SHILOH: 
 
 THE ONLY CORRECT 
 
 MILITARY HISTORY OF U. S. GRANT 
 
 AND OF THE 
 
 MISSING- ARMY RECORDS, 
 
 FOR 
 
 WHICH HE IS ALONE RESPONSIBLE, TO CONCEAL 
 HIS ORGANIZED 
 
 DEFEAT OF THE UNION ARMY AT SHILOH, 
 
 APRIL 6, 1863. 
 
 BY T. WORTHINGTON, 
 
 POINT GBADI 
 
 WASHINGTON CITY: 
 
 18T2. 
 
 
 
 tli' I. i!'i-:ii ian of i
 
 [From the Washington Republican of May 24, 1872.] 
 "SHILOH." 
 
 Among the meanest of the agencies set in operation to defame, for the basest 
 of political ends, the character and public reputation of eminent men whom 
 the nation has delighted to honor, is a wretchedly-written pamphlet by the 
 notorious Tom Worthington, of Ohio, a man known by everybody who knows 
 him at all to be without a single title to respect other than his years, and they 
 illy spent, may afford him. This pamphlet, printed and circulated at the cost 
 of men who would be ashamed to have their connection with it publicly 
 known, professes to give an account of the Shiloh campaign in 1862, but it 
 reveals nothing more than the malignant envy, hatred, and malice of its 
 reputed author towards the men who had befriended him before his treachery 
 and unworthiness were exposed, and who ceased not to visit him with acts 
 of charity thereafter. 
 
 Tom Worthington graduated from the Military Academy in 1827, and left 
 the army a year afterwards. During the war with Mexico he served four 
 months as a lieutenant in a regiment of volunteers, and again disap; 
 from army view. In the early part of 1862 he became colonel of tli 
 Ohio volunteers. It . ia time he fell under command of General 
 
 Sherman, who, for old acquaintance' sake, sought to have him advanced in 
 rank, but did not succeed. A few months after the battle of Shiloh he was 
 summarily dismissed the service by the President, after escaping the sentence 
 of a general court martial through a legal informality, for repeated and hab- 
 itual drunkenness on and off duty, attended, on more than one occasion, by 
 disgraceful incidents which greatly scandalized the service, and for printing, 
 for circulation in the Army of the Tennessee, "extracts" from a fictitious 
 "iliarv." filled with abuse and slander of his commanding officers, Generals 
 i i Sherman, and laudation of his own military talent and foresight, 
 time of his dismissal onward he made unceasing efforts to get his 
 iljle dismissal exchanged for a discharge by resignation, but Secre- 
 iton, who knew him well, was inflexible, and it was only upon the 
 iion of General Grant that a qualified order of revocation 
 ;Vorn the War Department, allowing him to stand recorded 
 :e by resignation. 
 
 man who is now put forward under the impulse of the despair- 
 Any thing to beat Grant!" and certainly, with such a record, nothing 
 th" - of a forlorn hope could justify his appearance even 
 
 loubtful company as that where he is to be found. Not the least 
 censure upon this last recruit to the ranks of the refon 
 ion of the honored title of a "West Point graduate" to hide his per- 
 henever he ventures into print. 
 
 information for the above fiction must have been had from 
 . as no one else could give it but Sherman. 
 
 -al T. Worthington, of the Hocking county (Ohio) militia, re- 
 company for i o war, under orders, because no one else in 
 it. It cost him in the end a pending lawsuit, involving 
 and. He became lieutenant of the company 
 r-r failing an election as lieutenant colonel, to go as Colonel 
 W. Morgan's adjutant of the 2d Ohio regiment. He v, 
 
 >f fever, and came home from Camargo 
 -igned on account of health, broken by the lingering 
 
 ial proves the "fictitious" diary true, and wanting in 
 gainst Grant, ic., established by the evidence. So Grant's 
 n on this point is one of his usual fictions. The record 
 .isehoods in Sherman's evidence, for which Grant 
 -. al of tli<- whole affair. The " disgraceful inci- 
 dents' are fictions, disgraceful only to Sherman, their inventor. The offense 
 (Continued on page 3 of cover.)
 
 SHILOH, 
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN OF 1862: 
 
 WRITTEN ESPECIALLY FOR THE 
 
 AND FOB THE 
 
 FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OF THOSE PATRIOT SOLDIERS, 
 WHO SANK INTO THEIR GRAVES ON SHILOH'S FIELD 
 
 UNKNELLED, UNNOTICED, AND UNKNOWN." 
 
 " I believe every life lost that day was necessary." SHERMAN. 
 "Bury the dead on the field wherever they fell." SAME. 
 
 BY A COMRADE ON THAT BATTLE-FIELD 
 
 AND 
 
 A WEST-POINT GRADUATE OF 1827. 
 
 WASHINGTON CITY: 
 
 M'QILL & WITHEROW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS. 
 1872.
 
 Tl "< ^\ -* 
 I 3 * 
 
 W8? s 
 
 lestrktet 
 
 TO 
 
 THE THOUSANDS OF UNION SOLDIERS, 
 
 WHO ALOXE 
 
 HELD THEIR GROUND AT SHILOH, AND HOLD IT YET, 
 
 THE 
 
 VICTIMS OF NEGLIGENCE, OR THE MARTYRS OF DESIGN, 
 
 ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE SACRIFICE THEY 
 OFFERED UP, 
 
 WITH REGRET FOR ALL WHO FELL IN WHAT THEY BELIEVED 
 TO BE A RIGHTEOUS CAUSE, 
 
 hte imperfect <$0mwe&tatg te ^edwitcU 
 
 BY A COMRADE IN BATTLE 
 
 AND 
 
 A WEST-POINT GRADUATE or 1827. 
 WASHIXI;TO, D. C., April, 1872. 
 
 186449
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 The writer of the following compendium, fully intend- 
 ing to have it published about the 1st of April, 1862, was 
 not assured till the last week in March of overt acts, by 
 direction of a cabal in "Washington, to protract the opera- 
 tions of an invading army, though at the imminent risk, and 
 indeed certainty, of defeat and slaughter of myriads of the 
 Union troops. This occasioned his having to reject over 
 half he had written, and rewrite nearly the whole work. 
 
 In the first week of April, after long search, he got to- 
 gether Hal leek's dispatches of March 3d and 4th, plainly 
 pointing to the instruments chosen for this purpose of in- 
 terested desolation. This required further changes in the 
 chapters, and may account for many points obscure and in- 
 consistent, which may be corrected hereafter, if this com- 
 mentary is found worthy of notice. 
 
 He has been refused all information at the War Depart- 
 ment, as the policy of protracting the war required the 
 suppression or destruction of all special army records, and the 
 abrogation of all established principles of military law. 
 
 W. P. G. 
 
 WASHINGTON, April, 1872.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter. Page. 
 
 PREFATORIAL Halleck's intrigue exposed by himself. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY Specimens of syntax by Grant and Sherman 
 
 II. ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION OF 1862 
 
 III. ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION UP TO SAVANNAH 
 
 IV. EASTPORT EXPEDITION 
 
 V. INTO CAMP AT SHILOH 
 
 VI. How BUELL WAS HURRIED UP 
 
 VII. How BUELL WAS KEPT BACK 
 
 VIII. SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE 
 
 IX. SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND REBUTTING EVIDENCE 
 
 X. SHERMAN'S LAST BRIGADE 
 
 XI. GRANT THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE 
 
 XII. GRANT ON AND OFF THE FIELD AND ON HIS BOAT 
 
 XIII. APPENDIX <...
 
 BADEAU'S MAP OF SHILOH. 
 
 Corrected by GBA.NT and SHERMAN, being the dotted lines. 1 1" "I II 
 Conected by W. P. G. {See Nos. 1-5, 10 and 12.) 
 Scale of two miles. Figures 10 to 20. 
 
 ///a 
 
 1. Correct position of McClernvid'i Dii'uion 
 
 2. Sherman's Division oa Bjdeau's Map. 
 
 4. McClernanil'i Division on Badeau's Map. 
 f. Correct position of Sherman's Division. 
 6. Rebel advance on Sh-rman. 7. Shiloh Ch 
 
 8. Kebel advance on the Gap. 9. Prentijs' poji :ioa 
 10. Correct position of Hrentin. 11. Uambargh Said. 
 
 12. Correct portion of Start's Bri^de. 
 
 13. Correct portion of Hurlbut on Bideau'a Map. 
 
 line on cvcmni of the Cth, and h-ad of the ravine. 
 
 
 . 
 14. Uai 
 
 It lVaeontheeveni; of thath. 
 
 17. Lew. Wallace on the morning of tha Oth. 18. Pittsburgh Landtag. 
 19. GunboatB. 2 1. 2 I. East Corinth Roa 1. 21. Snake Creek. 
 22. Hamburgh. 22. Savannah. 24. Crump'f Landing-

 
 ^c^U^,
 
 EXPLANATION OF HALLECK'S DISPATCHES 
 OF MARCH 3D AND 4TII. 
 
 The writer, on consideration and advice, that not one in- 
 telligent reader in a thousand would take any notice of 
 the peculiarly opposite statements in Halleck's dispatches of 
 March 4, 1862, has thought best to make an explanation. 
 The whole of the dispatch of March 4, from Halleck to 
 Buell, is given to show the extent of the fraud. 
 
 General Buell to General Halleck. 
 
 NASHVILLE, March 3, 1862. 
 "General HALLECK, St. Louis: 
 
 " What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus? Remember, I 
 am separated from you by the Tennessee river. Johnson is moving toward 
 Decatur and burning the bridges as he goes. D. C. BUELL." 
 
 General Halleck to General Buell. 
 
 " ST. Louis, March 4, 1862. 
 "General BCELL, Nashville: 
 
 . " If Johnson ha< destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, he cannot 
 return to attack you. Why notcorne to the Tennessee and operate with me 
 to cut Johnson's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid. Columbus 
 has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concentrating at New Madrid 
 and Island No 10. I ata concentrating a force of twenty thousand against 
 him. Grant with ail available force has gone up the Tennessee, to destroy 
 connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. Estimated strength of enemy 
 at New Madrid, Randolph, and Memphis is fifty thousand. It is of vital im- 
 portance to separa''e them from Johnson's army. Come over to Savannah 
 or Florence, and we can do it. We then can operate on Decatur or Memphis, 
 or both, as may appear best. H. W. HALLECK." 
 
 This is an entirely deceptive, and in part fictitious dis- 
 patch, wkh false information of a trebly criminal character. 
 
 1st. No expedition had gone up the Tennessee, nor did 
 for a week after the 4th. 
 
 2d. There was no intention of cutting railroad commu- 
 nication at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, or any of 
 those places, which were to be let alone especially. 
 
 3d. It was not the intention (though he says of vital im- 
 portance) to cut communication between A. S. Johnson and 
 Memphis, but to leave the way open for an object, and a 
 base one.
 
 12 EXPLANATION OF IIALLECIv'S DISPATCHES. 
 
 4th. It was not Halleck's intention that Buell should 
 march to Florence, Avhen urging him to "come over" to that; 
 place, but to stop the march, as he did. 
 
 5th. It is seen he does not notify Buell that he has dis- 
 placed Grant as commander of the Tennessee expedition ; 
 but, on the contrary, having displaced him, (as a sham or 
 cover,) tells Buell he 1<as gone up the Tennessee with an ex- 
 pedition that did not start for a week after the date of the 
 dispatch, and then under the command of C. F. Smith, as 
 a cover. 
 
 For any one of these acts of falsehood or deception, and 
 especially for the false information, Halleck's life should 
 have been forfeited; and were he alive now any President 
 fit for his position would, on the discovery of such con- 
 duct, drop him from the rolls of the arrny in disgrace. Yet 
 this man, because capable of such gross criminality, was 
 virtually the director of the war from November, 1861, till 
 it was over. Whatever were the particulars of the bargain 
 between Halleck and the Washington cabal, it was a dia- 
 bolical transfer of each to the other on both sides, Halleck 
 having and keeping the advantage. Those dispatches should 
 be in the War Office, but the War Office dare not make 
 them known officially without betrayal of the whole plot. 
 And thus the War Office is estopped from giving any infor- 
 mation whatever as to any event of the war, while the 
 present Administration is in power ; and when it is out, all 
 records of that campaign will have disappeared most 
 have now. ]S~o such criminal occurrence is upon historical 
 record, and no monarch on earth dare trifle with the lives 
 and treasure of the people as this plot proves the people of 
 this Union have been trifled with, cheated, and deceived by 
 the war administration in 1862, and no doubt during the 
 war. The main object was to deceive Buell, and to effect, 
 not prevent, the junction of Johnson with Beauregard at 
 Corinth. Buell had for three months been urging the seiz- 
 ure of Florence, and by consequence the occupation of the 
 upper Tennessee, which would have captured Chattanooga 
 and Knoxville with scarce an eflbrt. He was, therefore,
 
 EXPLANATION OF HALLRCK'S DISPATCHES. 13 
 
 anxious to see some use made of the Tennessee river for the 
 furtherance of the war. He had in his command over 
 100,000 men, doing next to nothing. Grant, Halleck, and 
 Sherman had been together some days, according to Badeau, 
 the last week in January, 1862, at St. Louis, when the outlines 
 of the intrigue, of wViich the dispatches following furnish am- 
 ple evidence, were then and there doubtless agreed upon, 
 under instructions or contracts from Washington, inclosed 
 of course to Halleck, who was really " commander-in-chief" 
 from and after the time he left Washington for St. Louis, 
 in November, 1861, and came on as such in July, 1862. 
 The seeming quarrel initiated between the chiefs of the 
 jobbers would operate to silence future suspicion. Hence 
 the dispatch to the War Office of the 3d, and the dispatch 
 of the 4th to Grant, at Fort Henry, both intended for de- 
 ceptive purposes, of which there is ample evidence, but for 
 which there is here no room, even if, to a professional 
 soldier, the deception was not plain upon the face of these 
 productions of "Old Brains" (Halleck.) These dispatches, 
 to be found in Grant's Badeau, page 59, excited exceeding 
 surprise and sympathy for Grant among innocent histo- 
 rians, such as Mansfield, &c. Grant was but nominally out 
 of command, to cover up the intrigue, one of its results 
 being SHILOH and its slaughter. 
 
 Smith, as has been stated, was put in command to cover 
 the plan of getting Sidney Johnson past Florence, as fast 
 as possible, to Corinth. This, of course, would have been 
 prevented if the expedition that stopped at Savannah on 
 the llth had kept on up that day to Florence, the point 
 where the Charleston and Memphis railroad reaches the 
 Tennessee river, near the foot of the Muscle Shoals, the 
 head of river navigation, connected by railroad with De- 
 catur, Alabama, where Johnson then was, March 11, 1862, 
 about to move west. This stoppage at Savannah brought 
 on the battle of Shiloh. The subsequent events of the 
 campaign, and those of the war, plainly show the collusion 
 between these officers themselves in the field, and some
 
 14 EXPLANATION OF HALLECK'S DISPATCHES. 
 
 authority at Washington having the regulation of the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 How, then, is it possible or appropriate for a historian, 
 and much less for a mere compiler, to maintain the proper 
 "dignity of history" when dealing with such mountebanks 
 and their intrigues? And to have invested such men in such 
 a way, and by such means, with almost absolute power 
 over the lives and limbs of hundreds of thousands of patri- 
 otic and unsuspecting citizens, is one of the most criminal 
 and terrible episodes in the warlike annals of the world. 
 
 A marble monument cannot be constructed of mud, or 
 even unburnt brick. These three men had already shown 
 how really worthless, for military enterprises, they were; yet 
 these three men have held the most prominent positions iu 
 the war of the rebellion, not by really legitimate authority, 
 however it seemed such, but plainly, as events have proved, 
 by a collusion, which implies criminality by some authority 
 at Washington never perhaps to be perfectly developed; 
 but it should be answered for. Caligula invested his horse 
 with the consulship; Domitian triumphed for his defeat by 
 the Dacians, as Sherman has been heroized for misconduct 
 at Shiloh; and Shakspeare makes Mark Antony treat his 
 colleague, the simple soldier Lepidus, as nothing more 
 than a well-trained war-horse. But this did not make the 
 horse of the tyrant an able general, nor Domitian a great 
 commander: no more did Shiloh make more than a sham 
 of Sherman, nor did the words of Antony abate the merits 
 of Lepidus as an able soldier. The elevation of these three 
 men, as the fitting instruments for party objects, made 
 them nothing more than leaders for the time to carry out 
 dishonest purposes. And they can only hold their ill- 
 gotten reputations, now waning fust away, so long as the 
 deception is maintained, by a prevention of all investiga- 
 tion. Into this general investigation they dare not go, nor 
 into the slightest specifications against them in this imper- 
 fect commentary. If they do not now express.a willingness 
 to go into such investigation, everything herein stated or 
 charged must be proven by default, as almost everything so
 
 EXPLANATION OF HALLECK'S DISPATCHES. 15 
 
 charged is proven by their own reports and letters, and the 
 histories, of which they themselves have declared them- 
 selves to he the true authority. The repression or destruc- 
 tion of all the usual war records in relation to Shiloh was 
 the result of that protractive policy of which these men 
 were the instruments. They have been suppressed or de- 
 stroyed; if not, let these records be produced. Much 
 of the true history of the campaign was suppressed by the 
 suspension of the 34th article of the army regulations by 
 Sherman, and perhaps other commanders in the field.* 
 
 Let these facts, then, be borne in mind by the professional 
 reader, who may condemn, as in bad taste, any badinage 
 or jocularity, at the expense of these men, (men upholstery 
 made-up commanders,) consider that the Government, 
 during the war, has turned over for the consideration of 
 the historian little else than mere pretenders and mounte- 
 banks, carried through the war at the expense and indul- 
 gence of the nation, in spite of themselves and blunders: 
 their admirers and parasites not even believing in their 
 own letters and reports, however derogatory to their char- 
 acters as honest men and good soldiers, as this treatise will 
 demonstrate. The writer, who claims nothing of the dig- 
 nity of a historian, may mingle comical remarks to relieve 
 his too tragical compilations, in which last he has indulged 
 as little as truth will permit. No historian, at any rate, is 
 bound down to the "dignity of history," where the subjects 
 offered afford no dignity in words or acts or character, on 
 which to expatiate. He then considers that he may, there- 
 fore, be permitted the occasional expression of contempt 
 and indignation, of which, for their acts and omissions, 
 every honest mind must be conscious, and a professional 
 soldier would be a hypocrite, such expression to suppress. 
 
 W. P. G. 
 
 Which may pass, when seen, for West Point Graduate. 
 
 * The record of Buell's court of inquiry was not allowed to extend back of 
 nor to include Shiloh, and that is gone ; and a court record touching the trial 
 of Colonel Worthington, 46th Ohio, has been entirely suppressed; and no 
 order-books at the War Office are allowed examination by any one.
 
 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 A SYNOPSIS OF THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN. 
 
 HOW HALLECK EXPOSES HIS OWN INTRIGUE. 
 
 General Halleck to the War Office at Washington. 
 
 "Sx. Lours, March 3, 1862. 
 
 "General Grant left his command without my authority and went to Nash- 
 ville. I can get no returns or reports of any kind from him. I am tired 
 and worn-out by this neglect and inefficiency." (The very qualities wanted 
 by the junto. 1st, act of the jugglers, &c. W. P. G.) 
 
 Halleck to Grant. 
 
 "ST. Louis, March 4, 1862.* 
 " General U. S. GKANT : 
 
 "You will place General Smith in command of the Tennessee expedition 
 and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to 
 report strength and position of your command? H.W. HALLECK." (2d act 
 of the jugglers ) 
 
 General Halleck to General Buell. 
 
 "Si. Louis, March 4, 1862* 
 
 "Grant, with all available force, has gone up the Tennessee, to destroy 
 (railroad) connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt." (All humbug, 
 as the above dispatches prove. W. P. G. 3d act of the jugglers, by Halleck, 
 Grant, and Sherman.) 
 
 The originators and managers of this performance were 
 in Washington, and may yet appear on this bloody stage, 
 as it afterwards got to be. 
 
 No expedition went up from Fort Henry till the 10th 
 March, in temporary command of Smith, for a special pur- 
 pose of the juggler^ On the llth Grant is in command again, 
 and writes to Smith, March 11, 1862, (from Fort Henry:) 
 
 " General Halleck telegraphs that when reinforcements arrive T may take 
 the general direction. I think it doubtful if I shall accept." (Certainly not ; 
 but he did accept, as usual, having only been out of the comedy behind the 
 scenes. The jugglers will next appear between Shiloh, Pittsburgh, and Sa- 
 vannah. W. P. G., West Point Graduate.) 
 
 A very distinguished Senator, who runs the financial 
 machinery of the nation with more or less ability and sta- 
 
 * Observe the dates.
 
 18 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 bility, has very justly remarked, in terms, that there was no 
 very specific difference or distinction between a tariff or rev- 
 enue and one for protection, they being convertible terms. 
 
 The same may be said, in some sort, of the relation be- 
 tween a preface and an introduction, as they invariably 
 run into each other. This writer, being nothing more than 
 a compiler of facts and fictions, thrown carelessly together, 
 must leave the reader, if he have one, to arrange what may 
 be written where he chooses, calling it either preface or 
 introduction. 
 
 The following treatise, compilation, or commentary, is 
 written, in the first place, because the writer could find no 
 one else who would undertake it, who would attempt it, 
 or who was willing to undertake, or have any share or re- 
 sponsibility in such a production. This writing, then, was 
 Hobson's choice on the part of the writer, and it must be 
 on the part of the reader, until some regular arid compe- 
 tent historian can take up the chaos herein thrown together, 
 and arrange the same in proper historical shape. 
 
 The work was compiled under very peculiar circum- 
 stances. It was necessary that some part of the expense 
 should be met by prepaid subscriptions, as some of the 
 ablest newspapers are carried on. Canvassing for sub- 
 scriptions and prepayments, it was at once apparent that, 
 in everybody's opinion, a true history of " Shiloh " would, 
 of necessity, be taken and considered as an attack upon 
 those officers who had, and have, and claim, the honor, and 
 the merit, and the gratitude of the people for that " brilliant 
 success" of April 6, 1862. This " brilliant success" had been 
 most remarkable for the almost miraculous manner in 
 which the Union army and its commanders had been 
 snatched from the wide-opened jaws of destruction, late in 
 the afternoon of April 6, as so forcibly related by General 
 Grant himself in his report of April 10, 1862. 
 
 In the necessary connection between this providential 
 deliverance, after the peculiar occurrences of the day, and 
 the peculiar conduct of the Union commanders, consisted 
 the elements of the inevitably supposed attack on these
 
 PREFATORIAL. 19 
 
 officers. However this may be, the writer is bound to 
 impute to the prospect of such an attack the facilit}' with 
 which sufficient ammunition was subscribed to make it. 
 His deepest acknowldgements are, therefore, due to Gen- 
 erals Grant and Sherman. For it is very certain that but for 
 an anxious, or curious, or interested, or disinterested dispo- 
 sition to see the result of such an attack, real or supposed, 
 the means of commencing it would not have been had. 
 This humble compiler utterly disclaims any intention of 
 such an attack, for the sake of the attack; has no more idea 
 of an attack on these officers than they had of an attack 
 on Johnson and Beauregard at Shiloh, though Buell's 
 troops were at hand, which would have made the attack, 
 at Hamburgh or Shiloh, a " brilliant success" with scarce 
 the scratch of a butcher's bill on either side. 
 
 To quote from Sherman's Campaigns by Bowman, "this 
 history of the Shiloh campaign is written in the single in- 
 terest of truth;" and Cicero, it is said, somewhere in- 
 culcates, that in writing history we must not fear to relate 
 what is true, nor dare to state for truth anything which is 
 the reverse. So far as regards the Shiloh campaign, this 
 law of history has been so far, reversed by all writers on 
 the subject. 
 
 To follow this rule, where the sources of truth have been 
 poisoned or perverted, is for the time, and often forever, 
 impossible, as will prove the history of the late war. 
 Take, for instance, General Grant's report of Shiloh, which 
 says as little as possible, and that little is in general falla- 
 cious, and so intended to be. It is not so much an expres- 
 sion, as a suppression of facts and incidents. 
 
 1st. " On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and 
 driven in by the enemy." 
 
 Here, then, is as suppression of the facts, that our pickets 
 had been driven within half a mile of the camp at 7 a. m., 
 on the day before the battle, and at least one of our picket 
 posts within easy cannon shot of the camp had been occu- 
 pied by the enemy. That for several days there had been in 
 his immediate front not less than 60,000 hostile troops,
 
 20 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 according to his estimate and belief. That he had, never- 
 theless, early on the morning of the 5th of April, withdrawn 
 his cavalry pickets and artillery from the front or Sherman's 
 line, and had no detachments of any kind out that day to 
 the distance of over two and a half miles, where the enemy 
 had been found on the 4th in such force as to make General 
 Sherman apprehensive of an immediate attack. That, in 
 fact, he and that commander had had reason to expect an 
 attack from and after the afternoon of the 3d of April, 1862. 
 2d. To make known and not to conceal facts, he should 
 have stated that General Buell, of the Army of the Ohio, 
 from Nashville, had arrived at 5 p. m. of the 5th, and the 1st 
 division of his army about noon the same day. That, as had 
 been intended, these troops might have been thrown up to 
 Hamburgh, on the river, four miles above, where they 
 would have been little over a mile to the right and rear of 
 the rebel army. That this was not done, for the reason 
 that General Halleck was daily expected, and it had been 
 his anxious desire to gratify that innocent commander's 
 disposition to lead personally in the expected attack. That, 
 knowing of General Buell's vicinity, it was preposterous to 
 suppose there would have been any real attack by the en- 
 emy, in which he was supported by the experienced and 
 able conviction of General Sherman, as expressed to Major 
 Kicker, which conviction was, that " Beauregard was not 
 such a fool as to march all the way from Corinth to make 
 such an attack," and still persisted in the conviction that 
 Beauregard made a fatal mistake when he made an attack 
 which drove us back no farther than the landing, with the 
 loss of but 10,000 men, or only half the number of those 
 that " did not run away" inclusive, &c., in the first day's 
 fight. Had he stated this, and several other items to be 
 supplied by this commentary, his report might have been 
 of at least as much value to general history as Sherman's 
 letter of January, 1865, to the U. S. S. Magazine is to 
 Sherman and Grant's history, if at all credible. 
 
 To do the commander of the Army of the Tennessee en" 
 tire credit, it must be admitted that we may gather by deep
 
 PREFATORIAL. 21 
 
 enough research that General BnelPs arrival (5 p. m.) 
 saved the landing and transports from capture and the 
 array from an equivalent conclusion of the campaign, but 
 most readers might, with justice, suppose that General 
 Buell was a delinquent subordinate like General Wallace, 
 who had tardily got up from his usual position on the field, 
 as G. charged and charges on Buell to this day. Now, these 
 suppressions dam up, to say the least, the true source of 
 history, while his statement of facts does as much to per- 
 vert the same fountains to wrong conclusions. He knew 
 the gunboats were useless without the presence of Buell's 
 troops, and were and could only be effective by the excite- 
 ment of a cannonade. The statement that his force was 
 too much fatigued to perfect a victory which was lost by 
 neglect of pursuit, is alike "fallacious, as there were over 
 30,000 men, not in action that day, ready, and anxious, and 
 able to pursue all night. If he had sent 3,000 idle cavalry 
 and 10,000 of the stragglers and idlers, without ammuni- 
 tion, as most of them were, up to Hamburgh at any time 
 after the arrival of Buell, all the trains and most of the 
 rebel troops would have been captured. But this was not 
 then the object. They were saved for future use, as the wise 
 old hunter spares the she wolf as productive of wolf scalps 
 when at a premium. The enemy, he says, retreated in good 
 order, for which he had, or should have had, an expression 
 of their obligations, properly engrossed, in the neatest 
 style, &c. 
 
 The worst perversion, however, is the statement 
 1st. That General Sherman was with his command the 
 entire two days of the battle, (which Sherman's report de- 
 nies.) 2d. That he displayed great judgment and skill in 
 the management of his troops, (which the report further 
 denies.) 3d. The repetition that his place was never vacant. 
 4th. That he was twice wounded and had three horses 
 killed under him, (all by agreement. W. P. G.) 
 
 These statements are all disposed of by General Sher- 
 man's report and his (Grant's) autobiography by Badeau. 
 And thus:
 
 22 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 1. General Sherman states in Ins report that at 10 a.m. 
 his 3d brigade (Hildebrand's) had substantially disappeared 
 from the field, and that the other two, Buckland's and Mc- 
 Dowell's, 4th and 1st, were conducted by his aids u to join 
 on Me demand' s right." This point was over a mile off' at 
 the time. It gradually grew to near three miles, but the 
 brigades never joined McClernand's right, and Sherman 
 never joined the brigades: so that, if that part of Sher- 
 man's report be true, and Buckland's report be true that 
 his brigade was dispersed at 9 a.m., and Sherman's report 
 be true that the attack in force did not commence till 8 
 a. m. of the 6th, Sherman was with his command, by his 
 own report, but one hour of the two days; and there were 
 and are thousands of witnesses, besides Sherman's report? 
 to prove this, Buckland's report aside. 
 
 2. If Sherman displayed such great skill and judgment^ 
 whence arise so many statements, by most historians who 
 heroize him, that his troops were all dispersed by 8 or 9 
 a.m.; and what was that skill and judgment worth in his 
 own opinion, which deferred to that of subordinate officers, 
 (his aids,) to whom he consigned, he says, his only two or- 
 ganized brigades at 10 a. m. 
 
 By this he plainly intimated, 1st. That these troops were 
 safer in the hands of his aids than under his own com- 
 mand; or, 2d. That he was safer in avoiding the command 
 of these troops on a march during which a contest he knew 
 was inevitable, as the result proved. 
 
 Take either horn, and what is proven as to "this gallani 
 and able officer" more meritorious than that he exhibited 
 the modesty of Bob or Tom Acres in the one case, in want 
 of self-confidence, or the wisdom of the great Falstaff in 
 the other in the husbandry of discretion. 
 
 The truth of this statement, as to the present com- 
 mander-in-chief, is easier sustained in this case than usual, 
 as the writer can bear witness that McDowell's brigade was 
 thus detached out of Sherman's immediate command by 
 himself, in the hottest of the fight, and it was most for- 
 tunate in his discretion of giving up the command, as
 
 PREFATORIAL. 23 
 
 stated by him, and perhaps equally so in its desertion by his 
 aids and his friend and favorite, the brigade commander, 
 which left it, as admiring historians say, "far to the right, 
 and front of the Union army," to join, as ordered, on to Mc- 
 Cleruand's perpetually vanishing right, if allowed by the 
 enemy, who vetoed the procedure before it came in sight 
 of the objective vanished point; and about the time that 
 Sherman, like Horatius Codes (or perhaps Cokely) at the 
 Sublician bridge, was so highly commended by Grant, (so 
 S. says,) for so obstinately keeping back the enemy with- 
 out troops, except his sword, as Mrs. P's broom kept out 
 the ocean, or the North sea, all the same. 
 
 3. The repetition that his place, or the position of his 
 feet, or his horse's feet, was never vacant, is perhaps true, un- 
 der the construction of the way in which a leopard may 
 change his spots; of which construction, if his report is 
 credible, he took advantage, by his change, in retreat, of 
 the numerous spots between Shiloh church in the morn- 
 ing and Snake creek bridge at night. 
 
 4. As the latest reports are' considered most reliable, 
 Grant's statement, onBadeau's authority, may be found on 
 page 84 of that veracious chronicle, that at the close of the 
 battle Grant was struck, but not hurt; Sherman was slightly 
 wounded, very slightly, in the epidermis, left hand, on its 
 back, by a twig, and at least 10,000 men on each side were 
 either killed or wounded, (true;) in which there is some 
 slight show of truth as to the mortal hurts of these greatest 
 of rebellion-risen commanders, while not much is abated of 
 the slaughter they achieved. And to sum up all the true 
 material for history above stated, as derived from Grant 
 and Sherman's reports, we have, 1st. That Buell's army 
 saved the Army of the Tennessee from ruin on the 6th 
 April; 2d. Sherman gave up all command at 9 or 10 a. m. 
 of the first day's fight, and was slightly wounded, he says. 
 As to the three horses, their bones, if ever discovered, will 
 be just as recognizable as those of the thousands of U,nion 
 soldiers dumped down and but slightly covered, under or 
 over where they fell, " unknelled, unnoticed, and unknown,'
 
 24 PREFATOKIAL. 
 
 by the benevolence of this " prototype of Washington," 
 who has the promulgation of the veracious Sherman for 
 being as " unselfish, kind hearted, and honest as a man 
 should be." And now, having presented for true history all 
 found worthy of transcription as truth from Grant's report, 
 return we, as the French say, to our "mouton," or to Gen- 
 eral Sherman's historian, Colonel S. M. Bowman, say " long- 
 bow-man" for shortness. 
 
 This historian, in the "single interest of truth," concludes 
 his preface by the hope, that his efforts in so deep an interest 
 may elicit new testimony from the same depths. Now, if it 
 be in the interest of truth to detect fallacy and expose fiction, 
 something of the sort, it is hoped, will be perfected by the 
 digressions and commentaries required in the search of that 
 oldest inhabitant of the bottom of a well. And, to begin at 
 the beginning, let all historians of the Shiloh campaign, past 
 and future, be warned against the report of Grant, repeat- 
 edly contradicted by himself, and as is seen, by Sherman's 
 report at the time. Be warned against Sherman's report, 
 contradictory in itself, and 'afterwards contradicted by him- 
 self; and especial care must be taken to exclude as truth 
 everything Hal leek has so far advanced, or which yet, undis- 
 covered, may be advanced on his authority, granting that 
 the evidence of these men may be used against themselves. 
 No living man, as he perhaps may repeat, regrets General 
 Halleck's death more deeply than this narrator. He might, 
 if alive, be made to answer for some part of the mischief 
 he has done, by being compelled to make known his au- 
 thority for the many terrible and most diabolical incidents 
 of the war, before and after he became commander-in-chief 
 of the army at Washington. Whitelaw Reid's paper is 
 the most readable account of the battle, and he seems to 
 have had an inkling of design in the arrangements for defeat 
 he has remarked were seemingly made. He was doubtless 
 deceived by some one in Sherman's interest as to the posi- 
 tion, of McClernand's left brigade, as to the attack upon 
 the 1st brigadenbefore the first retreat, and its disappear- 
 ance among the ravines of Snake creek, &c., &c.
 
 PREFATORIAL. 25 
 
 He might have seen that it was detached in that direc- 
 tion by Sherman's report, but he never had any means of 
 further tracing its operations. As to his statement that 
 Grant allowed no sign of distrust to escape him, he had 
 not seen Grant's letter to Buell about noon of the 6th, of 
 which the following extract is sufficient at present: 
 
 " Commanding OFFICER, &c., BuelTs army, near Pittsburgh: 
 
 "If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage over the river, it 
 will be a move to our advantage, and POSSIBLY save the day to us. 
 
 "U.S. GRANT." 
 
 If this was no sign of distrust, what could be more so 
 than his proving his faith by his works, and abandoning the 
 field as lost till Buell in person came up at 1 p. m. ? Sher- 
 man's chivalric conduct is all the merest fiction. His own 
 report, as above stated, and his retiring on Snake-creek 
 bridge, by which he could have escaped to the river be- 
 low, proves his cautious, and perhaps correct, intent to save 
 himself and what troops he could on the expected capture 
 of the landing he made no effort to prevent. He made 
 no more use of the brigade sent him by McCleruand to 
 support his left than Grant did of Buell's division reach- 
 ing Savannah at noon on the 5th, by means of which the 
 Confederates could have been driven back without the 
 necessary loss of a single Union soldier. This warning 
 against Halleck is proven clearly right by the intrigue de- 
 veloped at the head of this prefatorial chapter; and his 
 statement, on which rests everything that could ever be 
 claimed for Sherman, is as purely a fiction as that of "Jack 
 the Giant Killer," or the Greek legend of "Ixion and the 
 Cloud," and his report proves it such. Never was the truth 
 more clearly established than by him (Halleck) that the 
 "evil that men do lives after them; the good dies mostly 
 with themselves." If he ever did the country a real ser- 
 vice during the war, it stands upon the Popish dogma that 
 "whatever is, is right;" and the Latin aphorism of " de mor- 
 tuis nil nisi bonum" was never more entirely than in his 
 case proven "more worthy in the breach than the observance." 
 That the dead should, of course, or in any case, stand in
 
 26 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 the way of the life, of truth, or of justice, to living men 
 or measures, is. as great an absurdity as the mourning of the 
 Spartans at each darkness of the moon, which religiously 
 kept them away from Marathon when the lights and liber- 
 ties of Greece itself were about to be extinguished by the 
 still existing darkness and superstition of the Asiatic world. 
 
 And here, lest it be forgotten, this compiler of fictions, 
 exploded like percussion caps against the truth, to their 
 own extinction, declares his intention, that in each and 
 every chapter of this commentary he will endeavor to im- 
 press upon the reader, weary or otherwise of repetition, 
 that 
 
 1st. About the only truth worthy of record in the re- 
 ports of these great commanders is that Buell saved the 
 army at 5 p. m., which Grant and Sherman retired from, 
 and gave up as lost at 10 to 12 a. m., April 6, 1862. 
 
 2d. That if ever, as Whitelaw Reid intimates, a defeat 
 was organized, it was done at Shiloh. 
 
 3d. That BuelPs army was purposely kept back during 
 three days of perpetually expected attack at Shiloh. 
 
 4th. That the troops of Buell at hand on the 5th of April 
 might have defeated the enemy, if they had not been pur- 
 posely rejected; and this would have been done without 
 the loss of a single Union soldier. 
 
 5th. That the otherwise inexplicable events of the Shiloh 
 campaign can only be accounted for from January to June, 
 1862, by a systematic effort to protract the war, as had 
 been agreed by the war cabal at Washington. 
 
 6th. That Grant, Sherman, and Halleck could have, on 
 this theory alone, obtained not only impunity but reward 
 for the. slaughter and disgrace of Shiloh, and other other- 
 wise unaccountable events of the war, the most direct evi- 
 dence being the choice of Halleck instead of Buell, March 
 11, 1862, to control the war in the West, when the cap- 
 ture of Florence and the upper Tennessee was the great 
 direct measure to be done or not on the llth of March, 
 1862. If there is any other explicable theory of the pro- 
 traction of the war than by the failure to take possession
 
 PREFATORIAL. 27 
 
 of the upper Tennessee after the fall of Fort Henry, let the 
 writer of this digressive treatise go into disgrace here and 
 hereafter. 
 
 After looking over, for a while, in the national library, 
 the numerous fallacies and fictions as to the Shiloh cam- 
 paign, this compiler had at last concluded to disperse them 
 by a commentary on the histories of Badeau and Bowman. 
 He had not half his work done when his proposed 150 
 pages were exhausted, and he had scarcely a fact per se 
 to show, except the fact of fallacies extinguished generally 
 by each other. He, however, by looking over official docu- 
 ments, and comparing them with his own, found that about 
 all that had been said or done by the chief actors in the 
 campaign must have been done by the authority of some 
 power in Washington delegated by the Government, which 
 the Government did not publicly acknowledge or avow. 
 
 It was plain that blundering and incapacity, even on a 
 battle-field, were not considered censurable, when the ob- I' 
 ject of the junto in "Washington was advanced without too 
 much risk of exposure and ultimate defeat. Violations of 
 the army regulations, of the articles of war, or of the estab- 
 lished laws of military art and science, of the grossest char- 
 acter, which subserved the purposes of the party in power, 
 were considered meritorious rather than otherwise. 
 
 This state of affairs had often been charged during the 
 war and since, but no very specific evidence was adduced 
 to establish the charge. . 
 
 Immediately on the capture of Fort Henry, when the 
 way was opened up to Florence, Alabama, the question at 
 once arose, whether the war should be virtually ended by 
 the occupation of the upper Tennessee and the capture of 
 Chattanooga, or should be continued a year or more by 
 delaying such occupation, which could have been effected 
 with little time, risk, or expense then. As will be seen, 
 Buell had been urging this as far as military propriety 
 would allow. He was sustained by McClellan, who, about 
 March 1, 1862, wrote Halleck that it was important to 
 seize Decatur, Alabama; and he should have ordered it. 
 
 If
 
 l\ 
 
 28 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 The question first to be settled was the seizure of Flor- 
 ence, near the Charleston and Memphis Railroad, so as to 
 prevent A. Sidney Johnson joining Bragg and Beauregard 
 at Corinth. 
 
 The matter was, of course, discussed in the Cabinet, but 
 was doubtless settled by the congressional cabal or com- 
 mittee on the war, or over and under the war, more prop- 
 erly called. It was nothing but a mask to cover the cabal. 
 The decision not to take and fortify Florence Avas the de- 
 cision to give Halleck the control of the war on the Ten- 
 nessee instead of Buell: to leave the road past Florence 
 open, and to protract the war, which was done, against 
 Buell's urgency. It then became a work of supererogation 
 for the writer to enter upon any specific examination into 
 the character or conduct of the commanders intrusted with 
 the prolongation of the war. Their true character as mil- 
 itary jobbers in bloodshed, and not leaders, was settled at 
 once. They were under a contract or obligation to extend 
 the war, instead of ending it for a consideration, of course. 
 And while no honorable soldier would go into such an 
 undertaking for any earthly consideration, these officers 
 understood that they were to have all that was to be had in 
 their line if the speculation succeeded. It did succeed, and 
 they have had and now enjoy their purchased positions and 
 perquisites. This bargain was doubtless consummated 
 when Grant went up to St. Louis the last week in January, 
 1862, to see Halleck, Sherman being there; and this was 
 doubtless the initiation of the Tennessee and Cumberland 
 expeditions, referred to in Sherman's speech at St. Louis 
 in 1865. In this speech he gave Halleck the credit of these 
 expeditions, and asserted the reverse of the fact, that Hal- 
 leck, but for delays occasioned by Buell. would have gone 
 on to Florence, instead of stopping at Savannah, or rather 
 Pittsburgh. 
 
