INTRODUCTION 
 
 , TO THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 OF 
 
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY- 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR STONE DEWING 
 
 PHILADELPHIA AND LONDON 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 
 1903 
 

 ' ' : :' :** :*/" : /. ' ' 
 
 GENERAL 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1903 
 BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 
 
 Published June, 1903 
 
 ELECTROTYPED AND PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA, U.S.A. 
 
TO 
 
 MY MOTHER 
 I DEDICATE THIS BOOK 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THERE are at the present time accessible to the English 
 reader many excellent and comprehensive histories of philoso- 
 phy. And the only reason for treating the subject again has 
 arisen from the hope that a more simple treatment would prove 
 useful to those readers unfamiliar with the technicalities of 
 recent philosophical systems. For various reasons the histori- 
 cal side serves as perhaps the only broad and permanently 
 valuable approach to the whole field of philosophy, while it is 
 a firm conviction with many that some slight acquaintance 
 with the development of philosophical problems is indispensable 
 to their appreciation. This work is intended as an introduction 
 to the subject, and is not the expression of a critical or recon- 
 structive attitude; it makes no attempt to trace the logico- 
 genetic development of modern thought, nor does it pretend 
 to consider every aspect of historical development. 
 
 This definite point of view has made it necessary to keep 
 certain matters clearly in mind. As few technical terms as 
 possible have been used and those which were considered neces- 
 sary have been defined either in the introductory chapter or 
 later on in the book. Again, the writer has striven to avoid 
 two difficulties which might be urged against an " Introduc- 
 tion/' stress on an array of unrelated facts and too broad a 
 point of view. The minute details of the various philosophical 
 systems have been omitted as far as possible, and for this 
 reason many features have been neglected which in a more 
 subjective and critical account might be considered of im- 
 portance. An exhaustive catalogue of these details would not 
 assist the reader to the understanding of the definite world-atti- 
 tude for which every great thinker stands; and, furthermore, 
 
6 PREFACE. 
 
 these particulars may be learned much better from the writings 
 of the philosophers themselves than from any historical sketch. 
 But, on the other hand, lack of detail has a tendency to bring 
 into the foreground too general or superficial a view-point. 
 We are dealing with men and movements, but not movements 
 alone. Any broad characterization of a certain tendency is 
 necessarily superficial, especially when written with the pres- 
 ent aim in mind, yet it is hoped that this objection may 
 prove less serious if supported by a distinct exposition of each 
 philosophical system. For various reasons the biographies of 
 the different men have been emphasized, with the belief that 
 the facts of a man's life and character are often the clearest 
 approach to the position that he has occupied in the world. 
 
 In regard to the arrangement of the subject-matter of the 
 book: the first chapter aims to present an explicit definition 
 of the ordinary conceptions of philosophy. This introductory 
 chapter observes in the main the traditional interpretations of 
 terms, even in those instances in which recent criticism has 
 tended to invest old words with new meanings. The second 
 chapter describes the general background on which strictly 
 modern philosophy rests. The brief resume of earlier history 
 is given more to furnish points of reference than to supply an 
 outline. The important pre-Kantian thinkers have been ar- 
 ranged according to two general attitudes towards philosophy, 
 the Eationalistic and the Empiric. This method of treat- 
 ment expresses the outward differences and frequent internal 
 resemblances of the Continental and English schools of 
 thought. It also defines clearly the position of Kant with 
 respect to those problems for the solution of which he developed 
 the " Critical Philosophy." The emphasis on Kant both in 
 the sketch of his life and in the outline of his system is not 
 due to individual prejudice, but is rather in accordance with 
 the philosophical tendencies of the present time. The treat- 
 ment of German transcendentalism is necessarily brief and 
 superficial, considering the depth and magnitude of the prob- 
 
PREFACE. 7 
 
 lems at issue ; but it is hoped that it will present some definite 
 meaning to the person who has intelligently followed the 
 previous chapters. The last chapter outlines more recent phases 
 of philosophy. There is no unanimity of opinion concerning 
 the relative importance of the earlier thinkers, while the com- 
 parative estimation of recent systems of philosophy is little 
 else than A matter of personal taste. In this closing chapter 
 it will be observed that the monistic point of view is given 
 considerable prominence,, while the last few pages suggest an 
 interpretation of the present tendencies in this direction. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 13 
 
 THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY 18 
 
 THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 22 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE BIRTH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL 45 
 
 THE RENAISSANCE 52 
 
 NICOLAS OF CUSA 54 
 
 GIORDANO BRUNO 57 
 
 MYSTICISM - 62 
 
 JACOB BOEHME 64 
 
 FRANCIS BACON 66 
 
 THOMAS HOBBES 70 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM. 
 
 THE SCEPTICISM OF THE RENAISSANCE 76 
 
 RENE DESCARTES 77 
 
 Method 79 
 
 Foundations of Philosophy 81 
 
 Metaphysics 84 
 
 CARTESIAN SCHOOL 87 
 
 BENEDICT DE SPINOZA 89 
 
 Life 90 
 
 Metaphysics 93 
 
 Epistemology 100 
 
 Ethics 101 
 
 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ 106 
 
 Metaphysics 108 
 
 THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE 115 
 
 9 
 
10 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LOCKE AND HIS INFLUENCE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM CONTRASTED 119 
 
 JOHN LOCKE 120 
 
 Object of Locke's Philosophy 125 
 
 Nature of Ideas 127 
 
 Knowledge 132 
 
 Ethics 134 
 
 FRENCH SENSATIONALISM 137 
 
 THE DEISTS 142 
 
 LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS 143 
 
 THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT . . 147 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 BERKELEY AND HUME. 
 
 GEORGE BERKELEY 150 
 
 Stand-point 153 
 
 Metaphysics 155 
 
 DAVID HUME 164 
 
 Stand-point 168 
 
 Metaphysics 169 
 
 Ethics 175 
 
 HUME'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY . 176 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 IMMANUEL KANT. 
 
 THE Two EPISTEMOLOGICAL STAND-POINTS 179 
 
 LIFE AND CHARACTER OF KANT 180 
 
 PROBLEMS OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 189 
 
 THE " CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON" 191 
 
 THE " CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON" 212 
 
 THE " CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT" 220 
 
 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT . . 223 
 
CONTENTS. 11 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENT ALISTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE POST-KANTIAN TENDENCIES 226 
 
 JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBABT 230 
 
 Metaphysics 231 
 
 KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD 236 
 
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE 237 
 
 Stand-point 240 
 
 The Primacy of the Ego 241 
 
 THE ROMANTICISTS 250 
 
 FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING 251 
 
 Stand-point 252 
 
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL 257 
 
 Relation to Former Idealists 259 
 
 Fundamental Conceptions 260 
 
 The " Phenomenology of Mind" 265 
 
 System 268 
 
 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER 274 
 
 Stand-point 276 
 
 System 280 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE 286 
 
 Auguste Comte 287 
 
 Hypotheses in Science 290 
 
 Evolution 292 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY 299 
 
 THEORIES OF ETHICS 303 
 
 Utilitarianism 305 
 
 Idealism of Green 308 
 
 IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS 309 
 
 Rudolph Hermann Lotze 309 
 
 Josiah Royce 312 
 
 F. H. Bradley 313 
 
12 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT 
 
 TIME 314 
 
 The Meaning of Presupposition 317 
 
 The Dual Presupposition of Philosophy 319 
 
 Experience 320 
 
 Thought 325 
 
 The Absolute . . 329 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 X \ r 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 OF 
 
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY,. 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE prominence of philosophical study has exerted a re- 
 markable influence on the intellectual life of Europe. It has 
 deeply affected the history of religion; it is accountable, in a 
 large measure, for the origin and growth of scientific theory, 
 and even in recent times it is philosophy which has been the 
 indirect cause for notable advances in the applied arts. Phi- 
 losophy served as the basis of Greek culture, it kept alive the 
 germ of learning during the darkness of the Middle Ages, and 
 gave impetus and permanent value to the wide-spread en- 
 lightenment of the Kenaissance. The truly great and original 
 discoveries in mathematics have been made by men whose 
 interest was primarily philosophical, and through mathematics 
 the sciences, the arts, and civilization have advanced. There 
 is no other branch of learning arising from a wider view-point, 
 nor is there any other science or art which defines for itself an 
 ideal so near to the ultimate meaning of truth. The appre- 
 ciation of the value of philosophy is thus intimately associated 
 with the intellectual progress of mankind, yet the various 
 descriptions of the subject have led to considerable confusion. 
 Our general understanding of the term has been derived from 
 
 13 
 
14 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Greeks, but from them we obtain no thoroughly uniform 
 definition of philosophy. The difficulty in defining our sub- 
 ject seems to have arisen from the depth and scope of its mate- 
 rial, for it is not easy to condense a wealth of meaning into a 
 few words. 
 
 Traditional Meaning. From the very beginning of phi- 
 losophy, when it seemed to be emerging for the first time from 
 .the, mists < o <tra$iion and mythology, it has appeared in the 
 light' of -a'-searcH 'for .the permanent reason of things. It is 
 , almost; univ^sally/ -inferred, both from the character of its 
 1 1 < subject-matter arid from the proverbial obscurity of its classic 
 productions, that the world of philosophy is somewhere beyond 
 the confusion and heterogeneity of the world of common life; 
 that it is concerned with the deeper problems of life and 
 nature. The derivation of the word philosophy " love of wis- 
 dom" would seem to imply this, especially when wisdom is 
 regarded as facts permanently true under all conditions. The 
 ancients taught us to go beneath the surface of things and dis- 
 cover the permanent in the increasing changes of the world, 
 and to this science of the permanent, tradition has given the 
 name of philosophy. We regard its material to be those ques- 
 tions which are seldom brought to the foreground in the ordi- 
 nary course of daily life, those enigmas of human conscious- 
 ness which are relegated to the quieter moments of study and 
 reflection, or else passed over entirely with a half-conscious 
 faith in the adequacy of religion to solve them. Not infre- 
 quently, however, philosophy has been degraded to the position 
 of a doctrine of magic, owing to a literal interpretation of its 
 foundation in the mysterious. And still again it has been 
 sometimes confused with religion, since the fields of the two 
 seem difficult to separate. With the exception of a few such 
 ! errors the popular conception of philosophy, as the science of 
 the permanent, is justly correct. This search for the perma- 
 nent may carry us into many regions, but it is still philosophy 
 so long as the object of the quest is clearly before us. 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY. 15 
 
 Two Attitudes towards Philosophy. Throughout the 
 whole history of our subject there have appeared two general 
 attitudes towards philosophy, each of which has had its classic 
 representations. These may be briefly summarized as the 
 Humanistic and the Naturalistic, according as the stress of 
 definition is laid on man or on nature. The former seeks to 
 explain man not only as the measure but also as the centre of 
 all things. The latter regards him as merely a product or 
 insignificant part of the universal processes of Nature. 
 
 The Humanistic Attitude.- It has been the favorite cus- 
 tom of many writers, especially those who have approached 
 philosophy from the stand-points of morality and history, to 
 regard man as the central figure in the drama of nature and 
 to consider philosophy as simply the record of the laws of his 
 being and the epitome of his progress. Such views are charac- 
 teristic of all ages and peoples. This humanistic philosophy 
 has had its counterpart in the man-like gods of religion, in 
 poetry, and in literature generally. It is this stand-point which 
 led Montaigne to quote Cicero as saying "that to Philosophy 
 is no other thing, than for a man to prepare himself to death." * 
 When Greek philosophy was at the height of its power the 
 attention of the foremost thinkers was directed to man. Soc- 
 rates is said to have declared that the field of human knowledge 
 was restricted to man himself, and tradition portrays another 
 thinker of that period as saying that " Man was the measure 
 of all things." 2 Again at the beginning of modern thought 
 the humanistic tendencies were very marked. The reaction 
 against the traditional customs and institutions of the Middle 
 Ages showed itself in an over-emphasis of the privileges and 
 dignity of the individual man, accompanied by a philosophy to 
 substantiate such views. And in our own time it is by no 
 means uncommon to find the field of philosophy confined to 
 
 1 Essays, Florio's translation, Book I., Chapter xix. 
 
 2 Protagoras J iravrwv xprjfjid.T(av perpov avOpoiwos. 
 
16 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 human action and its problems restricted to life, the soul and 
 its immortality. 
 
 The Naturalistic Attitude. In contrast to this former 
 attitude towards philosophy there has always existed another 
 and far broader stand-point. Even from the time of the earliest 
 Greeks, when Thales identified the world with water, and 
 Heraclitus with the eternal flux of fire, there have always been 
 attempts to discover the original nature of the Universe. These 
 attempts have appeared under the name of philosophy, and the 
 object of their search has been the goal of the human intellect. 
 Philosophy thus appears as the science of sciences, which, rec- 
 ognizing the office and necessary place of every field of knowl- 
 edge, endeavors to harmonize the disparate and bring unity 
 into the farthest recesses of Nature. In this sense philosophy 
 i becomes strictly the science of nature, when this term is inter- 
 \ preted to mean the sum of all things. It recognizes the contra- 
 1 dictions and enigmas that surround man on every side and tries 
 to simplify them. In this struggle with the almost impossible 
 the nature philosophy, like the empirical sciences, breathes its 
 own interpretation into nature, suggests its own hypotheses and 
 tests them in the court of common experience. It is thus simi- 
 lar to the sciences themselves in the general attitude towards 
 nature, but far broader and deeper in scope than any one of 
 them, since it is concerned with these very principles and laws 
 upon which all possible empirical sciences must ultimately 
 rest. 
 
 A Provisional Definition. We have just mentioned the 
 difficulty of any attempt to define our subject. Yet it is the 
 undefinable which any philosophy must conscientiously fear. 
 And besides, no clear treatment of philosophical problems is 
 possible unless we understand their general character. A 
 definition of philosophy cannot be so broad as to include all 
 possible knowledge within it, although in its deepest sense 
 philosophy truly lies at the foundation of knowledge; nor, on 
 the other hand, can the definition be so narrow as to exclude 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY. 17 
 
 some of the special problems. A provisional definition of our 
 subject is possible only if we succeed in uniting the two atti- 
 tudes already referred to the humanistic and the natural- 
 istic with the traditional understanding of the term as the 
 search for the permanent in our experience. 
 
 The humanistic philosophies sought to explain the inner 
 nature of man, the peculiar power of his reason, his relation to 
 his environment, and the value of the moral law. In the 
 treatment of all these problems it has been found necessary 
 to compare with one another the many perceptions and 
 thoughts which together comprise the conscious life of man. 
 In this comparison the philosopher seeks to discover the unity 
 of life behind the heterogeneity of our experiences. The hu- 
 manistic philosophy is thus a science of the permanently real 
 in man, such as the inner laws of his character. And from 
 the broader range of the nature philosophies this same pur- 
 pose is observable. They seek to unfold the connection between 
 the human mind and the Absolute Eeason, the unity of phe- 
 nomena and the harmony of natural law. 
 
 In both of these attitudes there seems to be this common 
 element, they each seek for a unity. In one it is the unity of 
 human life, while in the other it is the unity of nature. And 
 besides this inquiry for the ultimate unity of things, there are 
 two other characteristics observable in all the humanistic and 
 nature philosophies. These are the methods by which a unity 
 may be discovered and 4he starting-point which furnishes the 
 requisite material. The former is the reason, the latter is 
 experience. In whatever form and under whatever outward 
 conditions any system of philosophy has appeared, it is pos- 
 sible only through the medium of the human reason. With what 
 ostentation its conclusions may be displayed, it is still the 
 reason which makes this mockery possible; and in whatever 
 manner we seek to avoid its meshes, it still holds us with an 
 irresistible power. On the other hand, this is equally true of 
 experience. Without a firm foundation in the world of mere 
 
 2 
 
18 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fact no philosophy can discover a starting-point for its specu- 
 lations or a foothold for its conclusions. Even to deal with 
 pure thought it is necessary to consider experience as its object, 
 else the concept of thought itself would be unattainable. 
 
 In view of these common elements, which we observe in 
 every system of philosophy under whatever conditions it has 
 appeared, we would suggest the following provisional defini- 
 tion, Philosophy is the rational unification of the facts of 
 experience. Experience is the starting-point, reason the method 
 or efficient cause, and, finally, unity is the ultimate purpose of 
 all systems of philosophy. And this is universally true, whether 
 we consider the speculations of Hindoo, Greek, Anglo-Saxon, 
 or German. 
 
 SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This attempt to characterize philosophy as if concerned 
 wholly with the rational unity in all our experience may seem 
 at first sight to be nothing else than a description of the entire 
 field of knowledge; that we have perhaps given an undue 
 prominence to our subject in view of the purpose and results 
 of both natural science and religion. In answer to this criti- 
 cism we might remark that by defining philosophy as the 
 science of the real unity in our experience we have certainly 
 raised it to an extremely important place, yet possibly not 
 greater than it deserves; but we have by no means exhausted 
 the whole expanse of human interests. The scope of philo- 
 sophical studies is much more restricted than this definition 
 would imply, for it is seldom that an ultimate unity is sought 
 for within any limited range of our experience. Sometimes 
 the objective or non-mental world, sometimes the emotions 
 and not the reason, receive too great an emphasis to admit of 
 a place within its clearly marked limits. Undoubtedly the 
 scope of philosophical studies is often exaggerated and treated 
 in so general a manner as to include almost any science within 
 its horizon. In order to obtain a clear appreciation of their 
 definite bounds it will be found advisable to consider the dis- 
 
SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 
 
 tinctions which separate this field from the natural sciences on 
 the one hand and religion on the other. 
 
 Philosophy Different from Science. The clearest distinc- 
 tion between philosophy and the physical sciences is concerned 
 with the treatment of material. The former deals only with 
 the general conceptions, while science advances by considering 
 the smallest and simplest details. It is a scientific fact that 
 the extinct armadillo resembles the modern and existing species 
 of the same type of animal in all respects except size, that the 
 variability of the light of the star Algol occurs periodically, or 
 that the colors of many copper salts in dilute solution are near 
 some shade of blue. An extensive array of such facts as these 
 constitute the special sciences of biology, astronomy, and chem- 
 istry. They are, however, far from being facts of philosophy. 
 The generalizations or laws upon which each depends evolu- 
 tion, gravity, and the ion theory may very well find a place 
 in philosophy, but the details and minute facts are the material 
 of science alone. 
 
 Another distinction of a similar character rests upon the 
 division of labor. Science has neither the time nor the inclina- 
 tion to examine its presuppositions ; it prefers to take the world 
 of sense perception as it is found, without trying to inquire fur- 
 ther into its true nature. Philosophy, on the other hand, re- 
 gards nothing to be too simple or apparent for investigation. 
 It delights in the discarded problems of science, constructs 
 theories of its own, and derives general explanations which are 
 altogether unintelligible to the descriptive scientist. 
 
 A less important distinction between these two fields lies in 
 the method of procedure. The scientist takes no step forward 
 until firmly fortified by direct experience. He has constantly 
 a microscope, a telescope, or a test-tube in his hand as the 
 sure guide to knowledge. In other words, the scientist pro- 
 gresses by a first-hand acquaintance with a limited part of the 
 vast realm of nature. Philosophy is too broad to allow of such 
 a jDaethptji. Jjk j^ust take the concerted opinion of specialists 
 
20 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 when it requires the knowledge of some fact, rather than to 
 instigate separate investigations itself. The philosopher 
 accepts the results accomplished by the patient investigations 
 of the expert astronomer or chemist. He looks forth upon the 
 vast expanse of human knowledge as if from some high emi- 
 nence. The extensive panorama spread before him, while 
 losing the details and close definitions of a nearer view, gains 
 in width, comprehensiveness, and generality. On the other 
 hand, the followers of the special sciences search with con- 
 scientious minuteness all the little by-ways of knowledge, bring- 
 ing into view the details, yet remaining ignorant of what is 
 beyond their limited scope. 
 
 Philosophy Different from Religion. Ever since the 
 earliest dawn of human history man has been a religious being. 
 Modern science is ignorant of a race of men so ancient or so 
 remote that they are devoid of any form of religion. It is the 
 strongest and simplest bond which harmonizes civilized man 
 with the primitive savage. Through the prominence of emo- 
 tions it points to a lower plane of life, yet at the same time it 
 raises man to the highest level of intellectual achievement 
 through the concept of a Personified Infinite. From the rudest 
 condition of man we learn that science and philosophy were at 
 one time identical with religion. It was only through a process 
 of slow differentiation that each gradually acquired an indi- 
 viduality of its own. It is therefore very natural that phi- 
 losophy and religion should have much in common, and that 
 many of the questions investigated by philosophy should have 
 a corresponding place in religion. ' This apparent identity of 
 both origin and subject-matter has often led to a confusion 
 of aim and an ignorance of the fundamental distinction which 
 separates them. To make this clearer it is necessary to indi- 
 cate briefly the psychic basis of religion, and to point out the 
 elements that constitute its mental foundations as well as the 
 side of human character to which it appeals. 
 
 The problem of the mental origin of religion is one of 
 
SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 extreme complexity. It has received considerable attention 
 from those who have endeavored to treat religion from an ana- 
 lytic stand-point and explain the laws which underlie the relig- 
 ious life. Sometimes religion is based on the emotions alone, as 
 in the instance of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a celebrated Ger- 
 man thinker of the early part of the nineteenth century. Be- 
 ligion to him was a feeling of absolute dependence on the uni- 
 verse personified as God. Again there are many philosophers 
 who regard the emotional elements of religion as the outward 
 covering of a purely rational centre. With such the synthetic 
 powers of the reason are alone responsible for all the elements 
 of religious life. Both theories are alike narrow in so far as 
 each neglects the aspect made prominent by the other. The 
 former forgets that feeling alone can never attain the concept 
 of the Infinite, while the latter disregards the obvious fact that 
 religion is always accompanied by an emotional feeling towards 
 God or Nature. Could we look back into the past and see early 
 man at the time when he first became conscious of the vast 
 complexity of his environment, one would find wonder and 
 fear intermingled with an instructive desire to understand his 
 surroundings as the chief expressions of his attitude towards 
 nature. Wonder and fear would appear only at times of un- 
 usual occurrences, such as earthquakes or death; whereas the 
 desire, gradually becoming instinctive, to explain and under- 
 stand this world would attain complete mastery over the mind 
 of the primitive man. We cannot, therefore, sympathize with 
 Lucretius in his attempt to found religion on fear, nor with a 
 modern hypothesis that it is based on wonder. 
 
 The easiest and simplest explanation of the universe which 
 the savage mind could bring forth would be a reflection of his 
 own consciousness in the external world. Every physical event, 
 such as the rise of a river, a volcano, or even the growth of a 
 plant, would be the outward manifestation of a consciousness 
 similar to his own. Towards the conscious Being would arise 
 feelings of awe and respect, since its all-powerful hand con- 
 
22 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 trolled the fortunes of the child-like savage. The first rudi- 
 ments of religion would thus spring from this instinctive 
 demand for an explanation of the universe intelligible to the 
 poetic mind of primitive man. These two elements, the in- 
 stinctive feeling and the rational explanation of the world, 
 have always remained of paramount importance in any form of 
 religion, and they may be regarded as salient points in our 
 comparison of philosophy and religion. 
 
 We earlier characterized philosophy as a study of universals 
 with the special object of bringing harmony into the variety 
 of our world. Explanation of the world is thus a common 
 element in both philosophy and religion. But here the simili- 
 tude ends. In religion there is also the element of feeling 
 towards God, or the Power of the world personified. This 
 is entirely lacking in philosophy. There is absolutely no emo- 
 tional expression of any kind towards its results; no feeling 
 of reverence towards the Universal of universals. It is very 
 possible that philosophy may develop a concept by no means 
 unlike the omniscient God of the higher forms of religion, 
 but such a concept exists for philosophy as an object only. It 
 develops from a rational analysis of the universe, nothing 
 more. 
 
 PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 These broad generalizations of the nature of philosophy are 
 altogether too indefinite for ordinary purposes. It has been 
 found convenient and almost necessary to divide philosophy as 
 a whole into numerous branches according to the field of 
 experience in which the unity is sought. The development of 
 philosophy as well as science has been characterized by the in- 
 crease in number of these special fields and the assertion of new 
 problems within them. In general form each is concerned with 
 universalizing some aspect of the world, such, for instance, 
 as the facts of mental life or the laws controlling moral action. 
 These subdivisions of philosophy are intended to exhaust the 
 field of knowledge; to be so broad as to afford an outline for 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 
 
 every fact, law, or science. Owing to this breadth of purpose 
 philosophy has no occasion or space to enter minutely into 
 the details of every fact, for this is the work of the special 
 sciences. When referring to any single experience or observa- 
 tion it relies on the concerted opinions of specialists. Each 
 branch of philosophy is content with harmonizing the facts of 
 extensive observation within its own definite boundaries. 
 
 These subbranches of philosophy may be arranged about a 
 centre, which may be regarded as the basis for all reference. 
 This centre of philosophy comprises the empirical science of 
 the various mental states, the theory of knowledge, and prob- 
 lem of ultimate reality. In addition to these subjects there 
 are on the one side the various investigations concerning the 
 ideals which the human mind may define for itself, and on the 
 other side the philosophical analysis of the laws and presuppo- 
 sitions involved in science, history, and religion. 
 
 Psychology. The most consistent approach to the various 
 subdivisions of philosophical inquiry may be made through 
 those subjects which are of fundamental importance to phi- 
 losophy as a whole, leaving until later the consideration of 
 human ideals, science, history, and religion. No investigation, 
 however, can take place unless it is in some way connected 
 with the human mind, no fact or process can be considered 
 unless it can be related to a mental state. On this account it 
 might seem as if the most apparent demand on the part of 
 philosophy in general would arise from a desire to under- 
 stand these mental states as they are in themselves. Such 
 a science of mental states is called Psychology. It is in fact a 
 natural science like physics or chemistry, since it regards the 
 mental states as the empirical data which it must describe and 
 explain, only the importance of mental states to philosophy 
 in general seems to warrant a consideration of psychology 
 in this connection. Psychology does not concern itself with 
 the source or ultimate nature of these mental states, but simply 
 describee our thoughts, feelings, and sensations, endeavoring 
 
24 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 perhaps to explain the one by the other, but never pursuing 
 the investigation beyond the limits of an empirical science. 
 
 Element of Psychology. Physical science recognizes a 
 certain hypothetical unit, called the atom, as the base for all 
 its investigations. In the same manner psychology accepts a 
 provisional unit which may be designated as sensation. This is 
 the simple unthinking element derived from the action of the 
 senses on the external world; it is the psychological genesis 
 of all the higher states of consciousness. When the mind rec- 
 ognizes the existence of a sensation we have a perception or a 
 conscious sensation. And when again these perceptions are 
 joined together by comparison, association, or abstraction, 
 there arises the flow of feelings, ideas, and thoughts of which 
 the conscious mind is composed. 
 
 Psycho-physical Parallelism. As an explanation of the 
 apparent similitude between this series of mental states, which 
 incessantly flows through the conscious mind, and another 
 series of phenomena, physical in character, which takes place 
 within the nervous system and the brain, the psychologist has 
 invented an hypothesis known as the Psycho-physical Parallel- 
 ism. This presupposes that for every change in the mind or 
 psychic world there is a corresponding change in the world of 
 material phenomena, yet there is only parallelism and no 
 causal connection between these two series of mental and phys- 
 iological states. When my mind perceives a flash of light, for 
 instance, the hypothesis demands that there must have been 
 a series of changes in the physical world which ran parallel 
 to the conscious mental processes of light perception, as the 
 excitation and accompanying chemical changes upon the retina 
 of the eye, the optic nerve, and the optical lobes of the brain. 
 For the purposes of exposition we may imagine two series of 
 phenomena, each controlled by its own laws and yet each series 
 absolutely separated from the other. Now imagine that for 
 every point or event in one series there is always a point or 
 event in the other, but yet at the same time the two corre- 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 spending events have no direct causal influence on one another. 
 The laws and the terms of one series are absolutely independ- 
 ent of those in the other series, yet there is a constant corre- 
 spondence, part for part. Upon some such hypothesis as this 
 the empirical science of psychology is able to deal with the 
 mental facts strictly as they are, without endangering its 
 conclusions by any positive theory of the relation between mind 
 and matter. 
 
 This parallelism well illustrates a rigid distinction which 
 has, until recently, prevailed throughout the whole field of phi- 
 losophy, the opposition of subjective to objective, the self to 
 its condition, thought to its content. On one side is the mind 
 or psychic world, restricted entirely to the mere flow of feel- 
 ings, thoughts, or ideas; on the other stands the physical 
 world, including all the objects of sense as well as our own 
 body, nerves, and brain. We shall see later how the true rela- 
 tion between the psychical and physical world becomes a ques- 
 tion of extreme importance throughout the history of modern 
 philosophy. 
 
 Epistemology. Psychology, as we have seen, deals with a 
 description of the mental states as they are in the mind, but 
 does not concern itself with their origin. It is thus an em- 
 pirical science, in so far as it receives the given facts of expe- 
 rience without seeking to determine their ultimate nature. 
 It is the special field of Epistemology to go one step deeper 
 than psychology and discover the source and possibility of these 
 mental states. It thus moves in the direction of what might 
 be called the presuppositions of empirical psychology. The 
 investigations of epistemology seek to explain the nature and 
 ultimate origin of our knowing processes; they endeavor to 
 define the details of a theory of knowledge. 
 
 We are accustomed to regard what we call knowledge or 
 facts as fundamental to our conscious life. This assumption 
 early checked all attempts to go deeper than the simple expe- 
 rience, and it is only within a comparatively recent time that 
 
26 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a special branch of philosophy has been assigned to examine 
 the character of our thinking process. When we say that the 
 " whole is greater than any of its parts," or that a " straight 
 line is the shortest distance between two points," we assert 
 what we consider a fact of knowledge; and it is the task of 
 epistemology to consider what truth there is in such an 
 assumption and upon what basis that truth depends. Episte- 
 mology is especially interested in what might be called the 
 
 ; criterion of knowledge. With psychology, this branch of phi- 
 losophy recognizes that the given experience, as we know it, 
 is all the original material that the human mind can obtain, 
 no matter how complicated a system of knowledge it may con- 
 
 \ struct. With this in view it naturally inquires why one expe- 
 rience should become a fact of knowledge, while another should 
 
 ( be discarded as the product of illusion or imagination. The 
 statement "that the earth revolves around the sun" is a fact 
 of knowledge, while the contrary statement "that the sun 
 revolves around the earth" is considered an illusory experience. 
 Such a comparison suggests that perhaps the reason is instru- 
 mental in the transition from mere experience to knowledge, 
 
 land epistemology seeks to determine the exact relation be- 
 
 . tween sense and reason in the constitution of true knowledge. 
 
 Empiricism. The central problem of epistemology is just 
 this question of the component elements of knowledge; as to 
 whether it is entirely derived from the sensuous impressions of 
 the external world on the one hand, or, on the other, whether 
 it consists of both elements obtained from the mind and from 
 sensation. The former theory, which regards all of our knowl- 
 edge as the direct product of experience, or sensuous impres- 
 sions, is called Empiricism. It is the favorite theme of those 
 writers who seek to explain the complexity of thought by the 
 apparent simplicity of human sensations. Such a view gives 
 to the reason and understanding nq^greater dignity or use than 
 that of a blank tablet upon which experience writes its facts 
 and from which it draws its conclusions. The truths of science 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 are such only because of long-continued experience, and even 
 the feeling of assured knowledge or necessary truth is derived 
 merely from repeated experiences and recurring series of 
 phenomena. 
 
 Rationalism. However plausible this empirical view of 
 knowledge may appear, there has always existed beside it 
 another theory of an opposite character. This latter gives 
 to the power of reason the higher and more important position 
 in the constitution of knowledge. Rationalism, the second of 
 the epistemological theories, recognizes the value of the human 
 reason and believes it to be the only criterion with which man 
 is able to determine truth. It is possible that reason may lead 
 us astray, but rationalism places it in this exalted position so 
 long as it is impossible to find a surer method for the dis- 
 covery of true knowledge. The error of the classic examples 
 of rationalism has been a tendency to disregard the all-impor- 
 tant truth that the starting-point of our facts and our sciences 
 is in the simple experience of sense impressions. The thinkers 
 of this school have been prone to erect complicated systems 
 of philosophy without due regard to the facts of observation 
 and sense, forgetting that an over-emphasis on reason can very 
 easily lead beyond the limits of philosophy and into the field 
 of the imagination. 
 
 Metaphysics. We found that epistemology dealt with 
 what was presupposed by psychology. There is also another 
 branch of philosophy which is concerned, not only with the 
 presuppositions of epistemology, but also with those of every 
 other science, subject, or fact. This basis of philosophy, or 
 rather science of the ultimate nature of the universe, is called 
 Metaphysics, or ontology. There are three general methods of 
 characterizing metaphysics, each of which exhibits its funda- 
 mental nature in a different manner. One can define it as the 
 base of all the physical sciences, as that branch of philosophy 
 which has as its subject-matter the presuppositions and foun- 
 dation-elements of all the other sciences. The reality of 
 
28 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 "matter" and "energy" are presupposed by physics and the 
 phenomena of life by biology; then, too, the concepts of time, 
 space, and causality find an almost necessary place in every 
 science. All these fundamental ideas, the nature of which is 
 apparently so simple that they are taken for granted by the less 
 critical sciences, are carefully examined and compared by 
 metaphysics. Even the sensations and the reason, the exist- 
 ence of which was presupposed by both psychology and episte- 
 mology, are subjected to unrelenting criticism by this branch 
 of philosophy. Metaphysics asks what is the ultimate nature 
 of mind and matter, what is the meaning of pure existence and 
 of simple being without any definable character. Any prob- 
 lem which is insoluble in the ordinary development of a special 
 science is relegated to metaphysics with the assurance that 
 here, if anywhere, it can find place, if not an explanation. 
 
 There is still another way of looking at metaphysics, 
 namely, as the final unity of all branches of philosophy. It 
 was earlier suggested that the general characteristic of each 
 of the subdivisions of our subject was the demand for a 
 rational unity in the facts of our experience. Employing this 
 same phrase, one may regard metaphysics as that branch of 
 philosophy which harmonizes into a consistent whole the nar- 
 rower unities of all the other subdivisions of philosophy. It 
 has therefore for its material general ideas of an extremely 
 abstract nature, thus making very difficult the style of its 
 literature. 
 
 There is a third stand-point which we may assume in de- 
 fining the nature of metaphysics. We may regard it as the 
 science of reality, employing this word in its broadest signifi- 
 cance. According to such a view the goal of metaphysical 
 research is the determination of what is absolutely Eeal. By 
 this term is meant that something which is so ultimately deep, 
 so true, and so essentially fundamental as to include within it 
 the endless variety of all possible experience. This reality of 
 the metaphysician is so broad and fundamental that it is often 
 
I PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 spoken of as something which requires its own existence, of 
 such a character that the world would be inconceivable without 
 it. The question of such a Eeality lying behind all phenomena 
 is the same question as the Unity of all unities, referred to in 
 a previous paragraph. The conception of a Unity which un- 
 derlies this world of changing experience would be so much the 
 expression of all else that it could only be regarded as the 
 ultimate Eeality. And conversely, should metaphysics define 
 what was sufficiently real to include all lesser reality, it is ob- 
 viously necessary that it must contain or unite every possible 
 element of experience. Absolute reality and ultimate unity 
 are metaphysically synonymous. 
 
 Monism. We have just mentioned that metaphysics seeks 
 to discover the unitary real lying at the base of the universe. 
 The school of thinkers who believe that this real is a single, 
 simple, undifferentiated unity may be called Monists, in con- 
 tradistinction to the Pluralists, who affirm the mulitiplicity of 
 the world elements. The Monists reduce both mind and mat- | 
 ter to either one or the other, or else to a something more j 
 fundamental than either. For example, the religious teacher 
 who characterized God as a Divinity, " For in Him we live, 
 and move, and have our being" (Acts xvii. 28), was asserting 
 the monistic metaphysics, for he meant to make the idea of 
 God so universal as to include every phase of man and nature. 
 And again, when Thales asserted that water, and Anaximenes 
 that air, were the primary elements of the world, each recog- 
 nized a monistic metaphysic. Science approaches this stand- 
 point when it regards some form of energy as the condition to 
 which all physical phenomena may be reduced ; or again when 
 it seeks to determine a unitary element to explain the periodic 
 variation of the atomic weights. 
 
 Pluralism. Pluralism, that theory of the universe which 
 regards several fundamental elements to be equally real, is 
 by no means as common as monism in modern thought. It\ 
 may take the form of dualism, which believes in two final real- 
 
30 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ities, such as mind and matter, eTtfoy and vb), thought 
 and extension. Again, there is a much more complicated form 
 of pluralism, which sometimes provides an infinite collection 
 of Eeals. A Greek thinker, Empedocles, tried to explain the 
 world as the interrelation of water, air, earth, and fire; while 
 his follower Anaxagoras increased the number of these ele- 
 ments indefinitely by regarding them as qualities. 
 
 Theology. Even this brief review of metaphysics would 
 be incomplete without some reference to the traditional mean- 
 ing of the term, as it comes down to us from the mediaeval 
 schools. During the Middle Ages the interest taken in these 
 same questions, which we have here referred to metaphysics, 
 was centred about the conception of God. These philosophers 
 or, rather, theologians, as they would now be called were 
 concerned wholly with the problem of the nature of the Deity. 
 Like metaphysics, the end sought was the ultimate unity of 
 the universe, but they interpreted this unity in terms of a 
 Divine Personality. This science, which might include almost 
 everything within it, was called Theology. 
 
 Confusion will undoubtedly arise as to the exact relation 
 between theology and metaphysics on the one hand, and theol- 
 ogy and religion on the other. The aim of metaphysics, we 
 have just discovered, is the hypothetical unity of the two enti- 
 ties, the self and nature. This unity of the two is a matter 
 of reason alone; it is developed by the philosopher as the 
 most rational explanation of the whole field of man and the 
 world. The God of theology, on the other hand, is nothing else 
 than this metaphysical unity transformed by the addition of 
 personal attributes into a Subject of divine and omniscient 
 power. The foundations of theology and the evidence upon 
 which its conclusions rest are identical with metaphysics, only 
 the result of the latter is abstract and colorless, while the 
 Unity of theology is a conscious Being who personifies the 
 ideals of mankind. 
 
 When this Divine Being of theology is regarded as an 
 
f UNIVERSITY J 
 PROBLEMS (X PHILOSOPHY. 31 
 
 omnipotent Power to whom all human beings owe devotion and 
 praise, then the Personality of theology becomes the God of 
 religion. Thus religion is the emotional feeling towards the 
 personal God, who sympathizes with the limitations and pas- 
 sions of man. The connection between these three subjects 
 may be briefly stated as follows: Metaphysics constructs a 
 purely rational Unity of man and nature; this is interpreted 
 in terms of Personality by theology; and, finally, religion 
 gives to it the elements of sympathy and emotional devotion. 
 
 These then, Psychology, Epistemology and Metaphysics, 
 form the three central and primary branches of philosophy. 
 The first concerns itself with the feelings and ideas of the 
 mind without considering their origin; epistemology, on the 
 contrary, seeks to explain the origin of these ideas ; while 
 metaphysics inquires into the reality and the nature of that 
 origin. The three thus form a graded sequence in which the 
 last member sums up and qualifies the other two. 
 
 The Normative Sciences. But, aside from psychology, 
 epistemology, and metaphysics, there are numerous side 
 branches and less general topics which, although important, 
 have not the primary nature of the three above mentioned. 
 The more prominent of these latter are the Normative Sciences, 
 which are concerned with the unification of human ideals. The 
 distinguishing feature of these subdivisions of philosophy lies 
 in the mobility of their material, the use of the concept of 
 ought or change towards some ideal. 
 
 The three branches of philosophy which we have summarized 
 above are concerned with what is rather than what should be. 
 Psychology takes the mental states as they are, without any 
 reference to what they might have been. Epistemology and 
 metaphysics are equally the sciences of facts, and not of possi- 
 bilities. But the normative sciences deal with laws and for- 
 mulae for the accomplishment of certain specific ends. They 
 tell us how we must or rather ought to act in order to reach 
 the goals we seek to attain. Their common characteristic is 
 
32 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the purposeful or ideological character of their subject-matter 
 and the primacy of the concept "ought." Philosophy as a 
 whole is concerned with universals and universalizing; and 
 the normative sciences, like the other subjects of philosophy, 
 recognize this quest for the universal. Only instead of con- 
 ducting their search in the realm of given fact, the normative 
 sciences seek for the universal behind the phenomena of action 
 and purpose. They inquire into the laws which we ought to 
 observe in order to attain the end in view, be it truth, goodness, 
 or beauty. These laws are considered universal, since they are 
 to be regarded as valid for all similar circumstances of action. 
 The normative sciences are classified according to the nature 
 of the end in view, whether it is truth in thinking, morality in 
 conduct, or beauty in art. It is Logic which prescribes the 
 universal laws for the attainment of truth, Ethics for the reali- 
 zation of moral goodness, and ^Esthetics for the portrayal and 
 judgment of the beautiful. 
 
 Logic. The first definite attempt to collect and arrange 
 the laws of right thinking is to be found in the works of 
 Aristotle, a Greek of the fourth century before Christ. Aristotle 
 attempted to prescribe the principles and rules by the ob- 
 servance of which the human intellect might hope to reach the 
 desired end of truth. During the Middle Ages the study 
 of logic was regarded as the necessary introduction to a com- 
 prehension of philosophy, and it was in the mediaeval schools 
 that the principles of logic were definitely formulated into 
 a system. During recent times the subject has been much 
 amplified, especially on account of the application of mathe- 
 matics to the thinking process, through the efficient labors of 
 the Englishman, Boole. At the present time the meaning of 
 logic has assumed new importance, owing to its reference to 
 the form of thought, rather than to the ideal of correct think- 
 ing. This view is far preferable to the traditional interpre- 
 tation, since it gives to logic a scientific value and enables it 
 to define as its special field the analysis, definition, and inter- 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 pretation of abstract concepts, such as quantity or number. 
 Logic thus becomes a supplement to metaphysics; the one 
 deals with the form of thought, the other with the reality of 
 its content. 
 
 Axioms of Logic. We have said that logic treats of 
 the universal laws of right thinking. There must, however, 
 be certain elements, or rather axiomatic principles, which 
 logic must regard as fundamental to the process of thought. 
 These are generally recognized to be three in number, and 
 may be briefly stated as follows: A thing is identical with 
 itself, A A, it must either exist or not exist, and, finally, 
 the principle of contradiction which requires that an assertion 
 and its contrary cannot be both true at the same time. These 
 three principles, apparently simple, but hardly as self-evident 
 as might appear at first sight, are regarded as the lowest terms 
 of our thinking process. They occupy in logic the same posi- 
 tion that the axioms of Euclid do in geometry, or the simple 
 process of counting in arithmetic. 
 
 Rules of Logic. From these principles as a starting-point 
 it has been possible to work out certain laws, like the formulae 
 of mathematics, which express in a general way the rules 
 which must be observed in order to think consistently. When 
 these laws are neglected there arise certain errors or fallacies 
 which are the types of erroneous thinking. As an example of 
 fallacious reasoning consider these statements, " All apple- 
 trees are organisms and all pear-trees are organisms;" there- 
 fore, "all pear-trees are apple-trees, because two things equal 
 to the same thing must be equal to each other/' The error 
 here lies in the fact that neither apple-trees nor pear-trees 
 exhaust the class of organisms, which is tacitly assumed in 
 the conclusion. This fallacy has a special name, which depends 
 on the fact that neither premise refers to all organisms. 
 
 Methods of Logic. Thought has sometimes been defined 
 as the process of drawing correct conclusions from given data. 
 One will readily perceive, however, that some conclusions seem 
 
 3 
 
34 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to possess a greater generality or extension than others. It is 
 possible to distinguish two ways in which we may proceed in 
 arriving at the results of thought, namely, from the general 
 to the specific or from the specific fact to the general principle. 
 The laws governing the former method comprise deductive 
 logic, and the latter inductive logic. For example, the geome- 
 ter tells us as a general fact that the radii of a sphere are all 
 equal in length. From this general statement it may be de- 
 duced, according to the laws of deductive logic, that all the 
 radii of a certain rubber ball are practically equal in length, 
 as well as the fact that all the lines to the centre of the earth 
 if it were a perfect sphere would be equal to each other. In 
 the same way we employ deductive logic when we assert that 
 a certain block of granite not yet quarried possesses weight, 
 knowing that all stones, including the granite, have weight. 
 
 We have stated that it is necessary to start with some gen- 
 eral or rather universal statement in order to proceed accord- 
 ing to deductive logic, but to determine the generality or 
 universality of a statement the opposite or inductive method is 
 required. This latter process of reasoning begins by consider- 
 ing a vast number of particular cases and from them deter- 
 mines the general law, or rule, which includes them all. The 
 inductive method is employed in science, where the general law 
 is inferred from many experiments. Thus from a vast num- 
 ber of observations concerning moving bodies the general law 
 of gravity is determined. From numerous experiences the 
 mariner feels himself able to predict the weather with some 
 degree of accuracy. Travellers have observed that many Bush- 
 men are short in stature, and from these observations we assert 
 as a scientific fact that the race of Bushmen, as a whole, is 
 below the average of mankind in height. All these examples 
 of induction show a process of reasoning from the particular 
 to the general. They are based upon the presupposition that 
 the mind can abstract from numerous experiences those char- 
 acteristics which are common to all. Perfect induction, how- 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 ever, giving rise to absolute certainty, is possible only when 
 every particular case is examined before the general law is 
 stated. 
 
 Ethics. The second of the normative sciences is Ethics, 
 dealing with the ought of conduct. Ethics is concerned with 
 the questions of right action, the meaning of goodness and 
 morality; with the nice distinctions between right and wrong 
 and the true value of life. It is this subject of inquiry which 
 has evolved the classic codes of the moral law, such as those 
 of Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed. These have been 
 generally embodied in some religious faith; but one must 
 very carefully distinguish between the ethical elements of the 
 broad world religions and those more significant portions 
 which refer to God and Nature. No more common error exists 
 in the popular understanding than to recognize a necessary 
 connection between morality and religion. The two subjects 
 have as little in common as religion and logic, or religion and 
 psychology. Tradition has united the science of conduct with 
 the religious belief in God, but fundamentally they deal with 
 altogether different sides of mental life. Owing to the fact 
 that the science of ethics deals with perhaps the most vital of 
 all the subjects of human interest, many have been prone to 
 believe that it constitutes the basis of philosophy. This was 
 referred to in an earlier part of this chapter as the humanistic 
 attitude, and it well illustrates the importance with which the 
 science of conduct is regarded. Among the early Persians 
 and Hebrews of the ancient nations the interest in practical 
 problems formed a very essential element in national life. The 
 period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle among the Greeks 
 was a time when all classes were deeply concerned with ques- 
 tions of an ethical nature. Among the thinkers of the modern 
 world the English, up to the last of the eighteenth century, 
 have shown the most marked interest in questions of conduct. 
 Such men as Locke, Shaftesbury, and the Mills have done much 
 for the advancement of philosophy by their clear and concise 
 
36 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 statements of the ethical problems. After the opening of the 
 nineteenth century, however, the German philosophers were 
 perhaps the most original in this direction. Their subtle 
 analyses and acute reasoning tended to clear away the mists 
 that had been gathering about the foundations of ethics since 
 the time of Plato. 
 
 Axioms of Ethics. Every science has some fundamental 
 axioms. In geometry they are always stated, without proof, 
 at the beginning of any treatise on the subject. In logic we 
 have found them to consist of those simple principles which 
 every one involuntarily assumes in all thinking. The science 
 of ethics is no exception to the general rule, only here we deal 
 with a presupposition of an altogether different character. We 
 have said that each of the normative sciences is concerned with 
 an ought of some kind, with a comparison between what is 
 and what should be. With ethics it is the moral comparison 
 between the present act and some future course of conduct. 
 This comparison, however, assumes that the person can or 
 cannot guide himself by the results of the decision. In other 
 words, ethics implicitly affirms that man possesses the power 
 to choose between two or more courses of action. It seems to 
 be the common assumption among us all that each person has 
 the power and privilege to contribute to his own moral devel- 
 opment by the free choice of action. This primal axiom of 
 morality is the ground not only of the problems of ethics, but 
 also of our simple and involuntary judgments of praise and 
 blame. Philosophy has denned two opposite and contradictory 
 theories regarding human action; the one postulates freedom, 
 the other denies it. 
 
 Libertarianism. The former and more natural theory 
 accepts uncritically the dictates of one's own consciousness 
 and gives to the human personality the unique dignity of de- 
 termining its own course of conduct. This view, which appears 
 under the name of Libertarianism, declares that the only means 
 of answering any question is by employing to its full extent the 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 37 
 
 authority of our own consciousness, for this is the necessary 
 setting to every fact of life and experience. And the liber- 
 tarians further declare that our own consciousness leaves no 
 doubt, but that at every moment of decision each person is at 
 liberty to freely choose his next succeeding act, provided there 
 is no physical hinderance or obstacle. Furthermore, it is con- 
 tended by the " f ree-willist" that unless freedom is conceded 
 to man the conceptions of praise and blame lose their force 
 and meaning. It is freedom that distinguishes man from the 
 brute, gives dignity to life, value to virtue, and authority to 
 the conscience. Without it man would be like the mechanisms 
 of nature, the direct product of circumstances, and a mere 
 function of his environment. 
 
 Determinism. Black as this picture of the freedomless 
 man appears when painted by the libertarian brush, there are 
 thinkers who accept it with all its apparent horrors. Deter- 
 minism is the opposite of libertarianism, since it denies the 
 ancient tradition of the freedom of the will. This school of 
 ethics declares that we have no right to distinctly part off man 
 from the rest of nature and declare that below him all is under 
 the control of blind necessity, whereas this being alone is en- 
 dowed with the heavenly power of choice. The determinists 
 do not hesitate to rank man with all the other members of the 
 animal kingdom, and refuse to recognize any other difference 
 than that of degree in mental power. According to them our 
 every act is the resultant of two irresistible forces, the present 
 environment and all our past actions as summed up in what 
 might be called character. It is the present environment which 
 unfolds to us the various possible lines of conduct; and it is 
 the individual character, personifying for that moment our 
 past actions and the lives of an indefinite series of ances- 
 tors, with their good and evil actions, their instincts, and 
 their passions, which irresistibly guides the moment of deci- 
 sion. A tree is stunted and ill-shaped because of an unhealthy 
 seed or decadent conditions of growth; while another of the 
 
38 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 same species is healthy and beautiful to look at because of 
 opposite conditions. The determinists contend that the varia- 
 tions in human character and conduct are the result of similar 
 variations in inheritance and environment. The human plant 
 prospers and grows beautiful in character and- life because of 
 circumstances over which it has absolutely no control. For 
 this reason, if for no other, the ideas of praise and blame, of 
 sin and virtue, have no other meaning than that of maturity 
 or decadence. Pity, sympathy, honor, and love have no exalted 
 place in determinism, especially in its classic examples. All 
 is nature and natural law, man is one of its peculiar 
 products. 3 
 
 Theoretical Ethics. Aside from this central problem of 
 freedom there are numerous other disputed questions within 
 the field of ethics. It is often convenient to divide the various 
 topics which cluster about conduct into two groups, the first 
 of which would include those of a distinctly theoretical nature 
 like the one already mentioned, while the second group would 
 comprehend those problems which approach nearer to the 
 ordinary questions and perplexities of daily life. The former 
 
 *In connection with this fatalistic attitude towards the world 
 especially prominent in Oriental literature and again in Christian 
 predestination one may call to mind Fitzgerald's classic transla- 
 tion of Omar Khayyam's Rubaiyat : 
 
 " LXXII. 
 
 " And that inverted Bowl they call the Sky, 
 Whereunder crawling coop'd we live and die, 
 
 Lift not your hands to IT for help, for It 
 As impotently moves as you or I. 
 
 " LXXIII. 
 
 " With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead, 
 And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed: 
 
 And the first Morning of Creation wrote 
 What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read." 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 
 
 we may call theoretical ethics, and the latter practical 
 ethics. 
 
 Possibly one of the most perplexing questions of theoretical 
 ethics is concerned with the ultimate spring or impetus which 
 turns us towards righteousness, the moral sanction, as it is 
 called. To what final criterion do we appeal when we seek to 
 determine the good or the evil of a certain act? Upon what 
 ground does the human mind base its decisions of right and 
 wrong? The history of European philosophy has had some 
 kind of a reply to this query since the Greek Cyrenaics made 
 individual pleasure the determining factor of human conduct. 
 The followers of this general attitude have been called 
 Hedonists (from the Greek equivalent for pleasure), because 
 of their intense emphasis on the momentary pleasure of the 
 individual. Subsequent English thinkers have modified the 
 hedonistic stand-point making universal, instead of individual, 
 happiness to be the determining moral sanction. This theory 
 of universal happiness attained considerable prominence in 
 England some thirty or forty years ago under the name of 
 Utilitarianism. In contrast to these pleasure-seeking systems 
 of morality there has always existed an opposite tendency 
 which, for want of a better and less threadbare term, we may 
 call Idealism or Intuitionalism. This view gives to morality 
 an existence altogether beyond the transient determinations 
 of pleasure and pain. We follow the dictates of conscience 
 because we believe it to be right; the decisions of the moral 
 judgment may or may not agree with the momentary require- 
 ments of pleasure, but this in no wise affects our attitude 
 towards them. With some of the idealists the authority of 
 morality is a divine gift from God to man ; with others it is a 
 self -conceived feeling of altruism; and still again it has been 
 founded on a certain "moral sense" of indeterminate origin. 
 
 While the question of the ultimate sanction of the moral law 
 is of paramount importance to theoretical ethics, there are 
 others quite as vital. The old discussion between the optimists 
 
40 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and the pessimists here finds its appropriate place. According 
 to the former school, life is worth the effort of living. On the 
 contrary, the pessimists, impressed with the evil and misery 
 inherent to human life, feel that some state of death and per- 
 haps non-existence would be preferable to the desire and strug- 
 gle of humanity. It was among the ancient Hindoos, a race 
 of marked philosophical power, that the pessimistic theory 
 received its strongest support. In fact, Buddhism, the most 
 truly metaphysical of all the broad world religions, is founded 
 upon pessimism as the ground of its theory of being and of 
 human reality. In the history of thought the Occident has 
 been distinctly optimistic in its theories of ethics, while the 
 Orient has always exhibited a pessimistic tinge. 
 
 Practical Ethics. The field of practical ethics is concerned 
 with the application of the theoretical questions to the routine 
 of our ordinary life. The scope of this branch is far broader, 
 but less philosophical, than that of theoretical ethics. It has 
 for its inquiry the practical questions of the moral life. Thus 
 we might easily agree on theoretical grounds that " lying is an 
 evil/' but it is an altogether different matter when we come 
 to declare that there are no cases in which lying is right. 
 Perhaps a lie will save an honorable life, will prevent some 
 atrocious crime, or even turn the course of history. 
 
 Esthetics. Now leaving our rapid survey of ethics, we 
 come to the third and least important of the normative 
 sciences, namely ^Esthetics. This is concerned with the ought 
 of beauty; the universal laws which we must observe if we 
 wish to attain an ideal of beauty constant for all mankind at 
 all times. ^Esthetics may be considered the science of the fine 
 arts. It is in no wise concerned with the creation of an artistic 
 object; nor does it prescribe minute principles for artistic 
 criticism, many of which arise from personal taste. It tries to 
 construct a rational understanding of the meaning of beauty; 
 after which it considers the various means by which beauty 
 may be obtained, estimating each in view of its value as a uni- 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 
 
 versal element. The mere feeling of pleasure towards an ob- 
 ject of beauty is avoided and the analytic rather than the 
 appreciative stand-point is assumed. The attempt is made to 
 determine the universal principles, such as unity, symmetry, 
 harmony, and expression, which give to the object this char- 
 acter of beauty. It compares the various branches of the fine 
 arts, such as music, poetry, the graphic and plastic arts, with 
 a view to determine in what manner and to what degree each 
 is an expression of universal principles. 
 
 Other Branches of Philosophy. The three subjects, 
 Logic, Ethics, and ^Esthetics, complete the trio of the nor- 
 mative sciences. The list, however, of the various branches 
 of philosophy is by no means exhausted even with these. Just 
 as there is a permanently valuable as well as an accidental way 
 of doing anything, so also there are certain elements of every 
 subject which deserve to be regarded as universal, and therefore 
 of philosophical interest. It is the universal element of com- 
 merce to derive profit, or of biology to deal with life, and of 
 mathematics to concern itself with the pure forms of space and 
 time. And since the very essence of philosophy is to deter- 
 mine, compare, and evaluate the universal whenever and wher- 
 ever it is found, then there must be a place in philosophy for 
 universals occurring in the most diversified fields of human 
 knowledge. 
 
 In view of this demand there have arisen innumerable in- 
 quiries, each concerned with the universals peculiar to some 
 restricted portion of scientific investigation. These studies, 
 concerned with the fundamental or universal principles, are 
 generally regarded as branches of philosophy, and appear to 
 the world as such. Of the many subjects which have been 
 treated in this manner we will mention but four, the phi- 
 losophy of science, the philosophy of society, the philosophy of 
 history, and the philosophy of religion. 
 
 Philosophy of Science. Ever since the beginning of 
 modern scientific studies there has been a desire among the 
 
42 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 deeper thinkers to further investigate the terms, definitions, 
 and formulae employed in the descriptive sciences. These in- 
 quiries, restricted to universal and invarient processes, were 
 different in character from the laboratory and class-room 
 experiments which formed the outward material of the sciences 
 themselves. They attempted rather to breathe a deeper and 
 broader meaning into the common phrases of accepted teach- 
 ings. Such investigations may be regarded as comprising the 
 philosophy of science, for they form a branch of our subject 
 in so far as they deal with universals. As an example of the 
 topics which occur in this very interesting and important field 
 may be mentioned the attempts to systematize the axioms of 
 mathematics, the struggle to define some absolute physical 
 constant, the various evolutionary hypotheses, or the interpre- 
 tation of the general principle of scientific causalty. It is 
 plainly seen that such questions as these are of a far more 
 universal character than the problems which generally arise in 
 the progress of a single one of the special sciences. 
 
 Philosophy of Society. The philosophy of science was 
 concerned with the universals of the objective and generally 
 non-human side of nature. There are, however, just as inter- 
 esting, just as invariable laws which are concerned entirely 
 with the operations of man in the aggregate. When these 
 actions are carefully examined, without reference to any par- 
 ticular time or place, we have the philosophy of society, or 
 sociology. This deals with the universal elements which gov- 
 ern the changes, the progress, and decay of great social groups. 
 It concerns itself with the invariable features of civilization, 
 the laws which have been gradually evolved through a long 
 process of trial and error. Here man is considered purely as 
 a social animal, as a mere reflection of his time, his environ- 
 ment, and the condition of his fellow-men. The broad laws 
 which control the migration of large bodies of men, such as 
 scanty food supply, conquest, or the search for gold, are here 
 considered. Also the gradual development of those institu- 
 
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 
 
 tions, such as marriage or civil law, which especially mark off 
 man from the beast and the civilized community from the 
 savage tribe. 
 
 Philosophy of History. These universal laws of sociology 
 have no reference to any special race or time, but are equally 
 applicable to the Anglo-Saxon and the aboriginal Australian. 
 There are, however, certain invariant or unchangeable forces 
 which exhibit themselves with special reference to some par- 
 ticular race or stage of civilization. And it is the details of 
 these laws which constitute the history of a nation or a race. 
 The philosophy of history is therefore nothing else than a de- 
 scription, comparison, and estimation of those primal laws 
 and forces the manifestation of which is the history of man- 
 kind. The difference between sociology and history is not so 
 much a natural distinction as one of convenience. Thus the 
 great law that lack of food supply results in migration is 
 generally considered in sociology, for in its abstract nature it 
 concerns human society at large. Whereas the conditions of 
 the Eoman Empire of the first century A.D. were especially 
 conducive to the development of colonial dependencies, or that 
 the great Irish famine distinctly increased the rate of emigra- 
 tion from Ireland, are facts which would be considered under 
 the philosophy of history, because they refer to some particular 
 time and place. 
 
 Philosophy of Religion. One of the favorite themes for 
 philosophical treatment is concerned with the various forms 
 and aspects of religion. Owing to the extent and depth of 
 religious feeling the subject is of universal interest. The phi- 
 losophy of religion, like the philosophy of science or of his- 
 tory, tries to determine the universal elements prominent in 
 every form of religion, including those of savage tribes as well 
 as those of civilized nations. It thus compares what may be 
 regarded as the basal elements of a purely natural religion 
 and endeavors to discover their mental origin and principles 
 of development. By such a careful analysis of what is essen- 
 
44 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tial to religion it is possible to remove from it the feeling of 
 reverence and to regard it from a purely objective or scientific 
 stand-point, thereby treating it from the same stand-point as 
 other human institutions. Thus the philosophy of religion 
 discusses the much-controverted question as to whether religion 
 is primarily founded on feeling or reason; also what was the 
 origin of religion and in what form did it first appear. Often 
 there is a comparative study of the various interpretations of 
 God or of the many representations of an after-world. It is 
 the philosophy of religion which compares the various proofs 
 for the existence of God, or for the immortality of the human 
 soul. It exhibits, if possible, the deeper conditions of environ- 
 ment and temperament which have influenced the development 
 of the world religions, and often points to the effect of mere 
 accidental conditions upon intellectual movements of universal 
 consequence. 
 
CHAPTEK II. 
 
 THE BIRTH OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 
 
 HISTORY is generally associated with political movements 
 and national events of extreme importance. The history of 
 philosophy, however, is distinctly different, dealing with the 
 development of. conceptions rather than with the concerted 
 actions of men. By tracing the gradual alterations in the 
 philosophical theories of mankind, it exhibits the national 
 traits of mind and the deeper character of race. From the 
 apparent chaos of individual opinions, clashing one with an- 
 other, it weaves the thread of true intellectual progress. As 
 the history of the state develops by the struggles and ambitions 
 of individual men, so also the history of philosophy rests on 
 the character, opinions, and philosophical systems of a few 
 brilliant thinkers. Sometimes these men possess themselves 
 extreme originality together with breadth and depth of thought. 
 They are able to influence their contemporaries and successors 
 solely by their unusual insight. Then again there are men 
 endowed with a certain native faculty for order and system 
 which enables them to cast into connected form the opinions 
 and ideals of their own time. And there is still a third class 
 of men who are extremely narrow and one-sided in their philo- 
 sophical stand-point but yet who possess a certain persistency 
 in carrying to the extreme the logical implications of a single 
 conception. They help along the general current of thought 
 by clearly defining the old issues and by suggesting new prob- 
 lems. The history of philosophy portrays the struggles of men, 
 more or less like these types, to define a conscious attitude 
 towards man and nature. 
 
 45 
 
46 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Its General Divisions. The history of philosophy may 
 be divided conveniently into four great periods, each clearly 
 distinguished from the others by the type of problem con- 
 sidered and by the method of its treatment. These may be 
 designated as the Hindoo, the Greek, the Mediceval or Scholas- 
 tic, and the Modern periods. All such broad divisions of any 
 intellectual movement are necessarily little more than con- 
 venient artifices. The exact dates which mark off one period 
 of the history of philosophy from the others are always uncer- 
 tain. The general attitude of mind, which alone is its dis- 
 tinguishing character, is discernible only in broad abstraction. 
 The same problems, with perhaps a change in their setting, 
 appear in different ages and among different peoples. It is 
 only the comparative distinctness which national temperament 
 gives to the treatment of a few important subjects which 
 enables us to refer to general divisions in the history of phi- 
 losophy with any exactness of meaning. 
 
 In each broad period of philosophy one may discover a time 
 of birth and youth, when enthusiasm and assurance combined 
 with narrowness of view are the distinguishing characteristics. 
 Following this there is another and generally shorter period 
 when philosophy reaches its culmination, a time when a few 
 great intellects sum up and immortalize their whole epoch. 
 Succeeding this short term of maturity there is a long and 
 generally unprofitable interval of decay in which general doubt 
 or scepticism is used to refute traditional authority. And 
 finally towards the close of this period of stagnation there are 
 signs of a new philosophy soon to be born under new condi- 
 tions. 
 
 Hindoo Philosophy. Neglecting for our purpose the rude 
 but interesting philosophy of the early savages, we meet in 
 the religious writings of ancient India a system of thought 
 worthy of very high estimation. Hindoo philosophy began 
 with the Vedic hymns, a series of devotional chants addressed 
 to the personified forces and phenomena of nature. The true 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 metaphysics of the Hindoo is to be found in the Upanishads, 
 a series of commentaries on the more ancient Vedas. The 
 central theme of their philosophy is the Absolute Unity of 
 internal and external phenomena in a single subjective con- 
 sciousness. This all-inclusive and indwelling self, or Brahma, 
 represents the Soul of the Universe. All the objects of the 
 world and the human self or Ego in a higher degree are reflec- 
 tions of the great universal self. The ultimate goal of human 
 thought is to recognize this truth and perceive that there is 
 but one true Being, the Brahma, while all the objects of the 
 world of sense are unreal in themselves, if regarded apart from 
 the immanent reality of Brahma. 
 
 Aside from this pure Monism, or what may be called from a 
 religious stand-point a pantheism, the Hindoos were the authors 
 of the truly philosophical religion of Buddhism. This religion 
 took its name from a teacher born about 369 B.C., whom tradi- 
 tion portrays as a man of the highest ethical ideals. Buddha 
 taught that all our sensuous life is built upon the chimera of 
 unfulfilled desire, that existence is in itself evil, and that the 
 highest ideal of life is the recognition of this great truth of 
 universal pessimism. This will be referred to again in con- 
 nection with Schopenhauer, a modern German exponent of 
 this same attitude of mind. 
 
 Greek Philosophy. Perhaps a little later as a whole, but 
 for the most part contemporaneous with Hindoo philosophy, 
 extended the varied history of Greek thought. It began with 
 several narrow monistic theories of the world and gradually 
 broadened and deepened until the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
 when Greek philosophy reached its climax. During this period 
 of its brilliant activity Greek philosophy was distinctly human- 
 istic, emphasizing, as no other period has done, the importance 
 of ethics and the eminent position of man in nature. Socrates, 
 Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics were all ethical phi- 
 losophers of the first rank; all of them interpreted nature in 
 terms of some aspect of human life. 
 
48 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Plato, probably following his master Socrates, opposed a 
 theory of materialistic metaphysics then widely taught in 
 Greece by the first system of thorough idealism to be found 
 in strictly European thought. The only ultimate reality con- 
 sisted in the ideas, which under certain circumstances could 
 be objectively expressed as the sense-world, or subjectively 
 manifested as the inner nature of the soul. Human knowledge 
 consisted in the reflection on ideas, human goodness in the 
 organic harmony of ethical ideals. 
 
 Aristotle stands for the scientific or analytic tendency in 
 Greek thought. Instead of a monism of ideas, he found it im- 
 possible to express nature in simpler terms than the dualism 
 of form and matter. Every sense-object represented the ex- 
 pression of these two world elements; above all the objective 
 nature was the perfect embodiment of form, a sort of form- 
 ideal without matter, which serve.d as the end in view for all 
 natural processes and human activities. The influence of 
 Aristotle has been far greater than that of any other Greek 
 thinker, owing to the fact that he later became the accepted 
 authority for Christian speculation. 
 
 The salient feature of the Epicurean school was the desire 
 to better the condition of man by prescribing a system of con- 
 duct intended to lead to the most constant happiness. The 
 Stoics, on the other hand, sought to raise the moral plane of 
 man by bringing his finite will into accord with the laws of the 
 universe; they are said to have originated the well-known 
 aphorism, " Live according to nature." 
 
 Mediaeval Philosophy. After the founding of the four 
 great schools of Greek thought, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, 
 the Epicurean, and the Stoic, the interest in philosophy began 
 to decline, until finally, about the sixth or seventh century of 
 the Christian era, it may be said to have wholly disappeared. 
 It was not until the Catholic Church was well established that 
 men began again to interest themselves in the problems of 
 philosophy. The whole setting of these problems had been 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 altered, in the intervening time, by the introduction of Chris- 
 tian ideas; so that the older views were no longer tenable in 
 their pagan form, but required to be reconciled and harmonized 
 with Christianity. It was this work which fell upon the school- 
 men, and the elaborate results of this attempted reconciliation 
 is called the Scholastic or Mediceval Philosophy. Its most 
 notable feature, especially during the later periods, was the 
 systematic and exhaustive one might almost say ponderous 
 character of its systems. Scholastic philosophy stood for a 
 general and systematic treatment of the whole universe : God, 
 angels, man, and physical nature. 
 
 Controversy over General Ideas. Prominent among the 
 philosophical problems which confused the schoolmen was the 
 controversy over the reality to be ascribed to general ideas, a 
 topic which is constantly reappearing in the history of philoso- 
 phy. Eegarding this question there were two opposing answers, 
 according as stress was laid on universal or particular terms 
 in connection with the interpretation of Christian dogmas. 
 Much confusion arose in the early Church as to the proper inter- 
 pretation of the relation between man and God. If we should 
 regard God as the only reality, then all the dignity of man, the 
 authority of the Church over the individual, and even the 
 meaning of sin, would be lost; then the absolute reality of 
 God would include the finite life of man. On the contrary, 
 should the Church give to man a reality outside of God's exist- 
 ence, then the Divine Power would fall short of being omnipo- 
 tent and absolute. Between this Scylla and Charybdis the 
 Church endeavored to steer its course. It wished to make the 
 individual man responsible for his own actions at the same 
 time that it included human frailty within God's omnipotence. 
 With this contradictory problem the Christian Church is still 
 struggling, and even in our own time meets with less success 
 in its solution than in the days of Augustine and Pelagius. 
 
 EEALISM. On the whole the authentic doctrine of the 
 medieval Church gradually acquired the form of Realism, 
 
 4 
 
50 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 obtained chiefly through the study of the Arabic interpretations 
 of Aristotle. This view of the world gave to the general or 
 universal ideas an absolute reality independent of varying 
 forms or modes. That is, the general idea of a man, of a 
 horse, or of a dog, was absolutely real in itself, whereas the par- 
 ticular man, Thomas or William, the particular horse, and 
 the particular dog had no reality except as specific expressions 
 of the general concept. In brief, the abstract general ideas 
 alone possessed reality. 1 The factors which determined the 
 doctrines of the Church in this regard were very various. 
 Realism gave to the Church, as a human institution, a per- 
 fectly definite reality apart from the churches, orders, and indi- 
 viduals which composed it; thereby increasing its temporal 
 authority, power, and dignity. Then, too, Christ, as the Son 
 of God, could mediate between man and God only on the hy- 
 pothesis that He personified at once the frailty of universal man 
 and the spirit of God. And still again, from another point of 
 view, the dogma of original sin retained its force only on the 
 supposition that the fall of Adam affected all generations of 
 mankind through their reality in the general idea of man. 
 
 NOMINALISM. The orthodox Realism of the mediaeval 
 Church was opposed by two brilliant thinkers, Roscellinus, a 
 native of Brittany who flourished in the eleventh century, and 
 William of Occam, an Englishman of the fourteenth century. 
 These men advocated a theory of metaphysics, appearing under 
 the name of Nominalism, which, as well as Realism, took its 
 rise from the study of Aristotle. It regarded the general ideas 
 as names only, possessed of absolutely no external reality. The 
 Realism of the Church, as we have just seen, declared that the 
 abstract idea, or thing in general, was alone real and that the 
 individual object was unreal; while Nominalism, on the other 
 hand, gave to the separate individual elements of the world a 
 positive existence and a definite reality. It regarded the gen- 
 
 1 Universalia sunt realia. 
 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 eral idea, which expressed the common qualities of these indi- 
 viduals, as merely a convenience of speech or name. 2 
 
 CONCEPTUALISM. Throughout most of the early period of 
 Scholasticism a war of words was kept up between these con- 
 flicting schools. An attempt at reconciliation, however, was 
 made by an original thinker named Pierre Abelard, a native of 
 France, who lived from 1079 to 1142. Abelard opposed the 
 extremes of both Eealism and Nominalism, by advocating a 
 theory known in the history of philosophy as C 'onceptualism . 
 He interpreted the general idea, not as absolutely real, as did 
 the Eealists, nor as altogether unreal, as did the Nominalists, 
 but as real in the mind. This is the most .plausible view from 
 the stand-point of " common sense/' The classic expressions 
 of conceptualism regard the universal idea of a horse as real 
 in both the mind of God and in the mind of man, for it is by 
 such general ideas that the thinking process is able to operate. 
 Conceptualism by no means contends that man in general has 
 some kind of reality out there in the world beyond, but only 
 that the mind is capable of understanding and employing such 
 expressions. As such the general ideas are concepts, real only 
 in processes of thought. 
 
 It has been a favorite procedure on the part of modern 
 writers to show contempt and endeavor to cast ridicule upon 
 the methods of the mediseval schoolmen. They forget for the 
 moment the incalculable debt which modern philosophy owes 
 to the subtle and acute analyses of their respective genius. 
 They conscientiously nourished and kept alive the glimmer of 
 intellectual light which the Arabians passed on to them from 
 the dying embers of the ancient world. They tempered the 
 dogmatism of the Church and gave to the Christian religion 
 the firmest philosophical basis which it has ever had. Notwith- 
 standing the futility of many of their discussions, their over- 
 emphasis on an uncritical deductive method, and general con- 
 
 2 Universalia sunt nomina. 
 
52 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tempt for scientific induction, they deserve far more credit for 
 what they have done than is generally admitted among writers 
 desirous of showing their own superiority. 
 
 THE EENAISSANCE. 
 
