced posts perceived 
 the glare of the torches, heard the acclama- 
 tions of our soldiers, and went to give the 
 alarm to General Tauenzien. At that moment, 
 the corps of Lannes set itself in motion, on 
 a signal from Napoleon. Suchet's division, 
 formed into three brigades, advanced first. 
 Claparede's brigade, composed of the 17th 
 light and a battalion of elite, marched at the 
 head, deployed in a single line. On the wings 
 of this line, and to preserve it from attacks of 
 cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming 
 the second brigade, were disposed in close co- 
 lumn. Vedel's brigade, deployed, closed this 
 sort of square. On the left of Suchet's divi- 
 sion, but a little in rear, came Gazan's divi- 
 sion, ranged in two lines and preceded by its 
 artillery. Thus they advanced, groping their 
 way through the fog. Suchet's division di- 
 rected its course towards the village of CJose- 
 witz, which was on the right, Gazan's division 
 towards the village of Cospoda, which was on 
 the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick 
 Augustus and Rechten, and the Prussian bat- 
 talion of Zweifel, perceiving through the fog a 
 mass in motion, fired all together. The 17th 
 light sustained that fire, and immediately re- 
 turned it. ' This fire of musketry was kept up 
 for a few minutes, the parties seeing the flash, 
 and hearing the report, but not discerning one 
 another. The French, on approaching, at 
 length discovered the little wood which sur- 
 rounded the village of Closewitz. General 
 Claparede briskly threw himself into it, and, 
 after a fight hand to hand, had soon carried it, 
 as well as the village of Closewitz itself. 
 Having deprived General Tauenzien's line of 
 this appui, the French continued their march 
 amidst the balls that issued from that thick 
 fog. Gazan's division, on its part, took the 
 village of Cospoda and established itself there. 
 Between these two villages, but a little farther 
 off, was a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, 
 occupied by Erichsen's fusiliers. Gazan's di- 
 vision carried that also, and was then able to 
 deploy more at its ease. At this moment the 
 two divisions of Lannes were assailed by 
 fresh discharges of artillery and musketry. 
 These were from the Saxon grenadiers of the 
 Cerrini brigade, who, after taking up the ad- 
 vanced posts of General Tauenzien, continued 
 to move forward, firing battalion volleys with 
 as much precision as if they had been at a 
 review. The 17th light, which formed the 
 head of Suchet's division, having exhausted 
 its cartridges, was sent to the rear. The 34th 
 took its place, kept up the fire for some time, 
 then encountered the Saxon grenadiers with 
 the bayonet, and broke them. The route hav- 
 ing soon extended to the whole corps of Gene- 
 ral Tauenzien, Gazan's and Suchet's divisions 
 picked up about twenty pieces of cannon and
 
 i80 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806 
 
 many fugitives. From the Landgrafenberg, 
 the undulated plateaux, on which the French 
 had just deployed, gradually subsided, as we 
 have said, to the little valley of the lira. 
 Hence they marched rapidly upon sloping 
 ground, at the heels of a fleeing enemy. In 
 this quick movement they encountered two 
 battalions of Cerrini, and also Pelet's fusiliers, 
 which had been left in the environs of Close- 
 witz. These troops were flung back for the 
 rest of the day towards General Holzendorf, 
 commissioned on the preceding day to guard 
 the debouche of Dornburg. 
 
 This action had not lasted two hours. It 
 was nine o'clock, and Napoleon had thus early 
 realized the first part of his plan, which con- 
 sisted in gaining the space necessary for de- 
 ploying his army. At the same moment his 
 instructions were executing at all points with 
 remarkable punctuality. Towards the left, 
 Marshal Augereau, having sent off Heudelet's 
 division, and likewise his artillery and cavalry, 
 to the extremity of the Miihlthal, on the high 
 road from Weimar, was climbing, with Des- 
 jardin's division, the back of the Landgrafen- 
 berg, and coming to form on the plateaux the 
 left of Gazan's division. Marshal Soult, only 
 one of whose divisions, that of General St. 
 Hilaire, had arrived, was ascending from 
 Lobstedt, in the rear of Closewitz, facing the 
 positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Krone, occu- 
 pied by the relics of Tauenzien's corps and by 
 the detachment of General Holzendorf. Mar- 
 shal Ney, impatient to share in the battle, had 
 detached from his corps a battalion of vol- 
 tigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th 
 light, two regiments of cavalry, alid'had gone 
 on before with this body of elite. He entered 
 Jena at the very hour when the first act of the 
 engagement was over. Lastly, Murat, return- 
 ing at a gallop, with the dragoons and cuiras- 
 siers, from reconnoissances executed on the 
 Lower Saale, was mounting in breathless haste 
 towards Jena. Napoleon resolved, therefore, 
 to halt for a few moments on the conquered 
 ground, to afford his troops time to get into 
 line. 
 
 Meanwhile, the fugitives belonging to Gene- 
 ral Tauenzien's force had given the alarm to 
 the whole camp of the Prussians. At the 
 sound of the cannon, the Prince of Hohenlohe 
 had hastened to the Weimar road, where the 
 Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet be- 
 lieving the action to be general, and complain- 
 ing that the troops were harassed by being 
 obligtd needlessly to get under arms. Being 
 soon undeceived, he took his measures for 
 giving battle. Knowing that the French had 
 passed the Saale at Saalfeld, he had expected 
 to see them make their appearance between 
 Jena and Weimar, and had drawn up his army 
 along the road running from one to the other 
 of these towns. As this conjecture was not 
 realized, he was obliged to change his dispo- 
 sitions, and he did it with promptness and 
 resolution. He sent the bulk of the Prussian 
 infantry, under the command of General 
 Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned 
 by General Tauenzien. Towards the Schnecke. 
 which was to form his right, he left the Niese- 
 xneuVnel div.'sion, composed of the two Sajcon 
 
 brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prus- 
 sian Boguslawski battalion, and of a numerous 
 artillery, with orders to defend to the last ex- 
 tremity the winding slopes by which the 
 Weimar road rises to the plateaux. To aid 
 them, he gave them the Cerrini brigade, ral- 
 lied and reinforced by four Saxon battalions. 
 In rear of his centre, he placed a reserve of 
 five battalions under General Dyherrn, to sup- 
 port General Grawert. He had the wrecks of 
 Tauenzien's corps rallied at some distance 
 from the field of battle, and supplied with am- 
 munition. As for his left, he directed General 
 Holzendorf to push forward, if he could, and 
 to fall upon the right of the French, while he 
 would himself endeavour to stop them in front. 
 He sent General Ruchel information of what 
 | was passing, and begged him to hasten his 
 ; march. Lastly, he hurried off himself with 
 the Prussian cavalry and the artillery horsed, 
 to meet the French, for the purpose of keeping 
 them in check and covering the formation of 
 General Grawert's infantry. 
 
 It was about ten o'clock, and the action of 
 the morning, interrupted for an hour, was 
 about to begin again with greater violence, 
 while, on the right, Marshal Soult, debouching 
 from Lobstedt, was climbing the heights with 
 St. Hilaire's division ; while in the centre, 
 Marshal Lannes, with Suchet's and Gazan's 
 divisions, was deploying on the plateaux won 
 in the morning ; and while, on the left, Mar- 
 shal Augereau, ascending from the bottom of 
 the Muhlthal, had reached the village of Iser- 
 stedt, Marshal Ney, in his ardour for fighting, 
 had advanced with his 3000 men of the elite, 
 concealed by the fog, and had placed himself 
 between Lannes and Augereau, facing the vil- 
 lage of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which occupied the 
 centre of the field of battle. He arrived at the 
 very moment when the Prince of Hohenlohe 
 was hastening up at the head of the Prussian 
 cavalry. Finding himself all at once facing 
 the enemy, he engaged before the Emperor 
 had given orders for renewing the action. The 
 horse-artillery of the Prince of Hohenlohe 
 having already placed itself in battery, Ney 
 pushed the 10th chasseurs upon this artillery. 
 This regiment, taking advantage of a clump 
 of trees to form, dashed forward on the gallop, 
 ascended by its right upon the flank of the 
 Prussian artillery, cut down the gunners, and 
 took seven pieces of cannon, under the fire of 
 the whole line of the enemy. But a mass of 
 Prussian cuirassiers rushed upon it, and il 
 was obliged to retire with precipitation. Ney 
 then despatched the 3d hussars. This regi- 
 ment, manoeuvering as the 10th chasseurs had 
 done, took advantage of the clump of trees to 
 form, ascended upon the flank of the cuiras- 
 siers, then fell upon them suddenly, threw 
 them into disorder, and forced them to retire. 
 Two regiments of light cavalry, however, were 
 not enough, to make head against thirty squad- 
 rons of dragoons and cuirassiers. Our chas- 
 seurs and our hussars were soon obliged to 
 seek shelter behind our infantry. Marshal 
 Ney then sent forward the battalion of grena- 
 diers and the battalion of voltigeurs which he 
 had brought, formed two squares, then placing 
 lutnscii in one of them, opposed the charges
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 197 
 
 of the Prussian cavalry. He allowed the ene- 
 my's cuirassiers to approach within twenty 
 paces of his bayonets, and terrified them by 
 the aspect of a motionless infantry which had 
 reserved its fire. At his signal, a discharge 
 within point-blank range strewed the ground 
 with dead and wounded. Though several 
 times assailed, these two squares remained 
 unbroken. 
 
 Napoleon, on the top of the Landgrafen- 
 berg, had been highly astonished to hear the 
 firing recommence without his order. He 
 learned with still more astonishment that 
 Marshal Ney, whom he had supposed to be in 
 rear, was engaged with the Prussians. He 
 hastened up greatly displeased, and on ap- 
 proaching Vierzehn-Heiligen, perceived from 
 the height Marshal Ney defending himself, in 
 the middle of two weak squares, against the 
 whole of the Prussian cavalry. This heroic 
 countenance was enough to dispel all dis- 
 pleasure. Napoleon sent General Bertrand 
 with two regiments of light cavalry, all that 
 he had at hand, in the absence of Murat, to 
 assist in extricating Ney, and ordered Lannes 
 to advance with his infantry. During the time 
 that elapsed before relief arrived, the intrepid 
 Ney was not disconcerted. While, with four 
 regiments of horse, he renewed his charges 
 of cavalry, he moved the 25th infantry to his 
 left, in order to appuy himself on the wood of 
 Iserstedt, which Augereau, on his part, was 
 striving to reach; he made the battalion of 
 grenadiers advance as far as the little wood 
 which had protected his chasseurs, and de- 
 spatched the battalion of voltigeurs to gain 
 possession of the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen. 
 But, at the same instant, Lannes, coming to 
 his assistance, threw the 21st regiment of 
 light-infantry into the village of Vierzehn- 
 Heiligen, and, putting himself at the head of 
 the 100th, 103d, 34th, 64th, and 88th of the 
 line, debouched in the face of the Prussian 
 infantry of General Grawert. The latter de- 
 ployed before the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, 
 with a regularity of movement due to long ex- 
 ercises. It drew up in order of battle, and 
 opened a regular and terrible fire of small 
 arms. Ney's three little detachments suffered 
 severely; but Lannes, ascending on the right 
 of General Grawert's infantry, endeavoured to 
 turn it in spite of repeated charges of the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe's cavalry, which came 
 to attack him in his march. 
 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe bravely supported 
 his troops amidst the danger. The regiment 
 of Sanitz was completely broken ; he formed 
 it anew under the fire. He then purposed that 
 the Zastrow regiment should retake the village 
 of Vierzehn-Heiligen at the point of the bayo- 
 net, hoping thereby to decide the victory. 
 Meanwhile, he was informed that more hos- 
 tile columns began to appear; that General 
 Holzendorf, engaged with superior forces, was 
 incapable of seconding him ; that General Ru- 
 chel, however, was on the point of joining him 
 with his corps. He then judged it expedient 
 to wait for this powerful succour, and poured 
 a shower of shells into the village of Vierzehn- 
 Heiligen, resolved to try the effect of flames 
 before he attacked it with his bayonets. He 
 
 sent at the same time officers a*fter officers to 
 General Ruchel, to urge him to hasten up, and 
 to promise him the victory if he arrived in 
 time ; for, according to him, the French were 
 on the point of giving way. Vain illusion of 
 an impetuous but blind courage! At that 
 very hour fortune was deciding otherwise. 
 Augereau debouching at last from the wood 
 of Iserstedt with Desjardin's division, disen- 
 gaged Ney's left, and began to exchange 
 a fire of musketry with the Saxons who were 
 defending the Schnecke, while General Heu- 
 delet attacked them in column on the high 
 road from Jena to Weimar. On the other side 
 of the field of battle, the corps of Marshal 
 Soult, after driving the remains of the Cerrini 
 brigade, as well as the Pelet fusiliers, out of 
 the wood of Closewitz, and flinging back Hol- 
 zendorf 's detachment to a distance, opened its 
 guns on the flank of the Prussians. Napo- 
 leon, seeing the progress of his two wings, 
 and learning the arrival of the troops which 
 had been left in rear, was no longer afraid to 
 bring into action all the forces present on the 
 ground, the guard included, and gave orders 
 for advancing. An irresistible impulsion was 
 communicated to the whole line. The Prus- 
 sians were driven back, broken, and hurled 
 down the sloping ground which descends from 
 Landgrafenberg to the valley of the lira. The 
 regiments of Hohenlohe and the Hahn grena- 
 diers, of Grawert's division, were almost en- 
 tirely destroyed by the fire or by the bayonet. 
 General Grawert himself was severely wound- 
 ed, while directing his infantry. No corps 
 manifested greater firmness. The Cerrini 
 brigade, assailed with grape, fell back upon 
 the Dyherrn reserve, which in vain opposed 
 its five battalions to the movement of the 
 French. That reserve, being soon left unco- 
 vered, found itself attacked, surrounded on all 
 sides, and forced to disperse. Tauenzien's 
 corps, rallied for a moment, and brought back 
 into the fire by the Prince of Hohenlohe, was 
 hurried away, like the others, in the general 
 rout. The Prussian cavalry, taking advantage 
 of the absence of the heavy French cavalry, 
 made charges to cover its broken infantry ; 
 but our chasseurs and hussars kept it in 
 check; and, though driven back several 
 times, returned incessantly to the charge, 
 upheld, intoxicated, by victory. A terrible 
 carnage followed this disorderly retreat. At 
 every step prisoners were made ; artillery was 
 taken by whole batteries. 
 
 In this great danger, General Ruchel at 
 length made his appearance, but too late. He 
 marched in two lines of infantry, having on 
 the left the cavalry belonging to his corps, and 
 on the right the Saxon cavalry, commanded by 
 the brave General Zeschwitz, whe had come 
 of his own accord and taken that position. 
 He ascended at a foot pace those plateaux, 
 sloping from the Landgrafenberg to the Ilm. 
 While mounting, Prussians and French poured 
 down around him like a torrent, the one pur- 
 sued by the other. He was thus met by a son 
 of tempest, at the moment of his appearance 
 on the field of battle. While he was advance 
 ing, his heart rent with grief at the sight of 
 this disaster, the French rushed upon him with
 
 188 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 the impetuosity of victory. The cavalry 
 which covered his left flank was first dispersed. 
 That unfortunate general, an unwise but ar- 
 dent friend of his country, was the first to 
 oppose the shock in person. A ball entered 
 his chest, and he was borne off dying in the 
 arms of his soldiers. His infantry, deprived 
 of the cavalry which covered it, found itself 
 attacked in flank by the troops of Marshal 
 Soult, and threatened in front by those of Mar- 
 shals Lannes and Ney. The battalions placed 
 at the left extremity of the line, seized with 
 terror, dispersed, and hurried along the rest 
 of the corps in their flight. To aggravate the 
 disaster, the French dragoons and cuirassiers 
 came up at a gallop, under the conduct of Mu- 
 rat, impatient to take a share in the battle. 
 They surrounded those hapless dispersed bat- 
 talions, cut in pieces all who attempted to re- 
 sist, and pursued the others to the banks of the 
 Ilm, where they made a great number of pri- 
 soners. 
 
 On the field of battle were left only the two 
 Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, 
 which,after honourably defending the Schnecke 
 against Heudelet's and Desjardin's divisions 
 of Augereau's corps, had been forced in their 
 position by the address of the French tirail- 
 leurs, and effected their retreat formed into 
 two squares. These squares presented three 
 sides of infantry and one of artillery, the latter 
 being the rear side. The two Saxon brigades 
 retired, halting alternately, firing their guns, 
 and then resuming their march. Augereau's 
 artillery followed, sending balls after them: a 
 swarm of French tirailleurs ran after them, 
 harassing them with their small arms. Mu- 
 rat, who had just overthrown the relics of Ru- 
 chel's corps, fell upon the two Saxon brigades, 
 and ordered them to be charged to the utmost 
 extremity by his dragoons and cuirassiers. 
 The dragoons attacked first without forcing an 
 entrance ; but they returned to the charge, 
 penetrated and broke the square. General 
 d'Hatpoul, with \he cuirassiers, attacked the 
 second, broke it, and made that havoc which 
 a victorious cavalry inflicts on a broken in- 
 fan'.ry. Those unfortunate men had no other 
 resource but to surrender. The Prussian bat- 
 talion of Boguslawski was forced in its turn, 
 and treated like the others. The brave Gen- 
 eral Zeschwitz, who had hastened with the 
 Saxon cavalry to the assistance of its infantry, 
 made vain efforts to support it, and was driven 
 back, and forced to give way to the general 
 rout. 
 
 Murat rallied his squadrons, and hastened 
 to Weimar, to collect fresh trophies. At some 
 distance from that town were crowded to- 
 gether, pell-mell, detachments of infantry, cav- 
 alry, artillery, at the top of a long and steep 
 slope, formed by the high road leading down 
 lo the bottom of the valley of the Ilm. These 
 troops, confusedly huddled together, were sup- 
 ported upon a small wood, called the wood of 
 Webicht. All at once, the bright helmets of 
 the French cavalry made their appearance. 
 A few musket-shots were instinctively fired by 
 this affrighted crowd. At this signal/the mass, 
 seized with terror, rushed down the hill, at the 
 foo of which Weimar is situated : foot, horse, 
 
 artillerymen, all tumbled one over another into 
 this gulf a new disaster, and well worthy of 
 pity. Murat sent after them a part of his 
 dragoons, who goaded on this mob with the 
 points of their swords, and pursued it into the 
 streets of Weimar. 'With the others he made 
 a circuit to jhe other side of Weimar, and cut 
 off the retreat of the fugitives, who surrendered 
 by thousands. 
 
 Out of the 70,000 Prussians who had ap- 
 peared on the field of battle, not a single corps 
 remained entire, not one retreated in order. 
 Out of 100,000 French, composed of the corps 
 of Marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, 
 Murat, and the guard, not more than 50,000 
 had fought, and they had been sufficient to 
 overthrow the Prussian army. The greater 
 part of that army, seized with a sort of vertigo, 
 throwing away its arms, ceasing to know 
 | either its colours or its officers, covered all 
 the roads of Thuringia. About 12,000 Prus- 
 sians and Saxons, killed and wounded, about 
 4000 French killed and wounded also, strewed 
 the ground from Jena to Weimar. On that 
 | ground were seen stretched a great number 
 a greater number, indeed, than usual of 
 Prussian officers, who had nobly paid for 
 their silly passions with their lives. Fifteen 
 thousand prisoners, 200 pieces of cannon, were 
 in the hands of our soldiers, intoxicated with 
 joy. The shells of the Prussians had set fire 
 to the town of Jena, and from the plateaux 
 where the battle was fought, columns of flame 
 were seen bursting from the dark bosom of 
 night. French shells ploughed up the city of 
 Weimar, and threatened it with a similar 
 fate. The shrieks of fugitives while running 
 through the streets, the tramp of Murat's ca- 
 valry, dashing through them at a gallop, 
 slaughtering without mercy all who were not 
 quick enough in flinging down their arms, had 
 filled with horror that charming city the noble 
 asylum of letters, the peaceful theatre of the 
 most exquisite intercourse of mind that was 
 then to be found in the world. At Weimar, as 
 at Jena, part of the inhabitants had fled. The 
 conquerors, disposing like masters of these 
 almost deserted towns, established their maga- 
 zines and their hospitals in the churches and 
 public buildings. Napoleon, on returning 
 from Jena, directed his attention, according to 
 his custom, to the collecting of the wounded, 
 and heard shouts of Vive I'JLmpereur! mingled 
 with the moans of the dying. Terrible scenes, 
 the sight of which would be intolerable, did 
 not the genius and heroism displayed redeem 
 their horror, and did not glory, that light which 
 embellishes every thing, throw over them its 
 dazzling rays ! 
 
 But, great as were the results already ob- 
 tained, Napoleon knew not yet the full extent 
 of his victory, nor the Prussians the full ex- 
 tent of their disaster. While the cannon were 
 heard rolling at Jena, they were also heard in 
 the distance, on the right towards Naumburg. 
 Napoleon had often looked that way, saying 
 that Marshals Davout and Bernadotte, who had 
 around them 250,000 men, had not much to 
 fear from the remnant of the Prussian army, 
 the greater part of which he had had, as he 
 conceived, upon his hands. He had several
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 189 
 
 limes repeated the order to hold out to the last 
 man, rather than abandon the bridge of Nautn- 
 burg. 
 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe, who retired with 
 a spirit racked by grief, had also heard the 
 cannon towards Naumburg, and was inclined 
 to proceed thither, alternately attracted and 
 repelled by news brought from Auerstadt, the 
 place where the army of the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick was encamped. Scouts declared that this 
 army had gained a complete victory ; others 
 said, on the contrary, that it had sustained a 
 more signal disaster than the army of the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe. The Prince soon 
 learned the truth. Here follows what passed 
 on that same memorable day, marked by two 
 sanguinary battles, fought at the distance of 
 four leagues from one another. 
 
 The royal army had marched on the preced- 
 ing day in five divisions on the high road from 
 Weimar to Naumburg. Crossing those pla- 
 teaux, undulated like the waves of the sea, 
 which form the surface of Thuringia, and ter- 
 minate in abrupt hills towards the banks of the 
 Saale, it had halted at Auerstudt, a little in ad- 
 vance of the defile of Kosen, a well-known 
 military position. It had marched five or six 
 leagues, and this was considered much for 
 troops not accustomed to the fatigues of war. 
 If had therefore bivouacked in the evening of 
 the 13th of October, in front and rear of the 
 village of Auerstlidt, and fared very ill, from 
 not knowing how to subsist without maga- 
 zines. Like the Prince of Hohenlohe, the 
 Duke of Brunswick appeared to pay little at- 
 tention to the outlets by which it was possible 
 for the French to come upon him. Beyond 
 Auerstldt, and before you reach the bridge of 
 Naumburg, over the Saale, you come to a sort 
 of basin of considerable magnitude, inter- 
 sected by a rivulet, which after a few wind- 
 ings runs to join the lira and the Saale. This 
 basin, the two sides of which incline towards 
 each other, seems to be a field of battle ready 
 formed to receive two armies, opposing no- 
 thing to their meeting but the slender obstacle 
 of a brook easy to cross. The road from 
 Weimar to Naumburg runs all through it, at 
 first descending towards the stream, crossing 
 it by a bridge, then ascending on the opposite 
 side, passing through a village called Hassen- 
 haus.en, and which is the only paint d'appui 
 that there is on this clear spot Beyond Has- 
 senhausen, the road, having reached the outer 
 margin of the basin in question, stops all at 
 once, and descends by rapid windings to the 
 banks of the Saale. Here is what is called 
 the defile of Kiisen. Below, there is a bridge 
 which has been named the bridge of Kosen or 
 of Naumburg. 
 
 As it was known that the French were on 
 the other side of the Saale, at Naumburg, it 
 was natural to take a position with at least 
 one division on the top of the winding descent 
 of Kiisen, not for the purpose of cleaning the 
 pass, which there was merely an idea of mask- 
 ing, but to bar the access against the French, 
 while the other divisions should prosecute 
 their movement of retreat, covered by the 
 Saale. 
 
 Not an individual of the Prussian stafl' 
 
 ' thought of this. They Contented themselves 
 with sending a few cavalry patroles to recon- 
 noitre, and these retired after exchanging pis- 
 tol-shots with the advanced posts of Marshal 
 Davout. From these patroles it was learned 
 that the French had not established themselves 
 in the defile of Kosen, and it was concluded 
 that all was safe. On the following day, three 
 divisions were to pass through the basin that 
 I we have just described, to occupy the winding 
 I slopes which lead down to the banks of the 
 Saale, and the two other divisions under Mar- 
 shal Kalkreuth, marching after the first three, 
 had orders to possess themselves of the bridge 
 of Freyburg ovt the Unstrut, in order to se- 
 cure to the army the passage of that tributary 
 of the Saale. 
 
 In war, it is in vain to think of many things, 
 if one does not think of all: the forgotten point 
 is precisely the one by which the enemy sur- 
 prises you. It was as gross a fault at this 
 moment to neglect the defile of Kiisen as to 
 relinquish the Landgrafenberg to Napoleon. 
 
 Marshal Davout, whom Napoleon had placed 
 at Naumburg, united with the soundest sense, 
 extraordinary firmness and inflexible severity. 
 He was stimulated to vigilance as much by 
 love of duty as by the feeling of a natural in- 
 firmity very weak sight Thus this illus- 
 trious warrior was indebted to a physical 
 defect for a moral quality. Being scarcely 
 able to discern objects, he took the pains to 
 observe them very closely : when he had seen 
 them himself he made others look at them: he 
 incessantly overwhelmed all about him with 
 questions, and neither took any rest himself, 
 nor allowed them any, till he thought himself 
 sufficiently informed; never being content to 
 live in that uncertainty in which so many 
 generals go to sleep, and risk their own glory 
 and the lives of their soldiers. In the evening, 
 he had gone himself to ascertain what was 
 passing in the defile of Kosen. Some pri- 
 soners, taken in a skirmish, had informed him 
 that the Prussian grand army was approach- 
 ing, headed by the king, the princes, and the 
 Duke of Brunswick. He had immediately de- 
 spatched a battalion to the bridge of Kiisen, 
 and enjoined these troops to be stirring hy 
 midnight, for the purpose of occupying tl ? 
 heights commanding the Saale before the 
 enemy. 
 
 Marshal Bernadotte was at the moment at 
 Naumburg, with orders to go to any point 
 where he conceived that he should be most 
 useful, and especially to second Marshal 
 Davout, if he had need of him. Marshal 
 Davout proceeded to Naumburg, communi- 
 cated to Marshal Bernadotte what he had just 
 learned, proposed to him that they should give 
 battle together, offered even to put himself 
 under his command; for 46,000 men, which 
 they had between them, were not too many 
 to cope with the 80,000 that rumour assigned 
 j to the Prussian army. Marshal Davout urged 
 i this proposal for the sake of the most import- 
 | ant considerations. Had Marshal Lannes, or 
 any other, been in the place of Marshal Ber- 
 , nadotte, so much time would not have been 
 j lost in useless explanations. The generous 
 i Lannes would, on the appearance of the
 
 190 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 enemy, have ei^oraced even a hated rival, anr 
 have fought with the utmost devotedness. Bu 
 Marshal Bernadotte, interpreting the Empe 
 ror's orders in the falsest manner, absolutely 
 persisted in leaving Naumburg and proceed 
 .ng to Dornburg, where the enemy was no 
 stated to be. 1 Whence could so strange a 
 resolution proceed? It proceeded from tha 
 detestable sentiment, which often causes the 
 blood of men, the welfare of the state, to be 
 sacrificed to envy, to hatred, to revenge. Mar 
 shal Bernadotte felt a deep aversion, conceived 
 on the most frivolous motives, for Marsha 
 Davout. The latter was left with three divi- 
 sions of infantry, and three regiments of ligh 
 cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte took with him 
 a division of dragoons, which had been de- 
 tached from the cavalry reserve, to second the 
 first and the third corps, and which he had no 
 right to dispose of exclusively. 
 
 Marshal Davout, however, was under no 
 hesitation concerning the resolution which he 
 had to take. He determined to bar the enemy's 
 way, and to perish with the last men of his 
 corps, rather than leave open a road which 
 Napoleon made it such an important point to 
 close. In the night between the 13th and 14th, 
 he was on march for the bridge, of Kiisen, with 
 the three divisions of Gudin, Friant, and Mo- 
 rand, forming 26,000 men present under arms, 
 the greater part infantry, luckily the best in 
 the army, for the discipline was iron under 
 that inflexible marshal. With these 26,000 
 men, he expected to have to fight 70,000, ac- 
 cording to some, 80,000 according to others, 
 in reality 66,000. As for the soldiers, they 
 were not accustomed to count their enemies, 
 how numerous soever they might be. Under 
 all circumstances, they held themselves bound 
 and certain to conquer. 
 
 The marshal, having his troops under arms 
 long before it was light, crossed the bridge of 
 Kosen, which he had occupied the preceding 
 evening, ascended with Friant's division the 
 winding slopes of Kosen, and debouched, 
 about six in the morning, on the heights form- 
 ing one side of the basin of Hassenhausen. In 
 a few moments, the Prussians appeared on the 
 opposite side, so that the armies might have 
 perceived each other at the two extremities of 
 this kind of amphitheatre, if the fog which at 
 that hour enveloped the field of battle of Jena 
 had not* covered that of Auerstlidt also. The 
 Prussian division of Schmettau marched at 
 the head, preceded by an advanced guard of 
 600 horse, under the command of General 
 Bkicher. A little in the rear came the king, 
 with the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal 
 Mollendorf. General Blucher had descended 
 to the muddy stream which runs through the 
 
 1 We quote a letter from the Emperor to the Prince 
 of Ponte Corvo, written alter the baitle of AuersiUdt, 
 which confirms all our assertions. It manhests a dis- 
 satisfaction which Napoleon feit sail more stixmgiy than 
 be expressed 
 
 "To the Prince of Ponte Corvo. 
 
 "Wittenberg, 23d October, 1806. 
 
 "I have received your letter. lam not in the habit 
 f recriminating upon the past, since it is without 
 remedy. Your corps tParmie was not on the field of 
 baltle, and that might have been extremely disastrous 
 fcir me. Still, agreeably to a very precise order, you 
 
 basin, crossed the little bridge, and was ascend- 
 ing the high road at a foot pace, when he met 
 a French detachment of cavalry commanded 
 by Colonel Bourke and Captain Hulot. Pistol- 
 shots were exchanged amidst the fog, and on 
 our side some prisoners were taken from the 
 Prussians. The French detachment, after this 
 bold reconnoissance, executed in a dense fog, 
 went and placed itself under the protection of 
 the 25th of the line, headed by Marshal Davout. 
 The marshal ordered some pieces of artillery 
 to be placed on the road itself, and fired with 
 grape at General Blucher's 600 horse, who 
 were soon thrown into great disorder. A horsed 
 battery, which followed this detachment of 
 cavalry, was taken by two companies of the 
 25th, and conveyed to Hassenhausen. This 
 first encounter revealed the extremely critical 
 nature of the situation. We should have a 
 great battle to fight. At any rate the fog must 
 retard the engagement, for neither party could 
 attempt any serious movement in the presence 
 of an enemy who might be said to be invisible. 
 Marshal Davout, coming from Naumburg to 
 cut off the retreat of the Prussians, turned his 
 back on the Elbe and on Germany. He had 
 the Saale on his left, wooded heights on his 
 right ; the Prussians, coming from Weimar, 
 had the contrary position. Marshal Davout, 
 thanks to the delay caused by the fog, had 
 time to post in a suitable manner Gudin's 
 division, the first that arrived, and composed 
 of the 25th, 85th, 12th, and 21st of the line, 
 and six squadrons of chasseurs. He placed 
 the 85th in the village of Hassenhausen, and 
 as on the right of Hassenhausen (the right of 
 the French) there was a small wood of wil- 
 lows, he dispersed in this wood a great num- 
 ber of tirailleurs, who opened a destructive 
 fire upon the Prussian line, which began to be 
 discernible. The three other regiments were 
 posted on the right of the village, two of them 
 deployed, and ranged in such a manner as to 
 present a double line, the third in column, 
 ready to form into square on the flank of the 
 division. The ground on the left of Hassen- 
 hausen was reserved for the troops of General 
 Morand. As for those of General Friant, their 
 position would be determined by the circum- 
 stances of the battle. 
 
 The King of Prussia, the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick, and Marshal MoJlendorf, who had crossed 
 the rivulet with Schmettau's division, delibe- 
 rated, at sight of the dispositions which they 
 perceived in front of Hassenhausen, whether 
 ;hey should attack immediately. The Duke 
 of Brunswick advised waiting for Wartensle- 
 Sen's division, that they might act with greater 
 unity; but the king and Marshal Mollendorf 
 were of opinion that the combat should not be 
 
 ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the 
 irincipal debouehls of the Saale, on the same day thai 
 Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augert-au al 
 iula, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In default 
 of having executed these dispositions, 1 had let you 
 tnow in the night, that, if you were still at Naumburg, 
 .on were to march towards Marshal Davout lor the 
 >urpose of supporting him. When this order arrived, 
 ,-ou were at Naumburg; and yet you preferred making 
 a false march and returning to Dornburg, and in conse- 
 quence you were not at the battle, and Marshal Davout 
 d principally to bear the brunt of the euemy's effort*. 
 All this is certainly very unfortunate. &c. 
 
 ' NA.POLEOH."
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 191 
 
 deferred. Besides, the fire of musketry be- 
 came so brisk that it was necessary to reply 
 to it, and to engage immediately. They de- 
 ployed, therefore, with Schmettau's division, 
 facing the ground occupied by the French, 
 having before them Hassenhausen, which, sit- 
 uated amidst this open ground, was soon to 
 become the pivot of the battle. They tried to 
 repulse the French tirailleurs in ambush, be- 
 hind the willows, but with no effect, and then 
 they moved a little to the right of Hassenhau- 
 sen, (right for the French, left for the Prus- 
 sians,) to secure themselves from a downward 
 and destructive fire. Schmettau's division 
 approached the lines of our infantry to fire at 
 it, and, the fog beginning to clear off", it disco- 
 vered the infantry of Gudin's division drawn 
 up to the right of Hassenhausen. At this 
 sight, General Blucher collected his numerous 
 cavalry, and, making a circuit, advanced to 
 charge Gudin's division in flank. The latter, 
 however, did nol allow him time to do so. The 
 25th, which was in first line, immediately 
 formed its right battalion into square ; the 21st, 
 which was in second line, followed that exam- 
 ple; lastly, the 12th regiment, which was in 
 rear-guard, formed a single square of its two 
 battalions, and these three masses, bristling 
 with bayonets, waited with calm assurance for 
 General Blucher' s squadrons. Generals Petit, 
 Gudin, Gauthier, had each placed themselves 
 in a square. The marshal went from one to 
 another. General Blucher, who was distin- 
 guished for impetuous courage, made a first 
 charge, which he took care to direct in person. 
 But his squadrons failed to reach our bayo- 
 nets, a shower of balls stopping them short, and 
 obliging them to turn about precipitately. Ge- 
 neral Blucher had his horse killed ; he took 
 that of a trumpeter, made three more attempts 
 to charge, but always unsuccessfully, and was 
 soon himself borne away in the rout of his 
 cavalry. Our squadrons of chasseurs, care- 
 fully kept in reserve, under the protection of a 
 small wood, dashed away in pursuit of that 
 fugitive cavalry, and obliged it to scamper off 
 still more speedily, by killing several men. 
 
 Thus far the third corps maintained its 
 ground without any wavering. Friant's divi- 
 sion, which had behaved so well at Austerlitz, 
 appeared at this moment on the field of battle. 
 Marshal Davout, perceiving that the enemy's 
 efforts were directed upon the right of Has- 
 senhausen, sent Frianl's division to that point, 
 and concentrated Gudin's division around Has- 
 senhausen, which, according to all appearance, 
 was about to be violently attacked. He sent 
 orders at the same time to General Morand to 
 hasten his coming, and to place himself on the 
 left of the village. 
 
 On the side of the Prussians, the second di- 
 vision, that of Wartensleben, arrived quite out 
 of breath, delayed as it had been by an encum- 
 brance of the baggage, which had taken place 
 on its rear. Orange's division also arrrived 
 breathless, having been long detained by the 
 same cause. From a deficiency of the habit 
 of war, the movements of that army were 
 slow, unconnected, awkward. 
 
 The moment had arrived when the combat 
 began to be furious ; Warlensleben's division 1 
 
 moved to the left of Hassenhausen, while 
 Schmettau's division, led with vigour Ly the 
 Prussian officers, advanced in front of Has- 
 senhausen itself, then drew back its two wings 
 above that village, in order to surround it. 
 Fortunately, three of General Gudin's regi- 
 ments had thrown themselves into it. The 
 85th, which occupied the front of it, behaved, 
 in this engagement, with heroic valour. Dri- 
 ven back into the interior of the village, it 
 barred the passage into it with invincible firm- 
 ness, replying by a continued and well-directed 
 fire to the tremendous mass of the Prussian 
 fire. That regiment had lost more than half 
 of its effective; still it stood firm and un- 
 shaken. Meanwhile, Wartensleben's division, 
 taking advantage of the circumstance that 
 Morand's division had nol yet occupied the 
 left of Hassenhausen, threatened to turn the 
 village, having an immense cavalry to precede 
 it. At this sight, General Gudin had deployed 
 the fourth of his regiments, the 12th, to the 
 left of Hassenhausen, to prevent his being 
 turned. It was evident to all eyes, that, on 
 this open ground, the village of Hassenhausen 
 being the only appui of the one, the only ob- 
 stacle to the other, the possession of it must 
 be obstinately disputed. The brave General 
 Schmettau, at the head of his infantry, received 
 a shot which obliged him to retire. The Duke 
 of Brunswick, witnessing the determined re- 
 sistance of the French, felf a secret despair, 
 and believed that the catastrophe, a presenti- 
 ment of which had for a month past oppressed 
 his dejected spirit, was near at hand. This 
 aged warrior, hesitating in council, never 
 under fire, resolved to put himself at the head 
 of the Prussian grenadiers, and to lead them 
 to the assault of Hassenhausen, along a ridge 
 of ground running by the side of the road, and 
 by which the village might be more surely 
 reached. While encouraging and showing 
 them the way, a rifle ball struck him in the 
 face, and gave him a mortal wound. He was 
 borne away with a handkerchief over his face, 
 that the army might not recognise the illustri- 
 ous sufferer. On the news of this event, a 
 noble rage seized the Prussian staff. The 
 worthy Mollendorf determined not to survive 
 that day ; he advanced, and was, in his turn, 
 mortally wounded. The king and the princes 
 exposed themselves to danger, like the lowest 
 of the soldiers. The king had a horse killed, 
 but would not move out of the fire. At length 
 the division of Orange arrived. It was parted 
 into two brigades ; one went to support War- 
 tensleben's division on the left of Hassenhau- 
 sen, (left of the French,) to try to reduce that 
 position by turning it; the other to occupy the 
 space left vacant by Schmettau's division, and 
 to throw itself upon Hassenhausen. This se- 
 cond brigade was especially destined to curb 
 Friant's division, which began to gain ground 
 on the flank of the Prussian army. 
 
 Marshal Davout, ever present in the greatest 
 danger, pushed to the right Frianl's division, 
 which was exchanging a brisk fire of musketry 
 with a brigade of the Orange division op- 
 josed to it. At the centre, at Hassenhausen 
 itself, he cheered all hearts by announcing the 
 arrival of Morand. At length Morand ap-
 
 192 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 peared on the left, and he hastened thither to ] 
 range that division, not the bravest of the ' 
 three, for all were equally brave, but the most 
 numerous. The intrepid Morand brought five 
 regiments, the 13th light, and the 61st, 51st, 
 30th, and 17th of the line. These five regi- 
 ments furnished nine battalions, the 10th hav- 
 ing been left to guard the bridge of Kosen. 
 They came to occupy the level ground which 
 is on the left of Hassenhausen. The Prus- 
 sians had planted upon this ground a numer- 
 ous artillery, ready to play upon any troops 
 that might appear. Each of the nine batta- 
 lions, after ascending the winding slopes of 
 Kosen, would have to debouch upon the pla- 
 teau, amidst the grape-shot of the enemy. 
 They deployed, however, one after another, 
 forming at the very moment when they got 
 into line, in spite of the repeated discharges 
 of the Prussian artillery. The 13th light ap- 
 peared first, formed, and moved rapidly for- 
 ward ; but, having advanced too far, it was 
 obliged to fall back upon the other regiments. 
 The 61st, which came next, received in the 
 same manner as the 31st, was not staggered 
 by it. A soldier, whom his comrades had 
 nicknamed the Emperor, on account of a cer- 
 tain resemblance to Napoleon, perceiving some 
 vavering in his company, ran forward, drew 
 himself up erect, and cried, "My lads, follow 
 your Emperor!" All followed him, keeping 
 close to each other, amidst that shower of 
 grape-shot. The nine battalions finished de- 
 ploying, and marched in columns, with their 
 artillery in the interval between one battalion 
 and the next. Marshal Davout, while conduct- 
 ing his battalions, was struck on the head by 
 a rifle ball, which pierced his hat at the height 
 of the cockade, and carried away some hair, 
 without touching the skull. The nine batta- 
 lions placed themselves facing the enemy's 
 line, and obliged Wartensleben's division to 
 fall back, as well as the brigade of Orange, 
 which came to its support. By gaining ground, 
 they disengaged the flank of Hassenhausen, 
 and obliged Schmettau's division to draw back 
 its wings, which it had extended around the 
 village. After a long firing of musketry, Mo- 
 rand's division perceived a fresh storm gather- 
 ing over its head: an enormous mass of ca- 
 . valry was seen collecting behind the ranks of 
 Wartensleben's division. The royal army had 
 with it the better and more numerous portion 
 of the Prussian cavalry. It could produce 
 fourteen or fifteen thousand horse, excellently 
 mounted, and trained to manoeuvres by long 
 exercises. With this mass of cavalry, the 
 Prussians intended to make a desperate effort 
 against Morand's division. They flattered 
 themselves that, on the level ground between 
 Hassenhausen and the Saale, they should 
 trample it under their horses' feet, or hurl it 
 from top to bottom of the spiral slopes of Ko- 
 sen. If they succeeded, the left of the French 
 army being overthrown, Hassenhausen sur- 
 rounded, Gudin taken in the village, Friant's 
 division could do no other than beat a running 
 reireat. But General Morand, on perceiving 
 this assemblage, disposed seven of his batta- 
 lions it squares, and left two deployed, to con- 
 nect him with Hassenhausen. He placed him- 
 
 self in one of these squares, Marshal Davout 
 placed himself in another, and they prepared 
 to receive with firmness the mass of enemies 
 ready to rush upon them. All at once, the 
 ranks of Wartensleben's infantry opened, and 
 vomited forth torrents of Prussian cavalry, 
 which at this point numbered not fewer than 
 10,000 horse, led by Prince William. It at- 
 tempted a series of charges, which were seve- 
 ral times renewed. Every time, our intrepid 
 foot soldiers, coolly awaiting the order of their 
 officers, allowed the enemy's squadrons to 
 come within thirty or forty paces of their lines, 
 and then poured into them volleys, so well 
 aimed, and so destructive, as to strike down 
 hundreds of men and horses, and thus to form 
 for themselves a rampart of carcasses. In the 
 interval between these charges, General Mo- 
 rand and Marshal Davout passed from one 
 square to another, to give to each of them the 
 encouragement of their presence. The Prus- 
 sian horse repeated these fierce assaults, but 
 never advanced even so far as our bayonets. 
 At length, after a frequent repetition of this 
 tumultuous scene, the disheartened Prussian 
 cavalry retired behind its infantry. Then Ge- 
 neral Morand, breaking his squares, deployed 
 his battalions, formed them into columns of 
 attack, and pushed them upon Wartensleben's 
 division. The Prussian infantry, assailed with 
 vigour, gave way before our soldiers, and de- 
 scended, while falling back, to the bank of the 
 rivulet. At the same time. General Friant, on 
 the right, forced the first brigade of the divi- 
 sion of Orange to retire ; and, in consequence 
 of this double movement, Schmettau's divi- 
 sion, left exposed on both its wings, horribly 
 decimated, was compelled to give way, and to 
 move off from that village of Hassenhausen, 
 so violently contested with Gudin's division. 
 
 The three Prussian divisions were thus 
 : driven beyond the marshy brook which runs 
 j through the field of battle. There the French 
 army halted for a moment to take breath, for 
 that unequal combat had lasted for six hours, 
 and our soldiers were fatigued to death. Gu- 
 din's division, charged to defend Hassenhau- 
 sen, had sustained prodigious loss; but Friant's 
 division had suffered moderately; Morand's 
 I division, not much hurt by the cavalry, like all 
 infantry that has not been broken, but worse 
 treated by the artillery, was nevertheless in 
 fighting condition, and all three were ready to 
 I begin again, if necessary, in order to make 
 ' head against the two Prussian divisions of re- 
 serve, which had remained spectators of the 
 engagement, on the opposite side of the basin 
 ! where the battle took place. These two divi- 
 1 sions of reserve, Kiihnheim's and Arnim's, 
 under Marshal Kalkreuth, awaited the signal 
 i for entering into line in their turn, and renew- 
 ing the conflict. 
 
 Meanwhile, those around the King of Prussia 
 were engage'd in deliberation. General Blu- 
 cher was for uniting the entire mass of cav- 
 alry with the two divisions of reserve, and 
 dashing with fury upon the enemy. The king 
 had at first been of the same opinion, but it 
 was represented to him that, if they waited but 
 for a single day, they should be joined by 
 Prince Hohenlohe's and General Ruchel's
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 193 
 
 corps, and that they should crush the French 
 by means of this union of forces. The sup- 
 position was not well founded; for, if they 
 were authorized to reckon upon the junction 
 of the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the 
 French whom they had before them were 
 likely to be joined also by the grand army. 
 No chance, therefore, could be better than that 
 which might be found in a last effort, made 
 immediately, and with the determination to 
 conquer or die, though that chance was not 
 great, considering the state of Friant's and 
 Morand's divisions. Orders, however, were 
 given for retreat. The king had shown re- 
 markable bravery, but bravery is not firmness. 
 Besides, the minds of those about him were 
 overwhelmed with despondency. 
 
 The movement of retreat was commenced 
 in the afternoon. Marshal Kalkreuth went 
 forward to cover it with his two fresh divi- 
 sions. General Morand had taken advantage 
 of an elevation called the Sonnenberg, to place 
 batteries which poured a most incommodious 
 fire upon the right of the Prussians. Marshal 
 Davout set in motion his three divisions, and 
 carried them briskly beyond the brook. They 
 marched in spite of the fire of the divisions 
 of reserve, came up within musket-shot of 
 them, and forced them to retreat without dis- 
 order, it is true, but precipitately. If Marsha) 
 Davout had had the regiment of dragoons car- 
 ried away with him by Marshal Bernadotte on 
 the preceding day, he might have taken thou- 
 sands of prisoners. He did nevertheless take 
 3000. besides 115 pieces of cannon an enor- 
 mous capture for a corps which had itself only 
 44. On reaching the other, side of the basin, 
 where the battle had been fought, he halted 
 his infantry, and, perceiving the troops of Mar- 
 shal Bernadotte in the environs of Apolda, he 
 requested him to fall upon the enemy, and to 
 pick up the vanquished whom his corps, ex- 
 hausted with fatigue, could not pursue much 
 longer. The soldiers of Marshal Bernadotte 
 were indignant, and asked one another what 
 could be thought of their courage at such a 
 moment. 
 
 The Prussian army had lost 3000 prisoners, 
 nine or ten thousand men killed and wounded, 
 besides the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mol- 
 lendorf, and General Schmettau, mortally, and 
 a prodigious number of other officers, who had 
 bravely done their duty. The corps of Mar- 
 shal Davout had sustained a heavy loss. 
 Out of 26,000 men, there were 7000 hors de 
 combat. Generals Morand and Gudin were 
 wounded; General de Billy was killed; half 
 the generals of brigade and colonels were dead 
 or severely wounded. Never, since Marengo, 
 had there been so bloody a day for the arms 
 of France, and never had a grander example 
 of heroic firmness been given by a general 
 and his soldiers. 
 
 The royal army retired, under the protec- 
 tion of the two divisions of reserve, commanded 
 by Marshal Kalkreuth. The rendezvous ap- 
 pointed for all the corps disorganized by the 
 battle was Weimar, behind Prince Hohenlohe, 
 who was supposed to be still safe and sound. 
 The king marched thither, deeply grieved, no 
 doubt, but yet calculating, if not on a turn of 
 
 VOL. 11^-25 
 
 fortune, at least on a retreat in good order 
 thanks to the 70,000 men under the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe and General Ruchel. He was pro 
 ceeding, accompanied by a strong detachment 
 of cavalry, when the troops of Marshal Berna- 
 dotte were descried on the rear of the field of 
 battle of Jena. At sight of them, no doubt was 
 entertained that some accident had befallen 
 the army of Prince Hohenlohe. Precipitately 
 leaving the Weimar road, the Prussians turned 
 off to the right into that of Sommerda. But 
 the whole truth was soon known, for the army 
 of Prince Hohenlohe sought at that moment 
 from the king's army that support which the 
 king's army was seeking from it. They met 
 in a thousand detached parties, running in all 
 directions, and each learned that the other had 
 been beaten. At this intelligence, the disorder, 
 not so great at first in the king's army, be- 
 cause it was not pursued, rose to the highest 
 pitch. A sudden panic seized the minds of 
 all : they set off, running confusedly along the 
 high roads and the by-roads, seeing the enemy 
 everywhere, and taking the affrighted fugitives 
 themselves for the victorious French. To ag- 
 gravate their disaster, they found upon the 
 roads that enormous mass of baggage which 
 the Prussian army, softened by a long peace, 
 carried with it, and among the rest a quantity 
 of royal baggage not in accordance with the 
 personal simplicity of King Frederick Wil- 
 liam, but which the presence of the court had 
 rendered necessary. Impatient to withdraw 
 from the danger, the two Prussian armies re- 
 garded these obstacles to the rapidity of their 
 flight as a calamity. The cavalry turned off, 
 crossing the country, and escaping in detached 
 squadrons. The infantry broke their ranks, 
 ransacking and overturning this incommodious 
 baggage, and leaving to the conqueror the 
 trouble of pillaging it, because they were 
 anxious above all things to get away. The 
 two divisions of Marshal Kalkreuth, which 
 alone had hitherto continued in good order, 
 were soon infected with the general despair; 
 and, in spite of the energy of their commander, 
 they began to disband themselves. The ranks 
 thinned from hour to hour, and the soldiers, 
 who had not shared the passions of their 
 officers, thought that the simplest way to escape 
 the consequences of the defeat was to fling 
 away their arms and hide themselves in the 
 woods. The roads were strewed with knap- 
 sacks, muskets, cannon. Thus it was that the 
 Prussian army retired across the plains of 
 Thuringia, and towards the mountains of the 
 Harz, presenting a very different spectacle 
 from that which it had a few days before ex- 
 hibited, when it promised to behave before the 
 French far otherwise than the Austrian^ and 
 the Russians had done. 1 
 
 The army- of Hohenlohe fled partly to the 
 right towards Sommerda, partly to the left 
 towards Erfurt, beyond Weimar. Half of the 
 royal army, that which had first quitted the 
 field of battle, with orders to proceed to Wei- 
 mar, finding that town in the hands of the 
 enemy, went to Erfurt, carrying its mortally 
 
 We merely repeat here the statements made by 
 Prutaian officers themselves, in the various narrative* 
 which they have published. 
 
 R
 
 194 
 
 wounded chiefs, the Duke of Brunswick, Mar- 
 shal Mollendorf, and General Schmetlau, along 
 with it The rest of the royal army marched 
 towards Sommerda, not that this was ordered, 
 but because Sommerda and Erfurt were towns 
 situated on the rear of the country in which 
 they had fought. Since that delirium of terror 
 which had seized all heads, no person was 
 capable of giving an order. The king, sur- 
 rounded by some cavalry, marched towards 
 Sommerda. The Prince of Hohenlohe, who 
 had retired with twelve or fifteen hundred 
 horse, had not 200 when he arrived next morn- 
 ; 'ig, the 15th, at Tennstiidt He made inquiries 
 al'Uit the king, who, on his part, inquired 
 ai'out him. No chief knew where the others 
 were. 
 
 During that terrible night, the victors suf- 
 fered not less than the vanquished. They lay 
 upon the ground, bivouacking in an intensely 
 cold night, having scarcely any thing to eat, 
 after a day of battle, naturally unproductive 
 of provisions. Many of them, wounded more 
 or less severely, were stretched on the bare 
 earth, beside wounded enemies, mingling their 
 groans; for it is not in so short a time that 
 the best organized medical establishment could 
 have picked up twelve or fifteen thousand 
 wounded. Napoleon, from feeling as much 
 as from calculation, had for several hours per- 
 sonally superintended their removal ; and he 
 had then returned to Jena, where he, too, had 
 found an accession of news, namely, the ac- 
 count of a second victory, still more glorious 
 than that which had been gained before his 
 own eyes. He refused at first to believe all 
 that was told him; because a letter from Mar- 
 shal Bernadotte, in order to excuse by a lie his 
 unpardonable conduct, asserted that Marshal 
 Davout had not more than nine or ten thou- 
 sand men before him. Captain Trobriant, an 
 officer of Marshal Davout, having come to ap- 
 prize him that he had 70,000 men to fight, he 
 could not believe this statement, and replied, 
 "Your marshal must see double." But, when 
 he was made acquainted witl. all the details, 
 his joy was extreme, and he lavished praises 
 and soon after recompenses, upon the admira- 
 ble conduct Gi the third corps. He was indig- 
 nant with Marshal Bernadotte, but not much 
 surprised. In the first moment, he intended 
 to use the utmost rigour, and even thought of 
 ordering a trial before a council of war. But 
 relationship, and a sort of weakness which 
 would not allow him to vent spleen otherwise 
 than in vehement words, softened down his 
 resolution of severity into a dissatisfaction, 
 which, for the rest, he took no pains to con- 
 ceal. Marshal Bernadotte got off with letters 
 from Prince Berthier and Napoleon himself 
 letters which must have made him profoundly 
 wretched, if he had possessed the heart of a 
 citizen and a soldier. 
 
 Next morning Marshal Duroc was sent to 
 Natimburg. He was the bearer of a letter 
 from the Emperor to Marshal Davout, and 
 signal testimonies of satisfaction for the whole 
 iorps d'annee. "Your soldiers and yourself, 
 monsieur le marechal," said Napoleon, "have 
 gained an evrlasting right to my esteem and 
 gratitude." Duroc was to go tn the hospitals, 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 I to visit the wounded, to convey to them the 
 promise of magnificent rewards, and to distri- 
 bute money among all those who were in need 
 of it The Emperor's letter was read in the 
 chambers where the wounded were crowded 
 together, and these unfortunate men, shouting 
 "Vive I' Empereur.'" amid their sufferings, ex- 
 pressed a desire for the recovery of their 
 health, that they might again devote their 
 lives to him. 
 
 On the very next day, the 15th of October, 
 Napoleon took measures for following up the 
 victory with that activity which no captain, 
 ancient or modern, has ever equalled. In the 
 first place, he enjoined Marshals Davout, Lan- 
 nes, and Augereau, whose corps had suffered 
 much on the 14th, to rest for two or three days 
 at Naumburg, Jena, and Weimar, but Marshal 
 Bernadotte, whose soldiers had not fired a shot, 
 Marshals Soult and Ney, part only of whose 
 troops had been engaged, Murat, whose ca- 
 valry had suffered nothing but fatigue, were 
 ordered forward to harass the Prussian army, 
 to pick up its wrecks, easy to capture in the 
 state of disorganization into which it had fall- 
 en. Murat, who had slept at Weimar, had 
 orders to hasten with his dragoons to Erfurt 
 on the morning of the 15th, and Ney to follow 
 him immediately. Marshal Soult was to march 
 by Sommerda, Greussen, Sondershausen, Nord- 
 hausen, after the enemy's army, to pursue it 
 through Thuringia, towards the mountains of 
 the Harz, where it seemed in its disorder to 
 purpose seeking refuge. Marshal Bernadotte 
 was enjoined to direct his course that very 
 day towards the Elbe, by proceeding towards 
 the right of the army through Halle and Des- 
 sau. It will be remarked that Napoleon, care- 
 ful to concentrate himself on the eve of a 
 great battle, next day when he had struck the 
 enemy, spread his corps, like a vast net, to 
 catch all that fled, skilful in thus modifying 
 the application of the principles of war ac- 
 cording to circumstances, and always with 
 ^?.t accuracy and fitness which ensures suc- 
 cess. 
 
 Having given these orders, Napoleon be- 
 stowed some attention on politics. The direc- 
 tion which the Prussians were following in 
 their retreat removed them to a distance from 
 Saxony. Napoleon held, moreover, in his 
 power a considerable number of Saxon troops, 
 who had fought honourably, though far from 
 pleased either at the war into which their 
 country had been dragged, or with the ill- 
 usage of which they conceived that they had 
 reason to complain on the part of the Prus- 
 sians. Napoleon assembled the officers of the 
 Saxon troops at Jena, in one of the halls of 
 the University. Making use of an employ^ of 
 the foreign affairs, called to be about him, he 
 addressed them in words which were imme- 
 diately translated. He said that he knew not 
 why he was at war with their sovereign, a 
 wise, pacific prince, and deserving of respect; 
 that he had even drawn the sword to rescue 
 their country from the humiliating dependence 
 in which it was held by Prussia, and that he 
 could not see why the Saxons and the French, 
 with so few motives for hating each other, 
 
 i should persist in fighting together: that he
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 was ready, for his part, to give a first pledge 
 of his amicable dispositions by setting them 
 at liberty, and by sparing Saxony, provided 
 that they would promise on their part never 
 more to bear arms against France ; and that 
 the principal of them should go to Dresden to 
 propose peace, and to induce its acceptance. 
 The Saxon officers, seized with admiration on 
 beholding the extraordinary personage who 
 was speaking to them, touched by the gene- 
 rosity of his proposals, replied by a unani- 
 mous oath, not to serve, either themselves or 
 their soldiers, during that war. Some of them 
 offered to set out immediately for Dresden, de- 
 claring that before the end of three days they 
 would be back, bringing the consent of their 
 sovereign. 
 
 By this politic act Napoleon purposed to 
 disarm German patriotism, so strongly excited 
 through the efforts of Prussia, and, by treating 
 a prince justly respected with this kindness, 
 to acquire a right to treat with severity a prince 
 whom nobody esteemed. This latter was the 
 Elector of Hesse, who had contributed by his 
 falsehoods to provoke the war, and who, since 
 the war, sought to traffic with his adhesion, 
 resolved to give himself up to that power of 
 the two which victory should favour. He was 
 a secret enemy, devoted to the English, with 
 whom he had deposited his wealth. Napo- 
 leon, on advancing into Prussia, did not care 
 to leave such an enemy on his rear. The 
 principles of war commanded him to be got 
 rid of, and those of an upright policy did not 
 defend him, for this prince had been a faith- 
 less neighbour both to Prussia and France. 
 Immediately, before he proceeded further, Na- 
 poleon ordered the eighth corps to leave May- 
 ence and to march to Cassel, though that 
 corps could not yet number more than ten or 
 twelve thousand men. He directed his brother 
 Louis to march by Westphalia for Hesse, and 
 to join Marshal Mortier with twelve or fifteen 
 thousand men, in order to concur in the exe- 
 cution of the decrees of victory. However, 
 deeming it inexpedient to charge one of his 
 brothers with so rigorous a commission, he 
 advised King Louis to send his troops to Mar- 
 shal Mortier, and to relinquish to the latter the 
 execution of the task of dispossessing the 
 House of Hesse, with the obedience and the 
 probity that distinguished him. Marshal Mor- 
 tier was to declare that the Elector of Hesse 
 had ceased to reign, (a form already adopted 
 in regard to the House of Naples,) to take 
 possession of his dominions in the name of 
 France, and to disband his army, giving to 
 such of the Hessian soldiers as chose to con- 
 tinue to serve, the offer of going to Italy. They 
 were mostly robust men, well-disciplined, ac- 
 customed to bear arms out of their own coun- 
 try in behalf of those who paid them, espe- 
 cially in behalf of the English, who employed 
 them in India with great advantage. The 
 Hessian army was composed of 32,000 of all 
 arms. It was an important point not to leave 
 behind one this formidable force, especially 
 when expecting to proceed so far northward 
 as Napoleon intended to do. 
 
 With these different orders Napoleon sent 
 tidings of his brilliant successes, tidings which 
 
 could not fail to dispel the hopes of his ene- 
 mies and the fears of his friends, and to in- 
 crease in his soldiers left in the interior a zeal 
 to join the grand army. According to custom, 
 he added a multitude of instructions for the 
 calling out of the conscripts, for the organiza- 
 tion of the depots, for the departure of the de- 
 tachments destined to recruit incomplete regi- 
 ments, and for the regulation of civil affairs, 
 which, during his reign, never suffered from 
 the preoccupations of war. 
 
 From Jena, Napoleon proceeded to Weimar. 
 He found there the whole court of the grand- 
 duke, including the grand-duchess, sister of 
 the Emperor Alexander. The grand-duke 
 alone was absent, having command of a 
 Prussian division. This polished and learned 
 court had made Weimar the Athens of mod- 
 ern Germany, and, under its protection, Goethe, 
 Schiller, Wieland, lived honoured, rich, and 
 happy. The grand-duchess, who was accused 
 of having contributed to the war, went to meet 
 Napoleon, and, agitated at the tumult which 
 prevailed around her, she said, on approach- 
 ing him, " Sire, I recommend my subjects to 
 you." " You see, madam, what war is," re- 
 plied Napoleon, coldly. For the rest, he con- 
 fined himself to this vengeance, and treated 
 this inimical but lettered court as Alexander 
 would have treated a city of Greece, showed 
 himself full of courtesy towards the grand- 
 duchess, expressed to her no displeasure at the 
 conduct of her husband, caused the town of 
 Weimar to be respected, and ordered due atten- 
 tion to be paid to the wounded generals,of whom 
 it was full. From Weimar he bore to the right, 
 directing his course to Naumburg, to congra- 
 tulate in person the corps of Marshal Davout, 
 while his lieutenants were pursuing the Prus- 
 sian army to the last extremity. 
 
 In this interval, the indefatigable Murat had 
 galloped with his squadrons to Erfurt, and in- 
 vested the place, which, though of but mo- 
 derate strength, was surrounded with very good 
 walls and provided with a considerable materiel. 
 It was crowded with wounded and fugitives. 
 Thither had been conveyed Marshal Mollen- 
 dorf, to whom Napoleon had ordered the ut- 
 most attention to be paid. Murat summoned 
 Erfurt, and employed Marshal Ney's infantry 
 to enforce the summons. Among the Prussian 
 fugitives there was not one capable of making 
 head against the French, and of replying by 
 any energetic resistance against the impetu- 
 osity of their pursuit. Besides, fourteen or 
 fifteen thousand fugitives, 6000 of whom 
 were wounded, most of them dying, were any 
 thing but elements of defence. The place 
 capitulated in the evening of the 15th. Here 
 were picked up, exclusively of the 6000 
 wounded Prussians, 9000 prisoners and an 
 immense booty. Murat and Ney left the town 
 immediately, to pursue the main body of the 
 Prussian army. 
 
 Murat had sent Klein's dragoons to Weis- 
 sensee, to intercept the corps that were fleeing 
 separately. That town was between Som- 
 merda, where the King of Prussia had passed 
 the first night, and Sondershausen, where he 
 was to pass the second. General Klein reached 
 it before the Prussians. General Blucher, on
 
 196 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 arriving with his cavalry, was quite aston- 
 ished to find Murat's dragoons already in his 
 way. Having desired to parley, he entered 
 into a sort of negotiation with General Klein, 
 founded on a letter alleged to have been writ- 
 ten by Napoleon to the King of Prussia, a let- 
 ter containing, it was said, offers of peace : he 
 affirmed upon his word that an armistice had 
 just been signed. General Klein believed 
 General Blucher, and opposed no obtacle to 
 his retreat This stratagem saved the relics 
 of the Prussian army. General Blucher and 
 Marshal Kalkreuth were thus enabled to re- 
 pair to Greussen. But Marshal Soult was fol- 
 lowing these corps upon the same road. Next 
 morning, the 16th, he overtook at Greussen 
 the rear-guard of Marshal Kalkreuth, who, 
 wishing to gain time, had recourse in his turn 
 to the fable of an armistice. Marshal Soult 
 was not to be duped: he declared that he dis- 
 believed the existence of an armistice; and, 
 after passing a few moments in parley, in or- 
 der to allow his infantry time to rejoin, he at- ] 
 tacked Greussen, carried it by main force, and j 
 picked up many more prisoners, horses, and 
 cannon. 
 
 On the following day, the 17th, pursued and ! 
 pursuers continued their course for Sonders- 
 hausen and Nordhausen, the one abandoning 
 to the other baggage, cannon, entire battalions. 
 More than 200 pieces of artillery had already 
 been picked up on all the roads, and several 
 thousand prisoners. 
 
 The King of Prussia, on arriving at Nord- 
 hausen, found the Prince of Hohenlohe there. 
 Still believing in the talents of that general, 
 who had been beaten like the Duke of Bruns- 
 wick, but who had in the eyes of the army the 
 merit of having censured the plan of the gene- 
 ralissimo, he conferred upon him the com- 
 mand in chief. At the same time he left the 
 command of the two divisions of the reserve 
 to old Kalkreuth, who had also the merit of 
 having found great fault with all that had been 
 done. This was the only measure taken by j 
 the king after that great disaster. Dejected, 
 reserved, showing a stern countenance to those 
 senseless persons who had been partizans of 
 war, but sparing them reproaches, which they 
 might have returned for, if they had been 
 silly, he had been weak he proceeded towards 
 Berlin, at a moment when his presence with 
 the army was most needed to restore the tem- 
 per of downcast, divided, soured minds, to 
 mould all those wrecks into a corps, which 
 should retard the passage of the Elbe, cover 
 Berlin for some time, and, on retiring to the 
 Oder, bring to the Russians a contingent of a 
 certain value. This departure was a serious 
 fault, and unworthy of the personal courage 
 shown by Frederick William during the battle. 
 That monarch added but one act to the nomi- 
 nation of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and that 
 was to write to Napoleon, to express his re- 
 gret at being at war with France, and to pro- 
 pose to open a negotiation immediately. 
 
 The king having left the head-quarters with- 
 out giving any military instructions to his 
 generals, these acie-1 without the slightest con- 
 cert. The Prince of Hohenlohe collected the 
 wrecks of the two armies, excepting the reserve 
 
 committed to Marshal Kalkreuth, and formed 
 it into three detachments, two of troops retain- 
 ing some organization, the third containing 
 the mass of the runaways. He directed them 
 all, by a movement to the right, towards the 
 Elbe, making them march by three different 
 lines of route, but all running in the same 
 direction, from Nordhausen to Magdeburg. 
 There would have been little advantage in 
 throwing himself into the Harz, for besides 
 the deficiency of resources in the way of pro- 
 vision, that mountainous chain was neither 
 sufficiently distant, nor had it depth enough to 
 serve for an asylum for the fugitive army. It 
 would have been pursued thither by the 
 French, who are very alert in mountains, and 
 perhaps in crossing the chain, it would have 
 found them beyond it, barring the way to the 
 Elbe. It was therefore a judicious determina- 
 tion to turn off to the right, with a view to 
 proceed directly to the Elbe and Magdeburg. 
 It dragged along with it, nevertheless, a train 
 of heavy artillery, which greatly retarded its 
 march. The idea was conceived of consign- 
 ing it to the care of General Blucher, who, 
 turning the mountains of the Harz on the op- 
 posite side by Osterode, Seesen, and Bruns- 
 wick, was likely to descend into the plains 
 of Hanover, without being followed by the 
 French ; for it was to be presumed that these 
 would throw themselves en masse into the 
 track of the Prussian main arm}-, and not run 
 alter a detachment along the difficult roads 
 of Hesse. In consequence, General Blucher, 
 with two battalions and a considerable corps 
 of cavalry, undertook to escort the great park. 
 The Duke of Weimar, who had plunged with 
 the advanced guard into the forest of Thurin- 
 gia, soon left it on hearing of the two lost 
 battles. Keeping along the foot of the moun- 
 tains, he skirted at as great a distance as 
 possible the two armies, French and Prus- 
 sian. He received timely information of the 
 movement which General Blucher was to exe- 
 cute, and resolved to join him by way of 
 Osterode and Seesen. Marshal Kalkreuth, 
 after halting a few hours at Nordhausen to 
 cover the retreat, proceeded directly for the 
 Elbe, below Magdeburg, choosing to march 
 alone, dissatisfied at having passed under the 
 command of two successive generals, whom 
 he held in little estimation, while he con- 
 ceived, and not without reason, that he had 
 himself deserved the chief command. 
 
 Marshals Ney, Soult, and Murat, started in 
 pursuit of the main Prussian army, making 
 forced marches to overtake it, and taking 
 prisoners and materiel at every step. But the 
 route from Nordhausen to Magdeburg was not 
 long enough to allow them time to get up 
 with the Prussians. They attained, however, 
 the principal object, by leaving them not a 
 day's rest, and thus depriving thrm of all 
 means of reorganizing themselves, and still 
 forming a force of some consistency upon the 
 Elbe. 
 
 Meanwhile, Marshal Bernadotl/. had march- 
 ed for Halle, intending to pass the Saal* 
 there, and to reach the Elbe towards Barby or 
 Dessau. Halle is on the Lower Saale, below 
 the point where that river receives the Elsti.-r,
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 197 
 
 and above the point where it falls into the 
 Elbe. The Duke of Brunswick, on his de- 
 parture for Weimar, for the purpose of re- 
 tiring to the Elbe under cover of the Saale, 
 had ordered Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg to 
 proceed to Halle to meet the Prussian main 
 army. That prince had come thither with a 
 corps of about seventeen or eighteen thou- 
 sand men, forming the last resource of the 
 monarchy. He had established himself there, 
 as in a good post for collecting the beaten 
 army. But, having taken the Magdeburg 
 road, it never came near him, and instead of 
 it a detachment of French troops made its ap- 
 pearance on the morning of the 17th of Oc- 
 tober. It was Dupont's division, which, for 
 the moment, accompanied Marshal Berna- 
 dotte's corps. No sooner was General Dupont 
 in sight of Halle than, having orders to attack, 
 he hastened to reconnoitre himself the posi- 
 tion of the enemy. Before the city of Halle, 
 the Saale divides into several branches. It is 
 passed by a bridge of great length, which at 
 the same time crosses overflowed meadows 
 and several arms of the river. This bridge 
 was provided with artillery, and in advance 
 of it there was a body of infantry. On the 
 islands which separate the river in several 
 branches had been formed batteries, enfilad- 
 ing the road by which the French were ap- 
 proaching. At the extremity of the bridge 
 stands the city, the gates of which were 
 barricaded. Lastly, beyond it, upon the 
 heights which command the course of the 
 Saale, was perceived the corps of the Prince 
 of Wirtemberg, drawn up in order of battle. 
 Thus the French would have to cross the 
 bridge, to force the gates of Halle, to pene- 
 trate into the city, to pass through it, and to 
 take the heights in the rear. These were a 
 series of difficulties almost insurmountable. 
 At this sight General Dupont, who had com- 
 manded in the brilliant actions of Hanslach 
 and Dirnstein, instantly formed his resolution. 
 He determined to dislodge the troops posted 
 at the avenues to the bridge, then to carry the 
 bridge, the town, and the heights. He went 
 back, withdrew his division out of the hands 
 of Marshal Bernadotte, who had most unsea- 
 sonably scattered it, 1 and disposed it in the 
 following manner. He placed the 9th light in 
 column upon the road, on the right the 32nd, 
 (which had made itself so famous in Italy, 
 and was still commanded by Colonel Darri- 
 cau,) and then the 9th in rear to support the 
 whole movement. This done, he gave the 
 signal, and, heading the troops in person, he 
 advanced with them at a run upon the post of 
 infantry placed at the head of the bridge. 
 They had to sustain tremendous discharges of 
 musketry and grape, but darted to the bridge 
 with the rapidity of lightning, drove back upon 
 it the troops which guarded it, and pursued 
 them, in spite of the fire poured from all sides, 
 and striking French and Prussians. After a 
 conflict of a few minutes, the former forced 
 their way to the further end of the bridge, and 
 entered the city pell-mell with the fugitives. 
 
 We here repeat an assertion contained in the Me- 
 moirs of General Dupont. We can affirm that in those 
 Memoirs, still in manuscript and very interesting, Gene- 
 
 There a vehement fire of musketry took plac< 
 in the streets with the Prussians ; however, 
 they were soon expelled from the town and 
 the gates closed upon them. 
 
 General Dupont had sustained some loss, but 
 he had taken almost all the troops that de- 
 fended the bridge, and likewise their numerous 
 artillery. Still, the operation was not finished. 
 The corps of the Prince of Wirtemberg was 
 posted on the other side of the town upon the 
 heights in rear. It was necessary for General 
 Dupont to dislodge him from them if he would 
 remain master of Halle and of the bridge over 
 the Saale. Having left his troops time to re- 
 cover breath, he ordered the city gates to be 
 thrown open, and directed his division towards 
 the foot of the heights. The three French 
 regiments, now numbering not more than 
 5000 combatants, were received with the fire 
 of 12,000 men well posted. They advanced, 
 nevertheless, in several columns, with the 
 j vigour of troops not accustomed to shrink 
 ; from any obstacle. At the same time, Gene- 
 ! ral Dupont sent one of his battalions upon the 
 flank of the position, turned it, and, perceiving 
 ] the effect produced by this manoeuvre, pushed 
 j forward his columns of attack. His three 
 ; regiments dashed on in spite of the enemy's 
 fire, scaled the heights, and, reaching the sum- 
 mit, dislodged the Prussians. A new action 
 ensued with the whole corps of the Prince of 
 Wirtemberg, on the ground situated beyond. 
 But Drouet's division arrived at the moment, 
 and its presence, extinguishing all the enemy's 
 hopes, put an end to his efforts. 
 
 This brilliant action cost the French about 
 600 killed and wounded, and the Prussians 
 about 1000. Four thousand more were made 
 prisoners. The Duke of Wirtemberg retired 
 in disorder towards the Elbe, by Dessau and 
 Wittenberg, destroying all the bridges without 
 loss of time. One of his regiments, that of 
 Trescow, which was coming from Magdeburg, 
 along the left bank of the Saale, to join him, 
 was surprised, and almost the whole of it 
 taken. Thus the reserve even of the Prus- 
 sians was in flight, and as disorganized as the 
 rest of their army. 
 
 Napoleon, having come to Naumburg to see 
 the field of battle of Auerst^dt, and to compli- 
 ment the corps of Marshal Davout on its bril- 
 liant conduct, had stopped there a very short 
 time and proceeded to Merseburg. On his 
 way was the spot where the battle of Rosbach 
 was fought. Perfectly versed in military his- 
 tory, he was accurately acquainted with the 
 minutest details of that celebrated action, and 
 he sent General Savary to seek the monument 
 which had been erected in memory of the 
 battle. General Savary discovered it in a 
 stubble field. It was a small column, only a 
 few feet high. The inscriptions were effaced. 
 Troops belonging to Lannes' corps, passing 
 the spot, carried it away, and put the pieces 
 into a caisson, which was sent oft" to France. 
 
 Napoleon then proceeded to Halle. He could 
 not help admiring the exploit of Dupont's 
 division. Upon the ground lay the dead of 
 
 ral Dupoiil is no detractor of Marshal Bernadotte'*. H 
 treats him like a friend, as well as all those who tri- 
 umphed in 1815, when France was overcome 
 it 2
 
 198 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806, 
 
 that division, whom there had not been time 
 K> bury, dressed in the uniform of the 32d regi- 
 ment. "What!" exclaimed Napoleon, "the 
 32d again ! So many of it were killed in Italy, 
 that I thought there could be none left." He 
 tvas lavish of his praises upon the troops of 
 General Dupont. 
 
 The movements of the enemy's army began 
 to become clear. Napoleon directed the pur- 
 suit, conformably to his general plan, which 
 consisted in turning the Prussians, getting be- 
 fore them to the Elbe and the Oder, and pass- 
 ing that river by means of a bridge of boats 
 near Barby, not far from the confluence of the 
 Saale and the Elbe. He enjoined Marshals 
 Lannes and Augereau, who had had two or 
 three days for recruiting themselves, to cross 
 the Saale by the bridge of Halle, and the Elbe 
 by the bridge of Dessau, replacing the latter 
 if it were destroyed. He had already directed 
 Marshal Davout to leave all his wounded at 
 Naumburg, to proceed with his corps to Leip- 
 zig, and from Leipzig to Wittenberg, to make 
 himself master of the passage of the Elbe at 
 this latter point. If he could gain timely pos- 
 session of the course of the Elbe from Witten- 
 berg to Barby, he had the greatest chance of 
 arriving first at Berlin and upon the Oder. 
 
 On his way, although Leipzig belonged to 
 the elector of Saxony, Napoleon prescribed to 
 Marshal Davout a rigorous measure against 
 the merchants of that city, who were the prin- 
 cipal traders in English commodities in Ger- 
 many. Napoleon, to revenge himself on the 
 commerce of Great Britain for the war which 
 she made upon France, strove to intimi- 
 date the commercial cities of the north, such 
 as Bremen, Hamburg, Liibeck, Leipzig, Dant- 
 zig, which strove to open the continent to the 
 English, while he was striving to close it 
 against them. He required, therefore, every 
 merchant to declare what English goods he 
 possessed, adding, that if the declarations ap- 
 peared false, their accuracy would be tested 
 by ocular inspection, and false allegations 
 punished by heavy penalties. All the goods 
 declared were to be confiscated for the benefit 
 of the French army. 
 
 Mean while, ovr troops continued their march 
 Jlowards the J?lb. Marshal Bernadotte passed 
 that river a' Barby, but less promptly than he 
 had orders to do. Napoleon, who had re- 
 strained Mmsuf after the affair of Auerstadt. 
 gave vent tin:, '.ime to his displeasure, and 
 
 > We quote this Idler, which is at the Depdt de la 
 Guerre: 
 
 Marshal Btrthier to Marshal Bernadottt. 
 
 Halle, 21st October, 1806. 
 
 The Emperor, monriwir le mare'chal, desires me to 
 inform you that he is highly displeased, because you 
 have not executed the order which you received, to 
 proceed yesterday to Calbe, for the purpose of throwing 
 a bridge over the mouth of the Saale, at Barby. Yet 
 vou must be aware that all the Emperor's dispositions 
 ,vere combined. 
 
 His majesty, who is extremely angry that you have 
 not executed his orders, reminds you, in reference to 
 tU:s su! ject, that you were not at the battle of Jena; 
 tlmt this m ght have been sufficient to endanger the 
 safety of the army, and to thwart the grand combina- 
 tions of His majesty ; and that it rendered that battle 
 doubtful and very sanguinary, when otherwise it would 
 have been much less so. Deeply mortified as the Em- 
 peror was, he refrained from speaking to you on the 
 ubje it, because he was fearful lest, in calling to mind 
 
 made Prince Berthier address a letter to Mar- 
 shal Bernadotte, in which, in reference to his 
 tardy passage of the Elbe, he was bitterly re- 
 minded of his precipitate departure from 
 Naumburg on the day of the two battles of 
 Jena and Auerstlidt. 1 However, as it is the 
 case, when we follow the rules of cold justice 
 less than the impulses of the heart, Napoleon, 
 too indulgent the first time, was almost too 
 rigorous the second, because the tardiness of 
 Marshal Bernadotte in passing the Elbe was 
 the fault of the elements much more than his. 
 Lannes threw himself upon Dessau, and thence 
 upon the bridge over the Elbe, which the Prus- 
 sians had half destroyed. He lost no time in 
 repairing it. Marshal Davout, on reaching 
 Wittenberg, found the Prussians there also 
 employed in destroying the bridge over the 
 Elbe, and ready to blow up a powder magazine 
 not far from the town. The inhabitants, who 
 were Saxons, and who already knew that Na- 
 poleon wished to spare Saxony the conse- 
 quences of the war, hastened to save the bridge 
 of Wittenberg themselves, to remove the 
 matches, and to assist the French to prevent 
 an explosion. It was on the 20th of October, 
 that Marshals Davout, Lannes and Bernadotte, 
 crossed the Elbe, six days after the battles of 
 Jena and Auerstadt. As we see, there had not 
 been an hour lost. Two great battles, and a 
 very smart action at Halle, had taken up only 
 the time spent in fighting, and the march of 
 our columns had not been suspended for a 
 moment. The Prussians themselves, though 
 their flight was rapid, did not reach the Elbe 
 till the 20th of October, and they passed it at 
 Magdeburg, on the same day that Marshals 
 Lannes and Davout passed it at Dessau and 
 Wittenberg. But they arrived there in a state 
 of increasing disorganization, incapable of 
 defending the lower course of the river, and 
 not even having any hope of reaching the 
 Oder before the French a condition upon 
 which their safety depended. 
 
 Napoleon, notwithstanding his impatience 
 to get to Berlin, in orden to direct his troops to 
 the Oder, stopped a day at Wittenberg to take 
 there marching precautions, which he was 
 careful to multiply in proportion as he carried 
 the war to greater distances. We have already 
 seen him, when penetrating into Austria, se- 
 curing points of support at Augsburg, at Brau- 
 nau, at Linz. In the expedition of far greater 
 length which he was now undertaking, he 
 
 your former services, he should hurt your feelings, and 
 because the consideration which he has for you induced 
 him to be silent; but, on this occasion, when you have 
 not gone to Calbe, and when you have not tried to pass 
 the Elbe, eilher at Barby or at the mouth of the Saale, 
 the Emperor is determined to speak his mind, because 
 he is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed to 
 mere etiquettes of command. 
 
 The Emperor, monsieur le mare'chal, directs me also 
 to speak to you about a matter of less consequence, 
 namely, that, in spite of the order which you received 
 yesterday, you have not yet sent hither three companies 
 to escort your prisoners. There remain in Halle 3500 
 without any escort. The Emperor, monsieur le mare'- 
 chal, orders you to send immediately a staff officer at 
 the head of three complete companies, forming 300 m'n, 
 to take all the prisoners that are at Halle, and to contact 
 them to Erfurt. There are no troops left here but the 
 imperial guard, and the Emperor does not chooe that 
 it should escort the prisoners taken by your co/ps. It 
 is nine o'clock, and there are no signs of the thre com- 
 panies for which 1 applied to you yesterday.
 
 Oct 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 199 
 
 purposed to create upon his route places of 
 safety for his sick or fatigued men, for the re- 
 cruits sent from France, for the stores of am- 
 munition and provisions that he intended to 
 collect. Erfurt being taken, he had changed 
 his line of stations, and, instead of making it 
 pass through Franconia, the province through 
 which he had entered Prussia, he had given it 
 again irs natural direction, and made it pass 
 along the ordinary and central high road of 
 Germany, by Mayence, Frankfurt, Eisenach, 
 Erfurt, Weimar, Naumburg, Halle, and Wit- 
 tenberg. Erfurt was provided with very good 
 defences, and stored with a considerable mate- 
 riel. Napoleon made it the first station on the 
 military road which he was resolved to mark 
 out across Germany. Wittenberg possessed 
 ancient half-destroyed fortifications. On this 
 account, but chiefly for the sake of the bridge 
 existing there over the Elbe, Napoleon ordered 
 this place to be put into condition, as far as 
 that could be done in the space of two or three 
 weeks. He put into the hands of General 
 Chasseloup a large sum of money, for the pur- 
 pose of employing six or seven thousand na- 
 tive labourers, and, in default of regular works, 
 for constructing field-works of great solidity. 
 He ordered the old scarps to be bared at the 
 foot, those which wanted height to be raised, 
 and where time would not permit the employ- 
 ment of masonry, he directed wood, which was 
 very abundant in the neighbouring forests, to 
 be substituted for stone. Immense palisades 
 were set up, a Roman camp was in some sort 
 constructed, such as the ancient conquerors 
 of the world constructed against Gaul and 
 Germany. In the same town of Wittenberg, 
 Napoleon had ovens built, corn collected, bis- 
 cuit made. He determined also that the great 
 park of artillery should be collected in this 
 place, and that workshops for repairs should 
 be established there. He took possession of 
 the public edifices and places, to turn them 
 into hospitals capable of containing the sick 
 and wounded of a numerous army. Lastly, 
 on the suddenly raised ramparts of this vast 
 depot he ordered more than a hundred pieces 
 of heavy artillery, collected in his victorious 
 march, to be placed in battery. He had ap- 
 pointed General Clarke governor of Erfurt; 
 he nominated General Lemarrois, one of his 
 aides-de-camp, governor of Wittenberg. The 
 wounded, separated into two classes, great and 
 little wounded, that is to say, such as would be 
 able to return to the ranks in a few days, and 
 those whose recovery would require a long 
 t:me, were divided between Wittenberg and 
 Erfurt. The little wounded remained at Wit- 
 tenberg, so that they could rejoin their corps 
 immediately; the others were sent to Erfurt. 
 Each regiment, besides the principal depot 
 which it had in France, had also a field depot 
 at Wittenberg. In the latter could be left men 
 who were fatigued or slightly indisposed, that, 
 by means of the attentions of a few days, they 
 might be enabled to march afresh, without en- 
 cumbering the roads, without exhibiting there 
 the spectacle of the tail of an army, sick, im- 
 potent, increasing in length in proportion to 
 the rapidity of the movements and the dura- 
 tion i>f the war. The detachments of con- 
 
 scripts, when leaving France in bodies, had 
 orders to halt at Erfurt and Wittenberg, to be 
 there reviewed, provided with what they needed, 
 augmented by convalescents, and directed to 
 their regiments. Lastly, to the same depots, 
 but especially to that of Wittenberg, Napoleon 
 ordered the immense quantity of fine horses 
 picked up in all parts of Germany, to be sent. 
 He directed all the regiments of cavalry to 
 pass through them in their turn, in order to be 
 remounted. The same order was given to 
 dragoons coming from France on foot. There 
 they would find horses, which they could not 
 procure in France. Thus Napoleon concen- 
 trated at these points, in a well-defended asy- 
 lum, all the resources of the conquered country, 
 which he had the art to take from the enemy 
 and apply to his own use. Victorious, and 
 marching forward, he had in them relays abun- 
 dantly furnished with every thing, provisions, 
 ammunition, materiel, and situated on the route 
 of the corps coming to reinforce the army. If 
 obliged to retire, they would be supports and 
 means of refitting, placed on the lines of retreat 
 
 After inspecting and ordering every thing 
 himself. Napoleon left Wittenberg, and took 
 the road for Berlin. Fate decreed that, in the 
 space of a year, he should visit Berlin and 
 Vienna as a conqueror. The King of Prussia, 
 who had written to solict peace, sent to him 
 M. de Lucchesini, to negotiate an armistice. 
 Napoleon would not see M. de Lucchesini, 
 and charged Marshal Duroc to deliver to the 
 minister of King Frederick William the an- 
 swer commanded by circumstances. It would 
 in fact have been giving the Russians time to 
 succour the Prussians, to grant an armistice. 
 This military reason admitted j f no reply ; un- 
 less the formal powers of Russia and Prussia 
 were produced for treating immediately for 
 peace on the conditions which Napoleon had 
 a right to impose after the late victories. 
 
 He despatched orders, therefore, to all his 
 corps to march to Berlin. Marshal Davout 
 was to start from Wittenberg, taking the direct 
 rout from Wittenberg to Berlin, that of Juter- 
 bock; Lannes and Augereau were to follow 
 that from Treuenbrietzen to Potsdam. Napo- 
 leon, with the guard, horse and foot, now 
 united and reinforced by seven thousand gren- 
 adiers and voltigeurs, marched between these 
 two columns. He purposed that, in recom- 
 pense for the victor}' of Auerstudt, Marshal 
 Davout should be the first to enter Berlin, and 
 receive the keys of the capital from the hands 
 of the magistrates. As for himself, before he 
 went to Berlin, he intended to stay awhile at 
 Potsdam, in the retreat of the great Frederick. 
 Marshals Soult and Ney had orders to invest 
 Magdeburg, Murat to remain in ambush for a 
 few days about that great fortress, to intercept 
 the bands of fugitives crowding thither. "It 
 is a trap," wrote Napoleon to him, " in which, 
 with your cavalry, you will catch all the de- 
 tached parties that are seeking a safe place 
 for crossing the Elbe." Murat was afterwards 
 to join the grand army at Berlin, and thenc 
 post off to the Oder. 
 
 Having waited to allow his corps farmee to 
 get the start of him a little, Napoleon set out 
 on the 24th of October, and passed through
 
 200 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 Kropstadt on his way to Potsdam. Perform- 
 ing the journey on horseback, he was caught 
 in a violent storm, though the weather had 
 continued very fine ever since the opening of 
 the campaign. It was not his custom to stop 
 for such a reason. However, he was offered 
 shelter in a house situated amid woods, and 
 belonging to an officer of the hunting esta- 
 blishment of the court of Saxony. He accepted 
 the offer. Some females, who seemed from 
 their language and dress to be of e'evated 
 rank, received, around a great fire, this group 
 of French officers, whom, from fear as much 
 as out of politeness, they treated with much 
 civility. They seemed not to be aware who 
 was the principal of these officers, around 
 whom the others respectfully ranged them- 
 selves, when one of them, still young, seized 
 with a strong emotion, exclaimed, "That is the 
 Emperor!" "How came you to know me 7" 
 asked Napoleon, drily. " Sire," she answered, 
 "I was with your majesty in Egypt." "And 
 what were you doing in Egypt!" "I was the 
 wife of an officer, who has since died in your 
 service. I have solicited a pension for myself 
 and my son, but I was a foreigner, and could 
 not obtain it ; and 1 am come to live with the 
 mistress of this house, who has kindly re- 
 ceived me, and intrusted me with the educa- 
 tion of her children." The countenance of 
 Napoleon, who was displeased at being recog- 
 nised, stern at first, all at once assumed a soft 
 expression : " Madam," said he, " you shall 
 have a pension ; and as for your son, I charge 
 myself with his education." 
 
 The same evening he took care to affix his 
 signature to both these resolutions, and said, 
 smiling, " I never yet met with an adventure 
 in a forest, in consequence of a storm : here 
 is one, however, and a most agreeable one." 
 
 He arrived in the evening of the 25th of 
 October at Potsdam. He immediately went 
 to visit the retreat of the great captain, the 
 great king, who called himself" The Philoso- 
 pher of Sans-Souci," and with some reason, 
 who seemed to wield sword and sceptre with 
 a jeering indifference, as if in mockery of all 
 the courts of Europe, one might venture to 
 add, of his own people, if he had not taken so 
 much pains to govern them well. Napoleon 
 went through the great and little palace of 
 Potsdam, desired to be shown Frederick's 
 works, crowded with Voltaire's notes, sought 
 to discover in his library on what books 1 he 
 was accustomed to feast his great mind, and 
 then went to the church of Potsdam, to inspect 
 the modest tomb where rests the founder of 
 Prussia. At Potsdam were kept the sword of 
 Frederick, his belt, his order of the Black 
 Eagle. Napoleon seized them, exclaiming, 
 " What a capital present for the Invalides, 
 especially for those who have formed part of 
 the army of Hanover ! They will be delighted, 
 no doubt, when they see in our possession the 
 sword of him who beat them at Rosbach." 
 Napoleon, in seizing these precious relics with 
 so much respect, most assuredly offered no 
 affront either to Frederick or the Prussian na- 
 tion. But how extraordinary, how worthy of 
 meditation is that mysterious concatenation 
 which binds, blends, separates, or brings to- 
 
 gether, the things of this wor.d ! Frederick 
 and Napoleon met here in a very strange man- 
 ner. That philosopher king, who, unknown 
 to himself, had been from his elevated throne 
 one of the promoters of the French Revolution, 
 now lying in his coffin, received a visit from 
 the general of that Revolution, become em- 
 peror and conqueror of Brrlin and Potsdam ! 
 The victor at Rosbach received a visit from 
 the victor at Jena! What a sight ! Unfortu- 
 nately, these reverses of fortune were not the 
 last. 
 
 While the head-quarters were at Potsdam, 
 Marshal Davout entered Berlin with his corps 
 on the 25th of October. King Frederick Wil- 
 liam, when he withdrew, had left Berlin to the 
 government of the citizens, under the presi- 
 dency of a considerable personage, the Prince 
 de Hatzfeld. The representatives of the civic 
 body offered to Marshal Davout the keys of 
 the capital, which he gave back to them, say- 
 ing, that they belonged to one greater than he 
 to Napoleon. He left a single regiment in 
 the city, to do the police duty jointly with the 
 city militia. He then went and established 
 himself at Friedrichsfeld, a league distant, 
 with his right to the Spree, and his left to the 
 woods. By order of Napoleon, he encamped 
 militarily, with the artillery pointed, and part 
 of the soldiers on duty as sentinels at the 
 camp, while the others went alternately to 
 visit the capital conquered through their ex- 
 ploits. He ordered hovels to be made with 
 straw and fir, that the troops might be shel- 
 tered from the inclemency of the season. It 
 was not necessary to recommend discipline to 
 Marshal Davout : there was no need to watch 
 him, unless to render him less severe. Mar- 
 shal Davout promised to respect persons and 
 property, as civilized conquerors ought to do, 
 on condition that they would obtain from the 
 inhabitants complete submission and provi- 
 sions, during the short time that the army had 
 to spend within their walls, which, for such a 
 city as Berlin, could not constitute a very 
 heavy burden. 
 
 The day after the entry of the French into 
 Berlin, the shops were open. The inhabitants 
 were walking peaceably in the wide streets of 
 that capital, and even in greater numbers than 
 usual. They seemed to be at once mortified 
 and curious, natural impressions among a 
 people patriotic but passionate, enlightened, 
 struck with all that is great, eager to know 
 the most renowned generals and soldiers then 
 in the world. They disapproved, moreover, 
 of their government having undertaken a 
 senseless war; and that disapprobation could 
 not but diminish the hatred which they bore 
 to the provoked conquerors. Marshal Lannes 
 was sent to Potsdam and Spondau. Marshal 
 Augereau passed through Berlin at the heels 
 of Marshal .Davout ; and Napoleon, having 
 staid the 25th and 26th at Potsdam, and the 
 27th at Charlottenburg, fixed on the 28th for 
 his entry into Berlin. 
 
 It was the first time that he had ever made 
 a triumphant entry, like Alexander or Caesar, 
 into a conquered capital. He had not entered 
 Vienna in that manner: indeed he had scarcely 
 visited the Austrian capital at all, living con-
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 201 
 
 stantly at- Schonbrunn, out of the sight of its 
 inhabitants. But, on this day, whether from 
 pride at having demolished an army reputed 
 to be invincible, or from a desire to awe Eu- 
 rope by a striking spectacle, or perhaps from 
 the intoxication of victory mounting higher 
 than usual into his head, he chose the morn- 
 ing of the 28th for his triumphant entry into 
 Berlin. 
 
 The whole population of the city was 
 abroad to witness this grand scene. Napo- 
 leon entered, surrounded by his guard, and 
 followed by the fine cuirassiers of Generals 
 d'Hautpoul and Nansouty. The imperial 
 guard, in rich uniform, was on this day more 
 imposing than ever. In front the grenadiers 
 and dismounted chasseurs, in rear the horse 
 grenadiers and chasseurs, in the middle Mar- 
 shals Berthier, Duroc, Davout, Augereau, and, 
 in the centre of this group, left by himself out 
 of respect, Napoleon, in the simple dress 
 which he wore in the Tuilleries, and in fields 
 of battle. Napoleon, the object of all eyes in 
 that immense concourse, silent, impressed at 
 once with sorrow and admiration. Such was 
 the spectacle exhibited in that long and spa- 
 cious street of Berlin leading from the gate of 
 Charlottenburg to the palace of the kings of 
 Prussia. The populace were in the streets, 
 the wealthy citizens at the windows. As for 
 the nobility, it had fled, full of fear and with 
 confusion. The wives of the Prussian burgh- 
 ers seemed to devour the spectacle that was 
 before their eyes : some shed tears, but none 
 uttered either cries of haired, or cries of flat- 
 tery for the conqueror. Happy Prussia, not 
 to be divided, and to keep up her dignity in 
 her disaster ! The entry of the enemy was 
 not with her the ruin of one party, the triumph 
 of another, and she had not in her bosom an 
 unworthy faction, feeling an odious joy, ap- 
 plauding the presence of foreign soldiers. We 
 French, mofe unfortunate in our reverses, 
 have witnessed that execrable joy, for we have 
 seen every thing in this century, the extremes 
 of victory and defeat, of greatness and abase- 
 ment, of the purest devotedness and the black- 
 est treachery ! 
 
 Napoleon received the keys of Berlin from 
 the magistrates, then proceeded to the palace, 
 where he gave audience to all the public au- 
 thorities, used mild, cheering language, pro- 
 mised order on the part of the soldiers, on 
 condition of order on the part of the inhabit- 
 ants, showed no severity in his expressions 
 but towards the German aristocracy, which 
 was, he said, the sole author of all the calami- 
 ties of Germany, which had dared to provoke 
 him to the fight, and which he would chastise 
 by obliging it to beg its bread in England. He 
 established himself in the king's palace, re- 
 ceived the foreign ministers representing 
 friendly courts, and summoned M. de Talley- 
 rand to Berlin. 
 
 His bulletins, narratives of all that the army 
 accomplished daily, often, too, violent answers 
 to his enemies, series of political reflections, 
 lessons to kings and nations, were rapidly 
 dictated by him, and usually revised by M. de 
 Talleyrand before they were published. He 
 there recorded each of the progresses which 
 
 VOL. II. 26 
 
 he had made in the enemy's country; he even 
 related what he heard concerning the political 
 causes of the war. In those which he pub- 
 lished in Prussia, he affected to lavish homage 
 to the memory of the great Frederick, tokens 
 of esteem on his unfortunate successor, taking 
 good care indeed that some pity for his weak- 
 ness should peep through, and the most viru- 
 lent sarcasms on queens who meddle in affairs 
 of state, who expose their husbands and their 
 country to frightful disasters ; treatment most 
 ungenerous towards the Queen of Prussia, 
 who was sufficiently racked by the sense of 
 her faults and her misfortunes, to be spared 
 the addition of outrage to adversity. These 
 bulletins, which betrayed with too little reserve 
 the licentiousness of the victorious soldier, 
 exposed Napoleon to more than one censure 
 amidst the shouts of admiration which his tri- 
 umphs drew from his enemies themselves. 
 
 In his irritation against the Prussian party 
 which promoted the war, he received sternly 
 the envoys of the Duke of Brunswick, who 
 had been mortally wounded at the battle of 
 Auerstadt, and who, before he expired, recom- 
 mended his family and his subjects to the con- 
 queror. " What would he who sent you have 
 to say," replied Napoleon " what would he 
 have to say, if I were to inflict on the city of 
 Brunswick that subversion with which, fifteen 
 years ago, he threatened the capital of the 
 great nation which I command 1 The Duke 
 of Brunswick had disavowed the insensate 
 manifesto of 1792; one would have thought 
 that with age reason had begun to get the 
 better of his passions, and yet he has again 
 lent the authority of his name to the follies of 
 hot-headed youth, which have brought ruin 
 upon Prussia. To him it belonged to put 
 women, courtiers, young officers, into their 
 proper places, and to make all feel the au- 
 thority of his age, of his understanding, and 
 of his position. But he had not the force to 
 do so, and the Prussian monarchy is demo- 
 lished and the States of Brunswick are in my 
 power. Tell the Duke of Brunswick that I 
 shall show him that consideration which is due 
 to an unfortunate general, justly celebrated, 
 struck by that fate which may reach us all, 
 but that I cannot recognise a sovereign prince 
 in a general of the Prussian army." 
 
 These words, published through the usual 
 channel of the bulletins, intimated that Napo- 
 leon would not treat the sovereignty of the 
 Duke of Brunswick any better than that of the 
 Elector of Hesse. If, however, he showed 
 asperity to some, he showed himself kind and 
 generous to others, taking care to vary his 
 treatment according to the known participa- 
 tion of each in the war. His expressions in 
 regard to old Marshal Mollendorf were per- 
 fectly decorous. There was in Berlin Prince 
 Ferdinand, brother of the great Frederick, and 
 father of Prince Louis, as well as the princess 
 his wife. There were also the widow of Prince 
 Henry, and two sisters of the king, one lying 
 in, the other ill. Napoleon went to visit all 
 these members of the royal family, with all 
 the signs of profound respect, and touched 
 them by testimonies coming from so high a 
 personage, for there was not then a sovereign
 
 202 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 whose attentions had so great a value as his. 
 In the situation to which he had attained, he 
 knew how to calculate his slightest tokens of 
 kindness or severity. Exercising at this mo- 
 ment the right belonging to all generals in 
 time of war, that of intercepting correspond- 
 ence, to discover the movements of the enemy, 
 he seized a letter from the Prince de Hatzfeld, 
 in which he appeared to inform Prince Hohen- 
 lohe of the position of the French army around 
 Berlin. The Prince de Hatzfeld, as head of 
 the municipal government established in Ber- 
 lin, had promised upon oath not to attempt 
 any thing against the French army, and to 
 attend solely to the quiet, safety, and welfare 
 of the capital. It was an engagement of loy- 
 alty towards the conqueror, who suffered an 
 authority which he could have abolished to 
 subsist for the benefit of the conquered coun- 
 try. The fault, however, was very excusable, 
 since it proceeded from the most honourable 
 of sentiments, patriotism. Napoleon, who was 
 apprehensive that other burgomasters would 
 imitate this example, and that, in this case, all 
 his movements would be revealed from hour 
 to hour to the enemy Napoleon resolved to 
 intimidate the Prussian authorities by an act 
 of signal severity, and was not sorry that this 
 severity should fall upon one of the principal 
 members of the nobility, accused of having 
 been a warm partisan of war, but accused 
 falsely, for the Prince de Hatzfeld was of the 
 number of the Prussian nobles who had mode- 
 ration because they had understanding. Na- 
 poleon sent for Prince Berthier, and ordered 
 Marshal Davout, on whose severity he could 
 reckon, to form a military commission, which 
 should apply to the conduct of the Prince de 
 Hatzfeld the laws of war against espvmnage. 
 Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution 
 adopted by Napoleon, endeavoured in vain to 
 dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulain- 
 court, Savary, not presuming to hazard remon- 
 strances which seemed misplaced from any 
 other lips than those of the major-general, 
 were alarmed. Not knowing to what means 
 to resort, they hid the prince in the very 
 palace, upon pretext of having him arrested, 
 and then informed the Princess de Hatzfeld, 
 an interesting person, and who was then preg- 
 nant, of the danger which threatened her hus- 
 band. She hastened to the palace. It was 
 high time ; for the commission, having assem- 
 bled, was applying for the evidence. Napo- 
 leon, returning from a ride in Berlin, had just 
 alighted from his horse, the guard beating the 
 march ; and, as he crossed the threshold of the 
 palace, the Princess de Hatzfeld, conducted by 
 Duroc, appeared all in tears before him. Thus 
 taken by surprise, he could not refuse to re- 
 ceive her : he granted her an audience in his 
 cabinet. She was seized with terror. Napo- 
 leon, touched by her distress, desired her to 
 approach, and handed her the intercepted 
 letter to read. Well, madam," said he, " do 
 you recognise the handwriting of your hus- 
 band 1" The princess, trembling, knew not 
 what to reply. Presently, however, taking 
 care to cheer her, Napoleon added, " Throw 
 that paper in to the fire, and the military com- 
 
 ' mission will have no evidence to convict 
 upon." 
 
 This act of clemency, which Napoleon could 
 not refuse after he had seen the Princess de 
 Hatzfeld, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice for 
 him, because it was part of his design to inti- 
 midate the German nobility, particularly the 
 magistrates of the towns, who revealed to the 
 enemy the secrets of his operations. He 
 learned subsequently to know the Prince de 
 Hatzfeld, appreciated his character and his 
 understanding, and was glad that he had not 
 given him up to military justice. Happy the 
 governments that have discreet friends, who 
 contrive to delay their severities ! It is not 
 
 i necessary that this delay should be long, be- 
 fore they have ceased to purpose acts upon 
 which, at first, they were most resolutely bent. 
 Napoleon, in this interval, had incessantly 
 directed the movements of his lieutenants 
 against the wrecks of the Prussian army. 
 Placed at Berlin with his principal forces, he 
 cut off the Prussians from the direct route 
 from the Elbe to the Oder, and left them no 
 roads for reaching the latter river, but such as 
 were long, almost impassable, and easy to in- 
 tercept. Berlin, in fact, is situated between 
 the Elbe and the Oder, at an equal distance 
 from the two rivers. The plains of sand which 
 we have already described, as they approach 
 the Baltic towards Mecklenburg, rise into sand- 
 hills, and present a series of lakes of all di- 
 mensions, parallel to the sea. These lakes, 
 being prevented by the chain of sand-hills 
 from discharging themselves directly into the 
 sea, find a channel towards the interior of the 
 country, in an inconsiderable and rather slug- 
 gish stream, the Havel, which runs towards 
 Berlin, where it falls in with the Spree, com- 
 ing from an opposite direction, that is to say, 
 
 | from Lusatia, a province which separates Sax- 
 ony from Silesia. The Havel and Spree, united 
 near Berlin, expand about Spandau and Pots- 
 dam, and there form new lakes, which the 
 hand of the great Frederick took pains to em- 
 bellish, and, turning to the left, proceed to the 
 
 ! Elbe. They thus describe a transverse line, 
 which, on one side, unites Berlin to the Elbe, 
 and, continued by the Finow canal on the other, 
 joins that capital to the Oder. It was through 
 
 , this tract, intersected by natural or artificial 
 streams, covered with lakes, forests, and sand, 
 
 1 that the vagrant relics of the Prussian army 
 had to take their flight. 
 
 Napoleon, established since the 25th of Oc- 
 tober at Potsdam and Berlin, had it in his 
 power to anticipate them in all directions. 
 He kept Lannes' corps at Spandau, the corps 
 of Augereau and Davout in Berlin itself, lastly, 
 Bernadotte's corps beyond Berlin all of them 
 ready to march on the first indication they 
 should have of the direction taken by the ene- 
 
 1 my. Napoleon had spread the cavalry around 
 Berlin and Potsdam, and upon the banks of 
 the Havel and the Elbe, to pick up intelligence. 
 Spandau had already surrendered. That 
 fortress, situated very near Berlin, amidst the 
 waters of the Spree and the Havel, strong by 
 its situation and its works, was capable of 
 
 | making a long resistance. But such had been
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 203 
 
 the presumption and the carelessness of the 
 Prussian government, that it had not even 
 armed the place, though the magazines which 
 it contained were provided with a considerable 
 materiel. On the 25th, the day of Marshal Da- 
 vout's entry into Berlin, Lannes had appeared 
 under the walls of Spandau, and threatened 
 the governor with the severest treatment if he 
 refused to surrender. The guns were not upon 
 the walls ; the garrison, participating in the 
 terror which had seized all hearts, desired to 
 capitulate. The governor was an old soldier, 
 whom age had bereft of all energy. Lannes 
 saw him, frightened him by the account of the 
 disasters^ of the Prussian army, and wrung 
 from him a capitulation, by virtue of which 
 the place was immediately delivered up to the 
 French, and the garrison declared prisoners 
 of war. It would require at once the impro- 
 ridence of the government, which hadneglect- 
 -d to arm the fortress, and the demoralization 
 tvhich everywhere prevailed, to account for so 
 strange a capitulation. 
 
 The Emperor hastened in person to Span- 
 dau, and resolved to make it his third depot in 
 Germany. This new refuge offered the more 
 advantages, inasmuch as it was situated with- 
 in three or four leagues of Berlin, surrounded 
 by water, perfectly fortified, and contained an 
 immense quantity of corn. Napoleon ordered 
 it to be armed forthwith, ovens built there, 
 ammunition amassed, hospitals organized in 
 short, the same establishments created as at 
 Wittenberg and Erfurt. He sent thither im- 
 mediately all the artillery, muskets, and muni- 
 tions of war taken at Berlin. In that capital 
 had been found 300 pieces of cannon, 100,000 
 muskets, and a great quantity of powder and 
 projectiles. This vast materiel, added to con- 
 siderable stores of grain, was a sort of gua- 
 rantee against any attempt of the people of 
 Berlin, now very quiet and docile, but whose 
 submission any reverse which we might sus- 
 tain would be liable to change into revolt. 
 
 While the Emperor was occupied with these 
 provident measures, the uninterrupted expedi- 
 tions of the light cavalry had revealed the 
 march of the Prussian army. The eleven 
 days which had elapsed since the battle of 
 Jena, those eleven days employed by the 
 French in gaining the Elbe, in crossing it, in 
 occupying Berlin, had been employed by the 
 Prussians also in gaining the Elbe, in there 
 collecting their scattered wrecks, in then pro- 
 ceeding towards Mecklenburg, in order to reach 
 the line of the Oder by means of a circuit to 
 the north. This movement towards Mecklen- 
 burg being unmasked, Napoleon despatched 
 Murat, by way of Oranienburg and Zehdenick, 
 to follow the banks of the Havel and the Finow 
 canal. It was along these military lines, and 
 protected by Ihem, that the Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe would march. Napoleon ordered them 
 to proceed along these lines in such a manner 
 as to keep constantly between the enemy and 
 the Oder, and then, when they had turned the 
 Prussians, to endeavour to envelope them, and 
 take them to the last man. Marshal Lannes 
 had set out with Murat, and with the recom- 
 mendation to march as rapidly as the cavalry. 
 Marshal Bernadotte had orders to follow 
 
 Lannes. Marshal Davout, after the three or 
 four days' rest which he needed, was to pro- 
 ceed to Frankfurt on the Oder; Marshal Au- 
 gereau and the guard were to remain at Ber 
 lin. Marshals Ney and Soult had been sent, 
 as we have said, to invest Magdeburg. 
 
 The unfortunate Prince of Hohenlohe had 
 actually taken the resolution that was attri- 
 buted to him. Pursued most perseveringly by 
 the French, he had arrived at Magdeburg, 
 hoping to find there rest, provisions, materiel, 
 and, above all, the time necessary for the re- 
 organization of his army. Vain hope ! The 
 want of precautions against a retreat so easy 
 to be foreseen prevailed everywhere. At 
 Magdeburg there were no supplies but what 
 were indispensable for the garrison. The old 
 governor, M. de Kleist, having provided for 
 the first wants of the fugitives, and given them 
 a small quantity of bread, refused to feed them 
 any longer, fearful of diminishing his own re- 
 sources, if he should be besieged. The inte- 
 rior of Magdeburg was so encumbered with 
 baggage, that the army could not be lodged 
 there : the cavalry was established, as a matter 
 of necessity, on the glacis ; the infantry in the 
 covered ways. Very soon the Prussian troops, 
 continually harassed by the French cavalry, 
 which came and carried off whole detachments 
 under the cannon of the place, were obliged to 
 pass to the other side of the Elbe. At length 
 M. de Kleist, terrified at the disorder prevailing 
 within and without Magdeburg, earnestly re- 
 quested the Prince of Hohenlohe to continue 
 his retreat towards the Oder, and to leave him 
 the liberty which he so much needed to put 
 himself into a slate of defence. The Prince 
 of Hohenlohe had, therefore, but two days to 
 reorganize an army composed of nothing but 
 wrecks, and in which several battalions had 
 to be united in order to form one. Moreover, 
 Marshal Kalkreuth having been sent for by the 
 king, who was in East Prussia, the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe was ordered to pick up the two di- 
 visions of reserve, and obliged to go to the 
 Lower Elbe, far below Magdeburg, to join 
 them. 
 
 Amidst these embarrassments, the Prince 
 of Hohenlohe commenced his march in three 
 columns. On his right, General Schimmel- 
 pfennig, with a detachment of cavalry and in- 
 fantry, was to cover the army towards Pots- 
 dam, Spandau, and Berlin, to keep at first 
 along the Havel, then, when he had ascended 
 high enough to turn Berlin, to proceed along 
 the Finow canal, and thus flank the retreat as 
 far as Prenzlau and Stettin, for, owing to the 
 position of the French, it was only towards 
 the mouth of the Oder that the Prussians could 
 reach that river. The bulk of the infantry, 
 marching at the centre, at an equal distance 
 from the corps of Schimmelpfennig and the 
 Elbe, was to proceed through Genthin, Rathe- 
 nau, Gransee, and Prenzlau. The cavalry, 
 which was already on the banks of the Elbe, 
 where it profited by the abundance of forage, 
 was to follow the banks of that river by Jeri- 
 chow and Havelberg, then leave them to pro- 
 ceed northward, and, passing through Witt- 
 stock, Mirow, Strelitz, Prenzlau, arrive a' tb* 
 common point, Stettin.
 
 204 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 The corps of the Duke of Weimar and the 
 grand park, under the conduct of General Blu- 
 cher, had fortunately turned the Harz by Hesse 
 and Hanover, without being annoyed by the 
 French, who were hastening to reach the 
 Elbe. The Duke of Weimar, by means of a 
 very clever manoeuvre, had continued to de- 
 ceive Marshal Soult. Feigning at first to at- 
 tack the line of investment around Magde- 
 burg, and then slipping oft' all at once, he had 
 suddenly crossed the Elbe at Tangermunde, 
 and thus gained the right bank. He had with 
 him twelve or fourteen thousand men. Gene- 
 ral Blucher had passed the river below. The 
 Prince of Hohenlohe assigned to the Duke 
 of Weimar the concerted rendezvous of Stettin, 
 which he was to reach by crossing Mecklen- 
 burg, and gave General Blucher the command 
 of the troops beaten before Halle, troops which 
 had passed out of the hands of the Duke of 
 Wirtemberg into, those of General Natzrner. 
 General Blucher was directed to form with 
 these troops the rear-guard of the Prussian 
 army. 
 
 If these forces had contrived to escape the 
 French and to reach Stettin, they might, after 
 being reorganized and joined by the contingent 
 of East Prussia, have composed behind the 
 Oder an army of some value, and lent a useful 
 hand to the Russians. The Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe had kept together 25,000 men at least. 
 Natzmer's corps, with the other wrecks of 
 General Blucher's, numbered nine or ten thou- 
 sand. The troops of the Duke of Weimar 
 amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand. 
 There was consequently a total force of about 
 50,000 men, which, joined to about 20,000, left 
 in East Prussia, could still have presented 
 70,000 fighting men, and, combined with the 
 Russians, have played an important part. 
 There were left 22,000 men to defend Magde- 
 burg. The Saxons, hastening to avail them- 
 selves of the clemency of Napoleon towards 
 them, had returned to their homes. 
 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe had to effect his 
 retreat through a poor country, difficult to 
 traverse, and amidst numerous squadrons of 
 French cavalry. The latter, which was at first 
 cautious in presence of the Prussian cavalry, 
 the excellence of which was highly extolled to 
 it, now, intoxicated with its successes, had be- 
 come so daring that mere chasseurs were no 
 longer afraid to encounter cuirassiers. 
 
 The prince set out then on the 22d of Octo- 
 ber, by the roads specified, Shimmelpfennig's 
 corps of flankers proceeding for Plauen, the 
 infantry for Genchin, the cavalry for Jerichow. 
 They marched slowly, on account of the sands, 
 the exhausted state of men and horses, and 
 their being unused to fatigue. Seven or eight 
 leagues a day were as much as these troops 
 could perform, while the French infantry, in 
 case of need, would clear fifteen. Moreover, a 
 very great indiscipline had crept into the corps. 
 Disaster, which sours men's minds, had dimi- 
 nished the respect due to officers. The cavalry, 
 in particular, marched in a confused manner, 
 without obeying any orders. The Prince of 
 Hohenlohe was obliged to halt the army, and 
 to address it in very sharp terms to bring it 
 back to a sense of its duty. He even caused 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 a horse-soldier, who had wounded an officer, 
 to be shot. For the rest, it must be confessed 
 that such is the usual effect of great reverses, 
 and sometimes, too, of great successes, lor vic- 
 tory has its disorder as well as defeat. The 
 French, eager after booty, ran, like the Prus- 
 sians, in all directions, without heeding the 
 commands of their officers ; and Marshal Ney 
 wrote to the Emperor, that, unless he were 
 authorized to make some examples, the lives 
 of the officers would be no longer safe. Sin- 
 gular consequences of the dissolution of states ! 
 The precipitate movements caused by this dis- 
 solution disorganize the conquered and the 
 conqueror. We had arrived at the perfection 
 of the highest department of war, and were 
 already approaching the limit where it be- 
 comes an immense confusion. 
 
 On the 23d the Prussians were, the infantry 
 at Rathenau, the cavalry at Havelberg. Bui 
 the pains which they took to break down the 
 bridges impeded the march of the corps on the 
 right, that of Schimmelpfennig, and they were 
 obliged to approach the Elbe by a wheel to the 
 left, in order to avoid the numerous streams 
 which are met with between the Havel and 
 the Elbe. They turned off as far as Rhino w. 
 On the 24th, they were, the cavalry at Kiritz, 
 the infantry at Neustadt, the corps of Schim- 
 melpfennig at Fehrbellin. Natzmer's corps, 
 transferred here to General Blucher, took near 
 Rhinow the place of the principal corps, the 
 rear-guard of which it formed. 
 
 Having reached this point, the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe had to deliberate on the further 
 course to be pursued. They had ascended to 
 the north far beyond Berlin, Spandau, and 
 Potsdam. At every step the army became 
 more and more disorganized. The colonel of 
 the staff, De Massenbach, advised that the 
 troops should be allowed a day of rest, in order 
 to reorganize them, and to be at least in a con- 
 dition for fighting, if they should chance to 
 meet with the French. The Prince of Hohen- 
 lohe replied, very justly, that neither one, two, 
 nor even three days would be sufficient to re- 
 organize the army, and it might give the 
 French time to cut it off from Stettin and the 
 Oder. As usual, a middle course was adopted; 
 a common rendezvous was fixed at Gransee, 
 where a general review was to be held, and 
 addresses delivered to the troops to recall them 
 to their duty. They then continued their 
 march without stopping. The rendezvous at 
 Gransee was fixed for the 26th. 
 
 But, the French being already apprized, 
 Murat's cavalry hurried to Fehrbellin on the 
 one side, to Zehdenick on the other. Lannes, 
 having entered Spandau on the 25th, marched 
 in the evening of the 26th with his infantry to 
 support Murat. Marshal Soult was pursuing 
 the Duke of Weimar while Marshal Ney in- 
 vested Magdeburg. Thus three French corps 
 d'.armee, besides Murat's cavalry, with the ex- 
 ception, it is true, of the cuirassiers, kept in 
 Berlin, were at this moment pursuing the 
 Prussians. On the 26th, the infantry of the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe was at Gransee, at the 
 appointed rendezvous, listening to his exhorta- 
 tions, imbibing hopes of being soon at Stettin, 
 and resting behind the Oder. But, at that mo-
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 205 
 
 ment, Mufat's dragoons surprised Schimmel- 
 pfennig's corps at Zehdenick, overturned his 
 cavalry, killed 300, and took seven or eight 
 hundred horse, and obliged the infantry of 
 that corps of flankers to disperse in the 
 woods. 
 
 This intelligence, brought by peasants and 
 fugitives to Gransee, induced the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe to decamp immediately, and to turn 
 off once more to the left towards Furstenberg, 
 instead of marching to Templin, which was 
 the direct route for Stettin. He was thus in 
 hopes of rallying his cavalry to him, and of 
 getting at the same time further from the 
 French. But, while he was making this cir- 
 cuit, Murat proceeded by the shortest road to 
 Templin, and Lannes, halting neither day nor 
 night, kept constantly in sight of Murat's 
 squadrons. The Prince of Hohenlohe slept at 
 Furstenberg, and made his infantry pass the 
 night there, while Lannes spent that same 
 night in marching. French and Prussians 
 continued to pursue a northward course to- 
 wards Templin and Prenzlau, the common 
 point of the Stettin road, moving at the dis- 
 tance of a few leagues from each other, and 
 separated merely by a curtain of woods and 
 lakes. They were still twelve leagues (seven 
 German miles) from Prenzlau. On the morn- 
 ing of the 27th, the Prince of Hohenlohe start- 
 ed for Boitzenburg, sending word to the ca- 
 valry to join him, and to the rear-guard, 
 commanded by General Blucher, to quicken 
 its pace. 
 
 He marched all day, having no other re- 
 freshment for his troops than what was fur- 
 nished them by the patriotism of the villagers, 
 who placed upon the road piles of bread and 
 caldrons full of potatoes. Towards evening 
 they approached Boitzenburg, and the owner 
 of that place, M. d'Arnim, came to intimate 
 that he had had bivouacs prepared around his 
 mansion, and abundantly provided with vic- 
 tuals and drink. This was welcome news to 
 men dying from fatigue and hunger. But, on 
 approaching Boitzenburg, reports of fire-arms 
 destroyed that hope of rest and food. Murat's 
 light-horse, having already reached Boitzen- 
 burg, were regaling on the provisions destined 
 for the Prussians. Too few, however, to make 
 head against the latter, they left Boitzenburg. 
 The unfortunate soldiers of Prince Hohenlohe 
 devoured what was left, but the presence of 
 French horse warned them that they had no 
 time to lose. They started again that same 
 night, making another circuit to the left to 
 avoid the French, and to reach Prenzlau be- 
 fore them. They marched the whole night, 
 flattering themselves that they should outstrip 
 them. At daybreak, they began to discern 
 Prenzlau ; but, on the right, across the woods 
 and lakes which lined the route, they had 
 caught a glimpse of horsemen riding at a ra- 
 pid rate. The fog prevented them from dis- 
 tinguishing the colour of their uniform. Were 
 they French 7 were they Prussians 1 Such 
 were the questions which they asked each 
 other. Some imagined that they perceived the 
 white plume of a Prussian regiment; others, 
 on the contrary, fancied that they could distin- 
 guish the helmet of Murat's dragoons. At 
 
 length, amidst these conjectures of fear and 
 hope, they arrived in sight of Prenzlau, the 
 French as they were assured, not having yet 
 been seen. They pushed on into a suburb, a 
 quarter of a league in length. Half of the 
 Prussian army had already entered, then all 
 at once, the cry, " To arms !" was raised. 
 The French dragoons coming up at the mo- 
 ment when part of the Prussian army was in 
 Prenzlau, attacked the tail of it, drove it into 
 the town itself, charged it in all directions, 
 and then dashed into the streets. The Prit- 
 witz dragoons, pushed by the French dra- 
 goons, fell back upon the Prussian infantry 
 and overturned it. Horrible was the fray that 
 followed, terror aggravating the tumult and 
 the danger. The Prussian army, cut in seve- 
 ral pieces, fled beyond Prenzlau, and took po- 
 sition as well as it could on the Stettin road. 
 It was soon surrounded, and Murat sent to 
 summon the Prince of Hohenlohe to surren- 
 der. He conceived that Murat had brought 
 nothing but cavalry with him ; but the in- 
 fantry of Lannes, which, after leaving Span- 
 dau, had marched day and night, halting only 
 to eat, arrived at the same moment. The co- 
 lonel of the stan", de Massenbach, affirmed that 
 he had seen it. There was no chance of es- 
 caping. Murat desired to speak with the 
 Prince of Hohenlohe. The soldier who had 
 become prince, and continued as generous as 
 he was intrepid, consoled the Prussian gene- 
 ral, promised him an honourable capitulation, 
 the most honourable that he could grant within 
 the limit prescribed by the instructions of Na- 
 poleon. Murat required that all the soldiers 
 should be prisoners, but consented that the 
 officers should remain free and be allowed to 
 carry away whatever they possessed, on con- 
 dition, however, of not serving again during 
 the war. He consented also that the soldiers 
 should be exempted from the humiliating for- 
 mality of laying down their arms when filing 
 before the French. This was a deference 
 which, under their misfortune, would distin- 
 guish them from the troops of the Austrian 
 Mack. The Prince of Hohenlohe, seeing that 
 he could not obtain better terms, feeling eveu 
 that Murat could not grant more, returned to 
 his officers, made them form a circle around 
 him, and, his eyes filled with tears, explained 
 to them the state of things. He was one of 
 those who had declaimed most vehemently 
 against every kind of capitulation. But he 
 was aware that there was no other resource, 
 not even that of an honourable combat, for 
 the ammunition was exhausted, and the spirits 
 of the troops had arrived at the lowest degree 
 of dejection. As no officer proposed an expe- 
 dient, the circle separated, uttering maledic- 
 tions, and breaking their arms. 
 
 The capitulation was, therefore, signed by 
 the prince, and, in the course of the same tfay, 
 the 28th of October, a year after the catastro- 
 phe of General Mack, 14,000 infantry ana 
 2000 cavalry surrendered themselves prisrn- 
 ers of war. The conquerors were intoxicated 
 with joy, and what joy was ever bettei found- 
 ed ! Such boldness in maneuvering, such pa- 
 tience in enduring privations, equal a' least 
 to those which the conquered had er.dured 
 S
 
 200 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1806. 
 
 such ardour in making still more rapid 
 marches than theirs, well deserved such a 
 prize. Disorders were unfortunately commit- 
 ted at Prenzlau, caused by the eagerness of 
 the soldiers to secure the booty, which they 
 considered as the legitimate fruit of victory. 
 But the French officers displayed the greatest 
 firmness in protecting the Prussian officers. 
 German writers themselves have done them 
 this justice. In 1815, the departments of the 
 north of France had not the same justice to 
 render to the Prussians. 
 
 But the French had more trophies to collect. 
 A number of Prussian squadrons and batta- 
 lions, which had not entered Prenzlau, had 
 marched further north towards Passewalck. 
 General Milhaud's light cavalry overtook them. 
 Six regiments of cavalry, several battalions of 
 infantry, a park of horse artillery, laid down 
 their arms. Lasalle, with the hussars and 
 chasseurs, hastened to Stettin, followed by the 
 infantry of Lannes. Wonderful to relate, an 
 officer of light cavalry dared to summon Stet- 
 tin, a fortress having a numerous garrison and 
 an immense artillery. General Lasalle had 
 an interview with the governor, and expatiated 
 with such conviction on the complete annihi- 
 lation of the Prussian army, that the governor 
 surrendered the place with all that it contained, 
 and a garrison of 6000 men prisoners of war. 
 Lannes entered the place on the following day. 
 Nothing assuredly could better serve to con- 
 vey an idea of the demoralization of the Prus- 
 sians, and of the terror excited by the French, 
 than a fact so strange and so new in the annals 
 of war. 
 
 All now left to be taken of the Prussian 
 army were General Blucher and the Duke of 
 Weimar, with about 20,000 men. When this 
 last remnant should be taken, one might say 
 that 160,000 men had been destroyed or made 
 prisoners in a fortnight, without one of them 
 having recrossed the Oder. General Blucher 
 and the corps of the Duke of Weimar had 
 Marshals Soult and Bernadotte in pursuit of 
 them. They would soon be overtaken by Mu- 
 rat himself, and would find themselves cut off 
 from the Oder, since Lannes occupied Stettin. 
 They had, therefore, very little chance of es- 
 caping. 
 
 Napoleon, on receiving these tidings, was 
 extremely delighted. "Since your chasseurs," 
 he wrote to Murat, " take fortresses, I may dis- 
 
 We quote some of the letters of Marshal Lannes, 
 which show the spirit of the French troops at this 
 period, and may serve to impart their true character to 
 those prodigious events. 
 
 Marshal Lannes to his Majesty the 'Emperor. 
 
 SIRE, I have received the letter which your majesty 
 has done me the honour to write me: it is impossible 
 for me to express the pleasure that it has given me. 
 There is nothing in the world that I desire so much, as 
 to be sure that your majesty knows that I do all that 
 lies in my nower for your glory. 
 
 I have communicated to my corps d'armee what your 
 maiesty has been pleased to say to me for it. It would 
 be impossible to describe lo your majesty the gratifica- 
 tion wn.iiii it afforded them. A single word from you 
 is sufficient to make the soldiers happy. 
 
 Three hussars, having lost their way towards Gam, 
 found themselves in the midst of an enemy's squadron. 
 They ran up to it, levelling their pieces, saying that it 
 was surrounded by a regiment, and must dismount im- 
 mediately. The commander of this squadron ordered 
 
 band my corps of engineers, aud melt dowr 
 my heavy artillery." In the bulletin he made 
 mention of the cavalry only, and omitted the 
 infantry of Lannes, which had nevertheless 
 contributed to the capitulation of Prenzlau as 
 much as the cavalry itself. This omission 
 was owing to the circumstance that Murat, in 
 haste to report the exploits of his cavalry, had 
 not thought of noticing the corps of Lannes. 
 When that marshal received the bulletin, he 
 durst not read it to his soldiers for fear of mor- 
 tifying them. " My attachment to your per- 
 son," he wrote to Napoleon, " will always set 
 me above every kind of injustice, but what 
 am I to say to those brave soldiers, who march 
 day and night, without rest, without food'! 
 What reward can they hope for, unless to 
 have their deeds proclaimed by the hundred 
 voices of Fame, which you alone have at your 
 disposal 7" That admirable emulation, that 
 ardent jealousy of glory, which, however, mani- 
 fested themselves here in a noble pensiveness 
 alone, was not one of the least remarkable 
 signs of that heroic enthusiasm which then 
 warmed all minds. 
 
 Napoleon, singularly kind to Lannes, replied : 
 " Art. you and your soldiers children? Can you 
 suppose me to be unacquainted with all that 
 you have done to second the cavalry 1 There 
 is glory for all. Auother time it will be your 
 turn to fill with your name the bulletins of the 
 grand army." 
 
 Lannes, transported, assembled his infantry 
 in one of the public places of Stettin, and or- 
 dered Napoleon's letter to be read in the ranks. 
 Overjoyed as himself, his soldiers greeted that 
 letter with repeated shouts of " Vive I'Empereur 
 d' Occident.'" (Long live the Emperor of the 
 west !) This singular appellation, which cor- 
 responded so perfectly with the secret ambition 
 of Napoleon, proceeded therefore from the en- 
 thusiasm of the army, and it proved that in 
 the estimation of all he already filled the west 
 with his power and his glory. 
 
 Lannes, in the effusion, not of his flattery, 
 but of his joy for, pleased himself, he wished 
 his master to be pleased loo Lannes wrote, 
 " Sire, your soldiers shout ' Vive VEmpereur <? Oc- 
 cident. 1 ' are we henceforth to address our letters 
 to you by that title 7"i 
 
 Napoleon made no reply, and that title which 
 gushed, as it were, from the enthusiasm of the 
 soldiers, was not assumed. As Napoleon con- 
 it 1o dismount, and it surrendered its arms to those 
 three hussars, who brought the men thither prisoners 
 of war. 
 
 J should be glad to learn your majesty's intentions, 
 that I may know whether I ought to have sent Suchet's 
 division to Stargard, and the cavalry on further. By 
 these means, we should have spared the provisions of 
 the fortress of Stettin, which, however, I have not yet 
 touched. The soldiers are cantoned in the environs, 
 and live with the inhabitants. 
 
 I have been over the fortress with General Chasse- 
 loup : he thinks it bad ; and my opinion is, that a great 
 deal of money must be spent to put it into a stale of de- 
 fence. AVe have been to Damm : it is a superb natural 
 position; you cannot get to it but by a causeway of a 
 league and a half, on which there are at least forty 
 bridges. I think that, if your majesty purposes to ad- 
 vance further, you will render that position impreg- 
 nable. 
 
 1 have just been assured that the king has shown great 
 displeasure with those gentlemen about him who ad- 
 vised him to the war ; that he was never seen in such 
 u passion j that he told them that- they w< re scoundrels,
 
 Oct. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 207 
 
 ceived, it "was only deferred. Of all the gran- 
 deurs that he ever dreamt of, this is the only 
 one that was not realized even for a moment 
 If, however, he had not the title, he had the 
 vast dominion of the Emperor of the West. 
 But human pride is as fond of the title of 
 power as of power itself. 
 
 The Prince of Hohenlohe being taken, there 
 was nothing left to take but General Blucher 
 with the rear-guard and the corps of the Duke 
 of Weimar. The latter had come under the 
 command of General de Vinning, since the 
 Duke of Weimar, accepting the treatment 
 granted by Napoleon to the whole house of 
 Saxony, had left the army. There were still 
 22,000 men to take prisoners, after which 
 there would not exist a single detachment of 
 Prussian troops from the Rhine to the Oder. 
 Napoleon ordered them to be pursued without 
 intermission, that they might be picked up to 
 the last man. 
 
 Lannes established himself at Stettin, with 
 the intention of occupying that important 
 place, and affording his infantry a rest which 
 it greatly needed. Murat and Marshals Ber- 
 nadotte and Soult were sufficient to complete 
 the destruction of 22,000 Prussians, worn out 
 with fatigue. It was enough to march in order 
 to take them, unless, indeed, they had the luck 
 to reach the sea, and to find sufficient shipping 
 to carry them to East Prussia. Murat, there- 
 fore, directed his course, in great haste, along 
 the coast, to prevent their approach to it. He 
 pushed as far as Stralsund, while Marshal 
 Bernadotte, setting out from the environs of 
 Berlin, and Marshal Soult from the banks of 
 the Elbe, proceeded northward, to drive the 
 enemy into the net of the French cavalry. 
 
 General Blucher had assumed the command 
 of the two Prussian corps at Waren near the 
 lake of Muritz. To retreat to East Prussia 
 across the Oder was impossible, since that 
 river was guarded in every part of its course by 
 the French army. The access to the coast and 
 to Stralsund was already intercepted by Murat's 
 horse. There was no other resource but to 
 turn about and go back to the Elbe. General 
 
 that they had made him lose his crown, that he had no 
 hope lett but to go and see the great Napoleon, and that 
 he reckoned upon his generosity. 
 
 I am, with the most profound respect, &c., 
 LANNES. 
 
 Passewalck, November 1, 1800. 
 
 SraE. I had the honour to announce yesterday to 
 your majesty 30 pieces of cannon, 60 caissons, as many 
 carts laden with ammunition, drawn by eight or ten 
 horses each vehicle, and 1500 light-artillery men. In- 
 deed, sire, I never saw finer men. It is a superb park. 
 I shall send it off this morning, for Spandau. Almost 
 all the men are mounted, and march in the greatest 
 order. Your majesty could, if you pleased, have them 
 taken to Italy. I am certain that if a few officers who 
 could speak German were to be placed with them, these 
 men would serve most cheerfully. I wish your majesty 
 were to see this convoy ; that would decide you to send 
 them to the kingdom of Italy. 
 
 The Grand-duke of Berg writes to me that he calcu- 
 lates upon coining up with the enemy, that is, the grand 
 corps of the Duke of Weimar and Blucher, with the 
 I'rince of 1'onte Corvo, in the course of to-morrow. 
 He has already taken some prisoners from the tail of 
 the column. In consequence of this information, I am 
 recalling all the light cavalry, which I had sent off for 
 Boitzenburg, and am going to assemble my whole corps 
 f armtt at Stettin. 
 
 There have been found in this place more than 200 
 pieces of cannon on their carriages, and many spare 
 
 Blucher formed this design, hopaig to throw 
 himself into Magdeburg, to increase the force 
 there to such a degree as to convert the garri- 
 son into a real corps d'armde, and, supported by 
 that great fortress, to make a brilliant resist- 
 ance. He directed his course, therefore, 
 towards the Elbe, with a view to attempt to 
 pass it in the environs of Lauenburg. 
 
 His illusions were of short duration. Pa- 
 troles of the enemy informed him that he was 
 surrounded on all sides ; that, on his right, 
 Murat was already advancing along the coast; 
 that, on his left, Marshals Bernadotte and 
 Soult barred the approach to Magdeburg. Not 
 knowing what plan to pursue, he marched for 
 some days straight forward towards the Lower 
 Elbe, as a French corps returning to France, 
 through Mecklenburg and Hanover, might 
 have done. His ranks grew thinner every 
 moment, because his soldiers fled into the 
 woods, or chose rather to surrender than 
 longer to endure hardships which had become 
 intolerable. He also lost a considerable num- 
 ber in rear-guard actions, which, owing to the 
 difficult nature of the country, did not always 
 turn out complete defeats, but which invaria- 
 bly ended with the relinquishment of the dis- 
 puted ground, and in the sacrifice of many 
 men taken or hors de combat. 
 
 In this manner he marched from the 30th 
 of October to the 5th of November. Not 
 knowing which way to direct his course, he 
 conceived a violent act, which, however, ne- 
 ! cessity might justify. In his road lay the city 
 of Liibeck, one of the last free cities preserved 
 by the Germanic constitution. Neutral by 
 right, it ought to have been safe from all hos- 
 tility. General Blucher resolved to throw him- 
 self into it by main force, to possess himself 
 of the great resources which it contained in 
 provisions as well as money, and, if he could 
 not defend himself there, to seize all the mer- 
 chant vessels he should find in its waters, to 
 embark his troops, and to transport them to 
 East Prussia. 
 
 In consequence, on the 6th of November 
 he entered Liibeck by force, in spite of the 
 
 ones ; an infinite quantity of powder, ammunition, and 
 magazines. 
 
 1 shall throw all my light cavalry upon the right bank 
 of the Oder. I shall have all the corn and flour I can 
 collect, to increase our stores ; I shall have ovens built, 
 and as much biscuit made as possible. 
 
 The garrison of Stettin amounted to 6000 men : a regi- 
 ment of Gazan's division .shall escort it to Spandau. 
 That general has but one regiment left. Souchet's divi- 
 sion, also, has furnished a great number of men for the 
 escort of troops, so that my corps d' armee is reduced 
 very low. 
 
 If Stettin affords sufficient means for clothing the sol- 
 diers, I shall do it, for they are quite naked. An in- 
 ventory of what there is in the place is preparing. I 
 shall have the honour to send it to your majesty. 
 
 Meanwhile, I request your imperial'majesty to let me 
 know your intentions as speedily as possible. My head- 
 quarters will be, to-night, at Stettin. 
 
 Yesterday I had your majesty's proclamation read at 
 the head of the troops. The concluding words deeply 
 touched the hearts of the soldiers. They all set up 
 shouts of Vive P Empereur <f Occident! It is impossible 
 for me to tell your majesty how much you are beloved 
 by these brave fellows, and, in truth, never was lover 
 j so fond of his mistress as they are of your person. I 
 beg your majesty to let me know if you will be pleased 
 to nave my despatches addressed in future to the Em- 
 peror of the West, and I make this inquiry in the namo 
 of my corps <F armee. I am, with the most profound, &.,
 
 203 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1868. 
 
 protest of the magistrates. The ramparts of 
 the city, imprudently converted into a public 
 promenade, had lost their principal strength. 
 Besides, the city was so unprovided with gar- 
 rison that General Blucher had no difficulty to 
 penetrate into it. He quartered his soldiers 
 upon the inhabitants, from whom they took 
 whatever they wanted, and, besides, required 
 a large contribution from the magistrates. 
 Lubeck, as everybody knows, is situated on 
 the frontier of Denmark. A corps of Danish 
 troops guarded that frontier. General Blucher 
 signified to the Danish general that, if he 
 suffered it to be violated by the French, he 
 would violate it in turn and take refuge in 
 Holstein. The Danish general having de- 
 clared that he would perish with the whole of 
 his corps rather than suffer any violation of 
 territory, General Blucher shut himself up in 
 Lubeck, confident that he should not be turned 
 out by the French, if the neutrality of Den- 
 mark were respected. But while he conceived 
 that he should enjoy some safety in Lubeck, 
 protected by the remains of the fortification, 
 and find compensation in the abundance of a 
 commercial city for the privations of an ar- 
 duous retreat, the French made their appear- 
 ance. The neutrality of Lubeck had ceased 
 to exist for them, and they had a right to pur- 
 sue the Prussians thither. Arriving on the 
 7th, they attacked on the same day the works 
 which covered the gates called the Burg-Thor 
 and the Miihlen-Thor. The corps of Mar- 
 shal Bernadotte carried the one, that of Mar- 
 shal Soult the other, by escalading, under a 
 fire of grape, and with unparalleled hardihood, 
 works which, though weakened, still present- 
 ed obstacles difficult to overcome. An obsti- 
 nate conflict ensued in the street. The unfor- 
 tunate inhabitants of Lubeck beheld their opu- 
 lent city converted into a scene of carnage. 
 The Prussians, cut in pieces or surrounded, 
 were obliged to flee, leaving more than a 
 thousand dead on the spot, about 6000 prison- 
 ers, and all their artillery. General Blucher, 
 sallying from Lubeck, took a position between 
 the half inundated territory in the environs of 
 Lubeck and the Danish frontier. There he 
 halted, having neither provisions nor ammu- 
 nition left. This time he was compelled to 
 .surrender, and, after so severely censuring 
 Mack a year, and the Prince of Hohenlohe a 
 week before, to follow their example. He 
 wished to add a few words to the capitulation. 
 Murat allowed him, out of respect for his mis- 
 fortune. The words added were, that he sur- 
 rendered for want of ammunition. This ca- 
 pitulation gave the French 14,000 prisoners, 
 who, with those already taken in Lubeck, 
 formed a total of 20,000. 
 
 From this day there was not a single Prus- 
 sian corps between the Rhine and the Oder: 
 the 70,000 men who had endeavoured to gain 
 the Oder were dispersed, killed, or prisoners. 
 
 While these events were occurring in Meck- 
 lenburg, the important fortress of Ciistrin, on 
 the Oder, submitted to a few companies of in- 
 fantry, commanded by General Petit. Four 
 thousand prisoners, considerable magazines, 
 the second position of the lower Oder, were 
 the prize of this new capitulation. Thus the 
 
 French occupied on the Oder the fortresses of 
 Stettin and Custrin. Marshal Lannes was 
 established at Stettin, Marshal Davout at Cus- 
 trin. 
 
 On the Elbe there was still left the great 
 fortress of Magdeburg, which contained a 
 garrison of 22,000 men and a vast materiel. 
 Marshal Ney had undertaken the investment 
 of it. Having procured a few mortars for 
 want of siege artillery, he several times 
 threatened the place with a bombardment a 
 threat which he took good care not to put in 
 execution. Two or three bombs, thrown into 
 the air, frightened the population, who sur- 
 rounded the governor's residence, begging with 
 loud cries that they might not be exposed to 
 useless ravages, since the Prussian monarchy 
 was now too much reduced to be capable of 
 defending itself. So complete was the de- 
 moralization among the Prussian generals, that 
 these reasons were held to be good, and that, 
 the day after the capitulation of Lubeck, 
 General Kleist surrendered with 22,000 pri- 
 soners. 
 
 Thus, since the opening of the campaign, 
 the Prussians had done four times, at Erfurt, 
 at Prenzlau, at Lubeck, and at Magdeburg, 
 what they had so grievously reproached the 
 Austrians with having done once at Ulm. 
 This remark is not designed to wound their 
 feelings under a misfortune which has since 
 been so fully repaired, but to prove that it had 
 been better a year before to respect the mis- 
 fortune of another, and not to declare the 
 Austrians such cowards, from the paltry mo- 
 tive of making the French appear less brave 
 and less clever. 
 
 Of the 160,000 men, who had composed the 
 active army of the Prussians, there was not 
 then a fraction left. Setting aside these ex- 
 aggerations, which, in the surprise of such 
 successes, were circulated in Europe, it is 
 certain that about 25,000 men had been killed 
 or wounded, and 100,000 made prisoners. Of 
 the 35,000 others, not one had recrossed the 
 Oder. Those who were Saxons had returned 
 to Saxony; those who were Prussians had 
 flung away their arms and fled across the 
 country. One might say with perfect truth, 
 that there was no longer a Prussian army. 
 Napoleon was absolute master of the mo- 
 narchy of the great Frederick, with the excep- 
 tion of a few places in Silesia, incapable of 
 resistance, and East Prussia, protected by the 
 distance and by the vicinity of Russia. Na- 
 poleon had carried off all the materiel of Prus- 
 sia in cannon, muskets, warlike stores ; he had 
 acquired provisions to subsist his army during 
 a campaign, 20,000 horses to remount his 
 cavalry, and colours sufficient to cover the edi- 
 fices of his capital. All this had been accom- 
 plished in a month, for Napoleon had entered 
 on the 8th of October, and received the capitu- 
 lation of Magdeburg, which was the last, on 
 the 8th of November. And it is this rapid 
 annihilation of the Prussian power, that ren- 
 ders the campaign, the history of which we 
 have been relating, so marvellous. That 
 160,000 French, who had arrived at military 
 perfection by fifteen years of war, should have 
 vanquished 160,000 Prussians enervated by a
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 209 
 
 long pea.ce, is no great miracle. But it is an 
 astonishing event, this oblique march of the 
 French army, combined in such a manner 
 that the Prussian army, constantly turned 
 during a retreat of two hundred leagues, from 
 Hof to Stettin, should not reach the Oder till 
 the very day that this river was occupied, that 
 it should be destroyed or taken to the last man, 
 and that, in a month, the sovereign of a great 
 monarchy, the second in succession from the 
 great Frederick, should find himself without 
 soldiers and without dominions ! It is, we 
 say, an astonishing event, when we consider 
 that this was not the case of Macedonians 
 beating cowardly and ignorant Persians, but 
 a European army beating a European army, 
 both intelligent and brave. 
 
 As for the Prussians, if you must know the 
 secret of that unparalleled rout, after which 
 fortresses surrendered at the summons of a 
 few hussars, or of a few companies of light 
 infantry, you will find it in the demoraliza- 
 tion which usually follows overweening pre- 
 
 sumption. After having denied, not the vic- 
 tories of the French they were undeniable 
 but the military superiority, the Prussians were 
 so struck with it in the first encounter, that 
 they considered resistance as no longer possi- 
 ble, flung away their arms and fled. They 
 were laid prostrate, and Europe with them. 
 She trembled all over after Jena, much more 
 than Austerlitz ; for, after Austerlitz, a confi- 
 dence in the Prussian army was retained, at 
 least by the enemies of France. After Jena, 
 the entire continent seemed to belong to the 
 French army. The soldiers of the great Fre- 
 derick had been the last resource of envy: 
 those soldiers vanquished, but one other re- 
 source was left to Envy, the only one, alas ! 
 that never fails her to predict the faults of a 
 genius thenceforth irresistible; to pretend that 
 no human reason could bear up under euch 
 successes : and it is unfortunately true that 
 Genius, after tormenting Envy by its suc- 
 cesses, takes upon itself to console her by its 
 faults. 
 
 VOL. II. 27 
 
 g 2
 
 S10 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nor. 1806. 
 
 BOOK XXVI. 
 
 EYLAU. 
 
 Effect produced in Europe by the Victories of Napoleon over Prussia Cause to which the Exploits of the Frencl 
 are attributed Ordinance of King Frederick William tending to efface the Distinctions of Birth in the Prussian 
 Army Napoleon decrees the Building of the Temple of La Madeleine, and gives the Name of Jena to the 
 Bridge erected opposite to the Military School Schemes which he conceives in Berlin in the Intoxication of 
 his Triumphs The Idea of CONQUERING THE SEA BY THE LAND becomes systematized in his Mind, and he 
 replies to the maritime Blockade by the continental Blockade Decrees of Berlin Resolution to push the War to 
 the North till the Subjection of the whole Continent Plan of marching to the Vistula, and exciting Insurrec- 
 tion in Poland Affluence of the Poles to Napoleon Umbrage taken in Vienna at the Idea of reconstituting 
 Poland Napoleon offers Austria Silesia in exchange for Gallicia Refusal and secret Hate of the Court of 
 Vienna Precautions of Napoleon against that Court The East interferes in the Quarrel of the West Turkey 
 and Sultan Selim Napoleon sends General Sebastian! to Constantinople, to induce the Turks to go to war witn 
 Russia Deposition of the Hospodars, Ipsilanti, and Maruz/.i The Russian General Michelson marches for tha 
 Provinces of the Danube Napoleon proportions his Means to the magnitude of his Plans The Conscription 
 of 1807 called out Employment of the new Levies Organization of the Reinforcements destined for the 
 Grand Army in marching Regiments New Corps drawn from France and Italy Development given to the 
 Cavalry Financial Means created -with the Resources of Prussia Napoleon, having been unable to agree 
 with King Frederick William upon ihe Conditions of an Armistice, directs his Army upon Poland Murat, 
 Davout, Augereau, Lannes, march for the Vistula at the Head of eighty thousand Men Napoleon follows with 
 an Army of the same Force, composed of the Corps of Marshals Soult, Bernadotte. Ney. the Guard, and the 
 Reserves Entry of the French into Poland Appearance of the Soil and Sky Enthusiasm of the Poles for 
 the French Conditions attached by Napoleon lo the Reconstitution of Poland Spirit of the high Polish No- 
 bility Knlry of Murat and Davout into Posen and Warsaw Napoleon establishes himself in Posen Occu- 
 pation of the Vistula, from Warsaw to Thorn The Russians, united with the Wrecks of the Prussian Army, 
 occupy the Banks of the Narew Napoleon resolves to make them fall back to the Pregel, that he may winter 
 more quietly on the Vistula Admirable Combinations for crushing the Prussians and the Russians Actions 
 at Czarnowo, Golymin, and Soldau Baltic of Pultusk The Russians, driven beyond the Narew with great 
 Loss, cannot be pursued on Account of the State of the Roads Embarrassment of Conquerors and Conquered 
 amidst the Sloughs of Poland Napoleon establishes himself in advance of the Vistula, between the Bug, the 
 Narew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra He places the Corps of Marshal Bernadotte at Elbing, in advance of the 
 Lower Vistula, and forms a tenth Corps under Marshal Lefebvre. to commence the Siege of Dantzig Admi- 
 rable Forecast for provisioning and the safety of his Winter Quarters Works of Praga, Modlin, Sierock 
 Material and moral State of the French Army Gayety of the Soldiers in a Country new to them Prince Je- 
 rome and General Vandamme, at the head of the German Auxiliaries, besiege the Fortresses in Silesia Brief 
 Joy at Vienna, where it is believed for a Moment that the Russians are successful A more accurate Appre- 
 ciation of Facts brings back the Court of Vienna to its usual Reserve General Benninpsen. appointed 
 General-in-chief of the Russian Army, resolves to resume Hostilities in the Depth of Winter, and marches 
 upon the Cantonments of the French Army, following the Coast of the Baltic lie is discovered by Marshal 
 Ney, who gives the Alarm to all the other Corps Brilliant Action fought by Marshal Bernadotte at Mohrungen 
 Scientific Combination of Napoleon's, to fling the Russians into the Sea This Combination is revealed to the 
 Enemy, through the Fault of an Officer, who suffers his Despatches to be stolen The Russiansjretire in time 
 Napoleon pursues them to extremity Actions of Waltersdorf and Hof The Russians, incapable of further 
 flight, halt at Eylau, resolved to give battle The French Army, dying of hunger and reduced one-third by 
 narching, meets the Russian Army, and a sanguinary Battle takes place at Eylau Coolness and Energy- of 
 Vapoleou Heroic Conduct of the French Cavalry The Russian Army retires almost destroyed : the French 
 \riay also has sustained severe Loss The Corps of Augereau so cut up that it must be dissolved Napoleon 
 mrsuee the Russians to KSnigsberg, and when he has assured himself of their Retreat beyond the Pregel, re- 
 umei his Position on the Vistula Change in the Site of his Quarters He leaves the Upper Vistula, to esta- 
 lisli himself in advance of the Lower Vistula and behind the Passarge, in order to cpver the better the Siege 
 f Dantzig Increased Attention to the Victualling of his Winter Quarters Napoleon, established atOsterode. 
 n a sort of Barn, where he employs his Winter in feeding and recruiting his Army, administering the Empire, 
 nnd awing Europe Tranquillity of iIind &nd incredible Variety of Occupations of Napoleon at Osterode and 
 tfiikenstem. 
 
 NAPOLEOX had in a month overturned the 
 Prussian monarchy, destroyed its armies, con- 
 quered the greater part of its territory. Fre- 
 derick William had nothing left but a province 
 and 25,000 men. It is true that the Russians, 
 who had taken refuge at Konigsberg, hastened, 
 at the earnest solicitation of the court of Ber- 
 lin, as fast as the distance, the season, and the 
 unskilfulness of a semi-barbarous administra- 
 tion permitted them. But the Russians had 
 been seen at Austerlitz, and, notwithstanding 
 their bravery, it could not be expected of them 
 that they should change the fortune of the war. 
 The cabinets and the aristocracies of Europe 
 were overwhelmed with consternation. The 
 conquered people, divided between patriotism 
 and admiration, could not help recognising in 
 Napoleon the child of the French Revolution, 
 the propagator of its ideas, the glorious applier 
 of the most popular of them all equality. 
 They beheld a striking example of this equality 
 in our generals, who were no longer designated 
 by their names, so well known, of Berthier, 
 Murat, Bernadotte, but by the titles of Prince 
 
 of Neufchatel, Grand-duke of Berg, Prince of 
 Ponte Corvo ! Striving to account for the un- 
 equal triumphs which we had gained over the 
 Prussian army, they attributed them not only 
 to our courage, to our experience in war, but 
 to the principles on which the new French so- 
 ciety rested. They accounted for the incredi- 
 ble ardour of our soldiers by the extraordinary 
 ambition which the government had contrived 
 to excite in them, by throwing open to them 
 that immense career, upon,which a man mighi 
 enter a peasant, like the Sforzas, and leave it 
 marshal, prince, king, emperor. It is true that 
 the last prize was the only one of its kind in the 
 urn of Fortune; but if there was only one 
 emperor who had earned that distinction by a 
 prodigious genius, ho w many dukes and princes 
 were there whose superiority to their comrades 
 was not of a nature to make any person despair! 
 The intercepted letters of the Prussian offi- 
 cers were full of strange reflections on this 
 subject. One of them, writing to his family, 
 said, " if nothing more was necessary than to 
 use our strength against the French, we should
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 211 
 
 very soon be conquerors. They are short, 
 puny : one of our Germans would beat four of 
 them. But in the fire they become superna- 
 tural beib S 3 They are hurried away by an 
 inexpressible ardour, not a trace of which is 
 
 to be discovered in our soldiers What 
 
 would you do with peasants, led into fire by 
 nobles whose dangers they share, without ever 
 sharing their passions and their rewards !"* 
 
 Thus there was mingled in the mouths of 
 the vanquished, with the glorification of our 
 bravery, the glorification of the principles of 
 our revolution. The King of Prussia, in fact, 
 when a fugitive on the confines of his king- 
 dom, was preparing an ordnance for introduc- 
 ing equality into the ranks of his army, and 
 for effacing in it all the distinctions of class 
 and birth. Singular example of the propaga- 
 tion of the liberal ideas, carried to the extre- 
 mity of Europe by a conqueror, who is fre- 
 quently represented as a giant who would fain 
 have stifled those ideas ! He had quashed 
 some of them, it is true, but the most social 
 of them travelled with him as far as his glory. 
 Always inclined to give to things the bril- 
 liancy of his imagination, Napoleon, who had 
 projected, on the morrow of Austerlitz, the 
 column in the Place Vendome, the Triumphal 
 Arch of 1'Etoile, the grand Rue Imperiale, de- 
 creed, in the heart of conquered Prussia, the 
 erection of a monument, which is since be- 
 come one of the grandest in the capital, the 
 Temple of La Madeleine. 
 
 On the spot now occupied by the church of 
 that name, which forms with the Place de la 
 Concorde so magnificent a whole, was to have 
 stood the new exchange. Napoleon thought 
 the site too fine for the temple of wealth to be 
 erected upon it, and he resolved to raise there 
 the temple of glory. He decided that some 
 other quarter should be sought out for the new 
 exchange, and that on one of the four points 
 seen from the middle of the Place de la Con- 
 corde should be erected a monument conse- 
 crated to the glory of our arms. He intended 
 the front of this edifice to bear this inscription 
 L'EMPEREUR NAPOLEON ATJX SOLUATS DE LA 
 
 GRANDE ARMEK (The Emperor Napoleon tc 
 the Soldiers of the Grand Army). On marble 
 tablets were to be inscribed the names of all 
 the officers and soldiers who had been present 
 at the great events of Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena; 
 and on tablets of gold the names of those who 
 had fallen in those battles. Immense basso- 
 relievos were to represent the superior officers 
 and the generals grouped beside each other. 
 Statues were granted to the marshals who had 
 commanded corps of the army. The colours 
 taken from the enemy were to be suspended 
 from the roof of the building. Lastly, Napo- 
 leon decided that every year a festival of an- 
 tique character, like the edifice itself, should 
 be held on the 2d of December, in honour of 
 the martial virtues. He gave orders for a 
 competition, reserving for himself the right to 
 choose, from among the plans presented, that 
 which should seem to him the most suitable ; 
 but he determined beforehand the style of ar- 
 chitecture which he intended to give to the 
 new fabric. He wanted, he said, a temple of 
 Grecian or Roman form. We have churches, 
 he wrote to the minister of the interior, but we 
 have not a temple, like the Parthenon, for in- 
 stance : Paris must have one of that kind. 
 France was then fond of the arts of Greece, 
 as formerly she was fond of the arts of the 
 middle ages ; and an imitation of the Parthe- 
 non was an absolutely new present to offer to 
 the capital. At the present day, this Grecian 
 temple, turned into a Christian church, (which 
 cannot be a subject for regret,) contrasts with 
 its new destination, and with the arts of the 
 present period. Thus our tastes, our passions, 
 our ideas, are as transient as the caprices of 
 that Fortune which has devoted this edifice to 
 purposes so different from those to which it 
 was originally destined. At any rate it fills 
 majestically the spot which was at first as- 
 signed to it, and the people have not forgotten 
 that this temple was to have been the temple 
 of glory. 2 
 
 The flatterers of the time, acquainted with 
 the weaknesses of Napoleon, and even exag- 
 gerating them to themselves in their mean ness, 
 
 In this passage we adhere faithfully to the sense of a 
 great quantity of letters, the originals of which are pre- 
 served among the innumerable papers of Napoleon's in 
 the Louvre. 
 
 We quote seme letters or Napoleon's on this subject, 
 which seem to us worthy of being introduced : 
 
 To the Minister of tfu Interior. 
 
 Posen, 6th December, 1S06. 
 
 Literature has need of encouragement : you are its 
 minister. Propose to me some means for giving a shock 
 to all the different branches of the belles lettres; which 
 have in all times shed a lustre on the nation. 
 
 You will have received the decree which I have is- 
 sued respecting the building of La Madeleine, and that 
 which repeals the establishment of the exchange on 
 that spot. It is, however, necessary to have an ex- 
 change in Paris. My intention is to have an exchange 
 huilt corresponding with the grandeur of the capital 
 . irt the quantity of business which is some day to be 
 transacted there. It must be spacious, in order to have 
 walks around it. I should like a detached site. 
 
 In assigning a fund of three millions for the erection 
 of the edifice of La Madeleine, I destined that sum for 
 the building only ; not for the ornaments, upon which, 
 in time, I purpose to expend a much larger sum. I de- 
 tire that the surrounding timber-yards be previously 
 purchased, in order to form a large circular place, in 
 the centre of which the structure shall stand, and around 
 which I will have houses built on a uniform plan. 
 
 It would not be unsuitable to call the bridge of the 
 
 military school the Bridge of Jena. Propose to me a 
 decree for giving the names of the generals and colonels 
 who were killed in that battle to the different new 
 streets. 
 Whereupon, &c. NAPOLEON. 
 
 To tht Minister of the Interior. 
 
 Finkenstein, 30th May, 1807. 
 
 After having examined attentively the different plans 
 for a monument dedicated to the Grand Army, I have 
 not been for a moment doubtful. That of M. Vignon is 
 the only one which fulfils my intentions. It is a temple 
 that I asked for, and not a church. What could one do 
 in the style of churches that would be fit to compete 
 with Si. Genevieve, or Notre Dame, and above all with 
 St. Peter's at Rome? M. Vignon's plan unites, with 
 many other advantages, that ofharmonifcing much better 
 with the palace of the Legislative Body, and of not 
 crushing the Tuileries. 
 
 I will not have any thing of wood. The spectators 
 must be placed, as I have said, upon seats of marble, 
 forming the amphitheatres destined for the public. 
 Nothing in this temple must be movable and changing; 
 every thing, on the contrary, must be fixed in its place. 
 If it were possible to place at the entrance of the temple 
 the Nile and the Tiber, which have been brought from 
 Rome, that would produce a very good effect. M. Vig- 
 non must endeavour to introduce them into his definitive 
 plan, as well as equestrian statues to be placed outside, 
 since they would really be out of place in the interior. 
 It is necessary, also, to fix the situations where the
 
 SIS 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 180(5. 
 
 proposed to him to change the revolutionary 
 name of Place de la Concorde into another 
 name more monarchical, taken from the impe- 
 rial monarchy. He replied to M. de Cham- 
 pagny in this very short letter: "The Place de 
 la Concorde must keep the name it has. COS- 
 CORD 'tis that which renders France invin- 
 cible." (January, 1807.) But a magnifi- 
 cent stone bridge, recently decreed, and erected 
 opposite to the Military School, had not yet 
 received a name. Napoleon ordered it to be 
 called by the glorious name of Jena, which 
 that bridge has retained, and which at a later 
 period would have become fatal to it, if an 
 honourable act of Louis XVIII. had not saved 
 it in 1814 from the brutal rage of the Prus- 
 sians. 
 
 These projects for monuments of art formed 
 in the midst of conquered capitals, were only 
 accessory ideas to those vast ideas which oc- 
 cupied his mind. The glorious event of Aus- 
 terlitz had already impressed him with the 
 highest notion of his strength, and applied new 
 stimulants to his gigantic ambition. That of 
 Jena raised his confidence and his desires to 
 the highest pitch. After that so complete and 
 so speedy destruction of the military power in 
 highest repute in Europe, there was nothing 
 but what he deemed possible, nothing but what 
 he desired. His enemies, to depreciate his an- 
 terior triumphs, having incessantly repeated 
 that the Prussian army was the only one to 
 be made any account of, the only one that it 
 was difficult to conquer, he had taken them at 
 the word, and having conquered, more than 
 conquered, annihilated it in a month, he per- 
 ceived thenceforward no bound to his power, 
 and admitted of no limitation to his will. Eu- 
 rope appeared to him a field without owner, in 
 which he could build up whatever he pleased, 
 whatever he considered as great, wise, useful, 
 and brilliant. Where then was he to discern 
 a symptom of resistance 7 Austria, disarmed 
 by a single manoeuvre, that of Ulm, was trem- 
 bling, exhausted, incapable of resuming arms. 
 The Russians, though deemed brave, had been 
 driven with the bayonet at their loins from 
 Munich to Olmiitz, and if they had made a 
 stand at Hollabrunn, at Austerlitz, it was to 
 sustain overwhelming defeats. Lastly, the 
 
 Prussian monarchy had just been destroyed in 
 thirty days. What obstacle, we repeat it, could 
 he discover to his projects ? The wrecks of 
 the Russian armies, united in the north to 
 25,000 Prussians, afforded no prospect of a 
 danger that he needed to be alarmed at. Hence 
 he wrote to the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, 
 "All here is child's play, to which an end must 
 be put; and this time I will take such a course 
 with my enemies as to settle them all." He 
 decided, therefore, to push the war till he had 
 wrung peace from all the powers, and such a 
 peace as should be equally brilliant and du- 
 rable. Not indeed that it would be difficult to 
 wring it from the courts of the continent, but, 
 from England, which, protected by the ocean, 
 was the only country that had escaped the 
 yoke with which Europe saw herself threat- 
 ened. Napoleon had already said that he 
 would gain the dominion of the sea by means 
 of the land ; and that, if the English were de- 
 termined to close the ocean against him, he 
 would close the continent against them. Hav- 
 ing reached the Elbe and the Oder, he con- 
 firmed himself in this idea more than ever, he 
 systematized it in his head, and he wrote to 
 his brother Louis in Holland, I am going tore- 
 conquer the colonies by means of the land. In the 
 fermentation of mind produced in him by the 
 extraordinary success of the war with Prussia, 
 he conceived the most gigantic ideas that he 
 ever brought forth in his life. In the first 
 place, he resolved to keep in deposite all that 
 he had conquered, and all that he should yet 
 conquer, till England had restored to France, 
 to Holland, to Spain, the colonies which she 
 had taken from them. The continental powers 
 being, in reality, but subsidized auxiliaries of 
 England, he determined to hold them all re- 
 sponsible for the British policy, and to lay down 
 as the essential principle of negotiation, that 
 he would not restore to one of them any thing 
 that he had taken, till England should give up 
 the whole or part of her maritime conquests. 
 Two Prussian negotiators, M. de Lucchesini 
 and M. de Zastrow, were at Charlottenburg, 
 soliciting an armistice and peace. He replied 
 to them through Duroc, who had continued the 
 friend of the court of Berlin, that, as for peace, 
 it was not to be thought of till England was 
 
 armour of Francis I., taken at Vienna, and the great 
 quadriga of Berlin, are to be placed. 
 
 No timber must be used in the construction of this 
 
 temple Granite and iron such must be the 
 
 materials of this monument. It may be objected that 
 Hie present columns are not of granite; but that objec- 
 tion would not be good, since, in time, those columns 
 might be renewed without injuring the monument. 
 However, if it should be proved that the use of granite 
 would occasion loo great an expense and too long delay, 
 it must be given up ; for the principal condition of the 
 project is tliat it be executed in three or four years, and 
 at furthest five years. This monument is connected in 
 some measure with politics ; of course, it is one of those 
 which ought to be speedily finished. It would, never- 
 theless, not be amiss to seek after granite for other 
 structures wh'ch I shall order, and which, from their 
 nature, may allow thirty, forty, or fifty years to be given 
 to their completion. 
 
 I presuppose that all the sculptures in the interior 
 shall be of marble, and that no sculptures fit for the 
 drawing-rooms and dining-rooms of the wives of Paris 
 bankers shall be proposed to me : whatever is not of 
 long duration ought not to be employed in this edifice. 
 I repeat that there must be no sort of furniture, not even 
 curtains. 
 
 As for the plan which has obtained the prize, it ha* 
 not come up to my views ; it was the first that I threw 
 aside. It is true that I made it a fundamental point to 
 retain that portion of the build ing of La Madeleine which 
 is still standing; but that expression is an ellipsis. It 
 meant that as much as possible of that building should 
 be preserved; otherwise there would have been no 
 need of programme, and nothing more to do thiin to 
 follow the original plan. My intention was not to have 
 a church, but a temple; and I desired neither that all 
 should be demolished, nor that all should be retained. 
 If these two propositions were incompatible, namely, 
 that of having a temple and that of retaining the present 
 buildings of La Madeleine, it was plain that the defini- 
 tion of a temple-ought to have been adhered to; by tem- 
 ple, I meant such a monument as existed at Athens, but 
 exists not in Paris. There are plenty of churches in 
 Paris ; there are churches in all the villages. I should 
 most assuredly not have taken it amiss if the architects 
 had pointed out that there was a contradiction between 
 the idea of having a temple and the intention of retain- 
 ing buildings erected for a church. The first was tha 
 principal idea, the second was an accessory idea. M. 
 Vignon has therefore divined what I wanted. 
 
 NA POLEON.
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 213 
 
 brought into more moderate views ; and that 
 Prussia and Germany should remain in his 
 hands in pledge for what England had taken 
 from the maritime powers ; but that, as for an 
 armistice, he was ready to grant one, on con- 
 dition of the immediate delivery to him of the 
 line on which he intended to winter, and which 
 he meant to make the starting post of his future 
 operations the line of the Vistula. In con- 
 sequence, he required all the fortresses in Si- 
 lesia, such as Breslau, Glogau, Schweidnitz, 
 Glatz, and all those on the Vistula, such as 
 Dantzig, Graudenz, Thorn, Warsaw, to be de- 
 livered up to him immediately ; for, if they 
 were not given up, he should go and reduce 
 them in a few days. 
 
 With this intention to COXQ.UER THE SEA 
 BT THE LAND, by depriving Great Britain of 
 all her allies, and closing all the ports of the 
 continent against her, the first thing to be done 
 was to interdict to her without delay access to 
 the vast coasts occupied by the French armies. 
 Napoleon had already himself, or by means 
 of Prussia, closed the mouths of the Ems, the 
 Weser and the Elbe. This was a natural and 
 legitimate exercise of the right of conquest, 
 for conquest confers all the rights of the sove- 
 reign, and especially the right of closing the 
 ports, or intercepting the roads of the con- 
 quered country, without such rigour being held 
 to be a violation of the right of nations to- 
 wards any person whatever. But to forbid 
 the entry of the Ems, the Elbe, and the We- 
 ser, was a measure very inadequate for attain- 
 ing the end proposed to himself by Napoleon ; 
 for, in spite of the strictest watch on the 
 coasts, English goods were introduced by 
 smuggling not only into Hanover but into Hol- 
 land, the government of which was under our 
 direct influence, and in Belgium, which had 
 become a French province. Besides, when 
 the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe were closed, 
 these goods entered by the Oder, by the Vis- 
 tula, and descended again from north to south. 
 They grew dear, it is true, but the English, 
 necessitated to dispose of them, sold them at 
 a price which compensated the expenses of 
 smuggling and freight. It was necessary, 
 therefore, to resort to more rigorous measures 
 against English merchandise, and Napoleon 
 was not the man to suffer himself to be de- 
 terred from them. 
 
 England herself had just authorized all sorts 
 of excesses against her commerce by taking 
 an extraordinary measure, and one of the 
 most outrageous that can be imagined against 
 the most generally admitted rights of nations, 
 and which is called a paper blockade. As we 
 have already explained several times, it is a 
 principle with most of the maritime nations 
 that every neutral, that is to say, every flag, 
 not a party in a war between two powers, has 
 a right to sail from the ports of one to the ports 
 of the other, to carry any merchandise what- 
 ever, even that of the enemy, excepting con- 
 traband of war, which consists in arms, mu- 
 nitions of war, and provisions cured for the 
 use of the armies. This liberty ceases only in 
 the case of a seaport blockaded by a naval 
 force, so that the blockade be efficacious. In 
 this case, the blockade being notified, the facul- 
 
 ty of entering the blockaded place is suspended 
 for neutrals. But if, in the restrictions imposed 
 upon the freedom of navigation, we do not 
 stop at this certain limit of the presence of an 
 effective force, there is no reason why we 
 should not lay an interdict upon whole tracts 
 of coast, upon pretext of blockade. England 
 had already sought to overstep the limits of 
 the real blockade, by alleging that, with a few 
 sail, insufficient in number to close the ap- 
 proaches to a seaport, she had a right to de- 
 clare the blockade. But at last she had ad- 
 mitted the necessity of a force of some sort 
 against the blockaded port. Now she did not 
 stop at this limit already so vague, and at the 
 time of her momentary rupture with Prussia, 
 occasioned by the occupation of Hanover, she 
 had ventured to forbid all commerce to neu- 
 trals on the coasts of France and Germany, 
 from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe. This 
 was the abuse of strength carried to the utmost 
 excess, and thenceforward a mere British de- 
 cree was sufficient to lay under interdict all 
 the parts of the globe which England was 
 pleased to deprive of commerce. 
 
 This incredible violation of the right of na- 
 tions furnished Napoleon with a just pretext 
 for authorizing the most rigorous measures in 
 regard to English commerce. He devised a 
 formidable decree, which, however excessive 
 it might appear, was but a just reprisal of 
 the violences of England, and which had, 
 moreover, the advantage of completely an- 
 swering the views which he had recently con- 
 ceived. This decree, dated Berlin, the 21st of 
 | November, applicable not only to France, but 
 to the countries occupied by her armies or in 
 alliance with her, that is to say, to France, 
 Holland, Spain, Italy, and all Germany, de- 
 clared the British Islands in a state of blockade. 
 The consequences of the state of blockade 
 were the following: 
 
 All commerce with England was absolutely 
 prohibited; 
 
 All goods, the produce of English manufac- 
 tures, or of English colonies, were to be con- 
 fiscated not only on the coast, but in the inte- 
 rior, in the houses of the merchants by whom 
 they should be harboured ; 
 
 All letters coming from or going to England, 
 addressed to an Englishman, or written in 
 English, were to be stopped at the post-offices 
 and destroyed ; 
 
 Every Englishman, whatsoever, seized in 
 France, or in the countries under subjection 
 to her arms, was to be declared a prisoner of 
 war; 
 
 Every vessel having only touched at the 
 English colonies or at any of the ports of the 
 three kingdoms, was forbidden to enter French 
 ports, or ports under subjection to France ; and, 
 in case of a false declaration being made on 
 this subject, she became a lawful prize ; 
 
 Half of the produce of the confiscation was 
 destined to indemnify French and allied mer- 
 chants who had suffered by the spoliations of 
 England ; 
 
 Lastly, the English who fell into our power 
 were to serve for the exchange of the French 
 or their allies who were taken prisoners. 
 
 Such were these measures, assuredly inex
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806. 
 
 cusable if England had not taken pains to 
 justify them beforehand by her own excesses. 
 Napoleon was fully sensible of their severity ; 
 but, in order to induce England to relinquish 
 her tyranny at sea, he had recourse to a like 
 tyranny upon land. He wished most especially 
 to intimidate the agents of the English com- 
 merce, and principally the merchants of the 
 Hanseatic towns, who, laughing at the orders 
 issued respecting the Elbe and the Weser, dis- 
 tributed the prohibited goods throughout all 
 parts of the continent. The threat of confis- 
 cation, a threat soon followed up, would make 
 them tremble, and, if not close the outlets 
 opened clandestinely to British commerce, at 
 least render them very narrow. 
 
 Napoleon, saying to himself that all the 
 commercial nations were interested in the re- 
 sistance which he was opposing to the unjust 
 pretensions of England, concluded that they 
 would submit to the inconveniences of a strug- 
 gle which had become necessary; he thought 
 that, these inconveniences falling particularly 
 upon the speculators of Hamburg, Bremen, 
 Leipzig, Amsterdam, and on smugglers by 
 profession, it was not worth while to limit his 
 means of reprisal, out of regard for such in- 
 terests. 
 
 The effect of this decree on the opinion of 
 Europe was immense. Some regarded it as 
 a revolting excess of despotism, others as a 
 stroke of profound policy, all as an extraordi- 
 nary act, proportioned to the conflict of giants 
 maintained by England and France against 
 each other, the one daring to seize the domi- 
 nion of the sea, hitherto the common route of 
 nations, and to interdict all commerce to her 
 enemies, the other aiming at the entire occu- 
 pation of the continent by force of arms, to 
 reply to the closing of the sea by the closing 
 of the land. Unheard-of spectacle, without 
 example in the past and probably in the fu- 
 ture, exhibited at this moment by the un- 
 chained passions of the two greatest nations 
 of the earth ! 
 
 No sooner was this decree conceived and 
 drawn up by Napoleon himself, and by him 
 alone, without the participation of M. de Tal- 
 leyrand no sooner was this decree signed, 
 than it was sent by extraordinary couriers to 
 .the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy, 
 with orders to some, summonses to others, to 
 put it into immediate execution. Marshal 
 Mortier, who had already taken possession of 
 Hesse, was directed to proceed with the ut- 
 most expedition to the Hanseatic towns, Bre- 
 men, Hamburg, Lubeck, and to make himself 
 master not only of those towns, but of (he ports 
 of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania as 
 far as the mouths of the Oder. He was en- 
 joined to occupy the rich warehouses of the 
 Hanseatic towns, to seize the merchandise of 
 English origin there, to arrest the English 
 merchants, and to do all this with punctuality, 
 exactness, and probity. It was because Na- 
 poleon expected a more rigorous, and, at the 
 same time, honest execution from Marshal 
 Mortier than from any other, that he had given 
 him such a commission. He ordered him to 
 lake with him into Germany a certain number 
 f seamen, drafted from the Boulogne flotilla, 
 
 to make them cruise in vessels at the mouths 
 of the Elbe and Weser, to arm all the passes 
 with cannon, and to sink every suspicious ship 
 that should attempt to force the blockade. 
 
 Such was the continental blockade, by which 
 Napoleon replied to the blockade upon paper de- 
 vised by England. 
 
 But, to subject the continent to his policy, iv 
 was requisite that Napoleon should push the 
 war further than he had done. Austria was, 
 six months before, in his mighty hands, and 
 might be so again whenever he pleased. 
 Prussia was there at that moment. But Rus- 
 sia, always repulsed when she appeared in the 
 regions of the West, nevertheless, escaped his 
 blows by retiring beyond the Vistula and the 
 Niemen. She was the only ally that England 
 had left, and he must beat her as completely 
 as he had beaten Austria and Prussia, to real- 
 ize, in its full extent, the policy of CONQ.CTRR- 
 
 IXG THE SEA BY THE LAND. Napoleon W3S 
 
 therefore resolved to proceed northward, and 
 to hasten to meet the Russians in the plains 
 of Poland, where the people were ready to rise 
 at his appearance. Never had warrior setting 
 out from the Rhine reached the Vistula, much 
 less the Niemen. But he, who had carried 
 the tri-coloured flag to float on the banks of 
 the Adige, the Nile, the Jordan, the Po, the 
 Danube, and the Elbe, could and must perform 
 this daring march ! At any rate, his presence 
 in the regions of the north would instantly 
 raise an immense European question that of 
 the re-establishment of Poland. The Poles 
 had always said, "France is our friend; but 
 she is at a great distance." When France 
 I approached Poland so near as the Oder, must 
 not the idea of a great reparation become with 
 one the subject of well-founded hope, with the 
 other the subject, of a matured project 1 Those 
 unfortunate Poles, so unsteady in their con- 
 duct, so serious in their sentiments, uttered 
 shouts of enthusiasm on hearing of our victo- 
 ries ; and a crowd of emissaries, hastening to 
 Berlin, besought Napoleon to proceed to the 
 Vistula, promising him their property, their 
 arms, their lives, to assist him in le-constitut- 
 mg Poland. This scheme, so seductive, so 
 generous, so politic if it had been more prac- 
 ticable, was one of those enterprises with, 
 which the smitten imagination could not fail 
 to be captivated at that moment, and one of 
 those imposing spectacles which it befitted his 
 greatness to give to the world. In penetrating 
 into the heart of Poland, he was adding, it is 
 true, to the difficulties of the present war the 
 most important of all difficulties that of dis- 
 tance and of climate; but he was depriving 
 Prussia and Russia of the resources of the 
 Polish provinces considerable resources in 
 men and alimentary substances ; he was sap- 
 ping the foundation of Russian power; he 
 was striving to render Europe the most signal 
 service that had ever been done for it ; he was 
 adding fresh pledges to those which he had 
 already in his hands, and which were to serve 
 him, to obtain from England maritime resti- 
 tutions by means of continental restitutions. 
 The vast countries situated upon the route 
 from the Rhine to the Vistula, causes of 
 weakness for an ordinary general, would be
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 215 
 
 converted, under the greatest of captains, into 
 abundant sources of things necessary for war; 
 he should draw from them, thanks to a skilful 
 administration, provisions, ammunition, arms, 
 horses, money. As for the climate, so formi- 
 dable in these countries in November and 
 December, he took it into account, no doubt ; 
 but he was resolved, in this campaign, to halt 
 at the Vistula. If it were given up to him by 
 the proposed armistice, he purposed to esta- 
 blish himself there ; if, on the contrary, it were 
 disputed, he would conquer it in a few marches, 
 make the troops encamp there till the winter 
 was over, feed them there upon the corn of 
 Poland, warm them with the wood of its fo- 
 rests, recruit them with fresh soldiers brought 
 from the Rhine, and, next spring, start from 
 the Vistula to penetrate much farther north 
 than any man had yet dared to do. 
 
 Excited by success, impelled by his genius 
 and his good fortune to a greatness of ideas to 
 which no head of empire or army had yet at- 
 tained, he hesitated not a moment what course 
 to pursue, and made dispositions for advanc- ! 
 ing into Poland. When passing the Rhine, 
 he had certainly embraced in his designs the 
 idea of a daring march to the north, but 
 vaguely. It was in Berlin, and after the rapid j 
 and signal successes obtained over Prussia, : 
 that he formed the serious plan of its execu- 
 tion. 
 
 Still, in addition to the perils inherent in 
 the enterprise itself, there was a particular 
 danger which Napoleon did not disguise from 
 himself; that is, the impression which might ; 
 be produced upon Austria, which, though con- 
 quered, and conquered even to exhaustion, | 
 might, nevertheless, be tempted to seize the 
 opportunity to fall upon our rear. 
 
 The present conduct of that court was of 
 such a nature as to excite more than one fear. 
 To the offers of alliance, which Napoleon had 
 directed to be made, in consequence of his 
 conversations with the Duke of Wurzburg, she 
 had replied by affected demonstrations of good- 
 will, feigning not to understand our ambassa- 
 dor; and, when he had explained himself in 
 a clearer manner, alleging that too close a 
 connection with France would draw upon her 
 a rupture with Russia and Prussia, and that, 
 so soon after a long struggle thrice renewed in 
 the last fifteen years, she was no longer ca- 
 pable of waging war either for or against any 
 power. 
 
 To these evasive words she had recently 
 added the most significant acts. She had as- 
 sembled in Bohemia 60,000 men, who, placed 
 at first along Bavaria and Saxony, were at this 
 moment marching towards Gallicia, following, 
 in some measure, behind their own frontiers, 
 the movement of the belligerent armies. In- 
 dependently of these 60,000 men, she had de- 
 spatched fresh troops towards Poland, and she 
 was exerting herself with extreme activity to 
 form magazines in Bohemia and Gallicia. 
 When questioned concerning her armaments, 
 she assigned common-place reasons, grounded 
 on her personal safety, saying that, exposed on 
 all sides to the contact of hostile armies which 
 were warring with each other, she must nt 
 allow any of them to violate her territory, and 
 
 that the measures she was called to account 
 for were but measures of pure precaution. 
 
 Napoleon was not to be duped by language 
 so insincere. The need of an alliance, since 
 he had lost that of Prussia, had for a moment 
 directed his mind towards the court of Vienna ; 
 but it was now easy to perceive that the power 
 from which he had wrested, in fifteen years, 
 the Netherlands, Suabia, the Milanese, the Ve- 
 netian States, Tuscany, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, 
 and lastly the Germanic crown, could never be 
 any other than an irreconcilable enemy, dis- 
 sembling, out of policy, her deep resentment, 
 but ready to let it burst forth on the "irst occa- 
 sion. He clearly perceived that the fears of 
 Austria were feigned, for none of the bellige- 
 rent parties had an interest in provoking her by 
 a violation of territory ; and he knew that, if 
 she armed, it could only be with the perfidious 
 intention of falling upon the rear of the French 
 army. Attaching no more importance than 
 was necessary to the word of a man and a 
 sovereign, by which Francis II. had engaged 
 not to make war again upon France, he 
 thought, nevertheless, that the recollection of 
 that word solemnly given must embarrass that 
 prince ; that he would need a very specious 
 pretext for breaking it ; and he had formed 
 two maturely weighed resolutions: the first not 
 to afford Austria any pretext for interfering in 
 the present war; and the second, to take such 
 precautions as if she were certain to interfere, 
 and to take them in an ostensible manner. 
 His language was conformable to these reso- 
 lutions. He first complained with the utmost 
 frankness of the armaments going forward iu 
 Bohemia and Gallicia, and in such a way as 
 to prove that he comprehended their object. 
 Then, with the same frankness, he intimated 
 the precautions which he thought himself 
 obliged to take, and which were likely to deter 
 the cabinet of Vienna. He affirmed anew that 
 he would not give any provocation to war, but 
 it should be prompt and terrible, if Austria 
 had the imprudence to recommence it. He de- 
 clared that, determined not to afford any pretext 
 for a rupture, he would not countenance a ris- 
 ing in the provinces of Poland belonging to 
 Austria; that the rising in Prussian and Rus- 
 sian Poland was imputable exclusively to those 
 who had been bent on war ; that he did not 
 disguise from himself the difficulty of repress- 
 ing the Poles dependent on Austria, when the 
 Poles dependent on Russia and Prussia were 
 stirring; but that, if the people at Vienna 
 thought on that point as he did, and if, like 
 him, they were convinced of the enormous 
 fault committed in the last century, in destroy- 
 ing a monarchy which was the bulwark of the 
 West, he suggested a very simple expedient 
 for repairing that loss in reconstituting Poland, 
 and offering to the house of Austria an ample 
 indemnification for the provinces, to the sacri- 
 fice of which she would have to submit. This 
 indemnification was the restitution of Silesia, 
 wrested from Maria Theresa by Frederick the 
 Great. Silesia was certainly as valuable as 
 the Gallicias, and this would be a signal repa- 
 ration of the disasters, the outrages, which the 
 founder of the Prussian monarchy had inflict 
 ed on the house of Austria.
 
 216 
 
 HIST< 
 
 OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806, 
 
 Assuredly in the situation in which Napo- 
 leon was placed, nothing was better calculated 
 than such a proposal. Led, in fact, by the 
 course of events to destroy the work of the 
 great Frederick by humbling Prussia, he could 
 not do better than to destroy that work com- 
 pletely, by restoring to Austria what Frederick 
 had taken away, and by taking from her what 
 Frederick had given her. For the rest, he of- 
 fered this exchange, without intending to im- 
 pose it upon her. If such a proposal, which 
 formerly would have filled Austria with joy, 
 should awaken her old sentiments in regard to 
 Silesia, he was quite ready, he said, to carry it 
 into effect; if not, it must be considered as not 
 having been made ; and he reserved himself to 
 act in Prussian and Russian Poland as events 
 should suggest to him, engaging only not to 
 undertake any thing injurious to the rights of 
 Austria. While taking care to furnish no pre- 
 text for complaint to the court of Vienna, Na- 
 poleon nevertheless repeated that he was quite 
 prepared, and that, if she was bent on war, 
 she would not take him at unawares. Though 
 satisfied with the services of his ambassador, 
 M. de la Rochefoucauld, he appointed in his 
 stead General Andreossy, who, as a military 
 man, and perfectly acquainted with Austria, 
 was capable of observing with a more correct 
 eye the nature and extent of the preparations 
 of that power. 
 
 Napoleon, at this extraordinary moment of 
 his reign, conceived the idea of making the 
 east subservient to his projects in the west. 
 Turkey was in a state of crisis, by which he 
 hoped to benefit. That unfortunate empire, 
 threatened ever since the reign of Catharine, 
 even by its friends, who, seeing its provinces 
 on the point of being rent from it, hastened to 
 prevent their rivals from seizing them wit- 
 ness the conduct of France in Egypt that 
 unfortunate empire had sometimes been at- 
 tracted towards Napoleon by the instinct of a 
 common interest, sometimes drawn away from 
 him by the intrigues of England and Russia, 
 working up the Divan by the recollections of 
 the Pyramids and Aboukir. Having made 
 peace at the time of the Consulate, relapsed 
 into coldness at the creation of the Empire, 
 which he had refused to recognise, Sultan Se- 
 lim had been definitively brought by the battle 
 of Austerlitz to a reconciliation, which had 
 soon become intimacy. He had not only con- 
 ceded to Napoleon the title of Padishah, at 
 first denied, but had sent to Paris an ambas- 
 sador extraordinary, to carry him congratula- 
 tions and presents along with the act of recog- 
 nitnn. Sultan Selim, in acting thus, had 
 indulged the real inclination of his heart, 
 which drew him towards France, in spite of 
 the intrigues with which he was beset, and 
 the redoubling of which attested the deplor- 
 able decline of the empire. This prince, mild, 
 liscreet, enlightened as a European, fond of 
 the civilization of the west, not from the whim 
 of a despot, but from a strong sense of the su- 
 periority of that civilization to the civilization 
 of the east, had, from his youth, when he was 
 buried in the voluptuous obscurity of the Se- 
 raglio, kept up, through M. Ruffin, personal 
 and secret correspondence with Louis XVI. 
 
 Having since ascended the throne, he had re- 
 tained a marked preference for France, and 
 he was glad to find in her victories a decisive 
 reason for giving himself up to her. The 
 Russians and English would fain have com- 
 bated this inclination even by force of arms. 
 An opportunity offered for trying their influ- 
 ence at Constantinople ; this was the choice 
 to be made of the two hospodars of Wallachia 
 and Moldavia. The hospodars Ipsilanti and 
 Maruzzi, devoted to England, to Russia, to 
 whomsoever desired the ruin of the Turkish 
 empire, for they were the real precursors of 
 the Greek insurrection, showed themselves in 
 their administration the declared accomplices 
 of the enemies of the Porte. Things had ar- 
 rived at such a point that the latter was com- 
 pelled to recall unfaithful and dangerous 
 agents. Russia had immediately ordered 
 General Michelson to march for the Dniester, 
 with an army of 60,000 men, and England had 
 sent a fleet to the Dardanelles, to effect by this 
 junction of forces the reinstatement of the de- 
 posed hospodars. The young Emperor Alex- 
 ander, who had appeared upon the stage of 
 the world only to sustain the memorable de- 
 feat of Austerlitz, said to himself that, amidst 
 this sanguinary fray of all the European na- 
 tions, it behooved him to take advantage of 
 circumstances, and to advance towards Tur- 
 key, that, whatever might be the chances of 
 fortune between the Rhine and the Niemen, 
 what he should take in the east would par- 
 haps be left him to compensate what others 
 should take in the west. 
 
 This calculation was plausible enough : 
 but, having Napoleon on his hands, he acted 
 with little prudence in depriving himself of 
 60,000 men, and sending them upon the Pruth. 
 The proof of this fault is manifested in the 
 joy which Napoleon feh when informed that 
 a rupture was likely to take place between 
 Russia and the Porte. It was in this antici- 
 pation that he had attached such importance 
 to the occupation of Dalmatia, which permit- 
 ted him to keep an army on the frontier of 
 Bosnia, and afforded him facility to succour 
 or to annoy the Porte, according to the cir- 
 cumstances of his policy. On perceiving the 
 approach of that crisis, which he desired the 
 more ardently the more serious the aspect of 
 events became, he had chosen for his ambas- 
 sador at Constantinople a soldier, a native of 
 Corsica, like himself, who united remarkable 
 political sagacity to military experience : this 
 was General Sebastiani, who had already been 
 employed on a mission in Turkey, of which 
 he had most satisfactorily acquitted himself. 
 Napoleon had given him express instructions 
 to excite the Turks against the Russians, and 
 to exert all his efforts to provoke a war in the 
 east He had authorized him to draw from 
 Dalmatia officers of artillery and engineers, 
 and even General Marmont's 25,000 men, if 
 the Porte, driven to extremities, should desire 
 the presence of a French army. The battle 
 of Austerlitz having reconciled Sultan Selim 
 with Napoleon, the battle of Jena was, in fact, 
 likely enough to embolden him to go to war. 
 Napoleon wrote to that prince, offering him 
 an alliance defensive and offensive, to induce
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 217 
 
 him to seize this opportunity of raising the 
 Crescent again, and informing him that he 
 was about to render the Turks the greatest 
 service that it was possible to do them, t re- 
 pair the greatest disaster which they had ever 
 sustained, by endeavouring to re-establish 
 Poland. Orders were given to General Mar- 
 mont to hold in readiness all the succours 
 that should be applied for by the Porte, and to 
 General Sebastiani to neglect nothing to kin- 
 dle a conflagration which should extend from 
 the Dardanelles to the mouths of the Danube. 
 In thus setting the Russians and Turks toge- 
 ther by the ears, Napoleon proposed to himself 
 a twofold object, that of dividing the Russian 
 forces, and that of throwing Austria into cruel 
 perplexities. Austria, no doubt, hated France, 
 but, when she should see the Russians over- 
 running the shores of the Black Sea, she 
 would necessarily feel apprehensions that 
 would be a very powerful diversion to her 
 hatred. 
 
 That immense quarrel, kept up for the last 
 fifteen years between Europe and the French 
 Revolution, was thus about to spread from the 
 Rhine to the Vistula, from Berlin to Constan- 
 tinople. Involved in a war of extermination, 
 Napoleon had recourse to means proportioned 
 to the magnitude of his designs. His first care 
 was to levy a new conscription. At the end 
 of 1805, he had called out the first half of the 
 conscription of 1806, and had just called out 
 the second half at the moment of his entry 
 into Prussia. He resolved to act in the same 
 manner in regard to the conscription of 1807, 
 and in calling it out immediately, though it 
 was not yet the end of 1806, to spare the young 
 men of that class for training, for gaining 
 their full strength, for breaking themselves to 
 the fatigues of war. With the spirit that per- 
 vaded the skeletons, this was more than was 
 needed to form excellent soldiers. This new 
 levy of men would, moreover, make a consi- 
 derable addition to the general effective of the 
 army. That effective, which in 1805, at the 
 time of leaving Boulogne, amounted to 450,000, 
 which was raised by the conscription of 
 1806 to 503,000, would be further augmented 
 by the conscription of 1807 to 580,000. An- 
 nual liberations being forbidden during the 
 war, the army was thus augmented by every 
 conscription ; for battle and disease did not 
 diminish the effective by a number of men 
 equal to that called out. The campaign of 
 Austria had not cost more than 20,000 men ; 
 that of Prussia had not yet cost any. It is 
 true that, the war being carried every day to a 
 greater distance and under severer climates, 
 the quality of the troops being lowered in pro- 
 portion as young recruits stepped into the 
 place of the veteran soldiers of the Revolu- 
 tion, the losses would soon be more sensibly 
 felt. But they were as yet of little import- 
 ance, and the army, composed of tried sol- 
 diers, made young rather than weakened by 
 the addition of a certain number of conscripts 
 to the war battalions, had attained its state of 
 perfection. 
 
 Napoleon wrote, therefore, to M. de Lacuee, 
 ordering him to call out the class of 1807. M. 
 de Lacuee was the person in the ministry of 
 
 VOL. II. 28 
 
 war officially charged with these calls. He 
 was an able functionary, devoted to the Em 
 peror, and determined to overcome the difficul- 
 ties of a very ungrateful task, under a govern- 
 ment under which there was so great a con- 
 sumption of men. Though he was not 
 minister of war, Napoleon corresponded im- 
 mediately with him, feeling it necessary to 
 guide, to support, to excite him by direct com- 
 munications. " You will see," he wrote to 
 him, " by a message addressed to the Senate, 
 that I am calling out the conscription of 1807, 
 and that I will not lay down arms till I have 
 peace with England and Russia. I see by the 
 statements that the whole of the conscription 
 
 of 1806 will have marched You shall 
 
 have no need to await my orders for the dis- 
 tribution among the different corps. I have 
 not yet lost any men, but the project which I 
 have formed is more vast than any that I ever 
 conceived; and from this lime, I must find 
 myself in a position to cope with all events." 
 (Berlin, November 22nd, 1806 Depot of the 
 Secretary of State's Office.) 
 
 Napoleon, following the practice which he 
 had adopted in the preceding year, of reserv- 
 ing for the Senate the vote of the contingent, 
 sent a message to that body to demand of it 
 the conscription of 1807, and to acquaint it 
 with the extension given to his policy since he 
 had annihilated Prussia. In this message, in 
 which the energy of the style equalled that of 
 the ideas, he said that till then the monarchs 
 of Europe had played with the generosity of 
 France ; that, when one coalition was conquer- 
 ed, another immediately sprang up; that no 
 sooner was that of 1805 dissolved than he had 
 to fight that of 1806; that it behooved France 
 to be less generous in future; that the con- 
 quered states should be retained till the gene- 
 ral peace oft land and sea ; that England, re- 
 gardless of all the rights of nations, launching 
 a commercial interdict against one quarter of 
 the globe, must be struck with the same inter- 
 dict, and it must be rendered as rigorous as 
 the nature of the things permitted ; that, finally, 
 it would be better, since they were doomed to 
 war, to plunge in wholly than to go but half- 
 way into it; that this was the way to termi- 
 nate it more completely and more solidly by a 
 general and durable peace. His style expressed 
 with the utmost vigour those ideas of which 
 he was full. Pride, exasperation, confidence, 
 were alike conspicuous. He then claimed 
 means proportioned to his ends, and these con- 
 sisted, as we have just mentioned, in the con- 
 scription of 1807 levied at the end of 1806. 
 
 We have already explained the precautions 
 taken by Napoleon, in the twofold hypothesis 
 of a long war in the north, and of an unfore- 
 seen attack on any part whatever' of his vast 
 empire. The third battalions of the regiments 
 of the grand army, forming depots, were, as 
 we have seen, ranged along the Rhine, undet 
 Marshal Kellermann, or in the camp of Bou 
 logne, under Marshal Brune. These third bat- 
 talions, already filled by conscripts of 1806, 
 soon to be by those of 1807, carefully trained 
 and equipped, under Marshal Kellermaan, 
 might, if wanted, join the eighth corps, com- 
 manded by Marshal Mortier to cover the Rhinn;
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806. 
 
 or those under Marshal Brune might join the 
 King of Holland, to cover either Holland, or 
 the coast of France as far as the Seine. Such 
 of these regiments as were neither in Ger- 
 many nor Italy, assembled in the interior, at 
 St. Lo, at Pontivy, at Napoleonville, formed 
 into small camps, were destined to proceed to 
 Cherbourg, Brest, La Rochelle, or Bordeaux. 
 Detachments of national guards, not nume- 
 rous, but well chosen, one at St. Omer, one in 
 the Lower Seine, a third in the environs of 
 Bordeaux, were to concur in defence of threat- 
 ened points. Some corps concentrated in 
 Paris were to travel thither by post. 
 
 The same system had been adopted, as we 
 have already seen, for the army of Italy. The 
 third battalions of the army, spread over Up- 
 per Italy, were dedicated to the instruction of 
 the conscripts, and furnished at the same time 
 the garrisons of the fortresses. The war bat- 
 talions were with the three active armies of 
 Naples, the Frioul, and Dalmatia. 
 
 Napoleon resolved, in the first place, to draw 
 from the depots the reinforcements necessary 
 for the grand army, and to fill the vacancy 
 which he should leave in them with the new 
 conscription ; and as that vacancy would be 
 filled, and much more than filled, by the con- 
 tingent of 1807, to avail himself of the sur- 
 plus to raise the battalions to 1000 or 1200 
 men, and the cavalry regiments to an effective 
 of 700 men, instead of 500. He resolved also 
 to augment the effective of the companies of 
 artillery, having perceived that the enemy, to 
 compensate for the quality of his troops, was 
 greatly increasing the number of his guns. 
 The depot battalions, being augmented to 1000 
 or 1200 men, there might always be drafted 
 from them, besides the recruiting of the active 
 army, the best trained 300 or 400 men, to be 
 sent to any quarter where an unforeseen want 
 of them might arise. 
 
 Napoleon had already drawn from the de- 
 p6ts about 12,000 men, who had been conducted 
 in large detachments from Alsace into Fran- 
 conia, from Franconia into Saxony, to fill the 
 vacancies produced in his ranks by the war. 
 Seven or eight thousand had just arrived, four 
 or five thousand were still on the march. This 
 was not a full equivalent for what he had lost, 
 much more, however, from fatigue than by 
 battle. Bearing in mind, above all, the dis- 
 tance to which the war was about to be car- 
 ried, he devised a system, profoundly conceived, 
 for bringing the conscripts from the Rhine to 
 the Vistula for bringing them thither in such 
 a manner, that they should incur no danger 
 during the long journey, that they should not 
 disperse upon the road, and that they should 
 have it in their power to render services by 
 the way upon the rear of the army. These 
 detachments, drawn from each depot battalion, 
 were to form several companies, according to 
 their number; these companies were to be then 
 united into battalions, and these battalions into 
 provisional regiments, of twelve or fifteen hun- 
 dred men. Officers, taken temporarily from 
 tlie depots, were to be given them for the route, 
 and they were to be organized, as if they were 
 o form definitive regiments. Setting out with 
 
 this organization, and with their complete 
 equipment, they had orders to stop at the fort- 
 resses situated on our line of operation, such 
 as Erfurt, Halle, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Span- 
 dau. Ciistrin, Frankfurt on the Oder; to rest 
 if they had need of rest, and to keep garrison 
 there, if it were necessary for the safety of our 
 rear; and, wherever they made a halt, they 
 were to resume the military exercises, that the 
 instruction of the men might not be neglected 
 during a journey of several months. They 
 would thus cover the communications of the 
 army, and obviate the necessity of weakening 
 it by too great a number of garrisons left in 
 rear, and therefore in some measure augment 
 its effective before they could actually join it. 
 
 Having arrived at the theatre of war, they 
 were to be dissolved by the despatch of each 
 detachment to its corps, and the officers were 
 to return by post to their depots, to fetch other 
 recruits. 
 
 The same organization was adopted for the 
 cavalry, with some particular precautions 
 commanded by the nature of that arm. 
 
 In all the fortresses converted into grand de- 
 pots, such as Wurzburg, Erfurt, Wittenberg, 
 Spandau, orders were given for collecting 
 there, by means of the resources which the 
 country afforded, clothing, shoes, arms, in 
 abundance. The commandants of those places 
 were enjoined to inspect every provisional re- 
 j giment that passed, to supply clothing and 
 arms for such men as were in want of them, 
 and to detain those who had need of rest. 
 The next corps that passed were to pick up 
 | the men left on the way by those which had 
 preceded them, and, finding as many men and 
 horses to take as they left behind, they were 
 always sure to arrive complete at the theatre of 
 war. Napoleon, reading assiduously the report? 
 of the commandants of the fortresses through 
 which the provisional regiments passed, in- 
 cessantly comparing them together, repri- 
 manded the slightest negligence, and thus in- 
 sured punctual attention from all. It required 
 nothing short of such combinations, supported 
 by such vigilance, to keep entire so large an 
 army at so vast a distance. 
 
 Napoleon not only purposed to keep up ihe 
 corps at the effective which they had at the 
 time of entering upon the campaign, he de- 
 signed also to draw new corps to the grand 
 army. He had left, as we have seen, three 
 regiments in Paris, to form a reserve, which 
 could be despatched to the coasts of France, 
 if they were threatened. He conceived that 
 he could dispose of two of these regiments, 
 the 58th of the line, and the 15th light, in coa 
 sequence of the considerable increase of the 
 conscripts in the depots. There were in Paris 
 six third battalions belonging to regiments 
 which had four battalions. The conscription 
 was to raise each of them to 1000 men. Ju- 
 not, governor of Paris, had orders to review 
 them several times a week, and to make them 
 manoeuvre in his presence. It was a reserve 
 of 6000 men, always ready to set out post for 
 Boulogne, Cherbourg, or Brest, and which al- 
 lowed the 58th of the line and the 15th light 
 to be removed without inconvenience. These
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 219 
 
 two regiments, considered as among the finest 
 in the army, were marched off for the Elbe, by 
 Wesel and Westphalia, 
 
 It will be recollected that Napoleon had re- 
 solved to convert the velites into fusileers of the 
 guard. Thanks to the prompt execution of 
 what he ordered, a regiment of two battalions, 
 amounting to 1400 men, the soldiers of which 
 had been carefully selected from the annual 
 contingent, and the officers and subalterns 
 taken from the guard, was already completely 
 formed. Napoleon directed it to be kept for 
 the time strictly necessary for its instruction, 
 and then sent by post from Paris to Mayence. 
 
 The guard of the capital was then, as now, 
 committed to a municipal force, consisting of 
 two regiments, and called regiments of the Paris 
 guard. Napoleon had recommended that the 
 effective of these two regiments should be 
 augmented as much as possible by men taken 
 from the last conscription. Reaping the bene- 
 fit of his foresight, he could, without stripping 
 Paris too much, take from them two battalions, 
 which would furnish a regiment of twelve or 
 thirteen hundred men, of excellent quality and 
 appearance. He ordered them to be sent off 
 for the army, thinking that a body of troops 
 which had been employed in keeping order at 
 home ought not to be deprived of the honour 
 of contributing abroad to the greatness of the 
 country, to which it would return better and 
 more respected. 
 
 The workmen at the ports were without em- 
 ployment and without bread, because naval 
 operations languished amidst the immense 
 development given to the continental war. 
 Napoleon found useful occupation and wages 
 for them. He composed out of them batta- 
 lions of infantry, which were charged to guard 
 the ports to which they belonged, with a pro- 
 mise that they should never be required to 
 leave them. They might be relied on, for 
 they were attached to the establishments in- 
 trusted to their vigilance, and they partook, 
 besides, of the martial spirit of the navy. 
 Thanks to this idea, Napoleon was enabled 
 to take from the coast service three fine regi- 
 ments, the 19th, 15th, and 31st of the line, 
 which were at Boulogne, Brest and St. Lo. 
 They were, like the others, increased to 2000 
 men for the two battalions, and sent off for 
 the grand army. 
 
 Thus there were seven new regiments of in- 
 fantry, capable of forming the nucleus of a fine 
 corps d'armee, that Napoleon had the art to draw 
 from France, without weakening the interior 
 too much. To these regiments was to be 
 joined the Legion of the North, filled with 
 Poles, and which was already on march for 
 Germany. 
 
 That which seemed particularly desirable 
 to Napoleon, and the utility of which he ap- 
 preciated, perhaps, to exaggeration, at a mo- 
 ment when he was leaving the plains of 
 Prussia and entering those of Poland, was 
 the cavalry. He had recently drawn from 
 Mayence, and marched off on foot, partly to- 
 wards Hesse, partly towards Prussia, all the 
 trained horse-soldiers that were at the depots. 
 He had ordered that their horses should be left 
 in France, and that they should be supplied 
 
 from those which had been collected in Ger- 
 many. Marshal Mortier, on entering the states 
 of the elector of Hesse, had disbanded the 
 army of that prince. This had furnished four 
 or five thousand excellent horses, part of 
 which had served for mounting immediately 
 a thousand French horse-soldiers, and the 
 others had been sent to Potsdam. There were 
 at Potsdam vast stables, built by the great 
 Frederick, who frequently took delight in see- 
 ing a great number of squadrons maneuvering 
 at once, in the delightful retreat where he 
 lived as king, philosopher, and warrior. Na- 
 poleon there created, under the cannon of 
 Spandau, an immense establishment for the 
 accommodation of his cavalry. Here he col- 
 lected all the horses taken from the enemy, 
 besides a great quantity of others bought in 
 the different provinces of Prussia. General 
 Bourcier, who had quitted the active army 
 after honourable services, was placed at the 
 head of this depot, with the recommendation 
 i not to leave it for a moment ; to see, with his 
 | own eyes, that due attention was paid to the 
 ; numerous horses collected there ; to mount 
 with them the cavalry regiments coming on 
 foot from France ; to stop those which passed 
 through Prussia, to review them, to furnish 
 them with horses in place of those that were 
 knocked up or scarcely capable of service ; to 
 detain, also, such men as were sick, and to 
 send them off with regiments coming after 
 them. The workmen of Berlin, having no- 
 thing to do in consequence of the departure 
 of the court and the nobility, were to be em- 
 ployed in. this depot, for wages, in saddlers', 
 harness-makers', shoe-makers' and wheel- 
 wrights' work. 
 
 It was to Italy that Napoleon thought to 
 have recourse for procuring cavalry. No- 
 where was it of less use. In Naples, they 
 never had to encounter any but Calabrese 
 mountaineers or English, landing from their 
 ships without horse-soldiers. There were at 
 Naples sixteen regiments of cavalry; some of 
 them cuirassiers, and among the finest in the 
 army. Napoleon directed ten of them to be 
 marched towards Upper Italy leaving only 
 six, all of which were light cavalry, and the 
 effective of which he was enabled to increase 
 to a thousand men each, in consequence of 
 the great number of the conscripts sent be- 
 yond the Alps. They would thus form a force . 
 of 6000 men, furnishing 4000 horse-soldiers, 
 always ready to mount, and fully adequate to 
 the service of observation, which they had to 
 perform in the kingdom of Naples. 
 
 Neither were the intersected plains of Lom- 
 bardy, in which canals, rivers, long screens 
 of trees, render the movements of cavalry so 
 difficult, a country where it was very neces- 
 sary. Besides, ten regiments of that army, 
 transferred from the south to the north of Ita- 
 ly, would allow some to be detached and sent 
 off to the grand army. Napoleon drew from 
 this source a division of cuirassiers, formed 
 of four superb regiments, which afterwards 
 distinguished themselves under the command 
 of General d'Espagne. He drew from it light 
 cavalry, also, and gave orders for despatching 
 successively to Germany the 19th, 24 f n, ICth,
 
 220 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806. 
 
 3d, and 24th regiments of chasseurs, which 
 made, with the four of cuirassiers, nine regi- 
 ments of cavalry borrowed from Italy. This 
 was a force of 5000 horse at least, travelling 
 partly with iheir horses, partly on foot the 
 latter being destined to be mounted in Ger- 
 many. 
 
 Napoleon was occupied, at the same time, 
 in placing the army of Italy on the war foot- 
 ing. He had taken care to send it 20,000 men 
 of the conscription of 1806, and he had recom- 
 mended to Prince Eugene to pay continual 
 attention to their training. When ready to 
 penetrate iuto the north leaving upon his 
 rear Austria, more terrified, but more hostile, 
 since Jena he gave orders to proceed with- 
 out delay to the formation of the active divi- 
 sions, so that they might be fit to take the 
 field immediately. In Frioul, there were al- 
 ready two divisions fully organized. He or- 
 dered their artillery to be completed to twelve 
 pieces for each division. He gave directions 
 to form forthwith, on the war footing, one divi- 
 sion at Venice, one at Brescia, a third at Alex- 
 andria, each nine or ten battalions strong, to 
 prepare their artillery, to compose their equi- 
 pages, and to appoint their staff". He followed 
 the same course in regard to the cavalry. He 
 directed the regiments of dragoons drawn from 
 Naples to be raised to their complement, both 
 of men and horses, and to be provided, more- 
 over, with a division of light artillery. These 
 five divisions amounted together to 45,000 
 infantry and 7000 cavalry, making a total of 
 52,000 present under arms. This force, aug- 
 mented, in case of need, by Marmont's corps 
 and by part of the army of Naples, would be 
 sufficient, in the hands of a man like Massena, 
 to keep the Austrians in check, especially if 
 it supported itself upon such fortresses as 
 Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, and 
 Alexandria. Napoleon ordered the eight depot 
 battalions of the army of Dal mat ia to be esta- 
 blished in Venice, the seven of the corps of 
 the Frioul in Osopo and Palma-Nova, the 
 fourteen of the army of Naples, in Peschiera, 
 Legnago, and Mantua. Each of these batta- 
 lions contained already more than 1000 men, 
 since the contingent of 1806, and would soon 
 have 1 100 or 1200 on the arrival of the contin- 
 gent of 1807. It would then become easy to 
 extract from them the companies of voltigeurs 
 and grenadiers, and with these to compose 
 excellent active divisions. Such was the fruit 
 of a vigilance that was never relaxed. Napo- 
 leon, moreover, ordered the provisioning of 
 the fortresses to be completed without delay. 
 
 Thus wholly engrossed in developing the vast 
 plan of precautions adopted on his departure 
 from Paris, Napoleon screened France from 
 all insult on the part of the English, secured 
 Italy from all sudden hostility on the part of 
 the Austrians, and without disorganizing the 
 means of defence of either, he drew from the 
 first seven regiments of infantry, from the 
 second nine regiments of cavalry, indepen- | 
 dently of the provisional regiments which, 
 setting out incessantly from the Rhine, would 
 ensure the recruiting of the grand army, and 
 tht safety of his rear. 
 The reinforcements which, within a month, 
 
 were likely to augment the grand army, may 
 be computed at about 50.000 men. With the 
 corps which had already joined it, since its 
 entry into Prussia, and which had raised it to 
 about 190,000 men, with those which were 
 preparing to join, with the German, Dutch, 
 and Italian auxiliaries, it would amount to 
 near 300,000 men : and, such is the inevitable 
 scattering of the forces, even under the direc- 
 tion of the ablest general, that, after deducting 
 from these 300,000 men the wounded, the 
 sick, who became more numerous in winter 
 and in severe climates, the detachments on 
 march, the corps placed in observation, you 
 could not flatter yourself to bring more than 
 150,000 men into fire. So necessary is it that 
 the resources should exceed the foreseen 
 wants, in order that they may merely supply 
 the real wants ! And if we extend this ob- 
 servation to the whole of the forces of France 
 in 1806, we shall see that, with a total army 
 amounting for the entire empire to 580,000 
 to 650,000, including the auxiliaries 300,000 
 at most could be present on the theatre of war, 
 between the Rhine and the Vistula, 150,000 
 upon the Vistula itself, and perhaps 80,000 
 upon the fields of battle, where the fate of the 
 world was to be decided. And yet never had 
 so many men and horses marched, never had 
 so many cannon rolled with that force of ag- 
 gregation towards one and the same goal. 
 
 It was not enough to bring the soldiers 
 together; financial resources were required for 
 supplying all that they needed. Napoleon, 
 having succeeded in raising his budget in war 
 time to 700 millions, (820 with the cost of col- 
 lection,) had the means of keeping an army 
 of 450,000 men. But he would soon have 
 600,000 to pay. He resolved to draw from the 
 conquered countries the resources necessary 
 for paying his new armaments. Possessed of 
 Hesse, Westphalia, Hanover, the Hanseatic 
 towns, Mecklenburg, lastly Prussia, he could, 
 without inhumanity, lay contributions on these 
 different countries. He had suffered the Prus- 
 sian authorities to remain everywhere, and 
 placed at their head General Clarke for the 
 political administration of the country, M. 
 Daru for the financial administration. The 
 latter, able, assiduous, upright, had made him- 
 self master of all the financial affairs, and 
 was as well acquainted with them as the best 
 Prussian employes, 
 
 The monarchy of Frederick William, com- 
 posed at this period of East Prussia, extend- 
 ing from Konigsberg to Stettin, Polish Prussia, 
 Silesia, Brandenburg, the provinces to the left 
 of the Elbe, Westphalia, the enclosed districts 
 situated in Franconia, might yield its govern- 
 ment about 120 millions of francs, the costs 
 of collection being paid upon the produce it- 
 self, most part of the wants of the army being 
 supplied by local taxes, the repair of the roads 
 ensured by" certain rates imposed upon the 
 farmers of the domains of the Crown. In 
 these 120 millions of revenue, the land-tax 
 furnished 35 or 36 millions, the farming of the 
 domains of the Crown 18, the produce of the 
 excise, which consisted of duties on liquors, 
 and on the transit of merchandise, 50, the 
 monopoly of salt 9 or 10. Various accessory
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 221 
 
 imposts made up the remainder of the 120 
 millions. Functionaries, collected into provin- 
 cial commissions, under the appellation of 
 Chambers of Domains and War, superintended 
 their assessment, their collection, and the farm- 
 ing of the domains of the Crown. 
 
 Napoleon decided that this administration 
 should be suffered to exist, even with its 
 abuses, which M. Daru had soon discovered, 
 and he notified to the Prussian government 
 itself to assist it in correcting them, that, at- 
 tached to each provincial administration, there 
 should be a French agent to keep an eye 
 upon the collection of the revenues, and upon 
 their payment into the central chest of the 
 French army. Daru was to superintend these 
 agents, and to centralize their operations. 
 Thus the finances of Prussia were about to be 
 administered on the account of Napoleon and 
 for his profit. It was foreseen, however, that 
 the annual produce of 120 millions would sink 
 to 70 or 80 in consequence of existing circum- 
 stances. Napoleon, exercising his right of 
 conquest, was not content with the ordinary 
 imposts, and decreed in addition a war con- 
 tribution, which, for all Prussia, might amount 
 to 200 millions. It was to be levied gradually, 
 in the course of the occupation, over and 
 above the ordinary taxes. Napoleon also 
 levied a war contribution on Hesse, Bruns- 
 wick, Hanover, and the Hanseatic towns, in- 
 dependently of the seizure of English merchan- 
 dise. 
 
 At this rate the army was to subsist itself, 
 and to consume nothing without paying for it. 
 Numerous purchases of horses, immense or- 
 ders for clothing, shoes, harness, gun-carriages, 
 given in all the towns, but more particularly 
 in Berlin, with the view to occupy the work- 
 men, and to provide for the wants of the 
 French army, were paid for out of the produce 
 of the contributions, ordinary and extraordi- 
 nary. 
 
 The contributions, heavy, no doubt, were 
 still the least vexatious mode of exercising 
 the right of war, which authorizes the con- 
 queror to live upon the conquered country; 
 for it substituted the regular collection of the 
 tax to the wasteful extravagance of the sol- 
 diers. For the rest, the most rigid discipline, 
 the most complete respect for private property, 
 excepting the ravages of the field of battle, 
 happily confined to very few localities, com- 
 pensated these inevitable hardships of the 
 war. And, assuredly, if we go back to the 
 past, we shall find that never did armies be- 
 have with less barbarity and with so much 
 humanity. 
 
 Napoleon, disposed by policy to spare the 
 court of Saxony, had offered it an armistice 
 and a peace after Jena. That court, honest 
 and timid, had joyfully accepted such an act 
 of clemency, and submitted to the discretion 
 of the conqueror. Napoleon agreed to admit 
 it into the New Confederation of the Rhine, 
 and to change the title of elector, borne by 
 the sovereign, into the title of king, on con- 
 dition of a military contingent of 20,000 men, 
 reduced for this time to 6000, in consideration 
 of circumstances. This extension of the Con- 
 federation of the Rhine afforded great advan- 
 
 tages, for it insured to our armies a free pas- 
 sage through Germany, and the possession at 
 all times of the line of the Elbe. To compen- 
 sate the charges of military occupation, which 
 were spared Saxony by this treaty, she agreed 
 to pay a contribution of twenty-five millions, 
 in specie, or in bills of exchange at a short 
 date. 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, could, while the war 
 lasted, dispose of three hundred millions at 
 least. Carrying foresight to the utmost length, 
 he did not suffer his minister of the treasury 
 to lull hjmself to sleep in confidence on the 
 resources found in Germany. The sum of 
 twenty-four millions was due to the grand 
 army for arrears of pay. Napoleon required 
 that this sum should be deposited partly in 
 Slrasburg, partly at Paris, in metallic specie, 
 because he would not submit to the necessity 
 of running in a pressing emergency after pa- 
 per for the payment of which there would be 
 a longer or shorter time to wait. Accordingly, 
 he left the money in deposit at Paris and on 
 the Rhine, intending to use it at a future time, 
 and meanwhile caused the arrears to be dis- 
 charged out of the revenues of the conquered 
 country, that his soldiers might have their pay 
 to spend while they were yet in the towns of 
 Prussia, and be able to procure for themselves 
 those comforts which are to be found only 
 amidst large populations. 
 
 All these dispositions being completed, Ge- 
 neral Clarke being left in Berlin to assume the 
 political government of Prussia, and M. Daru 
 to adihiriister it financially, Napoleon broke up 
 with his columns to enter Poland. 
 
 The King of Prussia had not accepted the 
 proposed armistice, because the terms were too 
 rigorous, and also because he had been made 
 to wait too long. Rejoined by Duroc at Oste- 
 rode in old Prussia, he replied that, notwith- 
 standing his most sincere desire to suspend 
 the course of a disastrous war, he could not 
 consent to the sacrifices required of him ; that, 
 in demanding not only the part of his domi- 
 nions already overrun, but also the province 
 of Posen and the line of the Vistula, they 
 would leave him without territory and without 
 resources, and, above all, give up Poland to 
 inevitable insurrection ; that he had therefore 
 made up his mind to continue the war; that 
 he acted thus from necessity, and also from 
 fidelity to his engagements, for, having called 
 the Russians, it was impossible for him to send 
 them back after the appeal which he had made 
 to them, and which they had answered with 
 the utmost cordiality. 
 
 In vain did MM. de Haugwitz and de Luc- 
 chesini, who, after participating for a moment 
 in the general infatuation of the Prussian na- 
 tion, had been brought back to reason by ca- 
 lamity in vain did they unite their efforts to 
 induce the acceptance of the armistice, such as 
 it was, saying that whatever was refused tc 
 Napoleon he would conquer in a fortnight 
 that they should let slip the opportunity for put- 
 ting a stop to the war and its ravages ; that, if 
 they were to treat at that moment, they should 
 no doubt lose the provinces situated on the 
 left of the Elbe, but that, if they treated later 
 they should lose Poland itself along with those 
 
 T 2
 
 222 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 180& 
 
 pi.-vvinces: in vain MM. de Haugwitz and de ' 
 Lucchesini gave this advice; their tardy pru- 
 dence obtained no credit. The court, in go- 
 ing lo Konigsberg, had placed itself under, 
 Russian influences : adversity, which had 
 calmed discreet minds, had, on the contrary, 
 heightened the exaltation of those destitute of 
 reason ; and the war party, instead of imput- 
 ing to itself the reverses of Prussia, imputed 
 them to alleged treasons of the peace-party. 
 The queen, irritated by mortification, insisted 
 more strongly than ever that the fortune of 
 arms should be once more tried, with the re- 
 mains of the Prussian forces, with the support 
 of the Russians, and under favour of distance, 
 which was a great advantage to the van- 
 quished, a great disadvantage to the victor. 
 MM. de Haugwitz and de Lucchesini, deprived 
 of all authority, assailed by unjust accusations, 
 sometimes overwhelmed with insults, solicited 
 and obtained their dismissal. The king, more 
 equitable than the court, granted it to them j 
 with demonstrations of infinite regard, espe- j 
 cially for M. de Haugwitz, having never ceased 
 to appreciate his intelligence, to acknowledge 
 his long services, and to lament that he had 
 not always followed his counsels. 
 
 The Russians had actually arrived on the 
 Niemen. A first corps of 50,000 men, com- j 
 manded by General Benningsen, had passed; 
 the Niemen on the 1st of November, and was | 
 advancing towards the Vistula. A second, of i 
 the like force, headed by General Buxhiivden, ' 
 followed the first. A reserve was organized 
 under General Essen. Part of General Mi- 
 chelson's troops were ascending the Dniester 
 and hastening to Poland. The imperial guard, 
 however, had not yet left Petersburg. A swarm 
 of Cossacks, issuing from their deserts, pre- 
 ceded the regular troops. Such were the then 
 disposable forces of that vast empire, which 
 showed for the second time that its resources 
 were not equal to its pretensions. Joined to 
 the Prussians, and while awaiting the reserve 
 of General Essen, the Russians could present 
 themselves upon the Vistula to the number of 
 120,000 men. In this there was nothing to 
 embarrass Napoleon, if the climate did not 
 happen to bring a powerful auxiliary to the 
 soldiers of the north ; and by the climate we 
 mean not merely the cold, but the soil, the 
 difficulty of marching and subsisting in those 
 immense plains, alternately muddy and sandy, 
 and where woods exceed in extent the part 
 under cultivation. 
 
 The English, it is true, promised a powerful 
 co-operation in money, in materiel, and even in 
 men. They announced landings on different 
 points of the coasts of France and Germany, 
 and particularly an expedition to Swedish 
 Pomerania, on the rear of the French army. 
 They had, indeed, a very convenient landing- 
 place in the inundated fortress of Stralsund, 
 situated upon the last tongues of the German 
 continent. This point was guarded by the 
 Swedes, and every thing prepared to receive 
 the English troops in an almost inviolable re- 
 treat. But it was probable that eagerness to 
 seize the rich colonies of Holland and Spain, 
 ill-defended at this moment on account of the 
 wreoccuDauous of the continental war, would 
 
 absorb the attention of the English forces. A 
 last resource, more vain than that expected 
 from the English, formed the complement of 
 the means of the coalition that was the sup- 
 posed interference of Austria. 
 
 The Prussians and Russians flattered them- 
 selves that, if a single success crowned their 
 efforts, Austria would declare in their favour, 
 and they almost included in the effective of the 
 belligerent troops the 80,000 Austrians at that 
 moment assembled in Bohemia and Gallicia. 
 
 All this gave little uneasiness to Napoleon, 
 who never was fuller of confidence and pride. 
 The refusal of the armistice had neither sur- 
 prised nor nettled him. " Your majesty," he 
 wrote to the King of Prussia, " has sent me 
 word that you have thrown yourself into the 
 arms of Russia; .... time will show whether 
 you have chosen the better and more effica- 
 cious part. You have taken up the dice-box 
 to play: the dice will decide." 
 
 The military dispositions of Napoleon /or 
 penetrating into Poland were these. He had 
 nothing to fear from the Austrians ; his gene- 
 ral preparations in France as well as in Italy, 
 and his diplomacy in the East, having provided 
 against all that he could have to apprehend on 
 their part. The landings of the English and 
 Swedes in Pomerania, tending to excite insur- 
 rection on his rear in suffering and humbled 
 Prussia, presented a more real danger. To 
 this danger he attached, however, but little im- 
 portance, for he wrote to his brother Louis, 
 who importuned him with his alarms, " The 
 English have something else to do than to 
 land in France, Holland, or Pomerania. They 
 had rather pillage the colonies of all nations 
 than attempt landings: the only advantage 
 which they reap from them is to be disgrace- 
 fully flung back to the sea." Napoleon be- 
 lieved one point at most that relating to the 
 Swedes, who had twelve or fifteen thousand 
 men at Stralsund. At any rate, the 8th corps 
 under Marshal Mortier, was charged to provide 
 against these contingencies. This corps, which 
 had for its 3rst mission to occupy Hesse and 
 to re-unite the grand army with the Rhine, was, 
 now that Hesse was disarmed, to awe Prussia 
 and to guard the coast of Garmany. It was 
 composed of four divisions: one Dutch, which 
 had become vacant by the return of King Louis 
 to Holland; one Italian, despatched through 
 Hesse to Hanover; two French, which were 
 about to be increased to the full complement 
 with part of the regiments recently drawn from 
 France. One portion of these troops was to 
 be.siege the Hanoverian fortress of Hameln, 
 which remained in the hands of the Prussians, 
 another to occupy the Hanseatic towns. The 
 remainder, established towards Stralsund and 
 Anklam, was destined to drive the Swedes 
 back into Stralsund, if they should sally from 
 it, or to proceed to Berlin, if a fit of despair 
 should seize -the people of that capital. 
 
 General Clarke had orders to concert with 
 Marshal Mortier how to parry all accidents. 
 Not a musket had been left in Berlin ; and all 
 the materiel had been removed to Spandau. 
 Sixteen hundred citizens formed the guard of 
 Berlin, with 800 muskets, which they passed 
 from one to another, only 800 being en duty at
 
 \iv. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 223 
 
 once. If a movement of any importance took 
 place, General Clarke was to retire toSpandau, 
 and to wait there for Marshal Mortier. The 
 vast cavalry depot established at Potsdam 
 would always be capable of furnishing a thou- 
 sand horses for patrole duty and for securing 
 stragglers, who roved about the country since 
 the dispersion of the Prussian army. To such 
 a length had wariness been carried, as to search 
 the woods, in order to collect the cannon which 
 the Prussians had concealed in their flight, and 
 to shut them up in the fortresses. 
 
 The corps of Marshal Davout, which had 
 entered Berlin before any of the others, had 
 had time to rest there. Napoleon marched it 
 off the first for Ciistrin, and from Ciistrin for 
 the capital of the grand-duchy of Posen. The 
 corps of Marshal Augereau, having reached 
 Berlin the second, and sufficiently rested also, 
 was sent by Ciistrin and Landsburg, on the 
 Netze, the road to the Vistula, with instruc- 
 tions to march to the left of Marshal Davout. 
 Further to the left still, Marshal Lannes, esta- 
 blished at Stettin ever since the capitulation of 
 Prenzlau, having while residing there some- 
 what recruited his troops, reinforced by the 
 28th light, and supplied with great coats and 
 shoes, had orders to take with him provisions 
 for eight days, to cross the Oder, to pass 
 through Stargard and Schneidmiihl, and to 
 join Augereau on the Netze. It is superfluous 
 to add that, before he left Stettin, he was to put 
 that fortress into a stale of defence. Lastly, 
 the indefatigable Murat, leaving his cavalry to 
 return by short marches from Liibeck, had 
 orders to repair himself to Berlin, to take the 
 command of the cuirassiers there, who had 
 been resting themselves while the dragoons 
 were running after the Prussians, to join with 
 the cuirassiers Beaumont's and Klein's dra- 
 goons, who had not advanced so far as the 
 others in pursuit of the enemy, and remounted 
 moreover with fresh horses in the depot of 
 Potsdam. With this cavalry, Murat was to 
 join Marshal Davout at Posen, to precede him 
 to Warsaw, and to put himself at the head of 
 all the troops sent to Poland, till Napoleon 
 should come to command them himself. The 
 Russians were still at a great distance from 
 the Vistula. Napoleon afforded himself time 
 for the despatch of his numerous affairs in 
 Berlin, and left his brother-in-law to commence 
 the movement upon Poland, and to sound the 
 disposition of the Poles in regard to insurrec- 
 tion. No person was fitter than Murat to ex- 
 cite their enthusiasm, by participating in it 
 himself. 
 
 While the French army, crossing the Oder, 
 was about to advance to the Vistula, Prince 
 Jerome, having under his command the Wir- 
 tembergers and the Bavarians, seconded by an 
 able and vigorous officer, General Vandamme, 
 was to take possession of Silesia, to besiege 
 the fortresses in that province, to push part 
 of his troops as far as Kalisch, and thus to 
 cover against Austria the right of the corps 
 that was to march upon Posen. 
 
 The troops despatched to Poland might 
 amount to about 80,000 men the corps of 
 Marshal Davout consisting of 23,000, that of 
 Marshal Augereau of 17,000, that of Marshal 
 
 Lannes of 18,000, the detachment of Prince 
 Jerome sent to Kalisch of 14,000, lastly, Mu- 
 rat's reserve cavalry, of nine or ten thousand. 
 This was more than would be required to 
 make head against the Russian and Prussian 
 forces which they were likely to meet with at 
 the first moment 
 
 Meanwhile, the corps of Marshals Soult and 
 Bernadotte were marching from Liibeck to 
 Berlin. They were to stay some time in that 
 capital, to recruit themselves there, and to get 
 supplied with all that they wanted. Marshal 
 Nev had repaired thither after the capitulation 
 of Magdeburg, and was preparing to march 
 for the Oder. Napoleon, with the imperial 
 guard, with General Oudinot's division of 
 grenadiers and voltigeurs, with the remainder 
 of the reserve cavalry, which was resting it- 
 self at Berlin, with the three corps of Marshals 
 Soult, Bernadotte, and Ney, would have at his 
 disposal a second army of 80,000 men, at the 
 head of which he was to proceed to Poland, 
 to support the movement of the first. 
 
 Marshal Davimt, the first despatched for 
 Posen, was a firm and reflective man, of whom 
 no imprudence was to be apprehended. He 
 had been initiated into the real ideas of Napo- 
 leon relative to Poland. Napoleon was frankly 
 resolved to repair the serious injury done to 
 Europe by the abolition of that ancient king- 
 dom ; but he did not disguise from himself 
 the immense difficulty of reconstituting a de- 
 stroyed State, especially with a people whose 
 anarchical spirit was as famous as its valour. 
 
 He intended, therefore, not to involve him- 
 self in such an enterprise, unless upon con- 
 ditions which should render its success, if not 
 certain, at least sufficiently probable. It was 
 requisite, in the first place, that he should gain 
 signal triumphs while advancing into those 
 plains of the north, where Charles XII. had 
 found his ruin; there was lequisite, ia the 
 next place, a unanimous rising of the Poles, 
 to concur in those triumphs, and to satisfy 
 him respecting the solidity ol he new State 
 that was to be founded amidst three hostile 
 i powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. When 
 I see all the Poles afoot, said he to Marshal 
 Davout, then will I proclaim their indepen- 
 dence, but not till then. He ordered a convoy 
 of arms of all kinds to accompany the French 
 troops, for the purpose of arming the insurrec- 
 tion, in case of its becoming general, as he 
 was assured that it would. 
 
 Marshal Davout, preceding the corps d'armee 
 which were to start from the Oder, had set 
 himself in motion in the first days of Novem- 
 ber. He marched with that order and that 
 strict discipline which he was accustomed to 
 maintain among his troops. He had notified 
 to his soldiers that, in entering Poland, they 
 would enter a friendly country, and that it 
 , must be treated as such. \s we have oh- 
 j served, a certain indiscipline had crept into 
 ; the ranks of the light cavalry, which has a 
 greater share in the disorders of the war, and 
 contributes more to them. Two soldiers of 
 that arm having committed some etcesses, 
 Marshal Davout ordered them to be shot, in 
 presence of the third corps. 
 
 He advanced upon Posen in three divisions
 
 224 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806. 
 
 The country between the Oder and the Vistula 
 is very much like that which extends from the 
 Elbe to the Oder. Most generally you have 
 to traverse sandy plains, upon which wood 
 readily thrives, especially the resinous woods, 
 and in particular the fir; and there is found 
 feeneath the bed of sand a marl fit for culture, 
 sometimes drowned by the sand itself, some- 
 times rising to the surface: amidst the fir for- 
 ests you meet with vast clearings tolerably 
 well cultivated, and in these clearings, with a 
 scanty, poor, but robust population, dwelling 
 under wood and thatch. On this soil, the 
 transport of every thing is a matter of un- 
 paralleled difficulty, for moving sands are suc- 
 ceeded by clay, in which, when it is soaked 
 with water, you sink to a great depth, so that, 
 after a few days' rain, it is convened into a 
 vast sea of mud. Men perish in it if assist- 
 ance does not come to extricate them. As for 
 horses, cannon, baggage, they are absorbed, 
 and not the strength of a whole army could 
 save them. Hence war is impracticable in 
 this portion of the plain of the north, unless 
 in summer when the ground is completely 
 dry, or in winter when a cold of several de- 
 grees has given to it the consistence of stone. 
 But every intermediate season is fatal to mili- 
 tary combinations, especially to the most in- 
 genious, which depend, as everybody knows, 
 upon the rapidity of the movements. 
 
 These physical characters do not appear all 
 together till you approach the Vistula, and es- 
 pecially further on, between the Vistula and 
 the Niemen. They begin, indeed, to be ob- 
 served after crossing the Oder. A phenomenon 
 peculiar to these vast plains, which we have al- 
 ready noticed, and which occurs here, is that 
 the sand raised into hills along the sea repels 
 the waters towards the interior of the country, 
 where they form numerous lakes, discharge 
 themselves into petty rivers, then unite into 
 larger, till, gradually increasing in magnitude, 
 they become vast streams, like the Elbe, the 
 Oder, the Vistula ; capable of opening them- 
 selves a passage through the barrier of sand. 
 In Brandenburg and Mecklenburg,that is to say, 
 between the Elbe and the Oder, the country 
 which was the theatre of the pursuit of the 
 Prussians by our army, the reader has already 
 had occasion to remark these peculiarities of 
 nature. They become more striking between 
 the Oder and the Vistula. The sands rise, re- 
 tain the waters, which seek through the Netze 
 and Warta an outlet towards the Oder. The 
 Netze comes from the left, the Warta from the 
 right, for any person proceeding from Berlin 
 to Warsaw, and, after they have both circu- 
 lated between the Vistula and the Oder, they 
 unite in a single bed, and throw themselves to- 
 gether into the Oder near Ciistrin. The coun- 
 try along the sea forms what is called Prus- 
 sian Pomerania. It is German by the inhabit- 
 ants and by spirit. The interior, watered by 
 the Netze and the Warta, is marshy, clayey, 
 and Slavonian by the race of people which in- 
 nabiu it. It is called Posnania, or grand-duchy 
 of Posen, the capital of which is Posen, a town 
 of son; ; importance, situated on the Warta 
 tself. 
 
 This orovince was the one in which the 
 
 Polish spirit burst forth with the greatest ar- 
 dour. The Poles, who became Prussians, 
 seemed to endure the foreign yoke more impa- 
 tiently than the others. In the first place, the 
 German and the Slavonian races, meeting on 
 this frontier of Pomerania and the duchy of Po- 
 sen, had an instinctive aversion for each other, 
 naturally stronger on the border where they ad- 
 joined. Independently of this aversion, the 
 usual consequence of neighbourhood, th& 
 Poles did not forget that the Prussians had 
 been, under the great Frederick, the first au- 
 thors of the partition of Poland, that they have 
 since acted with black perfidy, and completed 
 the ruin of their country, after favouring its in- 
 surrection. Lastly, the sight of Warsaw in the 
 hands of the Prussians rendered them the most 
 odious of the partitioning powers. These 
 feelings of hatred were carried to such a length, 
 that the Poles would almost have considered 
 it as a deliverance to escape from the King 
 of Prussia, and to belong to an Emperor of 
 Russia, who, uniting all the Polish provinces 
 under the same sceptre, should have proclaimed 
 himself King of Poland. There was, there- 
 fore, a stronger disposition to insurrection in 
 the duchy of Posen than in any other part of 
 Poland. 
 
 Such was, in physical and moral respects, 
 the country through which the French were 
 inarching at this moment. Transported into 
 a climate so different from their native climate, 
 so different in particular from the climates 
 of Egypt and Italy, where they had lived 
 so long, they were, as ever, merry, confident, 
 and found, in the very novelty of the country 
 which they were traversing, a subject of hu- 
 morous pleasantry rather than of bitter com- 
 plaints. Besides, the favourable reception of 
 the inhabitants compensated their hardships ; 
 for, on the roads and in the villages, the pea- 
 sants ran to meet them, offering them victuals 
 and the liquors of their country. 
 
 But it is not in the country, it is among con- 
 glomerate populations, that is to say, in the bo- 
 som of cities, that the patriotic enthusiasm of 
 nations bursts forth with the greatest energy. 
 At Posen, the moral dispositions of the Poles 
 manifested themselves more strongly than else- 
 where. That city, which usually contained 
 15,000 souls, soon contained double the num- 
 ber, from the affluence of the inhabitants of 
 the neighbouring provinces thronging to meet 
 their deliverers. It was on the 9th, 10th, and 
 llth of November that the three divisions of 
 Davout's corps entered Posen. They were re- 
 ceived there with such transports of enthusi- 
 asm, that the grave marshal was touched by 
 them, and that he himself indulged the idea 
 of the re-establishment of Poland, an idea very 
 popular in the mass of the French army, but 
 not at all among its chiefs. Accordingly, he 
 wrote to the Emperor letters strongly impreg- 
 nated with the sentiment which had just broken 
 forth around- him. 
 
 He told the Poles that in order to reconsti- 
 tute their country, Napoleon must have the 
 certainty of an immense effort on their part in 
 the first place to gain great successes, without 
 which he could not impose upon Europe the 
 re-establishment of Poland, and, in the next
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 225 
 
 place, to inspire him with some confidence in 
 the duration of the work which he was about 
 to undertake a very difficult work, since its 
 object was to restore a state destroyed forty 
 years ago, and which had been degenerating 
 for more than a century. The Poles of Posen, 
 more enthusiastic than those of Warsaw, pro- 
 mised, with the utmost cheerfulness, all that 
 seemed to be desired of them. Nobles, priests, 
 people, ardently wished to be delivered from 
 the German yoke, antipathic to their religion, 
 to their manners, to their race ; and at this 
 price there was nothing which they were not 
 ready to do. Marshal Davout had as yet but 
 3000 muskets to give them ; they distributed 
 them among themselves immediately, begging 
 to have thousands of them, and affirming that, 
 whatever the number, they would find arms to 
 carry them. The people formed battalions of 
 infantry, the nobles and their vassals squad- 
 rons of cavalry. In all the villages situated 
 between the Upper Warta and the Upper Oder, 
 on the approach of the troops of Prince Je- 
 rome, the population expelled the Prussian 
 troops, and only spared their lives because the 
 French troops everywhere prevented violence 
 and excesses. From Glogau to Kalisch, Prince 
 Jerome's route, the insurrection was general. 
 
 At Posen there was established a provisional 
 authority, with which were concerted the mea- 
 sures necessary for subsisting the French 
 army on its passage. There could not be a ques- 
 tion about imposing war contributions on Po- 
 land. It was understood that she should be 
 held exempt from the charges laid upon con- 
 quered countries, on condition, however, that 
 her strength should be joined to ours, and that 
 she should give up to us some of the corn with 
 which she was so abundantly provided. The 
 new Polish authority concerted with Marshal 
 Davout for the erection of ovens, the collec- 
 tion of corn, forage and cattle. The zeal of the 
 country and some funds seized in the Prussian 
 chests were sufficient for these first prepara- 
 tions. Thus every thing was arranged for re- 
 ceiving the bulk of the French army, and par- 
 ticularly its commander, who was awaited with 
 keen curiosity and ardent hopes. 
 
 Nearly about the same time Marshal Auge- 
 reau had reached the boundary which sepa- 
 rates Posnania and Pomerania, leaving the 
 Warta to the right, and bearing to the left, 
 along the Netze. He had passed by Lands- 
 berg, Driesen, Schneidmuhl, through a dreary, 
 poor, moderately populated country, which 
 could not give very expressive signs of life. 
 Marshal Augereau met with nothing that could 
 warm and exalt his imagination; he had great 
 difficulty to march, and would have had still 
 greater difficulty to subsist, but for a convoy 
 of caissons laden with the bread for his troops. 
 In the environs of Nackel, the streams cease 
 to flow towards the Oder, and begin to run to- 
 wards the Vistula. A canal joining the Netze 
 with the Vistula commences at Nackel, and 
 terminates at the town of Bromberg, which is 
 the entrepot of the commerce of the country. 
 Augereau's corps found there some relief from 
 its fatigues. 
 
 Marshal Lannes had advanced by Stettin, 
 VOL. II. 29 
 
 Stargard, Deutsch-K rone, Schneidmuhl, Nackel 
 and Bromberg, flanking the march of Auge- 
 reau's corps, as the latter flanked the march 
 of Davout's corps. He, too, skirted the bound- 
 ary of the German and Polish country, and 
 traversed a tract more difficult, more dreary 
 still, than that which Marshal Augereau had 
 passed through. He found the Germans hos- 
 tile, the Poles timid, and, swayed by the im- 
 pressions which he received from the wild and 
 desert country, from the information which he 
 collected respecting the Poles, in a country 
 which was not favourable to them, he was led 
 to consider the re-establishment of Poland as 
 a rash and even foolish undertaking. We have 
 already made mention of this extraordinary 
 man, of his qualities, of his defects; we shall 
 have frequent occasion to mention him here- 
 after, in the history of a period during which 
 he was so lavish of his noble life. Lannes, 
 impetuous in his sentiments, consequently 
 unequal in character, inclined to ill-temper, 
 even towards his master to whom he was at- 
 tached, was one of those whom the sun, hid- 
 ing or showing his face, by turns depressed 
 and cheered. But, never losing his heroic 
 temper, he recovered in dangers that calm 
 force of which sufferings and crosses had 
 robbed him for a moment. We should not do 
 justice to this superior warrior, were we not 
 to add here that in him a great fund of good 
 sense was so joined to unevenness of temper 
 as to influence him to censure a spirit of im- 
 moderate enterprise in Napoleon, and to draw 
 ' from him sinister predictions amidst our most 
 glorious triumphs. After the success of the 
 war with Prussia, he was for stopping short 
 | at the Oder, and imposed not the least restraint 
 upon himself in the expression of this opinion. 
 On reaching Bromberg, after a toilsome march, 
 he wrote to Napoleon, that he had been tra- 
 j versing a sandy, barren country, without in- 
 i habitants Comparable, with the exception of 
 climate, to i^e desert which must be traversed 
 in going from Egypt to Syria; that the soldiers 
 were dull, and attacked by fever, owing to the 
 wetness of the soil and season ; that the Poles 
 j were not at all disposed to rise, but trembled 
 under the yoke of their masters; that a judg- 
 ment of their dispositions must not be formed 
 from the counterfeit enthusiasm of a few no- 
 bles attracted to Posen by a fondness for noise 
 and novelty; that, at bottom, they were always 
 fickle, divided, given up to anarchy; and that, 
 by attempting to reconstitute them into one na- 
 tion, we should uselessly expend the blood of 
 France for a work without solidity and without 
 permanence. 
 
 Napoleon, having remained in Berlin till 
 the last days of November, received without 
 surprise the contradictory reports of his lieu- 
 tenants, and waited till the movement produced 
 by the presence of the French should have 
 spread to all the Polish provinces, in order to 
 form an opinion in regard to the re-eslabash- 
 ment of Poland, and to res< Ive whether to pass 
 through that country as a field of battle, or to 
 erect a grand political edifice upon its soil. 
 He made Murat set out, after having again 
 specified to him the conditions which h* 1 in-
 
 226 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 180. 
 
 tended to attach to the restoration of Poland, ' 
 and the instructions which he wished to be 
 followed in marching for Warsaw. 
 
 The Russians had arrived on the Vistula, 
 and taken possession of Warsaw. The last 
 Prussian corps that King Frederick William 
 had left, placed under the command of General 
 Leslocq, an officer equally discreet and brave, | 
 was established at Thorn, having garrisons at i 
 Graudenz and Dantzig. 
 
 Napoleon desired that, on approaching War- 
 saw, the different corps of the French army 
 should keep close to each other, in order that, 
 with a mass of 80,000 men, a force far supe- 
 rior to what the Russians could bring together 
 on one point, his lieutenants should be screened 
 from any check. He recommended to them 
 neither to seek nor to accept battle, unles's they 
 were very superior in number to the enemy, to 
 advance with great caution, and all of them 
 appuying to the right, to cover themselves 
 from the Austrian frontier. At this period, the 
 Piiica on the left side of the Vistula, the Na- 
 rew on the right, both falling into the Vistula 
 near Warsaw, formed the Austrian frontier. 
 By appuying therefore to the right, on leaving 
 Posen, they would beNdrawing nearer to' the '. 
 Piiica and Narew; they would be covered on , 
 all sides by the neutrality of Austria. If the 
 Russians designed to take the offensive, they 
 could not do so without passing the Vistula on 
 our left, in the environs of Thorn, and then, 
 by dropping down on the left, the French would 
 obtain one of these three results they should 
 eirher fling them into the Vistula, or drive them 
 back to the sea, or thrust them upon the bayo- 
 nets of the second French army marching to 
 Posen. For the rest, it should be added that, 
 if Napoleon, contrary to his custom, did not 
 on this occasion oppose a single mass to the 
 enemy, which would have cut short all diffi- 
 culties, it was because he knew that the Rus- 
 sians were not 50,000 all together, and because 
 the extreme fatigue of part of his troops, hav- 
 ing run as far as Prenzlau and Liibeck, obliged 
 him to form two armies, one composed of those 
 who could march immediately, the other of 
 those who had need of a few days' rest before 
 they started again. Thus it is that circum- 
 stances occasion variations in the appl.cation 
 of the most invariable principles. It is for 
 the tact of the great general to modify this 
 application safely and fitly. 
 
 Napoleon therefore enjoined Marshal Da- 
 vout to bear to the right, as the route from 
 Posen to Warsaw required, to pass through 
 Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno, Sochaczew, and 
 Blonie, and to send his dragoons direct to the 
 Vistula at Kowal, to give a hand to Marshals 
 Lannes and Augereau. Lannes, after indem- 
 nifying himself amidst the abundance of Brom- 
 berg for the privations of a long route through 
 the sands, had taken the precedence of Auge- 
 reau. He had orders to ascend the Vistula, 
 and by his right to proceed from Bromberg to 
 luowraclaw, Blezesc, Kowal, filing away un- 
 der the cannon of Thorn, and connecting him- 
 self with the corps of Marshal Davout, the left 
 of which he was to form. Marshal Augereau 
 soon followed him, and pursuing the same 
 route, came to form the lel't of Lannes. 
 
 On the 16th of November, and the follow* 
 ing days, Marshal Davout, pieceded by Mural, 
 marched from Posen, where he left every thing 
 in the best order, for Sempolno, Klodawa, 
 and Kutno. Lannes, after leaving Bromberg, 
 and filing away in sight of Thorn, while cov- 
 ering himself with the Vistula, found that he 
 was again surrounded by the sands, which 
 are met with almost universally in this part 
 of the course of the Vistula, encountered for 
 a second time sterility, dearth, the desert, and 
 was not on that account the more favourably 
 disposed to the war which was about to be 
 undertaken. He proceeded by Kowal and 
 Kutno to appuy himself on the corps of Mar- 
 shal Davout. Augereau followed at his heels, 
 participating in his impressions, as it fre- 
 quently happened, for he had more than one 
 resemblance in character to Lannes, though 
 far inferior in talents and energy. 
 
 Murat and Davout, not at all tempted to 
 give battle without the Emperor, having or- 
 ders moreover to avoid it, advanced with great 
 caution to the environs of Warsaw. On the 
 27th of November, their light cavalry drove a 
 detachment of the enemy's out of Blonie, and 
 advanced to the very gates of the capital. 
 The Russians had been everywhere found re- 
 treating, or occupied in destroying provisions, 
 or in removing them from the left bank to the 
 right bank of the Vistula. In retreating, they 
 merely passed through Warsaw, which no 
 longer seemed to them a place of safety, in 
 proportion as the approach of the French 
 thrilled all hearts there. They therefore re- 
 crossed the Vistula, to shut themselves up in 
 a suburb of Praga, situated, as it is well 
 known, on the other bank of the river. On 
 repassing it, they destroyed the bridge of Pra- 
 ga, and sunk or took away with them all the 
 craft that could serve for means of crossing. 
 
 Next day Murat, at the head of a regiment 
 of chasseurs and dragoons of Beaumont's di- 
 vision, entered Warsaw. After leaving Po- 
 sen, the people of the small towns and in the 
 country had shown less cordiality than the in- 
 habitants of that city, because they were re- 
 strained by the presence of the Russians. 
 But, in a great population, the expression of 
 its sentiments is proportionate to the feeling 
 of its strength. All the inhabitants of War- 
 saw had hastened beyond the walls of the city 
 to meet the French. The Poles had, from a 
 secret instinct, long regarded the victories of 
 France as the victories of Poland itself. They 
 had been thrilled by the news of the battle of 
 Austerlitz, fought so near the frontiers of Gal- 
 licia, and that of Jena, which seemed gained 
 on the very road to Warsaw. The entry of 
 the French into Berlin, and the appearance of 
 Davout on the Oder, had filled them with hope. 
 They beheld at last those French so renowned, 
 so eagerly expected, and at their head that 
 brilliant general of cavalry, a prince to-day, 
 to-morrow a king, who conducted their ad- 
 vanced guard with equal hardihood and glory. 
 They extolled with transport his noble look, his 
 heroic appearance on horseback, and greeted 
 him with a thousand times repeated shouts of 
 " Vive U Empereur! vive*U les Franqxis" A 
 general delirium seized all classes of the popu
 
 Nov. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 227 
 
 lation. This time, the resurrection of Poland 
 might be considered as rather less chimerical 
 on witnessing the appearance of the grand ar- 
 my, which, under the great captain, had van- 
 quished all the armies of Europe. Joy, ve- 
 hement, profound, without reserve, pervaded 
 that unfortunate people, so long the victim of 
 the ambition of the courts of the north, of the 
 effeminacy of the courts of the south, feast- 
 ing itself with the idea that the hour had at last 
 arrived when the Emperor of the French would 
 make amends for the weaknesses of the kings 
 of France. The Austrians had everywhere de- 
 stroyed the provisions, but the cordiality of the 
 Poles supplied the deficiency. People quar- 
 relled which should have French soldiers to 
 lodge and to board. 
 
