CO o o O)/ . /?& 4fMW09lUfo/ j0# (^ K xiHK SUSTAV E.STECHERTl | ft THE REBELLION INDIA: HOW TO PREVENT ANOTHER, JOHN BRUCE NOETON ! I " Certe id firmissimum longe imperium est quo obedientes gaudent." LIVY, 1. viii. c. 13. " Nihil est quod adhuc de republica putem dictum, et quo possim longius progredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse illud, sine injurft non posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summa justitiarempublicam regi non posse. "- CICERO, Fragm. de Rep. 1. ii. LONDON : RICHARDSON BROTHERS, 23, CORNHILL, E.G. 1857. [The Right of Translation is reserved.'] 3, CORNHILI., E,C. HEHRV - * e PREFACE. FORBID to make any comment in India on the startling events now passing before my eyes, forbid even to make any enquiry into the causes of the rebellion, I turn in common, no doubt, with many others to England, where the liberty of the Press is not yet shackled. I state a fact. It is not rny intention here to discuss the merits of the Gagging Act. From many quarters abundant strictures will pour in on that subject.* The only point of view in which I wish * The Calcutta journals expect to enlist the indignation of the English Press in their cause, as though it were a common cause. To me, such an event seems problematical. It seems to me almost impossible to predict what view will be taken of this measure by the Press in England. The danger is so im- minent and overwhelming, and there is so prevalent a general idea that the English Press of India is licentious and scurrilous ; it has been so assidiously branded as " lying," " rascally," and the like, that perhaps the Press and public at home may not regard the attack in its true light. They may regard it in some measure as necessary and merited, and there will be poured in from a hundred quarters, statements which may seem to justify Lord Canning's Act. Be it remembered, however, that these representations proceed from the very parties who have everything to gain by the suppression of the liberty of the Press. A 2 512824 IV PREFACE. to present it, is to warn the people of England against being misled by this most iniquitous device for blinding them. I utterly deny that Lord Canning has shown any sufficient reason for his indiscriminate application of one and the same measure to the loyal English, and the treasonous Native Press. As well might we confound the power of Printing-house-square with the filth of Holy well- street. Lord Canning expressly says, that " poison " has been poured into the minds of the people by a " portion of the Native Press, within the last few " weeks." " It is to this quarter then," he con- tinues, " that I direct the attention of the members " of the Legislative Council." He expressly exone- rates the European Press. He says, " the remarks u / have made against the Native Press, I do not " direct against the European Press ; " he gives credit to the " many able and intelligent men who " conduct the newspaper Press in this country, for " the feeling they have shown at this period ; " and forthwith, with an inconceivable logic, proceeds to say that he can draw no line of demarcation between the European and the Native Press, and at once confounds liberty and license, loyalty and treason, in one common catastrophe ! Now I warn my fellow-countrymen in England against being deluded by this feeble sophistry, Let them depend upon it, that this attack upon the PREFACE. V Press is in reality intended to screen the cowardice and incapacity of the real authors of the revolution. Lord Canning's arm may have dealt the blow, but there is a power behind which directed the arm. It is not that the crisis necessitated the measure; but that the crisis has been seized as the fittest moment for striking a long meditated blow at the Press, and gratifying a grudge of ancient standing. Political capital has been made out of the bloodshed in the North-West. The arm of the law was amply strong enough before the Gagging Act to meet the alleged evil : and the best proof is, that Mr. Beadon, since the passing of the Act, has prosecuted certain Native papers for treasonable writings published before. A public prosecution would at any time have been sufficient to curb the unbridled license of the Native Press. On Lord Canning's own shewing, it would have sufficed to legislate for the Native Press. If the intention had been merely to provide against the chance of injudicious statements, or erroneous infor- mation, finding their way to the public ear during a season of great excitement, the institution of a cen- sorship would have met the object. Prevention is better than cure. But if it was sought to stifle all inquiry and all comment, then the measures of the supreme Government were admirably adapted to- wards accomplishing such a consummation. The Act itself is sweeping and indefinite enough : but the A 3 vi PREFACE. real sting of the transaction lies in the conditions, since notified, on which licenses to printing presses will be granted. The first is as follows ; 1. " That no book, newspaper, pamphlet, or " other work printed at such press, or with such " materials or articles, shall contain any observa- " tions or statements, impugning the motives or " designs of the British Government, either in " England or India, or in any way tending to ." bring the said Government into hatred or con- " tempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance " to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, " or the lawful authority of its civil or military " servants." Under this the Government, and the very lowest of its civil and military servants, enjoy perfect immunity and impunity. Such acts as those of Mr. Thomas can no more be commented on : and Mr. Thomas's conduct is venial in comparison with many other illegalities) which are at this moment running their career. Any attempt to trace the causes of the rebellion to the wicked, foolish policy of the past few years; to show how the hesitation of military men, the incapacity of civilians, has precipitated an unavoidable event; how the Commissariat reforms of Lord Dalhousie have paralyzed our arm at the moment we would put it forth to suppress insurrection; every sug* PREFACE. Vll gestion for the future guidance of our rule, may be construed without warning or notice into an offence punishable by a fine of 5,000 rupees, im- prisonment for two years, the seizure of a trades- man's entire stock in trade, in short, total ruin; this at the discretion of the magistrate such magistrates as obtain in India! The other con- ditions are these: 2. " That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, " or other work shall contain observations or state- " ments , having a tendency to create alarm or " suspicion among the Native population of any " intended interference by Government with their " religious opinions and observances. 3. " That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, " or other work, shall contain observations having " a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the " British Government of Native Princes, Chiefs, " or States in dependence upon, or alliance with it. u The above conditions apply equally to original " matter, and to matter copied from other publica- " tions." The third is of course expressly intended to prevent any allusion whatsoever to our shameless usurpation of our neighbour's property a cause which I, for one, believe lies at the very root of the rebellion. Further, as these conditions extend to extracts Vlll PREFACE. as well as original matter, no discussion in par- liament on any Indian subject, no comment in any London journal, unless indeed laudatory of the Company, can be copied into an Indian news- paper under pain of the like penalties. Even in France the Press has its three warnings. In Austria, despotism is not so despotic as it is in India. Our gag is a garotte. Freedom of speech having been stifled, the Government can put forth what accounts it pleases, uncontradicted, unobserved upon ; and I venture to predict that every effort, both here and in England, will be made to divert public inquiry from the true sources of our misfortune. The mutiny will be purely military ; it might have been crushed at its outbreak at Meerut, but for the strange inactivity of the military officer there in command. The people will have taken no part in the insurrection. The rebellion will have strengthened our power. The Civil Government has deserved well of its country. It is but one step further, a step in the right direction, many will deem it, after having "deprived the Press of any power of reply, to attribute the origin of the war partially, and by degrees mainly, to its unbridled license. This calumny, indeed, false as it is foul,* has already been heard. * The Friend of India has had its independence suppressed ; its Editor has resigned ; a gentleman in the employ of Govern- PREFACE. ix Correspondents in several journals have openly asserted it ; the sycophant throng echo the cry in the salons of our Government House ; by and bye the chorus will swell into a diapason of scurrilous, lying abuse.* ment now edits it ; and it is thus that the Government carries out the gagging principle. It stops the mouths of others, but having now identified itself with journalism, it may in its own organ say what it likes ! The Friend of India has been crushed for writing in favour of annexation and proselytism. The Athenccum is branded as seditious for having steadily written against both these lines of policy. * Scarcely was the ink of this sentence dry ere my predictions began to be verified. There is a dead set against the Press in general, and against some obnoxious journals in particular. In this Presidency the Athenaeum is singled out for attack. Anonymous charges have been preferred against it in the Spectator, for having incited mutiny by certain articles which have appeared on military matters during the past three years. These articles excited great attention. They were directed to the correction of a gross wrong done to a meritorious body of officers in respect to their promotions. They were temperately and ably written, with a thorough knowledge of the subject. They received the sanction of the late Commander-in- Chief. At the very time they were appearing, an intimation was received by me, from indisputable authority, that the Governor- General regarded the Athenceum as the ablest paper in India. They drew the attention of the Home Authorities to the state of the question, and had a main share in procuring for some hundred officers a recognition of their undoubted rights. Such are the articles which are now assailed as calculated to excite mutiny in the Madras army! Lord Harris was, till lately, a warm admirer of the Athenceum. His lordship personally assured me that he admitted its ability and its utility ; though he could not agree in the tone or the opinions of all the articles ; that he had no wish to see its utility circumscribed. This was at a time when his lordship had the unvarying support of the Athenceum ; and no man was ever borne with more X PREFACE. I bid the English public, then, call to mind Lord Canning's own exoneration of the Anglo-Indian Press. If this insidious policy prevails, the people of England will be most thoroughly hoodwinked and deceived. The real causes of the rebellion will have been kept out of sight. Our wretched administration of a theoretically good system of government will be perpetuated ; opportunity will have been thrown aside. Our giant warning neg- lected, India will be handed over without a re- monstrance to those who have most signally, most fearfully proved themselves drivellers and imbeciles we shall relapse for a while into our old career, and then will come the closing scene, sudden as patiently than his lordship by the Press. But he was somewhat roughly handled with reference to his share in the annexation of the Carnatic and Tanjore. This no doubt is treason in India, though a voice even from the Board of Control assured me that he who should write down annexation and centralization would be a second Hampden. The Athenceum has excited powerful odiums. It has exposed not any particular species of cant, but cant as a species ; it has plainly called a spade a spade, and indulged in an awkward knack of going at once to the gist of the matter in hand, without respect to persons, fear, favour, or affection, reward or hope thereof. For this our gentility vote it low-toned. Some little high and mighty officials have left India with a determination to make it a personal request to the Times, forsooth, to write down the Athenceum! and I am quite prepared to hear the most lavish abuse bestowed upon the journal, now that it cannot reply to such accusations. Fortunately its columns remain ; the matter therein, and the mode of handling it, speak for themselves, and afford the best refutation of the calumny. PREFACE. XI the present, but far more complete the loss of our Indian Empire, the massacre of every Englishman in India, when no one will be left to tell the tale. So far as my ability extends, an effort shall be made to counteract the result of the Gagging Act. I will at least point out to the English public topics calling for their most serious consideration. The true path of investigation shall be opened out to them. With them will lie the responsibility of following it up, or turning aside from it. The following pages have been jotted down con- temporaneously with the progress of the rebellion, which will account for an occasional want of ar- rangement. They would probably under no circum- stance have appeared even in England, certainly not in India, until men's minds had recovered their equilibrium and eqaniniity until the cause of order was secure ; but now that an attempt is made by the highest authorities to stifle inquiry, these sheets cannot too soon be communicated to the people of England : because unless independent men will come forward, it is certain that nobody else will. The Indian Government, the Civil Service, the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, have everything to gain by secrecy ; they have everything to lose by publicity. By gagging the Press, the Indian Government has secured to itself the entire occupa- tion of the public ear. It can put forward what it xii PREFACE. pleases, keep back what it pleases, alter what it pleases, mystify what it pleases. " Truth," said the first Lord Napier, " can hardly u be obtained, to the disadvantage of powerful men, " when such men are the sources of the information " on which the cause is to be judged." What sort of information, how full, how accurate, how arranged, is likely to reach England from those in authority ? let the papers on Sir Charles Napier's case laid before the Great Duke testify, upon which even that clear intellect and sound judgment came to the conclusion that there had been no mutiny at Wuzzeerabad in 1849 ! Let me, in conclusion, offer one remark which I think is fairly justifiable. If what appears in these pages be assailed as prejudiced exaggeration, let my credit at least derive whatever strength is due to it from the fact, that no single statement which I have ever yet put forward, however startling and incre- dible, whether it appeared in the exposure of the administration of justice in Southern India, in the representation of the condition of the Madras Pre- sidency, or in the Torture Report, has been shown to be untrue, or even incorrect. THE REBELLION IN INDIA. WRITING in the early part of 1854, to the Eight Honourable Robert Lowe, then Joint Secretary of the Board of Control, on the condition of the Presi- dency of Madras, I concluded a few prefatory words as follows : " A letter read in the House of Commons u said, ' Woe be to India if the present crisis is " allowed to slip by unimproved;' but I say, Woe be " to England, for it cannot be too emphatically im- " pressed upon the people of England at large, that " this question of India is to them, properly con- " sidered, the one great question of the age. They " may not so see it now ; may we act with such pru- u dence, benevolence, and justice, that they may not u be forced so to acknowledge it hereafter." A man who has studied history and observes the events of his time with ordinary intelligence, may perhaps claim a capacity for political prediction, without laying himself open to Voltaire's charge of being either an impostor or a madman: I am not B one lightly to adopt the opinions of others ; lightly to form, or lightly to express, my own : what I wrote then was as clear and true to my own apprehension as it is now ; though it was not forced upon me by any extraordinary events, but formed in times com- paratively well adapted for calm consideration. But, perhaps, now that the same truth is thrust forward in a more startling and authoritative form ; now that it is written in the blood of our murdered country- men in India, illustrated by rebellion, and illumin- ated by the conflagrations at Meerut and Delhi, and Lucknow, and Allahabad, the people of England may be induced to concentrate their attention upon a matter of such vital importance ; to investigate the foundations of the assertion, and deliberate upon the best means of remedy for the past and preven- tion for the future. There has been of late years, it is true, a steadily but slowly increasing interest in Indian affairs on the part of Englishmen in England : but still India is comparatively little known, and little cared for. An Indian question is still, as Lord Monteagle called it, the " dinner bell " of Parliament. An Indian Budget is explained to empty benches ; a lamentable / ignorance and most culpable indifference on Indian affairs generally prevail among the masses ; but the ; present crisis must, one would think, rivet general ; attention upon the position of Indian affairs. I " Nemo observat lunam nisi laborantem, tune urbes " conclamant, tune pro se quisque supers titione vana " trepidat. Hsec tamen non annotamus quamcliu " ordo servatur. Si quid turbatuni est, aut prater " consuetudinem emicuit, spectamus, interrogamus. " ostendimus." There will be eagerness and excitement enough roused by a rebellion which ordinary forethought during times of dull peace and every day routine must assuredly have foreseen, and might probably have prevented. There will be more alarm in Eng- land than even in India ; and already many will have rushed to the false conclusion that our empire in India is lost. Not that the present moment is the one of all others which a wise choice would select for discussing matters, the excitement attending which has not yet subsided. But India's extremity is the reformers' opportunity; if we do not strike at once, while the iron is hot, we shall have missed our chance of planting a telling blow; for it is to be feared that the public mind will soon relapse into its wonted apathy, either from a carelessness for that which has ceased to be novel, or because it will have been lulled by interested misrepresentations and assurances into a false security, through a feeling that the danger is past. This it is which induces me once again to come forward, and endeavour to impress upon the public mind the conviction, that this Indian problem is, properly considered, the sub- ject of the age to England. The solemn question, which we cannot longer blink or put aside until some more convenient season, is simply this, Shall we throw away or shall we preserve our Indian Empire ? I do not say, because I do not believe, that it is lost; and I cannot too deeply condemn the character B 2 of an unnecessary alarmist; but I do say that our general policy in India, for the last few years espe- cially, has been tending to bring about such a con- summation ; and that if it be persevered in if peo- ple will not investigate the true causes, and all the causes which may have helped to lead to the present insurrection with its attendant horrors ; if they will allow themselves to be led aside from the proper course of inquiry, or to be lulled again into security and forgetfulness, by assertions that the evil was merely temporary and local, and that all spirit of disaffection has been extinguished then I say that we shall lose our hold on India, and that the horrors we have just witnessed are as child's play to the general massacre which will accompany the closing scene. When the present rebellion has been suppressed (I write while it is still unchecked) and its imme- diate authors punished, I doubt not we shall be told that such outbursts visit India periodically ; that we are stronger than ever, since the Native soldiery has seen the hopelessness of revolt. Historical precedents of former dangers, which threatened our empire with ruin, and which have been averted, will be quoted. It will be asserted, that the origin of the present crisis is purely military disaffection, such as that which formerly led to the mutiny at Vellore, or all but broke out among even the European officers of the Indian army in Olive's time. It will be de- clared to be entirely isolated from the people; that the masses took no share in it, and that it does not afford any proof, indeed scarcely leads to any in- ference, that the people at large are disaffected. Indeed the apathy of the people to the events passing among them will be cited as a convincing proof that the Government is in the main popular; and thus the rebellion will be vouched as a test both of our strength and our popularity. Those remedies, it will be said, are sufficient, which seek to improve the condition of the Native army, or by the increase of the European regiments, to counterpoise and over- awe the turbulent Native troops. These and the like lines of argument will be sedulously put forth, because they flatter the vanity and screen the incom- petence of our Indian civil administration. Indeed this drivelling cry, which, if it prevails now, will cost us our empire hereafter, has been already raised. Only a day or two ago, a civilian, high in office and of high repute, was heard expressing precisely the views which I have suggested, as he twitted a mili- tary officer with the outbreak of the sepoys, and contrasted military insubordination and military ad- ministration with civil administration and the quiet of the people ; and with many these assertions will prevail. The conduct of some of the villagers towards the European fugitives in the neighbourhood of Delhi, the ready assistance afforded by the Eajahs of Puttialah, Bhurtpoor, and Gwalior, may be regarded by some as signs that the rebellion is confined to the troops and those immediately influenced by them; but when was any revolution in India brought about by the people not of the military classes, though it may be presumed that we shall not readily 6 admit that the people at large had more reason to be contented with their former rule than our own? It is not that disaffection exists only in the army ; the true difference is, that with the army disaffection is organized; among the people at large it has no ex- pression, because it has no organization. The ex- tent to which the people have participated in the rebellion cannot yet be ascertained. At first, the Government bulletins staunchly declared that the " people were with us to a man;" but that cry has long since ceased. It is, of course, good policy for the Government to endeavour to persuade districts yet peaceful of the truth of such an important fact ; but I, for one, would no more pin my entire faith to such representations from such a quarter, than I would trust the Roman account of the Carthagi- nians, or the man's painting of the lion. There is no doubt that civil emissaries have been tampering in various quarters with military virtue. The Irre- gular Cavalry in the North- West has been burning the villages in the neighbourhood of which the tele- graphic wires have been cut. I have seen many accounts which speak but ill of the temper of the people; and even while I write, a letter comes to hand from Mr. Fischer, than whom no man on this side of India more thoroughly knows the people. He writes : " I have been asked my opinion, and I " think it was for Government, as to the state of the " feelings of the Natives in these parts towards " Government; and I replied that the people gene- " rally were disaffected, and that they had too much "cause for it; indeed, that there was disaffection " enough in the land for half-a-dozen rebellions, but :t that the community was composed of so many " diverse and discordant castes and creeds, that they " could not unite against the common enemy : that " our strength lay in this condition of the country, " and in no merit of Government." Sir Thomas Munro long since pointed out how very little we really know of the feelings of the Natives, and I question whether time has given us any deeper insight. The line of separation between the European and the Native is far more marked now than formerly. In our vanity and assumed superiority we utterly deceive ourselves. We assert that the Natives esteem us, and regard the change from Native to European rule as a blessing. We forget the antipathy between the Orientals and the European ; we overlook the jealousy natural towards a conquering and superior race. " It would be well " for us," writes an Indian authority, " if we " governed the country as well as Ackbar." When Heber asked an intelligent Native if he would wish to become subject to British rule, the reply was, " Of all misfortunes keep me from that." We have levelled all ambition, all distinctions; we have de- stroyed the nobility and the gentry; we have substi- tuted a nation of Peons and Eyots. Every com- manding officer of a regiment deludes himself into the fatal mistake that his corps is loyal; that him at least the sepoys love. The 6th and 25th Regi- ments were stated to be mutinously disposed ; the officers wrote to the libellous journals, indig- nantly asseverating the fidelity of these two corps. 8 The former was publicly thanked by the Governor- General. The poor deluded officers are only con- vinced of their mistake when the soldiers turn round upon them and rend them, shooting them down and mutilating their half dead bodies with a terrible ferocity. An officer writing from Neemuch to the Telegraph and Courier says, " I have been many " years with my regiment; I have lived among the u men, marched over the length and breadth of the " land with them ; I have fought with them, trusted u them, respected them, cared for them, treated " them with kindness and consideration always, u attended to all their wants; redressed, as far as " lay in my power, their grievances; and yet these "'men have been hatching treason against the State " for months perhaps years : while coming to me " and in daily intercourse with me, they have been " treacherously plotting against my life, and with u the foulest and blackest ingratitude I ever heard u or read of, they sent me away with such a shower " of bullets over my head as I never had before " except at Chillianwalla ; and not content with " this, they burnt my house to the ground, and leave " me and my family beggars." I have moved myself much among all classes, and claim to know something of the disposition of the people. True, they may have exaggerated their statements somewhat to me, and I take what I have heard with caution; but the impression conveyed to my own mind is, though I do not go so far as some of my friends, that the people do not regard us with anything approximating to affection, not even with the esteem which the vanity of many prompts them to believe. There are no doubt instances now occur- ing of protection afforded to our fugitive country- men by Zemindars and others ; but the instances seem equally frequent, when the villagers thrust them forth and bid them pass on. Out of ten Thaseeldars in the Meerut district, but one has stood faithful to his post : and the efforts of the civilians to stem the force of the torrent of insurrection, if any have been made, have been too feeble even to attract a mo- ment's notice. The whole civil administration has been struck down and paralyzed at a single blow. Where are the police and the constabulary, if any exist? What body has any civilian been able to organize? Who has stood by them? What check have they offered to the insurgents ? What influence over the people have they shown? What vestige of power in the cause of order have they left? I do not say that they have not done their duty to the best of their ability, as gallant English gentlemen; but Metcalfe's assertions have been once more proved true : " When the storm begins to roar," says he, " the civil power, and all semblance of the existence " of a government, are instantly swept away by the " torrent." Their authority has fallen from them, and is scattered on the ground like water. They have been forced to seek protection within the pale of the British bayonets. On what spot beyond the shadow of those bayonets, since the present outbreak, has civil authority been found strong enough to stand alone? What agricultural population has it rallied in defence of order? Suppose that a similar 10 military insurrection had occurred in England, how many magistrates would have been able to raise local corps of the sturdy rustics, the soiled artizans and mechanics of the towns ! How great would have been the contrast ! The civil authority of India has thoroughly broken down on the first moment of peril and trial. How far the English Government deserves well of the people, how far it commands the respect of the people, what are probably the feelings of the great body towards us, whether they prefer our govern- ment to those which have preceded it, I shall find an opportunity hereafter of considering. What I wish to guard against in the outset is, the false impression which I am perfectly confident it will be industri- ously endeavoured to produce, so soon as order is restored, that the condition of the people, as a body, has nothing whatever to do with the rebellion ; that they are perfectly contented with the present dis- pensation ; and that the insurrection was purely military. But in discussing the present situation of affairs, it would be the height of folly to limit enquiry to the state of the army, when there may be lurking among us exciting causes of far more great and general dangers than that which we have not yet escaped. It behoves us to regard the present out- break as a warning. Thankful that the spirit of rebellion has scarcely touched the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and that rebellion itself has been crushed, we must then not only trace out all the causes which have immediately led to the out- 11 break, but, if we are wise, review our own position in India, and become familiar with all that may hereafter threaten our empire with peril or destruc- tion. But little faith is due to specific and panacea. All practical politics are necessarily tentative and experimental ; but it is expedient to listen to all expositions of the condition of our affairs, and all attempts to account for that condition, come they from what quarter they may ; as well as to consider all suggested remedies, so as to select that which is apparently the best. Now there is a passage in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's work on Politics which strikes me as singu- larly applicable on the present occasion. It is as follows : 44 In the first place, then, it is a sound maxim of " political, not less than of medical therapeutics, that 44 all specifics for a malady are suspicious, while 44 panacseas are to be absolutely rejected. The phy- " sician is taught, that he must not only understand " the general nature of diseases, but that he must 44 study the peculiarities of his patient's case, both as " respects the origin and symptoms of his malady, 44 and also his constitutional state of body. His 44 remedies are to be applied so as to remove the 44 cause of the disease, and restore the patient to 44 health ; for which purpose he is to observe the 44 symptoms, and hence to form his plan of treat- " ment. The circumstances in the patient's condi- 44 tion to which rational medicine looks, and from 44 which plans of treatment can be properly drawn, 44 are described as being four in number 1* Very 12 4 u remote causes, which only predispose the body to " disease. 