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A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
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 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER; 
 
 OR, 
 
 THE DANGER OF 
 A RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA, 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN DACOSTA. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO., Ltd., 13 WATERLOO PLACE. 
 
 AND AT CALCUTTA. 
 
 1891. 
 
 (All rights reserved.) 
 
.5 
 
 LONDON 
 
 PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., LIMITED, 
 
 13, WATERLOO PLACE. S.W. 
 
 * 
 
 RY MORSE STEP 
 
ObC^ 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The apprehension of a Russian invasion of India 
 through her north-west frontier has long been a 
 source of anxiety to the British Government, and 
 that feeling has been growing in intensity as the 
 conquests of the Czar pushed the borders of the 
 Russian Empire nearer and nearer to those of our 
 neighbours, the Afghans. Under these circumstances 
 our policy towards Afghanistan has been prompted 
 chiefly by the consideration as to what line of action 
 would best protect us from the apprehended danger. 
 
 When the annexation of the Punjab carried our 
 frontier to the foot of the mountains which form the 
 eastern boundary of Afghanistan, Lord Dalhousie, 
 referring to the prevailing fear of an eventual attack 
 from Russia, declared in a Minute, dated the 30th 
 April 1855 : " The treaty gives to the Government 
 of Tndia on its western frontier as complete security 
 
 511668 
 
6 PKEFACB. 
 
 against a foreign and distant enemy as it is possible 
 for us in the nature of things to encompass." 
 
 This sense of security was inspired by the barren 
 and difficult nature of the country which an army, 
 entering Afghanistan from the north, would have to 
 traverse before it reached India ; and by the character 
 of the Afghan tribes, a knowledge of which we had 
 acquired during our invasion in 1838-42. 
 
 In 1867 certain opinions found expression in mili- 
 tary circles to the effect that our means of success- 
 fully encountering a Eussian advance would be greatly 
 improved if we held advanced posts in Afghanistan, 
 whence we could meet our northern foe at a distance 
 from the Indian frontier. These opinions, however, 
 as soon as they were promulgated, were pronounced 
 by high authorities to be fundamentally wrong ; but 
 the scheme had meanwhile found favour with mem- 
 bers of the Cabinet, and has ever since been the 
 subject of much discussion and of controversy be- 
 tween the political parties in Parliament. 
 
 It is proposed in the following pages to review, in 
 the light of the events of the last fifty years, the 
 main arguments adduced on each side. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER I. General Remarks on the Afghan 
 
 War of 1878-80 9 
 
 II. Operations in Southern Afghanistan 
 
 in 1878-79 18 
 
 III. Extracts from Major Le Messurier's 
 
 Book - 27 
 
 IV. Extracts from Major Colquhoun's 
 
 Book 34 
 
 V. Review of the Operations of the 
 
 Kuram Field Force, and Summary 
 of the Campaign of 1878-79 - 50 
 
 VI. Mr. Howard Hensman's Letters, 
 
 WRITTEN DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 X879-80 58 
 
8 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER VII. Extracts from Dr. Duke's Book - 92 
 
 VIII. Campaign of 1879-80 - - - 106 
 IX. Hon. George Curzon's Chapter on 
 the North - West Frontier of 
 
 India - 115 
 
 , X. Conclusion 127 
 
 XT. The Financial Question - - - 138 
 
 ^*2P^fc^i>-r- 
 
A SCIENTIFIC FKONTIER; 
 
 OR, 
 
 THE DANGER OF A RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 General Remarks on the Afghan War of 1878-80. 
 
 The policy towards Afghanistan, which was initiated 
 by the Beaconsfield- Salisbury Cabinet in 1876, and 
 resulted in the unfortunate war of 1878-80, was 
 declared, in the enigmatic language of the Prime 
 Minister, to have for its object the acquisition of a 
 " scientific frontier " ; that is, a frontier which could 
 be defended at a considerably smaller cost than the 
 boundary we actually possessed on the north-west of 
 India. "So far as the invasion of India in that 
 
 1 
 

 10 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 quarter is concerned," said his Lordship, "it is the 
 opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it is 
 hardly practicable. The base of operations of any 
 possible foe is so remote, the communications are so 
 difficult, the aspect of the country so forbidding, that 
 we have long arrived at the opinion that an invasion 
 of our Empire by passing the mountains which form 
 our north-western frontier is one which we need not 
 dread." (Speech on Lord Mayor's Day, 1878.) On 
 the same occasion, however, Lord Beaconsfield added : 
 " I should be sorry if you believed that it was the 
 opinion of Her Majesty's Government that an in- 
 vasion of India was impracticable. If the Euphrates 
 valley were in the possession of a very powerful 
 State, an adequate force might march through the 
 passes of the Asian mountains, through Persia, and 
 absolutely menace the empire of the Queen." 
 
 These two statements are manifestly irreconcilable, 
 and the speaker's intention would seem to have been 
 to keep the public as much in the dark as possible 
 on the actual line of action to which the nation was 
 being committed, a surmise which is fully confirmed 
 by the fact that the papers laid before Parliament, 
 and the oral declarations of the Government touching 
 our relations with Afghanistan throughout the period 
 in question, were of a remarkably misleading cha- 
 
REMARKS ON THE AFGHAN WAR. 11 
 
 racter. Indeed, Lord Wolseley's sentence, quoted in 
 the Times of 4th February last, in reference to the 
 magazine rifle question, might well be applied, 
 mutatis mutandis, to the instance just alluded to, 
 viz. : " One of the most serious complaints that 
 can be brought against our system of government, as 
 it bears on the army, is that we do not tell the truth * 
 to the English people." 
 
 It, however, soon became evident that' the scheme 
 of the Cabinet in 1876 aimed at our military occu- 
 pation of Candahar and Herat as a menace to Eussia, 
 with whom our relations had become excessively 
 strained during the Kusso-Turkish War. The Amir 
 was pressed to co-operate in that movement against 
 Eussia, and, on his refusing to commit himself to 
 such a course, three armies were sent to invade his 
 territories and forcibly put the scheme into execu- 
 tion. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Berlin had placed 
 our relations with Eussia once more on a friendly 
 footing. The scheme, nevertheless, was persisted in, 
 perhaps in view of future eventualities, but chiefly, 
 no doubt, in order to punish the Amir for withholding 
 his co-operation, and also because the occupation of 
 Candahar and Herat was the main feature in a 
 secretly cherished plan which had some years before 
 commended itself to certain members of the Cabinet 
 
 1 * 
 
12 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 of 1876. That plan had been submitted in 1867 for 
 the opinion of the authorities in India, by whom it 
 was unanimously condemned as unsound and dan- 
 gerous; and a change of Ministry having occurred 
 about the same time, the plan was temporarily 
 shelved. Its fatal defects in the eyes of the Indian 
 authorities were, that it involved our encountering a 
 powerful enemy in a most difficult country, far from 
 our main resources, and that it entailed the necessity 
 of our maintaining British garrisons and British 
 representatives in a land where communications were 
 always difficult and often impracticable, where the 
 climate had proved most injurious to our soldiers, 
 and where the population, who were fanatically 
 attached to the Mahomedan religion, had shown 
 themselves irreconcilable to the domination of any 
 Power professing a different faith. 
 
 A similar policy had been tried in 1838, when we 
 first invaded Afghanistan for the purpose of setting 
 up at Cabul a ruler who would submit to our influence 
 and acquiesce in our plans. The authors of that 
 policy were deplorably ignorant of the country and 
 the people of Afghanistan; they believed that the 
 ruler of Cabul exercised autocratic and despotic sway 
 over the whole country, and was able to carry out 
 any engagement he might be induced or compelled 
 
REMARKS ON THE AFGHAN WAR. 13 
 
 to make with us ; they refused at the same time to 
 believe that the semi-barbarous tribes dwelling in 
 those wild regions Could prevent the permanent 
 settlement of British troops in their cities ; on the 
 contrary, they firmly entertained the hope that the 
 people, if liberally remunerated by us, would not 
 only be reconciled to the presence of our troops, but 
 would willingly provide for the wants of our soldiers. 
 The utter fallacy of those notions soon became mani- 
 fest, and our first invasion of Afghanistan resulted 
 literally in the annihilation of a British army, and in 
 our withdrawal from that country under circum- 
 stances which cannot be remembered without sorrow 
 and shame. 
 
 The experience acquired in the disastrous opera- 
 tions of 1838-42 led us to adopt an entirely different 
 course of action; and our avowed policy has ever 
 since rested on the principle, that we should look to 
 the willing co-operation of our neighbours for more 
 effectually repelling any invasion attempted through 
 their country. 
 
 It is certain that the fanatic tribes inhabiting the 
 regions in question would as strongly resent the 
 presence of a Eussian army, as they have shown 
 themselves opposed to the presence of British troops 
 in their territory ; and that, in the event of a conflict 
 
14 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 taking place there between the British and the 
 Russians, the sympathies of the inhabitants would 
 be with the party who had previously abstained from 
 interfering in their affairs, and from whom they 
 would, therefore, have less reason to fear any ulterior 
 design against their rude but much cherished and 
 ancient independence. 
 
 Such have been the opinions expressed by all the 
 Governors-General and Commanders-in-Chief who 
 were entrusted with the safety of our Indian Empire, 
 ever since our territory became conterminous with 
 the mountainous regions generally known as Afghan- 
 istan. Accordingly, when the Government of India 
 were consulted regarding the plan in favour of our 
 holding advanced posts in those regions, their reply 
 contained the following passage which clearly sets 
 forth the grounds of their objection : 
 
 " We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any 
 of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, 
 if that country seriously thought of invading India, 
 as we certainly should decrease them if we left our 
 frontier and met her half-way in a difficult country, 
 and possibly in the midst of a hostile and exaspe- 
 rated population. We foresee no limit to the expen- 
 diture which such a move might require. Should 
 Russia ever think of invading India, our true policy, 
 
REMARKS ON THE AFGHAN WAR. 15 
 
 our strongest security, would be found to lie in 
 previous abstinence from entanglements, either at 
 Cabul or Candahar or any similar outpost, and in 
 full reliance on a compact army within our territories 
 or on our border." 
 
 That opinion, moreover, was emphatically endorsed 
 by Sir Frederick Eoberts, who, with the experience 
 acquired in the war of 1878-80, wrote from Cabul on 
 the 29th May of the latter year : 
 
 " The longer and more difficult the line of commu- 
 nication is, the more numerous and greater the 
 obstacles which Kussia would have to overcome ; and, 
 so far from shorteaing one mile of the road, I would 
 let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth 
 of the Khyber Pass. . . . We have nothing to fear 
 from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to 
 leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be 
 flattering to our amour-propre, but I feel sure that I 
 am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of 
 us, the less they will dislike us. Should Eussia in 
 future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or in- 
 vade India through it, we should have a better 
 chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we 
 avoid all interference with them in the meantime." 
 
 These are facts which deserve special attention at 
 the present moment, seeing that we are once more 
 
16 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 on the eve of serious complications on the north- 
 west frontier of India. When we look back at the 
 incidents of the last fifty years, and more especially 
 at the two epochs in our history when an irrational 
 fear of invasion from Kussia drove us to unprovoked 
 hostilities against our neighbours hostilities which 
 resulted in signal disasters to our armies, and in 
 great discontent among our Indian subjects, whom 
 we burdened with the cost of our unsuccessful enter- 
 prises ; when we consider the serious consequences 
 of the errors committed on those two occasions, it 
 becomes a matter for surprise as well as for deep 
 concern, that a policy which nothing has justified 
 should at the present moment be actively pursued in 
 India, with the certainty of its soon landing us into 
 fresh complications and the hazards of a third Afghan 
 campaign. The policy of 1876, abandoned in 1880, 
 when Sir Frederick Eoberts proclaimed its unsound- 
 ness in the letter quoted above, was suddenly revived 
 in 1885 under the scare produced by the Russian 
 onslaught at Penjdeh, and while public attention at 
 home was engrossed in heated political strife re- 
 garding Ireland ; and many millions have already 
 been expended upon railroads and other works in- 
 tended to facilitate the march of our troops to Can- 
 dahar and Cabul. 
 
REMAKES ON THE AFGHAN WAR. 17 
 
 The strategic advantage which the advocates of 
 that mistaken policy look for, from our holding 
 outposts in Afghanistan, whence our troops could 
 march against a Eussian advance, would be entirely 
 neutralized by the difficult nature of the country, the 
 distance of our main resources, and the hostility and 
 fanaticism which our occupation of Candahar and 
 other outposts would arouse among every tribe in the 
 country. The railroad we are constructing to Can- 
 dahar, and our projected line towards Cabul, could 
 afford little or no assistance to our troops, after they 
 had penetrated the mountainous tracts beyond those 
 cities; yet, can we forget how our armies were 
 harassed, and their movements impeded, by the 
 action even of tribes denying allegiance to the Amir, 
 against whom personally we had declared war ? 
 Those tribes were actuated solely by religious fana- 
 ticism and hatred of foreign domination; and how 
 powerfully their action contributed to the complete 
 failure of our two expeditions in 1878-80 should be 
 most carefully remembered, if we are to avoid similar 
 disasters in future. 
 
18 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Operations in Southern Afghanistan in 1878-79. 
 
 When a British army of 13,000 men was sent via 
 Quetta to Candahar in November 1878, the object 
 was to advance on Herat with the co-operation of 
 the two armies of 16,000 and 6,000 men respectively, 
 which entered Afghanistan at the same time through 
 the Khyber Pass and the Kuram Valley. The 
 Candahar column, upon entering the enemy's country, 
 found the greatest difficulty in procuring food ; and, 
 that difficulty soon proving insurmountable, our 
 troops had to retrace their steps, and the greater 
 part of them to return to India, leaving only 4,000 
 men to hold Candahar. Under these circumstances 
 the advance on Herat, which was the main feature in 
 our plan of campaign, became impossible, and had 
 to be given up. 
 
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN. 19 
 
 Meanwhile the Khyber army had reached Jellal- 
 abad, and the Kuram force occupied the Peiwar Kotal, 
 on their respective lines of advance towards Cabul. 
 As their mission was to co-operate with the army in 
 the south in the projected march to Herat, the collapse 
 at Candahar rendered their further operations pur- 
 poseless. The Kuram force, moreover, was stopped 
 in its march by the Shutargardan, which is imprac- 
 ticable in winter, and our general situation thereupon 
 became highly embarrassing. Meanwhile the enemy, 
 avoiding, as a rule, any general action, seized every 
 opportunity of attacking our convoys and detached 
 parties ; while cholera, typhoid, and the hand of the 
 assassin were doing their destructive work among our 
 soldiers, and our commissariat and transport diffi- 
 culties were increasing daily. This untoward state 
 of things made it urgent for our armies to leave the 
 country with the least possible delay ; * and the 
 
 * The situation is thus referred to in a despatch to the Secretary of 
 State (C. 2401, 1879, page 33): "In the meanwhile the suspended 
 activity of our troops on the Khyber line had begun to exercise a 
 very prejudicial influence upon our political, as well as our military, 
 position in Afghanistan. The result was ... a recrudescence of 
 petty but vexatious and harassing attacks from the surrounding 
 tribes. ... At the same time the increasing heat of the weather, and 
 the defective sanitary conditions of Jellalabad, had begun to tell 
 injuriously on the health of the large force concentrated in that 
 locality, and due regard to the well-being of our troops necessitated 
 an immediate change of quarters." 
 
20 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Government accordingly, within five weeks of our 
 entering Candahar, made overtures to Yakub Khan, 
 then Governor of Cabul, expressing a desire to settle 
 amicably the differences which had led to the 
 war.* 
 
 This disappointing result of the scheme in search 
 of a " scientific frontier " was carefully concealed 
 from the public, and Lord Beacon sfield, at the open- 
 ing of Parliament on the 13th February 1879, 
 represented the situation in the following delusive 
 terms : 
 
 " H.M.'s Government have the satisfaction of feel- 
 ing that the object of their interference in that 
 country has been completely accomplished. We 
 are now in possession of the three great highways 
 which connect Afghanistan with India . . . and I 
 hope that this country will remain in possession of 
 those three great highways (Ministerial cheers). We 
 have secured the object for which the expedition was 
 
 * The papers presented to Parliament make it appear as if the 
 overtures of peace had come from Yakub Khan. This false impres- 
 sion, produced by Lord Lytton's letter of 27th March, and the 
 suppression of our Political Officer's despatch, to which Yakub's 
 missive of 20th February was an answer, will be removed by a 
 reference to Afghanistan Paper No. 7 (C. 2401 of 1879). Besides, 
 Major Cavagnari's telegram of 28th February clearly states : " Letter 
 affords favourable opportunity for opening negotiations with Yakub 
 Khan." 
 
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN. 21 
 
 undertaken. We have secured that frontier which 
 will, I hope, render our Empire invulnerable." 
 
 At the very time when this inspiriting picture 
 was being held up to the nation, the Government 
 were endeavouring to negotiate a treaty of peace, by 
 which they eventually agreed to evacuate Candahar, 
 Jellalabad, and every other part of Afghan territory 
 then occupied by our troops, excepting the districts 
 of Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi, and to pay an annual 
 subsidy of six lakhs of rupees to the Amir, who, on 
 his side, agreed to a British Eepresentative residing 
 at Cabul. Thus two of those " great highways," the 
 possession of which was declared to have been " the 
 object of the expedition," and was to " render our 
 Empire invulnerable," were being quietly surrendered; 
 while the third route through the Kuram Valley is 
 not a highway at all suitable for an army, seeing 
 that it is closed in winter, and that our force under 
 General Eoberts was actually shut up in it at the 
 very time when it was being represented in the mis- 
 leading and grandiloquent terms just quoted. Doubt- 
 less the speaker relied on the ignorance of his 
 hearers regarding the frontier he so vaguely denned, 
 and regarding also the nature of the operations that 
 had been carried on in Afghanistan. Indeed, on the 
 latter point the public had scarcely any reliable 
 
22 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 information until the conclusion of the war, when 
 the diaries of officers attached to our forces were 
 published under various forms. The information 
 which these publications afforded was, for obvious 
 reasons, incomplete, and, on some important points, 
 vaguely and even ambiguously expressed. Never- 
 theless, the diaries in question clearly establish 
 the ominous fact that, in spite of the valour and 
 endurance displayed by our soldiers, and the ability 
 and energy of our generals and many of the sub- 
 ordinate officers, difficulties arose at every step, 
 from the nature of the country and the character 
 of the foe, which hindered the movement of our 
 troops, and effectually prevented them from accom- 
 plishing the object of the expedition. As those 
 diaries, however, appeared only after the anxiety 
 created by the war had subsided, and the angry 
 feelings of the nation had been somewhat allayed 
 by the overthrow of the Ministers responsible 
 for the disastrous enterprise, the publications did 
 not receive all the attention they deserve. A few 
 extracts from them may therefore prove of interest, 
 showing, as they do, that the climate, the configura- 
 tion and barrenness of the land, and the fanaticism 
 of the people constituted obstacles against which the 
 perfection of our weapons, the discipline of our troops, 
 
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN. 23 
 
 and the scientific contrivances at our command often 
 proved totally unavailing. 
 