 This bargain or arrangement once understood, everything 
 about the battle and campaign of Shiloh is made plain. 
 This shows why the expedition was started from Paducah 
 without proper forage, ammunition, proper stores, or in-
 
 PREFATORIAL. 29 
 
 trenching tools, such as it should have had. This accounts 
 for taking along the sick, purposely to incumberthe camps 
 with hospitals, for the feigning on Eastport, for the condi- 
 tion of the roads out from the landing to Shiloh, for the 
 scattering of the camps, for taking a position commanded 
 by high ground in front, with a bushy screen for the 
 enemy. It accounts for the failure to order intrench- 
 ments, and the refusal of tools to strengthen the front. A 
 battle was invited without regard to any other result. 
 That a defeat was at first intended to be organized admits 
 not of a doubt by those who understand the rules of war. 
 
 The expectation of Sherman and Grant of an attack on 
 on the 3d of April; the effort to keep Buell back till the 
 7th and 8th, or till after the fight; the rejection of his 
 troops when they came three days to five days before they 
 were wanted, while the enemy in front was estimated at 
 one hundred thousand men; the indifference of Grant on 
 and off the field; his lingering at the landing and on his 
 boat; Sherman's recklessness on the battle-field and the 
 turning over of his last-organized troops to his aids at 9 
 to 10 a. m. all point to an intended defeat, or a careless- 
 ness for the result, without apprehension of reprimand 
 from Washington. And they got no such reprimand; they 
 got reward and promotion. 
 
 Then the refusal of Halleck to make any investigation, 
 though unanimously demanded after the battle, except by 
 thecowards and skulkers; the silence of the junto in Wash- 
 ington, so sharp after McClellan; Halleck's statement, with 
 an audacity without parallel, that Sherman had saved the 
 day he had done most to lose; the delay at Shiloh after 
 the battle; the snail pace to Corinth, all to throw away 
 time; the suspension of all operations in Western Ten- 
 nessee, which let Bragg loose after Buell; the purposely 
 mismanaged campaign in Virginia ; Bragg' s raid into Ken- 
 tucky ; and the displacement of Buell all point to a power 
 at Washington that had determined to protract the war. 
 Besides this, the promotion- of Sherman on the capture of 
 Corinth, for misconduct at Shiloh, and the translation of
 
 30 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 Halleck to Washington as commander-in-chief Halleck, 
 who had laid the foundation of all this delay, and disaster, 
 and bloodshed, by the refusal to occupy Florence all 
 told the same story. And the story was, that the object 
 was to make use of the war to carry the elections of 1864, 
 which was done done at an expense of blood and money 
 past estimation ; at the risk of national calamity too terri- 
 ble for contemplation; and was the commission of a crime 
 by their own Government against the army and the country 
 without a parallel in the annals of the world. And here 
 all explanation or exposition of the Shiloh campaign might 
 terminate with this preface, but the book is written and 
 partly paid for. The character of the instrument employed 
 by the Washington junto as the principal in this enormous 
 intrigue may here appropriately be given by himself. His 
 untimely death is a calamity to this writer, and to the ends 
 of justice, as he is beyond the reach of human law or even 
 human execration. To deceive Buell, to humbug the 
 people, and cover the intrigue was the question : and here 
 is the way he did it, or had it done : 
 
 Halleck to the War Office at Washington. 
 
 " ST. Louis, March 3, 1862. 
 
 " Grant has left his command and gone to Nashville without my authority. 
 I can get no returns or reports from him; I am worn out and tired with this 
 negligence and inefficiency." (Second act of the juggle.) 
 
 Halleck to Grant. 
 
 " MARCH 47i, 1862. 
 
 " You will place Major General C. F. Smith in command of the expedition 
 (up the Tennessee) and remnin yourself at Fort Henry. Why don't you obey 
 my orders," &c., &c. (Third act of the jugyle.) 
 
 Halleck at St. Louis to Budl at Nashville, Tennessee. 
 
 " MARCH 4i7t, 1862. 
 
 " Grant, with all available force, has gone up the Tennessee river to break 
 the road at Humboldt," &c. (First act of the jugyle.) 
 
 The object of all this was understood by all the parties 
 concerned, except Buell and Smith; Sherman being as it 
 were the audience and claquer all to himself and. for 
 himself. 
 
 Buell may have been deceived, and thought the expedi- 
 tion was bound for Florence. It did not, however, leave
 
 PREFATORIAL. 31 
 
 Fort Henry till the 10th; got to Savannah on the llth; 
 then, presto, as the jugglers say, and Grant was in command 
 again on the 13th March, as he writes Smith on the llth. 
 (Last act of the juggle.) The expedition was long enough 
 under command of Smith to give color to his location of 
 the Shiloh battle-field. This had been doubtless arranged 
 at St. Louis. Sherman's Bowman says that Halleck or- 
 dered the position on the west side of the river, to pre- 
 vent Beauregard joining Johnson at Decatur.* (To keep 
 up the juggle this is written, but lets it out.) 
 
 This character of Halleck is enough to settle the char- 
 acters of his coadjutors, Grant and Sherman; and it is 
 easily shown, as are the eclipses of the almanac maker, or 
 the programme of the traveling juggler, by the after-con- 
 duct of these men, that they were chosen to carry out the 
 plan of protracting the war, for the reason that Halleck was a 
 man that never advised a battle, never went near a skirmish 
 on the Corinth approach, and kept his quarters out of reach of 
 the heaviest artillery. Grant could not or did not give an in- 
 telligent order, or perform a tactical manoeuvre on the 
 battle-field of Shiloh, or any other battle-field, of himself, 
 during the w T ar. Sherman, at Shiloh, ruined everything he 
 handled or meddled with in person on the field of Shiloh, 
 and everywhere else. These were the men, and exceedingly 
 proper men, chosen by the Aulic council at Washington 
 to protract the war in 1862, and let it run according to 
 political circumstances thereafter, till 1864 and 1865. 
 
 This commentator, then, with such characters to handle, 
 
 *This needs no explanation to a close or military reader, but may to others. 
 Buell's effort was to prevent Johnson going from Decatur to Corinlh by rail- 
 road. Halleck's effort had been to get Johnson to Corinth, past Florence, 
 from Decatur; but here Sherman says, that the effort was to prevent Beau- 
 regard joining Johnson at Decatur, (an absurdity,) and, therefore, it was nec- 
 essary to locate the army on the west side of the river, which is a double 
 fiction, or worse. To take and hold Florence was to prevent the junction 
 of the rebel armies, and for this purpose Florence itself, on the north or east 
 bank, was the point to reach. Sherman avoids this truth, for the purpose of 
 deception, in one case, as to the true object in view by Buell, which is one 
 fiction, and makes a statement against the fact to justify the location at 
 Shiloh, where a battle could be invited, as it was to prolong the war, and 
 this makes the double fiction. W. P. G.
 
 82 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 claims and proclaims it his duty, as a truthful narrator, a 
 soldier, and an honest man, to put the very worst possible 
 construction upon the writings, words, and doings of these 
 men. By their conduct since the war, they have rendered 
 themselves subject to an indictment for false pretenses, if 
 nothing worse, in appropriating laurels they never won, in 
 assuming merit they never had, and in claiming the grati- 
 tude of the people for having been the mere tools of polit- 
 ical practitioners, to call them nothing worse. They have 
 been hired and paid for unnecessary bloodshed, for accumulat- 
 ing hundreds of millions of national debt, and for being the 
 ministers of party frauds, and abuses without historical paral- 
 lel. Are such hirelings fit to be trusted ? If not hirelings, 
 let their admirers tell us what they are, unless, like cun- 
 ning stewards, they have become the owners of the estate, and 
 will, if they can, by themselves or their successors, hold it 
 in- perpetuity, if not foiled in the impending attempt at 
 the continuance of a corrupt administration of the Gov- 
 ernment of the Kepublic. Such, after as full an examina- 
 tion as possible of what chance records of the war are left, 
 is the entire conviction of a 
 
 WEST POINT GRADUATE. 
 WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862. 
 
 SHERMAN'S REPORT. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, 
 
 CAMP SHILOH, April 18, 1862. 
 Captain J. A. RAWLINS, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General to General Grant: 
 
 SIE: I had the honor to report that on Friday, the 4th instant, the enemy's 
 cavalry drove in our pickets, posted abont a mile and a half in advance of 
 my center, on the main Corinth road, capturing one first lieutenant and seven 
 men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them 
 back about five miles, killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was 
 again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe he de- 
 signed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning early, 
 the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, 
 when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General Mc- 
 Clernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him 
 notice that the enemy.was in our front in force ; and to General Hurlbut, ask- 
 ing him to support General Prentiss. At that time, 7 a. m., my division was 
 arranged as follows :
 
 PREFATORIAL. 33 
 
 1st Brigade. Composed of 6th Iowa, Col. J. A. McDowell ; 40th Illinois, 
 Col. Hicks; 46th Ohio, Col. Worthington ; and the Morton Battery on the 
 extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road, over Owl creek. 
 
 2d Brigade. Composed of 5th Illinois, Col. D. Stuart; 54th Ohio, Col. T. 
 Kilby Smith ; 71st Ohio, Cql. Mason; on the extreme left, guarding the ford 
 over Lick creek. 
 
 3d Brigade. Composed of 77th Ohio, Col. Hildebrand; 53d Ohio, Col. 
 Appier ; 57th Ohio, Col. Munger ; on the left of the Corinth road, its right 
 resting on Shiloh meeting-house. 
 
 4th Brigade. Composed of 72d Ohio, Col. Buckland ; 48th Ohio, Col. Sulli- 
 van ; 7th Ohio, Col. Cockerill; on the right of the Corinth road, its left rest- 
 ing on Shiloh meeting-house. 
 
 Two batteries of artillery Taylor's and Waterhouse's were posted, the 
 former at Sliiloh and latter on a bridge to the left, with a front fire over open 
 ground, between Monger's and Appier's regiments. The cavalry and com- 
 panies of the Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large 
 open field to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I regard as the 
 centre of my position. 
 
 Shortly after 7 a. m., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our 
 front, and when in the open field before Appier's regiment, the enemy's pick- 
 ets opened a brisk fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, 
 of Company H, Second Illinois cavalry. The fire came from the bushes, 
 which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of Appier's camp, 
 and flows to the north along rny whole front. 
 
 This valley afforded the enemy a partial cover, but our men were so post- 
 ed as to have a good fire at him as he crossed the valley and ascended the 
 rising ground on our side. 
 
 About 8 a. m. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry 
 to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became 
 satisfied, for the first time, that the enemy designed a determined attack oa 
 our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of bat- 
 tle, at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appier and ordered him to hold 
 his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, 
 and I informed him that he had a good battery on his right, and strong sup- 
 porters to his rear. General McClernand had promptly and energetically re- 
 sponded to my request, and had sent me three regiments, which were posted 
 to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line. 
 
 THE FIRST DAY. 
 
 The battle began by the enemy opening a battery in the woods to our front, 
 and throwing shell into our camp. Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries 
 promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry pass- 
 ing obliquely to the left across the open field in Appier's front ; also other 
 columns advancing directly upon my division. 
 
 Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle be* 
 came general. Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across 
 the field to our left, and directing their course on General Prentiss's. I saw 
 at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals 
 McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the 
 Tennessee river, and about two miles back from it. Very soon the sound of 
 musketry and artillery announced that Pjrentiss was engaged, and about 
 9 a. m. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appier's regi- 
 ment broke in disorder, followed by Mungen's regiment, and the enemy 
 pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery, thereby exposed. . 
 
 The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of the battery stood for 
 some time, but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, and the fire so severe, 
 that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound 
 and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and 
 
 3
 
 34 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Water-house's) battery. Al- 
 though our leit was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole line, 
 I dec-rned Shiloh so important that I remained by it, and renewed my orders 
 to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground, and we did hold 
 these positions rntil about 10 o'clock a. m., when the enemy had got his 
 artillery to the rear of the left flank, and some change became absolutely nec- 
 essary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade Appier's and Mungen's 
 had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in 
 disorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery, still at Shiloh, to 
 fall back as far as the Purdv and Hamburgh road, and for McDonald and 
 Buckland to adopt that road" as their new line. I rode across the angle and 
 met P.ehr's battery at the cross roads, and ordered it immediately to come 
 into battery action right. Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost 
 immediately shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, 
 carrying off the caissons, and abandoning five out of the six guns without 
 firing a shot. The enemy pressed on after gaining this battery, and we were 
 again forced to choose a line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had sub- 
 stantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. 
 McDowell's and Buckland's brigades still maintained their organizations, 
 and were conducted by my aids so as to join on McClernand's right, thus 
 abandoning my original camps and line. 
 
 This was about 10 a. m., at which time the enemy had made a furious at- 
 tack on General McClernand's whole front. He struggled most determinedly, 
 but finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left 
 flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the 
 men to avail themselves of every cover trees, fallen timber, and a wooded 
 valley to our right; we held this position for four long hours, sometimes 
 gaining and at others losing ground, General McClernand and myself act- 
 ing in perfect concert and struggling to maintain this line. While we were 
 so hardly pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could 
 .not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front; and Gene- 
 ral Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 
 3 p. m. But about 4 p. m. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been 
 driven back to the river; and knowing that General Wallace was coming with 
 reinforcements from Crump's Landing, General McClernand and I, on con- 
 sultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge by 
 which General Wallace had to approach. 
 
 We fell back as well as we could, gathering, in addition to our own, such 
 scattered forces as we could find, and formed the line. During this change 
 the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by an Illinois 
 regiment, whose number I did not learn at that time or since. The Fifth Ohio 
 cavalry, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in 
 check lor some time, and Major Taylor also came up with a new battery, and 
 got into position to get a good flank fire upon the enemy's column as he pressed 
 on General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when General McCler- 
 nand's division made a fine charge on the enemy, and drove him back into 
 the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field about two hundred 
 yards wide in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the 
 enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day. 
 
 Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding "the first brigade, held his ground 
 all Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle, and, 
 when ordered, he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In 
 falling back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and injured, 
 and his brigade was no^m position on Monday morning. His subordinates, 
 Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel 
 Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound winch 
 it is feared may prove mortal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and de- 
 serves well of his country. Lieutenant Colonel Walcott, of the Forty-sixth 
 Ohio, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since.
 
 PREFATORIAL. 
 
 35 
 
 My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having 
 received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had been 
 under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them, as 
 they did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of 
 older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and 
 organization ; when individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get 
 away. 
 
 My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where 
 they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. 
 
 LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED. 
 First brigade. 
 
 6th Iowa Vols. 
 40th 111. 
 46th Ohio " 
 
 55th 111. 
 54th Ohio. 
 71st " 
 
 77th Ohio. 
 57th " 
 53d " 
 
 72d Ohio. " 
 48th " 
 70th " 
 
 Taylor's battery, no report. 
 Behr's " 1 
 
 Barrett's " 
 
 Waterhouse's do. 
 
 Orderly Holliday. 1 
 
 Killed, wounded, &c. 16 
 
 KILLED. WOUNDED. 
 
 MlSSINQ. 
 
 Officers. Men. Officers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 2 
 
 49 3 
 
 217 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 1 
 
 42 7 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 32 3 
 
 147 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 
 Second brigade, 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 45 8 
 
 183 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 2 
 
 22 5 
 
 128 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 52 
 
 1 
 
 45, 
 
 
 Third brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 48 7 
 
 107 
 
 3 
 
 53 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 82 
 
 1 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 5, 
 
 
 Fourth brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 13 5 
 
 85 
 
 
 
 49> 
 
 1 
 
 13 3 
 
 70 
 
 1 
 
 45. 
 
 
 
 9 I 
 
 53 
 
 1 
 
 sa 
 
 302 
 
 45 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 14 
 
 1230 
 
 G, 
 
 435 
 
 Ofiicers killed 16 
 
 " wounded 45 
 
 " missing 6 
 
 Aggregate loss, 2,034 in the division. 
 
 Soldiers killed, 302x261-563. killed. 
 
 " wounded.. 1,230. 
 
 " died since the baitle... 261 
 missing....... 435 
 
 The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we re- 
 covered seven, not the identical guns we had lost,, but enough in number to. 
 balance the account. At the time of recovering our camps our men were so 
 fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy, but on 
 the following day I followed up with Buckland's and Ui]debrand's brigades 
 for six miles, the results of which I have already reported. 
 
 The cavalry of my command kept to the rear, and took littje part in the 
 action; but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the mus- 
 ketry fire under which we were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a. m. 
 till Monday at 4 p. m." W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 Brevet Gen. Com. 5th I>iv.
 
 36 PREFATOKIAL. 
 
 Extract from Bowman's Sherman and Sis Campaign. 
 
 The enemy's forces under General A. S. Johnston, consisting of the corps 
 of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, of two divisions each, and the reserve division 
 of Brigadier General Breckinricfge, having successively evactuated Columbus 
 and Nashville, and abandoned Tennessee and Kentucky, with the exception 
 of Memphis and Cumberland Gap, had concentrated at Corinth, in Missis- 
 sippi, and were there awaiting the development of our plans, ready to act, 
 according to circumstances, on the offensive or defensive, and to take advan- 
 tage of any error we might make. The position was well chosen for observ- 
 ing our movements', for covering the line of the Mississippi, or for menacing 
 the flank and rear of an army invading Mississippi and Alabama, 
 
 General Halleck decided to advance up the Tennessee river as far as'prac- 
 ticable by water, then to debark on the west bank, attack the enemy at Cor- 
 inth, and endeavor to cut him off from the east, and compel bis surrrender, 
 either at Corinth or on the banks of the Mississippi. Grant was ordered to 
 move up the Tennessee, and Buell to march from Nashville and join him near 
 Savannah, Tennessee. 
 
 On the 14th of March Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's 
 army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and after making a feint of 
 landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh 
 Landing. It was Sherman's intention to march from this point seven miles, 
 in the direction of luka, and then, halting his infantry, to dispatch the cav- 
 alry to the nearest point on the Memphis and Charleston railway. The at- 
 tempt was made, but the enemy was encountered in greater force than had 
 been expected, and it did not succeed. In the meanwhile, Major General 
 Charles F. Smith, who had command of the advance, having landed his own 
 second division at Savannah, had selected Pittsburgh Landing as the most 
 favorable position for the encampment of the main body of the army, and 
 under his instructions Sherman and Hurlbut, who, with the fourth division, 
 had closety followed him, went into carnp there. In the course of a few days 
 they were joined by the first and sixth divisions of McClernand and Prentiss, 
 i3nd by Smith's own division from Savannah; and Major General Grant him- 
 : 8$f arrived and took command in person. During the last week of March 
 ,the Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio. General 
 "Pueljl 'had informed General Grant that he would join him before that time; 
 i',bui he had encountered great delays, and on the morning of the 6th of April 
 ; ,the Army .of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected. Instruc- 
 tions had been &ent by General Grant to expedite its advance, and to push 
 <ra to Pittsburgh.. The importance of the crisis was apparent, for Johnston 
 would n&tnr.allysee}j: to strike Grant before Buell's arrival: but Buell marched 
 his troops with the .sajoe deliberation as if no other army depended upon his 
 promptness, By express orders, he even caused intervals of six miles to be 
 observed between his divisions on the march, thus lenathening out his column 
 o a distance of over thirty miles. 
 
 Extracts from General Grant's report of SJdloh. 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE, 
 
 " PITTSBURGH^ April 9, 1862. 
 ""To Captain N. H. McLEAN, &c. : 
 
 "It becomes my duty again to report another battle, fought between two 
 great armies, one contending for the best Government to be desired, and the 
 .other for its destruction. It is pleasant to record the success of the army 
 .-contending for the former principle. 
 
 " On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by the enemy. 
 "The battle waxed warm on the left and center, ranging at times to all parts 
 of the line. There was the most continuous firing of musketry and artillery 
 ever heard on this continent kept up till nightfall.
 
 PREFATORIAL. 37 
 
 " The enemy having forced the center line to fall back nearly half way from 
 their camps to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort 
 was made by*the enemy to turn our' left and get possession of the landing, 
 transports, &c. This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexing- 
 ton, Captains Gwin and Shirk commanding, with four 24-pound Parrot guns 
 and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for 
 artillery and cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops 
 were stationed there, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry 
 force for their support. 
 
 "Just at this moment the advance of Major General Buell's column, part 
 of the division of General Nelson, arrived. The two generals named both 
 being present, an advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, 
 and the enemy was soon driven back. 
 
 "In this repulse much is due to the presence of the gunboats Tyler and 
 Lexington and their able commanders, Captains Gwin and Shirk. During 
 the night the divisions under Generals Crittenden and McCook arrived. Gen- 
 eral Lew. Wallace, at Crump's landing, six miles below, was ordered, at an 
 early hour in the morning, to hold his division in readiness to move in any 
 direction he might be ordered. At 11 o'clock a. m. the order was delivered 
 to move it up to Pittsburgh, but, owing to its being led by a circuitous route, 
 did not arrive in time to take part in Sunday's action. 
 
 " My force was too much fatigued, from two days' hard fighting and expo- 
 sure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to 
 pursue immediately. Night closed in with a heavy rain, making the woods 
 impassable for artillery next morning. General Thomas, however, followed 
 the enemy, finding that the main part of their army had retreated in good 
 order," &c. 
 
 "I feel it a duty, however, to a gallant and able officer Brigadier General 
 W. T. Sherman to make special mention. He not only was with his com- 
 mand the entire two days of the action, but displayed great judgment and 
 skill in the management of his men. Although severely wounded in the 
 hand on the first day, his place was never vacant. He was again wounded, 
 and had three horses shot under him," &c. 
 
 " Lieutenant Colonel McPherson, attached to my staff as chief of engineers, 
 deserves more than a passing notice for his activity and courage. All the 
 ground around our camps has been reconnoitered by him, and the plans, care- 
 fully prepared under his supervision, give the most accurate information of 
 the nature of the approaches to our lines. During the two days' battle he 
 was constantly in the saddle, leading the troops as they arrived to points 
 where their services were required. During the engagement he had a horse 
 shot under him. At present I can only give our loss approximately at 1,500 
 killed and 3,500 wounded; 200 horses were killed. U. S. GEANT." 
 
 186449
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
 
 "The south to-day is more formidable and arrogant than she was two 
 years ago, and we lose far more by having an insufficient number of men than 
 from any other cause. We are forced to invade ; we must keep the war South. 
 They are not only ruined and exhausted, but humbled in pride and spirit." 
 (Sherman's letter after Vicksburg.) 
 
 "The enemy having forced the center line to fall back nearly half way 
 from the camp to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate 
 effort was made by the enemy to turn our left, and get possession of the land- 
 ing, transports, &c. 
 
 " This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Captains 
 Gwin and Shirk, commanding, with four twenty-four pound guns and a 
 battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery 
 and cavalry and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were sta- 
 tioned there, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for 
 their support. 
 
 "Just at this moment the advance Major General Buell's column, a part 
 of the division of General Nelson arrived ; the two generals named, both being 
 present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, and 
 the enemy was soon driven back. U. S. GRANT." 
 
 Extract from General Grant's Letter to the Society of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 "WASHINGTON, April 7, 1871. 
 "General W. W. BELKNAP. 
 
 "Give my congratulations to the gallant Society of the Army of the Tennes- 
 see, &c. The battle of Shiloh, though much criticized at the time, will ever he 
 remembered by those engaged in it as a ' brilliant success,' won with raw 
 troops over a superior force, and under circumstances the most unfavorable 
 to the Union troops. U. S. GRANT." 
 
 The writer of this treatise on the Shiloh campaign of 
 1862 claims nothing more than to be an imperfect compiler 
 of facts, fallacies, and fictions, in regard to this extraordi- 
 narily understood and entirely misunderstood campaign. 
 It stands forth now as a campaign more unexampled in its 
 results, so far as they are known, than any this age or 
 country has ever witnessed, in regard to its influence on 
 the politics and policy of this so-called republic of the 
 world.
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 39 
 
 This compiler will sometimes endeavor to rise to the grade 
 of a narrator or relator of events and their bearing upon 
 each other and upon parties or individuals well known to 
 the people of the Union. 
 
 He cannot aspire to the dignity of a historian such as 
 Ileadly or Hume, or Greeley or Gibbon, or Badeau or Ban- 
 croft, to close up the comparative alliteration. Abjuring 
 everything in the shape of the philosophy of history, or 
 historial philosophy, as to the meaning of which he pro- 
 fesses his entire ignorance, he suggests the students of that 
 science to Swintonor Schlagel, or Sherman's Bowman, or 
 McCauley's Niehbur, or even to ISTed Buntline himself, as 
 having far more philosophical capacity, or at least audacity, 
 or even veracity, than several of the above-suggested his- 
 torians of the rebellion, and especially the historiographers 
 of the Shiloh campaign now in question : Instance Badeau 
 and Bowman. All he does claim in the line of Lindlay 
 Murray is, that his syntax shall be as near the standard of 
 the illustrious characters at the head of this chapter and of 
 the army, and of the army and nav} 7 of the republic, as cir- 
 cunstances, and room, and time will permit. 
 
 And that his conclusions from the same premises shall be 
 no wider apart than those of the -chivalric Sherman, in the 
 first quotation, and that there shall be few, if any, wider in- 
 terjections between his premises and conclusions more dif- 
 ficult to span or fathom than the ravine for artillery and 
 cavalry thrown in between the arrival of Buell and his 
 rescue of Pittsburgh landing, &c., so luminously related 
 by the illustrious President of the republic. 
 
 And, having thus introduced these august personages, 
 which, for the present occupy and require, of choice or of 
 necessity, so much of the attention of this treatise and this 
 Union, an analysis, however imperfect, may next be under- 
 taken to develop the profundity of Sherman, and extract 
 from the martial and naval erudition of Grant the true 
 meaning and intent of their respective paragraphs illustrat- 
 ing this chapter. 
 
 The condition of the South being in question, take from
 
 40 SHILOH. 
 
 Sherman's paragraph all extraneous matter, and the solu- 
 tion will be perfect, as thus: 
 
 "The South this moment is more formidable and arro- 
 gant than she was two years ago. She is not only ruined 
 and exhausted, but broken in pride and spirit." There it 
 is; how luminous, how like well; like Sherman, of course. 
 
 This is a favorite practice of antithesis habitual to this 
 '* great commander" who thus, in an unconsciously playful 
 manner, seems only to express that he may expunge him- 
 self, as at the West Point black-board after a demonstra- 
 tion. This practice may be more readily observed in the 
 chapters on "Sherman's Evidence and Cross-examination." 
 These specimens of logic, or elements of evidence, may 
 not be as profound or clear as " Starkie on Evidence ," but 
 will be found far more original, and infinitely more incon- 
 clusive, to which condition it seems his effort to reduce 
 his own evidence in usual cases, even without a rebutter, 
 of which there is seldom a necessity. 
 
 Next, to proceed with the illustrative paragraph of the 
 illustrious President, with which it has been presumed to 
 illuminate this straggling production, it should first be 
 premised, in historical justice, that it contains, if less syn- 
 tax, much more of conclusion, however extremely ultimate, 
 than does the conclusive production of his admiring friend 
 the General, &c. The solution, however, is a trifle more 
 tedious, not to sa} r abstruse, by reason of the depth and 
 width and ponderosity, not to say prolixity, of the syntax 
 to be developed, with more or less grammatical ability and 
 mechanical skill. First steam out, with all possible regard 
 and respect for Captains Gwin and Shirk, the gunboats 
 "Tyler" and "Lexington," these captains commanding, 
 with four twenty-four Parrot guns and a battery of rifled 
 guns, then filling up the ravine for artillery and cavalry, 
 which last are thus made to play the patriotic part of the 
 noble Curtius (or, perhaps, properly Curtis G. H. or 
 Grant Harper's Curtis) in the pit of the Roman forum, 
 some time since, letting, meantime, the hostile infantry, 
 if any, stand from under, while packing or parking the
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 41 
 
 artillerists nearer the landing; then marching off "the 
 small infantry force" to swell Sherman's corporal's guard 
 at the close of the battle, which, having no troops, as 
 Greeley says, after 8 a. m., he must have need for; as 
 Grant says, by his "personal efforts" like a steel-clad paladin 
 of old, he saved the army. 
 
 Having, with so much time and strain, cleared off these 
 traverses or interjections between the President's premises 
 or conclusion, we do reach the fact, by no means seem- 
 ingly intended to be expressed, if possibly to be avoided by 
 this able rhetorician and commander, that " at a late hour 
 in the afternoon a desperate effort was made to turn our 
 left and get possession of the landing, transports," &c. 
 (That is, trains, artillery, generals, and army.) "Just at 
 this moment General Nelson, with the advance of Major 
 General Buell's column, arrived, both Generals being pres- 
 ent, when an advance was by these generals made, and the 
 enemy driven back." Here is a necessarily handsome, but 
 a hardly and niggardly wrung-out admission of almost 
 providential aid in a desperate extremity, with not a word 
 of acknowledgment, much less of gratitude, for deliver- 
 ance from the very closing jaws of destruction. And then 
 the matter is as indifferently dropped as the stump of a 
 cigar. It is no wonder, then, that a mind so indifferent to 
 benefits, and a memory so callous to their recollection, 
 selfish, ungenerous, and unjust, should, with the weight of 
 honors and emoluments thrust upon their possessor, utterly 
 ignore such a service, after nine long years of enjoyment 
 and prosperity, due alone to such a providential rescue 
 April 6, 1862. 
 
 No wonder that their preservation from this very mael- 
 strom of destruction should cultivate entire mental obliter- 
 ation of the past, and the man, made what he is by the 
 criminality of that day, should write such a letter as the 
 above, claiming this deliverance from disgrace and destruc- 
 tion as a "brilliant success." 
 
 Yes, a " brilliant success" won by him over a superior
 
 42 SHILOH. 
 
 force, while in command of the Army of the Tennessee at 
 Pittsburgh landing, April 6th, 1862. 
 
 Should any intelligent and impartial man, without know- 
 ing anything personally or historically of Grant or Sher- 
 man, have the above-quoted paragraphs referred to him, by 
 which to judge of the characters and qualifications of their 
 writers, he might justly conclude, th:it the writer of the 
 first paragraph had not a very perfectly-balanced intellect, 
 and the writer of the last might have serious imperfections 
 of both head and heart. Such is the fact, such will be 
 found the fact, from everything these distinguished person- 
 ages have said or done or written, hereinafter stated or hav- 
 ing reference, as a part of this compendium of the Shiloh 
 campaign of 1862. 
 
 Taking a fair average of everything these men have ever 
 said or done of themselves substantially, the above quota- 
 tions are a fair criterion by which their degree of useful- 
 ness and capacity may be properly determined. They are 
 the inevitable results of the system under which the war 
 was carried on and carried through, and it is about time 
 that the people, having some little interest in the welfare of 
 the Union, should endeavor to establish their real value, 
 before intrusting them any further with the administra- 
 tion of the military and civil Government of the Union. 
 
 The writer first proposed to develop the true history and 
 character of these officers by a commentary upon their 
 biographies, more especially that of Sherman, as the more 
 obtrusive of the two, but he soon found himself in a maze 
 of perpetual digression, as incomprehensible as the crudi- 
 ties and fallacies and fictions of Badeau and Bowman he 
 undertook to explain and explode. The diary extracts 
 hereinafter quoted constitute the earliest germ of this 
 treatise. When written, the writer saw much that was 
 out of rule not therein recorded. He first attempted, with 
 thousands of others, to have an investigation, immediately 
 after the battle, by order of General Halleck; but all were 
 referred by him to Grant and Sherman, the officers whose
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 43 
 
 conduct was to be investigated. Next he, with thousands 
 of others, in and out of the army, applied to the Ohio Sena- 
 tors, Messrs. Sherman and "Wade, the latter of whom was 
 the head of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. No 
 answer could be had from them, and this relator, having 
 written to the Hon. Y. B. Horton, of Ohio, received an 
 answer as follows : 
 
 " WASHINGTON, June 6, 1862. 
 
 "DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 23 came. to hand. I saw Mr. Wade, as 
 you requested. It is a delicate matter for any one connected with the legis- 
 lative department of Government, to interfere with the military details, and 
 I doubt whether Mr. Wade will think it judicious to do anything. What- 
 ever is done in regard to inquiries, will have to be accomplished, I think, 
 through the regular military channels. 
 
 "Yours, truly, 
 
 " V. B. HORTON." 
 
 It was then plain to him that there was a power of some 
 description at Washington, by which the architects of de- 
 feat and slaughter at Shiloh enjoyed perhaps something 
 even more than impunity. It seemed a nonplus. 
 
 The French astronomer, Le Verrier, having noted the 
 perturbation of Herschel, the planet, for which Saturn, his 
 hither neighbor, could not be made accountable, betook 
 himself to the laws of Newton, and perhaps Kepler, in ref- 
 erence to planetary or material gravitation, in the inverse 
 ratio of the squares of the distances, and perhaps the dis- 
 cription of heavenly bodies of equal areas in equal lines, on 
 the plane of their orbit, and with little more science than 
 is exercised by the butcher or the grocer with his steelyards 
 and counter-scales in the weight of a pound of beef or 
 butter, he discovered his new planet. Moral influences 
 have more intricate laws, and are far more complex in the 
 manner of their solution; but, by observing the seemingly 
 reckless, but clearly designing, and calculating, and invit- 
 ing manner in which Grant and Sherman had allowed their 
 army to be attacked; the deliberate movements of Grant 
 after the attack; the destructive performances of Sherman 
 on the field; and winding up by the audacious fiction of 
 Halleck, that Sherman had saved the "fortunes of a day " 
 it was the unanimous conviction he had done most to lose.
 
 44 SHILOH. 
 
 This relator was impressed with the conviction that Hal- 
 leek had, in some way, an individual interest in the result 
 of what had occurred at Shiloh. 
 
 The indisposition to make any investigation, and after- 
 ward the snail pace to Corinth, gave a solution to a con- 
 versation that had taken place in Halleck's tent a day or 
 two after he reached Pittsburg. Sherman's conduct on 
 the march to Corinth, in magnifying the difficulties and 
 dangers encountered, and his congratulatory order after the 
 capture of Corinth, in which Halleck and the tedious and 
 more than tardy achievmeut of capturing Corinth were 
 so extravagantly exalted, as about the most brilliant and 
 important victory of history, next to Shiloh by Grant, of 
 course; faintly suggested an idea of collusion somewhere. 
 Some words used in Sherman's address, or report, as to the 
 aridity of the region, &c., called to mind a reported talk, such 
 as is before mentioned. And when Halleck went to Wash- 
 ington as commander-in-chief, in July, 1862, the inference 
 was plain, that these commanders were in accord with each 
 other and with some influences at Washington, overriding 
 the articles of war. This then seemed a possible solution 
 of disturbing influences behind and above military laws. 
 The perturbation of Herschel, calculated by Le Verrier, 
 outside of any attractions for which, as has been said, the 
 chronic old Saturn could be brought to look also hinted 
 a clue. Hence the impunity to Grant for keeping Buell 
 back to risk the loss of a battle, of which the writer was 
 then ignorant. The promotion of Sherman, dating from 
 the evacuation of Corinth, 26th May, and not from Shiloh, 
 (too flagrant that,) was suggestive, in connection with his 
 outside influences at Washington. 
 
 Extract from Sherman's official report of the siege of Corinth, dated at Corinth, 
 Mississippi. June, 1862. 
 
 It is a victory as important as any recorded in history. But a few days 
 ago (two months) a large and powerful rebel army lay at Corinth, with out- 
 posts extending to our very camp at Shiloh. (By special invitation, W. P .G.) 
 If with two such railroads as they possessed they could not supply their 
 army with troops and stores, how can they attempt it in this poor, arid, and 
 exhausted part of the country ?"
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 45 
 
 The point here is, that Sherman writes as though the re- 
 bels had moved from a distance to where he was then and 
 there at Corinth. These words are those which had been 
 used by Halleck in saying that there should be no battle, as 
 the "poor, arid, and exhausted state of the country" would com- 
 pel an evacuation, &c., early in June, 1802. Sherman con- 
 cludes by saying that success can only be accomplished by 
 a ready and cheerful obedience to our leaders, (Halleck and 
 Grant and he,) in whom we now (after the siege) have just 
 reason for the most implicit confidence. 
 
 The letter of the Hon. V. B.&erton plainly proved that 
 the Committee on the Conduct of the War was a cover, not 
 an exposition, and might have been instituted to relieve the 
 War Office of responsibility, which was the fact. Seeing 
 no chance with the legislative or military authorities, 
 plainly in collusion as to Shiloh, the writer became still more 
 determined to hunt the matter down, as subversive of all 
 justice or safety in the military, and all stability in the civil 
 existence of the Government. He became determined, as 
 desirous, to get at a solution, if possible, of this collusive con- 
 duct of the commanders in the field, and to find out how 
 they were in accord with the influences at Washington. 
 
 Disgusted with a service in which incapacity, neglect, 
 and cowardice, and worse were at a premium, even on a 
 battle-field, he pursued a course not necessarily here ex- 
 posed, by which he gained the court martial evidence de- 
 tailed in a following chapter and never before made public. 
 That he strove for the court martial is plain, from the fol- 
 lowing indorsement of General Sherman, on the letter of 
 objections, for which see the end of this chapter: 
 
 Respectfully forwarded. 
 
 Colonel Worthington knew that the subject-matter of the charges were 
 made by General Sherman, and placed in the hands of the judge advocate. 
 
 He might have excepted to them before pleading, but he did not, but actu- 
 ally courted the trial and waived all objections on that point. The original 
 proceedinr/s* wore sent to the Adjutant General's office, Washington,, D. C., 
 before any order was made by me, and sent back with the indorsement of the 
 Judge Advocate General^ that they did not require the orders or approval of 
 the President. 
 
 * Not the fact. f Not the fact.
 
 46 SHILOH. 
 
 Had Colonel Worthington excepted to his trial at the right time, viz, be- 
 fore pleading, his exception would have been good. But it is now too late, 
 as he boastingly waived all objections and courted investigation. The original 
 proceedings will sent to the War Department/or record. 
 
 W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 [No date, T. W.] Maj. Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS DIST. WEST TENNESSEE, 
 
 JACKSON, TENS., October 18, 1862. 
 
 Respectfully forwarded to the Headquarters of the Army, Washington, 
 B.C. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 Maj. Oen. 
 
 The prisoner did not make objections before pleading, 
 for fear they might be sustained, in which case he would 
 not get the evidence he was after, outside of Sherman's 
 evidence. Sherman, he felt sure, would betray his violent 
 enmity, as he did. To insure his careless, reckless manner 
 of expression and exposition, the prisoner employed no 
 counsel, and for fear the court might demur to the extreme 
 sentence insisted on by Sherman, he made no defense, ex- 
 cept of his diary extracts, or rather a statement to show 
 that all and far more than therein charged was true. He 
 had not foreseen that all evidence as to everything happen- 
 ing during the battle would be ruled out. That audacity 
 was not provided for. But he perfectly understands it now. 
 It arose from Sherman's impunity for any act of his or his 
 court, however criminal or unlawful, which would carry 
 out the policy of those by whom the officers in question 
 were employed to prolong the war. Knowing this then, 
 August, 1862, he , might not have called the court. Such 
 evidence was excluded, -Because of its damning character, 
 bearing on Grant, and especially on Sherman. It would, 
 of course, have upset Halleck's glaring and most infamous 
 fiction as to the conduct of Sherman at Shiloh. But in 
 the light of subsequent events even that evidence would 
 have had no effect upon the court, as it will not now likely 
 have upon the general public; and this is another fearful 
 result of promoting men for acts which, by the articles of 
 war, or by common law, would disgrace or execute them 
 by a sergeant's platoon. 
 
 The prisoner was indeed willing to waive a record so
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 47 
 
 disgraceful to a West Point Graduate, and did not insist on 
 the evidence, as Sherman's own report offered sufficient 
 evidence to show how worse than worthless on the battle- 
 field this witness, prosecutor, and court, alljn one, had been. 
 The prisoner did not then know that this incapacity, or worse, 
 had gained him not only his promotion at Washington, 
 but a lease of his position for the -war. The record states, 
 that the prisoner asked and was allowed counsel, but the 
 fact was, that'he asked only that one of his captains (Alex- 
 ander) might assist in keeping the record, which was not al- 
 lowed long, as soon after he was ordered on duty with the 
 regiment in Memphis. And here may as well be made a 
 digression as to another charge which came before the 
 court, arising as follows : 
 
 About the 25th June, 1862, the colonel of the 40th Ohio, 
 with 302 men for duty, no cavalry, and two light guns, had 
 been left for capture atLaFayette, Tennessee, there being a 
 force of 1,000 to 1,600 of the enemy, with headquarters not 
 far southwest. He, however, soon finding out the danger 
 through his pickets, at once fortified himself by the only 
 closed field-work constructed during the campaign. Grant, 
 then at Memphis, had refused to allow the troops of this 
 regiment their daily rations of whiskey, when on this fa- 
 tigue duty, as had been allowed by Hal leek, to break the 
 monotony of the Corinthian advance of half a mile a day. 
 He, Colonel W., was notified by Sherman, at Moscow, Ten- 
 nessee, July 16, to join his brigade next day, (17th,) as he 
 did when the brigade came up. At the request of all hands 
 who had built the fort, he allowed his sutler to bring up a 
 few thousand rations of cherry-bounce, &c., from Memphis, 
 thirty miles off. The division coming up on the 18th of 
 July, the troops having been separated on detached service 
 for some weeks, there were congratulations to the 46th 
 Ohio for its escape from capture by means of its defenses, 
 and also convivialities, in which the colonel of the 46th 
 Ohio was joined, of course, but attended to his usual duty 
 in remaining behind to see that everything was got off in 
 proper order, and nothing left behind.
 
 48 SHILOH. 
 
 The fort was evacuated at 8 a. m., and General Sherman, 
 coming in to see the work at 10 a. m., noticed the colonel 
 in a better humor, perhaps, than usual, as he wished and in- 
 tended to be, and thus avoid givinghis general of division his 
 opinion as to his desertion of his first brigade at Shiloh, 
 and exposure of the regiment without a horseman at La 
 Fayette. It will be understood that the colonel of the 46th 
 had been relieved from his command the day before, and 
 the fort had been evacuated two hours before Sherman 
 came in. On the strength of this affair, however, and the 
 diary extracts, Sherman preferred a charge of "drunkenness 
 on duty ," as commander of the fort, from which the colonel 
 had been relieved by special order the day before.* He not 
 only made this charge, but swore to the truth of this fiction, 
 which he required his staff and several suborned witnesses 
 to do also, and of course the prisoner was found guilty of 
 being in command of a deserted post! Another necessary 
 result of protractive policy. 
 