 Leaving now the long period of mediaeval philosophy, we 
 approach the opening of modern thought. No exact dates can 
 be fixed to distinguish the two periods, and no distinct lines 
 can be drawn even among the thinkers themselves. The years 
 from about 1400 to 1600 are often regarded as the time when 
 the barren and futile investigations of the Middle Ages were 
 being transformed into the life and activity of the modern 
 world. It is distinctly a period of transition and of change. 
 The traditional institutions and the old ways of living were 
 undergoing complete alteration. Fire-arms superseded the 
 ancient implements of war ; the mediaeval castle was abandoned 
 for the fort, the knight and esquire gave way to the hireling 
 soldier. With these changes there followed a new social life 
 acting and reacting on the industrial, political, and intellectual 
 temper of the age. 
 
 Tendencies of the Renaissance. These changes in the 
 outside world could not but affect the trend of philosophy. The 
 old orthodox Church formulae were given new meanings and a 
 freer interpretation. The spirit of a strict ethical code was 
 avoided, and churchmen and laymen alike recognized few prin- 
 ciples of morality in their private life. It was an age when 
 the individual man was asserting himself with the extreme 
 enthusiasm of his newly- discovered importance. This asser- 
 tion of the individual may be recognized as having three lines 
 of development, the intellectual, the political, and the artistic. 
 The first is characterized by a new philosophy, a new religion, 
 and a new science. In the political field the individual man 
 asserted himself all over Western Europe, especially in the 
 new social and industrial conditions, as opposed to the mediae- 
 
THE RENAISSANCE. 53 
 
 val empire ; while in the fine arts this period gave to the future 
 reformed principles and new ideals. 
 
 Intellectual Awakening. It is the intellectual awakening 
 that alone interests us, and it is its three branches philosophy, 
 religion, and science,, each taking root in a different country 
 that may be associated with the true birth of modern philoso- 
 phy. We may regard the nature philosophers of Italy, men of 
 extreme brilliancy of mind, as the precursors of our modern 
 technical philosophy. They stated the vital and pressing ques- 
 tions of metaphysics in terms of nature rather than of God, from 
 the stand-point of philosophy rather than from that of religion. 
 In consequence of their rashness many of them were prosecuted 
 by the Church, but their work remains and their influence may 
 be traced throughout modern thought. The philosophical side 
 of the intellectual awakening developed in Italy, whereas the 
 religious Renaissance was restricted to the more northern 
 countries. During this period Protestantism first presented 
 itself as a factor in the religious life of Europe. The religious 
 reformation passed readily into extreme forms, of which Ger- 
 man mysticism is perhaps the most interesting from our stand- 
 point. And, finally, the scientific side of the intellectual un- 
 folding of this period seems to have been concentrated in 
 England, where an interest in the empirical study of nature has 
 been apparent from early times. Even certain of her school- 
 men, notably Duns Scotus, Occam, and Roger Bacon, were far 
 ahead of their contemporaries in their regard for natural 
 science. 
 
 National Characteristics. The distinct traits of character 
 peculiar to each of the three racial types Italian, German, and 
 English are well exhibited by the three attitudes of mind 
 above referred to, the speculative, the religious, and the em- 
 pirical. The Italian, brilliant, quick, and imaginative, easily 
 reaches the heights of metaphysics ; but the shallowness of his 
 mind and his lack of perseverance failed to withstand the decay 
 of an uncritical scepticism. The German, on the contrary, 
 
54 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fails perhaps to possess the brilliant imagination of the Latin, 
 but is more than compensated for this defect by his greater 
 depth and constancy. German mysticism soon disappeared, 
 but its departure only awakened a new interest in philosophy, 
 instead of quenching it altogether. The Anglo-Saxon, with 
 whom modern science first found protection, combines the 
 quickness of the South with the cool, calculating perseverance 
 of the North, and adds still a third element peculiar to his own 
 t} r pe of mind. This is the fondness for the simple, the natural, 
 and the near at hand. He despises all imaginative theories and 
 elaborate hypotheses in philosophy as well as in science. He 
 defines reality by what is close to his own consciousness ; never 
 by the complex, if the simple will answer. The English phi- 
 losophers are empirical in their epistemology, and exhibit far 
 greater success in their psychology than in their metaphysics. 
 They approach the field of philosophy with the acuteness of the 
 scientist and the exactness of the mathematician. 
 
 We may regard the history of modern philosophy as first 
 beginning to formulate itself in connection with the tendency 
 to regard God and Nature as One. The earliest name to be 
 associated with this movement is that of 
 
 NICOLAS CHRYPPS OP CUSA. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 He was born in 1401, at Cues, or Cusa, a small place on 
 the Moselle. After having studied philosophy, mathematics, 
 and law at the University of Padua, he abandoned the latter 
 profession and devoted himself to theology. He attained 
 marked distinction in the Church and travelled extensively on 
 various missions connected with his work. It is interesting to 
 note that Nicolas defined unconsciously tendencies of thought 
 which, when more fully developed in the following century, 
 stood in marked contrast to the established teachings of his 
 Church. 
 
NICOLAS CHRYPPS OF CUSA. 55 
 
 Philosophy. The base of the philosophy of Nicolas is his 
 conception of the nature of God. Instead of deducing God 
 from Aristotle and the Bible, he endeavored to construct a 
 rational conception of the Deity which should accord with the 
 wealth and variety of the world about him. Constantly 
 throughout nature Nicolas recognizes the partial and incom- 
 plete union of opposite elements. God was to him the perfect 
 and absolute harmony of all conflicting terms. God was so 
 Infinite as to include or transcend both the finite and the 
 infinite, the one and the many, mind and matter, identity and 
 plurality. 
 
 Owing to the immeasurable chasm which separates the com- 
 plete infinity of God from the potential and only partial in- 
 finity of man, human knowledge is unable to comprehend the 
 Divine nature. The faintest glimmer of this perfect knowledge 
 is attained only from the irrational suggestions of intuition. 
 This intuition of the Being of God, or " learned ignorance," 3 
 is the highest condition of mind. Just below the intuitional 
 knowledge of God, but separated from it by an incalculable 
 difference, are the partial truths derived from the activity of 
 the intellect 4 in its struggles with subtle metaphysical ques- 
 tions. Below the intellect Nicolas places the analytic reason 5 
 which harmonizes the facts of experience. While lowest of all 
 is the sensuous knowledge obtained from the particular ex- 
 periences of the external world. This fourfold classification of 
 human knowledge is strongly suggestive of a similar division 
 to be found considerably later in the philosophical systems of 
 Spinoza and Immanuel Kant. 
 
 Following Nicolas came a long series of Eenaissance names : 
 Paracelsus, a rather eccentric character who tried to unite 
 philosophy with medicine; Pomponatius, who remodelled the 
 old Aristotle after the Eenaissance view of nature; Taurellus, 
 who tries to define the relation between philosophy and theol- 
 ogy, speculation and church dogma; Telesius, who founded 
 
 8 Docta ignorantia. * Intellectus. 5 Ratio. 
 
56 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a fraternity for the avowed purpose of opposing Aristotle; 
 and much later Campanella, who anticipated the Frenchman, 
 Descartes, by resting the certainty of philosophy on the exist- 
 ence of the self, and the English empiricists by his emphasis 
 on the importance of a theory of knowledge. 
 
 THE ADVANCES IN PHYSICS. 
 
 In connection with this period it may be well to consider for 
 a moment the scientific influences which helped to mould the 
 speculative philosophy. In 1543 Copernicus had published his 
 monumental work on astronomy, which defined for the first 
 time our modern conception of the heliocentric nature of the 
 universe. Following the lead of Aristotle and the Bible, the 
 Arabic and Scholastic philosophers had accepted unreservedly 
 the older conception of the heavens in which the earth was the 
 centre, while the stars, the sun, and other planets revolved 
 about it in circular orbits. This was strictly in accordance 
 with divine revelation. It regarded the earth as the centre of 
 the solar system, and man, in the divine likeness of God, the 
 spiritual and metaphysical centre of the universe. When, how- 
 ever, a system of physics should arise which dared to oppose 
 the convictions of twenty centuries, it is not surprising that the 
 whole Church should have been stirred to its foundations and 
 should have made use of all the instruments within its power 
 to wipe out the heresy. It perceived that the dignity of man 
 was shaken, that a dogma of faith had been opposed by the 
 observations of nature. The Copernicans asserted that the 
 earth was only one of many worlds, and the Church inferred 
 from this that it could be regarded no longer as the work of 
 God created solely for the purpose of serving man. 
 
 Together with the growing influence of the heliocentric as- 
 tronomy, the atomism of the Greeks began to reappear. The 
 apparent success with which it explained the physical world in 
 terms of moving particles of matter led the Church to regard 
 it as an attempt to dispense with the spiritual guidance of 
 
GIORDANO BRUNO. 57 
 
 God, or at least to minimize His immediate control. In con- 
 nection with these physical theories may be mentioned Kepler, 
 whose three laws of planetary motion anticipate Newton's 
 theory of attraction, and who rests universal mechanism on 
 universal harmony. In this connection one must not forget 
 the physicist Galileo, and at a little later time the atomist 
 Gassendi. 
 
 The deepest of the Italian nature-philosophers, one who com- 
 bines the speculative interests of Nicolas and the older scholas- 
 tics with a keen appreciation of the value of scientific in- 
 quiry, is 
 
 GIORDANO BRUNO. 
 LIFE. 
 
 He early entered the Dominician order of monks, but, 
 influenced by Nicolas, he exhibited too much freedom in his 
 teachings to harmonize well with his monastic surroundings. 
 Owing to certain heretical opinions concerning the dogma of 
 the Trinity, Bruno was considered dangerous by the authorities. 
 He emigrated across the Alps to Geneva on hearing that his 
 conduct had met with the disapproval of the Church. During 
 these years of unrest it has been reported that he taught a 
 children's school, and it is well known that some years later he 
 delivered lectures at the University of Toulouse. He visited 
 Oxford, where his new ideas were regarded with disfavor by the 
 British scholars. On leaving England he travelled through the 
 length and breadth of Europe, lecturing at the various univer- 
 sities. He produced during this period of wandering numerous 
 works on almost every known subject, philosophy, theology, 
 logic, astronomy, and other natural sciences. While at Frank- 
 fort he accepted an invitation to visit Venice and instruct a 
 young nobleman in logic. Suspicions having arisen in regard 
 to his orthodoxy, he was delivered by his pupil to the Inquisi- 
 tion, and later transferred to Eome, where he was confined for 
 seven years in a papal prison. At his trial Bruno bore himself 
 
58 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with fortitude. He rejected a proposal of reconciliation offered 
 him by the Pope, and repeatedly declared that there was 
 nothing in his opinions or works which was opposed to the 
 deeper meaning of a truth-seeking Christianity. On February 
 9, 1600, Bruno was convicted of heresy, and burned at the stake 
 on the 17th of the same month. To his sentence he replied, 
 " Ye who judge me have more to fear that I who am judged;" 
 and nearly three centuries after his death Italy raised a monu- 
 ment to commemorate the greatest of her philosophers. The 
 life of Bruno was an expression not only of his own philosophy, 
 but likewise of the whole Renaissance. Intense, feverish at the 
 restraint of authority, he felt only dimly the fundamental 
 nature of his mental struggles. While keenly appreciating the 
 interest in natural science which sprung up around the labors 
 of Leonardo da Vinci and Copernicus, he was yet unable to 
 understand the difference in stand-point between the old 
 Church and the new science. Seeking to the end the harmony 
 of all truth which came to his intensive nature from every side, 
 he nevertheless neglected to harmonize his successive points of 
 view. 
 
 Pantheism. The concept of a Divinity, in and through 
 nature, was suggested by Nicolas and approached by many of 
 the thinkers of the time, but attains its deepest significance in 
 the thought of Bruno. God may be briefly summarized as the 
 soul of the universe. Deprived of the Christian attributes and 
 terms, He closely resembles the Brahma of the Hindoos. This 
 same conception of a pantheistic world we shall presently meet 
 in a more abstract form among the German mystics and after- 
 wards in the profound metaphysics of Spinoza. The difference 
 between pantheism and mysticism lies in an attitude of mind, 
 a method of approach to ultimate truth, rather than in any 
 definite conception. Both recognize a monistic unity of the 
 world, but pantheism struggles to appreciate this in terms of 
 the reason, whereas mysticism arises from a faith in the divine 
 intuition of its truth. But without regard to this distinction 
 
GIORDANO BRUNO. 59 
 
 of method, the conception of Bruno's Nature-Deity was richer 
 than any form of pantheism which had yet appeared. God is 
 the absolute and complete unity of the world ; the source of 
 all things which includes within itself all phases, antitheses, 
 and contradictions to be found in heaven or on earth. In Him 
 are united freedom and necessity, for He is determined only 
 by His omniscience. God not only created the universe, but He 
 is the Universe. He not only dictates the eternal laws of the 
 world, but is those very laws themselves through their manifes- 
 tation in natural phenomena. God is generative nature, in- 
 finite in time and space ; and at the same time the unity of the 
 finite, generated forms. He is the efficient and ideal cause for 
 the harmonious evolution of the universe towards an ultimate 
 realization of truth, goodness, and beauty. 7 From Him ema- 
 nate, and to Him return, all the processes of nature. The plant 
 produces the man, the man dies, and from his dust again arises 
 the plant ; and running through all these changes is the eternal 
 law of evolution, the true expression of God's will. 
 
 This doctrine of the immanent being of God in nature was 
 regarded as atheism by the Church, chiefly because of the 
 narrow interpretation given to Bruno's philosophy. The dis- 
 tinction lies entirely in regard to the stress of emphasis. The 
 Church gave to God an existence outside of nature, the latter 
 being an expression of God's creative act. Bruno, on the 
 contrary, made God the creator and Nature the created one and 
 the same. With Bruno the universe is the never-ceasing ex- 
 pression of God, the eternal act of creation. 
 
 Physics. Bruno was too much under the influence of the 
 
 6 " Deus ergo est substantia universalis in essendo, . . . Summa Ter- 
 minorum Metaphysicorum ; De Deo sev Mente, I." Collected Latin 
 Works, vol. i., Part 4. (The work is a very concise and clear account 
 of Bruno's philosophy, especially in its relation to Scholasticism. The 
 metaphysical rather than the mystical element is here prominent.) 
 
 7 " Deus est amor, emciens, claritas, lux." De Triplici Minimo et 
 Mensura, Book I., Chapter i. 
 
60 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 prevalent enthusiasm for mathematics and the new stimulus 
 given to science by the Copernican astronomy to rest satisfied 
 with a purely pantheistic explanation of the world. He sought 
 rather to explain how from a scientific as well as a pantheistic 
 stand-point he might exhibit the underlying unity of the world. 
 Not that the truth of this unity can appear in two different 
 forms, the purposive and the mechanical, but only that 
 there can be two ways of interpreting it. 
 
 He regarded every object of phenomena of the physical world 
 as a little reality in itself, uniting two opposite elements in a 
 manner which approximates, but cannot attain, the absolute 
 unity of nature. These two elements may be variously defined 
 as mind and matter, form and substance, purpose and inertia, 
 activity and passivity. Each object is thus the expression of 
 the two great world elements, the conceptions of which can find 
 their complete harmony only in God. From its position in 
 each atom Bruno thus raises mere "matter" above the place 
 assigned to it by scholastic metaphysics. Its existence is a 
 divine necessity 8 permeating every form of life, a ground- 
 work for the manifestation of mind. Every object or atom, 
 owing to this harmony of opposites, is the arena for the conflict 
 of two motives or forces, the one expansive, the other contrac- 
 tile. The former leads upward and outward towards God, 
 while the contractile force tends towards the stagnation and 
 death of the object. Through the uninterrupted action of 
 these two forces upon the component elements of mind and 
 matter, every atom in nature is constantly changing its relative 
 position. Those combinations which exhibit a lack of the pur- 
 posive or mental element quickly fade, whereas those others 
 remain which are more the expression of law than of accident. 
 Accordingly there arises in the universe a perfectly graded 
 scale of beings, in which the lower members approximate a con- 
 tracted and inert state of existence, while those of higher dig- 
 
 8 Cosa divina. 
 
GIORDANO BRUNO. 61 
 
 nity approach the fulness of the Nature-God. Here is a new 
 expression of ancient atomism and an early statement of the 
 system of evolving monads destined to occupy a prominent 
 position in the later philosophy of Leibnitz. 
 
 Ethics. The relative importance of man in Bruno's phi- 
 losophy is distinctly in accord with the evolutionary hypothesis 
 of the modern world. Although he recognizes that everything 
 represents a unity of mind and matter, he believes that man is 
 the highest fulfilment of this harmony. Human knowledge, 
 deep and wonderful as it may appear, can never attain a com- 
 plete understanding of God, in this Bruno follows the 
 " learned ignorance" of Mcolas, but yet man is endowed with 
 the dignity of expressing the will of God through moral action. 
 In his valuation of human ideals Bruno places the pursuit and 
 attainment of truth as the highest. He extols the virtues of 
 the heart, as hope, sympathy, and love; he emphasizes the 
 feelings and the emotions, since they represent the mental and 
 moral harmony of opposites. The necessary conflict of oppo- 
 sition leads upward and outward to an ultimate supremacy of 
 the good over the evil, the exalted over the degraded, the reason 
 over the passion. Everything is good because it expresses in 
 its own unique way the harmonious will of God; all things 
 are perfect because each expresses an individuality of its 
 own. 
 
 Position of Bruno. The execution of Bruno marks the de- 
 cline of Italian philosophy ; it sprung suddenly into being only 
 to fade with the same quickness and mystery that surrounded 
 the brilliancy of its appearance. Bruno summed up in an 
 immortal form the prevalent ideas of his time. His mind had 
 all the quickness, intensity, and passionate struggle for an 
 ideal which characterizes the Latins. His system, however, 
 lacked clearness of detail and cogency of parts, although the 
 broad outline of his metaphysics well represented many feat- 
 ures of later modern philosophy. In his writings are elements 
 which are found in every later school, suggestions which are 
 
62 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 amplified into systems by such minds as those of Spinoza, Leib- 
 nitz, and even Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. 
 
 The philosophical movement of Italy was only one of the 
 three ways in which the intellectual awakening of the Benais- 
 sance reacted on the thought of Europe. The Reformation 
 introduced a new life into the strictly religious sentiment of 
 the age. Although Protestantism was interpreted strictly as 
 a religion of faith, and the leading spirit of its early history, 
 Martin Luther., showed a distinct abhorrence for philosophical 
 problems, yet in Philip Melanchthon philosophy found a true 
 student. Educated in the German universities, he developed 
 a preference for the philosophy of Aristotle, the teachings of 
 whom he struggles to accommodate to Protestantism. The 
 moral principle of Aristotle was interpreted as God's will, while 
 virtue was simply a knowledge of the Divine Law. 
 
 MYSTICISM. 
 
 General Character. By far the most interesting of the 
 movements directly connected with the new religious enthusi- 
 asm was the development of what has been called Mysticism. 
 In our previous discussions, notably in the case of Nicolas of 
 Cusa, we have approached very near to this type of philosophi- 
 cal religion. Among the Hindoos we find the first expression 
 of its doctrine, only to reappear again in the later forms of 
 Christian Platonism. The central theme of the mystic creed, 
 in whatever forms it has appeared, is the simple belief in a 
 spiritual Essence of the Universe, or God, unknowable to human 
 reason, but yet suggested by the higher forms of intuition. 
 Various terms and circumlocutions are employed to testify to 
 the inexpressibleness of the mystic One. Sometimes He is 
 called the Unknowable, owing to the finite limits of human 
 knowledge; again He is identified with all knowledge, because 
 of His immanent existence in all the objects of human thought 
 and feeling. So far as may be judged every form of mysticism 
 recognizes God, or this undifferentiated essence of the world, 
 
GIORDANO BRUNO. 63 
 
 to be the creator of all things. The universe, as we knew it, 
 is merely an outpouring or effusion, which comes forth from 
 the limitless personality of the Divine Being. His nature is 
 infinite, it includes and transcends all truth, all goodness, and 
 all beauty. He is pure thought, pure mind, or pure reason, of 
 which the human forms are but meagre expressions. He is 
 superior to law because He is law; higher than will because 
 He is will. Towards this highest power of the universe the 
 human soul yearns with inexpressible feelings and emotions. 
 And it is by these intuitions alone that man is able to recognize 
 the existence and supreme reality of the Mystic Absolute. 
 
 Christian Mystics. The Christian Mystics differ but little, 
 in the deeper meaning of their thought and life, from the 
 Hindoo, Greek, or Arabic Mystics. The undifferentiated unity 
 of the Absolute is the same to the Mystic whether it is called 
 Brahma, Allah, or God. Although this doctrine, so peculiar and 
 yet so universal in its nature, could not be easily amalgamated 
 with the outward forms of Christianity, it often appeared even 
 within the Catholic Church itself. The early Father Origen 
 leaned perceptibly towards mysticism, possibly owing to the 
 fact that his master Saccas and his fellow-pupil Plotinus are 
 generally recognized as the founders of the mysticism of an- 
 tiquity. Later Thomas a Eempis, in his " Imitation of Christ," 
 gave to the world an immortal statement of mysticism shrouded 
 in the words of the subjective conflict of good and evil. 
 
 The mystics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries sought 
 to replace the complex externality of the Church by a simple 
 personal faith, very much akin to Protestantism. Prominent 
 among these was Meister Eckliart, who was born about the mid- 
 dle of the thirteenth century, at a time when the power and 
 influence of the Church was at its height. As a Dominican 
 monk he preached at Cologne and taught in the University of 
 Paris. Finally the Church ordered an inquiry concerning his 
 orthodoxy, during the process of which he died, probably about 
 1330. In his teachings Eckhart approached very near to Pan- 
 
64 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 theism. Keality, existence, life, even knowledge, are to him 
 but mere expressions of a single Unit. From this unitary 
 being of God emanate all the forms of the world and all the 
 thoughts of men. The soul or permanent substance, which lies 
 at the basis of every form of mind and matter, is a reflection 
 from God. The human soul in its fundamental nature is iden- 
 tical with the world soul of God ; from Him the immortal part 
 of man springs and to Him it returns. Such teachings were 
 by no means -uncommon among the Mystics, but they appear 
 in strange contrast to the formal Catholicism of the times. 
 Eckhart's teachings were widely spread in Germany, especially 
 by John Tauler, whose name is generally associated with his 
 own. 
 
 JACOB BOEHMB. 
 LIFE. 
 
 Christian mysticism of a later period found a sympathetic 
 disciple in Jacob Boehme. Born in 1575, he was apprenticed 
 at an early age to a shoemaker, and received but the meagre 
 education of a small village school. He worked steadily at his 
 craft in the little German town of Gorlitz, and produced at 
 the same time a number of works which have exerted a marked 
 influence on subsequent German thought. The first of these 
 was the "Aurora'' which purported to be the record of a 
 divine revelation from God to man. 
 
 Theology. Boehme combined in his nature a strong re- 
 ligious feeling with a firm belief in the power of personal 
 inspiration. Unlike the classic forms of pantheism, Boehme's 
 philosophy found a place for evil in the world without detract- 
 ing from the goodness of God. The Divine Spirit was all, 
 creator and created, self-knowledge and knowledge of the 
 world. This perfect unity, however, could not be the com- 
 pletely good unless it contained the opposing elements of which 
 perfect unity and harmony is necessarily formed, and among 
 these evil must find its place. Instead of detracting from the 
 
JACOB BOEHME. 65 
 
 goodness of God the presence of evil really adds to His glory, 
 it being one of the forms through which the Divine Spirit 
 expresses the dualism and conflict involved in the process of 
 creation. 
 
 Cosmology. The process of creation is the successive mani- 
 festation of certain activities arising directly from God. Every 
 activity involves a duality, and this duality in turn is com- 
 pletely harmonized in the Divine Nature. Here unite fire and 
 water, heat and cold, good and evil, opposite and contradictory 
 elements of every character. Creation is the eternal expression 
 of the unity of God through the assertion and absorption of 
 duality. All nature is endowed with life and value, all laws of 
 nature are the will activities of the Spirit. The physical evo- 
 lution of the universe takes place according to certain primary 
 activities, seven in number. Each is given a metaphorical 
 interpretation by the religious enthusiasm of Boehme, on the 
 one hand as a physical force, and on the other as a psycho- 
 logical or moral principle. The elementary principles of crea- 
 tion are represented by two forces; the one expansive, giving 
 rise to physical fluidity and moral sweetness ; the other a con- 
 tractive force, expressing itself as solidity and acute pain. 
 These two forces unite in a third, the principle of sensuality, 
 desire, and anxiety. It is the union of the two elementary 
 forces in the desires of sense which is expressed by the Mosaic 
 account of the fall of man. The other activities which Boehme 
 discovers in the world process are, in general, fire, love, sound, 
 and matter. As a whole, despite his metaphorical illustrations, 
 the mysticism of Boehme represents the first strictly German 
 speculation. It is a religious appreciation of the initial prin- 
 ciple of all evolutionary theory, a unity manifesting itself in 
 successive oppositions. 
 
 The philosophical spirit of the Eenaissance showed itself in 
 England not as Italian pantheism nor as German mysticism, 
 but rather as a new interest in the empirical method of science. 
 
 5 
 
66 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The English mind long held a covert longing to substitute a 
 philosophy of experience for the traditional formalism of the 
 Church. Feelings of repugnance towards Aristotelian and 
 scholastic logic, its methods and its results, were gradually 
 attaining in England, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
 centuries, the magnitude of a national character of mind. In- 
 stead of the sudden appearance and disappearance of the 
 Italian reformers, sharply defined against a background of 
 mediaevalism, the English nation was assuming the garb of a 
 whole race of reformers. For from the dominant influence of 
 a decaying church the clear-headed Anglo-Saxon was rising step 
 by step above the intellectual plane of his ancestors. His 
 fondness for the reality of his senses combined with the ac- 
 quired distrust of scholastic dialectic, produced a new attitude 
 towards the world, capable only of contributing to a true ad- 
 vance in natural science. The progress of British philosophy 
 has been slow and steady, seldom evincing remarkable bril- 
 liancy, but never exhibiting signs of decay. 
 
 FRANCIS BACON. 
 LIFE. 
 
 This empirical attitude of mind, peculiar to the Eng- 
 lish Eenaissance, finds in Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam 
 and Viscount St. Albans, its fullest individual expression. He 
 was born at London in 1561, a son of Mcolas Bacon, keeper 
 of the great seal under Queen Elizabeth. He early entered 
 the University of Cambridge, where he acquired the charac- 
 teristic dislike for scholastic traditions, especially in the field 
 of the sciences. Leaving his studies, he travelled in France 
 in order to become somewhat acquainted with men, and his 
 Essays testify to the success with which he learned this lesson. 
 He was left to his own resources by the early death of his 
 father, and turned towards politics and the law as the quickest 
 and easiest means of attaining prominence. In this he was 
 not disappointed, for he steadily rose in public office, especially 
 
FRANCIS BACON. 67 
 
 after the accession of James I., until in 1618 he became Lord 
 Chancellor and was a little later vested with the titles of Baron 
 of Verulam and Viscount St. Albans. While at the height of 
 his glory he was charged with bribery, fined, and sentenced to 
 imprisonment. The King, however, never permitted the full 
 execution of the penalties. The closing years of his life were 
 occupied by literary labors and scientific studies. In 1626 he 
 died, " loved and admired," it is said, by all who knew him. 
 
 THE GREAT BEGENERATION. 
 
 Bacon's place in the history of thought is secured for him 
 by an extensive project of which only a fragment reached com- 
 pletion. This undertaking was no less than the attempt to 
 sum up the then present stage of human knowledge, point out 
 the defects which would hinder its future progress, and finally 
 to mark out in broad outlines the method and direction of 
 future science. This remarkable attempt to evaluate the human 
 reason has been called the " Instauratio Magna" or great regen- 
 eration, having as its expressed purpose the " restoration of 
 the sciences." Bacon's original plan is recognized to have been 
 arranged according to six separate divisions, of which only the 
 first two approached anywhere near their complete and per- 
 manent form. The first part of the "Instauratio Magna' 
 began with a survey of the present condition of science. Ba- 
 con's final views on this topic were published in 1623 as " De 
 Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum" the same being an en- 
 largement of the "Advancement of Learning" which had made 
 its appearance seventeen years earlier. The second part of the 
 great plan was occupied with the proper method of scientific 
 inquiry. It treated of the " Novum Organum" or inductive 
 method, in contradistinction to the old method of Aristotelian 
 logic. In the third part Bacon wished to treat of the data of 
 science ; while the fourth was intended to exemplify the results 
 to be attained by the use of his inductive method. The fifth 
 and sixth parts treated respectively of Bacon's expectations in 
 
68 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his new philosophy and the part which future generations shall 
 contribute towards the application of his method to the world 
 of scientific experience. 
 
 Imperfections of Knowledge. In Bacon's treatment of 
 science he directs attention to the three requisites necessary to 
 the successful investigator of nature, namely, a starting-point 
 in experience, a sure method, and a gradual rather than a rapid 
 progress. In the pursuit of knowledge man is hindered by 
 four phantoms or groups of "idols," which lead the human 
 intellect into false paths. The first of these Bacon called idols 
 of the tribe, 9 of which he enumerated seven. They represent 
 the misguiding characters which are common to every human 
 mind because of its organic structure. They are inherent in 
 the nature of man and corrupt the understanding by their uni- 
 versality. For instance, we all make the facts fit some favorite 
 theory; and passions influence all our judgments. Another 
 class are the idols of the den 10 which arise from the peculiar 
 nature of each individual; these are traceable to habit, educa- 
 tion, or accident. Some people, for example, are prone to 
 observe differences, while others lay stress upon resemblances. 
 A third class are the idols of the market-place " which arise 
 from the deficiencies and ambiguity of our language; words 
 of a fanciful or fictitious origin and meaning. And, finally, 
 there are the idols of the theatre 12 which recount the errors of 
 past systems of philosophy, errors which are caused either by 
 too narrow a basis, too little experiment, or too much assurance 
 in tradition. The development of knowledge is like a theatre 
 in which customs, opinions, and systems of philosophy appear 
 and disappear like the scenes of a drama. 
 
 Division of Sciences. This purely negative treatment of 
 knowledge served only as an introduction to his positive teach- 
 
 ^ 8 Idola tribus. Novum Organum, Book I., Section 41. 
 
 10 Idola specus. Ibid., Section 42. 
 
 11 Idola fori. Ibid., Section 43. 
 "Idola theatri. Ibid., Section 44.' 
 
FRANCIS BACON. 69 
 
 ings. Bacon's philosophy, if such a term may be used to cover 
 its breadth, was more an attempt to define a general classifica- 
 tion and arrangement of all possible branches of human in- 
 quiry than to develop any systematic theory of reality. The 
 only unity that pervades the almost measureless extent of the 
 " Instauratio Magna" is its general empirical stand-point. 
 The criterion which Bacon employs to differentiate the sciences 
 depends more often on empirical and frequently accidental 
 data derived from psychological evidence, than on the meaning 
 of the sciences themselves. In this respect he defines in its 
 classic form the assurance which the English mind has always 
 felt in the simple facts of experience and the sufficiency of 
 psychological explanations. 
 
 The general classification of all knowledge depends on a 
 threefold division of the faculties of the mind ; history relates 
 to the memory, poetry to the imagination, and philosophy to the 
 reason. It is history which simply reviews the images or im- 
 pressions received from sense, " which is, as it were, the port or 
 entrance to the understanding/' 13 Civil history records the 
 works and acts of mankind ; natural history describes the gen- 
 erative processes of nature and the use of material objects. 
 Poetry comes from a fanciful rearrangement of sense-impres- 
 sions without reference to true individuals. Philosophy, which 
 alone arises from the reason, is concerned with knowledge of 
 God, of Nature, and of Man. Theology, however, has taken to 
 itself the problems which refer to God and the human soul, 
 thus leaving to philosophy in its stricter sense the investigation 
 of the laws of nature, the activities and interests of man. 
 
 It is in the field of the natural sciences that the reason has , 
 perhaps its firmest hold. Here the inductive method, upon 
 which Bacon laid so much emphasis, finds an almost unlimited 
 opportunity for the exercise of its authority. It is this em- 
 phasis on the importance of the inductive approach to science 
 
 " De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Book II., Chapter i. 
 
70 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that gives to Bacon the prominence which he deserves in modern 
 thought. The authority of experience and the method of induc- 
 tion defines the position of Bacon, and it is through the con- 
 fidence in these two factors that the natural science of modern 
 times has been able to fulfil the predictions of its founder. 
 
 Position of Bacon. One looks in vain for a complete and 
 clearly articulated system of metaphysics in the works of Bacon. 
 His analytical and psychological account of the divisions of 
 knowledge belongs more to the history of science than to specu- 
 lative thought. The whole object of his undertaking was the 
 advancement of natural science, although the accomplishment 
 of this might initiate a decay in philosophy proper. The 
 tribute which the modern world owes to Bacon and his asso- 
 ciates rests upon the stimulation which they gave to the em- 
 pirical and scientific tendency of the whole English race. Ger- 
 man historians of philosophy are prone to decry the importance 
 of the position allotted to him by Englishmen, and can see 
 , little worthy of praise in his character or in his life-work. He 
 may have lacked the extreme originality accredited to him by 
 his admirers, and perhaps borrowed many of his conceptions 
 from prevalent scientific notions; he might have been un- 
 scrupulous in character and uncompromising in the pursuit of 
 his ambition, but notwithstanding he supplied the distinct de- 
 mands of his age. His scientific aspiration and his character, 
 to a greater degree than we are willing to admit, portrayed the 
 ambitions of the modern world. 
 
 THOMAS HOBBES. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 If Bacon approached philosophy from science, one may 
 easily point to a contemporary and friend of his, Thomas 
 Hobbes, who came to science with a metaphysical theory already 
 formed. He was the son of the Vicar of Malmesbury, a person 
 who is said to have lacked both intellectual and moral refine- 
 
THOMAS HOBBES. 71 
 
 ment. Thomas was prematurely born in 1588. His hasty en- 
 trance into the world is ascribed to the wide-spread fear caused 
 by the Spanish Armada. He early attended the village school, 
 and at fifteen years of age began the study of scholastic learn- 
 ing at Oxford. Hobbes seems to have attained considerable 
 proficiency in Greek, although, like Bacon, he was rather re- 
 pelled by the classicism and ecclesiastical pedantry of the Uni- 
 versity. After leaving the University, Hobbes travelled exten- 
 sively on the Continent, meeting the foremost thinkers of 
 France and Italy. While waiting in a drawing-room for the 
 arrival of a friend, he accidentally raised from the table a copy 
 of Euclid's Geometry. From that time forth his whole attitude 
 of mind was changed. Mathematics, mathematical methods, 
 and mechanical explanations became the fundamental element 
 in all his thought. Although never a professional mathemati- 
 cian, and latterly involved and distinctly defeated in several 
 discussions on mathematical topics, he moulded his own phi- 
 losophy on mathematical standards and indirectly defined the 
 attitude of subsequent English naturalism. Hobbes died at 
 the advanced age of ninety-one, retaining to the last the vigor 
 of his faculties and the acuteness of his mind. 
 
 Epistemology. It has been often observed, especially by 
 historians of English and French philosophy, that a material- 
 istic metaphysics is universally associated with an empirical 
 epistemology. This generalization possesses the strongest force 
 in the case of Hobbes. He may be regarded as the spiritual 
 father of the long line of English empiricists. The human 
 organism, higher only in degree than that of the brute, can 
 only attain to knowledge through the medium of sensation. In 
 fact what we recognize as knowledge, even of the most abstract 
 character, is derived from the union of sensation. " Originally 
 all conceptions proceed from the action of the thing itself, 
 whereof it is the conception," Hobbes tells us in his "Dis- 
 course on Human Nature/' and repeats it in his political 
 treatise, "Leviathan" And further, that the "coherence of 
 
72 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thought," which we would call the flow of consciousness, is 
 ( the result- of sensations related to one another in a single stream 
 of time. Imagination and memory are " decaying senses ;" 14 
 experience is the collection of these past sensations and the 
 ^ understanding is their representation by words. An object in 
 the external world excites the end organs of sense by means of 
 'its own movement, and this motion is transmitted through the 
 nerves to the brain. The brain transformations, and not the 
 true movements of the external object, are what constitute the 
 cognitions of our thought ; we can perceive the " sentient" but 
 not the true qualities which inhere in the object itself. " Im- 
 age or color is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agita- 
 tion, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain" 15 
 This theory of sense-qualities was earlier defined by the physi- 
 cist Galileo and became a point of almost universal agreement 
 among subsequent English philosophers. 
 
 Metaphysics. TJie system of Hobbes divides itself very 
 conveniently into three parts, the metaphysics, ethics, and 
 politics, all of which are erected on the empirical foundation 
 just outlined. In metaphysics Hobbes represents the first 
 modern interpreter of materialism. Every phenomenon of 
 the universe is interpreted in terms of "matter" and "mo- 
 tion;" and thought becomes simply a peculiar form of the 
 latter. To account for the endless variety of the forms of 
 matter, Hobbes premises the broad generalization that all 
 changes or transformations represent different forms of mo- 
 tion. The processes of thought, as well as the development of 
 worlds, are all mere expressions of moving coagulations of 
 matter. Although matter is therefore synonymous with reality 
 and existence, Hobbes believes that an ultimate law of nature 
 lies behind its activities. This he finds in the principle of 
 causality, the sequence of cause and effect. An understanding 
 
 14 Leviathan, Part I., Chapter ii. 
 
 15 Human Nature, Chapter ii. 
 
THOMAS HOBBES. 73 
 
 of its various specific applications constitutes ultimate truth; 
 philosophy itself is nothing else than the knowledge of cause 
 and effect, and the correct method of philosophy consists in the 
 " shortest way of finding out effects by their known causes, or 
 of causes by their known effects." 16 
 
 The terms and general conceptions which Hobbes employs 
 readily bring to mind his early studies of Aristotelian and 
 Scholastic philosophy. Space is the appearance of any external 
 thing, and time the before and after relation. Body is a 
 specially existent thing independent of our thought processes; 
 the accidents of body are the external sources of our concep- 
 tions. From these views one recognizes that Hobbes has trans- 
 formed the scholastic doctrines into a materialism, in which 
 " substance" of the earlier thinkers becomes the " matter" of a 
 mechanical universe. Its mathematical laws of motion exclude 
 the possibility of purposes or ends in nature, no " Final 
 causes" as in the Aristotelian systems. Hobbes is thoroughly 
 straightforward in his materialism, and does not hesitate to 
 draw the most disagreeable conclusions if the rigidity of his 
 mathematical method seems to demand it. The conception 
 of a thoroughly mechanical universe, in which thought processes 
 are regarded as movements of matter, does not meet with much 
 sympathy among the philosophers directly following Hobbes; 
 and materialism cannot be regarded as of much consequence 
 until the time of the French Encyclopaedists, during the latter 
 part of the eighteenth century. 
 
 The Nature of Man. The empiricism and materialism of 
 Hobbes is apparent in his treatment of human relations. He 
 develops what may be called a naturalism, a term which well 
 describes any theory of ethics which regards man merely as the 
 causal product of his environment ; a highly organized machine, 
 properly adjusted to complicated surroundings. Pleasure and 
 pain, beauty, morality, and truth exist for no other purpose 
 
 16 Computation or Logic, Part I., Chapter vi. 
 
74 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 than to assist man to accommodate himself to his environment. 
 Fundamental to human character is an insatiable love of life 
 and power, the satisfaction of one's natural appetities, and the 
 primitive emotions of pleasure and pain, good and evil, express 
 its gratification or its disappointment. Freedom of will is an 
 error of individual prejudice ; it springs from a misinterpreted 
 consciousness. Man, like every other species of animal, is 
 controlled in his actions by the passions and inclinations of the 
 moment. Volition is only the expression of consent to an 
 irretrievable fate, a fate founded on the principle of sufficient 
 reason and operative on the ground of the psychical demand 
 for the greatest pleasure. Goodness, morality, and such terms 
 are convenient words for the evaluation of conduct, but in an 
 absolute sense void of any meaning. Praise and blame are 
 ideas which are inapplicable to the estimation of moral value, 
 they are of service only as expression of the relative utility of 
 modes of conduct. 
 
 Philosophy of Society. In connection with Hobbes's 
 theory of sociology his name is best known. Earlier, Jean 
 Bodin and Hugo Grotius attempted a naturalistic explanation 
 of society, but lack as a starting-point the unwavering material- 
 ism of Hobbes. The latter begins with the assumption that 
 primitive man was without social organization, a premise 
 which Hegel later denies as contrary to the very nature of man 
 as a social being. Under such conditions each individual is in 
 constant conflict with the rights of all other men, a war of all 
 against all, without moral law or justice. "To this warre of 
 every man against every man, this also is consequent; that 
 nothing can be Unjust." 1T Peace, the attainment of which 
 constitutes the first law of social progress, is possible only on 
 some mutual understanding or agreement. Each man, there- 
 fore, reliquishes a portion of his natural rights in order that 
 those remaining to him may be more secure. From this mutual 
 
 "Leviathan, Chapter xiii. 
 
THOMAS HOBBES. 75 
 
 agreement arises a universal compact vested either in a monarch 
 or in some constituted assembly. It is the function of this 
 centralized government to receive from each certain of his 
 natural rights and at the same time to assure to every person 
 the rights and privileges of a peaceful life. The state is thus 
 a product of fear on the one hand and prudence on the other. 
 Estimate of Hobbes. Hobbes and Bacon present to us 
 very well the attitude of the English thinkers during the seven- 
 teenth century. The one initiated a new advance in physical 
 science, the other defines the characteristic English empiricism. 
 Hobbes cannot be called a man of extreme originality, nor, on 
 the other hand, is his philosophy stimulated by a remarkable 
 depth of insight. His importance lies more in the hidden cur- 
 rents of thought which later defined the character of English 
 philosophy than in the immediate influence of his stand-point. 
 It is interesting to note that Hobbes is condemned or else neg- 
 lected altogether by nearly all of his successors, yet his attitude 
 and method, and not uncommonly his theories, are uncon- 
 sciously assimulated by opponent and disciple alike. His 
 breadth of view and power of analysis are perhaps greater than 
 in the case of the next illustrious English philosopher, Locke, 
 but the influence of the latter has been much more pronounced. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 CONTINENTAL RATIONALISM. 
 
 SCEPTICISM OF THE RENAISSANCE. 
 
 IN the foregoing pages we traced the early movements of 
 modern thought as they appeared in the nature philosophy of 
 Italy, the religious enlightenment of Germany, and the critical 
 empiricism of England, The era of these movements, each in- 
 dicative of the subsequent national stand-point, may he re- 
 garded as the transition period between mediaeval and strictly 
 modern thought. The problems of the ancients were restated 
 in the light of the Renaissance, the traditions of the old were 
 compared with the ideals of a new; the humanistic philosophy 
 of the Greeks and the theology of the Schoolmen were replaced 
 by a simple philosophy of nature. The influence of this transi- 
 tion period was felt in France as well as in the countries 
 already mentioned, although here the reaction away from 
 Catholicism first appeared as a general attitude of doubt or 
 scepticism. The Frenchman of the Renaissance possessed the 
 deep imagination of the Italian but lacked sufficient intensity 
 to give reality to his mental dream. On the other hand he 
 shared with the Englishman an interest in science, but failed 
 to possess the reliance of the latter on the facts of experience. 
 A general tendency to philosophize was the only possible result 
 of this peculiar condition of character, but a tendency which 
 was devitalized by a deep feeling of scepticism. The French 
 philosophy of the early Renaissance lacked confidence in both 
 the reason and the senses. 
 
 Significant of this whole type of thought is Michael de Mon- 
 taigne, who is really less of a sceptic than his critics often 
 admit. Born in Southern France in 1533, he lived a quiet and 
 retired life until his death in 1592. Montaigne was a true 
 76 
 
RENE DESCARTES. 77 
 
 child of the Renaissance, individualistic, intense, and intro- 
 spective. He writes for the mere pleasure of self-culture. He 
 penetrates by analysis and philosophizes by subtle distinctions. 
 Like other figures of the Eenaissance he places nature as the 
 standard of life, but unfortunately fails to grasp this standard. 
 He is a humanistic philosopher impressed with the dignity of 
 man and the shallowness of the life of passion; ignorance is 
 preferable to artificiality, servitude of mind is too dear a price 
 to pay for civilization. The ancient Stoics rather than the 
 Sceptics were his teachers. Nature, and life according to 
 nature, sum up his metaphysics and his ethics. 
 
 RENE DESCARTES. 
 LIFE. 
 
 Not long after this time of general doubt and dissatisfaction, 
 both with the old and the new, there appeared in France a 
 man who belongs to the age succeeding the period of transi- 
 tion to the distinctly modern world. Descartes was born in a 
 period when the spirit of the French Eenaissance had lost the 
 vigor of its freshness and when even the "life according to 
 nature" seemed to demand a firmer foundation in some con- 
 sistent metaphysic of nature. Descartes was born on March 
 31, 1596, at the village of La Haye, in the province of Touraine, 
 as the son of a noble family. The young Descartes passed the 
 first eight years of his life at home, where he showed sufficient 
 signs of originality to be dubbed the "Little Philosopher." 
 The years from 1604 to 1612 he spent at the Jesuit college of 
 La Fleche. Here he acquired a considerable knowledge of 
 Latin, an antipathy towards scholasticism, and a rather pro- 
 nounced conceit of his own powers. On leaving the seclusion 
 of the Jesuit college we find him at Paris, enacting the part of 
 a man of the world, but later devoting all his attention to 
 study. Becoming anxious to visit the various countries of 
 Europe, he entered the army of the Netherlands, taking part 
 
78 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in several campaigns of the Thirty- Years' War. On November 
 10, 1619, while at Neuburg, a small town on the Danube, he 
 records that the first intimation of the central thesis of his 
 philosophy came to him like a vision. He then retired for 
 some hours that he might have an opportunity of estimating 
 the true value of his new discovery. An account of this strange 
 incident appears in the "Discourse concerning Method/' 1 
 published in 1637, which may be regarded as the first work 
 which belongs strictly to modern philosophy. 
 
 This incident at Neuburg was the decisive point in the career 
 of Descartes, as well as in the history of philosophy. From 
 that time forth his whole life was controlled by the ideal of 
 study, as it appeared in the light of his new discovery. To 
 accomplish this purpose of study he took up his residence in 
 the Netherlands. The only person who was acquainted with 
 the place of his retirement was Pere Mersenne, whose friend- 
 ship began in the early days of the Jesuit school. Through 
 this friend he held communication with the outside world. 
 By him he was kept informed concerning the scientific and 
 literary progress in France, and also it was through his in- 
 strumentality that the works of Descartes were printed. In 
 the seclusion and intellectual freedom of the various Dutch 
 cities which he visited, Descartes devoted himself to an exten- 
 sive work on natural science, entitled " The World" 2 This 
 was probably completed about 1634, but the Inquisition had the 
 previous year enjoined Galileo from teaching the Copernican 
 cosmology, and condemned as heretics all who accepted the 
 heliocentric astronomy. Descartes rejected the scholastic the- 
 ory of the heavens and rested the elements of his treatise on 
 the physical hypotheses of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, 
 with the express intention of developing a mechanical theory 
 of the universe. Owing, however, to the action of the Church, 
 he withheld the publication of his work. Descartes wrote to 
 
 1 Discours de la M6thode. a Le Monde. 
 
RENtf DESCARTES. 79 
 
 Mersenne at the time, that he wished in no wise to conflict with 
 the faith and teachings of the Church, a desire which arose 
 in a large measure from fear and love of quietude. Nothing 
 of the Cartesian philosophy was made known until 1637, when 
 Descartes published the very important introduction to his 
 system, under the title of " A Discourse concerning Method" 3 
 the first four parts of which were devoted to a discussion of the 
 circumstances of the discovery and the general nature of the 
 Cartesian presuppositions, to which were added two sections 
 treating of the application of the "method" to the physical 
 world. Together with the "Discourse concerning Method" 
 which is largely of metaphysical import, there appeared three 
 other articles, the whole forming the " Philosophical Essays." 4 
 Of these latter the " Dioptrics" was concerned with the applica- 
 tion of mathematics to physics; the " Meteores" with physics 
 proper; while the " Geometric" laid the foundations of modern 
 analytic geometry. In 1641 Descartes published a series of 
 "Meditations" together with a series of criticisms and the 
 replies of Descartes. The work had been circulated in manu- 
 script among prominent thinkers, Hobbes included. The 
 last of his important works was an interesting ethical essay 
 entitled the " Emotions of the Soul." 6 
 
 Descartes was assailed by Protestants and Catholics alike, 
 and the latter part of his life was embittered by both religious 
 and philosophical controversies. In 1649 he accepted an invi- 
 tation extended to him by Queen Christina of Sweden, at 
 whose court his death occurred a year later, caused probably by . 
 the severity of the climate and the radical change in his habits 
 of living. 
 
 METHOD. 
 
 The history of philosophy agrees with Descartes in regarding 
 the method of philosophical analysis as the important element 
 
 Discours de la MSthode. 
 
 4 Essais Philisophiques. 
 
 5 Les Passions de 1'Ame. 
 
80 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the Cartesian system. Its founder seeks above all to develop 
 some method by which he may discover the basal presupposi- 
 tions of philosophy. To do this he must estimate the value of 
 the different faculties of the mind as means to the end in 
 view. The history of ancient peoples, poetry, rhetoric, the 
 study of foreign languages, all lead towards the cultivation of 
 the memory, imagination, or emotions, but fail to assist in the 
 discovery of ultimate truth. Even ethics did not suffice in 
 this regard, for he entertained a special antipathy towards 
 complicated systems of morality, likening them to " impressive 
 and magnificent palaces founded on sand and mud." 6 
 
 Primacy of the Mathematical Method. Mathematics ap- 
 pealed to Descartes above all else, its firm basis in the faculty 
 of the reason alone, its precision and apparent certitude ex- 
 cited his wonder and admiration. With the method of this 
 science clearly before him, Descartes next endeavored to apply 
 its principles towards an analysis of himself; observing, how- 
 ever, four simple rules of procedure. The first of these was to 
 discountenance every fact whose truth was not perfectly certain 
 and true. The next step was to conduct his analysis by slow 
 and well-graded advances, always proceeding from the simpler 
 to the more complex; and finally making frequent reviews in 
 order to avoid omissions. Geometry had already, by following 
 this method, developed truths of remarkable certainty and 
 complexity, and Descartes hoped by the use of these simple 
 rules to introduce the same certainty within the field of meta- 
 physics. 
 
 Rules for Living. While engaged in this process of self- 
 examination it was necessary to observe some fixed code of 
 morals, just as a temporary house is required by one who is 
 intent upon rebuilding an old structure. In the first place 
 he resolved to obey the laws of the people with whom he resided, 
 to rest in the faith of his childhood, and to avoid extremes of 
 
 Discours de la MSthode, Part I., Section 10. 
 
REN DESCARTES. 81 
 
 all kinds. The second maxim of his conduct was to hold stead- 
 fast to his purpose and not deviate for insignificant reasons 
 from his chosen line of thought; any direction if pursued 
 far enough will lead one out from the maze of a forest. Again 
 he would avoid any ill feeling towards fortune, whatever might 
 occur, remembering that beyond our own individual thoughts 
 there is little within the power of man. And, finally, Descartes 
 decided that a life of study and reflection was, above all other 
 occupations, the one best suited to the accomplishment of his 
 purpose and the attainment of truth. 
 
 FOUNDATIONS OF His PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 With these various rules of thought and maxims of conduct 
 Descartes looked about him for the discovery of some ultimate 
 truth upon which to base his philosophical system. It was not 
 impossible that the senses, which men generally regard as in- 
 dicative of absolute certainty, might deceive us. And still 
 further, all the syllogisms of logic and deductions of mathe- 
 matics, in fact all the ideas and thoughts which enter into the 
 minds of men, either in the waking or the dreaming states, 
 all might be founded on error and deception. But when, how- 
 ever, one had rejected all these it was necessary to believe that 
 the person who was thus exhibiting the activity of thought pos- 
 sessed some kind of existence. In other words, the fact that 
 I doubt, requires that the I exists. 
 
 Existence of the Self. Although one might reject all the 
 data of sense and thought, there still remains the perfectly 
 certain axiom of the existence of the self, absolutely necessary 
 for the very process of thought. " I think, therefore I am" 7 is 
 a truth of so deep a character that it defines the thinking self as 
 the necessary criterion of existence, " a substance whose very 
 
 7 " Cogito, ergo sum." 
 " Je pense, done je suis." 
 
 Discourse de la M6thode, Part IV., Section 1. 
 6 
 
82 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 essense and nature consists in thought alone." 8 In replying 
 to one of his critics, Descartes expressly declares that the mere 
 objective act of thinking does not constitute the force of the 
 argument. The really significant element lies in consciousness 
 rather than in judgment, as a mere psychical process. I am 
 conscious that I am thinking is the full premise, and the logical 
 amplification of any thought-activity. "I walk, therefore I 
 am" 9 may be substituted for " I think, therefore I am," pro- 
 vided the act of walking is accompanied by the full conscious- 
 ness of the activity. 
 
 Descartes, by thus predicating the existence of the self to 
 every assertion concerning the existence of anything else, gives 
 to the thinking subject a logical antecedence over the reality 
 of either the external world or of God. Ancient philosophy 
 regarded both universe and man from a purely objective stand- 
 point, without attention to the instrument or method of in- 
 quiry. Mediaeval philosophy builds an objective theology on 
 nature, irrespective of the psychological motives which gave 
 it birth. Modern philosophy has learned from Descartes the 
 invaluable lesson of criticism. We realize to-day, with all our 
 progress in science and philosophy, that no theory of either 
 man, the external world, or of God is sufficient without first 
 an assurance of the existential basis of the human mind, with- 
 out the medium of which no philosophy is even possible. To- 
 day philosophy approaches God and the world through man, 
 and not man through God and the world. 
 
 Existence of God. Among the many ideas which we 
 have, the one of doubting is especially significant. Every one 
 would agree that certainty is at least more desirable, more 
 satisfactory, more near an ideal of perfection, than doubt. 
 
 8 " . . . je connus de la, que j'etais une substance dont toute 1'essence 
 ou la nature n'est que de penser." Discours de la Methode, Part IV., 
 Section 2. 
 
 Les Principes de la Philosophic, Part I., Prop. 9. 
 
RENE DESCARTES. 83 
 
 When, therefore, I am conscious of the act of doubting, I am 
 also conscious of a contrast between an imperfect and a perfect. 
 This idea of the Perfect could not have arisen from the im- 
 perfect nature of man as a doubting being, any more than 
 something could have arisen from nothing. It must, there- 
 fore, have been placed in the mind of man by a Being " that 
 comprehended within itself all the perfection of which man 
 has any idea, or, in a single word, God." 10 And, furthermore, 
 Descartes reinforced his belief in the existence of God by an 
 old proof which may be traced back to the scholastic teacher 
 Saint Anselm. This ontological proof f as it is generally known 
 to philosophy, regards the attribute of existence as a necessary 
 element of perfection. The idea of God, in order for it to 
 refer to a completely perfect Being, must possess existence " in 
 the same way that the equality of three angles to two right 
 angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle." n God would not 
 be perfect, and hence would not be God, unless He existed, for.- 
 that which is possessed of existence is obviously more perfect 
 than that which does not possess it. It is interesting here to 
 note that the validity of this proof of the existence of God has 
 been variously treated by more recent philosophers. Some have 
 believed it of sufficient weight to support the whole superstruc- 
 ture of theology and natural religion, while others have regarded 
 it as little else than sophistry. The most forcible objection 
 that has been brought against it refuses to regard existence as 
 a necessary attribute of perfection, contending that an im- 
 aginary object is none the less perfect even if only its idea 
 exists in the mind. 
 
 Existence of the External World. Although Descartes 
 regarded the existence of the thinking self and of God as the 
 
 10 "... et mme qui efit en soi toutes les perfections dont je pouvaia 
 avoir quelque id6e, c'est-a-dire, pour m'expliquer en un mot, qui fut 
 Dieu." Discours de la M6thode, Part IV., Section 4. 
 
 11 Discours de la M6thode, Part IV., Section 5. 
 
84 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 most certain axioms of knowledge, he has by no means ex- 
 plained the vast array of objects which collectively we call the 
 external world. These objects of the external world must be 
 given the certainty of existence, else the Cartesian philosophy 
 would contradict common sense and oppose any advance in 
 science. Our ordinary belief in the reality of the objects of 
 experience is thoroughly substantiated if all thoughts or 
 activities of deception are excluded from the perfection of God. 
 We all believe in the existence of the world of sensuous per- 
 ception; and since this belief has its source in the perfection 
 God, we must regard this testimony of the senses as truth, 
 since universal deception is altogether foreign to the perfect 
 nature of God. " For God has given me a very strong inclina- 
 tion to believe that certain ideas arise from corporeal things, 
 and I do not perceive how it is possible to excuse him from 
 deception, if in reality these ideas arise elsewhere, . . . and 
 therefore it is necessary to conclude that there are corporeal 
 things which exist." 12 Thus in Descartes's mind a knowledge 
 of the reality and truth of God necessarily precedes the assur- 
 ance of the reality of experience. He even goes so far as to 
 assert that no possible confidence in the existence of the ex- 
 ternal world can arise without the previous faith in the Perfect 
 and Infinite Being of God. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Upon the triple foundations of the existence of the self, God, 
 and nature, Descartes conceived himself capable of erecting 
 a self-sufficient and consistent system of philosophy. He must, 
 however, give to these three primary entities a reality which 
 would distinguish them from the complicated facts of our 
 experience. He employed the scholastic term substance to 
 indicate God,, the human soul, and external nature, while 
 
 12 Meditation sixime, Section 9. 
 
RENtf DESCARTES. 85 
 
 all the individual forms in which they may appear were called 
 modes. Of the three substances, God is highest, for he com- 
 prehends both nature and man. 
 
 The Three Substances. Descartes is by no means clear as 
 to the relation between the three substances, beyond the primal 
 unity of soul and nature, mind and matter, in God. The God 
 of Descartes, however important it may appear at first sight, 
 is of little real consequence except as a convenient conception 
 which may be brought in when everything else seems to fail. 
 The really significant parts of his system are contained in the 
 two opposing elements, man and external nature, mind and 
 matter. 
 
 Man. The essence of man, that which distinguishes him 
 from all else, is the power of thought. The human soul or 
 faculty of thought is a simple, immaterial substance which 
 serves as the substratum or basis for all our sensations, percep- 
 tions, and ideas. It supplies that unity whereby thought is 
 possible and the freedom which enables it to select the true 
 ideas from the false. These ideas, which have their seat in the 
 soul, may be divided into three general classes according to the 
 "substance" from which they arise. Those which arise from 
 the accidental sensations of the external world, those which are 
 a product of our own intellect, and finally a third class called 
 eternal truths. 13 These latter, of which " The Perfect" is an 
 example, are impressed on the mind by the hand of God, and 
 therefore are invariably true. Besides acting as the medium 
 for our ideas, the soul has certain emotions of its own of which 
 wonder, love, hate, desire, joy, and sorrow may be regarded as 
 the most elemental. 14 Morality in its highest sense consists 
 in the pursuit of truth and in the self-satisfaction of that 
 
 13 Les Principes de la Philosophic, Part L, Props. 48 and 49. 
 
 14 " I/admiration, 1'amour, 1'haine, le de"sir, la joie, et la tristesse, 
 et que toutes les autres sont compose'es de quelques-unes de ces six, 
 ou bien en sont des especes." Les Passions de 1'Axne, Part II., Art. 69. 
 
86 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tranquility and mental repose which arises only from the con- 
 trol and regulation of these various emotions. 15 
 
 Matter. Intimately associated with mind is the domain of 
 matter, the substance of extension. These two realms are abso- 
 lutely distinct from one another, finding their only means 
 of communication through the close relationship of the think- 
 ing soul and the extended body of man. The " pineal gland," 
 a small protuberance shaped like a pea and lying at the base of 
 the brain, Descartes supposed to be the seat of the soul and 
 the means of communication between the soul and the body. 
 All the lower animals, as well as plants and inorganic nature, 
 belong to the kingdom of matter. Here rules unchangeable 
 mechanical law, mathematical certainty, and invariable caus- 
 ality. God is the Ultimate Will which originally started the 
 motions of the minute particles of which all forms of matter 
 are composed ; mechanical law is therefore an expression of the 
 thought of God. In his theory that the motion of the universe 
 is constant Descartes suggested the conservation of energy, an 
 hypothesis of extreme importance in modern physics. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF DESCARTES. 
 
 In character Descartes does not altogether represent the true 
 philosopher and his originality has been perhaps overestimated. 
 The really important and influential elements of his thought 
 may be traced in earlier and now almost forgotten writings. 
 The existence of the self as the axiom of all possible philoso- 
 phy had been suggested several years before by the Italian 
 Campanella. The ontological proof for the existence of God 
 forms a very fundamental feature in the theology of Anselm, 
 who employs it as a rational substantiation of faith and revela- 
 tion. The subsequent importance of Descartes is due, in a 
 great measure, to the lucidity and beauty of his style, the 
 clearness and brevity of his arguments, and the significant fact 
 
 "Lea Passions de 1'Ame, Part III., Art. 190. 
 
CARTESIAN SCHOOL. 87 
 
 that he wrote in the language of the people. Nevertheless, 
 modern philosophy rightly regards Descartes as its real founder, 
 for he was the first to define the central problem of subsequent 
 philosophy, the criterion of existence. He established phi- 
 losophy on a firm basis by requiring a criticism of method 
 before all else. He is the spiritual source of a movement in 
 modern thought of incalculable importance, and in this respect 
 he is comparable with Locke and Kant. 
 
 CARTESIAN SCHOOL. 
 
 The philosophy of Descartes stirred to its foundations the 
 intellectual life of Western Europe. Besides arousing objec- 
 tors on every side and causing numberless polemical attacks, it 
 attracted to its standard many younger men, especially those 
 who had inherited the Baconian distrust of scholastic learning. 
 Prominent among this number were the Port Royalists Arnauld 
 and Nicole, also the great French churchman F melon. But 
 by far the most influential of the Cartesians were two young 
 men named Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche. The 
 former was born in the Netherlands in 1625, and studied at 
 Lyons and Leyden, afterwards serving as a teacher. He died 
 in 1669. Malebranche was the son of the secretary of Louis 
 XIII. He was born in 1638, and passed an uneventful and 
 retired life as a member of the Catholic Order of the Oratory. 
 He died in 1715, in consequence, it is said, of an interview and 
 controversy with the English philosopher, George Berkeley. 
 To Geulincx is generally accredited the elaboration of the doc- 
 trine of " Occasionalism" although it has been suggested that 
 a Parisian lawyer, Cordemoy, was the real founder. 
 
 Occasionalism. The difficulties and vagueness which at- 
 tended the explanation of Descartes regarding the true relation 
 between the three substances, God, mind, and matter, led to 
 various attempts to deduce some consistent hypothesis to solve 
 this central problem of the rationalistic metaphysic. It was 
 the work of the Cartesians to point out that the independency 
 
88 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of both mind and matter, together with the primal reality of 
 God, could be reconciled only by supposing that the Deity 
 represented the real unity and interaction between the inde- 
 pendent realms of mind and matter. Thus mind, thought, 
 desire, cannot express itself in bodily or material form without 
 calling to its aid the mediating power of God. My thought 
 only " occasions" the act, it is merely the ff occasional cause" 16 
 while the will of God is the true cause. In the same manner 
 that modern psychology recognizes the laws of Nature, the 
 operation of which we are ourselves unconscious of, as the 
 media for the projection of thought into the external world. 
 None of us are conscious of the mechanism that raises our arm ; 
 our thoughts may be said simply to occasion the movement. 
 
 Seeing all Things in God. Besides the theory of occa- 
 sional causes, Malebranche emphasized a rather mystical 
 aspect of Cartesianism. He carries to its logical conclusion the 
 occasionalism of the previous members of the school by giving 
 mind an existence in and through the nature of God. 1T All 
 our ideas of material things, in fact all our thought itself, 
 exists in the Supreme Intelligence of God. Whatever is 
 considered the object of our thought is really the reflection in 
 our own finite consciousness of the Idea of the Perfect God. 
 Thus in a certain sense all our thoughts are modifications of 
 the one thought of God, all our ideas are seen through His all- 
 embracing mind. We, the finite minds, perceive all sensations, 
 think all thoughts, and will all volitions in God. The ultimate 
 conclusion of Malebranche's doctrine of ff seeing all things in 
 God" is really the non-existence of the third substance, mat- 
 ter; although he was too much under the influence of Des- 
 cartes to recognize the logical outcome of his philosophy. 
 
 16 Causes occasionnelles. 
 
 17 " . . . parce qu'en effet 1'attention de 1'esprit n'est que son retour 
 et sa conversion vers Dieu qui est notre seul maitre, et qui seul nous 
 instruit de toute vSi-ite"." Preface to Malebranche, De la Recherche 
 de la V^rite". 
 
 \ 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 89 
 
 Malebranche was a contemporary of Spinoza, Locke, and Leib- 
 nitz, men who belong to a distinctly later period of thought. 
 In the history of philosophy he may be looked upon as repre- 
 senting the transition from Descartes to Spinoza. His mysti- 
 cism is the connection between the pluralism of the former 
 and the pantheism of the latter. 
 
 BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 
 RATIONALISTIC TENDENCY. 
 
 In Descartes one feels a new power or force first becoming 
 aware of its strength. The human reason was turned upon 
 itself and required to examine the instruments of its own opera- 
 tion. Instead of erecting its structure on the precarious array 
 of facts brought to us through the half-conscious medium 
 of uncriticised reason and sense-impressions, modern philoso- 
 phy began to delve into the mysteries of this reason and de- 
 mand of it an explanation of its own being. Delighted with 
 its newly-discovered power, we are by no means surprised to 
 find that Descartes and his immediate followers should wish to 
 base upon it the entire stress of philosophical authority. If a 
 new reliance on the power of reason, as it expressed itself in 
 the method of mathematical induction, had raised the modern 
 world above the philosophical plane of the past, it might be 
 expected that the early thinkers should neglect the world of 
 sense-experience in order to over-emphasize the power of the 
 mind. As might be expected, therefore, the epistemological 
 trend of the followers of Descartes is distinctly opposed to a 
 simple empirical reliance on " common sense." 
 
 We have called the subject of this chapter the " Continental 
 Rationalists," simply wishing to designate by this term those 
 few truly original men who dominated the thought of conti- 
 nental Europe, during the seventeenth century, with their at- 
 tempts to derive a system of knowledge primarily from a study 
 of the human reason. The distinction between rationalism 
 and empiricism is a convenient, but superficial, means for 
 
90 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 classifying the earlier modern thinkers. Hobbes himself em- 
 ploys reason to discover facts of experience, and Descartes 
 bases his system upon the empirical datum " I think/* and the 
 reality of the external world on the certainty of sense-im- 
 pressions. When strictly applied the distinction is valueless, 
 for the history of philosophy has failed to produce a system 
 erected entirely on either reason or sense-impressions. It is 
 extremely useful, however, to distinguish two types of mind; 
 the one that finds the criterion of philosophical truth in 
 abstract construction, the other in concrete experience. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Early Life. Baruch (or Benedict) de Spinoza, the greatest 
 of the Eationalists, was the foremost mind of the seventeenth 
 century, as we shall find Kant to be of the eighteenth. His 
 parents were Spanish Jews who, together with others of their 
 sect, had fled to Amsterdam to avoid the persecution of the 
 Inquisition. Baruch, who afterwards changed his name to 
 Benedict, was probably born on November 24, 1632. His early 
 education was conducted by a Eabbi, Moses Morteira, who was 
 a trusted member of the Semitic community. From a study 
 of the Talmud, one of the Jewish scriptures composed mainly 
 towards the beginning of the Christian Era, and of the Semitic 
 philosophers of the late Middle Ages, he acquired a mystical 
 and fatalistic tendency. When still a young man he became 
 interested in physical science; and later, in order to perfect 
 himself in Latin, he attended the school of a physician, Van 
 Ende, a scholar of ill repute on account of his heretical 
 opinions. From Ludwig Meyer he learned the then prevailing 
 physical theories, and was introduced by him to the philosophy 
 of Descartes. When the attention of Spinoza was thus turned 
 into channels distinctly different from those approved by his 
 Jewish brethren, he found himself confronted with two alter- 
 natives: he could either retract his opinions, reform his con- 
 duct, and again devote himself exclusively to the Jewish scrip- 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 91 
 
 tures, or continue as he was, with the prospect of alienation 
 from his people. Spinoza chose the latter. On August 6, 
 1656, he was excommunicated from the Jewish Synagogue and, 
 so far as lay in the power of man, expelled from the race of his 
 fathers. 
 
 The Outcast. Thus thrown upon the world without friends 
 or sympathy, a lesser man than Spinoza might have regretted 
 his choice and used every possible means to soften the feelings 
 of his people towards him, or else have become embittered 
 towards the world and enwrapped himself in a shroud of nar- 
 rowed cynicism. Spinoza, however, was possessed of too little 
 sentiment or emotional feeling to be moved by the passion of 
 remorse or vindictiveness. True genius does not arise from a 
 poetic fancy, nor from any ephemeral sympathy with the emo- 
 tions of man, but rather from the extra-human reason. Thus 
 the greatest men have been those least swayed by the common 
 emotions of weaker humanity. The world of to-day recognizes 
 a simple greatness in the lone Jew of Amsterdam, it can see a 
 poetry in the colorlessness of his literary style, and even a 
 religion has been discovered in the depths of his personality. 18 
 All this because, in a distinctly humanistic period, Spinoza 
 showed a decided tendency towards the nature view of man. In 
 his mind the mechanical side of nature, the stern requital of 
 natural law, combined with the exactness of mathematical 
 methods, embodied the ideals of human life. 
 
 After his separation from the Jewish community Spinoza 
 resided a short time in Amsterdam. But he soon found it 
 necessary to remove from the city, owing to continued persecu- 
 tion by the Protestant authorities. He settled in a neighboring 
 town, where he obtained a scanty living by grinding optical 
 lenses, a trade he learned while a rabbinical student. Here 
 there commenced to gather about him a small company of 
 friends, to whom he would communicate his philosophical 
 
 18 Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 
 
92 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 opinions as they gradually assumed form in his own mind. 
 At this time Spinoza was distinctly influenced by the Italian 
 nature-philosophy, probably by the writings of Bruno; he 
 also felt the strength of the Cartesian method, although one of 
 his earliest writings, an attempt to formulate the philosophy 
 of Descartes after the manner of geometrical demonstration, 
 was regarded with disfavor by the truer disciples of Descartes. 
 Later Life. After a residence of some years in the neigh- 
 borhood of Amsterdam, he removed to Khynsburg, near Leyden, 
 and afterwards to The Hague. During all this time his life was 
 of the simplest character. A few intimate friends were all 
 who may be said to have known him. The prominent men of 
 the time were acquainted with him through correspondence, 
 but few had ever met him. In 1670 Spinoza published the 
 " Theological Political Treatise," 19 in which he advocated com- 
 plete freedom of thought in all matters, and sought to derive 
 religion from the individual consciousness rather than from 
 formal dogma. Spinoza had been working for some years on 
 his great work the " Ethics/' which, however, was not published 
 until after his death. The chair of philosophy at Heidelberg 
 was offered to him, but his fondness for unrestrained thought 
 and his distaste for notoriety of any kind forbid its acceptance, 
 although perfect freedom of expression was assured to him. 
 Spinoza died in 1677, of consumption, a disease which he is 
 said to have inherited. 
 
 THE "ETHICS." 
 
 Parts. Chief among the writings of Spinoza is his 
 " Ethics/' This work, the fruit of many years of thought and 
 labor, ranks with Aristotle's "Metaphysics/' Kant's "Pure 
 Reason/' and Hegel's "Logic" as the truly great classics of 
 philosophical literature. The "Ethics" is divided into five 
 parts, of which the first two are of extreme importance. Part 
 
 19 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 93 
 
 I. is concerned with " God" 20 in which Spinoza deduces the 
 most general propositions regarding the deeper problems of a 
 monistic metaphysics. In Part II. he treats of the "nature 
 and origin of mind" 21 considering this problem from a psy- 
 chological stand-point. The first part, " Concerning God/' is 
 strictly rationalistic. The definitions, axioms, and demonstra- 
 tions are as far as possible removed from experience. Whereas 
 in the second part the demonstrations are based on axioms 
 which are themselves psychological facts of experience. The 
 third part treats of the " passions" 22 the fourth of " human 
 bondage/' 23 and the fifth of an " intellectual freedom" 24 
 
 Method. Spinoza describes his book " as after the plan of 
 geometrical demonstration," a phrase which very well illus- 
 trates the character and arrangement of the work. A set of 
 definitions and axioms, which are truly the metaphysical ele- 
 ments of his whole system, precede the text proper. This latter 
 is in the form of Euclidian theorems, to each of which is suf- 
 fixed a deductive proof, depending on the previous axioms or 
 theorems. The details of the work show a marvellous ingenuity 
 and a keenness of insight, which in its unique combination of 
 synthesis and analysis is even superior to the strict formality 
 of its mathematical ideal. Spinoza's mind was of a type which 
 is seldom met with. A great mathematician he never was ; but, ! 
 like Hobbes, he possessed the rare ability of applying the spirit 
 of the mathematical method to the variety, the complexity, and 
 the depth of human life. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 It is somewhat confusing to find a work of rare metaphysical 
 importance bearing the title of " Ethics" Spinoza, as well as 
 
 20 De Deo. 
 
 21 De Natura et Origine Mentis. 
 
 22 De Origine et Natura Affectuum. 
 
 23 De Servitute Humana, sue de Affectuum Viribus. 
 
 24 De Potentia Intellectus, seu de Libertate Humana. 
 
94 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hume and Kant in later thought, regarded the problems of the 
 moral life as at once the most familiar and at the same time the 
 most difficult of treatment. He therefore finds it necessary to 
 base ethics on the sure foundation of metaphysics. He was the 
 first thinker of the modern world to recognize the logical 
 priority of metaphysics at the same time that he felt the im- 
 portance and the depth of the problems of human life and char- 
 acter. With Spinoza nature and man are in exact equipoise: 
 each exist for the other. His philosophy unites the three 
 prominent tendencies of the Renaissance referred to in a 
 previous chapter: the pantheism of the South, the mysticism 
 of the North, and the logical clearness in method of the early 
 English mind. 
 