 Two days afterwards, Marshal Davout's in- 
 fantry, which had not been able to keep pace 
 with the cavalry, entered Warsaw. There 
 was the same intoxication, there were the 
 same demonstrations, at sight of these veteran 
 warriors of AuersUldt, Austerlitz, and Ma- 
 rengo. All looked bright at this first moment, 
 when the prospect of difficulties was veiled, 
 as it were, by joy and hope. 
 
 Napoleon sincerely designed, as we have 
 already said, to restore Poland. It was, ac- 
 cording to his ideas, one of the most useful 
 and most approved ways of renewing that 
 Europe, the face of which he purposed to 
 change. When, in fact, he created new king- 
 doms, to form supports for his young empire, 
 nothing was more natural than to raise again 
 the most brilliant and the most to be regretted 
 of the destroyed kingdoms. But, besides the 
 difficulty of wringing great sacrifices of terri- 
 tory from Russia and Prussia sacrifices which 
 it was not possible to wring from them with- 
 out fighting to the last extremity, there was 
 another difficulty, that of taking the Gallicias 
 from Austria ; and if those provinces were to 
 be left out, if he were to content himself with 
 recompensing new Poland with two-thirds of 
 the old, he should run the very serious risk 
 of exciting in the cabinet of Vienna a re- 
 doubled distrust, hatred, ill-will, and perhaps 
 of bringing an Austrian army upon the rear 
 of the French army. Napoleon therefore 
 would not make any but conditional engage- 
 ments with the Poles, and he decided not to 
 proclaim their independence till they should 
 have deserved it by a unanimous outburst, by 
 a warm zeal to second him, by the energetic 
 resolution to defend the new country which 
 he had recovered for them. Unfortunately, 
 the high Polish nobility, not so easily wrought 
 upon as the people, discouraged by the differ- 
 ent insurrections which had been attempted, 
 fearful of being deserted after they had com- 
 mitted themselves, hesitated to throw them- 
 selves into the arms of Napoleon, and found, 
 in their actual situation, something better to 
 do than to rise in insurrection to receive from 
 the French an existence, independent but des- 
 titute of support, exposed to all dangers, be- 
 tween Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This 
 high nobility, fallen, like Warsaw itself, under 
 the yoke of Prussia, entertained for that court 
 the same aversion which was felt by all the 
 Poles who had become Prussians. Most of 
 
 the members of the Warsaw nobility would 
 have considered it as a happy change of for- 
 tune to become subjects of Alexander, upon 
 condition of being remoulded into one nation, 
 and acting under the Emperor of Russia the 
 same part as the Hungarians act under the 
 Emperor of Austria. To be united into one 
 and the same nation, and transferred from a 
 German master to a Slavonian master, seemed 
 to them an almost desirable lot, the only one, 
 at least, to which they ought to aspire in the 
 present circumstances. It was, in the estima- 
 tion of many of them, secretly influenced by 
 Russian intrigue, the only reconstitution of 
 Poland that was practicable; for Russia, they 
 said, was near at hand, and capable of sup- 
 porting her work when once undertaken ; 
 whereas the existence which they should re- 
 ceive from France would be precarious, ephe- 
 meral, and vanish as soon as the French 
 army had withdrawn. It is true that there 
 were some reasons of prudence to be alle'ged 
 in favour of that idea of a demi-reconstitution 
 of Poland, the offspring of a demi-patriotism: 
 but those who formed this wish forgot that, if 
 the existence which Poland could receive from 
 France was liable to perish when the French 
 had recrossed the Rhine, that which the Rus- 
 sians should give it was exposed to another 
 certain and speedy danger to the danger of 
 being absorbed in the rest of the empire, of 
 being subjected, in short, to a complete assimi- 
 lation a result to which Russia must inces- 
 santly tend, and which she would not fail to 
 realize on the first occasion, as events have 
 since proved. It was therefore necessary 
 either that the Poles should renounce their 
 nationality, or that they should devote them- 
 selves to Napoleon, at any cost, at any risk, 
 with all the uncertainties attached to such an 
 enterprise, on the day that this mighty reformer 
 of Europe should appear at Warsaw. Cer- 
 tain motives, less exalted, operated upon that 
 portion of the nobility which gave a cold re- 
 ception to the deliverance of Poland by the 
 hand of the French ; this was the jealousy 
 excited by the Polish generals trained in our 
 armies, returning with reputation, pretensions, 
 an exaggerated sense of their own merit. 
 These various motives, however, did not pre- 
 vent the generality of the nobles from feeling 
 a lively joy at sight of the French, but they 
 rendered them more prudent, and induced 
 them to make conditions with a man, to whom 
 patriotism would then have advised them not 
 to propose any. But the masses, more unani- 
 mous, less restrained by reflection, at that mo- 
 ment better for there is a moment, a single 
 moment, when reason is of less worth than 
 the impulsion of the passions; it is when 
 that devotedness, even if blind, -is the neces- 
 sary condition of the salvation of a people 
 the masses, we say, insisted on throwing 
 themselves into the arms of the French, and 
 thrust all into them without distinction, peo- 
 ple, nobles, and priests. 
 
 Divided between these contrary sentiments, 
 the grandees of Warsaw thronged around Mu- 
 rat, and came to submit to him their wishes, 
 not in the form of demands but of advice, 
 and with the aim, as they said, of producing
 
 228 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 18C6. 
 
 a universal rising of the Polish people. These 
 wishes consisted in soliciting that Napoleon 
 would immediately proclaim the independence 
 of Poland, not confine himself to this act, but 
 select a king from his own family, and so- 
 lemnly place him on the throne of the Sobies- 
 kis. This double guarantee given them, they 
 added, the Poles, no longer doubting the in- 
 tentions of Napoleon and his firm resolution 
 to uphold his work, would give themselves up 
 to him, body and possessions. The king to 
 be chosen out of the imperial family was 
 already designated it was that valiant gene- 
 ral of cavalry, so well fitted to be the king of 
 a nation of horsemen it was Murat himself, 
 who actually cherished in his heart the ardent 
 desire of a crown, and particularly of that 
 which was offered to him at this moment, for 
 it corresponded alike with his heroic propensi- 
 ties and with his frivolous and ostentatious 
 taste. He had already accommodated his cos- 
 tume to this new character, and brought from 
 Paris gorgeous habiliments, calculated to give 
 his French uniform some resemblance to the 
 Polish uniform. 
 
 Murat, ever since his marriage to a sister 
 of Napoleon's, was consumed by the passion 
 for reigning. This passion, which ultimately 
 proved fatal to his glory and his life, had been 
 strengthened by the incitements of his wife, 
 still more ambitious than himself, and capable, 
 in order to accomplish her wishes, of drawing 
 her husband into the most culpable actions. 
 At the sight of this vacant throne of Poland, 
 Murat could no longer curb his impatience. 
 He had therefore no difficulty to adopt the 
 ideas of the Polish nobility, and undertook to 
 communicate them to Napoleon. The com- 
 mission, however, was a difficult one to exe- 
 cute ; for Napoleon, though fully sensible of 
 the brilliant and generous qualities of his 
 brother-in-law, had nevertheless an extreme 
 distrust of the levity of his character, and 
 frequently proved himself a harsh and severe 
 master to him. 
 
 Murat guessed full well what reception Na- 
 poleon would give to ideas which ran counter 
 to his politics, and which would moreover 
 have the appearance of an interested proposal. 
 He took good care, therefore, not to name the 
 king fixed upon by the Poles : he went no fur- 
 ther than to state their ideas in a general man- 
 ner, and to express their desire that the inde- 
 pendence of Poland should be immediately 
 proclaimed and guarantied by a French king 
 oi' the Bonaparte family. 
 
 Napoleon had himself left Berlin during the 
 march of his corps d'armee to Warsaw, and ar- 
 rived on the 25th of November at Posen. 
 There it was that he received Murat's letter. 
 He needed not to be told what he wished to 
 know. Even under the most artful dissimu- 
 lation, he detected the secrets of rninds, and 
 Murat's dissimulation was not of such a na- 
 ture as to be very difficult to penetrate. He 
 soon discovered the ambition which swayed 
 that heart, at once so valiant and so weak. 
 It excited equal dissatisfaction with him and 
 with the Poles. He viewed the proposals 
 made to him as calculations, reserves, condi- 
 tions, a demi-euthusiasm, and those of them 
 
 that related to himself as dangerous engajrp- 
 ments without the equivalent of a powerful 
 co-operation. By a singular concurrence of 
 circumstances, he received on the same d:iy 
 despatches from Paris relative to the cele- 
 brated Kosciusko, whom he had purposed to 
 draw from France, and to put at the head of 
 new Poland. This Polish patriot, whom mis- 
 taken notices prevented at this period from 
 doing useful service to his country, lived in 
 Paris amidst the small number of discontented 
 men who had not yet forgiven Napoleon the 
 18th Brumaire, the Concordat, the re-establish- 
 ment of the monarchy. A few senators, a few 
 members of the old Tribunate, composed this 
 honest and vain society. Kosciusko was 
 wrong to oppose unseasonable contradictions 
 to the only man who then had it in his power 
 to save his country, and who seriously intend- 
 ed to save it. Besides the preliminary en- 
 gagements proposed by the nobles of Warsaw, 
 and impossible to be taken in the face of Aus- 
 tria, Kosciusko required other political condi- 
 tions, absolutely puerile, at a moment when 
 the only question was about raising Poland 
 again, before discussing what constitution 
 should be given her. Finding himself thwart- 
 ed at once by the Poles who had become ideo- 
 logues in Paris, and the Poles who had become 
 Russians in Petersburg, he conceived a dis- 
 trust and coldness for the matter. 
 
 As for what related to Kosciusko, he replied 
 to Fouche, the minister whom he had com- 
 missioned to make proposals to him : "Kosci- 
 usko is a fool, who has not in his own country 
 all the importance that he fancies he has, and 
 whom I shall well do without for re-establish- 
 ing Poland, if the fortune of arms seconds 
 me." He addressed a dry and severe letter 
 to Murat. Tell the Poles," he wrote, " that 
 it is not with these calculations, with these 
 personal precautions, that men emancipate 
 their country which has fallen under a foreign 
 yoke; that it is, on the contrary, by rising all 
 at once, blindly, without reserve, and with the 
 resolution to sacrifice fortune and life, that 
 one may have not the certainty but the mere 
 hope to deliver it. I am not come hither," he 
 added, " to beg a throne for my family, for I am 
 not in want of thrones to give away ; I am come 
 in behalf of the European equilibrium, to at-' 
 tempt the most difficult of enterprises, by 
 which the Poles have more to gain than any- 
 body else, since it is their national existence 
 that is at stake, as well as the interests of 
 Europe. If, by dint of devotedness, they se- 
 cond me so far as that I succeed, I will grant 
 them independence. If not, I will do nothing, 
 and I will leave them under their Prussian 
 and Russian masters. I do not find here in 
 Posen, in the provincial nobility, all the jea- 
 lous notions of the nobility of the capital. I 
 find in them frankness, zeal, patriotism, what 
 is requisite, jn short, for saving Poland, and 
 what I seek in vain among the great person- 
 ages of Warsaw." 
 
 Napoleon, dissatisfied, but not renouncing 
 on that account the plan of changing the face 
 of the north of Europe by the re-establishment 
 of Poland, resolved not to go to Warsaw, but 
 to remain at Posen, where he was the object
 
 Nov. 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 229 
 
 of an extraordinary enthusiasm. He contented 
 himself with sending to Warsaw M. Wibiski, 
 a Pole, whose understanding he highly appre- 
 ciated, a gentleman more versed in the science 
 of law and politics than in that of war, but hav- 
 ing a thorough knowledge of his country, and 
 animated with the sincerest patriotism. Na- 
 poleon explained to him the difficulties of his 
 situation, in presence of the three old copart- 
 ners in the partition of Poland, two of whom 
 were in arms against him, and the third ready 
 to declare himself, the necessity he was under 
 of using great delicacy, an<? of finding in a 
 spontaneous and unanimous movement of the 
 Poles at once a pretext for proc.aiming their 
 independence, and a support sufficient to up- 
 hold it. His language, perfectly sensible and 
 sincere, persuaded M. Wibiski, who repaired 
 lo Warsaw for the purpose of endeavouring 
 to impart his convictions to those of his coun- 
 trymen most distinguished by their position 
 and their talents. 
 
 This singular contest between the Poles, 
 who expected Napoleon to begin with pro- 
 claiming their independence, and Napoleon 
 insisting that they ought to set out by deserv- 
 ing it, should not be a motive of censure either 
 for them or him, but a proof of the very diffi- 
 culty of the enterprise. The Poles thereby 
 acknowledged that they deemed an existence 
 placed at so great a distance from the pro- 
 tector who had restored it to them extremely 
 precarious, and required of him, for their 
 satisfaction, not only a solemn engagement, 
 but also the ties of blood. 
 
 Napoleon, on his part, acknowledged that, 
 though powerful enough to pretend to change 
 the face of Europe, bold enough to dare to 
 carry the war to the Vistula, still he hesitated 
 to proclaim the independence of Poland, hav- 
 ing two of the three copartitioners in front and 
 the third on his rear. If, however, it is abso- 
 lutely necessary to find here matter for cen- 
 sure against some one, it must be against the 
 Poles, at least against those who calculated in 
 that manner. Napoleon, in fact, owed nothing 
 to the Poles, except on account of what they | 
 should do for Europe, whose representative ; 
 he was, while they owed every thing to their 
 country, even an imprudent confidence, were 
 that confidence to entail an aggravation of 
 their evils. When Napoleon was prudent he 
 did his duty ; when the Poles pretended to be 
 so, they failed in theirs; for, in the situation 
 in which they were, their duty was not to be 
 prudent, but devoted even though they per- 
 ished.' 
 
 Napoleon, established at Posen among the 
 nobility of the grand-duchy, all of whom 
 flocked around him, employed himself in cre- 
 ating there one of those military establish- 
 ments with which he was accustomed to mark 
 his route, in proportion as the war was car- 
 ried to a greater distance. He bought up corn, 
 forage, in particular, cloth, for there was at 
 
 Posen a considerable cloth manufactory ; he 
 organized the preserving of provisions, hos- 
 pitals, all that was requisite, in short, for form- 
 ing a vast depot in the heart of Poland. This 
 place, it is true, was not fortified, like Witten- 
 berg and Spandau; it was as open as Berlin, 
 but it had for its defence the affection of the 
 inhabitants, heartily devoted to the cause of 
 the French. 
 
 Napoleon then directed the movements of 
 the artillery, conformably to his plan of inva- 
 sion. Marshal Ney had arrived at Posen. 
 Marshal Soult and Bernadotte were proceeding 
 thither by short marches, after taking in Ber- 
 lin all the rest that their troops had need of. 
 The guard and the grenadiers, repairing to 
 Posen, surrounded the Emperor there. Prince 
 Jerome had sent off the Bavarians for Kalisch, 
 and with the Wirtembergers commenced with 
 Glogau the investment of the fortresses of Si- 
 lesia. 
 
 Napoleon sent Marshal Ney from Posen to 
 Thorn, to endeavour to gain possession of this 
 latter place, and to secure by surprise the pas- 
 sage of the Vistula. He directed Marshal 
 Lannes, who had already executed that same 
 movement, to enter Warsaw, to take the place 
 of Marshal Davout, as soon as the latter should 
 have re-established the bridges of the Vistula, 
 which connect the city of Warsaw with the 
 suburb of Praga. In ordering Marshals Ney 
 and Davout to cross the Vistula as soon as 
 possible at the two points. Thorn and Warsaw, 
 he recommended to them to secure the pas- 
 sage in a permanent manner by constructing 
 strong tetes du von'. He deferred his ulterior 
 movements till the moment when these two 
 bases of operation should be solidly established; 
 and meanwhile he occupied himself in bring- 
 ing forward, without haste and without fatigue, 
 the two corps of Marshals Soult and Berna- 
 dotte, that they might enter into line at the 
 head of all his collected forces. 
 
 During this interval, Marshal Davout, with 
 his corps d'armee, Murat, with the cavalry re- 
 serve, had installed themselves in Warsaw, 
 and were endeavouring to execute the Empe- 
 ror's orders there. The Russians had employed 
 the time of their stay in that city in carrying 
 off or destroying the provisions, in sinking all 
 the craft, in short, in leaving no means of sub- 
 sistence and no means of passage. Thanks to 
 the zeal of the Poles, they were supplied with 
 great part of what was wanting. Authorized 
 by Napoleon, who never spared the money with 
 which he was provided, bargains were made 
 with Jew dealers, who proved themselves very 
 expert and very clever at extracting from these 
 extensive countries the corn in which they 
 abounded. An Austrian cordon stationed 
 along Gallicia prevented the exportation of 
 alimentary commodities. But the Jews were 
 commissioned to remove the difficulty by hand- 
 some bribes to the officers of the customs, and 
 by means of the money that was paid them, 
 
 Marshal Davout, a warm partisan of the re-esla- I which is general in the middle classes. The uncertainly 
 blishmen. of Poland, wrote under date of the 4th of of the future alarms them, and they give us pluinly to 
 December : " The levies of men are very easily raised, understand that they will not declare themselves openly 
 but they are in want of persons capable of directing till, by declaring their independence, we shall huv 
 their organization and training. Muskets, also, are entered into a tacit engagement to guaranty it. 
 wanting. The public spirit is excellent at Warsaw; j " Warsaw, 1st December, 1806." 
 but the great exert their influence to cool the ardour I
 
 230 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1806. 
 
 and by means of all the salt found in the Prus- 
 sian magazines that was given up to them, 
 they were induced to promise to send down the 
 Pilica into the Vistula, by the Vistula into 
 Warsaw, the wheat and the oats, and to bring, 
 besides, a considerable quantity of meat 
 
 The next thing thought of was the passage 
 of the great river, which cut the capital in two. 
 The weather, alternately rainy and frosty, con- 
 tinued unsettled, which was the worst of at- 
 mospheric conditions in such a country, for 
 the Vistula, without being frozen over, floating 
 down enormous flakes of ice, admitted neither 
 of a bridge being thrown over, nor of crossing 
 upon the ice. Detachments of light cavalry 
 had been sent along the banks of the river, to 
 sei7 the barks which the enemy had not had 
 time to sink, and in this manner a certain num- 
 ber had been collected at Warsaw. Not yet 
 able to throw a bridge, on account of the ice 
 which the current carried down with violence, 
 the French tried to put some detachments over 
 in boats. It required the boldness which the 
 habit of success had imparted to our soldiers 
 and to our generals to venture upon such ope- 
 rations ; for these detachments, being conveyed 
 over one after another, might have been car- 
 ried off before they were sufficiently nume- 
 rous to 'iefend themselves. But the Russian 
 general who commanded the advanced guard, 
 seeing this commencement to pass, took the 
 alarm, abandoned the suburb of Praga, and 
 retire^ upon the Narew, a military line, the 
 direction of which we shall presently describe, 
 and which is a few leagues from Warsaw. 
 The French lost no time in taking advantage 
 of this circumstance; a whole division of Da- 
 voui's corps was carried across the Vistula, 
 took possession of Praga and advanced to Ja- 
 blona. The Vistula appearing somewhat less 
 encumbered with ice, the bridges of boats were 
 rf-established, thanks to the seamen of the 
 g'lard and to the zeal of the Polish boatmen, j 
 li a few days, the construction of bridges of | 
 Duals being finished, Marshal Davout was en- j 
 abled to pass with his whole corps to the right 
 bank, to establish himself at Praga, and even 
 oe/ond, in a strong position on the Narew. 
 The corps of Lannes came to make itself 
 amends in Warsaw for the privations which 
 it had suffered in ascending the Vistula. Mar- 
 ' shal Augereau replaced him, and took his po- 
 sition below Warsaw, at Utrata, opposite to | 
 Modlin, that is to say, opposite to the conflux j 
 of the Narew and the Vistula. His corps suf- ' 
 fered much there, and had nothing but the 
 bread which Lannes and Murat sent from War- 
 saw, with the zeal of good comrades. 
 
 While the passage of the Vistula was taking 
 place at Warsaw, Marshal Ney had marched 
 for Thorn, through Griesen and Inowraclaw. 
 The Prussian corps of Lestocq, which was ! 
 still 15,000 strong, after furnishing garrisons j 
 for Graudenz and Dantzig, occupied Thorn by I 
 a detachment. Marshal Ney approached that 
 :own, which, by a situation quite contrary to 
 that of Warsaw, is on the right bank of the 
 Vistula, and has only a mere suburb on the 
 /eft bank. A vast bridge, resting upon wooden 
 arches, and supported upon an island, united 
 the two banks; but the enemy had almost de- 
 
 stroyed it. Marshal Ney, having advanced 
 with merely the head of a column, made a re- 
 connoissance of the banks of the Vistula, in 
 company with Colonel Savary, commandant 
 of the 14th of the line. Thorn stands upon 
 the boundary separating the Slavonian country 
 from the German country. The two popula- 
 tions, ever inimical to each other, and never 
 more so than then, were ready to come to 
 blows before the arrival of the French. Some 
 Polish boatmen assisted the troops of Marshal 
 Ney, and brought him a sufficient number of 
 boats to carry over a few hundred men. Co- 
 lonel Savary, with a detachment of his regi- 
 ment, and some companies of the 69th of the 
 line and of the 6th light, embarked in these 
 boats, and ventured across the wide bed of the 
 Vistula, navigating through the midst of enor- 
 mous ice-flakes. When he approached, a fire 
 of musketry commenced, and was the more 
 annoying, because the ice-flakes, more com- 
 pact on the banks than in the middle of the 
 river, scarcely allowed the boats to land. The 
 German boatmen prepared to join their efforts 
 to this local obstacle, for the purpose of pre- 
 venting the landing of the French. At this 
 sight, the Polish boatmen, bolder and more 
 numerous than the German, fell upon the lat- 
 ter, drove them away, and, wading into the 
 water up to their waists, dragged the boats to 
 the shore under the fire of the Prussians. The 
 400 French, leaping ashore, immediately darted 
 upon the enemy. Presently, boats, sent from 
 the other side of the Vistula, brought fresh de- 
 tachments, and Ney's troops were sufficiently 
 numerous in Thorn to make themselves mas- 
 ters of the place. 
 
 After this daring act, so happily accom- 
 plished, Marshal Ney set about making an 
 establishment in Thorn for himself and for 
 the corps which were coming to join him. 
 The first thing he did was to repair the bridge, 
 which was no difficult matter, as the destruc- 
 tion had been very incomplete. He discovered 
 boats in great numbers, because the traffic on 
 the Lower Vistula is more active ; indeed, it is 
 so extensive, as to send craft to Warsaw, and 
 to the intermediate points, particularly tc 
 Utrata, where they were very necessary to 
 Marshal Augereau, for the conveyance of his 
 provisions. He then turned his attention to 
 the conversion of Thorn to the purposes to 
 which Posen and Warsaw had already been 
 applied that is to say, to the creation of hos- 
 pitals, of manufactories for preserving provi- 
 sions, of establishments of all kinds. 13rom- 
 berg, which is situated on the Nackel canal, at 
 a little distance from Thorn, might there pour 
 in part of its vast resources, and which could 
 be done without delay, by means of the navi- 
 gation. Ney then ranged the seven regiments 
 of his corps d'arwie'e around Thorn, disposing 
 them like radii about a centre, and placing his 
 light cavalry at the circumference, to secure 
 himself from the Cossacks very nimble run- 
 ners, and very annoying, too. 
 
 When Napoleon learned that, through th 
 zeal and boldness of his lieutenants, he was 
 master of the course of the Vistula at the two 
 principal points, Thorn and Warsaw, he im- 
 mediately suspended his plan of operations till
 
 Dec. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 231 
 
 the end of autumn. He was sufficiently ac- 
 quainted" with the state of the country, and the 
 action of the rain on its clayey soil, to decide 
 on taking his winter quarters. But he intend- 
 ed first to strike the Russians a blow, which, 
 if not decisive, should at least be effective 
 enough to throw them back to the Niemen, 
 and allow him to take his winter quarters qui- 
 etly along the Vistula. In order to compre- 
 hend clearly the movements which he medi- 
 tated, we must form an accurate idea of the 
 localities, and of the position which the enemy 
 had occupied there. 
 
 The King of Prussia, driven from the Oder, 
 had retired upon the Vistula. Driven from 
 the Vistula, he had fallen back upon the Pre- 
 gel, at Konigsberg. Having arrived at this 
 extremity of his kingdom, there was left for 
 him to defend, in concert with the Russians, 
 the space comprised between the Vistula and 
 the Pregel. The soil here exhibits the same 
 characters as between the Elbe and the Oder, 
 between the Oder and the Vistula, that is to 
 say, a long chain of sand-hills, parallel to the 
 sea, retaining the waters, and forming a series 
 of lakes extending from the Vistula to the Pre- 
 gel. These lakes frequently find a channel to 
 flow off, some directly to the sea, by small 
 rivers which throw themselves into it, and the ! 
 principal of which is the Passarge the others 
 into the interior of the country by a multitude 
 of streams, such as the Omulew, the Orezyc, 
 the Ukra, which run into the Narew, and, by 
 the Narew, into the Vistula. This singular 
 country, comprised between the Vistula and 
 the Pregel, has, therefore, two slopes, one 
 towards the sea, which is German, formerly 
 colonized by the Teutonic Order, and highly 
 cultivated ; the other turned towards the in- 
 terior, thinly inhabited, scantily cultivated, 
 covered with thick forests, and almost im- 
 penetrable in winter. You find nothing but 
 resources in approaching the sea ; nothing 
 but obstacles, difficulty to subsist, when you 
 penetrate into the interior. At the mouth of 
 the Vistula, and at that of the Pregel, are 
 seated two great commercial cities, Dantzig 
 on the first, Konigsberg on the second full, 
 at the period of which we are treating, of im- 
 mense resources, not only the produce of the 
 country, but such as the English had brought, 
 and were daily bringing thither. Danlzig, 
 strongly fortified, provided with a numerous I 
 garrison, could not be reduced without a long 
 siege. It was a point d'appui for the Russians 
 and Prussians, of great importance, on the ' 
 Lower Vistula, and rendered our position on j 
 the Upper Vistula precarious, by enabling the 
 enemy, at all times, to pass that river on our 
 left, and to threaten our rear. Konigsberg, ill- 
 fortified, but defended by the distance, con- 
 taining the last resources of Prussia in matt~ 
 riel, military stores, money, soldiers, officers, 
 was the principal depot of the enemy, and his 
 medium of communication with the English. 
 Between Dantzig and Konigsberg extends the 
 Frische Haff, a vast lagoon, like the lagoons 
 of Venice and Holland, owing to the cause 
 which has produced all the phenomena of this 
 soil, and to the accumulation of the sand, 
 which, thrown up in a long bank parallel to 
 
 the shore, separates the waters of the rivers 
 from the maritime waters, and thus forms an 
 intermediate sea. It is the same phenomenon 
 that is remarked at the mouth of the Oder, by 
 the name of the Great HafT; and, at the mouth 
 of the Niemen, by the name of the Curische 
 Haff. Besides Dantzig and Konigsberg, other 
 commercial towns,Marienburg,Elbing,Brauns- 
 berg, situated along the Frische Haff, form a 
 belt of wealthy and populous cities. These 
 were the last wrecks of the Prussian mo- 
 narchy left to Frederick William. That mo- 
 narch, himself fixed at Konigsberg, had his 
 troops scattered between Dantzig and Konigs- 
 berg, trusting to the Russians on the side to- 
 wards Thorn. He thus defended the maritime 
 slope with 30,000 men, including garrisons. 
 The Russians, with 100,000, occupied the in- 
 land slope, backed upon thick forests, and 
 covered by the Ukra and the Narew, rivers 
 which, uniting before they fall into the Vis- 
 tula, describe an angle, the apex of which 
 supports itself upon that great river a little 
 below Warsaw. 
 
 Two combinations were possible on the part 
 of the allies. They could unite in one mass 
 towards the sea, in order to avail themselves 
 of the numerous points of support which they 
 possessed upon the coast, particularly Dantzig, 
 and, passing the Lower Vistula, oblige us to 
 repass the Upper, if we did not choose to be 
 turned. They could also, leaving to the Prus- 
 sians the charge of guarding the sea, and 
 communicating together by means of a few 
 detachments placed on the line of the lakes, 
 push forward the Russians 'in advance of the 
 region of the forests, into the angle described 
 by the Ukra and the Narew, thus forming a 
 sort of wedge, and driving the point of it to- 
 wards Warsaw. Napoleon was ready for 
 either of these cases. If the Prussians and 
 Russians operated in one mass toward the sea, 
 his intention was to ascend the Narew by the 
 roads running through the inland country, and 
 then, dropping down to the left, throw the ene- 
 my into the sea or into the Lower Vistula. If, 
 on the contrary, leaving the Prussians towards 
 the sea, between Dantzig and Konigsberg, the 
 Russians advanced along the Narew and the 
 Ukra upon Warsaw, then, breaking in between 
 the two by Thorn, he had determined to wheel 
 about on his right, the extremity of which 
 would rest upon Warsaw, to bear up with his 
 left, so as to separate the Prussians from the 
 Russians by this rotatory movement, and to 
 fling back the latter into the chaos of the woods 
 and marshes of the interior. He should thus 
 cut them off from the resources of the sea, 
 from the succours of England, and force them 
 to flee in disorder through a horrible labyrinth. 
 This separation affected, the maritime region, 
 defended by a few thousand Prussians, would 
 be easy to conquer, and with it he should take 
 all the material riches of the coalition. 
 
 Of the two combinations which we have de- 
 scribed, the allies seemed to have adopted the 
 second. The Prussians occupied the maritime 
 region, connecting themselves with the Rus- 
 sians by a detachment placed in the environs 
 of Thorn. The Russians were ranged in 
 masses in the inland region, upon the Narew
 
 232 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1806. 
 
 and its tributaries. General Benningsen, who 
 commanded the first Russian army, had fallen 
 back from the Vistula upon the Narew, on the 
 approach of the French, and had taken posi- 
 tion in the interior of the angle formed by the 
 Ukra and the Narew. General Buxhovden, 
 with the second army, composed also of four 
 divisions, was in rear upon the Upper Narew 
 and the Omulew, in the environs of Ostrolenka. 
 General Essen, with the two divisions of re- 
 serve, had not yet arrived on the theatre of 
 war. With a view to flatter the passions of 
 the veteran Russian soldiers, there had been 
 given them for commander-in-chief General 
 Kamenski, an old lieutenant of Suwarrow's, 
 having the energetic roughness of the illus- 
 trious Muscovite warrior, but none of his ta- 
 lents. Having at first fallen back before the 
 French, the Russians, regretting the ground 
 lost, were moving forward to recover it; but, 
 at sight of our army, fully prepared to receive 
 them, they had resumed their position behind 
 the Ukra and the Narew. 
 
 Informed of the situation of the Prussians 
 and Russians, the former established along the 
 sea, the latter crowded together in the inland 
 region, and weakly connected towards Thorn, 
 Napoleon resolved to oppose to them the ma- 
 noeuvre contrived for this case, that is to say, 
 to debouch from Thorn with his left reinforced, 
 to separate the Prussians from the Russians, 
 and to throw the latter into the inextricable 
 difficulties of the interior. He had already 
 directed Marshal Ney upon Thorn; he also 
 sent thither Marshal Bernadotte, with the first 
 corps and Dupont's division. He pushed for- 
 ward the corps of Marshal Soult intermediately, 
 by Sempolno upon Plock, ordering him to pass 
 the Vistula between Warsaw and Thorn, and 
 recommended to him to connect himself by 
 his left with Marshals Ney and Bernadotte, by 
 his right with Marshal Augereau. The dra- 
 goons mounted at Potsdam having joined the 
 army, Napoleon united them with the portion 
 of the heavy cavalry which had rested itself 
 in Berlin, and thus composed a second reserve 
 of horse, which he consigned to Marshal Bes- 
 sieres, removed for a time from the command 
 of the imperial guard. This second reserve 
 he sent to Thorn. It formed a body of seven 
 or eight thousand horse, which, added to the 
 corps of Marshals Ney and Bernadotte, would 
 compose at the extreme left of the French 
 army a column of from forty to forty-five thou- 
 sand men, quite sufficient to effect the pro- 
 jected rotatory movement. Marshal Soult, at 
 the head of 25,000 men, formed the centre; 
 Marshals Augereau, Davout, and Lannes, 
 formed the right, destined to appuy itself upon 
 Warsaw. All these corps were near enough 
 10 co-operate with each other, and to present 
 in a few hours 70,000 men assembled on one 
 point, wherever it might be, at which the ene- 
 my should be found in force. Napoleon sup- 
 posed, therefore, that, his left advancing by 
 rapid marches while his right wheeled round 
 .slowly, he might take the Russians in hand by 
 the wav, and, after he had separated them from 
 the Prussians, drive them from the Ukra to 
 the Narew, from the Narew to the Bug, far 
 from the sea, and bury them in the interior of I 
 
 Poland. If the weather, favouring such de- 
 signs, should facilitate marches, it was possi- 
 ble that the Russians might be forced back so 
 far from their base of operation, and from the 
 country on which they subsisted, that their 
 rout would become a signal disaster. 
 
 Being desirous to wheel round upon War- 
 saw, but also to be able to move away from it 
 if necessary, in case he should be obliged to 
 follow the movement of his left, and to ascend 
 with it, Napoleon had considerable works 
 constructed in the suburb of Praga. He 
 ordered it to be fortified by means of earth- 
 works, provided with a revetement in wood, 
 which was equal to a scarp in masonry. This 
 suburb, thus fortified, would serve for a te!e du 
 pont to Warsaw. Napoleon enjoined Marshal 
 Davout, who had proceeded from the Vistula 
 to the Narew, to throw a bridge over the latter 
 river, and to put it into a state of defence. 
 He directed Marshal Augereau, who was pre- 
 paring to pass the Vistula at Modliu, to esta- 
 blish there also a permanent bridge, and to 
 render it unassailable on both banks. He 
 charged General Chasseloup to mark out the 
 works ordered. He recommended to him to 
 employ earth and timber exclusively for them, 
 to mount upon them the heavy artillery taken 
 from the enemy, and to draw thither, by good 
 wages, Polish workmen in great number. 
 Napoleon was desirous that these fortifica- 
 tions of earth and wood, raised to an equality 
 with a permanent fortification, should, on his 
 leaving there the Poles of the new levy and 
 a few French detachments, suffice for their 
 own defence, while the army was pushing 
 onward, if the course of the operations under- 
 taken should require it to do so. 
 
 The orders of Napoleon were always punc- 
 tually executed, unless absolute impossibility 
 prevented, because he paid incessant attention 
 to their execution, and urged it on most per- 
 severingly. General Chasseloup pushed for- 
 ward the prescribed works with activity, but 
 he had difficulty to procure workmen. The 
 violences committed by the Russians, and the 
 dread of similar violence^ on the part of the 
 French, had induced the peasants to betake 
 themselves, with their families, their cattle, 
 and their means of conveyance, to the terri- 
 tory of Austrian Poland, the frontier of which, 
 being extremely near, and closed against both 
 the belligerent armies, offered a ready and a 
 safe asylum. The inhabitants of whole vil- 
 lages had fled, headed by their priests, to 
 escape the horrors of war. Hands were not 
 to be procured, even at very high prices. 
 There were some, it is true, at Warsaw, but 
 the construction of-ovens, the organization of 
 the military establishments, which required to 
 be proportioned to an army of 200,000 men, 
 absorbed almost all of them. None at all 
 were left to be employed elsewhere. Soldiers 
 had to supply their place. Unfortunately, the 
 latter begin to flag, and to feel the influences 
 of the season, which was hitherto rather wet 
 than cold. They had also to suffer privations. 
 The provisions ordered in Gallicia were long 
 in coming, and even at Warsaw there was 
 found some difficulty to subsist. Marshal 
 Lannes was encamped there with his two
 
 Dec. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 233 
 
 divisions. Marshal Davout was encamped 
 beyond ; that is to say, on the bank of the 
 Narew, which falls into the Vistula a little 
 below Warsaw. It was about eight leagues 
 from Warsaw to the Narew, and in that space 
 there were abundance of heaths, little culti- 
 vated land, and few dwelling-houses. Sol- 
 diers of Davout's corps, being obliged to eat 
 pork for want of beef and mutton, were at- 
 tacked with dysentery. They had no bread 
 but what was sent them from day to day. 
 Marshal Davout had his head-quarters at Jab- 
 lona, and his column-head on the very bank 
 of the Narew, towards Okunin, opposite to 
 the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. Mar- 
 shal Davout, in spite of the Russian advanced 
 guards, had passed the Narew, thrown a bridge 
 over that river, with the aid of some boats 
 which had been collected, and had labourers 
 engaged upon defensive works at both ex- 
 tremities of this bridge. He had it in his 
 power, therefore, to manoeuvre on either bank 
 of the Narew. Still, having crossed it below 
 the point where it is joined by the Ukra, he 
 had yet to cross it higher up, or to cross the 
 Ukra itself, in order to penetrate into the angle 
 occupied by the Russians. But they were 
 numerous there, and solidly intrenched on 
 weody, elevated ground, and armed with 
 artillery. It was impossible to attack them 
 without passing the Ukra by main force. 
 Such an attempt must necessarily bring on a 
 battle, which was not to be sought but in the 
 presence of Napoleon. 
 
 Marshal Davout's labourers almost gave 
 the hand to those of Marshal Augereau, who 
 was actively engaged in establishing himself 
 upon the Vistula, near Modlin, at the point 
 where the Vistula and Narew join. But he 
 was destitute of the necessary means, for the 
 Russians had destroyed every thing in retir- 
 ing. Twelve boats, picked up above and be- 
 low Modlin, had served him to put one detach- 
 ment after another across the river. He set 
 about building a spacious bridge at Modlin, 
 with defensive works on both banks. His 
 troops, amidst the sands which prevail in this 
 part of the country, fared still worse than 
 those of Marshal Davout. He was impatient 
 to remove to Plonsk, beyond the Vistula, oppo- 
 site to the Ukra, in a more fertile country. 
 Marshal Soult had performed the marches 
 ordered by the Emperor, and had begun to 
 pass at Plock, whence he could either join 
 Marshal Augereau at Plonsk, or Marshals 
 Ney and Bernadotte at Biezun, according to 
 circumstances. As for the corps which had 
 Thorn for their base of operations, these were 
 in want of nothing. 
 
 These rapid conquerors, who had so speed- 
 
 ily overrun Austria last year, and Prussia last 
 month, found their triumphal march slack- 
 ened by a damp and dreary climate, by a mov- 
 ing soil, alternately sandy and muddy, by the 
 want of provisions, becoming scarcer in pro- 
 portion as population and cultivation dimi- 
 nished. They were surprised at this, not cast 
 down ; indulged in a thousand sarcastic sal- 
 lies on the attachment of the Poles to such a 
 country, and desired nothing better than to 
 fall in with the enemy of Austerlitz, that they 
 might revenge upon him the annoyances of soil 
 and climate. 
 
 On seeing the Russians by turns advance 
 and fall back, then retire for the last time, 
 with all the appearances of a definitive retreat, 
 Napoleon conceived that they were retiring to 
 the Pregel, with the intention of taking up 
 their winter quarters there. He therefore or- 
 dered Mural and Bessieres to pursue them at 
 the head of 25,000 horse, the one debouching 
 from Warsaw with the first reserve of cavalry, 
 the other debouching from Thorn with the se- 
 ! cond. But the more accurate reports of Mar- 
 i shal Davout, who, placed at the conflux of the 
 Narew and Ukra, beheld the Russians solidly 
 established on both rivers, the corresponding 
 i reports of Marshal Augereau, and, in particu- 
 lar, of Marshal Ney, who was in the habit of 
 observing the enemy very closely, soon unde- 
 ceived him, and proved to him that it was 
 high time to march against the Russians, that 
 I it was even necessary to do so, if he was not 
 disposed to let them winter in a position too 
 i near to that of the French army. Besides, 
 I the bridges over the Vistula, which he pur- 
 ! posed to make his points d'appui, were finished, 
 i provided with a commencement of defensive 
 I works, and capable of a sufficient resistance, 
 if some troops were placed in them. 
 
 Napoleon therefore left Posen in the night, 
 between the 15th and 16th of December, after 
 a stay of nineteen days, passed through Kutno 
 and Lowicz, gave orders everywhere for pro- 
 visions, and for medical and surgical stores, 
 in case of a retrograde movement, not very 
 probable, but always kept sight of by his pru- 
 dence ; and lastly superintended the march of 
 his columns for Warsaw, and was particularly 
 attentive to the despatch of the guard and 
 Oudinot's grenadiers for that city. 1 
 
 He entered the capital of Poland at night 
 to avoid noisy demonstrations, for it did not 
 suit him to pay for a few popular acclamations 
 by imprudent engagements. Wibiski. the Pole, 
 had preceded him, and exerted all his powers 
 to persuade his countrymen that they ought to 
 devote themselves to him. Many of them had 
 been won by the reasons which he gave them. 
 Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last king, 
 
 We quote the following letter, as it clearly indicates 
 the state of things at the moment to which the above 
 particulars relate : 
 
 To General Clarke. 
 
 Lowitz, 18th December, 1806, 7 P. M. 
 I have arrived at Lowicz. I write to you to relieve 
 you from every kind of uneasiness. There is no news 
 here. The armies are in presence. The Russians are 
 on the right bank of the Narew, and we on the left. 
 Besides Praga, we have two titet du pont, one at Mod- 
 tin, the other on the Narew. at the mouth of the Ukra. 
 VOL. II. 30 
 
 We have Thorn, and an army twenty leagues in ad- 
 vance, maneuvering upon the enemy. All this news is 
 for yourself. It is possible that, before the end of eight 
 days, there may be an affair that will put an end to the 
 campaign. Take your precautions, that there may not 
 ; be a musket left either in Berlin or in the country, that 
 i Spandau and Custrin are in a good state, and that every 
 | body does good service. 
 
 Write to Mayence and to Paris, merely to say thuc 
 
 you are writing, that there is no news, 
 done in general every day, when I ha 
 
 passing : that baffles unfavourable reports. 
 
 ive no couriers 
 
 NAPOLXOK.
 
 334 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1806. 
 
 young, brilliant, and brave, a kind of hero 
 lulled to sleep in the lap of voluptuousness, 
 but ready to awake at the first clash of arms, 
 was one of those who had offered themselves 
 to second the plans of Napoleon. Count Po- 
 tocki, old Malakouski, marshal of one of the 
 last Diets, and others who had come to War- 
 saw, had collected around the French authori- 
 ties, tc concur in forming a government. A 
 provisi. -nal administration had been composed, 
 and all began to go on well, with the excep- 
 tion of the inevitable skirmishes between per- 
 sons of little experience and strongly inclined 
 to jealousy. Men were raised and battalions 
 organized, either at Warsaw or at Posen. Na- 
 poleon, in order to assist the new Polish go- 
 vernment, had exempted it from all contribu- 
 tion, on condition of its furnishing provisions 
 in case of emergency. For the rest the high 
 society of Warsaw paid him extraordinary 
 homage. All the Polish nobility had left their 
 country seats, impatient to see him, to meet 
 the great man, as well as the deliverer of Po- 
 land. 
 
 Having arrived in the night between the 
 18th and 19th, Napoleon mounted his horse in 
 the morning, in order to reconnoitre himself 
 the position of Marshal Davouton the Narew. 
 A thick fog prevented him. He made his dis- 
 positions for attacking the enemy on the 22d 
 or 23d of December. It is high time, he wrote 
 to Marshal Davout, to take our winter quarters; 
 but this cannot be done till we have driven 
 back the Russians. 
 
 The four divisions of General Benningsen 
 first presented themselves. Count Tolstoy's 
 division, posted at Czarnowo, occupied the 
 apex of the angle formed by the junction of 
 the Ukra and the Narew. That of General 
 Sacken, also placed in. rear towards Lopaczym, 
 guarded the banks of the Ukra. The division 
 of Prince Gallitzin was in reserve at Pultusk. 
 The four divisions of General Buxhovden were 
 at a great distance from those of General Ben- 
 ningsen, and not calculated to render support 
 to him. Two detachments at Popowo observed 
 the country between the Narew and the Bug. 
 Two others were encamped still further off, at 
 Makow and Ostrolenka. The Prussians, driven 
 out of Thorn, were on the upper course of the 
 Ukra, towards Soldau, connecting the Russians 
 with the sea. As we have said, General Es- 
 sen's two divisions of reserve had not yet ar- 
 rived. The total mass of the allies destined 
 to enter into action was about 115,000 men. 
 
 It is easy to perceive that the distribution of 
 the Russian corps was not judiciously com- 
 bined in the angle of the Ukra and the Narew, 
 and that they had not sufficiently concentrated 
 their forces. If, instead of having a single 
 division at the point of the angle, and one on 
 each side at too great a distance from the first, 
 lastly, five out of reach, they had distributed 
 themselves with intelligence over ground so 
 favourable for the defensive; if they had 
 strongly occupied, first the conflux, then the 
 two rivers, the Narew from Czarnowo to Pul- 
 tusk, the Ukra from Pomichowo to Kolozomb; 
 if they had placed in reserve in a central po- 
 sition, at Nasielsk, for example, a principal 
 mass, ready to run to any threatened point, 
 
 they might have disputed the ground with ad 
 vantage. But Generals Benningsen and Bux- 
 hovden were on bad terms : they disliked to be 
 near each other: and old Kamenski, who had 
 arrived only on the preceding day, had neither 
 the necessary intelligence nor spirit for pre- 
 scribing other dispositions than they had 
 adopted in following each of them their own 
 whim. 
 
 Napoleon, who saw the position of the Rus- 
 sians from without only, certainly concluded 
 that they were intrenched behind the Narew 
 and the Ukra, for the purpose of guarding the 
 banks, but without knowing how they were 
 established and distributed there. He thought 
 that it would be advisable to take, in the first 
 place, the conflux, where, it was probable, they 
 would defend themselves with energy, and, 
 having carried that point, to proceed to the 
 execution of his plan, which consisted in 
 throwing the Russians, by a wheel from right 
 to left, into the marshy and woody country in 
 the interior of Poland. In consequence, hav- 
 ing repeated the order to Marshals Ney, Ber- 
 nadotte and Bessieres, forming his left, to pro- 
 ceed rapidly from Thorn to Biezun on the 
 upper course of the Ukra, to Marshals Soult 
 and Ausereau, forming his centre, to set out 
 from Plock and Modlin, and form a junction 
 at Plonsk on the Ukra, he put himself at the 
 head of his right, composed of Davout's corps, 
 Lannes' corps, of the guard, and the reserves, 
 resolved to force immediately the position of 
 the Russians at the conflux of the Ukra and 
 the Narew. He left in the works of Praga the 
 Poles of the new levy, with a division of dra- 
 goons, a force sufficient to ward off all acci- 
 dents, as the army was not to remove far from 
 Warsaw. 
 
 Having arrived on the morning of the 23d 
 of December at Okunin on the Narew, in wet 
 weather, by muddy and almost impassable 
 roads, Napoleon alighted to superintend in 
 person the dispositions of attack. This gene- 
 ral, who, according to some critics, while di- 
 recting armies of 300,000 men, knew not how 
 to lead a brigade into fire, went himself to re- 
 connoitre the enemy's positions and to place 
 his forces on the ground, down to the very 
 companies of the voltigeurs. 
 
 The Narew had been already crossed at 
 Okunin, below the conflux of the Ukra and 
 the Narew. To penetrate into the angle formed 
 by those two rivers, it was necessary to pass 
 either the Narew or the Ukra above their point 
 of junction. The Ukra, being the narrower 
 of the two, was deemed preferable for attempt- 
 ing a passage. Advantage had been taken of 
 an island which divided it into two arms, near 
 its mouth, in order to diminish the difficulty. 
 On this island, the French had established 
 themselves, and they had yet to pass the se- 
 cond arm to reach the point of land occupied 
 by the Russians between the Ukra and the Na- 
 rew. This point of land, covered with woods, 
 coppices, marshes, looked like one very dense 
 thicket. Further off, the ground became some- 
 what clearer, then rose and formed a stsep 
 declivity, which extended from the Narew to 
 the Ukra. To the right of this natural in- 
 trenchment appeared the village of Czarriowo
 
 Dec. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 235 
 
 on the Narew, to the left the village of Pomi- 
 chowo on the Ukra. The Russians had ad- 
 vanced guards of tirailleurs in the thicket, 
 seven battalions and a numerous artillery on 
 the elevated part of the ground, two battalions 
 in reserve, and all their cavalry in the rear. 
 Napoleon repaired to the island, mounted the 
 roof of a barn by means of a ladder, studied 
 the position of the Russians with a telescope, 
 and immediately made the following disposi- 
 tions. He scattered a great quantity of tirail- 
 leurs all along the Ukra, and to a considerable 
 distance above the point of passage. He or- 
 dered them to keep up a brisk firing, and to 
 kindle large fires with damp straw, so as to 
 cover the bed of the river with a cloud of 
 smoke, and to cause the Russians to apprehend 
 an attack above the conflux, towards Pomi- 
 chowo. He even directed to that quarter 
 Gauthier's brigade, belonging to Davout's 
 corps, in order the more effectually to draw the 
 enemy's attention thither. During the execu- 
 tion of these orders, he collected at dusk all 
 the companies of voltigeurs of Morand's divi- 
 sion on the intended point of passage, and 
 ordered them to fire from one bank to the other, 
 through the clumps of wood, to drive off the 
 enemy's posts, while the seamen of the guard 
 were equipping the craft collected on the Na- 
 rew. The 17th of the line and the 13th light 
 were in column ready to embark by detach- 
 ments, and the rest of Morand's division was 
 assembled in the rear, in order to pass as soon 
 as the bridge was established. The other di- 
 yisions of Davout's corps were at the bridge 
 of Okunin, awaiting the moment for acting. 
 Lannes was advancing at a rapid pace from 
 Warsaw to Okunin. 
 
 The seamen of the guard soon brought some 
 boats, by means of which several detachments 
 of voltigeurs were conveyed from one bank to 
 the other. These penetrated into the thicket, 
 while the officers of the pontoniers and the 
 seamen of the guard were occupied in forming 
 a bridge of boats with the utmost expedition. 
 At seven in the evening, the bridge being 
 passable, Morand's division crossed in close 
 column, and marched forward, preceded by 
 the 17th of the line and the 13th light, and by 
 a swarm of tirailleurs. They advanced un- 
 der cover of the darkness and the wood. The 
 sappers of the regiments cleared a passage 
 through the thicket for the infantry. No 
 sooner had they overcome these first obstacles, 
 than they found themselves unsheltered, op- 
 posite to the elevated plateau which runs from 
 the Narew to the Ukra, and which was de- 
 fended either by abattis or by a numerous ar- 
 tillery. The Russians, amidst the darkness 
 of the night, opened upon our columns a con- 
 tinuous fire of grape and musketry, which did 
 us some mischief. While the voltiguers of 
 Morand's division and the 13th light ap- 
 proached as tirailleurs, Colonel Lanusse, at 
 the head of the 17th of the line, formed in 
 column of attack on the right, to storm the 
 Russian batteries. He had already carried 
 one of them, when the Russians advancing in 
 mass upon his left flank, obliged him to fall 
 back. The rest of Morand's division came 
 up to the support of the first two regiments. 
 
 The 13th light, having exhausted its cartridges, 
 was replaced by the 30th, and again they 
 marched by the right to attack the village of 
 Czarnowo, while, on the left, General Petit 
 proceeded with 400 picked men to the attack 
 of the Russian intrenchments facing the Ukra, 
 opposite to Pomichowo. In spite of the dark- 
 ness, they manffiuvred with the utmost order. 
 Two battalions of the 30th and one of the 17th 
 attacked Czarnowo, one by going along the 
 bank of the Narew, the two others by directly 
 climbing the plateau on which that village is 
 seated. These three battalions carried Czar- 
 nowo, and, followed by the 51st and the 61st 
 regiments, debouched on the plateau, driving 
 back the Russians into the plain beyond it. 
 At the same moment General Petit had as- 
 saulted the extremity of the enemy's intrench- 
 ments towards the Ukra, and, seconded by the 
 fire of artillery, kept up by Gauthier's brigade 
 from the other side of the river, had carried 
 them. At midnight, the assailants were mas- 
 ters of the position of the Russians from the 
 Narew to the Ukra, but, from the tardiness of 
 their retreat, which could be discerned in the 
 dark, it was to be inferred that they would re- 
 turn to the charge, and, for this reason, Mar- 
 shal Davout sent the second brigade of Gu- 
 din's division to the assistance of General 
 Petit, who was most exposed. During the 
 night, the Russians, as it had been foreseen, 
 returned three times to the charge, with the 
 intention of retaking the position which they 
 had lost, and hurling down the French from 
 the plateau towards that point of woody and 
 marshy ground on which they had landed. 
 [ Thrice were they suffered to approach within 
 | thirty paces, and each time the French, re- 
 plying to their attack by a point-blank fire, 
 brought them to a dead stand, and then, meet- 
 ing them with the bayonet, repulsed them. 
 At length, the night being far advanced, they 
 betook themselves in full retreat, towards Na- 
 sielsk. Never was night action fought with 
 greater order, precision, and hardihood. The 
 Russians left us killed, wounded, and prison- 
 ers, about 1800 men, and a great quantity of 
 artillery. We had on our side 600 wounded, 
 and about one hundred killed. 
 
 Napoleon, who had not quitted the site of ac- 
 tion, congratulated General Morand and Mar- 
 shal Davout on their gallant conduct, and 
 hastened to reap the consequences of the pas- 
 sage of the Ukra, and to give such orders as 
 the circumstances required. The Russians, 
 deprived of the paint d'appui which they pos- 
 sessed at the conflux of the Ukra and the Na- 
 rew, were not likely to be tempted to defend 
 the Ukra, the line of which had just been, 
 forced at its mouth. But, ignorant as the 
 French were of their real situation, it was to 
 be apprehended that they were in force at the 
 bridge of Kolozomb, on the Ukra, opposite to 
 Plonsk, the point at which the corps of Mar- 
 shals Soult and Augereau were to meet Na 
 poleon directed the cavalry reserve, com 
 manded by General Nansouty in the absence 
 of Murat, who had been taken ill at Warsaw, 
 to ascend the Ukra on both shores, to beat the 
 banks as far as Kolozomb, to give a hand tc 
 Marshals Augereau and Soult, to pssist them
 
 236 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1806 
 
 to pass the Ukra if they met with any diffi- 
 culties, to connect them, in short, with Marshal 
 Davout, who was to march on before and 
 cross, at about the middle, the country com- 
 prised between the Ukra and the Narew. 
 He ordered Marshal Davout to proceed direct 
 for Nasielsk, and despatched the guard and 
 the reserve to support him. Lastly, he grave 
 Marshal Lannes instructions to cross the Ukra, 
 at the same place where the passage had just 
 been forced, and to ascend, on the right of 
 Davout's corps, along the Narew to Pultusk. 
 This town became a point of great importance, 
 for the Russians, flung back from the Ukra 
 upon Narew, had no bridges, but those of 
 Pultusk, for crossing the latter river. The 
 order already despatched to Marshals Soult 
 and Augereau to march for Plonsk and cross 
 the Ukra there, and to Marshals Ney, Berna- 
 dotte, and Bessieres to advance rapidly to 
 Biezun, was of course confirmed. 
 
 Napoleon, continuing to keep with Marshal 
 Davout, resolved to march the same morning 
 of the 24th for Nasielsk, notwithstanding the 
 fatigues of the night. The precaution was, 
 however, taken to place Friant's division at 
 the head, in order to afford a few hours' rest to 
 Morand's division, fatigued with the action of 
 Czarnowo. About dusk they arrived at Na- 
 sielsk, and there found in position Tolstoy's 
 division, the same that had been driven from 
 Czarnowo. It manifested an intention of mak- 
 ing some resistance, for the purpose of giving 
 the detachments sent to the Ukra time to 
 join it. 
 
 We have already said that General Ben- 
 ningsen's four divisions were : Tolstoy's divi- 
 sion at Czarnowo, to defend the conflux of the 
 two rivers ; Sacken's division at Lopaczym, 
 to watch the Ukra ; Sedmaratzki's division at 
 Zebroszki, to guard the Narew ; lastly, Gallit- 
 zin's division at Pultusk, to act as reserve, 
 the latter, though at a great distance from the 
 Ukra, having a strong advanced guard on that 
 river, commanded by General Barklay de 
 Tolly a confused and complicated disposi- 
 tion, which bespoke a very feeble direction in 
 the operations of the Russian army. The 
 natural movement of these divisions, sur- 
 prised by a vigorous attack on the Ukra, would 
 have been to withdraw their detachments, in 
 order to their retreating upon the Narew. 
 This was in fact the movement which they did 
 adopt, and which their general-in-chief al- 
 lowed to be executed rather than enjoined. 
 
 Count Tolstoy, commandant of the division 
 which had fallen back upon Nasielsk, had 
 maintained his ground there, till the moment 
 when he saw the detachment charged to guard 
 the Ukra towards Borkowa coming back pur- 
 sued by the reserve cavalry. However, Gene- 
 ral Friant, having deployed his division facing 
 the Russians, and marched up to them, obliged 
 
 Those readers who recollect having seen the 14th 
 of the line, with its colonel. Savary, distinguishing it- 
 elf in the passage of the Vistula at Thorn, will find it 
 difficult to comprehend how that same regiment could 
 be, on the 24th of December, under Marshal Augereau 
 at the passage of the Ukra at Kolozomb. The explana- 
 tion is easy : that regiment, leit at Bromberg by Mar- 
 hal Augereau when he ascended the left bank of the 
 V'j'.ula from Thorn to Modi in. remained for a moment 
 
 them to retire in the greatest haste. The dra 
 goons dashed after them ; some hundred men 
 were killed or taken, and cannon and baggage 
 picked up. 
 
 On this same 24th, Marshal Augereau, hav 
 ing arrived on the banks of the Ukra, resolved 
 to force the passage. He had the bridges of 
 Kolozomb and Sochoczyn attacked simultane- 
 ously. The 14th of the line, under Colonel 
 Savary, who had passed the Vistula at Thorn 
 on the 6th of December, 1 threw itself upon 
 the scarcely repaired relics of the bridge of 
 Kolozomb, and heroically passed it amidst a 
 tremendous fire of musketry. This brave colo- 
 nel fell on the other bank, having received 
 several lance wounds. At Sochoczyn, the at- 
 tack on the bridge having miscarried, the 
 French proceeded to a neighbouring ford, and 
 effected the passage. Thus Augereau's corps 
 crossed on the 24th to the other bank of the 
 Ukra, and advanced, pushing before it the de- 
 tachments of the different Russian divisions 
 left to guard that river. They were likewise 
 pursued by the reserve cavalry, under the com- 
 mand of General Nansouty. The French 
 marched towards Nowomiasto, in the direction 
 from the Ukra to the Narew, so as to connect 
 themselves with the corps of Marshal Davout 
 To the left of Augereau's corps, Marshal Soult 
 was preparing to pass the Ukra, near Sochoc- 
 zyn. The left, under Ney, Bernadotte, and 
 Bessieres, continued to ascend by a rapid 
 movement from Thorn towards Biezun and 
 Soldau. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th, Napoleon di- 
 rected his columns upon Strezegocin. The 
 weather had become frightful for an army which 
 had to manoeuvre, and above all to execute 
 several reconnoissances, in order to discover 
 the plans of the enemy. A complete thaw, 
 accompanied with melting snow and rain, had 
 soaked the ground to such a degree, that in 
 certain places the men sank up to the knees; 
 and some of them were even found half bu- 
 ried in this soil, suddenly changed into a quag- 
 mire. They were obliged to double the teams 
 of the artillery, before they could move for- 
 ward a few paces. They were gainers by this 
 state of things, it is true, as they captured at 
 every step the cannon and the baggage of the 
 Russians, many laggards and wounded, and 
 lastly, a considerable number of Polish de- 
 serters, who voluntarily stayed behind to give 
 themselves up to the French army. But they 
 lost, on the other hand, the inestimable advan- 
 tage of celerity, the benefit of the artillery, 
 which they could no longer take with them, 
 and the means of information, which are al- 
 ways proportionate to the facility of commu- 
 nication. Figure to yourself immense plains 
 covered alternately with mud and thick forests, 
 for the most part thinly peopled, and still more 
 scantily since the general emigration of the 
 
 at the disposal of Marshal Ney, and effected under hi* 
 orders the passage of the Vistula at Thorn. 
 
 We should not have added this note, which may ap- 
 pear useless, if some inattentive and ignorant critics 
 had not accused us of making corps figure in different 
 actions in which they had no share. There are attack* 
 about which one ought uot to care ; yet, out of respect 
 for the impartial reader, we are anxious 10 prove to 
 him that we have spared no pains to arrive at the strict- 
 est accuracy.
 
 Dec. 1806.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 237 
 
 inhabitants armies in pursuit or in flight 
 through th'is miry desert, and you will have an 
 idea, though inadequate, of the spectacle ex- 
 hibited at this moment by the French and 
 Russians in this part of Poland. 
 
 Napoleon discerning imperfectly the enemy's 
 movements in this flat and woody country, and 
 unable to make amends by repeated reconnois- 
 sances for what he could not see, was plunged 
 into the most perplexing uncertainty. It 
 seemed indeed to him that the retreating Rus- 
 sian columns were proceeding from his left to 
 his right, from the Ukra towards the Narew. 
 Accordingly, he had sent Lannes towards Pul- 
 tusk, and thinking that he could perceive a 
 body of the enemy following Lannes, he had 
 detached Gudin's division from Davout's corps 
 to follow the pursuers, and to prevent them from 
 attacking Lannes in rear. But a large assem- 
 blage appeared in front of him, in the direction 
 of Golymin. Reports were received of the pre- 
 sence of numerous forces, which had arrived 
 upon the rear of the Russian army at this 
 point. It was said that a corps of 20,000 men 
 was retiring from the Ukra towards Ciechanow 
 and Golymin. Amidst this chaos, Napoleon, 
 resolving to fall forthwith upon the nearest 
 enemy, towards whom, besides, all the others 
 seemed to converge, left Lannes, escorted by 
 Gudin's division, to proceed to the right upon 
 Pultusk, and, as for himself, he advanced direct 
 towards Golymin, with two of Davout's three 
 divisions, with Augereau's entire corps, with 
 the guard and the reserve cavalry. He, more- 
 over, ordered Marshal Soult, who had passed 
 the Ukra, to go to Ciechanow itself. He en- 
 joined Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessi- 
 eres, who had left Thorn, to continue their ro- 
 tatory movement by Biezun. Soldau, and Mlawa, 
 which would bring them upon the flank and 
 nearly upon the rear of the Russians. 
 
 In this manner, the troops marched, with 
 the greatest difficulty, the whole of the 25th 
 and the morning of the 26th, taking two hours, 
 sometimes three, to advance a league. 
 
 Meanwhile, the different corps of the Russian 
 army had not taken precisely the direction 
 which Napoleon had conjectured. Nearly the 
 whole of General Benningsen's four divisions 
 had fallen back upon Pultusk. Tolstoy's di- 
 vision, driven from Czarnowo to Nasielsk, from 
 Nasielsk to Strezegocin, had followed the road 
 which runs across the middle of the tract be- 
 tween the Ukra and the Narew. On its arrival 
 at Strezegocin, it had borne to the right to- 
 wards Pultusk, as soon as it was able to rally 
 its scattered detachments. Sedmaratzki's di- 
 vision, posted in the preceding days at Ze- 
 broszki, on the bank of the Narew, having but 
 a few steps to go to reach Pultusk, had repair- 
 ed thither immediately. Gallitzin's division, 
 which, though its head-quarters were at Pul- 
 tusk, had posts on the Ukra, had concentrated 
 itself upon Pultusk. But the detachments of 
 that division which guarded the Ukra, cut off 
 by our cavalry, had sought refuge at Golymin. 
 Lastly, Sacken's division, which particularly 
 guarded the Ukra, and had its head-quarters at 
 Lopaczym, being annoyed by the French ca- 
 valry, had retired, partly to Golymin, partly to 
 Pultusk. Thus Tolstov's and Sedmaratzki's 
 
 two entire divisions, and part of Gallitzin's 
 and Sacken's two divisions, were on the 26th 
 at Pultusk. The other part of Gallitzin's and 
 Sacken's divisions, which had taken refuge in 
 Golymin, had fallen in with one of BuxhOv- 
 den's divisions, Doctorow's division, which 
 had moved forward, and thus given rise to the 
 report of an assemblage of troops on the rear 
 of the Russian army. Lastly, the Prussians, 
 in flight before Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, 
 and Bessieres, had quitted the Ukra, and were 
 retiring by Soldau upon Mlawa, incessantly 
 striving in their retreat to connect themselves 
 with the Russians. 
 
 On the morning of the 26th, Lannes came 
 in sight of Pultusk. He there discovered a 
 mass of forces far superior to that which he 
 had at his disposal. The four Russian divi- 
 sions, though two of them were incomplete, 
 numbered no fewer than 43,000 men.' Lan- 
 nes, with General Becker's dragoons, had no 
 more than 17 or 18 thousand. Five or six 
 thousand were coming on his left with Gudin's 
 division. Lannes, however, was but very 
 vaguely apprized of this circumstance, and, 
 in the state of the roads, this reinforcement, 
 though at an inconsiderable distance from 
 Pultusk, could not reach the field of battle till 
 very late. Lannes was not a man to be 
 daunted. Neither he nor his soldiers feared 
 to meet the Russians, whatever might be their 
 number, however tried their bravery. Lannes 
 drew up his little army in order of battle, 
 having taken care to send a messenger to 
 Marshal Davout to inform him of the unex- 
 pected force which he had just met with at 
 Pultusk, and which placed him in a most 
 critical situation. 
 
 A vast forest covered the environs of Pul- 
 tusk. On issuing from this forest, you found 
 yourself on open ground, dotted here and 
 there with clumps of trees, drenched with 
 rain, like all the rest of the country, rising 
 gradually in form of a plateau, and then ter- 
 minating abruptly in a steep declivity towards 
 Pultusk and the Narew. On this ground 
 General Benningsen had drawn up his army, 
 having its back turned to the town, one of its 
 wings appuyed on the river and the bridge 
 which crosses it, the other on a patch of wood. 
 A strong reserve formed a support to its cen- 
 tre. His cavalry was placed in the intervals 
 of his line of battle and a little in advance. 
 Though they had lost part of their artillery, 
 the Russians took with them so great a quan- 
 tity ever since the campaign of Austerlitz, that 
 they had sufficient left to cover their front with 
 a line of guns, and to render the approach to 
 that front extremely formidable. 
 
 Lannes had to oppose to them only a few 
 pieces of small calibre, which had been 
 dragged through the mud with- the greatest 
 exertions and by the united efforts of all the 
 teams of the artillery. He placed Suchet's 
 division in first line, and kept Gudin's divi> ion 
 in reserve on the skirt of (he forest, to have 
 wherewithal to meet any events which might 
 threaten to become serious, in the uncertainty 
 
 i Piotho, the narrator, an officer of the .Russian army, 
 ami an eye-witness, likewise sets down the number at 
 43.000.
 
 233 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 m which every one was plunged. A few men, 
 well directed, might suffice to carry this posi- 
 tion, and had the advantage of affording less 
 scope to the formidable artillery of the Rus- 
 sians. Lannes debouched, therefore, from the 
 forest with Suchet's single division, formed 
 into three columns ; one on the right, under 
 General Claparede, composed of the 17th light, 
 and of General Treilhard's light cavalry ; one 
 on the left, under General Reille, composed of 
 the second battalion of the 88th, of the 34th of 
 the line, and of General Becker's dragoons. 
 The plan of Lannes was to attack by his right, 
 and towards the Narew, for, if he could but 
 penetrate to the town, he should at once de- 
 prive the position of the Russians of all its 
 advantages, and even place them in a disas- 
 trous situation. 
 
 He moved forward his three little columns, 
 sallying boldly from the woods, and climbing 
 the plateau under a shower of grape. Unfor- 
 tunately the ground, soaked with rain and ren- 
 dered slippery, scarcely admitted of that im- 
 petuosity of attack which might have made 
 amends for the disadvantage of number and 
 position. Nevertheless, advancing with diffi- 
 culty, they came up to the enemy, and drove 
 him back towards the abrupt declivities ter- 
 minating the ground in a kind of fall towards 
 the Narew and Pultusk. The French marched 
 with ardour, and were about to throw the Rus- 
 sian troops of General Bagowout from the 
 plateau into the river, when the general-in- 
 chief, Benningsen, sent in the utmost haste to 
 the aid of General Bagowout part of his re- 
 serve, which took in flank Claparede's brigade, 
 forming the head of our attack. Lannes, who 
 was in the thick of the fray, answered this 
 manoeuvre by moving from his centre towards 
 his right Vedel's brigade, composed, as we 
 have just said, of the 64th and the first batta- ; 
 lion ot' the 88th. He himself took in flank the 
 Russians who had come to succour General I 
 Bagowout, and driving them one upon the ] 
 other towards the Narew, he would have put 
 an end to the struggle at this point, and per- ; 
 haps to the battle, if, amidst a violent squall 
 of snow, the battalion of the 88th, surprised 
 by the Russian cavalry before it could form 
 into square, had not been broken and over- 
 turned. But this brave battalion was presently 
 rallied by one of those officers whose charac- 
 ter is rendered conspicuous by danger. This 
 officer, named Voisin, recovering himself im- 
 mediately, and taking advantage, in his turn, 
 of the embarrassments of the Russian cavalry, ! 
 despatched with the bayonet those horsemen i 
 floundering, like our fool-soldiers, in a sea of j 
 mud. 
 
 Thus, on the right and at the centre, the 
 action, though less decisive than it might have 
 been, turned, nevertheless, to the advantage of 
 the French, who left the Russians backed to 
 the margin of the plateau, and liable to a dan- 
 gerous fall towards the town and the river. 
 On the left, our third column, composed of the 
 34th of the line, the second battalion of the 
 88th, and General Becker's dragoons, had to 
 contend with the enemy for the patch of trees 
 upon which the centre of the Russians ap- 
 puyed itself. The 34th, directed by General i 
 
 [Dec. 1806 
 
 Reille, and saluted unawares by unmasked 
 batteries, suffered severely. Seconded by the 
 j charges of General Becker's dragoons, it cap 
 j ried the patch of wood ; but some battalions 
 of General Barklay de Tolly's retook it. 
 Again the French made themselves masters 
 of it, and maintained, for three hours, an ob- 
 stinate and unequal fight At length, on this 
 point, as on the others, the Russians, forced 
 to give way, were obliged to back as closely 
 as possible to the town. Lannes, having got 
 rid of the combat on the right, had moved to 
 the left to encourage the troops by his pre- 
 j sence. If, at this moment, he had been less 
 uncertain what was passing elsewhere, and 
 more assured of being supported, he might 
 have brought Gazan's division into action, 
 and then it would have been all up with the 
 Russians, who would have been hurled down 
 the back of the plateau, and drowned in the 
 Narew. But Lannes saw, beyond his right, 
 and at the extreme right of the Russians, Tol- 
 stoy's division, bordering the ravine of Moc- 
 zyn, and forming a hook in rear to cover the 
 ; extremity of the position. He deemed it more 
 [ prudent not to engage all his troops, and, by 
 his orders, Gazan's brave division remained 
 motionless on the skirt of the forest, exposed, 
 at the distance of three hundred paces, to the 
 balls of the enemy, but rendering the service 
 of awing the Russians, and deterring them 
 also from fighting with the whole of their 
 j forces. 
 
 The day was closing, when Gudin's division 
 i at length arrived upon our left, hidden, by the 
 j woods, from our army, but perceived by the 
 Cossacks, who immediately apprized General 
 Benningsen of the circumstance. Of all its 
 artillery, Gudin's division brought but two 
 pieces, which were dragged with great labour 
 ; to the field of battle. It faced the extreme 
 right of the Russians, and the point of the 
 I angle formed by the bending back of their 
 line. General Daultanne, who, on that day, 
 commanded Gudin's division, after a few 
 rounds of cannon-shot, formed en echelons by 
 his left, and marched resolutely up to the 
 enemy previously apprizing Marshal Lannes 
 of his entering into action. His attack pro- 
 duced a decisive effect, and forced the Rus- 
 sians to fall back. But this division, already 
 separated, by the woods, from Lannes's corps, 
 increased, by advancing, the interval which 
 parted them* At this instant, a squall of wind 
 drove rain and snow into the faces of our sol- 
 diers. The Russians, from a superstitious no- 
 tion of northern people, which caused them to 
 consider tempest as a favourable omen, ran 
 forward, with wild shouts. They threw them- 
 selves into the interval left between Gudin's 
 division and the corps of Lannes, forced back 
 the one, and turned the other. Their cavalry 
 rushed into the gap; but the 34th, on the side 
 next to Suchet's division, the 85th, on the side 
 next to Gudin's division, formed into square, 
 and cut short that charge which was rather a 
 demonstration on the part of the Russians to 
 cover their retreat, than a serious attack. 
 
 The French, then, had, on all points, con- 
 quered the ground which commands Pultusk, 
 and they had but a last effort to make to throw
 
 Dec. 1806.,; 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 239 
 
 the Russians into the Narew, when General 
 Benningsen, taking advantage of the darkness, 
 withdrew his army, making it pass over the 
 bridges of Pultusk. While he was giving his 
 orders for retreat, Lannes, full of ardour, in 
 high spirits on account of the arrival of Gu- 
 din's division, was deliberating whether he 
 should immediately make a second attack, or 
 defer it till the next day. The lateness of the 
 hour, and the difficulty of communicating in 
 this chaos of mud, rain and darkness, decided 
 him to postpone the combat. Next morning, 
 the sudden retreat of the Russians deprived 
 the Fronch of the prize earned by their daring 
 and obstinate conduct. 
 
 This hard-fought action, in which 18,000 
 men had been for a whole day in presence of 
 43,000, might certainly be called a victory. 
 Owing to their small number, and to the supe- 
 riority of their tactics, the French had lost 
 scarcely 1500 men, killed and wounded. We 
 speak from authentic statements. The loss 
 of the Russians, on the other hand, in killed 
 and wouuded, exceeded 3000 men. They left 
 us 2000 prisoners, and an immense quantity 
 of artillery. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Benningsen, having re- 
 turned to Pultusk, wrote to his sovereign that 
 he had just gained a signal victory over the 
 Emperor Napoleon, commanding, in person, 
 three corps d'armee, those of Marshals Davout, 
 Lannes, and Suchet, besides the cavalry of 
 Prince Murat. Now there was not, as the 
 reader may have seen, any corps d'armee of 
 Marshal Suchet's, since General Suchet mere- 
 ly commanded a division of the corps of Mar- 
 shal Lannes; there were on the ground, at 
 Pultusk, two divisions of Marshal Lannes's 
 corps, and one only of Marshal Davoul's, no 
 cavalry of Prince Murat's, and, still less, any 
 Emperor Napoleon commanding in person. 
 
 A great deal has been said about the lying 
 bulletins of the Empire still they were more 
 true than any of the European publications 
 of that period but what are we to think of 
 such a way of relating one's own acts ! The 
 Russians, assuredly, were brave enough to be 
 veracious. 
 
 On that same day, the 26th, the two divisions 
 of Marshal Davout's that were left him, and, 
 likewise, the two divisions composing Marshal 
 Augereau's corps, arrived opposite to Goly- 
 min. This village was surrounded by a belt 
 of woods and marshes, studded with a few 
 hamlets, and, beyond this belt, the Russians 
 were established, with a strong reserve, at the 
 village of Golymin itself. 
 
 Marshal Davout, debouching by the right, 
 that is to say by the Pultusk road, ordered an 
 attack of the woods, which formed, on his 
 part, an obstacle to be overcome before he 
 could penetrate into Golymin. Marshal Au- 
 gereau, debouching by the left, that is to say 
 by the Lopaczym road, had to cross the 
 marshes, dotted with a few clumps of wood, 
 and among these marshes to carry a vil- 
 lage, that of Ruskovo, through which ran 
 the only practicable road. Marshal Davout's 
 brave infantry repulsed, not without loss, the 
 Russian infantry of the detached corps of Sac- 
 ken and Gallitzin. After a brisk fire of small 
 
 arms, the former engaged the latter with the 
 bayonet, and compelled it by haud-to-hand 
 fights to abandon to it the woods on which it 
 supported itself. On the right of these warmly 
 disputed woods, Marshal Davout forced the 
 road from Pultusk to Golymin, and threw upon 
 the . Russians part of the cavalry reserve in- 
 trusted to Rapp, one of those intrepid aides-de- 
 camp, whom Napoleon kept at hand, to em- 
 ploy them on difficult occasions. Rapp upset 
 the Russian infantry, turned the woods, and 
 thus did away with the obstacle which co- 
 vered Golymin. But, being exposed to an ex- 
 tremely brisk fire, he had an arm broken. 
 On the left, Augereau, crossing the marshes 
 in spite of the hostile force placed at that 
 point, took the village of Ruskovo, and 
 marched, on his part, for Golymin, the com- 
 mon object of our concentric attacks. The 
 French penetrated into it towards the close of 
 the day, and made themselves masters of it, 
 after a very hot action with the reserve of 
 Doctorow's division. As at Pultusk, a great 
 quantity of artillery and some prisoners were 
 taken, and the ground was strewed with Rus- 
 sian corpses. In fight with them fewer ene- 
 mies were taken, but more killed. 
 
 On this day, the 26th, our columns were 
 everywhere engaged with the Russian co- 
 lumns, over a space of twenty-five leagues. 
 From an effect of chance, impossible to be 
 prevented when the communications are diffi- 
 cult, while Lannes had found before him twice 
 or thriqe as many Russians as he had French, 
 the other corps met with scarcely their equiva- 
 lent, as Marshals Augereau and Davout, at 
 Golymin, or no enemy to fight, as Marshal 
 Soult in his march for Ciechanow, and Mar- 
 shal Bernadotle in his march for Biezun. 
 Marshal Bessieres, it is true, serving for scout 
 to our left wing, with the second cavalry re- 
 serve, had come up with the Prussians at Bie- 
 zun, and taken a good number of prisoners. 
 Marshal Ney, who formed the extreme left of 
 the army, had marched from Strasburg to Sol- 
 dau and Mlawa, driving Lestocq's corps be- 
 fore him. Arriving on the 26th at Soldau, at 
 the very moment when Lannes was engaged 
 at Pultusk, when Marshals Davout and Auge- 
 reau were engaged at Golymin, he had directed 
 Marchand's division upon Mlawa, in order to 
 turn the position of Soldau, a necessary pre- 
 caution, for insurmountable difficulties might 
 have been found there. In fact, the village of 
 Soldau was situated amidst a marsh impassa- 
 ble except by a single causeway, from seven 
 to eight hundred fathoms in length, resting 
 sometimes upon the ground, sometimes upon 
 bridges, which the enemy had taken care to 
 break down. Six thousand Prussians, with 
 cannon, guarded this causeway. A first battery 
 enfiladed it longitudinally ; a -second, esta- 
 blished on a spot judiciously chosen in the 
 marsh, took it obliquely. Ney, with the 69th, 
 and the 76th, advanced impetuously along it. 
 They threw planks over the broken bridges , 
 they carried the batteries at a run ; they over- 
 turned with the bayonet the infantry drawn up 
 in column on ihe causeway, and entered the 
 village of Soldau pellmell with the fugitives. 
 A most obstinate conflict with the Prussians
 
 240 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1806. 
 
 took place there. The French had to storm 
 Soldau house by house. This was not accom- 
 plished without unparalleled efforts, and not till 
 nightfall. But, at this moment, the gallant ge- 
 neral, Lestocq, rallying his columns in rear of 
 Soldau, made his soldiers swear to recover the 
 lost post. The Prussians, treated by the Rus- 
 
 in men and cannon occasioned to the en em}', 
 and safe winter quarters in the heart of Poland, 
 formed a worthy termination to that extraordi- 
 nary campaign, begun on the Rhine, finished 
 on the Vistula. The state of the weather and 
 of the ground, sufficiently accounted for the 
 circumstance that the results obtained in these 
 
 sians since Jena as the Austrians had been last days had neither the greatness nor the 
 treated since Ulm, determined to avenge their ! suddenness to which Napoleon had accus- 
 
 honour, and to prove that they were not infe- 
 rior in bravery to any nation. And so they 
 did. Four times, from seven in the evening 
 till midnight, they attacked Soldau with the 
 bayonet, and four times they were repulsed. 
 
 tomed the world. The Russians, no doubt 
 surprised at not having been disposed of so 
 speedily as the Prussians at Jena, the Austri- 
 ans at Ulm, and themselves at Austerlitz, went 
 off to pride themselves on a defeat less prompt 
 
 At last, they retired, having sustained an im- ! than usual, and to circulate fables respecting 
 
 mense loss in killed and wounded, and pri- 
 soners. 
 
 Thus, on this day, over a space of twenty- 
 
 their pretended successes : this there was no 
 preventing. This time they would not have 
 been more fortunate, if we had met with frozeu 
 
 five leagues, from the Pultusk to Soldau, there lakes instead of bottomless quagmires. But 
 had been obstinate fighting, and the Russians, the season, a very unusual one, which brought 
 defeated wherever they had attempted to resist with it a muddy soil instead of a frozen soil, 
 us, had not escaped without abandoning their had saved them from a disaster. It was a 
 artillery and baggage. Their army was dimi- freak of Fortune, who had hitherto favoured 
 nished by nearly 20,000 men out of 115,000. Napoleon too much for him not to forgive this 
 Great numbers of them were hors de combat or slight inconstancy : only he ought to have 
 prisoners. Great numbers more, of Polish borne this in mind, and to have learned to 
 origin, had deserted. We had picked up more know her. For the rest, his soldiers encamped 
 than eighty pieces of cannon, of large calibre, on the Vistula, his eagles planted in Warsaw, 
 and a considerable quantity of baggage. We were a sight extraordinary enough for him to 
 had not lost a single prisoner or a single de- feel gratified, for Europe to remain quiet, Aus- 
 serter, but the fire of the enemy had deprived tria awed and affrighted, France confident. 
 us of four or five thousand men, killed or He halted two or three days at Golymin, 
 wounded. | with the intention of allowing his army a little 
 
 The plan of Napoleon, tending to separate rest, and, on the 1st of January, 1807, he re- 
 the Russians from the sea, and to throw them turned to Warsaw, lo arrange there the esta- 
 by a rotatory movement, from the Ukra upon blishment of his winter quarters, 
 the Narew, from the rich coast of old Prussia Whoever desires to have an accurate notion 
 into the woody, marshy, uncultivated interior of the district which he chose for cantoning 
 of Poland, had succeeded on all points, though his troops, must figure to himself the confor- 
 at none had it led to one of those great battles mation of the country beyond the Vistula, 
 which always marked conspicuously the sci- ! That series of lakes to which we have already 
 entific mancBuvres of that immortal captain. ; several times adverted, and which here sepa- 
 The heroic action of Lannes at Pultusk was a ' rate old Prussia from Poland, the German 
 defeat for the Russians, but a defeat without country from the Slavonic country, the mari- 
 disaster, which was as great a novelty for time and rich region from the inland and poor 
 them as for us. If, however, it had been pos- ( region, pour the greater part of their waters 
 sible to march on the next and the following into the interior by a series of rivers, as the 
 day, the Russians would have been obliged to Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, which throw 
 deliver to us the trophies which they could themselves into the Narew, and by the Narew 
 not long withhold from our bravery and our into the Vistula. And while, by means of the 
 skill. Thrown beyond the Ukra; the Orezyc, Omulew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra, the Narew 
 
 and the Narew, into an impenetrable forest, 
 above fifteen or twenty leagues in extent, com- 
 prised between Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Or- 
 telsburg, their complete destruction would 
 
 receives the waters of the lakes which cannot 
 find an outlet to the sea, and which descend 
 from the west, it receives, by means of the 
 
 Bug, the waters descending 
 
 have been the inevitable effect of the profound from the heart of Poland. 
 
 from the east and 
 Uniting with the 
 
 combinations of Napoleon, and of the futile | Bug at Sierock, and increased by all these tri- 
 
 or unfortunate combinations of their gene- 
 rals. 
 
 But it was impossible to take a step without 
 falling into inextricable embarrassments. Men 
 sank up to the waist in those horrible quag- 
 
 butaries, it carries them in a single bed to the 
 Vistula, into which it falls at Modlin. 
 
 The Narew, then, presents one common 
 trunk, which supports itself on the Vistula, 
 around which the Bug on the right, the Ukra, 
 
 mires, and there stuck fast till assistance came the Orezyc and the Omulew on the left, run to 
 to drag them out. Many had expired in this attach themselves to it like so many ramifica- 
 
 situation, for want of timely aid. 
 
 Napoleon, whose plans had never been bet- 
 ter conceived, whose soldiers had never been 
 more valiant, was obliged to halt, after march- 
 ing on for two or three days, to assure himself 
 thoroughly of the rout of the Russians and of 
 their flight towards the Pregel. A great loss 
 
 tions. It was between these ramifications, and 
 appuying himself upon the principal trunk 
 towards Sierock aud Modlin, that Napoleon 
 distributed his corps (Tarmce. 
 
 He made Lannes take cantonments between 
 the Vistula, the Narew, and the Bug, in the 
 angle formed by these streams, guarding at
 
 Jan. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 241 
 
 one and- the same time Warsaw by Suchet's 
 division, Jablona, the bridge of Okunin, and 
 Sierock, by Gazan's division. The head-quar- 
 ters of Lannes were at Sierock, at the conflux 
 of the Bug and the Narew. Marshal Davout's 
 corps was to be cantoned in the angle formed 
 by the Bug and the Narew, his head-quarters 
 adjoining to Pultusk, his posts extending to 
 Brok, on the Bug, to Ostrolenka, on the Narew. 
 The corps of Marshal Soult was established 
 behind the Orezyc, having his head-quarters 
 at Golymin, uniting the cavalry reserve with 
 his corps d'armee, and thus having the means 
 of covering the vast extent of his front by the 
 numerous squadrons placed at his disposal. 
 The corps of Marshal Augereau was cantoned 
 at Plonsk, behind Marshal Soult, occupying 
 the open angle between the Vistula and the 
 Ukra, the head-quarters being at Plonsk. Mar- 
 shal Ney's corps was placed on the extreme 
 left of Marshal Augereau, turned towards 
 Mlawa, about the sources of the Orezyc and 
 the Ukra, near the lakes, protecting the flank 
 of the four corps d'armee, which formed radii 
 around Warsaw, and connected themselves 
 with the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, who de- 
 fended the Lower Vistula. The latter, canton- 
 ed close to the sea, was commissioned to guard 
 the Lower Vistula, and to cover the siege of 
 Dantzig, which it was indispensably necessary 
 to reduce, in order to render the position of 
 the army secure. This siege, moreover, was 
 destined to form the interlude between the cam- 
 paign which was just over, and that which 
 was to be opened in the spring. 
 
 Each corps had orders, on the first appear- 
 ance of the enemy, to concentrate itself, that 
 of Marshal Lannes at Sierock, Marshal Da- 
 rout's at Pultusk, Marshal Soult's at Golymin, 
 Marshal Augereau's at Plonsk, Marshal Ney's 
 at Mlawa, Marshal Bernadotte's between Grau- 
 denz and Elbing, towards Osterode ; the first 
 four charged to defend Warsaw, the fifth to 
 connect the quarters of the Narew with those 
 of the coast, the last to protect the Lower Vis- 
 tula and the siege of Dantzig. 
 
 With this able disposition of the canton- 
 ments, were united precautions of admirable 
 forecast. The soldiers, having bivouacked in- 
 cessantly since the commencement of the cam- 
 paign, that is to say, ever since the month of 
 October, were at length to be lodged in the 
 villages and be subsisted there, but so that 
 they could assemble at any time on the first 
 danger. The light cavalry, the cavalry of the 
 line, the heavy cavalry, ranged one behind 
 another, and appuyed on some detachments of 
 light infantry, formed a long screen before the 
 cantonments, to keep off the Cossacks, and to 
 prevent surprises by means of frequent recon- 
 noissances. The troops engaged in this very 
 hard service were sheltered by hovels, the ma- 
 terials for which were furnished by the woods 
 so abundant in Poland. 
 
 Orders were issued to scour the country in 
 qnest of the corn and the potatoes hidden under 
 ground by the inhabitants before their flight, 
 to collect the dispersed cattle, and to form with 
 what should be thus got together magazines 
 which, established for each corps, and regu- 
 larly administered, would be secured from all 
 VOL. II. 31 
 
 waste. The corps which were not advanta- 
 geously placed in regard to alimentary re- 
 sources, were to receive supplies of corn, 
 forage, and butchers' meat from Warsaw. 
 What was to be sent them, embarked on the 
 Vistula, was to descend the river to the near- 
 est point to each corps, to be there landed and 
 carried away by the army equipages, or by 
 vehicles organized in the country. Napoleon 
 had ordered all services to be paid in money, 
 either on account of the Poles, whom he wished 
 to conciliate, or on account of the inhabitants, 
 whom he hoped to attract by the prospect of 
 gain. 
 
 It should be remarked that each corps, though 
 cantoned in such a manner as to be able to 
 proceed rapidly to any point that might be in 
 danger, had a base on the Vistula or on the 
 Narew, in order to turn the water transport to 
 account. Thus, Marshal Lannes had at War- 
 saw, Marshal Davout at Pultusk, Marshal Au- 
 gereau at Wyszogrod, Marshal Soult at Plock, 
 Marshal Ney at Thorn, Marshal Bernadotte at 
 Marienburg and Elbing, a base on that vast 
 line of navigation. At these different points 
 were to be placed their depots, their hospitals, 
 their establishments for preserving provisions, 
 their shops for repairs, because to these places 
 the articles necessary for those departments 
 could be brought with the greatest facility. 
 
 In the ordinary histories of war, we see only 
 armies completely formed and ready to enter 
 into action ; but it can scarcely be imagined 
 what efforts it costs to bring the armed man to 
 his post, equipped, fed, trained, lastly cured, if 
 he has been sick or wounded. All these diffi- 
 culties are increased in proportion to the 
 change of- climate, or to the distance which 
 the army removes from the point of departure. 
 Most generals or governments neglect this 
 kind of attentions, and their armies melt away 
 visibly. Those only who practise them with 
 perseverance and skill find means to keep their 
 troops numerous and well-disposed. The ope- 
 ration which we are describing is the most 
 admirable example of this sort of difficulties 
 completely overcome and surmounted. 
 
 Napoleon desired that, as soon as situations 
 adapted to each cantonment were chosen, and 
 necessaries collected, or such as were deficient 
 brought from Warsaw, ovens should be built, 
 and destroyed mills repaired. He required 
 that, when the regular supply of the troops was 
 insured, and when, in preparing provisions, a 
 larger stock had accumulated than the quan- 
 tity indispensable for the daily consumption, 
 there should be formed a reserve store of bread, 
 biscuit, spirits, not at the place where the de- 
 pot was fixed, but at the spot appointed for the 
 assembling of each corps d'armee in case of at- 
 tack. No doubt the reader guesses his motive. 
 He wished that, if a sudden appearance of the 
 enemy called the troops to arms, each corps 
 might have sufficient provisions for seven or 
 eight days' march. He took in genera) no 
 more time than that to accomplish a great op^ 
 ration and to decide a campaign. 
 
 With the money arising from the contribu- 
 tions levied in Prussia, which was first col- 
 lected on the Oder, and then conveyed to the 
 Vistula in artillery wagons, b caused the
 
 242 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1807. 
 
 troops to be punctually paid, and moreover 
 granted extraordinary aids to the masses of the 
 regiments. By masses are meant the portions 
 of the pay thrown into a common fund, to feed, 
 clothe, and warm the soldier. It was a method 
 of increasing the comforts of the troops in 
 proportion to the difficulty of subsisting, or to 
 the more rapid consumption of articles of 
 equipment. 
 
 The first days of this establishment amidst 
 the marshes and forests of Poland, and during 
 the inclemencies of winter, were most irksome. 
 If the cold had been intense, the soldier, warmed 
 at the expense of the forests of Poland, would 
 have suffered less from the frost than from that 
 soaking wet which drenched the ground, ren- 
 dered it almost impossible to stir abroad, in- 
 creased the fatigues of the service, saddened 
 the eye, relaxed the muscles, depressed the 
 spirits. In that country they could not have a 
 worse winter than a rainy winter. The tem- 
 perature varied incessantly from frost to thaw, 
 never reaching below one or two degrees of 
 cold, and returning to the moist, soft tempera- 
 ture of autumn. In consequence, the men 
 longed for frost, as in the fine climates people 
 long for the sunshine and the verdure of spring. 
 
 In a few days, however, their situation be- 
 gan to improve. The corps made their abode 
 in the deserted villages ; the advanced guards 
 built themselves hovels with branches of fir. 
 A great quantity of potatoes and cattle enough 
 were found. But the soldiers grew tired of 
 potatoes, and sighed after bread. By and by, 
 they discovered corn hidden in the woods, and 
 collected it in magazines. They also received 
 some by the Vistula and the Narew, part of 
 that which the ingenuity of the Jews contrived 
 to send down to Warsaw, through the military 
 cordons of Austria. A system of bribery, 
 adroitly practised by these clever traders, had 
 lulled the vigilance of the guardians of the 
 Austrian frontier. Being paid a good price 
 either in salt taken in the Prussian magazines 
 or in ready money, the supplies were furnishec 
 with tolerable regularity. The ovens were 
 built, and the damaged mills repaired. The 
 reserve magazines began to be organized. The 
 wines necessary for the health of the soldier 
 and for his good humour, drawn from all the 
 cities of the north, to which commerce carrie 
 them in abundance, and conveyed by the 
 Oder, the Warta, and the Netze, to the Vis 
 tula, arrived also, though with more difficul- 
 ty. All the corps, indeed, did not enjoy the 
 same advantages. Those of Marshals Davou 
 and Soult, pushed forwarder into the woody 
 region, and far from the navigation of the 
 Vistula, were most exposed to privations 
 The corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau 
 placed nearer to the great river of Poland, had 
 less to suffer. The indefatigable Ney had by 
 his industry and boldness opened a source of 
 abundance for himself. He had approachec 
 very near to 'the German country, which is 
 extremely rich ; nay, he had even ventured to 
 the banks of the Pregel. Sallying forth or 
 daring expeditions, he placed his soldiers on 
 sledges when it froze, and went marauding to 
 the very gates of KOnigsberg, which indeed 
 *ie had once wellnigh surprised and carried. 
 
 The corps of Bernadotte was very favour- 
 ably situated for subsisting on the Lower Vis- 
 ula. But the proximity of the Prussian gar- 
 risons of Graudenz, Dantzig. Elbing, annoyed 
 lim severely, and prevented him from enjoying 
 .he resources of that country so much as he 
 might have done. 
 
 After several skirmishes with the Cossacks, 
 they had been obliged to leave the cantonments 
 quiet. It was perceived that the light cavalry 
 was a sufficient guard, and that the heavy ca 
 valry suffered much in the advanced canton- 
 ments. Accordingly, Napoleon, enlightened 
 by the experience of a few days, made a change 
 in his dispositions. He brought back the heavy 
 cavalry towards the Vistula. General d'Haut- 
 poul's cuirassiers were cantoned around Thorn; 
 the dragoons of all the divisions from Thorn 
 to Warsaw; General Nansouty's cuirassiers 
 behind the Vistula, between the Vistula and 
 the Pilica. The light cavalry, reinforced by 
 some brigades of dragoons, remained at the 
 advanced posts, but came by turns, two regi- 
 ments at a time, to recruit itself on the Vistula 
 where forage abounded. Gudin's division of 
 Davout's corps, which had suffered more than 
 any other in the whole army, because it had 
 borne a part in two of the hottest actions dur- 
 ing the war, Auerstadt and Pultusk, was sent 
 to Warsaw, to indemnify itself there for its fa- 
 tigues and its combats. 
 
 The army, it is true, did not fare so well in 
 the recesses of Poland as in the camp of Boo- 
 logne, where all the means of France and the 
 space of two years had been devoted to pro- 
 viding for its wants. But it had necessaries, 
 and sometimes more. Napoleon, in reply to 
 Fouche, the minister, who communicated to 
 him the rumours circulated by disaffected per- 
 sons respecting the hardships endured by our 
 soldiers, wrote as follows : 
 
 " It is true that the magazines of Warsaw 
 not being largely stored, and the impossibility 
 of collecting there in a short lime a great 
 quantity of corn, have rendered provisions 
 scarce; but it is as absurd to imagine that 
 there is no corn, no wine, no butcher's meat, 
 no potatoes, to be found in Poland, as to say 
 that they are not to be got in Egypt. 
 
 " I have at Warsaw an establishment which 
 furnishes me with 100,000 rations of biscuit 
 per day; I have one at Thorn; I have maga- 
 zines at Posen, at Lowicz, along the whole line : 
 I have sufficient to feed an army for more than 
 a year. You must recollect that, at the time 
 of the expedition to Egypt, letters from the 
 army asserted that we were dying there of hun- 
 ger. Let articles be written in this spirit. It 
 is natural that we should be short of something 
 when we were driving the Russians from War- 
 saw; but the productions of the country are 
 such, that it is impossible to feel any alarm/' 
 (Warsaw, 18th January, 1807.) 
 
 There was, however, a considerable number 
 of sick, indeed more than usual, in that valiant 
 army. They were seized with fevers and pains, 
 in consequence of the continual bivouacs, be- 
 neath a cold sky, upon the wet ground. This 
 was no more than what might be expected from 
 what befei the chiefs themselves. Several 
 i marshals, those, in particular, who were called
 
 Jan. 1807.] 
 
 < ONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 243 
 
 Italians and Egyptr ins, because they had served 
 in Italy and Egypt, were seriously indisposed. 
 Murat had not been able to take part in the 
 last operations on the Narew. Augereau, suf- 
 fering from rheumatism, was obliged to with- 
 draw himself from the contact with the cold 
 damp air. Lannes, taken ill at Warsaw, had 
 been forced to leave the 5th corps, which he 
 could no longer command. 
 
 Napoleon crowned the attentions paid to his 
 soldiers by attentions not less assiduous to his 
 sick and wounded. He had caused six thou- 
 sand beds to be prepared at Warsaw, and an 
 equally considerable number to be provided at 
 Thorn, at Posen, and on the rear, between the 
 Vistula and the Oder. There had been seized 
 in Berlin, wool coming from the domains of 
 the Crown, and tent-cloth; out of these, mat- 
 tresses were made for the hospitals. Having 
 at his disposal Silesia, which Prince Jerome 
 had occupied, and which abounds in linen of 
 all kinds, Napoleon ordered a great quantity to 
 be bought and to be made into shirts. He es- 
 pecially committed the direction of the hos- 
 pitals to M. Daru, and prescribed a peculiar 
 organization for those establishments. He de- 
 termined that in each hospital there should be 
 a chief overseer, always provided with ready 
 money, charged, upon his responsibility, to 
 procure for the sick whatever they needed, 
 under the superintendence of a Catholic priest. 
 This priest, while exercising the spiritual min- 
 istry, was also to exercise a sort of paternal 
 vigilance, to make reports to the Emperor, to 
 acquaint him with the slightest negligence to- 
 wards the sick, whose protector he was thus 
 constituted. Napoleon had intended that this 
 priest should have a salary; and that each hos- 
 pital should become, in some sort, an itinerant 
 cure in the train of the army. 
 
 Such were the infinite pains taken by this 
 great captain, whom party hatred represented, 
 on the day of his fall, as a barbarous con- 
 queror, driving men to the slaughter, without 
 giving himself any concern about feeding them 
 when he made them march, or about their cure 
 when he had made cripples of them, and car- 
 ing no more about them than about the beasts 
 which drew his cannon and his baggage. 
 
 After attending to the men with a zeal 
 which is not the less noble because it was in- 
 terested for there are generals, sovereigns, 
 who suffer the soldiers, the instruments of 
 their power and their glory, to perish for want 
 Napoleon directed his attention to the works 
 undertaken on the Vistula, and to the punc- 
 tual arrival of his reinforcements, so that in 
 spring his army might present itself to the 
 enemy more formidable than ever. He had 
 given orders, as we have seen, for works at 
 Praga, purposing that Warsaw should be able 
 to support itself unaided, with a mere garri- 
 son, in case he should move forward. Hav- 
 ing examined every thing with his own eyes, 
 he resolved upon the construction of eight re- 
 doubts, closed at the gorge, with scarp and 
 counterscarp, lined with wood a species of 
 revetement, the value of which the siege of 
 Dantzig soon afforded occasion for appreciat- 
 ing and embracing in their circle the exten- 
 sive suburb of Praga. He resolved to add to 
 
 them a work which, placed in rear of these 
 eight redoubts, and opposite to the bridge of 
 boats connecting Warsaw with Praga, should 
 serve at once for an appendage to that species 
 of fortress, and for te'e du pont to the bridge of 
 Warsaw. At Okunin, where bridges were 
 thrown across the Narew and the Ukra, he 
 ordered a mass of works, to cover them and 
 to secure the exclusive possession of them to 
 the French army. The same thing was pre- 
 scribed at the bridge of Modlin, which had 
 been thrown at the conflux of the Vistula and 
 the Narew, and where advantage had been 
 taken of an island to ground upon it the 
 means of passage, and to construct a defen- 
 sive work of the greatest strength. Thus be- 
 tween the three points of Warsaw, Okunin, 
 and Modlin, where so many and so large 
 streams meet, Napoleon secured all the pas- 
 sages to himself, and interdicted them all to 
 the Russians ; so that these great natural ob- 
 stacles, converted into facilities for him, into 
 insurmountable difficulties for the enemy, be- 
 came in his hands powerful means of manoeu- 
 vre, and could, above all, be left to themselves, 
 if circumstances obliged him to advance far- 
 ther north than he had yet done. Napoleon 
 completed this system by a work of the same 
 kind at Sierock, at the conflux of the Narew 
 and the Bug. With timber, which abounded 
 on the spot, with money, which he had at his 
 disposal, he was certain to have both mate- 
 rials and hands to set to work upon them. 
 
 Napoleon had drawn from Paris two regi- 
 ments of infantry, the 15th light, and the 58th 
 of the line, a regiment of fusiliers of the guard, 
 and a regiment of the municipal guard. He 
 had also drawn one regiment from Brest, one 
 from St. Lo, and one from Boulogne. These 
 seven regiments were on march, as well as 
 the provisional regiments destined to conduct 
 the recruits of the depot battalions to the war 
 battalions. Two of them, the 15th light, and 
 the 58th, had outstripped the others and joined 
 Marshal Mortier's corps, which was thus in- 
 creased to eight French regiments, besides 
 the Dutch or Italian regiments, which were to 
 complete its effective. Napoleon, taking ad- 
 tage of this reinforcement, which at the mo- 
 ment exceeded the wants of the eighth corps, 
 for thus far no enterprise seemed to threaten 
 the shores of the Baltic, detached from it the 
 2d and 15th light, forming 4000 men, good 
 French infantry. He joined to them the Ba- 
 den troops, the eight Polish battalions raised 
 at Posen, the legion of the north, full of vete- 
 ran Poles who had long been in the service 
 of France, the four fine regiments of cuiras- 
 siers which had come from Italy, lastly, two 
 of the four fine regiments of cavalry, which 
 I had likewise come from Italy, -the 19th and 
 | 23d chasseurs. With these troops ho com- 
 posed a new corps d' armee, to which he gave 
 | the title of French corps; the Germans, who 
 i were in Silesia under Prince Jerome, having 
 already received the title of ninth. He in- 
 trusted the command of this corps to old Mar- 
 shal Lefebvre, whom he had brought with him 
 to the grand army, and placed temporarily at 
 the head of the infantry of the guard. He 
 charged him to invest Colberg, and to com-
 
 244 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1807. 
 
 mence the siege of Dantzig. The latter fort- 
 ress had a particular importance, on account 
 of the position which it occupied on the thea- 
 tre of the war. It commanded the Lower Vis- 
 tula, protected the arrivals of the enemy by 
 sea, and contained immense resources, which 
 would place the army in abundance, if we 
 could make ourselves masters of it. Besides, 
 so long as it was not taken, an offensive 
 movement of the enemy towards the sea, 
 pushed beyond the Lower Vistula, might 
 oblige us to leave the Upper Vistula, and to 
 fall back towards the Oder. Napoleon was 
 therefore resolved to make the siege of Dant- 
 zig the grand operation of the winter. 
 
 Napoleon, thus devoting the bad season to 
 the reduction of fortresses, purposed to besiege 
 not only those of the Lower Vistula, which 
 were on his left, but also those of the Upper 
 Oder, which were on his right. His brother 
 Jerome, seconded by General Vandamme, was, 
 as we have seen, to complete the subjection 
 of Silesia by the successive reduction of the 
 fortresses of the Oder. ' These fortresses, con- 
 structed with care by the great Frederick, to 
 render definitive the valuable conquest which 
 constituted the glory of his reign, presented 
 serious difficulties to surmount, not only in 
 the magnitude and excellence of the works, 
 but also in the garrisons which were charged 
 to defend them. The surrender of Magdeburg, 
 Custrin, Stettin, had covered with disgrace the 
 commandants who had given them up, under 
 the empire of a general demoralization. A 
 reaction had soon taken place in the Prussian 
 army, at first so deeply discouraged after Jena. 
 Indignant honour had spoken to the hearts of 
 all the military men, and they were deter- 
 mined to die honourably, even without anv 
 hope of conquering. The king had threat- 
 ened with terrible punishments those com- 
 mandants who should surrender fortresses 
 committed to their keeping, till they had done 
 all that constitutes, according to the rules of 
 the art, an honourable defence. It began 
 moreover to be understood, that the fortresses 
 remaining on Napoleon's left and right would 
 soon acquire a special importance, for they 
 were so many points d'appui needed by his dar- 
 ing march,and which must second the resistance 
 of his enemies. The resolution to defend them 
 energetically was therefore firmly taken by all 
 the commandants of the Prussian garrisons. 
 
 Prince Jerome had with him only Wirtem- 
 bergers and Bavarians, and, with these aux- 
 iliary troops, a single French regiment, the 
 13th of the line, and a few squadrons of French 
 light cavalry. These German auxiliaries had 
 not yet acquired that military valour which they 
 subsequently displayed on more than one oc- 
 casion. But General Vandamme, who com- 
 manded the ninth corps under Prince Jerome, 
 and General Montbrun, commanding the caval- 
 ry, assisted by a young French staff, full of 
 irdour, infused into them, in a short time, the 
 spirit which then animated our army, and 
 which it communicated to all the troops in 
 contact with it. Vandamme, who had never 
 directed a siege, and possessed none of the 
 qualifications of the engineer, but who made 
 amends for all by a happy instinct for war, 
 
 had undertaken to proceed in a summary man- 
 ner with the fortresses of Silesia, though he 
 knew that the governors of those places were 
 resolved to defend them stoutly. He intended 
 to employ the means which had been used at 
 Magdeburg, and to intimidate the inhabitants, 
 in order to impel them to surrender in spite of 
 the garrisons. He began with Glogau, the 
 place nearest to the Lower Oder and to the 
 military routes followed by our troops. The 
 garrison was not numerous, and demoraliza- 
 tion still prevailed in its ranks. Vandamme 
 had several mortars and pieces of heavy artil- 
 lery placed in battery, and, after some threats, 
 followed up with effect, induced the place to 
 capitulate on the 2d of December. Here 
 were found great resources in artillery and 
 stores of all kinds. Vandamme then ascended 
 the Oder, and commenced the investment of 
 Breslau, situated on that river, about twenty 
 leagues above Glogau. 
 
 It was with the Wirtembergers that Glogau 
 had been taken. They were not enough to 
 besiege Breslau, a city containing 60,000 souls, 
 provided with a garrison of 6000 men, nume- 
 rous and solid works, and a good commandant. 
 Prince Jerome, who had pushed on to the en- 
 virons of Kalisch, while the French army was 
 making its first entry into Poland, had returned 
 to the Oder, since Napoleon, solidly established 
 on the Vistula, had no further occasion for 
 the presence of the ninth corps towards his 
 right. Vandamme therefore had, for under- 
 taking the siege of Breslau, the Wirtember- 
 gers, two Bavarian divisions, with some French 
 artillerymen and engineers, and likewise the 
 13th of the line. To carry on a regular siege 
 of so extensive a place, appeared to him a long 
 and difficult business. In consequence, he en- 
 deavoured, as at Glogau, to intimidate the popu- 
 lation. He chose in a suburb, that of St. 
 Nicholas, a site for establishing batteries for 
 red-hot shot. A brisk fire, directed upon the 
 interior of the city, failed of producing the in- 
 tended result, owing to the vigour of the com- 
 mandant. Vandamme then turned his thoughts 
 to a more serious attack. Breslau had fur its 
 principal defence a bastioned enclosure, bor- 
 dered by a deep ditch, full of the water of the 
 Oder. But the French engineers perceived 
 that this enclosure was not everywhere lined, 
 and that, at certain points, there was nothing 
 but a scarp of earth. Vandamme resolved to 
 attempt the assault of the enclosure, which, 
 consisting not in a wall of masonry but a mere 
 turf slope, might be scaled by enterprising sol- 
 diers. It would first be necessary to cro<=s 
 upon rafts the ditch which was supplied by the 
 Oder. Vandamme caused whatever was re- 
 quisite for this daring enterprise, to be pre- 
 pared. Unluckily, the preparations were dis- 
 covered by the enemy ; the moon shone brightly 
 during the night of the execution; and from 
 these variou-s causes the attempt miscarried. 
 Meanwhile, the Prince of Anhalt-Pless, who 
 was governor of the province, having collected 
 detachments from all the fortresses, and raised 
 a levy of peasants, which had procured him a 
 corps of 12,000 men, gave the garrison hopes 
 of succour from without Nothing could have 
 happened more fortunately for the besiegers
 
 Jan. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 215 
 
 than to have solved in open field the question 
 of the capture of Breslau. Vandamme has- 
 tened to meet the Prince of Anhalt with the 
 Bavarians and the French 13th of the line, 
 beat him twice, put him completely to the rout, 
 and appeared again before the place now de- 
 prived of all hope of relief. At the same time, 
 a sharp frost having set in, he resolved to cross 
 the ditches upon the ice, and to scale the earth 
 works. The commandant, finding himself in 
 danger of being taken by assault, a danger 
 most alarming for a wealthy and populous city, 
 consented to parley, and surrendered 'the place 
 on the 7th of January, after a month's resist- 
 ance, on the conditions granted to Magdeburg, 
 Ciistrin, and the other fortresses of Prussia. 
 
 This conquest was not only brilliant, but 
 singularly useful for the resources which it 
 afforded to the French army, by the command, 
 in particular, which it gave us over Silesia, the 
 richest province in Prussia, and one of the 
 richest in Europe. Napoleon congratulated 
 Vandamme upon it, and after Vandamme his 
 brother Jerome, who had shown the intelli- 
 gence of a good officer and the courage of a 
 brave soldier. 
 
 A few days afterwards, the ninth corps made 
 a further conquest, that of Brieg, situated above 
 Breslau, on the Oder. The whole centre of 
 Silesia being reduced, there yet remained to 
 be taken Schweidnitz, Glatz and Neisse, which 
 shut the door of Silesia on the side next to Bo- 
 hemia. Napoleon ordered them to be besieged 
 one after another, and determined, in as far as 
 he was concerned, upon a rigorous act, but yet 
 conformable to the law of war, namely, to de- 
 stroy them. In consequence, he ordered the 
 works of those which were already in his 
 power to be blown up. He had a two-fold rea- 
 son for acting thus ; one of the moment, the 
 other prospective. At the moment, he wished 
 to avoid scattering his troops by multiplying 
 around him the posts to be guarded: for the 
 future, not reckoning upon Prussia as an ally, 
 perceiving every day that he must not flatter 
 himself to make a friend of Austria, he had 
 henceforth nothing to hope but from the mis- 
 understanding which had always divided those 
 two courts. Silesia, dismantled on the side 
 towards Austria, would become for Prussia an 
 object of uneasiness, an occasion for expenses, 
 and a cause of weakness. 
 
 Thus on the rear of the army, on the left as 
 on the right, the visible progress of our opera- 
 tions attested that the enemy could not derange 
 them, since he suffered them to be accom- 
 plished. A few partisans, indeed, sallying 
 from the fortresses of Colberg and Dantzig, 
 recruited by Prussian prisoners who had es- 
 caped, infested the roads. Several detachments 
 were employed in pursuing them. A slight 
 accident, of little consequence, did, however, 
 excite a momentary alarm for the tranquillity 
 of Germany. Hesse, whose sovereign Napo- 
 leon had recently dethroned, whose fortresses 
 he had demolished, whose army he had dis- 
 solved, was naturally the worst disposed pro- 
 vince of Germany towards the French. Thirty 
 thousand disbanded men, without employ, de- 
 prived of pay and of the means of subsistence, 
 were, though disarmed, a dangerous leaven, 
 
 which prudence cautioned against leaving in 
 the country. Part of them had been induced 
 to enrol themselves, without being informed 
 where they would be expected to serve. The 
 intention was to employ them in Naples. The 
 secret having transpired, through some indis- 
 cretions committed at Mayence, the enrolled 
 men broke into insurrection, saying that the 
 Hessians were about to be sent to perish in 
 the Calabrias. General Lagrange, who com- 
 manded in Hesse, had but very few troops at 
 his disposal. The insurgents disarmed a 
 French detachment, and threatened to raise 
 all Hesse. But the forecast of Napoleon had 
 furnished beforehand the means of parrying 
 this unlucky circumstance. Provisional regi- 
 ments which had set out from the Rhine, and 
 an Italian regiment on march for Marshal 
 Mortier's corps, the fusiliers of the guard 
 drawn from Paris, and one of the regiments 
 of chasseurs coming from Italy, were not far 
 off. They were despatched in the utmost haste 
 to Cassel, and the insurrection was quelled 
 immediately. 
 
 Then the immense country extending from 
 the Rhine to the Vistula, from the mountains 
 of Bohemia to the sea, was brought under 
 subjection. The fortresses surrendered one 
 after another to our troops, and our reinforce- 
 ments passed quietly through them, performing 
 the police duty there, while marching toward 
 the theatre of war to recruit the grand army. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Russian general, Benning 
 sen, had so boldly proclaimed himself victo- 
 rious, that the King of Prussia, at Ko'nigsberg, 
 the Emperor Alexander, at Petersburg, had 
 received and accepted congratulations. And 
 though the material results, such as the retreat 
 of the Russians upon the Pregel, our tranquil 
 establishment on the Vistula, the sieges under- 
 taken and finished on the Oder, must have 
 answered all these bombasts of an enemy, who 
 fancied himself victorious when he had not 
 sustained a disaster so complete as that of 
 Austerlitz or Jena ; people affected, neverthe- 
 less, to show a certain joy. That joy was 
 manifested more particularly at Vienna, and 
 in the bosom of the imperial court. Emperor, 
 archdukes, ministers, high personages, alike 
 congratulated one another. Nothing was more 
 natural and more legitimate. There was no 
 fault to be found but with the language held by 
 the cabinet of Vienna in its most recent com- 
 munications with Napoleon language which 
 perhaps passed the bounds of the dissimula- 
 tion allowable in such cases. At any rate, the 
 error which caused the joy of our enemies was 
 not of long duration. M. de Lucchesini, who 
 had left the court of Prussia at the same time 
 as M. de Haugwitz, was just then passing 
 through Vienna, on his way to Lucca, his na- 
 tive city. He was no longer tinder illusion 
 himself, he had no interest in palming illusion 
 upon others, and, in consequence, he told the 
 truth relative to the sanguinary encounters of 
 which the Vistula had just been the theatre. 
 The quagmires of Poland, he said, had para- 
 lyzed vanquished and victors, and enabled the 
 Russians to withdraw themselves from the 
 pursuit of the French. But the Russians, 
 beaten most soundly everywhere, had no 
 x 2
 
 248 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1807. 
 
 chance to make head against the formidable 
 soldiers of Napoleon. They need but wait 
 till spring, perhaps only till the first frost, to 
 see the latter make an irruption upon the Pre- 
 gel or the Niemen, and put an end to the war 
 by some signal stroke. The French army, 
 added M. de Lucchesini, was neither demoral- 
 ized nor destitute of resources, as it was al- 
 leged : it lived well, accommodated itself to 
 the damp, cold climate of Poland, as it had 
 formerly accommodated itself to the dry, 
 scorching climate of Egypt: it had, in short, 
 implicit faith in the genius and good fortune 
 of its leader. 
 
 This intelligence, from a calm and disinte- 
 rested observer, dispelled the false joy of the 
 Austrians. The court of Vienna, as well to 
 make Napoleon easy by a friendly proceeding, 
 as to have at the French head-quarters an ac- 
 curate informant, solicited an authorization to 
 send the Baron de Vincent to Warsaw. The 
 ministers of the foreign courts who had wished 
 to follow M. de Talleyrand to Berlin, some of 
 them even to Warsaw, had been politely shuf- 
 fled off, as inconvenient and frequently very 
 slanderous witnesses. The mission of M. de 
 Vincent, however, was assented to out of in- 
 dulgence for Austria, and also to furnish her 
 with a direct medium for being informed of 
 the truth, which it was much more the interest 
 of Napoleon to make him acquainted with than 
 to conceal from him. Accordingly, M. de Vin- 
 cent arrived towards the end of January at 
 Warsaw. 
 
 While Napoleon was employing the month 
 of January, 1807, either in consolidating his 
 position on the Vistula, or in augmenting his 
 army by reinforcements from France and Italy, 
 or, lastly, in exciting the east against Russia, 
 holding himself in readiness to meet any im- 
 mediate attack, though believing that there 
 would be none, the Russians, notwithstanding 
 the severity of the season, were preparing one 
 for him, and a most formidable one. After the 
 affair at Pultusk, General Benningsen being 
 beaten, whatever he might choose to say for 
 what general retires in the greatest haste when 
 he is victorious 1 had passed the Narew, 
 and found himself in the region of heaths, 
 marshes, and woods, extending between the 
 Narew and the Bug. He had there picked up 
 two divisions of General Buxhovden's, most 
 uselessly left by the latter at Popowo, on the 
 Bug, during the late engagements. He as- 
 cended the Narew with these two divisions 
 and those of his army which had fought at 
 Pultusk. At this same moment, the two demi- 
 divisions of General Benningsen's, which had 
 been unable to join him, rallied to the two di- 
 visions of General Buxhovden's, which were 
 at Golymin and Makow, and remained on the 
 other bank of the Narew, the bridges of which 
 had just been carried away by the ice. The 
 two portions of the Russian army, deprived 
 of the possibility of communicating with each 
 other, ascended the banks of the Narew, the 
 separation of which might have been easily 
 overcome, if one could have been informed of 
 their situation, and if, moreover, the state of 
 the roads had allowed us to get at them. But 
 who can know every thing in war 1 The ablest 
 
 of generals is he who, by dint of application 
 and sagacity, contrives to be a little less igno- 
 rant of the enemy's plans than the generality. 
 Under any other circumstances, Napoleon, 
 with his prodigious activity, with his art in 
 following up victory, would soon have disco- 
 vered the perilous situation of the Russian 
 army, and infallibly destroyed that portion of 
 it which he should have chosen to pursue. 
 But buried in mud, deprived of artillery and 
 bread, he had found it utterly impossible to 
 stir; besides, having led his soldiers from the 
 extremity of Europe, he had considered it as 
 a sort of cruelty to put their attachment to a 
 longer trial. 
 
 General Benningsen and General Buxhov- 
 den made some attempts to join, but the 
 bridges, several times repaired, were as often 
 broken down again, and they found them- 
 selves obliged slowly to ascend the Narew, 
 living as they could, and endeavouring to 
 reach places where a junction would be prac- 
 ticable. They contrived, however, to meet 
 personally, and they had an interview at No- 
 wogrod. Though by no means disposed to 
 come to a better understanding, they agreed to 
 a plan, tending to nothing less than the prose- 
 cution of hostilities, in spite of the state of the 
 country and of the season. General Benning- 
 sen, who, by dint of asserting that he was vic- 
 torious at Pultusk, at length believed that he 
 was so, absolutely insisted on resuming the 
 offensive, and decided the immediate continu- 
 ation of the military operations, by pursuing 
 a totally different course from that which had 
 at first been adopted. Instead of keeping 
 along the Narew and its tributaries, and thus 
 backing upon the woody country, which fixed 
 the point of attack on Warsaw, it was re- 
 solved to make an extensive circuit, to turn 
 by a movement in rear the vast mass of fo- 
 rest, then to traverse the line of the lakes, and 
 to bear away towards the maritime region of 
 Braunsberg, Elbing, Marienburg, and Dantzig. 
 In operating on this side they were sure of 
 provisions, owing to the richness of the soil 
 along the coast. They flattered themselves, 
 moreover, that they should surprise the ex- 
 treme left of the French cantonments, perhaps 
 carry off Marshal Bernadotte, established on 
 the Lower Vistula, easily pass that river on 
 which they had retained several appuis, and, 
 by pushing beyond Dantzig, annul at a single 
 stroke the position of Napoleon in advance 
 of Warsaw. 
 
 In fact, if you cast your eye on the line de 
 scribed by the Vistula and the Oder to dis- 
 charge themselves into the Baltic, you will re- 
 mark that they run at first to the north-west, 
 the Vistula as far as the environs of Thorn, 
 the Oder to the environs of Ciistrin ; that 
 they then turn abruptly to proceed to the 
 north-east, thus forming a considerable elbow, 
 the Vistula towards Thorn, the Oder towards 
 Ciistrin. It results from this direction, parti- 
 cularly as far as the Vistula is concerned, 
 that the Russian corps, passing that river be- 
 tween Graudenz and Thorn, would be much 
 nearer to Posen, the base of our operations in 
 Poland, than the French army encamped at 
 Warsaw. The difference was nearly half. I*
 
 Jan. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 247 
 
 was, therefore, in itself a well-conceived plan 
 to cross the Vistula between Thorn and Mari- 
 enburg, saving the able execution, on which i 
 the result of the best plans always depends.! 
 We have, in fact, already demonstrated more j 
 than once that, without precision in the calcu- 
 lation of distance and time, without prompt- 
 ness in marches, vigour in encounters, perse- 
 verance in following up an idea to its com- 
 plete accomplishment, every bold manoauvre 
 becomes as mischievous as it might have been 
 fortunate. And here, in particular, if one failed, 
 one would be sure to be turned by Napoleon, 
 cut off from Kb'nigsberg, driven back to the sea, 
 and exposed to a real disaster; for, to repeat 
 another truth, already expressed elsewhere, in 
 every great combination, you run as much 
 risk as you cause your adversary to incur. 
 
 Scarcely had the two Russian generals 
 agreed upon the plan to be adopted, when a 
 resolution taken at St. Petersburg, in conse- 
 quence of the false statements of General Ben- 
 ningsen, conferred on him the order of St. 
 George, appointed him general-in-chief, and 
 relieved him from the military supremacy 
 of old Kamenski, and from the rivalry of 
 General Buxhovden. These two latter were 
 by the same resolution recalled from the army. 
 
 General Benningsen, left alone at the head 
 of the Russian troops, naturally persisted in a 
 plan which was his own, and hastened to 
 carry it into execution. He ascended the 
 Narew to Tykoczyn, passed the Bober near 
 Goniondz, at the very spot where Charles XII. 
 had crossed it a century before, and proceeded 
 to traverse the line of the lakes near Lake 
 Spirding, by Arys, Rhein, Rastenburg, and 
 Brischoffstein. The names of the places show 
 that he had reached the German country, that 
 is to say, East Prussia. On the 22d of Janu- 
 ary, a month after the last actions of Pultusk, 
 Golymin, and Soldau, he arrived at Heilsberg 
 on the Alle. It is not thus that he must 
 march who hopes to surprise a vigilant ene- 
 my. However, concealed by that impenetra- 
 ble curtain of forests and lakes, which sepa- 
 rated the two armies, the movement of the 
 Russians was entirely unperceived by the 
 French. 
 
 At this period, General Essen had, at last, 
 brought the two divisions of reserve, so long, 
 announced, which increased the number of 
 the divisions of the Russian army to ten, ex- 
 clusively of the Prussian corps of General 
 Lestocq. These two new divisions, composed 
 of recruits, were destined to guard not only 
 the Bug and the Narew, but also the position 
 previously occupied by the two divisions of 
 General Buxhovden, which had no share in 
 the operations of the month of December. 
 Sedmaratski's division was posted at Goni- 
 ondz, on the Bober, to watch the line of the 
 lakes, to keep up the communications with 
 the copps of General Essen, and to give um- 
 brage to the French on their right. Of the 
 ten divisions then, General Benningsen re- 
 tained but seven, to proceed with him to the 
 
 coast and to the Lower Vistula. After the 
 losses sustained in December, the^ might 
 form a force of 80,000 men, and of 90,000, 
 at least, with the Prussian corps of Lestocq. 
 
 We have already explained that the waters 
 of the lakes run off, some inland by the Omu- 
 lew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, into the Narew and 
 the Vistula; others through small rivers di- 
 rectly to the sea; and that the principal of 
 these is the Passarge, which falls perpendicu- 
 larly into the Frische Haff. The French corps, 
 scattered on the right about the Narew and its 
 tributaries, on the left about the Passarge, co- 
 vered the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to 
 Elbing. Marshals Lannes and Davout had 
 their cantonments, as we have said, along the 
 Narew, from its fall into the Vistula to Pul- 
 tusk and above it, forming the right of the 
 French army, and covering Warsaw. The 
 corps of Marshal Soult was established be- 
 tween the Omulew and the Orezyc, from Os- 
 trolenka to Willenberg and Chorzellen, giving 
 the hand on one side to the troops of Marshal 
 Davout, on the other to those of Marshal Ney, 
 and thus forming the centre of the French 
 army. Marshal Ney, placed more forward at 
 Hohenstein,on the Upper Passarge, connected 
 himself with the position of Marshal Soult, at 
 the sources of the Omulew, and with that of 
 Marshal Bernaclotte, behind the Passarge. 
 The latter, protected by the Passarge, occu- 
 pying Osterode, Mohrungen, Preuss-Holland, 
 Elbing, formed the left of the French army 
 toward the Frische Haff, and covered the 
 Lower Vistula as well as Dantzig. 
 
 Marshal Ney, who had the most advanced 
 position, added still more to the distances 
 which separated him from the bulk of the 
 army, by the boldness of his excursions. As 
 soon as the frost began to give some consist- 
 ence to the ground, he put his light troops 
 into sledges, and scampered to the very envi- 
 rons of Konigsberg, in quest of provisions for 
 his soldiers. In this manner he had made 
 some lucky captures, which had singularly 
 contributed to the comfort of his corps d'urmee. 
 The Alle, whose banks he scoured, has its 
 sources near those of the Passarge, in a group 
 of lakes, between Hohenstein and Allenstein, 
 then separates from it at a right angle, and 
 while the Passarge runs to the left towards 
 the sea, (or Frische Haff,) it proceeds straight 
 towards the Pregel, so that the Alle and the 
 Passarge, the Pregel and the sea, form, as it 
 were, the four sides of an oblong square. 
 Marshal Ney, placed at Hohenstein, at the 
 apex of the angle described by the Passarge 
 and the Alle, before they separate, having, on 
 his right, in rear, the cantonments of Marshal 
 Soult, on his left, in rear, those of Marshal 
 Bernadotte, by turns ascending and descend- 
 ing the Alle in its course to the Pregel, could 
 not fail to fall in with the Russian army in 
 movement. 
 
 Napoleon, fearful that he would involve 
 himself in danger, had reprimanded him seve- 
 ral times. But the bold marshal, persisting 
 
 I Such is the assertion of Plotho, the narrator himself, was strange indeed not to be acm, on their own fron- 
 vrho, to enhance the merit of the Russian army, lowers i tier, to present to an enemy who came from such a ew- 
 that of his own government, by always making a point j tance more than 90,000 men capable of fighting. 
 of reducing the sum total of the forces employed. It
 
 248 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1807 
 
 in running further than he was authorized, ' 
 fell in with the Russian array which had 
 passed the Alle, and was about to cross ihe 
 Passarge, in the environs of Deppen. It ad- 
 vanced in two columns. That which was to 
 cross the Passarge at Deppen was charged to 
 make a digression towards Liebstadt, in or- 
 der to approach the Lower Vistula, and to 
 surprise the cantonments of Marshal Ber- 
 uadotte. 
 
 Marshal Ney, whose indocile temerity had 
 at least had the advantage of giving us timely 
 notice, (an advantage which ought not to en- 
 courage to disobedience, for it rarely has such 
 beneficial effects,) Marshal Ney hastened to 
 fall back himself, to apprize Marshal Berna- 
 dotte, on his left, Marshal Soult, on his right, 
 of the danger which threatened them, and to 
 send intelligence of the sudden appearance 
 of the enemy to the head-quarters at Warsaw. 
 He took a well-chosen post at Hohenstein, 
 whence he could proceed either to the assist- 
 ance of Marshal Soult's cantonments on the 
 Omulew, or 10 the assistance of Marshal Ber- 
 nadotte's cantonments behind the Passarge. 
 He pointed out to the latter the position of 
 Osterode, a capital position on plateaux, where 
 the first and the sixth corps, united, would be 
 able to present thirty and odd thousand men 
 to the Russians in an almost impregnable 
 situation. 
 
 But the troops of Marshal Bernadotte, scat- 
 tered as far as Elbing, near the Frische Haff, 
 had great distances to go in order to rally ; 
 and if General Benningsen had marched ra- 
 pidly, he might have surprised and destroyed 
 them before their concentration was effected. 
 Marshal Bernadotte sent orders to the troops 
 of his right to proceed direct to Osterode, and 
 to the troops of his left, to assemble at the 
 common point of Mohrungen, which is situ- 
 ated on the route to Osterode, a little in rear 
 of Liebstadt, that is to say, very near to the 
 Russian advanced guards. The danger was 
 pressing, for, on the preceding day, the ene- 
 my's advanced guard had very roughly han- 
 dled a French detachment left at Liebstadt. 
 General Markoff, with about fifteen or sixteen 
 thousand men, formed the head of the Russian 
 right column. He was, on the morning of the 
 25th of January, at Pfarrers-Feldchen, having 
 three battalions in that village, and in rear a 
 strong mass of infantry and cavalry. About 
 noon, Marshal Bernadotte arrived at that place, 
 at but a short distance from Mohrungen, with 
 troops which, having set out in the night, had 
 already marched ten or twelve leagues. He 
 decided upon his dispositions immediately, 
 and threw a battalion of the 9th light into the 
 village of Pfarrers-Feldchen, to take that first 
 point d'appui from the enemy. That brave bat- 
 talion entered at the point of the bayonet, un- 
 der a brisk fire of musketry from the Russians, 
 and maintained an obstinate combat in the 
 interior of the village. Its eagle was taken in 
 the fray, but soon recovered. Other Russian 
 battalions having come and joined those which 
 "vere engaged with it, Marshal Bernadotte sent 
 to its assistance two French battalions, which, 
 after an extremely violent conflict, remained 
 masters of Pfarrers-Feldchen. Beyond, upon 
 
 a rising ground, was seen the bulk of the ene- 
 my's column, appuyed on one side upon woods, 
 on the other upon lakes, and protected in front 
 by a numerous artillery. Marshal Bernadotte, 
 having formed the 8th, the 94th of the line, 
 and the 27th light in line of battle, marched 
 direct towards the Russian position, under 
 a most murderous fire. He attacked it bold- 
 ly ; the Russians defended it with obstinacy. 
 As good luck would have it, General Dupont, 
 arriving from the shore of the Frische Haff, 
 by way of Preuss-Holland, made his appear- 
 ance beyond the village of Georgenthal, on 
 the right of the Russians. The latter, un- 
 able to withstand this double attack, aban- 
 doned the field of battle, covered with slain. 
 This action cost them fifteen or sixteen hun- 
 dred killed or taken. It cost the French about 
 six or seven hundred killed and wounded. 
 The dispersion of the troops, and the great 
 number of sick, had prevented Marshal Ber- 
 nadotte from collecting at Mohrungen more 
 than eight or nine thousand men, to fight fif- 
 teen or sixteen thousand. 
 
 The results of this first encounter were to 
 render the Russians extremely circumspect, 
 and to give the troops of Marshal Bernadotte 
 time to assemble at Osterode, a position in 
 which, when united with those of Marshal 
 Ney, they would have nothing to fear. Ac- 
 cordingly, Marshal Bernadotte.having proceed- 
 ed to Osterode on the 26th and 27th of Janu- 
 ary, kept close to Marshal Ney, firmly await- 
 ing the ulterior enterprises of the enemy. 
 General Benningsen, whether surprised by the 
 opposition made to his march, or desirous to 
 concentrate his army, assembled the whole of 
 it at Liebstadt, and there halted. 
 
 It was on the 26th and 27th of January, that 
 Napoleon, successively informed by intelli- 
 gence from different quarters of the movement 
 of the Russians, was completely fixed respect- 
 ing their intentions. He had conceived at first 
 that it was the excursions of Marshal Ney, 
 which had brought reprisals upon him, and in 
 the first moment he had felt and expressed very 
 great displeasure. But he was soon enlight- 
 ened concerning the real cause of the appear- 
 ance of the Russians, and he could not but 
 discover that they meditated a serious enter- 
 prise, having a totally different aim from that 
 of contending for the cantonments. 
 
 Though this new winter campaign inter- 
 rupted the rest which the troops had need of, 
 his regret soon gave place to satisfaction, es- 
 pecially when he considered the new state of 
 the temperature. A sharp frost had set in. 
 The great rivers were not yet frozen, but the 
 stagnant waters were completely ; and Poland 
 appeared one vast plain of ice, in which nei- 
 ther guns, nor horses, nor men, ran any risk 
 of being engulfed in mud. Napoleon, reco- 
 vering the freedom of manoeuvering, conceived 
 a hope of putting an end to the war by some 
 signal stroke. 
 
 His plan was instantly determined, and con- 
 formably to the new direction taken by the 
 enemy. When the Russians, threatening War- 
 saw, followed the banks of the Narew, he had 
 designed to debouch by Thorn with his left re- 
 inforced, in order to separate them from the
 
 Jan. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 249 
 
 Prussians, and to fling them into the chaos of 
 woods and marshes which the interior of the 
 country exhibits. This time, on the contrary, 
 perceiving them to be decided to skirt the coast 
 for the purpose of passing the Lower Vistula, 
 it was proper for him to adopt the contrary 
 course, that is to say, to ascend the Narew 
 himself, which they were leaving, and, pro- 
 ceeding high enough to turn them, then drop 
 down suddenly upon them, in order to drive 
 them to the sea. This manoauvre, in case of 
 success, would be decisive ; for if, by the first 
 plan, the Russians, thrust back towards the 
 interior of Poland, were liable to be placed in 
 a difficult and dangerous situation, by the 
 second, backed upon the sea, they would find 
 themselves, like the Prussians at Prenzlau and 
 Liibeck, obliged to capitulate. 
 
 In consequence, Napoleon resolved to as- 
 semble his whole army to the corps of Marshal 
 Soult, taking that corps for the centre of his 
 movements. While Marshal Soult, collecting 
 his divisions to that of his left, was to march 
 by Willenberg to Passenheim and Allenstein, 
 Marshal Davout, forming the extreme right of 
 the army, was to proceed to the same place by 
 Pultusk, Myszniec, and Ortelsburg; Marshal 
 Augereau, forming the rear-guard, was to come 
 thither from Plonsk by Neidenburg and Hohen- 
 stein ; Marshal Ney, forming the left, was to 
 come from Osterode. It is at this village of 
 Allenstein, chosen by Napoleon for the general 
 rallying point, that the Passarge and the Alle, 
 after approaching each other for a moment, 
 begin to separate. Having once reached this 
 point, if the Russians persisted in crossing the 
 Passarge, we should be already on their flank, 
 and have almost turned them. It was there- 
 fore of importance that to this village of Al- 
 lenstein the four corps of Marshals Davout, 
 Soult, Augereau, and Ney, should be timely 
 brought. 
 
 Murat had scarcely recovered from his in- 
 disposition, but his ardour made amends for 
 deficient strength: he mounted his horse the 
 same day, and, having received the verbal in- 
 structions of the emperor, he immediately as- 
 sembled the light cavalry and the dragoons, to 
 head with them the corps of Marshal Soult. 
 The heavy cavalry, cantoned on the Vistula 
 towards Thorn, was to join him as speedily as 
 possible. 
 
 Napoleon, apprized of the presence of Gene- 
 ral Essen between the Bug and the Narew, 
 consented to dispense with the corps of Mar- 
 shal Lannes, which was the fifth, and he or- 
 dered it to place itself at Sierock, to keep in 
 check the two Russian divisions posted on that 
 side, and to fall upon them at the first move- 
 ment they should attempt towards Warsaw. 
 Marshal Lannes being absolutely incapable 
 of taking the command of the fifth corps, 
 owing to the state of his health, Napoleon 
 gave it to his aide-de-camp, Savary, on whose 
 intelligence and resolution he placed entire 
 reliance. 
 
 He directed his guard, foot and horse, to the 
 rear of Marshal Soult, and as for the reserve 
 of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which had taken 
 its quarters behind the Vistula, between War- 
 saw and Posen, he deprived himself of it on 
 
 VOL. II. 82 
 
 this occasion to make it occupy the environs 
 of Ostrolenka, and to form with it an inter- 
 mediate echelon between the grand army and 
 the fifth corps left upon the Narew. This re- 
 serve was charged to succour the fifth corps, 
 if General Essen's divisions should threaten 
 Warsaw : in the contrary case, it was to rejoin 
 the head-quarters. These dispositions towards 
 his right being settled, Napoleon took towards 
 his left precautions still more profoundly cal- 
 culated, and which showed how vast an ex- 
 tent he hoped to give to his movement He 
 directed Marshal Bernadotte, who was at Os- 
 terode, to fall back slowly upon the Vistula, 
 in case of emergency even as far as Thorn, to 
 draw the enemy thither, then to slip away, 
 covering himself with an advanced guard as 
 with a curtain, and to come, by a forced 
 march, to connect himself with the left of the 
 grand army, in order to render the mano2uvre 
 by which he meant to thrust back the Rus- 
 sians to the sea and to the Lower Vistula the 
 more decisive. 
 
 Napoleon, however, did not stop there. 
 Fearing lest the Russians, if he succeeded in 
 j turning them, might imitate the example of 
 I General Blucher, who, when separated from 
 Stettin, ran off" to Lubeck, and lest they might 
 post away from the Vistula to the Oder, he 
 I provided against this danger by a skilful em- 
 ployment of the tenth corps. That corps, des- 
 tined to carry on under Marshal Lefebvre the 
 siege of Dantzig, was not yet completely as- 
 sembled. Marshal Lefebvre had only the 15th 
 of the line, the 2d light, General d'Espagne's 
 cuirassiers, and the eight Polish battalions of 
 Posen. Napoleon ordered him to remain with 
 these troops along the Vistula and above 
 Graudenz. The fusiliers of the guard, the 
 regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, the 
 legion of the North, two of the five regiments 
 of chasseurs of Italy, who had already pro- 
 ceeded to Germany, lastly, the Baden troops, 
 were to assemble at Stettin, under General 
 Menard, and, ascending toward Posen, endea- 
 vour to join Marshal Lefebvre, who would 
 come to them or let them come to him, ac- 
 cording to circumstances, so as to fall all to- 
 gether upon any Russian corps that should at- 
 tempt to go from the Vistula to the Oder. 
 Lastly. Marshal Mortier had orders to relin- 
 quish the blockade of Stralsund, to place the 
 troops indispensable for that blockade in good 
 lines of circumvallation, then to join himself 
 with the others to the assemblage under Gene- 
 ral Menard, to take the direction of it, if that 
 assemblage, instead of ascending to the Vistula 
 to reinforce Marshal Lefebvre, should, by the 
 circumstances of the pursuit, be brought back 
 towards the Oder. 
 
 Napoleon left Duroc at Warsaw, that he 
 might have a trusty person there. . Prince Po- 
 niatowski had organized some Polish batta- 
 lions. Those which were most advanced in 
 their organization were, with the provisional 
 regiments arriving from France, to guard, un- 
 der the command of General Lemarrois, the 
 works of Praga. Napoleon caused all the ve- 
 hicles which he had at his disposal to be de- 
 spatched from Warsaw laden with biscuit and 
 bread, hoping that, the frost facilitating con-
 
 250 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1807. 
 
 veyance, nis soldiers might not fall short of 
 any thins In consequence of these orders, 
 issued on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of January, 
 the army was to be assembled at Allenstein 
 on the 3d or 4th of February. It should be re- 
 marked, that the reinforcements brought with 
 such foresight from France and Italy were still 
 on march ; that the 2d light, the 15th of the line, 
 the four regiments of cuirassiers borrowed 
 from the army at Naples, had alone arrived on 
 the Vistula; that the other corps had not yet 
 reached the line of the Elbe ; that Napoleon 
 had scarcely received the first detachment of 
 recruits drawn from the depots the day after 
 the battle of Jena, which had procured him a 
 dozen thousand men at most, a very inade- 
 quate supply to fill the gaps produced either by 
 battle or by the diseases of the season ; that 
 most of the corps were reduced to a third or a 
 fourth ; that those of Lannes, Davout, Soult, 
 Augereau, Ney, Bernadotte, with the addition 
 of the guard, Oudinot's grenadiers, and Murat's 
 cavalry, no longer formed one hundred and 
 odd thousand men ;' and that, leaving Lannes 
 and Oudinot on his right, having but a 
 very uncertain chance of bringing Bernadotte 
 towards his left, he would have 75,000 men, 
 at most, left to give battle 16 General Ben n ing- 
 sen, who had 90,000, including the Prussians. 
 
 Notwithstanding this numerical inferiority, 
 Napoleon, reckoning upon his soldiers and the 
 roads, which seemed to admit of rapid concen- 
 trations, took the field with a heart full of hope. 
 He wrote to the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres 
 and to M. de Talleyrand, that he had broken 
 up his cantonments, to take advantage of a fine 
 frost and fair weather: that the roads were su- 
 perb ; that they must not say a word to the 
 empress, in order not to give her useless uneasi- 
 ness, but that he was in full movement, and that 
 it would cost the Russians dear, if they did not think 
 better of it. 
 
 Leaving Warsaw on the 30th, he was in the 
 evening of that day at Prasnitz, and on the 
 31st at Willenberg. Murat, having outstripped 
 him, had collected in all haste the regiments 
 of cavalry, except the cuirassiers scattered 
 along the Vistula, and formed the advanced 
 guard of Marshal Soult, already concentrated 
 upon Willenberg. Marshal Davout had made 
 forced marches to reach Myszniec, Marshal 
 Augereau to reach Neidenburg. Meanwhile, 
 Marshal Ney had collected his divisions at 
 Hohenstein, ready to press forward as soon as 
 
 Here is the real force of the corps, deduced from a 
 eomparison of numerous authentic documents : 
 
 Marsha! Lannes 12.000 men. 
 
 Marshal Davout 18,000 ' 
 
 Marshal Soult 20,000 
 
 Marshal Augereau 10,000 
 
 MarshalNey 10.000 
 
 Marshal Bernadotte 12,000 " 
 
 General Oudinot 6,000 ' 
 
 Theguard 6.000 
 
 Murat's cavalry 10,000 " 
 
 Total 104,000 
 
 Dedact from this total of 104,000 men 
 
 12.000 Bernadotte, to be left between Thorn and 
 
 ' Graudenz. 
 
 30,000 
 
 There will remain 74,000 men, actire troops, capable 
 f being united under the hand of Napoleon. 
 
 the bulk of the army had passed his right 
 Marshal Bernadotte, falling back slowly, had 
 come to place himself in rear of the left of 
 Ney, at Lobau, then at Strasburg, and lastly 
 in the environs of Thorn. Thus far, every 
 thing turned out according to wish. The 
 enemy had, with his right column, followed 
 step by step the movement of Marshal Berna- 
 dotte, and with the left had scarcely advanced 
 towards Allenstein. An incomprehensible 
 inaction kept him for some days in that posi- 
 tion. General Benningsen, full of boldness 
 when he had to plan a great manoeuvre on the 
 Lower Vistula, now hesitated, when it was 
 time to engage in that daring manreuvre, 
 which was far above his faculties and those 
 of his army. In order to venture upon such 
 enterprises, one needs the confidence derived 
 from the habit of victory, and likewise the ex- 
 perience of the sudden turns of fortune through 
 which one is doomed to pass before one ar- 
 rives at success. General Benningsen, who 
 had neither that confidence nor that experi- 
 ence, floated amidst a thousand uncertainties, 
 giving others and himself the false pretexts 
 with which irresolution covers itself, some- 
 times alleging that he was waiting for provi- 
 sions and ammunition sometimes affecting 
 to believe, or really believing, that the retro- 
 grade movement of Bernadotte's corps was 
 common to the whole French army, and that 
 he had obtained the desired result, since Na- 
 poleon was preparing to leave the Vistula, 
 For the rest, his hesitation, though ridiculous 
 enough after the pompous announcement of 
 a vast offensive operation, insured his safety; 
 for, the farther he had ventured upon the 
 Lower Vistula, the deeper would have been 
 the abyss into which he would have fallen. 
 This very hesitation, it is true, if continued 
 for two or three days longer, was just as likely 
 to ruin him as a more decisive movement, for, 
 during that interval, Napoleon was continuing 
 to ascend upon the left flank of the Russian 
 army. 
 
 On the 1st of February, Murat and Marshal 
 Soult were at Passenheim, Marshal Davout 
 was advancing upon Ortelsburg, Augereau 
 and Ney were drawing nearer by Hohenstein 
 to the bulk of the army, Napoleon was with 
 the guard at Willenberg. In twenty-four or 
 forty-eight hours more, the French would be, 
 to the number of 75,000 men, on the left flank 
 of the Russians. Napoleon, always careful 
 to guide his lieutenants step by step, had sent 
 a fresh despatch to Marshal Bernadolte, to ex- 
 plain to him for the last time the part which 
 he was to act in this grand manoeuvre, to 
 point out to him the manner of stealing away 
 quickly from the enemy, and of rejoining the 
 army, which must render the effect of the 
 present combination more certain and more 
 decisive. This despatch had been consigned 
 to a young officer recently attached to the 
 staff, who had orders to carry it with the ut- 
 most expedition to the Lower Vistula. 
 
 The troops continued marching on the 2d 
 and 3d of February. In the evening of the 
 3d, having got past Allenstein, they debouched 
 before an elevated position, which extends 
 from the Alle to the Passarge, well flanked on
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 251 
 
 the right and left by those two rivers and by 
 woods. This was the position of Jonkowo. 
 Napoleon, who had pushed forward on the 3d 
 to Gettkendorf, not far from Jonkowo, hast- 
 ened to the advanced guard, in order to recon- 
 noitre the enemy. He found him in greater 
 force than he should have supposed, and 
 drawn up on the ground as if he intended to ' 
 give battle there. Napoleon immediately 
 made his dispositions for a general engage- ! 
 ment on the following day, if the enemy 
 should persist in waiting for him at Jon- 
 kowo. 
 
 He urged the arrival of Marshals Augereau 
 and Ney, who were ready to join him. He 
 had already at hand, at Gettkendorf, Marshal 
 Soult, the guard, Murat, and, at some distance 
 on the right, Marshal Davout, who quickened 
 his pace in order to reach the banks of the 
 Alle. Anxious to insure the success of the 
 morrow, Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to 
 file to the right, along the course of the Alle, 
 to follow the windings of that river, to pene- 
 trate into a re-entering angle, which it formed 
 behind the position of the Russians, and to 
 pass it by main force at the bridge of Berg- 
 fried, whatever resistance he should meet! 
 with. This bridge carried, we should possess ; 
 on the rear of the enemy a debouche by which , 
 we should have it in our power to place him ! 
 in the greatest danger. Two of Marshal Da- ! 
 vout's divisions were directed to this point, in 
 order to render the result infallible. 
 
 On the evening of that same day, Marshal 
 Soult executed the Emperor's order; the vil- ! 
 lage of Bergfried was carried by Luval's divi- j 
 sion, and then the bridge over the Alle, lastly | 
 the heights beyond. The action was short, j 
 but brisk and bloody. The Russians lost 
 1200 men, the French five or six hundred. 
 The importance of the post was worth such a 
 sacrifice. In the course of the evening, Mu- 
 rat's cavalry and Marshal Soult's corps gave 
 each other the hand along the Alle. We were 
 in presence of the Russians, deprived of appuy 
 towards their left, threatened even on their 
 rear, and separated from us merely by a small 
 brook, a tributary of the Alle. It was expect- 
 ed that the morrow would be an important 
 day, and Napoleon asked himself how it could 
 be that the Russians were already assembled 
 in such great number, and concentrated so op- j 
 portunely on that point. He was puzzled to 
 account for this, since, according to all calcu- 
 lations of distance and time, they could not 
 have been informed of the movements of the 
 French army soon enough to take a determi- 
 nation so prompt, so discordant with their 
 first plan of offensive march on the Upper 
 Vistula. At any rate, be the motive that had 
 brought them together what it might, they 
 were in danger of losing a battle, and losing 
 it in such a manner as to be cut off from the 
 Pregel, if they waited only till the morrow. 
 On the morrow, in fact, our troops, full of ar- 
 dour, advanced upon the position. They con- 
 ceived for a moment the hope that they should 
 come at the Russians, but they beheld their 
 lines gradually move off and vanish. Pre- 
 sently, they even perceived that they had be- 
 fore them nothing but advanced guards, placed 
 
 as a curtain to deceive them. Napoleon, at 
 this moment, would have had reason to regret 
 not having attacked ihe Russians on the pre- 
 ceding day, if on the preceding day his army 
 had been assembled and early in possession 
 of the bridge of Bergfried. But the concen- 
 tration, which was complete on the morning 
 of the 4th, was not so on the evening of the 
 3d ; he had therefore no delay to reproach 
 himself with. All that he could do was to 
 march, and to penetrate the secret of the ene- 
 my's resolutions. 
 
 This secret he soon learned, for the Rus- 
 sians, in their joy at having miraculously es- 
 caped certain ruin, proclaimed it themselves 
 upon the roads. The young officer, sent to 
 Marshal Bernadotte, had been taken by the 
 Cossacks with his despatches, which he had 
 not had the presence of mind to destroy. Ge- 
 neral Benningsen, apprized by these despatches 
 forty-eight hours earlier than he should have 
 been by the movement of the French army, 
 had had time to concentrate himself in rear 
 of Allenstein, and, on seeing Napoleon's pre- 
 parations at Jonkowo, he had decamped in the 
 night between the 3d and 4th, either deeming 
 it imprudent to fight in a position where he ran 
 the risk of being turned, or because it was not 
 consistent with his views to accept a decisive 
 battle. Thus this enterprising general, who 
 was to take Warsaw and Poland from us by a 
 single manoeuvre, was already retreating upon 
 Konigsberg. He hurried back towards the 
 Pregel by the road to Arensdorf and Eylau, 
 parallel to the course of the Alle. 
 
 But Napoleon, whom Fortune, twice incon- 
 stant in so short a time, had deprived of the 
 fruit of the most admirable combinations, was 
 not best pleased with having left his canton- 
 ments for nothing, and with not having an 
 opportunity to pay those who had disturbed his 
 rest for their rash enterprise. The frost, though 
 not very intense, was nevertheless sharp enough 
 to make the roads firm without rendering the 
 temperature insupportable. He determined, 
 therefore, to put the speed of his soldiers again 
 to the test, and to endeavour still to turn the 
 flank of the Russians, for the purpose of giv- 
 ing them battle in a well-chosen position, and 
 such a battle as should put an end to the war. 
 
 He took, in the utmost haste, the way to 
 Arensdorf, marching at the centre and on the 
 principal road, with Murat, Marshal Soult, 
 Marshal Augereau, and the guard, having Mar- 
 shal Davout's corps on his right toward the 
 Alle, Marshal Ney's corps on his left toward 
 the Passarge. Judging with wonderful saga- 
 city that the Russians, though opportunely 
 rallied through a caprice of Fortune, had been 
 taken too much unawares not to have left de- 
 tachments in rear, he sent off Marshal Ney a 
 little to the left toward the Passarge, and or- 
 dered him to break down the bridge of Deppen, 
 predicting that he should there make some 
 good prize if he could intercept the routes 
 leading from the Passarge to the Alle. Lastly, 
 he enjoined Marshal Bernadotte to leave th 
 banks of the Vistula immediately, and, since 
 there was now no enemy to trick, to rejoin tha 
 grand army as speedily as possible. 
 
 The troops advanced, following the ord
 
 252 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1807. 
 
 indicated. On this same day, the 4th of Feb- 
 ruary, the Russians halted for a moment at 
 Wolfsdorf, at an equal distance from the Alle 
 and the Passarge, to take some rest, and to see 
 whether the Prussian corps of General Les- 
 tocq, which was behind, would find means to 
 rejoin them. But that corps was still so far 
 off that they could not wait for it, and, pressed 
 by the French, they continued their march, 
 abandoning Gnttstadt,the resources which they 
 had collected there, the wounded, the sick, and 
 500 men, who were made prisoners. 
 
 Though the magazines of Guttstadt were not 
 very considerable, they were valuable to the 
 French, who, outstripping their convoys, had 
 no means of subsistence but what they pro- 
 cured for themselves by the way. 
 
 Next day, the 5th of February, they conti- 
 nued to march in the same order, the French 
 having their right to the Alle, the Russians 
 their left, each striving to surpass the other in 
 speed. During this time, Ney, having advanced 
 by the bridge of Deppen beyond the Passarge, 
 in order to cut off the retreat of such of the 
 enemy's troops as were belated, actually fell 
 in with the Prussians on the Liebstadt road. 
 General Lestocq, having no hope of opening 
 a passage for himself through Ney's corps, 
 made up his mind to a sacrifice which had be- 
 come necessary. He presented to the French 
 a strong rear-guard of three or four thousand 
 men, and, leaving it to their attack, he sought 
 to steal away by descending the course of the 
 Passarge, with the intention of crossing it 
 lower down. This calculation, which is fre- 
 quently one of the most cruel necessities of 
 war, saved seven or eight thousand Prussians 
 by the sacrifice of three or four thousand. Ney 
 rushed upon those* who were opposed to him 
 at Waltersdorf, cut part of them in pieces and 
 took the rest At the conclusion of the fight 
 he had 2500 prisoners. The ground was co- 
 vered with 1000 dead and wonnde d, a nume- 
 rous artillery, and an immense quantity of 
 baggage. Napoleon, who attached more value 
 to beating the Russians by the wh'ole of his 
 collected forces than to picking up prisoners 
 on the roads, recommended to Marshal Ney 
 not to persevere too much in the pursuit of 
 General Lestocq, and not to separate himself 
 from the grand army. In consequence of these 
 instructions, Ney relinquished the pursuit of 
 the Prussians, striving, however, not to lose 
 sight of them, in order to prevent their junc- 
 tion with the Russians. 
 
 On the 6th of February, the Russians, hasten- 
 ing their march, reached Landsberg, inces- 
 santly harassed by the French, and abandon- 
 ing the little town of Heilsburg on the Alle, 
 where they had more magazines, sick, and lag- 
 gards. Their rear-guard having endeavoured 
 to maintain its ground there, Marshal Davont 
 caused it to be briskly pushed, and, as he ad- 
 vanced, occupying both banks of the Alle, F ri- 
 ant' s division encountered this advanced guard, 
 which was running off on the right bank, dis- 
 persed it, and killed and took some hundred 
 men. 
 
 The Russians purposed to stop for the night 
 oetween the 6th and 7th at Landsberg. In con- 
 sequence, they covered 'hemselves by a large 
 
 detachment placed at Hoff. In the midst of a 
 diversified country, a strong mass of infantry 
 having a village on its right, woods on its left 
 protected, moreover, by a numerous cavalry 
 barred the way. Murat, coming up first 
 pushed his hussars and his chasseurs, after- 
 wards his dragoons, on the cavalry of the 
 Russians, upset it, but could not make an im- 
 pression upon their solid infantry. General 
 d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers, arriving at the mo- 
 ment, were set on in their turn. The first re- 
 giment charged first, but in vain, damped as 
 it was in its ardour by a charge of the enemy's 
 cavalry. Murat, then rallying the division of 
 cuirassiers, flung it entire upon the Russian 
 infantry. A shout of Vne CEmpereur ! issuing 
 from the ranks, accompanied and excited the 
 movement of those gallant horse-soldiers. 
 They broke the enemy's line, and cut in 
 pieces a great number of foot, trampled down 
 by the horses. At that instant, Legrand's di- 
 vision, belonging to Soull's corps, made its 
 appearance. One of his regiments marched 
 to the village on the left and carried it. The 
 Russians, who attached great value to this po- 
 sition, which insured their tranquillity for the 
 night, made another attempt upon the village. 
 Surprised in the heat of their conflict with the 
 French infantry by a fresh charge of our cui- 
 rassiers, they were definitively overthrown, 
 and beat a retreat after losing two thousand 
 men, sacrificed in this rear-guard action. 
 
 General Benningsen, pursued in this man- 
 ner, conceived that it would not be safe for him 
 to pass the night in the town of Landsberg, 
 and retired upon Eylau, which he entered in 
 the daytime on the 7th of February. 
 
 He placed a numerous rear-guard on a pla- 
 teau called the plateau of Ziegelhoff, and be- 
 fore which you arrive on issuing from the 
 woods that cover the road from Landsberg to 
 Eylan. Generals Bagowont and Barklay de 
 Tolly were in position on this plateau, ready 
 to renew the action of the preceding day. 
 General Benningsen, fully sensible that he 
 was too closely pressed not to be obliged to 
 fight, made it a particular point to occupy this 
 plateau, on which the French army, debouch- 
 ing from the woody country, might be received 
 with advantage. He was likewise solicitous 
 to protect the arrival of his heavy artillery, 
 which he had ordered to make a circuit. From 
 all these motives his resistance at this point 
 could not fail to be obstinate. 
 
 Murat' s cavalry, seconded by Marshal Soult's 
 infantry, debouched from the woods with its 
 usual boldness, and advanced towards the 
 plateau of Ziegelhoff. Levasseur*s brigade, 
 composed of the 46th and 28th regiments of 
 the line, followed it resolutely, while Vivies's 
 brigade, filing off to the right, tried to turn the 
 position by crossing the frozen lakes. Levas- 
 sear's brigade, urged by the fire of a nume- 
 rous artillery, to hasten the attack, qnickened 
 its pace. " A first line of the enemy's infantry 
 was first repulsed with the bayonet. But the 
 Russian cavalry, charging opportunely on the 
 left of the brigade, overturned the 28th before 
 it had time to form in square. It cut down 
 many of our foot, and took an eagle. 
 
 The combat, being soon renewed, was kept
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 253 
 
 np on both sides with great obstinacy. Mean- 
 while, Vivws's brigade having turned the posi- 
 tion of the Russians, the latter left it and re- 
 tired to the town of Eylau itself. Marshal 
 Soult forced his way into it at the same time 
 with them. Napoleon was unwilling that the 
 town of Eylau should be left in their posses- 
 sion, in the uncertain but probable case of a 
 great battle. The French, therefore, entered 
 Eylau at the point of the bayonet. The Rus- 
 sians there defended themselves obstinately 
 from street to street. The town was turned, 
 and one of their columns was found esta- 
 blished in a church-yard, which has since be- 
 come famous for the terrible recollections at- 
 tached to it, and which was situated outside 
 the town on the right Vivies's brigade carried 
 this cemetery after the severest struggle. 
 The Russians fell back beyond Eylau. Of all 
 rear-guard actions, this had been the most 
 sanguinary, and it had caused Marshal Soult's 
 corps considerable loss. The French threw 
 themselves in some disorder into the town of 
 Eylau, the soldiers dispersing in quest of pro- 
 visions, and surprising in the houses a great 
 number of Russians, who had not had time to 
 escape. 
 
 The first opinion conceived by Murat, and 
 which he transmitted to Napoleon, was that 
 the Russians, having lost the point cTappui of 
 Eylau. would go and seek a more distant one. 
 Meanwhile, some officers, who had lost them- 
 selves in the fray, perceived the Russians es- 
 tablished a little beyond Eylau and lighting 
 their bivouac fires, in order to pass the night 
 there. This observation, confirmed by fresh 
 reports, left no doubt respecting the importance 
 of the fight reserved for the following day, the 
 8th of February, and such indeed is that 
 which it has acquired, that the memory of it 
 must endure for ages. 
 
 It became evident that the Russians, halting 
 this time after the action in the evening, and 
 not employing the night in marching, were re- 
 solved on fighting a general battle on the mor- 
 row. The French army was harassed with 
 fatigue, greatly reduced in number by rapid 
 marches, pinched by hunger, and suffering 
 from cold. But it was necessary for them to 
 give battle, and it was not on such an occasion 
 that soldiers, officers, generals, were accus- 
 tomed to feel their hardships. 
 
 Napoleon, losing no time, despatched the 
 same evening several officers to Marshals Da- 
 vout and Ney, to bring them back, the one to 
 his right, the other to his left. Marshal Davont 
 had continued to follow the Alle to Bartenstein, 
 and he was not more than three or four leagues 
 ofl. He replied that he should arrive at day- 
 break upon the right of Eylau, (the right of 
 the French army,) ready to fall upon the flank 
 of the Russians. Marshal Ney, who had been 
 directed upon the left, so as to keep the Prus- 
 sians at a distance, and to be able to rush upon 
 Kdnigsberg, in case the Russians should throw 
 themselves behind the Pregel Marshal Ney 
 was inarching for Kreutzburg. Messengers 
 were despatched after him, though it was not 
 so sure that he could be brought back in time 
 to the field of battle, as it was that Marshal 
 Davout would make bis appearance there. 
 
 Deprived of Ney's corps, the French army 
 amounted at most to fifty and some thousand 
 men, though the Russians raise the number to 
 80,000 in their relations, and a French histo- 
 rian, in general worthy of credit, to 68,000.' 
 The corps of Marshal Davout, whose effective 
 presented 26,000 men at Auerstadt, considera- 
 bly diminished by the battles fought since, by 
 disease, by the last march from the Vistula to 
 Eylau, by the detachments left on the Narew, 
 was about 15,000 strong. The corps of Mar- 
 shal Soult, the most numerous of the whole 
 army, likewise greatly reduced by dysentery, 
 marching, rear-guard actions.could not be com- 
 puted at more than sixteen or seventeen thou- 
 sand men. That of Marshal Augereau, weak- 
 ened by a great number of stragglers and 
 marauders, who had dispersed in search of 
 provisions, numbered only six or seven thou- 
 sand at the bivouac of Eylau, in the evening 
 of the 7th of February. The guard, better 
 treated, more restrained by discipline, had not 
 left any laggards behind. Still it amounted to 
 no more than 6000 men. Lastly, Mural's ca- 
 valry, composed of one division of cuirassiers 
 and three divisions of dragoons, presented 
 scarcely 10,000 men in the ranks. It formed, 
 therefore, a total force of fifty-three or fifty-four 
 thousand men, capable of any thing, it is true, 
 but worn down with fatigue and exhausted by 
 hunger. If Marshal Ney were to arrive in 
 time, it would be possible to oppose 63,000 
 men to the enemy, all present under fire. No 
 expectation could be entertained of the arri- 
 val of Bernadotte's corps, which was thirty 
 leagues off. 
 
 Napoleon, who slept that night but three or 
 four hours in a chair in the house of the post- 
 master, placed the corps of Marshal Soult at 
 Eylau itself, partly within the town, partly on 
 the right and left of it, Augereau's corps and the 
 imperial guard a little in rear, and all the ca- 
 valry upon the wings, till daylight should en- 
 i able him to make his dispositions. 
 
 General Benningsen had at last determined 
 to give battle. He was on level ground, or 
 nearly so, excellent ground for his infantry, not 
 much versed in manoeuvres, but solid, and for 
 his cavalry, which was numerous. His heavy 
 artillery, which he had directed to make a cir- 
 cuit, that it might not cramp his movements, 
 had just rejoined him. It was a valuable re- 
 inforcement. Besides, he was so closely pur- 
 sued, that he was obliged to interrupt his march 
 in order to make head against the French. A 
 retreating army must have some start, that it 
 may be able to sleep and eat It ought also 
 not to have the enemy too close to it; for, to 
 suffer an attack by the way, with the back 
 turned, is the most dangerous manner of re- 
 ceiving battle. There is then a moment when 
 the wisest thing that can be done is to choose 
 one's ground, and there halt to fight Such 
 was the resolution adopted by General Ben- 
 ningsen on the evening of the 7th. He halted 
 beyond Eylau, determined to fight desperately. 
 His army, amounting to seventy-eight or eighty 
 
 > We should not venture, in the teeth of the falw *- 
 *-rl:oii of historian*, foreign and French, to advance 
 f ucb a truth, if it were not based 01. the most 
 document*. 
 
 y
 
 23-1 
 
 HISTOKY OF THE 
 
 (Feb. 1807 
 
 thousand men, and to ninety thousand with the 
 Prussians, had sustained considerable losses 
 in the late battles, but scarcely any in marches, 
 for an army in retreat, without being in disor- 
 der, is rallied by the enemy that pursues it, 
 whereas the pursuing army, not having the 
 same motives for keeping close together, al- 
 ways leaves part of its effective behind. De- 
 ducting the losses sustained at Mohrungen, 
 Bergfried, Waltersdorf, Hoff, Heilsberg, and at 
 Eylau itself, 1 one may say that General Ben- 
 uingsen's army was reduced to about 80,000 
 men, 72,000 of whom were Russians and 
 8000 Prussians. Thus, in case General Les- 
 tocq and Marshal Ney should not arrive, 54,000 
 French would have to fight 72,000 Russians. 
 The Russians had, moreover, a formidable ar- 
 tillery, computed at four or five hundred pieces. 
 Ours amounted to two hundred at most, includ- 
 ing the guard. It is true that it was superior 
 to all the artilleries of Europe, even to that of 
 the Austrians. General Benningsen, therefore, 
 determined to attack at daybreak. The cha- 
 racter of his soldiers was energetic, like that 
 of the French soldiers, but governed by other 
 motives. The Russians had neither that con- 
 fidence of success nor that love of glory which 
 the French exhibited, but a certain fanaticism 
 of obedience, which induced them to brave 
 death blindly. As for the quantum of intelli- 
 gence possessed by the one and by the other, 
 it is superfluous to make any remark on the 
 difference. 
 
 Since debouching upon Eylau, the country 
 appeared level and open. The little town of 
 Eylau, situated on a slight eminence, and 
 topped by a Gothic spire, was the only conspi- 
 cuous point. The ground gently sloping, on 
 the right of the church, presented a cemetery. 
 In front it rose perceptibly, and on this rise, 
 marked by some hillocks, appeared the Rus- 
 sians in a deep mass. Several lakes, full of 
 water in spring, frozen in winter, at this time 
 covered with snow, were not distinguishable 
 in any way from the rest of the plain. Scarcely 
 did a few barns united into hamlets, and lines of 
 barriers for folding cattle, ftrm a point dCappui, 
 or an obstacle on this dreary field of battle. 
 A gray sky, dissolving at times into thick 
 snow, added its dreariness to that of the coun- 
 try, a dreariness which seized eye and heart, 
 as soon as daylight, which comes very late in 
 this season, had rendered objects perceptible. 
 
 The Russians were drawn up in two lines, 
 very near to each other, their front covered by 
 three hundred pieces of cannon planted on the 
 salient points of the ground. In rear, two 
 close columns, appuying, like two flying but- 
 tresses, this double line of battle, seemed de- 
 signed to support it and to prevent its bending 
 under the shock of the French. A strong re- 
 serve of artillery was placed at some distance. 
 The cavalry was partly in rear, partly ou the 
 wings. The Cossacks, in general scattered, 
 
 The Russians bad lost 1500 men at Mohrungen 
 1000 " at Bergfried. 
 3000 at Waltersdorf. 
 2000 ' at Hof. 
 1000 at Heilsberg. 
 500 at Eylau. 
 
 Total 
 
 9000 men. 
 
 kept on this occasion with the body of the 
 army. It was evident that, to the energy and 
 dexterity of the French, the Russians had de- 
 signed to oppose on this open ground a com- 
 pact mass, defended in front by a numerous 
 artillery, strongly supported in rear, in short a 
 real wall, pouring forth a shower of fire. Na 
 poleon, on horseback by daybreak, had sta 
 tioned himself in the cemetery, to the right of 
 Eylau. There, scarcely protected by a few 
 trees, he had a perfect view of the position of 
 the Russians, who, already in battle, had 
 opened their fire by a cannonade which be- 
 came brisker every moment. It might be fore- 
 seen that cannon would be the weapon of that 
 terrible fight. 
 
 Owing to the position of Eylau, which 
 stretched itself out facing the Russians, Na- 
 poleon could give the less depth to his line of 
 battle, and consequently the less scope to the 
 balls of the artillery. Two of Marshal Soult's 
 divisions were placed at Eylau, Legrand's di- 
 vision in advance and a little to the left, Le- 
 val's division, partly on the left of the town, 
 upon an eminence topped by a mill, partly on 
 the right, at the cemetery itself. The third 
 division of Marshal Soult's, St. Hilaire's di- 
 vision, was established still further to the 
 right, at a considerable distance from the ceme- 
 tery, in the village of Rothenen, which formed 
 the prolongation of the position of Eylau. In 
 the interval between the village of Rothenen, 
 and the town of Eylau, an interval left vacant 
 for the purpose of making the rest of the army 
 debouch there, was posted a little in rear, Au- 
 gereau's corps, drawn up in two lines, and 
 formed of Desjardins's and Heudelet's divi- 
 sions. Augereau, tormented with fever, his 
 eyes red and swollen, but forgetting his com- 
 plaints at the sound of the cannon, had mount- 
 ed his horse to put himself at the head of his 
 troops. Further in rear of that same debouche 
 came the infantry and cavalry of the imperial 
 guard, the divisions of cuirassiers and dra- 
 goons, both ready to present themselves to the 
 enemy by the same outlet, and meanwhile 
 somewhat sheltered from the cannon by a hol- 
 low of the ground. Lastly, at ihe extreme 
 right of this field of battle, beyond and in ad- 
 vance of Rothenen, at the hamlet of Serpallen, 
 the corps of Marshal Davout was to enter into 
 action in such a manner as to fall upon the 
 flank of the Russians. 
 
 Thus Napoleon was in open order, and his 
 line having the advantage of being covered 
 on the left by the buildings of Eylau, on the 
 right by those of Rothenen, the combat of ar- 
 tillery, by which he designed to demolish the 
 kind of wall opposed to him by the Russians, 
 would be much les formidable for him than 
 for them. He had caused all the cannon of 
 the army to be removed from the corps, and 
 placed in order of battle. To these he had 
 added the forty pieces belonging to the guard, 
 and he was thus about to reply to the formi- 
 dable artillery of the Russians by an artillery 
 far inferior in number, but far superior in, 
 skill. 
 
 The Russians had commenced the firing. 
 The French had answered it immediately by a 
 violent cannonade at half cannon-shot. The
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 256 
 
 earth shook under this tremendous detonation. ' 
 The French artillerymen, not only more ex- 1 
 pert, but firing at a living mass, which served ' 
 them for a butt, made dreadful havoc. Our 
 balls swept down whole files. Those of the 
 Russians, on the contrary, directed with less 
 precision, and striking against buildings, in- 
 flicted loss mischief upon us than that sus- 
 tained by the enemy. The town of Eylau and 
 the village of Rothenen were soon set on fire. 
 The glare of the conflagration added its hor- 
 rors to the horrors of the carnage. Though 
 there fell far fewer French than Russians, still 
 there fell a great many, especially in the ranks 
 of the imperial guard, motionless in the ceme- 
 tery. The projectiles, passing over the head 
 of Napoleon, and sometimes very close to him, 
 penetrated the walls of the church, or broke 
 bpanches from the trees at the foot of which 
 he had placed himself to direct the battle. 
 
 This cannonade lasted for a long time, and 
 both armies bore it with heroic tranquillity, 
 never stirring, and merely closing their ranks 
 as fast as the cannon made gaps in them. 
 The Russians seemed first to feel a sort of im- 
 patience. 1 Desirous to accelerate the result 
 by the taking of Eylau, they moved off to carry 
 the position of the mill, situated on the left of 
 the town. Part of their right formed in column, 
 and came to attack us. Leval's division, com- 
 posed of Ferey's and Vivies's brigades, gal- 
 lantly repulsed il, and by their firmness left 
 the Russians no hope of success, if they re- 
 newed their efforts. 
 
 As for Napoleon, he attempted nothing de- 
 cisive, for he would not endanger, by sending 
 it forward, the corps of Marshal Soult, which 
 had done so well to keep Eylau under such a 
 tremendous cannonade; nor would he risk 
 either St. Hilaire's division or Augereau's 
 corps against the centre of the enemy; it 
 would have been exposing them to dash them- 
 selves against a burning rock. He waited for 
 acting till the presence of Marshal Davout's 
 corps, which was coming on the right, should 
 begin to be felt on the flank of the Russians. 
 
 This lieutenant, punctual as he was intrepid, 
 had actually arrived at the village of Serpallen. 
 Friant's division marched at the head. It de- 
 bouched the first, encountered the Cossacks, 
 whom it had soon driven back, and occupied 
 the village of Serpallen with some companies 
 of light infantry. No sooner was it established 
 in the village and in the grounds on the right, 
 than one of the masses of cavalry posted on 
 the wings of the Russian army detached itself, 
 and advanced towards it. General Friant, 
 availing himself with intelligence and coolness 
 of the advantages afforded by the accidents of 
 the locality, drew up the three regiments of 
 which his division was then composed behind 
 the long and solid wooden barrier, which served 
 for folding cattle. Sheltered behind this natu- 
 idl intrenchment, he kept up a fire within 
 point-blank range upon the Russian squad- 
 rons, and forced them to retire. They fell 
 back, but soon returned, accompanied by a 
 column of nine or ten thousand infantry. It 
 was one of the two close columns, which 
 
 An expression of Napoleon's, in an account which 
 he gave himself of the battle 
 
 served for flying buttresses to the Russian line 
 of battle, and which now bore to the left of 
 that line, to retake Serpallen. Generel Friant 
 had not more than 5000 men to oppose to it. 
 Still, sheltered behind the wooden barrier with 
 which he had covered himself, and able to de- 
 ploy without apprehension of being charged 
 by the cavalry, he saluted the Russians with a 
 fire so continuous and so well-directed, as to 
 occasion them considerable loss. Their squad- 
 rons having shown an intention to turn him, 
 he formed the 33d into square on his right, and 
 stopped them by the imperturbable hearing of 
 his foot-soldiers. As he could not make use 
 of his cavalry, which consisted of some horse 
 chasseurs, he made amends for it by a swarm 
 of tirailleurs, who kept up such a fire upon 
 the flanks of the Russians, as to oblige them 
 to retire towards the heights in rear of Ser- 
 pallen, between Serpallen and Klein-Sausgar- 
 ten. On retiring to these heights, ihe Russians 
 covered themselves by a numerous artillery, 
 the downward fire of which was unfortunately 
 very destructive. Morand's division had ar- 
 rived in its turn on the field of battle. Mar- 
 shal Davout, taking the first brigade, that of 
 General Ricard, went and placed it beyond and 
 on the left of Serpallen; he then posted the 
 second, composed of the 51st and the 61st, on 
 the right of the villages, so as to support either 
 Ricard's brigade or Friant's division. The 
 latter had proceeded to the right of Serpallen, 
 towards Klein-Sausgarten. At this very mo- 
 ment, Gudin's division was accelerating its 
 speed to get into line. Thus the Russians had 
 been obliged by the movement of our right to 
 draw back their left from Serpallen towards 
 Klein-Sausgarten. 
 
 The expected effect on the flank of the ene- 
 my's army was therefore produced. Napoleon, 
 from the position which he occupied, had dis- 
 tinctly seen the Russian reserves directed 
 towards the corps of Marshal Davout. The 
 hour for acting had arrived; for, unless he 
 interfered, the Russians might fall in mass 
 upon Marshal Davout and crush him. Napo- 
 leon immediately gave his orders. He directed 
 St. Hilaire's division, which was at Rothenen, 
 to push forward and to give a hand to Morand's 
 division about Serpallen. He commanded the 
 two divisions of Augereau's corps, Desjardins's 
 and Heudelet's, to debouch by' the interval be- 
 tween Rothenen and Eylau, to connect them- 
 selves with St. Hilaire's division, and to /orm 
 all together an oblique line from the cemetery 
 of Eylau to Serpallen. The result expected 
 from this movement was to overturn the Rus- 
 sians, by throwing their right upon their centre, 
 and thus break down, beginning at its extre- 
 mity, the long wall which he had before him. 
 It was ten in the morning. General St. Hi- 
 laire moved off, left Rothenen, and deployed 
 obliquely in the plain, under a terrible fire of 
 artillery, his right at Serpallen, his left towards 
 the cemetery. Augereau moved nearly at the 
 same time, not without a melancholy forebod- 
 ing of the fate reserved for his corps d armtr, 
 which he saw exposed to the danger of being 
 dashed to pieces against the centre of the Rus- 
 sians, solidly appuyed upon several hillocks. 
 While General Corbineau was delivering the
 
 256 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1807 
 
 orders of the Emperor to him, a ball pierced 
 Ihe side of that gallant officer, the senior of an 
 heroic family. Marshal Augereau marched 
 immediately. The two divisions of Desjardins 
 and Heudelet debouched between Rothenen and 
 the cemetery, in close columns, then, having 
 cleared the defile, formed in order of battle, the 
 first brigade of each division deployed, the se- 
 cond in square. While they were advancing, 
 a squall of wind and snow, beating all at once 
 into the faces of the soldiers, prevented them 
 from seeing the field of battle. The two divi- 
 sions, enveloped in this kind of cloud, mistook 
 their direction, and bore a little to the left, 
 leaving on their right a considerable space 
 between them and St. Hilaire's division. The 
 Russians, but little incommoded by the snow, 
 which they had at their backs, seeing Auge- 
 reau's two divisions advancing towards the 
 hillocks on which they appuyed their centre, 
 suddenly unmasked a battery of seventy-two 
 pieces, which they kept in reserve. So thick 
 was the grape poured forth by this formidable 
 battery, that in a quarter of an hour half of 
 Augereau's corps was swept down. General 
 Desjardins, commanding the first division, was 
 killed; General Heudelet, commanding the se- 
 cond, received a wound that was nearly mortal. 
 The staff of the two divisions was soon hors de 
 combat. While they were sustaining this tre- 
 mendous fire, being obliged to re-form while 
 marching, so much were their ranks thinned, 
 the Russian cavalry, throwing itself into the 
 space which separated them from Morand's 
 division, rushed upon them en masse. Those 
 brave divisions, however, resisted, but they 
 were obliged to fall back towards the cemetery 
 of Eylau, giving ground without breaking, un- 
 der the repeated assaults of numerous squad- 
 rons. The snow having suddenly ceased, they 
 could then perceive the melancholy spectacle. 
 Out of six or seven thousand combatants, 
 about four thousand killed or wounded strewed 
 the ground. Augereau, wounded himself, but 
 more affected by the disaster, of his corps rf'ar- 
 mee than by his personal danger, was carried 
 into the cemetery of Eylau to the feet of Na- 
 poleon, to whom he complained, not without 
 bitterness, of not having been timely succoured. 
 Silent grief pervaded every face in the impe- 
 rial staff. Napoleon, calm and firm, imposing 
 on others the impassibility which he imposed 
 on himself, addressed a few soothing words to 
 Augereau, then sent him to the rear, and took 
 his measures for repairing the mischief. De- 
 spatching, in the first place, the chasseurs of 
 his guard and some squadrons of dragoons 
 which were at hand, to drive back the ene- 
 my's cavalry, he sent for Murat, and ordered 
 him to make a decisive effort on the line of 
 infantry which formed the centre of the Rus- 
 sian army, and which, taking advantage of 
 Augereau's disaster, began to press forward. 
 At the first summons, Murat came up at a gal- 
 lop. " Well," said Napoleon, " are you going 
 to let those fellows eat us up?" He then ordered 
 that heroic chief of his cavalry to collect the 
 chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, and to 
 fall upon the Russians with eighty squadrons, 
 to try what effect the shock of such a mass of 
 horse, charging furiously, would have on an 
 
 infantry reputed not to be shaken. The ca- 
 valry of the guard was brought forward, ready 
 to add its shock to the cavalry of the army. 
 The moment was critical, for, if the Russian 
 infantry were not stopped, it would go and at- 
 tack the cemetery, the centre of the position, 
 and Napoleon had only six foot battalions of 
 the imperial guard to defend it. 
 
 Murat galloped off, collected his squadrons, 
 made them pass between the cemetery and 
 Rothenen, through the same debonche by 
 which Augereau's corps had already marched 
 to almost certain destruction. General Grou- 
 chy's dragoons charged first, to sweep the 
 ground, and clear it of the enemy's cavalry. 
 That brave officer, whose horse fell with him, 
 put himself, on rising, at the head of a second 
 brigade, and effected his purpose of dispersing 
 the groups of cavalry which preceded the Rus- 
 sian infantry. But, for overturning the latter, 
 nothing short of the heavy iron-clad squadrons 
 of General d'Hautpoul was required. That of- 
 ficer, who distinguished himself by consum- 
 mate skill in the art of managing a nume- 
 rous cavalry, came forward with twenty-four 
 squadrons of cuirassiers, followed by the whole 
 1 mass of dragoons. These cuirassiers, ranged 
 in several lines, started off and threw them- 
 selves upon the Russian bayonets. The first 
 lines, stopped by the fire, could not penetrate, 
 and falling back to right and left, went to form 
 afresh behind those who followed them, in or- 
 der to charge anew. At length, one of them, 
 rushing on with more violence, broke the ene- 
 my's infantry at one point, and opened a 
 breach, through, which cuirassiers and dra- 
 goons strove which should penetrate first. As 
 a river, which has begun to break down a dike, 
 soon carries it away entirely, so the masses of 
 the squadrons, having once penetrated the in- 
 fantry of the Russians, finished in a few mo- 
 ments the overthrow of their first line. Our 
 horse then dispersed to slaughter. A horri- 
 ble fray ensued between them and the Russian 
 foot soldiers. They went, and came, and 
 struck on all sides those obstinate antagonists. 
 While the first line of infantry was thus over- 
 turned and cut in pieces, the second fell back 
 to a wood that bounded the field of battle. A 
 last reserve of artillery had been left there. 
 The Russians placed it in battery and fired con- 
 fusedly at their own soldiers and at ours, not 
 caring whether they slaughtered friends or 
 foes, if they only got rid of our formidable 
 "horse. General d'Hautpoul was mortally 
 wounded by a rifle ball. While our caval- 
 ry was thus engaged with the second line of 
 the Russian infantry, some parties of the first 
 rallied and renewed their fire. At this sight, 
 the horse grenadiers of the guard, headed 
 by General Lepic, one of the heroes of the 
 army, came forward in their turn to second 
 Murat's efforts. Dashing off at a gallop, they 
 charged the groups of infantry which they 
 perceived to be still on their legs, and crossing 
 the ground in all directions, completed the 
 destruction of the centre of the Russian army, 
 the wrecks of which at last fled for refuge to 
 the patches of wood which had served them 
 for an asylum. 
 
 During this scene of confusion, a fragment
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 257 
 
 of that vast line of infantry had advanced to . 
 that same cemetery. Three or four thousand 
 Russian grenadiers marching straight forward 
 with the blind courage of braver and more in- 
 telligent troops, came to throw themselves on 
 the church of Eylau, and threatened the ceme- 
 wry occupied by the imperial staff. The foot 
 guard, motionless till then, had endured the 
 cannonade without firing a piece. With joy 
 it beheld an occasion for fighting arrive. A 
 battalion was called for: two disputed the 
 honour of marching. The first in order, led 
 by General Dorsenne, obtained the advantage 
 of measuring its strength with the Russian 
 grenadiers, went up to them without firing a 
 shot, attacked them with the bayonet, and 
 threw one upon another, while Mural de- 
 spatched against them two battalions of chas- 
 seurs under General Bruyere. The unfortu- 
 nate Russian grenadiers, hemmed in between 
 the bayonets of the grenadiers of the guard 
 and the swords of our chasseurs, were almost 
 all taken or killed, before the face of Napoleon, 
 and only a few paces from him. 
 
 This cavalry action, the most extraordinary 
 perhaps, of any in our great wars, had for 
 its result to overthrow the centre of the Rus- 
 sians, and to drive it back to a considerable 
 distance. It would have been requisite to 
 have at hand a reserve of infanlry, in order to 
 complete the defeat of troops which, aAer 
 being laid on the ground, rose again to fire. 
 But Napoleon durst not venture to dispose of 
 Marshal Sonlt's corps, reduced to half of its 
 effective, and necessary for keeping Eylau. 
 Augereau's corps was almost destroyed. The 
 six battalions of the foot guard were alone left 
 for reserve, and amidst the so various chances 
 of that day, still far from its close, it was a re- 
 source which it behoved Napoleon to preserve 
 with the utmost care. On the left, Marshal Ney, 
 march' r^ for several days side by side with 
 the ?'UJ?ians, might reach the field of battle 
 befo>-* /hem or they before him, and eight 
 it *en -.ho u sand men, arriving unexpectedly, 
 might bring to one of the two armies a rein- 
 forcement which would perhaps be decisive. 
 On the right, Marshal Davout was engaged in 
 an obstinate combat with the left of the Rus- 
 sians, the result of which was as yet unknown. 
 
 Napoleon, motionless in the cemetery, in 
 which were heaped the bodies of a great num- 
 ber of his officers, graver than usual, but com- 
 manding his countenance as well as his soul, 
 having his guard behind him, and before him 
 the chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, 
 formed and ready to devote themselves afresh 
 Napoleon awaited the event ffefore taking a 
 definitive determination. Never had he or his 
 soldiers been engaged in so holly-contested a 
 fight. 
 
 But the time for defeat had not yet arrived, 
 and Fortune, frowning for a moment on that 
 extraordinary man, still treated him as a fa- 
 vourite. At that juncture, General St. Hilaire 
 with his division, Marshal Davout with his 
 corps, justified the confidence which Napoleon 
 had placed in them. St. Hilaire's division, re- 
 ceived, like Augereau's corps and at the same 
 moment, with a murderous fire of grape and 
 musketry, had suffered cruelly. Blinded also 
 
 VOL. II. 33 
 
 by the snow, it had not perceived a mass of 
 cavalry hurrying towards it at a gallop, and a 
 battalion of the 10th light had been overturned 
 under the horses' heels. Morand's division, 
 the extreme left of Davout, uncovered from the 
 accident which had befallen the 10th light, had 
 been obliged to fall back two or three hundred 
 paces. But Davout and Morand had soon 
 moved it forward again. During this interval, 
 General Friant was maintaining an heroic 
 struggle at Klein-Sausgarten, and, seconded 
 by Gudin's division, it definitively occupied 
 that advanced position on the flank of the 
 Russians. He had even pushed detachments 
 to the village of Kuschitten, situated on their 
 rear. It was the moment when.it being near- 
 ly dark, and the Russian army almost half 
 destroyed, it seemed that the battle must ter- 
 minate in our favour. 
 
 But the event, which Napoleon dreaded, had 
 occurred. General Lestocq, perseveringly pur- 
 sued by Marshal Ney, appeared on that field 
 of carnage, with seven or eight thousand 
 Prussians, eager to revenge themselves for 
 the disdain of the Russians. General Lestocq, 
 only an hour or two ahead of Marshal Ney's 
 corps, had merely time to strike one blow be- 
 fore he was struck himself. He debouched 
 upon the field of battle at Schmoditten, passed 
 behind the double line of the Russians, now 
 broken by the fire of our artillery, by the 
 swords of our horse, and presented himself at 
 Kuschitten, in front of Friant's division, which, 
 passing beyond Klein-Sausgarten, had already 
 driven back the left of the enemy upon its 
 centre. The village of Kuschitten was occu- 
 pied by four companies of the 108th, and by 
 the 51st, which had been detached from Mo- 
 rand's division to go to the support of Friant's 
 division. The Prussians, rallying the Rus- 
 sians around them, rushed impetuously on the 
 51st, and on the four companies of the 108th, 
 without being able to break them, though they 
 obliged them to fall back to a considerable 
 distance, in rear of Kuschitten. The Prus- 
 sians, after this first advantage, pushed on 
 beyond Kuschitten, in order to recover the 
 positions of the morning. They marched, de- 
 ployed in two lines. The Russian reserves, 
 being rallied, formed two close columns on 
 their wings. A numerous artillery preceded 
 them. In this manner they advanced across 
 the rear of the field of battle, to regain the lost 
 ground, and to beat back Marshal Davout up- 
 on Klein-Sausgarten, and from Klein-Sausgar- 
 ten to Serpallen. But Generals Friant and 
 Gudin, having Marshal Davout at their head, 
 hastened up. Friant's entire division, and 
 the 12th, 21st and 25th regiments, belonging 
 to Gudiu's division, placed themselves fore- 
 most, covered by the whole of -the artillery of 
 the third corps. To no purpose did the Rus- 
 sians and Prussians exert themselves to over- 
 come that formidable obstacle : they were 
 ! unsuccessful. The French, appuyed on woods, 
 marshes and hillocks, here deployed in line, 
 there dispersed as tirailleurs, opposed an in- 
 vincible obstinacy to this last effort of the 
 allies. Marshal Davout, passing through the 
 ranks till dark, kept up the firmness of his 
 soldiers, saving, " Cowards will be sent to die
 
 258 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1807. 
 
 in Siberia; the brave will die here like men 
 of honour." The Prussians and the rallied 
 Russians desisted from the attack. Marshal 
 Davout remained firm in that position of 
 Klein-Sausgarten, where he threatened the 
 rear of the enemy. 
 
 The two armies were exhausted. That day, 
 so sombre, was every moment becoming more 
 sombre still, and about to terminate in a tre- 
 mendous night. More than 30,000 Russians, 
 struck by the balls and the swords of the 
 French, strewed the ground, some dead, others 
 wounded more or less severely. Many of the 
 soldiers began to abandon their colours. 1 
 General Benningsen, surrounded by his lieu- 
 tenants, were deliberating whether to resume 
 the offensive, and try the effect of one more 
 effort. But, out of an army of 80,000 men, 
 not more than 40,000 were left in a state to 
 fight, the Prussians included. If he were 
 worsted in this desperate engagement, he 
 would not have wherewithal to cover his re- 
 treat. However, he was still hesitating, when 
 intelligence was brought him of a last and 
 important incident. Marshal Ney, who had 
 closely followed the Prussians, arriving in 
 the evening on our left, as Marshal Davout 
 had arrived in the morning on our right, de- 
 bouched at length near Althof. 
 
 Thus Napoleon's combinations, retarded by 
 time, had, nevertheless, brought upon the two 
 flanks of the Russian army the forces that 
 were to decide the victory. The order for 
 retreat could no longer be deferred ; for Mar- 
 shal Davout, having maintained himself at 
 Klein-Sausgarten, would not have much to do 
 to meet Marshal Ney, who had advanced to 
 Schmoditten; and the junction of these two 
 marshals would have exposed the Russians to 
 the risk of being enveloped. The order for 
 retreating was instantly given by General 
 Benningsen ; but, to insure the retreat, he 
 purposed to curb Marshal Ney, by attempting 
 to lake from him the village of Schmoditten. 
 The Russians marched upon that village, un- 
 der favour of the night, and in profound si- 
 lence, in hopes of surprising the troops of 
 Marshal Ney, which had arrived late on the 
 field of battle, when it was difficult to recog- 
 nise one another. But the latter were on their 
 guard. General Marchand, with the 6th light 
 and the 39th of the line, allowing the Russians 
 to approach, then receiving them with a point- 
 blank fire, stopped them short. He then 
 rushed upon them with the bayonet, and 
 obliged them to renounce all serious attack. 
 From that moment they definitively com- 
 menced their retreat. 
 
 Napoleon, discerning the real state of things 
 by the direction of Marshal Davout's and Mar- 
 shal Ney's fires, knew that he was master of 
 the field of battle; nevertheless, he was not 
 sure that he should not have a second battle 
 to fight, either that night or on the morrow. 
 He occupied that slightly rising plain beyond 
 Eylati, having his cavalry and his guard be- 
 fore him and at the centre, on his left, in ad- 
 vance of Eylau, Legrand's and Leval's two 
 divisions of Marshal Soult's corps, on the 
 right, and St. Hilaire's division, which con- : 
 The vry expression of .Plotho, the narrator. 
 
 nected itself with the corps of Marshal Da- 
 vout, pushed beyond Klein-Sausgarten ; the 
 French army thus forming an oblique line on 
 the ground which the Russians had possessed 
 in the morning. Considerably beyond, on the 
 left, Marshal Ney, detached, found himself on 
 the rear of the position which the enemy was 
 quitting in the utmost haste. 
 
 Napoleon, certain of being victorious, but 
 grieved to the bottom of his heart, had re- 
 mained amidst his troops, and ordered them to 
 kindle fires, and not leave the ranks, even to 
 go in quest of provisions. A small quantity 
 of bread and brandy was distributed among 
 the soldiers, and, though there was not enough 
 for all, yet no complaints were heard. Less 
 joyous than at Austeriitz and at Jena, they 
 were full of confidence, proud of themselves, 
 ready to renew that dreadful struggle, if the 
 Russians had the courage and the strength to 
 do so. Whoever had given them, at this mo- 
 ment, bread and brandy, which they were in 
 want of, would have found them in as high 
 spirits as usual. Two artillerymen of Marshal 
 Davout's corps having been absent from their 
 company during this engagement, and arrived 
 too late to be present at the battle, their com- 
 rades assembled in the evening at the bivouac, 
 tried them, and not liking their reasons, in- 
 flicted upon them, on that frozen and blood- 
 stained ground, the burlesque punishment 
 which the soldiers call the suvate. 1 
 
 There was no great abundance of any thing 
 but ammunition. The service of the artillery, 
 performed with extraordinary activity, had al- 
 ready replaced the ammunition consumed. 
 With not less zeal was the service of the 
 medical and surgical department performed. 
 A great number of wounded had been picked 
 up; to others relief was administered on the 
 spot, till they could be removed in their turn. 
 Napoleon, overwhelmed with fatigue, was still 
 afoot, and superintending the attentions that 
 were paid to his soldiers. 
 
 In the rear of the army so firm a counte- 
 nance was not everywhere presented. Many 
 stragglers, excluded from the effective in the 
 morning, in consequence of the rapidity of the 
 marches, had heard the din of that tremendous 
 battle, had caught some hourras of the Cos- 
 sacks, and fallen back, circulating bad news 
 along the roads. The brave collected to range 
 themselves beside their comrades, the others 
 dispersed in the various routes which the army 
 had traversed. 
 
 Daybreak next morning threw a light upon 
 that frightful field of battle, and Napoleon him- 
 self was movd to such a degree as to betray 
 his feelings in the bulletin which he published. 
 On that icy plain thousands of dead and dying, 
 cruelly mangled, thousands of prostrate horses, 
 an infinite quantity of dismounted cannon, 
 broken carriages, scattered projectiles, burning 
 hamlets, all this standing out from a ground of 
 snow, 2 exhibited a thrilling and terrible specta- 
 cle. "This spectacle," exclaimed Napoleon, 
 " is fit to excite in princes a love of peace and 
 a horror of war!" A singular reflection from 
 
 i We borrow these particulars from the military an/ 
 manuscript memoirs of Marshal Davout. 
 * An expression of Napoleon's in one of his bulletin*.
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 259 
 
 his lips, and sincere at the moment when he 
 suffered it to escape them ! 
 
 One singularity struck all eyes. From a 
 propensity for returning to the things of past 
 times, and also from economy, an attempt had 
 been made to introduce the white uniform 
 again into the army. The experiment had 
 been made with some regiments, but the sight 
 of blood on the white dress decided the ques- 
 tion. Napoleon, filled with disgust and horror, 
 declared that he would have none but blue 
 uniforms, whatever might be the cost. 
 
 The sight of this field of battle, abandoned 
 by the enemy, gave the army an assurance of 
 its victory. The Russians had retired, leaving 
 upon the ground 7000 dead and more than 
 5000 wounded, whom the generous conqueror 
 lost no time in removing after his own. Be- 
 sides the 12,000 dead or dying left at Eylau, 
 they took with them about 15,000 wounded 
 more or less severely. They had consequently 
 twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand men hors 
 de combat. We had taken three or four thou- 
 sand prisoners, twenty-four pieces of cannon, 
 sixteen colours. Their total loss then amounted 
 to 30,000 men. The French had about 10,000 
 men h&rg de combat, 3000 of whom were killed 
 and 7000 wounded; 1 a loss far inferior to that 
 of the Russian army, and which is accounted 
 for by the position of our troops posted in ex- 
 tended order, and by the dexterity of our artil- 
 lerymen and of our soldiers. Thus, on that 
 fatal day, nearly 40,000 men had perished by 
 fire and sword. It is the population of a large 
 town cut off in a day. Melancholy conse- 
 quence of the passions of nations! terrible 
 passions, which we ought to take pains to di- 
 rect properly, not strive to extinguish ! 
 
 So early as the morning of the 9th, Napoleon 
 had sent forward his cuirassiers and his dra- 
 goons in pursuit of the Russians, to drive them 
 towards Konigsberg, and to throw them for the 
 whole winter beyond the Pregel. Marshal Ney, 
 who had not had much to do in the battle of 
 Eylau, was charged to support Murat. Mar- 
 shals Davout and Souk were to follow 1 at a 
 little distance. Napoleon himself remained at 
 Eylau, engaged in healing the wounds of his 
 brave army, in procuring it supplies, and in 
 setting every thing to rights on its rear. This 
 
 > It is seldom that one can slate the losses sustained 
 in a battle with such accuracy as one is enabled to dp 
 for the battle of Eylau. I undertook a careful exami- 
 nation, in order to arrive at precision, and here follows 
 the truth, at least as nearly as it is possible to attain it 
 in such a matter. The inspector of the hospitals certi- 
 fied the same evening, at Eylau, the existence of 4500 
 wounded ; and next day, after going his rounds in the 
 adjacent villages, he increased the total amount to 7094. 
 His report has been preserved. The reports of the 
 different corps make the number of men more or less 
 severely wounded amount to not fewer than 13 or 14 
 thousand. This difference is explained by the manner 
 in which the authors of those reports understand the 
 word wounded. The chiefs of corps include even the 
 lightest contusions, each of them naturally striving to 
 make the most of the sufferings of his men. But half 
 the men set down as wounded, never thought of apply- 
 ing for any altendance, and this is proved by the report 
 of the director of the hospitals. A month afterwards a 
 curious controversy was kept up by letter between Na- 
 poleon and M. Daru, who could not find more than 6000 
 Mrounded in the hospitals of the Vistula. This appeared 
 disputable to Napoleon, who conceived that there must 
 be more, especially if there were included in this num- 
 ber the wounded of the battle of Eylau and those of the 
 actions wiiich p'<-ceded it, after the breaking up of the. 
 
 was of greater importance than a pursuit, an 
 operation which his lieutenants were perfectly 
 capable of executing themselves. 
 
 On marching, the French acquired a still 
 more complete conviction than before of the 
 disaster sustained by the Russians. As they 
 advanced, they found the small towns and vil- 
 lages of East Prussia full of wounded ; they 
 learned the disorder, the confusion, the deplo- 
 rable state, in short, of the fugitive army. The 
 Russians, nevertheless, in comparing this battle 
 with that of Austerlitz, were proud of the dif- 
 ference. They admitted their defeat, but they 
 made themselves amends for this avowal, by 
 adding that the French had paid dearly for the 
 victory. 
 
 The pursuers did not stop till they reached 
 the banks of the Frisching, a small river which 
 runs from the line of the lakes to the sea, and 
 Murat pushed his squadrons as far as Konigs- 
 berg. The Russians, who had fled in the ut- 
 most haste, some beyond the Pregel, the others 
 to Konigsberg itself, showed a disposition to 
 defend themselves there, and had planted a 
 numerous artillery upon the walls. The terri- 
 fied inhabitants asked themselves if they were 
 to be exposed to the fate of Lilbeck. Luckily 
 for them, Napoleon resolved to put an end to 
 his offensive operations. He had sent Murat's 
 horse to the gates of Konigsberg, but he had 
 no intention of conducting his army itself 
 thither. It would have required nothing less 
 than that entire army to attempt, with any hope 
 of success, an attack by main force on a large 
 city, provided with some works, and defended 
 by all that were left of the Russian and Prus- 
 sian troops. An attack, even if successful, on 
 that wealthy city, would not be worth the risks 
 that must be incurred, if the attempt should 
 miscarry. Napoleon, having pushed his corps 
 to the banks of the Frisching, was content to 
 leave them there for a few days, to be fully 
 certified of his victory, and then purposed to 
 retire, and resume his cantonments. He had 
 not, indeed, obtained the immense result with 
 the prospect of which he at first nattered him- 
 self, and which would certainly not have es- 
 caped him, if an intercepted despatch had not 
 revealed his designs to the Russians ; but he 
 had led them fighting for fifty leagues ; had 
 
 cantonments. However, aAer minute examination, 
 there were never found more than six thousand and 
 some hundred, and fewer than six thousand for Eylau 
 itself, which, taking account of the deaths that super- 
 vened, agrees exactly with the statement of 7094 fur- 
 nished by the director of the hospitals. We think, 
 therefore, that we are near the truth in computing the 
 looses of the battle of Eylau at 3000 killed and 70110 
 wounded. Napoleon, speaking in the bullet:n of 2000 
 killed and five or six thousand wounded, had. as we 
 see, not warped the truth much in comparison with 
 what the Russians had done. One may even assert 
 that, in the evening after the battle, Be was founded in 
 supposing that there were not more. 
 
 As for the losses of the Russians, I have adopted their 
 own amounts and those which were certified by the 
 French. We found 7000 dead, and in the surrounding 
 places 5000 wounded. They must have carried awar 
 a much greater number. Both, a German, says that 
 they carried to Konigsberg 14.900 wounded, who almost 
 all died from the cold. He admits, moreover, that they 
 had 7000 killed, and left 5000 wounded on the field of 
 battle. Add three or four thousand prisoners, and you 
 arrive at a tola! loss of 30,000 men, which can scarcely 
 be disputed. General Benningsen. always very inaccu 
 rale, admitted, in his statement, a loss of 20,000 men.
 
 260 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1807. 
 
 destroyed 9000 of them m a series of rear 
 guard actions; and, finding them at Eylau 
 formed into compact mass, covered by artil 
 lery, resolved to desperation, 80,000 strong 
 including the Prussians, in a plain where nc 
 manoeuvering was possible, he had attacker 
 them with 54,000, destroyed them with cannon- 
 balls, and parried all the accidents of the en- 
 gagement with imperturbable coolness, while 
 bis lieutenants were exerting themselves tc 
 rejoin him. The Russians on that day had 
 had all their advantages, solidity, immova- 
 bleness in fire ; he had not had all his upon a 
 ground where it was not possible for him to 
 manoeuvre; but to their tenacity he had op- 
 posed invincible courage, a moral force above 
 the horrors of the most frightful slaughter. 
 The spirit of the soldiers was displayed on 
 that day as strongly as his own. Assuredly, 
 he had reason to be proud of this test. Be- 
 sides, for the twelve or thirteen thousand men 
 whom he had lost during those eight days, 
 he had destroyed 36 thousand of the enemy. 
 But he must have been sensible at that mo- 
 ment of all the power of climate, soil, distance, 
 for, though possessing more than 300,000 men 
 in Germany, he had not been able to collect 
 more than 54,000 on the ground of the decisive 
 action. After such a victory, he could not fail 
 lo make serious reflections, to take more ac- 
 count of the elements and fortune, and to at- 
 tempt less in future on the invincible nature 
 of things. These reflections he did make, and 
 they induced, as we shall presently learn, con- 
 duct the most soberly calculated and the most 
 admirably provident. Would to Heaven that 
 they had remained for ever engraved on his 
 memory ! 
 
 Though victorious, and safe for several 
 months from any enterprise against his can- 
 tonments, still he had one thing to fear, namely, 
 the lying reports of the Russians, the effect 
 of those reports on Austria, on France, on 
 Italy, on Spain, in short, on all Europe, which, 
 seeing his progress twice stopped in three 
 months, either by the mud or by the climate, 
 would be led to believe him less irresistible, 
 less fatally successful, would regard as doubt- 
 ful a victory, neverthless the most incontest- 
 able, the most cruelly efficacious, and might 
 be tempted to disbelieve his fortune. 
 
 He resolved therefore to show here the cha- 
 racter which he had displayed during the battle 
 of Eylau itself, and, certain of his strength, to 
 wait till Europe, more enlightened, should be 
 equally sensible of it. After passing a few 
 days on the Frisching, as the enemy kept close 
 within his lines, he resolved to return, and re- 
 occupy his cantonments. The weather was 
 still cold, but the temperature never fell more 
 than two or three degress below freezing. He 
 availed himself of it to remove his wounded in 
 sledges. More than 6000 endured, without 
 suffering much, this singular journey of forty j 
 or fifty leagues to the Vistula. The extreme I 
 care taken to seek them all up in the neigh- | 
 bouring villages furnished opportunity fur as- ' 
 certaining their real number. It agreed with 
 that which we have mentioned above. When 
 every thing was removed wounded, sick, 
 prisoners, artillery taken from the enemy 
 
 Napoleon commenced, on the 17th of Febru- 
 ary, his retrograde movement, Marshal Ney 
 with the 6th corps, Mural with the cavalry, 
 forming the rear-guard, the other corps retain- 
 ing their accustomed position in the order of 
 march, Marshal Davout on the right, Marshal 
 Soult in the centre, Marshal Augereau on the 
 left ; lastly, Marshal Bernadotte, who had re- 
 joined, forming the extreme left along the 
 Frische HaflT. 
 
 Napoleon, having ascended the Alle, nearly 
 to the lakes from which it issues, and from 
 which the Passarge likewise issues, changed 
 his direction, and, instead of taking the route 
 to Warsaw, took that of Thorn, Marienburg, 
 and Elbing, purposing thenceforward to appuy 
 himself upon the Lower Vistula. Recent 
 events had modified his ideas respecting the 
 choice of his base of operation. His motives 
 for this change were these. 
 
 The position between the branches of the 
 Ukra, the Narew, and the Bug, which he haa 
 at first adopted, was a consequence of the oc- 
 cupation of Warsaw. It had the advantage 
 of covering that capital, and, if the enemy pro- 
 ceeded along the coast, of allowing him to be 
 more easily outwinged, turned, thrown back to 
 the sea, a plan which Napoleon had just at- 
 tempted, and which he would certainly have 
 executed, but for the taking of his despatches. 
 But, this manffiuvre once unmasked, it was not 
 probable that the Russians, forewarned, would 
 expose themselves a second time to a danger 
 which they had escaped by a sort of miracle. 
 Thus the position chosen in advance of War- 
 saw no longer possessed the same advantage, 
 and it had a serious inconvenience, that of 
 obliging the army to extend itself beyond mea- 
 sure, in order to cover at once Warsaw and 
 he siege of Dantzig a siege which became 
 an urgent operation, to which it was necessary 
 to devote the leisure of winter. In fact, in 
 ^lacing himself at Warsaw, Napoleon was 
 obliged to leave Bernadotte's cor v is at a great 
 distance, with little chance of rallying it to 
 he nftiin body of the army ; and if he marched 
 brward, he should be obliged to leave likewise 
 he fifth corps, that of Lannes, to guard War- 
 saw. Of course, he would have to act with 
 wo corps deficient. The distance of Berna- 
 lotte's corps would become in future a sub- 
 ect of the greater regret, since it would very 
 soon be necessary to unite with him new 
 'orces, in order to second and cover the siege 
 f Dantzig. 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, resolved to keep at a 
 listance from Warsaw, to commit the guard 
 f that capital to the fifth corps, the Poles, the 
 Javarians the submission of the fortresses 
 n Silesia having rendered the latter dis- 
 sosable and to establish himself, with the 
 greater part of his troops, in advance of the 
 ~iower Vistula, behind the Passarge, having 
 Thorn on his right. Elbing on his left, Dantzig 
 on his rear, his centre at Osterode, his ad- 
 vanced posts between the Passarge and the 
 Alle. In this position he covered himself the 
 siege of Dantzig, without needing to detach 
 any part of his forces for this purpose. If, in 
 fact, the Russians, designing to relieve Dant- 
 zig, were to come and seek a battle, he could
 
 Feb. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 261 
 
 oppose to them all his collected corps, includ- 
 ing Bernadotte's, and even part of Lefebvre's 
 troops, which there would be nothing to pre- 
 vent his calling in to him, in case of emer 
 gency, as he had done in 1796, when he raise 
 the siege of Mantua to run after the Austr 
 ans. His only deficiency on a day of battl 
 would be that of the fifth corps, which, ii 
 whatever way he operated, was indispensabl 
 upon the Narew, in order to defend Warsaw 
 This new position, moreover, would furnis! 
 aecasion for scientific combinations, fertile in 
 $reat results, combinations unknown to th 
 'inemy, whereas he was acquainted with al 
 fhose having Warsaw for base. Cantoned be 
 hind the Passarge, Napoleon would be bu 
 fifteen leagues from KGnigsberg. Supposing 
 that the Russians, encouraged by the apparen 
 loneliness in which Warsaw was left, shoulc 
 advance upon that capital, one might run be 
 hind them to KOnigsberg, get possession of tha 
 city, then, dropping down by a movement to 
 the right, on their rear, throw them upon the 
 Narew and the Vistula, into the marshes of the 
 interior, with as much certainty of destroying 
 them as in the case of the movement towards 
 the sea. If, on the contrary, they attacked the 
 cantonments on the Passarge in front, one 
 would have, as we have just observed, in addi- 
 tion to the natural strength of those canton- 
 ments, the entire mass of the army to oppose 
 to them. The position, then was excellent for 
 the siege of Dantzig, excellent for the future 
 operations ; for it would give rise to new com- 
 binations, the secret of which was not re- 
 vealed. 
 
 It is assuredly an imposing and instructive 
 sight to see that impetuous general, who, as 
 his detractors allege, was fit only for offensive 
 war, carried at a bound from the Rhine to the 
 Vistula, pausing all at once before the diffi- 
 culties of localities and of seasons, shutting 
 himself up in a narrow space, carrying on 
 cold, slow, methodical war there, disputing 
 petty streams foot by foot, after passing the 
 largest rivers without stopping, confining him- 
 self to covering a siege, and placed at so vast 
 a distance from his empire, in presence of 
 Europe, which this new mode of proceeding 
 astonished, and in which doubt began to gain 
 ground, retaining unutterable firmness, not 
 seduced even by the desire of striking a signal 
 blow, and knowing how to defer that blow till 
 the moment when the nature of things ren- 
 dered it sure and possible : it is, we say, wor- 
 thy of interest, astonishment, admiration ; it 
 is a fine subject for study and reflection for 
 any one who can appreciate the combinations 
 of great men, and who takes delight in medi- 
 tating upon them. 
 
 Napoleon proceeded then to place himself 
 between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula. 
 Marshal Bernadotte's corps on the left, on the 
 Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden ; 
 Marshal Soult's corps in the centre, between 
 Liebstadt and Mohrungen ; Marshal Davout's 
 corps to the right, between Allenstein and Ho- 
 henstein, at the point where the Alle and the 
 Passarge approach nearest to one another ; 
 Marshal Ney's corps as advanced guard, be- 
 tween the Passarge and the Alle at Guttstadt ; 
 
 : the head-quarters and the guard at Osterode, 
 
 in a central position, where Napoleon could 
 
 i assemble all his forces in a few hours. He 
 
 drew General Oudinot to Osterode, with the 
 
 grenadiers and voltigeurs, forming an infantry 
 
 reserve of six or seven thousand men. He 
 
 spread the cavalry on his rear, between 
 
 Osterode and the Vistula, from Thorn to 
 
 Elbing, a country abounding in all kinds of 
 
 forage. 
 
 In the enumeration of the corps cantoned 
 behind the Passarge, we have not mentioned 
 Augereau's. Napoleon had pronounced its 
 dissolution. Augereau had left the army, dis- 
 concerted at what had befallen him in the bat- 
 tle of Eylau, erroneously imputing his check 
 to the jealousy of his comrades, who. as he 
 said, had not chosen to support him, alleging 
 that he was fatigued, ill, worn out. The Em- 
 peror sent him back to France, with testimo- 
 nies of satisfaction, which were of a nature to 
 cheer him. But, apprehensive lest there might 
 lurk in the seventh corps, half destroyed, a 
 leaven of the discouragement manifested by 
 its chief, he pronounced its dissolution, after 
 lavishing rewards upon it. He divided the 
 regiments between Marshals Davout, Soult, 
 and Ney. Of the 12,000 men composing the 
 seventh corps, there had been 7000 present at 
 Eylau, and two-thirds of those 7000 had been 
 put hors de combat. The survivors, added to 
 those who had lagged behind, furnished the 
 different corps of the army with a reinforce- 
 ment of seven or eight thousand men. 
 
 Napoleon placed the fifth corps on the Omu- 
 ew, at some distance from Warsaw. Lannes 
 continuing ill, he had sent for the first of his 
 enerals, Massena, who had not been able to 
 agree with Joseph, at Naples, with regret to 
 deprive Italy of him, but with great satisfac- 
 ion to have him in Poland. He gave him the 
 command of the fifth corps. The sieges in Sile- 
 sia advancing, thanks to General Vandamme's 
 nergy and fertility of mind, Schweidnitz 
 >eing taken, and Neisse and Glatz alone re- 
 maining to be reduced, Napoleon took advan- 
 age of circumstances to bring to the Vistula 
 )eroy's Bavarian division, six or seven thou- 
 and strong, and very good troops, which was 
 ;antoned at Pultusk, between the position of 
 he fifth corps on the Omulew and Warsaw. 
 The Polish battalions of Kalisch and Posen 
 jad been sent to Dantzig. Napoleon assem- 
 led those of Warsaw, organized by Prince 
 'oniatowski, at Neidenburg, so as to keep up 
 tie communication between the head-quarters 
 nd the troops encamped on the Omulew. 
 'hey were there under the command of Gene- 
 al Zayonscheck. He also required that a ca- 
 alry corps of one or two thousand Poles 
 hould be organized, in order to run after the 
 Cossacks. These different Polish troops, des- 
 ned to connect the position of the grand 
 rmy on the Passarge with that of Massena 
 n the Narew, were not capable, it is true, of 
 topping any Russian army that might have 
 aken the offensive, but they were sufficient to 
 revent the Cossacks from penetrating bo 
 ween Osterode and Warsaw, and to exercise 
 n active vigilance in that extensive space. 
 Concentrated thus behind the Passarge and
 
 2CS 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 fn advance of the Lower Vistula, covering in I of liberty and disorder, and ready to return to 
 an inassailable position the siege of Dantzig, the ranks as soon as they should learn the re- 
 which was at length about to begin; able, by sumption of the operations. Napoleon, ap- 
 a threat against Konigsberg, to stop any offen- prized of this state of things by the difference 
 sive movement upon Warsaw, Napoleon was between the number of men reputed to be in 
 in a situation not to fear any thing. Rejoined < the hospitals, and the number of those whom 
 by the laggards left behind, and by Berna- M. Daru's expenses proved to be really there, 
 dotte's corps, reinforced by Oudinot's grena- j turned his serious attention to this abuse. He 
 diers and voltigeurs, he could, in forty-eight employed for its repression the police of the 
 hours, assemble 80,000 men on one of the Polish authorities, and then the gendarmerie 
 points of the Passarge. This situation was d'elite attached to the guard, as the only body 
 very imposing, especially if we compare it of men sufficiently respected to enforce obedi- 
 with that of the Russians, who could not have ence. Still this leprosy attached to large 
 brought 50,000 men into line. But it is a re- armies could never be completely destroyed on 
 mark worthy of being repeated, though already the line of operation. And yet the army in 
 made by us, that an army of 300,000 men, question was the army of the camp of Bou- 
 spread from the Rhine to the Vistula, admin- 1 logne, the steadiest, the best disciplined, the 
 istered with a skill never equalled by any cap- bravest, that ever existed. In the campaign 
 tain, was incapable of furnishing more than I of Austerlitz, the marauders had scarcely 
 80,000 combatants on the same field of battle, j shown themselves. But the rapidity of the 
 There were 80,000 or 90,000 men, capable of movements, the distance, the climate, the sea- 
 
 acting offensively between the Vistula and the 
 Passarge, 24,000 on the Narew, from Ostro- 
 lenka to Warsaw, including the Poles and the 
 Bavarians, 22,000 under Lefebvre, before 
 
 son, lastly the slaughter, relaxing the ties of 
 discipline, those vermin, deplorable effect of 
 wretchedness in a great body, began to multi- 
 ply. Napoleon provided against the evil for 
 
 Dantzig and Colberg, 28,000 under Mortier, | this time by immense forecast, and by the vic- 
 
 Italians, Dutch, and French, spread from Bre- 
 men and Hamburg to Stralsund and Stettin, 
 15,000 in Silesia, as well Bavarians as Wir- 
 tembergers, 30,000 in the fortresses frem Po- 
 sen to Erfurt and Mayence, 7000 or 8000 em- 
 ployed in parks, 15,000 wounded of all epochs, 
 60 and some thousand sick and marauders, 
 lastly, 30,000 to 40,000 recruits on march, 
 which gave nearly 330,000 men to the grand 
 army, 270,000 of whom were French, and 
 about 60,000 auxiliaries, Italians, Dutch, Ger- 
 mans and Poles. 
 
 What will appear singular is the enormous 
 
 lories which he soon gained. But defeats can 
 in a few days aggravate an evil of this kind 
 to such a degree as to produce the dissolution 
 of armies. Thus in the very successes of 
 that glorious and terrible campaign of 1807, 
 appeared many of the symptoms of a most 
 fatal and even memorable campaign, that of 
 1812. 
 
 The return into cantonments was marked 
 by some movements on the part of the Rus- 
 sians. Their ranks were exceedingly thinned. 
 They had not 50,000 men capable of acting left. 
 General Benningsen, however, quite proud of 
 
 number of 60,000 sick or marauders ; a num- j not having lost all to the very last man at Ey- 
 ber, it is true, merely approximative, 1 difficult j lau, and according to custom proclaiming him- 
 
 to be fixed, but worthy of the attention of 
 statesmen, who study the secret springs of the 
 power of nations. Of these 60,000 absent men 
 designated as sick, not half were in the hospi- 
 tals. The others were gone a-plundering. We 
 have already said that many soldiers were ab- 
 sent from the ranks at the battle of Eylau, 
 owing to the rapidity of the marches, and that, 
 the impressions of this dreadful battle spread- 
 ing to a distance, cowards and hangers-on had 
 
 self conqueror, was desirous to give his boasts 
 the appearance of truth. He therefore left 
 Konigsberg, as soon as he learned that the 
 French army was retiring upon the Passarge. 
 He showed strong columns along that river, 
 especially in its upper course, towards Gutt- 
 stadt, facing the position of Marshal Ney. He 
 went to the wrong person; for that intrepid 
 marshal, deprived of the honour of fighting at 
 Eylau, and impatient to make himself amends, 
 
 run off as fast as their legs would carry them, j gave a vigorous reception to the corps that 
 crying that the French were beaten. Since came within his reach, and inflicted on them 
 
 then, they had been joined by a great number 
 of men, who, on pretext of illness or slight 
 wounds, applied for admission to the hospitals, 
 ut took good care not to go into them, as they 
 should be detained, watched, and even receive 
 great deal more attendance than they liked. 
 
 a considerable loss. At the same moment, the 
 corps of Marshal Bernadotte, seeking to esta- 
 blish itself on the Lower Passarge, and being 
 obliged for that purpose to occupy Braunsberg, 
 made itself master of that town, where it took 
 prisoners 2,000 Prussians. It was Duponl's 
 
 They had passed the Vistula, lived in the vil- | division which had the merit of this brilliant 
 lages on the right and left of the high road, so expedition. The Russians having, neverthe- 
 
 as to escape that general superintendence 
 which kept in order all the parts of the army. 
 In this manser, they lived at the expense of 
 
 less, continued to bestir themselves, and mani- 
 festing an intention to proceed to the Upper 
 Passarge. Napoleon, in the first days of 
 
 the country, which they did not spare, some of j March, resolved to make an offensive demon- 
 them downright cowards, for every ai y, how- ' stration on the Lower Passarge, so as to alarm 
 ever heroic, always has a certain quantity of j General Benningsen for the safety of Konigs- 
 them in its ranks; the others very brave, on berg. It was with regret that Napoleon de- 
 the contrary, but plunderers by nature, fond , cided on such a movement, for it was reveai- 
 The F.mperor could never fix it exactly, owin- lo i in & tO the Russians the risk which they ran in 
 
 *.r. crm>:nuul fluctuation of the effective of the corps. ascending upon our right to threaten Warsaw.
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 2*3 
 
 Well knowing that an unmasked manoeuvre is 
 a lost resource, Napoleon would have chosen I 
 not to act at all, or to act in a decisive manner 
 by marching for Konigsberg with all his forces. 
 But, on the one hand, it was necessary to 
 oblige the enemy to keep quiet, in order to be 
 so himself in his winter quarters; on the other, 
 he had neither sufficient provisions nor ammu- 
 nition to altempt an operation of any duration. 
 Napoleon, therefore, made up his mind to a 
 mere demonstration on the Lower Passarge, 
 executed on the 3d of March by the corps of 
 Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, who passed 
 that river, while Marshal Ney, at Guttstadt, 
 was roughly pushing the enemy's corps pro- 
 ceeding to the Upper Passarge. The Russians 
 lost in these simultaneous movements about 
 2000 men; and, on seeing their line of retreat 
 upon Konigsberg endangered, they hastened to 
 retire and to restore tranquillity to our canton- 
 ments. 
 
 Such were the last acts of that winter cam- 
 paign. The cold, which had long delayed its 
 coming, began to be severe : the thermometer 
 had fallen to eight and ten degrees below the 
 freezing point. There was going to be in March 
 the weather that might have been expected in 
 December and January. 
 
 It was with the utmost reluctance that Na- 
 poleon had given orders for the last operations. 
 Writing to Marshal Soult, he says, " It is cer- 
 tainly one of the inconveniences that I have 
 felt from the present movements, that they en- 
 lighten the Russians respecting, their position. 
 But they pressed me too much on my right. 
 Being resolved to let the bad season pass, and 
 to organize the supplies, I am not otherwise 
 vexed at this lesson given to the enemy. With 
 the spirit of presumption with which I see him 
 animated, we need but to have patience to 
 see him make capital blunders." (Osterode, 
 March 6th.) 
 
 If Napoleon had then had provisions and 
 means of conveyance to carry along with him 
 sufficient to subsist the army for a few days, 
 he would have put an end to the war imme- 
 diately, having to do with an enemy ill-advised 
 enough to come and throw himself upon his 
 quarters. Thus the whole question consisted, 
 according to his notions, in such a supply of 
 provisions as would enable him to recruit his 
 soldiers, exhausted by privations, and to as- 
 semble them for some days without being liable 
 to see them die of hunger or to leave half of 
 them behind, as was the case at Eylau. 
 
 The towns on the coast, especially Elbing, 
 would be able to furnish him with provisions 
 for the first moments of his establishment, but 
 such resources were not sufficient for him. He 
 purposed, therefore, to bring large quantities, 
 either from Warsaw down the Vistula, or from 
 Bromberg by the Nackel canal, and which 
 should then be carried by land from the Vis- 
 tula to the different cantonments of the army 
 on the Passarge. To this end, he gave the 
 most precise orders for collecting the neces- 
 sary supplies in the first instance at Bromberg 
 and Warsaw, for next creating the means of 
 transport for completing the journey from the 
 Vistula to the banks of the Passarge. His 
 intention was to begin with serving out to his 
 
 soldiers the entire ration for each day, and then 
 to form at Osterode, the centre of his quarters, 
 a general magazine containing some millions 
 of rations of bread, rice, wine, spirits. For 
 this purpose he meant to turn to account the 
 zeal of the Poles, who had hitherto rendered 
 him few military services, and from whom he 
 wished to derive some administrative services 
 at least. As he had M. de Talleyrand at War- 
 saw, he charged him to arrange with the pro- 
 visional government which directed the affairs 
 of Poland. He wrote him therefore the fol- 
 lowing letter, sending him full powers for 
 concluding the bargains, whatever the prices 
 might be : 
 
 Osterode, 12th March, 10 at night 
 
 "I received your letter of the 10th at three 
 this afternoon. I have 300,000 rations of bis- 
 cuit at Warsaw. It takes eight days to come 
 from Warsaw to Osterode : work miracles, but 
 despatch 50,000 rations to me every day. En- 
 deavour also to send me 2000 quarts of spirits 
 per day. At this moment the fate of Europe 
 and the most extensive schemes depend upon 
 supplies of provisions. To beat the Russians, 
 if I have bread, is mere child's play. I have 
 millions; I do not refuse to give some of them. 
 All that you do will be rightly done, but, on the 
 receipt of this letter, there must be sent off to 
 me by land, by way of Mlawa and Takroczin, 
 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2000 quarts. It 
 is a matter of eighty wagons per day, which 
 must be paid for handsomely. If the patriot- 
 ism of the Poles cannot make this effort, they 
 are not good for much. The importance of 
 what I am desiring of you is greater than all 
 the negotiations in the world. Send for the 
 ordonnateur, General Lemarrois, and the most 
 influential persons of the government. Give 
 money; I shall approve whatever you do. Bis- 
 cuit and brandy that is all we want. Those 
 300,000 rations of biscuit and those eighteen 
 or twenty thousand quarts of brandy, which 
 may reach us in a few days these are the 
 things to foil the combinations of all the 
 powers." 
 
 M. de Talleyrand assembled the members 
 of the Polish government, to endeavour to 
 obtain the supplies and wagons which were 
 wanted. Provisions were not scarce in Po- 
 land, for, by furnishing the Jews with ready 
 money, you would be sure to obtain them. 
 But to organize the means of conveyance was 
 a very difficult task. It was intended to hire 
 them in the country, paying liberally for them ; 
 but it was finally decided to buy carts and 
 horses, and thus relays were established from 
 the banks of the Vistula to those of the Pas- 
 sarge. The provisions were sent down the 
 Vistula in boats ; being then landed at War- 
 sow, Plock, Thorn, Marienwerder, they were 
 carried to Osterode, the centre of the canton- 
 ments, either in the caissons of the regiments, 
 or in the carriages of the country, or in those 
 which had been purchased and horsed for the 
 purpose. Oxen were bought up throughout all 
 Silesia, and driven on foot to Warsaw. Wines 
 and spirits were sought on the north coasi 
 whither commerce brings them in considera- 
 ble quantity and superior quality. They were 
 to be obtained at Berlin, at Stettin, at Elbing.
 
 264 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 .March, 180T. 
 
 and were despatched by \rater to Thorn. Na- 
 poleon had been particularly solicitous to pro- 
 cure two or three hundred thousand bottles of 
 wine, to cheer the hearts of his soldiers. He 
 had near him a valuable resource of this kind, 
 but it was shut up in the fortress of Dantzig, 
 where there were several millions of bottles 
 of excellent wines, that is to say, sufficient to 
 supply the army for some months. This was 
 no weak stimulus to reduce that fortress. 
 
 These assiduous attentions paid to the sup- 
 ply of the army could not produce an imme- 
 diate effect; but, meanwhile, the soldiers were 
 living on the Nogath, on Elbing, on the very 
 districts which they occupied, and, their indus- 
 try making up for what was deficient, they had 
 contrived to procure necessaries. Considerable 
 quantities of hidden provisions had been dis- 
 covered, and these enabled them, to wait for 
 the regular arrivals from the Vistula. They 
 were lodged in the villages, and had ceased to 
 bivouac, which was a great relief for troops 
 that had bivouacked for five successive months, 
 from October to February. At the advanced 
 posts they lived in hovels, the materials for 
 which, and for fuel, were furnished in abun- 
 dance by the forests of the country. Some wine, 
 some spirits, found at Elbing, and distributed 
 with order, restored to our soldiers some of 
 their gayety- After the first days, they began 
 to like the situation better than that on the 
 Narew ; for the country was finer, and they 
 hoped, on the return of the mild season, to 
 compensate themselves for present privations, 
 and to put an end, by a day of battle, to the 
 terrible struggle in which they were engaged. 
 The provisional regiments destined to bring 
 the recruits began to arrive on the Vistula. 
 Several of them, already gone to the theatre of 
 war, had been reviewed, dissolved, and distri- 
 buted among the regiments to which they be- 
 longed. The soldiers thus saw their ranks 
 filled up, heard talk of numerous reinforce- 
 ments which were preparing on the rear of 
 the army, and relied more than ever on that 
 supreme vigilance which provided for all their 
 wants. The cavalry continued to be the ob- 
 ject of the most attentive care. Napoleon had 
 formed foot detachments of all the dismounted 
 horse, and had sent them into Silesia in quest 
 of horses, in which that province abounded. 
 
 Immense works were in progress on the 
 Passarge and on the Vistula, in order to se- 
 cure the position of the army. All the bridges 
 over the Passarge had been destroyed, two 
 excepted one for the use of Marshal Berna- 
 dotte's corps at Braunsberg, the other for the 
 use of Marshal Soult's corps at Spanden. 
 Vast te'es du pont were added to each of them, 
 to afford facility for debouching beyond Na- 
 poleon repeating incessantly to his lieutenants, 
 that a line was not easy to defend, unless one 
 were able to cross it in its turn, to take the of- 
 fensive against any one who should attack it. 1 
 Two bridges over the Vistula, one at Marien- 
 burg, the other at Marienwerder, insured the 
 
 communication with the troops of Marshal 
 Lefebvre, charged with the siege of Dantzig. 
 Napoleon, therefore, could either go to them, 
 or make them come to him, and everywhere 
 present a compact mass to the enemy. Mar- 
 shal Lefebvre was approaching Dantzig, while 
 awaiting the heavy artillery drawn from the 
 fortresses of Silesia, to commence this import- 
 ant siege, which was to be the occupation and 
 the glory of the winter. The works of the 
 Sierock, Praga and Modlin, destined to con- 
 solidate the position of Warsaw, were like- 
 wise prosecuted. 
 
 It was at the little village of Osterode that 
 Napoleon directed all these operations. His 
 soldiers, having bread, potatoes, meat, brandy, 
 straw to shelter themselves, wood for fuel, 
 were not badly off'; but the officers, who could 
 procure no better food and lodging than the 
 soldier, even with their pay punctually paid, 
 were exposed to many privations. Napoleon 
 meant to set them an example of resignation 
 by remaining among them. The officers of 
 each corps, sent to Osterode, could not say 
 that they had found him more comfortably 
 settled than the lowest of'them. Accordingly, 
 in answering his brother Joseph, who com- 
 plained of the hardships endured by the army 
 of Naples, he laughed at his complaints, ac- 
 cused him of weakness of mind, and drew the 
 following picture : 
 
 " The officers of the staff have not undressed 
 for these two months, and some not for four 
 months past: I have myself been a fortnight 
 without taking off my boots. We are amidst 
 snow and mud, without wine, without brandy, 
 without bread, eating potatoes and meat, mak- 
 ing long marches and counter-marches, with- 
 out any kind of comforls, fighting in general 
 with the bayonet and under grape, the wounded 
 having to be carried away in sledges, exposed 
 to the air, for fifty leagues." 
 
 He is adverting here to the march which 
 followed the battle of Eylau for at Osterode 
 they were better off. 
 
 "It is, therefore, a silly joke to compare the 
 places where we are with the fine country of 
 Naples, where you have wine, bread, sheets 
 to your beds, society, and even that of women. 
 After destroying the Prussian monarchy, we 
 are fighting against the rest of Prussia, against 
 the Russians, the Calmucks, the Cossacks, and 
 those northern tribes which of old overran the 
 Roman empire. We are waging war in all its 
 energy and its horror. Amidst all these ex- 
 cessive fatigues, everybody has been more or 
 less ill for my part, I was never better, and I 
 have grown fat." (Osterode, March 1.) 
 
 The situation, of which Napoleon draws 
 this sketch, was already much improved at 
 Osterode, especially for the soldiers. But, if 
 we suffered, the Russians suffered far more, 
 and were hi extreme distress. Their batta- 
 lions, which, at the commencement of the 
 operations, numbered 500 men, were now re. 
 duced to 300, 200, 150. Ten had just been 
 
 " Neither a river nor any line whatever." he wrote 
 lo Bernadotte, (6th March, Osterode,) "can be defended 
 unless they have offensive points; for, when you have 
 only defended yourself, you have run risks without 
 gaining my thing. But when you can combine defence 
 
 with an offensive movement, you cause the enemy to 
 run more risks than he makes the attacked body incur. 
 Let. then, the works at the ilia du pont of Spanden and 
 Braunsberg proceed day and night "
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 265 
 
 taken at orice, which fell short of the last num- 
 ber. If the Russians were to attempt to cope 
 with Napoleon, it would be on condition of 
 sacrificing their army ; in consequence, they 
 could no longer show themselves in the open 
 field. Word had been sent to Petersburg, in 
 the name of all the generals, that, if the forces 
 which were left were not doubled at least, they 
 could not thenceforth do any thing but run 
 away from the French. For the rest, all the 
 Russian officers, filled with admiration of our 
 army, sensible that, in fact, they were fighting 
 much more for England or Prussia than for 
 Russia, longed for peace, and called loudly 
 for it. 
 
 Their troops, not supplied, like those of Na- 
 poleon, by a superior forecast, were dying of 
 hunger. Weary of war, they had ceased to 
 fight with our men. They met, in marauding, 
 almost without attacking one another. They 
 seemed to have instinctively agreed not to add 
 to the hardships of their situation. Some- 
 times it happened that unfortunate Cossacks, 
 driven by hunger, and expressing themselves 
 by signs, came to beg bread of our soldiers, 
 giving them to understand that, for several 
 days, they had not had any thing to eat; and 
 our men, always disposed to pity, gave them 
 potatoes, of which they had a great abun- 
 dance. Singular sight this return to huma- 
 nity even amidst the cruelties of war ! 
 
 Napoleon knew that, while suffering great 
 hardships, he had subjected the enemy to much 
 greater. But he had to combat the false re- 
 ports accredited at Warsaw, at Berlin, and 
 above all at Paris. His prodigious glory alone 
 awed minds, always independent in France, 
 always malevolent in Europe, and he could 
 already anticipate that, on the first serious re- 
 verse, he should see one after another desert 
 him. Never, in consequence, had he such 
 efforts to make, such energy of character to 
 exert, in order to control the public opinion. 
 Young auditors sent from Paris to carry to 
 head-quarters the despatches of the different 
 ministries, unaccustomed to the scenes that 
 met their view, and officers, either discontented 
 or more deeply impressed than usual with the 
 horrors of that war, sent to France letters full 
 of exaggerations. " Concert with M. Daru," 
 said Napoleon to M. Maret in one of his let- 
 ters, " about sending back the auditors, who are 
 useless here, who are wasting their time, and 
 who, unused to the events of war, write nothing 
 but stupid absurdities to Paris. In future, I will 
 have the papers brought by officers of the 
 staff." As for the accounts relative to the bat- 
 tle of Eylau, emanating from certain officers, 
 ind which Fouche mentioned to him as the 
 source of the false reports circulated in Paris, 
 Xapoleon replied that nothing of the sort was 
 .0 be believed. " My officers," said he, " know 
 as much about what is passing in my army as 
 the loungers parading in the garden of the Tuileries 
 know about what is wider deliberation in the cabi- 
 net. (April 13.) Besides, the human mind is pleased 
 with exaggeration. The sombre pictures drawn 
 for you of our situation have for their authors , 
 Paris babblers, who are adepts at painting. Never 
 was the position of France either greater or 
 more glorious. As for Eylau, I have said and 
 
 V L . II. 34 
 
 repeated that the Bulletin had exaggerated the 
 loss ; and what are two or three thousand men 
 killed in a great battle 1 When I take bark my 
 army to France and. to the Rhine, it will be seen 
 that not many will be missing at roll-call. At the 
 time of the expedition to Egypt, the corre- 
 spondence of the army, being intercepted by the 
 British cabinet, was printed and led to the ex- 
 pedition of the English, which was silly, which 
 ought to have failed, but which succeeded be- 
 cause it was decreed by fate that it should succeed. 
 Then, too, it was said that we were destitute 
 of every thing in Egypt, the richest country in 
 the world; it was said that the army was de- 
 stroyed, and I brought back eight-ninths of it 
 to Toulon ! The Russians claim the victory : 
 so they did after Pultusk, after Austerlitz. 
 They were pursued, on the contrary, at the 
 point of the sword, till they were under the 
 guns of Ku'nigsberg. They had fifteen or six- 
 teen generals killed. Their loss was immense. 
 We made a downright butchery of it." 
 
 There had been printed some fragments of 
 letters from Major-general Berthier, making 
 mention of the dangers to which Napoleon had 
 been exposed. "They are publishing," he 
 wrote to the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, 
 " that I command my advanced posts. . . .what 
 absurdities ! I begged you not to allow any- 
 thing but the Bulletins to be inserted in ihe 
 Moniteur. If this is not attended to, you will 
 prevent me from writing at all, and then you 
 will be more uneasy. . . . Berthier writes amidst 
 a field of battle, wearied, and not expecting 
 that his letters will be printed." (Osterode, 
 March 5.) 
 
 Thus Napoleon had no desire that his own 
 personal courage should be noticed, for that 
 very courage became a danger. It was ac- 
 knowledging too plainly that this military mo- 
 narchy, without past, without future, was at the 
 mercy of a cannon-ball. 
 
 The transports caused in France by the won- 
 ders of Austerlitz and Jena, were succeeded 
 by a sort of uneasiness. Paris was dull and 
 deserted, for the emperor and the chiefs of the 
 army, who constituted a great part of the high 
 society of that reign, were absent. Trade suf- 
 fered. Napoleon enjoined his sisters and the 
 Princes Cambaceres and Lebrun to give enter- 
 tainments. He wished to fill up in this way 
 the void created by his absence. He ordered a 
 survey to be made of the movables of the 
 crown at Fontainebleau.Versailles, Compiegne, 
 St. Cloud, and several millions taken from his 
 personal savings to be expended on stuffs in 
 the manufactories of Lyons. Rouen, and St. 
 Quentin. He directed the sums laid out to be 
 proportioned, not to the wants of the imperial 
 residences, but to the wants of the different 
 branches of trade. Though he generally made 
 a point of checking the fondness of the em- 
 press and his sisters for expense, on this occa- 
 sion he recommended prodigality to them. He 
 desired that the Sinking Fund, that is to say, 
 the treasury of the army, should devote a mil- 
 lion per month to be lent to the principal 
 manufacturers, on deposit of goods, and he de 
 manded a projet for converting that accidental 
 measure into a permanent institution, having 
 for its object, he said, not the creation of a 
 Z
 
 266 
 
 HISTORY OP' THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 chest for the assistance of bankrupts, but of a 
 provident chest destined to uphold manufactu- 
 rers employing a great number of hands, whom 
 they would be obliged to discharge, if they 
 were not furnished with facilities for paying 
 them. 
 
 Lastly, he devised an extraordinary medium 
 for procuring capitals for commerce, and for 
 making at the same time a notable improve- 
 ment in the administration of the finances. At 
 that time, still less than at the present day, was 
 the sum total of the taxes rigidly levied within 
 the year. Thus the bills of the receivers- 
 general, representatives of the taxes, were not 
 due, for a part at least, till three or four months 
 after the turn of the year, that is to say, till 
 March, April, or May, in the following year. 
 It was necessary, therefore, to discount them, 
 a business undertaken by a class of agents 
 who carried on a very active stock-jobbing. It 
 was the floating debt of the time, which was 
 met with the bills of the receivers-general, as 
 it is now met with the bons royaux. This dis- 
 count required a capital of eighty millions on 
 the part of the Paris capitalists. Napoleon's 
 idea was to determine that, for 1808, for exam- 
 ple, that portion of the bills which should not 
 be due till 1809, should be applied to the ser- 
 vice of 1809 itself, and the same in future, so 
 that the service of each year should have for 
 its use only those bills which fell due in that 
 same year. The deficit, answering to the por- 
 tion of the bills carried back to 1809, would 
 remain to be provided for. This was a sum 
 of eighty millions to be raised. Napoleon pro- 
 posed to furnish it by a loan which the treasury 
 of the state should obtain from the treasury of 
 the army at a moderate rate. " By this means," j 
 he wrote, "my bills would fall due all within 
 twelve months; the public treasury would save 
 five or six millions in expenses of negotiation ; 
 our manufactures and our commerce would 
 make an immense gain, since there would be 
 eighty millions idle, which, as they could not 
 find employment at the treasury, would be 
 placed in commerce." (Note to Prince Cam- 
 baceres, Osterode, April 1.) 
 
 He gave orders for making in Paris itself a 
 considerable quantity of shoes, boots, harness, 
 and gun-carriages, to give employment to the 
 workmen of the capital. The articles made in 
 Paris were of better quality than those made 
 elsewhere. The only question was, how to 
 transport them to Poland. Napoleon devised 
 for this an expedient as simple as it was inge- 
 nious. At this period a company of contractors 
 was charged with the transports of the army, 
 and furnished at a fixed rate the caissons which 
 carried the bread, the baggage, every thing in 
 short that follows the troops, even the most 
 lightly equipped. Napoleon had been struck, 
 amidst the quagmires of Pultusk and Golymin, 
 with the little zeal of those drivers enrolled by 
 private industry, with their want of courage 
 in danger, and, as he had determined to orga- 
 nize the artillery-drivers militarily, so he re- 
 solved likewise to organize the baggage-drivers 
 militarily; thinking that, the danger being 
 nearly equal for all those who concur in the 
 different services of an army, it was necessary 
 lo connect them all by the bond of honour, 
 
 and to treat them as soldiers, in order to im- 
 pose on them the duties of soldiers. He had 
 therefore given orders for forming successively 
 in Paris, battalions of the train, charged with the 
 driving of the equipages, for constructing cais- 
 sons, for purchasing draught horses, and, when 
 the personal and material establishment of 
 these battalions should be organized, for de- 
 spatching them to the Vistula. Instead of 
 coming empty, these new military equipages 
 were to bring the articles of equipment manu- 
 factured in Paris. These articles might arrive 
 in time on the Vistula, for the journey took two 
 months, and it was possible that the war might 
 last five or six. Napoleon purposed by the 
 whole of these measures to remedy the tempo- 
 rary stagnation of commerce, and to make the 
 war consumption compensate for the deficiency 
 of the peace consumption. The one, in fact, 
 consumes not less than the other: and, when 
 money is not scarce, a skilful administration 
 can furnish workmen with the employment 
 that peace would supply, and afford them the 
 means of earning a livelihood even amidst the 
 difficulties of war. 
 
 Such is the multitude of objects to which he 
 directed his attention in the village of Oste- 
 rode, living in a sort of barn, whence he awed 
 Europe and governed his empire. A more 
 suitable abode was at length found for him, at 
 Finkenstein ; it was a country house, belong- 
 ing to one of the employes of the crown of 
 Prussia, and spacious enough to accommodate 
 himself with his staff and his military house- 
 hold. There, as at Osterode, he was in the 
 centre of his cantonments, and had it in his 
 power to repair to any quarter where his pre- 
 sence might be necessary. The portfolios of 
 the several ministers were sent to him every 
 week, and he turned his attention to the most 
 important as well as the most trivial matters. 
 The theatres themselves, at this distance, did 
 not escape his active superintendence. There 
 had been composed in his honour music and 
 verses which he deemed bad. By his order, 
 others were composed, in which he was less 
 praised, but in which elevated sentiments were 
 expressed in suitable language. He directed 
 that the authors should be thanked and re- 
 warded, adding these noble words: The best 
 way to praise me is to write things which excite heroic 
 sentiments in the nation, in youth, and in the army. 
 He read the public papers attentively, followed 
 the meetings of the French Academy, desired 
 that the tendencies of the minds of writers 
 should be corrected, and that an eye should be 
 kept opon the orations delivered before the 
 Academy. He considered the attacks made 
 by the Journal de I'JZmpire and the Meratre de 
 France upon the philosophers as mischievous. 
 " It is necessary." said he, " to have discreet 
 men at the head of those journals. Those 
 two journals affect religion even to bigotry. 
 Instead of attacking the excesses of the ex- 
 clusive system of some philosophers, they 
 attack philosophy and human knowledge. In- 
 stead of keeping the productions of the age 
 within bounds by sound criticism, they dis- 
 courage, depreciate and debase them. I am 
 not adverting to political opinions : one need 
 not be very shrewd to perceive that if they
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 267 
 
 durst launch into them, they would not be | 
 much sounder than those of the Courrier i 
 frangais." 
 
 The French Academy had held a meeting 
 for the reception of" Cardinal Maury, recalled 
 to France and replaced in the chair which he 
 had formerly occupied. The Abbe Sicard, in i 
 receiving Cardinal Maury, had expressed him- ! 
 self in unbecoming terms of Mirabeau. The 
 person received had spoken no better of him, 
 and this academical meeting had furnished 
 occasion for a philippic against the Revolution 
 and the revolutionists. Napoleon, disagree- 
 ably affected, wrote to Fouche, the minister: 
 "I recommend to you, lei there be no reaction 
 in the public opinion. Let Mirabeau be men- 
 tioned in terms of praise. There are many 
 things in that meeting of the Academy which 
 do not please me. When shall we grow wiser! 
 When shall we be animated with genuine 
 Christian charity, and when will our actions 
 not have for their object to humble anybody ! 
 When shall we absiain from awakening recol- 
 lections which go to the heart of so many 
 persons !" (Finkenstein, May 20.) 
 
 At another time, he learned from the corre- 
 spondence of all kinds, which he paid for libe- 
 rally and read with care, that intestine quarrels 
 divided the administration of the Opera, and 
 that there was a apposition to persecute a 
 machinist, on account ?f a change of decora- 
 tion which had failed : " 1 will not have wrang- 
 ling anywhere," he wrote to M. Fouche. "I 
 
 will not suffer M to be the victim of a 
 
 fortuitous accident; my custom is to support 
 the unfortunate : whether actresses ascend 
 into the clouds or ascend not, I will not allow 
 that to be made a handle for intriguing." 
 (April 12.) 
 
 At the same time he showed extreme solici- 
 tude about the institutions for education, par- 
 ticularly about that of Ecouen, where the 
 daughters of poor legionaries were to be edu- 
 cated. He wished them, he wrote to M. de 
 Lacepede, to be trained up into women, sim- 
 ple, chaste, worthy of being united to men 
 who should have served him faithfully, either 
 in the army or in the civil administration. 
 To render them such, it was requisite, accord- 
 ing to him, that they should be brought up in 
 sentiments of solid piety. "I have attached," 
 said he, " but a secondary importance to the 
 religious institutions *br the school of Fon- 
 tainebleau. The objecC of that is to train 
 young officers ; but as for Ecouen, it is a to- 
 tally different affair. It is there proposed to 
 train up women, wives, mothers of families. 
 Make believers of them, not reasotiers. The weak- 
 ness of the brain of women, the mobility of their 
 ideas, their destination in the social order, the neces- 
 sity for inspiring them with a perpetual resignatum 
 and a mild and easy charity all this renders the 
 yoke of religion indispensable for them. I am 
 desirous that they may leave it not agreeable 
 women, but virtuous women, that their agree- 
 able qualities may be of the heart, not of the mind." 
 In consequence, he recommended that they 
 should be taught history and literature, that 
 they should be spared the study of the ancient 
 languages and too abstruse sciences ; that 
 they should also learn sufficient of natural 
 
 philosophy to be able to dispel the popular 
 ignorance around them, somewhat of ordi- 
 nary medicine, of botany, of dancing, but 
 not that of the Opera, the art of ciphering, 
 and all sorts of needle-work. Their apart- 
 ments, he added, must be furnished by their 
 own handiwork. They must make their che- 
 mises, their stockings, their dresses, their caps, 
 and be able, in case of need, to make clothes 
 for their infants. I want to make these young 
 girls useful women, certain that I shall there- 
 by make them agreeable women. If I were 
 to allow any one to set about making them 
 agreeable women, I should soon have them 
 turned into female coxcombs, (fetiies malireues.) 
 (Finkenstein, May 15.) 
 
 Amidst this prodigious activity, sometimes 
 changing from beneficent vigilance to jealous 
 mistrust, which cannot fail to happen with a 
 new and absolute master, Napoleon turned his 
 attention to the police, knew what persons en- 
 tered Paris and what left it. He was informed 
 that Madame de Stael had returned thither, 
 that she had already visited at several coun- 
 try-houses in the environs, and made more 
 than one hostile speech. Alleging, that, if 
 he did not interfere, she would compromise 
 good citizens, whom he should afterwards be 
 obliged to treat with severity, he had ordered 
 her, notwithstanding many contrary solici- 
 tations, to be expelled from Paris. As he dis- 
 trusted Fouche, the minister, who was dis- 
 posed to spare influential persons, he had 
 enjoined him to make her set off without de- 
 lay, and had recommended to the Arch-chan- 
 cellor Cambaceres to see to the execution of 
 this order. (March 26.) At the same mo- 
 ment he was informed that the police had 
 sent away from Paris an old Conventionalist, 
 named Ricord. For the latter nobody soli- 
 cited, no great personage claimed indulgence ; 
 all were hurried away by the reaction, and 
 there was neither favour nor humanity for 
 those who were called revolutionists. " Why," 
 wrote Napoleon to Fouche, " why send Ricord 
 the Conventionalist away from Paris 1 If he 
 is a dangerous man, he ought not to have 
 been suffered to return, contrary to the laws 
 of the year VIII. But since he has been per- 
 mitted to come back, he must be left there. 
 What he did formerly is of little consequence. 
 He conducted himself in the time of the Con- 
 vention like a man anxious to make his for- 
 tune; he joined in the cry of the time. He is 
 now in easy circumstances, and will not in- 
 volve himself in any scrapes for the sake of a 
 subsistence. Let him then be tolerated in 
 Paris, unless there are strong reasons to pre- 
 vent his residing there." (March 6.) 
 