2. Remote exciting causes, which induce u the disease. 3. The proximate cause. 4. The " signs or symptoms of the disease, and the different " states of the patient. These maxims may be " transferred, with little alteration, to the conduct of u the politician. When a political evil exists he " must examine its causes and symptoms, and form " his plan of treatment accordingly ; he must distin- " guish the predisposing causes from the positive " direct causes which lead to it; and these, again, " from the occasion, or accidental cause, from which " it immediately springs. He must likewise observe " the effects which are symptomatic of its operation. " Thus, if an insurrection or popular disturbance u occurs in any country, its outbreak at the p&rti- " cular time and place may be owing to some casual u occurrence, of little moment in itself. This, how- " ever, is the immediate exciting cause. The clispo- " sition to disturbance may further be owing to some " special causes of local mal- -administration ; for ex- " ample, to some tax, or other fiscal burden to which " the people are subject. These may be the remote u exciting causes. Lastly, there may be a certain " state of the people with respect to their ignorance, " the relations of social classes, their historical recol- " lections, or some similar permanent phenomena, " which may predispose them to violent outbreaks. " When the disturbance has occurred, it will produce " certain consequences, symptomatic of its influ- " ence, which the practical politician must carefully " watch." 13 Let us follow this method of investigation. It is not my intention to write any history of the rebel- lion. We shall have ample accounts of the horrible particulars from the personal memoirs, the private letters, and published stories of the surviving Europeans, and the connected accounts for which they will doubtless furnish materials conjointly with official records. Then shall be chronicled a glorious though a mournful page in England's annals; for never have her sons and her daughters shown, re- spectively, more devotion to duty, or calmer forti- tude. Then shall be read of many perilous escapes; many a hero falling at his post ; many a lady sharing the duties of defence, or inspiring confidence by her noble calmness, or her uncomplaining bearing of the hardships of flight and hunger. Then shall many an act of the noblest courage come to light; and many a name of those who have fallen be illustrated by the history of his death. Finnis, who charged up to his regiment only to receive his death wound. Piele, who would not leave without his colours. Willoughby, who blew up the magazine at Delhi. Fletcher Hayes, the accomplished and the brave, the scholar-soldier. Young Hutchison, than whom England has not a nobler character amid a host of equals. Then shall the gallant independence of Neill, the stern determination of Lawrence, the un- flagging marches, the fiery charges of Colburn be rehearsed, and England will at least have the melan- choly pride of knowing that her offspring of to-day are as the offspring of her former generations, gallant in life, devoted in their death. But not for me is 14 such a task. I must turn to the political aspect of the lesson. The signs or symptoms are clear enough. They are those of a wide-spread disaffection ; a hatred not of obnoxious individuals who have given offence to their immediate inferiors ; not a class feeling of the soldiery against their officers ; but a general an- tipathy to the European race, which exhibits itself in the indiscriminate slaughter of women and chil- dren, as well as men, without reference to age, occupation, or station, attended by a savage ferocity aiming at total extermination. The Cavalry muti- neers from Meerut, as they marched through the streets of Delhi, refused to plunder: they declared they came for life, not loot. Blood was their object, and they pointed to the marks of the fetters on their legs, as their reason and their justification. Do not let the fatal mistake in our diagnosis be committed of fancying, that this outbreak is merely the local ex- hibition of discontent on the part of a few disaffected regiments. It will be found to extend from one end of Bengal to the other, and probably to embrace all classes, civil as well as military. It leaps from one distant point to another almost simultaneously. Thus the same post brings intelligence of risings at Sattarah, at Nagpore, at Jhansi. Its origin is partly, if not principally, political. The answer of the sepoys to their officers at Neemuch may show us that. The dying speech of the traitor at Sattarah shows us that. Within three little months 50,000 soldiers have turned rebels ! The following is an imperfect list, but full, as far 15 as it can yet be ascertained of the sepoys who have become rebels. It represents a force of about 50,000 men : 19th Rt. N. I. Disbanded at Barrackpore, April 3rd. 7th Rt. Oude Irregulars, Mutinied at Lucknow, May 1st. 34th Rt. N. I. 7 Companies at Lucknow, May 5th. 3rd Rt. Lt. Cy. Mutinied at Meerut, May 10th. llth Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Meerut, May 10th. 20th Rt, N. I. Mutinied at Meerut, May 10th. 38th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, May llth. 54th Rt, N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, May llth. 74th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, May llth. 3rd Company 7th Batt. Arty. Mutinied at Delhi, May llth. The Sappers and Miners, about half the Corps, Mutinied at Meerut, May 13th. 45th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Ferozepore, May 13th. 57th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Ferozepore, May 13th. The Sappers and Miners (300 men) Mutinied at Roorke, May 18th. 9th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Allygurh, May 23rd. 5th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Umballah, 60th Rt, N. I. Mutinied at Umballah, 55th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Murdaun, 44th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Agra, May 31st. 67th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Agra, May 31st. 3rd Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Phillour, May 26th. 7th Rt. Lt. Cy. Mutinied at Lucknow (2 troops) May 30th. 13th Rt. N. I. (part only) Mutinied at Lucknow, May 30th. 48th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Lucknow, May 30th. 71st Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Lucknow, May 30th. 15th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Nusseerabad, May 28th. 30th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Nusseerabad, May 25th. 72nd Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Neemuch, June 3rd. 24th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd. 27th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd. 51st Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd. 5th Rt. Lt. Cy. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd, 16th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 14th. 1C 26th Rt. N, I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 14th. 49th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 14th. 8th Lt. Cy. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 15th. 7th Gwalior Infantry Mutinied at Neemuch, June 3rd. Artillery June 3rd. Bhurtpore Levies Mutinied near Neemuch about the beginning of June. 12th N. I. Mutinied at Jhansi, June 5th. Artillery June 5th. 30th N. I. (one company) Mutinied at Jeypore, June 3rd. 37th N. I. Mutinied at Benares, June 4th. Loodianah Regiment of Sikhs Mutinied at Benares, June 4th. 6th N. I. Mutinied at Allahabad, June 6th. 70th N. I., and all the native troops at Barrackpore and Calcutta Disarmed, June 14th. N. I. Regts. Disarmed at Mooltan, June 10th. Hurrianah Light Infantry Mutinied at Jhansi, May 29th. Troops at Jhansi Mutinied about May 29th. 64th N. I. Disbanded at Shukbuddur, June 3rd. 28th N. I. Mutinied at Shajehanpur about the middle of June. 1st Nizam's Cavalry Mutinied at Aurungabad, May 23rd. 21st N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd. 1st N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June 5th. 56th N. I. June 5th. 2nd Lt. Cy. June 5th. 22nd N. I. Mutinied at Fyzabad about June 8th. 1st N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June 2nd N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th. 6th N. I. Mutinied at Allahabad, June 4th. 10th N. I. Mutinied at Futtyghur, June. 17th N. I. Mutinied at Azimghur, June 3rd. 18th N. I. Mutinied at Bareilly, June. 22nd N. I. Mutinied at Fyzabad, June 9th. 28th N. I. Mutinied at Shajehanpur, June 22nd. 29th N. I. Mutinied at Moradabad, June. 37th N. I. Mutinied at Benares June 4th. 41st N. I. Mutinied at Seetapore June. 43rd N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th. 17 53rd N. I. Mutinied at Cawnporo, June- 56th N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June. 68th N. I. Mutinied at Bareilly, June. 70th N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th. 1st L. C. Mutinied at Neemuch, June 3rd. 2nd L. C. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June 3rd. Malwa Contingent Mutinied near Neemuch about the beginning of June. 17th N. I. Mutinied at Azimgurh, June 3rd. But all honour to the armies of Madras and Bombay; they seem staunch; and the few clamours that have been heard from the former have ori- ginated from the mismanagement of the authorities, and the complaints seem rational, if not justifiable, in the shape in which they were put forward. At Bangalore, where I am now writing, a Native, well acquainted with the spirit and feelings of his countrymen, has declared that but for the presence of the European troops, there would not be a European alive in the station within a week. At Madras the ball on the Queen's Birth-day was danced out with the guard of honor (a European guard of H.M. 43rd) keeping watch over the merry makers, each man with twenty rounds of ball cartridge in his pouch. Since then, our Government has had a panic from Triplicate; fear only is said to keep the Mussulmen down : their brethren in Poonah have publicly offered up prayers for the success of the Native arms at Delhi and Meerut. If Oude was really ever a source of danger to us from the example which its internal condition afforded to its immediate neighbours, our policy has now constituted it a magazine full of inflammable materials in the very centre of our c 18 territories, and those who best know the disposition of the natives of that kingdom towards us, do not hesitate to state that we are invariably regarded witli feelings of bitter hatred. Lucknow has been in flames, and there Lawrence can do no more than hold his own. Glide is in an entire state of revolt. The Governor of the N.W. Provinces has officially de- clared the same with regard to his territories. Benares, Allahabad, Nusseerabad Neemuch, Simlah, and many other places, have become the scenes of mutiny and outbreaks. It is impossible to limit the cause of outbreak to the offended religious prejudices of any particular caste. Mussulmen as well as Hindus, have turned rebels. Seikhs and Goorkhas have proved unloyal; irregulars as well as regulars, cavalry as well as infantry, sappers and miners, and artillery, all have been swept into the vortex of rebellion. No dependence can ever again be placed on the Indian army which has thus been faithless to its salt. So long as that army was faithful to us we were secure ; but when it has turned against us, " Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? " The rebellion is wide-spread and contagious. It shows signs of combi- nation. It draws all religions as to a common centre. It has probably one common origin. It is truculent and exterminating; pitiless in its barbarity. It must be no ordinary frame of mind, no ordinary sense of wrong, which can so have banded men together in so desperate an undertaking. Such are the symptoms. The proximate or alleged proximate cause, is that of the greased cartridges. It is no doubt matter of the gravest inquiry, whether 19 there is really a deep seated belief on the minds of the sepoys that we are attempting to destroy their caste by forcing them to pollute their lips with the fat of bullocks; and the Natives are so easily worked upon and credulous, especially in matters connected with their religion or their caste, that it is not at all improbable that this distrust of the new cartridges was not at the outset a mere pretext, but that a real excitement on the point has been brought about, partly by the carefully disseminated insinua- tions of designing agitators who skilfully hit upon a topic of alarm, which all could appreciate ; partly by that species of infection or contagious panic which runs occasionally through large bodies. It may be the spark which has set fire to the train, but unques- tionably the train existed before; I believe there is no one so weak as to fancy, that had there been no greased cartridges there would have been no re- bellion. Sooner or later, and for some assigned cause of grievance or other, similar events would have occurred; and we may dismiss at once the opinion that the substitution of vegetable oils for animal fat will suffice to restore confidence to the soldiery, and prevent dissatisfaction for the future. It is impossible any longer to attribute the revolt of regiment after regiment to this cause. For fifty years the rifle companies of our Native regiments have used 'greased cartridges without a murmur. The obnoxious cartridge can have been served out to very few regiments, if any. In Lucknow the men declared they were prepared not only to bite, but to eat them, if the Company commanded. The real c2 20 nature of- the grease used has been carefully ex- plained to every regiment in the service : there has been no effort to insist upon the further issue and use of the obnoxious material. The Governor-Ge- neral has publicly proclaimed the absence of any intention on the part of Government to interfere ^ with the religion of the soldiery. The rebel cavalry at Delhi indeed expressly declared that their motives for massacre was revenge for the insult offered them by placing fetters on their legs. Regiments, of whose loyalty there was no previous question, and who had given no sign of disaffection, suddenly turned over to the rebels against whom they were brought. Here again it is not a question of grease I which leads to rebellion; but the natural antipathy of race ; the sympathy with those of their own creed and country, when the moment comes for making a choice between the ties of allegiance, and those of blood; between the stranger and brother. Fatal to us is the moment of that electric touch of nature which makes them kin. Unquestionably the causes of discontent which exist in the Native army lie far deeper: they must be thoroughly probed and searched. Possibly the u General Service Order," which com- pels every recruit for the future to enlist for foreign as well as home service, may be thought by some sufficient to account for the discontent of the Bengal army. The Bengal regiments, it is well known, are averse to crossing the sea. It clashes with their caste prejudices; and many a high caste sepoy who had looked to his children and their children follow- 21 ing liis own profession of arms, thus finds them suddenly cut off from an ancestral means of liveli- hood: and this may have pre-disposed the whole army to listen to the counsels of the designing and seditious. The General Service Order 1012 of 1856, pub- lished on the 25th July, 1856, touched upon a most delicate matter, one not to be handled without a thorough knowledge of the Bengal soldier, and the feelings of the Natives in general. Lord Dalhousie had not ventured, amid his many changes, to pro- mulgate so hazardous a change. Yet Lord Canning, raw to the country, within three months after his taking the reins of government, rushed in, where Lord Dalhousie had feared to tread. He might have otherwise remembered the mutinous spirit of the Bengal sepoys in the last century, when ordered on foreign service to Madras: their conduct in 1816 at Java during the expedition under Auchmuty : their conduct in Burin ah, in the first Burmese war in 1824; above all, the recent refusal of the 38th regiment to embark for Burmah in Lord Dalhousie's reign, an epoch which may be marked as the starting point of the present rebellion. Of this anon. The order was uncalled for at the present moment, because we have eighty-one regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies, available for foreign service. It was unwise, because it struck at the very root of the Bengal sepoys contents. It would introduce some thirty or forty recruits a year into each regiment, enlisted on terms which the old soldiers would regard as derogatory to their rights, and which would ne- 22 cessarily lead to constant bickerings, recriminations, internal dissensions, in regiments composed of two such discordant classes, as the old and new soldiers must in the course of some six or eight years become. Unless, therefore, the Government was quite sure that it was strong enough to put down any disaffec- tion which so unpalatable an order was certain to call forth, its promulgation should have been at any rate deferred. But at that moment we had a miserably small European force in the country : and I can only regard this measure as another instance of that "blind infatuation, and inflated self sufficiency, which has taught us to regard our position in India as impregnable, and utterly to ignore the possi- bility of any existence, either of dissatisfaction at our most distasteful and unjust measures, or of power on the part of any portion of our Native subjects, military or civil, to resist or resent even what they might view with the most sullen indignation. If grievances are really found to exist, they must be redressed; if the constitution of the army is defective, it must be altered; if the old loyal spirit of the sepoy has been shaken, it must be re-established; if we have Prcetorian bands among us, they must be coerced ; but these are questions of detail which may be well left for the consideration of the highest military authorities ; they are not matters on which I feel inclined to dwell, or could usefully do so, had I the inclination. Suffice it briefly to point out that the augmentation of our armies not having kept pace with the increase of our territories, the Native troops have now much heavier labour to perform than had 23 their forefathers; that they are cut up into small detachments, and generally do police rather than military duties;* that their pay has remained sta- tionary while provisions and carriage have gradually risen in price, and that there will be found on inquiry many causes sufficiently accounting for the disaffec- tion of the present soldiery. Thus the necessities of the civil administration of the State have almost denuded the regiments of their officers a fatal mistake, if the cordial spirit of mutual reliance and esteem between officers and men is essential to dis- cipline and confidence ; and if a thorough supervision of the men's comforts and knowledge of their cha- racters, and a candid representation of their wants and wishes, be thought instrumental towards engen- dering and promoting a spirit of content, affection, and respect. Witli the present skeleton staff of officers doing duty with each regiment, this is phy- sically impossible : the few officers present on parade could not do all this important duty even if they would; but it is to be feared, that the few regi- mental officers who have not obtained- staff appoint- ments, the "Refuse," as a distinguished member of their own body has unjustly called them, get through their duties listlessly and superficially, partly from a sense of the hoplessness of otherwise discharging it, partly from a spirit of indifference produced by con- * "Between the 1st January and the 31st Octoberjof the following year," says Sir Charles Napier, " of the Bengal Army 25,916 Infantry, and 3,364 Cavalry, total 29,080 soldiers, were furnished for treasure escorts alone, exclusive of all other civil duties." 24 trasting what they consider their own ill luck with the good fortune of their contemporaries on staff employ. The Regiment is not looked upon as what it ought to be a man's home. The first effort, the first wish of the cadet is, either by interest or study, to get away from regimental duty to the more agree- able labours of a comparatively independent charge. And the effect, upon the character of the privates may easily be conceived. " Military officers," writes Lord Dalhousie, in his Retrospective Minute, u have " been withdrawn for this purpose from the regi- " mental duties in the Artillery and in the Line in " large and unprecedented numbers. " The expedient is advantageous to the present il interests of the officers, and it affords a material " relief to the present necessities of the Government. " But there seems good reason for apprehending u that it will, after a time, prove deeply injurious to " the military efficiency of the army. It is to be " hoped, therefore, that the experiment will be " treated on all hands as a temporary one." Lord Dalhousie omits to mention how many officers he withdrew from the regular army to officer his irre- gular forces ; and this eking out the wants of civil administration at the expense of the efficiency of the army, though perhaps an immediate relief to the State, was but robbing Peter to pay Paul; or sewing on to one end of the blanket what was cut off from the other, under the pleasant self-delusion that the blanket was thereby made to do double duty. So with regard to the Native officer. He is a very different personage from what he was in the days of Olive. Then the cadet of some old family marched into the head-quarters of the regiment about to be formed at the head of a hundred of his retainers. He became at once an officer. He was familiar with his European superior, the regimental duties were performed by him, he was constantly in the battle field ; so great was the trust reposed in him, so large the actual amount of duty he per- formed, that Munro thought one European officer sufficient for a company. Now, all this has changed. We have destroyed the class from which the Native officer was drawn. He is now a poor, old, decrepit creature, not rising from the ranks until he is scarcely fit for any thing but superannuation. Fre- quently he owes his promotion to favouritism and the influence of his officer, with whom he has ingratiated himself, rather than to any aptitude or merit of his own. He is no longer the leader and superior of the common soldiery ; there is no clannish feeling in his favour. He is taken from their ranks, he is of the same quality as themselves; and onee raised to the grade of an officer, his promotion goesHby seniority. There is no longer the old bond of union between the European and the Native officer. They are not drawn together by common dangers in the field : the one springs from the English gentry; the other is no longer his equal in birth, in age, in pay, in tempera- ment, but is drawn from an altogether inferior class of society ; and the consequence is that there exists another community of feeling or of interests.* * Sir Charles Napier gives a very different account of the status of the Native officer in the Madras army. But Sir 26 So again, take the Madras army for an example. With a very trifling increase to its strength, it has now twice the extent of territory to guard. Out of a total of fifty-two regiments, seventeen are on foreign service. The remaining corps have to discharge the entire military duties of the Presidency. The result is that their work has terribly increased. Their tour for foreign duty comes round three times as rapidly as formerly ; the long marches from station to station leave scarcely a moment's breathing time. The men are plunged into debt by building houses at new stations, and by paying for carriage for their wives and families. One regiment, for instance, has had within the last few years to build houses and huts at no fewer than three stations : they have ac- complished long marches ; and on their return lately from Burmah, the men have had to pay sixty rupees per cart, to bring their wives and families from Bur- hampore to Vellore, a distance of 700 miles. I do not select this corps as particularly unlucky; it is but a fair average specimen of what is going on everywhere. The 17th Regiment might have been just as well spoken of; so might the 34th. The result is that the men are deeply embarrassed. A sepoy on seven rupees a month, who has to pay fifty or sixty rupees for his wife's cart once in every two or three years, is unavoidably plunged in debt. He must borrow at exorbitant interest from the money- Charles had no personal acquaintance with the Madrassees, He never landed at Madras, and must have written upon hear- say information. 