 Substance. The initial premise of Spinoza's metaphysics 
 is the doctrine of Substance. In this he advances from the 
 pluralism of Descartes to an absolute monism. Substance was 
 I to Spinoza the ultimate unity of mind and matter, thought and 
 extension.^ Although this is the true meaning of substance, as 
 later developed, he preferred to define it first in terms of 
 " self -being," 25 believing this to be the first premise of any 
 philosophy. In the third definition, prefixed to the first book of 
 the "Ethics" we have the following formal description of 
 Substance: "By substance I understand that which exists in 
 itself, and is conceived through itself alone; that is, the con- 
 ception of which does not require for its formation the concep- 
 tion of anything else." 26 The object of this rather formal defi- 
 nition was to convey to the reader what in Spinoza's mind was 
 the most elementary concept attainable by human thought. 
 His whole method was distinctly deductive, and in order to be 
 consistent with an absolute monism it was necessary to define 
 
 "Causa-sui." Ethics, Part I., Def. 1. 
 
 28 " Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur : 
 hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo 
 formari debeat." Ethics, Part I., Def. 3. 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 95 
 
 at the outset some concept the breadth of which could include 
 every aspect of reality. 27 The three characteristics of Substance 
 are existence, unity, and infinity. 28 The self -being of substance 
 simply implies its necessary fundamentally, its logical priority 
 before all else. Should one conceive of some other concept 
 more fundamental than Substance, Spinoza could with thor- 
 ough consistency call this other concept the true substance. In 
 this sense, of having nothing beyond it, substance is its own 
 cause, although such a conception must not be confused with 
 the self -creation of the Scholastics. Moreover, its very breadth 
 unites within itself such contradictory ideas as those of liberty 
 and necessity; for all its activities are free with respect to 
 each other. In brief, Substance is controlled only by the self- 
 conceived laws of its own being. 
 
 From an earlier treatise it is evident that Spinoza was at first 
 doubtful regarding an adequate foundation for his monism. 
 At one time he seems to have approached very near to a pure 
 naturalism, in which mere nature occupied the primal position. 
 Again in a pantheistic mood he regards God as the ultimate 
 source of the mind and matter, leaning more nearly towards 
 Cartesianism. His complete thought, however, identifies both 
 concepts with Substance. Eegarded from a naturalistic- 
 scientific stand-point, one may refer to Substance as Nature. 
 When so interpreted we emphasize the mechanical and mathe- 
 matical side of Spinoza's philosophy and are inclined perhaps 
 to connect him with the school of Hobbes. Again this same 
 self-being may be interpreted in terms of religion. The Deus 
 or God of Spinoza thus becomes identified with the " One" of 
 the Mystics and the Jehovah of the Jews. And still from a 
 third aspect we may regard Spinoza's monism from a purely 
 metaphysical stand-point, for we shall later see that it is 
 
 27 " Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi 
 potest." Ethics, Part I., Prop. 15. 
 
 28 See letter of April 20, 1663, Spinoza to L. Meyer. 
 
t 
 
 96 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 strongly suggestive of the "Absolute" in German Idealism. 
 However interpreted as Nature, God, or Substance, Spinoza 
 has no reference to a transcendent Being of any kind. His 
 Substance is an Immanent Reality which exists in and through 
 Nature; in the same sense that the God of pantheism or the 
 "natural law" of physics are expressions of some esoteric 
 force operating in and through the Universe. 
 
 Defined in such elemental terms one would certainly consider 
 that a direct proof for the existence of God or Substance would 
 be either superfluous or impossible. Yet Spinoza makes the 
 attempt in no less than five different forms. All are stages and 
 modifications of the " Ontological Proof," as given by Anselm 
 and Descartes, only instead of deducing existence from the 
 nature of Goodness or Perfection, Spinoza employs the concept 
 of " Self-being." Yet recognizing the abstractness of his con- 
 cept of God, Nature, Spinoza distinguished between Sub- 
 stance, immanent in and through nature, called by him " natura 
 naturans," and nature in fthe ffin^e nf flie sum of all-existent 
 objects, or " natura naturata" The former is the true Eeal, 
 while the latter is only the sum of the finite phases of the 
 world. A similar distinction was pointed out in connection 
 with Bruno, only the Italian conceived God to represent the 
 mere identity of both generating and generated nature. 
 
 Attributes. The barrenness of Spinoza's substance, its com- 
 plete abstraction and lack of anything in the least appreciable, 
 is at first repugnant to ordinary thought. He has made his 
 foundation so broad that it really amounts to nothing. Spinoza 
 recognizes this difficulty, and next advances to the doctrine of 
 attributes where the boundlessness of Substance begins to take 
 form. These attributes are the terms applied to the manner in 
 which the existence of substance is made known to man. J[n- 
 finite Substance, as the truly unconditioned, possesses an in- 
 finite number of characters, each of which may be regarded as 
 an attribute. Of this infinite number of attributes, however, 
 two only are known to finite man. These are mind and matter, 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 97 
 
 thought and extension, subject and object, the self and the 
 not-self. Each of these expresses to its full extent a single 
 aspect of the infinite character of Substance, without in any 
 wise depreciating the value of the other attributes. Each of 
 them is therefore relatively independent of the other, and co- 
 incidently, because of its reference to the infinite Substance, is 
 itself "infinite after its kind." Although restricted and par- 
 tial, like the view of a mountain from a single point, either one 
 of the attributes conveys a distinct and clear conception of 
 Substance. An object may be white and at the same time 
 smooth without in the least containing contradictions. In the 
 same manner an infinite object may be supposed to contain an 
 infinity of infinite attributes, each one of which adequately, 
 but never perfectly, defines the object itself. 
 
 Mind and matter are the two attributes of Substance. But 
 a question will naturally arise as to the manner in which they 
 are related, especially to our own finite thought. Are we to 
 interpret the attributes as really existent in Substance, just as 
 roundness is existent in a circle ? or else are we to regard them 
 as simply the ways in which the concept of Substance comes to 
 human consciousness? The former or realistic interpretation 
 regards the attributes as truly expressing the inner nature of 
 Substance; while the latter or idealistic view regards them 
 simply as media, so to speak, through which man knows of 
 God. This is a distinction which, carries us back to the realism 
 and conceptualism of the Middle Ages and forward to Leibnitz 
 and Kant. 
 
 Among the first definitions of the " Ethics" Spinoza describes 
 attributes as " that which the intellect perceives of Substance 
 as constituting its essence/ 7 29 And the whole dispute is nar- 
 rowed down to the epistemological question does " the intellect 
 perceive" an aspect of the true nature of Substance? One 
 
 59 " Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia per- 
 cipit, tamquam ejusdem essentiam const! tuens." Ethics, Part I., 
 Def. 4. 
 
98 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cannot help believing that the recent historians of philosophy 
 have made more of this ambiguity than Spinoza's text would 
 warrant. That those idealistically inclined, Hegel, Erdmann, 
 and others, have been prone to interpret the " Ethics" in terms 
 of their own philosophy. Spinoza constantly refers to the 
 necessary agreement between the "idea" and the "thing/ 3 so 
 that what "the intellect perceives" cannot be separated from 
 what " truly constitutes." 
 
 Modes. In the thought of Spinoza the idea of Substance 
 seems farthest removed from the common experience of man. 
 The two attributes of Substance, mind and matter, seem a 
 little nearer our ordinary comprehension; but even they lack 
 that apparent familiarity which we associate with the ideas of 
 practical life. The term mind or thought is at least abstract; 
 it is too general to convey much significance to one who wishes 
 a really practical explanation of the world. Likewise matter, 
 simple as the term may appear, is capable of endless modifica- 
 tions and interpretations. We can therefore well understand 
 the feeling, that although the attributes are less indefinite than 
 the primal Substance, they also are too abstract in their nature 
 to form the materials of our ordinary world of ideas and sense- 
 impressions. To conform to this justifiable demand Spinoza 
 saw the necessity for carrying his deduction one step farther 
 and recognized a term for the various modifications and sep- 
 arate modifications and separate manifestations of mind and 
 matter. In just this significance Spinoza uses the word mode, 
 another term borrowed from the vocabulary of the Schoolmen. 
 As the attributes were the distinct and differentiated aspects 
 of Substance, so the modes are the still more individual and 
 less abstract manifestations of the attributes. 
 
 The system of Spinoza represents in the history of modern 
 philosophy the classic example of psycho-physical parallelism. 
 The distinctiveness of this position becomes very clear in con- 
 nection with the theory of modes. Every separate object con- 
 stitutes a mode of the attribute of extension, every idea a mode 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 99 
 
 of thought. But, although ideas may be formed of objects, 
 and objects are the necessary points of reference for ideas, the 
 two systems of modes are absolutely distinct from one another; 
 each may be conceived to possess its own peculiar characters 
 and laws. Yet, notwithstanding this complete independency in 
 regard to any causal interferences, there is a perfect parallelism 
 between the elements of the two series, term for term, mode 
 for mode. This is explained by a very interesting proposition 
 in the second part of the " Ethics/' dealing with the nature 
 and origin of mind. "The order and connection of ideas is 
 the same as the order and connection of things." 30 This propo- 
 sition is also important in connection with the controversy 
 concerning the realistic or idealistic interpretation of attribute. 
 It is remarkable evidence in support of the former hypothesis, 
 for it seems to show that Spinoza recognized no difference in 
 absolute nature between "what the intellect perceives" and 
 what truly is. 
 
 In this doctrine of modes is developed more forcibly the 
 abstract and fundamental character of Spinoza's lonely Sub- 
 stance. In its majestic "oneness" Substance is determined 
 only by itself. It is self -caused, because the source of its being 
 lies within its own nature. In direct contrast to the self- 
 determined existence of Substance stand the various modes, 
 every one of which depends on a cause beyond itself. Each 
 finite mode arises out of and must be conceived in connection 
 with other similar finite modes, the whole causal series of which 
 presupposes and is implicitly contained in the infinite mode 
 of the intellect. And likewise this latter demands the existence 
 ofThe attribute of thought, infinite after its own kind, which 
 in its turn finds its reality only in Substance itself. Each 
 thought, each volition, and each object is intelligible only if 
 conceived in the Absolute. 
 
 30 " Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum." 
 Ethics, Part II., Prop. 1, 
 
100 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 EPISTEMOLOGY. 
 
 One must consider that the distinction between metaphysics 
 and epistemology has been recognized for only a short time, 
 and yet notwithstanding this fact that the difference was un- 
 known at the time of Spinoza, the definiteness of his geomet- 
 rical method enabled him to observe more clearly than any 
 other writer of that period the separation between the theory 
 of reality and the theory of knowledge. The sharp line of de- 
 marcation between objects and ideas, modes of extension and 
 modes of thought, required some definite theory of the relation 
 between the two series other than the proposition that the 
 order and connection of the two was parallel. The human 
 mind consists of nothing but ideas, modes of thought; it is 
 therefore the general expression for the power of ideation. The 
 material object which corresponds to tUcf human mind, for 
 every form of idea must refer to an object, is the human body ; 
 it is a very complex mode of extension, " consisting of many 
 composite parts." 31 Mind and body are aspects of one and the 
 same reality, the antithesis of which arises from a difference 
 of stand-point. 
 
 In his treatment of knowledge itself Spinoza reminds one 
 of the fourfold classification of the sources and kinds of knowl- 
 edge earlier found in the thought of Nicolas of Cusa. With 
 Spinoza the highest type of knowledge is concerned with the 
 essence (essentia), or fundamental nature of the object. In 
 an earlier fragment on the " Improvement of the Intellect" 32 
 Spinoza seems to believe this purest kind of knowledge is at- 
 tainable without a direct reference to the being of God, provided 
 only we completely understand the fundamental nature of the 
 thing, as, for example, " By this kind of knowledge we know 
 two and three to be five, and if there are given two lines parallel 
 
 81 Ethics, Part II., Postulate 1. 
 
 22 Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione. 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 101 
 
 to a third, they are parallel to each other." In the " Ethics" 
 however, it is expressly defined as a deduction- from " an -ade- 
 quate idea of the formal essence of certain 'attributes of* -God 
 to an adequate knowledge of the essence vof 'thhrgs. 38 Thh 
 highest kind of knowledge, perfect as it i's and v Mmfct synony- 
 mous with the intuition of the Mystics, can be employed only 
 in regard to- a very few objects. The great mass of the true 
 ideas belong to a type of knowledge obtained from observing 
 the interrelation of things, by advancing from a knowledge of 
 one thing to the knowledge of another, from a true knowledge 
 of light one may deduce the true conclusion that the sun is 
 larger than it appears. These two former kinds of knowledge 
 furnish the ground by which we may distinguish the true from 
 the false, but they by no means exhaust the possible sources of 
 knowledge. The imagination or unfounded opinion supplies us 
 with a considerable portion of the elements of our intellectual 
 activity. It falsely connects two ideas which should be sun- 
 dered, or it allows us to consider as true the confused memory 
 images or fanciful word symbols. Even below the confused 
 images there is the lowest kind of knowledge^ derived from 
 vagugjixperience. The senses present us a disorderly array of 
 mutilated expressions which in nowise resemble the true nature 
 of the objects to which they correspond. To this lowest type 
 of knowledge belong the ideas which the mind forms . of the 
 emotions of its body; they are always felt but never intellec- 
 tually perceived. Even the idea of the body itself is known 
 only through the obscurity of vague knowledge, since the pres- 
 ence of its sensations is only indirectly given through confused 
 emotions. 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 Thus far the philosophy of Spinoza appears to be little else 
 than a monistic metaphysics, an absolute pantheism in which 
 there is no place for man. Although the history of modern 
 
 88 Ethics, Part IT., Prop. 40, Scholium 2. 
 
102 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy considers Spinoza's metaphysical basis as the im- 
 portant part of his system, yet in his own mind he regarded 
 metaphysics as merely the ground for the interpretation of the 
 relation ;be rf twen man and nature. In the accomplishment of 
 this lie has recourse 'to both a mechanical psychology and a 
 Stoical estimation of human character. The former led him 
 to reduce the more complex feelings and emotions to the sim- 
 plest elements of animal passion ; the latter led him to find the 
 dignity of life, the real value of these emotions, in a lofty 
 contemplation of nature. It was a strange yet impressive har- 
 mony of mechanism and reason, of empirical psychology and 
 rational naturalism. 
 
 Psychology of Ethics. Owing to their subsistence in the 
 attribute of mind the infinite modes of will and intellect are 
 to be regarded from the metaphysical stand-point as one and 
 the same. But when looked upon from the stand-point of 
 human activity, we must recognize the primacy of the volitional 
 impulse. The desire for the preservation of life, Spinoza, like 
 Hobbes and the later materialists, places as the real basis of 
 the psychology of the feelings. "Happiness consists in a 
 man's ability* to preserve his own being." 34 Upon this funda- 
 mental presupposition he seeks to establish the psychological 
 side of his theory of ethics. When this desire for its own 
 being, the universal property of all existence, is expressed 
 through the conscious reason of man, we have will activity. 
 This gives rise to the emotions of pleasure, when the activity 
 of the will causes a transition from a less to a more perfect 
 state of organic life ; to those of pain, when the movement is in 
 the opposite direction. The criterion for the determination of 
 the pleasurable or painful rests upon certain more or less tran- 
 sient subjective ideals, created by each person from the indi- 
 viduality of his own character. Most prominent among the 
 
 84 " . . . et f elicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse con- 
 servare protest." Ethics, Part IV., Prof. 18, Scholium. 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 103 
 
 forces which Spinoza believes to contribute towards the preser- 
 vation of individual man are the existence and the welfare of 
 one's fellow-men. In this connection the conception of 
 Spinoza's original motive of self-preservation becomes trans- 
 formed into a higher recognition of the brotherhood of all 
 mankind, giving rise to the virtue of generosity. " Minds are 
 not conquered by force but by love and generosity." 35 
 
 Naturalism of Ethics. Characteristic of the breadth of 
 Spinoza's philosophy is another element which enters into his 
 ethical thought. Besides the empirical psychology of feeling, 
 which starts with the animal emotion of egoism and developed 
 through reason into the virtue of altruism, Spinoza emphasizes 
 the subsistence of all feelings, emotions, and virtues in Nature. 
 It is a virtue to see one's own happiness in the happiness of 
 mankind, it is noble to strive for the higher ideals of others; 
 but it is the highest virtue to recognize the real unity that 
 lies at the base of human frailty and natural law. Just as 
 true virtue recognizes the community of the whole human 
 species, it is virtue of a higher kind to connect mankind with 
 God. This noblest virtue is the intellectual contemplation of 
 Nature, " amor Dei intellectualis" 36 springing from the 
 highest kind of knowledge and eternal in its essence, and which 
 Spinoza regards more as a passive attitude of mind than as a 
 specific formulation of the moral law. To one who has at- 
 tained this perfect intellectual peace, all the conflict of the 
 external world, all the sin and evil of man, becomes the mani- 
 festation of the eternal laws of God. Human weakness is 
 prone to recognize such emotions as sympathy, pity, remorse, 
 or hope, but they have no place in the intellectual contempla- 
 tion of nature. There is no evil or good, no love or hatred, 
 beauty or ugliness, no virtue or sin in the world as it is in 
 
 85 " Animi tamen non armis, sed Amore et Generositate vincuntur.' 
 Ethics, Part IV., Appendix 11. 
 39 Ethics, Part V., Prop. 33. 
 
104 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 itself, in God; it is the finitude and partiality of the human 
 mind which creates these emotions from its own contorted 
 consciousness. Owing to a false assumption of power, a pride 
 in his finite judgment, man is wont to interpret nature after 
 his own liking. He attributes purposes or final causes to 
 impersonal nature; he even explains the will of nature by 
 elaborate theories of his own. From a similar conceit man 
 believes himself capable of making moral and aesthetical judg- 
 ments, forgetting that goodness or beauty, as well as purpose, 
 have no real existence except in the imagination. 
 
 The God or Nature of Spinoza, although first appearing in 
 a metaphysical setting, now becomes the direct object of the 
 ethical consciousness. But at the same time that he emphasizes 
 the ideal of a colorless Nature as the object of the highest 
 virtue, he transforms virtue from the field of the will to that 
 of the intellect. Spinoza may be easily associated in this regard 
 with the Greek, Socrates, whose ethical aphorism "Virtue is 
 knowledge" is equally applicable to the seventeenth-century 
 Jew. Morality, then, according to its highest ideal is a product 
 of the intellect rather than of the emotions. " Blessedness is 
 not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself/' 37 We may will 
 to behold the perfection of a purely natural God, devoid of all 
 anthropopathic attributes, but the appreciation of such a God 
 is an act of reason alone. It is an under-emphasis on the 
 meaning of the " intellectual contemplation of God" that leads 
 many to regard Spinoza's monism as a religion. 
 
 NATURALISTIC FATALISM. 
 
 Notwithstanding his high estimation of human character, 
 Spinoza did not fail to draw the conclusion which his intellec- 
 tual naturalism demanded. If nature constitutes the essence 
 of reality, then the irrevocable laws of nature must be applic- 
 
 " " Beatitude non est virtutis prsemium, sed ipsa virtus." Ethics, 
 Part V., Prop. 42. 
 
BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 105 
 
 able to all the finite modes of nature. In other words, Spinoza's 
 monism in its treatment of man afforded no place for freedom. 
 Just as the stone obeys the eternal laws of the attribute of 
 matter, so also the human will obeys the equally irresistible 
 laws of mind. It is true the finite intellect of man believes 
 itself to be free, because memory and limited knowledge are 
 unable to determine the direct causes of action. < Should we 
 know, however, every law of nature, then the forces which 
 control human activity would become known and recognized 
 as expressions of the divine thought of Substance. However 
 stern and relentless this naturalistic fatalism may appear, its 
 apparent horror was altogether alleviated in Spinoza's own 
 mind by the lofty ideal of " the intellectual contemplation of 
 God.",2Jt was a favorite theme among the Schoolmen to recon- 
 cile human responsibility and Divine omnipotence by suggest- 
 ing that man freely chose the eternal will of God. In a 
 similar manner Spinoza feels himself elevating the dignity of 
 man by emphasizing his subsistence in nature. The fatalism 
 of Spinoza lies at the very root of his system. It springs from 
 his desire to uplift nature to a place far higher than the ob- 
 jective existence attributed to it by physical science. 
 nature is made to include man, then natural law becomes 
 human law and the activities of Infinite Nature are reflected in 
 every act of finite man. By his reality in nature, man becomes 
 a significant part in a vast process and the individual expres- 
 sion of infinite law and mind. Spinoza exalts nature above 
 man, but in so doing he emphasizes their ultimate harmony. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE. 
 
 In the philosophical system of Spinoza the deductive ration- 
 alism of the time reaches its fullest development. It is the 
 most perfect monism which has been yet established on a 
 realistic basis. Substance is something real, appreciable, defi- 
 nite ; it is not a principle or an idea, like the " Pre-established 
 Harmony" of Leibnitz or the " Absolute" of subsequent meta- 
 
106 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 physics, but rather the objectively real source of all being. In 
 his initial conception of Substance Spinoza removes himself 
 altogether from experience. He realizes this error and en- 
 deavors to re-establish himself in the world of fact by his theory 
 of modes. But we seek in vain for an adequate explanation 
 of the transition. The early Schoolmen were wont to discuss 
 the problem of "Why did God become man?" ("Cur Deus 
 homo?") and we too inquire of Spinoza in what manner does 
 Substance become modes. There is seemingly a need for some 
 kind of spiritualistic unity which shall afford a basis for the 
 existence of plurality in unity. An attempt to supply such a 
 ground is illustrated by the " Pre-established Harmony" of the 
 third important exponent of rationalism, Leibnitz. 
 
 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. 
 
 Among the persons who frequently wrote to Spinoza, and 
 to whom the latter confided his "Ethics" was a young man 
 who was introduced to him as "being free from the usual 
 theological prejudices." This young man was Leibnitz, the 
 successor of Spinoza in his rationalism, but his opposite in 
 type of mind and in philosophical stand-point. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Leibnitz was born in 1646, the son of a Professor of Moral 
 Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. His father died 
 when he was very young, but left a large library to which the 
 lad had free access. From his early reading Leibnitz acquired 
 a considerable knowledge of physics, scholastic philosophy, and 
 various foreign languages. At fifteen years of age he entered 
 the University of his native city, but took his final degree of 
 Doctor of Laws at the smaller University of Altdorf. From 
 that time to an advanced age the attention and interest of 
 Leibnitz was distributed throughout every possible field of 
 scientific, philosophical, and legal inquiry, in all of which he 
 met with distinguished success. He was first associated with 
 
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. 107 
 
 the Elector of Mayence in the systematization of the laws, and 
 later went on an embassy to Paris, with the object of diverting 
 the attention of Louis XIV. towards the conquest of Egypt. 
 
 At the French capital he became associated with some of 
 the most remarkable men of the time, especially those inter- 
 ested in mathematical physics. Through the suggestion of a 
 friend he made an investigation into the Cartesian doctrine of 
 God, and began to feel the need of a reconciliation between 
 the mechanical universe of modern science and the demand for 
 a purposive Author of Nature. 
 
 On his return journey from Paris he paid several visits to 
 Spinoza, then residing at The Hague. Undoubtedly the later 
 philosophy of Leibnitz was somewhat influenced by his personal 
 intercourse with Spinoza, especially as the latter permitted him 
 to read the "Ethics;" but too much stress must not be laid 
 upon indirect testimony alone. Although their general inter- 
 ests were parallel and the rationalistic tendency was as promi- 
 nent in one as in the other, yet it is doubtful if the difference 
 in their temperaments and stand-points admitted of any appre- 
 ciation of each other's philosophy. Soon after his return from 
 Paris, the Duke of Hanover appointed Leibnitz to the office 
 of Councillor and Librarian, a post which he held for many 
 years. His death occurred in 1716. 
 
 In public life and in letters Leibnitz achieved high dis- 
 tinction on account of his breadth of learning and the original 
 trend of his mind. He was the founder of the Berlin Academy 
 of Science, and was elected its first President, an office he held 
 for life. He was honored by several of the German States, 
 by Austria and Kussia. In 1676 he announced the discovery of 
 the Differential Calculus, which has revolutionized pure and 
 applied mathematics. The honor of this achievement, however, 
 is justly divided with the Englishman Newton, who antici- 
 pated the work of Leibnitz by his Calculus of Fluxions. 
 
 During his early life Leibnitz wrote various treatises on 
 jurisprudence, and also a small work on the logical method of 
 
108 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Raymond Lully. During his latter life, even after his philoso- 
 phy was definitely crystallized in his own mind, Leibnitz found 
 himself too much occupied with other things to give definite 
 form to his thought. His literary remains form at best a 
 patchwork, which, had he possessed a greater power of concen- 
 tration, he might have welded into a philosophical system of 
 universal power and scope. The three works on which his 
 chief speculative merit rests are, the "New Essay upon the 
 Human Understanding" " The Theodicy, and the " Monadol- 
 ogy" The "New Essay" was prepared as a refutation to 
 Locke, although it was not published until fifty years after 
 the death of Leibnitz. The "" Theodicy" was directed against 
 a mild scepticism then prevalent in France and Germany. The 
 work endeavored to harmonize for Leibnitz was always har- 
 monizing the reason of God and the existence of evil. It 
 Advocated that freedom and the possibility of evil contribute 
 to the absolute perfection of God. The " Monadology" was a 
 brief analysis of his doctrine of the force atom and a philo- 
 sophical justification of realistic pluralism. This latter is the 
 doctrine of metaphysics which advances the belief that at the 
 very foundation of the universe there are certain simple ele- 
 ments, absolutely real in themselves. The atomism of the 
 Greeks is an excellent example of such a view, as well as the 
 older interpretations of the atomic theory in physics. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Spinoza and Leibnitz. In a foregoing paragraph we have 
 stated that Spinoza was the opposite in almost every respect to 
 Leibnitz. In character the former was simple and unpreten- 
 tious, reserved in speech, and retired in manner of life, little 
 influenced by what the world calls honor and ambition. His 
 mind was more constructive than original, more thorough and 
 systematic than quick and powerful. In all these respects 
 Leibnitz was the opposite. His life was full of variety, his 
 character frank, earnest, and easily swayed by passing ambi- 
 
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. 109 
 
 tions. His mind was far more original in type than that of 
 Spinoza, but decidedly lacked the concentrativeness of the 
 latter. One is the personification of passivity, the other of 
 activity. This contrast penetrates to the very roots of their 
 respective philosophical positions. The only similarity lies in 
 the general trend of their rationalistic epistemology, for each 
 finds in reason the ultimate criterion of truth. With Spinoza 
 Substance, Nature, or God was completely defined by " self- 
 ejdstence." This existence was purely a passive state^com^ 
 pletely self-determined in the sense that its reality was inde- 
 pendent of all descriptive definition. Leibnitz defined the 
 primal Substance as activity instead of passivity. Substance, 
 to him, was ultimately real, not because it was self-determined, 
 but because it strove to be something other than what it was. 
 Instead of starting with a world of absolute rest, a Universal 
 of all universals, Leibnitz chose rather to construct his universe 
 from elements whose only positive attributes are restlessness 
 and distinctive individuality. With this demand in mind lie 
 saw only force and activity, transition and evolution, where 
 Spinoza had seen the opposite. The spirit of the philosophy of 
 Leibnitz carries us back to Heraclitus, Democritus, and Lucre- 
 tius ; and forward to the vortex rings, the force function^, and 
 energetics of modern physics. 
 
 Definition of Monad. The active Substance of Leibnitz 
 did not allow of an undifferentiated monism. Activity pre- 
 supposes a duality of some kind, and in its ultimate analysis 
 seems to evade all attempts at reduction to a single element. 
 The organic unity of Spinoza's system demanded an undiffer- 
 entiated Unit as the logical genesis of all forms of mind and 
 matter. Leibnitz, on the contrary, is required by his funda- 
 mental definition of Substance to develop his world from origi- 
 nal atoms of activity or force. Everything is actuated into 
 being by the incessant reality of force; action and reaction 
 was the first law of the Universe. These atomic forces, or 
 monads, as they were technically called, correspond in their 
 
110 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 variety to the modes of Spinoza. Only the two concepts differ 
 in that the monads may be considered self-sufficient and ele- 
 mentary, while the modes derive their reality from the deeper 
 nature of Substance. Briefly denned, the monads are the 
 simple, indestructible, indivisible parts of the universe. 
 " These monads are the true atoms of nature, that is, the 
 elements of things." 38 The objects of sense are really com- 
 pounds or aggregations of these simple elements. Just as 
 large quantities of the invisible impurities of the atmosphere 
 are sufficient to become appreciable by obscuring the landscape, 
 so the invisible monads are capable of congealing into tangible 
 objects of sense. And further, the monads are themselves 
 unaffected by the accidents of time and space, they arise 
 through a creative act of God, and can be annihilated only by 
 His will. 
 
 Description of Monads. Beyond the mere definition, how- 
 ever, a difficulty presents itself. A monad cannot be conceived 
 as a physical atom, for this would be a purely material object 
 capable of still further division; and if capable of division, it 
 could not be regarded as a final element. Nor, on the other 
 hand, could one define the monad in mathematical terms, for 
 by definition the geometrical point is purely conceptual; no 
 summation of mathematical points could give us the idea of 
 space. The solution of this dilemma is characteristic of the 
 harmonizing spirit of Leibnitz. We are told that the monad 
 is not exactly a physical unit, nor is it a mathematical point; 
 yet it partakes of the nature of each. The pure force monad 
 has the space-filling quality of the physical atom, but at the 
 same time the indivisibility of the mathematical point ! From 
 this premise it may be regarded as the constituent of the 
 objects of sense at the same time that one conceives it to be the 
 indivisible atom of the universe. 
 
 38 ". . . ces Monades sout les v6ritables atomes de la nature et en 
 un mot les elements des choses." Monadology, Section 3. 
 
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. Ill 
 
 The World of Monads. Beyond this bare presupposition 
 of an indeterminate number of realistic monads, Leibnitz is 
 confronted with two distinct problems. It will be remembered 
 that one of the most significant difficulties in Spinoza's monism 
 was concerned with the relation between Substance and its 
 finite modes. We were able to understand much that was said 
 in this important connection, yet found difficulty with the 
 question : Why does Substance show itself in just these forms ? 
 We naturally inquire if there is not some deep-seated law 
 which permeates the full extent of nature, that explains its 
 variety and finite forms by reference to some conceptual prin- 
 ciple of unity. To both of these problems, the variety of the 
 world and the law of its unity, Leibnitz offers the hypothesis 
 of the monads with their ideal harmony. 
 
 THE SERIAL ORDER OF THE MONADS. For convenience of ex- 
 position let us first inquire into the former problem, the source 
 of the world's variety. Leibnitz recognized activity in a cer- 
 tain direction to be the essential of force. Universal striving, 
 cause and effect, action and reaction, reign throughout the 
 world of the monads. In all this incessant striving of monads 
 new conditions arise which are, from the nature of their strug- 
 gles, more or less perfect than the preceding states. There will 
 thus develop a long series of monads, the position of each being 
 determined by the degree of its relative perfection. At the 
 summit of this series stands " the Monad of monads" which 
 occupies the position of God in the system of Leibnitz. Below 
 God are all grades of monads extending from the purely mate- 
 rial or formless up to the highly spiritual, such as the human 
 soul. Every sensible object, as a chair or a stone, is a vast 
 coalition of monads, each of which has its unique place in the 
 scale of relative perfection. The individuality of each object, 
 however, is defined by its formal or soul-monad. Thus, for 
 example, a chair consists of wood-, iron-, paint-, and rattan- 
 monads, but dominating all and giving form and character to 
 the assembly is the special chair-monad. In a similar manner 
 
112 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 each individual man is composed of the immortal soul-monad, 
 acting in conjunction with a vast organized assembly of cor- 
 poreal monads, together forming the body. 
 
 THE " PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY" OF THE MONADS. In 
 his solution to the problem of the general law which controls 
 the activity of the monads, Leibnitz approaches more nearly to 
 the idealism of the following century. Starting with the real- 
 istic assumption of a pluralism, he cannot have recourse to a 
 substantive unity, like that employed by Spinoza. On the con- 
 trary, every monad is absolutely distinct in itself and possesses 
 " no windows to look out of." Any principle of unity, therefore, 
 that controls the monads must be distinctly spiritual, ideal- 
 istic, teleological, or purposive, whichever of these terms is 
 best suited to express the opposite of objectivity. " The natural 
 \ changes in the monads arise from an internal principle, since 
 J an external one could not influence their interior." 39 And 
 again, " The influence of the monads upon one another is 
 purely ideal/' 40 The importance of these passages cannot be 
 estimated too highly, for they indicate the most pronounced 
 advance of Leibnitz over his predecessors, that of conceptual 
 unity of Nature. This element of his philosophy places it in 
 sharpcontrast to the naturalism of Spinoza and Hobbes, while 
 it unites him closely with Kant and his idealistic followers. 
 To supply this demand for an ideal unity of nature, Leibnitz 
 introduced us to his doctrine of "Pre-established Harmony/' 
 Each monad follows its own individual course of activity, abso- 
 lutely oblivious of what occurs about it; but from the perfect 
 harmony of the whole system the impulse of the one will be 
 the law of the whole. Each monad has its own individual 
 activity, simple and imperishable, but yet it reflects in its own 
 
 39 " . . . que les changements naturels des Monades viennent d'un 
 principe interne; puisqu'une cause externe ne saurait influer dans 
 son inter ieur." Monadology, Section 11. 
 
 40 " Mais dans les substances simples, ce n'est qu'une influence id6ale 
 d'une monade sur 1'autre." Monadology, Section 51. 
 
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. 113 
 
 peculiar way, the whole organic structure of the Universe. 
 This is the conceptual principle upon which Leibnitz believes 
 himself able to assert the doctrine of " Pre-established Har- 
 mony" as the universal law of the monads. Every monad acts 
 according to its own life, but on account of its position in the 
 organic structure of the Universe, it acts in harmony with 
 every other monad. 
 
 Human Freedom. This theory of " Pre-established Har- 
 mony" places the freedom of man in an altogether original 
 light. As the soul is an imperishable and unconditioned monad, 
 it obeys no other law than its own. But nevertheless it belongs 
 to the organic structure of nature, and in that sense obeys the 
 ultimate law of the Universe. The soul is free to do as it 
 would, but yet it freely chooses what is required by the law of 
 "Pre-established Harmony." The soul freely chooses law. 
 This skilful evasion of the Scylla and Charybdis of the free- 
 will controversy is characteristic of the harmonizing spirit of 
 Leibnitz. It is in spirit similar to the teachings of Thomas 
 Aquinas in the thirteenth century : the human will necessarily 
 chooses the good, the will of God. 
 
 The Importance of God. With Leibnitz this principle of 
 e< Pre-established Harmony" also supplies " a new proof for 
 the existence of God, one of unusual clearness." 41 The term 
 " Pre-established," when applied to the world, implies the 
 Author of the universe, for universal harmony could arise only 
 from" "a creative and rational Being. " The harmony of so 
 many substances influenced by each other could only come 
 from a .general cause, upon which they all depend, and that 
 must possess infinite power and wisdom in order to establish 
 this universal harmony." 42 God created the monads, and Him- 
 self impressed upon them their deepest law of " Pre-established 
 Harmony." Leibnitz further unites "line two concepts of God 
 
 41 New System of Nature, Section 16. 
 "Principles of Life, 1705. 
 8 
 
114 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and " Pre-established Harmony" by regarding the latter as the 
 constant expression of God's will. For God, the " Monad of 
 monads/' occupies the highest possible position in the scale of 
 being; He is the fy2e<J[deaL And it is the constant and 
 incessant desire of all the less perfect monads to rise to the 
 Supreme Perfection of God. Although in harmony with one 
 another, every monad struggles forward to some higher state. 
 Evolution towards God is the single impulse which permeates 
 the entire fabric of nature. 
 
 Optimism. -Owing to the fact that there can be but one 
 God, every other monad necessarily possesses a certain amount 
 of imperfection or evil, dependent on the relative distance from 
 the " Monad of monads." In a similar manner Leibnitz ex- 
 plains away all forms of evil, as the consequence of the wisdom 
 of God, suggesting at the same time that we live in the best 
 of possible worlds. It is true that we observe evil in the world, 
 but it is only here through the consent of God, for by evil is 
 He best able to work out the salvation of mankind. Evil often 
 accompanies and makes possible a greater good, as " a general 
 in the army will prefer great victory and slight wounds to 
 neither." 43 
 
 SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM. 
 
 In its broader meaning and with special reference to the 
 original philosophy of Leibnitz, the principle of " Pre-estab- 
 lished Harmony" was supposed to control the relations among 
 all the monads. The special relation between mind and matter, 
 the old problem of Cartesianism, was thus but a single example 
 of the operation of a universal principle. The importance of 
 this single instance of the broader law has led the historians of 
 philosophy following the lead of Wolff, a disciple of Leibnitz 
 to regard the operation of the principle of " Pre-established 
 Harmony" to be of importance only to the single case of body 
 and soul. This popular misinterpretation brings into the fore- 
 
 43 Abridgment Theodicy, 1. 
 
THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE. 115 
 
 ground the Cartesian problem of the relation of mind and 
 matter, but at the same time it modifies the value of the Leib- 
 nitzian Realism. The ingenuity, originality, and power of 
 reconciling the irreconcilable cannot but impress the reader of 
 Leibnitz. His scattered thoughts are all brilliant, keen, and 
 searching, but disconnected and often contradictory. In origi- 
 nality he has been compared with Aristotle and in analytical 
 keenness to Kant, but his utter lack of systematic expression 
 gives to him a position in philosophy far inferior to either. 
 
 THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE. 
 
 THEIR PROBLEM. 
 
 Before we turn our attention towards the British philoso- 
 phers, who look upon reality from an altogether different stand- 
 point, it may be well to take a brief retrospect of the whole 
 rationalistic school. At the beginning of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury the learned world was concerned with the reconciliation 
 of a new science to the traditions of philosophy and religion. 
 The former pointed to a mechanical universe in which both 
 God and man were subordinated to natural law, while the 
 more conservative thought still held to the God of Moses and 
 the Christian estimation of man. Various were the attempts 
 to deal with this reconciliation and various were the results 
 obtained. Should one over-emphasize natural law he would 
 evolve the Universe of the materialist with its countless human 
 machines ; and if, on the contrary, natural law were forgotten, 
 religion would become transformed into a mysticism or even 
 a fanaticism. 
 
 Various Solutions of the Problem. <5V"ith the Cartesian 
 metaphysics a new instrument was discovered which could be 
 very readily employed in effecting a proper balance between 
 law and God. This instrument was none other than a rigid 
 examination of the meaning of existence as founded on the 
 reality of the self. Instead of attempting the reconciliation 
 
116 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 just alluded to, Descartes stated the new problem of self- 
 certitude and turned the inquiry towards the relation between 
 this self and the external. But this solution of the new prob- 
 lem by Descartes, with its reliance on the self-evident, was by 
 no means sufficient to prevent any future advance. The mere 
 existence of the self, however assured it may be, is insufficient 
 to determine the relation of this self to a possible world beyond 
 / it. The central problem of the Cartesian theory becomes the 
 discovery of the relation between mind and matter. 
 
 Eeceiving from the hands of their master the mere state- 
 ment of the problem, the later Cartesians developed the doc- 
 : trine of " Occasional Cause." They conceived God to be the 
 ; mediator between the impulses of mind and the laws of matter. 
 Spinoza, looking at the same problem from a monistic stand- 
 point, considered it necessary to subsume mind and matter 
 under the unity of substance, in order to make possible their 
 mutual relation. And Leibnitz, approaching the problem from 
 an opposite direction, considered the spiritual unity of " Pre- 
 .established Harmony" to be the only ground for the separate 
 reality of self and the not-self. 
 
 Example of the Clocks. Perhaps the clearest appreciation 
 of the similarity and difference of the three rationalistic solu- 
 tions of the relation between mind and matter is expressed 
 in several letters written by Leibnitz, although the illustration 
 was suggested by earlier Cartesians. He considers two clocks 
 which run in perfect unison as a suggestive illustration of the 
 parallelism of mind and matter. The agreement of these two 
 timepieces may result from one of three causes. In the first 
 instance we may presuppose a skilled workman who constantly 
 keeps the two clocks in accord with one another. The workman 
 corresponds to God in the Occasionalistic hypothesis. As a 
 second explanation it is possible to believe that the two clocks 
 are not really separated but connected by some hidden bond, 
 such as sympathy of vibration. This illustrates the Imma- 
 nent God of Spinoza, in whom both mind and matter sub- 
 
THE RATIONALISTS AS A WHOLE. 117 
 
 sist. And thirdly, there is the possibility that the two clocks 
 "have been constructed with so much art and accuracy as to 
 assure their future harmony." This last explanation well illus- 
 trates the theory of " Pre-established Harmony" made promi- 
 nent in Leibnitz's own philosophy. 
 
 Its Deeper Meaning. In their metaphysics each branch of 
 the rationalistic school represents a distinct phase of the central 
 inquiry of speculative philosophy, the possibility of both unity 
 and variety. The deeper meaning of the old problem of mind 
 and matter was not distinctly understood by Descartes and his 
 immediate followers. For this reason we have God denned by 
 means of antithetical attributes. The God of Malebranche and 
 Geulincx supplies the ultimate and passive connection between 
 mind and matter; and at the same time He personified con- 
 stant activity, in so far as the relation between soul and body 
 was interpreted dynamically. In this twofold position of pas- 
 sive Unity and active Mediator, the Deity of the Cartesians 
 exhibits a distinct contradiction. While by original conception 
 the Cartesians have interpreted Descartes according to a more 
 consistent monism, they are compelled, nevertheless, to sacri- 
 fice this unity to a deeper plurality as soon as they attempt to 
 apply it to the world. They sought to harmonize activity and 
 passivity, without establishing a sufficient ground. 
 
 Following directly upon the failure of the Cartesians to 
 discover a real unity beneath the variety of the world, we meet 
 with the two opposing solutions of Spinoza and Leibnitz. The 
 meaning and importance of the contrast between these two is 
 of extreme moment. The Substance of Spinoza possessed an 
 absolute reality, it comprehended in its definition all that was 
 real; consistency required that the modes should be made 
 dependent and that their reality should arise only in their 
 relations to Substance. Leibnitz, on the contrary, gave to the 
 multitude of monads an individual existence as real as the 
 Spinozistic Substance and transformed this apparent pluralism 
 into a monism by the universal principle of " Pre-established 
 
118 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Harmony." The Cartesians were at a loss to reconcile pas- 
 sivity and activity in the Godhead; Spinoza emphasized the 
 former and evolved a realistic unity, requiring an idealistic 
 variety. Leibnitz started with a realistic variety and was com- 
 pelled to posulate the idealistic unity. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 LOCKE AND HIS INFLUENCE. 
 
 RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM CONTRASTED. 
 
 CONTEMPORANEOUS with the history of Continental Ration- 
 alism, the English philosophy of science developed its reliance 
 on the given facts of experience. We have met striking exam- 
 ples of the empirical and metaphysical sides of this attitude 
 of mind in earlier writers, such as Bacon and Hobbes. 
 Although nearly all of the thinkers of the Continent were more 
 or less influenced by the new ideas which directly sprung from 
 the impetus given to philosophy by Descartes, the Englishmen 
 remained apart from the general current. They set for them- 
 selves other problems, for the solution of which the rational- 
 istic formulae were of little avail; and even when the same 
 questions were investigated by both schools, the difference of 
 stand-point rendered the results obtained by one of little value 
 to the other. 
 
 The important and perhaps only thread that unites the 
 philosophical systems of the Cartesians, Spinoza, and Leibnitz 
 is their rationalistic foundation. The single bond that gives 
 a unity to the whole extent of British thought is the constant 
 and final reference to the test of experience. Historians of 
 philosophy have been accustomed to regard the antithesis 
 between the Rationalists and the English Empiricists as one 
 of extreme importance, for it well illustrates the differences 
 which may arise from a fundamental distinction in the episte- 
 mological stand-point. From their emphasis on the reason the 
 Rationalists developed the metaphysical and logical side of 
 philosophy; and on their emphasis of the value of experience 
 the English thinkers laid the foundation of a scientific psy- 
 chology. And when the two currents of thought united in the 
 
 119 
 
120 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 genius of Kant, each contributed its own necessary element 
 towards the realization of a broad and symmetrical philosophy. 
 Narrowness of Early Empiricism. The influence of 
 Hobbes was negative rather than positive; it served to stimu- 
 late and antagonize, but failed to excite the interest of any 
 who might have been capable of developing more fully the 
 suggestions of his significant but rather crude materialism. 
 When similar doctrines eventually sprung up all over Europe, 
 they could be traced only indirectly to Hobbes. He wrote at 
 a time when the attention of the English people was turned 
 towards political changes and had little time or inclination to 
 analyze and estimate a new system of metaphysics. Eeligious 
 principles were in the ascendency, and any philosophy that 
 conflicted with the dogmas of religion as a whole could expect 
 little sympathy from either Protestant or Catholic. If any 
 philosophy was to seriously effect the trend of national thought 
 it could not altogether disregard ancient traditions, nor, on the 
 other hand, could it spring from distinctly religious motives. 
 The materialism of Hobbes faded away because it tended 
 towards the former extreme. On the contrary, the voluminous 
 tracts which had their origin in the religious ferment of the 
 seventeenth century also failed to occasion more than a momen- 
 tary interest. The middle course, free from the narrowness 
 of either extreme, was followed by John Locke, the most in- 
 fluential of the English Empiricists. 
 
 JOHN LOCKE. 
 LIFE. 
 
 It was a coincidence that Locke, the broadest of English 
 Empiricists, was born in the same year as Spinoza. The stand- 
 points of the two men are absolutely different; yet there are 
 many points of resemblance in their philosophical systems 
 which the contrast in outward form seems to obscure. 
 
 Youth. John Locke was born on August 29, 1632, in 
 Wrington, a small village in the north of Somersetshire. His 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 121 
 
 father was a practising country attorney, from whom "he 
 probably derived, if not his earliest instruction, at least some 
 of his earliest influences and some of his most sterling charac- 
 teristics." 1 
 
 Mr. Fox-Browne, in his Life of Locke, quotes a letter from 
 Lady Masham, in which she says, " From Mr. Locke I have 
 often heard of his father, that he was a man of parts. Mr. 
 Locke never mentioned him but with great respect and affec- 
 tion. His father used a conduct towards him when young that 
 he often spoke of afterwards with great approbation. It was 
 the being severe to him by keeping him in much awe and at a 
 distance when he was a boy, but relaxing, still by degrees, of 
 that severity as he grew up to be a man, till, he being become 
 capable of it, he lived perfectly with him as a friend." 
 
 The young empiricist spent six years at Westminster School, 
 where he developed a dislike for the study of the Greek and 
 Latin classics. At twenty years of age he entered Christ 
 Church, Oxford, where the course of study convinced him of 
 the futility of the scholastic method of education. This is 
 often given as the reason why he failed to attain any promi- 
 nence in his studies, choosing rather to develop himself by an 
 extensive course of private reading. It is said that the works 
 of Descartes first drew his attention to philosophy, although 
 he never evinced very much sympathy with the more specu- 
 lative parts of Cartesianism. He regularly took the degrees 
 of Bachelor and Master of Arts, and in 1660 was appointed 
 Greek lecturer at Christ Church. 
 
 Political Career. The English government desired to es- 
 tablish an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg. For this 
 purpose Sir Walter Vane was sent to Cleves, the capital of 
 Brandenburg, at the head of an embassy in which Locke was 
 appointed secretary. This embassy accomplished nothing, and 
 returned to England after an absence of three months. Locke 
 
 *Life of Locke, by Thomas Fowler. 
 
122 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 soon after settled down again at Oxford, and devoted himself 
 seriously to the study of medicine, the profession which he 
 decided to adopt. About 1666 he made the acquaintance of 
 Lord Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley, with whom he remained 
 in close intimacy during the rest of Shaftesbury's life. He 
 acted as physician and trusted friend to the Ashley family. 
 He also became tutor to Shaftesbury's only son, Anthony, and 
 was finally entrusted with the delicate task of selecting a wife 
 for his young pupil. As a result of Locke's inquiries the 
 young Anthony was married to a daughter of the Earl of Rut- 
 land, to whom was born Anthony, third Earl of Shaftesbury 
 and author of the " Characteristics/' a name well known in 
 the history of English ethics. Locke assisted Ashley and the 
 other seven "lords proprietors" in the drafting of a constitu- 
 tion for the colony of Carolina. It is not known just what 
 part Locke had in the preparation of these articles, but it 
 is almost certain that he is accountable for the section relative 
 to religious freedom. In 1672 Shaftesbury became Lord High 
 Chancellor of England and Locke was made Secretary of Pre- 
 sentations. During the following year his patron was removed 
 from office, an event which caused Locke to lose the Secretary- 
 ship. Shortly after this circumstance Shaftesbury, who in the 
 meantime had been raised to another position of political im- 
 portance, was compelled to flee to Holland, owing to a connec- 
 tion with an unsuccessful revolution against Charles. Locke 
 followed the fortunes of his old friend, and accordingly he 
 went to Holland in 1683. Here he remained until 1689, when 
 the new political conditions rendered his return to England 
 admissible. William of Orange offered him several foreign 
 positions of importance, but his enfeebled health prevented 
 their acceptance. 
 
 Declining Years. His declining years were spent at Gates, 
 the seat of Sir Francis Masham. The wife of Sir Francis 
 was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, perhaps, of all the Eng- 
 lish thinkers, the one least in sympathy with the philosophy 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 123 
 
 of Locke. In the genial society and stanch friendship of the 
 Masham family Locke had the opportunity and leisure to enjoy 
 his tastes. He was constantly surrounded by men of promi- 
 nence in politics and science, among whom were Boyle and 
 Newton. Weekly meetings held at the house of Lord Pem- 
 broke for the express purpose of discussing matters of scien- 
 tific moment were a source of constant pleasure to Locke. 
 Here all the company felt at liberty to express their unbiased 
 views on whatever topic they saw fit. " These conversations, 
 ' undisturbed by such as could not bear a part in the best enter- 
 tainment of rational minds, free discourse concerning useful 
 truths/ were a source of great enjoyment to Locke." 2 During 
 the last few years of his life he interested himself in various 
 political undertakings, notably in the opposition to the depre- 
 ciation of the currency, and again in behalf of the English 
 woollen trade. Unfortunately, he was not spared the unpleas- 
 antness of religious controversy, for Stillingfleet, Bishop of 
 Worcester, provoked an extended correspondence regarding the 
 dogma of the trinity. On October 28, 1704, Locke died, having 
 been in very feeble health during the last few years of his life. 
 Literary Labors. Although Locke wrote a number of arti- 
 cles on various scientific, literary, and political subjects his 
 importance in the history of philosophy rests almost entirely 
 on "An Essay concerning Human Understanding." In the 
 epistle to the reader, prefixed to this work, Locke gives the 
 following account of its origin: "Were it fit to trouble thee 
 with the history of this essay, I should tell thee, that five or 
 six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a sub- 
 ject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a 
 stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had 
 awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolu- 
 tion of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my 
 thoughts that we took a wrong course, and that before we set 
 
 2 Fowler's Life of Locke. 
 
124 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to 
 examine our own abilities, and see what objects our under- 
 standings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I pro- 
 posed to the company, who all readily assented ; and thereupon 
 it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry." 3 This 
 " meeting," to which Locke above refers, took place about 1671, 
 but the "Essay" itself was not published until 1690, three 
 years after the appearance of Newton's " Principia" These 
 two works make the closing years of the seventeenth century 
 illustrious in the history of intellectual progress. Locke's 
 "Essay" has exerted a far greater influence than any other 
 English philosophical work; and the "Principia" written by 
 Locke's friend, has established the foundations of modern 
 mathematics and physics. In the case of Locke we meet with 
 a man who published practically nothing during his early life, 
 but after finishing and publishing his "Essay" he seems to 
 have acquired a certain degree of self-reliance, and thereafter 
 produced works on almost every conceivable topic. The publi- 
 cation of all his writings is confined to a period comprising the 
 last fifteen years of his life, during which the comparative 
 quiet of politics allowed him ample time for literary labor. 
 The "Essay concerning Human Understanding" is the first 
 of a long series of English works on introspective psychology. 
 The philosophy of Locke is remarkable above all else for an 
 acuteness of observation or " common sense," as it has been 
 called. Seldom does he approach the subtility or profundity 
 of the Continental philosophers, but far exceeds them all in 
 the acuteness of psychological analysis, portions of Spinoza's 
 " Efhics" alone excepted. His works are all intelligible to the 
 ordinary mind and are altogether devoid of any arrogance of 
 bearing or of expression. The clearness and freshness of treat- 
 ment which characterizes all his writings served to initiate a 
 wide-spread interest in speculative problems. Yet he is strictly 
 
 8 Epistle to the Reader, Locke's Works. 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 125 
 
 a psychologist and epistemologist, but wrote at a period when 
 the limits of the various fields of philosophy were unrecognized. 
 The description of inner experience is certainly an important 
 element in truth, and Locke's empiric stand-point turned the 
 course of philosophical inquiries into new and fertile fields. 
 
 OBJECT OF LOCKE'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Two distinct motives seem to have stimulated the production 
 of Locke's " Essay." On the one hand there was a practical 
 demand, in answer to which he endeavored to account for the 
 extent and limitation of human knowledge. Should he dis- 
 cover "the utmost extent of its tether," as he hoped; he felt 
 that it would furnish some ground whereby we could distin- 
 guish between the possible and the impossible. This desire to 
 define the limits of human inquiry was closely connected with 
 another motive which had considerable influence on the pro- 
 duction of the "Essay." Locke favored the "Low Church" 
 party of England against a twofold opposition. On the one 
 side was the " High Church," as represented by such men as 
 Stillingfleet and Lord, and on the other the atheistic tendencies 
 of Hobbes and the free-thinkers. While wishing to limit the 
 unsubstantiated speculations of both the uncritical clergy and 
 the Continental Kationalists, he sought also to show that the 
 human understanding cannot exist without the idea of God. 
 The discovery of the limits of human knowledge and the 
 development of a rational conception of God were the under- 
 lying motives in the philosophy of Locke. 
 
 THE SOURCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 In order to discover the limits of human knowledge, or even 
 to discuss knowledge itself, Locke considers it necessary to 
 understand the source of all our ideas. He recognizes but two 
 alternatives : the ideas may be imprinted upon the mind from 
 without, or else they may arise coincident with the very nature 
 of the mind itself. 
 
126 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Opposition to Innate Ideas. The first part of the 
 "Essay" is concerned with the refutation of the latter alter- 
 native, thus preparing the ground for a more ready acceptance 
 of the universality of the former. To prove that there is 
 nothing innate in the mind, he observes that the most ele- 
 mentary facts of knowledge, those which most readily suggest 
 common assent, are either the fundamental laws of thought or 
 the principles of morality. The former cannot be innate, for 
 they are consciously recognized only in a comparatively late 
 period of one's life. A child is aware that salt is not sugar 
 long before it is conscious of the fundamental law of thought 
 that " a thing cannot both be and not be." From similar ob- 
 servations Locke finds that the primary principles of morality 
 are not innate, for he conceives that the moral commandments 
 vary with the race and the individual; they are the imprints 
 of environments, and not the inborn laws of God. A distinct 
 code of morals is firmly impressed on the minds of all children 
 according to the example of their immediate surroundings; 
 and when the child later reflects on these principles, they 
 appear to have been present from birth. 
 
 True Source of Our Ideas. After having, to his own sat- 
 isfaction, disposed of; the possibility of innate ideas, Locke 
 believes himself able to declare that experience is the only 
 source of our knowledge. " Our observation employed either 
 about external sensible objects or about the internal operations 
 of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that 
 which supplies our understandings with all the materials of 
 thinking." 4 From an historical point of view the ideas arising 
 from mere sensation come first, while those proceeding from 
 reflection are later, because they need more careful attention 
 than the former. The mind is supposed to be at first like a 
 blank sheet of white paper, upon which is written the sensuous 
 impressions of the external world. These impressions are fur- 
 Locke's Essay, Book II., Chapter i., Sec. 2. 
 
f UNIVERSITY 1 
 JOHN fcOCKE. 127 
 
 ther reshaped by the reason into the more complex and abstract 
 ideas of the thinking process. 
 
 Epistemological Foundation. The older historians of 
 philosophy have been accustomed to place Locke among the 
 empiricists, and the general attitude of much that he has 
 written seems to warrant such a view. But on the other hand 
 the dual source of our knowledge in sensation and reflection 
 seems to demand a little hesitancy. And still more doubtful 
 of Locke's empiricism does one become when it is observed 
 that the "operation of the mind" or reason occupies a very 
 important place. True empiricism, in its logical consequence, 
 is sensationalism, a doctrine which we meet in Condillac, a 
 French disciple of Locke. But Locke himself was not dis- 
 tinctly aware of his epistemological position, although he well 
 represents the empirical tendencies of his race. While empha- 
 sizing sensation as the material source of our ideas, he gives to 
 the reason as high and as important a position as it occupies 
 in the system of any rationalist. Undoubtedly the empirical 
 school took its rise from the impetus which Locke gave to 
 philosophy, yet its founder cannot be regarded as a strict 
 empiricist. 
 
 THE NATURE OF OUR IDEAS. 
 
 Division of Ideas. SIMPLE IDEAS. With the general 
 source of our knowledge clearly before him, Locke proceeds to 
 divide the ideas into the simple and the complex, the former 
 representing the primary elements of the latter. 5 To the 
 former group he attributes four distinct classes : those simple 
 ideas which are acquired through a single sense, those from 
 many senses, those from reflection alone, and, finally, those 
 simple ideas which have their source in both sensation and 
 reflection. As an example of a simple idea of a single sense 
 may be mentioned color, sound, or heat. The ideas of "will- 
 
 s For further exposition, see the opening chapters of the second book 
 of Locke's Essay. 
 
128 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ing" and " thinking," which correspond to the " infinite modes" 
 of Spinoza, are regarded by Locke as simple ideas derived 
 from reflection alone. While pleasure, existence, or unity are 
 examples of simple ideas derived from both sensation and 
 reflection. 
 
 COMPLEX IDEAS. The simple ideas are the original atoms 
 out of which the mind constructs an almost endless variety of 
 complex ideas. In this transition from the simple to the com- 
 plex, Locke mentions six psychological processes or operations 
 which the mind employs. And it is this emphasis on the re- 
 arranging and remoulding of our ideas which warrants the 
 rationalistic interpretation of Locke earlier mentioned. While 
 in the reception of the simple ideas we may fail to perceive 
 any direct activity of the mind itself, yet when Locke proceeds 
 to the treatment of the complex ideas one is made to feel that 
 the mind is no longer a passive participant in the thinking 
 process, but rather an active and indispensable agent. The 
 first of these psychological activities by which the mind trans- 
 forms the simple ideas into the complex is perception. This 
 faculty was regarded by Locke as the distinguishing trait of 
 the animal kingdom, and is best defined as the conscious recog- 
 nition of the simple idea. Beyond the mere perception, the 
 mind is able to compare its various ideas, either by directly 
 contemplating them together or else by the retention in the 
 memory of previous impressions. In this act of comparison 
 it is necessary for the mind to clearly discern both the super- 
 ficial and the subtile distinctions between its various ideas. 
 And it is the development of this faculty of discernment which 
 makes possible clearness and accuracy of thought. The fifth 
 faculty of the mind to which Locke draws our attention is the 
 compounding or uniting of the simpler mental states into the 
 more complex ones. The last and by far the most highly 
 evolved process of the mind is that of abstraction. This is the 
 ability to form general concepts by the observation of numerous 
 particular cases. By this process of abstraction one is able to 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 129 
 
 define a common characteristic, present in all members of a 
 class, and to distinguish the class by this common quality. 
 Thus we are able to abstract from many objects, such as chalk, 
 snow, and milk, a common color which we call whiteness ; and 
 we define as a class all objects to which this general idea is 
 capable of application. Locke thought that he had discovered 
 in the power of abstraction a means for determining the rela- 
 tive capacity of the intellect. Brutes were totally devoid of 
 this faculty, while it is barely visible in idiots, savages, and 
 children. Whether any one does possess this power has been 
 doubted, and the question will be more fully considered in the 
 study of Berkeley and Hume. At least modern anthropology 
 seems to countenance Locke's theory, as far as abstract names 
 are concerned. The inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, one of 
 the five lowest of natural races, are said to possess a language 
 so lacking in general terms that thirty thousand separate words 
 are required, and the people are incapable of counting beyond 
 three. 
 
 DIVISION OF COMPLEX IDEAS. In the foregoing exposition 
 it is observable that Locke is chiefly concerned with intro- 
 spective psychology. He approaches the problems of his philos- 
 ophy by inquiring into the genetic source of the states of the 
 mind, by asking what we observe to be true rather than what 
 must or ought to be true. But once his primary analysis of 
 the mind was firmly established, Locke felt it necessary for 
 him to consider more speculative issues. He divided all com- 
 plex ideas, of whatever origin or character, into three distinct 
 groups. The most fundamental, from a metaphysical stand- 
 point, was the group of substances which comprehends all com- 
 plex ideas referrible to " distinct particular things subsisting 
 by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of 
 Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief." * As an 
 example of a substance take the metal lead. This includes in 
 
 Locke s Essay, Book II., Chapter xii. 
 9 
 
130 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a single complex idea many simple ideas, as color, weight, 
 hardness, and fusibility, combined with the concept of a tan- 
 gible objective something or substance. The second division 
 or group of complex ideas was called modes. This was in- 
 tended to include all those ideas which refer to states of 
 " affections" of the more fundamental substances. Thus such 
 ideas as are conveyed by the words gratitude, wonder, hatred 
 are not completely intelligible in themselves, but require the 
 logical premise of some substance, such as a man or a child. 
 And still again there are classes of complex ideas which are 
 called relations and arise from the comparison of several ideas. 
 All complex ideas of relation are derived from the comparison 
 of other ideas. They are generally brief methods of explaining 
 comparison. 
 
 Substance. In the foregoing definitions one can clearly 
 perceive the difference of meaning which the English mind 
 attributes to terms already used in the more speculative sys- 
 tems of the Continent. To the Eationalists, as well as to 
 Locke himself, Substance meant the metaphysical premise upon 
 which a philosophy of the external world must ultimately rest ; 
 that which is absolutely real in itself. The speculative trend 
 of the Cartesians led them to connect this primal reality with 
 God, Nature, or activity ; the simple " common sense" of 
 Locke led him to interpret Substance as the separate objects 
 of a material, external world of sense. This fundamental dif- 
 ference in the use of a single term well illustrates the distinc- 
 tion between the two attributes of thought. The followers of 
 Descartes sought a unity beyond the apprehension of the 
 human mind, and from the hypothetical character of its defini- 
 tion they were able to regard it as the logical essence of the 
 Universe. Locke, on the contrary, founded the base of his 
 metaphysics on what is looked upon as real by all, the objects 
 of sense. But when he came to define Substance more defi- 
 nitely, he found himself at a loss for adequate expression. He 
 employed the term very much in the scholastic sense of a 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 131 
 
 " central something" which upholds the various attributes or 
 qualities, " the supposed but unknown support of those quali- 
 ties we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, ( sine 
 re substante/ without something to support them." 7 This 
 doctrine of Substance is a much more important element in the 
 system of Locke than might appear at first sight. Not only 
 does it exhibit the contrast between his own position and that 
 of the Continental thinkers, as well as suggesting a distinct 
 problem for Berkeley and Hume, but it also supplies a ground 
 for Locke's whole attitude towards the limits of scientific 
 inquiry. The contrast which he makes between Substance and 
 the perceivable qualities which inhere in it, is a contrast which 
 separates the absolutely real world an understanding of which 
 would require a knowledge of this unknowable substance and 
 the world of scientific phenomena presented to us by the senses 
 and intelligibly through experiment. 
 
 Primary and Secondary Qualities. In this connection 
 Locke is careful to distinguish between primary and secondary 
 qualities. The former produces the ideas of extension, solidity, 
 or figure; ideas which are empirically real in the object, that 
 is, independent of human apprehension. The secondary quali- 
 ties, on t the other hand, such as the colors, tastes, or sounds, 
 are to be distinguished from the primary in that they are 
 directly dependent on the senses and possess no real existence 
 in the object itself. This distinction between primary and 
 secondary qualities is closely connected with Locke's doctrine 
 of Substance and is of great importance in subsequent British 
 thought. It forms the central distinction between Locke on 
 the one side and Berkeley and Hume on the other. 
 
 Modes. In his treatment of modes Locke feels more con- 
 fidence in himself than he shows in the exposition of his un- 
 known substance. For convenience he divides all modes into 
 the simple and the mixed, according to the complexity of the 
 
 7 Locke's Essay, Book II., Chapter xxiii., Sec. 2. 
 
. \ 
 1 1 
 ' ' 
 
 132 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ideas from which they spring. The ideas of space and time are 
 the more important simple modes, and both take their origin 
 from rejection. The modal concept of space results from a 
 reflection on the objects of sight and touch; tinie upon the 
 succession of our__ideas. We construct the concepts of an 
 infinite space and an infinite time, by observing that a single 
 portion of either really requires its own limitlessness. As 
 examples of mixed or more complex modes Locke instances the 
 ideas implied by obligation, drunkenness, falsehood : " they are 
 not looked upon to be characteristical of any real beings that 
 have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas 
 put together by the mind." 8 
 
 Relation of Personal Identity. The third and last group 
 of complex ideas arise from the relations between the various 
 states of mind. These are almost innumerable in kind and 
 character, one of the most interesting of which is that of iden- 
 tity. Locke meets the old problem of what constitutes personal 
 identity or sameness of a human being by the simple criterion 
 of consciousness. The personality of a man is the same so long 
 as the consciousness of past states of thought and action remain 
 unaltered, but the continuation of the same body does not make 
 the same person unless there is a continuity of consciousness. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 After having treated of the various elements which enter 
 into our thought, Locke in the fourth book of his "Essay" 
 considers himself ready to deal with the problem of knowledge 
 itself. He formally defines knowledge as "the perception of 
 the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repug- 
 nancy of any of our ideas," 9 and describes three distinct grades 
 or degrees. We have immediate or intuitive knowledge of the 
 existence of the self ; demonstrative knowledge of the existence 
 
 8 Locke's Essay, Book II., Chapter xxii., Sec. 1. 
 Ibid., Book IV., Chapter i., Sec. 2. 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 133 
 
 of God ; and, finally, a sensitive knowledge of the existence of 
 all other objective things. As regards our belief in the exist- 
 ence of the self, Locke follows the " cogito ergo sum" of Des- 
 cartes, but is inclined to feel little confidence in the ontological 
 proof of God. In its stead Locke substitutes the proof from 
 firstcause, generally known as the cosmological. The exist- 
 ence of the individual self, of which we have intuitive cer- 
 tainty, when analyzed really requires the existence of something 
 beyond; this in its turn demands something further, and so 
 on to the necessary existence of a First- Cause. The present 
 reality of the self therefore requires the omniscient and eternal 
 Being of God as its ultimate cause. 
 
 Limits of Knowledge. Two motives, we earlier observed, 
 were prominent in Locke's mind during the production of his 
 "Essay." By this causal proof for the existence of God he 
 felt himself able to oppose any atheistic tendencies which might 
 emanate from the Hobbesian metaphysics, but there still re- 
 mained the desire to define the limits and capabilities of the 
 human intellect. From his empirical presuppositions Locke 
 felt sure that our ideas are necessarily resjricied to .,the. posgeiL 
 and scope of the senses; while he further observed that our 
 knowledge, which can only arise from the limited perceptions 
 of a few ideas^has even a rnpre restricted fi e id than the sense- 
 perceptions themselves. The position of Locke in this regard 
 is quite remarkable. At the same time that he restricts our 
 knowledge to a range even narrower than the senses, he is care- 
 ful to point out that the existence of God is quite as infallible 
 as the demonstrable principles of mathematics, and that " the 
 bare testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty." 10 
 Locke here takes a stand which is in marked contrast to the 
 position later developed by Kant in his " Critique of Pure 
 Reason" 
 
 Science. The pursuit of scientific inquiry is ultimately 
 
 10 Locke's Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvi., Sec. 14. 
 
134 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 limited to the ideas obtained from the senses. But even this 
 range cannot give us incontestable scientific knowledge. There 
 are two types of condition which limit the discovery of abso- 
 lute knowledge, the one due to the unknowable character of 
 substance, the other to the limits_of the human intellect. By 
 no means whatsoever can the mind penetrate to the absolute 
 understanding of substance, the real essence of things behind 
 the field of sense-impression. The true and incontestable pro- 
 cesses of nature, which neither the sense can appreciate or the 
 reason comprehend, are forever hidden from our inquiry. It is 
 true that the knowledge of the sequence of events, the knowl- 
 edge of the qualities and accidents of substance, lead us to a 
 belief in the high probability of the truth of our observation, 
 but an absolute certainty of the laws of nature could arise only 
 from a perfect knowledge of substance. 
 
 The second restriction to the pursuit of scientific knowledge 
 is concerned with the imperfections of sense and reason. 
 Truth consists in the correct union of ideas, according to their 
 agreement with things. But this test is very limited in its 
 application. Owing to the paucity of clear and distinct ideas 
 of spirit we can have no .true scientific knowledge of spiritual 
 things, and from the lack of knowledge of atoms we can have 
 no perfect knowledge of bodies, since we cannot know the 
 nature of their finest parts. And, furthermore, when we come 
 to the imperfection of our reason we find other difficulties. 
 The syllogism of logic often leads to error, while all processes 
 of reasoning abound in false assumptions and undefined 
 terms. 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 Basis of Morality. Before closing this account of a few 
 of the important and influential doctrines of Locke it may be 
 well to refer briefly to his attitude towards some of the contro- 
 verted questions of ethics. He regards the relation between 
 God and man as the basis for the principles of morality; the 
 moral law as the expression of His divine will. At the same 
 
JOHN LOCKE. 135 
 
 time Locke believes that these basal principles, such as justice 
 or benevolence, are capable of demonstration, 11 and looks to the 
 future to establish them with the same certainty as is attached 
 to the theorems of Euclid. His advocacy of the objectivity of 
 the ethical principles is countenanced by his doctrine of moral 
 control. 
 
 Theory of the Will. The idea of power, which we obtain 
 from observing the various changes in our own consciousness, 
 especially the flow of thought, served to supply Locke with a 
 ground for his theory of the will. He is very careful at this 
 point to avoid a confusion of terms, a merit which is not uni- 
 versal among writers on this subject. Liberty is as little ap- 
 plicable to the will as squareness is to virtue; it is simply the 
 power to follow one's own mental preference and is opposed to 
 external restraint. Thus we arc not at liberty "to lay by 
 the idea of pain," nor is the prisoner at liberty to escape. The 
 will, on the contrary, is another power of having a preference, 
 and its nature is in no wise affected by the liberty to realize 
 this preference in the external world. The deepest spring of 
 action is, in Locke's mind, the desire for happiness. It is the 
 universal and primary sanction that ultimately shapes the 
 course of the will. This constant desire for happiness results 
 in a certain uneasiness or discontent with the present surround- 
 ings; and this in turn stimulates the judgment of the mind 
 to decide upon some action. The decisions of the judgment 
 with regard to a pleasurable action are the final motives which 
 definitely determine the will. This view of the volition is 
 accepted by practically all the later English thinkers and 
 bears a close resemblance to the naturalistic determination of 
 Spinoza. 
 
 LOCKE'S INFLUENCE. 
 
 Comparison with Leibnitz. In the philosophy of Locke 
 one feels the presence of a mind of the first order, with a dis- 
 
 11 Locke's Essay, Book IV., Chapter iii., Sec. 18. 
 
136 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tinct power of introspective analysis. In comparison with Leib- 
 nitz we observe a sharp distinction in mental force. Both pos- 
 sessed intellects of the first order, but totally different in char- 
 acter. Leibnitz was quick, energetic, strikingly original, and 
 often superficial; Locke was slow, tenacious of purpose, ana- 
 lytical, but not remarkably original. If Locke had written at 
 a more recent date he would be regarded chiefly as an episte- 
 mologist and psychologist. His method aims to describe rather 
 than explain, to analyze rather than synthesize. Even when 
 he approaches more profound questions of metaphysics the 
 same reliance on inner experience is observable. In the causal 
 demonstration of God's existence he utterly fails to reach the 
 standards of logical power already attained by the Schoolmen 
 and the Continental philosophers. His influence, however, 
 came at the time it was most needed, and served to show the 
 necessity for an introspective element in all philosophy. 
 
 Extent of Influence. This influence of Locke's stand-point 
 and method, truly one of the prime factors of modern phi- 
 losophy, extended all over the learned world. It occasioned 
 a long and systematic refutation on the part of Leibnitz and 
 involved its author in controversies with the High-Church- 
 men and the " Free-thinkers." On its positive side Locke's 
 philosophy served to excite no less than four separate and dis- 
 tinctly original tendencies. These sprung from certain funda- 
 mental conceptions developed in the "Essay' 9 each of which^ 
 like the imperfect Socratic schools of Greece, laid stress on 
 but a single aspect of the master's thought. By far the most 
 profound of these tendencies, and the one which forms the 
 logical completion of Locke's work, is traceable in Berkeley 
 and Hume. It emphasizes the subjective side of Locke's 
 empirico-rationalism. It narrows the epistemological dualism 
 of sensation and reflection to the mere reception of ideas, and 
 avoids the inconsistency of substance and primary qualities. 
 Directly opposite to the school of Berkeley and Hume was the 
 pure empiricism, or sensationalism, which found a welcome in 
 
FRENCH SENSATIONALISM. 137 
 
 France. This discarded the reflective element in knowledge 
 and sought to prove that organs of sense supplied the only and 
 sufficient approach to truth. 
 