 By the same pains that he took to inquire 
 about every thing, he learned from MM. 
 Monge and Laplace, that a man of science 
 whom he particularly honoured and cherished, 
 M. Berthollet, was in some pecuniary embar- 
 rassment. " I am informed," he wrote to 
 him, " that you are in need of 150,000 francs. 
 I shall give my treasurer an order to place 
 that sum at your disposal, very glad to find 
 this occasion to be useful to yon, and to give 
 you a proof of my esteem."- < Fmkens'.ein, 
 May 1.)
 
 268 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 L March, 1807. 
 
 He then addressed further advice to his bro- 
 thers, Louis and Joseph, on the manner of 
 reigning, the one in Holland, the other in Na- 
 ples. He accused Louis of favouring, from 
 the vanity of an upstart king, the party of the 
 old government, the Orange party ; of creat- 
 ing marshals without having an army ; of in- 
 stituting an order, which he gave to all comers ; 
 to Frenchmen who were unknown to him, to 
 Dutchmen who had never rendered him any 
 service. He reproached Joseph with being 
 weak, careless, more engaged with ostentatious 
 reforms than with the subjection of the Cala- 
 brias; with preceding the suppression of the 
 monks, a measure which he highly approved, 
 by a preamble that seemed to be drawn up by 
 philosophers, not by statesmen. " Such a pre- 
 amble," he said, " ought to be written in the 
 style of an enlightened pontiff, who suppresses 
 the monks because they are unserviceable to 
 religion, burdensome to the Church. I con- 
 ceive a bad opinion of a government whose 
 papers are directed by the mania of fine viriting" 
 (April 14.) " You live too much," said he, 
 " with literary and scientific men. They are 
 coquettes with whom one must keep up a com- 
 merce of gallantry, but whom one must never 
 think of making one's wife or one's minister." 
 He reproached him with creating illusions re- 
 specting his situation at Naples, with flatter- 
 ing himself that he was beloved, when he had 
 reigned but a year at most. " Ask yourself," 
 said he, "what would become of you if there 
 were no longer thirty thousand French in Na- 
 ples. When you have reigned twenty years, 
 and have made yourself feared and esteemed, 
 then you may venture to believe that your 
 throne is consolidated." He then drew for 
 him the following sketch of the situation of 
 the French in Poland. " At Naples, you are 
 eating green peas, and perhaps seeking the 
 shade already : we, on- the contrary, are still in 
 the month of January. I have had the trenches 
 
 opened before Dantzig. jne hundred 
 of cannon, two hundred thousand pounds of 
 gunpowder, are beginning to be collected 
 there. Our works are 60 fathoms from the 
 place, which has a garrison of six thousand 
 Russians and twenty thousand Prussians, com- 
 manded by Marshal Kalkreuth. I hope to take 
 
 it in a fortnight For the rest, give your 
 
 self no uneasiness." (Finkenstein, April 19.) 
 Such were, amidst the snows of Poland, the va- 
 rious occupations of that extraordinary genius, 
 embracing every thing, superintending every 
 thing, aspiring to govern not only his soldiers 
 and his agents, but minds themselves : wanting 
 not only to act but to think for everybody : most 
 frequently disposed to do good, but sometimes, 
 in his incessant activity, suffering himself to be 
 drawn into evil, as it happens to him who can 
 do any thing, and who finds no obstacle to his 
 own impulsions ; at one time preventing reac- 
 tions, persecutions, at another in the bosom 
 of immense glory, so keenly sensitive to the 
 sting of an enemy's tongue as to descend from 
 his greatness to persecute a woman, on the 
 same day that he defended a member of the 
 Convention against the reacting spirit of the 
 moment ! Let us rejoice that we have at last 
 become subject to the law, to the law equal for 
 all, and which does not expose us to the peril 
 of being dependent on the good or evil move- 
 ments of even the greatest and the most gene- 
 rous of souls. Yes, the law is better than any 
 human will, whatever it may be! Let us be 
 just, however, to that will, which found means 
 to accomplish such prodigious things, which 
 accomplished them by our hands, which em- 
 ployed its fertile energy in reorganizing French 
 society, in reforming Europe, in carrying our 
 power and our principles over the whote 
 world, and which, if, after all that it did with 
 us, it has not left us the power that passes 
 away, has at least left us the glory that is perma- 
 nent and glory sometimes brings back power.
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 BOOK XXVII. 
 
 FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT. 
 
 Events in the East during the Winter of 1S07 Sultan Selim, frightened by the Threats of Russia, restores the 
 Hospodars, Ipsilanti. and Maruzzi The Russians, nevertheless, continue their March to the Turkish Frontier 
 The Porte, on learning the Violation of its Territory, at the instigation of General Sebastian!, sends the Rus- 
 sian Minister, M. d'ltalinski, his Vassports The English, in concert with the Russians, demand the return of 
 M. d'ltalinski, the Expulsion of General Sebastian!, and an immediate Declaration of War against France 
 Resistance of the Porte and Retreat of Mr. Arbuthnot, the English Minister, on board the English Fleet at 
 Tenedos Admiral Duckworth, with a Squadron of seven Sail of the Line and iwo Frigates, forces the Darda- 
 nelles, without sustaining any Damage, and destroys a Turkish Naval Division at Cape Nagara The Turkish 
 Government, divided, is on the point of yielding General Sebastiani encourages Sultan Selim, and persuades 
 him to feign a Negotiation, to gain Time for arming Constantinople The Counsel of the French Ambassador 
 is lollowed, and Constantinople armed in a few Days, with the Assistance of the French Officers Parleys 
 succeed between the Porte and the British Squadron lying at the Prince's Islands These Parleys terminate 
 in a Refusal to comply with the Demands of the British Legation Admiral Duckworth proceeds to Constanti- 
 nople, finds the City armed with three hundred Pieces of Cannon, and determines to regain the Dardanelles 
 He passes through them again, but with considerable damage to his squadron Great Effect produced in Europe 
 by this Event, in favour of the Policy of Napoleon Though victorious. Napoleon, impressed with the difficul- 
 ties which Nature opposes to him in Poland, reverts to the Idea of a great continental Alliance lie makes 
 fresh Efforts to discover the Secret of the Policy of Austria The Court of Vienna, in answer to his Questions, 
 offers its Mediation with the belligerent Powers Napoleon regards this Offer as a Mode of intermeddling in 
 the Quarrel, and of preparing for War He calls out immediately a third Conscription, draws new Forces 
 from France and Italy, creates wilh extraordinary Promptness an Army of Reserve of one hundred thousand 
 Men, and gives Austria an Intimation of these Measures Flourishing State of the French Army on the I,ower 
 Vistula and the Passarge Winter, long delayed, is severely felt Napoleon avails himself of this Period of 
 Inaction to undertake the Siege of Dantzig Marshal Lefebvre charged with the Command of the Troops, 
 General Chasseloup with the Direction of the Engineering Operations Long and difficult Works of that memo- 
 rable Siege The two Sovereigns of Prussia and Russia resolve to send a strong Force to relieve Dantzig 
 Napoleon, on his Part, disposes his Corps in such a Manner as to be able to reinforce Marshal Lefebvre on a 
 sudden Brilliant Action fought under the Walls of Dantzig Last Works of Approach The French ready to 
 make the Assault The Place surrenders Immense Resources in Corn and Wine found in the City of Dantzig 
 Marshal Lefebvre created Duke of Dantzig The Return of Spring decides Napoleon to resume the Offensive 
 The Commencement of the Operations fixed for the 10th of June, l507 The Russians anticipate the French, and 
 on the 5th of June make a general Attack on the Cantonments of the Passarge Marshal Ney. having two-thirds 
 of the Russian Army upon him, opposes them -with heroic Intrepidity between Guttstadt and Deppen That Mar- 
 shal gives Napoleon time to concentrate the whole French Army on Deppen Napoleon, in his turn, takes a vigor- 
 ous Offensive, and follows up the Russians closely General Benningsen retires precipitately towards the Pregel, 
 descending the Alle Napoleon marches in such a manner as to interpose between the Russians and KSnigsherg 
 The Head of the French Army finds the Russian Army encamped at Heilsberg Sanguinary Action on the 10th 
 of June Napoleon, arriving in the Evening at Heilsberg with the bulk of his Forces, prepares for a decisive En- 
 gagement on the following day, when the Russians decamp He continue? to maiMEuvre in such a manner as to 
 
 cut them off from Konigsberg He sends his left, composed of Marshals Soult and Davout, towards Konigsberg, 
 ps of Marshals Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Bernadotte, and the Guard, follows the Russian Army 
 along the Alle General Benningsen, alarmed for the Fate ot Konigsberg, hastens to pass the Alle at Friedland, 
 
 with the intention of proceeding to the Relief of the Capital Napoleon surprises him on the Morning of the 14th, 
 at the Moment when he is passing the Alle Memorable Battle of Friedland The Russians, overwhelmed, 
 retire towards the Niemen, abandoning Konigsberg Konigsberg taken Armistice offered by the Russians and 
 accepted by Napoleon Removal of the French Head-quarters to Tilsit Interview between Alexander and 
 Napoleon, on a Raft placed in the middle of the Niemen Napoleon invites Alexander to cross the Niemeu, 
 and to take up his Abode at Tilsit An Intimacy speedily ensues between the two Monarchs Napoleon gains 
 an Ascendency over the Mind of Alexander, and induces him to concur in vast Designs, tending to force all 
 Europe to take Arms against England, if she will not consent to an equitable Peace The Partition of the 
 Turkish Empire is to be the Price of Alexander's Compliance Dispute about Constantinople Alexander 
 finally adheres to all Napoleon's Plans, and appears to feel the warmest Friendship for him Napoleon, put of 
 Consideration for Alexander, consents to restore to the King of Prussia part of his Dominions The King of 
 Prussia repairs to Tilsit His Part between Alexander and Napoleon The Queen of Prussia also goes to Til- 
 sit, to endeavour to obtain from Napoleon some Concessions favourable to Prussia Napoleon respectful 
 towards that unfortunate Queen, but inflexible Conclusion of the Negotiations Patent and Secret Treaties 
 of Tilsit Secret Convention still unknown to Europe Napoleon and Alexander, agreed upon all Points, part 
 with extraordinary Tokens of Affection, and a Promise to meet again soon Return of Napoleon to France, 
 after an Absence of nearly a Year His Glory after Tilsit Character of his Policy at this Period. 
 
 WHILE Napoleon, cantoned on the Lower 
 Vistula, was waiting amidst the snows of Po- 
 land for the return of spring to allow him to 
 resume the offensive, and employing the inter- 
 val of this apparent inaction in laying siege 
 to Dantzig, in recruiting his army, in govern- 
 ing his vast empire, the East, having recently 
 interfered in the quarrel of the West, afforded 
 Dseful assistance to his arms and procured 
 ignal success for his policy. 
 
 We have already made the reader acquainted 
 with Sultan Selim, the nobleness of his cha- 
 racter, the high qualities of his mind. We 
 have also shown the embarrassment of his 
 situation between Russia and England, whom 
 he disliked, and France, to whom he was at- 
 tached from taste, instinct, foresight, for he 
 well knew that she, even in the days of her 
 
 greatest ambition, would never covet Constan- 
 tinople. We have yet to relate what had oc- 
 curred while the French army was fighting in 
 December the battle of Pultusk, and in Feb- 
 ruary that of Eylau. 
 
 Sultan Selim, as we have seen, had begun 
 by deposing the hospodars of 'Wallachia and ! 
 Moldavia, Maruzzi and Ipsilanti, notoriously 
 devoted to the policy of Russia. But, M. d'lta- 
 linski having soon threatened him with an 
 immediate rupture unless he replaced them in' 
 their post, he had yielded to the menaces of 
 this represenative of Russia, and made up 
 his mind to commit the government of the 
 provinces of the Danube to two professed ene- 
 mies of his empire. Russia appealed, in or- 
 der to extort this concession, to *,ne treaty of 
 Cainardge, which conferred >n her a sort of 
 c 2
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807 
 
 right to intervene in the government of Molda- 
 via and Wallachia. No sooner had Sultan 
 Selim, impelled much more by the will of his 
 ministers than by his own, complied with the 
 demand, than he wrote to Napoleon, to solicit 
 his indulgence, to assure him that the act to 
 which he had suffered himself to be urged 
 was uot a desertion of the alliance of France, 
 but a measure of prudence commanded by the 
 alarming disorganization of the Turkish forces. 
 Napoleon replied immediately, and, far from 
 discouraging him by expressions of displea- 
 sure, he had pitied, soothed, cheered, and of- 
 fered him the twofold succour of the French 
 army of Dalmatia, which might be sent Ihrough 
 Bosnia to the Lower Danube, and of the 
 French fleet at Cadiz, which was ready to sail 
 from Spain for the Dardanelles. That fleet, 
 protected by the straits, as soon as it had 
 passed the Bosphorus, would presently be mis- 
 tress of the Black Sea, and afford a great sup- 
 port there to the Turks. Meanwhile, till this 
 succour should arrive, Napoleon had ordered 
 several officers, both engineers and artillery, 
 to be despatched from Dalmatia, to assist the 
 Turks in the defence of Constantinople and 
 the Dardanelles. General Sebastiani, employ- 
 ing with skill the means placed at his dispo- 
 sal, had never ceased stimulating the sultan 
 and the divan, to induce them to declare war 
 against the Russians. He expatiated to them 
 on the prodigious success of Napoleon in the 
 plains of the north, his bold march beyond the 
 Vistula, his grand project for reconstituting Po- 
 land, and promised, in his name, if the Porte 
 would take arms, lo obtain for it the revocation 
 of the treaties which placed it in the dependence 
 of Russia, perhaps even the restitution of the 
 Crimea. 
 
 Sultan Selim would willingly have followed 
 the advice of General Sebastiani, bnt his min- 
 isters were divided ; one half of them, sold to 
 the Russians and the English, openly betrayed 
 him ; the other half trembled to think of the 
 impotence into which the Ottoman empire had 
 fallen. Though that empire still numbered 
 more than 300,000 soldiers, mostly barbarians, 
 some half trained, and a fleet of about twenty 
 ships of respectable appearance, these forces, 
 as badly organized as they were commanded, 
 could scarcely be opposed to the Russians and 
 the English, unless many French officers, ad- 
 mitted into the ranks of the Turkish army, 
 should come and communicate at length Eu- 
 ropean knowledge to the troops, who were 
 brave, it is true, but whose fanaticism, cooled 
 by time, could not make up as formerly for 
 the want of the resources of military science. 
 While the Porte was involved in these per- 
 plexities, the Russians had put an end to its 
 uncertainty by crossing the Dniester, even af- 
 ter the restoration of the hospodars. That in- 
 vincible attraction which draws them toward 
 Constantinople had silenced in them all the 
 considerations of prudence. It was, in truth, 
 an egregious blunder, when they had the 
 French army upon their hands, and scarcely 
 200,000 men to oppose to it, to employ 50,000 
 of that number against the Turks. But, 
 amidst the convulsions of this age, the idea of 
 seizing any occasion to take what they pleased [ 
 
 was then the prominent idea of all govern- 
 ments. The Russians, therefore, said to them 
 selves that the time was perhaps come fot 
 them to take possession of Moldavia and 
 Wallachia. The English, on their part, were 
 not sorry to find a pretext for reappearing in 
 Egypt. If they were not yet agreed upon thr 
 immediate partition of the Turkish empire 
 a subject on which it seemed very difficult for 
 them to come to an agreement they con- 
 curred at least in withdrawing the Porte from 
 the influence of France, and of withdrawing it 
 from that influence by force. The Russians 
 were to cross the Dniester and the English to 
 pass the Dardanelles. At the same time a 
 squadron was to attack Alexandria. 
 
 This explains why the Russians had passed 
 the Dniester, even after the restoration of the 
 hospodars. They had marched in three corps, 
 one proceeding towards Choczin, another to 
 Bender, and the third to Yassi. Their design 
 was to advance upon Bucharest, to give the 
 hand to the revolted Servians. Their active 
 forces amounted to 40,000 men, and to 50,000 
 including the reserves left in rear. 
 
 While the Russians were acting on their 
 side, the English Admiralty had ordered Rear- 
 admiral Louis to proceed with three ships to 
 the Dardanelles, to pass through them without 
 committing any hostile act, which might be 
 done, as the Turks at that time granted a free 
 passage to the armed ships of England and 
 Russia merely to reconnoitre the localities, 
 to receive on board the families of the English 
 merchants who should not choose to stay at 
 Constantinople, during the events with which 
 it was threatened, and then to return to Tene- 
 dos, and wait for two divisions the one under 
 Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, drawn from the 
 seas of the Levant, the other under Admiral 
 Duckworth from Gibraltar. The three divi- 
 sions, amounting to eight ships of the line, 
 several frigates, cutters, and bomb-vessels, 
 were to be placed under the command of Ad- 
 miral Duckworth, and to act on the requisition 
 of Mr. Arbuthnot, the ambassador of England 
 at Constantinople. 
 
 When this display of force came to the 
 knowledge of the Turks, either through the 
 march of the Russians beyond the Dniester, 
 or by the appearance of Rear-admiral Louis 
 at the Dardanelles, they considered war as 
 inevitable; and they met it, some with enthu- 
 siasm, others with terror. Though Russia 
 strongly protested her inoffensive intentions, 
 and declared that her troops should come and 
 occupy pacifically the Danubian provinces, in 
 order to insure the execution of treaties, the 
 Porte was not to be deceived, and sent M, 
 d'ltalinski his passports. The two straits 
 were immediately closed against the military 
 flag of all the powers. The pachas placed in 
 the frontier provinces were ordered to collect 
 troops ; and Mustapha Baraictar, at the head 
 of 80,000 men, was charged to punish the 
 Russians for their contempt of the Turkish 
 army a contempt carried to such a length as 
 to lead them to invade the empire with fewer 
 than 50,000 men. 
 
 M. d'ltalinski being gone, there was left at 
 Constantinople Mr. Arbuthnot, the English
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULAR tf AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 minister, whom there was no ground for dis- 
 missing, since no hostility had been commit- 
 ted by the British forces. He assumed in his 
 turn a most threatening attitude, insisted on 
 the recall of M. d'ltalinski, the expulsion of 
 General Sebastiani, the immediate adoption 
 of a policy hostile to France, the renewal of 
 the treaties which bound the Porte to Russia 
 and England, lastly, the free passage of the 
 straits for the British flag. It was impossible 
 to carry exigency in things, arrogance in lan- 
 guage, to a greater length. The ambassador 
 even declared that, if his conditions were not 
 accepted forthwith, he should soon follow M. 
 d'ltalinski, and that he should go on board the 
 English squadron lying at that moment at Te- 
 nedos, and bring it back by main force beneath 
 the walls of Constantinople. This threat threw 
 the Divan into the greatest consternation. Lit- 
 tle reliance could be placed on the fortifications 
 of the Dardanelles, which had long been ne- 
 glected ; and, the Dardanelles once passed, 
 people trembled at the idea of an English 
 squadron, master of the sea of Marmora, bat- 
 tering with its guns the Seraglio, St. Sophia, 
 and the arsenal of Constantinople. 
 
 Thus the disposition to yield was general. 
 But the able ambassador who then represented 
 France at Constantinople, and who had the 
 advantage of being both a diplomatist and a 
 soldier, upheld the sinking courage of the 
 Turks. He pointed out to them all the mis- 
 chiefs attached, under this circumstance, to a 
 pusillanimous conduct. He set before their 
 eyes the coincidence of the designs of England 
 and Russia, the concert of their efforts for in- 
 vading the Ottoman territory by land and sea, 
 the speedy junction of a Russian army and a 
 British fleet under the walls of the capital, the 
 danger of a total partition of the empire, or, 
 at least, a partial dismemberment, by the si- 
 multaneous occupation of Wallachia, Molda- 
 via and Egypt. He laid great stress on the 
 name of Napoleon, his victories, his presence 
 on the Vistula, and the advantages which 
 would be found in his alliance. He announced 
 the sending very shortly of considerable suc- 
 cours, and promised the restoration of the 
 ancient Ottoman power, if the Turks would 
 but display for a moment the courage of by- 
 gone times. These exhortations, reaching the 
 sultan and the different members of the go- 
 vernment, sometimes through direct, some- 
 times through indirect but well-chosen chan- 
 nels, seconded, moreover, by the evidence of 
 the danger, by the tidings successively arriving 
 of the triumphal progress of Napoleon, pro- 
 duced the effect that was to be expected, and 
 the divan, after numerous alternations of ex- 
 altation and depression, put an end to this 
 negotiation, by refusing to accede to the de- 
 mands of Mr. Arbuthnot, and by manifesting 
 a firm resolution to allow him to depart. 
 
 The English minister left Constantinople 
 on the 29th of January, and embarked in the 
 Endymion, to be carried on board the squadron 
 lying off Tenedos. outside the Dardanelles. 
 For a fortnight, Mr. Arbuthnot never ceased 
 threatening the Porte with the thunders of the 
 British squadron, and thus employed, in cor- 
 responding, the time which Admiral Duckworth 
 
 271 
 
 passed in waiting for a favourable wind. Ge- 
 neral Sebastiani, on his part, after working up 
 the Porte to an energetic resolution, had a much 
 more difficult task to perform that of rousing 
 it from its apathy, conquering its negligence, 
 i inducing it at length to raise some batteries, 
 either on the straits, or at Constantinople. 
 This was not an easy matter, with an incapa- 
 ble government, which had long since fallen 
 into a kind of imbecility, and was paralyzed 
 at this moment by the fear of the English 
 ships much more than by that of the Rus- 
 sian arms. However, by employing alternate 
 urgency with the sultan' and his ministers, 
 assisted by his aides-de-camp, Messrs, de 
 Lascours and de Coigny, he obtained a com- 
 mencement of arming, which, though very 
 imperfect, was nevertheless sufficient to excite 
 some apprehensions in the English admiral, 
 who wrote to his government that the opera- 
 tion, though not impracticable, would be more 
 difficult than it was imagined in London. 
 
 At length, all the correspondence between 
 Mr. Arbuthnot and the Reis-Effendi having 
 proved ineffectual, a south wind, long wished 
 for, having sprung up, Admiral Duckworth 
 made sail on the morning of the 19th of Feb- 
 ruary for the castles of the Dardanelles. 
 
 There is not a position in the world so well 
 known even to the persons least versed in 
 geographical knowledge as that of Constanti- 
 nople, situated amidst the sea of Marmora, an 
 enclosed sea, to which there is no penetrating 
 but by forcing the Dardanelles or the Bospho- 
 rus. When, in coming from the Mediter- 
 ranean, you have ascended the strait of the 
 Dardanelles for fifteen leagues, a strait which, 
 from the closeness of its shores, and its con- 
 tinual current, resembles a large river, you 
 enter the sea of Marmora, about twenty 
 leagues wide and thirty long, and you find 
 seated on a beautiful promontory, washed on 
 one side by the sea of Marmora itself, on the 
 other by the river of the Fresh Waters, the 
 renowned city, which under the Greeks was 
 Byzantium, under the Romans Constantinople, 
 under the Turks Stamboul, the metropolis of 
 Islamism. Beheld from the sea, it presents an 
 amphitheatre of mosques and Moorish palaces, 
 among which are distinguished the domes of 
 St. Sophia, and, quite at the extremity of the 
 promontory which it occupies, you perceive 
 the Seraglio, where the descendants of Ma- 
 homet, plunged into voluptuousness, slumber 
 over the danger of a bombardment, since their 
 imbecile incapacity is no longer competent to 
 the defence of the Dardanelles, those two doors 
 of their empire, which it is nevertheless so 
 easy to shut. 
 
 When you have cleared the Dardanelles, 
 traversed the sea of Marmora, and passed the 
 promontory on which Constantinople is seated, 
 you arrive at a second strait, narrower, more 
 formidable, seven leagues only in length, and 
 the shores of which are so near to each other, 
 that a squadron must infallibly perish, if it 
 were well defended. This strait is that of the 
 Bosphorus, which leads to the Black Sea. 
 The Dardanelles are for the Ottoman empire 
 the door opened towards England, the Bospho- 
 rus the door opened towards Russia. But, if
 
 272 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 the Russians have against them the narrow 
 dimensions of the Bosphorus, the English have 
 against them the current setting incessantly 
 from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. It 
 was against this current, which it is impossible 
 to overcome without a favorable south wind, 
 that the English began to beat up on the 19th 
 of February, 1807. Admiral Duckworth hav- 
 ing under his command the two rear-admirals, 
 Louis and Sir Sidney Smith, with seven ships 
 of the line, two frigates, and several cutters 
 and bomb-vessels, sailed in column up the 
 strait of the Dardanelles. He had on the pre- 
 
 whose fire nothing could keep off or counter- 
 act. Part of the population insisted, trembling, 
 on compliance with the demands of the Eng- 
 lish. The other party, indignant, raised 
 shouts of fury. The women of the Seraglio, 
 exposed first to Admiral Duckworth's fire, dis- 
 turbed the imperial palace by their lamenta- 
 tions. Alternate fits of weakness and courage 
 recommenced in the bosom of the divan. Sul- 
 tan Selim was for resisting; but the clamours 
 with which he was assailed, the counsels of 
 some dishonest ministers, alleging, in order to 
 persuade him to yield, a destitution of re- 
 
 ceding day lost one of his ships, the Ajax, ' sources of which they were themselves the 
 which had been consumed by fire. By the aid guilty authors, contributed to shake his heart, 
 of the wind, he had soon cleared the first part 
 of the channel, which runs from west to east, 
 
 and which is of such width that the possessors 
 have never thought of defending it. From 
 the cape called that of the Barbers, to Sestos 
 and Abydos, the canal turns northward, and it 
 becomes so narrow in that part that it is ex- 
 tremely dangerous to defy its cross-fires. It 
 then turns eastward again, forming an elbow, 
 upon which are formidable batteries. These 
 batteries rake ships fore and aft, so that a squad- 
 ron daring enough to force the passage, cannon- 
 aded on the right and on the left by the batter- 
 ies of Europe and Asia, is met also by the fire 
 of the batteries of the Sestos for the space of 
 above a league. It is at the entrance and at 
 the outlet of this narrow passage, that the 
 castles called the Dardanelles are situated. 
 They are constructed of ancient masonry, 
 mounted with heavy, unmanageable artillery, 
 which threw enormous stone balls, formerly 
 the terror of the Christian navies. 
 
 The English squadron, in spite of the efforts 
 
 more noble than energetic-. Meanwhile, the 
 ambassador of France hastened to Selim, 
 strove to make him, his ministers, all about 
 him, blush at the idea of surrendering to a 
 squadron which had not a soldier to land, and 
 which might burn a few houses, and shatter 
 the roofs of some edifices, but which would at 
 last be obliged to retire, after useless and hate- 
 ful ravages. His advice was to resist the 
 English, to gain time by means of a feigned 
 negotiation, to send the women, the court, all 
 who trembled, all who shouted, to Adrianople, 
 then to employ the energetic portion of the 
 population in raising batteries on Seraglio 
 Point, and, this done, to treat with the British 
 fleet, with the muzzles of their guns pointed 
 at it. 
 
 For the rest, the pretensions of the English 
 were of a nature to second by their harshness 
 and arrogance the counsels of M. Sebastiani. 
 Mr. Arbuthnot, to whom the admiral was su- 
 bordinate in all that related to politics, had 
 determined to send a preliminary summons to 
 
 of General Sebastiani to excite the Turks to the Porte, demanding the expulsion of the 
 defend the Dardanelles, had no great perils to French legation, an immediate declaration of 
 encounter. Not one of its masts was shat- | war against France, the delivery of the whole 
 tered : it got off with a few torn sails and about Turkish fleet, lastly, the occupation of the forts 
 sixty men killed or wounded. Having arrived of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the 
 at Cape Nagara, at the entrance of the sea of j English and the Russians. To comply with 
 Marmora.it found a Turkish division at an- such demands would be placing the empire, its 
 
 navy, the keys of its capital, at the discretion 
 of its enemies by land and sea. While await- 
 ing the answer, the English went and anchored 
 off the Princes' Islands, near the coast of Asia, 
 at some distance from Constantinople. 
 
 General Sebastiani did not fail to represent 
 to the Sultan and his ministers how disgraceful 
 and dangerous it would be to submit to such 
 conditions. Luckily, just at that moment ar- 
 rived a courier from the banks of the Vistula, 
 bringing a fresh letter from Napoleon, full of 
 
 being able to return it. Sir Sidney Smith was j warm exhortations for the sultan. "Generous 
 ordered to destroy it, which was no difficult Selim," said he, " prove thyself worthy of the 
 business, for the crews were for the most part descendants of Mahomet ! The hour is come 
 
 to release thyself from the treaties which op- 
 press thee. . I am near thee, engaged in recon- 
 stituting Poland, thy friend and thine ally. One 
 of my armies is ready to descend the Danube, 
 and to take the Russians in flank, while thou 
 shalt attack them in front. One of my squad- 
 rons is about to sail from Toulon, to guard thy 
 capital and the Black Sea. Courage, then, for 
 never wilt thou find such an occasion for 
 raising thine empire and shedding glory on. 
 thy memory !" These exhortations, though not 
 new, could not come more seasonably. The 
 
 chor : it consisted of one ship of sixty-four 
 guns, four small frigates and two cutters. 
 This division could not have been placed in a 
 worse or more useless position. To have been 
 .tf any service, it must have been well posted, 
 well directed, and have added its action to that 
 of the land-batteries. But, inactive during the 
 passage, and confined after the passage to an 
 anchorage without defence, it was a prey of- 
 fered to the English to compensate them for 
 the fire which they had just endured, without 
 
 on shore. In a few minutes the Turkish ves- 
 sels were obliged to make for the shore. The 
 English followed them in their boats, and not 
 being sure that they should be able to bring 
 them off on their return, they preferred burn- 
 ing them immediately, which they did, with 
 she exception of one cutter that had been left 
 Oy them at the anchorage. This second ope- 
 ration, however, cost them about thirty men. 
 On the morning of the 21st of February, 
 U>ey appeared before the city of Constanti- 
 nople, terrified to see an enemy's squadron
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 273 
 
 heart of Selim, cheered by the words of Na- 
 poleon, and by the urgent importunities of 
 General Sebastiani, was filled with the noblest 
 sentiments. He spoke energetically to his 
 ministers. He assembled the divan and the 
 ulemas, communicated to them the proposi- 
 tions of the English, fired all souls with indig- 
 nation, and it was unanimously resolved to 
 resist the English fleet, whatever it might at- 
 tempt, but to follow the able counsels of Gene- 
 ral Sebastiani, that is to say, to endeavour to 
 gain time by parleys, and to employ the time 
 so gained in throwing up formidable batteries 
 around Constantinople. 
 
 The first thing that was done was to reply 
 to Mr. Arbuthnot, that, without examining the 
 grounds of his propositions, they could not 
 listen to them till the English squadron had 
 taken a less threatening position, for it was 
 not befitting the dignity of the Porte to delibe- 
 rate under the enemy's guns. It took at least 
 a day to go from Constantinople to the Princes' 
 Islands, and to return from them. It required, 
 therefore, but a small number of communica- 
 tions to gain the few days that were needed. 
 When the answer of the Porte arrived, Mr. 
 Arbuthnot had been suddenly taken ill, but his 
 influence continued to preponderate in the 
 English squadron. The admirals were sensi- 
 ble, like himself, that to bombard Constanti- 
 nople would be a barbarous enterprise, that, 
 having no land troops, they should be obliged, 
 if the Turks were determined to resist, to retire 
 after committing useless ravages ; that, in order 
 to get away, they should moreover be obliged to 
 force the Dardanelles again, with a perhaps 
 damaged squadron and under batteries proba- 
 bly better defended the second time than the 
 first. They deemed it, therefore, wiser to obtain 
 by intimidation, and without proceeding to a 
 bombardment, all or part of their demands. 
 The delivery of the Turkish fleet was the tro- 
 phy of which they were most tenacious. In 
 consequence, Admiral Duckworth, supplying 
 the place of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was ill, replied 
 to the Turks that he was ready to agree to a fit 
 place for negotiating, and desired that it might 
 be immediately fixed, in order that he might 
 send one of his officers thither. The Porte 
 was in no hurry to answer this communica- 
 tion, and on the day after the next, it proposed 
 Kadikoi', the ancient Chalcedon, below Scutari, 
 opposite to Constantinople. In the state of 
 exasperation in which the Turks then were, 
 the place was neither the safest nor the most 
 suitable for the English officer ordered to repair 
 thither. Admiral Duckworth remarked this, 
 and desired that some other place might be 
 chosen, threatening to act immediately, if 
 the Turks did not make haste to open the 
 negotiations. 
 
 A few days had been gained by means of 
 these illusory parleys, and they had been em- 
 ployed at Constantinople in the most active 
 and judicious manner. Several officers of ar- 
 tillery and engineers, detached from the army 
 of Dalmatia, had just arrived. General Se- 
 bastiani, seconded by them, encamped himself 
 among the Turks. The whole legation had 
 followed him. The young linguists, hastening 
 to the works, served for interpreters. With 
 
 Vot. II. 35 
 
 the concurrence of the population and of our 
 officers, formidable batteries rose, as by en- 
 chantment, on Seraglio Point, and in that part 
 of the city bordering the sea of Marmora. 
 Nearly three hundred pieces of cannon, drawn 
 by the enthusiastic populace, who at that mo- 
 ment regarded the French as saviours, were 
 placed in battery. Sultan Selim, whom the 
 sight of these preparations so promptly exe- 
 cuted filled with joy, desired that a tent should 
 be pitched for him beside that of the French 
 ambassador, and required each of his ministers 
 to come and establish himself in one of the 
 batteries. Constantinople assumed from hour 
 to hour a more imposing aspect, and the 
 English saw new embrasures opened, and the 
 muzzles of cannon protruding from them. 
 
 After seven or eight days thus employed, the 
 fear which at first withheld the English, that 
 of a useless, perhaps, dangerous devastation, 
 followed by a second passage of the Darda- 
 nelles more difficult than the first that fear 
 became every day more founded. Perceiving 
 that he gained nothing by wailing, Admiral 
 Duckworth sent a final summons, in which, 
 having taken care to reduce his demands and 
 to increase his threats, he merely required that 
 the Turkish fleet should be delivered up to him, 
 and declared that he should proceed to Con- 
 stantinople unless a place fit for negotiation 
 were immediately pointed out to him. This 
 time, every thing being nearly completed at 
 Constantinople, the answer given to the Eng- 
 lish admiral was that, in the state of the peo- 
 ple's minds, they knew not a place safe enough 
 for them to venture to guaranty the lives of 
 the negotiators who might be sent thither. 
 
 After such an answer, there was nothing fur- 
 ther to do but to commence the cannonade. 
 But Admiral Duckworth had only seven ships 
 of the line and two frigates : he beheld a 
 frightful mass of artillery pointed at him, and 
 he was informed, moreover, that, through the 
 exertions of the French, the passes of the Dar- 
 danelles were bristling with cannon. It was 
 therefore certain that he should commit a bar- 
 barity on Constantinople alike without aim 
 and without excuse, and arrive with a disabled 
 squadron before a strait which it had become 
 much more dangerous to pass through. In 
 consequence, after staying eleven days in the 
 sea of Marmora, he weighed anchor on the 
 2d of March, appeared in line of battle under 
 the walls of Constantinople, stood in nearly to 
 within gun-shot, and, perceiving that he did 
 not intimidate the Turks, who were prepared 
 to defend themselves, he went and anchored al 
 the entrance of the Dardanelles, intending to 
 pass through on the following, day. 
 
 If mortification and confusion reigned on 
 board the English squadron, boundless was the 
 joy that burst forth in Constantinople at the 
 sight of the enemy s sam disappearing at the 
 horizon in the direction of the Dardanelles 
 French and Turks congratulated themselves 
 on this happy result of a moment of courage, 
 and in the enthusiasm of success, the Turkish 
 squadron, which had been speedily equipped, 
 determined to sail in pursuit of the English. 
 General Sebastiani strove, but in vain, to pre- 
 vent this imprudence, which might furnish
 
 274 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 180T. 
 
 Admiral DucKworlh with an occasion to mark 
 his retreat with the destruction of the Turkish 
 fleet. But the people raised such shouts, and 
 the crews were so animated, that the govern- 
 ment, not capable of withstanding the out- 
 burst of courage any more than that of cow- 
 ardice, was obliged to consent to the departure 
 of the squadron. The capitan-pacha weighed 
 anchor, while the English, in haste to retreat, 
 fled, without being aware of it, from the tri- 
 umph that was running after them. 
 
 Next day, the 3d of March, the English 
 squadron entered the narrow and dangerous 
 part of the strait of the Dardanelles. The 
 small number of French officers whom it had 
 been possible to send to the strait, had there 
 awakened the zeal of the Turks as success- 
 fully as at Constantinople. The batteries were 
 repaired and better served. Unluckily, the 
 heavy artillery, mounted on wretched carriages, 
 was in the hands of inexpert pointers. A cer- 
 tain number of large marble balls, more than 
 two feet in diameter, and which, if well di- 
 rected, would have been very dangerous, were, 
 nevertheless, discharged at the English squad- 
 ron. The English were but an hour and a half 
 in clearing the narrow part of the canal, from 
 Cape Nagara to the Barbers' Cape, thanks to 
 a north wind, which was very favourable to 
 their progress. They behaved with the usual 
 intrepidity of their navy, but sustained this 
 time serious damage. Several of their ships 
 were perforated by those prodigious projectiles, 
 which would have sunk them, if they had been 
 hollow and charged with powder, like those 
 now used. Most of the ships of the squadron, 
 on leaving the strait, were in a state that re- 
 quired speedy repairs. This second passage 
 cost the English two hundred men, killed and 
 wounded, an inconsiderable loss if compared 
 with the slaughter in great land battles, but 
 not unimportant, when compared with what 
 takes place in sea-fights. While the English 
 squadron was leaving the strait, Admiral Si- 
 niavin was arriving atTenedos, with a Russian 
 division of six ships. He used the strongest 
 importunities to prevail on Admiral Duck- 
 worth to recommence the operation. After the 
 check which had just been sustained, a fresh 
 attempt would have been extravagant ; for six 
 Russian ships would not have materially 
 changed the situation or lessened the difficulty. 
 Such was the end of that enterprise, which 
 miscarried through the inadequacy of the 
 means employed and scruples of humanity not 
 usual at that time with English policy. Eng- 
 land appeared singularly affected with this re- 
 sult. In Napoloon it excited a very natural 
 joy, for, independently of the moral effect pro- 
 duced in Europe by the affair of Constanti- 
 nople, an effect entirely in his favour, the quar- 
 rel with the Turks became one of the most 
 useful diversions for his arms. 
 
 Europe was at this moment deeply moved 
 by the terrible battle of Eylau, which led to | 
 comments extremely diverse in spirit. Some 
 rejoiced that a foe had at last been found ca- 
 pable of making head against the French ; 
 others, in much greater number, were affrighted 
 at the condition upon which that foe had been 
 able to resist them for a moment a terrible 
 
 condition, for it had obliged him to give them 
 an army to slaughter, by throwing it in their 
 way, like a physical obstacle, to destroy. For 
 the first time, it is true, the success obtained 
 by the French had not been so decisive as 
 usual, especially in appearance; but the Rus- 
 sian army had, nevertheless, lost in that san- 
 guinary fight, one-third of its effective; and, if 
 General Benningsen, to cloak his defeat, did 
 attempt some presumptuous demonstrations in 
 face of our winter quarters, it was impossible 
 for him to venture upon any thing of conse- 
 quence, or to oppose one of the sieges under- 
 taken before his eyes. Napoleon, who began 
 to be joined by his reinforcements, had for 
 overwhelming him one hundred thousand men 
 present under arms, not including the French 
 troops or allies who, protected by the grand 
 army, were carrying on the siege of Dantzig 
 on the left, and completing the conquest of the 
 fortresses of Silesia on the right. The only 
 difficulty which prevented Napoleon from put- 
 ting an end to this campaign, already very 
 long, was, as we have seen, that of transport. 
 Had there been a hard frost, he could have 
 taken with him upon sledges sufficient to sub- 
 sist the army during an offensive operation : 
 but the alternations of frost and thaw rendered 
 it impossible to carry a supply for a few days. 
 He was therefore obliged to wait for a change 
 of season, and M. de Talleyrand, left at War- 
 saw, resorted to solicitations, money, promises, 
 even threats, to insure the transport of indis- 
 pensable provisions from the Vistula to the 
 Passarge. 
 
 In this situation, which might be prolonged 
 for months, there was room for negotiations. 
 Since Napoleon had been made sensible of the 
 force of natural obstacles, and especially since 
 he had observed Poland more closely, that in- 
 toxication which had carried him to the Vis- 
 tula was somewhat dispelled. He had disco- 
 vered that the Russians, little to be dreaded by 
 French soldiers, if one went not to seek them 
 beyond the Danube and the Elbe, when as- 
 sisted by the climate, became an enemy whom 
 it was difficult and took long to conquer. 
 Struck at first by the enthusiasm which burst 
 forth at Posen, Napoleon had conceived that 
 the. Poles might be able to furnish him with a 
 hundred thousand men ; but he had soon seen 
 the country people indifferent to a change of 
 government, which left them slaves of the soil 
 under all masters, escaping from the horrors 
 of war by flight into Austrian Poland; the 
 population of the towns enthusiastic, and 
 ready to devote itself without reserve, but the 
 nobility, with more forecast, making condi- 
 tions, which could not be accepted without 
 imprudence; the officers who had served in 
 the French armies living on bad terms with 
 the nobles w'ho had not quitted their mansions; 
 both adding by their susceptibilities to the 
 difficulties of the military organization of the 
 country; lastly, the levies,which were to amount 
 to 100,000 men, reduced to 15,000 young sol- 
 diers, organized into twenty battalions, destined 
 at a future day to cover themselves with glory 
 under the gallant Poniatowski, but at this mo- 
 ment almost strangers to military habits, and 
 provoking the ridicule of our soldiers. Na-
 
 Man h, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 275 
 
 ]oleon had seen all this, and he was less ar- 
 dent to reconstitute Poland, less disposed, since 
 he was better acquainted with it, to convulse 
 the continent for its re-establishment. Without 
 doubting his own power, he had a more just 
 conception of the obstacles which Nature can 
 oppose to the most heroic army, and a less fa- 
 vourable opinion of the work which had drawn 
 him into the plains of the north. He was, 
 therefore, rather more inclined to listen to pa- 
 cific proposals, without departing on that ac- 
 count from any of his pretensions, because he 
 was sure, on the return of spring:, to demolish 
 all the armies that might be brought against 
 him. In a negotiation which should lead to 
 peace he saw nothing but a saving of time 
 and blood ; for as to dangers, he deemed him- 
 self capable of surmounting all, whatever they 
 might be. 
 
 Since the battle of Eylau, several flags of 
 truce had passed to and fro between Konigs- 
 berg and Osterode. Under the first impres- 
 sion of that battle, Napoleon had sent word by 
 General Bertrand to King Frederick William 
 that he was ready to restore his dominions, 
 but only as far as the Elbe, which would entail 
 upon that prince the loss of the provinces in 
 Westphalia, Saxony, and Franconia, that is to 
 say, nearly a fourth of the Prussian monarchy, 
 but which would at least insure to him the 
 'restitution of the other three-fourths. Napo- 
 leon added that, filled with esteem for the mo- 
 narch who reigned over Prussia, he would ra- 
 ther grant this restitution to himself than to 
 the intervention of Russia. The unfortunate 
 Frederick William, though the sacrifice was 
 great, though his soldiers had behaved honour- 
 ably at Eylau, and though he found himself 
 somewhat raised in the estimation of his allies, 
 indulged in no illusion ; and that battle of Ey- 
 lau, which the Russians called almost a victory, 
 was in his eyes but a sanguinary defeat, differ- 
 ing from Jena and from Austerlitz only in hav- 
 ing cost the French more blood, and having 
 led, owing to the season, to less decisive re- 
 sults. He was persuaded that in spring the 
 French would put a speedy and disastrous end 
 to the war. But the queen, but the war party, 
 excited by the late military events, by the in- 
 fluence of Russia, to which the Prussian 
 court was unfortunately too near at Konigsberg, 
 did not appreciate the situation with so sound 
 a judgment as the king, and, in dictating an 
 evasive answer, to the friendly message which 
 General Bertrand was commissioned to de- 
 liver, prevented any advantage from being de- 
 rived from the momentarily pacific disposition 
 of Napoleon. 
 
 Thus the obstinacy of the struggle with 
 Russia had for an instant brought back Napo- 
 leon towards Prussia. Happy had it been, if, 
 reconciling himself completely with her, re- 
 storing to her not only her provinces beyond 
 the Elbe, but her provinces on this side of it, 
 he had sought to attach her definitively by this 
 act equally generous and politic. But, again 
 finding King Frederick William, weak, waver- 
 ing, controlled, he was anew convinced that 
 Prussia was not to be relied on ; and from that 
 day he never thought of her but to despise, to 
 maltreat, and to lessen her. Not quite so much 
 
 intoxicated, however, as after Jena, he was 
 anew led to believe that, in order to sway the 
 continent and to exclude English influence 
 from it, in order to conquer the tea on the land, he 
 needed not only victories but a great alliance. 
 He had believed this after Marengo and Ho- 
 henlinden ; he had believed it after Austerlitz 
 and before Jena; after Jena, without believing 
 it the less, he had ceased for a moment to 
 think of it; but he believed it again after Pul- 
 tusk and Eylau ; and meditating incessantly 
 on his situation amidst the difficulties of this 
 war, he considered what alliance he could ob- 
 tain. Setting aside Prussia, there were left 
 Russia, with which he was battling, and Aus- 
 tria, which, under the appearance of neutrality, 
 was preparing armaments upon his rear. 
 Though the court of Russia, excited by the 
 suggestions of England, and by the boastings 
 of General Benningsen, appeared more ani- 
 mated than ever, yet its generals, its officers, 
 its soldiers, who bore the burden of this fright- 
 ful war, who found themselves reduced one- 
 half by the battles of Czarnowo, Pultusk, Goly- 
 min, and Eylau, who, thanks to a barbarous ad- 
 ministration, lived on a few potatoes scratched 
 from under the snow with the points of their 
 bayonets, entertained very different sentiments; 
 and held a very different language from the 
 courtiers of Petersburg. Filled with admira- 
 tion of the French army, feeling towards it 
 none of those national antipathies arising 
 sometimes from neighbourhood or even from 
 a common origin, they asked themselves why 
 they were expected to spill their blood for the 
 benefit of the English who were in no hurry 
 to support them, and for the Prussians who 
 were not capable of defending themselves. 
 
 The idea that France and Russia, at the dis- 
 tance which parts them from one another, had 
 no ground for quarrel, occurred to the minds 
 of such of the Russian officers as reasoned, 
 and was repeated in all their conversations. 
 Several of our officers, taken prisoners and 
 exchanged, had heard the strongest language 
 on this subject from the lips of even the brav 
 est of the Russian generals, Prince Bagration, 
 who commanded the Russian advanced.guards 
 and rear-guards by turns, the advanced guards 
 when attacking, the rear-guards when retreat- 
 ing. 
 
 These particulars, reported to Napoleon, 
 furnished him with subject for reflection. He 
 said to himself, even amidst the horrors of the 
 present war, that it was perhaps with Russia 
 that he ought to seek a reconciliation, in order 
 to close the ports and the cabinets of the con- 
 tinent against England. But, if that alliance 
 could be conceived, it was not bet ween, two 
 battles, when one was obliged to communicate 
 with the advanced posts by means of a trum- 
 pet, that one could find means to prepare and 
 conclude it. This actual impossibility forced 
 him to revert to Austria. Calling to mind 
 what the Archduke Ferdinand had said to him 
 at Wurzburg, he was anew led to think of an 
 alliance with the court of Vienna, in spite of 
 the armaments with which she threatened him, 
 especially when he considered that he had now 
 the power to restore to her what half a century 
 before would have filled her with joy SiUsia,
 
 276 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 that Northern Lombardy, which she had so 
 keenly regretted, which she had made so many 
 efforts to recover, and for the sake of which 
 she had been for thirty years the ally of 
 France. Removed from the bivouac of Oste- 
 rode to the mansion of Finkenslein, and there, 
 sometimes making the round of his canton- 
 ments, and riding so much as thirty leagues a 
 day; sometimes corresponding with his agents 
 in Poland for the supply of the army, or with 
 his ministers in Paris for the administration 
 of the Empire; lastly, sometimes, in the long 
 nights of the north, ruminating upon plans of 
 general policy, after weighing all the alliances, 
 he had ended by reducing himself to two, and 
 concluding that he must choose between that 
 of Russia and that of Austria. In correspond- 
 ence with M. de Talleyrand, who remained at 
 Warsaw, and who there directed the foreign 
 affairs, he wrote to him : " Jill this must end in 
 a system with Russia, or in a system with Austria. 
 Think well of this; fix your ideas ; and oblige 
 Austria to come to a definitive explanation 
 with us." 
 
 But Austria covered herself with an impe- 
 netrable veil. While General Andreossy, our 
 ambassador at Vienna, was daily reporting 
 acts tending to produce uneasiness, such as 
 levies of men, purchases of horses, the forma- 
 tion of magazines, General Baron de Vincent, 
 on the contrary, sent to Warsaw by the court 
 of Austria, was incessantly affirming, with 
 every appearance of frankness, that Austria, 
 exhausted, was incapable of making war; 
 that she was resolved not to break the peace, 
 unless she were subjected to treatment impos- 
 sible to be borne ; that, if she was taking 
 some precautions, they must not be regarded 
 as preparations hostile or threatening for 
 France, but as measures of prudence com- 
 manded by a terrible war, which embraced 
 the entire circle of her frontiers, and particu- 
 larly by the state of the Gallicias, which were 
 much agitated by the rising in Poland. M. 
 de Talleyrand had suffered himself to be per- 
 suaded that he ought instantly to denounce 
 General Andreossy to Napoleon as a danger- 
 ous agent, observing and judging wrongly of 
 what was passing around him, and capable, 
 if he were listened to, of embroiling the two 
 courts by means of incorrect and malevolent 
 reports. 
 
 Napoleon, though, like every other man, he 
 was apt to believe what pleased him, though 
 he was fain to think that Austria could not 
 raise herself after the blows which she had re- 
 ceived at Austerlitz and Ulm, that she never 
 durst break her word given to him personally 
 at the bivouac of Urschitz Napoleon, en- 
 lightened by danger, put more faith in the re- 
 ports of General Andreossy than in those of 
 Baron de Vincent. " Yes," he wrote to M. de 
 Talleyrand, "General Andreossy is opinion- 
 ated, an indifferent observer, probably exag- 
 gerating what he sees ; but you are credulous, 
 as inclined to allow yourself to be seduced, as 
 you are clever at seducing others. One need 
 but flatter in order to deceive you. M. de 
 Vincent cozens while coaxing you. Austria 
 fears us, but she hates Us she is arming to 
 take advantage of any reverse. If we gain a 
 
 great victory in spring, she will behave like 
 M. de Haugwitz, the day after Austerlitz, and 
 you will have been right. If the war is mere- 
 ly doubtful, we shall find her in arms upon our 
 rear. Meanwhile, we must oblige her to speak 
 out. It is, in fact, a great fault in her not to 
 come to an understanding with us at once, and 
 not to take advantage of a moment when we 
 are masters of Prussia to recover through our 
 means what Frederick formerly wrested from 
 her. She can, if she pleases, indemnify her- 
 self in a day for all that she has lost in half a 
 century, and re-make the fortune of the house 
 of Austria, so much diminished at one time by 
 Prussia, at another by France. But she must 
 explain herself. Does she want indemnities 
 for what she has lost! I offer her Silesia. 
 Does the state of the east alarm her! I am 
 ready to satisfy her respecting the fate of the 
 Lower Danube, by disposing of Moldavia and 
 Wallachia as she pleases. Is our presence 
 in Dalmatia a subject of umbrage] I am 
 quite disposed to make sacrifices on that point 
 by means of an exchange of territory. Or, 
 lastly, is it for war that she is preparing, to 
 try, for the last time, the power of her arms, 
 taking advantage of the union of the whole 
 continent against us ] Be it so I accept this 
 new adversary. But let her not hope to sur- 
 prise me. None but women and children can 
 believe that. I shall go and penetrate into the 
 deserts of Russia, without having taken my 
 precautions. Austria will not find me unpre- 
 pared. In Saxony, in Bavaria, in Italy, she will 
 meet with armies ready to oppose her. She will 
 see me, by a rearward march, drop down upon 
 her with my whole weight, crush her, treat her 
 worse than any of the powers that I have ever 
 conquered. I will make a terrible, a striking 
 example of her treachery, of which the present 
 fate of Prussia cannot convey an idea. Let her 
 speak out, then, that I may know what I have 
 to depend upon in regard to her dispositions." 
 
 Napoleon recommended to M. de Talley- 
 rand not to leave M. de Vincent any rest, but 
 to make incessant attempts to sound the depths 
 of the policy of Austria. M. de Talleyrand, 
 stimulated by the Emperor, divided his time 
 between exhortations to the Polish govern- 
 ment to furnish provisions and wagons, and 
 interviews with M. de Vincent, to draw from 
 him in a hundred different conversations the 
 secret of his court. 
 
 That secret he sought in the most insignifi- 
 cant expressions of the Austrian envoy, in the 
 slightest movement of his countenance. Some- 
 times he was free and easy with him, and 
 strove to provoke his candour by unbounded 
 communicativeness. Sometimes he endea- 
 voured to surprise and agitate him by laying 
 abruptly before him, with feigned anger, ac- 
 counts of the armaments received from Vien- 
 na. M. de Vincent, whether from art or sin- 
 cerity, always repeated his story, that people 
 at Vienna neither would nor could make war, 
 that they were content to guard themselves 
 without thinking of attacking anybody. How- 
 ever, when M. de Talleyrand, proceeding fur- 
 ther, talked sometimes of Silesia, sometimes 
 of the provinces of the Danube, sometimes of 
 Dalmatia, as the price of an alliance, the Aus-
 
 March 180'< 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 277 
 
 triat minister replied that he had no instruc- 
 tions respecting affairs of such importance, 
 and bogged leave to refer to his court, which 
 he did by communicating immediately to 
 M. de Stadion the overtures of M. de Talley- 
 rand. 
 
 M. de Stadion then directed the foreign af- 
 fairs of Austria in a spirit still more hostile to 
 France than the Cobenzels had done, but we 
 must do him the justice to admit, without con- 
 cealing so many hostile sentiments under the 
 mask of cordiality. For the rest, though full 
 of hatred, he could control himself, and main- 
 tained a suitable reserve. The secret of M. de 
 Stadion and of his court was easy to penetrate, 
 if one would set aside appearances that pleased, 
 and confine one's self to the ground of things 
 which had nothing pleasing in it. Austria 
 was arming to take advantage of our reverses, 
 which in her was but very natural, and it was 
 a great error to suppose that one could con- 
 ciliate that vindictive power with brilliant of- 
 fers. She was animated, in fact, by a hatred 
 which would have prevented her from justly ap- 
 preciating solid and real advantages, if they had 
 been offered her, and much more insufficient 
 advantages, such as a portion of Silesia, of 
 Moldavia, or of Dalmatia advantages far in- 
 ferior to all that she had lost during the last 
 fifteen years. Still she would have accepted 
 them, no doubt, insufficient as they were, if 
 she had imagined that, in the then state of the 
 world, any thing could be given in a solid and 
 durable manner. But, amidst the continual 
 changes of the European states, she conceived 
 that there was nothing stable, and she was not 
 disposed to take, in compensation for heredi- 
 tary provinces, anciently belonging to her 
 house, provinces given by the policy of the 
 moment, liable to be as lightly withdrawn as 
 they were given, and which, besides, would 
 have to be purchased by a war with her usual 
 allies, for the advantage of him whom she ac- 
 cused of being the author of all her calamities. 
 Thus, on the part of Napoleon, there was 
 nothing that could attract or excite confidence. 
 Her refusal of all offers coming from him was 
 certain beforehand. But, pressed with ques- 
 tions, she could not shut herself up either in 
 absolute silence, or in a general refusal to listen 
 to any proposal. She therefore bethought her 
 of an expedient, which would furnish her, for 
 the moment, with a suitable answer, and in- 
 sure to her afterwards the means of profiting 
 by events, whatever they might be. In conse- 
 quence, she conceived the idea of offering 
 France her mediation with the belligerent 
 courts. Nothing could be better calculated for 
 the present or for the future. For the present, 
 it proved that she was desirous of peace, by 
 labouring for it herself. For the future, she 
 would labour sincerely for this peace, and she 
 would take care to direct its conditions in a 
 spirit conformable to her policy, if Napoleon 
 were victorious. If, on the contrary, Napo- 
 leon were vanquished, or only half victorious, 
 she would pass from a modest mediation to 
 an imposed mediation. She would moderate 
 or crush him, according to circumstances. 
 She would reserve for herself, in short, the 
 means of entering into the quarrel at pleasure, 
 
 and having once entered into it, of conducting 
 herself as fortune might suggest. 
 
 M. de Stadion charged the Baron de Yin- 
 cent to reply to M. de Talleyrand that the 
 court of Vienna was deeply sensible to the of- 
 fers of the Emperor of the French, but advan- 
 tageous as were these offers, it could not ac- 
 cept them, for they would lead to a war either 
 with the Germans, who were its countrymen, 
 or the Russians, who were its allies ; and that, 
 as for war, it deprecated it for any cause or with 
 any person, for it declared itself incapable of 
 maintaining it an admission not dangerous 
 at a moment when Austria was making the 
 most imposing military preparations that it 
 was desirous of peace, peace alone, which it 
 preferred to the most valuable acquisitions; 
 that as a proof of this love of peace, it offered 
 to interpose to negotiate it, and that, if France 
 assented, it would undertake to bring into it 
 the cabinets of Berlin, Petersburg, and Lon- 
 don ; that M. de Budberg, minister of the Em- 
 peror Alexander, having been consulted on 
 the subject, had already accepted the good of- 
 fices of the court of Vienna, and that in Lon- 
 don, another cabinet having taken the direc- 
 tion of affairs, [that of Castlereagh and Can- 
 ning,] there was a chance of meeting with pa- 
 cific dispositions in these new representatives 
 of the English policy, for they would probably 
 be delighted to render themselves popular in 
 England, by giving peace on their accession 
 to office. M. de Stadion directed the Austrian 
 envoy to add that the court of Vienna would 
 deem itself happy, if the all-powerful Empe- 
 ror of the French should regard this offer as a 
 pledge of the sentiments of disinterestedness 
 and concord which animated the Emperor of 
 Austria. 
 
 The all-powerful Emperor of the French 
 had not less perspicacity than power, and 
 when this answer was sent from Warsaw to 
 Finkenstein, he was not deceived by it. He 
 seized its meaning with as much promptness 
 as he would have discovered the movements 
 of an enemy's army on the field of battle. 
 
 This," he immediately replied to M. de Tal- 
 leyrand, "is a first step of Austria, a com- 
 mencement of intervention in events. Re- 
 solved not to intermeddle at all in the struggle 
 kept up by France, Prussia, Russia, and Eng- 
 land, she would not even risk compromising 
 herself by transmitting the words of the one 
 to the others. To offer herself as mediator is 
 to prepare herself for war, is to secure for her- 
 self a decent means of taking part in it, means 
 which she has need of, after the declara- 
 tions from cabinet to cabinet, after the oaths 
 from sovereign to sovereign; by which she 
 has promised to refrain from it forever. This 
 circumstance," added Napoleon, "is unfortu- 
 nate, for it forbodes the presence of an Aus- 
 trian army on the Oder and on the Elbe, while 
 we are on the Vistula. But it is impossible to 
 refuse this mediation. It would be a contra- 
 diction to our usual language, which has al- 
 ways represented us as disposed to peace. It 
 would, above all, expose us to the risk of acce- 
 lerating the determinations of Austria by a 
 peremptory refusal, which would affront her, 
 and oblige her to take an immediate resolu- 
 2 A
 
 278 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 tion. We must, thereiore, gain time, and an- 
 swer, that the offer of mediation is too indirect 
 for us to accept it positively ; but that, in all 
 cases, the good offices of the court of Vienna 
 will always be received with gratitude and 
 confidence." 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, directed by Napoleon, 
 gave the prescribed answer to M. de Vincent, 
 and manifested a certain disposition to accept 
 the mediation of Austria, but seemed at the 
 same time to doubt whether the offer of this 
 mediation was serious. M. de Vincent af- 
 firmed, on the contrary, that this offer was 
 perfectly serious, and for the rest declared that 
 he would refer the matter to his court. He 
 wrote, accordingly, to M. de Stadion, who, on 
 his part, gave a prompt reply. In a very few 
 days, in fact, the court of Vienna intimated 
 that it was ready to proceed from mere par- 
 leys to a formal proposal ; that it was certain 
 to get the mediation accepted in Petersburg 
 and London ; that it should, moreover, address 
 the same day the positive offer both to France 
 and Prussia, and to Russia and England; and 
 that she awaited the precise expression of the 
 intentions of the Emperor Napoleon on the 
 subject. 
 
 This answer, so prompt and so plain, sup- 
 ported by armaments of which there could be 
 no further doubt, appeared to Napoleon an ex- 
 tremely serious act, the drift of which it was 
 impossible to dissemble, to which, unfortu- 
 nately, no other reply could be given than by 
 an acceptance, but against the consequences 
 of which it was necessary to provide by means 
 of immediate and imposing precautions. He 
 wrote in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand, and 
 sent him from Finkenstein a draft of the note 
 which will be found below. He intimated to 
 him at the same time that he was about to 
 add to that note new preparations, more for- 
 midable than ever, and of which it was neces- 
 sary to inform Austria immediately, that she 
 might know in what manner her intervention, 
 friendly or hostile, diplomatic or warlike, 
 would be received. 
 
 The answer to the offer of mediation was 
 as follows : 
 
 " The undersigned minister of foreign affairs 
 has submitted to his majesty, the Emperor 
 and King, the note delivered to him by M. the 
 baron de Vincent. 
 
 "The Emperor accepts for himself and his 
 allies the amicable intervention of the Empe- 
 ror Francis II. for the re-establishment of 
 peace, so necessary to all nations. He has 
 but one fear, namely, that the power which 
 hitherto appears to have made a system of 
 founding its power and its greatness on the 
 divisions of the continent, will strive to draw 
 from this step new subjects of animosity, and 
 new pretexts for dissensions. However, any 
 way that can encourage a hope of the cessa- 
 tion of bloodshed, and at length bring consola- 
 tion among so many families, ought not to be 
 neglected by France, which, as all Europe 
 knows, was dragged in spite of herself into 
 .he last war. 
 
 " The Emperor Napoleon finds, moreover, 
 j* this circumstance, a natural and signal oc- 
 casion to testify to the Sovereign of Austria 
 
 the confidence with which he inspires him, 
 and the desire which he has to see those bonds 
 knitted more closely between the two nations, 
 which in other times constituted their com- 
 mon prosperity, and which at this day can 
 more than any thing else consolidate their 
 tranquillity and their well-being." 
 
 These parleys had occupied the whole month 
 of March. The weather had become severe. 
 The frost, which had been looked for in vain 
 during the winter, came on in spring. The 
 military operations were obliged to be again 
 deferred. Napoleon resolved to avail himself 
 of this delay to give his forces an immense 
 development, and as formidable in appear- 
 ance as it would be in reality. His intention 
 was, without draining Italy or France too 
 much, to increase his active army by at least 
 one-third, and to form on the Elbe an army of 
 reserve of 100,000 men, in order to be strong 
 enough to crush both the Russians and the 
 Prussians on the very opening of the cam- 
 paign, and to be able, in case of necessity, to 
 turn against Austria, if she decided to take 
 part in the war. 
 
 To attain this twofold result, he resolved to 
 call out a new conscription, that of 1808, 
 though it was only March, 1807. He had al- 
 ready called out that of 1807 in 1806, and that 
 of 1806 in 1805, in order to procure the young 
 conscripts an apprenticeship of twelve or fif- 
 teen months, and to keep his depots always 
 full. The general effective of the French 
 army, which had been raised from 502,000 
 men to 580,000 by the conscription of 1807, 
 would be increased by that of 1808 to about 
 650,000, exclusively of the allies. Owing to 
 the skill with which he managed his resources, 
 Napoleon would find in this increase of effec- 
 tive, the means of supplying all his wants and 
 of meeting all events. 
 
 But there was some difficulty, after calling 
 in November, 1806, for the conscription of 
 1807, to call in March, 1807, for that of 1808. 
 It was making two calls in five months, and 
 raising 150,000 men at once. Napoleon him- 
 self drew up the decree, sent it immediately to 
 Cambaceres, the arch-chancellor, who supplied 
 his place at the head of the government, and 
 to M. Lacuee, who was charged with the calls, 
 telling them both that he knew and foresaw the 
 objections to which such measures were liable 
 to give rise, but that they must not stop a mo- 
 ment for them; for a single objection raised in 
 the Council of State, or in the Senate, would 
 weaken him in Europe, and bring Austria upon 
 him ; and then it would not be two conscrip- 
 tions, but three or four that they would be 
 obliged to decree, perhaps to no purpose, and 
 be vanquished at last. "Things," he thus 
 wrote, " must not be considered in a narrow 
 point of view, but in a wide point of view; 
 they must be considered especially in all their 
 political bearings. A conscription announced 
 and resolved upon, without hesitation, which 
 perhaps I shall not call for, which certainly I 
 shall not send to the active army, for I am not 
 going to wage war with boys, will cause Aus- 
 tria to drop her arms. The least hesitation, on 
 the contrary, would induce her to resume them, 
 and to use them against us. No objection, I
 
 March, 1807.J 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 279 
 
 repeat, but an immediate and punctual execu- 
 tion of the decree which I send you that is 
 the way to have peace to have a speedy, 
 a magnificent peace." 
 
 Having despatched this decree to Paris, Na- 
 poleon sent it to M. de Talleyrand, at Warsaw, 
 desiring him to communicate it to M. de Vin- 
 cent, with an express recommendation to make 
 him acquainted with the new display of forces 
 which was preparing in France, and to lay be- 
 fore him a statement of the expenses which 
 would thence result for all the belligerent 
 powers, and for Austria in particular : to de- 
 clare to him without circumlocution, that the 
 Emperor had divined the drift of the mediation, 
 that he accepted that mediation, but with a 
 knowledge of what it signified; that to offer 
 peace was well, but that peace ought to be 
 offered with a white truncheon in the hand: that 
 the armaments of Austria, henceforth impos- 
 sible to be denied, were a very unsuitable ac- 
 companiment to an offer of mediation ; that, 
 for the rest, he explained himself with this 
 frankness to prevent calamities, to save Aus- 
 tria herself from them ; that if she chose to 
 send Austrian officers to France and Italy, an 
 engagement should be given to show them the 
 depots, the camps of reserve, the divisions on 
 march, and they should see that, independently 
 of the 300,000 French already present in Ger- 
 many, a second army of 100,000 men was pre- 
 paring to cross the Rhine, to check any hostile 
 movement on the part of the court of Vienna. 
 
 These communications came very season- 
 ably. M. de Vincent could not conceal his 
 emotion when informed of the new increase 
 of our forces, and protested a thousand times 
 more, in the name of his government, that its 
 intentions were most pacific. The movements 
 of troops which were complained of, were, he 
 said, but symptoms of a reorganization under- 
 taken by the Archduke Charles, in order to 
 render the Austrian army less expensive, and 
 to introduce into it various improvements bor- 
 rowed from the French armies. If any corps 
 seemed to approach the frontiers of Poland, 
 they were there only by way of precaution re- 
 specting the Gallicias, extremely agitated by 
 what was passing in their neighbourhood. The 
 offer of mediation ought to be regarded only 
 as a proof of a desire to put an end to a war 
 which was desolating the world; and it must 
 be recognised not as a longing to intermeddle 
 in that war, but as a frank and sincere wish to 
 put a stop to it. For the rest, the Emperor 
 would soon be enabled to judge of this matter 
 by the results, and to assure himself of the 
 sincerity of Austria by her persisting in re- 
 maining neuter. 
 
 The intimations sent by Napoleon to Paris, 
 arrived not less opportunely than his commu- 
 nications at Vienna. Though his star still 
 shone in all its splendour, though the marvels 
 of Austerlitz and Jena had not yet lost any of 
 their spell, though people were impressed as 
 deeply as they ought to have been with that 
 grand and prodigious spectacle of a French 
 army wintering quietly on the Vistula, certain 
 detractors, extremely obsequious in the pre- 
 sence of Napoleoa, gladly reviling him in his 
 absence, made, in very subdued tones, some 
 
 bitter observations on the sanguinary carnage 
 of Eylau, and of the difficulties on the war 
 carried to such a distance; and little persua- 
 sion would have been needed to induce minds, 
 always ready in France to seize the weak side 
 of things, to substitute censure for the con 
 tinued admiration of which Napoleon had 
 never ceased to be the object since he held in 
 his hand the destinies of France. The prudent 
 Cambaceres perceived these symptoms, and, 
 dreading every thing that was likely to injure 
 the imperial government, he would fain have 
 disarmed censure by sparing the country new 
 burdens. M. Lacuee, judging of the situation 
 from a less elevated point of view, seeing only 
 the material sufferings of the population, feared 
 that two demands of 80,000 men, renewed so 
 soon after one another, the one in November, 
 1806, the other in March, 1807, especially after 
 those which had preceded in 1805 demands 
 which called men to the army without giving 
 back one of them would produce a mis- 
 chievous effect, by depriving agriculture of 
 hands, families of their supporters. Messrs. 
 Cambaceres and Lacuee were therefore both 
 of them disposed to offer some objections, and 
 to desire that these calls might be deferred for 
 a certain time. The sentiment which actuated 
 them was honest and prudent, and well had it 
 been for Napoleon if many men had then pos- 
 sessed the courage to pour into his ear, before 
 it burst forth, the cry of forlorn mothers a 
 cry which was not yet threatening, but which 
 sometimes, on the news of a great slaughter, 
 like that of Eylau, would be raised faintly in 
 the heart. However, while telling Napoleon 
 the truth, by way of giving him a profitable 
 lesson for the future, the best thing to be done 
 at that moment was to obey his commands ; 
 for there was nothing more serviceable, even 
 to the cause of peace, than the new display of 
 forces which he had just decreed. Thus the 
 objections of the arch-chancellor and M. La- 
 cuee, sent in writing to the head-quarters, but 
 soon smothered by subsequent letters de- 
 spatched from them one after another, pro- 
 duced no postponement of the presentation, 
 adoption and execution of the decree calling 
 out the conscription of 1808. 
 
 Napoleon lost no time in making that use of 
 these new resources which suited his vast de- 
 signs. Since he entered Poland, he had, as we 
 have seen, drawn from France seven regiments 
 of infantry; from Paris the 15th light, the 58th 
 of the line, the first regiment of the fusiliers 
 of the guard, and a municipal regiment; from 
 Brest the 15th of the line; from St. Lo the 
 34th ; from Boulogne the 19th. He had drawn 
 from Italy five regiments of mounted chasseurs 
 and four regiments of cuirassiers. Most of 
 these corps had recently reached Germany. 
 The 19th, 15th, and 58th of the line, and the 
 15th light, were approaching Berlin, and going 
 to co-operate in the siege of Dantzig. The 1st 
 regiment of the fusiliers of the guard, and the 
 regiment of the municipal guard were on march. 
 The four regiments of cuirassiers from Italy 
 were already on the Vistula, under the com- 
 mand of an officer of the most distinguished 
 merit, General d'Espagne. Two of the five 
 regiments of mountf I chasseurs, the 19th ami
 
 280 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 23d, had joined General Lefebvre below Dant- ] 
 rig. The 15th was remounting in Hanover. 
 The two others were coming with the utmost 
 expedition. 
 
 The provisional or marching regiments had 
 already passed through Germany to the num- 
 ber of twelve of infantry and four of cavalry. 
 They had been reviewed on the Vistula, dis- 
 solved, and sent to the corps on the Passarge 
 a sight always very gratifying to the army, 
 which thus saw the gaps made in its ranks 
 filled up, and heard talk every day of the nu- 
 merous reinforcements that were coming to 
 second it. Whereas, in the first days of its 
 establishment on the Passarge, it could not 
 have presented more than seventy-five or eighty 
 thousand men on one spot, it was now able to 
 oppose 100,000 to any sudden attack. The 
 provisions, brought from all quarters to the 
 Vistula, and carried from the Vistula to the 
 different cantonments by means of wagons 
 organized on the spot, were sufficient for the 
 daily ration, and began to form the reserve 
 stores for unforeseen movements. The army, 
 well warmed, well fed, was in high spirits. 
 The heavy cavalry and the cavalry of the line 
 had been taken to the Lower Vistula, to benefit 
 by the forage which was found in great quan- 
 tity towards the mouth of that river. The 
 regiments of light cavalry, left in observance 
 on the front of the camps, went by turns to 
 enjoy rest and abundance on the banks of the 
 Vistula. Napoleon, who had determined to 
 increase the cavalry from 54,000 men to 60,000, 
 then to 70,000, had just given orders for raising 
 the number of the horse to 80,000. The cam- 
 paign had already consumed 16,000 horses for 
 three or four thousand horse-soldiers put liors 
 de combat. Besides the horses taken from the 
 Prussian and Hessian armies, Napoleon had 
 purchased 17,000 in Germany, and now he 
 ordered 12,000 to be bought in France for the 
 supply of the depots. The works of Praea, 
 Modlin and Sierock, quite finished, being con- 
 structed of timber, were as solid as masonry. 
 The cantonments on the Passarge were pro- 
 vided with strong tetet du pout, which afforded 
 facilities for repulsing an enemy, or for attack- 
 ing him, if necessary. The situation was not 
 only safe but good, as much so, at least, as the 
 country and the season permitted. 
 
 The corps on the march, thanks to the dc- 
 p6ts of infantry and cavalry established on the 
 route, in which they deposited fatigued men 
 and horses, and took in exchange those previ- 
 ously left by other corps the corps on march 
 numbered at the end of their route the same 
 effective as at their departure. The regiments 
 'of cuirassiers from Naples had arrived entire 
 upon the Vistula. For the troops that came 
 from Italy, Parma, Milan, Augsburg, for those 
 that came from France, Mayence, Wiirzburg, 
 Erfurt, for both, Willenberg, Potsdam, Berlin, 
 Custrin, Posen, Thorn, Warsaw, were the sta- 
 ions where they found whatever they needed, 
 provisions, arms, articles of clothing, made 
 everywhere, in Pans as well as in Berlin, in 
 the conquered capital, as well as in the con- 
 quering capital ; for Napoleon wished to afford 
 subsistence to the population of both. It was by 
 these continual attentions that he had supplied 
 
 with necessaries, kept up at its effective at dis- 
 tances from four to five hundred leagues a 
 regular army of 400,000 men, a chimerical num- 
 ber, when given us by antiquity, unless in refer- 
 ence to emigrant populations, never recorded in 
 modern histories, and first reached and exceeded 
 at the time of which we are treating. 
 
 Taking advantage of the presence of nume- 
 rous conscripts in the depots, Napoleon set 
 about bringing fresh troops from Italy and 
 France, with the twofold intention, as we have 
 said, to augment considerably the active army 
 of the Vistula, and to create an army of re- 
 serve on the Elbe. Having it in his power to 
 draw ready-trained conscripts from the depots, 
 he ordered Marshal Kellermann to increase the 
 number of the provisional regiments of in- 
 fantry to twenty, and that of the provisional 
 regiments of cavalry to ten. But into these 
 regiments were to be admitted only such con- 
 scripts as were perfectly trained and disci- 
 plined. He devised another combination for 
 rendering serviceable those conscripts whose 
 military education had scarcely commenced, 
 that was to organize battalions called garrison 
 battalions, composed of men not yet trained, 
 not even clothed; to send them to Erfurt, Cas- 
 sel, Magdeburg, Hameln, Custrin, where they 
 would have time to get trained, and thus ren- 
 der the old troops left in the fortress disposable. 
 He fixed the effective of these battalions at 
 about ten or twelve thousand men. 
 
 After directing his attention to the provi- 
 sional regiments destined for recruiting the 
 corps established on the Vistula, Napoleon 
 resolved to add to the seven regiments of in- 
 fantry and the nine regiments of cavalry al- 
 ready drawn from France and Italy, some 
 others, which was possible by having recourse 
 to numerous combinations, of which he alone 
 was capable. There was in garrison at Brau- 
 nau a superb regiment, the 3d of the line, com- 
 prising three war battalions and 3400 men 
 present under arms. Napoleon ordered it off 
 to Berlin, supplied its place at Braunau by the 
 7th of the line, borrowed from the garrison of 
 Alexandria, and replaced the 7th in Alexan- 
 dria by two regiments from Naples, beaten at 
 St. Euphemia, and needing to be reorganized. 
 Resolving to leave none but dragoon regiments 
 in Italy, he sent for the 14th of mounted cha?- 
 seurs, which was still there, and which would 
 increase the number 01' cavalry regiments 
 brought from Italy to ten. He ordered a se- 
 cond regiment of the fusiliers of the guard to 
 be formed in Paris which might be done, since 
 there were two conscriptions, that of 1807 and 
 that of 1808, to choose out of. He detached 
 from the camp of St. Lo the 5th light, which 
 was not actually indispensable there. He di- 
 rected a regiment of dragoons of the guard, 
 encamped at that moment at Meudon, to be 
 despatched from Paris to the Rhine ; it was 
 afterwards to be mounted at Potsdam. He 
 gave the same order relative to the 26th chas- 
 seurs, which was at Saumur. and which the 
 profound tranquillity of the Vendee rendered 
 disposable. He commanded a battalion of 
 seamen of the guard, very serviceable for the 
 navigation of the Vistula, to be marched off 
 There were, consequently, three French rugi-
 
 March, 1807] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 281 
 
 ments of infantry, three French regiments of 
 cavalry, besides a battalion of seamen, which 
 he drew from France and Italy, and which 
 were to concur either in completing the exist- 
 ing corps, or to constitute a new corps for 
 Marshal Lannes. That marshal, having been 
 taken ill at Warsaw, had been succeeded in 
 the command of the fifth corps by Massena, 
 and was beginning to recover. When the 
 siege of Dantzig was over, Napoleon purposed 
 to form, with part of the troops which had 
 been engaged in it, and the new regiments 
 brought from France, a corps of reserve, 
 which he intended to give to Lannes, and to 
 attach to the active army. The 8th corps, 
 under Marshal Mortier, composed of Dutch, 
 Italians and French, dispersed from the Han- 
 seatic towns to Stralsund, from Stralsund to 
 Colberg, had hitherto been destined to over- 
 awe Germany. The Dutch division guarded 
 the Hanseatic towns ; one of the French di- 
 visions kept in check the Swedes before Stral- 
 sund. The other was at Stettin, ready to 
 concur in the blockade of Stralsund, or in the 
 siege of Dantzig. The Italian division block- 
 aded Colberg. The sieges once ended, Napo- 
 leon had resolved to collect, in the 8th corps, j 
 all the troops that were French, and to unite 
 it with the active army. He would thus have, 
 besides the corps of Marshals Ney, Davout, 
 Soult, Bernadotte, Murat, on the Passarge, two 
 new corps, under Mortier and Lannes, placed 
 between the Vistula and the Oder, and con- 
 necting themselves with the second army, , 
 which he purposed to organize in Germany. 
 
 He created the elements of this second army 
 in the following manner. There were, in Si- 
 lesia, part of the Bavarians and all the Wir- 
 tembergers, finishing, under Prince Jerome 
 and General Vandamrae, the sieges in Silesia. 
 There were, on the coast of the Baltic, the ; 
 Dutch, then belonging to Mortier's corps, the j 
 Italians, also belonging to it, the one esta- 
 blished, as we have just said, in the Hanseatic 
 towns, the others before Colberg. They were 
 good auxiliaries, hitherto faithful, and begin- 
 ning to learn something of war in our school. I 
 Napoleon thought to augment the number of | 
 these auxiliaries, and to unite with them for a 
 support 40,000 French, good veteran troops, 
 so as to form on the Elbe an army of more 
 than 100,000 men. 
 
 In the first place, he demanded of the Con- 
 federation of the Rhine, grounding himself on 
 the suspicious armaments of Austria, a new 
 portion of the contingent which he had a right 
 to require, and which, as it would amount to 
 20,000 men, would produce about 15,000. It 
 was giving displeasure to the German govern- 
 ments, our allies; but the present war, if it 
 were complicated by the intervention of Aus- 
 tria, would put their recent aggrandizement in 
 such jeopardy that he was authorized to de- 
 mand of them such an effort. For the rest, it 
 was the people, much more than the govern- 
 ments, whom this measure would dissatisfy 
 and that consideration alone rendered such a 
 requisition matter of regret. Napoleon thought 
 also of demanding of the new kingdom of Italy 
 two of its regiments of infantry, and two of its j 
 regiments of cavalry. It was not in Italy that . 
 
 VOL. II. 36 
 
 the Italian soldiers were likely to find occasion 
 to learn war, but in the north, in the school of 
 the grand army ; and, if the Germans could, 
 up to a certain point, complain of being made 
 subservient to interests which were not theirs, 
 the Italians had no complaint of that kind to 
 raise for the interests of France were cer- 
 tainly those of Italy, and, in teaching them to 
 fight, we were teaching them to defend, on 
 some future day, their national independence. 
 
 Napoleon conceived another idea, which, at 
 the moment, had all the appearance of a jeer; 
 that was to demand troops from Spain. The 
 day before the battle of Jena, the Prince of the 
 Peace, always engaged in some treachery, 
 open or concealed, had published a proclama- 
 tion, calling the Spanish nation to arms, upon 
 the strange pretext that the independence of 
 Spain was threatened. In Spain, in France, 
 in Europe, people asked by whom that inde- 
 pendence could be threatened. The answer 
 was easy to give. The Prince of the Peace 
 had believed, like all the adversaries of France, 
 in the superiority of the Prussian army; he 
 had expected the destruction, by that army, of 
 what was called the common enemy. But, 
 the victory of Jena having undeceived him, 
 he had the hardihood to say that his procla- 
 mation was designed to raise the Spanish 
 nation, for the purpose of sending it to the 
 assistance of Napoleon, in case he should 
 stand in need of it. The falsehood was too 
 gross to mislead. Napoleon only smiled, and 
 deferred this quarrel till another time. There 
 were, however, along the Pyrenees, some thou- 
 sands of Spaniards, good troops, who had no- 
 thing to do there, if they were not destined to 
 act against France. There were, also, some 
 thousands of Spaniards at Leghorn, to guard 
 that port of the kingdom of Etruria, and who 
 were more likely to deliver it up to the English 
 than to defend it. Napoleon, affecting 10 take 
 the explanation which the Prince of the Peace 
 gave of his proclamation, in a serious light, 
 thanked him for his zeal, and requested him 
 to furnish a proof of it by assisting him with 
 twelve or fifteen thousand men, who were ab- 
 solutely useless, either at the Pyrenees, or at 
 Leghorn. Napoleon added, that he meant to 
 put into their hands Hanover, an English pos- 
 session, as a pledge for the restitution of the 
 Spanish colonies. Indeed, there needed not 
 reasons so artfully arranged for the meanness 
 of the Spanish government of that period. No 
 sooner had Napoleon's despatch reached Ma- 
 drid, than orders to march were sent to the 
 Spanish troops. Nine or ten thousand men 
 started from the Pyrenees, four or five thou- 
 sand from Leghorn. Napoleon sent to all 
 quarters the necessary instructions for receiv- 
 ing them, either in France, or in the countries 
 dependent on his arms, in the most friendly 
 and hospitable manner; and desired that they 
 might be abundantly supplied with provisions, 
 clothing, and even money. 
 
 He was, therefore, about to have on the Elbe, 
 Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch, to the 
 number of 60,000 men at least. The Bavari- 
 ans and the Wirtembergers, united with the 
 new contingent required from the confedera- 
 tion of the Rhine, might form about 30,000 
 2.4.2
 
 283 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 men ; the Dutoh, increased by some troops, 
 15,000; the Spaniards 15,000; the Italians 
 seven or eight thousand. In order to make 
 very good troops of these auxiliaries, it would 
 be sufficient to join with them a certain quan- 
 tity of French. Napoleon devised a method 
 of procuring 40,000 of the better sort, likewise 
 to be drawn from Italy and France. He had 
 taken the precaution a long time beforehand 
 to give orders for the army of Italy to be put 
 on the war footing. Five divisions of infan- 
 try were quite organized in Frioul and Lom- 
 bard}-. Napoleon resolved to call from Brescia 
 and Verona the two divisions of Molitor and 
 Boudet, excellent divisions, and which after- 
 wards proved at Essling and Wagram what 
 they were capable of. They formed an effec- 
 tive of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, almost 
 all veteran soldiers of Italy, recruited with 
 some conscripts of the last levies. These di- 
 visions received orders to pass the Alps and 
 proceed by Augsburg, the one to Magdeburg, 
 the other to Berlin. Six weeks were sufficient 
 for this journey. 
 
 Napoleon thus weakened Italy, but Italy 
 was at the moment of far less importance than 
 Germany. Well covered on his rear while he 
 should be in Poland, certain of being able to 
 throw himself, by Silesia or Saxony, upon Bo- 
 hemia, and to lay Austria prostrate by a single 
 blow of the back of his sword, he was always 
 sure to disengage Italy, if she were tempo- 
 rarily overrun. He calculated, therefore, very 
 ably, in preferring to make himself strong in 
 Germany rather than in Italy. It was, how- 
 ever, not without compensation, that he weak- 
 ened the latter country, for he had directed 
 20,000 conscripts, taken from the classes of 
 1807 and 1808, to be sent thither, and he or- 
 dered moreover the companies of elite to be 
 extracted from the depot battalions, to form 
 two new active divisions in Lombardy, which 
 his forecast had rendered easy by keeping the 
 depots of Italy, like those of France, always 
 full and well exercised. He should, therefore, 
 soon have, as before, 60,000 men on the Adige, 
 72.000 with Marmont's corps, 90,000 by draw- 
 ing a strong detachment from Naples towards 
 Milan. 
 
 But 15,000 French were not sufficient on 
 the Elbe to serve for a link and appui to 
 60,000 auxiliaries, whom he was about to col- 
 lect there. Napoleon thought to draw from 
 France another valuable resource. He had 
 formed at Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, and Na- 
 poleonville, four camps, composed of a certain 
 number of the oldest regiments, of such as 
 had need to rest and recruit themselves, and 
 had abundantly supplied them with all that 
 they needed in men and materiel. These regi- 
 ments formed a force of nearly 36,000 men. 
 They were to be seconded, as we have seen, 
 by some detachments of national guards, of 
 which 6000 men were at St. Omer, 3000 at 
 Cherbourg, 3000 between Oleron and Bor- 
 deaux, by 10,000 seamen of the Boulogne flo- 
 lilla, by 3000 workmen, regimented at Ant- 
 werp, 8000 at Brest, 3000 at Lorient, 4000 at 
 Rocheforl, by 12,000 coast-guaras,and by 3000 
 af the gendarmerie, which might at any time 
 he assembled at one point by calling together 
 
 that militia for twenty-five leagues round. 
 This would be a force of nearly 90,000 men 
 along the coast, capable of presenting 25 or 
 30 thousand men on any point of it that might 
 be attacked. Napoleon designed to supply the 
 place of the regular troops of the camps of 
 Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, Napoleonville, by 
 a new creation. He gave orders for the for- 
 mation of five legions, composed of officers 
 taken out of the army, and of conscripts 
 drawn from the last two conscriptions, com- 
 manded by five senators, each six battalions 
 and 6000 men strong, the five comprising 30 
 battalions and 30,000 men. They were to re- 
 ceive their education while stationed on the 
 coast of the ocean. The permanent state of 
 war since '92, had bred up such a quantity of 
 officers that skeletons were never wanting for 
 the creation of new corps. The elements of 
 these five legions could not be brought to- 
 gether, it is true, in less than four or five 
 months, that is to say, before the end of May 
 or the beginning of June. But the troops of 
 the camps were not yet going to leave the 
 coast. If in May or June the English were 
 not seen standing for the coast of France, if, 
 on the contrary, they were seen sailing for the 
 coast of Germany, 25,000 veteran soldiers of 
 the camps were to follow the movements of 
 the English squadrons, proceeding simultane- 
 ously with them along the shores of the Chan- 
 nel, the North Sea. the Baltic, by Normandy, 
 Picardy, Holland, Mecklenburg, and to join in 
 Germany the two divisions of Boudet and Mo- 
 litor. They had orders to perform this march 
 as speedily as possible, should the conduct of 
 Austria render it necessary; and they had 
 orders, in any case, to leave behind them the 
 five new legions, whose presence might be 
 useful, even before their organization was 
 completed. 
 
 By means of this combination, Napoleon 
 was about to have with Boudet's and Molitor's 
 divisions, with the 25,000 men drawn from 
 Normandy and Bretagne, with the sixty or 
 seventy thousand auxiliaries, Germans, Ita- 
 lians, Spaniards, Dutch, a second army of 
 more than 100,000 men on the Elbe, independ- 
 ently of the two corps of Marshals Mortier and 
 Lannes, whose part it was to connect the army 
 of reserve with the grand active army of the 
 Vistula. Endowed with an admirable talent 
 for moving his masses-, he could, by doubling 
 his tail back to his head, or his head back to 
 his tail, his left upon his right, or his right 
 upon his left, carry the bulk of his forces, 
 either forward towards the Niemen, or back- 
 ward towards the Elbe, or to the right upon 
 Austria, or to the left upon the coast With 
 all that he had brought together, with all that 
 he was to .bring together by and by, he should 
 number not fewer than 440,000 men in Ger- 
 many, 860,000 of whom were French, and 
 80,000 allies. Never had such means been 
 collected with that power, with that vigour, 
 with that promptness. 
 
 Of all these reinforcements, none had yet 
 arrived but the new regiments drawn from 
 France and Italy, the provisional regiments 
 which came daily to recruit the ranks of the 
 grand army, the Bavarians and Wirtembergers
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 283 
 
 acting in Silesia, the Dutch on the Baltic, and 
 the troops of Mortier spread before Stralsund, 
 Colberg, and Dantzig. Orders were despatched 
 for Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, for the 
 Italian, German, Spanish, and French troops. 
 Marshal Brune, who was at the camp of 
 Boulogne, as commander-in-chief, and who 
 was still recommended by the remembrance 
 of his conduct at the Helder, was called to 
 Berlin, to be put at the head of the second 
 army assembled in Germany. 
 
 Meanwhile the sieges continued. Before we 
 relate the vicissitudes of the most important 
 of all these sieges, that which filled the winter 
 with memorable incidents, we must mention a 
 circumstance which had wellnigh seriously 
 endangered the safety of our rear. Marshal 
 Mortier, commanding the 8th corps, and hav- 
 ing under his orders four divisions, one Dutch, 
 one Italian, two French, had placed the Dutch 
 division near the mouth of the Elbe, left Grand- 
 jean's French division before Stralsund, posted 
 Dupas' French division at Stettin, and sent the 
 Italian division before Colburg, to repress the 
 incommodious partisans thrown by the garri- 
 son of that place between the Vistula and the 
 Oder. We should add that, of the six regi- 
 ments composing the two French divisions, 
 four had been taken, the 2d light to be sent 
 toward Dantzig, the 12th light to be sent to 
 Thorn, the 22d and 65th of the line to reinforce 
 the army on the Passarge. The 58th light, 
 arriving from Paris, had been given to Marshal 
 Mortier in compensation, and several other 
 regiments coming from France were destined 
 for him. He had therefore not been able to 
 leave General Grandjean more than two French 
 regiments, the 4th light, and the 58ih of the 
 line. He had taken with him the 72d, in order 
 to support the Italians before Colberg. 
 
 This was the moment that the Swedes chose 
 for an enterprise upon our rear. They still 
 occupied Stralsund, an important seaport of 
 Swedish Pomerania, which was the place 
 where they usually landed in Germany. This 
 place would have been worth the trouble of a 
 siege, if Dantzig had not deserved the prefer- 1 
 ence before any other conquest of that kind. ! 
 The King of Sweden, whose disordered reason 
 was destined to cost his family the throne, and 
 his country Pomerania and Finland the King 
 of Sweden had purposed to start from Stral- 
 sund, with an army composed of Russians, 
 English, Swedes, and, like another Gustavus 
 Adolphus, to make a brilliant incursion upon 
 the continent of Germany. But Napoleon, 
 absolute master of that continent, had obliged 
 the Swedish troops to shut themselves up in 
 Stralsund, where they were blockaded, as it 
 were, in a tele du pont. The King of Sweden, 
 extremely vehement with friends as well as 
 foes, was sorely displeased with Russia, and 
 still more with England, which sent him not a 
 soldier, and doled out the subsidies with extra- 1 
 ordinary parsimony. Thus, shut up in his 
 own territories, since he was no longer per- 
 mitted to travel on the continent, he lived at 
 Stockholm, dull, secluded, leaving General j 
 Essen at Stralsund with a corps of 1 5,000 j 
 good troops. General Essen, apprized of what 
 was passing before him, could not withstand ( 
 
 the temptation to force the line of the blockade, 
 which the French defended with too small a 
 force. In the first days of April, he marched 
 out at the head of 15,000 Swedes, against 
 General Grandjean, who had scarcely five or 
 six thousand men, half of whom at most were 
 French, to oppose to them. General Grand- 
 Jean, after defending himself bravely before 
 the place, found himself threatened with hav- 
 ing his wings turned, and was obliged to retire, 
 first upon Anklam, and then upon Uckermunde 
 and Stettin. He made an orderly retreat, se- 
 conded by the valour of the French and Dutch, 
 lost few men on the field of battle, but a great 
 quantity of military effects, and some solitary 
 detachments, which could not be picked up, 
 especially in the islands of Usedom and Wol- 
 lin, which close the Great Haff. 
 
 This surprise produced a certain alarm on 
 the rear of the army, especially in Berlin, 
 where a hostile population, deeply mortified, 
 eagerly watching events, sought food for its 
 hopes in every unforeseen circumstance. But 
 the fortune of France, then so brilliant, could 
 leave her adversaries only short joys. At 
 that moment, several regiments coming from 
 France, among others the 15th of the line, and 
 several provisional marching regiments, ar- 
 rived on the Elbe and the Oder. General 
 Clarke, who governed at Berlin with wisdom 
 and firmness, immediately despatched the 15th 
 of the line to reinforce General Grandjean at 
 Stettin. He added to it a provisional regiment 
 and several squadrons of cavalry in the great 
 depot at Potsdam, which were disposable. 
 Marshal Mortier, on his part, marched back at 
 the head of the 72d and of several Italian de- 
 tachments drawn from Colberg. These troops, 
 united with Grandjean's division, were suffi- 
 cient to punish the Swedes for their attempt. 
 Marshal Mortier formed with them two divi- 
 sions under General Grandjean and Dupas, put 
 the 72d, the 15th of the line, and the Dutch in 
 the first, the 4th light, the 58th of the line, and 
 some Italians, in the second, left the provi- 
 sional regiments to cover his left and his rear, 
 and marched to the enemy with that calm re- 
 solution which characterized him. He drove 
 the Swedes from position to position, forced 
 them to fall back on the Peene, passed that 
 river in spite of them, and drove them into 
 Stralsund, with the loss of some hundred killed 
 and 2,000 prisoners. The incursion of the 
 Swedes, commenced in the first days of April, 
 was finished on the 18th. General Essen, ap- 
 prehensive lest all Pomerania should soon be 
 wrested from him, was disposed to save it by 
 an armistice. A flag of truce, sent by him to 
 Marshal Mortier, came and offered to neutralize 
 that province by suspending all kinds of hos- 
 tilities. As it was impossible for us to besiege 
 Stralsund, nothing could be more convenient 
 to us than to close an inlet by which the Eng- 
 lish might have been able to penetrate into 
 Germany, and at the same time to render the 
 troops, which must otherwise have been left in 
 Swedish Pomerania, disposable for the siege 
 of Dantzig. Marshal Mortier, knowing the in- 
 tentions of Napoleon on this point, consented 
 to an armistice, in virtue of which the Swf les 
 promised to observe an absolute neutrality, not
 
 284 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807 
 
 to open Swedish Pomerania to any enemy of ! which was the last bulwark of his kingdom. 
 France, and not to afford any succour either to the principal depot of his wealth ; and, as long 
 Colberg or to Dantzig. A resumption of hos- as it continued in his hands, a serious danger 
 tilities was to be preceded by ten days' notice, for Napoleon. He had put into it a garrison 
 The armistice was sent to Napoleon for his of 18,000 men, 14,000 of whom were Prus- 
 approbation. i s i ans > an d 4000 Russians. He had given it 
 
 Napoleon could not reason in any other way for governor the celebrated Marshal Kalkreuth, 
 than his lieutenant, for the motive which had at that moment unemployed and grumbling at 
 
 caused him to reduce the troops placed before 
 Stralsund to the smallest possible number, 
 must dispose him to the acceptance of an 
 armistice, which annulled Stralsund without 
 
 Kiinigsberg, and well qualified for such a com- 
 mand. It was not to be apprehended that this 
 old warrior, who had just condemned to death 
 the commandant of Stettin for having surren- 
 
 diverting any part of our forces for the pur-j dered the post committed to his keeping, would 
 pose of blockading it. He therefore accepted make a faint resistance to the French. No 
 the proposed armistice on condition that the sooner did he arrive than Marshal Kalkreuth 
 notice to be given before the resumption of finished burning the rich suburbs of Dantzig, 
 hostilities should be extended from ten days to j which his predecessor had begun to consign 
 
 to the flames, set about repairing the works, 
 rousing the spirit of the garrison, and intimi- 
 dating every one who was disposed to surrender. 
 
 a month. 
 
 General Essen signed the armistice with this 
 modification, and sent it to Stockholm to obtain 
 the royal ratification. In the mean time, Mar- 
 shal Mortier was to remain on the Peene with 
 his forces, and then to march them to Stettin, 
 Colberg and Dantzig, leaving, however, the 
 Dutch to observe the neutralized province. 
 
 For the rest, if the Swedes had served us by 
 adopting this armistice, they had likewise 
 served themselves, for the French forces were 
 accumulating in Berlin. The 3d of the line, 
 
 Thus Dantzig, in March, 1807, was no longer 
 a ruined and neglected place, which it would 
 be possible to take by surprise. Not only- 
 had it an excellent governor, a strong garri- 
 son, extensive and solid works, but its site 
 was very difficult of approach. Like all great 
 rivers, the Vistula has its Delta. A little be- 
 low Mewe, about fifteen leagues from the Bal- 
 tic, it divides into two arms, which embrace a 
 
 drawn from Braunau, and 3400 strong, four or j rich and fertile tract, called the Isle of Nogath. 
 five provisional regiments on march from the One of these arms, the right, which goes by 
 Rhine to the Elbe, the 15th chasseurs remount- the name of Nogath, throws itself into the gulf 
 ing in Hanover, lastly the 19th of the line/ called the Frische-Haff; the left, retaining the 
 
 coming from the camp of Boulogne, would 
 soon have been advancing upon Swedish Po- 
 merania. The Swedes would have paid with 
 their total destruction for the time which they 
 would have caused our troops to lose. 
 
 During these transactions, Dantzig was in- 
 vested, and the operations of the siege had 
 commenced. Napoleon had at first intended 
 only to blockade the place. The war being 
 prolonged, he resolved to employ the winter in 
 reducing it. Dantzig was worth the trouble. 
 It commands, in fact, the Lower Vistula, the 
 fertile plains traversed by that river towards 
 its mouth, comprehends a spacious harbour, 
 and contains the riches of the commerce of 
 the north. Master of Dantzig, Napoleon could 
 not be shaken in his position on the Lower 
 Vistula; he deprived the allies of the means 
 of turning his left; and he obtained possession 
 of immense stores of corn and wine, sufficient 
 to supply the army for above a year. It was 
 impossible, therefore, to make a better use of 
 the winter than in effecting such a conquest. 
 But it required a long siege, as well on account 
 of the works of the place as of the strong gar- 
 rison charged to defend it. If, at the com- 
 mencement of the campaign, Napoleon could 
 have suddenly set about such a siege, it is to 
 be presumed that the defences of Dantzig, 
 which were of earth, and in the most neglected 
 state, would have yielded to an unforeseen at- 
 tack. But Napoleon had not then either dis- 
 posable troops or heavy artillery, and he had 
 been obliged to blockade Dantzig with German 
 and some Polish auxiliaries, supported by a 
 single French regiment, the 2d light. The 
 King of Prussia, forewarned, had therefore had 
 wine to put into a state of defence a place 
 
 name of Vistula, proceeds directly north to 
 within a league of the sea ; there meets all at 
 once with a bank of sand, turns off to the 
 west, and, after running along this bank of 
 sand for seven or eight leagues, again turns 
 northward, and at last falls into the Baltic. 
 It is at the mouth of the latter arm of the Vis- 
 tula, in a flat country, extremely fertile, fre- 
 quently overflowed, and at the foot of some 
 sandy heights, that the city of Dantzig is situ- 
 ated, at the distance of several thousand paces 
 from the sea. 
 
 The long sand-bank, at which the Vistula 
 turns off to run westward, is called the Neh- 
 rung. At one end, it terminates before Dant- 
 zig, running the other way for twenty leagues, 
 forming one of the banks of the Frische-Haff 
 as far as KGnigsberg, with the exception of a 
 cut at Pillau a natural channel formed by the 
 waters of the Nogath, the Passarge and the 
 Pregel, in order to discharge themselves from 
 the Frische-Haff into the Baltic. It is by 
 Pillau, in fact, that you pass out of the Frische*- 
 Haff into the Baltic, and that shipping pro- 
 ceeds to and from the important city of Kii- 
 nigsberg. 
 
 You may then, provided you clear the 
 narrow pass of the Pillau, communicate bv 
 land from Konigsberg to Dantzig, by follow- 
 ing the sand-bank of the Nehru ng, a league 
 broad, at most, and generally much less, 
 twenty-five long, without a free, except near 
 Dantzig, and presenting only a few fisher. 
 men's huts. 
 
 Dantzig, seated on the left arm of the Vis- 
 tula the one which has retained that name 
 is 2300 fathoms, or about a league, from the 
 sea. The fort of Weichselmunde, regularly
 
 March. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 285 
 
 built, closes the mouth of the Vistula. T 
 shorten the distance from the place to the sea 
 a canal, called the canal of Laaken, has been 
 dug. The ground, between the river and the 
 canal, forms an island, called the Holm. Nu 
 merous redoubts, established in this island 
 command the river and the canal, which are 
 the two outlets toward the sea. Lastly, the 
 place itself, seated on the bank of the Vistula 
 traversed by a little river, the Motlau, encom 
 passed by their united waters, shut in by a 
 bastioned enclosure of twenty fronts, is mos 
 difficult of access, surrounded by an inunda- 
 tion not artificial but natural, which a besieger 
 cannot get rid of at pleasure by draining, anc 
 against which the very inhabitants have the 
 greatest difficulty to defend themselves at cer- 
 tain litres of the day and of the year. Dant- 
 zig, thus surrounded, on the north, the east, 
 and the south, by inundated grounds, would be 
 inaccessible but for the sandy heights which 
 command it, and which terminate in rapid 
 slopes to the foot of the walls on the western 
 side. In consequence, these heights have not 
 failed to be secured for the advantage of de- 
 fence, and they have been crowned by a series 
 of works forming a second enclosure. It is 
 from these heights that Dantzig has generally 
 been attacked. In fact, the double enclosure 
 which occupies their summit being once taken, 
 the city may be overwhelmed with a downward 
 fire, to which it is scarcely possible for it to 
 make any resistance. This double enclosure, 
 however, renders the attack of the place ex- 
 tremely difficult. The works of Dantzig are 
 of earth, and present turfed slopes instead of 
 scarps of masonry. But at the foot of these 
 slopes were then standing strong palisades of 
 enormous dimension, (they were fifteen inches 
 in diameter,) very close together, and deeply 
 planted in the ground. A ball might some- 
 times splinter them, sometimes break off their 
 heads, but not knock them down. On the 
 slopes in rear, enormous logs suspended by 
 ropes were at the moment of an assault to be 
 made to roll from, top to bottom upon the be- 
 siegers. Then again, at all the re-entering 
 angles of the enclosure (re-entering places 
 farmes') had been erected blockhouses of rough 
 timber; these were covered with earth, and 
 rendered almost impenetrable to ball and bomb. 
 The timber of the plains of the north, for 
 which the city of Dantzig is the great mart, 
 had been lavishly employed in all forms for 
 the purpose of fortifying it, and occasion was 
 soon offered for discovering its defensive pro- 
 perties, which were not appreciated as they 
 were after that memorable siege. Lastly, am- 
 munition in immense quantity, provisions suf- 
 ficient to subsist the population and the troops 
 for above a year, continual communications 
 with the city of Konigsberg, either by sea or 
 by the Nehrung, communications which gave 
 the besieged garrison the assurance that it 
 should be relieved, and that it could retire 
 whenever it pleased, added to the chances of 
 the defence and to the difficulties of the attack. 
 Marshal Lefebvre, appointed to the command 
 of the troops which were to be employed in 
 the siege, possessed none of the qualifications 
 requisite for such an operation There was 
 
 not in the whole army a soldier more ignorant 
 or more brave. To all the questions of art 
 raised by the engineers, he saw but one solu- 
 tion, which was to proceed to the assault at the 
 head of his grenadiers. If Napoleon had se- 
 lected him in spite of his deficiency.it was be- 
 cause, as we have elsewhere said, he was desi- 
 rous to give employment to senators ; it was 
 because he had no mind to leave in Paris an 
 old soldier, submissive and attached, but who 
 frequently let his tongue run when he was not 
 checked; it was, lastly, because he wished, 
 without intrusting him with a corps farmee, to 
 afford him an opportunity of earning a high 
 reward. The brave Lefebvre, who redeemed 
 his ignorance by a certain natural intelligence, 
 could form a just estimate of himself, and was 
 absolutely frightened when he learned what a 
 task Napoleon had committed to him. Napo- 
 leon had cheered him by promising to send 
 him all the resources that he should need, and 
 to guide him himself from his camp at Fink- 
 enstein. "Take courage," said he; "why 
 should not you, too, when you get back to 
 France, have something to talk of in the hall 
 of the Senate!" 
 
 Overcome by these gracious words, the Mar- 
 shal had cheerfully obeyed. Napoleon had 
 jiven him for assistants two officers of the 
 highest merit, Chasseloup the engineer, and 
 the general of artillery, Lariboissiere, knowing 
 that it is by means of engineers and artillery 
 hat the walls of fortresses are overthrown. It 
 s true that they are apt to differ in opinion, for 
 one is charged to determine the attacks, the 
 other to execute them by means of cannon, 
 and their provinces trench too closely upon 
 one another for them not to disagree. It is for 
 he general commanding in chief to reconcile 
 hem. But Napoleon was thirty or forty leagues 
 rom Dantzig: he could always resolve diffi- 
 culties by his daily correspondence, or send 
 me of his aides-de-camp, General Savary or 
 ~eneral Bertrand, to put an end in his name to 
 he disputes which Marshal Lefebvre was in- 
 japable of comprehending and deciding. This 
 
 did several times during the siege. 
 
 Napoleon had resolved to commence the 
 
 irst operations with the auxiliaries and one or 
 
 wo French regiments borrowed from the corps 
 
 of Marshal Mortier; then, while the troops 
 
 brought from France should be passing near 
 
 he Vistula, to keep them for a time under the 
 
 walls of Dantzig to reinforce the besieging 
 
 roops. Marshal Lefebvre had, therefore, to 
 
 jegin with five or six thousand Poles of the 
 
 lew levy, scarcely trained; 2500 of the legion 
 
 if the north, composed of Poles, and German 
 
 nd Russian deserters, having spirit but not 
 
 olidity, for want of a sufficient organization ; 
 
 1200 Baden troops, unaccustomed to fire and 
 
 o the fatigues of the trenches; 5000 Saxons, 
 
 good soldiers, but who, having sided with the 
 
 russians at Jena, could not yet conceive any 
 
 "real affection for us ; lastly, 3000 French, 
 
 amely, the 2d light, the 23d and 19th regi- 
 
 nenls of mounted chasseurs, which had ar- 
 
 ived from Italy, and 600 of the corps of engi- 
 
 leers, incomparable troops, who, making up for 
 
 11 deficiencies in this famous siege, covered 
 
 hemselves with glory. It was, as we see. with
 
 286 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1807. 
 
 18,000 men at most, only 3000 of whom were 
 French, that we were about to undertake the 
 regular attack of a place containing a garrison 
 of 18,000 men. 
 
 The heavy artillery, of which at least one 
 hundred pieces were required, with immense 
 supplies of powder and projectiles, could be 
 obtained only from the arsenals of Silesia. 
 Water carriage being interrupted, it had to 
 be drawn with great labour, along wretched 
 roads, from the Oder to the Vistula. It was 
 expected so early as March. But the first 
 thing to be done, before battering the place 
 could be thought of, was to invest it closely, 
 in order to deprive the garrison of reinforce- 
 ments and of the encouragements which it was 
 receiving from Kiinigsberg. To accomplish 
 this, it would be necessary, on the one hand, 
 to cut it off from the fort of Weichselmiinde, 
 and, on the other, to intercept the Nehrung, 
 that long sand-bank, extending, as we have 
 said, from KOnigsberg to Dantzig, with a single 
 cut at Pillau. 
 
 We had arrived by the sandy heights which 
 command Dantzig on the west, and we per- 
 ceived before us the outer enclosure con- 
 structed on these heights, at our feet the city, 
 on the left the Vistula, throwing itself into the 
 Baltic, amidst the works of the fort of Weich- 
 selmiinde, on the right the vast tract of land 
 overflowed by the Motlau, in front, stretching 
 further than the eye could reach, the Nehrung, 
 washed on one side by the sea, on the other by 
 the Vistula, and sinking at the horizon towards 
 the Frische-Haff'. It was a circuit of seven or 
 eight leagues, which it was impossible to en- 
 compass with 18,000 men. It is true that, by 
 occupying certain points, the investment might 
 be sufficient. Thus, by placing ourselves on 
 the Vistula, between the fort of Weichselmiinde 
 and Dantzig, we should intercept the commu- 
 nications by sea. By establishing ourselves 
 on the Nehrung, we should intercept the com- 
 munication by land. But to possess ourselves 
 of the principal points only, we must first 
 crown the heights, then descend on the left, 
 carry the works of the fort of Weichselmiinde 
 on both hanks of the Vistula, and, in default 
 of this operation, at least bar the river, pene- 
 trate into the isle of Holm, and take the canal 
 of Laaken. We must then, after descending 
 on the left, descend on the right also into the 
 inundated plains, cross it upon the dikes, pass 
 the Vistula above Dantzig, as we had passed 
 it below, enter upon the Nehrung, intrench 
 ourselves there, and cut off the land route as 
 well as that by sea. These first difficulties 
 overcome, we might open the trenches before 
 the enclosure. But for this purpose we should 
 have needed eight or ten thousand more good 
 troops, and we had them not. By the advice 
 therefore of Chasseloup, commanding the en- 
 gineers, it was decided to choose from among 
 the various preliminary operations that which 
 appeared most urgent and least difficult To 
 cross the Vistula below Dantzig, between the 
 fort of Weichselmunde and the place, to pene- 
 trate into the isle of Holm, under the fire of 
 well-armed redoubts, and in spite of the sallies 
 which might be made either from Weichsel- 
 miinde or from Dantzig, was too perilous. It 
 
 was resolved therefore to cross above Dantzig, 
 a league or two higher up, at a place called 
 Neufahr, to form a small camp there, in this 
 manner to intercept the Nehrung, then, in pro- 
 portion as means should be found, to reinforce 
 this camp, to bring it nearer to Dantzig, in 
 order that it might give a hand to the troops 
 which should by and by be charged to cross 
 the Vistula, between the place and. the fort of 
 Weichselmunde. 
 
 This operation was intrusted to General 
 Schramm, with a corps of about 3000 men, 
 composed of a battalion of the second light, 
 some hundred Saxon grenadiers, a Polish de- 
 tachment, infantry and cavalry, and a squadron 
 of the 19th chasseurs. On the morning of the 
 19th of March, the troops, having got as high 
 as Neufahr, two leagues above Dantzig, were 
 embarked in boats which had been procured, 
 crossed the Vistula, which is not so broad after 
 it has divided into several arms, and in this 
 operation took advantage of an island situated 
 near the opposite bank. General Schramm, 
 having reached the Nehrung in consequence 
 of this passage, divided his little corps into 
 three columns ; one on the left, to fall upon the 
 enemy's troops which defended the position 
 towards Dantzig; one on the right, to repulse 
 those which might come from the Konigsberg 
 side; and a third, to act by way of reserve. 
 At the head of each of these columns he had 
 placed a detachment of French, which would 
 set them an example. 
 
 No sooner had they landed than General 
 Schramm's troops, hurried on by the battalion 
 of the 2d light, turned to the left, went to meet 
 the Prussians, and upset them in spile of the 
 most vehement fire. While the principal co- 
 lumn, taking the left, pushed them towards 
 Dantzig, the second remained in observation 
 on the Kiinigsberg road. The third, kept in 
 reserve, served to reinforce the first. The 
 enemy, having tried to take advantage of the 
 obstacles of the ground to renew his resistance 
 for the Nehrung, as it approaches Dantzig, 
 has both hills and woods the first column, 
 assisted by the third, again repulsed him, and 
 killed and took some men. The Saxons vied 
 on this occasion with the French. Both drove 
 back the enemy to the glacis of the fort of 
 Weichselmunde, from which the troops that 
 defended the Nehrung had come. 
 
 The affair seemed to be over, when, about 
 seven o'clock in the evening, a column of 
 three or four thousand Prussians was seen 
 debouching from Dantzig, and ascending the 
 Vistula, with drums beating and colours fly- 
 ing. The 2d light, by a well-directed and 
 well-sustained fire, stopped that column, then 
 charged it with the bayonet, and drove it back 
 upon Dantzig, whither it ran to shut itself up. 
 This day, which put us in possession of a 
 passage over the Vistula above Dantzig, and 
 of a position which intercepted the Nehrung, 
 cost the enemy two or three hundred men put 
 horg de combat, and five or six hundred made 
 prisoners. Captain Girod, of the engineers, 
 appointed to direct the expedition, distinguished 
 himself by his intelligence and his coolness 
 The operation being finished, he had trees felled, 
 epaulements thrown up, a bridge of boats esVa
 
 March, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 287 
 
 blished over the Vistula, with the accompani- 
 ment of a strong tete du pont. Behind this 
 shelter the troops lodged, and they were 
 guarded by means of posts of cavalry, which, 
 on one side, pushed on to beneath the glacis 
 of the fort of Weichselmunde, and, on the 
 other, ran along the Nehrung, in the direction 
 of Konigsberg. 
 
 On the following days, general Schramm, 
 who commanded this detachment, endeavoured 
 to descend as far as Heubude, in order to press 
 the place more closely, and to gain possession 
 of a sluice, which had the greatest influence 
 upon the inundation. But this sluice, sur- 
 rounded by water, was not accessible on any 
 side. General Schramm was obliged to relin- 
 quish the design of taking it, and to confine 
 himself to bringing down the bridge of boats 
 to Heubude. However, this post of the Upper 
 Vistula, after its removal to Heubude, had six 
 leagues to go in order to communicate with 
 the head-quarters, across the inundated lands 
 and along the dikes. In attempting to cut off the 
 communications of the besieged, he therefore 
 ran the risk of losing his own communications. 
 
 On the 26th of March, the enemy attempted 
 two sorties; one from the place, directed by 
 the Schidlilz and Oliva gates upon our advanced 
 posts, with the intention of completing the 
 burning of the suburbs ; the other from the 
 outworks of the fort of Weichselmiinde, and 
 directed upon the left of the head-quarters by 
 Langenfurth. Both were briskly repulsed. 
 A Polish cavalry officer, Captain Sokolniki, 
 distinguished himself there by his intrepidity 
 and skill. A celebrated Prussian partisan, 
 the Baron de Kakow, was taken there. 
 
 Our troops, in driving back the enemy to 
 the foot of the works, approached nearer to 
 the place than they had yet done, so that one 
 could study its configuration. General Chas- 
 seloup formed the plan of the attacks with the 
 perspicacity of an equally scientific and prac- 
 tised engineer. The outer enclosure, con- 
 structed on the margin of the heights, pre- 
 sented two works, connected with each other, 
 but distinct and separated by a small valley, 
 at the farther end of which is the suburb of 
 Schidlilz. The first of these works, that on 
 the right (the right of the besieging army) is 
 called the Bischoffsberg ; the second, that of 
 the left, is called Hagelsberg. It was the lat- 
 ter which General Chasseloup chose for the 
 object of the principal attack, reserving the 
 option of directing a false attack upon the 
 Bischoffsberg. The motives which decided 
 him were the following :' 
 
 The works of the Hagelsberg appeared less 
 carefully constructed than those of the Bis- 
 choffsberg. The Hagelsberg was narrow, in- 
 convenient for the deploying of troops, whe- 
 ther the besieged had to make sorties or to 
 repulse an assault ; whereas the Bischoffs- 
 berg, spacious and well distributed, admitted 
 of three or four thousand men being drawn 
 
 We have thought it right to relate wilh some detail 
 the siege of Dantzig. because it is a fine model of a 
 regular siege, and perhaps the most remarkable of our 
 age, because examples of regular sieges, to frequent 
 and so perfect under Louis XIV., have become very 
 
 up in order of battle, and thrown in a mass 
 upon the besieger. The Hagelsberg could be 
 battered from behind by the Stolzenberg, one 
 of the outer positions ; the Bischoffsberg 
 could not be from any side. The Hagelsberg 
 was reached over ground undulated, but un- 
 broken. To approach the Bischoffsberg, you 
 came to a deep ravine, in which it would not 
 be easy to make paths, and into which also 
 you ran the risk of being flung, if you at- 
 tempted to cross it in proceeding to the as- 
 sault. Not only was the Hagelsberg easier to 
 take than the Bischoffsberg, but the position 
 when taken was better. You commanded the 
 place from both alike, and could overwhelm it 
 with your fire. But, if that fire was not suffi- 
 cient to reduce it, and it were necessary to 
 descend from the heights to force the second 
 enclosure, you found, on descending from the 
 bastion of Heilige Leichnam to the bastion of 
 St. Elizabeth, a salient front, and which not be- 
 ing flanked on any side, could present but few 
 difficulties to the besieger. In descending from 
 the Bischoffsberg, on the contrary, from the bas- 
 tion of St. Elizabeth to the bastion of St. Gertrude, 
 you found on all sides a re-entering flank, and 
 exposed, moreover, to the fire of several very 
 elevated platforms (cavaliers'). Lastly, a rea- 
 son deduced from the general situation ought 
 to decide the attack on the Hagelsberg. This 
 attack would bring our principal forces nearer 
 to the Lower Vistula, and it was in fact by 
 the Lower Vistula that the besiegers must 
 think of investing the place, by drawing from 
 this point the detached corps of General 
 Schramm, by giving a hand to him for pass- 
 ing into the isle of Holm, and by thus cutting 
 off Dantzig from the fort of WeichselmQnde. 
 These reasons were convincing, and con- 
 vinced Napoleon himself. General Kirgener, 
 placed under General Chasseloup, had con- 
 ceived the idea of fixing the point of attack 
 still more to the left, towards the Oliva gate, 
 in the low ground between the Hagelsberg 
 and the Vistula, opposite to the isle of Holm. 
 This idea was not adopted ; for it would have 
 been necessary, in the first place, to carry the 
 outer enclosure, while exposed on the right to 
 the fire of the Hagelsberg. Such a mode of 
 operating was not admissible. 
 
 General Chasseloup, called for several days 
 to Thorn, to trace the plan of some defensive 
 works there, left, at his departure, the plan oi 
 the attacks, and orders for the commencement 
 of the operations. 
 
 There was no longer any reason for delay, 
 for Marshal Lefebvre had received the rein- 
 forcements which had been promised him. 
 The 44th of the line, drawn from Augereau's 
 corps, arrived at that moment from the banks 
 of the Vistula; it was only a thousand men. 
 but of the very best. The 19th, which had 
 set out from France two months before, arrived 
 also from Stettin, with a convoy of artillery, 
 which it escorted. This was sufficient, while 
 
 rare in our days, because that of Dantzig had the signal 
 honour to be covered by Napoleon at the head of 200,008 
 men, because, finally, it is the imtispensable episode 
 which connects the winter campaign wilh the summet 
 campaign in the glorious war in Poland.
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1807. 
 
 expecting the other regiments announced, for 
 commencing the operations, and for setting an 
 example for the auxiliary troops. 
 
 Without being versed in that fine science 
 which immortalized Vauban, every one knows 
 with what precaution fortresses must be ap- 
 proached. You must burrow under ground, 
 open trenches, throw up the rubbish proceed- 
 ing from those trenches on the side next to the 
 enemy, and advance under the fire of the heavy 
 artillery. In this manner you produce lines 
 which are called parallels, because they are 
 parallel to the front which you are attacking. 
 These are then armed with batteries, for reply- 
 ing to the fire of the besieged. Having traced 
 the first parallel, you approach, working under 
 ground, by zigzags, to the distance at which 
 you intend to form the second parallel, which 
 you arm with batteries like the first. You 
 arrive successively at the third, from which 
 you leap upon the border of the ditch, which 
 is called the covered way. You then descend 
 into that ditch with fresh precautions, break 
 down with breaching batteries the walls, called 
 scarps, fill the ditch with their rubbish, and 
 lastly mount upon that rubbish to the assault. 
 Sorties of the enemy to disturb these difficult 
 operations, combats of heavy artillery, mines 
 which blow into the air besiegers and besieged, 
 add animated, and frequently terrible, scenes 
 to this subterranean warfare, in which science 
 vies with heroism for attacking or defending 
 large cities, whose wealth, geographical situ- 
 ation, or military strength, render them worthy 
 of such efforts. 
 
 To such complicated means, one is obliged 
 to resort, when a fortress cannot be taken by 
 surprise. This was the case here, for the 
 causes already assigned; and, in the night be- 
 tween the 1st and 2d of April, the trenches 
 were opened facing the Hagelsberg, which was 
 the point of attack fixed upon. Our troops had 
 taken a position on the Zigankenberg. They 
 sought, as usual, to conceal this first opera- 
 tion from the enemy, and by daybreak our 
 soldiers were covered by an epaulement of 
 earth for an extent of two hundred fathoms. 
 The besieged kept up a very brisk fire upon 
 them, but could not prevent them from com- 
 pleting the work in the course of the day. In 
 the night between the 2d and 3d of April, they 
 got beyond the first parallel by the transverse 
 trenches, called zigzags, and thus gained 
 ground. While part of our men were thus 
 employed, an attempt was made to carry a 
 work that was soon to annoy our operations. 
 
 This was the redoubt known by the name of 
 Kalk-Schanze, situated on our left on the very 
 margin of the Vistula, and consequently on the 
 low ground through which the river runs. 
 Though lower than the point which we were 
 crowning with our works, it enfiladed our 
 trenches a sufficient motive for striving to get 
 rid of it. Soldiers of the legion of the north, 
 daring fellows, as we have said, but not very 
 uteady, threw themselves boldly into the work, 
 and made themselves masters of ii. During the 
 same night, the enemy made a sortie upon our 
 first trenches and upon the redoubt which had ; 
 just been taken. He was at first repulsed, but 
 retook the redoubt, and drove out the soldiers 
 
 of the legion of the north and the Baden men. 
 No sooner was he established there, than he 
 filled the ditches with the water of the Vistula, 
 surrounded the scarps of earth with strong 
 palisades, and rendered himself almost im- 
 pregnable there. 
 
 We were therefore obliged to continue our 
 works, notwithstanding the proximity of so 
 incommodious a neighbour, against whom it 
 became necessary for us to protect ourselves 
 by traverses, a sort of epaulements of earth, 
 opposed to the flank fire, which circumstance, 
 occasioning an increase of labour, was likely 
 to prolong the operations of the siege. 
 
 During the following nights and days, from 
 the 4th to the 7th of April, the works of ap- 
 proach were prosecuted under the fire of the 
 place, to which we could not reply, our heavy 
 artillery not having yet arrived. We had only 
 field artillery, placed in some redoubts, to play 
 upon the enemy in case of sortie. The works 
 were attended with more difficulties than occur 
 in most regular sieges. The soil in which 
 they were carried on, consisted of a fine, loose, 
 incompact sand, which sunk down when struck 
 by balls, and which the wind, that had become 
 violent on the approach of the equinox, drove 
 into the faces of our men. The weather was 
 bad, alternately snowy and rainy. Lastly, we 
 had no staunch labourers but the French, and 
 these were not numerous, and worn out with 
 fatigue. 
 
 In the night between the 7th and 8th, a pa- 
 rallel was opened against the Bischoffsbers:, 
 with the twofold intention of diverting the 
 enemy by a false attack, and establishing bat- 
 teries which should take the Hagelsberg from 
 behind, and could even fire upon the city. 
 
 In the following days the works, as well for 
 the real as for the false attack, were continued. 
 The besieged, on their part, had undertaken 
 works of counter-approach, with a view to 
 gain possession of a hillock which would give 
 them the command of our trenches. In the 
 night between the 10th and llth, General 
 Chasseloup, who had returned to the camp, 
 made the necessary dispositions for destroying 
 the works directed against ours. At ten o'clock 
 at night, four companies of the 44th of the 
 line, with 120 soldiers of the legion of the 
 north, commanded by Rogniat, chef de bataillon, 
 crossed a kind of ravine, which separated the 
 left of our first parallel from the position occu- 
 pied by the Prussians, fell upon them, over- 
 turned them, took thirteen, and obliged the 
 others to scamper off, throwing away their 
 muskets. The soldiers of the legion of the 
 north were immediately set to work to fill with 
 the shovel the trenches begun by the besieged. 
 Now this destruction of the enemy's works 
 took place within forty fathoms of the fortress, 
 and under a murderous fire of grape and ball. 
 Our labourers of the legion of the north, hav- 
 ing withstood it for some time, at length ran 
 away one after another, so that the Prussians 
 could return to the abandoned work before it 
 was completely destroyed. At one in the 
 morning, General Chasseloup and Marshal 
 Lefebvre, having perceived the return of the 
 enemy, resolved to drive him out again. Four 
 hundred men of the 14th, sent against the
 
 April, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 289 
 
 work, found there a strong detachment of Prus- 
 sian grenadiers, attacked them with the bayo- 
 net, killed or wounded about fifty, and took 
 about the same number, with a considerable 
 quantity of muskets and tools. A company 
 of Saxons remained till daylight to fill the 
 trenches of the besieged, but when it was 
 light, though seconded by our tirailleurs, they 
 could hold out no longer against the fire of 
 the place, and were obliged to retire. 
 
 The Prussians reoccupied the work in the 
 course of the 12th, and threw up in the utmost 
 hasle a sort of palisaded redoubt on the hil- ' 
 lock to which they attached so much value. ' 
 It was not possible to leave them thus quietly 
 settled on the left of our trenches. It was de- 
 cided that in the following night this position 
 should be taken from them for the third time, 
 and that no time should be lost in connecting 
 it with the second parallel which had that day 
 been opened. At nine in the evening of the 
 12th, Rogniat, chef de bataillon, and General 
 Puthod, at the head of 300 Saxon Bevilacqua 
 grenadiers, a company of carbineers of the 
 legion of the north, and a company of grena- 
 diers of the 44th, commanded by the chef de 
 batnillon, Jacquemard, resolutely attacked the 
 work. The enemy made a vigorous resistance. 
 Covered by the palisades, he kept up such a 
 fire of musketry as for a moment staggered 
 our troops. But the grenadiers of the 44th 
 marched right up to the palisades, while the 
 Saxon Bevilacqua grenadiers, led by a brave 
 drummer, finding a way that turned the work 
 on the left, got into it and decided the success. 
 We remained masters of the redoubt, and 
 made haste to connect it with the second par- 
 allel. 
 
 On the return of daylight, however, the 
 enemy, resolved to dispute with us to the last 
 a position which would enable him to stop our 
 works, if he could succeed in retaining it, 
 made a sortie in great force, and directed a 
 strong column upon the point so warmly con- 
 tested. All the guns of the place supported 
 his efforts. He fell upon the redoubt in which 
 the Saxons still were, overwhelmed them by 
 numbers, notwithstanding the most courageous 
 resistance on their part, and having recon- 
 quered the work, marched resolutely to our 
 trenches, with the intention to take and to de- 
 stroy them. He had already entered, when 
 Marshal Lefebvre, who, on the first noise of 
 this sally, had speedily collected a battalion of 
 the 44th, fell upon the Prussians, sword in 
 hand, and. amidst a shower of balls, drove 
 them out of the trenches, and followed them 
 with the bayonet to the glacis of the Hagels- 
 berg. Having arrived there, he was obliged 
 to retire under a shower of grape. In this ac- 
 tion the Prussians lost about 300 men. It cost 
 us fifteen officers and about 100 men, Saxons 
 and French. 
 
 From that moment that hillock on the left 
 was relinquished to us by the enemy. It was 
 definitively connected with our trenches, and 
 we then debouched by new traverses beyond 
 the second parallel. The troops worked in 
 like manner at that which had been marked 
 out before the Bischoft'sberg, and the object of 
 which we have already specified. 
 
 VOL. II. 37 
 
 These three days' fighting had greatly re- 
 tarded the operations of the siege, inasmuch 
 as, our trenches being continually threatened, 
 we were obliged to reserve our best troops to 
 guard them. The following days were em- 
 ployed in finishing the second parallel, in en- 
 larging it, and forming places <Parmes, for lodg- 
 ing the troops who were to guard it, in prepar- 
 ing the sites of batteries, while awaiting the 
 arrival of the heavy cannon ; and the same 
 pains were bestowed on the parallel of the 
 false attack undertaken before the Bischoffs- 
 berg. Two regiments had arrived agreeably 
 to the orders of Napoleon, who was extremely 
 attentive to the operations of this great siege. 
 It was, on the one hand, the regiment of the 
 municipal guard of Paris, and, on the other 
 the 12th light, temporarily detached from Thorn 
 and sent to Dantzig. At the same time, Napo- 
 leon had ordered Marshal Mortier, who had 
 just finished the affair of the armistice with 
 the Swedes, to march his troops by way of 
 Stettin to Dantzig; and he was collecting, in 
 the isle of Nogath, the elements of the infan- 
 try reserve which Marshal Lannes was to com- 
 mand. He was therefore in hopes of being 
 soon strongly appuved. 
 
 The besieging army being provided with 
 two new French regiments, it was fitting to 
 complete the investment of the place, and to 
 continue the operations projected on the Vis- 
 tula by bringing General Schramm from the 
 height of Heubude to that of the isle of Holm, 
 which became the more urgent, since the 
 enemy was daily communicating by the fort 
 of Weichselmiinde with the sea, whence he 
 received succours in money and ammunition. 
 In consequence, on the 15th of April, General 
 Gardanne, who had taken the command of the 
 troops placed in the Nehrung, descended the 
 course of the Vistula with those troops and 
 some reinforcements which had been sent him, 
 and went and established himself along the 
 canal of Laaken, between Dantzig and the fort 
 of Weichselmunde, at the distance of 700 fa- 
 thoms from the glacis of that fort. He was 
 posted in such a manner as to intercept the 
 navigation of the canal, and subsequeutly that 
 of the Vistula itself, when the troops at the 
 head-quarters should come and join their fires 
 with his by descending on their left to the 
 bank of the river, which was not at first much 
 opposed, unless by the redoubts on the isle of 
 Holm ; but Marshal Kalkreuth, having soon 
 ! perceived the importance of the enterprise, re- 
 1 solved to make the greatest efforts to maintain 
 ! his communications with the sea. On the 
 | 16th of April, three thousand .Russians and 
 two thousand Prussians sallied simultane- 
 ously, the first from the fort of Weichsel- 
 ! munde, the second from Dantzig, to attack our 
 ' troops, who had not had time to establish 
 i themselves solidly in the Nehrung and at the 
 ' mouth of the canal. An extremely sharp ac- 
 i tion took place near Weichselmunde with the 
 Russians, and luckily just before the Prus 
 sians had debouched from Dantzig. They 
 were driven back to the glacis of the fort, after 
 sustaining considerable loss. No sooner had 
 our troops finished with them than they were 
 obliged to begin again with the Prussians, but 
 2 B
 
 290 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1807. 
 
 that affair was neither difficult nor long, for I 
 for our auxiliaries, having the 2d light at their 
 head, behaved gallantly. The enemy lost in 
 the whole five or six hundred men, killed 
 or prisoners. We lost about two hundred. 
 
 After this action, our establishment on the 
 Lower Vistula and in the Nehrung appeared 
 safe. Pains were, nevertheless, taken to conso- 
 lidate it. A double epaulement of earth was 
 thrown up to protect it at once against the fort 
 and against Dantzig, and it was extended far 
 enough for it to join the river on one side, and 
 on the other the woods which cover this part 
 of the Nehrung. Vast abattis rendered these 
 woods almost inaccessible. A strong block- 
 house was placed in the centre of our intrench- 
 ments. To these precautions was added a 
 guard of sloops on the canal and the river, for 
 preventing the enemy's craft from ascending 
 or descending the Vistula. While these works 
 were going forward on the right bank, the 
 troops from the head-quarters on the left bank, 
 descending from the heights to the margin of 
 the Vistula, had thrown up redoubts there, in 
 order to cross their fires with those of the 
 troops established in the Nehrung. They se- 
 cured themselves on this side by a gabion 
 work two hundred fathoms in length. A brave 
 officer, named Tardiville, having quartered 
 himself with about a hundred men, in a house 
 on the bank of the Vistula, maintained him- 
 self there, in spite of the enemy's projectiles, 
 with such obstinacy that this house was named 
 after him while the siege lasted. The isle of 
 Holm was still left to be conquered before 
 the investment was complete and definitive. 
 Still, however, it was not without difficulty 
 that the enemy's vessels got up to Dantzig. Se- 
 veral barks, indeed, had been taken, and a 
 cutter, having attempted to ascend the Vistula, 
 had been stopped by the fire from the two 
 shores. The soldiers, led by an officer of en- 
 gineers named Lesecq, had leaped from the 
 top of the intrenchments, placed themselves 
 uncovered, on the bank of the river, and over- 
 whelming the enemy's vessel with their mus- 
 ketry, had obliged her to sheer off. Captain 
 Lesecq had his sword carried away by a shot, 
 without sustaining any injury himself. 
 
 It was on the 20th of April. The French 
 had been six weeks before the place, and it 
 was twenty days since the trenches were 
 opened. The heavy artillery had just arrived, 
 part from Breslau, part from Stettin, part from 
 Thorn and Warsaw. Nothing ran short but 
 ammunition. Still there was sufficient for open- 
 ing the fire of the batteries of the first and 
 second parallel. Every arrangement had been 
 made for commencing on the 20th, when a 
 tremendous equinoctial tempest, bringing a 
 heavy fall of snow along with it, filled the 
 trenches and interrupted the operations in 
 them. It took two days to clear them out, and 
 our soldiers, bivouacking in the open air in 
 that rude climate, rendered still more rude by 
 the lateness of winter, suffered very severely. 
 At length in the night of the 23d, fifty-eight 
 pieces, mortars, howitzers, twenty-four and 
 twelve-pounders, fired at once, and continued 
 to batter the place the whole of the 24th. The 
 enemy's artillery, which had reserved its 
 
 means to oppose ours, replied briskly and with 
 tolerable precision. But, after some hours of 
 this fight with great guns, directed with supe- 
 rior skill by General Lariboissiere, a great 
 number of the enemy's embrasures were de- 
 molished, many of his pieces dismounted, and 
 a fierce conflagration, kindled by the shells 
 thrown in the false attack, raged in the inte- 
 rior of the city. Columns of smoke were seen 
 rising above the highest edifices, melancholy 
 evidences of the ravages which we had caused. 
 Marshal Kalkreuth, nevertheless, succeeded 
 in extinguishing the fire by means of the 
 abundance of water with which the city was 
 provided. He appeared to be unshaken. Next 
 day, the 25th, Marshal Lefebvre, to sound his 
 disposition, sent him word that he was going 
 to fire red-hot balls. He made no reply. The 
 fire of all our pieces then recommenced with 
 still greater energy, and occasioned a new con- 
 flagration, which was again extinguished by 
 the united efforts of the garrison and the in- 
 habitants. The violent fire of our artillery, 
 drawing upon it the enemy's projectiles, had 
 produced a diversion serviceable to our works, 
 which, having become more easy, advanced 
 more rapidly. Thanks to the ardour of the 
 engineer troops, digging out the sand amidst 
 balls which demolished the head of the shafts, 
 and carried away gabions and sand-bags, the 
 zigzags were carried to the third parallel, 
 opened at length in the night between the 25th 
 and 26th, by flying sap. 
 
 In the night between the 26th and 27th, great 
 part of that parallel was traced, still by favour 
 of the combat of the two artilleries. Unluckily, 
 we had not a sufficient quantity of pieces or of 
 ammunition. We fired scarcely two thousand 
 shot a day, while the enemy fired three thou- 
 sand. We had many iron guns which burst 
 in the hands of our artillerymen, and did as 
 much mischief as the enemy's projectiles. 
 Our soldiers, however, made amends for infe- 
 riority of number by accuracy of aim. On the 
 27th, the enemy resolved to resume the offen- 
 sive by means of sorties. Taking advantage 
 of the works of the third parallel being yet 
 unfinished, he resolved to destroy them, and 
 suddenly suspended his fire about seven o'clock 
 in the evening. This circumstance led to the 
 presumption of an enterprise on the part of 
 the besieged. Companies of the 12th light, 
 recently arrived, were placed on the right and 
 left, behind the epaulements, which concealed 
 them. Six hundred Prussian grenadiers, fol- 
 lowed by two hundred labourers, advanced 
 upon the parallel, still imperfect and of easy 
 access. A sentinel, lying on the ground upon 
 his belly, having perceived them, retired to let 
 them enter. The companies of the 12th light 
 then rushed suddenly upon them, attacked 
 them with the bayonet in the ditch, and fought 
 them hand to hand. The combat, was san- 
 guinary, but they were driven out, leaving 120 
 killed or wounded on the spot. A certain 
 number were taken, and the rest driven at the 
 point of the bayonet to the glacis of the place. 
 
 Marshal Kalkreuth solicited a suspension of 
 arms, for the purpose of taking away the dead 
 and wounded. With the advice of the direc- 
 tors of the artillery and engineers, who wished
 
 April, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 291 
 
 for this suspension >f arms, in order to make 
 some reconnoissances, it was granted by Mar- 
 shal Lefebvre. Generals Lariboissiere and 
 Chasseloup hastened immediately under the 
 walls of the place, to seek positions whence 
 the works of the besieged might be more 
 effectually battered. These reconnoissances 
 being finished, they fell to work again, and set 
 about establishing new batteries at the points 
 which they had chosen, taking care to connect 
 them by branches with our trenches. 
 
 In the night between the 28th and 29th, the 
 enemy attempted another sortie with a column 
 of 2000 men, divided into three detachments. 
 He marched as he had done two days before 
 on our third parallel, the works of which he 
 seemed desirous to interrupt at any rate. As 
 soon as the first detachment appeared, two 
 companies of the 19th of the line fell upon it 
 with the bayonet, and pushed it to the glacis 
 of the Hagelsberg, but, received there with a 
 very brisk fire from the covered way, and en- 
 veloped by the second detachment, which they 
 had not perceived, they lost about forty men. 
 They were, nevertheless, timely succoured and 
 extricated. The enemy, driven back, left us 
 seventy killed and 130 prisoners. 
 
 These violent efforts directed against our 
 third parallel did not prevent us from complet- 
 ing its works, lengthening it on the right and 
 left, and arming it with batteries. New con- 
 voys, recently arrived, had permitted eighty 
 pieces of large calibre to be placed in battery. 
 From that moment the fire of the artillery re- 
 doubled, and we debouched at length from the 
 third parallel on two sides, in order to get upon 
 the salients of the Hagelsberg. This work 
 was composed of two bastions, between which 
 there was a half-moon. The French proceeded 
 towards the salient of the left bastion and to- 
 wards the salient of the half-moon. The works 
 of approach then became extremely destruc- 
 tive. The enemy, who had saved the greatest 
 resources of his artillery for the conclusion 
 of the siege, directed the best part of it against 
 our works. Our soldiers of the engineers saw 
 their shafts destroyed, and the loose sand which 
 they had thrown out dashed back into the 
 trenches by the shock of the numerous pro- 
 jectiles. Their firmness in labouring on amidst 
 all these dangers was unconquerable. Our 
 infantry, on their part, had to endure excessive j 
 fatigue ; for the nearer we approached the j 
 place, the more necessary it became to com- ' 
 mit the guard of the trenches to tried soldiers. 
 Out of forty-eight hours, they passed twenty- ' 
 four either in working or in protecting those ' 
 who were at work. We advanced, therefore, ' 
 at that moment very slowly. Marshal Le- ' 
 febvre, who began to lose patience, found fault ; 
 with everybody, with the engineers, whose 
 combinations he did not comprehend, with the 
 artillery, whose efforts he did not appreciate, 
 and particularly with the auxiliaries, who did 
 him much less service than the French. The 
 Saxons fought well, but showed little willing- 
 ness, especially for labour. The Baden sol- 
 diers were not good for work or fight. The 
 Poles of the new levy had zeal but no habit 
 of war. The soldiers of the legion of the north, 
 very prompt in attack, dispersed on the slightest 
 
 resistance. As all these auxiliaries were in- 
 clined to desertion, care was taken to supply 
 them from the magazines of the head-quarters, 
 that they might not have to run about in the 
 neighbouring villages ; so that it was neces- 
 sary to provide them with better fare than the 
 French, though they were far from doing such 
 good service. Marshal Lefebvre spoke of 
 them in the most abusive terms, saying inces- 
 santly that they could do nothing but eat, called 
 all the arguments of the engineers gibberish, 
 declaring that he would do more than they 
 with the breasts of his grenadiers, and abso- 
 lutely insisting on putting an end to tie siege 
 by means of a general assault 
 
 The design was rash, for we were still at a 
 distance from the works of the place, and, if 
 we were to leap into the ditch, we should meet 
 with those formidable palisades, which at Dant- 
 zig served instead of scarps of masonry. The 
 engineers, as it is usual in sieges, could not 
 agree with the artillery. They accounted for 
 the slowness of their progress by the loose na- 
 ture of the soil, by the insufficient protection 
 which they received from the artillery, by the 
 too small number of good labourers. The 
 artillery replied that it had too few guns, too 
 little ammunition, to equal the fire of the 
 enemy, and that it could do no better. In con- 
 sequence, the marshal, to settle all differences, 
 proposed to put an end to the business by an 
 assault, even before the works of approach 
 were finished. The engineers, who lost many 
 men, replied that, if the artillery would by a. 
 ricochet battery throw down one length of the 
 palisades, they would cheerfully lead our in- 
 fantry to the assault of the Hagelsberg. As, 
 however, the Russians had in 1724, lost 5000 
 men before Dantzig, in an enterprise of this 
 kind, undertaken from impatience, they durst 
 not risk so rash a proceeding without submit- 
 ting the matter to the Emperor. 
 
 Luckily, he was about thirty leagues off, and 
 they could have his answer in forty-eight 
 hours. He would even have gone himself to 
 give it in person, if the presence of the King 
 of Prussia and of the Emperor of Russia at 
 the head-quarters of Bartenstein had not made 
 him apprehensive of some enterprise on their 
 part against his winter quarters. As soon as 
 he had received Marshal Lefebvre's letter, he 
 lost no time in moderating the ardour of the 
 old soldier by addressing to him a strong repri- 
 mand. He reproved him severely for his im- 
 patience, his contempt for science, which he 
 did not possess, his bad language respecting 
 the auxiliaries. "You can do nothing," said 
 he, " but find fault, abuse our allies, and change 
 your opinion at the pleasure of the first comer. 
 You wanted troops; I sent you them; I am 
 preparing more for you, and you, like an ingratt, 
 continue to complain without thinking even 
 of thanking me. You treat our allies, espe- 
 cially the Poles and the Baden troops, without 
 any delicacy. They are not used to fire, but 
 they will get accustomed to it. I)o you ima- 
 gine that we were as brave in '92 as we are 
 now, after fifteen years of war! Have some 
 indulgence, then, old soldier as you are, for the 
 young soldiers, who are starting in the career, 
 and have not yet your coolness amidst danger.
 
 292 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1807. 
 
 The Prince of Baden, whom you have with 
 yon, [that prince had put himself at the head 
 of the Badeners, and was present at the siege 
 of Dantzig,] has chosen to leave the pleasures 
 of the court for the purpose of leading his 
 troops into fire. Pay him respect, and give 
 him credit for a zeal which his equals rarely 
 imitate. The breasts of your grenadiers, which 
 you are for bringing in everywhere, will not 
 throw down walls. Yon must allow your en- 
 gineers to act, and listen to the advice of 
 General Chasseloup, who is a man of science, 
 and from whom you ought not to take your 
 confidence at the suggestion of the first petty 
 caviller pretending to judge of what he is inca- 
 pable of comprehending/ Reserve' the courage 
 of your grenadiers for the moment when sci- 
 ence shall teh you that it may be usefully em- 
 ployed, and in the mean time learn patience. 
 It is not worth while, for the sake of a few 
 days, which, besides, I know not how to em- 
 ploy just now, to get some thousand men killed, 
 whose lives it is possible to spare. Show the 
 calmness, the consistency, the steadiness,which 
 befit your age. Your glory is in the taking of 
 Dantzig; take that place, and you shall be 
 satisfied with me." 
 
 Nothing more was needed to pacify the mar- 
 shal. He was content, therefore, to allow the 
 operations of the siege to be continued accord- 
 ing to all the rules of the art. Though the camp 
 of the Nehrung had been removed to the 
 Lower Vistula, and the passage of the canal 
 and the river barred, the investment could not 
 be rendered complete without the reduction of 
 the isle of Holm, and it was only by the reduc- 
 tion of that island, too, that it was possible to 
 nullify a number of redoubts, the Kalk-Schanze 
 in particular, which took our trenches at the 
 back, annoyed them by its fire, and retarded 
 our progress, on account of the cross-trenches 
 which it was necessary to add to our works. 
 Though we had not all the troops that we might 
 have desired for pushing the siege briskly, still 
 we had sufficient for making an attempt on the 
 isle of Holm. The night between the 6th and 
 7th of May was devoted to this enterprise. 
 Orders were given to General Gardanne to 
 concur in it on his part, by proceeding to the 
 canal of Laaken and endeavouring to pass it 
 on rafts. Eight hundred men, descending from 
 the left of the head-quarters to the bank of the 
 Vistula, were to cross that river at twice and 
 to make the principal attack. At ten o'clock 
 at night, twelve barks were brought opposite 
 to the village of Schellnmhl, unperceived by 
 the enemy. At one in the morning, these 
 barks, carrying detachments of the regiment 
 of the Paris guard, of the 2d and 12th light, 
 and fifty soldiers of the engineers, started from 
 .he left bank, and reached the isle of Holm. 
 The enemy directed a few rounds of grape at 
 the craft. Our troops leaped ashore in spite 
 of the fire. The grenadiers of the Paris guard 
 ran to the nearest redoubt without firing a 
 shot, a#d took it from the Russians who de- 
 r ended it. At the same instant, 100 men of the 
 55d light and 100 men of the 12th, likewise ran 
 to two other redoubts, the one constructed at 
 ihe point of the island, the other at a building 
 trailed he White House. They received a first 
 
 discharge, but marched so fast that in a few 
 minutes the redoubts were carried and the 
 Russians taken. Our troops fell with the same 
 rapidity upon the other works, and in half an 
 hour had made themselves masters of half the 
 island and taken 500 prisoners; While this 
 operation was so promptly executed, the barks 
 employed in the passage of the Vistula brought 
 a second column, composed of Baden troops 
 and soldiers of the legion of the north, which 
 turned to the right, and proceeded towards that 
 part of the island which faces the city of Dant- 
 zig. These troops, inspirited by the example 
 which the French had just set them, threw 
 themselves boldly upon the enemy's posts, sur- 
 prised and disarmed them, and took in an in- 
 stant 200 men and 200 artillery horses. Gene- 
 ral Gardanne had on his part crossed the canal 
 of Laaken and landed in the island. This im- 
 portant conquest was thus fully secured. 
 
 This was a favourable occasion for an at- 
 tempt to gain possession of the Kalk-Schanze, 
 that annoying redoubt which had been taken 
 and lost at the commencement of the siege. 
 This redoubt, surrounded by water, and open 
 at the gorge on the side nearest to the isle of 
 Holm, owed its principal strength to the sup- 
 port which it received from that island. At 
 the very moment when our two columns were 
 reducing the isle of Holm, a detachment of 
 Saxons and soldiers of the legion of ihe north, 
 led by the chef de bataillon Roumette, entered 
 the ditches of the redoubt, with the water up 
 to their arm-pits, threw itself upon the pali- 
 sades, cleared them, and, in spite of a brisk 
 fire of musketry, remained masters of the 
 work, in which were taken 180 Prussians, four 
 officers, and several pieces of cannon. 
 
 This series of coups-de-main, which gave us 
 600 prisoners and 17 pieces of cannon, and 
 cost the enemy 600 killed or wounded, gained 
 us above all the possession of the isle of Holm, 
 which completed the investment of Dantzig, 
 and put an end to the fire so mischievous to 
 our trenches. Owing to the rapidity of th 
 execution, our loss had been very trifling. 
 
 Our works of approach had reached the sa- 
 lient of the half-moon. A circular trench, 
 embracing that salient and turning it both on 
 the right and left, had been opened. The mo- 
 ment for the assault of the covered way had ar- 
 rived. That name is given to the inner side 
 of the ditch along which the besieged move 
 about and defend themselves, under shelter 
 of a range of small palisades. In the night 
 between the 7th and 8th, a detachment of the 
 19th of the line and of the 12th light, preceded 
 by about fifty men of the engineers, armed 
 with hatchets and shovels, under the direction 
 of Barthelemy and Beaulieu, officers of engi- 
 neers, and Berlrand, chef de bataillon of infan- 
 try, debouched from the two extremities of the 
 circular trench, and advanced briskly along 
 the covered way. This detachmeni was 
 greeted with a shower of balls. The soldiers 
 of the engineers, marching at the head, fell 
 upon the palisades with their hatchets, and 
 cut down some of them. Our foot-soldiers, 
 pushing on after them in the covered way, 
 traversed it amidst the grape poured down 
 from the walls of the place. They then pn>
 
 May, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 ceeded to the strong blockhouses which had 
 been constructed in the re-entering angles of 
 the enclosure ; but they found themselves ex- 
 posed to so brisk a fire of musketry that they 
 were obliged to return to the salient of the 
 half-moon. The covered way, nevertheless, 
 remained in their possession. The miners 
 had meanwhile run about everywhere to satisfy 
 themselves that no mines had been com- 
 menced, and, as usual, disposed in such a 
 manner as to blow up the ground conquered 
 by the besiegers. A sergeant of engineers ac- 
 tually discovered the shaft of a mine in the sa- 
 lient of the half-moon. He leaped in, sword 
 in hand, found twelve Prussians at work upon 
 the branches of the mine, and, taking advan- 
 tage of th^ fright produced by his sudden ap- 
 pearance, made all of them prisoners. He then 
 overturned the whole work. The name of 
 this brave man, which is worthy of being pre- 
 served, was Chopot. 
 
 The assault of the covered way, always one 
 of the most sanguinary operations of a regu- 
 lar siege, cost us 17 killed and 76 wounded 
 a rather large loss considering the small num- 
 ber of men employed on so contracted a space. 
 Masters of the covered way of the half-moon, 
 we were established on the margin of the 
 ditch. It would be necessary to descend into 
 it, then to overthrow the range of strong pali- 
 sades which occupied the bottom of it, next to 
 carry by assault the turfed slopes which sup- 
 plied the place of scarps of masonry. These 
 were not easy undertakings. It was requisite, 
 moreover, to execute at the salient of the left 
 bastion the same operation that we had just 
 executed at the salient of the half-moon, that 
 we might not be taken in flank by the guns 
 of that bastion, when we should attack the 
 half-moon itself. 
 
 We established ourselves, then, on the ditch, 
 covering ourselves there with the usual pre- 
 cautions, and continued to proceed towards 
 the left, in order to approach the salient of the 
 bastion. The 8th, 9th, 10th, llth, 12th, and 
 13th of May were employed in this work, 
 which had become extremely dangerous, for 
 at this short distance the enemy's balls over- 
 turned the saps, penetrated into the trenches, 
 swept oft" the men, and frequently caused the 
 epaulements which they had laboriously raised, 
 to fall down upon them. The effect of the 
 musketry at that distance was not less terrible 
 than that of the artillery. The sand which 
 the soldiers threw out sunk down every mo- 
 ment, and they were obliged to begin the same 
 works several times over. Lastly, the nights, 
 having become very short in May for every- 
 body knows that the nearer you approach to 
 the pole, the longer the nights are in winter, 
 the shorter in summer left us scarcely four 
 hours to work out of the twenty-four. Mar- 
 shal Lefebvre, growing more and more impa- 
 tient, was incessantly asking when they would 
 render the assault practicable, by throwing 
 down the line of palisades which fenced the 
 bottom of the ditch. The engineers told him 
 that it was the province of the artillery to de- 
 stroy it by ricochet shot. The artillery, ap- 
 prehensive that the ground was undermined, 
 replied that there was not room for its batte- 
 
 ries. The difficulty which we met with here 
 was a proof of the defensive properties ol 
 wood : for if, on reaching the edge of the ditch, 
 we had a wall of masonry facing us instead 
 of a line of palisades, we should have esta- 
 blished a breaching battery, demolished that 
 wall in forty-eight hours, filled the ditch with 
 the rubbish, and mounted to the assault. But 
 the balls broke off" the heads of some of the 
 palisades, in many cases scarcely splintered 
 them, and knocked down none. The decisive 
 moment approached : impatience was extreme. 
 It was almost that moment of a siege when 
 the besieged make the last efforts of resist- 
 ance, and when the besiegers, to put an end 
 to the matter, are disposed to hazard the most 
 daring attempts. 
 
 But all at once a rumour was circulated 
 among the besieged as well as besiegers, that 
 a Russian army was coming to the relief of 
 Dantzig. That relief, indeed, had been long 
 promised, and there was reason to be asto- 
 nished that it had not yet arrived. The sove- 
 reigns of Russia and Prussia, who were then 
 together at their head-quarters, knew in what 
 danger Dantzig was. They were well aware 
 how important it was for them to prevent its 
 fall, for, while they retained that place, they 
 held Napoleon's left in check, they rendered 
 his establishment on the Vistula precarious, 
 they obliged him to deprive himself of 25,000 
 men employed either in a blockade or a siege; 
 lastly, they closed against him (he most exten- 
 sive mart for supplies that existed in the north. 
 If they were sooner or later to resume the of- 
 fensive, it was worth while to make haste on 
 account of so important a motive. For reliev- 
 ing Dantzig they had two direct courses : either 
 to attack Napoleon on the Passarge, in order 
 to take from him the positions under shelter 
 of which he covered the siege ; or to send a 
 considerable corps, either by land, following 
 the Nehrung, or by sea, embarking their troops 
 at Kiinigsberg, and landing them at the fort of 
 Weichselmiinde. There was, it is true, a third 
 course, but not dependent on themselves, 
 namely, a landing of 25,000 English, a hun- 
 dred times promised, a hundred times an- 
 nounced, never executed. It is certain that, 
 if the English had kept their word to their 
 allies, and if, instead of retaining part of their 
 forces in England, as a check upon the camp 
 of Boulogne, sending another to Alexandria to 
 lay hands on Egypt, and a third to the banks 
 of La Plata, to possess itself of the Spanish 
 colonies, they had thrown an army either into 
 Stralsund or into Dantzig, when we had scarcely 
 three or four French regiments dispersed in 
 Pomerania, they might have changed the course 
 of events, or at least have caused us great em- 
 barrassment. Napoleon, in fact, would have 
 been forced to detach 20,000 men from the 
 grand army, and, if he had been attacked at 
 the same moment on the Passarge, he wou 1 ^ 
 have been deprived of a considerable portion 
 of his forces for making head against the prin- 
 cipal Russian army. 
 
 But the English had no intention of coming 
 
 to the assistance of their allies. It was too 
 
 frightful a thing for them to set foot on the 
 
 continent. It suited them better to employ 
 
 2 B 3
 
 294 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1807. 
 
 iheir troops in taking colonies. Besides, a 
 change of ministry, to the causes and the ef- 
 fects of which we shall presently advert, ren- 
 dered all resolutions in London uncertain. 
 The only succour sent to Dantzig was that of 
 three cutters, laden with ammunition, and 
 commanded by intrepid officers, who had 
 orders to ascend the Vistula and penetrate to 
 the place at any rate. 
 
 Thus it was from Prussian and Russian 
 troops alone that any efficacious succour could 
 be expected for Dantzig. The two sovereigns, 
 having met at Bartenstein, deliberated on the 
 subject with their generals, and had the greatest 
 difficulty to agree. One reason, the want of 
 provisions, opposed a plan which would have 
 been most suitable, and consisted in resuming 
 active operations immediately. The ground 
 was not yet sufficiently fecundated by the sun 
 to furnish food for men and horses. The allies 
 had few magazines, they could at most supply 
 the men with corn and butcher's meat, and as 
 for the horses, they had nothing to give them 
 but the straw which thatched the cottages of 
 the peasants in Old Prussia. They thought, 
 therefore, of waiting till the grass was high 
 enough to feed the horses. It was the same 
 reason that detained Napoleon on the Pas- 
 sarge. But he had no important fortress to 
 save; every day, on the contrary, brought him 
 strength, and enabled him to take a fresh step 
 towards the walls of Dantzig. 
 
 In this situation, the two allied sovereigns 
 resorted to the means of the most slender suc- 
 cour, and resolved to send about ten thousand 
 men, half by the tongue of land called the 
 Nehrung, half by sea and the fort of Weich- 
 selmunde. The plan was to force the line of 
 investment, to take the French camp on the 
 Nehrung, by debouching upon that camp either 
 from the fort of Weicbselmiinde, or from the 
 Nehrung itself by the Konigsberg road, then 
 to penetrate into the isle of Holm, to re-esta- 
 blish the communications with Dantzig, to 
 enter the place, and, if all these operations 
 should prove successful, to make a general 
 sortie against the besieging corps, for the pur- 
 pose of destroying its works and obliging it to 
 raise the siege. It would have required for 
 this much more than ten thousand men, and 
 above all, that they should have had able com- 
 manders. 
 
 A Prussian and Russian corps composed in 
 great part of cavalry, under the command of 
 Colonel Billow, was to be conveyed in sloops 
 through the pass of Pillau, to land on the point 
 of the Nehrung, and to proceed over that nar- 
 row sand-bank for the twenty leagues that se- 
 parate Pillau from Dantzig. Eight thousand 
 men, mostly Russians, were embarked in trans- 
 ports, at Pillau, and escorted by English ships 
 of war to the fort of Weichselmiinde. They 
 were commanded by General Kamenski, the 
 *on of that old general, who had for a moment 
 commanded the Russian army at the com- 
 mencement of the winter campaign. Arriving 
 on the 12th of May at the mouth of the Vis- 
 tula, they were landed on the outer mole, under 
 the protection of the guns of Weichselmunde. 
 At this same time, demonstrations had taken 
 place against all ou winter quarters. Before 
 
 Massena, a feint had been made of passing the 
 Bug, as if it were the intention to act at the 
 other extremity of the theatre of war. Nume- 
 rous patroles were sent out facing our canton- 
 ments on the Passarge. Lastly, the corps 
 destined to march along the Nehrung moved 
 rapidly towards the detached posts which he 
 had at the extremity of that sand-bank, and 
 obliged them to fall back. 
 
 The assembling at Pillau of two corps, which 
 were to go by different ways to the relief of 
 Dantzig, had been noted. Reports emanating 
 from the besieged fortress had confirmed the 
 news from Pillau, and this was sufficient to 
 throw Marshal Lefebvre into the greatest un- 
 easiness. He had lost no time in recurring to 
 the emperor, in calling to him General Oudi- 
 not, who was in the isle of Nogath, with the 
 division of the grenadiers which was to form 
 part of the corps of reserve destined for Mar- 
 shal Lannes. He had at the same time writ- 
 ten to all quarters, applying for assistance to 
 the commanders of the troops placed in his 
 vicinity. 
 
 But Napoleon, whom twenty-four hours suf- 
 ficed for sending a courier from Finkenstein 
 to Dantzig, had provided beforehand for every 
 thing. He reprimanded Marshal Lefebvre, but 
 mildly, for this manner of acting. He cheered 
 him with the intelligence of speedy succours, 
 which, long prepared, could not fail to arrive 
 in time. Napoleon was under little concern 
 about the puerile demonstrations made on his 
 right, for he could too well distinguish in war 
 between a feint and a real design, for it to be 
 possible to deceive him. He had, moreover, 
 soon learned to a certainty that one large de- 
 tachment only would be despatched for Dant- 
 zig, either by the Nehrung or by sea, and he 
 had proportioned his precautions to the se- 
 riousness of the danger. 
 
 Marshal Mortier, having become entirely 
 disposable by the definite conclusion of the 
 armistice with the Swedes, had received orders 
 to hasten his march, and to send off a portion 
 of his troops before him to Dantzig. In con- 
 sequence of this order, the 72d of the line had 
 arrived at the camp of Marshal Lefebvre, at 
 the moment of his greatest agitation. The re- 
 serve of Marshal Lannes, prepared in the isle 
 of Nogath, began to be formed, and, meanwhile, 
 the fine division of Oudinot's grenadiers, which 
 was the nucleus of it, had been placed between 
 Marienwerder and Dirschau, two or three 
 marches from Dantzig. The 3d of the line, 
 drawn from Brannau, 3400 strong, was also 
 stationed in the isle of Nogath. The resources, 
 therefore, were quite sufficient. Napoleon 
 ordered one of General Oudinot's brigades to 
 proceed to Furstenwerder, to throw a bridge 
 across there, and to hold itself in readiness to 
 pass the arm of the Vistula which separates 
 the isle of Nogath from the Nehrung. The 
 cavalry being dispersed in the pasture-grounds 
 of the Lower Vistula, in the environs of El- 
 bing, he ordered General Beaumont to take a 
 thousand dragoons, to proceed to Furstenwer- 
 der, to allow the enemy's corps coming over 
 the Nehrung to file away, to cut it off when it 
 should have passed Furstenwerder, and make 
 as many prisoners of it as possible. Lastlj,
 
 May, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 he enjoined Marshal Lannes to march with 
 Ondinot's grenadiers to Dantzig, not to fatigue 
 the troops while there by employing them in 
 the labours of the siege, but to keep them in 
 reserve, in order to throw them upon the Rus- 
 sians as soon as they should attempt to land 
 in the environs of Weichselmiinde. 
 
 These dispositions, prescribed in time, 
 thanks to a foresight which did every thing 
 opportunely, brought around Dantzig more 
 troops than were needed to dispel the danger. 
 The Russians had begun to land on the 12th 
 of May. From the sandy heights which we 
 occupied, they were seen distinctly on the 
 moles of the fort of Weichselmiinde. They 
 were not all landed and assembled in advance 
 of Weichselmiinde till the evening of the 14th. 
 Repeated advices sent meanwhile to Marshal 
 Lannes, caused him to accelerate his march, 
 and on the 14th he arrived under the walls of 
 Dantzig, with Oudinot's grenadiers, excepting 
 the two battalions left at Furstenwerder. The 
 72d was already at the camp. Marshal Mor- 
 tier, with the rest of his corps, was one march 
 behind. 
 
 Marshal Lefebvre, made easy by these rein- 
 forcements, had sent the regiments of the 
 municipal guard of Paris to General Gardanne, 
 who commanded the camp of the Lower Vis- 
 tula in the Nehrung, and waited, before he 
 despatched further succours to him, for the 
 design of the Russians to be clearly indicated, 
 for they could debouch from the fort of Weich- 
 selmiinde, or on the right bank, to attack Gene- 
 ral Gardanne's camp, or on the left bank to 
 attack the head-quarters. 
 
 On the 15th of May, at three in the morn- 
 ing, the Russians, to the number of seven or 
 eight thousand, sallied from the fort of Weich- 
 selmiinde, and marched to attack our positions 
 on the Nehrung. These positions commenced 
 at the point of the isle of Holm, the same at 
 which the canal of Laaken joins the Vistula, 
 extended under the form of a palisaded epaule- 
 ment to the wood which covers this part of the 
 Nehrung, were protected in that part by nu- 
 merous abattis, and terminated at the sand- 
 hills along the sea. General Schramm, now 
 under the command of General Gardanne, 
 defended that line with a battalion of the 2d 
 light, a detachment of the regiment of the Pa- 
 ris guard, a Saxon battalion, part of the 19th 
 chasseurs, and some Polish horse under Cap- 
 tain Sokolniki, whom we have already seen 
 distinguishing himself at this siege. General 
 Gardanne kept in rear with the rest of his 
 forces, either to be ready to succour the troops 
 defending the intrenchments, or to oppose a 
 sortie from the place. Marshal Lefebvre, per- 
 ceiving from the heights of the Zigankenberg 
 the movements of the Russians, had sent him 
 in the morning a battalion of the 12th light. 
 Shortly afterwards, Marshal Lannes had set 
 out himself with four battalions of Oudinot's 
 division, and marched upon the dikes which 
 ran through the flat country situated on our 
 right, the engineers not having yet been able 
 to construct a bridge towards our left, to com- 
 municate directly with the camp of the Neh- 
 rung by the Lower Vistula. 
 
 The Russians advanced in three columns 
 
 one directed along the Vistula, facing our re- 
 doubts, the second against the wood and the 
 abattis which defended the approach to it, the 
 hird composed of cavalry, and destined to 
 keep along the sea-shore. A fourth had re- 
 mained in reserve, to assist any of the three 
 that might waver. The English cutters arriv- 
 ing at the same time, were, for their part, to as- 
 cend the Vistula, to destroy the bridges which 
 were supposed to exist, to take our works 
 from behind, and to second the movement of 
 the Russians by the fire of sixty pieces of 
 large calibre. But the wind was not favour- 
 able for the execution of this plan, and the 
 cutters were forced to remain at the mouth of 
 the Vistula. 
 
 The Russian columns marched with vigour 
 to the attack of our positions. Our soldiers, 
 placed behind intrenchments of earth, coolly 
 waited for them, and fired upon them when 
 very close. The Russians were not stag- 
 gered; they approached to the very foot of 
 the redoubts, but could not get into them. 
 On every repulsed attempt, our soldiers leaped 
 from the intrenchments, and pursued the as- 
 sailants with the bayonet. The column, which 
 had proceeded to the abattis, having a less 
 solid obstacle to overcome, endeavoured to pe- 
 netrate into the woods, and to establish itself 
 there. It was stopped, like the first, but it re- 
 turned to the charge, and engaged in a series 
 of hand-to-hand fights with our troops. The 
 conflict, at this point, was long and obstinate. 
 The column of cavalry ordered to march along 
 the shore remained in observation before our 
 detachments of cavalry, without making any 
 serious movement. The action lasted for se- 
 veral hours; and our troops employed in the 
 defence of the works, numbering no more than 
 two thousand men against seven or eight 
 thousand for General Gardanne was obliged, 
 with the rest, to take care of the debouches of 
 the place our troops were exhausted, and 
 must at length have succumbed under these 
 repeated attacks, if a battalion of the Paris 
 guard, sent by General Gardanne, and the bat- 
 talion of the 12th light, which had come from 
 the head-quarters, had not brought them deci- 
 sive succours. These brave battalions, di- 
 rected by General Schramm, fell upon the 
 Russians, and repulsed them. All the troops, 
 animated by this example, rushed upon them, 
 and drove them back to the glacis of the fort 
 of Weichselmiinde. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Kamenski had orders 
 to make the utmost efforts to relieve Dantzig. 
 He would not, therefore, shut himself up in 
 the fort till he had made a last attempt. Join- 
 ing with the troops which had just been fight- 
 ing the reserve which had not yet been en- 
 gaged, he again advanced upon our intrench- 
 ments, so violently, so ineffectually attacked. 
 But it was too late. Marshal Lannes and 
 General Oudinot had broughtGeneral Schramm 
 the reinforcement of four battalions of grena- 
 diers. One of these four battalions was suf- 
 ficient to put an end to the fight. General 
 Oudinot, at the head of this battalion, rallying 
 around him the mass of our troops, then 
 bringing them forward, overturned the Rus- 
 sians, and drove them, with the bayonet at
 
 396 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1807 
 
 their loins, to the glacis of the fort of Weich- 
 selmiinde, where he forced them to shut them- 
 selves up definitively. This action might well 
 be, and it was, the last. 
 
 The Russians left 2000 men on the field of 
 battle, most of them dead or wounded, some 
 prisoners. Our loss was about 300 men hors 
 de combat. General Oudinot had a horse killed 
 by a cannon ball, which, passing between him 
 and Marshal Lannes, missed very little of 
 killing the latter. The moment had not yet 
 arrived when the illustrious marshal was to 
 sink under so many repeated exploits. Fate, 
 before it struck him, still reserved for him 
 some brilliant days. 
 
 Thenceforward, Marshal Lefebvre could not 
 entertain any uneasiness, nor Marshal Kalk- 
 reuth any hope. Meanwhile, the commanders 
 of the cutlers, sent from England to succour 
 Dantzig, were anxious to execute their instruc- 
 tions. The place being chiefly in want of 
 ammunition, the captain of the Dauntless was 
 desirous to take advantage of a stiff breeze 
 from the north to ascend the Vistula. But no 
 sooner had he passed the fort of Weichsel- 
 miinde, and approached our redoubts, than he 
 was assailed by a violent fire of artillery. 
 The troops, leaving the intrenchments, joined 
 the fire of musketry to that of the cannon, and 
 reduced the cutter to such a state that very 
 soon she would not answer the helm, and 
 struck upon a sand-bank, where she was 
 obliged to haul down her colours. She con- 
 tained a great quantity of powder, and de- 
 spatches for Marshal Kalkreuth. 
 
 The place, therefore, was absolutely left to 
 itself. Unfortunately, the operations of the 
 siege became every moment more difficult. 
 The troops were lodged on the margin of the 
 ditch ; they had already attempted to descend 
 into it; but the nature of that soil, falling 
 down incessantly, and the immense quantity 
 of artillery which the enemy had at his dis- 
 posal, and which enabled him to overwhelm 
 our trenches with his bombs, rendered the ope- 
 rations as slow as they were perilous. It was 
 necessary, however, cost what it might, to get 
 to the bottom of the ditch, and proceed, hatchet 
 in hand, to cut an opening in the palisades 
 wide enough to admit our columns of attack. 
 The men began, therefore, to descend into the 
 ditch, making use of the blinded passages 
 that is to say, advancing under a frame-work 
 covered with earth and fascines. Several 
 times the enemy's bombs broke through these 
 blinds, and crushed the men whom they shel- 
 tered. But nothing could daunt our engineer 
 troops. Out of six hundred men of that arm, 
 nearly three hundred had fallen. Half of the 
 officers were either killed or wounded. Among 
 the obstacles that we had to conquer, was 
 the block-house in the re-entering angle which 
 the half-moon formed with the bastion. It 
 was resolved to blow up by mining this work, 
 which withstood even cannon balls. A mine, 
 -vhich had not been carried near enough to 
 ine block-house, exploded, and covered it with 
 earth, but rendered it still more difficult to de- 
 stroj The men then established themselves 
 on the funnel of the mine, cleared, under the 
 enemy's fire, the ground about the block-house, 
 
 which they set on fire, and thus, at last, got rid 
 of it. 
 
 When they had reached the bottom of the 
 ditch, several soldiers of the engineers tried 
 to go under the very fire of the place to cut 
 the palisades. It took them half an hour to 
 destroy three. Thus the operation could not 
 fail to be very long and very sanguinary. It 
 was now the 18th of May, and forty-eight days 
 since the trenches were opened. There was 
 no fault to be found with the engineer corps, 
 which displayed admirable devotedness. Some 
 detractors laid the blame of the slowness of the 
 siege on General Chasseloup. General Kir- 
 gener, who was sub-director of the works, and 
 who had conceived different ideas respecting 
 the choice of the point of attack, was inces- 
 santly repeating to Marshal Lefebvre that the 
 Hagelsberg had been ill chosen, and that this 
 was the only cause of the delays that we had 
 experienced. This he repeated so often, that 
 Marshal Lefebvre at last believed him, and 
 wrote, on the 18th of May, to the Emperor, 
 complaining of General Chasseloup, and attri- 
 buting the long resistance of the place to the 
 wrong choice of the point of attack, alleging 
 that the Bischoffsberg would have presented 
 far fewer difficulties. 
 
 Complaints at this moment would have 
 availed nothing, had they been as well founded 
 as they were the reverse. But Napoleon, who 
 never ceased to watch the siege attentively, did 
 not make the marshal wait long for an answer. 
 "I really conceived," he thus wrote to him, 
 " that you had more character and opinion. Is it 
 at the end of a siege that a man ought to suffer 
 himself to be persuaded by inferiors that the 
 point of attack must be changed, to discourage 
 the army by it, and to discredit your own judg- 
 ment 1 The Hagelsberg is judiciously chosen. 
 It is by the Hagelsberg that Dantzig has al- 
 ways been attacked. Give your confidence to 
 Chasseloup, who is the most skilful, the most 
 experienced, of your engineers ; take his ad- 
 vice alone and that of M. de Lariboissiere, and 
 drive away all petty cavillers." 
 
 Marshal Lefebvre was, therefore, obliged to 
 persist in the first choice, and to wait the slow 
 but sure effects of an art, of which he was 
 wholly ignorant. The troops of the engineers, 
 unsparing of themselves, had got, on one side, 
 to the bottom of the ditch of the half-moon, 
 and on the other, to the bottom of the ditch of 
 the bastion, being forced, on account of the 
 narrow space in which they operated, to work 
 under the bombs, and themselves to defend the 
 works against the sorties of the place. Lastly, 
 facing the left bastion, which was attacked at 
 the same time as the half-moon, they had, 
 sometimes with fires of fascines, sometimes 
 with powder bags, sometimes also with the 
 hatchet, destroyed the palisades for the space 
 of ninety feet. This was sufficient to afford a 
 passage for the columns of assault. That mo- 
 ment was impatiently awaited by the troops. 
 The night of the 21st of May was fixed for the 
 assault. Several columns, to the number of 
 4000 men, were brought into the ditch, led 
 successively to the foot of the slope of earth 
 which rose behind the palisades, that they 
 might previously see the work that was to be
 
 May, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 scaled, and learn how to climb it. Filled with ' 
 ardour at the sight, they demanded with loud | 
 cries permission to rush to the assault. Three i 
 enormous logs, suspended by ropes at the top 
 of the earth slopes, were ready to roll down i 
 upon the assailants. A brave soldier, whose 
 name history ought to record, Franpois Valle, 
 a chasseur of the 12th light, who several times 
 assisted the working engineers to demolish the 
 palisades, offered to go and cut the ropes which i 
 supported these logs, and thus effect their fall 
 before the assault. Seizing a hatchet, he 
 climbed the turfed scarps, cut the ropes, and it 
 was not till he was just finishing that he was 
 struck by a ball-; but, we may add, the wound 
 was not mortal. 
 
 At length the hour of the assault drew near, 
 when, all at once, the troops learned to their 
 great regret that Marshal Kalkreuth had de- 
 sired to capitulate. 
 
 Colonel Lacoste, in fact, had gone with a 
 flag of truce to deliver to Marshal Kalkreuth 
 the letters addressed to him which had been 
 found on board the English cutter recently 
 taken. He arrived very opportunely to afford 
 Frederick's lieutenant an honourable opportu- 
 nity for proposing a capitulation, which had 
 become necessary. The marshal entered into 
 conversation with the colonel, acknowledged 
 the necessity for surrendering, but claimed for 
 the garrison of Danlzig the conditions which 
 the garrison of Mayence had formerly obtained 
 from him, that is to say, liberty to march out 
 without being prisoners of war, without laying 
 down arms, and merely engaging not to serve 
 against France before the expiration of a year. 
 Marshal Lefebvre signed these conditions, for 
 he was sorely afraid of seeing the siege pro- 
 longed; but he required time to consult Napo- 
 leon. The latter was not in such a hurry, for 
 he held the Russians in check on the Passarge, 
 and he would gladly have sacrificed a few 
 more days to take prisoners a whole corps 
 iTarmee, making no account of the engagement 
 entered into by the enemy's troops not to serve 
 for a year. He expressed, therefore, a certain 
 regret, but consented to the proposed capitula- 
 tion, ordering Marshal Lefebvre to tell M. de 
 Kalkreuth, that it was out of consideration for 
 him, for his age, for his glorious services, and 
 for his courteous manner of treating the 
 French, that such favourable conditions were 
 granted. The capitulation was signed and ex- 
 ecuted on the 26th. 
 
 On the morning of the 26th, Marshal Le- 
 febvre made his entry into the fortress. He 
 had proposed to Marshal Lannes and Marshal 
 Mortier, who had arrived a few days before, to 
 enter with him ; but they would not dispute 
 with him an honour which belonged to him, 
 and which he had earned, if not by his skill at 
 least by his bravery and by his perseverance 
 in living for two months in those formidable 
 trenches. He made his entry, therefore, at the 
 head of a detachment of all the troops which 
 had concurred in the siege. The engineers 
 naturally marched first. This distinction was 
 due to them on all accounts, for, out of six 
 hundred men, about half had been put hart de 
 combat. Accordingly, Napoleon immediately 
 published the following order of the day : 
 
 VOL. II. 38 
 
 "Finkerutein, May 38, 1907. 
 
 "The fortress of Dantzig has capitulated, 
 and our troops entered it to-day at noon. 
 
 " His majesty expresses his satisfaction to 
 the besieging troops. The sappers have co- 
 vered themselves with glory." 
 
 This memorable siege had been long, since 
 the place had held out for fifty-one days after 
 the trenches were opened. Various causes 
 contributed to the length of this resistance. 
 The configuration of the place, its vast extent, 
 the strength of the besieged garrison, nearly 
 equal to that of the besieging army, the tardy 
 arrival and the insufficiency of the heavy ar- 
 tillery, which permitted the enemy to reserve 
 his fire for the moment of the last approaches, 
 the small number of good labourers propor- 
 tioned to the small number of good troops, the 
 nature of the soil, slipping down incessantly 
 under the projectiles, the defensive qualities of 
 the timber, which could not be battered in 
 breach, but which required to be demolished 
 with pickaxe and hatchet, lastly, the terrible 
 weather, variable as at the equinox, passing 
 from frost to torrents of rain all these causes, 
 we say, contributed to prolong this siege, which 
 was alike honourable to the besieged and to 
 the besiegers. Marshal Kalkreuth took away 
 with him but a small portion of his originally 
 strong garrison. Out of 18,320 men, only 
 7120 marched from Dantzig. 1 There had been 
 2700 killed, 3400 wounded, 800 prisoners, 4300 
 deserters. Frederick's old pupil had on this 
 occasion proved himself worthy of that great 
 school of war in which he had been brought up. 
 
 Marshal Lefebvre by his bravery, General 
 Chasseloup by his skill, Napoleon by his vast 
 foresight, the engineer corps by their incredi- 
 ble devotedness, had obtained for the army this 
 important conquest. Though there had been 
 a deficiency of heavy artillery, it was a down- 
 right miracle, at such a prodigious distance 
 from the Rhine, in such a season, to have been 
 able to draw the materiel necessary for so great 
 a siege from Silesia, Prussia, and Upper Po- 
 land. It would, no doubt, have been easy for 
 Napoleon, by detaching one of his corps de 
 armee from the Passarge or the Vistula, to put 
 an end much sooner to the resistance of Dant- 
 /ig. But he would have obtained this accele- 
 ration only at the price of a great imprudence; 
 for, according to all probabilities, Napoleon 
 would be attacked during the siege by the Rus- 
 sian and Prussian armies, and, if he had been, 
 the 20,000 men detached to Dantzig would have 
 considerably weakened him. We cannot then 
 too much admire the art with.which he chose 
 that position of the Passarge, where he covered 
 the siege of Dantzig, and at the same time faced 
 the allied armies which might every moment 
 present themselves the art in particular, with 
 which he took advantage of so many regiments 
 on march, as well troops returning from Stral- 
 sund, as infantry reserve, prepared on the 
 Lower Vistula, to keep up around Dantzig a 
 force sufficient for the operations of the siege 
 finally, the art with which he awaited a re- 
 sult that he might have endangered by endea 
 
 These numbers are taken from statements found in 
 the place.
 
 298 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1807. 
 
 vouring to hasten it, and that, besides, he would 
 have had no interest in hastening, for, not in- 
 tending to act offensively till June, his not 
 completing the conquest of Dantzig till May 
 was of very little consequence. 
 
 It was not sufficient to have taken Dantzig, 
 it was necessary to be master of the mouth of 
 the Vistula and the sea approaches, that is to 
 say, the fort of Weichselmunde, which, well- 
 defended, would have required a regular attack 
 and occasioned a great loss of time. But the 
 moral effect of the reduction of Dantzig pro- 
 duced the surrender of the fort of Weichsel- 
 munde forty-eight hours afterwards. Half of 
 the garrison having deserted, the other half 
 surrendered the fort, desiring to capitulate oh 
 the same terms as the garrison of Dantzig. 
 The route of the Nehrung as far as Pillau 
 served both for returning to Konigsberg. Be- 
 sides the advantage of securing a base of 
 operation on the Vistula that was not to be 
 shaken, Napoleon acquired in the city of Dant- 
 zig immense supplies. With great wealth, 
 Dantzig contained 300,000 quintals of corn, 
 and above all seven million bottles of wine 
 of the best quality, which, in this dreary cli- 
 mate, would be to the army a subject of joy 
 and a source of health. Napoleon immediately 
 sent his aid-de-camp, Rapp, on whose devoted- 
 ness he had perfect reliance, to take the com- 
 mand of Dantzig, and to prevent the misappli- 
 cation of valuable things. He immediately 
 followed him in person, and went to pass two 
 days at Dantzig, wishing to judge from his 
 own observation of the importance of that 
 place, of the works which would be required 
 to render it impregnable, lastly, of the re- 
 sources which might be derived from it for 
 the subsistence of the army. 
 
 He ordered 18,000 quintals of wheat to be 
 conveyed immediately to Elbing, to supply the 
 exhausted magazines of that city, which had 
 already furnished 80,000 quintals of corn. He 
 sent off a million bottles of wine to the quar- 
 ters on the Passarge. He inspected all the 
 works of the siege, approved all that had been 
 done, highly praised General Chasseloup and 
 the attack by the Hagelsberg, distributed signal 
 rewards among the officers of the army, and 
 promised himself to compensate them soon by 
 magnificent donations for all the booty that he 
 had wisely and nobly withdrawn from them in 
 intrusting General Rapp with the government 
 of Dantzig. He resolved to create Marshal 
 Lefebvre Duke of Dantzig, and to add a superb 
 endowment to the title. He wrote to M. Mol- 
 lien, desiring him to purchase, with the funds 
 of the army treasury, an estate with a mansion 
 producing a nett income of 100,000 livres, to 
 form the appanage of the new duke. He like- 
 wise recommended to M. Mollien to buy about 
 twenty mansions which had belonged to ancient 
 families, and as many as possible situated in 
 the west, for presents to the generals who 
 freely spilt their blood for him, striving thus 
 to renew the aristocracy of France, as he was 
 renewing the dynasties of Europe by the strokes 
 of his sword, transformed in his hand into a 
 sort of magic wand, from which dropped glory, 
 
 alth, and crowns. 
 He gave the necessary orders for the imme- 
 
 1 diate repair of the works of Dantzig. He 
 placed there by way of garrison the 44th and 
 49th of the line, which had suffered severely 
 during the siege. He desired that all the pro- 
 visional regiments, which should not have 
 time to reach the army before the resumption 
 of offensive operations, should be assembled 
 there. He assigned to the legion of the north, 
 whose zeal and fatigues had been extreme, and 
 whose fidelity was undoubted, the custody of 
 the fort of Weichselmunde. He directed part 
 of the German troops to be distributed in the 
 Nehrung. He ordered the Saxons, who were 
 
 '. good soldiers, but who needed to serve in our 
 ranks that they might become attached to us, 
 to join Lannes' corps, which had already re- 
 turned to the Vistula, and the Poles, whom he 
 wished to inure to war, to join Mortier's corps, 
 likewise destined to proceed to the Vistula. 
 The Italians were left to blockade Colberg, the 
 rest of the Poles to blockade the little citadel 
 of Graudenz, points of little importance which 
 he had yet to take. 
 
 Napoleon, on his return to Finkenstein, 
 made all his dispositions for recommencing 
 offensive operations in the first days of the 
 month of June. The crafty negotiations of 
 Austria had terminated only in rendering a so- 
 lution by arms inevitable. The offer of me- 
 diation made by that court, accepted with mis- 
 trust and regret but with a good grace by Na- 
 poleon, had been immediately transmitted to 
 England, Prussia, and Russia. The , new 
 English cabinet, though its policy was far from 
 inclining to peace, could not at its outset pro- 
 claim too marked a preference for war. Mr. 
 Canning, as minister for foreign affairs, re- 
 plied, that Great Britain cheerfully accepted 
 the mediation of Austria, and would follow in 
 this negotiation the example of the allied 
 courts, Prussia and Russia. The answer of 
 the latter was the least amicable of the three. 
 The Emperor Alexander had repaired to the 
 head-quarters of his army, at Bartenstein, on 
 the Alle. He had there been joined by the 
 King of Prussia, who had come from Konigs- 
 berg to converse with him. The imperial 
 guard, which had lately left Petersburg, and nu- 
 merous recruits drawn from the remotest pro- 
 vinces of the empire, had brought the Russian 
 army a reinforcement of 30,000 men, and re- 
 paired the losses of Pultusk and Eylau. The ri- 
 diculous exaggerations of General Benningsen, 
 pushed beyond the limit that a wish to raise 
 the courage of one's soldiers, one's country, 
 and one's sovereign, allows, had deceived the 
 voung czar. He almost imagined that he had 
 been conqueror at Eylau, and he was tempted 
 to try once more the fortune of arms. The 
 King of Prussia, on the contrary, whom parti- 
 cular relations with Napoleon, kept up through 
 the medium of Duroc, had enlightened respect- 
 ing the somewhat more favourable dispositions 
 of the conqueror of Jena, appeared inclined to 
 treat, on condition that the greater part of his 
 kingdom should be restored to him. He had not 
 deceived himself in regard to the successes 
 obtained by the coalition. He had seen the 
 principal fortress in his dominions taken be- 
 fore the face of the Russian army, powerless 
 to prevent it, and he could not persuade him-
 
 May, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 299 
 
 self that the allies would soon be able to force 
 Napoleon back to the Vistula and the Oder. 1 
 He was, therefore, in favour of peace. But 
 the Emperor Alexander, infatuated by his pre- 
 tended advantages, to which, however, the re- 
 duction of Dantzig gave a signal contradiction, 
 affirmed to King Frederick William that very 
 shortly his whole patrimony would be restored 
 to him without the reservation of a single 
 province, that the independence of Germany 
 would be re-established, and that for this pur- 
 pose it would be sufficient to gain a single 
 battle, that one victory would decide Austria, 
 and that they should thus ensure the ruin of 
 Napoleon and the liberation of Europe. Fred- 
 erick William, therefore, allowed himself to 
 be led away by new suggestions, very like 
 those which had already seduced him at Pots- 
 dam, and the mediation of Austria was refused 
 in reality, though accepted in appearance. 
 The allies replied that they should be delighted 
 to see peace restored to Europe, and restored 
 through the good offices of Austria, but they 
 wished first to know on what bases Napoleon 
 intended to treat with them. This evasive 
 answer left no doubt of the continuation of the 
 war, and it gave great displeasure to Austria, 
 who thus lost the means of entering into the 
 quarrel in order to terminate it as she pleased, 
 either by the concurrence of her arms, if Na- 
 poleon sustained reverses, or by a peace, of 
 which she should be arbitress, if he continued 
 successful. Nevertheless, she would not re- 
 linquish the mediation in such a manner as to 
 appear beaten : she communicated the an- 
 swers which she had received to Napoleon, 
 and begged him to clear up the doubts which 
 seemed to prevent the belligerent powers from 
 opening the negotiations. It was M. de Vin- 
 cent who was charged with the series of these 
 parleys. He could only carry them on in writ- 
 ing, for while he had remained at Warsaw M. 
 de Talleyrand had joined Napoleon at Finken- 
 stein. 
 
 This conclusion pleased Napoleon, who had 
 viewed the mediation of Austria with great ap- 
 prehension. Still persisting in not taking upon 
 himself the refusal of peace, he replied that 
 he was ready to adopt the medium of conces- 
 sions, provided there were granted to his allies 
 Spain, Holland, the Porte, restitutions equiva- 
 lent to those which he was disposed to make. 
 He added that, as soon as a place should be 
 fixed upon for the meeting of a congress, he 
 would send his plenipotentiaries thither with- 
 out delay. 
 
 But the mediation had miscarried, for it 
 would take several months to bring such par- 
 leys to any terminations whatever, and he 
 hoped in a few days of fine weather to finish 
 the war. 
 
 Every thing was ready, in fact, on both sides, 
 for resuming hostilities with the greatest en- 
 ergy. The two sovereigns, living together at 
 Bartenstein, had contracted the most solemn 
 engagements towards each other, and promised 
 
 not to lay down their arms till the cause of 
 Europe was avenged, and the whole of the 
 Prussian dominions restored. They had 
 signed at Bartenstein a convention by which 
 they bound themselves to act only in concert, 
 and not to treat with the enemy but by common 
 consent. The proposed aim of their efforts 
 was not, they said, the abasement of France, 
 but the emancipation of the powers, great and 
 small, abased by France. They were going to 
 fight in order to bring about the evacuation of 
 Germany, Holland, even Italy, if Austria 
 joined them, to establish, in default of the an- 
 cient German confederation, a new federative 
 constitution, which should ensure the inde- 
 pendence of all the German States, and a rea- 
 sonable influence to Austria and Prussia in 
 Germany. For the rest, the extent of the pro- 
 jected reparations was to depend on the suc- 
 cess of the coalition. Other conventions had 
 been signed, as well with Sweden as with Eng- 
 land. The latter, more interested in the war 
 than any other, and hilherto profiting by the 
 efforts of the powers without making any her- 
 self, had promised subsidies and land troops. 
 Her avarice in regard to subsidies had indis- 
 posed the King of Sweden to such a degree 
 as to disgust that prince with the crusade 
 which he had always meditated against France. 
 Still, with the assistance of Russia, there had 
 been wrung from England a million sterling 
 for Prussia, a yearly allowance for the Swedes 
 employed in Pomerania, and an engagement 
 to send a corps of 20,000 English to Stralsund. 
 Prussia had promised on her part to send to 
 Stralsund eight or ten thousand Prussians, 
 who, united with the 20,000 English and 
 15,000 Swedes, would form on the rear of Na- 
 poleon a respectable army, and the more to be 
 feared by him as it would cover itself with 
 the veil of the armistice signed with Marshal 
 Mortier. 
 
 These conventions communicated to Aus- 
 tria had no influence upon her. Besides, 
 the taking of Dantzig, which attested the im- 
 potence of the Russians, was sufficient, with 
 all that was known at Vienna concerning the 
 relative situation of the belligerent armies, to 
 confine that court to its system of expectant 
 politics. 
 
 Alexander and Frederick William were, 
 therefore, left to struggle on against the 
 French with the wrecks of the Prussian 
 forces, consisting of about 30,000 men, mostly 
 prisoners who had escaped from our custody, 
 with the Russian army recruited, with the 
 Swedes and a promised corps of English in 
 Pomerania. General Benningsen's troops 
 were still suffering severe distress, and, 
 while Napoleon contrived to obtain from 
 an enemy's country the most abundant re- 
 sources, the Russian administration, amidst 
 a friendly country, with considerable means 
 of navigation, knew not how to find where- 
 withal to appease the painful cravings of 
 her army. That unfortunate army suffered, 
 
 i It is very difficult to know precisely what passed 
 between these two sovereigns, living in a continual 
 ttte-ii-tete, and not communicating their secret disposi- 
 tion to those about them. But what passed at head- 
 quarters became known from communication* of the 
 
 court of Prussia to several petty Germaa courts; and 
 besides, the assertion which I make here is derived 
 from statements made by the Queen of Prussia hernelf 
 to one of the most respectable diplomatists of the 
 time
 
 300 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1807 
 
 complained, but on seeing its young sove 
 reign at Bartenstein, it mingled cries of at 
 tachment with its cries of pain, and deceivec 
 him while promising by its acclamations more 
 than it could perform for the policy and the 
 glory of the Moscovite empire. Though igno 
 rant, it could form a just estimate of the use 
 lessness of that war, but it was desirous to 
 march forward, were it only to conquer pro 
 visions. Accordingly, the two sovereigns 
 repairing, the one to Tilsit, the other to Ko 
 nigsberg. whither they went to await the re 
 suit of the campaign, had left orders to their 
 generals to take the offensive as soon as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 General Benningsen had posted himself on 
 the upper course of the Alle, at Heilsberg, 
 where, in imitation of Napoleon, he had cre- 
 ated an intrenched camp, formed some very 
 ill-stocked magazines, and prepared his ground 
 to fight a defensive battle, if Napoleon entered 
 first into action. He could assemble under 
 his hand about 100,000 men. Besides this 
 principal mass, he had at his left a corps of 
 18,000 men on the Narew, placed at first un- 
 der the command of General Essen, and after- 
 wards under that of General Tolstoy. He had 
 on his right about 20,000 men, composed of 
 Kamenski's division, returned from Weichsel- 
 miinde, and of the Prussian corps of Lestocq ; 
 he had, lastly, some depots at Kiinigsberg, 
 making a total of 140,000 men scattered from 
 Warsaw to KOnigsberg, 100,000 of whom were 
 assembled on the Alle, opposite to our can- 
 tonments on the Passarge. General Labanof 
 was bringing a reinforcement of 30,000 men, 
 troops drawn from the interior of the empire. 
 But these troops were not likely to be on the 
 theatre of war before the resumption of the 
 operations. 
 
 Though this army could present itself with 
 confidence before any enemy, whoever he 
 might be, it could not fight with any chance 
 of success against the French army of Auster- 
 litz and Jena, to which, besides, it had be- 
 come greatly inferior in number, since Napo- 
 leon had had time to extract from France and 
 Italy new forces, of which we have already 
 given a long renumeration. Napoleon, in 
 fact, was about to reap the fruit of his inces- 
 sant attentions and his admirable forecast. 
 His army, rested, fed, recruited, was able to 
 face all his enemies, either then declared, or 
 ready to declare ihemselves on the first event. 
 On his rear, Marshal Brune, with 15,000 
 Dutch, collected in the Hanseatic towns, with 
 14,000 Spaniards, despatched from Leghorn, 
 Perpignan, and Bayonne, and on march to- 
 wards the Elbe, with the 15,000 Wirtem- 
 bergers recently employed in reducing the 
 fortresses in Silesia, with the 16,000 French 
 in Boudet'sand Molitor's divisions, which had 
 entered Germany, with 10,000 men of the gar- 
 rison battalions occupying Hameln, Magde- 
 burg, Spandau, Custrin, Stetten, with the new 
 contingent of the Confederation of the Rhine 
 Marshal Brune had an army of about 80,000 
 tnen. This army could, in case of need, be 
 reinforced by 25,000 veteran soldiers, drawn 
 from the coasts of France, which would make 
 amount to 100,000 or 110,000 men. 
 
 The fatigued French troops, and the allied 
 troops on which the least dependence was 
 placed, guarded Dantzig or continued the 
 blockade of Colberg and Graudenz. Two 
 new corps compensated on the Vistula the 
 dissolution of Augereau's corps ; these were, 
 as we have seen, that of Marshal Mortier and 
 that of Marshal Lannes. The corps of Mar- 
 shal Mortier was composed of the 4th light, of 
 the 45th and 58th of the line, of the Paris mu- 
 nicipal regiment, forming Dupas's division, 
 and of part of the Polish regiments recently 
 levied. The corps of Lannes was composed 
 of Oudinot's famous grenadiers and voltigeurs, 
 of the 2d and 12th light, of the 3d and 72d of 
 the line, forming Verdier's division. The 
 Saxons were to constitute the third division 
 of Lannes' corps. These two corps were 
 upon the different arms of the Lower Vistula, 
 one at Dirschau, the other at Marienburg. 
 That of Mortier could furnish 11,000 or 12,000 
 men present under fire, that of Lannes 15,000. 
 Their nominal effective was much more con- 
 siderable. 
 
 Beyond the Vistula, and facing the enemy, 
 Napoleon possessed five corps, besides the 
 sjuard and the cavalry reserve. 
 
 Massena, occupying both the Narew and 
 the Omulew, having his right near Warsaw, 
 lis centre at Ostrolenka, his left at Neiden- 
 aurg, guarded the extremity of our line with 
 36,000 men, 24,000 of whom were ready to 
 fight. Among the number were 6000 Ba- 
 varians. 
 
 The corps of Poles recently levied, that of 
 iayonschek, five or six thousand strong, in 
 real part cavalry, nominally belonging to 
 Vtortier's corps, filled the interval between 
 Vlassena and the cantonments on the Pas- 
 arge, and sent out continual patroles, either in 
 he forests, or in the marshes of the country. 
 
 Lastly came the old corps of Marshals Ney, 
 )avout, Soult and Bernadotte, cantoned all 
 bur behind the Passarge. 
 
 We have already described the Passarge 
 and the Alle, rising near one another, and the 
 nimerous lakes of the country, the first run- 
 ning to our left perpendicularly to the sea ; 
 he second, right before us, perpendicularly to 
 he Pregel, thus forming both of them an an- 
 jle, one side of which we occupied, and the 
 lussians the other. Each of the two armies 
 was ranged in a different manner on the sides 
 f this angle. We bordered the Passarge 
 ongitudinally, that is for about twenty leagues 
 rom Hohenstein to Braunsberg. The Rus- 
 ians, on the contrary, in order to face us, 
 were concentrated on the upper course of the 
 Alle, near Heilsberg. 
 
 Marshal Ney, established at the top of this 
 angle, which was rather irregular, like all 
 hose of Nature's making, held at once the 
 Alle and the Passarge, by Guttstadt and Dep- 
 ien, with his corps of 25,000 men, furnishing 
 7,000 combatants, incomparable troops, and 
 worthy of their commander. At the same 
 tieight, but somewhat in rear, Marshal Da- 
 out was, like Marshal Ney, between the Alle 
 and the Passarge, between Allenstein and Ho- 
 icnstein, flanking Marshal Ney, preventing 
 he enemy from turning the army, and coming
 
 May, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 301 
 
 by Osterode to open a passage toward the 
 Vistula. His corps, a model of discipline and 
 bearing, made in the image of him who com- 
 manded it, could bring into action 30,000 out 
 of 40,000 men. He it was, among all the 
 marshals, whose troops always presented the 
 greatest number of men fit for fighting, thanks 
 to his vigilance and his vigour. Marshal 
 Soult, placed on the left of Marshal Ney, 
 guarded at Liebstadt the middle of the course 
 of the Passarge, having intrenched posts at 
 the bridges of Pittehnen and Lomitten. He 
 had an effective of 43,000 men, and 30,000 or 
 31,000 present under arms. Marshal Berna- 
 dotte defended the Lower Passarge, from Span- 
 den to Braunsberg, with 36,000 men, 24,000 
 of whom were ready to march. Dupont's 
 fine division occupied the shore of the sea, or 
 Frische-Haff. 
 
 Lastly, between the Passarge and the Vis- 
 tula, in a tract interspersed with lakes and 
 marshes, were situated the head-quarters of 
 Finkenstein, where Napoleon was encamped 
 amidst his guard, mustering 8000 or 9000 
 combatants out of an effective of 12,000 men. 
 A little further in rear, and to the left, was 
 spread Murat's cavalry, comprehending all the 
 cavalry of the army, with the exception of the 
 hussars and chasseurs left to each corps as 
 the means of guarding itself. Out of 30,000 ' 
 horse, it contained 20,000 ready to mount. 
 
 Such were the forces of Napoleon. From ! 
 the Rhine to the Passarge, from Bohemia to 
 the Baltic, in troops on march, or which had i 
 already reached the theatre of war, in troops j 
 guarding his rear or ready to take the often- j 
 sive, invalid soldiers, wounded or sick, French j 
 or allies, he numbered more than 400,000 
 men. If we take into account those only that 
 were about to enter into action, and exclude 
 the corps of Massena destined to guard the 
 Narew, we may say that he had at hand six 
 corps, those of Marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, 
 Bernadotte, Lannes, Mortier, besides the ca- 
 valry and the guard, which composed an ef- 
 fective of 225,000 men, 1 160,000 of whom 
 were real combatants. Such is the difficulty 
 of the offensive ! The further you advance, ] 
 the more fatigue, dispersion, the necessity for 
 guarding yourself, diminish the strength of 
 armies. Let us suppose these 400,000 men 
 falling back to the Rhine, not in consequence 
 of defeat, but from a calculation of prudence, 
 every man, excepting the sick, would have 
 furnished a combatant. On the Vistula, on 
 the contrary, less than half could fight Let 
 us suppose them to be two hundred leagues 
 further off, not more than a fourth could have 
 presented themselves before the enemy. And 
 
 1 
 
 Effective. 
 
 Present under arms. 
 
 Ney 
 
 ... 25.000 .. 
 
 17.000 
 
 Da'out 
 
 ... 40,000 - 
 
 30.000 
 
 Soult 
 
 - 43.000 
 
 31 or 32.000 
 
 Bernadotte 
 
 36,000 - 
 
 24.000 
 
 Mural 
 
 ... 30,000 
 
 20,000 
 
 Guard 
 
 12.000 
 
 8or 9.000 
 
 Lanaes 
 
 20.000 
 
 15,000 
 
 Mortier 
 
 15,000 
 
 10.000 
 
 
 221.000 
 
 155.000 
 
 Reckoning Zayonschek's Poles. 5000 for even or 
 eight thousand, we shall have 160,000 combatants out 
 of a total effective of 226,000 men. 
 
 yet he who conducted these masses was the 
 greatest organizer that ever existed. Let us 
 be thankful to the nature of things which has 
 decreed that attack should be more difficult 
 than defence ! 
 
 But the 160,000 men, whom Napoleon had 
 at his disposal, after he had sufficiently co- 
 vered his flanks and his rear, were all in rank. 
 If the same method of counting had been ap- 
 ! plied to the Russian army, most assuredly 
 there would not have been 140,000 men. Na- 
 poleon's soldiers were perfectly rested, abun- 
 dantly fed, suitably clothed for war, that is to 
 say, dressed and shod, well provided with 
 arms and ammunition. The cavalry, in par- 
 ticular, recomposed in the plains of the Lower 
 Vistula, mounted with the finest horses of 
 Germany, having resumed its exercises for 
 two months past, presented a superb specta- 
 cle. Napoleon, wishing to see it all together 
 in one plain, had gone to Elbing to review it 
 Eighteen thousand horse, an enormous mass, 
 moved by a single chief, Prince Murat had, 
 after maneuvering before him for a whole 
 day, dazzled his eyes, though so accustomed 
 to large armies, to such a degree, that, writing 
 an hour afterwards to his ministers, he could 
 not help extolling the fine sight which he had 
 just beheld in the plains of Elbing. 
 
 From a forecast for which he had great rea- 
 son to applaud himself, Napoleon had given 
 orders that, after the 1st of May, all the corps 
 should leave the villages in which they were 
 cantoned, and encamp in divisions, within 
 reach of one another, in well-chosen situa- 
 tions, and behind good field-works. This was 
 the right way to prevent being surprised; for 
 the examples of armies attacked unawares in 
 their winter quarters have all been furnished 
 by troops, which had spread themselves for 
 the sake of lodging and provisions. An army 
 vigorously attacked in this position may, be- 
 fore it has time to rally, lose in number half 
 its force, in territory, provinces and kingdoms. 
 The precaution of encamping, though infinitely 
 prudent, he had great difficulty to obtain from 
 officers and soldiers, for it obliged them to 
 leave good cantonments, where each had com- 
 fortably established himself, and thenceforward 
 expect from magazines alone, those provisions 
 which they found more surely on the spot. 
 Napoleon, nevertheless, required it, and, in ten 
 or fifteen days, all the corps were encamped 
 in hovels, covered by earth-works or by im- 
 mense abattis, maneuvering every day, and, 
 having recovered, in consequence of their as- 
 semblage in mass, the energy of the military 
 spirit, an energy which is infinitely fluctuating, 
 which rises or sinks, not only from victory or 
 defeat, but by activity or rest, by all the cir- 
 cumstances, in short, which stretch or relax 
 the human mind like a spring. 
 
 Nature, so dreary in this climate during win- 
 ter, but which is nowhere destitute of beauty, 
 especially when the returning sun brings back 
 to it light and life Nature herself invited the 
 men to motion. Rich pastures afforded food 
 for the horses, and allowed all the means of 
 transport to be devoted to the subsistence of 
 the men. The two armies were in presence, 
 within cannon-shot, sometimes maneuvering 
 2C
 
 302 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 before each other's face, reciprocally serving 
 for a sight to one another, but abstaining from 
 firing, certain that this peaceful activity would 
 change soon enough to a sanguinary conflict. 
 On both sides a speedy resumption of the ope- 
 rations was expected, and they kept on their 
 guard for fear of being surprised. One day 
 even, towards Braunsberg, a post occupied by 
 Dupont's division, there was heard at night- 
 fall a confused sound of voices, which seemed 
 to denote the presence of a numerous corps. 
 The officers ran up, conceiving that the attack 
 of the cantonments had at length commenced, 
 and that the Russians were taking the initia- 
 tive. But, on approaching the place whence 
 the noise proceeded, they perceived a multi- 
 tude of wild swans sporting in the Passarge, 
 on the banks of which they dwell in countless 
 flocks. 1 
 
 Meanwhile, Napoleon, having returned from 
 Dantzig to Elbing, and having all his means 
 collected between the Vistula and the Passarge, 
 resolved to set himself in motion on the 10th 
 of June, to march to the Alle, to descend its 
 course, to separate the Russians from Konigs- 
 berg, to take that city before their faces, and 
 to throw them back upon the Niemen. He 
 had given orders that, by the 10th, each corps 
 d'urmee should be supplied with bread and 
 biscuit for fourteen days, four in the soldiers' 
 knapsacks, ten in the caissons. But, while he 
 was preparing to recommence hostilities, the 
 Russians, determined to be beforehand with 
 him, anticipated by five days the movements 
 of the French army. 
 
 It might have been expected that they would 
 have defied all the risks of the offensive, when 
 the salvation of Dantzig was at stake. But 
 now, when no pressing interest urged them to 
 haste, to venture to attack Napoleon in long 
 studied, carefully defended positions, merely 
 because the fine season had arrived, was a 
 proceeding conceivable only of a general act- 
 ing without reflection, obeying vague instincts 
 rather than an enlightened reason. One ought 
 to have been as sure as one was uncertain, of 
 the due execution of the operations, in then 
 opposing the Russian troops to the French 
 troops, that there would not have been any 
 good plan of offensive against Napoleon, es- 
 tablished as he was upon the Passarge. To 
 attack by sea, to attempt to take Braunsberg 
 on the Lower Passarge, and then to dash 
 against the Lower Vistula and Dantzig which 
 we occupied, would be but a series of follies. 
 To attack on the opposite side, that is to say, 
 to ascend the Alle, to pass between the sources 
 of the Alle and those of the Passarge, to turn 
 our right to slip between Marshal Ney and 
 Massena's corps, in the space guarded by the 
 Poles, was all that Napoleon himself desired ; 
 for, in this case, he shou'd ascend by his left, 
 get between the Russians and Kiinigsberg.cut 
 them off from their base of operation, and 
 throw them into the inextricable difficulties of 
 the interior of Poland. In taking the offen- 
 sive, then, there were but dangers to incur, 
 without a single advantageous result to obtain. 
 
 These particulars are derived from General Du- 
 ponl's rruhiury Memo.rs, JH manuscript, and replete 
 will the highest interest. 
 
 [June, 1807, 
 
 To wait for Napoleon on the Pregel, the right 
 to Kiinigsberg, the left to Wehlau, to defend 
 that line stoutly, then, that line being lost, to 
 fall back in good order upon the Niemen, to 
 entice the French into the recesses of the em- 
 pire, avoiding great battles, opposing to them 
 . the most formidable of obstacles, that of dis 
 ', tance, and refusing them the advantage ol 
 | signal victories such would have been the 
 only rational conduct on the part of the Rus- 
 sian general, and, as subsequent experience 
 has unfortunately for us demonstrated, the 
 only wise course. 
 
 But General Benningsen, who had promised 
 his sovereign to draw the most brilliant con- 
 sequences from the battle of Eylau, and soon 
 to gain for him an ample compensation for the 
 loss of Dantzig, could no further prolong the 
 inaction observed during the siege of that 
 place, and thought himself obliged to take the 
 initiative. Accordingly, he had formed the 
 plan of falling upon Marshal Ney, whose very 
 advanced position was more favourable to sur- 
 prise than any other. Napoleon, in fact, desi- 
 rous of keeping not only the Passarge up to 
 its sources, but the Alle itself in the upper part 
 of its course, so as to occupy the apex of the 
 angle described by those two rivers, had placed 
 Marshal Ney at Guttstadt on the Alle. The 
 latter must have appeared in the air to any 
 one not acquainted with the precautions taken 
 to remedy the apparent inconvenience of such 
 a situation. But all the means of a prompt 
 concentration were secured and prepared be- 
 forehand. Marshal Ney had his retreat indi- 
 cated upon Deppen, Marshal Davout upon Os- 
 terode, Marshal Soult upon Liebstadt and 
 Mohrungen, Marshal Bernadotte upon Preuss- 
 Holland. If the enemy persisted, they were 
 all to make one march further, to join them- 
 selves at Saalfeld with the guard, with Lannes, 
 with Mortier, with Murat, in a labyrinth of 
 lakes and forests, the outlets of which were 
 known to none but Napoleon, and where he 
 had prepared a disaster for the imprudent 
 adversary who should come thither in quest 
 of him. 
 
 Without having dived into any of these com- 
 binations, General Benningsen resolved to sur- 
 prise Marshal Ney's corps, and made such dis- 
 positions as at first sight seemed calculated to 
 succeed. He directed the greater part of his 
 forces upon Marshal Ney, confining himself to 
 mere demonstrations against the other mar- 
 shals. Three columns, and even four, reckoning 
 the imperial guard, accompanied by all the ca- 
 valry, were to ascend the Alle, to attack Marshal 
 Ney in front by Altkirch,on the left by Wolfs- 
 dorf, on the right by Guttstadt, while Plato w, het- 
 man of the Cossacks, filling Avith his horsemen 
 the space which separated us from the Narew, 
 and with the light infantry forcing the Alle 
 above Guttstadt, was to endeavour to slip be- 
 tween Ney's corps and Davout' s. Meanwhile, 
 the imperial guard, under the Grand-duke Con- 
 slantine, was to place itself in reserve behind 
 the three columns destined to attack Marshal 
 Ney, and to proceed to the assistance of any 
 of them that might need.it. A column com- 
 posed of two divisions, under the command of 
 Lieutenant-general Doctorow, had orders to
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 SOS 
 
 come from Olbersdorf to Lomitten, to attack 
 the bridges of Marshal Soult, and to prevent 
 him from assisting Marshal Ney. Another 
 Russian column, under Generals Kamenski 
 and Rembow, was directed to make a strong 
 demonstration on the bridge of Spanden, which 
 Marshal Bernadotte was guarding, so that the 
 whole course of the Passarge would be threat- 
 ened at once. The Prussian General Lestocq 
 was even directed to show himself before 
 Braunsberg, in order to increase the uncer- 
 tainty of the French respecting the general plan 
 upon which all these attacks were arranged. 
 
 It remained to be seen whether the disposi- 
 tions of the Russian general, apparently well 
 calculated, would be executed with the preci- 
 sion requisite for giving success to such com- 
 plicated operations, and whether they would 
 not find the French so prepared, so resolute, j 
 that it would be impossible to surprise them 
 and to force them in their position. The move- ' 
 ments of these numerous columns, concealed 
 by the forests and the lakes of that dreary 
 country, escaped our generals, who had no idea 
 that the Russians were ready, but who, know- ; 
 ing that they were ready themselves, and ex- 
 pecting to march every moment, felt neither 
 surprise or fear at sight of the preparations of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Here we may perceive that forecast is all- 
 powerful in war. This formidable attack, di- 
 rected against Marshal Ney, would infallibly 
 have succeeded, if our troops, scattered in the 
 villages, had been surprised and obliged to run '. 
 to the rear to rally. But this was not the case, 
 and, thanks to the orders of Napoleon, disa- 1 
 greeable orders to all the corps, and which he ' 
 had been obliged to render absolute in order to 
 enforce their execution, the troops were en- 
 camped by divisions, covered by earth-works 
 and by abattis, established in such a manner 
 that they could defend themselves for a long 
 time, and succour one another before they were 
 obliged to give way. 
 
 On the morning of the 5th of June, by day- 
 break, the Russian advanced-guard, led by 
 Prince Bagration, advanced rapidly upon the 
 position of Altkirch, one of those occupied by 
 Marshal Ney with a division, and neglected all 
 the petty French posts scattered in the woods, 
 intending to take by turning them. Our troops, 
 which, in consequence of the encampment, 
 slept ready for battle, pleased rather than as- 
 tonished at sight of the enemy, full of compo- 
 sure, exercised every day in firing, opened a 
 murderous fire upon the Russians, which 
 quickly brought them to a stand. The 39th, 
 placed in advance at Altkirch, did not retire 
 till it had strewed the foot of the intrench- 
 ments with slain. Meanwhile, the attacks made 
 upon Wolfsdorf on the left, upon Guttstadt on 
 
 the right, and further still to the right apon 
 Bergfried, were vigorously executed, but luckily 
 without any unity, and in such a manner as to 
 allow Marshal Ney time to effect his retreat 
 Hastening to the head of his troops, he per- 
 ceived that the principal effort of the Russian 
 army was concentrated upon him, and that it 
 was time for him to take the road to Deppen, 
 assigned by the foresight of Napoleon as his 
 line of retreat He had one of his divisions 
 in advance of Guttsladt at Krossen, the other 
 in rear at Glottau. He united them, taking 
 time, however, to collect his artillery, his bag- 
 gage, his detached posts in the woods, all which 
 he took away with him, except two or three 
 hundred men, left at the furthest extremity of 
 the forest of Amt-Guttstadt He followed the 
 road from Gultstadt to Deppen, through Quetz 
 and Ankendorf, slowly traversing the narrow 
 space comprised between the Alle and the Pas- 
 sarge, halting with extraordinary coolness to 
 give fire with two ranks, sometimes charging 
 with the bayonet the infantry which pressed 
 him too closely, or forming in square, pouring 
 volleys, within point blank range, upon the 
 innumerable Russian cavalry, in short, filling 
 the enemy with an admiration which they ex- 
 pressed themselves a few days afterwards. 1 
 He was unwilling to give up entirely the space 
 of four or five leagues, which separates the 
 Alle at this place from the Passarge, and he 
 halted at Ankendorf. He had had to do with 
 15,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry; and, if the 
 two columns of Prince Bagration and Lieu- 
 tenant-general Sacken had acted together, if 
 the imperial guard had joined them, opposed 
 to 60,000 men, he could scarcely have failed 
 to experience a terrible disaster. He had lost 
 twelve or fifteen hundred killed or wounded, 
 but more than 3000 Russians had fallen. At 
 three o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy de- 
 sisted of himself, without any motive, as it 
 frequently happens when a firm and consistent 
 mind does not direct the movements of great 
 masses. 
 
 On the same day, the hetman Platow had 
 passed the Alle at Bergfried, and inundated 
 with his Cossacks the marshy and woody tract 
 which separated the grand army from the posts 
 of Marshal Massena. But it was not at all 
 probable that he would venture to attack Mar- 
 shal Davout's 30,000 men. The latter, hearing 
 the distant thunder of the cannon, hastily col- 
 lected his troops between the Alle and the Pas- 
 sarge, and took the road to Alt-Ramteu, which 
 permitted him to succour Marshal Ney, at the 
 same time that he was approaching Osterode. 
 By a lucky stratagem of war, he sent one of 
 his officers in the direction of the enemy, with 
 despatches announcing his speedy arrival at 
 the head of 50,000 men to support Marshal 
 
 Hlotho gives the following account of the retreat of 
 Matshal Ney to Deppen. 
 
 "The French, consummate masters in the art of war, 
 resolved on that day this very difficult problem, to exe- 
 cute a retreat that is become indispensable, in the face 
 of an enemy who is much stronger and urgently press- 
 ing, and to render it as little prejudicial as possible. 
 They extricated themselves from the situation with the 
 utmost ski!!. The calmness and order, and, at the same 
 time, the rapidity, shown by Ney's corps, in assembling 
 at the signal of three cannon-shot ; the coolness and 
 attentive circumspection with which it executed its re- 
 
 treat, during which it opposed a resistance renewed at 
 every step, and knew how to avail itself, in a masterly 
 manner, of every position all this proved the talent of 
 the captain who commanded the French, and the habil 
 of war carried by them to perfection, as strongly as the 
 finest dispositions and the most scientific execution of 
 an offensive operation could have done. For attacking 
 with success, as well as for opposing a regular resist- 
 ance in a retreat, there are required rare qualities, vir- 
 tues difficult to practise; and yet it is necessary that all 
 these should be combined in the some pe. 1 son to form 
 the great captain."
 
 304 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 Ney. On the opposite side, to the left of Ney's 
 corps, the attacks projected against Marshals 
 Soult and Bernadotte were executed conform- 
 ably to the plan agreed upon. Lieutenant- 
 General Doctofow, marching with two divi- 
 sions by Wormditt and Olbersdorf, over the 
 tltetdupont which Marshal Soult was guarding, 
 found, in advance of the Passarge, numerous 
 abattis, and behind those abattis brave tirail- 
 leurs, who kept up a constant and well-directed 
 fire. He was obliged to fight for several suc- 
 cessive hours, in order to overcome the obsta- 
 cles which defended the approaches of the 
 bridge of Lomitten. No sooner had he carried 
 one part of the abattis, than companies of 
 reserve, falling upon his troops, drove them 
 out at the point of the bayonet. Detachments 
 of Russian cavalry, having crossed some fords 
 of the Passarge, were obliged by our mounted 
 chasseurs to fall back. The course of the 
 Passarge was everywhere left in the posses- 
 sion of the valiant troops of Marshal Soult: 
 merely the half-burnt abattis, in advance of 
 the bridge of Lomitten, had been finally relin- 
 quished to the Russians. General Doctorow 
 desisted towards nightfall, exhausted with fa- 
 tigue, despairing of overcoming such obstacles, 
 defended by such soldiers. The Russians, at- 
 tacking uncovered our troops, who were well 
 sheltered, had more than 2000 men put hors du 
 combat, and we had not lost above 1000. Gene- 
 rals Ferey and Vivies of Carra-St. Cyr's divi- 
 sion, with the 47th and 56th of the line, and 
 the 24th light, had covered themselves with 
 glory at the bridge of Lomitten. 
 
 An action nearly similar had taken place at 
 the bridge of Spanden, which belonged to Mar- 
 shal Bernadotte. An intrenchment of earth 
 covered the bridge. The 27th light guarded 
 this post, having in rear the two brigades of 
 Villate's division. At the very commencement 
 of the action, Marshal Bernadotte received a 
 wound in the neck, which obliged him to re- 
 linquish the command to his chief of the staff, 
 General Maison, one of the most intelligent 
 and energetic officers in the army. The Rus- 
 sians, here united with the Prussians, cannon- 
 aded the teledupont for a long time, and when 
 they conceived that they had daunted the troops 
 which defended it, they advanced to scale it. 
 The soldiers of the 27th light had received 
 orders to lie down on the ground that they 
 might not be perceived. They allowed the 
 assailants to come to the foot of the intrench- 
 ment, and then, by a point-blank discharge, 
 swept down three hundred, and wounded several 
 hundred more. The Russians and Prussians, 
 struck with terror, dispersed, and retired in dis- 
 order. The 17th dragoons, then debouching 
 from the tete dv, pont, rushed upon them at a 
 gallop and cut down a great number. 
 
 The attack was not pushed beyond this point. 
 It had cost the enemy not fewer than six or 
 seven hundred men. Our loss was insig- 
 nificant 
 
 This vigorous manner of receiving the Rus- 
 sians all along the Passarge, excited in them 
 a surprise easy to be conceived, and produced a 
 commencement of hesitation in plans, adopted 
 with too little reflection to be prosecuted with 
 Pfrseverance. The Russian and Prussian 
 
 column of Generals Kamenski and Rembow, 
 beaten at Spanden, awaited ulterior orders, 
 before engaging in fresh enterprises. General 
 Doctorow, stopped at the bridge of Lomitten, 
 ascended the Passarge to approach the main 
 body of the Russian army. General Benning- 
 sen, surrounded at Quetz by the greater num- 
 ber of his troops, not having been able to take 
 Marshal Ney's corps, but having obliged him 
 to fall back, and not yet aware of all the ob- 
 stacles which he should have to encounter, 
 resolved to make a new effort on the following 
 day against that same corps, the object of his 
 most violent attacks. 
 
 Six or seven hours after these simultaneous 
 attempts on the line of the Passarge, Napoleon 
 received intelligence of them at Finkenstein, 
 for he was scarcely twelve leagues from the 
 most distant of his lieutenants; and he had 
 taken care to regulate his means of correspond, 
 ence in such a manner as to be informed of 
 the most trivial incident with extreme prompt- 
 ness. He was anticipated by six days only 
 since his orders had been given for the 10th 
 of June. He was not, therefore, taken at un- 
 awares. His resolutions were formed for all 
 cases no hesitation, consequently, no loss of 
 time could retard his dispositions. He ap- 
 proved the conduct of Marshal Ney, gave him 
 ie praise which he deserved, and enjoined 
 him to retire in good order upon Deppen, and, 
 if he could not defend the Passarge at Deppen, 
 to fall back, through the labyrinth of the lakes, 
 first to Liebemiihl, then to Saalfeld. He or- 
 dered Marshal Davout to unite his three divi- 
 sions immediately on the left flank of Marshal 
 Ney, directing his course to Osterode which 
 was already done, as we have seen. He en- 
 joined Marshal Soult to persist in defending 
 the Passarge, and to retire upon Mohrungen, 
 and from Mohrungen to Saalfeld, if he was 
 forced in his position, or one of his neighbours 
 was forced in his. The same instructions 
 were sent to the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, 
 with indication of the route from Preuss-Hol- 
 land to Saalfeld, as the line of retreat. 
 
 While Napoleon was bringing back to Saal- 
 feld his lieutenants placed in front, he was 
 calling to the same point his lieutenants 
 placed in rear. He ordered Marshal Lannes 
 to march from Marienburg to Christburg and 
 Saalfeld; Marshal Mortier, who was at Dir- 
 schau, to follow the same route, and both to 
 take with them as large a quantity of provi- 
 sions as they could. The light cavalry was 
 to assemble at Elbing, the heavy cavalry at 
 Christburg, and to proceed towards Saalfeld. 
 The three divisions of dragoons, encamped on 
 the right at Bischoffswerder, Strasburg and 
 Soldau, had orders to rally around Davout's 
 corps by Osterode. All were to take their 
 provisions along with them by means of con- 
 veyances previously provided. It would take 
 forty-eight hours before these different concen- 
 trations were effected, and 160,000 men were 
 assembled between Saalfeld and Osterode. 
 Napoleon, moreover, made his guard march 
 from Finkenstein for Saalfeld, and prepared 
 to leave Finkenstein himself on the following 
 day, the 6th, when the movements of the ene- 
 my should be more decided, and his designs
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 305 
 
 more clearly indicated. He sent his house- 
 hold to Dantzig, as well as M. de Talleyrand, 
 who was quite unfit for the fatigues and dan- 
 gers of the head-quarters. 
 
 On the 6th, in fact, the Russian columns, 
 charged to prosecute the attack commenced 
 on the corps of Marshal Ney, were more 
 concentrated, in consequence of the offensive 
 movement which they had made on the pre- 
 ceding day, and Marshal Ney was about to 
 have upon his hands 30,000 infantry and 
 15,000 cavalry. After the losses sustained 
 on the preceding day, he could oppose but 
 15,000 men to the enemy. But he had pro- 
 vided beforehand for every contingency. He 
 had sent on his wounded and his baggage be- 
 yond Deppen, thai the road might be free, and 
 that his corps d'armee might not meet with any 
 obstacle on its passage. Instead of decamp- 
 ing in haste, Marshal Ney boldly waited for 
 the enemy, the brigades of which his two di- 
 visions were composed being ranged en eche- 
 lons, each extending beyond the other. Each 
 dchelon, before it retired, delivered its fire, fre- 
 quently even charging with the bayonet, and 
 leaving the next echelon to repress the Rus- 
 sians. On open ground, with troops less 
 steady, such a retreat would have ended in a 
 rout. But, owing to a skilful choice of posi- 
 tions, owing also to extraordinary firmness in 
 the men, Marshal Ney could take several hours 
 to traverse the space of less than two leagues. 
 Every moment he beheld a multitude of horse 
 rushing en masse upon his bayonets; but all 
 their efforts were foiled by his unyielding 
 squares. Having arrived near a small lake, 
 the enemy committed the blunder of dividing, 
 in order that one part might pass on the right 
 of the lake, the other part on the left. The 
 intrepid marshal, seizing the opportune mo- 
 ment, with equal resolution and presence of 
 mind, halted, resumed the offensive against 
 the divided enemy, charged him with vigour, 
 repulsed him to some distance, and thus ob- 
 tained time to regain quietly the bridge of 
 Deppen, behind which he should be protected 
 from all attack. On reaching that spot, he 
 placed his artillery advantageously, in ad- 
 vance of the Passarge, and, as soon as the 
 enemy attempted to show himself, he riddled 
 him with balls. 
 
 This action, which cost us some hundred 
 men, but the enemy twice or thrice as many, 
 heightened the admiration excited in both 
 armies by the intrepidity of Marshal Ney. 
 On our left, alone the Lower Passarge, the 
 Russian columns remained motionless, await- 
 ing the result of the action going on between 
 Guttstadt and Deppen. On our right, Marshal 
 Davout's corps, on march since the preceding 
 day, had proceeded without accident to the 
 flank of Marshal Ney, in order to support him, 
 or to gain Osterode. 
 
 With such lieutenants, with such soldiers, 
 the combinations of Napoleon had, besides 
 their merit of conception, the advantage of an 
 almost infallible execution. In the evening 
 of the 6th, Napoleon, having directed all that 
 were behind to Saalfeld, repaired thither him- 
 self, to judge of events from personal observa- 
 tion, to rally his lieutenants there if they were 
 
 Vox.. II. 39 
 
 repulsed, or to direct upon any one of them 
 the mass of his troops if they had maintained 
 their ground, in order to take the offensive, in 
 his turn, with an overwhelming superiority 
 of forces. On his arrival at Saalfeld, he 
 learned that the greatest tranquillity had pre- 
 vailed during the day; that, on the Upper 
 Passarge, the intrepid Ney had effected the 
 most successful retreat toward Deppen, and 
 that Marshal Davout was already on march 
 upon the right flank of Marshal Ney towards 
 Alt-Ramten. Things could not be going on 
 better. Next day, the 7th, Napoleon resolved 
 to go himself to Deppen, to the advanced posts, 
 and left orders for all the corps marching to 
 Saalfeld to follow him to Deppen. In the 
 evening of the 7th, he went to Alt-Reichau, 
 and, having again learned that all still con- 
 tinued quiet, he proceeded to Deppen, con- 
 gratulated Marshal Ney and likewise his 
 troops on their gallant conduct, saw the Rus- 
 sian army motionless as an army whose un- 
 decided commander is puzzled what course to 
 pursue, and ordered a strong demonstration, 
 in order to judge of his real intentions. The 
 Russians repulsed it in such a manner as to 
 prove that they were more disposed to fall 
 back than to persist in their offensive march. 
 General Benningsen, in fact, perceiving the 
 futility of the efforts directed against Marshal 
 Ney's corps, the little success gained on the 
 other points of the Passarge, and above all the 
 rapid concentration of the French army, was 
 soon aware that a more decided movement 
 upon Warsaw, with Napoleon on his right 
 flank, could not lead to any thing but disaster. 
 He determined, therefore, to pause. Having 
 passed the 7th at Guttstadt, in a perplexity 
 natural under such serious circumstances, he 
 determined at last to recross the Alle and pro- 
 ceed to Heilsberg, for the purpose of occupy- 
 ing the defensive position which he had long 
 since prepared there by means of good field- 
 works. On the 7th, at night, he prescribed to 
 his army a first retrograde movement to Quetz. 
 On the 8th, apprized of the march of most of 
 the French corps for Deppen, he was confirmed 
 in his resolution to retreat, and enjoined all 
 his divisions to descend the Alle and to pro- 
 ceed to Heilsberg. That part of his troops 
 which had advanced further between Guttstadt 
 and Deppen, was to slip away instantaneously, 
 by redrossing the Alle forthwith and gaining 
 Heilsberg by the right bank. Four bridges 
 were thrown over the Alle to facilitate this 
 passage. Prince Bagration was charged to 
 cover this retreat with his division and with the 
 Cossacks. The other columns, which had not 
 proceeded so far in that direction, were merely 
 to regain the position of Heilsberg by way of 
 Launau, and by the left bank. The most dis- 
 tant of the Russian columns, that of General 
 Kamenski, which, in conjunction with the 
 Prussians, had attacked the tele du pont of 
 Spanden, was ordered to retire by Mehlsack, 
 so that it would have to traverse the base of 
 the triangle formed by Spanden, Heilsherg and 
 Guttstadt. It left the Prussian infantry with 
 General Lestocq, and took their cavalry only 
 along with it. General Lestocq was to fall 
 back in rear to cover Konigsberg, with great 
 2 c 2
 
 306 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 danger of being cut off from the Russian 
 army ; for, following the sea-coast while Gene- 
 ral Benningsen followed the course of the 
 Alle, he should be from fifteen to eighteen 
 leagues distant from the latter. 
 
 In the night of the 8th, the Russian army 
 was in full retreat On the 9th, it finished 
 crossing the Passarge about Guttstadt, when 
 the French came up. A considerable portion 
 of our troops was in fact collected around 
 Deppen. Lannes, starling from Marienburg, 
 the guard from Finkenstein, Murat from Christ- 
 burg, and all arriving at Deppen in the even- 
 ing of the 8lh, formed, with Marshal Key's 
 corps, a mass of fifty to sixty thousand men. 
 They pressed the enemy closely. Murat's ca- 
 valry, swimming across the Alle, dashed after 
 Prince Bagration. The Cossacks showed more 
 mettle than usual, kept close together about 
 the Russian infantry, and sustained, bravely, 
 for partisans, the fire of our light artillery. 
 
 Meanwhile, Marshal Soult, crossing by Na- 
 poleon's order the Passarge at Elditten, fell in 
 with General Kamenski's corps near Wolfs- 
 dorf, overturned one of its detachments, and 
 took a great number of prisoners. Marshal 
 Davout, rectified in his direction, since the 
 army, instead of retiring, was marching for- 
 ward, drew near Guttstadt. Napoleon would 
 have there at hand the corps of Marshals Da- 
 vout, Ney, Lannes, Soult, besides the guard 
 and Murat, who never quitted him, and like- 
 wise Marshal Mortier, who was one march be- 
 hind. This formed a force of 126,000 men, 1 
 exclusively of Bernadotte's corps, which re- 
 mained on the Lower Passarge, and which it 
 was necessary to leave there for two or three 
 days to watch the conduct of the Prussians. 
 But, the Prussians, once thrust upon the rear 
 by our forward march, Napoleon could draw 
 in to him the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, and 
 thus have at his disposal 150,000 combatants, 
 being deprived of Massena's corps alone, which 
 was indispensable upon the Narew. General 
 Benningsen, on the contrary, separated like Na- 
 poleon from the corps left on the Narew, (18,000 
 men,) and doomed, in descending the Alle, to 
 separate himself from Lestocq, (18,000 men,) 
 would have to face Napoleon with the central 
 mass of his forces only, that is to say, with 
 about 100,000 men, weakened by six or seven 
 thousand killed and wounded left at the foot of 
 our intrenchments. 
 
 The plan of Napoleon was soon decided 
 upon, for that plan was the very consequence 
 of all that he had foreseen, willed, and prepared 
 for four months past. In fact since, by the 
 skilful disposition of his cantonments between 
 the Passarge and the Lower Vistula, by the 
 strong occupation of Braunsberg, Elbing, and 
 Marienburg, and by the taking of Dantzig, he 
 had rendered himself invincible on his left and 
 loward the sea, he had left no other course for 
 
 Davout 
 
 Ney 
 
 Lannes 
 
 Soult 
 
 The Guard 
 
 Murat 
 
 Mortier 
 
 30,000 
 
 15,000 
 
 15,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 8,000 
 
 lb,000 
 
 10,000 
 
 126,000 
 
 the Russians but to attack his right, that is to 
 say, to ascend the Alle, in order to threaten 
 Warsaw. Thenceforward his manoeuvre was 
 ready chalked out. He must, in his turn, push 
 forward, turn the enemy's right, separate him 
 from Konigsberg, throw him back upon the 
 Pregel, and without stopping, occupy by a de- 
 tachment that valuable depot, Konigsberg, 
 where the Russians had shut up their last re- 
 sources, and whither the English had sent the 
 succours promised to the coalition. The more 
 Russians he should find entangled on the upper 
 course of the Alle, the greater must be the re- 
 sult of that manoeuvre. They had indeed just 
 stopped abruptly for the purpose of re-descend- 
 ing the Alle by the right bank. But Napoleon 
 was about to descend it after them by the left 
 bank, with nearly a certainty of beating them 
 in speed, of arriving as soon as they at the 
 ccnflux of the Alle and the Pregel, and of in- 
 flicting upon them by the way some great dis- 
 aster, if they attempted to pass that river be- 
 fore him, in order to march to the rescue of 
 Konigsberg. 
 
 Views so long and so deeply reflected upon 
 must very quickly transmute themselves into 
 formal dispositions, and without the loss of a 
 single moment for deliberation. So early as 
 the 9th, Napoleon ordered Marshal Davoul to 
 join the right of the army immediately, Mar- 
 shal Ney to rest for a day at Guttstadt from 
 his severe combats, and then to rejoin Mar- 
 shal Soult, who was a little to the left, near 
 Launau, to march along the Alle to Heilsberg, 
 preceded and followed by Murat's cavalry, 
 Marshal Lannes to accompany Marshal Soult, 
 lastly, Marshal Mortier to quicken his pace 
 and form his junction with the bulk of the 
 army. He himself, with the guard, followed 
 this movement, and prescribed to Marshal 
 Bernadotte's corps, commanded temporarily 
 by General Victor, to concentrate itself on 
 the Lower Passarge, for the purpose of pro- 
 ceeding beyond it, as soon as the designs of 
 the enemy on our left should be more clearly 
 indicated. 
 
 Accordingly, on the 10th of June, the army 
 marched on the right bank of the Alle for 
 Heilsberg. It was obliged to cross a defile, 
 near a village called Beverniken. Here it 
 found a strong rear-guard, which was soon re- 
 pulsed, and debouched from it in sight of the 
 positions occupied by the Russian army. 
 
 After so many presumptuous demonstra- 
 tions, the enemy's general could not but feel a 
 temptation not to run away so swiftly, but to 
 stop and fight, especially in a position where 
 a great many precautions had been taken tc 
 render the chances of a great battle less dis- 
 advantageous. But it was far from wise, for 
 time became precious, if he wished not to be 
 cut off from Konigsberg. Pride, nevertheless, 
 drowning the voice of reason, General Ben- 
 ningsen resolved to wait before Heilsberg for 
 the French army. 
 
 Heilsberg is situated on the heights between 
 which runs the river Alle. Numerous re- 
 doubts had been erected on those heights. 
 They were occupied by the Russian army, 
 parted in two by the Alle. This very serious 
 inconvenience was redeemed by four bridges
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 307 
 
 constructed in well-sheltered nooks, and allow- 
 ing troops to be moved from one shore to the 
 other. As, according to all indications, the 
 French would come along the left bank, the 
 greater part of the Russian troops had been con- 
 centrated on that side. In the redoubts of the 
 right bank, General Benningsen had left only 
 the imperial guard and Bagration's division, 
 fatigued with the actions fought on the pre- 
 ceding days. Batteries had been disposed to 
 fire from one bank to the other. On the left 
 bank, by which we were to attack, was seen 
 the bulk of the enemy's army, under the pro- 
 tection of three redoubts bristling with artil- 
 lery. General Kamenski, who had joined on 
 the 10th, defended these redoubts. Behind, 
 and a little above, the Russian infantry was 
 drawn up in two lines. The first and third 
 battalion of each regiment, entirely deployed, 
 composed the first line. The second battalion 
 formed in column behind the former, and in 
 their intervals, composed the second. Twelve 
 battalions, placed a little farther off, were des- 
 tined for a reserve. On the prolongation of 
 this line of battle, and forming a hook to the 
 right behind, was the whole of the Russian 
 cavalry, reinforced by the Prussian cavalry, 
 and constituting a mass of squadrons beyond 
 all the usual proportions. Lastly, still further 
 on the right, towards Konegen, the Cossacks 
 were on the watch. Detachments of light in- 
 fantry occupied some patches of wood sprin- 
 kled here and there in front of the position. 
 Thus the French coming to Heilsberg had to 
 sustain in flank the fire of the redoubts of the 
 right bank, in front the fire of the redoubts of 
 the left bank, besides the attacks of a nume- 
 rous infantry, and the charges of a still more 
 numerous cavalry. But, impelled by the ar- 
 dour of success, persuaded that the enemy 
 was thinking only of flight, and eager to wrest 
 from him some trophies before he had time 
 to escape, they took no account either of num- 
 ber or of positions. This spirit was universal 
 among the soldiers as well as the generals. 
 Napoleon not being yet on the spot to repress 
 their ardour, Prince Murat and Marshal Soult, 
 on debouching upon Heilsberg, attacked the 
 Russians before they were followed by the 
 rest of the army. Prince Bagration, placed at 
 first on the right bank, was rapidly transferred 
 to the left bank, to defend the defile of Bever- 
 niken, and General Benningsen had ordered 
 General Ouwaroff to support him with twenty- 
 five squadrons. Marshal Soult, having forced 
 the defile, had taken care to place thirty-six 
 pieces of cannon in battery, which had greatly 
 facilitated the deploying of his troops. Carra- 
 St. Cyr's division first advanced in column by 
 brigades, and flung back the Russian infantry 
 beyond a ravine, descending from the village 
 of Lawden, to the Alle. Under favour of this 
 movement, Murat's cavalry was enabled to 
 deploy; but, harassed by fatigue, not being 
 yet entirely assembled, and attacked at the 
 moment when it was forming by the twenty- 
 five squadrons of General Ouwaroff, it los 
 ground, ran to the rear to form anew, again 
 charged, and regained the advantage. Carra- 
 St. Cyr's division bordered the ravine beyond 
 which it had flung the Russians. Cannonaded 
 
 n front by the redoubts of the left bank, in 
 lank by those of the right bank, it had suf- 
 >red severely. St. Hilaire's division came to 
 upply its place in the fire, passing in close 
 columns through the intervals of our line of 
 >attle. That brave division of St. Hilaire's 
 passed the ravine, drove back the Russians, 
 and followed them to the foot of the three re- 
 doubts which covered their centre, while Mu- 
 rat's cavalry fell upon the cavalry of Prince 
 Bagration, cut it in pieces, and killed General 
 Soring. During these transactions, Legrand's 
 division, the third of Marshal Soult's, had ar- 
 rived and taken position on our left, before 
 the village of Lawden. It had driven the 
 nemy's tirailleurs from the patches of wood 
 situated between the two armies, and it too 
 had reached the foot of the redoubts which 
 onstituted the strength of the Russians. 
 General Legrand then detached the 26th light 
 to attack that of the three redoubts which was 
 within his reach. That gallant regiment 
 dashed off at a run, carried the redoubt in 
 spite of General Kamenski's troops, and kept 
 possession of it, after an obstinate fight. But 
 the officer who commanded the enemy's artil- 
 lery, having had his guns drawn off at a gal- 
 lop, quickly removed them to the rear, to a 
 spot which commanded the redoubt, and co- 
 vered the 26th with grape, which made pro- 
 digious havoc. At the same moment, the 
 Russian General Warneck, perceiving the bad 
 plight of the 26th, rushed upon it at the head 
 of the Kaluga regiment, and retook the re- 
 doubt. The 55th, which formed the left of St. 
 Hilaire's division, and was next neighbour to 
 the 26th, came to its assistance, but could not 
 mend matters. It was obliged to rejoin its di 
 vision after losing its eagle. Our soldiers re 
 mained thus exposed to the fire of a numerous 
 and powerful artillery without flinching. Ge- 
 neral Benningsen then resolved to employ his 
 immense cavalry, and had several charges 
 made upon Legrand's and St. Hilaire's divi- 
 sions. They sustained those charges with 
 admirable coolness, and gave the French ca- 
 valry time to form behind them, and in its 
 turn to charge the Russian squadrons. Mar- 
 shal Soult, placed in the middle of one of the 
 squares, in which were mixed, pell-mell, 
 French and Russians, foot soldiers and dis- 
 mounted horse, kept all to their duty by the 
 energy of his attitude. Napoleon, who was 
 still at a distance from the theatre of this ac- 
 tion, as soon as he heard the guns, had given 
 General Savary the young fusiliers of the 
 guard, to go to the assistance of the corps 
 which had rashly engaged. General Savary, 
 hastening up, took position between St. Hi- 
 laire's and Legrand's divisions. Formed into 
 square, he sustained for a long time the 
 charges of the Russian cavalry, which a ter- 
 rible fire from the redoubts would have ren- 
 dered dangerous, if our troops had been less 
 firm, and not had such excellent officers. The 
 brave General Roussel, who was, sword in 
 hand, amidst the fusiliers of the guard, had 
 his head carried off by a cannon ball. This 
 imprudent action, in which 30,000 unsheltered 
 j French were opposed to 90,000 Russians pro- 
 i tected by redoubts, was kept up till the nigh*
 
 308 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 was far advanced. At length Marshal Lan- 
 ces appeared at the extreme right, strove to 
 earn something of the enemy's position, but 
 would not attempt any enterprise without 
 orders from the Emperor. The booming of 
 the guns soon ceased; the night was rainy, 
 and each, stretching himself on the ground, 
 sought to get a little rest The Russians, more 
 numerous and close than we, had sustained 
 a loss far superior to ours. They numbered 
 3000 killed, and seven or eight thousand 
 wounded. We had 2000 killed, and 5000 
 wounded. 
 
 Napoleon, arriving late, because he had not 
 supposed that the enemy would pause so soon 
 to resist him, was highly pleased with the en- 
 ergy of his troops, but far less with their ea- 
 gerness for fighting, and resolved to wait till 
 the morrow to give battle with his collected 
 forces, if the Russians should persist in de- 
 fending the position of Heilsberg, or to pursue 
 them to the utmost if they should decamp. 
 He bivouacked with his soldiers on the field 
 of carnage, where lay 18,000 Russians and 
 French, dead, dying, and wounded. 
 
 General Benningsen, a prey to acute pain 
 and to great perplexities, 1 passed the night at 
 the bivouac, wrapped in his cloak. It requires 
 a strong mind to defy at once physical pain 
 and moral pain. General Benningsen was ca- 
 pable of enduring both. Divided between the 
 satisfaction of having made head against the 
 French, and the fear of having them all upon 
 his hands on the morrow, he waited for day- 
 light before he decided what course to pursue. 
 Our troops, on their part, were astir by four 
 o'clock in the morning, picking up the wound- 
 ed, and exchanging musket-shots with the 
 enemy's advanced posts. Our carps d'armee 
 successively took their positions. Marshal 
 Lannes had placed himself the evening be- 
 fore on the left of Marshal Soult; the corps 
 of Marshal Davout began to show itself on the 
 left of Marshal Lannes, towards Grossendorf; 
 the guard, foot and horse, deployed on the 
 heights in rear; and every thing denoted a de- 
 cisive attack with formidable masses. This 
 sight, and particularly the appearance of the 
 corps of Marshal Davout, which turned at 
 Grossendorf the Russian army, and which 
 even seemed to be taking the direction of K5- 
 nigsberg, determined General Benningsen to 
 retreat. He was unwilling to lose at once a 
 day and a battle, and to run the risk of arriv- 
 ing perhaps too late, perhaps half destroyed, 
 to the relief of Konigsberg. General Kamen- 
 ski was to start first, in order to gain in time 
 the Konigsberg road, and to join the Prussians, 
 with whom he was accustomed to fight. Hav- 
 ing withdrawn from Heilsberg all that could 
 he removed, General Benningsen marched 
 himself with his army by the right bank of the 
 Alle, in the course of the i , th. He proceeded 
 in four columns for Bortenstein, the first post 
 beyond Heilsberg. His head-quarters had 
 long been fixed there. Napoleon spent part 
 of the day in observing that position, and, if 
 be did not exert his usual promptness in at- 
 
 I'lotho. the Russian historian, says that Genera! 
 -- was afflicted with the stone. 
 
 tacking, it was because he had no great incli- 
 nation to give battle on such ground, and had 
 no doubt that, by pushing forward his left, he 
 should oblige the Russian army to decamp by 
 a mere demonstration. Things having turned 
 out as he had foreseen, he entered Heilsberg 
 the same evening, and established himself 
 there with his guard. He found in the town 
 considerable magazines, many Russian wound- 
 ed, to whom he desired the same attention to 
 be paid as to the wounded French, and whose 
 number attested that the enemy's army had 
 lost on the preceding day from ten to eleven 
 thousand men. 
 
 The battle of Heilsberg could not make any 
 change in the plans of Napoleon. What he 
 had to do was still to tend to turn the Russians, 
 to cut them off from Konigsberg, and to take 
 advantage of the first false movement they 
 should make to get at that important place, 
 which was the base of their operation. They 
 had not presented themselves to him this time 
 in a situation that permitted him to crush 
 them, but the favourable opportunity for which 
 he was waiting could not fail to occur soon. 
 For its failure there could have been required 
 nothing less than that General Benningsen, in 
 the difficult position in which he was placed, 
 should not commit a fault. 
 
 In order the better to attain his aim, Napo- 
 leon somewhat modified his march. On pass- 
 ing Heilsberg, indeed on passing Launau, the 
 Alle turns to the right, making a thousand 
 windings, and forming a very long route if 
 you choose to follow its course, a route which, 
 moreover, carries you away from the sea and 
 from Konigsberg. General Benningsen stand- 
 ing in need of the Alle to appuy himself upon 
 it, was certainly obliged to follow its windings. 
 Napoleon, on the contrary, who wanted only 
 to find his enemy deprived of appui, and who 
 had especial occasion to take an intermediate 
 position between Konigsberg and the Alle, 
 whence he could send a detachment to KOnigs- 
 berg, without being at too great a distance 
 from that detachment, could leave the banks 
 of the Alle without inconvenience, nay, even 
 with advantage. In consequence, he resolved 
 to strike into an intermediate route, which he 
 had travelled in the preceding winter, that 
 from Landsberg to Eylau, which runs in a di- 
 rect line with the Pregel. On coming into 
 this road, beyond Eylau, that is to say, at Dom- 
 nau, you find yourself two marches from Ko- 
 nigsberg on the left, and on the right one 
 march only from the Alle and the town of 
 Friedland, because the Alle, turning westward 
 again after numerous windings, is nearer at 
 Friedland to Konigsberg than in any part of its 
 course. It was there that, with good luck and 
 skill, one must have the best chances of taking 
 Konigsberg with one hand, and striking the 
 Russian army with the other. 
 
 With this idea, Napoleon despatched Murat 
 with part of the cavalry to Landsberg. He 
 sent after him the corps of Marshals Soult and 
 Davout, destined to form the left wing of the 
 army, and to extend themselves to Kiinigsherg, 
 or to fall back upon the centre, if they were 
 wanted for fighting a battle. Napoleon left 
 upon the Alle the rest of his cavalry, com-
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 309 
 
 posed of chasseurs, hussars, and dragoons, for 
 the purpose of beating the banks of that river 
 and closely pursuing the enemy. He sent 
 through Landsberg for Eylau the corps of 
 Lannes, which he had at hand, that of Ney, 
 which had stopped a day at Guttstadt to rest 
 itself, that of Mortier, still one march behind- 
 hand, and made them advance each by a dif- 
 ferent track, to avoid encumbering, but so as 
 io be able to collect them in a few hours. 
 Lastly, the Prussians, retreating towards Ko- 
 nigsberg, no longer deserving any attention, 
 Bernadotte's corps, left provisionally on the 
 Lower Passarge, had orders to rejoin the army 
 immediately by Mehlsack and Eylau. 
 