27 lender, and before he can reclaim the past, the " route" comes for a fresh march to far distant can- tonments, and hurries him into fresh difficulties. Then the character of the duties performed by the army is essentially changed. They are seldom led to battle and victory, as of yore; they are separated in small detachments, scattered over the face of the country, an entire regiment seldom meeting on parade. They form treasure parties, jail guards; they are, in fact, degraded from the functions of an army to those of an armed police; and this constant separation of a regiment into small fractional parts destroys its unity and esprit de corps. These are among the first causes of discontent, and they admit of easy remedy. There are others less apparent, which have made the Bengal army a Praetorian band, not to be trusted, striving for mas- tery, determined to rule or die. Thirty thousand Goorkas, Sir C. Napier tells us, are necessary to coerce the pampered Bengal sepoy. True, Lord Dalhousie declared that Napier was -libelling the Bengal army : which of the two was the' most far- sighted, let recent events decide. Probably it will be found necessary to reorganize our army and our military system. The institution of a staff corps, or if that measure, as many military men assert, is not practicable in the Indian Army something tan- tamount to it, whether by a system of " seconding," or otherwise keeping up the full complement of European regimental officers, becomes essential, if the regiments are to be efficiently officered, The retention of a far larger number of Europeans, and, 28 as 1 would suggest, of East Indians, in the service of the Company, will be one very palpable measure. Never again will it be wise to denude India of troops to such an extent as has lately been the case. The capital of the Presidency of Fort St. George has, at this moment, but a wing of H.M.'s 43rd and a few artillerymen to guard it. At Cawnpore, there appear to be about twenty Europeans, and a single gun is placed in position to protect the tele- graph station ! Probably the troops will be hereafter much more massed in cantonments, and their duties be more purely of a military character, even if our Government itself does not for many years to come assume the same characteristic ; for the events of the two last months have thrown back the cause of civil progress for half a century at least. We must not place too much reliance on the increase of power which the electric telegraph and the railway place in our hands. It has been asserted, indeed, that when these machines were complete, we might even dispense with a part of our present military establishments ; but late events prove that, although the electric telegraph and railway no doubt vastly increase our means for rapid communication and concentration against a foreign enemy, they aiford us no safeguard against a domestic foe suddenly springing up among ourselves. So long as the Native army is faithful, we can direct their movements with a rapidity un- known before : the moment they become disaffected, the wires are sure to be cut, and the rail broken up ; so that we may trust to a broken reed, if, in our reliance on these forces, we neglect our ordinary 29 roads : certainly we cannot reduce our army on ac- count of the introduction of these appliances of modern science. Some other facts are apparent enough even to a non-military observer. In the first place, the ablest of our Indian soldiers and statesmen have ever been alive to the fact, that the chief danger to our empire lay, not in foreign invasion, but in the revolt of our own armies, and the antipathies of our own subjects. A gentleman once observed to Sir C. Metcalfe, that we had now so mastered all around, that there was no one left to contend with us. Sir Charles shook his head. " Why," replied his friend, " if any enemy arises " against us, he must spring up out of the ground." " You have said it," was the retort of the sagacious statesman. The selections of Sir C. Metcalfe's papers, made by Mr. Kaye, are full of similar fore- bodings. Sir Charles Metcalfe was one of the ablest of English statesmen; one of the most experienced of our Indian rulers. Mr. Kaye's name' stamps his views with an India House authority. Let us peruse a few. " Our empire in India has arisen from the supe-0 " riority of our military prowess. Its stability rests 4 " entirely on the same foundation. Let this founda- " tion be removed, and the fabric must fall to the " ground. Let this foundation be in the least " shaken, and the fabric must totter. Whatever " delusions may prevail in England respecting the " security to be derived from the affections of our " Indian subjects, and a character for moderation 30 " and forbearance with foreign native states, it will " probably be admitted in India that our power de- " pends solely on our military superiority. " Yet there is reason to apprehend that our com- " parative superiority is in some measure dimi- " nished, in consequence of the general increase of " discipline, experience, skill, and confidence, on the " part of the military of India." Again : " Our situation in India has always been preca- " rious. It is still precarious, not less so perhaps at " the present moment, by the fault of the system " prescribed by Government at home, than at any " former period. We are still a handful of Europe- " ans governing an immense empire without any "firm hold on the country, having warlike and " powerful enemies on all our frontiers, and the " spirit of disaffection dormant, but rooted univer- " sally among our subjects. " That insuperable separation which exists be- " tween us and our subjects, renders it necessary to " keep them in subjection by the presence of a niili- " tary force, and impossible to repose confidence in " their affection or fidelity for assistance in the " defence of our territories. " It may be observed that the tried services and "devotion of our Native army furnish a proof to the " contrary of the preceding assertion. Our Native " army is certainly a phenomenon, the more so as " there is no heartfelt attachment to our government " on the part of our Native troops. They are, in " general, excellent soldiers, attached to regular pay, 31 <; and possessing a good notion of the duty of fidelity " to the power which gives them "bread. There is " no reason to apprehend their general defection as " long as we continue tolerably successful. But if " the tide of fortune ever turn decidedly against us, " and any power rise up able to give good pay regu- u larly, and aware of the use to which such an " instrument may be applied, there will then be a " general proof afforded of that want of attachment " in our Native army, of which at present numbers " of persons are not convinced" Again : " We are to appearance more powerful in India " now than we ever were. Nevertheless, our down- " fall may be short work. When it commences it " will probably be rapid, and the world will wonder " more at the suddenness with which our immense " Indian empire may vanish, than it has done at the " surprising conquest that we have achieved. Jhe " cause of this precariousness is, that our power " does not rest on actual strength, but on impres- " sion. Our whole real strength consists in the few " European regiments, speaking comparatively, that " are scattered singly over the vast space of subju- " gated India. That is the only portion of our " soldiery whose hearts are with us, and whose con- " stancy can be relied on in the hour of trial. All " our Native establishments, military or civil, are " the followers of fortune; they serve us for their " livelihood, and generally serve us well. From a " sense of what is due to the hand that feeds them, " which is one of the virtues that they most extol, 32 " they may often display fidelity under trying cir- " cumstances; but in their inward feelings they par- " take more or less of the universal disaffection " which prevails against us, not from bad govern- " ment, but from natural and irresistible antipathy; " and were the wind to change to use a native ex- " pression and to set in steadily against us, we " could not expect that their sense of honour, al- " though there might be splendid instances of devo- " tion, would keep the mass on our side in opposition " to the common feeling which, with one view, might " for a time unite all India from one end to the " other." Again : " Our greatest danger is not from a Russian inva- " sion, but from the fading of the impression of our " invincibility from the minds of the Native inha- " bitants of India. The disaffection which would " willingly root us out exists abundantly ; the con- " currence of circumstances sufficient to call it into " general action may at any time happen. u Our government is not a national government " that can rely on the affections of its subjects for u defence against foreign invasions. It is the curse " of a government over a conquered country that it " cannot trust the people. Our subjects are internal " enemies, ready at least for change, if not ripe for " insurrection ; the best affected are passive votaries " of fate. We can retain our dominion only by a " large military establishment ; and without a con- " siderable force of British troops the fidelity of our " Native army could not be relied on. " Our danger does not lie in the military force " alone of Native states, but in the spirit by which " they are actuated towards us ; and still more in " the spirit of our subjects, from one end of India to " the other. We have no hold on their affections ; " more than that, disaffection is universal. So that " what to a power supported by the affections of its " subjects would be a slight disaster, might to us be " an irreparable calamity. The little reverse which " we met with at Ramoo in the Burmah war, " sounded throughout India like our repulse at the " first siege of Bhurtpore, magnified and exagge- " rated as if it had been our death knell." Again : " I have noticed these circumstances at the risk " of repeating what I have probably said more than " once on former occasions, because the prevalent " disaffection of our subjects, the uncertainty under " which we hold any part of our Indian possessions, " without the presence or immediate vicinity of a u military force; the utter inability of our civil esta- " blishments to stem the torrent of insurrection ; their "^consternation and hopelessness when it begins to " roar, constitute in reality the greatest of our " dangers in India; without which a Russian inva- " sion, or any other invasion, might, I doubt not, be " successfully met and repulsed. The authority of " the late Governor- General in deriding internal dis- " affection and insurrection, as if they were quite " contemptible, must have great weight, the more be- " cause it will be gratifying to our rulers to see such " opinions supported by such authority. Differing I) 34 " totally from those opinions, I think it necessary to " appeal to facts of recent occurrence. What hap- " pened in the Barasut, Kamglmr, and Jungul Mehel " districts, may happen in any other part of our " country, without any other cause than the disaf- " fection already existing everywhere. " Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of the u greatest of our dangers, or, rather, becomes so " when the means of quelling it are at a distance. " It is easy to decide it, because insurgents may not " have the horse, foot, and artillery of a regular " army ; but it becomes serious if we have not those " materials at hand. Nothing can be a stronger " proof of our weakness in the absence of a military " force, even when it is not far removed, than the " history of such insurrections as have occurred. " The civil power and all semblance of the existence " of our government are instantly swept away by the " torrent." These extracts are of singular significance at the present moment, both as having been written long before the present events, and as proceeding from one of the greatest and best informed among Indian statesmen. There is one other passage which I would quote from the same authority. It is a com- mon observation that our empire in India is one purely founded on opinion. Sir Charles Metcalfe thus forcibly analyzes the truth : " Some say that our empire in India rests on " opinion, others on main force. It in fact depends " on both. We could not keep the country by " opinion if we had not a considerable force ; and no 35 " force that we could pay would be sufficient if it :c were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility, " Our force does not operate so much by its actual " strength as by the impression which it produces, " and that impression is the opinion by which we " hold India." Opinion may be the wider basis of the two : but it would fall to-morrow if unsupported by our arms. Plus nominis honor Quam tuns ensis aget. Especially has the Bengal army been regarded as the source of danger. Its composition, the greater number of high caste men and Brahmins in its ranks, the repeated refusal of various regiments to embark on foreign service, the whole history of the mutinies u passive respectful mutinies" Sir Charles Napier calls them, at Eawul Pindee and Wuzurabad in 1849, when thirty sepoy Battalions were implicated, though Lord Dalhousie, when the danger was past, called the whole affair " a farce ; " all these things lead us to look on the out-break of mutiny among the ranks of the Bengal army without surprize. They may teach us too that Sir Charles Napier by his wise measures saved the empire in 1849 from a mutiny which has been only postponed. Lord Dalhousie in his famous Minute reviewing his whole administra- tion states indeed, that " the position of the Native " soldier in India has long been such as to leave " hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of " improvement," and he called Sir Charles Napier the calumniator of the Indian army for his having D 2 36 asserted then there was a mutiny. But now, it is curious to see that all the Indian Journals, even those formerly most favourable to Lord Dalhousie, are full of quotations from Napier, who is declared to be little short of a prophet. Napier expressly says that " Mutiny with the sepoys is the most formidable " danger menacing our Indian Empire." And again, " The ablest and most experienced civil and " military servants of the East India Company con- " sider mutiny as one of the greatest, if not the " greatest danger threatening India ; a danger also " that may come unexpectedly, and, if the first symp- " toms be not carefully treated, with a power to " shake Leadenhall." But it is very far from true that the condition of the sepoy is such as scarcely to admit of improve- ment : and the condition of the army becomes neces- sarily the next subject for enquiry, since it is obviously there that we are likely to find one of the predisposing causes to revolt. I have already par- tially alluded to this subject, in adverting to the paucity of European regimental officers : the altered character and position of the Native officer ; the quality of duties now performed by the soldiers ; the increase of their fatigues, and their expenses. To these I would now add the following. Of late years the European soldier in India has been greatly improved in position ; * his pay, rations, tentage in the field, barracks, punka-pullers, followers in quarters, boxes for holding the kit of himself and * See Lord Dalhousie's Minute, 150165. 37 family in cantonment, and canvass bags for the field, all have been granted, improved, or increased ; his marches are made as rarely as possible ; fine healthy cantonments in the coolest hill stations are selected for him in preference to hot barracks in the plains ; his comforts are all cared for ; convalescents and recruits are looked after ; annuities to soldiers as well as good conduct pay granted ; but in all that time nothing has been done for the Native soldier. Yery far am I from implying that more has been done for the European troops than the interests of Government or their own merits justified ; I merely desire to show the great contrast between the care of Government for that part of the Forces and of the Native army. With the sepoy it has been different. While his pay has remained stationary, his ex- penses have increased, both by the higher price of provisions and the more numerous and much longer marches he has now to perform. Formerly a regi- ment had at least six months' notice of its intended march. The sepoys had time to make their prepara- tions, and they marched on to some neighbouring station, comparatively near. Now the order for the march comes in suddenly, and the sepoy is hustled off on a route of some four or even seven hundred miles. Nor does the sepoys' pay bear the same relative value to the present earnings of the mass of the people as in former years. The employment of a soldier was then deemed honorable and ranked high in social opinion ; the parties so employed enjoying a good standing in 38 social position and worldly wealth as compared with the masses ; now, the many public employments given in our Courts of Justice, in the Revenue, and Government Offices, and in the Public Works, have all elevated another class of a less dominant caste far above the sepoy in position and emoluments. The only boon to the sepoy which I can call to mind is the Order of British India, but it has been so arranged, that a decoration which would be useful, if worn by the Native officer with his corps, is generally by the time of its bestowal, made the inducement for the Native officer to take his pension and retire to his native village. Thither he carries with him the prize which accompanies the decoration the money allowance. Hence it happens that many Native officers linger on long after they ought to retire, in hopes of receiving the decoration and allowance, and when they do get it, they immediately leave the regiment, and all the useful influence of this valuable boon goes with them. There has been a vast quantity of useless tinkering with the soldiers' pay, clothing, rations, flogging, the alterations in the articles of war, pensions for wounds, compensation for dearness of provisions, money rations, rations without money, all wretch- edly carried out, and invariably with a niggardly spirit: guard duty has been severe and incessant; personal escorts, treasure escorts, and jail guards multiplied; frequent absences from the provinces; withdrawal of right to have civil cases heard by the courts in priority. The military administration of India, instead of 39 being simple, is complicated, disjointed, and con- fused ; instead of being vigorous, it is weak, vacil- lating, and ill-informed even in general matters, and lamentably ignorant in those minute details in which the Central Government so unwisely meddles. The organization and sub-divisions into which the component parts of the army are formed, are irregu- lar and contradictory The three Indian forces are by Act of Parliament designated by the name of the presidencies in which they serve ; the army of the presidency of Fort William, being usually styled the Bengal army, and belonging to the Government of that name. When the late Charter Act constituted Bengal a distinct Government, the control over that portion of the armed force of India ought to have gone to the newly-appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, just as the control of the armies of Madras and Bombay belonging to the local Governments of those presidencies ; but jealousy of authority pre- vailed, and the command of this army was retained in the hands of the Governor- General of India. No inconvenience would have resulted from the other arrangements, as the Bengal army would have been as much at the command of the Government of India as ever. Indeed, at this present time, there is a very large portion of the troops of the Madras and Bombay presidencies immediately under the direct control of the Government of India, as far as respects their positions as military bodies. The dis- advantage of the Governor- General retaining the immediate and direct control over the army of Bengal, has been that the Governor-General of India 40 luiving all the vast civil concerns of this great Empire to care for, has also directed the most petty and unimportant matters connected with the welfare of a great army. Lord Dalhousie's temperament led him to supervise the most minute details of ordinary routine, and the result was such as might have been expected. Let the past military management be looked into, to prove the utter folly of this administration. Dila- toriness, supineness, indifference, ignorance, and errors of deep import, have been the characteristic of the military system of India. Let the financial statement of the military Auditor- General of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, as sent home for the past five years, be returned to the House of Commons uninuti- lated. Then the people of England will see the remarkable division of forces, subsidiary forces, Pun- jaub irregulars, Nizam's contingent, Nagpore irregu- lar force, Oude force, local infantry, an innumerable host all holding direct and immediate allegiance to the man, the Governor-General, without the inter- ventions of the Commander-in-Chief. Let a search- ing, honest investigation be instituted, and the true condition of the Bengal army will be dis- covered. Then it will appear that it has for years been the dominant body in the country : that the most extraordinary concessions have been made to its tyranny by the authorities ; that the head caste man in the regiment, and not the com- manding officer, has really been in command. That tli is very representation and others of a similar character have been in vain forwarded officially to 41 the superior authorities ; that they have known and ignored the mutinous state of the troops whom they feared and gulled. At Mooltan, when the Bengallees according to their privileges declined to work in the trenches, the cost of the hired labour to perform this work, was, in accordance with a standing order, directed to be stopped out of their pay. The men refused to permit this, and the officers actually paid the money out of their own pockets to hush the matter up! With such an army as that of Bengal, mutiny was a necessity. It was a mere question of time. The moment must have come in its history, as in the history of all such bodies, when it must either subdue the State it professed to serve, or be subdued. The policy of Lord Dalhousie has pre- cipitated the event, it is true; but the event itself was nevertheless certain. Those officers who were aware of the condition of the army and neglected to report it, are under a heavy responsibility ; so are those at head quarters who have put aside such representations as reached them ; so is Lord Dalhousie, whose despotic monopoly of power prevented many an honest man from making representations, which he knew would be unattended to, and call down displeasure on himself. Major Bird. I see, has publicly stated at Manchester, that the Company's troops had declared their readiness to join the King of Oude, if he would resist the spolia- tion of his kingdom. On what authority was this statement made ? Was it known to others ? Was any representation of this conveyed to head quarters? AVas any notice taken of it ? 42 Further, the jealousy evinced by the late Governor- General, Lord Dalhousie, towards the exercise of power by the Conimander-in- Chief, and his resolute determination to concentrate in his own hands the whole authority, military and civil, of all India, led him to deny to one and all in high office the right to exercise any authority by virtue of the office, except such as it pleased him to yield. Thus he refused such a man as Sir Charles Napier the right to ex- ercise any independent action or discretion however trifling even in a crisis fraught with danger to the Empire, on the plea that the Governor- General pos- sessed the priority of all talent and information. The plea was not, however, well founded, for men with a glimmering perception of what was coming were afraid to speak out. It was common talk, universally accepted, that no man in India could without danger to his individual prospects either oppose Lord Dalhousie, or make known to him unpleasant truths. From the commencement of our power up to this lord's government, though we exer- cised despotic power over the people, yet the Euro- pean functionaries were allowed a liberty of speech and writing, and a certain independence of thought; and thus from the many minds, all interested in Eng- land's prosperity, truth and good suggestions readied the Government ; but under Lord Dalhousie's admin- istration, no man or body of men, however high in rank or power, good in intention, sound in views, dared to give expression to ideas opposed to those held by his lordship. Especially was this the case after the overthrow of Sir Charles Napier, and thus that mono- 43 poly of power which was mistaken fur strength, was in reality the cause of fatal weakness : it struck down all independence even of thought, much more of action. It disgusted the honest and the able, and kept them aloof in a moody silence. It brought forward the pliant and the courtier. It repressed the communication of valuable, though unpalatable information, and led to the neglect of essential measures, and to the introduction of futile measures based upon an ignorance of the actual state of the soldiery, or upon half information, which necessarily led even the clearest intellect to mistaken conclusions. Lord Dalhousie listened to those who flattered him by prophesying smooth things. This, and his lordship's love of temporarily relieving the State by a show of economy, probably led to that most fatal of his measures of army improvement, the breaking up of the Commissariat Department. " The substitution of hired cattle," his lordship writes,* " for the use of the Government, in lieu of " animals bred and maintained by the Government " itself, was a change hardly less important than that " which has just been noted. Though the measure u is described in a single sentence, it has given a large " permanent saving to Government, while it has pre- " served full efficiency in the public carriage of the " army." So far from this being the case, I have just read a letter from an officer with the late Commaiider-in- Chief at the time of his death, stating that it was * A Minute, par. 160. 44 utterly impossible to move sooner against Delhi, from there being not a camel or beast of burthen procurable. How much " permanent saving" this sacrifice of our means of moving our forces at a critical moment has effected, may be calculated by our present loss of life and treasure. The HurJcaru has the following pertinent remarks upon this sub- ject : " LORD DALHOUSIE AND COMMISSARIAT. If the " advance upon Delhi has been delayed principally " or even partly by want of carriage, this forms u another indictment in the heavy charges we have " to bring against Lord Dalhousie. That nobleman, " some three or four years ago, set himself to work " to reform the Commissariat Department. It is u probable that at the time he was in want of " money, either for the conversion of the Five per " Cents., for the Burmese war, or to swell his ba- " lances, for, we believe, his reform of the Commis- " sariat, although heralded with much pomp and " parade, resolved itself into an order to do away " with the breeding establishment at Hissar, and to " sell off the whole stock of Government camels on " hand. A contract was at the same time entered u into with Lalla Joteepersad to keep up a certain " number of hired animals ready for service. The " sale of the Government stock doubtless brought in " a considerable amount of ready money, but what " has been the practical result of the reform? Why, " that at a most critical period the most critical 4i season of our rule in India our troops, for the " first time in history, have been unable to inflict 45 " prompt punishment upon mutineers, and all for " want of carriage ! " This is a sample of the penny-wise and pound- " foolish policy of the man who, undoubtedly, pro- " yoked the present crisis." That Lord Dalhousie's administration was sup- ported by many, if not a large majority of the Europeans in India, is undoubted ; but this is simply saying that men are selfish, and seek after the loaves and fishes so plentifully at the command of a Governor- General : but there is a considerable num- ber of Europeans who regard his lordship's career in a very different light as one, during which a greater amount of evil has been done to our real power in India, more destruction of the independent English feeling by his lordship's despotism, than during any former government. With reference to future military measures of reform, the following seem most prominently worthy of consideration. 1st. The distribution of our army on a totally different plan from that of the single station and detachment plan now in vogue, by which our forces are, as Sir C. Napier says, scattered over the country as by a pepper-box. The grouping of our forces in large bodies at sundry principal cantonment stations has, I believe, been lately recommended by the pre- sent military authorities. It has the sanction of Sir C. Napier and Sir C. Metcalfe ; but it involves necessarily an entire reorganization of our police, upon whom must then fall all the civil duties of 46 treasure and jail guards, and other fatigue duties, now discharged by the army. 2nd. The introduction of some fresh element into the Native ranks, to counterpoise the influence of the Brahmins and men of caste. It is thus that able journal the Plicenix describes the influence of the Brahmins in the army of Bengal : " It is in the army, however, that the Brahmin is " most mischievous, that his propensities for intrigue " become most dangerously developed. Our Native " regiments are crowded with Brahmins. They " preponderate in most corps above all other castes. " Orders prohibiting their enlistment have hitherto " been next to useless. They enlist under false " names, professing to be of other castes; assured " that the presence of shoals of their kinsmen will " secure them, after enlistment, from recognition as " Brahmins by the other sepoys. The mischief those " priest-soldiers do is incalculable. They are at the u bottom of every plot, the components of every " punchayet; as they will, so must all others do. " Their numbers and their priestly influence give " them, in some degree, the command of the corps. " Europeans unacquainted with the internal struc- " ture of the Bengal Native regiments, can have but " the faintest notion of the influence for evil the " Brahmins of a regiment of Native infantry have " it in their power to wield. It is, indeed, difficult " to convey a correct idea of the bad influence these " bodies of priests can exercise, when inclination or " interests lead them to disaffection. Ireland, in a 47 " state of semi-rebellion, garrisoned by regiments, u three-fourths of the men of which were Roman " Catholics, would not furnish an ample illustration ! " If our readers can, however, fancy three-fourths of " those Irish Catholic soldiers to be men invested " with Jesuitical influence over their fellows nay, " really Jesuits they will realize a picture that " comes something near the mark. Is it wonderful " that an army so organized should sooner or later " mutiny not merely mutiny, but boldly essay the " destruction of British Indian rule? The wonder " is, that it has not long before attempted what "it is now trying to achieve. Until late years, " however, any attempt of the kind must have " seemed hopeless." That we must henceforth continue to keep a far larger European force than hitherto in India for many years to come, seems unquestionable. But though such regiments would, under a system of cantonments, be quartered with Native regiments, they would still be perfectly distinct from them. Various propositions have from time to time been made, with reference to the source whence new blood may be infused into our Indian ranks. Lord Wil- liam Bentinck proposed Malays; Sir Charles Napier advocated Goorkas : a proposition has lately appeared to enlist Africans; another suggests the addition of European companies to every Native regiment. This last would, at any rate, seem inexpedient. The European and the Native may forego their prejudices in seasons of pressing, common danger, as happened between the 13th Queen's and the 35th B.L.I. 48 during the siege of Jellalabad ; but the latter brave regiment was spurned by the Bengal regiments for even such conduct, and there is little prospect of coalescence between the European and Native soldier. The former despises the latter as a "nigger;" the latter regards the former as a beef-eating, outcast Pariah. They have no community of language, thought, or habits; and the presence of the Euro- peans would afford no safeguard against the preva- lence of sedition, the influence of punchayets, and the like, among the Native ranks. There is, however, another class admirably adapted for "our purpose, a class whom we are bound to support, though it has hitherto been too much the custom to despise them I speak of the East Indians. This rapidly increasing class is like the bat in the fable, between the birds and beasts; they are outcasts on either hand. They are miserably poor ; they have contracted habits of early, improvident marriages, and produce families for whom they find it impossible to provide. Hence, we see plenty of emaciated specimens of humanity among them. But in all those instances in which good food and wholesome air have been allowed to operate, the East Indian frame becomes developed, and the individual is a stout, stalwart man. They speak English and one Native language, often more, indifferently ; they are, with respect to habits of life, rather assimilated to their Asiatic than the European side of origin; there is a substratum variety in their composition, on which would naturally rise a proper esprit de corps. They would harmonize with the Native soldiery. As it is, they compose the bands 49 the drummers, buglers, and fifers of our army. From their knowledge of Native habits and lan- guage, they would act as a constant police upon the Native sepoys, who could scarcely by any possibility carry on intrigue in the presence of such a detective ; whilst the pride of British ancestry would ever render the East Indian loyal to the English interests, which they would identify with their own. The East India Company has been frequently urged to avail itself of this source for recruiting its army hitherto without success. It is a fact that East Indians, unable to enter the Company's army, have sailed to England, and there enlisted in the Queen's forces. Any number required might be recruited at a short notice; and, while effectually serving our- selves, we should be doing bare justice to a race whose claim to our care we have been only too tardy in acknowledging. 