 Besides these two tendencies which are concerned with 
 Locke's epistemology we can trace a religious and an ethical 
 movement due to the further growth of the empirical principles 
 and likewise to the subsequent reaction against them. The 
 former sought to develop a natural as opposed to a revealed 
 religion, placing its reliance on the belief that the existence of 
 God was capable of a rational demonstration. The ethical 
 influence of Locke was rather indecisive in character and 
 somewhat difficult to trace. It appeared most clearly in the 
 general demand for a rational ground of morality, the ten- 
 dency to develop the concept of goodness from experience and 
 reason rather than from religious emotions. Owing to the ex- 
 treme importance of Berkeley and Hume, we shall leave the 
 development of their relations to Locke until the following 
 chapter ; but the sensationalistic, the religious, and the ethical 
 tendencies may be advantageously considered here. 
 
 FRENCH SENSATIONALISM. 
 
 The variety and many-sidedness of the Lockeian philosophy 
 was the source of a most exacting sensationalism and mate- 
 rialism. It had its centre of activity in France, where the 
 whole eighteenth century is characterized by a revolt against 
 religious traditions. Montesquieu and Voltaire are generally 
 accredited with the introduction of English philosophy among 
 the French. Their importance lies more in popularizing the 
 empiric philosophy than in the development of anything new. 
 The reputation of Montesquieu rests chiefly upon his achieve- 
 ments in political science rather than in speculative philosophy. 
 His classic work, " The Spirit of the Laws'' 12 contains a favor- 
 able estimation of Locke's interpretation of the English con- 
 
 "L'Esprit des Lois. 
 
138 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 stitution. Voltaire, equally well known in general literature, 
 opposed the optimistic teleology of Leibnitz and sought to in- 
 troduce to his countrymen the naturalism of Locke and 
 Newton. 
 
 By far the most profound of the French sensationalists was 
 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac. He was born in 1715, lived the 
 peaceful and unassuming life of a student and thinker, and 
 died in 1780. Although he was Abbot of Mureaux and some- 
 time tutor to the grandson of Louis XV., his philosophy is 
 remarkably free from sectarianism. In his attempt to estab- 
 lish an uncompromising sensationalism by the inductive 
 method, Condillac admits a thorough empiricism in his general 
 attitude towards the source of our ideas. While Locke proves 
 to his own satisfaction that knowledge originates from sensa- 
 tion and reflection by precluding all other possibilities, Condil- 
 lac believes that he is able to definitely trace all our ideas to 
 sensation alone. His method for accomplishing this result is 
 unique and interesting. Starting with a statue which is en- 
 dowed only with the sense of smell, 13 Condillac imagines va- 
 rious odors presented to it, each of which leaves a faint mem- 
 ory image. By mere passive attention to these memory images 
 and the recognition of sameness and identity, there arises the 
 power of reflection, the reason, and the will. And further, 
 should the other four senses be added to that of smell, one after 
 the other, the statue would gradually acquire all the psychic 
 processes which we associate with the human mind. On the 
 same grounds Condillac believes the self-conscious and per- 
 sonal identity of the subject to consist in the mass of sensory 
 impressions united by the memory. 
 
 Materialism. In the strict sense of the word Condillac was 
 not a materialist, for his sensations are mere subjective states 
 
 18 " Les connoissance de notre statue borages au sens de 1'odorat, ne 
 peuvent s'Stendre qu' a des odeurs." Traits des Sensations, Part I., 
 Chapter i. 
 
FRENCH SENSATIONALISM. 139 
 
 and give us no ground for a belief in the absolute reality of the 
 material world. But the transition from a pure sensationalism 
 to pure materialism is by no means difficult. It has been ob- 
 served that a sensationalistic epistemology always accompanies 
 a materialistic metaphysic; so that Condillac readily found 
 disciples who did not hesitate to combine the two stand-points. 
 To mention all the French materialists of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury would be a difficult task. Certain among them, notably 
 Diderot, La Mettrie, D'Holbach, and Cabanis, developed the 
 most perfect materialism that the history of philosophy has 
 ever seen. 
 
 Denis Diderot { the first notable name among the French ma- 
 terialist^, was educated under church influences, but the study 
 of the English empiricists gradually turned his mind to a 
 materialism in which God was only a name without definite 
 place. The name of Diderot is universally associated with the 
 French Encyclopaedia 14 of which he was the editor-in-chief. 
 This work was published in twenty-eight volumes during the 
 years following 1750. It had as its covert intention the under- 
 mining of traditional authority by the sceptical question, 
 " Que sais je ?" It answered this inquiry by exhibiting the un- 
 certainty and limited range of the achievements which the 
 human intellect had thus far accomplished. But the barrier 
 between scepticism and materialistic atheism is very easily trav- 
 ersed, and the step had already been taken by the French 
 physician, Julien Offray de la Jtfe^rjp* 
 
 He was born in 1709, and early obtained considerable promi- 
 nence as a physician, but was expelled from France and Hol- 
 land on account of atheistic writings. He found a protector in 
 the person of Frederick the Great, of Prussia, at whose court he 
 died in 1751. 
 
 La Mettrie remarks in the preliminary observations to his 
 " (Euvres Philosoptyques" that he " does not pretend to favor 
 
 14 Encyclop6die-Dictionnaire Kaissonng. 
 
140 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 atheism, but only examine it as a disinterested physician/' but 
 nevertheless he suggests at the same time that a society com- 
 posed of atheists would be more successful than one in which 
 the recognized laws of morality were superimposed on religious 
 fanaticism. A classic work of La Mettrie, " The Man- 
 Machine" 15 attempts to prove that all the characteristics which 
 we associate with mental processes, the ideals of religion, 
 beauty, and justice, result from the peculiar conditions of the 
 structure of the human organism, and are referable in all cases 
 to move^e^tswithin tjie r j^ervoussjstejn. It is only the physi- 
 cian who is the philosopher, because he alone understands the 
 structure and laws of this very complicated piece of mechanism, 
 and these laws, when thoroughly understood, will be able to 
 explain every characteristic of man. The physical state of 
 sleep or the presence of opium is able to change entirely the 
 mental life, " a sleeping soldier is oblivious of the bomb that 
 is ready to tear him to pieces." The diet of men affects their 
 mental processes, rare meat makes a race fierce and indocile; 
 rage, moral degeneracy, and madness are the immediate effects 
 of hunger. And since the organic functions comprise the en- 
 tire being of man, the purpose of life is the gratification of 
 those pleasures which arise from bodily activities. The pleas- 
 ures of the mind, however, because they are more permanent 
 and less restricted, are superior to the sensuous pleasures. 
 
 The fact that man like other natural formations is a function 
 of matter and its laws was further reinforced by observations 
 among the lower animals. We are able to find very little differ- 
 ence except in complexity of structure between the brain of man 
 and the brain of the monkey. La Mettrie even advances the 
 supposition that a monkey could be so trained as to become 
 a " perfect man, a little polite fellow, with as many parts and 
 members as ourselves, able to think and profit by his educa- 
 tion." This materialist praises Descartes for interpreting the 
 
 " L'Homme Machine. 
 
FRENCH SENSATIONALISM. 141 
 
 brute as an automaton, since this is the first step towards the 
 recognition of universal mechanism throughout the whole or- 
 ganic world ; " that man is a machine and that there is in the 
 universe only a single substance differently modified." : 
 
 D'Holpjfacfi, in his classic work on the " System of Nature" 
 (" Systeme de la Nature"), endeavors to show that the valuable 
 moral ideals are supported by materialism, although the exist- 
 ence of God, the soul, and the possibility of human immortality 
 cannot be recognized. D'Holbach believes that the happiness ^ 
 derived from helping mankind is greater than would be realized/ 
 from the reward of Heaven. 
 
 Pierre J^^Cab^is, a prominent physician of the French 
 revoIutTonary period, was the last and perhaps the most in- 
 fluential of the eighteenth-century materialists. He defined the 
 psychical processes as simply the phenomena of the nervous 
 system, stimulated by the sensuous impressions from the real 
 physical world. "Vivre, c'est sentir." To live is to sense. 17 
 He describes the various emotions and mental states as the 
 direct product of nervous activities arising from mechanical 
 and chemical changes. Influencing the formation of ideas and 
 moral affections there are six primary conditions, age, sex, 
 temperament, disease, habit, and climate. 17 Controlled by the 
 same physiological laws, thought emanates from the brain in 
 the same manner that bile is secreted by the liver. 
 
 Stand-point of Materialism. As a whole the materialists 
 stand for a perfectly definite attitude of mind. They are im- 
 pressed with the universal mechanism to be observed wherever 
 they conduct their scientific studies, and can discover no suf- 
 ficient reason to prevent the application of mechanical laws to 
 human values. They are monists in the strictest sense of the 
 word, matter with its motion is the primordial Substance, the 
 
 16 " Que 1'Homme est une Machine ; & qu'il n'y a dans tout PUnivers 
 qu'une seule substance diversement modifiee." L'Homme Machine. 
 17 " Rapports du Physique et du Moral de 1'Homme." 
 
142 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 self -existent and eternally immutable. In the earlier instance 
 of Hobbes materialism was just emerging from its scholastic 
 background, Substance still retained its early significance of a 
 metaphysical substratum, while matter was its physical repre- 
 sentation. But the French materialists of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury had withdrawn from all traditions which could in any wise 
 modify the extent of their position. Imbued with the scien- 
 tific enthusiasm which was developing about them, they sought 
 to go even to the utmost limits of possible science and define 
 a speculative structure in accordance with which experimental 
 science might some time accomplish its ideal, the reduction of 
 life to mechanical terms. In its deeper meaning their phi- 
 losophy teaches that the science of mind is somehow a part of 
 the whole science of nature, a conclusion with which all schools 
 of monism are in agreement. 
 
 THE DEISTS. 
 
 The second philosophical movement which arose from the 
 influence of Locke has been called English Deism. No exact 
 and definite characterization of this tendency of thought is 
 possible; those men who are generally associated with it seem 
 devoid of any striking similarity in the result of their reflec- 
 tions. It is more a religi^us^attitude than a metaphysical 
 qfifoonl- more a synthesiscJ faith and reason than an analysis 
 of either. In general English Deism is a sort of philosophical 
 religion, a pantheism personified. Locke had taught that the 
 existence of God was the necessary presupposition following 
 directly from the existence of the self. If this stand-point is 
 granted, then reason has successfully invaded the field of re- 
 vealed religion; a dogma of faith has been approved by the 
 laws of the intellect. Once this signal step is taken, all re- 
 ligion and Christianity must be subjected to reason, a task 
 which the Deists attempted with all the hope of success. In 
 brief, Deism appears as the advocate of natural religion. It 
 exhorts men to see God in all natural processes, and to recognize 
 
J 
 
 LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS. 143 
 
 His voice in the conscience. In connection with this move- 
 ment two names are worthy of mention, Toland. anji i Chut&. 
 
 John Toland was born in 1670 and was educated as an Irish 
 Catholic " in the grossest superstition and idolatry/' 18 In his 
 chief work, (f Christianity not Mysterious" which appeared six 
 years after Locke's " Essay," Toland endeavors to examine, in 
 the light of reason, the various tenets of simple Christianity 
 undefiled by ecclesiastical interpretation. In the process of this 
 investigation he is able to discover nothing which contradicts 
 the reason, nor which is mysterious or occult ; and although it 
 contains many things that our narrow intellects cannot ade- 
 quately grasp, there is nothing in the religion of Christ which 
 absolutely contradicts the laws of human thought. 
 
 The moral side of Deism is brought into the foreground by 
 the teachings of a very interesting character named Thomas 
 Chubb, a poor tallow-chandler. Like Jacob Boehme, he sought 
 to interpret Christianity to the lowest classes of society. In his 
 teachings Chubb recognizes the reason as a divine gift, by 
 which God enables man to worship him through a life of simple 
 morality. Love, usefulness, and purity are the only means to 
 grace, happiness in this world and in the life to come. 
 
 LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS. 
 
 The simple faith of Chubb, exhorting all mankind to a life 
 of rational morality, forms a fitting transition from the Deisti- 
 cal to the Ethical influence of Locke. The French thinkers 
 have always exhibited a remarkable power of logical analysis, 
 often developing into materialism and scepticism; the Ger- 
 mans have evinced an aptitude for profound and subtile meta- 
 physics, for originality and systematization. But to the British 
 thinkers belongs the credit of founding and developing modern 
 psychology and ethics. The " English moralists" from Hobbes 
 to Green represent a movement of modern thought of the first 
 
 18 Preface to " Christianity not Mysterious." 
 
144 HISTORY -OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 importance. A single central theme runs through the whole 
 of English ethics, the discovery of the 
 
 morality, and each of the eignTe^th-celitury moralists con- 
 tributes his own solution to this problem. The mention of 
 three names will be sufficient to distinguish the general char- 
 acter of these writings : Clarke, who emphasized the reasonable- 
 ness of morality ; Shajtesbury its beauty ; and Butler its origin 
 in the conscience. 
 
 Samuel Clarke, born 1675, in Norwich, England, and edu- 
 cated at the University of Cambridge, supplements Locke's 
 belief in the rational foundations of morality by a rationalistic 
 metaphysic. He maintains the supposition that certain neces- 
 sary and eternal laws control the relations between every ele- 
 ment of the world. Each thing possesses an individuality of 
 its own, by virtue of which there is a unique relation with 
 every other thing. In some cases these relations express a cer- 
 tain degree of adaptability or fitness of relation between things ; 
 while again they indicate an heterogeneity and antipathy. In 
 Clarke's method of proving these contentions he follows the 
 "more geometrico" of Spinoza, and arrives at the conclusion 
 of a dynamic world, not unlike that of Leibnitz. In his moral 
 philosophy Clarke is as rationalistic as his Continental masters, 
 only he emphasizes Locke's statement, "Moral principles are 
 capable of demonstration." Goodness is the expression of the 
 fitting and appropriate relations between things, while the term 
 evil indicates those relations of the opposite type. Clarke ob- 
 serves in the first "Discourse concerning Natural and Revealed 
 Religion/' one of the most remarkable portrayals in English 
 of a rationalistic ethics and theology, "Also that, from the 
 different Eelations of different Persons one to another, there 
 necessarily arises a Fitness or Unfitness of certain Manners of 
 Behavior of some Persons towards others: Is as manifest, as 
 that the Properties which flow from the Essences of different 
 mathematical Figures, have different Congruities or Incon- 
 gruities between themselves/' Among these fitting moral rela- 
 
LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON ETHICS. 145 
 
 tions are to be mentioned the worship of God, the exercise of 
 charity, honesty, and mercy. Virtue COTusktsi^oj^ 
 the inf allib^^ason, the^t^^^S^ons Eetwee^magia^d^his 
 envifonment ; " ana j^thT^sCTvaJp.^^^''^^? immutable laws 
 
 oTTirtueTs to be found the only true happiness. There are, 
 however, many men who are too weak to be guided by the rea- 
 sonableness of virtue and who need an artificial stimulus. To 
 this latter class Clarke regards revelation and the promise of 
 future reward to be of especial help. In recognizing the neces- 
 sary existence of both good and evil relations Clarke mediates 
 between the uncritical optimism of the last quarter of the seven- 
 teenth century Leibnitz and Shaftesbury and the pessimistic 
 tinge to be found at the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
 Swift and Mandeville 19 and Voltaire. 
 
 Perhaps the most widely read of the English moralists was 
 Anthony Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, earlier referred to 
 in connecton with the life of Locke. He differed far more 
 with Locke than did Clarke, and lacked the speculative ability 
 of the latter. In fact it is no exaggeration to say that Shaftes- 
 bury had little foundation for his ethics, a circumstance which 
 by no means benefited the latter. Throughout all nature he 
 saw, like the ancient Stoics, a harmony and simplicity of law 
 and order, which led him to interpret the Universe in terms of 
 beauty. Man's relation to this natural beauty was reflected in 
 the " moral sense," a faculty of the mind as original in charac- 
 ter as the reason or the feeling. The operation of the " moral 
 sense" is immediate and altogether separable from the decision 
 of the intellect. Through the demands of this immediate fac- 
 ulty mankind is led towards benevolence and altruism. Happi- 
 
 19 " So vice is beneficial found 
 
 When it's by Justice lopt and bound." 
 
 Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turn'd Honest. 
 
 Mandeville contended that social prosperity and racial progress are 
 promoted by the struggles and vices of the individuals rather than by 
 the exercise or Christian virtues. 
 
 10 
 
146 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ness, contentment, and prosperity result only from a life of ser- 
 vice to others. Shaftesbury introduces a line of ethical thought 
 in his writings which runs in opposition to Hobbes, Locke, and 
 Clarke; it shows a distinct reaction against the assurance in 
 reason so generally prominent in the opposite empirical school of 
 ethics. All these intuitional writers seek to give the moral law 
 a foundation above and beyond the sense or the reason, either 
 in an innate faculty of the soul or in the direct voice of God. 
 The two attitudes, the empirical and the intuitional, were 
 somewhat united by Bishop Butler, Dean of St. Paul's. On the 
 one hand he admits the operation of a certain complex moral 
 faculty, the intuitional sense; while on the other hand the 
 exercise of the conscience is possible only through the reason. It 
 will be observed that Shaftesbury gives us no analysis of the 
 "moral sense." This is attempted by Joseph Butler, the 
 author of " The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, 
 to the Constitution and Course of Nature/' one of the classical 
 religious works of English thought. Butler finds that Nature 
 acts according to conceptual processes, which find a correspond- 
 ence in the moral life of man. Certain activities are "appro- 
 priate to the constitution of Nature, and likewise certain 
 actions are proper according to the characteristics and organiza- 
 tion of man. But just as there is a reason which guides our 
 thoughts towards the ends of truth, so also there is a conscience, 
 the observance of which leads men to virtue and happiness. 
 This conscience is the source of moral activity, and exerts its 
 authority in view of the ends best adapted to the progress of 
 mankind and the purposes of God. The lowest element ob- 
 servable in the conscience is concerned with the lower pas- 
 sions, which arouse the interests of self-love, and very often 
 moral relations towards our fellows. Benevolence is a higher 
 stage of the conscience, while in its complete expression Butler 
 finds both an intuitional and a rational significance; the for- 
 mer is the foundation of morality, while the latter is the means 
 of its expression. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT. 147 
 
 THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT. 
 
 The tendencies of empirical thought, first consciously for- 
 mulated by Bacon and Hobbes, were fully developed by Locke 
 and his immediate followers. The points wherein the English 
 philosophy of this period differ from the rationalistic tenden- 
 cies of earlier and later Continental thought are very difficult 
 to appreciate in other than the most general terms. The dif- 
 ference lies more in stand-ppi^t. than jg jrwntppt^- mnrp in the 
 a ttjtude, towards thjjjEOjld than in the deeper results of philo- 
 sophical inquiry. This is a fact which is quite remarkable 
 and inclined to be overlooked. It is certainly true that the 
 outward form, the language, the methods, and even the imme- 
 diate conclusions of the empirical philosophy stands in marked 
 contrast to the similar characteristics of the Continental think- 
 ers. Yet this notable contrast does not penetrate to the central 
 meaning of the two schools. Beneath the form of expression, 
 the accidents of temperament and environment, beneath even 
 the conclusions of the individual man himself, there is discerni- 
 ble a similarity in the deeper values of life and the world which 
 is appreciable only in terms of the unity of human thought. 
 Specific illustrations of this abound. Locke accepted the 
 aphorism of self -existence as the most certain of all knowledge, 
 while Descartes on the other hand found it necessary to give 
 certainty to the facts of experience, in order to go beyond the 
 abstractions of the self and God ; and in fact when stripped of 
 external peculiarities it will be found that the reason and ex- 
 perience are of about the same relative importance in the sys- 
 tems of the founders of empiricism and rationalism. Descartes, 
 Spinoza, and Locke are equally acute in their psychological 
 analysis of human emotion, and with each the demonstration 
 of moral truths is the foundation for ethics. The materialists 
 are monists ; when strictly analyzed their " matter" differs but 
 little from Spinoza's " Substance." Clarke denounces Spinoza 
 as an atheist, yet he observes his geometrical method and estab- 
 
148 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lishes the existence and attributes of God by the same rational- 
 istic evidence earlier employed in the " Ethica" Leibnitz had 
 his correspondences in the empirical school; a metaphysical 
 atomism was taught by many scientists of the times; "Pre- 
 established Harmony" often appears under other names among 
 the Encyclopedists, the Deists, and the earlier English 
 moralists. 
 
 When we have thus discovered a fundamental unity between 
 rationalist and empiricist we have by no means exhausted the 
 topic. While emphasizing the unity of thought which pervades 
 the whole pre-Kantean philosophy, it must not be understood 
 that the profound difference of stand-point between rationalism 
 and empiricism can be for a moment neglected. These internal 
 similarities are discovered only in the deeper recesses of the 
 various systems of philosophy; they would probably have been 
 repudiated by the philosophers themselves. As a matter of 
 considerable consequence empiricism does define a type of 
 thought peculiarly its own, but its individuality consists in its 
 attitude towards the world, its method of approach to the prob- 
 lem of philosophy rather than in its ultimate conclusions. Em- 
 piricism is psychological, it is metaphysical only so far as it 
 is epistemological ; rationalism is distinctly metaphysical, logi- 
 cal, and critical. Eeduced to its simplest terms, empiricism 
 has always meant nothing else than a thorough reliance on the 
 given facts of experience, on the psychological data of the men- 
 tal image, " This is my fact." It approaches philosophy with 
 a metaphysic already formed, the fact has a reality which 
 cannot be further analyzed, and proceeds to show wherein 
 many facts of this description are able to give a world consistent 
 with itself and full of ethical and religious values. It makes 
 no covert assumptions nor does it struggle to give the facts a 
 mysterious significance unrepresented in their bare "given- 
 ness." It is advanced by philosophers who are by temperament 
 active and eminently practical, generally by men who have 
 attained some distinction in the law or in politics. Empiricism 
 
THE EMPIRICAL STAND-POINT. 149 
 
 does not disregard the reason any more than rationalism can 
 afford to disregard experience. Experience and reason are 
 equally essential to both methods, the former is always the con- 
 tent and starting-point, the latter is necessarily the form or 
 instrument. The distinction of schools results from the differ- 
 ence of approach. Eationalism compels reason to prosecute an 
 examination into itself before considering the data of sense, 
 whereas empiricism first requires the reason to analyze expe- 
 rience. 
 
CHAPTEK V. 
 
 BERKELEY AND HUME. 
 
 METAPHYSICAL INFLUENCE OF LOCKE. 
 
 IN the previous chapter it was our purpose to review briefly 
 the life and philosophy of John Locke, with special reference 
 to those problems of marked significance to the history of 
 philosophy. With this latter point in mind we were able to 
 discover a metaphysical, an epistemological, a religious, and 
 an ethical movement traceable directly to the influence of 
 Locke. By brief summaries of the epistemological, religious, 
 and ethical movements we traced the reception of Locke's 
 philosophy in French Materialism, English Deism, and Eng- 
 lish Ethics, but at the same time we reserved to this chapter 
 a consideration of his influence on the more speculative phases 
 of British thought. Berkeley and Hume are generally asso- 
 ciated with the metaphysical development of Locke's philoso- 
 phy, although in reality they only carry his dualistic episte- 
 mology of sensation and reflection to its logical conclusion. 
 
 GEORGE BERKELEY. 
 LIFE. 
 
 Youth. George Berkeley, one of the most profound think- 
 ers of the English race, was born in the County of Kilkenny, 
 Ireland, on March 12, 1685. His father is said to have been 
 of English descent, while his mother was undoubtedly Irish. 
 Little is known of his early life other than a short entry in his 
 " Commonplace Book" " I was distrustful at eight years old." 
 At eleven years of age he entered the Kilkenny school, where 
 Swift had previously studied. Four years later we find him at 
 Trinity College, Dublin, already deeply engaged with the prob- 
 lems of reality. At this period of his life Locke's influence 
 160 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 151 
 
 was distinctly felt by Berkeley, and he read, to a certain 
 extent, the works of Descartes, Malebranche, Aristotle, and 
 perhaps some of the Schoolmen and the Church Fathers. In 
 Berkeley's philosophical diary or "Commonplace Boole," contin- 
 ued in the years immediately following his graduation, are found 
 entries which indicate the character of his reading and at the 
 same time mark the progress of his own conceptions. Berke- 
 ley continued his connection with the University after taking 
 the Masters' degree and prepared at this time two short works 
 of extreme importance. The first of these, " An Essay towards 
 a New Theory of Vision" was published in 1709. This was 
 followed the next year by " A Treatise concerning the Princi- 
 ples of Human Knowledge" The former leads up to Berke- 
 ley's own metaphysic, by a psychological analysis of the sense 
 of vision, while the "Principles" define his own position and 
 explain his objections to Locke and the materialists. His 
 complete stand-point is more fully developed in later dia- 
 logues, but in these two essays, written when Berkeley was 
 only twenty-five years of age, one observes a certain freshness, 
 vigor, and self-assertion which is less prominent in his later 
 writings. 
 
 Travels. About two years after the publication of the 
 "Principles" Berkeley removed to London with the manu- 
 script of another exposition of his theory of the world, written 
 in the form of a dialogue. Here he met some of that brilliant 
 company that made the opening years of the eighteenth century 
 the Augustan age in English literature, Swift, Pope, Addi- 
 son, Steele, Johnson, Clarke, Pembroke, and Collins. In the 
 society of these men, Berkeley, whose personal charm won him 
 favor in every direction, spent nearly a year. It is interesting 
 to note that his "idealistic system of the world" excited a 
 wide-spread interest. Swift writes, " That Mr. Berkeley is a 
 very ingenious man, and a great philosopher, and I have men- 
 tioned him to all the ministers, and have given them some 
 of his writings, and I will favor him as much as I can." 
 
152 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Towards the close of 1713 Berkeley decided to accompany Lord 
 Peterborough on an embassy to Sicily. The journey gave him 
 the opportunity to visit France and Italy. There is a tradition 
 extant that while in Paris Berkeley called on Father Male- 
 branche in his cell and that a heated discussion which arose 
 during the interview was the "occasional cause" of the aged 
 Father's death. 
 
 Bermuda College. About 1721 Berkeley conceived the 
 project of founding a college in the Island of Bermuda for 
 the education of savages, and where he might prove to be " the 
 mean instrument of doing great good to mankind." However 
 hypothetical and impractical such a scheme might appear, the 
 most sincere praise is due to Berkeley for his energy and self- 
 sacrifice. At a time when the " South Sea Catastrophe" was 
 in everybody's mind, the fact that unaided, except by his own 
 attractive personality, Berkeley was able to arouse interest on 
 every side, obtain private subscriptions amounting to five thou- 
 sand pounds, to which Walpole contributed, with an almost 
 unanimous grant of twenty thousand pounds from Parliament, 
 attests more than words to his self-denial, earnestness, and sin- 
 gle-heartedness. Late in 1728 Berkeley sailed for America, and 
 arrived at Newport, Ehode Island, early in the following year. 
 He purchased a farm, about three miles from the town, where 
 he built a large house in the prevailing colonial style. Here at 
 " Whitehall," as he called his home, he composed the longest of 
 his philosophical dialogues, " Alciphron, or the Minute Philoso- 
 pher." Here he welcomed Jonathan Edwards, one of the 
 very few illustrious names which America has added to the 
 History of Philosophy, together with many missionaries and 
 professors from Harvard and Yale. During the life of retire- 
 ment at Whitehall his fortunes at the English court were not 
 altogether prospering. The promised grant from the Crown 
 had not been paid, and Walpole intimated that Berkeley had 
 better come home and not wait for it. Thus was quenched the 
 hopes and labors of many years. Fraser fittingly remarks, in 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 153 
 
 his Sketch of Berkeley's life, that " Of all who have ever landed 
 on the American shore, none was ever moved by a purer and 
 more self-sacrificing spirit. America still acknowledges that 
 by Berkeley's visit on this mission it has been invested with 
 the halo of an illustrious name, and associated with religious 
 devotion to a magnificent ideal, even if it was sought to be 
 realized by impractical means." * 
 
 Last Years. After Berkeley's return to England he re- 
 ceived the appointment to the Bishopric of Cloyne, in South 
 Ireland, a position which he held until the last years of his 
 life. Here, in a secluded corner of Ireland, Berkeley was 
 occupied with the various needs of his diocese, with literary 
 work, and with "Tar-water." This latter was a preparation 
 which Berkeley, with his accustomed enthusiasm, conceived to 
 be the cure for every ailment. The news of this remarkable 
 discovery the good Bishop of Cloyne spread far and near. 
 " Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries con- 
 cerning the Virtues of Tar-Water and Divers other Subjects 
 Connected Together and Arising One from Another" is the 
 title of a work prepared during this period. " Divers other 
 subjects" comprise nearly everything in heaven and earth, and 
 well illustrates the breadth of Berkeley's interests. About the 
 middle of 1752 he moved from Cloyne to Oxford, in order to 
 be near his son, who was about to enter the University. He 
 writes at this time that he no longer felt the same enthusiasm 
 and interest in things that characterized his earlier years, and 
 that he was becoming very infirm in health. On January 14, 
 1753, Berkeley died, having been at Oxford but a few months. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 In the whole range of British thinkers there have been few 
 who have exhibited greater breadth of mind or power of philo- 
 sophical expression. The difficulty with his metaphysics arises, 
 
 1 Berkeley's Works, edited by A. C. Fraser, Vol. I. lix. 
 
154 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not from narrowness of scope, but rather from over-concentra- 
 tion. He focused his mind upon a single aspect of truth, and 
 from that very intensity he was able to produce a lasting 
 influence on Modern Philosophy. Had he been unbiassed by 
 religious motives and conceptions he might have anticipated 
 more fully the German Transcendentalists and effected a wider 
 and deeper impression on the current of the world's thought. 
 
 Epistemology. Like all British thinkers, Berkeley erects 
 his metaphysic upon a perfectly definite epistemological basis. 
 In such a light he is a strict empiricist; reality is reached 
 through the senses, for they are the only means which we pos- 
 sess for the attainment of knowledge. "But whoever reads 
 my book with attention," he writes in a letter, " will see that 
 I question not the existence of anything we perceive by our 
 senses." Instead of following Locke in his division of the 
 ultimate origin of human knowledge into sensation and reflec- 
 tion, Berkeley conceived only of the n Hi mate, existence of 
 ideas ^ from sensation, although he recognizes the less vivid 
 ideas of memory__and imagination.,.. In this he was perfectly 
 consistent with the epistemological demands of Locke, only 
 the meaning of sense and sensation was subjected to an alto- 
 gether new interpretation. This involved a new metaphysical 
 background, which constitutes the true advance from Locke 
 to Berkeley. 
 
 After he has defined the source of our ideas, Berkeley is next 
 concerned with their jeality. He recognizes that the deter- 
 mination of reality requires a certain principle or criterion 
 which shall be in every respect authoritative. In discovering 
 this principle we have the transition from his empirical episte- 
 mology to his spiritualistic metaphysics. For if we can assert 
 that the data of sense is the only source of knowledge, then the 
 ^jOWfT of perception is itself the absolute criterion of knowl- 
 edge. In other words, Berkeley, with perfect consistency, 
 draws the conclusion that if all we can know are sense-percep- 
 tions, they themselves comprise all that can be regarded as 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 155 
 
 real. 2 This wasjiis initial pmdple fci j^ ^absolute criterion., jpf 
 
 reality and the metaphysical foundation of his philosophy. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Ideas. We may now remove the epistemological staging , 
 which enabled us to discover the principle " esseffl per dpi'' /^-c 
 perception constitutes^ existence, and consider what kind of a/ 
 universe is presented to our view. The world of mere percep- V 
 tion amounts to nothing more than a constant and uninter- / 
 mpted ffay lit fl^jYfy(7j? occurring either singly or in groups. 
 Thus the blueness of the sky is an idea which is excited by 
 simply looking up, and if the mere sensation alone is observed, 
 it constitutes a single disconnected idea. But this pure imme- 
 diacy of blueness is seldom attained. Our ideas generally come 
 to us in groups, that is, the color idea of yellowness, the 
 touch idea of smoothness, the odor idea of fragrance, and the 
 taste idea of sweetness, all jnjji iii fa^^ffi,jjBu,flW > concept of 
 apple. The same color idea may occur in connection with 
 various other groups of ideas, but we employ the term " apple" 
 only when a certain definite and predictable combination of 
 the various sense ideas is before us. And presently we shall 
 see that this unique combination of sense ideas is called a 
 " thing" and can be given juj absolute reality beyond the per- 
 c^mng^ubject, ojSfy as, a^ matter ^of convenieiice. 
 
 SUBJECTIVITY OF IDEAS OF DISTANCE. Before we have suf- 
 ficient data to inquire into the truth of the belief in the object- 
 ive existence of the "thing," it is necessary to know the real 
 nature of these ideas of which it seems to be composed. Per- 
 haps the most vivid class of ideas are those which we receive 
 through the sense of sight; therefore, before extending any 
 theory to all the ideas, it may be well to begin our examination 
 with those derived from sight alone. One of the most impres- 
 sive features of a landscape is the apparent unequal distances 
 
 a " Ease $ percipi." Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 3. 
 
156 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the various objects seen. Berkeley, in his " Essay towards a 
 New Theory of Vision" suMects thi& idea of distance to careful 
 scrutmy, and reaches the conclusion that we are confronted 
 with one of two attitudes. Either , .the distance of the various 
 objects is given jfoecjj^Jjy the^yjpiiil jmage, or else it is in 
 some way inferred from the configurations and^Lmngs. This 
 latter alternative, which was" tfieone advocated by Berkeley, 
 may appear in a clearer light if we examine the relation 
 between sight and touch. If we suppose a man endowed only 
 with the 'sense of sight, he would believe every part of the whole 
 landscape to be equally distant from his eye; the haze about 
 the remote hills, instead of conveying to him the idea of dis- 
 tance, would simply indicate natural conditions; the sheep 
 at the farther end of the pasture would appear to him as 
 belonging to a smaller species than those in the foreground. 
 Now let this same man be given the power of touch or move- 
 ment, and he would soon discover that the blue haze indicated 
 remoteness, that lines receding from the eye appear to con- 
 verge, and that the smaller sheep are more distant, but are 
 really of the same size as those in the foreground. He would 
 soon learn from detailed observation to interpret, without the 
 necessity of touch or movement, the signs and appearances 
 which indicate variations in distances. From this analysis 
 Berkeley concludes that the idea of distance is really injerreji 
 tythemmd from certain appearances, and not given by dirjct 
 perception, as was presumed before his time. 
 
 SIHBJECTIVITY OF ALL OUR IDEAS. In his "New Theory of 
 Vision'' Berkeley had proved to his own satisfaction that the 
 third dimension of space was an idea originating in the mind ; 
 that the mere sight of converging lines contains in itself no 
 idea of distance. This was only the first step towards a much 
 broader generalization which he developed the following year 
 in the " Principles of Human Knowledge." In order to prove 
 the subjectivity^ or., spiritual origin of all our ideas, he refers \ 
 back to Locke's division of qualities or ideas into primary and 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 157 
 
 secondary. It will be remembered that the former comprised 
 solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, qualities 
 which had a perfectly valid existence in the external world. 
 The secondary qualities included all the direct sense ideas, 
 such as color, taste, or odor, and differed from the former 
 group in that they were real only to the percipient subject. 
 Berkeley is in perfect agreement with the latter part of this 
 analysis, and believes, even more fervently than Locke, that 
 the secondary qualities have only a mental existence ; but fails 
 at the same time to understand why the same is not likewise 
 true of the primary qualities. In the application of his for- @ 
 mula " esse is percipi" Berkeley finds it impossible to perceive j 
 mere dimension, figure, or motion, these ideas always occur \ 
 in connection with the secondary qualities. Take dimension, 
 for instance. It is possible for a very small insect to look 
 upon the foot of a mite as a man might regard a mountain. 
 Dimension and size are merely relative ; what appears to be 
 large to one animal will be small to another. And this same 
 relativity is also true with regard to the primary quality of 
 number for the same object " is one, or three, or thirty-six, 
 according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a 
 foot, or an inch." 3 From a similar stand-point all primary 
 ideas must, at the last analysis, be looked upon as meaningless, 
 or else placed with the secondary as subjective relations and 
 products of some mental process, either human or divine. i 
 
 Matter. Locke found it rather difficult to define his con- A* 
 ception of substance or mere matter, but finally led us to 
 believe that it referred to that part of an object which held up 
 or supported the various secondary qualities or attributes. 
 Beyond simple extension Locke found it impossible to give to 
 substance any positive attribute, preferring to rely on the 
 universal belief that some material substratum supported the 
 qualities of sense. This inability to define substance was made 
 
 3 Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I., Sec. 12. 
 
158 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by Berkeley the cardinal objection to any materialistic meta- 
 physics; for so soon as extension and all other qualities are 
 recognized to be ideas, real only for a perceiving mind, there 
 no longer exists any need for the presupposition of an external, 
 unknowable substratum. In other words, the old idea of matter, 
 which we inherit from the mediaeval schools, is a contradictory 
 concept; it is said to exist, yet it cannot be described; it is 
 real, yet it cannot be perceived. This contradiction led Berke- 
 ley to regard the concept "matter" as nothing more than a 
 philosophical illusion. 4 And, moreover, the epistemological 
 theory, at that time by no means uncommon, that the subjective 
 ideas of man were archetypes of real objective things was 
 unable, in his estimation, to fortify this illusion. For this 
 archetype or idea can originate in nothing but an idea, and 
 hence can exist only in the mind. In brief, then, this is 
 Berkeley's theory of the world: All ideas ttfajk, come into our 
 consciousnesfif tbej^pjp mid^Tm mmplpY^ the_distinct $pA 
 the indistinct, have theirsource in Spirit or mind, ajifl nn|. in* 
 
 hypothetical matter. Every conscious statej o|_mind is an idea, 
 and as '.such .coasts only in and! tErougfathe percipient subject. 
 The concept of matter, as it is used to indicate a world object- 
 ively valid beyond the sense, is in itself unintelligible; it can 
 be defined onlyjjjj; negative terjas _jjollectiyely equjj[alent_to 
 npj^ing. 
 
 Abstract Ideas. In order to reinforce this general position 
 Berkeley thought it nccessaryjo_reiute_the accredited doctrine 
 Locke believed that the mind had the power 
 
 to regard, as a single quality, that dejnent^LL^grfifip^ioQ which 
 was common to several objects. The mind could abstract from 
 
 * It is to be noted that a similar conception of the external world 
 was reached by Arthur Collier, rector in the English Church. In 1713 
 he published " Clavis Universalis : or, a new Inquiry after Truth, 
 being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence, or Impossibility, of an 
 External World." Jonathan Edwards also approached very near to 
 the Berkeleian Idealism. 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 159 
 
 paper, snow, and clouds the common or abstract color of white- 
 ness. This theory struck at the very heart of Berkeley's initial 
 principle, " esse is per dpi" for should the power of abstraction 
 be admitted, then there would exist an important class of ideas 
 which could not be directly perceived. Berkeley, recognizing 
 this, contended that the abstract idea of white cannot be per- 
 ceived, because it is neither dull or vivid, distinct or confused. 
 The general idea of man is neither like Peter, James, or John, 
 nor has it any predictable qualities. Animal-in-general is un- 
 intelligible to us, for we know not whether it has "hair, 
 feathers, or scales." 5 Every time we think of whiteness, in 
 Berkeley's own opinion, we must at the same time think of a 
 certain definite white object ; the term " man" is meaningless 
 unless it calls to mind a certain definite person with predict- 
 able qualities capable of perception Abstract ideas are merely 
 words or convenient expressions to Berkeley; like material 
 substance, they are the artifices of a decadent metaphysics. 
 
 Duality of Idea and Spirit. In our previous statement of 
 Berkeley's theory of ideas no account was given of what was 
 meant by mind or spirit. To transfer the origin of our ideas 
 from one unknowable to another of a different name was cer- 
 tainly no great advance. Berkeley understood this, and from 
 the very outset emphasized a realitj, other tha^Jhat of tha 
 ideas. the higher reality of S^^^ f ^^mind i ^ The essence of 
 the distinction between idea and spirit is that the former is 
 passive and the latter active. We can show that all our ideas 
 or whatever we may choose to call them are inactive; one 
 idea can in nowise produce an effect on another, neither can 
 it come or go at will. Thepassive existence_flf jhe^ ijfca&jgallv, 
 shows thflt ^^y ^,grffl{pj[py fiojnp Active power which Berke- 
 ley designates bl^jh_jiame_of^ ^J^utik" the cause of the 
 umn^rrupted flow of our ideas, their regularity and apparent 
 uniformity. This active source of our ideas "must therefore 
 
 5 Introduction, Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 9. 
 
160 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal 
 or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of 
 ideas is an uncorporeal active substance or Spirit." 6 We 
 cannot perceive spirit, since spirit is the source of the power 
 of perception. A difficulty is at once apparent. There can be 
 no idea of spirit, and ideas are the only elements of knowledge ; 
 then one can surely infer that we can have no knowledge of 
 even the existence of spirit. Berkeley appreciated this dilemma 
 after the publication of the first edition of the " Principles/' 
 and in his subsequent works is to be found a new doctrine of 
 notion. We can have a notion a sort of reflective mental 
 state of a Spirit, but no idea. But still further we may 
 inquire as to how one may have an idea of a notion. A ques- 
 tion which strikes at the very root of the Berkeleian Idealism. 
 
 Kinds of Spirit. The mere duality of idea and spirit is in 
 itself insufficient to explain the uniformity and apparent pur- 
 posiveness of the sense ideas; it was necessary to define the 
 conception of God as the ultimate unity of the world of ideas. 
 God is the source of the true and scientific ideas, whereas the 
 less powerful spirits of individual men are alone responsible 
 for the creations of the imagination. The real, the burning 
 idea of fire is impressed upon us by the Spirit of God, whereas 
 the fire of our fancy is an idea which the human spirit pro- 
 duces. We are able to discern the source of those ideas which 
 come from God by their superior vividness, strength, and asso- 
 ciations; they correspond to the ideas which the materialists 
 attribute to the objective world. 
 
 EELATION BETWEEN KINDS OF SPIRIT. One of the least sat- 
 isfactory points of Berkeley's philosophy is the ambiguity which 
 settles about the relation between the universal Spirit of God 
 and the individual spirit of man. Berkeley was educated in 
 the faith of the Church of England and his later life was spent 
 in its service. The Christian conception of God was therefore 
 
 Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I., Sec. 26. 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 161 
 
 very firmly fixed in his mind, and he could hardly be expected 
 to recognize any philosophy which did not possess a religious 
 background. In fact one of the results which he hoped his 
 philosophy might accomplish was the permanent refutation of 
 atheism. Had Berkeley drawn the logical conclusion from his 
 premises he would have developed a pure pantheism like 
 Spinoza, or else a pure idealism like that of India or late 
 Germany. The Christian dogmas of transcendency and human 
 freedom preclude the former alternative, while a pure idealism 
 which should recognize only the infinite evolution of an Idea 
 through finite forms would have then been looked upon as 
 atheism. To be true to his original position and at the same 
 time avoid either of these extremes was a task difficult indeed ; 
 it formed the philosophical theme of " Siris" his last and least 
 homogeneous work. So far as may be judged, the Spirit of 
 God was the true author, not only of the ideas of direct per- 
 ception, but also of the less powerful spirits of man. These 
 latter were endowed by their Divine Author with the passive 
 ability of perception, as well as the distinct power to create 
 by their own free will the ideas of the imagination and the 
 ideals of life. 
 
 THEOLOGY. As Berkeley grew older in years the importance 
 of God in his system seemed to increase in his estimation. In 
 his earlier writings he is content with the proof that the passive 
 ideas must have a source beyond themselves, in a Power which 
 should embody universal Wisdom, Authority, and Spirituality. 
 But in his later works he reaches a final proof for God's exist- 
 ence based directly on his empirical epistemology. In the 
 fourth dialogue of " Alciphron" after having shown that all 
 the perceptions of the world indicate the operations of a Divine 
 Mind, Berkeley concludes that we have the same authority for 
 the belief in the Divine Being as we have for the existence of 
 our fellow-men. In fact every idea is a manifestation or sign 
 of the highest reality of God. All ideas of our sight compose 
 a " visual language" by means of which God speaks to man. 
 
 11 
 
162 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Much akin to this is his theory of natural law, already briefly 
 mentioned. We observe that the idea of stone is always con- 
 nected with the idea of hardness, that heaviness is associated 
 with lead, and that some characteristic noise accompanies every 
 animal. Instead of regarding these causal relations as indi- 
 cations of a material background to the stone, lead, or animal, 
 we must look upon them as the expressions of God's will. 
 Those unalterable sequences, which we call " necessary connec- 
 tion/' are really God's thoughts unfolding the laws of His 
 omniscient mind. Law, order, science, truth, are mere expres- 
 sions for the notion of God; imagination, error, are the ideas 
 created by the spirit of man. 
 
 ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 Absent Objects. A theory of the world so original and 
 brilliant as that of Berkeley's empirical idealism would nat- 
 urally meet with many objections. This fact was recognized 
 by Berkeley himself, who made every exertion to avoid any 
 misunderstanding, the worst of all objections. A very ap- 
 parent difficulty might arise with regard to absent objects. 
 Berkeley does not assume that the moon ceases to exist when 
 nobody happens to be gazing at it, or that there is continued 
 annihilation and recreation following the history of a single 
 percipient subject. On the contrary, we are told that all the 
 real ideas of the so-called external world are being constantly 
 perceived by the Divine Spirit. That I, the individual spirit, 
 may not always perceive the moon, the table, or the chair, but 
 that God perceives them without interruption. It is He who 
 holds these ideas in constant reality, ready at any time to 
 impress them on the finite spirit. 
 
 -A Extension and Mind. Another and more subtle objection 
 
 might be advanced on the ground that if so-called " extension" 
 
 can exist only in the mind, then extension is itself an attribute 
 
 of mind. In reply to this, Berkeley carefully distinguishes 
 
 "between the idea in the mind that is, perceived by the 
 
GEORGE BERKELEY. 163 
 
 and what might be said regarding the mind itself. Thus it is 
 conceivable for a vessel to contain water, and at the same time 
 be devoid of all the qualities by which we describe water. 
 
 Meaning of " Matter." Perhaps the hardest to convince, 
 in Berkeley's estimation, are those who still cling to the reality 
 of matter as either a convenient or necessary hypothesis. To 
 the former, who regard matter as a convenient form of expres- 
 sion, he advances a well-known aphorism, " We ought to think 
 with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." 7 Although most 
 of us are convinced of the movement of the earth, yet we speak 
 of the rising of the sun. To the other class, who regard the 
 objective existence of matter to be necessary, he is by no means 
 so lenient. If we demand "matter" for science we do not 
 disturb either the facts or laws of science by substituting the 
 will of God for an unknowable principle of causation itself 
 dependent on an unknowable substance. If we demand " mat- 
 ter" in order to give the world of our ideas a reality, we fail 
 utterly in such an undertaking, for we can describe it only by 
 negative terms which make it a " something 5 ' indistinguishable 
 from " nothing." 
 
 Few thinkers have been more misinterpreted in their real 
 meaning than Berkeley, and few have struggled so valiantly or 
 so well to avoid misrepresentation. Dr. Johnson is said to 
 have refuted him by an impetuous stamp on the earth, and 
 others have concurred with the learned lexicographer. Even 
 Kant, in his famous refutation of idealism, is inclined to 
 believe that Berkeley regarded the objects of the space world 
 to be possessed of only an imaginary reality. 8 
 
 Whatever criticism of Berkeley's system is made, one cer- 
 tainly cannot suppose that he meant to do away with the reality 
 
 7 Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 51. 
 
 8 "Und darum auch die Dinge im Raum fur blosse Einbildungen 
 erklart." Kant, Pure Reason, Second Ed. (Refutation of Idealism), 
 p. 274. 
 
164 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of our world of sense or even of our fancy; no thinker has 
 ever lived who rested his metaphysic more explicitly on the 
 world of sense-perception. His chief aim was to show that the 
 indescribable "matter" of the materialists was a fiction unin- 
 telligible and in itself contradictory; it could therefore have 
 no value. A lasting contribution he has most certainly made 
 to the progress of the world's thought by drawing attention to 
 the idealistic or universalistic side of empiricism. Berkeley 
 represents the transition from Locke to Hume. Locke found 
 a reality behind the senses in a material world, Berkeley found 
 a higher reality in the Spirit of God, while Hume failed to 
 find reality in either. 
 
 DAVID HUME. 
 
 Hobbes and Locke were Englishmen in the broadest sense of 
 the word, Berkeley and Hume were such only in name. The in- 
 terests of Berkeley, his hopes, and his ambitions, were connected 
 with Protestant Ireland. The life and character of Hume are 
 those of the eighteenth-century Scotchman. Both, however, 
 evinced striking similarity in disposition, character, and mental 
 power. Both were noted for their generosity, simplicity, and 
 dislike of ostentation. Both had written their most influential 
 works in philosophy before the age of twenty-five, and both 
 forsook philosophy for other pursuits in later life. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Early Surroundings. David Hume was born in Edinburgh 
 on April 26, 1711. His father, who owned a small estate or 
 farm near the English border, died when David was but a 
 small child. Both parents were of sturdy Scotch families, 
 such as make up the small gentry of the Lowlands. His mother 
 is said to have been a woman of singular mental acuteness, 
 although an early estimation of her son seems not to indicate 
 any great sympathy with the brooding and perhaps lazy philos- 
 opher. " Our Dayie's a fine, good-natured crater, but uncom- 
 
DAVID HUME. 165 
 
 mon wake-minded." 9 Hume's youth was spent at the parental 
 farm of Mnewells, where he seems to have devoted himself to 
 the study of the ancient and modern classics. He was a self- 
 taught man, having derived little help from schools or school- 
 masters. When about seventeen his relatives thought the pro- 
 fession of the law might prove a practical realization of his 
 rather useless studies, so he entered upon the path of a young 
 advocate. The attempt early proved to be a failure, and for 
 the next six years he became a resident at Ninewells. 
 
 Philosophical Authorship. About this period Hume 
 began to exhibit a decided interest in philosophical works, espe- 
 cially the writings of the Roman moralists. While impressed 
 with their brilliant portrayal of virtue and honor, he observed 
 a lack of experiential foundation, especially in the writings 
 of the Stoic philosophers. At the age of twenty-three he 
 decided to travel to a foreign country where he might have 
 the opportunity and leisure to construct a theory of morals 
 which should supply the deficiency in the classic systems of 
 ethics. In 1736 we find him at La Fleche, in France, where was 
 located the Jesuit College made famous by the boyhood of 
 Descartes. For three years Hume worked on his philosophical 
 labors with unabated zeal and patience, and, finally, when he 
 came forth from his self-imposed retirement, he brought with 
 him the completed manuscript of his first and most powerful 
 work, "A Treatise of Human Nature." This was published 
 during the first part of 1739 and met with little recognition 
 or criticism, two results which its author hoped it might attain. 
 Biographers of Hume place an ambition for literary fame, " a 
 craving for notoriety and vulgar success," as Huxley calls it, 
 as one of the prime motives of his life and character. What- 
 ever internal evidence may exist for this view, Hume's whole 
 literary career seems to verify it. Instead of resting satisfied 
 with what he had achieved, which he must have felt would 
 
 Prof. Huxley's Life. 
 
166 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ultimately influence the development of human speculation, 
 Hume peevishly writes that his first work " fell dead-born 
 from the press without reaching such distinction as even to 
 excite a murmur among the zealots." 10 Thoroughly dissatis- 
 fied with the reception of the " Treatise," Hume sought to 
 gain recognition by recasting his thoughts into more popular 
 form. Accordingly he rewrote the first book of his former 
 work, entitled, " Of the Understanding/' publishing a more 
 polished but less profound exposition of its main tenets under 
 the title of "An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding;" 
 and the latter portions of the earlier work, which dealt with 
 ethics, as "An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals" 
 
 Essayist. Hume now gradually lost his youthful interest 
 in philosophy and began to speculate on political and economic 
 questions. About 1740 he made the acquaintance of Adam 
 Smith, who later wrote ef The Wealth of Nations" a classic 
 in the science of political economy. Smith has also a place in 
 English ethics from the authorship of a theory of morals 
 which emphasized the element of sympathy. This is a stand- 
 point not very far from that of Hume. In the political field 
 Hume exhibits the same power and subtility of mind which 
 made his philosophy the culmination of British thought. In 
 the "Political Essays" published in 1741, may be noted the 
 early beginning of the modern science of political economy. 
 Here he contends that there may be discovered, permeating the 
 laws of government and the relations of men, certain causal 
 sequences of almost mathematical certainty, notwithstanding 
 the heterogeneity of the motives and passions of mankind. 
 An assumption not unlike this lies at the very foundation of 
 all economic inquiry. 
 
 Later Life. Soon after the publication of the "Essays" 
 the friends of Hume endeavored, without success, to procure 
 for him the professorship of moral philosophy at the Univer- 
 
 10 Hume's My Own Life. 
 
DAVID HUME. 167 
 
 sity of Edinburgh. His writings were by this time too well 
 known to admit of any sympathy from among the Presbyterian 
 Clergy. The charge of heresy and scepticism was advanced 
 against him, not without foundation, as it will later appear, 
 and the governing council filled the vacancy by " a safe 
 nobody/' as Huxley expresses it. A few years later he began 
 the publication of his "History of England" as a result of 
 which he achieved that literary fame he had so long cherished 
 as the dearest wish of his ambition. 
 
 His philosophical speculations produced more comment on 
 the Continent of Europe than at home. His writings were 
 considered to be in deep sympathy with the superficial philoso- 
 phy of the more fashionable circles of French society. To the 
 uncritical reader the epistemology and religious scepticism of 
 Hume appeared very close to the materialism of La Mettrie 
 and D'Holbach. A visit to France was the occasion for much 
 attention from great nobles and great ladies, who treated him, 
 it is said, much like a newly-found " sensation." It was at 
 this time also that he made the acquaintance of Rousseau, 
 which later placed the generous and kind-hearted Hume in a 
 position to receive, in return for his kindness, the lunatic 
 malignity of the passionate and half-crazed Swiss. 
 
 By this time Hume had acquired a large fortune, amply suffi- 
 cient to supply his needs and his generosity. He had built 
 for himself a house on one of the newly-opened streets of Edin- 
 burgh, to which some one jokingly gave the name of " St. 
 David's Street," a title which it continues to bear. Here 
 Hume entertained the most accomplished society of the Scotch 
 metropolis, Adam Smith, Ferguson, and many others of lesser 
 note. About 1775 his health began to fail, "I now reckon 
 upon a speedy dissolution. ... I consider, besides, that a 
 man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmi- 
 ties," " and on the 25th of August of the following year, 
 
 "Hume's My Own Life. 
 
168 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1776, he died. He met death with the same cheerfulness and 
 resignation which had been his temperamental characteristic 
 through life; and even a full understanding of approaching 
 death failed to bring him nearer to the faith of his fathers or ex- 
 cite a single expressed hope in the immortality of the soul. Yet 
 few men whose lives have been recorded in history have met 
 ' death with greater simplicity, cheerfulness, or noble fortitude. 
 Whatever we may believe regarding his philosophy, there is 
 certainly unanimity in the estimation of a generous and noble 
 life consecrated to the service of others and the pursuit of 
 truth. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 The interest that Hume manifested in early life for philoso- 
 phy is probably traceable to the reading of the Roman moral- 
 ists. The Hellenic-Roman philosophy, prominent about the 
 beginning of the Christian era, is remarkable for its emphasis 
 on man. Rome attained its prominence in the ancient world 
 more through action than reflection. The explanation of man, 
 his power and his passions, interested the Latins far more 
 than theories of the world or speculations concerning the truth 
 and the basis of knowledge. The Roman philosophers were all 
 moralists in the strict sense of the word. Hume accepted their 
 stand-point, but he was [unwilling to recognize any system of 
 ethics unless it could be ultimately traced to the world of 
 experience. ' In this he followed his predecessors, Bacon, 
 Hobbes, and Locke. He therefore, finds himself unable to 
 continue his progress in moral philosophy until he has exam- 
 ined the nature of man, upon which all morality rests. His 
 problem, then, is the examination of human nature. 1 
 
 Epistemology. With this purpose in mind Hume first 
 seeks to discover the origin of our mental states, believing with 
 Locke that this is the key to all knowledge. " As the science 
 of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so, 
 the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself 
 
DAVID HUME. 169 
 
 must be laid on experience and observation." 12 He therefore 
 divides all the perceptions of the mind, or elements of knowl- 
 edge, into two broad classes, Impressions and Ideas. The 
 former correspond to the sensations, direct perceptions, and 
 more violent passions, all of which come to the mind with an 
 irresistible force. The ideas, on the other hand, are secondary , 
 in character, arising rather from the processes of thought; \ 
 they may be directly traced to the impressions for their origin, 
 but are generally more complex in character and richer in 
 content. Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas 
 is like that between immediately present feeling and derived 
 or secondary reflection. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Previous Meaning of " Idea." We must not confuse the 
 meaning of the word " idea" as employed by the three British 
 philosophers. With Locke it indicated "whatsoever is the 
 object of the understanding, when a man thinks." 13 To him 
 the ideas comprehended the perception of color, sound, as well 
 as the concepts of existence, unity, and power; it was the 
 general name to be applied to almost any state of mind. This 
 appreciation of the meaning of idea was also followed by 
 Berkeley, who wrote in his " Commonplace Book/' " By idea 
 I mean any sensible or imaginable thing." Hume, on the con- 
 trary, sought to restore the term to what he considered to be 
 its original significance. Instead of defining idea in such a 
 manner that it included all perceptions or psychical states, he \r 
 restricted its application to thoughts or derivative processes r* 
 of the mind. His use of the term was therefore much more 
 restricted in its application than in the case of the two earlier 
 thinkers. Hume wished it to express only the more complex 
 reflective processes of mind, possibly a significance nearer to 
 conception than perception. 
 
 11 Introduction, Treatise of Human Nature. 
 "Locke's Essay, Book I., Chapter i., Sec. 8. 
 
170 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Substance. The theory of general ideas advanced by Hume 
 is almost the same as that of Berkeley. The latter, it will be 
 remembered, positively denied the existence in the mind of 
 any such abstract concepts, and Hume writes " that all general 
 ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain^ 
 term which gives them a more extensive significance and makes 
 them recall on occasion other individuals which are similar to 
 them." 14 The denial on the part of Berkeley of any real 
 existence in the mind to be ascribed to abstract ideas was fol- 
 lowed by the denial of that unknown substance behind our 
 ideas, considered so important by Locke. With this Hume 
 was also in agreement. Substance meant to him a certain 
 group of qualities or simple impressions often occurring 
 together. The idea of substance, if considered apart from this 
 collection of qualities, is contradictory in its nature. No one 
 can mention any properties which belong to mere substance as 
 such, since it is believed to excite no color, sound, or other 
 sensation. It is therefore undefinable and of no value, except 
 as the expression for a certain specific group of impressions. 
 
 Association of Ideas. According to Hume the reappear- 
 ance in the mind of an impression, as an idea, is accomplished 
 by two faculties, the memory and the imagination. The for- 
 mer reproduces the impressions as they are in themselves, 
 according to a fixed order and position; the latter recon- 
 structs them into ideas, according to its own laws. These laws 
 of the imagination, or rather the means by which we connect 
 or associate our ideas, are three in number. It is possible that 
 ideas may be connected in the mind by more resemblance. 
 The face of a stranger suggests some absent friend, a clap 
 of thunder may bring to mind the report of artillery. These 
 connections of ideas are merely those of superficial similar- 
 ity, they point to no real connection between the stranger 
 and the friend, or the thunder and the artillery. Another 
 
 14 Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part I., Sec. 7. 
 
DAVID HUME. 171 
 
 means by which different ideas may become associated or united 
 in the mind arises from some previously noted.^^^m|_ in 
 space or time. Thus it is possible that the idea of a flower 
 may suggest a certain book, because on some previous occasion 
 the two were observed side by side. And, finally, Hume men- 
 tioned the principle of causality as perhaps the relation which 
 produces the strongest and most certain association of ideas. 
 The~idea of the ruins of a house consumed by fire would 
 almost invariably arouse the idea of fire. The name of an 
 author will suggest his best-known work, and likewise the name 
 of a book will suggest its writer. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLE or CAUSALITY. Of the several relations 
 which may exist among the ideas, Hume considers this con- 
 nection of cause and effect to be especially worthy of analysis. 
 Before his time the connection between two events was believed 
 to be necessary, if one could infer that a causal relation existed 
 between them. Hobbes had taken this for granted and had 
 raised the principle of causality, the undeniable relation of 
 necessity which controlled all mental as well as external events, 
 to a position of supreme importance. The entire world was 
 under the dominion of law, this was the _basis_oUus.. mate- 
 rialism. Locke also had accepted a rather uncritical attitudej^ 
 towards causality. The idea of cause was derived from that / 
 which produced something, and effect from that which was 
 produced. The unknowable substance, in which all the quali- 
 ties of an object subsist, served as the unchangeable connective 
 between the cause and the effect. Locke's belief in substance 
 was therefore a sufficient basis for the necessary connection 
 between two events. Berkeley interpreted the substratum of 
 our ideas, not as a material and unknowable substance, but as 
 the spiritual Being of God. And even Spirit as the ultimate 
 origin of our ideas could well serve as the basis for the neces- 
 sary connection between natural events. It was this that 
 Berkeley especially emphasized in his later writings ; God, the 
 eternal Spirit, gave to certain of our more vivid ideas that 
 
172 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 necessary connection which leads us to associate them with the 
 fixity and necessity of the external world. 
 
 HUME'S VIEW OF NECESSARY CONNECTION. Hume, on the 
 other hand, finds himself at a loss to reconcile his thorough 
 empiricism with the prevalent explanation of necessary con- 
 nection. He could neither recognize with Locke and the scien- 
 tists of his time the existence of a material " Substance," nor 
 could he remain satisfied with the " spirit" of Berkeley, since 
 both views premised a something which could not be received 
 by the mind as an impression. The only alternative for Hume 
 as a consistent empiricist was the denial of the recognized 
 principle of necessary connection. One impression comes to 
 the mind, and another, of a different character, immediately 
 follows it. The ideas excited by these impressions are asso- 
 ciated together in the mind by contiguity in time. On some 
 future occasion the two impressions occur in the same tem- 
 poral order, and the association by contiguity in time is further 
 strengthened. And likewise it is observed that the two hnpres- 
 sions always, within the limits of our experience, recur^n ms 
 same temporal order, never one without the other. From this 
 observed sequence the human mind, which is too apt always 
 to draw its conclusions from insufficient data, infers that there 
 is some inner unity or necessary connection between the two 
 events. This inner connection, which gives the element of 
 necessity to the succession of cause and effect, is what Hume^ 
 denies. All we know is the impressions ; these suggest no idea 
 of internal connection beyond the mere flux in consciousness; 
 causality is merely observed sequence, nothing more. 
 
 The Basis of Science. Hume's interpretation of causality 
 is certainly simple on the surface, but yet carries with it conse- 
 quences of a momentous character. There is no real connection 
 between the impressions of sun-setting and darkness, they are 
 merely connected by customary observation. There is no abso- 
 lute and infallible reason why darkness must follow the setting 
 of the sun, only from the association of ideas, by sequence in 
 
DAVID HUME. 173 
 
 time, throughout unnumbered centuries. It is true that the 
 probability is highly in its favor, but high probability is dis- 
 tinctly different from true knowledge. The observations of 
 man since time immemorial give risejmly^to a high probability, 
 never to absolute knowledge. What we call truth, or science, or 
 law, is nothing but a sequence of those ideas the past observa- 
 tion of which has already testified to the high probability of 
 their future re-occurrence. Scientific facts are the epigram- 
 matic statements of these observed sequences among our ideas. 
 
 The Character of Hume's Scepticism. This view un- 
 doubtedly has a sceptical tinge, but it is far from the classic 
 forms of scepticism; were this not so, Hume would have no , 
 place in the history of positive philosophy. Hume is positive I 
 in so far as he regards the imprp^oj^ t.n be the source of all / 
 our ideas; he is sceptical in so far as he refuses to admit the/ 
 validity of any ideas which cannot be traced to experience.) 
 Necessary connection, the idea of God or human immortality, 
 are concepts which have no firm foundation in the world of 
 impressions, and therefore he denies, or perhaps seriously 
 doubts, their reality or value. We cannot but admire the 
 logical consistency of Hume, who, starting with a firm belief 
 in the infallible nature of his empiricism, constructs his whole 
 philosophy with its demands foremost in his mind. Impres- 
 sions as such exist, that is his positive philosophy. " They 
 are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind; 
 nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where 
 these scenes are represented, or the materials of which it is 
 compos'd." 15 We cannot know if the objects of the impres- 
 sions are real in themselves, or whether the propositions of the 
 reason are true, and that is his scepticism. 
 
 The Self and Personal Identity. The empirico-sceptical 
 attitude of Hume is still further emphasized by the problem 
 of personal identity. Locke, it may be remembered, founded 
 
 15 Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part IV., Sec. 6. 
 
174 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the continuity of selfhood upon mere consciousness, but never- 
 theless, as a true Christian, he recognized the existence of the 
 human soul and likewise its immortality. Berkeley accepted 
 the continued existence of the human spirit as the necessary 
 condition for the flow of ideas and the operations of the mind. 
 Hume, in his analytical attitude, wished to inquire into the 
 nature of this soul^ or self before he would consent to accept 
 it as a real idea; if such it could be directly traced to some 
 impression. Now, the self, according to its classic definition, 
 Hume observes, is a constant throughout life, " but there is no 
 impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief 
 and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never 
 all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any 
 of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self 
 is derived, and consequently there is no such idea." 16 All the 
 perceptions are distinguishable from one another and may be 
 regarded apart from anything necessary to support them. The 
 "self" is perhaps a brief term to express the succession of 
 conscious states of the mind, but apart from this convenience 
 it has no meaning whatsoever. The " I" is simply the suc- 
 cession of impressions. 
 
 It is merely the memory, and not a permanent soul-sub- 
 stance, which is able to refer back to some original impression, 
 now awakened in the mind as an idea. The succession of im- 
 pressions, which can be called an " I" only for convenience, is 
 in some wise grasped by the faculty of the memory, which 
 alone gives oneness to our lives. It is the memory which 
 enables us to recognize our ideals and which guides our action 
 according to rational motives. The " self/' however, which 
 the memory seems to represent to us, is nothing more than a 
 reflection of the original impression; it is empirical in its 
 character and very far from the " soul-substance" referred to 
 in the older theories of personal identity. In brief, the self or 
 
 16 Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I., Part IV., Sec. 6. 
 
DAVID HUME. '\ 175 
 
 person is merely a sequence of impressions and ideas, devoid 
 of any fundamental unity and related only through the empir- 
 ical character of the memory. 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 The moral philosophy which Hume endeavors to erect upon 
 his epistemological foundation has not the importance in the 
 history of thought which is conceded to his metaphysics. It 
 stands in . disagreement with that of Locke, and in certain 
 respects not far from the positions of Shaftesbury and Hume's 
 friend, Adam Smith. Hume is distinctly opposed to Locke's 
 original thesis, "that morality is capable of demonstration as 
 well as mathematics." 17 On the contrary, he believes that the 
 moral judgments are derived from a certain moral sense arising 
 independent of the reason. The values of good and evil are 
 perceived or felt like any other impression ; they are empirical 
 in their nature, not rational. The element by which we may 
 distinguish the noble from the bad is a certain feeling of 
 pleasure or satisfaction. "'Hume constantly emphasizes the ele- 
 mentary distinction between the sentiments of pleasure and 
 pain; it lies at the root of passion and action, of desire and 
 volition. But this elementary feeling is not always associated 
 with mere bodily enjoyment; sometimes it shows itself as a 
 delicate satisfaction in the presence of the beautiful in art and 
 the moral in conduct. Beauty and goodness were very close to 
 one another in Hume's mind. The nature of man involun- 
 tarily approves of those actions which give rise to a feeling of 
 pleasure. We are drawn towards both the actor and the act 
 by an irresistible bond of sympathy. " There is no spectacle 
 so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous action; nor one 
 that gives us more abhorrence than one that is cruel and 
 treacherous." 18 
 
 17 Locke's Essay, Book IV., Chapter xii., Sec. 8. 
 
 18 Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. II., Part I., Sec. 2. 
 
176 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HUME'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 . Hume's importance in the history of philosophy lies more 
 
 in his relation to other thinkers than in the extreme originality 
 
 j of his attitude towards the world. He sums up, so to speak, 
 
 / the English philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
 
 I turies. He carries the empirical epistemology to its ultimate 
 
 logical implications and discards every fragment of knowledge 
 
 which is not countenanced by the empirical stand-point. If, on 
 
 the one hand, he brings to a culmination the history of British 
 
 V philosophy, Hume must be regarded likewise as the real source 
 
 of that critical attitude towards the world characteristic of 
 
 later German speculation. He is so thoroughly an empiricist, 
 
 so representative of the analytical psychology of the English 
 
 type of mind, that he really initiates a movement in the 
 
 opposite direction. 
 
 The problem which lies at the foundation of all English 
 philosophy is the same problem that Hume considered himself 
 able to dispose of by means of his empirico-scepticism, a per- 
 I manent and philosophical foundation for natural science. It 
 was this same problem that excited Descartes, stimulated the 
 speculation of the early Continental scientists, Kepler and Gas- 
 sendi, and which served as a guide to the analytic methods of 
 Spinoza and Leibnitz. But to the English thinkers the prob- 
 lem of science appears in an original setting. Instead of first 
 determining the conditions and the jnethods by which science is 
 possible, the central inquiry of Continental thinkers in early 
 as well as recent times, the English philosophers took the 
 empirical stand-point as their original presupposition and 
 showed that any other point of view was radically opposed to 
 the fundamental demands of science. 
 
 This method of presupposing the validity of all experiential 
 data was thoroughly successful and sufficient so long as the 
 regularity of these experiences could be interpreted as identical 
 with the true processes of that nature which science itself 
 
DAVID HUME. 177 
 
 sought to interpret. So long as the empirical presupposition 
 gave to the experiences an objectively valid basis, the English 
 philosophy of experience was impregnable. But when Hume, 
 in the light of the very stand-point which made his question 
 possible, demanded an empirical explanation for this basis of 
 our expediences, he removed the foundations from the entire 
 English empirical philosophy. By showing that the causal 
 relations among our ideas correspond only to observed se- 
 quences, he showed as well that a science resting merely on 
 the~"5ow of experiences is in reality nojscience. The solution 
 of this perplexity was the problem which he set for himself 
 and which unsolved was passed on to Kant. 
 
 Although Hume represents the true culmination of British 
 thought, the central current of modern philosophy passed from 
 him away from the English to the Germans. Yet his own 
 countrymen were by no means satisfied with the position that 
 he defined for them. They in turn sought to re-establish 
 empiricism in its original self-reliance unvitiated by the scep- 
 tical outcome. Hume was followed in Scotland by a long line 
 of thinkers whose works are of little value except from the 
 stand-point of introspective psychology. The founder of this 
 movement was Thomas Eeid, author of " An Inquiry into the 
 Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense." Keid 
 reduced all judgments of absolute or scientific truth to a cer- 
 tain innate faculty of the mind, which, like the moral or aes- 
 thetic sense, operated by certain infallible principles or laws. 
 He therefore replied to the empirico-scepticism of Hume by 
 resting the facts of science on the certainty of consciousness. 
 And in thus transferring the criterion of necessity from the 
 objective to the subjective he moves towards the criticism of 
 the true successor of Hume, Immanuel Kant. 
 
 The most original of the so-called " Scotch school" was Sir 
 William Hamilton. The earlier members of this school had 
 refuted, in their own mind, the sceptical character of Hume's 
 empiricism by defining reality in terms of " common sense/' 
 
 12 
 
178 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Anything is real which is determined to be such by all men 
 at all times. Hamilton, however, refused to rest satisfied with 
 this simple solution to the problem of reality, and he brought 
 German criticism to the aid of English introspection. 
 Knowledge should be defined as a system of relations or con- 
 ditions. Nothing is known to consciousness, except in terms 
 of relation; every fact is the expression of some relation. 
 Knowledge, as the expression of conditions, has two extremes, 
 both of which are beyond the power of the human intellect. 
 On the one hand there is the simple immediate relation, the 
 absolutely conditioned or defined; while on the other there 
 is the absolutely unconditioned, complete freedom from all 
 determination. Between these two extremes lie the common 
 relations of fact and life. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 IMMANTJEL KANT. 
 
 ' THE Two EPISTEMOLOGICAL STAND-POINTS. 
 
 THUS far we have perceived two separate movements domi- 
 nating the philosophical speculation of the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries. On the Continent, Descartes and his fol- 
 lowers emphasized above all else the rational element in our 
 knowledge, while the British thinkers, influenced by the scien- 
 tific characteristics of their nature, developed a distinctly em- 
 pirical philosophy, standing in sharp contrast to the more 
 speculative tendency of the Continent. 
 