 Before submitting the extracts just referred to, it 
 might be as well to conclude the remarks which 
 suggest themselves with regard to the overtures of 
 peace made by us in February 1879. Shortly after 
 receiving Yakub Khan's letter of the 20th of that 
 month, our Government was informed that the Amir 
 Sher Ali had died in Turkestan, and that Yakub 
 Khan was proclaimed his successor. The country, 
 by that time, was in a state of anarchy, and Yakub 
 scarcely exercised any power or influence over the 
 people or their leaders. Under those circumstances 
 he was glad of an opportunity of coming to terms 
 with us, and a treaty of peace was accordingly con- 
 cluded at Gandamak on the 26th May, by which we 
 agreed, as already mentioned, to evacuate every part 
 of the Afghan territory except Kuram, Pishin, and 
 Sibi, and to pay an annual subsidy to the Amir, who, 
 on his side, agreed to a British [Representative 
 residing at Cabul. 
 
 That treaty, by which the British Government 
 virtually gave up all that it had contended for, and 
 gained nothing substantial except the termination of 
 the hostilities, aptly illustrates the very critical posi- 
 tion in which it was placed. In short, the treaty was 
 
24 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 the best arrangement that could be devised tor 
 covering our failure; and an examination of the 
 apparent concessions we obtained under it, will show 
 those concessions to have been utterly worthless. Of 
 the three districts which we were not called to evacu- 
 ate, Pishin and Sibi are wild tracts of barren land, 
 the former having no denned boundary and the latter 
 bordering on the arid plains of Beluchistan. Their 
 soil is too poor to bear the cost of civil administration 
 even in the most elementary form ; and the Amir has 
 consequently never maintained any permanent repre- 
 sentative on the spot. Dr. Duke, in his Recollections 
 of the Cabul Campaign of 1879-80, says : "Of all 
 the horrible stations to be met with on our frontier, 
 Sibi must bear the palm." As regards Pishin, an 
 officer attached to the Candahar column described it 
 as "an isolated position so destitute of food and 
 water that a single native cavalry regiment could not 
 subsist on its resources."* 
 
 Kuram is a winding valley in the midst of high 
 mountains inhabited by some of the most turbulent 
 tribes in Afghanistan, over whom the Amir himself 
 exercises but little control. It has an issue towards 
 Cabul through a very narrow rocky defile, of which 
 
 * The War in Afghanistan : Its Origin and Results. By Lieut. - 
 Col. R. D. Osborn. (H. J. Infield, 1880.) 
 
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN. 25 
 
 Wylde, in his notes on the map of Afghanistan, 
 observes : " One of our best frontier soldiers states 
 that it is impossible to conceive a worse pass for an 
 army." The pass is blocked with snow in winter in 
 short, the Kuram valley is a veritable cul-de-sac, in 
 which an invading army, which persisted in holding 
 the place, might be shut in, starved, and destroyed. 
 
 Lastly, as regards the clause providing for a British 
 Eepresentative to reside at Cabul, it was well known 
 at the time that the Amir had not the power of pro- 
 tecting our Envoy from the hatred and fanaticism of 
 his subjects. The late Amir, Sher Ali, had repeatedly 
 told us, in most earnest language, that he could not 
 guarantee tte safety of British officers in Cabul, so 
 bitter was the remembrance in the minds of the 
 people of the outrages which our army had committed 
 in that city in 1842. Since then we had many con- 
 vincing proofs that a similar feeling prevailed 
 throughout the country ; and when Afghans have 
 been questioned and remonstrated with on the sub- 
 ject, their reply has been to the following effect : 
 
 " Sir Alexander Burnes, your Envoy in 1838, was 
 received as the friend of the nation ; there was not a 
 house in our country the door of which was closed to 
 him. He departed, and when next we saw him he 
 was at the head of an army coming to dethrone his 
 
 2 
 
26 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 friend, Dost Mahomed, and destroy our independence. 
 Can we trust you after that ? " 
 
 If the safety of a British officer in Cabul could not 
 be guaranteed in the reign of Sher Ali, by whom 
 the tribes of Afghanistan were brought under better 
 control than they had ever been, it was worse than 
 folly, it was a crime, to entrust the life of a British 
 Envoy to the weak hands of Yakub Khan, at a time 
 of anarchy, and when the fanaticism and exaspera- 
 tion of the people had been aroused in the highest 
 degree by our unprovoked invasion of their country.* 
 The massacre of our Envoy and of his entire escort 
 on the 3rd September occurred within six weeks of 
 their arrival in Cabul, and with that deplorable event 
 the first chapter in the history of the war of 1878-80 
 may be said to have closed. * ' 
 
 * Lieut.-Col. Osborn thus explains the urgent necessity under 
 which the Envoy clause was inserted : " The Government dared not 
 face the country with nothing to show as the fruits of a wicked and 
 unrighteous war except a miserable and transparent imposition such 
 as the ' Scientific Frontier.' " 
 
27 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Extracts from Major Le Messurier's Book. 
 
 The following extracts from the diary of the Brigade 
 Major attached to the Candahar column* relate to 
 the operations carried on in Southern Afghanistan 
 from the commencement of the war until the mas- 
 sacre of the British Embassy at Cabul : 
 
 Extracts. 
 
 " 1878, Dec. 22nd. A sergeant of the 70th was 
 stabbed by a Pathan. 
 
 " 1879, Jan. 10th. The prices we have to pay 
 are startling ; the forage for a horse costs 2 rupees 
 a-day. . . . The Commissariat has only four days' 
 supply for Europeans and seven for natives, and yet 
 
 * Kandahar in 1879. By Major A. Le Messurier, R.E. (W. H. 
 Allen & Co.) 
 
 2 * 
 
558 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 there are only some 8,000 fighting men at Candahar 
 out of the 13,000 men which form the Quetta army. 
 ... As St. John was riding in the city to-day a 
 fanatic ^fired a pistol at him, but without evil results. 
 Very much at the same time Lieut. Willis, E.A., 
 while standing at a shop, was stabbed over the right 
 nipple {he died on the 15th) by another fanatic, who 
 at once ran a tilt, wounding three of our soldiers 
 before he was cut down. Jerome, when out survey- 
 ing, was more than once insolently hustled by men 
 in uniform who were squatting in the village. 
 
 "Jan. 25th. Analysing the table of the Canda- 
 har force, the result is that, for every fighting man 
 you must have one follower and one camel. This 
 may seem an over-estimate, but it is not so ; for the 
 followers are not in excess and the camels are known 
 to be deficient. The mortality among the beasts of 
 burden is very great. From calculations roughly 
 made, I do not hesitate to fix it at 40 per cent, per 
 month ; and should any bad or severe weather occur, 
 it will be still greater. This means that, if we have 
 12,000 camels at work, others must be coming at the 
 rate of 1,500 a week. This deficiency cannot altogether 
 be met locally, and India must be looked to for sup- 
 port, remembering at the same time that the further 
 we go the larger will be the number to be despatched 
 
MAJOR LE MESSURIER's BOOK. 29 
 
 to cover the losses among the relief camels them- 
 selves. 
 
 "On the Way to Robat. 
 
 " The shoe begins to pinch, and the want of camel- 
 carriage, added to the fact that we have outstripped 
 our convoys of provision, is forcing itself to the 
 notice of all. 
 
 " Jan. 17th. Marched to Okhoond Ziarat. A 
 biting cold wind blowing all day. The camels have 
 suffered ; 200 are reported to have died ; also 60 of 
 the cavalry brigade. 
 
 "18th. Marched 12 miles to Shahr-i-Safa. The 
 water all along is very brackish and strongly impreg- 
 nated with nitre. 
 
 "21st. Marched to a point opposite Pulsingi. A 
 trooper of Oliver's was shot to-day by marauders. 
 On this march we cross the boundary between the 
 Durani and Ghilzai territories. 
 
 " 24/i. Provisions not easily obtainable, and a 
 reconnoitring (raiding ?) party was ordered off 
 towards Mirzan, viz. 2 guns 11.11 E.A., 100 sabres 
 15th Hussars, a squadron of the 19th Bengal Lan- 
 cers, and a detachment of Sappers. . . . The mail is 
 reported uncertain and unsafe ; our men are stopped 
 and stripped and flogged, and sometimes killed. 
 
SO A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 * " 29th. Thermometer 25. Increased mortality 
 among camels. No more tobacco. 
 
 "Feb. 2nd. We have turned back our steps to- 
 wards Candahar, and marched 15 miles against a 
 cutting wind loaded with fine dust : miserable work, 
 and one and all more or less in the dumps. Brown, 
 our political officer, is hand-and-glove with the Ghil- 
 zais. Whatever influence he may have over them 
 must wane when they see our force quietly leaving 
 the valley and returning to Candahar after accom- 
 plishing so little. 
 
 " 4th. The Commissariat are out of wood ; camels 
 are dying off. 
 
 "1th. Black frost last night ; increased mortality 
 among the camels continues. 
 
 " 12lh. Eumours of a division of forces, some going 
 back to India, now confirmed. The bread we have 
 been having, and the water combined, will probably 
 account for the sickness. 
 
 "March 4th. In the march to Khelat-i-Ghilzai 267 
 camels started with the Head-quarters camp and 154 
 died in eight days. 
 
 "April 6th. The transport officers are complain- 
 ing dreadfully of the state of the road beyond Sha- 
 randaru Kotal. . . . The stench from the dead camels 
 along the line was scarcely bearable. Around the 
 
MAJOR LE MESSURIER's BOOK. 81 
 
 camp at Mand-i-Hissar are some forty dead camels 
 unburied. . . . They tell me that, among the camels 
 that manage to get in with their loads, about 
 half the number cannot get on their legs in the 
 morning and are left to die. Poor beasts ! What a 
 tale they could tell ! Will the broad hint of their 
 dead carcasses have any effect on our future cam- 
 paigns ? 
 
 " 24th. Eode back into Candahar and heard of 
 Colonel Fellowes' death. He was as fine a looking 
 man as any of the Force, and most active. 
 
 " May 6th. 35 camels died out of 609 in one 
 night, from eating a poisonous herb close to lake 
 Lagowlee. 
 
 " 11th. Eode to Mahomed Shah's village to see how 
 it should be destroyed. The village has given cover 
 to the men who attacked Pittman's telegraph party 
 when laying the line into Candahar. 
 
 "JuneZSrd. One of the 60th sentries was shot 
 at last night. We seem to be in for a lively time of 
 it. The Colonel is laid up, and Eogers, Hawskin, 
 and Oliver are all down with fever. 
 
 " July 14th. Cholera has appeared, ending fatally 
 in 14 cases. 17th. Cholera still busy at Head- 
 quarters and the two squadrons. ISth. A telegram 
 came in saying that Nicholetts was dead, having 
 
32 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 been seized with cholera at 1 p.m. and died at 6 p.m. 
 21st, Hannel of the 1st Punjab Cavalry died of 
 cholera. 29th. Captain Chisholme of the 59th 
 buried to day. August 6th. Major Powis of the 59th 
 was buried this evening cholera. Anderson of the 
 25th N.I., who has been been ill for some time, 
 has been buried to-day : our doctor in the Sappers 
 died last night ; also Corporal Boon, K.E. 23rd. 
 Heard that Stavely lost 4 Europeans and 2 natives 
 out of his battery, that Dr. Blanchard had died at 
 Gatur, and Lieutenant Campbell of the Beluchis at 
 Chaman, all of cholera. 31st. Brown, commanding 
 Sappers and Miners, had 6 cases of cholera, 5 of which 
 were fatal. 
 
 "Sept. 6th. The order to stand fast has reference 
 to Cabul, where our Envoy and Suite have] all been 
 murdered. 
 
 "13th. The troops which left on the 1st September 
 returned to Candahar. Bobberies are again on 
 the increase. 17th. Warning issued to all to be 
 careful and not go near the city during the Eed 
 festival. 
 
 " Oct. 2nd. Lieutenant Kinloch, on his way to 
 join his regiment, the 12th Bengal Cavalry, was 
 murdered on the road between Chappri and Man- 
 tui." 
 
33 
 
 These extracts show how great were the straits to 
 which the Candahar column was reduced soon after 
 entering Afghanistan, and how imperative was the 
 necessity which compelled the General to send the 
 greater part of the force back to India. When that 
 significant retrograde movement took place, and the 
 Xuram force was, at the same time, stopped by the 
 Shutargardan from either advancing on Cabul or 
 forming a junction with the Khyber army, a situation 
 ensued which renders quite intelligible the early 
 desire suddenly manifested by the British Cabinet to 
 conclude peace on the best terms that could be 
 obtained. 
 
84 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Extracts from Major Colquhoun's Book. 
 
 The extracts which will now be given are from the 
 diary of an officer* attached to the Kuram army ; 
 they relate, therefore, to operations quite distinct 
 from those in the south, referred to in Major Le 
 Messurier's volume. As these extracts are made for 
 the sole purpose of illustrating the causes which 
 contributed to the failure of the expedition, they 
 afford no adequate idea of the merit of Major 
 Colquhoun's book, which is full of valuable informa- 
 tion, and graphically describes the operations of the 
 force to which he belonged. 
 
 * With the Kuram Field Force, 1878-79. By Major J. A. S. 
 Colquhoun, R.A., dedicated to Sir F. Roberts, by permission. 
 (W. H. Allen & Co. 1881. 
 
major colquhoun's book. 85 
 
 Extracts. 
 
 "1878. Dec. 15th. The Government has directed 
 that native troops and public followers will be, 
 when employed beyond the British territory, 
 entitled to their rations. This is equivalent to 
 raising the pay of the native army about 30 per 
 cent. 
 
 " Nov. 28th. (Kuram Fort.) The regiments for 
 the advance started at 6 a.m. The left column were 
 sent with instructions to seize the village of Turai. 
 . . . Orders were sent to the right brigade to march 
 up the regular road to the Peiwar Kotal, thus forming 
 a support to the attack of the left. ... As soon as 
 the head of the left column found itself in the narrow 
 passage that closes the entrance to the 'Punch 
 bowl,' they came in sight of the Afghans, who 
 showed themselves on the crest of the mountain high 
 above their heads. Nothing, however, could be done 
 in this direction ; the high precipitous mountains 
 rising up straight from the ravine seem to bar the 
 way, . . . the only thing to be done was to fall back 
 on the village of Turai. This retrograde movement 
 excited the Afghans, ... a party of them moved 
 down, and commenced an attack on the regiments as 
 they were moving towards the village, ... a smart 
 
36 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 skirmish ensued. A wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry, 
 under Captain Hall, was posted on a knoll of the 
 spur. The 29th Punjab Infantry climbed the steep 
 face of the hill, till the difficulty of the ground 
 prevented their ascending any further. The two 
 mountain guns, under Lieut. Jarvis, fired shells at 
 the enemy ; but as most of the Afghans were behind 
 shelter-trenches and tree-stems, not much damage 
 resulted. . . . The right column arrived at Turai at 
 2 p.m., and the Major-General and staff came up at 
 the same time. . . . The regiments engaged with the 
 Afghans were recalled, while, to assist the retreat, 
 the 5th Goorkhas were ordered up from the right 
 brigade, and the line was then withdrawn by alter- 
 nate regiments. 
 
 " The arms were piled and the troops were resting 
 on the ground, awaiting the arrival of their baggage, 
 when, at 4 p.m., the Afghan gun, which had mean- 
 while been brought to the point of the spur over- 
 looking the village of Turai, came into play at a 
 range of 1,700 yards right on to the ground where 
 the troops were to have camped, and which was 
 covered with men. . . . The guns of the P/A 
 E.H.A., were brought at once into action. . . . 
 The winter day was shortening; the order was 
 given to move the camp back, and it was nearly dark 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 87 
 
 when the spot selected was reached. ... It is a 
 difficult matter to pitch a camp in the dark on a 
 plain, and in this case the difficulty was increased by 
 having to pitch tents in a scrub-jungle amid a scat- 
 tered growth of hill-oak and thorny bushes. . . . 
 This broken ground extended for three and a half 
 miles. The eagerness of the Afghans to commence 
 hostilities was the salvation of the force. If, knowing 
 the range as they did, and being in an inaccessible 
 position, they had been content to wait till the camp 
 was pitched, and had commenced to shell the camp 
 with all their mountain guns after dark, the con- 
 sequences would have been most serious. Nothing 
 could have been done except to withdraw from the 
 camp ; but in all probability there would have been 
 a stampede among the mules. The camp, with all 
 its bedding and baggage, might have been burnt 
 down, and the Kuram Field Force had been rendered 
 hors de combat. 
 
 " The retrograde movement was most annoying, as 
 the troops had been on foot since early dawn, and on 
 the move all day ; and just as they were on the point 
 of enjoying their well-earned rest, they had to retire 
 for over a mile. 
 
 " Nov. 29th. Owing to the exhaustion of the men 
 and cattle, and the impossibility of keeping up the 
 
38 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 supplies with the troops, it was decided not to 
 attack to-day. 
 
 " Dec. 1st. The force remained in the same camp 
 till this evening. 
 
 "Dec. 2nd. The camp fires were burning brightly 
 when, at 10 o'clock last night, the troops, who had 
 been warned, formed up in the dark as quietly as 
 possible. The secret had been well kept. ... It 
 was very dark. . . . The orders were that every 
 regiment should be followed by its ammunition mules 
 and hospital doolies and dandies. . . . Baggage ani- 
 mals on a narrow road hinder the traffic very com- 
 pletely in the day-time, and at night, of course, the 
 delays occasioned are much greater. . . . The object 
 of starting as early as 10 p.m. was to allow time for 
 the troops to rest on the road ; but the experience of 
 the first part of the march showed that there was 
 hardly time to do the remaining six miles . . . and 
 unless the place were stormed in the early morning, 
 the whole of the night's labour would have been lost. 
 The cold began to be felt more as the night progressed 
 . . . the mounted officers felt it most. The diffi- 
 culty of maintaining touch in the dark between 
 regiments was very great, especially with the inter- 
 vening mules and hospital equipment. At the turn 
 of the road the 2nd Punjab Infantry lost their way 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 89 
 
 . . . the regiment in the rear, the 23rd Pioneers, 
 and the four guns of the Koyal Artillery that 
 followed the column on elephants, being behind 
 the 2nd Punjab Infantry, naturally went astray 
 also. . . . 
 
 " After having advanced slowly for a mile and a 
 half, the report of a gun was heard, immediately 
 followed by another discharge. Colonel Gordon 
 halted the advance party, and endeavoured to find out 
 the men who had fired . . . but no one could, or 
 would, identify them ... a native officer took 
 several men's rifles and smelt them. He soon found 
 out the men who had fired, but, being a Mahomedan, 
 he tried to screen his co-religionists. There is little 
 doubt that some of the Pathans of this regiment 
 (29th Punjab Infantry) were imbued with the idea 
 that they should not fight against their neighbours 
 the Afghans, as they were of the same religion, and 
 thus these shots were fired with the view of giving 
 notice of the approach of the column. This view is 
 confirmed by the behaviour of a party of men of the 
 regiment, who, in the course of the subsequent en- 
 gagement, made their way back to the camp, with 
 the story that they had lost their way in the dark. 
 . . . About 8 o'clock at night, after a time which 
 seemed an age, a messenger reached the bivouac to 
 
40 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 say that the 2nd Battalion 8th King's were in posses- 
 sion of the Peiwar Kotal. 
 
 "Dec. 6th. The troops marched to AlikheyL 
 There was but little forage to be had, so the horses 
 with the force fared badly. Only three guns and 
 their ammunition wagons were brought up the hill ; 
 the task was a severe trial. As there was no forage 
 on the Kotal, the horses and drivers were sent down 
 the hill again to be attached to the two guns F/A 
 R.H.A., and march back with them the next day 
 to the camp at Kuram. 
 