3rd. The occupation of the country by a far greater number of British troops. That we must have many additional regiments from England quar- tered continually in India seems very certain. Whe- ther England can spare a sufficient number seems problematical, looking to the vast territories she has to defend, and the increasing difficulty in finding recruits. Under these circumstances we must cast about to supply our wants by other means. One seems feasible, and well worthy of consideration; I allude to the plantation of military European colo- nies on our numerous healthy hills. What a power should we have in 5,000 British military colonists on the Neilgherries, trained to arms, nursed to cli- E 50 mate, centrically placed, ready to descend by good roads, at an hour's notice, on any of the plains around, where their services might be required ! A proposal of this nature has been started by Major Andrew Crawford of the Bombay army, and I take the following from a review on his work in the columns of the Athenaeum : " British India contains 840,000 square miles. " Her population has been variously estimated at " from one to two hundred millions. She is guarded u by 260,000 combatants, of whom 41,475 are " European troops ; but she has no reserve, no " militia, no conscription whatever. The extent of " continental Europe westward of Russia is about " the same as the extent of British India. The " population may be about the same too. But the " former supports 1,234,000 regular troops, whilst " the latter, as we have just seen, is guarded by " only 260,000 ! Yet, is this limited army contented " and happy ? Is even the commissioned rank satis- "fied?" Major Crawford replies in the negative. " Promotion is slow; regimental employment is dis- " tasteful; brevet rank is unequally distributed. " The average age of the whole body of general " officers is about seventy-two. Yet these gentlemen, " seldom possessed of viridis senectus, are borne in " the strength of the army. Nor is there less stag- " nation as the grades descend lower. Eegimental " colonels and majors are generally called to their " appointments at the respective ages of fifty -three " and forty-eight years, and after the respective " lengths of service of thirty-six and thirty-two 51 :c years. Nor does the brevet rank give satisfaction. " Commissaries, paymasters, and judge-advocates, " have honours conferred upon them as lavishly as " upon officers who have passed through the ordeal " of fire. These honours, scattered without discri- " mination, are deprived of half their value, and the ;c whole of their justice. The soldier, the sepoy, and " the officer, are at present alike uneasy, and alike " desirous of reform. " What then does Major Crawford propose? Why 44 something not unlike the plan of industrial armies " put forward by Charles Fourier, the Phalansterian. c What a grand amount of labour is locked up in c the Indian army ! What magnificent public works 44 are ill-provided with labourers ! Yet in the ranks 44 of our Indian army we possess an amount of labour 44 which is represented by a money value of at least 44 7,500,000 rupees a year. We could spare up- " wards of 70,000 native infantry throughout the 44 three presidencies, for works similar to those ex- 44 ecuted by the Eoman legionaries roads, bridges, " canals, dams, tanks, harbours, and piers. In the " Indian army there is some 30,000 artillery and " cavalry, but these could not be employed like the " infantry in indiscriminate labours. Their cattle "is in number 35,564. The forage for it costs " 3,912,040 rupees annually. Therefore, this artil- " lery and cavalry should be colonized on the Aus- " trian and Russian system, and be made to produce " subsistence for themselves and their horses. By 44 means of both these working systems, Government " would save 1,141,204 annually. Prince Eugene E2 52 " started and carried out the latter system in Aus- " tria : and 45,000 men now form a colonized cordon " of troops along the Turkish frontier, at posts 50 " miles apart, in a line 800 miles in length. Eussia, " admiring and imitating the example of Austria, " has now an establishment of 98,260 men, 71,210 " horses, and 152 guns, all supported by military " labour. They are among the best corps of the " Eussian army." Our hills are healthy and well adapted for farm- ing. They grow wheat and other cereals, and there is ample room for any number of men we may choose to locate upon them. Apparently some such scheme might be effected at a positive saving to Govern- ment. But beyond glancing at the suggestion itself, I profess myself unequal to consider it in detail. 4th. By some scheme or other a full working com- plement of English officers must be kept up, with every regiment of service. Whether this is to be brought about by a staff corps, or some other device, it is not my province to determine ; but that it must be done, somehow or other, I think will be admitted by those who consider the necessary consequences of such an under-officering of corps, as a perusal of the army lists of the various presidencies discloses. 5th. The command of corps must only be en- trusted to men who can efficiently perform their duty : men in the prime of life, or, at least, a hale and green old age ; not men effete from senility, dis- ease, or the effects of long residence in India; who cannot sit a horse, or hear a volley fired close to their ears, or speak audibly a word of command, or 53 distinguish between a stone or a stockade at thirty paces distance. Of these poor old gentlemen the army must be weeded ; they have seen their day, and done their duty well in their time no doubt. By quicker promotion, by stronger inducements to retire, let them be gently compelled to seek home and repose, with all those honours which should attend old age ; but, at all events, let them not con- tinue to impair the efficiency of our military arm, while younger, abler, fitter instruments, are ready at hand at a moment's notice. 6th. The question of elevating the position and quality of the native officer demands attention. 7th. The just grievances of the sepoy call for inquiry and redress. On all these points I would venture to recommend a perusal of " Malcolm's Political History," and " White's Considerations on the State of British India." One remark only I would venture to make here ; a hope that after victory has crowned our arms, we may not tarnish our success by any unnecessary bloodshed. The rebels have put themselves out of the pale of quarter by their own inhuman atrocities. Let those who meet us in battle pay the penalty of their crimes by death upon the spot. But after the battle is over, may we remember mercy. There are, I know, many strong-minded persons among us who counsel utter extermination. " The rule," writes " Macaulay, " by which a prince ought after rebel- " lion to be guided in selecting the rebels for punish- " ment, is perfectly obvious. The ring-leaders, the " men of rank, fortune, and education, whose powers 54 " and whose artifices have led the multitude into " error, are the proper objects of severity. The " deluded populace, when once the slaughter on the " field of battle is over, can scarcely be treated too " leniently." True, the majority here are military who are guilty of the military crime of mutiny, as well as the civil crime of rebellion. They are doubly trai- tors; but, as Napier has observed, we cannot deal with thirty thousand men as we would with a single or a few mutineers ; and it is to be hoped that the policy of Gamillus rather than Pontius may prevail in our councils on the present occasion. The further consideration of the treatment of the army I must leave to military authorities. I must apologize and crave forbearance indeed for having even said so much on a topic with which I am not professionally acquainted; but it was impossible with such a subject as the present before me, to pass in silence over any of those causes which may have pre- disposed men to revolt; but it is rather with the more remote and very remote exciting causes which I have to do; and these it is, which I desire to bring prominently under notice, because they are apt to elude observation, or to be denied; and it is impos- sible to devise the proper remedies, if the circle of our inquiries does not include within its circum- ference all the causes, remote as well as immediate, that may have led to a malady, which if not checked, will prove speedily fatal. I do not say that these causes may be traced back in a regular series, each accounting for, and pro- 55 ducing the other. By asserting this, I should fall into the fallacy, or at least I should certainly be so accused, of enlisting every possible event into the service of a preconceived theory, and the foregone conclusion of a mere party writer. What I say is, that we must bring under review every cause which seems likely to endanger our empire for the future ; whether or not they shall be thought to be more or less connected or altogether unconnected with the recent rebellion. On this point opinions may differ. Some may see in every one of the topics which I am about to bring forward, only so many reasons accounting for the late revolt: others may deny the relation of cause and effect between them and that event. Whichever view be right, it is nevertheless prudent, if not imperative on us, to investigate them all. The first is the general tone of feeling that the people of Ijidia entertained towards us. The most prejudiced, narrow-minded, short-sighted civilian of the old school, would scarcely venture at the present day to assert that our rule is loved by the Natives, or that they look to us with feelings of affection. Let the reader refer back to the prohetic expres- sions, the repeated warnings, the statesmanlike con- victions of Sir Charles Metcalfe. Nothing indeed is more remarkable than the blindness of the general run of civilians to the actual feelings of the people. They are so puffed up with an overweening idea of their own excellence, that they cannot believe the people disaffected under their superintendence ; they are so wedded to the perfections of the Indian Go- 56 vernment, that they cannot conceive it distasteful to the people. They make no allowance for the exis- tence among the Natives of those feelings which actuate themselves. They cannot believe that the Natives look with reverence, or affection, or respect to old institutions, old associations, old names, old dynasties. They look only to what they conclude their system ought to produce: they listen to the reports of their Sheristadars and Thasildars; the supple Bengalee is little likely to bring forward what shall prove humbling to " master's " pride, or incur the loss of "master's favor;" they ignore the neces- sary consequences of such an administration of justice and police as obtains throughout India. They glance only at the superficial state of the country ; and even in their recent official dispatch in reply to the Bengal Missionaries' Memorial, written so lately as the llth March last, I find the following passage : " We " observe with great satisfaction that the Lieutenant- " Governor expresses his absolute dissent from the " statement made, doubtless in perfect good faith, " that the people exhibit a spirit of sullen discontent kt on account of the miseries ascribed to them, or that " there exists among them that bitter hatred to the u Government, which has filled the memorialists, as " they declare, with alarm as well as sorrow." I believe the following will be found to be some- thing near the truth of the matter. There is indis- putably a very large and influential population who hate us cordially. First of all, in daring as in bit- terness, I would place the Mohamedans, who pursue us with a double hatred, both as Kaffirs to be exter- 57 minated on account of our religion, and as the race which has toppled them from their palaces and super- seded them in the empire of the East. Next are the Brahmins, who, without the same intense religious prejudices, or the same open audacity of purpose, have nevertheless not marked their ascendancy over the millions who pass away from their hands without a deep animosity ; nor is the effect of their revenge less formidable, because it exhibits itself in wily intrigue, in tampering with the soldiery, and underhand sedi- tion, rather than in open violence. So again the high castes view us askance. Their importance is lost, they no longer fatten on the revenues of the country, or thrive by the oppression of the masses ; a task, which so far as it is permitted at all, we have ourselves monopolized. The great Zemindars and other landholders, whose estates have passed from them, and such of their retainers as look back with regret to the feudal ancestral hall, nurse a bitter grudge against the English. The old landed aris- tocracy, as a body, are angry at us for having broken down the privileges which they misused. But there anything like hatred or jealousy stops. The great bulk of the people, the ryots and cultivators of the soil are better off under our government, than any of its predecessors. Our policy is all in their favor. We have released them, at least in the Presidency of Madras, from the thraldom of their lords, who governed them ruthlessly ; we have done much to level the dis- tinctions of caste, and to raise the Pariah to a higher social platform. We have striven to educate the lowest, rather than to keep knowledge locked up 58 exclusively in the breasts of the fortunate few. Our intentions have been excellent ; we have marred them in performance; and the discontent of the masses is not levelled at the Government as a Govern- ment, but at the constant interference with their agricultural operations, which our mistaken revenue practice has most unnecessarily introduced, the feeble- ness of the administration of justice which envelopes the land in a cloud of litigation, and the corruption of the police, which leads to false charges and extortion on the one hand, while it is perfectly powerless to protect life and property from crimes of violence on the other. The natives have enough in all conscience to make them grumble, but their discontent is neither dangerous in its character, nor directed to the over- throw of the State. Were their condition at once bettered, as it very easily might be, by the introduc- tion of those measures which have already been sanctioned as admitted essentials, they would speedily rise in prosperity, and become one of the happiest and most contented people in the world. I, for one, believe that the future has this in store for India, if our rule obtains ; I believe that Madras, so assiduously declared to be " benighted," is far in advance of any other part of India, in respect to that social change to which I have alluded. "We have here three dis- tinct classes, the ryot, the merchant, and the Govern- ment official. At present all are in a transition state. The Thasildar has enormous powers of working good or harm : when education has raised the character of this class, their influences for good will vastly pre- dominate. By lowering our heavy demands on the 59 agricultural class, and opening up communications for the purposes of traffic, we shall enrich the ryot and the merchant. In these three classes we have the germs of our future landed gentry, our merchant princes, and our ruling class. We have latterly shocked the prejudices of all by our repeated instances of flagrant bad faith in our respective treaty breaches with the native sovereigns of India; we have rudely staggered their belief in our honesty, and done what in us lay to alarm and alienate all classes. It may seem paradoxical, and I confess, I feel it difficult how to reconcile my statement of belief in discontent on the part of the masses with the admission that our Government is an improvement upon any form which has preceeded it. Perhaps the difficulty is created by forgetting that though our predecessors' adminis- tration may have been worse than our own, it does not follow that our own is good. It may still be practically bad. This is but an illustration of Ben- tham's fallacy of false consolation by which the wretched condition of a people is complacently contrasted with one which is more wretched. It is not by what we have done, but by what we have left undone, that our claims to praise or blame must be decided. And it is in this direction, that our errors lie. We have governed too much for ourselves, too little for the people. Till very lately our primary object has been to extract revenue out of them, and they groan under a host of comparatively petty evils, the sum of which is large indeed, and ample enough to engender discontent and disaffection. Perhaps the j GO following remarks of Sir C. Metcalfe, may help to elucidate this seeming contradiction. He says : " Persons unacquainted with our position in India " might throw in our teeth, that this disaffection is " the consequence of bad government, and many " among us, connecting the two ideas together, are " reluctant to credit the existence of general disaffec- " tion. But this feeling is quite natural without any " mis-government. Instead of being excited by our " misrule, it is, I believe, in a great degree, mollified " by our good government. It exists, because the " domination of strangers in every respect strangers " in country, in colour, in dress, in manners, in " habits, in religion, must be odious. It is less " active than it might be, because it is evident to all " that we endeavour to govern well, and that what- " ever harm our government does, proceeds from " ignorance or mistake, and not from any wilful in- " justice or oppression." It is not possible to conceive a greater calamity to the people of India, than the present dissolution of the bands between them and us. Pen cannot de- scribe, heart cannot conceive the misery in store for the natives of India, if every European were massa- cred to morrow, and they handed over to their own devices. Internecine war, anarchy such as the world has not witnessed, would follow our destruction. There is no man strong enough, or wise enough, or good enough, among them, to reconstruct a Govern- ment ; and it would be one universal scene of pillage and devastation throughout the country. As Tacitus 61 writes of the Gauls : " Pulsis Romanis, quid aliud quam bella inter se gentium existent?" But they reflect not on these consequences, apparent as they are to us. It is a trite remark that our own government in India is one emphatically of opinion. Macaulay has enshrined the power of an Englishman's " yea, yea " " nay, nay " in one of his epigrammatic sentences. The sepoy who once eat the Company's salt knew that his pay would be punctual ; his pension during old age, or the support of his family in event of his death in battle, ensured. The ryot, though we wrung his hard-earned rupees out of him, felt that he enjoyed a degree of security to which his ancestors were strangers. He was no longer subject to the predatory incursions of the Pindarees or Mahratta horse. He believed that as a general principle, a love of justice and fair dealing characterized the Englishmen set over him, however distant or patronizing the former might be. Kings confided in us, and gave up real power which they could not preserve, upon the faith of treaties which they fondly flattered themselves would at least leave royal dignity and a princely revenue to their heirs and successors so long, as in their own phrase, "the sun and moon endured." They watched us attempting to punish crimes of violence with the strong hand of the law, and endeavouring to ad- minister civil justice amid the forgeries and perjuries which beset us at every step of a suit. Added to this, they were dumbfounded and stupified at the wondrous success of our arms : they regarded us 62 with a childlike admiration : they looked up to us as beings of a superior order, as the Mexicans and Peruvians looked on the followers of Cortez and Pizarro. Custom has somewhat marred our reputa- tion ; long familiarity has diminished our terrors ; we have taught them the art of war by which we conquered their forefathers ; as we every day approach nearer to them, they see us more and more distinctly. Those whom they mistook for gods, they discover to be mere men ; education is beginning to enable them to judge us by a more rational standard, Minuit praesentia famam. May it not all end in the contempt of Caliban for Trinculo ! More true than ever is it at the present day that any government of ours in India must be one of opi- nion. When the Natives have once discovered their own strength, all attempts on our part at mere phy- sical coercion are manifestly impracticable. We can never be but as a mere handful of strangers, when compared with the swarming millions of our subjects. When once combination among them becomes fea- sible, and a determination to combine is persevered in, the greater force must prevail over the lesser. When a hundred million combine, writes Sir Charles Napier, the game is up. And therefore, if we are to perpetuate our empire, we must eifect it, not through physical force, but by such acts of justice, prudence, and benevolence, as may reconcile the Natives to our rule ; make them regard us as bene- factors, or rather as a portion of themselves ; render ourselves so useful to them, that our presence shall 63 be a continued necessity, at least until they are themselves fitted to take their own government peacefully and powerfully into their own hands. Our practical policy, as it appears to me, is diametrically opposed to all this. India is at this moment in a transition state; it is so by our own acts and measures ; and yet we ignore the fact, and treat the Natives as though every thing was station- ary. It was, no doubt, a perception of this truth which induced Lord Ellenborough boldly to proclaim that the spread of education is incompatible with the security of our empire in India. And so, no doubt it is, if we will cling to our old practice of despotic power ; not so, however, if we are prepared to modify our principles of government to the altered condition of the people. Education is spreading ; opinion is springing up ; judgment is forming ; and yet we seek to deal with the people as though they were the utterly ignorant, powerless, timid, child-like population, whom we conquered a hundred years ago. They are treading fast upon our kibes, and we seek to keep them socially and politically at as great a distance from ourselves as ever. Publicity is becoming every day less and less avoidable, and we would persevere in lines of action which could only be successful from the privacy of their perpetration. We dream that the spoliation of a kingdom, the reduction of a royal family to the miserable dependency of pensioners, the most open treaty breach, the absorption of vast estates, equal in size to an English county, can now be carried on with as complete impunity, attract as little notice, 64 and cause as little discussion as at a period when there was not a public journal and scarce a printing press in India. We fancy that people do not see our short comings in all the objects of good government, education, policy, and justice. We have given the people a standard whereby to measure us, and we are weak enough to suppose they will not use it. Let the sceptical study the leading articles in the Hindu Patriot, written by a Brahmin with a spirit, a degree of reflection and acuteness which would do honor to any journalism in the world. Our govern- ment has always been one of opinion ; but there is this dinstiction between the present and past. Formerly it was a false opinion, compounded of ignorance and fear : now it is a true opinion, compounded of knowlege and reflection ; or, at least, it is every day more and more nearly approximating to a true opinion, to which it must come at last. And this leaves us necessarily but one path to follow, that of truth and justice, on which alone we can preserve, in the opinion of the Natives, a character which will induce them to give us their voluntary, cheerful, and loyal support. And it is precisely in proportion as we have of late years departed from these principles, that the belief of the Natives in our good faith and honesty of intention has been most lamentably shaken ; for I conscientiously believe that the last eight years call it at once the period of Lord Dalhousie's rule, and the policy of aggression, spoliation, and confiscation which characterized his lordship's administration under the Yankee euphemism of " Annexation" have 65 done more to loosen our hold upon the respect of the Natives, than a century of previous efforts to rivet and enchain it. These eight years honestly, if unostentatiously, employed in the introduction of the necessary measures of domestic reform; in strengthening the administration of justice, for in- stance ; in purging the police ; in revising the rates and principles of assessment ; in settling, on a satis- factory basis, the scheme of general education ; in carrying out a complete revenue survey, and so improving the condition of our old possessions, instead of in coveting and grasping new$ would, indeed, have consolidated our power, and with his lordship's great aptitude for business, unflagging powers of labour, and clearness of intellect, the happiest results might have been, nay, must have been, produced. But, unfortunately, consolidation was assumed to consist of usurping every square acre of land, for the occupation of which a pretext could be found. Our dominions would thus become more compact, and our power more uniform and substantial : whereas in reality every fresh acquisi- tion was but a fresh element of weakness, both as it necessitated the spreading of our already insufficient agency, civil and military, over an ever extend- ing area; and as the singular audacity of our bad faith, when treaty after treaty came to be regarded as so much old waste parchment, caused us to be regarded more and more with suspicion and distrust by the great body of the people. It is this accursed " Annexation " system which will probably be found F 66 to be one of the principal, if not the principal, cause of the present rebellion. Time, place, and opportunity befitting, I will pledge myself to prove that our various acts of annexation are one and all contrary to law, the construction of treaties, the facts of the particular case, the law of nations, and the principles of honour, honesty, and good faith. It would take up far too much space were I to enter into a thorough elucidation of the demerits of the confiscation of the respective territories and thrones of Sattarah, Surat, Nagpore, Oude, Tanjore, and the Carnatic. But I must briefly trace the outlines of the principal fea- tures of these cases, and the principles which were violated in carrying out the work of what Mr. Leoni Levi, a dry statistical compiler, can find no other word for than " spoliation." I beg particular attention may be paid to the dissection of these cases, supported as all my asser- tions are by authentic official documents ; because it is only by a thorough understanding of the whole facts, that the wickedness and folly of the annexation policy can be realized by the English public. Let us first see what are the general principles by which the East India Company professes to be guided in such cases. The Sattarah Blue Book furnishes us with the pro- fessed general principle. There we find a general principle laid down by Lord Auckland and his colleagues, to " persevere in " the one clear and direct course *of abandoning no 67 "just and honourable accession of territory or re- " venue; while all existing claims of right are, at the " same time, scrupulously respected;" a fair and open line of policy with which nobody can quarrel. Lord Dalhousie indorses the above as follows : " I " take this fitting occasion of recording my strong " and deliberate opinion that in the exercise of a wise " and sound policy, the British Government is bound " not to put aside or to neglect such rightful oppor- " tunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may " from time to time present themselves, whether they " arise from the lapse of subordinate States by the " failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, " or from the failure of heirs natural, when the suc- " cession can be sustained only by the sanction of " Government being given to the ceremony of adop- " tion, according to Hindu Law." " The Government," he continues, " is bound in " duty as well as policy to act on every such occasion " with the purest integrity, and in the most scru- " pulous observance of good faith : where even a " shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should be " at once abandoned.' 11 These views are entirely in accordance with the expressed sentiments of the Court of Directors. In their Political Letter to the Bombay Government dated llth June (No. 8), 1834 they write as follows : " Whenever the tenure of the estate, and the " custom of previous Governments are such that the " refusal of your permission to adopt would be con- " sidered an act of hardness, still more when it would " be considered an injury, the permission should be F 2 68 " given ; but otherwise not, unless as a reward " merited either by special services or by general " fidelity and good conduct, and especially by a good w administration of the jagheer. It is your duty, " we add, not to violate any express or construe- u tive right, nor to defeat any just expectation, but " when your refusal to recognise an adoption would " not have any such effect, we are not disposed to " renounce the prospective claims of Government, " unless when the -chief, or family, in whom the " renunciation is solicited, may have deserved reward " at our hands, and when this mode of conferring it " is the most eligible in respect of the interests of all " parties, including both the Government and the " individuals of the jagheer.' 