 After the systematization of the philosophy of Leibnitz by 
 his disciples, Wolff and Baumgarten, there is noticeable but 
 little progress within the field of the Eationalists. Original 
 investigation is Jacking, beyond an uncritical incorporation of 
 the doctrines of others within their own orthodox teachings, 
 a way of philosophizing often called Eclecticism. This recast- 
 ing and harmonizing of somewhat contradictory principles into 
 the form of a single system was the task of the German univer- 
 sity professors during the early years of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury. Just at this period, however, when rationalism was con- 
 fined to a formal set of principles, the English empiricism 
 had assumed unlooked-for importance. From the sudden im- 
 petus given to philosophy by the analytic acuteness of Locke, 
 the empirical idealism of Berkeley, with its negative outcome 
 in Hume, the influence of empiricism became strongly felt 
 throughout all Europe. It penetrated to the remote city of 
 Konigsberg, near the eastern border of Prussia, where it ex- 
 cited the attention of a poor German tutor. And it is the 
 transformation which empiricism received at his hands which 
 forms the subject of this chapter, nationalism gradually de- 
 
 179 
 
180 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 clined during the eighteenth century, while at the same time 
 the influence of empiricism steadily increased. It was natural, 
 therefore, that some attempt should be made to unite the truer 
 elements of each and resuscitate the dying rationalism by the 
 youthful self-reliance of empiricism. Owing to the funda- 
 mental difference of method of the two schools, a mere amalga- 
 mation of parts was impossible; only by a new and original 
 stand-point could the distinctive features of each be retained 
 and harmonized. Such a stand-point was developed by Im- 
 manuel Kant, the father of contemporaneous philosophy, and 
 perhaps the most profound thinker of the modern world. 
 
 LIFE AND CHARACTER. 
 
 Parentage. Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in the pro- 
 vincial city of Konigsberg, the capital of East Prussia. His 
 father, a saddler by trade, was of Scotch descent. The elder 
 Kant (spelled Cant) left no evidence of more than ordinary 
 education nor any indication of remarkable intellectual bril- 
 liancy. He was extremely poor, even for his time and sur- 
 roundings, but yet was always referred to by his son in terms 
 of the deepest reverence, particularly for his honesty and thrift. 
 The mother of the family was a woman of an extremely pious 
 and sensitive nature, and although she had had but few educa- 
 tional privileges, Kant inherited from her a simple apprecia- 
 tion for Nature which was one of the ruling motives of his life. 
 From her little Immanuel learned his first lessons in science, 
 for she would often take him outside the city and tell him 
 what she knew concerning the flowers and trees. The stern 
 morality and sincere piety of his parents were perhaps the 
 most notable influences of his younger years. Simple morality 
 remained for him, throughout his whole life, an ideal superior 
 in value to the speculative truths of philosophy. 
 
 Early Life. At the age of eight he was sent to the Gym- 
 nasium, or public school, of his native city. It was by the sug- 
 gestion of the family pastor, Dr. Schulz, that Kant was 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 181 
 
 allowed this privilege, for his parents had eleven children and 
 could ill afford the expense. It has been said that this worthy 
 man, Schulz, furnished the family with firewood to offset the 
 cost of ImmanuePs schooling. There is nothing in the youth 
 of Kant which would suggest mental ability beyond the aver- 
 age boy of his age. He spent almost nine years in the Gym- 
 nasium, devoting his attention to the Latin language, and is 
 said at that time to have aspired to the career of a classical 
 philologist. 
 
 When sixteen years old he entered the University of Konigs- 
 berg. Here his earlier preference for Latin was lost and he 
 displayed a constantly growing inclination for physics and 
 mathematics. This change in his taste was caused by the 
 professor in physical sciences, Kuntzen by name,, a man of rare 
 ability and power, who seems to have excited a feeling of 
 reverence in Kant. While a student at the university a dispute 
 arose between those who were inclined to interpret Nature 
 pantheistically and the orthodox Lutherans. The intolerance 
 shown by the latter was sufficient to turn Kant's designs away 
 from the ministry, although he was registered under the theo- 
 logical faculty. Intolerance, in whatever form it showed itself, 
 was disagreeable to Kant, and these impressions of formal 
 religion were amply sufficient to alienate him from the pietistic 
 influences of his early surroundings. Kant separated the 
 moral ideal from the religious emotions; the former he re- 
 garded as the basis of life itself, but there have been few who 
 have felt to a less extent the influence of a religion of feeling. 
 His university career was marked by severe poverty. He de- 
 rived some income from teaching the less studious pupils, but 
 this and a little assistance from a relative was hardly sufficient 
 for his meagre support. Self-denial and an unconquerable will 
 were the fruits of these early years of struggle and penury. 
 Poverty and physical weakness taught him the power of the 
 mind over the body, the will over the passions. 
 
 First Publication. Kant left the university at twenty years 
 
182 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of age and published his first book about two years later. The 
 subject of this work was concerned with the purely -physical 
 interpretation of Leibnitz's concept of force. During the 
 whole of his academic course, and even earlier at the Gymna- 
 sium, he had been taught by disciples of the Leibnitz-Wolffian 
 philosophy. Owing to its rationalistic foundation, the inter- 
 pretation of truth in terms of what ought to be, Kant was 
 led to call this whole movement the dogmatic. To this dog- 
 matic way of thinking Kant was deeply attached during the 
 first thirty years of his life ; and this publication, which treated 
 of kinetic forces in a mathematical manner, was distinctly 
 dogmatic rationalistic in character. 
 
 After the death of his father, which occurred in 1746, Kant 
 became a family tutor. This occupation lasted for nine years, 
 during which time he was in the service of three different 
 families, all residing in the immediate vicinity of Konigsberg. 
 In this period of his life the purely academic learning acquired 
 during his earlier years was polished and brightened by con- 
 stant intercourse with persons of culture. As a practical tutor 
 he gained what was of inestimable value to him in later years, 
 the power of clear and concise expression. The duties of 
 these positions did not demand all his attention, and he found 
 time and opportunity for the study of his favorite subject, 
 astronomical physics. Besides his first publication already 
 mentioned he prepared an essay on the retardation of the earth's 
 motion by tidal action. From a rough estimation of the retard- 
 ing effect of the action of the tides on the east coast of the 
 whole American continent Kant inferred that the length of the 
 day was increasing at the rate of a little less than a second in 
 every thousand years. 
 
 Theory of the Heavens. This short essay on the relation 
 between the moon's attraction and the earth's diurnal motion 
 was the prelude to an extended treatise which appeared anony- 
 mously in 1755, entitled " A General Natural History of the 
 Heavens; or, an Essay concerning the Consitution and Me- 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 183 
 
 chanical Origin of the whole Universe considered according 
 to the Newtonian Principles." This work, which alone places 
 Kant in the first rank of original thinkers of the modern 
 world, is the first exposition of the so-called "Nebular Hy- 
 pothesis." The discovery of this cosmological theory, which 
 marks a new era in astronomy, has been falsely attributed to 
 the Frenchman, Laplace. The principal work of the latter, 
 " The System of the World" 1 did not appear until forty-one 
 years after the publication of Kant's treatise. In it there is 
 no mention of Kant ; but it is highly improbable that Laplace 
 would have mentioned this anonymous essay, even if he had 
 seen it. 
 
 An exposition of Kant's discovery would properly belong to 
 the history of astronomy rather than to that of speculative 
 thought, but the importance warrants a brief summary here. 
 The entire extent of the present stellar universe is supposed to 
 have been occupied at some previous time by minute particles 
 of matter, each of them susceptible to the laws of gravity. 
 Gradually as the particles of the original chaos would act and 
 react against one another there would arise centres of rotation 
 throughout the whole mass, in a manner similar to the rotation 
 of water while passing rapidly down a spout. Our own sun, 
 with its attendant planets, developed from a single system of 
 rotating particles, and each of the stars and visible nebulae 
 represent other rotating systems in various stages of evolution. 
 As regards the formation of the planets, Kant supposes a 
 gradual separation of the revolving particles into rings, each 
 ring finally concentrating about a centre. These centres, of 
 which the earth is one, would, after they had become solid 
 spheres, still retain the original motion of rotation about a 
 central body or sun. Kant proceeds at length to explain the 
 various astronomical facts by means of his theory, showing in 
 what manner the planets, the form of their orbits, and their 
 
 1 SystSme du Monde. 
 
184 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 satellites are all phases in the realization of the law of stellar 
 evolution. 
 
 University Career. In the following year Kant published 
 a work on physical geography, in which he offered, for the first 
 time it is said, a true explanation of the trade-winds. This 
 publication came out immediately after his appointment as 
 lecturer, or " Privat-Docent," at the University of Konigsberg. 
 This position allowed him to deliver lectures on whatever sub- 
 jects he might choose and to collect the fees from the students, 
 but it carried with it no official recognition from the university. 
 These lectures were on the most varied subjects, comprising 
 mathematics, physics, physical geography, anthropology, mili- 
 tary science, pedagogics, natural theology, logic, moral phi- 
 losophy, and metaphysics. In each of these subjects his name 
 is connected with some contribution to the progress of true 
 knowledge. By the discovery of the nebular hypothesis his 
 name is worthy of a place beside that of Copernicus and New- 
 ton; and he may also be regarded as one of the early founders 
 of physical geography and the modern science of anthropology. 
 In pure metaphysics the name of Aristotle, of all the great 
 thinkers of ancient and modern times, is alone worthy of a place 
 beside that of Kant. Such an estimation is not the result of 
 unmerited enthusiasm, but rather an echo of what the world 
 is gradually coming to realize when it recognizes the extent of 
 his influence together with the obligations which society owes 
 to this humble thinker of remote Konigsberg. 
 
 The Three " Critiques." Thus occupied with private lec- 
 tures Kant continued until 1770, when he received the appoint- 
 ment to the chair of logic and metaphysics in the university of 
 his native city, a position which he continued to hold until his 
 death. After the inauguration as professor, Kant devoted him- 
 self almost exclusively to metaphysics. The spreading influ- 
 ence of English empiricism had already shaken his early 
 reliance on the rationalistic methods, and finally the sceptical 
 tendency of Hume had disturbed his confidence in the validity 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 185 
 
 of science. Some years before, he had conceived the funda- 
 mental premises of a philosophy wherein he hoped to restore the 
 former eminence of science, and in his inaugural address de- 
 fended a thesis made prominent in his later publications. His 
 greatest work, the " Critique of Pure Reason," 2 published in 
 1781, is the result of fifteen years of thought. Kant in this 
 first " Critique" intended to treat of the speculative or meta- 
 physical capacity of man and to define the limits of the human 
 mind in its pursuit of mathematical, scientific, and metaphysi- 
 cal truth. This speculative reason, however, is by no means 
 the extent of intellectual activity; the fields of moral and 
 aesthetic judgments form a very considerable part of our mental 
 range. To supply an estimation of these Kant found it neces- 
 sary to supplement his former work by the issue in 1788 of 
 his " Critique of Practical Reason " 3 and in 1790 of his 
 " Critique of Judgment/' 4 Kant's reputation as a meta- 
 physician rests almost entirely on these three works, for in 
 them is found the fundamental elements, if not the complete 
 exposition, of his system, called the Critical Philosophy. The 
 " Pure Keason" is empirical and sceptical in character. It seeks 
 to establish mathematical and physical science more firmly, 
 while it also aims to show the inability of the reason to deal 
 with the deeper problems of pure metaphysics. The " Practical 
 Keason" supplements the former work and seeks to establish 
 metaphysics on a moral rather than on a speculative basis. It 
 shows that the same problems, such as immortality, human 
 freedom, and God, which the " Pure Keason" found itself 
 unable to cope with, were really solved by our faith in the 
 ultimate reality of duty and morality. In the " Critique of 
 Judgment" Kant applies an idealistic interpretation to beauty, 
 sublimity, and natural purposes, believing such to result from 
 
 2 Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 
 
 8 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. 
 
 * Kritik der Urtheilskraft. 
 
186 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mental attitudes rather than from the perception of qualities 
 possessing a real existence in the external world. 
 
 Characteristics. The many peculiarities in the personality 
 of Kant deserve a passing remark, but hardly warrant such 
 undue emphasis as they often receive. In physique he was 
 weak and undersized; in stature scarcely five feet in height. 
 A narrow chest, feeble lung power, and sunken cheeks are 
 certainly indications of a frail body, but in Kant's case they 
 were the result of inherited weakness enhanced by years of 
 study. During the latter part of his life, when his feeble- 
 ness and infirmities increased, he is said to have presented 
 an emaciated and even deformed appearance, particularly 
 noticeable to strangers. Kant was well aware of his own feeble- 
 ness, and with this in mind he made the health of his body 
 a special study. He believed that a healthy and happy state of 
 mind was the first requirement for a healthy body, and that, 
 within limits, the intellect controlled the condition of the whole 
 organization. He disliked drugs of all kinds and believed that 
 regularity and exercise, pure air and recreation were the surest 
 foundations for a lengthened life. 
 
 The regularity of his conduct has been the source of surprise 
 to all who know only the complicated conditions of our modern 
 life. He rose punctually at five in the morning and partook 
 of tea ; until seven o'clock he was occupied with the preparation 
 of his lectures, and from seven until nine with their delivery. 
 The rest of the morning was taken up in writing for publica- 
 tion or in the correction of his manuscript. During hours of 
 meditation it was his custom to fix his eye upon some distant 
 object, in order that he might more readily concentrate his 
 thoughts. A neighboring tower seemed well adapted for this 
 purpose, and there is current a tradition that when it became 
 obscured by some intervening trees Kant required their removal. 
 Eegularly at one o'clock he met a group of his friends at the 
 dinner-table, preferring never to dine alone. These social 
 gatherings were extremely enjoyable to Kant. Here he pur- 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 187 
 
 posely came in contact with men of the most varied experience, 
 merchants, professors, clergymen, and students were among 
 the number. The subjects of conversation were never of a 
 philosophical character; he desired rather to hear of travel, 
 politics, and topics of daily interest. He is said to have been 
 a " brilliant conversationalist" and interesting to all who had 
 the privilege of dining with him. His marvellous memory, 
 keen insight, wit, and mild sarcasm form a combination which 
 may well deserve to be called " brilliant." After the noonday 
 meal he would either visit at the house of some friend or spend 
 a few hours in the reading of newspapers. Regularly at the 
 close of the afternoon he would take a walk. For this purpose 
 Kant chose each day the same locality until his generosity 
 towards beggars so increased their number that he was obliged 
 to seek exercise elsewhere. Returning from the daily walk, 
 which was never postponed on account of the severest weather, 
 Kant would spend the evening enjoying some light reading. 
 He is said to have been especially fond of Johnson and Swift 
 among the English, and Montaigne and Rousseau among 
 French writers. Promptly at ten he retired for the night. 
 
 Mental Qualities. Kant was pre-eminently the thinker 
 rather than the actor; he lived in an intellectual sphere and 
 not in the world of practical affairs. Because of long brooding 
 over problems of metaphysics his whole attitude towards the 
 world became cold and reserved, evincing few traces of warmth 
 or emotional sympathy. Although he looked with favor upon 
 the American and French revolutions and on the cause of politi- 
 cal freedom among all classes, it was a sympathy born of the 
 intellect and not of the heart. The laws of human progress 
 required an increasing respect towards the dignity of man, and 
 Kant beheld in political liberty a single phase of human free- 
 dom. He had an especial dislike for music, believing it to be 
 a waste of time and energy, well enough perhaps for women 
 who had nothing else with which to occupy their attention, but 
 not worthy of consideration by the man of serious mind. Of 
 
188 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the other aesthetic arts, poetry alone appealed to him, and 
 among the poets Lucretius, Horace, and Pope were his favorites. 
 Eloquence was the object of special aversion to him, and he is 
 said to have often declared that oratory attains its object 
 through vain deceit. It is almost needless to say that Kant 
 never married; he was too much the philosopher to subject his 
 independence to his passions. He entertained no very high 
 regard for women in general, and believed marriage of advan- 
 tage only for rational ends, such as position or wealth. 
 
 With reference to religion Kant is the same critical phi- 
 losopher. He regarded Christ as simply a personified Idea of 
 Goodness which "reason presents to us for imitation/' But 
 beyond this religion of reason Kant had little sympathy with 
 formal Christianity. He avoided all attendance at church and 
 " spoke contemptuously of all acts of worship." Yet there 
 have been few men in modern times who have had a more 
 lasting influence on the deeper phases of Christianity or have 
 contributed more towards a rational theology. Perhaps the 
 deepest and firmest element in Kant's character was his rever- 
 ence for simple morality. From his earliest boyhood he had 
 respected the moral conscience above all else, and sought in later 
 life to raise it to a position higher than that of the speculative 
 reason. 
 
 To say that Kant was free from all emotions is certainly an 
 exaggeration. He was often dogmatic in the expression of his 
 views, disliked contradiction under all circumstances, and 
 evinced unmistakable signs of anger when his old servant, 
 Lampe, disobeyed his orders. Although modest in the estima- 
 tion of his own worth, he was not always just towards those 
 who were opposed to the Critical Philosophy. Long reflection 
 made it difficult for him to appreciate the opinions of others, 
 especially when they could not readily find a place in his own 
 thought. 
 
 Death. Towards the close of the century Kant's former 
 powers began to fail. He no longer experienced the same pleas- 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 189 
 
 lire in the conversations of his friends or the same interest in 
 contemporary affairs. His writings became less coherent and 
 concise and at the same time more dogmatic in tone. Finally, 
 towards the end of the year 1803, it was evident that he could 
 not live much longer, and on February 12, 1804, he breathed his 
 last. When the news of his death spread over Konigsberg, a 
 soldier pointed to a small cloud in the zenith, and said, " Be- 
 hold, that is Kant's soul flying heavenward." Thus died one of 
 the profoundest and noblest men who has ever lived. 
 
 PROBLEMS or THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In the exposition of Kant's philosophical system one meets 
 with two difficulties, its minuteness and its scope. Between 
 this Scylla and Charybdis the expounder of Kant must steer 
 his course. As regards its scope, it must te remembered that 
 Kant endeavored to bring all branches of knowledge within 
 the field of the Critical Philosophy and subject them to its prin- 
 ciples. To accomplish this undertaking he had recourse to a 
 minuteness and detail altogether inappreciable, except in the 
 writings of the philosopher himself. As a thinker he is gen- 
 erally regarded as the typical German metaphysician, subtle 
 but unintelligible, except after years of study. The style in 
 which he wrote is often obscure and not infrequently lends 
 itself to several interpretations. 
 
 Three Factors. In the philosophy of Kant, considered as 
 a whole, there are three factors which give it distinctness of 
 form, rationalism, empiricism, and morality. During the 
 earlier years of philosophical study and reflection Kant was 
 under the influence of the Leibnitz- Wolffian school. He dis- 
 played little originality in metaphysics and evinced a decided 
 disposition to follow the current of the prevalent university 
 philosophy. Later, however, he met the English empiricists, 
 who impressed him with the inadequacy of the rationalistic 
 stand-point and the necessity of meeting the issues of a sceptical 
 empiricism. Hume's treatment of Causality particularly trou- 
 
190 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bled him. He felt the cogency of its position, and yet was 
 unwilling to accept it, since it seemed to undermine the possi- 
 bility of any science whatever. If the principle of causalty was 
 merely observed sequence, then the laws and truths of science 
 have no value. To reconcile Leibnitz and Hume was the im- 
 mediate purpose of the Kantian philosophy; but this recon- 
 ciliation was by no means the only end in view. Kant had long 
 felt that morality was superior to the syllogism of logic that 
 the practical reason could approach nearer to ultimate reality 
 than the speculative reason. With this in view the whole 
 Critical Philosophy culminated in the proof of God's existence 
 deduced from the eternal reality of the moral law. His early 
 writings defined a new empirico-rationalism, through which 
 Kant was able to reassert the validity of science; the later 
 works carried this same stand-point beyond the physical world 
 into the range of moral ideals. 
 
 The Motive. Kant set before himself the problem of 
 human knowledge, and the peculiar solution which he offered 
 is known as the " Critical Philosophy." This aims to criticise^ 
 the data of experience and at the same time to define the laws 
 necessarily implied in the apprehension of experience, the 
 origin of these laws, their nature, and their limits. This ex- 
 amination, however, of the presuppositions of science and the 
 validity of empirical knowledge was subordinate to Kant's 
 especial task of raising the authority of the moral conscious- 
 ness above that of the reason. Thus, there appears to be two 
 distinct, although in the end identical, aspects of the Kantian 
 system, the criticism of the sense-impression and the proper 
 estimation of the moral consciousness; the former is made 
 prominent by the " Critique of Pure Reason" alone, while the 
 latter is in evidence when one considers this work in connection 
 with the " Critique of Practical Reason" 
 
 Kantian Terminology. At the time when Kant wrote, the 
 meaning of philosophical terms was much less firmly fixed than 
 at present. Especially was this true in Germany, where Wolff 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 191 
 
 and Baumgarten, but a few years before, had distinctly defined 
 for the first time the use of the German language in technical 
 philosophy. The original stand-point of Kant's system, to- 
 gether with the paucity of philosophical terms, made it neces- 
 sary for him to define new meanings and attach to them new 
 words. This makes the terminology of the Critical Phi- 
 losophy a study in itself and renders its translation into popular 
 language a difficult and precarious task. The understanding 
 of Kant's system demands an acquaintance with a few at least 
 of these terms, especially as they are now in use in general 
 philosophical literature. 
 
 THE "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." 
 
 The Logical Judgments of Science. It was earlier re- 
 marked that the problem of the " Critique of Pure Reason" 
 was chiefly concerned with the foundations of science. With 
 this inquiry before him Kant considered it necessary to define 
 with considerable care the methods of reasoning employed in 
 mathematics and science, and also the general type of logical 
 judgment indicated by scientific statements. It is an ancient 
 conception in logic whic^ distinguishes between those thoughts 
 or judgments which really join two separate facts or concep- 
 tions and those other word statements which merely repeat 
 the same idea, as A = A. The former class Kant called " syn- 
 thetic" because they indicate a synthesis or progress of ideas; 
 whereas the latter class, which are mere redundant expressions, 
 were called by him " analytic." Thus the judgment " that leaf 
 is large" is a synthetic expression, for the two distinct and 
 unrelated ideas " leaf" and " largeness" are united in a single 
 statement. But when we say "the leaf is a leaf," it is quite 
 obvious that no progress of thought had been made, and 
 the statement is a useless redundancy, and is therefore 
 " analytic." 
 
 Still again, Kant lays special stress upon a distinction be- 
 tween judgments which depend on their apparent necessity 
 
192 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and universality. Thus it would be agreed that the statement 
 "boats float "on the water" is universal and carries with it a 
 sort of implicit necessity which receives the assent of everybody. 
 But if one said " this boat is white," the statement has little or 
 no meaning until the special boat referred to is made known; 
 for some boats are white and some are not. It is therefore 
 possible to distinguish among judgments two broad classes. 
 One may be said to include all those propositions which are 
 universally valid so far as human thought and experience are 
 concerned, such, for example, as "boats float on the water," 
 "two plus two make four," "barium sulphate is practically 
 insoluble in water," or the law of gravity. These are called by 
 Kant " a priori" in so far as they seem to be based on a sort 
 of implicit necessity. In contradistinction to these judgments 
 of universally valid facts there is a second class, which in- 
 cludes the simple descriptive statements of but a single experi- 
 ence, " this boat is white," " that man is tall," or " that salt 
 is deliquescent." These, it will be observed, are not scientific 
 or true facts until the boat, the man, or the salt is directly indi- 
 cated by some description; the statements are true only for a 
 limited portion of the extent of human experience; whereas 
 the a priori judgments of the former class may be re- 
 garded as true throughout the whole length and breadth of 
 our possible experience. This second class of statements 
 whose truth is limited to a single observation Kant calls "a 
 posteriori" 
 
 The Value of Synthetic Judgments. And, furthermore, 
 it is readily seen from the foregoing analysis that it is pos- 
 sible to divide all judgments into four subclasses by first 
 classifying them into synthetic and analytic and then dividing 
 each of these groups in its turn into a priori and a pos- 
 teriori judgments. Of these four classes, however, the two 
 comprising the analytic statements are of little or no conse- 
 quence, since they are mere redundant expressions. The syn- 
 thetic judgments a priori and a posteriori, on the contrary, 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 193 
 
 are of great value, because it is by their means that we can 
 attain to scientific knowledge. But a synthetic judgment is 
 one that connects two ideas of a distinctly different char- 
 acter in such a manner that we regard the relation as true. 
 There is therefore a kind of mystery connected with these syn- 
 thetic judgments, for they are able to express true relations 
 between apparently disconnected and heterogeneous ideas. In 
 the case of the class of synthetic judgments a posteriori we 
 have direct experience to appeal to in establishing this relation 
 of truth. When I make the synthetic a posteriori judgment 
 " this boat is white" I connect the different ideas of " boat" and 
 " whiteness" by means of the sensations of sight and touch. 
 But these sensations of sight and touch cannot penetrate beyond 
 the boat directly before me to all boats of possible experience, 
 hence the judgment is valid only with reference to \ certain 
 definite circumstance. From this example it is readily seen 
 that in the case of synthetic judgments a posteriori we have 
 the ground for the assurance of their truths directly derived 
 from the certainty of sense-impression, but for that very reason 
 the assurance is restricted to the momentary experience be- 
 fore us. 
 
 Synthetic Judgments a priori. When, in the second place, 
 we inquire regarding the basis of our certainty in the synthetic 
 judgments a priori we approach a question much more difficult 
 to answer. For when we say " boats float on the water" we 
 assert that at any time or in any place we shall find this state- 
 ment true, although our own restricted experience allows us to 
 examine but a small number of all the boats that ever were or 
 ever will be built and only a small portion of all the water that 
 exists. Yet, notwithstanding this restriction, we feel able to 
 assert as a fact of scientific knowledge that this statement is 
 necessarily and universally true. In the case of synthetic 
 judgments a posteriori we had direct experience to rely upon, 
 but with a priori judgments this is entirely lacking. What, 
 then, is their ground of truth and assurance? Or in Kant's 
 
 13 
 
194 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 wording, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? 6 
 This is the immediate problem of the ff Critique of Pure 
 Reason/' through the answer to which he hopes to reconcile 
 empiricism and rationalism and thereby permanently relieve 
 science from scepticism. 
 
 The knowledge within the fields of mathematics, natural 
 science, and metaphysics consists of synthetic judgments a pri- 
 ori,, and the field of these judgments is co-extensive with the 
 limits of possible knowledge. With this in mind Kant recog- 
 nized that if he should determine the extent of the possibility 
 of the synthetic judgments a priori he would have really deter- 
 mined the extent of the possible knowledge of man. Kant's 
 new problem of the ff Critique of Pure Reason" is in truth, 
 nothing else than the old problem of Aristotle, Nicolas of Cusa, 
 Locke, and Hume, the limits of human knowledge. 
 
 The Three Faculties of the Mind. In order to deal with 
 this problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori 
 it was necessary to consider the various circumstances under 
 which they could arise. For it would seem quite obvious that 
 the same solution to the problem could not be applied to those 
 very complex processes of thought which might be found suffi- 
 cient in cases where the mind only made simple judgments of 
 apprehension. The differences in the complexity of the various 
 mental activities would render a single solution to the problem 
 inadmissible. In brief, it was necessary to divide the mind into 
 its different regions of activity and then search for the ground 
 of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori within each 
 field. In order to accomplish this the ff Critique of Pure Rea- 
 son" is divided into three distinct parts, each of which relates to 
 a special aspect of the mind. At first Kant is concerned with 
 the reception of our knowledge, that is, the mere intuitioji 
 and tfllvnlfl.f.irm nf t.hft fp*fo flf ftYpftriftnf.ftj an operation of the 
 
 B "Wie sind synthetische Urteile & priori moglich?" Kritik der 
 reinen Vernunf t, Second Edition, p. 19. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 195 
 
 mind which is accomplished by the function or faculty of 
 sensibility. 6 But, besides this mere reception, the experiences 
 of sense and imagination must be arranged and systematized in 
 order to be of use in the processes of thought. For this purpose 
 Kant suggests a second faculty, that of the understanding, 7 
 which analyzes and arranges the data presented to it by the 
 sensibility. Beyond this power of arrangement of the under- 
 standing there is still another faculty of the mind, the reason, 8 
 which attempts to carry the facts of sense beyond their legiti- 
 mate limits and into the field of abstract metaphysical construc- 
 tions. The term faculty does not imply that there are three 
 unrelated regions of the mind, each one of which operates by 
 independent laws. On the contrary, Kant insists that the mind 
 is a unity in itself and that these so-called faculties are only 
 the different aspects, functions, or modes of its operation. 
 
 The " Thing-in-itself." -With this threefold classification 
 of our mental activities clearly defined, the further treatment 
 of the original problem regarding synthetic judgments a priori 
 would quite naturally take the form of what we might call a 
 natural history of the ordinary processes of knowledge. This 
 would take the form of an account of How we obtain knowledge, 
 it would attempt to trace each step of the mind through the 
 three faculties from the single sense-perceptions to the formula- 
 tion of the highly abstract conceptions of metaphysics. Such an 
 historical sketch would point out the general nature of each men- 
 tal process and describe the conditions under which it occurred. 
 While tracing the natural history of our mental processes 
 we shall later discover that Kant is a rationalistic-idealist in so 
 far as he recognizes that the mind and not the outside world 
 is responsible for the universality and necessity of all true 
 judgments of knowledge, an empiricist in so far as he recognizes 
 that the elements of these judgments are ultimately derived 
 from sense-impressions. In order, however, for any idealism to 
 
 6 ShuHcbkeit. 7 Verstand. 8 Vermmft. 
 
196 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 reconcile itself with the hard stubbornness or the given quality 
 of our world of fact, it has always felt the necessity of some 
 purely objective, external, or non-idealistic element. Thus 
 Berkeley, influenced by religious motives, defined God as the 
 ultimate source of our true ideas, or synthetic judgments 
 a priori, as the critical mind of Kant would have called the God- 
 given ideas of Berkeley. And in the same manner Kant found 
 it necessary to trace our knowledge back to some external source, 
 only his clear insight found it difficult to explain the partially 
 comprehensible facts of knowledge by the incomprehensible 
 nature of God. On the contrary, he sought the simplest and 
 perhaps least objectionable realistic basis for any idealism, the 
 mere unqualified existence of a something existing outside of 
 space and time and beyond our exact knowledge, but a some- 
 thing which might serve as the logical background for our 
 world of experience. This unknowable substratum of sensation 
 Kant called the " thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich). It must not 
 be confused with the " substance" of Locke and the Scholastics, 
 for the " thing-in-itself " is a spaceless, timeless, and causeless 
 entity, the conception of which is entirely original with Kant. 
 It is, even in his case, ultimately traceable to an inference from 
 experience, for he sympathizes above all else with the empirical 
 stand-point. " As regards temporal antecedence," Kant says, 
 in the introduction to the second edition of the " Critique of 
 Pure Reason/' " there is no knowledge within our mind which 
 was not first in experience." He thus begins with apparently 
 the same empirical presupposition as Locke, only Kant recog- 
 nizes in experience something" deeper than its mere givenness. 
 This he finds in the logical reality of the "thing-in-itself" a 
 non-sensuous but real something, which somehow underlies our 
 apprehension of the outsidje* world. This strange "thing-in- 
 itself" is the basis or original starting-point for our natural 
 history of the mental processes. The only conception we can 
 possibly form of it and even this meagre conception refers 
 only to its existence and not to any qualities it might possess 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 197 
 
 may be obtained by abstracting from some object all its spacial 
 or temporal characteristics, and the mere " skeleton" which 
 remains is some approach to Kant's " thing-in-itselJ." Its 
 nature will perhaps become somewhat clearer if we proceed to 
 trace the conditions under which it may affect the mind. 
 
 The Sensibility. ITS FORMS OF APPREHENSION. The im- 
 pression from the outside unknowable " thing-in-itself" comes 
 first, to the mind as a mere stimulus which, owing to its space- 
 less and timeless character, altogether evades consciousness. It 
 is Kant's original interpretation of the knowing process that 
 this external stimulus to experience is received by the mind 
 according to its own laws of perception. It is the faculty of 
 sensibility which first reacts on the " thing-in-itself," and in 
 so doing impresses upon it the conditional elements of space 
 and time. They are the universal qualities of every experience, 
 the peculiar and distinctive tools or instruments which the 
 faculty of sensibility employs in the perception of the unknow- 
 able " thing-in-itself." In other words, space and time are the 
 instrumental conditions or formula? of procedure and tabula- 
 tion by which the mind perceives the external source of its 
 ideas. They are not, as wrong interpretations of Kant would 
 seem to imply, the arbitrary creations of the sensibility which 
 are somehow made and then objectified in order to deceive the 
 mind, but, on the contrary, they are the necessary conditions 
 or methods without which the mind could not react on the real 
 external world ; from a similar stand-point one might consider 
 warm temperature to be one of the necessary conditions without 
 which life could not continue, or feet, to use a simple illustra- 
 tion, the necessary condition for animal locomotion. Just as a 
 man who has always worn red spectacles would perceive the 
 external world in terms of redness, or the person under the in- 
 fluence of opium would look at the world through the veil 
 which this drug impresses upon the mind, so space and time 
 are the universal media by which the human intellect appre- 
 hends its experiences. 
 
198 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE " PHENOMENON." Should one wake up in the morn- 
 ing and find that everything experienced had a red color and 
 that nothing could be conceived except as veiled in this redness 
 it is by no means improbable that the conclusion would be 
 drawn that the redness was a result of some peculiarity of the 
 mind. From a similar stand-point Kant, finding that space and 
 time are the universally necessary elements of all experience, 
 failed to account for them in any other way than as subjectiie 
 forms of apprehension. By so doing he ceased to regard our 
 sensuous experiences as the ultimately simple (after Locke and 
 Hume), but rather as the secondary constituents of knowledge. 
 The term " appearance" (object of sense-perception), 9 and later 
 the word " phenomenon/' was employed by Kant to denote those 
 constituent elements of our knowledge which result from the 
 action of the subjective forms of space and time on the un- 
 knowable " thing-in-itself ." They are the " objects" of every- 
 day experience, the common facts given us by sensation. 
 
 SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN MATHEMATICS. Sir 
 William Eowan Hamilton, the originator of the calculus of 
 quaternions, called algebra the science of time and geometry 
 the science of space. Under one or both of these most general 
 forms it is perhaps possible to subsume every branch of modern 
 mathematics. Hamilton was a disciple of Kant in metaphysics, 
 and this observation well illustrates the stand-point of the 
 Critical Philosophy towards mathematical science. If the 
 mathematical truths have their source in an ultimate reference 
 to space and time they would rest on a humanistic, subjective, 
 or idealistic element; they would be referable to conditions of 
 mental apprehension rather than to the external world. Now, 
 since the mere forms of spacial and temporal apprehension are 
 identical for all men throughout all possible ranges of experi- 
 ence, then what is true with reference to the space and time of 
 
 " Erscheinungen (Gegenstande der sinnlichen Anschauung)." 
 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 52. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 199 
 
 one person remains true to everybody at all times. Thus, if I 
 assert that within the Euclidian postulates three angles of a 
 triangle are equal to a straight angle, I have declared what is 
 true to every person under any condition, because the space in 
 which this proposition holds true is the same space as that 
 through which we all receive our experiences. This proposition 
 is universally and necessarily true, because it is required by 
 what is universal and necessary for all mankind, space. This 
 is the reply by which Kant himself answers his original ques- 
 tion : How are synthetic judgments a priori possible in mathe- 
 matics ? They are possible because space and time, the forms of 
 mathematics, are subjective elements universal for all men 
 under all circumstances. 
 
 " TRANSCENDENTAL FORM." Our experiences, hitherto con- 
 sidered so simple and so ultimate, seem to appear in a new 
 light if the bearing of this theory of Kant is understood. And 
 especially interesting does this analysis of experience appear 
 if considered in connection with Hume's sceptical attitude 
 towards the sciences. The Scotchman had left philosophy in 
 an unhappy plight. While resting all the assurance of knowl- 
 edge on experience he had in the next breath shown that experi- 
 ence gives us no basis for such an assurance. Driven to this 
 stand-point by the irresistible logic of the Briton, Kant sought 
 to re-establish the dignity of mathematics and the sciences by 
 criticising experience. He recognized that Hume's position was 
 unassailable so long as the experience itself was considered ulti- 
 mate, but by analyzing this experience he hoped to avoid a 
 sceptical outcome. The " thing-in-itself ," like the "impres- 
 sions" of Hume, can itself lead us nowhere, but the phenomenon 
 .formed by the union of this "thing-in-itself" with space and 
 time may lead us to true knowledge through the subjective uni- 
 versality of the latter elements. These two necessary forms of 
 experience, by which Kant is able to escape the scepticism of 
 Hume, were called by him " transcendental;' because their ex- 
 istence is necessary for even the possibility of experience. The 
 
200 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 term a priori, earlier referred to in connection with universal 
 and necessary judgments, is often used with a similar signifi- 
 cance, for it is by means of the implicit necessity which attaches 
 itself to the transcendental elements, that the a priori judg- 
 ments are possible. Briefly defined, the transcendental elements 
 in the " Critique of Pure Reason" are those forms which are 
 necessarily required by the very nature of the possibility of 
 experience itself. This term must not be confused with tran- 
 scendent, which has an altogether different meaning, the latter 
 referring to that which goes beyond or transcends all possible 
 experience, as God and the conception of the world's be- 
 ginning. 
 
 The Understanding. We have just seen that the faculty 
 of the sensibility has transcendental ways of looking at experi- 
 ence, and we now have to inquire as to the nature of the second 
 faculty of the mind, the understanding. It is here that the 
 phenomena produced by the sensibility from the "thing-in- 
 itself" and its transcendental elements of space and time are 
 synthesized into the propositions, thoughts, and statements 
 of scientific knowledge. That is, the understanding is the 
 faculty that judges; it brings together, according to the nat- 
 ural laws of thought, the mere unconnected experiences or 
 phenomena presented to it by the sensibility. The understand- 
 ing is an 'active faculty, for besides the mere reception of the 
 phenomena from fhe sensibility, it is able to rethink, according 
 to its own laws, these phenomena into the distinct propositions 
 of thought. 
 
 THE MEDIACY OF ALL EXPERIENCES. But before we inquire 
 into these laws by which the understanding unites the experi- 
 ences it may be possible to simplify the task by the discovery of 
 some general character common to all experience. We have 
 all probably observed that no single experience comes to us 
 entirely disconnected from its context in thought. When we 
 recognize the experience of something, say a mountain, the 
 mere sensuous perception is never unmixed with the memory of 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 201 
 
 some other experiences which it serves to recall, or with the 
 train of thought which it initiates. The perception never occurs l 
 emotions. It is quite true that these psychological processes 3 
 pure, it is always set in a context of other ideas, thoughts, and ^ 
 which accompany the mere perception are seldom consciously 
 recognized, they are noted only by subsequent reflection. This 
 elementary fact of psychology, that all our experiences are 
 united by subtle bonds of subconscious thought, is known 
 as the interrelatedness or mediacy of experience. By sup- 
 plying a ground or point of reference for all experiences, 
 even of the most diverse character, it gives unity to our con- 
 sciousness and purposive form to our life. 
 
 Although one may perhaps doubt that all our experiences 
 are as intimately connected with one another as this description 
 might imply, we would all probably agree with Kant that the 
 flow of time at least is a bond of unity for every experience. It 
 is always possible to connect two experiences by the before and 
 after relation, by representing them both in one temporal series. 
 It would seem, therefore, that the continuity of time is the 
 simplest form of mediacy, for every fact of our conscious life 
 has some relative position in the temporal series, and no ex- 
 perience can be even thought which has not a place in time. 
 
 THE TRANSCENDENTAL SELF. Although this mediacy or 
 connectiveness of experience may appear to be very simple and 
 hardly worth mentioning, it seems to carry with it consequences 
 of a most important character. To illustrate what is involved 
 in the unitv of our temporal consciousness let us take the ex- 
 perience of a single event and trace its logical implications. 
 When I cast my eyes towards the west we will say that a certain 
 pointed irregularity meets my gaze. At first I merely appre- 
 hend or perceive it, but coincident with the mere unconscious 
 perception there comes the thought, what is it ? To this half- 
 conscious query there appear the vague images of other experi- 
 ences which I momentarily reproduce in my imagination. By 
 means of these images of other experiences I am able to recog- 
 
202 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nize that this irregularity in the landscape denotes a mountain. 
 From certain topographical features I recognize that the moun- 
 tain is familiar to me, it recalls past experiences, it serves to 
 unite my present consciousness to the thoughts and experiences 
 of other days. An occurrence like this is constantly happening 
 to all of us, but owing to its familiarity we have long since 
 ceased to wonder at the process or examine its nature. But yet 
 there is something very striking about this power of a single 
 sensation to awaken nearly forgotten memories of the past and 
 to change the whole current of our thought. Through all 
 these past experiences thus reproduced in memory there must 
 have been a certain sameness or unity, else the single experience 
 of the familiar mountain would have been unable to bring them 
 into consciousness. In fact the existence of a certain unper- 
 ceived bond of unity my own self -bond is presupposed by 
 the simplest unity or mediacy of our experience. This inner- 
 most Ego/ whose function it is to bind together into a single 
 conscious life all the experiences of a person, is never itself 
 perceived. Yet unless we presuppose its existence the experi- 
 ences of the past would lack all familiarity; we would be con- 
 scious only of the momentary present. We only appreciate the 
 existence of this deepest self because experience, as we know it, 
 would be impossible without such a bond of unity ; its existence 
 is inferred as the necessary condition for the possibility of our 
 common experiences. In a previous paragraph those elements 
 which were necessary for our experience, as space and time, were 
 denoted by the Kantian term " transcendental/' And this self 
 which we have just described as the central unity of our con- 
 scious life is the "transcendental Ego." Although it can never 
 itself be directly perceived, its binding nature is demanded btt^ 
 the unity of our conscious life. 
 
 THE CATEGORIES. It is now possible for us to return to 
 the laws of the understanding, for we are able to perceive that \ 
 there is a transcendental element, the Ego, involved in the 
 experiences or phenomena with which the understanding deals. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 203 
 
 The operations of this faculty are above all else orderly. The 
 very fact that in the background lies the transcendental Ego, 
 synthesizing all the experiences into an interrelated whole, re- 
 quires that unity lies at the very heart of the understanding. 
 And, moreover, this unity of the understanding shows itself in 
 the laws of the judgment, for we earlier saw that judgment was 
 the special duty of this faculty. And behind these laws there is 
 a unity of motive, in that all judgments of whatever character 
 seek to attain the truth. Now since this unity of the under- 
 standing rests on the transcendental Ego, the laws by which 
 this faculty acts must themselves be transcendental. In other 
 words, the laws of the understanding, or, as Kant calls them, 
 the Categories, are, like space and time, transcendental in their 
 nature. They are the subjective, or a priori, or transcendental 
 forms by which the understanding unites the phenomena 
 handed over to it by the sensibility ; the conditions which make 
 possible the orderly processes of thought. We have thus dis- 
 covered that the understanding as well as the sensibility has 
 certain rules or formal conditions which it impresses upon the 
 phenomena. The categories, however, are not, like space and 
 time, mere forms of apprehension, but rather the laws by which 
 the understanding must operate. Owing to the unity and pur- 
 pose of the understanding it is possible to be perfectly sure as 
 to the number and character of these categories, for they are 
 identical with the general principles which the judgment em- 
 ploys in its search for the truth. They are twelve in number 
 and are divided into four groups of three each. In Kant's mind 
 they corresponded exactly to the laws of the judgment or think- 
 ing process, as exemplified by formal logic. They represent the 
 way the human intellect must proceed in its thought in order to 
 approach the ideal of truth. 
 
 CAUSALITY. Of the twelve categories that of causal relation 
 may be regarded as the most important and will be employed 
 to illustrate the general nature of the others. Let us consider 
 for a moment the case of two billiard-balls moving towards each 
 
204 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 other. The phenomena of their movement, the contact, and 
 the reaction are thought by the understanding under its own 
 transcendental laws or categories. The three positions of the 
 billiard-balls are not regarded as mere unconnected events, but 
 are rather united by the understanding into a causal series. 
 Wherever we apprehend nature the phenomena come to the 
 understanding unrelated, in simple temporal succession, like 
 the observed sequences of impressions which was all that Hume 
 could find in nature ; they are then thought by the understand- 
 ing according to its own forms or categories. Causality does 
 not exist in the world of the " thing-in-itself," it is only one of 
 the ways by which the understanding relates the phenomena. 
 Causality, law, order are imposed upon the world by the mind 
 and are not found in the world itself. 
 
 SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN SCIENCE. In view of 
 this theory of the transcendental character of the laws of 
 thought it is not difficult for Kant to answer his original 
 question concerning synthetic judgments a priori in physical 
 science. For if it is the universal laws of the human under- 
 standing which give the regularity, unity, and apparent neces- 
 sity to the world of outer nature, then it is perfectly possible 
 for knowledge to fall within the limits of truth, so long as it 
 arises from the legitimate exercise of the categories of the un- 
 derstanding. The mind through its faculty of the understand- 
 ing impresses the laws upon nature. This faculty is, like the 
 sensibility, universal among men, so that the valid operation of 
 its transcendental elements will always give rise to perfectly 
 true and scientific judgments a priori, these judgments arise 
 from the universal nature of the categories themselves and in 
 no wise refer to the objective reality of law in the world of the 
 " thing-in-itself/' Thus far Kant's work has been distinctly 
 positive. He set before himself the problem: How are syn- 
 thetic judgments a priori possible ? To this he replies, they are 
 possible because their a priori or universally necessary nature 
 arises from the inherent laws of the mind's activity, and not 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 205 
 
 from any externally valid relations. Mathematical predictions 
 remain true; scientific laws are universally accepted because 
 the transcendental elements upon which both depend are uni- 
 versal and necessary for all mankind. The outer world in its 
 absolute reality, the " thing-in-itself," is forever unknowable; 
 the nature known to our own consciousness is this unknowable, 
 apprehended under the forms of space and time and interpreted 
 in terms of the categories. 
 
 NOUMEN"A. It is true that the understanding sometimes 
 meets with ill-fated results when it attempts to deal with con- 
 cepts which are not themselves phenomena, but which arise 
 within the mind independently of the sensibility. These non- 
 spacial and non-temporal concepts which the understanding 
 finds it cannot employ in its processes of thought are called by 
 Kant, "noumena" The self is an example of such a concept. 
 In its innermost nature the soul is outside of time and space, 
 and cannot therefore be employed by the understanding in its 
 processes of thought. All attempts to think a "noumenon" 
 are by their nature doomed to failure. Our mind can go no 
 further than the sensibility permits ; the understanding can deal 
 only with its phenomena. Kant thus far is in agreement with 
 Locke as to the limits of our sensuous knowledge, only we shall 
 see later that he denies the intuitive knowledge of the soul and 
 the rationally demonstrable knowledge of God. 
 
 Kant's reply to the scepticism of Hume is distinctly ideal- 
 istic. Instead of refuting the observation of the acute Scotch- 
 man that natural laws are only observed sequences, he accepts 
 it with all that it implies, only he asks us to consider for a 
 moment the inner nature of these sequences. Criticise the 
 experiences of which the sequences consist and we may not find 
 them as simple as might appear at first sight. The error of 
 Hume, according to Kant, consisted in the belief that the given 
 impression was ultimate. By an analysis of experience Kant 
 discovered not only the objective and given, but also a subjective 
 and universal character. Thus conceived, the scepticism of 
 
206 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hume vanishes. Eeality has become internal rather than ex- 
 ternal, subjective instead of objective. 
 
 The Reason. Although Kant rejected Hume's attitude to- 
 wards the possibility of a true science, he did not hesitate to 
 follow him in certain respects. By means of his transcendental 
 stand-point he had defined the limits of the human intellect, 
 and he was disinclined to desert his convictions. There was, 
 however, a region of inquiry to which the understanding, 
 limited to a few phenomena, could not attain; and it was the 
 office of the third faculty of the reason to investigate those 
 subjects which lay beyond the power of the former. If we 
 regard the understanding as the faculty of rules Kant believes 
 that the reason may be defined as the faculty of principles.^ 
 By this Kant would indicate the highest power of the mind, a 
 faculty which concerns itself with general propositions and con- 
 ceptions and does not hesitate to penetrate to the broadest and 
 deepest generalities. The operation and the results of the un- 
 derstanding are legitimate, they are founded directly on ex- 
 perience and proceed no further than the separate phenomena 
 will permit. But, on the contrary, the reason seeks to go far 
 beyond the legitimate ground of the phenomena and construct 
 ideas of its own from the insufficient data received from the 
 understanding. 
 
 THE IDEAS OF THE KEASON. In this illusory procedure of 
 the reason it is especially concerned with the ideas of the unity 
 of the soul, the ultimate character of the world, and finally 
 with the Ideal of God. After repeated failures on the part of 
 the baffled reason to establish anything of value, it discovers that 
 these ideas belong to a realm beyond experience and higher than 
 the speculative faculty of man can penetrate. The manner in 
 which Kant shows the insufficiency of the speculative reason in 
 
 10 Vermogen der Regeln." Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edi- 
 tion, p. 356. 
 u " Vermogen der Principien." Ibid. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 207 
 
 the presence of these problems has exerted a lasting influence 
 on later philosophy. The arguments in each case are founded 
 in the fact that the reason can never deal with a totality of 
 phenomena, 12 because the understanding cannot supply the 
 necessary data. Totality implies a limited whole which can 
 never under any condition be attained through the phenomena 
 themselves. And the three central ideas are deduced from a 
 totality of phenomena; hence the reason is baffled in their 
 presence. 
 
 THE PARALOGISMS OP PSYCHOLOGY. When the reason en- 
 deavors to make assertions regarding the soul it becomes 
 involved in certain difficulties which Kant calls the "para- 
 logisms" They deal with the presuppositions of rational psy- 
 chology and illustrate the results to the reason in its attempt 
 to discover a spiritual essence of man, called_the^gQul, incor- 
 ruptible and immortal. The several paralogisms appear per- 
 fectly logical on the surface, for they observe the form of the 
 syllogism of logic. But when they are further examined we 
 find that the reason has constructed them on the premise of the 
 subjective totality of experience. This, however, is forbidden 
 ground, for the concept of a totality of phenomena of whatever 
 character lies beyond the legitimate field of the intellect. Kea- 
 son feels conscious that it is able to deal with the self of self- 
 consciousness, but fails in its attempt, because the only self is 
 the "transcendental Ego," which we earlier saw was only an 
 implication of experience and not a reality directly perceived. 
 In brief, the speculative reason of metaphysics cannot know, 
 anything about the soul, because its nature is bound up in that 
 totality of experience which itself lies beyond all experience. 
 And, furthermore, Kant discards the proof of the soul's exist- 
 ence given by Descartes. " I think, therefore I am," said the 
 Frenchman, but Kant replies that the aot of thinking is itself 
 
 12 ". . . Anschauungen die Allheit ( universitas ) oder Totalitat der 
 Bedingungen." Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 379. 
 
208 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a single experience and cannot lead us to the reality of that 
 unity which expresses the totality of all our experience. It 
 proves the momentary existence of thought, but not the con- 
 ^tinuity of selfhood. 
 
 THE ANTINOMIES OF COSMOLOGY. The soul is not the only 
 forbidden ground for the reason; psychology is not the only 
 science in which the reason may go astray by placing too great 
 reliance on its power. It seems to be the universal custom to 
 construct theories of the world, concerning its beginning, its 
 limits in space and time, and the extent of its physical laws. In 
 all these inquiries, which generally appear under the name of 
 cosmology, the human reason is the guide. We are apt to 
 declare that the world had no beginning, or that freedom of 
 volition is impossible, because the opposite premises contradict 
 reason. Kant therefore set himself to discover the real powers 
 of our speculative reason in the presence of these problems, and 
 arrived at conclusions not altogether gratifying. The reason 
 when confronted with the cosmical questions finds itself in a 
 strange predicament. It is able to reach opposing and con- 
 tradictory solutions to the same problem by equally valid 
 methods of procedure. These equally valid contradictions are 
 called antinomies by Kant. They are four in number and 
 represent the exertions of the reason while trying to conceive 
 of the totality of the world. The reason is able to prove conclu- 
 sively that the universe is limited in time and space, yet in the 
 next breath it is able also to prove the opposite or antithesis. 
 Still again the reason finds that invariable mechanical laws are 
 universal in the control of the human will as well as external 
 nature. Then, as if playing with our convictions, it brings 
 forward irresistible arguments to prove the necessity of free- 
 dom. The antinomies are thus logical contradictions. They 
 arise from the same error that permeates the paralogisms. 
 Only in the former case the reason tried to deal with the 
 totality of phenomena within the grasp of a single conscious- 
 ness, here in the antinomies it is the totality which is repre- 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 209 
 
 sented by the universe; the former was a subjective totality, 
 this latter is objective. We cannot grasp the origin of the 
 world, nor its ultimate nature, for these concepts, depending on 
 the conception of the objective totality of all phenomena, are 
 absolutely beyond the range of the speculative reason. 
 
 THE IDEAL OF THEOLOGY. The third employment of the 
 reason leads us to a higher totality than belonged to either the 
 paralogisms of the soul or the antinomies of the universe. 
 He is the ultimate Ideal of Pure Reason,, God. Just as the 
 reason sought to regard the subjective totality of all our experi- 
 ence as the concept of the soul and the objective totality of 
 phenomena as the concept of the universe, it now endeavors to 
 unite or synthesize these two totalities into the all-inclusive 
 Ideal of God. Theology, therefore, as a science, unites both the 
 premises of psychology and cosmology; the concept of God 
 is the union of the subjective and the objective, the soul 
 and external nature. Just as surely as the speculative reason 
 failed in its attempt to deal with the other two ideas, so also 
 is it doomed to failure when it seeks to conceive of the in- 
 finite totality of all possible phenomena in God. But further 
 than the mere conception of God, the reason believes itself able 
 to prove His existence. In the history of previous philosophy 
 Kant recognizes three general types of proof, all of which are 
 familiar to the student. The ontological proof endeavors to 
 move from essence to existence, from an Absolute Concept to 
 the reality of that concept. The cosmological proof requires 
 a First Cause; while the teleological proof moves from the 
 purposes in nature to their Divine Author. 
 
 THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF. The ontological proof, earlier 
 met with in Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza, was believed by 
 Kant to lie at the foundation of all rationalistic conceptions of 
 God. This declares that the idea of the Perfect, which we 
 realize by means of contrast with our own imperfection, must 
 have all possible attributes, else it would not be Perfect. Ex- 
 istence, however, is a positive attribute, and therefore must be 
 
 14 
 
210 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 included in the idea of the Perfect. In reply to this Kani 
 observes that the ideas of perfection and existence are in nc 
 wise related to one another. Logic would say that the two ideas 
 do not belong to the same universe of discourse. For although 
 I may think of the Perfect, its nature is in no wise affectec 
 by the further addition or subtraction of the quality of exist- 
 ence. " A hundred real dollars/' observes Kant, " contain noi 
 the least more than a hundred possible dollars." 13 The exist 
 ence of God is a matter altogether different from the concep 
 of perfection ; and the former can in no wise be inferred f ron 
 the latter. 
 
 THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF. The ontological proof is diffi 
 cult to comprehend and appeals only to those metaphysically 
 inclined. Another type of proof which has been long em 
 ployed to establish the necessary existence of a Divine Bein^ 
 as the Author of the Universe is called the cosmological proof 
 .It will be remembered that Locke employed it as the mos 
 certain of the proofs of God's existence. It starts with th< 
 intuitive existence of the thinking self, or some observed phe 
 nomena, as the premise. From this simple fact it revert 
 backward by the law of cause and effect to a necessary Firs 
 Cause, the Author of that series of events of which the sel 
 is the present stage. "I exist/' the cosmological proof de 
 clares, "and, therefore, God, the First Cause of the univers* 
 and Author of my being, must also exist." So stated it i 
 observed that the premises of the cosmological proof are reall; 
 three in number, the existence of the self or some observe* 
 phenomena, the absolute reality of the law of cause and effect 
 and the impossibility of an infinite series of events. To ou 
 minds, inclined to the ordinary ways of thinking, the greate 
 simplicity of this proof is perhaps more convincing than th 
 subtility of the ontological proof. But not so in Kant's estima 
 tion; the cosmological proof is a form only of the more funda 
 
 18 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second Edition, p. 627. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 211 
 
 mental ontological proof; here also the movement is made 
 from essence to existence, from absolute causality to the exist- 
 ence of the First Cause. And, further, the cosmological proof 
 rests the entire stress of authority on the uncritical acceptance 
 of the absolute reality of the principle of causality. Already 
 in the treatment of the understanding Kant had placed the law 
 of cause and effect among the transcendental or subjective 
 elements of the understanding, it pointed therefore to no 
 absolute reality outside of the mind. But the cosmological 
 proof rests its whole validity upon the objective and absolute 
 reality of this principle. It is therefore, in the opinion of 
 Kant, even less reliable than the ontological proof, for it con- 
 tradicts the essence of the transcendental character of the laws 
 of thought. 
 
 TELEOLOGICAL PROOF. The teleological or third proof for 
 the existence of God is far simpler and more silently con- 
 vincing than the other two. It was met with in connection 
 with the " Pre-established Harmony" of Leibnitz and was 
 especially prominent among his disciples. Briefly stated, it 
 depends on the rational and purposive structure of nature. We 
 see the different phases of nature following one another in 
 perfect harmony according to fixed and invariable laws. We 
 see that certain results are accomplished by the operation of 
 these laws, that certain ends seem realized and certain purposes 
 fulfilled. All of which seem the expression of thought and 
 design rather than the result of chance or accident. The 
 teleological proof tells us that we behold in nature an intelli- 
 gence that could only proceed from the Infinite Reason of God. 
 Thus stated, the argument from design lays all its stress upon 
 the observation of rational ends in nature. But Kant in his 
 transcendental mood of thought finds these ends, these laws 
 of nature, in the mind, and not in the unknowable objective 
 world, as it is in itself. The rational laws of nature arise from 
 the transcendental nature of human thought, the purposes of 
 nature are the purposes of mind; the Infinite Intelligence of 
 
212 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 God exists only in my consciousness, and not in the world of 
 external reality. 
 
 Thus with a single stroke, so to speak, Kant feels that he 
 has undermined the whole superstructure of natural religion. 
 He has shown that, according to the data of the " Critique of 
 Pure Reason/' the belief in the reality of an absolutely neces- 
 sary Being is founded on the illegitimate claims of the specula- 
 tive reason. God has no place in the cold world of the fact 
 phenomena. This conclusion is directly opposite to that of 
 Locke, who, like Kant, limits our possible knowledge to the 
 extent of sense-impression, but yet ascribes to the reason the 
 power of attaining to the truth of God by infallible demonstra- 
 tion. Kant finds that the epistemological stand-point of the 
 English thinkers requires criticism; and although this criti- 
 cism establishes more firmly their reliance on experience, it 
 destroys altogether the rational belief in God. 
 
 THE " CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL SEASON." 
 
 Transition from former " Critique." In the " Critique 
 of Pure Reason" Kant laid down the premises of his stand-point 
 and the principles of his method. In the criticism of experi- 
 ence he finds that a certain unknowable something, the " thing- 
 in-itself," serves as the logical basis of our knowledge, while 
 the mind looks at this something in terms of its transcendental 
 elements, time and space and the categories. Just so long as 
 our ambitions are restricted to this field of the phenomena and 
 we are contented to consider the phenomena singly and not in 
 their impossible totality, our knowledge finds its legitimate 
 field. But when finally speculative reason tries to create for 
 itself the conceptions of the self, the universe, and God by the 
 hypothesis of a totality of phenomena which it can never right- 
 fully perceive, it is proper to recall the mind from the impos- 
 sible task. Strange as it may seem, these conclusions of the 
 " Critique of Pure Reason" by no means represent the deeper 
 meaning of the Critical Philosophy. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 213 
 
 We have earlier said that religion in Kant's mind took the 
 form of morality. His nature was truly moral, but hardly 
 religious. The dignity of the moral man appealed more to 
 him than the complicated systems of theology or the emotional 
 sentimentality of religious feeling. His God sprung from 
 this innate reverence for morality, and not from any acquired 
 belief in revelation. So that the first " Critique" gave expres- 
 sion to only half his faith, and the latter portion of this was 
 negative. It merely prepared the way for a moral metaphysic 
 by showing that the metaphysic based on the speculative reason 
 failed altogether to understand the soul, the universe, and God. 
 In the <c Critique of Practical Reason" it was Kant's purpose to 
 treat these same problems from the stand-point of action rather 
 than of thought, and to show if possible that, although rejected 
 by the speculative reason, they formed the necessary grounds 
 for the very existence of morality. The "Critique of Pure 
 Reason" was sceptical towards those ideas of metaphysics ; the 
 "Critique of Practical Reason" sought to establish their 
 validity from the stand-point of the moral life. 
 
 Will in Morality. Should we desire to analyze the moral 
 nature of man it is not at all unlikely that before long we 
 should find that the will is especially important to both the 
 ethical and psychological treatments of morality. Very soon 
 we should discover that morality and the will seem in such 
 close connection that the one is almost necessary for the other. 
 This was not a discovery of Kant's, but is common to many 
 ancient and modern systems of ethics. In the present instance, 
 however, it is of special importance, 'because Kant was able to 
 analyze the authority of the will and discover the secret of its 
 moral power. 
 
 With him the value of the act is solely determined by the 
 character of the will from which it springs. In the first sen- 
 tence of one of his ethical treatises 14 Kant says, "Nothing 
 
 14 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. 
 
214 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which 
 can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will." 
 
 From its nature the will is coextensive with the possibility 
 of morality, yet it is itself moral only so far as it is good. 
 Through this distinction between the good and the bad Kant 
 reduces the will to a principle which lies behind it and from 
 which the will derives its moral worth; some principle, such 
 as a maxim or rule of conduct, may be regarded as the sub- 
 jective source of the act. The moral worth of the act is 
 therefore identical with the moral worth of the principle from 
 which it springs. The outward act is the temporary reflection 
 of the inner law, the goodness of the will is derived from a 
 determining principle. 
 
 The Imperatives. These subjective rules of conduct or 
 subjective principles which guide the will are most diverse in 
 character. They form the temporary and often subconscious 
 sources of our daily actions. Although fundamental to the 
 moral acts they are too transient to serve as an ideal which 
 shall endure unchanged throughout long periods of life. This 
 latter is the function of the imperative or objective and uni- 
 versally appreciable laws upon which the temporary rules above 
 referred to are founded. It is to one of the imperatives that 
 we almost instinctively appeal in all our decisions of conduct. 
 They are the broad and general laws which lie at the root of the 
 moral judgments, the universal but hidden springs which 
 give stability to character and constancy to purpose. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES. There is one class of these 
 imperatives, such as wealth, honor, happiness, or hope in a 
 life hereafter, which obtain their binding character because of 
 the reward which they depict. Thus one might say, " If you 
 wish to possess happiness, then love thy neighbor." In this 
 instance the appeal is made in terms of an " if," and loses all 
 its force in those cases in which the imperative appealed to is 
 not regarded as final. It is by means of the hypothetical im- 
 peratives that virtue and action are correlated with some 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 215 
 
 specific reward. Sensuous immortality is often the hypothetical 
 imperative of righteousness. Political economy derives its 
 character as a science from the fact that all its judgments are 
 based on the hypothetical imperative of wealth. Most forcible, 
 however, of all the hypothetical imperatives is that of the pur- 
 suit of happiness in general. Kant rightly agrees with the 
 Hedonists that it is involved in the very being of man, but can- 
 not regard it as ultimate in the moral life. Happiness through 
 riches brings envy, care, and anxiety; a long life may carry 
 misery with it; and even knowledge is by no means a sure 
 guide to happiness. Instinctive as this hypothetical imperative 
 may appear, it is of little value in our moral decisions, because 
 we are always unaware of the paths that will ultimately lead 
 to its largest fulfilment. If, however, these rules for a happy 
 life could be learned from experience and could afterwards be 
 trusted with absolute certainty, we would undoubtedly employ 
 them in all our actions, but without the possibility of such 
 permanent precepts Kant seeks beyond happiness for an ulti- 
 mate imperative, self-sufficient in its nature. On account of 
 this lack of absolute permanency the hypothetical imperatives, 
 such as happiness or wealth, can never lead to morality. An 
 imperative with this latter as its object must define the nature 
 of morality at the same time that it indicates the means for its 
 attainment. 
 
 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE. All our conduct is guided by 
 rules, only the variety of our life requires many such rules to 
 fit every possible circumstance. Should we discover some pre- 
 cept broader than the rest which might be regarded as applic- 
 able to every possible occasion, we would have discovered a law 
 which would be sufficient to divide every phase of the will into 
 either good or bad. This law, or moral imperative, would be 
 the final criterion of worth when applied to the other rules of 
 conduct ; it would in fact be categorical. This universal moral 
 law is stated by Kant in the following terms, " So act that the 
 rule which guides thy will can always under the same circum- 
 
216 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hold true as a principle of universal legislation." 15 We 
 can thus recognize the meaning of Kant's assurance that the 
 tegorical imperative is the " a priori principle of morality," 
 for by its Terr nature it is universally applicable throughout 
 the whole field of action. 
 
 Undoubtedly such a moral law appears at first sight too 
 formal, and perhaps, after all, like happiness, ineffectual in our 
 daily life. Although necessarily formal, because of its gen- 
 erality, it is possible to trace its application in the simplest 
 acts of life. Conduct is right if at the moment of decision we 
 may consistently will that the transitory rule that prompts 
 the action may become universal throughout nature. The cate- 
 gorical imperative regards suicide as immoral, because no one 
 can consistently will self-destruction throughout all nature. 
 Theft is wrong, because if made universal it would destroy 
 itself. Lying would lose its character if made a principle of 
 universal legislation. The categorical imperative is of extreme 
 importance to the whole philosophy of Kant. It was pointed 
 out in the beginning of this chapter that the Critical Philosophy 
 as a whole sought to develop the supremacy of morality over 
 the speculative reason. The categorical imperative, as the 
 expression of the principle of morality, is thus raised to a 
 unique position in the Kantian system. And presently we 
 shall discover that it is by the aid of this principle that Kant 
 feels himself able to go beyond the mere negative results of the 
 " Critique of Pure Reason" and establish more firmly than ever 
 before the existence of God, freedom and human immortality. 
 
 The concept of duty derives its force from the a priori, 
 or necessary and universal character of the categorical impera- 
 tive, for when we have conceived of the peculiar nature of the 
 moral law we have a means for discovering at once the meaning 
 
 * " Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als 
 Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten konne." Kritik der 
 praktiachen Vernunft, L, 7. 
 
IMMAXUEL KAXT. 217 
 
 of duty. Tins lattrr is taw 
 
 feel within us that impels us towards the 
 bv the categorical impel ai ire as the objecti 
 
 law. It is a doty for one to lire, for sui 
 
 to the moral law; likewise, truth, honesty, indnstiy 
 
 required by duty, because each k the rlpmnd of 
 
 imperative, 
 
 The Postulates of Practical Reason. Thus far 
 only stated the general conditions for a universal 
 ethics, We have by no means indicated what would follow 
 the categorical imperative if it is recognized as the 
 morality. In the ' ' Critique of Pmn Emmm" the 
 tal elements, time, space, and the categories, were of 
 importance, since they were necessarily assumed by 
 possibility of experience and thought From a similar 
 point Kant believes that there are certain premises, or 
 postulates, transcendental in their character, which at 
 be required by the very nature of morality, 
 are of such a nature that given even the thooghi of the 
 gorical imperative as the universal expression of the moral law 
 and their realitv is necessarilv included. They are three in 
 number, &SM freedom, fke immwrialitf of ike soml, and 
 ike existence of God, 
 
 THE SELF ix MORALITY. These p*ffifo1afr' would be real 
 only on the condition that Kant admits of 
 the self. For certainly some knowledge of the moral 
 required before we can intelligently refer to its fiuedum or to 
 its immortality. In the paralogisms of the " Critique of Pmn 
 Eeason" we were shown the futility of all mnq^itJiHm of the 
 soul. They were valueless because the reason endeavored to 
 deal with a totality of phenomena by carrying its inquiries be- 
 yond the limits of experience. At the same time, howcici, that 
 Kant sought to dissuade all attempts to understand the concept 
 of the soul he yet recognized a substratum of personal identity. 
 The transcendental elements, time, space, and the 
 
218 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 all required a base or subject in which they might subsist. And 
 we saw that the mediacy of experience pointed to the existence 
 of the transcendental Ego, incapable itself of direct perception, 
 yet required by the very nature of experience itself. Without 
 this noumenal or transcendental Ego the application of the 
 transcendental elements to the " thing-in-itself " would be im- 
 possible, life would become dissipated into a mere flux of sen- 
 sations. In the "Critique of Practical Reason" this noumenal 
 Ego, the presence of which was only implicitly recognized in 
 the former " Critique," was here brought into the foreground. 
 Further than the mere substratum of personal identity as 
 the ground of the transcendental elements, the noumenal Ego 
 here becomes the logical basis of morality, the self of the 
 moral agent. Unlike the phenomenal or perceptional self, this 
 inner soul of man is beyond the limiting conditions of time, 
 space, and the categories. It is therefore unknowable in its 
 true nature, but yet real in the deepest sense; it is required by 
 the unity of the conscious life and directly assumed by morality. 
 THE POSTULATE OF FREEDOM. With the categorical impera- 
 tive as the universal law of morality and the innermost reality 
 of the noumenal Ego as its source, Kant finds himself in a 
 position to deal with those problems laid aside by the specu- 
 lative reason of the former " Critique." The existence of free- 
 dom was perhaps the most vital question in the antinomies of 
 cosmology, especially when considered from the stand-point of 
 morality. But the concept was then discarded because the 
 reason found itself able to prove its existence as well as its 
 non-existence by equally valid methods. It is to be noted, 
 however, that the speculative reason regards the freedom of the 
 noumenal Ego as highly probable, owing to its transcendental 
 nature, but was incompetent to present any direct proof. In 
 the "Critique of Practical Reason" the problem assumes a 
 new aspect, freedom becomes one of the postulates of the moral 
 law; freedom and morality are inseparable. Discard personal 
 choice in the decision of conduct and we would at the same time 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 219 
 
 refuse to admit even the possibility of morality. The binding 
 force as well as the dignity of the categorical imperative arises 
 from the belief that man is free to observe it. Freedom and 
 morality are inseparable, deny the one and you cannot admit 
 the other; recognize either and the other necessarily follows. 
 Kant does not attempt to prove that the noumenal Ego is free, 
 he only requires that we observe the close connection between 
 the concepts of freedom and morality and from this intimate 
 association recognize the existence of both. 
 
 THE POSTULATE OF IMMORTALITY. Human immortality 
 was discarded in the paralogisms of the first " Critique" be- 
 cause, like other attributes of the soul, it lay beyond the power 
 of human reason. When, on the other hand, it is considered 
 in connection with morality, the belief in immortality assumes 
 a new value. We constantly observe a conflict between the 
 desires of the sense and the demands of the categorical impera- 
 tive. A state in which there is no such conflict would be a con- 
 dition of perfect goodness, the summum bonum of morality. 
 Such a state Kant believes to be necessarily implied in morality. 
 It cannot, however, become realized in any temporal existence, 
 for time always carries with it the desires of the external world. 
 The realization of perfect morality is therefore attainable only 
 in a timeless existence, that is, in a state of immortal life. 
 This endless process towards the ideal of perfection serves as 
 an inspiration to man. It points out to him a state of holiness 
 which, although unattainable in this life, is yet possible in the 
 infinite life of the world beyond the grave. 
 
 THE POSTULATE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. And finally 
 morality gives us the assurance in the existence of God alto- 
 gether unattainable by the direct proofs of the reason. The 
 binding force of the categorical imperative as well as the ideal 
 of morality in the life to come, require a source beyond the 
 individual man. The objective universality of the moral law 
 arises from an external source, and this source, infinite in its 
 nature because morality is infinite, is God. It is He, through 
 
220 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the moral law, that is truly the ruler of the universe, the seat 
 of divine intelligence. 
 
 This conception of God as the necessary fulfilment of mo- 
 rality is the culmination, although not the completion, of the 
 whole Critical Philosophy of Kant; it supplies both a founda- 
 tion and a unity to his whole system. It removes the grounds 
 for any charge of atheism which might have arisen from an 
 imperfect understanding of the " Critique of Pure Reason." 
 As to whether Kant is justified in the means by which he 
 proves the existence of God, as well as the other postulates, is a 
 matter which does not concern us at present. Our work is to 
 understand rather than criticise, to appreciate rather than 
 deprecate. 
 
 THE " CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT." 
 
 But even with this final postulate of God's existence Kant by 
 no means considered his philosophical system complete. The 
 " Critique of Pure Reason" proved to us the validity of science ; 
 it opened up the vast extent of the objective world and estab- 
 lished the critical basis for a philosophy of nature. The " Crit- 
 ique of Practical Reason" on the contrary, was restricted to the 
 subjective world of morality rather than to the objective world 
 of fact ; to the mobility of action and not to the fixity of event. 
 Even with this exhaustive division of the world of human expe- 
 rience Kant regarded the gulf between these two stand-points as 
 too wide. There was still lacking a critique of those judgments 
 which are neither concerned altogether with fact nor with 
 action, but which seem to belong to a faculty of the mind 
 lying between the understanding and the moral reason. These 
 are the judgments of mere approval, considered at length in the 
 third " Critique/' that of the " Judgment" proper. On the one 
 side these judgments of approval are like those of the under- 
 standing, in so far as they express a given unchangeable fact; 
 and on the other side they require the conception of an ideal 
 which allies them closely to the moral judgments of the " Prac- 
 tical Reason." We cannot approve or disapprove of a certain 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 221 
 
 object without having in mind some purpose which it partially 
 or wholly exemplifies. Judgments of approval arise from the 
 comparison of the object and the ideal of the complete reali- 
 zation of its purpose the comparison between the imperfect 
 and the perfect representation of some conception. 
 