 The above properly belongs to the development of Sher- 
 man's character as a man of justice and veracity. It also 
 illustrates the objects and requirements of the Washington 
 cabal, who employed such instruments to carry on or carry 
 back the war, as the policy of the party in power seemed 
 to require. 
 
 The colonel of 46th Ohio has long and vainly endeavored 
 to have the incidents of the Shiloh campaign investigated 
 by the Senate, or his court martial reported on by a com- 
 mittee of the House in Congress. It is now plain how 
 useless was the endeavor. Such an investigation would 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS, Moscow, TENN., 
 
 "July 16, 1862. 
 "Colonel WORTITINGTON, 
 
 " Commanding La Fayette. 
 " SIR: We are ordered to move. My division will come to-morrow or the 
 day after to La Fayette, where you will be prepared to join your brigade 
 with all your men and means of transportation. 
 
 "Be prepared to destroy your works then, and everything that would be 
 of service to the enemy who may come in. We are to operate farther South. 
 If Colonel McDowell be at La Fayette, or near there, please communicate to 
 him this fact, and that he need not return to his camp here, but await our 
 arrival at La Fayette. _ __ __" W. T. SHERMAN, Maj. Gm."
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 49 
 
 develop much about the doings and misdoings of this in- 
 side ring and hidden cabinet council of the ruling party at 
 Washington. It would disclose the price paid for pro- 
 crastinating the war in the early winter of 1862, and the 
 price promised for the slaughter and disgrace of Shiloh, 
 notwithstanding the extent and nature of the official doc- 
 uments suppressed and destroyed, and would prove the 
 fact of this suppression and destruction. By this court 
 martial is proven the suppression of what occured at Shiloh, 
 the day and night before the battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862. 
 
 Through this necessarily digressive, and, in some sort, 
 aggressive, treatise, this relator makes his appeal to the great 
 court of last resort, the people of the Union, and more es- 
 pecially the volunteers of the rebellion, whose lives and 
 hopes, and limbs, and health, and fortunes, were made sub- 
 servient to the purposes of cowardly and scheming politi- 
 cians, on and off the battle-fields of the war. 
 
 Is there a man of character, who was in that service, 
 who would have budged an inch towards a field of slaugh- 
 ter, where his general was employed to lose a battle, as a 
 jockey is hired to lose a race? 
 
 To you who so cheerfully strained yourselves to furnish 
 the sinews of the war against the rebellion you, the peo- 
 ple, who, in the path of duty to the republic, strove so 
 faithfully and trustingly to you, the people, is made this 
 appeal to you who risked your lives in camps and hos- 
 pitals North and South, exposed your lives and limbs and 
 blood upon the battle-fields of the Union for the Union, 
 this appeal is made. 
 
 And while this appeal for justice is put forth, a solution 
 is offered of the tangled mystery which for ten years has 
 clouded the battle-field of Shiloh, and the incidents of that 
 campaign. These incidents were clearly and directly con- 
 nected with the great crisis of the war. That crisis clearly 
 came with the determination of the Government at Wash- 
 ington to take no decisive advantage of the Tennessee river, 
 in the winter of 1862-'63, to open a highway to the heart 
 of the Confederacy. From December to March, the ques- 
 4
 
 50 SHILOH. 
 
 tion of moving troops up the Tennessee to the Muscle 
 shoals had been skillfully avoided by Halleck, and he had 
 / repeatedly declined a personal interview with Buell, to ar- 
 range as to this most important measure. A great parade 
 had been made as to breaking up the railroads at Corinth, 
 Jackson, and Humboldt, requiring land marches of from 
 twenty to sixty miles, while the main connecting point at 
 Florence, Alabama, was avoided, as will be seen, by Hal- 
 leck. Let it then be established, that the occupation of 
 Florence, and consequently of the Upper Tennessee valley, 
 was purposely avoided, when so easily accomplished, with 
 other studied neglect, tending to a prolongation of the 
 war, and the intention of that prolongation is plain, and it 
 is equally plain that it could only be for the political pur- 
 pose of gaining the Presidential election. 
 
 What, had such a policy been known, or even suspected, 
 would have been the results? 
 
 1. Volunteering would have been checked, and perhaps 
 entirely suspended, and with such a policy to carry on the 
 war by drafts would have been impossible. 
 
 2. The public credit would have been utterly prostrated. 
 
 3. The policy of anything like delay was a premium oil 
 incompetence and neglect, if not cowardice itself. 
 
 4. It was a policy of bloodshed, to maintain a party more 
 terrible and revolting, because more irresponsible, than the 
 newer policy to maintain a throne. 
 
 5. It required the payment or pensioning of those whose 
 knowledge demanded pay for silence. 
 
 6. It gave impunity to official oppression and the ac- 
 ceptance of fictitious testimony, and the maintenance of 
 trumped-up charges and consequent disgrace, or even death, 
 to officers, for personal purposes, or who denounced the 
 policy and its ministers. (See Colonel W's court-martial, 
 the charges and the evidence.) 
 
 7. It led to the destruction or suppression of all true 
 records of the war, and led to the retention of false reports 
 for special purposes, of which there is ample evidence in 
 this commentary.
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 51 
 
 8. Such a polie}' necessarily sanctioned and encouraged 
 the violation of all established rules of war, as was the case 
 at Shiloh, where every law of war possible was violated 
 with impunity, and rewarded by promotion. 
 
 9. It abrogated all true criterion of military efficiency, 
 and made that a merit which before had been a crime y 
 punished by disgrace or death. 
 
 10. It was equivalent to the legalized extension of dis- 
 ease, and vice, and crime, the concomitants of war, indefi- 
 nitely and without control. 
 
 11. Such a policy was actually the extension of aid and 
 comfort to the enemy, as occurred in the failure to take 
 Florence, or pursue, with ample means, the enemy after 
 Shiloh. 
 
 12. Any established evidence of this policy must re- 
 lease the opposition to the war from any cause, from all 
 odium arising from such opposition in 1862. While the 
 war lasted, the sympathy of the people and the vote of the 
 troops would most likely be as it was, on the side of the 
 administration of the Government by the party responsible 
 for the results of the war. ^p> f It/v. {\A\^- \fiAArt Vvv*i/fic 
 
 One result necessarily would be, that all possible means 
 must betaken to conceal a policy so inhuman in its prac- n J 
 tice and terrible in its results. It led directly to a neglect 
 of all reports from the field, and indeed of their suppression 
 when made, as has to a great extent occurred. The writer 
 is aware of one record of a court-martial entirely sup- 
 pressed by General Sherman, as no doubt many such 
 records have been by him, and especially by General Hal- 
 . leek, with the approval of General Grant. 
 
 The record of General Buell's court of inquiry, with the 
 exception of the findings, cannot be had. The inquiry in 
 BuelPs case was not allowed to include the incidents pre- 
 ceding and during and immediately succeeding the. battle |\ 
 of Shiloh, proving, as did the suppression of these inci- 
 dents on Colonel Worthington's trial, that they will not 
 bear the light. It can be proven that the articles of the ' 
 army regulations requiring division commanders to make
 
 52 SIIILOH. 
 
 immediate reports of all orders issued, was dispensed with, 
 at least in the case of General Sherman. The orders issued 
 by this general in his campaigns were, as a general rule, 
 unknown at the War Office till the end of the war, when 
 his order-books came in. These books are inaccessible, 
 except by act of Congress, which cannot be had, and, if had, 
 no order, the suppression of which was necessary to conceal 
 the extension of the war policy could be found. 
 
 The institution of the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War for the ostensible purpose of instigating and keeping 
 a record of its events, was a mere cover, against any inves- 
 tigation or history whatever, so that this terrible policy 
 inaugurated the system of keeping no official records of 
 the war, and suppressing those which were necessarily made. 
 To conclude on this point, the writer feels assured that the 
 members of this committee, with one or more members of 
 the Cabinet, and two or more of the heads of the military 
 bureaus, constituted, with the general-in-chief, Halleck, the 
 Aulic council, which regulated the whole course of the 
 war after 1861. These gentlemen in Congress were the 
 Hous. B. F. Wade and Z. Chandler, with perhaps Yates 
 and Sherman, of the Senate, and of course Cameron, where- 
 ever he was, and the Hons. Covode, Julian, and Gooch, of 
 the House. 
 
 The Hon. Henry Wilson, chairman of the Committee 
 on Military Affairs, must have been in some sort aware of 
 the policy pursued. 
 
 This course must certainly have been repugnant to the 
 principles and feelings of a man so honorable and benevo- 
 lent ; such a man as was Senator Henry Wilson, of Mas- 
 sachusetts, 
 
 "As mild a mannered man 
 As ever cut a bore, or scuttled" 
 
 an amendment to an army bill. 
 
 Early in 1862 this relator made known to him that there 
 was terrible neglect, or design, or worse, in the inauguration 
 and consummation and consequences of the battle of Shi- 
 loh, and he thought he understood from him and others
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 53 
 
 in the public councils that when the war was over its inci- 
 dents of wrong and injustice would be righted, and all 
 proper investigation had for its true history; but, as above 
 suggested, this has been made impossible by its extension 
 policy, and all or most official records of any consequence 
 relative to the great rebellion will constitute no material 
 part of future history. 
 
 If the statements hereinafter made, derived, as they are, 
 from the official documents of the Shiloh campaign of 1862, 
 and from the letters and biographies of Generals Grant, 
 Sherman, Buell, and Amrnen, including, of course, Colo- 
 iiel Worthington's court-martial record if these statements 
 are established, and if the most prominent actors in this 
 campaign (Halleck, Grant, and Sherman) acted on their 
 own responsibility, that responsibility is shown to be such 
 that, for its terrible and far-reaching results, they should 
 be held responsible, whatever length of time has passed 
 away. Otherwise they will continue to be, as they have 
 been, the beneficiaries of their own wrong. 
 
 If they acted in obedience to the policy of the Govern- 
 ment at Washington, in obedience to the will or advice of 
 any man, or set of men, authorized to carry out that policy, 
 they did so, as is plain upon the record, to the violation of 
 all military law all human justice. 
 
 It is a recognized principle, even by Napoleon, despot 
 as he was, that no general is bound to expose his honor, or 
 the honor or safety of his troops, to any policy or order of 
 his Government at home. 
 
 If he cannot obey without the violation of established 
 military law, without risk to his soldiers' honor, and the 
 welfare of his troops, he may resign, and avoid exposing 
 both, as his duty it is to do. 
 
 If, then, these generals, in obedience to any power, legit- 
 imate or otherwise, at Washington, are guilty, as charged, 
 with failing to take those measures urged by Buell to defeat 
 the enemy, and close the war; if at Shiloh the army was 
 willfully exposed, without guards or defenses, to an invited 
 attack; if an endeavor was made to kee"p reinforcements
 
 54 SHTLOH. 
 
 back which were needed for the safety of the Army of the 
 Tennessee; if they refused to use sufficient of their forces 
 at hand to defeat the enemy, with little or no loss to the 
 Union army; if all this, and more, was done for the pur- 
 pose of protracting the war, and if, in consequence of de- 
 feat, they were screened from punishment and rewarded 
 with promotion, the case is clear, that they were bought up 
 to serve a political purpose, for which they have been 
 amply paid. But as buyers and sellers of misery and blood, 
 and human life, and severed social and parental ties, and 
 broken hearts, and blasted hopes, and ruined fortunes, all, 
 and more than these, the dread concomitants of war, they 
 have proved themselves unworthy of all human s^tipathy 
 and public confidence in future, and subject to disgrace 
 and punishment for the past. 
 
 Brennus, the barbarian Gaul, but threw his sword into 
 the scale to swell the golden ransom for desolated Rome, 
 in an age of barbarity and blood. But these statesmen, 
 and these commanders, in this age of culture and refine- 
 ment, have not hesitated to trade and truck and traffic for 
 myriads upon myriads of lives and limbs, and rivers of 
 blood and rivulets of tears, to satisfy a mad ambition for 
 power and a groveling greed of gain. If the charge is false, 
 then let them answer, why was Buell, who would have 
 pushed on the war, pushed oat? Why was Halleck, who 
 kept back the war, kept in ? Why were these commanders, 
 who organized defeat at Shiloh, and rejected the surest 
 means of victory, promoted? Why were those who did the 
 most to save the Army of the Tennessee from ruin and dis- 
 grace kept down and forced out of the military service? 
 These questions are sufficient now. When satisfactorily 
 answered, we may go into details as to how it is made a 
 merit for commanders of the highest grade to give up their 
 commands to subordinates, or give up the field as lost at 
 noon of the day, and desert the ruin they had wrought.
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 55 
 
 NOTE. Letter of Objections. 
 
 " FORT PICKERING, September 17, 1862. 
 "ADJUTANT GENERAL U. S. A. 
 
 " SIR : I would most respectfully call your attention to the record on case 
 of the trial of Colonel Thomas Worthington, 46th regiment 0. V. I., by gen- 
 eral court-martial, at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, on the 14th Au- 
 gust, 1862, and submit whether, from the evidence, it is not apparent that 
 Major General Sherman is the accuser or prosecutor. It also appears mani- 
 fest of record that the court was ordered by General Sherman. Is this not 
 an irregularity, (see sec. 65, Article of War, act 29th May, 1830,) for which 
 the record ana proceedings should be set aside ? 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " T. WORTHINGTON, 
 " Col. 46(/t Regt. O. V. /." 
 
 Indorsements on the above. 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS 46TH 0. V. I., 
 
 "September 17, 1862. 
 
 " Colonel Worthington asks that the proceedings of his court-martial may 
 be examined and set aside. CHAS. C. WALCUTT, 
 
 "Lt. Col. Com'g 46fA O. V. I." 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS 2o BRIG., 5TH Div., FORT PICKERING, 
 
 "September 18, 1862. 
 " Respectfully forwarded. " JNO. ADAIR McDowELL, 
 
 "Col. 3th Iowa Vols., 2d Brig. Comcfg" 
 " Respectfully forwarded. 
 
 "Colonel Worthington knew that the subject-matter of the charges were 
 made by General Sherman and placed in the hands of the judge advocate. 
 
 " He might have excepted to them before pleading, but he did not, but 
 actually courted the trial, and waived all objections on this point. The orig- 
 inal proceedings* were sent to the AdjutantGeneral's office, Washington, B.C., 
 before any order was made by rne, and sent back with the indorsement of the 
 Judge Advocate General,-f that they did not require the orders or approval of 
 the President. 
 
 "Had Colonel Worthington excepted to his trial at the right time, viz, be- 
 fore pleading, his exception would have been good. But it is now too late, as 
 he boastingly waived all objections, and courted investigation. The original 
 proceedings will be sent to the War Department/or record. 
 
 " W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 [No date. T. W.] "Mai. Gen. Commanding." 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DIST. WEST TENNESSEE, 
 
 "JACKSON, TENN., October 18, 1862. 
 
 " Respectfully forwarded to the headquarters of the army, Washington, 
 D. C. U. S. GRANT, 
 
 "Maj. Gen." 
 
 "ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 "November 4, 1862. 
 
 " Respectfully referred to the Judge Advocate General for report. 
 " By order of the Secretary of War. 
 
 " THOMAS M. VINCENT, 
 
 "Ass't. Adft. Gen." 
 
 "Returned to the Adjutant General November 9. (See mem. within.) 
 " The mem. within is as follows: [In pencil. T. W.] 
 "Returned to the Adjutant General. The Secretary of War will direct 
 what order shall be issued in this case. "C. P. BUCKINGHAM, 
 
 "Brig Gen., A. A. G" 
 
 * Not the fact. t -Not the fact.
 
 56 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION OF 1862. 
 
 "Our Army of the Tennessee have indulgedin severe criticism at the slow 
 approach of that army, which knew the danger that threatened us from the 
 concentrated armies of Johnson, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay at Corinth," 
 (sixteen miles off. W. P. G.) (Sherman to U. 8. S. Magazine, 1865.) . 
 
 "I hardly think we will want your troops. I do not think we will have 
 an engagement short of Corinth." (sixteen miles away. W. P. G.) (General 
 Grant to General Ammen, April 5, 1862, at noon on his arrival at the 
 river, half an hour by steamer from Shiloh.) 
 
 In the last week of November, 1861, General Buell, who 
 had been two weeks at Louisville, wrote to General-in-Chief 
 McClellan, proposing an expedition up the Tennessee as high 
 as Florence and Decatur, Alabama, which McClellan ap- 
 proved. On the 3d January following he proposed to Gen- 
 eral Halleck the same expedition, to destroy the bridges 
 over the Tennessee, as high up as Florence and Decatur, 
 so as to sever the communication of the enemy between 
 the north and south sides. This also would, by the oc- 
 cupation of Florence in force, have prevented all communi- 
 cation between Decatur and Memphis past Corinth, and 
 past Humboldt, to New Madrid and Columbus, Kentucky, 
 where the enemy were in force. 
 
 The occupation of both Florence and Decatur in force 
 would have compelled the evacuation of Fort Donelson and 
 Nashville without a fight, as afterwards Sherman's march 
 from Savannah, Georgia, to the North, compelled the evacu- 
 ation of Charleston, South Carolina. General Buell had 
 proposed that the gunboats should run past Fort Henry, 
 as afterwards, on Halleck's urgency, was done by Grant at 
 Vicksburg; after starting down, as an experiment, in Feb- 
 ruary 1863, two gunboats separately, which safely ran the 
 batteries, but were of course captured below. 
 
 Buell's plan could have been accomplished, and would 
 so have been by any commander less over-cautious than
 
 ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 57 
 
 Halleck, who could never be driven into an initiative 
 'movement likely to provoke a battle.* Halleck at that time 
 expected and intended nothing, other than to capture Forts 
 Henry and Donelson, and took care that Buell should 
 have no immediate share in the honor of these captures, or 
 any operations up the Tennessee; which will be plain before 
 this narrative is concluded, (by necessary limitation,) and 
 was upheld by the Washington ring. Before going into the 
 subsequent correspondence, it may here be premised that 
 Halleck, having seen the growing discontent with McClellan, 
 during the winter of 1861-'62, had, as subsequent events 
 prove, determined, if possible, to obtain McClellan's position 
 as commander-jn-chief. The first commander, East or West, 
 who should achieve any important success would of course 
 be most likely to obtain the position ; and when Mr. Lin- 
 coln, in January, 1862, exercised, ex officio, the duties of 
 commander-in-chief, it was plain, as it was from the first of 
 the war, that the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers offered 
 the direct path to the most active and important operations 
 of the war in the West. There was no one so likely to 
 obstruct by his success the calculations of Halleck as Gen- 
 eral Buell. If he could be made use of in achieving any 
 important object, without himself being an immediate actor, 
 Halleck's point would be gained, as it eventually was by a 
 course of intrigue, of which Buell, to his honor be it said, 
 was morally and intellectually indisposed, if not incapable, 
 for any intrigue, for any purpose; while intrigue for every 
 purpose was Halleck's characteristic practice and delight; 
 and in this he, as will be seen, had resemblers, or perhaps 
 followers or imitators, of various gradations. In all the cor- 
 respondence so far published, the name of General C. F. 
 Smith, as a principal, does not appear; though we are told 
 he was in command of the troops up the Tennessee from 
 early in March to the 17th, and even a later date of that 
 month. This means distinctly that he was either considered 
 unfit for duty, or his name was used as a cover for ulterior 
 
 *And had not the policy of the junto at Washington heen in the way.
 
 58 SHILOII. 
 
 purposes: the main purpose being to make him account- 
 able for the location of the Union army at Shiloh. The 
 only mention of any correspondence with C. F. Smith is a 
 letter of Grant's, March 9th, to Smith, stating this: " Gene- 
 ral Halleck telegraphs me that when reinforcements arrive I may 
 take the general direction.'' On the llth, Smith reached 
 Savannah, Tennessee, whence he replied: "I wrote you 
 yesterday to say how glad I was to find from your letter of 
 the llth of March you were to resume your old command, 
 &c. C. F. SMITH." 
 
 Reference, for the better understanding of the above state- 
 ments, may now be had to the correspondence as to the 
 Tennessee expedition, in which it will be seen that Halleck 
 evades his concurrence in, and seeming origination of, the 
 occupation of Florence, Alabama, in letters of March 4th, 
 6th, and 10th, 1862, which was the most obvious and 
 immediate object, after the capture of Fort Henry, (in a 
 military point of view,) as a means of closing the war. 
 This was the last thing wanted then, at Washington, with 
 whose ring Generals Halleck and Sherman were in close 
 communion. And, as will be seen, to avoid Buell's urgency 
 for the capture of Florence, he was placed under Halleck's 
 command by the order of March 11, 1862. This was done, 
 as must be repeated, that, by permitting A. S. Johnson's 
 junction at Corinth, the expected battle would be out of 
 Buell's district. After the capture of Corinth all operations 
 were suspended on the Mississippi, to prolong the war and 
 ruin Buell, who was too upright a man for the purposes of 
 the ring. 
 
 "Johnson will not stand at Murfreesboro' ; in fact, is preparing to get out 
 of the way. Their plan seems to be to get in rear of the Tennessee, and in 
 position to concentrate on Halleck or me." (Buell to McClellan, March 1, 
 1862.) 
 
 " I have telegraphed Halleck that it is important to seize Decatur, and 
 thus cut General A. S. Johnson from Memphis and Columbus," &c., (which 
 Halleck would not do. W. P. G.) (McCldlan to Buell, March, 1862.) 
 
 As Halleck had in January been perfectly silent to Buell 
 as to a visit of General Grant to St. Louis, to propose the 
 Fort Henry affair, so he is, as will be seen, entirely silent
 
 ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 59 
 
 as to any dispatch from McClellan urging the obvious cap- 
 ture of Decatur, which would first have required the occu- 
 pation of Florence. This would have driven A. S. Johnson 
 down into Alabama or towards Chattanooga, which was the 
 last thing to be done for the accomplishment of Halleck and 
 Sherman's objects which was to allow the junction of 
 Johnson to the rebel force at Corinth. This junction would 
 carry the war out of Buell's district and into that of Grant, 
 held by him under Halleck's command, which was done. 
 Halleck had undoubtedly grown jealous even of Grant at 
 one time, or he pretended to be, in consequence of Donel- 
 son. He wrote him no word of congratulation ; imputed the 
 capture mainly to C. F. Smith, (it was right;) and got up a 
 row with Grant about going without leave to Nashville 
 in February, 1862. (This was, of course, all understood,) 
 or it was doubtless quieted by Sherman's agency when 
 he reached Fort Henry on the 7th of March, 1862. He and 
 Halleck had soon become aware that Grant was not a sub- 
 stantive man, and had sense enough to know it; which is 
 a very great and his only merit, and effective as great it 
 has been. It is the merit of the obstinate, but really docile 
 mule, which, feeling its generic inferiority, will follow any 
 thing of any sex in the shape of a horse however halt or 
 blind, lame or spavined, the horse may be. 
 
 "NASHVILLE, March 1, 1862. 
 
 * * "Johnson is evidently preparing to go towards the Tennessee. De- 
 catur and Chattanooga seem to be the points of rendezvous at present. As 
 soon as I can see my way a little, I will propose that we meet somewhere to 
 consult, if agreeable to you." (Which it was not, to Halleck.) (General Buell 
 to General Halleck.) 
 
 " ST. Lours, March 3, 1862. 
 
 * * "I will make an appointment to meet you as soon as the Columbus 
 movement is ended." (Which he did not intend to do. W. P. G.) (General 
 Halleck to General Buell.) 
 
 On the same day General Buell informs General Halleck 
 that "Johnson is moving towards Decatur, Alabama, and 
 burning all the bridges as he goes," and asks, "What can 
 I do to aid your operations against Columbus?" 
 
 On the 4th General Halleck writes Buell: 
 
 "Why not come to the Tennessee, and operate with me to cut Johnson's
 
 60 SHILOH. 
 
 line with Memphis and New Madrid?* Grant, with all available force^ has 
 
 feme up the Tennessee to destroy connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Hum- 
 oldt, (not. the fact.) Estimated strength of the enemy at New Madrid, Ran- 
 dolph, and Memphis is 50,000. It is a vital importance to separate them 
 from Johnson's army : come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can do 
 it. We then can operate either on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may 
 seem best," (of which he had no intention not wishing to make Buell promi- 
 nent, under the then circumstances.) 
 
 On the 5th of March Buell answers: 
 
 "Your views accord with my own generally, but some slight modification 
 seems necessary. Can we not meet at Louisville in a day or so? I think it 
 very important. The thing which I think of vital importance is, that you 
 seize and hold the bridge at Florence in force. Johnson is now at Shelby- 
 ville, some fifty miles south of this. I hope you will arrange for our meeting 
 at Louisville." D. C. BUELL." (General Budl to General Halleck) 
 
 Halleck answers March 6 : 
 
 "I cannot possibly leave here at the present time, (of course not, W. P. G.) 
 Events are passing on so rapidly, that I must all the time be in telegraphic 
 communication with Curtis, Grant, &c. We must consult by telegraph. News 
 down the Tennessee that Beauregard has 20,000 men at Corinth, Ac. Smith 
 will probably be not strong enough to attack it. It is a great misfortune to 
 lose that point, (why lose it then?) I shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as 
 possible. If you could send a division round into the Tennessee, it would 
 require only a small amount of transportation to do it. [Signed.] 
 
 " H. W. HALLECK." 
 
 Here now is as plain an intention of avoiding Buell as 
 Grant put in practice a month later at Savannah. He says 
 we must bear the great misfortune of losing Corinth, be- 
 cause there are 20,000 of the enemy there, we having 60,000 
 men or more; while all idea of Florence, from which, he 
 says in his letter of the 4th, two days before, we could 
 operate on Decatur and Memphis, is forgotten : and be it 
 understood that Florence was the only attainable point 
 from which we could so operate with any chance of suc- 
 cess. That's why Halleck avoided Florence. 
 
 If there were 20,000 of the enemy at Corinth, these were 
 20,000 reasons why Johnson should not be allowed to join 
 them with 20,000 more of the enemy. Even the unsus- 
 picious Buell seems to have felt that here was the cold 
 shoulder to his great yet obvious project, indorsed by 
 McClellan the project of preventing the junction of the 
 defeated Kentucky troops, under General Johnson, with 
 troops from the Chesapeake and the Gulf, at Corinth, 
 
 * Not the intention. f Not the fact.
 
 O'RIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 61 
 
 which project Halleck thus defeated. It seems that after 
 the 6th of March there was a dispatch from Halleck of the 
 same tenor on the 8th, to which Buell replies on the 9th, 
 from Nashville, as follows : 
 
 "I did not get your dispatch of the 6th until yesterday, (suspicious;) that 
 of the 8th to-day. I suggest as follows: The enemy can move from one side 
 of the river to the other at pleasure, (by the Florence bridge,) and if we 
 attempt to operate on both sides, without equal means of transit, we are 
 beaten in detail. Florence is the only point from which we can act centrally. 
 If you occupy that point, I will reinforce you by water or join you by land. 
 If we could meet, I think we could better understand each other." (This 
 Halleck persistently avoided purposely.) "D. C. BUELL." 
 
 Halleck answers, at St. Louis, March 10, 1862: 
 
 " My forces are moving up the Tennessee river, &c. Florence was the point 
 originally designated, but, on account of the enemy's forces at Corinth and 
 Humboldt, it is deemed best to land at Savannah and establish a depot, (which 
 was never done the depot.) The selection is left to C. F Smith, who com- 
 mands the advance. H. W. HALLECK." 
 
 It is likely the dispatch of the 8th, which seems omitted 
 above, had proposed a location on the west .side of the 
 river, as Buell intimates that till Florence is occupied, the 
 enemy may move freely from side to side of the Tennessee 
 by the bridge, and therefore insists on the occupation be- 
 fore joining Halleck by land or water, (and was right.) 
 
 Here he (Halleck) states that Florence was the point 
 originally designated, but on account of the enemy's forces 
 at Corinth and Humboldt, he abandons a position, in the 
 loss of which hundreds of millions and myriads of lives 
 were involved and lost, which became the more essential 
 from this occupation of Corinth, to say nothing of Hum- 
 boldt, one hundred and twenty miles or more oft' from 
 Florence, and from which no attack need to have been 
 apprehended. ]STo depot, properly speaking, was ever es- 
 tablished at Savannah, except upon boats. 
 
 Halleck says, however, the selection between Florence 
 and Savannah, on the east side of the river, was left to C. 
 F. Smith. So now, if Sherman and Badeau and Grant and 
 Bowman are credible witnesses, C. F. Smith disobeyed 
 orders or directions here stated by Halleck, in choosing 
 Pittsburgh on the west, instead of Florence or Savannah on 
 the east, bank of the river. But this brave but infirm old
 
 62 SHILOH. 
 
 soldier was indisposed or unfitted for any arduous intel- 
 lectual duty after the capture of Fort Donelsou, as was 
 generally understood, and was hurt by an accident at Fort 
 Henry, which, with other apparent causes, ended in his 
 death the day of April, 1862. This fixes with certainty 
 upon Sherman, Halleck, and Grant equal responsibility 
 for their battle-field. But to return to the last letter of 
 Buell, which could not have been of any avail, dated Nash- 
 ville, March 10, 1862. 
 
 "The possession and absolute security of the country 
 north of the Tennessee river," says Buell, " is of vital im- 
 portance, both in a political and military point of view, 
 and under no circumstances should it be jeopardized. It 
 enables us, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate east, 
 west, and south." (This, of course, looked to the occupa- 
 tion of Florence, at the head of river navigation.) Had 
 the enemy occupied and fortified Florence, the conditions 
 stated by Buell could not have existed before its capture. 
 (W. P. G.) " With this view," lie continues, " the establish- 
 ment of your force on the east side of the river as high 
 up as possible (Florence) is evidently judicious, and with 
 the same view it would be unadoisable to change the line on 
 which I propose to advance." (The line to Florence.) "I 
 believe you cannot be too promptly or too strongly estab- 
 lished on the Tennessee," (at Florence.) (Signed) " D. C. 
 BUELL." 
 
 Meantime, after Mr. Lincoln had issued his military 
 orders, no doubt on the advice of Halleck and others most 
 concerned against McClellan, such a change was made in 
 Halleck's command, March llth, as made further remon- 
 strance on Buell's part unmilitary and unavailable, and 
 thus, it is repeated, was organized on a wrong base, with 
 a selfish and political purpose, the "Shiloh. campaign," of 
 which this is intended to be a treatise a campaign by 
 which was clearly planned and inaugurated the battle re- 
 sulting in the slaughter and defeat of Shiloh, which sent 
 Halleck to Washington as commander-in-chief; and with- 
 out any merit but a criminal defeat, willfully induced,
 
 ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE. 63 
 
 placed Grant and Sherman where they are; lengthened 
 the war by at least a year, as was. the object; cost $800,- 
 000,000 and the lives and blood of many myriads of Union 
 soldiers, with a pension list of at least $10,000,000 a year. 
 Two days before this last letter or message of Hal leek's, 
 March 8th, General Curtis gained the battle of Pea Ridge, 
 and Hal leek, if he had chosen, had then 80,000 men for 
 the capture and occupation of Florence, for which not 
 30,000 were requisite; but this capture, it is repeated, 
 would have given Buell and Mitchell the honor of Johnson's 
 defeat or retreat at, or from Decatur, and might have made 
 Buell commander-in-chief at Washington, instead of Hal- 
 leek, unless, as is probable, that had been arranged in 
 Washington in November, 1861. It must here be under- 
 stood, that the line of march for Buell from Nashville to 
 Florence or Decatur, Alabama, was shorter and better 
 than that to Savannah, had it been commenced the 5th or 
 10th of March, as it was not till the 20th that Johnson 
 passed the danger, as he supposed it, of joining the Con- 
 federates at Corinth. 
 
 In a letter of March 18th, 1862, he (Johnson) says to 
 JefF. Davis: 
 
 "After Buell's capture of Nashville I marched southward and crossed the 
 Tennessee at this point, (Decatur,) so as to co-operate or unite with General 
 Beauregard at Corinth for the defense of the valley of the Mississippi. The 
 passage is almost completed, and the head of my column is already with 
 General Bragg at Corinth. The movement was deemed too hazardously the 
 most experienced members of my staff, but the object warranted the RISK. 
 The difficulty of effecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it ap- 
 proaches completion. Day after to-morrow, the 20th, unless the enemy 
 intercepts me, my force will be with Bragg." 
 
 As to the fall of Fort Donelson, General Johnson says: 
 
 "I observed silence, as it seemed the best way to serve the cause and the 
 country," (the South.) 
 
 Exactly the reasons which prevented an investigation 
 into the criminality of Shiloh. It would have checked or 
 stopped volunteering, and might have changed the politi- 
 cal complexion of Congress. 
 
 "The test of merit with the people is success," says Johnson. " It is a 
 hard rule, but I think if, right. If I join this corps to the forces of General 
 Beauregard, (I confess a hazardous experiment,) then those who are now 
 declaiming against me will be without an argument."
 
 64 SHILOH. 
 
 And thus, through Halleck's ambition to be com- 
 mander-in-chief, and perhaps stronger desire to avoid a 
 battle-field, was the way paved to the battle of Shiloh, 
 which cost Johnson his life, the Union 13,000 soldiers, and 
 made that field of disgrace and slaughter the path to 
 power and promotion, by those who were their ministers, 
 (through the ring at Washington.) 
 
 Halleck had thus manoeuvred away forty days after the 
 battle of Fort Henry before BuelPs order, of March 18th, 
 to McCook, to move from Columbia to Savannah. On the 
 20th of March, eight days after Badeau says Grant was 
 restored to command, Halleck dispatches to Buell, as 
 though General Smith were still in command at Savannah, 
 though General Grant got there on the 17th. On the 22d 
 March, Buell states that he has a communication from Gen- 
 eral Grant at Savannah, of the 19th, which contains no intel- 
 ligence of importance. He closes by asking if the bridge at 
 Florence is destroyed, but is never answered. Its de- 
 struction was harmless to the enemj 7 , as we were on the west 
 bank of the river, preparing for the defeat at Shiloh. On 
 the same day, March 22d, he writes to General Grant, in 
 answer to Grant's letter of the 19th ; states that he has 
 directed his advance at Columbia to open communications 
 with General Grant at Savannah, and also asks if the 
 bridge at Florence is destroyed, to which, no answer. 
 
 The above abstract of correspondence, to be returned to 
 perhaps hereafter, will show: that Halleck, against the 
 urgent advice of Buell, is responsible for the junction of 
 Johnson and Beauregard at Corinth, and he and Grant 
 are responsible for Buell's detention at Columbia. A single 
 word that he was wanted, and, in less than two days, or 
 one day, Buell could have crossed Duck river by flying 
 bridges, and, if wanted, could have been at Savannah when 
 Grant reached there, on the 17th of March, or sooner, but 
 for Halleck; but there would have been no battle of Shiloh 
 with its fatal results to all but these conspirators. 
 
 And now, having got the Army of the Tennessee near its 
 camp at Shiloh, and shown how a month had been wasted
 
 ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 65 
 
 for a selfish purpose in not having it at Florence a month 
 before, let it be shown who was responsible for its location 
 at Shiloh. The means by which the floods were assisted 
 in keeping Buell back will be developed, and here, so far 
 as private information is concerned, General Grant must 
 bear the brunt of the delay and its consequences, meri- 
 torious or otherwise. To do this satisfactorily, reference 
 must be had to Badeau's History of General Grant, indorsed 
 by General Grant himself, and one digression after 
 another, and frequent repetitions, must be the tedious 
 consequence. The third, or Shiloh chapter, of this his- 
 tory of Badeau, is made part of this commentary,* so that 
 the reader, if not satisfied with the construction put upon 
 the history by the commentator, can put upon the history 
 a construction of his own, and no charge of garbling 
 can be made, when so easily detected, by referring to Ba- 
 deau. Reference must, in considering this history, be 
 made to the letters and reports of Generals Grant and 
 Sherman, the life of Sherman by Bowman, with Sherman's 
 indorsement, and such other oflicial and unoflicial evidence 
 as will explain a narrative by no means connected, but as 
 regular a commentary as such a history as Badeau's will 
 permit. No account of the battle of Shiloh can have much 
 consistency as to the connection or succession of events. 
 But there need be no such contradictions as to time, events, 
 or distances, as occur in Badeau, and all other accounts. The 
 intention to confuse and deceive the casual reader is evi- 
 dent, and the labored endeavor to show that Grant did not 
 try to evade Buell on the 5th of April, gives plain proof of 
 this evasion. This evasion or avoidance of General Buell 
 by Grant, on the 5th, is entire proof of the charge that he 
 sedulously invited an attack, while as sedulously endeavor- 
 ing to prevent BuelPs knowing the danger, or having any 
 share in repelling the expected attack; all of which, how- 
 ever tedious the process, the true and impartial historian 
 is in duty bound to expose, as intimately connected with 
 
 * The writer is compelled to omit this chapter on Badeau. 
 
 5
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 the most important, and extraordinary, and sanguinary 
 battle of the rebellion. 
 
 NOTE. In this order of March 11, 1862, is found the first direct evidence 
 of the intention and endeavor of the party at Washington to prolong the 
 war. The matter had doubtless been understood and arranged oefore Hal- 
 leek left Washington. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson doubt- 
 less created alarm among these political schemers, who were bartering the 
 lives and blood of Union soldiers for another quadrennium of power. 
 
 The capture of Florence was to be avoided, and it was for fear that Buell 
 might follow up Mitchell's movement, and himself march on Florence, un- 
 der authority of Halleck's letter of March 4, that this order was issued, which 
 put the matter beyond the reach of Buell or McClellan; clipping McClellan's 
 authority, and bringing Buell at once to a sense of subordination which he 
 could not but approve. After the capture of Florence, that of Chattanooga, 
 and the whole of the valley up to Harper's Ferry, so carefully avoided, 
 might not have keen easily prevented before the election of 1864. 
 
 And thus this order sealed and signed the death warrant of 100,000 or 
 more Union soldiers, and created Government bonds of a thousand millions 
 or over. Who was, and who still is, and should be held responsible, and 
 who were the willing instruments of such a willful waste of patriot blood 
 and national treasure, whose punishment should no longer be delayed?
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 67 
 
 CHAPTER m. 
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN OF 1862, UP TO SAVANNAH. 
 
 " I wish no prominent place in this war, I have no heart for it. I am per- 
 petually embarrassed by my former associations with the South." (Sherman 
 at Paducah and Columbus, Ohio.) 
 
 " I suppose we had a full supply of hay coming from Paducah, but think 
 we were rather short." (Colonel Stuart's evidence for Sherman.) 
 
 " Some of Grant's regiments arrived at Shiloh without cartridges, and had 
 withstood and repelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy at 
 4 p. m." (Sherman's letter, January, 1865.) 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO, March 5, 1862. 
 "Captain HAMMOND, Adjutant General: 
 
 " Hold all steamboats till morning ; notify all armed brigades and regi- 
 ments to embark for Tennessee to-morrow. SHERMAN." 
 
 This dispatch was the initiation of that Army of the Ten- 
 nessee which marched by Shiloh and Memphis to Vicks- 
 burg; thence by Memphis and Chattanooga to Atlanta ; 
 thence by Savannah, Georgia, and Richmond, to Washing- 
 ton, where, after a grand triumph, it was disbandoned in the 
 summer of 1865. 
 
 The above dispatch reached Colonel Hicks, 40th Illinois 
 volunteers, about 9 p. m. of the 5th, and he, as brigade 
 commander, made it known through his assistant adjutant 
 general, to his subordinates during the course of the follow- 
 ing forenoon. One of those subordinates (the writer) re- 
 ceived the order to march while distributing arms to his 
 regiment, about 9 a. m. of the 5th, or perhaps later in the 
 day. It was, of course, greeted by his troops, with exceed- 
 ing joy and great applause. 
 
 Proceeding immediately to headquarters at Paducah, all 
 commanders of regiments considered within the scope of 
 the order received the following in addition : 
 
 [" SPECIAL ORDER No. 74.] 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO, 
 
 " PADUCAH, March 6, 1862. 
 
 " The following regiments will embark to-day for Savannah, Tennessee 
 river, and there report to Major General Smith.
 
 68 SIIILOH. 
 
 " The commanding officers will see that their regiments have eighty rounds 
 of ammunition and all the means of transportation n hand. Baggage must 
 be reduced to the minimum, and the quartermaster, Captain Pearse, will ob- 
 tain a house in which to deposit all baggage left behind. (No house for the 
 sick. W. G. P.) 
 
 "Ohio 46th, Colonel Worthington ; Ohio 48th, Colonel Sullivan ; Illinois 
 40th, Colonel Hicks; Ohio 53d] Colonel Appier ; Ohio 72d, Colonel Buck- 
 land. 
 
 " The quartermaster will at once provide the transportation necessary. 
 
 " By order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman. 
 
 " F. H. HAMMOND, A. A. G." 
 
 With this order the different chiefs of regiments repaired 
 to the transportation office for boats, and generally left dur- 
 ing the 6th of March, 1862. 
 
 It will he observed, that in this order to raw troops, ig- 
 norant of, and unaccustomed to, service in the field, noth- 
 ing is said in regard to army or hospital stores of any kind, 
 or to any disposition of the sick, of which there was neces- 
 sarily a large number, who could and should have been 
 provided for in the many empty dwellings then in Pad- 
 ucah, left by rebels. 
 
 "Fort Henry had been captured," says Colonel Bowman, 
 General Sherman's autobiographer, by " General Grant, on 
 the 6th February, 1862," without explaining that the capture 
 had been made through the intervention of Commodore 
 Foote's gunboat fleet, sometime before that General's ar- 
 rival, which, in justice to the gunboat fleet, should have 
 been explained as it is here. 
 