 " 11th. No extra issue of food, on payment or 
 otherwise, is henceforth to be allowed. 
 
 " 12th, The Major-General has decided to return 
 to Kuram . . . the baggage of four regiments, even on 
 the reduced scale, made a tolerably long column, and 
 the commissariat camels added to the length to be 
 protected. 
 
 " 18th. The tents were struck at 1 a.m. ; the night 
 was bitterly cold and dark. The track up the Kotal 
 was excessively steep and difficult for the camels . . . 
 there were slippery surfaces of ice which hindered 
 the camels and delayed the march of the baggage. . . . 
 The ascent had been troublesome to the camels, but 
 the descent was infinitely more so, and it was with 
 difficulty that these animals could be made to go 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 41 
 
 down the abrupt and slippery road. The gorge at 
 the foot of the hill extended for five miles ; the track 
 for the first part ran through a deep ravine with 
 perpendicular walls, which narrowed in places to but 
 a few yards. ... It would have been difficult to crown 
 the heights on each side, as these in their turn were 
 commanded by successive ridges, on all of which it 
 would have been necessary to place troops. . . . Here 
 and there side ravines broke into the road, in any 
 one of which an ambush might have been conve- 
 niently laid ; but we had got the start of the enemy, 
 and it was not till the real difficulties of the road 
 were passed that some inhabitants of the country 
 were seen high up on the mountain-sides. . . . Before 
 the tail of the column had extricated itself from the 
 ravine, more of the people had collected ... by degrees 
 they closed as they advanced, and soon were fifty 
 yards off the convoy. . . . Suddenly a volley was fired 
 at the party. Capt. Goad fell wounded (he died on the 
 16th). All this while the column was advancing 
 steadily, and the rear-guard was continually attacked 
 by the more daring of the enemy, who swooped down 
 in parties as the ground allowed them, while the rest 
 kept up a fire from above. In one of these attacks 
 Capt. Powell was wounded twice (he died soon after- 
 wards). The head-quarters of the regiment (5th 
 
 3 
 
42 A SCIENTIFIC FEONTIER. 
 
 Goorkhas) had reached the camp when the news of 
 the attack came in ; but by the time they arrived to 
 the assistance of the rear-guard, the affair was over, 
 and the enemy had retired into the mountains. 
 
 " 14th. Mr. Christie, Assistant Commissioner, was 
 sent to inquire regarding the possibility of punishing 
 the Mangals who made the attack. The result of the 
 inquiries was that the Mangal villages were all scat- 
 tered hamlets, and that the only one of any size was 
 the chief village of the Laggi Glen, which was situ- 
 ated in a very difficult country. The intention (of 
 punishing) was abandoned. 
 
 " 15th. D. 0. 347, Sick and wounded to be trans- 
 ported from Kuram to Kohat under escort of the 
 5th Punjab Infantry. The hostile feeling of the hill- 
 men showed itself by the nightly cutting of the tele- 
 graph wire. 
 
 " 16^. The necessity of husbanding the transport 
 became apparent, as the camels were beginning to 
 die. . . . The distance of the nearest hill where brush- 
 wood which would do for their food was found, was 
 seven miles ; and the camels had thus to walk four- 
 teen miles, there and back, to their feeding-ground 
 daily. The cold, added to the change of diet, was 
 trying to their constitution, and the damage from 
 these causes materially affected the movements of the 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 43 
 
 force. . . . Some of the Orakzai tribe fired into the 
 cavalry post, killing a horse, and were assembling 
 with the intention of attacking the force. 
 
 " ISth. A robbery occurred in the Kuram fort of 
 the treasure belonging to the army. 
 
 " Mth. The hardly won Peiwar Kotal had to be 
 retained at all costs during the winter months, to 
 prevent its falling into the hands of an inimical 
 tribe. 
 
 11 Khost Expedition. 
 
 " 1879, Jan. 6th. Our camp was pitched to the 
 east of the Fort of Matun at 2 p.m. Information 
 was brought in at 7 that the Mangals had come down 
 into the valley. 
 
 "7th. In the morning the Mangals and other 
 tribesmen began to swarm out of the villages. As 
 the enemy seemed disposed to make an attack, the 
 troops fell in at 9 a.m. ; but were dismissed when the 
 intention of the enemy became more evident, which 
 was to make a simultaneous attack in every direction. 
 By 12 o'clock the surrounding movement was com- 
 pleted, and the troops were ordered to fall in again. 
 ... On the arrival of the cavalry the enemy withdrew 
 to the foot of the hills . . . the exchange of fire had been 
 going on for half an hour when our infantry brought 
 
44 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 a more effective fire on the ridge where the enemy 
 were now collected. The Mangals then retired 
 beyond the reach of pursuit, which was, however, 
 not attempted, as nothing would have been gained 
 by following the enemy into the recesses of the 
 mountains. . . . The string of camels which had been 
 seized (from our camp by the Mangals) and were 
 being led away, were visible on the plain; but it 
 would not have been possible, with the mass of men 
 still hanging about, to attempt the recapture, without 
 the risk of being cut off. 
 
 " 12th. Sick and wounded moved into fort. 
 
 " 14th. Disturbed all night by rumours that the 
 Mangals intended attacking. Trenches were thrown 
 up. 
 
 " 16th. No forage for camels : 400 sent back to 
 Hazir Pir. 
 
 " ISth. Flour rations reduced from 1 to f seer. 
 
 11 21st. Thermometer 17 deg. The cold and in- 
 different supply of water affected the health of the 
 troops ; intermittent fever, pneumonia, and dysentery 
 began to show themselves. 
 
 " 29th. Cavalry vedettes sent out . . . the fort of 
 Matun was emptied of all the powder and grain ; but 
 there were not many unladen camels . . . the pow- 
 der was poured into the wet ditch, the grain that 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 45 
 
 could not be carried off was set alight. The task 
 being over, there remained only two alternatives 
 either to fight the Mangals or to retire. The latter 
 course was decided on; the enemy were in great 
 force, and even if they had been driven back to the 
 hills nothing would have been gained, as they could 
 not have been pursued. The Mangals, emboldened 
 by our seeming inactivity, ventured out and formed a 
 line about a mile long towards the west. Had only 
 the whole force been available, or had even our men 
 been fresh to go out and do battle, and if we had 
 been victorious, we would have done more towards 
 the pacification of the independent tribes than any 
 patched-up money-bought peace. A little before 12 
 the retirement began while the enemy were still at a 
 distance. 
 
 "Feb. 2nd. A convoy of sick men (including 
 General Cobbe, who had sufficiently recovered from 
 his wound) proceeded to India under escort. The 
 detachment was ordered to march via the Durwaza 
 Pass, as there was some chance that the Mangals 
 might otherwise attack the party. The Peiwar Kotal 
 was now virtually secure ; the only place where 
 trouble was expected was Thull, though it was in our 
 borders. 
 
 " On the night of the 2nd March a raid was made 
 
46 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 by the Alisherais and Mamuzais. . . . After killing 
 five of our men and wounding seven, the raiders 
 carried off 29 mules. 
 
 " May 30th. Alikheyl. The increasing heat ap- 
 peared to be affecting the troops, and in consequence 
 of several cases of erysipelas it was decided to move 
 to Plateau A. The 67th Kegiment at Byan Kheyl 
 were also similarly affected, but suffered more from a 
 severe form of typhoid. 
 
 " The General and Staff rode up the Lukkerai Pass 
 for eighteen miles with the object of meeting Captain 
 Strahan, K.E., and Major Stewart, Guides Corps, 
 who were coming from Gandamak. After waiting 
 for some time, the General had to return, as it was 
 getting late, and afterwards it was telegraphed that 
 these officers had been unable to cross the Pass. 
 
 M June "6rd. The General and Staff went to the 
 top of a spur. The idea was to proceed up the Has- 
 san Kheyl valley till the Pass on the Ghazni road 
 was reached ; but the headmen of the Hassan Kheyls 
 pointed out that part of this road lay through the 
 Mangal territory, where opposition was likely to be 
 met with. The idea was consequently abandoned 
 . . . but the party was taken up a spur which over- 
 looked the Pass. Not much time was allowed for 
 making observations, as when the Mangals in the 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 47 
 
 valley below sighted the party on the ridge, their 
 drums beat, alarm was given, and they began to col- 
 lect with the object of fighting ... so the party 
 returned to camp. 
 
 "June 6th. It was necessary to explore the Ishtiar 
 Pass. The General started with a small force, and 
 till the last moment the destination of the march 
 was kept secret, and it was given out that the troops 
 were to go through the Manjiar Pass, so that, if the 
 Mangals thought of attacking, they would be on the 
 wrong track. No opposition was met with. . . . 
 The people of Keriah, however, used to creep up close 
 and fire into the camp at night. ... On the 15th 
 June the last reconnaissance was to be made. . . . 
 Arrangements were made with the Lajji Mangals for 
 security on their part of the road. . . . Just before 
 reaching the last village one of the Badragga (native 
 escort) said that the Mangals would object to the 
 advance of the party. . . . The General decided to 
 make further inquiry before committing himself to 
 the defile. . . . The road being reported as clear, the 
 first Mangal village was reached and the road was 
 resumed. About three miles from the border line a 
 halt was called to find out the intentions of some 
 men who were coming down to the side ravine. 
 There were not many visible, only three or four, but 
 
48 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 their actions were hostile. Prolonged shouts of 
 Allah and occasional (war) dances showed that oppo- 
 sition was to be met with. About three miles further, 
 the Ahmed Kheyl villages, which were the goal of the 
 expedition, were in sight ; but there was a chance of 
 the return journey being cut off. The men on the 
 hill-top were asked to come down and talk over the 
 matter, but their reply was a shot. . . . About an 
 hour passed in the fruitless endeavour to bring the 
 Mangals to terms. ... It was then reported that 
 they were coming to take us in the rear. . . . The 
 General gave the order for the return. ... As soon 
 as the enemy observed the movement they swarmed 
 down and, skirmishing from rock to rock, returned 
 our fire with interest. The party returned to camp 
 at 4 p.m. On the 17th June the camp broke, and the 
 General returned to Shabuzan. On the 18th, Lieu- 
 tenant Whitall, a promising young officer attached to 
 the Bengal Lancers, died from cholera at Badesh 
 Kheyl. After his death the camp was removed to a 
 higher table-land ; the drawback there was the dis- 
 tance of the water-supply. On the 25th, Mr. Sinclair, 
 Assistant Commissioner at Thull, and several civil 
 subordinates who were in camp near him, were 
 attacked with cholera. Mr. Sinclair died the follow- 
 ing day. Dr. Smith, who was sent to Thull on 
 
MAJOR COLQUHOUN'S BOOK. 49 
 
 account of the cholera, was murdered at Chappri. 
 The camp at Badesh Kheyl being a bare plateau, 
 fatigue parties were sent daily to bring in fire-wood. 
 Two parties of the 21st and 11th P. I. were set upon, 
 and a Subadar (captain) and his orderly were killed. 
 
 11 July 1st. Head-quarters shifted to the Peiwar 
 Kotal. The heat and moisture at Kuram were very 
 relaxing . . . and the climate was beginning to 
 affect the health of all. 
 
 " 18^. The head-quarters and the Cabul Mission 
 (Envoy and suite) marched to Karatiga and proceeded 
 on the 19th to the Afghan camp at Shutargardan. 
 The General and Staff were allowed to go as far as 
 the Pass. AH political work in the Kuram valley 
 thus terminated on the 20th July." 
 
50 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Review of the Operations of the Kuram Field 
 Force, and Summary of the Campaign of 1878-79. 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing extracts that 
 causes similar to those which produced the collapse 
 at Candahar, contributed likewise to mar the opera- 
 tions of the Kuram Field Force. The transport and 
 commissariat difficulties, notwithstanding the proxi- 
 mity of our base at Kohat, were sufficiently great to 
 seriously impede the movements of our troops ; while 
 the obstacles due to the configuration of the land 
 were somewhat greater than in the south ; and sick- 
 ness from climatic causes, as well as the hostility and 
 fanaticism of the inhabitants were the same in both 
 places. 
 
 The Kuram army, 6,000 strong, crossed the Afghan 
 frontier, opposite Thull, on the 21st November 1878, 
 
OPERATIONS OF THE KURAM FIELD FORCE. 51 
 
 and marched to the Kuram fort, some forty-seven 
 miles distant, without encountering opposition ; but 
 its further advance, on the 28th, was completely un- 
 successful. It met the enemy in a defile, and had to 
 fall back on the village of Turai ; and, while waiting 
 there for the baggage to pitch their camp, our troops 
 were shelled from a spur overlooking their position, 
 and had to beat a further retreat. Indeed, the Kuram 
 force was in that instance saved from annihilation, as 
 Major Colquhoun so clearly explains, only by the 
 eagerness of the Afghans to commence hostilities. 
 
 The supplies had not come up, and our troops, who 
 had been on the move ever since early dawn, were so 
 exhausted that it was impossible to renew the attack 
 the next day, and until the 2nd of December, when, 
 after a whole night's march in order to effect a sur- 
 prise, and a very hard day's fight, the enemy re- 
 treated and left us in possession of the Peiwar Kotal. 
 Important as that action was in supporting the pres- 
 tige of our arms, it nowise promoted the object of 
 the expedition, seeing that our further advance to- 
 wards Cabul was hopelessly arrested by the Shutar- 
 gardan, and that we had to remain confined in the 
 Kuram Valley throughout the remainder of the 
 campaign. This period of enforced inactivity was 
 partly employed on an excursion into the adjacent 
 
52 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 country of Khost. The exploration of the Khost 
 Valley was undertaken avowedly for the purpose of 
 ascertaining how far its inhabitants could interfere 
 with our communications ; but in reality with a view 
 to conquest and annexation, unaccountable as that 
 might appear, but as the course which was actually 
 pursued clearly indicates. 
 
 A force of 2,300 men entered the Khost country on 
 the 3rd January 1879, and encamped on the 6th close 
 to the fort of Matun, the residence of the Afghan 
 governor. That official, haviDg only some two hun- 
 dred matchlockmen with him, could offer no resist- 
 ance, and surrendered at discretion, giving up all the 
 revenue records, stores, and ammunition which were 
 in the fort. The Mangals, however, a powerful tribe 
 inhabiting the neighbouring hills, threatened to expel 
 us from the country, and accordingly surrounded 
 our camp on the following day. Sharp fighting 
 ensued, and ultimately the attack was repulsed ; 
 whereupon we seized all the grain found in the neigh- 
 bouring villages, placed a garrison in the fort, and 
 resumed our excursion on the 13th. The next day, 
 on hearing that the Mangals were preparing to 
 renew their attack, we hastened back to Matun, threw 
 up intrenchments, and did all we could to put our 
 camp in a state of defence. Our situation, looking at 
 
OPERATIONS OF THE KORAM FIELD FORCE. 5S 
 
 the smallness of our force, and the absence of any 
 support, was extremely precarious. Nevertheless, a 
 durbar was held on the 25th, at which the head-men 
 of the Khost villages were told that the British Govern- 
 ment had taken the country under its protection, and 
 appointed a Governor ; that our regiments were about 
 to depart, but that troops would always be within 
 reach to quell disturbances, if necessary. Then, turn- 
 ing to the hillmen, who had also been invited to the 
 durbar, the General told them that if they wanted to 
 fight, we were always ready for them ; but he advised 
 them not to try, as we did not want to hurt them if 
 they would only keep the peace. These speeches, so 
 inconsistent with our actual situation, seem unac- 
 countable, except on the hypothesis that they were a 
 stratagem for getting out of a critical position, or 
 were prompted under instructions framed in Downing 
 Street. However that might be, the hollowness of 
 the whole affair was soon exposed. Our troops had 
 scarcely left the place on the 27th, when the General 
 was overtaken by a messenger, and informed that the 
 hillmen threatened to put our garrison and governor 
 to death. It was then found that all we could do 
 under the circumstances, was to relieve our garrison 
 and governor, and finally evacuate the Khost country. 
 Even this, however, we were not allowed to accom- 
 
54 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 plish without suffering further humiliation. While 
 our cavalry watched the movements of the enemy, 
 we endeavoured to carry away the powder and grain 
 left in the fort ; but owing to the want of transport 
 animals, the powder was poured into a ditch, the 
 grain that could not be carried off was set on 
 fire, and we beat a hasty retreat while the enemy 
 were still at a distance. The narration of this un- 
 fortunate incident closes abruptly, in Major Colqu- 
 houn's book, with an allusion to " a patched-up, 
 money-bought peace " ; and it is a significant fact 
 that the Parliamentary Eeturn purporting to contain 
 " a Report of the Operations in the Khost Valley in 
 January 1879" makes no mention of what occurred 
 there after the 8th of that month, although it was 
 ordered to be printed only on the 17th of March. 
 
 That Parliamentary Eeturn, by confining its report 
 to the attack repulsed on the 7th January, produced 
 the impression that "the operations in the Khost 
 Valley in January 1879 " had been entirely success- 
 ful ; while, in fact, our troops had been compelled to 
 evacuate the country in that very month, under cir- 
 cumstances which were the very reverse of a success- 
 ful operation. 
 
 Frequent allusions to money payments and gifts to 
 the enemy are found in the diaries kept during the 
 
OPERATIONS OP THE KURAM FIELD FORCE. 55 
 
 war, a circumstance which cannot fail to produce a 
 painful impression on the reader. The responsibility 
 in this respect must rest entirely on those who 
 originated the expedition with inadequate means for 
 accomplishing their object ; whence situations ensued 
 which rendered it imperative to resort to all avail- 
 able means for averting disaster. 
 
 It is true that the armies employed exceeded 
 100,000 men, including camp-followers ; but the 
 experience we had acquired of the country and of its 
 inhabitants should have taught us that, even with 
 such a force, our means were insufficient for the task 
 that was undertaken. The ever-recurring necessity 
 of sending out detached parties to collect food, to 
 accompany the sick and wounded, to protect convoys, 
 and to perform other duties away from head-quarters, 
 materially diminished our forces and weakened their 
 power for both attack and defence. 
 
 A review of the operations of the Kuram Field 
 Force will show that, notwithstanding the hard- 
 fought and successful action of the Peiwar Kotal, and 
 the incessant work which fell to that small army, 
 nothing whatever was accomplished by it that in any 
 way promoted the object of the expedition. Simi- 
 larly, the Khyber army of 16,000 fighting men, after 
 conquering the opposition met with at Ali Masjid, 
 
56 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 remained at Jellalabad, repelling the attacks of the 
 Khughianis, Shinwaris, and other tribesmen, until 
 the worthless treaty of Gandamak brought the cam- 
 paign to an end. 
 