 These dispositions, and many others relative 
 to the magazines, the ovens, the hospitals 
 which he purposed to organize at Heilsberg, 
 to the rich supplies of Dantzig, which he never 
 ceased to watch over, to the navigation of the 
 Frische-Haff, of which he took care to possess 
 himself, by closing the path of Pillau, and by 
 making the seamen of the guard cruise there 
 in shipping of the country these dispositions 
 detained Napoleon at Heilsberg the whole of 
 the 12th. During this interval, his corps were 
 marching, and it would be easy for him to 
 overtake them on horseback in a few hours. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, Napoleon him- 
 self repaired to Eylau. It was no longer that 
 Tast snow-clad, dull and dreary-looking plain, 
 which had been drenched with so much blood 
 on the 8th of February; it was a fertile and 
 smiling country, covered with green woods 
 and beautiful lakes, and studded with nume- 
 rous villages. The cavalry and the artillery 
 discovered with astonishment that,in the great 
 battle of Eylau, they had galloped on the sur- 
 face of the lakes then completely frozen. The 
 indications collected respecting the march of 
 General Benningsen were as uncertain as the 
 plans of that general. On the one hand, the 
 light cavalry had followed the main body of 
 the Russian army along the Alle, had seen it 
 between Bartenstein and Schippenbeil ; on the 
 other, it had been imagined that detachments 
 of the enemy had been perceived going to- 
 wards Konigsberg, and designing, according 
 to all appearances, to join General Lestocq, in 
 order to defend that city. From the whole of 
 these indications it could not but be concluded 
 that the Russian army was inclined to proceed 
 to Kiinigsberg, that for this purpose it would 
 quit the Alle, and that in this movement the 
 French would meet with it at Domnau. Na- 
 poleon then pushed Marshals Soult and Murat 
 with half the cavalry upon Kreuzburg, and 
 ordered them to march to Konigsberg and 
 make a sudden attack on it. He sent after 
 them Marshal Davout, who was to take an in- 
 termediate position, so as to join in a few 
 hours either Marshal Soult or the main body 
 of the army according to circumstances. He 
 immediately despatched Marshal Lannes from 
 Eyiau for Domnau, joined with him part of 
 the cavalry and of Grouchy's dragoons, with 
 orders to send parties as far as Fricdland, to 
 learn what the enemy was about, to ascertain 
 if he was or was not quitting the Alle, if he 
 was or was not going to the assistance of Ko- 
 nigsberg. Marshal Mortier, who had arrived 
 
 at Eylau, was sent off immediately for Dora 
 nau, and would arrive there a few hours after 
 Marshal Lannes. Marshal Ney, with his corps, 
 General Victor, with Bernadotte's, were at that 
 moment entering Eylau. Before he would 
 direct them either.upon Domnau or after Mar- 
 shals Lannes and Mortier, or upon Kiinigsberg 
 after Marshals Davout and Soult, Napoleon 
 waited till further reports of the cavalry 
 should throw a light on the real march of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In the evening of the 13th, the reconnois- 
 sances of the day left no further doubt that 
 General Benningsen had descended the Alle, 
 and appeared to be taking the road to Fried- 
 land, either to continue his march along the 
 Alle, or to leave there the banks of that river, 
 in order to gain Kiinigsberg. It was at Fried- 
 land, in fact, that he was likely to be tempted 
 to quit the Alle, because it is the point where 
 that river approaches nearest to Konigsberg. 
 Napoleon hesitated not a moment longer. He 
 despatched towards Lannes and Mortier all 
 that part of the cavalry which had not fol- 
 lowed Murat. and gave the command of it to 
 General Grouchy. He enjoined Lannes and 
 Mortier to proceed to Friedland, to make them- 
 selves masters of that town if they could, and 
 of the bridges of the Alle. He ordered Ney 
 and Victor to advance upon Domnau, to follow 
 Lannes and Mortier at a greater or less dis- 
 tance from Friedland, according to circum- 
 stances. He then marched ofl' his guard, and 
 resolved to start himself on horseback at day- 
 break, to be on the morrow, the 14th of June, 
 at the head of his assembled troops. That 
 day, the 14th of June, the anniversary of the 
 battle of Marengo, reminding him of the most 
 glorious day of his life, filled him with a secret 
 and joyful presentiment. He had not ceased 
 to believe in his good fortune, and that belief 
 was still well founded. 
 
 Lannes, arriving at Domnau a few hours 
 before Marshal Mortier, had forthwith sent the 
 9th hussars on reconnoissance to Friedland. 
 That regiment had penetrated into Friedland, 
 but, presently attacked by more than thirty 
 enemy's squadrons, which brought with them 
 a great quantity of light artillery, it had been 
 very roughly handled and obliged to flee to 
 Georgenau, an intermediate post between 
 Domnau and Friedland. On this intelligence, 
 Lannes despatched the light horse and the 
 Saxon cuirassiers to the assistance of the 9th 
 hussars, then set himself in march for Fried- 
 land, to fling back the enemy's cavalry beyond 
 the Alle, and to close the outlet by which it 
 seemed to be the intention of the Russian army 
 to proceed to the succour of Konigsberg. He 
 arrived there about one in the morning of the 
 14th, and, perceiving, as he thought, a consi- 
 derable quantity of troops amidst the darkness 
 of the night, he stopped at Posthenen, after 
 dislodging a detachment of the enemy that was 
 guarding that village. He was not strong 
 enough to occupy the town of Friedland itself 
 a very fortunate circumstance, for, by occu- 
 pying it he would have prevented an egregious 
 blunder of General Benningsen's, and snatched 
 from Napoleon one of his most splendid tri- 
 umphs.
 
 310 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 At this moment, in fact, the whole Russian 
 army was approaching Friedland, preceded by 
 thirty-three squadrons, eighteen of them be- 
 longing to the imperial guard, by the infantry 
 of that guard, and by twenty pieces of light 
 artillery. The main body of the army was to 
 enter in a few hours. General Benningsen, 
 aware that there was no time to be lost if he 
 would save Konigsberg, or at least save him- 
 self behind the Pregel, had marched the whole 
 night between the llth and the 12th, in order 
 to reach Bartenstein, given a few hours' rest 
 there to his soldiers, resumed his march for 
 Schippenbeil, arrived there on the 13th, and, 
 learning that the French had appeared at 
 Domnau, had hastened to reach Friedland, the 
 point where the Alle, as we have just observed, 
 approaches nearer to Konigsberg than in any 
 other part of its course. He had taken care 
 to send before him a strong advanced guard 
 of cavalry. 
 
 Lannes, established at Posthenen, could not 
 appreciate before daylight the importance of 
 the event that was preparing. In a country 
 so near the pole, twilight, in the month of June, 
 commences at two in the morning. It was 
 quite light by three o'clock. Marshal Lannes 
 soon distinguished the nature of the ground, 
 the troops which occupied it, and those which 
 were crossing the bridges of the Alle, for the 
 purpose of disputing with us the road to Ko- 
 nigsberg. 
 
 The course of the Alle, near the spot where 
 the two armies were about to meet, exhibits 
 numerous windings. We arrived by woody 
 hills, beyond which the ground gradually sinks 
 to the bank of the Alle. The ground at this 
 season is covered with rye of great height. 
 The Alle was seen on our right, pursuing its 
 way through the plain in many meanders, then 
 turning round Friedland, coming to our left, 
 and thus forming an elbow open on our side, 
 and the further end of which was occupied by 
 the town of Friedland. It was by the bridges 
 of Friedland, placed in this elbow of the Alle, 
 that the Russians came to deploy in the plain 
 opposite to us. They were seen distinctly 
 hurrying across the bridges, passing through 
 the town, debouching from the suburbs, and 
 drawing up in line of battle facing the heights. 
 A rivulet called the Mill Stream, running to- 
 wards Friedland, there formed a small pond, 
 then threw itself into the Alle, after dividing 
 that plain into two unequal halves. The half 
 situated on our left was the less extensive of 
 the two. It was that on which Friedland was 
 seated, between the Mill Stream and the Alle, 
 at the very corner of the elbow which we have 
 just described. 
 
 Marshal Lannes, in his haste to march, had 
 brought with him only Oudinot's voltigeurs 
 and grenadiers, the 9th hussars, Grouchy's 
 dragoons, and two regiments of Saxon cavalry. 
 He could not oppose more than 10,000 men 1 to 
 the enemy's advanced guard, which, succes- 
 sively reinforced, was treble that number, and 
 was soon to be followed by the whole Russian 
 army. Fortunately, the soil afforded numerous 
 
 Oudinot, 7000; Grouchy, 1800; 9th hussars, light 
 torse, and Sajjof. cuirassier"*, 1200: total, 10,000. 
 
 resources to the skill and courage of the illus- 
 trious marshal. In the centre of the position 
 which it was necessary to occupy in order to 
 bar the way against the Russians, was a vil- 
 lage, that of Posthenen, through which ran the 
 Mill Stream to pursue its course to Friedland. 
 Somewhat in rear rose a plateau, from which 
 the plain of the Alle might be battered. Lannes 
 placed his artillery there, and several battalions 
 of grenadiers to protect it On the right, a 
 thick wood, that of Sortlack, protruded in a 
 salient, and divided into two the space com- 
 prised between the village of Posthenen and 
 the banks of the Alle. There Lannes posted 
 two battalions of voltigeurs, which, dispersed 
 as tirailleurs", would be able to stop for a 
 long time troops not numerous and not very 
 resolute. The 9th hussars, Grouchy's dra- 
 goons, the Saxon cavalry, amounted to 3000 
 horse, ready to fall upon any column which 
 should attempt to penetrate that curtain of 
 tirailleurs. On the left of Posthenen, the line 
 of woody heights extended, gradually lowering 
 to the village of Heinrichsdorf, through which 
 ran the high road from Friedland to Konigs- 
 berg. This point was of great importance, for 
 the Russians, desirous to reach Konigsberg, 
 would of course obstinately dispute the road 
 thither. Besides, this part of the field of battle 
 being more open, was naturally more difficult 
 to defend. Lannes, who had not yet troops 
 sufficient to establish himself there, had placed 
 on his left, taking advantage of the woods and 
 heights, the rest of his battalions, thus ap- 
 proaching the houses of Heinrichsdorf with- 
 out being able to occupy them. 
 
 The fire, commenced at three in the morn- 
 ing, became all at once extremely brisk. Our 
 artillery, placed on the plateau of Posthenen, 
 under the protection of Oudinot's grenadiers, 
 kept the Russians at a distance, and made con- 
 siderable havoc among them. On the right, 
 our voltigeurs, scattered on the skirt of the 
 wood of Sortlack, stopped their infantry by an 
 incessant tirailleur fire ; and the Saxon horse, 
 directed by General Grouchy, had made several 
 successful charges against their cavalry. The 
 Russians having become threatening towards 
 Heinrichsdorf, General Grouchy, moving from 
 the right to the left, galloped thither, to dispute 
 with them the Konigsberg road, the important 
 point for the possession of which torrents of 
 blood were about to be spilt. 
 
 Though, in these first moments, Marshal 
 Lannes had but 10,000 men to oppose twenty- 
 five or thirty thousand, he maintained his 
 round, thanks to great skill and energy, and 
 also to the able concurrence of General Oudi- 
 not, commanding the grenadiers, and of Gene- 
 ral Grouchy, commanding the cavalry. But 
 the enemy reinforced himself from hour to 
 hour, and General Benningsen, on arriving at 
 Friedland, had suddenly formed the resolution 
 to give battle a very rash resolution, for it 
 would have been much wiser for him to con- 
 tinue to descend the Alle to the junction of 
 that river with the Pregel, and to take a posi- 
 tion behind the latter, with his left to Wehlau 
 his right to Konigsberg. It would have taken 
 him, it is true, another day to reach Konigs- 
 berg ; but he would not have risked a battle
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 311 
 
 against an army superior in number, in qua- 
 lity, better officered, and in a very unfavourable 
 situation for him, since he had a river at his 
 back, and he was very likely to be pushed into 
 the elbow of the Alle, with all that vigour of 
 impulsion of which the French army was ca- 
 pable. But, after losing a great deal of time 
 in gaining Konigsberg, General Benningsen 
 was extremely impatient to get thither, stimu- 
 lated, it is said, by the Emperor Alexander, 
 who had promised his friend, Frederick Wil- 
 liam, to save the last remnant of the Prussian 
 monarchy. He was moreover convinced that 
 the route by Friedland was infinitely shorter; 
 and lastly, he conceived that he should there 
 fall in with a detached, unsupported corps of 
 the French army, and that it might be possible 
 for him to crush that corps before he returned 
 to Konigsberg. He persuaded himself that 
 this was an unlooked-for favour offered him 
 by Fortune, of which it behoved him to avail 
 himself, and he resolved not to let it slip out 
 of his hands. 
 
 In consequence, he lost no time in having 
 three bridges thrown over the Alle, one above 
 and two below Friedland, in order to accelerate 
 the passage of his troops, and also to furnish 
 them with means of retreat. He lined with 
 artillery the right bank, by which he arrived, 
 and which commanded the left bank. Then, 
 nearly his whole army having debouched, he 
 disposed it in the following manner: In the 
 plain around Heinrichsdorf, on the right for 
 him, on the left for us, he placed four divisions 
 of infantry, under Lieutenant-general Gort- 
 schakoff, and the better part of the cavalry 
 under General Ouwarroff. The infantry was 
 formed in two lines. In the first were two bat- 
 talions of each regiment deployed, and a third 
 drawn up in close column behind the two 
 others, closing the interval which separated 
 them. In the second, the field of battle gradu- 
 ally narrowing the further it extended into the 
 angle of the Alle, a single battalion was de- 
 ployed and two were formed in close column. 
 The cavalry, ranged on the side and a little in 
 advance, flanked the infantry. On the left, 
 (the right of the French.) TWO Russian divi- 
 sions, of which the imperial guard formed 
 part, increased by all the detachments of chas- 
 seurs, occupied the portion of the ground com- 
 prised between the Mill Stream and the Alle. 
 They were drawn up in two lines but very 
 near each other, on account of the want of 
 room. Prince Bagration commanded them. 
 The cavalry of the guard was there, under 
 General Kollogribow. Four flying bridges had 
 been thrown across the Mill Stream, that it 
 might interrupt the communications between 
 the two wings as little as possible. The fourth 
 Russian division had been left on the other side 
 of the Alle, on the ground commanding the 
 left bank, to collect the army in case of disas- 
 ter, or to come and decide the victory, if it ob- 
 tained any commencement of success. The 
 Russians had more than two hundred pieces 
 of cannon upon their front, besides those which 
 were either in reserve or in battery on the right 
 bank. Their army, reduced to eighty or eighty- 
 two thousand men after Heilsberg, separated 
 at this time from Kamenski's corps and from 
 
 some detachments sent to Wehlau to guard th 
 bridges of the Alle, still amounted to seventy 
 two or seventy-five thousand men. 
 
 General Benningsen caused the mass of the 
 Russian army to be moved forward in the 
 order just described, so that, on getting out of 
 the elbow of the Alle, it might deploy, extend 
 its fires, and avail itself of the advantages of 
 number which it possessed at the beginning 
 of the battle. 
 
 The situation of Lannes was perilous, for he 
 had the whole Russian army upon his hands. 
 Fortunately, the time which had elapsed had 
 procured him some reinforcements. General 
 Nansouty's division of heavy cavalry, com- 
 posed of 3500 cuirassiers and carabineers, Du- 
 pas's division, which was the first of Mortier's 
 corps, and numbered 6000 foot-soldiers, lastly, 
 Verdier's division, which contained 7000 and 
 was the second of Lannes' corps, marched off 
 successively, had come with all possible expe- 
 dition. It was a force of twenty-six or twenty- 
 seven thousand men,i to fight 75,000. It was 
 seven in the morning, and the Russians, pre- 
 ceded by a swarm of Cossacks, who extended 
 their rides quite to our rear, advanced towards 
 Heinrichsdorf, where they already had infantry 
 and cannon. Lannes, appreciating the import- 
 ance of that post, sent thither the brigade 
 of Albert's grenadiers, and ordered General 
 Grouchy to secure possession of it at any rate. 
 General Grouchy, who had just been reinforced 
 by the cuirassiers, proceeded immediately to 
 the village. Without stopping to consider the 
 difficulty, he despatched the brigade of Milet's 
 dragoons to attack Heinrichsdorf, while Car- 
 rie's brigade turned the village, and the cui- 
 rassiers marched to support this movement. 
 Milet's brigade passed through Heinrichsdorf 
 at a gallop, drove out the Russian foot-soldiers 
 at the point of the sword, while Carrie's bri- 
 ade, going round it, took or dispersed those 
 who had saved themselves by flight. Four 
 pieces of cannon were taken. At this mo- 
 ment, the enemy's cavalry, coming to the as- 
 sistance of the infantry expelled from Hein- 
 richsdorf, rushed upon our dragoons and drove 
 them back. But Nansouty's cuirassiers charged 
 it in their turn, and threw it upon the Russian 
 infantry, which in this fray was obliged to 
 withhold its fire. Thus we remained masters 
 of Heinrichsdorf, in which the grenadiers of 
 Albert's brigade were established. 
 
 During these occurrences, Dupas's division 
 entered into line. Marshal Mortier, whose 
 horse was killed by a cannon-ball, the mo- 
 ment he appeared on the field of battle, placed 
 that division between Heinrichsdorf and Pos- 
 thenen, and opened on the Russians a fire of 
 artillery which, poured upon deep masses, 
 made prodigious havoc in their ranks. The 
 arrival of Dupas's division rendered disposable 
 those battalions of grenadiers which had a 
 
 i Oudinot 7000 
 
 Verdier 7000 
 
 Lannes' cavalry 1200 
 
 Dupas 6000 
 
 Nansouty 3500 
 
 Grouchy 1800 
 
 26.500
 
 312 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 first been drawn up to the left of Posthenen. 
 Lannes drew them nearer to him, and could 
 oppose their closer ranks to the attacks of the 
 Russians, either before Posthenen or before the 
 wood of Sortlack. General Oudinot, who com- 
 manded them, taking advantage of all the ac- 
 cidents of ground, sometimes from clumps of 
 wood scattered here and there, sometimes from 
 pools of water, produced by the rains of the 
 preceding days, sometimes from above the 
 corn, disputed the ground with equal skill and 
 energy. By turns he hid or exhibited his sol- 
 diers, dispersed them as tirailleurs, or exposed 
 them in a mass, bristling with bayonets, to all 
 the efforts of the Russians. Those brave gre- 
 na^iers, notwithstanding their inferiority in 
 number, kept up the fight, supported by their 
 general, when, luckily for them, Verdier's divi- 
 sion arrived. Marshal Lannes divided it into 
 two movable columns, to be sent alternately 
 to the right, to the centre, to the left, wherever 
 the danger was most pressing. It was the skirt 
 of the wood of Sortlack and the village of the 
 same name, situated on the Alle, that were the 
 most furiously disputed. In the end, the Rus- 
 sians remained masters of the village, the 
 French, of the skirts of the wood. When the 
 Russians attempted to penetrate into that wood, 
 Lannes, making a brigade of Verdier's divi- 
 sion sallying from it on a sudden, drove them 
 back to a distance. Terrified by these start- 
 ling appearances, fearing that Napoleon was 
 lying concealed with his army in this myste- 
 rious wood, they durst no longer venture to 
 approach it. 
 
 The enemy, unable to force our right be- 
 tween Posthenen and Sortlack, made a vigor- 
 ous attempt on our left in the plain of Hein- 
 richsdorf, which presented few obstacles. The 
 nature of the ground having induced them to 
 direct the greater part of their cavalry to that 
 side, they had there more than 12,000 horse to 
 oppose to General Grouchy's five or six thou- 
 sand. The latter, studying to compensate in- 
 feriority of number by skilful dispositions, 
 deployed in the plain a long line of cuirassiers, 
 and on the flank of that line, behind the vil- 
 lage of Heinrichsdorf, he placed in reserve 
 the dragoons, the brigade of the carabineers, 
 and the light artillery. These dispositions 
 completed, he put himself at the head of the 
 deployed line of his cuirassiers, advanced upon 
 the Russian cavalry as if going to charge it, 
 then, suddenly facing about, he affected to re- 
 tire at a trot before the mass of the enemy's 
 squadrons. In this manner, he enticed them 
 to follow him, till, having passed Heinrichs- 
 dorf, they offered their flank to the troops con- 
 cealed behind that village. Then halting and 
 wheeling round, he Jed back his cuirassiers 
 upon the Russian cavalry, charged it, over- 
 turned it, obliged it to pass back under Hein- 
 richsdorf, whence burst a shower of grape, and 
 from which the dragoons and carabineers in 
 ambush rushed upon it and finished by throw- 
 ing it into disorder. But the encounters of 
 troops on horseback are never so destructive 
 as to prevent the repetition of them. The Rus- 
 sian cavalry, therefore, returned to the charge, 
 anrl General Grouchy, practising each time the 
 same manoeuvre, drew it beyond Heinrichsdorf, 
 
 and caused it to be taken in flank and rear in 
 the way that we have already seen, as soon as 
 it was past the village. After several encoun- 
 ters, the plain of Heinrichsdorf remained in 
 our hands, covered with dead men and 
 horses, dismounted riders, and glistening 
 cuirasses. 
 
 Thus, on the one hand, the resistance which 
 the Russian infantry met with at the skirts of 
 the wood of Sortlack, and on the other the 
 flank attacks to which their cavalry was ex- 
 posed, when it passed the village of Hein- 
 richsdorf, kept them at the foot of our posi- 
 tions, and Lannes was enabled to prolong till 
 noon this conflict of 26,000 men against 75,000. 
 But it was high time for Napoleon to arrive 
 with the rest of his army. 
 
 Lannes, anxious to apprize him of what 
 was passing, had sent to him almost all his 
 aides-de-camp, one after another, ordering 
 them to get back to him without loss of time, 
 if they killed their horses. They found him 
 coming at a gallop to Friedland, and full of a 
 joy that was expressed in his countenance. 
 " This is the 14th of June," he repeated to 
 those whom he met ; " it is the anniversary of 
 Marengo; it is a lucky day for us!" Napo- 
 leon, outstripping his troops through the speed 
 of his horse, had successively passed the long 
 files of the guard, of Ney's corps, of Berna- 
 dotte's corps, all marching for Posthenen. He 
 had saluted in passing, Dupont's fine division, 
 which, from Ulm to Braunsberg, had never 
 ceased to distinguish itself, though never in 
 his presence, and he had declared that it 
 would give him great pleasure to see it fight 
 for once. 
 
 The presence of Napoleon at Posthenen 
 fired his soldiers and his generals with fresh 
 ardour. Lannes, Mortier, Oudinot, who had 
 been there since morning, and Ney, who had 
 just arrived, surrounded him with the most 
 lively joy. The brave Oudinot hastening up 
 with his coat perforated by balls, and his 
 horse covered with blood, exclaimed to the 
 Emperor: "Make haste, Sire, my grenadiers 
 are knocked up; but, give me a reinfoicement, 
 and I will drive all the Russians into the wa- 
 ter." Napoleon, surveying with his glass that 
 plain, where the Russians, backed in the elbov 
 of the Alle, were endeavouring in vain to de 
 ploy, soon appreciated their perilous situation 
 and the unique occasion offered him by For- 
 tune, swayed, it must be confessed, by his ge- 
 nius ; for the fault which the Russians were 
 committing had been inspired, as it were, by 
 him, when he pushed them from the other side 
 of the Alle, and thus forced them to pass it 
 before him, in going to the relief of Konigs- 
 berg. The day was far advanced, and it 
 would take several hours to collect all the 
 French troops. Some of Napoleon's lieuten- 
 ant's were, therefore of opinion that they ought 
 to defer fighting a decisive battle till the mor- 
 row. " No, no," replied Napoleon, " one does 
 not catch an enemy twice in such a scrape." 
 He immediately made his dispositions for the 
 attack. They were worthy of his marvellous 
 perspicacity. 
 
 To drive the Russians into the Alle was 
 the aim which every individual, ilown to the
 
 June 1307.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPlKfc. 
 
 313 
 
 meanest soldier, assigned to the battle. But I 
 how to set about it, how to ensure that result, f 
 and how to render it as great as possible, was 
 the question. At the farthest extremity of this 
 elbow of the Alle, in which the Russian army 
 was engulphed, there was a decisive point to 
 occupy, namely, the little town of Freidland 
 itself, situated on our right, between the Mill 
 Stream and the Alle. There were the four 
 bridges, the sole retreat of the Russian army, 
 and Napoleon purposed to direct his utmost 
 efforts against that point. He destined for 
 Ney's corps the difficult and glorious task of 
 plunging into that gulf, of carrying Friedland 
 at any rate, in spite of the desperate resist- 
 ance which the Russians would not fail to 
 make, of wresting the bridges from them, and 
 thus barring against them the only way of 
 safety. But at the same time he resolved, 
 while acting vigorously on his right, to sus- 
 pend all efforts on his left, to amuse the Russian 
 army on that side with a feigned fight, and not 
 to push it briskly on the left till, the bridges 
 being taken on the right, he should be sure, 
 by pushing it, to fling it into a receptacle with- 
 out an outlet. 
 
 Surrounded by his lieutenants, he explained 
 to them, with that energy and that precision 
 of language which were usual with him, the 
 part which each of them had to act in that 
 battle. Grasping the arm of Marshal Ney, 
 and pointing to Friedland, the bridges, the 
 Russians crowded together in front, " Yonder 
 is the goal," said he; "march to it without 
 looking about you: break into that thick 
 mass, whatever it costs you ; enter Friedland, 
 take the bridges, and give yourself no concern 
 about what may happen on your right, on 
 your left, or on your rear. The army and I 
 shall be there to attend to that." 
 
 Ney, boiling with ardour, proud of the for- 
 midable task assigned to him, set out at a gal- 
 lop to arrange his troops before the wood of 
 Sortlack. Struck with his martial attitude, 
 Napoleon, addressing Marshal Mortier, said, 
 " That man is a lion I" 1 
 
 On the same ground, Napoleon had his dis- 
 positions written down from his dictation, that 
 
 I got these particulars from Marshal Mortier, with 
 whom I had the honour to be acquainted, and who has 
 often related them to me himself. 
 
 Nothing is more difficult than to compute, with strict 
 accuracy, the force of an army on a day of battle. One 
 rarely has authentic staiements, and when one can pro- 
 cure such, it is still more rarely that such statements 
 agree with reality. M. Derode, in an excellent paper 
 on the battle of Friedland, has made use of a statement 
 extracted from the work of General Mathieu Dumas a 
 statement which, though derived from the depdt of war, 
 is incorrect in several particulars. In the offices of the 
 ministry in Paris were drawn up statements, with 
 which the facts occurring on the Vistula did not always 
 correspond. There exists in the Louvre, in the rich 
 depot of the papers of Napoleon, memorandum books, 
 kept by himself, which he always had at hand, and 
 which, renewed month by month, contained an accu- 
 rate description of each of the corps acting under his 
 command. The leaves of these books have writing on 
 one side only, and on the other are sometimes given, in 
 red ink, the changes that happened in the course of the 
 month. It is in these little books, but on condition of not 
 taking even them for absolute ground- work, and on con- 
 dition of incessantly modifying their data, by the appre- 
 ciation of the 'circumstances of the moment it is in 
 these little books, we say, that one may look for the 
 approximative truth. I have not found those for the 
 months of May, June, and July, ISO? ; I have therefore 
 VOL. II 40 
 
 each of his generals might have them bodily 
 present to his mind, and not be liable to devi- 
 ate from them. He ranged, than, Marshal 
 Ney's corps on the right, so that Lannes, 
 bringing back Verdier's division upon Posthe- 
 nen, could present two strong lines with that 
 and the grenadiers. He placed Bernadotte's 
 corps (temporarily Victor's) between Ney 
 and Lannes, a little in advance of Posthenen, 
 and partly hidden by the inequalities of the 
 ground. Dupont's fine division firmed the 
 head of this corps. On the plat< au behind 
 Posthenen, Napoleon established the imperial 
 guard, the infantry' in three close columns, 
 the cavalry in two lines. Between Posthenen 
 and Heinrichsdorf was the corps of Marshal 
 Mortier, posted as in the morning, but more 
 concentrated, and augmented by the young 
 fusiliers of the imperial guard. A battalioa 
 of the 4th light infantry, and the regiment of 
 the municipal guard of Paris, had taken the 
 place of the grenadiers of the Albert brigade 
 in Heinrichsdorf. Dombrowski's Polish divi- 
 sion had joined Dupas's division, and guarded 
 the artillery. Napoleon left to General Grou- 
 chy the duty of which he had already so ably 
 acquitted himself, that of defending the plain 
 of Heinrichsdorf. To the dragoons and the 
 cuirassiers commanded by that general he 
 added the light cavalry of Generals Beaumont 
 and Colbert, to assist him to rid himself of 
 the Cossacks. Lastly, having two more divi- 
 sions of dragoons to dispose of, he placed that 
 of General Latour Maubourg, reinforced by 
 the Dutch cuirassiers, behind the corps of 
 Marshal Ney, and that of General La Hous- 
 saye, reinforced by the Saxon cuirassiers, be- 
 hind Victor's corps. The French in this im- 
 posing order amounted to no fewer than 
 80,000 men.2 The order was repeated to 
 the left not to advance, but merely to keep 
 back the Russians till the success of the 
 right was decided. Napoleon required that 
 before the troops recommenced firing, they 
 should wait for the signal from a battery of 
 twenty pieces of cannon placed above Pos 
 thenen. 
 
 The Russian general, struck by this deploy- 
 
 been obliged to resort to those for the months of March 
 and August, though that for March is too incomplete, 
 for the army had not then received all the reinforce- 
 ments which arrived in May and June; and though 
 that of the month of August is too complete, on the con- 
 trary, for al that period a considerable portion of forces, 
 on march during the events of June, had joined. But, 
 by using these statements, by comparing them, by recti- 
 fying them above all by Napoleon's correspondence, 
 and by enlightening one's self, in regard to the battle of 
 Friedland, by a note in his own handwriting, which 
 gives the strength of several of the corps that figure in 
 that battle, one arrives at the following computation, 
 which I believe to be very near the truth. I will add 
 that this approximation to the truth is sufficient ; for, to 
 judge of a great event like Friedland or Austerlitz, it is 
 of little importance to ascertain whether there were 80 
 or 82 thousand men who fought. Two or three thou- 
 sand combatants more or less, make no change either 
 in the character of the event or in the combination* 
 which decided it. If the historian ought not to spate 
 any pains to arrive at the absolute truth, it is because 
 he ought to make a constant habit of it, in order that he 
 may never sutler the scrupulous regard for truth to be 
 relaxed in him ; but the important point is the charactei, 
 not the minute detail of things. 
 
 The most probable computation, then, of the force of 
 the French army in the battle of Friedland, is as fol 
 lows: 
 
 ftti
 
 314 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807 
 
 ment, discovered the mistake which he had 
 committed in supposing that he had to do with 
 but the single corps of Marshal Lannes ; he 
 was surprised, and naturally hesitated. His 
 hesitation had produced a sort of slackening 
 in the action. Scarcely did occasional dis- 
 charges of artillery indicate the continuance 
 of the battle. Napoleon, who desired that all 
 his troops should have got into line, rested for 
 at least an hour, and, being abundantly sup- 
 plied with ammunition, was in no hurry to 
 begin, and resisted the impatience of his ge- 
 nerals, well knowing that, as at this season, in 
 this country, it was light till ten in the even- 
 ing, he should have time to subject the Rus- 
 sian army to the disaster that he was prepar- 
 ing for it. At length, the fit moment appear- 
 ing to him to have arrived, he gave the signal. 
 The twenty pieces of cannon of the battery of 
 Posthenen fired at once ; the artillery of the 
 army answered them along the whole line ; 
 and, at this impatiently-awaited signal, Mar- 
 shal Ney moved off his corps d'armee. 
 
 From the wood of Sortlack issued Mar- 
 chand's division, advancing the first to the 
 right, Bisson's division the second to the left. 
 
 Both were preceded by a storm of tirailleurs, 
 who, as they approached the enemy, fell back 
 and returned into the ranks. These troops 
 marched resolutely up to the Russians, and 
 took from them the village of Sorllack, so long 
 disputed. Their cavalry, in order to stop our 
 offensive movement, made a charge on Mar- 
 chand's division. But Latour-Maubourg's 
 dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, passing 
 through the intervals of our battalions, charged 
 that cavalry in their turn, drove it back upon 
 its infantry, and, pushing the Russians against 
 the Alle, precipitated a great number into the 
 deeply embanked bed of that river. Some 
 saved themselves by swimming; many were 
 drowned. 1 His right once appuyed on the 
 Alle, Marshal Ney slackened its march, and 
 pushed forward his left, formed by Bisson's 
 division, in such a manner as to thrust back 
 the Russians into the narrow space comprised 
 between the Mill Stream and the Alle. When 
 arrived at this point, the fire of the enemy's 
 artillery redoubled. The French had to sus- 
 tain not only the fire of the batteries in front, 
 but also the fire of those on the right bank of 
 the Alle ; and it was impossible to get rid of 
 
 The guard, though increased to 9000 men, had 
 not in its ranks either the seamen or the dra- 
 goons, and had sustained a considerable loss 
 in fusiliers. It numbered of men present, at 
 
 most 
 
 The note in the hand-writing of 
 Napoleon, mentioned above, com- 
 putes Oudinot's grenadiers at, men 
 
 present 7000 
 
 Verdier's division at 8000 
 
 The Saxon infantry at 4000 
 
 The ninth hussars at 400 
 
 The Saxon cuirassiers at 600 
 
 The Saxon light-horse at 200 
 
 Making for the whole corps of Lan 
 
 nes a total of 20,200 
 
 But the Saxons had been left at Heilsberg, ex- 
 cepting, however, three battalions, which, 
 according to some accounts, were at Fried- 
 land. Verdier's division had sustained con- 
 siderable loss at Heilsberg, and lastly, the 
 troops had marched very fast. I think, there- 
 fore, that we shall be about the mark, if we 
 set down Lannes' corps as follows : 
 
 Oudinot 7000 
 
 Verdier 6500 
 
 Saxons 1200 
 
 Cavalry 1200 
 
 15,900 
 
 (The artillery is included in the divi- 
 sions of infantry.) 
 
 Lannes 
 
 Marshal Ney's corps amounted to 16 or 17 thou- 
 sand men present under arms at the moment 
 of taking the field, which is proved by a letter 
 from Marshal Ney to Napoleon. He had lost 
 not fewer than from 2000 to 2500 men, killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners, in the battles of Gutt- 
 stadt and Deppen. Taking marches into ac- 
 count, it amounted then, at most, to 
 
 Marshal Mortier, according to the 
 note of Napoleon's already men- 
 tioned, had in Dupas's division 6400 
 
 In Dombrowski's division 4000 
 
 He had a detachment of Dutch horse, 
 the designation of which is uncer- 
 tain, in the note referred to 1500 
 
 11,900 
 
 When we know from Marshal Lefebvre's letters 
 how the Poles behaved, and how steadily they 
 followed the colours, we cannot set down 
 
 Marshal Mortier's corps at more than 
 
 The corps of Marshal Bernadotte, commanded 
 by General Victor, had in March, without the 
 div.mon of dragoons, about 22,000 men present 
 
 7,500 
 
 Amount brought forward 47,400 
 
 under arms. It was allerwards recruited, 
 but had left behind several posts ; and if it 
 amounted to 25,000 men, it could not have 
 
 taken to Friedlaud above 22,000 
 
 The cavalry comprehended General 
 Nansouty's cuirassiers, from whom 
 must be deducted the losses on 
 
 march, at Heilsberg, &c. 3500 
 
 General Grouchy's dragoons 1800 
 
 General La Houssaye's dragoons- 1800 
 General Lalour-Maubourg's dragoons, 
 
 ^ forming six regiments 2400 
 
 The light cavalry of Generals Beau- 
 mont and Colbert 2000 
 
 11,500 
 
 Thus we find for the total of the army 
 
 80,900 
 
 15,900 
 
 14,000 
 
 I think, therefore, we may say that the French army 
 was about 80,000 men at the battle of Friedlancl, 25,000 
 of whom, as we shall see, never fired a shot. There 
 were, further, the corps of Marshal Davout, which had 
 not fought, and which amounted to 29 or 30 thousand 
 men, at the opening of the campaign, to 28,000, if 
 we allow for those left behind on march; Marshal 
 Soult's, which had lost about 5000 men at Heilsberg, 
 and could scarcely exceed 27.000; lastly, Mural, with 
 about 10,000 men, which would make the total of the 
 army in action at the moment 
 
 At Friedland 80,000 
 
 Before Konigsberg, or on march vut- ' ' 
 for that city 
 
 Total 
 
 145,000 
 
 10,000 
 
 A mount carried forward 47,400 
 
 This total of 145,000 men in action would correspond 
 well both with the forces existing on the 5th of June, 
 and with the probable losses sustained in the various 
 fights since the 5th of June. Reckoning these losses at 
 12 or 15 thousand men, killed, wounded, prisoners, or 
 laggards, we shall again find the 160.000 men composing 
 the army at the opening of the campaign. Though these 
 numbers are taken from the only documents worthy of 
 credit documents rectified, modified, by a correspond- 
 ence of each day, we consider them as approximative, 
 and nothing more. And, if we have entered into these 
 details, it is to convey an idea of the difficulty of arriv- 
 ing at strict accuracy in matters of this kind. But, wo 
 repeat it, if the historian, in order never to relax in his 
 duty, ought to aspire to the strict truth, posterity, in 
 reading him, judging from his elTbrts, can feel satisfied, 
 in regard to numbers and details, of the general truth. 
 It is this general truth which is of importance to him, 
 which is sufh'cient for him, for it is that which consti- 
 tutes the real character of thing? and of events. 
 
 i Two thousand, says Marshal Ney, in his report
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 815 
 
 the latter by taking them, as they were sepa- 
 rated from them by the deep bed of the river. 
 Our columns, battered at once in front and 
 flank by the balls, endured with admirable 
 coolness this terrible convergence of fires. 
 Marshal Ney, galloping from one end of the 
 line to the other, kept up the courage of his 
 soldiers by his heroic bearing. Meanwhile, 
 whole files were swept away, and the fire be- 
 came so severe that the very bravest of the 
 troops could no longer endure it. At this 
 sight, the cavalry of the Russian guard, com- 
 manded by General Kollogribow, dashed off 
 at a gallop, to try to throw into disorder the 
 infantry of Bisson's division, which appeared 
 to waver. Staggered for the first time, that 
 valiant infantry gave ground, and two or three 
 battalions threw themselves in rear. General 
 Bisson, who, from his stature, overlooked the 
 lines of his soldiers, strove in vain to detain 
 them. They retired, grouping themselves 
 around their officers. The situation soon be- 
 came most critical. Luckily, General Dupont, 
 placed at some distance on the left of Ney's 
 corps, perceived this commencement of disor- 
 der, and, without waiting for directions to 
 march, moved off his division, passing in 
 front of it, reminding it of Ulm, Dirristein and 
 Halle, and taking it to encounter the Russians. 
 It advanced, in the finest attitude, under the 
 fire of that tremendous artillery, while Latour- 
 Maubourg's dragoons, returning to the charge, 
 fell upon the Russian cavalry, which had scat- 
 tered in pursuit of our foot-soldiers, and suc- 
 ceeded in the attempt to drive it back. Du- 
 pont's division, continuing its movement on 
 that open ground, and, supporting its left on 
 the Mill Stream, brought the Russian infantry 
 to a stand. By its presence it filled Ney's 
 soldiers with confidence and joy. Bisson's 
 battalions formed anew, and our whole line, 
 re-invigorated, began to march forward again. 
 It was necessary to reply to the formidable 
 artillery of the enemy, and Ney's artillery 
 was so very inferior in number, that it could 
 scarcely stand in battery before that of the 
 Russians. Napoleon ordered General Victor 
 to collect all the guns of his divisions, and to 
 range them in mass on the front of Ney. The 
 skilful and intrepid General Senarmont com- 
 manded that artillery. He moved it off at full 
 trot, joined it to that of Marshal Ney, took it 
 some hundred paces ahead of our infantry, 
 and, daringly placing himself in face of the 
 Russians, opened upon them a fire, terrible 
 from the number of the pieces and the accu- 
 racy of aim. Directing one of his batteries 
 against the right bank, he soon silenced those 
 which the enemy had on that side. Then, 
 pushing forward his line of artillery, he gra- 
 dually approached to within grape-shot range, 
 and, firing upon the deep masses, crowding 
 together as they fell back into the elbow of the 
 Alle, he made frightful havoc among them. 
 Our line of infantry followed this movement, 
 and advanced under the protection of General 
 Senarmont's numerous guns. The Russians, 
 thrust further and further back into this gulf, 
 felt a sort of despair, and made an effort to 
 extricate themselves. Their imperial guard, 
 appuyed upon the Mill Stream, issued from 
 
 that retreat, and marched, with bayonet fixed, 
 upon Dupont's division, also placed along the' 
 rivulet. The latter, without waiting for the 
 imperial guard, went to meet it, repulsed it 
 with the bayonet, and forced it back to the 
 ravine. Thus driven, some of the Russians 
 threw themselves beyond the ravine, the others 
 upon the suburbs of Friedland. General Du- 
 pont, with part of his division, crossed the 
 Mill Stream, drove before him all that he met, 
 found himself on the rear of the right wing 
 of the Russians engaged with our left in the 
 plain of Heinrichsdorf, turned Friedland, and 
 attacked it by the Konigsberg road; while 
 Ney, continuing to march straight forward, 
 entered by the Eylau road. A terrible conflict 
 ensued at the gates of the town. The assail- 
 ants pressed the Russians in all quarters ; 
 they forced their way into the streets in pur- 
 suit of them ; they drove them upon the bridges 
 of the Alle, which General Senarmont's artil- 
 lery, left outside, enfiladed with its shot. The 
 Russians rushed upon the bridges lo seek 
 refuge in the ranks of the fourteenth division, 
 left, in reserve, on the other side of the Alle, 
 by General Benningsen. That unfortunate 
 general, full of grief, had hurried to this divi- 
 sion, with the intention of taking it to the 
 bank of the river to the assistance of his en- 
 dangered army. Scarcely had some wrecks 
 of his left wing passed the bridges, when those 
 bridges were destroyed set on fire by the 
 French, and, by the Russians themselves, in 
 their anxiety to stop us. Ney and Dupont, 
 having performed their task, met in the heart 
 of Friedland in flames, and congratulated one 
 another on this glorious success. 
 
 Napoleon, placed in the centre of the di- 
 visions which he kept in reserve, had never 
 ceased to watch this grand sight. While he 
 was contemplating it attentively, a ball passed 
 at the height of the bayonets, and a soldier, 
 from an instinctive movement, stooped his 
 head. If that ball were destined for you," 
 said Napoleon, smiling, " though you were to 
 burrow a hundred feet under ground, it would 
 be sure to find you there." Thus he wished 
 to give currency to that useful belief that 
 Fate strikes the brave and the coward without 
 distinction, and that the coward who seeks a 
 hiding-place disgraces himself to no purpose. 
 
 On seeing that Friedland was occupied and 
 the bridges of the Alle destroyed, Napoleon at 
 length pushed forward his left upon the right 
 wing of the Russian army, deprived of all 
 means of retreat, and having behind it a river 
 without bridges. General GortschakofF, who 
 commanded that wing, perceived' the danger 
 with which he was threatened, and, thinking to 
 dispel the storm, made an attack on the French 
 line, extending from Posthenen to Heinrichs- 
 dorf, formed by the corps of Marshal Lannes, 
 by that of Mortier, and by General Grouchy's 
 cavalry. But Lannes, with his grenadiers, 
 made head against the Russians. Marshal 
 Mortier, with the 15th and the fusiliers of the 
 guard, opposed to them an iron barrier. Mor- 
 tier's artillery, in particular, directed by Colonel 
 Balbois and an excellent Dutch officer, M. Van- 
 briennen, made incalculable, havoc among 
 them. At length, Napoleon, anxious to take
 
 316 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 advantage of the rest of the day, carried for- 
 ward his whole line. Infantry, cavalry, artil- 
 lery, started all at once. General Gortscha- 
 koff, while he found himself thus pressed, was 
 informed that Friedland was in the possession 
 cf the French. In hopes of retaking it, he 
 despatched a column of infantry to the gates 
 of the town. That column penetrated into it, 
 and for a moment drove back Dupont's and 
 Ney's soldiers ; but these repulsed in their turn 
 the Russian column. A new fight took place 
 in that unfortunate town, and the possession 
 of it was disputed by the light of the flames 
 that were consuming it. The French finally 
 remained masters, and drove GortschakofTs 
 corps into that plain without thoroughfare 
 which had served it for field of battle. Gorts- 
 chakoff s infantry defended itself with intre- 
 pidity, and threw itself into the Alle rather 
 than surrender. Part of the Russian soldiers 
 were fortunate enough to find fordable pas- 
 sages, and contrived to escape. Another 
 drowned itself in the river. The whole of the 
 artillery was left in our hands. A column, 
 the furthest on the right (right of the Russians) 
 fled and descended the Alle, under General 
 Lambert, with a portion of the cavalry. The 
 darkness of the night and the inevitable dis- 
 order of victory facilitated its retreat, and en- 
 abled it to escape from our hands. 
 
 It was half-past ten at night. The victory 
 was complete on the left and on the right. 
 Napoleon, in his vast career, had not gained a 
 more splendid one. He had for trophies 80 
 pieces of cannon, few prisoners, it is true, for 
 the Russians chose rather to drown themselves 
 than to surrender, but 25,000 men, killed, 
 wounded, or drowned, covered with their bodies 
 both banks of the Alle. The right bank, to 
 which great numbers of them had dragged 
 themselves, exhibited almost as frightful a 
 scene of carnage as the left bank. Several 
 columns of fire, rising from Friedland and the 
 neighbouring villages, threw a sinister light 
 over that place, a theatre of anguish for some, 
 of joy for others. On our side we had to re- 
 gret upward of seven or eight thousand men, 
 killed or wounded. Out of about 80,000 French, 
 25,000 had not fired a shot. The Russian 
 army, deprived of 25,000 combatants, weak- 
 ened, moreover, by a great number of men 
 who had lost their way, was thenceforward 
 incapable of keeping the field. Napoleon had 
 owed this glorious triumph as much to the 
 general conception of the campaign as to the 
 plan itself of the battle. In taking for several 
 months past the Passarge for base, in thus se- 
 curing to himself beforehand in all cases the 
 means of separating the Russians from Kii- 
 nigsberg, in marching from Guttstadt to Fried- 
 land in such a manner as constantly to out- 
 wing them, he had obliged them to commit a 
 great imprudence in order to reach Kiinigs- 
 berg, and had deserved from fortune the lucky 
 chance of finding them at Friedland backed 
 upon the river Alle. Always disposing his 
 masses with consummate skill, he had con- 
 trived, while sending sixty and odd thousand 
 men to Konigsberg, to bring forward 80,000 
 U Friedland. And, as we have just seen, 
 
 there was no need for so many to overwhelm 
 the Russian army. 
 
 Napoleon slept on the field of battle, sur- 
 rounded by his soldiers, joyous on this occa- 
 sion, as at Austerlitz and Jena, shouting Vive 
 I'Empereur ! though they had nothing to eat 
 but a piece of bread brought in their knap- 
 sacks, and contenting themselves with the 
 noblest of the acquisitions of victory glory. 
 The Russian army, cut in two, descended the 
 Alle in a clear, transparent night, with soul 
 steeped in despair, though it had done all its 
 duty. Fortunately for it, Napoleon had at 
 hand only half his cavalry. If he had had the 
 other half and Mural himself, the entire Rus- 
 sian corps descending the Alle under General 
 Lambert would have been taken. 
 
 So rapid was the march of the Russians, 
 that on the following day they were at Wehlau 
 on the Pregel. They cut down all the bridges, 
 and, on the morning of the 16th, they esta- 
 blished themselves a little beyond the Pregel, 
 at Petersdorf, intending not to retire to the 
 Niemen till the detached corps of Generals 
 Kamenski and Lestocq, incapable of defending 
 Konigsberg against the French army, had 
 joined them, for the purpose of effecting their 
 retreat together. 
 
 On the day after the battle of Friedland, 
 Napoleon lost not a moment in deriving from 
 his victory all the results possible. Having, 
 according to custom, visited the field of battle, 
 shown a warm interest for the wounded, in- 
 formed his soldiers what rewards his high for- 
 tune permitted him to promise and to give, he 
 had set out for the Pregel, preceded by all his 
 cavalry, which ran in pursuit of the Russians 
 while descending both banks of the Alle. 
 But the Russians had twelve hours' start, for 
 it had been impossible to deny a night's rest 
 to soldiers who had marched the whole of the 
 preceding night in order to reach the field of 
 battle, and who had afterwards fought all day, 
 from two in the morning till ten at night. The 
 Russians, having thus the advantage of some 
 hours, and retiring with the celerity of an army 
 which cannot find safely but in flight, we 
 could not flatter ourselves that we should reach 
 the Pregel before them. When we arrived 
 there all the bridges were broken down. Na- 
 poleon lost no time in re-establishing them, 
 and making the dispositions necessary for en- 
 abling us to secure, between the Pregel and 
 Niemen, all the prizes which he had not had 
 time to take between Friedland and Wehlau. 
 
 While he was occupied with the Russian 
 army at Friedland, Marshals Soultand Davout, 
 preceded by Murat, had marched for Konigs- 
 berg. Marshal Soult falling in with the rear- 
 guard of General Lestocq, had taken from it 
 an entire batlalion, and had surrounded and 
 taken, near Konigsberg itself, a column of 
 twelve or fifteen hundred men, which had not 
 retired in time from the environs of Brauns- 
 berg. He had appeared on the 14th under the 
 walls of Konigsberg, too well defended for it 
 to be possible to take it by a sudden attack. 
 Davout and Murat, having, for their part, re 
 ceived orders to return to Friedland, in case 
 the battle should have lasted more than one
 
 Jane, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 317 
 
 day, had both left Marshal Soult and proceeded 
 to the right for Wehlau. Having received 
 fresh tidings by the way, and learned the vic- 
 tory of Friedland and the retreat of the Rus- 
 sians, they had directed their march to Tapiau 
 on the Pregel, an intermediate point between 
 Konigsberg and Wehlau. Having collected 
 the means of passing the Pregel, they had 
 crossed it, in order to intercept as many of 
 the Russian troops as they could on their 
 flight. 
 
 On the news of the battle of Friedland, the 
 Prussian and Russian detachments guarding 
 Konigsberg no longer hesitated to quit that 
 place, which was not in a condition to sustain 
 a siege like Dantzig. The court of Prussia 
 had already fled to the small frontier town of 
 Memel, the last of the kingdom founded by 
 the great Frederick. Generals Kamenski and 
 Lestocq, therefore, retired, abandoning the im- 
 mense stores, as well as the sick and wounded 
 of the two armies, collected at Konigsberg. A 
 battalion, left to stipulate the capitulation, de- 
 livered it to Marshal Soult, who could enter 
 immediately. In Konigsberg were found corn, 
 wine, 100,000 muskets, sent by England, and 
 still on board the vessels which had brought 
 them, lastly, a considerable number of wound- 
 ed, who had been there ever since Eylau. Of 
 these, the surrounding villages contained seve- 
 ral thousand. 
 
 Generals Lestocq and Kamenski, bringing 
 their troops in the greatest haste by the Ko- 
 nigsberg road to Tilsit, threw themselves into 
 the forest of Baum, before Marshal Davout 
 and Prince Murat had intercepted the route 
 from Tapiau to Labiau. Still, they did not 
 join General Benningsen without leaving three 
 thousand prisoners in the hands of Marshal 
 Davout. 
 
 Napoleon, having arrived at Wehlau, con- 
 tinued to follow up the Russian army without 
 intermission, and to lay snares for its detached 
 corps with a view to take such as should be 
 behind. He kept Marshal Soult at Konigsberg, 
 to establish himself there, and to commence im- 
 mediately the attack of Pillau. That little fort 
 taken, the garrison of Konigsberg was to give 
 the hand by the Nehrung to the garrison of Dant- 
 zig. and moreover to close against the English 
 the Frische-Haff, the navigation of which was 
 at this moment performed by the seamen of the 
 guard. He sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to 
 take the command of the citadel of Konigs- 
 berg, as he had sent Rapp to Dantzig, with 
 the intention of preventing waste of the stores 
 taken from the enemy, and of creating a new 
 depot. He directed Marshal Davout upon La- 
 biau, the point where the whole inland navi- 
 gation of these provinces terminates at the 
 Baltic, and gave him a corps of some thousand 
 horse under General Grouchy to pick up the 
 Russian detachments left behind. He sent off 
 Murat, with the bulk of the cavalry, upon the 
 direct road from Wehlau to Tilsit, and de- 
 spatched after him the corps of Mortier, Lan- 
 nes, Victor, and Ney. Davout's corps was, in 
 case of emergency, to rejoin the army by a 
 single march. Napoleon was, therefore, strong 
 enough to crush the Russians, if they had the 
 presumption to sloo again to fight. On the 
 
 ; right, he threw out 2000 light horse, hussars, 
 and chasseurs, to ascend the Pregel, and to 
 bar the road against all who should retire 
 on that side, wounded, sicK, stragglers, con- 
 voys. 
 
 These skilful dispositions occasioned the 
 capture of several thousand more prisoners 
 and of divers convoys of provisions, but they 
 could not procure us another battle with the 
 Russians. In haste to take refuge behind the 
 Nicmen, they arrived there on the 18th, finish- 
 ed crossing on the 19th, and destroyed all the 
 means of passage for a considerable distance. 
 On the 19th, our scouts, after pursuing some 
 parties of Calmucks armed with bows, which 
 highly amused our soldiers, unaccustomed to 
 that kind of enemy, pushed on to the Niemen, 
 and saw the Russian army on the other side 
 of the river, encamped behind that bulwark 
 of the empire which it had been so impatient 
 to reach. 
 
 There was destined to end the daring march 
 of the French army, which, setting out from 
 the camp of Boulogne, in September, 1805, had 
 traversed the continent in its greatest width, 
 and conquered in twenty months all the armies 
 of Europe. The new Alexander was about to 
 pause at last, not on account of the fatigue of 
 his soldiers, ready to follow him whithersoever 
 he should wish to lead them, but on account 
 of the exhaustion of his enemies, incapable 
 of further resistance, and obliged to beg that 
 peace which, a few days before, they had had 
 the imprudence to refuse. 
 
 The King of Prussia had left at Memel the 
 queen, his consort, the afflicted instigator of 
 that fatal war, to rejoin the Emperor Alexander 
 on the banks of the Niemen. The modest 
 Frederick William, though not sharing the 
 silly illusions which the battle of Eylau had 
 excited in his young ally, had, nevertheless, 
 yielded to his persuasions to refuse peace, and 
 he now foresaw that he should have to pay for 
 that refusal with the greater part of his domi- 
 nions. Alexander was dispirited, as on the 
 day after Austerlitz. He was angry on ac- 
 count of recent events with General Benning- 
 sen, who had promised what he could not per- 
 form, and he felt that he had no further strength 
 to continue the war. His army, too, cried out 
 loudly for peace. It was not dissatisfied with 
 itself, for it was aware that it had behaved well 
 at Heilsberg and Friedland; but it considered 
 itself incapable of coping with the army of 
 Napoleon, collected entire since the taking of 
 Kdiiigsberg, reinforced by Massena, who had 
 just repulsed Tolstoy's corps at Durczewo,.and 
 able to oppose 170,000 men to the 70,000 Rus- 
 sian and Prussian soldit.s who were still left. 
 They asked for whom the war was carried on ; 
 was it for the Prussians, who could not defend 
 their own country 1 Was it for the English, 
 who, after so frequently announcing succours, 
 sent none, and thought only of conquering 
 colonies 1 The contempt expressed for the 
 Prussians was unjust, for they had conducted 
 themselves gallantly of late, and had done all 
 that could be expected from their small num- 
 l ber. The Prussians, in their turn, complained 
 , of the barbarism, the ignorance, the devastat 
 ing ferocity of the Russian soldiers. The t 
 2 i) 2
 
 318 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807 
 
 agreed in nothing but in regard to the English 
 These, indeed, by landing either at Stralsund 
 or at Dantzig, might have brought useful sue 
 cours, and perhaps have changed, or at leas 
 slackened the course of events. But they hac 
 shown no activity except in sending expedi 
 tions to the Spanish colonies ; and about the 
 very subsidies, which, in default of armies 
 constituted their sole co-operation, they hac 
 haggled till they had cooled the King of Swe 
 den and disgusted him with the war. It is a 
 relief under misfortune to be able to com- 
 plain, and, at this moment, Russians anc 
 Prussians inveighed vehemently against the 
 British cabinet. The Russian officers, in par- 
 ticular, loudly declared that it was for the Eng- 
 lish, for their paltry ambition, that brave men 
 were set together by the ears, though they hac 
 no reason to hate or even to be jealous of each 
 other, since, after all, Russia and France had 
 nothing to envy one another. 
 
 The two vanquished monarchs shared the 
 animosity of their soldiers against England, 
 and felt still more than they the necessity of 
 separating from her, and obtaining peace im- 
 mediately. The King of Prussia, who would 
 have wished for it earlier, and who foresaw 
 how dearly he should pay for having retarded 
 it, was of opinion, without complaining, that 
 they ought to solicit it of Napoleon, and left 
 the business of negotiating it to the Emperor 
 Alexander. He hoped that his friend, who 
 alone had insisted on that fatal prolongation 
 of the war, would defend him in the negotia- 
 tions better than on the field of battle. It was 
 therefore agreed that they should propose an 
 armistice, and that, having obtained this armi- 
 stice, the Emperor Alexander should seek to 
 obtain an interview with Napoleon. It was 
 known by experience how extremely sensible 
 he was to the attentions of hostile sovereigns, 
 how accommodating on the morrow of his vic- 
 tories; and the recollection of what the Em- 
 peror Francis had obtained from him at the 
 bivouac of Urschitz, encouraged hopes of a 
 peace less disadvantageous than might be 
 feared, if not for Russia, which had nothing 
 but consideration to lose, at least for Prussia, 
 which was wholly in the hands of the con- 
 queror. 
 
 In consequence, on the 19th of June, Prince 
 Bagration transmitted to Murat, at the advanced 
 posts, a letter written to him by the general-in- 
 chief, Benningsen, in which the latter, deplor- 
 ing the miseries of war, offered an armistice 
 as the means of putting an end to them. This 
 letter, delivered to Napoleon, who at that mo- 
 ment arrived at Tilsit, was very favorably re- 
 ceived ; for, as we have said, he began to find 
 how much distance aggravated the difficulties 
 of military operations. It was nearly a year 
 that he had been far away from the centre 
 of his empire, and he felt an urgent desire to 
 return thither, to assemble in particular the 
 legislative body, the meeting of which he had 
 deferred, not choosing to call it together in his 
 absence. Lastly, in listening to the language 
 held by the Russian army, he was led to think 
 that he should perhaps find in Russia that ally 
 whom he needed for closing the continent 
 against England for ever. 
 
 He returned, therefore, an amicable answer, 
 saying that, after so many efforts, fatigues, 
 victories, he desired nothing but a safc and 
 honourable peace, and if this armistice could 
 be the means of effecting that, he was ready 
 to consent to it. Upon this answer, Prince 
 Labanoff repaired to Tilsit, had an interview 
 with Napoleon, represented to him the dispo- 
 sitions that were manifested by all about Alex- 
 ander ; and after having received the assurance 
 that, on the part of the French, the wish for 
 peace was not less strong, though less com- 
 manded by necessity, he agreed to an armistice. 
 Napoleon required that the Prussian fortresses 
 in Pomerania and Poland, which still held out, 
 such as Colberg, Pillau, Graudenz, should be 
 given up to him. But for this the consent of 
 the King of Prussia would be necessary, and 
 he was then absent from the Russian head- 
 quarters. Some resistance was, indeed, ap- 
 prehended on his part, when it should be pro- 
 posed to him to give up fortresses, the last 
 remaining in his hands. A separate armistice 
 was in consequence stipulated between the 
 French and Russian armies, which was signed 
 on the 22d of June by Prince Labanoff and the 
 Prince of Neufchatel, and carried to the head- 
 quarters of Alexander, who ratified it imme- 
 diately. 
 
 Marshal Kalkreuth then came forward to 
 treat on behalf of the Prussian army. Napo- 
 leon received him with many civilities, told 
 turn that he was the distinguished and still 
 more the courteous officer, who alone, of ali 
 the officers of his nation had treated the French 
 prisoners humanely; that, on this account, he 
 eceived and granted a suspension of arms, 
 without insisting on the delivery of the Prus- 
 sian fortresses. It was a pledge that he \ras 
 
 enerous to leave in the hands of Prussia, and 
 which could not give uneasiness to the French 
 army, too solidly established on the Vistula by 
 Warsaw, Thorn, and Dantzig, on the Pregel 
 >y Konigsberg and Wehlau, to have any thing 
 to fear from such points as Colberg, Pillau, 
 and Graudenz. The armistice was therefore 
 signed with Marshal Kalkreuth, as it had been 
 with Prince Labanoff. The demarcation which 
 eparated the belligerent armies was the Nie- 
 men as far as Grodno, and then, turning back- 
 ward on the right, the Bober as far as its influx 
 nto the Narew, and lastly the Narew as far as 
 3 ultusk and Warsaw. 
 
 Napoleon, never relaxing his usual vigi- 
 ance, organized himself behind this line, as if 
 ic was soon to continue the war and carry k 
 nto the heart of the Russian empire. He 
 drew Massena's corps nearer to him, and es- 
 abiished it at Bialistock. He united Dom- 
 >rowski's -and Zayonschek's Poles into a sin- 
 le corps of 10,000 men, which was to connect 
 Wassena with Marshal Ney. He placed the 
 alter at Gumbinnen on the Pregel. He col- 
 ected at Tilsit Marshals Mortier, Lannes, Ber- 
 nadotte, Davout, the cavalry, and the guard. 
 He left Marshal Soult at Konigsberg. He or- 
 ered an intrenched camp to be prepared at 
 Wehlau, to concentrate himself there in case 
 f need, with his whole army. He gave orders 
 t Dantzig and Konigsberg for withdrawing 
 part of the immense stores found in those
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 319 
 
 places, and sending them off to the Niemen. 
 Lastly, he enjoined General Clarke, at Berlin, 
 and Marshal Kellermann, at Mayence, to con- 
 tinue to direct the marching regiments to the 
 Vistula, just as if the war was not interrupted. 
 Of the various measures which he adopted for 
 augmenting his forces in spring, he suspended 
 but one, namely, the calling out of the second 
 portion of the conscription of 1808. He was 
 desirous that this news, accompanying that of 
 his triumphs, should be an additional reason for 
 France to rejoice and to applaud his victories. 
 
 In this imposing attitude, Napoleon awaited 
 the opening of the negotiations, and invited M. 
 de Talleyrand, who had gone to Dantzig to 
 seek a little safety and quiet, to come immedi- 
 ately to Tilsit to lend him the aid of his 
 shrewdness and patient ingenuity. According 
 to his custom, Napoleon addressed to his army 
 a proclamation impressed with the two-fold 
 greatness of his soul and of the circumstances. 
 It was as follows : 
 
 " Soldiers On the 5th of June we were at- 
 tacked in our cantonments by the Russian 
 army. The enemy had mistaken the causes 
 of our inactivity. He perceived too late that 
 our repose was that of the lion : he repents of 
 having disturbed it. 
 
 " In the battles of Guttstadt and Heilsberg, 
 and in that ever memorable one of Friedland, 
 in a campaign of ten days, in short, we have 
 taken 120 pieces of cannon, seven colours, 
 killed, wounded, or made prisoners, 60,000 
 Russians, taken from the enemy's army all its 
 magazines, its hospitals, its ambulances, the 
 fortress of KGnigsberg, the 300 vessels which 
 were in that port, laden with all kinds of mili- 
 tary stores, 160,000 muskets which England 
 was sending to arm our enemies. 
 
 " From the banks of the Vistula, we have 
 come with the speed of the eagle to those of 
 the Niemen. You celebrated at Austerlitz the 
 anniversary of the coronation; this year, you 
 have worthily celebrated that of the battle of 
 Marengo, which put an end to the war of the 
 second coalition. 
 
 " Frenchmen, you have been worthy of your- 
 selves and of me. You will return to France 
 covered with laurels, and, after obtaining a 
 glorious peace, which carries with it the gua- 
 rantee of its duration. It is high time for our 
 country to live in quiet, screened from the ma- 
 lignant influence of England. My bounties 
 shall prove to you my gratitude, and the full 
 extent of the love that I feel for you. 
 
 " At the Imperial Camp of TUsit, June 22d, IS07." 
 
 The two vanquished sovereigns were in a 
 still greater hurry than Napoleon to open the 
 
 i It is very difficult to ascertain precisely what passed 
 in the long conversations which Napoleon and Alex- 
 ander had together at Tilsit. All Europe has rung with 
 controverted statements relative to this subject; and 
 not only have chimerical conversations been invented, 
 but there have been published a quantity of treaties 
 under the designation of 'secret articles of Tilsit, 
 which are absolute forgeries. The English, in particu- 
 lar, to justify their subsequent conduct towards Den- 
 mark, have put forth a great many secret articles of 
 Tilsit, as they are called, some devised after the event 
 by collectors of treaties, others really communicated at 
 the time to the cabinet of London by diplomatic spies, 
 who, on this occasion, ill earned the money that was 
 lavished upon them. Thanks to the authentic and official 
 documents, which I have been enabled to consult, I 
 
 negotiations. Prince Labanoff, one of 
 Russians who wished most sincerely for har- 
 mony between France and Russia, returned on 
 the 24th to Tilsit, to obtain an audience of Na- 
 poleon. It was immediately granted. That 
 Russian noble expressed the strong desire felt 
 by his master to put an end to the war, his ex- 
 cessive disgust for the English alliance, his 
 extreme impatience to see the great man of the 
 age, and to come to a frank and cordial expla- 
 nation with him. Napoleon desired nothing 
 better than to meet that young sovereign, of 
 whom he had heard so much, whose under- 
 standing, grace, and seduction, which were 
 highly extolled, excited in him great curiosity 
 and little fear, for when he entered into com- 
 munication with men he was more certain to 
 win than to be won. Napoleon accepted the 
 interview for the following day, the 25th of 
 June. 
 
 He determined that a certain pomp should 
 mark this meeting of the two most powerful 
 princes in the world, to confer about termi- 
 nating their sanguinary quarrel. He had a 
 large raft moored by General Lariboissiere, 
 of the artillery, in the middle of the Niemen, 
 equi-distant from and within sight of both 
 banks of the river. Upon one part of this raft 
 a pavilion was constructed, with all the rich 
 stuffs to be procured in the little town of Tilsit, 
 for the reception of the two monarchs. On 
 the 25th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Na- 
 poleon embarked on the river, accompanied 
 by the Grand-duke of Berg, the Prince of Neuf- 
 chatel, Marshals Bessiere and Duroc, and Can- 
 laincourt, grand-equerry. At the same instant, 
 Alexander quitted the other bank, accompanied 
 by the Grand-duke Ccnstantine, Generals Ben- 
 ningsen and Ouwaroff, Prince Labanoff, and 
 Count Lieven. The two boats reached the 
 raft at the same time, and the first movement 
 of Napoleon and Alexander, on meeting, was 
 to embrace one another. This testimony of 
 a frank reconciliation, perceived by the nume- 
 rous spectators who lined the river for the 
 Niemen at this place is not wider than the 
 Seine excited vehement applause. The two 
 armies, in fact, were ranged along the Niemen, 
 the half-savage people of these parts had joined 
 them ; and the witnesses of this extraordinary 
 scene, little versed in the secrets of politics, 
 seeing their masters embrace, imagined that 
 peace was concluded, and a stop thencefor- 
 ward put to the spilling of their blood. 
 
 After this first demonstration, Alexander and 
 Napoleon entered the pavilion which had been 
 prepared for their reception. 1 " Why are we 
 at war]" they asked one another, in corn- 
 
 shall make known for the first time the real stipulations 
 of Tilsit, both public and secret: 1 shall furnish, in par 
 ticular, the substance of the conversations of Napoleon 
 and Alexander. For this purpose I shall have recourse 
 to a very curious collection, probably doomed to remain 
 secret for a long time, but from which I can without in- 
 discretion extract what relates to Tilsit. I allude to the 
 private correspondence of Messrs, de Savary and De 
 Caulaincourt with Napoleon, and the correspondence 
 of Napoleon with them. General Savary remained 
 some months at Petersburg as envoy-extraordinary, 
 M. de Caulaincourt resided them several years in 
 quality of ambassador. The devoledness of the one, 
 the veracity of the other, forbid any doubt of the pains 
 which they took to acquaint Na;-c*on with the whole 
 truth J and I must say that the tone of sincerity which
 
 320 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807 
 
 mencing this conversation. Napoleon, in fact, 
 was warring with Russia only as an ally of 
 England ; and Russia, on her part, though 
 justly uneasy about the continental domina- 
 tion of France, was serving the interests of 
 England much more than her own in perse- 
 vering in this contest with such animosity as 
 she had done. "If your grudge is against 
 England, and against her alone," said Alex- 
 ander to Napoleon, " we shall easily agree ; 
 for I have as much reason to complain of her 
 as you have." He then enumerated his griev- 
 ances against Great Britain, the avarice, the 
 selfishness which she had manifested, the false 
 promises with which she had lured him, the 
 deserted state in which she had left him, with 
 the resentment excited by a disastrous war, 
 which he had been obliged to wage single- 
 handed. Napoleon, seeking to discover what 
 were the sentiments of the speaker which he 
 ought to flatter, soon perceived that two were 
 then predominant: in the first place, deep 
 spleen against allies, burdensome like Prus- 
 sia, or selfish like England ; and, in the next, 
 a very sensitive and deeply-mortified pride. 
 He took pains, therefore, to prove to young 
 Alexander that he had been duped by his al- 
 lies; that, moreover, he had conducted him- 
 self with nobleness and courage. He strove 
 to persuade him that Russia was wrong to 
 persist in patronising ungrateful and jealous 
 neighbours, like the Germans ; or in serving 
 the interests of greedy traders, like the Eng- 
 lish. He attributed this mistake to generous 
 sentiments carried to excess, to misconcep- 
 tions to which ministers, incompetent or bribed, 
 had given rise. Lastly, he highly extolled the 
 bravery of the Russian soldiers, and told the 
 Emperor Alexander that, if they were to unite 
 the two armies which had fought so valiantly 
 against one another at Austerlitz, at Eylau, at 
 Friedland, but which in those battles had berth 
 behaved like real giants fighting blindfold, 
 they might divide the world between them, 
 for its own peace and welfare. He then in- 
 sinuated, but very cautiously, that, by waging 
 
 pervades that correspondence, is honourable to both. 
 Fearful of substituting their judgment for that of Napo- 
 leon, and anxious to enable him to judge for himself, 
 they were accustomed to annex to their despatches 
 minutes, in question and answer, of their private con- 
 versations with Alexander. The one and the other had 
 interviews with him almost every day, tite-ii-tite, in 
 the greatest familiarity; and in reporting word for word 
 what he said, they have drawn, without pretending to dp 
 so, a. most interesting and certainly a most faithful portrait 
 of him. Many people, and many Russians, in particular, 
 in order to excuse this intimacy of Alexander's with 
 Napoleon, place it to the account of policy, and, making 
 him more profound than he was, say that he was de- 
 ceiving Napoleon. This singular excuse would not 
 even be attempted, if such persons had read the corre- 
 spondence in question. Alexander was dissembling, but 
 he was impressionable, and in these conversations we 
 find him incessantly throwing off all restraint, and say- 
 ing whatever he thought. It is certain that he attached 
 himself for some time, not to the person of Napoleon, 
 who always excited in him a certain apprehension, but 
 to his policy, and that he served it very actively. He 
 had conceived a very natural ambition, which Napoleon 
 Miflered to spring up, which he flattered for a while, 
 and which he ended with deceiving. Then it was that 
 Alexander detached himself from France, detached 
 himself before he avowed it, which constituted for a 
 momen. ;hat falseness which- the Russians place to his 
 credit, but which scarcely was such, so easy was it to 
 discern in his language and in his involuntary move- 
 nenU the change of his dispositions. I should be antici- 
 
 war with France, Russia was spending her 
 strength without any possible compensation ; 
 whereas, if she would unite with France in 
 subjecting the west and the east, on land and 
 on sea, she would gain as much glory, and 
 certainly more profit. Without explaining 
 himself further, he seemed to take it upon 
 him to make the fortune of his young antago- 
 nist much more satisfactorily than they who 
 had led him into a career in which he had 
 hitherto met with nothing but defeats. Alex- 
 ander, it is true, was under engagements to 
 Prussia, and it was requisite that his honour 
 should get out of that situation unstained. 
 The Emperor, therefore, gave him to under- 
 stand that he would restore to him so much 
 of the Prussian states as would be required to 
 release him honourably from his engagements 
 to his allies ; after which the Russian cabinet 
 would be at liberty to follow a new policy, the 
 only true, the only profitable policy, resem- 
 bling in all respects that of the great Cathe- 
 rine. 
 
 This conversation, which had lasted above 
 an hour, and which had touched upon all ques- 
 tions without investigating them thoroughly, 
 had deeply moved Alexander. Napoleon had 
 opened to him new prospects, which is always 
 a pleasing thing to a fickle, and, especially, to 
 a discontented mind. Besides, more than 
 once, Alexander, amidst his defeats, feeling 
 keenly the inconveniences of that furious 
 war into which he had been led against 
 France, and the advantages of a system of 
 union with her, had said to himself some- 
 thing like what Napoleon had just been say- 
 ing to him; but not with that clearness, that 
 force, and, above all, that seduction of a con- 
 queror, who presents himself to the conquered 
 with hands full of presents, with mouth full 
 of caressing words. Alexander was seduced 
 Napoleon clearly perceived it, and promised 
 himself soon to render the seduction com- 
 plete. 
 
 After flattering the monarch, he resolved to 
 flatter the man. " You and I," said he, " shall 
 
 pating the history of later times, were I to mention here 
 what was that ambition of Alexander's which Napo- 
 leon flattered, and which at last he would not gratify. 
 What I ought to explain at this moment is, how the long 
 series of conversations between Alexander and Messrs, 
 de Savary and de Caulaincourt could enable me to clear 
 up the mystery of Tilsit. It was in the following man- 
 ner that I arrived at this elucidation: Alexander, full 
 of the recollections of Tilsit, was incessantly relating 
 to Messrs, de Savary and de Caulaincourt all that had 
 been said and done in that celebrated interview; and 
 frequently repeated the conversations of Napoleon, the 
 expressions, by turns profound and poignant, which 
 dropped from his lips, and particularly the promises 
 which he said he had received. All this, faithfully 
 transcribed on the very same day, was transmitted to 
 Napoleon, who sometimes disputed, at other times visi- 
 bly admitted, as not capable of being disputed, what 
 they reported to him. It is from the contradictory re- 
 productions of these recollections that I have derived 
 the particulars which I am about to furnish, and the 
 authenticity of which cannot be questioned. I have 
 obtained, moreover, from a foreign source, equally au- 
 thentic and official, the communication of very curious 
 despatches containing the private conversations of the 
 Queen of Prussia, on her return from Tilsit, with an 
 old diplomatist, worthy of her confidence, of her friend- 
 ship. It is with the assistance of these different ma- 
 terials that 1 have composed the sketch which I am 
 about to submit to the reader, and which I believe to be 
 the only true one among all those that pretend to de- 
 scribe the memorable scenes of Tilsit
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 321 
 
 understand each other better, if we treat di- 
 rectly, than by employing our ministers, who 
 frequently deceive or misunderstand us ; and 
 we shall advance business more in an hour 
 than our negotiators in several days. Be- 
 tween you and me," he added, " there must be 
 no third person." It was impossible to flatter 
 Alexander in a more sensible manner, than by 
 attributing to him a superiority over those 
 around him, similar to that which Napoleon 
 had a right to attribute to himself over all his 
 servants. In consequence, Napoleon proposed 
 to him to leave the hamlet where he was liv- 
 ing, and to establish himself in the little town 
 of Tilsit, which should be neutralized to re- 
 ceive him, and where they might treat of 
 business themselves, in person, at any hour. 
 This proposal was eagerly accepted, and it 
 was agreed that M. de Labanoff should go that 
 day to Tilsit to make the necessary arrange- 
 ments. They had still to talk of that unfortu- 
 nate King of Prussia, who was at Alexander's 
 head-quarters, awaiting what should be done 
 with him and his kingdom. Alexander offered 
 to bring him to that same raft on the Niemen 
 to introduce him to Napoleon, who should ad- 
 dress a few soothing words to him. It was 
 recessarv, in fact, that Alexander, before he 
 passed from one system of politics to another, 
 should, if he meant not to dishonour himself, 
 have saved some portion of the crown of his 
 ally. Napoleon, who had already taken his 
 determination on this point, and who was well 
 aware that he must grant certain concessions 
 to save the honour of Alexander, consented to 
 receive the King of Prussia on the following 
 day. The two sovereigns then left the pavi- 
 lion, and, passing from serious affairs to testi- 
 monies of courtesy, complimented the persons 
 of their respective suits. Napoleon treated 
 the Grand-duke Constaniine and General Ben- 
 ningsen in a flattering manner. Alexander 
 congratulated Murat and Berthier on being 
 the worthy lieutenants of the greatest captain 
 of modern times. Parting with fresh demon- 
 strations of friendship, the two emperors again 
 embarked in sight, and amidst the applause 
 of the numerous spectators assembled on the 
 banks of the Niemen. 
 
 Prince Labanoff came in the afternoon to 
 the French head-quarters, to settle every thing 
 relative to the removal of the Emperor Alex- 
 ander to Tilsit. It was agreed that the town 
 of Tilsit should be neutralized; that the Em- 
 peror Alexander should occupy one half, the 
 Emperor Napoleon the other; that the Rus- 
 sian imperial guard should pass to the left 
 bank to do duty about its sovereign, and that 
 this change of abode should take place the 
 very next day, after the presentation of the 
 King of Prussia to Napoleon. 
 
 Accordingly, on the next day, the 26th of 
 June, the two emperors, conveyed, as on the 
 preceding day, to the middle of the Niemen, 
 observing the same etiquette, repaired to the 
 pavilion where their first interview had taken 
 place. Alexander brought the King of Prus- 
 sia. That prince had not received any grace 
 from nature, and misfortune, grief, could not 
 be supposed to have conferred any. He was 
 an honest man, sensible, modest and awkward. 
 
 VOL. II. 41 
 
 He did not humble himself before the con- 
 queror; he was sad, dignified and stiff. The 
 conversation could not be long, for he was the 
 prince vanquished by Napoleon, the protege of 
 Alexander; and if there appeared to be a dis- 
 position to restore to him part of his domi- 
 nions, which was probable, but not certain, 
 from the conversation of the preceding day, it 
 was the policy of Napoleon which granted 
 that restitution for the honour of Alexander; 
 but nothing was done for him, nothing was 
 expected of him, so that there were no expla- 
 nations to give him. The interview, conse- 
 quently, could not but be short, and so it really 
 ! was. The King of Prussia, however, appeared 
 to make a particular point of proving that he 
 had not wronged Napoleon, and that, if, after 
 having long been the ally of France, he had 
 become her enemy, it was by the effect of cir- 
 cumstances, and not in consequence of any 
 breach of engagement for which an honest 
 man ought to blush. Napoleon, on his part, 
 affirmed that he had nothing to reproach him- 
 self with; and, too generous and too sensible 
 to wound an humbled prince, he merely said 
 1 to him that the cabinet of Berlin, often warned 
 j to beware of the intrigues of England, had 
 I committed the fault of not listening to this 
 friendly counsel, and that to this cause alone 
 were to be ascribed the disasters of Prussia. 
 For the rest. Napoleon added, that France, vic- 
 torious, did not pretend to draw the very last 
 consequences from her victories, and that, in 
 ! a few days, they should probably be so fortu- 
 ! nate as to come to an understanding relative 
 to the conditions of an honourable and solid 
 peace. 
 
 The three sovereigns parted, after an inter- 
 view which had lasted scarcely half an hour. 
 : It was decided that the King of Prussia also 
 should come to Tilsit to reside with his ally 
 i the Emperor of Russia. 
 
 At five o'clock the same day, Alexander 
 crossed the Niemen. Napoleon went to the 
 bank of the river to meet him, conducted him 
 to the quarters destined for him, and received 
 him at dinner with the highest honours and 
 the most delicate attentions. From that day 
 it was settled that the Emperor Alexander, not 
 having his household with him, should take all 
 his meals with the Emperor Napoleon. They 
 passed the evening together, conversed for a 
 long time in a confidential manner, and their 
 j nascent intimacy was manifested on both sides 
 by a familiarity at once dignified and graceful. 
 Next day, the 27th, they mounted their horses 
 to review the French imperial guard. These 
 j old soldiers of the revolution, by turns soldiers 
 : of the Republic, of the Empire, and always 
 heroic servants of France, showed themselves 
 with pride to the sovereign whom they had 
 vanquished. They had not to display to him 
 ! the lofty stature, the regular and measured 
 I march, of the soldiers of the north ; but they 
 ; exhibited that freedom of movement, that as- 
 surance of attitude, and that intelligence of 
 look, which accounted for their victories and 
 their superiority over all the armies of Europe. 
 Alexander complimented them highly. Thej 
 answered his flatteries with repeated sV'ili 
 i of " Vive jUlexandre ! vine Napoleon .'"
 
 322 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807 
 
 It was forty-eight hours since the two empe- 
 rors first met, and they were already on such 
 intimate terms that they could speak out freely. 
 Napoleon then laid before the astonished eyes 
 of Alexander the designs in which he would 
 fain associate him designs suggested to him 
 by recent circumstances. 
 
 It was an extraordinary situation, that of 
 Napoleon at this moment. While showing 
 conspicuously the greatness of his genius, the 
 prodigious height of his fortune, it revealed at 
 the same time the weak sides of his policy, an 
 extravagant and variable policy, like the pas- 
 sions which produced it. 
 
 We have often adverted to the alliances of 
 France at that period; we have often said that, 
 for realizing the alarming phenomenon, hap- 
 pily impossible, of universal monarchy, Na- 
 poleon should have done nothing less than 
 strive to number in Europe other than ene- 
 mies, publicly or secretly leagued against him, 
 and that he should have endeavoured to make 
 himself a friend there at least one. We have 
 said that Spain, our most ancient and most 
 natural ally, was completely disorganized, and, 
 till her entire regeneration, destined to be a 
 burden to those who should unite themselves 
 with her; that Italy was yet to create; that 
 England, uneasy about the possession of India, 
 alarmed to see us established at the Texel, at 
 Antwerp, at Brest, at Cadiz, at Toulon, at Genoa, 
 at Naples, at Venice, at Trieste, at Corfu, as 
 proprietors or sovereigns, was irreconcilable 
 with us; that Austria would be implacable so 
 long as we had not restored or made her for- 
 get Italy ; that Russia was jealous of us on 
 the continent, as of England on the ocean ; 
 that Prussia alone, the natural rival of Aus- 
 tria, a neighbour threatened by Russia, a Pro- 
 testant, innovating power, enriched by the 
 possessions of the Church, was the only one 
 whose political interests and moral principles 
 were not absolutely incompatible with ours, 
 and that in her was to be sought that strong 
 and sincere friend by whose means all coali- 
 tions would be rendered either impracticable 
 or incomplete. But we have seen that Prus- 
 sia, placed between the two parties which then 
 divided the world, wavering and hesitating, had 
 committed faults of weakness, Napoleon faults 
 of strength ; that a deplorable rupture had en- 
 sued; that Napoleon had gained the immense 
 military glory, had the immense political mis- 
 fortune to destroy in a fortnight a monarchy 
 which was our only possible ally in Europe; 
 lastly, that the Russians coming to the assist- 
 ance of the Prussians in Poland, as they had 
 done to the assistance of the Austrians in Gal- 
 licia, he had crushed them at Friedland as at 
 Austerlitz. 
 
 Conqueror of the entire continent, surrounded 
 by powers successively beaten, the one ten days 
 before at Friedland, the other eight months be- 
 fore at Jena, the third eighteen months before 
 at Austerlitz, Napoleon found himself at liberty 
 Vo choose, not between sincere friends, but be- 
 tween officious, submissive, obsequious friends. 
 If, by a concatenation of things, almost impos- 
 sible to break, the moment for attempting a 
 Russian alliance had not then arrived for him, 
 h would have been able, at this moment, to 
 
 control Fate in some measure, to return sud- 
 denly into the ways of sound policy, never to 
 leave them again, and he would there have 
 found, with less apparent power, more real 
 strength, and perhaps an everlasting duration, 
 if not for his dynasty, at least for the greatness 
 of France, which he loved as much as his 
 dynasty. For this he must have conducted 
 himself as a generous conqueror, and by an 
 unexpected act, but by no means odd though 
 unexpected, have raised prostrate Prussia, re- 
 composed her stronger, more extensive than 
 ever, saying to her, You have done wrong, you 
 have not been candid with me ; I have pun- 
 ished you for it; let us forget your defeat and 
 my victory ; I am aggrandizing instead of di- 
 minishing you, that you may for ever be my 
 ally. Assuredly Frederick William, who had 
 an aversion for war, who daily reproached 
 himself for having suffered others to drag him 
 into it, and who subsequently, in 1813, when 
 Napoleon, half vanquished, presented a prey 
 easy to devour, still hesitated to avail himself 
 of the turn of Fortune, and who took up arms 
 only because his people took them up in spite 
 of him, this king, loaded with benefits after 
 Jena and Friedland, forced to gratitude, would 
 never have formed part of a coalition, and Na- 
 poleon, having only Austria and Russia to fight, 
 would not have been overwhelmed. If Na- 
 poleon desired a crown in Germany for one of 
 his brothers an unlucky and unwise desire 
 he had Hesse, which Prussia would have been 
 too happy to relinquish to him. He would 
 have held the fate of Hanover in suspense, 
 ready to give it to England as the price of 
 peace, or to Prussia as the price of a close 
 alliance. And as for the Emperor Alexander, 
 having nothing to take from him, nothing to 
 restore to him, Napoleon would have left him 
 without a single grievance, by reconstituting 
 Prussia on the morrow of the joint defeat of 
 the Russians and the Prussians. He would 
 have constrained her to admire the conqueror, 
 to sign the peace without saying a word, with- 
 out any more talk about Italy, or Holland, or 
 Germany, the ordinary pretexts at that period 
 for disputes between France and Russia. 
 
 What we are imagining here was no doubt 
 a Utopia, not of generosity, for Napoleon was 
 perfectly capable of that unexpected, that daz- 
 zling generosity which sometimes springs 
 from a great heart eager after glory, but a 
 Utopia with reference to the combinations of 
 the moment. At that time, indeed, the course 
 of events which leads men, even the most 
 powerful, conducted Napoleon to other reso- 
 lutions. In regard to alliances, he had, though 
 only in the middle of his reign, already tried 
 all sorts of- them. No sooner had he arrived 
 at the consulship, the period of good, wise, 
 profound thoughts, because they were the first 
 that the sight of things inspired him with long 
 before the corruption which springs from pro- 
 longed power, he had turned towards Prussia, 
 and made her his ally. For a moment under 
 Paul I., but as an expedient, he had thought 
 of uniting himself with Russia. For a mo- 
 ment again, during the peace of Amiens, he 
 had conceived the idea of uniting himself with 
 England, seduced by the advantage of joining
 
 June, 180.'.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 323 
 
 the naval powers to the land power, but only 
 in a transient manner, and Prussia had not 
 ceased to be still his intimate confidante, his ac- 
 complice in all the affairs of Europe. Having 
 fallen ouc with Prussia so seriously as to de- 
 clare war against her, feeling his loneliness, 
 he made Austria overtures, which would have 
 done little honour to his penetration, if the ! 
 need to have an ally, even amidst his vic- 
 tories, had not justified him in seeking not the 
 most likely. Presently, apprized of the treach- 
 erous armaments of Austria, intoxicated by 
 Jena, he imagined that he could dispense with 
 everybody. Transported into Poland, and 
 surprised after Eylau, at the obstacles which 
 nature can throw in the way of heroism and 
 genius, he had once more thought of alliance ' 
 with Prussia. But, offended at the answers j 
 of that power, answers less eager than he had ! 
 right to expect of her, and having again ' 
 proved victorious as ever at Friedland, finally 
 desiring to put an end to a distant war, he 
 had been necessarily led, in turning inces- 
 santly in the circle of his thoughts to that 
 which had not yet had its day to that which 
 was favoured by so many present circum- 
 stances, to the thought of an alliance with 
 Russia. Alienated definitively from Prussia, ! 
 which had not the skill to seize a moment of j 
 returning kindness for her, irritated to the 
 highest degree at the crafty conduct of Aus- 
 tria, finding Russia disgusted with allies who 
 had so ill seconded her, conceiving that there 
 would be more sincerity in Russia than in 
 Prussia, because there would be less ambi- 
 guity of position, lastly, seduced by novelty, 
 which always misleads to a certain degree 
 even the strongest minds, Napoleon thought 
 to make Alexander an ally, a friend, by ac- 
 quiring an ascendency over him, by filling his 
 head with ambitious ideas, by placing before 
 his dazzled eyes spells which it was easy to 
 create, to keep up for some time, but not to 
 perpetuate, unless they were renewed by the 
 most dangerous satisfactions. The east natu- 
 rally presented itself as a resource for pro- 
 curing young Alexander satisfactions, easy 
 enough to imagine, much less so to realize, 
 but which had all at once been facilitated by 
 an accidental and recent circumstance ; so 
 true it is that, when the moment for an event 
 has arrived, every thing seems to favour it, 
 even the most unlooked-for accidents. 
 
 Napoleon had enlisted the Turks in his 
 quarrel by exciting them to dispute the pro- 
 vinces of the Danube with the conquerors of 
 the Crimea, Egypt with the possessors of In- 
 dia. He had promised to assist them by land 
 against the Russians, by sea against the Eng- 
 lish, and he had begun by aiding them with 
 his officers to defend the Dardanelles. Lastly, 
 he had engaged not to sign a peace without 
 rendering it common and advantageous to the 
 Ottoman empire. But the unfortunate Selim, 
 hated by the ulemas, whose power he wanted 
 to reduce, by the janissaries, whom he wanted 
 to subject to the European discipline, had ex- 
 piated his wise and generous designs by a 
 frightful downfall. The uleraas had long 
 manifested a profound defiance of him. The 
 janisaries saw with a sort of frenzy the new 
 
 troops known by the name of mzam-diedid. 
 Both only awaited an opportunity to gratify 
 their resentment. The sultan having required 
 the janissaries keeping garrison in the castles 
 of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles to 
 take the costume of the nizam-djedid, a revolt 
 broke out among them, and spread with the 
 swiAness of lightning among the companies 
 of janissaries that were either at Constanti- 
 nople or in the towns near the capital. All 
 thronged to Constantinople, assembled riot- 
 ously in the square of the At-Meidan (the an- 
 cient Hippodrome) with their camp-kettles 
 reversed, the usual sign of revolt, denoting 
 that they refused the food of a master who 
 had become odious to them. The ulemas as- 
 sembling on their part, declared that a prince 
 who had reigned seven years without having 
 posterity, under whom the pilgrimage to Mecca 
 had been interrupted, was unworthy to reign. 
 The janissaries remaining assembled for seve- 
 ral clays, had successively demanded, obtained, 
 and in some instances taken without their be- 
 ing given to them, the heads of the ministers 
 of the Porte, accused of favouring the new 
 system ; and, at length, the revolt becoming 
 more alarming, the mufti had proclaimed the 
 deposition of Selim and the elevation of Mus- 
 tapha to the throne. The unfortunate Selim, 
 confined in an apartment of the Seraglio, had 
 reason to hope, it is true, for the assistance of 
 his army commanded by a devoted subject, 
 the grand-vizier Baraictar. But this assist- 
 ance would involve serious dangers, for it was 
 to be feared that the appearance of the grand- 
 vizier at the head of faithful soldiers would 
 cause the dethroned sultan to be murdered 
 before he could be rescued. Such was the 
 intelligence which Napoleon received at his 
 head-quarters at Tilsit, on the 24th of June. 
 According to all probability, the new Turkish 
 government would be inimical to France, 
 merely because the overturned government 
 had been her friend. It was certain, besides, 
 that the anarchy which was undermining this 
 unfortunate empire classed it with Spain 
 among those allies, from whom more trouble 
 than service was to be expected, especially 
 when such an ally, placed at the distance 
 which separates Constantinople from Paris, 
 could not be counselled without difficulty, or 
 assisted without delay. Napoleon, in whom 
 revolutions of ideas were wrought with the 
 vivacity natural to his genius, all at once 
 viewed the events in the east in a new light. 
 The statesmen of Europe had long considered 
 the Turkish empire as on the eve of dismem- 
 berment, and it was in this view that Napo- 
 leon had intended to seize beforehand the 
 share of France by taking possession of 
 Egypt. He had for a moment given up this 
 idea, when, in 1802, he thought to reconcile 
 France with all the powers. He reverted to 
 it with vehemence on observing what was 
 passing at Constantinople, and said to him- 
 self, that since it was impossible to keep that 
 empire alive, the best thing that could be done 
 was to benefit by what it had left for the bet- 
 ter arrangement of the affairs of Europe, and 
 particularly for the humiliation of England. 
 He had with him. vanquished out still form*-
 
 324 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1807. 
 
 dable, the sovereign whose young head it was 
 easy to turn, by showing !um the mouths of 
 the Danube, the Bosphorus, Constantinople, 
 and he thought that, with some of these Turk- 
 ish spoils, which sooner or later must devolve 
 to Russia, he might obtain, not only peace, 
 which at the moment was no longer doubtful, 
 but a close, an intimate alliance, by means 
 of which he should conquer England, and ac- 
 complish those revolutions on the thrones of 
 the west which he meditated. 
 
 Having the Emperor Alexander daily at his 
 side, either at reviews, or in long rides on the 
 banks of the Niemen, or in his writing cabi- 
 net, where the map of the world was spread 
 out, and where he often shut himself up with 
 him after dinner, he mastered the mind of that 
 prince to such a degree as to upset it com- 
 pletely, by placing before him, in an almost un- 
 interrupted conversation of several days, the 
 following views. 
 
 A dispensation of Providence, said he to 
 Alexander, has just set me at liberty in regard 
 to the Porte. My ally and my friend, Sultan 
 Selim, has been hurled from the throne into 
 confinement. I did think that one might make 
 something of those Turks, restore to them 
 some energy, teach them to make use of their 
 natural courage ; 'tis an illusion. It is time to 
 put an end to an empire which can no longer 
 hold together, and to prevent its spoils from 
 contributing to increase the power of England. 
 
 Napoleon thereupon unfolded to Alexander 
 the new projects which he had just conceived. 
 If Alexander desired to be the ally of France, 
 her solid and sincere ally, nothing was more 
 easy, nothing would be more advantageous for 
 himself and for his empire. But this alliance 
 must be entire, without reserve, followed by a 
 complete devotedness to the mutual interests 
 of the two powers. In the first place, this al- 
 liance was the only one that was suitable for 
 Russia. What, in fact, was France accused 
 of] of wanting to rule Italy, Holland, perhaps 
 Spain ; of wanting to create on the Rhine a 
 system which would overthrow the old pre- 
 ponderance of Austria in Germany, and stop 
 the rising preponderance there of Prussia. 
 But need Russia care about Italy, Spain, Hol- 
 land 1 Germany herself, was she not at once 
 jealous of Russia and her secret enemy? 
 Was it not doing Russia a service to weaken 
 the principal German powers 1 What, on the 
 contrary, was England accused of? of want- 
 ing to rule the seas, which are the property of 
 everybody; to oppress neutral flags, to which 
 the flag of Russia belonged; to possess her- 
 6elf of the commerce of nations; to fleece 
 th?m by making them pay for colonial produce 
 v. hatever price she pleased ; to set foot wher- 
 -ver she could upon the continent, in Portugal, 
 ja Denmark, in Sweden ; to take or to threaten 
 the dominant points of the globe, the Cape, 
 Malta, Gibraltar, the Sound, in order to impose 
 her laws on the whole trading world. At this 
 very moment, instead of assisting her allies, 
 was she not endeavouring to conquer Egypt? 
 And recently, if she had possessed herself of 
 the Dardanelles, what would she have done 
 arith them ? Now about these English cravings 
 one cannot say as about the longings imputed 
 
 to France what do they concern Russia? It 
 was the opinion of the great Catherine and of 
 Paul I., that they deeply concerned Russia, 
 since both of them declared war against Great 
 Britain on account of the rights of the neutral 
 flag. The English oppressed the commerce 
 of nations to such a degree that they had mo- 
 nopolized that of St. Petersburg, all the capi- 
 tals of which they held, and this became in 
 their hands a dangerous source of influence 
 over Russia, for by merely withholding ready 
 money, they could instigate to murmuring and 
 to the murdering of emperors. A French army, 
 led by a great captain, could, strictly speaking, 
 come to the Vistula, to the Niemen: would it 
 get to the Neva ? An English fleet, on the 
 contrary, after forcing the Sound, could burn 
 Cronstadt, threaten Petersburg, after forcing 
 the Bosphorus, destroy Sevastapol and Odessa. 
 An English fleet could shut up the Russians 
 in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, keep them 
 prisoners in those seas as in a lake. But 
 France and Russia, not touching at any point, 
 having the same enemies, the English on the 
 sea, the Germans on land, having, moreover, 
 a. common and pressing object of solicitude, 
 the Turkish empire, ought to be upon good 
 terms, to concert together, and if they chose 
 to do that, they were powerful enough to rule 
 the world between them. 
 
 To these grand views Napoleon attached a 
 system of means still more seductive than the 
 general ideas which he had just developed. 
 He was accused of being fond of war for the 
 sake of war. That was not the case, and he 
 would instantly prove it Be my mediator, 
 said he to Alexander, with the cabinet of Lon- 
 don. That character befits your position as 
 the former ally of England and the future ally 
 of France. I have done thinking of Malta. 
 Let Great Britain keep that island in compen- 
 sation for what I have acquired since the rup- 
 | ture of the peace of Amiens. But let her, in 
 her turn, give up the colonies of Spain and of 
 Holland, and at that price I will restore Han- 
 over to her. Are not these conditions just, per- 
 fectly equitable ? Can I accept others ? Can 
 1 1 desert my allies ? And when I sacrifice my 
 conquests on the continent, such a conquest 
 as Hanover, to recover the distant possessions 
 of my allies, is it possible to dispute my pro- 
 bity and my moderation ? 
 
 Alexander admitted that these conditions 
 were perfectly just, and that France could not 
 accept others. Napoleon, continuing, brought 
 that prince to acknowledge that, if England 
 persisted after such proposals, she ought to be 
 forced to submit, as it was not right that the 
 world should be for ever disturbed by her; and 
 he proved to him that they had the means of 
 reducing her by a mere declaration. If, said 
 he, England refuses peace on these conditions, 
 proclaim yourself the ally of France ; declare 
 that you will join your forces with hers to en- 
 sure a maritime peace. Let England know 
 that, besides war with France, she will have 
 war with the whole Continent, with Russia, 
 with Prussia, with Denmark, with Sweden, 
 and with Portugal, which must obey when we 
 signify our will to them, with Austria herself, 
 who will be obliged to speak out in the same
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 325 
 
 spirit, if we declare to her that she will have 
 war with us, in case she does not choose to 
 have war with England on the conditions sig- 
 nified by us. England, then, exposed to a uni- 
 versal war, if she will not conclude an equi- 
 table peace England will lay down her arms. 
 All this, added Napoleon, ought to be commu- 
 nicated to each cabinet, and precise and short 
 terms fixed for deciding. If England does not 
 yield, we will act in concert, and we shall find 
 .sufficient indemnities to compensate us for 
 this continuation of the war. Two very im- 
 portant countries, one of them in particular, 
 lor Russia, will perhaps resist. These are 
 Portugal and Sweden, whose maritime position 
 places them under the influence of Great Bri- 
 tain. Relative to Portugal, said Napoleon, I 
 will settle with Spain. You will take Finland 
 as a compensation for the war which you will 
 have been obliged to wage with Sweden. The 
 King of Sweden, it is true, is your brother- 
 in-law and your ally: let him follow the 
 changes of your policy, or let him take the 
 consequences of his ill-will. Sweden, repeated 
 Napoleon several times, may be a relation, an 
 ally of the moment, but she is a geographical 
 enemy. 1 Petersburg is too near the frontiers 
 of Finland. The fair Hussions of Petersburg 
 must not again hear from their palaces the cannon 
 of the Swedes. 
 
 Napoleon, after assigning Finland to Alexan- 
 der, as the price of the war against England, 
 held forth to him something still more alluring 
 in the east. "You are to act as mediator 
 with England for me," said he to Alexander, 
 " and as armed mediator who imposes peace. 
 I will act the same part for you with the Porte. 
 I will signify my mediation to her; if she re- 
 fuses to treat on such conditions as satisfy you 
 in the state of anarchy into which she has 
 fallen, I will unite with you against the Turks, 
 as you will have united with me against the 
 English, and then we shall make a suitable 
 partition of the Ottoman empire." 
 
 Here it was especially that the field of hypo- 
 theses became immense, and that the imagina- 
 tion of the two sovereigns strayed into infinite 
 combinations. The first wish of Russia was to 
 obtain at once, whatever might result from the 
 negotiation with the Porte, some portion of the 
 provinces of the Danube. Napoleon assented, 
 in return for the assistance which Russia was to 
 lend him in the affairs of the west. However, 
 as it was probable that the Turks would not 
 give up any thing, war would ensue, and after 
 the war the partition. But what partition 7 
 Russia might have, besides Bessarabia, Mol- 
 davia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, as far as the Bal- 
 kans. Napoleon would naturally wish for the 
 maritime provinces, such as Albania, Thes- 
 saly, Morea, Candia. Some indemnities for 
 Austria would be found in Bosnia and Servia, 
 either ceded to her in full property, or made 
 the appanage of an arch-duke; and thus they 
 would endeavour to console her for those con- 
 vulsions of the world, from each of which she 
 would come forth lessened and her rivals 
 aggrandized. 
 
 These are the very expressions of Napoleon, re- 
 peated by Alexander, in relating to M. de Caulaincourt 
 what bad passed at Tilsit. 
 
 Figure to yourself the young czai, humbled 
 the day before, coming to the camp of Napo- 
 leon to solicit peace, feeling of course no un- 
 easiness about his own dominions, the distance 
 of which saved them from the coveting of the 
 conqueror, but expecting to lose a large portion 
 of the territory of his ally, the King of Prussia, 
 and to retire disgraced from this war figure 
 him to yourself, suddenly transported into a 
 sort of world at once imaginary and real, im- 
 aginary by its grandeur, real by its possibility, 
 finding himself, immediately after a signal de- 
 feat, in the way to conquer Finland and part 
 of the Turkish empire, and to acquire by a dis- 
 astrous war, more than was formally acquired 
 by a successful war, as if the honour of hav- 
 ing been vanquished by Napoleon was almost 
 equivalent to a victory, and ought to pro- 
 duce the fruits of one figure to yourself this 
 young monarch, eager after glory, seeking it 
 everywhere for seven years past, sometimes 
 in the precocious civilization of his empire, 
 sometimes in the creation of a new European 
 equilibrium, and meeting only with unpar- 
 alleled defeats, then all at once finding that 
 glory so earnestly sought, in a system of alli- 
 ance with, his conqueror, an alliance which 
 was to give him a share in the sway of the 
 world, below but by the side of the great man 
 who was pleased to divide it with him, worth 
 to Russia the brilliant conquests promised by 
 Catherine to her successors, which, since Ca- 
 therine's time, had fled into the realm of chi- 
 meras figure to yourself, we say, passing from 
 such deep dejection to such high hopes, and 
 you will comprehend without difficulty his agi- 
 tation, his intoxication, his sudden friendship 
 for Napoleon a friendship which assumed 
 the form of an affection, enthusiastic and 
 assuredly sincere, at least in these first mo- 
 ments. 
 
 Alexander, who, as we have already said, 
 was mild, humane, intelligent, but fickle as his 
 father, rushed eagerly into the new track 
 opened for him by his wily seducer. Never 
 did he once leave Napoleon without expressing 
 his unbounded admiration. What a great 
 man ! he said incessantly to those who ap- 
 proached him ; what a genius ! what extensive 
 views ! what a captain ! what a statesman ! 
 had I but known him sooner, how many faults 
 he might have spared me ! what great things 
 we might have accomplished together! His 
 ministers who rejoined him, his generals who 
 were about him, perceived the influence exer- 
 cised over him, and they were not sorry for it, 
 for they saw him getting out of a deplorable 
 scrape with advantage and honour, judging at 
 least from the satisfaction that beamed from 
 his countenance. 
 
 Meanwhile, the unfortunate King of Prussia 
 had come to Tilsit, bringing with him his mis- 
 fortunes, his affliction, his homely reason, and 
 his modest good sense. Those intoxicating 
 secrets which enraptured Alexander were not 
 adapted for him. Alexander represented his 
 intimacy with Napoleon as the means of ob- 
 taining larger restitutions in favour of Prussia. 
 But he concealed from him the new alliance 
 that was preparing, or intrusted him with ouly 
 the smallest part of the secret. It would havf 
 2E
 
 326 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [June, 1801 
 
 appeared strange, in fact, that one of the two 
 conquered sovereigns should obtain such fine 
 acquisitions when the other was going to lose 
 half his kingdom. Frederick William, treated 
 with infinite respect by Napoleon, was never- 
 theless left by himself. On horseback, at the 
 head of troops, he had not the brilliant grace- 
 fulness of Alexander, the quiet ascendency of 
 Napoleon. He remained in general behind, 
 lonely as the unfortunate, making his crowned 
 companions wait when they mounted or 
 alighted from their horses, an object, in short, 
 of little interest, and even of less esteem than 
 he deserved ; for the French believed, from the 
 gossip of the imperial court, that Napoleon 
 had been betrayed by Prussia, and the Rus- 
 sians incessantly repeated that she had fought 
 ill. As for Alexander, all attentions were for 
 him. When he returned from long excursions, 
 Napoleon detained him, lent him even furni- 
 ture, and his linen, and would not let him^lose 
 time in going to his quarters to change his 
 dress. A superb dressing-case of gold, used 
 by Napoleon, having appeared to please him, 
 was instantly offered and accepted. After din- 
 ner, which the three sovereigns took together, 
 and always at Napoleon's, they separated 
 early, and the two emperors went and shut 
 themselves up together a privacy from which 
 Frederick William was excluded, and which 
 was always charged to the same account the 
 efforts making by Alexander with Napoleon to 
 recover the greater part of the Prussian mo- 
 narchy. 
 
 That, however, was not the subject discussed 
 in those long tete~d-teles, but that immense sys- 
 tem by which they were to hold joint rule over 
 Europe. The possible, the probable partition 
 of the Turkish empire was the continual topic 
 of conversation. A first partition had been 
 discussed, as we have seen, but it seemed in- 
 complete. Russia was to have the banks of 
 the Danube as far as the Balkans. Napoleon 
 the maritime provinces, such as Albania and the 
 Morea. The inland provinces, as Bosnia and 
 Servia, were allotted to Austria. The Porte re- 
 tained Roumelia, that is the country south of the 
 Balkans, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Egypt. 
 Thus, according to this plan, Constantinople, 
 the key of the seas, and in the imagination of 
 men the real capital of the east, Constanti- 
 nople, so positively promised to the descend- 
 ants of Peter the Great by the universal opinion, 
 an opinion formed from the hopes of the Rus- 
 sians and the fears of Europe Constantinople, 
 with St. Sophia's, was left to the barbarians 
 of Asia! 
 
 Alexander reverted to this point several 
 times, and a more complete partition, which 
 should have given Napoleon not only the Mo- 
 rea, but also the islands of the Archipelago, 
 Candia, Syria, Egypt, but Constantinople to 
 the Russians, would have pleased him better. 
 Napoleon, however, who thought that he had 
 done enough, nay, more than enough, to attach 
 ehe young emperor to himself, would never go 
 *o far. To give up Constantinople, no matter 
 
 I have these particulars from M. de Meneval him- 
 self, an eye-witness ; and their accuracy is guarantied 
 not ocly by the veracity of that respectable witness, but 
 also LV the correspondence of Messrs, de Savary and 
 
 to whom, so it were a declared enemy of Eng. 
 land, and thus let any one during his lifetime 
 make the most brilliant acquisition that it was 
 possible to imagine, could not suit Napoleon. 
 He could, indeed, as in obedience to a natural 
 tendency of things, and to resolve many Euro- 
 pean difficulties, lastly to gain a powerful alli- 
 ance against England, he could certainly per- 
 mit the torrent of Russian ambition to dash 
 against the foot of the Balkans, especially in 
 the desire of diverting that torrent from the 
 Vistula; but he would not suffer it to pass 
 those tutelary mountains. He would not suffer 
 the most striking work of modern times to be 
 accomplished by any one before his face, or at 
 his side. He was too jealous of the greatness 
 of France, too jealous of occupying alone the 
 imagination of mankind, to consent to such aa 
 encroachment upon his own glory. 
 
 Thus, notwithstanding his strong desire to 
 seduce his new friend, he never could be per- 
 suaded to any other partition than that which 
 should take from the Porte the provinces of 
 the Danube, too loosely attached to the empire, 
 and Greece, already too much awakened to 
 submit long to the yoke of the Turks. 
 
 One day the two emperors, on returning from 
 a long ride, shut themselves up in the writing 
 cabinet, where numerous maps were spread 
 out. Napoleon, apparently continuing a con- 
 versation briskly began with Alexander, de- 
 sired M. de Meneval to bring him the map of 
 Turkey, unfolded it, then resumed the conver- 
 sation, and, suddenly clapping his finger oa 
 Constantinople, exclaimed several times, re- 
 gardless of being heard by his secretary, in 
 whom he had absolute confidence: "Constan- 
 tinople! Constantinople! never! 'tis the em- 
 pire of the world !" 1 
 
 However, Finland, the Danubian provinces, 
 as the price of the concurrence of Russia in 
 the projects of France, held out a prospect 
 sufficiently brilliant to enchant Alexander, for 
 his reign would equal that of the great Cathe- 
 rine, if he obtained these extensive territories, 
 It was in consequence agreed that France and 
 Russia should form from that moment a close 
 alliance, at once defensive and offensive, should 
 have in future only the same friends, the same 
 enemies, should on all occasions direct their 
 joint land and sea forces towards the same 
 object. The number of men and ships to be 
 employed in each particular case, was to be 
 settled afterwards by a special convention. 
 Russia was immediately to offer her mediation 
 to the British cabinet for the re-establishment 
 of peace with France, and, if that mediation, 
 on the conditions fixed by Napoleon, were not 
 accepted, she bound herself to declare war 
 against Great Britain. Immediately afterwards, 
 they were to force all Europe, Austria included, 
 to concur in that war. If Sweden and Porto- 
 gal, as it was easy to foresee, should resist, a 
 Russian army was to occupy Finland, a French 
 army Portugal. As for the Turks, Napoleon 
 engaged to offer them his mediation for restor- 
 ing peace between them and Russia; and if 
 
 de Caulaincourt. which proves that, notwithstanding all 
 the efforts of Alexander, the limit of the Balkan* WM 
 never passed.
 
 June, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 they refused this mediation, it was stipulated 
 that the war of Russia against them should be 
 common to France, and that the powers should 
 afterwards do what they thought fit with the 
 Ottoman empire, with the proviso that dismem- 
 berment was to extend no further than the Bal- 
 kans and the gulf of Salonichi. 
 
 These resolutions once adopted in substance, 
 Napoleon undertook to draw up with his own 
 hand the treaties, patent and secret, which ' 
 were to include them. It was requisite, how- ' 
 ever, that they should come to an understand- 
 ing about that unfortunate Prussia which Na- 
 poleon had promised not utterly to destroy, and 
 for the honour of Alexander to allow it to 
 subsist, at least in part. There were two fun- 
 damental conditions which Napoleon had laid 
 down, and from which he would not depart: 
 that is, to take, for the purpose of various com- 
 binations, all the German provinces which 
 Prussia possessed on the left of the Elbe, and 
 likewise the Polish provinces which she had 
 acquired by the various partitions of Poland. 
 This was not less than half of the Prussian 
 states, in territory and population. With the 
 provinces of Westphalia, Brunswick, Magde- 
 burg, Thuringia, anciently or recently acquired 
 by Prussia, Napoleon purposed, by uniting 
 them with the grand-duchy of Hesse, to com- 
 pose a German kingdom, which he should call 
 the kingdom of Westphalia, for his brother 
 Jerome, in order to introduce a member of his 
 family into the confederation of the Rhine. 
 He had already crowned two of his brothers, 
 the one who reigned in Italy, the other in Hol- 
 land. He should thus establish a third in Ger- 
 many. As for Hanover, which had belonged 
 for a moment to Prussia, Napoleon intended 
 to keep it as a pledge of peace with England. 
 With respect to Poland, his idea was to com- 
 mence its restoration by means of the pro- 
 vinces of Posen and Warsaw, which he should 
 constitute into an independent state, in order 
 to repay the services of the Poles, who had 
 been of little assistance to him hitherto, but 
 might be of greater, when they should combine 
 the advantage of organization with their na- 
 tural courage ; in order, likewise, to abolish 
 by its overthrow the principal and most cen- 
 surable of the works of the great Frederick 
 the partition of Poland. Napoleon knew not 
 how much time would subsequently permit 
 him to take from Austria, by exchanges or by 
 force of the Polish provinces retained by that 
 power ; and, meanwhile, he revived the king- 
 dom of Poland by the creation of a Polish 
 state of considerable extent and of real import- 
 ance. To facilitate this restoration still more, 
 he conceived the idea of reverting to another 
 combination of the past, that was, to give Po- 
 land to Saxony. Thus, in destroying one of 
 the great monarchies of Germany, Prussia, he 
 designed to substitute for it two new allied mo- 
 narchies, Westphalia, composed of many frag- 
 ments, in behalf of his youngest brother, Saxony, 
 so aggrandized to be doubled, and both destined, 
 according to all probability, to remain faith- 
 fully attached to him. He intended in this 
 manner tore-form a new German equilibrium, 
 and to replace by two alliances the strong alli- 
 ance of Prussia, which he had lost. He as- 
 
 signed, therefore, for limits to the confederation 
 of the Rhine, the Inn in regard to Austria, the 
 Elbe in regard to Prussia, the Vistula in regard 
 to Russia. 
 
 Russia had not many objections to raise 
 against such combinations, especially when 
 once she had determined to associate herself 
 with the policy of France. Excepting the sa- 
 crifices imposed on Prussia, excepting the 
 restoration of the kingdom of Poland, she 
 cared but little about these creations, about 
 these dismemberments of German States. But 
 the sacrifices imposed on Prussia were em- 
 barrassing for the Emperor Alexander, espe- 
 cially when he recollected the oaths sworn 
 over the tomb of the great Frederick, and the 
 demonstrations of chivalrous devotedness la- 
 vished on the Queen of Prussia. From nine 
 millions and a half of inhabitants, the Prussian 
 monarchy was reduced to five millions. From 
 a revenue of a hundred and twenty millions 
 francs, it was reduced to sixty-nine. Alexander 
 could not therefore consent to such a lessening 
 of his ally without some objections. He sub- 
 mitted them to Napoleon, and was listened to 
 but coolly. Napoleon replied, that it was out of 
 consideration for him that he left Prussia so 
 many provinces ; that, but for the desire to 
 please him, he would have reduced her to a 
 third-rate power. He would even have taken 
 Silesia from her, he said, and either given it to 
 Saxony, for the purpose of transferring to the 
 latter all the consequence which Prussia had 
 possessed, or to Austria, in exchange for the 
 Gallicias. 
 
 This double combination would certainly 
 have been the better of the two. The determi- 
 nation to sacrifice Prussia once taken, it had 
 been better to destroy her entirely than but 
 half. In all cases, it is a bad system to over- 
 throw old states in order to create new ones; 
 for old states are apt to revive, new ones apt 
 to die, unless you act decidedly in a manner 
 consistent with the progress of things. The 
 progress of things had brought with it the 
 gradual aggrandizement of Prussia, the gra- 
 dual destruction of Poland and Saxony. All 
 that might be done in this spirit would have a 
 i chance of lasting; all that might be done in 
 ! the contrary spirit had little chance. To give 
 consistence to the new work, it was requisite 
 that Prussia should at once be made so weak, 
 Saxony and Poland so strong, that the former 
 should have few means of recovering, and the 
 ' two others numerous means of upholding 
 themselves. Not reconstituting Prussia in 
 I her integrity a reconstruction which would 
 have been preferable to any other Napoleon 
 , had done better to destroy her completely 
 He thought so himself, and so he told the Em. 
 i peror Alexander. He went so far as to offer 
 him part of the spoils of the house of Branden- 
 burg, if he would countenance his plans for 
 the more complete re-establishment of Poland. 
 But Alexander refused for it was evidently 
 impossible for him to accept the spoils of 
 Prussia. It was bad enough not to defend 
 I her more strenuously, and to become the in- 
 ' terested ally of the conqueror who despoiled 
 her. Independently of the fate inflicteu on 
 i Prussia, Alexander could not view with plea-
 
 328 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 snre the restoration of Poland. But Napoleon 
 strove to prove to him that, towards the west, 
 Russia ought to stop at the Niemen ; that, in 
 passing it, to approach the Vistula, as she had 
 done in the last partition of Poland, she in- 
 curred the suspicion and odium of Europe; 
 acquired subjects, long, perhaps even for ever, 
 refractory ; and, for the sake of doubtful con- 
 quests, rendered herself dependent on neigh- 
 bouring powers, always ready to foment in- 
 surrection in her territories; that it was re- 
 quisite to seek her aggrandizement in other 
 quarters; that she would find it in the north 
 towards Finland, in the east towards Turkey; 
 that, in the latter direction in particular, there 
 was opening for her the track of real great- 
 ness, of greatness without limits, since India 
 itself was in perspective ; that, in seeking to 
 aggrandize herself on that side, she would find, 
 on the continent, friends, allies France in 
 particular and that she would have no ad- 
 versary but England, whose power, reduced 
 to that of her ships, could never dispute with 
 her the banks of the Danube. The reasons of 
 Napoleon were strong, and had they been bad, 
 his auditor was not in a position to contradict 
 them. He had to choose either to have no 
 share anywhere, not to aggrandize himself in 
 any quarter, without preventing the revival of 
 Poland, the downfall of Prussia; or to aggran- 
 dize himself extensively in the direction pointed 
 out by Napoleon. Alexander hesitated not. 
 Besides, he was so seduced, so fascinated, 
 that there was no need of force to decide him. 
 But what puzzled him was how to render his 
 misfortune endurable to Frederick William, 
 who, seeing the two emperors so intimate, 
 might flatter himself that he was the motive 
 of that intimacy, and that he should reap be- 
 nefit from it. Alexander undertook, embar- 
 rassing as was the task, to break the matter 
 to him, and having communicated to Frede- 
 rick William the resolutions which concerned 
 him, leaving to him the business of arranging 
 with the supreme arbiter, who fixed the bound- 
 aries of every power. Frederick William 
 received Alexander's communication very 
 coldly, and promised to confer with Napoleon 
 on the subject. The luckless King of Prussia, 
 to whom Fortune was then so unfavourable, 
 but whom she afterwards compensated, was 
 not capable of negotiating his own business 
 himself. He was neither adroit nor imposing, 
 and if his spirit, heaving off the load of cala- 
 mity, indulged in some involuntary move- 
 ments, they were movements of testiness, not 
 well befitting a king without dominions and 
 without army. The town of Memel, where 
 the Queen of Prussia passed her nights and 
 her days in weeping, and General Lestocq's 
 ten or fifteen thousand men, were all that he 
 had left That prince had a long explanation 
 with Napoleon, and, at the first interview, he 
 took great pains to prove to him that he had 
 not deserved his misfortune, for the origin of 
 his quarrel with France dated from the viola- 
 tion of the territory of Anspach; and he af- 
 firmed most pertinaciously that, in passing 
 through the province of Anspach, Napoleon 
 had violated the Prussian sovereignty. At 
 the point to which things had now arrived, 
 
 ' this question was of little importance; but on 
 that subject Napoleon entertained a convic- 
 tion as strong as that of the king. In passing 
 through that province of Anspach, he had 
 acted with perfect sincerity, and he was as 
 anxious to set himself right on this point as 
 if he had not been the stronger. The two 
 : monarchs grew warm, and the King of Prus- 
 sia, in his despair, was hurried into transports 
 ! of passion, to be lamented for the sake of his 
 dignity, far from serviceable to his cause, per- 
 plexing for Napoleon. Annoyed by his com- 
 plaints, Napoleon referred him to his ally, 
 Alexander, who had induced him to continue 
 the war, when, on the morrow of Eylau, peace 
 would have been possible and advantageous 
 for Prussia. " For the rest," said he, " the 
 Emperor Alexander has the means of indem- 
 nifying you namely, to sacrifice to you his 
 relations, the Princes of Mecklenburg and 
 Oldenburg, whose dominions will furnish a 
 fine compensation for Prussia towards the 
 ! north and towards the Baltic ; he can also 
 give up to you the King of Sweden, from 
 whom you may take Stralsund and that por- 
 tion of Pomerania which he makes such bad 
 use of. Let the Emperor Alexander consent 
 for you to these acquisitions, not equal to the 
 | territories that are taken from you, but better 
 ; situated, and, for my part, I shall make no 
 I objections." Napoleon had good reason for 
 referring Frederick William to Alexander, 
 j who could, in fact, have obtained those com- 
 pensations for Prussia. But Alexander was 
 already in trouble enough, caused by the grief 
 I of his Prussian allies, without raising up 
 i complaints, reproaches, dismayed faces, in 
 | his own family. Frederick William would 
 never have even ventured to mention such a 
 thing, and regarded the ofier as an evasion. 
 He was, therefore, obliged to make up his 
 mind to the sacrifice of half his kingdom. It 
 was possible, however, to afl'ord him some 
 petty consolations, which had considerably 
 soothed his grief. Old Prussia, Pomerania, 
 Brandenburg, Silesia were still left him; the 
 provinces on the left of the Elbe were taken 
 from him, and, in taking these extensive por- 
 tions of his dominions, it was necessary to 
 avoid separating from him too much those 
 that were left him. It was, in fact, by suc- 
 cessive encroachments on Poland that Frede- 
 rick had connected together Old Prussia, 
 Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia. The 
 question was, what portions of Poland should 
 be left to Prussia for the purpose of binding 
 those provinces properly together. Lastly, 
 and above all, it was necessary to decide 
 whether, in assigning to Prussia the frontier 
 of the Elbe in Germany, the fortress of Mag- 
 deburg, seated on the Elbe, a more important 
 place than Mayence, or Strasburg on the 
 Rhine, should be granted to her. Napoleon 
 consented that the boundaries of Poland should 
 i be so traced as to connect together, as much 
 ! as possible, Old Prussia, Pomerania, Bran- 
 denburg and Silesia; but, in conceding the 
 Lower Vistula to Frederick William, he in- 
 sisted on taking Dantzig from him, and con- 
 stituting it a free city, like Lubeck, Bremen 
 and Hamburg. With regard to Magdeburg,
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 329 
 
 he was inflexible. Mayence, Magdeburg, 
 formed the entrepots of his power in the 
 north ; it was not possible for him to part 
 with them. He was, therefore, peremptory 
 in his resolutions relative to Dantzig and 
 Magdeburg, 
 
 The King of Prussia made up his mind to 
 the loss of Dantzig, but he was loth to relin- 
 quish Magdeburg; for, situated in the heart of 
 Germany, it was an important point d'appui, 
 and the key of the Elbe, which had become 
 his frontier. He urged not this motive, but a 
 reason of ancient affection. In fact, the in- 
 habitants of the duchy of Magdeburg, lying 
 both on the right and on the left of the Elbe, 
 were among the oldest and most loyal subjects 
 of the monarchy. He gained nothing, how- 
 ever, by this new argument. As he was 
 very urgent, sometimes with Napoleon, some- 
 times with Alexander, the latter conceived the 
 idea of shaking Napoleon by inviting the 
 Queen of Prussia to Tilsit, to try the power of 
 her understanding, her beauty, and her mis- 
 fortune on the conqueror of Europe. The 
 calumnious reports to which the admiration 
 of Alexander for this princess had given rise, 
 had prevented her from going to Tilsit. Re- 
 course was, nevertheless, had to her interven- 
 tion as a last expedient, not for coarsely touch- 
 ing Napoleon, but for working upon his most 
 delicate feelings by the presence of a queen, 
 beautiful, accomplished, and unfortunate. 
 
 It was late to try such a resource, for the 
 ideas of Napoleon were definitively fixed, and, 
 for the rest, it was not at all probable that, at 
 any time whatever, Napoleon would have 
 sacrificed part of his designs under the influ- 
 ence of a woman, how interesting soever she 
 might be. 
 
 Frederick William, therefore, invited the 
 queen to come to Tilsit. She decided to com- 
 ply, and the negotiation, which had already 
 lasted about twelve days, was spun out to give 
 that princess time to make the trip. She ar- 
 rived at Tilsit on the 6th of July. An hour 
 after her arrival, Napoleon anticipated her, by 
 calling to pay her a visit. The Queen of Prus- 
 sia was then thirty-two years old. Her beauty, 
 formerly brilliant, appeared to be slightly af- 
 fected by age, but he was still one of the finest 
 women of her time. With a superior under- 
 standing she combined a certain habit of busi- 
 ness, from taking an indiscreet part in it, per- 
 fect nobleness of character and dignity of 
 attitude. However, too strong a desire to pro- 
 duce an effect on the great man, on whom she 
 was dependent, was a drawback upon her suc- 
 cess. She spoke of the greatness of Napo- 
 leon, of his genius, of the misfortune of having 
 mistaken him, in terms not simple enough to 
 touch him. But the energy of character and 
 strength of mind of that princess were soon 
 displayed in that conversation to such a degree 
 as to embarrass Napoleon himself, who, while 
 paying her the utmost attentions and respect, 
 took good care not to drop a single word that 
 could be binding upon him. 
 
 She came to dine with Napoleon, who re- 
 ceived her at the door of his imperial residence. 
 During dinner, she strove to conquer him, to 
 draw from him at least one word from which 
 VOL. II. 42 
 
 she could derive hope, especially respecting 
 Magdeburg. Napoleon, on his part, always 
 respectful, courteous, but evasive, disappointed 
 her by a resistance which resembled a con- 
 tinual flight. She divined the tactics of her 
 mighty adversary, and bitterly lamented that 
 he would not, at parting, leave in her soul a 
 recollection which permitted her to join with 
 admiration for the great man's genius inviola- 
 ble attachment for the generous conqueror. 
 Perhaps, if Napoleon, less preoccupied with 
 plans for aggrandizing ungrateful royalties, or 
 for creating ephemeral royalties, had yielded 
 on this occasion and conceded not only what 
 was solicited of him, but what he could further 
 have granted without prejudice to his other 
 projects perhaps he might have attached to 
 himself the warm heart of that queen, and the 
 honest heart of her husband. But to the soli- 
 citations of the princess he opposed an invin- 
 cible respect. He had fixed with his immuta- 
 ble will all that related to Prussia, to Poland, 
 to Westphalia; he had consented to a demar- 
 cation between Poland and Pomerania, which, 
 following the banks of the Netze and the canal 
 of Bromberg, ran and joined the Vistula be- 
 low Bromberg. He made one concession in 
 regard to Magdeburg, namely, that, in case 
 Hanover should remain in the possession of 
 France, either because peace was not con- 
 cluded with England, or because she concluded 
 it without restoring Hanover, there should be 
 ceded back to Prussia, on the left of the Elbe 
 and in the environs of Magdeburg, a territory 
 of three or four hundred thousand souls, in- 
 cluding the restitution of the fortress itself. 
 
 He would not grant any thing more. M. de 
 Talleyrand had orders to confer with Messrs, 
 de Kourakin and de Labanoff, and to settle all 
 disputed points on the 7th, so that the queen, 
 sent for to Tilsit to soften the lot of Prussia, 
 only accelerated the result, which it was the 
 intention to prevent, by the very embarrass- 
 ment which she occasioned Napoleon, through 
 the success that she had wellnigh obtained 
 by her solicitations, at once delicate and per- 
 severing. The Russian and Prussian nego- 
 tiators, finding themselves summoned pe- 
 remptorilv to consent or to refuse, at length 
 yielded. The treaty, concluded on the 7th, 
 was signed on the 8th, and assumed the 
 title, which has become famous, of TIIEATT 
 OF TILSIT. 
 
 There are three sorts of stipulations : 
 
 A patent treaty between France and Rus- 
 sia, and another between France and Prussia; 
 
 Secret articles added to this double treaty.; 
 
 Lastly, an occult treaty of alliance, offensive 
 and defensive, between France and Russia, 
 which the two parties engaged to envelope in 
 absolute secrecy till both should agree to pub- 
 lish it. 
 
 The two patent treaties between France, 
 Russia, and Prussia, contained the following 
 stipulations : 
 
 Restitution to the King of Prussia, in consi- 
 deration of the Emperor of Russia, of Old Prus- 
 sia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Upper and 
 Lower Silesia; 
 
 Cession to France of all the provinces t.' 
 the left of the Elbe, for the purpose of com 
 2 2
 
 330 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 posing with them and me grand-duchy of 
 Hesse a kingdom of Westphalia, in behalf of 
 the youngest of Napoleon's brothers, Prince 
 Jerome Bonaparte; 
 
 Cession of the duchies of Posen and War- 
 saw, for the purpose of forming a Polish state, 
 which under the title of grand-duchy of War- 
 saw, was to be assigned to Saxony, with a 
 military road across Silesia, affording passage 
 from Germany to Poland. 
 
 Acknowledgment by Russia and by Prus- 
 sia of Louis Bonaparte as King of Holland, 
 of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, of 
 Jerome Bonaparte as King of Westphalia; 
 acknowledgment of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine, and in general of all the States created 
 by Napoleon ; 
 
 Re-establishment in their sovereignties of the 
 princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, but 
 occupation of their territories by the French 
 troops, for the execution of the continental 
 blockade ; 
 
 Lastly, mediation of Russia, for re-esta- 
 blishing peace between France and England ; 
 
 Mediation of France to re-establish peace 
 between the Porte and Russia. 
 
 The secret articles contained the following 
 stipulations : 
 
 Restitution to the French of the mouths of 
 the Cattaro ; 
 
 Cession of the Seven Islands, which were 
 thenceforward to belong to France, in full 
 sovereignty ; 
 
 Promise in regard to Joseph, already recog- 
 nised as King of Naples in the patent treaty, 
 to acknowledge him as also King of the Two 
 Sicilies, when the Bourbons of Naples should 
 be indemnified either by means of the Balearic 
 Islands or Candia ; 
 
 Promise, in case of the incorporation of 
 Hanover with the kingdom of Westphalia, to 
 restore to Prussia on the left of the Elbe a ter- 
 ritory containing three or four hundred thou- 
 sand inhabitants; 
 
 Lastly, annuities for life, settled on the dis- 
 possessed heads of the Houses of Hesse, 
 Brunswick, and Nassau Orange. 
 
 The occult treaty, the most important of all 
 those signed at the moment, and which the 
 parties engaged to envelope in inviolable se- 
 crecy, contained an engagement on the part 
 of Russia and France to make common cause 
 in all circumstances, to unite their forces by 
 land and sea in any war which they should 
 have to carry on; to take arms against Eng- 
 land if she would not subscribe to the condi- 
 tions which we have recapitulated ; against 
 the Porte, if the latter should not accept the 
 mediation of France, and in this last case to 
 withdraw, so said the text, the European pro- 
 vinces from the vexations of the Porte, excepting 
 Constantinople and Roumeha. The two powers 
 engaged to summon, jointly, Sweden, Den- 
 mark, Portugal, Austria herself, to concur in 
 the projects of France and Russia, that is to 
 say, to shut their ports against England, and 
 to declare war against her. 1 
 
 The signature given by the Russians neces- 
 
 i I am not giving ihe text, but a strictly accurate 
 analysis of the treaty, the precise words of which have 
 enlmuuU unknown to this day. 
 
 j sarily deciding that of the Prussians, produced 
 i strong emotion in the latter. The Queen of 
 Prussia determined to set out immediately. 
 After dining as usual at Napoleon -s, on the 
 8th, after addressing to him some complaints, 
 full of pride, and some to Alexander, full of 
 bitterness, she withdrew, attended by Duroc, 
 who had never ceased to feel a warm attach- 
 ment to her, and threw herself into her car- 
 riage, sobbing. She set out immediately for 
 Memel, whither she went to mourn her im- 
 prudence, her political passions, the mischiev- 
 ous influence which they had exercised on 
 public affairs, the fatal confidence which she 
 i had placed in the fidelity of chiefs of empires, 
 in their word and in their friendship. For- 
 tune was to change for her country and her 
 husband; but this hapless princess was not 
 destined to witness that change. 
 
 Alexander, having got rid of his unfortunate 
 friends, whose sorrows annoyed him, gave 
 himself up wholly to enthusiasm for his new 
 projects. He was conquered, but his armies 
 were honoured ; and instead of sustaining 
 losses in consequence of a war in which he 
 had met with nothing but disasters, he left 
 Tilsit with the hope of speedily realizing the 
 great designs of Catherine. The thing de- 
 pended on himself, for he could turn to peace 
 or war the mediation of Russia with the cabi- 
 net of Great Britain, and the mediation of 
 France with the Divan. One was to procure 
 him Finland, the other the whole or part of 
 the Danubian provinces. He was delighted 
 with his new ally. They promised to be in- 
 violably attached to one another, to conceal 
 nothing from each other, to meet again soon, 
 to continue those direct relations which had 
 already borne such excellent fruit. Alexander 
 durst not propose to Napoleon to come to 
 see, in the recesses of the north, the capital of 
 an empire yet too young to deserve his notice : 
 but he would go to Paris, visit the capital of 
 the most civilized empire in the world, where 
 was exhibited the spectacle of the best go- 
 vernment succeeding the most frightful anar- 
 chy, and where he hoped, he said, to learn, by 
 attending the meetings of the Council of State, 
 the great art of reigning, which the Emperor 
 of the French practised in so superior a 
 manner. 
 
 On the 9th of July, the very day after the 
 signature of the treaties, the solemn exchange 
 of the ratifications and the parting of the two 
 sovereigns took place. Napoleon wearing the 
 grand cordon of St. Andrew, went to the house 
 occupied by Alexander. He was received by 
 that prince, who wore the grand cordon of the 
 Legion of Honour, and who had about" him his 
 guard under arms. The two emperors, having 
 exchanged the ratifications, mounted their 
 horses and showed themselves to their troops. 
 Napoleon desired that the soldier reputed to be 
 the bravest of the Russian Imperial Guard 
 should be ordered to step out of the ranks, and 
 gave him with his own hand the cross of the 
 Legion of Honour. Then, after conversing 
 for a considerable time -with Alexander, he ac- 
 companied him towards the Niemen. They 
 embraced each other for the last time, amidst 
 the applause of all the spectators, and parted.
 
 My, 1807.; 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 331 
 
 Napoleon remained on the bank of the Nie- ' 
 men (ill he had seen his new friend land on the 
 other bank. Not till then did he retire, and 
 after taking leave of his soldiers, who by their 
 heroism had rendered such wonders possible, 
 he set out for Konigsberg, where he arrived 
 on the following day, the 10th of July. 
 
 In that city he arranged all the details of the 
 evacuation of Prussia, and directed Prince Ber- 
 thier to make them the subject of a conven- 
 tion which should be signed with M. de Kal- 
 kreuth. The banks of the Niemen were to be 
 evacuated by the 24th of July, those of the 
 Pregel by the 25th, those of the Passarge by 
 the 20th of August, those of the Vistula by the 
 4th of September, those of the Oder by the 1st 
 of October, those of the Elbe by the 1st of No- 
 vember, on the condition, however, that the 
 contributions owing by Prussia, both ordinary I 
 and extraordinary, should be wholly paid either 
 in specie or in bills accepted by the intendant ' 
 of the army. The amount was five or six hun- 
 dred millions, imposed on the Hanseatic towns, ! 
 on the German States, on the dispossessed j 
 princes, on Hanover, and, lastly, on Prussia 
 properly so called. That sum comprised both 
 what the French or allied troops had con- 
 sumed in kind, and what was to be paid them 
 in money. The treasury of the army, begun 
 at Austerlitz, would therefore receive consider- 
 able augmentation and sufficient resources for 
 rewarding the attachment of heroic soldiers 
 to the most magnificent of all masters. 
 
 Napoleon divided the army into four com- 
 mands, under Marshals Davout, Soult, Mas- 
 sena, and Brune. Marshal Davout, with the 
 third corps, the Saxons, the Poles, and several 
 divisions of dragoons and light cavalry, was to 
 form the first command, and to occupy Poland 
 till it should be evacuated. Marshal Soult, 
 with the fourth corps, the infantry reserve 
 which had belonged to Marshal Lannes, part 
 of the dragoons and of the light cavalry, was 
 to form the second command, to occupy old 
 Prussia from Konigsberg to Dantzig, and to 
 take upon him all the details of the evacua- 
 tion. Marshal Massena, with the fifth corps, 
 with the troops of Marshals Ney and Mortier, 
 with the Bavarian divisions of Wrede, was to 
 form the third command, and to occupy Silesia 
 till the general evacuation. Lastly, Marshal 
 Brune, forming the fourth command, with all 
 the troops left on the rear, was charged to 
 watch the coasts of the Baltic, and, if the 
 English should appear there, to receive them 
 as he had formerly done at the Helder. The 
 guard and Victor's, formerly Bernadotte's, 
 corps were marched for Berlin. 
 
 Napoleon left Konigsberg on the 13th of 
 July, and proceeded straight to Dresden, to pass 
 a few days there with his new ally the King of 
 Saxony, created Grand-duke of Warsaw, and 
 to agree with him what constitution to give to 
 the Poles. That good and wise prince, far 
 from ambitious, but flattered, as well as all his 
 subjects, with the greatness conferred on his 
 family, received Napoleon with transports of 
 delight and gratitude. Napoleon left him to 
 return to Paris, where he was impatiently ex- 
 pected, and which had not seen him for nearly 
 
 a year. He arrived there on the 27th of July, 
 at six in the morning. 
 
 Never had greater lustre surrounded the per- 
 son and the name of Napoleon ; never had 
 greater apparent power been acquired for his 
 imperial sceptre. From the strait of Gibral- 
 tar to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bo- 
 hemia to the North Sea, from the Alps to the 
 Adriatic, he ruled either directly or indirectly, 
 either personally or by princes, who were 
 some of them his creatures, the others his de- 
 pendants. Beyond were allies or subjugated 
 enemies, England alone excepted. Thus al- 
 most the whole continent was under his sway; 
 for Russia, after resisting him for a moment, 
 had warmly adopted his designs, and Austria 
 found herself forced to suffer them to be ac- 
 complished, and even threatened with being 
 compelled to concur in them. England, in 
 short, secured from this vast domination by the 
 ocean, was about to be placed between the 
 acceptance of peace and a war with the whole 
 world. 
 
 Such was the external appearance of that 
 gigantic power: it had in it enough to dazzle 
 the world, and it did actually dazzle it; but the 
 reality was less solid than brilliant. A mo- 
 ment's cool reflection would have sufficed to 
 convince one's self of this. Napoleon, di- 
 verted from his struggle with England by the 
 third coalition, drawn from the Shores of the 
 ocean to those of the Danube, had punished 
 the house of Austria by taking from it, in con- 
 sequence of the campaign of Austerlitz, the 
 Venetian States, the Tyrol, Suabia, and had 
 thus completed the territory of Italy, aggran- 
 dized our allies of South Germany, removed 
 the Austrian frontiers from ours. So far, so 
 good for, to finish the territorial emancipation 
 of Italy, to secure friends in Germany, to place 
 new spaces between Austria and France, was 
 assuredly consistent with sound policy. But 
 in the intoxication produced by the prodigious 
 campaign of 1805, to change arbitrarily the 
 face of Europe, and instead of being content 
 to modify the past, which is the greatest tri- 
 umph given to the hand of man, instead of 
 keeping up for our profit the old rivalship of 
 Prussia and Austria by advantages granted to 
 the one over the other to wrest the Germanic 
 sceptre from Austria without giving it to Prus- 
 sia; to convert their antagonism into a com- 
 mon hatred of France ; to create, by the title 
 of Confederation of the Rhine, a pretended 
 French Germany, composed of French princes, 
 to whom their subjects had a natural antipathy, 
 of German princes, unthankful for our gifts, 
 and after rendering by this unjust displacement 
 of the boundary of the Rhine, war with Prus- 
 sia inevitable, war impolitic as it was glorious, 
 to suffer one's self to be carried by the torrent 
 of victory to the banks of the Vistula, and on 
 arriving there to attempt the restoration of 
 Poland, having on one's rear Prussia, van 
 quished but fuming, Austria secretly implaca 
 ble all this, admirable as a military work, 
 was, as a political work, imprudent, extrava- 
 gant, chimerical. 
 
 With the aid of his genius, Napoleon up- 
 held himself at these perilous extremities, tri-
 
 332 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 umphed over all obstacles, distances, climate, 
 mud, cold and completed on the Niemen the 
 defeat of the continental powers. But, at the 
 bottom, he was anxious to put an end to this 
 daring expedition, and his whole conduct at 
 Tilsit betokens that situation. Having es- 
 tranged for ever the heart of Prussia, which 
 he had not the good idea to attach to himself 
 for ever by a signal act of generosity, enlight- 
 ened respecting the sentiments of Austria, 
 feeling, how victorious soever he might be, the 
 necessity for making himself an alliance, he 
 accepted that of Russia, which presented itself 
 at the moment, and conceived a new system 
 of policy founded on a single principle the 
 concurrence of two ambitions, Russian and 
 French, to do whatever they pleased in the 
 world a mischievous concurrence, for it be- 
 hoved France not to allow Russia to do every 
 thing, and above all not to allow herself to do 
 every thing. After having aggravated, by the 
 treaty of Tilsit, the deep ranklings of Germany, 
 by creating in her bosom a French royalty 
 which must cost us in men, money, animosi- 
 ties to overcome vain counsels, all that those 
 of Naples and Holland already cost us : after 
 having half reconstituted Prussia, instead of 
 restoring or destroying her entirely ; after hav- 
 ing, in like manner, half reconstituted Poland, 
 and done every thing in an incomplete man- 
 ner, because at these distances time pressed, 
 the strength began to fail, Napoleon made 
 irreconcilable enemies, impotent or doubtful 
 friends, raised, in short, an immense edifice, in 
 which every thing was new from bottom to top, 
 an edifice run up so rapidly that the founda- 
 tion had not had time to settle, the mortar to 
 harden. 
 
 But, if every thing is censurable in our opi- 
 nion in the political work of Tilsit, brilliant as 
 it may appear, all is admirable, on the con- 
 trary, in the conduct of the military operations. 
 That army of the camp of Boulogne, which, 
 carried with incredible despatch from the strait 
 of Calais to the sources of the Danube, enve- 
 loped the Austrians at Ulm, drove back the 
 Russians upon Vienna, finished by crushing 
 both at Austerlitz, having then rested some 
 months in Franconia, soon recommenced its 
 
 j victorious march, entered Saxony, surprised 
 ; the Prussian armj' in retreat, broke it up by a 
 j single stroke at Jena, pursued it without inter- 
 mission, turned it, took it to the last man on 
 the shores of the Baltic; that army which, 
 diverted from north to east, ran to meet the 
 Russians, hurled them into the Pregel, then 
 exhibited the unheard of spectacle of a French 
 army quietly encamped on the Vistula, then 
 suddenly disturbed in its quarters, left them to 
 punish the Russians, reached them at Eylau, 
 fought, though perishing with cold and hunger, 
 a bloody battle with them, returned after that 
 battle to its quarters, and there, encamped 
 again upon snow in such a manner that its 
 repose alone covered a great siege, fed, re- 
 cruited during a long winter, at distances 
 which baffle all administration, resumed its 
 arms in spring, and, this time, Nature assist- 
 ing genius, placed itself between the Russians 
 and their base of operation, compelled them, 
 in order to regain Kunigsberg, to cross the 
 river before its face, flung them into it at Fried- 
 land, and thus terminated by a splendid vic- 
 tory, and on the banks of the Niemen, the 
 longest, the most daring expedition, not through 
 defenceless Persia or India, like the army of 
 Alexander, but through Europe, swarming with 
 soldiers as well disciplined as brave this is 
 unparalleled in the history of ages, this is 
 worthy of the everlasting admiration of men, 
 this combines all qualities, celerity and slow- 
 ness, daring and prudence, the art of fighting 
 and the art of marching, the genius of war 
 and that of administration, and these things, 
 so diverse, so rarely united, always opportune, 
 always at the moment when they were needed 
 to ensure success. Every one will ask him- 
 self how it was possible to display so much 
 prudence in war, so little in politics. The 
 answer will be easy, in war Napoleon was 
 guided by his genius, in politics by his passions. 
 We shall add in conclusion, that the edifice 
 so hastily constructed might have stood for 
 some time, had not new weights, accumulated 
 on its already overladen foundations, occa- 
 sioned its downfall. The fortune of France, 
 though endangered at Tilsit, was not, therefore, 
 inevitably ruined, and her glory was immense.
 
 July, 1V)7.] CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 833 
 
 BOOK XXVIII. 
 
 FONTAINEBLEAU. 
 
 Joy caused in France and in the Allied Countries by the Peace of Tilsit First Acts of Napoleon after his Return to 
 Paris Mission of General Savary to St. Petersburg Fresh Distribution of the French Troops in the North Marshal 
 Brune's Qnrps (TArme directed to occupy Swedish Pomerania and to besiege Stralsund, in case of the Resumption 
 of Hostilities against Sweden Solicitations to induce Denmark to enter into the New Continental Coalition Seizure 
 of English Merchandise over the whole Continent First Explanations of Napoleon with Spain, after the Restoration 
 of Peace Summons addressed to Portugal, in order to compel her to drive the English out of Lisbon and Oporto- 
 Assemblage of a French Army at Bayoune Similar Measures in regard to Italy Occupation of Corf u Disposition* 
 relative to the Navy Events which occurred at Sea from the Month of October, 1805. to the Month of July, 1807 
 System of cruizing Squadrons Squadron of Captain L'llermitte on the Coast of Africa, of Kear-Admiral Willaumei 
 on the Coasts of both Americas, of Captain Leduc in the Northern Seas Succours sent to the French Colonies, and 
 State of those Colonies Increased attention of Napoleon to the Navy System of Naval Warfare, which he deter- 
 mines to pursue Internal Affairs of the French Empire Changes in the high Offices M. de Talleyrand appointed 
 Vice-Grand Elector, Prince Berthier Vice-Constable M. de Champagny appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 M. Crete t Minister of the Interior, General Clarke Minister of War Death of M. Portal is who is succeeded by 
 M. Bigot de Preameneu Definitive Suppression of the Tribunate Purification of the Magistracy State of the 
 Finances Budgets of 1806 and 1807 Balance re-established between the Receipts and the Expenses, without having 
 recourse to Loans Creation of the Gmse de Service, Institution of the Court of Accounts Public Works Loan's 
 derived for these Works from the Treasury of the Army Assignments granted to the Marshals, Generals, Officers, 
 and Soldiers Institution of Titles of Nobility State of Manners and of French Society Character of Literature and 
 of the Arts and Sciences under Napoleon Legislative Session of 1807 Adoption of the Code of Commerce Marriage 
 of Prince Jerome Close of the short Session of 1807, and translation of the Imperial Court to Fontaiiirhlcati 
 Affairs in Europe during the Three Mouths devoted by Napoleon to the Internal Affairs of the Empire state of tba 
 Court of St. Petersburg since the Peace of Tilsit Efforts of the Emperor Alexander to reconcile Russia with France 
 He offers his Mediation to the British Cabinet State of Parties in England The Fox and Gr>-nville Administra- 
 tion is succeeded by that of Canning and Castlereagh Dissolution of Parliament Formation of a Majority favour- 
 able to the new Ministry Evasive answer to the offer of the Mediation of Russia, and despatch of a Fleet to 
 Copenhagen, to secure the Danish Navy Landing of English Troops under the Walls of Copenhagen, and Prepara- 
 tions for Bombardment The Danes summoned to give up their Fleet On their refusal, the English bombard the 
 City for three Days and three Nights Disastrous Fate of Copenhagen General indignation in Europe, and re- 
 doubled Hostilities against England Efforts of the latter to cause the odious Act committed by her against Denmark 
 to be approved at Vienna and St. Petersburg Dispositions produced in the Court of Russia by recent Events She 
 determines to ally herself more closely with Napoleon, in order to obtain thereby Moldavia and Wallnchia, in 
 addition to Finland Solicitations of Alexander to Napoleon Resolutions of the latter, after the Disaster of Copen- 
 hagen He encourages Russia to take possession of Finland, keeps up his hopes in regard to the Danubian Pro- 
 vinces, concludes an arrangement with Austria, moves his troops from the North towards the South of Italy, with 
 a view to prepare an expedition against Sicily, re-organizes the Boulogne flotilla, and hastens the invasion of Por- 
 tugal Formation of a second Oarps d'Armce to support the march of General Junot towards Lisbon, under the 
 designation of Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde The Question concerning Portugal gives rise to that of 
 Spain Inclinations and hesitations of Napoleon in regard to Spain The systematic idea of excluding Bourbons 
 from all the thrones of Europe is gradually formed in his mind The want of a sufficient pretext for dethroning 
 Charles IV. causes liim to hesitate The part performed by M. de -Talleyrand and Prince Cambaceres on this occa- 
 sion Napoleon determines upon a provisional partition of Portugal with the Court of Madrid, and signs the Treaty 
 of Fontainebleau on the 27th of October While he is disposed to an adjournment in regard to Spain, important 
 occurrences at the Escurial demand his whole attention State of the Court of Madrid Administration of the 
 Prince of the Peace The Navy, the Army, the Finances, the Commerce of Spain in 1807 Parties into which the 
 Court is divided Party of the Queen and the Prince of the Peace Party of Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias An 
 Illness of Charles IV., which excites fears for his life, suggests to the Queen and the Prince of the Peace the idea of 
 depriving Ferdinand of the throne Means devised by the latter to defend himself against the plans of his enemies 
 He addresses himself to Napoleon to obtain the hand of a French Princess Some imprudences committed by him 
 excite suspicion respecting his way of living, and occasion the seizure of his papers Arrest of the Prince and com- 
 mencement of a criminal process against him and his friends Charles IV. reveals to Napoleon what is passing in 
 his family Napoleon, urged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, forms a third Oorpt d'Armee, towards the Pyrenees, 
 and gives orders for the departure of the troops by post While he is preparing to interfere, the Prince of the 
 Peace, alarmed at the effect produced by the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias, decides to obtain his pardon, if he 
 will mate a disgraceful submission Pardon and humiliation of Ferdinand Temporary calm in the affairs of Spain 
 Napoleon takes advantage of it to visit Italy He sets out from Fontainebleau for Milan about the middle of 
 November, 1807. 
 
 THE peace of Tilsit had caused profound and 
 universal joy in France. Under the conqueror 
 of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, people 
 could not be afi aid of war ; yet they had felt a 
 moment's uneasiness on seeing him venture so 
 far in such a rancorous struggle ; and more- 
 over a secret instinct said plainly to some, in- 
 distinctly to all, that, in his career, as in every 
 other, a man must know where to stop ; that, 
 after successes, there might come reverses ; 
 that Fortune, prone to be fickle, ought not to 
 
 They felt, besides, the want of peace and of 
 its soothing enjoyments. Napoleon had, it is 
 true, procured for France internal security, 
 and to such a degree had he procured it for 
 her, that during an absence of nearly a year, 
 and at a distance of 400 or 500 leagues, no 
 disturbance whatever had broken out. 
 
 A brief anxiety, produced by the carnage 
 of Eylau, by the dearth of provisions during 
 the winter, by the timid language held in the 
 drawing-rooms of certain discontented persons, 
 
 be pushed to extremity; and that Napoleon had been the only agitation that marked the' 
 would be the only one of the three or four crisis through which the country had just 
 
 heroes of humanity, whom she would not have 
 doomed to expiate her favours, if he ventured 
 to abuse them. In all human things there is a 
 limit, which must not be overstepped, and, ac- 
 cording to an impression which was then gene- 
 ral, Napoleon was approaching that limit, 
 which the mind discerns more easily than the 
 passions choose to recognise it. 
 
 passed. But, though the people no longer 
 dreaded the horrors of '93, and indulged an 
 entire confidence, still it was on condition that 
 Napoleon should live, and that he should cease 
 to expose his precious person in the field ; it 
 was with the desire of enjoying, without any 
 mixture of uneasiness, the immense prosperity 
 which he had conferred on France. Those wi
 
 334 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 were indebted to him for high situations aspired 
 to enjoy them ; the classes that live by agri- 
 culture, industry, and commerce that is to 
 say, nearly the whole of the nation, wished at 
 length to profit by the consequences of the re- 
 volution and the vast extent of markets opened 
 to France ; for, if the seas were closed against 
 us, the entire Continent offered itself to our 
 activity, to the exclusion of British industry. 
 The seas themselves would, it was hoped, be 
 opened afresh in consequence of the negotia- 
 tions of Tilsit. The two greatest powers of the 
 Continent, enlightened respecting the conform- 
 ity of their present interest, the uselessness of 
 their contest, had, in fact, been seen embrac- 
 ing each other, in a manner, on the banks of 
 the Niemen, in the person of their sovereigns, 
 and joining to shut out England from the shores 
 of Europe, and to turn the efforts of all nations 
 against her ; and people flattered themselves 
 that this power, alarmed at her loneliness in 
 1807, as in 1802, would accept peace on mode- 
 rate conditions. It was not to be supposed 
 that the mediation of the Russian cabinet, 
 which had just been offered her, rendering 
 easy to her pride a pacification claimed by her 
 interests, could be rejected. On the Continent 
 people enjoyed peace ; they had a glimpse of 
 peace on the seas ; and they were happy at 
 once in what they possessed and what they 
 hoped for. The army, upon which rested more 
 particularly the burden of the war, was not, 
 however, so eager after peace as the rest of 
 the nation. Its principal leaders, it is true, 
 who had already seen so many distant coun- 
 tries and bloody battles, who were covered 
 with glory, whom Napoleon was about to load 
 with wealth, wished, like the nation itself, to 
 enjoy all that they had acquired. A great 
 number of old soldiers, assured of their share 
 in the munificence of Napoleon, were of the 
 same way of thinking. But the young gene- 
 rals, the young officers, the young soldiers, and 
 these formed a great part of the army, desired 
 nothing better than to see fresh occasions of 
 glory and fortune springing up. At any rate, 
 after a severe campaign, an interval of rest 
 was not displeasing to them ; and we may say, 
 that the peace of Tilsit was hailed by the una- 
 nimous acclamations of the nation and of the 
 army, of France and of Europe, of the victors 
 And of the vanquished. Excepting England, 
 who found the Continent once more united 
 against her ; excepting Austria, who had for a 
 moment hoped for the ruin of her controller ; 
 there was not a person but applauded this 
 peace, following suddenly upon the greatest 
 bustle of warfare that has occurred in modern 
 times. 
 
 Napoleon was awaited with impatience; for, 
 besides the reasons which people had to take 
 no pleasure in observing his absences, always 
 occasioned by war, they were glad to know 
 that he was near them, watching over the 
 peace of the whole world, and endeavouring to 
 ilraw from his inexhaustible genius new sources 
 f prosperity. Tl.e cannon of the Invalides, 
 which proclaimed his arrival at the palace of 
 St. Cloud, pealed in all hearts as the signal of 
 the happiest event ; and at night a general 
 illumination, not commanded either by the po- 
 lice of Paris, or by the threats of the mob, and 
 which was displayed in the windows of the 
 
 citizens as well as on the fronts of the public 
 edifices, attested a feeling of joy, genuine, 
 spontaneous, universal. 
 
 My reason, tempered by time, enlightened 
 by experience, is well aware of all the dangers 
 concealed beneath this immeasurable greatness, 
 dangers, moreover, which it is easy to appre- 
 ciate after the event. Still, though devoted to 
 the modest worship of good sense, let me be 
 allowed a moment of enthusiasm for so many 
 wonders, which did not last, but which might 
 have lasted, and to relate them with an entire 
 forgetfulness of the calamities which followed. 
 In order to retrace with a more just feeling 
 those times so different from ours, I will not 
 turn my eyes to those calamitous days which 
 have since succeeded, until they arrive. 
 
 A vulgar sign, but a true one, of the dispo- 
 sition of minds, is the rate of the public funds 
 in the great modern States which make use of 
 credit, and which, in a vast market, called Ex- 
 change, permit the sale and purchase of the 
 titles of loans which they have contracted with 
 the capitalists of all nations. The 6 per cent, 
 stock, (signifying, as everybody knows, an in- 
 terest of 5 allowed for a nominal capital of 
 100,) which Napoleon had found at 12 francs 
 on the 18th Brumaire, and which afterwards 
 rose to 60, got up, after the battle of Auster- 
 litz, to 70, and then passed that point to reach 
 90, a height at that time unprecedented in 
 trance. The disposition to confidence was 
 even so strong, that the price of this stock rose 
 still higher, and towards the end of July, 1807, 
 reached 92 and 93. Previously to the time of 
 the assignats, when a fondness for financial 
 speculations did not exist, when the public 
 funds had not yet made the fortune of great 
 speculators, and had, on the contrary, brought 
 ruin on the legitimate creditors of the State, 
 when the value of money was such that it was 
 easy to find in solid depositories an interest of 
 6 or 7 per cent., it required immense confi- 
 dence in the established government to cause 
 the titles of the perpetual debt to be accepted 
 at an interest of 5 per cent. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th of July, Napo- 
 leon arrived at the palace of St. Cloud, where 
 he was accustomed to pass the summer. With 
 the princesses of his family, eager to see him 
 again, were assembled the grand dignitaries, 
 the ministers, and the principal members of 
 the bodies of the State. Confidence and joy 
 beamed from his face. " There," said he, 
 "you are sure of continental peace; and, as 
 for maritime peace, we shall soon obtain that 
 by the voluntary or the forced concurrence of 
 all the continental powers. I have reason to 
 believe the alliance that I have just concluded 
 with Russia to be solid. A less powerful alli- 
 ance would have sufficed to enable me to con- 
 trol Europe, to deprive England of all re- 
 source. With that of Russia, which victory has 
 given me, which policy will preserve to me, I 
 shall put an end to all resistances. Let us en- 
 joy our greatness, and now turn traders and 
 manufacturers." Addressing himself particu- 
 larly to his ministers, Napoleon said to them : 
 " I have had enough of, the trade of general ; 
 I shall now resume with you that of first minis- 
 ter, and recommence my great reviews of a/airs, 
 which it is time to substitute for my great 
 reviews of armiet." He detained at St. Cloud
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 333 
 
 Prince Cambace'reg, whom he admitted to his 
 family dinner, and with whom he conversed 
 upon his plans ; for his ardent head, inces- 
 Bantly at work, never finished one operation 
 without beginning another. 
 
 On the following day, he employed himself 
 in giving orders, which embraced Europe from 
 Corfu to Konigsberg. His first idea was to 
 secure immediately the consequences of the 
 Russian alliance which he had just concluded 
 at Tilsit. By that alliance, purchased at the 
 price of sanguinary victories and infinite hopes 
 excited in Russian ambition, it behoved him to 
 profit, before time or inevitable miscalculations 
 should come to cool its first ardours. He had pro- 
 mised himself to force Sweden, to persuade Den- 
 mark, to draw off Portugal by means of Spain, 
 and in this manner to decide all the States bor- 
 dering on the European seas to declare against 
 England. He had even proposed to himself 
 to coerce Austria, in order to bring her into 
 similar resolutions. England would thus find 
 herself encompassed by a girdle of hostilities, 
 from Kronstadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Trieste, 
 unless she accepted the conditions of peace 
 which Russia was commissioned to offer her. 
 During his journey from Dresden to Paris, Na- 
 poleon had already given orders, and the very 
 day after his arrival at Paris, he gave further 
 directions for the immediate execution of this 
 vast system. His first care was to send to St. 
 Petersburg an agent who should continue with 
 Alexander the work of seduction commenced 
 at Tilsit. Most assuredly he could not find an 
 ambassador so seductive as he was himself. It 
 was requisite, nevertheless, to find one who 
 was able to please, to win confidence, and to 
 Bmooth the difficulties that may arise even in 
 the most sincere alliance. This choice required 
 some reflection. Till he should fix upon one 
 who combined the desired qualifications, Napo- 
 leon sent an officer, usually employed, and fit 
 for every thing for Avar, for diplomacy, for 
 police, who could be by turns supple and arro- 
 gant, and was very capable of insinuating him- 
 self into the mind of the young monarch, whom 
 he had already contrived to please. This was 
 General Savary, whose talents, courage, un- 
 scrupulous and unbounded devotedness, we 
 have elsewhere had occasion to notice. Gene- 
 ral Savary, despatched in 1805 to the Russian 
 head-quarters, had found Alexander full of 
 pride on the day before the battle of Auster- 
 litz, dismayed on the morrow, had not abused 
 the change of fortune, had, on the contrary, 
 skilfully spared the vanquished prince, and, 
 availing himself of the ascendency which weak- 
 nesses give over another whose secret one has 
 detected, had acquired a sort of influence suf- 
 ficient for a temporary mission. In this first 
 moment, when the point was to ascertain whe- 
 ther Alexander was sincere, whether he would 
 have the courage to defy the resentment of his 
 nation, which had not passed so speedily as he 
 had done from the sorrows of Friedland to the 
 illusions of Tilsit, General Savary was fitted 
 by his shrewdness to penetrate into the young 
 prince, to intimidate him by his boldness, and, 
 if need were, to reply by a completely military 
 insolence to the insolences that he might meet 
 with at St. Petersburg. General Savary had 
 another advantage, of which the malicious 
 pride of Napoleon disdained not to avail itself. 
 
 | The war with Russia had commenced on ac- 
 count of the death of the Duke of Enghiea : 
 Napoleon was not sorry to send to that power 
 the man who had figured most in that catas- 
 trophe. He thus galled the Russian aristo- 
 cracy, which was inimical to France, without 
 hurting the prince, who, from his versatility, 
 had forgotten the cause of the war as quickly 
 as the war itself. 
 
 Napoleon gave General Savary, without any 
 apparent title, extensive powers and plenty of 
 money, that he might live in suitable style at 
 St. Petersburg. General Savary was to protest 
 to the young emperor the sincerity of France, to 
 urge him to come to an explanation with Eng- 
 land, and to bring matters with her to a speedy 
 result either peace or war and, if it should 
 be war, to take immediate possession of Fin- 
 land an enterprise which, while it flattered 
 Moscovite ambition, would have the effect of 
 definitively engaging Russia in the politics of 
 France. The general, in short, was to apply 
 all the resources of his mind to cultivate and 
 give stability to the alliance concluded at Tilsit. 
 
 Having paid this attention to the relations 
 with Russia, Napoleon directed it to the other 
 cabinets called upon to concur in his system. 
 He scarcely expected sensible conduct from 
 Sweden, then governed by an extravagant king. 
 Though that power had a twofold interest in 
 not waiting till she should be forced the inte- 
 rest of contributing to the triumph of the neu- 
 trals and that of sparing a Russian invasion 
 Napoleon nevertheless thought that he should 
 %oon be obliged to employ force against her. 
 This would be a very easy matter, with an army 
 of 420,000 men, commanding the Continent from 
 the Rhine to the Niemen. He went, therefore, 
 no further than making some dispositions for 
 the immediate invasion of Swedish Pomerania, 
 the only possession which her ancient and her 
 recent follies had allowed Sweden to retain on 
 the soil of Germany. With this view, Napoleon 
 made various changes in the distribution of his 
 forces in Poland and Prussia. He purposed 
 not to evacuate Poland till the new Saxon roy- 
 alty, which he had just re-established there, 
 should be firmly settled ; and Prussia not till 
 the war contributions, as well ordinary as ex- 
 traordinary, should be completely paid up. In 
 consequence, Marshal Davout, with his corps, 
 with the Polish troops of the new levy, with the 
 greater part of the dragoons, had orders to 
 occupy that part of Poland destined, under the 
 title of grand-duchy of Warsaw, for the king 
 of Saxony. One division was to be stationed 
 at Thorn, another at Warsaw, a third at Posen. 
 The dragoons were to find forage on the banks 
 of the Vistula. This was denominated the first 
 command. Marshal Soult, with his corps (Tarmte 
 and almost all the reserve cavalry, was com- 
 missioned to occupy old Prussia, from the Pregel 
 to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder, 
 with orders to retire successively, according to 
 the payment of the contributions. The heavy 
 and the light cavalry were to live in the island 
 of Nogath, amidst the abundance afforded by 
 the Delta of the Vistula. Into the bosom of this 
 second command, Napoleon introduced another, 
 in some measure exceptional, like the place 
 which required its presence that was Dantzig. 
 There he placed Oudinot's grenadier?, and like- 
 wise Verdier's division, which had formed th
 
 336 
 
 HISTORY" OF THE 
 
 [July, 1307. 
 
 sorps of Marshal Lannes ; and these were des- 
 tined to occupy that rich town, as well as the 
 territory which it had recoTered, together with 
 the quality of a free city. Verdier's division 
 was not intended to remain there, but the gre- 
 nadiers had orders to stay till the complete set- 
 tlement of European affairs. The third com- 
 mand, embracing Silesia, which was committed 
 to Marshal Mortier, whom Napoleon was glad 
 to place in the provinces where there was abund- 
 ance of wealth to save from the disorders of 
 war, and who had quitted his corps darmie, re- 
 cently dissolved by the reunion of the Poles and 
 the Saxons in the duchy of Warsaw. This mar- 
 shal had under his command the fifth and sixth 
 corps, which Marshals Massena and Ney had 
 lately left. These two and Marshal Lannes had 
 btained permission to go to France, to rest 
 themselves from the fatigues of war. The fifth 
 corps was cantoned in the environs of Breslau, 
 in Upper Silesia ; the sixth around Glogau, in 
 Lower Silesia. The first corps, transferred to 
 General Victor, since the wound of the Prince 
 of Ponte Corvo, had orders to occupy Berlin, 
 accompanying in its retrograde movement the 
 imperial guard, which was returning to France, 
 to be there treated with magnificent festivities. 
 Lastly, the troops which had formed the army 
 of observation, in the rear of Napoleon, were 
 rapidly moved towards the coast. The Italians, 
 part of the Bavarians, the Baden troops, the 
 Hessians, the two fine French divisions of Bou- 
 det and Molitor, were marched, with the park 
 f artillery which had been employed in the 
 siege of Dantzig, towards Swedish Pomerania.' 
 Napoleon increased this park with all the ar- 
 tillery and ammunition, which the fine season 
 allowed to be collected, and ordered them to be 
 placed opposite to Stralsund, for the purpose 
 of wresting that spot from the King of Sweden, 
 in case that prince, adhering to his character, 
 should single-handed resume hostilities, when 
 all besides had laid down their arms. 
 
 Marshal Brune, who had been placed at the 
 head of the army of observation, received the 
 direct command of these troops, forming a total 
 of 38,000 men, provided with an immense mate- 
 riel. Chasseloup, the engineer who had so ably 
 directed the siege of Dantzig, was charged with 
 the direction of that of Stralsund also, if it 
 should be necessary to undertake it. 
 
 Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, 
 who had gone to Hamburg to recover from his 
 wound, had the command of the troops destined 
 to guard the Hanseatic towns and Hanover. 
 The Dutch were drawn towards Holland and 
 marched upon the Ems : the Spaniards occupied 
 Hamburg. These latter had traversed, some 
 Italy, others France, to proceed through Ger- 
 many towards the coast of the North Sea. They 
 formed a corps of 14,000 men, under the com- 
 mand of the Marquis de la Romana. They were 
 fine soldiers, with dark complexion, spare limbs, 
 shivering with cold on the dreary and frozen 
 shores of the Northern Ocean, exhibiting a sin- 
 gular contrast with our northern allies, and re- 
 minding one, by the strange diversity of nations 
 subject to the same yoke, of the times of Roman 
 greatness. Followed by a great number of wo- 
 en, children, horses, mules, and asses, laden 
 with baggage, ill-dressed, but in an original 
 manner, lively, animated, noisy, acquainted 
 with no language but their own, living exclu- 
 
 sively by themselves, exercising little, and 
 spending great part of the day in dancing to 
 the sound of the guitar, with the womea who 
 accompanied them, they attracted the stapified 
 curiosity of the grave inhabitants of Hamburg, 
 whose papers communicated these details to 
 Europe, astonished at so many extraordinary 
 scenes. The corps of Marshal Mortier haviny 
 been dissolved, as we have related, the French 
 division of Dupas, which had formed part of it, 
 was marched towards the Hanseatic towns, to 
 be ready to fly to the assistance of our allies, 
 Dutch or Spaniards, in case an enemy should 
 pay them a visit. That enemy could not be any 
 other than the English, who, for a year past, 
 had kept promising in vain a continental expe- 
 dition, and who might possibly, as it frequently 
 happens after long hesitation, act when the time 
 for action was past. The troops of Marshal 
 Brune, charged to station themselves before 
 Stralsund, and those of Marshal the Prince of 
 Ponte Corvo, commissioned to observe Hanover 
 and Holland, were to be joined, in case of need, 
 by Dupas' division at first, and afterwards by 
 the whole first corps concentrated at that mo- 
 ment around Berlin. Any attempt of the Eng- 
 lish could not but miscarry against such a com- 
 bination of forces. 
 
 Thus every thing was ready, if the Russian 
 mediation should not succeed, to drive the 
 Swedes from Pomerania into Stralsund, from 
 Stralsund into the island of Riigen, from the 
 island of Riigen into the sea, and to throw the 
 English themselves into it in case of their land- 
 ing on the Continent. These measures were 
 intended also to have the effect of obliging Den- 
 mark to complete by her adhesion the conti- 
 nental coalition against England. Every thing 
 was easy in reference to the course to be pur- 
 sued towards the Swedes. They had behaved 
 in a manner so hostile, so arrogant, that nothing 
 more needed to be done than to summon them, 
 and then drive them into Stralsund. The Danes, 
 on the contrary, had scrupulously observed the 
 neutrality, had conducted themselves with such 
 moderation, inclining in heart towards the cause 
 of France, which was their own, but not daring 
 to speak out, that it would not be right to treat 
 them as roughly as the Swedes. Napoleon 
 charged M. de Talleyrand to write immediately 
 to the cabinet of Copenhagen, to represent to 
 it that it was time to come to a decision : that 
 the cause of France was its own ; that if France 
 was at war with England, it was on account of 
 the question of the neutrals, and the question 
 of the neutrals was a question of existence for 
 all the naval pc/wers, especially for the smallest, 
 habitually least spared by British supremacy. 
 M. de Talleyrand had orders to be friendly, but 
 pressing. He was ordered also to offer Denmark 
 the finest troops of France, and the concurrence 
 of a formidable artillery, capable of keeping at 
 a distance the best armed English ships. 
 
 It was by frightening England with this com- 
 bination of forces, and by proceeding with the 
 utmost rigour against her commerce, that Na- 
 poleon thought to second in a useful manner 
 the Russian mediation. While he wae taking 
 the military measures that we have been detail- 
 ing, he had caused English merchandise to be 
 seized at Le'pzig, where there was a consider- 
 able quantity. Dissatisfied with the manner in 
 which his orders had been executed in the Han-
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 337 
 
 Beatic towns, he directed the English factory at 
 Hamburg to be seized, bills and goods to a large 
 amount to be confiscated, and the letters of Bri- 
 tish commerce to be intercepted at all the post- 
 offices, and more than 100,000 of them were 
 burned. King Louis, on the throne of Holland, 
 was incessantly aggravating him by his incon- 
 siderate measures, by his vanity, by the pro- 
 jected reduction of the Dutch army and navy, 
 (notwithstanding which he purposed to institute 
 a royal guard, to appoint marshals, to go to the 
 expense of a coronation,) King Louis united 
 with all his plans, devised to please his new 
 subjects, a tolerance in regard to English com- 
 merce, which became downright treason against 
 the policy of France. Napoleon, out of all pa- 
 tience, wrote to him that, unless there was a 
 change of conduct, he should proceed to the 
 last extremities, and have the ports of Holland 
 guarded by French troops and custom-house 
 officers. This threat had some success, and 
 the prohibitions issued against English com- 
 merce in Holland were somewhat more strictly 
 executed. 
 
 Napoleon required that all the goods seized 
 should be sold, and the produce paid into the 
 chest of the war contributions, to increase the 
 wealth of that chest; the application of which, 
 at once noble, ingenious, and beneficial, we shall 
 presently notice. He gave orders that Hano- 
 ver, to which he granted no indulgence, because 
 it was an English province, that Hesse, that the 
 Prussian provinces in Franconia, lastly, that 
 Prussia itself, should pay up. their contributions 
 before the army retired. It may be said with 
 truth that the vanquished had not been treated 
 Tery severely, especially when we recollect what 
 occurred in the 17th century, during the wars 
 of Louis XIV., in the 18th, during the wars of 
 the great Frederick, and in our own times, when 
 France was invaded in 1814 and 1815. Napo- 
 leon had added to the ordinary contribution, 
 half of which at most had been paid, an extra- 
 ordinary contribution, which was far from over- 
 whelming, and which amounted to precisely the 
 cost of the war that had been raised against 
 him. By means of this contribution he caused 
 all that was taken from the houses of the in- 
 habitants to be paid for. He charged M. Daru, 
 his able and upright representative for the finan- 
 cial affairs of the army, to treat with Prus- 
 sia relative to the mode of discharging the con- 
 tributions that were still due, declaring that, 
 notwithstanding his desire to recall the French 
 .troops, in order to move them to the coasts of 
 Europe, he would not evacuate a province 
 or even a place of Prussia before the integral 
 payment of the sums which had been promised 
 him. He hoped in this manner, all the expenses 
 of the campaign being paid, and by adding 
 to the contributions of Germany the remnants 
 
 1 I shall coon have to handle a most important subject, 
 the invasion of Spain, and the moment is approaching 
 when I shall have to relate the tragic catastrophe of the 
 Spanish Bourbons, the origin of an atrocious and calamit- 
 ous war for both countries. I announce beforehand that, 
 furnished with the only authentic document* that exist. 
 which are very numerous, frequently contradictory, and 
 reconcilable only by means of great efforts of criticism, 
 I think myself capable of giving the entire secret, which 
 i* yet unknown, of the unfortunate events of that period, 
 and that on many points I shall disagree with the works 
 which have appeared on the same subject. I am not al- 
 luding to the thousand rhapsodies, published by histo- 
 rians, who had neither mission, nor information, nor con- 
 
 VOL. II. 43 
 
 of the contribution levied upon Austria, to re- 
 serve about 300 millions, a sum worth at that 
 time double what it would be worth now, and 
 which in his skilful hands was to become a ma- 
 gical means of beneficence and of creations of 
 all kinds. 
 
 While Napoleon was taking his measures foi 
 the North, he took them likewise for the accom- 
 plishment of his system in the South. During 
 the campaign in Prussia, Spain had given him 
 just cause for distrust, and the proclamation of 
 the Prince of the Peace, in which he called the 
 whole Spanish population to arms, upon pre- 
 text of resisting an unknown enemy, was not 
 to be accounted for, unless by absolute trea- 
 chery. And such in fact it was ; for, at that 
 very moment, on the eve of the battle of Jena, 
 the Prince of the Peace had begun secret rela- 
 tions with England. Though unacquainted 
 with these details, Napoleon was not to be de- 
 ceived; but he resolved to dissemble till he 
 should have recovered the full liberty of his 
 movements. The ignoble favourite, who go- 
 verned the Queen of Spain, and through the 
 queen, the king and the monarchy, had be- 
 lieved, like all Europe, in the invincibility of 
 the Prussian army. But on the morrow of the 
 victory of Jena, he had thrown himself at the 
 feet of the conqueror. Ever since that time, 
 there was no sort of flattery but he employed 
 to appease the wrath, dissembled but easy to 
 be guessed, of Napoleon. There was but one 
 kind of obedience which he did not add to his 
 meannesses that was to govern Spain well, to 
 raise her navy again, to defend her colonies, 
 to render her at length a useful ally a kind 
 of expiation, which, in the eyes of Napoleon, 
 would have been sufficient, which would even 
 have stifled the first feelings of his anger. 
 
 On his return to Paris, Napoleon began to 
 direct his attention to this the most important 
 portion of the coast of Europe ; and he .xm- 
 ceived that it behoved him to take some resolu- 
 tion in regard to that backsliding of Spain, 
 which was always ready to transform itself 
 into treason. But, though his mind was never 
 at rest, though it flew incessantly from one 
 object to another, like his eagle flying from 
 capital to capital, he thought that he ought not 
 yet to take up that important question, being 
 unwilling to complicate the present situation, 
 and to throw obstacles in the way of a general 
 pacification, which he ardently desired, which 
 he had little hope of, and which, if it were ac- 
 complished, would render the regeneration of 
 the Spanish monarchy much less necessary to 
 him. If, on the contrary, England, under the 
 guidance of the weak and violent heirs of Mr. 
 Pitt, was bent on continuing the war in spite 
 of her lonely condition, he then proposed to 
 turn his serious attention to the state of Spain, ' 
 
 cern about truth. I speak of historians worthy of being 
 taken into consideration, of those who have been permit- 
 ted by exception to make researches in the depots of fo- 
 reign affairs and war, or of those who, like M de Toreno, 
 having occupied the highest posts, had not only a know- 
 ledge of things, but the means of informing themselves 
 concerning them. I shall have to contradict the asser- 
 tions of both, for there is nothing relative to the business 
 of Spain in the depot of the Foreign Office, Beauharnais, 
 the ambassador, having never possessed the secret of his 
 government; and in the depot of war there is only tlm 
 detail of the military operations and even that frequently 
 incomplete. Lastly, as for the Spanish historians, they 
 . could not be acquainted with the secret of resolution* 
 2F
 
 338 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 and to take a decisive resolution on that point. 
 For the moment, he thought of one thing only 
 to obtain from her the utmost strictness 
 against British commerce, and the submission 
 of Portugal to his vast designs. 
 
 Spain had at Paris, besides an ordinary am- 
 bassador, M. de Masserano, an absolutely use- 
 less official agent, charged solely with the 
 honorary functions of his station, M. Yzquierdo, 
 a secret agent of the Prince of the Peace, who 
 was invested with the entire confidence of that 
 prince, and with whom had been negotiated 
 the financial convention, concluded in 1806 
 between the Spanish Treasury and the French 
 Treasury. He alone was charged with real 
 business, and he was well fitted for it by his 
 astuteness, and by his acquaintance with all 
 the secrets of the court of Spain. The unfor- 
 tunate sovereigns of the Escurial, conceiving 
 that these two agents were not sufficient to 
 soothe the wrath of Napoleon, bethought them 
 of sending to him a third, who, with the title 
 of ambassador extraordinary, should come to 
 congratulate him on his victories, and to ex- 
 press a joy at his successes which they were 
 far from feeling. For this ostentatious and 
 puerile part was selected one of the highest 
 grandees of Spain, the Duke de Frias, and per- 
 mission to send him to Paris was solicited. So 
 much homage was not required for disarming 
 Napoleon. A little more activity against the 
 common enemy would have appeased him with 
 much greater certainty than the most magni- 
 ficent embassies. Napoleon, unwilling to give 
 unnecessary uneasiness to that court, which 
 was conscious of its offences, received the Duke 
 de Frias with great distinction, listened to the 
 congratulations on his triumphs, then said to 
 the new ambassador, repeated to the old one, 
 and informed the most active of the three, M. 
 Yzquierdo, that he accepted the congratula- 
 tions which were addressed to him upon his 
 triumphs and upon the restoration of the con- 
 tinental peace, but that he must make the con- 
 tinental peace produce a maritime peace ; but 
 this result, so desirable for Spain and for her 
 colonies, could be attained only by intimidating 
 the common enemy by a concurrence of ener- 
 getic efforts, and by an absolute interdiction 
 of her commerce ; that it was necessary to 
 second France, and, in this view, to require of 
 Portugal an immediate and entire adhesion to 
 the continental system : as for himself, he was 
 resolved to insist not on a sham exclusion of 
 the English from Oporto and Lisbon, but a 
 complete exclusion, followed up by an imme- 
 diate declaration of war and the seizure of all 
 British goods; that, if Portugal would not 
 
 ! consent to this at once, Spain must prepare 
 her troops, for he was already preparing his, 
 and they must forthwith take possession of 
 Portugal, not for a week or a fortnight, as had 
 been done in 1801, but for the whole time of 
 the war, perhaps for ever, according to circum- 
 stances. The three envoys of Spain bowed to 
 this declaration, which they were to transmit 
 without delay to their cabinet. 
 
 Napoleon, at the same time, sent for M. de 
 Lima, the ambassador of Portugal, and signi- 
 fied to him that if, in the time strictly neces- 
 sary for writing to Lisbon and receiving an 
 answer, he were not promised the exclusion of 
 the English, the seizure of their commerce, 
 persons, and effects, and a declaration of war, 
 M. de Lima must take his passports and expect 
 to see ci French army march from Bayonne to 
 Salamanca, from Salamanca to Lisbon. Such 
 were the determinations of a policy agreed 
 upon among the great powers, and indispen- 
 sable for the re-establishment of peace in 
 Europe. Napoleon, in his contest with the 
 English, insisted on severities against both 
 their property and their persons, because he 
 knew that a feigned exclusion was already 
 secretly arranged between the courts of Lon- 
 don and Lisbon ; and it was necessary that the 
 latter should wholly compromise itself, if one 
 wished to arrive at a serious result. The 
 course of events proved that he had guessed 
 rightly. Besides, having seen the English, on 
 the rupture of the peace of Amiens, make 
 seizures from us to the amount of more than 
 one hundred millions, and capture a great 
 number of commercial men sailing upon the 
 faith of treaties, he sought everywhere to 
 secure pledges, both in men and merchandise. 
 
 M. de Lima promised to write immediately 
 to his court, and failed not to do so. But 
 Napoleon, not satisfied with a mere declara- 
 tion of his will, and clearly foreseeing that 
 this declaration would not be efficacious unless 
 it were followed up by an armed demonstra- 
 tion, made his dispositions for having in a few 
 days a corps of 25,000 men at Bayonne, quite 
 ready to recommence the expedition of 1801 
 against Portugal. It will no doubt be recol- 
 lected that, some months before, while availing 
 himself of the inaction of winter to carry on 
 the siege of Dantzig, and to prepare on his rear 
 an army of observation, to secure him against 
 any attempt of Austria and of England, he had 
 conceived the idea of rendering the camps 
 formed on the coasts disposable, and replacing 
 them by five legions of reserve, of six bat- 
 talions eacl^, the organization of which was to 
 be consigned to five old generals, who had be- 
 
 which wore all taken at Paris. The whole is to be found 
 in the private papers of Napoleon deposited in the Louvre, 
 which comprehend both the French documents and the 
 Spanish documents carried off from Madrid. In these 
 documents, frequently contradictory, as I hare just ob- 
 served, one cannot come at the truth but by dint of com- 
 parisons, approximations, and the exercise of critical 
 Judgment. It will be evident from the various notes, 
 whHi, contrary to my custom, I shall be obliged to place 
 at the foot of the pages of this book, what efforts I have 
 been forced to make, even with the authentic documents, 
 to arrive at the truth. But from this very moment, I de- 
 clare that all the historians who have represented the 
 origin of Napoleon's designs upon Spain as dating so far 
 back as Tilsit are mistaken; that all those who have sup- 
 posed that Napoleon assured himself at Tilsit of the con- 
 cent of Alexander to what he projected respecting Madrid, 
 and that he was in haste to sign the peace of the North, 
 
 in order to return the sooner to the affairs of the South, 
 are equally ipistaken. At Tilsit Napoleon settled nothing 
 but a general alliance, which guarantied the adhesion of 
 Russia to all that he should do on his part on condition 
 that Russia should be suffered to do what she pleased on 
 hers. At this period, he did not at all consider it urgent 
 to interfere in the affairs of Spain ; he was full of resent- 
 ment on account of the proclamation of the Prince of the 
 Peace, promised himself to express his sentiments upon it 
 some day, and to secure himself, but thinking at his re- 
 turn of nothing but imposing peace upon England, by 
 threatening her with complete exclusion from the Con- 
 tinent, and of making use of the cabinet of Madrid to 
 bring the cabinet of Lisbon into his projects. We shall 
 soon see how and through whom arose the temptation to 
 intermeddle in the affairs of Spain. I correct that error at 
 present : I shall correct others as the order of facts and 
 the progress of my narrative require it.
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 339 
 
 come senators. Four months had since elapsed, 
 and he wrote immediately to the senators 
 charged with this organization, to learn if he 
 could already dispose of two battalions out of 
 the six in each of these legions. Trusting, till 
 their arrM'al, to the terror which the speedy 
 return of the grand army must strike into the 
 English, having no fear that the expeditions 
 agrtinst the Continent, with which they were 
 said to have been so long occupied, would be 
 directed against the coasts of France, having 
 all his precautions taken on those of Holland, 
 Hanover, Pomerania, old Prussia, he hesitated 
 not to strip those of Normandy and Bretagne, 
 and ordered the assemblage at Bayonne of the 
 troops distributed among the camps of St. Lo, 
 Pontivy, and Napoleon-Vendee. Each of these 
 camps, formed of third battalions and some 
 complete regiments, contributed a good di- 
 vision, and, with the depots of dragoons 
 collected at Versailles and St. Germain, and 
 with detachments of artillery drawn from 
 Kennes, Toulouse, and Bayonne, would com- 
 pose an excellent army of about 25,000 men. 
 This army had orders to concentrate itself 
 forthwith at Bayonne. For the command of it, 
 Napoleon selected General Junot, who was 
 acquainted with Portugal, where he had been 
 ambassador, who was a good officer, entirely 
 devoted to his master, and, as Governor of 
 Paris, had no other fault but indulging there 
 too freely in his pleasures. He was said to 
 have formed a connection with one of the 
 princesses of the imperial family, which caused 
 some scandal, so that several circumstances 
 united to recommend this choice. These mea- 
 sures were taken ostensibly, and in such a 
 manner that Spain and Portugal could not be 
 ignorant how serious the consequences of a 
 refusal would be to them. At the same time 
 the necessary orders were given for the two 
 battalions of each of the legions of reserve to 
 hold themselves in readiness to replace on the 
 coast the troops that were about to be with- 
 drawn from it. 
 
 It was in the same spirit that Napoleon di- 
 rected his attention at this moment to the 
 affairs of Italy. There as elsewhere, redoubled 
 severity against English commerce was his first 
 care, always with the intention of rendering 
 the cabinet of London more sensible to the 
 overtures of Russia. The Queen of Etruria, 
 daughter, as the reader knows, of the sove- 
 reigns of Spain, placed by Napoleon on the 
 throne of Tuscany, who had become, by the 
 death of her husband, regent for her son' of 
 that petty kingdom, governed it with the care- 
 lessness of a woman and a Spaniard, and with 
 very little fidelity to the common cause. The 
 English carried on commerce at Leghorn as 
 freely as in any port of their own country. 
 Napoleon had collected all the depots of the 
 army of Naples in the Legations. With his 
 accustomed vigilance, he kept them constantly 
 supplied with conscripts and materiel. He or- 
 dered Prince Eugene to draft from them a di- 
 vision of 4000 men, to march across the Apen- 
 nines upon Pisa, to fall suddenly upon the 
 English commerce at Leghorn, to carry off 
 both men and goods, and then to declare to 
 the Queen of Etruria that he was come to 
 
 urdx Prince of Lucca and Parma. 
 
 I secure that important port against any hostile 
 attempt, an attempt both possible and pro- 
 bable, since the Spanish garrison had gone to 
 join the corps of La Romana in Hanover. 
 While prescribing this expedition, he sent or- 
 ders for detachments of troops to march under 
 General Lemarrois into the provinces of Ur- 
 bino, Macerata, and Fermo, to occupy the 
 coast, to drive the English from it, and to pre- 
 pare safe harbours for the French flag, which 
 was soon to make its appearance in those seas. 
 Napoleon had, in fact, just recovered the mouths 
 of the Cattaro, Corfu and the Ionian Islands. 
 He purposed to take advantage of circum- 
 stances for conquering Sicily and to cover the 
 surface of the Mediterranean with his ships. 
 He recommended at the same time to General 
 Lemarrois to observe the spirit of those pro- 
 vinces, and if a disposition, evinced in general 
 by the provinces of the Holy See to escape 
 from the government of priests and to place 
 themselves under the lay government of Prince 
 Eugene, should manifest itself among these, 
 not to oppose either contradiction or obstacle 
 to that disposition. 
 
 At that moment, the quarrel with the Holy 
 See, the origin of which we have elsewhere 
 noticed, but neglected to record its daily vicis- 
 situdes, was every instant making fresh pro- 
 gress. The Pope who, having come to Paris to 
 anoint Napoleon, had carried back, together 
 with many moral and religious satisfactions, 
 the temporal mortification of not having re- 
 covered the Legations ; who had since seen hia 
 independence rendered nominal by the succes- 
 sive extension of the French power in Italy ; 
 had conceived a resentment which he was un- 
 able to dissemble. Instead of coming to an 
 understanding with an omnipotent sovereign, 
 against whom powers even of the first order 
 could then effect nothing, who, moreover, wa3 
 a well-wisher to religion, and never ceased to 
 confer benefits on it, who had no idea to pos- 
 sess himself of the sovereignty of Rome, and 
 merely required him to behave like a good 
 neighbour in regard to the new French States 
 founded in Italy the Pope committed the er- 
 ror of yielding to mischievous suggestions, 
 which had the stronger influence over his mind, 
 since they accorded with his secret sentiments. 
 Animated by similar dispositions, he had op- 
 posed Napoleon in all the arrangements rela- 
 tive to the kingdom of Italy. He had insisted 
 on reserving there all the rights of the Papacy, 
 which are much greater in Italy than in France, 
 and would not admit of an equal Concordat in 
 the two countries. At Parma, at Placentia, 
 there were the like demands, and the like dis- 
 agreements. To these were added other an- 
 noyances of a still more personal kind. Prince 
 Jerome Bonaparte, during his naval campaigns 
 in America, had contracted marriage with a 
 very handsome person, of good family, but at 
 an age which rendered that alliance null, and 
 without the concurrence of her parents, a de- 
 fect which made it still more null. Napoleon, 
 who purposed, in marrying that prince with a 
 German princess, to found a new kingdom in 
 Westphalia, had refused to acknowledge a mar- 
 riage, null in the eye of the civil law as in that 
 of the religious law, and in the highest degree 
 contrary to his political designs. He had ap- 
 plied to the Pope, soliciting its annulment,
 
 840 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 which the Pope had formally refused. Lastly, 
 the city of Rome, in still more open hostility, 
 which no religious scruple could justifj- the 
 city of Rome had become the refuge of all the 
 enemies of King Joseph. The Pope had not only 
 protested against the French royalty establish- 
 ed in Naples, in his quality of ancient lord para- 
 mount of the crown of the Two Sicilies ; but he 
 had received, almost allured to him, the car- 
 dinals who had refused their oath to King 
 Joseph. He had, moreover, given an asylum 
 to all the robbers who infested the roads of the 
 kingdom of Naples, and who, still covered with 
 the blood of Frenchmen, took refuge without 
 any disguise in the suburbs of Rome. Never 
 was it possible to obtain justice or the delivery 
 of any of them. 
 
 Napoleon, during his journey from Tilsit to 
 Paris, wrote from Dresden to Prince Eugene, 
 who voluntarily made himself the advocate of 
 the court of Rome, recapitulating his grievances 
 against that court, commissioning him to inform 
 the Vatican of them, and to give the Pontiff to 
 understand that his patience, seldom very great, 
 was this time at an end, and that, without 
 touching his spiritual authority, he should not' 
 hesitate, if necessai-y, to strip him of his tem- 
 poral authority. Such were then the relations 
 with the court of Rome, and these relations 
 account sufficiently for the facility with which 
 Napoleon adopted the measures we have just 
 described respecting that part of the coast of 
 the Adriatic dependent on the Holy See. 
 
 The treaty of Tilsit stipulated the restitution 
 of the Mouths of the Cattaro, as well as the 
 cession of Corfu and all the Ionian Islands. No 
 possession had been more coveted by Napoleon, 
 none so highly gratified his imagination, so 
 prompt and so vast. He beheld in it the com- 
 plement of his Illyrian provinces, the dominion 
 of the Adriatic, an approach towards the pro- 
 vinces of Turkey in Europe which were destined 
 for him, in case there should be a partition of 
 the Ottoman empire, lastly, an additional 
 means of making himself master of the Medi- 
 terranean, where he resolved to reign in an 
 absolute manner, in compensation for the re- 
 linquishment of the Ocean, in spite of himself, 
 to England. 
 
 It will be recollected that the Russians, after 
 the peace of Presburg, had taken advantage of 
 the moment when the Austrian garrison was 
 about to be replaced by a French garrison, to 
 get possession of the forts of the Cattaro. To 
 prevent the English from doing the same this 
 time, Napoleon had given orders from Tilsit 
 itself to General Marmont, that the French 
 troops should be assembled under the walls of 
 Cattaro, at the moment when the Russians 
 were retiring from it. These orders had been 
 executed point by point ; and our troops, hav- 
 ing entered Cattaro, strongly occupied that 
 important maritime position. 
 
 But Corfu and the Ionian Islands interested 
 him still more than the mouths of the Cattaro. 
 He enjoined his brother Joseph to march se- 
 cretly towards Tarento, and in such a manner 
 as not to excite any suspicion in the English, 
 the 5th Italian of the line, the 6th French of 
 the line, some companies of artillery, artificers, 
 ammunition, officers of the staff, and General 
 Caesar Berthier, appointed to the command of 
 the garrison, and to form with them several 
 
 convoys, to be transported in feluccas from 
 Tarento to Corfu. The distance being but a 
 few leagues, forty-eight hours would be suf- 
 ficient to convey in several trips the 4000 men 
 composing the expedition. Admiral Siniavin, 
 commander of the Russian forces in the Archi- 
 pelago, was commissioned to deliver up the 
 Ionian Islands to the French. He performed 
 the operation with extreme and undissembled 
 displeasure ; for the Russian navy, directed in 
 general, either by English officers or by Rus- 
 sians educated in England, was much more 
 hostile to the French than the army itself, 
 which had just fought at Eylau and at Fried- 
 land. The admiral, nevertheless, obeyed, and 
 delivered over to the French troops those fine 
 positions which he had been appointed to 
 guard. But his vexation had a double motive, 
 for, besides the surrender of Corfu and the 
 Seven Islands, which was painful to him, he 
 would presently find himself in the middle of 
 the Mediterranean, being prevented from re- 
 turning to the Black Sea through the Darda- 
 nelles, in consequence of the rupture with the 
 Turks, and forced to pass through the Straits 
 of Gibraltar, the Channel, the Sound, through 
 the English fleets, which, according to the 
 state of the negotiations commenced, might 
 either suffer him to proceed or stop him. Na- 
 poleon had foreseen all these complications, 
 and had sent word to the Russian admirals, 
 that they would find in the ports of the Medi- 
 terranean, as well in those of Italy and France 
 as of Spain and Portugal, safe harbours to put 
 into, provisions, stores, and means of refitting. 
 He wrote to Venice, Naples, Toulon, Cdiz, 
 even to Lisbon, to his maritime prefects, ad- 
 mirals, and consuls, and recommended to them, 
 wherever the Russian ships should make their 
 appearance, to receive them cordially and to 
 supply them with every thing they might need. 
 At Cadiz, in particular, where he was repre- 
 sented by Admiral Rosily, who commanded the 
 French fleet lying in that port ever since Tra- 
 falgar, and where it was most probable that 
 the Russians would seek an asylum, Napoleon 
 enjoined the French admiral to prepare sup- 
 plies that were not to be expected from the 
 Spanish administration, accustomed to leave 
 its own sailors to starve, and authorized him, 
 if need were, to give his signature, in order to 
 obtain the necessary funds from the Spanish 
 bankers. 
 
 The Russian naval forces, apprized by their 
 own government and by ours, retired in two 
 divisions in different directions. The division 
 which had on board the garrison of Cattaro 
 steered for Venice, where it landed the Rus- 
 sian troops, whom Eugene received with tha 
 greatest cordiality. The division which con~ 
 veyed the troops from Corfu, landed them at 
 Manfredonia, in the kingdom of Naples, and 
 then steered under Admiral Siniavin for the 
 Straits. This admiral, who had not yet en- 
 tered into the views of his sovereign, had no 
 inclination to put into a French port or one 
 dependent on French influence, and flattered 
 himself that he should reach the seas of the 
 North, before the negotiations between his 
 court and that of England should have termi- 
 nated in a rupture. 
 
 The intention of Napoleon was not to stop at 
 the precautions which he had already taken for
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 341 
 
 the provinces of the Adriatic and the Mediter- 
 ranean. The corps of 4000 men which he had 
 sent to Corfu appeared to him insufficient. He 
 was well aware that the English would not fail 
 to make great efforts, in case the war should be 
 prolonged, to wrest from him the Ionian Islands, 
 which were of such importance as to counter- 
 balance that of Malta. He therefore ordered 
 the French 14th light, and several other detach- 
 ments, to be sent thither, so as to increase the 
 French and Italian forces to seven or eight 
 thousand men, exclusive of some Arnauts and 
 Greeks, enrolled under French officers, for 
 guarding the small islands. Five thousand men 
 were to reside at Corfu itself, and 1500 at St. 
 Maura. Five hundred were to guard the port 
 of Parga, on the continent of Epire. As for 
 Zante and Cephalonia, Napoleon resolved to 
 keep only mere French detachments there, to 
 support and control the Arnauts. He directed 
 Prince Eugene and King Joseph to despatch 
 from Ancona and Tarento, by means of small 
 Italian vessels, and in all favourable winds, 
 corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, muskets, can- 
 non, gun-carriages, and to continue to send 
 stores of these kinds without interruption, till 
 there should be collected at Corfu an immense 
 stock of things necessary for a long defence, so 
 that they might not be liable, as at Malta, to 
 lose through famine a position which the enemy 
 could not take from us by force. Not relying 
 upon the solvency of the Treasury of Naples, 
 he despatched sums in gold from the chest at 
 Turin, in order to keep the .troops constantly 
 paid up, and to pay the workmen employed in 
 constructing fortifications. Admirable instruc- 
 tions to General Caesar Berthier, (brother of the 
 major-general,) providing for all cases, and 
 pointing out the conduct to be pursued under 
 all imaginable circumstances, accompanied the 
 resources which we have just enumerated. 
 
 General Marmont had already constructed 
 fine roads in the provinces of Illyria, which he 
 governed with great intelligence and zeal. He 
 had orders to continue them to Ragusa and 
 Cattaro, to push reconnaissances as far as Bu- 
 trinto, a point of the coast of Epire facing Corfu, 
 and to prepare the means for expeditiously 
 leading a division thither. Napoleon caused 
 application to be made to the Porte to give up 
 Butrinto to him, that he might be able to use 
 more freely that position, from which it was 
 easy to send supplies to Corfu: and it was 
 granted to him without difficulty. Lastly, he 
 claimed, and obtained also, the establishment 
 of relays of Tatars from Cattaro to Butrinto, 
 that General Marmont might be speedily ap- 
 prized of any appearance of the enemy, and 
 might hasten up with ten or twelve thousand 
 men a force sufficient to throw the English 
 into the sea, if they should attempt a landing. 
 
 To these means Napoleon added those which 
 the concurrence of the navy was capable of 
 affording. He sent from Toulon, Captain Chau- 
 nay-Dnclos, with the frigates La Pomone and 
 La Pauline, and the corvette La Victorieuse, to 
 form at Corfu the commencement of a navy. 
 He directed moreover that two large brigs should 
 be put on the stocks in the port of Corfu, that 
 they should be equipped with the assistance of 
 the sailors of the country and some detachments 
 of French troops. Thia infant navy, composed 
 of frigates and brigs, was to cruise incessantly 
 
 between Italy and Epire, between Corfu and the 
 other islands, so as that the passage should be 
 always open to our merchantmen and closed to 
 those of the enemy. 
 
 In addressing these multiplied instructions to 
 King Joseph, to Prince Eugene, to General Mar- 
 mont, not only with the imperious accent with 
 which he always accompanied his orders, but 
 with the impassioned accent which he always 
 imparted to them, when his orders were con- 
 nected with any of the grand designs which occu- 
 pied his mind, Napoleon wrote thus: "These 
 measures belong to a system of projects which 
 you cannot be acquainted with. Know only 
 that in the state of the world, the loss of Corfu 
 would be the greatest misfortune that could 
 befall the Empire." 
 
 Indeed, few persons in Europe were acquaint- 
 ed with these projects. M. de Talleyrand, Na- 
 poleon's negotiator at Tilsit, had himself but a 
 very incomplete idea of them. They were known 
 to none but to Alexander and Napoleon, who, 
 in their long conversations on the banks of the 
 Niemen, had engaged to join in the partition of 
 the Turkish empire a partition in which the 
 one sought the satisfaction of French greatness, 
 the other the consummation of the ruin of the 
 Ottoman empire, which Asiatic effeminacy could 
 no longer defend against European energy. Na- 
 poleon was far from desiring to hasten this re- 
 sult : Alexander, on the contrary, longed for it 
 most eagerly and this constituted the peril of 
 their alliance. But, in the foresight of events, 
 Napoleon was disposed to lay his hand on the 
 Turkish provinces situated within his reach, 
 and moreover, whether this necessity should oc- 
 cur or not, he intended to make himself master 
 of the Mediterranean. He conceived that, when 
 master of that sea, the shortest communication 
 between the East and the West, he might con- 
 sole himself for being but the second upon the 
 Ocean. Napoleon, therefore, was resolved, the 
 very day after the signature of the peace of 
 Tilsit, to recover Sicily, which he considered as 
 his own, ever since he had taken Naples for one 
 of his brothers, and he hoped to keep it, either 
 through the relinquishment of it by the English, 
 if the Russians should succeed in negotiating 
 peace, or by the force of his arms, should the 
 war continue. Accordingly, as soon as winter 
 was over, he had begun to send orders to his 
 minister of the marine to despatch squadrons 
 in the direction of Toulon, and thus to prepare 
 a great expedition against Sicily. 
 
 These orders, the fulfilment of which was 
 thwarted by circumstances and the inadequacy 
 of the resources, were repeated with increased 
 force after the signature of the continental 
 peace. On the very day that this peace was 
 signed at Tilsit, Napoleon wrote to four persons 
 at once, to Prince Eugene, to King Joseph, to 
 the King of Holland, to the minister of the ma- 
 rine, that, the continental war being at an end, 
 he must turn his attention towards the sea, and 
 think at length of deriving some benefit from 
 the immense extent of coast at his disposal. 
 England had undoubtedly the advantage of her 
 insular position, the hitherto immovable foun- 
 dation of her maritime greatness ; but the pos- 
 session of all the European coasts from Kron- 
 stadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Naples, from Na- 
 ples to Venice, WHS likewise a means of n>tri- 
 time power, and a formidable means, if one had 
 2r2
 
 842 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, 1807 
 
 the art and the time to make use of it. Napo- 
 leon had said in Berlin, in exultation over his 
 victories, "The sea must be ruled by the land." 
 He had just realized so much of this idea as it 
 was possible to realize, by obtaining at Tilsit 
 the voluntary or forced union of all the powers 
 of the Continent against England ; and it was 
 requisite for him to hasten to take advantage 
 of this union, before the continental domination 
 of France should become still more intolerable 
 to the world than the maritime domination of 
 England. 
 
 Twenty-two months had elapsed since that 
 fatal battle of Trafalgar, in which our flag had 
 displayed a sublime heroism amidst an immense 
 disaster. Those twenty-two months had been 
 employed with some activity, and here and there 
 some glory, with that at least which is due to 
 the courage that reverses cannot depress. Ad- 
 miral Decres, continuing to place at the service 
 of the impetuous will of Napoleon profound ex- 
 perience and a superior mind, could not always 
 succeed in persuading him that in the navy, 
 with good-will, with courage, with money, with 
 genius itself, it is not possible to make amends 
 for time and long training. He had proposed 
 to Napoleon to substitute for the system of great 
 naval battles that of small and very distant 
 squadrons. By this system, you have the ad- 
 vantage of risking less at once, of acquiring, 
 while cruising, that experience which you want, 
 of doing great mischief to the enemy's com- 
 merce, and of having a chance of at length fall- 
 ing in with your adversary, inferior in numeri- 
 cal force ; for the sea, from its very immensity, 
 is the field of chance. Such a system was as- 
 suredly worth trying, and for us it would have 
 had incontestable advantages over the other, if 
 the numerical disproportion of our forces to 
 those of the English had not been so great, and 
 if our distant settlements had not been so ut- 
 terly ruined, so destitute of all resource. 
 
 Conformably to the plan of M. Decres, seve- 
 ral squadrons had been prepared at Brest, 
 Rochefort, and Cadiz, for the purpose of running 
 out, towards the end of 1805, by taking advan- 
 tage of the autumnal gales. One division of 
 four frigates had sailed in order to cruise in the 
 track of the Indian Ocean, to destroy the Eng- 
 lish commerce there, and to support the island 
 of Bourbon and the Isle of France by the pro- 
 duce of their prizes, since they could no longer 
 support themselves by trade. These frigates, 
 arriving without accident, did, in fact, procure 
 tolerably abundant resources for our two 
 islands. Captain L'Hermitte, with one ship of 
 the line, the Regulus, two frigates, the Cybele 
 and the President, two brigs, the Surveillant and 
 the Diligent, had sailed from Port Lorient on 
 the 30th of October, 1805, and steered for the 
 Canaries. Running down the coast of Africa, 
 from north to south, for many hundred leagues, 
 for the purpose of seizing the English vessels 
 engaged in the slave-trade, he took or destroyed 
 a great number ; for the English Admiralty, not 
 foreseeing the visit of a French squadron in that 
 quarter, had not taken any precautions. Hav- 
 ing cruised during the months of December, 
 January, February, and March, committed 
 great ravages, made rich captures, this division, 
 excepting the Survtiltant brig, which had been 
 sent to France, with intelligence of its proceed- 
 ings, would fain have put into some port to re- 
 
 fit the ships, to repair the rigging, to rest the 
 crews, and to procure fresh provisions. Not 
 daring to return to France during the summer, 
 not disposed to go to our West India islands, 
 which were always closely watched, and having 
 but few ports either French or allied to choose 
 from, it was caught by the trade winds, which 
 carried it towards the coast of America, and in 
 April it reached San Salvador, a port of Brazil, 
 where it had a chance of obtaining provisions, 
 and selling to advantage the blacks taken from 
 the English traders. Having put in there for 
 twenty-two days, it again sailed to cruise off Rio 
 Janeiro, was frequently pursued by English 
 ships going to India, bore away for the latitude 
 of the West Indies, continued to make prizes, 
 and was at length overtaken on the 19th of 
 August by a tremenduous hurricane, one of the 
 most terrible that had been experienced in those 
 seas for a quarter of a century. It was dis- 
 persed. The Regulus, haying lost sight of her 
 frigates and looked for them in vain, reached 
 Brest on the 3d of October, 1806, after having 
 been nearly a year at sea. The Cybele frigate, 
 dismasted, had steered for the United States. 
 The President, separated from the division, had 
 been taken. Captain L'Hermitte had destroyed 
 twenty-six of the enemy's vessels, taken 570 
 prisoners, destroyed goods worth more than five 
 millions, and brought back considerable sums, 
 far exceeding the expenses of the cruise. The 
 slade-trade was ruined for that year on the 
 coast of Africa, and the English insurance com- 
 panies cried out furiously against the Admi- 
 ralty. But our large squadrons were not des- 
 tined to be so fortunate. 
 
 Cadiz presented nothing but wrecks, which 
 required to be reunited and reorganized before 
 a division could be formed out of them. Roche- 
 fort contained the division of Admiral Allemand, 
 who was resting in that port, after the difficult 
 cruise which he had made in consequence of 
 having missed Admiral Villeneuve, purposing 
 to enter a port of France during the equinoc- 
 tial gales, which drove off the enemy. 
 
 Brest alone afforded resources for equipping 
 a very strong division. Of the twenty-one ships 
 collected in the great harbour, six, the fittest 
 for a long voyage, had been selected, and de- 
 spatched, under the command of Rear-admiral 
 Willaumez, on the 13th of December, 1805, to 
 the American seas. This division was composed 
 of the Foudroyant, an 80-gun ship, the Veteran, 
 the Cassard, the Impetueux, the Patriote, and 
 the Eole of 74 guns, and two frigates, the Valeu- 
 reuse and the Comttf,. It carried provisions for 
 seven months. On the news of its sailing, more 
 than thirty English ships had started in pursuit 
 of it, for the purpose of seeking it in all the 
 seas. It had first cruised off St. Helena, in the 
 months of- February and March, 180C, taken 
 several prizes there, and then, having sick on 
 board, and being in want of fresh provisions, it 
 had gone to San Salvador, from the same mo- 
 tives which had led Captain L'Hermitte to that 
 port. After a rest of seventeen days, it had 
 sailed to cruise again, and in June had touched 
 at Madeira, with the intention of getting into 
 the wind of the Antilles and there falling in 
 with the great Jamaica convoys. At Marti- 
 nique it had found but a small quantity of pro- 
 visions, the colony having scarcely sufficient for 
 its own consumption, few means of refitting, foi
 
 July, 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 343 
 
 the almost continual state of war for fifteen 
 years had permitted scarcely any naval stores 
 to be sent thither ; and it went to lie in ambush 
 in the passes of the Antilles, in the hope of 
 making some rich capture, equivalent to the 
 expense of so large an armament. On the 28th 
 of July, the ships of the squadron were sailing 
 apart, with the intention of taking a convoy 
 which had been descried, when, the wind fresh- 
 ening, the distance which separated them began 
 rapidly to increase. Next morning, the 29th, 
 at day-break, the admiral had lost sight of the 
 Veteran, on board of which was Prince Jerome 
 Bonaparte, and of the Valeureuse frigate. In 
 the hope of meeting with these two ships, he 
 stood to the northward along the coast of Ame- 
 rica, and proceeded to cruise thirty-eight 
 leagues to eastward of New York ; but, not 
 falling in with either the Veteran or the Valeu- 
 reuse, he steered for the rendezvous previously 
 agreed upon for such ships as should part com- 
 pany, in latitude 29 N. and longitude 67 W. 
 Here he was joined by the Valeureuse, but not 
 by the Veteran, which had that moment sailed 
 for the bank of Newfoundland, and he remained 
 in that quarter till the 18th of August. During 
 these vicissitudes, the English divisions had 
 missed him, as he had himself missed the Ja- 
 . m:iicu convoy, which passed within forty leagues 
 of his squadron. Such are the hazards of the 
 eea ! Having waited at the rendezvous beyond 
 the time assigned for his ships, Admiral Wil- 
 laumez, who had intended to proceed to New- 
 foundland, assembled his captains, held a coun- 
 cil of war with them, and, having ascertained 
 that they had a great number of sick, scarcely 
 any water, wood, or provisions, he resolved to 
 touch at Porto Rico, then to sail northward to 
 the bank of Newfoundland, destroy the English 
 fisheries there, and return to Europe. But 
 scarcely was this resolution adopted, when, in 
 the night of the 18th of August, 1806, the same 
 hurricane which had dispersed L'Hermitte's di- 
 vision, overtook the squadron of Admiral Wil- 
 laumez, and for three successive days tossed it 
 about upon the waves till it was on the point 
 of perishing. The Foudroyant and the Impe- 
 tueux, the only ships of the squadron which had 
 not been separated by the tempest, lost all their 
 masts, repaired themselves at sea as well as 
 they could, and purposed to proceed in com- 
 pany, when fresh gales parted them also. Per- 
 ceiving amidst the tempest, the lights of seve- 
 ral enemy's ships, they sought safety wherever 
 they could. The Foudroyant, the admiral's 
 ship, took refuge at the Havannah ; the Imp6- 
 tueux, having lost her masts, one tier of guns 
 thrown overboard, and part of her powder, 
 suffered herself to drive at the mercy of the 
 hurricane into the bay of Chesapeake, where 
 she ran aground, pursued by two enemy's ships. 
 The crew, seeing their ship lost, sought refuge 
 on shore, where they were protected by the 
 American neutrality, and assembled on board 
 the Cybele, Captain L'Hermitte's frigate, which 
 had likewise taken shelter in the Chesapeake. 
 While the Foudroyant and the Impetueux were 
 thus struggling against ill fortune, the Eole, 
 completely dismasted, exposed to the winds and 
 the enemy, had also fled into the Chesapeake. 
 There, towed by American vessels, she was got 
 aground sufficiently high to be safe from the 
 English. The Patriote, having lost her top- 
 
 masts, her mizen-mast, and all her sails, had 
 likewise reached the Chesapeake, and cast an- 
 chor at Annapolis. The Valeureuse frigate had 
 fled to the Delaware. The Cassard, after being 
 long buffeted by the waves, having lost the bar 
 of her helm, having had fourteen stanchions 
 stove in, had well nigh been upset. As, how- 
 ever, she made no water in her hold, she was 
 righted and repaired at sea. Her sails were in 
 tolerably good condition, and she had still pro- 
 visions for seventy-eight days. Upon the 
 strength of these circumstances, it was thought 
 that she had no need to go to Porto Rico, and 
 she sailed for Europe, reaching Brest on the 
 18th of October. The Veteran, Captain Jerome, 
 which had been long separated from the squad- 
 ron, after roving for some time on the coast 
 of North America, had returned to Europe ; 
 but the blockade of Lorient had obliged her to 
 take refuge in the bay of Concarneau, where 
 she was scarcely safe. 
 
 Thus, of the six ships which sailed from 
 Brest, the Foudroyant had taken refuge at the 
 Havannah ; the Impetueux was destroyed ; the 
 Patriote and the Eole had ascended the Chesa- 
 peake in a deplorable state, and without much 
 chance of getting out again; the Cassard was 
 saved ; the Veteran had got to an anchorage at 
 Concarneau, from which it was difficult to ex- 
 tricate her. As for the frigates of the expedi- 
 tion, the Valeureuse was in the Delaware ; the 
 Comete had taken shelter in an American port. 
 A few prizes takon from the enemy formed a 
 slender compensation for such disasters. 
 
 About the same time three frigates, the 
 Syrtne, the Revanche, and the Guerriere, had 
 been despatched from Lorient for the northern 
 seas, under the command of a brave Flemish 
 seaman, Captain Leduc. The three frigates 
 directed by this intrepid navigator had not 
 experienced the same disasters as the large 
 division of Willaumez, but had met with terri- 
 ble seas and undergone great hardships. Cap- 
 tain Leduc, sailing from Lorient in March, 
 1806, steered for the Azores, where he picked 
 up some prizes, was separated for a moment 
 from the Guerriere, then, coming back towards 
 the west coast of Ireland, had borne away for 
 the point of Iceland, which he came in sight 
 of on the 21th of May, and for the point of 
 Spitzbergen, which he had descried on the 
 12th of June. In those latitudes he had met 
 with frightful weather, and lost sight of the 
 Guerriere. Diseases soon broke out: he num- 
 bered so many as forty dead, 160 sick, 180 
 convalescent, out of 700 or 800 men, who com- 
 posed the crews of his two frigates. Continuing 
 to cruise, sometimes off the coast of Greenland, 
 sometimes off that of Iceland, now and then 
 taking prizes, he had returned in September 
 to St. Malo, and being unable to land there, 
 he put into the little roadstead of Brehat. 
 Notwithstanding these crosses and the severi- 
 ties of the weather, endured by Captain Leduc 
 with extraordinary fortitude, he had taken 
 fourteen English vessels and one Russian, made 
 270 prisoners, and destroyed nearly three mil- 
 lions' worth of property. Unfortunately he 
 had lost ninety-five men. This cruise might 
 be considered as advantageous, though the 
 weather was so extremely unfavourable. It 
 did the highest honour to Captain Leduc, the 
 commander.
 
 844 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [July, ISO? 
 
 In September, 1806, Rear-admiral Cormao, 
 the same who had behaved so nobly at Trafal- 
 gar, sailed from Toulon with the ships the 
 B&rte and the Annibal, the Uranie frigate, and 
 the Sucees, to fetch from Genoa the ship Le 
 Genois, built in that port. Having crossed the 
 gulf, he returned to Toulon, opening that sea 
 to French and Italian commerce. He repeated 
 this trip more than once, and always succeeded 
 in driving off the enemy's cruisers. 
 
 At the same time Captain Soleil, sailing from 
 Rochefort with four frigates and a brig belong- 
 ing to Allemand's division, experienced a san- 
 guinary disaster. The English had adopted a 
 new system of blockade : it consisted in not 
 keeping so close to the coast, in order to tempt 
 our blockaded vessels to slip out, and thus to 
 procure for themselves the means of cutting 
 them off, before they had time to turn back. 
 This stratagem completely succeeded in the 
 case of Captain Soleil. The custom then was 
 to start at night, in order to pass the enemy's 
 cruisers unperceived. The English not being 
 in sight, owing to the distance at which they 
 kept, Captain Soleil slipped out at night on the 
 24th of September, 1806, met with none of 
 them in his way, perceived them next morn- 
 ing, the 25th, in the offing, crowded all sail to 
 outstrip them in speed, cleared the space of 
 100 miles without being overtaken, but on the 
 26th was surrounded by Sir Samuel Hood's 
 whole squadron, composed of seven ships of the 
 line and several frigates, and maintained for 
 several hours an heroic fight with five of the 
 enemy's ships. Excepting the Themis, which 
 contrived to escape with two brigs, the whole 
 French division was taken or destroyed. 
 
 About the same time with these encounters, 
 to which the too great numerical superiority 
 of the enemy gave sooner or later an unfortu- 
 nate termination, there were others, in which 
 the courage of our seamen showed that, ship 
 to ship, when circumstances were not too un- 
 favourable, we were capable of facing the 
 English, and even of beating them. On the 
 24th of April in the same year, Captain Bou- 
 rayne, proceeding to the Cape with la Canon- 
 niere frigate, had fallen in with an English con- 
 voy, and dashed into the midst of it to make 
 prizes, when a 74-gun ship, charged to escort 
 this convoy, all at once made her appearance. 
 Captain Bourayne at first wished to decline an 
 unequal combat with this adversary ; but, find- 
 ing himself pressed too closely, he gallantly 
 accepted battle, and profiting by the circum- 
 stance that the swell of the sea prevented the 
 enemy's ship from using her lower deck-guns, 
 he had taken an advantageous position, and in 
 a few moments brought down her main-mast, 
 completely cut up her rigging, and obliged her 
 to sheer off. Some stout merchantmen having 
 sought to interfere in the fight, he bore down 
 upon them, presently spoiled their stomach, 
 and continued his route to the Cape, being yet 
 unaware of its conquest by the English. These 
 latter, in order to entrap French or Dutch ves- 
 sels, had not struck the Dutch colours. No 
 sooner had Captain Bourayne cast anchor, 
 than, at a signal, all the Dutch colours were 
 hauled down, replaced by English, and a 
 shower of bombs and balls poured upon the 
 Canonniere. The undaunted Captain Bourayne 
 cut his cable, sacrificed his anchors, and, crowd- 
 
 ing sail, escaped all dangers. He arrived safe 
 and sound at the Isle of France, where he was 
 destined to signalize himself by fresh naval 
 adventures not less bold, not less glorious. 
 
 Another circumstance of this kind, which 
 occurred on our own coast likewise, proved all 
 that could be expected from the ardour and 
 intrepid courage of our seamen. The flute la 
 Salamandre, having sailed from St. Malo with 
 a cargo of ship-timber for Brest, being pursued 
 I by a large corvette of 24 guns, two brigs, and 
 I a cutter, ran herself aground near the mouth 
 ! of Erquy, and the crew defended themselves 
 ! as well as they could with small arms. Soon 
 j perceiving the impossibility of prolonging this 
 defence, they got away in a boat and on the 
 wreck of the mast, succeeded in reaching the 
 land, proceeded to the battery called St. Michel, 
 directed its fire upon the English corvette, which 
 had approached too near to the coast, crippled 
 her so that she could not be worked, and thus 
 forced hei to run aground. They then dashed 
 into the water, and, seconded by a few soldiers 
 who had run to the shore, took possession of 
 the corvette in spite of the remnant of the 
 English crew, part of whom were hors de com- 
 bat, and part had run away. 
 
 Such were the actions, unimportant but gal- 
 lant, by which our sailors signalized themselves* 
 against a power usually superior to us in num- 
 ber and training, and still more superior at a 
 moment when all our forces were exclusively 
 directed to the war on land. Thus, at the 
 conclusion of 1806, the able and unfortunate 
 minister Decres, having nothing but disasters 
 to relate to a master who was receiving only 
 favourable news from all quarters, was en- 
 tirely discouraged and not less disgusted with 
 the system of cruises than with the system of 
 great battles. Being y obliged to acquaint Xa- 
 poleon with the reverses which we had sus- 
 tained in this new system of warfare as well 
 as in the old one, he gave him sound reasons 
 which ought to have convinced him that all 
 kinds of naval warfare were alike danger- 
 ous in the then state of things. In the first 
 place, the numerical disproportion was so 
 great, according to him, that the English could 
 blockade our ports with several strong squad- 
 rons, and keep at the same time numerous 
 divisions to run after our cruisers the moment 
 they were descried ; which proved that, even 
 without pretending to fight general battle?, very 
 considerable forces were still required for car- 
 rying on war with petty divisions. In the next 
 place, our materiel was too defective in compari- 
 son with that of the enemy ; and, though our 
 sailors, never inferior in courage, were far be- 
 hind in experience, the materiel which they em- 
 ployed was much more in fault than their skill. 
 Their ships withstood the tempest much less 
 vigorously than they withstood it themselves. 
 In the hurricane of the 19th of August, which 
 had destroyed Willaumez's division, and sadly 
 shattered L'Hermitte's, the English had borne 
 its fury better than we had done, because their 
 rigging was not only better managed, but also 
 because it was of far superior quality. .More 
 numerous, better equipped, they were always 
 certain that among them, enough would always 
 escape the dangers of the sea to oblige our 
 ships, some to surrender, others to run aground, 
 and others to run away. But the inferiority
 
 July, 18J7 ] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 315 
 
 of number and that of materiel were not, ac- 
 cording to Admiral Decres, the only causes of 
 our disasters. The ships of Willaumez's divi- 
 sion, on leaving the port of Brest, where they 
 were selected with care from a considerable 
 squadron, were not inferior in quality to good 
 English ships. But ten months' continuance 
 at sea, without finding any harbour to put into 
 well supplied with provisions and spare arti- 
 cles, had put them out of condition either to 
 escape by their sailing from a stronger squad- 
 ron, or to withstand a storm, or to prosecute 
 their cruise without a fresh stock of provisions, 
 which exposed them to the danger of being dis- 
 covered by the enemy. Admiral Decres there- 
 fore wrote to Napoleon on the 23d of October, 
 1890, "After ten months' continuance at sea, 
 the yards and topmasts break, the rigging gets 
 relaxed, and wears the more, because one can- 
 not follow up its gradual repair while out at 
 sea ; the lower masts give, the ships become 
 loose ; and there is no example of vessels hav- 
 ing continued at sea for so long a time, without 
 taking occasion to repair themselves afresh, 
 and quietly, in some port." Unfortunately, 
 we had no longer any ports, or those which we 
 had were scantily supplied with stores. We 
 possessed, it is true, an excellent one, incom- 
 parable for its advantages in the Indian Ocean : 
 this was that of the Isle of France, which, at 
 the time of the American war, had served the 
 bailli Suffrein for the base of operations during 
 his brilliant campaign in India. But amidst 
 the disorders of the Revolution and the diffi- 
 culties of the continental war> the government 
 had not been able to supply it with naval stores. 
 The Cape of Good Hope, which belonged to 
 allies, could not be provisioned like a national 
 port, and, besides, it had just been taken. On 
 the coast of Brazil, we had nothing but a neu- 
 tral and almost hostile port, as it was Portu- 
 guese that of San Salvador.. Lastly, in the 
 West Indies, we were masters of the magnifi- 
 cent road of Fort Royal, one of the safest and 
 most capacious in the world ; but Martinique 
 was utterly distitute of naval stores, and as to 
 provisions, it rather needed that our squadron 
 should leave part of their biscuit for the troops 
 of the garrison, than have to renew the stock 
 consumed at sea. With four well-stored places 
 to resort to, one in the West Indies, one on the 
 coast of Brazil, one at the Cape of Good Hope, 
 one in India, we might have kept advantage- 
 ously at sea. But, deprived of these resources, 
 we could but appear as fugitives, always hur- 
 ried, always dreading an encounter, having not 
 only the chances of inferior number against 
 us, but all those of inferior and inadequate 
 equipment. Such were the consequences of 
 long domestic convulsions and of foreign wars, 
 unparalleled for their magnitude, their dura- 
 tion, and their rancour. 
 
 Napoleon, whom it was not easy to discourage, 
 nnd who thought that, notwithstanding many 
 unfortunate accidents, these last expeditions had 
 done great damage to the enemy's commerce, 
 resolved to send out fresh cruisers in 1807 ; 
 but this was strongly opposed by M. Decres, 
 who said that the coast of Africa, ravaged in 
 1800 by Captain L'Hermitte, was this year pro- 
 vided with considerable means of defence, in 
 consequence of the vehement complaints of 
 English commerce ; that we possessed no place 
 
 VOL. II. 44. 
 
 of resort either at the Isle of France, which 
 was destitute of stores, or at the Cape, which 
 was taken, or at San Salvador, which was ex- 
 hausted, or at Martinique, which had scarcely 
 necessaries for itself. To consolidate, mean- 
 while, the continental peace, to occupy the Eng- 
 lish cruisers with squadrons fitted out in our 
 ports, and to take advantage of certain mo 
 ments for sending succours to the colonies in 
 frigates, appeared to him to be the only allow- 
 able activity an activity that could do little 
 harm for the present and advantageous for the 
 future. Napoleon, who, between Eylau and 
 Friedland, had had to create new armies to 
 overawe Europe on his rear, had admitted the 
 negative system of M. Decres, and the opera- 
 tions of our navy in 1807 were confined to some 
 succours despatched to the East and West In- 
 dies. 
 
 Our colonies, though exposed to many hard- 
 ships, received, nevertheless, frequent relief. 
 Producing nothing but sugar, coffee, some 
 spices, a few dyeing materials, and no provi- 
 sions, no clothing, their prosperity consisted in 
 selling their natural productions to advantage, 
 in order to procure in exchange the means of 
 clothing and subsisting themselves. At the 
 period of which we are treating, it was difficult 
 to forward these commodities, and provisions 
 arrived with still greater difficulty, on account 
 of the English cruisers. In this state of dis- 
 tress, the severity of the exclusive system was 
 relaxed in favour of our colonies. They were 
 allowed that commerce with neutrals, which, in 
 time of peace, is reserved for nationals alone. 
 The North Americans came to fetch their sugar 
 and their coffee, and gave them in return corn 
 and cattle. But as people are more eager to 
 sell their own commodities than to buy those of 
 another, the Americans brought provisions to a 
 greater amount than that of the sugar and cof- 
 fee which they exported. On account of the 
 difficulty of selling colonial produce again in 
 Europe, they frequently insisted on being paid 
 in cash for their corn and their cattle, which 
 began to render ready money very scarce. 
 Moreover, paying no custom-house duties at 
 their departure, because they went in ballast, 
 they occasioned a considerable diminution of 
 the local revenues, which consisted almost solely 
 in the produce of the customs, and, in conse- 
 quence, nearly all the budgets of our settle- 
 ments exhibited a deficit. This state, still en- 
 durable at the period in question, was likely to 
 be soon aggravated : if peace were not restored, 
 and the maritime contest should assume a 
 character of increased rancour, the measures 
 for crippling commerce would be more strictly 
 enforced, on the part both of France and Eng- 
 land. Thus far, however, the despatch of 
 frigates to India, and that of brigs to our An- 
 tilles, furnished tolerably abundant resources 
 in specie, provisions, and goods adapted for 
 clothing. The Semillante and Ptemontaise fri- 
 gates had performed prodigies at the Isle of 
 France in 1806, and captured between them 
 property to the amount of nearly eight millions. 
 They had powerfully seconded the brave Gene- 
 ral Decaen, who, from that magnificent posi 
 tion, devoured with his eyes the peninsula of 
 India, and demanded 10,000 men only to throw 
 the whole of it into insurrection. Guade- 
 loupe and Martinique had been supplied witk
 
 84G 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 negroes by the cruisers, and several thousand 
 of them had been received ; so that the labour- 
 ing population there had been increased in 
 spite of the war. But the blockades being daily 
 rendered stricter by the enemy, naval stores 
 were wanting for the equipment of cruisers, 
 and our colonies demanded articles of consump- 
 tion, at least for the troops, specie to pay for 
 the American provisions, armed vessels to con- 
 tinue the cruises, lastly, recruits to fill the 
 vacancies which took place in our garrisons : 
 thus, at the Isle of France, which would have 
 required 3000 or 4000 men, they were reduced 
 to 1600. At Martinique, where there had been 
 4700, and which needed 5000 at least, there 
 were left 3000 at most. At Guadaloupe there 
 were scarcely 2000 left. These garrisons, it is 
 true, seconded by inhabitants full of energy 
 and patriotism, were sufficient to repel any 
 force which the English squadrons could trans- 
 port to so remote a distance. At St. Domingo, 
 terrible convulsions and the destruction of a fine 
 French army were followed by scenes equally 
 ridiculous and atrocious. Dessalines, a negro, 
 aping the Emperor Napoleon, as Toussaint 
 Louverture had endeavoured to imitate the 
 First Consul Bonaparte, was seen placing an 
 imperial crown upon his black head, soon sink- 
 ing beneath the daggers of the negro Christophe 
 and the mulatto Pethion; then these two new 
 competitors contending, like the generals of 
 Alexander, for the power of Toussaint Louver- 
 tnre, drenching with their blood that soil which 
 they would not water with their sweat, and 
 leaving it sterile for blood, let people say what 
 they will, never fertilizes the earth. After 
 these sanguinary and burlesque scenes, we 
 lost the French part of the island; we were 
 confined to the Spanish part, where we occupied 
 the town of Santo Domingo with 1800 men, the 
 relics of an army equally unfortunate and 
 heroic. General Ferrand conducted himself 
 there with ability and vigour, profiting by the 
 divisions of the blacks and the mulattoes to 
 maintain his ground, and, by the safety enjoyed 
 under the protection of our bayonets, drawing 
 to him numerous colonists, French and Spanish, 
 black and white, masters and slaves. 
 
 Such was the state of our navy and of our 
 maritime establishment, on the return of Na- 
 poleon from his long campaign in the north. 
 Encouraged by his prodigious triumphs to at- 
 tempt every thing, persuaded that, at the 
 head of the continental powers, he should ob- 
 tain peace, or that he should conquer England 
 by a combination of overwhelming forces, he 
 was full of ardour. Accustomed, moreover, to 
 find in his genius inexhaustible resources for 
 conquering men and the elements, he was far 
 from sharing in the discouragement of Admiral 
 Decres. He discovered in the future new and as 
 yet untried resources against the English. In 
 the first place, all the inlets had not till then 
 been closed against British commerce. By 
 Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Hanseatic 
 towns, by Portugal, which was hostile, by Spain, 
 which was negligently watched, by Austria, 
 which it had been necessary to treat with more 
 delicacy, many doors had been left at least 
 ajar; and English commodities, being sold 
 cheap, (which they might well be at that period, ) 
 had found means to penetrate to the Continent. 
 Now, on the contrary, every avenue was to be 
 
 [July, 1807. 
 
 closed, and an immense injury was preparing 
 for the manufactures of England. Napoleon, 
 moreover, was about to be at liberty to increase 
 his naval force, either with the resources of the 
 French budget, daily becoming more wealthy, 
 or with the produce of conquest, or with the 
 timber and the hands of the whole coast of 
 Europe. His numerous armies being, besides, 
 disposable, he had conceived a vast system, the 
 successive development of which we shall see 
 hereafter, and which would have so multiplied the 
 chances of a great expedition directed against 
 London, Ireland, or India, that this expedition, 
 once eluding the vigilance of the Admiralty, 
 might perhaps have at last succeeded, or that 
 British obstinacy might in the end have yielded 
 to the threat of an ever imminent danger. 
 Napoleon, in fact, was not much in favour of 
 great naval battles, which, for the rest, he had 
 accepted on certain occasions, merely to avoid 
 recoiling in too manifest a manner from the 
 enemy. Neither was he more in favour of cruises, 
 which the want of safe and well-stored places 
 of resort rendered too perilous. But his de- 
 sign was, uniting the Russian, Dutch, French, 
 Spanish, Italian navies having armed fleets 
 at the Texel, Flushing, Boulogne, Brest, Lori- 
 ent, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, Tarento, 
 and Venice keeping numerous camps full of 
 invincible troops near these fleets his design 
 was to oblige England to maintain before those 
 ports naval forces inadequate to blockade all, 
 and starting unawares from one that might be 
 ill watched, to transport an army either to 
 Egypt, to India, or even to London, and, while 
 waiting for the realization of this chance, to 
 exhaust the English nation of men, timber, 
 money, perseverance, and courage. We shall 
 see, in fact, that, if he had not exhausted him- 
 self in a thousand enterprises foreign to this 
 great object, if he had not wearied out the 
 good-will or the patience of his allies, certainly 
 the means were so vast, so well conceived, that 
 they would in the end have triumphed over 
 England. 
 
 But before arriving at this immense develop- 
 ment, which two or three years would have 
 sufficed for attaining, Napoleon began by issu- 
 ing orders for redoubled activity in the build- 
 ing of ships throughout the empire, and then 
 by trying in the Mediterranean that system of 
 expeditions ever ready and ever threatening, 
 by making an attempt on Sicily, in order to 
 add that island to the kingdom of Naples, al- 
 ready given to his brother Joseph. 
 
 Informing his brother Louis that the Dutch 
 army was about to return, and thenceforward 
 to absorb a smaller portion of his resources, 
 he enjoined him to put the Texel fleet into good 
 condition and to collect there at least nine ships 
 of the line fully equipped. At Antwerp and 
 Flushing he had already obtained astonishing 
 results. Five ships, some of eighty, the others 
 of seventy-four guns, built at Antwerp, had 
 descended without accident to Flushing, crossed 
 the shoals of the Scheldt, and were equipping 
 in the latter port. Three others, nearly 
 finished, on the stocks at Antwerp, would in- 
 crease the Scheldt squadron to eight. Dutch, 
 Flemish, Picard sailors 'were collected from all 
 the coasts to man them. Napoleon ordered the 
 three ships finished to be launched, and fresh 
 keels to be laid down upon the stocks which
 
 Aug. 1807.J 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 847 
 
 had become vacant, and the number of those 
 stocks to be increased ; for it was his intention 
 that Antwerp should become the port for build- 
 ing, not only for Flushing but for Brest, on ac- 
 count of the timber of Germany and the North, 
 floated down by the rivers into the whole of the 
 Netherlands. He purposed to reserve the tim- 
 ber at Brest for the repair of the squadrons 
 which were always equipping at that great 
 port. He promised himself, on his return to 
 Paris, to review the old Boulogne flotilla and 
 to organize it upon a different plan. He urged 
 the building of frigates at Dunkirk, Havre, 
 Cherbourg, and St. Malo. At Brest, where, 
 ever since the squadron of Willaumez sailed, 
 there had remained twelve ships armed, five of 
 which were bad and seven good, Napoleon or- 
 dered the five bad to be put out of service, and 
 the seven good to be equipped in the best pos- 
 sible manner, reserving the sailors who had be- 
 come disposable for the new ships which were 
 preparing to be built. He directed that a ship, 
 the building of which was just finished, should 
 be added at Lorient to a division of two ships 
 already there. He consented that the Veteran, 
 which had taken refuge at Concarneau, and 
 was obstinately blockaded by the English, 
 should be disarmed and the crew conveyed to 
 Lorient to man a ship lately built. We had at 
 Rochefort a fine division of five ships, equally 
 well equipped and commanded. The com- 
 mander was one of those men whom the sailors 
 in their familiar language, call sea-wolves, the 
 brave Admiral Allemand, deprived of his fri- 
 gates by the disaster of Captain Soleil, but im- 
 patient nevertheless to sail, and always stopped 
 by an English squadron, which, for eight or ten 
 months, had not lost sight of the Isle of Aix. 
 Napoleon gave orders for launching a ship that 
 was finished, for refitting another that might 
 be rendered serviceable, and for increasing 
 this division to seven. Wherever ships were 
 launched, he had other keels laid immediately 
 upon the stocks. His financial resources, old 
 and new, enabled him, as we shall presently 
 see, to make these immense efforts. At Cadiz 
 he had an excellent division of five ships, relics 
 of Trafalgar, well organized, well manned, and 
 commanded by Admiral Rosily. Napoleon 
 would have wished to add to them some Spa- 
 nish ships ; but when he cast his eyes upon the 
 Peninsula, he could not suppress a mingled 
 feeling of pity, anger, and indignation, when 
 thinking that, at Ferrol and Cadiz, Spain was 
 $ot able to equip one division ; that, at Cartha- 
 gena alone, she had six ships, which had been 
 equipped several years before, the hulls of 
 which were in a filthy state from lying in the 
 port, with rigging hanging loose, and provi- 
 sions insufficient for the shortest campaign ; for 
 the crews had consumed those on board, hav- 
 ing none on shore. He said to himself that he 
 must come to the point and insist that Spain, 
 for her own sake, for the sake of her allies, 
 Bhould govern herself differently ; and mean- 
 while he addressed almost threatening repre- 
 sentations to the cabinet of Madrid, to induce 
 it to attach a few ships to those of Admiral Ro- 
 sily, and recommended to the latter to hold 
 himself in readiness to weigh anchor at the 
 first signal. At Toulon there were three ships, 
 two belonging to Toulon and one to Genoa. In 
 conjunction with several frigates, they made 
 
 ! some successful sorties. Napoleon desired that 
 ; the Commerce de la Ville de Paris and the Ro- 
 | buste should be launched at Toulon, and the 
 j Breslau at Genoa, that they should be equipped 
 ! by dismantling either bad or inferior ships; 
 that fresh ships should be laid down on the 
 stocks where they were built, and that there 
 should be six ships ready in that port. He 
 sent engineers to Spezzia, to examine that po- 
 sition, which the continual study of the map 
 had revealed to him. He enjoined his brother 
 Joseph, after obtaining information concerning 
 the ports of Naples and Castellamare, to com- 
 mence there the building of two ships, and to 
 proceed soon to the building of four. Recol- 
 lecting that a French ship had found an asylum 
 at Ancona, he thought that he might make use 
 of that port, and ordered two ships to be built 
 there, for the purpose of employing the timber 
 and the workmen of the Roman State, caring 
 but little about the temporal sovereignty of the 
 Pope, whom he already treated as though it no 
 longer existed. Lastly, at Venice there were 
 five ships building. He ordered three more to 
 be put upon the stocks on account of the Trea- 
 sury of Italy and two on account of the Trea- 
 sury of France, and directed canals to be cut, 
 for taking the resuscited navy of Venice from 
 their arsenal to the Adriatic Sea. The same 
 Italian provinces which were to furnish the 
 timber and the workmen for these operations, 
 were also to furnish sailors, always very plen- 
 tiful on their coasts. With these numerous 
 new ships, with sailors to be found on the coasts 
 of Europe, with an addition of young French 
 soldiers and officers, the number of whom Na- 
 poleon never had difficulty to augment, he 
 might hope to double or treble the naval forces 
 of the empire before a year had elapsed. These 
 ships, insufficient at first to match English ships, 
 would be sufficient in a short time to carry 
 troops, and would be so immediately to neces- 
 sitate fresh blockades and to doom England to 
 ruinous expenses. 
 
 While these immense armaments were in pre- 
 paration, Napoleon intended forthwith to send 
 succours to the colonies, and to assemble by the 
 same operation forty sail in the Mediterranean. 
 For this purpose he directed that the divisions 
 of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort should take on 
 board 3100 men, and a great quantity of stores ; 
 that they should land 1200 at Martinique, 600 
 at Guadaloupe, 500 at St. Domingo, 300 at 
 Cayenne, 100 at Senegal, and 400 at the Isle 
 of France, and on their return to Europe, pro- 
 ceed through the Straits of Gibraltar to Toulon. 
 The junction at Toulon of seven ships from 
 Brest, three from Lorient, seven from Roche- 
 fort, six from Cadiz, and six from Toulon, 
 would compose, with frigates, a total of forty 
 sail, twenty-nine of them of the line, a force 
 superior to any that the English, even if timely 
 apprized, could bring into that sea under two 
 or three months, and capable of throwing fif- 
 teen or eighteen thousand men into Sicily, and 
 as many as one pleased into the Ionian Islands. 
 Admiral Decres, who applied himself with 
 honourable courage to oppose Napoleon's pro- 
 jects when the magnitude of them was not pro- 
 portionate to the means, did not fail to impugn 
 this scheme of junctions preceded by a voyaga 
 to the West Indies. He thought that to make 
 the revictualling of the colonies dependent on
 
 848 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 the success of two or three great expeditions j 
 was an imprudent thing ; for these great expe- 
 ditions of several ships of the line and frigates, 
 to carry a few hundred men to the colonies, 
 incurred dangers which were not in proportion 
 to the importance of the object; that it would 
 be better to despatch single frigates, each car- 
 rying a certain quantity of stores and two or 
 three hundred men ; that if we lost one, the 
 loss was inconsiderable ; so the others arrived, 
 the colonies would be always sure of receiving 
 a portion of the succours which were destined 
 for them. As for junctions in the Mediterra- 
 nean, he maintained that the divisions ordered 
 to pass through the Straits, in spite of the Eng- 
 lish squadron at Gibraltar, would have to run 
 immense risks ; that, to escape them, they 
 ought to be left at liberty to take advantage 
 of the first favourable gale ; that, therefore, no 
 other instruction ought to be given them but 
 to pass the Straits, leaving them to seize the 
 first favourable circumstance, without compli- 
 cating their mission by a voyage to the West 
 Indies and a return to Europe. Lastly, he 
 thought that it would be sufficient to send into 
 the Mediterranean the Cadiz division placed so 
 near to the goal, and perhaps that of Roche- 
 fort; but that we ought not to deprive our- 
 selves of all the forces we had in the ocean, 
 by despatching the Lorient and the Brest divi- 
 signs also to Toulon. 
 
 Napoleon, who suffered his ideas to be modi- 
 fied by experienced men, when those men fur- 
 nished him with good reasons, received favour- 
 ably the observations of M. Decres. In con- 
 sequence, he decided that, from the ports of 
 Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, Nantes, Roche- 
 fort, Bordeaux, in which there were many fri- 
 gates, single vessels should sail for the colo- 
 nies ; that the naval divisions ordered to pro- 
 ceed to the Mediterranean should have that 
 sole direction ; and, as for the number, he pro- 
 posed to call two at least to Toulon, that of 
 Rochefort and that of Cadiz, which would form, 
 with the Toulon division, a squadron of seven- 
 teen or eighteen sail of the line, besides seven 
 or eight frigates, a force sufficient to make him 
 absolute master of the Mediterranean, and to 
 execute there all that he meditated relative to 
 Sardinia, Sicily, and the Ionian Islands. In 
 consequence, Admiral Allemand at Rochefort, 
 Admiral Rosily at Cadiz, had orders to seize 
 the first propitious occasion for weighing an- 
 chor, passing the Straits, making any manoeu- 
 vre which their experience and the circum- 
 stances of the sea should suggest. The court 
 of Spain was required to equip a few ships at 
 Cadiz, and to issue immediate orders that the 
 Carthagena division, commanded by Admiral 
 Salcedo, should be supplied with the provisions 
 necessary for a short expedition, and despatch- 
 ed to Toulon. 
 
 Such were the measures ordered by Napo- 
 leon in execution of the treaty of Tilsit, to 
 intimidate England by an immense concurrence 
 of means, to dispose her to peace, and if she 
 were bent upon war, to force Sweden, Denmark, 
 Prussia, Portugal, Austria, to close their ports 
 against the productions of Manchester and Bir- 
 mingham, to prepare, with the junction of all 
 the naval forces of the continent, expeditions, 
 he ever threatening possibility of which would 
 ooner or later weary out the perseverance or 
 
 exhaust the finances of the English nation, 
 without taking into account that the success of 
 a single one would be sufficient to strike Ler to 
 the heart. But the attention of Napoleon waa 
 not wholly engrossed by foreign affairs. He 
 was anxious at length to direct it to the admin- 
 istration, the finances, public works, legisla- 
 tion, to every thing that could conduce to the 
 internal prosperity of France, which he had as 
 much at heart as his glory. 
 
 Before he turned it to those points, he was 
 obliged to make some indispensable changes 
 in the high civil and military offices. M. de 
 Talleyrand was the principal, if not the sole, 
 cause of these changes. That able represen- 
 tative of Napoleon to all Europe, who was in- 
 dolent, addicted to pleasure, never in haste to 
 act or to bestir himself, and whose physical 
 infirmities increased his fondness for indul- 
 gence, had been severely tried by the cam- 
 paigns of Prussia and Poland. To live in the 
 cold climate of those distant regions, to scam- 
 per over the snow after an indefatigable con- 
 queror, through bands of Cossacks, to sleep 
 most frequently under thatch, and, when fa- 
 voured by the fortune of war, to live in a 
 wooden house, decorated with the title of the 
 castle of Finkenstein, harmonized no better 
 with his taste than with his energy. He was 
 tired, therefore, of the ministry for foreign 
 affairs, and wished to resign, not the direction 
 of those affairs, which were his favourite occu- 
 pation, but to direct them under a different 
 title from that of minister. His pride had 
 been much hurt at his not becoming grand dig- 
 nitary like M. de Cambace"res and M. Lebrun ; 
 and the principality of Benevento, which had 
 been conferred on him in compensation, had 
 only postponed, not satisfied, his longing. An 
 occasion offered for increasing the number of 
 the grand dignitaries ; this was the indefinite 
 number of the princes of the imperial family, 
 who were at the same time grand dignitaries 
 and foreign sovereigns. There were three in 
 this predicament: Louis Bonaparte, w,ho was 
 King of Holland and constable ; Eugene de 
 Beauharnais, who was Viceroy of Italy and 
 arch-chancellor of state ; Joseph, who was 
 King of Naples and grand elector. M. de Tal- 
 leyrand had insinuated to the Emperor that 
 they ought to have deputies appointed, with 
 the titles of vice-constable, vice-grand elector, 
 vice-chancellor of state, and that if, indeed, 
 their by no means active functions scarcely 
 required a double titulary, still the high offices 
 destined to reward signal services could not be 
 multiplied too much. M. de Talleyrand would 
 have wished to become vice-grand elector, and 
 leaving to a minister for foreign affairs the vul- 
 gar duty of opening and sending off despatches, 
 continue- himself to direct the principal nego- 
 tiations. While with the army, he had not 
 neglected any opportunity of talking to the 
 Emperor on this subject, never ceasing to extol 
 the advantages of these new creations, and al- 
 leging, in regard to himself in particular, his 
 age, his infirmities, his fatigues, and his need 
 of rest. By dint of perseverance, he had ob- 
 tained a sort of promise, which Napoleon per- 
 mitted to be wrung from him against his will ; 
 for he never intended that the grand dignita- 
 ries should perform any active functions, see- 
 ing that, partaking in some measure in the in-
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 849 
 
 violability of the sovereign, they were not ex- ] 
 pected to be responsible. On the contrary, 
 Napoleon held it to be essential that he should 
 possess the power of removing persons invested 
 with active functions, and he especially disliked 
 to place in a position of demi-inviolability a 
 personage whom he distrusted, and whom he 
 deemed it prudent to keep constantly under his 
 all-powerful hand. 
 
 As soon as he had returned to Paris, at the 
 moment when every one came to receive the 
 reward for his serrices during the late war, 
 M. de Talleyrand went to St. Cloud to remind 
 Napoleon of his promises. The Arch-chan- 
 cellor Cambace'res was present. Napoleon be- 
 trayed a strong feeling of displeasure. "I 
 cannot comprehend," said he, sharply, to M. de 
 Talleyrand, "your impatience to become a 
 grand dignitary, and to quit a post in which 
 you have acquired importance, and from which 
 I am aware you have reaped great advantages," 
 (alluding to the contributions said to have been 
 levied from the German princes, at the time of 
 the secularizations.) "You ought to know 
 that I will not suffer any one to be at the same 
 time grand dignitary and minister ; that the 
 foreign affairs cannot then be reserved for you, 
 and thus you will lose an eminent post, for 
 which you are qualified, to gain a title which 
 will be no more than a satisfaction granted to 
 your vanity." 
 
 "I am worn out," replied M. de Talleyrand, 
 with apparent phlegm, and with the indiffer- 
 ence of a man who had not understood the 
 Emperor's cutting allusions, "I have need of 
 rest." 
 
 "Be it so," rejoined Napoleon, "you shall 
 be grand dignitary; but not you alone." Then 
 addressing Prince Cambace'res, "Berthier," 
 said he, "has rendered me as much service as 
 any person whatever; it would be unjust not 
 to make him grand dignitary, too. Draw up 
 a decree by which M. de Talleyrand shall be 
 raised to the dignity of vice grand-elector, Ber- 
 thier to that of vice-constable, and bring it to 
 me to sign." M. de Talleyrand retired, and 
 the Emperor expressed more at length to Prince 
 Cambace'res all the dissatisfaction that he felt. 
 It was in this manner that M. de Talleyrand 
 quitted the ministry for foreign affairs, and, 
 with great prejudice to himself and to public 
 business, withdrew from the person of the Em- 
 peror. 
 
 The decree was signed on the 14th of Au- 
 gust, 1807. It was necessary to appoint suc- 
 cessors to Prince de Talleyrand and Prince 
 Berthier ; the one as minister of foreign affairs, 
 the other as minister of war. Napoleon had 
 at hand M. de Champagny, minister of the 
 interior, a mild, honest, industrious man, ini- 
 tiated by his embassy at Vienna in the ways, 
 but not in the secrets, of diplomacy, and unfor- 
 tunately not capable of withstanding Napoleon, 
 whom, it is true, nobody would then have been 
 capable of restraining, such was the overpower- 
 ing influence of success and circumstances. 
 M. de Champagny was therefore appointed 
 minister for foreign affairs, and succeeded in 
 the ministry of the interior by M. Cr6tet, a 
 well-informed and laborious member of the 
 Council of State, and at the moment Governor 
 of the Bank of France. He was preferred to 
 Count Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, whose 
 
 double talent of writing and speaking seemed 
 to render him indispensably necessary in the 
 Council of State and in the Legislative Bodv, 
 and whose character appeared unsuitable to 
 the post of minister of the interior. M. Jau- 
 bert, another member of the Council of State, 
 succeeded M. Cr^tet, as Governor of the Bank. 
 