 About the time of this capture it seems that General "W. 
 T. Sherman was ordered to Paducah, to take charge of for- 
 warding supplies and reinforcements from that point. What- 
 ever the characteristic energy imputed by his biographer 
 may have effected in regard to the troops at Fort Donelson, 
 it is certain that near a month later there was neither proper 
 forage, ammunition, nor hospital stores for the five regi- 
 ments ordered up the Tennessee on the 6th of March, 1862. 
 That there were no proper hospital stores, and neither hay, 
 oats, nor straw even, for the draft animals, might be accounted 
 for by the exhaustion of this material of war for the con- 
 sumption of the three divisions of McClernand, C. F. Smith, 
 and L. Wallace, then at or near Fort Henry, which divis-
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 69 
 
 ions, however, reached Savannah in about the same state 
 of destitution; and General Sherman, a month later, admits 
 that some of the regiments reached camp Shiloh even with- 
 out ammunition. But hospitals and quarters for the sick 
 were plenty at Paducah. There was no possible excuse 
 for the extravagance, impolicy, and inhumanity of hauling 
 sick men to crowded boats, where to properly care for 
 them was impossible; and to carry them with the army, 
 as was done, to die, was simply barbarous. 
 
 The surgeons, of their own motion, found empty houses, 
 and did the best they could for the dangerously sick, though 
 all weak and ailing men should, as a matter of expediency 
 if not humanity, have been left behind. 
 
 The 6th was a raw, windy, snowy March day, worthy 
 more of Labrador than Tennessee, near the line of which 
 last we were. The mud was just sufficiently frozen for the 
 horses to break through at every other step. This narra- 
 tor, with his command, was near two miles from his boat, 
 and, with unbroken mule teams, to reach the river during 
 daylight, with his camp equipage and stores, was a very 
 uneasy job. 
 
 Of the above-named regimental commanders ordered up 
 the Tennessee, Colonel Worthington, 46th Ohio, was the 
 only educated military officer. He was sufficient!} 7 provi- 
 dent to take on board ten days' additional stores of army 
 rations for his men and provender (nothing but shelled 
 corn) for his mules and horses. Of the eighty rounds of 
 ammunition ordered, but thirty could be had, and that at 
 11 p. m., or after. 
 
 His stores were all on board, and he embarked (just one 
 month before the battles of the 6th and 7th of April fol- 
 lowing,) at 3 a. m. of the 7th of March, 1862. The boat 
 (Adams) neared Fort Henry, about noon next day, and about 
 all the boats which had left Paducah the day before were 
 still there, besides many others intended for the transpor- 
 tation of the three divisions from Fort Donelson to the fu- 
 ture field of Shiloh. 
 
 Drawing up on the west side to make inquiries, the 40th
 
 70 SHILOH. 
 
 Ohio found itself next the boat of the 5th Ohio cavalry, 
 Colonel Taylor. On inquiry it was found that this regi- 
 ment had been there near a week, waiting orders, and that 
 there was one gunboat and perhaps a single transport 
 gone up the river. During our two weeks' delay at Padu- 
 cah, there had been rumors of ill treatment of Union men 
 at Savannah, who had expected we would have immediately 
 taken possession of Florence, Alabama, as urged by Gen- 
 eral Buell, immediately after the capture of Fort Henry. 
 On this reliance many had expressed their sentiments too 
 freely, and thereby suffered in various ways. A general draft 
 of all men fit to bear arms had been contemplated, and as 
 it is one of the first rules of an intended invasion to move to 
 the objective point as rapidly as possible, it was concluded, 
 nem. con., to proceed, as there was no signal for the boat 
 from Fort Henry. Beyond this there was some chance of 
 forage for the teams before the advance of the army, mo- 
 mentarily expected, and the regiment accordingly steamed 
 on up. The colonel of the 46th would have continued all 
 night, and urged the master of the boat to do so, but he 
 was apprehensive, he said, of masked batteries upon either 
 shore, and nothing was left but reluctant acquiescence. 
 The colonel's diary of the 8th is as follows : 
 
 " Saturday, March 8th, 1862. A fair frosty morning. Started about sunrise, 
 and about 8. 30 a.m. stopped at Britt's landing, and took aboard 98 bushels and 
 426 sheaves of oats. Stopped at Clifton and other landings, but heard nothing 
 satisfactory. Got to Savannah about sunset. Found there one half of the 
 40th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Booth. Took command, and threw out 120 
 men as pickets also a patrol, which took up 40 or 50 stragglers of the 40th, 
 who were invading the houses, and, as the people thought, threatening mis- 
 chief, there being o bar on board the boat. Saw a Union man, Mr. W . H. 
 Cherry, and got him to send a servant to Waynesboro, 30 miles northwest, 
 for information. Heard that the rebel authorities, in anticipation of our 
 arrival, were hauling stores from the river below, around by Florence, to luka, 
 all of which would have been stopped but for the delay in sending troops to 
 Florence a month before. This half of the 40th Illinois had passed Fort 
 Henry in the night of the 6th, and, taking little note of circumstance or time, 
 had reached Savannah about an hour by sun. It might have been in danger 
 but for the arrival of the 46th, which last it was afterward rumored, at home. 
 had been captured by ignorantly going ahead of the fleet, &c. But the arri- 
 val was roost timely. From Mr. Cherry was derived information that the 
 rebel authorities were active in the vicinity that there had been a draft en 
 masse of the able-bodied male population the previous Thursday, and the 
 drafted men were ordered to muster at Savannah on Monday, the lOth of 
 March following."
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 71 
 
 Deeming it his duty to get as full a report as possible of 
 the state of affairs in the vicinity for the information of 
 General C. F. Smith on his arrival, he, as stated in the above 
 diary extract, employed and dispatched a scout in the direc- 
 tion of Waynesboro. During the night many refugees came 
 to the boat from the west side of the river. Many came 
 into the town from the eastward on hearing of the arrival 
 of Union troops, and perhaps more than a thousand drafted 
 men from all quarters crowded the little village next day. 
 
 On Sunday, the 9th, the 46th had a dress parade, and, 
 in connection with the in-coming refugees from the rebel 
 draft, this Sunday was pronounced the liveliest day the little 
 town of less than one thousand inhabitants had ever wit- 
 nessed. At about 2 p. m. several officers of the 46th went 
 up in the gunboat Lexington, by invitation of Captain Quin, 
 to Pittsburgh landing, eight miles above, and threw, per- 
 haps, a dozen shell into the interior, to which there was 
 no reply. 
 
 Savannah is the county seat of Hardin county, and is 
 joined on the west by McNairy county. From the drafted 
 refugees mainly of these two counties the 46th received 
 during the day forty or fifty recruits. Night came on with 
 no news oi' the fleet below, much to the surprise of the 46th 
 Ohio, which, being the last regiment to embark at Padncah 
 had had little thought of being the first full regiment to 
 to reach its destination in advance of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, so famous afterwards in the war. 
 
 On Monday, the 10th, daylight came on with rain. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Booth, of the 40th Illinois, found him- 
 self out of stores, and the colonel of the 46th, declining 
 his request to forage upon the people of the town, gave him 
 two days' rations, and an order to proceed down the river 
 and look up the army fleet. This was deemed an affront 
 which Colonel Hicks, of the 40th Illinois, and commander 
 of the brigade, was disposed to resent, and did afterwards 
 resent, as an insul L , to himself and his regiment. 
 
 A river boat, crowded with troops, being the last place 
 suitable for sick men, they were got out to-day, and put.into'
 
 72 SHILOH. 
 
 a vacant house near the river, which had been emptied by 
 its owner, who was an officer in the Confederate army. 
 He had, however, with usual southern hospitality, author- 
 ized Mr. Cherry to allow its occupation by our sick or 
 wounded, should our troops appear in his absence : doubt- 
 less, also, aware of the good policy of making a virtue of 
 necessity. 
 
 Arrangements were also made for the fitting up of a new 
 frame church, with the consent of the village authorities^ 
 fora government hospital; it having been understood that 
 here was to be a large army depot for weeks or months, 
 whence the troops would march to break up railroads, or 
 rebel camps at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, (humbug.) 
 During Sunday and Monday the pickets of the 46th had 
 captured half a dozen or more of rebel scouts and horse- 
 men, with their horses and mules, and learned that there 
 was a large force of Confederate troops gathering or ex- 
 pected about Florence, Tuscumbia, Eastport, and luka, 
 then expecting our attack on the first-named place, as it 
 had been expected a full month before. 
 
 Tuesday, the llth, was a fair, cool morning. The troops 
 were brought ashore to clean up the boat, and most of the 
 sick were made more comfortable in the improvised- hopi- 
 tals, the villagers doing all service in their power ; for which 
 they had and still have the grateful recollections of the 
 troops and their commander Mr. William H, Cherry be- 
 ing among the foremost in this friendly, and, indeed, charit- 
 able ministration, for which no provision had been made 
 by our commander. 
 
 Several Confederates were captured to-day, and among 
 them one of the regular rebel cavalry, whc had been sent 
 in to see what was going on among the Yankee invaders 
 of the "sacred soil." 
 
 The steamer Golden Gate came up about noon, and an- 
 nounced the Union fleet of boats at hand. The 46th Ohio 
 was paraded on the hill above the landing on open ground, 
 where a fair view could be had of .the approaching Army 
 of the Tennessee.
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 73 
 
 The first boats came in sight about 2 p. m., some two 
 miles down the river, and it was a sight fraught with 
 splendor for the 46th Ohio a spectacle beheld by no other 
 regiment in the army. The weather was soft and fine, 
 and one or more flags floated over every boat. Nearly 
 every regiment had a band of music, and in this, till then, 
 sequestered region, occurred a scene of martial activity and 
 festivity, never before witnessed in the Union. Unexpected, 
 grand, and indeed terrible, it was, to the inhabitants along 
 the forest-girded banks of the Tennessee. 
 
 It was soon, however, discovered, that however beneficial 
 to the people of the vicinity and to the interests of the 
 Union had been the arrival of the 46th Ohio in advance of 
 the army, it was anything but agreeable to General C. F. 
 Smith and the general officers of the Army of the Tennessee. 
 General Smith, irritable from ill-health and ill-habits, was 
 furious at what he denominated the presumption and in- 
 subordination ofacolonelofvolunteersinprecedingsuchan 
 expedition in command of a regular officer of the army of 
 the United States and major general of Union volunteers. 
 He refused to receive the colonel's report, and rebuked him 
 for disregard of military etiquette in not passing his report 
 through his commander of brigade and division, with 
 whom his orders had nothing to do ; and to do this would 
 have been impossible, without disobeying the order of the 
 6th, (No. 74,) which was peremptory to proceed to Savan- 
 nah and there report to Major General C. F. Smith, who 
 was on the leading boat of the fleet, where the colonel of 
 the 46th found and offered him his report. 
 
 It also soon appeared that the division commander was 
 equally irate at the too prompt arrival of the 46th, whose 
 colonel he had snubbed at midnight for being slack in his 
 
 O O 
 
 departure, while he was getting on stores and hunting up 
 ammunition, which the general of division not only failed 
 to supply, but he refused to give an order for ammunition 
 at Paducah, intended for a regiment without arms. But 
 Colonel W. got it. 
 By his prompt arrival the "colonel of the 46th had pre-
 
 74 SHILOH. 
 
 vented the pressure into the rebel service of perhaps a 
 thousand Union men, and had added hundreds to fill 
 up the deficient Union regiments. Instead of approbation 
 for the result of his prompt obedience to a peremptory 
 order, his reward was the enmity of those above him, who 
 had failed in their duty, and an attempt at his degradation 
 for performing his own. (See notes at the end of the chap- 
 ter.) 
 
 Colonel Hicks, the brigade commander, was an old Illi- 
 nois militia officer, a benevolent and brave man, but proud 
 and obstinate, as he was ignorant of, and opposed to strict 
 military discipline. Without much education of any kind, 
 he was boastful that in the Mexican war he had acquired, 
 and professed, great contempt for regular officers and army 
 regulations. This contempt for all military law he had car- 
 ried out to the fullest extent at Paducah, refusing to sub- 
 ject his troops (good men as they were and of excellent 
 material for soldiers) to any discipline whatever. 
 
 He had in consequence been held in arrest by General 
 Smith for weeks or even months at Paducah, and his men, 
 instead of being sent to the field, had been retained in 
 quarters, as utterly unskilled, in consequence of their col- 
 onel's practices and principles, and therefore unfitted for 
 campaign duty. 
 
 Under this officer, at war as he professed to be with all 
 regular officers and with strict discipline, was the colonel 
 of the 46th Ohio brigaded by the general of division, with a 
 purpose of his own, and anything but friendly to the older 
 graduate. When visiting his pickets at Paducah, near those 
 of Colonel Hicks, he had found it the practice of these vigi- 
 lant watchers of the Illinois, to gather in squads, of two or 
 three or more, around a fire, on or off the picket line, then 
 and there to stack arms, by driving their bayonets into the 
 "bloodless sheath" of the muddy soil, and pass the time at 
 seven-up, poker, or some such absorbing game of cards, 
 and all with their colonel's entire approbation sometimes 
 perhaps a looker on himself. 
 
 On reporting this in a quiet way to the brigade com-
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 75 
 
 mander, he told his subordinate a long story of his expe. 
 rience with the stiff and stately regulars, tyrannizing over 
 the innocent recreations of their men, of whom they should 
 have been like him, even as it were a father to his troops, as he 
 was. As to amending the habits of the sentinels, " it was hard 
 to teach an old dog new tricks." On representing the case to 
 General Sherman he agreed with Colonel Hicks, and con- 
 cluded to let matters proceed in the regularly irregular 
 militia routine, or no routine at all. 
 
 So the West Point man had to give it up, &c., &c., 
 forbidding his own men on pain of imminent death or dis- 
 grace, if ever in danger, from indulging on picket duty in 
 such agreeable but dangerous and most unmilitary prac- 
 tices; and it was by such practices that many regiments were 
 surprised, posts lost, and thousands of men killed and cap- 
 tured, in the early period of the war. But to return to the 
 brigade commander at Savannah. He had on arrival landed 
 on the west side of the river, thus dividing his brigade. On 
 the morning of the 12th, the adjutant of the 46th reported 
 this fact, and stated that, the yawl of the Adams being 
 gone, he could not get his morning report over the river. 
 He was told to send a copy of the report to the A. A. G. of 
 the division, and get the report over as soon as he could 
 get a boat. There was no forage to be had in the country 
 for the teams, and the colonel of the 46th, having purchased 
 a lot of corn in the husk, was busily getting it on board, 
 supposing, of course, the expedition would not stop short 
 of Florence, where feed for teams would be still more dif- 
 ficult of supply, and therefore he left the care of his report 
 to the adjutant. 
 
 At 1 p. m. Colonel Hicks had the colonel of the 46th 
 arrested for failing to send over his report. Stating the 
 case to Sherman, he got a release at 5 p. m., with a letter 
 from Hicks, in which he was assured the arrest had been 
 fully approved by Sherman, who knew that no one but 
 General C. F. Smith could legally make an arrest. This, 
 however, exposed his animus toward Colonel Worthing- 
 ton of the 46th, who was reported at home as degraded for
 
 76 SHILOH. 
 
 misconduct and neglect of duty, in preceding the army with- 
 out orders. The object of brigading him under such an 
 enemy of regular officers as Colonel Hicks had been at- 
 tained, and soon after Hicks was displaced for the appoint- 
 ment of another brigade commander, also with a personal 
 object on the part of Sherman, as will appear in the course 
 of this treatise; which, let it here be remembered, will 
 not be cumbered with any more such personalities, if pos- 
 sible to be avoided. 
 
 We have now the. Army of the Tennessee at Savannah, 
 instead of Florence; the reason of stopping short of which 
 place will be developed hereafter, so far as present infor- 
 mation can lead to such development. 
 
 The division commander thus vented his rage at the 
 early arrival of the 46th Ohio at Savannah, on those of its 
 sick men his negligence or inhumanity had failed to pro- 
 vide for at Paducah, and this after having snubbed its 
 commander for being late at that place, to repair his ne- 
 glect in not giving orders to his colonels to take on addi- 
 tional stores for such an expedition and leave their sick 
 behind. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 [Extract from the Diary of an Officer of the Army of the Tennessee.} 
 
 SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, TUESDAY, March 12, 1872. 
 
 "A lot of sick men were lodged for the day in a house near the river bank, 
 owned by a Confederate officer named Martin, with leave of his brother to 
 use it and his own leave, through Mr. Cherry. Martin's wife I had seen in the 
 morning, who made no objection to the use of the house, which was destitute 
 of any furniture, and did not tell me there was anything to be injured, as I 
 understood there was not. Being in a room above stairs about sunset, I heard 
 that she was complaining that mischief had been done. I went down and 
 told the siok men logo to the boat. Going out, I found Mrs. Martin com- 
 plaining to General Sherman, who asked me angrily what the men were doing 
 in the h.-use. I said they were sick men, put in the house by permission of 
 its owner, while the boat was being cleaned out. He answered that it was 
 an outrage to put men in a house wnere' there were a parcel of women, and 
 ordered some soldiers of a Missouri regiment to turn the men out. The sick 
 were going as fast as their strength would permit. I clutched his arm and 
 requested him to be quiet, as I had ordered the men out, and he saw that 
 they were going out. He repeated his order to clear them out very violently, 
 and in the most silly and brutal manner; but no one seemed disposed to obey 
 an order to commit violence upon sick men, thus barbarously brought up 
 from Paducah, instead of being sent home, both as a matter of humanity and 
 economy."
 
 TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 77 
 
 "SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, March 12, 1862. 
 
 "The undersighed, citizens of Savannah, Tennessee, and vicinity, hereby 
 declare, that the presence of the 46th Ohio volunteer regiment.on the 3d in- 
 stant, proved most opportune in preventing the arresting and pressing into 
 service of persons subject to the draft or detail ordered by the State authori- 
 ties. Refuge was thereby afforded to those who had to leave home on ac- 
 count of the draft, and in preventing many of them from being pressed into 
 the rebel army, and adding a considerable number of recruits to the Union 
 army. The troops under Colonel Worthington have been quiet and orderly, 
 committing no trespass or intrusion on our citizens or their property. That 
 they were actively engaged as scouts and pickets is proven by their capture 
 of a number of the rebel cavalry. Information of hostile operations was 
 sedulously sought for, and active measures taken for their suppression by the 
 officers in command. And we further declare, that the opportune arrival of 
 said regiment here gave great satisfaction to our community, and by their 
 efficiency and good conduct they merit our thanks and approval, as they will 
 doubtless re.ceive that of the national Government and all true friends of the 
 Union. W. H. Cherry, H. Stephens, J.S. Berry, B. Hinkle, George L. Morrow, 
 Donald Campbell, H. H. Brogles, I. N. Kindel, I. N. Herring, C. W. Morris, 
 Bert S. Russell, B. B. Alexander, J. I. Trist, D. T. Street, T. N. Caldwell, T. 
 G. Lee, R. T. Picket, John H. Maxwell, John Willliams, E. Walker, W. N. 
 Maxwell, Win. Russell, John W. Eccles, J. D. Donahue, C. C. Franks, Thos. 
 Maxwell, J. S. Winton, W. W. Thurston, Robt. Meadar, W. D. Booth, T. L. 
 Puckett, D. D. Crook, T. F. Frazier, R. H. Russell."
 
 78 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 
 
 "Sherman, on the 14th March, went to Tyler's landing, whence the 6th 
 Ohio marched to Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, some 
 miles east of Oorinth, which waa destroyed, and returned unmolested to 
 Savannah." (Hon. H. Greeley.) 
 
 "On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's 
 army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and, after making a feint of 
 landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pitts- 
 burgh landing," (all on the 14th.) (Bowman & Irving' s Sherman and his 
 Campaigns.) 
 
 " General C. F. Smith pushed forward troops to Eastport, on the Ten- 
 nessee, but ultimately took Pittsburgh landing as the initial point." (E. D- 
 Mansfield's Lives of Grant and Colfax.) 
 
 " C. F. Smith took command of the expedition, and while the captain of 
 Donelson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops were pushed 
 forward as far as Eastport, on the Tennessee. The operations, however, 
 were without results, and Smith returned to Pittsburgh landing, on the 
 western bank of the Tennessee." (Badeau's History of Grant.) 
 
 By the above the honor of this Eastport affair seems to 
 remain easy as between the claims of Smith and Sherman 
 to the same, while Grant is entirely accessory, and was, 
 perhaps, more than so .in reality, though Smith bears the 
 blame. N"ow, there may be many inferences deduced from 
 the above-cited quotations by the admirers of these two 
 rebellion-risen commanders. Inseparable in the origin 
 and cause of their success as the twin brothers of the old 
 Dorian mythology, though which is the pugilist and which 
 the cavalier their admirers may take their own time and 
 way to determine. (Both are of the ring.) 
 
 From this category of admirers may, perhaps, be ex- 
 cluded that most benevolent and impracticable politi- 
 cal philosopher and too practical utilitarian sage, Gree- 
 ley, never satisfied without the evolution of results from 
 causes. In such earnest and laudable research he has 
 found it essential to tell, in order that actions may have
 
 EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 79 
 
 results, that Sherman went to Tyler's landing, whence the 
 6th Ohio (under the general's command, of course,) 
 marched to Burnsville, some miles out of Corinth, which 
 (Burnsville or Corinth?) was destroyed, and returned un- 
 molested to Savannah. It is difficult to distinguish as to 
 the merit of these wonderful performances, if accomplished; 
 but it seems plain that the 6th Ohio should have the palm, 
 not as to the imaginary destruction of Burnsville or Corinth, 
 &c., but, being at the time (March 14th) at Nashville, 
 Tennessee, its march must, if made, have far exceeded in 
 celerity that of ISTero, the consul, (not the fiddling fire- 
 brand,) from Yenusia to the Metaurus. 
 
 There seems, at the same time, little or no disposition 
 on the part of Sherman's admirer, Bowman, to impute 
 that merit to his patron, which, according to Badeau and 
 Sherman, properly belongs to C. F. Smith, the real hero 
 of Fort Donelsou, if there was one. The fast friend (fidus 
 Achates) and uncertain eulogist of the President is clearly 
 entitled to the merits, and still more clearly to the de- 
 merits, of this wonderful, dangerous, and mysterious ex- 
 pedition, comparable only to that of Jason, (or possibly 
 Mason,) to Colchis after the Golden Fleece time out 
 mind. 
 
 This expedition is, or was, as brilliant, according to 
 Greeley, as it is terrible, according to Draper. If we are 
 to believe this most erudite, critical, and most veracious 
 historian, Sherman lost many men and horses in the 
 swollen streams, striving to reach the Memphis and Charles- 
 ton railroad. If any men and horses were really lost, 
 their record has been kept more quiet than that of the 
 three horses which were not killed under Sherman at 
 Shiloh, unless, like the knight of old, he killed them to 
 prevent their captivity by the enemy. 
 
 The venerable Mansfield makes the Eastport honor un- 
 certain, but drops the matter as provocative of inquiry by 
 curious readers. 
 
 The true history of this affair, so studiously covered up 
 by Badeau and Bowman, is taken from the diary of an
 
 80 SHILOH. 
 
 officer who was an actor in this worse than useless expedi- 
 tion, which was most fortunately arrested, as it might plainly 
 have produced the most ruinous results to the troops en- 
 engaged in it though with that cost if Sherman, its in- 
 stigator, could thereby have been set aside for a more 
 worthy commander at Shiloh. 
 
 "SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, March 14, 1862. 
 
 " About 1 p. m. Sherman's troops left on an expedition to Mississippi, and 
 tied up a few miles below Eastport. Rain last night and rain all day after 
 12 m. We were to have left for the interior at midnight, but about 11 p. m. 
 had orders that the start was postponed till 2 a. m. (15th,) the river rising six 
 or eight inches an hour, and filling a bayou or thoroughfare next the hill, 
 which will be impassable long before noon to morrow. 
 
 "Saturday, March 15,1862. Up at half past 12; raining, as it had 
 been all night. The expedition had been ordered, with two days' cooked pro- 
 visions, to march out and break up the Memphis and Charleston railroad and 
 return. A useless job, unless we can effect a lodgement, which does not seem 
 intended. Started in the rain about 3 a. m., though from the rising water 
 it was plain we would soon have to return. Went out about three or four 
 miles, over a road impracticable for artillery without repair, and were there 
 stopped by a creek backed up from the river and several feet deep upon the 
 road. My regiment, having charge of the artillery, I went back and re- 
 ported to Sherman, who ordered a return about 7 or 8 a. m. At the bayou 
 found the 54th Ohio zouaves, Colonel Smith, wading back breast deep. 
 
 " A very silly expedition under the circumstances, and adding hundreds 
 of weakly men to the sick list." 
 
 The high water was fortunate, as had we got a few 
 miles farther toward the railroad, the division would 
 have been captured, as the rebels were in force about luka, 
 and A. S. Johnson was just passing his troops over the 
 route from Decatur to Corinth, expecting the occupation 
 of Florence every hour of every day after the capture of 
 Fort Henry, up to the time he concentrated with Bragg 
 and Beauregard, about the 20th of March, 1862. (W. P. G.) 
 
 This Eastport affair demands attention, on account of 
 the endeavor, by imputing it to Smith or dropping it en- 
 tirely, to conceal a characteristic blunder of Sherman's in 
 the opening of the campaign, which was repeated by him 
 whenever an opportunity offered throughout the war. It 
 was the blunders, and nothing else but blunders and far 
 worse, at Shiloh, which have given him his present posi- 
 tion, and blunders alone characterized him in the advance 
 on Savannah, Tennessee, as improvident, reckless, violent, 
 and unjust, while his advance on Savannah, Georgia, earns
 
 BATTLE 
 
 SHILOH 
 
 April (Aimn 6 ' 
 1862 
 
 r /Jfiti o/ -VMoh 
 rfiny to fii.v firpart- /itit'inff ? 
 /)i\-iaian'jt 
 
 .vnifj'tl f" ttlf 
 
 ILErrrmi f.ith
 
 EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 81 
 
 for him the reputation of the " Attila of the age." It took 
 all day of the 15th to get the troops and artillery on board 
 the fleet. Left soon after midnight, and on the morning 
 of Sunday, the 16th, the boats tied up at Pittsburgh, which 
 also deserves attention, as this first landing of troops at 
 Pittsburgh is imputed by Grant to C. F. Smith. 
 
 NOTE. This most extraordinary and indeed insane movement could not be 
 accounted for by the writer till he found ample evidence that it was intended 
 to cover Halleck's avoidance of the occupation of Florence for personal pur- 
 poses. It would not have been undertaken had there been any probability 
 of its success. Time will doubtless develop that these operations of Hal- 
 leck's had their origin in Washington, having several purposes one to sup- 
 plant McClellan, one to prolong the war, and beyond this to put Halleck, 
 Grant, and Sherman into the positions they attained, at the sacrifice of hun- 
 dreds of millions and myriads of lives. 
 
 6
 
 82 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 INTO CAMP SHILOH. 
 
 " A small stream that rises in the field in front flows to the north along my 
 whole front. (This faces the division to the west, W.P.G.) I saw that the 
 enemy designed to pass rny left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernand 
 and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee 
 river, and about two miles back from it." (Sherman's Report of Shiloh. ~) (The 
 Tennessee running due north at Shiloh.) 
 
 These divisions are also face east or west, and are in a line parallel with 
 Sherman's division, exposing their flanks to the attack from the South, (see 
 plate 2,) which was about an equivalent arrangement to that which ex- 
 isted. (W. P. G.) 
 
 Sherman's 5th division went into camp three miles out 
 from Pittsburgh landing, on the 18th and 19th of March, 
 and Hurlbut's division, (the 4th,) from half a mile to a 
 mile out about the same time, and to the right and left of 
 the Corinth road, with little or no order whatever. C. F. 
 Smith's and McClernand's divisions came out from the 
 20th to the 22d of March. Smith's, the 2d division, was 
 scattered along the upper Purdy road from half a mile to 
 a mile or over, out west from Pittsburgh landing. 
 
 McClernand's (1st) division was encamped in better 
 order and on better ground than any other. His left was 
 & little east of the main Corinth road, about four hundred 
 yards nearly due north from Sherman's center at Shiloh 
 church, and bending a little back or eastward from the center 
 to the right or north ; the ground was, in general, wooded 
 on the east of this camp, with open ground on the west, 
 which was a good arrangement for defense, so far as it 
 went. 
 
 Its general direction made an angle of about seventy 
 degrees toward the northwest, with the direction of Sher- 
 man's line at its center. Sherman's statement of his center 
 as being at Shiloh church is about the only correct state- 
 ment in that report, except, perhaps, his account of his
 
 INTO CAMP SHILOH. 83 
 
 wanton destruction of a battery of his own artillery, and 
 his desertion of what organized troops he had left at the 
 most dangerous hour of the day, 10 o'clock m., as he spe- 
 cifies, but only one brigade, not two, as he says. 
 
 Badeau's map of Shiloh, corrected both by Grant and 
 Sherman, has his (Sherman's) center far east of the Corinth 
 road; while the official map, corrected by the same authori- 
 ties, puts the same centerfive hundredyards or more west of 
 the Corinth road, so that both maps contradict the division 
 report and each other. Badeau's map refuses, or throws 
 back the right or 1st brigade of Sherman's, which was the 
 reverse of the fact. This map also throws the 1st brigade 
 across the Purdy road, where it was not, but where one of 
 its regiments should have been. 
 
 The two extreme right regiments of the army lay directly 
 along the lower Purdy road, which passed between the 
 field and staff quarters on one side and the company quar- 
 ters on the other. Sherman's division was on a line con- 
 cave, instead of convex to the front. 
 
 It is most probably arranged convex on the map to pro- 
 duce the impression that Sherman's center, behind which 
 he had his headquarters, was the most advanced part of 
 the line, as it was, southwest towards Corinth, but not south- 
 ward. 
 
 The camp of General B. M. Prentiss, established ten or 
 twelve days before the battle under General Grant's im- 
 mediate direction, was located with its right over a mile 
 from the left of Sherman. Its center was in latitude near 
 a quarter of a mile south of Shiloh church, or a little south 
 of east from Sherman's center. It had seven regiments 
 scattered without order along a distance of half its proper 
 front,which would have been over three-quarters of a mile. 
 
 On Badeau's map a third brigade, which is a fiction, is 
 thrown in to fill up the vacancy. The left of Prentiss 
 was in nearly a north and south line with the right of Stu- 
 art's (2d) brigade of Sherman's (5th) division, and was about 
 eighty rods south of Stuart, whose three regiments were 
 dumped down anywhere, near a mile from the Ham-
 
 84 SHILOH. 
 
 burgh ford of Lick creek, half a mile from its mouth at 
 the river. It has been asserted, according to Whitelaw, 
 Reed, and others, as an excuse for so exposing and de- 
 taching this brigade, that as Buell's troops were to be 
 posted at Hamburgh, two miles above on the river, the ex- 
 posure would cease when this posting should occur. Now, 
 Buell's advance division reached Savannah, eight miles be- 
 low Pittsburgh, before noon of the 5th. The same after- 
 noon the rebel army was concentrated westwardly, at and 
 from the southeast bend of Lick creek. This bend is 
 about a mile northwest of Hamburgh, on the river, and 
 the same distance nearly due- south of Stuart and Pren- 
 tiss, making the right of the enemy a little over a mile 
 from the river at Hamburgh, according to Badeau's map. 
 So that, if the intention of posting Buell at Hamburgh 
 had been carried out, the rebel army might have been 
 attacked at 4 p. m. (5th) or after, on its right and rear, by 
 Buell, and on its front by our army of 40,000 men, at Shi- 
 loh. Its capture and dispersion would have been inevita- 
 ble. But, if done, this would have been done by Buell's 
 troops, and was not in accordance with the views of Grant, 
 Sherman, and Halleck, in the field, nor the Committee on 
 the Conduct of the War, &c.,.at "Washington. This digres- 
 sion will be repeated whenever opportunity offers, to show 
 how and why the Union troops at Shiloh were slaughtered 
 for personal purposes, after their betrayal into security, 
 for purely or impurely political objects, by direction of 
 those in power.* 
 
 After which digression return is made to the camp. 
 Grant and Sherman, to make the front look respectable, 
 have posted the right of Pivotiss half a mile nearer Shiloh 
 than it was, while the brigade of Stuart, the only body 
 of troops placed anywhere near right on the front, is sep- 
 arated from the left of Prentiss by a gap of half a mile, 
 which did not exist, so as to close the gap towards Shiloh.' 
 
 * The war was cultivated as old hunters cultivate she- wolves, for wolf- 
 scalps for the sum of so much a head or scalp.
 
 INTO CAMP SHILOH. 85 
 
 To cover this fictitious gap there is very cunningly placed 
 a body of troops which was not there till after the battle. 
 
 The very worst fictional feature of this map of Grant's 
 and Sherman's is the poking in of McClernand's left flank 
 between Sherman and Prentiss, over half a mile east from 
 its true position. This is an attempt to close upon paper a 
 gap of over a mile, which did really exist in fact, and which 
 Sherman swears did not exist at all, and did exist; for Buell's 
 troops, which were to be sent to Hamburgh, as they would 
 have been sent, were it not necessary, as he says, to have 
 had a "Shiloh" trial of pluck, So they were left at 
 Savannah, were BuelPs troops. This gap was a bait; the 
 bait took, and took with it 13,000 Union soldiers on the 
 6th and 7th of April, 1862. 
 
 This gap was not only the key-point, but the wide, open 
 highway to the flanks and rear of the Union line; and this 
 is the key Grant says Sherman held into the inside of the 
 line, if line that can be called, without military connection; 
 without connecting roads, front, flank, or rear; without prop- 
 er guards; without defenses, for fear they would invite an 
 attack; without anything especial but the gaps, like the in- 
 tervals between herds of buflfaloes scattered over the west- 
 ern plains, if buffaloes do scatter at all, even when out of 
 danger. The least broken ground on this battle-field 
 
 O O 
 
 of about ten square miles, except that of McClernaiid's 
 1st division, was the line of this front, of about two and 
 a half to three miles from Stuart's left to the extreme 
 right of Sherman's 1st brigade. This extreme right rested 
 on a height one hundred and twenty rods north of Owl 
 creek. There was a rivulet, with swampy borders, be- 
 tween the left regiment, the 53d Ohio, which separated it 
 about two hundred yards from the 57th, on its right. 
 Over this swamp there was no causeway or connection with 
 the center, but by the high land in the rear. The ground 
 "on this line being unbroken by ravines, was easily defen- 
 sible from infantry, and no line ever more required defenses 
 than did this line of Sherman's three right brigades, and de- 
 fenses suflicieiit could have been made by all the troops in
 
 86 SHILOH. 
 
 an hour. Located on the upland, bordering a creek fifty 
 to one hundred and fifty yards in front, with a wooded, 
 bushy border, the line was approachable and was ap- 
 proached within half-musket shot by an an enemy remain- 
 ing almost entirely unseen. Beyond the creek four hun- 
 dred to six hundred yards in front, was a range of low hills, 
 commanding the camp, and forty to sixty feet or more 
 above its level, which level was thirty to forty feet above 
 the creek bottom immediately in front. The left might have 
 been so located as to be completely protected by the Ten- 
 nessee river, but it was so posted as to be turned easily, as it 
 was turned soon after the attack on the 6th. On the ex- 
 treme right, Owl creek might have been used to strengthen 
 that flank, but it was left as a mask for a hostile approach. 
 Had this right flank been attacked, as was Sidney John- 
 son's intent, by even a single brigade, at the same time 
 with the left, and held its ground no better than the 53d 
 Ohio, under Sherman's immediate direction, the destruc- 
 tion of the Union army before noonwould have been inev- 
 itable. 
 
 The same result would have occurred at or about noon, 
 had our right been turned by the rebel flanking force, 
 which for several hours was repelled by the 1st brigade of 
 the 5th division, which brigade was detached under the 
 charge of Sherman's aides, and, deserted by them and him, 
 was left unsupported and alone, iar on the extreme right 
 and front of the Union line of battle. (See Sherman's re- 
 port. 
 
 Such as is above imperfectly described, was the battle- 
 field of Shiloh, selected by Sherman with demoniac sagacity 
 and approved by Grant, before the troops went into camp 
 on the 18th and subsequent days of March, 1862 chosen 
 with as much anxious and personally interested sagacity as 
 marked the patriotic purpose of the great German libera-. 
 tor Arminius (Hermann) in chosing among the forests of the 
 Lippe (DeTmold now) that battle-field for the destruction of 
 Vdrus and his legions, denominated, as one part of it is, the 
 "mord kessel" (" death pot") to the present day.
 
 INTO CAMP SHILOH. 87 
 
 To fix the day of our being ordered into camp the fol- 
 lowing diary extracts may be of interest : 
 
 "PiTTSBUEG LANDING, March 18, 1862. 
 
 "Went to Sherman's boat, the Continental, for orders, and was told to get 
 everything off the boat of the 46th Ohio at once, and to the camp about three 
 miles out near Shiloh church. During the night the 3d Iowa and 81st Ohio 
 bad completely clogged the road, which they did not clear for the teams of 
 the 46th till near 2 p. m. By night the teams were worn out and had to 
 stop. There seems no order or regularity about anything. Every volunteer 
 regiment is allowed to dump its camp down anywhere and in everybody's 
 way." 
 
 "WEDNESDAY, March 19tb, 1862. 
 
 " A damp morning, after rain during the night. At 8.30 a. m. saw Sherman 
 
 on the Hannibal, and reported that the road was clogged by the regiment 
 
 and would soon be impassable. Without waiting for my suggestion that the 
 road should be left open or I could not get out, he said very brusquely that 
 be could not act on my mere ipse dixit; that his engineer had examined and 
 reported on the road, (he had no engineer.) I then suggested that one thousand 
 men on the road towards the proposed camp could put it in passable order in 
 a few hours, and requested that I might be myself permitted to repair the 
 road. He said he would do nothing with it to-day, but might to-morrow, 
 (nothing, however, was done.) Kode out to the camp about noon, stepped off 
 the ground for the ten companies, and had my own tent pitched about sunset."
 
 88 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 
 
 " I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype, 
 Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be." 
 (Sherman to Grant on hit appointment as Lieutenant General.) 
 
 But this much is certain : The rebels were repelled in their last attack on 
 Sunday without any assistance from Buell that turned the scale. (Grant in 
 Badeau. See Grant's report. W. P. G.) 
 
 The first thing that will call the attention of the critical 
 reader in the autobiographies of Grant and Sherman by 
 Badeau and Bowman, is the fact that General Buell is 
 charged with tardiness, while the Army of the Tennessee 
 is in danger of attack and need of assistance. Grant says, 
 in Badeau, page 67, that on the 17th March he removed 
 his headquarters to Savannah. " The attention of the rebels 
 in this part of the country had now become concentrated 
 on Grant's forces. Troops in great numbers were accord- 
 ingly hurried to Corinth, and the eneniy was preparing to 
 assume the offensive. To counteract this, General Buell's 
 command, numbering nearly 40,000 men, and Buell him- 
 self, were ordered from Nashville to the support of General 
 Grant. And there was imminent need of such support. The 
 movements of General Buell, however, were seldom expe- 
 ditious," &c. (Imminent need of support, March 17, 1862?) 
 
 General Sherman informs us, through Colonel Bowman, 
 "that General Halleck had decided to advance up the Ten- 
 nessee river as far as practicable by water then to de- 
 bark on the west bank, attack the enemy at Corinth, and 
 endeavor to cut him off from the east, &c. During the last 
 week of March the Army of the Tennessee only waited for 
 the Army of the Ohio."* General Buell had informed Gen- 
 eral Grant that he would join him before that time. On 
 
 * To march on Corinth.
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HUERIED UP. 89 
 
 the morning of the 6th of April the Army of the Ohio had 
 not yet come. The importance of the crisis was apparent, 
 but Bnell marched his troops with the same deliberation as 
 " if no other army depended on his promptness." There was 
 imminent need of support, such as Buell's, we are told. 
 The importance of the crisis was apparent, says Sherman; 
 but Buell's march was not altered by the consideration 
 that another army depended upon his promptness. The 
 apprehension of danger both by Grant and Sherman must 
 be borne in mind as we proceed, as this danger of attack 
 was denied on the 5th of April, 1862. The point here 
 aimed at by this relator is, that if there was imminent 
 need of Buell's support as early as the 17th March, the 
 need increased in proportion of the increase and proximity 
 of the enemy, and, therefore, it was essential that Buell 
 should have had daily or hourly information of the progress 
 of the enemy, in the increase of his force, and his actual or 
 probable approach to the point of danger. 
 
 Now, if General Grant had been the man described by 
 Sherman as the second Washington, he would have been 
 the first to repel this charge of tardiness, if for no other 
 reason than that Buell, as he admits, saved him and his 
 army from ruin on the 6th day of April, 1862, at Pittsburgh 
 landing. 
 
 It was not the fact that Buell was ordered from Nash- 
 ville to support Grant. This expression, " to support Grant," 
 is made the origin of all the obloquy thrown upon the 
 former, (Buell,) in not supporting Grant in time to prevent 
 the slaughter and disgrace of April 6, 1862. Buell's Army 
 of the Ohio was ordered over to form a junction with the 
 Army of the Tennessee at Savannah, on the east side of 
 the Tennessee river, nine miles below Pittsburgh, which 
 destination was afterwards altered to Hamburgh, on the 
 west side, after, it is said, General C. F. Smith, on General 
 "W. T. Sherman's suggestion, had fixed upon Pittsburgh 
 landing as the best point at which to organize the army to 
 advance on Corinth. The two armies were to be united at 
 Savannah, and when ready to advance with adequate men
 
 90 SHILOH. 
 
 and means, were to be under the immediate command of 
 Halleck, as happened after the battle. 
 
 Halleck was most anxiously striving for the general 
 command of the Union army, vacated on the llth or 12th 
 of March by the relief of McClellan. 
 