7 Let us now see how these principles were applied in the case of the Rajah of Sattarah. Dying, he had adopted a son in the presence of the Residency surgeon. The Governor of Bombay had strongly minuted in favour of the recognition of the adopted son as Rajah. Mr. Willoughby asserted that the Company by a variety of rights, as successor to the Mogul, as suzerain, and lord paramount, had a right of veto on the adoption, so far as concerned suc- cession to the Raj. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has con- clusively shown the fallacy of this opinion. Mr. Willoughby seems to have been equally fortunate on this occasion, as on that to which he alludes in his late letter published in the Times, in convincing Lord Dalhousie that his reasoning was conclusive : though it may be thought not a very difficult task to convince a man already persuaded. Lord Dalhousie decided 69 against the succession. The matter came before the Court of Directors. Mr. Henry St. George Tucker. Mr. Shepherd, Major Oliphant, the Honourable W. L. Melville, and General Caulfield wrote separate Mi- nutes, in which they fully exposed the utter untena- bility of the legal plea of a power of confirmation as lord paramount ; and also deprecated the annexation on the score of expediency asserted by Lord Dal- housie. Mr. Mangles minuted in favour of the an- nexation. Nine other Directors expressed their general concurrence in the views of Mr. Mangles. I would here quote a passage from Mr. Kaye's selection of Lord Metcalfe's papers on the law of adoption : " The question is, whether chiefs and princes, not " having heirs of the body, have a right to adopt a " successor, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, or " of the supposed reversionary rights of the paramount " power, and whether the British Government is " bound to acknowledge the adoption. " In the disposal of this question there is a wide dif- " ference between sovereign princes and jagheerdars, " between those in possession of hereditary sovereign- " ties in their own right, and those who hold grants " of land on public revenue, by gift from a sovereign " or paramount power. " Those who are sovereign princes in their own " right, and of the Hindoo religion, have, by Hindoo " law, a right to adopt, to the exclusion of collateral " heirs, or of the supposed reversionary right of the " paramount power; the latter, in fact, in such cases, " having no real existence, except in the case of " absolute want of heirs ; and even then the right is 70 lt only assumed in virtue of power, for it would " probably be more consistent with right that the " people of the States so situated should elect a " sovereign for themselves. " In the case, therefore, of Hindoo sovereign " princes, I should say that, on failure of heirs male " of the body, they have a right to adopt, to the " exclusion of collateral heirs, and that the British " Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, " provided that it be regular, and not in violation of " Hindoo law." To this I would add my own humble testimony that the above exposition of the law is indubitably sound. Now I would ask, if this was not a case in which Lord Dalhousie's dictum, that " whenever a shadow " of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be " abandoned," ought to have been applied, where was such a case to be found? Here were Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, and five of the Court of Directors one way of thinking ; the Governor-General, the rest of the Council of Bombay, and nine of the Court of Directors, of another way of thinking. Those who take the trouble of reading the respective arguments, will, I think, not have much difficulty in deciding that those against the annexation are the most forcible. Here, too, was Sir C. Metcalfe's express authority, and I will venture to add the authority of any lawyer on Pundit, whose opinion it might have been thought worth while to ask. But the benefit of the doubt was not given ; and the practice of the Company was, as usual, in direct op- position to its professions. 71 But it may be thought that the rule of the late Rajah was so disastrous, that political expediency required our taking his country, even if we stretched the law a point in so doing. So far from this, how- ever, we have the testimony of Sir G. Clerk undis- puted by any of his colleagues or Lord Dalhousie, that the Rajah's rule had been most excellent, his people happy, and his country flourishing. Was not this a case, then, for the application of the Court of Directors' principle of foregoing their privilege, when the head of the family might have, " deserved reward u at our hands?" Not at all : Lord Dalhousie thus meets that objec- tion : " I am unable to admit the force of the argument u advanced by Sir G. Clerk, for its continuance, " which is founded on the happy and prosperous con- " dition of the state, and the just and praiseworthy " government of the late Raja, " These, indeed, would be strong arguments for its " continuance, if the late Raja were yet alive, or if it " could be shown that the excellence of his adminis- " tration arose, not from his own personal qualities, " but from the nature of the institutions of the State, " by which the disposition of the Sovereign would " always be guarded or compelled into an observance " of the rules of good government. " But if the excellence of his government proceeded " only from the excellence of his own disposition, I " find in that fact no argument for the continuance of " his sovereignty to others, whose dispositions may u differ widely from those so happily displayed by 72 " his Highness, and whose administrations may be as " conspicuous for oppression and misrule as that of " Shreemunt Maharaj has been for wisdom and u mildness." Further ; there can be no question but that at the date of the treaty, the contracting parties never con- templated the exclusion of adopted heirs, which is the common custom over all India. If a man has no son, his religion compels him to adopt one, since it is only through the ceremonies and offerings of the son, that the soul of the father can be released from Put : which seems to be the heathen Purgatory. The adopted son stands to his adoptive father precisely in the same relation as though he were begotten. He succeeds to every hereditary right, precisely in the same way as though he were a naturally born son ; and it is altogether contrary to good faith, to import into a treaty, by implication, terms of limita- tion which it does not expressly contain. Had the intention of the contracting parties been to confine the treaty to any particular class of heirs, apt terms would have been used ; and we should have found the treaty to run, not with " heirs," but " natural " heirs," "heirs of the body," "heirs male," or the like. Indeed the East India Company craves the appli- cation of this rule of construction to themselves, in their Petition to the House of Lords against the Surat Treaty Bill, in Ali Moorad's case. Therein they write as follows : " Your Petitioners desire that any pecuniary " engagements to which they are bound by treaty, u should be fulfilled as exactly as pecuniary con- 73 " tracts between man and man ; but your Peti- " tioners insist that in construing a treaty, the deter- " mination of what those pecuniary engagements 1C really are materially depends on the consideration " of the public and political relations existing " between the contracting parties at the time of the u treaty. To exclude such considerations would lead " to an erroneous construction of the engagements " involved in the treaty" Sir G. Clerk forcibly refers to this principle of construction, one which Grotius has luminously insisted on, but which indeed requires no authority, since it rests on every man's perception of common honesty. " In a matter such as this question of re- " sumption of a territory," writes Sir G. Clerk, " recovered by us, and restored to an ancient dynasty, u I would observe, that we are morally bound to give " some consideration to the sense in which we in- " duced or permitted the other party to understand " the terms of a mutual agreement. Whatever we " intend in favour of an ally in perpetuity, when " executing a treaty with him on that basis, by that " we ought to abide in our relations with his succes- " sors, until he proves himself unworthy . We should " look for escheats, not from such a source as the " doubtful meaning of the stipulations of an agree- " ment, but from the incorrigible misconduct of " allies when thrown back, as they should be, on the " responsibilities of the sovereign rights relinquished " to them ; rendering punishment in such cases u signal and salutary, by abstaining from half " measures, such as largely pensioning or managing 74 u for the delinquent, or substituting his child, wife, " or minister." But Lord Dalhousie was not the man to be turned from his prey by any such consideration. He is silent as to this argument of Sir G. Clerk : but he will not admit that the decision is to be governed by a reference to the condition of affairs at the date of the execution of the Treaty, but by expediency, with reference to affairs as they stand now. The Athenaeum thus writes : " But Lord Dalhousie, in his Naboth's-vineyard- " view of the matter, argues as follows : ' How- u ever wise the policy may have been which led to u the creation of the State of Sattarah in 1819, and " however strong the reasons which induced the u government at that period to establish anew a Mah- " ratta State on that side of India, I venture to " think that the same reasons do not exist for its con* " tinuance now. The power of the Mahrattas at " that period, still formidable, is no longer a source " of anxiety to us; the territories of the Peishwa " have for thirty years remained tranquilly in our " possession ; the supremacy of the British Govern- " ment has, year by year, become more firmly " established ; Scindia and Holkar have, in the a course of events, been effectually reduced to harm- " lessness, and there is now no reason, as there " formerly was, to apprehend the formation of alarm- " ing confederacies among Mahratta chiefs, nor any " necessity for maintaining, as a counterpoise, the " nominal sovereignty of the house of Seevajee.'" " The territories," says Lord Dalhousie, arguing 75 for their annexation, " lie in the very heart of our " own possessions. They are interposed between the " two principal military stations in the Presidency of u Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands u of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle " to safe communication and combined military " movement. The district is fertile, and the reve* " nues productive. The population, accustomed for " some time to regular and peaceful government" (the late Rajah's, mark you!), " are tranquil them- " selves, and prepared for the regular government " our possession of the territory would give." Such is the history of the annexation of Sattarah, the first in order, though not in baseness, of the many spoliations of native princes which followed during Lord Dalhousie's reign. It may seem extra- ordinary that any man would pursue a system of plunder in his public capacity, from the bare thought of which he would shrink in his private capacity. Sir George Lewis, perhaps, solves the difficulty, and explains and reconciles the paradoxical discrepancy.* " A nation, represented by its Government, may have " a collective character, independent of the cha- " racter of any of its citizens, and this character "may appear in its acts at successive periods of " time ; a Government may, for example, be faithless " in its public engagements, though the persons com- " posing that Government may be honourable in " their private transactions. A false morality re- " specting national interests and patriotism may in- * 2 Pol., p. 108. 76 " duce persons to resort to means on behalf of their " country which they would scorn to use for them- " selves." But Lord Dalhousie was a very strong- minded man ; he held a very decided opinion as to the policy of " consolidating" our empire by " ab- " sorbing" all the States within it as opportunity arose : he had a fatal facility of penmanship which was his worst enemy; being skilled to make the worse appear the better reasoning, no scruple of con- science ever turned him from what he considered the firm discharge of his duty ; or, if he ever felt a " kind of remorse," it was of that fleeting kind of " holy humour" which the professional -gentleman who " annexed" Clarence, in Shakespeare's play of " Richard the Third," tells us " was wont to hold " him but while one could count twenty ; " and thus, though Lord Dalhousie had several times to furnish forth totally contradictory reasons for the same policy, he never was without a reason sufficient for the nonce to justify his conduct to himself and his masters his admirers and dependents at any rate; nor was any obstacle so formidable that he was not prepared, to use his own phrase to General Outram, to " face" it. Here is his lordship's creed : u There may be a conflict of opinion as to the " advantage or the propriety of extending our al- " ready vast possessions beyond their present limits. "No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do, " any extension of the frontiers of our territories " which can be avoided, or which may not become " indispensably necessary, from considerations of our 77 " own safety, and of the maintenance of the tran- " quillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive " it possible for any one to dispute the policy of " taking advantage of every just opportunity which " presents itself, for consolidating the territories " that already belong to us, by taking possession of " States which may lapse in the midst of them ; for " thus getting rid of these petty intervening princi- " palities, which may be made a means of annoyance, " but which can never, I venture to think, be a " source of strength; for adding to the resources of " the public treasury, and for extending the uniform " application of our system of government to those " whose best interests, we believe, will be promoted " thereby." This is the key to the whole of his lordship's " consolidation" policy. He may have persuaded himself that our rule was such a blessing, that it ought, at all hazards, to be imposed upon the entire people; and thus, as all things appear yellow to a man in the jaundice, every opportunity seemed " just," which presented itself to his lordship. It is a pursuance of this policy, which has done more to loosen our hold upon India than all our other actions put together. We have thereby destroyed the Native belief in our good faith from one end of India to the other; we have alarmed the few remaining princes for the safety of their thrones and their revenues; we have stirred up the angry passions of the soldiery, who are making a final stand against the annihila- tion of their ancient dynasties. But for the robbery I can call it by no other name of Oude, probably 78 we should have had no rebellion. It is thence, as Sir C. Napier says, that the Bengal army is chiefly mounted. It is there, says Sir James Outram, that every family has at least one member in the Bengal army. Do these facts give us any insight into the origin of the rebellion? With another policy, should we not have had the support of Oude instead of a rebellion at Lucknow, if, indeed, any rebellion could ever have broken out. Who are . our supporters at the present moment? The Rajahs whom we have spared! It is thus that the Mofussilite speaks of the Maharaja of Scindia: " We had occasion in a former issue to notice the " admirable system of administration introduced by " his Highness the Maharaja of Scindia into the ter- " ritories of Scindia, which are fortunate enough to " own him as their prince, and hope to continue our " notice in an early issue. In the perfect quiet " which has reigned throughout them during the " past month of mutiny and plunder, we can gain a " glimpse of the strength of his Highness' govern- " ment, and the esteem in which it is regarded by " his subjects. It is no small credit to the Maha- " raja's statesmanship, that, in the short space of a " few years, he should have established such perfect " order and organization throughout extensive pro- " vinces, in which anarchy and insubordination pre- " viously prevailed; that, in spite of mutinies and " insurrections in adjacent quarters, not an instance '* of a dacoitee, even, has been reported in them. " In the prompt and generous manner in which " he has tendered assistance to the British Govern- 79 " me'nt, the Maharaja has set an example to all " Native princes. On hearing of the disturbances " at Delhi, at the risk of the safety of his own capital, " he at once forwarded the choice troops of his body- " guard, whose drill and efficiency had been his espe- " cial care, to the seat of the North-west government " at Agra ; and at the same time made liberal offers " of a further reinforcement. Afterwards, when in- " triguing villains, at the instigation of the scoun- " drels who have mutinied in our provinces, endea- " voured to sow distrust between the faithful sepoys " of the Gwalior contingent and their officers, and " in the prosecution of their vile plot, did not hesi- " tate to tamper, even, with his Highness 7 name, " the Maharaja at once offered an asylum to the " European ladies and children; and, by removing " them to his own place, and surrounding them with " his own troops, proclaimed in the most marked " and public manner the determination he had taken " to stand or fall by the British Government. By " this act he has effectually baffled the designs of " any intriguers who may have hoped to seduce our " troops from their allegiance by employing his " name. " In the course the Maharaja has taken at this " crisis, it is difficult to pronounce, whether the " greater credit be due to his generosity or to his " foresight. A less generous prince might have re- " mained neutral; a less sagacious one might have " declared for the cause of anarchy. To Scindia is " due not only the credit of doing more than his " duty to the British Government, but the sagacity 80 " to perceive the inevitable result of the present dis- " turbances. At a time when many weaker and less " experienced minds see, in the disaffection of some " of our sepoys, the downfall of our power; the Ma- " haraja can perceive its re-establishment on a firmer " basis than before. While others may think each " petty station burnt, or each European officer trea- " cherously murdered, a victory over the British; u Scindia can see, that to destroy is not to construct, " and that though mutineers can do much damage " now, they cannot but fail in the work of consolida- " tion hereafter. While others think they see our " weakness in the paucity of European troops ; the " Maharaja, enlightened by travel, knows well our " unbounded resources. He has seen the shipping " of Calcutta, and knows, that if every European " regiment in India were blown into the air, treble " their number would be sent from England to take " their places within six months. He knows it is " only ignorance of our resources which gives despe- " ration to the arms of our mutinous sepoys." We have destroyed the only remaining stages for the ambitious to play their parts on; we have re- duced the families of sovereigns to the miserable condition of pensioners; we have thrown their de- scendants and dependants by thousands penniless upon the world; we have frittered away the Native nobility and gentry; the classes destined to rise on their ruin have not yet emerged from obscurity ; the mercantile class, though important in point of wealth, are numerically scanty; the great body of the people consist of ryots and revenue servants, 81 or, as one of the Madras civilians designated them in the Torture Report, " the oppressors and the oppressed:" and every act of " annexation" and " consolidation " has only added to our embarrassed poverty and our weakness. As to Lord Dalhousie's not conceiving it possible that any one can dispute the policy of " consolida- " tion, " let us see what opinion Mr. Henry St. George Tucker holds : " Those," says he, " who are eager for the exten- " sion of our territory, flatter themselves that we " are extending our power as a necessary conse- " quence; but the annexation of a principality to " our gigantic empire may, in my opinion, become " the source of weakness by impairing our moral in- " fluence over our native subjects. I remonstrated " against the annexation (I am disposed to call it " confiscation) of Colaba, the ancient seat of the " Argria family, to which the allusion has been made " in the Bombay minutes ; and, far from having seen " reason to modify or recall the opinion recorded by " me on that proceeding, I have availed myself of " every suitable occasion to enforce my conviction ic that a more mischievous policy could not be pur- " sued than that which would engross the whole ter- u ritory of India, and annihilate the small remnant " of the native aristocracy. There are persons who " fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be " successfully administrated by native agency. In " disproof of this notion, I would point to the Ram- " poor Jagheer in Rohilcund, which was a perfect " garden when I saw it long ago, and which still re- G 82 " mains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricul- " tural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the " principality of Sattara, which appears to have been " most successfully administered both by the ex- " Rajah, Purtap Sing, and his brother and successor " the late Rajah, Appah Sahib, who have done more " for the improvement of the country than our Go- " vernment can pretend to have done in any part of " its territory." To this may be added the testimony of such men as the Duke of Wellington, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir Henry Russell, Mount Stuart Elphinstone, Lord Auckland, Sir Charles Napier, General Briggs, the Honourable Mr. Melville, Mr. Shepherd, and Lord Ellenborough no mean names in the catalogue of Indian authori- ties. " We are lords paramount, and our policy is " to acquire as direct a sovereignty over the 717,000 " square miles still possessed by native princes, as " we already have over the other half of India." That is the key note of Lord Dalhousie's aggressive policy. Let us listen to the emphatic convictions of some of the great men whose names I have quoted. They are too important to be omitted. The Duke of Wellington writes : " In my opinion, the extension of our territory " and influence has been greater than our means. " Besides, we have added to the number and descrip- " tion of our enemies, by depriving of employment " those who heretofore found it in the service of " Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread " ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves 83 u at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this " evil; we throw out of employment and means of " subsistence all who have hitherto managed the " revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or " have plundered the country. These people become " additional enemies, at the same time that by the " extension of our territory our means of supporting " our government and of defending ourselves are " proportionally decreased." Sir Thomas Munro writes : " Even if all India could be brought under the u British dominion, it is very questionable whether " such a change, either as it regards the natives or " ourselves ought to be desired. One effect of such " a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having i4 no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, " would gradually lose its military habits and disci- " pline, and that the native troops would have leisure " to feel their own strength, and, for want of other " employment, to turn it against their European " masters. But even if we could be secured against u every internal commotion, and could retain the " country quietly in subjection, I doubt much if the " condition of the people would be better than under " their native princes. The strength of the British " Government enables it to put down every rebellion, " to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its " subjects a degree of protection which those of " no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions " also afford them a security from domestic oppres- " sion unknown in those states ; but these advantages " are dearly bought. They are purchased by the G 2 84 " sacrifice of independence, of national character, " and of whatever renders a people respectable. " The natives of the British provinces may, without " fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, " meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits u of their labour in tranquillity ; but none of them " can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal " state of thriving in peace : none of them can look " forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or u military government of their country. It is from " men who either hold, or who are eligible to public " office, that natives take their character ; where no " such men exist, there can be no energy in any " other class of the community. The effect of this " state of things is observable in all the British " provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the " most abject race in India. No elevation of char- " acter can be expected among men, who, in the " military lines, cannot attain to any rank above " that of Subadar (Captain), where they are as " much below an (English) ensign as an ensign is " below the Commander-in- Chief ; and who, in the " civil line, can hope for nothing beyond some petty " judicial or revenue office, in which they may by " corrupt means make up for their slender salary. " The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of u India by the British arms would be, in place of " raising, to debase the whole people. There is, per- " haps, no example of any conquest, in which the " natives have been so completely excluded from all u share of the government of their country as " British India. Among all the disorders of the 85 u native states, the field is open for every man to " raise himself; and hence, among them, there is a " spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and inde- " pendence, far preferable to the servility of our " Indian subjects. The existence of independent " native states is also useful in drawing off the " turbulent and disaffected among our native troops." Sir John Malcolm writes : " I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, u not to say the security of our vast Oriental pos- " sessions is involved in the preservation of the " native principalities which are dependent upon us " for protection. These are also so obviously at our " mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides " the other and great benefits which we derive from " those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is " of itself a source of political strength, the value of " which will never be known till it is lost. They " show the possibility of a native state subsisting u even in the heart of our own territories, and their " condition mitigates in some degree the bad " effects of that too general impression, that our " sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance " of native princes and chiefs * * * " I am further convinced, that though our revenue " may increase, the permanence of our power will be " hazarded in proportion as the territories of native " princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. Con- " sidering as I do, from all my experience, that it is " now our policy to maintain as long as we can all " native states now existing, and through them, and " by other means to support and maintain native 86 " chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the Empire of " India, I do think that every means should be " used to avert what I should consider as one of the " greatest calamities, in a political point of view, " that could arise to our empire, viz., the whole of " India becoming subject to our direct rule. There " are none of the chiefs who can venture to contend " against us in the field. They are incapable, from " their actual condition, of any dangerous combina- "' tions with each other, and they absorb many " elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to " be observed on this part of the subject, that the " respect which the natives give to men of high " birth, with claims upon their allegiance, contributes " greatly to the preservation of the general peace. " Such afford an example to their countrymen of " submission to the rule of foreigners they check "the rise of those bold military adventurers, with " which India has, and ever will abound, but who " will never have the field widely open to their enter- " prises, until our impolicy has annihilated, or suf- " fered to die of their own act, those high princes " and chiefs, who, though diminished in power, have " still the hereditary attachment and obedience of mil- " lions of those classes, who are from habits and " courage alike suited to maintain or to disturb the " public peace." Sir Henry Eussell writes : " The danger that we have most to dread in " India lies entirely at home. A well conducted re- " bellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaf- " fection of our native troops, is the event by which 87 " our power is most likely to be shaken ; and the " sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by " every enlargement of our territory. The increase " of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, "is an increase not of our strength, but of our 44 weakness ; between them and us, there never can 44 be community of feeling. We must always con- i4 tinue foreigners, and the object of that jealousy 44 and dislike which a foreign rule never ceases to " excite." Mr. Elphinstone writes : 44 It appears to me to be our interest as well as our " duty, to use every means to preserve the allied " governments ; it is also our interest to keep up the 44 number of independent powers : their territories " afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war, " intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of 44 remaining quiet in ours ; and the contrast of our 44 Government has a favourable effect on our sub- 44 jects, who, while they feel the evils they are 44 actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater 44 ones from which they have been delivered. If the 44 existence of independent powers gives occasional 44 employment to our armies, it is far from being a 44 disadvantage." Lord Ellenborough says : 44 Our Government is at the head of a system 44 composed of native states, and I would avoid 44 taking what are called rightful occasions of appro- " priating the territories of native states ; on the 44 contrary, I should be disposed, as far as I could, to 44 maintain the native states ; and I am satisfied " that the maintenance of the native states, and " the giving to the subjects of those states the con- c ' viction that they were considered permanent parts 44 of the general Government of India, would mate- " rially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied " that I never stood so strong with my own army " as when I was surrounded by native princes " they like to see respect shown to their native " princes. These princes are sovereigns of one-third " of the population of Hindostan ; and with refer- " ence to the future condition of the country, it " becomes more, important to give them confidence " that no systematic attempt will be made to take " advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate " their property, or to injure in any respect those " sovereigns in the position they at present occupy." Mr. Shepherd, writes: u Throughout the short period of the wonderful " rise of the British power in India, our Governments " have adopted generally a system of decided con- " ciliation towards the native princes, chiefs, and " people. The former were found the best instru- " ments for conciliating towards us the good will of " their subjects. We managed generally so to com- " bine their interest with our own, that they soon per- " ceived that the success of our government proved " the best source of benefit to themselves, and thus " they became in a manner constituent elements of " our system of government. The language of Mr. " Elphinstone was, that the British Government is " uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its " adherents, it being a maxim of its policy that the 89 u interests of such persons should be as dear to it as " its own. " I attribute to this system the first and more " early co-operation of the natives generally in our " progress. A perseverance in the same course of " moderation and forbearance, a cautious abstaining " from interference with the native religion, a scru- u pulous regard to the maintenance of our honour " and good faith, an impartial administration of " justice, and, in fact, the general kind and benevolent " treatment of all classes, did not fail to win the con- u fidence of the people at large. An immense native " army, second to none in efficiency and discipline, " and whose attachment and fidelity have stood the " test of no ordinary temptations, has also been the " fruits of this system. And, at length, we have the " amazing spectacle of a vast country, consisting of " 600,000 square miles, and containing upwards of "one hundred millions of inhabitants, governed " through the medium of a handful of Englishmen. " May it not be fairly questioned, whether a " system of universal conquest and assumption of " territory, would have been equally successful ? and " if so, whether it is prudent, even were it just, to " deviate from this successful course? I am the last " person to wish to derogate from the importance of " c British bayonets' in India; without them we " could have neither 'gained, nor retained, our mag- " nificent empire. I am, however, equally persuaded " that a bare dependence upon physical force, either " in early or later times, although it might no doubt " have maintained the security of our factories on 90 " the coast, and fully vindicated our national power, " yet, under it, the civilizing influences of the British " rule could never have been extended, and the range " of our cannon must have continued to be the " boundaries of our territory." General Briggs writes : " If you do away with the right of adoption with " respect to the princes of India, the next question " will be, whether in the case of estates which you " yourselves have conferred on officers for their ser- " vices, or upon other individuals for their merits, " they should be allowed to adopt. Here you are " treading on delicate ground. If you are to do " away with the right of individuals to adopt, you " will shake the faith of the people of India ; you will " influence that opinion which has hitherto main- " tained you in your power ; and that influence will " thrill through your army; and you will find some " day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once said, ' we " shall rise some morning, and hear of a conflagra- " tion throughout the whole empire of India, such as " a few Europeans amongst millions will not be able " to extinguish.' Your army is derived from the " peasantry of the country, who have rights, and if " those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer " have to depend on the fidelity of that army. You " have a native army of 250,000 men to support " your power, and it is on the fidelity of that army " your power rests. But you may rely on it, if you " infringe the institutions of the people of India, that " army will sympathise with them ; for they are part " of the population ; and in every infringement you 91 u may make upon the rights of individuals, you in- " fringe upon the rights of men, who are either them- " selves in the army, or upon their sons, their " fathers, or their relatives. Let the fidelity of " your army be shaken, and your power is gone." In 1842, Lord Auckland writes: " I would at once put aside any reference to the " prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Emperor u of Delhi, or of any supposed rights which, it has " been thought, might be assumed by us, because " they were habitually enforced by those sovereigns, "or by others, who have at different times held " supreme rule within the various .provinces of the " empire. I would look only to the terms and spirit " of the treaties or engagements which we have ic formed with the several states of India and bring " forward no other demand than such as, in reference " to those engagements, may be indisputably con- " sistent with good faith." Again, when an attempt was made to deprive the Eajah of Oorcha of his rights, as an independent prince, on similar grounds, Lord Auckland, rejecting the flimsy pretences, thus grasped the substance of justice : " I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine, that " because the view of policy upon which we may " have formed engagements with native princes may u have been by circumstances materially altered, we " are not to act scrupulously up to the terms and " spirit of those engagements." Lord Metcalfe went even further : for he argued that even in a casus omissus, native law and prac- 92 tice, and neither our supremacy nor our power, ought to prevail : " Where there is a total failure of heirs, it is pro- " bably more consistent with right that the people u should elect a sovereign, than that the principality " should relapse to the paramount state, that state, " in fact, having no rights in such a case but what " it assumes by virtue of its power." Lord Dalhousie, however, writes the author of a pamphlet called " The Native States," has reversed this sound policy. According to him, our supre- macy, wherever an apology or an excuse can be raised, has to over-ride our treaties, has to interpret their language, and to decide all their difficulties. " By these annexations, however," writes the pamphleteer, " a large body of Englishmen do, no u doubt, gain. Patronage is increased, employment " is increased, salaries are increased; at the cost, " however, of the general revenues, and to their im- " poverishment." " Five native states," writes Mr. Sullivan, " have fallen within the last ten years. "If we put on one side of the account what the " natives have gained by the few offices that have " been lately opened to them, with what they have " lost by the extermination of these states, we shall " find the net loss to be immense; and what the "" native loses, the Englishman gains. Upon the " extermination of a native state, an Englishman " takes the place of the sovereign, under the name " of commissioner ; three or four of his associates " displace as many dozen of the native official aris- " tocracy, while some hundreds of our troops take 93 u the place of the many thousands that every native " chief supports. The little court disappears trade " languishes the capital decays the people are " impoverished the Englishman flourishes, and acts u like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of " the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the " banks of the Thames. Nor is this all. Native u princes and their courts not only encourage native :t trade and native arts, but under them, and be- " cause of their very weakness, public spirit and " opinion flourishes : all that constitutes the life of a " people is strengthened; and though the govern- " ment may occasionally be oppressive, heavier far is " the yoke of our institutions." A few civilians, indeed, uphold the contrary doc- trine. Mr. Toby Prinsep traces our financial em- barrassments to our not being masters of the entire area of India. Mr. Campbell looks upon every in- dependent prince much as an heir-expectant regards some bed-ridden uncle, whose shameless lingering keeps him unjustly out of the fair heritage of his broad acres. " It is only in this way" (annexation), he writes, " that we can hope gradually to extin- " guish the native states, which consume so large a " portion of the revenues of the country ! " As though they were not their own. In the same spirit the Court of Directors in their despatch on Tanjore affairs, say they will not create a right " for the sole " purpose of perpetuating a titular principality at a great cost to the public revenue /" that revenue being the portion which the Rajah reserved for himself and his family when he ceded to the Company the fair 94 kingdom of Tanjore, the " garden of Southern India," whence they have ever since drawn fifty lakhs a year! To those who take this view we would suggest the following considerations, taken from a pamphlet entitled " The Native States." 1st. Considerations for our own safety, arising, in the judgment of the eminent authorities already quoted, from the maintenance of the authority of our native allies. 2nd. The limited and restricted character of our supremacy, and the tendency which an avowal of our intention to disregard those limitations and restric- tions has to degenerate our government to one of mere unlicensed and uncontrolled power and force. 3rd. The moral advantages of a strict adherence to good faith, of a generous interpretation of treaties, and of a liberal course of policy towards our inferiors. 4th. The risk, as experience warns us, that we run of only increasing our financial difficulties by extensions of our territories. 5th. The magnitude of the task of adding to our dominions a greater area than that we already rule. 6th, The evil effects which the immense extension of patronage at home, consequent on the further employment of European agency in our new acquisi- tions, may produce by increasing the power of home authorities. 7th. The danger to England as well as to India which a successful resistance in any one case may originate and produce. 8th. The injustice, the slaughter, and the cost of pursuing such a policy. 95 9th. The hopelessness of promoting the improve- ment and happiness either of our old or our new territories by such means. Whatever "conflict of opinion" there may be regarding the policy of annexation, when there is a bond fide title to the territory, I apprehend, to use Lord Dalhousie's own words, that there can be no dispute as to the impolicy as well as wickedness of annexing territory when there is NOT really a lapse ; when we can only create one by the most glaring bad faith, and a perverted construction of treaties which the Friend of India derides as " antiquated parch- " ments, " to the amazement and disgust of the Natives, and at the cost of our own character for honest dealing and a reverence for our word. Re- venue is the object ; it is the old story : Si possis, recte, si non, quocunque modo, rem. And the more I ponder on the subject, the more clearly comes home to me the conviction that this accursed, grasping annexation policy has paved the way for the rebellion now raging in the heart of our empire. As one kingdom after another fell, a sullen silent discontent spread wider and wider over the native mind. The fall of Oude filled up the measure of indignation. At the slaughter of Neemuch, when the officers said to their native troops (says the Bombay Times), " You have eaten the Company's " salt, why are you not faithful to it ? " The answer, as the sepoys shot down and bayonet ted them, was, 9G " You Banchats ! have you been faithful to the King " of Oude ?" Does that not give us a glimmering of the truth ? See how rebellion, the moment it extended beyond the focal centre of Bengal, leaps from point to point, where our annexation policy has usurped the sovereignty. Almost simultaneously we hear of insurrection at Nagpore, at Sattara, at Jhansi, and the fear of it at Triplicane, far apart and unconnected as those localities are from one another. Peruse the dying speech of the traitor at Sattara, as we call him hero and martyr as the people regard him, and as we should ourselves regard him, were the fable narrated of ourselves and invading Russians and reflect, whether his brief address to his country- men does not throw light upon the feelings which prompted the rising at Sattara. The following is the account furnished to the Bombay Telegraph by an eye-witness : " SATTARA, 19TH JUNE, 1857. Seventy men of " the 14th Dragoons, and 100 of the 3rd Europeans " have arrived. The former occupy the camp " hospital, and the latter the engineers' workshops. " The field service detachment S. M. I. Horse " marches in to-morrow. Several arrests have been " made ; the ringleaders are being brought in priso: - " almost daily. The gallows-tree has hard work " awaiting it. Its services were put in requisition this " morning. Not being myself a lover of death " scenes, I was not present at the rebel Putta- " wallah's execution, but the following is a true u account of the whole affair. At a quarter to seven " the prisoner, escorted by an European ollicer and u forty men of the f:iilliful l^Jiul Kogimont N. I., u marched into the enclosure surrounding the scaf- >4 fold. Tlu* preliminaries of striking offtho fetters, l * reading the donth warrant, &e., &c., being gone ;t through, the prisoner having previously asked " a native olliror of tho local corps to look after his " children, to which request he received a very dis- " tunt reply in a bold, fearless manner mounted the " drop and during the process of adjusting the noose " and pinioning, he, in a loud linn voice, addressed kt tin 1 crowd in the following words (my informant 11 knows Maharatta. as well as English) : u Listen, all ! As the English people hurled the u l\ 194,533 Four regiments of Native Infantry 110,784 ^ Carried forward . , 225,729 168 Straits of Malacca. Shalapoor . . Pegu . . . . < Add, for mis according Parliament outlay . . . Brought forward. . Per Annum. Total. 225,729 I 50,696 48,000 > 552,352 ^One company of European Artillery 9,000 14,000 27,696 48,000 45,000 165,000 332,352 10,000 Two ditto of Golundauze . Three regiments of Native ^ Infantry One regiment of Light Cavalry (Native) 'Five European companies and two Horse Field Batteries of Artillery . , Three regiments of Eu- ropean Infantry Twelve ditto Native ditto. Three companies of Sap- pers . Total . , 876,777 219,194 73,000 43,888 12,900 cellaneous military charges, to statements laid before , one-fourth of the total Add, for Cc total outla] Add, for cosl total outlaw Add, for Me tieth of tol unmissariat, one-twelfth of r of Staff, one-twentieth of 7 dical Department, one-six- al outlay Grand Total . . 1,225,759 And yet when the Madras journals point this out, they are told by the Friend of India, the quasi- government organ of Calcutta, that they are con- tending for mere local interests; that they should discuss subjects of general bearing, and not bring forward parochial squabbles. Such is the fashion in which annexation pays pecuniarily. How it " pays" in other respects, let the present rebellion satisfy us. 169 Let it not, however, be thought that all men have been blinded to what was about to happen. Madras did not respond to the Calcutta call for a statue of Lord Dalhousie. The Athenceum has had no former praise to swallow; it has been stedfast in its measure of Lord Dalhousie's policy. It is thus that this journal wound up its articles on Oude : " The remainder of this history needs not to be " told. We know how the head conspirators were " rewarded; how Dalhousie received 5,000 a year; u how Outran! was made a K.C.B. But surely if " retributive justice exists in the world, a terrible " result, sooner or later, will accrue somewhere for " the false, wicked, cowardly, traitorous annexation " of Oude." In England, some few, at any rate, have foreseen the necessary result of such acts. It is thus that Mr. Dickinson, in his pamphlet on the " Bureaucratic u Government of India," after exposing the policy of annexation, warns his countrymen : " I cannot help warning my countrymen that if " they stand by, and look quietly on, while this poli- " tical martyrdom is once more consummated, their " consenting unto the deed will leave a heavy debt " of vengeance against them, not only on earth but " in heaven ; it will provoke that retributive justice " which frequently allows an individual to escape, " but never, never fails to overtake a nation. Let " them weigh this well before they say, on our heads " and on our children's be it ! It is true, that we u have an overwhelming mercenary army, and the " word is passed, no danger above the horizon ; but 170 " some may be coming ; and in history we are " always wise after the event ; and when it is too " late, when the bolt has fallen, and the penalty has '' been paid, then for the first time do politicians see " why a Government based on injustice and bad " faith could not stand : and what innumerable con- " sequences of its own wrong-doing were all the " while undermining its power. God forbid that we " should be wise too late in India !" The able writer in the Quarterly Review thus concludes his terrible articles : " Of all Lord Dalhousie's extensions of the " Empire, the only one that is really beneficial was " the final conquest of the Punjaub, though that is " only beneficial in a military, and not in a financial, " sense. By not obtaining the cession by treaty of " Pegu, he has left our future tenure of it open to all " that doubt and uncertainty which attach to pos- " sessions seized, but not confined to the captor " afterwards by cession, under the rules and prin- u ciples of international law. The other annexations " made by him can give no strength to the Empire ; " for whatever political or military advantages they 11 possessed were ours already, the sovereigns having " long since been reduced to the positions of ciphers " dependent on our will. In a pecuniary sense, these " confiscations will not more than repay the costs of " their management, even if they do that, while the u outrage on all the established laws of succession, " and the gross violations of treaties that have been " involved in the seizure of them, have spread ' ' throughout all India the deepest feelings of distrust 171 " arid discontent. It may be that the laws which " sanction the continuance of a throne, or of a " private heritage by adoption, may appear absurd " to Lord Dalhousie, but it is the fixed law of India " from time immemorial ; and nothing could be " more solemn and more binding than the pledges of " our Government to the Natives, that their laws and " customs should ever be respected and observed. " To a man more deeply read in history than his u lordship appears to be, there is nothing very " wonderful, after all, in this very simple law. u Among the Romans it existed, as it did among u the Hindoos ; and among them, too, the adopted " son, whether of a private citizen or of an emperor, " acquired at once all the rights and became subject u to all the duties of a natural heir. Nor in cases ' where our own crown has appeared likely to be 4; disputed, has the precaution been neglected of " allowing of an adopted heir. It was for this " reason that our Eighth Henry was specially em- " powered by Parliament to name his successor: and " in this, the 19th century, a similar measure has, " for a similar purpose, been sanctioned by the legis- " lature of France. There, too, of all the evils that " can happen, the greatest is thought, as among the ; Hindoos, to be that of a disputed succession ; and " there, too, the Emperor Napoleon the Third has, in " the event of dying without issue (male), the pri- " vilege accorded to him of nominating a successor to u the throne. " While such have been the fruits within our Empire of a policy at once so ignorant and so sordid, 172 " the frontier on which we are told to rely as a bar- u rier against Russia has been brought into a state " of hatred and detestation of us, which never will " die out. Perpetual raids, perpetual plunderings, " perpetual village burning, are the work of our " soldiers there, and all against men whose real " crime consists in refusing to pay dues to us for u their barren holdings from which their ancestors u from time immemorial had been exempt. Nothing " seemed too cruel for us, as nothing was too mean " under this new plan for making India pay. To " curtail enormous and wasteful salaries would have u been unpopular with the Europeans ; but there are " no representatives, either in Parliament or in the " direction of the hill tribes on the frontier, or of the " widowed ladies of Sattara and Nagpore. A truly " great government would have spurned the driblets u procurable from such sources ; it was the fate of " Lord Dalhousie to turn to such means for re- " plenishing an empty treasury, and after all to fail. " His lordship has been compared by his flatterers to " Lord Wellesley, and it is said that the idea is " greatly encouraged by himself ; but what acts was u Lord Wellesley ever guilty of that could deserve " any comparison with deeds like these ? Lord " Wellesley went to India when we were a weak " power there ; he boldly faced the Native princes in " the plenitude of their arrogance, and, aided by a " Wellington and a Lake, he subdued them. Lord " Dalhousie went to India when every Native prince " was at our feet; and, saving in the case of the " Sikh insurrection, ignoble indeed were the spoils 173 " lie won. Mud and musqnitoes were his chief " enemies in Burmah; women and children were his " prey at Sattara and Nagpore. A being weaker " than a woman graced his triumphal car in Oude. " Lord Wellesley attacked the Native powers because " they were too powerful for our peace ; Lord Dal- " housie seized Sattara, as he tells us in his minute, " because the Mahrattas were no longer to be dreaded, " and so the annexation might be safely made. Lord cc Wellesley was Alexander of Macedon, conquering " the then known world ; Lord Dalhousie was Alex- " ander's successor in the third generation, supposing " his Empire to have remained undivided ; con- " fiscating the pensions and provinces, and poor " remains of power that the conqueror had left. " Lord Wellesley left the Indian Empire consoli- " dated, its greatness established ; and our name for " generosity after victory only equalled by that for " reckless daring in war. In what state Lord Dal- u housie left India, these pages, and those of the " more independent of the Indian journals declare "as do the crowds of Indians now to be seen in " London on every side, who have come to petition " the throne of England against his acts. Eunjeet " Sing, his lordship tells us, was most satisfied with " those of his governors, against whom there were " many complaints ; and the criterion is not a bad " one, either in the east or in the west. If the " petitions of these people be fairly listened to, and " reparation afforded them, where, on a careful " investigation of the facts, it shall be seen that " injustice has been done, all may yet be well. But 174 " if England is to claim that infallibility for the acts " of her public servants in India, which she refuses " rightly to accord to those of her public servants " here, then we may rely on it, that new com- " binations will arise there to combat her power, and u that she, too, will sink from the excesses of her " despotism, as the Empire of so many other nations u there has sunk before her. It should be remem-l " bered, that we treated the Affghans with similai u contempt till we were rudely taught to know thei: u power ; and it were well, before we drive all India' " to desperation, to reflect that we are in numbers to u the Natives but as one in five thousand, and that " every Native of India is accustomed to the use of 1 " arms from his childhood upwards. They are a u people whom justice, and generosity, and good " faith may for centuries hold in subjection : but u those are the worst enemies of England who " endeavour to rule them on the principles of greedy " rapacity, pursued from first to last by Lord " Dalhousie." Will Lord Dalhousie's statue ever now tower over Calcutta ? I have no hesitation in expressing my solemn conviction, shared by many an able man of my acquaintance, that the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's government have been the most fatal to our supremacy that have yet been recorded on the page of history. Had he employed his time in really consolidating our power by attention to our internal condition, by introducing the reforms into the army pointed out by Sir C. Napier; by reforming the administration of 175 justice, by reorganizing an effective police throughout the length and breadth of the land; by inquiring into the amount of the assessment, pushing on revenue surveys, and lowering the demand where too high; had he matured plans for education, and fostered that great cause with half the zeal he served his own ambition, he might perchance have less dazzled men for the moment with the meteoric brightness of his career, but he would have earned a more lasting and a nobler reputation. He would have left India really at peace within and without, the people contented with our government, and prospering under its sway. No doubt we shall have the brilliancy of the electric telegraph and the railway flashed across our eyes ; but I say that these measures were none of Lord Dalhousie's originating, but were forced upon him by the pressure of public opinion; and both were measures calculated immeasurably to increase the centralizing power of government, as well as to benefit the people. His lordship's decision has, however, fettered us with a system of railways which is now generally admitted to be unsuited to the wants of the country. Colonel Arthur Cotton's principle of speed in completing the iron way, not speed of travelling upon it when completed, is now seen to be the correct view; too late, however, as we have bound us down to the " idol speed." In education, Lord Dalliousie did nothing. The scheme came out ready cut and dry from home. It was not one of those exciting subjects, which would attract his energies. He was employed in the great works of annexation, consolidation, and centralization. By the 176 last he reduced all men to silence, save those pliant instruments who would be content to echo his senti- ments, and lay before him only such information as was likely to prove palatable. But for this, would Lord Dalhousie ever have pursued the infatuated course he did towards the 38th Bengal Infantry, when they refused to proceed on foreign service to Burmah? He yielded to them; and from that moment mutiny may be said to have been sanc- tioned, and its future outburst certain. The final catastrophe was merely from that moment a ques- tion of time. Other acts of his lordship have- precipitated it; but, sooner or later, it must have come. It is thus that the Hurkaru treats the subject : " Our readers will not forget that Lord Dalhousie " was the first Governor- General who succumbed to " mutineers. When the 38th N. I. (the corps which " raised the cry of mutiny in Delhi) refused to go to " Burmah, Lord Dalhousie gave in; from that " instant the feeling of the sepoys, in all probability, " underwent a change towards their masters. That " act was sufficient to demoralise an army; who can " say that it did not do so ? u It has been the fashion in certain circles to abuse u Lord Ellenborough. But, whatever might have " been his faults, he never allowed himself to be " conquered by mutineers. There are many in India " who recollect that when the 4th and 64th Regiment " refused to go to Scinde, they did not meet with the " same mild treatment as the 38th when they " declined to go to Burmah. The difference of 177 " conduct on the two occasions showed the difference >c between the two men. Lord Ellenborough com- " pelled the sepoys to carry out his order : the sepoys " compelled Lord Dalhousie to put up with their '' resolves. The one saved India, the other brought " it to the verge of ruin. " But our late Governor-General was not content c with that. As we have shown above, he not only " sowed the seeds of mutiny, but he took away all " power of motion. By selling the camels, he " succeeded in squaring his balances, and in making :; the army powerless for any sudden emergency ! " Napoleon, when he was maligned by the titled " miscreants of Europe, exclaimed, 4 Posterity will do " me justice ! ' and he was right. Lord