 Napoleon, in raising Prince Berthier to the 
 dignity of vice-constable, had no intention to 
 deprive himself of his services as major-gene- 
 ral of the grand army, a post in which none 
 could equal him, and in which he therefor* 
 continued him. But he selected for his suc- 
 cessor as minister of war, General Clarke, 
 whose administrative talents he had recently 
 put to the test, in the post of Governor of Berlin 
 talents more specious than solid but who, 
 assuming the appearance of anxious docility 
 and close application to business, had misled 
 Napoleon. There was, however, sufficient 
 ground for this choice, for the military men fit 
 for active war were all employed ; and among 
 those who were better suited to the cabinet 
 than to the field of battle, General Clarke ap- 
 peared to be the one who had most of the spirit 
 of order, and of that comprehension of details 
 which administrative matters require. M. 
 Dejean continued in the post of minister of the 
 materiel of war. General Hullin, whose attach- 
 ment and personal courage Napoleon had had 
 more than one occasion to appreciate, suc- 
 ceeded to the command of Paris, in place of 
 Junot, appointed to head the army of Portugal. 
 
 About this time France sustained a serious 
 loss in the person of the minister of public 
 worship, (ministre des cultes,) Count de Portalis, 
 a learned lawyer, an ingenious and brilliant 
 writer, an able co-operator in the two most 
 meritorious works of Napoleon, the Civil Code 
 and the Concordat, having in his relations with 
 the clergy had the skill to preserve a due 
 medium between weakness and rigour, esteemed 
 by the French Church, and exercising a useful 
 influence over it and over Napoleon : a person 
 age, in short, much to be regretted at a mo- 
 ment when we were on the point of an open 
 rupture with the court of Rome, and as much 
 to be regretted in the administration of the 
 cultes, as Talleyrand in the direction of the 
 foreign affairs. That laborious man, struck 
 with a sort of blindness, had had the art to 
 supply the want of the sense of which he was 
 deprived by a prodigious memory ; and it once 
 happened that, being summoned to write from 
 Napoleon's dictation, he reproduced from 
 memory his ideas, with their vivid expression, 
 which he had made believe to take down in 
 writing. M. de Portalis had become dear to 
 Napoleon, by whom he was deeply regretted. 
 His successor, as ministre des cultes, was another 
 lawyer another author of the Civil Code, .M. 
 Bigot de Pre"amcneu, a man of no very brilliant 
 understanding, but discreet, and religious with- 
 out weakness. 
 
 It was requisite to compensate M. Regnault 
 de Saint-Jean-d' Angel}', who had approached 
 the ministry of the interior without arriving at 
 it. M. Regnault was one of the members of 
 the Council of State most employed by Napo- 
 leon, on account of his intimate acquaintance 
 with matters of business, and his facility of 
 expounding them in perspicuous and eloquent # 
 reports. As there was then no other disputw 
 2 G
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807 
 
 tion, but that of a councillor of State discuss- 
 i).g a subject in opposition to a member of the 
 Tribunate, before the mute Legislative Body, 
 and adducing reasons agreed upon against 
 arguments likewise agreed upon, nothing more 
 was wanted for these contests, arranged before- 
 hand in preparatory conferences, and resem- 
 bling those of free assemblies as much as the 
 manoeuvres of a review resemble war, than 
 fluency, variety, and brilliancy. Only it was 
 lequisite that this talent should be ready and 
 indefatigable, under a master, prompt in con- 
 ceiving and in executing, desiring, when he 
 turned his attention to a subject, to go through 
 with it at the moment that it suggested itself, 
 in order to proceed immediately to another. 
 M. Regnault was the first of orators for such a 
 part; and it may be said that all the eloquence 
 of the time was his alone. Napoleon, appre- 
 ciating his services, resolved to compensate 
 him with the title of minister of State, a title 
 without definition, which gave the rank of 
 minister without conferring the power, and 
 with a place at court, to which was attached a 
 very handsome salary ; that of Secretary of 
 State to the imperial family. M. Defermon, 
 for his services in the section of the finances, 
 M. Lacue'e, for those which he rendered in the 
 direction of the conscription, obtained also the 
 quality of ministers of State. 
 
 These appointments being decided upon with 
 the arch-chancellor, the only person whom he 
 consulted on such occasions, Napoleon bestow- 
 ed on legislation, the internal administration, 
 the finances, and the public works, an attention 
 which he had never refused them during the 
 war, but which, given at a distance, hastily, 
 amid the pealing of cannon, was sufficient for 
 superintending, not for creating. 
 
 The first point to which Napoleon turned his 
 thoughts was the introduction into the imperial 
 constitution of a modification which* appeared 
 necessary to him, though in itself of very little 
 importance that was, the suppression of the 
 Tribunate. This body had ceased to be any 
 more than a mere shadow, since it had been 
 reduced to the number of fifty members, de- 
 prived of tribune, divided into three sections, 
 those of legislation, internal administration, 
 and finances. It discussed with the correspond- 
 ing sections of the Council of State, in particu- 
 lar conferences, the projets de lois which were to 
 be proposed by the government. We have ex- 
 plained elsewhere how this business was ma- 
 naged. The lapse of time had made no change 
 in the proceedings; all that it had brought 
 with it was a little more calmness and silence. 
 After conferences held at the arch-chancellor's, 
 a member of the Tribunate and a member of 
 the Council of State went each of them to de- 
 liver a speech before the Legislative Body, 
 either in a contrary sense, or in the same sense, 
 according as there had been agreement or di- 
 vergence. The Legislative Body then voted, 
 without speaking a word, and by an immense 
 majority, theprofets (bills) presented, excepting 
 in some very rare cases, which concerned ma- 
 terial interests, the only interests on which 
 members ventured to differ in opinion from the 
 government ; also excepting in some still more 
 rare cases, in which the propositions in ques- 
 tion wounded the sentiments of men attached 
 to the revolution, sentiments dormant, not ex- 
 
 tinguished, in their hearts. At such times, 
 minorities of forty or fifty voices proved that 
 liberty was deferred, not destroyed, in France. 
 Thus internal affairs were carried on silently 
 and speedily, with the general approbation, 
 founded on the persuasion that these affairs 
 were perfectly conducted, the Emperor having 
 most frequently devised, the Council of State 
 thoroughly examined, the Tribunate contra- 
 dicted in their speech, the measures adopted. 
 As for foreign affairs, which it would then have 
 been high time to discuss boldly, in order to 
 stop him whom the impetuosity of his genius 
 was soon to plunge into an abyss, they were re- 
 served exclusively for the Emperor and the 
 Senate, in very unequal proportions, as may 
 well be imagined. Napoleon decided at will 
 upon peace and war, in a manner more abso- 
 lute than the emperors of ancient Rome, the 
 sultans of Constantinople, or the czars of 
 Russia ; for he had neither praetorians nor 
 janissaries, neither Strelitzes, nor Ulenias, nor 
 aristocracy. He had but soldiers, equally sub- 
 missive and heroic, but a salaried clergy, ex- 
 cluded from public affairs, but an aristocracy 
 which he created, with titles begotten by his 
 imagination, and with a fortune derived from 
 his vast conquests. From time to time he com- 
 municated in confidence to the Senate diplo- 
 matic negotiations, when they had terminated 
 in war. The Senate, which, since 180o, had, 
 in the absence of the Legislative Body, received 
 the attribution of voting levies of men, paid 
 for those confidences with two or three con- 
 scriptions, which the Emperor paid for in his 
 turn with magnificent bulletins, with blackened 
 and tattered colours, with treaties of peace, 
 unfortunately too far from durable ; and the 
 country, dazzled with all this glory, delighted 
 with its tranquillity, finding internal affairs 
 conducted with superior ability, the external 
 affairs raised to an unparalleled height, wished 
 that this state of things might last for a long 
 time to come ; and now and then only, on see- 
 ing the French army wintering on the Vistula, 
 and battles fought near the Niemen, began to 
 fear that all this greatness might find an end 
 in its very excess. 
 
 A slight agitation was manifested in this go- 
 vernment only when one-fifth of the Legislative 
 Body was to go out. Then some intrigues were 
 formed about the Senate, which was required 
 to choose the members of the deliberative bodies 
 from the lists presented by electoral colleges 
 formed for life. Applications to the principal 
 senators were resorted to, and men solicited a 
 seat in the Legislative Body, mute, but having 
 a salary attached to it, as they would solicit a 
 place in the finances. The arch-chancellor 
 Cambace"res superintended the elections, in 
 order to admit none but adherents ; and for 
 this very little picking and choosing was re- 
 quired. The worst that could happen was, 
 that at the end of each list there might slip 
 in a few creatures of the opposition in the Se- 
 nate, timid and not numerous adversaries, whom 
 Sieyes had deserted and forgotten, who repaid 
 by forgetting him in their turn, and who found 
 fault with Napoleon, not foi the rash enter- 
 prises which were to bring ruin upon France, 
 but for the Concordat, for the Civil Code, and 
 for many other equally excellent creations. 
 
 Such were the forms of that heroic despotism
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 351 
 
 which sprang from the Revolution. It was of 
 little consequence to change them, for the 
 ground-work must have remained the same. 
 Certain details might no doubt have been rec- 
 tified in the organization of those dependent 
 and submissive bodies. This might have been 
 done, and Napoleon had so designed in regard 
 to the Tribunate. The Tribunate, confined to 
 criticism on words in the private conferences, 
 annoying to the Council of State, to which it 
 was nothing but the obscure rival, had a false 
 position, a position unworthy of its title. The 
 Legislative Body, though not desiring more im- 
 portance than it had, and by no means disposed 
 to use the liberty of speaking, in case that were 
 restored to it, was sometimes confused at its 
 mute condition, which exposed it to ridicule. 
 There was one very simple thing to be done, 
 and which could scarcely have been prejudicial 
 to the liberty of the time this was to unite 
 the Tribunate to the Legislative Body, by blend- 
 ing together attributions and persons. This 
 Napoleon, after conferring with the arch-chan- 
 cellor, resolved to do. In consequence, he de- 
 cided that the Tribunate should be suppressed, 
 that its attributions should be transferred to the 
 Legislative Body, thus put again in possession 
 of the liberty of speech ; that, at the opening 
 of every session, there should be formed in the 
 bosom of the Legislative Body, and by ballot, 
 three commissions, of seven members each, des- 
 tined, like the suppressed commissions of the 
 Tribunate, to attend, the first to legislation, the 
 second to internal administration, the third to 
 finances ; that these sections' should continue 
 to discuss with the corresponding sections of 
 the Council of State, and in private conferences, 
 the projets de lois submitted by the government ; 
 that when they should find themselves agreed 
 with the Council of State, a member of that 
 Council should come and explain from the tri- 
 bune of the Legislative Body the motives which 
 the government had had for proposing the pro- 
 jet in question ; and that the president of the 
 commission should give, on his part, the mo- 
 tives which it had for approving it ; but that, 
 in case of disapproval, all the members of the 
 commission should be admitted to produce pub- 
 licly the reasons on which their opposition was 
 founded ; and that, lastly, the Legislative Body 
 should continue to vote, without any other de- 
 bate, on the measures submitted to its appro- 
 bation. It was further determined that, to 
 avoid changing the present state of things in 
 the session that was about to open, and all the 
 business of which was already prepared, the 
 tenatus-consulte, containing the new arrange- 
 ments, should not be promulgated till the day 
 on which that session should close. 
 
 In fact, the Legislative Body, recovering the 
 faculty of speech, since twenty-one of its mem- 
 bers, elected annually by ballot, were called to 
 the discussion of the matters under considera- 
 tion, the suppression of the Tribunate merely 
 put out of sight a body which had long been de- 
 prived of life. The Legislative Body was sen- 
 sible of this restitution of speech, not that it 
 was ready to make use of it, but because it 
 would relieve it from a ridicule which had be- 
 come annoying. At any rate, there was one 
 word suppressed, a word which had had some 
 importance : it was that of Tribunate. This was 
 enough to displease certain constant friends of 
 
 the Revolution, and to please Napoleon ; who 
 was not afraid, in order to get rid of a word 
 which the recollections of 1802 rendered dis- 
 agreeable, to restore to the Legislative Body 
 prerogatives of some value. It is true that a 
 precaution was taken against these new pre- 
 rogatives, namely, to fix at forty years the age 
 at which a member could sit in the Legislative 
 Body a paltry precaution, which would not 
 have prevented an assembly from being enter- 
 prising, if the spirit of liberty could have then 
 awakened, and which caused the political edu- 
 cation of public men to begin too late. 
 
 After getting rid of this troublesome shadow 
 of the Tribunate, it still remained to be con- 
 sidered what was to become of the persons, 
 whom Napoleon, from natural kindliness of dis- 
 position, as much as from policy, never liked to 
 ruffle. He therefore resolved that the members 
 of the Tribunate should go with their preroga- 
 tives and seek an asylum in the bosom of the 
 Legislative Body, where they were to find a 
 title and appointments. Still Napoleon was 
 unwilling to render the Legislative Body, then 
 limited to 300 members, too numerous by pour- 
 ing into it the whole Tribunate. He therefore 
 opened this asylum to the most obscure mem- 
 bers only of the body. As for those who had 
 displayed intelligence and application to busi- 
 ness, he destined them for high employments. 
 He first placed in the Senate M. Fabre de 
 1'Aude, who had presided over the Tribunate 
 with distinction, and M. Cure"e, who had com- 
 menced his career by the manifestation of an 
 ardent republicanism, but who had finished it 
 with a motion for restoring monarchy by insti- 
 tuting the Empire. As for the other members 
 of the Tribunate distinguished by their merit, 
 Napoleon ordered the ministers of the interior 
 and of justice to propose them to him for the 
 vacant places of prefects, first presidents, and 
 procureurs-ffenerauz. Lastly, he reserved some 
 others to make them figure in a new magistracy, 
 which was to be the complement of our financial 
 institutions the Court of Accounts, the crea- 
 tion of which we shall presently relate. 
 
 There was another measure which Napoleon 
 was not less impatient to take, and which he 
 considered as much more urgent than the sup- 
 pression of the Tribunate: this was the puri- 
 fication of the magistracy. The government 
 of the Consulate, at the moment of its instal- 
 lation, had brought an excellent spirit into its 
 selections ; but, in haste to establish itself, it 
 had chosen in haste the members of all the 
 administrations, and, if it had erred less than 
 the governments which preceded it, still it had 
 erred too much not to be obliged to reform 
 some of its first nominations. In all the classes 
 of functions it had amended several of them, 
 and these changes of persons had been the 
 more approvable and approved, since it was 
 never political influence that dictated them, 
 but the knowledge acquired of the merit of 
 each. In the magistracy nothing of the kind 
 could be effected, on account of the irremov- 
 ability established by the constitution of M 
 Sieyes ; and certain selections made in the 
 year VIII., in ignorance of the individuals, in 
 the hurry of a reorganization, had become in. 
 time a permanent scandal. Therhad, indeed,, 
 been attributed to the Court of Cassation a dis ' 
 ciplinary jurisdiction over the magistracy; bat
 
 352 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 this jurisdiction, sufficient in ordinary times, 
 was not so in regard to an establishment of 
 magistrates nominated in mass, on the eve of 
 an immense convulsion, and among whom 
 wretches, unworthy of the rank which they 
 occupied, had slipped in. While decency and 
 application prevailed amongst all the agents 
 of the government placed under an active 
 superintendence, the magistracy alone some- 
 times set pernicious examples. Against such 
 it was requisite to provide ; and Napoleon, who 
 deemed himself called in 1807 to lend a finish- 
 ing hand to the reorganization of France, had 
 decided to put a stop to such disorder, lie 
 had asked the opinion of the arch-chancellor, 
 supreme judge on the like matters. That 
 mind, equally fertile and wise, had found on 
 this occasion, as on many others, an ingenious 
 expedient, founded, moreover, on solid reasons. 
 The constitution of the year VIII. , though it 
 declared the members of the judicial order 
 irremovable, nevertheless subjected them to 
 a condition common to all the members of the 
 government, namely, that they should appear 
 in the lists of eligible persons. It had not, 
 therefore, insured to them the perpetuity of 
 their offices, excepting conditionally, and when 
 they should deserve all their life the public 
 esteem. This precaution having been done 
 away, along with the lists of eligible persons, 
 since abolished, we must supply its place, said 
 Prince Cambace'res ; and he proposed two mea- 
 sures, the one permanent, the other temporary. 
 The first consisted in not considering the nomi- 
 nations in the magistracy as definitive and 
 conferring irremovability till after the expi- 
 ration of five years, and according to the ex- 
 perience had of the morality and the capacity 
 of the magistrates chosen. The second con- 
 sisted in forming a commission of ten mem- 
 bers, and charging this commission to review 
 the whole of the magistracy, and to point out 
 such of its members as had proved themselves 
 unworthy to administer justice. This ingenious 
 and cheering combination was adopted by Na- 
 poleon, and converted into a senatus-consulte, 
 which was to be laid before the Senate. At 
 any other time, this measure would have been 
 considered as a violation of the Constitution. 
 At this period, succeeding immense convul- 
 sions, in presence of an acknowledged neces- 
 sity, and with the intervention of a body whose 
 elevation ensured impartiality, it appeared no 
 more than what it really was, a reparative and 
 necessary act. This purification, soon carried 
 into effect with justice and discretion, was 
 more approved in its execution than in its 
 principle. 
 
 While engaged upon these constitutional and 
 administrative measures, Napoleon directed his 
 attention to- the finances also. There was no 
 department of the administration with which 
 he had reason to be so well satisfied as with 
 this; for abundance prevailed at the Treasury, 
 and order was completely re-established there. 
 "We have seen the budget, fixed at first at 500 
 millions in 1802, soon swelling by the definitive 
 liquidation of the public debt, by the develop- 
 ment given to public works of general utility, 
 by the successive re-establishment of the ser- 
 vices of the Church in the smallest communes 
 in France, by the creation of a vast system of 
 iustruction, by the extension of ship-building; 
 
 lastly, by the institution of monarchy and the 
 creation of a civil list, to about COO millions, 
 and on the breaking out of the war to 700 mil- 
 lions (820, including the expenses of collection.) 
 In 1806, Napoleon, on his return from Prussia, 
 had declared to the Legislative Body, with the 
 intention that Europe should be apprized of it, 
 that 600 millions were sufficient for peace, 700 
 millions for war, and that, without recurring 
 to loans, a system to which at that time France 
 had an antipathy, he should obtain that sum 
 by the re-establishment of the natural collec- 
 tions, which the French Revolution had abolish- 
 ed, instead of confining itself to the reform 
 of them. In consequence, he had re-established, 
 under the name of droits reunis, the taxes upon 
 liquors, and, instead of the tolls at the barriers, 
 a tax upon salt. These imposts soon justified 
 his foresight and firmness ; for the droits reunis, 
 after producing 20 millions in the first year, 
 yielded 48 in the year 1806, and promised 76 
 in the year 1807. The salt-tax, which had 
 produced frrm six to seven millions in 1806, 
 brought in i\) millions in 1807, and encouraged 
 a hope of much more in the following years. 
 The old taxes had likewise shown considerable 
 improvement. The registration had increased, 
 from 160 millions to 180 ; the customs from 40 
 millions in 1806 to 66 in 1807 ; for if maritime 
 commerce was prohibited, the commerce with 
 the Continent was prodigiously increasing. 
 
 Hence the ordinary revenues, which Napoleon 
 in 1806 had estimated at 700 millions, rose 
 far higher in 1807, and might be computed ap- 
 proximatively at 740 millions, made up in the 
 following manner : 315 millions arising from the 
 direct contributions (tax on land, buildings, 
 doors and windows, rent, &c. ;) 180 from re- 
 gistration, (duty on stamps, legacies, changes 
 of property, with the addition of the produce 
 of the forests ;) 80 produced by the droits reunis, 
 50 by the customs, 30 by salt, five by salt and 
 tobacco beyond the Alps, five by the salt-works 
 of the East, 12 by the lottery, 10 by the posts, 
 one by powder and saltpetre, 10 by instalments 
 due from purchasers of national domains, six 
 by various receipts, 36 by the Italian subsidy, 
 representing the cost of the French army em- 
 ployed in guarding Italy. This total sum of 
 740 millions, increased by special items to the 
 amount of 30 millions, that is to say, by the 
 additional centimes to the direct contributions 
 for the departmental expenses, and the tolls 
 established on certain rivers for the mainte- 
 nance of the navagation, would make altogether 
 770 millions. Some of these items, such as the 
 produce of the registration, of the d roils n-n/u's, 
 of the customs, might rise or fall, but the total 
 amount must reach and exceed successively the 
 mean revenue of 740 millions, 770 with the 
 special items. 
 
 It is true that the expenditure had surpassed 
 not less than the receipts the limits specified in 
 the law of the finances. Napoleon, in 1806, had 
 estimated at 700 millions the budget of the state 
 of war, at that time the most usual state ; which, 
 with 30 millions of special items, must carry 
 the total expenditure to 730 millions. We 
 know already that it would be 760 millions for 
 that same year 1806. It was afterwards known 
 that it amounted even to 770. It had therefore 
 exceeded the estimated sum by 40 million!!. 
 In 1807, the history of which year we are at
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 353 
 
 this moment relating, the expenditure, com- 
 puted at 720 millions, 750 with the special 
 items, threatened to be much more con- 
 siderable. It was subsequently fixed at 778 
 millions. The cause of these augmentations 
 may easily be guessed ; for the expense of the 
 war, (for the two ministries, of the personnel 
 and of the materiel,) estimated at 300 millions, 
 had amounted to 340. Even this sum is far 
 from revealing the whole extent of it : for, in- 
 dependently of the expenses charged to the 
 St.-ite, the countries occupied by our troops 
 furnished part of the provisions, and the Trea- 
 sury of the army, into which the war contribu- 
 tions were paid, had defrayed part of the ex- 
 penses of the materiel and of the pay. The sup- 
 plements drawn from this treasury amounted 
 to not less than 40 or 50 millions for 1806, 
 and to at least 140 or 150 for 1807. But, the 
 current receipts of the year furnishing already 
 740 millions, (770 with the special items,) and 
 the Treasury of the army being capable of fur- 
 nishing some supplements without being im- 
 poverished, we are authorized to assert that 
 Napoleon had attained his aim, to make the 
 receipts balance the expenses, even during a 
 state of war, without having recourse to loans. 
 
 For the rest, the total expenditure of 770 
 millions for 1806, of 778 for 1807, was not yet 
 wholly revealed ; for French account ability, 
 though then in progress, had not yet arrived at 
 the perfection which at present enables us, a 
 few months after the turn jf the year, to ascer- 
 tain and to fix the expenditure of it. It took 
 .not less than two or three years to arrive at 
 such a liquidation. Napoleon then estimated 
 the expenses of the year at 720 millions, 750 
 including the services paid out of the special 
 items ; and, excepting a few extra sums for 
 the maintenance of the army, that estimate 
 was correct. In this total of 720 millions, the 
 public debt would require 104 millions, (54 of 5 
 per cent, rentes perpetuelles, 17 of life annuities, 
 24 of ecclesiastical pensions, 5 of civil pensions, 
 4 of the debt of Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and 
 Placentia;) the civil list 28, (including the 
 princes;) the service of foreign affairs 8; the 
 administration of justice 22; the expenses of 
 the interior and of the public works 54, (not in- 
 cluding the works in the departments paid for 
 out of the 30 millions of special items;) the 
 salaries of the clergy 12 ; the general police 1 ; 
 the finances 3G, (including 10 millions for the 
 sinking fund : ) the administration of the Trea- 
 sury 18,(including 10 millions paid for discount;) 
 the navy 106; war 324; lastly, a reserve of 10, 
 destined for unforeseen expenses total 720 
 millions, 750 with the expenses of the depart- 
 ments. 
 
 This total of the expenses forming 750 mil- 
 lions, compared with the produce of the re- 
 ceipts forming 770 millions, left in hand a 
 balance of 20 millions. Napoleon immediately 
 resolved to restore the benefit of it to the coun- 
 try, by the abolition of the 10 war centimes im- 
 posed in 1804, in place of the voluntary dona- 
 tions voted by the departments for the building 
 of the Boulogne flotilla. It was a considerable 
 relief upon the direct contributions, the heaviest 
 of all at that period, and the third of the kind 
 granted since the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon 
 ordered that, when the law of finances was 
 presented to the Legislative Body, which was 
 
 VOL. II. 45 
 
 I about to be assembled after a prorogation of a 
 year, this important improvement in the con- 
 dition of the tax-payers should be immediately 
 ' proposed to him, and that thus the termination 
 of part of the burdens of the war should be 
 proclaimed, before the termination of the war 
 itself. 
 
 His ardent mind, fond of diving into the fu- 
 ture, had already inquired what would be the 
 ! state of the finances of the country in a few 
 ! years ; and he had ascertained that, in fifteen 
 ! years, the rapid extinction of the life-annuities 
 and ecclesiastical pensions, that the equally 
 rapid redemption of the rentes perpetuelles, pro- 
 vided with a sinking fund, to which the sale, 
 daily more advantageous, of the national pro- 
 perty gave a very powerful operation, would re- 
 duce the public debt from 104 millions to 74. But, 
 long before this result, for which he should be 
 obliged to wait several years, the restoration 
 of peace might reduce the public expenses far 
 below 720 millions, causing the revenue to rise 
 much higher, and afford abundant means for 
 either alleviations or useful creations. But for 
 the faults which we shall soon have to record, 
 these fair prospects would have been realized, 
 and the finances of France would have been 
 saved with her greatness. 
 
 With the favourable state of the finances was 
 combined, ever since the preceding year, a com- 
 pletely new facility in the service of the Trea- 
 sury. It will be recollected that various causes, 
 one of them permanent, the other accidental, 
 had rendered this service extremely difficult, and 
 given the Treasury the appearance of a rich man 
 in embarrassments, who, either from want of 
 order, or from the difficulty of recovering his re- 
 venues, cannot provide for his current expenses. 
 The permanent cause arose from the system of 
 obligations and bills at sight, which the receivers- 
 general subscribed, and which, payable at their 
 chest month by month, were the medium by 
 which the produce of the taxes reached the 
 Treasury. The obligations, representing the 
 amount of the direct contributions, were drawn 
 only at distant dates, and one fourth, at least, 
 was not payable till four, five, or six months 
 after the year to which they belonged. The 
 bills at sight, representing the indirect contri- 
 butions, and drawn at indefinite periods, sub- 
 sequently to the actual receipt of the tax, kept 
 back the produce of these contributions from 
 the State for fifty or sixty days after they had 
 been paid into the chests of the receivers-gene- 
 ral. These latter had, therefore, the benefit of 
 the funds, which constituted part of their 
 emoluments. But what occasioned" much inure 
 serious inconvenience than the excessive emolu- 
 ments allowed to the receivers, was the neces- 
 sity, under which the Treasury found itself, to 
 realize its revenues at seasonable times, to get 
 those obligations and bills at sight discounted, 
 sometimes by the bank, sometimes by great 
 capitalists, who made it pay as high a discount 
 as 12 and 16 per cent., and had even, like M. 
 Ouvrard, turned its paper to fltrange purposes 
 The sums which were thus carried back beyond 
 the twelve months of the year were computed 
 at 124 millions. Nevertheless, as the expense 
 was not paid, any more than the tax, in thosu 
 twelve months, the service of the Treasury 
 might have been carried on almost without dia 
 count, if other causes, wholly accidental, had 
 2o2
 
 354 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807 
 
 not supervened to complicate the ordinary situa- 
 tion. On the one hand, the anterior budgets 
 of 1805, 1804, and 1803, had left arrears, for 
 which endeavours were made to provide w\th 
 the current resources ; and, on the other hand, 
 the extraordinary financial adventure of the 
 United Merchants, who, by blending the affairs 
 of France and Spain, had deprived the State 
 of a sum of 141 millions, had thrown the 
 Treasury into a double embarrassment. It 
 had found itself obliged to meet an anterior 
 deficit of 60 to 70 millions, and a debit of 141 
 millions, created by the United Merchants. It 
 had, it is true, solid assets, but difficult to be 
 realized, in pledge for this debit. It had, 
 therefore, been necessary, in addition to the 
 annual discount of 124 millions' worth of 
 obligations, not due till in the following year, to 
 meet a deficit of about 200 millions. This ac- 
 counts for the financial distress of 1805 and 
 1806, even amidst the prodigious successes of 
 the campaign which was terminated by the vic- 
 tory of Austerlitz. 
 
 But the arrival of Napoleon in January, 1806, 
 returning victorious, and his hands full of me- 
 tals taken from Austria, had revived confidence, 
 and afforded a first relief, for which there was 
 great need. Credit soon recovered itself ; the 
 interest of twelve and fifteen per cent, fell to 
 nine and even to six per cent, on the discount 
 of the assets of the Treasury. 
 
 Other means had been pursued for removing 
 the difficulties of the moment, and rendering 
 their recurrence impossible. In the first place, 
 the national domains, which constituted the 
 endowments of the Senate, the Legion of Ho- 
 nour, and the University, were withdrawn from 
 them ; annuities were allotted to them in com- 
 pensation, and the domains transferred to the 
 sinking fund, that might effect a gradual sale 
 of them, which it did with prudence and ad- 
 vantage. These domains were valued at 60 
 millions, and upon this pledge inscriptions to 
 that amount had been created, bearing an in- 
 terest of six and seven per cent., according to 
 the time they had to run, and payable succes- 
 sively by the said fund, in the course of five 
 years. These rescriptions, on account of the 
 interest which they yielded, the security of the 
 pledge, and the confidence inspired by the fund 
 which was surety for them, had acquired the 
 credit of the best assets, and had never ceased 
 to be negotiable at a rate nearly approaching 
 to par. They had thus furnished a medium 
 for discharging the arrear of the budgets of 
 1803, 1804, and 1805. The domains given in 
 pledge acquiring in time a more considerable 
 value, the amount of these rescriptions might 
 be increased to 70 and even 80 millions, in or- 
 der to defray the charges successively revealed 
 by the liquidation of anterior assets. 
 
 After this arrear had been provided for, 
 great pains were taken for the recovery of the 
 141 millions constituting the debit of the 
 United Merchants. M. Mollien, who had be- 
 come minister of the Treasury on the removal 
 of M. de Marbois, and was incessantly stimu- 
 lated by Napoleon, had displayed remarkable 
 zeal and ability in the realization of the assets 
 composing this debit. In the first place, im- 
 movable property belonging to the sieurs 
 Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh, worth 10 or 11 
 millions, had been seized. M. Vanlerbergh's 
 
 ! warehouses had next been taken possession of; 
 ' and, as the Emperor was much pleased with 
 ] his activity, he had continued to him the sup- 
 ; ply of the provisions for the army and navy ; 
 I and, by paying only in part for his supplies, 
 means had been secured for soon recovering a 
 sum of about 40 millions. Messrs. Ouvrard, 
 Desprez, and Vanlerbergh had fu, ther ad- 
 vanced, in different payments, or in effects 
 upon Holland, a sum of 30 millions. Lastly, 
 Spain, acknowledging herself personally a 
 debtor to the total amount of 60 millions, had 
 paid in assignations upon Mexico for 36 mil- 
 lions of piastres, and promising to pay directly 
 24 millions in the course of 1806, at the rate 
 of two millions per month Spain was the 
 worst debtor of all; for, of the 24 millions 
 payable by monthly instalments in 1806, she 
 had paid but 14 millions in August, 1807, after 
 showing an evident ill-will before Jena, and 
 after Jena a deplorable exhaustion. It was by 
 means of loans in Holland that she discharged, 
 in August, 1807, 14 of the 24 millions due in 
 1806. As for the 36 millions of piastres to be 
 received in the counting-houses of Mexico, 
 Vera Cruz, the Caraccas, the Havannah, and 
 Buenos Ayres, M. Mollien devised a very in- 
 genious expedient for recovering that amount; 
 this was, to transfer them to the Dutch house 
 of Hope, which made them over to the English 
 house of Baring ; and, on account of the scar- 
 city of the precious metals in England, the 
 latter obtained permission to bring them over 
 from the Spanish ports in English frigates. 
 France guarantied only the delivery in harbour 
 to English boats, at the rate of 3 fr. 75 cent., 
 the rate at which she took them. The profit 
 of 1 fr. 25 cent., relinquished to those who 
 risked the difficulties of the operation, was, 
 therefore, not at her cost, but at that of Spain, 
 which thus paid by an enormous discount for 
 the distance of the sources of her wealth, and 
 the weakness of her flag, obliged to leave to 
 that of England the transport of the metals of 
 America. The houses of Baring and Hope 
 afterwards remitted to the French Treasury, 
 by transfers of assets, the amount of the ceded 
 piastres. The bargain had been made on these 
 conditions for more than 25 millions, part of 
 which had just arrived. The surplus had been 
 applied to the payment, in the United States, 
 or in the Spanish colonies, of debts contracted 
 by our ships, and especially those of Admiral 
 Willaumez, which had sought refuge, some in 
 the port of the Havannah and others in the 
 Delaware and the Chesapeake. 
 
 It was by the aid of these various combina- 
 tions, that in August, 1807, the French Trea- 
 sury had found means to recover 100 millions 
 of the 141 composing the enormous debit of 
 the United Merchants. The payment of the 
 balance of 41 millions was secured within 
 about four or five millions and at very short 
 intervals. 
 
 The Treasury, deeply in debt in the wintei 
 of 1806, soon relieved by the metallic succours 
 which Napoleon had brought from abroad, by 
 the revival of confidence, by the integral pay- 
 ment of the arrear of the budgets, by the al- 
 most total recovery of the debit of the United 
 Merchants, had had to provide in 1807 for only 
 a small part of that debit, and for the 124 mil- 
 lions of obligations usually recoverablt in the
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 355 
 
 following year, which was an easy matter, as | 
 we have already observed, the payment of the 
 expenses being deferred nearly as long as that 
 of the taxes. The Emperor, therefore, had 
 been able to demand and to obtain that the 
 pay of the grand army, which amounted to four 
 or five millions per month, and from the imme- 
 diate payment of which he had dispensed the 
 French Treasury, should gradually accumulate 
 at Erfurt, at Mayence, at Paris, and there form 
 a depot of specie to the amount of more than 
 40 millions, an excessive precaution, which 
 proves how prudent in war was that man so 
 imprudent in politics. 1 
 
 But a new institution, which was the neces- 
 sary complement of our financial organization, 
 facilitated in 1806 the operations of the Trea- 
 sury, and in the course of 1807 caused an abun- 
 dance previously unknown to prevail there. 
 According to the system proposed to the First 
 Consul by M. Gaudin, on the morrow of the 
 18th Brumaire, a system pursued till 1807, the 
 receivers-general signed, as we have said, for 
 the profit of the Treasury, bills of exchange, 
 with the title of obligations or bills at sight, fall- 
 ing due month by month. Such was the me- 
 thod employed for getting in the public revenue. 
 The Treasury thus had the certainty of a fixed 
 term for payments, and left as emoluments to 
 the receivers-general the profits thence result- 
 ing ; for the taxes always came in before these 
 obligations or bills at sight were due. It was no 
 doubt a great improvement, in reference to the 
 time at which this system was devised ; for it 
 insured fixed terms for the payment of the 
 taxes. In 1807 there was one step more left 
 to be taken that was to oblige the receivers 
 to hand over their funds to the Treasury the 
 very moment that they received them. But to 
 suppress all at once this system of bills of ex- 
 change, and to substitute for it the more natu- 
 ral system of an immediate payment under the 
 form of an account current between the Trea- 
 sury and the receivers-general, would have 
 been too abrupt a change, and perhaps a dan- 
 gerous one. The experience and the inventive 
 spirit of M. Mollien suggested to him one of 
 the happiest of transitions. 
 
 M. Mollien, as the reader no doubt recollects, 
 was director of the sinking fund, when Napo- 
 leon, satisfied with the manner in which he had 
 directed that fund, called him in 1806 to the 
 ministry of the Treasury, as successor to M. 
 de Marbois, dismissed in consequence of the 
 affair of the United Merchants. Mollien was 
 a shrewd, ingenious talker, full of the doctrines 
 of the economists, very clever at business, 
 though he expounded it in affected language, 
 timid, susceptible, easily agitated in the pre- 
 sence of Napoleon, who disliked long disserta- 
 tions, but soon finding in himself the independ- 
 ence of an honest man and the firmness of a 
 
 1 The details which I am here recording may appear tri- 
 Tial, but to me they seem indispensable for conveying a 
 notion of the coarse of our finances, of the administrative 
 ability of Napoleon and his agents, and of the singular 
 times in which they lived. These details, and in particu- 
 lar those which are about to follow concerning the crea- 
 tion of the new system of the Treasury, are extracted, not 
 *rom official publications, which had become extremely 
 rare at this period, left, moreover, very incomplete, and, 
 above all, perfectly silent respecting the means of execu- 
 won, but from the archives of the Treasury itself. With 
 the authorization of Messrs. Human and Damon, the 
 ministers of the finances, I hare availed myself of these . 
 
 convinced mind. Napoleon sometimes treated 
 the theories of M. Mollien with the freedom 
 of omnipotence and of genius, and then left 
 that able minister to act, knowing how con- 
 scientious, how zealous, and above all how well 
 qualified he was to reform the mechanism of 
 the Treasury, where still reigned old practices, 
 protected by obstinate interests. 
 
 When the negotiation of the assets of the 
 Treasury was taken from M. Desprez, the re- 
 presentative of the company of the United Mer- 
 chants, a committee of receivers-general had 
 been charged to supply his place. This com- 
 mittee existed for some time, and its service 
 consisted in discounting the obligations and bills 
 at sight, acting on account of the receivers- 
 general. The funds employed by this commit- 
 tee came to it from the receivers-general them- 
 selves, who always received the amount of the 
 taxes before the time, when the maturity of the 
 obligations and the bills of sight obliged them to 
 pay it in. M. Mollien, struck with the remark 
 that the money with which this committee dis- 
 counted the assets of the Treasury, was the 
 money of the Treasury itself, conceived the idea 
 of requiring its immediate payment by means of 
 a combination which, without depriving the re- 
 ceivers of the use of the funds by which they 
 made a profit, should lead them to pay over the 
 produce of the taxes to the chests of the Trea- 
 sury directly and without intermediate agent. 
 To accomplish this, he created a chest called 
 caisse de service, a title borrowed for its very ob- 
 ject, to which the receivers-general were to 
 send, the moment they received them, all the 
 funds obtained from the tax-payers, for which 
 an interest of five per cent, was to be allowed. 
 This chest, in order to acquit itself towards 
 them, was afterwards to give them back their 
 obligations and bills at sight, when they became 
 due. To induce the receivers-general to pay 
 the sums collected into this chest, he addressed 
 to them a circular, in which he said that, if on 
 the one hand the funds were not owing till their 
 obligations became due, on the other, they were 
 but depositaries of those funds and had no right 
 to employ them in private speculations ; that 
 the caisse de service, instituted to receive them, 
 would be the most natural and the safest depo- 
 sitory, and would pay them a reasonable inte- 
 rest, that of five per cent. He added that their 
 account current with this chest would be sub- 
 mitted every month to the inspection of the 
 Emperor, whom every body knew to be attentive, 
 and full of memory and justice. This was enough 
 to stimulate the zeal of those who were well 
 disposed. With the others M. Mollien took a 
 different course. Relieved by the abundance 
 of money which he began to enjoy from the ne- 
 cessity of recurring so frequently to the dis- 
 count of the obligations and bills at sight, he suf- 
 fered not one of those papers to be seen on the 
 
 archives in the composition of a considerable work, for 
 which, long as it may be, I have been compensated by tho 
 information which I have obtained respecting the progress 
 of our financial administration. I have also been much 
 enlightened as to what concerns this period, by the peru- 
 sal of the unpublished and highly important memoirs of 
 Count Mollien. I guarantee, therefore, the perfect accu- 
 racy of the details which have preceded and are about to 
 follow, in regard to the fact* themselves and in regard to 
 the figures : only I have given the round sums, and. for 
 amounts varying from day to day, the mean bum?, which 
 best expressed the durable truth of things.
 
 356 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 i 'lace, and if, in certain pressing emergencies, 
 be was obliged to apply to the Bank of France 
 to discount a few millions in paper, it was on 
 condition that it should keep those assets in its 
 portfolio. Thenceforward the receivers-gene- 
 ral who employed the funds arising from the 
 taxes in jobbing upon obligations and bills at 
 tight, had no other resource than the caisse de 
 service itself, and they sent those funds to it. 
 Some from zeal, from emulation to distinguish 
 then- selves in the eyes of the Emperor himself- 
 others, from the impossibility of finding else- 
 where an employment for their capitals, since 
 the obligation* had ceased to appear on the Place, 
 paid the realized produce of the taxes into the 
 caisse de service for the sake of the interest of 
 five per cent., and the chest acquitted itself to- 
 wards them by giving them back their obliga- 
 tions whenever they became due. The opera- 
 tion of discount was thus naturally suppressed, 
 and succeeded by an immediate payment to the 
 Treasury on condition of an interest of five per 
 cent, for the time to run between the period 
 of payment and the period when the obligations 
 and the bills at sight would become due. 
 
 Instituted at the conclusion of 1806, at the 
 moment of the departure of Napoleon for Prus- 
 sia, the caisse de service was disgorging funds in 
 1807 at the moment of his return. M. Mollien, 
 whose ingenious and skilful combinations on 
 this occasion cannot be too much admired, did 
 not stop at directing the funds of the receivers- 
 general towards the cause de service ; he went 
 further. It was not the receivers only who had 
 recourse to the obligations and the bills at sight, 
 for the employment of funds at their temporal 
 disposal ; it was also individuals, who sought to 
 place them there for a short term, (as is done at 
 the present day by the French capitalists, who 
 look out for bills of the Treasury ; or by the Eng- 
 lish capitalists, who buy Exchequer Bills ; ) it was 
 also public establishments which had capitals to 
 place out, such as the Mont-de-Pie'te', the Bank, 
 the sinking fund, &c. These different capitalists 
 applied to the bankers usually jobbing in obliga- 
 tions and bills at sight, in order to procure some. 
 M. Mollien authorized the caisse de service, by 
 the decree of institution, to issue bills on itself, 
 bearing an interest at 5 per cent, and at a fixed 
 term. Instead of giving obligations or bills at 
 sight to private individuals, it gave them the 
 bills upon itself, and it had soon issued to the 
 amount of 18 millions, which put it in posses- 
 sion of a like sum in cash. It concluded, more- 
 over, a particular treaty with the Mont-de- 
 Pie'te', which usually needed from 15 to 18 mil- 
 lions' worth of obligations for the employment 
 of its funds. Instead of giving it obligations, 
 notes of the caisse de service were delivered to it, 
 with a guarantee of the reserve of 18 millions' 
 worth of obligations, kept at the Treasury in a 
 special portfolio. In this manner the obligations 
 and bills at sight were withdrawn from circula- 
 tion, and the notes of the caisse de service were 
 taken by the public in their stead. In July, 
 1807, this chest had existed a year, and it had 
 already received 45 millions from the receivers- 
 general, (half on their own account, half on ac- 
 count of capitalists in the country,) 18 millions 
 from the public, and 18 millions from the Mont- 
 de-Pie'te', thatistosay, a sum total of 80 millions. 
 
 It may be conceived what facility the crea- 
 tion of the new chest must have given to the 
 
 service of the Treasury, which, relieved from 
 the arrear of the budgets by the creation of 
 the 70 millions' worth of rescriptions, reim- 
 bursed for the greatest part of the debit of the 
 United Merchants, found besides, in this float- 
 ing loan of 80 millions, resources which dis- 
 pensed it from recurring to the discount of 
 obligations and bills at sight. This loan had in 
 reality always existed, since capitals had always 
 sought a temporary location in the good paper 
 of the Treasury. But the Treasury had not 
 been their intermediary. Speculators, placed 
 between it and the public, drew away the capi- 
 tals to themselves, and then made their custom- 
 ers beg, pray, frequently wait, and pay at an 
 exorbitant rate the discount of the obligations 
 and bills at sight. Sometimes even these specu- 
 lators were no other than its own receivers, who 
 lent it the funds from the taxes, and not only 
 fleeced it without shame, but likewise con- 
 tracted the mischievous habits of jobbing. The 
 caisse de service, having become the intermediary, 
 also became master of that permanent loan, of 
 the rate at which it was contracted, and libe- 
 rated itself from the receivers, whom it re- 
 duced to mere depositaries of the public money, 
 and left them nothing more of the part of 
 bankers than the business of moving the funds 
 of the Treasury from one point to another. 
 The sudden and extraordinary reduction in the 
 expenses of negotiation for 1806 and 1807 fur- 
 nished the material proof of all these advan- 
 tages. For the service of 1806, which, on ac- 
 count of the change in the calendar, compre- 
 hended not only the twelve months of 1806 but 
 the last three months of 1805, the amount of 
 the expense of negotiation rose to the exorbit- 
 ant sum of from 27 to 28 millions.* For the 
 first four months it had been 14 millions, (equal 
 to 3J millions per month, or 40 millions per 
 year.) For the seven following months it had 
 been nearly 9 millions, (being on an average 
 no more than 1200 thousand francs per month, 
 and 14 or 15 millions per annum.) Lastly, for 
 the last four months it had been 4 million 300 
 thousand francs, (which would be equal to, at 
 most, 12 millions per year.) This expense was 
 reduced in 1807 to 9 or 10 millions, a consider- 
 able saving, which left to the capitalists only 
 legitimate profits, and by no means to be 
 grudged, if we consider in particular how it 
 was to be divided. Of these 9 millions the 
 Bank received 1400 thousand francs, the sink- 
 ing fund 1500 thousand, the Mont-de-Piete 1350 
 thousand, the receivers-general and private in- 
 dividuals, for their perquisites and expenses, 5 
 millions. What a change, if we look back to 
 the preceding years, when the receivers-general 
 made enormous profits by the sums which they 
 retained, .if we go back especially to the times 
 of the ancient monarchy, when the farmers- 
 general paid the court, the ministers, the em- 
 ployes, and amassed immense fortunes besides 
 during a lease of a few years ! 
 
 The cause de service, in addition to these differ- 
 ent advantages, of emancipating the Treasury, 
 of producing great savings, of bringing the re- 
 ceivers into better habits, was attended with 
 
 i 27,369,022 fr for 4fi5 days, divided as follows >- 
 for 130 days, 14.385,680 fr. 
 for 197 days, 8,609.872 
 for 138 days, 4,373;470 
 Total, 27,369,022
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 857 
 
 this consequence, to put a stop, in the general 
 circulation of paper, to false movements, which 
 resolved themselves, for the State and for the 
 country itself, either into banking expenses, or 
 the useless displacing of cash ; when, for in- 
 stance, the Treasury was not yet in direct and 
 daily communication with its receivers, by 
 means of an account current with them, and it 
 had need of money somewhere, ignorant as it 
 was of this, it got obligations discounted at Paris, 
 and despatched the amount to the spot, where 
 frequently there were abundant funds in the 
 chest of the receiver-general. The receiver- 
 general, on his part, interested in ridding him- 
 self of unprofitable funds, sought to transmit j 
 them to Paris or to other points, and loaded the 
 public conveyances with specie; whereas, if the 
 account current had existed, merely writing 
 would have spared the Treasury the sending of 
 cash to the departments, and the departments 
 the sending of it to Paris. 
 
 M. Mollien had not confined himself to the 
 creation of a came de service in the centre of the 
 Empire ; he had instituted a similar one in the 
 departments beyond the Alps. There, still more 
 than in Old France, prevailed the pernicious 
 contradiction of stagnant capitals in the hands 
 of the receivers, with urgent wants for which 
 it was necessary to provide by the transmission 
 of specie. To put an end to this serious incon- 
 venience, M. Mollien established, not at Turin, 
 but at Alexandria, in the circuit of the great 
 fortresses erected by Napoleon, a transfer chest 
 (came de virements) into which all the receivers 
 of Liguria, Piedmont, and all French Italy, 
 were to pay their funds, and which, in its turn, 
 forwarded them to the places where they were 
 needed, to Milan in particular, where the French 
 army had to be paid. This chest, placed under 
 the direction of an able agent, M. Dauchy, had 
 soon produced the same advantages as that 
 which had been instituted in Paris, that is to 
 say, rendered the service easy, the sources 
 abundant, the transmission of specie useless; 
 and in truth it was worth while to introduce 
 such order into this portion of the finances of 
 \he Empire : for French Italy (by this name we 
 mean that which was converted into depart- 
 ments, and not that which was constituted under 
 Prince Eugene into an allied but independent 
 State) yielded at this period so much as 40 
 Millions, 18 of which were expended on the local 
 administration, justice, the police, the roads ; 
 and 22 millions remained, either for the con- 
 struction of fortresses, or to contribute to the 
 maintenance of 120,000 men, who barred the 
 routes of Lombardy against the Austrians. 
 
 Napoleon, while making war in the North, 
 had watched attentively the course and progress 
 of these new financial creations, and, at his re- 
 turn, on the very day that the ministers had 
 come to hail in him the fortunate conqueror of 
 the Continent, he had congratulated M. Mollien, 
 with a sort of effusion of heart. Never satisfied 
 with doing good by halves, he proposed to ren- 
 der what he called the emancipation of the 
 Treasury more complete. The new cause de 
 service, owing to the floating loan of 80 millions 
 which has just been adverted to, was almost 
 dispensed from discounting obligations and bills 
 at sight, save in certain pressing emergencies, 
 when it applied to the Bank. But Napoleon re- 
 eolved to insure its resources in a definitive 
 
 manner, with the aid of a combination, the idea 
 of which he had conceived while bivouacking 
 amidst the snows of Poland. The sum of the 
 obligations and bills at sight, not due till the fol- 
 lowing year, and which it was consequently ne- 
 cessary to discount, amounted to about 124 
 millions. It is true that, if the money was not 
 received, neither was the expense paid till the 
 next year. But Napoleon proposed to have, as 
 far as possible, the expenditure paid during the 
 same year, and for this end to realize the re- 
 venues of the State within the same interval 
 of time. Conformably to this design, which 
 he had conceived in Poland, he directed that 
 the obligations of 1807, which would not fall due 
 till 1808, should be left for the service of 1808; 
 that those of 1808, which would not be due till 
 1809, should be left in like manner for 1809; 
 so that to the service of each year should be 
 attached only the paper becoming due in the 
 twelve months of its duration. But to accom- 
 plish this, it would be requisite to furnish 1807 
 with an equivalent for the 124 millions' worth 
 of paper transferred to the following years. 
 Napoleon resolved to make a loan for the caisse 
 de service of 124 millions, which would settle the 
 matter, thanks to the resources which he had 
 at his disposal. After various combinations, he 
 fixed on the idea of making the Treasury of the 
 army furnish 84 of the 124 millions, and those 
 establishments which were in the habit of plac- 
 ing their funds in assets of the Treasury supply 
 the remaining 40. The new chest would thence- 
 forward find itself in extraordinary abundance, 
 having 84 millions coming to it all at once from 
 the army, and having no more than 40 millions 
 to apply to the public for, instead of 80, which 
 it had borrowed of it in 1807. It would be dis- 
 pensed in future from discounting the obligations 
 and bills at sight, since the service of each year 
 would thenceforward have at its disposal nothing 
 but paper falling due in that same year. Napo- 
 leon decided, moreover, that the 124 millions' 
 worth of obligations and bills at sight transferred 
 from one year to anotiier, should be shut up in 
 a portfolio and not taken out till the following 
 year, at the moment of replacing them by an 
 equal sum in new paper. It would then become 
 easy to suppress them as useless, for their only 
 function would consist in remaining in deposit 
 in the portfolio, or in affording the receivers- 
 general by paper at prolonged dates those pro- 
 fits from interest which it had been thought 
 proper to grant them. The same results might 
 be obtained by regulating the account of inte- 
 rest kept between the Treasury and the re- 
 ceivers-general, so as to indemnify the latter. 
 This, in fact, was done afterwards. The cai* 
 de service, instituted upon the same principles, 
 is called central chest of the Treasury. The 
 receivers- general have an account current with 
 this chest. They are debited, that is to say, 
 made debtors for all that they have received 
 during the ten days. In like manner they are 
 credited, or made creditors for all that they 
 have paid into the chest during the same days. 
 The interest, which runs against them when 
 they are debtors, runs for them when they are 
 creditors. The interest account is then balanced 
 every three months, and at the end of the year 
 besides they are allowed, for the mass of the 
 direct contributions formerly represented by 
 the obligation*, an improvement of interest which
 
 358 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 indemnifies them if the receipts have not taken 
 place in the twelve months, which rewards them 
 if they have managed to effect them in that in- 
 terval of time, and which finally interests them 
 in the speedy and easy collection of the public 
 money. 
 
 This fine operation completed the reorganiza- 
 tion of the finances, by the good constitution of 
 the Treasury. It was agreed that it should not 
 be definitively carried into execution till 1808, 
 as well on account of the debit of the United 
 Merchants, which could not be entirely dis- 
 charged before that period, as on account of the 
 collection of the foreign contributions, which it 
 was impossible to effect sooner. The loan of 
 124 millions was to be applicable to the service 
 of 1808, which, owing to this sum of 124 mil- 
 lions, would cause all the obligations and bills at 
 sight falling due after the 31st December, 1808, 
 to stand over for the service of 1809 ; so that 
 the service of 1809 was to be the first that 
 should have at its disposal nothing but paper 
 becoming due in the twelve months of its 
 duration. 1 
 
 This loan granted to the Treasury of the State 
 by the Treasury of the army was not to be tem- 
 porary, but definitive, by means of a profound 
 combination, which revealed still more clearly 
 the use that Napoleon intended to make of the 
 produce of victory. He surmised that, after he 
 had paid the extraordinary war expenses of 
 1805, 1806, and 1807, he should have left about 
 300 millions, which were already in part depo- 
 sited, and the whole of which was to be depo- 
 sited in the chest of the sinking fund. He pur- 
 posed to draw from this Treasury, as from a 
 wonderful spring, not only wealth for his gene- 
 rals, his officers, his soldiers, but the prosperity 
 of the Empire. If to this sum be added from 
 12 to 15 millions, which he had the art to save 
 every year out of the 25 millions of the civil list, 
 besides a number of domains in Poland, Prus- 
 sia, Hanover, and Westphalia, we shall have an 
 idea of the immense resources which he had re- 
 served, in order to insure at once private for- 
 tunes and the public fortune. But in the desire 
 to derive from them a double benefit, he should 
 take good care not to reward his generals, his 
 officers, his soldiers, with sums of money ; for 
 the sums would soon be consumed by those 
 whom he designed to enrich, and who, sensible 
 that they were continually exposed to death, 
 meant to enjoy life while it was left them. It 
 was sufficient, therefore, for him that the Trea- 
 sury of the grand army was rich in revenues, 
 and he was not solicitous that it should be so 
 in ready money. In consequence, he decided 
 that, for the 84 millions which he was about to 
 pay into the came de service, the State should 
 furnish the Treasury of the army with an equi- 
 valent sum in inscriptions of 5 per cent, rentes. 
 Fully resolved not to have recourse to the public 
 for contracting loans, he had thus in the Trea- 
 sury of the army a capitalist always at hand to 
 lend the State at a reasonable interest, without 
 either any jobbing or any depreciation of assets; 
 and moreover he could complete with assign- 
 ments in rentes the military fortunes which he 
 had already commenced with assignments in 
 lands. 
 
 ' The definitive decree, ordering the loan of 84 millions, 
 raj not signed till the 6th of March, 1808. 
 
 Upon this principle it was that he finished 
 regulating the budgets of 1806 and 1807, which 
 were not yet definitively liquidated. The war 
 contributions imposed on conquered countries 
 served to defray the extraordinary expenses of 
 subsistence, mate'riel, and remounts of the army; 
 and Napoleon left nothing to the account of the 
 Treasury but the annual and ordinary pay. 
 But this charge alone of pay would make the 
 budget of 1806 amount to 770 millions, and that 
 . of 1807 to 778, and, as we have seen, the ordi- 
 nary resources of the taxes had not yet attained 
 that standard. Napoleon thought that the pro- 
 duce of victory ought to serve not only to enrich 
 his soldiery, but also to relieve the finances and 
 to keep them in equilibrium. He resolved, 
 therefore, that the chest of the army should 
 make provision for those excesses of expense 
 which the taxes could not cover, as far as the 
 payment of 33 millions for 1806 and 27 millions 
 for 1807. Thanks to this assistance, the four- 
 teen months' pay, the payment of which had 
 been deferred, and the amount of which had 
 been gradually accumulated in specie in the 
 provident chests established in Paris, Mayence, 
 and Erfurt, would be liquidated. If we add 
 this supplement to those which the chest of the 
 contributions had already furnished for the ex- 
 traordinary expenses of the war, we shall come 
 at the sums of 80 millions for 1806, and 150 
 millions for 1807 ; which would make the total 
 expenses of the army amount to 372 millions 
 for 1806, and to 43 millions for 1807, to say 
 nothing of many other local consumptions es- 
 caping all computation. It is this that explains 
 how, out of the 60 millions imposed on Austria 
 in 1805, and the 570 imposed on Germany in 
 1806 and 1807, there should be left in the Trea- 
 sury of the army no more than about 20 mil- 
 lions of the first contribution and 280 of the 
 second. But this kind of service was not the 
 only one that the Treasury of the army was to 
 render to the budgets of 1806 and 1807. The 
 Treasury had counted as receipts for the ser- 
 vices for the two years upon assets not suscep- 
 tible of being immediately realized, such as the 
 10 millions' worth of property given up by the 
 United Merchants, six millions of the price of 
 the salt works of the East, eight millions of old 
 accounts of purchasers of national property, 
 the whole amounting to 24 millions. Napoleon 
 consented that the Treasury should pay with 
 these assets what it owed to the army for the 
 settlement of the pay. These assets, of more 
 or less remote date, but certain realization, 
 suited the Treasury of the army, which had no 
 need of money but of revenues, and did not 
 suit the Treasury of the State, which wanted 
 immediate resources. 
 
 Napoleon completed the fine financial mea- 
 sures of this year by the establishment of the 
 new system of accounts by double entry, (en 
 partie double,} which put the finishing hand to 
 the 5ntr9duction into our finances of that ad- 
 mirable clearness which has ever since reigned 
 in them. 
 
 The new came de service having created for 
 the receivers-general the duty, the interest, the 
 necessity, of paying in their funds to the Trea- 
 sury, at the very moment 'when they received 
 them, without any further than the inevitable 
 delay of the local collection, of the centraliza- 
 tion in the chief town of the department, and
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 359 
 
 of forwarding money for expenses either to 
 Paris or to the places where they occurred, had 
 furnished the means of observing more accu- 
 rately the facts of which the receipt and the 
 paying in of the taxes are composed. M. Mol- 
 lien had formerly been employed in the depart- 
 ment of the farms, in which were not followed 
 in the keeping of accounts the vague and anti- 
 quated forms of the ancient Treasury, but the 
 simple, practical, and sure forms of commerce, 
 had introduced them at the sinking fund when 
 he was director of it, and at the came de ser- 
 vice since he had induced its institution. He 
 had made use at that chest of book-keeping by 
 double entry, which consists in keeping a day- 
 book of all the operations of receipt and ex- 
 penditure at the very moment when they take 
 place ; in extracting from this day.-book the 
 facts concerning each particular debtor and 
 creditor with whom you have done business on 
 the same day; in opening with each of them a 
 particular account which places, facing one 
 another, what they owe and what is owing to 
 them ; lastly, in entering the substance of all 
 these particular accounts in a general account, 
 which is but a daily and accurate analysis of 
 the transactions of a trader with all others, 
 and gives him natural contradictors in all those 
 who are named in his books, who, on their part, 
 have been obliged to keep similar books, and 
 to keep them correctly or suffer for false entries. 
 M. Mollien, observing by the aid of such ac- 
 counts, the proceedings of the came de service and 
 the situation of the receivers towards it, being 
 enabled at any moment to satisfy himself about 
 their punctuality in paying in, and also to ascer- 
 tain every moment what resources or engage- 
 ments it had, naturally asked himself why this 
 system of accounts should not become that of the 
 Treasury itself, its sole and obligatory system. 
 The receivers-general at that time sent in to 
 the general office of accounts declarations con- 
 taining a summary of their receipts and of 
 their payments, at distant intervals of time, 
 and without annexing to them a daily journal 
 of their operations. Neither did the sub-re- 
 ceivers, who handed the funds to them, the 
 pay-masters, who received them from their 
 hands, in order to apply them to the expenses 
 of the state, and who were both their natural 
 contradictors, send in any journal of their ope- 
 rations. All of them furnished nothing more 
 than general results collected later, and too 
 late to enable the general office of accounts, by 
 comparing them, to settle the account of each. 
 Thus the receivers-general could place them- 
 selves in debit without the Treasury knowing 
 it, and, what is worse, without being aware of 
 it themselves. When, it is true, there was any 
 one of them who collected thirty or forty mil- 
 lions in the course of the year, it was easy for 
 him to retain annually two or three hundred 
 thousand francs out of such a sum, and by 
 thus gaining four or five years without settling 
 his account, to accumulate three or four debits, 
 and to get one or several millions in arrear 
 with the Treasury. There were some who 
 owed 12, 15, 18 hundred thousand francs, and 
 who employed them either in embarking in 
 hazardous speculations, or in entering into 
 foolish expenses, or even, considering them- 
 selves rich before they were so, in purchasing 
 properties which involved them in ruin, be- 
 
 cause they were disproportionate to their i ml 
 fortune. A rigid investigation proves that 
 many of them were in these various situation). 
 The receivers-general, who did not deceive thf 
 Treasury, or who, in deceiving it, did not de 
 ceive themselves, were those who, without 
 saying so, made use for their own benefit of 
 the daily, strict, contradictory system of ac- 
 counts employed by commerce under the de- 
 nomination of book-keeping by double entry, 
 and which M. Mollien had recently introduced 
 both at the sinking fund and at the came dt 
 service. This circumstance, being soon ascer- 
 tained by the inspectors of the Treasury, was 
 sufficient to serve for a decisive lesson both to 
 the minister and to Napoleon himself, always 
 informed of what was passing in the adminis- 
 tration. M. Mollien. not venturing to change 
 suddenly the system of accounts of the Em- 
 pire, nor to extinguish a light, however faint 
 it might be, till he had first caused another to 
 be lit up, conceived the idea of creating a 
 second office of accounts, by the side of the 
 old one, and concurrently with it. He insti- 
 tuted for himself an office of accounts, directed 
 by an experienced accountant, 1 placed under 
 him book-keepers selected from various com- 
 mercial houses, and a number of young men 
 belonging to old financial families, some of 
 them even sons of those farmers-general whom 
 the Revolution had sent to the guillotine. In 
 this office he had the accounts with several 
 receivers kept by double entry; these, having 
 no intention to conceal the truth from the 
 Treasury, sought, on the contrary, the best 
 means of discovering it. Some others, who, 
 without any ill intention, had no reasons for 
 disliking the new system of book-keeping but 
 its novelty and their ignorance, took young 
 men, obtained from the office instituted in 
 Paris, to teach them how to make use of it. 
 Lastly, those of whom there was any suspicion 
 were overawed. It took but a very short time 
 to discover that many of the receivers were 
 debtors, some from blindness to their situation, 
 others from engaging in false speculations, or 
 indulging in extravagant luxury. There wero 
 some who had at last come to regard their de- 
 bits standing over for a series of years, from 
 one year to another, as a capital belonging to 
 them, and who had bought estates in propor- 
 tion to the fortune which they fancied they 
 possessed, but which was not theirs. Several 
 were obliged to give up the secret of their con- 
 nection with the wealthy speculators of Paris ; 
 and thus it was discovered that their funds 
 that is to say, the funds of the State had 
 been employed in jobbing in the obligations and 
 bills at sight, which jobbing cost the Treasury 
 25 millions in expenses of negotiation instead 
 of 10. The receiver-general of La Meurthe 
 alone was constituted debtor to the Treasury 
 to the amount of 1,700,000 francs. The mys- 
 tery once unveiled, there was no need to hesi- 
 tate longer, and it became necessary to change 
 the system of accounts. The thing was easy, 
 since Government possessed the means of sub- 
 stituting everywhere the new method for the 
 old one. Napoleon, who always gave force to 
 good innovations by rejecting bad ones, had, 
 since his return, closely watched the course of 
 
 ' M. -i* S&int-Didier.
 
 360 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807 
 
 this financial experiment; and he authorized 
 M. Mollien to draw up a decree for rendering 
 the new system obligatory throughout the whole 
 Empire, from the 1st of January, 1808. The 
 relations of each accountable person with the 
 came de service, accurately described and ren- 
 dered obligatory, furnished the model for this 
 decree. Every receiver-general, or private in- 
 dividual, every paymaster, every depositary, 
 in short, of the public money, charged to re- 
 ceive or to pay it in, was thenceforward re- 
 quired to keep a day-book of his operations, 
 and to send it every ten days to the Treasury, 
 which, on comparing these different journals 
 with each other, has since been enabled to 
 ascertain exactly the incoming and outgoing of 
 assets, so as not to pay, not to require, any in- 
 terest but what it owes, or but what is due to 
 it. The dispositions of this decree are the 
 same as those practised at the present day ; 
 and they have rendered the French system of 
 accounts the surest, the most accurate, and 
 the clearest in Europe. They have permitted 
 the accounts of each year to be closed ten 
 months after the end of the year to which they 
 belong, that is to say, on the 1 st of the Novem- 
 ber following. Owing to this reform, the 
 agents of the Treasury, checked the one by the 
 other, and, with the aid of the daily and direct 
 testimony of their accounts, flooded, as it were, 
 with light, could not have either means or 
 temptation to deceive, and were even secured 
 from the danger of getting into debt with the 
 State. Napoleon and M. Mollien, agreeing on 
 this point, as on all others, were of opinion 
 that receivers detected in a fault should not be 
 punished unless in case of evident dishonesty; 
 but that involuntary inaccuracies or dilatori- 
 ness, the consequence of old habits, should be 
 pardoned ; for the vicious method had been 
 the seducer and accomplice of faulty receivers, 
 and was, indeed, more faulty than they. In 
 consequence three receivers-general only were 
 dismissed ; the others were brought back to 
 better habits, but not deprived of their places. 
 Napoleon, delighted with this excellent order, 
 resolved to reward the minister who had esta- 
 blished it, and whom he had besides power- 
 fully seconded by his approbation, and by the 
 force which he had lent him against interested 
 resistances. Not always approving his ideas 
 in regard to political economy, though he ap- 
 proved all his ideas in regard to financial 
 accounts, he had one day in the Council of 
 State directed some keen shafts against inno- 
 vators. M. Mollien conceived that those shafts 
 were aimed at him, and complained in a letter, 
 which, though respectful, betrayed the morti- 
 fication which he had felt. Napoleon hastened 
 to answer him in terms full of nobleness and 
 cordiality, and to express his high esteem for 
 him, and his regret that he had been misun- 
 derstood. He then sent him one of those high 
 decorations which he conferred on his servants, 
 and a considerable sum of money to purchase 
 an estate, where that minister is now passing 
 the closing years of a useful and justly ho- 
 noured life. 
 
 A single institution was still wanting, in 
 order to leave the administration of France 
 nothing more to desire. In the central office 
 of accounts had been collected, as in a focus 
 in which the rays of light concentrate them- 
 
 selves in order to diffuse greater lustre, all the 
 means of control and mathematical verifica- 
 tion. But this office had only a purely admi- 
 nistrative authority. Its decisions respecting 
 accountable persons were insufficient in certain 
 cases to constrain or to liberate them, and, in 
 regard to the country, they were of no ^ther 
 moral value than that of a testimony borne by 
 the administrators of the Treasury concerning 
 themselves and concerning their subordinates. 
 There was yet left to be created a more exalted 
 jurisdiction, that is to say, a magistracy set- 
 tling all accounts, discharging validly the ac- 
 countable agents, releasing their persons and 
 their property pledged to the State, affirming, 
 after an investigation made out of the office of 
 the finances, the accuracy of the accounts de- 
 livered, and giving to their annual settlement 
 the form and the solemnity of an arret of a 
 supreme court. Napoleon had often thought 
 of this, and, on his return from Tilsit, he 
 realized that grand idea. 
 
 There had formerly existed in France, under 
 the title of Chambers of Accounts, tribunals 
 exercising an active superintendence over the 
 accountable agents, supplying in a certain de- 
 gree the place of that which an ill-organized 
 Treasury could not then exercise, having the 
 powers of a criminal jurisdiction over them, 
 charged to punish acts of extortion, but liable 
 also to be dispossessed of those powers by an 
 arbitrary government, and having been so 
 sometimes, when proceeding against wealthy 
 agents, having high protectors because they 
 had been in a high degree corrupters. This 
 was the first model which needed improving 
 and adapting to the institutions, the manners, 
 and the regularity of the new times. Ever 
 since the abolition of the Chamber of Accounts 
 in 1789, buried with the parliaments in one 
 common ruin, there had been only a commis- 
 sion of accounts, independent indeed of the 
 Treasury, but destitute of character, not suffi- 
 ciently numerous, and having left an immense 
 number of accounts in arrear. Napoleon, in- 
 dulging his fondness for unity, and conforming 
 to the character of the new French adminis- 
 tration, centralized in all its parts, resolved to 
 have but a single Court of Accounts, which 
 should have equal rank with the Council of 
 State and the Court of Cassation, and should 
 come immediately after those two great bodies. 
 It was to judge directly, individual^, and every 
 year, the receivers-general, and the paymas- 
 ters, that is to say, the agents of the receipt 
 and of the expenditure. No criminal proceed- 
 ing against them was attributed to it, for this 
 would have been encroaching upon other juris- 
 dictions, but it was invested with authority to 
 declare them every year acquitted towards the 
 state for their annual conduct, and to liberate 
 their property, that is, to decide questions of 
 mortgage. They were at length charged to 
 keep books of observations respecting the faith- 
 ful execution of the laws of finances obser- 
 vations transmitted every year to the head of 
 the state by the prince arch-treasurer of the 
 Empire. Warm discussion took place before 
 Napoleon and in the Council of State, whether 
 the new Court of Accounts should judge or not 
 judge the vrdonnateurs, that is to say, whether 
 it should be limited to certifying that the 
 agents of the receipts had collected the moneys
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 CGt 
 
 legally voted, and had rendered a faithful ac- 
 count of it ; that the agents of the expenditure 
 had paid the expenses legally authorized ; or 
 if it should go so far as to decide whether the 
 ordonnateurs, that is to say, the ministers, had 
 administered well or ill, had, for instance, 
 bought well or ill the corn destined for the 
 Bupport of the army, the horses destined to 
 remount the cavalry ; whether they had been, 
 in short, or had not been, intelligent, economi- 
 cal, and skilful dispensers of the public money. 
 To go so far would have been giving to magis- 
 trates, who ought to be irremovable that they 
 may be independent, the means, and with the 
 means holding out the temptation, to obstruct 
 the operations of the government itself. By 
 permitting them to rise from the judgment of 
 accounts to the judgment of the supreme agents 
 of power, the government would have abdicated 
 its authority, in favour of a jurisdiction irre- 
 movable, and consequently invincible in its 
 errors. It was therefore resolved that the new 
 Court of Accounts should judge only account- 
 able agents, never ordonnateury, and, for the 
 greater security, it was settled that its deci- 
 sions, so far from being without appeal, might 
 be referred to the Council of State, the sove- 
 reign jurisdiction, at once impartial and im- 
 bued with the spirit of government, besides 
 irremovable, and easy to bring back, if it 
 could go out of the way. 
 
 The organization of the new Court still re- 
 mained to be settled. It was proposed to pro- 
 portion the number of its members to the ex- 
 tent of its duties. In the first place, in order 
 that the investigation which it was to under- 
 take should be real and not a mere assent to 
 the papers drawn up in the office of finances, 
 there was instituted a first class of magistrates 
 called councillors referendary, having no deli- 
 berative voice, as numerous as the multiplicity 
 of the accounts required, and charged to verify 
 each of those accounts, having the accountable 
 papers before them. They were to lay the re- j 
 suit of their labours before the high magistra- , 
 cy of master-councillors, who alone should 
 have deliberative voices, and should be divided 
 into three chambers of seven members each, 
 six councillors, and one vice-president. It was 
 settled that, according to the importance of the 
 questions, the three chambers were to unite 
 into a single assembly, under the presidency 
 of a first president, who, with a procureur- 
 ffenfral, was to be at the head of the company, 
 to give it an impulsion and direction. This 
 respectable body, which has since rendered j 
 such great services to the state, was to rank ' 
 immediately after the Court of Cassation, and | 
 to receive the same appointments. At its 
 very outset a difficult task was assigned to it, 
 which it alone could perform, that of settling 
 all the accounts in arrear, the number of 
 which amounted to not fewer than 2300, which 
 dated back to the creation of assignats, and 
 the examination of which the last commission j 
 of accounts had never been able to finish. This 
 examination was difficult, for it was necessary 
 to distinguish between the honest accountable 
 agents, who had suffered by the continual fluc- 
 tuations of the paper-money, and the fraudu- 
 lent agents, who had profited by them. It was 
 not only difficult but urgent, urgent for the 
 state, which had tc claim considerable sums, 
 
 VOL. II. 46 
 
 I and for the families of the accountable agents 
 deceased or dismissed, who had to get rid of 
 the legal mortgage laid upon all their property. 
 The new Court was invested with the power 
 of arbitrating in regard to the accounts in 
 arrear, but was limited for the new accounts 
 to the rigorous application of the laws. It 
 soon acquitted itself of this arbitration, with 
 ! as much justice as it afterwards exhibited in 
 the pure and simple application of the finance 
 j laws, of which it is the keeper, as the Court 
 I of Cassation is keeper of the civil and criminal 
 ; laws of our country. 
 
 This institution, which was destined to have 
 such useful and such durable results for the 
 whole administration, had moreover the se- 
 i condary advantage of furnishing honourable 
 | and lucrative places for the most distinguished 
 j members of the Tribunate, for whom Napoleon 
 was anxious to provide in a suitable manner ; 
 for in his conceptions all these things were 
 strongly and intimately connected. He com- 
 posed, therefore, the new Court of Accounts 
 with the members of the commission of ac- 
 counts, which had just been suppressed,- and 
 with the members of the Tribunate, likewise 
 recently suppressed. Messrs. Jard-Panvilliers, 
 Delpierre, and Brierc de Surgy, the two former 
 members of the Tribunate, the third a member 
 of the commission cf accounts, were appointed 
 vice-presidents of the new Court. The im- 
 portant post of president still remained to be 
 filled. This afforded opportunity for making 
 amends to a respectable man for the temporary 
 severities to which he had been exposed. This 
 man was M. de Marbois, removed in 1806 from 
 the post of minister of the Treasury, for want 
 of shrewdness and firmness in the transactions 
 with the United Merchants. Napoleon had 
 been wrong to expect those qualities of him, 
 and to punish him because he had them not. 
 This wrong he repaired by putting him into 
 his proper place, that of first president of the 
 Court of Accounts ; for M. de Marbois was 
 much better fitted for the first magistrate of 
 the finance than its active and circumspect 
 administrator. 
 
 To the attention paid to the system of the 
 accounts of the Empire, Napoleon added a not 
 less active concern for the great works of 
 public utility. Consulting on this subject with 
 M. Cre"tet, minister of the interior, with Messrs. 
 Regnault and De Montalivet, members of the 
 Council of State, with the ministers of finances 
 and of the public Treasury, he took numerous 
 resolutions, which had for their object either 
 to give greater activity to the works already 
 begun, or to order new ones. The restoration 
 of peace, the supposed approaching diminution 
 of the public expenses, the faculty of recurring 
 to the Treasury of the army, either for con- 
 tracting loans at a moderate rate, without 
 having recourse to credit, permitted Napoleon 
 to follow the inspirations of his creative genius. 
 Thirteen thousand four hundred leagues of 
 high roads, forming the vast net-work of the 
 communications of the Empire, had been either 
 repaired or kept up at the expense of the 
 public Treasury. Two monumental routes, 
 those of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, had just 
 been finished. Napoleon ordered funds to be 
 allotted for at length setting about that of 
 Mont Genevre. He opened the necessary 
 2H
 
 362 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 180* 
 
 credits for trebling the workshops of the high 
 road from Lyons to the foot of Mont Cenis, for 
 doubling those of the road from Savona to 
 Alexandria, destined to connect Liguria with 
 Piedmont, for trebling those of the high road 
 from Mayence to Paris, one of those to which 
 he attached the greatest importance. He de- 
 creed, moreover, the opening of a route not 
 less useful in his estimation, that from Paris 
 to Wesel. Four of the bridges previously de- 
 creed were finished. Ten were building, par- 
 ticularly those of Roanne and Tours on the 
 Loire, of Strasburg on the Rhine, and of 
 Avignon on the Rhone. He ordered that of 
 Sevres on the Seine ; the completion of that of 
 St. Cloud, partly of wood, on the same river; 
 that of the Scrivia, between Tortona and Alex- 
 andria ; lastly, that of the Gironde, before 
 Bordeaux, which is become one of the grandest 
 monuments in Europe. 
 
 The canals, then the only known medium of 
 obtaining for land conveyance the facility and 
 low price of conveyance by sea, had not ceased 
 to engage the attention of Napoleon. Ten great 
 canals, destined to unite together all the parts 
 of the Empire, the Scheldt with the Meuse, the 
 Meuse with the Rhine, 1 the Rhine with the 
 Saone and the Rhone,' 2 the Scheldt with the 
 Somme, the Somme with the Oise and the 
 Seine, 3 the Seine with the Saone and the 
 Rhone, 4 the Seine with the Loire, the Loire 
 with the Cher, the Sea to the north of Bretagne 
 with the Sea to the south ; some so natural, so 
 ancient, that they had been projected, and 
 even undertaken in the seventeenth and eight- 
 eenth centuries ; some entirely planned by 
 Napoleon ; all, either continued or commenced 
 by him, were in full progress. That called the 
 canal of the North, which was to form the 
 communication between the Scheldt and the 
 Meuse, the Meuse and the Rhine, and to 
 emancipate the Netherlands from Holland, 
 conceived by Napoleon, possible for him only, 
 on account of the incorporation of the countries 
 traversed by this canal with France, was defi- 
 nitively resolved upon and marked out. The 
 works recently prescribed were begun. The 
 tunnel of St. Quentin, the principal difficulty 
 of the canal which was to unite the Scheldt 
 with the Somme, the Somme with the Seine, 
 was completed, and promised the speedy open- 
 ing of the navigation from Paris to Antwerp. 
 The canal of the Ourcq, four-fifths finished, 
 would soon bring to Paris the waters of the 
 Marne. Until the waters of the Beuvronne 
 could be brought into the basin of Villette, 
 Napoleon resolved to introduce them immedi- 
 ately into the quarters of St. Denis and St. 
 Martin. The canal of Burgundy, a plan and 
 creation of the eighteenth century, had been 
 long relinquished. Napoleon had caused that 
 part of it from Dijon to St. Jean de Losne 
 to be continued. Out of twenty-two locks, 
 comprehended in this part, eleven, executed 
 during his reign, had just been finished. The 
 navigation from Dijon to the Saone would 
 therefore soon be rendered practicable. From 
 the Yonne to Tonnerre, eighteen locks were 
 
 i Canal of the North. 
 
 TheAapoleon Canal, from the canal of the Rhone to 
 the Rhine. 
 * Canal of St Quentin. 4 Canal of Burgundy. 
 
 required, and these were in progress. But the 
 important point of the work consisted in cross- 
 ing the heights which separate the basin of the 
 S^eine from that of the Saone. The means 
 hitherto proposed appeared inadequate. Na- 
 poleon ordered this great line of navigation to 
 be resumed, at first by surveys, and as soon as 
 possible by operations upon the soil. After he 
 had investigated the difficulties presented by 
 the canal from the Rhone to the Rhine, the 
 construction of which he had much at heart, 
 and to which he had permitted his name to be 
 given, he assigned to it further funds. The 
 canal of Beaucaire was finished. He had the 
 state of that of the South, the everlasting glory 
 of Riquet, examined, purposing to continue it 
 to Bordeaux. He caused that of Berry, tend- 
 ing to prolong the navigation of the Cher from 
 Montlu9on to the Loire, to be resumed. He 
 gave orders for fresh works upon that of La 
 Rochelle, indispensable to that great naval 
 establishment, and on those of Ille-et-Rance, 
 and of the Blavet, from Nantes to Brest, des- 
 tined to cross the peninsula of Bretagne in all 
 directions, to render it navigable at all points, 
 and to facilitate the transit of stores to our 
 great military ports. 
 
 To this artificial navigation of canals, he 
 justly conceived that there ought to be added 
 the natural navigation of streams and rivers, 
 and that for this purpose their courses required 
 to be improved. He ordered surveys to be 
 made of eighteen rivers, upon which, it is true, 
 certain works were already undertaken. Al- 
 ways consistent in his conceptions, he passed 
 from canals and rivers to ports. He assigned 
 fresh funds to that of Savona, which was one 
 of the terminations of the Alexandria road. It 
 is well known what wonders were accomplish- 
 ing at Antwerp, where vast basins, scooped out 
 as by enchantment, already contained three- 
 deckers, which they had received from the 
 stocks established within the compass of that 
 great city, and which they transmitted by the 
 Scheldt to Flushing. In arrangement with 
 Holland for obtaining the cession of Flushing, 
 Napoleon gave orders for works there, for the 
 purpose of facilitating the entry into, the de- 
 parture from, and the anchoring in that port, 
 and for placing ships there out of the reach of 
 the enemy. He allotted funds for lengthening 
 the piers of Dunkirk and Calais. At Cher- 
 bourg, the great pier, destined to form a har- 
 bour, was above the water, and had been 
 crowned by a battery called the Napoleon Bat- 
 tery. New funds were granted for the conti- 
 nuation of this superb undertaking, the work 
 of Louis XVI., though it commemorated one 
 of the glories of the ancient monarchy. Lastly, 
 Napoleon prescribed a new examination of the 
 whole system of the fortresses of the Empire. 
 He resolved to devote to them not less a sum 
 than 12 millions a year, and he distributed it 
 among them according to their importance, 
 which he appreciated and fixed, classing them 
 in the following manner : Alexandria, Mayence, 
 Wesel, Strasburg, Kehl, &c. 
 
 But never did he turn his attention to great 
 works without thinking of Paris Paris, his 
 residence, the centre of his government, the 
 city of his predilection, the capital which was 
 an epitome of the greatness, of the moral pre- 
 eminence, of France over all nations. He had
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 363 
 
 promised himself before the conclusion of his 
 reign to cover it with monuments of art and of 
 public utility, to render it not less salubrious 
 than magnificent. Already, thanks to him, 
 thirty fountains, instead of pouring forth water 
 for a few hours, were running day and night. 
 The forwardness of the canal of the Ourcq ad- 
 mitted even of an addition to this abundance, 
 and allowed the water to be kept running with- 
 out intermission, in the other fountains, old 
 and new. At this moment were raised by the 
 hands of several thousand labourers, the two 
 triumphal arches of the Carrousel and 1'Etoile, 
 the Column in the Place Vendome, the facade 
 of the Legislative Body, the Church of La Ma- 
 deleine, then the Temple of Glory, and the 
 Pantheon. The Bridge of Austerlitz ; thrown 
 over the Seine, at the entry of that river into 
 Paris, was finished. The bridge of Jena, span- 
 ning the Seine at its exit, was in progress, and 
 the capital of the empire was thus about to be 
 enclosed between two immortal memorials. 
 Napoleon had enjoined the administration of 
 the Bank to build an hotel for that great esta- 
 blishment. He had decreed the palace of the 
 new Exchange, and directed a site to be sought 
 for it. The great Rue Impe'riale, resolved upon 
 in 1806, was soon to be commenced. For mo- 
 numents of art these were sufficient, and it was 
 requisite that he should direct his attention to 
 monuments of public utility. Napoleon in one 
 of his councils, decided that long covered gal- 
 leries should be erected in the principal mar- 
 kets to shelter buyers and sellers from the in- 
 clemency of the weather ; that instead of the 
 forty slaughter-houses, in which cattle for the 
 consumption of Paris were killed, and which 
 were equally unwholesome and dangerous, 
 there should be erected four large buildings for 
 the purpose at the four principal extremities 
 of Paris ; that the cupola of the Halle aux 
 file's should be rebuilt : lastly, that vast maga- 
 zines, capable of containing several million 
 quintals of grain, should be erected towards 
 the arsenal, near the creek of the canal of St. 
 Martin, at the point where all the navigable 
 routes terminate. He had bestowed assiduous 
 pains, and expended considerable sums on the 
 supplying of Paris with provisions, but he 
 thought that it was n,ot sufficient to lay out 20 
 millions of francs for corn, as he had done at 
 a preceding period ; that it was necessary to 
 have besides a place in which it could be depo- 
 sited : and to this idea are owing the granaries 
 (rjr?nirrt cT abandonee) existing at this day near 
 the Place of the Bastille. 
 
 For all these works, spread from the centre 
 to the circumference of the Empire, the budget 
 of the interior rose instantaneously from 30 
 odd millions to 56. The reserve funds placed 
 in the budget by way of resource, and lastly 
 supplementary sums which one knew where to 
 find, were to meet these excesses of the regular 
 expenses, not with interested views of local 
 utility, and not overstepping the bounds of 
 discretion, notwithstanding the creative ardour 
 of the head of the State. Napoleon was never- 
 theless desirous to ease the Treasury, or rather 
 to furnish it with the means of providing con- 
 tinually for fresh undertakings, and he devised 
 various combinations for attaining this end. 
 In the first place, the abolition of the ten war 
 centimes, recently granted, appeared to him an 
 
 occasion by which it would be right to profit. 
 It would be sufficient to keep back a small part 
 of that benefit in some of the departments, for 
 instance three or four centimes, to create con- 
 siderable resources. Napoleon thought that 
 certain works, though having a high character 
 of general utility, such as the canal of Bur- 
 gundy, the canal of Berry, and the road from 
 Bordeaux to Lyons, presented at the same time 
 an evident character of particular and local 
 utility ; that the departments would cheer- 
 fully make sacrifices to accelerate their com- 
 pletion ; and that in their concurrence there 
 might be found more considerable means of 
 execution, along with greater distributive jus- 
 tice. This was not a vain hope, for several de- 
 partments had already voluntarily taxed them- 
 selves, in order to contribute to these vast works 
 of general and particular utility. But these 
 votes had the inconvenience of being tempo- 
 rary, subject to the deliberations of general 
 councils, and on such a groundwork one could 
 scarcely found durable undertakings. Napo- 
 leon therefore resolved to present a law, by 
 virtue of which the participation of the de- 
 partments in certain works should be equi- 
 tably adjusted, and the centimes judged neces- 
 sary imposed for a specific number of years. 
 Thirty-two departments were in this predica- 
 ment. The longest duration of the centimes 
 was to be for twenty-one years, the shortest 
 for three, the mean for twelve ; the maximum 
 of the centimes imposed 6, the minimum 2f. 
 Thus the departments of the Cote-d'Or and 
 the Yonne, with the arrondissement of Bar, 
 were to contribute to the canal of Burgundy ; 
 those of the Allier and the Cher to the canal 
 of Berry ; those of the Rhone, the Loire, Puy 
 de Dome, la Correze, the Dordogne, and the 
 Gironde, to the high road from Bordeaux to 
 Lyons. It would be too long to enumerate the 
 others. In general, the proportion to be con- 
 tributed by the state and the department was 
 fixed at a half each. This impost was, after 
 all, but a reduction of the land-tax : and the 
 source of immense advantages to the localities 
 on which it was laid. 
 
 An annual subsidy being thus insured by the 
 law which imposed the centimes, it was possible 
 to contract loans, because one had the means 
 of serving their interests. Recourse was had 
 to the usual lender, the Treasury of the armj 7 , 
 which, according to the intentions of Napoleon, 
 was to seek to procure for itself solid revenues 
 by the advantageous employment of its capitals. 
 This Treasury immediately lent the prefect of 
 the Seine eight millions for the works in Paris. 
 Other cities, as well as several departments, 
 had recourse to this beneficent dispensation of 
 the wealth acquired by victory. Always ex- 
 tracting from every idea whatever of utility it 
 comprehended, Napoleon thought to carry the 
 employment of this kind of resource much fur- 
 ther. Three of those canals which we have 
 enumerated above, those from the Scheldt to 
 the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Rhone, from 
 the Rhone to the Seine, appeared to him more 
 worthy of fixing his attention, and of becoming 
 the object of his all-powerful activity. Besides 
 these three canals, and almost in their vicinity, 
 there were three others, finished, or nearly so, 
 and capable of yielding speedy revenues ; these 
 were the canals of St. Quentin, Orleans, and
 
 3G4 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Ang. 1807. 
 
 the South. Napoleon resolved to finish them 
 immediately, then to sell them to capitalists in 
 shares which ought to bring in six or seven per 
 cent.: making sure of finding a purchaser for 
 all those which the public would not take. This 
 purchaser, as it may easily be guessed, was 
 again the Treasury of the army. These sums, 
 said he to the minister of the interior, you will 
 employ in pushing forward the execution of the 
 three canals, the completion of which is of such 
 importance to the prosperity of the Empire ; 
 and when these three are completed, I shall 
 sell them to a purchaser, who will take them 
 too ; and thus shifting from work to work a 
 capital of three or four hundred millions accru- 
 ing from moneys annually furnished by the 
 State and the departments, we shall in a few 
 years change the face of the country. 
 
 His plan was, after setting all these enter- 
 prises in motion, after getting voted in a short 
 session, besides the budget, the legislative mea- 
 sures which he needed for the execution of his 
 projects, to give before winter a few days to Italy, 
 wishing to extend to her also the benefit of his 
 creative looks. He purposed at his return to re- 
 solve the questions left undecided, that in spring 
 the works might commence all over the Empire. 
 He therefore ordered the minister of the inte- 
 rior to subject all these ideas to a thorough 
 examination, that they might be realized as 
 speedily as possible. "If we do not make 
 haste," said he to him, "we shall die before 
 we have seen the navigation opened on those 
 three great canals. Wars, silly people, will 
 come, and those canals will be left unfinished. 
 Every thing is possible in France at this moment, 
 when one has more need to seek the way to 
 employ money than money itself. .... 
 I have funds destined to reward the generals 
 and -the officers of the grand army. Those 
 funds might as well be given them in canal 
 shares as in rentes on the .State, or in money. 
 I should be obliged to give them money, if 
 something of that sort were not soon settled. 
 I have made the glory of my reign consist in 
 changing the face of the territory of my Empire. 
 The execution of these great public works is as 
 necessary to the interest of my people as to my 
 own satisfaction." 
 
 Napoleon, moreover, was deeply intent on 
 the extinction of beggary. To accomplish its 
 abolition, he resolved to create departmental 
 houses, where mendicants should be furnished 
 with work and food, and in which also they 
 should be forcibly confined, when found beg- 
 ging in the public places or on the high roads. 
 He required that houses of this kind should be 
 opened shortly in all the departments. " I at- 
 tach," he wrote in the letter to the minister of 
 the interior quoted above, " a great importance 
 and a great idea of glory to the suppression of 
 mendicity. Funds are not wanting, but every 
 thing seems to me to proceed slowly, and mean- 
 while the years are flying away. We ought not 
 to pass through this world without leaving 
 traces that recommend our memory to poste- 
 rity. 1 am about to be absent for a month. 
 Contrive to be ready on my return on all these 
 questions, to have examined them all in detail, 
 that I may be able, by a general decree, to give 
 a finishing stroke to mendicity. Before the 15th 
 of December, you must have found either in the 
 reserved fourths or in the funds of the com- 
 
 munes the resources necessary for the mainte- 
 nance of sixty or a hundred houses for the ex- 
 tirpation of mendicity ; let the sites for them 
 be fixed upon, and the general regulations ma- 
 tured. Don't ask me again for three or four 
 months for collecting information. You have 
 young auditors, intelligent prefects, clever en- 
 gineers of the ponts et chaussees make all these 
 run about and don't go to sleep over the ordi- 
 nary office business. The winter evenings are 
 long ; fill your portfolios, that, during the even* 
 ings of those three months, we may be able to 
 discuss the means of arriving at those great 
 results." 
 
 In this extreme ardour, which impelled him 
 to hasten, nay, to hurry, the accomplishment 
 of good, he paid the like attention to the Bank 
 of France, which he purposed to make one of 
 the principal instruments of the public pros- 
 perity. He had required in 1806, that this 
 great establishment should change its constitu- 
 tion and take the monarchical form, instead of 
 the republican form which it before had, a 
 result obtained by giving it a governor and 
 three regents appointed by the minister of the 
 finances. He desired, moreover, that the capi- 
 tal of the Bank should be proportioned to the 
 part which he destined for it, and that, instead 
 of 45,000 shares, it should issue 90,000, which 
 would raise its capital from 45 to 90 millions. 
 These shares had not yet been issued, because 
 the Bank was afraid that it should not find em- 
 ployment for the funds which they would pro- 
 duce, especially as Napoleon had judged it 
 more expedient to cause the service of the Trea- 
 sury to be executed by the Treasury itself, and 
 had devoted to this service a sum of 84 mil- 
 lions, more than half of which was already 
 paid in. The result of this excellent measure 
 was, however, to leave without employment the 
 capitals accustomed to be invested in obligations 
 and bills at sight. Napoleon was delighted at 
 the embarrassment which he thus occasioned to 
 certain capitalists, for, he said, it would reduce 
 them to the necessity of seeking, in commerce, 
 in industry, in the great public works, invest- 
 ments which the paper of the Treasury no 
 longer offered them. The Bank, which was 
 usually engaged in the discount of that paper, 
 and which could no longer procure any, hesi- 
 tated to issue its 45,000 new shares. Napoleon 
 forced it to issue them, promising soon to fur- 
 nish it and all capitalists with employment for 
 their money by the multiplication of undertak- 
 ings of all sorts. In this figurative language, 
 he said to the Bank of France, " With the pro- 
 pensity which exists in our country to central- 
 ize every thing in Paris, to centralize their pay- 
 ments as well as the government itself, the 
 Bank ought to become there the greatest of 
 commercial agents ; it ought to be truly worthy 
 of its name, and to become for Paris what the 
 Thames, which conveys every thing to London, 
 is for London." He insisted, therefore, on the 
 issue of the 45,000 new shares, which, for the 
 rest, were disposed of with advantage ; for, 
 issued at 1200 francs, (1000 francs representing 
 the capital of the share, 200 francs represent- 
 ing old accumulated bonuses,) they were nego- 
 tiated at 1400 francs. The three public effects 
 of the time were the 5 per cent, rentes, the 
 Bank shares, and the rescriptions on the na- 
 tional domains, devised to liquidate the arrear.
 
 Ang. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 865 
 
 The 5 per cent., at the time of which we are 
 treating, (August, 1807,) sold at 93 francs, the 
 Bank shares at 1425, the rescriptions at 92. 
 The rate of the latter had become almost in- 
 variable. 
 
 Napoleon required that the interest should 
 be reduced to 5 per cent, at the Bank, a mea- 
 sure which it most cheerfully adopted. He or- 
 dered that the interest of securities should be 
 reduced, for some from 6 to 5, for the others 
 from 5 to 4. At last he carried the impatience 
 to do good so far as to desire to fix the interest 
 allowed by the caisse de service to capitals at 3 
 and 3. Having no need of money, pouring it 
 into that chest in abundance, he maintained 
 that only such funds ought to be kept as could 
 be content with that remuneration ; that all the 
 others ought to be sent back to commerce ; and 
 that thus the reduction of interest ought to be 
 forced by all the means that were at the dispo- 
 sal of the government. But M. Mollien stop- 
 ped him by proving to him that such a result 
 was premature ; for the money promised to the 
 chest was not wholly paid in, and it was still in 
 need of the resources by which it was usually 
 supplied. The success of such a measure would 
 have been infallible in the following year, had 
 not new enterprises abroad intervened to divert 
 the capitalists as well as the soldiery of France 
 from iheir better, more useful, and more sure 
 employment. 
 
 The aspect, if not alarming, at least sad, 
 which the war had assumed during the winter 
 of 1807 [1806?], added to the severity of the 
 season and to the absence of the imperial 
 court, had slackened for a moment the activity 
 of business, particularly in Paris. But the 
 restoration of continental peace, and the hope 
 of maritime peace, had again encouraged the 
 highest flights of imagination, and in all parts 
 people began to fall to work in the manufac- 
 tories, and in commercial houses to plan specu- 
 lations which embraced the whole extent of 
 the Continent. Though the productions of 
 Great Britain still found their way beyond the 
 coast of Europe by inlets unknown to Napo- 
 leon, they yet had difficulty to penetrate and 
 still greater to circulate ; cotton threads and 
 BtuffS, which, thanks to the prohibitory laws 
 then issued in France, had been fabricated 
 with profit, in great quantity, and with a com- 
 mencement of perfection, superseded the Eng- 
 lish productions of the same kind, passed the 
 Rhine in the train of our armies, and spread 
 themselves in Spain, Italy, and Germany. 
 Our silks, unrivalled at all times, filled the 
 markets of Europe, which caused general satis- 
 faction at Lyons. Our cloths, which had the 
 advantage of raw material, since the English 
 were shut out from the Spanish wools, of 
 which we ;iad a superabundance, drove the j 
 English woollens out of all the fairs of the j 
 Continent ; for they had the superiority not ; 
 only in quality but in beauty. Besides, it was ! 
 not our productions alone that gained by the 
 exclusion of English goods. Saxony, the most 
 industrious of the German provinces, already 
 eent charcoal by the Elbe to Hamburg, cloths 
 made of the fine Saxon wools to markets to 
 which they had never penetrated, and the 
 metals of the Erzgebirge to all quarters where 
 the metals of America were deficient. Our 
 iron and that of Germany also profited greatly j 
 
 by the exclusion of English and Swedish iron, 
 and was perceptibly improved. 
 
 Napoleon strove to encourage by the power 
 of fashion, a fickle, fantastic power, which 
 shares with the sacred power of conscience the 
 privilege of escaping from material power, but 
 which, nevertheless, cheerfully obeys glory 
 Napoleon strove then by the power of fashion 
 to gain a preference for the use of articleH 
 manufactured from materials of continental 
 origin. He wished, for example, that the 
 linens and lawn, composed of flax and hemp, 
 should be preferred to the muslin made of cot- 
 ton. He also wished silks to be preferred to 
 plain cloth, which must occasion a return to- 
 wards the luxury of the ancie-n regime, towards 
 that time when men, instead of dressing in the 
 modest stuff called black cloth, wore stuffs as 
 rich as those used for the dresses of the other 
 sex. And he encouraged this return to luxury, 
 as well as a return to nobility, to titles, to do- 
 tations, for reasons peculiar to himself, serious 
 reasons which always guided him in things ap- 
 parently the most frivolous. 
 
 Excepting our maritime branches of industry, 
 which he sought to compensate for their inac- 
 tivity by immense naval creations, our other 
 industries found, therefore, a powerful cause 
 of development in that extraordinary situation 
 which Napoleon had procured for France. But, 
 what is singular enough, the greatest of me- 
 chanical forces, that of steam, which, from its 
 expansive power, animates at this day every 
 branch of human industry, which gives motion 
 to so many machines, which propels so many 
 vessels, which is, with peace, the principal 
 cause of the prosperity of the inferior classes, 
 and of the luxury of the superior classes the 
 force of steam was developing itself by his side, 
 without him. Those machines, then called 
 fire-machines, from their most obvious phe- 
 nomenon, rudely constructed, consuming an 
 excessive quantity of fuel, were employed only 
 in coal-mines, on account of the cheapness of 
 fuel in works of that kind. The Society for 
 the encouragement of industry offered a prize 
 as,, a reward for those who should render its 
 application more practical and more econo- 
 mical ; and, two thousand leagues from our 
 shores, Fulton, scarcely listened to by Na- 
 poleon in 1803, because he wanted, for cross- 
 ing the sea, not an untried but a tried agent, 
 was obliged to go and make the experiment 
 with a vessel moved by what was then called 
 the fire-machine. He had performed the double 
 trip from New York to Albany and from Al- 
 bany to New York in four days, and had 
 scarcely attracted the notice of the world, the 
 face of which he was to change thirty years 
 later. This is not the first time that a great 
 invention, due to second-rate but special geni- 
 uses, has passed before the eyes of superior 
 geniuses, without exciting their attention. 
 Gunpowder, which, destroying the empire of 
 physical strength in war, contributed so power- 
 fully to a revolution in all the European man- 
 ners, was not only odious to the heroic Bayard, 
 but excited the disdain of Machiavel, that most 
 profound judge of human things, that author, 
 so admired by Napoleon, of the treatise on 
 war, and was considered by him as an ephe- 
 meral invention and of no consequence. 
 
 Thinking that a good legislation is, with 
 2u2
 
 366 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 capitals and markets, the greatest benefit that 
 can be conferred on commerce, Napoleon had 
 ordered the arch-chancellor Cambaceres to get 
 a commercial code prepared. This code had, 
 in fact, just been drawn up. The groundwork 
 of it had been borrowed from the most cele- 
 brated maritime nations, and the simple and 
 analytical form from French intelligence, which 
 shone more than ever in this respect in the di- 
 gesting of the laws, because, conceived on a 
 vast and uniform plan, and their composition 
 carefully revised in the Council of State, they 
 were never retouched by the Legislative Body, 
 vrhich adopted or rejected them without amend- 
 ment. This code, completely prepared at the 
 moment of Napoleon's return, was to be pre- 
 sented, with the other measures, of which we 
 have just been treating, to the Legislative 
 Body, in the short session for which prepara- 
 tions were making. 
 
 It was time that Napoleon should at length 
 confer on his glorious soldiers the rewards 
 which he had promised them, and which they 
 had so richly deserved during the last two 
 campaigns. But it was in the very form of 
 these rewards that he particularly displayed 
 his organizing and mighty genius. He was 
 sure, in fact, to take good care not to fling to 
 them the spoils of the vanquished, that they 
 might consume them in an orgie. He pur- 
 posed, with what he should give them, to 
 found great families, which should surround 
 the throne, concur in defending it, contribute 
 to the splendour of French society, without 
 injuring public liberty, and, above all, with- 
 out incurring any violation of the principles 
 of equality proclaimed by the French revolu- 
 tion. Experience has proved that an aris- 
 tocracy is not prejudicial to the liberty of a 
 country ; for the English aristocracy has con- 
 tributed not less than the other classes of the 
 nation to the liberty of Great Britain. Reason, 
 moreover, tells us that an aristocracy may be 
 compatible with the principle of equality on 
 two conditions : in the first place, that the 
 members who compose it should have no ex- 
 clusive rights, and should be subject in all 
 things to the general law ; secondly, that the 
 purely honorary distinctions granted to one 
 class should be accessible to all the citizens 
 of the same State who have earned them by 
 their services or their talents. So much as 
 this was but reasonable in the wishes of the 
 French revolution, and this it was that Na- 
 poleon purposed to maintain invariably. But 
 in our opinion, in modern societies, in which 
 envy has risen against aristocratic institutions, 
 what a sensible government had best do is to 
 leave the laws of human nature to act, with- 
 out in any way interfering with them. They 
 lead back the free man to God, and, next to 
 God, to another worship, that of ancestors. 
 Whatever we may do or not do, the great war- 
 rior, the great magistrate, the illustrious man 
 of science, will bequeath to their descendants 
 a consideration which will cause them to be 
 distinguished from the multitude, and which, 
 when they have merit, will spare them the 
 most serious of the difficulties that merit meets 
 within this world, that of attracting the first 
 notice of the public. 
 
 The laws have no need to interfere in order 
 thut it should be thus, for it is not written laws, 
 
 it is Nature, that produces the aristocracy in 
 all countries and especially in republics. Na- 
 ture had created the aristocracy of Venice long 
 before it thought of attributing exclusive rights 
 to itself by laws. It is a thing in which one 
 ought not to intermeddle, whatever inclination 
 one may have to do so. Time makes aristocra- 
 cies everywhere : all that one has to do is to 
 avoid the ridicule of making them one's self, 
 and at most to prevent their being tempted 
 hereafter to arrogate to themselves exclusive 
 privileges. t 
 
 If, however, there was a sovereign in the 
 world who could escape the ridicule or the odi- 
 um sometimes excited by the establishment of 
 aristocratic institutions, it was he who dared 
 and could re-establish monarchy on the morrow 
 of the Republic, the difference of ranks (not 
 that of rights) on the morrow of a brutal equal- 
 ity ; who, in his vast imagination, figured to 
 himself a society great as his genius and his 
 soul ; and who had immortal names and trea- 
 sures for the creating of mighty families ; who 
 could call them Rivoli, Castiglione, Montebello, 
 Elchingen, Auerstadt, and give them an annual 
 revenue of not less than a million. He was 
 therefore excusable, for he would not violate 
 the true principles of the French revolution, 
 and he thought, on the contrary, to consecrate 
 them in a striking manner, by making, after 
 the image of his own fortune, a duke, a prince, 
 out of a child of the plough. Finally, a last 
 consideration here presented itself, to disarm 
 the most austere reason, that was to procure 
 for himself the innocent and inoffensive means 
 of exciting and rewarding eminent services. 1 
 
 Napoleon availed himself, therefore, of the 
 glory of Tilsit, and of the spell with which he was 
 surrounded at this moment, to accomplish the 
 plan which he had long meditated of instituting 
 a nobility. Already, in 1806, when he had given 
 crowns to his brothers, to his sisters, to his 
 adopted sou, principalities to several of his ser- 
 vants, that of Ponte Corvo to Marshal Bernu- 
 dotte, that of Benevente to M. de Talleyrand, 
 that of Neufchatel to Major-general Berthier, 
 he had announced that a posterior statute 
 should prescribe the system of the succession 
 for the families in favour of whom there should 
 be created principalities, duchies, and other dis- 
 tinctions destined to be hereditary. In conse- 
 quence he enacted by a senatus consults that the 
 titles conferred by him as well as the revenues 
 attached to those titles should be transmitted 
 hereditarily in a direct line from male to male, 
 contrariwise to the system of succession ad- 
 mitted by the Civil Code. He further enacted 
 that the dignitaries of the Empire of all de- 
 grees might transmit to their eldest son a title, 
 which should be that of duke, count, or baron, 
 according to the dignity of the father, on con- 
 dition of having given proof of a certain reve- 
 nue, at least one-third of which must remain 
 attached to the title conferred on the descend- 
 ants. These same personages had also the 
 right of constituting for their younger sons 
 titles always inferior to those which should 
 have been granted to the eldest, and always on 
 
 These lilies were written in 1846, under the monarchy. 
 I wrote them because I believed them to be true in all 
 times. I shall not alter them, therefore, though times ar 
 changed.
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 3G7 
 
 condition of setting aside out of their fortune 
 a part which should be the hereditary accom- 
 paniment of those titles. Such was the origin 
 of the majorats. 'The grand dignitaries, as the 
 grand-elector, the constable, the arch-chancel- 
 lor, the irch-treasurer, were to have the title 
 of highness. Their eldest sons were to have the 
 title of dukes, if their father had instituted in 
 their favour a majorat with a revenue of 200,000 
 livres. The ministers, the senators, the coun- 
 cillors of State, the presidents of the Legislative 
 Body, the archbishops, were authorized to take 
 the title of count and to transmit that title to 
 their sons or nephews, on condition of a majo- 
 rat with a revenue of 30,000 livres. Lastly, 
 the presidents of the electoral colleges for life, 
 the first presidents procureurs generaux, and 
 bishops, the maires of the thirty-seven good 
 cities of the Empire, were authorized to take 
 the title of barons, and to transmit it to their 
 eldest sons on condition of a majorat with a re- 
 veliue of 15,000 livres. The plain members of 
 the Legion of Honour might call themselves 
 chevaliers, and transmit that title on condition 
 of a majorat with a revenue of 3000 livres. 
 Another statute was to determine the conditions 
 to which these portions of the fortune of the 
 families thus placed under an exceptional go- 
 vernment were to be subject* 
 
 Here, again, it was the Senate that received 
 the commission to stamp a legal character on 
 this new imperial creation by means of a sena- 
 ttu consulte, which most expressly stipulated 
 that these titles should not confer any particu- 
 lar right, or form any exception to the com- 
 mon law, or give any exemption from the 
 charges or duties imposed on other citizens. 
 There was nothing exceptional but the system 
 of the substitutions imposed on the ennobled 
 families, which acquired their new greatness 
 by sacrificing for themselves the equal sharing 
 of inheritances. 
 
 These dispositions being decreed, Napoleon 
 distributed among his companions in arms part 
 of the treasures amassed by his genius. While 
 waiting till he had decreed to Lannes, Massena, 
 Davout, Berthier, Ney, and others, the titles 
 which he purposed to borrow from the great 
 events of his reign, he resolved to insure their 
 opulence to them immediately. He gave them 
 estates situated in Poland, in Germany, in 
 Italy, with power to sell them, and to invest 
 the produce in France, besides sums in ready 
 money to buy and furnish hotels. This was 
 only a first gift, for these assignments were 
 afterwards doubled, trebled, and even quad- 
 rupled, some of them. Marshal Lannes re- 
 ceived a revenue of 328,000 francs, and a mil- 
 lion of ready money ; Marshal Davout a reve- 
 nue of 410,000 francs, and 300,000 francs in 
 money ; Marshal Massena a revenue of 183,000 
 francs, and 200,000 francs in money, (he was 
 afterwards one of the most richly endowed;) 
 Major-general Berthier a revenue of 405,000 
 francs, and 500,000 francs in money ; Marshal 
 Ney a revenue of 229,000 francs, and 300,000 
 francs in money ; Marshal Mortier a revenue 
 of 198,000 francs, and 200,000 francs in mo- 
 ney ; Marshal Soult a revenue of 305,000 
 francs, and 300,000 francs in money ; Marshal 
 Augereau a revenue of 172,000 francs, and 
 200,000 francs in money ; Marshal Bernadotte 
 a revenue of 291,000 francs, and 200,000 1 
 
 francs in money. Generals Sebastiani, Victor, 
 Rapp, Junot, Bertrand, Lemarrois, Caulain- 
 : court, Savary, Mouton, Moncey, Friand, St. 
 Hilaire, Oudinot, Lauriston, Gudin, Marchand, 
 Marmont, Dupont, Legrand, Suchet, Laribois- 
 siere, Loison, Reille, Nansouty, Songy, Chas- 
 seloup, and others, received, some a revenue 
 of 150, others 100, 80, 50 thousand francs, and 
 almost all 100,000 francs in money. The civi- 
 lians also had their share in these largesses. 
 The Arch-chancellor Cambace"res and the 
 Arch-treasurer Lebrun obtained each a reve- 
 nue of 200,000 francs. Messrs. Mollien, 
 Fouche", Decres, Gaudin, Daru, obtained each 
 40 or 50 thousand. All, civil and military, 
 were only provided for ad interim by these mag- 
 nificent gifts, and were so in Poland, in West- 
 phalia, in Hanover, which must interest them 
 in upholding the greatness of the Empire. Na- 
 poleon had reserved for himself in Poland 
 domains to the amount of 20 millions, in 
 Hanover of 30, in Westphalia a capital repre- 
 sented by a revenue of 5 or 6 millions, inde- 
 pendently of 30 millions in capital, and of an 
 income of 1,250,000 francs in Italy, already 
 reserved in 1805. He had, therefore, where- 
 withal to enrich the brave men who served 
 him and to fulfil the fair promises which he 
 had addressed to several of them. " Pillage 
 not," said he ; " I will give you more than you 
 would take ; and what I shall give you, 
 amassed by my foresight, will not cost your 
 honour or the nations we have conquered any 
 thing." And he said truly, for the domains 
 which he distributed were imperial domains in 
 Italy, royal or grand-ducal in Prussia, in Han- 
 over, in Westphalia. But these domains, won 
 by victory, might be lost by defeat; and, for- 
 tunately for them, those who were so mag- 
 nificently endowed were mostly to receive in 
 France, either on the rentes or the canals, other 
 assignments, less exposed to the risk of events 
 than lands situated abroad. 
 
 The French generals were not the only par- 
 ticipators in these largess, for the Polish 
 generals Zayonsheck and Dombrowski, old 
 servants of France, obtained each a million. 
 
 After the generals, the officers and soldiers 
 also received marks of his liberality. Napoleon 
 ordered all of them to be paid, besides the pay 
 in arrear, considerable gratuities, in order to 
 procure for them immediately a few pleasures, 
 which they had well earned. Eighteen millions 
 were distributed under this form, 6 millions 
 among the officers, 12 among the soldiers. 
 The wounded had a treble sum. Those who 
 had been fortunate enough to be present. at 
 the four great battles of the late war, Auster- 
 litz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland, obtained 
 twice as much as the others. To these gra- 
 tuities of the moment were added permanent 
 assignments of 500 francs for the soldiers who 
 had lost a limb, and of 1000, 2000, 4000, 5000, 
 10,000, in favour of those officers who had 
 distinguished themselves, from the rank of sub- 
 officer to that of colonel. For the officers, aa 
 for the generals, this was but a first remunera- 
 tion, followed subsequently by others moro 
 considerable, and independent of the salaries 
 of the Legion jf Honour, as well as the retir- 
 ing pensions legally due at the end of tho 
 military career. 
 
 This glorious conqueror, therefore, designed
 
 J68 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 that everybody should participate in his pros- 
 perity as in his glory. As for himself, simple, 
 frugal, magnificent for others only, repressing 
 the slightest misapplication of the public mo- 
 ney, unmerciful for any expense which seemed 
 to him unnecessary in his palace or in the 
 State, he was prodigal only with noble views, 
 and towards all who had contributed to the 
 greatness of France or to his own. The slan- 
 derers of his glory and of ours have alleged 
 that, in despoiling the vanquished, in glutting 
 the greediness of his soldiers, he had taken 
 from the one the means of exalting the bravery 
 of the others. We must leave such calumnies 
 to foreigners, or to parties associated with 
 foreigners. These treasures were taken not 
 from the people, but from emperors, kings, 
 princes, convents, leagued against France ever 
 since 1792. As for the vanquished people, 
 they were spared as much as the war allowed 
 them to be, much more than they had been 
 spared in any times and in any country, much 
 more than we have been ourselves. And, as 
 for those heroic soldiers, whose value Napoleon 
 is said to have stimulated with money, they 
 had no more idea that, in running to Auster- 
 litz, to Jena, to Eylau, to Friedland, they 
 should meet with Fortune by the way, than 
 they expected it in running to Marengo, to 
 Rivoli, and at an earlier period to Valmy or 
 to Jemmapes. After flying to the defence of 
 their country in 1792, they now dashed on to 
 glory, impelled by the passion for great things, 
 a passion which the French revolution had be- 
 gotten in them, and which Napoleon had in- 
 flamed to the highest degree. If, on the mor- 
 row of a long perseverance in defying cold, 
 hunger, death, they found competence, it was 
 a surprise of Fortune's which they enjoyed, as 
 a soldier enjoys a little gold found on a field 
 of battle ; and these gratifications which had 
 been contrived for them, they were ready to 
 leave afresh, to expend again that life which 
 they considered as not their own, and which 
 they hastened to use as a loan made to them 
 by Napoleon, till he should demand from them 
 the sacrifice of it. 
 
 Napoleon took other measures as wise as they 
 were humane. He ordered, according to his 
 custom in every interval of peace, several re- 
 views of the army, one after another, to with- 
 draw from the ranks soldiers who were worn 
 out or mutilated, and fit for no other service 
 than to stimulate the young soldiers by their 
 military stories. He caused their pension to be 
 settled and their places in the ranks to be filled 
 up by conscripts, repeating incessantly that the 
 Treasury of the army was not rich enough to 
 pay for all old services, neither was the budget 
 of the State to pay soldiers who could not serve 
 actively. Thinking of civil merits as well as 
 of military merits, he demanded and obtained 
 a modification of the law of civil pensions, a 
 law which, ever since 1789, had varied as much 
 under the influence of popular caprice as re- 
 wards varied before that period under the influ- 
 ence of royal caprice. At the time of the Con- 
 stituent Assembly, the limit adopted for the 
 very highest civil pension was 10,000 francs, in 
 the time of the Convention 3000, in the time of 
 the Consulate 6000. Napoleon wished that 
 limit to be fixed at 20,000, proposing to himself 
 not to approach, not to come up to it, unless in 
 
 favour of signal services. It was the death of 
 M. Portalis, leaving a widow without fortune, 
 which suggested this idea, attended with little 
 danger to the finances of a State, and useful 
 for the development of talents. He granted a 
 pension of 6000 francs and a sum of 24,000 
 francs to Mademoiselle Dillon, sister of the first 
 officer murdered in our popular disturbances. 
 The mother of the empress, Madame de la Pa- 
 gerie, having died at Martinique, he ordered 
 the negroes and the negresses who had served 
 her to be set at liberty, a dowry to be given to 
 a young woman who had nursed her, and in 
 short placed in comfort all who had had the 
 honour to approach her. 
 
 The Church, as well as all the servants of the 
 State, had a share in the munificence of the 
 conqueror. On the proposal of Prince Camba- 
 ce"res, who had acted ad interim as minister of 
 the cultes, during the interval between the death 
 of M. Portalis and the appointment of M. Bigot 
 de Preameneu, he decided that the number of 
 chapels of ease (succursaks) should be increased 
 from 24 to 30 thousand, in order to extend the 
 benefit of divine service to all the communes in 
 the Empire. Perceiving, moreover, that the 
 career of the priesthood was in less request 
 than formerly, he granted 2400 exhibitions for 
 the small seminaries. He wished to make 
 known to the Church that if there were some 
 differences of a purely temporal nature with its 
 head, in regard to spirituals he was always 
 equally disposed to serve and to protect him. 
 At this moment he was engaged with the exe- 
 cution of the law of 1806, which authorized him 
 to create a university out of the foundation of 
 that great establishment. But this idea waa 
 not yet mature either with him or around him. 
 For the present he was content with increasing 
 the number of the exhibitions in the lyceums. 
 
 While he was thinking so much about others, 
 he nevertheless lent himself to a measure which 
 seemed to interest his personal glory alone. 
 He consented, agreeably to a wish, excited by 
 sincere attachment in some, by adulation in 
 others, to change the title of the Civic Code, 
 and to call it the Napoleon Code. Assuredly 
 if ever title was merited, it was this ; for that 
 Code was as much the work of Napoleon as the 
 victory of Austerlitz and Jena. At Austerlitz, 
 at Jena, he had had soldiers, who had lent him 
 their arms, as he had lawyers who lent him 
 their knowledge in the digesting of that Code ; 
 but to the force of his will, to the soundness 
 of his judgment, was owing the completion of 
 that great work. And if Justinian, who, ac- 
 cording to an expression in the exposition of 
 his motives, " fought by his generals, thought 
 by his ministers," had a right to give his name 
 to the code of the Roman laws, Napoleon had 
 a greatef right to give his to the code of the 
 French laws. Besides, the memory of a great 
 man protects good laws, and good laws protect 
 the memory of a great man. Nothing, there- 
 fore, was more just than this measure, and it 
 was conceived, proposed, and cordially adopted, 
 almost without leaving Napoleon the trouble of 
 wishing, or asking for it. At the same time, 
 Napoleon wrote to his- brothers and to the 
 princes under his influence, to persuade them 
 to introduce into their States this code of jus- 
 tice and civil equality. He had prescribed ita 
 adoption throughout all Italy. He enjoined his
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 369 
 
 brother Louis to adopt it in Holland, and his 
 brother Jerome to adopt it in Westphalia. He 
 invited the King of Saxony, Grand-duke of War- 
 saw, to put it in force in restored Poland. It 
 was already studied in Germany, and in spite 
 of the repugnance which that country must 
 then have felt to receive any thing coming from 
 France, all hearts there were attracted by the 
 equity of a code, which, besides its precision, 
 its clearness, its consistency, had the advantage 
 of re-establishing justice in families, and put- 
 ting an end to feudal tyranny in them. At 
 Hamburg, the Civil Code had been called for by 
 the wish of the population. It began to be 
 acted upon in Dantzig. It was announced that 
 the same would be the case at Bremen and in 
 the Hanseatic cities. The prince primate, in 
 his principality of Frankfort, the King of Bava- 
 ria, in his aggrandized monarchy, had enjoined 
 the study of it. in order to introduce it into the 
 minds of their subjects before introducing it 
 into practice. The Grand-duke of Baden had 
 just admitted it into his duchy. Thus France 
 indemnified humanity for the blood spilt in war, 
 and made some compensation for the injury 
 done to the present generation by an immense 
 benefit insured to future generations. 
 
 All sorts of glory would be in vain dispensed 
 by Providence to a nation, if that nation had 
 the keen regret to conceive that the glory of 
 letters, of the arts and sciences, was refused 
 it ; and, if the Romans had had no other merit 
 than that of conquering the world, of civilizing 
 after they had conquered it r of giving it im- 
 mortal laws, which, adapted to our manners, 
 still live in our codes ; if they had but this 
 eminent merit ; if they had not numbered 
 among their great men Horace, Virgil, Cicero, 
 Tacitus, done nothing to charm mankind, after 
 having done every thing to domineer over it, 
 they would have left the Greeks the honour of 
 being its delight, and they would occupy in the 
 annals of the human mind a lower place than 
 that small nation. But the genius of govern- 
 ment and war never exists without the genius 
 of letters, and of the arts and sciences, because 
 it is impossible to act without thinking, and to 
 think without speaking, writing, and painting. 
 
 France, which has shed so much generous 
 blood on all the battle-fields of Europe, 
 France has also had this double glory, and 
 while she won the victories of the Downs and 
 of Rocroy, she created the Cid and Athalie, she 
 had Conde" and Bossuet to celebrate Conde 1 . | 
 Napoleon in his immense desire to be great, 
 but to be so with France and through France, 
 would also have been glad that she should have 
 under his government all sorts of crowns, those 
 of intelligence as well as those of power, and 
 not renounce the glory of producing men of I 
 letters, men of science, painters, as he pro- 
 duced heroes. But the will can do every thing 
 among men, except changing the times, and 
 the times have a greater influence over the 
 genius of nations than all the will of govern- 
 ments. Charlemagne, great as he was, smitten 
 as he showed himself to be with the noblest 
 studies, could not fertilize a barbarous age. 
 St. Louis XIV. while admiring genius some- 
 times without comprehending it, sometimes 
 maltreating it, had only to allow it to act in 
 order to have around him the finest spectacle 
 that the human mind ever exhibited, for never 
 VOL. IL 47 
 
 did it produce works so grand and so perfect. 
 Napoleon would have had the time, which he 
 wanted through his own fault, which would 
 have restored the French nation that youth of 
 intellect which produces a Cid and an Athalie ; 
 and he would certainly have refused it a liberty 
 which creates Ciceros and Sallusts when it 
 exists, Tacituses when it has ceased to exist. 
 
 France, from 1789 to 1814, eminent in the 
 sciences, fancying that she was so in the arts 
 of design, even nattered herself that she was 
 eminent in letters. In these sciences, three 
 savants, illustrious for their vast and noble 
 works, insured a durable glory to the period 
 in which they lived. M. Lagrange, by pushing 
 the Algebraic sciences beyond their former 
 limits, gave a new power to abstract calcula- 
 tion. M. de Laplace, applying this power to 
 the universe, did the only thing which, after 
 Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Copernicus, and 
 Newton, was left to be accomplished ; this waa 
 to calculate with a precision till then unknown 
 the movements of the celestial bodies, and to 
 display in its sublime totality the system of the 
 world. Lastly, M. Cuvier, applying cool and 
 patient observation to the wrecks with which 
 our planet is covered, studying, comparing 
 together, the relics of the animals and plants, 
 buried in the ground, discovered the succession 
 of time in that of those beings ; and in creating 
 the ingenious science of comparative anatomy, 
 rendered positive that fine history of the earth 
 which Buffon had conjectured by an effort of 
 genius, and left conjectural for want of facts 
 sufficiently observed at the period in which he 
 lived. 
 
 In the arts of design a reaction, estimable 
 for the intention, had taken place against the 
 tastes of the eighteenth century. During that 
 effeminate and philosophic age, Boucher, the 
 adored painter of the Regency, had, with light 
 hand, sketched upon the canvas licentious 
 courtesans, remarkable not for beauty but for 
 a certain lascivious gracefulness. Greuze, with 
 chaster inspirations, had opposed to them 
 charming virgins, painted with a soft and deli- 
 cate pencil. But the art, debased by Boucher, 
 had not been raised again by Greuze to the 
 dignity of style, which, in default of genius, 
 Poussin had preserved to it. It has been 
 granted but once to a nation to display to the 
 world the genius of a Michael Angelo and a 
 Raphael ; but all, when they practise the arts, 
 ought to aspire at least to correctness, to noble- 
 ness of design, and can attain it by severe 
 study. This it was that David, the celebrated 
 painter, accomplished. Disgusted with the 
 character of the art, at the time of his youth, 
 he went to Rome, was smitten there by the 
 touching, picturesque, and sublime beauty of 
 the masters of the Italian school, and, his 
 passion for the beautiful increasing gradually, 
 he had raised himt-elf to a level with the 
 Italians of the fifteenth century, with the 
 ancients themselves ; and, instead of the 
 courtesans of Boucher, or the modest young 
 females of Greuze, he had sketched on canvas 
 antique statues, elegant but stiff, destitute of 
 life, even of colour ; and in acquiring a better 
 style of drawing had lost that facility and 
 brilliancy of pencil which still distinguished 
 Boucher and Greuze. It was a school of imi- 
 tation, grave, noble, and without genius. On
 
 370 
 
 HISTORY OF TH3 
 
 painter, however, M. Gros, escaped from the 
 imitation of antique basso-relievos by painting 
 battles. Faulty in design, mediocre in com- 
 position, but excited by the spectacle of the 
 time, and hurried away by a certain natural 
 passion, he flung upon the canvas images which 
 will live probably from a certain force of exe- 
 oution and a certain brilliancy of colour. It is 
 the style which insures the duration of works 
 of the mind ; it is that which insures the 
 duration of works of art, because it is not the 
 only sign of inspiration, but the loftiest, the 
 most constant. Another painter, M. Prudhon, 
 by imitating Correggio, from a natural taste 
 for grace, exhibited some appearance of ori- 
 ginality at a time when an artist, if he did not 
 paint Leonidases and Brutuses, was obliged to 
 paint the grenadiers of the imperial guard. 
 But neither M. Gros nor M. Prudhon, to whom 
 the succeeding age has done more justice, 
 excited so much enthusiasm as David, Girodet, 
 Gerard. France imagined that she possessed 
 in them nearly equals to the great masters of 
 Italy singular and honourable illusion of a 
 nation captivated with all sorts of glory, as- 
 piring to possess them all, and applauding 
 even mediocrity in the hope of calling forth 
 genius ! 
 
 In literature France was still further from 
 real superiority. But, an exquisite judge in 
 this matter, she did not deceive herself. A sort 
 of inertness, by no means usual, had then seized 
 the national genius. In the seventeenth cen- 
 tury France, arrayed in all the brilliancy of 
 youth and glory, had been seen excelling in the 
 highest degree in the tragic representation of 
 the passions of man, and in the comic repre- 
 sentation of his oddities, giving lustre to the 
 pulpit by a grave, energetic, sublime eloquence, 
 unknown to the world, which has never heard 
 it, which will never hear it, again. She had 
 been seen in the eighteenth century suddenly 
 changing her taste, her genius, her creed, for- 
 saking art for polemics, attacking the altar, the 
 throne, all the social institutions, acrimonious, 
 vehement, immortal too in the literature which 
 occupies itself in depicting the human heart. 
 She had thus been seen varying to infinity the 
 productions of her understanding, never ex- 
 hausted like that spring at which the ancients 
 represented genius slaking its thirst and which 
 poured forth upon the world a perpetual stream. 
 But nil at once, after an immense revolution, 
 the most humane in its object, the most terrible 
 in its means, the most vast in its consequences, 
 the genius of France, which had desired, called, 
 and produced it, appeared surprised, agitated, 
 terrified at its own works, and as it were ex- 
 hausted. French literature subsequently to the 
 Revolution of 1789, notwithstanding the in- 
 fluence of Napoleon, remained null and devoid 
 of inspiration. Tragedy, which had already 
 declined much, when Voltaire depicted in his 
 "Zaire" the conflicts of religion and love, crept 
 along, sometimes applying to Greece sometimes 
 to England, sometimes to Sophocles sometimes 
 to Shakspeare, for inspirations, for which it is 
 better to look to Nature, which never come when 
 they are sought, for genius truly inspired has 
 no need of extraneous excitement. Its own 
 plenitude is sufficient for it. M. Chenier imi- 
 tated, in a pure and noble style, the Greek tra- 
 gedy ; M. Ducis, in an incorrect and touching 
 
 [Aug. ISO/. 
 
 | style, the English tragedy. Comedy, of which 
 M. Picard was then the most renowned conti- 
 nuator in France, depicted without depth but 
 with some humour undecided characters, the 
 great characters having been drawn for ever 
 by Moliere and by one or two of his disciples. 
 The pulpit having lost its authority, the tribune 
 was mute. There was no other eloquence but 
 that of M. Regnault, expounding, in a brilliant 
 and easy style, the petty affairs of the time, 
 and that of M. Fontanes, expressing sometimes 
 at the head of the bodies of the State, and in a 
 correct, elegant, and noble style, grand from 
 the greatness of the events rather than from 
 that of the historian, the admiration of France 
 for the prodigies of the imperial reign. His- 
 tory, in short, wanted liberty, wanted expe- 
 rience, and had not yet contracted that taste 
 for research by which it has since been dis- 
 tinguished. 
 
 French literature did not recover a genuine 
 originality, a touching eloquence, till M. de 
 Chateaubriand, celebrating the days of yore, 
 addressed himself, as we have elsewhere ob- 
 served, to that true melancholy of the human 
 heart, which always regrets the past, whatever 
 it may be, how unworthy soever of regret, solely 
 because it no longer exists. The age, however, 
 had an immortal writer, immortal as Csesar: 
 this was the sovereign himself, a great writer, 
 because he was a great genius, an inspired ora- 
 tor in his proclamations, the bard of his own 
 exploits in his bulletins, a powerful demonstra- 
 tor in a multitude of notes which emanated 
 from him, in articles inserted in the Moniteur, 
 in letters written to his agents, which will, no 
 doubt, appear some day, and which will astonish 
 the world as much as it has been astonished by 
 his actions. High-coloured when he painted, 
 clear, precise, vehement, imperious when he 
 demonstrated, he was always simple as befitted 
 the serious part assigned to him by Providence, 
 but sometimes rather declamatory, from the 
 remnant of a habit peculiar to all the children 
 of the French revolution. Singular destiny of 
 that prodigious man to be the greatest writer 
 of his time, while he was its greatest captain, 
 its greatest legislator, its greatest administra- 
 tor. The nation having, on a day of fatigue, 
 relinquished to him the trouble of willing, or- 
 dering, thinking for all, had, in some measure, 
 by the same privilege, conceded to him the gift 
 of speaking, of writing, better than all. 
 
 Already at that period, in that restless agi- 
 tation of an antiquated literature, which seeks 
 inspirations everywhere, a double literary ten- 
 dency became observable. Some were for going 
 back to the seventeenth century and to anti- 
 quity, as to the source of all beauty ; others 
 proposed to solicit from England, from Ger- 
 many, the secret of stronger emotions puny 
 efforts of the spirit of imitation, which changes 
 its object, without attaining the originality that 
 is refused it! Napoleon, from a natural taste 
 for the purely beautiful, and from an instinct 
 of nationality, repulsed these new attempts, 
 extolled Racine, Bossuet, Moliere, and the an- 
 cients along with them, and strove to make 
 classic studies flourish in the University. At 
 length, seeking to act powerfully on the public 
 mind, he devised a means, in his opinion the 
 most efficacious, for producing good works, 
 which was to give reputation, to give it justly,
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 371 
 
 greatly, with authority. In a free country, 
 thousands of writers engaged in criticism, en- 
 lightened or ignorant, just or passionate, honest 
 or base, discuss the works of mind, and then, 
 after a vain clamour, are succeeded by Time, 
 which decides in at once the mildest and the 
 surest manner, by taking no notice of certain 
 works, by continuing to speak of certain others. 
 But, in granting to literature the freedom of 
 discussion, Napoleon was not resolved to permit 
 it entire even for that ; and, as for Time, he 
 was too impatient to await its decisions. He 
 conceived, therefore, the idea of applying to 
 each class of the Institute for thoroughly di- 
 gested reports on the progress of literature and 
 the arts and sciences since 1789, specifying the 
 good or bad tendencies, the distinguished or 
 indifferent works, and awarding praise or cen- 
 ure with strict impartiality. The reports were 
 to be discussed by each of the classes, that they 
 might have the authority of an arret, presented 
 by one of the eminent men of the time, and read 
 before the Emperor in the Council of State, thus 
 judging from the throne, and encouraging the 
 works of French genius by this solemn attention. 
 
 In consequence, M. Chenier came to read be- 
 fore Napoleon, and in a meeting of the Council 
 of State, a simple, firm, dignified report on the 
 progress of literature since 1789. When the 
 reading was finished, Napoleon answered M. 
 Chenier in these beautiful words : 
 
 "Gentlemen deputies of the second class of 
 the Institute, if the French language is become 
 a universal language, it is to the men of genius 
 who have sat or who still sit among you that 
 we are indebted for this. 
 
 "I attach a value to the success of your la- 
 bours ; they tend to enlighten my people, and are 
 necessary to the glory of my crown. I have heard 
 with satisfaction the report that you have just 
 made to me. You may rely on my protection." 
 
 When governments will interfere in the works 
 of the human mind, it is in this lofty style that 
 they ought to do so ; and, moreover, to this 
 manner of distributing glory by a decision of 
 the public authority Napoleon added a munifi- 
 cence, numerous instances of which we have 
 already cited, and the most efficacious of all' 
 encouragements, the approbation of genius. In 
 other sittings, he heard M. Cuvier make a re- 
 port on the progress of the sciences, M. Dacier 
 on that of historical researches, and succes- 
 sively the representatives of all the classes on 
 the subjects which concerned them. Desirous 
 of giving to the arts of design a not less signal 
 mark of attention, he went himself with the 
 Empress, and part of his court, to the studio 
 of David the painter, to inspect the picture of 
 the Coronation, and, after viewing it, to address 
 to him the most flattering expressions. 
 
 Such were the occupations of Napoleon after 
 his return from Tilsit ; such is also the specta- 
 cle which France exhibited during his reign, 
 either from the effect of circumstances, or from 
 the personal influence which he exercised over 
 her. Most of the resolutions which he had just 
 taken could not dispense with the concurrence 
 of the legislative power. It was more than a 
 year since it had met, and he was impatient to 
 assemble it, as much to present to it the finance 
 laws, the code of commerce, the laws relative 
 to the public works, as to make a European 
 manifestation before the bodies of the State. 
 
 He had resolved to open the session of the Le- 
 gislative Body on the 16th of August, the day 
 following the 15th, fixed for the celebration of 
 the festival of St. Napoleon. The 15th was a 
 real festival for Paris and for all France. The 
 people were still filled with the joy which the 
 peace had occasioned ; for, signed at Tilsit on 
 the 8th of July, known at Paris on the 15th, it 
 was scarcely a month that they had enjoyed it. 
 To this joy for the continental peace was added 
 the hope of a maritime peace. The presence 
 of Napoleon at Paris had already exercised its 
 usual influence. Fresh bustle prevailed every 
 where. Money was plentiful. Those on whom 
 Napoleon had just conferred wealth were build- 
 ing elegant hotels, and bespeaking costly fur- 
 niture to adorn them. Their wives spent money 
 in handfuls on the dealers in articles of luxury. 
 It was announced that the court would make a 
 long stay at Fontainebleau, whither all the high 
 society of Paris would be invited, and where 
 would be given festivities of which the winter 
 had been deprived. In short, the national glory, 
 which deeply touched all hearts, contributed 
 likewise to all these joys by heightening them. 
 The evening of the 15th of August was as daz- 
 zling as a bright day. The whole population 
 of Paris was at night under the windows of the 
 palace, intoxicated with enthusiasm, loudly de- 
 siring to see the glorious sovereign, who had 
 conferred so many benefits, real or apparent, 
 on France, and, above all, who had rendered 
 her so great. It must be acknowledged, for the 
 honour of human nature, that what most at- 
 tracts it is glory. Had Napoleon not been Em- 
 peror and King, the people would still have 
 desired to see in his person the greatest man 
 of modern times. He showed himself several 
 times holding the Empress by the hand, scarcely 
 discerned amidst a brilliant group, but cheered 
 and applauded as though he had been distinctly 
 perceived. He wished to be himself a closer 
 witness of the popular enthusiasm, and went 
 out disguised, with his faithful Duroc, to take 
 a walk in the garden of the Tuileries. By fa- 
 vour of the night and of his disguise, he could 
 enjoy the sentiments which he inspired without 
 being known, and amidst all the groups he heard 
 his name pronounced with gratitude and love. 
 He stopped in the garden to listen to a little 
 boy who was shouting with transport Vive 
 r Empereur ! He caught up the child in his arms, 
 asked why he shouted in that manner, and re- 
 ceived for answer that his father and mother 
 taught him to love and bless the emperor. They 
 were Bretons, who, being obliged to flee from 
 the horrors of civil war, had found in Paris 
 peace and competence in an humble employ- 
 ment. Napoleon conversed with them, and they 
 knew not till next day before how powerful a 
 witness they had poured forth the simple effu- 
 sions of their hearts. 
 
 On the following day, the 16th, Napoleon re- 
 paired to the Legislative Body, surrounded by 
 his marshals, followed by an immense concourse 
 of people, and found the Council of State and 
 the Tribunate assembled, with the member" "f 
 the Legislative Body. M. de Talleyrand, in 
 quality of vice-grnnd-elector, presented the 
 members of the Legislative Body recently 
 elected to be sworn ; and then the Emperor, in 
 a clear and penetrating voice, delivered the fol- 
 lowing speech :
 
 372 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Aug. 1807. 
 
 " Gentlemen deputies of the departments to 
 the Legislative Body, messieurs the Tribunes 
 and the members of my Council of State, since 
 your last session, new wars, new triumphs, new 
 treaties of peace, have changed the political 
 face of Europe. 
 
 " If the house of Brandenburg, which first 
 conspired against our independence, still reigns, 
 it is indebted for this to the sincere friendship 
 with which the powerful emperor of the North 
 has inspired me. 
 
 " A French prince will reign on the Elbe ; he 
 will understand how to reconcile the interests 
 of his new subjects with his first and most sa- 
 cred duties. 
 
 " The house of Saxony has recovered, after 
 
 fifty years, the independence which it had lost. 
 
 " The people of the duchy of Warsaw, and 
 
 of the city of Dantzic, have recovered their 
 
 country and their rights. 
 
 " All nations rejoice with one accord to see 
 the mischievous influence which England exer- 
 cised over the Continent destroyed for ever. 
 
 " France is united with the people of Ger- 
 many by the laws of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine ; to those of Spain, Holland, Switzer- 
 land, and the Italics, by the laws of our fede- 
 rative system. Our new relations with Russia 
 are cemented by the reciprocal esteem of these 
 two great nations. 
 
 "In all that I have done, I have had in view 
 solely the prosperity of my people, more dear 
 in my eyes than my own glory. 
 
 " I am desirous for maritime peace. No re- 
 sentment shall ever influence my determina- 
 tions. I can never have any against a nation, 
 the puppet and victim of the parties which tear 
 it in pieces, deluded respecting the situation 
 of its own affairs as well as that of its neigh- 
 bours. 
 
 " But whatever be the issue which the de- 
 crees of Providence have allotted to the mari- 
 time war, my people shall find me ever the 
 same, and I shall ever find my people worthy 
 of me. Frenchmen, your conduct in these last 
 times, when your Emperor was more than five 
 hundred leagues away, has heightened my es- 
 teem, and the opinion which I had formed of 
 your character. I have felt proud of being the 
 first among you. If, during these ten months 
 of absence and dangers, I have been present to 
 your thoughts, the marks of attachment which 
 you have given me have constantly excited my 
 warmest emotions. All my anxieties, all that 
 could have relation even to the preservation of 
 my person, touched me only from the interest 
 which you took in them, and for the importance 
 of which they might be for your future desti- 
 nies. You are a good and a great people. 
 
 "I have contemplated various dispositions 
 f:r simplifying and improving our institu- 
 tions. 
 
 " The nation has experienced the happiest 
 effects from the institution of the Legion of 
 Honour. I have created several imperial titles 
 to give new lustre to the principal of my sub- 
 jects, to honour eminent services by eminent 
 rewards, and also to prevent the revival of 
 any feudal title incompatible with our consti- 
 tutions. 
 
 ' ' The accounts of my ministers of the finances ; 
 and of the public Treasury will acquaint you | 
 with the proeperoui state of our finances. My 
 
 people will experience a considerable relief in 
 regard to the land-tax. 
 
 " My minister of the' interior will inform you 
 of the public works which have been com- 
 menced or finished ; but what remains to be 
 done is of far greater importance ; for I intend 
 that, in all parts of my Empire, even in the 
 smallest hamlet, the prosperity of the citizens 
 and the value of land shall be augmented by 
 the effect of the general system of improvement 
 which I have conceived. 
 
 " Messieurs the deputies of the departments, 
 your assistance will be necessary for me to ar- 
 rive at this great result, and I have a right to 
 rely firmly upon it." 
 
 This speech was heard with warm emotion, 
 and applauded with transport. Napoleon re- 
 turned to the Tuileries, accompanied by the 
 same concourse, and greeted with the same 
 shouts. 
 
 On the next and succeeding days were brought 
 forward the various laws which fixed the budget 
 of 1807 at 720 millions in receipts and expen- 
 diture, which demanded for 1808 mere provi- 
 sional credits, conformably to the custom of the 
 time ; which, for this same year 1808, remitted 
 to the country 20 millions on the land-tax ; 
 which regulated the concurrence of the depart- 
 ments in the great works of general utility, in- 
 stituted a Court of Accounts, and lastly were 
 to compose the commercial code. The mea- 
 sures concerning the institution of the new 
 titles, the purification of the magistracy, the 
 union of the Tribunate to the Legislative Body, 
 were reserved for the Senate. After the pre- 
 sentation of all these laws came the report of 
 the minister of the interior on the state of the 
 Empire. When that minister had, in a picture 
 for which Napoleon had furnished the sub- 
 stance and almost the form, finished the sketch 
 of the flourishing state of France, of the pro- 
 gress of her manufactures and commerce, of 
 the impulsion given to all the works, of the 
 simultaneous construction of canals, roads, 
 bridges, and public monuments, over the whole 
 surface of the territory, of the regularity, 
 order, abundance, prevailing in the finances, 
 of the efforts made to diffuse instruction, to 
 extend to every commune the benefit of public 
 worship, in short of so many useful creations, 
 the course of which a war of giants had not 
 interrupted, for which it had even procured the 
 means, thanks to the tribute levied from the 
 conquered kings, M. de Fontanes, president of 
 the Legislative Body, replied in the following 
 speech, which he had been enabled to prepare 
 beforehand, for the sentiments that were ex- 
 pressed in it filled all hearts : 
 
 " Monsieur the minister of the interior, mes- 
 sieurs the councillors of State, 
 
 " The picture set before our eyes seems to 
 present the image of one of those pacific kings, 
 exclusively engaged in the internal administra- 
 tion in the heart of their dominions; and yet 
 all these useful labours, all these wise projects, 
 which are designed to improve upon them, were 
 ordered and conceived amidst the din of arms 
 
 I have said in another plnce 15 millions; it was never- 
 theless 20 millions; but the new centimes imposed for the 
 concurrence of the departments in the public works re. 
 duced these '20 millions to 15.
 
 Aug. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 378 
 
 on the furthest confines of conquered Prussia, 
 and on the frontiers of threatened Russia. If 
 it be true that, at the distance of five hundred 
 leagues from the capifal, amid the cares and 
 the fatigues of war, a hero prepared so many 
 benefits, how is he about to increase them by 
 returning among us ! The public welfare will 
 wholly engage him, and his glory will be the 
 more touching for it. 
 
 "We are far from refusing to heroism that 
 homage which in all times it obtains. Philo- 
 sophy more than once insulted military enthu- 
 siasm : let us now dare to avenge it. 
 
 " War, that ancient, and unfortunately ne- 
 cessary disease, which has ravaged all socie- 
 ties ; that scourge, the effects of which it is so 
 easy to deplore, and so difficult to extirpate the 
 cause war itself is not without utility for na- 
 tions. It imparts new energy to old societies ; 
 it draws together great nations which have 
 long been enemies, which learn to esteem each 
 other on the field of battle ; it stirs and ferti- 
 lizes minds by extraordinary spectacles ; above 
 all it instructs present and future ages, when 
 it produces one of those rare geniuses formed 
 to change every thing. 
 
 "But, for war to have such advantages, it 
 must not be too prolonged, or irreparable evils 
 are the consequence. The fields and the work- 
 shops are depopulated, the schools in which 
 minds and manners are formed become de- 
 serted, barbarism approaches, and the genera- 
 tions ravaged in their flower see the hopes of 
 the human race perish along with themselves. 
 
 " The Legislative Body arid the French na- 
 tion bless the great prince who puts an end to 
 war before it can subject us to such disastrous 
 influences, and when it brings us, on the con- 
 trary, so many new means of strength, wealth, 
 and population. War, which exhausts every 
 thing, has renovated our finances and our ar- 
 mies. The vanquished nations give us subsi- 
 dies, and France finds soldiers worthy of her 
 among the allied nations. 
 
 " Our eyes have beheld the most extraordi- 
 nary things. A few years have been sufficient 
 for renewing the face of the world. A man has 
 traversed Europe, taking away and giving dia- 
 dems. He displaces, he contracts, he extends, 
 the boundaries of empires : all are borne away 
 by his ascendency. Well ! this man, covered 
 with so much glory, promises us still greater: 
 peaceable and disarmed, he will prove that this 
 invin-jible force, which, as it runs, overturns 
 thrones and empires, is beneath that truly royal 
 wisdom, which preserves them by peace, which 
 enriches them by agriculture and industry, 
 adorns them with master-pieces of art, and 
 founds them everlastingly on the two-fold sup- 
 port of morality and the laws." 
 
 The labours of the Legislative Body com- 
 menced immediately, and were prosecuted with 
 the calmness and celerity natural in discussions 
 which were purely formal ; for the serious in- 
 vestigation of the proposed laws had taken 
 place elsewhere, that is to say, in the confer- 
 ences between the Tribunate and the Council 
 of State. During this short session, which kept 
 him in Paris and deferred his departure for 
 Fontainebleau, Napoleon celebrated the mar- 
 riage of the Princess Catherine of Wurtemberg 
 with his brother Jerome. This young princess, 
 endowed with the noblest qualities, beautiful 
 
 and striking in person, proud as her father, but 
 gentle and devoted to all her duties, and des- 
 tined to become some day a pattern for wives 
 in adversity, arrived at the chateau, of Raincy, 
 near Paris, on the 20th of August, rather un- 
 easy about the situation that awaited her in a 
 court, the splendour and power of which no- 
 body in Europe denied, but which was repre- 
 sented as the abode of brutal force, and to 
 ! which she was not to be accompanied by any 
 I of the servants whom she had had around her 
 ' from her infancy. Napoleon received her on 
 the 21st on the first step of the palace of the 
 Tuileries. She was going to bow to him, when 
 he caught her in his arms, and then presented 
 her to the Empress, to his whole court, and to 
 the deputies of the new kingdom of Westphalia, 
 convoked to Paris to be present at this union. 
 On the following day, the, young couple were 
 civilly married by the Arch-chancellor Camba- 
 ce"res, and the day afterwards they received in 
 the chapel of the Tuileries the nuptial benedic- 
 tion of the prince-primate, who, always alike 
 attached to the Emperor from inclination and 
 from gratitude, had come to consecrate in per- 
 son the new German royalty, founded in the 
 north of the Confederation, of which he was 
 chancellor and president. 
 
 The festivities held on occasion of this mar- 
 riage lasted several days, and during this time 
 Napoleon prepared for the departure of the 
 young couple for Westphalia. Their kingdom, 
 composed principally of the territories of the 
 Grand-duke of Hesse, dethroned on account of 
 his perfidies, was to have Cassel for its capital. 
 It comprehended, besides electoral Hesse, West- 
 phalia and the provinces separated from Prus- 
 sia, on the left of the Elbe. Magdeburg was 
 its principal fortress. It had likewise hopes 
 of being enriched by part of Hanover. The 
 title of Kingdom of Westphalia was suited to 
 its geographical situation, to its extent, to its 
 part in the Confederation of the Rhine. It had, 
 moreover, a sort of consequence, and did not 
 remind one, as the title of Kingdom of Hesse 
 would have done, of the dispossession of a great 
 German family. Napoleon had charged three 
 councillors of State, Messrs. Simeon, Beugnot, 
 and Jollivet, to go, under the title of provisional 
 regency, and to commence the administrative 
 organization of this kingdom, so that Prince Je- 
 rome should, on his arrival, find a sort of go- 
 vernment instituted, and, after his arrival, wise 
 councillors capable of guiding his inexperience. 
 Napoleon then despatched him with the follow- 
 ing instructions : 
 
 " My brother, I think you ought to go to 
 Stuttgard, as you have been invited thither by 
 the King of Wurtemberg. You will proceed 
 thence to Cassel, with all the pomp with which 
 the hopes of your people will induce them to 
 surround you. You will convoke the deputies 
 of the towns, the ministers of all religion?, the 
 deputies of the States now existing, taking care 
 that there shall be half not noble, half noble ; 
 and before this assembly, so composed, you will 
 receive the constitution and swear to maintain 
 it, and immediately afterwards you will receive 
 the oath of those deputies of the people. The 
 three members of the regency shall be charged 
 with the delivery of the country to you. They 
 will form a privy council, which shall remain 
 with you, so long as you have need of it. Ap- 
 21
 
 374 
 
 HISTORY OF TTIE 
 
 [Sept. 1807. 
 
 point at first only half of your councillors of 
 State ; that number will be sufficient for com- 
 mencing business. Take care that the majority 
 be composed of non-nobles, but without letting 
 any one perceive this habitual caution to keep 
 up a majority of the third estate in all offices. 
 I except from this some places at court, to 
 which, upon the same principles, the highest 
 names must be called. But, in your ministries, 
 in your councils, if possible in your courts of 
 appeal, in your administrations, the greater 
 part of the persons whom you employ should 
 not be nobles. This conduct will go to the 
 heart of Germany, and perhaps mortify the 
 other class. It is sufficient not to use any affec- 
 tation in this conduct. Take care never to en- 
 ter into discussions, nor to let it be understood, 
 that you attach such importance to the advance- 
 ment of the third estate. The avowed principle 
 is to select talents wherever they are to be found. 
 I have here marked out for you the general prin- 
 ciples of your conduct. I have given orders to 
 the major-general to deliver up to you the com- 
 mand of the French troops which are in your 
 kingdom. Remember that you are French, and 
 guard against their suffering any wrong. By 
 degrees, and according as they become unne- 
 cessary, you will send back the governors and 
 the commandants of arms. My opinion is, that 
 you should not be in a hurry, and that you 
 should listen with prudence and circumspection 
 to the complaints of the towns, which are only 
 anxious to rid themselves of the embarrass- 
 ments occasioned by the war. Remember that 
 the army remained six months in Bavaria, and 
 that those good people bore this burden with 
 patience. Before the month of January, you 
 ought to have divided your kingdom into de- 
 partments, to have appointed prefects in them, 
 and to have commenced your administration. 
 What is of particular consequence to me is, 
 that you delay not in the least the introduction 
 of the Napoleon Code. The constitution esta- 
 blishes it irrevocably on the 1st of January. 
 If you defer putting it in force, this would be- 
 come a question of public right, for if succes- 
 sions should chance to open, you would be em- 
 barrassed by a thousand claims. Objections 
 will not fail to be made ; oppose them with a 
 firm will. The members of the regency, who 
 are not in favour of what was done in France 
 during the revolution, will make remonstrances : 
 give them for answer that this does not concern 
 them. But ca-11 to your aid their intelligence 
 and experience, from which you may derive 
 great advantage. Above all, write to me very 
 often. 
 
 "You will find annexed the constitution of 
 your kingdom. That constitution contains the 
 conditions on which I renounce all my rights 
 of conquest and my acquired rights to your 
 country. You ought to follow it punctually. 
 The happiness of your people is of importance 
 to me, not only for the influence which it may 
 have upon your glory and mine, but also under 
 the point of view of the general system of Eu- 
 rope. Listen not to those who tell you that 
 your people, accustomed to servitude, will re- 
 ceive your benefits unthankfully. They are 
 more enlightened in the kingdom of Westphalia 
 than some persons would fain persuade you ; 
 and your throne will never be firmly founded 
 but on the confidence and the love of the popu- 
 
 lation. What the people of Germany desire 
 with impatience is, that individuals who are 
 not noble, and possess talents, should have an 
 equal right to your consideration and to office ; 
 that every species of bondage, and all interme- 
 diate restrictions between the sovereign and 
 the lowest class, should be entirely abolished. 
 The benefits of the Napoleon Code, the publi- 
 city of law proceedings, the institution of juries, 
 will be so many distinguishing characteristics 
 of your monarchy ; and, if I must tell you my 
 whole mind, I reckon more upon their effects 
 for the extension and consolidation of that mo- 
 narchy than upon the result of the greatest 
 victories. Your people must enjoy a liberty, 
 an equality, a prosperity, unknown to the other 
 people of Germany ; and this liberal govern- 
 ment must produce, in one way or another, 
 changes the most salutary to the system of the 
 Confederation and to the power of your mo- 
 narchy. This mode of governing will be a 
 stronger barrier to separate you from Prussia 
 than the Elbe, than fortresses, than the protec- 
 tion of France. What people would be willing 
 to return under the arbitrary Prussian govern- 
 ment, after it has tasted the benefits of a wise 
 and liberal administration ? The people of Ger- 
 many, those of France, Italy, Spain, desire 
 equality and require liberal ideas. It is now 
 several years that I have directed the affairs 
 of Europe, and I have had occasion to convince 
 myself, that the grumbling of the privileged 
 persons was contrary to the general opinion. 
 Be a constitutional king. If the reason and 
 the intelligence of your times were not suffi- 
 cient, in your position good policy would en- 
 join it." 
 
 The session of the Legislative Body, though 
 there were numerous pr'ojets to be converted 
 into laws, could not last long, thanks, as we 
 have observed, to the previous conferences, 
 which rendered public discussion nearly use- 
 less, and a matter of mere form. The second 
 half of the month of August and the first half 
 of September were sufficient. The business 
 of this session being finished, the senatus-con- 
 sulte, which suppressed the Tribunate, and 
 transferred its attributes and its members to 
 the Legislative Body, was brought to the two 
 assemblies. It was accompanied by an address, 
 which bestowed due praise on the labours and 
 services of the suppressed body. The presi- 
 dent of that body, on receiving this communi- 
 cation, delivered a speech on his part, thank- 
 ing the sovereign, who acknowledged the me- 
 rits of the members of the Tribunate and 
 opened to them a new career. After these 
 vain formalities, the session was closed, and a 
 legal character was imparted to the last works 
 of the imperial government. 
 
 At length, on the 22d of September, the 
 court set out for Fontainebleau, where it was 
 to pass the autumn amidst festivities and pomp- 
 ous pageantry. Napoleon purposed to exhibit 
 there a complete image of the manners of the 
 old court. Many foreign princes had been 
 invited thither, such as the prince-primate, who 
 had come to Paris on occasion of the marriage 
 of the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Arch- 
 duke Ferdinand, late sovereign of Tuscany and 
 of Salzburg, now of Wurzburg, who had come in 
 the hope of restoring good harmony between 
 France and Austria; Prince William, brother
 
 Sept. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 375 
 
 of the King of Prussia, despatched to Paris to 
 obtain a mitigation of the charges imposed 
 upon his country, and a multitude of other 
 great personages, French and foreign. In the 
 daytime the company pursued the sport of 
 coursing the deer of the forest. Napoleon 
 had prescribed a dress indispensable for the 
 chase, and had imposed the necessity of wear- 
 ing it on both men and women. He disdained 
 not to appear in it himself, excusing in his 
 own eyes these puerilities by the opinion that 
 etiquette in courts, and particularly in new 
 courts, contributes to respect. In the evening 
 the first actors in Paris came to perform be- 
 fore him the masterpieces of Corneille, Racine, 
 Moliere ; for he admitted to the honour of his 
 presence none but the great productions, im- 
 mortal titles of the nation, and, as if to com- 
 plete this resurrection of the ancient manners, 
 he cast on certain ladies of the court, re- 
 nowned for their beauty, glances which dis- 
 tressed the Empress Josephine, and caused ob- 
 servations to be made respecting him less serious 
 than those of which he was usually the object. 
 While Napoleon, mingling some, recreations 
 with a great deal of business, awaited at Fon- 
 tainebleau the resultT>f the negotiations com- 
 menced by Russia with England, the stipula- 
 sions of Tilsit occupied cabinets and produced 
 in the world their natural consequences. Por- 
 tugal, obliged to come to a decision, solicited 
 permission of the Court of London to comply 
 with the requisitions of Napoleon, at least in 
 such a manner as to do the least possible inju- 
 ry to British commerce, and to spare the Eng- 
 lish, as well as the Portuguese, the presence 
 of a French army in Lisbon. The Court of 
 Spain, anxious in the highest degree about the 
 consequences which its perfidious conduct last 
 year might produce, alarmed at the thoughts 
 which omnipotence and leisure might suggest 
 to Napoleon, despatched to him, as we have 
 seen, in addition to her ordinary ambassador, 
 M. de Massaredo, an ambassador extraordina- 
 ry, M. de Frias, besides a secret envoy, M. 
 Yzquierdo. Neither of the former had found 
 means to penetrate the frightful mystery of 
 his coming. Austria, bitterly regretting not 
 having acted in the interval between the battles 
 of Eylau and Friedland, extremely uneasy at 
 the signs of intelligence which began to be 
 perceived between the emperors of France and 
 Russia, said to herself that their allfance, so 
 natural when France was engaged with Eng- 
 land on the sea, with Germany on the land, and 
 so formidable at all times to Europe, was per- 
 haps at this moment absolutely concluded, and 
 that the provinces of the Danube, then occu- 
 pied by the Russians, would, in all probability, 
 be the price of the new union. If such were 
 the case, it would crown all the disasters which 
 had overtaken her during the present century : 
 for, despoiled in the course of fifteen years of 
 the Netherlands, of Italy, of the Tyrol, of 
 Suabia, forced back behind the lun, behind the 
 Styrian and Julian Alps, after so many misfor- 
 tunes, only one greater could befall her, to see 
 Russia established on the Lower Danube, cut- 
 ting her off from the Black Sea, and envelop- 
 ing her in the East as France enveloped her in 
 the West. Hence, in all the courts where the 
 representatives of Austria met with ours, they 
 were seen reetless, suspicious, seeking by all 
 
 possible means to ferret out the secret of Tilsit, 
 here offering to pay for it with money, there 
 striving to discover it in an unguarded moment, 
 and at length, on the refusal of our diplomatists 
 to betray it, demanding it with a ridiculous in- 
 discretion. And while they were everywhere 
 endeavouring to penetrate the projects of the 
 new alliance, without succeeding, they gave 
 out at Constantinople that they were com- 
 pletely discovered, telling the Turks that 
 France had deserted, betrayed them, and given 
 them up to Russia ; that they ought to turn 
 their arms against the French, continue the 
 hostilities against the Russians, and reconcile 
 themselves with the English ; who, they added, 
 would not be the only people to support them. 
 Prussia, overwhelmed by her calamity, con- 
 cerned herself but little about the secret con- 
 ditions stipulated at Tilsit, and caring still less 
 what should befall the balance of Europe in 
 the East, since it was already destroyed for 
 her in the West, thinking only of obtaining tho 
 evacuation of her territory and a reduction of 
 the war-contributions imposed upon it : for, in 
 the exhausted state in which she found her- 
 self, every sum given to France was a resource 
 withdrawn from her for reconstituting her 
 army and for some day retrieving her reverses. 
 In Russia the spectacle was totally different : 
 there the sovereign, who had sought in the 
 French alliance prospects of greatness suited 
 to indemnify him for his recent mishaps, was 
 seen making continual efforts to lead the court, 
 the aristocracy, the people, into his views. 
 But, having been exposed alone at Tilsit to the 
 seductions of Napoleon, he could not persuade 
 them to pass so quickly as himself from the 
 horrors of war to the enchantments of a new 
 alliance. He therefore strove now to persuade 
 everybody that, in terminating by a reconcilia- 
 tion with France, things had taken the best 
 possible turn ; that his late ministers, in em- 
 broiling him with that power, had led him into 
 a fatal track, from which he had extricated 
 himself with equal good fortune and skill ; that, 
 in all this, he had committed but one error, 
 that of having believed in the valour of the 
 Prussian army and in the integrity of England, 
 but he had soon dispelled this double illusion ; 
 that there were but two armies in Europe 
 which deserved to be mentioned, the Russian 
 army and the French army ; that it was use- 
 less to make them fight in order to serve the 
 cause of a perfidious and selfish power like 
 Great Britain ; and that it was better to unite 
 them in one common aim of peace and great- 
 ness ; of peace, if the cabinet of London would 
 at length desist from its maritime pretensions; 
 of greatness, if it did oblige Europe to lead the 
 same life of torment and sacrifices; that, in 
 this case, every one must take care of himself 
 and his own interests ; and that it was time 
 for Russia to think of hers. Having arrived 
 at this point of his explanations, Alexander, 
 not daring to reveal all the hopes which Na- 
 poleon had permitted him to conceive, nor 
 above all to avow the occult treaty which they 
 had promised themselves to keep profoundly 
 secret, assumed an air of mystery but of satis- 
 faction, leaving all to be guessed that he dur{. 
 not venture to tell, though strongly tempted to 
 do so, and speaking, for instance, of Turkey, 
 declaring openly that he was about to sign an
 
 876 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807. 
 
 armistice Tilth her, but should take care not to 
 evacuate the provinces of the Danube, where 
 he should stay for a long time, and that no 
 difficulty would be met with at Paris on the 
 subject of this prolonged occupation. 
 
 These demi-confidential intimations had 
 rather excited an indiscreet and mischievous 
 curiosity than gained over those to whom they 
 were imparted to the ideas of the Emperor 
 Alexander. He was, for the rest, warmly 
 seconded by M. de Romanzow, who was ac- 
 quainted with every thing, who had served 
 Catherine, and inherited her oriental ambition. 
 The minister, like the sovereign, repeated that 
 they must have patience, and leave events to 
 unfold themselves, and that they should soon 
 have a satisfactory explanation to give of the 
 change of politics effected at Tilsit. 
 
 But the emperor was not always listened to 
 and obeyed. The public, ignorant of the 
 secrets of the imperial diplomacy, galled by 
 the late defeats, exhibited a sorrowful aspect, 
 and an especial ill-will towards the French. 
 The grandees in particular called to mind the 
 fickleness of Russian politics under Paul, and, 
 beginning to believe that this fickleness would 
 be the same under Alexander, were fearful that 
 the intimacy with France would soon lead to a 
 war with England, which alarmed them on ac- 
 count of their revenues, always threatened 
 when British commerce ceased to purchase 
 their productions. Hence General Savary, on 
 his arrival at St. Petersburg soon after the 
 signature of the peace, had met with the coldest 
 reception, excepting from the Emperor Alex- 
 ander and two or three families composing the 
 intimate society of that prince. The catas- 
 trophe of Vincennes, of which people were 
 reminded by the appearance of General Savary, 
 was assuredly not likely to reconcile with him 
 hearts which politics estranged ; but the true 
 cause of this general estrangement was in the 
 remembrance of recent hostilities and of great 
 defeats, without any event which could console 
 the national self-love. The emperor, fully 
 aware of this situation, endeavoured to render 
 General Savary's stay at St. Petersburg endur- 
 able, nay even agreeable to him, paid him all 
 sorts of attentions, admitted him to his pre- 
 sence almost every day ; invited him frequently 
 to his table, and, in fear of the reports which 
 he might despatch to Napoleon, begged him to 
 have patience, saying that every thing would 
 change when the late impressions were effaced, 
 and when France should have done something 
 for the just ambition of Russia. He knew not 
 how far General Savary might be initiated in 
 the secret of Tilsit, and strove to discover this, 
 to have the pleasure, if the general was ac- 
 quainted with that secret, of conversing with 
 him on the fondest subject of his thoughts. 
 The French envoy was but partially informed, 
 and even had orders to appear to know less 
 than he did ; for Napoleon had no wish that 
 the young emperor, incessantly talking over 
 the subjects which had engaged him at Tilsit, 
 should at last confirm himself in his own de- 
 sires, and take mere eventualities for certain 
 And speedy realities. General Savary replied, 
 therefore, with extreme reserve to the insinua- 
 tions of the emperor, with warm gratitude for 
 his kind attentions, appeared satisfied, not at 
 all vexed, at the disagreeable reception given 
 
 him by Russian society, and full of confidence 
 in a speedy change of dispositions. He had, 
 besides, to defend him, sufficient understand- 
 ing, plenty of assurance, and the immensity 
 of the national glory, which permitted French- 
 men to hold their heads high everywhere. 
 
 The example of the Emperor Alexander, and 
 the strong expression of his will, had opened 
 to General Savary some of the most important 
 houses in St. Petersburg, but most of the great 
 families continued to exclude him ; for Alex- 
 ander, though master of power, was, never- 
 theless, not master of high society, placed 
 under a different influence from his. Having 
 owed to a tragic catastrophe the anticipated 
 possession of the sceptre of the czars, this 
 prince strove to compensate his mother, who 
 had descended before the time to the station 
 of dowager, by leaving to her the exterior of 
 supreme power. This princess, virtuous but 
 haughty, consoled herself for having lost with 
 Paul half of the empire, by the ostentatious 
 display of imperial splendour, with which her 
 son desired that she should be surrounded. 
 As for himself, he had no court. Disliking 
 the empress, his wife, a cold and grave beauty, 
 he hastened after his repasts to leave the 
 palace, to employ himself in business with the 
 statesmen his confidents, or to pursue his plea- 
 sures in the society of a Russian lady, of whom 
 he was enamoured. The court assembled at 
 his mother's. There were to be seen the cour- 
 tiers fond of living in the society of the sove- 
 reign, having favours to obtain or thanks to 
 pay for favours obtained. All came to solicit 
 or to thank the empress-mother, as if she were 
 the sole author of the acts of the imperial 
 power. Alexander himself made his appear- 
 ance there with the assiduity of a respectful, 
 submissive son, who had not yet inherited the 
 ! paternal sceptre. The empress-mother, who 
 . fondly loved that son, would neither hold nor 
 | suffer any language that could displease him, 
 | but did not disguise her own sentiments in 
 | manifesting a visible aversion to the French. 
 | She had therefore received General Savary 
 | with cold politeness. He had not shown any 
 . emotion, but had adroitly hinted to the son 
 j that none of these circumstances had escaped 
 ; him. For a moment Alexander could not con- 
 tain himself, and, apprehensive lest, under this 
 affected respect for his mother, a foreigner, an 
 aide-de-camp of Napoleon's, should not recog- 
 nise the real master of the empire, he grasped 
 the general's hand, and said, " There is no 
 sovereign here but myself; I respect my mo- 
 ther, but everybody shall obey, be assured of 
 it ; and, at all events, whoever needs it, shall 
 be reminded of the nature and the extent of 
 my authority." General Savary, content with 
 having brought the emperor to such a confi- 
 dential communication by piquing his imperial 
 pride, went no further, satisfied respecting his 
 dispositions and his zeal to maintain the new 
 alliance. For the rest, the court of the em- 
 press-mother showed, not more politeness, for 
 it had never ceased to show that, but more 
 cordiality. "Let us wait," said the Emperor 
 Alexander incessantly to General Savary, 
 " and see what England will do. Let us know 
 what course she will pursue ; I will then break 
 out, and when I have declared myself, nobody 
 shall resist."
 
 Sept. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 377 
 
 An explanation of the conduct which England 
 intended to adopt was in fact awaited with 
 keen impatience. The patent treaty of Tilsit 
 had been published. Every one plainly per- 
 ceived that it did not tell all, and that the new 
 alliance with France inferred other secret sti- 
 pulations. But, at any rate, according to the 
 patent arrangements of that treaty, and with- 
 out going any further, it was known that Rus- 
 sia would act as mediatrix for France with 
 England, and France as mediatrix of Russia 
 with the Porte. The result of this double me- 
 diation was therefore looked for. 
 
 Faithful to his engagements, no sooner had 
 the Emperor Alexander arrived at St. Peters- 
 burgh, than he addressed a note to the British 
 cabinet, expressing a wish for the restoration 
 of general peace, and offering his mediation with 
 a view to bring about a reconciliation between 
 France and England. This note had been re- 
 ceived by the British ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg, and by the minister of foreign affairs in 
 London with a coldness which left but little 
 hope of an accommodation. The new English 
 ministers, in fact, disciples of Mr. Pitt, but of 
 inferior abilities, were not inclined to peace. 
 Their origin, their party connections, their ac- 
 cession to the ministry, are sufficient of them- 
 selves to explain the policy which they adopted 
 in this decisive circumstance. 
 
 It will, no doubt, be recollected that when in 
 1806 [May, 1804] Mr. Pitt resumed the direc- 
 tion of the counsels of George III., after main- 
 taining, jointly with Mr. Fox, a strong contest 
 with the Addington administration, he had either 
 the weakness or the treachery to resume it with- 
 out Mr. Fox, on the one hand, without his old 
 friends, such as Lord Grenville and Mr. Wind- 
 ham, on the other. He had come back to of- 
 fice with men who had then but little political 
 importance, Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh. 
 This conduct towards his friends, old or recent, 
 had much weakened him in parliament, and had 
 rendered his second administration by no means 
 brilliant. The battle of Austerlitz proved mor- 
 tal to him. No sooner was Mr. Pitt dead than 
 his feeble colleagues, Mr. Canning and Lord 
 Castlereagh, deeming themselves incapable of 
 making head against such men as Lord Gren- 
 ville and Mr. Windham, old and distinguished 
 colleagues deserted by Pitt, and Mr. Fox, his 
 old and illustrious rival they retreated from 
 before them in all haste, and Lord Grenville 
 and Mr. Windham had re-entered the adminis- 
 tration along with Mr. Fox. The wise Mr. 
 Addington, by the name of Lord Sidinouth, the 
 celebrated Mr. Grey, by the name of Lord 
 Howick, formed part of this cabinet, which was 
 a double compromise between persons and 
 opinion. Mr. Sheridan himself had joined it 
 in becoming treasurer of the navy. The re- 
 appearance of Mr. Fox in power, as short as that 
 of Mr. Pitt had been, and terminating in like 
 manner in his death, had not lasted long enough, 
 as we have elsewhere said, to bring about the 
 restoration of peace. After the fruitless ne- 
 gotiations of Lord Yarmouth and Lord Lau- 
 derdale in Paris, Napoleon had taken possession 
 of Prussia and Poland. The administration, 
 which was called Fox-Grenville, had maintain- 
 ed its ground after the death of Mr. Fox, thanks 
 to the powerful men of which it was still com- 
 posed, and of the system of compromise which 
 
 VOL. II. 48 
 
 it had continued to follow. At home, the 
 Catholics were conciliated ; abroad the war was 
 kept up, but with a sort of prudence, by the 
 grants of subsidies to the continental powers, 
 and by not risking the English troops, unless 
 in expeditions of demonstrated advantage to 
 Great Britain. The old colleagues of Mr. Pitt, 
 blended with the old friends of Mr. Fox, no 
 longer affected to wage against France a war 
 of principle but of interest. They neglected 
 what was likely to call to mind the crusade 
 against the French revolution, and occupied 
 themselves exclusively in extending the con- 
 quests of England in all the seas. Urged by 
 Prussia and Russia to send troops either to 
 Stralsund or to Dantzig, to effect a diversion on 
 the rear of Napoleon, they had always delayed, 
 sometimes upon pretext of Ireland, which re- 
 quired troops to guard it, at others upon pre- 
 text of the Boulogne flotilla, which had been 
 kept constantly armed ; and they had mean- 
 while sent out distant expeditions, projected for 
 the sole interest of England. Thus they had 
 taken the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch. 
 From the Cape of Good Hope they had pro- 
 ceeded to the shores of the La Plata, and at- 
 tempted a coup de main against Monte Video 
 and Buenos Ayres. The supineness of the 
 Spanish government, and the cowardice of its 
 commandants, had permitted the English to 
 penetrate into Buenos Ayres, and to possess 
 themselves of that metropolis of South America. 
 But M. Liniers, a Frenchman, who, after the 
 American war, had passed into the service of 
 Spain, had rallied the Spanish troops and po- 
 
 , pulation, and driven the English out of Buenos 
 Ayres, after reducing them to a capitulation 
 mortifying for their glory. At Monte Video, 
 likewise, after having entered and evacuated 
 it, the English had been obliged to withdraw 
 from the city, and they occupied some islands 
 
 t at the mouth of the La Plata. The Mediter- 
 ranean also had become the theatre of their 
 ambitious expeditions. They had, it will be 
 
 ; recollected, forced the Dardanelles, without 
 any result for themselves, and effected a land- 
 ing in Egypt, which had been followed by their 
 
 , retreat. By all these enterprises the English 
 had gained the Cape, the island of Curaooa, 
 and the animadversion of their allies, who said 
 that the}' were deserted. 
 
 Such was the state of the Grenville ministry, 
 when, in March, 1807, a question unexpectedly 
 
 , arose, which put the moderate principles of 
 
 ! that administration in opposition with the re- 
 ligious principles of old George III. Once be- 
 fore that devout prince had carried his infatua- 
 tion against the Catholics of Ireland to such a 
 length as to part from Mr. Pitt rather than 
 grant a commencement of emancipation. The 
 same cause was destined to separate the col- 
 leagues and successors of Mr. Pitt. The Irish 
 rendered good service in the army, and, at a 
 moment when the contest with France assumed 
 a new character of implacability, it was politic 
 to satisfy those brave soldiers by permitting 
 them to attain the same rank as the English 
 officers, and thus to attach the Catholics to 
 England by a first act of justice. A bill to this 
 effect was therefore proposed by ministers, and 
 owing to the obscurity of that bill, an obscurity 
 purposely imparted to it by the ministers who 
 had drawn it up, George III., misapprehending 
 2i2
 
 378 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807 
 
 its object, consented that it should be presented ; 
 but no sooner was it brought in than the ene- 
 mies of the cabinet, who were no other than 
 the secondary personages by whom Mr. Pitt 
 had surrounded himself at the time of his last 
 administration, had by secret intrigues awak- 
 ened the scruples of the old king, and caused 
 Buch explanations to be laid before him as gave 
 the bill an import which at first he had not 
 suspected. George III. had then desired that 
 it should be withdrawn. Lord Grenville and 
 Lord Howick resigned themselves with diffi- 
 culty to this humiliating step, declaring that 
 the concessions now refused to the Irish must 
 be granted to them sooner or later, to which 
 George III. replied by demanding a promise 
 that nothing of the kind should be in future 
 proposed. In consequence of this royal requi- 
 sition, Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and their 
 colleagues, resigned in March, 1807. The weak 
 remnant of the ministers who had surrounded 
 Mr. Pitt then returned to office, under the pre- 
 sidency of the old Duke of Portland, a veteran 
 Whig, who had no longer any political import- 
 ance on account of his great age, and who was 
 introduced merely to give the cabinet some 
 appearance of political coalition. Mr. Canning, 
 Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Perceval, the principal 
 members of this administration, justly acquired 
 the denomination of the king's creatures, avail- 
 ing themselves of the royal weakness to substi- 
 tute themselves for the most considerable and 
 the most capable men in England. Violent 
 discussions in both Houses of Parliament had 
 well nigh left them in a minority ; they had 
 dared to threaten Parliament with a dissolution, 
 and had finished by dissolving it, strong in the 
 support of George III. The elections had taken 
 place in June, 1807, amidst cries of "Down 
 with the Papists !" a cry which always finds 
 many echoes in England. Seconded by the 
 popular fanaticism, which was carried to such a 
 length that it might have been supposed that the 
 Pope had actually landed in Ireland, ministers 
 of no consideration, champions of a detestable 
 cause, had obtained a considerable majority. 
 Such were the men who at this moment go- 
 verned England. 
 
 These new comers, for whom Fortune destined 
 at a later period the unmerited honour of reap- 
 ing the fruits of the efforts of Mr. Pitt, naturally 
 desired to distinguish themselves from their 
 predecessors, and those predecessors, having 
 Bought to temper the policy of Mr. Pitt, could 
 do no other than seek to exaggerate it. They 
 had at once given the promise, for which they 
 were most bitterly reproached, not to propose 
 any measure in favour of the Catholics ; and as 
 to foreign politics, they affected great zeal for 
 the allies of England, unworthily deserted, they 
 alleged, by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and 
 Lord Howick. 
 
 Without loss of time they had promised ex- 
 peditions to the Continent; so that, entering 
 into the ministry in March, they might have 
 been able in April, May, and June to afford 
 useful aid to the belligerent powers, since 
 Dantzig had not surrendered before the 26th 
 of May; but they had done nothing, either 
 from incapacity or from being occupied by 
 domestic affairs, an occupation which must have 
 been urgent, for they had then to dissolve Par- 
 liament, and to convoke a new one. Be this as 
 
 it may, after they had assembled a considerable 
 fleet in the Downs and collected at that point, 
 numerous troops for embarkation, their co- 
 operation in the continental war was limited to 
 the despatch of an English division to Stral- 
 sund. The news of the battle of Friedland and 
 the peace of Tilsit had filled them with alarm 
 for their country, and still greater for them- 
 selves ; for, after reprehending with extreme 
 severity the inaction of their predecessors, they 
 had rendered themselves liable to be much more 
 justly reproached for their inertness during 
 the three decisive months of April, May, and 
 June, 1807. It was therefore necessary, at 
 any rate, to attempt some enterprise which 
 should strike the public opinion, which should 
 avert the reproach of inactivity, which, useful 
 or useless, humane or barbarous, should be 
 sufficiently specious, sufficiently dazzling to 
 occupy discontented and alarmed minds. 
 
 In this situation, they resolved upon an en- 
 terprise which has long made the world ring as 
 an outrage against humanity, an enterprise not 
 only odious, but very ill-judged in regard to 
 British interest. This enterprise was no other 
 than the famous expedition against Denmark, 
 projected for compelling her by violence to 
 declare herself in favour of England. Paltry 
 imitators of Mr. Pitt, the English ministers 
 determined to inflict on Copenhagen a repeti- 
 tion of the signal blow by means of which Eng- 
 land had in 1801 dissolved the coalition of the 
 neutrals. But when the Addington adminis- 
 tration had struck Copenhagen in 1801, it was 
 to break up a coalition, of which Denmark 
 publicly formed a part ; it was an act of war 
 opposed to an act of war ; it was a rash opera- 
 tion but clever in its temerity, cruel in its means 
 but necessary. In 1807, on the contrary, there 
 was neither pretext, nor justice, nor skill, in 
 attacking Denmark. That State, scrupulously 
 neutral, had taken extreme care to maintain 
 her neutrality. She had, from an unfortunate 
 habit of using greater precaution against France 
 than against England, placed her whole army 
 along Holstein, incurring, as had been the case 
 at Liibeck, the risk of a collision with the 
 French troops rather than suffer the line of her 
 frontiers to be violated. Her diplomacy had 
 acted in the same manner as her army, and 
 had always manifested a jealous susceptibility 
 in regard to France. At the very moment, she 
 had not, as the English ministers falsely as- 
 serted, just been engaged in treating with Rus- 
 sia and France, and stipulating her adhesion to 
 the new continental coalition. So far from it, 
 she had just protested once more her desire to 
 maintain her neutrality, though Napoleon had 
 caused an intimation to be made to her with 
 delicacy, but with firmness, that, when Eng- 
 land shduld have explained herself respecting 
 the Russian mediation, Denmark would at 
 length be obliged to come to a decision, and to 
 declare for or against the oppressors of the 
 seas. If on this occasion the English ministers 
 had acted judiciously, they would have left to 
 Napoleon the odious part of compelling Den- 
 mark to speak out, and sent a fleet into the Cat- 
 tegat; then, in case of the approach of the 
 French, they should have gone to the assistance 
 of Copenhagen, and, in assisting that capital, 
 they would have become the legitimate masters 
 of the Danish fleet, the two Belts, and the
 
 Sept. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 379 
 
 Sound. At a period when Europe, already 
 weary of suffering by the quarrel between 
 France and England, was disposed to judge 
 severely either of the two powers which should 
 aggravate the evils of the war, this friendly 
 conduct and assistance afforded to Denmark 
 would have been the only line of conduct to 
 pursue. The contrary conduct gave Denmark 
 to Napoleon, spared him the embarrassment 
 of himself exercising a tyrannical constraint, 
 and the carrying off of a few crazy hulls of ships 
 by the English was but a fruitless act of pil- 
 lage, the more impolitic and odious since it was 
 not to be accomplished but by the abominable 
 means of bombarding a population of women, 
 children, and old men. 
 
 Supposing that enlightened ministers, placed 
 in a simple position, had then directed the 
 politics of England, the choice would not have 
 been doubtful, and their conduct, which would 
 have consisted in aiding Denmark in her resist- 
 ance against Napoleon, would certainly have 
 prevailed. But Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, 
 Perceval, were, with more or less of oratorical 
 talent, sovry politicians, and ministers more 
 intent on their own interest than on that of the 
 country. They imagined that the repetition of 
 the blow of 1801 was actually necessary ; and 
 in this they proved themselves puny imitators 
 of Pitt's policy, and every imitator is a cor- 
 ruptor, for every imitator corrupts what he 
 imitates by exaggerating it. 
 
 No sooner had the news of the peace of Til- 
 sit arrived than the English cabinet, falsely 
 pretending to have obtained from secret com- 
 munications the knowledge of a stipulation, 
 tending, as it alleged, to subject Denmark to 
 the continental coalition, resolved to send a 
 powerful expedition to Copenhagen for the pur- 
 pose of securing the Danish fleet, upon the 
 pretext that to deprive Napoleon of the mari- 
 time resources of Denmark was, on the part 
 of England, only an act of legitimate defence. 
 This resolution being adopted, the English 
 cabinet immediately issued the necessary or- 
 ders.' The troops and the fleet were all ready 
 in the Downs, and had nothing to do but to set 
 sail. Ever since the check before Constanti- 
 nople, the Admiralty had in its counsels made 
 it a rule that every naval expedition ought to 
 be accompanied by land forces. Conformably 
 to this notion, 20,000 men had been assembled 
 in the Downs ; these, added to the English 
 troops sent to Stralsund, would form an army 
 of twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand men 
 under the walls of Copenhagen. The proceed- 
 ings were to be worthy of the object. Taking 
 advantage of the circumstance that Denmark 
 had all her troops, not in the islands of Seeland 
 and Funen, but on the frontiers of Holstein, it 
 was resolved to throw a naval division into the 
 two Belts, to intercept those passages, and thus 
 to prevent the Danish army from coming to the 
 succour of Copenhagen, then to land 20,000 
 men around that capital, to invest it, to sum- 
 mon it, and if it refused to surrender, to bom- 
 bard and even to destroy it. This plan of at- 
 tack, founded on the default of preparation 
 towards the sea, and on the assemblage of all 
 the Danish forces on the land side, was a com- 
 plete demonstration of the good faith of Den- 
 mark and of the base ill faith of the British 
 cabinet. Sir Home Popham, deeply compro- 
 
 mised in the failure of the attempt on Buenos 
 Ayres, and extremely impatient to retrieve his 
 reputation, had greatly contributed to the con- 
 ception of the plan, and also contributed 
 greatly to its execution. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that the 
 offer of the Russian mediation and the propo- 
 sal to treat for a reconciliation with France 
 arrived in London. There they were far too 
 deeply engaged in a system of implacable hos- 
 tilities, too strongly enticed by the hope of a 
 signally prosperous expedition, to listen to any 
 pacific proposal. It was decided, therefore, to 
 return an evasive answer, hypocritically calcu- 
 lated, which, without precluding any ulterior 
 reconciliation, would for the moment leave the 
 ministers at liberty to prosecute the enterprise 
 commenced. In consequence, in a note, which 
 was a parody of the former language of Pitt, 
 they declared, like him, that they were quit* 
 ready for peace, but that it had always been 
 prevented by the bad faith of France, and that, 
 not disposed, after so many fruitless negotia- 
 tions, to fall into a new snare, they requested to 
 be informed on what bases Russia, on becom- 
 ing mediatrix, was commissioned to treat. It 
 was a shuffling answer, but of which posterior 
 acts were soon to furnish a cruelly negative 
 interpretation. 
 
 Admiral Gambier, commanding the English 
 fleet, and Lieutenant-general Cathcart, com- 
 manding the land-forces, set sail in several di- 
 visions towards the end of July. The expedi- 
 tion, starting from several ports in the Chan- 
 nel, was composed of 25 sail of the line, 40 
 frigates, and 377 transports. It carried about 
 20,000 men, and was to find seven or eight 
 thousand returning from Stralsund. The ships 
 of war preceded the fleet of transports, in or- 
 der to surround the island of Seeland, and to 
 prevent the return of the Danish troops to- 
 wards Copenhagen. This fleet was on the 1st 
 of August in the Cattegat, on the 3d at the en- 
 trance of the Sound. Before proceeding up 
 the Sound, Admiral Gambier had detached 
 Commodore Keats with a division of frigates 
 and brigs, and a few seventy-fours, drawing 
 but little water, to secure the two Belts, and to 
 station a squadron there, with orders not to 
 suffer a single man to pass from the Continent 
 to the island of Funen, or from the island of 
 Funen to that of Seeland. This precaution 
 taken, the fleet passed the Sound without re- 
 sistance, because Denmark knew nothing, and 
 Sweden knew every thing. It came to an an- 
 chor in the road of Elsineur, near the fortress 
 of Kronenborg, which continued silent, and it 
 despatched an English agent to address a sum- 
 mons to the Prince-royal of Denmark, then 
 regent of the kingdom. The agent chosen was 
 worthy of the mission. It was Mr. Jackson, 
 who had formerly been charge" d'affaires in 
 France, before the arrival of Lord Whitworth 
 in Paris, but who could not be left there, on 
 account of the bad spirit which he manifested 
 on all occasions. He did not meet with the 
 prince-royal in Copenhagen, and went in quest 
 of him to Kiel, where the royal family was re- 
 siding at the moment. Being introduced to the 
 regent, he alleged a pretended secret stipula- 
 tion, by virtue of which Denmark, it was said, 
 was voluntarily or by force to join a continental 
 coalition against England. As a reasoii f*r
 
 380 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807 
 
 acting, he assigned the necessity in which the 
 British cabinet found itself to take precautions 
 lest the naval forces of Denmark and the pas- 
 sage of the Sound should fall into the power 
 of the French ; and in consequence he demand- 
 ed, in the name of his governnent, that the for- 
 tress of Kronenborg, which commands the 
 Sound, the port of Copenhagen, and lastly the 
 fleet itself, should be delivered up to the Eng- 
 lish army, promising that the whole should be 
 held in deposit for the account of Denmark, 
 which should be put again in possession of all 
 that was to be taken from her, when the dan- 
 ger should be over. Mr. Jackson gave an as- 
 surance that Denmark should not lose any 
 thing, that the English would conduct them- 
 selves in his country as auxiliaries and friends, 
 that the British troops would pay for all that 
 they should consume. "And with what," re- 
 plied the indignant prince, "would you pay for 
 our lost honour, if we were to accede to this 
 infamous proposal ?" The prince continued, 
 and contrasting with this perfidious aggression 
 the upright conduct of Denmark, which had 
 taken no precautions against the English, which 
 had taken all against the French, and now found 
 that her confidence was abused to surprise her. 
 Mr. Jackson replied to this just indignation with 
 an insolent familiarity, saying that war was 
 war, and that one must submit to its necessi- 
 ties and yield to the stronger when one is the 
 weaker party. The prince dismissed the Eng- 
 lish agent with very harsh words, declaring 
 that he should immediately return to Copen- 
 hagen to perform there his duties of Danish 
 prince and citizen. He accordingly repaired 
 thither, made known by a proclamation the 
 dangers with which the country was threat- 
 ened, addressed a patriotic appeal to the popu- 
 lation, and prescribed all the measures which 
 time and the unexpected investment of the 
 island of Seeland allowed to be taken an in- 
 vestment which had already become so close 
 that the prince had himself found the greatest 
 difficulty to cross the two Belts. Unfortunately, 
 the means of defence were far from correspond- 
 ing with the wants of Copenhagen, for there 
 were scarcely 5000 troops in the city, 3000 of 
 the line, and 2000 well organized militia. To 
 these were added a civic guard of three or four 
 thousand citizens and students. All the old 
 ships were moored, as in 1801, outside the pas- 
 pages, so as to cover the city towards the sea 
 with floating batteries. The fleet, the object 
 of the predilection and the pride of the Danes, 
 was carefully removed to the interior of the 
 basin; and, lastly, on the land side works were 
 hastily thrown up, for it was known that the 
 English had brought with them a great land 
 force, and the heavy artillery, with which the 
 Danish arsenals were abundantly provided, was 
 mounted in battery in all quarters. But if 
 such means were sufficient to prevent the tak- 
 ing of the city by assault, they were far from 
 sufficient against the danger of a bombardment. 
 It would have been requisite to keep the enemy 
 at such a distance as should render any bom- 
 bardment impossible, or to have had outworks, 
 which Denmark, relying upon the insular posi- 
 tion of her capital, had never thought of erect- 
 ing, or an army of the line, which her good 
 faith had induced her to place on the frontier 
 of her territory. Be this as it may, the prince, 
 
 after making the dispositions adapted to th 
 urgency of circumstances, left a brave officer, 
 General Peymann, to command the city of Co- 
 penhagen, with orders to defend himself to the 
 last extremity. As there was in the island of 
 Seeland itself, and consequently within the 
 Belts, a pretty numerous population, capable 
 of furnishing some thousand militia, he ordered 
 General Castenskiold to 1 assemble this militia 
 in all haste, and to introduce it, if possible, 
 into Copenhagen, before the investment of that 
 city. As for himself, he left the place and 
 hastened in person to Holstein to collect the 
 army scattered on the frontier, and lead it to 
 the relief of the capital, if he could succeed in 
 crossing the Belts. 
 
 Meanwhile the English envoy, having re- 
 turned to the fleet, directed the English lega- 
 tion to leave Copenhagen, and gave Admiral 
 Gambier, as well as General Cathcart, the 
 signal for the fearful execution prepared 
 against a city, whose whole crime consisted in 
 the possession of a fleet which the English 
 ministers wanted to capture in order to place 
 themselves on higher ground in parliament. 
 The parleys with the Danish government, the 
 necessity for awaiting the arrival of the trans- 
 port fleet, which sailed later than the ships of 
 war, the tarrying for a favourable wind, had 
 retarded Admiral Gambier's operations till the 
 15th of August. On the 16th he stood in 
 shore at a point of the coast called Webeck, a 
 few leagues to the north of Copenhagen, and 
 there landed about 20,000 men, mostly Ger- 
 mans in the service of England. The division 
 of troops from Stralsund was to land to the 
 south towards Kioge. Encouraged by the pre- 
 sence in the Belts of Commodore Keats' divi- 
 sion of light vessels, they commenced in secu- 
 rity their criminal enterprise. The English 
 well knew that they should not be able even 
 with thirty thousand men to carry by assault a 
 place defended by eight or nine thousand men, 
 five thousand of whom were regular troops, 
 and a population of very brave seamen. But 
 they reckoned upon the means of destruction 
 which they had at their disposal, thanks to the 
 immense quantity of heavy artillery brought 
 in their ships. To make the more sure of suc- 
 cess, they had even brought with them Colonel 
 Congreve, who was to make trial, for the first 
 time, of his formidable rockets. In conse- 
 quence, their operations did not consist in 
 regular works of approach, but in the solid 
 and well-protected establishment of a few bat- 
 teries for red-hot shot. Around Copenhagen 
 there was a sort of lake, of oblong form, which 
 embraced nearly all that portion of enclosure 
 on the land side. They took a position behind 
 this lake, and there entrenched themselves. 
 Covered in this manner, on the side next to 
 the city, against sallies of the besieged, they 
 sought to cover themselves on the side next 
 the country also by a second line of counter- 
 vallation, in order to keep in awe the militia 
 of Seeland, assembled under General Casten- 
 skiold, or the regular troops themselves, if any 
 of them should find means to cross the Belts. 
 Having solidly established themselves, they 
 began to construct their batteries for red-hot 
 shot, and refrained from making use of them 
 till they should be completely armed and in a 
 state for opening a destructive fire. While
 
 Sept. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 381 
 
 they were thus engaged, their fleet had ap- 
 proached the side next the sea, and brisk 
 skirmishes took place on the two elements, 
 between the besieged and the besiegers. A 
 Danish flotilla, hastily equipped, contested 
 with the English flotilla, and with advantage, 
 the narrow passages by which it is possible to 
 approach Copenhagen ; while the troops of the 
 line, shut up in the city, made frequent sorties 
 against General Cathcart's troops. Having 
 unfortunately the option of only two points of 
 attack, the two extremities of the lake which 
 separated them from the enemy, the Danes 
 found, when they attempted sorties, the Eng- 
 lish forces drawn to those two points, and were 
 not sufficiently numerous to force the lines of 
 the besiegers. They were obliged every time 
 to fall back, after killing a few men, and hav- 
 ing lost many more than they had killed, on 
 account of the disadvantage of position. 
 
 The English, to make sure of success, await- 
 ed the arrival of their second division, which 
 was before Stralsund. The Swedes having, at 
 their instigation, resumed hostilities, Marshal 
 Brune proceeded to lay siege to that place with 
 38,000 men and all the siege artillery, the use 
 of which was restored to the French army by 
 the reduction of Dantzig, and by the cessation 
 of hostilities before Colberg, Marienberg, and 
 Graudenz. Marshal Brune was accompanied 
 by General Chasseloup, of the engineers, the 
 same who had contributed so much to the 
 taking of Dantzig. That able officer, possess- 
 ing this time all the means, which had been 
 but successively accumulated before the fort- 
 ress of Dantzig, purposed to make the siege of 
 Stralsund a model of precision, vigour, and 
 promptitude. He had planned three attacks, 
 but with the intention of rendering only one 
 of the three serious, that which, directed 
 towards the Kneiper gate to the north, might 
 carry destruction to the Swedish fleet. Having 
 opened the trenches at all points at once, in 
 spite of the fire of the place, he had in a few 
 days established and armed his batteries, and 
 commenced an attack so tremendous that the 
 hostile general, though he had 15,000 Swedes 
 and seven or eight thousand English, either in 
 the fortress or in the Isle of Riigen, found him- 
 self compelled to send a flag of truce, and to 
 surrender Stralsund on the 21st of August. 
 
 During this siege, conducted by the French 
 with a bravery and skill worthy of admiration, 
 General Cathcart had been joined, agreeably 
 to his orders, by the division of English troops 
 which had been directed to co-operate with the 
 Swedes. He had just disembarked it at Kioge, 
 and from that moment he had so closely shut 
 up the city of Copenhagen within a double line 
 of countervallation that he had it in his power 
 to destroy that unfortunate city, without hav- 
 ing any thing to fear from the effects of its 
 despair. Nothing is more legitimate than a 
 siege. Nothing is more barbarous than a 
 bombardment, when one of those imperious 
 necessities of war which justify all things does 
 not render it excusable. And what necessity 
 for justifying the atrocious proceeding prepared 
 by the English, but that of pillaging a fleet and 
 an arsenal reputed to be very rich. 
 
 Nevertheless, on the 1st of September, Ge- 
 neral Cathcart, having in battery sixty-eight 
 pieces of artillery, forty-eight of which were 
 
 mortars and howitzers, summoned Copenhagen 
 in a language the feigned humanity of which 
 could not deceive. He required that the port, 
 the arsenal, and the fleet, should be delivered 
 up to him, threatening, in case of refusal, to 
 burn the city, and adding to his summons 
 pressing entreaties that he might be spared the 
 employment of the means which, he said, were 
 repugnant to his heart. General Peymaun, 
 having replied in the negative, a tremendous 
 fire of howitzers, bombs, and Congreve rockets, 
 burst over the hapless capital of Denmark. 
 The barbarous authors of this enterprise had 
 not even the excuse of their own danger, for 
 they were so covered as not to lose a single 
 man. After continuing this cruelty the whole 
 night of the 2d of September, and part of the 
 next day, the English general suspended the 
 fire to see whether the place would surrender. 
 Fires had broken out in various quarters ; hun- 
 dreds of unfortunate creatures had perished ; 
 several large buildings were in flames ; the 
 able population, employed in pouring the wa- 
 ters of the Baltic on the burning quarters, was 
 exhausted with fatigue. General Peymann, 
 with a heart rent by this spectacle, maintained 
 a gloomy silence, waiting, before he surren- 
 dered, for humanity to silence honour. Insen- 
 sible to all these calamities, the English re- 
 commenced their fire in the evening of the 3d, 
 keeping it up all night and the whole of the 
 next day, excepting a short interruption, and 
 persisting in this barbarity till the morning of 
 the 5th. Nearly 2000 persons, men, women, 
 children, and aged people, had perished. Half 
 the city was in flames ; the fine churches were 
 in ruins ; the arsenal was on fire. General 
 Peymann, unable to withstand any longer the 
 horrible scenes which he had before his eyes, 
 yielded at length to the threats of total destruc- 
 tion which the English general repeated, and 
 surrendered Copenhagen to its barbarous con- 
 querors. The capitulation was signed on the 
 7th. It gave up to the English the castle of 
 Kronenborg, the city of Copenhagen, and the 
 arsenal, with the faculty of occupying them 
 for six weeks, the time judged necessary for 
 equipping the Danish fleet and carrying it off 
 to England. This fleet was given up to Admi- 
 ral Gambier, upon condition that it should be 
 restored at a peace. 
 
 This capitulation being signed, the English 
 entered Copenhagen and their seamen rushed 
 to the arsenal. No spectacle since their entry 
 into Toulon, was comparable to that which they 
 exhibited on this occasion. Before the face of 
 a population overwhelmed with grief, which 
 beheld its habitations ravaged, whiph numbered 
 in its bosom thousands of victims dead or dy- 
 ing, which, besides its private sorrows, deeply 
 felt the public misfortunes, for the loss of the 
 Danish navy seemed to every one the ruin of 
 his own existence before the face of this 
 afflicted population, coming ashore in great 
 numbers, they rushed to the arsenal with un- 
 heard-of brutality. The English custom of 
 granting to sailors a great part of the value of 
 prizes, in adding to their animosity against all 
 European navies the stimulant of personal 
 greediness, officers and men displayed extra- 
 ordinary ardour and activity to get afloat every 
 vessel in Copenhagen that was in a state to put 
 to sea. There were found sixteen sail r.f h
 
 382 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807. 
 
 line, and about a score of brigs and frigates 
 capable of serving, with the rigging stowed 
 away in storehouses kept in very good order. 
 In a few days these forty and odd vessels were 
 rigged, equipped, and warped out of the basins. 
 The destructive zeal of the English sailors did 
 not stop at this robbery. There were two ships 
 building them they demolished. All the tim- 
 ber and naval stores in the arsenal were car- 
 ried on board the Danish squadron or the Eng- 
 lish squadron. They took away the very tools 
 of the workmen, and destroyed whatever they 
 could not carry off. Half of the English crews 
 was then put on board the Danish ships to na- 
 vigate them, and the entire expedition, the 
 conquering as well as the conquered fleet, 
 worked through the passages, taking care to 
 receive on board in haste the army which it 
 had landed, and which did not think itself safe 
 in a city that it had drenched with blood, and 
 on the approach of the French, who were 
 coming in all haste to avenge such an atrocity. 
 Passing Webeck, Kronenborg, and all the 
 points of the coast, this immense naval arma- 
 ment picked up the English troops, and then 
 made sail for the coast of England. 
 
 It would be impossible to express the sensa- 
 tion produced in Europe by the unheard-of act, 
 which, not the English nation, which severely 
 censured that act, but the administration of 
 Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, had au- 
 thorized. The indignation was general among 
 the friends of France, who, at that time, were 
 not numerous, for she had too much success to 
 have many friends, as well as among her most 
 decided enemies. There was not a nation 
 more highly esteemed than the Danish nation. 
 Discreet, modest, laborious, attentive to her 
 own commerce, without seeking to injure that 
 of another, making a point of scrupulously 
 maintaining her neutrality amidst a war of 
 bitter animosity, and though inoffensive, yet 
 capable, as in 1801, of devoting herself heroic- 
 ally for the principle of that neutrality which 
 formed her whole policy, she was, like the 
 Swiss, like the Dutch, one of those nations 
 which make up for numerical weakness by 
 moral strength, and know how to command 
 universal respect. The surprise of which she 
 Lad just been the victim, furnished still more 
 striking evidence of her good faith ; for she 
 suffered for having taken no precaution against 
 England, and for having taken too much against 
 France. Hence there was but one sentiment, 
 but one cry, throughout all Europe. Before, 
 it was said that nobody could rest quietly be- 
 side the redoubtable conqueror begotten by 
 the French Revolution. Now it was said that 
 England was quite as tyrannical at sea as Na- 
 poleon on land ; that she was as perfidious as 
 he was violent; and that, between the two, 
 there was neither security nor repose for any 
 nation. Such was the language of our ene- 
 mies, such the language of Berlin and Vienna. 
 But, among our friends and among impartial 
 men, it was acknowledged that good reason 
 for endeavouring to unite all nations against 
 ai. intolerable maritime despotism a despot- 
 ism which, once established, would be invin- 
 cible, would suffer no flag but the English flag, 
 no traffic but in English produce, and end in 
 fixing at pleasure the price of English com- 
 modities, whether exotic or manufactured. It 
 
 was necessary therefore to join, in order to 
 make head against England, to wrest from her 
 the sceptre of the seas, and to compel her to 
 restore to the world that peace, of which, on 
 her account, it had been deprived for fifteen 
 years. 
 
 It is certain that there was nothing, except- 
 ing peace, which Napoleon wished for more 
 than such an event. He should not hereafter 
 have to resort to violence with Denmark, 
 which, on the contrary, would throw itself into 
 his arms, assist him to close the Sound, and 
 furnish him with what was of more value than 
 a few old ships, with excellent sailors, fit to 
 man the innumerable vessels which France had 
 on the stocks. He could push the Russian 
 armies upon Sweden, and push the armies of 
 Spain upon Portugal ; ,Jie could even require 
 at Vienna the exclusion of the English from 
 the shores of the Adriatic ; lastly, he could 
 demand every thing at St. Petersburg; for, 
 after what had passed at Copenhagen, Alexan- 
 der could not meet with any further resistance 
 to his policy in the opinion of the Russians. 
 Had Napoleon at this moment profited by the 
 fault of England, without committing an equal 
 one, he would have been in a unique position ; he 
 would have become as morally strong through 
 the wrongs of his enemy, as he was materially 
 through his own armies. In fact, the trouble 
 of his system of . conquering the sea by land 
 was saved, for the violence done to the conti- 
 nental powers to oblige them to concur in his 
 designs would be thenceforward explained and 
 justified. If he closed the ports of the Haii- 
 seatic towns, of Holland, of France, of Portu- 
 gal, of Spain, of Italy ; if he doomed the peo- 
 ple to shift without sugar and coffee, and to 
 substitute for those productions of the tropics, 
 costly and very imperfect European imitations ; 
 if he did violence to all tastes, after having 
 done violence to all interests ; he had a com- 
 plete and signal excuse in the crime of Copen- 
 hagen. But, we repeat it, he ought to have 
 left England to sin alone and not himself have 
 sinned so grievously, a difficult thing, for, in 
 a rancorous contest, faults link themselves to- 
 gether, and it is rarely the case that the faults 
 of the one are not speedily balanced or sur- 
 passed by the faults of the other. 
 
 Napoleon was well aware of the advantage 
 which the conduct of England gave him, and 
 if he lost a hope of accommodation, a hope 
 which was but slender in his estimation, he all 
 at once saw a concurrence of means, a union 
 of efforts, preparing for him, which would pro- 
 mise him a peace, the conditions of which would 
 compensate the delay. He failed not, there- 
 fore, to excite the journals of France and all 
 those that he could command out of France, 
 against the abominable act which had roused 
 the indignation of Europe. From Fontainebleau 
 itself, from amidst the pleasures of that resi- 
 dence, his armies, his fleets, were all prepared 
 for a conflict still more vast and more terrible 
 than that which for so many years had appalled 
 the world. 
 
 For the rest, Napoleon had no effort to make 
 in order to impart to the opinion of Europe 
 that impulsion which it suited him to give to 
 it. In England itself the misdeed committed 
 against the city of Copenhagen was censured 
 with extreme severity. In that great and mo-
 
 Sept 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 383 
 
 ral country there were, notwithstanding an 
 unworthy administration, notwithstanding a 
 debased parliament, notwithstanding the pas- 
 sion of the people for the success of the na- 
 tional navy, there were enlightened, honest, 
 impartial men, who condemned 'he unparalleled 
 act perpetrated against an inoffensive and dis- 
 armed power. Lord Grenville, Messrs. Wind- 
 ham, Addington, Grey, Sheridan, and others, 
 spoke out with vehemence against this odious 
 act, which, according to them, was but an 
 iniquitous and mischievous parody of that of 
 1801 ; for, in 1801, Denmark formed part of a 
 coalition hostile to England, and the means 
 employed for reducing her were the most legi- 
 timate of all, a naval battle. In 1807, on the 
 contrary, that same Denmark was at peace, 
 wholly occupied in defending her neutrality 
 against France, disarmed in regard to Eng- 
 land, and the method employed to reduce her 
 was the atrocious bombardment of an inoffen- 
 sive population. The result was, instead of 
 dissolving a coalition of neutrals, to link Den- 
 mark and France more closely together, to 
 spare the latter the odium of a general con- 
 straint exercised upon the Continent, to take 
 upon itself that odium, to close the Sound 
 against itself; for the Danes closed it on their 
 side, and the Swedes were soon forced to close 
 it on theirs. Lastly, to balance such deplor- 
 able consequences, there was nothing to allege 
 but the pillage of an arsenal, the carrying 
 nway of a fleet which was very old, and only 
 four ships of which were worth the expense of 
 repair. Such were the animadversions directed 
 with deserved vehemence against Mr. Canning, 
 who replied to them with an intrepidity in 
 falsehood, which is not of a nature to honour 
 his memory, redeemed, it is true, by his pos- 
 terior conduct. For his only excuse, he re- 
 peated incessantly that ministers had obtained 
 the secret of the negotiations of Tilsit, and that 
 this secret justified the Copenhagen expedition. 
 His adversaries justly replied by desiring to be 
 informed, not who was the author of this reve- 
 lation, whom the feigned generosity of the 
 British cabinet refused to name, but of the 
 mere substance of what he had revealed. Now, 
 on this point, the cabinet returned but very 
 confused and perplexed answers, and could not 
 furnish any other : for, if it was true that, at 
 Tilsit (as the British cabinet knew but very 
 vaguely) Russia and France had promised to 
 unite their efforts to force the Continent into a 
 coalition against England, this was only after 
 an offer of peace on moderate conditions ; it 
 was moreover unknown to the cabinet of Co- 
 penhagen, which was not an accomplice in that 
 design. In the conduct pursued towards Den- 
 mark, there was then iniquity in a moral point 
 of view, and silliness in a political point of 
 fiew ; for the true means of having that neu- 
 tral power on one's side, of having her fleet, 
 her sailors, and the Sound, would have been to 
 assist her and to leave to Napoleon the trouble 
 of doing her violence. 
 
 In spite, however, of the reprobation bestowed 
 by all honest men in England on the Copen- 
 hagen expedition, a parliament subservient to 
 the anti-Catholic prejudices of the Crown, and 
 to the extravagant policy of Pitt, decided in 
 favour of the ministers, but not without be- 
 traying the embarrassment which it felt. It 
 
 adopted in fact the form of an adjournment, 
 declaring that it would take the act into con- 
 sideration at a future time, when the ministers 
 should have it in their power to say what they 
 could not divulge at the moment. But all idea 
 of peace was for ever abandoned. The British 
 cabinet, not disguising from itself the mischiev- 
 j ous impressions produced in Europe by its late 
 j violences, endeavoured to recover its credit 
 with the two principal courts of the Continent, 
 those of Vienna and St. Petersburg. It sent 
 Lord Pembroke to Vienna, General Wilson to 
 St. Petersburg, to convey some of those propo- 
 sals which one chooses rather to communicate 
 orally than in writing. These proposals were 
 the following. 
 
 From the apparent satisfaction which the 
 Emperor Alexander seemed to have brought 
 back from a war, marked nevertheless by re- 
 verses ; from the deini-confidential communi- 
 cations which he had made, and which all led 
 to the inference that great results would be 
 seen to spring from the alliance with France ; 
 from his persisting to occupy Moldavia and 
 Wallachia ; it was evident to men endowed 
 with any sagacity that France, in order to 
 [ bring Russia into her views, had promised her 
 I great advantages in the East, and that she had 
 singularly flattered her ambition in regard to 
 j that quarter. The British cabinet decided, there- 
 | fore, without hesitation, on the sacrifices which 
 circumstances appeared to command, and, 
 though it incessantly affected to defend the in- 
 tegrity of the Ottoman empire, it conceived 
 that it would be better to give itself Moldavia 
 and Wallachia to Russia, than to leave them 
 to be given her by Napoleon. In consequence, 
 General Wilson, bold and clever as a soldier 
 and a diplomatist, a personage at that time of 
 too little importance for ministers to be afraid 
 of disavowing him in case of need, was charged 
 to convey to St. Petersburg a message of the 
 most alluring kind for the Emperor Alexander. 
 He had no ostensible powers, but Mr. Canning, 
 in conversation with M. d'Alopeus, the Russian 
 minister, assured him that credit might be 
 given to what General Wilson should say. 
 Lord Pembroke, envoy extraordinary to Aus- 
 tria, notwithstanding the presence of Mr. 
 Adair, was directed to demonstrate to the 
 court of Vienna the necessity for being on 
 good terms with Russia, and consequently for 
 making up its mind to all the sacrifices which 
 this line of policy might entail. The real drift 
 of this was nothing less than to dispose Aus- 
 tria to see with calmness Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia become the property of the Russians. 
 
 Lord Gower, ambassador in .Russia, and 
 General Wilson, who had been sent to second 
 him, strove to persuade the Russian cabinet 
 not to take amiss what had been done at Co- 
 penhagen ; that ministers had merely endea- 
 voured to deprive the common enemy of Europe 
 of the means of doing mischief; that it ought to 
 rejoice instead of being irritated at it; that 
 England relied upon Russia to bring back 
 Denmark to a more just appreciation of the 
 late events ; and that, as for the fleet, it would 
 subsequently be given back to her if she would 
 j join the good cause ; that, for the rest, with- 
 out pretending to set itself up for judge of 
 the new line of policy adopted by Russia, the 
 British cabinet was certain that she would
 
 884 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807. 
 
 Boon return to her old system, as the only good 
 one; that it would not seek to involve her 
 again in war with France, at a moment when 
 she had such need of rest to recruit herself; 
 that it should even see with pleasure any ag- 
 grandizement of her territory and her power ; 
 for there was but one mischievous sort of ag- 
 grandizement which must by all means be 
 prevented the aggrandizement of France ; 
 but that if Russia was desirous to have Mol- 
 davia and Wallachia, it would consent to her 
 making the acquisition, provided that it was 
 not in consequenoe of a partition of the Turk- 
 ish provinces with the Emperor Napoleon. 
 
 The most compromising of these words, those 
 which one would not hazard without the facul- 
 ty of withdrawing them in case of need, were 
 spoken by General Wilson to M. de Romanzoff, 
 who reported them a moment afterwards to Ge- 
 neral Savary. The others were said by Lord 
 Gower himself with an arrogance which was 
 not likely to destroy the strangeness of their 
 effect. That smart way of explaining the Co- 
 penhagen expedition, that commission given to 
 Russia to justify England to Denmark, were 
 one of the most offensive of familiarities to the 
 Russian cabinet. The Emperor of Russia felt 
 it deeply, and insisted that the overtures of 
 England should be received with the greatest 
 haughtiness. In reply to the proposal for jus- 
 tifying to Copenhagen the carrying off of the 
 Danish fleet, he caused a formal demand of a 
 formal explanation on that subject to be made, 
 and he required Lord Gower to give an imme- 
 diate and categorical answer to the offer of me- 
 diation which the Russian cabinet had addressed 
 to the British cabinet. Lord Gower, since so 
 honourably known by the name of Lord Gran- 
 ville, seems on this occasion to have shaken off 
 his habitual indolence, insisted imperiously on 
 being made acquainted with the secret of the 
 negotiations at Tilsit, and declared that until 
 England was informed of what had been done 
 at that celebrated interview, she should hold 
 herself dispensed from all explanation respect- 
 ing what she had done at Copenhagen. As to 
 the Russian mediation, Lord Gower, being 
 pressed to declare definitively whether he con- 
 sented to accept it or not, replied proudly that 
 he did not. 
 
 Such was the issue of the explanations with 
 Lord Gower. As for the overtures with which 
 General Wilson was charged, M. de Romanzoff 
 received them superciliously, as words of no 
 importance, and dismissed Wilson himself, with- 
 out seeming to comprehend what the latter had 
 meant to say. He had thoroughly understood 
 him, however, as we shall presently see. 
 
 M. de Romanzoff, formerly a minister of Ca- 
 therine's, retaining a reflection of the glory 
 of that princess, heir of her vast ambition, a 
 great personage in all respects, had become in 
 these circumstances the intimate confidant of 
 Alexander and of all his dreams. Minister of 
 commerce, he had just been appointed minister 
 for foreign affairs ; and Alexander, seeking an 
 ambassador who might be suitable for Paris, 
 would not send him thither, though he possessed 
 every quality for such a post, solely that he 
 might keep him about his person. The young 
 sovereign and the old minister ardently coveted 
 the provinces of the Danube. Finland, an ac- 
 quisition immediately more desirable, because 
 
 it was a necessary, whereas the provinces of 
 the Danube were but superfluities, did not in- 
 terest them by far so much. Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia led to Constantinople, and this was what 
 allured them. They would, therefore, have ac- 
 cepted them, no matter from what hand ; and, 
 in the impatience of their desires, they retained 
 only so much judgment as was requisite to ap- 
 preciate the donor the most capable of giving 
 speedily and solidly. In regard to this point, 
 Napoleon had all their preference. From whom, 
 in fact, could one at that period receive some- 
 thing, and something considerable, unless from 
 Napoleon ? To take territory in any part of 
 the European continent without his assent would 
 have entailed war with him ; and war with him, 
 by whatever number it had been waged, had 
 not hitherto proved successful. Supposing, 
 even, that a new general coalition could be 
 formed, such battles as those of Austerlitz, 
 Jena, and Friedland, presented no very cheer- 
 ing prospect ; and at this time, too, when, in 
 the state of the French army, any encounter 
 with it must have the same consequences. Be- 
 sides, if England, throwing out slight baits here 
 and there, had shown an easy disposition in 
 regard to the provinces of the Danube, could 
 Russia flatter herself that Austria would mani- 
 fest the like disposition ? Had she not at St. 
 Petersburg her ambassador, M. de Meerveldz, 
 who was every day inquiring aloud, arid of 
 everybody, the secret of the negotiations at 
 Tilsit, and who declared that, if Moldavia and 
 Wallachia were the price of the new alliance, 
 they must be prepared to destroy the last Aus- 
 trian before they should obtain the consent of 
 the court of Vienna ? They must, therefore, 
 not hope that a coalition would be formed to 
 insure such a gift to Russia. This gift, con- 
 ferred in spite of Austria, could come only from 
 the man who, for fifteen years, had invariably 
 conquered her, that is to say from Napoleon ; 
 and, the Emperor of Russia leagued with the 
 Emperor of France, not a creature in Europe 
 would dare to oppose what they had jointly de- 
 termined upon. 
 
 It was necessary, therefore, to persist in the 
 career commenced at Tilsit, and to obtain from 
 Napoleon, by contriving to please him, the real- 
 ization of the hopes to which he had so com- 
 plaisantly lent himself on the banks of the Nie- 
 men. The value which he set on all that was 
 expected from him it was easy to discover. If 
 the war continued, he would attempt fresh en- 
 terprises in Italy, in Portugal, perhaps even in 
 Spain. In those countries there were Bour- 
 bons, who must form a glaring, an intolerable 
 contrast with his dynasty. He had said no- 
 thing on this subject at Tilsit or elsewhere to any 
 creature whatever ; if, nevertheless, peace were 
 further adjourned, it was easy to foresee that 
 he would not stop short in his activity, that he 
 would prosecute in the West that work of reno- 
 vation which consisted in dethroning the sove- 
 reigns who were allies or relations of the an- 
 cient house of Bourbon. But Russia was not 
 at all interested in preventing enterprises of 
 that kind. It was indeed of little consequence 
 to Russia whether a Bourbon or a Bonaparte 
 reigned at Naples, at Florence, at Milan, at 
 Madrid. The ideas introduced in the train of 
 the new dynasties created by Napoleon did not 
 yet threaten the authority of the czars. As
 
 Sept. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 385 
 
 for the influence of France, Russia would have 
 no reason to regret her aggrandizement, if that 
 influence were employed to facilitate the march 
 of the Moscovites towards Constantinople. The 
 Emperor Alexander, therefore, had no cause 
 to be uneasy about what Napoleon might be 
 tempted to undertake in the south and west of 
 Europe ; and if he winked at it, he had every 
 reason to hope that Napoleon would let him do 
 what he pleased in the East. Napoleon might 
 condescend more or less to the desires of Alex- 
 ander, permit him to advance to the Danube, to 
 the foot of the Balkans, or even to the Bospho- 
 rus ; but the least that he could grant was 
 Wallachia and Moldavia. All that Napoleon 
 had said on this subject, at least all that Alex- 
 ander conceived that he had heard, seemed to 
 admit of no doubt. Alexander, ruminating 
 day and night over his recollections of Tilsit, 
 M. de Romanzoff ruminating over what Alex- 
 ander had related to him, had accustomed 
 themselves to consider Moldavia and Wallachia 
 as the smallest of the gifts which they might 
 hope for. By dint of reckoning upon this gift, 
 they had even arrived at a sort of anticipated 
 satiety, and they began already to conceive 
 new desires. Unluckily, they had not confined 
 themselves to this intimate and secret enjoy- 
 ment of their future conquests ; they had 
 thought fit to communicate it to many confi- 
 dants, to some in order to diffuse their inward 
 satisfaction, to others to justify themselves for 
 the sudden change in Russian politics. They 
 had thus spread around them a conviction that 
 Moldavia and Wallachia were the assured price 
 of the new alliance ; and they were instigated 
 to wish for the possession of them, not only by 
 the passion for possessing them, but also by 
 the urgent desire to escape passing for dupes. 
 
 Recent events served, therefore, only to con- 
 firm Alexander and M. de Romanzoff in the 
 policy adopted at Tilsit. Since the mediation 
 turned to war, they must derive from war all 
 that Napoleon had promised to make it produce ; 
 only, to bind him the more firmly, they must 
 lend themselves to what he should desire. He 
 was evidently about to require that the English 
 and Swedish legation should be sent away ; 
 that the Russian army should march for Fin- 
 land, to oblige Sweden to close the Sound. 
 They must satisfy him on all these points, that 
 he might consent to leave the Russian troops in 
 Wallachia and Moldavia. Singularly enough, 
 to march into Finland ought to have been the 
 primary desire of Russia, as it was her primary 
 interest. 1 However, so decidedly had they 
 taken the route to the East, that marching to 
 Finland was an absolute sacrifice on their part, 
 which they made solely that they might be suf- 
 fered to retain Bucharest and Yassy. 
 
 The Emperor Alexander then had in the de- 
 partment of foreign affairs an insignificant mi- 
 nister, without passions, without ideas, a dis- 
 
 i Historians too often make historical personages think 
 and speak without having any mean? of knowing either 
 their thoughts or their language. I do not allow myself 
 here to report the most secret thought" and the most pri- 
 vate conversations of the Emperor Alexander, solely be- 
 cause, in order to do so, I could support myself upon docu- 
 ments of incontestable authority. I have said in a note to 
 Vol. II., Book XXVII.. that there Is in the I/ouvre a series | 
 of conversations of Generals Savary and Caulaincourt with : 
 the Kmperor Alexander and with M. de RomanzofT, daily ! 
 conversations, of such familiarity and privacy that I durst ; 
 tot give them entire, for Alexander made the French en- j 
 II. 49 
 
 agreeable confidant to talk with about matters 
 which left him perfectly cold : this was M. de 
 Budberg. Alexander dismissed him, and exe- 
 cuted his intention of confiding the foreign 
 affairs to M. de Romanzoff himself. There was 
 left in the cabinet one of the members of that 
 little occult society, which had long governed 
 the empire Prince Kotschoubey. He was the 
 youngest and the most reserved of them. But 
 he was a witness of the past, a troublesome 
 judge of the present ; and, besides, Czartoryski 
 and M. de Novosiltzoff, with whom he lived, 
 scarcely disguised their disapprobation of the 
 new turn which things had taken. He could 
 not keep about him critics so annoying, and he 
 was obliged moreover to give them a sign of his 
 displeasure. The ministry of the interior was 
 therefore withdrawn from M. de Kotschoubey, 
 M. de Labanoff, one of the personages who had 
 figured at Tilsit, was called to the ministry of 
 war, M. de Tchitchagoff to the marine ; M. de 
 Novosiltzoff was recommended to travel. Prince 
 Czartoryski, too particular a friend of the sove- 
 reign for friendship not, to cause politics to be 
 forgotten in regard to him, perceived that the 
 affected silence which the emperor observed 
 with him relative to the affairs of the empire 
 was redoubled. Lastly, for the embassy to 
 Paris was selected the person who seemed fittest 
 for succeeding there. Alexander would have 
 wished to send thither, as we have just said, 
 M. de Romanzoff himself, but he chose rather 
 to keep him about his person. He had for grand 
 marshal of the palace a Russian nobleman who 
 was devoted to him : this was M. de Tolstoy, 
 and this nobleman had a brother, General de 
 Tolstoy, an officer distinguished for his spirit 
 and his services. Alexander thought that the 
 latter, from attachment to his master, would not 
 seek to render himself disagreeable in France, 
 as M. de Markoff had made it his business to 
 do ; that, from ambition, he would be delighted 
 to attach his name to a policy of aggrandize- 
 ment, and that, from profession, he would find 
 pleasure in a military court, and please it in his 
 turn, and follow it everywhere in its rapid 
 movements. At the same time, the emperor 
 purposed to send to Napoleon on this subject, 
 and submit to him the choice of General Couni 
 Tolstoy, before he should definitively appoint 
 him. 
 
 General Savary had not ceased to be sur 
 rounded at St. Petersburg by the attentions of 
 Alexander, and by the cold politeness of higb 
 Russian society. Though he knew not at first 
 all that had been said at Tilsit, and had learned 
 it only from a later communication of Napo- 
 leon's, who had thought fit to acquaint him 
 with it in order to prevent any faults of igno- 
 rance on his part, he perceived that Russia was 
 ready to do whatever was wished, in consider- 
 ation of the relinquishment of one or two pro- 
 vinces, not in the North but in the East. With- 
 
 voys acquainted with his very pleasure* : that these con- 
 versations, committed to writing at the moment when they 
 had just taken place, reported with minim- 3delity, in 
 question and answer, and depicted with striking truth 
 what was passing from day to day in the mind of the em- 
 peror and of his minister. From the solicitations and the 
 ill-dissembled agitations of both, it is impossible not to dis- 
 cern clearly what they thought. Other authentic and 
 secret documents, as, for instance, the personal corres- 
 pondence of Napoleon and Alexander, complete tills col- 
 lection of proofs, and enable me to give as certain Ian Jo- 
 tails which I furnish in this part of my narrative. 
 
 2K
 
 386 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Sept. 1807. 
 
 out involving Napoleon more than he was 
 obliged to do, without stepping out of his part, 
 he had sought to render himself agreeable at 
 St. Petersburg, and had succeeded in flattering 
 with prudence the passions of the sovereign. 
 Hence, no sooner had the news of the events at 
 Copenhagen been received, no sooner had the 
 warm explanations with Lord Gower taken 
 place, than Alexander and M. de Romanzoff 
 sent for General Savary, and, in the language 
 befitting each of them, communicated to him 
 the resolutions of the Russian cabinet. 
 
 "You know," said Alexander to the general, 
 in several very long conversations, " that our 
 efforts for peace end in war ; I expected it, but 
 I confess I did not expect either the Copenhagen 
 expedition or the arrogance of the British ca- 
 binet. My resolution is taken, and I am ready 
 to fulfil my engagements. In my interview with 
 the Emperor Napoleon, we calculated that, if 
 the war were to continue, I should be led to 
 declare myself in December, and I could wish 
 that it were not earlier, that I might not have 
 war with the English till after the shutting up 
 of the Baltic. No matter I shall declare my- 
 self forthwith. Tell your master that, if he 
 desires it, I will send back Lord Gower. Cron- 
 stndt is armed, and, if the English are deter- 
 mined to make an attack on it, they shall see 
 that fighting the Russians is a very different 
 affair from fighting the Turks or the Spaniards. 
 However, I shall not decide upon any thing 
 without sending a courier to Paris, for we must 
 not run the risk of thwarting the calculations 
 of Napoleon. Besides, before a rupture, I 
 should like my fleets to have all got back to 
 Russian ports. Be this as it may, I am entirely 
 disposed to follow that conduct which shall best 
 suit your master. Let him even send me, if he 
 chooses, a note ready written, and I will order 
 it to be delivered to Lord Gower together with 
 passports. As for Sweden, I am not prepared, 
 and I ask for time to reorganize my regiments, 
 which suffered severely in the late war, and 
 which are some distance from Finland, and 
 would have to be brought from the south to the 
 north of the empire. Besides, on this theatre 
 my army is not sufficient for me. In the shoal 
 waters of the gulfs of the North-galley, flotillas 
 are much used. The Swedes have a numerous 
 one : mine is not yet equipped, and I will not 
 run the risk of receiving a check from so weak 
 a State. Tell your master, then, that, as soon 
 as my means are prepared, I will crush Sweden ; 
 that he must give me till December or January ; 
 but, as for the English, I am ready to declare 
 myself immediately. I am even of opinion that 
 we ought not to stop there, but require of Aus- 
 tria her adhesion, voluntary or compulsory, to 
 a continental coalition. In this case, too, I am 
 disposed to receive a note drawn up in Paris, 
 to be sent to Vienna ; for there is no demi- 
 alliance, and in all things we must act in perfect 
 harmony. I wish my friendship with Napoleon 
 to be complete, and with this view I have chosen 
 M. de Tolstoy. I have not, like your master, 
 abundance of eminent men in every line. M. 
 de Markoff possesses understanding, but yet 
 he only stirred up discord. I have preferred 
 M. de Tolstoy to any other, because he belongs 
 to a family which is devoted to me, because he 
 is a soldier, because he can ride, and attend the 
 emperor to the chase, to war, and wherever it 
 
 is fit that he should. If he is not liked, let mo 
 know it, and I will send another, so much have 
 I it at heart to prevent the slightest cloud. \Ve 
 shall certainly not be urged to fight just yet ; 
 but tell Napoleon that I am weak, changeable, 
 surrounded by his enemies; that he must net 
 reckon upon me. I shall be told that Napoleon 
 is insatiable, that he wants all for himself, no- 
 thing for others ; that he is equally crafty and 
 violent ; that he promises me much, that he will 
 give me nothing; that he spares me just now, 
 but when he has got out of me all that he wishes, 
 he will fall upon me in my turn ; and that, se- 
 parated from my allies, whom I shall have suf- 
 fered to be destroyed, I must make up my mind 
 to endure the same fate. I believe it not. I 
 have seen Napoleon ; I flatter myself that I have 
 inspired him with part of the sentiments with 
 which he has inspired me ; and I am certain 
 that he is sincere. But, when one is at a dis- 
 tance, and we cannot see each other, jealousies 
 speedily spring up. On the first doubt, on the 
 first unpleasant impression, let him write to 
 me, or send me word through you or any other 
 confidential person he shall choose, and all shall 
 be explained. For my part, I promise him entire 
 frankness, and I expect the like from him. Oh 
 that I could see him, as at Tilsit, every day, 
 every hour ! what talent for conversation ! what 
 an understanding! what a genius ! what a gainer 
 I should be by living frequently near him ! how 
 many things he has taught me in a few days ! 
 But we are so far distant ! however, I hope to 
 visit him soon. In spring I shall go to Paris, 
 and I shall have occasion to admire him in his 
 Council of State, amidst his troops, in every 
 place, in short, where he appears so great. 
 But, till then, we must endeavour to understand 
 each other through an intermediary, and to 
 render the mutual confidence as complete as 
 possible. For my part, I am doing all I can to 
 that end, but I do not exercise here that as- 
 cendency which Napoleon exercises in Paris. 
 This country, you perceive, has been surprised 
 at the rather too abrupt change which has taken 
 place. It is apprehensive of the injuries which 
 the English can inflict on its commerce ; it is 
 angry at your victories. These are interests 
 which must be gratified, sentiments which must 
 be soothed. Send French merchants hither ; 
 buy our naval stores and our productions : we 
 will buy in return your Parisian commodities ; 
 the re-establishment of commerce will put an 
 end to all the anxieties which the upper classes 
 conceived on account of their revenues. Assist 
 me, above all, to conciliate the whole nation for 
 yon, by doing something for the just ambition 
 of Russia. Those wretched Turks, who are at 
 this day slaughtering your partisans, who are 
 striking off the heads of all that are reputed to be 
 friends of the French (this is what was actually 
 taking place at the moment in Constantinople, 
 thanks to the suggestions of Austria and Eng- 
 land,) those wretched Turks are no match 
 for me, and I should think that, if they were 
 put into the balance with me, you would not 
 find them to equal me in weight. Your master 
 has, no doubt, told you what passed at Tilsit." 
 Here the emperor appeared inquisitive and 
 restless. He was impatient to open himself to 
 General Savary on the subject that interested 
 him most, and at the same time fearful of com- 
 mitting an indiscretion by disclosing himself to
 
 Sepv. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 387 
 
 one who was not acquainted with the secret. 
 He had, however, a new motive for explaining 
 himself to the representative of Napoleon. An 
 armistice between the Turks and the Russians 
 had been just signed in consequence of the 
 French mediation an armistice which stipu- 
 lated the restitution of the vessels taken from 
 the Turks by Admiral Siniavin, the interdic- 
 tion of all hostility before spring, and, lastly, 
 the evacuation of the banks of the Danube. In 
 reality, there was but this last condition which 
 affected the Emperor Alexander, but this he 
 would not admit, and complained in a general 
 manner of the armistice, which he imputed to 
 the unfriendly intervention of the minister of 
 France. 
 
 He did not think, he said to General Savary, 
 about the provinces of the Danube ; it was 
 your emperor, who, on receiving the news of 
 Selim's downfall, exclaimed at Tilsit: "One 
 can do nothing with those barbarians ! Pro- 
 vidence releases me from restraint in regard 
 to them ; let us settle matters at their ex- 
 pense !" I entered into this track, continued 
 the Emperor Alexander, and M. de Romanzoff 
 with me. The nation has followed us, and it 
 is not too notable an advantage on that point 
 to render it favourable to France. Finland, to 
 which you urge me to march, is a desert, the 
 possession of which smiles on nobody, which, 
 besides, must be taken from an old ally, by a 
 sort of defection which wounds the national 
 delicacy, and affords pretexts to the enemies 
 of the alliance. We must, therefore, seek 
 elsewhere specious reasons for our abrupt 
 change of conduct. Tell the Emperor Napo- 
 leon all this : persuade him that I am far less 
 influenced by the desire to possess an addi- 
 tional province, than by the desire of rendering 
 an alliance from which I expect great things 
 solid and agreeable to my nation. Ah ! re- 
 peated the emperor, if I could but go to Paris 
 at this moment, all would be settled in a few 
 minutes' conversation ; but I cannot, before the 
 month of March. 
 
 On uttering these last words, the- Emperor 
 Alexander questioned General Savary with a 
 restless inquisitiveness, in order to learn whe- 
 ther he had not heard from Napoleon, whether 
 he was not in the secret of his plans, of his 
 resolutions, in regard to the East and the 
 West. 
 
 General Savary used infinite art not to dis- 
 courage the Emperor Alexander ; told him, 
 and told him truly, that he could not yet know 
 what grand ideas the continuation of the war 
 might suggest to the Emperor Napoleon, but 
 that he would certainly do every thing to sa- 
 tisfy his powerfully ally. 
 
 M. de RomanzofF was still more explicit than 
 his sovereign, related to General Savary the 
 overtures of General Wilson, the effect which 
 they had produced on the Emperor Alexander, 
 and the eagerness of that prince to seize this 
 occasion of proving his fidelity to France, by 
 accepting from her hand what he might receive 
 from the hand of England. He expressed to 
 him more strongly than ever his resolution to 
 declare himself against England and Sweden ; 
 against Austria herself, if it were necessary to 
 bring over this latter power to the politics of 
 Tilsit. Thus it was that, in the language of 
 the day, (for people create a language for 
 
 every new circumstance,) they termed the sys- 
 tem of tolerance which they had reciprocally 
 promised one another for the enterprises which 
 they might be tempted to engage in, each for 
 himself. M. de Romanzoflf added, that Russia 
 must obtain an equivalent for all that she was 
 disposed to permit, were it only for the sake 
 of rendering the new alliance popular and 
 durable. Receiving at this moment despatches 
 from Constantinople, which brought intelli- 
 gence of fresh disturbances, M. de Romauzoff 
 said, smiling, to General Savary, that he saw 
 plainly that it was all over with the old Otto- 
 man empire, and that, unless the Emperor 
 Alexander interfered, the Emperor Napoleon 
 himself would soon be obliged to declare in the 
 Moniteur that "the succession of the sultans 
 was vacant, and that the natural heirs must 
 come forward." 
 
 While everything was lavished on General 
 Savary, solicitations, caresses, familiar effu- 
 sions, and even presents, the Emperor Alex- 
 ander, without saying a word about that, 
 directed orders to be given to his army not to 
 evacuate the provinces of the Danube, upon 
 pretext that the armistice could not be ratified 
 as it then stood. He and his minister repeated 
 that they must be left in quiet on the subject 
 of the Turks ; that the Russians must not be 
 required to abase themselves before bar- 
 barians ; that they ought to turn their atten- 
 tion as soon as possible to a territorial ar- 
 rangement in the East, to send confidential 
 ambassadors to each other, and above all to 
 send French purchasers to St. Petersburg to 
 supply the place of English purchasers. Alex- 
 ander specially solicited two things; in the 
 first place, to be authorized to send to France 
 for education the cadets destined to serve in 
 the Russian navy, who were usually brought 
 up in England, where they contracted a fac- 
 tious spirit ; secondly, liberty to purchase in 
 the French manufactories muskets to supersede 
 those of the Russian soldiers, which were of 
 bad quality, adding, that the two armies, being 
 now destined to serve the same cause, might 
 then use the same arms. He accompanied 
 these gracious expressions with a magnificent 
 present of furs for the Emperor Napoleon, 
 saying that he would "be his furrier," and 
 repeated that he expected M. de Tolstoy, whom 
 he meant to despatch as soon as he should be 
 definitely approved at Paris. 
 
 On learning these details, faithfully reported 
 by General Savary, Napoleon was at once 
 gratified and embarrassed, for he saw that he 
 could dispose at pleasure of the Emperor Alex- 
 ander and his principal minister. But he had 
 reflected coolly since Tilsit, and began to think 
 that it was a serious matter to allow a fresh 
 step to be taken towards Constantinople by the 
 gigantic empire of Peter the Great an empire 
 which for a century past had so rapidly in- 
 creased that it was enough to terrify the world. 
 General Sebastiani, on his part, wrote to him 
 from Constantinople that the Russians were 
 abhorred ; that; if the Turks had the slightest 
 hope of deriving support from France, they 
 would voluntarily throw themselves into her 
 arms ; and that, instead of having to fight, iu 
 order to force them to become subjects of 
 Russia, a trifling assistance might perhaps 
 sumce to aid them to become subjects of
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 France ; that all the parts of the empire, fit, 
 from their situation, to become French, would 
 give themselves up to us spontaneously ; that, 
 in this case, it was with Austria, not with 
 Russia, that we ought to seek to arrange mat- 
 ters ; that an understanding with Austria would 
 be easier and more advantageous, whether one 
 purposed to partition or to preserve the Otto- 
 man empire ; for, if it were to be partitioned, 
 she would demand less, always satisfied so that 
 Russia had no share of the banks of the 
 Danube ; and if one decided to preserve it, she 
 would deem herself so fortunate in such a reso- 
 lution, that one would have her concurrence 
 with very trifling sacrifices. These various 
 ideas, which had all their specious side, had 
 succeeded and alternately combated each other 
 in the mind of Napoleon, whose activity never 
 rested, and he resolved pot to be in too great a 
 hurry to decide what course to pursue on so 
 important a subject. In a system of moderate 
 ambition, to refuse satisfactions to Russian 
 ambition would have been very wise. But 
 with what France had undertaken, with what 
 she was about further to undertake, it was 
 adding to the temerity of French politics to 
 engage in new events, without attaching Russia 
 completely to her by a sacrifice in the East. 
 
 Napoleon thought to satisfy Moscovite ambi- 
 tion, not towards the East, to which it was 
 strongly attracted, but towards the North, 
 which had very little attraction for it, and to 
 give up Finland to Russia, upon pretext of 
 pushing her against Sweden. Such a conquest 
 as Finland, said he to himself, is a jine acquisi- 
 tion, and the Emperor Alexander ought to find 
 in it a first satisfaction for Russian opinion, 
 which will give him time to wait for others. In 
 fact, Finland was a fine acquisition, consider- 
 ing real European interests ; for, if Russia, in 
 taking Moldavia and Wallachia, would take an 
 alarming stride for Europe towards the Darda- 
 nelles, she would take a stride equally alarm- 
 ing towards the Sound, by possessing herself 
 of Finland. Unfortunately, while she thus 
 obtained an extension to be regretted for the 
 future independence of Europe, she would be 
 receiving a present in her estimation almost 
 worthless. Napoleon gave a great deal in 
 reality, very little in appearance ; and this 
 was the contrary to what he ought to have 
 done to purchase, at as cheap a rate as pos- 
 sible, the new alliance which was about to 
 become the foundation of all his ulterior enter- 
 prises. He nattered himself, therefore, that 
 he should satisfy Russia with Finland ; and, as 
 for the provinces of the Danube, he resolved 
 to defer any decision in regard to them, with- 
 out however destroying the hopes which he had 
 need to keep up. 
 
 He, too, had had great difficulty to find an 
 itmbassador suitable for the court of St. Peters- 
 burg, and he had finally fixed upon M. de 
 Oaulaincourt, at this time grand equerry, a 
 soldier by profession, reputed to be upright, 
 intelligent, worthy, but most unjustly compro- 
 mised in the affair of the Duke of Enghien, 
 (which Napoleon almost regarded as a recom- 
 mendation for the embassy to Russia,) but well 
 fitted to acquire influence over the young 
 emperor, to follow him everywhere, and to dis- 
 guise, by his very straightforwardness, the 
 somewhat artful tendency of a mission, the sole 
 
 1 aim of which was not to perform all that he 
 had been taught to hope for. Napoleon in- 
 ; formed M. de Caulaincourt of what had passed 
 at Tilsit, acknowledged that, in striving to 
 j satisfy the Emperor Alexander, he had no in- 
 tention to make concessions too dangerous for 
 Europe, and recommended to him not to spare 
 any pains for maintaining an alliance up'n 
 which must thenceforth rest all his policy. Le 
 placed in his suite some of the most distin- 
 guished young men of his court, and allowed 
 him the sum of 800,000 francs a year, that he 
 might worthily represent the great Empire. 
 
 He wrote at the same time to the Emperor 
 Alexander, thanking him for his presents, 
 offering magnificent ones in return, (Sevres 
 porcelain of the greatest beauty,) earnestly 
 soliciting that he would assist him in restoring 
 peace, by forcing England to submit to it ; 
 requesting him to send away immediately the 
 ambassadors of England and Sweden from St. 
 Petersburg ; apprising him that a French army 
 was going to occupy Denmark, in virtue of a 
 treaty of alliance concluded with the court of 
 Copenhagen, and urging him to march a Rus- 
 sian army into Sweden, that the Sound might 
 thus be closed on both coasts ; giving him 
 afresh his assent to the conquest of Finland; 
 acquainting him with the measures which he 
 was taking in regard to England, in order to 
 decide him to adhere to the policy of Tilsit, 
 and also informing him of the entry of nume- 
 rous armies into the Spanish peninsula, for the 
 purpose of closing it definitively against the 
 English ; telling him finally that he had nothing 
 to do with the wording of the armistice with 
 the Porte, that he disapproved of it, (which 
 implied a tacit approbation of the prolonged 
 occupation of the provinces of the Danube,) 
 and that, in regard to the maintenance or the 
 partition of the Ottoman empire, that question 
 was so important, so interesting, both to the 
 present and the future, as to require his ma- 
 ture consideration ; that he could not discuss 
 it in writing, and that he purposed to examine 
 it thoroughly with M. de Tolstoy ; that he 
 reserved it for that ambassador ; and that it 
 was even to wait for him that he had deferred 
 his departure for Italy, though he was in 
 urgent haste to repair to that country. Let us 
 unite, said Napoleon to Alexander, and we 
 shall accomplish the greatest things of modern 
 times! Napoleon moreover sent word to the 
 Emperor and M. de Romanzoff that the minister 
 Decres was about to purchase twenty millions' 
 worth of naval stores in the ports of Russia ; 
 that the French navy would receive all the 
 Russian cadets who should be sent to it for 
 instruction ; and, lastly, that fifty thousand 
 muskets, -after the best model, were at the dis- 
 posal of the imperial government, which might 
 send for them to any place that it should be 
 pleased to point out. 
 
 While he was writing thus cordially to the 
 Emperor Alexander, Napoleon recommended to 
 M. de Caulaincourt not to talk too much about 
 an approaching interview ; for, in a new impe- 
 rial tf.te-d-teie, he should be obliged to come to 
 a conclusion respecting Turkey, which he ex- 
 tremely dreaded. At any rate, Finland granted 
 immediately, the provinces of the Danube left 
 in prospect, the silence observed relative to 
 their prolonged occupation, lastly, many de-
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 369 
 
 monstrations of friendship, appeared to Napo- ! 
 leon, and they really were, sufficient means for 
 living in harmony for a longer or shorter but 
 limited time. 
 
 Napoleon, unfortunately, had not merely re- 
 garded the outrage of England against Den- 
 mark as an occasion for conciliating the opinion 
 of Europe ; he had, on the contrary, discovered 
 in it a pretext for venturing upon fresh enter- 
 prises ; and he resolved to take advantage of 
 the prolongation of the war to complete all the 
 arrangements which he meditated. He thought 
 that, in order the better to attain this end, it 
 might be well to conciliate Austria, and to put 
 an end to that extremely unpleasant state with 
 her, arising, independently of the ordinary 
 grievances of that court, from the recent events 
 of the war. Austria was angry with herself 
 for having armed without profiting by the op- 
 portunity for acting, which offered after Eylau 
 and before Friedland, for having incurred use- 
 less expenses, and for having shown, for no 
 benefit whatever, dispositions of which Napo- 
 leon could not be the dupe. She was uneasy 
 about what he might require by way of punish- 
 ing her, more uneasy still about what he might 
 have promised Russia on the Danube, and but 
 little cheered by the language of England, who 
 was incessantly repeating that she must, on the 
 one hand, prepare seriously for war, and, on 
 the other, reconcile Russia, by herself conced- 
 ing to her all that Napoleon was ready to grant 
 her ; that is to say, after the terrible calami- 
 ties of the last fifteen years, she was to inflict 
 upon herself a new one, more terrible than all 
 the others, namely, that of seeing Russia on the 
 Lower Danube. 
 
 Napoleon, who had no difficulty to discern 
 the uneasiness of Austria, was solicitous to put 
 an end to it, that he might be more free in his 
 actions. He had received at Fontainebleau, 
 with perfect courtesy, the Duke of Wiirzburg, 
 brother of the Emperor Francis, transferred, 
 as we have several times observed, from prin- 
 cipality to principality, and most desirous to 
 bring about a good understanding between 
 Austria and France, that he might not have to 
 suffer still more by their quarrels. Napoleon 
 entered, at length, and with the utmost frank- 
 ness, into explanations with this prince, com- 
 pletely satisfied him respecting his intentions 
 towards the court of Vienna, from which, he 
 said, he had no desire to take any thing, but to 
 which, on the contrary, he was ready to give 
 up the fortress of Braunau, left in the hands 
 of the French, ever since the treachery com- 
 mitted at the Mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon 
 declared that, the Mouths of the Cattaro hav- 
 ing been restored to him, he considered him- 
 self as having a right and interest in keeping 
 Braunau, an important place, which com- 
 manded the course of the Inn ; that, on the 
 side of Istria, he desired nothing more than 
 the maintenance of the military road previ- 
 ously granted for the passage of French troops 
 proceeding to Dalmatia ; that, at most, if they 
 should consent to it at Vienna, he should pro- 
 pose a rectification of the frontiers between the 
 kingdom of Italy and the empire of Austria, a 
 rectification limited to the exchange of the 
 email Italian territories situated on the left 
 bank of the Izonzo for the small Austrian ter- 
 ritories situated on the right bank, so as to 
 
 take the thalweg of that river for the boundary ; 
 that, this done, he should require nothing more, 
 and would be quite disposed to respect scrupu- 
 lously the letter of the treaties. In regard to 
 general policy, Napoleon added that he joined 
 Russia in soliciting Austria to assist him in re- 
 storing peace, by closing the coasts of thf 
 Adriatic to English commerce ; that the atro- 
 cious affair of Copenhagen rendered this a duty 
 for all the powers; that if Austria pursued 
 this course, she would have the honour of re- 
 establishing peace, for England would not hold 
 out against the strongly expressed unanimity 
 of the Continent; that, finally, this union on 
 all points being obtained, the court of Vienna 
 would no doubt renounce useless, expensive, 
 and annoying armaments ; that Napoleon, on 
 his part, would not have any more urgent con- 
 cern than to withdraw his armies, and to con- 
 vey them to the coast of Lower Italy. As for 
 Turkey, Napoleon spoke of it very vaguely, and 
 manifested no disposition for any speedy reso- 
 lution. Moreover, he always gave it to be un- 
 derstood that nothing would be done in the East 
 but in concert with Austria, that is to say, in 
 allotting her share to her, in case the Ottoman 
 empire should cease to exist. 
 
 These explanations, which were honestly 
 given, and which were received with joy by the 
 Duke of Wiir/burg these explanations, trans- 
 mitted to Vienna, imparted a real relief. Deep 
 as was the regret felt for having neglected to 
 seize the moment when Napoleon was marching 
 towards the Niemen, to place himself between 
 it and the Rhine, nothing better was desired, 
 now that the opportunity was lost, than to re- 
 main quiet, and not to have such an enemy to 
 contend with, when one was alone and had no 
 other ally than England, a not very helpful 
 ally, who, when she had urged on the conti- 
 nental powers to war, and made them fight, 
 quietly drew back to her island, complaining 
 of the bad quality of the auxiliary troops. To 
 learn that it could recover Braunau without 
 sustaining any loss in Istria, to learn, more- 
 over, that nothing speedy was preparing in the 
 East, would have afforded real joy to the Aus- 
 trian cabinet, if, in the present state of things, 
 it had been capable of feeling joy. It appeared 
 inclined, therefore, to do all that Napoleon de- 
 sired, as well respecting the thalweg of the 
 Izonzo as the steps to be taken with England, 
 whose conduct at Copenhagen was so odious 
 that, even at Vienna, there was no hesitation 
 to condemn it strongly. In consequence, powers 
 were sent to M. de Metternich, ambassador of 
 Austria at Paris, to sign a convention, embrac- 
 ing all the objects upon which concert was de- 
 sirable and appeared easy after the explana- 
 tions exchanged at Fontainebleau. 
 
 It was agreed that the fortress of Braunau 
 should be given up to Austria; that the thalwtg 
 of the Izonzo should be taken for the frontier 
 of the Austrian and Italian possessions ; and 
 that a military road through Istria should con- 
 tinue open to French troops proceeding to Dal- 
 matia. The convention containing these stipu- 
 lations was signed at Fontainebleau on the 10th 
 of October. To the written stipulations were 
 added formal promises relative to England. 
 Towards this old ally Austria could not pro- 
 ceed by an abrupt and firm declaration of war ; 
 but she promised to arrive at the desired result 
 Sxl
 
 390 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 by having recourse to forms which would dimi- 
 nish in no respect the firmness of her resolu- 
 tions. Accordingly, she directed M. de Stah- 
 remberg, her ambassador in London, to com- 
 plain of the act perpetrated upon Copenhagen, 
 as an outrage which must be deeply felt by all 
 the neutral States ; to require an answer to the 
 offers of mediation made in April by the court 
 of Austria, in July by the court of Russia, and 
 to signify that, if England did not soon reply 
 to overtures of peace so often repeated, reserv- 
 ing a right afterwards to debate the conditions 
 in the presence of the mediating powers, Aus- 
 tria should be compelled to break off all con- 
 nection with her, and to recall her ambassador. 
 To these official communications was added the 
 secret declaration that Austria, left entirely 
 alone on the Continent, was incapable of mak- 
 ing head against Russia and France united ; 
 that she was of course obliged to give way ; 
 that, besides, at this moment, France was 
 granting her tolerable conditions ; that de- 
 cidedly she neither could nor would think of 
 war ; and that England, on her part, ought to 
 think of peace, otherwise she would force her 
 best friends to separate themselves from her. 
 It is true that, if the cabinet spoke thus, the 
 passionate partisans of war strove to induce a 
 belief that this was only a transient resolution 
 to obtain the restoration of Braunau, a resolu- 
 tion which would change as soon as Russia had 
 been brought back to a different policy. Not- 
 withstanding these assertions of the war-party 
 at Vienna, the Austrian cabinet in reality de- 
 sired nothing better than to find its pacific re- 
 presentations listened to in London, and had 
 resolved to break off its diplomatic relations 
 with England, in case the latter persisted in 
 turning a deaf ear to any accommodation. 
 