 Sherman, stung by his having been deemed unequal to 
 the situation in Kentucky, was madly, but not insanely 
 striving for promotion. But, as will be apparent, with 
 that craftiness which is generally imputed to unfortunates 
 of an unsound mind. Grant was striving, as usual, for any 
 thing chance or Providence might throw in his way, in- 
 difterent alike to the intrigues of Sherman or Halleck, so 
 that "profits might accrug" to this "Ancient Pistol" of modern 
 war. All, more or less schemers, were alike striving for in- 
 dividual interest entirely, and were, perhaps, the most suc- 
 cessful triumvirate that ever engaged in a combination for 
 the advancement of each other, with regard to nothing else. 
 
 An actual design will be proven by comparing the state- 
 ments above quoted from Bowman and Badeau, on Sherman 
 and Grant, with the actual circumstances existing, and to 
 exist, before, at, and after the battle of Shiloh. This com- 
 mentary is not intended to be, it is repeated, so much a nar- 
 rative of events, as the exposition of concealments and the 
 correction of fallacies and fictions, indulged in for selfish 
 purposes by the principal actors and their coadjutors in 
 and out of the army, especially the last. 
 
 It will have been seen by the above or previous corres- 
 pondence, that General Buell would long before have been 
 up the Tennessee, as far as practicable, or to Florence, but 
 for Halleck's ulterior designs as to his own promotion, and 
 to keeping Buell inactive. The whole tending, and intend- 
 ing, to lengthten the war. Granfpretends that there was 
 imminent need of BuelPs support on the 17th of March: 
 perhaps from his knowledge that Johnson was forming the 
 junction at Corinth, wanted by Halleck. But he tells Hal- 
 leck there is no immediate danger, whatever there might 
 have been, here is an extract from his dispatch to Halleck 
 of April 5, 1862, from which it is seen that he says:
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 91 
 
 " I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made 
 upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." 
 
 Sherman writes to Grant the same day 
 
 " All is quiet along my lines now ; we are in the act of exchanging cavalry, 
 according to your orders." 
 
 And he adds: 
 
 " I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day but some picket firing." 
 
 It will have been seen by the assertion of Sherman, through 
 Bowman,* that Halleck intended to advance up the Tennes- 
 see AS far as practicable by water. Halleck had said that he so 
 intended, (as we have seen,) to advance as high as Florence, 
 not to cut the army ofl' from the East, as Sherman says, 
 but to cut Johnson off' from the West, which, against Buell's 
 and McClellan's urgency, he concluded not to do, for reasons 
 above intimated, so that the above statement is clearly fal- 
 lacious. 
 
 1st. In impressing the idea that Halleck did advance as 
 far as practicable up the Tennessee; t and, 2d, that the object 
 was to prevent troops going East instead of West ; while 
 not a word is said about the failure to occupy Florence, 
 which silence is most significant of the intention and wish, 
 both of Halleck and Sherman, that the rebel junction 
 should take place, so as to provoke a battle outside of 
 Buell's command. "During the last week of March, says 
 Sherman, the Army of the Ohio only waited for the Army 
 of the Tennessee" to march and fight of course. Yet, as 
 will be seen, Sherman reproved Buckland, on the 4th of 
 April, for capturing prisoners, whereby an attack might 
 have been brought on before the Army of the Tennessee 
 was ready. (When was it ever ready?) 
 
 Sherman also says in his report that many of the troops 
 were unprovided with ammunition, (could they then ad- 
 vance?) There is official evidence that no intrenching 
 tools could be had up to the day of the battle. Could he ad- 
 vance without axes? That Prentiss wanted five regiments 
 to make up his division, and that regiments intended for 
 
 * See extract from Bowman, Sherman, &c.
 
 92 SHILOH. 
 
 the march on Corinth arrived on the day of the battle, and 
 many of them not for ten or more days afterwards. The 
 army, Sherman knew, was not to march till General Hal- 
 leek came up, and further, that on the 28th General Hal- 
 leek writes that large reinforcements are being sent to 
 General Grant. 
 
 Beyond all this, General Halleck, on the 5th of April, 
 dispatches to General Buell "that he is right about concen- 
 trating at Waynesboro, thirty miles west of Savannah, thus 
 causing delay of one or more days, and says, as usual, that 
 future movements must depend on those of the enemy, and 
 also that he will not be able to leave St. Louis till the 7th or 
 8th of April, all of which must of course have been known 
 to General Sherman and Grant, as still more cause of 
 delay before the army could march. 
 
 Buell, he says, had informed General Grant that he 
 " would join him before the 1st of April." This statement 
 is utterly gratuitous, and little suits the veracity and honor 
 of a soldier. Grant does not claim that he himself fixed a 
 time for Buell to be up. On the 1st of April, Buell dis- 
 patches to Halleck that he expects to concentrate at Savan- 
 nah on the 6th and 7th. This is the first evidence of any 
 time fixed on by Buell, and Grant never named a day for 
 Buell's arrival, as will be seen, before the 7th and 8th; 
 while, as will be proven, he expected the battle of Shiloh 
 would have been fought without Buell, before that date, 
 from the 3d to the 7th. Again, says Sherman, on the 6th of 
 April, "the Army of the Ohio had not yet come." Now, 
 Sherman knew that BuelPs advance division reached Sa- 
 vannah before noon of the 5th, and thus charges General 
 Grant himself with dereliction for not telling him of Buell's 
 arrival, on the evening of that day, the 5th, when he was 
 at Sherman's quarters at Shiloh, late in the afternoon, and 
 remained there, or at his boat at the landing, till near mid- 
 night, purposely to avoid meeting Buell, who had requested 
 a meeting that day, April 5th, with Grant, at Savannah, 
 where he (Buell) arrived at 5 p. m., to find Grant not there. 
 Instructions, says Sherman, had been sent by General
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 93 
 
 Grant to expedite Buell's advance and push on to Pittsburgh. 
 The reverse was the case, and Sherman must have known 
 that, expecting an attack, as he swears he did every hour after 
 the afternoon of the 3d of April, Grant had not only not 
 countermanded an order sent Nelson, of Buell's army, 
 March 30th, not to he at Savannah before the 7th, but that, 
 on the 4th of April, knowing Nelson to be twenty miles 
 from Savannah, he sent him word that he need not be up 
 till the 8th of April, as he could not ferry him across 
 the river till that time. " The importance of the crisis 
 was apparent," says Sherman, for Johnson would natur- 
 ally seek to strike Grant before Buell's arrival, and yet he 
 was a party to the attempt, at least twice, to keep Buell 
 back till long after the blow should be struck. Buell, he 
 says further, marched his troops as if no other army de- 
 pended on his promptitude that is, depended for safety 
 from defeat, of course, on him, (Buell.) 
 
 What, then, must be thought of these repeated efforts 
 to keep Buell back till after the expected attack ? How 
 could Buell suppose danger possible, when his advance 
 division, under Nelson, was first informed, March 30th, 
 that he was not wanted at Savannah till April 7th ; and 
 again, on the 4th of April, when twenty miles off, that he 
 need not be up till the 8th following, or three to five days 
 after ? Sherman's own evidence, on oath, shows that he 
 expected the attack on the 3d, and the worst deception 
 of all for the public, is the statement that Buell caused in- 
 tervals of six miles to be observed between (the heads of) 
 his divisions: a soldierly arrangement which Sherman 
 habitually neglected, and consequently on a march habitu- 
 ally had his troops in confusion. 
 
 Let us examine the wisdom of this arrangement : Say 
 there were 7,000 men in each division. These would re- 
 quire one and a half miles in line of battle, and over three 
 miles on a route march; and the artillery and trains of an 
 army will, in general, require as much space as the troops, 
 and far more, with such a commander as Sherman or Grant. 
 There was not, however, an average of over 6,000 men, if
 
 94 SHTLOH. 
 
 that, to a division, and the baggage was cut down below 
 the average, so that the six miles so invidiously introduced, 
 as an obvious means of delay, would be barely sufficient 
 to avoid confusion. 
 
 There are in a space of one page and two lines of this 
 third chapter of Bowman, on Shiloh, at least fifteen state- 
 ments such as the above, some of which are noted else- 
 where in this treatise, especially that easily exploded fal- 
 lacy that " Sherman merely made a feint of landing at 
 Eastport." This may have also been done ; but, as has 
 been stated, he landed a few miles below, and, marching 
 out in the rain near four miles, effected nothing more than 
 to fatigue and consign hundreds of men to the sick list 
 to endanger the whole division of 8,000 men, and, as his 
 admirer, Draper, says, " to occasion the drowning of many 
 mtn and horses in the swollen streams. 7 ' This condition of 
 the streams he also knew would exist when he started, at 
 2 a. m., on a fifteen or twenty mile trip, the water then 
 rising eight inches an hour. 
 
 This characteristic piece of strategy has thus been hushed 
 up, laid on C. F. Smith by Grant, or made a triumphant 
 success by Greeley in the destruction of Burnsville or Cor- 
 rinth, it is hard to say which, from the philosopher's syn- 
 tax. There are, in this chapter of Sherman's on Shiloh, 
 from pages 47 to 57 inclusive, which, in the above-stated 
 proportion, say on 12 pages, would contain 180 fallacies, 
 suppressions, or fictions. So that, whatever may be this 
 commander's reputation as a tactition and strategist, it is a 
 mere tifle to his archery practice with the long- bow. 
 
 The following utterly fallacious, and indeed fictitious, 
 statement of General Grant should not escape attention, 
 though noted elsewhere : 
 
 " At the battle of Shiloh General Sherman held, on the first day, with raw 
 troops, the key-point of the landing. It is no disparagement to any other 
 officer to pay, that I do not believe there was another division commander of 
 the skill and experience to have done it." (No one did do it.) 
 
 To his individual efforts I am indebted to the success of 
 that battle. "Was the 6th a success? W. P. G." (U. S. 
 Grant.)
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 95 
 
 Kow, not to he in the least critical or disparaging, where 
 these " two mighty warriors" (see sensational history,) are 
 concerned, it may as well be explained, that the key-point 
 of any battle line or any position aimed at beyond it, is 
 that point of approach where the line is easiest pierced, or 
 turned, or entered, for a special purpose. This key-point at 
 Shiloh, should have been the Corinth road at Shiloh church, 
 on Sherman's center; but Sherman threw away this key- 
 point, by leaving a gap of over a mile on the left of his left 
 center brigade, near half a mile to the left of the Shiloh 
 church. This became then not only a key to a closed gate, 
 but an open highway, through which the enemy could 
 march in column by division of a mile front to the flanks and 
 rear of three division of the Union army. There is evidence 
 in this treatise, and in Sherman's report, that near this gap 
 in front of his left center brigade he was fired on from the 
 thicket in front, his orderly killed, and he instantly and 
 considerately rode rapidly to the rear. The rear, be it un- 
 derstood, being the usual proper place for a commander in 
 action ; but he did not stop in rear of this left regiment now 
 doubly left which stood its ground against the example 
 from 10 to 20 minutes, and then, making discretion the bet- 
 ter part of valor, not only followed the example, but for the 
 time far surpassed the examplar, by a rout in retreat to the 
 landing very early in the fight. Such is the manner in 
 which, as thousands can prove who were present, Sherman 
 held the key-point to the landing, to which the key had 
 been lost the first day and hour of the battle. As to the 
 results of skill and experience exhibited, the results are the 
 best evidence, as even the benevolent and philosophic 
 Greeley had it impressed on his editorial conviction that 
 Sherman's whole division was scattered at 8 a. rn.,in which 
 most other writers agree, while they make him the great 
 Horatius at the bridge, of the battle, on the above statement 
 of Grant, quoted from Hal lack, who was thereby made 
 commander-in-chief for this single stretch of his long-bow. 
 
 As to Sherman's individual efforts in saving the day, 
 reference need only be had to his report, from which it ap-
 
 96 SHILOH. 
 
 pears he never left his position on the right and rear of Mc- 
 Clernand, (to which point he was driven pell-mell at 9 or 10 
 a. m.,) till after the second day's battle. That on the 6th 
 he was driven hack to Snake-creek bridge, near three 
 miles north of Shiloh and near two miles west of the laud- 
 ing. So that, by his own report, he could have done noth- 
 ing in saving the day with the fragments of a few disorganized 
 and disheartened regiments, which did little more than fall 
 
 O ' 
 
 back, when threatened, till the end of the battle. But be- 
 yond all this, here is General Grant's own report, which, 
 in a little over a year, he seems to have utterly forgotten, 
 
 or thought worthless : 
 
 [Extract,] 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF WEST TEKNESSEB, 
 
 " PITTSBURGH, April 9, 1862. 
 
 * * * "The enemy having forced the center line to fall back nearly 
 half way from their camps to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a 
 desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession 
 of the landing, transports, &c. Just at this moment the advance of Major 
 General Buell's column, a part of the division of General Nelson, arrived. 
 The two generals named both being present, [when,] an advance was imme- 
 diately made upon the point of attack, the enemy was soon driven back." 
 
 Now where "tell us where" are the personal efforts 
 of General Sherman, out of cannon-shot as he was, at the 
 Snake-creek bridge, waiting for General L. Wallace to 
 come up; and, if Sherman is to be credited, he was, at the 
 time of Nelson's arrival, concluding, with the aid of General 
 Grant, that there had not been "much of a shower after all ;" 
 and inasmuch as Lew. Wallace had saved Grant from defeat 
 at Donelson, why should he not do the same next day at 
 Shiloh? Happy and fortunate Lewis Wallace, of the civic 
 crown, who, having had the presumption to attack, with- 
 out orders, in Grant's absence, for seven or eight hours at 
 Donelsou, was fortunatety preserved on the 6th for the 
 battle of the 7th. That day, on Sherman's right, he, with 
 McClernand on Sherman's left, literally, as it were, carried 
 along Sherman and his panicked troops through the fight 
 on our right flank. For this and other acts of good soldier- 
 ship at Donelson and Shiloh, these generals were merci- 
 fully allowed to command the reserve "in the siege;"
 
 HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 97 
 
 perhaps to pick up the shells and stragglers thrown or 
 driven back from that tremendous advance upon, and siege 
 of Corinth, where, as Sherman testifies, Halleck won a 
 victory as brilliant and important as any recorded in his- 
 tory. And who shall doubt such testimony, on authority 
 as undoubtable as this commentary has shown Sherman's 
 evidence to be or not to be that is the question? 
 
 P. S. Some one of the earliest earls of Pembroke, Henry 
 IPs time, perhaps, (ittas^wwBPfiiMprfiill rnbU^WMPWItewL 
 
 was surnamed Strougbow, from his bold bearing in 
 battle. 
 
 If in the approaching imperium simply a question of 
 time there shall be instituted a dukedom for a " Due de 
 Longebowe," which of these commanders, on their own evi- 
 dence, should bear the palm, or wear the strawberry leaf 
 on his shoulder-strap or collar? 
 7
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 VII. 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 
 
 " General Sherman asked me what was up. I answered, that I bad just 
 met and fought the advance of Beauregard's army ; that he was advancing 
 on us. Next morning, the 5th, the 5th Ohio cavalry were removed to the 
 4th division, General Hurlbut." (Major Bicker, 5th 0. V. C.) 
 
 "General Sherman's manner indicated that he was not pleased, as he asked 
 what I had been about. I replied, that I had accidentally got into a little 
 fight, and there were some of the fruits of it, pointing to the prisoners. 'He 
 answered, that I might have drawn the whole army into a fight before they 
 \rere ready." (BucHancCs Skirmish, April 4, 1862.) 
 
 "While great stress is, and perhaps ought to be, laid by 
 General Sherman on the fact, that the importance of the 
 crisis was apparent from and after the junction of Johnson 
 and Beauregard at Corinth, about the 20th March, 1862, 
 it is stated that, during the last week of March the Army 
 of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio, 
 and at the same time great pains are taken to show 
 that the movements of Buell were seldom expeditious. 
 That, as early as the 16th of March, Hal leek had in- 
 formed Grant that Buell was in motion towards the army 
 at Savannah, Tennessee, and that it took Buell from the 
 19th of March to the 6th of April, or nineteen days, to 
 inarch 90 miles ; while the writer knew that the march of 
 the 4th (Nelson's) division had been made over this same 
 ground in six days, and Buell himself had ridden it in two 
 days from the evening of the 3d to the evening of the 
 5th of April, 1862. 
 
 A great effort is also made to prove that while the Army 
 of the Ohio was anxiously expected, exceeding pains were 
 taken to hurry it up; the whole showing, however, being 
 that Grant sent word to McCook, on the 31st March, as 
 follows: "I have been looking for your column anxiously 
 for several days." But no evidence is adduced to prove
 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 99 
 
 that any message to that effect ever reached the com- 
 mander of that army or McCook, or that he was ever ad- 
 vised of any possible immediate danger to the Army of 
 the Tennessee, as he studiously was not so advised. 
 
 The statements of Badeau to conceal facts, without seem- 
 ing to do so, evince much ingenuity, calculated to puzzle 
 and perplex even a professional reader, without due ex- 
 amination. Take, for instance, the following: Grant, he 
 says, had made his arrangen^ents to move his head- 
 quarters from Savannah, Tennessee, to Pittsburgh, eight 
 or nine miles above, when a message was brought to him, 
 dated the 4th of April, requesting Grant to remain at Sa- 
 vannah on the 5th, as he (Buell) would arrive there on 
 that day. "I shall be in Savannah myself to-morrow, with 
 perhaps two divisions," said Buell. "Can I meet you 
 there?" Grant replied, on the 5th : "Your dispatch just 
 received. I will be here to meet you to-morrow, (the 6th.) 
 
 The enemy at and near Corinth are probably from 60,000 
 to 80,000." "Buell, however," says Badeau, "did not 
 arrive till the 6th, or, if otherwise, did not make it known 
 to his superior, and G-rant remained to meet him." Now, on 
 the 68th page, behind this statement, we are told that on 
 the 3d of April Grant was finally able to inform Halleck 
 " that a dispatch from the telegraphic operator is just in. 
 He states that General Nelson, commanding Buell's fore- 
 most division, is in sight. The advance will probably 
 arrive on Saturday, the 5th;" but there is ample evidence 
 to prove that Grant did not remain at Savannah all day on 
 the 5th, but avoided meeting Buell that day. 
 
 It is notorious that on the morning of the 4th, General 
 Nelson, then twenty miles from Savannah, received a mes- 
 sage, stating that he need not hurry his march, and that he 
 could not be ferried over the river before Tuesday, the 8th. 
 
 This message of Grant's may have occasioned some 
 delay. But Nelson, an active and impatient commander, 
 did not pay full attention to the dispatch, and his advance, 
 under General Arnmen, reached Savannah before noon of 
 the 5th of April, 1862.
 
 100 SHILOH. 
 
 Both these divisions, stated by Buell, if hurried, could 
 have heen up during the 4th, and McCook's that or next 
 night at furthest. 
 
 Crittenden did not get in till on the 6th, at 10 a. m., ;ind 
 then got no orders to go on, but went up of his own accord. 
 
 This is the anxious way in which Buell's troops were 
 hurried up. Grant, meantime, had information, that the 
 main body of the enemy left Corinth the night of the 2d 
 and 3d of April, and could, as expected, have been at 
 Shiloh the afternoon of the 3d, had he marched as fast as 
 Grant, the previous February, had done from Fort Henry 
 to Fort Donelson twelve miles in half a day. So says his 
 autobiograplier, Badeau. Though the rebel march was 
 delayed till afternoon of the 3d, there had been since 
 April 1st a large rebel force at Monterey, five miles on the 
 way to Corinth. Sherman has testified under oath that 
 there was reason to expect an attack on the 3d, and there 
 is ample evidence to prove that he thought there was 
 sufficient force in his front to attack him on the 4th, as 
 follows : 
 
 General R. P. Buckland, an especial friend of Generals 
 Sherman and Grant, in describing a picket skirmish on the 
 4th of April, 1862, says: " Major Ricker, of the 5th Ohio 
 cavalry, came up with his cavalry, and we joined in pursuit. 
 We pursued about a mile, when the enemy commenced 
 firing artillery at us. "We discovered that he had a large 
 force of cavalry and artillery." 
 
 " We therefore concluded to march back to camp with as 
 little delay as possible. When we reached the picket line 
 General Sherman was there, with several regiments in line 
 of battle. As I rode up to General Sherman, at the head 
 of my column, with about fifteen prisoners close behind 
 me, the General asked me what I had been doing. His man- 
 ner indicated that he was not pleased. I replied that I had 
 unintentionally got into a little fight, and there were some 
 of the fruits of it, pointing to the prisoners. He answered 
 " that I might have drawn the whole army into a fight before 
 they were ready, and ordered me to take my men to camp."
 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 101 
 
 (Yet he (Sherman) swears there was no danger of attack 
 the 4th or 5th.) 
 
 Here, then, on the 4th of April, is a clear admission on 
 the part of General Sherman that the enemy, marching 
 from Corinth early the morning of the 3d, which he thought 
 was the fact, were in full force before him at about 3 or 4 
 p. m. of the 4th.-/And an admission, too, of not being ready 
 for an attack, upsetting his assertion in his autobiography 
 by Bowman, that, during the last week of March, the army 
 of the Tennessee only waited for the army of the Ohio to 
 advance upon the rebel force at Corinth. Now, however, 
 it appears that, so far from being ready to advance on the 
 4th of April, he was not ready to meet an attack in his own 
 lines, if these words to Buckland are worthy of credit. 
 Having given such evidence of what the commanders, Gen- 
 erals Grant and Sherman, thought of a probable attack on 
 the 5th of May, let it be shown what precautions were taken 
 to meet it. 
 
 Major Ricker, mentioned above by General Buckland, 
 noticing Gen. Bucklaud's statement, writes as follows in 
 the Cincinnati Gazette, April, 1871: 
 
 "General Buckland refers to the 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry in his article 
 in the Cincinnati Gazette of April 7, 1871. I propose to give a statement of the 
 part taken by the 2d battalion 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry, for a few days 
 before the battle of Shiloh. From the 24th of March till the 4 4th of April, 
 the 2d battalion had almost daily skirmishes with the rebel scouts and pick- 
 ets. About 3 o'clock p. in. April 4th, 1 received an order from General Sher- 
 man to go to the front, with one hundred and fifty men, to look for a major, 
 lieutenant, and five or six men, who had wandered outside the lines and were 
 lost or captured." 
 
 After relating the occurrence of a sharp skirmish, he 
 proceeds : 
 
 "Colonel Buckland soon came up with his command on the double-quick. 
 After consultation, we inarched back for camp, the 5th Ohio volunteer cav- 
 alry bringing off eleven prisoners. When we got back to the picket lines, we 
 found General Sherman there, with infantry and artillery in line of battle, 
 caused by the heavy firing of the enemy on us. General Sherman asked me 
 what was up. 1 told him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's 
 army; that he was advancing on us. General Sherman said it could not be 
 possible. Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations 
 at Corinth and attack us in ours. 
 
 " On Saturday the 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry moved their camp to the 
 4th division, General Hurlbut. and the 4th Illinois cavalry took our places 
 with General Sherman's division."
 
 102 SHILOH. 
 
 Major Ricker does not state that the 4th Ohio* volunteer 
 cavalry were moved very early Saturday morning, and that 
 the 4th Illinois cavalry did not come in till late in the eve- 
 ening of Saturday, the 5th, so that the Union front had no 
 cavalry scouts out that day or night, the 5th. 
 
 The object of removing Ricker's cavalry was of course 
 to quiet the suspicions of the enemy as to our alertness on 
 the one hand, and prevent the Union troops from getting 
 information on the other. But riot only the cavalry scouts, 
 but three out of the four batteries of Sherman's artillery, 
 were moved back on the morning of the 5th. Two of 
 these batteries were returned at dark to a point eighty 
 rods in rear of Sherman's center; but that of the second 
 brigade, detached some two miles to the left, was not 
 returned at all, though the position of the brigade was 
 commanded by the heights above Lick creek, from which 
 this brigade bore the brunt of an artillery attack the morn- 
 ing of the battle. So that, so far as guards and defenses 
 were concerned no army was ever more completely ex- 
 posed to attack than this Army of the Tennessee, till at- 
 tacked at 6 or 7 o'clock the next day, 6th of April, 1862, 
 utterly unprepared. Add to this the indications of a bat- 
 tle were never more absolute, whatever the rebel writers 
 may have said about concealing the approach of the attack. 
 At 7 a. m. of the 5th, the pickets opposite the right center 
 were driven back in three brigades, and the picket stations 
 occupied by the rebel advance less than a mile from the 
 front of the camp. Early in the afternoon several pieces 
 of rebel artillery were seen at a picket station of the 1st 
 brigade, not three-quarters of a mile in front of the right 
 center brigade; and all these facts, reported to General 
 Sherman, must have been reported to Grant during the 
 course of the afternoon. One of the rebel cavalry, wounded 
 on the 4th, and dying during the night, made known that 
 we were to be attacked on the 5th, while at the same 
 time many of the regiments had little or no ammunition 
 for small arms ; and the artillery, as next day proved, was 
 yet worse off. Add to this, the camp hospitals were full of
 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 103 
 
 men ill with diarrhea, and men unfit for duty were num- 
 bered by the thousand in more than one division, while no 
 regular hospitals had been established at the river. No 
 intrenching tools, and especially no axes, were to be had, 
 and the colonel of the 46th Ohio, when his regular requi- 
 sition was reduced and the reduced number not forthcom- 
 ing, ordered one hundred from Paducah, arid the night 
 before the battle got twenty-Jive all, he was told, that could 
 be found at Padncah. One hundred axes, properly used for 
 one hour before the attack, would have prevented or de- 
 feated it. On such cobweb strands did the lives, and limbs, 
 and liberty of so many thousands hang. 
 
 Yet with a knowledge of all these facts, and expecting 
 an attack, known by General Grant to be imminent at any 
 moment, from the myriads of foes gathered and gath- 
 ering within drum-beat of his front, he dispatches repeat- 
 edly to Halleck on the 5th, as follows : 
 
 " SAVANNAH, April 5, 1862. 
 " Major General H. W. HALLECK, 
 
 St. Louis, Missouri: 
 
 " The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points 
 east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt. The 
 number at these places seems continually to change. The number of the 
 enemy at Corinth and within supporting distance of it cannot be far from 
 60,000 men. Information obtained through deserters places their force west 
 at 200,000. One division of Buell's column arrived yesterday, (the 4th.) Gen- 
 eral Buell will be here himself to-day. U. S. GRANT, Major General." 
 
 The above seems plainly intended to deceive General Ilal- 
 leck. The number of troops (200,000) is intended to keep 
 Halleck away till there are more reinforcements, and the 
 statement about the arrival of Buell's troops the day be- 
 fore is to quiet his apprehensions of an attack without a 
 sufficient Union force. The statement about the troops 
 at and about Corinth is plainly fallacious, as can be proven 
 from a score of sources: he (Grant) knowing these Corinth 
 troops to be within striking distance of his own front. < 
 Claiming to know all about troops at Jackson and Hum- 
 bold, Tennessee, forty to sixty miles off, he cannot deny 
 intimate knowledge of everything at Corinth, but one- 
 third that distance from his front.
 
 104 SHILOH. 
 
 Here is another dispatch to Halleck, based on one from 
 Sherman, who says: 
 
 " PlTTSBUEGH LANDING, TENNESSEE, 
 
 "April 5, 1862. 
 "General GRANT. 
 
 " SIR: All JB quiet along my lines now. We are in the act of exchanging 
 cavalry, according to your orders, and I will send you ten prisoners of war, 
 &c. W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier General." 
 
 " Your note yesterday received. I have no doubt that nothing will occur 
 to-day but some picket firing, &c. I will not be drawn out far, unless with 
 certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on 
 our position. SHERMAN." 
 
 It is to be presumed that with this dispatch at hand 
 Grant telegraphs to Halleck the third time : 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, 
 
 " SAVANNAH, April 5, 1862. 
 " Major General H. W. HALLECK, 
 
 " St. Louis, Missouri : 
 
 " Just as my letter of yesterday was finished, notes from General McCler- 
 nand and Sherman's assistant adjutant general were received, stating that 
 our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable 
 force. 1 immediately went up, but found all quiet, &c. They had with 
 them three pieces of artillery and infantry. How much, cannot of course be 
 estimated. I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being 
 made upon UP, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. 
 
 "General Nelson's division nas arrived; the other two of Buell's column 
 
 will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them 
 
 to Hamburgh, some four miles above Pittsburgh, when they all get here. 
 
 Colonel McPherson has gone wit-i an escort to-day to examine the defensi- 
 
 bility of the ground about Hamburgh, &c.* AS 
 
 " U. S. GRANT, Major General." 
 
 Now, to prove what must be more than once repeated, 
 that Grant was deceiving Halleck, by collusion or other- 
 wise, as to occurrences at Pittsburgh, and actually evading 
 Buell, with the same purpose an attack before Buell came 
 up and before repeating the occurrences of Saturday, the 
 5th of April, recurrence must be had to Badeau's History 
 of Grant, page 71, in which it is stated that Buell did not 
 arrive till the 6th; or, if otherwise, did not make it known 
 to his superior, and Grant remained to meet him. And in a 
 note on the same page is found the statement, that " BuelPs 
 official report states that he arrived at Savannah on the 
 5th, but Grant was not notified of this, and, consequently, 
 had no suspicion of the fact" (because he was away.) 
 
 * McPherson was driven back by the rebel cavalry, which was known to 
 Grant at the time of this dispatch.
 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 105 
 
 The very repetition of this statement is plainly intended 
 to hide the fact that Grant evaded Buell, and this evasion 
 of him was necessary to the intention of provoking and 
 meeting the expected attack before the knowledge of his 
 (BuelPs) arrival should reach the enemy, and before Buell, 
 aware of the danger, should demand that his troops should 
 be sent forward to Hamburgh, or Pittsburgh, or take them 
 forward himself. 
 
 Why put off meeting Buell till the 6th, and perplex the 
 reader by stating, as Badeau states on page 71, that, while 
 writing to Buell on the 5th that he would meet him on 
 the 6th, he nevertheless remains (see Badeau) to meet 
 him on the 5th, and in the same sentence states that Buell 
 did not arrive till the 6ch, knowing the reverse, as he 
 did. 
 
 The whole matter of Badeau's History from page 68, 
 where he indicates danger to Grant, March 17th, to page 
 75, where he announces the attack by Johnson, April 6th, 
 is confusedly mixed, without seeming connection or con- 
 tinuation, and is most ingeniously arranged, so as to per- 
 plex even a professional reader of more than usual patience 
 and research. One main object of this commentary is to 
 unfold the design of this medley, intended to cover the effort 
 to deceive Halleck by agreement perhaps, and keep him 
 back at St. Louis; to keep Buell back at Columbia or 
 "Wayuesboro', and, unaware of danger, to keep all knowl- 
 edge of Buell's arrival out of reach of Grant's own troops 
 and the enemy: all of which was most skillfully and for- 
 tunately done till the object was accomplished, which was 
 an attack by the enemy, which Buell's troops should not 
 be present to repel, but in the repulse of which, if neces- 
 sary, they might be made available, as they were for the 
 salvation of the Army of the Tennessee in its last extrem- 
 ity .'^NSut even this last intention was only adopted, as will 
 be seen, when it was found that, against repeated orders or 
 advice, Buell's advance troops were at Savannah, as the 
 whole might have been, in full time not only to have taken 
 part in a battle on the 6th, but, if sent to Hamburgh on 
 
 /A
 
 106 SHILOH. 
 
 the 5th or 6th, to have captured or dispersed the enemy. 
 This must be repeatedly stated. 
 
 Going back to page 70, it will be seen that Grant's head- 
 quarters remained at Savannah after sending up McCler- 
 nand and Smith's divisions, "because," says Badeau, "from 
 there he could more easily communicate with Buell, whose 
 deliberate movements had not yet brought him within sup- 
 porting distance of the Army of the Tennessee." 
 
 Grant was very anxious to hurry up Buell, and Buell 
 was very slack in hurrying up, is the plain English of what 
 is here intended by Badeau or by Grant, for they are one 
 in this matter. 
 
 On page 68 of Badeau, the dates are brought down to the 
 3d of April. We are told that on the 19th of March 
 Grant wrote to Buell: "There is every reason to suppose 
 that the rebels have a large force at Corinth and many at 
 other points on the road towards Decatur." But he does 
 not tell Buell that these troops on the road towards Deca- 
 tur are A. S. Johnson's troops from Decatur, gathering 
 at Corinth. 
 
 And this note of the 19th is the last communication 
 spoken of by Badeau from Grant to Buell, till the answer 
 to Buell's note of the 4th of April. 
 
 Nor does he tell Buell that he is, as Badeau says he was, 
 apprehensive of an attack on Pittsburgh, and is concentrat- 
 ing his own troops at that threatened locality. 
 
 On the 26th of March he tells Halleck, "my scouts are 
 just in with a letter from General Buell, who is yet on the 
 east side of Duck river, detained bridge building;" and 
 the next day, the 27th, he dispatches again to Halleck: "I 
 have no news of any portion of Buell's command being 
 this side of Columbia," but says nothing of danger to the 
 army. On the 31st he writes to Halleck: "Two soldiers 
 from the head of McCook's command came in this evening: 
 some of this command crossed Duck river on the 24th and 
 established guards eight miles out that night.* On the 
 
 *An officer of Sherman's division kept a diary, and on this 31st March, 
 the entry is: "Further indications through the pickets that an attack is im- 

 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 107 
 
 same day, the 31st, he (Grant) sent word to McCook, (not 
 Bnell,) "I have been looking for your column anxiously for 
 several days." But no dispatch is mentioned by Badeau 
 to Buell or kelson two or three days before the 31st, and 
 our biographer may not have found on Grant's order- 
 book such a dispatch, where likely it was never entered or 
 was verbal. Let there be a pause in this relation to say 
 here, that before the 31st Grant must have heard of the 
 concentration of A. S. Johnson's troops at Corinth, whence 
 it had been understood at Shiloh they were to march on 
 Pittsbugh the 1st of April, 1862, or account of Buell's ap- 
 proach. No such anxiety as that expressed to McCook, as 
 above stated, is intimated to Buell- or Halleck. On the con- 
 trary, immediately after the dispatch to Halleck, of the 
 27th, stating no news of Buell this side of Columbia, he 
 sends a message to Buell or Nelson, in substance as follows : 
 
 "SAVANNAH. March 28, 1862. 
 "General NELSON, 
 
 " of Buell's advance Division. 
 
 "You will so time your march to Savannah, Tennessee, as to reach there 
 not before Monday, the 7th of April, as the crowd of troops arriving and to 
 be cared for will make it inconvenient to pay proper attention to so large a 
 body of troops before that date. U. S. GRANT." 
 
 It may have also been arranged with Halleck, as a fur- 
 ther precaution, to keep Buell back at Waynesboro. For, on 
 the 20th, Halleck writes thatBuell is " marching on Waynes- 
 boro," there to concentrate and march thence to Hainbugh, 
 four miles above Pittsburg. "From that point to Corinth 
 the road is good, and a junction can be formed with the 
 troops from Pittsburgh at almost any point." (Grant to 
 Halleck, Savannah, April 5, 1862.) 
 
 It was intended by Nelson not to reach Savannah before 
 the 7th, and Buell expected a dispatch at Waynesboro to 
 stop him there. But by some fatality Nelson had just 
 passed Waynesboro when Buell got there, and, meeting no 
 
 minent, and though I don't fear the result, a sudden attack, if violently 
 made, asit will be, may throw us back for months. The men are discouraged 
 at our delay here, and the close vicinity of the rebel scouts, which should be 
 driven off. Sherman is inviting an attack, for which we are unprepared, but 
 which I hope may occur."
 
 108 SHILOH. 
 
 dispatch from Halleck, Buell pushed on to Savannah, reach- 
 ing there at 5 p. m. on the 5th. 
 
 Grant's combinations to defeat 100,000 rebels with less 
 than half their supposed number had miscarried. The 
 affair, as sailors say, had missed stays; and, sa}'s Colonel 
 Adam Badeau, 
 
 " On the 3d of April Grant was finally able to inform Halleck that, accord- 
 ing to the telegraphic operator, General Nelson, commanding Buell's fore- 
 most division, is in sight. (From what station ?) The advance will arrive, 
 probably, on Saturday, April 5th," (when Grant kept purposely away. W. 
 P. G.) 
 
 Now, here is a blunder, real or intended, calculated to 
 befog the casual and perplex or irritate the professional 
 reader. Why say a body of troops in sight on the 3d, or 
 even the 4th of April, will only "probably arrive on the 
 5th," when so anxiously expected? The country about 
 Savannah, in the direction of Waynsboro, was level and 
 wooded, and a mile was probably the limit of vision in that 
 direction. The inference may be, what was probably the 
 fact, that Nelson might act upon the message from Grant of 
 the 4th, that he need not hasten his march; and there was, 
 therefore, room for such a probability. But this dispatch, at 
 least, proves, outside the message to Nelson, that no effort 
 was made to have Nelson up in time to defend the attack 
 Grant and Sherman knew was intended to be made on or 
 about the 5th, and of which, with no other evidence than 
 that of Bucklarid and Kicker, above stated, Sherman on the 
 4th felt certain of on the 5th. 
 
 These messages or dispatches, endeavoring to delay 
 Buell's arrival, if ever reduced to writing, or placed upon 
 record, with numbers of others, criminating both Grant 
 and Halleck in regard to their own and BuelFs operations 
 about this time, have doubtless been suppressed, and, as 
 such messages may seem surprising to readers knowing 
 little or nothing of the parties here concerned, the follow- 
 ing evidence maybe of interest to all concerned, especially 
 old volunteers of these armies : 
 
 "CINCINNATI, February 12, 1872. 
 " I was in command of the 10th brigade, 4th division, (General W. Nelson
 
 HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 109 
 
 commanding division,) army of the Ohio, on its march from Nashville to Sa- 
 vannah, Tennessee, in the spring of 1862. 
 
 "On leaving Columbia, Tennessee, about the last of March, General Nelson 
 directed me to conduct the march, so as to reach Savannah, Tennessee, the 
 7th of April, as we were not wanted there before. 
 
 "The roads were good, the weather pleasant, and camping grounds favor- 
 able, which will account for our reaching Savannah before noon April 5th, 
 1862. If required, the march might have been hastened without fatigue to 
 the troops or leaving any part of the train behind. J. AMMEN." 
 
 Supposing it plain now that, while anxiously seeming 
 to expect Buell, Grant was still more anxiously striving to 
 keep him back, the text of Colonel Badeau is again taken 
 up.
 
 110 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE. 
 
 "General Grant, while at Springfield, Massachusetts, said that Buell might 
 have reached Pittsburgh landing several days earlier than he did, in which 
 case General Grant would have been the attacking party." (N. Y. Herald, 
 August, 1865.) 
 
 It is exceedingly convenient, especially for a military man 
 or historian, to forget, or omit, or misplace dates, which are 
 generally of the utmost importance, even to a minute or a 
 second of time, during or before a battle, and are important 
 at all times. General Grant's report of Shiloh proves that 
 five minutes' more delay might have lost his army. The 
 enemy on our extreme right, on the 6th of April, 1862, 
 about noon, failed to turn that flank by withholding his 
 fire in a single instance not over a second of time. Our 
 biographer, whether prompted or not, takes advantage of 
 this circumstance to omit or confuse his dates as emergen- 
 cies seem to require. Thus we are told that a message from 
 Buell, dated April 4th, was brought to Grant, not stating 
 whether received the 4th or 5th. Grant replies on the 5th, 
 at Savannah: " Dispatch justreceived; I will be here to meet 
 you to-morrow. The enemy at and near Corinth are prob- 
 ably from 60,000 to 80,000." "And," says Badeau, "Buell, 
 did not arrive till the 6th, and Grant remained to meet 
 him." 
 
 Now, if the writer of this mixed matter intended to say that 
 Grant retained his headquarters at Savannah to meet Buell, 
 he should so specify. But Grant's headquarters were, or 
 were supposed to be, on the boat Tigress, while his adju- 
 tants had offices on shore, both at Pittsburgh and Savannah. 
 The fate of two armies of 80,000 men depended in a great 
 measure on the meeting of these two commanders. And 
 here was one most anxiously expected, as we are to/d, while the 
 other, in the utmost danger, as the event proved he was
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. Ill 
 
 and professed to be, not only endeavors to keep his troops 
 back, but delays an answer to a dispatch received on the 
 4th of April till the 5th; and writing on the 5th, which, it 
 is repeated, was the last limit of the expected attack, he 
 postpones the requested interview to the 6th, and by this 
 he plainly postpones this requested meeting until after 
 the attack did come, as was expected; and, but for several 
 accidents of the most improbable character, this postpone- 
 ment must have been more fatal to both armies than the 
 delay was to the one so miraculously saved, and then thrown 
 back, as it was, at any rate, one to two months in its ex- 
 pected operations.* Consider again this confusion of dates, 
 which is repeated two pages forward, (page 73.) Grant 
 writes to Buell on the 5th: "I will be here to meet you 
 to-morrow, the 6th." "Buell did not arrive till the 6th, 
 and Grant remained to meet him," says Badeau. When ? 
 On the 5th, when this answer was written, or the day after? 
 Now, it is certain that General Grant saw General Nelson 
 soon after noon on the 5th, and must have heard from him 
 of the proximity of General Buell. He also sees Colonel Am- 
 men; tells him he is not wanted, as he does not expect a 
 fight much outside of Corinth. Knowing that General Buell 
 will be at Savannah on the 5th; and, expecting every mo- 
 ment to hear the roar of an attack above, he runs up in 
 the Tigress, after seeing Nelson, to Pittsburgh, and does not 
 return till near midnight, and thus avoids seeing Buell. 
 Next morning, roused up by the roar of rebel cannon, he 
 hastily and forgetfully writes to Buell as follows: "Savan- 
 nah, April 6, 1862. Heavy firing heard up the river, in- 
 dicating an attack on my most advanced position. I ex- 
 pected this, but did not think it would take place till to- 
 morrow or next day," (Monday or Tuesday, 7th or 8th.) 
 
 And this is written after he had dispatched to Nelson at 
 Columbia that he was not wanted till the 7th, written after 
 he had arranged with Halleck to stop Buell, to close up at 
 Waynsboro, (30 miles off,) and march thence to Hamburgh; 
 
 *This was the object of the Washington cabal. W. P. G.
 