 Thus, three British armies, numbering some 50,000 
 fighting men (including the various reserves and the 
 contingents supplied by Indian princes) were kept in 
 the field in 1878 and 1879 without having achieved 
 anything to compensate for the blood and treasure 
 expended in pursuance of Lord Beaconsfield's enig- 
 matic Afghan policy. Indeed, the very attempt to 
 carry out that policy involved us not only in disas- 
 ters and humiliations, but in a new war equally 
 unsuccessful and unfortunate. I This second war, 
 entered upon for avenging the murder of our repre- 
 sentative, terminated with our evacuating Afghan- 
 istan without any reparation having been made to us 
 for the outrage of the 3rd of September, and under 
 other conditions likewise most derogatory to the 
 dignity of a great nation. The Herati regiments of 
 the Amir, who, on entering Cabul in August, had 
 publicly insulted our Envoy, and were afterwards 
 the leaders and principal actors in the massacre, 
 left Cabul as we approached that city, and it was 
 beyond our power, owing to the nature of the country 
 and the smallness of our army, to pursue and punish 
 
OPERATIONS OF THE KURAM FIELD FORCE. 57 
 
 them. We imposed a fine on the inhabitants of 
 Cabul as abettors in the crime, but failed to recover 
 any portion of that fine. We seized treasure in the 
 city, but had to refund the amount, although it was 
 prize-money belonging to our soldiers. We went 
 farther still for obtaining a peaceful settlement; we 
 paid ten lakhs of rupees from the Indian treasury to 
 the new Amir, Abdarrhaman, although he persistently 
 declined to meet us at Cabul, and superciliously 
 ignored every proposal we made for coming to an 
 arrangement which would spare our national sus- 
 ceptibilities/ The policy which brought these disas- 
 ters and humiliations on the nation, and which has 
 burdened our Indian fellow-subjects with upwards of 
 thirty millions of debt, is the policy which a fear of 
 Kussia, as irrational as it is unworthy, is at the 
 present moment driving our Government to pursue 
 in its relations with Afghanistan. 
 
 4 
 
58 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 Mr. Howard Hensman's Letters, written during 
 the Campaign of 1879-80. 
 
 The diaries which have been quoted in preceding 
 pages relate to the war of 1878-79, which ended with 
 the Treaty of Gandamak. The extracts which will 
 now be given refer to the subsequent period extending 
 from September 1879, when hostilities were resumed 
 to avenge the death of our Envoy, to September 
 1880, when our troops were on their way back to 
 India. 
 
 Extracts 
 
 From Mr. Howard Hensman's letters, published 
 under the title of The Afghan War of 1879-80, 
 preceded by a passage in Sir F. Eoberts's letter 
 
MB. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 59 
 
 congratulating the author on the excellence of 
 his work. 
 
 (These extracts, having been made for the special 
 purpose already explained, can afford but a feeble 
 idea of the merit of the work whence they have been 
 taken.) 
 
 " 1879. Oct. 20th. To-day five prisoners, more or 
 less directly concerned in the events of the last few 
 weeks, were marched to execution. It has been no 
 easy matter to collect evidence. 
 
 " 23rd. Yesterday two Eassaldars of the Afghan 
 Cavalry were marched to execution. The city 
 rabble is unpunished. The Herati regiments havb 
 escaped. 
 
 " Nov. 5th. Five persons were hanged this morn- 
 ing; four of them were village head-men near 
 Shutargardan, who were in our pay but played a 
 double game. 
 
 "9^. We are unhappy in our minds as to our 
 line of communications. . . . We have been cut off 
 again from the Khyber force for several days. . . . 
 We are anxious to send our sick and wounded back 
 to India before the full rigour of winter comes upon 
 them here. 
 
 " 12th. A flying column was to have started on 
 
 4 * 
 
60 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 the 15th, but it is probable that the expedition will 
 now be postponed. It would involve great hardships 
 to march troops 90 miles exposed to sleet and snow- 
 storms ; and, as the chief object would be to secure 
 food and forage, other means may perhaps be found 
 to gain the end in view. 
 
 " 14th. We regret that our cavalry should have 
 to be sent back to the Jellalabad valley where forage 
 is fairly plentiful ; and yet what can we do ? 
 
 "General Macpherson (who marched some days 
 ago to meet the column expected from Peshawar) 
 had no supplies, as everything is being gathered into 
 Sherpur for the winter. On the 8th the force crossed 
 to Nagloo, and bivouacked without tents. On the 
 following day a reconnaissance was made . . . Some 
 seventy Sans appeared and threatened to attack if 
 we proceeded further. Lieutenant Smith returned to 
 Nagloo. On the 10th a foraging party of one com- 
 pany of the 67th Foot, under Captain Poole, marched 
 six miles west of Nagloo. A narrow defile had to be 
 passed, and, a little further, a second defile. . . . 
 Upon getting through this second defile Captain 
 Poole saw, on the slope below, some 800 to 1,000 men, 
 who immediately opened fire. . . . We returned the 
 fire and checked the enemy, but observed some 400 
 Safis creeping round the hill with the evident inten- 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 61 
 
 tion of cutting off our retreat. Our position became 
 so hazardous that Captain Poole ordered the men to 
 fall back. ... In the open our men began to drop 
 . . . the fighting was so close that Captain Poole 
 could not carry off his dead ... he was struck by a 
 bullet in the calf. . . A Sowar galloped to Nagloo 
 for assistance. General Macpherson sent a squadron 
 of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and four mountain guns ; 
 150 of the 67th, and a company of the 28th Punjab 
 Infantry following. The cavalry arrived at a trot, 
 but the defile was so blocked with the baggage- 
 animals, that to get through was impossible. The 
 cavalry dismounted and went up the hill to use their 
 carbines, and, the guns also arriving, went up to the 
 crest under escort of the 28th and 1st company of the 
 67th, and opened fire at 1,000 yards. . . . The 
 enemy retreated. The affair proves how great a risk 
 small foraging parties run. The difficult ground put 
 a body of infantry, encumbered with baggage-animals, 
 at a great disadvantage. That one-sixth of Captain 
 Poole's company was put out of action, is too 
 significant to be lightly regarded. 
 
 " 18th. The Commission appointed to inquire into 
 the circumstances of the massacre of our Envoy has 
 completed its task, and to-day the report was signed 
 by Colonel Macgregor, Dr. Belle w, and Mahomed 
 
OSS A SCIENTIFIC FKONTIER. 
 
 Hyat Khan. In due course Government will, no 
 doubt, furnish a connected narrative of the events of 
 the early part of September. (No narrative has been 
 published.) 
 
 " 21st. We are only at Cabul, and it now seems 
 beyond doubt that we shall not advance further this 
 year. . . . Twenty degrees of frost have warned us 
 that bivouacking would be nearly impossible for 
 well-clad soldiers, and certain death to hundreds of 
 camp-followers. . . . General Macpherson's brigade 
 has been warned for service in the district of Maidan, 
 where large supplies of grain and fodder are said to 
 have been collected. 
 
 " Mth. General Baker has found much difficulty 
 in inducing village head-men to bring in corn . . . 
 several were very insolent. . . . One of them, Baha- 
 dur Khan, was obstinate. The cavalry were sent out 
 yesterday to fetch him in by force . . . they were 
 fired upon by a large body of men ... it was 
 decided to break up the tribal gathering before it 
 grew to serious proportions. General Baker marched 
 in command of a compact little column . . . news 
 was volunteered by a village sirdar that Bahadur 
 Khan and his followers had taken all their movable 
 property and fled to the hills ... it was soon seen 
 that the place was quite deserted. ... All Bahadur 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 63 
 
 Khan's villages were marked down to be looted and 
 burnt. The houses were found stored with straw, 
 firewood for the winter, and a small quantity of corn 
 . . . orders were given to fire the villages, and 
 destroy the houses and their contents. 
 
 " December 1st. During the past few days reports 
 have come in that the Kohistanis meditate attacking 
 Sherpur. 
 
 " 4th. As it began to dawn on the minds of men 
 that we were settling down for the winter, the hostility 
 to our presence revived. In Turkestan it had never 
 subsided. It is not surprising, therefore, that our 
 attempts to open up communications with the 
 Afghan Governors of the northern districts should 
 have failed. ... Of Herat we know nothing 
 The Proclamation of 28th October concluded as 
 follows : ' The services of such Chiefs as assist in pre- 
 serving order will be duly recognised ; but all disturbers 
 of peace, and persons concerned in attacks upon the 
 British authority, will meet with condign punishment. 
 The British Government, after consulation with the 
 principal tribal Chiefs, will declare its will as to the 
 future permanent arrangement to be made for the good 
 government of the people.' Now, these stilted periods 
 either mean a great deal or nothing at all. In 
 Turkestan there are disturbers of the peace as there 
 
64 A SCIENTIFIC FKONTIER. 
 
 are in Kohistan, Maidan, and Logar, and to be con- 
 sistent we must fulfil our pledge to punish them 
 condignly. But these disturbers have had no evidence 
 of the British authority beyond the empty words of 
 the Proclamation. ... An authority to be respected 
 must be tangible. ... It is not tangible in Turkestan ; 
 and it is idle to expect a proclamation, or even a 
 thousand, to cause provincial governors to submit to 
 an authority which does not reach them. ' Consul- 
 tation with tribal chiefs ' is admirable from the view 
 of closet politicians; but how if chiefs decline to 
 consult ? An attempt has been made to carry out 
 the spirit of the Proclamation to make permanent 
 arrangements for the good of the people by con- 
 sulting such sirdars as have deemed it wise to come 
 to us. From their number four have been chosen 
 as governors of districts ; but this system has been 
 a failure. However much they may represent us, 
 they are rejected by the people, and the three who 
 have ' joined their appointments' have had a rough 
 time of it. They have been worried and threatened. 
 ... In one case that of Maidan assassination 
 has been added to threats. . . . From Charikar and 
 Logar our Governors report that they are looked upon 
 with disfavour, and even hated, and as they have no 
 escorts, their lives may be considered in jeopardy. 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 65 
 
 " 9th. Yesterday a detachment under Brigadier- 
 General Macpherson marched to Aoshahr. . . . 
 Mahomed Jan has 5,000 men with him on the 
 Ghazni road, and pressure has been brought by him 
 to bear on the local villagers who were bringing in 
 grain and fodder. In the Logar Valley our Governor 
 has been defied, and supplies from that district have 
 almost entirely ceased. The Ghilzais, Lughmanis, 
 Shinwaris, and Afridis on our line of communications 
 are still quiet, beyond cutting the telegraph-wire 
 between Dakka and Jellalabad. 
 
 " 11th. The strategical move to disperse Mahomed 
 Jan's force has had an unexpected result. The 
 enemy has beaten us at our game ; and, instead of 
 Mahomed Jan being a fugitive, his standards are 
 flying in sight of Cabul. The enemy advanced 
 confidently, and our cavalry were obliged to fall 
 back. . . . Later, the enemy broke, but entered the 
 Chardah Valley. Though the shells from our four 
 guns were pitched into the thick of the enemy, they 
 never wavered, bat came steadily on ; and, as General 
 Massey, commanding the Artillery, had no infantry 
 with him, he was obliged to retire. Sir Frederick 
 Eoberts joined, and the cavalry were ordered to 
 charge. The Lancers had to risk a heavy loss in 
 the hope of saving the guns. The three bodies of 
 
66 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 cavalry disappeared in a cloud of dust as they headed 
 the masses of the enemy. . . . The riderless horses 
 came galloping back, followed by scattered parties of 
 troopers quite out of hand. They had been received 
 with a terrific fire. . . . Men and horses went down 
 in the melee, and, once down, there was but a faint 
 chance of being rescued. When the dust cleared 
 away, it was seen that the cavalry charge had made 
 no impression upon the enemy, who were still ad- 
 vancing steadily, waving their knives and tulwars 
 and carrying their banners more proudly than ever. 
 The rally was sounded, and Colonel Macgregor and 
 other officers collected the Lancers, while two guns 
 advanced and re-opened fire. The squadron of the 
 14th Bengal Lancers, with Captain Gough's troop of 
 the 9th, were still able to keep between the guns and 
 the enemy, now only 1,000 yards off. ... A second 
 charge was ordered, but it was made in a half-hearted 
 way, the country being of extraordinary difficulty for 
 horses. . . . One of the guns stuck in a watercourse 
 when the Artillery were retiring after the first 
 cavalry charge. . . . Three other guns were got 
 further on, but were stopped by a channel deeper 
 than any yet crossed. They were spiked and left,, 
 and the drivers and gunners moved off with the 
 cavalry, the villagers firing rapidly upon them. The 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 67 
 
 enemy came straight on, waving their knives, and 
 put their faces towards Nanuchi Kotal, which leads 
 to the western gate of our cantonments. In Sherpur 
 an anxious afternoon was passed. . . . When the 
 stragglers from the 9th Lancers and the F.A. Battery 
 rode in, wounded, mud-splashed, and many without 
 swords or lances, it was known that a serious action 
 had taken place, and all troops in the cantonments 
 were ordered to stand to their arms. Major Smith 
 Windham, with half a dozen drivers, was the first 
 officer to arrive, and when no guns followed him, and 
 he reported them * spiked and abandoned,' the 
 anxiety, was greatly increased. 
 
 " 12th. At 9 o'clock heliograph communication 
 was opened with General Baker, who reported that 
 his rear-guard had been harassed for the last two 
 days, and that the hills in all directions were lined 
 with tribesmen. He was ordered to march without 
 delay to Sherpur, and reached in the evening, his 
 troops foot-sore and tired. 
 
 " 13th. Hard fighting. A convoy of wounded 
 sent from Sherdarwaza heights to Sherpur had a 
 narrow escape. 
 
 " 15th. Yesterday the severest fight we have yet 
 gone through took place on the Asmai heights and a 
 lower conical hill adjoining them on the north. 
 
68 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIEB. 
 
 To-day has been one of almost absolute quiet. 
 Luckily, the telegraph remained open until five this 
 morning ; so full particulars of our condition were 
 sent down the line. Our losses in yesterday's action 
 were very severe. We shall probably leave Mahomed 
 Jan to his occupation of Cabul until General Charles 
 Gough arrives. What that occupation is likely to 
 be we are already learning. The houses of all 
 known friends of the British are being looted and 
 destroyed. 
 
 " 16th. A second night has passed without a 
 demonstration by Mahomed Jan against Sherpur. 
 Our soldiers have had time to rest and not been 
 obliged to stand out all night in the bitter cold. 
 Four blankets per man have been served out. We 
 are practically in a state of siege. Beyond defence 
 we can do nothing. We are quietly accepting the 
 humiliation of investment, and witnessing the looting 
 of Cabul and the Bala Hissar without being able to 
 strike a blow against the enemy. 
 
 " 17th. It is a heavy blow to our prestige to be 
 forced into Sherpur after having ruled at Cabul for 
 two months. 
 
 " 18^. (More fighting.) Snow began to fall at 
 7 o'clock this evening, and it is still snowing now 
 at midnight. At 10 o'clock I visited the bastions 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 69 
 
 held by the 72nd Highlanders. The sentries in their 
 great- coats were simply white figures standing rigidly 
 up like ghosts, the snow-flakes covering them from 
 head to foot and freezing as they fell. ... In the 
 ditch below our horses were tethered and our syces 
 (grooms) and followers sleeping, the snow covering 
 all alike and whitening the ground as far as the eye 
 could reach. 
 
 " There was again to-day constant firing by the 
 enemy. Our men do not answer except when certain 
 of their aim, as one rifle discharge from the walls is 
 the signal for twenty answering shots. A trooper of 
 the 9th Lancers was badly hit in the chest. The 
 bullet was from a Snider rifle, and must have tra- 
 velled 1,500 yards. There have been so many bullets 
 singing about that there was positive danger in 
 walking from point to point. Our loss in officers is 
 painfully great. The 9th Lancers have been the 
 worst sufferers. 
 
 11 20th. Old Mushk-i-Alam continues to prophesy 
 a repetition of the victory of 1841-42. 
 
 " 21st News has been (received to-day from 
 General Hugh Gough, who will be here on the 24th 
 with 1,400 men and four mountain guns. 
 
 " 22/id. We have been left almost undisturbed 
 to-day. A message has been sent to General Charles 
 
70 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Oough ordering him to march to Sherpur without 
 halting at Bhatkak. 
 
 " ZSrd. After eight days' investment Mahomed 
 Jan has made his attack upon Sherpur and has been 
 beaten off. After five hours' skirmishing the enemy 
 tried again to assault our lines ; they were driven 
 back. . . . Shortly after this, when their scouts re- 
 ported that a new force was crossing the Logar river, 
 they became a mob bent upon seeking safety. 
 General Charles Gough had been able to communicate 
 by heliograph with General Eoberts. The heliograph 
 flashings must have warned Mahomed Jan of the 
 near approach of our reinforcements. By 1 o'clock 
 the enemy were completely broken. . . . Very glad 
 indeed are we to be once more free after nine days' 
 close confinement ... it has harassed men and 
 officers so much that we dread the reaction ; the ex- 
 citement is over now, and the exposure night after 
 night to snow and slush must have broken down the 
 health of many . . . the worst cases in hospital are 
 suffering from pneumonia. Snow has begun to fall 
 again. 
 
 " 2Uh. The enemy which held us in check since 
 December 14th has disappeared, and our troops are 
 once more in Cabul, which shows terrible marks of 
 Mahomed Jan's occupation. Every house belonging 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 71 
 
 to sirdars known to favour the British has been 
 looted. The Hindoos and Kizilbashes, who relied 
 upon us for protection, may well revile us, since we 
 nave left them to their fate ; while the Mahomedans, 
 who have looted their houses, insulted their women 
 and terrorized over them for ten days, are now 
 laughing at our inability to follow them to their 
 distant villages. The unlucky Hazaras, who worked 
 so well for us, were hunted down, beaten, and reviled 
 wherever they showed their faces in the streets, and 
 were told jeeringly to call for help upon the British 
 locked up in Sherpur. Our humiliation is so great 
 that to risk a repetition of it would be ruinous. If 
 we are to hold Cabul we must hold it by our bayonets 
 and not by our rupees, 
 
 " Z7th. Our Christmas has been one of the sober, 
 thoughtful kind. We have so lately been released 
 from the painful constraint of constant vigilance and 
 hard fighting that our spirits could not rise very high 
 in the scale of festivity; and our losses have so 
 sobered us, that it would seem almost sacrilegious to 
 feast and make merry, with the deaths of so many 
 comrades still fresh in our memory, and with the 
 hospitals full of wounded men, sufferers in the 
 actions fought since the 10th. Besides, everyone 
 is worn out with watching, and it will be some 
 
72 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 time before officers and men can once more take life 
 placidly. 
 
 " We may seem strong enough now when we have 
 not an enemy within twenty miles ; but we seemed 
 equally safe three weeks ago when we disbelieved in 
 the possibility of 30,000 Afghans ever collecting 
 together. 
 
 " The question of powder may involve us in 
 difficulties If Mahomed Jan had per- 
 sistently attacked our force in the manner he 
 at last did on December 23rd, we should have 
 been left with about seventy rounds in each 
 man's pouch. Fortunately for us, Mahomed Jan 
 is not a military genius. The two guns of 
 Swinley's battery lost on the 14th are still miss- 
 ing. 
 
 " 29th. I came across a few disconsolate-looking 
 Hindoos and Kizilbashes on their way to Sherpur to 
 relate their woes, and file their bill of damages against 
 the great British Government which had promised to 
 protect them. 
 
 "Wali Mahomed, our protege, has been a great 
 sufferer, and the ladies of his zenanah have been 
 subjected to great indignities. Believing that they 
 had ornaments of great value hidden upon their 
 persons, they were stripped of every stitch of clothing 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 73 
 
 and turned out in all the shame of nakedness into 
 the streets. 
 
 " I left Cabul, feeling that it was indeed a hapless 
 city. The industrious classes, who had been our 
 friends, had been despoiled under our eyes. 
 
 " 1880, Jan. 1st. Our losses have been heavy, 
 and there are now 800 men on the sick list, many 
 of whom must be sent back to India. 
 