 Its Transcendental Basis. Judgments of mere approval, 
 like those of natural science and morality, rests upon a tran- 
 scendental basis. In science it is the categories, in ethics it is 
 freedom, and finally in these judgments of approval it is the 
 belief in the purposiveness of nature. Just as the categories 
 were the necessary conditions for the possibility of synthetic 
 judgments a priori and freedom a necessary postulate for the 
 reality of the moral life, so also the belief in the existence of 
 ends or purposes in nature is necessarily required for the pos- 
 sibility of the judgments of approval. Like the other transcen- 
 dental principles, time, space, and the categories, purpose 
 cannot be attributed to the " thing-in-itself " as the final reality, 
 but only represents one way of looking at the world of 
 phenomenal appearances. Purpose is a concept which the 
 human mind imprints on nature, an attribute of the intellect, 
 a stand-point for the judgments of approval. 
 
 Kinds of Purpose. The judgments of purposive approval 
 which we impress upon nature are of two kinds, those which 
 arise from regarding the object as the embodiment of its own 
 purpose and those judgments which connect the single object 
 with a purpose beyond itself. In the former case we have a 
 feeling of pleasure towards the form of the object alone; in 
 the latter case the object points to an all-inclusive purpose 
 beyond itself. This feeling of pleasure in the presence of an 
 object which embodies its own purposes already fulfilled, arises 
 from judgments of taste; 16 whereas the recognition that the 
 single object before us partially expresses the universal purpose 
 of Nature is teleology. 
 
 18 Gesehmacksurtheils. 
 
222 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Beauty. The philosophy of taste regards its object as 
 beautiful when the purpose which it embodies is distinctly ex- 
 pressed in definite form. That object appears to the mind as 
 beautiful when it can excite disinterested and universal ap- 
 proval without requiring a purpose beyond itself. The mind 
 regards a statue to be beautiful because it conceives the sensuous 
 object to express fully the idea or conception which it sug- 
 gests. Beauty arises from the mental judgment that repre- 
 sentation and conception are approved to be the same. Beauty 
 is therefore only a way of looking at those objects which are 
 sufficient in themselves, it is the transcendental element of the 
 aesthetic judgment. 
 
 Sublimity. Close to our judgments of the beautiful, but 
 differing from them in certain important respects, are the emo- 
 tions of the sublime. A beautiful object is definite in form, an 
 isolated perfection in so far as it embodies its completely 
 determined purpose. The sublime object, on the contrary, 
 represents boundlessness. It excites our admiration and respect 
 by presenting to view an object or idea which cannot be en- 
 compassed by the senses but is comprehended in its almost 
 infinite immensity only by the intellect. The incomparably 
 great are alone sublime, forces of nature or the system of 
 stars. 
 
 Teleology. The judgments of taste, beauty and sublimity, 
 recognize a purpose fufilled in the object. The Teleological 
 judgments, on the contrary, are based on the universal pur- 
 posiveness of nature. Mechanism interprets phenomena as 
 causal sequences only without any reference to the purposes 
 and ends involved. Teleology regards the processes of nature 
 as if controlled by rational purposes ; every event is a step to- 
 wards the fulfilment of an ideal. Mechanism and teleology, 
 causality and purpose, these form contradictory stand-points 
 for the explanation of nature; both are transcendental ways 
 of looking at the real. And, moreover, this reality, the 
 " thing-in-itself," is as unknowable to one as it is to the other. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 223 
 
 The mechanical view of nature presents us with a systematic 
 science; the purposive view discloses to us the ideals of life, 
 art, and religion. 
 
 Retrospect. These three works of Kant, the Critiques of 
 Pure Beason, of Practical Keason, and of Judgment, present to 
 us an elaborate system of philosophy erected around certain 
 central ideas; a unity wonderful in its scope and organic 
 structure. Towards the beginning of this chapter three factors 
 were mentioned which may well be considered the important 
 elements from which Kant formed his system. These were, 
 first, the rationalistic conceptions which Kant acquired from 
 the teachings of Leibnitz and Wolff; second, the importance 
 and limitations of experience which Locke and Hume had 
 taught him; and, finally, the moral and religious elements 
 which influenced his character in early childhood. Each of 
 these factors finds its place in the Critical Philosophy when 
 this is regarded as an organic whole. The Eationalists are 
 responsible for the importance of the human mind in all knowl- 
 edge, for the transcendental principles of time, space, and the 
 categories, freedom and purpose, and finally for the construc- 
 tive and uniting power of the transcendental Ego. Not that 
 these specific elements may be found in any one of the earlier 
 thinkers, but only that the rationalistic tendencies of thought 
 led Kant to these conclusions. To the English Empiricists may 
 be attributed the sensuous foundation for all scientific knowl- 
 edge and the sceptical attitude which supplements the positive 
 teaching of the " Critique of Pure Reason." And finally his 
 moral nature asserted itself in the presence of the ultimate 
 problems of life. When both reason and experience proved 
 inadequate, simple morality constructed for itself with absolute 
 certitude the existence of God. Kant's God was the God of 
 morality, his religion was a metaphysic of ethics. His interest 
 was thus divided between the field of scientific fact and that 
 of the moral ideal; between the understanding and the prac- 
 tical reason. " Two things fill the soul with ever new and 
 
224 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 increasing wonder and respect, the oftener and more attentively 
 we reflect on them : the starry heaven above me' and the moral 
 law within me." 1T These are the words with which Kanl 
 closes the " Critique of Practical Reason" and they form the 
 inscription on his monument in Konigsberg. 
 
 Prospect. We are introduced by the philosophical system 
 of Kant to a new interpretation of nature. Instead of the certi- 
 tude of the rationalistic reliance on reason and the simple faith 
 of the empirical confidence in the testimony of the senses, the 
 Critical Philosophy substitutes an analysis of experience ac- 
 cording to the principles of the reason. By analyzing experi- 
 ence it discovers that the nationalists and Empiricists wen 
 both in a sense correct, the former, when they 'asserted thai 
 our world was transformed through mind, the latter when the} 
 founded the origin of knowledge on experience and restricted 
 its limits to empirical data. The philosophy of Kant is, there- 
 fore, the synthesis of both schools. But in this synthesis ne^w 
 problems arose, the ancient values of life and nature wen 
 given a new setting, the changing view-point rendered obsolete 
 the discussions of former centuries. These new problems could 
 not be completely understood and developed by Kant himself, 
 His own mind passed quickly over the presuppositions of his 
 system; continued thinking had given them a unique value, 
 Bacon cautioned us to avoid the "Idols of the Den," recog- 
 nizing that the plausible will often become the true unless we 
 temper our own conclusions by those of others. Kant was a 
 solitary thinker; the truth of his own stand-point was sc 
 firmly impressed on his own consciousness that he found him- 
 self, especially in his latter life, altogether unable to compre- 
 
 17 " Zwei Dinge erfiillen das Gemiith mit immer neuer und zunehmen- 
 der Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je ofter und anhaltender sich das 
 Nachdenken damit beschaftigt: der bestirnte Himmel iiber mir, und 
 das moralische Gesetz in mir.'* Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Be- 
 schluss. 
 
IMMANUEL KANT. 225 
 
 hend the opposition which arose about him. Under these cir- 
 cumstances it is not strange that Kant, like Locke and Aristotle, 
 is to be regarded rather as the founder of a magnificent move- 
 ment than as a thinker who has definitely solved the ultimate 
 problems of philosophy. His importance rests more in the 
 statement of new issues of philosophical moment than in the 
 solutions which they received at his own hands. The astronomy 
 of Copernicus attained its fulfilment two centuries after in the 
 nebular hypothesis of Kant, and the fulfilment of Kant's meta- 
 physics is yet unwritten. 
 
 16 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTAIJSTS. 
 
 THE POST-KANTIAN TENDENCIES. 
 
 EVERY original mind stimulates a group of brilliant men to 
 follow in the same direction, but these disciples are apt to give 
 their master's teachings a more intense interpretation. Three 
 distinct lines of thought emanate from the critical ethics of the 
 Platonic-Socrates: a metaphysical movement which was ex- 
 pressed by Aristotle and his mediaeval commentators; the dis- 
 tinctly ethical phase of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; and, 
 lastly, the pessimistic naturalism of the Cynics and the Stoics. 
 Locke, whose influence, if not his originality, is to be classed 
 with the Platonic-Socrates, also inaugurated movements which 
 are comparable with those of later Greek thought. We have 
 here the idealistic metaphysics of Berkeley with its sceptical 
 outcome in Hume, the ethical tendencies of Clarke, Shaftes- 
 bury, and Butler, and the pessimistic naturalism of the French 
 Materialists. And, finally, Kant, whose originality, and prob- 
 ably his influence, will prove as great as that of either the 
 Greek or of the Englishman, set in motion certain lines of 
 thought which bear a close resemblance to those of Greek and 
 British philosophy. This analogy is by no means perfect. The 
 metaphysical character of the German mind permitted an 
 ethics or a pessimism only on a metaphysical background, while 
 in Greece the ethical element was prominent and in England 
 the epistemological. There were several distinct elements in 
 the Kantian system which hardly received adequate treatment 
 in their original setting, and the disciples of the Critical Phi- 
 losophy sought to remedy these defects. They found them, 
 however, so intimately interwoven with the organic unity of the 
 system itself that a radical change in any part meant the reor- 
 226 
 
THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS. 227 
 
 ganization of the whole. This transformation of the Critical 
 Philosophy, in order to give one or another element greater 
 logical clearness and consistency, was attempted by the imme- 
 diate successors of Kant. The dissolution of a system into 
 parts always destroys the organic structure of the system itself 
 and brings the elements into new and generally extravagant 
 relations. But should one wish to dismember the Critical 
 Philosophy for the purpose of comparison only, it would be 
 possible perhaps to discover in it three central factors. These 
 are the reality of the " thing-in-itself," the logical existence 
 of the ethical Ego with its postulates, and, lastly, the will 
 activity of the mind in the creation of the world of phenomena. 
 Each of these is of extreme importance and each becomes the 
 nucleus of a distinct movement in the philosophy of post- 
 Kantian Germany. And just as in the case of Platonic- 
 Socrates and Locke, each becomes identified with a metaphysics, 
 a metaphysical ethics, and a pessimistic naturalism. 
 
 The Metaphysics of the " Thing-in-itself ."To all stu- 
 dents of the Critical Philosophy the ghostly reality of the 
 " ihing-in-itself" appears somehow mystifying. We do not 
 know exactly where to place it, and fail to find any relation or 
 character which will relieve the difficulty. This predicament 
 appealed particularly to Herbart, Kant's successor at Kb'nigs- 
 berg, who sought to modify the metaphysics of his master in 
 such a manner that the "thing-in-itself" would no longer 
 appear contradictory or incomprehensible. With him the 
 " thing-in-itself " still retained its original significance, only it 
 became richer in meaning, through a broader psychological 
 context. Let us call this general school of metaphysics, which 
 finds a real existence independent of the mind and behind the 
 phenomena of sense, Realism. 
 
 The Ethical Ego. The nucleolus of the whole Kantian 
 world is the Ego. In the " Pure Keason" it is only the neces- 
 sary background for the several transcendental elements, but 
 becomes in the " Practical Reason" the essential basis for the 
 
228 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 moral postulates of freedom, immortality, and God. Yet, not- 
 withstanding its importance, Kant does not seem to give us any 
 adequate idea upon which we may base our concept of this 
 deepest self. We are constantly reminded of its importance, 
 yet there is the " thing-in-itself " which looms up apparently 
 beyond the Ego. Perhaps there is some relationship between 
 the two. Perhaps it is possible to erect a metaphysical struc- 
 ture within which our ethical Ego may reign supreme; a 
 system in which some aspect of the Ego occupies the funda- 
 mental position of an absolutely real " thing-in-itself" and also 
 gives unity and internal harmony to the whole structure, in 
 fact the metaphysic of a world of self. This was attempted 
 by a long line of thinkers beginning with Reinhold and ending 
 with Hegel. Each sought to add a little to Kant's theory of 
 the self, each contributed a little more to a consistent idealism, 
 and each advanced a little beyond his predecessors. Let us call 
 these thinkers, who find the ultimate reality of the world in 
 the subjective consciousness alone, Absolute Idealists. 
 
 The Naturalistic Pessimism of the Will. And still 
 another figure appears in this little group of Kantian disciples 
 who have exerted such a tremendous influence on the thought 
 of the nineteenth century. We cannot discover a place for 
 Schopenhauer in either of the former tendencies. His person- 
 ality and the results of his philosophy are somehow outside the 
 general current of the time; we do not know whether to con- 
 nect him with the Buddhists of India, the Mystics of Persia, 
 or the idealists of Germany. His idealism is both mystical and 
 transcendental. The creative faculty of the mind, upon which 
 Kant bases his transcendentalism, indicates to Schopenhauer 
 an aspect of a great world-force which becomes exemplified 
 in the will of man. This is the essence of the idealism of 
 Schopenhauer. On closer examination, however, we find that 
 will implies incessant struggle and can be interpreted to phi- 
 losophy only as a pessimism ; the world-force is purely mechani- 
 cal in its operation and produces evil with an irresistible relent- 
 
THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS. 229 
 
 lessness. " Die, and unite thy limited will with the universal 
 Will" is the creed of Schopenhauer. This philosophical stand- 
 point, which is not common in our Western world, may be 
 called Mystical Idealism. 
 
 The Relation of Previous Idealism. While considering 
 this whole movement of transcendental idealism which arose 
 from the Critical Philosophy of Kant, it is interesting to note 
 the relation to previous idealistic tendencies. The whole post- 
 Kantian transcendentalism represents an idealism in metaphy- 
 sics erected on a rationalistic epistemology. In earlier philoso- 
 phy Leibnitz first develops a rationalistic idealism, but his 
 incoherent system lacked the critical and analytic stimulus of 
 Kant. The idealism of Berkeley, on the other hand, differed 
 essentially from that of later Germany in two important re- 
 spects, the epistemological starting-point and the final inter- 
 pretation of the Universal Mind. In the case of Leibnitz it will 
 be remembered that the unity of the individual monads was 
 founded on the "ideal principle" of "Pre-established Har- 
 mony." His monism was therefore conceptual or idealistic and 
 stood in sharp contrast to a realistic or objective monism like 
 that indicated by the all-inclusive character of Spinoza's Sub- 
 stance. This idealistic principle of Leibnitz was defined with 
 the expressed intention of penetrating to the ultimate essence of 
 the world, and hence was a nature-philosophy in the broadest 
 sense. But the relative importance of the human soul-monad 
 rendered this early idealism distinctly humanistic and self- 
 centred when interpreted by the immediate disciples of Leib- 
 nitz. In contrast to this narrower reaction the German idealists 
 seek to re-establish rationalistic idealism on the broader plane 
 of a nature-philosophy. But in so doing pantheism takes the 
 place of theism, the universal moral law supplants the arbitrary 
 freedom of the individual. 
 
 The conditions under which Berkeley's idealism arose places 
 it in sharp contrast to German transcendentalism. Like nearly 
 all the British thinkers, Berkeley is an empiricist in his epis- 
 
230 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 temology, he bases the reality of ideas on the perception of 
 the senses. The Germans, on the contrary, follow the lead of 
 Kant and discover in the given experience a rational element 
 which constitutes the form of true knowledge. Aside from 
 this epistemological difference, Berkeley was under the influence 
 of Christian theism; he opposes any pantheistic tendencies 
 which might seem to arise from his idealism. Kant, however, 
 had undermined the rationalistic foundation for theism and 
 transformed the conception of God into a Moral Ideal. So 
 that the Absolute Mind which the Germans as well as Berkeley 
 believed to be the source of all intellectual forms could be de- 
 scribed by the post-Kantians as a World-Idea of activity, of 
 thought, or of will without involving theistical attributes in 
 its conception. 
 
 JOHANN FBIBDRICH HERBART. 
 LIFE. 
 
 The first of the important Kantian schools is that of the 
 Realism of Johann Herbart. Its founder was born in Northern 
 Germany, the son of a lawyer, on April 4, 1776. While yet 
 a young man, and before he entered the University of Jena, 
 Herbart became acquainted with the works of the Leibnitz- 
 Wolffian school and also with those of Kant. At the age of 
 eighteen he came under the influence of those thinkers who 
 sought to bring into prominence the ethical Ego in Kant's 
 system, but the young Herbart was repelled by their absolute 
 idealism. After leaving Jena, he spent several years in Switzer- 
 land as tutor in a private family. Eeturning to Germany, 
 he became a teacher in Gottingen, afterwards occupying Kant's 
 chair at Konigsberg. He died in 1841. Herbart belongs to 
 that large class of thinkers who are impressed with the depth 
 of the problem of existence and at the same time seek to ex- 
 plain it in the simplest manner possible; but this very desire 
 for simplicity often leads to the presupposition of something 
 
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART. 231 
 
 that is far from simple, in order that reality and common 
 sense may become harmonized. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Herbart approaches the Kantian problem of reality from the 
 stand-point of Descartes. He doubts everything. But even 
 after he has thus placed himself in a completely sceptical atti- 
 tude he finds that he cannot resist one reality, namely, the 
 mere appearance of something. The appearances which we 
 call our experiences are at least real, although they may or may 
 not indicate anything beyond ; the determination of this latter 
 problem is the work of philosophy. We must assume that the 
 appearances, the phenomena themselves, exist and are real; 
 they form the necessary starting-point for any philosophy. 
 But with the existence of the representations presupposed, we 
 have no further ground for inferring that what they present is 
 true absolutely. Are time and space or the causal relations 
 among phenomena real in themselves, or are they merely super- 
 ficial appearances involving contradiction? To determine this 
 question it is necessary for metaphysics to analyze some simple 
 relation among phenomena, such as change. 
 
 The Changeless Real. When a certain event occurs we 
 may say that a change of some kind has taken place, the 
 water has changed to ice. By this we mean that a certain 
 phenomenon of water has passed into another called ice. We 
 require that the water and the ice shall have something in 
 common, else we could not connect them by means of a causal 
 relation, yet at the same time we observe that there is a dis- 
 tinct difference between the two phenomena. Here we have 
 identity and diversity united in a single concept, that of 
 change. We have a thing remaining the same and yet be- 
 coming different, a contradiction of the most decided character. 
 Change of all kinds is therefore discarded by Herbart as mere 
 appearance, belonging only to the phenomena and not to the 
 real world beneath. This gives to Herbart a motionless, static, 
 
232 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 inane world of reality, not very much unlike the "thing-in- 
 itself" of his master. 
 
 The Plurality of Reals. But he is not satisfied with this 
 definition of his ultimately real universe. He has still before 
 him the old problem of metaphysics, the unity and diversity, 
 the one and the many. Spinoza solved this by a monism; 
 Leibnitz, whom Herbart early read, placed his stress on the 
 objective pluralism of the monads united within a system by 
 the ideal unity of the principle of "Pre-established Har- 
 mony." Herbart follows Leibnitz in the plurality of Reals 
 (das Reale). Every phenomena, because it is a presentation, 
 must point to something which is itself presented. There can 
 be no outward appearance without some sort of inner reality. 
 Behind every sensation there lies a something which is given 
 to us ; nothing can transform this nucleus into subjective fact ; 
 it is purely objective in its nature, it is the ultimate basis of 
 being. "We cannot remove this difficulty; the form of ex- 
 perience becomes changed into the forms of the supposition of 
 the Reals ; . . . and it is forced upon us that the Reals are to be 
 presupposed and defended." 1 And, furthermore, these Reals 
 behind sensation are absolutely simple, their reality is fully 
 explained by the possession of a single ultimate quality. It is 
 true our consciousness cannot understand what these atomic 
 qualities truly are, we only know of their existence through an 
 analysis of the phenomena. 
 
 The Phenomenal Appearance. But, even with the pre- 
 supposition of these metaphysical atoms, Herbart finds some 
 little difficulty when he comes to explain just what is in our 
 experiences. The "thing," which we observe through sensa- 
 tions, consists of many properties or qualities. Each one of 
 
 1 " Man kann diese Sorge nicht ablehnen ; die Formen der Erf ahrung 
 verwandeln sich in Formen der Setzung des Realen; ... so zwingen 
 sie uns, das Reale zu setzen und zu hiiten." Allgemeine Metaphysik, 
 Section 199. 
 
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART. 233 
 
 these qualities represents a single Real, undifferentiated, simple 
 and eternal, like the quality-atoms of a Greek philosopher, 
 Anaxagoras. Thus the whiteness of sugar is furnished by a 
 certain group of Reals, the sweetness by another group, the 
 crystalline form by still another, and so on until all the proper- 
 ties of sugar have been exhaustively ascribed, each to a certain 
 class of Reals. " Matter is real as a sum of divisible Being ; 
 and in this Being something truly happens, as a consequence 
 of which it has the appearance of a special existence/' 2 Thus 
 the " thing" observed by sensation is never the Real, it is 
 always a large group of these Reals. To explain the fact that 
 the several qualities of an experience seem to form a single 
 object Herbart has recourse to a distinction between intel- 
 lectual and phenomenal space, which recalls to mind the pecu- 
 liar spacial qualities of the Leibnitzian monads. In intellectual 
 space two or more Reals may occupy the same point, forming 
 an intimate relation; change is explained by the transforma- 
 tion of this relation, thus permitting the Reals to form new 
 configurations. According to this hypothesis of intellectual 
 space it is readily seen that each grain of sugar, no matter how 
 small, may possess all the quality Reals which together com- 
 prise sugar. Phenomenal space has nothing to do with the 
 inherence of many Reals in a single point of intellectual space. 
 Psychology and the Soul-Real. Prominent among the 
 Reals is the subjective unit, the soul. In Herbart's estimation 
 all previous psychology was in error in so far as it regarded 
 the soul as the bond of unity existing between the several 
 faculties of the mind. The true Ego cannot be known in self- 
 consciousness, for a subject can never perceive itself. The Ego 
 is a Real like other truly existent Beings, indestructible, space- 
 less, and eternal; but its existence can be inferred only from 
 the analysis of the various states of mind. It is not, however, 
 the unity of our plural consciousness, as Kant and the later 
 
 2 Lehrbuch zur Psychologic, Section 156. 
 
234 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 idealists believed; it is rather the single unit which can exist 
 in innumerable combinations. Its only property is that of a 
 continued assertion manifested in whatever combination of 
 other Eeals it may find itself. 
 
 THE MEANING OF REPRESENTATIONS. With this meta- 
 physical starting-point of the unit Ego, Herbart begins to con- 
 struct a psychology. The starting-point of psychology is not the 
 hidden Ego, but rather its own representations of which the 
 flux of human consciousness is composed. The initial problem 
 of psychology becomes, therefore, the discovery of the relation 
 between the Ego and its appearances in the phenomenal world. 
 To explain variety in consciousness Herbart recognized that 
 the Ego may assert itself in numberless combinations of other 
 Reals, although it still retains its own indestructible simplicity. 
 These combinations, infinite in variety, yet all stamped by the 
 presence of the Ego, are what we call the representations, the 
 phenomena, the experiences of our daily life. In all this flux 
 of changing combinations or representations the Ego can be 
 abstractly recognized by thought; in the same manner that 
 the point of a wedge may always be distinguished from its 
 path, although it is seen in constantly changing relations. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATIONS. The sensations are the most 
 elemental representations; they form the starting-point of 
 psychology. And, furthermore, just as the combinations in the 
 physical world are capable of mathematical treatment, so these 
 psychical combinations known as the sensation-representation 
 can be treated from the stand-point of mathematics. This is 
 generally recognized as Herbart's greatest contribution to psy- 
 chology, the introduction of the exact methods of mathe- 
 matics within its borders. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF HERBART. 
 
 Besides his metaphysics and psychology, Herbart made Im- 
 portant contributions to pedagogics, and has often been re- 
 garded as the first to establish the art of teaching on the firm 
 
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART. 235 
 
 basis of a science. The history of philosophy has rather under- 
 estimated his importance in metaphysics proper. It has em- 
 phasized as Kant's logical successor the more brilliant but 
 perhaps less scientific mind of Fichte. Herbart called himself 
 a " Kantian of the year 1828," meaning thereby that he had 
 remodelled the Kantian stand-point so that it might better 
 agree with the later philosophical environment. In reality 
 Herbart represents a remarkable synthesis of Leibnitzian meta- 
 physics and Kantian criticism with the English demand for a 
 scientific psychology. The first influences of his boyhood were 
 those of Leibnitz and Kant; his whole philosophy was the 
 transformation of the pluralism of the former, with its loyalty 
 to science and mathematics, into the criticism of the latter. In 
 this process he and his immediate disciples carried the Realistic 
 premise of Kant to its legitimate conclusions. 
 
 ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. 
 
 The second tendency of thought which arose from the in- 
 fluence of Kant we have chosen to call Absolute Idealism, for 
 want of a better term. It is difficult to determine a single ele- 
 ment which may serve to designate the definitive character of 
 this movement. The school of Herbart assures us of the real 
 existence of something behind our phenomena, it makes this 
 "Real" objective. Absolute Idealism, on the contrary, is im- 
 pressed with the subjective, the mental, the idealistic source 
 of experience. It fails to find any reality beyond the thought, 
 no existence beyond the conditions of mental activity, and no 
 facts beyond the facts of consciousness. This is perhaps the 
 central theme in the entire movement, but it is susceptible to 
 many interpretations, varying with the stress of emphasis and 
 the temperament of the thinker. 
 
236 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 KARL LEONHABD BEINHOLD. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Unity was the demand from all the disciples of Kant, and 
 it was this element which they found wanting in the Critical 
 Philosophy itself. Reinhold, the founder of the so-called 
 " Kantian school," attempts to remedy this difficulty by intro- 
 ducing a greater emphasis on consciousness or the power of 
 representing. Reinhold's parents were Austrians, and he was 
 born at Vienna in 1758. Educated by the monks of the Jesuit- 
 Barnabite order, he became dissatisfied with the restricted field 
 of the Church and sought greater intellectual freedom in Ger- 
 many. There he became interested in the works of Kant, and 
 obtained the professorship at the University of Jena by his 
 brilliant exposition of the Critical Philosophy. Latterly the 
 numerous changes in his opinions lost for him the positive 
 position and the influence which he had earlier exerted. Rein- 
 hold died in 1823, while holding the position of Professor at 
 Kiel. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 Herbart based his philosophy on our representations, so also 
 did Reinhold. There is, however, a very fundamental distinc- 
 tion between them; to Herbart the representations pointed to 
 an objective plurality beyond, while to Eeinhold they pointed 
 to a subjective unity within. The great fault of the Kantian 
 system seemed to consist in the lack of some absolutely ele- 
 mental principle. It was a fundamental belief, not only on the 
 part of Reinhold but also with many others, that the whole of 
 the Critical Philosophy could perhaps be deduced from a 
 single basal principle. In his important work, "Suggestions 
 towards a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representa- 
 tions/' 3 Reinhold believes himself able to deduce a f unda- 
 
 *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsver- 
 mogens. 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 237 
 
 mental principle of this character from an analysis of our repre- 
 sentations (Vorstellung). When we experience an object, it 
 is not the object itself that points to reality, as Herbart 
 thought, nor is it the presence of the subject in the represen- 
 tation, as we shall soon find was the conclusion of Fichte, 
 but it is rather the conscious relation of these two. In con- 
 sciousness both object and subject meet in their ultimate unity. 
 It is consciousness alone that is Eeal. 
 
 The Primacy of Consciousness. The " thing-in-itself," 
 which possessed a sort of phantom reality in Kant's own mind 
 and which was a plurality of Eeals to Herbart, became the 
 principle of consciousness with Keinhold. And, true to his 
 own stand-point, he realized that if consciousness truly pos- 
 sessed this primacy which he ascribed to it he could deduce 
 therefrom all the transcendental elements or forms of knowl- 
 edge. In the conscious representation the phenomenon of 
 Kant we have the unity of two aspects, the formal side, 
 which is related to the subject and gives rise to the transcen- 
 dental forms of our knowledge, and an objective or material 
 side which is seemingly beyond consciousness. Reinhold is 
 not clear as to this objective content of our consciousness, 
 and seems to liken it to the unknowable "thing-in-itself" of 
 Kant. This fundamental difficulty in the explanation of the 
 objective side of consciousness forms the transition to the 
 second thinker of this Idealistic School, Johann Fichte. 
 
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Fichte, the son of a poor peasant, was born in 1762, in 
 Lusatia, in the southwestern part of Germany. He spent his 
 early childhood in herding geese, but later attracted the notice 
 of a wealthy land-owner by his marvellous memory and ap- 
 parent aptitude for study. The incident is worth repeating. 
 A rich nobleman of Saxony visited Fichte's native village for 
 
238 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the purpose of hearing a sermon from the pastor, but arriving 
 too late, he was told that a young boy could reproduce the 
 entire discourse. Fichte so impressed the company by his 
 accurate and forcible repetition of the morning sermon, his 
 earnestness and moral force, which seemed to spring from a 
 strength of character already clearly defined, that the nobleman 
 readily consented to take charge of Fichte's education. The 
 fact that a boy of eight years could arouse the interest of a 
 stranger by his unusual personality illustrates that native force 
 of character which was the key to Fichte's remarkable influence 
 on the history of philosophy and the part which his popular 
 lectures played in arousing German patriotism at the out- 
 break of the War of Liberation. Fichte was placed by his 
 benefactor in a preparatory school and afterwards sent to the 
 universities of Jena and Leipzig. Later he became a private 
 tutor in Zurich, but did not give satisfaction, for he sought 
 to instruct the parents as well as the children. 
 
 Influence of Kant. Already deeply impressed by the 
 " Ethics" of Spinoza, he became about this time acquainted with 
 the first two " Critiques" of Kant. He writes that his life 
 is altogether changed by the Critical Philosophy ; some uncon- 
 scious principle is stirred within him and cries for expression. 
 He was possessed with a desire to do something. He felt the 
 pressure of an inner force endeavoring to realize itself in the 
 outside world, a struggle of the will for expression. His 
 whole attitude towardsjif e is erected on^lie^supremacy of the 
 active moral will over^the ^external facts^pf the senses. This 
 feeling, first brought to his own consciousness by the writings 
 of Kant, developed later into the central theme of his entire 
 philosophy. Subsequently a tutor's position called him to East 
 Prussia, and he took this opportunity to visit Kant. In order 
 to win the latter's approval he prepared, in a very short time, 
 an essay treating of the Critical Philosophy as applied to 
 revealed religion. Fichte suggested that the moral law, or the 
 universal validity of the categorical imperative, might become 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 239 
 
 endowed with personal attributes and thus represent the God 
 of religious reverence. In this first essay one recognizes the 
 central element in both the personality and the philosophy of 
 Fichte, the primacy of the active moral will. Instead of 
 degrading the Christian conception of the Deity, he believed 
 that he had exhalted God to the Supreme Force of the universe 
 by identifying Him with the moral law. This work, although 
 published anonymously, won for Fichte the respect of Kant 
 and a literary recognition throughout Germany. 
 
 University Career. Probably as a result of this promi- 
 nence he was called to occupy the chair of Eeinhold at Jena. 
 Here he began the preparation of his classic work, " The Science 
 of Knowledge," * published in 1794, but revised several times 
 later. ff The Vocation of Man," 5 published in 1800, is a popu- 
 lar and brilliant presentation of his system; it develops the 
 conception of true knowledge, as Fichte considered his funda- 
 mental idea, from the three stand-points of doubt, knowledge, 
 and faith. At Jena he became involved in several controversies, 
 and at last he was compelled to withdraw. These controversies 
 illustrate the distinctness of purpose and self-reliance which 
 was characteristic of Fichte, as well as a certain officiousness 
 which obscured his real motive and made enemies for him on 
 every side. He enraged the students by inducing them to give 
 up duelling, he offended the authorites by conducting popular 
 lectures on Sunday afternoons. During this " atheistic con- 
 troversy," as it is called, Fichte addressed an appeal to the 
 public, in which he sought to show that the real motive for 
 molesting him was due to his sympathy with political freedom 
 rather than from any sincere religious scruples on the part of 
 the authorities of the university. At the same time he addressed 
 a private letter to a friend, in which he stated in rather arro- 
 gant language that any rebuke from the government would 
 
 * Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 5 Die Bestimmung des Menschen. 
 
240 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be followed by his resignation. This letter was placed before 
 the Council, who promptly removed him from the professorship. 
 After leaving Jena, Fichte finally settled at Berlin, where in 
 1810 he became professor of philosophy and rector at the 
 recently founded university of that city. While here he de- 
 livered a series of addresses, entitled "Talks to the German 
 People/' 6 which served more perhaps than any other single 
 intellectual force to arouse enthusiasm in the War of Libera- 
 tion. Fichte died in 1814. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 These, in brief, are the facts of Fichte's life; but behind 
 them there was a personality of unusual force and power, 
 although not wholly free from the emotional influences of his 
 nature. It is a fact of unusual significance that a person's 
 system of philosophy is often merely the outward expression of 
 the inner character and personality. And this observation is 
 especially true in the case of Fichte. He was more the man of 
 the world, the actor, who sought to establish a rational and 
 philosophical background for his emotional convictions and to 
 bring into the foreground the dignity of the moral law. Kant 
 began with the " thing-in-itself " and finished his philosophy 
 with the supremacy of the moral reason. Fichte interpreted 
 both as the free act of an absolute self. Action and not thought, 
 the moral will and not the analytical reason, was to him the 
 ultimate reality of the universe, the " thing-in-itself" of Kant 
 and the Principle of Consciousness of Keinhold. Fichte, like 
 the other two thinkers who have just received our attention, 
 began his philosophical investigations by means of the repre- 
 sentation. He considered them to be the empirical basis of all 
 philosophy, but as such implied nothing beyond the activity 
 of the subject. Fichte, like Keinhold, was impressed by the 
 conscious or subjective meaning of our representations, but 
 
 6 Keden an die Deutsche Nation. 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 241 
 
 unlike him he sought to make this subjectiveness absolute in- 
 stead of relative. Keinhold had found two elements in the 
 Principle of Consciousness, a subjective and an objective; 
 Fichte found but one, the subjective act. 
 
 THE PRIMACY OF THE EGO. 
 
 It will be remembered that Kant himself found it difficult 
 to describe the " thing-in-itself " by any other means than its 
 unknowability. Herbart met with the same difficulty in his 
 treatment of the Eeals, and Reinhold found himself at a loss 
 to account for the objective element in consciousness. Fichte 
 recognized this inherent difficulty present in the metaphysics 
 of any dualistic realism. Consciousness as. the unity of life 
 explained only the subjective part of the world; it could not 
 account for a purely objective element without becoming in- 
 volved in contradictions. In the spirit of the movement of 
 Absolute Idealism which he himself initiates he sought to im- 
 merge this duality of subject and object in the simple conscious 
 act, the inner expression of the Ego. Fichte, who believed 
 himself to be merely an interpreter of Kant, saw in the asser- 
 tive act of the Ego not only the moral background for freedom, 
 immortality, and God, but also the metaphysical unity of both 
 the "thing-in-itself" and its transcendental forms of apper- 
 ception. By immerging the objective "thing-in-itself" and 
 the subjective transcendental elements into the deepest reality 
 of the Deed-act, Fichte hoped to avoid the avowed dualism of 
 Kant and the implied dualism of Reinhold. Activity, as Ego, 
 by supplying all the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, 
 is likewise the full condition for its own existence. From this 
 absolute point of view that is, from the point of view which 
 regards the Ego-activity as the single condition for all existence 
 we can conceive of this Ego as in itself free, and likewise as 
 that from which arises all the material and forms of our world 
 of sense and knowledge. 
 
 The Assertion of the Ego. The development of this 
 
 16 
 
242 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 central theme forms the subject of Fichte's classic work, " The 
 Science of Knowledge/' which appeared in various forms. This 
 critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase 
 which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards 
 all approaches to Eeality as empirically starting with a fact of 
 knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was 
 the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a 
 mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the 
 science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is " the 
 intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intui- 
 tions into one." 7 Knowledge of this character is above contra- 
 diction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use 
 some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind 
 of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to 
 Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to 
 the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy. 
 
 In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the " abso- 
 lute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposi- 
 tion" 8 of all human knowledge, believing that if such a propo- 
 sition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of 
 all sciences, the "Science of Knowledge/' He had already 
 pointed out in the essay " Concerning the Concept of the 
 Science of Knowledge" 9 that such a ground-proposition really 
 exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the 
 sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like 
 a building, at the foundation there is one element that sup- 
 ports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the 
 purpose of the true science of knowledge. 
 
 Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not 
 itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions 
 
 7 Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre von 1801. 
 
 8 " Erster, schlechthin unbedingter Grundsatz." Wissenschaftslehre, 
 1794. 
 
 9 Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 243 
 
 upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single 
 proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is 
 the deed-act of assertion. I must will to search for knowledge 
 before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will- 
 act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all 
 proof. Of its existence, however, I am certain beyond doubt, 
 for it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of 
 doubting its existence. " The Subject of self-conscious knowl- 
 edge and the Principle of actual existence are the same/' 10 
 Kant had already employed this transcendental method of 
 proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories 
 were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte 
 used it to show that the reality of the act of a self -asserting 
 consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experi- 
 ence, but even for the possibility of thought. 
 
 To illustrate this transcendental, character of the self, let us 
 consider the proposition " A is A." Although apparently a 
 mere judgment of repetition and at first sight of no value, yet 
 a little reflection will show that a judgment even as simple in 
 character as this, undoubtedly implies the assumption that I, 
 a person, make the statement. That is, the simplest fact of 
 knowledge is derived from the proposition, I, an existent 
 being, act. This is of the deepest consequence to Fichte's 
 system. It clearly indicates that the whole science of knowl- 
 edge is based on the existence and activity of the Ego; that 
 the Ego and not some outside, objective, inane world is 
 the source of our representations, the fundamental principle of 
 all knowledge, and the ground of all reality. "Before all 
 assertions the Ego must be asserted through itself." xl Fichte 
 did not mean to declare, however, as many of his critics seem 
 to imply, that the individual, finite self creates arbitrarily the 
 
 10 Das System der Sittenlehre, Paragraph 4. 
 
 11 " . . . vor allem Setzen im Ich vorher das Ich selbst gesetzt sey." 
 Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 1, Paragraph 5. 
 
244 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 world about it from a previous condition of non-existence. He 
 wished only to point out that the "Rpo must, a^grf. if r>wn 
 reality before it can assert the sense-world. Th fundamental 
 proposition oi all science is thus expressed, " The Ego asserts 
 originally its own being." 12 A proposition so simple in charac- 
 ter as to receive at once universal assent. It was suggested by 
 Descartes when he derived all reality from the existence of 
 the self, by Kant when he defined the transcendental Ego, and 
 still again by Eeinhold when he made consciousness the prin- 
 ciple for the unity of the subjective and the objective. To 
 Fichte, however, the Ego meant something more real, more 
 central than it did to the earlier thinkers; as act, it expressed 
 the identity of subject and object; as will, it unfolded the 
 moral freedom of the individual. It is that reality which 
 exists for itself, "for whatever is not for itself is not for an 
 Ego." Its very being consists in merely asserting itself as 
 existent. 
 
 The Assertion of the Non-Ego. The classic objection to 
 all forms of absolute idealism demands an explanation of the 
 return from the Absolute to common experience. And Fichte 
 recognized that his Ego, as the highest condition of knowledge, 
 once defined, had little value unless applicable to life. In the 
 bare absoluteness of this first proposition of the science of 
 knowledge one perceives only a principle, and not a system. 
 The mere assertiveness of the Ego, the mere will activity, can- 
 not produce a world of experience and of thought. Some 
 object, some non-Ego is necessary to supplement the abstract 
 reality of the Ego. But this non-Ego must be derived from the 
 Ego itself, since the assertion of the Ego is at the foundation 
 of all science and all knowledge. A non-Ego, or medium for 
 expression, is asserted, opposited, or demanded by the free ac- 
 tivity of the Ego, in order that the Ego-niay have an object 
 \ -^ j 
 
 12 "Das Ich setzt ursprtinglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn." 
 Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 1, Paragraph 10. 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 245 
 
 against which to assert its own self-consciousness. This non- 
 Ego, which is~trulylisserted by the Ego, is known to the em- 
 pirical consciousness of man as a " fact/' an object, or an ex- 
 perience; its assertion is the second proposition of the science 
 of knowledge. 
 
 Fichte is very careful to insist that our concept of the so- 
 called external world is not, as is ordinarily supposed, the 
 product of abstracting the given element from all our repre- 
 sentations. Very ingeniously he points out that the process 
 of abstraction by which we define a Real, external world 
 independent of the Ego is a process which takes place only 
 through the activity of the Ego. I believe in a real, external 
 world because I have previously willed to do so; the Ego 
 freely wills the external world, and truly wills it to be such 
 as it is. This method of demonstrating the subjective character 
 of any concept has been often employed by subsequent idealists. 
 Schopenhauer, and more recently Royce, have used the same 
 method to prove the subjectivity of the principle of causality. 
 The subject must already have the idea of the necessary con- 
 nection between two phenomena before he can objectify the 
 idea in the world of fact-experience. The principle of causality 
 arises from the mind, and the non-Ego only supplies the 
 material for its realization. 
 
 The Limitation of the Ego and the Non-Ego. But to 
 return to Fichte's philosophy of self-assertion. He had already 
 defined the existence of the Ego as the first proposition of 
 every philosophy and the assertion of the non-Ego as the 
 second. But these two propositions are evidently opposed to 
 one another; a third proposition is required to exhibit their 
 internal unity. This cannot, however, be absolutely different 
 from either; it must be deduced from a synthesis of both. 
 The Ego could not fully realize itself unless it freely asserted 
 the non-Ego ; the non-Ego could not exist unless it was asserted 
 by the Ego. But the Ego which in the pure conscious activity 
 is the ground for both the asserted Ego and the asserted non- 
 
246 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Ego is more unlimited than the limited Ego which is asserted. 
 This must be recognized in the third proposition which syn- 
 thesizes the former two. As stated by Fichte, it is as follows : 
 " The Ego asserts a distinguishable Ego over against a distin- 
 guishable non-Ego." 13 This distinction between the unlimited 
 and limited Egos, which was more emphasized in his later 
 works, will be referred to under the section treating of the 
 Absolute in Fichte's Idealism. 
 
 Deductions from the Fundamental Propositions. These 
 three propositions lie at the foundation of the Fichteian phi- 
 losophy. They are the result of a process of reflection, gradu- 
 ally exhibiting to the empirical consciousness its true existence 
 in a Principle of Pure Consciousness. But as mere statements 
 they are formal, abstract, and far from those processes of 
 thought usually employed. Fichte, like his master, felt it 
 necessary to show wherein the categories of thought might be 
 deduced from a single fundamental principle. The category 
 of reality is implied by the mere assertion of the Ego, that of 
 negation by the assertion of the non-Ego; and, further, the 
 reciprocity of Ego and non-Ego leads us to the category of 
 limitation. This reciprocal limitation of Ego and non-Ego 
 develops as a process through which the limited Ego struggles 
 to assert its absolute freedom. The continual process gives rise 
 to the various stages of knowledge of which sensation is the 
 lowest and reason is the highest. 
 
 The inner being of reality may be called " Egoness, Intelli- 
 gence, Eeason, or whatever one might wish to call it." 14 Be- 
 sides this intellectual description we may also add the moral, 
 the Ego is Will and Freedom. When regarded as the basis of 
 all contemplative knowledge it is Intelligence; when regarded 
 as activity it is Will; and when regarded as the unconditioned 
 
 u " Ich seize im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich ent- 
 gegen." Wissenschaftslehre, 1794, Section 3, D. 
 "Das System der Sittenlehre. 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 247 
 
 principle, or as the ground of the moral law, it is Freedom. 
 The description opens up at once two distinct problems. We 
 inquire, as did Fichte in his later life, the meaning of the Ego 
 as Absolute, the possibility of moving from the individual self 
 to the Highest Self. And then again there is the significance 
 of the moral law which especially appealed to Fichte. Like 
 Kant, he sought to emphasize the true dignity of morality and 
 the perfect equilibrium between the free Ego and the moral 
 ideal. 
 
 The Absolute. The first of these problems namely, to 
 show the relation between the individual conscious act and a 
 higher Principle of Consciousness or the Absolute especially 
 attracted Fichte's attention in the later expressions of his 
 system. It is a problem that may be approached from various 
 stand-points, all of which lead to the same conception of the 
 Absolute Self. Like Berkeley, Fichte began with a Principle, 
 the deed-act, rather than the ef esse is percipi" of the British 
 Idealist, and from this moved upward to the Absolute which 
 was implicitly required in the whole mental process. And, like 
 Berkeley, he tended to emphasize this Absolute more in his 
 later expositions than in the first expression of the " Science of 
 Knowledge." It represented, however, not so much the creative 
 Spirit of God, which the British Idealist had brought into 
 the foreground, as a universal Principle of self-conscious 
 activity. 
 
 Of the various avenues of approach to Fichte's Absolute 
 there are three which seem of extreme importance. The first 
 of these has already been referred to in connection with the 
 third fundamental proposition of the " Science of Knowledge," 
 which required an Ego over and above the mutual limitations 
 of the divisible Ego and non-Ego. Since my individual self 
 is constantly asserting the not-self, and at the same time the 
 not-self is compelling it to take successively higher and higher 
 points of view, then in Fichte's mind there seemed to be the 
 necessity of a Universal Principle in which all such finite 
 
248 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 activites could be included. It must, however, be of the general 
 form of the individual Ego, since it is self -activity to which 
 everything in the universe is referred. Another approach to 
 the Absolute may be made through the nature of thought. 
 All our finite thought-processes are somehow only portions of 
 reality, they never express its full nature. We can, however, 
 conceive of a highest form of thought which is free from the 
 imperfections of the lower forms, that is in fact Absolute 
 in its nature. While still again there is a third side from which 
 the Absolute may be approached. It may be regarded as the 
 unity of moral freedom and moral law. The human self is 
 free, yet it finds that its freedom is possible only in the presence 
 of the moral force o'f the world. This conception of the har- 
 mony, of freedom and law is possible only when we conceive of 
 a Universal Moral Being from whom sprang both human free- 
 dom and the moral law. This conception of the moral aspect of 
 the Absolute suggesfs"at once Fichte's interpretation of God. If 
 the inference from various of his writings is correct, the term 
 God always indicated to him the moral order of the universe; 
 as such it was asserted by a free act of the Ego as the complete 
 fulfilment of its moral Ideal. Knowledge as the operation of 
 the human Ego, the moral law as it is reflected in human con- 
 sciousness, are truly identical with the fundamental essence of 
 all being. There is but one Absolute, one God, and one Keality. 
 This later emphasis on God and the Absolute Ego seems truly a 
 completion of his earlier thought, although many have con- 
 sidered it an altered stand-point. He had earlier defined the 
 relation between the empirical and the pure consciousness, he 
 now defined the relation between the human Ego and its In- 
 finite Ideal. 
 
 Morality. Besides the general nature of the Absolute, the 
 problem of the moral relation among men appeared to Fichte 
 of great importance. This he discusses at length in two trea- 
 tises. The one deals with the inner laws and principles of 
 morality and shows the development of duty in its various 
 
I UNIVERSITY 
 
 V or 
 
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. 249 
 
 forms out of a single abstract conception, while a second work 
 traces the external conditions for moral relations among men. 
 In " The System of the Science of Ethics/' 15 Fichte sought to 
 apply the chief conclusions of his more theoretical philosophy to 
 the meaning of conduct. Starting with the conception of the 
 free Ego, he explains that freedom requires, for its very concep- 
 tion, a law of harmonious action which the free Ego may 
 freely observe. Freedom can only be freedom if it asserts a 
 law to control its actions, the free Ego wills Law. This law, 
 which is truly at one with the inner meaning of the Ego, is the 
 fundamental principle of morality. It is purely formal, it 
 simply says, "to be morally f r^e. thexfi.muat be a certain law or 
 regularity to the conduct." The transition from this formal 
 condition of morality to its various manifestations as the moral 
 feeling, is accomplished by the practical aphorism "Act ac- 
 cording to the best belief in thy duty, or act according to thy 
 conscience." 16 In the practical application of this command- 
 ment Fichte outlines the general nature of duty as obligation 
 to the moral law and its various requirements- for men in 
 different walks of life. 
 
 The other treatise on conduct, " The Foundation of Natural 
 Rights/' 17 is distinctly objective and is concerned neither with 
 the moral law or with the conception of duty. It has as its 
 problem the discovery of the conditions, six in number, for 
 the expression of individual freedom in the external world. 
 Among these conditions the most important, from a certain 
 point of view, is the existence of other free beings. Fichte 
 believes that the existence of other persons can be directly 
 developed or unfolded from the conception of a single free in- 
 dividual. This removes any objection to his system that might 
 
 15 Das System der Sittenlehre. 
 
 "" Handle stets nach bester Ueberzeugung von deiner Pflicht; oder: 
 handle nach deinem Gewissen." Das System der Sittenlehre, Part I., 
 Section 13. 
 
 " Grundlage des Naturrechts. 
 
250 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be advanced on the ground that he believed only in the exist- 
 ence of himself, a way of philosophizing known as Solipsism. 
 The immediate problem of the " Natural Eights" is to discover 
 the various means by which the freedom of the single indi- 
 vidual can exist in harmony with other free beings so that each 
 may assist the others to fuller and nobler lives. " The concep- 
 tion of right is the conception of the necessary relations among 
 free beings." 18 This introduces us to the legal relations 
 among men, and the institutions the State, the city, the 
 family through which man seeks to attain a fuller realization 
 of his own particular freedom in harmony with the rest of 
 mankind. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF FICHTE'S IDEALISM. 
 
 The philosophy of Fichte is above all else original, impres- 
 sive, and striking. Although often lacking in orderly arrange- 
 ment of parts and logical consistency in presentation, it is 
 remarkable for its scope and magnitude. This breadth supplies 
 the ground for three movements not unlike, in general char- 
 acter, the movements which we traced from Kant. The exces- 
 sive emphasis on the value of individual man finds an expres- 
 sion in the passionate sentimentality of the Romanticists. And, 
 further, the mystical or Absolute element in Fichte is em- 
 phasized by Schelling, who discovers a dual aspect in the prin- 
 ciple to Self-Consciousness. But by far the most important 
 result of Fichte's system is to be found in Hegel. The transi- 
 tion from Fichte to Hegel will be outlined in connection with 
 the latter. 
 
 THE ROMANTICISTS. 
 
 Frequently in the history of thought the symbolism of theo- 
 retical principles becomes the ideal of life. The reaction 
 against the formal aestheticism of the mediaeval Church ex- 
 hibited itself in the over-assertion of the individual, the 
 characteristic of the period of the Renaissance. In that case, 
 
 " Grundlage des Naturrechts, Section 2. 
 
FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING. 251 
 
 however, the individualism represented merely a subjective 
 reaction against outward forms, and not an objective assertion 
 of a subjective caprice. This latter is characteristic of the 
 stand-point of the Romanticists who applied the Fichteian 
 principle the Ego asserts its object to the interpretation of 
 life. The one element of agreement among all the Roman- 
 ticists, no matter how much they disputed with one another 
 in regard to particular points, seems to have been the 
 supremacy of an intuitive feeling, an emotional rather than a 
 logical approach to ultimate questions. The play of analogy 
 often takes the place of reason, vain sentimentality not infre- 
 quently supplies the ground of reality. Such are the depths 
 into which philosophy sometimes falls. 
 
 The Romantic school includes, among others, Novalis (Har- 
 denberg), the two Schlegels, and Tieck. They all attempt to 
 discover in the feelings a single emotion which shall explain 
 the mysteries of all things. Novalis tries to deduce a philos- 
 ophy from poetry and sexual emotion. An unfinished lyric of 
 his defines poetry and art as the outward expressions of inner 
 reality. Philosophy, he tells us, is only the theory of poetry, 
 at the root they are identical. Some mystic word, perhaps, 
 may explain the essence of the subjective and the objective! 
 In his life also Novalis defines poetry as the innermost essence 
 of things. He gives his soul a year to prepare for suicide, that 
 he might join his departed love, at the end of the year he 
 marries elsewhere. 
 
 FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLINO. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 The most influential of the Romanticists, as far as further 
 tendencies in philosophy are concerned, was Friedrich Wil- 
 helm Joseph Schelling, born in 1775, in Wurtemberg, and edu- 
 cated at Tubingen. About 1798 he went to Jena, where, under 
 the influence of the Kantians, Reinhold, and especially Fichte, 
 
252 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he prepared his more important contributions to the history of 
 thought. After 1803 he served as profesor of philosophy at 
 various German universities, and latterly lost that vigor of 
 philosophic expression which characterized his early manhood. 
 Schelling succeeded Hegel at Berlin, but failed to counteract 
 the pantheistic tendencies then prominent. He died in 1854. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 The system of absolute idealism, as it appears in the early 
 writings of Fichte, presented a universe of self, but neglected 
 an adequate treatment of the not-self. Schelling realized the 
 one-sidedness on the part of his master, and sought to obviate 
 the defect by developing a parallelism between subject and 
 object. Fichte's subjective idealism was true so far as it went, 
 so Schelling thought in his early life, but it represented only 
 half the world. It was believed by this disciple of idealistic 
 parallelism that the explanation of the agreement between sub- 
 ject and object, which constitutes philosophy, may be reduced 
 to two original premises. 
 
 Nature-Philosophy. According to one point of view it 
 may be supposed that "the objective is first made, and the 
 question then arises as to how the subjective may be made to 
 correspond to it." 19 This proposition gives rise to the Phi- 
 losophy of Nature, or speculative physics, the task of which is 
 " to explain the ideal from the real/' 20 Nature is not a mere 
 product (natura naturata), the sum total of material objects, 
 but, on the contrary, the essence of nature is the esoteric and 
 imperishable force behind all appreciable phenomena; it is 
 called by Schelling " projlujgtivity," 21 or generating nature 
 
 "System des transcendentalen Idealismus, 1800, Einleitung, Sec- 
 tion 1. 
 
 30 " Das Ideelle aus dem Reellen zu erklaren." Naturphilosophie, 
 1799.. Section 1. 
 
 21 Naturphilosophie, Section 6, ii. 
 
FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING. 253 
 
 (natura naturans). Pure productivity, however, is formless; 
 in order for it to become definite it must set limits for itself. 
 This self-limiting principle of productivity, the force-substance 
 of theHLeilmitzian school, gives nse Tf <T tlie Hmle" products or 
 separate objects of sense-perception. Nature, as we know it, 
 is the unending struggle of this inner essence of productivity 
 to limit itself as product, an infinite metamorphosis. 
 
 Transcendental Idealism. Instead of beginning with the 
 objective, we may believe the " subjective made first, and the 
 question arises as to how the objective may be brought to cor- 
 respond with it ;" 22 this is the idealistic attitude towards the 
 world and the true basis of any transcendental philosophy. In 
 the " System of Transcendental Idealism'" published in 1800, 
 Schelling observes, in outward form at least, the method of 
 Fichte, whereas in the previous Nature-Philosophy he leans 
 towards the scientific premises of Kant's later writings. On a 
 more minute comparison between Fichte's ff Wissenschafts- 
 lehre" and Schelling's " Transcendentalen Idealismus" a very 
 important distinction is discovered, which is perhaps the most 
 fundamental difference between master and pupil. Fichte 
 found that a mere assertion of logical identity implied the 
 existence of the Ego, and its activity was the first principle 
 of all philosophy. Schelling discovered in this identity not a 
 mere activity of the Ego, but rather an antithesis between sub- 
 ject and object to be thought only in terms of a universal prin- 
 ciple of self-conscious limitation. Fichte defined the Ego as 
 esentially activity, Schelling found it to consist in an act of 
 self-knowledge, _eternally limiting itself, a synthesis which 
 implies both the contrast and the imity"of subject and object. 
 
 EXPRESSION OF SELF-CONSCIOUS LIMITATION. This funda- 
 mental principle of the self-conscious antithesis of subject and 
 object forms a basis for subsequent deductions in the regions 
 of theoretical and practical philosophy, history, religion, and 
 
 B System des transcendentalen Idealismus, Section 1. 
 
254 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the fine arts. In theoretical philosophy Schelling endeavors 
 to trace the successive steps or "spocljg^ whereby the absolute 
 principle earlier defined is able to appear in the various psy- 
 chological activities of the mind. The first epoch traces the 
 principle of self-conscious limitation from sensation to produc-^ 
 tive intuition, from mere limitation to a consciousness of lhat 
 limitation. Commencing with productive intuition, which 
 requires the recognition of the contrast between the material 
 and ideal worlds, the second epoch defines a process by which 
 this productive intuition develops into reflection, wherein the 
 self is not only conscious of its limitations, but is likewise con- 
 scious of itself as limited. The third and last epoch of the 
 theoretical philosophy carries reflection over into the realm 
 of Will, a process during which Schelling finds himself able to 
 give greater unity and internal consistency to Kant's system of 
 categories. This portion of Schelling's transcendental philoso- 
 phy is thus seen to be a natural history of the chief mental 
 processes, an attempt to exhibit their internal structure or 
 logico-genetic relationship. Such an undertaking, which had 
 already been outlined by Fichte, later received exhaustive treat- 
 ment in Hegel's " Phenomenology of Mind." 
 
 NORMATIVE EXPRESSIONS. In the latter portions of his 
 " Transcendental Idealism" Schelling describes the freedom of 
 the infh'virhja] mill, the selLdetermination of which constitutes 
 the ground of unity between theoretical and practical phi- 
 losophy. In the political state the will observes the moral law 
 of justice, history is the embodiment of its progress, while 
 religion expresses its ultimate ideal. Finally, in the last section 
 of his work Schelling outlines the philosophy of art, which 
 offers to his romantic mind an appropriate close to "Tran- 
 scendental Idealism/' He has constantly referred to the im- 
 plied antithesis between subject and object, and now through 
 the aesthetic feeling he discovers a state of self-consciousness 
 wherein this opposition is lost, where the intellect perceives 
 that it is both self-conscious and self -created. 
 
FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING. 255 
 
 Philosophy of Identity. Schelling thus far appears as a 
 transcendental parallelist, one who discovers by the implica- 
 tions of thought two relatively independent worlds. The objec- 
 tive world of nature is pure productivity,, limiting.- itself as 
 product; the subjective, world of thought is self-consciouin 
 limiting Itself through successive stages of development. 
 Within nature the infiTJfe fiti ril gu^ p ^ pro r l ;preme, 
 
 within mind self-consciousness is the highest principle. An 
 opposition of worlds so marked as this was soon recognized by 
 Schelling himself to be illogical unless he united the nature- 
 philosonhy and the transcendental idealism by the conception 
 of an all-inclusive Absolute. He is therefore a disciple of 
 Spinoza born under Kantian and Fichteian influences. Schell- 
 ing develops his conception of the Absolute as the ground of 
 the identity of nature and mind in a brief outline entitled 
 "Presentation of my System of Philosophy'" published the 
 year after the " Transcendental Idealism" This short essay, 
 which suggests the " Ethica" of Spinoza in the geometrical 
 method of proof and in the metaphysical stand-point, is a work 
 of remarkable logical power, and seems to deserve a deeper 
 consideration than it has generally received. As far as Schell- 
 ing's future influence is concerned, it denotes the culmination 
 of his philosophical career. 
 
 The broadest conception of the human intellect is 
 liifaReasatir " thought as the +r>fa1 JT^jffprp> fl f 
 and objective." 24 it is the unconditioned beyond which there 
 nothing. It corresponds in the main to the Substance of 
 Spinoza, although it is perhaps less abstract. The general 
 form of this principle of Absolute Reason may be expressed by 
 
 a Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophic, 1801. 
 
 M The first proposition of the " Darstellung meinea Systems der 
 Philosophic" is as follows: " Ich nenne Vernunft die absolute Ver- 
 nunft, oder die Vernunft, insofern sie als totale Indifferenz des Sb- 
 jektiven und Objektiven gedacht wird." 
 
256 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the logical proposition of identity, A is A, since the latter is 
 true beyond the conditions of time, "eternal in an absolute 
 but not empirical sense." The Absolute Reason_cannot be con- 
 ceived as infinite unless it includes both the subjective realm 
 of self-consciousness and the objective realm of productive 
 nature. This internal separation of subject and object within 
 the conception of the Absolute involves a certain quantitative 
 differentiation which becomes definitely expressed in the finite 
 objects of the world, such as the mechanical and electrical phe- 
 nomena, the various plants and animals, in fact the modes of 
 Spinoza or the things of ordinary speech. 
 
 POSITION OF SCHELLING. 
 
 After the publication of the theory of the Absolute, Schell- 
 ing's philosophy began to assume a theistical form and to show 
 signs of degeneration into the poetical mysticism of the other 
 Romanticists. An essay entitled " Bruno, or the God-like and 
 Natural Principle of Tilings," a strong though rather diffuse 
 work, marks the beginning of this later period of his phi- 
 losophy. Many years before Schelling's death the superior 
 brilliancy of Hegel had obscured the Philosophy of Identity, 
 with its " night-black" Absolute. Yet it is to be remembered 
 that the conception of dynamic process, the germ of Hegel's 
 evolutionary philosophy, is strongly in evidence throughout 
 Schelling's early thought. In the history of German philosophy 
 the idealistic parallelism of Schelling is important as the tran- 
 sition from Fichte's subjectivism to the deeper and richer sys- 
 tem of Hegel. The Principle of Self-conscious Reason pre- 
 sented to Schelling a duality, the self perceived its object; it 
 recognizes it as another beyond itself. But in a subsequent 
 reflective attitude the self discovers that this object is only 
 another form of its own inner reality. Object and subject are 
 truly one, they exist in and through the Absolute. The pan- 
 theism of Bruno, of Spinoza, and of Schelling have much in 
 common; Nature, Substance, and Reason are conceptions 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 257 
 
 which express each in its own way the monistic truth of the 
 Universe, the Imminent Absolute is all. 
 
 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 
 
 The Fichteian philosophy was more an attitude towards life 
 than an arbitrarily finished system. Like the self which it 
 formulates, the Fichteian world always implies, for the full 
 expression of its meaning, an unrealized something beyond. 
 Fichte is the transition between Eeinhold and Schelling, be- 
 tween the identity of subject and object in consciousness and 
 their identity in the Absolute. But even Schelling with this 
 formal unity of the two worlds sacrificed meaning to abstract- 
 ness. His Absolute was merely the identity of subject and 
 object, nothing else. Some meaning must be attributed to the 
 Absolute if it is to be conceived as actual. This task was 
 accomplished by Hegel, the profoundest and by far the most 
 influential of the post-Kantians. 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Hegel was born at Stuttgart, the capital of Wiirtemberg, on 
 April 27, 1770. He received his early education in the schools 
 of his native city and at Tubingen. After serving as a private 
 tutor in Switzerland, he followed Schelling to Jena, where the 
 two together edited a journal in the interests of the " Philos- 
 ophy of Identity." The battle of Jena occurred just as Hegel 
 was finishing the last sheets of his first important work, the 
 " Phenomenology of Mind." 25 This is the introduction to the 
 Hegelian system and attempts to trace the logical development 
 of " mind" through successive stages. The defeat of the Prus- 
 sians at Jena made it necessary for Hegel to seek elsewhere for 
 a means of livelihood, and he undertook the editorship of a 
 newspaper in a neighboring town. He resigned this position 
 
 25 Phanomenologie dea Geistes. 
 17 
 
258 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the following year for that of rector in a preparatory school. 
 Here he prepared an extensive statement of the formal elements 
 of his system, the "Logic" so called. Even at that time 
 the outlines and more important features of his whole system 
 were clearly in his mind, and the last twenty years of his life 
 were occupied mainly in their unfolding. 
 
 When Hegel was forty-six years of age, with a clear con- 
 ception of his own philosophical position and with an equally 
 forcible conception of its truth, he began lecturing as professor 
 of philosophy at Heidelberg. While there he wrote an outline 
 to his whole system, the " Encyclopedia of Philosophical 
 Sciences." 26 This is the most concise and exhaustive presen- 
 tation of his system. The first part is an outline of the larger 
 "Logic" published a few years before; the second part deals 
 with natural science; while the third part outlines his general 
 theory of psychology, morality, art, religion, and the purpose 
 of philosophy. In 1818 he removed to Berlin to fill the chair 
 of Fichte, where he remained until his death in 1831. At 
 Berlin, Hegel prepared a more detailed statement of the latter 
 portions of the "Encyclopedia." Here he became famous 
 throughout Germany, and acquired, through his published 
 works and various official positions a remarkable influence. 
 
 The character of Hegel is that of a student and thinker, 
 every act is the result of careful consideration, his slow and 
 studied utterances are devoid of feeling and sympathy. He was 
 shrewd, reserved, and conservative, harsh to his inferiors and 
 opponents, often patronizing to those from whom he sought to 
 derive benefit. He was the philosopher rather than the man of 
 the world, the observer and not the actor. In character, breadth 
 of mind, and acumen he closely resembles Kant. They were 
 both constructors and systematizers, but their minds were of 
 different types. Kant was original, suggestive, and impressive ; 
 Hegel was acute, penetrating, and concise. Both were men of 
 
 86 Encyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 259 
 
 thought rather than of action, to whom logical consistency was 
 the basis of the world. 
 
 KELATION TO FORMER IDEALISTS. 
 
 The Critical Philosophy of Kant was a wonderful synthesis 
 of the subjective or mental insight of the rationalists and the 
 objective or nature philosophy of the Englishmen. The sys- 
 tem of Hegel unfolds a similar synthesis. It unites the intense 
 subjectivism of Fichte, full of meaning and form, but in the 
 end only symbolic, with the breadth of Schelling's nature- 
 philosophy, so exhaustive as to be devoid of definite form and 
 meaning. 
 
 Fichte. The transition from the Fichteian activity of the 
 Ego to the Hegelian world of reason presents a remarkable in- 
 sight into the distinction between the two stand-points. Fichte 
 had declared that the Ego freely created the non-Ego, in order 
 that it might have a ground for its self-assertion. Hegel, how- 
 ever, saw in this merely a process in which the Absolute Reason 
 manifested itself through both Ego and non-Ego. The self 
 could not know that it had asserted the not-self, or even con- 
 ceive of the possibility of such an assertion, unless it was 
 itself grounded on a principle of reason. In order to distin- 
 guish Ego from non-Ego, subject from object, some common 
 element must include them both. And reason as this ground 
 is more fundamental than the will-assertive force of Fichte, 
 because it alone can be the basis for consciousness, freedom, and 
 purposive thought. 
 
 Schelling. This difficulty of the Fichteian system was 
 recognized by Hegel's early friend Schelling, whose brilliant 
 exposition of the philosophy of identity rather startled the 
 meditative and conservative Hegel. But the latter soon dis- 
 covered that behind the various attempts on the part of 
 Schelling to transcend the seemingly magic circle of Fichte's 
 Ego and non-Ego by a kind of poetic intuition there lurked a 
 mystic element altogether unintelligible to Hegel. Schelling 
 
260 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 had, it is true, supplied a ground of identity for both Ego and 
 non-Ego, but unfortunately this " night-black" Absolute, as the 
 mere identity of the two world-aspects, was a formal and 
 abstract something, inconceivable except in terms of the Mystic 
 One. Hegel regarded Schelling's Absolute as a more recent 
 form of Spinoza's Substance, only an abstract universal, 
 and this Substance or Absolute, as the mere identity of thought 
 and extension, of Ego and non-Ego, represented to him a mean- 
 ingless abstraction. Schelling laid stress on the immediate 
 or intuitive nature of thought in the comprehension of the 
 Absolute. Hegel required that thought must be mediate in 
 all cases in order to be intelligible. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS. 
 
 There is something magnificent in the completeness and con- 
 ciseness lacking literary form, yet suggestive of latent power 
 that lurks in the expositions of Hegel's system. Analysis 
 shows us that this fascination arises mainly from the impres- 
 sion which we receive of thoroughness in its presentation. 
 This thoroughness, together with the precision of his utter- 
 ances, shows plainly that the system is at least clear in its 
 author's mind. Hegel's philosophy is an intellectualism. He 
 represents the culmination of the rationalistic methods of 
 analysis. The pantheism of Spinoza with its two equally fun- 
 damental attributes of thought andextension is reduced by 
 Loffism" of thought? Logical 
 
 Hegel to a " panlogism" of thought? Logical process, matter, 
 extension, the phenomenal world, and the world of ideals are 
 all different modes or aspects of a universal Thoupht-Idea un- 
 folding itself in various forms. The individualism of Leib- 
 nitz, with its ideal principle" 6 " Pre-established Harmony," is 
 transformed into a universalism which yet retains all the 
 richness, all the finite differentiation of a pluralism. Like the 
 series of monads ordered by the truth of God, the Hegelian 
 world is a universe of particulars, each of which expresses in 
 its own finite way the Thought-Idea of the whole. Hegel's 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 261 
 
 system is a monism, but yet a monism in which every fact of 
 life, even every feeling, emotion, or will-activity, finds its 
 ordered place, not through contrast with other objects, but 
 through the expression of its own definite meaning in the 
 Thought- Absolute. In this system which thus unfolds a logical 
 evolution of the World- Forms we are able to discover two fun- 
 damental conceptions, which together give life and character 
 to the Hegelian world. The dialectic movement, a process of 
 development in three stages, might be regarded as the form; 
 while the concept of free and actual thought as the World- 
 Idea manifesting itself through the dialectic movement as its 
 form might be conceived as the content of the system. 
 
 The Form of Philosophy as the Dialectic Movement. 
 It is a common aphorism that an extreme of some kind often 
 induces a reaction in the opposite direction. And it is often 
 noticeable that both the action and reaction finally unite in a 
 third stage which combines the essential features of each. Such 
 a process is, in brief, the dialectic movement made prominent 
 in Hegelianism. It is by no means original with Hegel, but 
 represents a formal element common to Kant and many of his 
 successors. This dialectic movement is not necessarily a tem- 
 poral development. It is rather a thought or logical process of 
 unfolding, in which each stage is conceived as a necessary sup- 
 plement, the development, directly deducible from the pre- 
 vious stage. This process is not an infinite regression like the 
 number series, but rather a closed circle in which every element 
 dovetails into its predecessor and its successor. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF THE DIALECTIC CONCEPTION. In the 
 treatment of the ideas of the speculative Keason in the third 
 part of Kant's first " Critique" it will be remembered that Kant 
 laid especial stress on the meaning of " totality of phenomena." 
 In the case of the paralogisms we noticed that it was a subjec- 
 tive totality of mental states, from which the reason inferred 
 the absolute unity of the soul-subject; and in the antinomies 
 it was the objective totality of the phenomena that led to the 
 
262 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 concept of the universe. And, moreover, the Ideal of God 
 united both the subjective and the objective in a single totality, 
 "the synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of 
 things in general." 27 It is quite obvious that in Kant's mind 
 the concept of God included or synthesized the abstract, subjec- 
 tive self and the multiform, objective world. This is in brief 
 the conception which the later idealists employed, not only in 
 this single instance, but throughout their entire philosophical 
 systems. 
 
 It will be remembered that Fichte introduced us to his 
 system by means of three propositions, the assertion of the 
 Ego, the assertion of the non-Ego, and their reciprocal limita- 
 tion. There can be observed in this process the same stages 
 which Kant employed in the ideas of the reason, the abstract 
 subjective and the more concrete objective, with the final inclu- 
 sion of both. Schelling observed this same movement when 
 he regarded the formal absolute as the identity of the two 
 worlds of objective productivity and subjective self-conscious- 
 ness. It was to him a poetic conception and lacked in its appli- 
 cation the simplicity of the Fichteian form or the symmetrical 
 precision of the Hegelian form. 
 
 THE DIALECTIC AS USED BY HEGEL. Although of im- 
 portance to the previous idealists, the dialectic movement be- 
 comes in the hands of Hegel the formal principle of organic 
 harmony of the entire universe. To the casual observer his sys- 
 tem suggests nothing more than the world expressed in dialectic 
 terms, for the meaning of the world itself seems at first obscured 
 by this outward form. With Hegel the first or thesis stage of 
 the dialectic is always abstract, indefinite; it represents the ab- 
 stractness of our thought, and in that sense it is subjective. 
 Usually the thesis stage contains the germ of all that is to 
 
 27 "... synthetische Einheit aller Bedingungen der Moglichkeit der 
 Dinge iiberhaupt." Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Second edi- 
 tion, p. 398. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 263 
 
 follow, but yet the germ is so unconscious and indefinite that 
 it requires a further realization to become truly itself. 
 
 The antithesis, as the second stage, represents the concrete 
 objectification of the germ of truth, only abstractly stated in 
 the thesis. This truth has become concrete, definite, and real; 
 it is limited by its conditions and is not merely an indefinite 
 something. But just because it is a concrete object it cannot 
 possess the abstract universality of the thesis. Neither the 
 abstract thesis or the concrete antithesis is a full expression of 
 the truth partly realized by each in its own way. It is neces- 
 sary for a third stage to unite, bring together, or transform 28 
 the imperfect realizations of the truth in its two former aspects. 
 
 The synthesis stage is therefore a completion of the dia- 
 lectic; it is "the truth returned to itself," as is often said. 
 It is vastly richer, more full of meaning than either of the 
 former stages, and just on account of this fulness it is both 
 abstract and concrete. It seems as if there is a slight difference 
 between the Fichteian and the Hegelian forms of the dialectic, 
 which it is well to observe. Hegel emphasized especially the 
 transition from the first to the second stage, believing that the 
 concrete object is directly deduced Jrom its abstra^Lgoacept ; 
 while Fichte, on the contrary, regarded the separate proposi- 
 tions of the Ego and non-Ego to be independent of each 
 other. 
 
 A familiar illustration of the dialectic may not be amiss at 
 this point. Take the rules of any applied art to represent the 
 thesis stage. They are abstract in character and have no 
 reality beyond the subject. The specific application of these 
 rules to a piece of raw material represents the antithesis stage. 
 The rules find their realization in a single phase of the objec- 
 tive. And finally in the synthetic stage the artisan realizes that 
 the rules mean more to him, have a new value, after he has 
 conceived of their concrete application. This third conception 
 
 28 Aufheben (raise out of). 
 
264 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 opens up to him the full meaning of the rules, but partially 
 comprehended in their abstract statement. 
 