 112 SHILOH. 
 
 after advising kelson on the 4th that he would be in the 
 way if up before the 8th; and after saying to General Am- 
 men that his troops were thus superfluous, as he did not 
 expect a fight much short of Corinth> telling him to hold 
 to the position he was in till boats came down for him; and 
 then, as Colonel Badeau relates, ordering JSTelson, with 
 extreme providence, to move to a point five miles below 
 Pittsburgh, forgetting, of course, the previous order to 
 Arnmen, to remain where he was at Savannah. 
 
 And this is the greatest soldier of the age, honest and 
 just, as a man should be ! This, then,.is the provident com- 
 mander, who had been so anxious for Buell's arrival over a 
 week before the 5th! Buell who, as Sherman says and 
 swears, had been rightfully expected for two weeks; and 
 therefore he (Sherman) maintained the gaps in our front 
 for an army which was to go elsewhere, but knew their 
 real use was gates to the enemy in cannon-shot of our camps, 
 and whose entry thereat was by him so successfully re- 
 pelled, if any faith is to be placed in his letter to Professor 
 Coppes, contradicting his division report, written immedi- 
 ately after the battle. Buell, be it repeated, was not sent 
 to Hamburgh, as he would have prevented the attack. But 
 to return again to Colonel Badeau's dates, jumbled together 
 like a crate of dates, and confused as the bloody battle about 
 to break upon and break to pieces the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 After the statement that on the 5th Grant remained to 
 meet Buel at Savannah, a very free use is made of that day, 
 the 5th, which may here be taken for either the 5th or 6th. 
 It will be seen, however, very plainly, that he did not re- 
 main on the 5th, the day fixed by Buell to see him. He 
 remained there, however, long enough to meet kelson and 
 Ammen, and give them conflicting orders, which came 
 very near, say within five or ten minutes, of utterly scat- 
 tering or c.ipturing the Army of the Tennessee, late in the 
 afternoon of the 6th, when, it is again repeated, as is stated 
 in Grant's report, these rejected troops of Buell's, under 
 Nelson and Ammen, prevented the turning of our extreme
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 113 
 
 left and the capture of the landing, transports, &c., while 
 so near the army to be deserted by Grant. But to the 
 dates again : 
 
 " There was skirmishing daily after the 2d of April, and on the 4th the 
 enemy felt Sherman's front m force, but nothing serious came of it, and the 
 opinion of that commander was, that no probability of an immediate engage- 
 ment existed. (Though there had been danger three weeks before.) Grant 
 rode out on the day after, i. e., the 5th, and concurred with him in this judg- 
 ment." 
 
 JSTow, supposing, of course, that these commanders, in 
 good faith, put these words out of or into the pen of their 
 biographer, what is to be thought of them as men above 
 idiocy, to say nothing of their being commanders, intrusted 
 at the time with the destinies of two large armies, quad- 
 ruple in number that with which the great Julius won 
 the empire of the olden world at Pharsalia? 
 
 Consider the circumstances then, by them known to ex- 
 ist, as has never been denied. Sherman and Grant both 
 believed the enemy had marched from Corinth the night 
 of the 2d and 3d; a very large force having been in our 
 front for some days before. Sherman has testified that there 
 was reason to expect an attack on the 3d, and Grant has 
 admitted that he thought an army equal to his own on the 
 evening of that day (the 3d) was in his front. Johnson 
 marched on the 3d, so as to attack before Buell came up, as 
 arranged by Grant, on the 7th or 8th: he (Johnson) having 
 fixed early on the 5th for the attack. 
 
 How it was possible he failed to know that Buell's ad- 
 vance was at Savannah the 5th, at noon, who can conjec- 
 ture; but such ignorance, on some reliable assurance, must 
 have existed. Our commanders now (the 5th) recognized 
 how close the chances were of his retreat or his attack, 
 and Beauregard advised a withdrawal of his troops. Grant 
 had been assured on the 4th that BuelPs advance was in 
 sight of the station, and Buell himself, Grant knew, was 
 to be on the ground with two divisions that day, (5th.) On 
 the 4th of April, 1862, the day before these commanders 
 concurred in their judgment, says Badeau, against the 
 probability of an immediate attack, Sherman had been 
 8
 
 114 SHILOH. 
 
 assured by Major Bicker that he had just met the ad- 
 vance of Beauregard's army, and Sherman had admitted 
 it by telling Buckland that, by capturing prisoners, he 
 might have drawn our whole army into a fight before they 
 were ready. But beyond this the meeting of Grant and Sher- 
 man must have been late in the afternoon of the 5th. 
 Badeau admits this imminent attack, by stating Grant's or- 
 ders to Nelson as to placing his camp five miles from Pitts- 
 burgh on the 5th. Grant then went up late on the 5th for 
 two very special reasons. One was to avoid meeting Buell, 
 and let Sherman know how close the chances were, and to 
 prevent all possible information to the enemy, for which 
 reason the cavalry pickets had been withdrawn the night 
 before, (4th.) They had both known or believed that an ad- 
 vance in force had been within the power of the enemy 
 since 2 p. m. of the day before, (the 4th,) or even the 3d, 
 and were no doubt in extreme apprehension that, knowing 
 Buell's proximity, the rebels had retreated, or determined 
 so to do that night, as some advised. But, more than all 
 this, there had occurred that day what Sherman and Grant 
 concealed in their reports- what they seem, according to 
 Badeau; to have concealed even from Halleck, (and what 
 they have seemingly or actually concealed from Badeau 
 and Bowman, which is left in doubt) occurrences not men- 
 tioned in the dozen histories and thousands of accounts of 
 the battle, and obtained by Colonel Worthington's court- 
 martial in August, 1862. At 7 a. m. (5th) the pickets of the 
 1st brigade were driven in from a station three quarters of a 
 mile, as Sherman testifies, from his right center, and soon 
 after the pickets of the two center brigades were also 
 driven back. The 5th April, early in the afternoon, one or 
 more rebel guns were in battery at this picket station of 
 Sherman's 1st brigade, and rebel artillery was heard of 
 farther to our left, opposite Shiloh church, and reported 
 to Sherman, who had no guns at hand. 
 
 The woods in front swarmed all day with rebel troops of 
 all arms, as Colonel (now General) Buckland testified, and 
 mentions in his letter to the Cincinnati Gazette, indicat-
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 115 
 
 ing the power to attack and warning the immediate ap- 
 proach of the enemy. 
 
 These facts are here repeated as known to Grant on the 
 5th, in the afternoon, when he avoided meeting Buell; and 
 to prove that he did this purposely, (see Ammen's note, &c., 
 above.) He thus kept Buell back, knowing himself liable 
 at any moment to attack, while he kept his front exposed 
 and defenseless. Yet this charge has been and is sneered 
 at as a queer idea, that any general of any army should 
 commit such an act of folly, or madness, or criminality, 
 whatever be its denomination in the calendar of crime, 
 or of insanity, or selfish purpose, or interest. The very 
 confusion and omission of dates now in hand prove the de- 
 sign charged by the avoidance of Buell on the 5th. We 
 have it stated, after mention of this interview between Grant 
 and Sherman on the 5th, that on the 4th " Grant's horse 
 slipped and fell on his rider. This lamed him for over a 
 week," &c. This fall, and especially the lameness, was not 
 apparent on the 6th to anybody, and was never known to this 
 narrator till seen in Badeau's history. The report may have 
 been spread as an additional inducement to the attack, and 
 Grant's going every night to Pittsburgh was calculated to 
 lull the suspicion of the enemy that their attack was ex- 
 pected, and to quiet any apprehension in his own army. 
 
 But this accident of the 4th should have been stated in 
 its place not so stated as to produce the impression that 
 the concurrence of judgment was on the 4th. He keeps 
 on mixing dates. The same day, we are to infer, on which 
 Grant got hurt, the 4th, Lew. Wallace reported eight regi- 
 ments of rebel infantry and 1,200 cavalry at Purdy, &c.; 
 and the same day, the 4th, he (Grant) writes to Sherman: 
 " I will return to Pittsburgh landing to-morrow, (the 5th,) 
 at an early hour," &c. An interview between Grant and 
 Sherman on the 5th has been noticed at length by Badeau. 
 If he did go up in the forenoon, he was back at Savannah 
 at noon and some hours later; and, going up to Pittsburgh* 
 in the afternoon to avoid Buell, his impressions as to an 
 immediate attack must have been the same; and it is a
 
 116 SHILOH. 
 
 fair presumption that Badeau was made aware of all that 
 occurred at Shiloh as to pickets, and before Grant returned 
 to Savannah at 11 p. m. that night, or so much pains 
 would not be taken to explain this avoidance of Buell on 
 the 5th. 
 
 We come now to Saturday, April 5th, and will be done 
 with these tedious and tangled dates tangled at a time 
 when of all others they should be eminently straight and 
 clear. On Saturday, April 5th, Sherman is quoted to 
 show that the enemy's cavalry came down well to his 
 front, and what is stated before by Badeau is repeated. It 
 is repeated that Grant, having made all his preparations 
 to remove his headquarters to Pittsburgh on the morrow, 
 (the 6th,) remained to meet Buell, as that " officer had 
 desired, on the 5th." 
 
 The inference here is plain, that Grant remained in 
 person to meet Buell on the 5th, as Buell had desired, (on 
 page 70.) To which desire on the 5th (page 71) Grant 
 writes : "I will be here to meet you to-morrow." 
 
 Buell, however, says Badeau, did not arrive till the 6th, 
 and Grant remained to meet him. If there is any doubt 
 about the date specified or meant by Badeau here, there 
 can be none where this same matter is specified (page 73) 
 as a meeting on the 5th, as Buell had desired. 
 
 A battle may be lost by delay or precipitation; by 
 blundering or neglect; by misinformation or by accident, 
 as thousands of battles have been lost or won, and yet the 
 delinquent general may preserve his honor, and even his 
 reputation. Soult never won a battle, and was beaten 
 repeatedly, and especially and unexpectedly by what 
 seemed, and may have been, a blunder, at Albuera, but 
 lost no reputation; while Beresford, who won the battle, 
 .gained none. Yet though Beresford was chargeable with 
 neglect of the same sort as that at Shiloh, both he and 
 Soult did all of which their minds and means were com- 
 petent, neglected no reinforcements that could be got 
 up before the battle, and made the best use they could of 
 iheir troops in hand.: they themselves all the time remain-
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 117 
 
 ing on the battle-field. Soult blundered in his tactics ; and 
 Beresford, it is said, lost his temper on the field of 
 " Albuera, lavish of its dead;" almost as Shiloh. But 
 neither of these generals was charged or chargeable with 
 designed neglect, or a selfish purpose, and their honor was 
 not tarnished. 
 
 But here is a case where an endeavor was plainly made 
 to delay the approach of much-needed reinforcements to 
 the aid of a threatened army, and, what is worse, an abso- 
 lute rejection occurs of the anxiously expected troops when 
 arrived, and when an attack was momentarily expected, 
 and when these troops, if used as had been intended, could 
 have crushed their adversaries in an hour, or one-fourth 
 the time, if properly handled. And though ten years 
 have passed, there has been no suspicion expressed but by 
 this relator, that any one but General Buell was in fault, 
 and, by his deliberation, was the cause of the slaughter and 
 disgrace at Shiloh, April 6, 1862. Hoping we have hunted 
 down these dates with a legitimate purpose to expose their 
 nefarious use, and hunted up and out their concealment 
 and confusion to an understanding of the fact, that while, 
 as is pretended, Grant remained to meet Buell on the 5th 
 of April, 1862, he purposely avoided doing so : the tedious 
 detail may not be without interest and instruction to a 
 professional reader. 
 
 The following letter, to show whether intentionally or 
 not the meeting with Buell was avoided, is introduced. 
 
 Grant and Sherman admit, by Grant's dispatch to Hal- 
 leek, that they had not the faintest idea of an immediate 
 attack on the 5th. There was nothing, then, to keep 
 Grant from Savannah on the 5th, where he had remained, 
 we are told, for the purpose of hurrying forward Buell's 
 troops. We are here shown how he did it, by remaining 
 at Pittsburgh, knowing Buell to be at Savannah: 
 
 'AUGUST 27, 1862. 
 
 " My statement of where I was and what I was doing April 5th and 6th, 
 (1862,) is as follows : 
 
 " I was sent in charge of ten prisoners and ten guards to Pittsburgh land- 
 ing from Shiloh meeting-house by Colonel Hildebrand, commanding 3d
 
 118 SHILOH. 
 
 brigade, on Saturday, April 5th. The prisoners had been taken the day 
 before, and belonged to companies C, K, and D, of 1st Alabama cavalry. 
 On Saturday evening I was ordered by General U. S. Grant to put my men 
 all on board the steamer Tigress, with one day's rations, and take the prison- 
 ers to Savannah that night. We landed at Savannah about 11 p. m., and 
 Genera] Grant said it was not advisable to take the men ashore that night. 
 He, with other officers, remained up to a very late hour, and were -very late 
 in getting up on Sunday morning. 
 
 "I finally got an order to take the prisoners to the guard-house, and was 
 told my guards might remain in town till 4 p. m. At that time the boat was 
 to start back to Pittsburgh landing. I had just got to the guard-house when 
 I heard cannonading in the direction of Shiloh. I looked down towards the 
 steamboat landing, and saw that the " Tigress" was. firing up. I took my 
 men (the guards) back on double-quick, and scarcely got there in time to 
 get on board the boat. General Grant stayed all night on the boat. We halted 
 
 at Crump's landing, and Grant inquired of Commodore where the 
 
 firing was at. Answer, 'in Sherman's division.' Grant remarked, 'I would 
 rather it was there than any place else along the line, for he is better pre- 
 pared for them. 1 He then ordered the boat on up to Pittsburgh, at which 
 place we arrived near 10 o'clock, a. m. 
 
 " E. R. MOORE, 
 "Second Lieutenant Company D, 77 'th Regiment 0. V. I." 
 
 If Badeau writes on Grant's authority, that commander 
 indicated his expectation of an attack both by the order 
 (which we are told was obeyed by Nelson) to encamp five 
 miles below Pittsburgh, and by telling Amrnen to stay 
 where he was, and that, if wanted, he would send boats 
 down for him; and, therefore, he must have been in mo- 
 mentary expectation of an attack, instead of the attack on 
 the 7th or 8th he told Buell he had been expecting. With 
 all this expectation of an attack on the 7th, there is no 
 accounting for the fact, that he did not send Buell 's troops 
 up on Saturday, except by the conclusion that he purposely 
 kept him back to prevent his having any share in the ex- 
 pected repulsion of an attack. With Sherman the pur- 
 pose might have been different, if, as he had said, his heart 
 was not in the war. 
 
 On page 72 we are told that the skirmish of the 4th put 
 both officers and men on the alert. We have seen, that 
 among these officers were not Sherman and Grant. Sher- 
 man parked his two center batteries eighty rods in rear of 
 his center on the evening of the 5th, and told a large num- 
 ber of troops, who were on the look-out near Shiloh church 
 after dark, to disperse to their quarters, where they would 
 be in no more danger than if at home in Ohio. Suppose,
 
 HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 119 
 
 now, these commanders bad been upon the alert, and, as 
 was dispatched to Halleck on the 5th, had been ready to 
 meet an unexpected attack, would not the threatening oc- 
 currences of Saturday, the 5th, have been dispatched hourly, 
 or oftener, to Halleck and to BuelPs troops in the rear? 
 Would not notice have been sent to Buell so soon as the 
 pickets were driven in at 7 a. m. ? Would not boats have 
 been ready to take up the division of Nelson that arrived 
 at noon on the 5th ? Would not Grant's scattered divis- 
 ions have been warned of the danger, and the widely sep- 
 arated columns have been brought into regular line of 
 battle that threatening afternoon and day ? 
 
 Sherman may perhaps be excused for inaction on the 
 ground of his theory that fortifications would have been a 
 sign of weakness, and invited an attack, for which he was 
 not ready on the 4th, or 5th, or 6th, or ever in the war. 
 Drawing his lines up so as to close the gaps, and properly 
 arranging his artillery on the front or flanks, would, on the 
 same principle, have incurred the temptation to attack; and 
 to lead even an enemy into temptation of shedding blood, 
 would have been morally and religiously wrong, and so he 
 remained inactive, lest he might induce an attack for which 
 we were not prepared. Such inactivity, in addition to 'the 
 presentation of his flanks to an expected attack, is the new 
 Shermanic strategy.
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE 
 
 Extract from record of court martial at Memphis, Tennessee, August, 1862. 
 
 " No stronger position was ever held by any army. Therefore on Thursday, 
 (3d of April,) two days before the battle, I knew there was no hostile force 
 within six (three) miles, though there was reason to expect an attack. The diary 
 entry that an attack was imminent on Thursday, April 3, 1862, is false and 
 libelous." (Sherman's evidence.) 
 
 " We did not occupy too much ground. General Buell's forces had been ex- 
 pected rightfully for two weeks, and a place was left for his forces, though 
 Grant had afterwards determined to send Buell to Hamburgh as a separate 
 command. The entry that we covered too much ground is false and libelous." 
 (Sherman's evidence.) 
 
 Extracts from the record of Colonel "Worthingtou's trial 
 at Memphis, Tennessee, August, 1862: 
 
 Extracts from a Diary of the Tennessee Expedition, 1862, by T. Worthington, 
 Colonel 46iA Regiment, 0. V. I. 
 
 " Wednesday, March26, 1862. At Camp Shiloh, three miles from Pittsburgh 
 landing. A company being called for picket duty to-day, detailed Captain 
 Sharp's company, B. Indications of an attack, if the country people are to 
 be believed. Their pickets are around, and too near us, showing a strong 
 effective force. 
 
 " Thursday, March 27, 1862. This afternoon two of Sharp's pickets were 
 
 fired on by the rebel horse, about 4 p.m., not a mile from camp. A disgrace 
 
 to the army that such should be the case, and an indication that they are 
 
 covering some forward movement, yet Sherman is improvident as ever, and 
 
 I takes no -defensive and scarce any precautionary measures. He snubs me, 
 
 land has no time to hear even a suggestion. 
 
 " Friday, March 28, 1862. Having suggested to McDowell the sending out 
 ?f a stronger picket, he ordered thirty more men, which were immediately 
 rolunteered. if Beauregard does not attack us, he and the chivalry are dis- 
 graced forever, if for nothing else. 
 
 " Saturday, March 29, 1862. Sherman has refused to sign a requisition for 
 lieventy-two axes for my regiment, making it twenty- two; and while a slight 
 /abattis might prevent or avert an attack, there are no axes to make it, nor 
 'is there a sledge or crowbar in his division, and scarce a set of tools out of 
 my regiment. 
 
 "Monday, March 31, 1862. Further indications through the pickets that 
 *n attack is imminent, and though I do not fear the result, a sudden attack, 
 if violently made, as it will be, may throw us back for months. The men are 
 discouraged at our delay here and the close vicinity of the rebel pickets, 
 which should be driven off. Sherman is inviting an attack, which I hope 
 may occur, but for which we are unprepared. 
 
 " Tuesday, April I, 1862. Have now over one hundred rounds of ammu-
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 121 
 
 nition for all available men, and feel easy on that point. Ordered the cap- 
 tains to send in accounts of clothing, &c., wanted, which the quartermaster 
 is very careless about getting. Still no axes, which now he cannot get if he 
 would, and which are worth more than guns at present. 
 
 " Thursday, April 3, 1862. Rode to Pittsburgh landing. The place is 
 crowded and in disorder below, with noise and gambling on the bank above, 
 across the way from the post office. Hunted up and down for clothing and 
 axes, and found that Sherman had forbidden his quartermaster from receiv- 
 ing any thing; that General Smith's quartermaster will answer no requisi- 
 tions outside of his immediate command and the post quartermaster, Baxter, 
 (Grant's,) will only answer the requisitions of the division quartermasters. 
 The reason that Sherman's quartermaster will not receive any stores is, that 
 he has no place to put them. There are now at least six boats hired by the day 
 at the landing, (as I hear,) at no less than two thousand ($2,000) a day, when 
 two thousand dollars with that many men could, in ten days or less, put up 
 etore-houses sufficient for an army of one hundred thousand men. And so the 
 Government will pay on this expedition so far not less than twenty thousand 
 dollars, and perhaps ten times that before the war is over, and lose not less 
 than one to ten million dollars in quartermaster and commissary stores, oc- 
 casioned by the improvidence and neglect of its major generals here, to say 
 nothing of the disorder and danger growing out of such a state of things. 
 
 " The indications are (still) of an attack, which I have also intimated to 
 Mcl>o\vell; we should now have on our right at least six batteries, and two 
 regiments of cavalry to warn the rear. With thick woods .before us aad 
 pickets scarce a mile out, we have no defenses whatever, and no means of 
 giving an alarm but by the fire of musketry. The troops cover too much 
 ground, and cannot support each other, and a violent attack, which we may 
 expect, may drive them back in detail. God help us, with eo many sick men 
 in camp, if we are attacked, there being over five thousand unfit for duty. 
 
 "Friday, April 4, 1862. One of McDowell's pickets was shot in the hand 
 about noon. A detail of Taylor's cavalry was sent out three or four miles; 
 found four to six hundred rebel cavalry, and fell back, returning about 2 p.m. 
 
 "Everything is carried on in a very negligent way, and nothing but the 
 same conduct on the other side can save us from disaster. They can concen- 
 trate one hundred thousand men from the heart of rebeldom, and with three 
 or four railroads have far greater facilities for handling troops than we have. 
 
 " Have brigade orders to stack arms at daylight till farther orders. Keep 
 two companies lying on their arms, and though aa quiet as possible, look for 
 an attack every hour. 
 
 " Saturday, April 5, 1862. Rode out to Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and 
 found two men (rebel pickets) wounded yesterday, who died last night at the 
 Widow Howell's. About 7 o'clock a.m., the rebels drove in Lieutenant Crary 
 from the Widow Howell's, getting possession of their dead men. Heard in the 
 evening that the rebels had established three guns (six pounders) opposite 
 Hildebrand's brigade, on our left, across the valley. Hear of five of their 
 regiments arriving to-day. 
 
 " Sunday, April 6, 1862. A clear cool morning. Rode out to the pickets at 
 sunrise, and soon after the enemy were seen advancing past the Howell 
 house. Directly one of Colonel Hicks'a regiment, 40th Illinois, was shot 
 through the heart, at not less than four hundred yards. Rode to McDowell'B 
 quarters, (not up,) and then back to the pickets, and ordered the men who had 
 fallen back to advance to the Howell fence. Returned to camp for prepara- 
 tion, and at about 7 a.m. the attack commenced on Hildebrand's and Buck- 
 land's brigades. This might have been expected, but we were really not 
 ready for a fight. No hospitals at Pittsburgh, ner even means to carry off the 
 wounded." 
 
 " APRIL 25, 1862. 
 
 "The undersigned hereby certify that most of the facts above set forth are 
 correct from their own knowledge, and that Colonel Worthington's remarks
 
 122 SHILOH. 
 
 and anticipations are in correspondence with his general conversation for ten 
 days before the battle of the 6th of April, 1862." 
 
 WILLIAM SMITH, Maj. 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 J. W. HEATH, Qapt. Co. A, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 A. G. SHAKP, Capt. Co. B, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 JNO. WISEMAN, Capt. Co. C, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 ED. N. UPTON, Lt. c'dg. Co. D, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 WM. PINNEY, Capt. Co. E, 46th Reg. 0.' V. I. 
 
 P. A. CROW, Capt. Co. G. 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 M. C. LILLY, Capt. Co. H, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 C. C. LYBLAXD, Capt. Co. I, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
 
 I. N. ALEXANDER, Capt. Co. K, 46th Reg. 0. V. I." 
 
 " SD CHARGE. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. 
 
 ''Specification 2d. In this, that the said Colonel Thomas Worthington, of 
 the 46th Ohio Volunteers, did print, or cause to be printed, on a sheet for 
 circulation, what purported to be extracts from his diary of the Tennessee 
 expedition, containing false and libelous matter, calculated and designed to 
 injure his superior officers, Colonel McDowell and General Grant and General 
 Sherman. 
 
 "Specification 3d. In this, that the said Colonel Worthington did print, or 
 cause to be printed, for circulation, what purported to be extracts from his 
 diary of the Tennessee expedition, designed to secure for himself a popular 
 reputation for prophecy and foresight, while said diary was not made con- 
 temporaneous with the dates set forth in it, but was fabricated or manufac- 
 tured after the occasion, to fulfill some base and dishonorable purpose. 
 
 "To which the prisoner pleaded not guilty." 
 
 General Sherman's testimony, having direct reference to 
 the charges, was as follows: 
 
 " As to the 3d charge, 2d specification, he says, of these facts I can testify, 
 that, about the 10th instant, (August, 1862,) one of my staff brought a sheet 
 of printed matter, which was left for me by Captain Giesy, of the 46th Ohio. 
 That sheet contains matter false and libelous. Though marked private and 
 confidential, it bears on its face evidence of its intent for circulation. Under 
 date of March 29, 1862, by this paper, he uses the words: 'Sherman has refused 
 to sign a requisition for seventy-two axes for my regiment making it twenty- 
 two.' I did so rightfully. I knew what axes were on hand and expected, and 
 was the judge, not Colonel Worthington, of their distribution. (There were 
 none to be had.) He says, 'a slight abattis might have prevented an attack." 
 What business was it of his whether his superior officer invited an attack or 
 not? The Army Regulations will show him that no fortifications can be made 
 except under order of the commanding general, (thus making Grant respon- 
 sible.) To have erected fortifications would have been evidence of weakness and 
 would have invited an attack. The entry of March 31, 1862, must have been 
 fabricated after the date, for our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on 
 the ground five days after this entry was made. Colonel Worthington might 
 have thought an attack imminent, because for weeks he was predicting the 
 worst, and hoping it might happen. The entry of April 3, 1862, is false and 
 libelous. Troops were arriving from every quarter by water; wagons were 
 coming to the landing from camps in the interior; high water contracted the 
 levee to a very small space, and many other causes, well known to Colonel 
 W. , produced confusion, which no general could have prevented, and which 
 no one could charge to General Grant. (Nothing was charged to General 
 Grant.) 
 
 'I admit that Colonel Worthington was wandering up and down the river 
 hunting for clothing and axes, but the assertion that Sherman had forbidden
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 123 
 
 his quartermasters to receive anything is an absurdity, (but nevertheless a 
 fact, as is proven.) Now, in this connection, while Colonel Worthington was 
 wandering up and down after axes, I will show what the men in front were 
 doing." 
 
 Here follows a statement of scoutings on the 2d and 3d 
 of April, in which nothing but rebel cavalry was encoun- 
 tered. He then proceeds to testify as follows : 
 
 "And here I mention for future history, that our right flank was well 
 guarded by Owl and Snake creeks, our left by Lick creek, leaving us simply 
 to guard our front. No stronger position was ever held by an army. There- 
 fore, on Thursday, two days before the battle, when Colonel Worthington 
 was so apprehensive, (for his personal safety,) I knew there was no hostile 
 party within six (three) miles, though there was reason to expect an attack, (that 
 day.) I suppose Colonel McDowell, like myself, had become tired of his con- 
 stant prognostications and paid no attention to him, especially when we were 
 positively informed by men like Buckland, Kilby Smith, and Major Ricker 
 who went to the front to look for enemies, instead of going to the landing, 
 (for axes to save his men from slaughter.) And here I will state, that Pitts- 
 burgh landing was not chosen by General Grant, but by Major General Smith. 
 I received orders from General Smith, and took post accordingly ; so did Gen- 
 eral Hurlbut; so did his own division. The lines of McClernand and Prentiss 
 were selected by Colonel (now General) McPherson. I will not insult General 
 Smith's memory by criticizing his selection of a field. It was not looked to 
 so much for defense, as for ground on which our army could be organized for 
 offense. 
 
 " We did not occupy too much ground. General Buell's forces had been 
 expected rightfully for two weeks, and a place was left for his forces, although 
 General Grant afterward had determined to send Buell to Hamburgh as a sepa- 
 rate command. 
 
 "But even as we were (without defense) on the 6th of April, you might search 
 the world over and not find a more advantageous field of battle flanks well 
 protected, and never threatened; troops in easy support; timber and broken 
 ground giving good points to rally; and the proof is, that 43,000 men, of 
 whom at least 10,000 ran away, held their ground against 60,000 chosen 
 troops of the South, with their best leaders. On Friday, the 4th, nor officer 
 nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can 
 prove. 
 
 "On Friday, April 4th, our pickets were disposed as follows: McDowell's 
 brigade, embracing Worthington's regiment, looked to Owl creek bridge, and 
 had nothing to do with any other road. Buckland and Hildebrand covered 
 our line to the main Corinth road. Pickets, one company to a regiment, 
 were thrown forward a mile and a half to the front, videttes a mile farther, 
 making a chain of sentinels. 
 
 "About noon of that day Buckland's adjutant came to my tent and re- 
 ported that a lieutenant and seven men of his guard had left their post and 
 were missing: probably picked np by a small cavalry force which had hovered 
 around for some days, and which I had failed to bag. I immediately dis- 
 patched Major Ricker, with all my cavalry, in a tremendous rain, to the 
 front. Soon after I heard distant musketry, and finally three cannon shots, 
 which I knew must be the enemy, as we had none there. 
 
 "This was the first positive information any intelligent mind on that field 
 had of any approaching force. Before that, no scout, no officer, no respon- 
 sible man had seen an infantry or artillery soldier nearer than Monterey, 
 (five miles out.) For weeks and months we had heard all sorts of reports, 
 just as we do now. For weeks old women had reported that Beauregard was 
 coming, sometimes with 100,000, sometimes with "300,000 ; when, in fact, he
 
 124 SHILOH. 
 
 did not leave Corinth until after even Colonel Worthington had been alarmed 
 for (his) safety. 
 
 "As soon as I heard the cannon I and my staff were in the saddle and off 
 for the front. We overtook a party of Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigades 
 going forward to the relief of the pickets. On reaching a position in ad- 
 vance of the guard-house, a mile and a half from Shiloh, they deployed into 
 line of battle, and I awaited the return of my cavalry and infantry, still to 
 our front. 
 
 "Colonel Buckland and Major Ricker soon returned, and reported en- 
 countering infantry, artillery, and cavalry near the fallen timber?, six miles 
 (three miles) in front of our camp. We then knew that we had the elements 
 of an army in our front, but did not know its strength or destination. The 
 guard was strengthened, (not the fict,) and as night came on we returned to 
 camp, and not a man in the camp but knew we had an enemy to the front 
 before we slept that night. But even I had to guess its purpose. No general 
 could have detected or reported the approach of an enemy more promptly 
 than was done," (on that occasion.) 
 
 (Here was read a letter of General Sherman to General 
 Grant, dated April 5th, 1862, giving an account of the 
 affair as above stated.) 
 
 " Thus, while Buckland's brigade, in the execution of its 
 proper duty, was guarding safely our front, a colonel of 
 another brigade, in a safe corner, was looking for an attack 
 every hour, (probably every minute. "W. P. G.) 
 
 "As to the journal entry of April 5th, I have but little to 
 say. As to the three guns on Hildebrand's left, he could 
 have heard no such thing, for our troops crossed and re- 
 crossed the ground all day Saturday, (and, as will be seen, 
 reported the artillery. "W. P. G.) 
 
 "I say it was impossible for him to have heard as to the 
 three guns on our left across the valley. The position is 
 well-known, and was within our pickets. (Fact.) If he 
 heard so, it was his sworn and boundeu duty to have re- 
 ported the fact to his commander, which he did not do." 
 (He says he was tired of such reports.) 
 
 Here follow personal reflections on Colonel Worthing- 
 ton, and imputations of publishing foolish reports of Shiloh, 
 little dreaming, he continues, "that one who knew so well 
 would do so much," c., and closes by saying, "I have given 
 a history of events during the week preceding the battle of 
 Shiloh, and state further, that from the 31st March to the 
 2d of April, with part of my division, I was up the Ten- 
 nessee river to Eastport. From the 2d to the 7th of April
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 125 
 
 I have given an account. On the 8th of April my division 
 pursued the enemy over the same ground six miles. On 
 the 9th, 10th, and llth of April I was up the Tennessee 
 and broke the Bear-creek bridge, the original object of the 
 expedition* I therefore repeat, that my command did ne- 
 glect no proper precautions, but was as industrious, and 
 vigilant, and patient as any part of "the troops constituting 
 the Army of the Tennessee." 
 
 (The diary extracts were applicable to the management 
 of the whole of the army of the Tennessee. "W. P. G.) 
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE REVIEWED. 
 
 Time and tedium may both be economized by examin- 
 ing this testimony in chief of General Sherman, without 
 waiting for his cross-examination by the defense. It must 
 be recollected that the weight or point of the charge is, that 
 the diary extracts, foreboding clanger and charging neglect 
 and design in braving the danger without preparation that 
 these diary extracts were written after the foretold danger 
 had occurred. If the specification is true, that is, writing 
 the diary after the event, the charge is established ; other- 
 wise, the charge is not in accordance with the facts, or not 
 true. If the statements of the diary are proven true, they 
 cannot, in law, be taken as libelous, neither can they be 
 taken as libelous or false, if it is proven they were writ- 
 ten before the event, when they were mere conjectures, 
 and by no means libels or falsities. 
 
 It may further be considered that all statements of the 
 diary not pronounced and proven false by the prosecutor are 
 to be taken as true. Proceeding on such data, the entry 
 of March 26th, that an attack is indicated by the country 
 people, and by the fact, not denied, that the rebel pickets 
 are around and too near us, is admitted as true. The entry 
 of March 27th, that the attack on our pickets by the rebel 
 cavalry is an indication that they are covering some for- 
 
 * If that only was the object of the expedition, why not remain at Sa- 
 vaniiah ? Because then he could not have invited a battle so easily. This 
 is one of the strongest points against these juggles.
 
 126 SHILOH. 
 
 ward movement, is thus admitted by the prosecutor as true, 
 and so proven by the event. The entry of March 28th, that 
 an attack on our camp would not be dangerous to an ene- 
 my under existing neglect or design, is also admitted as 
 true, and so proven by the event. 
 
 Saturday, March 29th. The refusal to allow the requi- 
 sition for the axes is admitted, and an inference is plain, 
 from the prosecutor's evidence, that there were axes to be had, 
 which is contradicted by the evidence of the quartermaster 
 and his sergeant, who both swear that no axes could be 
 had till after the battle. He (Sherman) does not deny that 
 an abattis (fallen trees) would prevent or avert an attack, 
 except by stating on oath that defenses would have invited 
 an attack. "What a statement for any officer to make, and 
 he a West Point graduate. How insane, or idiotic, or what? 
 for it can be nothing less than insanity, or idiocy which is 
 worse, or a mere spiteful, childish, womanish denial, for 
 the mere indulgence of contradiction to say that an abattia 
 would not have averted an attack which he had invited, 
 which he does not deny. 
 
 Monday March 31st. It is stated that, through the 
 pickets, there are indications of attack. We having heard 
 on good authority of many thousands of the enemy being 
 five miles off, at Monterey, toward Corinth : and Captain 
 Sharp, 46th Ohio, testifies that there were five thousand 
 rebel troops at Monterey the 1st of April, 1862. 
 
 General Sherman testifies that this entry of the 31st of 
 March must have been fabricated after its date, because 
 our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on the ground 
 five days after it was made. Suppose they were on the 
 ground, &c., as they were not for he says that from the 
 31st of March to the 2d of April part of his division was 
 up at Eastport, and there is an inference that the charge of 
 making the entry after its date was elicited by his (Sher- 
 man's) supposition that the writer intended to indicate this 
 absence as a sure means of inviting an attack, as it was, 
 while the entry, for other reasons, had been made before 
 his return. JSTor is it true that either " squadrons, regi-
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 127 
 
 ments, and brigades" were on the ground (in our front) Jive 
 days after the 31st of March. He says he was away the 
 1st, till the 2d, late on which, and the 3d, he had scouting 
 parties out at night, which is one day, and perhaps a little 
 more, of the five. He was out on the 4th, in the afternoon, 
 part of a day, and first tells of knowing there were the 
 elements of an array in his front. This is two days of the 
 five. He tells on this day, the 4th, that he did not know 
 the destination and purpose of an enemy from whom there 
 was reason to expect an attack the 3d. On the 5th he says 
 he had no cavalry. But to go back to the 31st of March, 
 the main entry of which is, that Sherman is inviting an 
 attack for which we are unprepared. This was not only 
 the case, but the troops were purposely kept unprepared. 
 All knew that the woods in front should have been cut 
 away. The colonel of the 46th had cleared off the woods 
 and other obstacles in front and rear, and other regiments, 
 seeing an Old Graduate preparing for danger, would have 
 followed his example, on the right, at least, as they after- 
 wards fortified on the march to Corinth. Bat axes could 
 not be had on requisition, and there was not one grindstone 
 in camp till two came irp for the 46th Ohio on the 5th, late 
 in the afternoon.* Quartermaster Giesy, of the 46th, tes- 
 tified that he never could get either clothing or tools before 
 the battle. The quartermaster sergeant, Parsons, testifies 
 that he never could get even the twenty-two axes, a requi- 
 sition for which was allowed, till after the battle, and that the 
 division quartermaster would receive no stores turned over 
 to him before the battle, the meaning of which is this : In 
 the early, and indeed in all stages of the war, to save time 
 and attention, &c., all sorts of stores, and especially tools, 
 went anywhere or nowhere; one regiment would get the 
 supply of three or four, and thus two or three were 
 destitute until the over-supplied regiment turned the sur- 
 plus over to some quartermaster, to be redistributed. But 
 
 * Ordered by its colonel; the quartermaster keeping no such imple- 
 ments. (W. P.G.)
 
 128 SHILOH. 
 
 Sherman would not allow his quartermaster to receive 
 stores in this way, lest; he (Sherman) should be made respon- 
 sible. This he said himself, as can easily be proven by at 
 least one officer of volunteers, who remonstrated with him 
 on the consequences at Pittsburgh. These consequences 
 were, that there were no tools to fortify, and these stores 
 were thrown away, unless turned over by one regimental 
 quartermaster to another. In this way a few axes were 
 got on the 5th of April by the 46th from the 57th, but it 
 was too late. And in this way, by refusing even the means 
 of defense, even ammunition, was dug the graves of the 
 thousands who alone held their ground at Shiloh, and hold 
 it yet; and this is justified on the ground that defenses 
 would have invited an attack. 
 
 In his evidence as to the entry of the 31st, Sherman up- 
 sets his whole charge of "fabrication," made the moment 
 before by his own evidence, that for weeks Col. Worthing- 
 tori had been predicting the worst that is predicting, he 
 says, defeat for want of defenses. It is not the fact that 
 Colonel W. openly predicted defeat,* but he expected it, 
 and with a really energetic enemy it would have occurred 
 about the 1st of April, 1862, or ten days before that date, 
 on the junction of Johnson with Bragg, at Corinth, the 
 20th March. The entry of April 3, that there was disorder 
 at the landing, Sherman declares to be false and libelous, 
 but swears there was confusion no general could have pre- 
 vented. What's the difference between confusion and dis- 
 order ? The entry of April 3d suggests indications of an 
 attack. 
 
 In the cross-examination he swears it is false that there 
 were indications of an attack on the 3d, because no stronger 
 position was ever held by an army clearly a sequitur ? though 
 while he knew there was no hostile party within six miles 
 on the 3d, there was reason, he swears, to expect an attack. 
 Here he swears the same thing to be false and true. He 
 says afterwards, on the 4th of April, there was no hostile 
 
 *See McDowell's evidence.
 
 SHERMANS' EVIDENCE. 129 
 
 party known before that day nearer than Monterey, which 
 is but five miles out on the map which General Grant says 
 was made by Colonel McPherson ; and General Buell states 
 Monterey at the same distance; and Captain Sharpe, the 
 picket officer of the 46th, states this skirmish of the 4th at 
 two and a half miles from camp, which is likely the dis<- 
 tance, and not six miles. The diary entry of April 3d 
 states that the pickets are scarce a mile out, meaning, of 
 course, those of the 46th Ohio. This Sherman also swears 
 is false, and also swears that the Howell house, proven a 
 main picket station of the 46th Ohio, was but three-fourths 
 of a mile in front of his right center brigade. (See cross- 
 examination.) 
 
 The entry of April 3d suggests that the troops cover too 
 much ground (i. e., the divisions are too far apart.) This 
 General Sherman swears is false, and testifies that we did 
 not occupy too much ground. "General Buell's forces had 
 been expected rightfully for two weeks, and a place or gap 
 was left for his forces, though General Grant afterward 
 had determined to send Buell to Hamburgh," (four miles 
 above.) 
 
 Here again is evidence, pitched up and knocked down, 
 as are infidels in the Mohammedan "inferno."' Monkir 
 pitches them up on a red-hot fork, and Nekir knocks them 
 back with a white-hot sledge to all eternity, or sufficiently 
 purified for true believers. The military term " occupy- 
 ing two much ground," means that there are gaps in a line 
 of troops. Sherman swears that that gap is no gap, if 
 intended to be filled ; that the intention of filling it has 
 been altered ; and he swears in terms that the intention to 
 fill the gap with troops intended for another post makes a 
 falsehood of the suggestion that there was any gap to be 
 filled in the line. So it was left open over a mile wide for 
 the enemy, by which to attack our flanks and rear, as he 
 says in his report the enemy did to some purpose on the 
 6th of April, 1862. Having thus answered its intended 
 purpose of letting in the enemy, without making use of 
 Buell's troops, either to fill the gap at Shiloh or fall on 
 9
 
 130 SHILOH. 
 
 the rebel right and rear at Hamburgh, he closes the gap on 
 the plan of the battle, which Badeau says was drawn by 
 McPherson and corrected by both Grant and Sherman. 
 These being all West Pointers, who dare deny the perfec- 
 tion of the map made since the battle? to back up Sher- 
 man's evidence. To fill this gap on the improved and 
 corrected and certified battle plan of Shiloh. Prentiss is 
 allowed an additional brigade he had not in the battle, and 
 McClernand has very kindly furnished the flank of a brig- 
 ade to fill up that line for which the imaginary brigade of 
 Prentiss was insufficient. So, on the map corrected since 
 the appropriate use of the same gap by the enemy on the 
 6th, we find a front respectably patched up for future his- 
 tory, to accompany Sherman's equally truthful letter of 
 January, 1865, for future history, as he says. 
 