 " We had laid in stores sufficient for our original 
 division until the spring ; but these will not suffice 
 when they are drawn upon by the troops which have 
 since joined us, apart from others that may yet come 
 up. 
 
 "7th. An amnesty has been issued dated Dec. 
 26, which is so worded that it may be looked upon as 
 a sign of weakness, meaning that we dread another 
 uprising. 
 
 " 9^. Our indecision has reacted upon a section 
 of the citizens of Cabul, who dread another occupa- 
 tion of the tribesmen. The Hindoo merchants are 
 beginning to move out with their families and goods. 
 I had many chances of learning their feeling from 
 one of their number, an intelligent banker, well 
 versed in local politics. His explanation of the 
 migration is that the Hindoos trusted in the British, 
 and looked to them for protection which was pro- 
 
 5 
 
74 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 mised. But when the rising took place, the British 
 had enough to do to hold Sherpur, and consequently 
 they were left at the mercy of the rabble about 
 Mahomed Jan. They will not risk a second occupa- 
 tion, being convinced that it will take place, as we 
 have really not received any considerable reinforce- 
 ments. ' Besides,' they add, ' no man can say what 
 you will do next ; whether you will go back to India 
 or permanently occupy Cabul. We have waited for 
 you to say what is to happen, and nothing has come 
 of it except loss to ourselves and insult to our 
 women.' It is a comment upon our ' waiting upon 
 providence ' policy. It should be remembered that 
 all through the troublous times of the Durani dynasty, 
 the forefathers of these Hindoos, and they themselves, 
 have remained in Cabul, and are only leaving the 
 city now because they do not believe in the power of 
 the British to hold it against another army of 50,000 
 Afghans. 
 
 " Feb. 10th. The political deadlock continues un- 
 changed. Some local sirdars have posted placards 
 on the walls of the city, pointing out how much 
 better the people were under the Amirs than they 
 are under General Roberts, whom they accuse of 
 sinning through l foolishness and ignorance.' 
 
 " 16th. It is rather difficult to follow Abdarrha- 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 75 
 
 man's movements. ... If he is ambitious enough to 
 claim Cabul, we shall either have to meet his forces 
 in the field or to offer him the Amirship and our 
 support. 
 
 "March 25th. The Government, through Mr. 
 Griffin, made known to the Barakzai Sirdars here 
 what is to be the future of Afghanistan. While the 
 British Government had no desire to annex the 
 country, they were resolved that Candahar and Herat 
 must henceforth no longer appertain to the sovereign 
 of Afghanistan. They would be separate and dis- 
 tinct, and the future ruler of Cabul would have to 
 look upon them as removed from his jurisdiction. 
 
 " April 6th. When General Roberts first proposed 
 to Habibulla Khan to go to Ghazni and sound the 
 temper of the leaders, with a view to arrange some 
 basis upon which the settlement of Afghanistan could 
 be carried out, the answer was that it would be use- 
 less they would not listen to him. Later, he went, 
 and for two months strange rumours prevailed. 
 . . . Mahomed Jan talked of a new Jehad, and the 
 driving of the British out of the country. . . . 
 Turning his attention to Mushk-i-Alam, Habibulla 
 showed him that they could get rid of the infidels 
 by negotiations. . . . The Moollah was but half con- 
 vinced. . . . Then (our agent) turned his attention 
 
 5 * 
 
76 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 to chiefs of his own tribe, and was successful by 
 means of which ive are ignorant. They 'perhaps scented 
 rewards. 
 
 " 14th. The chiefs who attended the durbar re- 
 presented only a minority of the tribesmen. Mr. 
 Griffin, in his speech, said : ' You have a proverb 
 that force and money are the only powers in Afghan- 
 istan. It is for you to choose. Government intends 
 to keep the sword for its enemies and the money for 
 its friends.' 
 
 " 22nd. Abdarrhaman's intentions towards the 
 British may be looked upon as unformed so far. . . . 
 If we decline to say anything to him, he will either 
 raise a Jehad, or will wait until we have left Cabul, 
 and then quietly swoop down upon any nominee we 
 have placed on the throne, and try his fortune once 
 more for the Amir ship. If, on the contrary, we in- 
 vite him to come forward, he will unquestionably 
 meet us half-way. 
 
 " The force told to co-operate with Sir D. Stewart's 
 column advancing from Candahar, left on the 16th 
 April, under command of Major- General Eoss. Its 
 numerical strength was nearly 4,000 fighting men of 
 all arms. 
 
 " 26th. The foraging parties sent out by General 
 Boss were fired at in the Narkh Valley and on the 
 
MB. HOWABD HENSMAN's LETTEBS. 77 
 
 Bamian road. News was brought in of a combination 
 of the neighbouring tribes. . . . The camp was made as 
 compact as possible ; entrenchments were thrown up. 
 A night attack was expected on the 21st, but no 
 alarm was given, and the following morning the force 
 marched to Sar-i-tope. It became daily more ap- 
 parent that the tribesmen meditated an attack all 
 along the road. Parties of men crowned the hills 
 on the west, and fired at long ranges upon the 
 column. ... At 9 a.m. Sar-i-tope was reached ; before 
 noon a heliograph flash was noticed, and we were 
 soon in communication with the advance party of 
 the Candahar column. The first message was from 
 Sir Donald Stewart, saying : ' On the 19th the divi- 
 sion under my command encountered an armed 
 gathering. . . . Preparations were made to attack the 
 strong position held by the enemy . . . when a body 
 of some 3,000 fanatic swordsmen poured down on our 
 troops, spreading out beyond either flank of our line. 
 The fighting lasted an hour, after which the entire 
 body of the enemy spread broadcast over the country. 
 The protection of the baggage prevented pursuit by 
 the cavalry.' 
 
 " The news had scarcely reached Sherpur when 
 the cantonment was thrown into a state of excite- 
 ment by a sharp fight at Charasiab. The tribesmen 
 
78 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 made a desperate attempt to cut up Colonel John- 
 son's party. Since the anxious days of December no 
 such excitement had been felt in Sherpur. . . . The 
 cantonment was all astir, and the secret orders 
 which had been issued when General Boss moved 
 out were at once put into execution . . . one might 
 have imagined that Sherpur was on the eve of a 
 second siege. These precautions were necessary, as 
 our spies had brought in news that 6,000 Kohistanis 
 were near Baba Kuch Kar, and our Governor of Koh- 
 Daman had sent in alarming reports of Mir Butcha's 
 intentions. . . . The news first sent in was that 
 2,000 tribesmen had opened fire on the camp at day- 
 break. At 9.50 Colonel Johnson heliographed that 
 the enemy was being reinforced, and that his troops 
 were debarred from anything but acting on the de- 
 fence, as their baggage would have had to be sacri- 
 ficed if an attempt had been made to storm the 
 hills . . . The infantry were protected by the Karez 
 mounds ; but the cavalry and guns were exposed to a 
 heavy cross-fire from the orchards, hill- side, and 
 ditches in front. ... No more trying position for 
 cavalry can be imagined than waiting helplessly in 
 the open. The severity of the fire can be understood 
 from the fact that three mounted officers, Major 
 White, Lieutenant Dick Cunningham, and Lieutenant 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 79 
 
 Robertson, had casualties to report. . . . Colonel 
 Jenkins' horse was shot, and the Guides' cavalry lost 
 8 horses killed and 24 wounded ; one-tenth of their 
 troopers were really put out of action. I have dwelt 
 thus particularly on this class of casualties simply to 
 prove the resolute way in which the tribesmen 
 attacked, and the mischief they can do with good 
 rifles in their hands. . . . Once or twice it seemed as 
 if a rush were meditated. ... It was believed that 
 when reinforcements arrived, an attempt would be 
 made to close round in the rear of Colonel Jenkins 
 and cut off his retreat. By noon, this movement 
 was apparent ; but General Macpherson, with his 
 forces, put an end to the affair. Our expenditure of 
 Martini and Snider ammunition was over 70,000 
 rounds, while the two guns fired each 45 rounds. 
 
 " It seems a pity that a scoundrel like Padsha Khan 
 cannot meet with his deserts. He was forgiven for 
 fighting against us in December, and he now collects 
 his men and attacks our troops, as if he had never 
 received any subsidy from us. 
 
 "May 2nd. General Stewart arrived at 10 o'clock, 
 and has taken over the command from Sir F. Koberts. 
 Sir Donald Stewart's march upon Ghazni was un- 
 eventful as far as Shajui, the limit of the Candahar 
 province, but from that point a change took place. 
 
80 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Several thousand men collected on the hills to the 
 east, and marched day by day parallel to the British 
 force. It was deemed unwise to attack them, as they 
 would probably have retired up the hill-sides. Be- 
 sides, the baggage train of the column was above six 
 miles in length, and to have detached a brigade to 
 make an attack upon the enemy would have left the 
 baggage open to molestation. 
 
 "With the British force were several thousand 
 Hazaras, who, as is usually the case with native 
 allies, were rather a source of anxiety than any real 
 aid. They marched in wild irregularity on the flanks 
 of the column, and every deserted village was plun- 
 dered by them without compunction. Thus they 
 appropriated large quantities of supplies which would 
 have been welcome to our army, and it was, at 
 times, annoying to find that they had cleared a vil- 
 lage of grain before our men could arrive. 
 
 " Sir D. Stewart encamped two long marches south 
 of Ghazni on the 18th of April, the enemy being a 
 few miles away. . . . The main body of the Afghans 
 remained on the hills to take advantage of any suc- 
 cess the Ghazis might gain. The fanaticism of the 
 3,000 men who made this desperate charge has per- 
 haps never been equalled; they had 500 yards to 
 cover before they could come to close quarters with 
 
MB. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 81 
 
 our infantry, and they made nothing of the distance. 
 They rushed forward in three lines ; many were on 
 horseback, and nearly all were armed with tulwars, 
 knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and match- 
 locks, while a few had simply pikes made of bayonets 
 or pieces of sharp iron fastened upon long sticks. 
 The Ghazis' attack broke with great violence on our 
 flanks. Lancers are always at a disadvantage when 
 infantry have broken their ranks, and the 19th was 
 no exception to the rule. In an instant they were 
 lost to sight in a cloud of dust and smoke ; and, 
 owing, perhaps, to some misunderstanding, or to men 
 losing their heads, in the confusion a troop charged 
 in the rear of the infantry line and came smashing 
 into the 19th Punjab Infantry. All was confusion 
 for a moment ; the ammunition .mules were stam- 
 peded, and, with the riderless horses of the lancers 
 killed or wounded, dashed into the head-quarters Staff. 
 The Ghazis had continued their onward rush, and 
 were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our 
 infantry. Some penetrated to within twenty yards 
 of the spot on which the Staff were watching the 
 action ; and so critical was the moment, that Sir 
 Donald Stewart and every man of his Staff drew their 
 swords and prepared for self-defence. The impetu- 
 osity of the Ghazis carried them right in the rear of 
 
82 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 our infantry, and but for the cool promptitude of 
 Colonel Lyster, V.C., commanding the 3rd Goorkhas, 
 this rush might have had terrible results. Colonel 
 Lyster formed his men into company squares and 
 poured volley after volley into the fanatics as they 
 surged onwards. In the meantime the attack had 
 also burst all along the line ; and in the hurry and 
 confusion some of our men did not fix bayonets. 
 
 " The General's escort were driven back and the 
 59th were ordered to check the rush. The order was 
 so delivered that it was understood to imply the re- 
 tirement of the whole regiment, and the movement 
 was carried out. The Ghazis were so close that there 
 was a tendency to collect in groups for mutual pro- 
 tection a fatal course when a general rush has to be 
 checked ; but General Hughes checked this in time, 
 and after a few minutes of excitement quite pardon- 
 able under the circumstances our men commenced 
 a continuous fire which swept away the Ghazis and 
 covered the plain with dead. . . . When the enemy 
 retreated, the cavalry pursuit had to be checked, as 
 the six miles of baggage had to be looked after, and, 
 with so many regiments in advance, it was feared 
 that detached bodies of Ghazis might run amuck in 
 our rear. The action lasted but an hour, but the 
 casualties were unusually heavy. 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 88 
 
 " On the 20th April the cavalry reached Ghazni. 
 ... Sir D. Stewart intended moving out on the 23rd ; 
 but it was rumoured that the gathering of men seen 
 on the 21st were the advance guard of an army which 
 Muskh-i-Alam had raised. Sir D. Stewart resolved 
 to disperse the tribesmen before moving northwards. 
 
 "Battle of Shalez. Two batteries fired the 
 unusual number of thirty rounds of shell per gun, a 
 total of 360 rounds ; but seven-pounder and nine- 
 pounder shells can do but little damage against walled 
 enclosures and stout mud walls. . . . When our 
 reinforcements arrived a sudden burst of fanatical 
 enthusiasm seized the defenders of the villages . . . 
 their unexpected boldness was met by our batteries, 
 and ultimately the enemy broke and retired. 
 
 " Sherpur, May 16th. We have still to levy the 
 fine inflicted upon the city for the murder of our 
 Envoy. (It was never levied.) 
 
 " 26th. We are on the eve of receiving an answer 
 from Abdarrhaman, to whom we sent a mission. . . . 
 A large party in the city maintain that he will never 
 visit Cabul so long as the British force occupies the 
 city . . . they argue that he is too wise to ruin 
 himself in the eyes of the nation by accepting the 
 Amirship from the hands of a British general. 
 
 "June 4th. Abdarrhaman is serenely independent 
 
84 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 in his attitude, and has given no promise whatever 
 on any specific points connected with the Amirship. 
 He seems fully aware of our awkward position in the 
 country, and is not at all anxious to aid us in extri- 
 cating ourselves. He is working to make the British, 
 and not himself, the grateful party in the negotia- 
 tions. There is a cool, self-possessed tone of inquiry 
 in his letter, as if he felt himself master of the situa- 
 tion and meant to dictate his own terms. We are 
 appearing in the eyes of the people rather as sup- 
 pliants than dictators to Abdarrhaman. 
 
 " Cabul has indeed proved a white elephant. . . . 
 We are so anxious to get rid of the beast that we are 
 thrusting it as a gift upon a man who looks upon it 
 as his lawful property which we have seriously 
 injured. The independent spirit shown by the Sirdar 
 cannot but have a bad effect upon the tribal chiefs ; 
 and if we allow the negotiations to drag on much 
 longer, serious mischief may follow. The natural 
 restlessness of Afghans will not permit them to 
 watch and wait for months, and already there are 
 signs of a turbulent spirit manifesting itself. 
 
 " July 2nd. We have so far lowered our pride as to 
 treat with Abdarrhaman in order to secure peace, 
 and now we are in the awkward position of finding 
 our words twisted, their meaning perverted, and the 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 85 
 
 pretender posing as a patriot. In our ultimatum we 
 stated clearly and distinctly that the Sirdar would be 
 welcomed as Amir of Afghanistan ; but that Canda- 
 har and the Kuram Valley could not be surrendered 
 to him, as their fate had once for all been settled. 
 He has chosen to construe our terms into an offer of 
 a united Afghanistan such as his grandfather the 
 Dost ruled over, and with calm assurance he says 
 that he accepts such offer. He has sent circulars to 
 all the tribes that the British have given up to him 
 the Amirship of the whole country, and that he will 
 shortly arrive among them to take up the reins of 
 power. The circular was received in Cabul fifteen 
 hours before Abdarrhaman's answer reached our 
 political officer. The tribesmen grew so bold that 
 they advanced within a few miles of General Hill's 
 force. . . . Palliser's cavalry brigade scattered them ; 
 they fought with desperation .... there were many 
 hairbreadth escapes .... the cavalry did not return 
 to camp until late, having been fifteen hours uninter- 
 ruptedly in the saddle. 
 
 "22wd. We have formally acknowledged Abdar- 
 rhaman as Amir of Cabul. The Sirdars sent to 
 represent him at the durbar were sorrily arrayed for 
 such an occasion ; but as the representatives of the 
 Amir, they had to be treated with every consideration. 
 
86 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 " 27th. We have withdrawn our guard from the 
 city. . . . The citizens have begun to swagger again 
 in all their turbulent boastfulness, and our soldiers 
 are warned against entering the bazaar. 
 
 " Aug. 2nd. Interest has been divided during 
 the past week between the startling news of the 
 Maiwand disaster and the approach of the Amir to 
 Cabul. A strong division has been told off to march 
 southward under Sir F. Eoberts. The flower of the 
 force thus being taken away, it becomes imperative 
 that the army left in Sherpur should retire upon 
 the Khyber line without delay. 
 
 " Our representatives have at last met Abdar- 
 rhaman, although our programme of a public durbar 
 has not been carried out. The Amir went through 
 the ordeal of receiving the officers introduced to him 
 with quiet self-possession and good humour Behind 
 him were clustered his wild-looking body-guard, each 
 man looking upon the ceremonious introduction with 
 more contempt than curiosity. 
 
 "The Amir was told that necessity might arise 
 for marching troops from Cabul to Candahar, as 
 Ayub Khan had shown unexpected strength. In 
 answer to the question whether there would be objec- 
 tions raised to such a march, he said he should like 
 to consult the people with him. At a second inter- 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 87 
 
 view the Amir said the tribes might object to a force 
 marching to Candahar; but that if no long halts 
 were made on the way, there could be no objection on 
 his part. 
 
 " It was not until last evening that the full mean- 
 ing of the sinister news from Candahar was generally 
 known in camp. When Colonel St. John's telegram 
 was read to an audience of twenty or thirty officers, 
 we could scarcely realise that 1,200 of our men had 
 been killed in open fight, and that the remainder of 
 the ill-fated brigade had made the best of their way 
 back to Candahar over an almost waterless country. 
 But there was no mistaking the hard facts set forth, 
 the list of killed and wounded, and the ominous 
 closing paragraph that the British garrison were 
 preparing for a siege. Our experience in December 
 had taught us a salutary lesson : the Afghans respond 
 to the call of a successful leader with a readiness 
 which defies all ordinary calculation. 
 
 " The behaviour of the Amir, since he has learnt 
 that a strong force will march to Candahar, has been 
 all that could be wished. He is wise enough to see 
 that Ayub Khan is the only dangerous rival he now 
 has in Afghanistan, and that, if we break up the 
 Herat army, Cabul will be made quite safe. 
 
 " Sir D. Stewart (with 20,000 men, including camp 
 
88 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 followers) left for India, via the Khyber. His march 
 will, it is expected, be a very peaceful one, as the 
 chief Ghilzai leaders are with the Amir, who has 
 been quietly warned to keep them with him and out 
 of mischief until our troops get to the east of Ganda- 
 mak. How we have hated our sojourn in Afghanistan 
 of late, when the hot weather found matters not yet 
 settled, only the record of our curses, an it be kept, 
 can ever reveal. 
 
 " 10^. The march (of Sir F. Koberts's force) to 
 Zahidabad was very trying. The 92nd Highlanders 
 and 23rd Pioneers were so tired and worn out that 
 many threw themselves down without energy enough 
 to take more than a mouthful of food. It was not 
 the distance (16 miles) which told upon us so much 
 as the long halts in the sun, while the baggage was 
 being pushed forward. 
 
 " On the 12th the road became so narrow that the 
 baggage animals had in many places to go in Indian 
 file. A few hundred yards of the road over the Sam- 
 burak Kotal were so steep that some of the cavalry 
 ponies cast their loads. 
 
 " 15th. To avoid placing in doolies men who are 
 only foot-sore, Colonel Low is buying up all the 
 donkeys he can find. 
 