Dalhousie, " too, notwithstanding the flattery which was heaped " upon him by his courtiers, may be well assured that " justice too will be meted out to him." Though Lord Dalhousie gave in to the mutineers, he marked his displeasure of their conduct by a side wind. He sent them to Dacca, the Sierra Leone of India; and when they had lost 300 men, he sent them to recruit at Cawnpore, where the gaps in their ranks were to be filled up by the inhabitants of the neighbouring kingdom of Oude. It is thus that the Dacca News describes the event : " The Friend of India advocates despotism, as the " mode of government best suited to Orientals. Let " him listen to the history of the effects of an order " of Lord Dalhousie's, and then tell us if he con- " tinues of the same opinion. At the commencement " of the Burmese war, Lord Dalhousie was led to N 178 " believe that the 38th regiment of Native Light " Infantry, then at Barackpore, would volunteer to " cross the Kala Pawnee, and serve in Burmah. " The regiment was asked to do so, and refused. " Lord Dalhousie then determined that it should be " punished, and ordered it to march to Dacca, the " cantonments of which, from long neglect, had " become the most unhealthy in Bengal. The usual " way of sending a regiment to Dacca is by water ; " but to mark his lordship's displeasure, the 38th " was ordered to march by Jessore and Furreedpore, "districts quite unaccustomed to the passage of " troops. There is no road, scarcely even a foot- " path, beyond Jessore, about half the distance. The " country is highly cultivated. The march, therefore, " was one continued trespass for about eighty miles; " orders were issued to the collectors to prepare " rations for the troops. The collectors directed " their Nazirs to take the usual steps to procure " rations, and these gentlemen rejoiced in the " prospect of securing, if judiciously managed, a " competency on which they might retire, when too old " to fulfil the ordinary duties of their appointments, " or when they might happen to lose the favour of u their European superiors. The country was given " up to them to plunder, and they well knew how to "make the most of it. Ryots of our own, living u 40 miles distant from the line of march, were " seized and forced to contribute to the purse of the " Nazir their little stock of ghee and rice. But " there were rivers to be crossed, the Pudda, the " Delassery, and the Booree Gunga* The Ghat 179 " Manjees were ordered to provide boats. They " seized every boat for 50 miles around, releasing " those who paid well. There was not a boat to be " had for purposes of commerce. The boatmen hid " or sank their boats till the storm was passed. The 14 usual supply of boats was not forth -coming for " months. At last the regiment arrived, and a finer " set of men we never saw. In a few months fever " had done its work. They were sufficiently " punished even to have satisfied Lord Dalhousie. " In three months the whole regiment passed three " times through the hospital ; and at last, when their " young adjutant died, a firing party could scarcely be " mustered from the whole of the companies to do " the last honours to their officer. The muskets " with which they fired were brought to the burial " ground, from cantonments a distance of about half " a mile, on hackeries. The men were too weak to " carry them. But the consequences of Lord " Dalhousie's ill temper did not end here. He u determined that he should never again be placed u in a like situation, and that it should be possible to " march troops to Burmah from Bengal. He " therefore ordered the construction of the Dacca " and Arracan road; a road passing through pestilen- " tial jungles ; a road which, expensive in construction, " will be much more so in maintenance, for the jungle " grows on it yearly, and there will be no traffic to u keep it down, for it can never compete with the " Megna and the sea as a means of carriage. Plow " does the Friend like our story of the effects of one " despotic act? If he is not yet convinced, we have N 2 180 " several more for him." Dacca News, July 5, 1856. Who in the army, after the fall of Napier, would dare to act on his own responsibility, even at the most critical moment? Yes; one lieutenant on de- tachment in Pegu hung a party whom he caught in his camp, on the idea that he was a spy. Lord Dalhousie, after bringing Mr. Proctor to a court- martial on a charge of murder, of which he was acquitted, dismissed him from his staff appointment, and this finished the paralysis of the army. With an almost feminine jealousy of power, he was not content with grasping the reins of government; his fingers must gather up the minutest threads ; he would examine all details of every proposition, how- ever trifling. He claimed to decide with something akin to intuition, superior to all the experience of local knowledge. Thus matters of importance were deferred by the supreme Government from absolute want of time ; thus business was slurred over, in order to its despatch; thus good suggestions were rejected, and unwise projects sanctioned, from a mis- conception of their respective merits. Thus reforms were denied the subordinate Governments, on one pretext or another; partly from requisition for more information, partly from an arrogant assumption of knowledge superior to that of the local authorities on the spot. The Governors and others were disgusted at the rejection of their well-considered plans, occa- sionally in language irritating or insulting ; they disliked naturally to forward further propositions which would only entail upon them fresh snubbing, 181 and thus everything in the shape of necessary reform was at a stand still. I will give but one instance of the quality of supervision which the supreme Govern- ment claims to exercise over the subordinate Govern- ments. In the educational department, the pettiest details must be submitted for sanction to the supreme Government ; but the following extract from the Records of the Madras Government must suffice : " On the 28th January last, the Madras Govern- " ment applied to the supreme Government for its " sanction to certain proposed establishments for the " management of the Soopah and Yellapoor Talooks " of the district of Canara. The establishments con- " sisted of Tasildar, Sheristadar, Goomastahs, Moon- " shees, Eecord Keepers, Duffadars, Peons, Sweepers, " &c., and involved a total increase of 298 rupees per " mensem. The Madras Government proposed to raise " the pay of one Moonshee from six rupees to seven " rupees; of another, from six rupees to eight ru- " pees ; and of another, from eight rupees to twelve " rupees; but to this increase the supreme Govern- " ment refused sanction, as also to an increase of one " rupee each per month proposed to be made to two " sweepers." What is the use of a Governor and Council, if they are riot competent to decide such questions as these? I am very far from saying that centraliza- tion of a certain quality, and to a certain extent, is not necessary. There must be some supreme ulti- mate authority, beyond all doubt : but the system of centralization at present obtaining, begins at the wrong end. It arises from a jealousy of power, 182 which will permit nothing which it does not ori- ginate. The true principle of application of cen- tralization would be, to hold the subordinate Govern- ments ultimately responsible; to sanction approved schemes of reform and public works ; to leave the carrying out of these schemes to the local Govern- ments ; and to watch narrowly the way in which they had executed their duties. Then the subordi- nates would work under a due sense of their respon- sibility; they would take care that no crude projects were submitted, and that all the work undertaken was effectively done. As it is, the local Govern- ments are freed, practically, from responsibility ; for the moment a measure is sanctioned, their responsi- bility ends. It may be advisable to alter the form of Government in Madras and Bombay; to do away with the expensive pageant of a Governor and Coun- cil, and to substitute a Lieu tenant- Governor, as in the North- West provinces and elsewhere. Not that this change would work any good, unless really capa- ble and experienced men be chosen for the office of Lieutenant-Governor. We must then seek out such men as Thomason, or Metcalfe, if they are to be found; for I should no more dream of strengthening a naturally feeble Governor, by disembarrassing him of his two members of Council, than I should hope to cure a lame man by depriving him of his crutches. The point of view in which this system of cen- tralization affects the present subject of discussion, is the impediment which it has proved to necessary substantial reforms. The condition of the people is now comparatively well understood ; the remedies 183 are pretty unanimously agreed on ; but nothing has "been done, and nothing will be done, so long as the jealousy of the centralizing spirit is paramount; and thus the causes of discontent and disaffection at work among the people are permitted to operate and spread without check or cure. This consideration it is which has induced me to dwell upon centraliza- tion in the present disquisition. And here I would beg to repeat that I am very far from making a sweeping assertion that our Government in India is altogether bad. On the contrary, it has very much that is good in it; and in theory and intention it is an infinite improvement upon any that has preceded it. Especially during the past few years has an im- pulse been given, by pressure from without, to its development of measures, which, if only carried out in their integrity, judiciously and prudently, must ultimately render the condition of its subjects nearly all that can be desired. It is against the lets and hindrances to practical activity that I direct my censures ; that spirit of jealous centralization which overrules the conclusions of local experience; that system of continual reference which ever encourages procrastination ; that " double " machinery, complex and antiquated, which may well be laid aside for an improved instrument, at once more simple arid more efficient. We have got our Government in India at last into the right grooves ; it remains to remove all the ob- stacles to its more rapid progress, and to apply continuous force to ensure its perpetual motion. What these obstructions are it is easy to indicate. 184 They are the impediments which everywhere exist to the decent administration of justice; a topic which embraces a wide sphere of fact and observa- tion, and which it is not my intention to enter upon with any particularity now. The civil ser- vice has the exclusive possession of the bench in the Mofussil, to the exclusion of trained profes- sional men. The absurdities and the monstrosities which this state of things calls forth daily over the whole land, render life and property insecure, and prevent the influx of English skill and capital into the interior, for the development of the re- sources of the country. That law can be adminis- tered in such a manner as to create confidence in the Natives, is found by the recent petitions to Parliament from the Natives of all these presi- dencies, in which they record their unanimous satisfaction with the system of law and its admi- nistrations, obtaining at the several capitals. The basis of the civil service has been what is called " widened," by throwing open its entrance to com- petition. But the boon is rather one to the public of England than to the public of India, since no line of demarcation has been drawn between the revenue and judicial branches; no special training made essential for the former branch. It was here that the remedy was wanting; and yet things are left just as they were. It becomes a question now, whether the shortest, the surest, perhaps the only way, of meeting an evil which has grown beyond all bounds, is not by at once placing professionally educated men upon the Mofussil bench. This 185 seems to me to be the real cause of the animosity lately displayed by the indigo planters and others in Bengal to the scheme of amalgamating the Courts, and creating a procedure whereby all men should stand equal in the eye of the law. It is not for the existence of any privilege or exemption itself so much that the British subjects in India contend, as for the protection of their life, liberty, and property, which they say would be imperilled by their being compelled to submit to such tribu- nals as exist in the Mofussil, where the European judge is ignorant, and the Native judge is both ignorant and malicious. Certainly there is much truth in this; present events, wherein rebellion is headed by Native judicial officers, and the fana- ticism and exterminating spirit, as well as the dia- bolical cruelty which we have witnessed, may well cause alarm at the thought even of the possibility of being tried by such men; and when we reflect on the ease with which false charges and false testimony are brought forward, and the inability of the European appellate courts to grapple with falsehood which has passed current with the courts of original jurisdiction, we cannot but admit that there is much force in the statements and argu- ments of the Bengal planters and the inhabitants of Calcutta. The opposition which has been raised to what are called the Black Acts has had the effect, however, of tying up reform altogether. A peg whereon to hang an excuse for delay has been thus afforded, and advantage has been at once taken of it; whereas the true remedy consists not 186 in handing over the country any longer to amateur judges, but in causing the law to be administered by stronger hands. This, I am aware, goes to the root of exclusive civilianism ; and it is sure to meet with determined opposition; but the question really now has come to this: Can an exclusive service be any longer maintained with safety to our empire in India? Is it not necessary to avail ourselves of practical experience and skilled pro- fessional labour, in order to secure such an admi- nistration of civil government as shall at any rate afford a reasonable prima facie probability that the Natives will be content with it, and that the English capitalist will no longer fear to risk his capital in the interior, where contracts cannot be enforced, except at an expense, and after a delay, which render it more prudent to refrain from mer- cantile operations than to embark in them. I am aware that the new " Cotton Association " has a timid dislike of being thought to aim at any reform in India: but I am perfectly well assured that neither they nor any one else can look to the development of this country's resources, until the administration of the law, including the organiza- tion of the police, is placed upon an entirely new footing. There is one other great measure of Lord Dal- housie's which must be examined, because I feel satisfied that it has been the source of wide spread, if not universal, discontent; I allude to his financial policy his lordship's conversion of the Five per Cent. Loan into a Four per Cent. Debt. This measure 187 has been much vaunted, and Lord Dalhousie appears to plume himself on having thereby saved the State 300,000 a year. The following account of the transaction, taken from the article in the New Quar- terly, fully and accurately represents the facts of the case : " There remains to us to remark upon Lord " Dalhousie's conversion, 1853-54, of the Indian " Five per Cent, into a Four per Cent. Debt. By " this measure, he tells us, he saved 300,000 per " annum to the Company, in the shape of difference " in interest, and he adds, that the measure was one " politic and successful in itself. The facts of the " case we shall briefly detail, and equally briefly ex- " hibit its results. In 1853, it was generally sup- " posed that the marquis would shortly return to " England, his term of office having expired, and " also a portion of the additional year for which it " was understood he had been requested by the Go- " vernment at home to stay. Nothing, of course, was u more natural, under the circumstances, than that he " should desire to create so fair an impression on the " minds of the people here, in regard to the results " of his administration, as such a reduction was cal- " culated to give; and if the reduction had been the " legitimate fruit of his success, in dealing with the " finances of India, it would have been impossible for " any one to complain. As events afterwards proved, " this was not the case. The whole thing rested on " a fabulous foundation, and the consequence has " been the creation, among the monied classes of " India, of great, and we fear permanent, distrust. It " is impossible to say how much of the creation of the 188 " false impression, under which the conversion was " assented to by the stock-holders, is attributable to u the generally supposed organs of Lord Dalhousie, 44 and how much to Lord Dalhousie himself; but the " story of the affair which we shall give, is a very 44 simple one, and we think it an accurate account of 44 what occurred. 44 The marquis having expressed himself in public 44 documents as very sanguine regarding the financial 44 results of his annexation and other measures, though 44 not probably more so than he really felt, the jour- 44 nals generally assumed to be the organs of the 44 Government in India at once took up the cry. 44 India was stated to be in a state of the highest 44 financial prosperity, and the surplus revenue ac- 44 cruing ffrom the annexations and public works was 44 to make the 4 emb arras de rich esses ' the only 44 embarrassment the Indian exchequer was ever likely 44 again to feel. Four per cent, was the highest 44 amount a Government so circumstanced could ever 44 consent to pay for money; and allowing the con- 44 version at that rate was proclaimed to be a 4 ' favour, the terms to the public generally being 44 fixed for the present at only three-and-a-half per 44 cent., even at that rate it was only prepared to 44 borrow money, to be expended on remunerative 44 public works its own requirements being amply 44 provided for under any events almost that could 44 occur. This tale, oft repeated, had its effect upon 44 the Indian public, and that effect was heightened 44 by the parading before its eyes the great amount 44 of cash balances in the Indian treasuries at the 189 :c time. By the uninitiated there were supposed to " be vast hoards lying in the vaults at Calcutta, in the " same way as one reads of the millions in the vaults " of the Bank of England. They were not aware " that it was simply the sum total of all the cash ba- " lances shown to be due at the date on all the " accounts of the collecting, and all the disbursing " officers of the East India Company, from the " Himalayas to Cape Comorin, and from Prince " of Wales' Island to Aden, and the Persian Gulf; u that it embraced the whole funds for the payment " of all the civil, military, marine, and commissariat " charges of the empire, during the remainder of the " year, and the pay of every servant of the State, " from the Governor-General downwards, for the same " period of time; and that it also embraced all sums " already due on the public accounts of all kinds, but " which, at the moment when the balance was struck, " had not been actually issued and paid away. In u short, that it was the aggregate of all the money in " hand, in every treasury, for the current expenses " during the year of the whole Indian empire, the " disposition of every farthing of which had been " already anticipated, and not one penny of which " could have been diverted to the paying off the debt u without the certainty of bankruptcy to the State. " The talk of such a sum of totals scattered every- " where, as being available for the purpose for which u it was paraded, was about equivalent to the " treating as available for a similar purpose the " aggregate of all the cash balances in the hands, " at this moment, of every collector, paymaster, 190 " commissariat-officer, and other disbursing func- " tionary, throughout the whole British and Colonial " empire. The best proof of the true financial state " of India, at the time when the conversion was " effected, will be found by an analysis of the " Parliamentary accounts of that year, and which " were this year published. It will be seen from " these, that in that very year, instead of Lord " Dalhousie's being really in a position to pay off " anything, he increased the public debt by upwards " of 241,000 (having in the previous year added " to it above 1,000,000) ; that in addition to this, he " forestalled the sums applicable to the ensuing year, " by reducing the annual cash-balance above a " 1,000,000, and that besides there was a deficit on " the year of above 2,000,000 sterling. As a matter " of course, therefore, he had almost immediately " afterwards to appeal to the public for a loan " of 2,500,000, and he then found the reaction " so great, that he could only borrow this at five " per cent, with a fourteen years' guarantee against u reduction. Even on those terms there was a dif- " ficulty in obtaining subscriptions, so great as to " have been only overcome, if private accounts are to " be credited, by personal applications, by our public " functionaries, to native capitalists, of a most un- " usual and most humiliating description. On this " latter point, of course, we can only speak by hear- " say ; but the difficulty found in filling up the loan, " and the fact of a guarantee against reduction " having been given, are matters of notoriety, and " probably a similar guarantee will henceforth become 191 " a sine qua non in the eyes of our native capitalists. " The last news from India is confirmatory of our " view of the incalculable damage done to credit by " the transaction; for now, too, a loan has again " been opened by the Government, and again it is u placed in the humiliating position of being unable " within any reasonable time to fill it. If the " reducing Indian credit to this low ebb is to be " politic and successful, then indeed has the operation " of 1853-54 been the most politic and successful " measure that was ever taken." Had there been really an overflow of cash in the public treasury, no doubt it could not have been more wisely applied than in the reduction of the public debt; but the transaction was little more than a transfer from one loan into another, and it is confidently asserted, that had the holders of five per cent, paper insisted upon cash payments, the measure must have fallen through] for want of funds. The thirteen crores of rupees in the public treasuries have melted away like morning mists, and no one has yet been able to trace what has become of them. But the measure caused the greatest lightness in the money market, and much personal private distress. Scarcely any gain has actually been made, since the Government has again been forced to borrow at five per cent. ; while the public creditor is a heavy loser, in many instances, to an extent of twenty -five per cent. Further, the loss falls on charities, on widows and orphans, whose little all is in the funds: and the constant uncertainty which has since prevailed, con- sequent upon the Three-and-a-half per Cent. Loan, 192 the Four, the Four-and-a-half, and now again the Five per Cent. Loan, has sown suspicion among all the monetary classes in India. Of all tampering, tampering with the public credit is the most dan- gerous ; and the extraordinary fluctuations in the money market which have followed Lord Dalhousie's great financial measure, have created a deep-seated distrust of us and our honesty in the Native mind. Another topic worthy of the deepest consideration at the present moment one which we are all too apt to overlook is the mighty change which is passing over the Native mind. The Native at this very time is in a transition state; we are too apt to ignore the fact, and seek to treat him as though he were sta- tionary. As we held ourselves towards him in the days of our earliest relation, so we do now; or rather we regard him with less kindliness of feeling, and more hauteur than in the early days of our acquaintance- ship. The gulf that separates the European and the Native has not beei\bridged over ; if anything, it has widened. Intercourse is neither so frequent nor so friendly between us at the present day as in the old times of Munro or Ani. Now, I think it behoves us to recognise this truth, and comport ourselves ac- cordingly : and I will not apologise for introducing here an extract from some observations which I made on this subject, at the late anniversary of Pacheap- pah's charities, before the outbreak of the rebellion. Alluding to this matter, I said : u I have never shrunk from exposing to the Natives " what I conceive to be their faults and their defi- " ciencies, though it has brought upon me no little 193 " odium. I will not now shrink, even at a similar " risk, from telling the European portion of our " society what it behoves them at the present crisis " to be doing. " I say crisis advisedly. For I believe we are in a " crisis. A change, mighty and spreading, is taking " place before our eyes in the Native mind and cha- " racter at this very moment. Its evidences are so " plain and palpable, that he who runs may read u them. The writing is displayed for us on the wall " in characters of fire ; woe be to us, if we shut our " eyes to the warning. " We are teaching the people to think: are we " prepared to carry out our act to its legitimate " necessary consequences? If not, far better were a it, with the boldness of Lord Ellenborough, to " avow at once, that the spread of education is in- li compatible with the maintenance of British rule " in India. Shall we ignore the change, or honestly " accept it, and its responsibilities? Is there any " one among us so infatuated, as to dream that after " we have taught the Natives to think, they will re- " frain from exercising their newly acquired power ? " The very charm of novelty alone would suffice to " insure its exercise. " We teach them principles of morality : are we in- " fatuated enough to imagine that they are not " questioning the reasoning on which we support a u declaration of war against a foreign state, or the ap- " propriation of the territories of our neighbours, or " that construction of old treaties which somehow " ever interprets them to our own advantage? We o 194 " inculcate in them the principles of jurisprudence : " do we suppose that they cannot spy out the naked- " ness of our present administration of justice, and " the mockery of our police? " We imbue them with a knowledge of political " science : shall we not expect to find them struggling " to assert their political rights, urging, as they have " already done, their claim to the abolition of all class " privileges, demanding that all men shall stand " equal before the law, requiring to be admitted to " an ever increasing share in the administration of " the country, pressing their admission to political " freedom, and a representative system which shall " give them the hold of their own purse strings? " Let him who doubts these things, look to the " increasing number of newspaper readers among " the Native community; let him look to the cha- " racter of the Native Press, so unbridled in its " violence that a Bengal journal has advocated its " suppression. This alone necessitates the further " spread of education. ' A little knowledge is a " dangerous thing.' It is the crudity of their " knowledge which renders the Natives violent in " their political opinions. We must teach them t wisdom, as well as mere knowledge, and thus " correct the imperfection of their views. Above " all, let us look to the late Native meeting in " Calcutta, in support of the principle of what is " termed the Black Act. Who that reads the speeches " there made, can doubt that the Native mind has u undergone a mighty change; that it has learned " to think, and in European modes of thought; 195 " that it sees clearly what are the rights of the " citizen, and is able to enforce them with arguments " eloquent and conclusive? " In the old days which are past, the people " obeyed us in their ignorance, because they regarded " us as beings of a superior order, and crouched " before us as clothed with an irresistible power. " They crouched and cowered before us. Omne " ignotum pro magnifico. But it is the tendency " of familiarity to lessen wonder, even where it " does not engender contempt; and we have edu- " cated the people, so as to enable them to judge us " by a more correct standard. It is more true " now than ever, that our empire is founded upon <; opinion. But there is this distinction: formerly, "it was a false opinion ; now, it is a true one : for- tl merly, opinion was the result of erroneous impres- " sions; now, it is founded upon more correct data: " formerly, it was based on ignorance; now, it is " founded on knowledge. Those whom they took supplied materials for Government, and cannot get his accounts settled ; or he has been driven to labour compulsorily on some public work ; * or the collector has summarily given up his land to another, leaving^ him to the slow torture of a " regular suit;" or he is in hot- water with his Pagoda people, and has no/ tribunal to appeal to ; f or the Sheristadar or Tha- , sildar has played him some scurvy trick; or he hasi been unjustly convicted by the criminal courts, with- j out, or even against, evidence. In short, the budget; of complaints is full of proofs of an administration of I affairs, feeble almost to inanition. I could give a 1 hundred cases from my own experience, drawn from* * An Act has been prepared for legalizing compulsory labour in case of tank or cover breach, and settling a rate of remune- ration. Some such enactment seems positively necessary in a country like this, where irrigation works are so numerous, and so much is at stake in their preservation. I heard an amusing instance of compulsory labour when I was in Tanjore. A tank was suddenly breached by a deluge of rain, and much damage would have been unavoidably done to the crops, but for the presence of mind of the Thasildar, who placed the villagers in the breach, shoulder to shoulder, and filled in the interstices of this human wall with wattle and dub, till other materials could be supplied for repairing the embankment ! Surely the Thasildar must have been some university-bred plagiarist of Shakespeare " This man, with lime and rough-cast, doth present wall." f I was lately engaged in an appeal in the Sudder, against a decree in a provincial court, in which the judge refused to entertain a claim to blow a trumpet during a procession, for the discharge of which office he had a yearly salary, because the judge thought it was a case of conscience ! Q 226 all classes, and every rank of life, from the Prince dethroned by treaty-breach, down to the pauper Ryot wandering penniless over the country. Let one suffice ; not selected because it presents any features of peculiarity, but because it is the latest which has come to my notice, if I except a few idiotcies, in the shape of decisions of judges and magistrates, which I found awaiting me on my return to Madras, for appeal to the Sudder Adalut : Going up to Bangalore the other day, I occupied the coupe in one of the railway carriages to Vellore. A Native, who, for aught his appearance betokened, might have been a master bricklayer or carpenter, came up to me on the platform, and asked if I had any objection to his sharing the coupe with me. Of course, I was only too glad of a companion; especi- ally as a first-class Native passenger is somewhat of a " rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno " and I speculated on his possible history. We soon entered into conversation, and the following is the sum of his story which he told me : " I am going to " spend Sunday at my village-house, where I have " an estate of about 2000 acres. This is an Enam " bestowed on my father, who was a meritorious " servant of the Company. On my brother's death u the Government resumed the land, but the Court " of Directors ordered it to be restored to me and my " son. It is not all cultivated, and lately the engi- " neers have been making some alterations in the " channels, which have diminished the quantity of u water in the tank, and I am not able to cultivate now " so large a portion as formerly. I have also a Mootah 227 44 in Masulipatam. It is twenty miles long, by so 44 many broad. I and my father were eighteen years 44 in litigation to obtain possession of this Zemindary. 