 But, badinage thus provoked aside, how long will it be 
 that such evidence proves even a West Point graduate 
 fitted to command all the armies of the Union, with nothing 
 better to prove his capacity? It may also as well be re- 
 peated here, as will be seen by battle plan No. 2, that 
 Sherman's reported position of the three front divisions, 
 if true, entirely upsets this patched-up arrangement, and, 
 with flanks to the front, leaves a gap of two miles, where 
 there was really but one mile before, and this arrangement 
 is not much, if any, worse than that which existed with 
 regard to these divisions at 7 a. m. on the 6th of April, 
 1862. But to return to the present commander-in-chief, as 
 to his generalship and vigilance two days before the advent 
 of that battle, on which really rest his position and repu- 
 tation as a great military strategist and tactician, such as 
 was wanted by the Washington ring for the sole purpose 
 of spinning out the war. 
 
 The diary of April 3d further suggests, that the scattered 
 condition of the troops, (denied by General Sherman, see 
 map 2, with flanks to the front,) in case of a sudden attack, 
 might drive them back in detail all of which occurred, 
 according to the diary, as is generally admitted, and among 
 others by General Sherman himself in his report and by
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 131 
 
 his admirers. The diary of Friday, the 4th, barely refers 
 to the picket affair of that afternoon. The brigade orders 
 to stack arms were suggested by Colonel W. to Colonel 
 McDowell. The negligence charged refers to the desti- 
 tution of tools and defenses, the failure to close up the 
 gaps and make roads in rear of the lines, to cut away the 
 timber and brush in front, and make some preparation for 
 the imminent attack. 
 
 In his evidence, as to the entries of April 3d, is a digres- 
 sion by General Sherman, which this narrator is compelled 
 to follow, as it refers to the choice of the ground on which 
 the battle was fought. No one had imputed the choice 
 of this ground to General Grant, though it is plain it had 
 his approval before it was occupied by the Union army. 
 Bowman says that on the 14th March General Sherman, 
 with the leading division of Grant's army, passed up the 
 Tennessee ; so of course he was under the orders of General 
 Grant, who the day before (the 13th) had been "relieved 
 from his disgrace," &c., and reached Pittsburgh the 17th. 
 Orders were first given by Sherman to unload the boats 
 of the camp equipage the 18th, and the camp was not 
 really established till next day, 19th. Bowman, indorsed 
 by Sherman, further says, that Halleck decided to advance 
 up the Tennessee river as far as practicable by water, then 
 to debark on the west bank, &c., &c. 
 
 Grant is then plainly responsible for the debarkation at 
 Pittsburgh landing, and doubtless had Halleck's authority 
 to land on the west side. No objection to Bowman's state- 
 ment was ever made by either Grant or Halleck, and there 
 is ample ground for Whitelaw Reed's statement that men 
 of rank and ability have denied that the choice of this camp 
 can be laid on General C. F. Smith, as charged by Sherman 
 in the course of this evidence, when it was irrelevant and 
 uncalled-for: thus proving the choice his own. 
 
 Smith was a prudent soldier, when in a healthy state of 
 mind and body ; which he was not, entirely, after the cap- 
 ture of Fort Donelson. 
 
 It is a slander on his memory, of which Sherman affects
 
 182 SHILOH. 
 
 to be so careful, to say that he ever approved of such an ex- 
 pedition as that to Eastport, under such circumstances, 
 when the roads were impassable and flooded, and when 
 Grant supposed not less than 40,000 of the enemy were 
 along the railroad between Decatur and Corinth, as was 
 the fact; when Badeau considered Grant's situation at 
 Pittsburgh in imminent need of Buell's force of 40,000 men, 
 and Grant, aware of the danger, "had not been at Savan- 
 nah one hour, on the 17th, when he sent up Smith and 
 McClernand as fast as boats could carry them." On the 
 14th he (Sherman) was under command of Grant, acting 
 under orders of Halleck, to establish a camp on the west side 
 of the river. Sherman went up, then, on the 14th, he says, 
 under Grant's orders, and came down to Pittsburgh on the 
 16th, under Smith's orders, as he swears Monkir and Ne- 
 kir again. On the 18th he issues the first orders to go 
 into camp at Shiloh, Grant then being at Savannah, but 
 Smith again in command, if Sherman is worthy of credit on 
 his own contradictory evidence, which less credulous people 
 than this commentator might doubt, if he were not com- 
 mander-in-chief, &c., at present. 
 
 Sherman says he had orders from General Smith, and 
 took post accordingly. Took post on the 18th and 19th, 
 under Smith's command, when Grant was himself at Sa- 
 vannah, on the 17th, ordering Smith up, as Badeau says, 
 and says in terms, that he and Grant, as to the history of 
 Grant, are responsible for each other, as to the facts. "Par 
 nobile fratrum ! " Yet Sherman says Smith's own division 
 took post, under Smith's orders, thus contradicting Grant 
 and Badeau. What ought such evidence to be worth from 
 any one except a commander-in-chief, or the President him- 
 self, as to who located camp Shiloh ? And then, after this 
 endeavor to shift the responsbility, as to the choice of the 
 camp, from himself and Grant to C. F. Smith, he proceeds 
 in the most nonsensically extravagant laudation of the lo- 
 cation : 
 
 "Even as we were, (without defenses,) on the 6th of April, 
 the world afforded no more advantageous field of battle."
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 133 
 
 For the purposes intended was doubtless a mental reserva- 
 tion for which he very likely had antecedent, as he did have 
 subsequent absolution, and a very substantial blessing and 
 testimonial from Halleck. Though this matter must be re- 
 peated, yet to maintain the thread of this digest of indiges- 
 tive evidence, it may or must come in here. 
 
 "Flanks well protected," says the commander-in-chief, 
 "and never threatened ; troops in easy support ; timber and 
 broken ground giving good points to rally," &c. Now, if 
 we are to believe his division report of April 10, 1862, the 
 flanks, in many cases, were turned merely by a threatened 
 advance of the enemy, and the protection of the creeks was 
 nothing, not even equal to the twig that abraded the back 
 of his bridle hand, to the extent of a half dime of surface, 
 and passed for a ball through it. Troops in easy support, 
 he says, when no separate divisions were nearer than four 
 hundred to eighteen hundred yards, with interposing woods 
 or hollows. Timber and broken ground, which enabled the 
 enemy to approach within half musket-shot of his front, 
 and was far more advantageous to an advancing foe than to 
 a retreating force, which it was distinctly understood he 
 calculated and expected the force under his command would 
 and perhaps was intended to be. So says Whitelaw Reed. 
 
 And he proceeds to prove the advantages of this field, by 
 stating that, in consequence of the strength of the position, 
 but 10,000 or more of the troops who held their ground ran 
 away, while the main body was not driven back farther 
 than two and a half to eleven miles, or from Shiloh to Snake 
 creek and Savannah. Against these 60,000 chosen troops of 
 the South there were some 3,000 of the Union soldiers, who 
 alone held their ground, and hold it yet. They died, the 
 price of that blood-stained ground, for the possession of 
 which no soldier on either side need to have lost a drop of 
 blood, had Buell's troops, on Saturday afternoon, been sent, 
 as intended, to Hamburgh, four miles above. 
 
 Who for this shall, in the future, be held responsible 
 Halleck, or Grant, or Sherman ; or those who, to prolong 
 the war for political purposes, made the sacrifice necessary,
 
 134 SHILOH. 
 
 as Sherman says not only for the purpose he avows,* but 
 for the promotion and emolument of those who upheld this 
 horrid policy at the capital and in the field? 
 
 But to return to the evidence: "On Friday, the 4th," 
 says General Sherman, "no officer nor soldier, not even 
 Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can prove." 
 ' f Grant had marched twelve miles," Badeau says, "from 
 Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, in half a day." 
 
 The distance from Shiloh church to Corinth is about six- 
 teen miles, and the distance from Hamburgh to Corinth, 
 being about the same, was marched by the 81st Ohio in 
 seven hours, during the winter of 1863 ; hence the danger 
 of so close an enemy. 
 
 It will be shown, also, that General Sherman believed 
 this very day that the enemy was in sufficient force in his 
 immediate front to justify them in an attack and justify 
 him in expecting one, this 4th of April, 1862. Soon after 
 noon he says he heard distant musketry, and finally three 
 cannon shot, which could not be ours. 
 
 This was the first positive information of any approach- 
 ing force nearer than Monterey, (five miles.) He at once 
 rode out one and a half miles, and there waited the return 
 of Colonel Bucklandand Major Ricker, who reported encount- 
 ering infantry, artillery, and cavalry. "We then knew," 
 says Sherman, "we had the elements of an army in our 
 front, but did not know its strength or destination" or desti- 
 nation 1 Here is a major general who has testified that there 
 was reason to expect an attack on the 3d of April, the day 
 before who has had reason to believe the enemy had over 
 60,000 men at or near Corinth; who knew, or thought he 
 knew, the rebel army had marched from Corinth on the 
 morning of the day before, (the 3d ;) and he here makes 
 oath that there was no reason to expect an attack after 
 twenty-four hours had elapsed since the actual or supposed 
 march from Corinth had begun ! If he did believe in this 
 
 *It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, should come off, to test 
 the manhood of the two armies: that is, for the mere purpose of a battle, (as 
 this writer charged at the time,) to get him promoted.
 
 SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE. 135 
 
 absence of danger, was he fit for a commander? And if, in 
 the presence of such danger, he, on the morning of the 5th, 
 removed his cavalry and artillery from his front to the rear, 
 as he did remove them, is he an idiot, or worse ? 
 
 But he repeats this assumption of ignorance. He had 
 to guess the purpose of this enemy in his front, who had an- 
 nounced himself by the discharge of artillery and mus- 
 ketry. He sees wolf-tracks about a sheep-fold, or a hawk 
 hovering over a chicken yard, and has to guess alike the 
 purpose of the wolf or hawk, or enemy lying before him. 
 But this is no worse than swearing that there was no gap in 
 a line, because it was to have been filled by Buell, who was 
 to have been sent up to Hamburgh. He then adds, with the 
 utmost self-gratulation and self-approval, that no general 
 could have detected the approach of an enemy sooner than 
 he had done by allowing that enemy to approach unmo- 
 lested within gun-shot of his camp. After such testifying 
 as this, it is superfluous to say anything about his statement, 
 in terms, that he had, on the 3d of April, gone through and 
 one mile beyond Monterey,* on the road to Corinth, where 
 there had been 5,000 or more of the enemy for near a week 
 before. He tells us, through Bowman, that the importance 
 of the crisis was apparent, and that Buell was tardy in his 
 march towards Shiloh, knowing the danger threatening the 
 Army of the Tennessee, as Badeau says, on and after the 
 17th March. Or that seventeen days before this time (the 
 4th of April, 1862) there was danger, and yet Sherman 
 swears, on the 4th, there was none, and proves it as above. 
 
 "Thus, while Buckland," he continues, "was guarding 
 safely our front, the colonel of another brigade, in a safe 
 corner, was looking for an attack every hour," thus again 
 upsetting his charge of fabricating apprehension of an at- 
 tack, after the event had passed. This witness then proceeds 
 to say that Colonel W. could have heard of no such thing 
 as rebel artillery across the valley from the camp ; and this 
 
 *If he went out, as he says, six miles, he must have gone a mile beyond 
 Monterey, according to his official map. W. P. G.
 
 136 SHILOH. 
 
 same evidence is thrice repeated in the course of his exami- 
 nation. He states that he has given a history of events dur- 
 ing a week preceding the battle "From the 2d to the ^th 
 of April I have given an account. ' ' What account has he 
 given of anything occurring Friday night, or Saturday, or 
 Saturday night, or Sunday, or Sunday night ? Not a word. 
 As will be seen, he denies everything material which occur- 
 red, and which plainly, as the lightning fortells the thunder, 
 foretold the bloody storm of death and destruction Grant and 
 he had invoked, and which was hovering over that beguiled 
 and fated army. The storm, which he of course avoided 
 doing anything to avert, and of which, for his own personal 
 purposes, was the veriest demon, from the fatal whirr of its 
 first deadly shaft, till it had strewn its myriads of murdered 
 and mangled victims over its crimsoned track; all of this 
 slaughter and destruction inuring to the benefit of those 
 who were and now are their blood-stained architects, whether 
 in or out of the Army of the Tennessee in the West, or the 
 political war "ring" at Washington. 
 
 NOTE. The most fallacious part of the statement by Sherman, as to what 
 occurred during the week before the battle, is that, in which he swears that 
 our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on the ground (in front, of course) 
 five days after the 31st of March, 1862. He then swears, as noted, that from 
 the 31st to the 2d he was at Eastport; and he also swears on cross-examina- 
 tion that he had no cavalry at his command on the oth of April, the very day 
 before the battle. He says not a word of what is made known by Colonel 
 Stuart and Lieut. Fitch, that the artillery was also withdrawn on the morn- 
 ing of the 5th. He is silent about the pickets being driven in and the rebel 
 artillery in his front the same day. And in this state of facts he swears that, 
 knowing a hostile army to be in front, which there is evidence he believed 
 had 60,000 men, he did not know their destination and had to guess their 
 purpose. 
 
 He had then no squadrons, regiments, or brigades out on the 5th, and his 
 five days are thus, by his own showing, reduced to two, on neither of which was 
 he ever three miles beyond the front of his camp. Could Argus, of the hundred 
 eyes, have been more vigilant? But his five days of activity, stated as such, 
 are on oath reduced to little over two; and yet again, on oath, these two are 
 at the close of his evidence increased to seven, like FalstafFs men in buck- 
 ram, to which are gratuitously added three days after the battle in going up 
 to destroy the Bear-creek bridge. 
 
 This point, being at the time undefended, passes among his deeds of chivalry 
 into the same category as the heroic action related by the venerable philoso- 
 pher, such as the valiant destruction of a very dangerous but abandoned 
 rebel camp and the more glorious capture of a hospital empty, or filled with 
 sick and wounded men our modern Franklin does not say. Such an omis- 
 sion!
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 137 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND THE COUNTER EVI- 
 DENCE AGAINST HIM. 
 
 "I was perfectly willing that the enemy should attack us and think Beau- 
 regard made a fatal mistake when he did it; but I deny that the enemy had 
 a battery near the Howell house that afternoon, April 5, 1862." (Sherman's 
 cross- examination August, 1862.) 
 
 Captain Sharpe, 46th Ohio, was sworn and testifies: 
 
 "I saw the piece of artillery myself to the right of the Widow Howell's 
 house. I reported the circumstance to General Sherman, who said hewsuld 
 have the (his) artillery in readiness." (Record of Colonel Washington's trial 
 at Memphis, August, 1862.) 
 
 General Sherman, being asked what entries of the 3d of 
 April were false in this diary, replied, as above stated, that 
 it was false to state that Sherman had forbidden his quar- 
 termaster receiving anything, (stores;) that there were indi- 
 cations of an attack, is false; that we covered too much 
 ground, is false; that our pickets were only a mile out, is 
 false, &c. ; and on question as to whether he heard of any 
 rebel artillery near the Howell house Saturday afternoon, 
 he answered that he had not. He testifies that on Satur- 
 day, the 5th, he had no cavalry subject to his orders, but 
 about dark that evening eight companies of the 4th Illinois 
 reported to him for duty. He testified " that no pickets were 
 driven out of the Howell house on Saturday. The house," 
 he says, " which I call the Widow Howell's house, was in a 
 field, near a lane, in Buckland's front, about three-quarters 
 of a mile from his center. Our pickets were a mile in front 
 of that house. I was perfectly willing the enemy should 
 attack us, and think Beauregard made & fatal mistake when 
 he did it; but I deny that the enemy had a battery near the 
 Howell house that Saturday afternoon. The house was in 
 a large field, and no place for pickets. It was not a picket 
 station, and pickets there were of no use. The fork of the 
 road in front was the key-point of the attack, and that point 
 was watched." " Did you know," asked Colonel W., " that
 
 138 SHILOH. 
 
 the pickets were driven in from Weaver's house on Satur- 
 day?" "Answer. I know of no such house; no such house 
 was a picket station. None of the pickets were driven in" (on 
 Saturday, April 5th.) 
 
 "I know," said the prosecutor, at the close of his cross- 
 examination, "that Colonel Worthington knew his duties 
 well, and wondered that he should disregard them." 
 
 On question by Colonel Worthington, whether he, to 
 Sherman's knowledge, had ever neglected any duty in his 
 regiment, Sherman answered, "I will allege none except 
 such as are charged here; I leave that to his brigadier.*' 
 
 The evidence above given will show what ground there 
 was for the charge of conduct unworthy of an officer and a 
 gentleman, and for the specification that he had fabricated 
 a false diary after the event, (the battle,) and this, when 
 none but an idiot would fabricate or write anything but 
 the facts that really occurred after their occurrence. 
 
 On being called by the defense, General Sherman testi- 
 fied as follows: "The charges were substantially drawn by 
 me. I placed the subject-matter in the hands of the judge 
 advocate for trial. I heard nothing of any (rebel) guns on 
 our left (front) on Saturday. I do not know Captain Sharpe; 
 I may have seen him; I did not tell an} 7 person on Satur- 
 day afternoon that I would have the artillery harnessed up, 
 unless for inspection." (His artillery had been withdrawn.) 
 
 REBEL ARTILLERY ON THE 5TH. 
 
 Colonel Buckland, (a great friend of General Sherman,) 
 testifies: "All I heard of artillery on Saturday was this : 
 Some of my pickets thought they had seen the glimmer 
 of a brass gun. I looked, but could see nothing of the 
 kind. I went over to General Sherman's headquarters and 
 reported that some of the pickets thought they had seen 
 artillery, but that I could not discover any." 
 
 Captain Sharpe, of trie 46th Ohio, testified that "there 
 was a piece of artillery near the Howell house, to the right, 
 on Saturday evening. He supposed it was rebel artillery.
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 139 
 
 It was pointed to our camp. It was first observed in 
 the early part of the afternoon. I did not see it until 5 
 p. m. I reported the circumstance both to Colonel Mc- 
 Dowell and General Sherman. General Sherman said he 
 would have the (his) artillery in readiness. I saw the 
 piece of artillery myself to the right of Widow HowelPs 
 house." 
 
 Lieutenant Crary, picket officer of the 46th Ohio, testi- 
 fied as to the artillery as follows : "Saturday afternoon, 
 April 5th, I rode along the pickets of the 40th Illinois. 
 They reported that they had seen several pieces of artillery 
 posted near the Howell house, southeast of the house. I 
 may have reported the number of guns at three, but I do 
 not recollect doing so. I heard of some artillery that 
 afternoon opposite Hildebrand's brigade, (the left.) I re- 
 ported to Captain Harlan, on Colonel McDowell's staff." 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Wai cut, 46th Ohio, testified as 
 follows : 
 
 "I do not remember hearing of any artillery on Saturday, April 5, except 
 Captain Sharpe thought there was some. When leaving Paducah there was 
 nothing but corn for the mules. We had but little ammunition." 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Walcut was a 
 particular friend and admirer of his patron, General Sher- 
 man. (W. P. G.) 
 
 Evidence as to pickets of 'Sherman' 's division at Shiloh, Saturday, 
 April 5, 1862. 
 
 Colonel Buckland, commanding the 4th brigade, testi- 
 fies: 
 
 "The pickets fell back Saturday morning without my orders." 
 
 (Much of Buckland's testimony has been eliminated from 
 
 the record, and it was unwillingly given, unless in favor of 
 
 Sherman.) 
 
 Colonel Hildebrand, commanding 3d brigade, testifies : 
 
 " The infantry pickets were driven in on Saturday. I endeavored to re- 
 place them, but was prevented by the rebel cavalry. This was near Lee's 
 house. Pickets were driven from that position some time in the afternoon of 
 Saturday, the 5th April."
 
 140 SHILOH. 
 
 Captain Sharpe, chief picket officer of 46th Ohio volun- 
 teer infantry : 
 
 "I went out on picket duty about the 25th March. Before Shiloh I made 
 headquarters at Weaver's. About the 1st of April made a post at Widow 
 Howell's. From Mrs. Howell's to Weaver's is three hundred or four hun- 
 dred yards. Moore's is not more than half a mile from camp. There were 
 two pickets fired on at Moore's March 25th to 27th by two cavalry. I was 
 at a picket skirmish Friday evening, the 4th of April, about two and a half 
 miles from camp. The pickets were driven from the Howell house on Saturday 
 about 7 a. m. There were no pickets that I know of in front of the Howell 
 house on the Corinth road. I never saw Colonel McDowell at picket there 
 while I was there. I never saw General Sherman there. I was at Pea 
 ridge (5 miles) about April 1st. Drove in their pickets, and was informed 
 by farmers that there were 5,000 infantry there. The pickets of McDowell's 
 brigade on Saturday were at Moore's, (half mile from camp.) Howell's was 
 recognized as one oif the picket posts of the 1st brigade, 5th division. The 
 Howell house was on the left of our brigade. There were no pickets between 
 my post and the enemy. I reported to Colonel McDowell habitually. I do 
 not know of any pickets from any of the other brigades in front of the Howell 
 house on Saturday, the day before the battle. 
 
 " Question by Colonel W. Were not the enemy in possession of the Howell 
 house all day Saturday ? 
 
 " Answer. They were. 
 
 "Captain H. E.Giesy, company F, appeared, and was sworn. 
 
 "Question by prisoner. Do you recollect my order for two compauies to lie 
 on their arms ? 
 
 " Answer. I recollect your ordering two companies to lie on their arms the 
 Friday before the battle. We had been drilling two weeks in the manual of 
 arms, and you directed them to practice in loading and firing." 
 
 " Question by prisoner. Where did you first see the charges now under in- 
 vestigation?" 
 
 (Ruled out by the court as improper and irrelevant. Cap- 
 tain Griesy was the officer who obtained surreptitious pos- 
 session of a proof sheet of Colonel W's diary extracts, and 
 took the same to General Sherman, for which he was pro- 
 moted to the majority of the regiment over seven or eight 
 older in rank and abler captains.) 
 
 Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the brigade, testi- 
 fied as follows, on question by Colonel W. : 
 
 "I do not know that I ever heard you predict any actual disaster. On 
 Monday or Tuesday before the battle you insisted that we would be attacked, 
 and complained of the want of tools." 
 
 Lieutenant George F. Crary, 46th Ohio, sworn: 
 
 " Question by prisoner. Did you see me on Saturday morning out with the 
 pickets? 
 
 "A. I saw you out there early in the morning. We were driven away 
 about 7 a. m., (Sept. 5, 1862.) I heard a rebel drum beat Friday afternoon. 
 The beat appeared to be in more than one regiment." 
 
 Colonel David Stuart, 55th Illinois, testified: 
 
 "Had no artillery on that day, (day of the battle.) It was taken away
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 141 
 
 Saturday morning, and annexed to General Smith's division. If the artil- 
 lery had remained, I think I should have lost it, from circumstances that 
 occurred during the battle." 
 
 Timothy N. Ward, hospital steward, sworn, testified : 
 
 _"That while at Fort Pickering Colonel Worthington had visited the hos- 
 pital almost daily. He had generally visited the hospital regularly on the 
 march." 
 
 Colonel T. Kilby Smith, 54th Ohio, sworn, testified: 
 
 "That his camp, in Sherman's 2d brigade, was about three'quarters of a 
 mile from and west of the river. When Lick creek was fordable at the Ham- 
 burgh ford, it was fordable above," (everywhere.) 
 
 (Much of an omission here. W. P. Gr.) 
 Testified further : 
 
 "That, when shown the diary extracts, he was told that they were to be 
 considered confidential. That Colonel W. had told him at the time that he 
 had written or intended to write a letter to go to him (Halleck) with the 
 diary extracts." 
 
 Lieutenant J. A. Fitch, Waterhouse's battery, sworn: 
 
 "On the evening of April 5, the battery was near Sherman's headquarters, 
 about sixty rods from (and in rear of) fcihiloh Church. Barrett's battery was 
 on our left. The park faced to the river. Came into camp on the 5th April, 
 (at dark.") 
 
 (This puts the flank of the artillery to the front. W. P. 
 G.) 
 
 It will be seeen by Colonel Smith's evidence that there 
 was no use for the 2d brigade where it was. Watching the 
 ford was all a pretence ; and Lick creek, as a defence, was 
 utterly worthless, being fordable all the way up when ford- 
 able at the Hamburgh crossing. 
 
 Lieutenant Fitch swears that the artillery was not parked 
 in line of battle, as Sherman says it was in his report. He 
 also testified that he came in at the same time as the 4th 
 Illinois cavalry about dark. (Record mutilated, as in 
 many other cases.) 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENCE. 
 
 It is plain that, as to the fabrication of the diary after the 
 event, the point of the charge and specifications of conduct 
 unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, Sherman has set- 
 tled the matter by his evidence against the truth of the 
 charge and specification. The question then arises, what
 
 142 SHILOH. 
 
 is the mental constitution of any man who repeatedly and 
 deliberately convicts himself of every charge against him- 
 self in the diary, on which he founds the charge of false- 
 hood and libel? 
 
 Swearing it is false,, and admitting on oath that it is true 
 in most cases, and swearing against notorious facts as to the 
 pickets and rebel artillery, plainly because he had failed to 
 mention them in his report, and failing to mention them, 
 because such mention would be evidence of more than the 
 neglect charged by the diary itself Is such a man of sound 
 mind or substantive integrity, or not? Eminent lawyers are 
 of opinion that this evidence against plain facts cannot prop- 
 erly be considered perjury, because the statements are so 
 easily overturned outside his own evidence, if that were not 
 sufficient. Calling these statements, then, the mere ebulli- 
 tions of ill temper or unguardedness, or vindictiveness, they 
 demonstrate at least one thing ; that is, the perfect confi- 
 dence of impunity, confidence in association or league with 
 these, or toleration or license from those for whose benefit 
 or whose objects these reckless actions or contradictory or 
 anomalous statements are made ; and the same reckless con- 
 fidence, not only of impunity, but of official approbation, 
 runs through all this commander's words and operations, 
 down to the Jo. -Johnston treaty at Durham station, where 
 the object of his employment for the protraction of the war 
 having ceased, it became necessary to check a career which, 
 if permitted further, might have exposed all the nefarious 
 jobbing, juggling, and selfish, intriguing policy of the po- 
 litical cabal at Washington throughout the war. On the 
 theory of his employment for such a purpose, and on no 
 other, can his unaccountable and extravagant words and 
 actions become intelligible. His outrageous order of March, 
 1867, attaching all the great military bureaus to his person- 
 al staff, and his bullying letter to Congress as to his pay, 
 are all traceable to the same source, and require to be curbed 
 in time, by putting him out of a place he is unfit for. And 
 now to a brief exposition of the balance of the evidence 
 brought out on this cross-examination, for the purpose of
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 143 
 
 obtaining which this trial was striven for with rather too 
 much success, according to the result, by the prisoner in the 
 case. 
 
 The truth of all the diary extracts, charged by the pros- 
 ecutor as false, having been proven, these extracts require 
 little more attention. The withdrawal of the cavalry pick- 
 ets on Saturday morning, when plainly more necessary than 
 before, was so extraordinary an incident, that General Sher- 
 man, after swearing that his squadrons of cavalry, &c., were 
 in the front from the 1st to the 6th of April, expunges his 
 veracity, as usual, by the evidence that he had no cavalry 
 subject to his command on Saturday, the 5th of April, 1862 . 
 
 From Senator Sherman's speech in the Congressional 
 Globe of May, 1862, it will be seen that this same with- 
 drawal of his cavalry pickets has been stated in a letter to 
 his brother, the Senator, thus making Grant clearly respon- 
 sible for a measure calculated to induce an attack ; to pre- 
 vent, by the capture of a picket, any news reaching the enemy 
 of Buell's vicinity, and doubtless intended to lull the Union 
 army into security, when on the verge of destruction. The 
 driving back of the pickets of three brigades is clearly proven 
 by Buckland, Hildebrand, and officers Sharp and Crary. It 
 is plainly proven that all day of the 5th, after 7 a. m., the 
 Howell house, a most important picket station, three-fourths 
 of a mile from Sherman's center, was in possession of the 
 enemy. 
 
 His persistent swearing that no rebel artillery was or 
 could possibly have been seen or heard of in his front 
 that day (the 5th) is clear proof, if any were wanting of 
 his entire knowledge of the fact proven by his especial 
 friends, Buckland and Walcot, and picket officers Crary 
 and Sharpe, 46th Ohio. Not a word of what this evidence 
 disclosed was dispatched to Halleck, (who did not want it,) 
 nor to the War Office at Washington, as required by arti- 
 cle 34 of the Army Regulations; nor was such news wanted 
 there, and if there, it would have been, long ere this, re- 
 moved or destroyed. This evidence was examined at the 
 Judge Advocate General's office. This false swearing could
 
 144 SHILOH. 
 
 not have been unnoticed. What is then the inference? 
 What else than that this promoter or rectifier of justice was 
 also in the interest of the combined cabals in and out of Con- 
 gress, in the Cabinet, or in the field? And here it may be 
 mentioned that, as part of the plan to prolong the war with- 
 out making the policy public, article 34, section 448 (per- 
 haps) of the Army Regulations, requiring the commanders 
 of armies in the field, generals of divisions, &c., to forward 
 from day to day their orders issued, and important infor- 
 mation obtained, was dispensed with in this campaign, es- 
 pecially in the case of General Sherman, and, of course, 
 that of other officers in the war. 
 
 (Sherman swears he was perfectly willing the enemy should 
 attack us, and thinks Beauregard made a fatal mistake when 
 he did it. He thus proves the truth of the diary entry of 
 March 31st, that he was inviting an attack for which we were 
 not prepared, which he has denied, yet, in contradiction, 
 as usual, he tells Colonel Buckland reprovingly, that on the 
 4th he might have brought on an attack, for which we were 
 not ready on that day. He was, of course, less prepared 
 on the 5th, when the cavalry and artillery were withdrawn. 
 And on the 6th, with no axes before that day to clear off 
 and defend the front, we were not prepared for anything 
 but the defeat that followed. So, while expecting an attack 
 (it cannot be too often repeated) on the 3d and on the 4th, 
 and more than ever defenceless, with an enemy in gunshot, 
 on the 5th he writes to Grant he has no expectation of an 
 attack. And knowing all the incidents of Saturday, Grant 
 dispatches an order to Halleck, "Not the least danger, but 
 will be prepared if there is " for a defeat. W. P. G.) 
 
 Sherman swears that he was willing that the enemy 
 should make the attack, but made a fatal mistake in making 
 it. Here is a plain expression of his mental reservation, 
 that, as he knew, the attack would have been fatal to the 
 enemy if Buell's troops had been sent up to Hamburgh at 
 any time before daylight, or even later, on the 6th, to fall 
 upon the rebel right and rear, in camp little if any thing 
 over a mile, by Grant's and Badeau's map, from that place.
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 145 
 
 All this Sherman tells us should have been done when he 
 says the attack was a mistake, which, instead of being fatal 
 to Beauregard, was fatal to 13,000 Union troops. What 
 else could have made the rebel attack fatal to them but the 
 exposure of their right and rear, which would have been 
 fatal if Buell had been sent up as intended. It is one of 
 the most unaccountable events of the war that A. S. John- 
 son should have occupied such a dangerous position a sin- 
 gle moment. The only reason which can be given that it 
 was not fatal to his army is, that Grant and Sherman, act- 
 ing by authority, designed and preferred the slaughter and 
 loss of 13,000 Union troops to a total defeat of the enemy, 
 in which Buell' s troops should have had a part, or preferred 
 a defeat, because essential to prolong the war, as this de- 
 feat did prolong it. 
 
 Beauregard himself, as has been written, was aware of 
 the danger of an attack where he was Saturday afternoon, 
 and a single messenger from Grant Saturday afternoon or 
 night, with news that Nelson's division was at Savannah, 
 would have scattered the hostile army like autumn leaves. 
 Grant knew, and it is believed was urged to attack by 
 McPherson, who knew, from a reconnoissance, that the 
 enemy were at the bend of Lick creek, northwest of Ham- 
 burgh. 
 
 Sherman closes this remarkable and almost unconscious 
 disclosure of his intentional neglect or failure to send up 
 Buell's troops, by the repeated denial, on oath, that there 
 was hostile artillery Saturday afternoon near the Howell 
 house. And he swears this, while he knew that the enemy 
 had more than one battery two or three miles out the day 
 before, with nothing to prevent them taking possession of 
 our picket stations next day, as they did. This evidence 
 against plain facts is clearly to cover the criminal with- 
 drawal of his own artillery, to show the enemy that he hajl 
 no suspicion of their immediate presence ; a presence made 
 known by their cannon and musketry the day before, as 
 well as by Major Kicker's assurance that he had met the 
 10
 
 146 SHILOH. 
 
 van of Beauregard's army on the 4th in the afternoon. 
 This is another phase of Shermanic strategy. 
 
 He then proceeds, in his usual absurd and self-contradic- 
 tory way, to swear that there were no pickets at the Ho well 
 house, or, if there, were of no use there. That, neverthe- 
 less, the key -point towards his center was the fork of the 
 road in front of the house, and that that point was watched; 
 yet he says in the same breath it was no place for pickets. 
 How was it watched except by pickets or guards, or senti- 
 nels, supposed to be out of sight of the camp? He was 
 right in his statement that the road fork near the house 
 was a key-point, where hostile marching columns could 
 unite for the attack on his center, as they did next morn- 
 ing. The first rebel troops seen by this narrator on Sun- 
 day morning were marching past the Howell house. That 
 was the reason, (the direct road to our center passed this 
 point) why it had been held by the hostile artillery the day 
 before. Here is where part of Sherman's artillery should 
 have been, instead of in his rear, and this is one key of his 
 perpetual denial of artillery at a point . which proclaimed 
 Grant's criminal neglect and his own; or, if this was 
 the result of design, the design made them the mere hired 
 instruments of party operators in patronage and blood. 
 
 Then, as if to clinch the flimsy fabric of his evidence with 
 a handful of sand, he swears wildly that no Union pickets 
 were driven in on Saturday, the day before the battle. This 
 was sworn in the face of the direct evidence of his whole di- 
 vision, had it been called up, and the question again arises, 
 what could have given him confidence in impunity and ap- 
 probation, except the contract and collusion established by 
 his every act as a commander, and every word as a witness 
 against an officer he had commended for his conduct on the 
 field ; an officer who had striven hard without avail, against 
 his opposition, to rescue that army from the bloody and dis- 
 astrous fate for which, by him and Grant, it had purposely 
 been prepared. 
 
 General Grant, as has been related, was out at Shiloh 
 Saturday afternoon, and remained on his boat at the land-
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 147 
 
 ing till near 11 p. m. of that day, the 5th. If it has not 
 been recorded, it may have reference here thatG-rant, in his 
 history by Badeau, barely mentions that he rode out to 
 Sherman's lines the day after the 4th, and concurred with 
 him that there was no danger of an attack both had expect- 
 ed, according to Sherman's evidence, on the 3d and 4th pre- 
 vious. But to conceal that this was the 5th, he states 
 immediately after, that in returning from the front on the 
 4th Grant was hurt by a fall from his horse. It is however 
 distinctly to be understood from Badeau that on the 5th, 
 after giving an, order to Nelson, Grant having made all his 
 preparations for removing his headquarters to Pittsburgh on 
 the morrow, did not go out to Shiloh, but remained to meet 
 JBuell, as that officer had desired, Buell having, by dispatch 
 on the 4th, desired to meet him at Savannah on the 5th. 
 
 Now, with such plain subterfuge, planned with so much 
 secretive care, plain to any narrator seeking for truth, what 
 respect or indulgence can the author of such petty deception 
 merit, whatever his position, and supposing his service as a 
 commander had been anything but worse than negative in 
 its character. Especially when, upon such subterfuge, ig- 
 norance is feigned of the occurrences of April 5th, when, with 
 all these occurrences before him, he dispatches to Halleck 
 that day or night that he has not the faintest idea of an at- 
 tack he evidently has been expecting for at least three days 
 before. He knew everything about the driving in of the pick- 
 ets on the 5th, and the presence of rebel artillery in sight 
 through the woods, from the Union picket posts within a 
 few hundred yards of the camp. Sherman testifies on oath, 
 and writes to his brother, the Senator, that Grant had taken 
 away his cavalry pickets early Saturday morning, and this 
 is confirmed by Major Ricker, 5th Ohio cavalry. Grant 
 knew also that, as Captain Stuart swears, the artillery of 
 Sherman's line had, the same morning, been taken to the 
 rear, and Stuart's was not returned at all. 
 
 All this had been done on the morning of the 5th, with 
 the knowledge that on the 4th, as Sherman swears, he 
 knew there were the elements of a hostile army in his front,
 
 148 SHILOH. 
 
 when their drum beats had been heard, yet these " great 
 commanders were innocent of the destination and purpose 
 of this army," so welcomed by them to their open front and 
 unsuspecting troops. The cannon and musketry with which 
 Sherman says they announced their presence on the 4th 
 appears and remains at our picket posts all next day to take 
 a regular rest and brush up for attack, and yet a dispatch 
 goes to headquarters that as Sherman says all is quiet along 
 my lines, and Grant repeats, "All's well," as it was for the 
 protraction of the war by the destruction of a Union army 
 of 40,000 men. And then, because of the place and power 
 thus attained, it is gravely argued that these commanders 
 must be treated with all the respect and consideration pur- 
 chased by crimes like these. If there is any other explana- 
 tion, let it be made known. 
 
 Now, to sum this matter up again with truth, and not with 
 fiction, or silence, or concealment, as has been always done, 
 what is the condition of affairs on Saturday night, the 5th 
 of April, 1862, under which the commander at the camp 
 writes to the commander at Savannah that "he does not 
 apprehend an attack on his position ?" 
 
 By his own evidence, well sustained in this case, Sherman 
 had reason to expect an attack on his position on the 3d of 
 April. He admitted to Buckland apprehension of an attack 
 on the 4th of April, on which day Nelson is informed that 
 he is not wanted till the 8th. The enemy drive in his pic- 
 kets, and occupy his nearest picket station with their can- 
 non on the 5th, on which day he not only sends no cavalry 
 pickets out, but his cavalry and artillery are withdrawn to 
 the rear. All such active and energetic preparations to meet 
 the enemy are made on the eve of battle, in accordance with 
 the Grant-Shermanic strategy and tactics of keeping all 
 flanks presented to the enemy,, and avoiding defences, which 
 invite an attack. These are the preparations in accordance 
 with the dictates of the protractive policy. Grant knows on 
 the day of these organizations for defeat, i. e. on the 5th, 
 that Nelson's division of say 7,000 men is at Savannah be- 
 fore noon of that day, spite of advice to keep back and not
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 149 
 
 intrude on his and Sherman's battle-ground till wanted. 
 And this intrusion is the more impertinent, since Grant and 
 Sherman knew Saturday afternoon that the right flank and 
 rear of the adventurous Southrons is little over a mile (by 
 Badeau) from the Tennessee river at Hamburgh, two miles 
 above our left at Shiloh. Grant knows that by a movement 
 of our army that night, or in early morning, a few miles out 
 on the lower Pudy and west Corinth roads, his troops will 
 be in position to attack the rebel left. He knows that the 
 divisions of Lew. Wallace at Crump's, and Nelson with Buell 
 at Savannah, can run up to Hamburgh at any appointed 
 hour of the night of the 5th, or early morning of the 6th of 
 April, 1862, when there will be say 14,000 Union troops on 
 the rebel right and rear, and near 40,000 opposite their left 
 and center. And he knows that by such simple dispositions 
 of the Union troops the hostile army must be scattered or 
 captured without material bloodshed. 
 
 And now, was it because of his unwillingness that BuelFs 
 troops should have a share in such success, or because of 
 secret instructions, under agreement to prolong the war, 
 ~by the loss of a battle, that he foregoes all this easy advant- 
 age, and allows our army to sleep in false security? Does 
 he, for the furtherance of this "protraction," hide from his 
 own and from Buell' s troops the presence of the enemy, 
 leaving them thus exposed to wanton slaughter, and sacri- 
 fices 13,000 Union soldiers to his own blind and bloody 
 jealousy, or for the political purposes of the Washington 
 cabal, let his preparations for disaster reach their legiti- 
 mate or illegitimate result. If his reasons were personal, 
 what, in comparison to this, was the whole crime of the 
 rebellion, and why should he so long have enjoyed power 
 and impunity instead of punishment? If unde r instructions 
 or by agreement, what punishment would be too severe for 
 both principals and instruments of such atrocity? If it was 
 mere stupidity, stolidity, or incapacity, what should be the 
 fate of his employers, and why should he remain in power 
 where he is? Whatever the private motive whatever 
 the party or public policy the salient result is plain and
 
 150 SHILOH. 
 
 prominent. A glorious and next to bloodless victory 
 was given up to the enemy worse than thrown away on 
 the 6th ; exchanged for intended disaster by the Union 
 commander ; bartered for future place and patronage by the 
 Washington cabal ; and 40,000 Union troops sold, labeled, 
 and consigned to a bloody and disgraceful defeat. 
 
 Who can, on the evidence of the above-stated trial, with 
 collateral incidents and facts, put any other construction on 
 the acts and neglects of these commanders before, on, and 
 after the 6th day of April. 1862. 
 
 The great effort of Grant and Badeau, Sherman and 
 Bowman, has been to impress upon the public, as they seem 
 to have done successfully, that if Buell had been up in time, 
 not only would the disaster of the 6th have been prevented, 
 but they would have attacked the Confederate army. Buell 
 ivas up in time, and the most favorable time for the utter 
 rout of the enemy, yet they made no use of these troops, 
 when, as all admit and none deny, an attack would have 
 been a victory. This refusal, then, of these Army of the 
 Ohio troops, when they were upon time, and exact time, 
 is ample evidence of keeping Buell back, even if that of 
 General Ammen and Grant's dispatch to Nelson, of April 
 4th, were wanting. And for this "tardiness" Buell has 
 been branded with disloyalty, and, to prove it, the record of 
 his inquiry court, proving the criminality of his accusers, 
 has by them been made away with. The two salient points, 
 then, to prove the protractive war policy upon the admin- 
 istration of 1862, are, first, the placing of Buell, who was 
 for the capture of the upper Tennessee, under Halleck, who 
 prevented it; and, second, the keeping back of Buell from 
 the field of Shiloh, and eventually driving him from the 
 army, and the advancement of Grant, not only for keeping 
 him back, but for refusing his troops, when they came up 
 in time to defeat the enemy, April 5, 1862. 
 