 " 23rd. Khelat-i-Ghilzai. Fifteenth day from 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 89 
 
 Cabul. Only those who have shared in the march 
 can form an idea of the hardship involved. At 
 Chardeh we were anxious to purchase camels from 
 Powindah traders ; they refused to send even 100, and 
 Colonel Low with 300 men surrounded their camp. 
 The Powindahs had hidden the camel saddles and 
 turned the camels loose, while women and children 
 rushed among the soldiers abusing them and making 
 a terrific din. Some shots were fired at the Goorkhas, 
 who returned the fire. Lieutenant Gordon had a 
 narrow escape from being hamstrung. . . . Eventually 
 150 camels were captured. 
 
 " On August 18th villagers brought donkey-loads 
 of water-melons, which our men fell upon ravenously. 
 The want of water told most upon the followers, 
 whose state at times was pitiable. 
 
 " For the first six miles out of Oba Karez not a 
 drop of water was found. August 20th will always 
 be remembered by those who survive the operations 
 now being carried, as a day full of privation, and 
 calling for much endurance from officers and men. 
 We marched 21 miles to Panjak. Water was so scarce 
 that followers fell exhausted on the road-side. . . . 
 The heat was greater than ever in the day, although 
 in the early morning the air had been bitterly cold. 
 One company of a native regiment laid down in an 
 
 6 
 
90 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 irrigation channel, the water in which was too muddy 
 to drink. Not a tree gave shade in any direction, and 
 the arid plain seemed to grow red hot. T do not wish to 
 exaggerate the sufferings of the army ; but it should 
 be counted in our favour hereafter that we were 
 marching day after day through a half-desolate land, 
 with no supports to fall back upon in case of dis- 
 aster, and uncertain of what lay before us ; with 
 nothing but thin tents to shield us from a sun which 
 laughed to scorn 100 in the shade, and with a water- 
 supply so uncertain that we never knew in the morn- 
 ing where our camping-ground in the evening might 
 be. 
 
 " A letter received shows the thorough nature of 
 the investment of Candahar, and how helpless the 
 garrison has become in the face of Ayub's over- 
 whelming strength. 
 
 " 27th.Robat. Colonel St. John reached our 
 camp on the 25th. We listened to long stories of 
 the disaster at Maiwand, the terrible retreat and the 
 abandonment of cantonments. Our entry into Can- 
 dahar has been made with a lack of enthusiasm on 
 the part of the garrison we have relieved. 
 
 " Battle of Candahar. On the evening of the 
 31st August the plan of attack was finally decided. 
 When General Eoberts and his staff rode through 
 
MR. HOWARD HENSMAN's LETTERS. 91 
 
 Mazra, the rout of Ayub was complete. ... In four 
 hours our force had scattered the hitherto victorious 
 Afghan army. . . . The cavalry pursuit resulted in 
 some 400 of the enemy being killed. 
 
 " The prevailing tone of the Candahar garrison was 
 still one of depression and want of heart. . . . There 
 had been undoubted demoralization within the walls 
 during the siege. Candahar bears an ill reputation 
 for Ghazi-ism, and there were many discontented 
 spirits within the walls, even after the 18,000 Pathans 
 had been turned out. 
 
 " Sept. 20th. Candahar. Eespecting criticism on 
 General Koberts' action of the 1st inst., it is said 
 our cavalry pursuit was really inoperative, as only 
 400 of the fugitives were killed ... it seems to be for- 
 gotten that not one but many roads were open to 
 them, while the mountainous nature of the country 
 was all in favour of trained hill-men." 
 
92 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Extracts from Dr. Duke's Book. 
 
 I have ventured thus largely to quote from Mr. 
 Hensman's letters, in order to present to the reader 
 a number of consecutive incidents illustrating the 
 entire campaign of 1879-80 ; and I would ask him 
 now to peruse a few extracts from the diary of a 
 medical officer* who served in a cavalry corps 
 throughout the same campaign, as it presents many 
 of its incidents from a somewhat different stand- 
 point. 
 
 Extracts from Dr. Duke's Recollections of the Cabul 
 Campaign. (W. H. Allen & Co. 1883.) 
 
 " 1879. Sept. From Thall to Kuram, 51 miles. 
 An Afghan caught Stewart, of the survey party, by 
 
 * Recollections of the Cabul Campaign. By Dr. Duke. (W. H. 
 Allen & Co. 1883.) 
 
DR. DUKE's BOOK. ' 93 
 
 the beard, and tried to make him repeat the Mahome- 
 dan creed ; he then turned round and tried the same 
 to me. Before we had mounted our ponies one of 
 the men rode past me on the narrow path so rudely 
 as to force me out of his way, and I should have 
 fallen had it not been for a rock on which I sat down. 
 All this was very hard to bear ; but it was useless to 
 remonstrate, and I firmly believe that, had we used 
 our arms, we should at once have been murdered. 
 . . . Why was not our Ambassador allowed to pro- 
 ceed by the Khyber route to the capital, instead of 
 the inhospitable Shutargardan, a road blocked for 
 months with snow ? 
 
 " The remains of our camel transport, a few hun- 
 dreds out of many thousands, were kept on the lower 
 slopes of the hills. The campaign practically proved 
 that no proper food for this useful animal is pro- 
 curable in the Kuram Valley. . . . Indeed, the camel 
 did not thrive west of Bahadur Khel, a short distance 
 from Kohat. Between Thall and the Peiwar the 
 poor camel was found on the roadside in the various 
 stages of death, from the point when he first throws 
 himself down, far from food and water, never to rise 
 again, to the latter stage, when his haughty eyes are 
 dimmed and his head is twisted painfully backwards 
 in the throes of death. Starved, weak, overladen, 
 
94 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 with often sore-back as the result, the poor beast lies 
 down, either because he cannot stand, or because he 
 has made up his mind to go no further. His driver 
 takes the latter view. Whack, whack, whack on one 
 side, severe kicks on the other, while a third assistant 
 forcibly pulls his tail in the onward direction, are 
 answered by deep groans and jerks. Sometimes the 
 animal rises, and falls after proceeding a few paces, 
 and then nothing will induce him again to get up. 
 His load is taken off, and he is left to die on the 
 roadside, never attempting to move from the spot. 
 
 "On the 17th Sept. the wing of the 72nd en. 
 camped near the fort of Kasim Khel. ... It was 
 hoped that sufficient supplies would be collected at 
 Kushi to enable our force to act independently of its 
 base. While holding the pass two difficulties were 
 offered to the Commissariat, one being the water- 
 supply, and the other forage for cattle which could 
 only be obtained in the smallest quantities and at 
 exorbitant rates. The mules of the battery obtained 
 little forage beyond the daily issue of grain. . . . 
 They persistently neighed and whinnied at night in 
 consequence, and, in spite of the cold, ate up their 
 own or their comrades' blankets, and even the hair 
 on each other's tails. 
 
 " Kushi is in a deep ravine. ... All suffered 
 
dr. duke's book. 95 
 
 much from thirst, as no water had been obtained 
 since leaving the Shinkai Kotal." 
 
 " Sept. 26th. The cavalry and guns accompanied 
 General Baker in a long detour in search of forage. 
 The villagers were sullen and refractory. . . . The 
 aspect of the guns pointed on the villages, however, 
 produced the desired effect. Our presence was 
 evidently distasteful to the Afghans, and this was 
 expressed on two occasions to two officers, who told 
 me what had occurred. A young officer in the 
 Quartermaster-General's department rode up to one 
 of Padsha Khan's villages, then our well-paid friend, 
 when a villager, annoyed at his presence, angrily 
 drew his hand several times suggestively across his 
 throat. Another villager said to a cavalry officer, 
 1 Do not come near me, or your shadow will defile 
 me.' 
 
 " Oct. 9th. Near Cabul. The escape of the enemy 
 at this time was a deplorable occurrence, as they 
 were chiefly composed of those troops who had killed 
 Cavignari. . . . They first defied and then escaped 
 us. On the 12th Nov. the first snow fell, and the 
 cold rapidly increased. The persistent cold wind did 
 much harm, especially among the camp-followers. 
 On the 14th the first convoy of sick left for India. 
 Keports became general in the camp that the Afghan 
 
96 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 nation had determined to combine and oust the hated 
 Kafir from their dominions. On the 21st General 
 Baker marched for Maidan to collect forage and 
 disperse any armed bodies of men found in the neigh- 
 bourhood. 
 
 "Nov. 24th. Bahadur Khan's fort destroyed by 
 us. 25th. The people attacked the Cabul police 
 sent to a village to recover property. 26th. Kumours 
 reach Cabul of a contemplated rising of the Kohis- 
 tans and Safis of Tagao. 
 
 " 27th. General Baker's reconnoitring party at- 
 tacked at Ben-i-badan. 29^. A letter received 
 from the newly-appointed Governor of Kohistan. His 
 order calling on the head-men to come in had been 
 ignored, while the people openly declared their inten- 
 tion of raising a holy war and destroying the British 
 force in Cabul. 
 
 " Dec. 1st. Mahomed Hussain Khan, our 
 Governor of Maidan, was killed; another of our 
 governors was attacked and fled for refuge. 
 
 "Dec. 1th. General Koberts telegraphed to 
 Foreign Secretary : * Affairs round Cabul less satis- 
 factory of late. . . . Anxious as I am to avoid any 
 further expeditions, I may be forced, if this movement 
 spreads, to send out troops again.' In the afternoon 
 of the 8th our movement against the Afghans com- 
 
dr. duke's book. 97 
 
 menced : a brigade under General Macpherson 
 marched to Killa Asher. On the 9th another brigade 
 under General Baker marched and camped at 
 Oharasia. On the 10th General Macpherson marched 
 in a northerly direction. . . . The enemy, who fired 
 on our cavalry, were taking up a strong position on 
 the hills above Karez Mir. 
 
 " The cold at starting was severe, and now as we 
 entered the lower barren hills the wind dropped, 
 whilst the sun-rays poured down with a fierceness 
 out of all comparison with the previous cold, and our 
 men began to fall out. No vegetation grew on these 
 barren hills, which reflected the heat powerfully, 
 and, as no water was procurable, the supply brought 
 on our mules began to run short. . . . The road 
 was exceedingly bad. . . . After the sun had set the 
 air became intensely cold, and the small stream we 
 had to cross froze hard, while solid bits of ice and 
 icicles barred the way and made walking extremely 
 difficult for man, much more so for the beasts. . . . 
 The camp was laid in pitch darkness, and the cold- 
 ness of the wind was very intense ! We heartily 
 pitied the rear-guard near the top of the pass, for 
 it would be impossible now to bring in all the lug- 
 
 " A telegram from General Roberts explained the 
 
y A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 object of the brigade movements : * General Mac- 
 pherson's brigade, with cavalry and horse artillery, 
 will advance to-day (11th December) towards Arghandi, 
 Kotal, and Maidan, and should effect a junction with 
 General Baker/ We had, however, reckoned without 
 our host. . . . General Macpherson discovered the 
 enemy in front over Killa Kazi, and brought his guns 
 into action. The Afghans seeing no infantry . . . 
 advanced boldly on the battery, and, opening out 
 their lines, out-flanked our force. The fire of the 
 battery in no way checked them, and the guns were 
 forced to retire. In the confusion which followed, the 
 guns became hopelessly jammed in the formidable 
 dykes in their way. "With the hope of saving them 
 the cavalry made a charge ; but the nature of the 
 ground was unfavourable, and no real impression was 
 made against overwhelming numbers. The cavalry 
 were driven back, and the four guns, together with 
 our killed and many wounded, fell into the hands of 
 the Afghans, who afterwards advanced on Cabul. 
 General Eoberts rode out towards the scene of action. 
 . . . The enemy advanced within a few yards of 
 General Eoberts' position. ... All now to be hoped 
 for was a steady retirement. 
 
 11 Dec, lUh. Soon after daybreak the enemy 
 were on the alert. Their determined advance almost 
 
db. duke's book. 99 
 
 up to our guns rendered our position most critical* 
 At half-past four Macpherson's brigade reached the 
 open plain to the south-west of Sherpur, and found 
 Colonel Jenkins's force and a wing of the 92nd High- 
 landers drawn up to cover their flanks. By 5 o'clock 
 the whole division was inside the walls of the canton- 
 ments. Anxiety was depicted on the face of our 
 bravest officers on the night of the 14th December. 
 During the 15th all troops that could be spared were 
 employed in strengthening our defences. The Afghans 
 were unwisely resting on their laurels ; some were 
 looting the city, others were clearing the Bala Hissar 
 of the powder in the magazine. On the 17th 
 December the enemy at last showed in force. During 
 the afternoon the 5th Punjab Infantry drove them 
 from the King's garden, from cover of which they 
 had been annoying our bastions. On the 18th the 
 Afghans were again on the alert. During the night 
 snow fell and added much to the general discomfort, 
 as nearly the whole force were obliged to sleep at 
 their posts. (Fighting continued on the 19th, 20th, 
 and 21st.) The 22nd passed in a comparatively 
 quiet and ominous manner. Early on the 23rd the 
 enemy opened fire and were routed. On the 24th 
 it was noised about that the Afghan army had dis- 
 appeared. As the day advanced a number of men 
 
100 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 and children were coming towards us from the city, 
 wringing their hands and proclaiming the misery 
 they had gone through during Mahomed Jan's 
 reign of terror. With delight we hailed the advance 
 guard of Gough's brigade . . . their rapid advance 
 no doubt hastened Mahomed Jan's attack on Sherpur. 
 25/i. The city of Cabul presents a woeful aspect. 
 The Bala Hissar was again occupied by our troops 
 in January. 
 
 " The first quarter of the year quietly slipped away. 
 In April our Government determined to send a large 
 force from Candahar to Cabul under General Donald 
 Stewart. A small division was despatched from 
 Cabul to meet General Stewart's column. The 
 division left Cabul on the 14th. Bahadur Khan 
 {whose villages we had looted in November) returned 
 to his head-quarters, and proceeded to annoy us by 
 firing on our foraging parties. A reconnoitring party 
 under Captain the Honourable Charles Dutton nearly 
 fell into an ambuscade, and had a narrow escape. . . . 
 Having made a detour, the party did not reach camp 
 until after dark. On the next morning our march 
 was resumed. For two days we were annoyed by 
 firing from the hills, especially where General Baker 
 had been nearly surprised in November. 
 
 " General Stewart's force advanced to within five 
 
DR. DUKE'S BOOK. 101 
 
 miles of our camp. On the following day we returned 
 with General Stewart to Cabul, where he took up the 
 chief command. 
 
 "While our little skirmishes were going on at 
 Saidabad, a portion of the 92nd Highlanders, the 
 Guides Infantry and Cavalry, and some guns of the 
 F.A. Eoyal Horse Artillery, who had been despatched 
 under Colonel Jenkins to Charasiab, were attacked 
 and partly surrounded by a large bod}' of Afghans. 
 At one time the force was considerably pressed, the 
 Afghans getting up very close, when they were ob- 
 served drawing out their knives and placing them on 
 the ground with fiendish pleasure at the hope of soon 
 using them against some of the Kafir throats. Re- 
 inforcements had to be sent to their aid under 
 General Macpherson. 
 
 " Immediately after the return of Eoss's division, 
 a brigade of all arms went out under General Baker, 
 feeding itself locally. It returned to Sherpur about 
 the 8th June. Shortly afterwards another brigade 
 of all arms marched out for feeding under Brigadier 
 Charles Gough. A reconnoitring party of the 3rd 
 Bengal Cavalry was attacked by a small body of 
 Afghans, who advanced in perfect military order. 
 The Koh-Daman Valley is well populated and possesses 
 orchards, vineyards, and magnificent plane and walnut 
 
102 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 trees, which are as grateful to the eye as their shade 
 is refreshing to the body. Our camps were invariably 
 pitched in open, dry, hot, uncultivated land. . . . 
 The fear of political complications prevented our 
 oamps being pitched near villages. While at Kariz 
 Mir our reconnoitring cavalry were frequently fired 
 on by the followers of a bloodthirsty scoundrel called 
 Mir Butcha. 
 
 " Our camp moved to Killa Hadji, eight miles from 
 Sherpur. Here the news reached us of the defeat of 
 our troops under General Burrows at Maiwand. On 
 the 30th July Sir D. Stewart, Sir F. Boberts, and 
 Mr. L. Griffin arrived at our camp. On the following 
 day a meeting was arranged with Abdarrhaman. 
 On the 3rd August the political arrangements were 
 completed, and Brigadier Charles Gough's brigade 
 returned to Sherpur, several of its regiments having 
 to accompany General Koberts in his march from 
 abul to Candahar, the cavalry corps to which I 
 oelong being one of those selected. 
 
 " The object of our march was the relief of the city 
 of Candahar, then closely invested by the victorious 
 army of Ayoub Khan, who had defeated our forces 
 under General Burrows on the 27th July 1880 at Mai- 
 wand, 45 miles from Candahar. At the mess-table, 
 the battle of Maiwand, with the terrible slaughter of 
 
dr. duke's book. 103 
 
 our troops, was of course much discussed. . . . 
 -would the diminished garrison of Candahar be able 
 to hold its own until our arrival ? Two days after 
 our departure, Sir D. Stewart's division marched 
 for India. Our splendid body of troops numbered 
 close upon 10,000 ; they formed essentially a fighting 
 force, hampered only by such camp-followers and 
 transport (near 8,000 men) as were absolutely neces- 
 sary. 
 
 "On the 7th August we marched to the ground 
 ast of the Bala Hissar. 8^. Charasiab. 9th. Za- 
 hidabad. 10^. Wazir Killa. 11th. Baraki Barak. 
 12*7*. Saidabad. 13th. Takia. 14^. Ghazni. On 
 the 16th our camp was formed at Yerghatta (17 miles) 
 a most desolate, arid spot. The infantry had a most 
 trying time of it, owing to a dust storm. 18th. 
 Karez-i-Oba. Each march seemed hotter and more 
 wearisome. Very little water was found on the road. 
 19th and 20th. Long marches terribly fatiguing to 
 the rear-guard, who necessarily arrived late and had 
 little time for rest and food. 21st. A trooper sent 
 back to a village with a message was probably killed, 
 for he never was seen again. 23rd. Kelat-i-Ghilzai. 
 26th. Tirandez. Heat very severe. News from 
 Candahar that Ayoub had raised the siege on the 
 24th. 31st. Arrived before Candahar, 84 miles 
 
104 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 320 from Cabul. Sept. 1. 
 Battle of Candahar. Our success was complete. 
 3rd. Moved to Kokeran. Heat excessive. Moun- 
 tain torrents to cross. 20th. Our return march to 
 India commenced. 26th. Chaman. 30th. Quetta, 
 having crossed the Kojak Pass on the 27th to Killa. 
 Abdalla. 
 