 Respecting her armaments Austria gave much 
 less sincere assurances. She affirmed that she 
 was making drafts from her. skeletons, and dis- 
 missing the men who had momentarily filled 
 them, that she was selling her magazines, that, 
 in short, she was reducing herself to the strict- 
 est peace establishment. In reality she was 
 only discharging those men who had nearly at- 
 tained the age for liberation, and replacing 
 them with young recruits, on whose military 
 education she bestowed particular pains, under 
 the direction of the Archduke Charles, who was 
 always engaged in making new improvements 
 in the organization of the Austrian army. In 
 fact, she was selling only such articles in the 
 magazines as were unfit to be kept, and filling 
 her arsenals with arms and stores of all kinds. 
 In short, Austria, adhering temporarily to the 
 views of Napoleon to spare herself a war, 
 wished, nevertheless, to be ready to revenge 
 her reverses, if fresh circumstances should lead 
 to the resumption of arms. For the present 
 she desired peace, even a general peace. 
 
 Napoleon, whose plan in all quarters was to 
 carry back hostilities towards the coasts of the 
 Continent, and for this purpose to pacify the 
 interior, had declared to Prussia that he would 
 cheerfully resume the movement of evacuation, 
 suspended for a while in consequence of delay 
 ia the payment of the contributions, but that 
 it was necessary to settle as speedily as possi- 
 lile respecting the amount of those contribu- 
 t:->.ns and their mode of payment. Prussia hav- 
 ing proposed to send Prince William, Napoleon 
 
 intimated that he would receive him with all 
 possible respect. That unfortunate power was 
 so depressed that it had declared not only its 
 adhesion to the continental system, but also its 
 readiness to conclude a formal treaty of alli- 
 ance, offensive and defensive, with France. As 
 for Denmark, she had signed a treaty of this 
 kind, and stipulated for the despatch of French 
 troops to the islands of Funen and Seeland, to 
 close the Sound, to cross it on the ice, and to 
 invade Sweden at the moment when the Rus- 
 sians should commence operations against Fin- 
 land. 
 
 Napoleon, being obliged by circumstances to 
 continue the war with England, and armed 
 with all the means of the Continent, thought 
 of employing them with all the energy and 
 ability of which he was capable. Even before 
 he was acquainted with the result of the Co- 
 penhagen expedition, and as soon as he knew 
 that this expedition was directed towards the 
 Baltic, he had ordered Admiral Decres to go 
 to Boulogne, to inspect the flotilla, and to see 
 if it could take on board the army which he 
 intended to bring back from Germany, as soon 
 as Prussia should have paid her contributions. 
 The departure of the English expedition, sent 
 towards the Sound, was a unique occasion for 
 surprising England when half disarmed. M. 
 Decres, repairing in all haste to Boulogne, 
 Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Calais, Dunkirk, Ant- 
 werp, had unfortunately found the flotilla in a 
 state which rendered it unfit to receive on board 
 a numerous army. The circular port formed 
 at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with 
 sand ; the ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, 
 three feet ; and a very few years more would 
 suffice to bury those creations of the genius 
 of Napoleon and of the perseverance of our 
 soldiers. Most of the vessels, hastily built, 
 and with green wood, required extensive re- 
 pair. Out of the 1200 or 1300 of these boats, 
 not more than about 300 had been kept in a 
 state fit to serve at sea, and these 300 were in- 
 cessantly employed in manoeuvring and forming 
 the line of defence from the Fort de 1'Heurt to 
 the Fort de la Creche. As for the other 900 
 transport boats, picked up everywhere, and at 
 every age, they were nearly past service, in 
 consequence of having lain four years at moor- 
 ings. The sailors, organized for the most part 
 in battalions, had lost some of their qualities 
 as seamen, but as landsmen they formed the 
 finest troops in the world. General Gouvion 
 St. Cyr, who commanded the camp of Boulogne, 
 declared that they were not surpassed by any 
 in the French army, the imperial guard in- 
 cluded. Removed back into ships, and having 
 soon become sailors again, they were sufficient 
 to man twelve sail of the line. As for the 
 Dutch flotilla, partly sent home, partly remain- 
 ing at Boulogne, it suffered less in its materiel, 
 being better built ; but it was weary of its in- 
 activity, and the men regretted the want of 
 employment better suited to their energy and 
 their courage. It was not possible, therefore, 
 to send the flotilla to sea immediately, and to 
 put 150,000 men on board of it, as in 1804. 
 But, with an expense of five or six millions, 
 and in two months' time by destroying a fifth 
 of the boats and repairing the others, one 
 might embark in the two flotillas, Dutch and 
 French, about 90,000 men and three or four
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 391 
 
 thousand horses. M. Decres, having returned 
 to Paris after this inspection, Napoleon was 
 of opinion, like his minister himself, that the 
 sailors of Holland ought no longer to be de- 
 tained for a service so uncertain as that of this 
 flotilla, always going and never gone ; that it 
 was difficu't to get out of these petty harbours 
 with so gresit a number of craft at once, and 
 that it would very soon be impossible for those 
 harbours to contain them ; that it would be 
 better to divide this expedition, to send home 
 the Dutch sailors with part of their materiel, to 
 keep the best war-boats, to destroy the others, 
 to repair those that should be preserved, and 
 to fit them for the embarkation of 60,000 men, 
 then to put the Dutch sailors who had been 
 sent home aboard the Texel fleet, the useless 
 French sailors aboard the Flushing squadron, 
 and to procure in this manner, besides the flo- 
 tilla, capable of throwing at once 60,000 men 
 on the coasts of England, the Texel and Flush- 
 ing squadrons, capable of carrying 30,000 from 
 the mouths of the Meuse to the mouths of the 
 Thames, without reckoning all the expeditions 
 which might sail from Brest and all the other 
 points of the Continent. This opinion being 
 adopted, orders were despatched, and the Bou- 
 logne flotilla, rendered more manageable, com- 
 bined at the same time with the squadrons 
 which were organizing at the Texel, Flushing, 
 Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Ge- 
 noa, and Tarento, took its place in the vast sys- 
 tem conceived by Napoleon the system of 
 camps formed near the great fleets, incessantly 
 threatening Great Britain with a formidable ex- 
 pedition against her soil or against her colo- 
 nies. 
 
 Napoleon issued likewise all the orders for 
 the Sicilian expedition and for the complete 
 provisioning of the Ionian Islands, to which 
 his whole attention was at this moment called 
 by the language held by the English agents at 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg. From this lan- 
 guage, in fact, it might be concluded that all 
 imaginable efforts would be made to wrest these 
 islands from the French. Napoleon prescribed 
 to his brother Joseph, with a warmth of expres- 
 sion raised even to passion, to recover Scylla 
 and Reggio, left in the possession of the Eng- 
 lish ever since the expedition to St. Euphemia ; 
 to assemble part of the regiments composing 
 the army of Naples around Baise and around 
 Reggio, and to hold them in readiness for em- 
 barkation. He enjoined Prince Eugene to make 
 his troops fall back from Upper Italy towards 
 Central Italy, in order to replace those which 
 should be employed in maritime expeditions. 
 He ordered King Joseph and Prince Eugene to 
 multiply the supplies of provisions sent to Cor- 
 fu, Cephalonia, and Zante. Lastly, he repeated 
 more expressly than ever the order to the two 
 divisions at Rochefort and Cadiz, to contrive to 
 get out of those ports, and to proceed to Tou- 
 lon. He despatched Admiral Ganteaume to 
 take the command of the fleet there, destined to 
 sweep the Mediterranean, to complete the con- 
 quest of the kingdom of Naples by the reduc- 
 tion of Sicily, and to consolidate the French 
 domination in the Ionian Islands by the trans- 
 port of vast resources to those islands. Mean- 
 while the naval engineers were recommended 
 to hasten the building of the ships begun on 
 the whole coast of Europe. 
 
 While he was thus engaged with the mari- 
 time positions situated in Italy, Napoleon had 
 urged anew the expedition to Portugal. Tho 
 three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon, 
 collected under General Junot at Bayonne, 
 presented there a nominal effective of 26,000 
 men, a real effective of 23,000, 2000 of whom 
 were cavalry, and thirty-six pieces of artillery. 
 A reinforcement of three or four thousand 
 men was on the march to join it. On the 12th 
 of October, the second day after the signature 
 of the convention with Austria, Napoleon or- 
 dered General Junot to cross the frontier of 
 Spain, contenting himself with a mere notice 
 given at Madrid of the passage of French 
 troops. He prescribed to General Junot the 
 route of Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Ciu- 
 dad-Rodrigo, Alcantara, and the right bank 
 of the Tagus to Lisbon. He recommended to 
 him the most rapid march. Spain had pro- 
 mised to join her forces to those of France, in 
 order to concur in the expedition, and natu- 
 rally to participate in the distribution of the 
 booty. Napoleon had not only accepted, but 
 insisted on the real despatch of the Spanish 
 force, reserving to himself to fix subsequently 
 the composition and the price when they should 
 have conquered Portugal. But, not reckoning 
 upon Spain or upon any troops that she could 
 send, he prepared a second army for the pos- 
 sible case that Portugal might make some re- 
 sistance, and for the far more probable case 
 that England might assemble at the mouths 
 of the Tagus the forces returning from the 
 Copenhagen expedition. Immediately after 
 his arrival at Paris, Napoleon directed that the 
 five legions of reserve, so frequently mention- 
 ed, and which had orders to replace the camps 
 charged with the defence of the coasts, should 
 be completely organized, instructed, and armed. 
 He had required the five senators who com- 
 manded them to make all necessary arrange- 
 ments for marching off two or three of the six 
 battalions of which they were composed. Hav- 
 ing learned that these two or three battalions 
 of each legion were ready, he ordered them to be 
 assembled at Bayonne, and formed into three 
 divisions under Generals Barbou, Vedel, and 
 Malher ; to be completed with two divisions 
 of the Parisian guard, which the return of that 
 guard, seasoned in Poland, rendered disposa- 
 ble, with four Swiss battalions, stationed some 
 at Rennes, the others at Boulogne and Mar- 
 seilles, lastly, with the 3d battalion of the 5th 
 light, in garrison at Cherbourg, and the 1 st of 
 the 47th of the line, in garrison at Grenoble. 
 
 Here were twenty-one or twenty-two batta- 
 lions, which were about to march from the 
 seat of each legion, that is to say, from Ren- 
 nes, Versailles, Lille, Metz, and Grenoble, and 
 to reach Bayonne towards the end of Novem- 
 ber. They were to form a corps of twenty- 
 three or twenty-four thousand men, accompa- 
 nied by forty pieces of artillery and some hun- 
 dred horse, under the command of one of th 
 most distinguished generals of division of the 
 time, General Dupont, who had distinguished 
 himself at Albeck, Diernstein, Hall, and Fried- 
 land, and destined by Napoleon to be soon pro- 
 moted to marshal. It was a second army, 
 sufficient to support that of Junot, whatever 
 importance the events in Portugal might ac- 
 quire. It took the name of second corps of
 
 392 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 observation of the Gironde, Junot's army hav- 
 ing already received the title of first corps. 
 Neither of these armies was deficient in any 
 thing but cavalry. Napoleon was preparing 
 for them a good and numerous cavalry at Com- 
 piegne, Chartres, Orleans, and Tours. During 
 the campaign in Poland, he had, as the reader 
 must recollect, taken as great pains to keep up 
 the depots of the cavalry as those of the in- 
 fantry. He had incessantly supplied them with 
 men and horses, and he could draft from them 
 and employ in the south reinforcements which 
 the peace of Tilsit rendered it unnecessary for 
 him to send to the north. He ordered a bri- 
 gade of 1000 hussars to be collected at Com- 
 piegne, at Chartres a brigade of 1200 chas- 
 seurs, at Orleans a brigade of 1500 dragoons, 
 and a fourth, of 1400 cuirassiers, at Tours, 
 which formed a total of 5000 horse, drawn 
 from the depots, and sufficiently numerous for 
 the mountainous countries in which the two 
 armies of the Gironde were called to act. 
 These were mere precautions, for it was doubt- 
 ful whether so large a force would be required 
 in Portugal ; but Napoleon had a great desire 
 to draw the English to that quarter; and, 
 though the soldiers whom he sent thither were 
 young, he thought them sufficient to be op- 
 posed to British troops, and more than suffi- 
 cient to beat the southern armies, of which at 
 that time he made no account. 
 
 Every thing, therefore, was prepared for 
 taking possession of Portugal, independently 
 of the assistance promised by the Spaniards. 
 An answer had been received from the Court 
 of Lisbon such as Napoleon had foreseen, and 
 such as he needed, after the affair of Copen- 
 hagen, to dispense him from showing any in- 
 dulgence. The Prince-regent of Portugal, 
 son-in-law, as we know, of the King and Queen 
 of Spain, was, no less from hereditary tradi- 
 tion than from personal weakness, the devoted 
 subject of England. His ministers differed in 
 opinion, it is true, and some of them thought 
 that dependence on England was neither the 
 situation desirable for Portugal, nor the surest 
 means of selling her wines and procuring corn. 
 But others thought that to live by England and 
 through England was a good thing at all times, 
 and a much better since France entered the 
 career of revolution, as, in approaching the 
 latter, they ran the risk of changing not only 
 their industrial system, but also their social 
 system. The prince-regent, apprized by M. de 
 Lima, his ambassador at Paris, and by M. de 
 Rayneval, charge d'affaires of France at Lisbon, 
 of the absolute will of Napoleon, had concert- 
 ed with the British cabinet the conduct to be 
 pursued, with the two-fold object of sparing 
 himself the presence of a French army, and 
 causing the least possible injury to the Eng- 
 lish interests. In consequence, he had come 
 to an understanding with Mr. Canning, through 
 the medium of Lord Strangford, and had re- 
 solved to concede to France the apparent ex- 
 clusion of the British flag, and even, if com- 
 pelled, a sham declaration of war against Eng- 
 land, but, in regard to the merchants of the 
 latter, to refuse any measure against persons 
 and property ; for Lisbon and Oporto had be- 
 come downright English factories, where mer- 
 chants, capitals, shipping, were all English. 
 
 To grant the seizure of persons and property, 
 \ which Napoleon insisted upon, would have been 
 I ravage and ruin to those factories. This an- 
 ; swer being agreed upon, it was hoped that, if 
 1 France was content with it, the commerce of 
 j Portugal, so advantageous to British activity, 
 : so convenient to Portuguese indolence^ would 
 i come off with a momentary restriction, and 
 j that the English royal navy would be quit also 
 by sailing direct from Portsmouth to Gibraltar 
 without touching at Lisbon. Still, it would 
 not fail, in case of need, to put into some of 
 the least frequented points of the coast of Por- 
 tugal, upon pretext of stress of weather, for 
 which the Court of Portugal would excuse it, 
 ! by alleging the laws of humanity. If France 
 would not accept such conditions, the Court of 
 Lisbon, rather than break with England, had 
 made up its mind to the last extremities, not 
 to a contest with French troops, (it was inca- 
 pable of this noble despair,) but to a flight 
 beyond sea. 
 
 This race of Braganza, grown old, like its 
 neighbour, the race of the Spanish Bourbons, 
 sunk, like the latter, in ignorance, effeminacy, 
 cowardice, had taken an aversion both to the 
 age in which such appalling revolutions were 
 occurring, and to the very soil of Europe, 
 which served them for a theatre. It went so 
 far in its shameful misanthropy as to resolve 
 to retire to South America, the territory of 
 which it shared with Spain. The flatterers of 
 its vulgar propensities boasted incessantly of 
 the riches of its Transatlantic possessions, aa 
 people boast before an opulent man, whom 
 they are encouraging to ruin himself, of his 
 patrimony, which he knows nothing about. 
 They told it, that it was not worth while to 
 contest with the oppressors of Europe the pos- 
 session of that petty country, Portugal, alter- 
 nately rocky and sandy, while it had beyond 
 I sea a magnificent empire, almost as extensive 
 I of itself as that dreary Europe, which a mil- 
 I lion of greedy soldiers were fighting for an 
 j empire sown with gold, silver, diamonds, where 
 j it would find peace, without a single enemy to 
 I fear. To flee from Portugal, to abandon its 
 | sterile shores to the English and to the French, 
 who might drench it with their blood as much 
 I as they pleased, to leave to the Portuguese 
 I people, the old companion in arms of the Bra- 
 j ganzas, to defend its independence, if it were 
 I still tenacious of that, such were the dis- 
 | graceful projects which, from time to time, 
 | allayed the terrors of the Regent of Portugal 
 I and of his family. This unworthy weakness 
 ' in the prince was combated only by another 
 | weakness, that is, by the trouble of taking an 
 I important resolution, of quitting the places 
 where he .had passed a luxurious life, of equip- 
 ping a fleet, to convey him with his household, 
 his courtiers, and his wealth ; lastly, of cross- 
 ing the sea, and defying one novelty in fleeing 
 j from another. Between these two weaknesses 
 j the Court of Portugal hesitated, but ready to 
 embark, if the footfalls of a French army 
 J should reach its ear. An official reply was, 
 ; therefore, given to M. de Rayneval, that Por- 
 i tugal would break with Great Britain, though 
 | she could scarcely do without her ; that the 
 i former would even go so far as to declare war 
 j against the latter ; but that it was repugnant
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 383 
 
 to the honour jf the prince-regent to order 
 the English merchants to be arrested and their 
 property seized. 
 
 Napoleon was too sagacious to be satisfied 
 with such subterfuges. He clearly perceived 
 that the answer had been concerted in Lon- 
 don, 1 that the exclusion of the English would 
 be but a sham, and that his principal object 
 would not be attained. He knew, moreover, 
 that the family of Braganza entertained a de- 
 sign of retiring to Brazil ; and he was not 
 sorry for it, for, unfortunately, since the dis- 
 aster at Copenhagen, his ideas had taken an- 
 other direction. He purposed, not to complete 
 by the occupation of Portugal the closing of the 
 shores of the Continent, but to appropriate 
 Portugal to himself, to be disposed of at his 
 pleasure. Instead of profiting by the moral 
 advantage over England, given him by the 
 scandalous violence committed by the latter 
 against Denmark, he had resolved to lay him- 
 self under no restrictions towards the friends 
 and favourers of the English policy, and to 
 destroy them all for the profit of the Bonaparte 
 family, saying to himself that, at the end of 
 the war, there would be neither more nor less 
 than another state suppressed in Europe, which 
 would add nothing to the difficulties of peace ; 
 that he should adopt, according to custom, the 
 cams presens as the basis of the negotiations ; 
 and that, if the face of the Peninsula was 
 changed, one would be obliged to admit it in 
 the state in which it should be found, and to 
 introduce it into the general treaty in its new 
 state. In consequence, he resolved to appro- 
 priate Portugal to himself, designing to come 
 to an understanding with Spain, and even to 
 make use of it to revolutionize Spain, for she 
 displeased him she cramped him she revolt- 
 ed him in her present state as much as the 
 Courts of Naples and Lisbon, which he had 
 already driven, or which he was about to 
 drive, from their tottering thrones. Such was 
 the commencement of the greatest faults, of 
 the greatest misfortunes, of his reign ! My 
 heart is wrung in approaching that sad story, 
 for it is not only the origin of the misfortunes 
 of one of the most extraordinary, the most 
 seducing, of men, but it is the origin of the 
 misfortunes of our hapless country, dragged 
 down with its hero into an appalling abyss. 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, ordered M. de Rayneval 
 to leave Lisbon, and passports to be delivered 
 to M. de Lima, recommended to General Junot 
 to hasten the march of his troops, and not to 
 listen to any proposal whatever, upon pretext 
 that he was not to enter into any negotiations, 
 and that his only commission was to close Lisbon 
 against the English. The intention of Napo- 
 leon, in making the troops march without re- 
 laxation or intermission towards Lisbon, was 
 to seize the Portuguese fleet, and to confiscate 
 all English property both at Lisbon and Oporto. 
 If the court of Lisbon should betake itself to 
 flight, he determined to carry off all the naval 
 stores and commercial effects that he could. 
 If it stayed, on the contrary, and submitted to 
 his demands, the capture of the Portuguese 
 
 fleet, and the booty taken from the English, 
 would compensate him for not being able to 
 destroy the house of Braganza, for it would be 
 impossible to treat a submissive and unarmed 
 court with rigour. 
 
 But Portugal would remain to be disposed 
 of in case the house of Braganza should retire 
 to America. To take possession of it for 
 France was not admissible, even for a con- 
 queror who had already constituted French 
 departments on the Po, and who was soon to 
 constitute more on the Tiber and on the Elbe. 
 To give it to one of the princes of the house of 
 Bonaparte, who had not yet received a crown, 
 seemed more reasonable ; but it was adopting 
 for the whole Peninsula an arrangement which 
 would have a definitive charactei-, and ou that 
 head Napoleon designed t) leave a doubt that 
 did not forbid any ulterior combination. For 
 some time past a fatal idea had begun to pre- 
 dominate in his mind. Having already ex- 
 pelled the Bourbons of Naples from their 
 throne, he frequently said to himself that he 
 should be obliged some day to act in the same 
 manner towards the Bourbons of Spain, who 
 were not enterprising enough to attack him 
 openly, as those of Naples had done, but who, 
 at bottom, were quite as hostile to him ; who 
 had tried to betray him just before Jena ; who 
 would not fail to seize yet the first opportunity 
 to do so; who at last, perhaps, would find a 
 fatal one for him, and who, if they betrayed 
 him not wilfully, would betray him de facto, by 
 suffering the Spanish power to perish in their 
 hands a power as necessary to France as to 
 Spain herself, and as completely annihilated in 
 1807, as if it had never existed. When Bona- 
 parte thought of the danger of having Bour- 
 bons on his rear a danger not very alarming 
 for himself, but extremely annoying for his 
 successors, who would not have his genius, and 
 who might, perhaps, find in the successors of 
 Charles IV. qualities which they no longer had 
 themselves ; when he thought of all the mean- 
 nesses, all the indignities, all the perfidies, of 
 the court of Madrid, not of the unfortunate 
 Charles IV., but of his guilty wife and her 
 ignoble favourite ; when he thought of the state 
 of that power, still so great under Charles III., 
 having then finances and a respectable navy, 
 now having neither a dollar nor a fleet, and 
 leaving inert resources, which, in other hands, 
 would have already served by their union with 
 those of France to reduce England, he was 
 seized with indignation for the present, with 
 fear for the future ; he said to himself, that he 
 must put an end to this state of things, and 
 avail himself of the submission of 'the Conti- 
 nent to his views of the devoted concurrence 
 which Russia offered to his policy of the in- 
 evitable prolongation of the war to which Eng- 
 land doomed Europe, and of the odium which 
 she had recently excited by her conduct to- 
 wards Denmark, to complete the renovation 
 of the face of the West, to substitute every- 
 where Bonapartes for Bourbons, to regenerate 
 a noble and generous nation, lulled to sleep in 
 sloth and ignorance, to restore its power to it, 
 
 > This is no assertion invented for justifying the con- acknowledged in parliament that all the answers of POT- 
 duct of Napoleon towards Portugal, but an authentic tugal to Napoleon had been concerted with thu British 
 truth officially proved. In fact, some time afterwards, ministry. Despatches since published furnish proof of 
 when the Court of Lisbon, having fled to Brazil, had no- this still more in detail, and with stronger evidence, 
 thinif more to fear from the French armies, Mr. Canning 1 
 Voi, II. 50
 
 304 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 M procure for France a faithful, useful ally, 
 instead of an unfaithful, useless, and vexatious 
 ally. Lastly, Napoleon said to himself, that 
 the greatness of the result would absolve him 
 from the violence or the craft which it might, 
 perhaps, be necessary to employ for the over- 
 throw of a court always ready to betray him, 
 while, in his incessant expeditions, he moved 
 to any distance from the West, prompt to pros- 
 trate itself when he returned, finally giving a 
 hundred real reasons, but no ostensible reason, 
 for destroying it. 
 
 These thoughts would have been true, just, 
 nay, even realizable, if he had not already un- 
 dertaken in the North more work than it was 
 possible to accomplish in several reigns, if he 
 had not already taken on himself the task of 
 constituting Italy, Germany, Poland. Of all 
 these works, not the easiest, but the most ur- 
 gent, the most useful after the constitution of 
 Italy, would have been the regeneration of 
 Spain. Of the 400,000 veteran soldiers em- 
 ployed from the Rhine to the Vistula, 100,000 
 would have sufficed for that purpose, and could 
 not have had a better employment. But to add 
 to so many enterprises in the North a new enter- 
 prise in the South, to attempt it with troops 
 scarcely organized, was extremely serious and 
 extremely hazardous. Napoleon did not think 
 so. He had not met with a difficulty which he 
 had not surmounted, from the Rhine to the 
 Niemen, from the Ocean to the Adriatic, from 
 the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, from 
 the Strait of Messina to the banks of the Jor- 
 dan. He had a profound contempt for the 
 southern troops, their officers, their command- 
 ers, made little more account of the English 
 troops, and considered the Spains as not more 
 difficult to subdue than the Calabrias. They 
 were more extensive, it is true ; which signified 
 that, if 30,000 had sufficed in the Calabrias, 
 80,000 or 100,000 would suffice in Spain, espe- 
 cially when they should bring the brave Spa- 
 nish nation, instead of the licentiousness into 
 which it was plunged, a regeneration for which 
 it most earnestly wished. It was not, therefore, 
 the material difficulty which made Napoleon 
 hesitate; it was the moral difficulty, it was 
 the impossibility of finding, in the eyes of the 
 world, a plausible pretext for treating Charles 
 IV. and his wife as he would have treated Caro- 
 line of Naples and her husband. Now, a dy- 
 nasty which, on his return from Tilsit, sent 
 him three ambassadors to pay him homage ; 
 which, while betraying him secretly when it 
 could, gave him its armies, its fleets, whenever 
 he asked for them such a dynasty furnished 
 no motive for dethroning it, which the public 
 sentiment of Europe could accept as specious. 
 Powerful and glorious as Napoleon was ; though 
 to the victories of Montenotte, of Castiglione, 
 of Rivoli, he had added those of the Pyra- 
 mids, of Marengo, of Ulm, of Austerlitz, of 
 Jena, of Friedland ; though, to the Concordat, 
 to the Civil Code, he had added a hundred 
 measures of humanity and civilization, it was 
 not possible, without revolting the world, to 
 come forward some day and say : Charles IV. 
 is an imbecile prince, deceived by his wife, 
 ruled by a favourite, who degrades and ruins 
 Spain ; and I, Napoleon, in virtue of my genius, 
 of my providential mission, I dethrone him, 
 f or the purpose of regenerating Spain. Such 
 
 j modes of proceeding humanity does not allow 
 ' to any man whatever. It sometimes forgives 
 them after the event, after success, and then 
 it adores in them the hand of God, if benefit 
 to nations has resulted from them. But, till 
 then, it regards them as an outrage on the 
 sacred independence of those nations. 
 
 Napoleon could not then dethrone Charles 
 IV. for his imbecility, for his weakness, for 
 the adultery of his wife, for the debasement 
 of Spain. He would have needed a grievance 
 that should have conferred on him the right 
 to enter his neighbour's dominions and to 
 change the dynasty reigning there. He would 
 have wanted a treachery like that which the 
 Queen of Naples ventured to commit, when, 
 after signing a treaty of neutrality, she at- 
 tacked the French army in rear; or a massa- 
 cre such as that at Verona, when the republic 
 of Venice slaughtered our wounded and our 
 sick, while the French army was marching to 
 Vienna. But Napoleon had nothing to allege, 
 excepting an equivocal proclamation, issued 
 just before the battle of Jena, calling the 
 Spanish nation to arms a proclamation, 
 which he had affected to consider as insignifi- 
 cant, which was accompanied, it is true, by 
 secret communications with England, since 
 demonstrated, and strongly suspected at the 
 time, but denied by the court of Spain ; and 
 such grievances were not to justify that Ro- 
 man sentence already pronounced against the 
 Bourbons of Naples The Bourbons of Spain 
 have ceased to reign. 
 
 Napoleon, however, expected the intestine 
 divisions prevailing in the Escurial to furnish 
 a pretext for interfering, for entering as de- 
 liverer, as peace-maker, perhaps as an offend- 
 ed neighbour. But, if he had a general sys- 
 tematic idea as to the end to be attained, he 
 had not fixed either the day or the mode of 
 acting. He would even have accommodated 
 himself to a family alliance between the two 
 courts which should have promised a complete 
 regeneration of Spain, and, through that re- 
 generation, a sincere and useful alliance be- 
 tween the two nations. In regard, therefore, 
 to Portugal, he purposed not to take any 
 definitive course, which should bind him 
 towards the court of Madrid. He could, for 
 instance, have given Portugal to Spain, and 
 this would have been the safest step to take, 
 in exchange for the Balearic Islands, the Phi- 
 lippines, or some other distant possession. He 
 would thus have transported the Spanish na- 
 tion with joy, by gratifying the most ancient 
 and most constant of its ambitions ; he would 
 have enchanted the court itself, by throwing a 
 veil over its turpitudes ; he would have awaken- 
 ed a fondness for the alliance of France, which 
 hitherto had appeared only burdensome to the 
 Spaniards. But to act in this manner would 
 have been rewarding cowardice and treachery 
 equally with the most tried and serviceable 
 ! fidelity. It could scarcely be required of an 
 ally so dissatisfied as Napoleon had reason to 
 be. There was one other course to pursue, 
 j that was to appropriate to himself, in exchange 
 ' for Portugal, some Spanish province bordering 
 ' on our frontier, and to acquire a footing beyond 
 the Pyrenees, as he had done in Italy beyond 
 the Alps, by the possession of Piedmont: a 
 . detestable policy, fit at most for Austria,
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 395 
 
 which has always coveted the possession of the 
 back of the Alps, and whose territories, be- 
 sides, composed of conquests, ill bound toge- 
 gether, are not so formed by Nature as to 
 excite in her a fondness for well-defined fron- 
 tiers. To make himself master of the Biscayan 
 provinces, and those bordering the Ebro, such 
 as Aragon and Catalonia, would therefore have 
 been a fault against geography, a sure way to 
 wound all Spaniards to the heart, and an inef- 
 ficacious method of placing their government 
 under the dependence of Napoleon ; but, as for 
 submissive, incapable of defending itself, this 
 government was so, but skilful, active, attach- 
 ed, in short all that could be wished, it would 
 not have become so by the cession of Aragon 
 or Catalonia to France. It would thereby have 
 been rendered more contemptible, but not 
 stronger, more courageous, more industrious. 
 
 This manner of disposing of Portugal would 
 have been the worst of all, and the most dan- 
 gerous. Napoleon was not inclined to it. He 
 had, however, examined it like all the others ; 
 and at this very period, which proves that he 
 had thought of it, he directed application to be 
 made to the French legation at Madrid, for a 
 statistical account of the Biscayan provinces, 
 and of the provinces watered by the Ebro in 
 its course. He had about him at that time a 
 dangerous counsellor dangerous, not because 
 he was deficient in good sense, but because he 
 was deficient in the love of truth ; this was M. 
 de Talleyrand, who, having guessed the subject 
 that engrossed the secret thoughts of Napoleon, 
 practised the most mischievous of seductions 
 upon him, by conversing with him incessantly 
 on the topics that engaged his mind. Power 
 has not a more dangerous flatterer than the 
 disgraced courtier who is anxious to recover 
 its favour. Fouche", the minister, having lost 
 in 1802 the portfolio of the police, for having 
 disapproved of that excellent institution, the 
 Consulate for life, had exerted himself to reco- 
 ver his lost portfolio, by seconding by a thou- 
 sand intrigues the fatal institution of the Em- 
 pire. M. de Talleyrand was playing at this 
 moment a similar part. He had sorely dis- 
 pleased Napoleon by insisting on relinquishing 
 the portfolio of the foreign affairs for the situa- 
 tion of grand dignitary ; and he strove to 
 please him again, by giving him advice, which 
 he was fond of receiving. M. de Talleyrand 
 was of the party at Fontainebleau. He saw, 
 since the affair of Copenhagen, the series of 
 wars resumed and continued, France pushing 
 Russia to the North and to the East, that she 
 might herself fall upon the South and the West. 
 The question of Portugal became urgent, and, 
 if he had not genius sufficient to judge what 
 arrangements were best adapted to Europe, he 
 was well enough acquainted with human pas- 
 sions to judge that Napoleon was full of 
 thoughts, still vague but absorbing, relative to 
 the Peninsula This discovery made, he had 
 endeavoured to lead the conversation to this 
 subject, and he had seen the coldness of Napo- 
 leon towards him disappear all at once, con- 
 versation revived, and, if not confidence, at 
 least ease restored. He had profited by it, 
 and had not ceased to add, to the already hide- 
 ous picture of the court of Spain, colours not 
 needed by that picture to offend the eye of 
 Napoleon. In regard to Portugal, he had ap- 
 
 peared to be strongly of opinion that to de- 
 scend upon the Ebro, to establish himself 
 there, in compensation for the cession to Spain 
 of the banks of the Tagus, would be a position 
 ad interim useful and advantageous to take. 
 Napoleon was not inclined to this plan, and 
 preferred another. But M. de Talleyrand had, 
 nevertheless, become his most intimate confi- 
 dant, after having been treated for two months 
 with extreme coldness. Napoleon, on his re- 
 turn from the chase, or on leaving the circle 
 of the ladies, was seen regularly in tSte-d-lgte 
 with M. de Talleyrand, talking at great length, 
 with animation, sometimes with a gloomy 
 though tfulness, on a subject evidently of im- 
 portance, of which everybody was ignorant, 
 and of which even none sought an explanation, 
 so powerful, so prosperous, so pacific, did the 
 Empire appear since Tilsit. Napoleon, walk- 
 ing in the vast galleries of Fontainebleau, 
 sometimes slowly, sometimes with a speed 
 proportioned to that of his thoughts, put to the 
 torture the infirm courtier who could not keep 
 up with him but by immolating his body, as 
 he immolated his soul in flattering the mis- 
 chievous and deplorable extravagance of genius. 
 One man only, deprived of the confidence which 
 he had enjoyed, the Arch-chancellor Camba- 
 ce"res, penetrated the subject of these conversa- 
 tions, durst not interrupt them, nor oppose his 
 assiduities to those of M. de Talleyrand ; for 
 Napoleon, having become with time more im- 
 perious towards him, without being less friend- 
 ly, was less accessible to the counsels of his 
 timid wisdom. A few words dropped by the 
 Arch-chancellor Cambace"res had been sufficient 
 to reveal the opposition of that clear-sighted 
 statesman to any new enterprise, and particu- 
 larly to any interference in the inextricable 
 affairs of the Peninsula, where corrupt govern- 
 ments reigned over half-savage populations, 
 where the difficulties which Joseph had encoun- 
 tered in the Calabrias would be found multiplied 
 tenfold. Napoleon had, therefore, perfectly 
 discerned the opinion of Prince Cambace'res, 
 and, fearing the disapproval of a wise man, he, 
 who feared not the world, showed the same 
 friendship for him as ever, but not the same 
 confidence. ' 
 
 There had just appeared at Fontainebleau 
 another personage, an obscure one, who was 
 rarely admitted to figure in the presence of 
 Napoleon, but clever and crafty as any secret 
 agent could be : this was M. Yzquierdo, the 
 confidential man of the Prince of the Peace, 
 and sent to Paris, as we have said above, to 
 treat seriously about the affairs which M. de 
 Massaredo and M. de Frias entered upon 
 merely as a matter of form. He was not only 
 charged with the interests of Spain, but also 
 with the personal interests of the Prince of the 
 Peace, to whom he was much attached, having 
 been BO distinguished and appreciated by him 
 as to be intrusted with the most important 
 missions. He did the best he could for the 
 affairs of his country and those of Emmanuel 
 Godoy ; for, though devoted to the latter, he 
 was a good Spaniard. Endowed with extra- 
 ordinary sagacity, he had for*-een that the 
 
 I report here the assertion of Prince Cambace'res him- 
 self, confirmed by the testimony of eye-witnesses, some 
 formerly ministers of Napoleon, others members of hi* 
 court, and by a variety of correspondence.
 
 306 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [<. ct. 1807 
 
 critical moment for Spain was approaching ; 
 for, on the one hand, Napoleon became daily 
 more disgusted with an incapable and perfidi- 
 ous ally ; and, on the other hand, having suc- 
 cessively touched on all the European ques- 
 tions, he was naturally led to that of the 
 Peninsula, and induced to turn to the affairs 
 of the South by the conclusion, apparent at 
 least, of those of the North. Accordingly, this 
 subtle and insinuating agent exerted all his 
 efforts to be informed of what was passing in 
 the counsels of the emperor. He had found 
 means to accomplish his purpose through the 
 grand-marshal of the palace, Duroc,- who had 
 married a Spanish lady, daughter of M. d'Her- 
 vaz, formerly at the head of the financial af- 
 fairs of the court of Madrid, afterwards Marquis 
 d'Almenara and ambassador at Constantinople. 
 M. Yzquierdo had cultivated this valuable con- 
 nection, and sought, notwithstanding the in- 
 tegrity and discretion of the grand-marshal, 
 either to discover the designs of Napoleon, or 
 to get some useful words conveyed to* him. He 
 had not failed, on occasion of Portugal, to ap- 
 pear more frequently at Fontainebleau, and to 
 endeavour to obtain the most advantageous 
 result for Spain and for his patron. 
 
 The court of Madrid, though it felt all its 
 desire awakened at the idea of an operation 
 against Portugal, nevertheless saw not without 
 vexation the house of Braganza pushed to- 
 wards Brazil, for it had felt great uneasiness 
 about its American colonies, ever since the 
 United States had shaken off the yoke of i -g- 
 land. The establishment of an independent 
 European State in Brazil filled it with dread of 
 a new commotion, which might lead Mexico, 
 Peru, and the provinces of the La Plata, to 
 constitute themselves free States also ; and, in 
 the moments when its foresight got the better 
 of its greediness, it would rather have seen 
 the Braganzas remain at Lisbon than see a 
 chance of acquiring Portugal arising from 
 their departure. It was not probable, how- 
 ever, that the Braganzas, saved a first time in 
 1802 by Spain, which had cost the latter the 
 island of Trinidad, could be again saved in 
 1807. Spain must therefore submit to their 
 removal, voluntary or compulsory, to Brazil. 
 In this situation, the court of Madrid could not 
 do better than endeavour to acquire Portugal. 
 But it was well aware that it had not deserved 
 so rich a present from Napoleon; it feared that 
 it should be obliged to purchase it with sacri- 
 fices, perhaps even to consent to its being di- 
 vided, and, in this case, M. Yzquierdo had a 
 secondary commission, which was to obtain 
 one of the provinces of Portugal for his patron, 
 the Prince of the Peace. The latter, seeing 
 from day to day a formidable storm gathering 
 against him, as well at court as in the nation 
 at large, purposed, in case he should be pre- 
 cipitated from the pinnacle of greatness, to 
 drop, not into nothing, but into an independ- 
 ent and solidly secured principality. The 
 queen ardently wished her favourite so desira- 
 ble a retreat. The good-natured Charles IV. 
 thought it due to the eminent services of the 
 man who, he said, had for twenty years assist- 
 ed him to bear the burden of the crown. In 
 consequence, M. Yzquierdo had received from 
 his sovereigns, as well as from the Prince of 
 the Peace himself, the express recommendation 
 
 to follow up this result, in case Portugal 
 should not be integrally given to Spain. In 
 case of the partition of Portugal, there was 
 another ambition still to gratify, that of the 
 Queen of Etruria, the favourite daughter of the 
 King and Queen of Spain, widow of the Prince 
 of Parma, mother of a king five years old, and 
 regent of the kingdom of Etruria, instituted 
 some years before by the First Consul. It was 
 much doubted whether Napoleon would leave 
 possessions in Italy to Spain any more than to 
 Austria ; and, with this forecast, part of Por- 
 tugal was solicited for the Queen of Etruria. 
 Portugal, divided then into two principalities, 
 vassals of the crown of Spain, would become 
 in reality a Spanish province. Moreover, the 
 court of Madrid, in its indolence, in its de- 
 basement, cherished an ambitious desire, which 
 was to acquire a title that should cover its pre- 
 sent degradation, and it wished that Charles IV. 
 should be called King of the Spains and Emperor 
 of the Americas. Thus every one in that de- 
 graded court would have been satisfied. The fa- 
 vourite would have had a principality wherein 
 to hide his turpitudes ; the queen would have 
 had the pleasure of providing for her favour- 
 ite and with him for her preferred daughter; 
 and the king would have picked up in passing a 
 title for the amusement of his imbecile vanity. 
 Such were the ideas, to which M. Yzquierdo 
 was commissioned to obtain assent at Fontaine- 
 bleau. Of all possible projects the latter was 
 the one which differed least from the views of 
 Napoleon. He wanted not at first, as we have 
 observed, any arrangement which could be- 
 come definitive. He meant purely and simply 
 to give Portugal to the court of Madrid, a gift 
 which it had not deserved, and which would 
 have raised it in the estimation of the Spa- 
 niards. He had renounced the idea lauded by 
 M. de Talleyrand, of gaining a footing beyond 
 the Pyrenees by the acquisition of the pro- 
 vinces of the Ebro. Thenceforward he should 
 prefer, saving some modification, the plan of 
 partition brought by M. Yzquierdo, and which 
 had for the moment the only advantages to 
 which he aspired. In the first place Napoleon 
 was resolved to clear Italy of all foreign 
 princes, and, after turning the Austrians out 
 of it, he purposed to remove the Spaniards 
 also, not as being dangerous. People, there- 
 fore, had rightly guessed his real intention, by 
 supposing that he would seek to recover Etru- 
 ria by means of an exchange for a portion of 
 Portugal. Then, though filled with contempt 
 for the favourite who was degrading and ruin 5 
 ing Spain, he resolved to attach him a little 
 longer, that he might have him at his disposal 
 in the different circumstances which he foresaw 
 or intended to bring about. But he thought 
 that it was too much to give half of Portugal 
 to the Queen of Etruria as the price of Tus- 
 cany, and the other half to the favourite as the 
 price of his subservience. In consequence, 
 taking little pains to persuade people, to whom 
 he had only to signify his will, he dictated to 
 M. de Champagny, on the morning of the 23d 
 of October, a note containing his definitive re- 
 solutions. 1 He granted to the Queen of Etru- 
 
 i It is from this very note and the identical instructions 
 sent from Madrid to M. Yzquierdo, both preserved in the 
 Louvre, among the papers of Napoleon, that I am writing 
 this account.
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 397 
 
 ria, for her son, a State containing a population 
 of 800,000 souls, situated on the Douro, and 
 having Oporto for its capital, which was to be 
 called the kingdom of North Lusitania. At 
 the other extremity of Portugal, in the south- 
 ern part, he granted to the Prince of the Peace 
 a State with a population of 400,000 souls, 
 composed of the Algarves and the Alentejo, 
 styled the principality of the Algarves. These 
 two small States balanced the population of 
 Tuscany, at that time computed at 1,200,000 
 souls. Napoleon was not sufficiently satisfied 
 with Spain to give her more than he took from 
 her. He reserved the central part of Portu- 
 gal, that is to say, Lisbon, the Tagus, the 
 Upper Douro, bearing the names of Portuguese 
 Estramadura, Beyra, and Tras-os-Montes, and 
 comprising a population of 2,000,000 inhabit- 
 ants, in order to dispose of it at the peace. 
 This wholly provisional arrangement suited 
 him wonderfully well, since it left every thing 
 in suspense, for it afforded either the means of 
 subsequently recovering the Spanish colonies, 
 by restoring two-thirds of Portugal to the 
 house of Braganza, or to make what arrange- 
 ment soever he pleased with the house of Spain, 
 if he should decide on suffering it to reign in 
 attaching it to him by the bonds of a marriage. 
 At any rate, it was agreed that the new Portu- 
 guese principalities should be constituted into 
 sovereignties, vassals of the crown of Spain, 
 and that poor King Charles IV. should be styled, 
 agreeably to his desire, King of the Spaina and 
 Emperor of the Americas, and bear, like Napo- 
 leon, the double title of Imperial and Royal 
 Majesty. 
 
 Besides these conditions, Napoleon required 
 that Spain should unite with the French troops 
 a division of 10,000 Spaniards to take posses- 
 sion of the province of Oporto, one of 10 or 11 
 thousand, to second the movement of the French 
 upon Lisbon, and one of 6000 to occupy the 
 Algarves. It was understood that General Ju- 
 not should command the French and allied 
 troops, unless the Prince of the Peace or Charles 
 IV. should go to the army, which they had pro- 
 mised not to do, for Napoleon would not have 
 intrusted to such generals the life of a single 
 soldier of his. By disposing of Portugal in 
 this manner, he should recover Etruria imme- 
 diately ; this, which Napoleon was solicitous to 
 do, on account of his arrangements in Italy, 
 would hold out an alluring bait to the ambition 
 of the Prince of the Peace, enable him to defer 
 every resolution in regard to the Peninsula, and 
 not even require him finally to decide the ques- 
 tion of the establishment of the Braganzas in 
 America. 
 
 The treaty containing this provisional parti- 
 tion of Portugal was drawn up conformably to 
 the note which Napoleon had dictated to M. de 
 Champagny, and signed by M. Yzquierdo for 
 Spain, and by the Grand-marshal Duroc for 
 France. It was signed at Fontainebleau itself, 
 on the 27th of October ; and it has obtained, 
 by the title of Treaty of Fontainebleau, an un- 
 fortunate celebrity, because it was the first act 
 of the invasion of the Peninsula. 
 
 1 A circumstance well worthy of remark, and which 
 will appear singular, is, that the Arch-chancellor Camba- 
 cervs. in his valuable manuscript memoirs, relates that 
 Napoleon adhered to his purpose, and that M. de Talley- 
 rand did not obtain what he wished. This is a mistake of 
 that grave personage, for the correspondence of Napoleon 
 
 No sooner were the signatures given, than 
 orders were despatched to General Junot, whose 
 troops, having entered Spain on the 17th, had 
 already reached Salamanca, purposing to pro- 
 ceed to the Tagus through Alcantara, and to 
 follow the right bank, while General Solano, 
 Marquis del Socorro, with 10,000 Spaniards, 
 would follow the left bank. General Junot had 
 been expressly recommended to send to Paris 
 all the Portuguese emissaries whom he should 
 fall in with, saying that he had no power to 
 treat, that his instructions were to march to 
 Lisbon, as a friend if he were not resisted, as a 
 conqueror if he met with any opposition what- 
 ever. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, for having listened to all 
 the effusions of Napoleon in regard to Spain, 
 obtained what he desired, that is to say, a cer- 
 tain supremacy over the department of foreign 
 affairs. Napoleon, irritated at first to see him 
 relinquish the portfolio of foreign affairs for 
 the purely honorary dignity of vice-grand-elec- 
 tor, had signified to him that he should no longer 
 have any part in the diplomacy of the Empire. 
 But, overcome by M. de Talleyrand's address, 
 he decreed that the vice-grand-elector should 
 succeed in their functions not only the grand- 
 elector, absent because he reigned at Naples, 
 but also the arch-chancellor of State, because 
 he reigned at Milan. The reader will recollect, 
 no doubt, that part of the duties of the arch- 
 chancellor of State consisted in the presenta- 
 tion of ambassadors, in the custody of treaties, 
 in short, the honorary part of the imperial diplo- 
 macy. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, combining 
 an office of formality conferred on him by de- 
 cree with the important duty attributed to him 
 by theVonfidence of the Emperor, found him- 
 self at once dignitary and minister, a situation 
 to which he had always aspired, and which Na- 
 poleon had declared that he would never grant. 
 The arch-chancellor Cambaceres made this re- 
 mark to Napoleon, who was slightly embar- 
 rassed, and promised that the decree should 
 not be signed. But the Arch-chancellor Cam- 
 bace"res was just then setting off to visit his 
 native city, Montpellier, which he had not seen 
 for a long time ; and, no sooner was he gone 
 than the decree so ardently desired by M. de 
 Talleyrand was signed and published as an offi- 
 cial act. ' Thus, in this decisive and fatal mo- 
 ment, prudence withdrew and complaisance re- 
 mained complaisance more dangerous in M. 
 de Talleyrand than in any other person, be- 
 cause with him it assumed all the forms of good 
 sense. 
 
 Napoleon's intention was to set out for Italy 
 as soon as he had received M. de Tolstoy, for 
 he had not visited since 1805 that country of 
 his predilection. He purposed to carry thither 
 the benefit of his vivifying presence, to embrace 
 his adopted son Eugene Beauharnais and his 
 eldest brother Joseph, and to converse with Lu- 
 cien himself, whom he hoped to prevail upon to 
 return into the bosom of the imperial family, 
 perhaps even to place on a throne. But, all at 
 once, when on the point of setting off. intelli- 
 gence from Madrid stopped and obliged him to 
 
 and the Monittur of November 7, 1807, No. 311, prove thai 
 the decree was signed. Napoleon, to avoid, no doubt, the 
 embarrassment of an explanation, probably never spoke 
 further on the subject to the arch-chancellor, wh.) "i^ht 
 believe that the decree did not exist. 
 
 2L
 
 398 
 
 HISTORY Jf THE 
 
 [Oct. isor. 
 
 suspend his departure.' The accounts from 
 that capital, which had for some time begun to 
 assume a grave character, were of the most 
 strange and unexpected nature. They inti- 
 mated that, on the 27th of October, the very 
 day on which the treaty of Fontainebleau was 
 signed in France, the Prince of the Asturias 
 had been arrested at the Escurial, and consti- 
 tuted a prisoner in his apartments ; that his 
 papers had been seized ; that among them had 
 been found proofs of a conspiracy against the 
 throne ; and that a criminal process would be 
 commenced against him. Immediately after- 
 wards, a letter of the 29th, signed by Charles 
 IV. himself, informed Napoleon that his eldest 
 son, seduced by miscreants, had formed a dou- 
 ble design against the life of his mother and 
 the crown of his father. The unfortunate king 
 added that such a design ought to be punished ; 
 that search was making for its instigators ; but 
 that the prince, the author of or accomplice in 
 such abominable projects, could not be permit- 
 ted to reign; that one of his brothers, more 
 worthy of the supreme rank, should have his 
 place in the paternal heart and on the throne. 
 To prosecute criminally the heir to the crown, 
 to change the order of succession, were resolu- 
 tions of immense importance, which could not 
 but move Napoleon, already deeply engaged 
 with the affairs of Spain, and forbade his de- 
 parture. The appeal made for his friendship, 
 almost for his advice, in acquainting him with 
 this family misfortune a misfortune most ter- 
 rible if it were true, most infamous if but a 
 calumny of an unnatural mother, and believed 
 by an imbecile father obliged him to inquire 
 minutely into the facts, and almost to inter- 
 fere, in order to obtain a command of dne con- 
 sequences. Besides, just at this time arrived 
 letters from the Prince of the Asturias, implor- 
 ing the protection of Napoleon against impla- 
 cable enemies, and soliciting to become not 
 only his protfyt, but his relation, his adopted 
 son, by obtaining the hand of one of the French 
 princesses. 2 Thus these unfortunate Bour- 
 bons, both father and son, themselves called 
 upon, nay almost forced, that dread conqueror 
 to interfere in their affairs at the moment 
 when he, thoroughly disgusted with their in- 
 capacity, was too well disposed to hurl them 
 from a throne on which they were not only 
 useless but dangerous to the common cause of 
 France and Spain. 
 
 ^e should not have a just conception of 
 these strange circumstances, were we not to 
 turn back and to take a survey of what had 
 occurred at the court of Spain for a year past. 
 We have seen elsewhere (Vol. I.) a picture 
 of that degenerate court, ruled by an insolent 
 favourite, who had contrived to* usurp, in a 
 manner, the royal authority, thanks to the 
 passion which he had excited twenty years 
 before in a queen devoid of modesty. If there 
 were a country in Europe capable of exhibit- 
 ing in its most hideous features, the spectacle 
 of the corruption of courts, it was assuredly 
 Spain Behind the Pyrenees, between three 
 
 seas, almost cut off from communication with 
 j Europe, sheltered by her armies and her ideas, 
 i amidst an hereditary opulence, which had its 
 j source in the treasures of the New World, 
 | which had kept up the indolence of the nation 
 as well as that of its princes ; in a hot climate, 
 which excites the senses more than the mind ; 
 an old court might well fall asleep, become 
 voluptuous and degenerate, between a clergy 
 intolerant for heresy but tolerant for vice, and 
 a nation accustomed to consider royalty, what- 
 ever it might do, as equally sacred with the 
 Deity himself. Towards the conclusion of the 
 last century, a wise, enlightened, and indus- 
 trious prince and a minister worthy of him, 
 Charles III. and M. de Florida Blanca, had 
 endeavoured to stop the general decline, but 
 had only suspended for a moment the melan- 
 choly course of things. In the next reign, 
 Spain had descended to the lowest step of 
 abasement, though the fine qualities of the 
 nation were only benumbed. King Charles 
 IV., always upright, well-intentioned, but in- 
 capable of any other exertion than that of 
 hunting, regarding it as a favour of Heaven 
 that some one should undertake the task of 
 reigning for him ; his wife, always dissolute as 
 a Roman princess of the Lower Empire, always 
 submissive to the old guards du corps, who had 
 become Prince of the Peace, and reserving her 
 heart for him, while she gave up her person to 
 vulgar gallants of his choosing ; the Prince of 
 the Peace, always vain, light, indolent, igno- 
 rant, deceitful, and cowardly, having every 
 vice but cruelty, always domineering over his 
 master, or taking the trouble to conceive for 
 him soft and capricious resolutions, which suf- 
 ficed to keep a debased government going the 
 king, the queen, the Prince of the Peace, had 
 brought Spain into a state difficult to be de- 
 scribed. No finances, no navy, no army, no 
 policy, no authority over colonies ready to re- 
 volt, no respect from the indignant nation, no 
 relations with Europe, which disdained a cow- 
 ardly, perfidious court, without a will of its 
 own, no longer even a support in France, for 
 Napoleon had been led by contempt to believe 
 that every thing was allowable towards a power 
 I which had arrived at so abject a condition: 
 ' such was Spain in October, 1807. 
 
 The first interest of the Spanish monarchy, 
 ever since, shut up between the Pyrenees and 
 the seas that surround her, she has neither 
 Netherlands nor Italy to disturb her the first 
 interest is the navy, which then included the 
 administration of her colonies and that of her 
 | arsenals. Her colonies contained neither sol- 
 diers, nor muskets to arm the colonists, in de- 
 fault of soldiers. Her captains-general were 
 j mostly officers so timid and so incapable that 
 the governor of the provinces of La Plata had 
 given up Buenos Ayres to the English without 
 fighting, and that a Frenchman, M. de Liniers, 
 had to put himself at the head of 500 men and 
 himself undertake to expel the invaders, which 
 he had done with complete success. The 
 Spaniards, indignant, had deposed the cap- 
 
 The correspondence of Napoleon proves this feet in 
 the most authentic manner. 
 
 The well known letter, in which Ferdinand applies to 
 I^appleon for his protection, and for the hand of a princess 
 of bis family, is dated the llth of October. But, for rea- 
 sons which we shall state elsewhere, it was enclosed by 
 
 M. de Bcauharnaia in a despatch till the 20th, left Madrid 
 on the 20th or 21st, could not arrive in Paris before the 
 28th, and probably reached Fontainebleau on the 29th. 
 It then took the courier* seven or eight days to travel 
 from Madrid to Paris.
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 399 
 
 tain-general, and resolved to appoint M. Li- 
 niers in his place, but he would accept only 
 the provisional title of military commandant. 
 In vain did the chain of the Cordilleras pour 
 forth metals from its rich flanks ; gold and 
 silver dug out of their bowels lay useless in 
 the cellars of the captain-generalships. There 
 was not a Spanish ship that durst go to fetch 
 them. The governor of the Philippines, for 
 example, being in want of ammunition, provi- 
 sions, money to buy them with, had been 
 obliged to apply to the brave Captain Bou- 
 rayne, commander of the French frigate La 
 Canonnitre, whose gallant fights we have al- 
 ready related, to procure piastres for him. 
 Captain Bourayne had brought to the amount 
 of 12,000,000, after making a trip from the 
 Philippines to Mexico and back, and thus twice 
 crossing half the globe. The Spanish govern- 
 ment, in order to have a little of this valuable 
 American coin at Madrid, was obliged to sell 
 considerable sums to the United States and to 
 Holland, and sometimes even to England, who, 
 being in absolute need of it herself, consented 
 to undertake the transport of it to Europe, and 
 to give one-half the amount to the enemy, on 
 condition of keeping the other half herself. 
 
 As for the navy itself, its state was this. 
 Composed of 76 ships of the line and 54 frigates 
 under Charles III., it had dwindled under 
 Charles IV. to 33 sail of the line and 20 frigates. 
 Of those 33 ships of the line, there were 8 to 
 be destroyed immediately, as not worth refit- 
 ting. There were left 25, 5 of them three-deck- 
 ers, well built and very fine ships, 11 of 74 
 guns, indifferent or bad, 9 of 54 and 64, mostly 
 old and on too small a scale, since the adoption 
 of the new dimensions in ship-building. The 
 20 frigates were divided thus : 10 equipped or 
 fit for equipping, 10 bad or requiring repair. 
 In this whole navy, there were but 6 sail ready 
 to put to sea, having on board provisions for 
 barely three months, their crews incomplete, 
 and their keels so filthy that they were scarcely 
 navigable. These were the 6 sail at Cartha- 
 gena, armed and equipped for three years past, 
 and which had never weighed anchor but to 
 Bhow themselves at the mouth of the harbour, 
 and to go back immediately. There was not a 
 chip capable of putting to sea either at Cadiz 
 or at Ferrol. At Cadiz there were, it is true, 6 
 sail of the line, armed, but without provisions 
 or crews. There was no want of seamen ; but, 
 having nothing to pay them with, the govern- 
 ment durst not engage them, and they were 
 left unemployed in the harbours. The small 
 number that had been raised, instead of being 
 on board the squadron, were employed in gun- 
 boats, between Algesiras and Cadiz, for the 
 protection of the coasting-trade. Thus the 
 whole Spanish navy in a state of activity was 
 reduced to 6 sail of the line armed and equip- 
 ped at Carthagena, (and these without a single 
 frigate,) and 6 armed at Cadiz, but not equip- 
 ped. Of fhe 20 frigates, there were but 4 
 armed and 6 capable of being armed. The 
 future presented a prospect as dreary as the 
 present ; for in all Spain there were but two 
 ships of the line building, and which had been 
 upon the stocks so long that they were looked 
 upon as not susceptible of being finished. 
 
 Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagena, were destitute of 
 timber, iron, copper, hemp. Those magnificent 
 
 arsenals, built in several reigns, and w orthy of 
 Spanish greatness, as well for their extent aa 
 for their appropriation to all the wants of a 
 powerful navy, were falling to ruin. The har- 
 bours were choked with mud. The superb wet 
 dock of Carthagena was becoming filled with 
 sand and filth. The numerous canals which 
 place the harbour of Cadiz in communication 
 with the rich plains of Andalusia, were encum- 
 bered with mud and wrecks of vessels. In one 
 of these canals lay sunk a ship of the line, the 
 St. Gabriel, two frigates, a corvette, three large 
 lighters, two transports, and a great quantity 
 of boats. One of the two magazines of the 
 arsenal of Cadiz, destroyed nine years before 
 by fire, had not been rebuilt. The basins, 
 destined for dry docks, were ruined by the 
 filtering of the water into them. Of the two 
 basins at Carthagena, built fifty years before, 
 and never repaired, the one destined to be kept 
 dry had rendered it necessary to burn the 
 timber of several ships for the service of the 
 machine employed in emptying it. The San 
 Pedro tie Alcantara, which was under repair in 
 it, had, nevertheless, been well nigh swamped 
 there. The rope-walks of Cadiz and Cartha- 
 gena were the finest in Europe, but there were 
 not even a few hundred-weight of hemp to em- 
 ploy them. At the same time, Seville, Grenada, 
 Valencia, were earnestly soliciting that the stocks 
 of hemp left upon their hands might be pur- 
 chased. The beeches and oaks of Old Castille, 
 Biscay, the Asturias, destined for Ferrol ; the 
 oaks of the Sierra de Ronda, destined for Cadiz ; 
 the noble pines of Andalusia, Murcia, Catalonia, 
 destined for Carthagena and Cadiz ; felled and 
 lying on the ground, were rotting there for 
 want of the means of transport to convey them 
 to the stocks where they were to be employed. 
 These materials were scarce, not only because 
 none were brought, but because they were sold. 
 Upon pretext of getting rid of refuse lumber, 
 the administration of the port of Carthagena, 
 in order to raise money to pay certain salaries, 
 had sold the most valuable materials, especially 
 metals. The board charged with the provision- 
 ing of the squadron at Carthagena could not 
 obtain supplies, because it was 18 millions of 
 reals in arrear with the contractors. The 
 workmen deserted, not from treachery, but 
 from sheer want. Out of 5000 workmen, there 
 were scarcely 700 left at Carthagena. Some 
 had died of the epidemic disease which had 
 desolated the coasts of Spain some years be- 
 fore, others had fled to Gibraltar, and would 
 eat the bread of England in her service. Those 
 at Cadiz found themselves, from the same 
 causes, considerably diminished, in number. 
 In 1807 nine months' pay was owing them, and 
 they were obliged to hold their hand. The 
 sailors, in like manner, were dispersed in the 
 interior, or in foreign countries. There were 
 some of them to whom twenty-seven months' 
 pay was owing. The few resources that wera 
 to be procured, were expended in the mainte- 
 nance of a staff that would have been sufficient 
 for several great navies. This establishment 
 included one high-admiral, two admirals, 29 
 vice-admirals, 63 officers corresponding in rank 
 with rear-admiral, 80 captains of ships of the 
 line, 134 captains of frigates, upwards of 12 
 intendants, 6 treasurers, 11 commissaires-ordon- 
 nateurs, 74 commissioners of the navy, and all
 
 400 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 these for a naval power reduced to 33 sail of 
 the line and 20 frigates, of which six ships of 
 the line and four frigates only were armed and 
 equipped ! So low was sunk the navy of one of 
 those nations of the globe most naturally des- 
 tined for the sea, of an insular nation almost 
 as much as the English, having finer harbours 
 than theirs, such as Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagena ; 
 timber which the English have not, such as the 
 oaks of Old Castille, Leon, Biscay, the Asturias, 
 and La Ronda ; the pines of Andalusia, Murcia, 
 Valencia, Catalonia ; materials of all kinds, as 
 the iron of the Pyrenees, the copper of Mexico 
 and Peru, the hemp of Valencia, Grenada, Se- 
 ville ; lastly, skilful and numerous workmen, 
 brave sailors, officers capable, like Gravina, of 
 dying the death of heroes. All these facts 
 which we have just stated were scarcely known 
 at Madrid. 1 When the Spanish administration 
 was asked how many ships there were, and how 
 many either building, or armed, or equipped, 
 it could not tell. When asked at what time 
 such a division would be ready to weigh anchor, 
 it was still more embarrassed for an answer. 
 All that the government knew was that the 
 navy was. neglected. It knew it, and even 
 wished it to be so. The navy appeared to it a 
 secondary interest, secondary for a nation which 
 had to defend the Floridas, Mexico, Peru, Co- i 
 lombia, La Plata, the Philippines ! The en- ' 
 gaging in a contest with England appeared to 
 it a chimera a chimera when France and Spain 
 combined had ports such as Copenhagen, the 
 Texel, Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, Brest, 
 Rochfort, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Carthagena, 
 Toulon, Genoa, Tarento, Venice, and could not 
 aend out 120 sail of the line ! The government, 
 that is to say the Prince of the Peace, was some- 
 times base enough to pour forth jests upon the 
 Spanish navy ; he had sarcasms instead of tears 
 for Trafalgar ! The fact was, that at heart he 
 detested France, that troublesome ally who 
 reproached him incessantly for his criminal 
 supmeness ; and he preferred England, because 
 she gave him hopes, if he would betray the cause 
 of the maritime nations, of the quiet so con- 
 genial to his cowardice. Thus, while he af- 
 fected contempt for the navy, the medium for 
 contending against England, he professed great 
 esteem for the land-army, the medium for re- 
 sisting the counsels of France. The Prince of 
 the Peace was fond of talking about his grena- 
 diers, his dragoons, his hussars. The state of 
 that army, the object of his predilection, was 
 nevertheless as follows : 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 'The Spanish government, in fact, knew nothing, or as 
 pood a* nothing, of the details we are giving respecting the 
 state of the navy, and of those which we hare^vi-n rela- 
 tive to the army and the finance*.. Napoleon was Acquainted 
 with the greater part of them by his agents, who were very 
 mmerous and strongly stimulated by hi? incessant curi- 
 L !v KpOTta were not the on 'y sou** of his 
 TK^ 1 T^ feW m nths later ' e "tered Spain, 
 ts relative to the navy were entirely known, thanks 
 
 The Spanish army was composed of about 
 58,000 infantry and artillery, 15 or 16 thousand 
 cavalry, 6000 royal guards, 11,000 Swiss, 2000 
 Irish, and lastly, 28,000 provincial militia in 
 all about 120,000 men, capable of furnishing 
 from 50 to 60 thousand combatants at most. 
 The infantry was weak, puny, and recruited 
 in part out of the scum of the population. 
 The cavalry was formed of more select men ; 
 only a very small part of it was mounted; 
 the fine breed of Spanish horses, so mettle- 
 some and so gentle, declining from day to day 
 The royal guards, Spanish and Walloons, were 
 the only portion that made a really imposing 
 appearance. The militia, composed of peasants 
 who were not trained, who could not be dis- 
 placed, were of scarcely any use. The Swiss 
 auxiliaries were, as everywhere else, thorough 
 soldiers, faithful, steady. After deducting 
 therefore, the 14,000 men sent to the north of 
 Germany, there were left no more than 15 or 
 16 thousand men to despatch towards Portugal 
 of the 26,000 promised by the treaty of Fon- 
 tamebleau. The presidios of Africa, especially 
 Ceuta, that formidable via-d-vu of Gibraltar, 
 the capture of which by the English or the 
 Moors would have rendered the passage from 
 the Mediterranean to the Ocean impracticable, 
 contained neither garrisons nor provisions. At 
 Ceuta, instead of a garrison of 6000 men, pre- 
 scribed by the regulations and by custom, there 
 were but 3000. At the famous camp of St. 
 Roch, before Gibraltar, there were at most 8 
 or 9 thousand men. The rest of the Spanish 
 army, dispersed in the provinces, were there 
 employed in performing the duty of the police, 
 because there were then no gendarmerie in 
 Spain. The assemblage of any army what- 
 ever would have been impossible; for the 
 14,000 sent to Germany and the 16,000 
 marched towards Portugal, almost entirely 
 absorbed the disposable portion of the regular 
 troops. For the rest, the whole of the military 
 force, ill clothed, ill fed, rarely paid, destitute 
 of emulation, of military spirit, of instruction, 
 was a body without soul. There, as in the 
 navy, the staff consumed all the resources. It 
 numbered of officers of the highest rank, three 
 captains-general, answering to the rank of 
 marshal, 87 lieutenant-generals, 127 mare- 
 chaux de camp, 252 brigadiers, (an intermediate 
 rank between that of marshal de camp and 
 that of colonel,) and an unknown number of 
 colonels ; for there were some whose titles were 
 real, others provisional or honorary, and be- 
 
 
 very curiou, collect of these pape 
 
 Louvre with the papers of Napoleon that the authentic 
 particulars which I here give respecting the administrative 
 affairs of Spain are derived. . I have made a careful com- 
 parison of all these statements, which doeg not allow me 
 to conceive a single doubt respecting their accuracy 
 Messrs. Munoz, O'Farrill. Azanza, writing neither for the 
 public, nor for an assembly, entering into polemics with 
 nobody, stating purely and simply the resources that could 
 be disposed of, were forced to tell the truth, which they 
 had no interest to conceal, and moreover supported by 
 irrefragable documents, such as quite recent inspections, 
 or oflicial registers and statements. For the rest, their 
 statements very nearly corresponded with what Napoleon's 
 agents had previously communicated to him. The study 
 of all these documents has therefore enabled me to draw 
 a complete picture of the state of the Spanish monarchy, 
 which could not at this day be sketched in Spain- for 
 the documents were transmitted to France at the mo- 
 ment of the invasion, and have remained there ever 
 since. I have thought this picture useful, nay, even ne- 
 cessary, for the understanding of events; and it is for thig 
 reason that I have taken the trouble to compose it, and 
 that I give my readers that of reading it
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 IONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 401 
 
 tween both they were not reckoned at fewer than 
 2000. Such was all that was left of those formi- 
 dable bands, which, in the loth and 16th cen- 
 turies, had made Europe tremble. Such, too, 
 was all the service rendered by the marked 
 predilection of the Prince of the Peace for the 
 army! 
 
 As for the finances, which, with the land 
 forces and the naval forces, constitute the com- 
 plement of the power of a State, they corres- 
 ponded to the state of those forces, and served 
 to account for it. There were debts owing to J 
 Holland, to the Bank, to the public, to the great 
 farms, for loans at fixed and annual dates, 114 
 millions; in arrears of pay and salaries 111 
 millions ; in royal vales (paper money, 50 per 
 cent, below par) 1033 millions ; which formed 
 a debt demandable of 1258 millions, part due j 
 shortly, part immediately, and which might be j 
 called dribbling ; for, 110 millions of arrears of 
 pay and salaries, 32 millions owing to the great 
 farms, eight millions promised by monthly in- 
 stalments to France and not paid, seven millions 
 of annual interest due to Holland, seven millions 
 of interest of vales not provided for, might well 
 be termed dribbling debts for a government. 
 The expenses and the revenues were composed 
 as follows: 126 millions of revenues, and 159 
 millions of expenses, leaving, of course, a yearly 
 deficit of 33 millions, that is to say, a fifth of 
 the necessities of the State unprovided for. 
 The customs, tobacco, the salt-works, tolls, bore 
 the principal burdens. Land, thanks to its 
 owners, mostly nobles or priests, paid nothing 
 but tithe for the benefit of the clergy. With 
 such a system of taxation, a revenue of not 
 more than 100 millions would have been ob- 
 tained, if America had not furnished a supple- 
 ment of 25 or 26 millions. Spain contributed 
 much more considerable sums, but great part 
 of which remained in the hands of the collect- 
 ors of the public revenue. Manufactures, long 
 since destroyed, no longer produced either beau- 
 tiful silks or beautiful cloths, notwithstanding 
 the mulberry-trees of Andalusia and the mag- 
 nificent flocks of the Spanish breed. Some 
 cottons, manufactured in Catalonia, were rather 
 a pretext for smuggling than a real branch of 
 industry ; for then, as at present, they served 
 to attribute a Spanish origin to English cottons. 
 Trade was ruined, for it was reduced to a few 
 clandestine exchanges of piastres, the export 
 of which was prohibited, for English goods, the 
 import of which was alike prohibited, and to 
 the importation (permitted in this case) of cer- 
 tain productions of French luxury. The supply 
 of the colonies and of the navy, which alone 
 had for a long time kept up a relic of activity 
 in the ports of Spain, had dwindled to nothing 
 in consequence of the war. The contraband 
 trade of the English in South America, facili- 
 tated by the conquest of Trinidad, was sufficient 
 there. Agriculture, behind-hand in its pro- 
 cesses, scarcely capable of modification accord- 
 ing to the new methods, on account of the heat 
 of the climate and an absolute want of water, 
 ravaged moreover by the mesta, that is to say, 
 by the annual migration of seven or eight mil- 
 lion sheep from the north to the south of the 
 Peninsula, had been for ages in a stationary 
 state. Thus the people were poor, the middle 
 class ruined, the nobility over head and ears in 
 debt, and the clergy itself, though richly en- 
 Vot. II. 51 
 
 dowed, and more numerous than the army and 
 navy put together, distressed also by the sale 
 of a seventh of its property, demanded and ob- 
 tained from the court of Rome on account of the 
 public necessities. But amidst this general po- 
 verty, there was a nation, strong, haughty, 
 proud of its past greatness as if that greatness 
 had still existed ; having lost the habit of fight- 
 ing, but capable of the most courageous self- 
 devotion ; ignorant, fanatic, hating other na- 
 tions ; knowing, nevertheless, that on the other 
 side of the Pyrenees useful reforms had taken 
 place, great things been accomplished, and call- 
 ing for, but at the same time dreading the in- 
 telligence of foreigners ; in short, full of con- 
 tradictions, of oddities, of noble and endearing 
 qualities, and at the moment, weary in the high- 
 est degree of its inactivity for a century past, 
 deeply grieved at its humiliations, indignant at 
 the spectacles which it had to witness. 
 
 It was before the face of a nation so nearly 
 on the point of losing its patience that the silly 
 favourite, the ruler of the indolence of his so- 
 vereign, of the vices of his queen, pursued his 
 disgraceful course. While specie was scarce 
 in a country possessing Peru and Mexico, and 
 the country had to shift with a discredited 
 paper money, Emmanuel Godoy, from a vague 
 presentiment, was amassing sums in gold and 
 silver, which the free command of all the re- 
 sources of the treasury permitted him to accu- 
 mulate, and which public rumour foolishly 
 exaggerated, for it talked of several hundred 
 millions hoarded in his palace. Thus, while 
 the nation felt itself impoverished, it believed 
 that all the national wealth was in the posses- 
 sion of Emmanuel Godoy. To the public scandal 
 of his adulterous intercourse with the queen 
 were added many other scandals. After having 
 married Dona Maria Luisa de Bourbon, Infanta 
 of Spain, own niece of Charles III., cousin- 
 german of Charles IV., sister of the Cardinal 
 of Bourbon, whom he had chosen in order to 
 draw near the throne, and whom he neglected 
 from dislike of her modest virtues, he had 
 publicly attached himself, by marriage accord- 
 ing to some, by long habit according to others, 
 to a young lady named Josefa Tudo, by whom 
 he had several children. Desirous of giving 
 a certain consecration to this connection, he had 
 obtained for Mademoiselle Josefa the title of 
 Countess of Castillo Fiel (Chateau Fidele), and 
 in addition to this title a grandeza for the eldest 
 of her children. He loaded her with wealth, 
 and surrounded her with a sort of power ; for 
 it was to her house persons went to see him 
 when they wished to converse freely with him ; 
 thither, too, the agents of European diplomacy 
 repaired to receive their instructions ; it was 
 with his discourse that ambassadors filled their 
 despatches ; and, while pouring oat to her the 
 cares, the vexations, the anxieties, to which his 
 blind levity exposed him, he could find, in the 
 youth and beauty of a sister of Mademoiselle 
 Tudo's, pleasures which crowned the scandals 
 of his life. And all Spain was acquainted with 
 this disgraceful licentiousness ; the queen her 
 self was acquainted with it, and bore with it 
 the king alone was ignorant of it, and thanked 
 Heaven for sending him a man who laboured 
 and governed for him ! 
 
 The unfortunate Spanish nation, not knowing, 
 between an insolent favourite, a |uiltv queen. 
 2L2
 
 402 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 rOct. 1807. 
 
 and an imbecile king, to vrhom to give its heart, 
 had given it to the heir to the crown, the Prince 
 of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., who was 
 not much more worthy of the love of a great 
 people than his parents. This prince, then 
 twenty-three years old, was left a widower by 
 the Princess of Naples, who died, it was re- 
 ported, by poison administered by the hand of 
 the queen and the favourite ; which was false, 
 but admitted to be true by all Spain. Repulsed 
 by his mother, who construed his habitual sad- 
 ness into a censure, by the Prince of the Peace, 
 who imagined that he discovered in it a jealousy 
 of authority, oppressed by both, obliged to seek 
 a refuge around him, he had found it in his 
 young wife, to whom he had become fondly at- 
 tached. As the two houses of Naples and Spain 
 mortally hated each other, and the young prin- 
 cess arrived at the Escurial with sentiments 
 derived from her family, she had not contri- 
 buted to reconcile Ferdinand with his parents, 
 but, on the contrary, fomented the aversion 
 which he entertained for them. Accordingly, 
 with his limited faculties of head and heart, 
 listening to every report conformable to his 
 hatred, Ferdinand believed that he had been 
 deprived by a crime of the woman whom he 
 loved, and this crime he imputed to his mother 
 as well as to the adulterous favourite who go- 
 verned her. It may be conceived what passions 
 must have fermented in these vulgar, ardent, 
 idle souls. The prince was awkward, weak, 
 and false, whose whole understanding consisted 
 in a certain shrewdness, and whose whole cha- 
 racter in a certain obstinacy. But in the eyes 
 of an impassioned nation, feeling a necessity to 
 love one of its masters, and to hope that the 
 future would be better than the present, his 
 awkwardness passed for modesty, his unsociable 
 Badness for the grief of a virtuous son, his ob- 
 Btinacy for firmness, and on the report of some 
 opposition made to various acts of the Prince 
 of the Peace, people had been pleased to invest 
 him with the noblest and the most energetic 
 virtues. 
 
 In the course of 1807, a rumour was sud- 
 denly spread, that the health of the king was 
 declining, and that he was near his end. Ap- 
 pearances, in fact, were alarming. This king, 
 honest and blind, had no suspicion of the infa- 
 mous proceedings which, unknown to him, dis- 
 graced his reign. Endowed, nevertheless, with 
 a certain good sense, he was well aware that 
 there were misfortunes around him, for, in spite 
 of the pains taken to deceive him, the loss of 
 Trinidad, the disaster of Trafalgar, the paper 
 money substituted for specie, could not wear 
 the appearance of prosperity and greatness. 
 He laid the blame on circumstances, and felt 
 thoroughly convinced that, but for the Prince 
 of the Peace, things would have gone on worse. 
 In reality he was melancholy and ill. It was 
 believed that his death was at hand. The na- 
 tion, without any ill-will to him, regarded his 
 death as the end of its humiliations : the Prince 
 of the Asturias as the end of his slavery ; the 
 queen and Godoy as the end of their power. 
 As for these last, it was more than the end of a 
 usurped power it was a catastrophe ; for they 
 supposed that the Prince of the Asturias would 
 take his revenge, and they measured that re- 
 venge by their own sentiments. From this mo- 
 live it was that the Prince of the Peace had 
 
 attached such value to becoming Sovereign of 
 the Algarves. 
 
 Various means were successively devised by 
 the queen and by the favourite to secure them 
 from the dangers they anticipated. 
 
 They thought at first of seizing the Prince 
 of the Asturias, and forcing him to contract a 
 marriage, which would place him under their 
 influence. For the accomplishment of this de 
 sign, they cast their eyes on Dona Maria The- 
 resa de Bourbon, sister of Dona Maria Luisa, 
 Princess of the Peace. They thought that, in 
 marrying this infanta, Ferdinand, having be- 
 come brother-in-law of Emmanuel Godoy, would 
 be either reconciled or controlled. But to this 
 plan Ferdinand opposed invincible and even 
 offensive refusals. I, said he, become brother- 
 in-law of Emmanuel Godoy ! never ! that 
 would be a disgrace ! These refusals, expressed 
 in such language, redoubled the anxieties of the 
 queen and the favourite. They no longer thought 
 of fortifying themselves against the conse- 
 quences of the king's death, then supposed to be 
 much nearer than it was destined to be. The 
 Prince of the Peace was already generalissimo 
 of all the Spanish armies. He resolved, and 
 the queen warmly approved this resolution, to 
 give himself new powers, in order to unite by 
 degrees in his own hands all the prerogatives 
 of royalty, and, when he should consider him- 
 self strong enough, to exclude Ferdinand from 
 the throne. He intended to get him declared 
 incapable of reigning, the crown transferred to 
 a younger head, to bring about in this manner 
 the necessity of a regency, and to attribute that 
 regency to himself, which would insure to him 
 the continuance of the power that he had ex- 
 ercised for so many years. This plan once re- 
 solved upon, they began by completing the 
 nominal authority of the prince, for his real 
 authority had long been as entire as it could 
 be. They persuaded the king, that, thanks to 
 Emmanuel Godoy, the army was in a flourish- 
 ing state, but that the navy was not in a like 
 predicament ; that the latter needed to receive 
 the influence of that genius which upheld the 
 Spanish monarchy ; that to place it under the 
 direct authority of the Prince of the Peace 
 would render its reorganization certain, and 
 afford great satisfaction to the mighty Emperor 
 of the French, who complained incessantly of 
 the decline of the Spanish navy. Charles IV. 
 adopted this proposal with the joy which he 
 always felt in stripping himself of his authority 
 in favour of Emmanuel Godoy ; and the latter 
 was gratified by a royal decree with the title 
 of grand-admiral, a title which had bee*i borne 
 by the illustrious conqueror of Lepanto, Don 
 John of Austria, and more recently by Don 
 Philip, brother of Charles III. To this title, 
 which coriferred on Emmanuel Godoy the com- 
 mand of all the naval forces, besides the com- 
 mand of all the land forces, which he already 
 had, was added that of Most Serene Highness. 
 A council of admiralty composed of his own 
 creatures was formed about the prince for the 
 purpose of seconding him, and, notwithstanding 
 the public poverty, it was decided that a palace, 
 called the palace of the Admiralty, should be 
 erecte 1 for it in the finest quarter of Madrid. 
 Thus instead of any benefit, the navy beheld 
 only tne creation of new charges, tending solely 
 to aggravate its distress.
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 403 
 
 1\ was not enough to unite the command of 
 all the forces of the monarchy in the hands of 
 the Prince of the Peace ; it was proposed to 
 make him master of the palace, and, in some 
 sort, of the person of the king. It was insi- 
 nuated about the latter, that his unnatural son, 
 detached from his parents by the mischievous 
 influences of the house of Naples, and sur- 
 rounded by perfidious subjects, was more and 
 more to be feared every day ; that the spirit 
 of disorder peculiar to the age might perhaps 
 second his evil designs, and therefore it was 
 requisite that the powerful hand of Emmanuel 
 (so Charles IV. called him in his confiding 
 friendship) should extend over the royal dwell- 
 ing, to preserve it from all danger. In conse- 
 quence, the prince was further appointed colo- 
 nel-general of the king's military household. 
 From that moment he commanded in the pa- 
 lace itself, and was chief of all the troops com- 
 posing the royal guard. No sooner had he re- 
 ceived this new title, which completed his om- 
 nipotence, than he hastened to make reforms 
 in different corps of the guard. Besides two 
 regiments of foot, one called the Spanish 
 guards, the other called the Walloon guards, 
 which formed an effective force of 6000 men, 
 there was a regiment of cavalry, called the 
 royal carbineers, and further a corps of elite, 
 called the life-guards, divided into four compa- 
 nies, the Spanish, the Flemish, the Italian, and 
 the American, commemorating by those names 
 all the ancient dominions of Spain. On this 
 corps, the most enlightened of all, thanks to 
 the selection of the men of whom it was com- 
 posed, and a good judge of what was passing 
 in Spain, the Prince of the Peace could not 
 place entire reliance. He conceived the idea 
 of dissolving it, upon the pretext of putting an 
 end to all denominations which no longer cor- 
 responded with the reality of things, and to 
 compose out of it two companies only, desig- 
 nated by the titles of first and second. He 
 availed himself of this occasion to remove from 
 it all those men whom he distrusted, and in 
 particular many French emigrants, who had 
 sought an asylum with the Bourbons of Spain, 
 and who, devoted with body and soul to the 
 good Charles IV., were nevertheless, from their 
 better education, more capable than the others 
 of appreciating the unworthy administration 
 which dishonoured the monarchy. Emmanuel 
 Godoy, in excluding them, removed honest 
 men, whom he dreaded, and gave vent to his 
 hatred against France, which every instant be- 
 came more violent. 
 
 Emmanuel Godoy did not confine himself to 
 this measure. He created his brother a gran- 
 dee of Spain, and appointed him colonel of the 
 regiment of Spanish guards. Lastly, he chose 
 a guard for himself from among the royal car- 
 bineers. All these precautions taken, he caused 
 all the members of the council of Castille whom 
 he thought he could influence, to be sounded 
 one after another for the purpose of preparing 
 them for a change in the order of succession to 
 the throne. The councils of Castille and of the 
 Indies were two bodies which tempered the ab- 
 solute authority of the kings of Spain, as the 
 parliaments tempered that of the kings of 
 France. There was, however, a difference in 
 their attributions: for, besides a jurisdiction 
 of appeal from all the tribunals of the kingdom 
 
 which belonged to them, they had administra- 
 tive attributions, the council of Castille rela- 
 tive to the internal affairs of the kingdom, the 
 council of the Indies relative to the vast affairs 
 of the possessions beyond sea. In consequence 
 of an uninterrupted enjoyment of the royal 
 confidence for a century past, and the necessity 
 which all royalty is under of surrounding itself 
 with a certain public assent, no great affair of 
 the monarchy was resolved upon without con- 
 sulting the opinion of these two councils. The 
 Prince of the Peace, who had already intro- 
 duced into them a good number of his crea- 
 tures, was naturally desirous to insure their 
 concurrence in his criminal designs. But, en- 
 slaved as they were, they appeared by no means 
 inclined to countenance a change in the succes- 
 sion to the throne. Secret efforts, however, 
 to work upon them continued to be made, and 
 underhand influence was resorted to with the 
 colonels of the regiments. The language held 
 to both, represented that-the Prince of the Astu- 
 rias was at once incapable and wicked, and 
 that at the death of the king the monarchy 
 might be brought into peril by hands as mis- 
 chievous as they were unskilful. 
 
 The Prince of the Peace extended his in- 
 trigues far beyond the court of Spain. Though 
 he detested France on account of the severe 
 and annoying advice which he received from 
 that quarter, he knew that all power resided 
 in her, and that the plans to which he attached 
 his salvation would be chimerical unless they 
 had the support of Napoleon. He strove, there- 
 fore, to make sure of him by a thousand mean- 
 nesses, especially since the famous proclama- 
 tion, the recollection of which disturbed his 
 sleep. Having learned that Napoleon, who 
 liked to ride Spanish horses, had recently lost 
 in the war one of those which the King of Spain 
 had given him, he had offered him four, se- 
 lected from among the finest in the kingdom. 
 Having formed a false idea of the imperial 
 court, borrowed from the court of Madrid, he had 
 taken it into his head that certain persons were 
 worth the trouble of gaining, that Murat was 
 the first military man, that he possessed a great 
 ascendency over Napoleon : him, therefore he 
 thought of gaining. With this motive he had 
 commenced a secret correspondence with him, ' 
 
 There are in the Louvre specimens of this correspond- 
 ence, the communication of which Napoleon had procured, 
 either through Murat himself; or hy his own active vigi- 
 lance. These specimens furnish a singular idea of the 
 baseness of the Prince of the Peace. To make the reader 
 better acquainted with this personage, his character, and 
 his views, we quote the following letter, copied with all 
 the faults of language that it contains. He will thus be 
 enabled to judge the better of the kind -of education re- 
 ceived at that period by the persons composing the court 
 of Spain : 
 
 " To hit Imperial and Royal Highness Vie Cfrand-dutce of 
 Berg* 
 
 " The letter of your Imperial Highness dated Venice the 
 7th of December, is the greatest proof to me of the emi- 
 nent character which constitutes the heart of a great prince 
 like your Imperial Highness. I have never doubted the 
 virtues that characterize you, and never has my soul con- 
 ceived the base idea of mistrust. Yes, prince. I have vowed 
 to your Highness fidelity in the friendship with which you 
 honour me, and my correspondence will last as long as my 
 existence. 
 
 * As we have not discovered in this letter any peculiari- 
 ties of language worth mentioning, which might have 
 rendered an exact transcript of the original desirable, we 
 are content to furnish as close an English version of it M 
 we are able. Translator.
 
 404 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 reinforced by presents, and particularly one of 
 superb horses. The imprudent Murat on his 
 part, deeming it useful to form connections 
 wherever crowns might chance to become va- 
 cant, had taken pains to procure for himself in 
 the Peninsula a friend so powerful as the Prince 
 of the Peace. The crown of Portugal, which 
 seemed likely soon to be vacant, was not foreign 
 to this calculation. 
 
 The secret intrigues of the Prince of the 
 Peace for changing the succession to the throne, 
 secret as they were, did not fail to transpire at 
 Madrid, and added to an unexampled accumu- 
 lation of titles, they had roused minds. The 
 Prince of the Asturias, equally exasperated 
 and alarmed, had opened himself respecting 
 his situation to a few friends on whom he 
 thought that he could rely. The principal 
 were his former governor, the Duke de San 
 Carlos, grand-master of the king's household, 
 a very honest personage, having no other merit 
 but that of a courtier ; the Duke de 1'Infantado, 
 one of the hiehest nobles in Spain, a military 
 man not following his profession, having ambi- 
 tion, little talent, upright intentions, and en- 
 joying universal consideration; lastly, an eccle- 
 siastic, who had taught the prince the little he 
 knew, the canon Escoi'quiz, then banished to 
 Toledo, where he was a member of the archi- 
 cpiscopal chapter, a clerical bel-esprit, a man ex- 
 tremely conversant in literature, very little in 
 politics, tenderly attached to his pupil and 
 fondly loved by him, afflicted at the situation 
 to which he beheld him reduced, resolved to 
 extricate him from it by all the means in his 
 power, and, though very well intentioned, yet 
 sensible to the prospect which opened before 
 him of being some day the friend, the director 
 of the conscience, of the King of Spain. It 
 was in the society of these personages and of 
 a few ladies of the court attached to the de- 
 ceased Princess of the Asturias, that Ferdinand 
 poured forth the bitter sentiments with which 
 he was filled. The canon Escoi'quiz being ab- 
 sent, he was secretly sent for to Madrid, be- 
 cause, in the opinion of Ferdinand and his 
 little court, he was deemed the most capable of 
 
 " I wan very sorry to be obliged to keep from your Im- 
 perial Highness a secret which I was forced to do by the 
 word of my sovereign, signed in a treaty with his Imperial 
 and Royal Majesty. My gratitude to your Imperial High- 
 ness would have induced me to reveal it, if the Emperor 
 had not required it. But as I cannot help thinking that 
 your Imperial Highness must now be acquainted with it, 
 I cannot but unfold my sentiments to you. It is now that 
 I begin to enjoy the tranquillity afforded me by a treaty 
 which places me under the protection of the Emperor. I 
 could not want for any thing during the lifetime of my 
 king, since his majesty honours me with his most singular 
 esteem ; but if, unfortunately, he should die, then my ene- 
 mies would strive to disparage my services, and to destroy 
 my reputation. I have not a friend in the world besides 
 your Imperial Highness, and though I am persuaded that 
 your power would have saved me from affliction, I never- 
 theless considered that your efforts would not have been 
 fowerful enough to avert the first stroke of infamy. Your 
 mperial Highness sees, therefore, whether that wh : ch has 
 been agreed upon in the treaty is not to me of inestimable 
 value. On this account I venture to take the liberty of 
 expressing my gratitude to his Imperial and Royal Ma- 
 jesty in the letter herewith enclosed. I should have made 
 a point of acquitting myself earlier of this respectable 
 duty, if the expression of the treaty itself had not op- 
 posed it. 
 
 " I wait with the utmost impatience for the explanations 
 which your Imperial Highness shall be pleased to offer me 
 Immediately after your arrival in Paris : and since his Im- 
 perial and Royal Majesty has demonstrated that he should 
 ee with pleasure the king my master distinguish Marshal 
 Duroc with the Golden Fleece, I have the honour to accom- 
 
 giving good advice. As he possessed mor>; 
 learning than the others, understood Virgil and 
 Cicero, and was acquainted with the French 
 authors, a degree of science uncommon at the 
 court of Spain, it was conceived that in this 
 labyrinth of horrible intrigues he would best 
 direct the oppressed prince. On the arrival of 
 the canon from Toledo, it was agreed that, in 
 the serious danger which threatened him, the 
 prince had but one resource to throw himself 
 at the feet of Napoleon, to invoke his protec- 
 tion, and, to insure it more completely, to ask 
 for a princess of the Bonaparte family in mar- 
 riage. The canon Escoi'quiz saw the advan- 
 tages in such an alliance : the first, to secure 
 an all-powerful protector ; the second, to attain 
 the end which Napoleon must have had in view, 
 that of attaching Spain to his dynasty by close 
 and solid ties. This counsel was listened to, 
 though it was not to Ferdinand's taste. The 
 young prince, in fact, fostered at the bottom of 
 his heart some of the least commendable of 
 Spanish passions, and especially a bitter ha- 
 tred of foreign nations, .and above all of the 
 French revolution and its illustrious chief. 
 These passions, which were natural to him, 
 had been further fomented by his wife, the 
 Princess of Naples. However, full of confi- 
 dence in the superior understanding of the 
 canon Escoi'quiz, he adopted his advice and re- 
 solved to conform to it. The canon had tra- 
 velled ; and for France and for Napoleon he 
 entertained those sentiments which every en- 
 lightened Spaniard must feel. 
 
 But, if the Prince of the Peace had the means 
 of establishing relations of all kinds with the 
 court of France, the Prince of the Asturias, on 
 the contrary, banished to the Escurial, closely 
 and continually watched, had no means of 
 transmitting his thoughts and his wishes to 
 Napoleon. He and his friends resolved to 
 address themselves to the ambassador of 
 France, M. de Beauharnais. 
 
 M. de Beauharnais, brother of the first hus- 
 band of the Empress Josephine, had succeeded 
 General Beurnonville at Madrid in 1806. He 
 was a man of moderate understanding, an 
 
 pany it with this letter; and at the same time your Impe- 
 rial Highness will find another forwarded herewith, which 
 the Emperor will be pleased to give to the King of West- 
 phalia, in demonstration of the alliance which exists, in 
 fact, between his Catholic Majesty and all the sovereigns 
 of the family of his Imperial and Royal Majesty. 
 
 "The trial of the criminal seducers of the Prince of the 
 Asturias is prosecuted according to the dispositions of our 
 laws, because the king has been pleased to divest himself 
 of his sovereign authority, by which he could iiave tried 
 them alone, and left the judges at liberty to consult his 
 Majesty upon their sentence. They have all incurred the 
 penalty of being stripped of their dignities, and the two 
 most inculpated have deserved capital punishment; but 
 the queen has disposed the will of the king to clemency, 
 and the punishment of death will be commuted into per- 
 petual imprisonment; and as for the others, they are to 
 be banished from the kingdom. Care has been taken to 
 refrain from the slightest mention of subjects of his Im- 
 perial and Royal Majesty, out of regard for what he has 
 caused to be signified. 
 
 " I am very sorry that I am not able to write to your 
 Imperial Highness in your own language, but I will not 
 deprive myself of the satisfaction of addressing to you my 
 original letter with this literal translation. It is not pos- 
 sible to transcribe the language of the heart, but on mine 
 are imprinted the gratitude and admiration, with which 
 will ever have for your Imperial Highness, with the high- 
 est consideration, 
 
 " Your invariable servant, 
 
 " MANUEL. 
 
 "San Lorenzo, December 20tli, 1807."
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 405 
 
 awkward and parsim.-^ious ambassador, not 
 fit for the delicate business of his station, and 
 Btill less for making the figure which that sta- 
 tion requires ; endowed nevertheless with some 
 good sense and perfect integrity. To all this 
 he added a very ridiculous pride, arising from 
 the sense of his situation, because he had, as 
 we have just observed, the honour to be bro- 
 ther-in-law of the consort of his sovereign. 
 
 His gravity, his probity, his awkwardness, 
 ill accorded with the trickery and the levity 
 of the favourite, and he liked the latter as 
 little as he esteemed him. He transmitted to 
 Napoleon reports conformable to what he felt. 
 Hence he was considered at Madrid as an 
 enemy of the grand-admiral. These were 
 favourable circumstances for Ferdinand's con- 
 fidants. The canon Escoi'quiz undertook to 
 call on M. de Beauharnais ; and he obtained 
 access to him upon the pretext of presenting 
 
 l M. de Toreno and several historians, both French and 
 Spanish, have alleged that M. de Beauharnais had received 
 from Paris, or had taken upon himself, the commission to 
 enter into communication with the Prince of the Asturias, 
 either for the purpose of instilling into him the idea of 
 marrying a French princess, or of dividing the royal family 
 of Spain, and thus securing the means of sowing dissen- 
 sions in it of which advantage was afterwards taken. This 
 is a complete error, as is proved hy the official and the 
 secret correspondence of M. de Beauharnais. In this 
 double correspondence the ambassador relates how the 
 agents of the Prince of the Asturias came to him, and from 
 his account, perfectly sincere, for he was incapable of 
 lying, it evidently results that this intercourse originated 
 with the Prince of the Asturias, and not with the French 
 legation. We shall presently quote two papers, which 
 perfectly clear up this point. The first is a despatch from 
 M. de Champagny, in which that minister, in reply to a 
 letter of M. de Beauharnais, full of reserve, enjoins him, 
 in very sharp language, to express himself more clearly. 
 This first despatch proves positively that it was not Napo- 
 leon who had the idea of interfering with the interior of 
 the royal family of Spain, and that, on the contrary, ap- 
 plication was made to him. The second is the very letter 
 of Prince Ferdinand to M. de Beauharnais, in which that 
 prince had enclosed the proposal of marriage addressed to 
 Napoleon. The proposal of marriage has been published ; 
 fcut the letter in which it was enclosed was never known 
 or published. The mere perusal of this second paper will 
 prove that neither M. de Beauharnais nor his government 
 commenced the intercourse with the Prince of the Astu- 
 rias. From the tone of this letter, it is easy to perceive 
 that the prince sought those to whom he addresses him- 
 Belf. and was not sought by them. 
 
 Here is the despatch of M. de Champagny to M. de 
 Beauharnais : 
 
 "Paris, 9th September, 1807. 
 
 " Monsieur 1'Ambassadeur, I have received your con- 
 fidential letter, and lose no time in replying to it. without 
 admitting an intermediary between you and me. All the 
 means that you deem it proper to employ in order to make 
 me acquainted either with the persons with whom you are 
 likely to have to treat, or with the state of the affairs which 
 you have to conduct, will appear very good to me, if they 
 shall tend to throw upon them more light, and in a surer 
 manner. You need not have any fears about the use 
 which I shall make of your letters. Any communication 
 through the offices, (bureaux,) whenever it does take place, 
 will always be without danger : they deserve the utmost 
 confidence, and, for several years past, they have been 
 guardians of the greatest interests of the government and 
 depositories of its most important secrets. Besides, it is 
 one of the first duties of every minister to a foreign court 
 to inform his government, without restriction and with- 
 out reserve, of all that he sees, of all that he hears, of all 
 that comes to his knowledge. Placed for the purpose of 
 seeing and hearing, furnished with all the means of gain- 
 ing information, what he learns does not belong to him- 
 self, it is the property of him whose representative he is. 
 You know this duty better than any one, and it is no 
 doubt in order to fulfil it in its whole extent that you wish 
 to multiply these means of communication with me : I am 
 fer from objecting to that. 
 
 "Your confidential letter contains very important 
 things, so important that it is to be regretted that you 
 have not represented them in greater detail, and in parti- 
 cular that you have not stated how they have come to you. 
 Such VKU the -'flection of the Emperor when I had the 
 
 him with a poem which he had composed on 
 the conquest of Mexico. The canon proceeded 
 by degrees to more intimate communications, 
 opened himself entirely to the ambassador of 
 France, made him acquainted with the situation 
 of the prince, with his dangers, with his wishes, 
 and with the desire which he had conceived 
 of obtaining a wife from, the hand of Napoleon, 
 being determined not on any account to have 
 the one destined for him by Emmanuel Godoy. 1 
 M. de Beauharnais was much too new in the 
 profession in which he was engaged not to be 
 alarmed at so delicate a position, for the over- 
 ture involved his assenting to a clandestine 
 intercourse with the heir to the crown. He 
 was fearful of being deceived by intriguers and 
 compromised with the court of Spain. He re- 
 fused at first to believe the canon Escoi'quiz, 
 and received his overtures with a coolness 
 capable of discouraging men less determined 
 
 honour of conversing with him on the subject. What have 
 been your relations with the young prince of whom you 
 speak f What are the positive reasons which you have for 
 judging of him in a certain manner? He. implores, you 
 say, on his knees, the protection of the Emperor : how do you 
 knt/w this f Has he told you so himself f or by whom has he 
 desired that you should be told it? These questions are 
 asked you by the Emperor, and it is he who has made the 
 reflection which I mentioned above, that a minister ought 
 to have no secrets from his government. CHAMPAGNY." 
 
 Here follows the letter of Prince Ferdinand to M. do 
 Beauharnais : 
 
 " You will permit me, monsieur 1'ambassadeur, to ex- 
 press to you all my gratitude for all the proofs of esteem 
 and affection which you have given me in the secret and 
 indirect correspondence that we have had hitherto through the 
 person whom you know, and who has all my confidence, 1 
 owe, in short, to your kindness, which I shall never forget, 
 the happiness of being able to express directly, and witliout 
 risk, to the great Emperor your master, the sentiments so 
 long retained in my heart. I avail myself therefore of this 
 happy moment to address by your hands to his Imperial and 
 Royal Majesty the accompanying letter, and, fearful of an- 
 noying him by misplaced prolixity, I, as yet, only half 
 express the esteem, respect, and affection, which I feel for 
 his august person ; and I request you, monsieur 1'ambas- 
 sadeur, to make amends for this in the letters which you 
 will have the honour to write to him. 
 
 " You will likewise do me the favour to add to his Im- 
 perial and Royal Majesty, that I conjure him to excuse 
 any faults against usage and style which there may be in 
 my said letter, as well on account of my being a foreigner, 
 as in consideration of the anxiety and restraint under 
 which I am obliged to write it, being, as you know, beset 
 even in my chamber with spies, who watch me, and forced to 
 avail myself for this purpose of the few moments that lean 
 steal from their malicious eyes. As I fatter myself that 1 
 shall obtain in this affair the protection of his Imperial and 
 Knyal Majesty, and that in consequence the communications 
 will become more necessary and more frequent, I charge th 
 said person who has hitherto had this commission to take his 
 measures in concert with you for conducting it safely, as hr. 
 has thus far had no warrant fur the said commission but 
 the tokens agreed upon ; being thoroughly assured of hit 
 integrity, his discretion, and his prudence, I (five him by thit 
 letter my full and absolute powers for negotiating this affair 
 till its conclusion, and I ratify all that he shall say or do 
 on this point in my name, as if I had said and done it 
 myself, which you will have the goodness to communicate 
 to his Imperial Majesty with the most sincere expressions 
 of my gratitude. 
 
 " You will also have the goodness to tell him that, if his 
 Imperial Majesty should happen to deem it useful, at what- 
 ever time it might be, for me to send to his court with suitable 
 secrecy some confidential person, to give him more complett 
 information concerning my situation than can be given in 
 writing, or for any other purpose that his wisdom may judge 
 necessary, his Imperial Majesty has but to send you word to 
 be instantly obeyed, as he shall be in every thing that shall 
 depend on me. 
 
 " I repeat, sir, the assurances of my esteem and grati- 
 tude. I request you to preserve this letter as a testimony 
 of the perpetuity of my sentiments, and I pray God i 
 have you in his holy keeping. 
 
 " Written and signed by my own hand, and sealed with 
 my seal. 
 
 " The Escurial, llth of October, 1807. FERDISAJTP "
 
 406 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Oct. 1807. 
 
 to make themselves listened to and understood. 
 But the canon devised a singular method of 
 obtaining credit : this was to establish an ex- 
 change of signs between the prince and M. de 
 Beauharnais in the visits which the latter 
 made to the Escurial for the purpose of paying 
 his respects to the court. These signs, agreed 
 upon beforehand, could not leave any doubt 
 respecting the secret mission which the canon 
 Escoiquiz alleged that he had received from 
 Ferdinand. In fact, M. de Beauharnais, on 
 his first visit to the Escurial, observed the 
 prince attentively, perceived the preconcerted 
 signs, was, moreover, on his own part the 
 object of the most marked attentions, and 
 could no longer feel any uncertainty respecting 
 the mission of the canon Escoiquiz. When he 
 was satisfied on this point, he still deferred 
 listening to him till he should be authorized 
 by his court to enter upon business of that 
 kind. He then sent to Paris a mysterious 
 despatch, saying that an innocent son, cruelly 
 treated by his father and his mother, solicited 
 the support of Napoleon, and desired to become 
 his grateful and devoted protege. Napoleon, 
 angry at this ridiculous mystery, ordered M. 
 de Beauharnais to be enjoined to make him- 
 self more clear and intelligible. The latter 
 obeyed, and related all that had passed. He 
 gave a detailed account of it in a secret cor- 
 respondence, which exhibited alike his awk- 
 wardness and his sincerity, and which neither 
 was to be, nor was, deposited in the office for 
 foreign affairs. He was told in reply that he 
 must hear every thing, promise nothing more 
 than a friendly interest for the misfortunes of 
 the prince, and, as for the proposal of mar- 
 riage, to declare that the overture was too 
 vague to be taken into consideration, and to be 
 followed either by assent or refusal. 
 
 Commenced in July, 1807, this intercourse 
 was continued in August and September, with 
 the same fear of committing himself on the 
 part of M. Beauharnais, and the same desire 
 to be accepted on the part of Ferdinand. That 
 prince at length determined to have two letters 
 delivered by the canon Escoiquiz, one for the 
 ambassador, the other for Napoleon himself, 
 in which deploring his wretched situation and 
 the dangers with which he was threatened, he 
 formally solicited the protection of France, and 
 the hand of a princess of the Bonaparte family. 
 These two letters, dated the llth of October, 
 were not despatched till the 20th, in conse- 
 quence of the pains taken by M. de Beau- 
 harnais to procure a safe messenger, and did 
 not arrive before the 27th or 28th, when other 
 tidings not less important, the subject of which 
 we are about to state, reached Paris. 
 
 While Ferdinand was applying to Napoleon, 
 not knowing whether the French protection 
 would be prompt enough, or signified strongly 
 enough, to save him, he had resolved to take 
 at the same time his precautions at Madrid 
 itself. In accord with his friends, he con- 
 ceived the idea of making an appeal to his 
 father, in order to open his eyes, denouncing 
 *he crimes of the Prince of the Peace, the com- 
 plicity of the queen, and, if not her adulterous 
 connection with the favourite, at least her 
 abject submission to the will of that ruler of 
 the royal household ; lastly, beseeching him to 
 put an end to the scandals, to the calamities 
 
 which desolated Spain, and to the danger* 
 which threatened an unfortunate son. Fer 
 dinand was to deliver to the king a paper con- 
 taining these revelations, with a request that, 
 after reading, he would return it to him, for an 
 indiscretion might endanger his life. The 
 minute of this paper was in the handwriting 
 of the canon Escoiquiz. Independently of this 
 proceeding, the authors of the plan had con- 
 ceived the further idea, in case the king should 
 die suddenly, to give to the Duke de 1'Infantado 
 powers signed beforehand by Ferdinand, by 
 virtue of which the duke should have the mili- 
 tary command of Madrid and New Castille, 
 that he might be enabled to resist by force of 
 arms, if necessary, any attempt of the Prince 
 of the Peace. Such were the means prepared 
 by this coterie to guard against any design of 
 usurpation, whether real or imaginary ; and 
 assuredly these means showed neither great 
 depth of understanding, nor great boldness of 
 character. But, during these proceedings of 
 the prince and his friends, spies posted about 
 them had observed unusual goings and comings. 
 They had seen Ferdinand himself writing seve- 
 ral times, which it was not customary for him 
 to do, and they had heard him, in his exaspe- 
 ration against his mother and the favourite, 
 use expressions of extreme bitterness. The 
 entry of the French troops into Spain, a sub- 
 ject of endless conjectures, had also given oc- 
 casion for very inconsiderate language on the 
 part of the prince and his friends. The latter 
 already looked upon themselves as certain of 
 the protection of France, and liked to boast of 
 it : though they had long made it a crime in 
 Emmanuel Godoy to seek it, and to pay for it 
 with a blind submission, they took pleasure in 
 insinuating, nay, sometimes in saying plainly, 
 that it was not for nothing that the French 
 armies were crossing the Pyrenees, and that 
 the contemptible government which oppressed 
 Spain would not be long in discovering this ; 
 which was unfortunately more true than they 
 themselves imagined, and than they soon had 
 occasion to wish. 
 
 Among the persons commissioned to watch 
 Ferdinand, one (it is said that she was a lady 
 of the court) having either been intrusted with 
 the prince's secrets, or having cast an indis- 
 creet eye over his papers, revealed all to the 
 queen. The latter, on learning these particu- 
 lars, was seized with a violent paroxysm of 
 rage. The Prince of the Peace was not at 
 that moment at the Escurial, distant about a 
 dozen leagues from Madrid. He was accus- 
 tomed to pass a week alternately at the Es- 
 curial and Madrid. He was ill, it was said, 
 in consequence of his debaucheries. He was 
 sent for secretly, and left his palace by a pri- 
 vate door,, desiring on this occasion that his 
 presence at the Escurial should not be known, 
 and to prevent all idea that he could be the 
 instigator of the scenes which were preparing. 
 The queen, more exasperated than he, strove 
 to persuade the king that the circumstances de- 
 nounced proved nothing less than an extensive 
 conspiracy against his throne and life, insisted 
 that it was necessary to act immediately with- 
 out fear of publicity now become inevitable, to 
 fall unawares upon the apartments of the prince, 
 and to seize his papers before he had time to 
 destroy them. The weak Charles IV., incapa
 
 
 Oct. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 107 
 
 ble of perceiving how far he was involving him- 
 self by such a step, consented to all that was : 
 desired of him, and that same evening, the 27th : 
 of October, the day on which the treaty was 
 signed at Fontainebleau, permitted his son's 
 apartments to be violated and his papers seized. 
 The prince, who, excepting a little shrewdness, 
 had neither understanding nor courage, was 
 thunderstruck, and delivered without resistance 
 all that he had. The papers which we have 
 just mentioned, mixed with others more insig- 
 nificant, were carried to the queen, who deter- 
 mined to examine them herself. One may con- 
 ceive the rage of that princess on reading the 
 paper in which all the turpitudes of the favour- 
 ite were denounced, and her own at least hinted 
 at. Imbecile and enslaved as was the unfortu- 
 nate Charles IV., this paper would not have 
 been sufficient to persuade him that his son 
 meditated a crime, and it might perhaps, 
 by opening his eyes, have attained the end 
 proposed by the canon Escoi'quiz and Fer- 
 dinand. But, unluckily, there were other pa- 
 pers, such as a cipher destined for a mysterious 
 correspondence, and the order appointing the 
 Duke de 1'Infantado commandant of New Cas- 
 tille, in which a blank had been left for the date 
 to be inserted at the moment of the king's death. 
 These last papers were sufficient for the queen 
 to found all imaginable suppositions upon, in 
 order to deceive the unfortunate Charles IV., 
 in order to deceive herself. After perusing 
 these papers, unable to repress her passion, 
 she said, perhaps she believed, that they fur- 
 nished proofs of a conspiracy tending to de- 
 throne her and her husband, to threaten even 
 their lives ; or why that cipher, if not to cor- 
 respond with conspirators ? why that appoint- 
 ment of a military commandant by Ferdinand, 
 who was not yet king, if not to consummate a 
 criminal usurpation ? This demonstration laid 
 before poor Charles IV., with no other proofs 
 than many outbursts of rage, filled him with 
 affliction. He shed tears of sorrow over a son 
 whom he still loved, and whom he was grieved 
 to find so culpable. He then thanked Heaven 
 for saving his life, his throne, his wife, and his 
 friend Emmanuel, from so great a danger. The 
 queen, excited by the vehemence natural to the 
 sex, to take an initiative in all this convenient 
 for the favourite the queen declared that the 
 case demanded a prompt, an energetic repres- 
 sion, which should satisfy the outraged majesty 
 of the throne and secure the State from the 
 repetition of such plots. It was therefore re- 
 solved that the prince and his accomplices 
 should be arrested that very instant, that the 
 ministers and the prinicipal personages of the 
 State should then be summoned, that the dis- 
 covery just made should be communicated to 
 them, with the royal resolution to institute a 
 criminal process against the culprits. This was 
 an abominable and a senseless resolution, for, 
 after such a clamour, it was imperative to pro- 
 secute the prince to the utmost, to convict him 
 of the crime, were he innocent, to deprive him 
 of his rights to the throne and thus to give that 
 throne, suspended on the brink of an abyss, 
 such a shock as might, and .actually did, preci- 
 pitate it into that abyss. But to prosecute the 
 prince, to get him condemned by sold judges, 
 to deprive him of the crown, was precisely 
 what that infuriated queen aimed at, whatever 
 
 the peril incurred by it. All that she wished 
 for was accomplished. Godoy was sent back 
 to Madrid, to induce a belief that he had never 
 left it, and that he had no hand in the tragic, 
 scenes at the Escurial. The king went to Fer- 
 dinand, demanded his sword, and constituted 
 him prisoner in his own apartments. Couriers 
 were then despatched in all directions, to give 
 orders for the apprehension of the alleged ac- 
 complices of the prince. The ministers and 
 the members of the councils were convoked, 
 and, with consternation in their countenances, 
 received the communication of all that had been 
 decided upon. They gave their silent assent, 
 not from zeal, but from timidity. 
 
 It was not possible, after such scandal, to 
 conceal from the Spanish nation the deplorable 
 events of which the Escurial had just been the 
 theatre. In enslaved countries, where all pub- 
 licity is prohibited, important news circulates 
 not the less speedily, nor the less completely. 
 It flies from mouth to mouth, propagated by an 
 ardent curiosity, and exaggerated by a credu- 
 lity that is not undeceived. The scenes pass- 
 ing at the Escurial were already known to all 
 Madrid, and would soon be known to all Spain. 
 Still, to publish officially the alleged discovery 
 of the plot, would be denouncing the prince to 
 the nation and rendering the misfortunes of 
 the throne irreparable. But the queen and the 
 favourite would have it so. In consequence, 
 they required an act of publicity, and, in a 
 country where there was no such thing but for 
 the most important events, such as a birth, 
 the death of a king, a declaration of war, a 
 signature of peace, a great victory, a great 
 defeat, the following royal decree was commu- 
 nicated to all the authorities of the kingdom : 
 
 " God, who watches over his creatures, does 
 not permit the consummation of atrocious 
 deeds when the victims are innocent; ac- 
 cordingly, his omnipotence has preserved me 
 from the most terrible catastrophe. All my 
 subjects are perfectly acquainted with my reli- 
 gious sentiments and the regularity of my mo- 
 rals ; all love me, and I receive from all proofs 
 of the veneration due to a father who loves his 
 children. I was living in the persuasion of 
 this truth, when an unknown hand came to re- 
 veal to me the most monstrous and unheard of 
 plan framed against me in my own palace. My 
 own life, so often threatened, had become an 
 encumbrance to my successor, who, infatu- 
 ated, blinded, and abjuring all the principles 
 of the Christian faith, taught him through my 
 care and my paternal affection, had entered 
 into a conspiracy for dethroning me. I there- 
 fore resolved to ascertain myself the truth of 
 the fact, and surprising my son in his own 
 apartments, I found in his possession the 
 cipher used for his communications with the 
 villains and the instructions which he received 
 from them. I summoned the governor ad in- 
 terim of the council to examine these papers in 
 concert with the other ministers ; they applied 
 themselves assiduously to all the necessary 
 investigations. Every thing was done, and the 
 result was the discovery of several culprits ; I 
 decreed that they should be apprehended, and 
 my son was under arrest in his own habitation. 
 This sorrow was wanting to all those which 
 afflict me ; it is likewise that which it is most 
 important to make its author expiate ; and, in the
 
 408 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 mean time, till I order the publication of the 
 result of the proceedings commenced, I will not 
 neglect to manifest to my subjects my affliction, 
 which the proofs of their loyalty will have the 
 effect of diminishing. You will consider this 
 as understood, to the end that the knowledge 
 of it may be diffused in the suitable form. 
 
 "San Lorenzo, (the Escurial,) 30th October, 1807. 
 "To the Governor ad interim of the Council." 
 
 In this court, where one durst not do any 
 thing without referring to Paris, where the op- 
 pressed son, the involuntarily oppressing fa- 
 ther, the favourite, the persecutor of both, 
 sought in Napoleon a support under their mis- 
 fortune, their silliness, or their crime, it was 
 not possible to commit such deplorable extra- 
 vagances without writing to him on the sub- 
 ject. In consequence, on the very day pre- 
 vious to the official act just quoted, a letter to 
 Napoleon was dictated to the unhappy Charles 
 IV. full of a ridiculous sorrow, destitute of 
 dignity, in which he said that he was betrayed 
 by his son, and threatened in his person and 
 his power, and announced nothing less than a 
 determination to change the order of the suc- 
 cession to the throne. 1 
 
 Napoleon, as we have seen above, had not 
 received the letter of the llth of October, in 
 which Ferdinand solicits his protection and a 
 wife, till the 28th of the same month. He re- 
 ceived successively, on the 5th, 6th, and 7th 
 of November, those of his ambassador and of 
 Charles IV., which informed him of the scandal 
 which the sovereigns of the Escurial had not 
 been afraid to occasion. He was therefore 
 obliged in some measure to interfere in the 
 affairs of Spain, whether he would or not, and 
 iertainly much earlier than he had expected or 
 wished to do so. For some time past, as we 
 Vave already related, he said to himself, that 
 it was dangerous to leave Bourbons on a throne 
 At once so lofty and so near a neighbour ; and 
 that he must, besides, relinquish all hope of 
 deriving any useful service from Spain, while it 
 should continue in the hands of a degenerate 
 face. He knew not what pretext to use for 
 striking the prostrate slaves at his feet, de- 
 testing him, well disposed to betray him, try- 
 ing sometimes to do so, then disavowing with 
 humility the treacheries in which they had 
 scarcely engaged. Neither did he disguise 
 from himself the danger, in dethroning the 
 Spanish dynasty, of galling an ardent, un- 
 tractable nation, desirous of changes, incapa- 
 ble of effecting them itself, and ready to revolt 
 against the foreign hand that should attempt 
 to effect them for it. He delayed, therefore, 
 
 being in no hurry, nor yet decided what course 
 to pursue ; witness the treaty of Fontaine- 
 bleau, which contained nothing but adjourn- 
 ments. But a son applying to him for a wife 
 and his protection, a father denouncing that 
 son to him as a criminal, offered, one might 
 say forced upon him, an occasion for interfering 
 immediately in the affairs of Spain ; and still, 
 full of doubts and anxieties, desiring, dread- 
 ing what he was about to undertake, under- 
 taking it from a sort of fatal impulsion, he gave 
 hasty orders, signs of a strongly excited mind. 
 
 Hitherto the only object of the movements 
 of troops prescribed by him had been Portu- 
 
 l. 2 But from this moment the preparations 
 received an extent and an acceleration, which 
 could not leave any uncertainty respecting 
 their object. He had composed General Ju- 
 not's army, destined to take possession of Por- 
 tugal, with the three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, 
 and Napoleon ; General Dupont's army of re- 
 serve (known by the name of second corps of 
 the Gironde) with the first, second, and third 
 battalions of five legions of reserve and some 
 Swiss battalions. These two armies, the one 
 already in Spain, the other on march for Bay- 
 onne, formed an effective of about 50,000 men. 
 These would not be enough, if serious events 
 should take place in the Peninsula ; for the 
 second only of these armies could be employed 
 in Spain. Napoleon hastened its march to- 
 ward Bayonne, ordered General Dupont to go 
 immediately and put himself at its head, and 
 resolved to compose a third, which borrowed 
 its title from the specious necessity for watch- 
 ing the coasts of the Ocean, deprived of the 
 troops which had been employed in guarding 
 them. He called this third army Corps of Ob- 
 servation of the Coasts of the Ocean, and gave 
 the command of it to Marshal Moncey, who 
 had formerly served in Spain, and resolved 
 that it should be about 84,000 strong. In 
 order to compose it, he drafted from the depots 
 of the regiments of the grand army stationed 
 along the Rhine from Basle to Wesel. These 
 depots, which had received several conscrip- 
 tions, and had no further detachments to send 
 to the grand army, were full of young soldiers, 
 whose training had already commenced, and 
 with some of them was nearly finished. For a 
 corps of observation, whether in France or in 
 Spain, Napoleon thought these young soldiers 
 quite sufficient. He gave orders, therefore, for 
 drafting from the 48 depots stationed on the 
 Rhine, 48 provisional battalions, composed of 
 four companies, of 150 men each, being 600 
 men per battalion, making a total of 28,000 
 infantry. He ordered four of these battalions 
 
 I subjoin the very text of that letter. 
 
 Letter of King diaries IV. to the Emperor Napoleon. 
 "Sir, my brother, at the moment when I was wholly 
 occ-ipied with the means of co-operating in the destruc- 
 tion of our common enemy, when I believed that all the 
 plots of the ci-devant Queen of Naples were buried with 
 her daughter, I see. with a horror which makes me shud- 
 der, that the spirit of intrigue has penetrated into the 
 very bosom of my palace. Alas ! my heart bleeds in giv- 
 ing an account of so frightful a deed. My eldest son, heir 
 resumptive to my throne, had formed a horrible plot to 
 ethrone me : he had gone to such an excessive length as 
 to engage in an attempt against the life of his mother. 
 Such an atrocious crime ought to be punished with the 
 most exemplary severity of the law. The law which 
 called him to the succession must be revoked ; one of his 
 brothers will be more worthy to take his place both in 
 
 my heart and on the throne. I am at this moment in 
 search of his-accomplices, in order to investigate thoroughly 
 this plan of the blackest villany, and I will not lose a sin- 
 gle moment in making your Imperial and Royal Majesty 
 acquainted with it; beseeching you to assist me with your 
 understanding and your counsels. 
 
 " Whereupon I pray God, my good brother, to have your 
 Imperial and Koyal Majesty in his holy keeping. 
 
 " CHARLM. 
 
 "Saint Laurent, 29th October, 1807." 
 
 o The repeated perusal of his most secret corre.pondenee 
 has proved to me that, till the .events at the Escurial, ha 
 thought of Portugal only, and that after those events he 
 thought solely of Spain. The dates of his orders, com- 
 pared with the dates of the news from Madrid, cannot 
 leave a doubt concerning their correlation, and > -ove 
 that the one were the certain consequence of the oth--'*.
 
 Nov. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 409 
 
 to be united and to form a regiment, two regi- 
 ments to form a brigade, two brigades a divi- 
 sion, and the entire corps to form three divi- 
 sions, under Generals Musnier, Gobert, and 
 Morlot. The points where they were to be or- 
 ganized were Metz, Sedan, Nancy. These 
 troops were to have the organization of provi- 
 sional corps, each battalion being still depend- 
 ent on the regiment from which it was de- 
 tached. Napoleon gave orders for attaching 
 to each division a battery of foot artillery, for 
 forming at Besanson and La Fere three other 
 batteries of horse artillery, which would make 
 the whole artillery of the corps amount to 36 
 pieces. General Mouton had orders to proceed 
 to Metz, Nancy, and Sedan, to superintend the 
 execution of these measures. The four bri- 
 gades of cavalry, of provisional formation also, 
 assembled at Compiegne, Chartres, Orleans, 
 and Tours, were distributed between the two 
 corps of Generals Moncey and Dupont. The 
 cuirassiers and the chasseurs were attached to 
 that of General Dupont, the dragoons and the 
 hussars to that of Marshal Moncey. The army 
 of General Junot being sufficient for the occu- 
 pation of Portugal, there would consequently 
 be left to meet events in Spain the corps of 
 General Dupont, entitled Second of the Gironde, 
 and the corps of Marshal Moncey, entitled 
 Corps of Observation of the Coasts of the 
 Ocean, forming between those two alone about 
 60,000 men. Lastly, the news from Madrid 
 growing worse from day to day, Napoleon pre- 
 scribed, as he had before done, the establish- 
 ment of relays of carts from Metz, Nancy, and 
 Sedan, to Bordeaux, that his troops might 
 travel post. To encourage them to endure 
 fatigue, and also to conceal his object, he di- 
 rected the soldiers to be told that they were 
 going to the relief of their brethren in Portu- 
 gal, threatened by the landing of an English 
 army. 
 
 Napoleon made a retrograde movement of 
 his veteran soldiers towards the Rhine coin- 
 cide with this movement of his conscripts 
 towards Spain. All the countries beyond the 
 Vistula were evacuated. Marshal Davout, who, 
 with the Poles, the Saxons, his third corps, 
 and part of the dragoons, had remained in 
 Poland, beyond the Vistula, and formed the 
 first command, fell back between the Vistula 
 and the Oder, occupying Thorn, Warsaw, and 
 Posen, his cavalry upon the Oder itself. 
 Poland, strongly recommended to Napoleon 
 by the King of Saxony, thus obtained a con- 
 siderable relief. Marshal Soult, who formed 
 the second command, received orders to evacu- 
 ate Old Prussia, and to fall back upon Prussian 
 and Swedish Pomerania, his cavalry alone 
 continuing to live in the island of Nogat. On 
 the right of the Vistula there were left only 
 Oudinot's grenadiers at Dantzig. The first 
 corps, transferred to Marshal Victor, con- 
 tinued to occupy Berlin, with the heavy ca- 
 valry in rear, on the banks of the Elbe. Mar- 
 shal Mortier, with the fifth and sixth corps 
 and two divisions of dragoons, was left in 
 Upper and Lower Silesia. The Prince of 
 Ponte Corvo, commanding alone the shores 
 of the Baltic, since the reduction of Stralsund 
 and the dissolution of the corps of Marshal 
 Brune, was to occupy Lubeck with Dupas' 
 division, Liinenburg with Boudet's division, 
 
 VOL. II. 52 
 
 Hamburg with the Spaniards, Bremen with 
 the Dutch. All the surplus cavalry not com- 
 prehended in these different commands was 
 sent into Hanover. The Bavarians, the Wiir- 
 tembergers, the Baden troops, the Hessians, 
 and the Italians, were authorized to return 
 home. The heavy siege artillery, the stores 
 of clothing, shoes, arms, made at a high price 
 in Poland and Germany, were despatched to 
 Magdeburg. The imperial guard, to the num- 
 ber of 12,000 men, hastened to march towards 
 Paris. 
 
 Napoleon, in prescribing these movements, 
 had the twofold intention of relieving the 
 north of Europe from its burden, and of bring- 
 ing back a few regiments of old troops to 
 France. Independently of the guard which 
 would soon arrive, he ordered the return of a 
 certain portion of the foot artillery, and many 
 skeletons of dragoons. With his usual dex- 
 terity, he managed this business so that there 
 should result from this change, instead of a 
 dissolution, a better organization of these 
 corps cTarmee. 
 
 The corps of Lannes, composed of Oudinot's 
 grenadiers, had at first been left at Dantzig. 
 There were grenadiers sufficient for Dantzig, 
 both as a defence and as a burden. Napoleon 
 pronounced the dissolution of Verdier's divi- 
 sion, composed of four fine regiments of in- 
 fantry. Two of these regiments, the 2d and 
 12th light, forming part of the garrison of 
 Paris, were recalled to that capital. The two 
 others, the 72d and the 3d of the line, were 
 attached to St. Hilaire's division, to com- 
 pensate it for three regiments, the 43d, 55th, 
 and 14th of the line, which were taken from it 
 because they had their depot at the camp 
 of Boulogne and at Sedan. This division 
 still comprised five regiments, a number which 
 Napoleon would not exceed. Morand's divi- 
 sion, having six regiments, was diminished 
 by the 51st. Dupas' division, which, with 
 the Saxons and Poles, composed Mortier's 
 corps at Friedland, now dissolved, formed only 
 a temporary assemblage, and bore heavily on 
 the city of Lubeck. Napoleon took from it 
 the 4th light, which belonged to the garrison 
 of Paris, and the 15th of the line, which 
 belonged to Brest. Lastly, the 44th of the 
 line, left in garrison at Dantzig to rest itself 
 there after the disaster of Eylau, being no 
 longer necessary in that city, was recalled. 
 The 7th of the line, having become disposable 
 by the evacuation of Braunau, was likewise 
 recalled. The artillery of Verdier's dissolved 
 division joined the corps returning to France. 
 In the North the arm of the dragoons was 
 more numerous than it needed 'to be. The 
 third squadrons of the 1st, 3d, 5th, 9th, 10th, 
 loth, 4th regiments, after turning over all 
 their men to the first two squadrons, wert 
 likewise to return to France. 
 
 Thus, without disorganizing his corps, by 
 restoring them to more uniform proportions, 
 and breaking only temporary aggregations, 
 Napoleon contrived to create means for bring- 
 ing ten fine regiments of infantry, belonging 
 almost all either to Paris or to the camps on 
 the coasts ; which was an additional congruity, 
 for these regiments, being those which had 
 contributed most to the corps of Portugal an., 
 the Gironde, wero thus brought near to their 
 2M
 
 410 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 detachments. That profound art of disposing 
 troops is perhaps the loftiest part of the 
 science of war. It is necessary for every go- 
 vernment, even though pacific, by title of good 
 administration. The grand army in the North 
 was still about 300,000 French, exclusive of 
 the Poles and Saxons left in Poland, and 
 the Bavarians and Wiirtembergers, the Baden- 
 ers, the Hessians, and the Italians, marching 
 to their own countries, but not disbanded, and 
 ready to return at the first call. Adding to 
 the grand army the armies of Upper Italy, 
 Dalmatia, Naples, the Ionian Islands, Spain, 
 and the interior, Napoleon had then 800,000 
 French troops, and at least 150,000 allied 
 troops, 1 a colossal, an alarming force, if we 
 moreover consider that the greater- part of it 
 was composed of veteran soldiers, that the 
 conscripts themselves were introduced into old 
 skeletons, that all of them were commanded 
 by the most experienced, the ablest officers 
 that war has ever produced ; and, lastly, that 
 these marched under the orders of the greatest 
 captains. 
 
 After he had withdrawn his old troops from 
 the Rhine, and pushed his young soldiers to- 
 wards the Pyrenees, Napoleon, full of an eager 
 curiosity, waited impatiently for tidings from 
 Madrid, which, he conceived, must follow in 
 rapid succession, in consequence of so flagrant 
 a step as the arrest of the presumptive heir to 
 the crown. Having come to no fixed resolu- 
 tion, hoping for that event which should be 
 most conformable to his wishes, not relying in 
 the least on the intelligence of M. de Beau- 
 harnais, though he had full reliance on his in- 
 tegrity, he gave him no other instruction than 
 to observe all that passed, and report it to Pa- 
 ris with all possible despatch. 
 
 It is by successive shocks that great revolu- 
 tions develop themselves, and always with 
 longer intervals between them than human im- 
 patience would wish for. Such was the case 
 at this time in Spain. Events did not follow 
 one another so rapidly as had been at first ex- 
 pected. 
 
 The Prince of the Asturias, engaged in a 
 scheme in which there was assuredly very 
 little criminality, the object of which, after 
 all, was only to open the eyes of a deceived 
 father, and to prevent usurpation the Prince 
 of the Asturias, engaged in this scheme with- 
 out prudence, without discretion, without cou- 
 rage soon proved that he deserved the slavery 
 from which he had aimed at releasing himself. 
 Shut up alone in his apartments, terrified when 
 he thought of the fate which the founder of the 
 Escurial, Philip II., had inflicted on the Infant 
 Don Carlos, full of exaggerated ideas of the 
 cruelty of the favourite, credulous enough to 
 
 i We tliii k it right to quote here a curious letter from 
 Napoleon to Joseph, in which he shows him. and in groat 
 confidence, the immense extent of his forces, a letter 
 which betrays, along with his pride at seeing them go 
 great, his embarrassment at haying to pay such a number. 
 
 Letter from, the Emperor to the King of Naples. 
 
 " Fontainebleau, 21st of October, 1807. 
 "The urgent necessity there is for me to establish good 
 order in the state of my military force, to avoid producing 
 derangement in all my affairs, requires that I should esta- 
 blish my army in Naples on a definitive footing, and that 
 I should know that it is duly kept up. 
 
 " You will judge what attention I am obliged to pay to 
 ietails when jou know that I have more than 800,000 men 
 
 admit that this favourite and his mother haa 
 caused his wife to be poisoned, he imagined 
 that he was undone, and thought to save his 
 life by the basest of means, by informing 
 against his alleged accomplices. This son, 
 worthy, as we see, of those against whose op- 
 pression he was struggling, formed the design 
 of throwing himself at the feet of his mother 
 and confessing every thing to her a confes- 
 sion which could scarcely satisfy her if he told 
 her nothing but the truth ; but which would 
 become the most infamous perfidy, if, to please 
 her, he charged his accomplices with supposi- 
 titious crimes. After the communication to 
 the members of the councils, quoted above, the 
 king had gone to seek in hunting that oblivion 
 of the cares of government which he could not 
 endure longer than a few moments. The queen 
 was alone at the Escurial, still transported 
 with anger. Emmanuel Godoy remaining ill 
 at Madrid, where he pretended to be much 
 worse than he really was. Ferdinand sent to 
 beseech his mother to come to see him in his 
 apartments, to receive his confession and the 
 assurance of his repentance and submission. 
 That princess, who had more understanding 
 than her son, who had no desire for a recon- 
 ciliation, the probable consequence of the in- 
 terview solicited by the prince, sent to him 
 M. de Caballero, minister of grace and justice, 
 an extremely circumspect personage, capable 
 of assuming all sorts of parts, but preferring 
 to all others that one which should bring him 
 nearest to the victorious party. Ferdinand 
 deeply humbled himself before this minister 
 of his father's, declared what had passed, con- 
 fining his account to the truth, which was not 
 very overwhelming : he maintained that he had 
 designed only to fore-arm himself against any 
 attacks upon his rights, and added, what was 
 still unknown, that he had written to Napoleon, 
 to solicit from him the hand of a French prin- 
 cess. The most serious thing in his confession 
 was his naming the Dukes de San Carlos and 
 de 1'Infantado, and above all the canon Escoi'- 
 quiz, as the instigators who had led him astray. 
 The result of the declaration was the immediate 
 apprehension, with unexampled brutality and 
 incarceration at the Escurial, of the personages 
 whom he had denounced. The prisoners an- 
 swered, with a dignity and firmness which did 
 them honour, all the questions which were put 
 to them, and, reducing the accusation to so 
 much of it as was true, declared that they had 
 only designed to enlighten Charles IV., de- 
 ceived by an unworthy favourite, to deliver 
 the Prince of Asturias from an intolerable op- 
 pression, and to prevent, in case of the king's 
 death, an act of usurpation foreseen and 
 dreaded by all Spain. The firmness of these 
 
 on foot. I have still an army on the Passarge, near the 
 Niemen; I have one at Warsaw; I have one in Silesia; I 
 have one at Hamburg : I have one at Berlin : I have one 
 at Boulogne ; I have one on march for Portugal ; I have 
 a second, which I am assembling at Bayonne ; I have one 
 in Italy; I have one in Dalmatia, which I am at this 
 moment reinforcing with six thousand men ; I have one 
 at Naples; I have garrisons on all my maritime frontiers. 
 You may judge, therefore, when this tide flows back into 
 the interior of my dominions, and I shall cease to find 
 foreign alleviation, how necessary it will be that all my 
 expenses should be rigidly calculated. 
 
 'You ought to hare an inspector of reviews skilful 
 enough to make out a statement of what a regiment ought 
 to cost you according to our regulations."
 
 NOT. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 411 
 
 honest men, culpable, no doubt, for having 
 engaged in irregular proceedings, but haying 
 an extraordinary situation for their excuse, 
 their firmness, we say, threw dishonour on 
 both the infamous court that would fain have 
 sacrificed them to its vengeance, and on the 
 pusillanimous prince who repaid their devoted 
 attachment by the basest desertion. 
 
 The effect, however, of this audacious and 
 foolish proceeding was immense throughout the 
 whole Peninsula. There was but one cry of 
 rage and indignation against the Prince of the 
 Peace, and against the queen, who were bent, 
 it was said, on sacrificing a virtuous son, the 
 only hope of the nation. People were not ac- 
 quainted with the bottom of things, but they 
 refused to believe that absurd imputation 
 levelled against the Prince of Asturias, of har- 
 bouring a design to dethrone his father ; and 
 the popular good sense discerned that there 
 was nothing more in the inculpatory acts than 
 an effort to undeceive Charles IV., and some 
 precautions to prevent the favourite from 
 usurping the supreme authority. At length the 
 application made by Ferdinand to Napoleon 
 becoming known by degrees, the scandalous 
 trial at the Escurial was attributed to the anger 
 which the court must have felt on that point. 
 The public mind, conforming immediately to 
 what the adored heir to the crown haa done, 
 approved of it without reserve. It was admit- 
 ted that it was an excellent idea to apply to 
 that great man, who had re-established order 
 and religion in France, who could, if he pleased, 
 regenerate Spain, without making her pass 
 through a revolution : it was above all a wise 
 idea to think of uniting the two houses by the 
 ties of blood : for that union alone could put 
 an end to the jealousies which still separated 
 the Bourbons from the Bonapartes. Ferdinand 
 was applauded for having had confidence in 
 Napoleon ; they felt indebted to Napoleon for 
 having inspired him with it ; and immediately, 
 with the fickleness, the ardour, of a warm- 
 hearted nation, the whole population of Spain 
 conceived but one wish, uttered but one cry : 
 that was, to insist that the long columns of 
 French troops proceeding towards Lisbon 
 should turn aside for a moment to Madrid, to 
 deliver a deceived father and a persecuted son 
 from the monster who oppressed them both. 
 This sentiment was general, unanimous, in all 
 classes of the nation : singular contrast with 
 the sentiments which were soon to burst forth 
 in that same Spain, hostile to France and to 
 her chief! 
 
 M. de Toreno has alleged, and other writers have re- 
 peated, that the motive which caused the proceedings 
 commenced against the Prince of the Asturias to be sus- 
 pended, was no other than the injunction addressed by 
 Napoleon to the Prince of the Peace, not to compromise in 
 any way the agents of the French government, or that 
 government itself. This is a mere supposition, contra- 
 dicted by facts and dates. It would have been easy to 
 continue these proceeding!! without introducing into them 
 the French ambassador, the communications with whom 
 were the smallest of the grievances, while the other 
 papers, suoh as that revealing to Charles IV. the conduct 
 of the favourite, the cipher, the eventual appointment of 
 the Duke de 1'Infantado, constituted the alleged crimes of 
 the prince and his accomplices. What affords a still 
 stronger proof of this is, that the proceedings against the 
 accomplices of the prince were continued, and that, the 
 grievances remaining exactly the same, the difficulty, had 
 there been 'any, would have been as great with them as 
 with the prince. But this invention, I repeat, is peremp- 
 torily contradicted by the dates. The begging pardon, 
 
 After having long despised Spain for having 
 suffered all kinds of scandals before her face, 
 the favourite began to be alarmed on hearing 
 the cry of reprobation raised against him in 
 all quarters. Leaving his bed, to which he 
 affected to be confined by severe indisposition, 
 he resolved to show himself at the Escurial as 
 peacemaker and reconciler. The excited pas- 
 sions of the queen were more difficult to repress 
 than his own ; and he had some trouble to 
 make her sensible that they must stop short in 
 the course which they were pursuing, unless 
 they meant to provoke a sort of popular insur- 
 rection. The signature of the treaty of Fon- 
 tainebleau had just been communicated to him, 
 though that treaty was not yet to receive the 
 consecration of publicity. Emmanuel Godoy 
 was rejoiced that he had obtained the quality 
 of sovereign prince, with the guarantee of that 
 new quality by France. He found in this a 
 reason for taking courage, for avoiding any 
 violent crisis, for seeking, in short, gentler 
 means of attaining his end. To dishonour the 
 Prince of the Asturias seemed to him safer 
 than to inflict on him a condemnation which 
 would revolt all Spain, and after which that 
 prince would become the idol of the Spanish 
 nation. ' A first step had been already taken 
 in this course by the anxiety of the prince to 
 offer his confession, for which he was not 
 asked, and to denounce accomplices who were 
 not thought of. la consequence, Emmanuel 
 Godoy persuaded the queen, but not without 
 difficulty, to grant a pardon, which the prince 
 should solicit with humility, and acknowledg- 
 ing his guilt. He went therefore to Ferdinand's 
 apartment, which had been converted into a 
 prison, and was received, not with the con- 
 tempt which he ought to have met with from & 
 prince endowed with any dignity, but with the 
 satisfaction experienced by an accused person 
 who feels that he is saved. Emmanuel Godoy 
 then proposed to Ferdinand, or Ferdinand to 
 him, to write a letter to his father and another 
 to his mother, in which he should solicit the 
 most humiliating pardon, and after that all 
 should be forgotten. Those two letters were 
 conceived in the following terms. 
 
 " November 5th, 1807. 
 " Sire and my Father, 
 
 "I have rendered myself culpable in offend- 
 ing against your Majesty, I have offended 
 against my father and my king. But I repent 
 of it, and I promise your Majesty the most 
 humble obedience. I ought not to do any 
 thing without the consent of your Majesty, but 
 
 and the royal act which grants it, are of the, 5th of Novem- 
 ber. Now, at this time, the arrest of the prince was 
 scarcely known at Paris, for the seizure of his papers was 
 on the 27th of October, his arrest on the 28th, and the 
 circulation of all these facts at Madrid on the 29th. No 
 explicit account then could have left Madrid before the 
 28th of October. All the couriers at that time took seven 
 or eight days for the journey. The news therefore ?ouM 
 not have reached Paris before the 5th of November. Had 
 it even left on the 27th. it could not have been there before 
 the 3d, and assuredly there would not have been time to 
 order at Paris on the 3d, an act which was consummate 
 at Madrid on the 5th, which bad even been resolved on 
 there on the 3d or the 4th. The dates are conse- 
 quently sufficient to contradict such a supposition. The 
 Prince of the Peace was induced to act the part of concili- 
 ator solely because the enterprise of obtaining the con- 
 demnation of the heir presumptive, in order to deprive 
 him of his rights to the throne, was beyond his audacity 
 and the patience of the Spanish nation.
 
 412 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807, 
 
 I was taken by surprise. I have denounced 
 the guilty persons, and I beseech your Majesty 
 to forgive me, and to permit your grateful son 
 to kiss your feet." 
 
 " Madame and my Mother, 
 "I deeply repent of the great fault which I 
 
 it seem that to allow Charles IV., the Prince 
 of the Peace, and the queen, to continue to 
 reign, would be a solution promising much du- 
 
 ration, as well on account of the king's health, 
 as that of the indignation ready to burst forth. 
 To change the dynasty, appeared, therefore, 
 the simplest course. But still, in this case, 
 
 have committed against the king and against ! there was the dangep of revo iti ng the opinion 
 you, my father and my mother. I therefore j of the Spanish nation, and, above all, the opi- 
 implore your pardon with the greatest submis- nion of Europe, there being no pretext for de- 
 sion, as well as for my obstinacy in denying throning princes, who, divided among them- 
 the truth to you the other night. therefore ; se i veS) we re united only in calling in Napoleon 
 
 as a friend and master. Persevering in his 
 doubts, as Spain in her agitations, Napoleon 
 resolved to avail himself of that momentary 
 respite to devote a few days to Italy, and to 
 regulate several important affairs that demand- 
 ed his presence. Besides, he was to meet in 
 Italy his brother Lucien, to reconcile himself 
 with him, to receive from his hand a daughter, 
 who might be the princess destined for Spain, 
 if the less violent plan of uniting the two 
 houses by a marriage should be definitively 
 adopted. These resolutions taken, he gave 
 counter-orders to his armies, not to stop their 
 march towards Spain, but to slacken the ra- 
 pidity of that march. He directed that the 
 troops of the corps of the Coasts of the Ocean, 
 which were to have been conveyed post to 
 Bordeaux, should perform that march on foot 
 and without any haste. He enjoined General 
 
 beseech your Majesty from the bottom of my 
 heart to deign to interpose your mediation with 
 my father, that he will be pleased to permit me 
 his grateful son to kiss his Majesty's feet." 
 
 After these letters were signed, a new pub- 
 lic act of Charles IV. pronounced the pardon 
 of the accused prince, reserving, however, 
 the continuation of the proceedings commenced 
 against his accomplices, and forbidding the 
 circulation of the first act, in which he had 
 been denounced to the Spanish nation. But it 
 was too late to smother so great a scandal. 
 The deplorable scenes at the Escurial were in- 
 separable from one another, and none could 
 remain concealed. The first disgraced the 
 king, the queen, the favourite ; the last dis- 
 graced the Prince of the Asturias. 
 
 The effect on public opinion was not, how- 
 ever, what one would have supposed. Though 
 
 all the actors in these scenes had deserved Dupont to make such arrangements that the 
 nearly equal censure, the father for his weak- j second corps of the Gironde might enter Spain 
 
 ness, the mother and the favourite for their 
 guilty passions, the son for his cowardly de- 
 sertion of his friends, the Spanish people, 
 nevertheless, resolved not to find any fault but 
 
 about the end of November, and he prescribed 
 to him to go to Valladolid, without advancing 
 further towards Portugal. He despatched from 
 Paris his chamberlain, M. de Tournon, whose 
 
 with the favourite and the queen ; neither would good sense he appreciated, with orders to go to 
 
 they regard the conduct of the prince as any 
 thing more than i consequence of the oppres- 
 sion under whi he groaned; his confessions 
 as declarati c.ther supposititious or extorted ; 
 and continued to love him with idolatry, to in- 
 vest him with all imaginable virtues, to demand 
 of Napoleon a movement of his mighty arm 
 towards Spain. All at once, Napoleon became 
 the tutelary deity, invoked on every side and 
 by every voice. It is the only moment perhaps 
 in which the Spanish people has ever admired 
 with transport a hero who was not a Spaniard, 
 and appealed to a foreign influence. 
 
 At the same time that Napoleon was in- 
 formed of the accusation preferred against the 
 Prince of the Asturias, he also received intelli- 
 gence of the pardon granted to that prince. 
 
 Spain, to observe what was passing there, ta 
 ascertain thoroughly whether the Prince of the 
 Asturias had many partisans, whether the old 
 court still retained any, and with the further 
 commission to carry an answer to the various 
 communications of Charles IV. In this an- 
 swer, full of civility and generosity, Napoleon 
 recommended to Charles IV. mildness and in- 
 dulgence towards his son, denied that he had 
 received any application from him, and strove 
 to avoid sowing fresh seeds of discord, though 
 he had more interest in exciting dissensions 
 than in pacifying Spain. 
 
 This done, Napoleon, expecting that he 
 should soon have to turn his attention again to 
 that quarter, left Fontainebleau on the 16th of 
 November, accompanied by Murat, by the mi- 
 
 He was as much surprised at the one as at the nisters of the marine and the interior, by 
 other ; but he clearly saw that the course of Messrs. Sganzin and De Proni, directors of se- 
 this drama, which would have been tragic in j veral important services, and proceeded to- 
 another age, but which was only disgusting in wards Milan, to embrace his beloved son 
 ours, was slackening, to be resumed by and by, ! Prince Eugene de Beauharnais. On leaving, 
 and to end subsequently in its conclusion. | he gave orders for the triumphal reception of 
 Though the step taken by the Prince of the j the imperial guard, which would soon arrive 
 Asturias had disposed him favourably, he j in Paris. 
 
 knew not whether it would be right to trust 
 such a character ; he knew not whether, in his 
 weakness and in his passions, there were not 
 reasons for seeing in him an impotent ally or a 
 perfidious enemy. To give him a princess of 
 the house of Bonaparte, apparently the easiest 
 solution, was not, therefore a very safe course. 
 
 He wished to be absent from this solemnity, 
 and, if possible, that nobody should even think 
 of him. He wished that honour should be done 
 to the army, to the army alone, by the festivi 
 ties given to the guard which was the elite of 
 that army. Accordingly, writing to the minis- 
 ter of the interior to prescribe the details of 
 
 Besides, history exhibited but few encouraging the ceremony, he said : "In the emblems and 
 instances in regard to princesses charged to ' inscriptions which shall be employed in this 
 attach Spain to us by marriages. Neither did i ceremony, my guard ought to be kept in view,
 
 NOT. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 413 
 
 not myself, and it ought to be shown that, in 
 honouring the guard, the whole grand army is 
 honoured." 
 
 Accordingly, on the 25th of November, the 
 prefect of the Seine and the maires of Paris 
 proceeded to the barrier of La Villette, fol- 
 lowed by an immense concourse of people, to 
 receive the heroes of Austerlitz, of Jena, of 
 Friedland. Marshal Bessie"res was at their 
 head. A triumphal arch had been erected at 
 that spot. The ensigns stepped out of the 
 ranksf lowered the standards, on which the 
 magistrates of the capital placed crowns of 
 gold, bearing the inscription, "The City of Paris 
 to the grand Army." Then the guard, number- 
 ing twelve thousand veteran soldiers, sunburnt, 
 mutilated, some of them having already gray 
 beards, filed off through Paris, with an enthu- 
 siastic crowd at their heels, applauding their 
 triumph. A plentiful repast, provided in the 
 Champs Elys4es, was offered to these twelve 
 thousand soldiers by the city of Paris, which, 
 in this fraternal and national solemnity, repre- 
 sented France, as well as the guard represented 
 
 the army. The weather was not favourable 
 towards the conclusion of the day, which was 
 frequently rendered unpleasant by the rain; 
 for it seemed that this army, which had no 
 other share in our greatness and our faults but 
 its heroism, was not lucky. Of the thousand 
 millions decreed by the Convention, was left 
 nothing but &fSte promised in 1806 to the whole 
 army of Austerlitz ; of that fete was left no- 
 thing but this entertainment to the guard, 
 which was damped by the weather and deprived 
 of the presence of Napoleon. But the glory 
 of the French army might well dispense with 
 such frivolous pomp. History will relate that 
 everybody in France from 1789 to 1845, ex- 
 cepting the army, mingled faults with his 
 services ; for while innocent victims were 
 slaughtered in 1793, it was defending the 
 country ; while Napoleon violated the rules of 
 prudence in 1807 and 1808, it confined itself 
 to fighting ; and, at all times, under all go- 
 vernments, it knew but how to devote itself 
 and to die for the existence and the greatness 
 of France.
 
 414 HISTORY OF THE fNoT. 1807. 
 
 BOOK XXIX. 
 
 AKANJUEZ. 
 
 Expedition against Portugal Composition of the Army destined for that Expedition First entry of the French into 
 Spain March from Ciudad-Rodrigo to Alcantara Dreadful hardships General Junot, hastening towards Lisbon, 
 follows the right of the Tagus, along the back of the mountains of Beyra Arrival of the French army at Abrantes, 
 in the most deplorable state -General Junot determines to march to Lisbon with the companies of elite On learn- 
 ing the approach of the French, the Prince-regent of Portugal decides to sail for Brazil Precipitate embarkation of 
 the court and of the principal Portuguese families Occupation of Lisbon by General Junot Further occurrences 
 at the Escurial State of the court of Spain since the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias and the humiliating 
 pardon granted to him Continuation of the proceedings against his accomplices Mistrust and fears which begin 
 to seize the court The idea of proceeding to America, after the example of the court of Braganza, occurs to the 
 queen and to the Prince of the Peace Opposition of Charles IV. to this scheme Before recurrfng to this extreme 
 resource, the Spanish government seeks to reconcile itself with Napoleon, and renews, in the king's name, the ap- 
 plication made by Ferdinand for a French princess. To this application are added urgent solicitations for the pub- 
 lication of the treaty of Fontainebleau These communications cannot reach Napoleon till he is in Italy His 
 arrival at Milan Works of public utility ordered in all the places through which he passes Journey to Venice 
 Meeting of princes and sovereigns in that city Plans of Napoleon for restoring Venice to her former commercial 
 prosperity Trip to Udine, Palma-Nova, and Osopo Return to Milan by Legnago and Mantua Interview at 
 Mantua with Lucien Bonaparte Residence at Milan Fresh military orders relative to Spain, and postponement 
 of the answers to be given to Charles IV. Political affairs of the kingdom of Italy Adoption of Eugene de Beau- 
 harnais, and the succession to the crown of Italy secured to his descendants Milan Decrees opposed to the new 
 maritime ordinances of England Departure of Napoleon for Turin Works ordered to connect Genoa with Pied- 
 mont, Piedmont with France Return to Paris, on the 1st January, 1808 Napoleon is unable to delay any longer 
 his answer to Charles IV. and the adoption of a definitive resolution respecting Spain Three parties are fornn^d 
 a marriage, a partition of territory, a change of dynasty Irresistible impulsion of Napoleon towards the change of 
 dynasty Though decided as to the end, Napoleon is not fixed in regard to the means, and meanwhile he increases 
 the number of the troops which he has in the Peninsula, and answers Charles IV. in an evasive -manner Levy of 
 the Conscription of 1809 Colossal force of France at this period System of military organization suggested to 
 Napoleon by the dislocation of his regiments which have battalions in Germany, in Italy, in Spain Napoleon is 
 desirous of terminating this time all the affairs of the south of Europe Aggravation of his quarrel with the Pope 
 General Miollis is ordered to occupy the Roman States The movement of the English troops towards the Penin- 
 sula, strips Sicily, and furnishes the long looked-for occasion for an expedition against that island Union of 
 French squadrons in the Mediterranean Attempt to convey sixteen thousand men to Sicily and immense supplies 
 to Corfu Continuation of occurrences in Spain Conclusion of the proceedings at the Escurial Charles IV., on 
 receiving the evasive answers of Napoleon, sends him another letter full of grief and uneasiness, and requiring an 
 explanation relative to the accumulation of the French troops towards the Pyrenees Being pressed with questions, 
 Napoleon feels the necessity for coming to the point He at length fixes upon his means of execution, and purposes, 
 by frightening the court of Spain, to induce it to run away like the House of Braganza This serious enterprise 
 renders the Russian alliance more necessary for him than ever Attitude of M. de Tolstoy at Paris His alarming 
 reports to the Court of Russia Explanation of Alexander with M. de Caulaincourt Apprised by the latter of the 
 danger which threatens the alliance, Napoleon writes to Alexander, and consents to enter into discussion on the 
 partition of the empire of the East Joy of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff Various plans of partition First idea 
 of an interview at Erfurt Invasion of Finland Satisfaction at St. Petersburg Napoleon, rendered easy respecting 
 the Russian alliance, makes dispositions for bringing about a deno&ment in Spain, in the course of the month of 
 March Various orders given between the 20th and the 25th of February, to intimidate the Court of Spain, and to 
 dispose it to flight Appointment of Murat to command the French army Ignorance in which Napoleon leaves 
 him respecting his political designs Instructions relative to the march of the troops Order for surprising St. 
 Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona The plan adopted placing the Spanish colonies in danger, Napoleon wards 
 off that danger by an extraordinary order despatched to Admiral Rosily Entry of Murat into Spain His recep- 
 tion in the Biscayan provinces and Castille Character of those provinces Entry into Vittoria and Burgos State 
 of the French Troops Their youth, their destitution, their diseases Embarrassment of Murat; arising from his 
 ignorance of Napoleon's political object Surprise of St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona Mischievous effect 
 produced by the capture of those three places Alarm conceived at Madrid on receiving the last news from Paris- 
 Definitive plan to retire to America Opposition of Cabellero, the minister, to this plan Reported preparation for 
 the voyage Extraordinary emotion among the population of Madrid and Aranjuez The Prince of the Asturias 
 and his uncle Don Antonio opposed to all idea of retiring The departure of the court fixed for the loth or 16th of 
 March The population of Aranjuez and its environs, moved by curiosity, indignation, and secret tampering, col- 
 lects in crowds about the royal residences, and exhibits alarming demonstrations The court is obliged to publish. 
 on the 16th a proclamation contradicting the rumours of a voyage It nevertheless continues its preparations 
 Revolution at Aranjuez in the night between the 17th and 18th of March The populace breaks into the palace of 
 the Prince of the Peace, utterly destroys it, and seeks the prince himself with the intention of putting him to death 
 The king is obliged to strip Emmanuel Godoy of all his dignities The search after the prince is continued After 
 hiding for thirty-six hours under some rush mats, he is discovered at the moment of leaving his retreat A few of 
 the Life Guards succeed in rescuing him from the fury of the people, and conduct him to their barracks, after re- 
 ceiving several wounds The Prince of the Asturias persuades the mob to disperse, by promising them that the 
 Prince of the Peace shall be brought to trial The king and queen, alarmed at the three days' commotion, and 
 hoping to save the lives of themselves and the favourite by abdicating, sign their abdication on the 19th of March 
 Character of the revolution of Aranjuez. 
 
 WHILE Napoleon, resolved as to the end that 
 he should pursue in Spain, uncertain as to the 
 means, was travelling to Italy, full of confidence 
 in the immensity of his power, the French ar- 
 mies were advancing into the Peninsula, and 
 about to encounter for the first time the hard- 
 ships which awaited them in that inhospitable 
 country. 
 
 The army ordered to enter it first was that 
 of General Junot : his commission, as we have 
 Been, was to take possession of Portugal. It 
 was composed of about 26,000 men; 23,000 
 
 from the depots. It was distributed into three 
 divisions,- under Generals Laborde, Loison, and 
 Travot. It had for the principal officer of the 
 staff General Thie"bault, and for commander- 
 in-chief, the brave Junot, the devoted aide-de- 
 camp of Napoleon, for a moment ambassador 
 in Portugal, an intelligent officer, bold to te- 
 merity, having no other defect than a natural 
 ardour of disposition, destined to terminate 
 one day in a mental malady. The army was 
 composed of young soldiers of the conscription 
 of 1807, levied in 1806, but embodied in the 
 
 present under arms, and followed by a reinforce- I old skeletons and sufficiently trained. They 
 ment of from three to four thousand men drafted | were very capable of behaving well under fire,
 
 Nov. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 415 
 
 hut unluckily not seasoned to fatigue, which, 
 /levertheless, was likely to be their principal 
 trial. Napoleon, anxious that they should enter 
 Lisbon speedily, in order to catch there, not 
 the royal family about which he cared very lit- 
 tle, but the Portuguese fleet, and the immense 
 wealth belonging to English merchants, had 
 given orders to General Junot to redouble his 
 celerity, and not to spare his soldiers either fa- 
 tigue or privations, in order to arrive in time. 
 Junot, with his ardour, was not the man to cor- 
 rect by a discreet discernment so much of that 
 order as might prove dangerous in the country 
 which they were about to traverse. 
 
 On the 17th of October, the army entered 
 Spain in several columns, in order to find sub- 
 sistence the more easily. It marched upon Val- 
 ladolid, by Tolosa, Vittoria, and Burgos. Not- 
 withstanding the promises of the Prince of the 
 Peace, scarcely any thing had been provided 
 upon the route, and at night it was necessary 
 to collect in haste whatever could be found to 
 feed the troops, worn out with the fatigues of 
 the day. The lodgings were detestable, full 
 of vermin, and so filthy that our soldiers chose 
 rather to lie in the fields or in the streets than 
 to accept the wretched shelter that was offered 
 them. The population received them with the 
 curiosity natural to a lively people, fond of 
 sights, and for which its inert government had 
 procured scarcely any for a century past. The 
 higher classes behaved well to our troops ; but 
 the lower showed towards them their sullen 
 hatred of foreigners. On the route to Salaman- 
 ca, several of our stragglers were stabbed with 
 knives, though they conducted themselves with 
 the most cautious discretion. 
 
 The army, before reaching Salamanca, where 
 it made a short halt, had already suffered much 
 from fatigue, and left a certain number of men 
 behind. General Junot, who had a provident 
 chief of the staff, established at Valladolid, 
 Salamanca, and in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
 depots, consisting of a commandant, several 
 managing clerks, and a detachment, to collect 
 the fatigued or sick, and to send them off by 
 and by to the army, in parties sufficiently nu- 
 merous to defend themselves. The order to 
 march without intermission having reached the 
 army at Salamanca, it left that city, on the 
 12th of November, formed into three divisions. 
 On its route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, 
 it had to cross the chain of mountains which 
 separates the valley of the Douro from that of 
 the Tagus, and which is a prolongation of the 
 Guadarrama. From Salamanca, to Alcantara 
 it would have to travel fifty leagues through a 
 poor, mountainous, woody country, inhabited 
 by herdsmen only, who were accustomed to 
 drive their flocks thither twice a year in au- 
 tumn, when they removed from Old Castille into 
 Estramadura, and in spring, when they returned 
 from Estramadura into Old Castille. Though 
 the Spanish authorities had promised to pre- 
 pare provisions, scarcely any were found at 
 Sanmunos, an intermediate point, half-way be- 
 tween Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. The 
 troops travelled nineteen leagues in two days, 
 without any thing to eat but a little goat's flesh, 
 which they procured by seizing the flocks which 
 they fell in with on their route. At Ciudad 
 Rodrigo, a considerable town and a fortress of 
 great importance, they found a governor very 
 
 unfavourably disposed, who excused himself 
 by alleging the ignorance in which he had been 
 left of the passage of the French army, and 
 who took no pains to procure the supplies that 
 he had neglected to provide. Some provisions 
 were, however, collected, sufficient to afford 
 the soldiers half a ration ; a new depot was or- 
 ganized for rallying the stragglers, whose num- 
 ber increased at every step, and tke army ad- 
 vanced towards the mountains, for the purpose 
 of passing out of the basin of the Douro into 
 that of the Tagus. The weather had all at 
 once become frightful, as is the case in these 
 southern countries, where Nature, in extremes, 
 like the inhabitants, passes with singular vio- 
 lence from the mildest to the most inclement 
 temperature. Rain and snow succeeded each 
 other without intermission. The tracks fol- 
 lowed by the different columns were completely 
 covered, and not discernible even under the 
 feet of men and horses. Misled by half sav- 
 age guides, who were themselves frequently 
 mistaken from having never passed the bounds 
 of their own village, several columns lost their 
 way, and arrived at the village of Pefla Parda, 
 nearly on the crest of the chain, worn out with 
 fatigue and hunger, having left part of their 
 men behind them, on the way. For food they 
 were obliged to go, for the purpose of passing 
 the night, to La Moral ej a, on the back of the 
 mountains. A tremendous tempest overtook 
 them. In a moment all the torrents overflowed. 
 What with the howling of the wind and the 
 roaring of the water, our inexperienced sol- 
 diers, having had scarcely any thing to eat for 
 several days, having no hope of better quarters 
 for the following days, were seized with one of 
 those sudden demoralizations, which surprise 
 and depress young minds not much accustomed 
 to the hardships of the military life. Night 
 having come on, and the drums, relaxed by the 
 rain, giving no sound, a sort of confusion took 
 place in this march. The soldiers, ceasing to 
 distinguish objects, having great difficulty to 
 discern one another, and endeavouring to com- 
 municate by shouts, made the mountains ring 
 with their wild hooping and hallooing. The 
 officers were no longer heeded or heard ; indis- 
 cipline had accompanied despair, and the scene 
 had become terrific. A first column, however, 
 had arrived, at about eleven o'clock at night, at 
 La Moral ej a; and, having found a detachment 
 which had already gone to bed, made known 
 the state in which it had left the rest of the 
 army. The men who were least fatigued were 
 selected and despatched to the aid of their com- 
 rades. Large fires were kindled, a light was 
 placed on the top of the steeple, .and the great 
 bell was rung, to draw the men who had lost 
 their way towards this point. To add to their 
 hardships, no more preparations had been made 
 at La Moraleja than elsewhere. No provisions 
 whatever were to be had. The soldiers, in the 
 delirium of hunger, respecting nothing, fell to 
 plundering and ravaging that unfortunate place, 
 which thus became the victim of the neglect 
 of the Spanish government to fulfil its promises. 
 There was not at the moment of arrival, one- 
 fourth of the men around the colours. By de- 
 grees, during the night, all who had not sunk 
 under fatigue, all who were not drowned in the 
 torrents, or murdered by the herdsmen of Ls- 
 tramadura, reached the devastated quarters of
 
 41C 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 La Moral ej a. A few more goats sufficed, not 
 to satisfy the hunger of the soldiers, but to pre- 
 vent their dying of inanition. It "was impossi- 
 ble to stop in such a place, and next day the 
 troops marched for Alcantara, "where they at 
 length reached the banks of the Tagus and the 
 frontier of Portugal. 
 
 The General-in-chief Junot had preceded 
 his army thither, in order to make amends by 
 his attentions for the carelessness of the Spa- 
 nish government. The town afforded rather 
 more resources than the wild mountains of 
 Estramadura. These resources, however, were 
 not very considerable, and they had been partly 
 absorbed by the Spanish troops of General 
 Carafa, who, with a division of nine or ten 
 thousand men, was to support the movement 
 of the French troops, and to descend the left 
 of the Tagus, while General Junot should 
 descend the right. A few bullocks and a few 
 sheep were collected, and distributed among 
 the regiments ; bread sufficient to allow half a 
 ration to each man was procured ; and a bait 
 was granted to the army, as well in order to 
 rally it as to enable it to recover its exhausted 
 strength. It had left behind or lost in the 
 forests and the torrents a fifth of its effective, 
 that is to say from four to five thousand men. 
 Half the cavalry was dismounted, many horses 
 had died of hunger, or could not follow for 
 want of shoeing. As for the artillery, the 
 army had been compelled to employ oxen to 
 draw it, and, that means soon failing, they 
 had not more than six pieces at Alcantara. In 
 respect to ammunition, that they had been 
 obliged to abandon by the way, together with 
 the rest of the materiel. 
 
 The embarrassment of the unfortunate Gene- 
 ral Junot was extreme. On the one hand he 
 was stimulated by the orders of Napoleon, by 
 the certainty that, if he did not soon reach 
 Lisbon, he should find either that the Portu- 
 guese fleet had sailed with the wealth of Portu- 
 gal, or meet with an organized resistance, 
 which he should have trouble to overcome ; on 
 the other hand, he saw before him the backs 
 of the mountains of Beyra, sloping towards the 
 Tagus, consisting of a multitude of abrupt 
 spurs, separated from one another by frightful 
 ravines, apparently cut out, as seems to be 
 expressed by the name of Tailladas given to 
 some of them, entirely destitute of inhabitants, 
 destitute of every resource, and rendered still 
 more dreary by the autumnal deluges of rain. 
 Add to this that our soldiers?, having left France 
 in haste, and being unable to take their bag- 
 gage along with them, were mostly without 
 shoes, without cartridges, and not in a fit state 
 to undergo a long march, or to conquer a 
 serious resistance, if they should meet with 
 one, which was not impossible ; for the Portu- 
 guese had still 25,000 tolerably good troops, 
 well disposed to defend themselves, since the 
 prospect of belonging to Spain did not incline 
 them to give a favourable reception to the in- 
 vaders of their country. Neither was the con- 
 currence of the Spaniards to be depended upon ; 
 for, instead of twenty battalions, they had 
 furnished us with only eight, and animated by 
 sentiments so adverse to the French, that it 
 had been found necessary to send them to their 
 cantonments. 
 
 \A the face of this alternative, either to allow 
 
 events that might excite regret to he consum- 
 mated at Lisbon, or to encounter fresh fatigues 
 with exhausted troops, in crossing a country 
 more frightful than that which he had just 
 traversed, General Junot did not hesitate, and 
 preferred the course of obedience to that of 
 prudence. He therefore took the resolution to 
 continue t-his precipitate march by crossing the 
 series of spurs detached from Beyra, which 
 border the Tagus from Alcantara to Abrantes. 
 He picked up some shoes and a few bullocks, 
 availed himself of a depot of powder existing 
 on the spot, and of the paper upon which were 
 written the voluminous records of the knights 
 of Alcantara for making cartridges. He then 
 divided his army into two parts, one composed 
 of the infantry of the first and second divisions, 
 the other of the infantry of the third division, 
 of the cavalry, of the artillery, and of the 
 stragglers. He pushed forward the first, and 
 left the second at Alcantara, with orders to 
 rejoin him, as soon as it should be somewhat 
 rallied, recruited, and provided with means of 
 transport. He took with him only a few 
 mountain guns, which, from their calibre, 
 were lighter to draw. 
 
 He resolved to leave Alcantara on the 20th 
 of November, and to cross the frontier of Por- 
 tugal on the right of the Tagus, while General 
 Carafa was to cross it on the left. It would, 
 no doubt, have been much better to pass the 
 Tagus, to penetrate further into Estramadura, 
 to reach Badajoz, to take the high road from 
 Badajoz to Elvas, which the Spaniards gene- 
 rally follow, through Alentejo, a level province 
 and easy to travel through. But it would have 
 been requisite to descend the Peninsula as far 
 as Badajoz, then to make a long circuit to the 
 right to reach Lisbon. Napoleon giving orders 
 at Paris, from the mere inspection of the map, 
 and preferring the road that led most speedily 
 to Lisbon, had directed the right of the Tngus 
 to be followed from Alcantara to Abrantes, 
 while the Spaniards were to follow the left. In 
 this manner one not only made sure of the 
 advantage of celerity, but also of that of not 
 having subsequently to effect a passage of the 
 Tagus when approaching Lisbon. If, how- 
 ever, Napoleon could have known that the 
 troops would meet with deluging rains in Por- 
 tugal, that, through the negligence of his allies, 
 the army would arrive at Alcantara exhausted 
 with hunger and fatigue, he would have chosen 
 rather to lose a few days than to prosecute a 
 march which was soon to resemble a route. 
 But here began to be revealed those calamitous 
 inconveniences of an extreme policy, which, 
 resolved to act at once upon the Vistula and 
 the Tagus, at Dantzig and at Lisbon, was 
 obliged to issue orders from a great distance, 
 and to employ weak soldiers and inexperienced 
 generals, when robust soldiers and able gene- 
 rals were employed elsewhere. There are 
 lieutenants who act wrong from timidity, others 
 from excess of zeal. The latter are the rarest, 
 and in general the most useful, though fre- 
 quently dangerous. The brave Junot was one 
 of these latter. He hesitated not, then, to 
 leave Alcantara on the ' 20th of November, 
 sending away, as we have said, part of the 
 Spanish troops, which seemed far from steady, 
 and assigning to the others the duty of follow- 
 ing the left bank of the Tagus, while he should
 
 Nov. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 417 
 
 pursue the right. Of an army which had at 
 Bayonne an effective of 23,000 men present 
 under arms, out of 26,000; he had with him 
 but 15,000 at most; not that the others were 
 all dead or lost, but because they were inca- 
 pable of continuing that hasty march. He 
 advanced along the Tagus, by paths formed on 
 the side of the mountains, compelled inces- 
 santly to ascend or descend, sometimes rising 
 to the very crests of the spurs which run out 
 from Beyra, sometimes plunging into the deep 
 ravines which separate them, having the sum- 
 mit of the mountains on his right, the river on 
 his left. He directed his two divisions of in- 
 fantry upon Castel-Branco by two different 
 roads. The first took the Idanha-Nova road ; 
 the second that to Rosmaninal. They were 
 each accompanied by some Spanish light 
 troops. The weather was still terrible, the 
 rain incessant, the road scarcely passable. 
 The first division, commanded by General 
 Laborde, having to cross an overflowed torrent, 
 wider and deeper than the others, that brave 
 general alighted, walked into the water up to 
 his waist, and remained in that position till all 
 his soldiers had passed. At night, they had 
 nothing to eat but goats' flesh, acorns, and one 
 ounce of bread per man. They arrived on the 
 following day at Castel-Branco, where the two 
 divisions joined, in a state difficult to be de- 
 scribed. The first that arrived, which had 
 had fewer difficulties to surmount, went and 
 bivouacked outside the town, that it might 
 leave to the other, which was still more fatigued 
 than itself, the advantage of lodging in it. 
 Guards were posted at every oven, to prevent 
 pillage. Thanks to this precaution, two ounces 
 of bread could be allotted to each man. They 
 were without meat, but had rice, vegetables, 
 and wine. The soldiers were pale, haggard, 
 and almost all barefoot. To stop would have 
 been to expose them to the danger of dying 
 from hunger, to say nothing of the inconveni- 
 ence of losing valuable time. They set off, 
 therefore, in the hope of reaching Abrantes, a 
 wealthy and populous town, situated beyond 
 the regions of the mountains, in an open and 
 fertile country. The troops marched thither 
 in two columns, one, formed of the first divi- 
 sion, by Sobreira-Formosa, the other formed 
 of the second division, by Perdigao. The first 
 had fourteen leagues to travel, and four or five 
 torrents to cross. They were so swollen by the 
 rain that they could not be passed without 
 danger. The soldiers formed a chain with 
 their muskets, to defend themselves against the 
 force of the water. Some, debilitated or worn 
 out with fatigue, were occasionally hurried 
 away by the current. The officers, full of zeal, 
 with the intention of setting the stronger the 
 example of assisting the weaker, took upon 
 their shoulders the men who were incapable 
 of passing, and thus helped them to cross the 
 torrents. On the road they found but a single 
 village, that of Sarcedas, and the soldiers, 
 dying of hunger, plundered it, in spite of the 
 efforts of the general in chief to prevent them. 
 It was eleven at night before they reached 
 Sobreira-Formosa, in a state of absolute de- 
 spair. For the first hour, not more than a 
 sixth of the men had joined. They found some 
 chestnuts, and a few cattle, and these were the 
 whole of their fare. The second division had, 
 VOL. II. 63 
 
 on its part, experienced cruel hardships in its 
 march to Perdigao. 
 
 The rest of the route to Abrantes was not 
 rendered so fatiguing by asperities of soil, but 
 equally marked by sterility and destitution. 
 At length, after unparalleled fatigues and pri- 
 vations, the troops arrived on the 24th at 
 Abrantes, to the number of four or five thou- 
 sand men, wan, wasted, with bleeding feet, 
 tattered clothes, unserviceable muskets, for 
 the soldiers had used them for sticks to assist 
 them in crossing the torrents and climbing the 
 mountains. To arrive in this state in a very 
 populous town would have been offering it a 
 temptation to close its gates against such as- 
 sailants, and to defend itself from them by 
 merely leaving them to die of hunger. Bat, 
 fortunately, the glorious victories gained in 
 all partH of the world by the old soldiers of 
 France, protected our young troops wherever 
 they might be. Such was the renown of the 
 French army that, at its approach, but one 
 sentiment pervaded the population, that of sa- 
 tisfying it by supplying its wants as speedily 
 as possible. If they had time to become ac- 
 quainted with it, they soon ceased to detest it, 
 without ceasing to fear it, and they offered it 
 cheerfully that which on the first day they had 
 offered under an impression of terror. 
 
 The general-in-chief had preceded his army 
 to Abrantes, in order to prepare beforehand 
 that relief which its deplorable state demand- 
 ed. The inhabitants complied with all his 
 requisitions. They collected cattle, bread in 
 abundance, and, for the first time since their 
 departure from Salamanca, for twelve days, 
 the soldiers received complete rations. Excel- 
 lent wine, shoes, clothing, and means of con- 
 veyance, were procured for them. They were 
 even enabled to send off vehicles to the rear, 
 to pick up the sick and the fatigued men. The 
 weather had not yet become serene and dry ; 
 but they were in a fine, level, warm country, 
 covered with orange trees, exhaling the deli- 
 cious perfumes of the South, presenting a 
 spectacle of comfort and wealth. The effect 
 on those young soldiers, accessible to all sen- 
 sations, was rapid, and they passed in two 
 days from the most gloomy despair to a sort 
 of joy and confidence. Many of them were 
 still bewildered among the rocks of Beyra, and 
 they came by degrees, in detached parties, to 
 receive in their turn the delightful impression 
 of a fine country abounding in resources of 
 every kind. 
 
 Junot had the arms repaired, and collecting 
 the companies of ilile, formed a column of 4000 
 men, capable of continuing the march for Lis- 
 bon. Having prevented by his celerity a re- 
 sistance which, in the mountains of Beyra, 
 might have become invincible, he had gained 
 a first prize of his efforts. But he wanted to 
 reach Lisbon, so as to seize on their passage 
 all who should attempt to escape from that 
 capital. This second success it was scarcely 
 possible to obtain. 
 
 At this moment incredible confusion pre 
 vailed at Lisbon. The prince-regent, govern^ 
 ing for his mother, who was afflicted with 
 insanity, had wavered among a thousand con- 
 trary resolutions. In concord with the cabinet 
 of London, he had endeavoured to prevail 
 upon Napoleon to accept a middle term, which
 
 418 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 consisted in closing his ports against the Eng- 
 lish, without confiscating their property. Na- 
 poleon having refused this, the prince-regent 
 had been again thrown into great perplexity. 
 His ministers, divided respecting the course to 
 be pursued, advised some of them, that they 
 should live as they had always lived, that is, 
 continue attached to England, and with her 
 aid to resist Napoleon ; others, that they should 
 forsake past errors, enter into the views of 
 France, expel the English, and thus spare 
 themselves a foreign invasion. Others again 
 proposed a third course, to which we have 
 already adverted, that of retiring to Brazil, 
 leaving the unfortunate land of the Braganzas 
 to the English and the French, who would 
 soon be fighting for its wrecks. Amidst these 
 painful hesitations, the prince-regent, as soon 
 us he was apprized of the march of the French 
 army upon Valladolid, had acceded to all the 
 demands of Napoleon, declared war against 
 Great Britain, decreed the seizure of all its 
 property, giving time, however, to the Eng- 
 lish merchants to carry away or sell the most 
 valuable of their effects. He had, lastly, de- 
 spatched messengers to meet General Junot, 
 and to stop the French army; but unluckily 
 they sought him on routes which he had not 
 taken. Lord Strangford, the English ambas- 
 sador, had received his passports, and retired 
 on board the English fleet, which had imme- 
 diately commenced the blockade of the Tagus. 
 The unexpected appearance of the French 
 army on the route from Alcantara to Abrantes, 
 where none of the emissaries sent off could 
 slacken its march, struck inexpressible terror 
 into the soul of the regent, a terror shared by 
 all his relations and councillors. The idea of 
 flight then became uppermost in all the others. 
 Lord Strangford, knowing what was passing, 
 lost no time in making his appearance again at 
 Lisbon, bringing news from Paris forwarded 
 from London, giving information of the resolu- 
 tion taken by Napoleon to dethrone the house 
 of Braganza. 1 This intelligence and his pre- 
 sence decided definitively the departure of the 
 royal family for Brazil. In the supposition 
 that the government might be forced to close 
 the Tagus against the English, all that was 
 left of the Portuguese fleet, that is to say, one 
 ship of 80 guns, seven of 74, three frigates, 
 and three brigs, had been armed somehow or 
 other. The arrival of Junot at Abrantes, 
 which is only three days' march from Lisbon, 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 being known in the capital on the 27th of No- 
 vember, the royal family and part of the aris- 
 tocracy were conveyed on board, together with 
 all the valuable effects that they could carry 
 off. In terrible weather, amidst pelting rain, 
 the princes, the princesses, the queen-mother, 
 with wildly rolling eyes in consequence of her 
 mental malady, almost all the persons com- 
 posing the court, many of the great families, 
 men, women, children, servants, to the num- 
 ber of seven or eight thousand, were seen con- 
 fusedly embarking in the squadron and in 
 about a score of large vessels employed in the 
 Brazil trade. The furniture of the royal pa- 
 laces and of the wealthy houses of Lisbon, the 
 funds in the public chests, the money which 
 the regent had for some time past taken care 
 to amass, that which the fugitive families were 
 able to procure, all lay on the quays of the 
 Tagus, half-buried in mud, before the eyes of 
 an astounded population, alternately melted 
 by so grievous a spectacle, and irritated at so 
 cowardly a flight, which left it without govern- 
 ment and without means of defence. So great 
 was the precipitation that, on board some of 
 these vessels laden with wealth, the most indis- 
 pensable articles of provision were forgotten 
 to be brought. Every thing was embarked by 
 the 27th ; and thirty-six ships of war, or mer- 
 chantmen, ranged around the admiral's ship, 
 in the middle of the Tagus, as broad before 
 Lisbon as an arm of the sea, waited for a 
 favourable wind, while a population of three 
 hundred thousand souls, divided between grief, 
 anger, curiosity, and terror, sorrowfully gazed 
 at them. At the mouth of the Tagus, the Eng- 
 lish fleet was cruizing to receive the emigrants, 
 and to protect them, if necessary, with ita 
 guns. 
 
 Thus passed the whole of the 27th, the wind 
 not permitting the expedition to leave the Tagus; 
 anxiety prevailed in the Portuguese fleet: for, 
 if a French detachment had arrived in time at 
 Lisbon and hastened to the tower of Belem, the 
 Tagus would have been closed. 
 
 Meanwhile General Junot, leading in haste 
 his unfortunate soldiers, arrived breathless 
 under the walls of Lisbon. He had been de- 
 tained during the 26th and 27th before the Ze- 
 zera, the waters of which had risen from twelve 
 to fifteen feet in a few hours, and which falls 
 into the Tagus near Punhette. He passed it, 
 with some thousand men, in boats, brought by 
 well paid seamen, and amidst the greatest dan- 
 
 < Several historians, as well Portuguese as Spanish and 
 French, have asserted that Lord Strangford decided the 
 prince-regent, by producing a Moniteur of the llth of No- 
 vember, which had come by way of London, containing 
 an imperial decree, similar to that which had pronounced 
 the forfeiture of the house of Naples, and declaring that 
 the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. This assertion, 
 if not totally inaccurate, is, nevertheless, erroneous. 
 Neither the Afoniteur of the llth of November, nor of any 
 anterior or posterior date, contains any decree declaring 
 that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. This 
 form, used in 1806 against the House of Naples, after an 
 unpardonable treachery, could not be employed against 
 reigning families, which had not furnished Napoleon with 
 any pretext Jor treating them in that manner. Neither 
 does the depot of the minutes at the secretary of state's 
 office, any more than the Mrmiteur, contain the alleged 
 decree. But the Moniteur of the 12th of November con- 
 tains, under the head Paris, and date of the 12th, an arti- 
 cle relative to the various expeditions of the English 
 against Copenhagen, Alexandria, Constantinople, and 
 Buenos-Ayres. In this article, evidently dictated by Na- 
 poleon, and tending to show the consequences to which 
 
 all the governments that sacrificed themselves to the Eng- 
 lish policy were liable, we find the following passage : 
 
 ' After these four expeditions, which so clea rly demon- 
 strate the moral and military decline of England, wo 
 shall advert to the situation in which they now leave 
 Portugal. .The Prince-regent of Portugal loses his 
 throne ; he "loses it, influenced by the intrigues of the 
 English ; he loses it for refusing to seize the English mer- 
 chandise at Lisbon. And what does England, that so 
 mighty ally? She looks on with indifference at what is 
 passing in Portugal. What will she do when Portugal is 
 taken? Will she go and seize Brazil? No: if the Eng- 
 lish make such an attempt, the Catholics will expel them. 
 The downfall of the House of Bragariza will be a new 
 proof that the ruin of all who attach themselves to Eng- 
 land is inevitable." 
 
 This is probably what is meant by the decree declaring 
 that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign ; and this 
 the Manitf.ur which, published at Paris on the 13th, reach- 
 ing London n the 15th or ICth, might through the Ad- 
 miralty be received by the English fleet on the 23d or 
 24th, and communicated to the Prince-regent of Por- 
 tugal.
 
 Nov. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 419 
 
 gers ; for these boats were carried away by the 
 current with great violence into the Tagus, and 
 were then obliged to work up the stream to get 
 to the point for landing. On the 28th Junot 
 marched for Santarem, across the inundation-', 
 which covered to a distance the banks of the 
 Tagus, and in which the soldiers sometimes tra- 
 velled for a league together with the water up 
 to their knees. On the 29th he reached Sacca- 
 vem, and there received intelligence from Lis- 
 bon. He learned that the royal family had em- 
 barked with the whole court, and that it was 
 taking away with it the Portuguese fleet laden 
 with wealth. There was now no hope left of 
 arriving in time ; but it was necessary to pre- 
 vent a rising which it would have been impos- 
 sible to quell with a few thousand exhausted 
 men and not a single piece of cannon. General 
 Junot resolutely pursued his course, and left 
 Saccavem on the morning of the 30th, with a 
 column of not more than 1500 grenadiers and 
 with an escort of some Portuguese horse, met 
 with by the way, which he obliged to accompany 
 him. He entered Lisbon at eight in the morn- 
 ing, was received by a commission of the go- 
 vernment to which the prince-regent had con- 
 signed the kingdom, and by a French emigrant, 
 M. de Novion, who was at the head of the po- 
 lice, and who performed that duty with equal 
 intelligence and energy. General Junot found 
 the capital quiet, mortified at the presence of 
 foreigners, but submissive, and, besides, so in- 
 dignant at the flight of the court, as to feel 
 little less embittered against it than against 
 those who were come to take its throne. The 
 Portuguese fleet, having waited under sail the 
 whole of the 27th and part of the 28th, had at 
 length crossed in the evening the bar of the 
 Tagus, thanks to a change of wind, and fugitive 
 royalty had been greeted with salutes by the 
 English fleet. Admiral Sidney Smith detached 
 a strong squadron to accompany that royalty 
 to America, where it was about to commence 
 with Brazil the enfranchisement of all the Por- 
 tuguese and Spanish colonies ; for it was given 
 to the French revolution to change the face of 
 the New World as well as that of the Old ; and 
 those thrones of the Peninsula, which it hurled 
 into the Ocean, were destined to produce by 
 their fall a reflux that was felt on the other side 
 of the Atlantic. 
 
 General Junot found, therefore, that part of 
 the results which he was pursuing with such 
 ardour had escaped him. But a few old ships, 
 so crazy that those on board them were fearful 
 they might not reach Brazil, some precious 
 stones, some coined metals, and lastly a family, 
 the capture of which would have been a great 
 embarrassment, were not equivalent to the ad- 
 vantage of becoming master of the most import- 
 ant positions of the coast of Europe without 
 striking a blow, and of having prevented a re- 
 sistance, which could not have been conquered, 
 had ever so little energy been exerted. General 
 Junot and his army had, therefore, won the 
 prize of their perseverance. But it was requi- 
 site to establish himself at Lisbon, to rally the 
 army, to give it rest, to provide it with neces- 
 saries, and to restore to it the imposing aspect 
 which it had lost during that memorable march. 
 
 Towards the evening of the 30th, part of the 
 first division arrived. Junot possessed himself 
 of the forts and of the positions commanding 
 
 Lisbon, which is situated on several hills on the 
 shore of the expansive waters of the Tagus. 
 The commission of the government, and parti- 
 cularly the commandant of the police force, 
 M. de Novion, assisted him to keep order ; in 
 which they acted as good citizens, for disturb- 
 ance would only have led to useless bloodshed, 
 and perhaps to the sacking of Lisbon. Junot 
 distributed the troops in the manner best suited 
 to their welfare and their safety, amidst a hos- 
 tile population of 300,000 souls. Having solidly 
 established the first detachments that arrived, 
 he turned his attention to rallying the others. 
 Many of the soldiers had been drowned or mur- 
 dered. These losses, however, though much to 
 be regretted, were not so great as there waa 
 reason to fear from the small number of men 
 who appeared in the ranks on the day that they 
 entered Lisbon. The lists subsequently made 
 proved that the dead and missing did not ex- 
 ceed 1700. There were left, therefore, 21 or 22 
 thousand soldiers, well tried already by that 
 campaign, and followed by three or four thou- 
 sand, who, brought by a frequented route of sta- 
 tions (tiapes) would arrive safe and sound at the 
 goal which their predecessors had not reached 
 without great difficulty and fatigue. Most of 
 the men left behind had collected into parties, 
 marching more slowly than the heads of co- 
 lumns, but defending themselves against the 
 peasantry, and living upon what they could find 
 in the woods. The flocks of goats and sheep 
 which they fell in with by the way furnished 
 their principal subsistence. When once at 
 Abrantes, they embarked in boats, which car- 
 ried them down the Tagus to Lisbon. The ar- 
 tillery, which arrived much later, was likewise 
 put on board boats, and by this expeditious 
 mode of conveyance carried to the general rally- 
 ing point. The cavalry arrived without horses. 
 But Portugal would soon supply the army witfc 
 all that it wanted. There was at Lisbon a mag- 
 nificent arsenal, appropriated alike to the land 
 and the sea service, peopled with three thou- 
 sand very skilful workmen, desiring nothing 
 better than to continue to earn their livelihood, 
 even by working for the French. Junot em- 
 ployed them in repairing or remaking all the 
 materiel of the army, and in making gun-car- 
 riages for the numerous artillery existing in 
 Lisbon, which was to be mounted in battery 
 against the English. Near the capital was 
 posted the Portuguese army, 25,000 strong, 
 waiting for its fate to be pronounced. The 
 Portuguese soldiers, in general, liked better to 
 live in their villages than under their colours. 
 Junot gave them furloughs, so that no more 
 than 6000 were left in the ranks.- He took all 
 the horses of the cavalry, and remounted the 
 French cavalry with them. He did the same 
 by the artillery, and, in a few days, his army, 
 rallied, armed, new-clothed, rested from its fa- 
 tigues, exhibited the finest aspect. There were 
 no funds in the chests for defraying these ex- 
 penses. But, till the payment of the taxes, 
 commerce, encouraged by the language and the 
 acts of General Junot, advanced him five mil- 
 lions, in order to supply the most urgent wants, 
 and thus he was enabled to pay for all that th* 
 army consumed. General Junot established his 
 first division in Lisbon ; the second, half in 
 Lisbon, and half opposite to Abrantes ; the 
 third, on the back of the mountains at the foot
 
 420 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 of which Lisbon is seated, from Peniche to 
 Coimbra. He sent his cavalry, under General 
 Kellermann, into the plain of the Alentejo, to 
 enforce all over it the recognition of the French 
 authority. He placed at Setuval General Ca- 
 rafa's Spaniards, who had accompanied him. 
 He established a well guarded and well sup- 
 plied route of stations (ttapes) through Leiria, 
 Coimbra, Almeida, Salamanca, and Bayonne. 
 In the first moment, all appeared quiet and 
 almost cheering. There was but one very em- 
 barrassing difficulty from the commencement, 
 that was to provision, in spite of the English, a 
 capital with 300,000 inhabitants, accustomed 
 to receive by sea corn and cattle from the coast 
 of Africa. General Junot treated with several 
 merchants, and gave commissions on all sides 
 for bringing supplies from the interior. He 
 was ably seconded by Thie"bault, chief of the 
 staff, and by M. Hermann, whom Napoleon had 
 sent to him to superintend the Portuguese 
 finances, the latter was a man of the highest 
 integrity, well acquainted with the country, 
 having long performed the diplomatic functions 
 both at Lisbon and at Madrid. Thanks to the 
 combined exertions of these different agents, 
 there was no want of any thing, for some time 
 at least, and a beginning was even made to 
 equip the remnant of the Portuguese fleet. At 
 the same moment, the Spanish General Taranco 
 occupied the province of Oporto with seven or 
 eight thousand men, and General Solano that 
 of the Algarves with three or four thousand. 
 
 While a French army was penetrating into 
 Portugal, Napoleon, who had prepared two 
 others to enter the Peninsula, had ordered Ge- 
 neral Dupont, commanding the second corps 
 of the Gironde, to take one of his divisions to 
 Vittoria, upon pretext of assisting General 
 Junot against the English. Shortly before the 
 march of this division, a reinforcement of three 
 or four thousand men, destined to be incorpo- 
 rated into the three divisions of the army of 
 Portugal, had already taken the road for Sala- 
 manca. Thus the French became accustomed 
 to consider the Spanish boundary as an abo- 
 lished demarcation and Spain itself as an open 
 road, which they made use of, without even 
 informing the sovereign of the country. Gene- 
 ral Dupont's first division, in fact, had reached 
 Vittoria before M. de Beauharnais had given 
 notice of that movement to the cabinet of Ma- 
 drid. It was the Prince of the Peace who first 
 spoke of it to M. Beauharnais, with a visible 
 anxiety. At the same time, he had made many 
 excuses for the want of preparations along the 
 route followed by General Junot, and had at- 
 tributed that neglect to important engagements 
 resulting from the process at the Escurial. 
 
 Since that process, and notwithstanding the 
 pardon granted to the Prince of the Asturias, 
 the agitation, both in the court of Spain and 
 in the country in general, had not ceased to 
 increase. The Prince of the Asturias, whose 
 abject submission and whose cowardly betrayal 
 of his friends ought to have disgraced him, 
 was, on the contrary, adored by a nation, which, 
 finding in that degenerate family no other prince 
 to love, was fain to excuse every thing in him, 
 and imputed whatever was equivocal in his con- 
 duct to his enemies, to their threats, and to 
 their tyranny. The application for a French 
 princess, addressed by Ferdinand to Napoleon, 
 
 an application now well known, had turned the 
 eyes of the nation, as well as those of the prince, 
 towards the high protector, who ruled at this 
 moment the destinies of the world. The French 
 troops that had already entered the Spanish 
 territory, those which were accumulating be- 
 tween Bordeaux and Bayonne, far exceeding 
 the force necessary for the occupation of I r- 
 tugal, accredited the opinion that this pow^i-- 
 ful protector designed to interfere in the affairs 
 of Spain ; and the whole nation rejoiced in the 
 belief that it would be in the way which ac- 
 corded with their wishes, that is to say, to over- 
 throw the favourite, confine the queen in a 
 convent, Charles IV. in a hunting-lodge, and 
 give the crown to Ferdinand VII., united to a 
 French princess. The attitude of M. de Beau- 
 harnais tended only to favour these illusions. 
 This ambassador, filled with aversion for tho 
 favourite, led by his secret intercourse with the 
 Prince of the Asturias to take an interest in 
 his behalf, flattering himself that this prince- 
 would marry a French princess, (Mademoiselle 
 de Tascher,) who was his relation, abounded in 
 all the sentiments of the Spaniards themselves ; 
 and these, concluding that the representative of 
 France had orders to be what he appeared, con- 
 ceived such an increasing enthusiasm for Napo- 
 leon, that our troops, instead of being a subject 
 of alarm to the most mistrustful people in the 
 world, had, on the contrary, become a subject 
 of hope for it. 
 
 To no purpose did some more sagacious minds 
 say to themselves that, to overthrow a favour- 
 ite abhorred by the Spanish nation, so many 
 soldiers were not required ; that the nod of the 
 omnipotent Emperor of the French would be 
 sufficient to reduce him to nothing ; that those 
 troops which were collecting were, perhaps, the 
 instruments long ago prepcired, of a more im- 
 portant resolution, tending to exclude the Bour- 
 bons from all the thrones of Europe : to no 
 purpose some clear-sighted minds made these 
 remarks ; they found no acceptance, because 
 they were contrary to the passion that possessed 
 all hearts. 
 
 Fear, infusing juster apprehensions into the 
 queen and her favourite, opened their eyes to 
 their own danger. The queen and the favour- 
 ite were both sensible, and the queen more 
 deeply than her paramour, what contempt they 
 must excite in the great man who ruled Europe. 
 They felt how far their weak incapacity was 
 beneath his great designs ; and the veil with 
 which he covered his intentions, added to their 
 presentiments the terror which arises from 
 obscurity. Though Napoleon had signed the 
 treaty of Fontainebleau, though, by this treaty, 
 he had recognised Emmanuel Godoy sovereign 
 Prince of the Algarves, they were, neither of 
 them, quite easy. In the first place, Junot had 
 seized into his own hands the entire administra- 
 tion of Portugal, without excepting the pro- 
 vinces occupied by the Spanish troops. In the 
 next, Napoleon had required that the treaty 
 of Fontainebleau should continue to be kept 
 secret. Wherefore this secrecy, when Portugal 
 was in the power of the allied troops, when the 
 house of Braganza was gone, and had, in some 
 measure, left the throne vacant by its depar- 
 ture ? To these questions were added the let- 
 ters of Yzquierdo, the agent, who could not dis- 
 guise from his patron the apprehensions with
 
 NOT. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 421 
 
 which he began to be filled. These apprehen- 
 sions, it is true, were not grounded on any pre- 
 cise fa t ; for Napoleon had not communicated 
 his determination respecting Spain to a single 
 creature indeed, he could not communicate it, 
 for he was yet uncertain what he should do. 
 But of that fatal propensity for everywhere 
 susperseding the Bourbon family by his own 
 a propensity which swayed his soul to such a 
 degree as to make him unmindful of all pru- 
 dence, some clear-sighted spirits had a presen- 
 timent, and, without his saying a word, his in- 
 tention was guessed by more than one observer. 
 The silence which he kept, though engaged in 
 very apparent preparations, had struck in par- 
 ticular the agent Yzquierdo, the cleverest of 
 men at discovering what was intended to be con- 
 cealed from him ; and he was incessantly writing 
 to the Prince of the Peace that, though Napo- 
 leon had set out for Italy, yet around his minis- 
 ters and his confidants there was not a word to 
 be picked up ; and yet, that in all he saw there 
 was a mystery which filled him with uneasiness. 
 Hence the Prince of the Peace and the queen 
 were extremely agitated. The queen, often in- 
 disposed, disguising her trouble under an af- 
 fected tranquillity, her age under the most 
 elegant personal decorations, nevertheless gave 
 way, in spite of herself, to frequent bursts of 
 anger. She filled the palace with her storming, 
 demanded the sacrifice of all those whom she 
 considered as her enemies, foolishly insisted on 
 the execution of the canon Escoi'quiz and the 
 Duke de Tlnfantado, and was enraged with Ca- 
 ballero, the obsequious minister of justice, who, 
 trembling all over, merely opposed to her de- 
 sires the difficulties arising from the ancient 
 laws of the kingdom, inviolate and inviolable. 
 She went so far as to declare that minister a 
 traitor, sold to Ferdinand. The latter, on his 
 part, dissatisfied with this same minister, called 
 him a vile executor of the commands of his 
 mother, and promised himself to take signal 
 vengeance on him at a future time. The Prince 
 of the Peace, believing it to be for his interest 
 even to pacify the queen, loaded her with atten- 
 tions and passed from an insulting indifference 
 towards her to incessant demonstrations of kind- 
 ness. Though he went in the evening to the 
 demoiselles Tudo to rest his weary soul, weary 
 with intrigue and alarm, he paid in the morn- 
 ing to that exasperated queen all the attend- 
 ance of a faithful courtier ; and these two para- 
 mours, whom, from their numerous infidelities, 
 one would have supposed to be disgusted with 
 each other, were brought back by mutual ter- 
 rors and mutual antipathies into an intimacy 
 wearing all the semblance of love. In public 
 the queen manifested redoubled affection for 
 the Prince of the Peace, and took delight in de- 
 fying by such demonstrations the modesty of 
 those who witnessed them and the aversion of 
 her enemies. The court was deserted : all re- 
 spectable persons had forsaken it. When the 
 royal family appeared outside the gardens of 
 the Escurial, the people remained silent, ex- 
 cepting for the Prince of the Asturias, whom 
 they followed with their cheers, to such a de- 
 gree that the queen had obtained a police ordi- 
 nance by which all acclamations were prohi- 
 bited. To such a length did she carry the 
 extravagance of her requisitions as to order a 
 . Te Deum to return thanks to Heaven for the 
 
 miraculous preservation which it had vouch- 
 safed to the king, in thwarting the plots of th 
 Prince of the Asturias. Of the members of 
 the grandeza, all convoked, four only had 
 attended, two Spaniards, two foreigners, con- 
 founded all four at their own baseness. At 
 leaving the church, the queen had shown a 
 tenderness, a familiarity, with Emmanuel Go- 
 doy, disgusting to the beholders ; while poor 
 Charles IV. perceived none of these infamous 
 proceedings, though, having a confused feeling 
 of the peril of his situation, he had uninten- 
 tionally crowned the scandal by supporting 
 himself on the arm of the favourite, as on 
 the mighty arm from which he hoped for 
 salvation. Deplorable, disgraceful spectacle, 
 not only for the throne, but for humanity itself, 
 the degradation of which, manifested in so ex- 
 alted a situation, was the more striking. 
 
 Every evening, the Prince of the Peace 
 went, as we have said, to the demoiselles Tudo, 
 to pour forth the tribulations of his soul, which, 
 notwithstanding its levity, was deeply afflicted. 
 In that house, to which the curious resorted in 
 quest of news, great joy had been conceived 
 and expressed at the treaty of Fontainebleau ; 
 a joy soon embittered by the order received 
 from Paris to keep that treaty secret, by the 
 continual entry of French troops, and by the 
 letters of Yzquierdo, the agent. As the pub- 
 lic was delighted to learn whatever was unfa- 
 vourable to the Prince of the Peace, his confi- 
 dants endeavoured to oppose to the torrent of 
 bad news a contrary torrent, referring with 
 exaggeration to all the tokens of favour obtained 
 from the Tuileries. Thus, in spite of the order 
 to keep secret the treaty of Fontainebleau, all 
 its particulars had been repeated, and with the 
 greatest detail, at the residence of the demoi- 
 selles Tudo. It had been there related that the 
 north of Portugal had been given to the Queen 
 of Etruria, the south to the Prince of the Peace, 
 constituted sovereign Prince of the Algarves, 
 and the middle reserved to be subsequently 
 disposed of. In this manner the presence of 
 the French armies was accounted for ; and, as 
 for their number, far superior to that which 
 the mere occupation of Portugal would have 
 required, that was attributed to the great pro- 
 jects of Napoleon in regard to Gibraltar. To 
 prevent the mischievous effects which the entry 
 of the other corps speedily expected could not 
 fail to produce, it was said that the French 
 army would amount to at least 80,000 men, that 
 the Prince of the Peace would command it in 
 person, and that consequently people need not 
 be alarmed on that subject. As for the pro- 
 ceedings against the accomplices of the Prince 
 of Asturias, which excited universal indigna- 
 tion, and which, it was said, Napoleon would 
 not suffer to go on, the friends of the Prince 
 of the Peace alleged that the court had intelli- 
 gence from Paris, that Napoleon had declared 
 the affair of the Escurial to be an affair foreign 
 to France, and that he highly approved of the 
 punishment of the intriguers, who had designed 
 to shake the throne. 
 
 Neither the Prince of the Peace, nor the wo- 
 men of such different rank who interested them- 
 selves in his fate, gave much credit to this in- 
 telligence. They were tormented by fear, which 
 suggested to them precautions of the nature of 
 those taken in the East against Fortune or 
 2N
 
 422 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Nov. 1807. 
 
 against tyranny. Thus gold and precious 
 stones were amassed at the palace of the Prince 
 of the Peace. Superb dresses were stripped 
 of their diamonds, which were carried to his 
 residence, together with considerable sums in 
 specie. Everybody might see at night laden 
 mules setting out from his habitation ; some 
 taking the road for Cadiz, others that for Fer- 
 rol. The people, according to custom, exag- 
 gerated these circumstances, and exaggerated 
 them most immoderately. They talked of five 
 hundred millions in specie collected in his pa- 
 lace, and then sent off in several convoys for 
 unknown destinations. These fabulous stories, 
 concurrent with the flight of the house of Bra- 
 ganza, had led in all quarters to the conclusion 
 that the Prince of the Peace purposed to carry 
 away the royal family to Mexico, to prolong 
 beyond sea a power which was expiring in Eu- 
 rope. Propagated with incredible rapidity, 
 this supposition had excited the indignation of 
 all the Spaniards. The idea of seeing the royal 
 family of Spain betaking itself to a cowardly 
 flight, like the royal family of Portugal, car- 
 rying away an adored prince a prisoner, leav- 
 ing a vacant kingdom to Napoleon, revolted 
 them ; and this fear had increased, if possible, 
 the popular fury excited by the favourite. 
 Every week the rumour that the riches of the 
 crown had been packed up, to be secretly con- 
 veyed to Cadiz, and that the Prince of the Peace 
 was about to conduct the royal family to Seville, 
 was spread anew as a sinister report, exaspe- 
 rated all minds, let loose all tongues, then sub- 
 sided for a moment, when found not to be con- 
 firmed by facts, like the hollow murmurs that 
 precede the tempest. 
 
 And, false as are in general the rumours 
 which circulate among an agitated people, 
 these were not without foundation. Long 
 before the flight of the house of Braganza, 
 the project of that flight had been communi- 
 cated to the court of Madrid, submitted to its 
 judgment, and so far discussed with it, as to 
 be mentioned to the French ambassador. 
 Struck with this example, the Prince of the 
 Peace, when he despaired of his situation, was 
 fond of musing upon an asylum in America, 
 to which he could go to seek repose, safety, 
 and the continuance of his power. He had 
 opened himself on this subject to the queen, 
 who liked this scheme much ; and in order to 
 dispose the king to agree to it, he had begun 
 to alarm him respecting the intentions of Na- 
 poleon. After telling him on this subject 
 more than he knew, but not more than was 
 really meditated, he had expatiated at great 
 length on the plan of flight to America, as the 
 safest and even the most profitable course for 
 Spain. To withstand the armies of Napoleon 
 was, according to the Prince of the Peace, 
 impossible. They might enter into a struggle, 
 but it must end in their succumbing to him 
 whom all Europe had in vain endeavoured to 
 oppose ; and in this cuiitest they should lose 
 not Spain alone, but the magnificent empire 
 of the Indies, a hundred times more desirable 
 than the European territory of the house of 
 Bourbon. The provinces beyond sea, strongly 
 agitated already by the insurrection of the 
 English colonies, desiring nothing better than 
 to declare themselves independent, warmly 
 urged to that step by the British agents, would 
 
 I take advantage of the war, that must absorb 
 all the forces of the mother-country, to shake 
 j off her yoke ; and thus they should see not 
 only the Spains, but Mexico, Peru, Colombia, 
 La Plata, the Philippines, wrested from them. 
 On the contrary, by removing to the colonies, 
 they should preserve them by the presence of 
 the reigning family, whom they would be happy 
 to have at their head to form an independent 
 empire ; and, if Napoleon, becoming more 
 odious to Europe, in proportion as he became 
 more powerful, should ultimately fall, they 
 might return to the old continent, more assured 
 of the fidelity of the provinces of America, 
 which they should have bound to themselves 
 by stronger ties, and having meanwhile es- 
 caped by a mere voyage the general convul- 
 sion of all the States. If, on the contrary, 
 the tyrant of the Old World should die on 
 his usurped throne, and leave his consolidated 
 dynasty upon it, they should find in the New 
 World a regenerated empire, affording where- 
 withal to make them forget everything that 
 they had left behind in Europe. 
 
 These ideas, the only forcible and sensible 
 j ideas that the favourite had ever conceived, for, 
 I if they renounced all intention of disputing 
 ; the possession of Spain by an heroic resist- 
 i ance, the best thing to be done was to pre- 
 ! serve to the nation the two Indies, and to the 
 ! reigning family a throne, how distant soever 
 it might be these ideas were of a nature to 
 confound Charles IV. To defend himself by 
 arms he most assuredly had no thoughts of. 
 To go from the Escurial to Cadiz, to embark, 
 to cross the sea, to deprive himself for ever 
 of the diversions of the chase in the Pardo, 
 appalled him almost as much as a battle. He 
 preferred banishing far from him these sinister 
 forebodings, and to throw himself, he said, 
 into the arms of his magnanimous friend, Napo- 
 leon. It must be added to the honour of this 
 good and unfortunate prince, that, notwith- 
 standing his intellectual mediocrity, he appre- 
 ciated whatever was great in Napoleon, that 
 he admired his exploits ; and that, if he had 
 been capable of any efforts, he would have 
 assisted him to beat England, for the interest 
 of both countries, which he comprehended 
 whenever he chanced to think about it. Ac- 
 cordingly, he replied to those who talked to 
 him of a distant retreat, that they must en- 
 deavour to divine the intentions of Napoleon 
 and conform to them, for, at bottom, they 
 could not be bad ; that the Prince of the Astn- 
 rias had, after all, not been so very ill-advised 
 in applying for a princess of the Bonaparte 
 family for a wife ; that it was a means of 
 strengthening the alliance of the two countries, 
 and putting an end to the animosity of the two 
 races ; that it was not possible for Napoleon, 
 after giving Ferdinand one of his adopted 
 daughters, to harbour an intention of dethron- 
 ing him. He was too great, too magnanimous 
 a hero, to commit such a breach of faith. It 
 was, perhaps, the first time in his life that 
 this unfortunate king, whose mind, roused 
 under the stimulus of circumstances, con- 
 ceived an idea of his own, and appeared to 
 adhere to it. He had already thought of this 
 j marriage of the heir to the crown with a niece 
 j of Napoleon, and he had not to do violence to 
 | himself to adopt such a project. He desired,
 
 Nov. 1807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 423 
 
 therefore, that the application made by Fer- 
 dinand in an irregular manner should be re- 
 peated regularly, in the name of the crown 
 of Spain, with suitable solemnity and the 
 powers necessary for treating. If Napoleon 
 assented, he was bound towards the house of 
 Bourbon; if he refused, they should know 
 what to infer respecting his intentions, and it 
 would then be time to think of retiring. 
 
 Nothing could be more disagreeable to the 
 queen and the favourite than such a marriage ; 
 for Ferdinand, husband of a French princess, 
 protected by Napoleon, protector in his turn 
 of the house of Spain, would become all- 
 powerful. The fall of the favourite and the 
 destruction of the queen's influence must ensue. 
 But not to renew Ferdinand's proposal in the 
 name of the crown, was declaring that he had 
 acted wrong not only in regard to the form 
 but in regard to the main point; it was show- 
 ing Napoleon that they desired not his alliance ; 
 it was depriving themselves of a sure means 
 of sounding his intentions ; and, above all, de- 
 priving themselves of arguments indispensable 
 with Charles IV. for inducing him to approve 
 of the project of flight to America. Such were 
 the reasons which reconciled the queen and 
 the favourite to the idea of applying for a 
 princess, that is to say, of renewing Ferdi- 
 nand's clandestine proposal, in the name of the 
 crown. This was perhaps the only occasion 
 when there was any necessity for debating a 
 resolution with Charles IV., the only occasion 
 assuredly on which a resolution of his became 
 that of the government. 
 
 In consequence, a most affectionate letter was 
 prepared for Charles IV. to write, soliciting 
 Napoleon to unite the heir to the crown of Spain 
 with a princess of the house of Bonaparte. But 
 this was not the only demand. In a second 
 letter, annexed to the first, the king sued to 
 Napoleon for the immediate execution of the 
 treaty of Fontainebleau, the publication of that 
 treaty, the entry into possession of the sharers 
 in the Portuguese provinces of the portion al- 
 lotted to each. This suit was suggested by 
 the Prince of the Peace, who had those points 
 much at heart, for he was impatient to be pro- 
 claimed a sovereign prince: they were more- 
 over for the well-judged interest of the house 
 of Spain, since, by this treaty, Charles IV. 
 had received the guarantee of his dominions 
 and the title of king of the Spains and emperor 
 of the Americas. The publication of the treaty 
 of Fontainebleau would have been at the 
 moment a powerful preservative against the 
 projects, real or supposed, of invasion. 
 
 While awaiting this publication, there were 
 persons who, as we have said, had not hesitated 
 to commit all kinds of faults and to divulge the 
 whole treaty. People talked publicly in the 
 streets of Madrid, exaggerating even the asser- 
 tions of Tudo House, that the Prince of the 
 Peace would soon be declared King of Portugal, 
 and Charles IV. Emperor of the Indies ; that, 
 in short, the favour of Napoleon to Emmanuel 
 Godoy was about to be shown in a signal man- 
 ner. In the very brief moments in which peo- 
 ple gave credit to these rumours, they half- 
 opened their eyes ; they said that, no doubt, 
 Napoleon was preparing to dethrone the last 
 of the Bourbons, as he had dethroned all the 
 Others, that he had concerted with Godoy to 
 
 | get them delivered up to him, and that he was 
 : giving him Portugal, that Godoy, in return, 
 | might give him Spain. In this they calumni- 
 i ated that personage, whom it was so difficult 
 to calumniate ; for, if it was true that he had 
 enslaved, degraded, ruined, his masters, it was 
 not true that he had betrayed them in favour 
 of Napoleon. Fortunately for the popularity 
 of Napoleon in Spain, these reports gained not 
 long credit. M. de Beauharnais, who was left 
 by his court in complete ignorance, affirmed 
 that be had no knowledge of that treaty, and 
 with such sincerity that nobody doubted his 
 word. The assertions of the favourite's friends 
 were, therefore, taken for one of their accus- 
 tomed boastings, and people again began to 
 believe what pleased them, that is to say, 
 that Ferdinand was about to become first the 
 husband of an adopted daughter of Napoleon, 
 then king, and that the odious faction which 
 oppressed and disgraced the Escurial would 
 thus be swept away. And, what is a singular 
 fact in this gloomy and melancholy history of 
 the fall of the Spanish Bourbons, while the 
 Prince of the Peace was soliciting at Paris the 
 authorization to publish the treaty of Fontaine- 
 bleau, M. de Beauharnais, on his part, was ap- 
 plying for the authorization to contradict it. 
 
 The letters of Charles IV. and the despatches 
 of M. de Beauharnais had to make a long jour- 
 ney to reach Napoleon, then in Italy, and tra- 
 velling from town to town with his usual ra- 
 pidity. In the state of the communications at 
 that period, it took not less than seven days to 
 go from Madrid to Paris, not less than five days 
 to go from Paris to Milan ; and, if Napoleon 
 was at that moment on a journey either to 
 Venice or to Palina Nova, it was sometimes 
 fourteen or fifteen days after the departure of 
 despatches from Spain that they were received 
 by him. The transmission of answers required 
 the same time ; and these delays s-iited Napo- 
 leon, who would fain have slackened the pace of 
 Time, so loth was he to take any resolutions 
 relative to Spain, divided as he was between 
 the desire of dethroning the Bourbons every- 
 where, and apprehension on account of the 
 violent and odious means which he should be 
 obliged to employ for its accomplishment. 
 
 Having left Paris on the 16th of November, 
 Napoleon had arrived at Milan on the 21st, 
 having previously visited several interesting 
 points. He had even taken by suprise his son 
 Eugene Beauharnais, who had not had time to 
 hasten off to meet him. Appearing on the 
 morning of his arrival at the Cathedral of 
 Milan, to hear Te Deum, in the afternoon at 
 the palace of Monza to visit the vice-queen, his 
 daughter, in the evening at the theatre of La 
 Scala, to show himself to the Italians, he had 
 conversed in the intervals with the functionaries 
 charged with the most important offices. He 
 spent the 23d, the 24th, and the 25th, in the 
 despatch of a great deal of business and in giving 
 a multitude of orders. Struck, while traversing 
 the new road over Mont-Cenis, which was his 
 work, with the absolute deficiency of accom- 
 modation for travellers, for want of population 
 on those snow-covered heights, he gave orders 
 for the creation of a commune, divided into 
 three hamlets, one at the foot of the ascent, one 
 at the summit, and one on the descent. The 
 hamlet situated on the summit was to be the
 
 424 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1807. 
 
 chief place of the commune. He prescribed 
 the erection of a church, an inn, an hospital, 
 and a barrack. He granted exemption from 
 taxes for all the peasants who should settle in 
 the new commune, and commenced the popula- 
 tion by the establishment of a certain number 
 of soldiers in cantonments, charged to keep 
 the road in repair on ordinary occasions, 
 and, in case of accident, to assemble at the 
 points where their assistance might be neces- 
 sary. Having fixed the budget of the kingdom 
 of Italy, paid serious attention to the Italian 
 army, convoked the three colleges of the Pos- 
 sidenti, Dotti, and Commercianti for the mo- 
 ment of his return to Milan, that is to say for 
 the 10th of December, he set off for Venice, 
 taking the road to Brescia, Verona, and Padua, 
 greeted on his passage by the acclamations of 
 an enthusiastic people. Ever usefully employed, 
 even amidst festivities, he had rectified, in pass- 
 ing, the drawing of the fortifications of Peschi- 
 era, reserving his decision upon those of Man- 
 tua till his return. On the road, he had fallen 
 in with a party of relations the King and 
 Queen of Bavaria, whose daughter Eugene had 
 married; his sister Elisa, Princess of Lucca, 
 and soon to be Gouvernante of Tuscany ; and 
 lastly his brother Joseph, whom he had not 
 seen since he nominated him King of Naples, 
 and whom he fondly loved, notwithstanding 
 numerous reproaches on account of his lax 
 mode of governing. At Fusina, a small port 
 on the lagoons, where travellers bound for 
 Venice embark, the authorities and the popu- 
 lation awaited him in gondolas decorated with 
 rich hangings, to conduct him to the seat of 
 the ancient queen of the seas. The people of 
 Venice, who consoled themselves for no longer 
 forming an independent republic with the satis- 
 faction of having escaped from tyrannical laws, 
 with the hope of soon belonging to an extensive 
 kingdom comprising all Italy ; lastly, with the 
 promise of vast works destined to render its 
 waters navigable, had displayed for the recep- 
 tion of Napoleon all the luxury of which they 
 were wont to make a parade when their doge 
 wedded the sea. Innumerable gondolas, be- 
 decked with a thousand colours, ringing with 
 the sound of instruments, escorted the barges, 
 bringing along with the master of the world, 
 the Viceroy and the Vice-queen of Italy, the 
 King and Queen of Bavaria, the Princess of 
 Lucca, the King of Naples, the Grand-duke of 
 Berg, the Prince of Neufchatel, and most of the 
 generals of the old army of Italy. After allow- 
 ing the necessary time for receptions, Napoleon 
 passed the following days in visiting the public 
 establishments, the dock-yards, the arsenal, the 
 canals, accompanied everywhere by Messrs. 
 Decres, Proni, and Sganzin. Having finished 
 the examination of these places, he issued a 
 decree, containing twelve heads, which em- 
 braced all the wants of regenerated Venice. 
 He began, in virtue of this decree, with re- 
 establishing a number of taxes, abolished since 
 the fall of the republic, but justified by long 
 experience, little burdensome in themselves, 
 and indispensable for defraying the expenses 
 of a wholly artificial existence ; for Venice, like 
 Holland, is a work of art rather than of Nature. 
 The means being insured, he thought of their 
 application. In the first place, he organized 
 an administration for keeping the canals in good 
 
 condition and for deepening the lagoons; he 
 next decreed a grand canal, for conveying ves- 
 sels from the arsenal to the passage of Mala- 
 mocco, a basin for 74-gun ships, hydraulic 
 works, both on the Brenta, which brings its 
 waters into the lagoons, and at the different 
 outlets by which they discharge themselves 
 into the Adriatic. He instituted, moreover, a 
 free port, into which commerce might bring 
 merchandise before the payment of the duties 
 of customs. He provided for the public health, 
 by transferring burials from churches to an 
 island destined for that purpose. He attended 
 to the pleasures of the people in ordering the 
 Place of St. Mark, the everlasting object of the 
 pride and the historical recollections of the 
 Venetians, to be repaired and lighted. Lastly, 
 he insured a subsistence to seamen by the re- 
 establishment of all the old charitable institu- 
 tions. After dispensing these benefits and re- 
 ceiving in return a thousand acclamations, 
 Napoleon set off to visit the Friule, to inspect 
 the fortifications of Palma Nova and Osopo, 
 which he had continued to direct from a distance, 
 and which he considered, with Mantua and 
 Alexandria, as pledges of the possession of 
 Italy. Osopo and Palma Nova on the Isonzo, 
 Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, Alexan- 
 dria on the Tanaro, were, in his estimation, 
 the stages of an almost invincible resistance 
 against the Germans, if the Italians exerted 
 any energy in defending themselves. He had 
 come by Porto Legnago to Mantua, where he 
 was to meet his brother Lucien, to try to bring 
 about a reconciliation, for which he was 
 anxiously desirous, but which he would grant 
 only on certain conditions. M. de Meneval 
 went in the night to an hotel to fetch Lucien, 
 and conducted him to the palace occupied by 
 Napoleon. Lucien, instead of throwing himself 
 into the arms of his brother, accosted him with 
 a very excusable loftiness (as he was the only 
 one of the five brothers who had no power) but 
 carried perhaps beyond what a well-understood 
 dignity would have required. The interview 
 was, therefore, unpleasant and stormy, but not 
 without useful result. Among the number of 
 the combinations possible in Spain, Napoleon 
 still included the union of a French Princess 
 with Ferdinand. In fact, he had that moment 
 received the letter of Charles IV. renewing the 
 proposal for a marriage, and though he inclined 
 to a more radical resolution, still he did not 
 exclude from his plans that kind of middle term. 
 He therefore desired Lucien to give him a 
 daughter, the offspring of a first marriage, to 
 be brought up about the Empress-mother, to 
 initiate her thoroughly into his views, and then 
 send her to Spain to regenerate the race of the 
 Bourbons. If he should not decide to intrust 
 her with' this part, there would not fail to be 
 other thrones, more or less exalted, on which 
 he could place her by means of an alliance. 
 As for Lucien himself, he was disposed to con- 
 fer on him the quality of French Prince, even 
 to make him King of Portugal, which would 
 have placed him near his daughter, on condi- 
 tion that he would annul his second marriage, 
 compensating his wife so repudiated by a title 
 and a handsome annuity. These arrangements 
 were possible, but they were required witu 
 authority, refused with irritation, and the bro- 
 thers parted, agitated, angered, but not at
 
 Dec 1807] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 425 
 
 variance, since part of what Napoleon desired 
 was complied with by Lucien Bonaparte, a few 
 days afterwards, sending his daughter to Paris. 
 On the very next day Napoleon set off on his 
 return to Milan, where he arrived on the 15th 
 of December. 
 
 Despatches from Spain and from all parts of 
 the Empire were waiting there for him, and he 
 had more than one resolution to take. The 
 letters of his agents relative to the Peninsula, 
 the letters of Charles IV. applying for a French 
 princess and for the publication of the treaty 
 of Fontainebleau, had been delivered to him 
 while on his journey. To resolve such im- 
 portant questions was impossible in the state 
 of mind in which he found himself. He would 
 not yet involve himself in any engagement, for 
 he had not definitively decided on any point, 
 though he inclined, as we have said, to the re- 
 solution for dethroning the Bourbons. In con- 
 sequence, he ordered M. de Champagny to 
 write to Madrid, that he had received the let- | 
 ters of King Charles IV., that he appreciated 
 their importance, but that, exclusively ab- 
 sorbed by the affairs of Italy, where he had 
 but a few days to stay, he could not devote to 
 those of Spain that attention to which they 
 were entitled ; and that, on his return to Paris, 
 he should give such answers as the king's let- 
 ters deserved. He insisted anew that the 
 treaty of Fontainebleau should remain secret 
 for some time longer ; and as for M. de Beau- 
 harnais, taking no heed of his advice and 
 opinions, he addressed to him insignificant 
 answers, but formal on one point, namely, the 
 prohibition to show any preference for the 
 parties into which the court of Spain was di- 
 vided, or to afford any cause for inferring to 
 which side the French cabinet leaned. 
 
 It was not true, however, that, wholly en- 
 grossed by the affairs of Italy, Napoleon could 
 not think of those of Spain. He had, on the 
 contrary, issued fresh military orders, tending 
 to increase his forces by degrees, both on this ! 
 and on the other side of the Pyrenees ; so that, \ 
 whatever course he should adopt, he might : 
 have but one resolution to express, when he i 
 should have decided upon it. All that he j 
 learned of the state of Spain contributed to i 
 persuade him that the moment of a crisis was 
 at hand; for it seemed no longer possible to 
 place the favourite on a throne, to instil pa- 
 tience into Ferdinand, and to repress the indig- 
 nation of the Spanish people. He determined, 
 therefore, to be ready to avail himself of an 
 occasion, and to this end to have considerable 
 forces in the Peninsula, without diminishing 
 either the grand army or the army of Italy, 
 both which served to keep Europe in alliance 
 with him or in subjection. Besides the army 
 of General Junot, necessary for Portugal, he 
 had prepared, as we have seen, two other 
 corps, that of General Dupont and that of 
 Marshal Moncey, and these he deemed insuffi- 
 cient. He considered that those two corps, 
 proceeding along the road to Burgos and Val- 
 ladolid, upon pretext of Portugal, enabled by 
 a movement to the left to march upon Madrid, 
 would keep in awe the capital and the two 
 Castilles. But Navarre, Aragon, and Cata- 
 lonia, provinces so important of themselves, 
 and likewise for their spirit, their position, 
 and the fortresses which they contained, ought, 
 
 VOL. II. 64 
 
 he conceived, to be occupied, if not by forces 
 to be marched thither immediately, at least by 
 forces which should be quite ready to enter 
 them. He resolved, therefore, to have two 
 divisions prepared ; one which, placed near St.- 
 Jean-Pied-de-Port, might, upon any pretext 
 whatever, fall upon Pampeluna ; the other, 
 which, assembled at Perpignan, might, in like 
 manner, enter Barcelona, and take possession 
 of that city and also of the forts which com- 
 mand it. Master of Pampeluna and of the 
 forts of Barcelona, Napoleon would have twe 
 solid bases for the armies that were to advance 
 upon Madrid. At any rate, though the crisis 
 at the Escurial seemed imminent to him, he 
 determined neither to hasten it, nor to assume 
 too ostensibly the part of invader, by march- 
 ing troops elsewhere than on the Burgos, Val- 
 ladolid, and Salamanca road, which was the 
 road to Portugal. The probable assemblage 
 of English troops on the coasts of the Penin- 
 sula could not fail to furnish subsequently 
 specious motives for introducing fresh troops 
 into the interior of Spain. Meanwhile it was 
 sufficient for him to keep them assembled on 
 the frontier. General Junot's army, composed 
 of the old camps in Bretagne, had left some 
 depot battalions, of which might be formed a 
 division of three or four thousand men, quite 
 sufficient to occupy Pampeluna and to awe 
 Navarre. These battalions, five in number, 
 belonged to the 15th, 47th, 70th, and 86th of 
 the line. One Swiss battalion, cantoned in the 
 vicinity, afforded the means of raising them to 
 six. Napoleon gave orders for their immedi- 
 ate assemblage at St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, under 
 the command of General Mouton, and for add- 
 ing to them a company of foot-artillery. As 
 for the Perpignan division, he sought the ele- 
 ments for that in Italy itself. He there had 
 Lombard and Neapolitan regiments, fit to be 
 employed in the climate of Spain, but needing 
 to be instructed in war by the French. The 
 return of the auxiliary troops to their country 
 admitted of the immediate disposal of part of 
 the Italian regiments stationed nearest to 
 France. Napoleon, therefore, directed four 
 Italian battalions, three resident at Turin, 
 and one at Genoa, to march for Avignon. A 
 fine Neapolitan regiment, which his brother 
 Joseph had already sent him to gain experi- 
 ence in war, was near Grenoble. The same 
 order was sent to it for Avignon. Four Lom- 
 bard and Neapolitan squadrons, six or seven 
 hundred strong, with several companies of 
 artillery, were directed to the same point. 
 The French regiment, which had left the fort- 
 ress of Braunau, restored to the . Austrians, 
 was crossing the Alps to return to Italy. Its 
 route was prescribed with a view to its being 
 sent to the south of France. Lastly, the five 
 regiments of chasseurs and the four regiments 
 of cuirassiers, transferred in the preceding 
 winter from Italy to Poland, had their depots 
 in Piedmont, and these depots well supplied 
 with men and horses, like all those of the 
 army. Napoleon drafted from them two more 
 fine brigades of cavalry, which formed a divi - 
 sion of 1200 horse under General Bessieres. 
 By joining to these troops some French or 
 Swiss battalions residing in Provence, it would 
 be possible to form a corps of from ten if 
 twelve thousand men for Catalonia. 
 2N2
 
 426 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Dec. 1807. 
 
 These dispositions being prescribed to the 
 troops which were not yet to cross the Pyre- 
 nees, Napoleon gave orders for a new move- 
 ment to those which had already passed them. 
 He enjoined General Dupont, whose first divi- 
 sion had arrived as far as Vittoria, to set in 
 motion the other two, so as to have all three 
 united in the first days of January, with the 
 appearance of being on march for Salamanca 
 and Ciudad Rodrigo, that is to say for Lisbon, 
 but with the precaution to observe the bridge 
 over the Douro on the Madrid road, and to be 
 ready to occupy it on the first occasion. He 
 ordered Marshal Moncey, with the corps of the 
 Coasts of the Ocean, to occupy the positions 
 left vacant by General Dupont, and to march 
 one of his divisions towards Vittoria. These 
 movements could not much increase the jea- 
 lousy of the court of Spain, because they would 
 take place or the route for Lisbon. To render 
 them still tiore natural, Napoleon instructed 
 M. de Beauharnais to communicate to the Spa- 
 nish ministry the most alarming intelligence 
 of an assemblage of English forces at Gibral- 
 tar an assemblage real enough, by the by, 
 and no fiction; for he had just learned that 
 the British government had caused Sicily to be 
 almost entirely evacuated, and that it was pre- 
 paring to send the troops which had returned 
 from Copenhagen to Portugal. He warmly 
 urged the Spanish cabinet to provide for the 
 safety of Ceuta, Cadiz, the camp of St. Roch, 
 the Balearic Islands ; and, while giving it use- 
 ful intelligence, he threw an air of greater pro- 
 bability over the pretexts alleged for the intro- 
 duction of fresh French troops into Spain. 
 
 Napoleon had made haste to despatch the 
 affairs of Italy, that he might return to Paris, 
 whore he could attend so much more closely to 
 the object that incessantly engaged his thoughts. 
 There was, nevertheless, one question which he 
 would have been more capable of resolving at 
 Paris than at Milan, because he would there 
 have had around him superior intelligence, 
 and for which, nevertheless, he would not de- 
 fer his decision for a single day. That ques- 
 tion related to the recent orders in council 
 issued by the British government respecting 
 the navigation of neutrals. By these ordi- 
 nances, England was about to plunge deeper 
 than ever into the system of violence ; and Na- 
 poleon, as it may easily be conceived, was de- 
 termined not to be left behind. To a hard 
 blow he made a point of replying immediately 
 by one still harder. The reader is acquainted 
 with the steps which had been previously 
 taken in this fatal track. To the pretension 
 of seizing enemy's property even under a neu- 
 tral flag, and of applying the right of blockade 
 to vast extents of coast, which it was physically 
 impossible to blockade, Napoleon had at first 
 replied by the prohibition of English commerce 
 on all the coasts of the Empire and of the 
 countries under his influence ; then, his irrita- 
 tion increasing in proportion to the violence of 
 the Admiralty, he had, by the famous Berlin 
 decree, declared the British islands in a state 
 of blockade, forbidden the traffic in English 
 goods in all countries under his sway, ordered 
 *heir seizure and confiscation everywhere, and 
 given notice that every ship which should have 
 touched at any place in the three kingdoms, or 
 at any of the English colonies, should be ex- 
 
 cluded from the ports belonging to France, or 
 dependent on her will. Various supplementary 
 decrees had imposed upon vessels laden with 
 colonial commodities the obligation to provide 
 themselves with certificates of origin delivered 
 by French agents. In default of these certifi- 
 cates all goods were liable to confiscation. The 
 alliance concluded with Russia and with Den- 
 mark, the adhesion promised by Austria, the 
 insured adhesion of the two governments of 
 the Peninsula, were about to extend these 
 formidable dispositions to the entire Continent. 
 England had at length perceived that the 
 system of interdiction, carried to extremity, 
 was more prejudicial to her than to France, 
 for she had more need to sell than the Conti- 
 nent to buy, that the colonial productions, the 
 almost general monopoly of which she had se- 
 cured, for her ships detained, under various 
 pretexts, even the vessels of the United States 
 themselves, remained unsold in the warehouses ; 
 that she should suffer, in point of importation 
 as much as in point of exportation, for she 
 would not be able to obtain certain raw mate- 
 rials which were indispensable for her, such as 
 the wools of Spain and the naval stores of the 
 North ; that, in this state of trade, France 
 would have much less reason to complain, for 
 she would furnish the Continent with the stuffs 
 which the English manufactures would cease 
 to supply ; that, as for colonial produce, there 
 would reach her, either by privateers or by 
 vessels escaping the cruisers, a certain quan- 
 tity, for which she would be obliged to pay a 
 high price, but which would suffice for her 
 wants ; and that, after all, the dearness of 
 sugar and coffee would not be productive of 
 such great inconveniences to France as the 
 suppression of all exchanges would entail on 
 England. The British cabinet had, therefore, 
 relinquished its system of exclusion, and de- 
 vised means for facilitating general commerce, 
 but, by obliging it to pass wholly through 
 Great Britain, and making it moreover her 
 tributary. In consequence, it had decided by 
 three orders in council, dated the llth of No- 
 vember, 1807, that every vessel belonging to a 
 nation not at declared war with Great Britain, 
 though more or less dependent on France, 
 might freely enter the ports of the United 
 Kingdom or its colonies, then go whithersoever 
 it pleased, provided that it had touched in 
 England either to carry thither or to receive 
 goods, and had there paid duties of customs 
 equivalent on an average to 25 per cent. Every 
 vessel, on the contrary, which should not have 
 touched in the ports of Great Britain and have 
 among her papers certificates of origin deli- 
 vered by French agents, was to be seized and 
 declared lawful prize. Accordingly merchant- 
 men, in -as far at least as violent laws can be 
 carried into execution over the immense ex- 
 tent of the seas, were compelled to touch in 
 England to pay the customs, or to go thither to 
 supply themselves with English commodities 
 and merchandise. All commerce, therefore, 
 was to be carried on through the English ports ; 
 all merchandise was to come from them or to 
 pay duty there. Thanks to these regulations, 
 the English had a sure means of sending ua 
 their colonial productions which did not carry 
 with them, like cotton stuffs, for instance, the 
 proof of their origin. They called, in fact,
 
 Deo. -807.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 427 
 
 neutral vessels into the Thames, loaded them 
 with sugar and coffee, then convoyed them to 
 within sight of our coast, in order to spare 
 their being searched, and thus introduced them 
 into our ports or those of Holland, furnished 
 with false papers, which enabled them to pass 
 for neutrals coming direct from America. 
 
 Napoleon, on receiving at Milan, where he 
 then was, the orders of the llth of November, 
 wrote first to Paris, to the minister of the 
 finances and the director of the customs, re- 
 quiring a report on these orders. But, not hav- 
 ing patience to wait for their answers, he issued 
 on the 17th of December a decree, known by 
 the appellation of the Milan decree, still more 
 severe than the preceding. In the Berlin de- 
 cree, he had done no more than exclude from 
 the ports of the Empire every vessel which 
 should have touched in England : this time he 
 went much further, and declared every vessel 
 which should have touched in England or in 
 her colonies, and submitted to an obligation to 
 pay a duty there, denationalized, therefore law- 
 ful prize. By further regulations, he fixed 
 heavy penalties for captains and seamen who 
 should make false declarations. While Napo- 
 leon was issuing this decree, Messrs. Gaudin, 
 Cretet, Defermon, and Collin de Sussy, in an- 
 swer to his questions, proposed a measure tend- 
 ing to nearly the same end, but still more se- 
 vere : it was to forbid all commercial inter- 
 course with the French Empire to such nations 
 as should not themselves have ceased all com- 
 merce with England. The Milan decree, such 
 as it was, served to cut off more strictly than 
 ever the communications which England had 
 purposed to re-open for her advantage. But 
 this advantage was purchased at the expense 
 of a redoubled violence, which was soon des- 
 tined to weary France and her allies as much 
 as England herself. 
 
 Excepting this short diversion, Napoleon be- 
 stowed all the time that he had left to the ad- 
 ministration of the kingdom of Italy. 
 
 The three colleges of the Possidenti, Com- 
 mercianti, and Dotti, met, agreeably to the 
 convocation which they had received, at Milan, 
 towards the end of December, to listen to the 
 communication of several essential acts. By 
 the first of these acts, Napoleon officially 
 adopted Prince Eugene Beauharnais as his son. 
 By the second, he fixed the consequence of this 
 adoption, by insuring to Prince Eugene the 
 succession to the crown of Italy and by restrict- 
 ing his right of inheritance to that crown alone, 
 which precluded the possibility of his succeed- 
 ing some day to that of France. After he had 
 established his brothers and his sisters, it was 
 natural that he should satisfy perhaps the 
 warmest of his affections, that excited in him 
 by the children of the Empress Josephine, and 
 particularly Eugene de Beauharnais, who had 
 served him with modesty, prudence, and zeal 
 in Italy. This prince was highly esteemed by 
 the Italians, who had never lived under so mild 
 and so enlightened a government, and who for 
 two years past had been resting in the quiet of 
 peace from the horrors of war. 
 
 The crown of Italy continuing for the pre- 
 sent united to that of France, and Eugene de 
 Beauharnais being still only heir presumptive 
 to it, with the title of viceroy, Napoleon re- 
 solved that he should be called Prince of Ve- 
 
 nice, and that this should thenceforward be the 
 title borne by every heir presumptive to the 
 crown of Italy. He created the title of Prin- 
 cess of Bologna for the infant daughter re- 
 cently produced by his marriage with the Prin- 
 cess Augusta of Bavaria. Lastly, desirous of 
 bestowing a new mark of favour on the Duke 
 de Melzi, formerly vice-president of the Italian 
 republic, he created him Duke of Lodi, a title 
 borrowed from one of the splendid achieve- 
 ments of our early campaigns. He then turned 
 his attention towards modifying in some points 
 the constitution of Italy a constitution of little 
 importance in itself, the will of Napoleon doing 
 every thing in Italy, a circumstance not to be 
 regretted for the moment, for, with the excep- 
 tion of the exigences arising from the general 
 war, that will neither purposed nor accom- 
 plished any thing but what was beneficial ther-' 
 The college of the Possidenti, the wealthiest 
 of the three, voted the erection at its expense 
 of a monument to perpetuate the memory of 
 the benefits with which Napoleon had loaded 
 Italy. 
 
 These operations finished, Napoleon set out 
 for Piedmont, inspected the great fortress of 
 Alexandria, complimented on the spot itself 
 General Chasseloup, intrusted with the con- 
 struction of that fortress, then proceeded to 
 Turin, where he granted further advantages to 
 those provinces which had become French, 
 With a view to connect Liguria with Piedmont, 
 he decreed a canal, which, discharging itself 
 into the sea at Savona, and crossing the Apen- 
 nines in their lowest part to reach the Bormida 
 at Carcara, was intended to join the Po and the 
 Mediterranean. He gave orders for the im- 
 provement of the navigation from Alexandria 
 to the Po, so that it should be rendered passa- 
 ble for craft in all seasons. He caused some 
 points on the high road from Alexandria to 
 Savona to be rectified, and determined that it 
 should be put into communication with the 
 Turin road by a branch from Carcara to Ceva. 
 He decided upon the opening of the high road 
 of MontGenevre, through Brian9on, Fenestrelle, 
 and Pignerol, which, joined to that of MontCe- 
 nis, was to complete the communications of 
 France with Piedmont by the Cottian Alps. 
 He decreed also the construction of several 
 bridges : one, of stone, over the Po at Turin ; 
 another, of stone, over the Doira ; one, of wood, 
 over the Sesia, at Verceil ; one, of wood, over 
 the Bormida, between Alexandria and Tortona ; 
 lastly, three, of less importance, likewise of 
 wood, over three streams that run between Tu- 
 rin and Verceil. He took care at the same 
 time to insure financial means sufficient for 
 these extensive works ; for he was not one of 
 those who give orders for new creations, with- 
 out considering how the consequent expenses 
 are to be defrayed. A balance owing by the 
 purchasers of national domains, the produce 
 of the mortgaged domains, an advance raised 
 upon the salt monopoly, were to provide for 
 these useful expenses. 
 
 Napoleon left Turin, accompanied by the ac- 
 clamations of the grateful population, and ar- 
 rived at Paris on the 1st of January, 1808, late 
 in the day, but in time to receive the homage 
 of the court, the public authorities, and tie 
 Parisians. His return to the capital of the 
 Empire was to be the signal for the most im-
 
 428 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1808. 
 
 portent determinations of his reign. It be 
 hoved him, in fact, to adopt some resolution in 
 regard to Spain, for he could no longer defe 
 answering Charles IV. He was obliged also t 
 decide respecting the court of Rome, the rela 
 tions with which became every day more diffi 
 cult. Napoleon was thus about to run agains 
 the two oldest, the two most formidable vestige 
 of the ancient system, the Bourbons of Spain 
 and the Papacy. 
 
 Swayed incessantly, ever since the Continen 
 was pacified, by the systematic idea of placing 
 Bonapartes on all thrones instead of Bourbons 
 drawn towards this object by family feeling am 
 also by his reforming genius, which was avers, 
 to leaving at his side degenerate royalties 
 either useless or prejudicial to the common 
 cause, Napoleon, as we have seen, was agitatec 
 by the most diverse ideas in regard to Spain 
 Three courses presented themselves to his mind 
 the first, to attach Spain to himself by the mar 
 riage of a French princess with the Prince of 
 the Asturias, and by the overthrow of the fa- 
 vourite, without requiring of the Spaniards anj 
 thing that could wound their pride or their am 
 bition ; secondly, to grant all that we have jus 
 mentioned, marriage, overthrow of the favour 
 ite, but to make Spain pay for it by sacrifices 
 of territory, which should secure to us the 
 banks of the Ebro, the coasts of Catalonia, anc 
 the joint possession of the Spanish colonies; 
 thirdly and lastly, to resort to extreme means, 
 that is to say, to dethrone the Bourbons, to im- 
 pose a new dynasty upon the Spaniards, with- 
 out demanding of them any sacrifice of terri- 
 tory, any commercial advantage, and content- 
 ing himself with having, as the sole result, 
 closely bound the destinies of Spain to those 
 of France. 
 
 Of these three courses not one was good, (we 
 shall presently explain why,) but they were far 
 from being equally bad. 
 
 To grant Ferdinand a French princess, to 
 add to this boon the overthrow of the favour- 
 ite, without requiring any sacrifice for this 
 double satisfaction, would have transported the 
 Spanish nation with joy, would have gained 
 him for some time an absolute devotedness on 
 its part, and would have secured him its ener- 
 getic support against any minister who had not 
 kept steadily in the track of French policy. 
 But gratitude in nations, as in individuals, is 
 of brief duration : Spanish jealousy would soon 
 have roused again, when the memory of Napo- 
 leon's benefits was effaced, and Ferdinand, who 
 had all the defects of the Spanish character, 
 without any of its good qualities, would have 
 become in a short time as inimical to France as 
 Emmanuel Godoy. His incapacity, his indo- 
 lence, would have rendered the counsels of Na- 
 poleon as annoying to him, as they were at this 
 moment to the favourite; after a few days' 
 warm gratitude, things would have resumed 
 their old course ; ignorance, carelessness, aver- 
 sion to all improvement, jealousy of foreign 
 superiority, would have been, as in times past, 
 *he character of the Spanish government in a 
 new reign. A French princess, it is true, would 
 have been placed near the throne, to repeat 
 there the good advice proceeding from Paris ; 
 but it would have required a very rare superi- 
 ority to withstand such contrary tendencies, 
 and this very superiority would perhaps have 
 
 rendered her odious. The past was not cheer- 
 ing for a French princess, bringing noble and 
 attractive qualities into Spain. Besides, one 
 cannot create at pleasure princesses enriched 
 with all the gifts of Nature, and those whom 
 Napoleon had then at his disposal gave no in- 
 dications of the brilliant faculties, which the 
 situation would have rendered as necessary for 
 their part as dangerous for themselves. 
 
 The second plan, that of requiring, in consi- 
 deration of the marriage, of the overthrow of 
 the favourite, and of the cession of Portugal, 
 large sacrifices, such as the surrender of the 
 provinces of the Ebro, and the opening of the 
 Spanish colonies to the French, was merely the 
 first. plan greatly aggravated. The provinces 
 of the Ebro offered an advantage more appa- 
 rent than real : for those provinces, on account 
 of their vicinity, disliked the French more than 
 any. They would not, even in time, have con- 
 tracted a fondness for the French, any more 
 than the Milanese have contracted a fondness 
 for Austria. The Pyrenees would always have 
 reminded them that they were Spanish and not 
 French ; and, so far from giving us a soldier or 
 a piastre, it would have cost us a great many 
 men and a great deal of money to keep them. 
 The alleged sway which they would have se- 
 cured to us over Spain, would be, under Napo- 
 leon at least, quite illusory. To start from 
 Pampeluna or Saragossa, instead of Bayonne, 
 for the purpose of marching to Madrid, was 
 not so great a difference as to induce a belief 
 that Spain would thus pass, in regard to us, 
 from a state of independence to a state of sub- 
 mission ; on the contrary, we should have ex- 
 asperated the Spaniards by this dismemberment 
 of their territory; we should have so embit- 
 tered their joy at seeing Ferdinand married to 
 a French princess and the favourite overthrown, 
 that we should have caused ingratitude to 
 spring up on the very first day. Lisbon itself 
 would have had no charms in their eyes, had 
 they been obliged to give Saragossa and Bar- 
 celona for it. As for the opening of the Span- 
 ish colonies to the French, this was a serious 
 advantage, sufficiently serious to be desired, 
 jut easy to be obtained without exciting re- 
 sentment, had it been the only price exacted 
 'or Portugal, the marriage, and the overthrow 
 of the favourite. The second plan, therefore, 
 lad not the merit of attaching Spain to us for 
 a single day; and for the sake of some territo- 
 rial cessions which it would be impossible to 
 etain, it would expose us to the everlasting 
 latred of the Spaniards. 
 
 The third course, towards which Napoleon 
 .ppeared to be urged in an irresistible manner, 
 consisted in dethroning the Bourbons, in the 
 lefinitive. approximation of France and Spain 
 )y the establishment of one and the same dy- 
 nasty in both countries, in regenerating the 
 atter, in order to render it useful either to 
 tself or to the common cause, in taking nothing 
 rom it ; on the contrary, in giving to it every 
 hing, Portugal, the overthrow of the favour- 
 te, internal reforms, in renewing, in short, the 
 jolicy of Louis XIV., which involved nothing 
 oo great for a man who had surpassed all known 
 reatness. Not only had this policy of Louis 
 V. nothing too great for Napoleon, but it 
 as, it must be acknowledged, the natural po- 
 cy of France. To unite in one and the same
 
 van. 1808. J 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 429 
 
 spirit, in one and the same interest, the whole 
 of the West, that is to say, France and the two 
 peninsulas, Italian and Spanish, to oppose their 
 continental power to the coalition of the courts 
 of the North, their maritime power to the pre- 
 tensions of England, was assuredly the true, 
 the legitimate ambition, which one could have 
 wished for Napoleon, that which would have 
 been justified by the rules of sound policy, had 
 it not suG/ieded. But the punishment of the 
 prodigal who has incurred foolish expenses con- 
 sists m being no longer able to defray necessary 
 expenses. Napoleon, for having undertaken in 
 the North an immense, an exorbitant task, out 
 of the real interests of France, such as to con- 
 stitute a French Germany, to the great dis- 
 pleasure of the German populations, to under- 
 take the restoration of Poland in spite of Austria 
 and Prussia, was about to feel the want of those 
 forces, which the execution of the most pro- 
 foundly political designs would have required. 
 He was, in fact, obliged at that very moment 
 10 keep three hundred thousand men between 
 ; he Oder and the Vistula, to insure the submis- 
 aon of Germany and the alliance of Russia, one 
 randred and twenty thousand men in Italy, to 
 leter Austria from all idea of recrossing the 
 Ups. If he required one or two hundred thou- 
 sand more men to coerce Spain, to prevent the 
 entrance of the English, who were likely to find 
 a convenient and firm footing there, for they 
 had merely the Bay of Biscay to cross in order 
 lo reach that country if he must keep these 
 liiferent armies in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, 
 it would be a mass of eight or nine hundred 
 thousand men that became necessary, and there 
 must thence result an extension of cares, of 
 efforts, of command, to which in the end, France 
 and even his genius would prove inadequate. 
 
 What was then passing afforded already a 
 striking proof of this, since, in order to procure 
 troops without weakening the grand army, with- 
 out stripping Germany and Italy, Napoleon was 
 obliged to set his wits to work in a thousand 
 ways, and had not hitherto contrived to find 
 any thing but conscripts, commanded by officers 
 picked up in the depots or dragged from retire- 
 ment. It was a first and strong indication of 
 the situation which Napoleon had created by the 
 immoderate multiplication of his enterprises. 
 Another circumstance served greatly to aggra- 
 vate this insufficiency of resources. The sub- 
 mission of the court of Spain, though mingled 
 with many secret perfidies, though rendered 
 barren by the incapacity of the Spanish admi- 
 nistration, had all the appearance of the most 
 absolute devotedness. Napoleon had, therefore, 
 no specious grievance to allege against the court 
 of the Escurial ; and the dictatorial act of de- 
 throning Charles IV. for reasons highly politic, 
 it is true, but contrary to simple equity, difficult 
 to make the multitude comprehend, and need- 
 ing, besides, definitive success to be admitted, 
 was liable to excite insurrection in a proud, 
 jealous nation, filled with ardent hatred against 
 foreigners. One ran the risk, therefore, of re- 
 volting its moral feeling, and, to repress it, 
 there would have needed forces very different 
 from those which Napoleon was then able to 
 collect. It was not young conscripts, brave no 
 doubt, but not imposing in appearance, that 
 would have been wanted : it was veteran sol- 
 diers, capable of striking terror by their num- 
 
 ber and their aspect, and who, seizing unawares 
 on all points at once of the affrighted Penin- 
 sula, would prevent any outbreak of the public 
 feeling, overawe the half-savage populace of 
 Spain, lastly, afford the middle classes wishing 
 for a new order of things, inclined to hope for 
 it from France, time to confirm themselves in 
 their sentiments and to diffuse them around, 
 them. On these conditions, the extraordinary 
 act to which Napoleon was reduced would have 
 had a chance of succeeding; and, the first 
 movement of revolt being thus prevented, the 
 Spanish nation would have learned by degrees 
 to acknowledge the benefits which France was 
 bringing it. But, attempted with inferior re- 
 sources, the plan of which Napoleon cherished 
 the idea was liable to prove the commencement 
 of a series of disasters. 
 
 There was one more condition necessary for 
 the success of this enterprise, that was to keep 
 up in all its intimacy the new alliance which 
 Napoleon had concluded at Tilsit; for, if he 
 were forced to recommence either the campaign 
 of Austerlitz or that of Friedland while engaged 
 in Spain, besides the difficulty of conqueriLg at 
 these two extremities of the European world, 
 it would be imposing not only a double task 
 upon himself, but rendering the second a hun- 
 dred times more difficult ; for the Spaniards 
 must receive extreme encouragement from any 
 war that might break out in the North. He 
 would then be obliged, whatever condescendence 
 he might show for the ambition of Alexander, 
 to take his own course, and to prevent the in- 
 convenience of the dispersion of the French 
 forces, by purchasing at any price the concur- 
 rence of the great empire of the North ; to pay, 
 in short, with Moldavia and Wallachia for the 
 possibility of dethroning the Bourbons of Spain 
 with impunity. 
 