 The diary extracts, on which is founded this commentary, 
 and on which it was endeavored to establish a charge of 
 unmilitary and ungentlemanly conduct against its writer 
 these diary extracts were written ten years ago to fulfill
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 151 
 
 their present mission, as is witnessed by one of the aids of 
 Sherman, under whose charge the 1st brigade of his divis- 
 ion was devoted to the "infernal gods." This was in sub- 
 stitution for himself in a very anti Roman Decius style ; but 
 the evidence of the intention above stated is as follows from 
 the record: Major W. D. Sanger, aid to General Sherman, 
 was sworn, and, among other things, testified, "that Colonel 
 Worthington had told him, shortly before leaving the camp 
 at Shiloh, that he wanted to make a report of the Tennessee 
 expedition, and throw the responsibility of our defeat where 
 it belonged. He stated that it rested upon Generals Grant, 
 C. F. Smith, and Sherman, and he was determined to show 
 them up to the people of Ohio and the world." 
 
 This evidence shows that this treatise had its origin on 
 the field of Shiloh, with no possible political bearing or 
 purpose whatever. He did suspect from Halleck's words, 
 few as they were, and his movements, slow as they were, 
 that there was an influence beyond him and his coadjutors 
 at work. If traced, as it is, to a cabal inside or outside the 
 Cabinet, or war office, it is all the same to this relator, and 
 had he traced that influence to his father's coffin, he would 
 have torn it open all the same, to expose such hitherto un- 
 recorded infamy, without regard to parties, circumstances, 
 or men, dead or alive. 
 
 This dealing in human lives and limbs, and public safety, 
 may have a petty parallel in the example of some seven by 
 nine German duchy, whose prince sold his subjects to the 
 king of England during our rebellion of the Eevolution. 
 This prince was not satisfied with anything but the death 
 of his subjects wounded under the English contract for 
 their blood and bones. If wounded, they came back upon 
 his hands; if dead, they were paid for at so much a head. 
 That was his "logic of events," and very conclusive pocket- 
 logic it was. Perhaps it may have been one of the lilliputs 
 of Cassel, but whoever it was, it was no viler a bargain 
 made by him with Britain than that between the "cabal" 
 and these commanders.
 
 152 SHILOH. 
 
 They were to carry out the "policy" and were to be car- 
 ried through the war, as they were. It was the war that 
 carried them along, not they who really carried on the war. 
 It was a clear case of Dundreary philosophy the tail be- 
 came the biggest and accordingly wagged the dog, who was 
 commanded therefore by his own tail and thus the last in 
 merit are the first in place and power. It should be stated 
 that, in April, 1862, the writer may have believed General 
 C. F. Smith to blame for the atfair of Shiloh, but he has 
 long since discovered, and Halleck's dispatches show, that 
 he was, in his illness and unfitness for duty, made the help- 
 less instrument of a wicked purpose. Occasion also is taken 
 here to withdraw his charge against Sherman, of complicity 
 with the enemy, made, not in defence of the charges against 
 the prisoner, for he made none that would thwart his ob- 
 jects, one of which was to get out of such a command, but in 
 defence of his diary extracts and their principles of war, and 
 against Sherman's plain criminality on his own evidence. 
 
 He closed his unfinished defence as follows : 
 
 " I did, in extreme cases, report to General Sherman, but all social com- 
 munion between us had ceased after the 19th of March, 1862, when I had 
 reluctantly concluded that he was utterly unfit for his position, and he 
 knowing that I knew it, I had nothing to expect but that he would disgrace 
 myself and regiment, if he could, as has since occurred. From what I heard 
 from him within a week after my arrival at Paducah, I concluded that he 
 could not safely be trusted with any 'separate and important command.' 1 
 Every day has more and more and more confirmed this conviction ; and if 
 anything more was wanting, the manner in which this trial has been brought 
 ODj * * * an( j t ne f a l s e and contradictory evidence given here by him, 
 cumulate the conclusion that he is utterly unfit and incompetent for any 
 responsible command. 
 
 "Should he wish to change sides, he could bring ample arguments to show 
 that his action has been unfavorable to the Union. * * * I knew per- 
 fectly well that he knew of- the rebel artillery in our front on the 5th of April ; 
 and* now could he ignore the fact when he had heard those guns on Friday, 
 which should have been hunted up on Saturday, as they were not. Saturday 
 was by the rebels made a day of rest within cannon shot of our camp ; and 
 if there was ever an invitation to an enemy to make an attack, when, how, 
 and where he chose, that invitation was given to the rebel army on the 5th 
 and 6th of April, 1862, by Major General W. T. Sherman." 
 
 Sherman was engaged in a viler service than that of the 
 enemy. In that, there might have been personal danger 
 with doubtful advancement; in the other there was imme- 
 diate advancement without other effort than that of mischief
 
 SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 153 
 
 to the service, such as he afterwards wrought at Vicksburg, 
 Jackson, Meridian, Chattanooga, Oostanaula, Kenesaw, 
 Peach Tree creek, Durham station, and on many other 
 occasions during the war. 
 
 He is absolved from all service in the 'rebel cause. It was 
 much too honorable for such a man, as his evidence and acts 
 have shown him to be. 
 
 Evidence ruled out by the court. 
 
 DEERFIELD, WARREN COUNTY, OHIO, January 11, 1872. 
 General T. WORTHINGTON, Morrow, Ohio. 
 
 DEAR SIR: In answer to your inquiries, I have to say that I was assistant 
 surgeon of the 20th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel C. C. Marsh, at the 
 battle of Shiloh. That General Sherman was first seen by that regiment when 
 his two center brigades were driven past and through the left of General Mc- 
 Clernand's camp, to the right and rear of his division, (the 1st,) about 9 a. m., 
 April 6, 1862. That General W. T. Sherman, during the remainder of the day, 
 kept in rear of his fragmentary troops, but did not seem at all active in rally- 
 ing or encouraging them to any effort, simply holding his proper position, and 
 nothing more, in the rear. 
 
 In the afternoon he and his staff were simply spectators of what was doing 
 in McClernand's division, which, though much thinned out, kept well together 
 till 4J p. m. I was at the landing on duty about 4 p. m., when Hurlbut's 
 division was driven in. On returning to my proper position soon after, I found 
 that immediately after Hurlbut's retreat the troops on our extreme right, 
 fragments of Sherman's division, had been driven back towards Snake creek 
 bridge, as stated in General Sherman's report. Besides the 17th and 20th Il- 
 linois, specified by General McClernand's report, as alone retaining their 
 organization after 4 p. m., the llth Illinois, though much reduced, kept well 
 together. What troops were left of these three regiments at 5 p. m. would 
 not have exceeded eight hundred men in line. 
 
 Much indignation was expressed after the battle at what was considered 
 the negligence of Generals Sherman and Grant. No one imputed any effect- 
 ive action that day to General Sherman, and Colonels Marsh, Hare, Crocker, 
 and many others, were considered, under General McClernand, as having 
 been infinitely more efficient in keeping any troops in line till 5 p. m. than 
 Sherman or Grant ; the first a mere spectator, and the latter scarcely seen or 
 even heard of anywhere on the field. As to General Grant, his utter incom- 
 petence was considered his excuse for allowing his army to be surprised and 
 defeated. At Donelson his conduct, in keeping off the field, was the same. 
 It was not disputed that had not Generals Buell and Nelson, with Colonel 
 Ammen's force, arrived with assistance about 5 p. m., the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee would have been dispersed or captured, as stated in General Grant's 
 report. From a little after 5 p. m. till dark the firing on our extreme left was 
 at least if not more severe than on any part of the field during the day. 
 Yours, respectfully, G. W. HENDERSON, 
 
 Au't Surg. 20th III. V. I. 
 
 The above statement is verified by General McClernand, who, writing the 
 same date from Springfield, Illinois, says : 
 
 "Sherman's division, losing its organization in the morning, occupied no 
 definite position from that time till near dark. In the meantime General 
 Sherman was without any real command. Grant may have seen Sherman 
 before or about noon without his division. I saw not General Grant, nor 
 received word from him during the day."
 
 154 SHILOH. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD, AND ON HIS BOAT 
 
 AT NOON. 
 
 "Grant was on every part of the field in person, constantly under fire, and 
 making unwearied exertions to maintain his position until Nelson and Lewis 
 Wallace should get up, but the national forces were losing ground every hour. 
 (Badeau's Life of Grant.) 
 
 " Grant was never discourged, and rose to the height of a hero when the 
 storm had burst." ( Whitelaw Reid.) 
 
 " Commanding OFFICES advance forces Huell's army. 
 
 " NEAR PITTSBURGH, April 6, 1862, (near noon.) 
 
 " If you will get upon the field, it will possibly save the day to us. The rebel 
 forces are estimated at 100,000 men. U. S. GRANT." 
 
 " About 1 o'clock p. m., April 6, I reached Pittsburgh landing. I found 
 Grant on his boat, with two or more of his staff, in the ladies' cabin. I pro- 
 posed we should go ashore, and his horses were accordingly taken ashore. 
 
 "D.C. BUELL." 
 
 Too much space has perhaps been devoted to the night 
 before the battle, if too much attention can be paid to events 
 which preceded the most inexplicable battle, and most 
 far-reaching results of any one before on record. We 
 now bring Grant on to the battle-field of Shiloh, where he 
 achieves nothing but to discover that, in his conviction, it 
 is lost, as will presently appear, and that he acted accord- 
 ingly, and perhaps discreetly, and Hudibrastically. 
 
 As Lieutenant Moore says, Grant reached Pittsburgh 
 about 10 a. m., perhaps a little before. He thence per- 
 haps sent a verbal order to General Lew. Wallace, and the 
 order to General "Wood, recorded in Badeau's history. Gen- 
 eral Sherman says nothing about seeing him in his division 
 report, till 3 p. m. In his letter of January, 1865, he says 
 he saw him about 10 a. m. The time must have been half- 
 past 10 or 11, as General Grant was seen by General Veatch 
 on the Corinth road about that time. He must have seen 
 Sherman while his first brigade was detached, as Sherman
 
 GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD. 155 
 
 says, to join on McClernand's right. Both doubtless gave 
 up the brigade for lost, as nothing else seemed possible. 
 Grant, however, saw that without speedy assistance the 
 day was lost, beyond a peradventure. He returned to his 
 headquarters near the landing about noon, or half an 
 hour earlier, and there found fugitives from the extreme 
 right of this detached brigade, which, with its command- 
 er, declared that the first brigade on the extreme right was 
 broken and scattered, and the rebels would soon be at the 
 landing. Whereupon he wrote as below, and despatched 
 the note by a boat which passed Crump's landing, with a 
 message for Wallace, about noon. General Buell, at any 
 rate, got the note about that time, or a little later, on his 
 way up to Pittsburgh landing. Here is the letter : 
 
 "Commanding OFFICES advance forces BuelVsarmy. 
 
 " NEAE PITTSBURGH, April 6, 1862, (noon.) 
 
 "The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. 
 The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, 
 both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon 
 the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a 
 move to our advantage, and POSSIBLY save the day to us. The rebel forces 
 are estimated at over 100,000 men. My headquarters will be in the log build- 
 ing on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide 
 you to your place on the field. Respectfully, U. S. GRANT." 
 
 The first inference from the letter is plain, that the day 
 is given up, without reinforcements, by which it can only 
 possibly be saved. The second is, that if there are 100,000 
 men in his front, it will be bwt bringing men to "add to 
 slaughter" to bring up Nelson's 6,000 or 7,000 troops. The 
 third inference is, that the mention of these 100,000 hos- 
 tile troops is intended, as it might be calculated, to keep 
 reinforcements, of a force like Nelson's, back. The fourth 
 is, that having left a staff' officer to attend to the reinforce- 
 ments, Grant has returned to the field, which by this note 
 he had plainly given up for lost. If so, there was sone chiv- 
 alry in the deed. Badeau's history strengthens such an in- 
 ference in the mind of a careless or admiring reader, as he 
 says (page 80) "that Grant was on every part of the field 
 in person, constantly under fire, and making unwearied ex- 
 ertions to maintain his position till Nelson and Lewis Wai-
 
 156 SHILOH. 
 
 lace should get up. But the national forces were slowly 
 losing ground each hour. Still, if only Nelson and Lewis 
 Wallace would come up, the day might even yet be saved" 
 
 So that Grant was on the field, striving against impossi- 
 bilities, if Wallace and Nelson did not come up, and very 
 serious improbabilities if they did even get up in time. 
 
 Some one has written, that the struggle of a great-souled 
 man against gigantic odds is a spectacle worthy the im- 
 mortal gods. 
 
 Here, then, was an example: the ubiquitous Grant every- 
 where, with the might and terror of a Titan, piling Pelion 
 upon Ossa, the fiery soul of Hector, and the sword of 
 Achilles, and also the longbow of Ulysses, only to be drawn 
 by Grant and Sherman, his long-bowman, with Badeau at 
 hand with the thunderbolts of Jove struggling, as it 
 were, between Scylla and Charybdis, (or at any rate, be- 
 tween hawk and buzzard,) on that field embattled by an 
 even mightier foe it was "ires grand magnifique" when 
 at about 1 p. m.,with himself and horses on his boat the 
 Tigress with his cigar of course, and engaged in his usual 
 and habitual recreation, Buell found him as follows : 
 
 " AIEDRIE, KY., Feb. 25, 1872. 
 
 " It could not have been later than 1 o'clock p. m., when I arrived at Pitts- 
 burg landing, on the 6th of April. The steamer on which I was, landed 
 almost against, but a little above, the one which Grant used. On inquiring for 
 him, I was informed that he was on board his steamer. I went there, and 
 found him in the ladies' cabin, with two, possibly three, officers of his staff, 
 whose names I do not now remember, if even I ever knew. I did not par- 
 ticularly observe them. I understood that they had all Grant and his staff 
 recently come in from the field. After getting what information I could from 
 him, and arranging with him to send steamers to bring up Crittenden's division 
 from Savannah, I proposed that we should go ashore. His horses were ac- 
 cordingly taken ashore. D. C. BUELL." 
 
 It is useless to waste time or strength, or ink or paper, 
 drawing inferences, which draw themselves, like a cork 
 without a screw, when you cut the string off. 
 
 It is very plain that it was no use, with less than 20,000 
 men, to struggle with 100,000 on such a field. He had 
 found himself of no use there any how, which is more, by 
 the loss of at least 5,000 men, than could be said for Sher- 
 man. Sherman was the ablest tactician at a drill, the oldest
 
 GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD. 157 
 
 graduate, higher in military art in his class than Grant, and, 
 what was more, had the most influence at "Washington; 
 and Sherman had given at least two examples against hope. 
 At 10 a. m., or earlier, Sherman had turned over his last 
 brigade to his aids, who in turn had turned the brigade 
 over to the enemy. They in turn had nearly turned its 
 right flank, and its commander had returned to the land- 
 ing, and made such a report to Grant of the defeat, by 
 the turning of the 46th Ohio and 6th Iowa on the right 
 flank, that Grant, thinking it best to keep up appearances, 
 wrote Nelson that, if he came to attack, he must expect to 
 meet 100,000 men. Like a discreet commander and horse 
 fancier, he thereupon, after turning over this weight of 
 responsibility, turned his attention to his horses, and be- 
 took himself to his boat. What were his intentions re- 
 main, as the historical philosophers say, "enshrouded in 
 the womb of time." His memories, however, most likely 
 recurred to Fort Donelson, where he had found such com- 
 fort on Commodore Foote's gunboat, while the battle was 
 raging above; and, perhaps, concluded that Floyd, when 
 he left his command at Donelson, had, doubtless, done 
 the best thing possible, under the circumstances. All in- 
 ferences on this affair are deferred to a generous public, 
 who may, or may not, suspend a conclusion. 
 
 NOTE. No charge of cowardice is here preferred, or so 
 intended, against General Grant, who has. perhaps, the 
 same courage of calculation held in common with practiced 
 soldiers or officers having a military education. 
 
 In absenting himself from the field, and keeping out of 
 the battle; in neglecting to send for Buell's troops, whose 
 arrival occurred at 10 a. m. of the 6th and noon of the 5th; 
 in having all his boats at Pittsburgh, to prevent their com- 
 ing up ; in doing everything for a defeat, and nothing for 
 victory, he was but carrying out his contract, or obeying 
 orders, for which he has been paid in full long ago. Here 
 is further proof that he expected the attack, while keeping 
 Nelson back:
 
 158 APPENDIX. 
 
 " General Grant to General JBuell. 
 
 " SAVANNAH, April 6, 1862. 
 
 "General D. C. BUELL: Heavy firing is heard up the (river,) indicating 
 plainly that an attack has been made upon our most advanced positions. I 
 have been looking for this, but did not believe the attack could be made be- 
 fore Monday or Tuesday, 7th or 8th. 
 
 "This necessitates my joining the forces up the river, instead of meeting 
 you to-day, as I had contemplated. 
 
 "I have directed General Nelson to move to the river with his division. 
 He can march to opposite Pittsburgh. 
 
 " Respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, 
 
 "Maj. Gen. Commanding." 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 For want of time and means, a large part of Chapter IX 
 is omitted, and also chapters headed "Sherman's Last Bri- 
 gade," "Sherman on and off the Field," "Sherman's First 
 Brigade," and "Sherman's Letter to the U. S. S. Magazine 
 of January, 1865." These may appear in a future edition. 
 
 The following statements, part of the chapter as to Sher- 
 man on and off the Field, are given as all of that chapter for 
 which there is present room or time : 
 
 SHERMAN'S REPORT. 
 
 General Sherman having omitted to state in his report 
 anything more as to what occurred when he was in front of 
 Appier's regiment than that his orderly was killed, the 
 omission is in some sort filled by Lieutenant Cutler's state- 
 ment, in which all officers and men of the 53d Ohio con- 
 curred. They were, however, deterred from signing with 
 Cutler by fear of Sherman's resentment. 
 
 In a letter to Hon. Ben. Stanton, June 10, 1862, Sherman 
 states that his orderly was killed 500 yards beyond Appier's 
 regiment. "Which statement is right? 
 
 Lieutenant Cutler's statement. 
 
 " The undersigned hereby certifies, that in a speech made to the 53d Ohio 
 Volunteer Infantry, a few days after the battle of Shiloh, General Sherman 
 said that Appier was a brave man ; that he had told him (Sherman) that he 
 did not order the regiment to retreat; that he would rather take Appier's 
 word than that of the whole regiment, who were a pack of cowards; that it 
 was true the regiment had been put in too exposed a position ; that he had
 
 APPENDIX. 15 
 
 intended to alter it, but that, in consequence of their cowardice on the day 
 of the battle, they should remain where they were. He said further, in con- 
 nection with the battle, that Beauregard and A. S. Johnson were gentlemen 
 and honorable men, (he knew them personally,) who would scorn to do a 
 mean thing; that if the 53d was attacked and retreated again, he would take 
 as much pleasure in pouring shot and shell and canister into them as into the 
 rebels. 
 
 "I certify that the regiment was attacked at 7 a. m. on the 6th of April, 
 (1862,) or a little before that time. General Sherman was just in front of the 
 regiment when his orderly was killed, immediately on which he rode rapidly 
 off toward the rear ; that the regiment left the rear of its camp about twenty 
 minutes afterwards, and General Sherman could not have seen and spoken to 
 Colonel Appier in the camp as late as 8 a. m., (on the 6th,) or even an hour 
 before that time. We further certify that it was General Sherman's wish that 
 Appier should continue to command the regiment, and urged him to do so ; 
 but Colonel Appier declined on the ground that he did not think himself fitted 
 for the command; and further, that from the left of Mungen's to the right of 
 Appier's camp the distance was at least 300 yards, with low swampy ground 
 between the camps, and to the left of the 53d was an open field near a mile 
 long, while there was thick brush not over 100 yards in front. 
 
 "Also, that the artillery did not fire on the rebels as they crossed the val- 
 ley, nor until half an hour after we were attacked. 
 
 "GEO. E. CUTLER, 
 " First Lt. Co. G.,53dO. V.I. 
 
 " MEMPHIS, TENS., Sept. 1, 1862." 
 
 The report of General Sherman states that McDowell con- 
 ducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. 
 
 The statement of his aid-de-camp (afterwards Lieutenant 
 Colonel Upton, a gallant officer) shows liow McDowell con- 
 ducted the attack, and how near at the time General Sher- 
 man was to the extreme right, as he says he was, when he 
 saw Grant at 10 a. m. of April 6, 1862: 
 
 " I hereby certify that on the 6th of April, 1862, General Sherman was not 
 seen by the 1st brigade of his division before the firing commenced, at about 
 7 a. m. ; nor did I see him that day till at or about the time he ordered the 
 brigade to fall back, about 2 p. m. 
 
 "Also, that after the 46th regiment 0. V. I. had fallen back after its first 
 fire, about noon, I was, with Colonel McDowell, Captain Harland, Commis- 
 sary Moreland, and Quartermaster Ingram, to the left of the brigade, on the 
 edge of an open field, in which Taylor's battery, not then firing, was located. 
 That there came suddenly a thick shower of balls, when I and Harland dis- 
 mounted. Colonel McDowell and the quartermaster and commissary rode 
 rapidly off towards the river, and I saw nothing more of Colonel McDowell 
 for half an hour afterwards, also near Taylor's battery, Who said that his com- 
 mand was gone; that it was no use further exposing themselves, and they 
 might as well go to the landing, towards which he immediately rode. Not far 
 
 from the landing, near a battery, he was requested by Major , of the 
 
 regiment, to assist in rallying the broken troops; he remained doing so but 
 a few moments. I knew nothing of hie having had a fall from his horse, but 
 when he last rode away from the right of Taylor's battery he complained of 
 having been hurt. EDWARD N. UPTOK, 
 
 "First Lt. Co. D., 46<A Regt. 0. V. I. 
 
 "CAMP No. 7, May 15, 1862." 
 
 "Witness: OLIVER P. BBOWST.
 
 160 APPENDIX. 
 
 General Sherman, in his report, having stated that at 10 
 or 10^ a. m. he drove back the rebel left and relieved the 
 pressure on McClernand's front, by means of McDowell's 
 1st brigade, the statement of Major Smith tells how and 
 how far this driving back was done, and how Sherman 
 did it: 
 
 " CAMP BEFORE CORINTH, May 23, 1862. 
 
 " Major J. B. Smith, 40th Illinois, says that about noon on the 6th of April, 
 1862, the regiment came into an open field, near a Union battery, about 400 
 yards south of an old house in the north end of the field, where it was met by 
 General W. T. Sherman. There, on consultation, or after conversation with 
 Colonel Hicks, in which Sherman said there was a rebel battery before us he 
 wished taken, he (Sherman) ordered the regiment forwards towards the same, 
 General Sherman, as we started, being to the rear of the left flank. That after 
 marching at quick time some 300 or 400 yards, we were ordered to halt and 
 lie down on rising ground, in sight of the battery, not exceeding two hundred 
 yards in front, which battery, however, was not seen when the regiment 
 started. 
 
 " We remained in this position some twenty or thirty minutes, when we 
 fell back about 300 yards, when we were again rallied, and advanced about 
 100 yards, where we remained till ordered to retreat by an officer I did not 
 know. 
 
 "In the first advance we lost about 180 men, (including Colonel Hicks, 
 badly wounded,) killed and wounded. After the first advance we lost about 
 40 men. 
 
 "After General Sherman's first order to advance I saw no more of him that 
 day. J. B. SMITH, 
 
 "Maj. 40th I II. 
 
 "T. WOETHINGTON, Col. 46A Ohio" 
 
 The most extraordinary statement in Sherman's report is, that at 10 a. m. 
 Buckland and McDowell's brigades were conducted so as to join on McCler- 
 nand's left flank. This is a fiction as regards Bucklan'd's brigade, which, by 
 his report, was utterly disorganized on the first retreat at 9 a. m. The single 
 1st brigade was then "by him deserted, as he says, in the hottest of the fignt, 
 while he himself sought refuge under the rear of McClernand's right wing, 
 the second desertion of his troops that morning by 9 a. m. This, as Badeau 
 says, was "commanding McClernand's division, as well as his own." Here, 
 then, was W. T. Sherman, a West Point graduate of high-class grade, in com- 
 mand of a division of about 7,000 men, during a battle where there was more 
 terror, confusion, and bloodshed combined, than any other fought within this 
 century, or perhaps any other, who abandons his only available troops to his 
 subordinates at a time when a skillful commander was most wanted; when, 
 as he reports, regiments, brigades, and divisions were successively swept back, 
 and the most trifling accident might drive back McClernandin slaughter and 
 confusion, he thus exposes this remnant of his troops, this forlorn hope of the 
 army, as it turned out to be, to seemingly inevitable destruction. Who would 
 believe it, if not in his report; yet in this one respect that report is true, ex- 
 cept that these troops were not permitted by the enemy to join McClernand's 
 right, nor did he expect it. From 9 a. m. till 2 p. m. this deserted force, with 
 the loss of near half its number, or 700 men, prevented the turning of the 
 Union right flank, and prevented its being driven back till 2 p. m. that day, 
 without aid or encouragement from Sherman or its brigadier.
 
 APPENDIX. 161 
 
 JOKE ON SHERMAN. 
 
 An odd statement, and, still more oddly, a true one, of Sherman's report, 
 that it would have been madness to have exposed horses to tha musketry fire 
 of the two days' battle to which he so freely exposed his men more especially 
 those of the first brigade, turned over, he says, in the hottest of the fight to 
 his aides in derogation of himself: this characteristic benevolence, so 
 like Grant, for his horses, taken together with the evidence of Colonel Stuart, 
 that his artillery would have been captured on the 6th had it not been taken 
 back on the 5th April, started a joke among the wags in camp, that Sherman 
 had withdrawn Ins artillery lest it should be captured, and his cavalry lest 
 the horses should be hurt. Though so much more careful of the horses while 
 living, all were treated with the same neglect when dead buried, or cov- 
 ered up, where they fell. Very inconsistent and contradictory conduct, but 
 just like the "Great Commander" W. T. Sherman. 
 
 GRANT'S CONTRADICTIONS. 
 
 The following letter from General Grant is in direct contradiction of his 
 report that Buell's troops saved the landing, transports, &c., from capture. 
 April 6, 1862, and is part of one of the chapters excluded for want of room, &c. 
 
 "WASHINGTON, D. C., April 7, 1872. 
 General W. W. BELKNAP : 
 
 "Give my congratulations to the gallant Society of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, and regrets that public duty prevented ray being with them on the 
 anniversary of one of the hardest-fought battles of the rebellion. The battle 
 of Shiloh, though much criticized at the time, will ever be remembered by 
 those engaged in it as a "BRILLIANT SUCCESS," won" with raw troops over a 
 superior force, and under circumstances the most unfavorable to the Union 
 troops. U. S. GRANT." 
 
 Grant's force was not less than 53,000, purposely scattered ten or eleven 
 miles along the river, by two or three miles back. The Confederates had 
 less than 41,000 men. The ''unfavorable circumstances" had been purposely 
 arranged by himself. The " brilliant success " was a disgraceful defeat, which, 
 but for Buell, Nelson, and Ammen, would have been entire capture or rout 
 of the Union army, devoted by him to ruin. 
 
 GRANT'S NOTICE OF "SHILOH" AND WHAT COMES OF IT. 
 
 Before the last pages of this incomplete work went to press, and on the 
 morning that Grant's notice of Shiloh appeared in the Washington Repub- 
 lican, the writer found that a resolution of the House as to missing rebellion 
 records applied only to that of Buell's court of inquiry. He thereupon re- 
 turned thanks for the notice to the proper editor of the Republican (Grant) 
 in writing; and in order that the President might try conclusions as to the 
 "missing records," if he chose, before the highest national tribunal, he pre- 
 sented to Congress the memorial as follows: 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., May 24, 1872. 
 To the Congress of the United States : 
 
 This relator respectfully presents, for reference only, a treatise on the Ten- 
 nessee or Shiloh campaign of 1862, to prove that the campaign was mainly 
 fruitless after February, 1862, by reason of the policy for protracting the 
 war previously adopted; and also" to prove that for the purpose of such pro- 
 traction, the defeat of the Union army at Shiloh, April 6, 1862, was the result 
 of that policy, carried out under direction of the late General Halleck by 
 General Grant. 
 
 The first overt act for continuing the war in Tennessee, against all military 
 
 11
 
 162 APPENDIX. 
 
 principles, one year or more, was perfected by the order of March 12, 1862, 
 placing General Buell under the immediate command of General Halleck, 
 who permitted the junction of A. S. Johnson's army from Decatur with the 
 rebel army at Corinth, resulting in the disaster to the Union army at Shiioh 
 April 6, 1862. Evidence of the first overt act to secure that defeat is found 
 in the dispatches of General Halleck of March 3d and 4th, herein submitted. 
 These dispatches are fictitious and deceptive on their face, and intended to 
 place the responsibility for the position of the battle-field of Shiloh on C. F. 
 Smith. 
 
 This protractive policy, and its terrible consequences, required the sup- 
 pression or destruction of all special army records, and the entire abrogation 
 of all established principles and practice of military law, of which this rela- 
 tor has ample evidence, as to the Shiloh campaign of 1862. No such records 
 can be had at the War Department, for they are not there. 
 
 The dispatches of General Halleck, March 3 and 4, 1862, to the War De- 
 partment and to General Grant, are authenticated in Badeau's military life 
 of Grant. General H'alleck's dispatch of March 4th to General Buell was 
 obtained from General Buell himself. 
 
 For the purpose of obtaining a correct history of this campaign, never yet 
 published, this relator respectfully suggests and requests that a competent 
 commission be at once appointed to rescue from destruction such army rec- 
 ords as remain, and replace as far as possible those abstracted from the War 
 Department at Washington, D. C. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 T. WORTHIKGTOX, 
 Late Colonel 46th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry. 
 
 The writer earnestly requests all honorable soldiers and good citizens to 
 sign and forward this and the above memorial to the next Congress, and to 
 their State Legislatures: 
 
 WASHINGTON, May 30, 1872. 
 To the Congress of the United States. 
 
 The undersigned respectfully submits (for aiding reference to official evi- 
 dence only) a treatise on the Tennessee campaign of 1862, the special records 
 of which have hitherto been suppressed or removed from the War Depart- 
 ment. He requests that, by an appropriate commission, there may be an 
 examination into the truth of the matter stated in said treatise, to deter- 
 mine 
 
 1st. Whether the war of the rebellion in Tennessee in 1862 was not pur- 
 posely continued one year, or more, for purposes outside of the prosecution 
 of the war; and whether, in the year 1862, the usual rules of war in this 
 campaign, and all established military law, were not utterly disregarded. 
 
 2d. Whether the disaster to the Union army at Shiloh, April 6, 1862, was 
 not the result of design on the part of one or more officers of the United 
 States army, including the officer then in command of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 3d. Whether the evidence given by General W. T. Sherman, and his con- 
 duct during the battle as stated in his division report, is such as renders such 
 an officer a safe depositary of his present command of the national army. 
 
 4th. Whether there should not be such additions made to the Army Regu- 
 lations and the Articles of War as will guard against the acts and neglects 
 stated in the treatise herewith submitted. 
 
 5th. Whether the Judge Advocate General properly performed his duty in 
 taking no notice of such evidence on the part of a commander and prosecutor 
 as that set forth in the treatise. 
 
 6th. Whether, from any lapse of time, an examination into the offences 
 charged should be remitted, and whether there is or not any redress for the
 
 APPENDIX. 163 
 
 proven wrong inflicted, without offence against the Army Regulations or 
 Articles of War. 
 
 7th. Whether the officers named as offenders in the treatise hold their 
 present positions by meritorious conduct, or by collusion with those in power 
 at Washington intrusted with the conduct of the war in 1862. 
 
 T. WORTHINGTON, 
 
 Late Col. 46iA Regt. 0. V. I. 
 
 WARNING TO THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR LEADERS IN ANY 
 FUTURE WAR, AND AGAINST FAITH IN MEN OF MERELY 
 MILITARY REPUTATION. 
 
 Since the issue of the first chapter of " Shiloh," the writer has observed 
 that the crimes proven therein, without ground of denial, are considered of so 
 terrible and atrocious a character, that most intellects shrink in horror from 
 their contemplation. 
 
 If there was any room for doubt or extenuation, any excuse or explana- 
 tion, the treatise on Shiloh would be largely quoted and have a wide circu- 
 lation at once. But the military crime of giving fictitious and deceptive 
 information in an invasive war, and of continuing the same at the expense 
 of so many hundreds of millions of money and rivers of blood the deliberate 
 location of an army on a field chosen for its slaughter the studied prepara- 
 tion of at least one army, by its commander, for destruction and disgrace 
 the deliberate desertion of 'their troops in obedience to a cruel policy, by 
 one or more commanders, at the moment of greatest danger, and the brutal 
 consignment of their victims to scattered, shallow, and nameless graves, where 
 they fell, constitute crimes which, if recognized, separate their perpetrators 
 from all social intercourse and all human sympathy with honorable men. 
 Such crimes, of the most atrocious and basest description, were denominated 
 under the general term of "perduellium " by the Roman law. The crimes 
 of these men are too monstrous for record in any modern criminal calendar. 
 For such horrors nothing is left but silence as to their perpetrators, and thus 
 through their infinite atrocity they escape unpunished. And not only that, 
 but, to avoid the unfolding of such terrible records, such guiltiest of men are 
 allowed to hold the highest civil and military positions in the Republic, and 
 with the multitude to live on with the reputation of "characters" whom the 
 people have delighted to honor. 
 
 WARNING! 
 
 "IF SUCH THERE BE, THE MORAL OF THIS WORK." 
 
 First. The most intelligent people on earth may, for more than ten years 
 together, be deluded by their trusted political leaders, as to the means and 
 manner of conducting a civil war. 
 
 Second. Men with no merit as soldiers, and with less than none as gene- 
 rals, may be imposed upon this nation and the world as the greatest com- 
 manders of the age. 
 
 Therefore it is the conviction of this writer, that we know and care less 
 about military laws and affairs, and are the merest politicians and money- 
 grabbers of the world. 
 
 A state of affairs producing such generals and rulers as Halleck, Grant, 
 and Sherman, distinguished for nothing, but worse than good-for-nothingness. 
 
 A state of affairs dangerous in the extreme, but even productive of future 
 benefit, if it can teach us how worthless is military reputation, and bow 
 exceedingly to be avoided in the choice of our rulers.
 
 164 APPENDIX. 
 
 GRATEFUL CONCLUSION. 
 
 Grant having impudently set forth in his ''organ," of May 24th, ii'.st., 
 that this relator of hidden history is "on agency set in operation," and "a 
 man put forwprd" to disclose the infamy of "eminence," he therefore aver* 
 what may easily be proven, that he has had nothing but discouragement and 
 disapprobation from nearly all, and direct commendation from but two 
 subscribers to his work perhaps but one. 
 
 He is under the greatest obligations to two school-mates of fifty years 
 ago, both now United States Senators, and to his printer especially, for get- 
 ting on so far with an imperative professional and public duty, which no one 
 else on earth could have performed. 
 
 Hia depth of obligation to all who have made advances at such risk can- 
 not be expressed in words, but may be conjectured, when he avers that for 
 months together, and most of the time since 1862, he has subsisted on a 
 peck of corn meal a week for himself and dog, with a pound of lard for his 
 griddle, say 25 cents, or less, "and water from the spring," without even the 
 hermit's "scrip with herbs and fruits supplied." This he has done, that he 
 might urge his claims each winter for army supplies furnished his own regi- 
 ment and other troops in 1861, and obtain, if possible, an investigation of 
 the case, now submitted to the people as the court of last resort in all cases 
 whatever. 
 
 NOTE. A few hundred copies of the Blunders of the Rebellion, written in 1869, are 
 attached to copies sent to first subscribers. 
 
 PRINCIPAL ERRATA, 
 Mainly owing to the writer's haste, for want of time. 
 
 Page 15, line 15 from top, mere for men. 
 
 Page 15, line 16 from top, and before "consider." 
 
 Page 21, line 18 from top, even after " idlers." 
 
 Page 30, line 21 from top, 1st, 2d, 3d, for 2d 3d, ]st. 
 
 Page 37, line 25 from top, Sherman for Thomas. 
 
 Page 41, line 4 from top, since for as. 
 
 Page 41, line 9 from top, and for or. 
 
 Page 43, line 4 from bottom, times lor lines. 
 
 Page 45, line 11 from top, Norton for Norten. 
 
 Page 45, line 16 from bottom, comma [ , ] after " work." 
 
 Page 49, line 2 from bottom, 61, 62 for 62, 63. 
 
 Page 50, line 13 from bottom, same for newer. 
 
 Page 52, line 6 from bottom, dash [ ] after " bore.'' 
 
 Page 65, last line, of, not on Badeau. 
 
 Page 82, line 7 from top, faced, not face. 
 
 Page 82, see pages 80, 81, map 2. 
 
 Page 91, line 11 from top, enemy, not army. 
 
 Page 91, line 16 from top, add, as to cutting off the enemy. 
 
 Page 117, line 14 from bottom, comma [ , ] after "reader." 
 
 Page 117, line 15 from bottom, small t for capital T. 
 
 I 'age 134, line 14 from top, has been for will be. 
 
 Page 138, line 18 from top, again after "called." 
 
 Page 143, line 12 from top, such for these. 
 
 Page 149, line 8 from top, Purdy, not Pudy. 
 
 TERMS: 
 
 ONB COPY, ONE DOLLAR. Tux COPIES, Six DOLI.AKS. 
 For sale by 
 
 SHILLINQTON, Washington, D. C. I BALTIMORE NEWS COMPANY, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 APPLEGATE, POUNDSFORD, & Co., Cincinnati. I AMERICAN NEWS COMPANY, New York. 
 R. W. CARROLL, & Co., Cincinnati. | CENTRAL NEWS COMPANY, Philadelphia. 
 
 CAPITAL OFFICE, Washington, I). C.
 
 of drunkenness on duty, as charged, was pr -.-sible by the evidence, 
 
 to obtain winch it would hi Colonel W's duty, if requisite, to have 
 
 remaim <>:/'-/% drunk" as charged, a month h, as Grant 
 
 has ofti ithout any imt an evil purpose; '/'/ , with other 
 
 proves that the Army of the T< ]',, m t com- 
 
 r, been dev on for the b ,md political ob- 
 
 jects. All evidence of wln< -luring ti.- f, or it 
 
 would have proven then, as is now pi " that 
 
 each of these commano l]}t [ a {. 
 
 one time when men on both sid>- of 3,000 or more 
 
 an hour. Grant was his enemy from . the colonel of the 
 
 46th Ohio found him skulking on his I 1] h a .d found 
 
 him two liours before, with his ho man waa hi -m the 
 
 first dav h" saw him at PadiU'ah, February L'l, l^fil', and i iiat he 
 
 might he detached to occupy and fortify Florei" ied to 
 
 ! (). M. Mitchell's command on the Cumberland. Both were his ene- 
 mies of course at lirst from his dispose 
 
 Sherman refused to attach Colonel W. to the command of Miteludl, whose 
 nii'inii In: was, for the reason l&t and for oih . hnt would 
 
 have sent him to the Mississippi, or left him all nmand of a 
 
 fort at Paducah. The reason now is plain. Fro: iferred 
 
 of what nature, in regard to the write] 
 
 ship it would take here too much space to enur envy, 
 
 hatred, malice, treachery, and unworthiness," are the synony h, jus- 
 
 tice, and integrity, with 
 
 "Knaves who feel the halter draw 
 Wirh liii'.l opinion of the law." 
 
 These officers, though for ten years so challenged, n< ', and 
 
 never will dare, put the charges of " Shiloh" to th n appropriate tri- 
 
 Itimal. Let the public and the future judi us. 
 
 His honorable discharge was obtained against Grant's four or li . 
 
 ilion, and he has neve: :iid a new trial on the evidence of 
 
 the record, with all its mutilations, which Grant dare not permit, and could 
 have to-morrow, if he would. 
 
 The most ike portion of this article is, that the work 
 
 is printed at the cost of men who would he ashamed to have their su', 
 tions known, <fec. Many of Grant's friends have bought the thus forbidden 
 book, perhaps, as a weapon for his defence; but -m to adopt 
 
 the prayer, "0, that mi < <'/(/<: a / ', the organ 
 
 it not a word. 
 
 If the charge of the "or*/- o those who pay for such a book, 
 
 the subscribers to the Patriot, Capital, &c., are also denounced, and we are 
 under a tyranny more degrading than that of Commodus or Caracalla. It 
 reveals nothing, &c., says ' . ! Why not publish extracts, to be 
 
 compared with the mutual adm a of these officers, and 
 
 their sateliii,-, the B's w ! " it is made up of true history, 
 
 proven so by their own si; sptive lette 
 
 dispatches, if a criminal's plea of guilty Hi 
 
 Sherman's report, that, he abandoned his troops to his aids, and Gran: 
 he won the battle; and also 
 troops, with Ammen in advance of Bnell's army, and mueh more.) 
 
 The writer is an "Old Whig," and no recruit of the "Reformers," from 
 whom he has had little encouragement, but that arising fro: 
 such effect of his exorcism : ih additional evidence 
 
 against himself and for the book in the columns of th< 
 
 He is of course, as he has always striven to be, outside the respect of all 
 who regard not truth, integrity, and liberty, always the sanu; "one and 
 inseparable, now and forever." 
 
 WASHINGTON, May 27, 18 T. WOUTHINOTON. 
 
 P. S. There was no record up to 1807 that Colonel W. was ever disi 
 by the President, and in hi< Grant meanly lugs in the sentence of a 
 
 court that was a nullity in law, as he knew. T. W.
 
 JU 
 
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