 " Our cavalry was selected to accompany General 
 MacGregor's force organized to punish the Maris, a. 
 powerful hill-tribe who had risen in arms after the 
 defeat of our troops at Maiwand. After a day's halt 
 we turned our heads toward the Bolan Pass and 
 reached Nari Bank, close to Sibi, in six days. On 
 the 12th October we marched through the Nari gorge, 
 and on the 13th joined General MacGregor's force at 
 Baba Kuch. On the 17th we marched for Thull,. 
 which we reached on the 22nd. At Spintangai we 
 crossed a terribly steep pass for cavalry and baggage ; 
 the last march to Thull (21 miles) was over one of 
 the most difficult roads I have ever seen. We crossed 
 five small but steep passes, and finally entered a suc- 
 cession of narrow rocky gorges with precipitous sides, 
 one place the rocks converged so that a mule with 
 baggage could only just clear the sides. . . . With the 
 exception of the plain in which Thull and the forest 
 of Chotiali are situated, and one other plain that we 
 
dr. duke's book. 105 
 
 subsequently entered after crossing a frightful pass, 
 we wandered through barren hills, meeting few signs 
 of man. . . . Our expedition, however, was success- 
 ful. The chiefs of the offending tribes, who had done 
 an incalculable amount of damage and reckless mis- 
 chief to the wonderful railway stock and buildings 
 we had commenced at Quetta via Harnai, tendered 
 their submission to General MacGregor, and paid up 
 part of the fine imposed on them. The fine realized 
 can never repay the damage committed." 
 
106 A SCIENTIFIC FBONTIER. 
 
 CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 The Campaign of 1879-80. 
 
 As stated in Mr. Hensman's letters and Dr. Duke's 
 book, a force of 10,000 fighting men, under General 
 Eoberts, marched on Cabul, in September 1879, to 
 avenge the murder of our Envoy. After defeating 
 the Afghan army at Charasia on the 6th of October, 
 General Eoberts entered Cabul on the 11th. It was 
 then well known that the leaders and chief actors in 
 the massacre at the British Embassy were certain 
 Herat regiments of the Amir, who had arrived in 
 Cabul in August and, after fighting against us at 
 Charasia, had dispersed and retired to their villages. 
 Under these circumstances the obvious course for 
 fulfilling the mission of the expedition would have 
 been to pursue and punish the criminal fugitives ; 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1879-80. 107 
 
 but sufficient troops could not be detached for 
 that purpose without dangerously weakening our 
 army. Besides, experience had taught us that to 
 follow the enemy into the recesses of their moun- 
 tains was to court disappointment and disaster. 
 Thus the punishment of the actual murderers was 
 found to lie beyond our power; whereupon we 
 decided on bringing, to justice such of the abet- 
 tors as we could apprehend and convict, and on 
 imposing a fine on the city of Cabul for its 
 connivance at the crime. Accordingly a number 
 of executions took place on the best evidence we 
 could obtain, and the Amir Yakub Khan was 
 sent a prisoner to India, on suspicion of his 
 connivance at the outrage. ' Had our army then 
 levied the fine imposed on the city of Cabul 
 and left the country, it would have accom- 
 plished its mission so far as it lay in its 
 power ; and the nation would have been spared 
 the disasters and humiliations which soon fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 Unfortunately, the success of the opening opera- 
 tions seemed to have unduly elated the British Cabi- 
 net and fatally blinded it to the actual condition of 
 things prevailing in Afghanistan. Believing, appa- 
 rently, from the temporary dispersion of the hostile 
 
 7 * 
 
108 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 army, that the country lay at our mercy,* the 
 Government decided on extending the original scope 
 of the expedition, and on preparing for a lengthened 
 occupation by appointing district governors to super- 
 sede the officials of the Amir. Indeed, so sanguine 
 were the views entertained of pur power and influence 
 that a telegram appeared in the Times, the second 
 week in December, to the effect that Afghanistan was, 
 to all intents and purposes, a conquered country 
 which our troops could traverse from north to south 
 without hindrance. Neither this pompous announce- 
 ment nor the imbecile attempt to control the internal 
 administration of the country was in any way jus- 
 tified by existing circumstances. < 
 
 Our army was in a particularly precarious situation ; 
 
 it had no reserves at hand, and its communications 
 
 with India were uncertain ; its energies were being 
 
 ^used chiefly in the collection of supplies, while its 
 
 * The same tendency to blindly over-estimate our advantages ap- 
 pears in the Secretary of State's despatch of 7th August 1879, in 
 which it is stated at para. 3, with reference to the situation in Dec. 
 1878: "The passage of the Afghan frontier by British troops was 
 followed by the defeat of the forces which guarded it and the rapid 
 occupation of positions which placed the territories of the Amir at 
 the mercy of the British Government." The sequel has shown how 
 far that statement was justified ; meanwhile the despatch was pub- 
 lished as a Parliamentary paper (0. 2402, 1879), and probably served 
 the political purpose for which it had been written. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1879-80. 109 
 
 strength was very sensibly affected by the foraging 
 and other detached parties which it had constantly 
 to send out. As early as November 14th the scarcity 
 of forage led to the determination of sending back the 
 greater part of our cavalry to the valley of Jellalabad ; 
 and before the end of that month it became known 
 that several powerful tribes were preparing to attack 
 us. A few days later the force, which went out to 
 break up the tribal gathering, were in full retreat 
 before the enemy, abandoning their guns, evacuating 
 the fortress of Cabul, and seeking safety in the en- 
 trenched camp at Sherpur. It was during these 
 distressing events that the telegram in the Times 
 announcing our supremacy in Afghanistan was being 
 read by the public at home. Then, as regards our 
 district governors, it has already been seen, from 
 Mr. Hensman's letters, how they were defied, in- 
 sulted, and threatened with death by the very 
 people over whom they were sent to rule, and how 
 that threat was, in one instance, actually carried into 
 effect. 
 
 Far greater humiliations still were, however, yet in 
 store for us. On regaining our freedom after the 
 investment of Sherpur, we were confronted with the 
 evidence of the oppression and indignities suffered 
 in Cabul by the Hindoos and others whom we had 
 
110 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 pledged ourselves to protect.* The tribes in the sur- 
 rounding country were meanwhile once more com- 
 bining to expel us, and our military prestige had so 
 greatly fallen in the estimation of the people that the 
 Hindoo merchants and bankers of Cabul, whose fore- 
 fathers and themselves had lived and prospered in 
 that city under the Durani dynasty, began to 
 emigrate, because they did not believe that we could 
 hold the place against the impending attack of the 
 tribesmen. 
 
 / In these embarrassing circumstances the British 
 Cabinet had once more recourse to diplomacy ; and a 
 message was sent to Abdarrhaman, grandson of Dost 
 Mahomed, proposing to confer on him the Amirship 
 and the amity of the British Government, provided he 
 surrendered Candahar and Herat. No answer being 
 received to that proposal, an ultimatum was sent, 
 peremptorily claiming Candahar and the Kuram 
 valley. Abdarrhaman, however, declined holding 
 any negotiations whatever on the subject, and clearly 
 let us know that he maintained his right to the 
 
 * This was the more galling that the Government had, not long 
 before, published a despatch stating at para. 42 : " We deem it 
 absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of 
 the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends 
 should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the fre- 
 buent assertion of it" (C. 2401, 1879, p. 36). 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1879-90. Ill 
 
 sovereignty of the whole kingdom ruled by his grand- 
 sire. Our ultimatum was thus superciliously ignored, 
 and we had to put up with the affront, simply because 
 we had ventured to make demands which we had no 
 power to enforce. / 
 
 In the midst of these untoward circumstances, 
 news reached us that our southern army was com- 
 pletely defeated at Maiwand, and its remnant closely 
 besieged at Candahar. It then became urgent that 
 our best troops should at once march to their relief ; 
 but could we reach Candahar in good time, looking 
 at the opposition we were certain to encounter on 
 the road ? Then, again, what would be the fate of 
 those we left behind at Sherpur ; some twenty thou- 
 sand men, consisting largely of sick and wounded 
 soldiers and camp-followers ? 
 
 In these circumstances, we had no choice but to sub- 
 mit to such terms as we could obtain ; and we had 
 accordingly to acknowledge Abdarrhaman as Amir of 
 Afghanistan, without any limitation of territory ; to 
 pay him 100,000 ; to surrender some thirty of our 
 guns ; to leave intact the defensive works we had 
 raised round Cabul ; to pledge ourselves to refund the 
 value of the treasure we had seized in that city, and 
 to renounce the fine we had imposed on its inhabitants 
 for their connivance at the murder of our Representative ! 
 
112 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Such have been the results of the war which was 
 carried on for two long years in vain attempts to 
 execute the enigmatic policy of a "scientific frontier" 
 for India. The war cost twenty millions sterling, 
 thousands of lives and an appalling amount of 
 human suffering, and it ended without the smallest 
 advantage having been gained to compensate for all 
 it had cost. Nay, the balance was quite the other 
 way. Our failure in a contest with a semi-barbarous 
 foe lowered our military prestige ; while the humili- 
 ations we suffered at the hands of a people whom we 
 unsuccessfully attacked for the purpose of robbing 
 them of their territory, have cast a stain on our 
 national character, which it should be our most 
 anxious desire to obliterate. 
 
 Unfortunately the incidents of the war and its 
 results are but imperfectly known to the public; some 
 of those incidents have been suppressed, others dis- 
 torted, in official documents and the writings of in- 
 terested or deluded persons ; while military men 
 who carefully watched the course of the operations 
 have been precluded, by an implied rule of their 
 service, from publicly discussing a subject which 
 involved political issues and party questions of 
 import. 
 t Had it been necessary to apply to Parliament for 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1879-80. 118 
 
 funds to prosecute the war, the House of Commorjs 
 would certainly not have consented to tax their con- 
 stituents without inquiring into the precise object, 
 the necessity and. the justice of the venture. But 
 the Indian treasury was made to supply the money ; 
 and, as India has no representative in Parliament, 
 explanations were avoided, and those who plunged 
 the nation into the calamitous operations of 1878-80 
 have never been called to answer for their action. 
 These circumstances will account for the facility with 
 which the fatal policy of 1876 was revived in 1885, 
 and for the countenance and support which it has 
 since received from numerous irresponsible advocates. 
 One of this class of writers suggests that " all local 
 hostility might be conjured by discreet diplomacy 
 and the omnipotent rupee " (Times, 18th November 
 1890). This, however, is simply ignoring the experi- 
 ence of our last expedition, when rupees were prodi- 
 gally lavished without, in any appreciable degree, 
 diminishing the hostility of the tribes ; and diplo- 
 macy in every shape signally failed, resulting some- 
 times in discomfiture and humiliation. Nor can any 
 surprise be felt at these results, seeing that the 
 means suggested, and which virtually amount to as- 
 tuteness and corruption, are not British character- 
 istics; and it was probably the repugnance of 
 
114 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Englishmen to the employment of such means, that 
 provoked the following remark recorded in Mr. Hens- 
 man's letter of August 1880, written on the eve of 
 our final departure from Cabul : " How we have 
 hated our sojourn in Afghanistan of late, only the 
 record of our curses, an it be kept, can reveal." 
 
115 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 Hon. George Curzon's Chapter on the North- 
 West Frontier of India. 
 
 Among other papers recently published in support of 
 the "Forward Frontier Policy" a very interesting 
 one is the chapter which the Hon. George Curzon 
 has added to Mr. W. S. Caine's book entitled Picturesque 
 India. Written in an attractive and lucid style, it 
 contains much information which is not generally 
 available to the public, and throws a clear light on 
 the views in furtherance of which the railway to 
 Chaman has been made, and new lines towards 
 Cabul and Ghazni are in contemplation. 
 
 After stating that " it is to protect the Indian 
 Empire from the danger of a Kussian advance that 
 the new frontier has been traced and fortified," the 
 
116 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 the writer goes on to say : "It is the forward move 
 from the old Indus Valley line across the Middle- 
 belt, and the relations entered into with its occupants, 
 that have, during the last five years, transformed the 
 unscientific frontier (we had) into the scientific 
 frontier, which I will now proceed to delineate/' In 
 this delineation Landi Kotal, Peiwar Kotal, a post at 
 the end of the Gumal Pass, and Chaman are referred 
 to as important points on the new boundary-line. It 
 is difficult to understand how these isolated spots, 
 which are separated from each other by mountainous 
 regions perfectly impervious to military operations, 
 can constitute a protective frontier line for our 
 distant Indian territories, from which they are 
 likewise separated by mountain defiles of extraordi- 
 nary difficulty, occupied by tribes who have hitherto 
 manifested the most inveterate hostility towards 
 us. 
 
 Indeed, a careful reader can scarcely rise from the 
 perusal of Mr. Curzon's paper without being struck 
 with the fact that our railway to Candahar, and the 
 other lines said to be in contemplation, while they 
 might subserve a future invasion of Afghanistan, 
 could afford no protection to our Indian frontier, 
 which they must, on the contrary, tend greatly to 
 weaken by smoothing some of those formidable 
 
HON. GEORGE CURZON's CHAPTER. 117 
 
 obstacles which a Eussian army would otherwise 
 have to surmount before it could reach India. 
 
 It is true that a British garrison would be posted 
 at the extremity of each defile ; but how would that 
 garrison be supported? Mr. Curzon, anticipating the 
 question, tells us that " the attitude of the border 
 tribes has, in recent years, become much more 
 friendly towards England than towards Afghanistan,'* 
 and that not only would they aid us in acquiring the 
 means of " swift movement for the support of our 
 positions beyond their country, but are themselves 
 gradually being transformed into an irregular frontier 
 guard of the Indian Empire." 
 
 All who have paid the least attention to our rela- 
 tions with those tribes will at once see how grave 
 would be the error of our relying for the safety of 
 our outposts on the protestations of a people proverbi- 
 ally treacherous and fanatically jealous of the inviola- 
 bility of their territory. Padshah Khan, a tribal 
 chieftain, whom we liberally subsidized and reckoned 
 among our best friends in the late war, kept on the 
 mask of hypocrisy while the tribes around us were 
 combining for our destruction, but cast it off and 
 joined our enemies the very moment the time for action 
 against us had arrived. And hundreds of similar 
 cases might be cited in which our money-gifts and 
 
118 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 other favours during that war were requited by 
 hatred and treachery. 
 
 A Punjab official, writing in 1868 in support of 
 the "Forward Frontier Policy," which was then 
 under consideration, recorded the following remarks 
 on the character of the Border tribes : 
 
 "By birth they are savages, and by profession 
 robbers. They are hardy, brave, and proud ; at the 
 same time, faithless, cunning, and treacherous. 
 Patriotic and full of pride of race, yet they will not 
 scruple to betray for gold their nearest relations. 
 They are extremely bigoted, entirely controlled by 
 their priests, and at all times ready for & jehad. The 
 Pathan never forgives an injury, and has a good 
 many scores against us to be wiped off at the first 
 favourable opportunity. They will willingly accept our 
 bribes, but will assuredly plunder us afterwards." 
 (Our Punjab Frontier, by a Punjab official, Lahore, 
 September 1868.) 
 
 The most powerful of the Border tribes and of 
 those throughout Afghanistan are bound, both by the 
 injunctions of the Koran and by solemn oaths, to 
 stand by each other in resisting the intrusion of any 
 infidel, i.e. any non-Mahomedan Power. That oath 
 does not, however, protect any particular tribe who 
 may have committed depredations on British territory 
 
HON. GEORGE CURZON's CHAPTER. 119 
 
 from retribution at our hands, provided always that 
 such retribution does not take the form of annexation 
 or prolonged occupation. 
 
 Looking at all these circumstances, there seems 
 nothing to justify the assumption that the traditional 
 character of the wild races in question could so quickly 
 have been obliterated and transformed as Mr. Curzon 
 has been led to believe ; and it would certainly be 
 the height of imprudence, not to say of folly, to 
 accept their protestations, purchased by our subsidies 
 and diplomacy, as enduring pledges of fidelity and 
 attachment. 
 
 Then, as regards our railroad to Candahar, an 
 impression prevails that it would remove, in a future 
 expedition, the difficulties which caused our failure 
 in January 1879. The impression is obviously 
 erroneous. That the railway would materially de- 
 crease the difficulties of transport on the Indian side 
 of Candahar there is no reason to doubt ; but those 
 difficulties were successfully overcome in all our 
 expeditions. The obstacle to our success in January 
 1879 arose entirely from the impossibility of procuring 
 food and the means of transport after we had left 
 Candahar and advanced into the interior of the 
 country. 
 
 Besides, if the efficiency of a future expedition is to 
 
120 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 depend on the working of our railway, can we forget 
 that the line, which in 1879 extended a little beyond 
 Sibi, was partly torn up by a Border tribe as soon as 
 the news of our defeat at Maiwand spread in the 
 country ? Can we forget that the punishment of the 
 guilty tribe necessitated a new expedition under General 
 MacGregor, which occupied thirty-three days, and 
 resulted only in the partial recovery of a small fine ; 
 while the cost of the punitive expedition, the damage 
 to the line and buildings, and the interruption in the 
 traffic remained unretrieved ? 
 
 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the 
 country traversed by our railway is annually exposed 
 to excessive floods, and that the interruptions in the 
 traffic caused thereby are neither unfrequent nor 
 always of short duration. Let us hear what Mr. 
 Ciirzon, who recently travelled on the line, says on 
 this subject : 
 
 " It has been a costly railway to build, a great 
 deal of tunnelling and cutting and bridging being 
 required. The Bolan route rejected in 1880 was 
 suddenly determined upon in the pressure exercised 
 by the Kussian scare in 1885. Pushed forward with 
 the haste that is born of panic, it was opened in 
 1887. Leaving Sibi, and crossing the plain to Eindi, 
 it enters the famous Bolan Pass, which, throughout 
 
HON. GEORGE CURZON's CHAPTER. 121 
 
 the 60 miles of its length, takes the form of a defile, 
 confined by mountain walls of uniform ruggedness. 
 The floor is the bed of the river from which it takes 
 its name, in the dry season a rough and stony chan- 
 nel, along which the rails are laid often in pools of 
 water, but, after the rains of July and August, filled 
 by a gross and powerful torrent that sweeps down 
 the gorge, tearing up the sleepers and twisting the 
 rails into extraordinary contortions. Hence the 
 great costliness of keeping up the line, a large por- 
 tion of which has to be relaid every autumn. The 
 sullenness and sterility of the Pass can scarcely be 
 conceived. 
 
 " From Eindi to Hirokh, a distance of 50 miles, 
 the railroad follows the track of the river. From 
 Hirokh to Kotal, 10 miles, the mountain walls con- 
 verge, the angle of cleavage increases in abruptness, 
 and the gorge twists in and out in sharp zig-zags. 
 The difficulty arising from the steepness of the gra- 
 dient in many places as much as 1 in 23 and from 
 the sharpness of the curves, induced the authorities 
 to construct a metre gauge line through this section 
 of the Pass, and accordingly a change of train was 
 necessitated both at Hirokh and Kotal. A realign- 
 ment of the track with the broader gauge has since 
 been carried out between these two points, and the 
 
 8 
 
122 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Abt system of a cog-wheel catching in the teeth of a 
 double central rail has been adopted. 
 
 " So disastrous have been the floods in the past 
 rainy season, and such the damage wrought in the 
 Bolan railway, that its abandonment has been 
 seriously discussed and may ultimately be realized, 
 as soon as a railway through the Gumal and the 
 Zhob valley to Pishin is ready to supply its place. 
 
 " From Quetta the railroad has been extended to 
 the foot of the Khojak Pass, and a tunnel 4,000 
 yards in length has been driven through the moun- 
 tain, emerging at Chaman, 60 miles from Candahar. 
 A sufficient supply of rails for the extension to the 
 latter place is stored in Pishin." 
 