 Lastly, when all these conditions were at- 
 tained there would still be a serious danger, 
 serious both for Spain and France the possi- 
 ble, nay, probable loss of the rich Spanish 
 colonies. These colonies, in fact, had been 
 already secretly worked up by the spirit of 
 revolt. The example of the United States had 
 strongly developed in them the disposition for 
 independence, and the shameful neglect of the 
 mother-country, which left them without de- 
 fence, disposed them to it still more. There 
 was reason, therefore, to apprehend that a new 
 dynasty, and that imposed upon the nation, 
 would furnish the colonies with the pretext 
 which they were seeking, to rise, and that the 
 English protection would furnish them more- 
 over with the means of doing so. In this case, 
 but too easy to be foreseen, Spain, while wait- 
 ing till she had opened for herself other sources 
 of prosperity, would be ruined, and France 
 would have done nothing more than enrich 
 English commerce with all the advantages 
 which the traffic of the vast Spanish colonies 
 must afford it. 
 
 Such were the three plans between which 
 Napoleon had to choose. They presented, each 
 of them, their inconveniences ; for the first, 
 which would have fulfilled all the wishes of the 
 Spaniards at once, by ridding them of the fa- 
 vourite, by assuring them of the protection of 
 Napoleon through a French marriage, by giv- 
 ing them Lisbon without territorial compensa- 
 tion, would perhaps have been but a cheat
 
 430 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1808. 
 
 The second, which would have required all 
 these advantages to be paid for by a cruel sa- 
 crifice of territory, would have revolted them. 
 The third and last, which solved the question 
 in a decisive manner, which definitively esta- 
 blished friendship between France and Spain, 
 which regenerated the latter, without demand- 
 ing any other sacrifice from her than that of a 
 debased dynasty, might, nevertheless, provoke 
 the nation to insurrection, and would then re- 
 quire such a disposable force as Napoleon had 
 not reserved for himself, and, as a last incon- 
 venience, would bring the Spanish colonies into 
 great danger. 
 
 Every thing considered, Napoleon could not 
 have done better than to adopt the first plan ; 
 that is to say, to deliver Spain from the favour- 
 ite, to grant her the hand of a French princess, 
 to cede Portugal to her, without requiring the 
 provinces of the Ebro in return, which would 
 have raised the popular joy to intoxication, 
 and to demand at most the opening of the colo- 
 nies, perhaps the cession of the Balearic Islands 
 or of the Philippines, from which Spain derived 
 no benefit ; serious and the only desirable ad- 
 vantages, which she would have relinquished 
 to us without regret, and without any change 
 whatever in her sentiments towards us. Her 
 gratitude might not have been of long dura- 
 tion, but it might have lasted long enough for 
 bringing the maritime war to a conclusion, for 
 obtaining, during the latter period of that 
 war, the sincere concurrence of the Spaniards 
 against the English, for acquiring, even in their 
 own estimation, the right to demand it, and, if not 
 obtained, the right to punish their ingratitude. 
 
 But this plan, the only prudent one, because it 
 was the only one which added no new enterprises 
 to those with which the Empire was already 
 overburdened, won no approbation, either from 
 Napoleon, with whose secret desires it dis- 
 agreed, or from M. de Talleyrand, who had not 
 the courage to support it, though he began 
 from that time to be alarmed at the conse- 
 quences that might arise from the policy which 
 he had complaisantly flattered. He had been 
 seen, with a view to regain the imperial favour, 
 obsequiously entering into all Napoleon's ideas, 
 making himself his secret confidant, his patient 
 interlocutor ; and now, prudence counterba- 
 lancing in him the desire to please, he hesi- 
 tated and sought in the second scheme a mid- 
 dle term, in which the courtier and the states- 
 man concurred. He seemed to think that they 
 ought not to enter too deeply into the affairs of 
 the Peninsula ; that it would be well to get all 
 they could from Spain, then leave her to her- 
 self, and, for this purpose, without pretending 
 to the honour of regenerating her, give her a 
 French princess since she desired one, rid her 
 of the favourite since she was tired of him, and 
 lastly give her the reserved portion of Portu- 
 gal, too distant from France to be kept by us, 
 but make her pay for it with Aragon, Catalo- 
 
 i This may serve to explain how it happens that M. de 
 Talleyrand, after flattering more than any other the diepo- 
 Mtiou of Napoleon to interfere in the affairs of Spain, 
 could since maintain that he had dissented from what 
 was done at this period. He had alone encouraged Napo- 
 leon to change the Mate of things in the Peninsula, which 
 rendered the dethronement of the Bourbons almost in- 
 ritable. This fact is proved by authentic documents ; but, 
 In truth, the despatches in which-M. de Talleyrand gives 
 on account of his negotiations with M. Yzquierdo prove 
 that lie preferred a marriage with Ferdinand and the ae- 
 
 nia, the Balearic Islands, the opening of the 
 Spanish colonies, and, having thus obtained 
 compensation for what we should have given, 
 let her alone, but watch her from the top of 
 the walls of Barcelona, Saragossa, and Pam- 
 peluna. 1 Such was the way in which M. de 
 Talleyrand strove to bring back Napoleon from 
 the fatal track into which he had urged him. 
 
 But the latter, who judged soundly of this 
 plan, because he disliked it, perceived as much 
 danger in defying as in adopting the last ; be- 
 cause it was as difficult in his estimation to 
 take Saragossa, Barcelona, and Pampeluna 
 from the Spaniards as to take from them a 
 degraded dynasty. He therefore always turned 
 away from it, and reverted irresistibly to the 
 idea of expelling the Bourbons from the last 
 throne that was left them in Europe, and said 
 to himself that he must take advantage of the 
 moment when he was all-powerful on the Con- 
 tinent, when England had just authorized every 
 thing by her conduct at Copenhagen, when he 
 was young, victorious, obeyed, served by For- 
 tune, to complete his system by a signal blow 
 struck at the Spanish dynasty, after which he, 
 the army, France, the West, would rest them- 
 selves, dazzled with his glory, satisfied with 
 the order which he should have established, 
 with the wise reforms which he should have 
 effected. He said to himself that, after all, 
 the difficulty could not be much greater than 
 that which had been encountered in the king- 
 dom of Naples ; that, supposing the Spaniards 
 to be as energetic as the banditti of the Cala- 
 brias, it would be sufficient to triple or quad- 
 ruple the extent of the Calabrias, and, instead 
 of 25,000 Frenchmen, to imagine 100,000, in 
 order to form an idea of the obstacles to be 
 overcome ; that his young soldiers, who had 
 everywhere proved themselves the best troops 
 in Europe, would certainly be capable of con- 
 quering degenerate Spaniards, and that, by 
 sending to the depots one more conscription, 
 he should have the hundred thousand conscripts 
 and more, necessary for this new enterprise ; 
 that the grand army should remain intact be- 
 tween the Oder and the Vistula, to overawe 
 Europe ; that moreover, Finland, given up to 
 Russia, Moldavia and Wallachia promised, 
 would insure him the concurrence of the Em- 
 peror Alexander in the accomplishment of his 
 designs ; that, in short, what he purposed to 
 do in Spain was the last consequence to be 
 drawn from his victories, the definitive esta- 
 blishment of his family, the complete consum- 
 mation of his destinies. 
 
 However, in January, 1808, on his return 
 from Italy, even after the proceedings at the 
 Escurial, Napoleon's resolution was not irre- 
 vocably taken, and he sometimes recurred to 
 the idea of stopping short at a marriage, which 
 would bind the two houses together, when a 
 family incident gave rise to a sort of material 
 impossibility in regard to this combination. 
 
 quisition of the provinces of the Ebro to the decisive mea- 
 sure of overthrowing the Bourbons. It is by supporting 
 himself on this equivocation that M. de Talleyrand as- 
 serted that h had not approved of the enterprise against 
 Spain. He had, nevertheless, pushed on Napoleon to this 
 enterprise, when men the most worthy of confidence, such 
 as the Arch-chancellor Cambaceres, would have withdrawn 
 him from it; and. after he had so pushed him, the pre- 
 ference given to the very worst of the three possible solu- 
 tions is not a valid manner of redeeming his responsi- 
 bility.
 
 Jan. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 431 
 
 Napoleon had, as we have already related, 
 called to Paris Lucien's daughter by a first 
 marriage, who had been sent to him, that she 
 might not be made a victim to the quarrels of 
 her relations. But, unfortunately, this girl, 
 brought up in exile, often hearing bitter com- 
 plaints against the omnipotent family which 
 shared among themselves all the thrones of 
 Europe, regardless of a distant and forgotten 
 brother this girl had not brought with her to 
 Paris such sentiments as it was desirable that 
 she should have done. Placed about her 
 grandmother, the empress-mother, she never- 
 theless met with a severity from her, with a 
 neglect from her aunts, which could not pro- 
 duce more favourable impressions of those, 
 whom she had been taught to fear more than 
 to love. Accordingly, in her correspondence 
 with her relations in Italy, she expressed the 
 disappointment that she felt. Napoleon, in 
 the supposition that he should send her to 
 share the throne of Spain, desirous of ascer- 
 taining whether she had brought with her 
 Buch dispositions as accorded with his policy, 
 directed that she should be closely watched, 
 and gave orders that her correspondence should 
 be read at the post-office. Scarcely had she 
 arrived in Paris before letters were seized, in 
 which she made reports concerning her grand- 
 mother, her aunts, her uncle Napoleon, far 
 from favourable to the imperial family. When 
 these letters were delivered to Napoleon, he 
 smiled maliciously, and immediately summoned 
 his mother, his brothers, and -his sisters, to the 
 Tuileries, and caused the letters which had 
 been intercepted to be read in family meeting. 
 He was highly diverted at the anger excited in 
 those present at this scene, all of whom were 
 treated harshly enough in this correspond- 
 ence ; then, passing from an ironical mirth to 
 a cold severity, he insisted that his young 
 niece should be sent back within twenty-four 
 hours, and accordingly on the following day 
 she was on the road for Italy. There was 
 then no princess of the Bonaparte family left 
 to be given to Spain ; for Mademoiselle de 
 Tascher, recently admitted into the imperial 
 family, did not belong to that house. 1 Na- 
 poleon had recently adopted this young per- 
 son, niece of the Empress Josephine, and had 
 sent her to Germany, to be there married to 
 the heir of the princely house of Aremberg. 
 In mixing his blood with that of the Bourbons, 
 he wished it to be his own blood, and not that 
 of his wife, strong as was the affection which 
 he felt for her. 
 
 Even without this incident Napoleon would 
 probably have preferred the more decisive 
 measure, that is to say, the dethronement of 
 the Bourbons. At any rate, he had no longer 
 any choice. To overthrow them and to sub- 
 stitute for them a member of his family was 
 the only solution that was left him. But the 
 pretext to be alleged for dethroning them, 
 without deeply wounding the public feeling in 
 Spain, in France, in Europe, was still the point 
 
 1 The Duchess of Abrantes, in her Memoirs, which be- 
 apeak a clover but not well-informed person, says that 
 Prince Lucien's daughter had not come to Paris, and that 
 the refusal of her father to send her thither had thus be- 
 come the cause of important events ; for Napoleon, obliged 
 to renounce the idea of a union with the Bourbons of 
 Spain had from that time resolved to dethrone them. 
 This assertion is inaccurate. Prince Luciea's daughter 
 
 that most embarrassed him. Unable to find it 
 in the abject submission of the Spanish go- 
 vernment to his will, he looked to events for 
 it. The dissensions of the court, the scandal- 
 ous passions of the queen and the favourite, 
 the hatred which they felt for the heir to the 
 crown and that which they excited in him, the 
 impatience of the nation, ready to break forth 
 all these passions, which kept increasing 
 from hour to hour, might produce a sudden 
 explosion, and give rise to the desired pretext. 
 It was easy, moreover, to perceive that the 
 successive introduction of French troops into 
 Spain contributed greatly to increase the im- 
 patience of all minds, by the hopes excited in 
 some, the fears excited in others, the expecta- 
 tions awakened in all, and that it might per- 
 haps end in provoking a catastrophe. Besides, 
 there might arise from all these causes a result 
 highly agreeable to Napoleon, namely the flight 
 of the royal family of Spain, in imitation of 
 the royal family of Portugal, going, like that, 
 to seek an asylum in America. Such a flight 
 would have set Napoleon quite at ease, by giv- 
 ing up to him a vacant throne, which the 
 Spanish nation, in its indignation against the 
 fugitives, might perhaps itself award to him. 
 This new emigration of a European dynasty to 
 America became, from that moment, the solu- 
 tion to which he adhered, as the least odious, 
 the least revolting, for the civilized public. 
 A sure way to bring about this result was to 
 increase the number of the French troops in 
 Spain, while enveloping his intentions in more 
 profound mystery than ever. This he failed 
 not to do. Being obliged to answer the let- 
 ters of Charles IV., which solicited of him the 
 baud of a French princess for Ferdinand and 
 the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, 
 he replied to the first that, highly honoured 
 for his house by the desire expressed by the 
 royal family, of Spain, he must nevertheless 
 beg to be informed, before entering into any 
 explanations, if the Prince of the Asturias, 
 recently prosecuted as a state criminal, had 
 been again taken into favour by his august 
 parents ; for nobody, he said, would ally him- 
 self with a dishonoured son. To the second he 
 answered that affairs were not yet sufficiently 
 advanced in Portugal to permit the adminis- 
 tration to be parcelled out, and above all the 
 military command to be divided, in presence 
 of the English, ready to land ; that he must 
 also beware of agitating the minds of the peo- 
 ple by premature disclosure of the lot which 
 awaited them; that, from all these motives, 
 the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau 
 must be deferred for some time longer. ' It 
 was M. de Vandeul, an employe of the French 
 legation, who had to deliver these two so am- 
 biguous letters without adding any explana- 
 tion tending to diminish the obscurity. To 
 this redoubled mysteriousness Napoleon added 
 a further augmentation of his forces. 
 
 We have seen what pains he had taken to 
 organize the corps destined for Spain without 
 
 did come to Paris, but not stay there on account of tha 
 incident which I have just related. The particulars here 
 given were derived from a member of the imperial family, 
 an eye-witness of the scene described, and from a person- 
 age who is a member of one of our assemblies and wai 
 appointed to conduct the princess to Italy, a commission 
 which be declined.
 
 432 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1808. 
 
 weakening his armies in Germany and Italy. ' 
 He had, in fact, composed the army of Portu- 
 gal with the late camps in Normandy and 
 Bretagne, the army of General Dupont, called 
 Corps of the Gironde, with the three first bat- | 
 talions of the five legions of reserve and some 
 Swiss and Parisian battalions ; the army of j 
 Marshal Moncey, called Corps of Observation 
 of the Coasts of the Ocean, with twelve pro- 
 visional regiments taken from the depots of | 
 the grand army ; the division of the Western j 
 Pyrenees, destined for Pampeluna, with some j 
 battalions left in the camps in Bretagne and j 
 Normandy ; lastly, the division of the Eastern 
 Pyrenees, with the Italian and Neapolitan 
 regiments, which had not served in Germany, 
 and which the return of the army of Italy 
 rendered disposable. These last two divisions 
 he resolved to reinforce, and to form, more- 
 over, a general reserve for all these corps. 
 
 He augmented the division of the Western 
 Pyrenees by adding to it the fourth battalions 
 ef the five legions of reserve, the organization 
 of which was just completed. These amounted 
 to 3000 men, who, added to those already 
 marching by St. Jean-Pied-de-Port for Pam- 
 peluna, would form a division of six or seven 
 thousand, sufficient to occupy that fortress and 
 to observe Aragon. It was placed under the 
 command of General Merle, and General Mou- 
 ton, who had been at first appointed to that 
 command, was commissioned to go and inspect 
 the other corps cTarmee. Napoleon augmented 
 the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, composed 
 of Italians, by adding to it the provisional bat- 
 talions drawn from the French depots situated 
 between Alexandria and Turin, swarming with 
 conscripts already trained. This new French 
 division was to consist of 5000 men, and, added 
 to the Italian division of six or seven thousand, 
 commanded by General Lechi, to form, under 
 General Duhesme, a corps quite sufficient for 
 Catalonia. 
 
 As for the general reserve, Napoleon organ- 
 ized it at Orleans for the infantry, at Poitiers 
 for the cavalry. He had recourse to the same 
 process which he had employed for composing 
 Marshal Moncey's corps, and he assembled at 
 Orleans fresh provisional battalions, drawn 
 from the depots which had not yet furnished 
 detachments for Spain. General Verdier was 
 to command these six new provisional regi- 
 ments of infantry, designated by the numbers 
 13 to 18. Napoleon assembled at Poitiers four 
 new provisional regiments of cavalry, likewise 
 drawn from the depots, consisting of 3000 
 horse of all arms, cuirassiers, dragoons, hus- 
 sars, and chasseurs, under a general of cavalry 
 of distinguished merit, General Lasalle. He 
 restored to the camp of Boulogne, to the gar- 
 rison of Paris, and to the camps in Bretagne, 
 the ten old regiments brought back from the 
 grand army ; which prepared for him, in case 
 of need, new reserves of a superior quality. 
 Lastly, he despatched secretly for Bordeaux 
 some detachments of the imperial guard, in- 
 fantry, cavalry, and artillery, expecting that 
 he should be obliged to go himself to Spain, to 
 bring about the denotement which he desired. I 
 Computing General Dupont's corps at 25 thou- j 
 Band men, Marshal Moncey's at 32 thousand, 
 the division of the Western Pyrenees at 6 or 7, 
 the corps of the Eastern Pyrenees at 11 or 12, ! 
 
 the two reserves of Orleans and Poitiers at 10 
 thousand, the troops of the guard at 2 or 8 
 thousand, the whole force destined for Spam 
 may be set down at 80 and some odd thousand 
 men, exclusive of the army of Portugal, form- 
 ing a total amount of more than 100,000 new 
 soldiers destined for the Peninsula. But they 
 were so young, so little inured to fatigue, that 
 there was reason to expect a great difference 
 between the number of men entered on the 
 muster-roll and the number of the men pre- 
 sent under arms. However, one-fourth of this 
 effective was still on march in the course of 
 January, 1808. Napoleon, with a view to ad- 
 vance the denotement, prescribed to his troops 
 a decided movement upon Madrid. The high 
 road leading to that capital divaricates oppo- 
 site to Burgos. One branch passes through 
 the Kingdom of Leon, by Valladolid and Se- 
 govia, crosses the Guadarrama towards St. 
 Ildefonso, and descends by the Escurial upon 
 Madrid. The other traverses Old Castillo, 
 passing through Aranda, crosses the Guadar- 
 rama at Somosiarra, a name famous in our 
 military annals, and descends by Buitrago and 
 Chamartin upon Madrid. The two corps of 
 Dupont and Moncey being, the first at Valla- 
 dolid, (in the route to Salamanca,) the second 
 between Vittoria and Burgos, before the di- 
 varication, had not yet taken a single step 
 which could betray the intention of marching 
 upon Madrid. Napoleon ordered General Du- 
 pont to direct one of his divisions upon Se- 
 govia, and Marshal Moncey one of his upon 
 Aranda, upon pretext of extending himself 
 for the sake of subsistence. From that mo- 
 ment the direction upon Madrid would be un- 
 masked. But the entry of the French troops 
 into Catalonia and Navarre, which it was at 
 length necessary to prescribe, in order to 
 occupy Barcelona, told still more plainly that 
 the real object of these movements was a very 
 different one from Lisbon. For the purpose 
 of furnishing an explanation that would be but 
 half credible, Napoleon, while ordering Gene- 
 ral Duhesme to penetrate into Catalonia, Ge- 
 neral Merle to enter Navarre, instructed M. 
 de Beauharnais to announce the intention of 
 a double movement of troops upon Cadiz, one 
 through Catalonia, the other through Estra- 
 madura and Andalusia. The French fleet lying 
 at Cadiz might be the motive of this expedi- 
 tion. If, however, this alleged object was in 
 some degree doubted, either at court or in the 
 country, nothing further could result from it 
 than an increased agitation, which Napoleon 
 would not be sorry for, since he wished to 
 bring about, if not immediately at least speed- 
 ily, the flight of the royal family. 
 
 Napoleon found too great advantage in keep- 
 ing his depots continually full, by means of 
 conscripts, called out beforehand, and trained 
 for twelve or fifteen months before they were 
 employed, not to persevere in this system of 
 anticipated conscription, especially at a mo- 
 ment when he purposed to form numerous 
 camps along the whole coast of Europe by the 
 side of his fleets. In consequence, after de- 
 manding the conscription t>f 1808 in the spring 
 of 1807, he resolved to demand the conscrip- 
 tion of 1809 in the winter of 1808. This de- 
 mand furnished him, besides, with occasion for 
 a communication to the Senate, and for a spe-
 
 Jan. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 433 
 
 cious explanation of the immense assemblage 
 of troops collecting at the foot of the Pyrenees. 
 The Senate was therefoic called together on 
 the 21st of January, to hear a report on the 
 negotiations with Portugal, and on the resolu- 
 tion taken, nay already executed, of seizing the 
 patrimony of the house of Braganza. This 
 was made a text for developing the system of 
 occupation of all the coasts of the Continent, 
 in order to reply to the maritime blockade by 
 the continental blockade. The conscription of 
 1808, said M. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, 
 author of the report presented to the Senate, 
 had been the signal and the means of the con- 
 tinental peace signed at Tilsit ; the conscription 
 of 1809 would be the signal for the maritime 
 peace. The latter, unfortunately, was still to 
 be signed in a place that no man knew or could 
 tell. The promise to employ in the depots alone 
 the young conscripts called out a year before- 
 hand was renewed on this occasion, to weaken 
 the moral effect of these anticipated calls. An- 
 other report declared the incorporation with the 
 Empire, in consequence of anterior treaties, of 
 Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, and Flushing; Kehl and 
 Cassel as indispensable annexions to the for- 
 tresses of Strasburg and Mayence ; Wesel as a 
 point of great importance on the lower course 
 of the Rhine ; lastly, Flushing, as the port of 
 a maritime establishment, to which Antwerp 
 was the dock-yard. This last communication 
 led to an imperial profession of faith respect- 
 ing the disinterestedness of France, which, hav- 
 ing had in her hands Austria, Germany, Prussia, 
 Poland, had kept nothing for herself, and was 
 content with such insignificant acquisitions as 
 Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, or Flushing. Napoleon 
 meant the new kingdom of Westphalia, for in- 
 stance, to be considered not as an extension of 
 territory, since it was given to an independent 
 prince, but as a mere extension of the federa- 
 tive system of the French Empire. 
 
 Good or bad, these argumentations, submitted 
 in brilliant and magniloquent language, for 
 which Napoleon furnished the ideas and M. 
 Regnault the style, were received, as usual, 
 with a respectful inclination of the head by the 
 senators, and followed by the vote of the con- 
 scription of 1809. 
 
 This new contingent of 80,000 men would 
 raise the mass of the French troops spread 
 ovr the banks of the Vistula and the Oder, the 
 shores of the Baltic, the Alps, thePo, the Adige, 
 the Isonzo, the coasts of Illyria and of the Ca- 
 labrias, lastly on the Ebro and on the Tagus, 
 to nearly 900,000 men. Adding to these 100,000 
 allies at least, here were more than a million 
 of men, three-fourths of whom were veteran sol- 
 diers, equal at least to the soldiers of Caesar, and 
 led by a man, who, in point of military genius, 
 was superior to the Roman captain. What was 
 there impossible with such colossal forces, the 
 greatest that mortal ever had at his disposal, if 
 political prudence had but stepped in to repress 
 the intoxication of victory ? Napoleon, when 
 enumerating them, felt a dangerous satisfac- 
 tion : he was puzzled only how to pay them, but 
 reckoned upon the continuation of the war to 
 enable them to live in foreign countries, or upon 
 a peace to permit him to reduce their effective 
 without diminishing their skeletons. Sup- 
 ported by this prodigious military power, he 
 dared to will any thing, to attempt any thing, 
 
 VOL. II. 55 
 
 considering himself, at that height, as above all 
 the rules of ordinary morality, empowered to 
 give and take away thrones, like another Pro- 
 vidence, always justified like it by the vastness 
 of his designs and of the results. 
 
 From this period dates the origin of an idea, 
 with which Napoleon was ever afterwards pre- 
 possessed on the subject of military organiza- 
 tion, which was not absolutely good in itself, 
 but which for him alone might have had ad- 
 vantages : this was to convert the French regi- 
 ments into legions, nearly resembling the Roman 
 legions. The battalion, composed of seven or 
 eight hundred men, and having for its measure 
 the physical power of man, who cannot com- 
 mand directly a greater number ; the regiment, 
 composed of three or four battalions, and hav- 
 ing for its measure the solicitude of the colonel, 
 who cannot extend paternal care to a greater 
 number of individuals, have been, in modern 
 times, the basis of the military organization. 
 With several regiments has been formed the 
 brigade, with several brigades, the division, 
 with several divisions the army. In general 
 there has been left on the frontiers a battalion, 
 called the depot battalion, in which it has been 
 customary to collect all the weakly men, con- 
 valescents, untrained recruits, with the officers 
 least capable of active service, to serve at once 
 as a place of rest and instruction, and to fur- 
 nish the war battalions with a constant recruit. 
 It was by managing this organization with pro- 
 found skill, that Napoleon had contrived to cre- 
 ate those armies, which, starting from the Rhine, 
 sometimes from the Adize or the Volturno, went 
 to fight and to conquer on the Vistula or the 
 Niemen. The constant attention bestowed on 
 the depots had been the secret cause of his suc- 
 cesses, as much as his genius for war. Now 
 his art was about to become complicated, his 
 solicitude extended, in proportion as these de- 
 pots, placed on the Po and on the Rhine, hav- 
 ing already sent detachments to the armies in 
 Prussia and Poland, were required to send more 
 to the armies in Spain, Portugal, and Illyria. 
 To follow with the eye 116 French regiments 
 of infantry, 80 of cavalry, from which have 
 been drawn a considerable number of provi- 
 sional corps, besides the imperial guard, the 
 Swiss, the Poles, the Italians, the Irish, and 
 the German and Spanish auxiliaries ; to follow 
 with the eye the regiment and its detachments 
 in every country, to direct its formation, train- 
 ing, location, so as to be assured of the best 
 employment of each, and to prevent the disor- 
 ganization which might arise from the disloca- 
 tion of parts, for a regiment whose depot was 
 on the Rhine had sometimes battalions in Po- 
 land, Germany, Spain, Portugal all this re- 
 quired a laborious and singularly wearisome 
 attention, even for the most indefatigable of all 
 geniuses. Napoleon, therefore, conceived the 
 idea of sixty legions, instead of a hundred and 
 twenty regiments, each composed of eight war 
 battalions, commanded by a martchal-de-camp. 
 several colonels and lieutenant-colonels, capa- 
 ble of furnishing war-battalions in Poland, in 
 Italy, and in Spain, and having a single depot, 
 to which all the detachments drawn from it 
 should be sent back. This was a departure 
 from the principle of the regiment, a juster 
 basis, as we have observed, since it has for its 
 measure the physical force of the chef-de-balail- 
 20
 
 434 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 Ion, and the moral force of the colonel, and sub- 
 stituted in its stead a new and completely arbi- 
 trary composition, for the convenience of a 
 unique position, unique as the genius and the 
 fortune of Napoleon ; for who, excepting him, 
 could ever have battalions of one and the same 
 regiment to send to Poland, to Italy, to Spain ? 
 This conception he had so much at heart, that 
 he never afterwards ceased to think of it dur- 
 ing his reign, and even in exile. However, 
 upon the objections of Messrs. Lacude and 
 Clarke, he contented himself with a middle plan, 
 which, instead of abandoning the principle of 
 the regiment, augmented its composition, so as 
 to diminish the total number of the corps. He 
 decided by a decree, which was not definitively 
 signed till the 18th of February, that all the 
 infantry regiments should be composed of five 
 battalions, four for war, one at the depot ; each 
 battalion, of six companies, one of grenadiers, 
 one of voltigeurs, and four of fusileers. The 
 depot battalion was fixed at four companies 
 only, as the companies of the elite were not to 
 be formed unless in war. Agreeably to this 
 decree, each company consisted of 140 men, 
 and the whole regiment of 3970, 108 of whom 
 were officers, and 38C2 subalterns and privates. 
 The colonel and four chefs-de-bataillon com- 
 manded the war battalions, and the major re- 
 mained at the depot. In this formation, which 
 already exceeded the natural proportions of 
 the regiment, and which was induced by the 
 situation of Napoleon and France, a regiment 
 having its depot on the Rhine, for example, 
 could have two war battalions with the grand 
 army, one on the coast of Normandy, and one 
 in Spain. A regiment having its depot in Pied- 
 mont, might have two of its war battalions in 
 Dalmatia, one in Lombardy, and one in Cata- 
 lonia. In this manner all the corps had a share 
 in all the species of warfare at once ; and, 
 when hostilities ceased in the North, care was 
 taken to allow all those who had just served in 
 Poland to rest themselves, and to send off for 
 Spain all who had not been in the late cam- 
 paigns, or all which had either strength or the 
 desire to make several successively. But this 
 composition of the regiments, which had per- 
 haps some advantages for Napoleon and for the 
 Empire, such as it had become, is a singular 
 proof of the influence which an extreme policy 
 exercised already on the military organization. 
 While the extension of his enterprises was about 
 to weaken the armies of Napoleon by dispers- 
 ing them, it was about to weaken also the regi- 
 ment itself, by extending it beyond measure, 
 by diminishing the energy of family spirit in 
 brethern in arms, too distant from one another. 
 A military corps is a whole, which has its natural 
 proportions, its architecture, if one may be al- 
 lowed the expression, which we are liable to dis- 
 tort by any attempt to extend it too much. 
 
 For the rest, several dispositions of this de- 
 cree revealed the noble and manly sentiments 
 of the great man who had conceived it. The 
 eagle of the regiment, an object of the respect, 
 the love, the devotedness of the soldiers, for it 
 is their honour, was always to be where the 
 greatest number of battalions were, and to be 
 consigned to the care of the eagle-bearer, who 
 was to have the rank and pay of lieutenant, 
 who should have served ten years, or have dis- 
 tinguished himself in the campaigns of Ulm, 
 
 [Jan. 1808. 
 
 Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland. Beside him were 
 to be placed, with the title of second and third 
 eagle-bearer, with the rank of sergeant and the 
 pay of sergeant-major, two old soldiers, who 
 had been in the great battles, but who had not 
 been able to obtain promotion, as illiterate men. 
 It was a worthy mode of employing and reward- 
 ing brave fellows, whose intelligence was not 
 equal to their courage. Every thing in the 
 State received, as we see, the influence of the 
 immoderate genius of Napoleon and the impress 
 of his great soul. 
 
 Elevated by the sense of his power, conceiv- 
 ing that he had a right to do whatever he 
 pleased, since England had dared to do every 
 thing, considering the continental war as 
 finished, and the prolongation of the maritime 
 war as a useless delay of the completion of his 
 plans, Napoleon resolved to demolish all the 
 obstacles that counteracted his will. While he 
 was giving the orders that we have just stated, 
 for the purpose of bringing the Peninsula into 
 the system of his Empire, he issued nearly 
 similar orders for bringing the Italian Peninsula 
 into the same system, and for putting an end, 
 on the one hand, to the sovereignty of the Pope, 
 who annoyed him in the centre of Italy, on the 
 other, to that of the Bourbons of Naples who de- 
 fied him from the centre of the island of Sicily. 
 We have seen how the refusal to restore the 
 Legations to the Holy See, after the coronation, 
 then the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, 
 which had completely reduced the Roman States 
 to a mere enclosure of the French Empire, had 
 successively galled Pius VII., and converted 
 his habitual mildness into a continual and some- 
 times violent irritation against Napoleon, to 
 whom he was nevertheless attached. The pri- 
 vation of the principalities of Benevento and 
 Ponte Corvo, granted to M. de Talleyrand and 
 to Marshal Bernadotte, the occupation of An- 
 cona, the continual passages of French troops, 
 1 had raised the displeasure and the exasperation 
 I of his Holiness to the utmost. Accordingly, lie 
 ! refused to comply with any of the applications 
 ! of France, and rejected them all, some for 
 j specious reasons, others for reasons which were 
 j not specious, and which he took no pains to 
 render so. He had, in the first place, refused 
 j to annul the first marriage of Prince Jerome, 
 consummated without any formality ; and could 
 not be induced to do any thing more than wink 
 I at the dissolution pronounced by the French 
 ! ecclesiastical authority. He had refused to 
 1 acknowledge Joseph as King of Naples, received 
 at Rome the refractory Neapolitan cardinals, and 
 given asylum in the suburbs of that capital 
 to all the banditti who murdered the French 
 soldiers. He had kept with him the consul of 
 the dethroned King of Naples, alleging that this 
 king, who' had retired to Sicily, was at least 
 sovereign of that island, and consequently had 
 a right to keep a representative at Rome. He 
 had not consented to exclude the English from 
 the Roman States, saying that he was an in- 
 dependent sovereign, and that, as such, he 
 could be at peace or war with whomsoever he 
 pleased ; adding that, in his quality of head of 
 the Christian Church, his- duty forbade him to 
 go to war with any of the Christian powers, even 
 though not Catholic. He delayed the canonical 
 institution of the bishops, insisted on a journey 
 to Rome in the case of the Italian bishops,
 
 Jan. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 435 
 
 contested the extension of the French Concor- i 
 dat to the Italian provinces which had become 
 French, such as Liguria and Piedmont, and the 
 extension of the Italian Concordat to the Vene- j 
 tian provinces, annexed the last to the kingdom 
 of Italy. Lastly, he would not assent to any 
 of the arrangements proposed for the new Ger- 
 man Church; and on every subject, be it what 
 it might, he objected the natural difficulties 
 arising out of it, and gladly created such as 
 did not exist. Napoleon thus reaped the re- 
 ward of his neglect to satisfy the court of 
 Borne, which he could have kept in the best 
 dispositions by means of a few sacrifices of ter- 
 ritory that would have been easy to him ; for, 
 without touching the kingdoms of Lombardy 
 aud Naples, he had Parma, Placentia, Tuscany, 
 for rounding the dominions of the Holy See. It 
 is true that his imperious determination to sub- 
 ject all Italy to his system of warfare against 
 the English would have proved, in any case, a 
 serious difficulty. But assuredly it would have 
 been possible to obtain from the satisfied Pope, 
 tinder the form of a treaty of alliance, offensive 
 and defensive, his adhesion to all the conditions 
 of war which he meant to impose upon Italy. 
 
 Taking no account of the motives which had 
 alienated his Holiness from him, Napoleon 
 ordered him to be told, "You are Sovereign of 
 Rome, it is true, but comprised in the French 
 Empire ; you are Pope, I am Emperor, such as 
 were the German emperors, such as Charle- 
 magne was still more anciently ; and I am Char- 
 lemagne for you by more than one title, by 
 title of power, by title of benefaction. You 
 will, therefore, obey the laws of the federative 
 system of the Empire, and close your territory 
 against my enemies." The manner of this pre- 
 tension offended Pius VII. still more than the 
 matter. His eyes, usually so mild, flashed with 
 all the fire of indignation, and he declared to 
 Cardinal Fesch that he recognised no sovereign 
 above him upon earth ; that, if it were intended 
 to renew the tyranny of the German emperors 
 of the middle ages, he would renew the resist- 
 ance of Gregory VII. ; and that, though it was 
 alleged that the spiritual arms had lost their 
 force, he would show that they could still be 
 powerful against a sovereign of recent origin, 
 whom he had consecrated with his own hands, 
 and who owed part of his moral authority to 
 that consecration. To this Napoleon replied 
 that, in the 19th century, he feared the spiritual 
 arms but little ; that, however, he would not 
 afford any legitimate pretext for their employ- 
 ment, by abstaining from touching religious 
 matters ; that he should do no more than strike 
 the temporal sovereign ; that he should leave 
 at the Vatican the respected Bishop of Rome, 
 the chief of the bishops of Christendom, and, 
 as for the temporal prince, whose spiritual 
 sovereignty should have received no injury, not 
 a creature either in France or Spain would in- 
 terest himself about him. 
 
 Cardinal Fesch, whose haughty and meddling 
 disposition and inferior capacity were liable to 
 embroil the easiest negotiations, having been 
 superseded by M. Alquier, accustomed succes- 
 sively, at the courts of Madrid and Naples, to 
 treat with the old royalties, and disposed to 
 humour them, the situation had nevertheless 
 remained the same, and the relations bet'vceii 
 the two governments had retained A 1 t uir , 
 
 acrimony. The pontifical court, however, re- 
 solved to send a cardinal to Paris, to put an 
 end by a compromise to the differences which 
 divided Rome and the Empire, and made choice 
 of Cardinal Litta. Napoleon rejected him as 
 one of the cardinals animated with the worst 
 spirit. It then selected the French Cardinal 
 de Bayanne, an enlightened and discreet mem- 
 ber of the Sacred College. At the same time, 
 the Pope, to prove that Cardinal Consalvi was 
 not the instigator of his resistance, as Napoleon 
 supposed, took from this friend the secretary- 
 ship of state, and gave it to an aged prelate, 
 without talent and without energy Cardinal 
 Casoni. They shall see, he exclaimed, with a 
 pride, which, notwithstanding his mildness, 
 would break forth all at once when he was ir- 
 ritated they shall see that it is with me, with 
 me alone, they have to deal: it is I who must 
 be crushed, trampled under foot by French sol- 
 diers, if they are resolved to do violence to my 
 authority. 
 
 Napoleon, ceasing to impose upon himself any 
 restraint, as we have said, caused the provinces 
 of Urbino, Ancona, and Macerata, which formed 
 the coast of the Adriatic, to be militarily occu- 
 pied by General Lemarois ; and then the Holy 
 See, Pope and cardinals, fearing that these 
 provinces would ultimately share the fate of 
 the Legations, thought for a moment of com- 
 pounding, and an accommodation took place, 
 the conditions of which were the following : 
 
 The Pope, independent sovereign of his do- 
 mains, proclaimed such, guarantied such, by 
 France, would nevertheless contract an alliance 
 with her, and whenever she may be at war, 
 would exclude her enemies from the territory 
 of the Roman States : 
 
 The French troops should occupy Ancona, 
 Civita Vecchia, and Ostia, but be subsisted at 
 the expense of the French government : 
 
 The Pope would engage to clear and put into 
 good condition, the muddy harbour of Ancona ; 
 
 He would recognise King Joseph, send away 
 King Ferdinand's consul, the murderers of the 
 French, and the Neapolitan cardinals refusing 
 the oath, and renounce his ancient right of in- 
 vestiture over the crown of Naples ; 
 
 He would consent to extend the Concordat of 
 Italy and the Concordat of France to all the pro- 
 vinces of Italy converted into French provinces ; 
 
 He would nominate without delay the French 
 and Italian bishops, and not require the latter 
 to travel to Rome : 
 
 He would appoint plenipotentiaries charged 
 to conclude a Germanic Concordat ; 
 
 Lastly, to satisfy Napoleon respecting the 
 spirit of the Sacred College, and to proportion 
 the influence of France to the extension of her 
 territory, he would increase the number of the 
 French cardinals to one-third of the total num- 
 ber of the cardinals. 
 
 This arrangement was nearly completed when 
 the Pope, impelled by unlucky suggestions, and 
 in particular offended by two clauses, that 
 which obliged the Holy See to close its territory 
 against the enemies of France, and that which 
 increased the number of the French cardinals 
 clauses, the first of which was inevitable in 
 the situation of the Roman States, and the 
 second adapted to pacify for th<> future- -the 
 Pope peremptorily refused his assent. 
 
 Then, without listening further to a single
 
 430 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Jan. 1808. 
 
 observation, without listening to the offer of with- 
 drawing a first refusal, he ordered passports 
 to be sent to the Cardinal de Baynnne, and 
 despatched the necessary orders for the inva- 
 sion of the Roman States. At bottom, he was 
 decided, there, as in Spain, to come to a defini- 
 tive solution, that is to say, to leave the Pope 
 at the Vatican, with an ample revenue, with a 
 purely spiritual authority, and to deprive him 
 of the temporal sovereignty of central Italy. 
 But, expecting to have to do with the Spaniards 
 in two or three months, that is, towards Easter, 
 he had no wish that religious causes should be 
 added to political causes to irritate a fanatical 
 people. He formed, therefore, the design of 
 occupying for the moment Rome and the pro- 
 vinces bordering the Mediterranean, as he had 
 already caused those which bordered the Adri- 
 atic to be occupied. Accordingly, he ordered 
 the general commanding in Tuscany to assemble 
 2500 men at Perugia, General Lemarois to 
 march as many upon Foligno, General Miollis 
 to put himself at the head of these two brigades, 
 to advance upon Rome, to pick up by the way 
 a column of 3000 men, ordered by Joseph to 
 start from Terracina, and with these 8000 
 soldiers, to take possession of the capital of 
 the Christian world. General Miollis was to 
 enter, by fair means or by force, the Castle of 
 St. Angelo, to take the command of the Papal 
 troops, to leave the Pope at the Vatican with 
 a guard of honour, to interfere in no respect in 
 the government, to say that he came to occupy 
 Rome for a longer or shorter time, in a purely 
 military interest, and to keep off the enemies 
 of France from the Roman States. He was 
 to make himself master of the police alone, 
 to expel all the banditti who made Rome 
 their retreat, to send off the Neapolitan cardi- 
 nals to Naples, and to have recourse to the 
 public chests for what was necessary for the 
 maintenance of the French troops. 
 
 The illustrious Miollis, an old soldier of the 
 republic, combining with an inflexible character 
 a most cultivated mind, the purest probity, 
 and much experience in treating with Italian 
 princes, was better qualified than any other for 
 performing this rigorous commission and pay- 
 ing at the same time the respect due to the 
 head of Christendom. Napoleon allowed him 
 a considerable salary, with orders to live in 
 high style at Rome, and to accustom the Ro- 
 mans to regard the French general established 
 at the Castle of St. Angelo as the real head of 
 the government, much more than the pontiff 
 left at the Vatican. 
 
 The invasion of Portugal had drawn towards 
 Gibraltar the troops which the English had in 
 Sicily, and those which they had brought back 
 beaten from Alexandria. Not more than seven 
 or eight thousand men were left in Sicily to 
 preserve that wreck of her crown for their un- 
 fortunate victim, Queen Caroline. This was 
 The time for preparing an expedition against 
 that island, and to take advantage of the junc- 
 tion of the French fleets in the Mediterranean 
 to convey that expedition. Napoleon had or- 
 dered Admiral Rosily, commanding the French 
 fleet at Cadiz, and Admiral Allemand, com- 
 manding the fine Rochefort division, to weigh 
 anchor on the first favourable occasion, and to 
 form a junction with the Toulon division. At 
 his instigation, the same order had been given 
 
 to the Spanish division at Carthagena, com 
 manded by Admiral Valdes, an order executeo 
 with tolerable punctuality, since the Spanish 
 government showed itself so submissive, and 
 he expected to have twenty and odd sail at 
 Toulon under Admiral Ganteaume, if all these 
 junctions were successfully effected. With one 
 only of these junctions, that of the Rochefort 
 squadron, one of the most probable on account 
 of the point of starting, and the most desirable 
 on account of the quality of the crews and of 
 the commander, there would be ships sufficient 
 to transport an army to Sicily and to revictual 
 Corfu, the second and not the least important 
 object of the expedition. He therefore ordered 
 Admiral Ganteaume to collect at Toulon, and 
 to take on board the division already assembled 
 in that port a considerable mass of stores of all 
 kinds, such as corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, 
 gun-carriages, tools ; and to land this cargo at 
 Corfu, whatever might be the success of the 
 operations against Sicily. He directed Joseph 
 to assemble at Baiae eight or nine thousand 
 men, completely equipped, and at Scylla, oppo- 
 site to the light-house, seven or eight thousand 
 more, with a great quantity of feluccas and 
 craft, capable of crossing the small arm of the 
 sea which separates Sicily from Calabria. He 
 desired that every thing should be ready, so 
 that Admiral Ganteaume, having left Toulon 
 and arrived off Baise, might embark the eight 
 or nine thousand men concentrated at that 
 point, convey them in twenty-four hours to the 
 north of the light-house, where the other seven 
 or eight thousand assembled at Scylla and em- 
 barked in the small vessels that should have 
 been procured, would have arrived on their 
 part. With these 15 or 16 thousand men the 
 light-house was to be taken, and armed as well 
 as the fort of Scylla, and these two points 
 which closed the Strait being gained by the 
 French, they would make themselves masters 
 for ever of the passage. This result obtained, 
 not an English soldier would dare to remain in 
 Sicily. 
 
 But this bold enterprise presupposed that the 
 orders repeated by Napoleon relative .to the 
 two points which the English still possessed on 
 the coast of Calabria, Scylla and Reggio, would 
 have been carried into execution. Napoleon 
 had several times been angry with Joseph, be- 
 cause, with an army of more than 40,000 men, 
 he suffered the English still to possess a foot 
 of the continent of Italy. " It is a shame," he 
 wrote to him, " that the English can still resist 
 us upon land. I beg you not to write to me till 
 this disgrace is retrieved ; and, if it is not soon, 
 I will send one of my generals to supersede you 
 in the command of my army in Naples." Joseph, 
 smarting under these reproaches, had charged 
 General Regnier to attack the two fortified 
 points of Scylla and Reggio, which so grievously 
 offended the eyes of Napoleon. They were on 
 the point of being taken but they were not 
 taken. Napoleon was extremely angry. How- 
 ever, his irritation against his brother's want 
 of energy made no change in the state of things; 
 it was agreed that the plan of the expedition 
 should be modified, for it was impossible to be 
 master of the strait, while the coast of the Ca- 
 labrias, which ought naturally to have belonged 
 to the French, was not yet in their possession. 
 I In consequence Admiral Ganteaume was to
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 437 
 
 proceed first to Corfu, to land the vast mass of 
 warlike stores on board the fleet, then to return 
 to the strait, touch at Reggio, which would 
 probably be taken at the presumed time of his 
 appearance in these seas, embark a dozen thou- 
 sand men there, and convey them by the inte- 
 rior of the strait to the south of the light-house. 
 The season was an additional motive with Ad- 
 miral Ganteaume for thus acting; for, in ope- 
 rating by the interior of the strait and to the 
 south of the light-house, he should be screened 
 from the violent winds, which in winter blow 
 from the north-west and render the approach 
 to the north coast of Sicily dangerous. 
 
 These dispositions being adopted, Admiral 
 Ganteaume held himself in readiness to embark 
 on the first appearance of one of the naval di- 
 visions expected every moment from Cartha- 
 gena, Cadiz, or Rochefort. The reader will re- 
 collect, no doubt, that on the very judicious 
 observations of Admiral Decres, it had been 
 agreed that the Brest and Lorient divisions 
 should remain at sea, and that those of Roche- 
 fort and Cadiz should alone receive orders to 
 penetrate into the Mediterranean. Admiral 
 Rosily was extremely anxious to leave Cadiz, 
 where he had been detained upwards of two 
 years. But it was more difficult for him to get 
 out than any other, on account of the Strait of 
 Gibraltar. It is to the immensity of the seas 
 that the facility of escape is owing ; but in the 
 narrow channel of a strait, within reach of such 
 a post as Gibraltar, it is impossible to elude an 
 enemy and to give him the slip. The sea be- 
 tween the coast of Spain and that of Africa 
 was covered with small vessels mounting guard 
 for the English fleet, which kept in the offing, 
 in order to entice Admiral Rosily to venture 
 out. But no sooner was he under weigh than 
 the whole naval force of the enemy was seen 
 bearing down upon him. Rosily's division was 
 completely armed, thanks to the resources of 
 the port of Cadiz, abundant for the French go- 
 vernment, which paid well, null for the Spanish 
 government, which never paid. It was man- 
 ned, moreover, by excellent crews, which had 
 been at sea and sustained the greatest sea- 
 fight of the age, that of Trafalgar. Admiral 
 Rosily, an old seaman, as experienced as he 
 was brave, would not have shrunk from fighting 
 an English division, even superior in force to 
 his own ; but, with six sail of the line and two 
 or three frigates, he could not defy twelve or 
 fifteen sail of the line and a multitude of fri- 
 gates without running the risk of a fresh dis- 
 aster. Thus, though he had received the order 
 to leave Cadiz in September, 1807, he had not 
 succeeded in getting out in February, 1808. 
 
 Rear-admiral Allemand, the boldest naval 
 officer that France then had, especially as a 
 navigator, found himself also closely blockaded 
 in Rochefort, and the disasters experienced by 
 Captain Soleil's frigates furnished a proof of 
 this. But once out of the Pertuis by a daring 
 venture, the ocean expanded before him, and, 
 with excellent crews, good ships, and his bold- 
 ness at sea, he had many chances of escaping 
 the English. Several times he weighed anchor, 
 and several times he beheld the enemy bearing 
 down in such number, that it would have been 
 impossible to escape. One day, however, the 
 17th of January, 1808, favoured by thick wea- 
 ther, he set sail, got out unperceived, dashed 
 
 into the Bay of Biscay, and doubled Cape Orte- 
 gal without accident, ran along the whole of 
 Spain, arrived within sight of the projecting 
 coasts of Europe and Africa, and in a dark 
 night, and with a tremendous west wind, he 
 threw himself boldly into the strait, so well 
 guarded that Admiral Rosily could not have 
 appeared in it had he not covered himself with 
 English colours. It has long been proverbially 
 said that Fortune favours the brave ; on this 
 occasion, at any rate, she certainly did ; for, in 
 a few hours Admiral Allemand found himself, 
 with his whole division in the open Mediterra- 
 nean, having passed Gibraltar and Ceuta with- 
 out being perceived. On the 3d of February, 
 i he appeared in sight of Toulon, and made a 
 signal to Admiral Ganteaume to come out, that 
 they might proceed together to the goal marked 
 for them by the Emperor. The joy of this 
 brave seaman was extreme, at having performed 
 so successfully such a dangerous trip. 
 
 The Spanish division at Carthagena, much 
 less closely watched than that of Admiral 
 Rosily, because it was more than a hundred 
 leagues from the strait, and at that time the 
 people ceased to do the Spanish navy so much 
 honour as to believe it to be enterprising the 
 division at Carthagena had few difficulties to 
 conquer in order to get out. It had, therefore, 
 been able to weigh anchor and to sail for Toulon, 
 agreeably to the orders of Napoleon. It was 
 commanded by Admiral Valdes, and composed 
 of one very fine three-decker, one ship of 80, 
 and four of 74 guns. After lying immovably 
 in the harbour for three years, their bottoms 
 were foul ; they were but moderately manned, 
 and had not on board provisions for three 
 months. Whether the admiral had received 
 secret orders not to execute his commission, or 
 the timidity of the Spanish sailors had become 
 extreme, the squadron had sailed round the 
 Balearic Islands, to find an asylum there in 
 case of need, and, on the first appearance of an 
 English sail, had taken refuge there, informing 
 its government, which lost no time in transmit- 
 ting the intelligence to Paris, that it was blocked 
 up and knew not when it would be possible to 
 put to sea again. Whether treachery or faint- 
 heartedness, the result was absolutely the 
 same for the plans of Napoleon, and exhi- 
 bited in the strongest light the manner in 
 which Spain was accustomed to perform her 
 duty as an ally. 
 
 For the rest, Admiral Ganteaume had orders 
 to sail on the first junction that should happen 
 to increase his force. The five ships at Toulon 
 having, in fact, been joined by the five from 
 Rochefort, he had nothing to fear in the Medi- 
 terranean. -The ships equipped at Toulon were 
 far less efficient than those which had arrived 
 from Rochefort ; and the crews of those in par- 
 ticular that were equipped in the port of Genoa 
 consisted of boys picked up on the quays of 
 that great city, the Genoese sailors themselves 
 having fled into the Apennine mountains. 
 Nevertheless, as an excellent spirit prevailed 
 in the Toulon squadron, a spirit which was tra- 
 ditional in that port, and which Rear-admiral 
 Cosmao strove to strengthen by his example, 
 goodwill made amends for inexperience, and the 
 Toulon division was likely to behave honour- 
 ably. Admiral Ganteaume, with two excellent 
 lieutenants, Rear-admirals Allemand and Cos- 
 2o2
 
 438 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808 
 
 mao, had two three-deckers, one 80-gun ship, 
 seven seventy-fours, two frigates, two corvettes, 
 two large flutes, in all sixteen sail. After taking 
 time to divide among the whole fleet the im- 
 mense stores which he was ordered to carry to 
 Corfu, he weighed anchor on the 10th of Feb- 
 ruary, 1808, steering for the Ionian Islands, 
 whence he was to return to the Strait of Sicily, 
 to convey a French army to Catanea, when he 
 should have accomplished the first part of his 
 mission. He sailed on the 10th of February, 
 and was out of sight before any enemy's ship 
 made her appearance. With the composition 
 of his fleet, and in the state of the enemy's 
 forces in the Mediterranean, every thing be- 
 spoke a successful result. In case of separa- 
 tion, the rendezvous was the point of Italy op- 
 posite to the coast of Epire, having for refuge 
 the Gulf of Tarento, the Mouths of the Cattaro, 
 and Corfu itself, the primary object of the 
 expedition. 
 
 While this voyage, which was long and lasted 
 two months, was commencing, events in Spain 
 were following their deplorable course. The 
 letters of Napoleon, in answer to the proposal 
 of marriage and the request to publish the 
 treaty of Fontainebleau, written on the 10th 
 of January, and despatched on the 20th, did 
 not reach Madrid till the 27th or 28th, and 
 were not delivered before the 1st of February. 
 These were not of a nature to cheer the court 
 of Spain. To add to its unhappiness, the pro- 
 cess at the Escurial was just then finished with 
 extraordinary eclat, and to the confusion of 
 those by whom it was set on foot. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the efforts made to get 
 the friends of the Prince of the Asturias de- 
 clared accomplices in a crime which had no 
 existence, their innocence, supported by the 
 public opinion, had saved them. The Marquis 
 d'Ayerbo, the Count d'Orgas, the Dukes de San 
 Carlos and De 1'Infantado, had conducted them- 
 selves with perfect dignity. But the canon 
 Escoi'quiz, in particular, had displayed an 
 almost provoking firmness, excited as he was 
 by the danger, by the ambition to sustain his 
 part, by the affection of his royal pupil, by the 
 indignation of an honest man. In spite of the 
 unbecoming threats of the director of this pro- 
 cess, Simon de Viegas, one of the vilest agents 
 of the court, Escoi'quiz, without disavowing the 
 papers on which the accusation was founded, 
 had persisted in maintaining and demonstrat- 
 ing his innocence, saying that, in fact, he had 
 endeavoured in those papers to unveil the tur- 
 pitudes and the crimes of the favourite ; that 
 in so doing, he was serving the king, not be- 
 traying him ; that the blank order, signed 
 beforehand, to confer military powers on the 
 Duke de 1'Infantado was a legitimate precau- 
 tion against a plan of usurpation which every 
 body was acquainted with, and proof of which 
 he engaged to furnish, if he were placed in 
 presence of Godoy, and permitted to call wit- 
 nesses who were all ready to reveal fearful 
 truths. The courage of this poor, unarmed 
 priest, having no other support against an all- 
 powerful court than public opinion, had dis- 
 concerted the accusers and excited general 
 interest : for, though the proceedings were 
 secret, the details of them were known from 
 day to day, and transmitted from mouth to 
 mouth with a rapidity which nothing but the 
 
 warmest passion can account for, in a country 
 without newspapers and almost without roads. 
 The judges beginning to waver, there had been 
 added to them a reinforcement of magistrates 
 supposed to be devoted, for the purpose of 
 rendering the condemnation more certain. The 
 fiscal, Don Simon de Viegas, had conformed to 
 the order which he had received, to require 
 the punishment of death against the accused. 
 The court, working in all possible ways on the 
 judges upon whom it conceived that it could 
 rely, made application to them to pronounce 
 the condemnation required by the fiscal, not 
 for the purpose of carrying it into execution, 
 but to afford the king occasion to exercise his 
 clemency. It had, it was alleged, but one 
 object in view; this was to render the royal 
 authority more respectable by punishing with 
 a sentence of death the mere thought of failing 
 in duty to the king, and to endear him still 
 more to the people, by furnishing occasion for 
 a signal act of clemency towards the accused 
 to emanate from him. It was, in fact, the 
 design of the court to obtain a sentence of 
 death, in order to prevent its execution. But 
 nobody had sufficient confidence in it to trust 
 it with the lives of the most honoured members 
 of the Spanish grandeza ; and, besides, public 
 opinion, ready to break loose against the dou- 
 ble-dealing judges who should sacrifice inno- 
 cence, was more imposing than the court. One 
 of the judges, related to the minister of grace 
 and justice, Don Eugenio Caballero, seized with 
 a mortal disease, would not leave the world 
 without expressing an opinion worthy of a great 
 magistrate. He requested his colleagues com- 
 posing the extraordinary tribunal to come to 
 his house to deliberate beside his death-bed. 
 When they were assembled, Don Eugenio main- 
 tained that it was impossible to try the accom- 
 plices in a crime, real or false, without the 
 principal author ; that is to say, without the 
 Prince of the Asturias, and that, according to 
 the laws of the kingdom, that prince could be 
 summoned and heard only before the assembled 
 Cortes ; that, moreover, the crime was ima- 
 ginary ; that the proofs furnished were null or 
 destitute of legal character, for they were 
 copies, and not the originals, which they had 
 before them ; that the unknown person, who 
 had denounced these facts, ought, according to 
 the Spanish laws, to come forward and depose 
 upon the faith of an oath ; that, in the state 
 of the proceedings, without the accused princi- 
 pal, without proofs, without witnesses, with all 
 that was otherwise known concerning the 
 alleged offence imputed to a prince, the object 
 of the love of the nation, and to great per- 
 sonages objects of its respect, upright judges 
 ought to declare themselves incapable of pro- 
 nouncing, and to beseech the king to annul so 
 scandalous a process. 
 
 No sooner had this courageous citizen of an 
 absolute monarchy, in which, absolute as it 
 was, there were laws and magistrates embued 
 with their spirit no sooner had he given his 
 opinion, than his colleagues adopted that opi- 
 nion and joined in it with a sort of patriotic 
 enthusiasm. They all embraced one another 
 after this decision, like men about to die. 
 People believed, in fact, not Charles IV., but 
 the court, to be capable of every thing against 
 judges who had disappointed its calculations,
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 439 
 
 and exaggerated its cruelty though they could 
 not exaggerate its baseness. 
 
 When this decision was known, it transported 
 the public with joy, and filled the court with 
 despondence. Poo- Charles IV. was persuaded 
 that he ought to display his own justice, in 
 default of that of the magistrates, and a royal 
 decree was wrung from him, in virtue of which 
 the Dukes de San Carlos, and De 1'Infantado, 
 the Marquis d'Ayerbo, and the Count d'Orgas 
 were exiled to the distance of sixty leagues 
 from the capital, and stripped of all their dig- 
 nities and decorations. The canon Escoiquiz, 
 the most hated of all, was treated still more 
 severely. He was deprived of his ecclesiastical 
 benefices, and doomed to end his days in the 
 monastery of Tardon. The Cardinal de Bour- 
 bon, Archbishop of Toledo, brother of the 
 princess of the blood married to Emmanuel 
 Godoy, was moreover required to make the 
 chapter of Toledo pronounce the degradation 
 of the canon Escoiquiz, a member of that 
 chapter. The cardinal obstinately refused to 
 comply. On this occasion, he ventured to re- 
 veal to Charles IV. the scandals of the mo- 
 narchy, and the melancholy situation of the 
 princess his sister, united to the favourite, 
 who had added to all his other crimes that of 
 bigamy. He went so far, it is said, as to 
 insist that his sister should be given up to him 
 and be permitted to shut herself up in a reli- 
 gious retreat, there to deplore a union which 
 brought upon her disgrace and misery. The 
 only answer received by the cardinal was an 
 order to retire to his diocese. 
 
 The courageous magistrate who had so nobly 
 done his duty, Don Eugenio Caballero, being 
 dead, his funeral became a sort of triumph. 
 All the religious congregations disputed the 
 honour of burying him gratuitously, and all 
 the most respectable people in Madrid accom- 
 panied the magistrate who had so worthily 
 finished his career to his last home. As for the 
 accused, the public rejoiced to see their lives 
 saved, especially after the exaggerated appre- 
 hensions occasioned by their trial. No fears 
 were entertained for the consequences of this 
 trial to their reputation, for they were sur- 
 rounded by universal esteem, even beyond 
 their merit; neither was any uneasiness felt 
 about their exile, for nobody imagined that it 
 would last long. All the world, in fact, ex- 
 pected a speedy catastrophe, whether it were 
 to proceed from the public indignation excited 
 to the highest degree, or to be the work of the 
 French troops, silently advancing towards the 
 capital, without telling what they came to do 
 there. People still flattered themselves that 
 they would do what was generally wished, 
 namely, hurl the favourite from that throne 
 half of which he had usurped, and unite the 
 Prince of the Asturias with a French princess 
 amid the thunder of their guns. 
 
 While the sympathies of an excited nation 
 surrounded those who declared themselves 
 against the court, that court was filled both 
 with rage and terror. It was an immemorial 
 custom for the royal family to leave, in Janu- 
 ary, the cold and bleak residence of the Escu- 
 rial, to enjoy the climate of Aranjuez, a mag- 
 nificent domain, crossed by the Tagus, and 
 where spring, as is the case in southern lati- 
 tudes, begins to be felt in the month of March, 
 
 sometimes even so early as the end of February. 
 It was customary too, Madrid lying in the way, 
 for the court to pass a few days there, to re- 
 ceive the homage of the capital. Expecting 
 this year to be greeted with demonstrations of 
 aversion alone, the court passed the gates of 
 Madrid without stopping, and went on to hide 
 its shame, mortification, and alarm at Aran- 
 juez. 
 
 It had, in fact, not a single support to hope 
 for in any quarter. The Spanish people mani- 
 fested an implacable hatred for it, and scarcely 
 made any difference in favour of the king by 
 despising instead of hating him. As for the 
 terrible Emperor of the French, whom that 
 court had alternately flattered and betrayed, 
 whose favour since Jena, it hoped to have 
 regained by a year of meannesses, he covered 
 himself all at once with an impenetrable veil, 
 and maintained an alarming silence respecting 
 his designs. The French armies, directed at 
 first upon Portugal, were now executing a 
 movement upon Madrid, upon pretext of march- 
 ing towards Cadiz or Gibraltar. But it was an 
 unheard of proceeding to invade in that man- 
 ner, and without further explanation, the ter- 
 ritory of a great power. The answer which 
 Napoleon had returned to the proposal of mar- 
 riage could not be regarded as serious ; for ha 
 wished to know, he said, before he gave a 
 French princess to Ferdinand, whether that 
 prince was readmitted into the good graces of 
 his parents, and this question he asked Charles 
 IV., who had formally acquainted him with 
 the arrest of the Prince of the Asturias and 
 the pardon which followed it. The refusal to 
 publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, which 
 contained the concession of a sovereignty to 
 Emmanuel Godoy, and the formal guarantee 
 of the dominions belonging to the crown of 
 Spain, could have none but a sinister significa- 
 tion. From all these considerations, despond- 
 ence prevailed at Aranjuez, in the interior of 
 royalty, and at Buen Retire, in the residence 
 of the Countess de Castel Fiel, the favourite of 
 the favourite. Both here and there, they began 
 to open their eyes, and to discover that, by 
 dint of meannesses, they had inspired Napoleon 
 with the audacity to overthrow a degraded 
 dynasty, despised by all the Spaniards. Every 
 day the idea of imitating the house of Bra- 
 ganza and retiring to America recurred more 
 and more frequently to the minds of the leaders 
 of the court, and gave occasion to more and 
 more frequent rumours. Emmanuel Godoy and 
 the queen had almost definitively decided upon 
 this resolution, and they secretly made their 
 preparations ; for the loads of valuable effects 
 sent off for the ports were more numerous and 
 more noticed than usual. But it was first ne- 
 cessary to gain the sanction of the king, whose 
 weakness dreaded a change of place almost as 
 much as the horrors of a war; it was also 
 necessary to decide the princes of the blood, 
 Don Antonio, brother of Charles IV., Ferdinand, 
 his son and heir, as well as the younger Infants. 
 The commission of one indiscretion would be 
 sufficient to cause the whole nation to rise 
 against such a design. The Prince of th 
 Peace, in order to cover the preparations which 
 were perceived at Ferrol and Cadiz, circulated 
 a report that he was going in person, in hia 
 quality of grand-admiral, to inspect the ports.
 
 440 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 and that he was to begin \vith those of the 
 South. 
 
 But, before undertaking this flight, which, 
 even for the queen and Godoy, was but an ex- 
 treme course, it would be proper to endeavour 
 by all means to draw from Napoleon the secret 
 of his intentions, and to bend, if possible, his 
 formidable will. There was nothing, in fact, 
 that ought to have been attempted, before they 
 had themselves decided on leaving Spain, and 
 before they had extorted the compliance of 
 Charles IV. In consequence, in reply to the 
 last answer of Napoleon, Charles IV. was pre- 
 vailed upon to write another letter, dated the 
 6th of February, eight or ten days before the 
 conclusion of the process at the Escurial, with 
 a view to force him to an explanation, to touch 
 his heart, if it were possible, to appeal even to 
 his honour, deeply interested in keeping the 
 promises that he had given. In this letter, 
 Charles IV. confessed the alarm which began 
 to be felt at the approach of the French troops, 
 reminded Napoleon of all that he had done to 
 gratify him, all the proofs of attachment that 
 he had given him, the sacrifice of his navy, the 
 sending of his armies to distant countries, and 
 solicited of him, in return for so faithful an 
 alliance, a frank and honest declaration of his 
 intentions ; as he could not suppose that they 
 were any other than what Spain had deserved. 
 The poor king knew not, when writing in this 
 manner, that this faithful alliance had been 
 intermingled with a thousand secret treache- 
 ries, that the sacrifice of his navy had served 
 only to cause the destruction of the two fleets 
 at Trafalgar, that the sending of a division to 
 Hamburg had been of no other service than 
 that of a demonstration, and that Spain had 
 been an auxiliary useless to herself and to her 
 allies, sometimes even the occasion of great 
 uneasiness to them. Ignorant of these things, 
 as of all others, he addressed these questions 
 to Napoleon in perfect sincerity, under the 
 dictation of those who knew, thought, and 
 willed for him. This unfortunate prince could 
 not believe that, at the close of his life, having 
 never sought to do an injury, he could be re- 
 duced to the necessity either of fighting or of 
 running away, convinced as he was that, to 
 reign honourably and safely, it was sufficient 
 to have never wilfully done harm ; of which he 
 was very sure, for he had never done any thing 
 but hunt and look after his horses and his 
 fowling-pieces. 
 
 This letter, destined for Napoleon, was fol- 
 lowed by most pressing letters to M. Yzquierdo. 
 He was implored to procure at any price, no 
 matter what it cost, precise intelligence of the 
 intentions of France ; to endeavour to change 
 them by means of sacrifices, if they were hos- 
 tile ; or, if they were not to be changed, to 
 communicate them at least, that one might be 
 able to combat them or to avoid their conse- 
 quences. All the necessary credits were opened 
 for him, in case there should be any means of 
 succeeding in such a commission. 
 
 The despatches in question arrived in Paris 
 in the middle of February. Napoleon had 
 evaded the application for a French princess 
 for Ferdinand, by feigning ignorance whether 
 that prince had been restored to favour by his 
 parents. Unable to allege any further doubt 
 on this subject, and directly questioned con- 
 
 [Feb. 180&. 
 
 cerning his intentions, he was sensible that the 
 time for the denoument had arrived, and that, 
 after taking a fixed resolution to dethrone the 
 Bourbons, he must at length fix upon the 
 means of accomplishing it, without revolting 
 too violently the public feeling of Spain, France, 
 and Europe. This was the only point upon 
 which he had really hesitated ; for, if he had 
 for a moment admitted the plan of allying the 
 two dynasties, by a marriage, as practicable, 
 and the plan of appropriating to himself a large 
 portion of the Spanish territory as worth discuss- 
 ing, at bottom, he had always preferred, as the 
 safest, the most decisive, nay, the most honest 
 course, to take nothing from Spain but her dy- 
 nasty and her barbarism, and suffering her to 
 keep her territory, her colonies, and her inde- 
 pendence. But the means of rendering endu- 
 rable this act of a conqueror, even in times 
 when not only the crowns of kings, but their 
 heads had fallen the means were difficult to 
 find. The family of Braganza had, itself, by 
 its flight, suggested a medium to him, to which 
 he had finally adhered as we have seen : this 
 was to induce the court of Spain to embark at 
 Cadiz for the New World. Nothing would then 
 be more simple than to present himself to a 
 deserted nation, to declare to it that, instead 
 of a degenerate dynasty, cowardly enough to 
 abandon its throne and its people, he would 
 give it a new, glorious, peaceably reforming 
 dynasty, bringing to Spain the benefits of the 
 French Revolution without its calamities, a 
 participation in the greatness, of France, with- 
 out the horrible wars which France had had to 
 sustain. This solution was natural, less liable 
 to censure than the other, and furnished by the 
 very cowardice of the adulterated families 
 which reigned over the South of Europe. It 
 became, moreover, more probable from day to 
 day ; since at each new fit of terror that should 
 seize the court of Spain, the report of a retreat 
 to America, echo of the internal agitations of 
 the palace, was circulated in the capital. It 
 would be sufficient to push this terror to the 
 utmost, to make the French troops advance de- 
 finitively towards Madrid, continuing to ob- 
 serve a threatening silence respecting their 
 destination. In consequence Napoleon made 
 all arrangements for bringing about the catas- 
 trophe in March ; for if it should be necessary 
 to act in Spain, spring would be the most fa- 
 vourable season for introducing his young sol- 
 diers into that arid and parched country, 
 which, physically as well as morally, is the 
 commencement of Africa. It was now the mid- 
 dle of February. Napoleon had a month to 
 the middle of March to make his last prepara- 
 tions. He began them, therefore, immediately 
 after he had received the interrogatory letter 
 of King Charles IV., dated the 5th of February ; 
 in which that unfortunate prince besought him 
 to explain his intentions in regard to Spain. 
 
 But, before provoking at Madrid the denod- 
 ment which he desired, he was obliged to de- 
 cide upon the course to be pursued on a ques- 
 tion not less important than that of Spain, on 
 the question of the East, for at the moment one 
 was linked to the other. If any thing, in fact, 
 could add to the imprudence of undertaking 
 new enterprises, when he had already such mo- 
 mentous ones on his hands, it would be that of 
 engaging in the affairs of Spain with Russia
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 441 
 
 discontented. Accustomed as Europe was to 
 new spectacles, prepared as it was for the ap- 
 proaching end of the Bourbons of Spain, its 
 foresight was far behind the reality; and the 
 overthrow of one of the most ancient thrones 
 in the world was destined to excite a deep emo- 
 tion, to transfer from the head of England to 
 that of France the reprobation called forth by 
 the crime of Copenhagen. Though Prussia was 
 crushed, Austria alternately irritated and trem- 
 bling, it would have been supremely imprudent 
 not to secure, on the eve of an act of the great- 
 est audacity, the certain adhesion of Russia. 
 It was, in fact, one of the most serious incon- 
 veniences of the enterprise against Spain, that 
 it inevitably entailed sacrifices in the East ; 
 and it was, as we shall see hereafter, one of the 
 most lamentable faults of the Emperor, in these 
 circumstances, not to have known how to make 
 those sacrifices frankly. It would have been 
 otherwise if, having undertaken less in the 
 North, if, having given up Germany to satisfy 
 Prussia, he had not had to leave on the Vistula 
 800,000 veteran soldiers, who composed the 
 real force of the French army. Confining him- 
 self then to the occupation of Italy and Spain, 
 having his armies concentrated behind the 
 Rhine, and nobody to fear or to support be- 
 yond that frontier, he might have dispensed 
 with purchasing by sacrifices the concurrence 
 of Russia. And if she had resolved to take 
 advantage of the occasion to fall upon the East, 
 Austria herself, though inconsolable for the loss 
 of Italy, would have become the ally of France 
 for the purpose of defending the Lower Danube. 
 But Napoleon, having destroyed Prussia, created 
 ephemeral royalties in Germany, and sowed the 
 seeds of hatred and ingratitude from the Rhine 
 to the Vistula, required an ally in the North, 
 even though dearly purchased. 
 
 General Savary had been succeeded at St. 
 Petersburg by M. de Caulaincourt, and nearly 
 at the same time M. de Tolstoy, ambassador of 
 Russia, had arrived at Paris. The latter was, 
 as we have said, a soldier, brother of the grand 
 marshal of the palace, imbued with the opi- 
 nions of the Russian aristocracy in regard to 
 France, but member of a family which enjoyed 
 the imperial favour, which placed that favour 
 above its prejudices, and which discovered in 
 the conquest of Finland and of the Danubian 
 provinces a sufficient excuse for the deserters 
 who had gone over from the English policy to 
 the French policy. " My brother has devoted 
 himself," said the Grand-marshal Tolstoy, to 
 M. de Caulaincourt; " he has accepted the em- 
 bassy to Paris, but, if he does not obtain for 
 Russia something of consequence he is ruined 
 and all of us along with him." 1 These words 
 prove in what spirit the new ambassador came 
 to France. Alexander had related to him what 
 had passed at Tilsit, in the way in which he 
 was fond of calling it to mind and understand- 
 ing it, and, according to this communication, 
 much altered from the conversations of Napo- 
 leon. M. de Tolstoy had conceived that all had 
 been told, that the sacrifice of the empire of 
 the East was made, that he had come to Paris 
 merely to sign the partition of Turkey, and the 
 acquisition, if not of Constantinople and the 
 
 These words are literally extracted from the secret 
 correspondence so frequently quoted by u*. 
 VOL. II 56 
 
 j Dardanelles, at least of the plains of the Da- 
 j nube as far as the Balkans. Besides, he had 
 j visited by the way the unfortunate sovereigns 
 ! of Prussia, despoiled of part of their domi- 
 nions, and deprived of nearly the whole of their 
 revenues by the prolonged occupation of the 
 provinces that were left them. M. de Tolstoy, 
 thinking that if the conquest of the provinces 
 of the East interested the glory of Russia, the 
 evacuation of the Prussian provinces interested 
 her honour, came to Paris prepossessed with 
 the two-fold notion of obtaining a share of the - 
 Turkish empire and the evacuation of Prussia. 
 Add to all this that he was techy, irritable, sus- 
 picious, and excessively proud of the glory of 
 the Russian armies. 
 
 Napoleon had promised to give him a favour- 
 able reception, to make him fond of residing at 
 Paris, that he might contribute by his reports 
 to the maintenance of the alliance. But he 
 found him so fiery and so intractable on the 
 double affair of the evacuation of Prussia and 
 the acquisition of the provinces of the Danube, 
 that he was annoyed at it. He felt so strong, 
 and was himself so far from patient, that he 
 could not long endure the persistance of M. de 
 Tolstoy. Napoleon, only half disguising the 
 vexation that he felt, told the new ambassador 
 that if, after evacuating the whole of Old Prus- 
 sia and part of Pomerania, he continued to oc- 
 cupy Brandenburg and Silesia, it was because 
 Prussia had refused to pay the war contribu- 
 tions ; that he desired nothing more than to 
 withdraw his troops as soon as they should be 
 paid ; that, for the rest, if he tarried in Prus- 
 sia beyond the intended time, the Russians, on 
 their part, were tarrying without any avowable 
 motive in the provinces of the Danube, and that 
 Moldavia and Wallachia were assuredly equi- 
 valent to Silesia. Without precisely saying so, 
 Napoleon appeared, in the eyes of a prejudiced 
 person, like M. de Tolstoy, to make the evacua- 
 tion of Silesia dependent on that of Moldavia 
 and Wallachia, and almost to link the acquisi- 
 tion of the latter by the Russians to the acqui- 
 sition of the former by the French. The tem- 
 per of M. de Tolstoy ought to have given way 
 to the elevation of Napoleon, but the Russian 
 minister felt grievously mortified ; and, as we 
 always seek the society that sympathizes most 
 with our own sentiments, he kept company in 
 preference with the infatuated persons of the 
 old French nobility, a far from numerous class, 
 who revenged themselves by their animadver- 
 sions, for not being yet admitted into the impe- 
 rial court. He held a language that was not 
 friendly, and had well nigh quarrelled with 
 Marshal Ney, who was not of a passive dispo- 
 sition, about the merit of the Russian and the 
 French armies, and behaved more like the re- 
 presentative of an unfriendly court than of one 
 which wished to be, and which really was, at 
 least for the moment, a close ally. M. de Tal- 
 leyrand, with his disdainful sang-froid, was in- 
 structed to curb, to calm, to repress, if need- 
 ful, the troublesome temper of M. de Tolstoy. 
 Things went on more smoothly at St. Peters- 
 burg between M. de Caulaincourt and the 
 Emperor Alexander, but the latter dissembled 
 no more than his ambassador the mortification 
 which he experienced. M. de Caulaincourt 
 was a grave man, whose face was stamped 
 with the integrity that dwelt in hie soul, hav-
 
 442 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808. 
 
 ing but one weakness, the incapability of con- 
 soling himself for the part which he had acted 
 in the affair of the Duke d'Enghien ; which 
 rendered him sensible, beyond measure, to the 
 esteem that was manifested for him, and which 
 furnished the Emperor Alexander with the 
 means of swaying him. M. de Caulaincourt 
 found the emperor full of courtesy and kind- 
 ness towards him, but wounded to the heart 
 to see that the promises made to him were not 
 immediately realized. At Tilsit, Napoleon had 
 said to the Emperor Alexander that, if the war 
 continued, and if Russia took part in it, she 
 might find towards the Baltic an increase of 
 security, towards the Black Sea an increase 
 of greatness ; and he had talked eventually of 
 the distribution to be made of the provinces of 
 the Turkish empire, without, however, stipu- 
 lating any thing positive. But if, on the one 
 hand, in the excitement of these communica- 
 tions he had perhaps said more than he meant 
 to grant, the Emperor Alexander had under- 
 stood more than he had really said to him ; 
 and, on his return to St. Petersburg, in a dis- 
 contented company, in order to pacify it, he 
 had made in confidence many indiscreet and 
 exaggerated communications. By degrees a 
 notion became current in the drawing-rooms 
 of St. Petersburg, that Russia, though van- 
 quished at Friedland, had brought back from 
 Tilsit the gift of Finland, Moldavia, and Wal- 
 lachia. Those who were well disposed to- 
 wards the Emperor Alexander, or at least who 
 were not predetermined to censure the go- 
 vernment, considered that this was a very fine 
 price for several unsuccessful campaigns; that 
 if Russia owed such extensive conquests to the 
 friendship of France, she did right to cultivate 
 and to preserve that friendship. Those, on the 
 contrary, who still cherished in their hearts all 
 the sentiments excited by the late war, or who 
 were angry with the emperor for his incon- 
 stancy, such as Messrs, de Czartoryski, Novo- 
 silzoff, Strogonoff, and Kotschonbey, repre- 
 senting the forsaken policy these alleged that 
 the conquest of Finland, to which Russia was 
 urged, was of no value, that it was a country 
 of lakes and marshes, totally destitute of in- 
 habitants ; that, moreover, this conquest was 
 immoral, since it was gained from a relation 
 and an ally, the King of Sweden ; that, for the 
 rest, it would be the only one that Napoleon 
 would allow the Emperor Alexander to make ; 
 that he would never put Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia into his hands, of which people would 
 very soon be convinced; that the French al- 
 liance was, therefore, at once a desertion, an 
 inconsistency, and a cheat. 
 
 This language, repeated to the Emperor 
 Alexander, deeply vexed him, and, seeing by 
 the reports of M. de Tolstoy that it was likely 
 to be some day verified, he expressed to M. de 
 Caulaincourt his extreme mortification on the 
 subject. He received him with great cordi- 
 ality, manifested for him an esteem for which, 
 as he perceived, that ambassador was eager, 
 and then, coming to what concerned the Rus- 
 sian interests, he launched out into bitter com- 
 plaints. He had never meant, he said, to link 
 the fate of Silesia with that of Moldavia and 
 Wallachia. He had stipulated and obtained 
 from the friendship of the Emperor Napoleon 
 the restitution of part of the Prussian domi- 
 
 nions, a restitution necessary, indispensable, tc 
 the honour of Russia. He should have been 
 content with that restitution, and have retired 
 to his own empire, satisfied with having spared 
 his unfortunate allies some of the consequences 
 of the war, if the Emperor Napoleon, desirous 
 to engage him in his system, had not afforded 
 him a glimpse of aggrandizements both to the 
 north and to the south of the empire, and had 
 not been the first to speak to him about Mol- 
 davia and Wallachia. Urged to enter this 
 track, he had done all that Napoleon desired ; 
 he had declared war against England, in spite 
 of the interests of Russian commerce ; he had 
 resolved upon war with Sweden, in spite of the 
 ties of relationship ; and, when he, and every- 
 body in the empire, expected to receive the 
 price of all this compliance with a foreign 
 policy, there comes all at once intelligence 
 from Paris that he must renounce the most 
 legitimate hopes. The czar could not recover 
 from his surprise or get the better of his vexa- 
 tion. To pretend to make the fate of Silesia 
 dependent on that of Moldavia and Wallachia, 
 and to keep back the one from the Prussians 
 in order to give the two others to the Russians, 
 was a proceeding which rendered it a duty of 
 honour to refuse every thing. He could not 
 pay with the spoils of an unfortunate friend, 
 whom he was accused of having too much 
 sacrificed already, for acquisitions that he 
 might be permitted to make on the Danube. 
 " Those unfortunate Prussians" said Alexander, 
 to M. de Caulaincourt, " have nothing to eat. 
 Relieve me from their importunities, and I 
 shall have nothing else to trouble me in my 
 relations with France. Besides, what would 
 Napoleon do with Silesia ? Would he keep it 
 himself? But in that case he would be my 
 neighbour, and neighbours, as he has himself 
 told me, are never friends. Of what advantage 
 to him would be a province so distant from his 
 empire ? Let him take what he pleases around 
 him, near to him, I shall think it natural and 
 regular. He has taken Etruria ; he is going, it 
 is said, to take the Roman States ; and con- 
 templates one knows not what against Spain 
 be it so ! Let him do what suits him in the 
 South, but leave us to do, in like manner, 
 what suits us in the North, and not approach 
 too near our frontiers. If he does not want 
 Silesia for himself, could he give it to any one 
 else equally serviceable to him with me ? As- 
 suredly not, and in restoring it to the Prus- 
 sians, which is the simplest of solutions, he 
 must not in retaliation refuse me what he has 
 promised. He would then disappoint not only 
 my expectations but those of the Russian 
 nation, which would esteem Finland to be not 
 worth the war which it will cost us with Eng- 
 land and -Sweden, which would say, 'that I 
 have been duped by the great man with whom 
 I have conversed at Tilsit; that one cannot 
 meet him without danger, either on the field 
 of battle, or in a negotiation ; and that it 
 would have been better, without continuing an 
 impolitic and dangerous war, to separate in 
 peace but with indifference and the coldness 
 which distance justifies.'." 
 
 Such had been, and such was, every day, the 
 language of the Emperor Alexander to M. de 
 Caulaincourt. He did not add that, if he had 
 been taught to hope for the provinces of the
 
 Feb 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 443 
 
 Danube, it MIS without their being promised 
 to him, and that if, out of a mere hope, the 
 Russian nation, misled by the rumours of the 
 court, had made a formal engagement, the fault 
 was his, owing to his indiscretion, nay, his 
 weakness, since he had not been able to control 
 those around him but by promising more thai} 
 he could perform. Alexander did not add this, 
 but it was evident that, if one were not to come 
 to his relief, by granting what he had impru- 
 dently suffered the nation to hope for, he would 
 be cruelly hurt, and his minister Romanzoff 
 also, and that, if the sudden change of policy 
 effected at Tilsit was too recent for one to ven- 
 ture upon another equally sudden, there would 
 still be left at the bottom of the heart a deep 
 wound constantly bleeding, and from which 
 fresh wars would be likely soon to ensue. 
 
 M. de Caulaincourt, affirming with his persua- 
 sive honesty the good faith of Napoleon, pro- 
 testing that every thing would be cleared up, 
 attributing to a misunderstanding, to the jea- 
 lous susceptibility of M. de Tolstoy, the sinister 
 reports which had come from Paris, succeeded 
 in restoring some composure to the mind of the 
 Emperor Alexander. The latter at length be- 
 gan to find fault with M. de Tolstoy himself, 
 with his awkwardness, with his ill temper, and 
 declared before M. de Caulaincourt that he 
 would not fail, if he again found M. de Tolstoy, 
 as he did formerly M. de Markoff, bent on em- 
 broiling the two courts, to make a signal exam- 
 ple of those who should study to thwart, instead 
 of endeavouring to serve him. The Emperor 
 Alexander had appeared highly gratified by the 
 magnificent presents of Sevres porcelain sent 
 to St. Petersburg, by the cession of fifty thou- 
 sand muskets, and by the reception of the Rus- 
 sian cadets into the French navy. But nothing 
 touched that heart, full of a single passion, ex- 
 cepting the object of that passion. The pro- 
 vinces of the Danube or nothing ; that was im- 
 pressed upon his countenance as in his soul, 
 deeply smitten with ambition and renown. 
 
 For the rest, M. de Caulaincourt, in order to 
 ascertain precisely whether the nation shared 
 the sentiments of its sovereign, sent one of the 
 employes of the embassy to Moscow, to pick up 
 what was said there. This employ^, transported 
 into the circles of the old Russian aristocracy, 
 whose language was more natural and more true 
 than at St. Petersburg, heard it repeated that 
 the young czar had very rapidly passed from 
 hatred to friendship in espousing the policy 
 of France at Tilsit ; that he had very lightly 
 compromised the interests of Russian commerce 
 by declaring war against Great Britain ; that 
 Finland was a very slender compensation for 
 such sacrifices ; that Wallachia and Moldavia 
 at least would be required to make suitable 
 payment for them ; but that those fine provinces 
 would never be obtained from Napoleon ; and 
 that their young emperor would, this time, 
 have to pay the penalty of a new inconsistency 
 by a new disappointment. 
 
 M. de Caulaincourt lost no time in transmit- 
 ting these various particulars to Napoleon, and 
 declared that without doubt the court of Rus- 
 sia, though deeply mortified, would not go to 
 war, but that it was not to be relied upon, if 
 that were not granted to it, which, with or with- 
 out reason, it had flattered itself that it should 
 obtain. 
 
 General Savary, returning from St. Peters- 
 burg, corroborated by his testimony the reports 
 of M. de Caulaincourt, supported them by the 
 recital of a multitude of particulars which he 
 had himself collected, and confirmed Napoleon 
 in the idea that it depended on himself to attach 
 the Emperor Alexander entirely, to chain him 
 to all his projects, whatever they might be, by 
 means of a concession in the East. Decided, 
 ever since the middle of February, to extin- 
 guish the Bourbons of Spain, Napoleon hesi- 
 tated no longer, and resolved to pay on the 
 banks of the Danube for the new power, which 
 he thought himself on the point of acquiring 
 on the banks of the Ebro and the Tagus. 
 
 It was assuredly the best measure that he 
 could adopt ; for, though it was very grievous 
 to have to lead the Russians by the hand, him- 
 self, to Constantinople, or at least to bring them 
 nearer to that object of their everlasting ambi- 
 tion, still it was necessary to be consistent, and 
 to submit to the condition of the enterprise in 
 which he was about to engage. He was obliged 
 to grant one or two provinces on the Danube, 
 in order to acquire the right of dethroning in 
 Spain one of the oldest dynasties in Europe, and 
 to renew the policy of Louis XIV. beyond the 
 Pyrenees. For the rest, if Napoleon had done no 
 more than give Moldavia and Wallachia, without 
 Bulgaria, to the Russians, that is to say, lead 
 them to the banks of the Danube, taking care 
 to stop them there ; if at the same time he had 
 procured Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria, for the 
 Austrians, for the purpose of opposing them 
 to the Russians, by placing them upon the road 
 to Constantinople, the mischief would not have 
 been by far so great. Albania and the Morea 
 would have been a fine compensation for France, 
 and she would not have bought too dearly the 
 concession which she was obliged to make, in 
 order to insure the Russian alliance. The daily 
 language of .the Emperor Alexander and of M. 
 de Romanzoff left no doubt of their acquiescence 
 in these conditions. Here then it was requisite 
 to stop : to pay for the Russian alliance, since 
 we had made it a necessity ; but not to push 
 the dismemberment of old Europe any further, 
 not to contribute more to the growth of the 
 young colossus, sprung from the ices of the pole, 
 and enlarging for a century past in a manner 
 to appal the world. 
 
 Napoleon, however, whether he designed to 
 occupy the imagination of Alexander, or whe- 
 ther, reduced to the necessity of a sacrifice, 
 he sought to envelop it in an immense recom- 
 position, or, lastly, whether he thought to de- 
 rive from circumstances, besides the overthrow 
 of the dynasty of the Bourbons, the entire ac- 
 quisition of the coasts of the Mediterranean 
 Napoleon conceived that he ought not to stop 
 at the mere concession of Moldavia and Walla- 
 chia, which would have settled every thing, and 
 assented to the raising of the immense question 
 of the complete partition of the Ottoman em- 
 pire. At the moment, the Turks, secretly ex- 
 cited by Austria, publicly by England, both 
 asserting that France was about to sacrifice 
 them to Russian ambition the Turks conducted 
 themselves in the most odious manner towards 
 the French. Not daring to strike off their heads, 
 they struck off those of their partisans, and be- 
 haved, in short, like furious barbarians, intoxi- 
 cated with blood and pillage. Napoleon, eias-
 
 444 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808. 
 
 perated against them, at length determined to 
 write a letter to the Emperor Alexander, in 
 which he announced his intention of discussing 
 the question of the empire of the East, of con- 
 sidering it under all its aspects, of solving it de- 
 finitively ; in which he also expressed a desire 
 to admit Austria as a sharer, and specified as 
 an essential condition of this partition, what- 
 ever it might be, partial or total, more advan- 
 tageous for these or for those, a gigantic expe- 
 dition to India, across the continent of Asia, 
 executed by a French, Austrian, and Russian 
 army. It was M. de Caulaincourt who deli- 
 vered Napoleon's letter to the Emperor Alexan- 
 der. The Czar was already apprized by a de- 
 spatch from M. de Tolstoy of the favourable 
 change which had taken place at Paris, and he 
 received the ambassador of France with trans- 
 ports of joy. He insisted on reading Napoleon's 
 letter immediately, and m his presence. He 
 read it with an emotion which he was unable to 
 repress. " Ah, the great man !" he exclaimed 
 every moment "the great man! There! he 
 has come back to the ideas of Tilsit! Tell 
 him," he frequently repeated to M. de Caulain- 
 court, " that I am devoted to him for life ; that 
 my empire, my armies, and all are at his dis- 
 posal. When I ask him to grant something to 
 satisfy the pride of the Russian nation, it is 
 not out of ambition that I speak, it is for the 
 purpose of giving him that nation whole and 
 entire, and as devoted to his great projects as 
 I am myself. Your master," he added, "pur- 
 poses to interest Austria in the dismemberment 
 of the Turkish empire ; he is in the right. It 
 is a wise conception : I cordially join in it. He 
 designs an expedition to India : I consent to 
 that too. I have already made him acquainted, 
 in our long conversations at Tilsit, with the dif- 
 ficulties attending it. He is accustomed to take 
 no account of obstacles ; nevertheless, the cli- 
 mate and distances here present such as sur- 
 pass all that he can imagine. But let him be 
 easy ; the preparations on my part shall be pro- 
 portioned to the difficulties. Now we must 
 come to an understanding about the distribu- 
 tion of the territories which we are going to 
 wrest from Turkish barbarism. Discuss this 
 subject thoroughly with M. de Romanzoff. 
 Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that all 
 this cannot be usefully, definitively discussed, 
 but in an interview between me and Napoleon. 
 As soon as our ideas have arrived at a com- 
 mencement of maturity I shall leave St. Peters- 
 burg, and go to meet your Emperor at whatever 
 distance he pleases. I should like to go as far 
 as Paris, but I cannot ; besides, it is a meet- 
 ing upon business that we want, not a meeting 
 for parade and pleasure. We might choose 
 Weimar, where he should be among our own 
 family. But even there we should be annoyed 
 by a thousand things. At Erfurt we should be 
 more free, more tn ourselves. Propose that 
 place to your sovereign ; when his answer ar- 
 ~ives I will set out immediately, and I shall 
 travel like a courier." 
 
 As he said these things and a thousand others, 
 which it were useless to repeat, the emperor, 
 overflowing with a joy which he could not re- 
 press, acknowledged that M. de Caulaincourt 
 was right some time before, when endeavouring 
 to tranquillize him respecting the intentions of 
 JJ apoleon, in imputing the momentary disagree- 
 
 ment to mere misunderstandings. He again 
 repeated that he was sure it was M. de Tolstoy, 
 who had been awkward, warm, perhaps even 
 indocile, to the new policy of the Russian ca- 
 binet ; that he would change him and send an- 
 other who should be entirely to the liking of 
 Napoleon, but he knew not where to find such a 
 one ; that he everywhere met with refractory 
 spirits; but he was determined to quell them, 
 whatever severity he was obliged to use, and 
 make them pursue the grand system of Tilsit. 
 
 M. de Caulaincourt found old M. de Roman- 
 zoff not less warm, less young, in the expres- 
 sion of his joy. " Here we are then come back 
 again to the ideas of Tilsit," he repeated to M. 
 de Caulaincourt. "Those we comprehend, we 
 enter into them ; they are worthy of the great 
 man who is an honour to the age and to human 
 nature." After incredible demonstrations of 
 satisfaction and of devotedness to France, M. 
 de Romanzoff ventured upon that difficult ques- 
 tion of partition. There commenced embar- 
 rassment, nay even, we must say, confusion. 
 To lay daring hands on the extensive countries 
 which are of such importance to the equilibrium 
 of the world, and which belong not only to the 
 stupid possessors, who keep them in barbarism 
 and sterility, but far more to Europe itself, so 
 deeply interested in their independence to lay 
 hands on these countries, even in idea, embar- 
 rassed the greedy Russian minister, who de- 
 voured them in his longings, and the French 
 minister, who gave them up from necessity to 
 the Moscovite monster of ambition. Though 
 both were furnished with their instructions, and 
 knew what to think, what to say, on the subject 
 which brought them together, neither was will- 
 ing to speak the first word. The most hungry 
 was, of course, the first to speak, and he did 
 speak. He spoke, in that interview and in se- 
 veral others, with entire freedom, and with an 
 unparalleled boldness of ambition. 
 
 Two plans presented themselves: in the first 
 place, a partial partition, which should leave 
 to the Turks that portion of their European 
 territory extending from the Balkans to the 
 Bosphorus, consequently the two straits and 
 the city of Constantinople, and all their Asia- 
 tic provinces ; in the second place, a complete 
 partition, which should leave to the Turks 
 none of their European territory, and take 
 from them all their Asiatic provinces washed 
 by the Mediterranean. 
 
 The first plan was that which seemed to have 
 occupied the two emperors at Tilsit. It pre- 
 sented but few difficulties. France was to 
 have all the maritime provinces, Albania, 
 which adjoins Dalmatia, the Morea, and Can- 
 dia. Russia was to obtain Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia, which form the left of the Danube, Bul- 
 garia, which forms the right, and thus stop at 
 the Balkans. Austria, to console herself for 
 seeing Russia established at the mouths of the 
 Danube, was to take Bosnia in full property, 
 and Servia as an appanage for one of the arch- 
 dukes. In this system the Turks would retain 
 the most essential part of their European pro- 
 vinces, those which geography and the nature 
 j of the population have hitherto amply insured 
 : to them, that is to say, the part to the south 
 of the Balkans, the two straits, Constantino- 
 ple, and the whole of the Asiatic empire. 
 There would thus be taken from them such
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 445 
 
 provinces only as they could no longer govern, 
 Moldavia, Wallachia, to which they had al- 
 ready been obliged to concede a sort of inde- 
 pendence ; Servia, which was at that moment 
 striving to emancipate itself by arms ; Epire, 
 which belonged to Ali, Pacha of Janina, more 
 than to the Porte ; lastly, Greece, which al- 
 ready appeared disposed to defy the sword of 
 its ancient conquerors rather than to endure 
 their yoke. The division of these provinces 
 among the copartners was made agreeably to 
 geography. France gained, it is true, superb 
 maritime positions. Still, besides the incon- 
 venience of herself bringing the Russians near 
 to Constantinople, there was another not less 
 serious, namely, that of giving to Russia and 
 Austria that which, from the contiguity of ter- 
 ritory, must continue theirs, and taking for 
 France such as could not remain hers unless in 
 the hypothesis of a greatness impossible to be 
 long maintained. Had we kept the most es- 
 sential part of that greatness, the Rhine and 
 the Alps, and even the back of the Alps, that 
 is to say, Piedmont, Greece was still too far 
 from us to be preserved. All this was, there- 
 fore, in reality, but a sorry concession towards 
 the East for the triumph in the West of great 
 designs no doubt, but unseasonable, extrava- 
 gant, which must add new burdens to those 
 which already oppressed the Empire. 
 
 The second plan was a sort of convulsion of 
 the civilized world. The Turkish empire was to 
 be swept away completely both from Europe 
 and from Asia. The Russians, according to 
 this new plan, were to pass the Balkans and to 
 occupy the southern slope, namely, ancient 
 Thrace as far as the straits, to obtain the ob- 
 ject of their desires, Constantinople, and a por- 
 tion of the shore of Asia, to insure to them 
 the possession of the straits. Austria, acquir- 
 ing also a better share, and employed in keep- 
 ing France and Russia apart, would obtain, 
 besides Bosnia and Servia, both in full pro- 
 perty, Macedonia itself as far as the sea, with 
 the exception of Salonichi. France, retaining 
 her former allotment, Albania, Thessaly as far 
 as Salonichi, the Morea, Candia, would have 
 further all the islands of the Archipelago, Cy- 
 prus, Syria, and Egypt. The Turks, flung 
 back to the extremity of Asia Minor, and upon 
 the Euphrates, would be at liberty to adhere 
 there to that religion of the Koran which had 
 caused them to lose their empire in Europe and 
 three-fourths of that in Asia. 
 
 In this chimerical division of the world, des- 
 tined perhaps to become some day a reality, 
 with the exception of what was then reserved 
 for France, there was one point, however, on 
 which it was impossible to agree, and which 
 was as strongly contested as if all these plans 
 were to be carried into speedy execution. Con- 
 stantinople interested both the pride and the 
 ambition of the Russians, and, among nations, 
 one is not more eager than another. The Rus- 
 sians coveted the city of Constantinople itself, 
 as a symbol of the empire of the East: they 
 coveted the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as 
 the keys of the seas. M. de Caulaincourt par- 
 ticipated in the sentiments of Napoleon, who 
 recoiled with pride and horror, when he was 
 asked to give up Constantinople to the rulers 
 of the North, peremptorily refused, and pro- 
 posed to make Constantinople and the two 
 
 straits a sort of neutral State a kind of Han- 
 seatic town, like Hamburg or Bremen. At 
 length, when the Russian minister persisted in 
 the demand of the city of Constantinople in 
 particular, as though it had been for St. So- 
 phia alone, M. de Caulaincourt acceded, saving 
 the pleasure of his master, but reserving the 
 Dardanelles for France, as being the route by 
 land for Syria and Egypt, which would have 
 made the French battalions travel the same 
 road as the ancient crusaders. The Russians, 
 having St. Sophia, would not relinquish to the 
 French the Strait of the Dardanelles, which 
 they were importunate to leave in the hands 
 of the Turks, weak as they were. They re- 
 fused Constantinople on those terms, and de- 
 clared, what was indeed true, that they should 
 prefer the first partial partition, which left the 
 south of the Balkans and Constantinople to the 
 Turks. Satisfied, in this case, with having the 
 extensive plains of the Danube as far as the 
 Balkans, they consented to postpone the rest 
 of their conquest, and chose rather to see the 
 keys of the seas in the hands of the Turks 
 than to put them into those of the French. 
 
 It was to no purpose to continue the discus- 
 sion on this important subject; the parties 
 could not come to an understanding, and the 
 interminable quarrel which arose daring and 
 silly anticipation of ages revealed the true 
 interest of Europe against Russia in the ques- 
 tion concerning Constantinople. The French 
 Empire having become, at this time, extensive 
 as Europe itself, was alive to all its interests, 
 and would not give up the strait from which 
 the Russians will some day threaten the inde- 
 pendence of the European continent. It was 
 quite enough to concede Finland to them, to 
 afford them the means of taking a step towards 
 the Sound, another strait, from which, at some 
 future time, they will be not less threaten- 
 ing. When, indeed, the Russian colossus shall 
 have one foot on the Dardanelles and the other 
 on the Sound, the Old World will be enslaved, 
 freedom will have fled to America ; chimerical 
 at this moment to narrow minds, these fore- 
 bodings will some day be realized ; for Europe, 
 unwisely divided, like the cities of Greece be- 
 fore the kings of Macedonia, will probably 
 experience the like fate. 
 
 After long discussion, the Russian minister 
 and the French ambassador had done no more 
 than ripen their ideas, as they said. There was 
 nothing but a meeting of the two sovereigns 
 that could settle these mighty differences. It 
 was therefore agreed that an exposition of the 
 two plans should be addressed to Napoleon, with 
 a request to send his opinions, and an offer of 
 an interview for the purpose of reconciling them 
 with those of the Emperor Alexander. For this 
 interview there was to be selected a place very 
 near to France, such as Erfurt for instance. 
 But to write such things was repugnant even to 
 those who had dared to utter them. M. de 
 Caulaincourt, apprized sometimes by his good 
 sense of their chimerical and alarming nature, 
 preferred leaving to M. de Romanzoff the task 
 of committing them to writing. The latter ac- 
 cepted it, and presented a note, written entirely 
 with his own hand, which M. de Caulaincourt 
 was to despatch immediately to Napoleon. If, 
 however, he ventured to write, he dared not sign 
 it. He delivered it himself, in his own hand- 
 2P
 
 446 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808. 
 
 writing, but not signed; and, to give it full 
 authenticity, the Emperor Alexander declared 
 orally to M. de Caulaincourt that this note had 
 his full approbation, and was to be received, 
 though without signature, as the authentic ex- 
 pression of the ideas of the Russian cabinet. ' 
 
 ' We think it right to quote this paper itself; perhaps the 
 most curious monument of those extraordinary times, 
 copied literally from the Minute in the handwriting of M. 
 de Romanzoff, sent to Napoleon and now preserved in the 
 depot of the LouTre. We have had before us the original 
 document, and we affirm the strict accuracy of the follow- 
 ing copy : 
 
 " Since his Majesty, the Emperor of the French and the 
 King of Italy, Ac, has recently adjudged that, in order to 
 attain a general peace and to secure the tranquillity of 
 Europe, it would be expedient to weaken the Ottoman 
 empire by the dismemberment of its provinces, the Em- 
 peror Alexander, faithful to his engagements and to his 
 friendship, is ready to concur in it 
 
 " The first idea which could not fail to present itself to 
 the Emperor of all the Russias, who is fond of calling to 
 mind the occurrences at Tilsit, when this overture was 
 made to him, was that the Emperor, his ally, purposed to 
 proceed immediately to the execution of what the two 
 monarchs had agreed upon in the treaty of alliance rela- 
 tive to the Turks, and that he added to it the proposal of 
 an expedition to India. 
 
 " It had been settled at Tilsit that the Ottoman power 
 was to be driven biick into Asia, retaining in Europe nc- 
 thing but the city of Constantinople and Romelia. 
 
 " There was drawn at the same time this consequence, 
 that the Emperor of the French should acquire Albania, 
 the Morea, and the island of Candia. 
 
 " Wallachia and Moldavia were next allotted to Russia, 
 giving that empire the Danube for its boundary, compre- 
 hending Bessarabia, which is in fact a stripe of sea-coast, 
 and which is commonly considered as forming part of 
 Moldavia; if to this portion be added Bulgaria, the em- 
 peror is ready to concur in the expedition to India, of 
 which there had then been no question, provided that this 
 expedition to India, as the Emperor Napoleon himself has 
 just traced its route, shall proceed through Asia Minor. 
 
 " The Emperor Alexander applauded himself for the idea 
 of gaining the concurrence of a corps of Austrian troops in 
 the expedition to India; and, as the Emperor, his ally, 
 seemed to wish that it should not be numerous, he con- 
 ceives that this concurrence would be adequately compen- 
 sated by awarding to Austria, Turkish Croatia and Bosnia, 
 unless the Emperor of the French should find it convenient 
 to retain a portion of them. There might moreover be offered 
 to Austria a less direct but very considerable interest, by 
 settling the future condition of Servia, ineontestably one 
 of the fine provinces of the Ottoman empire, in the follow- 
 ing manner : 
 
 " The Servians are a warlike people, and that quality, 
 which always commands esteem, must excite a wish to 
 regulate their lot judiciously. 
 
 u The Servians, fraught with a feeling of just vengeance 
 against the Turks, have boldly shaken off the yoke of 
 their oppressors, and are, it is said, resolved never to wear 
 it again. In order to consolidate peace, it seems necessary, 
 therefore, to take care to make them independent of the 
 Turks. 
 
 " The peace of Tilsit determines nothing in regard to 
 them. Their own wish, expressed strongly and more than 
 once, has led them to implore the Emperor Alexander to 
 admit them into the number of his subjects; this attach- 
 ment to his person makes him desirous that they should 
 live happy and content, without insisting upon extend- 
 ing his sway; his Majesty seeks no acquisitions that could 
 obstruct peace; he makes with pleasure this sacrifice, 
 and all those which can contribute to render it speedy and 
 solid. He proposes, in consequence, to erect Servia into an 
 independent kingdom, to give its crown to one of the Arch- 
 dukes who is not the head of any sovereign branch, and 
 who is sufficiently remote from the succession to the throne 
 of Austria; and in this case it should be stipulated that 
 thi kingdom should never be incorporated with the mass 
 of the dominion* of that houne. 
 
 fc This whole supposition of the dismemberment of the 
 Turkish provinces, as explained above, being founded upon 
 the engagements at Tilsit has not appeared to offer any 
 difficulty to the two persons commissioned by the two 
 emperors to discuss together the means of attaining the 
 ends proposed by their imperial Majesties. 
 
 u The Emperor of Russia is ready to take part in a 
 treaty between the three emperors, which should fix the 
 <nditions above expressed; but, on the other hand, having 
 conceived that the letter which he recently rewived from 
 the Emperor of the French seemed to indicate the resolu- 
 tion of a much more extensive dismemberment of the 
 Ottoman empire than that which had been projected De- 
 
 However, it was not enough to discuss even- 
 tually plans of partition of the Turkish empire. 
 Napoleon conceived that something more posi- 
 tive was needed to satisfy the Russians, some- 
 thing which, while imposing a less sacrifice on 
 him, would touch them deeply, when from words 
 
 tween them at Tilsit, that monarch, in order to meet the 
 
 clared that, without wanting a further diminution of the 
 strength of the Ottoman Porte, he would cheerfully concur 
 in it. 
 
 " He has laid down as the principle of his interest in 
 this greater partition that his share of the increased ac- 
 quisition should be moderate in extent or magnitude, and 
 that he would consent that the share of his ally in parti- 
 cular should be marked out of much larger proportion. 
 His Majesty has added that beside this principle of mo- 
 deration he placed one of wisdom, which consisted in not 
 finding himself by this new plan of partition worse placed 
 than he is at the present in regard to boundaries and com- 
 mercial relations. 
 
 " Setting out with these two principles, the Emperor 
 Alexander would see, not only without jealousy but with 
 pleasure, the Emperor Napoleon acquire and incorporate 
 with his dominions, in addition to what has been men- 
 tioned above, all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, 
 Rhodes, and even whatever is left of the sea-ports of the 
 Levant, Syria, and Egypt. 
 
 " In case of this more extensive partition, the Emperor 
 Alexander would change his preceding opinion respecting 
 the state of Servia ; studying to form an honourable and 
 highly advantageous share for the house of Austria, he 
 should wish that Servia should be incorporated with the 
 mass of the Austrian dominions, and that there should be 
 added to it Macedonia; with the exception of that part of 
 Macedonia which France might desire in order to fortify 
 her Albanian frontier, so as that France might obtain 
 Salonichi. This line of the Austrian frontier might be 
 drawn from Scopia to Orphane, and would make the 
 power of the house of Austria extend to the sea. 
 
 " Croatia might belong to France or to Austria, as the 
 Emperor Napoleon pleases. 
 
 -The Emperor Alexander cannot disguise from his ally 
 that, finding a particular satisfaction in all that has been 
 said at Tilsit he places, according to the advice of the Em- 
 peror his friend, those possessions of the house of Austria 
 between theirs, in order to avoid the point of contact, al- 
 ways so liable to cool friendship. 
 
 ' The sha of Russia in this new and extensive partition 
 would hav added to that which was awarded to her in 
 the preceding plan, the possession of the city of Constan- 
 tinople, with a radius of a few leagues in Asia, and in 
 Europe part of Romelia, so as that the frontier of Russia, 
 on the side of the new possessions of Austria, setting out 
 from Bulgaria, should follow the frontier of Servia to a 
 little beyond Solismick and the chain of mountains which 
 runs from Solismick to Trayanopol inclusive, and then 
 the river Moriza to the sea. 
 
 " In the conversation that has taken place respecting this 
 second plan of partition, there has been this difference of 
 opinion, that one of the two persons conceived that, if Russia 
 were to possess Constantinople, France ought to possess the 
 Dardanelles, or, at least, to appropriate to herself that 
 which was on the Asiatic side : this assertion was con tested, 
 on the other part upon the ground of the immense dispro- 
 portion proposed to be made in the shares of this new and 
 greater partition, and that oven the occupation of the fort 
 would utterly destroy the principle of the Emperor of 
 Russia not to be worse placed than he now is in regard to 
 his geographical and commercial relations. 
 
 " The Emperor Alexander, moved by the feeling of his 
 extreme friendship for the Emperor Napoleon, has de- 
 clared, with a view to remove the difficulty ; Istly, that he 
 would agree to a military road for France, running through 
 the new possessions of Austria and Russia, opening to her 
 a military route to the ports of Syria ; 2dly, that, if the 
 Emperor Napoleon wished to posses* Smyrna or any other 
 point on the coast of Natolia, from the point of that coast 
 which is opposite to Mitylene to that which is situated op- 
 posite to Rhodes, and should send troops thither to con- 
 quer them, the Emperor Alexander is ready to assist in 
 this enterprise, by joining, for this purpose, a corps of his 
 troops to the French troops ; 3dly, that if Smyrna, or any 
 other possession on the coast of Natolia. such as has just been 
 pointed out having come under the dominion of France, 
 should afterwards be attacked not only by the Turks, but 
 even by the English, in hatred of that treaty, his Majesty 
 the Emperor of Russia will in that case proceed to the aid 
 of his ally whenevor h shall be required to do so. 
 
 " 4thly. His Majesty thinks that the house of Austria 
 might, on the same
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 447 
 
 they should proceed to deeds this was the 
 conquest of Finland. He had ordered M. de 
 Caulaincourt to urge warmly the expedition 
 against Sweden, from the motive that we have 
 just mentioned, and also because he was de- 
 sirous to compromise Russia irrevocably in his 
 system. Once engaged against the Swedes, she 
 could not fail to be so against the English, and 
 to proceed, in regard to them, from a mere de- 
 claration of hostilities to hostilities themselves. 
 But, singular enough, the Russians were reluc- 
 tant to undertake the conquest of Finland, the 
 most useful one, nevertheless, of all those which 
 they were meditating, and it seemed to be suf- 
 ficient to have obtained the authorization for 
 it, without being in haste to carry it into exe- 
 cution. It was with regret that they diverted 
 part of their forces either from the East or 
 from the Polish provinces, greatly agitated at 
 that moment. Nevertheless, continually urged 
 by M. de Caulaincourt, they did at length in- 
 vade Finland in the course of February, at the 
 very time when the plan of partition of which 
 we have been treating was under discussion. 
 
 Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Emperor 
 Alexander could not assemble more than 25,000 
 men on the frontier of Finland. He had in- 
 trusted the command of them to General Bux- 
 hSvdeu, the same who had displayed his inca- 
 pacity at Austerlitz, and who displayed it still 
 more in the war with Sweden. Excellent troops 
 had been given him, with good lieutenants, es- 
 pecially the heroic and indefatigable Bagration, 
 who, when one war was finished, longed to begin 
 another. Napoleon had strongly urged them 
 to act during the frosts, that they might be able 
 to cross without difficulty the waters which 
 cover Finland, a country studded with lakes, 
 forests, granitic rocks, dropped upon this earth 
 like aerolites. A brave Swedish officer, Gene- j 
 ral Klingspor, with 15,000 regular troops, steady 
 as Swedish troops always are, and four or five 
 thousand militia, defended the country. If the 
 Swedish government, less regardless of all the 
 warnings which it had received, had taken its 
 precautions and directed all its forces upon 
 that point, instead of threatening the Danes 
 with ridiculous attempts, it might have advan- 
 tageously disputed the possession of that va- 
 luable province. But it had left there too few 
 troops, and those too untrained, to oppose any 
 efficacious resistance. The Russians, on their 
 part, attacked upon a very ill-conceived plan, 
 which attested the profound incapacity of their 
 commander-in-chief. Finland, from Wiborg to 
 Abo, from Abo to Uleaborg, forms a triangle, 
 two sides of which are washed by the gulfs of 
 Finland and Bothnia, while the third is bordered 
 by the Russian frontier. Common sense inti- 
 mated that it was requisite to operate on the 
 side of the triangle bordering the Russian fron- 
 
 tier, that is to say, by the Savolax, because it 
 was the shortest and the least defended line 
 The Swedes, in fact, occupied the two sides 
 which form the coasts of the gulf of Finland 
 and Bothnia: they were spread through the 
 sea-ports, peopled in general by Swedes, the 
 ancient colonists of Finland. If, instead of 
 traversing the two maritime sides of the triangle 
 for the purpose of disputing these with them, 
 the Russians had followed with a column of 
 15,000 men the side which borders their fron- 
 tier from Wiborg to Uleaborg, sending along 
 the coast only a column of 10,000 men, to oc- 
 cupy as fast as the Swedes evacuated it, and 
 also to blockade the fortresses, they would have 
 arrived before the Swedes at Uleaborg, and 
 taken not only Finland, but General Klingspor 
 and the little army charged with the defence 
 of the country. They did nothing of the kind, 
 advanced along the coast in three columns, 
 commanded by Generals Gortschakoff, Toutch- 
 koflf, and Bagration, driving before them the 
 Swedes, who defended themselves as vigorously 
 as they were attacked, in a series of partial 
 actions. The left column, having arrived at 
 Sweaborg, while the other two were marching 
 upon Tavastehuus, undertook the blockade of 
 that great maritime fortress, which consisted 
 of several fortified islands, and which was de- 
 fended by old Admiral Cronstedt with 7000 men. 
 The columns of the centre and the right ad- 
 vanced from Tavastehuus to Abo, after travers- 
 ing the side of the Finland triangle which 
 borders the Gulf of Finland. General Bagra- 
 tion was left at Abo, and General Toutchkoff 
 was afterwards sent along the side that borders 
 the Gulf of Bothnia, running direct north to 
 Uleaborg. A weak column had been directed 
 upon the essential line, that from Wiborg to 
 Uleaborg. Thus the Russians did nothing more 
 than push the enemy before them, merely taking 
 from them a few prisoners, and bringing about 
 themselves a concentration of the Swedes, who, 
 had they thrown themselves in mass upon the 
 true line of operation, from Uleaborg to Wiborg, 
 by the Savolax, might have made them atone 
 for so vicious a manner of operating. There 
 were, nevertheless, brilliant petty actions, 
 which proved the bravery of the troops of the 
 two nations, an/i the experience acquired by 
 the Russian officers in their wars against us, 
 but the ignorance of their staff in all that con- 
 cerned the general conduct of the operations. 
 It was not thus that French generals, educated 
 in the school of Napoleon, would have acted 
 upon such a theatre of war. The Russians, 
 having invaded but not conquered the country, 
 undertook the siege of the fortresses on the 
 coast, among others that of Sweaborg, which 
 the frost could not but singularly facilitate. 
 A mouth or thereabout had sufficed for this 
 
 sion of Salonichi, and proceed to the aid of that port when- 
 ever it shall be required of her. 
 
 " Sthly. The Emperor of Russia declares that he has no 
 wish to acquire the south coast of the Black Sea which is 
 in Asia, though, in the discussion, it was thought that it 
 might be desirable for him. 
 
 " 6thly. The Emperor of Rua.sia has declared that what- 
 ever mi^ht be the success of his troops in India, he should 
 not desire to possess any thing there, and that he would 
 cheerfully consent that France should make for herself 
 all the territorial acquisitions in India which she might 
 think fit; and that it should be likewise at her option to 
 cede any portion of tho conquests which she might make 
 there to her allies. 
 
 " If the two allies agree together in a precise manner that 
 they adopt one or the other of these two plans of partition, 
 his Majesty the Emperor Alexander will hn.e extreme 
 pleasure in repairing to the personal interview which has 
 been proposed to him, and which could perhaps take place 
 at Erfurt. He conceives that it would be advantageous if 
 the basis of the engagements that are to be made there, were 
 previously fixed with a sort of precision, that the two empe- 
 rors may have nothing to add to the extreme satisfaction of 
 seeing one another but that of being enabled tc sign with- 
 out delay the fate of this part of this globe, and thereby, 
 as they purpose to themselves, to force England to dcsiro 
 that peace from which she now keeps aloof wilfully out 
 with such boasting."
 
 448 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808 
 
 military march, which was only the commence- ; 
 ment of the war in Finland, a month employed j 
 by the Russian cabinet in the discussion of the j 
 partition of the East. The King of Sweden, on 
 learning the invasion of his dominions, to re- 
 venge himself apparently for the surprise sus- 
 tained from a brother-in-law, ventured upon an 
 act which is hardly customary any longer even 
 in Turkey ; he caused the Russian ambassador, 
 M. d'Alopeus, to be seized, instead of merely 
 Bending him away; which excited general in- 
 dignation in the whole diplomatic body residing 
 at Stockholm. Alexander replied with suitable 
 dignity to this strange conduct ; he dismissed 
 with infinite marks of attention M. de Ste- 
 dingk, ambassador from Sweden at St. Peters- 
 burg, an old man universally respected ; but 
 he revenged himself in a different and more 
 skilful manner. He took advantage of the oc- 
 casion to pronounce the union of Finland with 
 the Russian empire. This conquest was the 
 sole result of the mighty plans projected at 
 Tilsit : but, though the only one, it was suffi- 
 cient to justify the policy followed at that mo- 
 ment by the Emperor Alexander, and it is a 
 proof that Russia cannot conquer but with the 
 concurrence of France. 
 
 Notwithstanding the disdain which the Rus- 
 sians had affected for .the conquest of Finland, 
 the fact itself, which seemed to be consum- 
 mated, though a great deal of blood was yet to be 
 spilt, the fact deeply affected the mind of the 
 public at St. Petersburg. It was remarked that 
 having met with nothing but defeats in the 
 service of England, Russia had, after only a 
 few months' friendship with France, acquired 
 an important province, but little cultivated and 
 thinly peopled it is true, in which respects it 
 was very much like the rest of the empire, but 
 admirably situated as a land and sea frontier ; 
 and people began to hope that the policy of the 
 French alliance might prove as fertile as the 
 government flattered itself that it would. The 
 emperor and his minister were radiant with joy. 
 Their usual critics, Messrs, de Czartoryski and 
 Novosiltzoff, were less disdainful and less bitter 
 in their animadversions. The society in St. 
 Petersburg itself manifested its content with 
 M. de Caulaincourt in quite new attentions, 
 addressed not only to his person, which was 
 surrounded by the public esteem, but also to 
 his government, with which it began to be 
 satisfied. 
 
 The emperor and M. de Romanzoff, who had 
 just received intelligence of the invasion of 
 Etruria and Portugal, of the movements of 
 troops towards Rome and Madrid, and who 
 could not doubt that those movements had a 
 very serious motive, never spoke of them but 
 with singular levity, without any appearance 
 of preoccupation, and as men who gave up the 
 weak, in order that they might be allowed to 
 oppress in their turn. But, though they felt a 
 real satisfaction, they were very urgent with 
 M. de Caulaiucourt for a speedy answer to the 
 various proposals for partition and the appoint- 
 ment of a place for an interview to be held very 
 shortly, in order to settle matters definitively. 
 Spring was near at hand, for it was almost the 
 end of February, and they wanted, they said, 
 against the opening of the navigation, some- 
 thing striking, that should make people forget 
 the disasters of the preceding year. The open- 
 
 ing of the navigation in tht 1 northern seas is a 
 period of rejoicing ; for light makes its appear- 
 ance again, warmth returns, commerce brings 
 its treasures. The productions of the North 
 are exchanged for those of civilized Europe or 
 for specie. But this year the English flag, the 
 usual instrument of these exchanges, was not 
 to appear, or if it did, it must float from the 
 mast-heads of men-of-war. The English ship- 
 ping, instead of bringing treasures, was not to 
 show any thing but the muzzles of its guns. 
 There was wanted to oppose to this sad spec- 
 tacle some great national joy, excited by inte- 
 rests of a different kind, the interests of Rus- 
 sian ambition. 
 
 M. de Caulaincourt, who accurately reported 
 to his master the ideas of this ambitious court, 
 had communicated every thing to Napoleon 
 with his usual veracity. But, in explaining the 
 wishes of Russia, he represented as certain 
 that, for the present, she was fully satisfied, 
 and that, for the rest, she could be fed for some 
 time with hopes. 
 
 Napoleon, successively informed of this situ- 
 ation at the end of February, and in the begin- 
 ning of March, had clearly foreseen all the 
 emotions, all the plans more or less chimerical, 
 all the hopes more or less exaggerated, that his 
 letter would produce at St. Petersburg ; but he 
 had said to himself that, in the immediate in- 
 vasion of Finland, and in the acceptance of a 
 discussion opened for the partition of the Turk- 
 ish empire, there was food enough for several 
 months for the imagination of the Russian na- 
 tion and of its sovereign ; and that, during this 
 interval, he could prosecute his plans respect- 
 ing the West. It is not true, as one would be 
 disposed to believe from what precedes, that he 
 entirely deceived Russia, and that, in reality, 
 he never intended to grant her at any price A 
 concession in the East. He knew that, by re- 
 linquishing Moldavia and Wallachia, and even 
 Moldavia alone, he should satisfy the czar, and 
 pay his debt to Russian ambition, whatever 
 French ambition might presume to do in the 
 West. He had, therefore, this resource, in all 
 cases, for realizing the hopes which he had led 
 the Emperor Alexander to conceive. But if he 
 went further, and was not sorry to employ in 
 this manner the lively imagination of his new 
 ally, it was because, on his part, his own ima- 
 gination plunged deeper into this futurity than 
 that of his contemporaries. The Turks, since 
 the fall of Selim, appeared to have reached the 
 term of their existence. Napoleon asked him- 
 self if he must not put an end to this ever- 
 threatening ruin; and, excited by his maritime 
 struggle with the English, he again asked him- 
 self if the time had not arrived for making 
 himself master of all the coasts of the Medi- 
 terranean, -and for availing himself of the mo- 
 mentary attachment with which he had inspired 
 Russia, to direct an army upon India, across 
 the partitioned continent of Asia. Though 
 chimerical in the eyes of a generation reduced, 
 like ours, to very moderate proportions, these 
 projects must not be judged of from our pre- 
 sent point of view. It must be recollected that 
 the man who conceived such daring schemes 
 could at pleasure make and unmake kings, pro- 
 nounce by a word the doom of the greatest 
 monarchies in Europe ; and though, in our opi 
 nion, he deceived himself, we must not believ<8
 
 Feb. 1808.1 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 that we accurately measure the extent of his 
 error, in measuring it according to our present 
 ideas ; for, by judging thus, our littleness would 
 deceive itself as much as his greatness did. 
 Having attained the summit of omnipotence, ! 
 subject to a continual fermentation of ideas, he 
 conceived that all these questions ought to be 
 investigated ; and though he dreaded the solu- 
 tion as much as his ally desired it, he did not 
 deceive him by bringing them under discussion ; 
 for, in the immensity of his views, he was some- 
 times quite disposed to resolve them. 
 
 Be this as it may, Napoleon, having pushed 
 the Emperor Alexander upon Finland, having 
 given him the partition of the Turkish empire 
 to discuss, said to himself that he had several 
 months before him, and he decided to carry at 
 length into execution the plan which he had 
 fixed upon relative to Spain. 
 
 We have already seen what this plan was. 
 It consisted in progressively increasing the 
 terror of the court of Spain, till he should in- 
 duce it to flee, as the house of Braganza had 
 done. For this purpose, he had recourse to 
 the most crafty means ; and on this occasion 
 he employed his genius in a way that cannot 
 be too deeply regretted. All the troops were 
 ready. General Dupont, with 25,000 men, was 
 on the Valladolid road, one division upon Se- 
 govia, taking the direction of Madrid. Mar- 
 shal Moncey, with 30,000, was between Burgos 
 and Aranda, the direct road for Madrid. Ge- 
 neral Duhesme, with seven or eight thousand 
 men, almost all Italians, was marching upon 
 Barcelona: 5000 French from Piedmont and 
 Provence were on march to join him. One di- 
 vision of 3000 men was proceeding by St. Jean- 
 Pied-de-Port, for Pampeluna. A second, com- 
 posed of the fourth battalions of the five legions 
 of reserve, was gone to reinforce the first. A 
 reserve of infantry was organizing at Orleans, 
 one of cavalry at Poitiers. These made about 
 80,000 men, all young soldiers, who had never 
 seen fire, but well officered, and full of the mi- 
 litary spirit which at that period animated our 
 armies. 
 
 It was necessary to give a commander to 
 these forces. Napoleon chose a very indiscreet 
 one for a political mission of such importance, 
 but he placed him in such a situation as to pre- 
 clude the possibility of any indiscretion. This 
 commander was Murat, still discontented at be- 
 ing only grand-duke, impatient to become king, 
 no matter where, having taken part in the wars 
 in Italy, Austria, Prussia, Poland, and contri- 
 buted to erect thrones at Naples, Florence, Mi- 
 lan, the Hague, Cassel, Warsaw, without gain- 
 ing one of those thrones for himself; inconsola- 
 ble above all for not having obtained that of 
 Poland, and eager for any war which might 
 offer fresh chances of reigning. The Penin- 
 sula, where at this moment the throne of Por- 
 tugal was vacant, where that of Spain tottered, 
 was for him the land of dreams, as Mexico or 
 Peru formerly was for the Spanish adventurers. 
 Good-natured and generous as Murat was, if 
 he was required to hasten the downfal of 
 Charles IV., by means not the most creditable 
 or avowable, in his ardour for reigning he was 
 the man to undertake the commission. There 
 was nothing to be feared en his part but too 
 much zeal. However, more intelligent, more 
 elirewd, than he has in general been deemed, 
 
 VOL. II. 67 
 
 (the circumstances which arc about to follow 
 will furnish proof of this,) he was capable, in 
 an important interest of ambition, of being 
 even discreet and reserved. He had, at all 
 events, as we have seen above, formed particu- 
 lar relations with Emmanuel Godoy, relations, 
 cultivated by the latter with equal eagerness, 
 each believing that the other would assist him 
 in the attainment of the object of his wishes, 
 and both deceiving themselves, for Godoy. was 
 no more in a condition to give a king to the 
 Spaniards than Murat an idea to Napoleon. 
 To send Murat to Spain was, therefore, in- 
 viting him to a feast. But Napoleon, designing 
 to frighten the reigning house by the despatch 
 of numerous troops combined with absolute 
 silence respecting his intentions, made use of 
 his brother-in-law conformably to the plan 
 which he had adopted. He had had him by 
 his side both in Italy and Paris, without utter- 
 ing a single word concerning his plans relative 
 to Spain, at the very moment when he was 
 thinking of them the most. On the 20th of 
 February, having seen him in the course of the 
 day without saying a word to him about the 
 mission which he destined for him, he directed 
 the minister of war to make him set out in the 
 night for Bayonne, in order to assume the com- 
 mand of the troops entering Spain. Murat 
 was to be there on the 26th, and to find there 
 his instructions. Those instructions were to 
 this effect : to take the general command of the 
 corps of the Gironde and of the Ocean, of the 
 division of the Eastern Pyrenees, of the divi- 
 sion of the Western Pyrenees, and of all the 
 troops which were penetrating further into 
 Spain ; to repair in the first days of March to 
 Burgos, whither the detachments of the impe- 
 rial guard were to proceed ; to place his head- 
 quarters at the centre of the corps of Marshal 
 Moncey, that is to say, at Burgos itself ; to ad- 
 vance with this corps upon the Madrid road by 
 Aranda and Somosierra ; to direct that of Ge- 
 neral Dupont thither by Segovia and the Escu- 
 rial ; to be master by about the 15th of March 
 of the two passes of the Guadarrama ; to col- 
 lect 600,000 rations of biscuit already made at 
 Bayonne, so that the troops should be supplied 
 for a fortnight, in case of a forced march ; to 
 await orders from Paris for any ulterior move- 
 ment; to occupy immediately the citadel of 
 Pampeluna, the forts of Barcelona, the fortress 
 of St. Sebastian ; to give the Spanish com- 
 mandants, as a reason for this occupation, the 
 ordinary rule of war to secure one's rear, when 
 marching forward even in a friendly country ; 
 to keep all the troops well together, as one is 
 accustomed to do on approaching the enemy ; 
 taking care that the pay should never be in 
 arrear, so that the soldiers, having money, 
 might not be tempted to consume without pay- 
 ing, and, as there was reason to distrust the 
 Neapolitans who were entering Catalonia, to 
 order the first Italian who should plunder to be 
 shot ; not to seek, not to accept of communica- 
 tion with die court of Spain, without having a 
 formal order ; not to answer any letter from 
 the Prince of the Peace ; to say, in case of be- 
 ing questioned in such a manner as not to be 
 able to keep silence, that the French troops 
 were entering Spain for a purpose known to 
 Napoleon alone, a purpose certainly advan- 
 tageous to the cause of Spain and of France; 
 2r2
 
 450 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808. 
 
 to pronounce vaguely the words Cadiz, Gibral- 
 tar, without saying any thing positive ; to inti- 
 mate particularly to the Biscayan provinces, 
 that whatever might happen, their privileges 
 would be respected ; to publish, on reaching 
 Burgos, an order of the day, recommending to 
 the troops the strictest discipline and the most 
 fraternal relations with the generous Spanish 
 people, the friend and ally of the French peo- 
 ple ; never to mix up with all these protesta- 
 tions of friendship any other name than that 
 of the Spanish people, and never to mention 
 King Charles IV. or his government, under any 
 form whatever. 
 
 Such is the substance of the instructions ad- 
 dressed to Murat on the 20th of February; 
 confirmed and developed in the following days 
 in posterior orders. General Belliard was 
 placed about him as chief of the staff, General 
 Grouchy as commander of his cavalry, General 
 Lariboissiere was charged with the direction 
 of the artillery of the army. The latter was 
 to despatch for Bayonne, from all the depots 
 of artillery, situated in the West and the South, 
 considerable stores, particularly tools and fire- 
 works capable of blowing up the gate of a town 
 or of a strong castle. The mode of carriage 
 in Spain being on the back of mules, orders 
 were immediately sent off to Bayonne to pur- 
 chase five hundred of the best and handsomest 
 of those animals. M. Mollien, minister of the 
 public treasury, was desired to send several 
 millions in specie, two of them in gold, to Bay- 
 onne, to defray all the expenses of the army, 
 and to pay them in ready money. He was, 
 moreover, to prepare an equitable tariff, show- 
 ing the comparative value of the French and 
 Spanish coins, which was to be published in 
 every town in Spain through which the troops 
 should pass, in order to prevent quarrels be- 
 tween the soldiers and the inhabitants. 
 
 To these instructions, given for the army 
 entering Spain, were added others for the 
 army in Portugal. Napoleon designed that 
 Spain should not be put to any expense in an 
 enterprise which was about to cost her the 
 reigning dynasty. But he was not equally 
 scrupulous in regard to Portugal, which he i 
 was authorized to treat as a conquered country 
 and the ally of England. Calculating the 
 wealth of that kingdom rather by that of the 
 colonies than by that of the mother-country, 
 he directed Junot to impose upon it a contri- 
 bution of one hundred millions. He recom- 
 mended the most extreme severity for any 
 attempt at insurrection, reminding him, as an 
 example to be followed, of the terrible manner 
 in which he had repressed Cairo in Egypt, 
 Pavia and Verona in Italy. He ordered him 
 to dissolve the Portuguese army, and to send 
 to France all that could not be disbanded. He 
 expressly enjoined him to have an eye on the 
 Spanish divisions which had concurred in the 
 invasion of Portugal, to move them as far as 
 he could from the frontiers of Spain, to keep 
 the bulk of his forces at Lisbon, and two small 
 French divisions of four or five thousand men 
 each, the one at Almeida to awe the Spanish 
 troops of General Taranco, who occupied 
 Oporto, the other at Badajoz, to march, if 
 needful, for Andalusia ; to keep this order 
 absolutely secret, and, if he heard that any 
 collision had taken place between the Spaniards 
 
 and the French, to circulate among the Portu- 
 guese that the cause of this collision was no 
 other than Portugal itself, the possession of 
 which was demanded by the Spaniards, but 
 refused them. 
 
 Napoleon lastly gave orders to the guard, 
 for he foresaw that he should be obliged to go 
 himself to Spain, either to direct the war, if 
 war should break out there, or to direct the 
 political affairs, if his policy should bring 
 about a like termination of the events in Spain 
 to those in Portugal, by the flight of the royal 
 family. He had successively despatched for 
 Bayonne the Mamelukes, the Poles, the sea- 
 men of the guard, several detachments of 
 chasseurs and horse grenadiers, and a regi- 
 ment of fusileers, that is to say, about 3000 
 men. He sent the brave Lepic to command 
 them, with orders to be in the first days of 
 March at Burgos, the infantry in Burgos itself, 
 the cavalry on the road from Bayonne to 
 Burgos. 
 
 These military dispositions were not suffi- 
 cient to fulfil completely the object which Na- 
 poleon proposed to himself. While his troops 
 were to advance mysteriously upon Madrid, 
 having no cheering words but for the Spanish 
 people, and none whatever for the reigning 
 family, he set his diplomacy to work in the 
 same spirit. M. de Beauharnais applied in- 
 cessantly at Paris for instructions against a 
 catastrophe which appeared imminent. He 
 solicited in particular permission to confer 
 some demonstrations of interest on Ferdinand, 
 still convinced that the favourite must be over- 
 thrown for the benefit of that prince, and the 
 fusion of the two dynasties be effected by a 
 marriage. Napoleon, who was now far from 
 entertaining such a plan, and who frequently 
 laughed at the credulity of M. de Beauharnais, 
 his awkwardness, his avarice, the importance 
 which he was fond of assuming, and who left 
 him where he was, because an honest man 
 without talent suited him better than another 
 to perform the ridiculous part of an ambassa- 
 dor who was left ignorant of every thing, di- 
 rected that he should be enjoined to observe 
 the strictest neutrality between the factions 
 which divided Spain, to show no demonstra- 
 tions of interest for any of them, to answer 
 merely, when asked concerning the disposi- 
 tions of the Emperor of the French, that he 
 was displeased, extremely displeased, without 
 saying at what ; to add, if any thing was said 
 to him concerning the march of the French 
 armies, that Gibraltar, Cadiz, probably re- 
 quired a concentration of troops, for the Eng- 
 lish were bringing large forces towards that 
 point; but that the Spanish cabinet was so 
 indiscreet that it could not be trusted with the 
 secret of a single military operation. 
 
 These instructions were sufhcient for the 
 part which M. de Beauharnais had to act. 
 But Napoleon employed more certain means 
 for striking terror into the unhappy court of 
 Spain. M. Yzquierdo was still in Paris, hover- 
 ing about the Tuileries, sometimes at the 
 Grand-marshal Duroc's, with whom he had ne- 
 gotiated the treaty of Fontainebleau, some- 
 times at M. de Talleyrand's, the principal 
 go-between in the whole Spanish business. 
 Seeing that it was impossible for him to obtain 
 the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau,
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 451 
 
 he had thence concluded that other measures 
 were contemplated in Paris ; that this parti- 
 tion of Portugal had been but a provisional 
 arrangement for obtaining the immediate ces- 
 sion of Tuscany ; and that, no doubt, the over- 
 throw of the dynasty itself was meditated. 
 With his usual perspicacity, he had completely 
 detected, not the means but the end at which 
 Napoleon was aiming. He had endeavoured, 
 by artfully sounding M. de Talleyrand, to dis- 
 cover whether large concessions of territory 
 or of commerce might not, accompanied by a 
 marriage, appease the wrath, real or feigned, 
 of the conqueror. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand, who was inclined to an 
 intermediate plan, had listened to M. Yzqui- 
 erdo, and perhaps as much proposed as adopted 
 the ideas, of which this agent of Emmanuel 
 Godoy's desired to make essay. These ideas 
 agreed precisely with the second plan, which 
 we have already detailed. It purported, in 
 fact, to marry Ferdinand to a French prin- 
 cess, to take for France the provinces of the 
 Ebro in exchange for the part of Portugal left 
 disposable, to open the Spanish colonies to the 
 French, to bind the two crowns together not 
 only by a marriage but by a treaty of alliance 
 offensive and defensive, which should render 
 either war or peace common to both, and 
 lastly to give to Charles IV. the title of Em- 
 peror of the Americas. Such were the ideas 
 which M. Yzquierdo put forward, as much to 
 sound the court of the Tuileries as to arrive at 
 a conclusion. All at once, Napoleon ordered 
 him to be treated with extreme harshness, to 
 be sent away, as if one was weary of his ter- 
 giversations, as if one would have nothing 
 more to do with a court so weak, so incapable, 
 so insincere ; in short, to impel him to set out 
 for Madrid, that he might carry thither the 
 terror with which he had been filled. The 
 Grand-marshal Duroc had orders to write to 
 M. Yzquierdo that he would do well to return 
 immediately to Madrid, 1 to disperse the thick 
 clouds which had arisen between the two 
 courts. It was not said what clouds ; but M. 
 Yzquierdo took the hint, and it would be suffi- 
 cient to make him set out to excite in the 
 eourt of Spain an agitation, which would not 
 let it rest anywhere, and which must lead to a 
 definitive resolution. M. Yzquierdo left Paris 
 the same day. 
 
 It was requisite, at the same time, to answer 
 the letter of the oth of February, in which the 
 terrified Charles IV. had besought Napoleon to 
 satisfy him respecting his intentions, and re- 
 specting the march of the French troops, which 
 at that moment were advancing towards Ma- 
 drid. In this letter Charles IV. had abstained 
 from alluding to the marriage of his son with 
 a niece of Napoleon's, seeing that the latter 
 affected to think no more of that proposal. 
 Like one who is striving to pick a quarrel, Na- 
 poleon, instead of endeavouring in his answer 
 to dispel the alarm of Charles IV., seemed to 
 complain that, on the subject of the marriage, 
 there should be observed a silence of which he 
 had himself set the example. This answer, 
 dated the 25th of February, was very short 
 and very dry. He therein mentioned that, on 
 
 I The letter is in the Louvre, and bears date the 24th of 
 February. 
 
 the 18th of November, King Charles had asked 
 him for a French princess, that he answered 
 on the 10th of January by a conditional con- 
 sent; that on the 5th of February, King 
 Charles, writing again to him, made no further 
 mention of the marriage ; and he added that 
 this last silence left him in doubts which it 
 was necessary to remove in order to decide 
 upon objects of great importance. 
 
 This new letter, which was but a refusal to 
 relieve the uneasiness of the unfortunate 
 Charles IV., and which, combined with other 
 circumstances of the moment, must have filled 
 him with terror, was brought by M. de Tour- 
 non, chamberlain of the Emperor, who had 
 been previously sent to Madrid on a similar 
 mission, and who to great devotedness united 
 much good sense and love of truth. He had 
 instructions to observe attentively the progress 
 and conduct of the French troops, the disposi- 
 tions of the Spanish people in regard to them, 
 to take particular notice also of what was pass- 
 ing at the Escurial, then to return to Burgos 
 about the loth of March, and there await the 
 arrival of Napoleon. The latter had, in fact, 
 calculated that his orders, given between the 
 20th and the 25th of February, would have 
 their consequences in Spain in the middle of 
 March, and that, at this period, he ought to 
 be in person at Burgos, to derive from events, 
 always fertile in unforeseen cases, the result 
 which he desired. 
 
 There was, therefore, every reason to be- 
 lieve that the court of Spain, already strongly 
 tempted to follow the example of the house of 
 Braganza, when it should see the French army 
 advancing upon Madrid, M. de Beauharnais 
 saying nothing because he knew nothing, and 
 M. Yzquierdo saying much, because he feared 
 much, would no longer hesitate to set out for 
 Cadiz. If, however, in spite of recommenda- 
 tions given to the French troops, to treat the 
 Spanish people as friends, an unforeseen colli- 
 sion should take place, there would then be a 
 solution again. He might consider himself as 
 betrayed by allies among whom he had come 
 amicably for an important expedition interest 
 ing the alliance, and he should revenge him- 
 self by deposing the Bourbons of Spain, as he 
 had deposed those of Naples for a treachery 
 real or supposed. Napoleon, acting thus as a 
 conqueror, who cares little about the means, 
 provided that he attains his end, reckoning 
 upon great results, such as the regeneration 
 of Spain, the re-establishment of the natural 
 alliances of France, to excuse himself in the 
 eyes of posterity for the dark machination 
 which he was employing towards a friendly 
 court Napoleon conceived that he had at 
 length discovered the true way of overturning 
 the Bourbons without resorting to atrocious 
 violences, which, in less humane ages than 
 ours, conquerors have never hesitated to com- 
 mit. He thought that, on giving a slight shako 
 to the throne of Spain, without violently hurl- 
 ing Charles IV. from it, he might induce that 
 weak prince, his guilty wife, and his cowardly 
 favourite, to forsake it, in order to seek an- 
 other in America. But this plan, devised to 
 avoid shocking Europe and France too much, 
 gave rise to an objection which had caused 
 Napoleon to hesitate long about adopting it. 
 By driving the reigning house to retreat, lik
 
 452 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 that of Portugal, to the New World, he should 
 inevitably bring upon Spain the loss of her 
 colonies, as had been the case with Portugal. 
 The Brnganzas in Brazil, the Bourbons in 
 Mexico, in Peru, on the banks of the La Plata, 
 would found empires, enemies of their usurped 
 mother-countries, friends of England, who 
 would find for a long time in the supply of 
 these colonies wherewithal to indemnify her- 
 self for the closing of the Continent. No doubt, 
 on penetrating into a distant futurity, one 
 might discover in these colonies new nations, 
 offering to their old mother-countries more 
 means of exchange, more occasions for profit, 
 as was already exemplified in the case of Eng- 
 land and the United States. But Spain, Portu- 
 gal, were not industrious England ; the Ameri- 
 cans of the South were not the Americans of 
 the North ; and all that could be foreseen for 
 a long series of years was the loss of the Span- 
 ish colonies, and the working of them for the 
 benefit of British commerce. To the flight, 
 therefore, of Charles IV. to America were at- 
 tached, together with a great convenience for 
 thffusurpation of the throne, great and serious 
 inconveniences in respect to the future lot of 
 the Spanish colonies. This must be a subject 
 
 ' I should very much astonish both the public and con- 
 temporary historians, (who are usually very prompt in 
 making up their minds on doubtful questions,) were I to 
 describe the various perplexities I experienced before I 
 could come to any satisfactory conclusion respecting Na- 
 poleon's real designs on Spain. As he ended by invading 
 the country and giving the sovereignty to his brother 
 Joseph, it has been inferred that he had all along projected 
 the scheme which he ultimately executed. In like man- 
 ner, there are persons who firmly believe that, because he 
 made himself Emperor of France, he had entertained that 
 project from the time when he commanded the army of 
 Italy. The collectors of recollections have even gone so 
 far as to look for the first traces of his projects in the 
 School of Brienne. Moreau betrayed France in 1813: 
 this is an unquestionable fact. But there are persons who, 
 not content with dating his civic delinquencies from the 
 conspiracy of Georges, and his misunderstanding with the 
 First Consul, trace them back to the conspiracies of I'iohe- 
 gru; and, following up the spirit of investigation, they go 
 so far as to affirm that he conceived the first idea of be- 
 traying the French armies to the Austrians whilst he was 
 engaged in studying the law at the School of Rennes. 
 This is,a most absurd mode of judging mankind. It is 
 founded on a misunderstanding, not only of the indivi- 
 duals themselves, but of the progress of the human mind, 
 which is slow and successive, and much less frequently 
 determines events than is determined by them. In 1808 
 Napoleon dethroned the Spanish Bourbons. When did he 
 determine on this step, and by what means did he propose 
 to effect it? These are questions the solution of which 
 presents the utmost difficulty, even to those who have the 
 historical documents within their reach. I am the only 
 historian who has possessed all the documents relating to 
 those facts, thanks to the facilities afforded by my political 
 position ; and yet I was for a considerable time involved 
 In great uncertainty. My doubts were only removed by 
 iiscoveries which have been in part due to persevering in- 
 vestigation, and in part the result of mere good fortune. 
 I will here subjoin an account of these discoveries for the 
 information of the public, and for the satisfaction of men 
 who regard conscientious inquiry on such points in the 
 light of a duty. 
 
 First, I have a few observations to offer respecting the 
 documents themselves. Of all the many writers who have 
 treated of the events here in question, not one has had 
 access to the real historical documents referring to them. 
 All have merely written books from other books. This is 
 evident, on a perusal of their works, to any one acquainted 
 with facts. Even Count de Toreno, whose work on the 
 Spanish revolution is remarkable for talent and what is 
 better still, for sound political judgment, had not the 
 means of consulting the necessary documents. He baswl 
 his work on the authority of Spanish and French publica- 
 tions and existing traditions, collected in his own country ; 
 and by these means his narrative was rendered in many 
 respecU highly valuable. Among French writers, one 
 only, M. Armand Lefevre, has had the advantage of being 
 Initiated into foreign affairs, and obtaining access to a few 
 authentic documents. But could he, through this initia- 
 
 [Feb. 1808 
 
 of grievous affliction to the Spaniards them- 
 selves, hence discontent and revolt, and an 
 injury to our commerce proportionate to the 
 advantage that would be derived by the com- 
 merce of the enemy. 
 
 Napoleon, extremely well informed respect- 
 ing these complicated interests, devised a new 
 combination, much more artful than any of 
 those to which we have adverted, and having 
 for its object to correct the only inconvenience 
 of the plan which he had definitively adopted. 
 There was at Cadiz a fine French squadron, 
 capable of commanding the harbour and the 
 road. He resolved to employ it in detaining 
 the Bourbons at the moment when they should 
 attempt to embark, and, after driving them 
 by fear from Aranjuez to Cadiz, stop them by 
 force at Cadiz itself, before they should have 
 sailed, under the escort of England, for Vera 
 Cruz. In consequence, he sent off to Admiral 
 Rosily a despatch in cipher, dated the 21st of 
 February, containing an express order to take 
 such a position in the road of Cadiz as to pre- 
 vent the departure of any vessel, and to stop 
 the fugitive royal family, if it should imitate 
 the folly, so said the despatch, of the court of 
 Lisbon. 1 
 
 tion, come to the knowledge of truth? A single remark 
 
 will suffice to answer this question. The correspondence 
 
 I of the foreign office, in relation to this Spanish business, 
 
 I consists of a very few despatches from M. de Chanip;; rny, 
 
 i and in a very considerable number of despatches from M. 
 
 de Beauharnais. the French ambassador at Madrid ! 
 
 Now, it happened that M. de Champagny, who was a 
 very honourable man, and sincerely devoted to the Em- 
 peror, knew nothing whatever of the affairs of Spain. M. 
 de Beauharnais, also a man of strict integrity, but very 
 incapable, was singled out as a fit personage to play the 
 ridiculous part of an ambassador who was deceived, in 
 order that he, in his turn, might the better deceive the 
 court to which he was accredited. " Say nothing to Beau- 
 harnais," " I have said nothing to Beauharnais," are 
 phrases of continual recurrence in the correspondence 
 between Bonaparte and his agents in Spain. Finally, at 
 the moment of the catastrophe, Napoleon despatched M. 
 du la Koret to second Murat regarding M. de Beauharnaig 
 as a person utterly useless: and he dismissed the latter in 
 disgrace, without even hearing his defence, which was a 
 flagrant ac! of injustice. The correspondence of the de- 
 partment of foreign affairs, even when one enjoys the 
 advantage of consulting it, comprises only a few very un- 
 important documents in relation to the affairs of Spain. 
 Where then, it will be asked, are the documents to be 
 found? In the correspondence between Napoleon and the 
 agents he employed at the time. The agents in 1'uris wore 
 MM. Talleyrand and Duroc in Madrid, first Murat. and 
 aft'Twards General Savary, Marshal Bessieres, General 
 Count de Lobau, M. de Tournon, General Grouchy, M. de 
 Monthyon. (whose reports were subsequently published 
 in a manner different from that in which he wrote them,) 
 and Admiral Perres, who was much engaged in this affair 
 in reference to the Spanish colonies. These were Napo- 
 leon's real agents; the only persons who possessed any 
 i knowledge of the affair, and they were only partially in- 
 i formed, for each individual knew only that which con- 
 cerned himself, and conjectured the rest as well as his 
 intelligence enabled him. The correspondence of all these 
 persons with Xapoleon, and of Napoleon with them exists. 
 It is an extensive and curious correspondence, preserved 
 in the Louvre, and I am the only person who has read it. 
 But though these documents seemed calculated to clear 
 up all obscurity, they did not satisfy my doubt until after 
 I had examined them with that sort of laborious attention 
 which it is necessary to bestow on certain passages in the 
 writings of the historians of antiquity, in order to eluci- 
 date historical facts. 
 
 In general, whenever I have perused the correspondence 
 of Napoleon with his agents. I have found it so clear and 
 precise that I never could be in doubt respecting facts and 
 events; but after reading this correspondence relative to 
 Spain, I remained for a length of time in the most embar- 
 rassing perplexity. At first Napoleon must have wavered 
 long amidst a variety of projects ; and, when at length hig 
 determination was fixed, he did not make known his de- 
 signs. Possibly he might have disclosed them to Savary 
 at the last moment and in reference to one point the 
 compulsory journey of Ferdinand to Bayonne. On tho
 
 Feb. 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 453 
 
 Assuredly, if one were to judge of these acts 
 according to ordinary morality, which renders 
 sacred the property of another, we must brand 
 them for ever, as we brand those of the crimi- 
 
 20th of February he had seen Murat, without mentioning 
 the matter to him, and he transmitted to him, through 
 the minister of the war department, the order to depart 
 for Bayonne. He traced to him the march of the army on 
 Madrid, adding not a single word relative to politics, and 
 forbidding any question to be asked. Count Lobau and 
 M. de Tournon, who were sent as observers, were not put 
 in possession of any secret. At length, when the revolu- 
 tion of Aranjuez was accomplished, and Spain was without 
 a king, (Charles IV. having abdicated, and Ferdinand VII. 
 not having been recognised,) Napoleon despatched General 
 Savary, and confided to him a part of the plan, that which 
 consisted in bringing the father and son to Bayonne, either 
 with their own free will or. by force. On that same day, 
 M. de Tournon left Paris with instructions of a totally dif- 
 ferent nature. These instructions, which were subse- 
 quently published at Saint Helena, are not apocryphal, 
 but perfectly authentic: they countermanded all that 
 Murat and General Savary had been ordered to do, and 
 what they actually did. It may be readily imagined how 
 great was the difficulty of elucidating historical truth from 
 amidst this mass of well-concocted dissimulation; and, if 
 this task was difficult, even with the help of genuine 
 documents, it must be pronounced impossible without 
 them. 
 
 I will now explain by what means I succeeded in ar- 
 riving at the truth. By comparing one with another all 
 the orders given, not only to confidential agents, bat to 
 agents who were mere instruments ; by comparing the 
 political with the military orders, and not only with the 
 military, but even with the financial orders; by com- 
 paring those which were given with those which were 
 executed, and with some little hints thrown out at the 
 critical moment when Napoleon found it necessary to 
 make a partial disclosure of his designs, in order to exact 
 obedience; by these means, and the help of much pa 
 tience, I succeeded in unravelling the truth, bu not till 
 after years of reflection. I may say years, for there is one 
 point on which I did not satisfy myself until after three 
 years of attentive examination and reflection. 
 
 Having thus shown the difficulty of my task, I will now 
 state the conclusions at which I have arrived, and how I 
 arrived at them. 
 
 That Napoleon had long and systematically entertained 
 the idea of hurling the Bourbons from every throne in 
 Europe admits of no doubt. But this idea did not take 
 birth in his mind until 1806, after the treachery of the 
 court of Naples, and after the dethronement of the king, 
 which was announced on the day succeeding the battle of 
 Austerlitz. Subsequently, the incapacity and meanness 
 of the court of Spain, its secret treachery, which were per- 
 ceptible, though not distinctly manifest; finally, the 
 famous proclamation by which the Prince of the Peace, on 
 the very eve of the battle of Jena, summoned the whole 
 Spanish nation to arms; all these circumstances confirmed 
 Napoleon in the idea that it was necessary to pursue to- 
 wards the Spanish Bourbons the same course he had adopt- 
 ed towards the Bourbons of Naples. But at what time was 
 this general and vague idea matured into a fixed scheme ? 
 This is the first question And after the idea had ripened 
 into a fixed scheme, by what means was that scheme to be 
 executed ? For the court of Spain had not the courage to 
 make that demonstration of hostile spirit by which the 
 Neapolitan court had furnished a just ground of offence. 
 By what means, then, the scheme being fairly determined 
 on, was it to be carried out? This is the second question, 
 and the most difficult of solution. 
 
 It has been said that, Immediately after the proclama- 
 tion of the Prince of the Peace, Napoleon, then in Berlin, 
 formed the project of deposing the King of Spain. Napo- 
 leon's correspondence, which almost in every line reveals 
 his inmost feelings, bears evidence to the contrary. After 
 the battle of Jena, he was wholly engrossed by thoughts 
 of a great war in the north of Europe. The general idea 
 of ultimately getting rid of the Bourbons, might have be- 
 come confirmed in his mind ; but the project for its execu- 
 tion was not yet even in embryo. It has been alleged 
 that Napoleon was induced to sign peace at Tilsit by M. 
 Talleyrand, who represented the necessity of bringing 
 matters to a close in the North, that he might be enabled 
 to direct his whole attention to the South, that is to say, 
 to Spain; and it has also been stated that the question of 
 dethroning the Spanish Bourbons was even discussed with 
 the Emperor Alexander, who consented to that step, on 
 condition of sacrifices being made to himself in the East. 
 All this is untrue. Napoleon was induced to treat for 
 peace at. Tilsit only by a consciousness of the difficulties of 
 his position, which in 1807 was in no way dissimilar to 
 what it wag in 1812 ; the good fortune of the former year 
 being whloly attributable to the excellence of the army at 
 
 nal who has made free with what does not 
 belong to him ; and, even if we judge of them 
 upon different principles, we cannot avoid in- 
 flicting severe censure upon them. But thrones 
 
 that period. Spain was entirely out of the question. The 
 private correspondence of M. de Caulaincourt bears evi- 
 
 of dethroning the King of Spain. Napoleon was desirous 
 of concluding the continental peace at Tilsit, because he 
 found that the Niemen was very far distant from the 
 Rhine ; and he had one grand object at heart, which was 
 to constrain England to conclude a maritime peace by the 
 union of all the powers of the Continent against her. 
 
 On his return to Paris, in July, 1807, Napoleon immedi- 
 ately directed attention to two objects ; first, the internal 
 administration of the empire, which had been neglected for 
 the space of a year; and secondly, to turn to the best ac- 
 count the results of the policy he had pursued at Tilsit. 
 Thus, whilst the cabinet of St. Petersburg, charged with 
 the task of mediation, was addressing England, saying 
 "Choose between peace and war peace with us, or war 
 with us !" Napoleon disposed matters so as to force the 
 States still remaining neutral to declare themselves 
 against England, in the event of her determination to 
 continue hostilities. These neutral States were Denmark, 
 4 -stria, and Portugal; and he prepared an army to con- 
 iiu the latter power to obedience. But his correspond- 
 . ... e and the nature of his orders prove that, as far as 
 concerns Portugal, he was merely desirous of breaking up 
 her neutrality. When, in August and September, 1807, 
 the only answer returned by England to the question 
 urgently, pressed by Russia was the burning of Copen- 
 hagen, a general war-cry was raised against her ; and then 
 Napoleon determined to take advantage of two things, the 
 prolongation of the war, and the universal indignation 
 excited against Great Britain ; this indignation enabled 
 Napoleon to pursue, in reference to England, a course 
 which he never would have ventured upon under other 
 circumstances. 
 
 His first attempt was made on Portugal, but, the secret 
 understanding of that power with England soon becoming 
 manifest, he resolved to reduce her under his own domi- 
 nion. Not being able to do this in a direct way, he deter- 
 iniin"l to divide the usurped power between himself and 
 Spain, in consideration of the cession of Tuscany. At this 
 time (October, 1807) the question respecting the whole 
 Peninsula was visibly raised in his mind by the question 
 respecting Portugal. Words inadvertently dropped, first, 
 orders hurriedly issued, show the latent thought that had 
 its origin in the events of Copenhagen. It was also at tlie 
 period here alluded to that the disgraceful scenes enacted 
 in the Escurial gave birth to the extravagant idea of 
 bringing the Prince of the Asturias to trial, with the view 
 of declaring the forfeiture of his claims to the crown, and 
 transferring these claims to some one else, probably to the 
 Prince of the Peace, under the title of regent. It would 
 moreover appear, from the orders of Napoleon, that the 
 vile conduct pursued at the court of Spain served as a 
 stimulant to his ambition, for, calculating the journeys 
 of couriers according to the rate of expedition usual at the 
 period, we find that, on receipt of the intelligence of whoi 
 was passing in the Escurial, the military movements com- 
 menced; for at first he had determined to send forward 
 the troops by forced marches, though he suspended that 
 order on receiving in Paris intimation of the royal pardon 
 accorded to the Prince of the Asturias. 
 
 Led by the catastrophe at Copenhagen, and the neces- 
 sity of continuing the war, to the thought of making him- 
 self master of Portugal, Napoleon's attention was next 
 directed to the general affairs of the Peninsula, and the 
 proceedings at the Escurial very much disposed him to 
 take part in those affairs by force. A delay in carrying 
 this wish into effect was the consequence of the pardon 
 grauted to Ferdinand, and he departed for Italy iti No- 
 vember, 1807. 
 
 From what passed at Mantua between Lucien Bonaparte 
 and Napoleon, it is evident that the latter thought of ar- 
 ranging the marriage of one of his nieces with Ferdinand. 
 and that he was not quite determined about the dethrone- 
 ment of the Bourbons. Yet, in Italy he issued orders foi 
 the march of the troops, and such orders as prove thai 
 those troops were not mere reinforcements to the armj 
 of Portugal, (as has been conjectured by those who imiv 
 gine that he cherished no hostile design prior to the revo- 
 lution of Aranjuez,) but troops destined to decide the fate 
 of Spain, for, when in Italy, he organized the Duhesiup 
 division, which was despatched to invade Calabria. 
 
 On his return to Paris, in January, 1808, his ordctft 
 were multiplied, and their rapid sin-cession shows, that his 
 plan was becoming matured, if" thav he was determined 
 to make an end of the Spari'h IkmrKms. t
 
 454 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Feb. 1808. 
 
 are a different thing from private property. 
 They are taken away or given by war or policy, 
 and sometimes to the great advantage of the 
 nations which are thus arbitrarily disposed of. 
 
 There were two, or, it may be said, three ways by which 
 this object might be accomplished. 
 
 1st. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdinand, 
 without requiring any sacrifice on the part of Spain. 
 
 2d. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdi- 
 nand, and to demand the surrender of the provinces of 
 the Ebro, and the opening of the ports of the Spanish co- 
 lonies. 
 
 3d. To dethrone the Bourbons. 
 
 As to the first plan, and in my opinion the wisest of the 
 three, Napoleon seems not to have dwelt upon it long, for 
 he speedily sent his niece back to Italy. This fact admits 
 of no doubt, for it is attested by witnesses under whose 
 observation it occurred. One of the Emperor's brothers is 
 among these witnesses. 
 
 With regard to the second plan, it certainly was enter- 
 tained, or at least thought of; for a despatch from M. Yz- 
 quierdo, received in Madrid by Ferdinand at the time of 
 his father's abdication, and published by the Spaniards, 
 bears evidence that the plan was discussed between MM. 
 Yzquierdo and Talleyrand. Moreover, there exists in the 
 archives of the Louvre, a letter from M. de Talleyrand, in 
 which he expounds this same plan to Napoleon, whilst M. 
 Yzquierdo, on his side, explained it to the court of Spain, 
 and at the same date. Of the existence of the project, 
 there can consequently be no doubt. But was it seriously 
 entertained? To a certain extent, I believe it was, for M. 
 de Talleyrand, in his despatch to the Emperor, thus ex- 
 presses himself: " My opinion is that, if your Majesty 
 thinks fit, M. Yzquierdo might, though with some little diffi- 
 culty, be induced to sign : but only on condition of the troops 
 being removed to some distance from the king's place of re- 
 sidence." The scheme either of marriage, or no marriage, 
 but with the surrenderor the Ebro provinces and the open- 
 ing of the colonial ports, had a certain degree of reality in 
 the mind of M. de Talleyrand, who was here the intimate 
 confidant of the Emperor. But was the plan entertained in 
 perfect seriousness and with entire earnestness of pur- 
 pose, or was it merely an eventuality which Napoleon held 
 in reserve, while really tending to a different object? I 
 believe this latter supposition to be the correct one. In 
 the course of February and March, 1808, Napoleon dis- 
 cussed the plan of settling the pending affairs of Spain, 
 on condition of the surrender of her Ebro provinces, and 
 the opening of her colonial ports, with or without a mar- 
 riage ; but, at the same time, and more seriously, his views 
 were directed to the dethronement. 
 
 The following are the reasons which determined my 
 conviction on this subject: 
 
 1st. The expressions employed "by M. de Talleyrand 
 prove that the project was only in part seriously enter- 
 tained ; for, if Napoleon had had no other object in view, 
 and had earnestly designed to carry out the scheme, Tal- 
 leyrand would not have made use of the expression, " If 
 your Majesty thinks fit." When Napoleon had adetermined 
 object in view, his own language, and also that of his 
 agents, was imbued with the spirit of his resolution ; it 
 assumed an emphatic and positive tone, and never the tone 
 of doubt. 
 
 2d. Had Napoleon desired only to appropriate to himself 
 the provinces of tho Ebro, to open the colonial ports, and 
 to conclude a marriage, he would not have deemed it ne- 
 cessary to overrun Spain with troops. He would have had 
 no need to issue mysterious orders for marching on Ma- 
 drid by all the routes at once. He had only to express his 
 desire, and the court of Spain, after perhaps resisting for 
 * while, would infallibly have yielded. He would, be- 
 sides, have distinctly told Murat what he desired, instead 
 of leaving him involved in doubt respecting the object for 
 which the French army was destined. 
 
 3d. Finally, Napoleon, who did not resolve until the last 
 extremity to make to Russia the sacrifice of discussing the 
 partition of the Turkish empire, (which was one step to- 
 wards the partition itself,) would not, about the middle of 
 February, the period of his definitive orders, have sent to 
 Kussia a dangerous lure, by proposing that she should ex- 
 plain _her ideas on so grave a subject. Nothing short of 
 an object so paramount as the dethronement of the Bour- 
 bons could have determined him to purchase, at such a 
 sacrifice, the concurrence or the silence of Kussia. 
 
 Thus, in February and March, 1808, every thing tends 
 to prove that the first and second projects, of marrying 
 Ferdinand to a French princess, and exacting or not exact- 
 ing territorial and commercial sacrifices, were no longer 
 seriously entertained, if they had ever been so. The lan- 
 guage of M. de Talleyrand would not have been so dubi- 
 tory, nor would Napoleon have invaded Spain with so much 
 mystery, or have made such great concessions to Russia for 
 an object of secondary and even of minor importance, in 
 comparison with the gigantic projects of the time. 
 
 It is clear that in February and March he had deter- 
 
 But whoever aims at playing the part of Pro- 
 vidence should beware of failing, of being 
 either odious or unfortunate in attempting to 
 be great, of not obtaining the results that ought 
 
 mined on dethroning the Bourbons, notwithstanding al 
 the contrary affirmations of those who maintain that he 
 had not determined on the step until he saw both the fa- 
 ther and the son at Bayonne, and witnessed their intellec- 
 tual incapability and moral degradation. 
 
 But, having ascertained the end he had in view, it is no 
 easy matter to discover the means he wished to employ foi 
 its attainment. This is a point on which I was long doubt- 
 ful, and my doubts were not cleared up until after several 
 years of inquiry and reflection. 
 
 Prior to the revolution of Aranjuez, that is to say, be- 
 fore the dethronement of the father by the son, Napoleon 
 did not disclose his intention to any person whatever. 
 Not one of his ministers was aware of it, and Murat, as 
 has been seen, was totally ignorant of the matter. 
 
 The idea has occurred to me, though it is not supported 
 by any positive proof, that Napoleon wished to force the 
 Spanish royal family to depart by filling them with alarm, 
 in the same manner as the Braganza family had been 
 frightened away. This idea was the first that occurred to 
 me in the course of my investigation, and after much 
 doubt and perplexity I have come back to it. 
 
 Whilst reading over five or six times the correspondence 
 of Napoleon, especially that which he maintained with 
 Murat, I alternately arrived at and abandoned this con- 
 viction. In the first place, I was forcibly struck with one 
 remark. Napoleon repeatedly says to Murat, " Maintain 
 the most perfect order, conciliate the populace, avoid any 
 sort of collision :" which was equivalent to saying that he 
 wished the dethronement should be effected without vio- 
 lence, in order to avoid war with the Spanish nation; but 
 he added, " Seek to remove tht apprehensions of the royal 
 family of Spain ; address tliem in courteous terms." 
 
 On the 14th of March he thus wrote to Murat : " I have 
 ordered that on .the 17th a passage shall be demanded, by 
 way of Madrid, for 50,000 men, destined to proceed to Ca- 
 diz. Your conduct must be framed according to the na- 
 ture of the answer that may be given. Brit endeavour to 
 be as encouraging as possible." On the 16th of March he 
 writes : " Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish 
 apprehension from the minds of the king, the Prince of the 
 Peace, the Prince of the Asturias, and the. queen." 
 
 On the 19th he wrote thus: "I suppose you will receive 
 this letter in Madrid, where. I am very anxious to learn that 
 our troops entered peacefully, and with the. consent of Vie, 
 Icing ; in short, that all is proceeding tranquilly. I am mo- 
 mentarily looking for the arrival of Tournon and Yzquior- 
 do, so that I may know what to do for the arrangement of 
 affairs. Announce in Madrid that I have arrived here. 
 Maintain rigorous discipline among the troops. Take care 
 that they receive their pay, so that they may be enabled 
 to scatter money." 
 
 On the 25th he wrote as follows : " I have received your 
 letter of the 15th of March. I regret to learn that" the 
 weather has been so bad ; here, we have the finest weather 
 imaginable. I presume you have been in Madrid since 
 the day before yesterday. I have already intimated that 
 the most important points to which you must direct at- 
 tention, are to provision your troops, and let them rest: 
 to maintain the best understanding with the king and tht 
 court, should they remain at Aranjuez ; to give out that the 
 Swedish expedition and the affairs of the North detain me 
 here for some days, but that I shall speedily arrive. In 
 short, set my house in order for me. Declare publicly 
 that your orders are to rest and refresh your troops in Ma- 
 drid, and to await the Emperor's arrival ; and that you are 
 certain not to quit Madrid until such time as his Majesty 
 shall arrive. 
 
 " Do not take part with any of the different factions 
 which divide the country. Behave well to every one. and 
 do nothing that may operate prejudicially on the course 
 which I am about to take. Be careful always to keep up 
 good supplies of provisions in the magazines of Buitrago 
 and Aranda.". 
 
 At first sight there appears nothing in these orders which 
 betrays the design of alarming the court of Spain ; and, 
 having once read them, I relinquished the idea that Napo- 
 leon's intention was to frighten the royal family away. 
 But a reperusal of them convinced me that he wished to 
 lull apprehension only till he could effect his entrance into 
 Madrid, and to avoid a collision before his entrance. For 
 example, in the letter of the 14th of March, which I first 
 quote, I remarked these words. " Whatever may be the 
 intentions of the court of Spain, I wish to impress upon 
 you the paramount importance of.arriving in Madrid with- 
 out hostilities of encamping the corps by divisions, to 
 make them appear more numerous, and to provision and 
 rest my troops. Meanwhile, my differences with the rour* 
 of Spain will be adjusted. / hope the war will not tab 
 place ; that is a point I have greatly at heart. If I take a? 
 these precautions, it is because I am in the habit of not
 
 March, ^ 308.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 455 
 
 to serve for excuse. He ought, in short, to be 
 shy of any enterprise which he dare not avow, 
 and for which he is necessitated to have re- 
 course to knavery and lying. Napoleon rea- 
 
 leaving any thing to chance. If war had broken out, your 
 position would be a good one, for you would have in your 
 rear a force more than sufficient to protect you, and on 
 your left think, Duhesme's division, comprising 14,000 
 men." 
 
 In his letter of the 16th. after the words already quoted, 
 Tiz., " Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish appre- 
 hension from the minds of the king, the Prince of the Peace, 
 the Prince of the Asturias. and the queen." he proceeds to 
 nay, "the principal object is to accomplish tlie arrival in 
 Madrid, there to let the troops rest, and procure fresh sup- 
 plies of provisions. Say that I am coming for the purpose 
 of conciliating and arranging affairs." 
 
 "Abort all tliinys amid any act of hostility, unless yott be 
 positively forced to it. I hope that all may be arranged. 
 It would be dangerous to irritate those people. " 
 
 The intention was evident. Napoleon was desirous of 
 entering Madrid without a collision, and he wished to 
 inspire ju.t such an amount of confidence as was requisite 
 for averting a rupture. But by carefully comparing one 
 with another the various passages in his letters, and look- 
 Ing into the whole of his arrangements, I have come back 
 to the idea th;it though he wished to avoid a collision with 
 the populace, he nevertheless wished the royal family to 
 depart. 
 
 Accordingly, every thing denoted the intended depar- 
 ture of the court, and Napoleon daily received intimation 
 of the expected movement from Madrid. M. Yzquierdo, in 
 conversation with M. de Talleyrand, had avowed the plan 
 of departure. In this state of things, Napoleon was fully 
 aware that it was only requisite to let matters take their 
 natural course, and the flight would take place. Nay, 
 more, the slightest interposition of his authority would 
 have sufficed to prevent it; for on the 19th the French 
 troops had arrived on the Guadarrama. A movement of 
 cavalry on Aranjuez might in the space of a few hours 
 have surrounded the court, and intercepted its flight. 
 And there was another course still more easy, which was 
 to despatch a force in the direction least calculated to ex- 
 cite alarm that of Talavera; this force, which might have 
 passed for a reinforcement to Junot. might have surroundf-d 
 Aranjuez. and have prevented all possibility of escape. But 
 there is one passage in Napoleon's correspondence more 
 decisive than all the rest ; and it leaves scarcely a shade 
 of doubt on the subject. I will here quote it. Murat,not 
 knowing how to act, when the news of the intended flight 
 of the court was everywhere spread about, addressed to 
 Napoleon the following question: "If the court should 
 wish to depart for Seville, am I to allow it?" On the 23d 
 of March Napoleon replied as follows : 
 
 " I may suppose that you have arrived in Madrid to-day, 
 or that you will arrive there to-morrow. You must main- 
 tain strict discipline. Should the court be at Aranjuez, you 
 will let it remain quietly there, and you will manifest friendly 
 teniiments to the royal family. Should the court be at Se- 
 vill'i you will also leave, it there undisturbed. You will send 
 aides<le-camp to the Prince of the Peace to inform him 
 that he has done wrong in avoiding the French troops, 
 that he must not make any hostile movement, and that 
 the King of Spain has nothing to fear from our troops." 
 
 Now, when it is recollected that Napoleon caused M. 
 Yzquierdo to depart from Paris, (there is extant a letter 
 from Duroc containing the invitation to depart forthwith.) 
 that he made him depart full of alarm and that, whilst 
 he ordered 80.000 men to advance on Madrid, he refused to 
 give any explanation, it is evident that every thing was 
 calculated to urge on the departure, which accordingly 
 took place, as far at least as depended on the court of 
 Spain. 
 
 It may be said, it is true, that Napoleon intended to sur- 
 round and capture them, and then to proclaim the abdi- 
 cation. In the first place, he might have surrounded them 
 and be did not ; in the next place, to have done so would 
 bave been an overt and unjustifiable act of violence. The 
 flight to Andalusia answered his purpose better, for it left 
 the throne vacant, and thus the whole difficulty was solved. 
 
 Having arrived at this point in my investigation, I 
 should have been convinced that Napoleon's plan was to 
 force the court of Spain to fly, but for one serious consi- 
 deration ; and that one so weighty that it caused me to 
 hesitate several times and to abandon the opinion I had 
 conceived. It is that the departure or flight of the Bour- 
 bons would have entailed the loss of the colonies. Now 
 Spain, without her colonies, would have been, as every one 
 must allow, a most onerous burden. All the commercial 
 interest of the South was exclaiming at Bayonne "Spare 
 us at least from the consequences which have visited 
 Portugal .'" 
 
 Now, to send the Bourbons to America was exactly the 
 WHT to bring about those consequences, for the Bourbons 
 
 soned upon what he was about to do as ambi- 
 tious policy always reasons. That Spanish 
 nation, he said to himself, so proud, so gene- 
 rous, deserved a better fate than to be subjected 
 
 would have raised the colonies in rebellion against the 
 royalty of Joseph, and at the same time would have opened 
 them to the English, a circumstance which it was most 
 desirable to prevent. 
 
 This consideration very much staggered me, and for a 
 considerable time Jpceased to believe that Napoleon wished 
 to cause the flighrtf the Spanish royal family. However, 
 the facility for flight which was afforded them, the order 
 to allow them to fly, combined with the alarm spread from 
 Paris by the departure of M. Yzquierdo, were also fact* 
 too conclusive to be disregarded. Amidst this perplexity, 
 one fact riveted my attention; viz., that there was in 
 Cadiz a French fleet, in possession of the road, and that 
 possibly it might have been Napoleon's intention to make 
 use of it to arrest the fugitive Bourbons, whose flight 
 would have morally ruined them in the eyes of the 
 Spanish nation. After having, on the one hand, induced 
 them to abandon the throne, to enable him to take posses- 
 sion of it, he would, on the other hand, have arrested 
 them, when on the point of embarking for America. Thin 
 refli-ction came across my mind like a ray of light, for it 
 explained and resolved every obscurity. Still it was but 
 a mere conjecture. I once more read OVIT the correspon- 
 dence of M. Decres, and in it I discovered the following 
 fact : that an order in cipher sent to Admiral Rosily could 
 not have been read, because the key to the cipher of the 
 consulate was lost; and that the admiral had sent to 
 Paris a confidential and intelligent officer to receive the 
 communications; which had remained unknown owing to 
 the loss of the cipher. This circumstance appeared to me 
 to be a remarkable confirmation of my first conjecture. 
 What could be the purport of this despatch in cipher f 
 Could it be an order for the fleet to quit Cadiz and proceed 
 to Toulon f That order had been given three or four times 
 in plain characters, that is to say, without employing tho 
 precaution of cipher. The despatch must, therefore, have 
 related to something else, something still more secret- 
 I felt quite convinced that it must be the order for the 
 arrest of the fugitive family. I renewed my search among 
 the papers of the department for foreign affairs; but 
 the despatch was not to be found there. I could scarcely 
 entertain a hope of finding it in the department cf the 
 marine, where the archives, though arranged in admirable 
 order, contain scarcely any documents of importance. 
 Nevertheless, I resolved to make the search, and, contrary 
 to my expectation, I found, in the historical section, the 
 despatch in cipher, and fortunately accompanied by the 
 key. It was written by M. Decres, and in the following 
 terms : 
 
 " I do not seek to discover the object of the entrance of 
 the French troops into Spain. The only point that con- 
 cerns me is, that you and I have to answer to his Majesty 
 for his squadron. 1 recommend you, therefore, to take a 
 position as distant as possible from the strong batteries, 
 and which, at the same time, will defend the road against 
 any attack either from within or without. You have pro- 
 visions which will serve you in case of need whilst you are 
 lying at anchor. Be cautious not to betray any inquie- 
 tude, but stand on your guard against any event, and that 
 without show, but merely as if it were the natural conse- 
 quence of the orders you have received for holding your 
 self in readiness to depart. Place the Spanish vc^i-ls in 
 the centre of, and under the guns of, the French ships. 
 
 " Should the court of Spain, whether impelled by the force 
 of events, or by an infatuation, which it is impossible to fore- 
 see, renew the scene that has been enacted at Lisbon, you 
 must oppose its departure. Leave events to take their na- 
 tural course as far as you possibly can ; but, should a crisis 
 arise, do not hold any parley with the English, and peem 
 as though you had not previously entertained any dis- 
 trust ; but silently adopt precautions for fhe safety of the 
 squadron, and do all that is expected of your sagacity and 
 personal merit in the service of his Majesty. Feb. 21st, 
 1808." 
 
 I naturally experienced very great satisfaction in hav- 
 ing thus elucidated the truth ; whilst, at the same time, I 
 felt sincere regret to find the truth so mortifying ; but it 
 was the consequence of the plan of dethroning the Bour- 
 bons. 
 
 From that moment Napoleon's design was evident to 
 me. First, it is important to note the date, (the 21st,) 
 which corresponds with the dates of incidents which com- 
 prise the whole plan, viz, the departure of Murat and th 
 instructions given to him the composition of the whole 
 army the departure of M. Yzquierdo the departure of 
 M. de Tonrnon the orders to Junot. Secondly, on com- 
 paring the despatch of Decres with the order given to Mu- 
 rat to allow the royal family to depart if they wished so to 
 do, it will be found that the one does not contradict the 
 other, but that both perfectly coincide. Napoleon wished
 
 456 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 to an incapable and degraded court ; it deserved 
 to be regenerated ; when regenerated, it would 
 be capable of rendering great services to France 
 and to itself, of assisting to overthrow the 
 maritime tyranny of England, of contributing 
 to the emancipation of the commerce of Europe, 
 of being called, in short, to brilliant and mighty 
 destinies. To interdict himself from all this 
 for the sake of an imbecile king, of a lewd 
 queen, of an abject favourite, ^ras more than 
 could be expected of an impetuous spirit, which 
 darts upon its object, like the eagle upon his 
 prey, the moment he descries it from the eleva- 
 tion where he dwells. The result was destined 
 to prove to what danger he exposes himself 
 who attempts to perform one of those parts so 
 far above humanity, who chooses to hold him- 
 self dispensed from regarding the lives, the 
 welfare, of men, upon pretext of the aim to- 
 wards which he is advancing. 
 
 Murat had executed with perfect submission 
 the orders of Napoleon, transmitted by the 
 minister of war. Setting out immediately for 
 Bayonne, he had arrived in that town on the 
 26th, as his instructions enjoined him to do. 
 His departure was so sudden, that he had with 
 him neither staff nor horses for his personal 
 service. He was accompanied only by the 
 aides-de-camp who ought to attend an officer 
 of his rank, marshal, grand-duke, and impe- 
 rial prince, all in one. He had despatched 
 them in all directions to ascertain the position 
 and state of the corps, to put himself into com- 
 munication with them, to assume the direction 
 of affairs. The mystery which Napoleon had 
 observed in his instructions hurt his vanity, 
 but so clearly did he perceive their drift, and 
 so well did it please him, that he asked for 
 nothing more, and fell to work in order to 
 execute punctually the commands of his master. 
 
 Bayonne exhibited a spectacle of confusion, 
 for there was not at this point the immense 
 military display which a war of fifteen years 
 had accumulated on the frontier of the Rhine 
 or of the Alps, and every thing there had to be 
 created at once. Moreover, the troops which 
 arrived, composed of conscripts recently or- 
 ganized, were in want of necessaries, and of 
 
 the court to depart from Madrid, that the throne might 
 be left vacant, but he did not wish the royal family to 
 quit Cadiz, lest the colonies should be excited to insur- 
 rection. 
 
 The great difficulty of arriving at the truth, even with 
 the help of the most authentic documents, may be easily 
 conceived; and I venture to affirm, that posterity will 
 never know more than I have here elucidated. Napoleon 
 made no disclosure on this subject; Murat has left behind 
 him nothing but his correspondence ; General Savary has 
 left inaccurate memoirs, (containing statements repeatedly 
 controverted by his own correspondence ;) M. de la Foret 
 himself wrote to me the assurance that he knew nothing 
 of the affair ; Prince CambaceYes, in his memoirs, declares 
 that he has no information to give ; Counts de Tournon 
 and Lobau have left only their correspondence, which I 
 have perused ; and M. de Yzquierdo has left only a few 
 letters, which are deposited in the Louvre, and which I 
 have read. I therefore conclude that no further informa- 
 tion on the subject can ever come to light, and that the 
 truth may be summed up as follows : 
 
 The idea of the invasion of Spain was not matured into 
 a settled plan in the mind of Napoleon till after the treaty 
 of Tilsit, and not before. 
 
 After the treaty of Tilsit, and before the burning of Co- 
 1nhagen, he thought only of closing the ports of Portu- 
 gal against Great Britain. 
 
 A fter the events at Copenhagen, the war being obsti- 
 nately protracted, he wished to profit by its prolongation 
 to effect a complete settlement of affairs throughout the 
 ciuth of Europe. 
 
 Ills first design waa to share Portugal with Spain ; but 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 ! the experience which might make amends for 
 | it. People were busy baking the biscuit, 
 j making shoes and great coats, creating the 
 means of transport, of which they were totally 
 destitute ; for it had been impossible to pro- 
 cure the 500 mules which Napoleon had ordered 
 to be bought, as those valuable animals were 
 not to be found anywhere but in Poitou. The 
 money itself was behind-hand, for want of con- 
 veyances. The artillery of the various corps 
 had scarcely joined, and the retarded materiel 
 of Junot's army, crossing that arriving for the 
 armies in Spain, increased the disorder. Not- 
 withstanding the clearness, the precision, the 
 vigour, which Napoleon infused on this occa- 
 sion as formerly into the despatch of his orders, 
 their execution was affected by the distance, 
 by the precipitation, by the inexperience, of 
 the administrators, the most capable being 
 employed in other parts of Europe. 
 
 Murat, who possessed intelligence, whom 
 Napoleon, by his grand lessons and continual 
 remonstrances, had 'trained to command, passed 
 several days at Bayonne to introduce some 
 order there, to inform himself of what had been 
 executed and what delayed, that he might ap- 
 prize Napoleon, and that the latter might 
 apply the remedy. He then set out for Vit- 
 toria. He crossed the frontier on the 10th of 
 March, and proceeded the same day to Tolosa. 
 If ever there was an officer who, by his good 
 looks, his martial air, his open and quiet 
 southern manners, suited the Spaniards, it was 
 assuredly Murat. He was formed at once to 
 please and to awe them, and, among the French 
 princes destined to reign, he would have been 
 incontestably the best that could be chosen for 
 ascending the throne of Spain. We shall see 
 hereafter how grievous a fault it was to prefer 
 another to him. The population of the Bis- 
 cayan provinces received him with great de- 
 monstrations of joy. These excellent people, 
 the handsomest, the most sprightly, the bravest, 
 and the most laborious of those that inhabit 
 the Peninsula, had not the same passions as 
 the rest of the Spaniards. They had neither 
 the same antipathy to foreigners, nor the same 
 national prejudices. Situated between the 
 
 the events at the Escurial suddenly stimulated him with 
 the determination of an armed interference in the affairs 
 of Spain. 
 
 The pardon of the Prince of the Asturias caused him 
 for a time to postpone the execution of his designs. 
 
 In Italy and in Paris he alternately entertained a 
 variety of plans, viz., a marriage, a territorial dismember- 
 ment, with a partition of the colonies, and a dethrone- 
 ment. 
 
 He gradually determined, about the months of January 
 and February, in favour of the last-named project the 
 dethronement. 
 
 That such was the fact, is evident from the mystery of 
 his orders, the extraordinary accumulation of troops, the 
 concession to Russia of the partition of the Ottoman em- 
 pire, all these were things useless and needless for the 
 accomplishment of any secondary project, such as the 
 marriage, or the appropriation of one or two provinces. 
 
 Finally, having once determined on the dethronement, 
 he wished to bring about, without collision, the flight to 
 Andalusia, and to prevent, by the arrest of the royal fa- 
 mily in the bay of Cadiz, the consequences which their 
 flight might entail on the colonies. 
 
 Such are, in my opinion, the real facts, collected with 
 rigorous impartiality from historical documents, and the 
 only facts which posterity can hope to obtain. 
 
 There remains only one doubt, which may be created by 
 a letter, (first sent forth to the world from St. Helena,) 
 bearing date the 29th of March, addressed to Murat, and 
 censuring his whole conduct. This letter I will 
 and explain in a following note.
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 457 
 
 plains of Gascony and those of Castille, in a 
 mountainous region, speaking a distinct lan- 
 guage, living by the illicit traffic which they 
 carried on with France and Spain, enjoying 
 extensive privileges, of which they availed 
 themselves for continuing that traffic, privi- 
 leges for which they were indebted to the 
 difficulty of conquering their mountains and 
 their courage, theirs was a kind of neutral 
 country, a Switzerland, as it were, between 
 France and Spain. They were, therefore, but 
 loosely attached to the Spanish rule, and would 
 not have been sorry to belong to a great em- 
 pire, which would have enabled them to extend 
 to a distance their industrious activity. They 
 welcomed Murat with boisterous acclamations, 
 and indicated in a thousand ways a wish to 
 belong to France. The French troops were 
 cordially received ; they observed strict disci- 
 pline, paid for all they had, and, by consuming 
 the produce of the country, were an advantage 
 to it rather than a burden. 
 
 Murat was not less favourably received at 
 Vittoria, the capital of Alava, the third of the 
 Biscayan provinces, in which the Spanish spirit 
 begins to express itself more strongly. He en- 
 tered it on the llth in the carriage of the 
 bishop, who, with all the authorities of the 
 country, had hastened to meet him. The popu- 
 lation thronged to the gates of the towns, and 
 gave the most brilliant reception to the gene- 
 ral who had become a prince, and was destined 
 to be soon a king. The French soldiers, though 
 very numerous in Spain, more numerous than 
 was consistent with the war with Portugal, 
 had not yet afforded the slightest cause for 
 complaint. If people ascribed any political 
 intention to their coming, it was against the 
 court, a court equally execrated and despised. 
 There was no reason, therefore, for checking 
 either the curiosity which they excited or the 
 hopes which they raised. The authorities, to 
 which orders had been sent from Madrid to 
 prepare provisions, in order to prevent all dis- 
 satisfaction, had collected them in tolerable 
 abundance. Murat, having given notice that 
 the consumption of the army would be paid 
 for by France, the authorities answered, with 
 Castilian pride, that they received the French 
 as allies, as friends, and that Spanish hospi- 
 tality was never paid for. 
 
 Thus, at this first moment, things went on in 
 the best manner. The illusions were recipro- 
 cal. While these half-Spaniards were giving 
 such a favourable reception to our troops and 
 their illustrious chief, the latter fancied that 
 every thing would be easy in Spain, that the 
 French were wished for there, that a king of 
 their nation would be accepted with joy, and 
 with still more joy if that king were himself. 
 Struck by the deep and universal hatred ex- 
 cited by the favourite, he soon discovered that 
 the support of Emmanuel Godoy was but a 
 feeble stay to secure for himself in Spain, and 
 that to obtain the popular favour there, he 
 must, on the contrary, let it be understood that 
 he had come to overthrow him. 
 
 From Vittoria Murat proceeded to Burgos, 
 which was to be the seat of his head-quarters. 
 When you leave Vittoria and pass the Ebro at 
 Miranda, the boundary at which the Spanish 
 officers of the customs were then stationed, 
 and where they continued not long since to be 
 
 VOL. II 58 
 
 placed, you quit the mountainous, diversified, 
 smiling, ever-verdant country of the Pyrenean 
 Switzerland, and enter real Spain. The Ebro, 
 which, at Miranda, is but a large rivulet, run- 
 ning among flints the Ebro being crossed, 
 you pass the defiles of Pancorbo, a kind of fis- 
 sure in a line of rocks, which form the last 
 ledge of the Pyrenees, and enter Castille. 
 There commence prodigious plains, extensive 
 views, stern and dreary scenes. On the vast 
 plateau of the Castilles, the sun is serene and 
 scorching in summer, the air foggy and chilly 
 in winter, and at all times raw. Dwellings are 
 rare ; the cultivation is uniform, and presents 
 to the eye, excepting when the crops have 
 grown up and are ripening, nothing but vast 
 fields of stubble, upon which subsist the flocks, 
 absolute masters of the soil of Spain, over 
 which they travel twice a-year from north to 
 south and from south to north, like birds of 
 passage. With this new aspect of physical 
 nature is united, on entering the Castilles, a 
 different aspect of moral nature. The inha- 
 bitant, handsome, particularly in the country 
 handsome, but less sprightly and less alert 
 than the Biscayan mountaineer, tall, well- 
 made, grave, always armed with a gun or a 
 dagger, ready to employ it against a country- 
 man, still more ready against a foreigner, dis- 
 plays in an exaggerated form all the features, 
 good or bad, of the Spanish character. He is 
 at once more ignorant, more savage, more cruel, 
 more brave, than the inhabitants of the towns. 
 The latter, with their imperfect instruction, 
 like half-civilized Turks, have lost with their 
 ferocity part of their energy. The mass of the 
 people in Spain, which by its vices and its vir- 
 tues, preserved the national independence, ex- 
 hibits a peculiar trait which distinguishes it 
 from the other nations of Europe. Along with 
 ardent passions, there is to be found in it a 
 sort of public spirit, owing to its mode of life, 
 to its aggregation in large villages, where it 
 lives all the time that it does not devote to the 
 land, on which it bestows but little, confining 
 itself to a single ploughing, then sowing, and 
 harvest, and doing nothing afterwards. While 
 the French, Belgian, English, and Lombard 
 peasantry, dispersed over the soil, engaged in 
 various and incessant agricultural occupations, 
 are not induced either by proximity or leisure 
 to attend to any thing but their labour, you find 
 the Spanish peasant, covered with a cloak, sup- 
 ported by a stick, along with a party of his 
 fellows in the public place of the village, talk- 
 ing about the king, the queen, the events of 
 the time, with an astonishing curiosity, or join- 
 ing in games, dances, songs, running to bull- 
 fights, a sanguinary amusement, of which no 
 class of the nation can deprive itself, scarcely 
 eyeing the passing foreigner, or eyeing him 
 with contemptuous pride, which, on the slight- 
 est civility, suddenly changes to unaffected 
 ease and freedom. The Spaniard, at this pe- 
 riod was more than ever disposed to turn his 
 attention with redoubled zeal to public affairs. 
 Thrust to the extremity of the Continent, it 
 was more than a century since he had been 
 seriously involved in the affairs of Europe. A 
 few sea-fights, some operations in Italy, a mo- 
 mentary war in the Pyrenees in 1793, had not 
 been sufficient to exhaust or even to satisfy his 
 energetic passions. Looking on with the im- 
 2Q
 
 458 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 patience of a spectator, -who -would fain act a 
 part in the great events of the age, nobody 
 could be better prepared to take an immoderate 
 part in all things. 
 
 Such was the country, such the people, 
 amidst which we arrived in March, 1808, on 
 crossing the Ebro. Murat was again well re- 
 ceived at Burgos, the capital of Old Castille, 
 that is to say, with curiosity and hope. Mean- 
 while, the lower class, less concerned than the 
 citizens about what the French were come to 
 do in Spain, seemed more displeased at seeing 
 foreigners overrun their country ; and, between 
 the petulant hastiness of our young soldiers 
 and the proud gravity of the lowest class of 
 the Spanish people, there were collisions here 
 and there, and some stabs with the knife, in- 
 stantaneously revenged by sword-cuts. In this 
 first meeting of the two nations there was one 
 unlucky circumstance. There should have 
 been set before these proud Spaniards, so in- 
 clined to despise all who were not their coun- 
 trymen, some of the soldiers of the grand 
 army, who would have made an impression 
 upon them by their superannuated age, their 
 wounds, their gray moustaches. But our le- 
 gions, composed of conscripts of 1807 and 
 1808, who had never seen fire, commanded, as 
 we have said, by officers taken out of the de- 
 pots or drawn from retirement, (this was the 
 case in particular with the officers of the five 
 legions of reserve,) had nothing whereby to 
 gain respect but the immense renown of our 
 armies. Marched in haste from the depots, 
 before they were completely clothed, shod, or 
 armed, they had not even the showiness of 
 equipment to compensate for their youthful 
 looks. They had, therefore, the two-fold dis- 
 advantage of not being sufficiently imposing 
 and of exhibiting the appearance of a greedy 
 poverty, which had come to eat up the country 
 that it was invading. Among our soldiers 
 there were many sick, some from having suf- 
 fered fatigues, for which they were not suffi- 
 ciently prepared, others having caught the itch 
 from Spanish beggars. One-fifth of the army 
 was infected with this loathsome disease. It 
 had been found necessary, in order to secure 
 the troops of the imperial guard from it, to 
 make them bivouack in the open air. The 
 Spaniards conceiving that these were the sol- 
 diers who had conquered Europe, said to them- 
 selves, that it could not be difficult to gain 
 victories, since such troops had sufficed, not 
 yet knowing, though they soon learned to their 
 cost and our own, that, such as they were, these 
 young soldiers were capable of conquering 
 them and stronger than they, thanks to the 
 spirit which animated them, and to the military 
 skill which superabounded in all parts of the 
 French army. It was only the cuirassiers, 
 whose large stature and imposing armour dis- 
 guised youth, and the guard, incomparable 
 troops, that inspired the populace of the Spa- 
 nish towns with the respect which they ought 
 to have inspired from the very first instant. 
 For the rest, at this moment, there was not 
 yet a thought of resistance ; nothing but good 
 was expected from the French; and, with 
 the exception of some accidental collisions be- 
 tween men of the lowest class and our con- 
 scripts, overtaken by the wine of Spain, or 
 excited by the beauty of the women, cordiality 
 
 prevailed. Certain reflecting Spaniards, in- 
 deed, said to themselves that this extraordi- 
 nary accumulation of troops must forbode some- 
 thing else than the overthrow of the Prince of 
 the Peace ; for, in the then state of minds, it 
 would have required but a word from Napoleon 
 to hurl him from power. But people would 
 not believe or hope for any thing but the fall 
 of the favourite : they would not think of any 
 object but that. Another rumour, moreover, 
 that of an expedition against Gibraltar, art- 
 fully circulated, completed the general illusion. 
 
 No sooner had Murat entered Spain than two 
 letters from his friend the Prince of the Peace 
 came, one after another, to congratulate and 
 at the same time to question him. The desire 
 to answer him, which, under any other circum- 
 stance, would have been vehement in the im- 
 petuous Murat, was easily surmounted by the 
 fear of renewing his relations with so unpopu- 
 lar a personage, and by the still greater fear 
 of displeasing Napoleon. The two letters were 
 left unanswered. For the rest, the questions 
 of the Prince of the Peace were not the only 
 ones to which Murat was exposed. The civil, 
 military, and ecclesiastical authorities, which 
 hastened around him to see and to entertain 
 him, provoked his natural indiscretion in a 
 thousand indirect ways. But he curbed him- 
 self, in the first place, because he was not ac- 
 quainted with Napoleon's designs ; and, se- 
 condly, because the general object, of which 
 he had a glimpse, was so important, that less 
 intelligence and less tact than he possessed 
 would have been sufficient to impose silence on 
 him. Still his vexation at finding himself in 
 the midst of this tumult without any but mili- 
 tary instructions was extreme. Accordingly, 
 as soon as he had arrived in Spain, he did not 
 fail to write to Napoleon a detailed report on 
 the state of the troops, on their destitution, on 
 their diseases, on their favourable reception 
 by the Spaniards, on the unpopularity of the 
 Prince of the Peace, on the enthusiasm of the 
 Spaniards for Napoleon, on the facility of de- 
 ing what one would in Spain, but also on the 
 necessity of deciding what one purposed to do, 
 and on the embarrassment of being left with- 
 out instructions to meet the events that were 
 preparing. "I conceived, sire," he wrote to 
 Napoleon "I conceived, after so many years' 
 service and attachment, that I had deserved 
 your confidence, and, invested above all, with 
 the command of your troops, that I ought to 
 know to what ends they are about to be em- 
 ployed. I beseech you," he added, "to give 
 me instructions. Be they what they may, they 
 shall be executed. Do you intend to overthrow 
 Godoy, to place Ferdinand on the throne ? 
 Nothing is easier. One word from your lips 
 will suffice. Would you change the dynasty 
 of the Bourbons, regenerate Spain by giving 
 her one of the princes of your house ? Again 
 nothing is easier. Your will shall be received 
 as that of Providence." Brave but weak ob- 
 server, he durst not add a last assertion, more 
 true than any of those with which he filled his 
 reports, that he should have been the best re- 
 ceived of the foreign princes who could have 
 been substituted for the reigning dynasty. 
 
 Napoleon, whose intention was to terrify the 
 court by his silence, and at the same time to 
 cheer the population by a friendly attitude, in
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 459 
 
 order to reach Madrid without striking a blow, 
 and to take pacific possession of a vacant 
 throne, Napoleon felt a movement of impa- 
 tience on reading Murat's letters, full of home 
 questions. " When I prescribed to you," said 
 he, " to march militarily, to keep your divisions 
 well together, and at a distance from fighting, 
 to supply them abundantly that they might not 
 commit any disorder, to avoid all collision, to 
 take no part in the divisions of the court of 
 Spain, and to send me the questions that might 
 be addressed to you, were not these instruc- 
 tions ? The rest does not concern you, and if 
 I say nothing to you, it is because you ought 
 to know nothing." 
 
 To this reprimand he added such orders as 
 circumstances required. He prescribed by a 
 decree that the battalions detached from their 
 regiments should be furnished immediately 
 with funds, to be placed to the account of the 
 administration of the corps ; to take from his 
 guard young sub-officers, sufficiently lettered, 
 having served in the campaigns of 1806 and 
 1807, to be appointed officers, and thus to sup- 
 ply the regiments which were deficient of them; 
 to subject immediately all those who had the 
 itch to proper treatment ; to encamp the troops 
 as soon as the cold season, which could not last 
 much longer in Spain, was over ; to despatch 
 the brigade composed of the fourth battalions 
 of the legions of reserve to join that of General 
 Darmagnac, already ordered to occupy Pam- 
 peluna, to arm it, to leave 1000 men there, then 
 to take the entire division of the Eastern Py- 
 renees between Vittoria and Burgos, in order 
 to cover the rear of the army ; to collect at the 
 same point all the regiments on march composed 
 of reinforcements destined for the provisional 
 regiments ; to send thither besides, and with- 
 out delay, Verdier's division, (called above the 
 Orleans reserve,) to form in this manner a con- 
 siderable corps, under the command of Marshal 
 Bessieres, which, with the guard, could not 
 amount to less than from 12, 000 to 15, 000 men, 
 and which, in case of collision, would secure 
 the line of retreat of the army against the 
 Spanish troops directed to occupy the North 
 of Portugal. Napoleon then settled about the 
 march upon Madrid. He ordered Murat to 
 make both Marshal Moncey's corps and General 
 Dupont's pass the Guadarrama, the one by the 
 Somosierra road, the other by that of Segovia, 
 on the 19th or 20th of March, to be on the 22d 
 or 23d under the walls of Madrid, to ask leave 
 to rest himself there, before he continued his 
 march for Cadiz ; to break open the gates of 
 Madrid, if they should be closed against him, 
 but not till he had done all that was possible 
 to prevent a collision. To all these directions 
 was added, and that repeatedly, the recom- 
 mendation to be silent on the subject of political 
 affairs, to supply all the wants of the troops, 
 that they might not take any thing, and even 
 to delay the movement for a day or two, if the 
 means of subsistence and transport should not 
 be sufficient. 
 
 Murat was, therefore, obliged to be content 
 to learn nothing more, and set about punctually 
 obeying the Emperor's orders, certain that, 
 after all, this mystery could conceal nothing but 
 what he desired, that is to say, the overthrow 
 of the Bourbons of Spain, and the vacating of 
 one of the finest thrones in the world. 
 
 The occupation of the fortresses, repeatedly 
 ordered by the Emperor, was executed. Ge- 
 nerals Duhesme and Darmagnac, the one at 
 Barcelona, the other at Pampeluna, had at first 
 occupied the towns only, and not the fortresses 
 commanding those towns. A secret order, ema- 
 nating from Madrid, prescribed to the Spanish 
 generals to receive the French amicably, to 
 open the towns to them, but as far as possible 
 to refuse them admission into the citadels. 
 General Duhesme, arriving at Barcelona at the 
 head of about 7000 men, mostly Italians, had 
 been received with affected politeness by the 
 authorities, with kindness and curiosity by the 
 townspeople, with distrust by the populace. 
 The incontinence of the Italians had drawn 
 upon them more than one infliction of the knife. 
 The seriousness of the circumstances having 
 occasioned the closing of the manufactories, 
 there was a great number of unemployed work- 
 men ready to take part in any kind of disturb- 
 ance. General Duhesme, placed with 7000 men 
 amidst a city of 150,000 souls, though followed 
 at a little distance by 5000 French, was in a 
 critical position, especially as he was not master 
 of the citadel of Barcelona and of the fort of 
 Mont-Jouy, which entirely commands the city. 
 In consequence, he agreed with General Lechi, 
 commanding the Italians, upon a plan for carry- 
 ing the fortresses, when a repeated order to 
 possess himself of them came and put an end 
 to all his hesitations. One morning, getting his 
 troops under arms, he directed one part of them 
 upon the citadel, another upon Mont-Jouy. At 
 the principal gate of the citadel, a French post 
 mounted guard as well as a Spanish post. Ad- 
 vantage was taken of this circumstance to pe- 
 netrate into the interior. Owing to the negli- 
 gence of the Spanish officers, half of the garri- 
 son was dispersed in the city. The French, 
 therefore, found themselves in far superior force 
 within the citadel, and made themselves masters 
 of it without striking a blow. At Fort Mont- 
 Jouy the result was different. Admission was 
 refused by the officer commanding there, bri- 
 gadier Alvarez, who afterwards energetically 
 defended Girona. Though part of his troops 
 were absent and dispersed, as had been the case 
 at the citadel, he assumed an attitude of de- 
 fence. General Duhesme, who had directed the 
 bulk of his force towards this point, declared, 
 on his part, that he should instantly commence 
 the attack. The Captain-General of Catalonia, 
 Count Ezpeleta, fearing a collision, which he 
 had been recommended to avoid, came to the 
 determination to yield, and to give up Mont- 
 Jouy to the French. They established them- 
 selves there immediately. Masters of these two 
 fortresses which command Barcelona, they had 
 nothing more to fear ; but they did not enter 
 them without exciting in the population of Ca- 
 talonia a painful, and, under the circumstances, 
 a very injurious emotion. 
 
 At Pampeluna, General Darmagnac, a brave 
 man, full of energy and honour, who would 
 more willingly have scaled by main force than 
 stealthily surprised a fortress which he was 
 ordered to occupy, made use of a clever expe- 
 dient to get into the citadel. He was lodged 
 in a house at a little distance from the principal 
 gate. He had a hundred well-armed grenadiers 
 concealed there. His troops were accustomed 
 to go in the morning into the citadel itself to
 
 460 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 fetch their provisions. He sent about fifty 
 picked men, who repaired without arms to the 
 gate of the citadel just before the distribution, 
 and who, pretending to be waiting, approached 
 the post guarding the gate, fell upon it, and 
 disarmed it, while the hundred grenadiers, in 
 ambush in General Darmagnac's house, running 
 up in all haste, completed the capture. The 
 French troops, secretly assembled, came up at 
 the same moment, and the citadel was con- 
 quered, but to the great displeasure of General 
 Darmagnac, who, reporting what he had done 
 to the minister of war, observed : " These are 
 disgraceful commissions." At Pampeluna, as 
 at Barcelona, the emotion was vehement and 
 general. 
 
 The troops had less trouble at St. Sebastian. 
 A Duke de Crillon, of French extraction, com- 
 manded there. Murat summoned him to sur- 
 render the place. He flatly refused to comply. 
 Murat replied that he had orders to occupy it, 
 not with hostile views, but, with mere views 
 of military prudence, to secure the rear of the 
 army ; and that, if any resistance were made, 
 he should open his fire immediately. The Duke 
 de Crillon, forewarned, like all the other com- 
 mandants of fortresses, that a collision was to 
 be avoided, surrendered St. Sebastian, on con- 
 dition that Murat should restore it if his com- 
 pliance was not approved at Madrid. Murat 
 assented to this puerile reserve, and sent a bat- 
 talion of French troops into St. Sebastian. 
 
 This sudden occupation of the fortresses, 
 effected in the last days of February and the 
 first days of March, produced a most baneful 
 impression in Spain. Those persons of fore- 
 sight, who had remarked that to take posses- 
 sion of Portugal, already conquered besides, 
 that, to overthrow a favourite, detested by the 
 nation, there was no need for so many troops, 
 began to find their remarks justified and to 
 meet with more assent. In the countries in 
 particular, which had witnessed these surprises, 
 accompanied with more or less violence, the 
 people had well nigh come to blows with the 
 troops. The middle class, which, less hostile 
 to foreigners than the populace, less excited by 
 the clergy, more disposed to changes, had taken 
 pleasure in hoping from us for the fall of the 
 favourite and the regeneration of Spain, was 
 sorely grieved. The populace manifested a first 
 movement of rage, which the firm attitude of 
 our soldiers and our officers soon succeeded in 
 repressing. Two circumstances contributed 
 further to aggravate these feelings of disap- 
 pointment among the middle class, and jealous 
 anger among the populace ; the first and the 
 most grievous was the contribution of one hun- 
 dred millions imposed upon the Portuguese ; 
 the second, not so generally known to the public, 
 was the marriage of Mademoiselle de Tascher 
 to the Prince of Aremberg. They began to 
 complain in all quarters that the French treated 
 very ill those from whom they were receiving 
 hospitality, and they asked one another what 
 would be the burden of Spain, if she had to 
 pay a proportionate contribution to that laid 
 upon Portugal. As for the marriage of Ma- 
 demoiselle de Tascher, it greatly affected the 
 enlightened class, to which it was more parti- 
 cularly known. They had persuaded them- 
 selves, in fact, that it was not a daughter of 
 Lucien's, a person unknown in Spain, but a 
 
 niece of the empress's recently adopted, and 
 related to the Ambassador Beauharnais, thai 
 Napoleon destined for the Prince of the Astu- 
 rias. The marriage of that young lady with 
 the Prince of Aremberg blighted the hopes of 
 all those who reckoned upon the speedy union 
 of a French princess with Ferdinand. The 
 dethronement of the Bourbons became thence- 
 forward the only intention that they could at- 
 tribute to the Emperor. The middle class, and 
 above all the nobility, might perhaps have ac- 
 commodated themselves to a change of dynasty, 
 which should have insured to them the regenera- 
 tion of Spain, without making her pass through 
 the cruel ordeal of the French revolution ; but 
 the clergy, and particularly the monks, who 
 regarded the French as dangerous foes to their 
 existence, repelled such an idea with indigna- 
 tion, and had no difficulty to act upon a still 
 fanatical people, eager for movement and tu- 
 mult. The clergy, corresponding from one end 
 of Spain to the other, by the dioceses and by 
 the convents, had a powerful means of commu- 
 nicating to all parts, with incredible speed, the 
 impressions which they had an interest in pro- 
 pagating. These first impressions, however, 
 were but a forerunning sign of the hatred that 
 was to break forth against us. For a moment 
 a different object engrossed the minds of the 
 Spaniards : this was the court the court in 
 which an unnatural mother and an execrated 
 favourite, governing a weak king, kept a young 
 and adored prince under oppression. It was 
 towards Madrid, towards Aranjuez, that all 
 eyes were turned, and to which the French 
 were called to consummate there a revolution 
 universally desired. Certain acts tended, it is 
 true, to excite doubts respecting their inten- 
 tions; but these acts, some of them explained 
 as mere military precautions, the others as 
 measures solely applicable to Portugal, quickly 
 passed out of the memory of a nation occupied 
 with a single object; and people soon began 
 again to think of the court, to wish for its 
 downfal, and to demand it of the French. 
 
 The moment of the catastrophe was actually 
 approaching. Napoleon had made M. Yzqui- 
 erdo leave Paris about the 25th of February to 
 carry terror to the hearts of the sovereigns of 
 Spain, and M. de Tournon to deliver a new let- 
 ter, alarming from its very insignificance ; for, 
 when he had been asked for a princess for Fer- 
 dinand, he had evaded the application by in- 
 quiring if that prince was restored to favour ; 
 and now, when marriage was no longer men- 
 tioned, he complained that nothing was said 
 about it. These contradictions, with the sinis- 
 ter explanations furnished by M. Yzquierdo's 
 reports, by the march of the French troops, by 
 the silence of Murat, were soon to bring about 
 the long-expected crisis at Madrid. 
 
 M. Yzquierdo, arriving at Madrid on the 3d 
 or 4th of March, was presented on the 5th at 
 Aranjuez to the whole royal family. His re- 
 ports were of the most alarming nature, and 
 filled with terror not only the royal family but 
 the intimate circle of the Prince of the Peace, 
 his mother, his sisters, and his mistress, Ma- 
 demoiselle Tudo. M. Yzquierdo, after explain- 
 ing the state of the negotiation, commenced 
 with M. de Talleyrand, on the subject of ceding 
 to the French the provinces of the Ebro and the 
 opening of the Spanish colonies M. Yzquierdo
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 4C1 
 
 declared that this negotiation, afflicting as it 
 might appear, was itself but a blind ; that Na- 
 poleon evidently wanted something else, that 
 is to say, the throne of Spain for one of his 
 brothers. 
 
 M. Yzquierdo easily succeeded in convincing 
 the court of Aranjuez, already terror-stricken, 
 and in persuading it that, unless it adopted a 
 decisive course, it was undone. The arrival 
 of M. de Tournon, and the delivery of the let- 
 ter of which he was the bearer, were not likely 
 to dispel the alarms excited by M. Yzquierdo. 
 Charles IV., ill, suffering from rheumatism in 
 the arm, received M. de Tournon with a polite- 
 ness, through which might be perceived pro- 
 found affliction ; the queen and the favourite 
 received him with a forced smile, that but ill 
 concealed their furious hatred. Charles IV. 
 told him, in a tone penetrated with grief, that 
 he should soon write to his ally the Emperor 
 Napoleon, and hastened to put an end to a use- 
 less and painful interview. From that moment 
 the resolution to leave the country was taken. 
 It was a cruel sacrifice for Charles IV. to quit 
 the three or four palaces situated around Ma- 
 drid, among which he was accustomed to divide 
 his life, going from one to another at every 
 change of season, like those animals which 
 change climates in following the sun. It was 
 to him a severe privation to renounce the chase 
 in the Parde, to wait instead for Napoleon, and 
 to place the fate of the house of Spain at the 
 disposal of his omnipotence. The good king 
 Charles IV. had too honest a heart, and too 
 limited an understanding, to surmise a single 
 one of Napoleon's combinations, and he was in- 
 clined to think that, by waiting for him and 
 placing confidence in him, all would be arranged 
 for the best. It is certain that this simple self- 
 surrender of weakness must have strangely em- 
 barrassed Napoleon, and perhaps produced dif- 
 ferent results. But the Prince of the Peace and 
 the queen, well aware that they had no favour 
 to hope for, that the interference of Napoleon, 
 whatever it might be, would at least act against 
 them, left no option to Charles IV., and induced 
 him to retire to Andalusia. It is probable that 
 thoy placed before his view nothing more than 
 this first removal, relying upon events for de- 
 ciding the definitive retreat to America. Their 
 resolution on this head was so firm, that the 
 Prince of the Peace, hurried away by his usual 
 intemperance of language, declared that he 
 would carry off the king rather than consent to 
 his awaiting the arrival of the French at Aran- 
 juez. 
 
 However, that he might not deprive himself 
 of every resource on the part of France, M. 
 Yzquierdo was obliged to return immediately 
 to Paris, to have recourse to supplications with 
 Napoleon, to gold with his agents, in order to 
 avert the stroke which threatened the house of 
 Spain, and to sign all the treaties which might 
 be required, how disgraceful soever they might 
 be. He set out again in haste, on the morning 
 of the llth of March, to reach Paris before a 
 fatal order was given. His distress was such 
 that those who met him, and there were many 
 going and coming on the road, were forcibly 
 struck by it. 
 
 The resolution to retire to Andalusia being 
 taken, it was necessary to reconcile to it many 
 minds both at Aranjuez and Madrid. The 
 
 Prince of the Asturias, judging of Napoleon's 
 intentions by the demonstrations of interest 
 which he received from M. de Beauharnais, 
 regarded the French as deliverers, and would 
 not submit to be dragged far away from them, 
 a prisoner to the queen and the Prince of the 
 Peace. He declared this loudly, since they had 
 talked of the journey to Andalusia, and they 
 talked of it, in fact, at the moment as a deter- 
 mined resolution. He had won to his opinion 
 his uncle Don Antonio, who felt as much aver- 
 sion as himself for the queen and the favourite, 
 and likewise all the members of the royal 
 family, excepting the Queen of Etruria, who 
 had recently arrived from Tuscany to take pos- 
 session of the north of Portugal. This prin- 
 cess, dear to the queen, was for that reason 
 odious to Ferdinand, but nobody cared much 
 about her opinion. All who had any weight in 
 the royal family were decidedly adverse to the 
 plan of flight, and in favour of waiting for the 
 French. The queen and the favourite, giving 
 themselves no concern about these oppositions, 
 were determined to conquer them, and, by fair 
 means or force, to take the whole royal family 
 to Seville. But there were still other more for- 
 midable oppositions to overcome. The council 
 of Castille, secretly consulted, had rejected the 
 idea of a disgraceful retreat, and replied that 
 the French ought not to have been admitted 
 into Spain, but, after having so easily admitted 
 them, it was necessary either to take the sud- 
 den resolution to resist them, by raising the 
 whole nation against them, or to receive them 
 with open arms, appealing to the good faith of 
 these allies, welcomed in Spain as friends and 
 brothers. Another opposition, more unlooked- 
 for than all the rest, suddenly burst forth. 
 The minister of justice, M. de Caballero, who 
 had appeared more attached than he was to the 
 fortune of the Prince of the Peace, called by 
 ; his functions as minister of justice to attend 
 frequently during the proceedings at the Escu- 
 rial, had thereby gained all the odium of them, 
 though without deserving it ; for he had main- 
 tained, before both the king and the queen, 
 that neither in the papers which had been found 
 nor in the facts collected was there sufficient 
 evidence for instituting criminal prosecutions. 
 He had even on this account incurred the anger 
 of the queen, who had called him a traitor sold 
 to the Prince of the Asturias. The public, 
 nevertheless, believed him to be much more cul- 
 pable than he really was. As for the journey 
 to Andalusia, he would not hear of it, saying 
 that it would be a cowardly desertion of the 
 nation, that the French ought not to have been 
 introduced into Spain, but that now it was ex- 
 pedient to wait for them, that it was for those 
 who distrusted them to retire, but that proba- 
 bly Charles IV., whose conduct had always 
 been honourable towards them, would perhaps 
 have no reason to repent having waited for 
 them. Another minister, M. de Cevallos, who 
 subsequently would fain have passed himself 
 off for an antagonist of the Prince of the Peace, 
 though he was servilely submissive to him, and 
 all whose patriotism consisted in a stupid hatred 
 of the French M. de Cevallos, minister of 
 foreign affairs, remained a quiet spectator of 
 this conflict, and left M. de Caballero to wUh- 
 stand singly the plan of flight. The Prince 
 of the Peace, regardless of his opposition, gav 
 2 Q 2
 
 462 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 all the orders for the intended journey to An- 
 dalusia. Seeking to conceal the object of this 
 journey, he talked vaguely of a personal pro- 
 ject for inspecting the ports, the superintend- 
 ence of which, since he was grand-admiral, 
 belonged specially to him. 
 
 The convoys of money and movables already 
 remarked, the preparations of the court, and 
 particularly of the Tudo family, soon left no 
 doubt. It would be difficult to form an idea 
 of the indignation of the Spaniards on learning 
 that they were about to be abandoned by the 
 house of Bourbon, as the Portuguese had been 
 by the house of Braganza. Concerning them- 
 selves but little about the advantages which 
 such a resolution might afterwards have for 
 the preservation of the colonies, they said to 
 themselves that, if the French had such evil 
 intentions, the government was either silly in 
 not having foreseen them, or criminal in having 
 favoured them ; that, at all events, they must 
 be resisted to the last extremity ; that all the 
 Spaniards, having the king and the princes at 
 their head, ought to cover the capital with their 
 bodies and perish rather than suffer it to be 
 entered ; but to run away cowardly was au 
 indignity, a treason ; that, for the rest, there 
 was in this flight something besides a precau- 
 tion of prudence for the benefit of the royal 
 family, merely a calculation for prolonging the 
 usurped power of the favourite ; for, if the in- 
 tention was to escape the French, it was because 
 they were known to be adverse to Emmanuel 
 Godoy and favourable to the Prince of the As- 
 turias. This last idea becoming general had 
 restored their popularity to the French, and 
 people said that, instead of running away or 
 fighting them, they ought to go to meet and 
 welcome them, since the Prince of the Peace 
 had such a strong distrust of their intentions. 
 The exasperation of all classes against the court 
 was at its height. The nobility, the middle 
 class, the common people, and the army, all 
 spoke one and the same language at Madrid ; 
 and this language was as open, as bold, as im- 
 moderate, as it is possible to be on the eve of 
 great events in the most free countries. In the 
 army, in particular, a body of men very ill- 
 treated by the Prince of the Peace, who had 
 overturned its organization, the life-guards, 
 manifested the greatest irritation, and resolved 
 to oppose the king's departure even by force. 
 Among the officers of this corps there were 
 several absolutely devoted to the Prince of the 
 Asturias, and in frequent communication with 
 him, receiving, it is alleged, suggestions and 
 orders from him. 
 
 This boisterous opposition had not shaken 
 either the Prince of the Peace or the queen in 
 their projects, and merely excited in them a 
 desire to withdraw themselves the sooner from 
 such hatred and such dangers, by retiring first 
 to Andalusia, afterwards, if they must, to Ame- 
 rica. The Prince of the Peace had given orders 
 accordingly. He had made the troops destined 
 to occupy Portugal fall back ; for, on the eve 
 
 The domestic resolutions of the Spanish government 
 are in general known from hearsay only, for there is no- 
 thing in writing on this subject by any well-informed man. 
 The Marquis de Caballero, however, when subsequently 
 questioned by M unit, delivered to him three very instruc- 
 tive memoirs concerning the events which preceded the 
 disturbance at Aranjuez, and the manuscripts exist in the 
 wcretary of state's office. M. de Caballero, relating the 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 of losing Spain, there was something else to 
 think of than the Algarves and North Lusita 
 nia. General Taranco had been obliged to 
 leave Oporto, to march into Gallicia, and from 
 Gallicia into the kingdom of Leon. General 
 Carafa had had to ascend the Tagus, and to 
 advance as far as Talavera ; General Solano, 
 Marquis del Socorro, to return from Elvas to- 
 wards Badajoz, and proceed for Seville. As- 
 suredly, the Prince of the Peace had no idea 
 of entering with these forces, consisting of six 
 or seven thousand men each, into a contest with 
 the French army. He probably destined them 
 much more to cover the retreat of the royal 
 family, than to organize a desperate defence in 
 the south of Spain. Several frigates were 
 eventually prepared in the port of Cadiz. ' 
 
 The Prince of the Peace, according to his 
 custom of passing a week alternately at Ma- 
 drid and with their majesties, had returned, 
 on Sunday, the 13th of March, to Aranjuez, a 
 magnificent royal residence seated on the bank 
 of the Tagus, decorated in the Italian style, 
 with superb gardens, somewhat reminding you 
 of the Arabic taste. This residence, as you 
 come from Madrid, is on the right of a high 
 road, as wide as the avenue of the Champs 
 Elyse'es. Opposite to the palace this road ex- 
 pands into a spacious place. On the left are 
 several fine mansions belonging to ministers 
 and to grandees of the court, and one of which 
 in particular was occupied by the Prince of the 
 Peace. A multitude of small houses, inhabited 
 by shopkeepers and tradesmen whom the court 
 and its numerous establishment draw after 
 them, form what may be called the town of 
 Aranjuez. 
 
 No sooner had he arrived than the Prince 
 of the Peace gave definitive orders for the 
 departure, which was fixed on Tuesday or 
 Wednesday, the 15th or 16th of March. The 
 major-domo of the court had already caused 
 the royal carriages to be got ready ; and relays 
 of horses were stationed on the Ocana road, 
 which leads to Seville. Directions had been 
 given at Madrid to the Walloon and Spanish 
 guards and to the life-guards, who were not on 
 duty, to hold themselves in readiness to set out 
 for Aranjuez. 
 
 But, although no account had been made of 
 the opposition of certain ministers, it became at 
 length necessary to inform them of the defini- 
 tive resolution of the court, and to apply to 
 them for the signature of various orders. The 
 Prince of the Peace, as soon as he arrived at 
 Aranjuez, had summoned several of them to the 
 royal residence, in particular the Marquis de 
 Caballero, who had kept him waiting. The 
 Prince of the Peace, somewhat nettled, received 
 him very ungraciously. The minister, persist- 
 ing in his .opposition, refused to concur either 
 by his consent or by his signature in the depar- 
 ture, which was no longer merely projected but 
 resolved upon I order you to sign, said the 
 prince to him, in a movement of anger. I take 
 no orders but from the king, replied M. de Ca- 
 
 discupsions which he had with the Prince of the Peace, re- 
 specting the projected departure, details all that passed on 
 this occasion, and furnishes a great many facts that ar 
 extremely curious. In particular, he heard the Prince of 
 the Peace assert that he had just caused five frigates to be 
 got ready at Cadiz for conveying the royal family bey<ml
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 463 
 
 ballero. Such an opposition, from a man not 
 distinguished by boldness of character, must 
 have proved to what a degree the authority of 
 the favourite was already shaken. The other 
 ministers having come in, a sharp altercation 
 took place among them. M. de Caballero, urged 
 to the highest pitch of irritation, reproached 
 M. de Cevallos for his base complaisance to- 
 wards the Prince of the Peace, and had no sup- 
 porter but the minister of the marine. They 
 separated without coming to any conclusion, 
 and, on leaving the palace, these counsellors 
 of the crown, retaining in their countenances 
 and in their language the agitation which they 
 were full of, dropped words which apprized the 
 public of the matter in hand, and of the dan- 
 ger with which it was threatened. 
 
 The Prince of the Asturias, on his part, and 
 his uncle Don Antonio, had communicated to 
 their confidants what they knew, and had, in 
 some measure, applied for aid against the vio- 
 lence that was preparing for them. The at- 
 tached officers whom the prince numbered in 
 the life-guards had spoken to their men, who 
 were disposed to infringe all the rules of subor- 
 dination, at the first word that should be said 
 to them. The household, who knew, from the 
 very preparations which had been made, how 
 aear at hand the journey was, and were sorry 
 to leave the old abode in which they were ac- 
 customed to dwell, had forewarned the inhabit- 
 ants of Aranjuez. The latter, grieved to be 
 deprived of the presence of the court, had re- 
 solved to prevent its departure ; and they had, 
 by reporting the design of flight in the sur- 
 rounding country, drawn together the formi- 
 dable peasants of La Mancha, grievously vexed 
 also to see the court leaving them, and taking 
 from them the advantage of its supply. The 
 affluence to Aranjuez became extreme, and 
 faces the most sinister and the most strange 
 began already to make their appearance. A 
 singular personage, the Count de Montijo, per- 
 secuted by the court, having, together with the 
 birth and fortune of a grandee, the art and a 
 disposition for exciting the popular masses, was 
 in the midst of this concourse, ready to give it 
 the signal for insurrection. In consequence, 
 there were seen tradesmen of Aranjuez, pea- 
 sants of La Mancha, brought together by anx- 
 iety, interest, passion, keeping continual watch 
 about the palace. 
 
 Monday, the 14th, the day after the alterca- 
 tion between M. Caballero and the Prince of 
 the Peace, was extremely stormy. On Tues- 
 day, the 15th, the sight of the last prepara- 
 tions of the court, the language of the dissi- 
 dent ministers, certain words attributed to the 
 Prince of the Asturias, who, it was said, asked 
 for aid against the violence of those who pur- 
 posed to carry him off to Andalusia, produced 
 such an emotion that a popular insurrection was 
 expected every moment to break out. There 
 was already the aspect, the shouts of one ; no- 
 thing was wanting but acts of violence. 
 
 On the morning of the next day, Wednesday, 
 the 16th, the authors of the project of a jour- 
 ney, seeing that the departure would be ren- 
 dered impossible unless a moment's tranquillity 
 could be restored to that agitated population, 
 proposed to publish a proclamation, by which 
 Charles IV. should promise not to leave Aran- 
 juez. Accordingly this proclamation was im- 
 
 mediately drawn up, read, and posted in all th 
 principal streets of Aranjuez, and sent in the 
 utmost haste to Madrid. " My dear subjects," 
 such was the substance of it, " be not alarmed, 
 either at the arrival of the troops of my mag- 
 nanimous ally, the Emperor of the French, 
 which have entered Spain to repel a landing 
 of the enemy on our coasts, or at my alleged 
 intention of departure. No ; it is not true that 
 I want to leave my beloved people. I will stay 
 with you, live among you, relying on your at- 
 tachment, if I should need it against any enemy 
 whatsoever. Spaniards, be easy then your 
 king will not leave you." 
 
 This proclamation infused into men's minds 
 a degree of security, and calmed them for a 
 moment. The multitude, collected in front of 
 the royal residence, called for its sovereigns, 
 who appeared at the windows of the palace, 
 cheering with all its might, shouting, "Long 
 live the king!" "Death to the Prince of the 
 Peace !" " Death to the favourite who dis- 
 honours and betrays his master !" Thus ended 
 the 16th, amidst a satisfaction which unfortu- 
 nately was to be but transient. 
 
 On the following day, the 17th, in spite of 
 the royal promises, the journey seemed still to 
 be resolved upon. The carriages remained 
 loaded in the courts of the palace. The horses 
 were waiting at the relays. The troops forming 
 the garrison of Madrid, composed of the Wal- 
 loon and Spanish guards, and of the company 
 of life-guards not on duty, set out for Aran- 
 juez. Part of the populace of the capital and 
 a multitude of curious persons followed and 
 performed the trip, a distance of seven or eight 
 leagues, along with them. By the way, this 
 train set up shouts against the queen and 
 against the Prince of the Peace, and asked the 
 officers and soldiers if they would let their sove- 
 reigns be carried off by an unworthy usurper, 
 who meant to take them away with him to 
 tyrannize over them the more safely. The 
 troops, thus accompanied, reached Aranjuez 
 towards the close of the day, and were quar- 
 tered upon the inhabitants, which was not the 
 way to recall them to military subordination. 
 A last circumstance completely convinced the 
 multitude that the royal promises were but a 
 deception : this was that the demoiselles Tudo 
 themselves had arrived at Aranjuez, and were 
 to set off that evening, it was said, for Anda- 
 lusia. 
 
 The concourse about the king's palace and 
 that of the Prince of the Peace was more con- 
 siderable than on the preceding days, for, with 
 the terrified inhabitants of Aranjuez, with the 
 peasants of La Mancha, were mingled soldiers 
 without arms, who, having once arrived at their 
 lodgings, came out again to join the mob and 
 the curious persons, who had left Madrid in 
 great number. The life-guards, at least those 
 not on duty, evidently excited by the friends 
 of the Prince of the Asturias, divided into 
 bands, forming volunteer patroles, sometimes 
 towards the king's stables, sometimes towards 
 the residence of the Prince of the Peace. 
 
 Towards midnight a singular incident, which 
 occurred in front of the palace of the Prince 
 of the Peace, became the spark that produced 
 the explosion. A lady coming out of this pa- 
 lace, under the arm of an officer, escorted by 
 a few hussars, of whom the prince composed
 
 464 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 his guard, was perceived by a band of the life- [ 
 guards and of inquisitive persons. They recog- 
 nised, or thought they recognised, Mademoiselle 
 Josepha Tudo, who, according to them, was 
 going to get into a carriage. The crowd pressed 
 around her. The prince's hussars having at- 
 tempted to open a passage, a gun was fired, it 
 is not known by whom. A frightful tumult 
 instantly arose. The life-guards ran to their 
 quarters, saddled their horses, and brandishing 
 their swords, rushed upon the prince's hussars 
 whom they met. The Walloon and Spanish 
 guards also took to their arms, rather for the 
 purpose of joining the mob than of enforcing re- 
 spect for the royal authority. The people, no 
 longer containing themselves, assembled be- 
 neath the windows of the palace, called for the 
 king with loud shouts, insisted on seeing him 
 that they might let him hear the expression of 
 their good wishes, by furiously shouting, " Long 
 live the king!" "Death to the Prince of the 
 Peace !" After terrifying him by greeting him 
 with such acclamations, they proceeded to the 
 other side of Aranjuez, towards the residence 
 of the Prince of the Peace, which they sur- 
 rounded on all sides. To force the doors and to 
 rush in appeared at first to this mob which set 
 out in the career of revolutious, an outrage 
 beyond its daring. They paused for a moment, 
 hesitating, but full of impatience, and devour- 
 ing their prey with their eyes before they seized 
 it. All at once a person, a messenger, it was 
 said, from the palace, appeared at the gate of 
 the prince, to obtain admittance. It was re- 
 fused him. He insisted. The guards of the 
 house, conceiving that they were attacked, 
 thought of defending themselves. Amidst this 
 agitation, a shot was fired. Hesitation was 
 then at an end. The enraged crowd dashed 
 against the gates, broke them in, penetrated 
 into the magnificent abode of the favourite, 
 ravaged it, flung out of the windows pictures, 
 hangings, sumptuous furniture, destroyed with- 
 out pillaging, more furious than greedy, as is 
 the case in the movements of every mob, ex- 
 cited but not debased. They ran from apart- 
 ment to apartment, in quest of the object of 
 the public hatred, but found only the unfortu- 
 nate wife of the Prince of the Peace. The 
 populace in Spain, even the very lowest of it, 
 had at length become acquainted with the whole 
 life of Emmanuel Godoy. They knew how 
 many women he had, which he loved, which 
 he did not love. They knew the wretchedness 
 of that august Princess de Bourbon, unhappily 
 united to a soldier in the guards, to throw on 
 that soldier the royal lustre which he had not. 
 The multitude, on perceiving her, fell at her feet, 
 conducted her respectfully out of the stormed 
 house, placed her in a carriage, and drew 
 her in triumph to the palace of the sovereign. 
 Having set her down in the abode of kings, 
 which she ought never to have been obliged to 
 leave, the mob, thinking that they had not done 
 with the palace of the Prince of the Peace, re- 
 turned thither, searched for the owner himself 
 in every corner of his mansion, and, not find- 
 ing him, revenged themselves by a frightful 
 devastation. The whole night was spent in 
 Bearching, ravaging, and when daylight came, 
 the favourite not being discovered, it was 
 supposed that he had sought an asylum else- 
 where. 
 
 It may be conceived what must have been at 
 this moment the terror of Charles IV. and the 
 despair of the queen. The remembrance of 
 the French revolution had always filled them 
 with horror. That revolution which they had 
 so dreaded they beheld at last at their own 
 door, raising the same cries, committing the 
 same acts, though excited by difl'erent senti- 
 ments. They were dismayed, appalled, re- 
 signed to whatever should befall them. That 
 queen, justly odious, felt nevertheless a true 
 sentiment, which, without rendering her inte- 
 resting, might, at least to a certain degree, ex- 
 cuse her scandalous life. She thought not in 
 her terror either of her family or of herself, 
 but of the ruler of her soul, the despicable 
 Godoy. She inquired of everybody what had 
 become of him ; she despatched trusty servants 
 to learn tidings of him. " Where is Emma- 
 nuel ?" she exclaimed; "where can he be?" 
 and she hid not the tears wrung from her by 
 such uneasiness. The king himself, when his 
 fear subsided, also inquired what they had 
 done with poor Emmanuel, who, he said, was 
 so attached to him. As for the Prince of the 
 Asturias, seeing his enemy pulled down, the 
 crown ready to drop from the head of hia 
 father upon his own, and not knowing that he 
 should soon fall to the ground, and be picked 
 up at the point of the sword, he manifested a 
 mean and perfidious joy, which was perceived 
 by his mother, and drew from her the most 
 violent reproaches. 
 
 The ministers and several nobles devoted to 
 the king, having hurried to the palace, tumult- 
 uously advised his majesty to take from the 
 Prince of the Peace all his dignities and em- 
 ployments, as the only means of restoring 
 tranquillity and saving the life of the prince 
 himself. The king, because he was ready for 
 any thing, the queen, because she was more 
 anxious to preserve the life than the power of 
 her paramour, immediately assented ; and a 
 decree appeared on the morning of the 18th 
 of March, declaring that the king withdrew 
 from Don Emmanuel Godoy his appointments 
 of grand-admiral and generalissimo, and au- 
 thorized him to proceed to what place soever 
 he should be pleased to choose for his retreat. 
 
 Such was the end of this deplorable favour- 
 ite, whose strange destiny was, in our times, 
 a last vestige of the vices of the old courts, in 
 contrast with the manners of the age ; for, 
 even in dissolute courts, they had come to re- 
 spect public opinion deplorable favourite on 
 other accounts than those of scandal ; for, 
 with the exception of bloodshed, he had drawn 
 upon Spain all evils at once, shame, disorgani- 
 zation, ruin, and, in the last instance, popular 
 insurrection. On learning the degradation of 
 Emmanuel -Godoy, the people with whom Aran- 
 juez was thronged, and who were composed of 
 several populations, not only of Aranjuez, but 
 of Madrid, of Toledo, of the country of La 
 Mancha, gave themselves up to a furious joy, 
 as though on the morrow they should be the 
 happiest people on earth. In all quarters 
 there were singing, dancing, bonfires : they 
 embraced in the streets, -congratulating one 
 another on this downfal, which gratified a 
 still stronger feeling than that of interest 
 hatred for an insolent fortune which had of- 
 fended all Spain. The news, carried in two
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 465 
 
 or three hours to Madrid, produced there an 
 absolute delirium. 
 
 As soon as this popular movement was 
 known, the Ambassador of France, destitute 
 of talents but not of courage, hastened to the 
 king, to cover him with his body if he had 
 been in danger. The disturbance being ended 
 by the fall of the favourite, whose enemy he 
 had become in consequence of the interest that 
 he felt in behalf of the Prince of the Asturias, 
 he appeared almost triumphant with the lat- 
 ter. He told Charles IV. that the French 
 troops whose arrival was near at hand, (they 
 were at that moment passing the Guadarrama, 
 to descend upon Madrid,) would be at his 
 command against all enemies at home and 
 abroad, and he believed that, in giving this 
 assurance, he was fulfilling the instructions 
 of his august master, who would never suffer 
 his friendship to be invoked in vain. Charles 
 IV. thanked M. de Beauharnais, and declared 
 that in future he should be happy to treat of 
 business with the Ambassador of France, and 
 without any intermediary. Unfortunate king ! 
 Fate had not reserved for him so heavy a 
 burden. 
 
 The 18th was tranquil ; but the multitude, 
 once agitated, had need of new emotions. It 
 wanted something else than a palace to de- 
 stroy. It would have rejoiced to have the 
 body of Emmanuel Godoy to tear in pieces. 
 Search was everywhere made for him, and the 
 queen trembled lest she should hear every 
 moment of the discovery of his asylum and his 
 death. All the ministers passed the night at 
 the palace near the two sovereigns, whose eyes 
 were not closed for an instant by sleep. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, the popular 
 agitation, calmed a first time by the proclama- 
 tion of the 16th, and a second time by the 
 deposition of the favourite, which had been 
 decreed on the 18th, had increased, like a 
 wave which alternately rises and sinks. At 
 the palace, the officers of the guards, finding 
 all authority over their troops slipping out of 
 their hands, had declared that it was not in 
 their power to enforce respect for the royal 
 authority, if it should be attacked. The king 
 and the queen, in deep consternation, had sent 
 for their son Ferdinand, to desire him to shield 
 them by his popularity, and he had promised 
 his good offices, with the secret joy of a con- 
 queror, and the ease of a conspirator, sure of 
 all the springs that he is to set at work ; when, 
 all at once, a fresh and violent rumour proved 
 that there was reason to feel apprehensions 
 for the day that was commencing. 
 
 The Prince of the Peace, so assiduously 
 sought for, had, nevertheless, not quitted his 
 residence. At the moment when the doors of 
 his palace were forced, he had taken a hand- 
 ful of gold and a pair of pistols, and hid him- 
 self in the loft under the roof, by rolling him- 
 eelf in a mat, a sort of rush carpet used in 
 Spain. Continuing in this deplorable situation 
 during the whole of the 18th, and during the 
 night between the 18th and 19th, he could 
 endure it no longer than till the morning of 
 the 19th, when, after thirty-six hours' suffer- 
 ing, overcome by thirst, he had quitted his 
 asylum, and found himself face to face with a 
 soldier of the Walloon guards, who was on 
 duty as sentry. Offering this man money, 
 
 VOL. II. 59 
 
 and not daring to add to his offer the threat 
 of using his pistols, all he gained was to get 
 himself denounced, and he was instantly de- 
 livered up. Fortunately for him, the mass of 
 the populace was not then near his palace. 
 Some of the life-guards coming up opportunely, 
 placed him between their horses, and pro- 
 ceeded as fast as they could towards the quar- 
 ters that served them for barracks. They 
 were obliged to pass through all Aranjuez, 
 and the populace, apprized of the circum- 
 stance, ran up in the twinkling of an eye. 
 The prince was on foot, between two of the 
 guards on horseback, leaning upon the pom- 
 mels of their saddles, and defended by them 
 against the attacks of the mob. The other 
 guards, in front and rear, did their best to 
 protect him, but could not prevent the furious 
 rabble from aiming at him dangerous blows 
 with stakes, forks, and all sorts of weapons 
 snatched up in haste. With his feet trampled 
 by the horses, with a large wound in his thigh, 
 with one eye almost out of his head, he arrived 
 at the barracks of the guards, where he was 
 thrown, covered with blood, upon the straw in 
 the stables melancholy example of the favour 
 of kings, when the popular fury comes to re- 
 venge itself in one day for twenty years' un- 
 merited omnipotence ! There is nothing in 
 history more lamentable than the spectacle 
 presented at that moment by this life-guards- 
 man, returning, after sharing the royal bed 
 and almost the throne, to the barracks and to 
 the straw on which he had lain in his youth. 
 
 The king and the queen, on hearing of this 
 fresh tumult, sent again for Ferdinand, and 
 besought him to forget his injuries, and to go 
 and rescue the unfortunate Godoy. He pro- 
 mised to save him, and accordingly hastened 
 to the quarters of the life-guards, which an 
 unruly populace threatened to storm, dispersed 
 it by the assurance that the culprit should be 
 tried by the council of Castille, and that jus- 
 tice should be done upon him for all his crimes. 
 At the desire of the heir to the crown, the mob 
 dispersed, Ferdinand went to Godoy, whom he 
 found bathed in blood, and told him, with a 
 feigned generosity, that he forgave and par- 
 doned all the injuries which he had received 
 from him. The sight of an abhorred enemy 
 restored to the Prince of the Peace that pre- 
 sence of mind which he had not possessed for 
 a moment since the beginning of the catas- 
 trophe. " Art thou king already," said he to 
 Ferdinand, "to grant pardon?" "No," re- 
 plied the prince, "I am not; but I shall be 
 soon." 
 
 The prince returned to the palace to tran- 
 quillize his parents, who were left in a state 
 of tribulation difficult to be described, and 
 ready, in order to save themselves and their 
 dear Emmanuel, to make every possible sacri- 
 fice, even that of the throne. " What would 
 they have of us," they exclaimed, " to induce 
 them to spare our unfortunate friend ? His 
 dismissal? We have pronounced it. His being 
 put upon his trial ? We are going to pronounce 
 it. Would they have the crown ? We will lay 
 that down too." A sort of aberration of mind 
 had seized the king and the queen ; they knew 
 not what they said, and addressed themselves 
 to every one, soliciting either support or ad- 
 vice. With a view to make them easy aboqt
 
 466 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [Marco, 1808. 
 
 the life of the Prince of the Peace, it was pro- 
 posed to send him under a proper escort to 
 Grenada, using for the purpose the relays with 
 which that road was provided. A carriage 
 drawn by six mules was immedietely brought 
 in front of the barracks of the life-guards, that 
 he might be put into it and removed from so 
 dangerous a place of abode as Aranjuez. But 
 no sooner were these preparations perceived, 
 than the populace, surmising for what object 
 they were destined, fell upon the carriage, 
 broke it in pieces, and manifested a determi- 
 nation to prevent any departure. 
 
 This new incident completely deranged the 
 heads of the unfortunate Charles IV. and his 
 wife. They both believed that it was the 
 French revolution recommencing its course in 
 Spain ; that it was not to the Prince of the 
 Peace alone, but to them also, that ill-will was 
 borne ; that to place the sceptre in the hands 
 of Ferdinand would perhaps be the best means 
 of dispelling this rising storm, and of saving 
 their lives and that of their unhappy friend. 
 This they said to all those who were around 
 them, to M. de Caballero and M. de Cevallos, 
 to the Duke de Castel Franco, commander of 
 the troops assembled in the royal residence, in 
 short, to different persons of the court; and 
 when they made this proposal, all present sig- 
 nified by a sorrowful and approving silence, 
 that this would certainly be the simplest, the 
 i/jfest, the most applauded solution, the solu- 
 tion most capable of stifling in its birth a revo- 
 lution as appalling as the commencement of 
 that which brought the head of Louis XVI. to 
 the block. After a few moments of these vague 
 parleys, of this consultation of distracted per- 
 i.ons, Charles IV. said that he would abdicate : 
 his ambitious wife replied that he was right ; 
 and, without a single voice being raised in 
 contradiction, his ministers offered to draw up 
 the act of abdication. 
 
 This act was instantly prepared, and pub- 
 lished immediately, amidst a joy which had no 
 parallel. Charles IV. therein declared that, 
 weary of the fatigues of the throne, bowed by 
 the weight of years and infirmities, he resigned 
 to his son Ferdinand the crown which he had 
 worn for twenty years. 
 
 The news of this abdication produced a sort 
 of intoxication at Aranjuez. The people 
 thronged to salute the young king, who had so 
 long been the object of their wishes, and loaded 
 him with a thousand benedictions. The court, 
 outstripping the people, had forsaken the old 
 sovereigns, as it forsakes their bodies when 
 they are dead. They were left by themselves, 
 somewhat less uneasy, but deeply dejected at 
 
 their fall ; and those who left them hastened 
 around Ferdinand to assure this new master 
 that it was he, he alone, whom they had had 
 in their hearts for years past, when bowing 
 their heads before his mother and the favour- 
 ite. Ferdinand, whom Nature had formed for 
 dissimulation, and whom the unhappiness of 
 his youth had further perfected in that odious 
 art, appeared pleased with everybody, and was 
 pleased enough with Fortune to seem so with 
 men. He retained provisionally his father's 
 ministers, whom he could not change imme- 
 diately, and instantly ordered them, for their 
 first commission, to send for the Duke de 1'In- 
 fantado, exiled to the distance of sixty leagues 
 from Madrid, and the canon Escoiquiz, shut up 
 in the convent of Tardon. He immediately ap- 
 pointed the Duke de 1'Infantado captain of his 
 guards and president of the council of Castille. 
 Thus, one favour extorted, another favour be- 
 got ; but this latter was destined to last for a 
 few days only. The formidable Napoleon ap- 
 proached. His troops were at that moment 
 descending from the heights of Somosierra upon 
 Buitrago, and were but one good march from 
 Madrid. Ferdinand's temporary ministers ad- 
 vised him to commence his reign by advances 
 towards the Emperor of the French. The 
 Duke del Parque was sent to Murat, to irrange 
 with that prince respecting the entry of the 
 French into Madrid. The Dukes de Medina- 
 Cell and De Frias, and Count Fernan-Nunez, 
 were sent to Napoleon, who was supposed to be 
 on the way to Spain, to swear friendship to 
 him, and to renew the application for a French 
 princess. This done at the close of this very 
 first day, Ferdinand fell asleep, believing him- 
 self to be a king. He was destined to become 
 such, but not till after long years of captivity, 
 and a terrible war. 
 
 Thus fell the last Bourbons, to re-appear well 
 or ill, gloriously or scurvily, a few years later: 
 they fell at Paris as at Aranjuez, as at Naples, 
 beneath the French revolution which drove 
 them before it, like the vengeful Furies pursu- 
 ing guilty spirits. At Paris, this revolution 
 had struck off the head of one Boui-bon. At 
 Naples, it had thrown another into the sea, and 
 obliged him to take refuge in Sicily. At Aran- 
 juez, it forced the last to abdicate, in order to 
 save the life of an ignoble favourite, and made 
 use not of a people smitten with liberty, but 
 of a people smitten with royalty, differing 
 therefore in its modes of acting, like the places 
 into which it penetrated, but always terrible 
 and regenerating, though fortunately less cruel, 
 for it now dethroned without killing kings.
 
 March, 1808-1 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 467 
 
 BOOK XXX. 
 
 BAYONNE. 
 
 Disturbances at Madrid on the news of the events at Aranjuez Murat hastens his arrival On approaching Madrid 
 he receives a message from the Queen of Etruria He sends M. de Monthyon to her The latter finds the royal 
 family in deep affliction and full of regret for having abdicated Murat, on the return of M. de Monthyon, suggests 
 to Charles IT. the idea of protesting against an abdication which was not free, and defers acknowledging Ferdi- 
 nand VII. Entry of the French into Madrid on the 23d of March Secret protest of Charles IV. Ferdinand VIL 
 hastens to Madrid to take possession of the crown Displeasure of Murat at the entry of Ferdinand M. de Beau- 
 harnais advises Ferdinand to go to meet the Emperor of the French Effect of the news from Spain on the resolu- 
 tions of Napoleon New course adopted by him on hearing of the revolution at Aranjuez He conceives at Paris the 
 same plan as Murat at Madrid, that of not acknowledging Ferdinand, and of making Charles IV. resign the crown 
 to him Mission of General Savary to Madrid Return of M. de Tournon to Paris Momentary doubt which arises 
 in the mind of Napoleon Singular despatch of the 29th, which contradicts all that he had thought and wished 
 News from Madrid, arrived on the 30th, induces Napoleon to return to his former projects He approves of Marat's 
 conduct, and the removal of the whole family of Spain to Bayonne He sets out for Bordeaux Murat, with Napo- 
 leon's sanction, assists General Savary in the execution of the arranged plan Ferdinand VII, having brought to- 
 gether at Madrid his confidants, the Due de 1'Infantado and the canon Escoiquiz, deliberates on the conduct to be 
 pursued towards the French Motives which induce him to have an interview with Napoleon A meeting with 
 General Savary confirms his decision He resolves on his departure, and leaves his uncle, Don Antonio, at the head 
 of a regency at Madrid Sentiments of the Spaniards on seeing him depart The aged sovereigns, on hearing that 
 he is going to Napoleon, wish to follow his example, in order to plead their cause in person Joy and foolish hopes 
 of Murat on seeing the Spanish princes give themselves up Spirit of the Spanish people Their feelings towards 
 our troops Conduct and position of Murat at Madrid Ferdinand VII.'s journey from Madrid to Burgos, and from 
 Burgos to Vittoria His stay at Vittoria His motives for stopping in that town Savary leaves him, in order to 
 receive fresh instructions Establishment of Napoleon at Bayonne His letter to Ferdinand VII., and orders given 
 concerning him Ferdinand VII. at length decides on going to Bayonne His arrival there His reception by Napo- 
 leon First mention of what is required of him Napoleon openly declares his intention to take possession of the 
 crown of Spain, and offers him, in compensation, that of Etruria Resistance and illusions of Ferdinand VII. 
 Napoleon, to put an end to the affair, awaits the arrival of Charles IV, who insisted on coming to Bayonne De- 
 parture of the aged sovereigns Deliverance of the Prince of the Peace Meeting at Bayonne of all the Spanish 
 princes Napoleon's reception of Charles IV. He receives him as king Ferdinand resumes the rank of Prince of 
 the Asturias Agreement of Napoleon with Charles IV. to insure him a retreat in France on his giving up the crown 
 of Spain Resistance of Ferdinand VII. Napoleon is ready to finish by an act of arbitrary power, when the events 
 at Madrid bring matters to the desired conclusion Insurrection of the 2d of May at Madrid Energetic measures 
 taken by Murat Counter-movement at Bayonne Emotion of Charles IV. on hearing of the 2d of May Violent 
 scene between father, mother, and son Terror and resignation of Ferdinand VII. Treaty for the cession of the 
 Spanish crown to Napoleon Departure of Charles IV. for Compiegne and of Ferdinand VII. for Valencay Napo- 
 leon destines the crown of Spain for Joseph, and that of Naples for Murat Sorrow and rage of Murat on hearing 
 Napoleon's resolutions He takes no less trouble to obtain from the Spanish authorities an expression of their wishes 
 in favour of Joseph Equivocal declaration of the Junta and Council of Castille. expressing a conditional vote for 
 Joseph Dissatisfaction of Napoleon with Murat Whilst waiting for Joseph's answer, in order to proclaim the new 
 dynasty, Napoleon attempts to repair the violence used towards Spain, by an extraordinary use of his resources 
 Monetary aid to Spain Division of the army, so as to defend the coasts and prevent any resistance Vast maritime 
 projects Arrival of Joseph at Bayonne He is proclaimed King of Spain Junta convoked at Bayonne Its delibe- 
 rations Spanish Constitution Acceptance of it, and acknowledgment of Joseph by the Junta Conclusion of affairs 
 at Bayonne, and departure of Joseph for Madrid, of Napoleon for Paris. 
 