44 The collector was very much opposed to my " getting it, and threw every obstacle in his power 44 in my way. At last, the Sudder Court decided in 44 my favour : but it was not until after great delay " that the Masulipatam authorities put me in pos- 44 session, and the Sudder had to issue sundry pre- " cepts before the revenue authorities would obey. 44 No sooner was I in possession, than I found 44 another suit filed against me* in the Masulipatam " Court, by the Company, denying the right of the 44 last Mootadar, a Hindoo widow, to alienate the 44 property as against them, to whom, they say, but 44 for such alienation, the estate would have lapsed by " escheat. Thus, I find myself launched on a fresh 44 sea of litigation. Heaven knows if I shall ever 44 reach the shore. From the moment I have been 44 in possession I have met with the most extraordi- 44 nary opposition. The Thasildar and the very 44 peons know that the collector and the judge are 44 ill-disposed to my claim. Rumours are circulated 44 that I shall very soon be turned out, and though I 44 have paid my kist regularly I have never been 44 able to get a receipt from the revenue authorities 44 for a single instalment. My manager and agents 44 have been most shamefully used. The manager, * Singularly enough, I had myself advised this suit whilst I held the office of Government Pleader. The extent of the power of a Hindu widow to alienate her estate is still a moot point. Q2 228 u who I believe is a respectable and known to be a " useful man, together with many others, has been " charged with murder by the police authorities. " The whole charge is utterly false. The others " were imprisoned. My manager was so alarmed " that he made his escape, giving out that he was " gone on a pilgrimage to a holy place. The rest u were tried by the judge, and they were all con- u victed, and recommended to be hanged. When " the case reached the Sudder, the Court directed " the release of all the prisoners. The Sudder said " there was not a tittle of trustworthy evidence in " the case, and that it was clearly a conspiracy. " Thereupon my manager returned. He was forth- " with arrested, and the charge against him pro- " ceeded with. Several of the witnesses on the " former trial were now brought forward. They " declared that their former statements were false, " that they had been tampered with by the police, " and instigated to give false evidence. The widow " of the man alleged to have been murdered was u among them. It was found impossible to convict " the accused. But he was imprisoned and dis- " graced. The criminal judge, determined, if pos- " sible, to ruin my man, wrote to the Sudder, to u know if the depositions taken in the former case " should be used against him. (These were behind " the back of the prisoner, and many of the depo- " nents had declared them to be false.) The Sudder " replied that it was preposterous. The Masuli- " patam authorities are determined to take security tc from my manager, as though there were a case of 229 u moral guilt or strong suspicion against him. He " is a ruined and degraded man. I don't know what " to do. If I take him back I shall only be sub- " jected to further annoyance and machinations; yet " he has always been a good servant to me, and I " believe him honest." The tale may seem incredible to people in England ; but to me, the features were not at all remarkable. I have heard many such, varied only in detail, the general outline being the same. The gentleman promised me the whole of the papers, and I hope they will arrive before this is despatched, so that I may verify his statements ; but I see no reason to doubt their general correctness ! Now let it be remembered that there are cases like this all over the country. Can the people be contented ? Can they regard our Government with esteem, or even with respect ? Are not materials of a most inflammable nature piled up everywhere ? May not general disaffection still exist, although at present it be smouldering ? I would now briefly trace the progress of the efforts which are pursued by those who try to obtain redress for a grievance. An Enam, for instance, has been resumed. The party ejected petitions the col- lector who has just ousted him. His petition is endorsed with a refusal to interfere, and returned to him. He travels up to Madras, and presents a petition to the Kevenue Board, who either decline to interfere, or remit him to the collector. He petitions the Govern- ment, who follow the same course. Perhaps in ex- treme cases, they direct the collector to report fully 230 on the matter. He is the party who has passed the decision. He supports his original view by e very- argument in his power. The petitioner never sees this report, which is a confidential communication between the Government and its subordinate. The Government minutes that the explanation offered by the collector is perfectly satisfactory, and declines to interfere. Perhaps the petitioner renews his at- tempts. He is referred to the Government endorse- ment of previous date. He has perhaps been hanging about Madras some two or three years during this process ; he has expended all his means ; he has been fooled by designing petition-writers in Madras who have wrung him of his last rupee under the false assurances of their influence with people in high places. But when the farce has been played out, he returns to his native village, or goes and hangs himself, or throws himself down a well, and is never heard of again. The number of petitions annually forwarded in this way, and thus annually disposed of, is enormous. The only limit to them is the utter hopelessness of success. The whole petitioning system is a vast delusion and mockery. I have traced the great majority of petitioners to the con- clusion of their attempts ; some few forwarded their memorial "m triplicate" through the Government to the supreme Government, and, after that, to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control the " Double Government" at home. The Indian Govern- ment gives it a friendly kick in passing it forward ; and, after a due interval, it is returned with an intimation, that the matter having been thoroughly 231 sifted by the authorities in India, the Board of Directors sees no reason to interfere. Let us now suppose that the memorialist is a dethroned prince, or a great zemindar. In such a case, an agent may be dispatched to England after the whole of the above process has been tried and failed, or the injured party may go in person to throw himself, as he hopes, at the feet of Her Majesty, there to claim a speedy justice. On his arrival in London he visits the Court of Directors, and is referred to the Board of Control. The Board of Control refers him back again to the Court of Directors. All this very courteously, it is true : but he soon finds out that there is no chance of a hearing, much less of redress, in either of those quarters. He obtains an intro- duction to some Member of Parliament. A question is asked in the House, which elicits an ambiguous or oracular reply. Papers are moved for, and if they are not garbled or mutilated, a tale of the gravest injustice, petty larceny, and villany, is disclosed The flimsy pretexts of setting aside the plainest treaty are seen to have been suggested in India, and held satisfactory and conclusive in England. A debate ensues before some forty members. India House influence, Board of Control influence, ministerial in- fluence is brought to bear upon the question. A burst of virtuous indignation escapes from any Director who may have a seat in Parliament : Mr. Mangles and others assure the House that, in their time, Indian Government was perfect, and they have no reason to believe it has deteriorated since ; and the whole thing ends in smoke. An effort is then made 232 to get the matter referred to the Privy Council. A minister, it may be the Duke of Argyll or Mr. Vernon Smith, assures the country that the Indian Govern- ment is only too anxious to lay the dispute before that tribunal, but that the highest legal authority has declared it extra vires. Then, as a last effort of despair, a Bill is brought in, to give the party his rights. It is carried by a triumphant majority in a really large House of Commons. But the Lords very summarily kick it out. It is a private bill. It is unconstitutional, it is highly unprecedented and dangerous. Next Session a question is asked the President of the Board of Control touching the whereabouts of the unfortunate prince call him Ali Moorad. In the recess, the India House hacks, and the journals which they can influence, have been industriously spreading reports of the utter unten- ableness of the claim, coupled with assurances that it is likely to be adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties by a compromise at the India House. The President of the Board of Control, however, has nearly forgotten the existence of the individual. He really does not know whether he is in England ; he thinks he has been remitted to the Governor- General in India for a final settlement of his claims ! Now this is a counterpart of the course pursued in India. There, the general principle is laid down never to take a kingdom or a property where there is a " shadow of a doubt ;" where the former incumbent " deserves well " of the Company, &c. ; but every case that arises is found to be one to which the general rule -does not apply ; and that in the teeth of 233 the most conclusive facts. The kingdom is seized. So in England, the general profession is a desire to do justice to every claimant. But in each special case, all conceivable delays and obstacles are thrown in his way, every possible objection shewn, and he never does get justice. All this shakes our power in India where it has no root ; we destroy the affections of the people, and we are set down as a nation of liars and robbers. Now I say, that neither the original seizure nor the final denial of justice could take place were it not for the Double Government. That is the root of the evil. If we had a Govern- ment acting publicly instead of secretly ; if there were room for fair investigation instead of mystification'; if the Government were restrained by a sense of its responsibility, and if it were immediately responsible to Parliament for all its acts, these deeds of spoliation could never have been attempted. Neither would redress be altogether hopeless, and its pursuit that mockery and delusion which it now is under the irresponsible despotism of the Double Government. But for the Double Government, let me ask, would it have been possible to stifle inquiry before the Par- liamentary Committees in 1852 ? With a minister decently responsible to Parliament, and no India House influence on the back stairs, would not all the subjects of proposed inquiry have been thoroughly sifted ? Would Lord John Russell ever have stood upon the " finality " of that superficial investigation which took place, and have left untouched the most important subjects the administration of justice, and 234 the condition of the people? Why if those topics had been sifted, such a state of things would have been necessarily exposed as might perhaps have led to measures sufficient to have prevented the present rebellion. Look at the disclosures of the adminis- tration of justice in Southern India ; look at the Torture Eeport ; look at the Bengal Missionary Petition. They will give some notion of what might be expected to have come out, if these subjects had been opened. But after a hasty inquiry into some few out of the many topics laid down for search at starting, the Committees were suddenly closed, after the India House had polled its witnesses on the spot, and before the people of India could send their witnesses into the field. It was as though the sheriff should declare the polling booths at an election closed at twelve o'clock in the day instead of at the pre-appointed hour. But for the Double Government, could the Eeport of the Law Eeform Commissioners, such men as Sir John Jervis and Sir John Eomilly, and the others who composed the Committee, have been shelved, a dead letter up to the present moment ? But for the Double Government, could the President of the Board of Control, in the year 1857, have made the following vague reply to an inquiry as to the course of Indian reform : " As the subject was one of great importance, and " one on which much difference of opinion existed, he " sent out all the proceedings of the commission to " India, with the request that the proposed mode of " procedure and penal code suggested by them should 235 " be carried through the Legislative Council in the " form of Acts. With regard to the amalgamation of u the Supreme Court and the Sudder Court, he u believed it would require an Act of the Imperial " Parliament, on account of the Admiralty jurisdic- " tion. It was, moreover, a point on which great u difference of opinion existed. The petition which " the honourable and learned gentleman had pre- " sented that evening advocated a different view " from that entertained by him ; and as the question " was extremely complicated, he thought it could be " better discussed in India ; but as soon as he " received the report of the decision arrived at, u he assured the honourable and learned gentleman >c that there should be no delay on his part in carry - " ing out the views of the Legislative Council." But for Double Government, is it possible that the cotton growing capabilities of India would not ere this have been developed, and the water communica- tion with the great cotton growing districts of Berar and Xagpore have been opened that cotton district, the fertility of which prompted Lord Dalhousie to break faith with the Sovereigns of Nagpore, and to spoil them of their kingdom ? Would the great Godavery not have been opened ? Would the Friend of India, in two lines, have dared to assert, that the scheme for the improvement of the Godavery was impracticable, in the teeth of Lieut. Haig's numerous reports, and at the very moment when a friend of mine was bringing cotton down by it from Chanda to Coringa ; and when the same gentleman, after proving the success of the experiment, has made 236 arrangements, single handed, for carrying down 10,000 bales by the river this very year? But for Double Government, should we have had the Times writing the tissue of sophistry which appeared in its columns on the 16th of May, with reference to the principles on which India must be governed, and the impossibility of Europeans ever successfully employ- ing their capital in developing the resources of the country ? Would not that powerful organ, in possession of the most accurate information and perfect know- ledge, instead of thus, perhaps unconsciously, furthering the policy of the India House, have been enlisted unequivocally on the side of those who, by a strong system of judicial administration, would invite English capital and enterprize into India, as the surest source of prosperity to the Natives? Would it not, while making the humiliating confession that Englishmen, in search of profitable employment or investment, will seek Sierra Leone rather than India, have stated the true causes of this indisputable and disreputable fact? Would the Times ever have written its insulting libel of the 10th June on the regimental officers of the Indian army, some of whom have been foully murdered, others died nobly at their posts, while the survivors are at this very moment reconquering the empire we have all but lost? Would it have dared to assert that the surviving officers of all regiments which have mutinied should be placed on half pay as a punishment and example ? or would it not have traced events to their true causes, cast blame on the proper shoulders, and 237 denounced the accursed lust of dominion, the tampering with religious prejudices, the infatuated monopoly of power, aimed at by centralization, as the source and origin of rebellion? The Double Government must cease. It has endangered our Indian Empire, and will eventually destroy it, if permitted to continue its career. What shall we substitute in its stead? Fox's principle of a single Chamber for India was certainly preferable to Pitt's scheme of control, notwithstanding the out- cry raised against it at the time. After seventy years we can look back calmly to the merits of the respective schemes. The one, too, has been tried, and found to have failed; nor do the dangers anticipated to the nation and the constitution from the vast amount of patronage which it was asserted Fox's scheme would throw into the hands of the minister of the day, any longer exist. Nor is there now any cause for alarm, lest ministerial influence should send out to India for its government those useless younger branches and offshoots of the aristocracy, who, it is said, have filled all offices in the colonies : men whose only claim to employment lay in their utter unfitness for success in any other profession of life. I know not whether this is a true picture of what has occurred in the colonies. It is constantly started as a fatal objection by civilians "in India. But the patronage has been taken away from the Government. It is now open to candidates of all grades of life, and of all qualities of intellect, and of all conditions of education. The civil and the medical services are already open. The military may 238 easily be made so. There is no danger to the liberties of England from the patronage which a change in Double Government would throw into the hands of the minister of the day. That is a bugbear of which no man need stand in awe. What then shall we substitute? Shall we transfer all power to the Board of Control? God forbid. The system which by any accident can place the control of Indian Government in the hands I say it with all respect, but with the most painful conviction of such gentlemen as Sir Charles Wood and Mr. Yernon Smith, must be radically wrong and rotten at the core. The only possible argument in favour of the continuance of the Board of Control, its power of nomination over the raw material of experience supplied from the quarter of Leadenhall Street, would be cut from under it by the extinction of the Court of Directors. Neither of these statesmen would, I fancy, lay claim to any personal experience of Indian affairs at the date of their respective acceptance of office, and our Indian Empire is a jewel of somewhat too great value for submission to mere experiment. Neither of the gentlemen I have named are remarkable, I believe like the old Gallic kings, who stood superior by the head and shoulders to the common herd for that overawing intellect which, if it does not supply the want of practical experience, at least blinds men to the defect. There must be nothing left to accident or chance, or at least as little as possible. In introducing a change we must take the best guarantee and security we can get for the probability of a really good and efficient 239 Government; and I believe we approach nearer to this in proportion to the publicity and responsibility under which the tenants of office act. Let there be a single Chamber for the Government of India. Let its composition include all the elements of theoretical statesmanship and practical experience. Let the best heads that England and India can furnish be seen around its board. Let the principal members of the Ministry be members ex-officio. Let those of the retired Indian Civil and Military Services who have won the most dis- tinguished reputation be their colleagues. Let some of the independent professions, men who have acquired fame and fortune in India, be associated with them. Let their deliberations be as public as is consistent with safety ; let their ordinary transac- tions be communicated to the Press ; let them be immediately responsible to Parliament; and we shall have a really efficient Government for India. Into the details of such a plan I do not propose to enter in a paper already run to an unexpected length. Suffice it to have chalked out a general scheme which seems to secure, to the greatest practical extent, all the advantages derivable from a combination of political wisdom and time-won experience. Such seems to be the best means of governing India. True, it is an experiment, but so are all political measures. Their success is always pro- blematical ; we may not achieve success, but we may do more deserve it. Constituted as things are at present, I can only say that we reverse this order we may obtain success, but we do not deserve it. 240 If that great sham, the Double Government, be abolished, and a single Chamber or Council for India be substituted, let us call things by their right names. Let us have no longer the real authority in one quarter, the nominal in another. The Government of India is in reality that of Her Majesty the Queen. Why should it be administered any longer in the name of the Company? why should not the name be where the strength lies ? why is the Queen to be veiled from a hundred and fifty millions of her subjects, yet faithful and loyal, if they could throw themselves at her feet, not repressed by the inter- vention of a phantom which forbids their approach to the throne? why should not the native bask in the sunshine of royalty, in common with every other dependency of the Crown, rather than be chilled by the " cold shade" of the Company? The Queen's name is a tower of strength ; the critical moment has arrived for using it. In the formula of the old French monarchy, let the Indian Company be arrested " au par de roi." Let the Government of India be carried on directly, and ostensibly, and avowedly in the name of the Queen. This measure would afford us the easiest solution for the great financial embarrassment which must necessarily stare us in the face after the rebellion shall have been put down. Vast sums have been plundered, vast sums dissipated in the unproductive outlay necessary for suppressing the rebels. Society will have been disorganized over a vast breadth of country, cultiva- tion neglected, labour idle. There must, therefore, be not only an actual deficiency in our treasu es, 241 but the certain prospect of a deficient revenue for the current year. The Friend of India estimates it at 3,000,000 sterling. Probably it will exceed that. Company's paper is selling at 42 per cent, discount; money will not be procurable in India at 7 per cent. With the Government carried on in the name of the Queen, and a Parliamentary guarantee, 10,000,000 sterling might be raised on England with ease at 5 per cent; and the Gordian knot, which we could with difficulty untie, may thus be cut. I believe, too, that this measure of governing in the name of Her Majesty would go farther to re-establish our power than any other which can be named. It would, at any rate, give us pause and breathing time. The people of India have a thorough distrust of the Company, thanks to long misrule and the crowning policy of Lord Dalhousie. In the abolition of the Company's Government they would see, rightly or wrongly, a recognition of its having abused its trust ; they would believe that sympathy was felt in England for their condition ; they would hope that under the new regime a totally different system would prevail ; that the policy of further annexation would be abandoned; that treaties, and grants, and promises would be respected; that there would be a chance for the introduction of decent administration of justice, an escape from eternal litigation, and the chicanery and oppression of the army of revenue and police peons. They would have their expectations most forcibly arrested ; every man would be a-gape and a -tip toe to see what first measure signalized the accession of the new Govern- 242 merit; new in name, and, if we are not infatuated, new in practice. If the Queen were to inaugurate Her Majesty's taking the reins of government into her own hands by some great signal act of justice, which all men could understand, and none could help seeing, such as the restitution to their thrones of those deposed sovereigns whose right and title might be shewn to be indisputable, I believe that all India would rejoice from one extremity to the other, and that at the same time that it decreed a bare act of justice, it would re-establish the shaken allegiance of the masses throughout the land. But some such act must only be the forerunner of real, radical, social reforms. We might rest awhile on the credit and prestige of such an act. Perhaps this wisest of policies may be impossible, if the Com- pany's rule is to be continued. Then the recognition of the despoiled princes might be regarded as a con- cession arising from our fears: and it would be whispered that this at any rate was one of the first fruits of the rebellion. Coming from the Company, it would be regarded with suspicion, and miss its effect. Coming from the Crown, it would not be so much re- garded as a mere act of royal grace and favour, as the necessary consequence of the complaints and wrongs of the injured having at last reached the royal ear, and the primal source of the fountain- justice. Such an act would be one of policy, as well as justice. Indeed, of its twofold motives, the former might predominate. We should in the first instance 243 umnistakeably arrest attention, and confirm a waver- ing faith. We must gain time for the introduction of those measures which will make India one of the most flourishing kingdoms of the world, and its people one of the richest and most contented. But woe be unto us if we idle away the time thus gained : if we do not at once set ourselves in earnest to those great reforms, the necessity of which has been proved and demonstrated, and admitted over and over again, but which have never yet been carried into execution. Instead of a restless ambi- tion to be ever extending our boundaries, or swallow- ing the independent kingdoms which each extension brings within our circumference, let us display the most scrupulous good faith to our old allies, in the midst of us ; let us study to render life and property secure by the organization of a trustworthy and efficient police; let us press forward those public works, which will create material prosperity both by the creation of produce, and the opening up of communications for its carriage to home markets or ports for foreign export ; let us revise our demands upon the cultivators of the soil, the great body of the people, and wherever those demands are found to press too heavily, reduce them ; let us render men's titles secure by an accurate survey of their land and registration of deeds; let us exercise economy in the Government, in order that we may have a larger portion of our annual revenues to expend upon the wants of the people, and the country ; let us push on the great cause of education, whence alone we can now raise an aristocracy in the place of that 244 landed aristocracy which has been destroyed; let us gradually advance the Natives to places of responsible and lucrative employment, and an ever increasing share in political importance, giving them thus a deeper and a deeper stake in the stability of the Government ; let us gradually pave the way to representative institutions, treading, it is true, cautiously, but ever onward, and with a well understood and settled purpose ; let us render ourselves, by our whole course of action, ever more and more independent of our army as the sole means of our maintenance of power; above all, let us purify . and strengthen our judicial admi- nistration. There can be no happiness, no prosperity for a people, where a feeble judiciary involves all alike in the meshes of inextricable, interminable litigation; where false charges brought by enmity and supported by perjury and forgery, even though such charges hazard the life of the accused,* are as likely of success as the most righteous cause ever brought into a court of justice. But these reforms, and a host of others which might-swell the catalogue, must now be introduced rapidly, or it may be too late. Vidi ego quod primum fuerat sanabile vulnus, Dilatum longse damna dedisse morse. * See the case related in these pages, by the passenger in the railway-train. &ICHARDSON BROTHERS, Printers* 23, Cornhill, E.G. I - RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. 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