 It would thus appear that the ill-advised selection 
 of the Bolan Pass for the construction of a railway 
 was due to the Russian scare of 1879, and the com- 
 pletion of that line to a similar scare in 1885. On 
 both occasions, as we soon afterwards perceived, the 
 panic was groundless ; and when we look at the 
 disastrous result of the late war, which was likewise 
 initiated under a policy conceived in an unwarrant- 
 able fear of Russia, and carried out under the 
 influence of illusory hopes and panics, it is but 
 reasonable to apprehend that that policy, if persisted 
 in, will lead in the future to much the same results 
 
 
HON. GEORGE CURZON's CHAPTER. 123 
 
 as those it produced in the past, namely, errors and 
 disappointments. Indeed, the policy of 1876, whieh 
 avowedly aimed at the safety of our Empire, has 
 very seriously impaired the security which our Indian 
 frontier previously possessed. This will best be seen 
 from the following passage of Lieut.-Col. Osborn's 
 paper, which has already been mentioned : 
 
 "The objects of this war were threefold. The 
 primary object was to establish permanently a British 
 officer as Envoy at Cabul. It must be plain to the 
 dullest comprehension that, unless we are prepared 
 to march periodically to Cabul to avenge the murder 
 of our Envoy, this object must be relinquished. The 
 second object was to obtain on our north-west frontier 
 a ' strong, friendly and independent Afghanistan.' 
 During the life-time of Sher A'li we had such an 
 Afghanistan. This war converted it into a country 
 filled from end to end with a righteous and burning 
 hatred of the British name and the British nation. 
 The third object was to acquire a scientific frontier.' 
 I have shown at the beginning of this pamphlet that 
 the old frontier of India was so strong that a stronger 
 can hardly be imagined. By the acquisition of the 
 so-called ' scientific frontier,' what we have done is 
 to shorten the distance which an invading army 
 would have to traverse by four hundred miles of 
 
 8 * 
 
124 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 desert country. This, however, is not the worst evil 
 of the new condition of things. Our permanent 
 presence within the boundaries of Afghanistan will 
 keep alive and increase the hostile feelings which our 
 unprovoked invasion has excited among the people ; 
 and, as a measure of self-defence, we shall be com- 
 pelled sooner or later to occupy the whole country, 
 and then we shall be confronted by that * greatest 
 danger ' which I mentioned at the beginning of this 
 pamphlet. The frontier of our Indian Empire will 
 be conterminous with that of a great military power 
 beyond it. It will be in the power of Eussia, by 
 assembling a few thousand men on the Oxus, to 
 convulse our Indian Empire whenever she pleases, 
 from one end to the other. The escape from all 
 these evils is to return to the policy advocated by 
 those men who predicted every mischief which has 
 ensued from our abandonment of it." 
 
 Before closing this chapter I would beg of the 
 reader to peruse one more extract from Lieut.-Col. 
 Osborn's paper, as it presents, in a concise and clear 
 form, the chief impediments to success which meet 
 an invading army in Afghanistan ; impediments 
 which we encountered on every occasion and were 
 never able to surmount. 
 
 " The enormous difficulty of carrying out a sue- 
 
HON. GEORGE CUEZON's CHAPTER. 125 
 
 cessful campaign in Afghanistan is due to two causes ; 
 and as these would operate as effectually to check the 
 advance of an invader from Central Asia, it will be 
 worth while to state them in some detail. The first 
 cause is the absence of any combined resistance. 
 Attacking the Afghan tribes is like making sword- 
 thrusts into the water. You meet with no resistanec, 
 but you also do no injury. The tribes harass the 
 communications of an invading army ; they cut 
 off straggling parties; they plunder baggage; they 
 give the troops no rest ; but they carefully avoid a 
 decisive action. The invading force moves wherever 
 it pleases ; but it never holds more of the country 
 than the ground on which it is actually encamped. 
 Each separate tribe is, as it were, an independent 
 centre of life, which requires a separate and special 
 operation for its extinction. The consequence is that 
 the only way in which we could hope to enforce our 
 authority throughout Afghanistan would be by a 
 simultaneous occupation of the entire country ; and 
 seeing that the country is as large as France, very 
 sparsely populated, and quite incapable of feeding a 
 large army, such an occupation is simply impossible. 
 The other great difficulty is that there is hardly any 
 forage in Afghanistan, and consequently the transport 
 train of an invading army cannot fail to be crippled 
 
126 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 after a few weeks of active service. The moment 
 that such a catastrophe is consummated an army in 
 the field becomes as cumbersome and useless as a 
 swan on a turnpike road. This latter difficulty it was 
 which compelled the Government to make the treaty 
 of Gandamak." 
 
127 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 Taking into consideration the various circumstances 
 mentioned in the foregoing pages, it would be childish 
 to assume that increased facilities of transport merely 
 to the borders of the Amir's territories would, in a 
 future expedition, remove those serious difficulties 
 which crippled our armies when they had penetrated 
 into the heart of the country ; which prevented them, 
 after every successful action, from reaping the fruit 
 of their victory, and which ultimately compelled 
 them to leave the country with loss of dignity and 
 without attaining the object which they were sent to 
 accomplish. 
 
 Unless, therefore, the costly preparations which are 
 now being made for a third invasion of Afghanistan 
 be stopped, and the enigmatic scheme of a" scientific 
 
128 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 frontier " be discarded, and replaced by a policy 
 resting on rational principles and the experience we 
 so dearly bought, the nation must be prepared for 
 fresh disasters and humiliations. 
 
 The tribes and the land of Afghanistan have re- 
 mained what they were in 1880; and if improved 
 implements of war and newly invented contrivances 
 have added to our power for attack, the Afghans 
 have not been slow in increasing their means of 
 defence. 
 
 The broad lines of our policy should be drawn, 
 not on the suggestions of irresponsible persons, nor 
 on the shifting tactics of the last campaign, but in 
 accordance with the opinions of those high autho- 
 rities who, while charged with the safety of our Indian 
 Empire, expressed, under official responsibility, the 
 views they had formed regarding the defence of our 
 north-western frontier, and regarding the line of 
 conduct which should be followed towards our neigh- 
 bours the Afghans of men like Lords Magdala, 
 Lawrence, Mayo, and Sandhurst. Small differences 
 may have divided them regarding details in special 
 circumstances; but their principles of action were 
 the same, and their general policy, reviewed in the 
 light of subsequent events, has been clearly traced 
 by Earl Grey in a letter which was published in the 
 
CONCLUSION. 129 
 
 Times in March 1887, the following passage in which 
 may usefully be transcribed here : 
 
 " I entirely concur in the opinion that the policy 
 of seeking to ensure the safety of our Indian Em- 
 pire by measures for checking the increase of Eussian 
 power in Central Asia is quite a mistaken one. 
 From so long ago as the year 1838, when the 
 adoption of this policy led to the first Afghan war, I 
 have always held that the chief danger to our 
 Indian Empire was from within, not from without. 
 Hence, I have uniformly maintained that our great 
 object ought to be to diminish, as much as possible, 
 the burthen of taxation, and to promote the welfare 
 of the Indian people. If in this manner we could 
 improve the condition of our subjects, and give them 
 reason to be satisfied with British rule, it seemed to 
 me that we had little to fear from attacks from 
 without. 
 
 " Still, of late years, when Eussia has been ex- 
 tending her influence nearer and nearer to our 
 frontier, I have never denied that we ought to do all 
 we can to guard that frontier from attack ; but I 
 have considered that there can be no greater mistake 
 than, for this purpose, to take measures founded on 
 the assumption that, if Eussia should attempt to 
 attack us, or to assist any of the half-civilized tribes 
 
130 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 of Asia in doing so, it would be expedient to meet 
 such attacks at a distance from our own dominions 
 and resources, instead of waiting for them on our 
 own frontier. I believe that, by creating the means 
 of rapidly moving an overwhelming force to any 
 point of our frontier which might be the object of 
 attack, we might have an assurance of being able 
 speedily to destroy any hostile force that might be 
 brought against us ; and that, if the money which 
 has been spent in needless wars had, on the contrary, 
 been used in making railways along our frontiers, 
 with two or three fortified posts where a force could 
 be assembled in readiness to attack any enemy as 
 soon as he appeared on our borders, perfect security 
 might have been obtained against any attack that 
 could possibly have been made on our dominions, 
 either by Eussian troops or by Asiatics assisted and 
 directed by Eussians. 
 
 " The only way in which Eussia could really, as I 
 think, injure us, is by creating an impression on the 
 minds of some of the Indian population within our 
 own dominions, that we are afraid of Eussia, and 
 that she really does possess the means of giving 
 effectual military support to any of the subjects of 
 the Indian Empire who may think they have reason 
 to be dissatisfied with our rule. What is called the 
 
CONCLUSION. 131 
 
 " forward frontier policy " of Lord Beaconsfield and 
 Lord Salisbury was calculated to increase that, the 
 only danger that is not imaginary, which India has 
 to fear from Eussia. 
 
 /*' Mr. Gladstone also, by the language he used in 
 moving for the vote of credit to make preparations 
 for war after the Eussian attack on the Afghans at 
 Penjdeh in 1885, and then allowing the Eussians to 
 retain all they had gained by this attack without 
 giving any redress to the Afghans, has contributed 
 even more to encourage among the people of India 
 a belief in the power of Eussia, and in its being an 
 object of dread to ourselves. If the British Govern- 
 ment had, from the first, not only professed, but 
 shown by its acts, indifference to the proceedings of 
 Eussia in Central Asia, their proceedings would have 
 done us no harm ; it is only our showing ourselves to 
 be afraid of their effects that has made them really 
 mischievous. 
 
 " I am persuaded that the only wise policy for 
 this country to pursue is to keep absolutely aloof 
 from all the quarrels of the Afghans and our other 
 neighbours, and to avoid all meddling in their affairs, 
 unless, by plundering our subjects or by other acts, 
 they inflict upon us injuries which ought to be 
 promptly punished. Even Lord ' Lawrence, wise as 
 
132 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 his conduct generally was, did not abstain, as 
 strictly as I should have wished, from interference 
 in the affairs of the Afghans, but made himself too 
 decidedly the partisan of the Ameer, giving him arms 
 and money. The British authorities cannot support 
 the ruler of the Afghans for the time being without 
 giving offence to all his competitors ; and as it is in 
 the nature of the half-barbarous States of Asia to 
 be never long free from revolutions, their rulers are 
 never secure from falling. The fall of one who has 
 been supported by the Indian Government, which 
 may take place at any moment, will have the ap- 
 pearance of a reverse to that Government." 
 
133 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The Financial Question. 
 
 The financial question connected with the " Scientific 
 Frontier," though of primary importance to its exe- 
 cution, has never been discussed by its advocates 
 and supporters ; and judging from what has tran- 
 spired of the scheme, the question appears to be in- 
 capable of any definite or satisfactory solution. The 
 initiative steps involved a war which cost twenty 
 millions sterling ; and a like s um has been expended 
 in acquiring territory in Baluchistan, in constructing 
 the Scind-Pishin railway and protective military 
 works, and in subsidising the Amir and a number of 
 tribal chieftains. But only a small portion of the 
 scheme has as yet been put forward. Surveys have 
 been made for a railway from Peshawur through the 
 Khyber Pass to Landi Kotal ; and an alternative line 
 through the Michni Pass towards Cabul, as well as 
 railways from Attock to Khushalgarh, Kalabagh, and 
 
134 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 Bannu, and from Mianwali to Kalabagh, are under 
 consideration. Then, the railway through the Bolan 
 Pass, being found unfit for its intended purpose, is to 
 be abandoned and replaced by a line through the 
 Gumal Pass and the Zhob country, to Pishin. More- 
 over, with the view of guarding against a descent 
 from Turkestan in the direction taken by the Eussian 
 exploring column of 1878, surveys have been made 
 for connecting Gilgit with our existing system of 
 military railroads ; it being asserted that, without 
 such a line, our defences would be incomplete and 
 the Empire would not be safe from invasion. 
 
 A reference to the map will show that the total 
 length of these projected lines is over 800 miles. No 
 estimate of their cost has been made public ; but 
 looking at the difficult nature of the ground, and 
 taking into account the necessity of protecting these 
 new lines, twenty millions would certainly fall con- 
 siderably short of the cost of this section of the 
 projected works. But the " Scientific Frontier" 
 would even then be incomplete. Great stress has 
 been laid on the strategic importance of Bannu, as 
 commanding an ingress via Thall to Afghanistan and 
 Cabul ; and of the Kuram and Tochi valleys, as 
 offering the means of swiftly moving troops to 
 Ghazni. This part of the scheme will, therefore, in 
 
THE FINANCIAL QUESTION. 135 
 
 its turn require railways, protective fortifications, and 
 probably also subsidies to the local tribes. 
 
 Still, the " Scientific Frontier " would remain un- 
 finished, seeing that, in the original plan considered 
 by the authorities in India in 1868, the occupation of 
 Jellalabad as commanding the position of Cabul, was 
 a main feature of the scheme ; and the possession of 
 Candahar has moreover been declared to be an 
 essential condition of success. 
 
 Money must be found for the construction of all 
 these works, and also for their maintenance, seeing 
 that military railroads do not earn even their working 
 expenses. Additional troops will likewise have to be 
 raised, for garrisoning the outposts and protecting 
 the different lines of this gigantic and undefined 
 scheme. Whence is that money to come ? During 
 the last fifteen years the Indian treasury has, by 
 means of loans raised on the security of the Indian 
 revenue, supplied the forty millions hitherto ex- 
 pended ; can it reasonably be expected to produce the 
 countless millions still wanted ? 
 
 The credit of the Indian Government in the Money 
 Market in London is, no doubt, excellent ; and the 
 Secretary of State could borrow many millions at 
 present by pledging the revenues of India. But the 
 interest on the new loans would have to be provided 
 
136 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 for, and this leads at once to the question, whether 
 the Indian revenue is capable of bearing such addi- 
 tional and unlimited burdens. On this point it may 
 be as well to remember how, through ill-regulated 
 expenditure, the Indian Exchequer was brought in 
 1869 on the very verge of bankruptcy. The situa- 
 tion cannot be better described than in the oft- 
 repeated words of the late Lord Mayo, when he 
 wrote in 1870: "An accumulated deficit of six 
 millions has occurred in the three last years; the 
 permanent debt during the same period has been 
 increased by nearly six and a half millions ; the 
 serious and unprecedented course of increasing the 
 burdens of the people in the middle of the year has 
 been taken ; the public works have in a great mea- 
 sure been suspended ; the income tax and the salt 
 tax in Madras and Bombay have been increased ; the 
 Government have declined to terrify the people by 
 new taxes, and has endeavoured to extricate the 
 Empire from a very great difficulty, by the only 
 mode which it thought it could venture to adopt ; the 
 period has been one of great trouble to the Empire 
 and of anxiety to the Government." A few months 
 later the Viceroy wrote again : " A feeling of dis- 
 content and dissatisfaction exists among every class, 
 both European and Native, on account of the increase 
 
THE FINANCIAL QUESTION. 137 
 
 of taxation that has for years been going on ; and the 
 continuance of that feeling is a political danger the 
 magnitude of which can hardly be over-estimated." 
 
 Let us now inquire into the present condition of 
 the finances of India. The estimates just published 
 for 1891-92 show a small surplus of Ex. 115,600, con- 
 tingent on the rate of exchange ruling, on an 
 average, at Is. 5Jd. per rupee. So far, however, the 
 market rate has ruled below that figure, and the 
 prospect for the remainder of the year is decidedly 
 unfavourable, in view of the heavy stock of silver 
 which has accumulated in America. The above- 
 mentioned surplus may, therefore, eventually be con- 
 verted into a deficit, even if the estimates in all other 
 respects be fully realised ; but this latter contingency 
 likewise seems improbable for the following reasons. 
 
 The income derived from opium, which very 
 materially contributes to the revenue, has been de- 
 creasing steadily during the last ten years. The nett 
 amount was 
 
 Ex. 8,451,167 in 1880-81, 
 
 Ex. 6,213,845 in 1886-87, 
 and is estimated at only 
 
 Ex. 5,318,700 for 1891-92; 
 and the Finance Minister records the following ob- 
 servation in reference to these figures : " The opium 
 
 9 
 
138 A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER. 
 
 revenue has no doubt fallen largely, and there are 
 no strong indications of a recovery." (Financial 
 Statement, para. 26.) 
 
 Then, as regards the expenditure, it has greatly 
 increased under the head of "Army" ever since the 
 " Scientific Frontier " scheme was revived in 1885, 
 the figures recorded at paragraph 55 being 
 In 1884-85, Ex. 16,963,803, 
 In 1887-88, Ex. 20,417,934, 
 Estimate for 1891-92, Ex. 21,051,200. 
 
 An ominous significance is added to these already 
 alarming figures by the following remarks of the 
 Finance Minister : 
 
 "29. It is impossible to speak with confidence 
 regarding the future military expenditure. 
 
 " 30. The best conclusion that lean form is that 
 the permanent cost of the army is likely to increase, 
 and that it is impossible to lay down any limit to 
 such increase. 
 
 "31. Besides the increase of permanent expen- 
 diture, there are temporary increases which vary 
 from year to year, but which can never be expected 
 to wholly disappear. The more important items of 
 this class are those connected with the frontier ex- 
 peditions ; such expenditure has been high in recent 
 years." 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL QUESTION. 139 
 
 These statements of the Government of India dis- 
 close a very critical state of things. It is well known 
 that the ordinary branches of revenue in that coun- 
 try have, for some years, ceased to give any signs of 
 elasticity ; while the cost of Civil administration and 
 pensions has been growing with alarming rapidity. 
 Under these circumstances, it becomes very difficult, 
 if not impossible, to see how the interest on the loans 
 needed for giving further effect to the " Scientific 
 frontier " scheme, is to be provided for. The Income 
 Tax and the Salt Tax were looked upon as financial 
 reserves of the Empire ; but both those imposts have 
 now been raised as high as it was deemed prudent to 
 raise them; and they have consequently become 
 valueless as reserves. Increased demands of the 
 tax collector have latterly resulted in disappointment ; 
 and they must, if persisted in much further, produce 
 that widespread feeling of discontent and dissatisfac- 
 tion which Lord Mayo, justly no doubt, described as 
 a political danger, the magnitude of which can hardly 
 be over-estimated. 
 
 It is obvious from these circumstances that the 
 completion of the " Scientific Frontier " scheme, 
 financially considered, is impossible; and that, if 
 new loans be raised on the revenues of India for 
 prosecuting that scheme, a danger will soon threaten 
 
140 A SCIENTIFIC FKONTIER. 
 
 the safety of our Indian Empire, which would be 
 far greater than any that can reasonably be appre- 
 hended from a Eussian attack through Afghanistan, 
 namely, the internal danger of dissaffection and 
 rebellion. 
 
 " The first essential to the preservation of India 
 against the attacks of a foreign enemy," said an able 
 and experienced officer of the Indian Army,* " is that 
 the Government of India should be so conducted as 
 to make it a matter of moral certainty that, in the 
 event of any other European Power attempting to 
 oust us from it, there shall be no internal uprising 
 to paralyse the military movements which the autho- 
 rities may consider, on strategic grounds, the best 
 calculated for its defence. If, like France in her last 
 contest with Germany, we have to deal not only with 
 the enemy in front of us, but also with revolutionary 
 or rebellious upheavings in our rear, the ablest plan 
 of action may, and probably will, prove utterly use- 
 less, because it will be found impossible to adhere 
 to it in this new state of things." 
 
 * The True Line of Defence for India, by Col. A. B. Ratbborne. 
 East India Association, 1876. 
 
 London Printed by W. H. Allen & Co., Limited, 13 Waterloo Place. S.W. 
 
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