 THE fall of the Prince of the Peace had al- 
 ready produced a sort of ferocious joy among 
 the people of Madrid. The news of the abdi- 
 cation of Charles IV., and of the accession of 
 Ferdinand VII. , crowned it. In the eyes of the 
 multitude no joy is complete without a riot. It 
 was known that the Prince of the Peace had 
 stopped at Aranjuez : an assault was made upon 
 his family and upon the persons who enjoyed 
 his confidence. Their houses were ravaged, 
 and their persons pursued ; but, thanks to the 
 courage of M. de Beauharnais, not one of them 
 fell into the hands of the mob. Immediately 
 on the abdication of Charles IV., the latter re- 
 turned to Madrid in time to offer an asylum to 
 the family of Godoy. His mother, the brother 
 of 'Emmanuel, and his sisters, married to some 
 of the highest nobility in Spain, passed a fright- 
 ful night under the roofs of their palaces. M. 
 de Beauharnais offered them an asylum in the 
 hotel of the embassy, where they would be pro- 
 tected by the fear inspired by the French arms 
 for Murat was then only on his march to Madrid. 
 The plundering and burning were continued 
 during the whole of the 20th, which was Sunday, 
 and the mob was not obstructed by any public 
 force. There were two Swiss regiments at Ma- 
 drid (those of De Preux and Reding;) but these 
 foreign soldiers, still worse circumstanced than 
 others in a case of popular agitation, did not 
 dare to show themselves, and took no means of 
 
 stopping the disorder. A kind of fatigue, the 
 assembling of a few citizens who had taken up 
 arms of their own accord, and a proclamation 
 of Ferdinand's who did not wish to dishonour 
 his new reign by any gross excesses put an 
 end to their abominable conduct. Madrid was 
 full of joy at seeing the end of a hateful reign 
 and the commencement of a new one, so ardently 
 desired. In their satisfied minds scarcely did 
 there remain room for disquiet on learning that 
 the French were approaching the capital. After 
 having hoped that they would overthrow the 
 favourite, the Spanish people now flattered 
 themselves that they were about to recognise 
 Ferdinand VII. ; and, whatever might be the 
 case, the people, elated at what they had just 
 done, and proud of having themselves conquered 
 the dreaded favourite, assumed an immense 
 confidence in themselves, and seemed no longer 
 to fear any one. In the simplicity of their joy, 
 they believed only what pleased themselves, and 
 in their eyes the French were nothing more 
 than auxiliaries come to inaugurate the reign 
 of Ferdinand VII. With such a disposition 
 of mind our troops were sure of being well 
 received. 
 
 A great part of the troops had already passed 
 the Guadarrama. On the 20th, the two first 
 divisions of Marshal Moncey's corps were be- 
 tween Cavanillas and Buitrago, and the thinl 
 at Some-Sierra. On the same day the first di
 
 468 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 vision of General Dupont was at Guadarrama, 
 ready to descend upon the Escurial ; the second 
 of the same corps was at Segovia, the third at 
 Valladolid. Thus, Murat was in a condition 
 to enter Madrid, in twenty-four hours, with two 
 divisions of Marshal Moncey, one of General 
 Dupont, the whole of the cavalry and the 
 guards ; that is, with 30,000 men. But there 
 only remained in that capital two Swiss regi- 
 ments, completely discouraged, and a people 
 without arms. Murat had consequently no re- 
 sistance to fear. 
 
 He was deeply troubled by the disorders in 
 the capital, and was afraid that in Europe the 
 French would be accused of having desired to 
 throw Spain into utter confusion in order to 
 seize upon it more easily. He was also wholly 
 ignorant whether this unforeseen situation was 
 that which Napoleon most desired, and that 
 especially, which would lead most surely to a 
 vacancy on the throne of Spain. Humanity, 
 obedience, and ambition caused a most painful 
 conflict in his mind. In this state of mind he 
 wrote to Napoleon to make him acquainted with 
 what he had just learned, to complain anew of 
 not having been admitted into his secrets, to 
 express the pain which the events in Madrid 
 had caused him, and to announce to him that 
 he was just about to enter that capital, in order, 
 at all costs, to repress the excesses of a bar- 
 barous populace. At the same time he put his 
 columns in motion, and advanced to lead Mar- 
 shal Moncey's troops to San Agostino, and those 
 of General Dupont to the Escurial. 
 
 On the next day, the 21st, being in person at 
 El Molar, he received a courier in disguise, who 
 was the bearer of a letter from the Queen of 
 Etruria. That princess, whom he had known 
 in Italy, and to whom he was bound by friend- 
 ship, appealed to his heart in the name of an 
 august and deeply unfortunate family. She 
 informed him that her aged parents were 
 threatened with the greatest danger, to guard 
 against which they had recourse to his generous 
 protection. She entreated him to come himself, 
 and secretly, to Aranjuez, to witness their de- 
 plorable situation, and to devise some means to 
 extricate them from it. 
 
 This deeply afflicted young woman, but little 
 versed in the knowledge of business, although 
 she had more talent than her deceased husband, 
 supposed that a commander-in-chief represent- 
 ing Napoleon, and at the head of a French army 
 at the gates of one of the largest capitals in 
 Europe, could secretly withdraw for a day or 
 two from head-quarters, as he may have done 
 perhaps at Florence, in a time of peace, and 
 when he was more occupied with pleasure than 
 with war or negotiations. Murat replied, with 
 great courtesy, "that he was fully sensible of 
 the misfortunes of the royal family of Spain, 
 but that it was impossible for him to leave his 
 head quarters where he was detained by impe- 
 rative duties : but that he would send in his 
 stead M. de Monthyon, one of his officers, a 
 man thoroughly to be relied on, to whom she 
 might say freely all that she would have con- 
 fided to him. 1 
 
 M. de Monthyon set out from El Molar on the 
 
 I make no supposition here. I write after the originals 
 deposited in the Louvre, a small number of which, with 
 rery considerable alterations, were published in the Mr* 
 mteuf. Murat's correspondence with Napoleon, tho most 
 
 21st, reached Aranjuez on the 22d, and found 
 the family of the aged sovereigns in the great- 
 est distress. In a fit of fear, Charles IV. and 
 his queen had been led to divest themselves of 
 the supreme authority. The queen, who was 
 the principal author of all the determinations 
 of the court, had been led to this abdication by 
 her desire to save the life of the Prince of the 
 Peace, and to release herself and her husband 
 from dangers which she had greatly exagge- 
 rated. But when the first moment was past, 
 the silence and solitude succeeding popular tu- 
 mult, new dangers threatening the Prince of the 
 Peace, whose trial had been ordered by Ferdi- 
 nand VII., she was seized with a double vexa- 
 tion, at seeing herself fallen, and of not know- 
 ing the object of her criminal affections to be 
 in safety. And as the emotions of her mind 
 were reproduced immediately in the mind of 
 her feeble husband, she had filled him with the 
 same regret and the same vexation. To increase 
 the misfortune, it was just notified to them in 
 the name of Ferdinand VII., that it was neces- 
 sary for them to go to Badajoz, at the extremity 
 of Estremadura, far from the protection of the 
 French, in order to live there in seclusion, 
 misery perhaps, whilst a hated son reigned, 
 avenged himself, and probably would sacrifice 
 the unfortunate Godoy ! With such a prospect 
 in view, their fall had become more cruel, and 
 the young Queen of Etruria, whom this exile 
 afflicted in proportion to her age, added to all 
 the vexations of the royal family her own de- 
 spair. Connected with Murat, deriving succour 
 from her relation with him, she had been em- 
 ployed to invoke the protection of the French 
 army. 
 
 Such was the situation in which M. de Mon- 
 thyon found this unfortunate family : he was 
 surrounded, assailed with prayers and the most 
 earnest entreaties by the aged king, the aged 
 queen, and the young Queen of Etruria ; they 
 related to him the sufferings of the days just 
 past, the violence to which they had been sub- 
 jected, and that to which, perhaps, they were 
 about to be subjected again; the injunction that 
 had been received to set out for Badajoz, and 
 above all, the dangers that threatened Emma- 
 nuel Godoy. They spoke of the latter still 
 more than of the royal family itself; they 
 earnestly begged for him the protection of 
 France, offering to refer all that had happened 
 to the decision of Murat, to make him the ar- 
 biter of the destinies of Spain, and finally, to 
 submit to every thing which he should order. 
 
 M. de Monthyon immediately set out again, 
 to rejoin Murat, who, during the 22d, had drawn 
 nearer to Madrid, in order to enter the city on 
 the 23d, the day almost indicated beforehand 
 in the instructions of Napoleon. He commu- 
 nicated to him what he had seen and heard in 
 his interview with the aged sovereigns, their 
 bitter regret and their desire to submit the late 
 events in Spain to Napoleon. Murat, on hear- 
 ing this recital, was seized with a kind of sud- 
 den illumination. He was not in the secrets 
 of the policy of which he was the instrument ; 
 but he had sometimes supposed that Napoleon 
 wished, by frightening Charles IV., to induce 
 
 important of all which relates to the affairs of Spain, h&8 
 never been published. Some fragments of that of M. do 
 Monthyon were inserted in the Ifoniteur, but greatly al- 
 tered. My narrative follows the autograph originals.
 
 March, 1805.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 469 
 
 him to flee, and <o procure for himself the crown 
 of Spain as well as that of Portugal, by the 
 desertion of their possessors. This plan being 
 defeated by the revolution of Aranjuez, Murat 
 thought it was necessary to make a completely 
 new one, to spring from the circumstances them- 
 selves. In consequence, he formed the idea of 
 changing the regret which the old sovereigns 
 exhibited at their fall into a formal protest 
 against the abdication of the 19th ; and, after 
 having obtained their signature to such a pro- 
 test, and having it confided to his hands, to re- 
 fuse the recognition of Ferdinand VII. ; this he 
 was very naturally able to do, for it was impos- 
 sible to recognise Ferdinand VII., who had 
 come to the throne in such a manner, without 
 first having referred to the authority of Napo- 
 leon. The result of this combination would be 
 to leave Spain without a sovereign ; for the old 
 king, fallen in fact, would not resume the throne 
 by protesting, and thanks to this protest, the 
 royal authority of Ferdinand VII. would remain 
 in suspense. Between a king who was no longer 
 king, who could no longer be so, and a king 
 who was not so yet, who could never be so, if 
 it was not wished that he should, Spain was 
 about to be without any other master than the 
 general commanding the French army. Fortune 
 thus restored the means which she had taken 
 away by preventing the departure of Charles IV. 
 
 Murat's mind, sharpened by ambition, had 
 just found out all that the genius of Napoleon, 
 in the exercise of its deepest cunning, devised 
 some days later, on the news of the recent 
 events. Without losing a moment, and with all 
 the vivacity of his desires, be caused M. de 
 Monthyon to set out again for Aranjuez, giving 
 him orders immediately to revisit the royal 
 family, and, since they declared that they had 
 been constrained, to propose to them to protest 
 against the abdication of the 19th, to protest 
 secretly if they dared not do it publicly, and to 
 enclose this protest in a letter to the Emperor, 
 who would not fail to arrive in a few days in 
 Spain, and who would thus be constituted ar- 
 biter of the hateful usurpation committed by 
 the son to the injury of the father. Murat 
 promised to gain Napoleon's favour for the 
 cause of the old sovereigns, and in the mean 
 time to protect not only them, but the unfortu- 
 nate Godoy, who had become the prisoner of 
 Ferdinand VII. 
 
 M. de Monthyon set out again for Aranjuez, 
 and Murat hastened to write to the Emperor, in 
 order to inform him of what had taken place, 
 and to submit to him the combination which he 
 had devised. Having arrived on the evening 
 of the 22d at Chamartin, on the very heights 
 which command Madrid, he prepared to make 
 his entry on the next day. He had just re- 
 ceived the Duke del Parque, the envoy of Fer- 
 dinand VII., commissioned to compliment him 
 in the name of the new king of Spain, to offer 
 him entrance into Madrid, provisions and quar- 
 ters for the army, and an assurance of the 
 friendly intentions of the young court towards 
 France. Murat gave the Duke del Parque a 
 very gracious reception, through which however 
 appeared something of that presumption which 
 was natural to him ; and, while accepting the 
 assurances of which he was commissioned to 
 be the bearer, expressed to him with sufficient 
 clearness, that the Emperor alone could recog- 
 
 nise Ferdinand VII., and legalize, in the name 
 of the rights of nations, the revolutions of 
 Aranjuez. He declared to him, that, whilst 
 awaiting the imperial decision, he could only 
 look upon the new government as a govern- 
 ment de facto, and give to Ferdinand no other 
 title except that of Prince of the Asturias. 
 This kind of relation was accepted, since Na- 
 poleon's lieutenant would admit of none other, 
 and every thing was arranged for the entry of 
 the French into Madrid on the next day, the 
 23d of March, 1808. 
 
 The leaders of the new court, though not very 
 wise, nevertheless perceived the necessity of 
 preventing any collision with the French ; for 
 their assumption of royalty the offspring of 
 a mere revolution in the palace might have 
 been put an end to by a regiment of cavalry. 
 In consequence, they issued orders to the peo- 
 ple of Madrid to give a good reception to the 
 French, and posted up a proclamation on the 
 corners of all the streets, in which Ferdinand 
 VII. appealed to those feelings of good-will 
 which ought to influence one towards another 
 nation so long and closely allied. The Spa- 
 niards comprehending this policy as well as their 
 young king, and drawn, moreover, by curiosity, 
 were then perfectly well-disposed to run forth 
 to meet Murat, and to lavish their acclamations 
 upon him. 
 
 On the morning of the 23d, Murat waited on 
 the heights situated behind Madrid, which are 
 merely the last declivities of the Guadarrama, 
 with a part of his army, which consisted at 
 this moment of the first two divisions of Mar- 
 shal Moncey, the cavalry of the whole corps, 
 and those detachments of the imperial guard 
 which had been sent from Paris to form Napo- 
 leon's escort. He made his entry in the mid- 
 dle of the day, at the head of a brilliant staff, 
 and delighted all the Spaniards by his noble 
 mien, and his trusting and gracious smile. The 
 imperial guard made a singular impression upon 
 the Spaniards ; and the cuirassiers, by their 
 great size, their accoutrements, and their disci- 
 pline, were no less imposing. The infantry of 
 Marshal Moncey, however, consisting for the 
 most part of boys badly clothed, and worn out 
 with fatigue, excited more pity than fear, which 
 was unlucky amongst a people whose senses it 
 was more necessary to affect than their reason. 
 Nevertheless the whole of this military specta- 
 cle produced a certain effect on the imagination 
 of the Spaniards ; and they highly applauded 
 both the French and their chiefs. 
 
 By a piece of involuntary negligence, rather 
 than any want of respect, which no one in- 
 tended to show, the arrangement of a proper 
 lodging for the commander-in-chief of the 
 French army had been omitted. At the gates 
 of Madrid, Murat alighted at the abandoned 
 palace of Buen-Retiro, and occupied the apart- 
 ments which had been inhabited by the demoi- 
 selles Tudo before their departure. He was 
 offended by this want of attention. But he 
 was immediately offered the former dwelling 
 of the Prince of the Peace, situated near the 
 magnificent palace of the royal family of Spain 
 The authorities civil and military, the clergy, 
 and the diplomatic body came to visit him. He 
 received them with grace and dignity almost like 
 a sovereign although he had no other title than 
 that of commander-in-chief of the French army. 
 2R
 
 470 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 180* 
 
 Whilst he was entering Madrid, he was in- 
 formed that the people were about to bring 
 thitLer, as a prisoner, loaded with chains, and 
 under the safe conduct of the life-guards, the 
 unfortunate Godoy, whose trial they were eager 
 to have the pleasure of seeing immediately com- 
 menced. Murat, both from generosity and cal- 
 culation, in order to spare the feelings of the 
 former court, now called to become the instru- 
 ment of new combinations, was resolved not to 
 tolerate any act of cruelty towards the fallen 
 favourite. Fearing lest the presence of Godoy, 
 who was an object of such hatred to the mul- 
 titude, might provoke a popular tumult, and 
 especially at the moment of the entrance of the 
 French troops, he sent one of his officers with 
 a clear and simple order to put off the removal 
 of the prisoner, and to detain him in a village 
 close to Madrid. This order found and fixed 
 the Prince of the Peace in the village of Pinto, 
 where he was detained some days. Murat im- 
 mediately ordered a detachment of cavalry to 
 proceed to Aranjuez, in order to protect the old 
 sovereigns, to oppose their being removed to 
 Badajoz, and to give them courage to follow his 
 counsels, by giving them security. At the same 
 time he announced, that neither he nor his mas- 
 ter would allow the severities which were in 
 preparation against Emmanuel Godoy. 
 
 M. de Monthyon had found the family of the 
 old sovereigns still more afflicted than on his 
 first visit, still more alarmed for the fate of the 
 Prince of the Peace, still more pained by the 
 solitude in which they were left, still more irri- 
 tated at the triumph of Ferdinand VII., and, 
 consequently, still more disposed to throw them- 
 selves into the arms of France. The idea of a 
 protest, calculated to lead to the recovery of 
 their power, or to enable them to avenge them- 
 selves, and at the same time quite in confor- 
 mity with facts, could not be otherwise than 
 received with delight. It was so, and imme- 
 diately thereupon Charles IV. showed himself 
 ready to sign it. The wording, however, which 
 Murat proposed, was not that which seemed 
 quite suitable to the old sovereigns, although 
 they were not difficult to please, and bad judges, 
 in fact, of the suitable phraseology. They 
 were afraid that such a step, if it was known, 
 might place their own lives and that of the 
 favourite in jeopardy. They therefore asked 
 a few hours, in order to consider the form which 
 might appear to be the best, engaging, how- 
 ever, to do as might be desired, and to date 
 the protest from the day which would most pro- 
 perly correspond with the entire freedom of 
 their appeal to the justice of Napoleon. M. dc 
 Monthyon was sent back to Murat with all these 
 assurances, and a new appeal to the protection 
 of the French army. 
 
 Murat, certain of being able to dispose of 
 the old sovereigns according to his wishes, for 
 the success of plans of which he was the author, 
 resolved to act equally upon Ferdinand VII., 
 in order to induce him not yet to take the crown, 
 not to perform any act of sovereignty to the 
 'atest time he could, and especially not to make 
 his solemn entry into Madrid. Murat thought, 
 as long as Ferdinand VII. should not be king, 
 nnd Charles IV. not being really so, things 
 would go better in the sense of his own hopes. 
 He desired, moreover, to obtain another deter- 
 mination from Ferdinand VII., which appeared 
 
 to him urgent. When the notion of a journey 
 to Andalusia was in contemplation, the Prince 
 of the Peace had given orders to the Spanish 
 troops to repass the frontiers of Portugal, Ta- 
 ranco's division to go to Old Castille, and So- 
 lano's to Estramadura. The latter, having 
 already reached Talavera, was approaching 
 Madrid, and might occasion a collision, which 
 was contrary to Murat's views, who understood 
 very well that the affairs of Spain were to be 
 managed by address, and not by force. In 
 order, however, to make the Spanish troops 
 retrace their steps, it was necessary to procure 
 an order from Ferdinand himself. 
 
 For this purpose, Murat sent for M. de Beau- 
 harnais, whom he very much distrusted, be- 
 cause he knew that the latter was attached to 
 Ferdinand VII., and to whom he imputed a 
 greater degree of finesse than this honourable 
 though unskilful ambassador was capable of 
 employing in any political plot. He persuaded 
 him to go immediately to Aranjuez, and, by 
 using his influence over Ferdinand VII., to ob- 
 tain from him the decision which the circum- 
 stances required. Murat began by frightening 
 him with respect to the manner in which he had 
 so completely misunderstood the intentions of 
 Napoleon, by contributing to prevent the jour- 
 ney to Andalusia (right or wrong, this was, in 
 fact, imputed to M. de Beauharnais.) In order 
 to disquiet him still more, Murat affirmed to 
 him what he really did not know, that Napoleon 
 would have wished a renewal of the scenes of 
 Lisbon. He then suggested to him, as a cer- 
 tain means of repairing his fault, the idea of 
 betaking himself immediately to Aranjuez, in 
 order to obtain a command from Ferdinand 
 VII. to make the Spanish troops retrace their 
 steps, and not come to Madrid ; and, moreover, 
 that he should leave the question of his sove- 
 reignty in suspense, till Napoleon's decision. 
 M. de Beauharnais, yielding to his advice, set 
 out the same hour for Aranjuez, in order to ac- 
 complish, if not the whole, at least a part of 
 what Murat desired. 
 
 Having reached the presence of Ferdinand, 
 he first asked, with his usual positiveness, for 
 an order for sending back the Spanish troops 
 into their former positions. Ferdinand had not 
 yet by his side his two chief advisers, the canon 
 Escoiquiz and the Due de 1'Infantado, who had 
 been in exile too far from Madrid to have had 
 time to return. He had retained some of his 
 father's ministers, especially MM. de Cevallos 
 and De Caballero, and after having consulted 
 them, he caused orders to be sent to General 
 Taranco and to the Marquis of Solano in par- 
 ticular, to return by Toledo and Talavera to 
 Badajoz. M. de Beauharnais, having dis- 
 charged the'first part of his commission, whe- 
 ther he did not understand Murat's intentions 
 with regard to the second, or did not wish to 
 conform to them, applied himself to persuading 
 Ferdinand that it was necessary for him, at all 
 costs, to secure the good-will of Napoleon, and 
 for that purpose to hasten to meet him, and to 
 throw himself into his arms, asking for his 
 friendship, his protection, and a wife ; that the 
 sooner he took such a step, the sooner he would 
 be certain of reigning ; that the best thing would 
 be to set out immediately from Aranjuez on such 
 a journey ; that he would not have to proceed 
 very far, for he would find Napoleon on the
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 471 
 
 way ; and, finally, that he ought only to come 
 to Madrid in order to pass through it as quiculy 
 as possible, to proceed to Burgos or to Vitto- 
 ria. 
 
 All this was done in good faith on the part of 
 M. de Beauharnais, who entertained no doubt 
 that he should contribute on his part, as Murat 
 on his, to the invention of an intrigue to which 
 Ferdinand would speedily succumb. Ferdinand 
 VII. did not reject the advice, but he deferred 
 his decision till the arrival of his two confiden- 
 tial advisers, without whom he did not wish to 
 undertake any thing so serious. He adopted 
 as much of the advice of M. de Beauharnais 
 as suited his present convenience, that was, 
 immediately to quit Aranjuez and to go to Ma- 
 drid ; and he announced his solemn entry into 
 the capital for the 24th, the next day. 
 
 M. de Beauharnais, having returned to Ma- 
 drid, ingenuously related to Murat all he had 
 said and done. The latter thought he perceived 
 in his conduct a perfidious calculation, in order 
 to lead Ferdinand to enter Madrid immediately, 
 and to take possession of his crown a little ear- 
 lier than he would otherwise have done. With- 
 out loss of time he denounced him to the Em- 
 peror as a secret accomplice of Ferdinand VII., 
 as an active agent in the revolution which had 
 hurled the old king from his throne, and as a 
 dangerous ambassador, who favoured the cause 
 of the new sovereignty, the only one which there 
 was any reason to fear. These accusations, 
 dictated by the jealous ambition of Murat, 
 were, however, unfounded, or at least greatly 
 exaggerated. M. de Beauharnais had been 
 from the first warmly attached to Ferdinand, 
 because he appeared to him the only person in 
 the court deserving the least interest ; this 
 attachment had perhaps become warmer since 
 the time in which the question had been raised 
 of his marrying a lady of the Beauharnais 
 family, but he sincerely believed that a close 
 union with Ferdinand VII. was the very best 
 solution of the difficulty for France ; and by 
 urging this prince to take the road to France, 
 he was desirous of leading him, not to Madrid, 
 but to the feet of Napoleon, in order to insure 
 that result which he thought the best. Ard, 
 moreover, he was neither sufficiently active nor 
 sufficiently able to have taken any part what- 
 ever in the late revolution, which he had only 
 appeased by bringing to the old sovereign at 
 the moment of danger the assistance of his un- 
 skilfulness and of his courage. 
 
 Those who directed the affairs of the new 
 sovereignty had every thing arranged for the 
 entry of Ferdinand VII. into Madrid. Although 
 they were ignorant of the designs of Napoleon, 
 they said to themselves, that Ferdinand's sove- 
 reignty, being the youngest and most vigorous, 
 ought to be the least agreeable to the French, if 
 they had any evil intentions with regard to the 
 crown of Spain. For this reason, they con- 
 sidered it as a pressing matter, that he should 
 enter Madrid and receive from the people of the 
 capital their acclamations, which would be a kind 
 of national consecration. Murat having entered 
 on the 23d, it was in their opinion too much to 
 be behind even a day. Accordingly, it was an- 
 nounced that the new court would remove from } 
 Aranjuez to Madrid on the 24th, without any i 
 other pageantry except a few guards and the 
 popular enthusiasm. 
 
 Accordingly, on the 24th, Ferdinand, hay- 
 ing set out early from Aranjuez, alighted 
 from his carriage at one of the gates of the 
 city, that of Atocha, mounted his horse, and, 
 surrounded by the officers of his court, tra- 
 versed the beautiful promenade of the Pra- 
 do, and entered the interior of Madrid by 
 the wide street of Alcala, in the midst of an 
 immense multitude, who, after having long 
 yearned for the termination of the old reign 
 and the commencement of the new, at length 
 saw their hopes realized, and sought in some 
 measure by the vigour of their shouts to drive 
 away the thoughts of the dangers which threat- 
 ened Spain. The whole population, intoxicated 
 with joy, were at the windows or in the streets. 
 The women scattered flowers from the tops of 
 the houses. The men threw themselves down 
 before the young king and spread their cloaks 
 under his horse's feet. Others, brandishing 
 their poniards, swore to die for his cause, for 
 the danger made itself confusedly felt in their 
 ardent minds. That crafty and malicious 
 prince, so little worthy of being loved, wifc at 
 that moment surrounded by as much love as 
 was shown for Titus by the Romans, or by the 
 French for Henry IV. He constituted the de- 
 light of Spain, who had no idea what was to 
 befall him no doubt at all of his future him 
 or herself! 
 
 Ferdinand VII., having reached the palace, 
 there received the public authorities. During 
 the day the diplomatic body came to pay their 
 respects to him, as if he were an undisputed 
 king, although not recognised by all the men 
 of Spain. M. de Beauharnais, kept back by 
 Murat, did not appear ; his absence greatly 
 alarmed the new court, and embarrassed the 
 members of the diplomatic body itself, who had 
 given way to their secret feelings by signifying 
 so quickly their adherence to the sovereignty 
 of the Bourbons. The ministers of weak and 
 dependent courts excused themselves. The 
 representative of Russia also sent his excuse, 
 but less humbly ; he alleged diplomatic usages, 
 which are invariable, and by virtue of which 
 addresses of ceremony are presented to every 
 new king, without at all prejudging the ques- 
 tion of his definitive recognition. 
 
 Murat received these explanations of a course 
 of conduct which displeased him with ill- 
 concealed dissatisfaction, because he already 
 looked upon Ferdinand as a rival for the crown 
 of Spain ; and when it was proposed to him to 
 go and pay a visit to him, he refused, absolutely 
 declaring that in his eyes Charles IV. was still 
 King of Spain, and Ferdinand Prince of the 
 Asturias, till Napoleon had pronounced his de- 
 cision on this melancholy conflict. On the 
 evening of the 21st, as we have said, he had 
 written from El Molar an account of all that 
 had taken place to Napoleon; he had commu- 
 nicated to him his own plan, which consisted in 
 making Charles IV. protest, and in net recog- 
 nising Ferdinand VII., in order that Spain might 
 find herself in the condition of being between 
 a king who was no longer so, and a prince who 
 had not yet become one. On the 22d and 23d, 
 occupied with his march and his entry into 
 Madrid, he was not able to write. On the 24th 
 he wrote an accoxmt of what had taken place 
 in the two days preceding, and, continuing to b 
 inspired by the events, he added a new idea to
 
 472 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 his plan an idea with which M. de Beauharnais 
 had innocently furnished him, and of which he 
 was about to make a treacherous use, that of 
 sending Ferdinand to meet Napoleon, in order 
 that the latter might make himself master of 
 his person, and then do with him what he 
 pleased. There would then be no other person 
 to deal with except Charles IV., from whom it 
 would be easy to snatch the sceptre, incapable 
 as he was of holding it in his weak hands, and 
 Spain herself not being disposed to leave it 
 there. 
 
 Whilst these events were occurring in Spain, 
 Napoleon had been successively apprized of 
 them five or six days after their occurrence 
 for such was the time then necessary for a com- 
 munication between Madrid and Paris. From 
 the 24th till the 27th, he was made acquainted 
 with the rising at Aranjuez, then with the over- 
 throw of the favourite, and finally, with the 
 forced abdication of Charles IV. This solution, 
 the most unexpected of all, although not the 
 least natural, surprised without disconcerting 
 him. The desired departure of the reigning 
 family, which would have rendered the crown 
 of Spain vacant, not having been effected, the 
 first plan proved nothing more than an abortive 
 combination. Napoleon, however, saw in these 
 very events a new means of arriving at his end, 
 and that means was in complete accordance 
 with what the circumstances had suggested to 
 Murat. Long before the letters in which the 
 latter put forward his ideas had arrived in Paris, 
 Napoleon had thought of not recognising Fer- 
 dinand VII., whose young sovereignty, eagerly 
 desired by the Spaniards, it would be difficult 
 to destroy, and to consider Charles IV. still as 
 king, whose old sovereignty, worn-out and hate- 
 ful to the Spaniards, it would be easy to over- 
 turn. Besides, under the form of arbitration 
 between the father and the son, it would be 
 easy to give an advantage to the cause of the 
 father, who would not fail soon after to cede 
 the crown of Spain to Napoleon, under the in- 
 fluence of the queen's advice and that of the 
 Prince of the Peace, who would wish, above all 
 things, to be avenged on Ferdinand VII. If, 
 moreover, under pretext of this arbitration, 
 Ferdinand VII. could be brought to go and meet 
 Napoleon, it would then be easy to become 
 master of his person, and the difficulty would 
 be greatly simplified, for he would have nothing 
 more before him than the old dethroned sove- 
 reigns, convenient instruments in hands which 
 could secure that repose which in their old age 
 they required, and the vengeance for which 
 their malicious hearts were greedy. The sceptre 
 might be left for some time in their hands, and 
 then they could be prevailed upon to surrender 
 it in return for a quiet and opulent retirement, 
 or even, perhaps, to carry them off at the same 
 
 i What is here stated is proved by the letters of both 
 Murat and Napoleon, by their contents and their dates. 
 
 It has been denied that General Savary ever received, 
 or Napoleon ever gave, this commission. It has been at- 
 tempted to show that the deplorable events of Bayonne 
 sprang by chance, from the concurrence of events ; that 
 the royal family of Spain, father, mother, son, brother, and 
 ancles, had all been drawn by a sort of involuntary al- 
 lurement to throw themselves into the hands of Napoleon, 
 who, when he found them all united, was not able to resist 
 the temptation of seizing upon them. I do not know that 
 Napoleon would be more excusable even on this hypothe- 
 is. But however that may be, the proofs exist, and leave 
 no room for doubt For myself, who have no desire to 
 tarnish the glory of Napoleon, 1 will speak the truth here, 
 
 time, by taking advantage of the fear with 
 which a nascent revolution inspired them, and 
 of the aversion felt for them by a people dis- 
 gusted with their vices. 
 
 It was thus Napoleon, by being drawn on into 
 this way of conquering a foreign throne without 
 employing war, proceeding from one act of cun- 
 ning to another, became daily more guilty. 
 Some have laid all this to the account of his 
 natural perfidiousness, and others to the im- 
 prudence of Murat, who had involved him in it 
 against his own will. The truth, however, is 
 as we have stated it here. Both, inspired by 
 ambition and guided by circumstances, con- 
 curred according to their position in this dark 
 work ; and as to the project of not recognising 
 the son and of using the instrumentality of the 
 angry father against the rebellious son, it 
 sprung up at the same time, both in Paris and 
 Madrid, in the heads of Napoleon and Murat on 
 the consideration of the events themselves ; for 
 the conditions being such as they have been 
 related, did not admit of any other mode of 
 action. 1 
 
 Napoleon instantly summoned the attendanc* 
 of General Savary, already employed in mis- 
 sions of the greatest magnitude, and who, at 
 that time had just returned from St. Peters- 
 burg, where, as has been seen, he had given 
 abundant proofs of suppleness as well as of 
 firmness. Napoleon opened to him the whole 
 of his thoughts respecting Spain, his desire of 
 regenerating the country and of binding it to 
 France by a change of dynasty ; the difficulties 
 which surrounded the enterprise, alternately 
 opposed or promoted by events ; the new phase 
 presented by the revolution of Aranjuez; and, 
 finally, the possibility of conducting it to the 
 desired end, by making use of Charles IV. 
 against Ferdinand VII. Napoleon expressed to 
 General Savary his intention of not recognising 
 the son of affecting a religious regard for the 
 authority of the father of maintaining this 
 authority as long as might be necessary to se- 
 cure the. crown, and of making him yield it up 
 immediately, or at a later period, according to 
 circumstances to draw Ferdinand VII. away 
 from Madrid, to lead him to Burgos or Ba- 
 yonne finally, to make sure of his person, and 
 to obtain from him the cession of his rights by 
 means of an indemnity in Italy, such as Etruria, 
 for example. Napoleon enjoined Savary to act 
 with discretion, to allure Ferdinand to Bayonne, 
 with the hope of seeing the dispute decided in 
 his favour ; but, if he should prove obstinate, 
 boldly to publish the protest of Charles IV., to 
 declare that he alone was King of Spain, and 
 to treat Ferdinand VII. as a son, and as a sub- 
 ject, like a rebel. The least violent means were 
 always to be preferred. 2 Napoleon wished 
 General Savary immediately to proceed to Ma- 
 
 as I have done in the case of the Due d'Enghien, under the 
 responsibility which always rests upon an historian, of 
 stating facts precisely as they took place. I have given 
 before the thoughts of Napoleon with respect to the inva- 
 sion of Spain ; here I relate with accuracy, on the authority 
 of unquestionable documents the autograph letters con- 
 tained in the Louvre the succession of bis ideas with re- 
 spect to the meeting at Bayonne. On the authority of this 
 correspondence, there cannot be a doubt that Generf J Sa- 
 vary received the commission which I hare attributed to 
 him. As soon, in fact, as he arrives, he writes to tlie Em- 
 peror, " I have stated your intentions to }*rinre Murat." 
 Prince Murat replies to the Emperor, " JVbto that I knoio 
 ymir views, every thing shall be done according to your desire." 
 Then Murat from day to day gives an account of evcrj
 
 March, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 473 
 
 drid, to go and tell Murat a secret which had 
 been concealed from him till that moment, which 
 he had indeed obtained a glimpse of, but which 
 it was necessary to communicate to him by a 
 confidential man, who should be capable of 
 gniding him in this tortuous course, in which 
 the slightest false step might prove fatal. Ge- 
 neral Savary immediately set out in order to 
 execute completely and without reserve the 
 wishes of Napoleon. 
 
 There took place, however, in the mind of 
 Napoleon, one of those sudden changes, which 
 astonish those who are unacquainted with the 
 nature of the human mind, and which men 
 hasten to call inconsistencies, when met with 
 in the conduct of men of less acknowledged 
 superiority than those on whose history I am 
 now engaged. Although a sort of fatal inclina- 
 tion drew him towards the usurpation of the 
 crown of Spain, he never concealed from him- 
 self any of the inconveniences attached to this 
 deplorable undertaking. He anticipated the 
 blame that would be thrown upon him by public 
 opinion, the indignation of the Spaniards, their 
 obstinate resistance, and the advantage which 
 might be taken of that resistance by England ; 
 he foresaw all these inconveniences with asto- 
 nishing clearness ; and yet, blinded not by the 
 difficulties, but with regard to his immense 
 power to conquer them, drawn by the passion 
 of founding a new order in Europe, he pro- 
 ceeded towards his object, troubled however, 
 from time to time, by the sudden though fleet- 
 ing apparition of the most sinister images. An 
 incident, ill-understood even at this day, caused 
 one of those accidental changes to spring up in 
 his mind, and led him to give orders the very 
 reverse of those he had despatched before 
 orders which certain badly-informed historians 
 have brought forward, as a proof that, in the 
 affairs of Spain he had no wish to do what was 
 done, and that he had been more guilty and 
 further involved than he wished by the impru- 
 dent ambition of Murat. 
 
 Among the agents of Napoleon travelling in 
 Spain, there was one in whom he had a well- 
 placed confidence : this was De Tournon, his 
 chamberlain, a man of cool mind, little inclined 
 to illusions, and sufficiently devoted to his 
 master to tell him the truth. He was one of 
 those persons whom Napoleon was well pleased 
 to send on any mission apparently indifferent, 
 such as that of delivering a letter of congratu- 
 lation or condolence ; because, as he travelled, 
 he observed much, observed well, and reported 
 faithfully what he had observed. M. de Tour- 
 non, during the last six months, had taken 
 several journeys to Spain as the bearer of let- 
 ters from Napoleon to Charles IV. He had 
 formed his opinion of the Peninsula, and of 
 what was going on there, with a sagacity which 
 events too well justified. Thus, for example, 
 he had clearly seen that the old court was 
 reaching the term of its dominion ; that a new 
 court was in preparation, already adored by the 
 Spaniards ; that it was necessary to try to 
 attach it to France, by the need which it had 
 
 thing which is done by him to induce the son to go to B- 
 ycnne ; then the father, the brothers, and all the princes, 
 referring always to the plans of Napoleon, transmitted by 
 General Savary, and other agents sent afterwards. Napo- 
 leon's letters, besides, contain his approval of all these 
 act*, at first in i-o vert phrases, then in plain language so 
 
 VOL. II. 60 
 
 of French protection; to be very careful of 
 taking away the crown of Spain either by force 
 or stratagem, inasmuch as a fanatical people 
 would make a desperate resistance, and tho 
 advantages which might be gathered from such 
 a conquest would not be worth the efforts ne- 
 cessary to effect it. M. de Tournon had very 
 clearly seen all this, and was not afraid to say 
 so in his numerous journeys in the presence 
 both of Murat and his officers, all eager for 
 bold enterprises, entertaining a profound con- 
 tempt for the Spaniards, and not believing foi 
 a moment that they could resist our arms, be- 
 fore which the best soldiers in Europe had 
 given way. M. de Tournon, during his sojouru 
 in Madrid, having seen the preludes to the 
 revolution of Aranjuez, and the popular enthu- 
 siasm in favour of the young king, still re- 
 mained convinced that it would be folly to seize 
 upon Spain, either by circuitous means or open 
 force, and that it would be a hundred times 
 better to make an ally of Ferdinand VII., who 
 would be still more submissive than Charles 
 IV., because the Prince of the Peace and the 
 old queen would no longer be at his side to 
 subject his submissiveness to the fluctuation 
 of their caprices or resentments. 'Napoleon 
 had given orders to M. de Tournon to be at 
 Burgos on the 15th of March, proposing to 
 arrive there himself at the same time, and 
 being anxious to collect from the mouth of a 
 man in whom he could confide, the details of 
 all that might have taken place. M. de Tour- 
 non, on his way to Burgos, being obliged to 
 pass through the head quarters of Murat, 
 neither concealed from him nor his officers tho 
 fear with which the enterprise in which they 
 were engaged inspired him, exposed himself to 
 all their raillery, (Murat in particular found 
 fault with him,) and went to Burgos on the 
 15th, as he had been ordered. From Burgos 
 he wrote to Napoleon, in order humbly to en- 
 treat him, but with the earnestness of an 
 honest man, not to take any further definite 
 part before having seen Spain with his own 
 eyes, above all not to found his determination 
 on the information forwarded to him by brave 
 but heedless soldiers, who thought of nothing 
 but battles and crowns ; that it would be found 
 they had made cruel miscalculations respecting 
 Spain, and disregarded what perhaps might 
 turn out dreadful evils. He waited at Burgos 
 till the 24th, and not finding Napoleon arrive, 
 he set out for Paris, which, with the greatest 
 expedition, he could not reach till the 29th, in 
 consequence of the state of the roads and of 
 the relays of horses, both worn out by the ex- 
 cessive use at that time made of them. 
 
 Murat, occupied as he had been with his en- 
 trance into Madrid, wrote no despatches on 
 the 22d and 23d, and Napoleon was without 
 news on the 28th and 29th. He was very un- 
 easy as to what might have happened in Spain, 
 and in this state of extreme anxiety he was 
 led for a moment to look at things in a less 
 favourable point of view. The unexpected ar- 
 rival of an eye-witness who was wise and well- 
 
 plain as to direct Marshal Bcssieres to arrest Ferdinand 
 VII., if the latter should refuse to proceed to Bayonne. 
 Thus, the determination of Napoleon to cause the Spanish 
 princes to be allured to Bayonne cannot be denied, any 
 more than that the commission of conducting them thither 
 was given to General Savary. 
 
 2 B2
 
 474 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 informed, and with a full conviction and entire | 
 disinterestedness contradicted the interested ' 
 accounts given by military men, the arrival of 
 such a witness produced in Napoleon's mind a j 
 sudden, and, unhappily, too short a change of ; 
 resolutions, for it lasted scarcely twenty-four 
 hours. Napoleon shared all the anxieties of i 
 M. de Tournon at the idea of the French enter- j 
 ing Madrid at the very moment of a political j 
 revolution, mixing with their natural forward- ' 
 ness in the strife of the factions which divided j 
 Spain, coming into collision with the Spaniards 
 and involving him in immense difficulties, per- 
 haps in a war of extermination with a fierce 
 people, passionately attached to their independ- 
 ence. He immediately wrote to Murat that 
 M. de Tournon was just about to set out, and 
 to bring him new orders; that he was proceed- 
 ing too quickly, and was in too great a hurry 
 to appear under the walls of Madrid, (yet 
 Murat was rather behind than in advance of 
 the period determined upon by Napoleon for 
 his entrance into the capital ;) that he was not 
 only proceeding too quickly in directing his 
 corps cTarmee upon Madrid, but that he directed 
 General Dupont too soon to go beyond the Gua- 
 darrama ; that as soon as he had been in- 
 formed of the return of the Spanish troops 
 under General Tareneo towards Old Castille, he 
 ought not to have weakened the garrisons of 
 Segovia and Valladolid ; that it was necessary 
 to beware of mixing himself up with the 
 Spaniards, of taking any part in their divisions, 
 and especially of coming into collision with 
 them, for every war of this description was 
 ruinous ; that it was a mistake to suppose the 
 Spaniards to be little to be feared because they 
 were disarmed; that independently of their 
 natural fierceness, they would have all the 
 energy of a new people, whom political passions 
 had not exhausted; that the army, though 
 scarcely amounting to 100,000 men, and in- 
 capable of resisting the weakest French force, 
 would separate, in order to go into every pro- 
 vince, and to serve as the kernel for continual 
 insurrection ; that the priests, monks, and nobles, 
 knowing well that they could only come to reform 
 the old social condition of Spain, would use all 
 their influence to stir up a fanatical people 
 against them ; that England would not fail to 
 take advantage of the circumstances to involve 
 us in immense difficulties, and create for us 
 new embarrassments ; that it was therefore 
 necessary to do nothing hastily, and to main- 
 tain the greatest possible reserve between the 
 father and the son ; that with regard to the 
 father, it was impossible to suffer him to reign 
 longer, because the government of the queen 
 and the favourite had become intolerable to the 
 Spaniards ; that with respect to the son, he 
 was in reality an enemy of France, for he 
 shared in the highest degree in all the Spanish 
 prejudices, and that the aversion which he 
 was supposed to entertain for his father's policy 
 a policy of concessions towards France 
 constituted some part of the popularity which 
 be enjoyed ; that experience had proved how 
 
 [March, 1808. 
 
 little influence marriages exercised in changing 
 the policy of princes ; that Ferdinand would 
 then before long be the declared enemy of the 
 French ; that, nevertheless, it was necessary 
 \ not to break with him, for, mean as he was, 
 ', our opposition would make him a hero; that, be- 
 j tween the impossibility of allowing the father 
 I to reign and of putting confidence in the son, 
 1 it was necessary not to be hasty in choosing; 
 above all, to give no one reason to divine the 
 i course we were likely to adopt, which was the 
 more easily done, as he (Napoleon) did not yet 
 : know it himself; that it was necessary to give 
 i hopes of the possibility of a kind and disinte- 
 j rested arbitration, and that as to an interview 
 ! with Ferdinand VII., that should not be thought 
 of, except in case France should be decidedly 
 obliged to acknowledge him ; that, in a word, 
 prudence advised to do nothing hastily no- 
 thing precipitately ; that Prince Murat shouM 
 especially guard against the suggestions of his 
 personal interests ; that Napoleon would think 
 for him, provided he did not think for himself; 
 that the crown of Portugal would always be 
 at his disposal to reward the services of the 
 most faithful of his lieutenants of him, who, 
 to all his own merits, added the advantage of 
 being his sister's husband. 
 
 Such was the wise counsel which Napoleon, 
 under the influence and by the instrumentality 
 of M. de Tournon, was about to address to his 
 lieutenant, when, after having been two days 
 without news, he received Murat's letters of the 
 24th, in which the latter informed him of his 
 [ peaceable entrance into Madrid, the excellent 
 i reception which had been given him, the in- 
 clination of the old sovereigns to throw them- 
 selves into his arms, their eagerness to protest 
 against the abdication of the 19th, the facility, 
 in fine, of rendering the throne vacant by re- 
 fusing to recognise Ferdinand VII., and thus 
 placing Spain between a king who had abdi- 
 cated and one who was not acknowledged. 
 Napoleon then finding all the means again in 
 his hands in which he had ceased to believe for 
 a moment, returned to the plan suggested to 
 Murat and himself by the revolution of Aran- 
 juez, and confirmed the orders which had been 
 just confided to General Savary before the ar- 
 rival of M. de Tournon. In consequence of this, 
 Napoleon, in a fresh letter, dated on the 30th, 
 wrote to Murat that he approved of the whole of 
 his conduct, and that he had done well by enter- 
 ing Madrid ; that it was, however, necessary to 
 continue to avoid every kind of collision, espe- 
 cially to guard against any mischief being done 
 to the Prince of the Peace, even to send him to 
 Bayonne, if he could ; carefully to protect the 
 old sovereigns, to bring them from Aranjuez to 
 the Escurial, where they would be in the midst 
 of the French army ; to beware of acknowledg- 
 ing Ferdinand VII., and finally, to wait for the 
 arrival of the French court at Bayonne, whither 
 it was about immediately to proceed. Napoleon 
 caused M. de Tournon to set out immediately, 
 without putting into his hands the cautious 
 letter of which we have just given an analysis, 1 
 
 The letter I have before mentioned first appeared, if I 
 mistake not, in the Memorial de Sainte-Hdene ; and since 
 then it ha* been printed in a multitude of publications. 
 To me it has been a subject of diligent inquiry and ex- 
 amination, with the view of ascertaining its authenticity, 
 j which I often had doubts. 1 will here explain 
 
 the reasons on which those doubts were grounded, and 
 also the reasons which definitively led me to believe it to 
 bo genuine. Of this fact, a series of the most careful com- 
 parisons brought me to an entire conviction on thi 
 subject. 
 I will commence by quoting the letter literally :
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 475 
 
 but without having been able to conceal either 
 the slight disapprobation which he had felt 
 regarding the conduct of Murat, or the appre- 
 hension which the possible consequences of this 
 
 "March 29th, 1808. 
 "MONSIEUR, GRAND DUKE OP BERG, 
 
 " I fear that you may be deceiving me respecting the 
 situation of Spain, and that you may be deceiving your- 
 self. The affair of the 19th of March has very consider- 
 ably embarrassed the state of things. Do not imagine 
 that you are attacking an unarmed nation, and that your 
 troops have only to show themselves in order to reduce 
 Spain to subjection. The revolution of the 20th of March 
 proves that there is spirit among the Spaniards. You 
 have to deal with a people in the prime of their energies, 
 fired with all the courage and all the enthusiasm which 
 animate men who have not been worn out by political 
 excitement. 
 
 "The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of 
 Spain. Should they become alarmed for their privileges 
 and their existence, they may raise against us levies en 
 maise, which will perpetuate the war. I now have parti- 
 sans ; but if I present myself as a conqueror, I shall have 
 none. 
 
 "The Prince of the Peace is detested, because he is 
 charged with having delivered Spain over to France ; this 
 is the grievance which favoured the usurpation of Ferdi- 
 nand. The popular party is the weakest. 
 
 "The Prince of the Asturias has none of the qualifica- 
 tions requisite for the head of a nation; nevertheless, for 
 the sake of setting him up in opposition to us, he will be 
 elevated into a hero. I will not consent to any violence 
 being exercised towards the personages of that family. 
 It never answers any purpose to render one's self odious, 
 and to stir up hatred. Spain has upwards of 100,000 men 
 in arms more than enough to carry on internal war with 
 advantage ; and this force, if dispersed over various points, 
 may serve to keep the whole monarchy in a state of in- 
 surrectionary ferment. 
 
 " 1 here point out to you all those obstacles which are 
 inevitable. There are others which your judgment will 
 enable you to comprehend. 
 
 " England will not let slip this opportunity of multiply- 
 ing our embarrassments. She is daily forwarding avisos 
 to the forces she keeps up on the coast of Portugal and in 
 the Mediterranean, and she is enlisting Sicilian and Por- 
 tuguese troops. 
 
 ' The royal family not having quitted Spain to proceed 
 to South America, nothing but a revolution can change 
 the face of the country ; and Spain is, perhaps, of all the 
 countries of Europe, that which is least prepared for revo- 
 lution. The persons who are sensible of the monstrous 
 vices of the government and of the anarchy which has 
 usurped the place of legal authority are in the minority: 
 the majority take advantage of those vices and that 
 anarchy. 
 
 " In the interest of my empire, I can effect much good 
 to Spain. The question is, what are the best means of 
 doing so? 
 
 " Shall I go to Madrid '! Shall I set up the authority 
 of a grand Protectorate, by deciding between the father 
 and the son ? It appears to mo that it would be a very 
 difficult matter to keep Charles IV. on the throne. His 
 government and his favourite have sunk so low in popu- 
 lar estimation, that they could not support themselves for 
 three months. 
 
 " Ferdinand is the enemy of France, and for that reason 
 he has been made king. To place him on the throne will 
 be to serve the factions, which for the space of twenty-five 
 years have been seeking the annihilation of France. A 
 family alliance would be but a feeble bond. Queen Eliza- 
 beth and other French princesses have been cruelly put 
 to death, when they could, with impunity, be made the 
 victims of atrocious vengeance. It appears to me that 
 matters ought not to be precipitated ; and that it will be 
 well to take counsel of coming events. We must rein- 
 force the corps on the frontiers of Portugal, and wait 
 patiently 
 
 " I do not approve of the course adopted by your im- 
 perial highness in so hurriedly taking possession of Ma- 
 drid. The army ought to have been kept at the distance 
 of ten leagues from the capital. You had no satisfactory 
 assurance that the people and the magistracy would will- 
 ingly recognise Ferdinand. The Prince of the Peace must 
 have partisans in the public departments; besides, the 
 attachment of habit which is cherished towards the old 
 king may produce results. Your entrance into Madrid, 
 by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully 
 served Ferdinand. I have ordered Savary to go to the old 
 king, and to learn how things are proceeding. He will 
 concert with your imperial highness. I will hereafter 
 direct what course is to be adopted : in the mean while, I 
 think it necessary to prescribe to you the following lino 
 of conduct: You must not bind me to any interview in 
 
 Spanish affair excited in his mind. He sent 
 him back without the letter, with the mission 
 to continue to observe every thing, and to pre- 
 pare apartments for him at Madrid. Napoleon 
 
 Spain, with Ferdinand, unless you judge the position of 
 things to be such as will warrant me in recognising him 
 as King of Spain. You must keep up an appearance of 
 amicable sentiments towards the king, the queen, and 
 Prince Godoy. You must exact for them and render to 
 them the same honours as formerly. You must manage 
 so that the Spaniards may have no suspicion of the course 
 I am about to take ; this will not be difficult, since 1 do 
 not myself know what that course will be. 
 
 "You must make known to the nobility and clergy 
 that, if France should interfere in the affairs of Spain, 
 their privileges and immunities will be respected. Inform 
 them that the Emperor desires the improvement of the 
 political institutions of Spain, that they may be raised to 
 a level with the state of civilization throughout Europe, 
 and released from the control of favourites. Tell the 
 magistrates, citizens, and all enlightened persons, that 
 Spain must reconstruct the machine of her government; 
 that she must have laws which will protect her citizens 
 against the arbitrary power and the usurpations of feu- 
 dalism ; institutions which will revive industry, agricul- 
 ture, and the arts. Portray to them the state of tran- 
 quillity and happiness enjoyed by France, notwithstanding 
 the wars in which she has been involved, and point to the 
 glory of her religion, which owes its re-establishment to 
 the Concordat I have signed with the Pope. Prove to 
 them the advantages they may derive from a political 
 regeneration : order and peace at home, respect and power 
 abroad. Such must be the spirit of your addresses to the 
 Spanish people, either in speaking or writing. Do not 
 hurry on any measure. I can wait at Bayonne, or I can 
 cross the Pyrenees, and fortifying myself in the direction 
 of Portugal, I can continue the war in that quarter. 
 
 " I will attend to your private interests do not trouble 
 yourself about them Portugal will be at my dis- 
 posal. Let no personal project occupy your thoughts or 
 guide your conduct; that would injure me, and would 
 injure you still more. You go too fast in your instruc- 
 tions of the 14th. The movement you prescribe for Gene- 
 ral Dupont is too rapid ; the event of the 19th of March 
 has rendered changes necessary. You must make new 
 arrangements; and you will receive instructions from my 
 minister for foreign affairs. I desire that discipline may 
 be maintained in the strictest manner : no pardon even 
 for the smallest faults. Let the inhabitants be treated 
 with the greatest consideration ; above all, let churches 
 and convents be respected. 
 
 "Our troops must avoid any sort of collision either with 
 the corps of the Spanish army or with detachments. Not 
 a cartridge must be fired on either side. 
 
 " Let Solano get beyond Radajoz, and keep watch upon 
 him. Trace out yourself the marches of our army, so as 
 to keep it always at the distance of several leagues from 
 the Spanish corps. If war should be kindled all is lost. 
 
 " The destinies of Spain must be determined by diplo- 
 macy and negotiations. I recommend you to avoid ex- 
 planations with Solano, as well as with the other Spanish 
 governors and generals. 
 
 "You will send me two expresses daily. In case of 
 events of urgent importance you must despatch orderly 
 officers. Send back immediately the Chamberlain de Tour- 
 non, who is the bearer of this despatch, and deliver to him 
 a detailed report, Ac. 
 
 (Signed) * NAPOLEON." 
 
 Before I proceed to discuss the authenticity of this let- 
 ter. I have a word or two to say respecting the inferences 
 which have been drawn from it. This document has been 
 regarded as evidence that Napoleon did not approve of 
 any thing that was done in Spain that all was done, 
 without his knowledge and against his will, by Murat, 
 prompted by his imprudence anil his impatient ambitioc. 
 This is a very false conclusion, for, the day before and che 
 day after the date of this letter, and during a considerable 
 interval succeeding it, Napoleon wrote a long series of 
 letters, ordering Murat point by point to do every thing 
 that was done ; and when Murat, inspired by events, took 
 some little upon himself, he received Napoleon's orders 
 from Paris or Bayonne to do the very things which he 
 had actually done. For example, Murat entered Madrid 
 on the 23d, but he had received formal orders to enter 
 one or two days earlier. It is, therefore, only by a false 
 induction, that this document can be made to exempt Na- 
 poleon from the responsibility of the events of Spain, and 
 to cast that responsibility on Murat. 
 
 The letter could only be the offspring of a moment ol 
 Indecision, amidst a line of conduct marked by the most 
 rexolute and undeviating firmness. Even this indecision 
 is marked with the impress of genius, for it ) .-trays the 
 most extraordinary and accurate prescience >f -ill that
 
 476 HISTORY OP THE [April, 1808. 
 
 himself took his departure on the 2d of April | conducted to Bayonne, compulsorily or volun- 
 for Bordeaux, where he wished to remain some j tarily, time to be brought or to repair thither. 
 
 days, in order to receive further letters from 
 Murat, and to give to all those who were to be 
 
 actually came to pass. Nevertheless, it was indecision, 
 for, during a brief space, Napoleon's will wavered, and he 
 abandoned one day that which he had desired the day be- 
 fore, and which he again dsired on the morrow. He 
 seemed as though enlightened by a supernatural intelli- 
 gence which unfolded the whole future before him. 
 
 This indecision, which at the first glance appears im- 
 probable, does not tend in any way to the justification of 
 Napoleon ; but it presents an interesting subject of reflec- 
 tion as regards the history of the human mind. It na- 
 turally creates astonishment that one of the most firm 
 and resolute minds that ever man possessed, should, 
 within a brief interval of time, survey things under such 
 contradictory aspects as led at one moment to determina- 
 tions, alike at variance with those formed the moment 
 before, and with those formed the moment after. Never- 
 theless, those who know the human heart, those who 
 have attentively observed its workings in great and try- 
 ing circumstances, are fully aware how greatly even the 
 firmest will is dependent ou events, and how the smallest 
 circumstances frequently suifice to shake the highest re- 
 solves. Many a victory enrolled in the annals of immor- 
 tality might never have been won, because the veriest 
 trifle would have caused the battle not to have been 
 fought. Vacillation is in the ordinary course of things : 
 the greatest minds are liable to it, and the firmest minds 
 vary ere they resolve. The letter in question proves in a 
 striking manner how clearly Napoleon could see the con- 
 trary side of the resolutions he formed; it proves, too, the 
 extraordinary foresight with which he was endowed ; but 
 at the same time it shows how light was the weight of 
 that foresight when balanced in the scale with his pas- 
 sions. I lelt as it were a certain degree of philosophic 
 interest in investigating the authenticity of this letter, 
 and I will now proceed to detail the various views I took 
 of it, before I definitively arrived at the conviction that it 
 was genuine. 
 
 At first glance, the superior style of the letter, both in 
 respect to ideas and language, leaves scarcely a doubt of 
 its having been written by Napoleon. Few, besides him- 
 self, could discuss great political and military events in 
 that masterly manner. Such is the impression it pro- 
 duced on the authors of all the works hitherto published 
 in relation to Napoleon. But those writers, knowing lit 
 tie or nothing of official documents, were not, like myself, 
 struck by the manifest discrepancies between the letter 
 and certain unquestionable historical facts; accordingly, 
 no doubt of its authenticity ever occurred to thm. For 
 my part, however, I saw such strong reasons for ques- 
 tioning that authenticity, that I fear I shall not be able 
 in the eye of rigorous criticism to show that those doubts 
 were unfounded. 
 
 In the first place, the letter stands in formal contradic- 
 tion to all that preceded and all that followed it. Some 
 have assigned to it the date of the 27th, others that of the 
 29th of March ; but the real date, as will be seen, can be 
 no other than the 29th. There exist letters from Nar 
 poleon, of dates between the 27th and the 30th, the pur- 
 port of which is totally at variance with that now under 
 consideration. In the communications dated between the 
 27th and the 30th, he approves of every thing done by 
 Murat; not only does he approve, but he orders the 
 entrance into Madrid, and prescribes a plan for getting 
 all the royal family of Spain into his power. The letter 
 of the 29th of March is the only one, amidst a lengthened 
 correspondence, which expresses any disapproval of the 
 course pursued by Murat a course which was, in fact, 
 conformable with his own directions. 
 
 Secondly, almost all Napoleon's letters arc in the collec- 
 tions in the Louvre; but this one is not there. This cir- 
 cumstance does not, it is true, amount to any absolute 
 Eroof. for out of 40,000 of the Emperor's letters, one is 
 ere aud there missing; and the letter in question may 
 possibly be one of the very few of which the minute has 
 not been preserved. These are so very few in number, 
 that they do not, perhaps, amount to 100 in the whole 
 40,000. Another curious circumstance is, that one of the 
 Emperor's letters, from which the following is an extract, 
 enumerates all the letters he wrote at this particular 
 juncture, and makes no mention of the one of the 29th 
 of March. 
 
 On his arrival at Bordeaux, he wrote to Murat, and, ad- 
 verting to the letters he had successively addressed to 
 him, he says " / received at midnight your letter of the 3d, 
 ny which I perceive that you, have received mine of the ZJth 
 of March. My letter of the 30th, and Savary, who must by 
 this time have arrived, wM make you better acquainted with 
 my intentions. General Reitte will depart immediately to 
 join you." Here not a word is said of the letter of the 
 29th. Can it be believed that he would not hare men- 
 
 He left M. de Talleyrand at Paris, to engage 
 the attention and satisfy the demands of the 
 
 tioned it, had it been written ; the more especially as it 
 was a letter countermanding all that he had ordered on 
 the 27th and the 30th ? He might, at least, be expected 
 to have alluded to it, by declaring that it was to be re- 
 garded as though it had never been received. 
 
 But the non-existence of this minute at the Louvre ac- 
 quires additional significance from the following circum- 
 stance. The very voluminous correspondence of Murat, 
 without the aid of which it would never have been pos- 
 sible to understand and narrate the events of Spain, exists 
 in entirety in the Louvre. It contains exact and minute 
 answers to all the Emperor's letters, even tho,e of the 
 least consequence. It may be said that this correspond- 
 ence comprises question and answer on every point; yet 
 there is no letter from Murat in reply to this letter so 
 important, so serious, and containing instructions so much 
 at variance with those previously given. Throughout 
 this correspondence Murat shows himself keenly sensible 
 to the slightest reproaches of the Emperor; and can he 
 be supposed to have left unanswered a letter expressive 
 of so much disapproval, and differing so essentially from 
 those which preceded and followed it? This is evidently 
 impossible. Should there still remain any doubt on the 
 question, it must vanish when it is found that Murat, in 
 a letter dated April 4th, (eleven o'clock at night,) says 
 " It. de. Tournon arrived this evening, he will have found 
 your Majesty's placs of residence ready prepared." Murat 
 does not add, " he has delivered to me your letters, &c." 
 It must be evident that M. de Tournon delivered nothing; 
 above all, nothing so important as the letter of the 29th 
 of March. I believe that the letter never was delivered, 
 which, however, is no proof that it was not written, as I 
 will presently show. 
 
 The discrepancy between this letter and all that pre- 
 ceded and followed it its non-existence in the Louvre, the 
 mutual silence of both Napoleon and Murat respecting it, 
 caused me at first to entertain doubts of its authenticity, 
 and at length convinced me that it could never have been 
 delivered. 
 
 I will now explain how my doubts of its authenticity 
 came to be removed, and how I arrived at the conviction 
 of its having been written without having been delivered. 
 That it is from the pen of Napoleon I entertain no doubt. 
 Imitators may succeed in forging style, but not in forging 
 ideas; besides, the writer must necessarily have been in 
 the very vortex of events to have spoken with so much 
 precision of the departure of General Savary, of the com- 
 mission intrusted to M. de Tournon, and various other 
 particulars of the same nature, with which the letter is 
 full. There is one point which, in my opinion, completely 
 establishes its authenticity ; it is this : ' You hare been 
 too precipitate in your instructions of the 14th to General 
 Dupont." Now, it happens that on the 14th instructions 
 were given to General Dupont, which fairly deserve the 
 reproach applied to them by Napoleon, when considered 
 from the point of view in which he saw them at the mo- 
 ment. By urging General Dupont too forward, Murat 
 left the rear of the army exposed to the attack of the 
 Spanish General Taraneo, who had been recalled from 
 Portugal by command of the Prince of the Peace. A 
 person forging the letter could not have been aware of 
 this fact, which could be known only to one who had 
 carefully read the orders of Napoleon. I also think that 
 this fact proven that the letter could not have been forged 
 at St. Helena by Napoleon himself, endeavouring in after- 
 thoughts to justify the most serious mistake of his reign. 
 He had too much pride to resort to such a device, for he 
 disdained to justify by falsehood the death of the Duke 
 d'Enghien; and, moreover, it is impossible that he could 
 have invented the circumstance relative to the orde 1 " jf 
 the 14th, for he had not at St. Helena the documents of 
 the Louvre; and I have evidence, from what he wrote at 
 St. Helena, that, without any desire to deviate from the 
 truth, he was often incorrect in dates and facts when he 
 had not official documents to refer to. The best Me- 
 moirs" are not free from similar errors, and I have fre- 
 quently detected them when comparing contemporary 
 publications with the correspondence of their authors. 
 
 Thus, independently of its style, the letter bears iuter- 
 nal evidence of its authenticity. But how are we to ac- 
 count for the contradiction between this letter and the 
 correspondence which preceded and followed it? and, 
 above all, how explain the silence of Murat, who does not 
 even acknowledge the receipt of the letter? I have en- 
 deavoured to solve these questions by the following facts. 
 
 I found in the Louvre the correspondence of M. de 
 Tournon. I there discovered that he alone, of all the 
 French agents, had condemned the Spanish enterprise, 
 and had implored Napoleon to suspend all decision on the 
 subject until after he should see the country with his own
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 477 
 
 representatives of European diplomacy, who 
 would require to be reassured or satisfied on 
 the arrival of every courier who should arrive 
 from Madrid. M. de Tolstoy claimed this care 
 and attention more than any of the rest. Na- 
 poleon took with him the docile and faithful M. 
 de Champagny, from whom he had no great 
 objections to fear, and even preceded his house- 
 hold, so eager was he to get nearer to the thea- 
 tre of events. Expecting to remain for a consi- 
 derable time on the frontiers of Spain, and to 
 receive there many princes and princesses, he 
 gave directions for the empress to come and 
 join him there in a few days. He arrived at 
 Bordeaux en the 4th of April, very impatient to 
 receive news of Murat. 
 
 The events at Madrid, which had stagnated 
 for a moment, whilst Murat was waiting for 
 orders from Paris, and Ferdinand VII. was 
 expecting his two principal confidential ad- 
 visers, canon Escoi'quiz and the Duke de 1'In- 
 fantado, soon resumed their course. Murat, 
 even while yielding to the impulse of his usual 
 boldness, could not avoid feeling occasional 
 anxiety with regard to his conduct, and asking 
 himself whether he had well or ill compre- 
 hended the Emperor's intentions. He was 
 therefore delighted on receiving the letter of 
 the 30th, and in spite of the momentary blame, 
 the secret of which M. de Tournon had divulged 
 in Madrid, he only persevered with the greater 
 zeal and cunning in the plan, so little worthy 
 of his honour, which he had invented as quickly 
 
 eyes. I have also read in Murat's correspondence, that 
 he himself. General Grouchy, and others, had at Somo- 
 Sierra ridiculed the gloomy forebodings of M. de Tournon. 
 Murat's correspondence, moreover, contains earnest so- 
 licitations that Napoleon will not form a decision from 
 any thing he may hear from M. de Tournon, the only 
 person adverse to Murat and the officers of his staff. I 
 have another proof of this fact. In the correspondence 
 of M. de Tournon. it appears that he remained at Burgos 
 until the evening of the 24th, impatiently waiting for the 
 Emperor. It is authentically recorded that he arrived in 
 Paris a few days afterwards. He could not, at the most 
 speedy rate of travelling, have arrived before the 29th, 
 which fixes the date of the letter in question at the 29th, 
 (at the very earliest,) since it is mentioned in the letter 
 itself that M. de Tournon was to deliver it. Having 
 arrived on the 29th, he found that the Emperor had re- 
 ceived no intelligence; f or) Murat not having written 
 either on the 22d or 23d. Napoleon necessarily passed 
 two days without despatches from Spain: and it must 
 have been the 28th and 29th, or possibly the 30th. when 
 he received answers to his communications of the, 22d and 
 23 I, on account of the time then required for the journey 
 from Madrid to Paris. There is consequently no letter 
 from the Kmperor, bearing date of the 28th or 2Jth, save 
 the letter in question. M. de Tournon found the Emperor 
 in the state of uneasiness naturally created by the ab- 
 gence of intelligence in critical circumstances, (and circum- 
 stances were then critical indeed, Murat being at the 
 gates of Madrid, and ready to enter.) Napoleon being ; n 
 this anxious condition of mind, is it not possible that M. 
 de Tournon might have exercised considerable influence 
 over him, and might have even persuaded him to write 
 the letter here under consideration ? Napoleon naturally 
 charged him to deliver it, it being in some measure his 
 own work. The phrase, " M. de Tburrum will deliver this 
 letter In you," connects it with M. de Tournon, and the 
 personal opinions of that individual connect it still more 
 closely with him. In the next place, dates concur in fix- 
 ing the transient indecision of Napoleon to the two days 
 during which he received no news, after having been ap- 
 prised of the movement of Murat on Madrid. Finally, 
 having received on the 30th the letter of the 24th. in 
 which Mural informs him how successfully every thing 
 had proceeded, he reverted to his former views, approved 
 every thing, and probably took bark the letter from M. 
 de Tournon. or it may be he despatched a courier to desire 
 him not to deliver it. as the aspt of affairs was changed. 
 However this may be. it is certain that the letter was not 
 delivered, for Murat makes no more allusion to it than if 
 it had never been written, though, from what he heard 
 
 as his master. General Savary had just ar- 
 rived, as the bearer of the Emperor's secret 
 wishes, which were in such sad harmony with 
 those of Murat, and he had no more hesitation 
 as to the course to be pursued. The plan in- 
 dicated by events appeared to Murat to be, not 
 to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., to induce him, 
 if possible, to meet the Emperor, if he resisted 
 to avail himself of the protest of Charles IV., 
 in order to declare the latter the only King of 
 Spain, and Ferdinand VII. a rebellious son 
 and usurper ; to rescue the Prince of the Peace 
 from the hands of his executioners, both from 
 humanity and politic calculation, for he was 
 about to become, in existing circumstances, a 
 very useful instrument; this plan, too, was 
 agreeable to the commands of Napoleon, who 
 was on his way to Bayonne. Murat and Ge- 
 neral Savary came to an understanding as to 
 the manner in which this difficult plot was to 
 be brought to a successful issue. They had a 
 very convenient auxiliary in M. de Beauharnais ; 
 and the more convenient, as he was convinced, 
 in his blind confidence, that Ferdinand VII. 
 could do nothing better than hasten to meet 
 Napoleon, and to throw himself into his arms 
 or at his feet in order to obtain the recognition 
 of his new title, the confirmation of all that 
 had taken place at Aranjuez, and the hand of a 
 French princess. M. de Beauharnais daily 
 advised Ferdinand to adopt this course, and the 
 latter, who was most eager to receive permis- 
 sion from Napoleon to reign, but dared not yet 
 
 from M. de Tournon, he must have been aware of the 
 Emperor's transient displeasure. 
 
 One thing is certain, viz. that, between the evening of 
 the 24th of March and the evening of the 4th of April, M. 
 de Tournon went from Burgos to Paris, and from Parig 
 to Madrid, which affords sufficient reason for believing 
 that he did not stop a moment on his journey, and that 
 he was in Paris on the 29th, on which day he might have 
 caused the Emperor to vacillate and to write the letter. 
 In this manner all is explained. The observation in the 
 letter itself stating that it is to be delivered by M. dc 
 Tournon, and thereby connecting the document with that 
 individual, enabled me. by inquiring into bis personal 
 opinions and comparing dates, to elucidate the mystery. 
 
 Now, it may be asked, how did this letter, which is not 
 in the collection at the Louvre, gain publicity. Of that I 
 know not. M. de Tournon is dead ; M. de Las Cases, who 
 was the first to send it forth to the world, is also dead. 
 It is possible that M. de Las Cases received it from Na- 
 poleon, as evidence that he was not wholly in the dark 
 respecting the affairs of Spain. It is also possible that It 
 may have been brought to light through some unknown 
 channel, which cannot now be traced out. But the style 
 in which it is written, together with the facts to which it 
 adverts, prove that it is not a forgery. Other facts equally 
 authentic prove that it was not delivered. The well 
 ascertained opinions of M. de Tournon, as well as the 
 circumstance of his having been intrusted with it con- 
 nect it with him ; dates identify it with a period which 
 must have betn to Napoleon one of great anxiety, and the 
 apparent inconsistency it betrays may be thereby ex- 
 plained. Napoleon, in a moment of hesitation, dictated 
 the counter-orders contained in this letter; then, his con- 
 fidence being restored by the intelligence of Murat's suc- 
 cessful entry into Madrid, he came back to his original 
 plans, and did not transmit the letter, which nt a subse- 
 quent period was discovered and made use of for the pur- 
 pose of a justification. It proves one thing, which is. that 
 Napoleon's intelligence always directed him rightly, whilst 
 his passions frequently misled him, and that it would 
 have been well had he followed the dictates of the former, 
 without yielding to the influence of the latter. I con- 
 ceived it to be important to verify this point of history, 
 us it affords a curious insi.cht into human character; and 
 I trust the candid portion of the public will readily admit 
 that, for the elucidation of truth. I have performed 
 more laborious task than historians frequent y deem it 
 necessary to undertake : moreover, I have had the mean* 
 of consulting documents which are still less frequently 
 accessible to writers in general.
 
 478 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 take any steps in the absence of his favourites, 
 promised to follow the advice of the French 
 ambassador as soon as he should have collected 
 around him in Madrid those in whom he placed 
 his confidence. He had already removed from 
 his ministry those who were regarded as beinj 
 the most devoted to the Prince of the Peace, o 
 towards whom he felt no inclination. The 
 administration of the war department had been 
 committed to M. O'Farrell, an officer of dis 
 tinction, who had formerly commanded th< 
 Spanish troops in Tuscany ; the finances to M 
 d'Azanza, a highly respected former minister 
 the department of justice to Don Sebastian 
 Pinuela, who had obtained great reputation in 
 the administration of the laws. He had re- 
 moved M. de Caballero, who alone, in late 
 times, had made any opposition to the Prince 
 of the Peace, but who was accused of playing 
 no very respectable character in the prosecu- 
 tion of the suit of the Escurial ; and he had 
 retained in the office of foreign affairs M. de 
 Cevallos, the humble servant on all occasions 
 of the Prince of the Peace, and especially in 
 the great question of the journey to Andalusia. 
 Cevallos pretended at this time to be the mosl 
 faithful friend of the new court, and had in 
 its eyes a most excellent title his detestation 
 of the French, whom, however, he was ready 
 to serve as soon as their arms were triumphant. 
 The Duke de 1'Infantado having at length 
 arrived, Ferdinand VII., as we have said, ap- 
 pointed him governor of the council of Castille 
 and commandant of his military house. He 
 had also the satisfaction of again seeing and 
 embracing his preceptor, whom he had most 
 unworthily given up in the suit of the Escurial, 
 but whom he loved from habit, and to whom he 
 was accustomed to open his heart, which he did 
 to very few. He wished to load him with dig- 
 nities and to make him grand inquisitor, which 
 canon Escoi'quiz, with a feigned disinterested- 
 ness, declined, imitating in this respect the 
 conduct of Cardinal de Fleury, and desiring 
 nothing more than to be the preceptor of his 
 royal pupil, but in reality under this title as- 
 piring to be governor of Spain and the Indies. 
 He only accepted the title of councillor of state 
 and the cordon of Charles III., just as if to 
 afford his king the pleasure of giving him 
 something. It was with the help of these dif- 
 ferent persons, and by forming a more secret 
 council with the Duke de 1'Infantado and canon 
 Escoi'quiz, in which the most important deci- 
 sions were to be made, and those grand ques- 
 tions to be solved, on which his own fate and 
 that of his monarchy depended. 
 
 The questions which Ferdinand had to re- 
 Bolve may all be comprised in a single one: 
 Bhould he go to meet Napoleon, in order to 
 obtain his good-will, an acknowledgment of his 
 new title, and the hand of a French princess ? 
 Or should he rather proudly await in Madrid, 
 surrounded by the fidelity and enthusiasm of 
 the nation, what the French would dare to at- 
 tempt against the dynasty ? Even before 
 resolving this grave question, various acts of 
 obsequiousness towards Napoleon had been 
 performed. After having sent three grandees 
 of the court, Count Fernand NieHez, the Duke 
 of Medina Celi, and the Duke of Frias, the 
 Infant Don Carlos was despatched to meet him 
 - -to go as far as Burgos, Vittoria, Irun, and, 
 
 if necessary, even to Bayonne. This first mark 
 of respect being shown to Napoleon, it remained 
 to know what concessions must be made to in- 
 sure his favour in case he should assume the 
 duty of acting as arbiter between father and 
 son. Several days were occupied in deliberat- 
 ing on this difficult subject. 
 
 First of all, it would have been necessary to 
 know what were Napoleon's intentions with 
 regard to Spain, when he had added to the 
 30,000 men sent to Lisbon another army esti- 
 mated at not less than 80,000, whose march 
 by Bayonne and Perpignan, by Castille and 
 Catalonia, clearly indicated some very different 
 object from Portugal. But Ferdinand's coun- 
 cillors, both those whom he had recently intro- 
 duced into the ministry and those who had 
 formed a part of it in the time of the Prince 
 of the Peace, were absolutely ignorant of the 
 diplomatic relations with France. M. de Ce- 
 vallos, the minister of foreign affairs, had never 
 been initiated into any of the negotiations car- 
 ried on in Paris by M. Yzquierdo. The Prince 
 of the Peace and the queen alone were ac- 
 quainted with them, and Charles IV. knew 
 nothing more than they thought fit to tell him. 
 Besides, these negotiations themselves, as M. 
 Yzquierdo sagaciously asserted, were perhaps 
 nothing more than a lure, to conceal under a 
 feigned dispute the secret designs of Napoleon. 
 Thus Ferdinand's councillors, new as well as 
 old, knew nothing of what the Prince of the 
 Peace was acquainted with, and he himself 
 only knew what M. Yzquierdo had rather 
 guessed than ascertained. Whilst these deli- 
 berations were being carried on, a despatch 
 from Yzquierdo arrived in Madrid, addressed 
 to the Prince of the Peace, and written from 
 Paris on the 24th, before any thing was known 
 of the revolution of Aranjuez. In this despatch 
 Yzquierdo gave the details of the pretended 
 negotiation going on between the cabinets of 
 Madrid and Paris. It appeared, according to 
 the language of this negotiation, that Napoleon 
 required a perpetual treaty of alliance between 
 the two countries, the opening of the Spanish 
 colonies to the French, and finally, in order to 
 avoid difficulties, the free passage of the troops 
 destined for the protection of Portugal, and 
 the exchange of that kingdom for the provinces 
 on the Ebro situated at the foot of the Pyre- 
 nees, such as Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia. 
 On these conditions, Yzquierdo informed the 
 jrince, the Emperor Napoleon would grant the 
 King of Spain the title of Emperor of the Ame- 
 ricas, would acknowledge Ferdinand VII. as 
 icir presumptive to the crown of Spain, and 
 ;ive him a French princess in marriage. He 
 lad, as he said, earnestly contended against 
 hese conditions, and especially against that 
 which related to the cession of the provinces 
 on the Ebro, but without success. He did not 
 add, because he had already stated it person- 
 ally in his short journey to Madrid, that Napo- 
 eon had a very different object in view, and 
 aimed at taking away the crown itself. In 
 ther respects, the contents of this despatch 
 were perfectly correct, for M. de Talleyrand, 
 n his part, had made a similar report to the 
 Emperor, offering, if he desired, to come to a 
 onclusion with the court of Spain on these 
 onditions. 
 When Ferdinand's councillors received M.
 
 April, i08.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 4', 9 
 
 Yzquierdo's despatch, which was not intended 
 for them, in their ignorance of men and busi- 
 ness they thought themselves thoroughly mas- 
 ters of the se :ret of Napoleon's policy. They 
 thought that, in reality, there were no other 
 questions between the governments of France 
 and Spain than those mentioned in the despatch 
 of Yzquierdo, and that Napoleon had no idea 
 whatever of seizing upon the crown of Spain. 
 They reasoned as follows : First, that Napo- 
 leon would not dare to brave the power of Spain 
 by making an attempt upon the crown ; as true 
 Spaniards, they could not entertain this idea. 
 That he had any desire to do so, they thought 
 still less admissible. Had he not, after the 
 battles of Austerlitz and Jena, left their thrones 
 to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia ? He 
 had up till this time dethroned only the Bour- 
 bons of Naples, who had drawn down this 
 severe treatment upon themselves by unpar- 
 donable treachery. But the court of Spain 
 had done nothing to deserve a similar fate, 
 since it had, on the contrary, lavished all its 
 resources in the service of France. The only 
 questions to be decided, therefore, according 
 to Ferdinand's councillors, were, whether they 
 should exchange a few provinces for the king- 
 dom of Portugal, consent to open the Spanish 
 Indies to the French, and agree to an alliance 
 which already existed in justice and in fact, 
 and which, after all, was for the true interest 
 of both countries. The only nice point was 
 the sacrifice of the provinces on the Ebro, a 
 sacrifice which the nation would most unwill- 
 ingly make, and which might prove very 
 injurious to the popularity of the young king. 
 On this point, however, the language of Yzqui- 
 erdo conveyed nothing absolute. It was, so to 
 speak, in exchange for a military road to Por- 
 tugal that the French cabinet appeared desirous 
 of obtaining the provinces on the Ebro. But 
 if they preferred supporting the bondage of 
 this military road, then they might dispense 
 with the cession of the provinces asked, and 
 escape with the inconvenient but temporary 
 passage of the French troops ; for as soon as 
 Napoleon should have a new war in the north 
 (which could not fail to happen) he would be 
 forced to evacuate Portugal, and Spain would 
 be free from the presence of his troops. 
 
 Such was their manner of interpreting Yz- 
 quierdo's despatch. Ferdinand's councillors 
 said to themselves that the worst which could 
 happen from a direct negotiation with Napo- 
 leon would be the being obliged to make some 
 concessions with regard to the colonies ; stipu- 
 late anew an alliance which had not ceased to 
 exist, and to concede a military route to Por- 
 tugal ; and that, in return, the acknowledg- 
 ment of the title of the new king would be cer- 
 tainly obtained. It was this last consideration 
 which exercised the greatest influence on the 
 minds of those ignorant advisers and of their 
 ignorant master, and which caused all others 
 to be regarded as of no importance. Although 
 it never entered their minds that the recogni- 
 tion of Ferdinand VII. might be refused, cer- 
 tain symptoms had given them some uneasiness 
 on this subject. The attentions shown by Mu- 
 rat to the old sovereigns, the eagerness to pro- 
 tect them by a detachment of French cavalry, 
 the declaration that no act of violence would 
 be allowed against the Prince of the Peace, 
 
 some proposals which had come from Aranjuez, 
 when the old court consoled itself by boasting 
 of the protection of its powerful friend Napo- 
 leon, all these circumstances excited some ap- 
 prehensions in the minds of Ferdinand and his 
 little court of some decided change of policy 
 in favour of Charles IV., a change brought 
 about by the intervention of France. Although 
 M. de Beauharnais had given them reason to 
 hope for the good-will of Napoleon without pro- 
 mising it, they had obtained nothing from the 
 ambassador for many days but vague words 
 the reiterated advice to throw themselves into 
 the arms, of Napoleon in order to obtain his 
 favour, which was, therefore, not yet acquired, 
 since it was necessary to go so far to attain it. 
 Murat, who stood in a still closer and more di- 
 rect communication with the Emperor of the 
 French, was still less favourable. He showed 
 no inclination to pay court to any except the 
 old sovereigns, and only gave the young king 
 the title of Prince of the Asturias. From the 
 tenor of other propositions from Aranjuez, they 
 began to fear that the old sovereigns enter- 
 tained the idea of going in person to meet Na- 
 poleon to inform him of the manner in which 
 the revolution of Aranjuez had been effected, 
 to surprise his favour, and obtain redress of 
 their wrongs. They were afraid that power 
 might thus return to Charles IV., and if not 
 into the hands of the Prince of the Peace, at 
 least to the queen, who would put Ferdinand 
 again in the sad situation of an oppressed son, 
 the Duke de 1'Infantado and canon Escoi'quiz 
 in strong castles, and thus be avenged upon 
 both for the few days of abasement to which 
 she had been obliged to submit, and, above all, 
 for the fall of her favourite, for whom she 
 would always continue inconsolable. 
 
 This was the reason which, above all others, 
 far more than their ignorance of affairs or than 
 foreign suggestions, led Ferdinand VII. and his 
 silly councillors to adopt the idea of going in a 
 body to meet Napoleon. The danger of com- 
 promising by an imprudent negotiation the pro- 
 vinces, colonial privileges, or some other great 
 interest of the Spanish monarchy, never even 
 presented itself to their minds, so exclusively 
 were they occupied with the fear that Charles 
 IV. would go to plead for himself, and perhaps 
 gain his cause from Napoleon. They would 
 have been a hundred times better pleased to 
 see Napoleon reign in Spain than to see the 
 queen again in possession of the royal author- 
 ity. This same feeling was entertained by the 
 old sovereigns in their turn ; and, to the mis- 
 fortune of Spain and France, this f.-eling caused 
 the sceptre of Philip V. to fall into the hands 
 of the Bonaparte family. 
 
 This fear no sooner took full possession of 
 the minds of the new court, than the question 
 of going to meet Napoleon was decided, and the 
 deliberations to which the journey might still 
 give rise, were the mere hesitations of feeble 
 minds, incapable even of willing resolutely 
 what they desired to do. Efforts were not 
 wanting, either on the part of Murat or of 
 General Savary, to put an end to these hesita- 
 tions. Murat availed himself of M. de Beau 
 harnais to repeat daily in Ferdinand's ears the 
 advice to set out, impressing on this unfortu- 
 nate ambassador that this was the only mear.g 
 of repairing the fault that he had committed
 
 480 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808 
 
 by hindering the journey to Andalusia. Murat 
 had also seen canon Escoi'quiz. The latter, look- 
 ing upon himself as necessarily much more 
 clever than a soldier who had passed his life on 
 the battle-field, flattered himself with being 
 able very easily to penetrate the secret of the 
 court of France by a few moments' conversa- 
 tion with the person who represented it at the 
 head of the French army. Murat saw him, 
 took good care not to promise beforehand the 
 recognition of Ferdinand VII., but declared 
 many times that Napoleon's intentions were 
 altogether friendly : that he had no wish to 
 interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, and 
 that, if his troops were at the gates of Madrid 
 at the moment of the last revolution, it was a 
 pure accident; but that, Europe being able to 
 make him responsible for this revolution, he 
 was obliged to be very sure, before recognising 
 the new king, that every thing had taken place 
 legitimately and naturally at Aranjuez; that 
 no one was better able to give him complete in- 
 formation on the subject than Ferdinand VII. ; 
 and that the presence of this prince, as well as 
 the explanations which he could give, would not 
 fail to produce a decisive effect on the Emperor's 
 mind. Murat thus duped the poor canon, who 
 flattered himself with duping him, and who 
 went away convinced that this journey would 
 infallibly lead to the recognition of the Prince 
 of the Asturias as King of Spain. 
 
 It was known that General Savary had ar- 
 rived in Madrid, and, although he was in a po- 
 sition inferior to that of Murat, he was re- 
 garded as being perhaps more thoroughly in- 
 formed of Napoleon's real thoughts than the 
 commander-in-chief. An interview with him 
 was therefore desired. The canon Escoi'quiz 
 and the Duke de 1'Infantado wished to converse 
 with him themselves, and then to present him 
 to Ferdinand VII. After having received still 
 more explicit assurances from him than those 
 given by Murat, because General Savary was 
 less bound to reserve, they presented him to 
 the Prince of the Asturias. The prince ques- 
 tioned General Savary as to the utility of the 
 journey he was advised to undertake, and the 
 consequences of an interview with Napoleon. 
 At that time there was no question about going 
 to Bayonne, but only to Burgos or Vittoria; 
 for the Emperor, they were assured, was on the 
 point of arriving, and the matter at issue was 
 that of doing him homage, of anticipating the 
 meeting of the old sovereigns with him, and of 
 being the first to speak in order to explain so 
 as to convince him of the necessity of the in- 
 explicable revolution of Aranjuez. General 
 Savary, without pledging the Emperor's word 
 with whose intentions on matters unknown 
 when he had left Paris he was, he said, unac- 
 quainted had no trouble in misleading persons 
 who would have deceived themselves had no one 
 else deceived them. Affecting to speak merely 
 his own sentiments, he alleged that, when Na- 
 poleon should have seen the Spanish prince, 
 heard from his own mouth an account of the 
 late events, and, above all, become convinced 
 that France would find in him a faithful ally, 
 he would acknowledge him as King of Spain. 
 That took place on this occasion which usually 
 happens in conversations of this kind : General 
 Savary thought he had promised nothing, by 
 giving abundant reason to hope, and Ferdinand 
 
 VII. thought that every thing he had been given 
 reason to hope for was actually promised. The 
 general had no sooner quitted the prince, than 
 the resolution, already taken, of going to meet 
 Napoleon, was definitively settled. An incident, 
 however, was very near compromising the result 
 which Murat and Savary were anxious to effect. 
 
 The Emperor had given orders to rescue the 
 Prince of the Peace from the fury of the ene- 
 mies who were eager for his death, in order not 
 to suffer the commission of a crime before the 
 eyes, and in some measure on the responsibility 
 of the French army ; and secondly, in order to 
 have in his hands an instrument, by whose aid 
 he reckoned on being able to influence the old 
 sovereigns according to his will. The old 
 queen, on her part, warmly seconded by the 
 imbecile goodness of Charles IV., asked, as a 
 favour of more value in her eyes than the 
 crown or almost than life itself, the deliverance 
 of him whom she always called Emmanuel, 
 their best, their only friend, who was, she said, 
 the victim of his too strong feeling of friend- 
 ship for the French. Thus, to save the favour- 
 ite became not only an act of humanity, but 
 the surest means of filling the old court with 
 gratitude and joy, and of moulding it at will. 
 Murat, with all the arrogance of power, de- 
 manded that the Prince of the Peace should be 
 given up to him. The prince, who had first 
 been detained in the village of Pinto, had after- 
 wards been conveyed to Villa- Viciosa, a sort 
 of royal mansion, where he was in greater se- 
 curity. He had been sent thither under an 
 escort of the life-guards, resolved to murder 
 rather than give him up. After having loaded 
 him with irons, his trial was conducted with a 
 degree of barbarous ferocity, inspired at once 
 by hatred, by a desire of doing dishonour to 
 the old court, and of guarding, by the death 
 of this old favourite, against a reverse of for- 
 tune. Ferdinand VII. and his councillors lent 
 themselves to these indignities as much on their 
 own account as on that of the base rabble whom 
 they were desirous of flattering. 
 
 Murat declared to them that, unless they de- 
 livered up the prince to him, he would order 
 his dragoons to cut to pieces the life-guards 
 who kept him imprisoned, and thus settle the 
 difficulty by main force It must be said to the 
 honour of this valiant man, that on this occa- 
 sion he was as much impelled by a generous 
 indignation as by any calculations of advantage. 
 The more he insisted, the more the confidential 
 advisers of Ferdinand, who were incapable of 
 comprehending any noble sentiment, saw in his 
 persistence a design of making use of the Prince 
 of the Peace against Ferdinand VII., and it was 
 confidently said that the idea of assassinating 
 the prisoner was for a moment entertained by 
 certain excited minds, it is not known which, 
 amongst the most influential of the new court. 
 
 General Savary, more wary than Murat, 
 thought he perceived that the very warmth 
 which was manifested in demanding the release 
 of the Prince of the Peace excited a degree of 
 distrust injurious to their principal object, 
 which was the departure of Ferdinand VIL, 
 and he took upon himself .to renounce for the 
 moment the surrender of the Prince of the 
 Peace, stating that this would be a matter of 
 subsequent arrangement, like all the others, in 
 the conferences which were about to take place
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 481 
 
 between the new King of Spain and the Em- 
 peror of the French. 
 
 This concession having been made, the de- 
 parture of Ferdinand was resolved upon. The 
 prince wished first of all to go to Aranjuez to 
 visit his father, whom he had left there desert- 
 ed, nay, almost in a state of destitution, since 
 the 19th of March, (it was then the 7th or 8th 
 of April.) without deigning to see him even 
 once. He was desirous of obtaining a letter 
 from him to Napoleon, in order in some mea- 
 sure to bind his old father by a testimony of 
 good-will given in his favour. Charles IV., 
 however, received the visit of this unnatural 
 eon very badly ; and the queen still worse. 
 They refused to give him any testimonial with 
 which he might arm himself to establish his 
 good conduct in the events of Aranjuez. 
 
 Although somewhat disconcerted by this re- 
 fusal, he nevertheless made preparations to 
 set out on the 10th of April. He left behind 
 him a regency composed of his uncle, the 
 infant Don Antonio, O'Farrill, minister of war, 
 Azanza, minister of finance, and Don Sebastian 
 de Pinuela, minister of justice, with a commis- 
 sion to give orders during his absence in cases 
 of urgency, and to refer to him on all matters not 
 requiring immediate decision, and in all cases 
 to consult and advise with the council of Cas- 
 tille. Ferdinand took with him his two most 
 confidential friends, the Duke de 1'Infantado 
 and the canon Escoi'quiz, Cevallos, minister of 
 state, and two experienced negotiators in 
 the persons of MM. de Musqurz and Labrador. 
 He was, besides, accompanied by the Duke of 
 San Carlos and the grandees who constituted 
 his new household. Cevallos was charged with 
 corresponding with the regency left behind in 
 Madrid. 
 
 It was, however, no easy matter to make this 
 resolution acceptable to the people of the capi- 
 tal. Some, from a feeling of pride peculiarly 
 Spanish, thought it would have been enough to 
 send the infant Don Carlos, the king's brother, 
 to meet Napoleon, and believed in all sincerity 
 that the sovereign of degenerate Spain was at 
 least equal to the Emperor of the French, the 
 conquerer of the Continent, and master of 
 Europe. Others, and they comprised the largest 
 number, began to see through the motives which 
 had brought so many French to the Peninsula, 
 put a sinister interpretation on the refusal to 
 acknowledge Ferdinand VII., and to look upon 
 this going to meet Napoleon as the act of a j 
 dupe, for this was to put himself into his power- ! 
 ful hands. They were far from supposing that ! 
 Ferdinand and his advisers would push their \ 
 folly so far as to go to Bayonne, or the French ' 
 territory, but they considered that the nearer [ 
 they approached to the Pyrenees, the more 
 they would place themselves within the reach i 
 of Napoleon and his armies. There was an in- j 
 expressible commotion in Madrid at the news 
 of this journey, and a regular tumult would ; 
 have taken place had not a proclamation been ! 
 issued by Ferdinand VII. calculated to appease ' 
 their minds, by saying that Napoleon was com- ! 
 ing in person to Madrid, there to knit more 
 firmly the bonds of a new alliance, and to con- ! 
 Bolidate the happiness of the Spaniards, and 
 that they could not neglect the duty of going ' : 
 to meet a guest so illustrious and so great as ! 
 the victor of Austerlitz and Friedland. 
 
 VOL. II.-- 61 
 
 This proclamation prevented the tumult with- 
 out entirely removing the suspicions which the 
 common sense of the people had led them to 
 entertain. Ferdinand took his departure on 
 the 10th of April, surrounded by an immense 
 multitude, who saluted him with a melancholy 
 interest, and with protestations of unbounded 
 devotedness. Amongst a part of the people, 
 however, it was easy to see a kind of disdain- 
 ful compassion for the foolish credulity of the 
 young king. 
 
 It had been agreed upon with Mnrat that 
 General Savary, for fear of some alteration in 
 Ferdinand's mind, or that of those who accom- 
 panied him, should make the journey along with 
 them, to draw them on from Burgos to Vittoria, 
 and from Vittoria to Bayonne, where it was 
 to be presumed the Emperor had stopped. It 
 was agreed, besides, that the demand for de- 
 livering up the Prince of the Peace should be 
 deferred till Ferdinand had crossed the fron- 
 tiers, and that even then care should be taken 
 to abstain from that step, or any other calcu- 
 lated to give offence. 
 
 By means of Generals Savary and Reille, 
 successively sent to Madrid, Napoleon had in- 
 formed Murat of his determination of getting 
 possession of Ferdinand VII. by inducing him 
 to come to Bayonne ; of placing Charles IV. * 
 again for a few days upon the throne ; and then 
 availing himself of this unfortunate prince to 
 make him cede the crown. He had at the same . 
 time enjoined Murat, if Ferdinand VII. could 
 not be prevailed upon to set out, to publish the 
 protest of Charles IV., to declare that he alone 
 was king, and Ferdinand VII. nothing more 
 than a rebel son. The facility, however, with 
 which Ferdinand VII. was persuaded to go to 
 meet Napoleon relieved him from having re- 
 course to these violent means, and from replac- 
 ing the sceptre of Spain in the hands of Charles 
 IV. However weak those hands might have 
 been, and however easy it might appear to have 
 snatched from them a sceptre only restored for 
 a moment, Murat was, nevertheless, much 
 better pleased not to be obliged to follow the 
 long course which kept him still at a distance 
 from the object to which all his wishes tended. 
 He saw, therefore, that it was necessary to be 
 satisfied with making Ferdinand VII. set out 
 without restoring the sceptre to Charles IV. 
 Ferdinand VII., whom the Spaniards eagerly 
 desired for their king, being once in the hands 
 of Napoleon, there only remained Charles IV., 
 whom the Spaniards would not have on any 
 conditions, and he might even be prevailed 
 upon to consent to go to Bayonne. Then all the 
 Bourbons, old and young, popular and unpo- 
 pular, would be at the disposal of Napoleon, 
 and the throne of Spain would be in truth 
 vacant. 
 
 What Murat had foreseen did not fail to come 
 to pass. The departure of Ferdinand VII. was 
 scarcely known when the old sovereigns were 
 also eager to be on the road. It had been 
 quite impossible to inspire them with a mo- 
 ment's confidence ever since the 17th of March, 
 Spain had become hateful to them. They con- 
 stantly spoke of quitting it, and of going to 
 occupy even an humble farm in France, a 
 country which their powerful friend Napoleon 
 had rendered at once so calm, so peaceable, 
 and so safe. But the case was altered alto- 
 28
 
 482 
 
 HISTORY OP THE 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 gether when they learned that Ferdinand VII. 
 had set out in order to have a personal inter- 
 view with Napoleon. Although they had neither 
 any great hope nor a great ambition of resum- 
 ing the sceptre, they were filled with envy at 
 the idea of Ferdinand gaining his cause with 
 the arbiter of their destiny of his being re- 
 cognised and settled as king by the acknow- 
 ledgment of France thus becoming their mas- 
 ter, and that of the unfortunate Godoy, and of 
 being able to decide their fate and that of all 
 their creatures. Not being able to bear this 
 idea, they conceived an ardent desire to pro- 
 ceed in person to plead their cause against 
 nn unnatural son in the presence of the all- 
 powerful sovereign who was approaching the 
 Pyrenees. The Queen of Etruria, who hated 
 her brother Ferdinand, and by whom she was 
 hated in return, had also to defend the rights 
 of her young son, now become King of North 
 Lusitania. She was afraid that his claims might 
 be entirely forgotten in the general confusion of 
 every thing in the Peninsula, and was desirous 
 of going with her father and mother to throw 
 herself into the arms of Napoleon, in order to 
 obtain from him justice and protection. She 
 therefore contributed to render the desire of 
 her aged parents more eager, and to urge them 
 J to take the road to Bayonne. In this manner 
 these unfortunate Bourbons were seized with a 
 sort of emulation to give themselves up to this 
 terrible conqueror, who attracted them as 
 snakes are said to charm birds, which are 
 drawn to them by an irresistible and mysterious 
 attraction. 
 
 The expression of this desire was immediately 
 communicated to Murat, who received its an- 
 nouncement with inexpressible joy. Had he 
 merely obeyed his first impulse, he would have 
 put the old court into carriages to make them 
 set out immediately after the young one. But he 
 was afraid of giving too great offence by making 
 all the members of the family leave at the same 
 time, of provoking reflections in the mind of 
 Ferdinand and his advisers, which might lead 
 them, perhaps, to relinquish their journey ; 
 and, above all, of adopting such a course with- 
 out the express assent of the Emperor. He 
 therefore confined himself to the immediate 
 despatch of this important news, not doubting 
 the answer, and contemplating with pleasure 
 the whole of the princes who had any right to 
 the crown of Spain hastening of their own ac- 
 cord towards the gulf open for them at Bayonne. 
 He entertained foolish hopes, and persuaded 
 himself that every thing was possible in Spain 
 to power mingled with a little address. 
 
 During this time Ferdinand and his court 
 were proceeding on their way to Burgos, with 
 that slowness usual with these indolent princes 
 of degenerate Spain. The eager homage of the 
 population, too, contributed not a little to delay 
 their progress. Everywhere the people broke 
 to pieces the busts of Emmanuel Godoy, and 
 carried about in procession those of Ferdinand 
 VII. crowned with flowers. The towns through 
 which the prince passed pardoned the object of 
 his journey, which procured them the pleasure 
 of seeing him ; but, deeply impressed with fear 
 for his fate, they swore to devote themselves 
 for him should there be need. They gave a 
 fuller and more energetic expression to these 
 feelings whenever they could be remarked by 
 
 the French, as if they wished to warn them 
 both of their distrust and of the devotedness 
 which they were ready to exhibit. 
 
 On their arrival at Burgos, Ferdinand VII. 
 and his travelling companions experienced a 
 surprise which gave rise in their minds to the 
 beginning of regret. General Savary had 
 always said to them that the only thing in 
 view was to go to meet Napoleon ; that he was 
 on his way to Old Castille, where they would 
 meet him, perhaps even at Burgos. The ardent 
 desire of being the first to see him, to anticipate 
 the old rulers, had wholly deprived them of all 
 clear sightedness, so that they failed to see a 
 snare so obvious. But, on approaching the 
 Pyrenees and plunging into the midst of French 
 armies, a sort of shuddering had seized them, 
 and they were almost tempted to stop, so much 
 the more, as they heard nothing whatever of 
 Napoleon or of his speedy arrival. (He was 
 then at Bordeaux.) General Savary, who never 
 quitted them, presented himself immediately, 
 gave firmness to their wavering confidence, as- 
 sured them they were at last going to meet 
 Napoleon ; that the further they advanced to- 
 wards him, the more he would be disposed to 
 favour them : and besides, that they would be 
 thus made certain of the fate which awaited 
 them two days earlier. It is a sure means of 
 drawing on agitated minds to promise them an 
 earlier clearing up of the doubts which agitate 
 them. It was then determined to proceed to 
 Vittoria, where they arrived on the evening of 
 the 15th of April. 
 
 At Vittoria, Ferdinand's hesitation changed 
 into absolute resistance, and he refused to pro- 
 secute his journey further. Firstly, he had 
 been informed that Napoleon, so far from hav- 
 ing crossed the frontiers, was still only at 
 Bordeaux, and Spanish susceptibility was deeply 
 offended by having advanced so far towards a 
 meeting when the other party had proceeded 
 so small a distance. Secondly, as they ap- 
 proached the frontiers of France, the truth 
 began to burst upon them. In Madrid, in the 
 midst of hostile factions, eager to anticipate 
 one another in obtaining Napoleon's favour, in 
 the midst of a people infatuated respecting 
 itself, which imagined that no foreign hand 
 would dare to touch the crown of Charles V., 
 it had been possible to suppose that the French 
 army had been sent to Spain solely with a view 
 to the interests of the royal family ; but, in the 
 neighbourhood of France, where every one 
 clearly saw the object of Napoleon ; where the 
 French armies, long assembled, had indiscreetly 
 talked of what they supposed to be the object 
 of their mission, it was more difficult to remain 
 in illusion. Every one at Bayonne and its 
 neighbourhood said that Napoleon was simply 
 about to complete his political system by plac- 
 ing the Bonaparte family on the throne of Spain 
 instead of that of the Bourbons. This conduct 
 was looked upon as quite natural in a conqueror, 
 who was the founder of a dynasty, always sup- 
 posing that the enterprise was crowned with 
 success, and especially that in these changes the 
 Spanish colonies did not go to enlarge the British 
 empire beyond the seas. These ideas had 
 passed from the French Basque provinces into 
 the Basque provinces of Spain, and produced 
 such a sensation in the minds of Ferdiiuind VII. 
 and the canon Escoi'quiz, that a resolution was
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 immediately adopted to stop at Vittoria. The 
 reason given was one of etiquette, which had 
 its weight ; for it was not a very dignified step 
 to proceed even beyond the frontiers of Spain 
 to meet Napoleon. In order to draw the 
 Spaniards on to Vittoria, General Savary had 
 constantly given them reason to hope, and al- 
 most to be certain, of meeting Napoleon at the 
 next post. But the certain news of his being 
 still at Bordeaux no longer permitted the em- 
 ployment of such means. He then said that, 
 since the object of the journey was to see Na- 
 poleon, in order to solicit the acknowledgment 
 of the new royalty, it was necessary to put 
 trifling considerations aside, and to proceed 
 towards the object which they wished to attain ; 
 that, after all, those who came to meet Napoleon 
 Lad need of him, whilst he had no need of them ; 
 and therefore it was natural that they should 
 take that road which other business, of great 
 importance, had hitherto prevented him from 
 pursuing; and that, finally, it was necessary 
 to cease rebelling, like children, against the 
 consequences of a step which had been taken 
 from motives of peculiar interest. The general, 
 with whom a sort of military vivacity often 
 baffled prudence, when he saw that he was not 
 listened to, suddenly changed his bearing ; 
 from being fawning and wily he became arro- 
 gant and harsh, and mounting his horse, said 
 that they might do as they pleased, but for his 
 own part he would return to Bayonne to join 
 the Emperor, and that they might probably have 
 to repent of their change of determination. 
 He left them frightened, but for the moment 
 obstinate in their resistance. 
 
 General Savary immediately set out for Ba- 
 yonne, where he arrived on the 14th of April, a 
 few hours before the Emperor, who did not 
 reach that city till the evening of the same day. 
 The latter had remained some days at Bordeaux, 
 in order to give the Spanish princes time to 
 approach the frontiers and to be relieved from 
 the necessity of going to meet them, which he 
 would have been obliged to do had he been at 
 Bayonne. He occupied his leisure in Bordeaux, 
 as he usually did, in informing himself of every 
 thing connected with the interests of the coun- 
 try, in ascertaining the nature and extent of 
 the commerce of that large city, and the means 
 of keeping up the relations of France with its 
 colonies'. Having seen with his own eyes how 
 greatly the city of Bordeaux was suffering from 
 the war, he had given orders for ft loan of seve- 
 ral millions from the extraordinary treasury, 
 and for a considerable purchase of wines on 
 account of the civil list. Having arrived at 
 Bayonne on the 14th, he heard with great satis- 
 faction all that had taken place at Madrid for 
 the promotion of his designs, and adopted suit- 
 able measures to insure their definitive excep- 
 tion. 
 
 After having concerted these measures with 
 General Savary, he agreed to send him back to 
 Vittoria as the bearer of an answer to a letter 
 which Ferdinand had already addressed to him. 
 This answer was couched in terms calculated 
 to draw this prince to Bayonne, without enter- 
 ing into any formal agreement with him. la it 
 Napoleon said that the papers of Charles IV. 
 ought to have convinced him of his imperial 
 good-will, (in allusion to the advice of indul- 
 gence given to Charles IV. at the time of the 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 483 
 
 process at the Escurial ;) that, consequently, 
 there could be no doubt concerning his personal 
 dispositions ; that, while directing his troops 
 to such points of the coasts of Europe as were 
 best calculated to second his operations against 
 England, he had conceived the design of going 
 to Madrid, in order to urge his august friend, 
 Charles IV., in passing, to adopt some indis- 
 pensable reforms, and especially to dismiss the 
 Prince of the Peace ; that he had often advised 
 this dismissal, and, if he had not insisted upon 
 it more, it was merely out of forbearance to- 
 wards his august weaknesses weaknesses 
 which must be pardoned for kings, like other 
 men, were only weakness and error ; that he had 
 been surprised in the very midst of these pro- 
 jects by the events of Aranjuez ; that he had 
 no idea of constituting himself the judge of 
 them, but that his armies, being actually on the 
 spot, he did not wish to appear in the eyes of 
 Europe to be either the promoter or accomplice 
 of a revolution which had overturned the throne 
 of an ally and a friend ; that he made no pre- 
 tensions to a right to intermeddle in the inter- 
 nal affairs of Spain, but that, if it could be 
 shown that the abdication of Charles IV. had 
 been voluntary, he should have no difficulty in 
 recognising him the Prince of the Asturias 
 as lawful sovereign of Spain ; that, for this 
 purpose, a conversation of some hours appeared 
 desirable, and that notwithstanding the reserve 
 maintained for a month past on the part of 
 France, there was no reason to apprehend in 
 the Emperor of the French a judge prejudiced 
 against him. This was followed by some ad- 
 vice, couched in the loftiest language, on the 
 subject of the prosecution designed against the 
 Prince of the Peace ; on the inconvenience that 
 would result from dishonouring not only the 
 prince, but the king and the queen, from initiat- 
 ing a jealous and ill-disposed multitude into 
 the secrets of state affairs, and from teaching 
 them the habit of laying hands upon those who 
 had long governed it ; for, added Napoleon, the 
 people are glad to avenge the homage which they 
 render us. Finally, he showed himself still dis- 
 posed to the idea of a marriage, if the expla- 
 nations which were to be given at Bayonne 
 should prove such as to satisfy him. 
 
 This letter, which was a clever mixture of 
 indulgence, haughtiness, and reason, would 
 have been an admirable piece of eloquence, had 
 it not been the means of concealing a treache- 
 rous delusion. General Savary was to bear 
 this letter to Vittoria, to give in person the 
 necessary developments of its contents ; or, if 
 necessary, to add some of his cunning words, 
 of which he was prodigal, and .which should 
 decide Ferdinand VII. without binding the Em- 
 peror. It was, however, necessary to make 
 provision for the case of Ferdinand VII. and 
 his advisers resisting all these artifices. Should 
 this case arise, Napoleon had no idea of stop- 
 ping half-way. He decided, therefore, that 
 force was to be employed. In addition to the 
 corps of observation of the Western Pyrenees, 
 he had ordered the reserve of provisional in- 
 fantry, under General Verdier, to pass into 
 Spain, as well as a corps of provisional cavalry 
 under General Lasalle, and numerous detach- 
 ments of the mounted imperial guards. These 
 troops, having formed a junction under Marshal 
 Bessieres, were to occupy Old Castillo, and tu
 
 484 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 protect the rear of the army. He sent orders 
 to Murat, as well as to Marshal Bessieres, not 
 to hesitate, and upon the mere authority of 
 General Savary to cause the Prince of the As- 
 turias to be arrested giving publicity at the 
 same moment to the protest of Charles IV. 
 declaring that the latter alone was king, and 
 the son nothing but a usurper, who had set on 
 foot the revolutions of Aranjuez in order to seize 
 upon the crown. If Ferdinand VII., however, 
 agreed to cross the frontier and come to Ba- 
 yonne, Napoleon entirely agreed to the opinion 
 of Murat, that the sceptre should not be re- 
 stored to Charles IV., from whom it must soon 
 be again taken away, and that the aged sove- 
 reigns should be sent towards Bayonne, since 
 they had themselves expressed that desire. He 
 continued to recommend to him, as soon as Fer- 
 dinand VII. had crossed the frontier, to insist 
 upon the Prince of the Peace being delivered 
 up to him, willingly or by force, and to send 
 him to Bayonne. Such were the arrangements 
 which were to complete, in case of necessity, 
 by force, if cunning failed, this dark scheme 
 laid against the crown of Spain. ' 
 
 After having given these orders, and sent 
 General Savary back to Vittoria, Napoleon oc- 
 cupied himself with forming an establishment 
 at Bayonne, wh ; ch might admit of his sojourn- 
 ing there for some months. Independently of 
 the Empress Josephine, he expected to receive 
 there a great number of princes and princesses, 
 and for this reason he resolved to keep at his 
 disposal the apartments which he occupied in 
 the interior of the town. This country is one 
 of the most attractive in Europe to it, how- 
 ever, Napoleon has unfortunately attached re- 
 collections much less pleasing than those with 
 which he filled Egypt, Italy, Germany, and Po- 
 land. In this country, composed of beautiful 
 hills, watered by the Adour, crowned by the 
 Pyrenees, and bounded on the horizon by the 
 sea, there was, about a league from Bayonne, 
 a small chateau of regular architecture, and of 
 uncertain origin, constructed, as it is said, for 
 one of those princesses whom France and Spain 
 formerly mutually gave in marriage. This cha- 
 teau stands in the midst of a beautiful garden, 
 in a most charming position, and under a sun 
 as brilliant as that of Italy. Napoleon was 
 anxious to get immediate possession of the 
 place. In order to satisfy the desire, it was 
 happily unnecessary to have recourse either to 
 those artifices or that violence which were 
 needed against the crown of Spain. Its owner 
 was delighted to sell it him for 100.000 francs. 
 It was decorated in haste with such resources 
 as the country offered. The garden was con- 
 verted into a camp for the troops of the impe- 
 rial guard. Napoleon established himself there 
 on the 17th, and left the apartments he occu- 
 pied in Bayonne free, in order to accommodate 
 in them the royal family of Spain, all the mem- 
 bers of which he hoped soon to bring together 
 there. 
 
 General Savary having set out in all haste 
 for Vittoria, found Ferdinand there, surrounded 
 not only by the advisers who had followed him, 
 but by many other important individuals, who 
 had hastened thither to offer him their services 
 and their homage. Among the latter, there 
 
 The account here given is according to the minutes 
 of the orders still existing in the Louvre. 
 
 was a person of great consideration ; this was 
 Urquijo, formerly prime minister, brutally dis- 
 graced in 1802, when the influence of the Prince 
 of the Peace had finally become supreme, and 
 who then retired into Biscay, his native coun- 
 try. Urquijo, who was a man of firm, pene- 
 trating, but morose mind, spoke to Ferdinand, 
 in the presence of his other advisers, like a wise 
 and experienced statesman. He told him and 
 them that nothing could be more imprudent than 
 the prince's journey, if they proceeded beyond 
 the frontiers ; that, as far as respect was con- 
 cerned, every thing had been done which the 
 greatest and most illustrious sovereign could 
 desire, by coming to receive him at the verge 
 of the kingdom ; that to go beyond, was to 
 prove wanting in the dignity due to the Span- 
 ish crown, and to commit an act of remarkable 
 folly ; that any one who had read with a ten- 
 tion the account of the revolution of Aranjuez, 
 inserted in the official journal, (Afoniteur,) must 
 have seen the lurking intention to discredit the 
 new king, to dispute his title, to inspire a feel- 
 ing of sympathy for the deposed sovereign 
 all which disclosed the purpose of Napoleon to 
 be, to treat the one as a usurper and the other as 
 incapable of reigning ; that any one who had for 
 some time observed the policy of Napoleon with 
 respect to Spain must have discovered the plan 
 of getting rid of the house of Bourbon, and of 
 making the Peninsula a part of the system of 
 the French empire ; that the indifference affected 
 towards the proclamation of the Prince of the 
 Peace, accompanied by the care taken to dis- 
 perse the Spanish fleets and armies, by bring- 
 ing the one into the ports of France, and send- 
 ing the other to the North, revealed even to 
 obviousness the project of taking vengeance on 
 the first opportunity, and that the reunion of 
 so many troops in the South at the conclusion 
 of affairs in the North could no longer leave a 
 doubt on such a subject. 
 
 MM. de Musquiz and De Labrador, who at 
 the different courts of Europe had learned to 
 form some just ideas of general politics, gave 
 unequivocal marks of assent to these wise ob- 
 servations ; but no attention was paid to their 
 advice. The advisers who were in favour were 
 the mediocre and versatile Cevallos, who con- 
 cealed his duplicity under impetuosity, and had 
 never pardoned Urquijo for the wrongs which 
 he had formerly done to this eminent man, for 
 he had been the subordinate instrument of his 
 disgrace, and was, therefore, but little disposed 
 to receive his ideas, and the two particular con- 
 fidants of the prince, the Duke de 1'Infantado 
 and the canon EscoTquiz ; both of them delighted 
 to dream of a happy reign under their own be- 
 nignant sway, and rejecting every thing calcu- 
 lated to disturb this dream of their vanity. 
 Nirae of the parties were willing to admit that 
 they had commenced and actively urged forward 
 the most fatal of imprudent steps. They found 
 it very difficult to believe that they could be at 
 the beginning of a long series of misfortunes, 
 instead of being at the commencement of a long 
 course of prosperity. On these grounds they 
 rejected the sinister prophecies of M. de Ur- 
 quijo, as the views of a gloomy mind, embittered 
 by the disgrace inflicted upon him. " What!" 
 said the Duke de 1'Infantado, with the strongest 
 assurance, " what ! is it likely that a hero, sur- 
 rounded by such a halo of glory, would conde-
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 485 
 
 scend to such base treachery?" "You do not 
 know heroes," replied Urquijo, with bitterness 
 and disdain; "you have not read Plutarch! 
 Read him, and you will learn that the greatest 
 of all have built their reputation on heaps of 
 dead bodies. The founders of dynasties espe- 
 cially have been those who have most frequently 
 built up their work in treachery, violence, and 
 robbery ! What did not our Charles V. do in 
 Germany, Italy, and even in Spain ? and I do 
 not go back to the worst of your princes ! Pos- 
 terity takes no account of any thing but the re- 
 sults. If the authors of so many guilty deeds 
 founded great empires, and rendered nations 
 powerful and fortunate, it attributes no blame 
 to princes for having robbed, or for the armies 
 which they sacrificed." The Duke de 1'Infan- 
 tado and the canon Escoi'quiz, having continued 
 to insist upon the reprobation to which Napo- 
 leon would expose himself by usurping the 
 crown, and on the commotions which he would 
 excite both in Spain and in Europe, and the 
 perpetual war which he would draw upon him- 
 self, Urquijo replied, that Europe had known 
 nothing else but to be beaten by the French ; 
 that coalitions, badly managed and thwarted 
 by intestine divisions, had no chance of success ; 
 that only a single power, Austria, was still in 
 a condition to fight a battle ; but that, even with 
 the support of England, it would be crushed, 
 and be obliged to pay for its resistance by new 
 losses of territory ; that Spain might be able 
 to carry on a war of partisans, but that in 
 reality its character would be confined to serv- 
 ing as a scene of action for the English and 
 French ; that it would be horribly ravaged, and 
 that its colonies would avail themselves of the 
 opportunity to shake off the yoke of the mother- 
 country ; that if Napoleon knew how to curb 
 his views of aggrandizement, and to give good 
 institutions to the countries which submitted to 
 his system, he would give a permanent founda- 
 tion to himself and his dynasty ; that the people 
 of the Peninsula, bound to those of France by 
 interests of all kinds, whenever they came to 
 see that they were fighting for the cause of a 
 family much more than for that of the nation, 
 would end by attaching themselves to a govern- 
 ment which promoted civilization ; that, after 
 all, the dynasties which had regenerated Spain 
 had always come from without ; that Napoleon 
 only needed to join a little prudence to his ge- 
 nius to make the Bourbons utterly lose their 
 cause ; that in every case Spain would be inun- 
 dated with a deluge of evils, and certainly lose 
 its colonies ; that they should, therefore, avoid 
 running into Napoleon's nets, and retrace their 
 steps as soon as possible ; that, if this could not 
 be done, the king should be. concealed, and 
 under a disguise conducted back to Madrid or 
 into the south of Spain, and that there, placed 
 at the head of the nation, he would have a bet- 
 ter chance of treating with Napoleon on accept- 
 able conditions. 
 
 It is very rare that a statesman entertains as 
 clear a view of the future as Urquijo displayed 
 on this occasion. His only answer, however, 
 was the disdainful smile of blind ignorance, and 
 in his vexation he set out immediately without 
 any desire to accompany the king, to whom he 
 was asked to continue to give his counsels, 
 whilst they absolutely refused to follow them. 
 "If," said he, "you wish me to go alone to 
 
 Bayonne, to discuss, negotiate, and make head 
 against the common enemy, whilst you withdraw 
 into the depths of the Peninsula, be it so : but 
 otherwise I have no desire, by accompanying 
 you, to tarnish my reputation, the only thing that 
 remains to me under my disfavour, and in the 
 midst of the misfortunes of our common country." 
 
 Urquijo not having been listened to, imme- 
 diately withdrew, and left the advisers of Fer- 
 dinand to themselves ; they continued madly 
 intent on their plans, but nevertheless somewhat 
 troubled at the sinister predictions of a man 
 of such penetrating views and firmness of mind. 
 On General Savary's arrival with Napoleon's 
 letter, they resumed their confidence in their 
 own judgment and in destiny. This letter, in 
 which they ought to have seen in every line a 
 concealed and menacing intention, for the 
 strange pretension of becoming judge in a dis- 
 pute between father and son ought to have re- 
 vealed to them the wish to condemn one of the 
 two, and obviously that one of the two the more 
 capable of reigning, so far from opening their 
 eyes, only made them close them the more. 
 The only passage that attracted their attention 
 was that in which Napoleon said that he needed 
 to be informed concerning the events of Aran- 
 juez, and that he hoped, after a conversation 
 with Ferdinand VII., to be in a condition to 
 have no difficulty in acknowledging him as king 
 of Spain. This vague promise filled them again 
 with all their illusions. In it they saw the 
 certainty of hearing this recognition the next 
 morning after their arrival in Bayonne, and 
 they had the simplicity to ask General Savary 
 if this was not the way in which Napoleon's 
 letter must be interpreted ; to which the gene- 
 ral replied, that they were no doubt right in 
 so interpreting it, and that it could not well 
 mean any thing else. Being thus reassured, 
 they resolved to set out from Vittoria on th 
 morning of the 19th, in order to sleep that nighi 
 at Irun. A courier was sent before them to 
 announce their arrival at Bayonne. It ought 
 to be added, also, that the troops under Gene- 
 ral Verdier had so completely surrounded them 
 at Vittoria, that they would not have had it in 
 their power to choose, had they wished to act 
 otherwise. They did not even notice this con- 
 straint, so blind were they to their danger. 
 
 But the people of the surrounding provinces, 
 who had been together to see Ferdinand, did 
 not reason on his situation like his advisers. 
 Urquijo had repeated everywhere and to every 
 one the advice which he had given at the court 
 of Ferdinand. His words had found an echo, 
 and multitudes of faithful subjects had assem- 
 bled to oppose the departure of the young king. 
 On the morning of the 19th, the day fixed for 
 their departure, and when the royal carriages 
 were already in waiting, there arose a sudden 
 commotion among the people. A crowd of 
 armed peasants, who had lain for some days on 
 the ground, either before the gate or in the in- 
 terior of the royal dwelling, manifested an in- 
 tention of opposing his journey. One of them, 
 armed with a sickle, cut the traces and unyoked 
 the mules, which were led back to the stables. 
 A collision would then have taken place between 
 the French troops which formed Ferdinand's 
 escort and the people, had not the infantry for- 
 tunately been ordered to remain in their bar- 
 racks, with their guns loaded, and lighted 
 2s2
 
 486 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 matches ready to apply to the cannon. The 
 cavalry of the guard alone were in the square 
 where the carriages were, but at a certain dis- 
 tance from the crowd, with drawn swords, and 
 in a position of threatening firmness. Ferdi- 
 nand's advisers, fearing that a collision would 
 injure their cause, sent the Duke de Tlnfantado 
 into the street to speak to the people. The 
 duke, who was greatly respected, rushed into 
 the midst of the crowd, succeeded in calming 
 the people by appealing to the respect due to 
 the royal wishes, and assured them that by 
 going to Bayonne they were certain of returning 
 in a few days, with the recognition of Ferdinand 
 as king, and a renewal of the French alliance. 
 The people were appeased rather from respect 
 than from conviction. The mules were put to 
 afresh, without any opposition, and Ferdinand 
 VII., getting into the carriage, saluted the 
 people, who received him with acclamations 
 mingled with cries of anger and pity. The 
 splendid squadrons of the imperial guards, 
 breaking into a gallop, immediately surrounded 
 the royal carriages, as if to render homage to 
 him whom they were carrying off as a prisoner. 
 Thus took his departure this foolish prince, de- 
 ceived by his own wishes still more than by the 
 ability of his adversary, deceived as if he had 
 been the most simple and most honourable of 
 the princes of his time, whilst he was in fact 
 one of the most hypocritical and least sincere. 
 The Spanish people saw him set out with vexa- 
 tion and contempt, saying, among themselves, 
 that, instead of their king, they would soon see 
 a stranger, supported by formidable armies. 
 
 Ferdinand slept at the small town of Irun, 
 with the view of crossing the frontiers the next 
 day. On the morning of the 28th he in fact 
 crossed the Bidassoa, and was very much sur- 
 prised to find no one to receive him except the 
 three Spanish grandees, returned from their 
 mission to Napoleon, and after having seen him, 
 bringing nothing but the gloomiest presenti- 
 ments. But it was now too late to return ; the 
 bridge of the Bidassoa was crossed, and there 
 was now nothing left but to plunge into the 
 , gulf which they had not had sense enough to 
 see till they were swallowed up. On approach- 
 ing Bayonne, the prince met Marshals Duroc 
 and Bessieres coming to compliment him, but 
 only conferring on him the title of Prince of the 
 Asturias. There was still nothing in this cal- 
 culated to make them very uneasy, for Napoleon 
 had adopted, as the theme of his policy, to take 
 no notice of any thing which had taken place 
 at Aranjuez till after he had received explana- 
 tions. They were therefore suffered to pass a 
 few hours longer without alarm. 
 
 When they reached Bayonne, Ferdinand 
 found there a few troops under arms, and a 
 small number of people, for no one had been 
 forewarned of his coming. He was conducted 
 to a residence very different from the magnifi- 
 cent palaces of the Kings of Spain, but it was 
 the only one in the town at their disposal for 
 the purpose. 
 
 He had scarcely alighted from the carriage, 
 when Napoleon, who had hastened on horseback 
 from the chateau de Marac, made him the first 
 visit. The Emperor of the French embraced 
 the Spanish prince with every semblance of the 
 greatest courtesy, always addressing him by 
 the title of Prince of the Asturias which, in 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 fact, was a part of the policy he had proposed 
 to himself and quitted him after a short inter- 
 view, for the purpose, as he said, of leaving 
 him to refresh himself, without having said 
 aught that could give rise to any interpretation 
 whatever. 
 
 In the course of an hour, the chamberlains 
 waited upon the prince, to invite him and his 
 suite to dine at the chateau de Marac. Ferdi- 
 nand repaired thither towards the close of day, 
 attended by his small retinue, and was received 
 in the same manner as before, that is to say, 
 with refined politeness, but with extreme re- 
 serve on every point relative to politics. After 
 dinner, the Emperor entered into general con- 
 ' versation with Ferdinand and his counsellors, 
 and speedily discovered, beneath the habitu- 
 ally immovable countenance and general re- 
 ! serve of the young king, a mediocrity of cha- 
 j racter by no means exempt from deceit ; in 
 the conversational powers of Escoiquiz, the 
 i king's preceptor, he discerned a cultivated 
 ! mind, which was, however, unskilled in poli- 
 tics; and beneath the gravity of the Duke de 
 1 1'Infantado, an honest man indeed, but one 
 i who thought more highly of himself than he 
 ! should ; ambition, without talent, constituting 
 the sum total of his merit. 
 
 Napoleon saw at a glance the kind of men 
 he had to deal with, and speedily dismissed 
 them all, under the pretext that they must be 
 fatigued with their journey; he, however, de- 
 tained the canon Escoiquiz, by expressing h;< 
 desire, which in fact was tantamount to a com- 
 mand, to have some conversation with him. 
 He deputed General Savary to tell the Prince 
 of the Asturias every thing which he was him- 
 self about to communicate to the preceptor, 
 with whom he preferred conversing himself, as 
 he considered him a man of more intelligence. 
 His secret was doubly oppressive to him, for 
 he had not only kept it long, but this secret 
 was itself a perfidy, a species of crime to 
 which his breast was a stranger. He felt con- 
 strained to reveal it to the least ignorant of 
 the counsellors of Ferdinand, to exonerate 
 himself, in some measure, by the frankness in 
 which he couched the expos6 of his designs, 
 and by the candid and simple avowal of mo- 
 tives of the highest policy for the line of con- 
 duct which he adopted. 
 
 He set out, therefore, by nattering the canon, 
 saying he knew that he was a man of learning, 
 and that he could therefore speak freely to 
 him. Without further preamble, and as if 
 compelled at once to unburden his heart, Na- 
 poleon declared that he had invited the princes 
 of Spain to come to France for the purpose of 
 taking from them all, father as well as son, 
 the crown of their ancestors : that he had for 
 some years been aware of the treachery of the 
 cour.t of Madrid ; that he had not taken any 
 notice of it, but that now, being quit of the 
 affairs of the North, he intended to regulate 
 those of the South ; that Spain was indispen- 
 sable to his designs against England, and that 
 he was indispensable to Spain in order to re- 
 store her grandeur ; that without him, she 
 would stagnate eternally under a weak and 
 degenerate dynasty ; that old Charles IV. was 
 an imbecile king ; that his son, though more 
 energetic, was quite below par, and less trust 
 worthy witness the revolution of Aranjuez,
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 487 
 
 the secret of which was known at Paris, with- [ 
 out any one's having been obliged to go to 
 Madrid in order to learn it ; that Spain, under j 
 such rulers, would never gain the moral, ad- 
 ministrative, and political regeneration which ' 
 was indispensable to enable her to regain her 
 rank among the nations ; that, as for him, Na- ; 
 poleon, he had never found aught among the 
 Bourbons save perfidy and hollow friendship ; , 
 that he was far too experienced to have any i 
 faith in the efficacy of marriages ; that a high- | 
 minded princess was a treasure not always at j 
 his disposal ; that, even supposing it were, he > 
 doubted whether she would be able to influ- | 
 ence this taciturn and vulgar prince, whose I 
 only talent, if indeed he had any, consisted in 
 the art of dissimulation ; that he, Napoleon, 
 everywhere conqueror and founder of a dy- 
 nasty, was obliged to trample under foot a | 
 multitude of secondary considerations, in order j 
 to reach his goal, which was placed at an im- 
 mense height ; that he had no taste whatever j 
 Cor evil, but it in fact cost him an effort to do 
 wrong, but that, wherever his chariot passed, 
 all must get out of the way, or be crushed by 
 the wheels ; that, in fine, his mind was made 
 up ; he intended to take the crown of Spain 
 from Ferdinand VII., but he would soften the 
 blow by offering him an indemnity ; that he 
 had, in fiict, already selected one for him, well 
 calculated to promote his repose ; it was no 
 other than the beautiful and peaceful Etruria 
 where this prince might go and reign, secure 
 from the revolutions of Europe, where he would 
 be far happier than in the midst of his Span- 
 iards who were possessed by the revolution- 
 ary spirit of the times, and could only be sub- 
 dued, settled, and made prosperous, by a 
 powerful and energetic prince. 
 
 While making this audacious declaration, 
 Napoleon was sometimes caressing, sometimes 
 imperious, and reached the very acme of the 
 cynicism of ambition. The poor canon was 
 quite confounded. The honour of being flat- 
 tered he, an humble canon of Toledo by one 
 of the greatest men of the age, struggled with 
 the indignation that filled his breast at hear- 
 ing such declarations. He was thunderstruck 
 and stupified, but his talent for discussion did 
 not forsake him, and he immediately employed 
 it with Napoleon, who resolved that he would 
 indemnify him for his pains by giving him a 
 hearing. 
 
 The unfortunate preceptor commenced by 
 justifying the Bourbon family to the head of 
 the house of Bonaparte. He reminded him 
 that, up to the moment of the greatest horrors 
 of the French revolution, Spain had not de- 
 clared war till after the death of Louis XVI. ; 
 that she had herself seized the first opportu- 
 nity of returning to a system of peace, and 
 from the system of peace to that of alliance 
 between the two States ; that, since that time, 
 she had lavished on France her fleets, her 
 armies, her treasures; that, if she had not 
 rendered better service, it was owing, not to 
 want of good-will, but to want of knowledge ; 
 that the Prince of the Peace alone was to 
 blame, for that he was the sole author of all 
 the ills of Spain and the cause of her weakness 
 as an ally ; that, however, this detestable fa- 
 vourite was for ever banished from the throne ; 
 that, under a young prince, attached to Na- 
 
 poleon, bound to him by the ties of gratitude 
 and by relationship, and directed by his coun- 
 sels, Spain would be speedily regenerated, and 
 regain that rank which she ought ever to have 
 maintained among the nations, and would, 
 without the cost of any effort or sacrifice, 
 render France every service that could be ex- 
 pected from her ; that, in the contrary case, 
 Spain would make a desperate resistance, she 
 would be seconded by England, and perhaps 
 by a part of Europe ; the colonies would be 
 lost, a misfortune equally great to France and 
 to Spain, and an indelible stain would tarnish 
 the glory of a splendid reign. 
 
 " Bad policy this of yours, M. le Canon ! bad 
 policy !" replied Napoleon, with a gracious 
 but ironical smile. " With all your learning, 
 you will not fail to condemn me, if I suffer the 
 only occasion to escape me, which offers, by 
 the submission of the Continent and the dis- 
 tress of England, to complete the execution of 
 my plan. As for your Bourbons, they have 
 always served me against the grain, ready to 
 betray me at the first brush. A brother would 
 suit me better, whatever you may say. The 
 regeneration of Spain is out of the question by 
 princes of an old family, which, in spite of it- 
 self, is always supported by old abuses. My 
 resolve is fixed ; this revolution must be carried 
 through. Spain shall not lose a single village; 
 she shall retain all her possessions. I have 
 already adopted precautions that she shall pre- 
 serve her colonies. As for your prince, he 
 shall be indemnified, if he submits with a good 
 grace to the force of events. It is for you to 
 use your influence in prevailing upon him to 
 accept those indemnities which I have in re- 
 serve for him. You are sufficiently well in- 
 formed to Jcnow that, in doing this, I only 
 follow the laws of sound policy, which have their 
 exigencies and their unavoidable rigours." 
 
 In saying this and other things of a like im- 
 port, in words which betrayed regret rather 
 than remorse at the intended spoliation, Napo- 
 leon gradually became mild and friendly, and 
 sometimes even extremely familiar in his man- 
 ner to the poor preceptor, whose lofty figure 
 formed a strange contrast with his own. As- 
 tounded at this firm resolve, Escoi'quiz, with 
 tears in his eyes, enlarged on the virtues of 
 his young prince ; he endeavoured to exonerate 
 Ferdinand from the revolution of Aranjuez ; 
 tried to prove that Charles IV. had abdicated 
 voluntarily ; that the authority of Ferdinand 
 VII. was consequently quite legitimate, &c. &c. 
 To all this Napoleon replied, with a smile of 
 incredulity, that he knew the whole story, that 
 the revolution of Aranjuez was not quite such 
 a natural event as the canon tried to make him 
 believe ; that Ferdinand VII. had given way to 
 culpable impatience, that he had done wrong 
 in declaring a succession open which neverthe- 
 less he ought not to enjoy, and that, as a 
 punishment for having sought to reign too 
 soon, he should not reign at all. 
 
 The canon endeavoured to soften Napoleon 
 by dilating on the virtues of Ferdinand VII., 
 and to move him by portraying the position to 
 which his unhappy advisers would be reduced 
 in the sight of Spain, of Europe, and of pos- 
 terity ; that they would be eternally disho- 
 noured for having given credit to the word 
 of Napoleon, which had summoned them to
 
 488 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808 
 
 Eayonne, by leading them to expec* that he 
 intended to recognise the new king; that they 
 would be accused of folly, nay of treason, 
 whereas their only crime was, that they had 
 believed the word of a great man. 
 
 " You are honourable men, every one of 
 you," replied Napoleon, "and you especially, 
 M. le Canon, are an admirable preceptor, for 
 the laudable zeal with which you defend your 
 pupil. No, depend upon it, it will merely be 
 said that you have yielded to superior force ; 
 neither you nor Spain will be able to resist me. 
 Policy, policy, M. le Canon, must be the main- 
 spring of every action of such a man as I am. 
 Go to your prince, and induce him to become 
 King of Etruria, if he wishes to be king of any 
 place, for you may positively assure him that 
 he shall no longer be King of Spain !" 
 
 The unfortunate preceptor of Ferdinand VII. 
 withdrew in consternation ; he found his pupil 
 equally surprised and wretched, in consequence 
 of the interview which he had just had with 
 General Savary. The latter, without any pre- 
 liminary form, and without entering into any 
 of those developments which Napoleon had 
 contrived to introduce by way of excuses, had 
 signified to Ferdinand VII. that he must re- 
 nounce the crown of Spain, and accept Etruria 
 as an indemnity for the patrimony of Charles 
 V. and Philip V. 
 
 Great was the agitation which prevailed at 
 this little court, which had hitherto been com- 
 pletely blind to its fate. All rallied round the 
 prince, weeping and raving, and concluded by 
 believing what they wished, that their misfor- 
 tunes were not real; that the whole was a 
 stratagem of Napoleon's, for it was impossible 
 that he should touch a person so sacred as 
 Ferdinand VII., or a thing so inviolable as the 
 crown of Spain. Napoleon, they were sure, 
 only wanted gome immense concession of ter- 
 ritory, or some important colony, and there- 
 fore held out this terrible menace to the house 
 of Spain ; that, in a word, it was a threat, and 
 nothing more. They therefore flattered them- 
 selves that it was enough not to yield to this 
 intimidation, in order to triumph, and they 
 resolved to resist and to reject all the proposi- 
 tions of Napoleon. M. de Cevallos was com- 
 missioned to treat with M. de Champagny on 
 the basis of an absolute refusal. 
 
 On the following morning M. de Cevallos 
 repaired to the chateau de Marac, for the pur- 
 pose of having a conference with M. de Cham- 
 pagny. This man, whose low cunning did not 
 restrain his impetuous temper, spoke to M. de 
 Champagny with a vehemence which was not 
 the result of courage, for here crowns alone, 
 not individuals, were in jeopardy. He spoke 
 BO loud that Napoleon heard him, and, coming 
 in, exclaimed: "What! you talk of -fidelity to 
 the rights of Ferdinand VII. ! You, who ought 
 faithfully to have served his father, whose 
 minister you were ! You, who have abandoned 
 him for a usurping son, and have throughout 
 acted the part of a traitor!" 
 
 M. de Cevallos, to whom these words might 
 Lave been spoken with justice by any one who 
 had nothing wherewith to reproach himself, 
 immediately retired to his new master, to relate 
 to him all that had passed. It was at once 
 considered, by the advisers of Ferdinand, that 
 
 authority nor tact to defend the rights of hia 
 sovereign ; and the mission was, therefore, 
 confided to M. de Labrador, who, in various 
 embassies in which he had been engaged, had 
 learned the art of negotiating great political 
 questions with the requisite reserve. The 
 basis of the negotiation remained unaltered, 
 namely, the inalienable right of Ferdinand VII. 
 to the crown of Spain, or, in default of his, that 
 of Charles IV., the only legitimate king, if 
 Ferdinand VII. were not so. 
 
 Napoleon was rather chagrined at this re- 
 sistance, but he hoped that it would soon give 
 way to necessity, and especially before Charles 
 IV. should come and make good his claims, 
 which were far better founded than those of 
 Ferdinand VII. ; for, although the idea of pro- 
 testing against this abdication had been sug- 
 gested to him by Murat, it was not less true 
 that his abdication had been the result of moral 
 violence exercised over his feeble character, 
 and that he was fully justified in reclaiming 
 his crown. Hence, in taking away the crown 
 from Ferdinand VII., it would have been but 
 an act of justice to have restored it to Charles 
 IV. Napoleon, regarding the presence of 
 Charles IV. as indispensable to oppose to the 
 pretensions of the son the rights of the father, 
 which, while it did not create the rights of 
 Bonaparte, nevertheless threw all these rights 
 into a state of confusion, by which he hoped to 
 profit, urgently pressed Murat to induce the 
 aged sovereigns to quit, and also to send him 
 the Prince of the Peace, who was still a pri- 
 soner at Villa Viciosa. Napoleon enjoined 
 Murat to employ force if needful, not for the 
 departure of the old court which had ear- 
 nestly desired to set out, and which nobody 
 sought to detain but to effect the deliverance 
 of the Prince of the Peace, whom the Spaniards 
 were unwilling to release at any price. He 
 also recommended that, in order to prepare the 
 mind of the public, the junta of the govern- 
 ment and the council of Castille should be 
 made acquainted with the protest of Charles 
 IV., which reduced the royalty of Ferdinand 
 VII. to nothing, without re-establishing that 
 of Charles, and thus commenced a convenient 
 sort of interregnum for the accomplishment of 
 his projected usurpation. He endeavoured to 
 make Murat comprehend that he must not wait 
 for a majority of opinions in effecting a change 
 which was not consonant to the minds of the 
 Spaniards, but constrain them by fear, and 
 afterwards gain over men of judgment, by 
 demonstrating the good which a French royalty 
 would effect, by assuring them that a change 
 of dynasty would not cost Spain one colony or 
 even a single village, an advantage which 
 would result from no other arrangement ; and 
 if this should fail to secure their assent, to 
 have recourse to a display of military force. 
 
 Napoleon desired Murat to be well on his 
 guard, to fortify two or three points in Madrid, 
 such as the royal palaces, the Admiralty, the 
 Buen Retiro ; not to permit a single officer to 
 sleep in the city, to insist that they should all 
 be lodged with their soldiers ; in a word, so to 
 conduct himself as if he were on the eve of an 
 insurrection which he considered inevitable ; 
 for the Spaniards would probably try the 
 mettle of the French; that, in this case, he 
 
 uuch a negotiator possessed neither sufficient must meet them with energy, BO as to deprive
 
 April., 1803.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 489 
 
 them of every hope of effectual resistance ; 
 that he must not forget how he carried on war 
 in the streets of Egypt, in Italy, and elsewhere ; 
 that he must not upon any account come to an 
 engagement within the city, but occupy the 
 heads of the principal streets with strong bat- 
 teries, make the power of his guns felt, and 
 wherever the crowd should be bold enough, to 
 show itself, openly annihilate it by the swords 
 of the cuirassiers. Thus was Napoleon led from 
 artifice to violence by this usurpation of the 
 crown of Spain. 
 
 On a single point only Murat had outstripped 
 the instructions of Napoleon : this was relative 
 to the departure of the aged sovereigns and the 
 deliverance of the Prince of the Peace. He 
 informed Charles IV. and his queen, in reply 
 to the expression of their desires, that it would 
 give the Emperor pleasure to have them near 
 him, and that, consequently, they had nothing 
 to do but to prepare for their departure, and 
 that he was about to demand the release of the 
 Prince of the Peace, in order that he might 
 travel with them as far as Bayonne : intelli- 
 gence doubly welcome, which shed a gleam of 
 joy into hearts that had been sad since the 
 fatal days of Aranjuez. 
 
 As soon as he had learnt that Ferdinand VII. 
 had actually crossed the frontier, Murat felt at 
 liberty to throw off the mask, especially as the 
 Spaniards, who were irritated at the weakness 
 of their princes, and humbled at being under 
 their sway, seemed ready for a moment to 
 throw off their allegiance to a family so un- 
 worthy of the loyalty of the nation. For a few 
 days, therefore, all went on smoothly ; but, as 
 Boon as he began to speak of the deliverance 
 of the Prince of the Peace, there was a sort 
 of commotion among them. The multitude, 
 greedy of revenge, were in despair at seeing 
 their victim escape them. The higher classes, 
 and among them were the men who were com- 
 promised in the revolution of Aranjuez, feared 
 that, in the midst of all these political changes, 
 the Prince of the Peace might some day regain 
 power, and revenge himself upon them for the 
 past. These diverse motives made them politely 
 refuse to set him at liberty. The junta of the 
 government, composed of the ministers and the 
 Infant Don Antonio, were, more than any 
 others, filled with these sad apprehensions. 
 They had from the very first offered a firm re- 
 sistance to the demands of Murat, and pre- 
 tended that, -having no authority to decide a 
 question of such importance, they must refer 
 it to Ferdinand VII. In fact, they addressed 
 themselves to him, and demanded his orders. 
 Ferdinand, greatly embarrassed how he should 
 reply to this message, declared that this ques- 
 tion should be treated and resolved upon at 
 Bayonne, together with those various points 
 which were about to occupy the two sovereigns 
 of France and of Spain. 
 
 The reply of Ferdinand having been in- 
 stantly transmitted to Murat, he considered the 
 question settled by the orders of Napoleon, and 
 demanded that the Prince of the Peace should 
 be instantly released from prison, in order that 
 he might send him to Bayonne. He however 
 stated that Emmanuel Godoy should be for ever 
 exiled from Spain, and would be transported to 
 France, where his life would be the only boon 
 granted to him. Murat, after having addressed 
 
 VOL. II. 62 
 
 this communication to the junta, directed a 
 body of cavalry upon Villa Viciosa, with orders 
 to carry off the prisoner either with consent or 
 by force. The Marquis de Chasteler, under 
 whose custody he was placed, deeming it an 
 honour to serve the national hatred, refused to 
 give him up ; when the junta, in order to pre- 
 vent a collision, sent him word straightway to 
 deliver up the prisoner. 
 
 The unfortunate ruler of Spain, who had till 
 lately been surrounded by all the superfluities 
 of luxury, surpassing royalty itself in sump- 
 tuousness as he had also surpassed it in power, 
 arrived at the camp of Murat almost without 
 clothes, his beard unshaven, and his body co- 
 vered with wounds which were scarcely healed, 
 and marked with the chains which had galled 
 him. In this deplorable state he for the first 
 time met the friend whom he had chosen in the 
 bosom of the imperial court, in the prospect 
 of far other fortune than what he realized this 
 day. Murat, whose generosity never failed 
 him, loaded Emmanuel Godoy with kindness, 
 supplied him with every thing he needed, and 
 sent him on to Bayonne under the escort of one 
 of his aides-de-camp and a body of cavalry. 
 
 Having executed this part of Napoleon's 
 orders, Murat turned his attention to the de- 
 parture of the old sovereigns, who, in the midst 
 of their misfortunes, were filled with joy that 
 their friend was saved, and that they should 
 soon be in the presence of the all-powerful Em- 
 peror, who would avenge them of their enemies. 
 The preparations for their journey being com- 
 pleted preparations which principally con- 
 sisted in obtaining possession of the most valu- 
 able of the crown jewels they desired Murat 
 to arrange their departure. They went, ac- 
 cordingly, on the 23d, from the Escurial to the 
 Pardo, and there passed the night in the midst 
 of the French troops, where they saw and em- 
 braced Murat with the greatest enthusiasm and 
 joy. They set out from thence for Buitrago, 
 taking the high road to Bayonne, and travelled 
 with that leisure which their age and infirmi- 
 ties demanded. On their route they met with 
 some marks of respect, but none of sympathy. 
 The presence of the old queen, who for twenty 
 years had been an object of hatred and con- 
 tempt to the nation, was enough to stifle every 
 display of affection. 
 
 Murat was now almost sole master of Spain, 
 and might have fancied himself a king. He 
 proceeded, by order of Napoleon, to communi- 
 cate to the junta the protest of Charles IV., 
 drawn up in a great measure under his own 
 dictation, and to demand by the proclamation 
 of that document the suppression .of the name 
 of Ferdinand VII. in the acts of the govern- 
 ment. The junta, greatly embarrassed, wished 
 to make the council of Castille share the re- 
 sponsibility by consulting it. The council, how- 
 ever, returned the document, and refused to 
 give an opinion. Murat then settled the ques- 
 tion by a word, and it was agreed that the acts 
 of the government should be published in the 
 name of the king, without specifying what king. 
 Thus the throne of Spain had suddenly become 
 vacant, and the Spaniards, with profound grief, 
 began to take cognisance of their true position. 
 Sometimes indignant at the folly and weaknesa 
 of their princes, who suffered themselves to be 
 deceived and plunged into an abyss from which
 
 490 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 they could not possibly extricate themselves, 
 and then, overwhelmed with pity for their fate, 
 they turned their fury against those foreigners 
 who had insinuated themselves into their terri- 
 tory by stratagem and violence. Those of en- 
 lightened minds, now clearly seeing why the 
 French had invaded Spain, fluctuated between 
 their hatred to the foreigners and their desire 
 to see Spain reorganized as France had been by 
 the hand of Napoleon. 
 
 Attracted, in company with their wives, to 
 the fetes given by Murat, they were sometimes 
 entrapped and half seduced, but never entirely 
 conquered. The populace, on the contrary, 
 never gave in to this species of seduction under 
 any form. Sometimes the appearance of the 
 national guard and of our cavalry would call 
 forth their enthusiasm, and they even admired 
 Murat ; but our infantry, composed chiefly of 
 young men, scarcely trained, suffering from the 
 itch, and completing their military instruction 
 under their own eyes, did not inspire them with 
 any respect whatever, and they were even 
 buoyed up with the confident expectation that 
 they would be our victors. The lazy peasants 
 of the environs had rushed to Madrid with their 
 muskets and their cutlasses, and were in the 
 habit of defying us with their looks before com- 
 bating us with their arms. Some of them, ex- 
 cited by fanatical monks, committed the most 
 horrible assassinations. One of their number 
 killed two of our soldiers and wounded a third 
 with his sword, under the inspiration, as he 
 said, of the Blessed Virgin. The priest of 
 Caramanchel, a village at the very gates of 
 Madrid, assassinated one of our officers. Mu- 
 rat made a memorable example of the authors 
 of these crimes, but he could not thereby ap- 
 pease the hatred which now began to manifest 
 itself. The minds of men were excited to such 
 a pitch, that on one occasion a horse having 
 run away on the grand promenade of the Prado, 
 everybody took to flight under the idea that a 
 combat was about to commence between the 
 French and the Spaniards. 
 
 Murat always contrived to deceive himself 
 m regard to the disposition of the Spaniards, 
 but, stimulated by the reiterated advice of Na- 
 poleon, he adopted some precautionary mea- 
 sures. He lodged the guard and the cuiras- 
 siers within the city, but placed the rest of 
 the troops upon the heights which commanded 
 Madrid. To the three divisions of Marshal 
 Moncey he added the first division of General 
 Dupont, and thus occupied Madrid with the 
 guard, the whole of the cavalry, and four di- 
 visions of infantry. The second division of 
 General Dupont was stationed at the Escurial, 
 and the third at Segovia. The troops were 
 lodged under tents around the whole of Ma- 
 drid. Though there was some difficulty in fur- 
 nishing them with provisions, on account of the 
 insufficiency of conveyance, they had never- 
 theless an abundant supply. The remedies 
 which were applied to our young soldiers for 
 the disease under which they were suffering, 
 had almost restored them to health. They 
 were now exercised daily, and began to ac- 
 quire that strength which it would have been 
 desirable for them to have had from the time 
 they entered Spain. Murat had placed over 
 them officers selected from among the subal- 
 terns of the guards, and, in fact, took infinite 
 
 ! pains in the organization of an army which he 
 regarded as the support of his future crown. 
 The division under General Dupont especially 
 was extremely fine. Unhappily, however, this 
 should have been displayed, we repeat it, in 
 its maturity to the Spaniards, and not have 
 grown up under their eyes. 
 
 Murat, consecrating himself to a work in 
 which he delighted, sometimes even applauded 
 by the Spanish populace, who were dazzled by 
 his presence and by the splendid squadrons of 
 the imperial guard, master of the junta, which, 
 balanced between two absent monarchs, un- 
 certain which to obey, yielded to present au- 
 thority Murat thought himself already King 
 of Spain. His aides-de-camp, in their turn, 
 dreamt that they were grandees of the new 
 court, flattered him more and more ; while he, 
 re-echoing these flatteries to Paris, wrote to 
 Napoleon "I am master here in your name; 
 give the word, and Spain will do all you de- 
 sire ; she will give the crown to whichever of 
 the French princes you may be pleased to 
 designate." Napoleon merely replied to these 
 idle assurances by reiterating his order to 
 fortify the principal palace of Madrid, and to 
 keep the officers lodged with their troops ; 
 measures which Murat executed rather as an 
 act of obedience than from a conviction of 
 their utility. 
 
 The Prince of the Peace performed the jour- 
 ney to Bayonne with the utmost speed, so as 
 not to give the populace time to create a mob 
 on his road, and arrived at his destination long 
 before his old sovereigns. Napoleon was ex- 
 tremely impatient to see this former ruler of 
 the Spanish monarchy, and, above all, to make 
 use of him. After a few moments' conversa- 
 tion, he saw that the favourite was as inferior 
 in talent as he had been described ; remark- 
 able only for some physical advantages which 
 had endeared him to the Queen of Spain, and 
 a certain shrewdness, combined with much ex- 
 perience in state affairs, but calumniated by 
 those who had depicted him as a monster. 
 Napoleon, however, in pity for his misfortunes, 
 refrained from manifesting the disdain which 
 such a head of the empire inspired him with, 
 and he hastened to set his mind at ease re- 
 specting his future destiny, and that of his old 
 masters, which he promised to render secure, 
 peaceable, and opulent, and worthy of the 
 ancient possessors of Spain and the Indies. 
 
 To these promises Napoleon added another, 
 not less soothing, that of promptly and cruelly 
 avenging them on Ferdinand VII., by making 
 him descend from the throne ; and he called 
 upon the Prince of the Peace to second him in 
 these projects with the queen and Charles IV. 
 This he readily promised to do, and this pro- 
 mise it would be easy to keep, because both 
 the father and mother were so irritated against 
 their son, that they would rather have seen a 
 stranger, nay, an enemy, on the throne of 
 their ancestors than Ferdinand VII. 
 
 The arrival of Charles IV. and the queen 
 was announced for the 30th of April. It was 
 the policy of Napoleon that the old sovereigns 
 should be received with royal honours, and 
 every thing was arranged for their reception as 
 if they were still in the enjoyment of their 
 power, and as if the revolution of Aranjuez had 
 never taken place. He ordered the troops to
 
 April, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 491 
 
 be drawn up under arms, sent his court to 
 meet them, commanded the cannon of the forts 
 to be fired, the flags to be hoisted in the vessels 
 in the waters of the Adour, and prepared to 
 put the crowning honour upon his plans by his 
 own presence. At mid-day they made their 
 entry into Bayonne, amid the firing of guns 
 and the ringing of bells. They were received 
 at the gates of the city by the civil and military 
 authorities, were met on their road by the two 
 princes, Ferdinand VII. and the Infant Don 
 Carlos, who welcomed them with visible though 
 repressed indignation, alighted at the govern- 
 ment palace which was placed at their disposal, 
 and for an instant might perhaps have pleased 
 themselves with the fond delusion that they 
 were still in possession of the supreme power ; 
 but this was the last and vain shadow with 
 which Napoleon amused their old age before 
 he precipitated them all, father as well as 
 children, into that abyss into which he desired 
 to plunge all the Bourbons. 
 
 A moment afterwards, Napoleon himself 
 arrived, at full gallop, accompanied by his 
 lieutenants, in order to pay his all-potent 
 homage to the aged pair, the victims of his 
 ambitious calculation. He was scarcely in the 
 presence of Charles IV., whom he had never 
 before seen, when he opened his arms, and the 
 unfortunate descendant of Louis XIV. flung 
 himself into them, weeping, as he would have 
 done to a friend from whom he hoped to receive 
 consolation in his misfortune. 
 
 The queen exerted all the art of a woman of 
 the court to please, especially with the Empress 
 Josephine, who had arrived a few days before 
 at Bayonne, and had hastened to greet the 
 sovereigns of Spain. After a short interview, 
 Napoleon quitted Charles IV., surrounded by 
 the Spaniards who had assembled at Bayonne, 
 and by the French officers and chamberlains 
 who were appointed to constitute his suite of 
 honour. According to the desires of Napoleon, 
 who wished none of the usages of the court of 
 Spain to be neglected on this occasion, there 
 was a general kissing of hands. Each of the 
 Spaniards present approached, and, kneeling 
 down, kissed the hand of the aged king and 
 of the queen his consort. Ferdinand, taking 
 his rank as son and Prince of the Asturias, 
 went in his turn to kneel before his august pa- 
 rents, but their countenances plainly indicated 
 the sentiments which filled their breasts. 
 
 As soon as this ceremony was over, the king 
 nnd queen, who were much fatigued, rose to 
 retire. Ferdinand VII. and his brother being 
 about to follow them into their apartment, 
 Charles IV., unable any longer to contain him- 
 self, stopped his eldest son, exclaiming, " Un- 
 happy man ! hast thou not sufficiently disho- 
 noured my white hair ; at least have respect to 
 my repose ;" and thus the king refused to see 
 him except in public. Ferdinand VII., reduced 
 in a few hours by this single etiquette to the 
 quality of Prince of the Asturias, felt that he 
 was lost: he was punished, and Charles IV. 
 avenged. But Charles was soon obliged to re- 
 sign into the hands of Napoleon the price at 
 which that vengeance had been attained. 
 
 The aged sovereigns desired with the utmost 
 impatience to embrace their friend, their be- 
 loved Emmanuel, whom they had not seen since 
 the fatal night of the 17th of March. They 
 
 threw themselves into his arms, and Napoleon, 
 who wished to give them time to unbosom them- 
 selves and enjoy unrestrained intercourse, de- 
 ferred till the following day the reception which 
 he had prepared for them at Marac, and left 
 them at liberty the whole day to converse freely 
 of their situation and their future lot. 
 
 The Prince of the Peace promptly informed 
 them of the subject that was mooted at Ba- 
 yonne. This neither astonished nor afflicted 
 them, for they had no longer any pretensions 
 to reign, and they had the satisfaction of learn- 
 ing that Napoleon, in avenging them of Ferdi- 
 nand VII., designed to give them in France a 
 secure and magnificent retreat, revenues equal 
 to those of the wealthiest reigning princes of 
 Europe, and all this for the loss of a power of 
 which they had long foreseen the approaching 
 termination. It was therefore by no means 
 difficult to make them fall in with the projects 
 of Napoleon, to which they were in fact re- 
 signed, even while they were yet in ignorance 
 of the indemnification which he had in reserve 
 for them. 
 
 On the following day Napoleon invited them 
 to dine at the chateau de Marac, where he pro- 
 posed entertaining them daily with every mark 
 of distinction. Charles IV. and his consort 
 went thither in the imperial carriages, so dif- 
 ferent from the antique vehicles of the court 
 of Spain, which were built on the same model 
 as those of Louis XIV. Charles had the great- 
 est difficulty to get into and alight from the 
 carriage, and manifested in the minutest points 
 how utterly he was a stranger to the usages 
 and ideas of the present age. 
 
 When he had arrived at the chateau de Ma- 
 rac, Napoleon hastened to the coach-door to 
 receive him, and the aged monarch leaned on 
 his arm as he put his foot to the ground. " Sup- 
 port yourself upon me," said Napoleon; "I 
 have strength enough for us both." " I depend 
 most surely on it," replied the old king, and 
 testified his sincere gratitude to the Emperor, 
 happy at finding in France, repose, security, 
 and opulence for the remainder of his days. 
 
 Napoleon had forgotten to insert the name 
 of the Prince of the Peace in the list of the 
 persons invited. Charles IV., not seeing him, 
 cried out with a vivacity which embarrassed all 
 the attendants, "Where is Emmanuel?" The 
 Emperor desired that the Prince of the Peace 
 might be sought for, and this friend, without 
 whom he could no longer exist, was brought to 
 Charles IV. 
 
 While Napoleon thus strove to soften the lot 
 of this aged, dethroned, childish king, the Em- 
 press Josephine watched with her accustomed 
 grace over the Queen of Spain, and procured 
 her those fertile amusements which were within 
 her reach, by offering her all the newest and 
 most exquisite personal ornaments of Paris. 
 But the wife of Charles IV. was more difficult 
 to console than her husband, owing to her 
 understanding and her ambition. Neverthe- 
 less, she could fully reckon on two consolations 
 the safety of Emmanuel Godoy and the de- 
 thronement of Ferdinand. 
 
 Napoleon having loaded his august and un- 
 happy guests with favours, was impatient to 
 arrive at a conclusion, and set to work the 
 various instruments which he had at his dispo- 
 sal. By his desire, Charles IV. addressed a
 
 492 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [April, 1808. 
 
 letter to Ferdinand, reminding him of his cul- 
 pable conduct in the scenes at Aranjuez, his 
 imprudent ambition, his inability to reign over 
 a country which through his delinquency was 
 abandoned to revolutionary agitation, and re- 
 quiring him to resign the crown. This demand 
 clearly revealed to the councillors of the duped 
 Ferdinand how the negotiations were to be 
 carried on after the arrival of the old court. 
 It was evident that the crown was demanded 
 from the son in order that it might rest for a 
 certain number of days, or perhaps hours, on 
 the head of his father, and then pass from his 
 aged head to that of a prince of the Bonaparte 
 family. 
 
 The advisers of the young king replied to 
 this demand by a very clever letter, in which 
 Ferdinand VII., speaking to his father as a 
 submissive and respectful son, declared him- 
 self ready to restore the crown, although he 
 had received it in consequence of a voluntary 
 abdication, subject, however, to two conditions : 
 the first, that Charles IV. would reign himself; 
 the second, that the restoration should take 
 place publicly at Madrid, in presence of the 
 Spanish nation. Without these two conditions, 
 Ferdinand formally refused to restore the crown 
 to his father ; because, if the latter would not 
 reign, Ferdinand considered himself as the only 
 legitimate king, in accordance with the laws of 
 the Spanish monarchy ; and if the retrocession 
 took place elsewhere than at Madrid, in the 
 very bosom of the assembled nation, it would 
 be neither free, dignified, nor secure. 
 
 This reply was able and suitable. But 
 Charles IV. was desired to reply to it, to en- 
 large on the irregularity of the abdication, on 
 the violence by which it had been brought about, 
 on the incapability of Ferdinand to govern 
 Spain, just awoke out of a long sleep and ready 
 to plunge headlong into revolutions, and on the 
 necessity of confiding to Napoleon the charge 
 of securing the happiness of the people of the 
 Peninsula. The letter concluded by an indi- 
 cation of menacing measures if this obstinacy 
 were persevered in. To this reply the young 
 court opposed a counter-reply, similar to the 
 first reply of Ferdinand VII. 
 
 The negotiation did not make any progress, 
 for the interchange of this idle correspondence 
 had occupied from the 1st to the 4th of May. 
 Napoleon began to manifest the most lively im- 
 patience, and resolved to declare Ferdinand 
 VII. a rebel, and to restore the crown to Charles 
 IV., who should then transmit it to him, after 
 a delay more or less brief. By the intervention 
 of the Prince of the Peace, he, in the first place, 
 caused an act to be drawn up, by which Charles 
 IV. declared himself the sole legitimate king 
 of the Spanish dominions, but that, being him- 
 self incapable of exercising his authority, he 
 appointed the Grand-duke of Berg his lieute- 
 nant, confided to him his royal powers, and espe- 
 cially the command of the troops. Napoleon 
 regarded this transition as necessary in pass- 
 ing the royalty from the Bourbons to the Bona- 
 partes. He hurried the despatch of this decree 
 with the reiterated order given a few days be- 
 fore, that all the Spanish princes still remaining 
 In Madrid should quit it immediately; the 
 Youngest of the infants, Don Francisco de Pau- 
 la, Don Antonio, uncle of Ferdinand, and pre- 
 sident of the junta, and the Queen of Etruria, 
 
 who had been prevented by indisposition from 
 accompanying her parents. After having taken 
 these measures, he prepared to put an end to 
 the scenes of Bayonne by a solution which he 
 himself intended to propose, when the events 
 of Madrid facilitated the denouement which he 
 desired by enabling him to dispense with the 
 employment of force. 
 
 While Napoleon corresponded with Madrid, 
 Ferdinand VII., on his side, neglected nothing 
 to transmit thither intelligence which was cal- 
 culated to enlist the national interest in his 
 favour, and above all counteract the bad effect 
 which his indiscreet conduct had produced. 
 He was not ignorant that the Spaniards felt as 
 much pity, and almost as much dislike, to his 
 person as to that of his aged father, for having 
 fallen into the snare laid by Napoleon. He 
 therefore, by means of couriers, who set out 
 from Bayonne in disguise, and traversed the 
 mountains of Aragon to gain Madrid, spread 
 abroad such intelligence as he deemed most 
 likely to reinstate him in the public opinion. 
 He made known that they wished to treat him 
 with treachery and violence at Bayonne, in 
 order to wrench from him the sacrifice of his 
 rights, but that he resisted, and would resist 
 every menace, and that his people should hear 
 of his death rather than of his submission to 
 the wishes of the foreigner. He depicted him- 
 self as the most noble, the most interesting of 
 victims, so as to enlist every generous heart in 
 his favour. 
 
 These couriers, in order to avoid the direct 
 route, which was covered with French troops, 
 lost a day or two in reaching Madrid, but they 
 all arrived there safely, and the news which they 
 carried, and which was rapidly spread, regained 
 Ferdinand VII. the good feeling which had for 
 a moment been alienated. The universally cre- 
 dited report that Ferdinand VII. was the object 
 of brutal violence at Bayonne, and that he op- 
 posed it by heroic resistance, regained him the 
 favour of the populace of the capital, numeri- 
 cally strengthened, as we have already said, by 
 the idle peasants from the environs. 
 
 Unable to have recourse to the press, which 
 was closely watched by the agents of Murat, 
 manuscript bulletins were employed, and these 
 bulletins, reproduced in profusion, and circu- 
 lated with incredible rapidity, excited the pas- 
 sions of the people to the hightest pitch. 
 
 The junta of the government, profoundly dis- 
 sembling its secret sentiments, affected great 
 deference for the desires of Murat, but devoted, 
 as was natural, to Ferdinand VII., it was, in 
 fact, the agent of the communications with 
 Bayonne, and of the publications which resulted 
 from it. It despatched emissaries to Ferdinand, 
 to ascertain whether he wished it to withdraw 
 itself from the French, whether it should in 
 some place proclaim the legitimate sovereign, 
 provoke a rising of the nation, and declare 
 war against the usurper. While waiting for a 
 reply to these propositions, the junta, after in- 
 terminable delays, yielded to the demands of 
 Murat, which were calculated to serve the de- 
 signs of Napoleon. 
 
 Among these demands, one had caused much 
 perplexity in the junta ; it was that which re- 
 quired that all the members of the royal family 
 still in Madrid should be sent to Bayonne. On 
 the one hand, the old Queen of Spain desired
 
 May, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 493 
 
 that the young Infant Don Francisco, who had 
 been left behind in consequence of the state of 
 his health, should be sent to her ; on the other 
 hand, the Queen of Etruria, who had remained 
 at Madrid from a similar cause, was herself 
 urgent to go, terrified at the state of agitation 
 which was daily increasing among the Spa- 
 niards. Murat, who had been commissioned 
 by the Emperor to make all the members of 
 the royal family repair to Bayonne, imperiously 
 demanded this twofold departure. With re- 
 gard to the Queen of Etruria there could be no 
 difficulty whatever, because she was an inde- 
 pendent princess, and was anxious to depart ; 
 but with regard to the young Infant Don Fran- 
 cisco, who, on account of his age, was placed 
 under royal authority, he was actually depend- 
 ent on the junta of the government, which 
 exercised that authority in the absence of the 
 king. 
 
 The junta easily divined the motives of these 
 successive departures, and assembled, during 
 the night between the 30th of April and the 1st 
 of May, to deliberate on the demand of Murat. 
 The numbers were augmented by the adjunc- 
 tion of the divers presidents of the councils of 
 Castille and the Indies, and several members 
 of those councils. The sitting was extremely 
 agitated. Some of the members demanded that 
 a positive refusal should be given to a proposi- 
 tion, the evident object of which was to remove 
 the last representatives of the royal family; 
 and that, rather than yield, open resistance 
 should be resorted to. 
 
 The minister of war, M. O'Farrill, exposed 
 the state of the army, the corps of which were 
 disorganized and dispersed, some in the North, 
 some in Portugal, and some on the coasts, 
 which did not leave in Madrid at this present 
 moment a combined force of more than 3000 
 military. Men of more ardent temperaments 
 proposed that the populace should be supplied 
 with knives and fowling-pieces, and the nation 
 eeek its safety in one grand act of popular 
 desperation. The majority were of opinion that 
 Murat should be answered by a dissembled re- 
 fusal, and every thing avoided that might pro- 
 voke a collision. 
 
 Besides the junta, a party of patriots, dis- 
 contented at what they called its weakness, de- 
 sired that the departure of the infants should 
 be prevented by every possible means, and in- 
 fused their passions into the people; though 
 certainly there was not much necessity for ex- 
 citing them. 
 
 The 1st of May, which fell on a Sunday, at- , 
 tracted an immense concourse of country peo- i 
 pie into the city; and wild, energetic figures, 
 mingled amid the numerous groups which took 
 their stations in the different squares of Ma- 
 drid At the Puerto del Sol, a large square 
 situated in the centre of the city, from which 
 issue the principal streets, such as that of 
 Mayor, Alcala, Montera, and Las Carretas, a 
 dense and menacing crowd was assembled. 
 Murat sent thither a few hundred dragoons, 
 whose very appearance dispersed the multitude, 
 and compelled them to remain tranquil. 
 
 Murat, to whom the junta had communicated 
 its refusal in very mild terms, replied that he 
 should take no notice whatever of it, and that, 
 on the following morning, the 2d of May, he 
 should make the Queen of Etruria and the In- 
 
 fant Don Francisco set out ; a declaration to 
 which the junta did not give any reply. 
 
 The next morning, at eight o'clock, the court 
 carriages accordingly drew up before the pa- 
 lace to receive the royal personages. The 
 Queen of Etruria displayed great readiness to 
 depart; but the Infant Don Francisco burst 
 into tears, so at least it was reported, at the 
 gates of the palace. These details passed from 
 mouth to mouth in the ranks of the assembled 
 throng, and produced a lively agitation. Sud- 
 denly an aide-de-camp of Murat's arrived, 
 having been sent by him to pay his respects to 
 the queen at the moment of her departure. 
 At the sight of the French uniform, the popu- 
 lace raised a shout, pelted the aide-de-camp 
 with stones, and were preparing to murder him, 
 when a dozen grenadiers of the imperial guard, 
 who were on duty at the palace occupied by 
 Murat, whence the tumult could be seen, rushed 
 into the thick of the crowd, bayonet in hand, 
 and rescued the aide-de-camp, who was on the 
 very point of being massacred. Some dis- 
 charges of musketry which were fired in this 
 conflict were the signal for a general rising, 
 and a universal firing was heard on all sides. 
 A furious populace, composed chiefly of the 
 peasants who had come from the environs, 
 threw themselves upon the French officers who 
 were dispersed in the various houses of Madrid 
 in spite of the recommendations of Napoleon, 
 and upon the detached soldiers who came by 
 squadrons to receive their rations. Several 
 were slaughtered with horrible ferocity, while 
 others were indebted for their lives to the hu- 
 manity of the citizens, who concealed them in 
 their houses. 
 
 Murat mounted his horse at the first alarm, 
 and issued his orders with the resolve of a 
 general who is accustomed to all the chances 
 of war. He ordered the troops of the camp to 
 fall back and enter Madrid by all the gates at 
 the same moment. The most distant, those 
 under General Grouchy, stationed near Buen 
 Retiro, were to enter by the main streets of 
 San Geronimo and Alcala, and march towards 
 the Puerto del Sol ; while Colonel Frederichs, 
 setting out with the fusiliers who were keeping 
 guard at the palace situated at the opposite ex- 
 tremity, were to go by Mayor-street, to meet 
 General Grouchy, towards the Puerto del Sol, 
 which was the centre of the movement. Gene- 
 ral Lefranc, who was stationed at the convent 
 of St. Bernard, was to march thither concen- 
 trically by the gate of Fuencarral. At the same 
 instant the cuirassiers and the cavalry, arriv- 
 ing by the road of Caravanchel, received orders 
 to advance by the gate of Toledo. 
 
 Murat, at the head of the cavalry of th 
 guard, was in the rear of the palace at the foot 
 of the height of St. Vincent, near the gate by 
 which those troops that were on duty at the 
 royal palace del Campo were to enter. Thus, 
 placed just without the populous quarters, and 
 in a commanding position, he could readilj 
 repair wherever his presence might be re- 
 quired. 
 
 The action commenced in the square of th 
 palace, whither Murat had directed a battalion 
 of the infantry of the guard, preceded by a 
 battery. A shower of musketry, followed by 
 a volley of grape-shot, very speedily cleared 
 the square. The people fled with such preoi- 
 2 T
 
 494 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1808. 
 
 pitation, that, as is generally the case in occur- 
 rences of this kind, the number of victims was 
 comparatively small. 
 
 Colonel Frederichs marched with his fusiliers 
 by the streets Plateria and Mayor towards the 
 Puerto del Sol, whither the troops of General 
 Grouchy were also marching by the streets 
 Alcala and St. Geronimo. Our soldiers, young 
 and old, advanced with that steadiness for 
 which they were indebted to experienced and 
 warlike leaders. The populace, backed by the 
 peasants, who were braver than themselves, 
 could not hold out ; but, stopping at the corner 
 of the cross streets, fired upon our soldiers, 
 and then disappeared into the houses, in order 
 to fire from the windows. They were pursued 
 by our soldiers, despatched with the bayonet, 
 and the fanatics found with arms in their hands 
 were thrown from the windows. 
 
 The two French columns, marching to meet 
 one another, had enclosed in the centre, that is 
 to say, in the Puerta del Sol, the infuriated 
 mob, Avhich by its denseness formed an obsta- 
 cle, and had not even the liberty of flight. The 
 most obstinate among the crowd fired upon our 
 troops. Several squadrons of the chasseurs, 
 and the Mamelukes of the guard, rushed, sabre 
 in hand, amid this mass of people, and com- 
 pelled them to disperse by every outlet that 
 was still left open. The Mamelukes especially 
 used their curved sabres with great dexterity, 
 cutting off the heads of several with a stroke, 
 and thus spread a panic, the remembrance of 
 which left a lasting impression upon the people 
 of Madrid. The crowd, repelled on every side, 
 had no other resource than to take refuge in 
 the houses, and to fire from the windows. The 
 troops of General Grouchy had many a mur- 
 derous execution to perform in the street of St. 
 Geronimo, especially in the hotel of the Duke 
 de Hijar, whence a deadly fire had issued. 
 
 The troops under General Lefranc sustained 
 a very obstinate combat at the arsenal, where 
 a part of the garrison of Madrid had been shut 
 up with orders not to fight. The insurgents, 
 having repaired thither, fired upon our troops, 
 and the corps of Spanish artillery was then 
 compelled, in spite of itself, to enter into the 
 combat. The storming of a strong edifice, 
 while exposed to the fire of the enemy, who 
 sent a brisk shower of musketry upon us from 
 every part, cost us several men. But our sol- 
 diers led the assault with energy, dislodged the 
 defenders, and made them pay dear for this en- 
 gagement. The arsenal was carried before the 
 people had time to take possession of the arms 
 and ammunition. 
 
 Two or three hours sufficed to suppress this 
 sedition, and after the taking of the arsenal 
 only a few isolated shots were heard here and 
 there. Murat had constituted a court-martial 
 at the post-office, which ordered the immediate 
 execution of all the peasants who were seized 
 with arms in their hands. Some of these, by 
 way of example, were shot on the spot, upon 
 the Prado itself; while others, who endea- 
 Toured to fly to the environs, were pursued by 
 the cuirassiers, and cut down by their sabres. 
 Tflc troops of the camp who arrived at this in- 
 stant found no occasion to use their arms. 
 Every thing was quieted by the terror of prompt 
 repression, and by the presence of the minis- 
 ters, O'Farrill and Azanza, who, accompanied 
 
 by General Harispe, chief of Murat's staff, put 
 a stop to this combat wherever there was yet 
 any trace of it. They demanded, and their 
 request was granted without difficulty, that at 
 immediate stop should be put to the executions 
 which had been ordered by the court-martia- 
 established at the post-office. 
 
 This fatal morning, which was afterwards to 
 be most fearfully re-echoed throughout Spain, 
 had the immediate effect of restraining the po- 
 pulace of Madrid, by taking from them every 
 illusion of their strength, and teaching them 
 that our young soldiers, led on by experienced 
 officers, were as invincible to the ferocious 
 peasants of Spain, as they were at Essling and 
 Wagram to the most disciplined soldiers of Eu- 
 rope. 
 
 The Infant Don Antonia, who at the noctur- 
 nal session of the junta had not been one of the 
 fomentors of the revolt, but had even appeared 
 annoyed at the braggings of the partisans of 
 the insurrectionary movement, said to Murat 
 in the evening, like a man who was able to 
 breathe after a long fatigue, " At length they 
 will cease to reiterate that peasants armed 
 with knives will be able to rout the regular 
 troops." 
 
 The impression, in fact, upon the people of 
 Madrid, was profound, and in their excitement 
 they stated and believed that several thousand 
 of their fellow-citizens had been killed or 
 wounded. However, there were not many after 
 all, for the insurgents scarcely lost 400 men, 
 and the French about 100 at the most. But 
 terror, as usual, magnified these numbers, and 
 gave a moral importance to this morning very 
 superior to its material importance. 
 
 From this moment Murat could act as he 
 pleased. On the following morning he sent off 
 not only the infant Don Francisco, but the 
 Queen of Etruria, her son, and the aged Infant 
 Don Antonio himself, who was imbued with all 
 the sentiments of the insurgents save their 
 energy, and who asked for nothing better than 
 to go to Bayonne and find there, what all the 
 other princes of Spain expected to find, repose 
 with certain losses. The Infant Don Antonio 
 readily consented to set out immediately, and 
 abandoned the presidency of the junta of the 
 government without even informing that body 
 of his intentions. 
 
 Murat had now received the decree of Charles 
 IV., which conferred on him the lieutenancy- 
 general of the kingdom. He summoned the 
 junta, made them accept him as president in 
 the room of Don Antonio, and was from this 
 moment invested with all the powers of royalty. 
 He took up his abode in the palace, where he 
 occupied the apartments of the Prince of the 
 Asturias," and, resuming, in his correspondence 
 with Napoleon, his habitual language, he wrote 
 that the entire force of resistance on the part 
 of the Spaniards was exhausted on the morn- 
 ing of the 2d of May ; that it was only needful 
 to designate the king destined for Spain, and 
 that this king would reign without obstacle. In 
 more letters than one he had already stated, 
 as a fact, which he cited without comment, 
 that the Spaniards, impatent to be relieved 
 from their long and painful anxieties, frequently 
 cried out, " Let us run to the Grand-duke de 
 Berg and proclaim him king." There was, 
 however, some truth in these vain allusions ;
 
 May, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 495 
 
 if they were to have a French king, Murat, by 
 his military renown, his courtly bearing, his 
 southern bravadoes, his presence at Madrid, 
 would have been the most readily accepted by 
 the Spanish nation. 
 
 The news from Madrid arrived at Bayonne 
 on the 5th of May, at four o'clock in the after- 
 noon. When he received it, Napoleon saw at a 
 glance that it was the very means of producing 
 that shock which he needed for terminating 
 this lengthened species of negotiation with the 
 Spanish princes. He immediately went to 
 Charles IV., with the despatch of Murat in his 
 hand, and displayed much more irritation than 
 he really felt at these Sicilian vespers which 
 had been attempted in the streets of Madrid. 
 He loved his soldiers, but he who could sacri- 
 fice 10,000 or 20,000 in one morning was not 
 the man to regret the loss of a paltry 100 for 
 so great an achievement as the conquest of the 
 throne of Spain. However, he pretended to be 
 extremely angry in the presence of these aged 
 sovereigns, who were terrified to see the vio- 
 lence of the man upon whom they were depend- 
 ent. The infants, with Ferdinand VII. at 
 their head, were immediately summoned. As 
 soon as they entered the apartment of their 
 parents, they were apostrophized by their 
 father and mother with extreme violence. " See 
 what you have done, sir!" exclaimed Charles 
 IV. "The blood of my subjects has flowed, 
 and the blood of the soldiers of my friend, my 
 ally, the great Napoleon, has also been shed. 
 See to what ravages you would expose Spain 
 if we had had to deal with a less generous con- 
 queror! Look at the consequences of all that 
 you and your friends have done, in order that 
 you might enjoy some few days too soon that 
 crown which I was in as much haste as you 
 were to place upon your head. It is you who 
 have unchained the people, and there is no 
 longer a master over them to-day. Restore, 
 restore that crown which is too weighty for 
 you, and give it to him who alone is capable of 
 bearing it." 
 
 While uttering these words, the aged king, 
 who was condemned to act this afflicting comedy, 
 kept brandishing a long gold-headed cane, upon 
 which, in consequence of his infirmities, he 
 generally leaned, and it was evident to all pre- 
 sent that he menaced his son with it. 
 
 The father had scarcely finished, when the 
 aged queen, with a violence which was certainly 
 not feigned, flew upon Ferdinand, loaded him 
 with abuse, reproached him with being a 
 wicked son, with having wished to dethrone his 
 father, with having desired to murder his 
 mother, with being false, prefidious, heartless, 
 without bowels of compassion, &c. &c. 
 
 While listening to all these apostrophes, 
 Ferdinand VII. stood immovable, his eyes 
 riveted on the floor with a sort of stupified in- 
 sensibility. He said nothing, he manifested 
 nothing, but he suffered every thing. Several 
 times his mother called upon him to answer, 
 went up to him, menaced him with her hand, 
 and exclaimed, "Yes, I see very well you are 
 just as you always were. Whenever your father 
 and I wished to give you any exhortations which 
 were for your own interest, you held your 
 tongue, and only replied to our counsels by 
 silence and hatred. Speak to your father, sir, 
 to your mother, to our friend, our protector, 
 
 the great Napoleon." But the prince, quite 
 insensible, was perfectly silent, merely affirm- 
 ing, in a quiet way, that he had nothing what- 
 ever to do with the disturbances of the 2d of May. 
 
 Napoleon, greatly embarrassed, nay, almost 
 confused at a scene like this, although it fur- 
 thered the solution he desired, said to Ferdi- 
 nand, in a cold but imperious tone, that if he 
 had not resigned the crown to his father that 
 same evening, he should be treated as a rebel- 
 lious son, the author or accomplice of a con- 
 spiracy which, on the days of the 17th, 18th, 
 and 19th of March, had ended in depriving the 
 legitimate sovereign of his crown. He then 
 retired to Marac to wait for the Prince of the 
 Peace, for the purpose of concluding with him 
 a definitive arrangement, under the present 
 impression of the events at Madrid. 
 
 " What a mother ! what a son !" cried Napo- 
 leon, as he returned to Marac, addressing those 
 around him. " The Prince of the Peace is 
 certainly a very inferior sort of person, that is 
 true enough ; but, after all, he is perhaps the 
 least incompetent of this degenerate court. 
 He proposed to them the only reasonable idea 
 an idea which might have led to great result* 
 had it been carried out with courage and re- 
 solution : it was this, to go and found a Spanislr 
 empire in America, there to save both thi 
 dynasty and the finest part of the patrimony 
 of Charles V. But they could do nothing that 
 was noble or great. The old people by theii 
 want of energy, the son by his perfidy, haw 
 ruined this design, and now behold them ac^ 
 tually denouncing each other to the very power 
 upon which they are dependent." Napoleon 
 spoke long, grandly, and with rare eloquence, 
 on the vast subject of America, of Spain, of the 
 translation of the Bourbons into the Indian 
 empire. After having judged others, he pro- 
 ceeded to judge himself, for he added these 
 words: "What I am doing now is not good in 
 a certain point of view ; I know that well 
 enough ; but policy demands that I should not 
 leave in my rear, and that too so near Paris, a 
 dynasty inimical to mine." 
 
 That evening the Prince of the Peace went 
 to Marac, and the results which Napoleon ob- 
 tained by means so deeply to be regretted, was 
 defined in the following treaty, which was signed 
 by the Prince of the Peace himself and by the 
 Grand-marshal Duroc : 
 
 "Charles IV., recognising the impossibility 
 that he and his family should secure the peace 
 of Spain, resigns the crown, of which he declares 
 himself the sole legitimate possessor, to Napo- 
 leon, that he may dispose of it as ft shall seem 
 good to him. He resigns it to him on the 
 following conditions: 
 
 " I. The integity of the soil of Spain and of 
 its colonies, no portion whatsoever of which 
 shall be severed. 
 
 "II. The preservation of the Catholic faith 
 as the dominant religion, to the exclusion of 
 every other. 
 
 "III. That Charles IV. shall, for his life, 
 have the chateau and forests of Compiegne and 
 the chateau of Chambord in perpetuity, together 
 with a civil list of 30,000,000 reals (9,500,000 
 francs,) to be paid by the treasury of France. 
 
 " IV. A proportionable revenue for all the 
 princes of the royal family." 
 
 Ferdinand VII. had returned home ; his eye*
 
 496 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1808 
 
 were at length opened to his actual situation, 
 and the firm resolve of Napoleon not only to 
 intimidate but to dethrone him. His counsel- 
 lors also were undeceived ; among them, one 
 only, the canon Escoi'quiz, though he was not 
 the least honest, nevertheless gave his young 
 master the most undignified counsel ; namely, 
 to accept the crown of Etruria, in order that 
 Ferdinand might remain king of some place, 
 and he, Escoi'quiz, the director of some king, it 
 mattered not of what realm. 
 
 The other counsellors, with more reason, 
 conceived that this would be tantamount to a 
 declaration to Spain that it need not take any 
 further steps with regard to Ferdinand, since 
 he accepted a foreign crown as an indemnifica- 
 tion for that which had been snatched from him. 
 They conceived that, to accept nothing save an 
 alimentary pension, would be an indication to 
 Spain that he had been dealt with treacher- 
 ously, that he protested against this treachery ; 
 that, in fine, he always thought of Spain, and 
 consequently she ought always to think of him. 
 
 Ferdinand VII., however, signed a treaty in 
 his turn, by which Napoleon secured to him 
 the chateau of Navarre, with a net revenue of 
 1,000,000 francs, besides 400,000 francs for 
 each of the infants, on condition of their com- 
 mon renunciation of the crown of Spain. 
 
 A couple of chateaux and 10,000,000 francs 
 a-year were the price that was to be paid to the 
 father and the children for this magnificent 
 crown of Spain ; a very moderate, nay, a very 
 mean price ; but to this was to be added a 
 fearful complement then unknown six years' 
 hateful war, the death of hundreds of thousands 
 of soldiers, the lamentable division of the forces 
 of the Empire, and an indelible stain upon the 
 glory of the conqueror. 
 
 Napoleon, who, blinded by power, did not 
 foresee the consequences of this fatal step, 
 hastened to execute the conditions. Success 
 restored his natural generosity. He gave 
 orders that every possible attention should be 
 shown to a family which had just fallen beneath 
 the strokes of his policy, as so many others had 
 fallen beneath the strokes of his sword. He 
 charged the Prince Cambace"res to receive the 
 aged sovereigns ; and, while the necessary ar- 
 rangements were completing at Compiegne, he 
 wished them to have a first essay of French 
 hospitality at Fontainebleau, a place which was 
 more calculated than any other to afford plea- 
 sure to Charles IV. He assigned to them the 
 company of the aged and mild arch-chancellor 
 as more congenial to their humour. This was 
 the first intimation of the affair of Spain which 
 Napoleon gave to this grave personage, for he 
 dared no longer speak to him of projects which 
 could not bear the scrutiny of a politician who 
 was as wise as he was devoted. 
 
 As for the young prince, he assigned to him 
 the chateau of Valen9ay as a residence until 
 that of Navarre should be completed, and as a 
 companion he gave a man as subtle as he was 
 dissipated, the Prince de Talleyrand, who had 
 lately become proprietor of this same cha- 
 teau of Valen9ay by an act of imperial munifi- 
 cence. Napoleon wrote to him the following 
 letter, for Napoleon executed with the refine- 
 ment of the manners of the nineteenth century 
 a policy which was worthy of the knavery of 
 the fifteenth : 
 
 " To the Prince de Benevent. 
 
 "Bayonne, May 9th, 1808. 
 
 " The Prince of the Asturias, the Infant Don 
 Antonio his uncle, and the Infant Don Carlos 
 his brother, will set out from this place on Wed- 
 nesday next, rest on Friday and Saturday at 
 Bordeaux, and on the following Wednesday reach 
 Valen9ay. Be there on Monday evening. My 
 chamberlain De Tournon will proceed thither 
 by post, in order to prepare every thing for 
 their reception. Take care that there be plenty 
 of table and bed linen, and that the kitchen be 
 well supplied. There will be about ten or 
 twelve persons in their train, and double the 
 number of servants. I have given orders to 
 the general who acts as chief inspector of the 
 gendarmerie at Paris to go thither and organize 
 the service of surveillance. 
 
 "I desire that the princes be received with- 
 out external pomp, but heartily and with sym- 
 pathy, and that you do every thing in your 
 power to amuse them. If you have a theatre 
 at Valen9ay, and can engage some comedians 
 to come, it will not be a bad plan. You had 
 better bring Madame de Talleyrand thither, 
 with four or five other ladies. If the Prince 
 of the Asturias should fall in love with some 
 pretty woman it would not be amiss, especially 
 if we were sure of her. It is a matter of great 
 importance to me that the Prince of the Astu- 
 rias should not take any false step. I desire, 
 therefore, that he be amused and occupied. 
 Stern policy would demand that I should shut 
 him up in Bitche, or some other fortress ; but, 
 as he has thrown himself into my arms, and 
 has promised to do nothing without my orders, 
 and that every thing shall go on in Spain as I 
 desire, I have adopted the plan of sending him 
 to a country-seat, surrounding him with plea- 
 sure and surveillance. This will probably last 
 throughout the month of May and a part of 
 June, when the affairs of Spain may have taken 
 a turn, and I shall then know what part to act. 
 
 "With regard to yourself, your mission is 
 extremely honourable. To receive under your 
 roof three illustrious personages, in order to 
 amuse them, is quite in keeping with the cha- 
 racter of the nation, and also with your rank." 
 
 Charles IV. quitted the frontier of Spain 
 with a broken heart, for he bade adieu to his 
 native land, to his throne, and to those habits 
 which had always constituted his pleasure, so 
 far at least as he was capable of enjoyment. 
 The popular agitation, however, of which he 
 had seen the first indications, had so greatly 
 troubled him, and the intestine divisions of his 
 family had so overwhelmed him with grief, that 
 he fondly consoled himself for his fall with the 
 prospects "of finding in France security, rest, 
 an opulent retreat, religious exercises, and the 
 fine hunting grounds of Compiegne. His aged 
 consort, disconsolate at the loss of her throne, 
 had also more than one indemnification: re- 
 venge, the secured presence of the Prince of 
 the Peace, and ample revenues. 
 
 Ferdinand VII., who had passed from stupid 
 blindness to positive terror, was full of regrets : 
 and few will conjecture the subject of these 
 regrets. He regretted having sent to the junta 
 of the government, in reply to its interroga- 
 tions, the secret order to convoke the Cortes, 
 to excite the nation to rise, and to make open
 
 May, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 497 
 
 war upon the French. He dreaded lest the 
 execution of this order should irritate Napo- 
 leon, and place in jeopardy his own person, his 
 allowance, and the estate of Navarre. He 
 therefore sent^a fresh messenger, and recom- 
 mended the junta to act with extreme prudence, 
 counselling that it should do nothing that might 
 alienate the French. Not content with this 
 precautionary measure, he had scarcely set 
 out for Valer^ay when he wrote to Napoleon, 
 to ask for one of his nieces in marriage ; and 
 not forgetting his preceptor, Escoiquiz, he re- 
 quested for him the confirmation of two royal 
 favours which he had conferred on him on suc- 
 ceeding his father, which favours consisted in 
 the grand cordon of Charles III., and the ap- 
 pointment of councillor of state ! It is evident 
 that the victims of Napoleon's ambition might 
 charge themselves with having annihilated all 
 remorse in him, and all interest in the public. 
 
 Napoleon, master of the crown of Spain, 
 hastened to dispose of it. This crown, the 
 most illustrious next to that of France of all 
 the crowns which he had had at his command, 
 seemed to him to belong of right to his brother 
 Joseph, now king of the peaceful and consider- 
 able kingdom of Naples. Napoleon was led to 
 this choice by affection in the first instance, 
 for he preferred Joseph to his other brothers ; 
 secondly, by a certain respect for hierarchy, 
 because Joseph was the eldest ; and lastly, by 
 confidence, for he had more in him than in any 
 of his other brothers. He considered Jerome 
 devoted to him, but too young ; Louis honest, 
 but so soured by illness, domestic troubles, and 
 pride, that he deemed him capable of taking 
 the most vexatious steps. With regard to 
 Joseph, while he reproached him for an excess 
 of vanity and weakness, he nevertheless judged 
 him a sensible man, mild, and very much 
 attached to his person ; and he resolved that 
 te him alone he would confide that important 
 kingdom which lay so near France. This 
 choice was by no means the least fault which 
 Napoleon committed in this fatal affair of 
 Spain. Joseph could not possibly be at Madrid 
 before the expiration of two months, and these 
 two months would suffice to decide upon the 
 submission or insurrection of Spain. He was 
 weak, inactive, not much of a soldier, and 
 quite incapable of commanding the Spaniards 
 or inspiring them with respect. 
 
 Murat, on the other hand, was actually at 
 Madrid ; he was liked by the Spaniards, and, 
 by the promptness of his resolutions, was the 
 very man to stifle an insurrection at its birth ; 
 from being accustomed to command the army 
 in the absence of Napoleon, he knew how to 
 make the French generals obey him : to Murat, 
 therefore, ought to have been confided the 
 charge of restraining and gaining the Spaniards. 
 But Napoleon had confidence in none but his 
 brothers ; he saw in Murat merely a simple 
 ally ; he was afraid of his levity and the ambi- 
 tion of his wife, although she was his own 
 sister, and he determined to give him only the 
 kingdom of Naples. 
 
 He accordingly wrote to Joseph as follows : 
 
 "King Charles, by a treaty which I have 
 just concluded with him, has ceded to me all 
 his rights to the crown of Spain. * * * This 
 crown I have destined for you. The kingdom 
 of Naples cannot be compared with Spain; 
 
 VOL. II. 63 
 
 there are eleven millions of inhabitants, a 
 revenue of above 150 millions, and the posses- 
 sion of America. Besides this, it i s the crown 
 which will place you at Madrid, three days' 
 journey from France, and which entirely de- 
 fends one of its frontiers. At Madrid you are 
 actually in France ; Naples is at the other end 
 of the world. 
 
 " I desire therefore that, immediately on tho 
 receipt of this letter, you will commit the 
 regency to whomsoever you please, and the 
 command of the troops to Marshal Jourdan, 
 and that you set out for Bayonne by the 
 shortest route possible, Turin, Mont Cenis, and 
 Lyons. * * * Keep the secret from everybody ; 
 as it is, it will only be suspected too readily. 
 * * * &c. &c." 
 
 Such was the simple and expeditious man- 
 ner in which crowns were then disposed of, nay, 
 even the crown of Charles V. and of Philip II. 
 
 Napoleon wrote to Murat to inform him of 
 what had passed at Bayonne, announced that 
 he had made choice of Joseph to reign in Spain, 
 the consequent vacancy of the kingdom of 
 Naples, which, added to the vacancy of the 
 kingdom of Portugal, (for the treaty of Fon- 
 tainebleau vanished with Charles IV.,) left an 
 option between two vacant thrones. Napoleon, 
 in the same despatch, offered Murat the choice 
 of whichever of the two he preferred, leading 
 him, however, to prefer that of Naples, because, 
 by the maritime projects which he meditated, 
 before securing Sicily to him, this kingdom 
 would, as formerly, comprise about six millions 
 of inhabitants. He enjoined him, meanwhile, 
 to make himself master of Madrid with all 
 authority, to make sure of it with the greatest 
 vigour, to inform the junta of the government, 
 the councils of Castillo and the Indies, of the 
 renunciation of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., 
 and to compel these divers bodies to ask for 
 Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. 
 
 It would be difficult to form any idea of the 
 surprise and grief of Murat in learning the 
 choice, however natural, which Napoleon had 
 just decreed. The command of the French 
 armies in the Peninsula, so speedily converted 
 into the lieutenancy-general of a kingdom, had 
 appeared to him a certain presage of his eleva- 
 tion to the throne of Spain. The overthrow of 
 all his hopes was a blow that profoundly shook, 
 not his mind only, but even his strong constitu- 
 tion, the proof of which was speedily visible. 
 The fair crown of Naples, with which Napoleon 
 sought to dazzle his eyes, was far from in- 
 demnifying him, and appeared to him nothing 
 better than a painful disgrace. He neverthe- 
 less refrained so great was his submission to 
 his all-powerful brother-in-law from testify- 
 ing to him any discontent ; but in his reply he 
 maintained a silence upon this subject which 
 plainly proved what he felt, and clearly showed 
 M. de la Foret, who had made himself master 
 of his confidence, the painful sentiments that 
 filled his breast. M. de la Foret, formerly 
 minister at Berlin, had been sent to him in 
 place of M. de Beauharnais, punished by an 
 unmerited recall for blunders which he had 
 committed, and which were inevitable in the 
 situation in which he was placed, even if he 
 had been more skilful. 
 
 Murat had, however, still one chance ; 
 namely, that Joseph would not accept the
 
 498 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1808. 
 
 crown of Spain, or that the very difficulties of 
 its transmission to a prince removed to a dis- 
 tance from Madrid, and who had not in his 
 hands the reins of the Spanish government, 
 might induce Napoleon to change his mind. 
 He therefore tried to conquer his painful emo- 
 tion, conceived a sort of hope, and laboured 
 sincerely to execute the orders he had received. 
 The junta of the government, no longer under 
 the presidency of Don Antonio, and enlarged, 
 as we have seen, by several members of the 
 councils of Castillo and the Indies, was natu- 
 rally attached to Ferdinand VII., for the men 
 who composed it were Spaniards at heart ; but 
 they were irresolute, and knew not what part 
 to take to promote the interests of their country. 
 As Spaniards, it cost them much to renounce 
 the ancient dynasty, which for a century had 
 reigned over Spain, and was as completely 
 identified with the country as if it had descend- 
 ed directly from Ferdinand and Isabella. This 
 attachment on their part was strengthened by 
 the energetic passions of the people, who, ex- 
 cited by hatred to foreigners, by their aversion 
 to the favourite Godoy, saw in Ferdinand VII. 
 the victim of both, and were everywhere dis- 
 posed to insurrection. But they were restrained 
 by the apprehensions entertained by all men of 
 discernment, that, if opposition were made to 
 the French, they should see Spain turned into 
 a field of battle for the armies of Europe ; a 
 fanatic and barbarian populace entering the 
 lists, to the detriment of all men of honour; 
 and, lastly, the colonies shaking off the yoke 
 of Spain, or perhaps opening their arms to the 
 English. Such was the conflict of ideas which 
 made the junta hesitate, and agitated the breast 
 of every Spaniard who understood and che- 
 rished the interests of his country. 
 
 Where the mind is uncertain the conduct 
 will be so also. The junta, and with it the 
 enlightened classes, acted therefore amid these 
 grave occurrences an indecisive and equivocal 
 part. In receiving the renunciations of Charles 
 IV. and Ferdinand VII., and the declarations 
 by which these princes released the Spaniards 
 from their oath of allegiance, the members of 
 the junta, though firmly persuaded that these 
 renunciations had been extorted by force, felt 
 disposed to bow before a superior destiny. The 
 recent recommendations of Ferdinand VII., 
 which engaged them to abstain from every act 
 of imprudence, gave the finishing stroke to 
 confirm them in this resolution. They were, 
 however, for a moment in painful uncertainty, 
 when the reply to the former questions of the 
 junta, inquiring whether they should assemble 
 in any other place than Madrid, convoke the 
 Cortes, and make national war upon the French, 
 reached them by a secret messenger, who had 
 lost much time in traversing the Castilles. The 
 first reply to these questions had been in the 
 affirmative, as will be remembered, and was 
 dated on the morning of the 5th of May, shortly 
 before that eventful scene took place at the 
 residence of the aged monarch Charles IV. 
 which had decided the renunciations. 
 
 After mature reflection, the members of the 
 junta, considering that what had since passed 
 between the father and the son had completely 
 changed the face of things, induced Ferdinand 
 VII. to resign his royalty, and himself to 
 Aounsol them to act with prudence, conceived 
 
 that they could take no account of orders which 
 were annulled by posterior resolutions. It 
 therefore testified its perfect resignation to 
 Murat, its readiness to obey his commands, 
 and to recognise the king whom Napoleon 
 should give them. Those especially who, from 
 conviction or interest, adopted the idea of a 
 change of dynasty the Marquis de Caballero 
 for example were disposed to serve the new 
 sovereign with great energy, especially if 
 Murat, with whom they were acquainted, wag 
 to be invested with that dignity. 
 
 Murat, however, had more to demand from 
 them than passive concurrence. He had orders 
 to elicit from the junta and the councils of Cas- 
 tille and the Indies the formal demand of Joseph 
 Bonaparte as King of Spain. This was too 
 much for the weakness of some and the inte- 
 rested calculations of others. To drop the rights 
 of the house of Bourbon, without taking upon 
 themselves the responsibility of a change of 
 dynasty, was all that could have been expected 
 from them. To compromise themselves for a 
 new prince, on condition of doing so before his 
 face, and thus to acquire all his favour, might 
 have suited ambitious minds ; but it was not in 
 accordance with their feelings to compromise 
 themselves for an absent prince, who was un- 
 known, and was not even witness of the ardour 
 manifested in his service. 
 
 Murat, therefore, found their courage com- 
 pletely cooled when he proposed to the junta 
 that it should concert with the councils-of Cas- 
 tille and the Indies to call Joseph Bonaparte to 
 the throne of Spain. Some did not conceal 
 their apprehensions, others their want of zeal 
 for the interests of an absent king. In all this 
 there was much to flatter the secret inclina- 
 tions of Murat, for it was evident that the ini- 
 tiative of the Spanish authorities would have 
 been far more easily obtained, if he himself 
 had been proposed, both because he pleased, 
 and because he was upon the spot. He did not, 
 however, on this account, insist the less ur- 
 gently and energetically with the Spanish au- 
 thorities, in order to extort from them what he 
 had been commissioned to obtain. 
 
 The councils of Castille and of the Indies, 
 which in some respects answered, as we have 
 already said, to the former French parliaments, 
 had always sought occasion to extend their 
 power ; now, however, far from seeking to extend 
 it, they availed themselves of its circumscribed 
 limits, and exclaimed against the pretension 
 which was suggested to them of trenching upon 
 the rights of the throne, and of deciding whether 
 one dynasty had deserved to descend from it and 
 another to mount it. However, after numerous 
 and active negotiations, in which the Marquis 
 de Caballero was the negotiator, the councils 
 of Castille and the Indies agreed upon a decla- 
 ration, to the effect that, in case Charles IV. 
 and Ferdinand VII. should have definitively re- 
 nounced their rights to the crown, the sove- 
 reign whom they considered most capable of 
 promoting the happiness of Spain was the 
 Prince Joseph Bonaparte, who reigned with so 
 much wisdom in a part of the ancient Spanish 
 patrimony in the kingdom of Naples. Thus 
 the councils did not take upon themselves to 
 pronounce on the rights of Charles IV. and 
 Ferdinand VII., but confined themselves, in 
 case of a well recognised vacancy of the throne,
 
 May, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 490 
 
 lf> signify a preference, which, after all, 
 amounted to no more than a mark of high con- 
 sideration for one of the most esteemed princes 
 of the family of Bonaparte. 
 
 Murat transmitted this result to Napoleon, 
 without concealing from him the trouble it had 
 cost him to obtain it, and the extreme difficul- 
 ties which an absent candidate would meet 
 with. It was easy to perceive that he expressed 
 a sort of satisfaction in seeing objections started 
 against the candidateship of Prince Joseph 
 which might revive his own. Napoleon, who 
 was not in the habit of sparing him, refrained 
 nevertheless from irritating him at a moment 
 when he stood in need of his zeal, and contented 
 himself with addressing to M. de la Foret the 
 most violent and unjust reprimands, saying that 
 he had placed him near the person of Prince 
 Murat in order that he might give him wise and 
 good counsels, not flatter his inclinations ; that 
 the indecision which was met with at Madrid 
 proceeded only from the weakness of action 
 displayed before the Spanish authorities ; that 
 the Grand-duke of Berg was lulling himself 
 with the hope of reigning over Spain, and that 
 his conduct evidenced this ; that this was a vain 
 delusion, which must be crushed, for no one in 
 Spain would ever think of having him for king ; 
 that it would never be forgotten that he was 
 the author of the whole plot which had effected 
 the dispossession of the fallen family, and the 
 general who had commanded the slaughter of 
 the 2d of May; that a prince who was a 
 stranger to all these acts, to whom no recollec- 
 tions of intrigue or rigour were attached, would 
 be far better received ; and that the reward of 
 the services rendered by Prince Murat would 
 be the kingdom of Naples, destined to become ' 
 vacant by the very success of what had been 
 done at Madrid. 
 
 This reprimand, which was addressed to M. j 
 tie la Foret in order that it might come to the 
 ears of Murat, was a melancholy reward to the 
 latter for his complaisance in seconding an 
 odious machination : a melancholy reward, we 
 say, but a well-merited reward, for thus should 
 all those be treated who lend their aid to guilty 
 designs. 
 
 After having manifested his discontent to 
 Murat in this indirect way, Napoleon consi- 
 dered that, while waiting for the definitive pro- 
 clamation of the new dynasty, it would be well 
 to employ the few weeks that must elapse in 
 preparing the administrative reorganization of 
 Spain. He wished to exonerate himself in the 
 eyes of the statesmen of every country for the 
 act which he had just committed by a marvel- 
 lous use of the resources of Spain ; and no man 
 for it is impossible to deny this was more 
 capable than he was of redeeming, by his man- 
 ner of reigning, the crime which he had com- 
 mitted in order to reign. The projects which 
 he formed, and which Spain baffled by fanatic 
 and generous resistance, were the most com- 
 prehensive, the best combined, which he had 
 ever conceived in his life. 
 
 He commenced, in the first instance, by de- 
 siring that all the documents made use of by 
 the Spanish administration relative to the 
 finances, the army, and the navy, should be 
 Bent to him at Bayonne. Very few were found, 
 for, as we have said elsewhere, the finances 
 vere a state secret of the minister of finances, 
 
 a creature of the Prince of the Peace. The 
 distribution of the army and the navy, their 
 condition, their resources, their wants, de- 
 pended upon local circumstances, which were 
 scarcely known to the central administration 
 at Madrid. When Murat applied, in the name 
 of the Emperor, for a statement of the navy, 
 a printed annual was presented to him ; but 
 Napoleon was not the man to be contented with 
 documents such as these. To M. O'Farrill, the 
 minister of war, and M. Azanza, the minister 
 of finance, the principal persons of the junta, 
 he sent marks of esteem, and even flattering 
 intimations which might lead them to expect 
 some great favour under the new reign, and 
 requested of them an immediate thorough in- 
 vestigation of every part of the service. He 
 ordered that engineers should forthwith be 
 despatched to every port, and officers to all the 
 principal military stations, to obtain accurate 
 and positive documents on every subject. 
 
 The Spaniards were not accustomed to such 
 activity or rigorous precision, but they were at 
 last roused by this all-powerful energy, of 
 which Murat gave a fresh instance on the arri- 
 val of every courier, and they sent to Napoleon 
 a tabular statement of the monarchy, a table 
 which we have already made known. It was 
 singular that Napoleon, in demanding these do- 
 cuments, said to Murat, " I shall want them, 
 in the first instance, for the measures which I 
 shall order ; and I shall want them afterwards 
 in order that posterity may learn in the sequel 
 in what state I find the Spanish monarchy." 
 Thus he was himself conscious that, in order 
 to justify himself, he should be compelled to 
 demonstrate the state in which he found Spain, 
 and the state in which he hoped to leave her. 
 But avenging Providence granted him only half 
 this justification. 
 
 The first and most urgent need of Spain was 
 want of money. Murat had not wherewith to 
 furnish the pay of the troops, or to send the 
 indispensable funds to the ports for sending a 
 few vessels to sea. Ferdinand VII., on his ac- 
 cession to the throne, had found means to dis- 
 pose of sums in cash which belonged either to 
 the consolidated fund or to the Prince of the 
 Peace, and which had been seized the moment 
 the old court had set out for Andalusia. He 
 had employed them in making several large 
 presents, and what was of more importance 
 in paying to the annuitants of the State a sum 
 of money of which they stood in great need, 
 and for which they had been waiting for some 
 months. This done, there was nothing left. 
 Murat, exhausted, and reduced to the necessity 
 of paying his own personal expenses out of the 
 chest of the French army, had informed Napo- 
 leon of the desperate state of the finances, and 
 demanded immediate pecuniary aid, relying on 
 the wealth which victory had placed in the 
 hands of Napoleon. But Napoleon, fearful of 
 dissipating a treasure which he had destined 
 as a recompense for his army in case of conti- 
 nued prosperity, or as a fund for creating grand 
 resources of defence in case of reverses, at 
 first replied that he had no money an answer 
 which he always gave when he was applied to 
 at all events, when not required for worka 
 of beneficence. 
 
 Speedily sensible that Spain was actually 
 more denuded than he had supposed, Napoleon
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1808- 
 
 reconsidered his refusal, and decided upon suc- 
 couring her his first punishment for desiring 
 to be master of her. Nevertheless, he would 
 not suffer his hand to be seen even while con- 
 ferring a benefit, for he knew that there would 
 be no haste to repay if only himself were known 
 to be the debtor. He therefore pretended to 
 obtain a loan to Spain of 100 millions of reals, 
 25 millions of francs, from the Bank of France, 
 upon the crown jewels of Spain, which Charles 
 IV. was, according to his engagements, to have 
 left at Madrid. But the principal of these 
 jewels could not be found, for they had been 
 carried off by the old queen. Napoleon, how- 
 ever, concluded this financial operation upon 
 reasonable conditions, which he obtained the 
 more easily from the Bank as it only lent its 
 name to the treasurer of the army. It was 
 secretly stipulated with the governor of the 
 Bank that Napoleon should furnish the funds 
 and run all the chances of the loan, but that 
 the Bank should act with all the precaution 
 and circumspection of a creditor acting on his 
 own account. In order that no time might be 
 lost, Napoleon instantly threw into the treasury 
 of Spain several millions of the specie which 
 he had accumulated at Bayonne ; thus, by his 
 energetic foresight, abridging the delays which 
 are ordinarily attached to all transactions of 
 this nature. 
 
 With these first succours, far more efficacious 
 from being in specie and not in royal Vales, 
 (paper-money issued by the Prince of the Peace 
 at a loss of 50 per cent.,) he gave a large sum 
 to the public functionaries and to the army, 
 but he reserved the greater part of his store 
 of cash for the service of the ports, which 
 more than any other he was anxious to re- 
 animate. Although he did not foresee a gene- 
 ral insurrection in Spain, especially after all 
 that Murat continued to write him, Napoleon 
 was especially distrustful of the army. He 
 commanded that it should receive a distribu- 
 tion, which, had it been executed in time, might 
 have averted many evils. He was at first very 
 anxious that the troops of General Solano 
 should be sent from Madrid and marched to 
 Andalusia. He subsequently renewed this 
 order, but prescribed that a portion of them 
 should be sent to the camp of St. Roch, before 
 Gibraltar, another to Portugal, for the purpose 
 of employing them on the coast, where they 
 would be useful rather than dangerous in face 
 of the English. He commanded that the 1st 
 division of General Dupont should instantly be 
 sent from the Escurial to Toledo, and from To- 
 ledo to Cordova and Cadiz, to protect the fleet 
 of Admiral Rosily, which had become the ob- 
 ject of his greatest care since the change of 
 the dynasty was known. He at the same time 
 enjoined that the 2d division of General Dupont 
 should go to Toledo, and there be ready to 
 support the 1st, and the 3d to the Escurial, 
 in order that it might be at hand to aid the two 
 others. 
 
 He made divers other dispositions for the 
 purpose of reinforcing General Dupont. He 
 added to his first division a strong artillery, 
 2000 dragoons, and four Swiss regiments, serv- 
 ing in Spain. He announced to the latter that 
 ie would take them into his pay, and grant 
 them exactly the same conditions as those 
 which they enjoyed in Spain, not doubting that 
 
 they would be far prouder to serve Napoleon 
 than Ferdinand VII. ; but he added, in writing 
 to Murat, that if these Swiss troops were in a 
 current of French opinion they would conduct 
 themselves well, but ill if they were in a current 
 of Spanish opinion. He consequently ordered 
 that the two regiments of Preux and of Red- 
 ing, which had formed part of the garrison of 
 Madrid, should assemble at Talavera, in order 
 to be placed on the route of General Dupont, 
 who should take them up in passing. He com- 
 manded that the two Swiss regiments which 
 were at Carthagena and Malaga should as- 
 semble at Grenada, whence they should join 
 General Dupont in Andalusia. Among other 
 things, he prescribed to General Junot to march 
 the Spanish troops to the Portuguese frontiers, 
 and to remove the French troops from thence, 
 taking two divisions of the latter, the one to- 
 wards Upper Castille to Almeida, the other 
 towards Andalusia to Elvas. 
 
 There General Dupont was to control the 
 Andalusians with 10,000 French of his 1st di- 
 vision, 4000 or 5000 of the division sent by 
 General Junot, and 5000 Swiss. The Spaniards 
 assembled in the camp of St. Roch were to join 
 him, and in common to protect the interest of 
 the new order of things against the English 
 and the discontented Spaniards. The fleet of 
 Admiral Rosily had therefore nothing more to 
 fear. 
 
 Napoleon next ordered that a large portion 
 of the Spanish troops stationed in the South 
 should be sent to the Balearic Isles, to Ceuta, 
 and all the other presidencies of Africa, in 
 order that these important points should be 
 well secured against every attack of the English, 
 and also that as few Spanish troops as possible 
 should at this moment remain on the continent 
 of Spain. He made one division go north- 
 wards, that is to say, towards Ferrol, for an 
 expedition to the colonies the importance and 
 object of which will afterwards be seen. Lastly, 
 he desired Murat to dispose of a certain num- 
 ber of those who were stationed in the environa 
 of Madrid, on the route of the Pyrenees, to 
 prepare them gradually to pass into France, 
 under the pretext that they were to go and 
 share the glory of the Romana division in an 
 expedition for Scania against the English and 
 the Swedes. 
 
 A similar disposition was prescribed for the 
 life-guard, which had displayed such hatred to 
 the Prince of the Peace and so much devotion 
 to Ferdinand VII., and who for this reason 
 were greatly suspected. A northern campaign, 
 side by side with the French army, was the 
 bait held out to them in making them choose 
 between this glorious mission and their dis- 
 bandment. 
 
 It is impossible duly to conceive a more able 
 distribution ; for the Spanish troops, dispersed 
 on the frontiers of the Peninsula, in Africa, in 
 America, and in the north of Europe, more- 
 over, placed everywhere under the surveillance 
 of the French army, could no longer be an 
 object of apprehension. Unhappily, however, 
 the unanimous effort of a great nation speedily 
 defeated the most profound combinations of 
 genius. 
 
 Let us now come to the dispositions relative 
 to the navy. The first care of Napoleon, in 
 the very first moment, was to secure the Spa-
 
 May, 1808 ] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 501 
 
 nish colonies from the dangers of an insurrec- 
 tion, by this means gaining the hearts of the 
 Spaniards in securing the interest which most 
 nearly touched them, and exalting their ima- 
 ginations by finally realizing those vast mari- 
 time projects which he meditated since the 
 days of Tilsit, but for the carrying out of which 
 he had hitherto, in the first instance, wanted 
 time, and, in the second, the free co-operation 
 of Spain. 
 
 Napoleon commenced by commanding multi- 
 plied communication, as well with the French 
 colonies as with those of Spain. To this end 
 he sent off from France, from Portugal, and 
 Spain, small vessels bearing proclamations 
 filled with the most seductive promises, with 
 papers emanating from all the commercial 
 companies confirming these proclamations, with 
 commissioners charged to spread them abroad ; 
 lastly, with warlike stores and provisions, of 
 which the recent events in Buenos Ayres had 
 revealed the urgent need. All the colonies had, 
 in fact, manifested the greatest zeal to defend 
 the domination of Spain, and their want of 
 arms alone had prevented this zeal from being 
 efficacious. Napoleon, who not only ordered 
 every thing, but himself carried those orders 
 into execution wherever he might himself be, 
 had already discovered at Bayonne, a port 
 from which there was at that time a good deal 
 of intercourse with the Spanish colonies, the 
 means of communicating with America. He 
 had there found out a vessel very small, very 
 neatly rigged, very inexpensive to build, almost 
 imperceptible at sea on account of her small 
 sails, and able to escape all the enemy's cruisers. 
 He despatched one which was already complete, 
 immediately caused six others to be put upon 
 the stocks under the name of mouches, [flies,] 
 in order to send them to Spanish America 
 laden with arms and communications for the 
 authorities. One month sufficed to build them ; 
 he was therefore sure that he should very soon 
 have an adequate number ready to send out. 
 
 He had ascertained, by observations made at 
 Cadiz, that this port was the best for distant 
 expeditions, because vessels steering for the 
 coast of Africa, and running down it as far as 
 the latitude of the trade-winds, were not obliged 
 to double any of the Spanish capes, where they 
 generally encountered the enemy's cruisers. 
 He desired that from this port a multitude of 
 little vessels should be immediately despatched, 
 carrying, like the others, a number of procla- 
 mations and warlike stores. 
 
 Having provided for frequent communication 
 with the colonies, he turned his attention to 
 sending considerable forces thither. He com- 
 manded that armaments should be equipped at 
 Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena. A part of the 
 loan granted to Spain was to be employed in 
 this object, and to obtain the double result of 
 gladdening the eyes of the Spaniards by the 
 sight of great maritime activity, and of pre- 
 paring expeditions capable of saving the colo- 
 nial possessions. There were at Ferrol two 
 ships of the line and two frigates ready for sea. 
 He commanded that two other vessels should 
 be immediately refitted ; these six ships should 
 be manned, freighted with arms and ammuni- 
 tion, and kept in readiness to receive from 
 3000 to 4000 soldiers, who were at that moment 
 on their way to Ferrol. This expedition was 
 
 destined for Rio de la Plata, and, as a few 
 hundred men under the command of a French 
 officer, M. de Linidrs, had sufficed to expel the 
 English from Buenos Ayres, and a hundred 
 French at Caraccas to defeat the attempt of 
 the insurgent Miranda, there was every reason 
 to hope that the sending of such a succour 
 would suffice to secure the vast possessions of 
 South America from every hostile attempt. 
 
 At Cadiz there had long been six sail of the 
 line equipped. Napoleon commanded that they 
 should be furnished with whatever they might 
 require in regard to crews and provisions ; that 
 to these should be added five other vessels, 
 which the resources of this port, if there were 
 a supply of money, would be adequate to refit, 
 to arm, and to equip. There were already at 
 Cadiz five French ships of the line and several 
 French frigates, under Admiral Rosily, the 
 glorious remains, as we have before said, of 
 the disaster of Trafalgar, and as well organized 
 as the best of the English ships. Napoleon 
 wished to reinforce this division by two other 
 vessels, by means of a very ingenious combina- 
 tion, which was highly advantageous to Spain. 
 He sent from the funds of the French treasury 
 the necessary advance for the construction of 
 two new ships, which were to be put on the 
 stocks at Carthagena, a port where ship-build- 
 ing was continually going on, while in that of 
 Cadiz the timber was reserved for repairing 
 the armed fleet. In return for this advance, 
 Spain was to lend France the Santa Anna and 
 the San Carlos, two magnificent three-deckers, 
 which were to be returned after the completion 
 of the two vessels at Carthagena. 
 
 Napoleon prescribed to the battalion of the 
 marines of the guard, from 600 to 700 strong, 
 which had followed the detachments of the 
 guards in Spain, to repair to General Dupont 
 at Cadiz. Besides these 600 or 700 excellent 
 seamen, Admiral Rosily might be able, without 
 weakening his own squadron, to take from it 
 300 or 400 men, whom General Dupont should 
 replace by giving conscripts from his battalions, 
 and by these means it would be perfectly easy 
 to man the two vessels borrowed from the 
 arsenal at Cadiz. Thus, therefore, there would 
 be immediately at Cadiz seven French sail of 
 the line, five or six Spanish, making in all 
 twelve or thirteen, and, with the five Spanish 
 the equipment of which had been commenced, 
 a total of eighteen, to be employed, as will 
 soon be seen, in the execution of the grandest 
 designs. 
 
 At Carthagena, the construction of two new 
 French vessels for the account of France was 
 about to reanimate the works and to re-as- 
 semble the dispersed workmen. From this 
 port a squadron of six vessels had sailed for 
 Toulon. There were left two others capable 
 of keeping the sea, and these Napoleon com- 
 manded to be immediately armed, and to be 
 joined by several frigates. He enjoined the 
 fleet of Carthagena, which had taken refuge at 
 Mahon, to repair to Toulon or to return to Car- 
 j thagena, where, with the two vessels which 
 were about to be manned, it would form a divi- 
 j sion of eight vessels. " Take to yourself the 
 I glory," wrote Napoleon to Murat, "of having, 
 during your short administration, reanimated 
 the Spanih navy : it is the best means of at- 
 taching the Spaniards to us, and of assigning
 
 602 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 [May, 1808 
 
 an honourable motive for our presence among 
 them." 
 
 It is easy to see that these preparations, 
 which were calculated -to reawaken activity in 
 all the ports of Spain, would act in concert 
 with the naval forces already created through- 
 out the whole extent of the French empire. 
 We have before said that the project of Napo- 
 leon was to station in all the ports of Europe, 
 from the Sound to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Toulon, 
 from Toulon to Corfu and Venice, fleets com- 
 pletely equipped, and at the side of these fleets 
 camps, which the return of the grand army 
 would enable him to compose of the finest 
 troops, for the purpose of ruining and dis- 
 heartening England by the already impending 
 possibility of an immense expedition to every 
 part of the globe for Sicily, Egypt, Algiers, 
 the Indies, Ireland, nay, England herself. In 
 this way Napoleon showed whither his projects 
 tended, and what they would become by the 
 union of Spain and France under the same 
 authority. 
 
 The expedition of Corfu, destined principally 
 for Sicily, had many storms to encounter, but 
 had been master of the Mediterranean for two 
 months, from the 10th of February to the 10th 
 of May. Admiral Ganteaume, who, as we 
 have stated, left Toulon on the 10th of February 
 with the two divisions of Toulon and Rochefort, 
 consisting of ten sail of the line, two frigates, 
 two corvettes, and one flute, encountered a 
 fearful tempest on the night of the llth. This 
 squadron once dispersed could not rally. With 
 his three-decker, Le Commerce de Paris, and the 
 division of Rochefort, he had kept out at sea, 
 doubled Sicily, and arrived in sight of Corfu, 
 which he entered on the 23d. 
 
 Rear-admiral Cosmao, on his part, with four 
 ships of the line, two frigates, two flutes, had 
 long battled with the seas of Sicily, in order to 
 rejoin the admiral ; had afterwards gained Cape 
 Santa Maria, the rendezvous which had been 
 assigned at the extremity of the Otranto terri- 
 tory, and, instead of entering Corfu, where he 
 would have found the rest of the fleet, had re- 
 turned to the gulf, to Tarento, on the false 
 report of the approach of the English squadron. 
 
 Admiral Ganteaume, who sailed from Corfu 
 on the 25th of February to join the division of 
 Cosmao, was tossed about by a frightful tem- 
 pest for nineteen days, and at length fell in with 
 his lieutenant on the 13th of March : thus collect- 
 ing his ten ships of the line, his two frigates, his 
 two corvettes, and one of his two flutes, he took 
 them back to Corfu. He had there landed a 
 considerable quantity of provisions and stores, 
 and increased the garrison to 6000 men. He was 
 preparing to enter the strait of Messina, to 
 effect the passage of the French troops into 
 Sicily, when he received intelligence from 
 Joseph that the English Admiral Strachan was 
 at Palermo with seventeen vessels ; he was 
 therefore obliged to return to Toulon, leaving 
 at Corfu his newly-equipped frigates, and tak- 
 ing with him the Pomone and the Pauline, which 
 had exhausted their stores and worn out their 
 rigging by their prolonged sojourn in that 
 island. He encountered the equinoctial gales, 
 and did not make Toulon till the 10th of April. 
 
 This expedition of two months, though greatly 
 impeded by weather, nevertheless gave Napo- 
 leon extreme satisfaction, and he ordered that 
 
 j the most pompous eulogiums should be lavished 
 upon the admirals and officers in all the public 
 journals throughout the empire. He arrive'! 
 at the conclusion that, with a little more dar- 
 ing and more practice, his admirals would be 
 able to attempt great things. He accordingly 
 commanded that Admiral Ganteaume's ten ships 
 should be instantly repaired, provided with ex- 
 cellent crews and two good officers Rear-ad- 
 mirals Cosmao and Allemand ; to put to sea 
 the Austerlitz, the Breslau, and the Donauwerth, 
 and that there should be added to them two 
 Russian vessels which had taken refuge at 
 Toulon, for which step he had obtained the 
 concurrence of the Russian government He 
 decreed a new levy of seamen on the coast of 
 Provence, Liguria, Tuscany, and Corsica, with 
 an addition of conscripts for manning the 
 three new vessels, the Austerlitz, the Breslau, 
 and the Donauwerth. He ordered that several 
 frigates and old ships should be equipped as 
 flutes, so that he might be able to embark 2000 
 men and 800 horses. The arrival of the Spa- 
 nish division from Carthagena, if it came fronr 
 the Balearic islands to Toulon, would thereb; 
 augment by a third or even a fourth the meant 
 of transport. 
 
 We have spoken of the preparation com- 
 manded at Carthagena and at Cadiz. General 
 Junot had found at Lisbon two vessels ready 
 for sea, and one on the stocks on the eve of 
 being launched. Napoleon had sent to him 
 several officers and some sailors, and had de- 
 sired him to enrol the Danish, Spanish, and 
 Portuguese sailors who might be found unem- 
 ployed at Lisbon, to man the three Portuguese 
 vessels. 
 
 At Rochefort, Napoleon had supplied the 
 place of Allemand's division by three ships of 
 the line already under sail, and a fourth just 
 launched. At Lorient, he had a division con- 
 sisting of three new ships of the line, besides 
 Le Veteran, which was about to return thither, 
 with several frigates and store-ships. He 
 ordered preparations to be made at the last- 
 mentioned port for the embarkment of 4000 or 
 5000 men. At Brest, there still remained 
 seven ships of the old fleet in good condition ; 
 to these were to be added several frigates and 
 other ships armed en flute, that is to say, having 
 only one tier of guns, so that a very few of 
 them would be capable of embarking 12,000 
 men. Admiral Villaumez was to command this 
 squadron. 
 
 Finally, there were already at Flushing eight 
 
 new ships of the line, just come down from 
 
 Antwerp ; besides about a dozen others in the 
 
 course of construction, several of which were 
 
 ready for -launching. Napoleon ordered that 
 
 a portion of the crews should be detached from 
 
 the ships forming this flotilla at Boulogne and 
 
 I organized into marine battalions, serving alter- 
 
 j nately by land and by sea, and made capable 
 
 of manning ships of war. The flotilla, reduced 
 
 j to such limits as the roads of Boulogne could 
 
 easily contain, was still sufficiently considerable 
 
 to transport 80,000 men in two or three trips 
 
 | across the Channel. In the harbour of Texel, 
 
 j King Louis had eight ships of war ready foi 
 
 j sea, and several detachments of Dutch troops. 
 
 Napoleon had thus forty-two French ships 
 
 j of war, equipped and manned ; twenty Spanish 
 
 \ ships already equipped or nearly so ; ten Dutch,
 
 May, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 603 
 
 and eleven Russian ships, in the various ports 
 of France ; twelve Russian vessels in the Adri- 
 atic, together with one or two belonging to 
 Denmark. In addition to all these, he hoped 
 to be able to build thirty-five more ships by 
 the close of the year ; namely, twelve at Flush- 
 ing, one at Brest, five at Lorient, five at Roche- 
 fort, one at Bordeaux, one at Lisbon, four at 
 Toulon, one at Genoa, one at Spezzia, and three 
 or four at Venice. These thirty-five ships were 
 already two-thirds finished. He calculated 
 that the completion of all these naval construc- 
 tions would put him in possession of 131 ships 
 of the line ; and his design was to station 7000 
 men at the Texel, 25,000 at Antwerp, 80,000 
 at Boulogne, 50,000 at Brest, 10,000 between 
 Lorient and Rochefort, 6000 Spaniards at Fer- 
 rol, 20,000 French round Lisbon, 30,000 round 
 Cadiz, 20,000 round Carthagena, 25,000 at 
 Toulon, 15,000 at Reggio, and 15,000 at Tarento. 
 With 131 ships of the line, and about 300,000 
 men always ready to embark at one point or 
 another, it would be easy to keep the English 
 in continual alarm. 
 
 Whilst this vast development of force was 
 accomplishing, Napoleon calculated that the 
 English would have ten ships of war in the 
 Baltic, keeping watch over the Russians and 
 the operations in Holland ; eight to observe the 
 fleet assembled at the Texel and at the outlets 
 of the Meuse ; twenty-four to oppose the eight 
 or ten at Flushing, the seven at Brest, the four 
 at Lorient, and the three at Rochefort ; four to 
 hold in check the expedition at Ferrol, twelve 
 to oppose the armament at Lisbon, twenty to 
 make head against the armament at Cadiz, and 
 twenty-two or twenty-four against the arma- 
 ment at Toulon. For all this, 102 ships were 
 required, to say nothing of the naval forces 
 necessary to be kept up on the coasts of Ame- 
 rica, India, and other parts of the world. It 
 must inevitably have been ruinous to Great 
 Britain to condemn her to a continuance of these 
 efforts for the space of two or three years. 
 
 But Napoleon was not disposed to confine 
 himself to empty threats, whatever degree of 
 alarm or expense it might occasion to England. 
 He determined to direct his immense prepara- 
 tions to two immediate results ; viz., an expe- 
 dition to India, and one to Egypt. This two- 
 fold scheme engrossed his whole attention 
 whenever it was diverted from the straits of 
 Calais. He had given orders for adding to the 
 divisions of ships armed for war a certain num- 
 ber of transports, consisting of old frigates and 
 other vessels armed en flute, and capable of 
 conveying numerous forces and great quantities 
 of provisions, without the inconvenience of 
 numerous vessels. By this means he could 
 embark 12,000 men at Brest, 4000 or 5000 at 
 Lorient, 5000 at Rochefort, all with supplies 
 of provisions for six months. At Toulon there 
 were arrangements for embarking 20,000 men, 
 with provisions for three years. At Cadiz he 
 had given orders for similar preparations for 
 20,000 men, but with reference to a more remote 
 period. 
 
 Profiting by the perplexity of England, when 
 thus menaced on all points at once, it was de- 
 termined that the Lorient expedition should be 
 the first to sail, conveying 4000 or 5000 men to 
 the Isle of France. This augmentation of 
 troops, ammunition, and naval force would 
 
 render the Isle of France a formidable post to 
 the trade of India. The Brest expedition was 
 to be the next in the order of departure. In 
 the event of its also reaching the Isle of France, 
 General Decaen, with a force of between 16,000 
 and 17,000 troops, and a powerful squadron, 
 would be enabled to overthrow, or at least to 
 shake, the British empire in India. After the 
 lapse of a little time, Admiral Ganteaume, with 
 20,000 men, was to proceed either to Sicily or 
 Egypt, whilst the fleet at Cadiz would follow in 
 the one or the other direction. The least im- 
 portant result that might be expected from 
 these combined movements, would be the con- 
 veyance of supplies to our colonies in the 
 ocean, and the conquest of an important point 
 in the Mediterranean ; whilst in both those 
 quarters the English navy would find so much 
 occupation that any attempt against the Spa- 
 nish colonies would be out of the question. 
 
 Whilst Napoleon was warmly discussing these 
 plans, alternately with the minister Decres and 
 with the admirals charged with the several 
 commands, he directed the arrangements of the 
 whole project, and verified the details by the 
 opinions of practical men. In his intervals of 
 leisure, he mounted his horse, and rode along 
 the sea-shore, visiting the mouth of the Adour, 
 and collecting, by his own personal observation, 
 much information relative to naval affairs. 
 During his visit to the Landes, he had seen 
 numbers of fine firs and oaks felled, and lying 
 on the ground rotting, for want of the means 
 of transport. On beholding this waste of use- 
 ful resources, he determined to conquer nature 
 by the force of art. " My heart bleeds," he said, 
 in a letter addressed to M. Decres, "to see all 
 this valuable wood perishing uselessly." He 
 forthwith gave orders for transporting a por- 
 tion of the timber by water down the Adour to 
 Mont-de-Marsan ; from thence it was to be 
 drawn by teams of oxen to Langon, and after- 
 wards to be floated by the Garonne to Bordeaux 
 and Rochelle. But this mode of conveyance 
 being very expensive, he continued building 
 ships at Bayonne, in order to use the timber 
 remaining in that part of the country. The bar 
 which obstructs the river was the only obstacle 
 that opposed these works. There being only 
 fourteen feet water at high tide, the depth was 
 insufficient to float a 74-gun ship, which Napo- 
 leon wished to construct in that port. He de- 
 vised works for throwing back the bar some 
 hundred fathoms, which would have procured 
 a depth of twenty or thirty feet of water ; for, 
 at a little distance out, the sea becomes ex- 
 tremely deep, and the bar sunk in proportion. 
 He sent for engineers from Holland to discuss 
 and arrange the plan of the works. He next 
 entertained various schemes for furnishing the 
 colonies with recruits and supplies of corn, 
 which they wanted, and for bringing home to the 
 mother-country the sugar and coffee which they 
 could not use. He proposed to give the owners 
 of merchant-vessels a certain sum per ton for 
 the transport of troops and stores ; but this 
 proposition was met by demands so exor- 
 bitant, that he determined on sending out sloops 
 and frigates to convey the troops and corn, and 
 to bring back the colonial produce at the charge 
 of the state. " Extraordinary circumstances,'' 
 he used to observe, " demand extraordinary 
 measures. To remain inactive, and to do
 
 504 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 nothing would be the -worst thing possible, for 
 our colonists would perish of hunger whilst sur- 
 rounded by their barrels of sugar and coffee, and 
 we should be in want of those valuable articles, 
 with our warehouses stored with unsold corn 
 and salted provisions." 
 
 About this time there arrived in Bayonne a 
 certain number of Spaniards, men of high re- 
 spectability, who had been selected, by order of 
 Napoleon, from the different provinces of Spain, 
 for the purpose of forming a junta. They had 
 readily responded to his summons ; some, be- 
 cause they felt convinced that, for the welfare 
 of Spain, to save her from a destructive war, 
 to preserve her colonies, and insure her regene- 
 ration, it was necessary to support the Napo- 
 leon dynasty ; others, because they were at- 
 tracted by interest and curiosity, or by the 
 sympathy which an extraordinary man never 
 fails to inspire Meanwhile, the insurrectional 
 movement, commenced in Madrid on the 2d of 
 May, had simultaneously spread into several 
 of the provinces. In Andalusia it was favoured 
 by the distance of the French troops ; in Ara- 
 gon by the national spirit prevailing in that 
 frontier province ; in the Asturias by the old 
 feeling of independence peculiar to that inac- 
 cessible region. There the sentiments of the 
 intelligent class of the people were subdued by 
 those of the populace who were less alive to 
 political considerations than offended at the 
 deposition of a national dynasty. In those pro- 
 vinces the attempt to nominate deputies for the 
 junta would have been abortive, and therefore 
 the government at Madrid took upon itself the 
 task of nominating them. Some of the deputies, 
 though commissioned to proceed to Bayonne, 
 were afraid to go, for the idea began to be 
 generally spread abroad that those who went 
 thither would never return. A sort of popular 
 and superstitious terror pervaded the public 
 mind. The troops destined for the Pyrenees, 
 and especially the life-guards, refused to march 
 a circumstance the more unfortunate, as it 
 served to strengthen the insurrectionary feel- 
 ing. Napoleon, warned by Murat of this dis- 
 position of the public mind, sent away, for a 
 few days, MM. de Frias, de Medina-Celi, and 
 some other persons of note, for the purpose of 
 showing that it was possible for persons to leave 
 Bayonne after having been there. 
 
 The end of May was now approaching, and 
 the warmth of public feeling in Spain was vi- 
 sibly declining. This change was especially 
 assignable to the delay in proclaiming the new 
 king. Murat urgently insisted that matters 
 should be brought to a crisis ; first, for deter- 
 mining a question which had incessantly occu- 
 pied his mind ; and next, for checking the in- 
 creasing indifference felt towards him by the 
 Spaniards. Napoleon, who clearly perceived 
 the personal motives of his brother-in-law, and 
 who could not hasten the arrival of the answer 
 he expected from Naples, wrote in a very angry 
 tone to Murat. The latter, agitated by a thou- 
 sand fears and hopes, which he alternately con- 
 ceived and abandoned, and tormented by the 
 anjust reproaches of Napoleon, fell ill of a 
 fever, caused not less by anxiety of mind than 
 by the effect of the climate. This circumstance, 
 which placed his life in jeopardy, served to 
 convince the ignorant class of the people that 
 Napoleon's lieutenant had been struck by the 
 
 [June, 1808. 
 
 avenging hand of Providence. This popular 
 superstition, together with the sudden suspen- 
 sion of the authority of the lieutenant-general, 
 were not a little unfortunate in the then exist- 
 ing circumstances. 
 
 At the commencement of June, after a delay 
 of three weeks, Napoleon received intimation 
 of the arrival of Joseph, and his acceptance 
 of the proposal made to him : the delay of 
 both the answer and the arrival having been 
 the unavoidable consequence of distance. Na- 
 poleon determined on at once proclaiming his 
 brother King of Spain, so that he might pre- 
 sent himself with that title in Bayonne, and 
 there receive the homage of the junta. He 
 issued a decree, in which, resting upon the de- 
 clarations of the council of Castille, he pro- 
 claimed Joseph Bonaparte king of Spain and 
 the Indies, guarantying to the new sovereign 
 the integrity of his dominions in Europe, Africa, 
 America, and Asia. On the 7th of June, Na- 
 poleon set out to meet Joseph on the road to 
 Pau : he overwhelmed him with demonstrations 
 of regard, which, though dictated by policy, 
 were not the less sincere ; for he loved his bro- 
 ther, and wished to give him credit in the eyes 
 of the junta. Joseph, though transported with 
 joy by the high position in which he found him- 
 self, was nevertheless dismayed by the difficul- 
 ties he beheld in perspective, difficulties of 
 which the insurrection in Calabria already af- 
 forded a distinct prognostic. Like all persons 
 suddenly raised to greatness, he was less happy 
 than jealous envy supposed. He received with 
 a certain degree of alarm the sovereignty of 
 Spain, which Murat had so ardently longed 
 for ; and his perplexed thoughts turned with 
 regret to the fair kingdom of Naples, which 
 was insufficient to satisfy the ambition of Mu- 
 rat. This strange state of things arose out of 
 one of the many singular positions presented 
 by the Bonaparte family, who, after being at 
 one moment elevated by a great man to the re- 
 gion of marvels, descended again to the region 
 of reality ; falling from the height of the loftiest 
 thrones of the earth. 
 
 As soon as Joseph arrived, Napoleon pre- 
 sented to him those Spaniards of high rank and 
 importance whom he had successively invited 
 to Bayonne, either to be members of the junta, 
 or because they were men of consideration 
 whom he wished to know, and who, flattered by 
 such a mark of attention, readily obeyed his 
 summons. Joseph's countenance possessed some 
 traces of the classic beauty which marked that 
 of Napoleon ; he had not, it is true, the per- 
 fect regularity of features, or that grandeur 
 of expression which imparted to the conqueror 
 of Rivoli aad Austerlitz a resemblance to Caesar 
 or Alexander. But Joseph, on the other hand, 
 possessed extreme amiability of manners, and 
 a certain grace, combined with some slight 
 share of borrowed dignity. The brothers of 
 Napoleon had, in their intercourse with him, 
 contracted the facility of conversing on mili- 
 tary affairs, on diplomacy and government ; 
 and on all those subjects they possessed such 
 an amount of general information as was re- 
 quisite to make them feel at ease in the extra- 
 ordinary positions to which the author of their 
 fortunes had raised them ; moreover, they were 
 not wanting in natural intelligence. The Spa- 
 nish grandees, who were ignorant, and vain of
 
 July, 1808.] 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 605 
 
 their own greatness, had already been fasci- 
 nated by the presence of Napoleon ; and Joseph, 
 by bis amiable manners, and a display of the 
 stock of information he had acquired in Naples, 
 succeeded in pleasing and inspiring them with 
 confidence in his capacity. Servility is conta- 
 gious ; and the Spaniards who were gathered 
 round the new king began to laud his virtues, 
 and even to put faith in his high qualities. 
 The Dukes de San Carlos, De 1'Infantado, Del 
 Parque, De Frias, De Hijar, and De Castel 
 Franco ; the Counts de Fernan-Nufiez, De Or- 
 gaz, and even the famous CevalloSj with all his 
 hostility to the French, were already persuaded 
 that the interests of Spain demanded submis- 
 sion to the new dynasty ; a fact which certainly 
 admitted of no doubt. O'Famll and De Azanzn, 
 the ministers of war and of finance, who had 
 been invited to Bayonne, were led to the same 
 conviction ; which was, however, on their part, 
 much more natural, for, not being courtiers, 
 but mere men of business, they were not influ- 
 enced by private or personal feelings, and had 
 no political object but to secure the greatest 
 degree of benefit to their country. In the 
 minds of such men there could exist no doubt 
 of the advantage of superseding the old dynasty 
 by the new one. Moreover, their introduction 
 to Napoleon had filled them with admiration, 
 and made them almost forget his conduct to- 
 wards the dethroned family. They readily 
 pledged themselves to serve the new king. 
 Whilst awaiting the arrival of Joseph, Napo- 
 leon, in conjunction with the Spaniards pre- 
 sent in Bayonne, had drawn up the plan of a 
 constitution adapted at once to the age and to 
 the manners of Spain. It was determined that 
 the junta should assemble in the ancient epis- 
 copal palace of Bayonne, which was arranged 
 for the purpose ; that there the king should be 
 recognised and the constitution discussed, so 
 as to give the appearance of a free and volun- 
 tary adoption. The whole plan was carried 
 into effect with military promptitude and pre- 
 cision. Joseph had arrived on the 7th of June. 
 On the 15th the junta was convoked, the pre- 
 sident being SeSor de Azanza, minister of 
 finance under Ferdinand VII., now destined to 
 fill the same post under Joseph Bonaparte, and 
 well worthy to fill it under any enlightened sove- 
 reign. Senor de Urquijo discharged the du- 
 ties of secretary. After a few formal speeches, 
 (all adverting to th advantage of receiving 
 from the hand of Napoleon a member of that 
 miraculous dynasty, which had been sent on 
 earth for the regeneration of thrones, and an- 
 nouncing that that member was Joseph Bona- 
 parte,) the imperial decree proclaiming Joseph 
 king of Spam and of the Indies was read. 
 The junta then waited on the new king to offer 
 the homage of the Spanish nation ; of which, 
 unluckily, they represented the intelligence but 
 not the passions. After taking leave of Joseph, 
 the junta visited Napoleon, and returned thanks 
 to the powerful benefactor, to whom, they be- 
 lieved, they owed a bright and prosperous future. 
 Several succeeding days were occupied in 
 discussing the plan of the constitution ; some 
 changes were suggested and taken into consi- 
 deration. It was framed on the model of the 
 French constitution, with some modifications 
 adapted to the manners of the Spaniards ; and 
 it contained the following provisions : 
 Vou IL 64 
 
 An hereditary monarchy, transmissible in th 
 male line, in the order of primogeniture, re- 
 versible from the branch of Joseph, to those 
 of Louis and Jerome. Any union of the crown 
 of Spain with the crown of France was ex- 
 pressly interdicted, and thus the independence 
 of Spain was secured. 
 
 A senate composed of twenty-four members, 
 like that of France, was intrusted with the de- 
 fence of the constitution, and also empowered 
 to protect the liberty of the press and personal 
 liberty ; a commission being appointed to make 
 known cases in which either freedom of the 
 press or of persons should be violated. 
 
 An assembly of the Cortes, comprising, tin- 
 der the name of the Bench of Clergy, twenty- 
 five bishops, chosen by the king; under the 
 name of Bench of NobiUty, twenty-five grandees 
 of Spain, also chosen by the king ; sixty-two 
 deputies from the provinces of Spain and the 
 Indies ; thirty deputies from the principal cities ; 
 fifteen eminent merchants ; fifteen literary and 
 scientific men, the latter representing the uni- 
 versities and academies ; all to be elected by 
 those whom they were to represent. The as- 
 sembly, which was to be convoked at least 
 every three years, was to discuss the laws, and 
 to fix the revenue and expenditure for three 
 years to come. 
 
 A permanent magistracy, dispensing justice 
 according to the forms of modern legislature, 
 under the supreme jurisdiction of a high court, 
 which was to be no other than the Council of 
 Castille, under the title of Court of Cassation. 
 Finally, a Council of State, for the supreme 
 regulation of the government, on the model of 
 that of France. 
 
 Such was the constitution of Bayonne, which 
 was certainly alike adapted to the manners of 
 Spain, and to the state of her political advance- 
 ment. It made no mention of the inquisition, 
 the clergy, or the privileges of the nobility; 
 for it had been drawn up with a desire not to 
 give umbrage to any class of the people. To 
 the legislature was consigned the task of sub- 
 sequently deducing consequences from the prin- 
 ciples laid down in this act, which contained 
 the germ of the regeneration of Spain. 
 
 The discussions on the constitution being 
 ended, a royal sitting was held on the 7th of 
 July, in the episcopal palace. Joseph, seated 
 on the throne, read a speech expressive of the 
 sentiments of devotion with which he was about 
 to assume the government of Spain ; then lay- 
 ing his hand on the Gospel, he took the oath 
 of allegiance to the new constitution. At the 
 close of these proceedings, which elicited loud 
 and enthusiastic acclamations, the assembly 
 adjourned to Marac, to compliment the man 
 whose will ruled the events of the time. 
 
 It was urgent that Joseph should forthwith 
 take possession of his kingdom. It was said 
 that the Spaniards, irritated at sight of the 
 blood shed on the 2d of May in Madrid, and 
 indignant at the artifice which had enticed the 
 Bourbon family to Bayonne, were already show 
 ing symptoms of discontent ; that an insurrec 
 tionary feeling prevailed in Andalusia, in Ara 
 gon, and in the Asturias, and that the route 
 by which the king had to travel was scarcely 
 safe. Nevertheless, it was indispensable that 
 Joseph should go to relieve Murat, now ill, and 
 in a delirium of impatience to quit a countrjr
 
 506 
 
 CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE. 
 
 [July, 180P. 
 
 which had become hateful to him, and in which 
 he could not remain without peril to his life. 
 
 Napoleon, beginning to perceive the real state 
 of things, and unwilling to send his brother 
 into a foreign country in a way which would 
 not command respect, prepared new military 
 forces for his escort. The reserves of infantry 
 formed at Orleans, and the reserves of cavalry 
 assembled at Poitiers, had already entered 
 Spain under the command of Generals Verdier 
 and Lasalle, and they formed a corps cTarmSe, 
 which occupied the centre of Castille. Some 
 old regiments, drafted from the grand army, 
 were sent to the coast camps, and, from the 
 forces previously occupying those camps, four 
 fine regiments were selected, viz., the 13th of 
 the line, and the 2d, 4th, and 12th light infan- 
 try. To these were added some Polish lancers, 
 and a superb regiment of cavalry, raised by 
 Murat in the territory of Berg ; and, out of all 
 these various corps, Napoleon composed a divi- 
 sion of veteran troops, amidst which Joseph 
 was to advance on Madrid by short stages, 
 thereby affording the troops the indulgence of 
 slow marches, and giving the Spaniards ample 
 opportunities of seeing their ne-w king. The 
 junta and the grandees of Spain followed in 
 the suite of the king, all proceeding by short 
 and slow journeys. 
 
 Joseph departed on the 9th of July, escorted 
 by veteran troops, and preceded and followed 
 by upwards of a hundred carriages, filled with 
 the members of the junta. Napoleon conducted 
 his brother to the frontier of France, where he 
 affectionately took leave of him. He recom- 
 mended him to be of good heart, whilst he 
 hinted only partially what his keen intelligence 
 enabled him to foresee. The irresolute spirit 
 of Joseph would have sunk under the disclo- 
 sures which his brother could have made ; and 
 yet Napoleon's keen glance, though it enabled 
 
 him to see the impending future, did not dis- 
 cern one half of the evils which were destined 
 to result from the great fault committed at 
 Bayonne. 
 
 Such were the measures to which Napoleon 
 was prompted by his deference to a systematic 
 idea, rather than by feelings of family affec- 
 tion, for he had the means of establishing all 
 his relations in high positions, without usurp- 
 ing the crown of Spain, and dethroning the 
 last of the Bourbons reigning in Europe. By 
 reason of the weakness of the Spanish Bour- 
 bons, he could not resort to force, for it would 
 have been ridiculous to declare war against 
 Charles IV. He therefore had recourse to 
 stratagem, and he forced them to fly by arous- 
 ing their fears. The indignation of Spain hav- 
 ing arrested the unfortunate Bourbons in their 
 flight, Napoleon took advantage of their family 
 discord and enticed them to Bayonne by the 
 hope of obtaining justice, which justice he dis- 
 pensed in the manner of the judge in the fable, 
 who gave an oyster-shell to each dissentient 
 party. He was led on from stratagem to dis- 
 honesty, and thereby affixed to his name one 
 of the two great stains which tarnish his glory. 
 To have escaped from this stigma, he must 
 have effected the good which he intended to 
 render to Spain ; and, by Spain, he must have 
 secured the advantages he contemplated for 
 France. Providence did not reserve for him 
 the opportunity of absolving himself from an 
 act of perfidy unworthy of his character. 
 
 But why anticipate the justice which time 
 never fails to award. In the events which re- 
 main to be narrated, stern justice will be seen 
 arising out of the events themselves, and show- 
 ing, by its punishment, that men of high genius, 
 no more than those of ordinary capacity, can 
 hope for dispensation for any departure from 
 rectitude and common sense. 
 
 END OF VOL. II.