 THE CIRCULAR FORM OF THE DIALECTIC. Over and over 
 again Hegel tells us that philosophy resembles a closed curve, 
 the dialectic process is essentially a going out and a subsequent 
 return unto itself. Conceived in its entirety, philosophy, as 
 the explanation of the parts of a system the system of the 
 world is an inclusive circle; while each of the subdivisions 
 of philosophy is a lesser whole resembling a circle of smaller 
 extension. This analogy of the circle to the dialectic process 
 becomes clearer if we regard the infinite nature of both the 
 closed curve and the world process. This circle-infinity, how- 
 ever, must be carefully distinguished from the endless suc- 
 cession exemplified by the infinite series of whole numbers; 
 the former is the real infinite, full of meaning because com- 
 pletely comprehended within itself; the latter is the false in- 
 finite, contradictory because never itself. The circle passes 
 through opposite points and finally returns to itself, only to 
 repeat the process over and over again and each time with a 
 fuller meaning. 
 
 The Content of Philosophy as Thought-Idea. In the 
 previous section we have traced the general form of the 
 Hegelian system, but in so doing we were compelled to neglect 
 the content which moved in this form. This content, as we 
 shall presently recognize, is nothing else than the actuality of 
 the world, " the outer and Inner worlct of Consciousness/' 29 
 The dialectic movement supplies the steps for the realization 
 of truth through a succession of logical stages; but we very 
 naturally inquire as to the truth which moves in this form. 
 We have earlier said that the primacy of thought over the deed- 
 act represented the transition from Fichte to Hegel, and that 
 fulness of meaning represented the latter's advance over 
 
 29 Aeussern und innern Welt des Bewusstseins. . . ." Encyklopiidie, 
 Section 6. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 265 
 
 Schelling. In discussing Hegel's meaning of this thought- 
 idmmmd. as the content of his system we shall first briefly 
 describe his interpretation of common empirical thought as the 
 medium for philosophical analysis before undertaking to trace 
 the successive appearances of mind from mere sensation up to 
 the self-conscious Absolute. 
 
 EMPIRICAL THOUGHT. Thought, 30 from its very nature, is 
 the instrument of philosophy. It is a faculty that pertains to 
 the dignity of man, but its philosophical application must be 
 free from habitual illusions or religious prejudices. The 
 thought employed in philosophical analysis is necessarily a re- 
 flective process in which the "thinking consideration of ob- 
 jects" is transformed into true knowledge. In this reflective 
 act thought is surrounded by what we call experience, through 
 the medium of which it struggles to understand its own activi- 
 ties. From an historical point of view philosophy arose from 
 the struggle of thought to comprehend itself, to understand 
 the process by which it became actual. 
 
 THE "PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND/' 
 
 Thought, as the instrument of philosophical analysis, o,s_ 
 merely a phase of mind or spirit in its broadest sense. In the 
 ef Phenomenology of Mind" 31 Hegel undertakes to trace the 
 evolution or developing-realization of this concept, and enu- 
 merates six stages. This natural history of the mental process 
 was the earliest important publication of Hegel. It contains 
 in germ the outline of his whole system, although the parts are 
 not so clearly articulated as in his more mature works. The 
 fundamental purpose of the " Phenomenology of Mind" is an 
 interpretation of absolute idealism, erected on the ideal char- . 
 acter^oj mediated thought rather than on intuition, an ideal- 1 
 ism which^ would proxe the inconsistency of a^real " thing-in- * * 
 itself r ' at the same time that it unfolded the richness of an 
 
 80 Denken. n Phanomenologie des Geistes. 
 
266 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Absolute-Thought. It will be remembered that such a natural 
 history of mental processes was suggested by the general ar- 
 rangement of the three faculties in Kant's " Critique of Pure 
 Reason." It was more explicitly attempted by Fichte in the 
 theoretical portions of " The Science of Knowledge" and such 
 a purpose pervades the whole of Schilling's "Transcendental 
 Idealism" But the most carefully developed and finished treat- 
 ment of the natural history of the mental processes or the forms 
 in which mind may unfold itself is to be found in this early 
 work of Hegel. 
 
 External Consciousness. In his estimation the most ob- 
 jective and lowest form of mind is external consciousness, in 
 which the self is viewed as essentially apart from the object. 
 The first condition of this external consciousness would be the 
 mere sensuUj^Jcnjw&ng of an object, in which the thing is 
 known immediately as an independency absolutely unrelated 
 to all else. But this very attempt to view the " thing" as im- 
 mediate is meaningless. Every present object contradicts its 
 predecessors, if it is regarded as the whole truth. The " now" 
 is in eternal change, it is successively night and noon, and 
 if it alone is real there is no constant reality. The "thing" 
 as " here" is successively a tree and a mountain ; it is, so far 
 as any sameness is concerned, nothing at all. And, further, 
 Hegel is quite as desirous as Berkeley that his opponent shall 
 discover in the " thing" some element or quality which is not 
 an idea expressing a relation. The object is not a mere un- 
 intelligible something, it is rather a complex of relations, each 
 one of which carries us beyond the object itself. Immediate- 
 ness is an illusion, sensuous knowing requires a relatedness. 
 This analysis of the "thing" given in Hegel's "Phenomen- 
 ology" is in striking contrast to the conclusions of Locke, 
 Kant, and Herbart on the same topic. To Herbart the 
 " thing" indicated at the last analysis a substratum of " thing- 
 in-itself" or Eeal, existent apart from consciousness, but inter- 
 preted as phenomenon by the transcendental elements of the 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 267 
 
 mind. To Hegel, on the contrary, the "thing" represents a 
 phase of mind, a complex which consciousness finally recog- 
 nized to be the same as itself. 
 
 Perception? 2 the second condition of consciousness, repre- 
 sents the Taking together of the accidental and hypothetical 
 sensations. It is essentially mediate, for it recognizes the 
 interconnection among the elements of consciousness. The 
 understanding is the third and last condition of external con- 
 sciousness^pF6per. This in a measure unites the immediacy of 
 sensuous knowing and the interrelatedness or mediacy of per- 
 ception. It is able to recognize the " thing" as an appearance 
 for itself and also cognize its internal structure. 
 
 Self-Consciousness. Succeeding the three conditions of ex- 
 ternal consciousness, each representing a phase of the conscious 
 apprehension of things, there is the second stage in the unfold- 
 ing of mind, that of s_elf -consciousness. Here the " object!! 
 the mere ^thing" of external consciousness becomes identical 
 with, the self that is conscious. The subject becomes aware of 
 itself in every respect. This is essentially the basis of the doc- 
 trine of individuality. The self-conscious being is all desire; 
 he is in conflict with others because he believes the world to be 
 virtually his own. We may remark that self -consciousness in 
 this Hegelian sense very well explains the " genius" of the 
 Romanticists. Above this stage there is the reason* 3 which, by 
 uniting external^ consciousness and self -consciousness, forms the 
 synthetic or third phase in the logical devefopmeniToTmind. 
 
 Reason. Reason us jjiUi^Uliir^Ene thought of "the object and 
 the thought of the subject in, the one thought activity ~ In its 
 operation it is the reason that comprehends the laws that con- 
 trol nature, the physical expression of mind. The final stages 
 of mind, ethical consciousness 34 religion 35 and the Absolute 36 
 find another and perhaps more satisfactory treatment in 
 
 82 Wahrnehmimg. 83 Vermmft. 34 Der Geist. 
 
 85 Die Religion. * Das absolute Wissen. 
 
268 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hegel's subsequent works. They will be mentioned, therefore, 
 in their place in his system. 
 
 SYSTEM. 
 
 It is an impossible task to give in an outline any adequate 
 conception of the breadth of the Hegelian system. Transla- 
 tions and exhaustive commentaries have been published, and 
 must be referred to by those who desire a detailed statement. 
 "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline/' 
 published by Hegel while a professor at Heidelburg, is a com- 
 plete and concise epitome of his whole work. The latter 
 portions were amplified in the years just before his death, but 
 the ideas expressed were in the main unchanged. 
 
 General Divisions. The three divisions of his system cor- 
 respond to three stages of the dialectic. The Logic represents 
 the abstract concepts of philosophy. It is, so to speak, the laws 
 of thought when thought is conceived in terms of certain 
 general conceptions. The antithesis stage of the system is 
 illustrated by the second part of the " Encyclopedia" the phi- 
 losophy of nature. 37 Here Hegel outlined the objective^develop- 
 ment of tJieJJaought^idea, showing wherein the logical abstract- 
 ness of the thesis stage becomes actualized in the objective 
 world of nature. And finally the synthesis stage of the world 
 process is reached in the philosophy of jnind where the 
 TTirmght-Irlpfl^attains itsfull and^cm^plete development. It 
 raises the Logic out of its formal abstractness and the world 
 of nature out of its concrete individuality. In brief, the phi- 
 losophy of mind treats of distinctly mental processes, such as 
 the soul, civilization, art, religion, and the ultimate concepts 
 of philosophy. Throughout this whole statement it must be 
 remembered that there are no indivisible elements anywhere to 
 be found in the Hegelian world. Each of these three larger 
 
 87 Philosophie der Natur. 
 K Philosophie des Geistes. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 269 
 
 divisions is itself the dialectic circle which forms the ground 
 for smaller and smaller dialectics. There is no element which 
 can be considered an indivisible entity; the large and the 
 small alike, each is the seat of a process which when analyzed 
 presents the tricotomy of the dialectic movement. 
 
 The Logic. The Logic is the thesis stage of the whole 
 world process, and as such it is extremely abstract in its nature. 
 "Logic is the science ofthe pure Idea, that is, the Idea as 
 the fl.hRt.ra.nt pIpmpjrjTof tEougllL 11 M ft is concerned with the 
 elemental conce^ts^of thought, the categories of being the 
 ground for existenclTor 1;he laws of the judgment. The thesis 
 of the Logic is represented by as abstract a concept as Hegel 
 conceived it possible to define " mere Being" 40 that which 
 requires for its appreciation quality, quantity, and their union. 
 The quality aspect of being is a mere identity-being without 
 definable attributes. Hegel, in a famous passage, defines this 
 "mere being," without any relations, as the same as no-being. 
 " This pure being is a pure abstraction, in character absolutely 
 negative, which likewise taken immediately is nothing." 41 This 
 recalls Berkeley's contention that mere "matter," which can 
 be defined only in negative terms, is equivalent to nothing. 
 In Hegel's estimation the apparent contradiction of mere 
 being including everything and no-being equivalent to 
 nothing is relieved only by regarding mere being as essentially 
 becoming a concept in which both the positive and negative 
 aspects are present. 
 
 The antithesis and synthesis stages of the Logic are repre- 
 sented respectively by the Doctrine of Essence 42 and the Doc- 
 trine of the Concept. 43 The former represents the stages of 
 existence, such as "the thing," the appearance, and the actu- 
 
 89 " Die Logik ist die Wissenschaft der reinen Idee, das ist, der Idee 
 im abstrakten Elemente des Denkens." Encyklopadie, Section 19. 
 *Sein. ti Encyklopadie, Section 78. "Wesen. 
 
 43 Begriff. 
 
270 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ality. The concept exhibits itself in such forms as the syllo- 
 gisms of the traditional logic, our judgments of purpose, and 
 finally as the abstract concept of the Absolute. 
 
 Philosophy of Nature. Nature represents the antithesis 
 stage of the whole world movement. The abstract and inde- 
 terminate principles of the Logic find their concrete and 
 definite application their finite realization in "tETjIocesses 
 ofjiature. " Thenature represents the Idea in its otherness." ** 
 In this otherness~or concrete timtude the Thougnt-Idea becomes 
 identified with the facts and materials of science. Nature, in 
 its abstract form, is represented by Mechanics as the science of 
 space, time, and motion, the laws of which become concrete in 
 Physical Chemistry. This treats of the different elements, the 
 forms of energy, and the character of natural processes. And 
 finally objective nature attains its highest realization in the 
 structure of organic bodies, the slow movement of geologic 
 processes the evolution of plants, and lastly the animal organ- 
 isms. 
 
 Philosophy of Mind. The synthetic or completely realized 
 stage of the world movement is attained in the philosophy 
 of^mwdLas it is exemplified in the intellectual activities of 
 man. This portion of the " Encyclopaedia" is in a measure the 
 restatement of the later portions of the "Phenomenology" 
 earlier mentioned. Mind has at once the abstract universality 
 of the pure idea, as treated in the Logic and the concrete 
 definitenegs of the phenomena, .ofJJature. Within this highest 
 region of mind one mayobserve the same dialectic move- 
 ment which extends throughout the entire range of Hegel's 
 system. The subjective phases, however, because they are 
 higher developments of the Thought-Idea, have a fuller mean- 
 ing than could be discovered in either the logic or philosophy 
 of nature. They represent the ideals of life, the teleological 
 
 44 "Die Natur hat sich als die Idee in der Form des Andersseins 
 ergeben." Encyklopadie, Section 247. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 271 
 
 significance of those activities which are characteristic of the 
 human intellect. 
 
 SUBJECTIVE MIND. The abstract form of the philosophy 
 of mind is denoted by subjective mind. This refers to the soul, 
 to consciousness, and to the various psychical processes. The 
 highest realization of this subjective phase of mind is to be 
 found in the " free jadJl jis^free jntelligence." 45 A will so free 
 that it realizes its own freedom; a freedom which arises from 
 intelligence and the desire for the truly permanent, but never 
 from mere impulse. In this regard Hegel suggests the intel- 
 lectual freedom of_Spinoza : they both recognize true freedom 
 only so far as it is a freedom of the intellect. 
 
 ETHICS. The objectwemfold, or second part of the whole 
 division of philosophy of mind, refers to the theory of ethics 
 and its various applications, " the conception of right and its 
 realization in the objective world." 46 In the entire treatment 
 of this subject Hegel is in search of the principles of our daily 
 life and social intercourse, which exemplify the application of 
 the principle of intellectual freedom, as it is outlined in the 
 former section, to the world of experience. He recognizes 
 everywhere the subsistence of all forms of morality, as well as 
 the complex human institutions, in the single idea of freedom. 
 In the conception of right it is freedom which gives value to 
 property, contract, and the fundamental distinction between 
 right and wrong; and likewise it is jreedorn upon which 
 morality and the institutions of society are grounded. These 
 human institutions which Hegel believes to be fundamental for 
 society are three in number, the jamily, the community, and 
 the state. Hegel opposes the political views of such" thinkers 
 as Hobbes, who declare that the state is a compact among its 
 members, and follows the Aristotelian view that man is natur- 
 
 \ville als freie Intelligenz 1st." Encyklopadie, Section 481. 
 48 " Die Idee des Rechts, den Begritf des Rechts und dessen Verwirk- 
 lichung zum Gegenstande." Philosophic des Rechts, Section 1. 
 
272 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ally a social being. It is part of one's nature to belong to the 
 state, the man unrelated to organized society is a contradic- 
 tion in terms. By nature man is dependent on his social con- 
 text, and he attains to the mastery of his powers through his 
 subsistence in the state. The state is not without the indi- 
 vidual, nor is the individual without the state. The state " has 
 the highest right over the individual, the highest duty of whom 
 is to be a part of the state." 4T 
 
 ABSOLUTE MIND. The complete realization of the world 
 process is represented by the philosophy of Absolute mind. It 
 is a conception of an Ideal in which the soul and its finite 
 manifestations become united into a deeper and fuller mind. 
 It is mind with all its meaning realized. This Ideal shows 
 itself in three forms, as the Beauty of Art, the Divine Per- 
 fection in the God of Religion, and finally as the Absolute of 
 Philosophy. Art is the limited sensuous expression of the Idea. 
 In its history Art has observed the same dialectic process which 
 is found elsewhere; the synthetic stage of this development is 
 found in the poetry of modern times, wherein all artistic forms 
 are united. In religion Hegel emphasizes especially the reason, 
 in contradistinction to the prominence of feeling. Not that 
 thinking is the entire meaning of God, but that thought is the 
 formal aspect by which alone the concept of God may be at- 
 tained. The Absolute, which is the Ideal of Philosophy expressed 
 without anthropomorphic symbolism, is nothing else than 
 the world process actualized. It is the Absolute in which the 
 logical principles, the natural phenomena, and finally the mind 
 itself, all subsist. The Absolute is the Thought-Idea complete 
 with all possible meaning. It has the abstract universality of 
 the "mere being," which was the starting-point in the first 
 thesis of the whole world process ; it has also the meaning, the 
 
 47 "... Endzweck das hb'chste Recht gegen die Einzelnen hat, deren 
 hochste Pflicht es 1st, Mitglieder des Staats zu sehn." Philosophic des 
 Rechts, Section 258. 
 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. 273 
 
 value, of all the intervening stages, each of which exemplifies 
 some form of its unlimited truth. The Absolute is mere Being, 
 but mere Being in which all the stages of its possible realiza- 
 tion are actualized^ It is this doctrine of the Absolute which 
 brings the Hegelian monism clearly into the foreground. Not- 
 withstanding the diversity of world elements, the apparent 
 separateness of the stages of the dialectic process, and the indi- 
 viduality which seems to be implied in many of the Hegelian 
 terms, yet in its deeper meaning the philosophy of the Idea is 
 a compact unity, a monism in which the diversity only assists 
 to the fuller meaning of the World-Idea. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF HEGEL. 
 
 The movement of Absolute Idealism, which had begun with 
 Reinhold, culminated in the universalistic system of Hegel. 
 There is a greater logical sequence of ideas in this movement 
 than it is possible to discover in any other period of philosophy. 
 The transcendentalism of Kant attained its most finished ex- 
 pression in Hegel. In the terms of his own philosophy Hegel 
 represents the synthesis of Fichte's abstract philosophy of the 
 self with the more concrete nature-philosophy of Schelling ; and 
 likewise the whole movement of idealism from Kant to Hegel 
 represents a synthesis of the subjective rationalists and the 
 objective empiricists. The year of Hegel's death, 1831, marked 
 the climax of his power and the most wide-spread influence of 
 the idealistic tendency of thought. This very completion, how- 
 ever, contained the germs of immediate decay. A philosophical 
 movement has vitality just so long as it represents growth; 
 dissipation invariably follows completion. The immediate dis- 
 ciples of Hegel found themselves unable to interpret the Abso- 
 lute Thought-Idea in any other than pantheistic terms, yet they 
 recognized the prominence in which Hegel himself had held the 
 Christian conception of God. The result was the division of 
 his disciples into two schools, each of which professed to teach 
 the master's true doctrine, but differed as to the fundamental 
 
 18 
 
274 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 theological conception. The keen edges of his system, its 
 breadth, and its cogency disappeared in the hands of his fol- 
 lowers. In their struggle to interpret his " panlogism" in 
 terms of a religion the Hegelian world was distorted beyond 
 recognition, and in the end every disciple struggled to remodel, 
 according to his own individual caprice, the dissociated frag- 
 ments of the once homogeneous whole. At the same time the 
 dialectic methods and the possibility of deducing all things from 
 a single principle were assailed by such men as Herbart, all of 
 whom were repelled by what were called the extravagant deduc- 
 tions of Kanfs " false disciples," and who sought to reinstate 
 the original psychological and epistemological premises of the 
 Critical Philosophy. The recognition on the part of the gov- 
 ernment in the end proved detrimental to the popularity of 
 Hegelian philosophy. An "official philosophy" is a contra- 
 diction. All these tendencies helped to undermine the posi- 
 tion of Absolute Idealism, and so effectually did they operate 
 that the direct influence of the whole movement which culmi- 
 nates in Hegel had grown insignificant by the middle of the 
 century. 
 
 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 
 
 During the years immediately succeeding Hegel's death there 
 arose a mystical and pessimistic tendency which took the form 
 of a reaction against his system. The influences, many in 
 number, which militated against the further extension of Absor 
 lute Idealism in its Hegelian form were summarized in the 
 mystical idealism of Schopenhauer. At the beginning of this 
 chapter three separate tendencies were defined, each empha- 
 sizing a certain aspect of the Kantian criticism. Herbart 
 sought a realistic interpretation of the " thing-in-itself ," the 
 movement from Eeinhold to Hegel erected an objective world 
 about the transcendental character of the ethical Ego, and 
 finally Schopenhauer brought into prominence the will-activity 
 of the mind in the creation of its world. 
 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 275 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 Schopenhauer was born at Danzic, in Northeastern Germany, 
 on February 22, 1788. His father was a merchant who had 
 travelled much, a man of stern character and morose disposi- 
 tion. The young Schopenhauer was intended by his parents 
 for a mercantile career, but the death of his father permitted 
 him to adopt the life of a student. His interests covered a wide 
 field, the ancient classics, history, science, and philosophy. 
 Early travels and residence in France and England gave him 
 an opportunity of acquiring more than an ordinary knowledge 
 of the world. He first attended the University of Gottengen, 
 but later removed to Berlin, where he heard the lectures of 
 Fichte, then at the zenith of his fame. The philosopher of 
 Absolute Idealism was positively repugnant to him. On the 
 cover of his notes of Fichte's lectures he is said to have written 
 " Wissenschafts leere" (science of emptiness). 
 
 With the approaching political disturbances of 1812 Schopen- 
 hauer retired to the Thuringian forest Here he prepared an 
 essay, entitled " Concerning the Fourfold-Root of the Principle 
 of Sufficient Ground/' 48 which was accepted by the University 
 of Jena for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Already 
 Schopenhauer had become conscious of the fundamental con- 
 ceptions of his philosophy, and in his early work he gave to the 
 will a higher position than it had hitherto received in Germany. 
 The following year he repaired to Dresden, and there remained 
 for four years. During this period he thought out and wrote 
 his classic work, " The World as Will and Presentation" 49 
 published at Leipzig in 1818. A second edition, containing a 
 restatement and further additions to the earlier work, was pub- 
 lished some twenty-five years later. During this Dresden resi- 
 dence an incident occurred which has been often quoted. On 
 a visit to a botanical conservatory Shopenhauer, who evidently 
 
 48 Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde. 
 " Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 
 
276 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 acted strangely, was asked who he was. " If you can tell me 
 who I am," he is said to have replied, " I shall be deeply 
 obliged to you." While a resident at Berlin his dislike for 
 the Fichte-Hegel philosophy manifested itself very prominently. 
 A course of lectures announced by him to be given at the same 
 hours that Hegel had his fullest audience proved a failure. 
 This incident by no means tended to soften his opposition 
 towards the Absolute Idealism and his prejudice against its 
 disciples. Like Hume, he craved for literary notoriety, and the 
 apparent contempt for his writings on the part of the philo- 
 sophical world only tended to aggravate his sensitive disposi- 
 tion, morbid and pessimistic by nature. Schopenhauer's tem- 
 perament was naturally impulsive ; strong in will and opinion, 
 he undoubtedly controlled his powerful emotions as few others 
 could have done. Towards women he entertained a profound 
 contempt, accountable partially to the lack of sympathy be- 
 tween his mother and himself. Keligion also was especially dis- 
 tasteful to him, since it rested on the emotional rather than the 
 intellectual side of man. In 1833 Schopenhauer retired to 
 Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he led a solitary life until his 
 death in 1860. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 The philosophy of Schopenhauer is directly traceable to three 
 sources, the transcendental idealism of Kant, the ethical mys- 
 ticism of India, and finally the emotional, one might almost 
 say impulsive, tendencies of his personality. Two central ideas 
 dominate his thought, the world, in its innermost structure 
 is not the mere appearances (Kant), but its inner reality is 
 a blind force struggling for self-assertion (Buddhism). 
 
 Behind the appearances of the phenomenal world there is the 
 reality of will. "Will is the ' thing-in-itself,' the inner con- 
 tent, the true essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the 
 phenomenon, is only the reflection of the Will." B0 The f un- 
 
 60 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Book IV, 
 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 277 
 
 damental difference between Schopenhauer and Hegel lies in 
 the relative importance of will. To Hegel the intellect was 
 the highest truth; it supplied not only the means for philo- 
 sophic expression, but likewise the very conception of the 
 Absolute. All the emotions, impulses, and feelings were fun- 
 damentally irrational, and could be admitted into philosophy 
 only if tempered by reason. To Schopenhauer thought was 
 only a secondary product of will. The volitional impulse, 
 the struggle of inner forces for some objective expression, was 
 the true basis of philosophy and the only possible approach to 
 the Absolute. In his personality and in the emphasis on the 
 emotional and intuitive aspect of life Schopenhauer recalls 
 Bruno. Both were monists who were far more deeply im- 
 pressed by a mystical appreciativeness than by an intellectual 
 interpretation of the Absolute. Yet, notwithstanding the mys- 
 tical tendencies of Schopenhauer, his own system has much 
 more in common with the school of Fichte and Hegel than he 
 is willing to admit. Both stand-points interpret the given 
 objects of the world as mere appearance, and look for a tran- 
 scendental reality beyond; and in details of expression 
 Schopenhauer's idealism has recourse to many conceptions 
 which originated in the other school. The relation between 
 Schopenhauer and Schelling was especially close; "will" re- 
 sembles "self-conscious limitation," the unending struggle of 
 the universal Will recalls the infinite productivity of Nature. 
 Schopenhauer's philosophy of art differs but little from the 
 treatment by the Eomanticists. Both regard art as the 
 highest sensuous embodiment of Eeality, and both look to 
 beauty for the harmony of object and subject, the fact and its 
 ideal. 
 
 Buddhism. It is quite impossible for one unfamiliar with 
 the central doctrines of Buddhism to understand the true bear- 
 ing of this modern instance of a pessimistic will-philosophy. 
 The outward appearance as well as the deeper meaning of 
 Buddhism is distinctly opposed to Christianity. Arising as it 
 
278 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 did from a reaction against the formalism of the ancient 
 Hindoo Vedas and the Upanishads, Buddhism is distinctly 
 humanistic. Like Christianity, it seeks to define the salvation 
 of man, but here the resemblance ceases. Christianity in 
 its native purity may be said to have had no metaphysical 
 foundation, no other theory of the world than a faith which 
 cannot be penetrated by reason. Buddhism, on the other hand, 
 is grounded on a definite theory of reality, the blind struggle 
 for an unattainable end, the eternal truth that all the "con- 
 stituents of being are misery." 51 The life of man is an evil in 
 itself, the goal of human endeavor is the freedom from this 
 misery of existence. In man there is no central spiritual ele- 
 ment analogous to the Occidental conception of soul, but rather 
 a continuity of a principle of consciousness* 2 which is the 
 direct cause of future rebirths. All life arises from sensuous 
 desire; or rather from the longing of the individual for the 
 physical gratification of those will-emotions which prove value- 
 less when attained. "By cleaving to anything thus done one 
 come to be." 53 Complete salvation results only when the per- 
 son has reached the supreme thought that this illusory desire 
 which he seeks is itself merely a subjective appreciation. Then 
 he has attained to complete knowledge of the world and has 
 freed his "principle of consciousness" from the curse of 
 future being. 
 
 Universal pessimism is perhaps the most apparent conclusion 
 from even a superficial acquaintance with Eastern thought, but 
 yet there is a deeper meaning which Europe has itself long 
 
 51 Augutta-Nikaya. (Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. xiv.) 
 52 1 have here used the term " principle of consciousness" to express 
 that Nidana consciousness which is alone reborn; it is not an element, 
 but rather a process. The word " self" is objectionable, as the exist- 
 ence of the Ego or soul is directly denied. ( See Warren, Buddhism in 
 Translations, p. 133. Buddha-ghosa's Visuddhi-Magga, Chapter 
 xviii.) 
 83 Samyutta-Nikaya. (Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. 161.) 
 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 279 
 
 struggled to realize. It is the duality of worlds; the inner 
 reality of an uncaused cause in contradistinction to its causal 
 manifestations in the world of sense-perceptions. It is a con- 
 ception which is found in all those systems of monism that find 
 a deeper reality than is given in the flux of sense-phenomena. 
 This duality of the real and the apparent is to be discovered 
 in the pantheistic thinkers of the mediaeval school, traceable 
 from them through the Arabian to Oriental sources. It forms 
 a fundamental distinction in Bruno and in Spinoza, the 
 " natura naturans" representing the self -caused reality of Sub- 
 stance and the "natura naturata" its manifestations as the 
 world of experience. It is the distinction between the " thing- 
 in-itself ' and the transcendental elements in the Critical Phi- 
 losophy. Traces of the distinction are observed in Fichte, and 
 it is especially prominent in Schelling, who employs the same 
 terms as were used by Spinoza. 
 
 The Influence of Personality. Aside from both the direct 
 influences of Buddhism, with its metaphysic of the will and its 
 ethics of pessimism, and Kant's system of transcendentalism, 
 with its two worlds of appearance and reality, Schopen- 
 hauer's philosophy is to a large extent the expression of his own 
 personality. He was intense, restless of mind, easily moved by 
 prejudice, strong in his likes and dislikes; in fact, a man to 
 whom the volitional, the expressive side of his nature was always 
 in the foreground. He was keen, analytical, and fond of self- 
 introspection ; his temperament was extremely sensitive to 
 some emotions, such as the artistic and the sexual, but yet 
 remained inflexible to others. Patriotism and religion were 
 ridiculed by him because irrational, and he ignored his mother 
 during the latter part of her life. In character Schopenhauer 
 seems to unite in a most original manner a powerful analytical 
 mind with the active striving side of human nature. The 
 former explains the grasp which he undoubtedly had on the 
 deepest problems of philosophy, while the latter gives us the 
 key to his fondness for Hindoo literature, with its cry for the 
 
280 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cessation of the turbulent spirit of man. He sought to give 
 philosophical expression to a self which struggles for unattain- 
 able ends, fully recognizing the present hopelessness of its task. 
 
 SYSTEM. 
 
 Schopenhauer's philosophy, more than any of the Occidental 
 systems, is built upon the fundamental distinction between the 
 immanent reality of the universe, as struggling will, and its 
 limiting conditions. The first part of " The World as Will and 
 Presentation" deals with presented fact. It is epistemological 
 in character and defines the grounds of knowledge. Once, how- 
 ever, he had discovered the solution to the world as a presenta- 
 tion he directed his attention to the deeper aspect of the world, 
 the inner reality of the Uncaused Will. This is a concept only, 
 and valueless as a precept for our daily existence. He there- 
 fore returns to the presented world as it is unfolded in art. 
 Beauty is to him a transitory realization of that perfect salva- 
 tion attainable only by the submersion of the individual self in 
 the Absolute Will. 
 
 Epistemology. The theory of knowledge is summarized in 
 Schopenhauer's mind by the quotation, " The world is my 
 presentation." Following his masters, Kant and Buddha, he 
 feels that the given world becomes vitalized about a conscious 
 centre which may be abstractly termed the " subject." But the 
 ideas which compose the conscious life are not given archetypes 
 of an external reality beyond; they are presentations created 
 by my own subjectivity from the principle of " sufficient 
 ground" (zureichenden Grunde). Like Kant, Eeinhold, Fichte, 
 and Hegel, from whom Schopenhauer differs less than he sup- 
 poses, he recognizes the presentation as such to be the direct 
 product of transcendental laws or roots (Wurzel). These he 
 finds to be four in number: The logical ground according 
 to which we find ourselves able to think a conclusion from 
 given premises, the transcendental source of the belief in the 
 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 281 
 
 authority of the laws of the reason ; secondly, the validity of the 
 principle of causality ; thirdly, the mathematical forms of space 
 and time, through which the objects stand in a relation which 
 is mutually determined by each other, yet a relation which is 
 nevertheless purely intuitional in character. The fourth root 
 is by far the most important in Schopenhauer's mind, it is 
 the necessary manifestation of the will-activity. The logical 
 and causal roots to the principle of sufficient ground have been 
 long recognized; whereas Schopenhauer conceived the two 
 latter to be original with Kant and himself. 
 
 Metaphysic. The central theme of the Schopenhauerian 
 philosophy is the will. He recognizes, as all the transcenden- 
 talists did, that the substratum upon which the mind imposes 
 its forms of time, space, and causality must be explained in 
 some way. He was dissatisfied with the unknowability of the 
 " thing-in-itself " as well as the indefinable self -consciousness 
 of the Absolute Idealists. Schopenhauer discovered the inner- 
 most reality of the world, not in an undefinable external, but 
 rather in a clearly appreciable subjective force. This Absolute, 
 the ff natura naturans" is will, an unconscious force behind 
 our world of appearance. Anselm defined the Absolute as 
 Goodness, Descartes as Perfection, Spinoza as Self-being, Kant 
 as Personified Morality, and Schopenhauer in his turn identifies 
 it with a blind and insatiable struggle for self -existence. His 
 metaphysic is an approach near to mystic pantheism. Nature 
 is the expression of an unthinking force, the forms of which 
 struggle for their existence in the temporal and spacial order. 
 In its innermost reality the nature of the Absolute Will can 
 never be known to the human consciousness, which conceives of 
 every thing in terms of its transcendental elements. Yet the 
 desires, the ambitions, the struggles which control the con- 
 scious life of every individual are the reflections of the Supreme 
 Will beneath. 
 
 After having defined the concept of the Absolute Will, he 
 again turned towards the world of presented fact. There he 
 
282 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is able to discover successive obj edifications of the Will. 
 The lowest of these is represented by inorganic nature and the 
 highest by the brain of man. Each separate obj edification of 
 the will is itself the embodiment of an eternal purpose to exist, 
 " a will to be." " The world as presentation is the reflection 
 of the Will in which it recognizes itself in various grades of 
 distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man." 84 
 Pleasure, harmony, and progress result from the gratification 
 of this " will to be ;" pain, discord, and decadence follow its 
 arrest. This vain struggle of the will for a fuller expression is 
 wrong; utterly wrong. The duty of man is to search for rest, 
 some state in which his " will to be" no longer yearns for the 
 unattainable. This is achieved in artistic contemplation and 
 in death. 
 
 Esthetics. To many Schopenhauer is known only as the 
 philosopher of the world of art. Yet the fine arts, as such, are 
 regarded by him as important only as corollaries to the theory 
 of the will. Each type of art represents a certain meaning of 
 the Will; in architecture it is force, in painting action, in 
 poetry temporal order, while music, as the highest art, repre- 
 sents the Will in its inner being. The presentation of art serves 
 for the moment to quell the struggle of the human " will to be," 
 for the personal identity of the subject is lost in the contem- 
 plation of beauty. The individual will, as the will of the 
 aesthetic object, are both momentarily merged in the Uni- 
 versal Will. The object of beauty serves only to arrest the 
 terrible struggle of existence for a single moment. The soul 
 yearns for complete rest, the eternal suppression of the finite 
 in the Infinite ; this is to be found in the moral denial of the 
 individual will. 
 
 Ethics. In his ethics Schopenhauer continues to observe 
 the same duality of worlds which is to be found in his whole 
 system. Man represents the highest form of objectified will 
 
 84 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Book IV. 
 
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. 283 
 
 and the only being who may become fully conscious of the 
 " will to live." Life for most of mankind is merely an inces- 
 sant struggle for existence; the fear of death is the chief in- 
 centive to endure this struggle, and yet death is its inevitable 
 climax. Pain is the unavoidable accompaniment of this un- 
 ending strife; and eren the happiness which is to be found in 
 life is purely negative, for it arises merely from the anticipation 
 of desires, and generally disappears at the moment of their 
 fulfilment. Aside from this universal "will to live," which 
 however extends only to the finite individual, there is the desire 
 to propagate the finite objectification of the will in future 
 generations. The sexual passion was conceived by Schopen- 
 hauer to be the second strongest emotion in the nature of man. 
 He is said to have declared that mankind would be helpless if 
 there existed another emotion as strong. 
 
 The simplest acts of will assertion are those which take place 
 as mere bodily activities. They are, however, the results of 
 purely self-centred motives, in which the will of one person 
 often contracts the assertive power of another. This gives rise 
 to the fundamental distinction between right and wrong. 
 When the finite " will to live" of one person breaks through 
 the limits which are required by the " will to live" of another, 
 there arises wrong in its various forms. Opposition by force is 
 less wrong than interference by deceit, because the latter breaks 
 the bonds of mutual trust and destroys all sympathy and hope- 
 fulness. This exhibits at once the fundamental premise of 
 Schopenhauer's ethics, the apparent separateness, the egoistic 
 strife of the individual beings of the world, and the true unity 
 of all mankind in the Real Will. It is only by the selfish 
 assertion of the will that we are separate ; by the denial of the 
 will we all become one. The suppression of the finite will, 
 the only purely rational act, is accomplished through a life of 
 honesty, purity, and sympathy. But more important even than 
 these moral motives is the recognition of the one truth of life, 
 all existence, all assertion of the will, is misery. " Before 
 
284 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 us there is certainly nothingness. ... To those in whom the 
 will has denied itself this world of ours which is apparently 
 so real with all its suns and milky ways is nothing." M 
 
 POSITION OF SCHOPENHAUER. 
 
 The pessimistic idealism of Schopenhauer represents the 
 reaction against the formalism of the Hegelians. It appeals to 
 a different side of character, a side of character which the ad- 
 vancing civilization of the nineteenth century has learned to 
 appreciate more and more. Hegel is seldom read except by the 
 professional philosopher; Schopenhauer, both on account of 
 his brilliant literary style and his masterly expression of the 
 struggle of life, appeals to the average man. He philosophizes 
 on what is nearest to all his readers, the motive, the strife, 
 and the ambition of active life. There is no need of training 
 to understand him, there are no subtle meanings which are only 
 partly expressed. Schopenhauer is dogmatic, but yet asserts 
 his opinion so lucidly and with so much skill that its force 
 seems irresistible to us. Even his pessimism finds a hearty wel- 
 come. The current industrial problems, the reaction away from 
 traditional forms of religion, in fact the whole social back- 
 ground of the present period, is tending towards a pessimistic 
 view of the world. Individualism, upon which the whole 
 Reformation and the progress of the northern races has been 
 founded, is being discarded for a degenerate socialism. In all 
 this restlessness and demand for the suppression of the indi- 
 vidual, Schopenhauer is pre-eminently the philosophical apolo- 
 gist. He supplies a metaphysical background for emotional 
 convictions and arouses an enthusiasm in a mystical interpreta- 
 tion of man and his social relations. For all these reasons the 
 various forms of mystical idealism are to-day the most popular 
 expressions of transcendental tendencies. 
 
 65 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. (Last paragraph of the first 
 edition. ) 
 
CHAPTEE VIII. 
 RECENT TENDENCIES IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE pessimistic naturalism of Schopenhauer was the last of 
 the classic reconstructions of the Critical Philosophy. From 
 the publication of the " Critique of Pure Reason" to the death 
 of Hegel, a period of just fifty years, Germany was the scene 
 of a wonderful movement in the history of human thought, a 
 movement which has acted and reacted on the science, the lit- 
 erature, and the ideals of the nineteenth century. While each 
 of the classic forms of German transcendentalism stands for a 
 definite meaning, an original interpretation of Kant, those who 
 have since written are concerned with the assimilation and re- 
 organization of the older systems rather than in the develop- 
 ment of new issues. English empiricism invaded Germany 
 towards the middle of the century, and likewise the German 
 idealism began to influence the development of British thought. 
 The result of this intermixture of epistemological stand-points 
 has been the convergence of all philosophy towards a state of 
 .equilibrium in which are to be found elements from almost 
 every phase of philosophical development. 
 
 This conciliatory tendency has shown itself wherever the 
 influence of philosophy is felt. It has sometimes degenerated 
 into an indefinite attitude of mind in which conflicting and 
 undigested elements are harmonized by a mere verbalism, and 
 still again the meeting of various lines of thought has reacted 
 on literature and helped to define more artistic conceptions of 
 life. This struggle for the harmony of empiricism and critical 
 rationalism affected ethics and metaphysics, and it has even 
 penetrated into the fields of science and psychology, generally 
 less susceptible to the influence of epistemological controversies. 
 It is the intent of this last chapter to outline some of the 
 
 285 
 
286 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 recent tendencies of thought which have influenced the funda- 
 mental theories of philosophy. In this brief account we shall 
 find that the philosophy of the Absolute has gradually attained 
 a remarkable importance. That beneath science, psychology, 
 ethics, and metaphysics there is an undercurrent of thought 
 which finds expression in a Principle of Being co-extensive 
 with the Universe. That, whatever stand-point we may take 
 towards the world of fact experience, whether religious, ethical, 
 or even sceptical, there still seems to remain a demand which 
 is only satisfied in the presence of a deeper metaphysic. The 
 ultimate conclusion of such a metaphysic we may call the 
 Absolute; and its development from experience and thought 
 may be similarly defined as the Philosophy of the Absolute. It 
 is our purpose in the closing pages of this chapter to consider a 
 few tendencies and stand-points which lead in this general 
 direction. We may find that in these considerations which 
 point towards a World-unity we are introduced to a concept 
 dark and formless in itself, yet from its very depth and uni- 
 versality it may prove to be the logical implication of the 
 elements of experience and the processes of thought. 
 
 SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Towards the close of the eighteenth century there were a 
 number of remarkable developments in scientific theory. The 
 French materialists, earlier alluded to in connection with 
 Locke, were impressed with the mechanical nature of the entire 
 universe and sought to establish the universality of the prin- 
 ciple of material causality. This absolute reliance on the ap- 
 parent infallibility of observation gave an unprecedented stim- 
 ulus to scientific inquiry and indirectly produced a long series 
 of discoveries. It was the time when such men as D'Alembert 
 and Laplace were active in the theory of mathematics, and 
 Priestly, Lavoisier, and Dalton in chemistry. Many of the 
 men who contributed to the scientific activities of the early part 
 of the nineteenth century are to be regarded as specialists 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 287 
 
 within a single field, and have therefore effected only an indi- 
 rect influence on the history of philosophy. Yet there were 
 men who felt the demand for a clearer understanding of the 
 meaning of scientific conceptions at the same time that they 
 recognized the advantage of their use. Among those who gave 
 a wider philosophical interpretation to the advances of science 
 is to be mentioned the Frenchman, Auguste Comte. 
 
 AUGUSTE COMTE. 
 
 He was born and reared under two distinct influences, each 
 of which finds a place in his system, the activities of the 
 special sciences and the social unrest following the period of 
 Napoleon. His " Positive Philosophy" 1 as Comte's stand- 
 point is called, has two distinct parts, one is critical and the 
 other constructive. In the critical portion Comte discovers, 
 after a careful examination of the history of scientific theory, 
 a certain law of progress observable in the development of all 
 the sciences. With this law in mind he then seeks to construct 
 an ideal for all science and to apply it within the field of so- 
 ciology, a subject with which he finds himself especially 
 concerned. 
 
 The Stages of Science. The history of science exhibits 
 three successive stages in its development, a religious, a meta- 
 physical, and finally a positive period. The first, or religious, 
 is characterized by a reference, in the explanation of natural 
 phenomena, to some incomprehensible spirit, such as the nature- 
 gods of the savage pantheon, or a supernatural Being. It rep- 
 resents the scientific views of both the race and the individual 
 in their periods of childhood. Everything in nature is re- 
 garded as animated, like the body of man ; natural phenomena 
 express the personal caprice of a supernatural agency. The 
 second, or metaphysical, stage represents the period in which 
 the point of reference is transferred from a personal agency to 
 
 1 Cours de Philosophic Positive, 
 
288 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 impersonal force. The natural processes are here explained 
 by an immanent power which pervades all being. This force 
 is an abstraction which nevertheless is regarded as real in 
 itself; perfection, necessity, and other concepts of science are 
 believed to be its laws. The metaphysical stage of explanation 
 regards true nature as the generating source of all natural 
 phenomena; it differs but little from the " natura naturans" 
 of Spinoza. In brief, the metaphysical period in science repre- 
 sents nature as the expression of some esoteric, unknowable 
 force which somehow makes itself felt but yet can never be 
 directly known; whereas the religious attitude conceived it 
 as the expression of a theistic will. 
 
 The third, or positivistic, stage is the ideal of all scientific 
 inquiry. It has recourse neither t6 the will of God nor to an 
 impersonal force for its explanations. It interprets the pre- 
 sented phenomena simply as they are in themselves, without 
 any reference to their ultimate origin or meaning; it regards 
 the laws of nature to be nothing more than convenient general- 
 izations from experimental observation. No extravagant hy- 
 potheses are employed; only those formulae or simple laws are 
 recognized which make farther observation possible. The iso- 
 lated experience must be united with others by some simple 
 means; but this abstract law, unlike its conception in the 
 metaphysical stage, is here conceived by the positive stand- 
 point to have no reality in itself apart from the experiences 
 by which it is defined. 
 
 Division of the Sciences. With this interpretation of the 
 history of science in mind, Comte next applies it to the world of 
 sense-impressions. For this purpose he divides all science into 
 six fields, according to the facility with which the positive 
 stage may be attained and the complexity of the material em- 
 ployed. Mathematics was the first science to become positive, 
 and at the same time its material is the simplest. The other 
 five sciences in the order of their increasing complexity are: 
 Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and, lastly, Sociology. 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 289 
 
 The phenomena of human intercourse and the interpretation 
 of the laws of social progress comprise the science of sociology. 
 It is the last of the abstract sciences to attain the distinction 
 of the positive stage, for the material with which it deals is 
 extremely complex. 
 
 Sociology. The theory of society, with which Comte is 
 especially concerned, constitutes the constructive phase of the 
 Positive Philosophy. Society, which is based on the unity of 
 the relations among men, may be regarded as an individual, 
 the development of which is characterized by the fuller ex- 
 pression of its intellectual faculties; in its higher stages the 
 nobler elements predominate over the baser passions. Person- 
 ality, as the force of the social order, is the only element in 
 nature worthy of devotion or respect. In this manner posi- 
 tivism develops into a religion of humanity and an ethics of 
 altruism. 
 
 Position of Positivism. The influence of the Positive 
 Philosophy has been somewhat lessened by the fact that its 
 disciples have tended to recognize two phases in the original 
 system. Comte's first philosophy was scientific and critical, 
 whereas in his later writings he tended to emphasize a mystical 
 or religious element. Not religion in its ordinary sense, but 
 rather an extravagant religion of mankind in which the uni- 
 versal man, society at large, was deified. Hero-worship was to 
 be substituted for God-worship; the feelings of sympathy and 
 altruistic love were to replace the intellect in the control of 
 life. Yet, notwithstanding these later developments of the 
 Positive Philosophy, the whole attitude of mind has had 
 a momentous influence on the French and English philosophy 
 of the nineteenth century. As well as calling attention to the 
 application of scientific methods and philosophical ideals to 
 the interpretation of social relations, it has stimulated a phi- 
 losophy of science by demanding a more accurate expression of 
 its fundamental laws. 
 
 19 
 
290 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HYPOTHESES IN SCIENCE. 
 
 The positivistic stand-point suggests at once the develop- 
 mental character of the world-process in the Hegelian dialectic, 
 and again the evolutionary aspect of recent British philosophy. 
 Yet before science can be conceived in terms of a philosophical 
 theory, the use of scientific hypotheses must be examined. 
 For whatever importance we may discover in the meaning of 
 evolution, or in the meaning of any other broad scientific 
 hypothesis, it is valueless with reference to natural phenomena 
 unless the ground of its application has been already deter- 
 mined. 
 
 Origin of Scientific Hypotheses. The early history of 
 any science is necessarily a record of observations, more or 
 less accidental in their method of procedure. The development 
 of science was possible only through broadening the point of 
 view by means of a wider range of experience. No laws or 
 principles could be formulated until there was a clear concep- 
 tion of the materials to be considered ; and, on account of the 
 limited range and the inaccuracy of methods at the disposal of 
 the early scientists, the results which they obtained were either 
 too narrow or else too broad. Early science concerned itself 
 either with simple uncritical facts of experience or with the 
 explanation of these facts by what we now consider to be ex- 
 travagant hypotheses. It was content with the mere, record 
 of perceived experiments, or else endeavored to explain them 
 by artificial constructions; no middle course seemed possible. 
 But gradually as the fields of the separate sciences were clearly 
 understood, as each became the object of special and detailed 
 study, the old hypotheses were remodelled according to the 
 demands of more enlightened knowledge. Narrow but com- 
 prehensive theories were substituted for ill-founded generaliza- 
 tions on the one hand and mere descriptions of facts on the 
 other. 
 
 As new laws have been conceived with the increasing range 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 291 
 
 of facts at the disposal of the scientists, there has been devel- 
 oped a tendency to inquire into these laws. And the further 
 this inquiry is carried the more the scientist leans on philoso- 
 phy, for the more universal do his principles become. It is 
 found that the simple fact of experience points to a principle 
 behind it, and this in turn to a broader law, until finally 
 science feels compelled to postulate an hypothesis so universal 
 as to comprehend an indeterminate range of experience. With 
 the growth of science these hypotheses tend to attain greater 
 universality. The principle of multiplication is included 
 within the binomial theorem, and this in turn finds a fuller 
 expression in a theorem of the infinitesimal calculus. So it is 
 throughout all science, the narrower fact is subsumed under 
 the broader principle; laws of the most diverse character are 
 harmonized by some universal hypothesis. But yet there is a 
 marked distinction between the hypothesis of modern science 
 and its counterpart in ancient speculation. The latter had 
 little reality beyond the imagination of the inventor, whereas 
 the hypothesis as now employed by science is the result of 
 extensive and correlated observation. 
 
 Implication of Scientific Hypotheses. It must be further 
 noted that the existence of hypotheses in science points towards 
 two presuppositions which the empirical scientist is often un- 
 willing to recognize. It may be observed that the generaliza- 
 tions perhaps those through which science has achieved its 
 most lasting result are themselves beyond direct experimental 
 proof; they are valid only so long as they find indirect support 
 from extensive ranges of experience and can serve as appro- 
 priate forms or skeletons to indicate the unity underlying phe- 
 nomena of the most diverse types. Physics finds it convenient 
 to postulate " energy" as the point of reference for many forms 
 of activity, yet energy itself can never be perceived, its reality 
 is inferred from generalizing the phenomena of light, mag- 
 netism, chemical affinity, heat, and mechanics. But besides 
 going bejond direct experience and resting its authority on the 
 
292 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 implications of experience in general, the hypothesis of modern 
 science involves another presupposition, that of the organic 
 unity of nature. Unless it is recognized that there is some 
 ultimate relationship behind the forces of nature, the postula- 
 tion of any law or hypothesis, itself beyond direct experience, 
 would be utterly worthless and illogical. The force of this 
 presupposition is by no means lessened even if science regards 
 the hypothesis as simply a point of reference; for a series of 
 experiences which on their surface have no similitude what- 
 soever can hardly be referred to a simple theory for their expla- 
 nation unless the ultimate unity of nature is implicitly as- 
 sumed. In their outward appearance there is no sameness 
 in the moving pendulum of a clock and a red-hot stove, the 
 magnetic current and a ray of light, yet on the presupposition 
 that the phenomena of nature are the expressions of an under- 
 lying unity, science finds itself able to refer each to a some- 
 thing, called, if you like, by the term " energy. " 
 
 EVOLUTION. 
 
 There is no broad generalization of scientific theory which 
 has influenced the development of science during the nine- 
 teenth century more, or has a profounder meaning, than the 
 concept of Evolution. Among the early Greeks the idea of a 
 gradual transformation of lower into higher forms was a fa- 
 vorite theme. But their speculations would have proved to be of 
 little interest to the modern scientist, with his just abhorrence 
 of imaginative constructions, had it not been for two remark- 
 able discoveries in biological science. One of these was in the 
 field of embryology and the other in that of paleontology. 
 
 Embryonic Evidence in Support of Biological Evolu- 
 tion. With improved methods of observation the biologist 
 noted a remarkable resemblance between certain stages of em- 
 bryonic life and other animal forms of a less complex nature 
 than the one into which the embryo would subsequently de- 
 velop. From this it was inferred, as the general but not exact 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 293 
 
 expression of a law, that the embryos of mammals pass through 
 stages in their development which are comparable, although 
 hardly identical, with lower and simpler conditions of life. 
 There is a one-cell stage like the simplest bodies at present 
 known to biology; and still again there is stage possessing 
 gills, which is strongly suggestive of the fish. A German 
 zoologist, Haeckel, has briefly stated this remarkable discovery 
 in a familiar quotation " Ontogeny, or the development of the 
 individual, is a shortened recapitulation of phylogeny, or the 
 evolution of the race." 
 
 Evidence from Fossil Forms. The evidence from paleon- 
 tology, or the study of fossil remains, is even more conclusively 
 in favor of the evolution of organic forms than that derived 
 from the comparison of embryos. It was observed that the 
 fossils found in the strata of rocks laid down in ancient geo- 
 logic times could be easily interpreted as the antecedent forms 
 of our present fauna and flora. Skeletons of the probable pro- 
 genitors of the horse are embedded in the rocks of prehistoric 
 ages; and further, the more recent the surrounding rock the 
 more nearly does the fossil resemble the living species. Ke- 
 markable achievements have often resulted from a comparison 
 and correlation of material, notwithstanding the limitations 
 and difficulties of the task. Hitchcock believed it possible to 
 construct a wholly new classification of certain birds (?) and 
 reptiles by the observation of their footprints in the Triassic (?) 
 sandstones of the Connecticut Valley. 2 
 
 Universal Character of Evolution. The problem involved 
 in biological evolution is not, therefore, so much as to its 
 existence as to the underlying unity of nature which it exem- 
 plifies and the forces which are operative in its expression. 
 The deeper phases of science rest unsatisfied with the uncriti- 
 cised belief that the hypothesis of evolution has a value ; they 
 
 a Ichnology of New England and Supplement, and United States 
 Geological Survey, Monograph XXIX. 
 
294 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 inquire into the presuppositions upon which it is based and 
 the laws by which it becomes manifested. But in this inquiry 
 it soon becomes evident that the gradual development of the 
 higher living forms from simpler conditions is only a single 
 aspect of a principle, the operation of which extends through- 
 out all nature; that in the interpretation of a single phase of 
 evolution one soon discovers that there is involved by implica- 
 tion the conception of universal evolution. Kant, Laplace, and 
 Herschel had established on a firm basis the evolution of planet- 
 ary systems from original nebulous masses. The sciences of 
 history and sociology have long recognized that the develop- 
 ment of human institutions is a result of the action and re- 
 action between the individual and his environment, continued 
 through a protracted period of time. Since the beginning of a 
 scientific interest in the growth of language the philologist has 
 founded all his inquiries on the assumption that words are the 
 result of a development from earlier and simpler forms. 
 
 Even in speculative thought the principle of evolution is by 
 no means unfamiliar. In the philosophy of the Rationalists 
 one will recall the evolving series of monads by which Leibnitz 
 sought to explain the diversity of the world. The German 
 transcendentalists were very familiar with the concept and 
 desired to extend it to even a wider range of phenomena than 
 will be admitted within the restricted limits of the physical 
 sciences. Fichte wished to explain the mental functions as a 
 gradual development from the fundamental will-activity. And 
 Schelling expressed objective nature in terms of an inner force 
 continually limiting itself and then transcending these limits, 
 while the subjective life gradually unfolded the various phases 
 of the principle of self -consciousness. Hegel, both in the 
 " Phenomenology of Mind" and in the more mature expression 
 of his system, is pre-eminently the philosopher of evolution. 
 In his case evolution had the broadest possible significance, and 
 not the technical meaning with which it is employed in bio- 
 logical science. The Universe, with all possible elements, 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 295 
 
 concepts, phenomena, mental states, and human ideals, was 
 believed to be the expression of an infinite Thought-Idea, 
 gradually developing into a richer and a fuller meaning. It 
 represents an evolution according to meaning or thought, and 
 not in accordance with the temporal before and after ; a substi- 
 tution of the logically complex richer and more mature for 
 the logically simple and less highly organized. But in the 
 treatment of the concept of evolution in science and in specu- 
 lative philosophy there seems to be a marked difference of inter- 
 pretation. Science employs the principle simply as a con- 
 venient hypothesis to explain numerous particular phenomena 
 altogether inexplicable without reference to some fundamental 
 unity. Philosophy, on the other hand, interprets evolution as 
 the expression of a universal world-process. On the scientific 
 side the tendency has been in the direction of a more and 
 more accurate formula which could be definitely applied to 
 organic life, a formula which had more of scientific accuracy 
 and detail than is suggested by the indefmiteness and compre- 
 hensiveness of a world-theory. In connection with this em- 
 pirical aspect of evolution two names are especially noteworthy, 
 Darwin for his originality and Spencer for his power of sys- 
 tematization. 
 
 Darwin. However universal one might assert the evolu- 
 tionary hypothesis to be, its application to biological forms 
 would have always remained in doubt unless scientific evidence 
 could be accumulated whereby the transition of one organic 
 species into another might be established. This was done by 
 Charles Darwin. Already Lamarck had defined evolution in 
 terms of acquired characteristics transmitted from generation 
 to generation in constantly increasing intensity. Darwin, how- 
 ever, conceived another factor in the development of a species, 
 which seemed to be susceptible of proof. He noted on a voyage 
 to South America that all animals, both the extinct and the 
 living, seemed exactly adapted to their surroundings, and that a 
 peculiar environment seemed to be responsible for a peculiar 
 
296 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 species. And, further, he noted in connection with breeders 
 of fancy stock that a species can be changed at the will of 
 man by properly selecting those parents which have the char- 
 acteristics desired in the offspring. With these two scientific 
 facts before him Darwin, in his work " The Origin of Species 
 ly Means of Natural Selection," published in 1859, formulated 
 the law of natural selection, or " the survival of the fittest," as 
 it has been called. In brief, the theory is this : that individual 
 which by mere accident possesses some quality through which 
 it is better adapted to the environment than its fellows, will 
 win in the struggle for existence. Individuals possessing this 
 superior quality will tend to propagate with others who like- 
 wise possess it; while those in which it is lacking will be 
 stamped out before they attain to their development. The 
 accidental quality will thus gradually assume the importance 
 of a racial character, and that species resulting from this trans- 
 formation will be better adapted to its environment than its 
 progenitor. 
 
 Darwin himself recognized that acquired characteristics as 
 well as natural selection were factors in organic evolution. 
 Subsequent biologists have disagreed on this point. Weis- 
 mann declares that no acquired characteristic, however strong, 
 can exert any influence on a succeeding generation. He points 
 to animals which differ in nowise from remote ancestors, 
 although their immediate parents possessed some marked pecu- 
 liarity. A surgical operation performed through countless gen- 
 erations seems in nowise to affect the natural conditions of the 
 organ in the next following generation. 
 
 Spencer. In opposition to Weismann there have been those 
 who have continued to recognize the original position of Dar- 
 win and give to the acquired characteristics an important 
 function in evolution. Among this number Herbert Spencer 
 stands prominent for systematic power rather than for original- 
 ity of mind. Spencer endeavors to reconstruct positivism on 
 the metaphysics of the English-Scotch school (of which Hamil- 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 297 
 
 ton was representative) and the scientific theory of universal 
 evolution. Spencer " discovers" that religion and science are 
 not only antagonistic to one another, but are also involved in 
 internal contradictions, unless each recognizes that the Abso- 
 lute is itself beyond the power of finite thought. This " Un- 
 knowable" Eeality exists only as an inference from observed 
 phenomena; its true nature as well as its origin is involved in 
 hopeless mystery. Human knowledge is restricted to the world 
 of given fact, and as such it should concern itself only with the 
 given facts of experience and their relations. " Science is par- 
 tially unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely unified 
 knowledge." 3 
 
 But even philosophy, in its struggle to unify the facts of 
 experience, discovers in them a certain incomprehensible char- 
 acter which cannot be defined in relative terms. This may be 
 symbolized as force, and the formal principle of its activity as 
 causality. Conservation of energy and causality are the two 
 fundamental propositions of science, and the nearest approach 
 to the Unknowable. Alone, however, they are little more than 
 meaningless abstractions; each requires a deeper principle to 
 which the concrete phenomena of nature may be referred. This 
 is evolution. Each special science concerns itself with partial 
 truth as its goal; each contributes towards the unity of all 
 knowledge as it is postulated by philosophy. The aim of each 
 science is to bring its restricted data into such continuity that 
 its systematized facts are able to find a place in the general 
 concept of evolution. Each science refers to its phenomena in 
 terms of some static element as matter, and some dynamic 
 element as motion, and the general principle of evolution re- 
 quires that each shall pass from a simple to a more complex 
 form, "from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity 
 to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity." * 
 
 3 First Principles, Section 37. 
 * Ibid., Section 145. 
 
298 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Although there is nothing strikingly original in Spencer's 
 stand-point, the systematic power of his mind is clearly seen 
 in the breadth of application which he finds for this initial 
 principle. He is able to construct a system of biology, of psy- 
 chology, of sociology, and of ethics on the evolutionary hy- 
 pothesis. And he is eminently successful in discovering data 
 within each of these fields which will exhibit the scope of the 
 evolutionary hypothesis. 
 
 Philosophical Aspect of Evolution. In this brief review 
 of the scientific aspects of the evolutionary doctrine one per- 
 ceives at once that the most general meaning of the term is the 
 same both in science and speculative philosophy, and that the 
 distinct tendency of science is to extend its application until 
 its significance approaches near to the universality accredited 
 to evolution by German transcendentalism. The value of the 
 Spencerian evolutionary system lies not in its originality, but 
 simply in the fact that it tends to suggest in a popular manner, 
 and after the ways of physical science, the universality and 
 breadth of the Hegelian world. But notwithstanding the ten- 
 dency to seek a more philosophical basis for the scientific theory 
 of evolution, there is yet a marked distinction between the con- 
 clusions which science and speculative philosophy draw from 
 the same facts. Both interpretations agree that Nature is 
 fundamentally a process of development, only they seem to dis- 
 agree as to what it is that develops. Biological science often 
 declares that the psychic activities of man are the direct prod- 
 uct of continued environmental changes reacting on the lower 
 forms of life, that mental phenomena, because they developed 
 in parallel with physical changes, differ from them only in 
 degree. This scientific interpretation of evolution seems correct 
 as far as it goes, Schelling and Hegel would probably have 
 said, only in pointing out the intimate connection between the 
 psychical life and its material correlate they would have pre- 
 ferred to deify matter rather than materialize mind. Matter 
 was to Hegel merely a lower form of a universal Principle 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 299 
 
 which expresses one of its higher stages as mind; while mind 
 is not, as the scientists often infer, a more or less accidental 
 correlative of movements of matter. The scientist reduces mind 
 to matter; whereas the transcendentalist expresses matter as a 
 lower phase of mind, and regards them both as different aspects 
 of the Absolute. 
 
 THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Besides the tendencies which spring from the desire on the 
 part of the physical sciences to understand their own presuppo- 
 sitions, tendencies which lead towards a fuller and deeper 
 philosophy of science, there is another branch of research 
 which from its very nature lies close to philosophy. Psy- 
 chology, until comparatively recent years, has been classed as 
 one of the strictly philosophical subjects. But gradually as 
 the introduction of improved methods of research and increased 
 laboratory facilities have tended to develop the causal nature 
 of our mental states simply as such, it has become evident that 
 psychology is truly an empirical science like physics or biology, 
 and should be no longer treated as a branch of philosophy. 
 Yet nevertheless the fact that psychology deals with the causal 
 nature of mental states makes the bearing of its researches on 
 philosophy which deals with the meaning of these mental states 
 a matter of considerable importance. All knowledge must pro- 
 ceed by the activities of the human mind, and the science which 
 considers these psychic states as empirically given data will 
 always remain a subject of extreme importance to every branch 
 of human inquiry. 
 
 Introspective Method. It has only been within the last 
 century that psychology has become clearly differentiated from 
 the other branches of philosophy. The Englishmen, who have 
 always been psychologists rather than metaphysicians, have 
 tended to recognize the importance of mental analysis. From 
 Hobbes and Locke to the present time they have sought to exam- 
 ine the contents of consciousness by the method of introspection, 
 
300 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 believing that the central problem of all philosophy is the classi- 
 fication and causal arrangement of every element of our mental 
 life. As a sure ground for the connection of our ideas, in the 
 Humeian sense, the English introspective psychologists have 
 emphasized association and the memory. In the strictest sense 
 the basis upon which these rest is altogether unexplained. The 
 self, thought, and even the duality of objective and subjective, 
 are always presupposed, but never established. It is chiefly as 
 introspective psychologists, in whose writings metaphysics and 
 epistemology are hopelessly confused, that the " Scotch School" 
 is of importance. The general position of this movement was 
 earlier alluded to in connection with Hamilton, who is perhaps 
 the most original representative. 
 
 Experimental Psychology. In contrast to this introspec- 
 tion of the British thinkers there has arisen a clearly-defined 
 tendency to introduce into psychology the experimental 
 methods of other sciences. Herbart, whom we have earlier 
 referred to as a Eealist, may be regarded as the originator of 
 this important movement. He follows the English psycholo- 
 gists, in so far as he regards consciousness to be the complex 
 resultant of the psychical elements of sensation and ideas, but 
 further suggests that the rise and fall, the centring of atten- 
 tion, or the inhibition of an idea may be expressed by exact 
 mathematical relations. Herbart attempts to correlate the ele- 
 ments of consciousness with mathematical laws, and in so doing 
 defines the basis for a broader and more scientific psychology. 
 
 Herbart's suggestion, impractical as it may appear in an 
 exact application, was not without immediate effect. There 
 were many who felt his influence and sought to discover a 
 foundation for psychology in physics, biology, and anthropology 
 rather than in speculative metaphysics. The most remarkable 
 advance in the physico-biological side of psychology was made 
 by Fechner about the middle of the nineteenth century. By 
 means of a simple mechanical law he believed himself able to 
 express the exact relationship between the psychical and physi- 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 301 
 
 cal phenomena. Briefly expressed, Fechner conceived that the 
 intensity of the sensation varied as the logarithm of the ex- 
 ternal stimulus to which the sensation could be referred. A 
 full treatment of this interesting conclusion may be found in 
 any treatise on psychology. From these suggestions, made by 
 men whose interests were mainly speculative, there has arisen 
 the important and productive field of experimental psychology. 
 Since 1874 Wundt and his younger pupils have been especially 
 active in this field. Empirical methods, extremely accurate 
 recording instruments, together with elaborate laboratory ex- 
 periments, have entirely transformed the narrower introspective 
 psychology of previous years. 
 
 The " Aspect Psychology." Although Fechner is chiefly 
 known in connection with his psycho-physical theory, his own 
 personal interests lay in the solution of the world problem 
 made prominent by the assimilation of German transcendental- 
 ism with the English empirical philosophy. 
 
 Herbart had made psychology a corollary of metaphysics, 
 but in so doing had found it necessary to postulate a thorough 
 Realism in order to account for the objective element in our 
 experience. Fechner was an idealist in the strictest sense of 
 the word, yet he acknowledges the value of all observational 
 science. Both the speculative and the empirical demands could 
 be recognized only on the supposition that each was an aspect 
 of the same ultimate Real. Thought, reason, purpose lead 
 us to an idealistic monism, experience and the analyses of 
 science lead us towards an extended world of multiform reality. 
 The law of psycho-physical relationship was merely an expres- 
 sion of a deeper unity between the singleness of thought and 
 the variety of experience. Each unfolds an abstracted char- 
 acter of the same conscious Absolute. 
 
 In recent years the double-aspect theory of the Universe, 
 defined by Fechner, has received considerable attention from 
 those psychologists who have themselves felt the influence of 
 the Kantian philosophy. There is an interesting passage by 
 
302 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Fichte in which he expressly declares that the " thing" given 
 as fact, or represented, and the representation as such, belong 
 to two different series. Universal law, causality, and the other 
 methods of the exact sciences are applicable to the given fact 
 as such; but the representation, on the other hand, belongs 
 to a series which depends on the original assertion of the Ego, 
 an act of asserting which never can itself be proved by the laws 
 of the former series. 5 Again, it will be remembered that Kant 
 distinguished between the mechanical way of looking at real- 
 ity, in contradistinction to the teleological, between the stand- 
 points of science and of life. The former was the product 
 of causality and the other categories of the understanding, 
 the latter arose from conceiving nature in terms of purpose and 
 value. 
 
 MECHANISM. Those psychologists who find it convenient 
 to regard Eeality from the different sides of science and pur- 
 posive value recognize the incompleteness of either aspect if 
 taken alone as the whole truth. The idealism of Fichte laid 
 its entire stress on the teleological stand-point, and the system 
 as a whole failed to effect a more lasting influence on philosophy 
 because it seemed to neglect natural science, which, from the 
 very nature of the subject, is founded on the opposite mechani- 
 cal view. There is at present an important tendency, of which 
 Professor Hugo Miinsterberg is representative, often called 
 the Neo-Fichteian movement, which is impressed with the 
 teleological meaning, the moral value of life, but yet recognizes 
 that empirical science has an important place. Reality, the 
 Absolute, is not a duality; it is rather the great active, moral, 
 and purposive Principle of the world, which, when regarded 
 from the different stand-points of causal science and life, pre- 
 sents the world according to two aspects, the mechanical and 
 the teleological. On the one side the empirical science of psy- 
 chology describes and seeks to explain every mental fact recog- 
 
 Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, Section 7. 
 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE. 303 
 
 nizing the universality of causation and mechanical law. Psy- 
 chology, from the empirical stand-point, is thus rendered a 
 purely positive science, in a Comteian sense. Everything is 
 explained, if explained at all, by psychical law; the states of 
 consciousness are treated simply as the necessary resultants 
 of previous physical and psychical phenomena. Man is con- 
 ceived as a machine causally reacting on his environment. 
 
 TELEOLOGY. This objective way of regarding life is neces- 
 sary for the empirical science of psychology. It supplies a 
 ground for the reduction of the states of consciousness to law 
 and order. But it is not the stand-point from which these 
 same states are regarded by consciousness itself. Life may best 
 be described by science as a causal series, but life itself refuses 
 to regard the causal explanation to be the full conception of 
 its meaning. Consciousness demands that purpose, value, 
 moral dignity enter into the inner or subjective life of a single 
 personality, and that these ideals cannot be expressed in the 
 causal series of psycho-physics. Causality is sufficient, if ap- 
 plied directly to empirical facts, but altogether insufficient in 
 the estimation of value and purpose. It is this latter purposive 
 of the teleological side of life by which every person implicitly 
 acknowledges the dignity of his own character through the 
 mere recognition of conscious ideals. One prefers to regard as 
 real what is reflected in one's own personality rather than what 
 is discovered by the causal explanation of that personality. To 
 this teleological side of our life belong the ideals of aesthetics, 
 ethics, and religion; the purposes with which we define char- 
 acter and the motives which underlie an organized life. 
 
 THEORIES OF ETHICS. 
 
 Empirico-Rationalistic Ethics. In earlier chapters we 
 were able to distinguish two stand-points with regard to human 
 conduct. We found Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Clarke repre- 
 sentative of what might be called the empirico-raiionalistic 
 school of ethics. These thinkers rested the authority of moral 
 
304 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 choice on the observations of experience and the laws of reason. 
 Hobbes believes that the superior convenience of the accepted 
 moral laws is a sufficient ground for their recognition, while 
 Locke is equally positive that " Morality is capable of demon- 
 stration." 6 Spinoza believed that the fundamental proposi- 
 tions of ethics are as undeniably true as the axiom that "the 
 whole is greater than any of its parts ;" and Clarke, the English 
 rationalist in ethics, founded the moral relations among men 
 upon certain appropriate correspondences, as certain in their 
 own field as the truths of mathematics. 
 
 Intuitional Ethics. In opposition to this school, which 
 thus places experience and reason as the ultimate criteria of 
 moral conduct, there has always flowed a counter-current of 
 ethical thought which has tried to separate the field of the 
 conscience from that of the reason. Shaftesbury, Hume, Kant, 
 and Fichte suggest this intuitional stand-point. They all refer 
 to some moral sense or faculty the operation of which cannot 
 be directly estimated by the reason ; an innate conscience whose 
 dictates are universally valid, without question, for all man- 
 kind. 
 
 The naturalistic description of morality developed by Hobbes, 
 with its emphasis on an egoism controlled by the exigencies of 
 reason and experience, was opposed by a group of seventeenth- 
 century thinkers known as the Cambridge Platonists. The 
 most important of these English Neo-Platonists was Ralph 
 Cudworth, a contemporary of Hobbes. He taught a thorough 
 intellectualism in which truth and the ideas of truth are con- 
 ceived as eternal and immutable. The principles of morality 
 were recognized to be necessary and fundamental, like the 
 truths of thought-intuitions; they were intuited by the mind 
 and arose from an objective source in the Being of God. These 
 moral truths could not change, nor could they develop with 
 the requirements of the social compact, as Hobbes believed, but 
 
 8 Locke's Essay, Book IV., Section 18. 
 
THEORIES OF ETHICS. 305 
 
 were rather the unchanging thoughts of God. This early form 
 of intellectualism may be regarded as the beginning in England 
 of the intuitional school. Shaftesbury and his successors ac- 
 cepted the immutability of morality and looked upon the con- 
 science as the peculiar faculty for the discernment of moral 
 truth. This moral sense is independent of the reason and 
 experience, and its intuitive truths are uninfluenced by either 
 individual caprice or social environment. In its later forms 
 intuitionalism has become less distinct and has been inclined 
 to admit an external or universalistic aspect to ethical prin- 
 ciples. Adam Smith, a friend of Hume, based morality on the 
 intuitive sympathy for all mankind, while recent writers have 
 strongly emphasized an intuitive imitation or assimilation of 
 our moral environment. 
 
 UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 Cumberland. The first attempt to reconcile the dynamic 
 character of morality the empirico-rationalism of Hobbes 
 with the innate conscience of the Intuitionalists was attempted 
 by Richard Cumberland, who lived from 1632 into the early 
 part of the next century. He is generally regarded as the first 
 advocate of the universal welfare of mankind as the highest 
 moral law, and in that sense he appears as an early advocate of 
 the recent utilitarian movement. Cumberland accepts the em- 
 pirical stand-point of Hobbes and discards the uncritical con- 
 fidence of the Platonists in the intuition of the moral sense. 
 But, on the other hand, he is especially interested in refuting 
 the artificiality of the Hobbesian description of morality. He 
 would prefer to regard the moral laws as natural and the 
 virtues of generosity and sympathy as the expression of motives 
 simple and natural rather than acquired. It is for the indi- 
 vidual to will the universal Good, sometimes regarded by 
 Cumberland as perfection and sometimes as happiness, and 
 in the greatest possible good of all mankind we have the highest 
 moral sanction. The movement from Cumberland to the later 
 
 20 
 
306 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Utilitarians is from an emphasis on a moral perfection to an 
 emphasis on universal happiness, from ideal good to material 
 welfare. 
 
 The Sanction of Happiness. One of the early Greek 
 schools, the Cyrenaic, conceived the momentary pleasure of the 
 individual to be the ultimate moral sanction, and their fol- 
 lowers, the Epicureans, transferred the emphasis from the mo- 
 mentary feeling to a general happiness throughout life. In 
 each of these schools two presuppositions may be noticed, ex- 
 perience qualifies the ground for happiness, reason determines 
 its application. Every act is the result of an " hedonistic cal- 
 culus" an arithmetical computation of the amount of happiness 
 that may be expected to arise from the act. Pleasures can be 
 estimated and compared ; this is the fundamental premise of all 
 schools of ethics that recognize happiness as the ultimate moral 
 sanction. 
 
 Bentham. In 1789 Jeremy Bentham published the "Prin- 
 ciples of Morals and Legislation" His interest in ethics was 
 from the legal rather than from the philosophical side; and 
 he therefore brought into the foreground humanity rather than 
 the individual. The idea of the organic structure of society 
 is by no means so ancient in its application to ethics as one 
 might presume. Plato pointed out the similarity between the 
 state and the individual person and the analogous functions 
 pertaining to each, and Aristotle described man in terms of his 
 social environment; but it was not until comparatively recent 
 times that it has been conceived possible to construct an ethics 
 on the presupposition of the organic structure of society. 
 
 Bentham unites the Epicurean principle of happiness with 
 this ideal of the social organism. We are all bound together 
 by a bond of sympathy, all tending towards the ideal of maxi- 
 mum happiness. When, therefore, I promote the general hap- 
 piness of society, I truly advance my own pleasure. The good 
 of one is the good of many; the vices of one affect every 
 member of society. The ultimate moral sanction is therefore 
 
THEORIES OF ETHICS. 307 
 
 the "greatest happiness to the greatest number." Virtue is 
 determined by experience; it is only distinguishable from evil 
 by its positive effect on the general happiness of mankind. 
 
 Mill. The Utilitarian ethics, thus based on the happiness 
 of all mankind and the organic unity of society, found its 
 most influential disciple in John Stuart Mill. He accepts the 
 general position of Bentham, but yet feels distinctly the influ- 
 ence of the idealistic tendencies of thought. " Utility, or the 
 Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in 
 proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
 tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is 
 intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, 
 pain and the privation of pleasure." 7 In the support of this 
 thesis Mill departs considerably from the thoroughly empirical 
 stand-point of the earlier Utilitarians, although the derivative 
 character of morality is always prominent. Like the other 
 Utilitarians, he recognizes the social and religious grounds of 
 moral distinction impressed upon the individual from without ; 
 but, besides these, Mill acknowledges the existence of an inter- 
 nal sanction or conscience, " a feeling in our own mind ; a 
 pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty." ' 
 But even after he has taken this decisive step he shrinks from 
 the admission of the full consequences of an intuitive element 
 in the choice of action, and seeks to rest the conscience on 
 motives superimposed upon the character from without. 
 
 In the treatment of the possible objections to his theory Mill 
 feels the odium of placing the intellectual and physical pleas- 
 ures on the same plane. The hedonistic calculus of Mill not 
 only recognizes a difference of quantity among pleasures, but 
 also a distinction of quality. By the latter term he would dis- 
 criminate between pleasures which are so diverse from one 
 another that no quantity of the one, however large, would be 
 
 7 Mill's Utilitarianism, Chapter ii. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chapter iii. 
 
308 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 comparable with the smallest quantity of the other. Thus the 
 intellectual pleasures are of an inestimably higher quality than 
 the sensual, and in an hedonistic calculus, which regards quan- 
 tity alone, a comparison between them is impossible. 
 
 IDEALISM OF GKEEN. 
 
 Utilitarianism and the Spencerian ethics of evolution repre- 
 sent the last important phases of the English ethics of empiri- 
 cism. Both of these theories have in common a final reference 
 to experience and a disregard for the problems which German 
 metaphysics has impressed on the philosophy of the nineteenth 
 century. Among those who have recognized the importance 
 of metaphysical issues and at the same time have sought to 
 discover the elements of permanent value in the empirical 
 theory of morals, the Englishman Thomas Hill Green is per- 
 haps the most remarkable. Green recognized with the Utili- 
 tarians the unity of society, but hesitated to establish the 
 dignity of the moral life on the ultimate sanction of happiness. 
 On the contrary, the ideal of society, a life of common interest, 
 results only from the perfection of all the self-conscious per- 
 sonalities of which it is composed. By this emphasis on uni- 
 versal perfection he brings into the foreground the idealistic 
 element in Cumberland, although personally Green was influ- 
 enced by German transcendentalism. And in agreeable contrast 
 to many of the English moralists, Green considers at length 
 the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of ethics 
 before he proceeds to construct a positive theory of morality. 
 Knowledge and nature are interpreted idealistically. Both re- 
 quire a spiritual principle over and above the mere object of 
 possible experience, " a self-distinguishing consciousness" 
 which shall be itself non-temporal and non-spacial. This eter- 
 nal spiritual Consciousness is partially realized in each indi- 
 vidual man, who is therefore in the highest sense free, owing 
 to this relation between the human soul and the original, eternal 
 Spirit. Each individual act is free, since it represents the iden- 
 
IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS. 309 
 
 tification of the inner,, free self with some desire. The develop- 
 ment or progress towards perfection, which is the ideal for the 
 individual self, is possible only in terms of the common good, the 
 well-being, the virtue, and the perfection of all mankind. The 
 self-consciousness of the individual, whereby he recognizes the 
 limitations of his own selfhood, unites him with the absolute 
 Self-Consciousness, as the ideal of his fulfilment, "with the 
 constant characteristic of self -consciousness and self -obj edifica- 
 tion, the one divine mind gradually reproduces itself in the 
 human soul. In virtue of this principle in him man has 
 definite capabilities, the realization of which, since in it alone 
 he can satisfy himself, forms his true good." 9 
 
 IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The classic systems of metaphysics have generally empha- 
 sized some distinct approach to reality and some definite attri- 
 bute of the Eeal. One cannot, however, make unalterable rules 
 for the classification of philosophical systems, because in each 
 case the epistemological elements give the resulting metaphys- 
 ical structure a different setting. The history of metaphysical 
 studies during the nineteenth century has tended to develop a 
 system in which intellectual, emotional, and empirical factors 
 are each recognized and each given its appropriate place. It is 
 doubtful if there is any idealism which does not find a place 
 for the achievements of science, no intellectualism which does 
 not lay considerable emphasis on experience, and, on the other 
 hand, the modern forms of realistic pluralism recognize, 
 although they may not accept, the monistic arguments. 
 
 EUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE. 
 
 One of the broadest and most finished systems of reconstruc- 
 tion is the empirico-idealism of Rudolph Hermann Lotze, who 
 died only about twenty-five years ago. Like Fechner, whom 
 he recalls to mind in many respects, Lotze feels the influence 
 
 Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III., Chapter ii., Section 180. 
 
310 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of both the empirical naturalism of science and the idealistic 
 monism of Fichte and Hegel. He studied medicine, physiology, 
 and physiological psychology, at the same time that his inter- 
 ests were centred on speculative metaphysics. The product 
 of these opposing influences is an idealistic metaphysic erected 
 on the explanation of the presuppositions of science. 
 
 STAND-POINT. 
 
 Lotze is dissatisfied with the attempts of the Absolute Ideal- 
 ists to deduce a universe of variety from a single principle, 
 mere Consciousness or Idea. He prefers to follow the lead of 
 Herbart and Hamilton, and first analyze the given "object." 
 Lotze discovers that the "thing" usually referred to as an 
 object of conscious perception is not a simple ultimate, but 
 rather a logical complex of relations, subsisting in an unper- 
 ceived ground or unity, and each capable of undergoing change. 
 Three elements are involved in the concept of the "thing:" 
 its qualities as they appear to perception in the form of 
 relations ; a real substance logically required as the ground of 
 these relations ; and, finally, a " Position" 10 by which alone 
 the actual " thing" is distinguished from its mere thought. 
 
 Theory of the External World. This analysis of the 
 "object" of consciousness illustrates the analytical side of 
 Lotze ; it is, however, merely an introduction to the speculative 
 issues. The world is given to us as a plurality of facts, which 
 as objects we call " things ;" thought gives to these facts their 
 deeper meaning. Each of the elements of the "thing" its 
 qualities, its essence, its position requires a universal element, 
 which in the end can be nothing else than a form of the Abso- 
 lute. It is false to consider the " thing" as something merely 
 external, altogether different from one's own self, for there 
 is a close analogy between the three elements of the " thing" 
 and the human personality. Relation, the quality element of 
 
 "Ladd's Translation of Lotze's Outline of Metaphysic, Section 25. 
 
IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS. 311 
 
 the " thing," is subjective in its nature, and is therefore easily 
 comparable with the flux of consciousness; and, furthermore, 
 the concept of selfhood, or Ego, is the only interpretation 
 which we can give to the essence of the "thing," the unper- 
 ceived unity of its qualities. Instead of the unsurmountable 
 barrier between subjective and objective, Lotze substitutes a 
 world of selves like the monads of Leibnitz. "Things" and 
 " men" differ only in the degree of this selfhood. 
 
 The Absolute. The interrelatedness of all "things," the 
 eternal reassertion of a single type of reality, is still further 
 illustrated by the interreaction of all the parts of nature. 
 Causality, the reaction of one series of changes upon another, 
 is inexplicable unless it is admitted that these two series are, 
 in their innermost structure, the expression of a single unity. 
 And, furthermore, the universality of purpose throughout 
 nature and the infinite ranges of feeling, thought, and life lead 
 us to interpret the efficient and ideal causes of the Universe 
 as the Infinite Personality of the Absolute. God represents 
 the complete purpose, as it is more or less reflected in the 
 individual selves, the Personality that consciously expresses 
 the Universe. 
 
 Among the recent thinkers who have felt most deeply both 
 the idealistic and naturalistic stand-points two names are espe- 
 cially notable, in America, Professor Eoyce, and in England, 
 Mr. Bradley. Neither hesitates to face the deeper problems 
 of metaphysics, and both rest their psychological and ethical 
 studies on a definite theory of reality. Both derive the pre- 
 mises of their philosophy from the same sources, and both 
 arrive at conceptions of the Absolute which are comparable but 
 dissimilar. Professor Royce feels the influence of the pur- 
 posive selfhood of Leibnitz and Lotze, while the spirituality 
 of Hegel and the infinite struggle of will of Schopenhauer 
 determine the outward form of his philosophy. Mr. Bradley, 
 on the other hand, follows the traditions of Spinoza, Kant, and 
 
312 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Schelling; the Absolute is infinitely wealthy, but yet so rich, 
 so full of experience, thought, will, and the ideals of life that 
 it can be expressed only as the abstract Unity of all 
 Appearances. 
 
 JOSIAH ROYCE. 
 
 The Given Experience. The initial demand of every 
 metaphysic is, above all else, the explanation of the world of 
 given experience; and the manner in which these experiences 
 are defined generally determines the subsequent conclusions. 
 Royce, influenced by that desire for scientific certitude so long 
 a prominent characteristic of English thinkers, finds in the 
 given presentation the necessary starting-point for every phi- 
 losophy, but discovers a richness of meaning in every experience 
 which ultimately leads us beyond the fact itself. Every expe- 
 rience contains within itself a meaning which is only partially 
 realized in its fragmentary finitude. Every fact or every idea 
 is a partial expression of the world-meaning ; every fact is the 
 necessary element in the unity of the whole. Like the monads 
 of Leibnitz, each reflects the law of the whole, each idea is a 
 phase of the ideal goal, and each partially expresses its full 
 meaning. 
 
 Selfhood. The purposive reality of simple facts is the 
 initial premise of Professor Royce's philosophy. But full of 
 meaning as this seems, it only partially expresses the richness 
 of these facts. Spinoza and Schelling sought to bring the 
 objective and subjective into harmony with one another. But 
 Professor Royce regards the abstract Substance of Spinoza or 
 the mere Identity of Schelling to be inadequate to express the 
 ultimate world of facts, since these are so full of meaning. 
 Like Lotze, he finds the true value and purpose of the frag- 
 mentary experience in the concept of selfhood, rather than in 
 mere logical subsistence. Every personality feels its own 
 finiteness most acutely when it recognizes the infinite possi- 
 bilities of its development. There is here involved a kind of 
 contradiction; the self is most infinite when it realizes its 
 
IMPORTANT STAND-POINTS IN RECENT METAPHYSICS. 313 
 
 finitude. This illustrates the real nature of the self as essen- 
 tially an infinite purposive development. In its logical aspect 
 it is comparable to the whole number series, each separate 
 term representing a finite stage in the realization of the infinite 
 purpose of counting. Each separate phase, each idea, thought, 
 and act of the human self is a partial expression of the purpose 
 of that self, the infinite purpose of self-expression. No finite 
 act of the self is a full expression of its purpose, there is 
 always a beyond which constantly transcends the partially 
 realized present. 
 
 The Absolute. Although the nature of the self is infinitely 
 rich, it differs only in degree from the fulness of meaning 
 which each individual experience and idea only partially ex- 
 presses. The principle of self-consciousness, through which 
 we apprehend this process of infinite self-realization, is re- 
 flected in the deeper meaning of every " object" of the external 
 world. The difference is only in degree ; the reality of purpose 
 and its fulfilment through an infinite series is the single Prin- 
 ciple of the Universe. The Absolute, which represents in its 
 complete selfhood the purpose and ideals of our finite world, 
 is, like all else, a self. But the selfhood of the Absolute is 
 incomparably richer than any of its phases. It is more than 
 the mere sum of the parts of the world, it is the world itself 
 through the full expression of its purpose. 
 
 F. H. BRADLEY. 
 
 The Absolute of Professor Koyce is infinitely rich in both 
 content and meaning. It is the world, because It expresses 
 the full meaning of the world. Mr. Bradley, on the other 
 hand, defines the Absolute in much more formal terms. He 
 discovers that the common elements of our world of thought 
 and experience involve a disagreeable self-contradictory process, 
 which renders the presuppositions of knowledge unintelligible 
 in themselves. Relations, qualities, changes, even things and 
 selves, present this unintelligibility, this infinite transcendency. 
 
314 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is remarkable to notice that both Professor Eoyce and 
 Mr. Bradley lay stress on the infinite transcendency of the 
 single experience; the former recognizes in it a reflection of 
 the Absolute, while the latter regards it as the evidence to 
 show that experience is not the Absolute. But if in Mr. Brad- 
 ley's mind the single experience is only an appearance, it is 
 nevertheless the appearance of the Absolute. The finite facts 
 are each aspects of Eeality, yet aspects which reflect the nature 
 of Reality in different degrees. Behind and within the tran- 
 sient forms of the external world, the momentary thoughts, 
 volitions, and feelings, there is a Unity which transcends the 
 inadequate meaning of the human activities. The Absolute is 
 both the completeness of the Mystic One and the actuality of 
 Hegel's Thought-Idea. 
 
 SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE 
 PRESENT TIME. 
 
 There is a striking resemblance between the development 
 of the race and the growth of a single individual. This simi- 
 larity has been constantly emphasized by those who have made 
 a philosophical study of history. A similar resemblance in 
 development is often observable between the history of philoso- 
 phy as a whole and the intellectual development of a single 
 person. At some period of mental growth nearly every indi- 
 vidual is aroused from the dogmatic recognition of traditional 
 theories of reality to a personal struggle, often only half- 
 consciously realized, with the same questions of life and the 
 world which have perplexed mankind throughout all ages. In 
 this personal contest of the individual reason with the full 
 truth the historical study of philosophy is perhaps of special 
 significance. It presents a phase of the development of civiliza- 
 tion which, although apparently insignificant when compared 
 with the forces of active life, is yet remarkable as the specific 
 expression of those intellectual conditions which lie at the 
 foundation of human progress. 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 315 
 
 While introducing us to an independence of thought and 
 supplying the ideals for mankind separately and collectively, 
 the historical study of earlier philosophy may perhaps indicate 
 the general direction of future tendencies. Among these move- 
 ments which we have followed from the period of the Renais- 
 sance to the interpretation given them by men now living 
 there seems to be none of greater importance than the general 
 monistic tendency. Not that the history of thought has grad- 
 ually evolved a compact and thoroughly satisfactory explana- 
 tion of the unity of the world, on the contrary, there is no 
 question more seriously discussed at the present time, but only 
 that historical study has taught us that some world-unity lies 
 behind almost every notable system of philosophy. The mate- 
 rialist believes that the ultimate homogeneity of the world is 
 intelligible only in terms of a single material substance coexten- 
 sive with thought and matter, while the pluralistic realist, 
 however he may resist the Unity of Being, is yet compelled 
 to recognize that the plurality of elements can be conceived 
 only through a process of thought-unity. 
 
 This monistic tendency in philosophy is not due to a narrow 
 point of view. The recent systems of monistic idealism, of 
 which those of Green, Professor Royce, and Mr. Bradley are 
 excellent examples, well illustrate a certain significant depth 
 and comprehensiveness. It is further true that not only this 
 absolutistic stand-point but also the other important ten- 
 dencies of the last few years indicate that philosophy as a 
 whole rests on certain broad and general points of view, and 
 that the individual movements are to be regarded as types of 
 thinking rather than as specific formulations of dogmatic prin- 
 ciples. These types of thinking are each of them the result 
 of extensive correlation of various historical stand-points ; each 
 important movement is influenced by the broadest study of 
 empiricism and rationalism, of idealism and realism. They 
 are quite different in character from the earlier phases of 
 modern philosophy in which each thinker could be definitely 
 
316 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 connected with a certain national or restricted movement and 
 had little appreciation for other philosophical stand-points. 
 But at the present time there is no single school or movement 
 of importance which has not felt the influence of the many 
 different attitudes of mind which have composed the history 
 of philosophy; there is no significant tendency of thought 
 which can be said to have directly sprung from a single philo- 
 sophical system in the same sense that Berkeley sprung from 
 Locke or Fichte from Kant. 
 
 While referring in a very brief manner to what might seem 
 to be important tendencies in the philosophical thought of the 
 present time it might be well to recognize certain matters 
 which no philosophy can ever afford to disregard, the starting- 
 point and the method of procedure. There are many details in 
 every philosophical stand-point which the variety of conditions 
 have made it necessary to change in the past, and which can 
 hardly retain their present significance unaltered throughout 
 the future, but yet it is possible to believe as a permanent truth 
 that any system of philosophy must have some starting-point 
 as well as some method to guide its inquiries. The determina- 
 tion of the starting-point and the method must depend on cir- 
 cumstances; yet the fact that some starting-point and some 
 method are required is perhaps a fundamental truth in any 
 system of philosophy. With this in mind it might be of advan- 
 tage to inquire into the meaning of the presuppositions of phi- 
 losophy, as presuppositions are often considered to be the 
 necessary starting-points for any investigation. This question, 
 however, would naturally lead us to a consideration of the use of 
 experience and thought, for historical study shows the im- 
 portance of these elements, not only as the usual starting- 
 points, but also as the means for the regulation of philosophical 
 method. But before these more specific problems are consid- 
 ered the general nature of the meaning to be attributed to the 
 term " presupposition" is certainly worthy of investigation. We 
 may notice among the prominent tendencies of the present 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 317 
 
 time, in both science and philosophy, the desire to examine with 
 considerable care the assumptions on which any inquiry rests. 
 One recognizes a feeling of sceptical questioning when some 
 axiom or fact is asserted to be undeniably true and beyond 
 legitimate inquiry. 
 
 THE MEANING OF PRESUPPOSITION. 
 
 Since the time of Descartes the ideal method by which phi- 
 losophy has sought to proceed begins with the recognition of 
 no presupposition and from this negative ground erects a con- 
 ception of reality considered to be sufficient in itself. But 
 even such a procedure implicitly recognizes a starting-point, 
 thought, substance, or activity, which, although regarded as 
 the most fundamental principle of all knowledge, still retains 
 the character of an assumption, since the proof of such a prin- 
 ciple, by a reduction to simpler terms, is from its very nature 
 intuitively denied. The relinquishing of this classic search for 
 the highest principle of knowledge is a significant aspect of 
 recent philosophy and may seem to many to be the same as the 
 abandonment of all hopes for any philosophy whatsoever and 
 the first step towards an uncompromising scepticism. But 
 such a misunderstanding can arise only from a narrow and 
 uncritical interpretation of the nature of presupposition. By 
 defining a new meaning for the term it is perhaps possible to 
 suggest a starting-point for philosophy which shall not require 
 the unending search for a "first and unconditionally funda- 
 mental proposition" beneath all knowledge, but which shall em- 
 phasize the organic structure of philosophy and the unity of 
 those constituent elements which can be unfolded from a single 
 premise. 
 
 This is possible if we would consider a usage of postulate, 
 axiom, or presupposition which has often appeared in recent 
 mathematical discussions. Instead of indicating by the word 
 " presupposition" some premise necessarily true, some assertion 
 too self-evident to need further comment, we may mean by the 
 
318 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 term simply a conception of such a nature that it defines, as 
 nothing else can, the problem we seek to investigate. A pre- 
 supposition, according to this view, would be simply a necessary 
 condition for the possibility of the inquiry in question, some 
 assertion that makes the problem possible. The so-called 
 axiom, "a whole is greater than any of its parts," may be 
 regarded, not as an improbable postulate, but rather as a pre- 
 supposition without which the branches of mathematics dealing 
 with finite magnitudes would be valueless. The assumption 
 of this presupposition makes possible as no other proposition 
 can the possibility of the conclusions of those mathematical 
 sciences above mentioned. It is a determining condition ; upon 
 its truth an unlimited range of propositions may be firmly 
 established, but with its falsity they also become false. No 
 attempt is made to prove that such a proposition is true by 
 deducing it from other propositions, such a process would 
 be endless, its only " proof lies in the unity of mathematics, 
 of which it is an indispensable factor. 
 
 As far back as the time of Baumgarten, a disciple of the 
 Leibnitz- Wolffian philosophy, the meaning of presupposition 
 began to take this form, and the brilliant investigation of Kant 
 into the presuppositions of sense and understanding as the 
 conditions which make the operation of these faculties possible 
 followed this general movement. But, unfortunately, many 
 of Kant's disciples sought to bring unity into the Critical Phi- 
 losophy by discovering a single fundamental axiom, rather 
 than pursuing more carefully Kant's meaning. One may ob- 
 serve a suggestion of this attitude towards " presupposition" in 
 Samuel Clark's treatment of miracles, as far back as the 
 opening of the eighteenth century. While mathematics, so 
 often the forerunner of philosophy in such matters, has grad- 
 ually assumed this attitude towards its postulates ; mathemati- 
 cal science has, since the time of Kiemann, regarded its axioms 
 or presuppositions to be merely the necessary conditions for its 
 procedure, and has relinquished the vain endeavor of verifying 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 319 
 
 one postulate by another. And it becomes a matter of consid- 
 erable importance that philosophy should likewise relinquish 
 its hope of the discovery of a fundamental principle of all 
 knowledge, itself independent of all else, and investigate more 
 carefully the presuppositions or conditions which lie at the 
 very heart of its existence, those postulates which make intelli- 
 gible and possible the very conception of philosophy. Although 
 these considerations may show that philosophy must have a 
 general conception of its starting-point, they by no means ex- 
 hibit its character. While denning its presuppositions it is 
 readily seen that philosophy must begin with the simplest 
 conceptions, but yet these conceptions must implicitly contain 
 all the richness of meaning which may be subsequently un- 
 folded. If they should not possess this implicit breadth, its 
 presuppositions would be insufficient. In brief, the starting- 
 point of philosophy is fully defined by those necessary and 
 sufficient conditions without which philosophy would be im- 
 possible and yet which implicitly contain all the world of mean- 
 ing which philosophy can unfold. 
 
 THE DUAL PRESUPPOSITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This problem of discovering the foundations, or rather the 
 necessary presuppositions, which make possible the problem of 
 philosophy, is the most elemental and at the same time the 
 most general inquiry of human knowledge. Its solution defines 
 abstractly the field within which is contained all derivative 
 truths, either simple or complex. For this reason the problem 
 cannot be approached by the observational method alone, for 
 observation, however extensive, cannot establish the validity 
 of the ground upon which it, as mere observation, is founded. 
 Nor, on the other hand, can thought extend its dominion to 
 those regions of mere illusory appearance where, instead of the 
 sound guide of experience, it meets with no other resistance 
 than its own arbitrary will. From this consideration we have 
 at once a clue which the philosophy of the present time has 
 
320 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 recognized by uniting English empiricism with German tran- 
 scendentalism; we see that both experience and thought are 
 indispensable to philosophical inquiry. The one cannot be 
 conceived without the other. Each is an abstraction in itself, 
 and yet each is the supplement of the other. This dual pre- 
 supposition which seems to supply the necessary conditions for 
 all philosophical inquiry is certainly a starting-point which 
 nearly all of the tendencies of the present either consciously 
 or unconsciously recognize. Our present problem of interpre- 
 tation would therefore seem to take the form of a more careful 
 examination into the meaning of both experience and thought 
 in order to unfold their relationship. But since we have noticed 
 the importance of the monistic tendency in our contemporary 
 philosophy, we would soon v be led to inquire into the relation 
 of the inner Unity of the world to our limited experience and 
 to our finite thought. In view of these considerations, a more 
 careful estimate of experience, thought, and their relation in 
 the Absolute might prove of some assistance to the intelligent 
 appreciation of the philosophical movements of the present 
 time. 
 
 EXPERIENCE. 
 
 When we turn to experience in our search for its contribu- 
 tion to philosophy we meet with a peculiar difficulty. The 
 whole world seems to our unreflective minds to be nothing but 
 a flow of heterogeneous facts, possessing little intelligible order. 
 The existence and continuous flux of these facts is perhaps the 
 initial premise of psychology, and likewise, because of the 
 apparent simplicity of the given facts, it may be regarded as a 
 standpoint of fundamental importance to philosophy in gen- 
 eral. It is possible that these so-called " facts" are more 
 complex than they appear at first sight, but as presented ele- 
 ments their genetic simplicity should not be overlooked. And 
 it is the belief in the simplicity of these " facts" of our mental 
 life which arouses that feeling of confidence and certainty in 
 the " given" character of experience. For the reason that we 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 321 
 
 must begin with empirically-given mental facts of some kind 
 in order to proceed with any inquiry, it seems as if psychology 
 as the science of introspection is certainly of especial import- 
 ance to all philosophical research; but nevertheless this indi- 
 vidualistic psychology, which merely attempts to unfold the 
 activities of a single consciousness, should be carefully distin- 
 guished from the broad and universal science of psychology, 
 which considers the mental activities of all mankind. 
 
 Starting with this so-called " given something," the premise 
 of all introspective psychology, we are able to discover in a 
 reflective state of mind that this experience is not a single 
 differentiated and uniquely given element, but rather a point 
 of reference or centre of thought. That is, what I call " object" 
 is for me a point, a centre, an x, which is real only as a point 
 of reference to which I may direct a process of thought. It is 
 known only through a recognition in thought; it is temporally 
 determined as the present by the past and future series of 
 thought-processes. Such an unanalyzed something, which 
 occurs as a node or point in the flow of consciousness, might 
 be called a psychological experience, owing to the fact that it 
 comes into the conscious life as an empirically given datum. 
 It is merely a conscious centre; it is surrounded by thought- 
 processes and possesses a kind of individuality or distinctness of 
 its own, because it seems to come from a somewhere outside of 
 consciousness. It is, in fact, the single experience of our 
 ordinary life. 
 
 The Aspects of Experience. In this description of the 
 unanalyzed, given, or psychological experience it would very 
 naturally occur that perhaps it is not so simple as might appear 
 at first sight. It is possible that there is a kind of manifold- 
 ness in the empirical fact, a variety of aspects which may be 
 discovered from a more careful analysis of its mere "given- 
 ness." Not that the experience itself is capable of division, 
 but that it appears differently when regarded from two stand- 
 points. From this difference of point of view it is possible to 
 
 21 
 
322 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 discover two aspects or sides to this empirically given centre 
 of consciousness. The first of these may be called its individ- 
 uality aspect, by which the particular conscious centre or expe- 
 rience is separated from all else, that which gives this single 
 experience an individuality of its own in the flow of conscious- 
 ness. And also there is the relativity aspect, by which the 
 experience may be viewed as intimately connected or united 
 with all the other experiences in the flow of consciousness. We 
 will consider each of these aspects in their order. 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALITY ASPECT GIVES AN EXPERIENCE DIS- 
 TINCTNESS. In our common speech it is customary to refer 
 to a certain " object" as itself, and no other. There is some- 
 thing about every experience which leads us to regard it as a 
 unique something, as a distinct element of our life which can 
 never come to us in just the same manner again. When I 
 perceive a mountain, a tree, or anything else, the experience 
 exists for me as an original something, as new and at the same 
 time never to be repeated. Certain qualities, ideas, or whatever 
 one wishes to call them, distinguish the mere " this" experience 
 from all else; it seems to possess an individuality in the con- 
 scious life. This character of separateness, of difference from 
 all else, may perhaps be called the individuality aspect of every 
 experience, using the term as just defined. But a perplexity 
 immediately presents itself. How do I know that it is an 
 individual experience unless I am able to place it in a negative 
 relation to all other experiences? In other words, the knowl- 
 edge that it is an individual fact, object, or experience implies 
 that I have compared or related it to the rest of my conscious 
 life. This introduces us to the second or relativity aspect of 
 all empirical data. 
 
 THE EELATIVITT ASPECT GIVES AN EXPERIENCE MEDIATION. 
 Every psychological experience as the point of reference or 
 centre of our consciousness possesses a certain character which 
 unites it with all other experiences. I know this tree, because 
 I have previously seen other trees. I know that this is a noise, 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 323 
 
 because I have heard similar sounds. The footstep of a friend 
 is recognized, not as a mere immediate sensation, but rather 
 as a particular centre in consciousness connected with other 
 experiences extending indefinitely into the past. A sudden 
 explosion is always apprehended together with its setting in 
 consciousness, its spacial characteristics, its probable cause, 
 or its possible effect on the person, and never merely as a 
 simple unconnected point. It is this intimate interrelatedness 
 of all the centres in the flow of consciousness that makes each 
 present experience an indispensable part in the whole conscious 
 life. This aspect of every psychological experience, or centre 
 in consciousness, might be called its relativity aspect. 
 
 The Logical Experience as a Limiting Individuality. 
 We have discovered in the psychological or common experience 
 two general characters, an individuality aspect, by which we 
 recognize it as a unique experience, and a relativity or mediate 
 aspect, by which we connect it with other experiences. But 
 the proportional intensity of these two aspects is not constant 
 for every experience. The sudden flash of light is certainly 
 less mediated than the recognition of a friend's face. They 
 both possess the mediate or relativity aspect, but the former to 
 a lesser extent than the latter. And, furthermore, we can 
 easily observe that this degree or intensive value of the mediate 
 aspect is different for every experience, the relativity of the 
 present to the past varies with each presented fact. This at 
 once defines a serial ground for our experiences, depending on 
 the intensive value of the mediation present in each. No expe- 
 rience is known to us which has not this relativity aspect, so 
 that there is no experience which cannot be placed in such an 
 orderly arrangement. In one direction of such a series the 
 psychological experiences would become more individualistic, 
 more defined by their distinctness and unrelatedness, while 
 if followed in the opposite direction the mediation would come 
 more and more into the foreground. Now the limit of the 
 series, followed in the direction of the diminishing intensity 
 
324 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the relativity aspect, may be regarded as an "experience" 
 of a peculiar kind. As the limit of the series, as a something 
 totally devoid of any mediacy and possessing mere individual- 
 ity, it is a kind of experience which has only an implied reality, 
 a sort of logical or hypothetical existence. It is never per- 
 ceived by our human consciousness, for all the experiences of 
 our daily life possess relativity as well as individuality. This 
 logical experience is only inferred as that realistic entity pos- 
 sessing mere individuality and uniqueness; it would corre- 
 spond to the experience of such a mind as could apprehend 
 without mediacy. 
 
 Before turning to inquire into the significance of our thought 
 in the problem of philosophy it might be well to review certain 
 points suggested by this analysis of experience. It is to be 
 especially remarked that an experience of pure individuality 
 or pure relativity is never given to us; and yet at the same 
 time it is equally incorrect to recognize that an experience is 
 a mere undifferentiated oneness. The empirically given comes 
 to us as a two-sided something, and should either of the two 
 aspects be absent, the something could not be known to our 
 human consciousness. An experience possessing only the indi- 
 viduality aspect would have merely a logical existence (i.e., in- 
 ferred as the limit of a series) inappreciable to human con- 
 sciousness. On the other hand, the experience possessing the 
 relativity aspect alone would correspond to a relation without 
 terms, a concept applicable only to the Absolute and incom- 
 prehensible as an empirical fact. This is a matter of extreme 
 importance. Experience never itself gives us a oneness, it 
 always appears in the form of a duality. The two aspects are 
 the necessary and sufficient terms of the experience. Neither 
 can exist without the other, and neither has any meaning 
 except in connection with the other. Our world of experience, 
 as such, is founded on a realistic dualism, and not on a single 
 "fundamental proposition." This dualism of the empirically 
 given, however, immediately suggests a monism in thought. 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 325 
 
 THOUGHT. 
 
 The Category of Reality. The boundary, uncertain and 
 difficult to perceive, between psychology on the one hand and 
 logic and metaphysics on the other is where the given in expe- 
 rience can no longer explain itself. Where the individual 
 centre in consciousness requires for its full meaning an expla- 
 nation that cannot arise from its own empirically-given nature. 
 Both the individuality and the relativity aspects are united by 
 our common meaning of experience, and when our thought 
 process endeavors to grasp and employ this experience it finds 
 it necessary to require that both aspects shall refer to one and 
 the same ground. This ground of the unity of the two em- 
 pirically-given aspects can never itself be recognized in expe- 
 rience, although it is always implied as soon as we begin to 
 employ any empirical fact in thought. The unity of the two 
 aspects of the psychological experience is thus the necessary 
 condition on the ground of which the experience, as the em- 
 pirically given, can be employed in the processes of thought. 
 In other words, the individuality and the relativity aspects are 
 alone given in the bare psychological experience itself; their 
 unity is required by thought. This ground of unity, necessary 
 for the operation of thought-processes, may be called the Cate- 
 gory of Reality. Introspection presents us with the two aspects 
 of experience, individuality and relativity, the ground for 
 their deeper unity must be discovered by thought; and the 
 category of reality is the abstract representation of this ground 
 in thought. 
 
 ORDINARY USAGE OF EEALITY. This usage of reality, as 
 that which holds together the two different characters of our 
 given experience, is unconsciously employed by all of us. It 
 is not an unfamiliar question to ask ourselves: Is this expe- 
 rience real or not? And in meeting this problem we uncon- 
 sciously regard reality as that which is the bond of unity, or 
 ground, of the two aspects earlier mentioned. One may observe, 
 
326 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in our common speech, that it is customary to require that two 
 conditions shall be fulfilled in order that we shall conceive this 
 or that something to be real. It must be capable of direct 
 appreciation, and again it must find a place in the conscious 
 life. We call this table real because of two indispensable lines 
 of evidence. In the first place, the table is capable of percep- 
 tion, of appreciation, it can be distinguished from the barren 
 concept of "no-thing;" and again this table has a meaning 
 for me, the present perception of it is intimately associated 
 with the recollections of other times. Without any exaggera- 
 tion it may be universally asserted that if either of these two 
 characters is absent the thing referred to could be called unreal 
 in a perfectly definite sense. A mermaid is considered unreal, 
 from a scientific stand-point, for it lacks the first character; 
 in daily life we would say, " it cannot be perceived directly or 
 indirectly by the senses." The mermaid is real to Greek 
 mythology, because its existence in that universe of discourse 
 can be appreciated by definite means. And beside the demand 
 which all of us feel, that an experience in order to be real 
 must be capable of definite appreciation, by some means at 
 least, we also feel that it must be intelligible, that it must 
 have a definite relation to the rest of the conscious life. The 
 meaning of a word in an unknown language is unreal, because 
 it has no meaning for me, no place in my life; or, in other 
 words, it is not related to the flow of consciousness. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE CATEGORY OF EEALITY. 
 These considerations suggest the fundamental importance of 
 the category of reality in our thought. Without it the processes 
 of thought would be impossible, for they would then be unable 
 to refer to experience. In this sense reality lies at the very 
 foundation of our active mental life; as the basis of thought- 
 processes it becomes the ground for all the derivative categories 
 and forms of thought. As the broadest category it refers to the 
 general possibility of all experience, and in this broad usage 
 gives rise to other categories directly founded on reality 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 327 
 
 which enable thought to refer more specifically to restricted 
 ranges of observation. Perhaps objectivity and subjectivity are 
 the most important of these secondary categories, because they 
 seem to refer directly to the two aspects of every experience, 
 the former to the individuality the latter to the^jglajjyjfcy. 
 But it is only the specialists in logic who are interested in this 
 very important field of the nature and order of the categories, 
 so that it is advisable to pass over these more detailed inquiries 
 while merely concerned with a general problem. 
 
 Difference Between Aspect and Category. There are, 
 however, a few matters which naturally recur at this point. 
 Especially suggestive is the difference between aspect and cate- 
 gory. The former, as we have here used the term, applies only 
 to the given in experience, while category is almost universally 
 associated with a condition of thought. One is found in expe- 
 rience, the other is required by thought. This distinction is 
 of fundamental importance, for it indicates the transition from 
 mere experience to the employment of that experience in our, 
 thought-processes. The aspects, just because they are empiri- 
 cally given, precede, both logically and genetically, the employ- 
 ment of experience by the categories of thought. But, further- 
 more, these aspects of experience give rise, through the ground 
 of their unity, to the logical category of reality. This latter 
 may be regarded as extremely important both to logic and to 
 metaphysics, since it serves on the one hand as the basis for 
 all the forms of our thinking process, and on the other it sug- 
 gests the ultimate unity of experience and thought in the 
 Absolute. 
 
 The Implied Existence of " Object" and " Subject." 
 There is another matter which illustrates this method of dis- 
 covering truth by the mutual implications of experience and 
 thought. Without entering into details, it may be interesting 
 to note that the ordinary expressions of "subject" and "ob- 
 ject" appear merely as abstraction of thought, as general con- 
 ceptions which have no other than a logical or implied exist- 
 
328 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ence. " Object" is only an abstract expression for that 
 something in our experience which thought refers to as an 
 individuality. In its strictest sense it is only that hypothetical 
 limit of a series of experiences in which the relativity aspect 
 diminishes towards zero; but in our ordinary speech we mean 
 by " object" anything that comes to us in experience with the 
 individuality aspect prominent. And from a similar stand-point 
 the " subject," or Ego, is merely a general or abstract expres- 
 sion for that continuum by which thought interprets the rela- 
 tivity of our experiences. It seems necessary to presuppose 
 some abstract element, the subject, common to all the expe- 
 riences of a single consciousness, since if these experiences had 
 absolutely nothing in common there could be no personal con- 
 tinuity, and therefore no relativity among the empirically 
 given facts. 
 
 It was earlier suggested that experience comes to us as a 
 flux of conscious centres, each of which contains two aspects. 
 And we further discovered that this empirical duality could 
 not be employed by thought unless the category of reality was 
 presupposed as the ground of the unity of the two aspects. 
 We were therefore led to recognize that experience demands 
 thought, and likewise thought demands experience ; while both 
 of them together form the necessary and sufficient condition 
 for all philosophical inquiry. This general interpretation 
 might be suggested to explain the movement in philosophy 
 which seeks to inquire more carefully into the meaning and 
 use of presuppositions and which seeks to unfold truth by the 
 method of implication rather than by that of direct logical 
 proof. It is to be observed that nothing was presupposed as true 
 without proof; nothing was assumed as an absolute or funda- 
 mental proposition. On the contrary, experience and thought, 
 with their intimate connection, were considered as the neces- 
 sary and sufficient conditions for philosophical inquiry, but 
 no attempt was made to prove their fundamental nature. Ex- 
 perience requires thought, and on the other hand thought is 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 329 
 
 only such in connection with experience. It is contended that 
 this dual unity this mutual supplementation of these two 
 presuppositions of philosophy contains within itself all that 
 can ever be known and that philosophy itself is merely the 
 unfolding of what is implicitly contained within the almost 
 unlimited scope of its dual presupposition. 
 
 THE ABSOLUTE. 
 
 That tendency of philosophy which was earlier alluded to in 
 connection with the monists is not restricted to the empirically 
 given and its ground in thought. The meaning of philosophy 
 is by no means exhausted when the connection between thought 
 and experience is unfolded; but, on the contrary, the whole 
 purpose of transcendental modes of inquiry is to develop the 
 ultimate unity of the world, the final completion or tran- 
 scendence in the Absolute of our limited experience and of our 
 finite thought. 
 
 In the earlier chapters of this volume we have followed the 
 history of monistic metaphysic through its religious, panthe- 
 istic, materialistic, idealistic, and even mystic phases, so that 
 the concept of the Absolute is by no means unfamiliar. In 
 the following pages it is not the purpose to prove the existence 
 of any monistic Ultimate, and much less to connect it with any 
 religious hypothesis. The purpose is to show that both expe- 
 rience and thought imply by their very nature an all-inclusive 
 Unity, which may be expressed by the Reality of the Absolute. 
 This conclusion, developed from the implications of both expe- 
 rience and thought, is more fundamental than the results of 
 demonstrative proof, for the latter always implies an un- 
 proved ground, which is itself of greater importance than the 
 result which may be obtained from it by subsequent deduction. 
 From the fact that all philosophy rests on a double presuppo- 
 sition, the approach to the concept of the Absolute is two-fold, 
 experience and thought. By the former it is perhaps possible 
 to discover a monistic background for all consciousness, accord- 
 
330 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ing to which the Absolute becomes the highest form of expe- 
 rience, formal only and beyond the limitations of internal 
 differentiation. By the implications of thought, on the other 
 hand, the conception of the Absolute develops into the ultimate 
 comprehension of all thought-processes, the deepest meaning 
 of the category of reality, and the identity of all categories 
 and forms of thought. 
 
 Experience and the Absolute. From our analysis of the 
 empirically given, it was discovered that the two aspects of 
 experience exist in a different ratio of intensity for every psy- 
 chological experience. And it was earlier suggested that an 
 experience could be defined having a logical reality only in 
 which the relativity aspect was entirely absent. Such a logical 
 experience was an individuality in the strictest sense, a mere 
 "this object" inappreciable except perhaps to an immediate 
 consciousness. This logical experience was conceived as the 
 limit of the series of experiences, in which the relativity aspect 
 gradually diminishes; and likewise it would seem possible, 
 from the opposite stand-point, to conceive and define an expe- 
 rience in which the individuality aspect should be deficient. 
 Such an experience would represent the upper limit of a series 
 of psychological experiences wherein the relativity aspect alone 
 existed. This limit, as the complete relativity and perfect 
 mediacy, suggests the Absolute from the stand-point of expe- 
 rience. 
 
 It will be observed that the complete relativity of the limit 
 of this series carries us at once beyond the finite experiences 
 of our daily life and introduces us to an " experience" which 
 differs essentially from the elements of human consciousness. 
 This will become apparent from an examination of such a 
 limiting "experience." To our ordinary consciousness it is 
 the individuality aspect of every conscious fact which intro- 
 duces the novel, the new, or the hitherto unperceived element 
 into our life. It is the relativity aspect which co-ordinates this 
 present newness with past experiences; establishes a relativity 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 331 
 
 between the related and the unrelated. Consider now this 
 highest "experience" in which the individuality aspect is ab- 
 sent. A momentous change is implied; our finite conscious-? 
 ness, limited for its material to the variety in the flow of 
 perceived facts, becomes an all-inclusive conception in which 
 there is no possible newness, no appreciable points or centres, 
 and, further, no limitation with respect to finite conditions. 
 The richness of an experience will depend on the intensive 
 value of its relativity aspect; the richest experience will be 
 the one most intimately connected with all our past life, and 
 therefore the one which mediates or synthesizes the greatest 
 number of finite, individual facts into an homogeneous unity. 
 And the Absolute, as the relativity of all possible relativity, 
 will be like a relation with all possible terms, the Universal 
 of universals in which every element of the universe finds a 
 place. This is readily recognized from the very fact that the 
 Absolute is represented by an " experience" in which the indi- 
 viduality aspect is absent, for this implies that the newness or 
 variety upon which individuality depends is also lacking. 
 And, furthermore, the complete universality of the relativity 
 aspect denotes that all possible variety is synthesized by the 
 unlimited breadth of this single " experience." 
 
 Thought and the Absolute. By means of the foregoing 
 we were able to suggest a formal definition of the Absolute as 
 the limit of a series of experiences increasing in relativity and 
 comprehensiveness. The Absolute so described is purely formal 
 in its nature and possessed of merely a logical reality. When, 
 however, we approach this conception from the stand-point of 
 thought, we are able to discover a new meaning altogether 
 unattainable by the implications of experience alone. 
 
 While considering the relations of thought to experience it 
 was suggested that the category of reality supplied the unity 
 to the two aspects of experience; as the ground by which the 
 empirically given this-fact, with its two aspects, can be em- 
 ployed by thought as a single element, the category of reality 
 
332 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 must be looked upon as the basis for all the other categories 
 and forms of thought. When conceived in this position, real- 
 ity would seem to contain all the richness, all the variety in 
 fact, all the depth and meaning of our thought-processes. 
 No conception, however false, crude, or barren, but is defi- 
 nitely contained within this broadest conception of the category 
 of reality. By this general characterization of reality two rep- 
 resentations of it are possible. On the one side reality appears 
 as the mere logical ground for experience and thought, and on 
 the other as the conceptual comprehension of all the value and 
 meaning of thought-processes. In the former sense reality is 
 abstract and formal, merely the ground for the conceptual 
 unity of the individuality and relativity of each experience; 
 in the latter sense, however, when reality is conceived as the 
 identity, the togetherness, or the comprehension of all cate- 
 gories and forms of thought, it becomes the Absolute, the 
 complete homogeneity within which there is no differentiation, 
 not even the antithesis of subject and object. 
 
 This distinction between the two representations of reality 
 is of extreme importance. As we are accustomed to employ 
 the term, it means simply the logical ground of thought, but 
 when this logical ground is recognized to contain all the 
 wealth and meaning and depth that is implicitly contained in 
 thought itself, the conception assumes a new significance which, 
 on account of its breadth and comprehensiveness, is the con- 
 ception of the Absolute. As such, reality contains not only 
 my finite restricted thought, but likewise all possible thought 
 of all thinking beings. The Absolute, as the perfect mediacy 
 of all experience, becomes synonymous with reality invested 
 with all the richness and depth of thought. There could be 
 no thought, idea, or concept which has not its appropriate 
 place in this Highest Conception, just as we have previously 
 seen that it implicitly contains every fact or experience. 
 
 This develops more clearly the internal unity of both expe- 
 rience and thought, for in the Absolute relativity and com- 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 333 
 
 prehensiveness become coextensive and identical. In this sense, 
 therefore, as the mediacy of all possible experiences and as 
 the comprehension of all thought, the Absolute becomes the 
 ultimate unity of experience and thought. And because these 
 were taken to be the necessary and sufficient presuppositions 
 of philosophy in general, the Absolute is to be regarded as 
 Ideal for the explanation of man and the world. 
 
 Formal Nature of the Absolute. Undoubtedly the con- 
 ception of the Absolute which has been here defined may appear 
 too formal to be of any value. In the search for a monism 
 which should include all the facts and all the meaning of the 
 world there is an undoubted temptation to employ terms so ab- 
 stract in their nature that the purpose of interpretation and ex- 
 planation is obscured. But perhaps this difficulty is not so im- 
 portant as we are inclined to believe. And although it must be 
 recognized that there can be no finite differentiation within the 
 being of the Absolute, and for that reason it is to be regarded 
 as an abstract conception very far removed from ordinary life, 
 yet is is perhaps doubtful if more definite terms can be em- 
 ployed to describe a conception which from its very nature 
 transcends all internal or external limitation. It cannot be 
 referred to in terms of goodness, perfection, morality, will, or 
 purpose without implying one of two alternatives. Either these 
 terms mean, when applied to the Absolute, something alto- 
 gether different from their significance in our ordinary appre- 
 ciation of them, or else they limit the Absolute to a mere 
 anthropomorphous fancy. 
 
 The Absolute not Personal. And, furthermore, it is per- 
 haps interesting to note that the nature of the Absolute, as the 
 limiting Ideal of thought and experience, transcends the usual 
 conditions by which our own experience is defined. We cannot 
 describe it in terms of consciousness, as we understand the 
 term, for consciousness implies internal centres analogous to 
 our own experience, while the Absolute is an homogeneous 
 Unity, devoid of all differentiation except as this differentiation 
 
334 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is implied by its unity. Nor, on the other hand, can the 
 Absolute be denned as self -consciousness, for this requires an 
 antithesis of self, and self that is conscious. The difficulty of 
 this latter contradiction can be avoided only by conceiving the 
 self-conscious Absolute as an infinite process, a self -repeating 
 series. This conception is certainly the least objectionable, 
 if one wishes to use the term consciousness in some form ; but 
 it seems to be nevertheless an incomplete characterization of 
 the Absolute. A process implies a logical succession of stages, 
 each of which denotes an element in the infinite series of 
 which it is a part ; but as element it is distinguishable from its 
 logical predecessors and successors, and the Absolute, as the 
 law of the unity of these elements, is itself defined by each. 
 Such an " Absolute" would be, therefore, only relative, since 
 it is determined strictly by internal differentiation. In fact, 
 it cannot be too strongly urged that such terms as conscious- 
 ness should not be used in this connection, since personal attri- 
 butes of any kind seem to introduce either an ambiguity or a 
 contradiction. It is a constant ambition on the part of philoso- 
 phy to establish the existence of an Absolute which shall meet 
 the demands of a consistent monism and at the same time 
 possess personal attributes. The difficulty of such an attempt 
 is fundamental. Personality, however defined, implies a limi- 
 tation and a differentiation. In the former case the personal 
 attribute is such because it is defined in terms of a logically 
 existent "not." This "not" is excluded from the Being of 
 the Personal Absolute, and hence the latter is defined with 
 respect to the limitations of the " not." Such a Being is not 
 Absolute, but only relative. And again the personal attribute 
 may lay stress upon finite differentiation within the being of 
 the Absolute. In this case the differentiation must observe a 
 certain law, or rather a ground, for the relation of the differ- 
 entiated elements. This law or ground becomes, therefore, the 
 true Absolute, which, because of its formal character, should 
 be conceived as impersonal. But even if one should contend 
 
SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES. 335 
 
 that this law was itself personal, owing to some internal char- 
 acter, then it would be possible to define a still more funda- 
 mental Absolute which should express the ground for the appli- 
 cation of this internal character to the law itself. 
 
 The formal terms with which it is necessary to allude to 
 the Absolute do not permit, with certainty, the application of 
 infinity, except figuratively. Finiteness and infiniteness are 
 conditions of human thought dependent on the conception of 
 limitation. As we approach the Absolute, however, the dis- 
 tinction no longer remains applicable, because the antithesis 
 of limited and unlimited is transcended. Eecent progress in 
 the application of mathematics to logic 11 has developed the 
 logical aspect of the infinite to such a degree that it is now 
 impossible to employ the concept as a synonyme for mere im- 
 mensity or greatness. There is no implication in our original 
 conception of the Absolute which could lead us to believe that 
 it is referable to the finite or to some degree (" dignity") of 
 the infinite. Perhaps it is a kind of existence which is some- 
 how both finite and infinite, or perhaps neither term, in its 
 ordinary significance, can be used. 
 
 In these brief suggestions concerning the interpretation of 
 the monistic tendencies in speculative thought several prob- 
 lems are especially significant. The view towards its axioms 
 which post-Kantian philosophy has gradually come to accept 
 demands a thorough investigation, not only of the first princi- 
 ples of our knowledge, but even of the presuppositions of these 
 principles. At no time in the history of philosophy has this 
 need been more apparent than now. We are no longer satisfied 
 with a merely empirical or psychological analysis, such as has 
 characterized a considerable portion of British philosophy even 
 to the present time, but, on the contrary, we demand an inves- 
 tigation into the bases and grounds, the conditions and pre- 
 
 11 Reference is made to the work of Dedekind, Cantor, and Royce. 
 
336 HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 suppositions, upon which all analysis, introspective or tran- 
 scendental, must ultimately rest 
 
 Closely connected with this question of the necessary and 
 sufficient presuppositions of philosophy, there still remains the 
 central problem of all systems of monism, the reconciliation 
 of unity and variety, of the one and the many. However deep 
 we may go, there are still unexplored regions beyond which 
 somehow seem to transcend our human thought and knowledge. 
 Although the progress of philosophy has gradually unfolded 
 what seemed to be a deeper and truer interpretation of Reality, 
 there still remains no more significant tendency in philosophy 
 to-day than the demand for the careful consideration of its 
 central problem. Within the limited sphere of our own con- 
 sciousness we are restricted to some form of a duality, the 
 subject and the object. The classic attempts to transcend this 
 duality have all proved objectionable in some respect. It has 
 been found very difficult, if not impossible, to define either 
 subject or object without implying the other. And although 
 we may avoid certain aspects of this antithesis by restricting 
 the duality to experience and thought, still the central problem 
 of their unity remains unanswered. The fundamental dis- 
 tinction between the empirically given variety and the concep- 
 tional unity cannot be solved by neglecting either; on the 
 contrary, a new philosophy must be born from the deeper union 
 of experience and thought, which, if completely understood, 
 would define as its Ideal the conception of ultimate truth and 
 the Philosophy of the Absolute. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abelard, Pierre, founder of mediaeval conceptual ism, 51 
 
 Absent objects, how real to Berkeley, 162 
 
 Absolute Idealism, 228, 235, 273 
 
 Absolute, The, Bradley, 314; Fichte, 241; formal nature of, 333; 
 Green, 309; Hegel, 272; Lotze, 311; not personal, 333; promi- 
 nence of conception, 286 ; relation to experience, 330 ; relation to 
 thought, 331; Royce, 313; Schelling, 255; the unity of the 
 world, 329 
 
 Abstract ideas, Locke, 128; Berkeley, 158; Hume, 170 
 
 Ac -tivity as self, Fichte, 241 
 
 Analytic judgments, Kant, 191 
 
 Anaxagoras, quoted, 30 
 
 Anaximenes, quoted, 29 
 
 Anselm, ontological proof, 83 
 
 Antimonies of cosmology, Kant, 208 
 
 Antithesis of dialectic, 263 
 
 A posteriori judgments, 192 
 
 Appearance, Herbart, 231 
 
 A priori judgments, 192 
 
 Aristotle, dualism of, 48 
 
 Arnauld, Cartesian, 87 
 
 Association of ideas, 170 
 
 Atheistic controversy of Fichte, 239 
 
 Attributes, with Spinoza, 96 
 
 B. 
 
 Bacon, Francis, division of sciences, 68; Great Regeneration, 67; life 
 
 of, 66; position of, 70 
 Bacon, Roger, mediaeval empiricist, 53 
 Boin^', Hegel's doctrine of, 269 
 Bentham, Jeremy, 306 
 Berkeley, George, answers to opponents, 162; epistemology, 154; life 
 
 of, 150; metaphysics, 155; stand-point, 153 
 
 22 337 
 
338 INDEX. 
 
 Boehme, Jacob, cosmology, 65 ; life of, 64 ; theology, 64 
 
 Bradley, F. H., 313 
 
 Brahma, the Hindoo Universal Self, 47 
 
 Bruno, Giordano, ethics, 61; life of, 57; pantheism, 58; physics, 59; 
 
 position, 61 
 Buddhism, 40, 47, 277 
 Butler, Joseph, ethics, 146 
 
 C. 
 
 Cabanis, French materialist, 141 
 
 Cambridge Platonists, 304 
 
 Campanella, 56 
 
 Cartesian School, 87 
 
 Categorical Imperative, 215 
 
 Categories, with Kant, 202 
 
 Causality, Hume, 171; Kant, 203 
 
 Chubb, Thomas, English deist, 143 
 
 Cicero, quoted, 15 
 
 Clarke, Samuel, English moralist, 144 
 
 Collier, Arthur, English idealist, 158 
 
 Comte, Auguste, French positivist, 287 
 
 Conceptualism, general idea real in mind, 51 
 
 Condillac, Etie"nne de, life of, 138; materialism, 138; sensationalism, 
 
 138 
 Consciousness, Buddhism, 278; Descartes, 82; Reinhold, 237; Hegel, 
 
 266 
 
 Copernicus, 56 
 Cordemoy, 87 
 " Critiques," of Kant, 184 
 
 Cudworth, Ralph, ethics, 304; relation to Locke, 122 
 Cumberland, Richard, ethics, 305 
 Cyrenaics, Greek hedonists, 39 
 
 D. 
 
 Darwin, Charles, English biologist, 295 
 
 Da Vinci, Leonardo, 58 
 
 Deductive method, 34 
 
 Deed-act, Fichte, 241 
 
 Deists, English, 142 
 
 Descartes, Rene", foundations of philosophy, 81; influence, 86; life 
 
 of, 77; metaphysics, 84; method in philosophy, 79 
 Determinism, 37; Hobbes, 74; Locke, 135; Spinoza, 104 
 
INDEX. 339 
 
 D'Holbach, French materialist, 141 
 Dialectic movement, 261 
 Diderot, Denis, French encyclopaedist, 139 
 Dualism, 29 
 
 Eckhart, Meister, Christian mystic, 63 
 
 Eclecticism, 179 
 
 Edwards, Jonathan, 152 
 
 Ego, primacy of, in Fichte, 241; transcendental, 201. See Self. 
 
 Emotional philosophy, 251 
 
 Empedocles, quoted, 30 
 
 Empiricism, 26; contrasted with rationalism, 119 
 
 Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel, 269 
 
 Encyclopaedists, French, 139 
 
 English Empiricism, 65 
 
 English ethics, 143 
 
 Epicureans, 48, 306 
 
 Epistemology, Berkeley, 154; defined as theory of knowledge, 25; 
 Descartes, 85; Hobbes, 71; Hume, 168; Kant, 189; Locke, 127; 
 Nicolas of Cusa, 55; Schopenhauer, 280; Spinoza, 100; stand- 
 points contrasted, 147 
 
 Essence, Hegel, 269 
 
 Ethics, axioms, 36; Bruno, 61; Butler, 146; Clarke, 144; defined as the 
 "ought" of conduct, 35; English, 143; Fichte, 248; Hegel, 271; 
 Hobbes, 73; Hume, 175; empirico-rationalistic, 303; intuitional, 
 304; practical, 40; recent theories, 303; Schopenhauer, 282; 
 Shaftesbury, 145; Spinoza, 101; theoretical, 38 
 
 Evolution, 292 ; embryological evidence, 292 ; paleontological evidence, 
 293; philosophical aspect of, 298; universal character, 293 
 
 Existence, Descartes, 81 
 
 Experience, aspects, 321; centre in thought, 321; presupposition, 
 320 
 
 F. 
 
 Faculties of mind, Kant, 194 
 
 Fechner, 300 
 
 F6n6lon, 87 
 
 Fichte, J. G., ethics, 248 ; life of, 237 ; primacy of Ego, 241 ; relation 
 
 to Hegel, 259 ; stand-point, 240 ; The Absolute, 247 
 Freedom, Fichte, 246; Kant, 218 
 
340 INDEX. 
 
 G. 
 
 Galileo, 57 
 
 Gassendi, 57 
 
 General ideas, controversy in scholasticism, 49 
 
 Geulincx, Arnold, Cartesian, 87 
 
 God, existence, see cosmological, ontological, and teleological proofs; 
 
 postulate, Kant, 219 
 Great Regeneration, Bacon, 67 
 Greeks, humanistic attitude, 15; philosophy, -47 
 Green, T. H., ethics of idealism, 308 
 
 Hamilton, Sir William, 177 
 
 Hedonism, ethics of individual pleasure, 39 
 
 Hedonistic calculus, 306 
 
 Hegel, G. W. F., influence, 273; life of, 257; "Phenomenology of 
 Mind," 265; relation to former idealists, 259; system, 268 
 
 Heliocentric cosmology, 56 
 
 Herbart, J. F., influence, 234; life of, 230; metaphysics, 231; psy- 
 chology, 300 
 
 Hindoo philosophy, 46 
 
 History, philosophy of, 43 
 
 Hobbes, Thomas, epistemology, 71; estimate, 75; life of, 70; mate- 
 rialism, 72; metaphysics, 72; naturalism, 73; sociology, 74; 
 theory of man, 73 
 
 Humanistic philosophy, 15 
 
 Human Knowledge, Berkeley's Principles of, 151 
 
 Human Nature, Hume's treatise of, 165 
 
 Human Understanding, Locke's essay concerning, 123 
 
 Hume, David, ethics, 175; epistemology, 168; life of, 164; meta- 
 physics, 169; position, 176; scepticism, 173; stand-point, 168 
 
 I. 
 
 Idea, various meanings: Berkeley, element of perceptual world, 155; 
 Descartes, states of the soul, 85 ; Hegel, The " Idea," logical evo- 
 lution of finite forms of world, 265 ; Hume, derived processes of 
 mind, 169; Kant, illusory conceptions of reason, 206; Locke, 
 object of mind when it thinks, 127 ; Royce, expression of purpose, 
 313; Spinoza, modification of thought, 99 
 
INDEX. 341 
 
 Ideal of theology, Kant, 209 
 
 Idealism, Absolute, 228, 235; Berkeley, 157; comparison of, 229; 
 
 Green, 308; Kant, 205; Leibnitz, 112; mystic, 229; Royce, 
 
 312; transcendental, see Kant 
 Identity, judgment of, Fichte, 243; Kant, 191 
 " Idols" of Bacon, 68 
 
 Immanent Reality of Spinoza's Substance, 96 
 Immortality, Kant, 219 
 Imperatives, Kant, 214 
 Individuality aspect of experience, 322 
 Inductive method, 34 
 
 Innate ideas, Descartes, 85; Locke's opposition, 126 
 Intellectual awakening of Renaissance, 53 
 Intellectual love of God, Spinoza, 103 
 Intellectual space, Herbart, 233 
 Intuitionalism, ethics, 39, 304 
 
 J. 
 
 Judgment, Kant's " Critique" of, 220 
 
 K. 
 
 Kant, Immanuel, influence on Fichte, 238; influence on philosophy, 
 224; life and character of, 180; problems of the Critical Phi- 
 losophy, 189; refutation of Berkeley's idealism, 163; scope of 
 system, 223; theory of heavens, 182; the three "Critiques," 
 184; the " Critique of Pure Reason," 191; the " Critique of Prac- 
 tical Reason," 212; the " Critique of Judgment," 220 
 
 Kepler, 57 
 
 Knowledge, kinds of, Nicolas of Cusa, 55; Spinoza, 100; limits of, 
 Locke, 133 
 
 L. 
 
 Lamarck, biologist, 295 
 
 La Mettrie, French materialist, 139 
 
 Leibnitz, G. W., comparison with Locke, 135; doctrine of monads, 109; 
 
 freedom, 113; life of, 106; metaphysics, 108; optimism, 114; 
 
 " Pre-established Harmony," 112; scope of system, 114; theology, 
 
 113 
 
 Leviathan of Hobbes, 71 
 Libertarianism, 36 
 Locke, John, doctrine of ideas, 127; ethics, 134; influence, 135; life 
 
 of, 120; object of philosophy, 125; theory of knowledge, 132 
 
342 INDEX. 
 
 Logic, axioms of, 33 ; defined as " ought" of thought, 32 ; Hegel, 258, 
 
 269; methods, 33; rules, 33 
 Lotze, R. H., Absolute, 311; stand-point, 310 
 Lucretius, definition of religion, 21 
 Luther, 62 
 
 Malebranche, Nicolas, Cartesian, 87 
 
 Mandeville, English sociologist, 145 
 
 Materialism, Cabanis, 141; defined, 72; D'Holbach, 141; French 
 eighteenth century, 138; Hobbes, 72; La Mettrie, 140; position 
 of, 141 
 
 Mathematical method, Descartes, 80; Hobbes, 71; Spinoza, 93 
 
 Mathematics, Kant, 198 
 
 Matter, Berkeley, 157 
 
 Mechanism, 302 
 
 Mediaeval philosophy, 48 
 
 Melanchthon, Philip, 62 
 
 Memory, Hume's ground of selfhood, 174 
 
 Metaphysics, or ontology, Bacon, 69; base of sciences, 27; Berkeley, 
 155; Bradley, 313; Fichte, 241; Hegel, 269; Herbart, 231; 
 Hume, 169; Kant, 206; Lotze, 310; recent stand-points, 309; 
 Royce, 312; Schopenhauer, 281; science of reality, 28; Spi- 
 noza, 93 
 
 Mill, J. S., English utilitarian, 307 
 
 Modes, Locke, 131; Spinoza, 98 
 
 Monads, Leibnitz, 109 
 
 Monism, 29, 286, 315, 336 
 
 Montaigne, quoted, 15; philosophy, 76 
 
 Montesquieu, 137 
 
 Moral law, Fichte, 248; Kant, 215 
 
 Morality, influence to, Kant, 189 
 
 Miinsterberg, Hugo, 302 
 
 Mystical Idealism, 229, 280, 284 
 
 N. 
 
 National characteristics of Renaissance, 53 
 Natura naturans, Schelling, 252; Spinoza, 96 
 Natura naturata, Schelling, 252; Spinoza, 96 
 Natural history of mental processes, Fichte, 246 ; Hegel, 266 ; Kant, 
 
 195; Schelling, 254 
 Natural selection, 296 
 
INDEX. 343 
 
 Naturalism, pessimistic, 228 
 
 Naturalistic philosophy, 16 
 
 Nature Philosophy, Hegel, 270; Schelling, 252 
 
 Nebular hypothesis, 182 
 
 Neo-Fichteian movement, 302 
 
 Newton, controversy with Leibnitz, 107; relation to Locke, 124 
 
 Nicolas of Cusa, life of, 54; philosophy, 55 
 
 Nicole, Cartesian, 87 
 
 Nominalism, mediaeval, general idea only name, 50 
 
 Non-Ego, Fichte, 244' 
 
 Normative sciences, use of " ought," 31 
 
 Noumenon, Kant, 205 
 
 Novalis, Romanticist, 251 
 
 Novum Organum, Bacon, 67 
 
 0. 
 
 Object, implied existence, 327 
 
 Observed sequence, Hume, 172 
 
 Occam, William of, mediaeval nominalist, 50, 53 
 
 Occasionalism, 87 
 
 Omar Khayyam, quoted, 38 
 
 Ontogeny, 293 
 
 Ontological proof of God's existence, Anselm, 83; Descartes, 83; 
 
 Kant, 209; Spinoza, 96 
 Optimism, definition, 39; Leibnitz, 114 
 Origen, Christian mystic, 63 
 
 P. 
 
 Pantheism, 47 
 
 Paracelsus, 55 
 
 Paralogisms of psychology, Kant, 207 
 
 Perception, definition, 24 
 
 Personal identity, Locke, 132; Hume, 173 
 
 Pessimism, definition, 40; Schopenhauer, 282 
 
 " Phenomenology of Mind," Hegel, 265 
 
 Phenomenon, Kant, 198 
 
 Philosophy, defined as the rational unification of facts of experience, 
 18; different from religion, 20; different from science, 19; gen- 
 eral history, 45; meanings of, 13; problems, 22; scope, 18; two 
 attitudes, 15; value, 314 
 
 Phylogeny, 293 
 
 Physics, early advances, 56 
 
344 INDEX. 
 
 Pineal gland, Descartes, 86 
 
 Plato, Greek idealism, 48 
 
 Pluralism, Leibnitz, 108 
 
 Pomponatius, 55 
 
 Positivism, 287 
 
 Postulates of practical reason, Kant, 217 
 
 Practical Reason, Kant's " Critique" of, 212 
 
 " Pre-established Harmony," Leibnitz, 112 
 
 Presentation, world as, 280 
 
 Presupposition, meaning of, 317; of philosophy, 319 
 
 Protagoras, 15 
 
 Protestantism, 53 
 
 Psychology, aspect theory, 301; defined as science of mental states, 
 
 23; element of, 24; introspective method, 299; science of, 299 
 Psycho-physical parallelism, definition, 24; Spinoza, 98 
 Pure Reason, Kant's " Critique" of, 191 
 Purpose, Kant, 221; Royce, 312 
 
 Q. 
 
 Qualities, primary and secondary, Locke, 131 ; Berkeley, 157 
 
 R. 
 
 Rationalism, definition, 27 ; Continental, compared with empiricism, 
 148; deeper meaning, 117; school as whole, 115; problem of, 
 115 
 
 Realism, mediaeval, general idea objectively real, 49 
 
 Realism, transcendental, 227, 232 
 
 Reality, category of, 325 
 
 Reals, Herbart, 232 
 
 Reason, faculty of, Kant, 206 ; Absolute, Schelling, 255 
 
 Reformation, The, 62 
 
 Reid, Thomas, 177 
 
 Reinhold, K. L., life and stand-point, 236 
 
 Relativity aspect of experience, 322 
 
 Religion, different from philosophy, 20; mental origin of, 20; phi- 
 losophy of, 43 
 
 Renaissance, scepticism of, 76; tendencies of, 52 
 
 Right, Hegel, 271 
 
 Romanticists, 250 
 
 Roscellinus, 50 
 
 Royce, Josiah, 312 
 
 Rules of living, Descartes, 80 
 
INDEX. 345 
 
 S. 
 
 Sanction of happiness, 306 
 
 Scepticism, Hume, 173; Renaissance, 76 
 
 Schelling, F. W., life of, 251; stand-point, 252; position of, 284; 
 relation to Hegel, 259 
 
 Schleiermacher, definition of religion, 21 
 
 Scholasticism, philosophy, 48 
 
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, life of, 275; stand-point, 276; system, 280; 
 position, 284 
 
 Science, Comte, 288; different from philosophy, 19; Hume, 172; hy- 
 potheses in, 290; Kant, 204; of knowledge, Fichte, 239; Locke, 
 133; philosophy of, 40; recent tendencies, 286 
 
 Scotch school, 177 
 
 " Seeing all things in God," 86 
 
 Self, theories of, Berkeley, 160; Descartes, 81, 85; Fichte, 241; Hegel, 
 271; Hume, 173; Kant, 207, 217; Leibnitz, 111; Locke, 132; 
 Lotze, 311; Royce, 312; Schelling, 253; Spinoza, 97 
 
 Self-consciousness, Hegel, 267 ; Schelling, 253 
 
 Sensation, definition, 24 
 
 Sensationalism, French, 137; Condillac, 138 
 
 Sensibility, faculty of, Kant, 197 
 
 Shaftesbury, educated by Locke, 122 ; ethics, 145 
 
 Significant tendencies in present philosophy, 314 
 
 Smith, Adam, 166 
 
 Society, philosophy of, 42 
 
 Sociology, Comte, 289 ; Hobbes, 74 
 
 Solipsism, 250 
 
 Space, Berkeley, 156; Herbart, 233; Kant, 197; Leibnitz, 110; 
 Schopenhauer, 281 
 
 Spencer, 296 
 
 Spinoza, Benedict de, attributes, 96; epistemology, 100; ethics, 92; 
 fatalism, 104; importance, 105; life of, 90; metaphysics, 93; 
 modes, 98; naturalism, 103; psychology, 102; rationalistic ten- 
 dency, 89; Substance, 94 
 
 Spirit, Berkeley, 159 
 
 Stoics, 48 
 
 Subject, implied existence of, 327 
 
 Sublimity, Kant, 222 * 
 
 Substance, various meanings: Berkeley, spiritual not material, 158; 
 Descartes, three primary reals, 85; Hume, idea contradictory, 
 170; Leibnitz, active force-atoms, 109; Locke, substratum of 
 qualities, 130; scholastic, universal substratum, 131 
 
346 INDEX. 
 
 Sufficient ground, principle of, 280 
 Synthetic stage of dialectic, 263 
 
 T. 
 
 Taste, judgments of, 221 
 
 Tauler, John, 04 
 
 Taurellus, 55 
 
 Teleology, contrasted with mechanism, 222, 303; judgments, 221 
 
 Teleological proof, Leibnitz, 112; Kant, 211 
 
 Telesius, 55 
 
 Theodicy, Leibnitz, 108 
 
 Theology, Berkeley, 161; definition, 30; different from religion and 
 metaphysics, 31 ; Leibnitz, 108 
 
 Theory of knowledge, 25 
 
 Thesis stage of dialectic, 268 
 
 " Thing-in-itaelf," Kant, 195 
 
 Thomas a Kern pi*, 63 
 
 Thought, Descartes, 85; Hegel, 265 
 
 Time, Kant, 197; Schopenhauer, 281 
 
 Toland, John, deist, 143 
 
 Transcendental forms, Fichte, 241; Herbart, 232; Kant, 199; Rein- 
 hold, 237; Schopenhauer, 281 
 
 Transcendental idealism, see Kant; of Schelling, 253 
 
 Transcendental self, 201 
 
 Transcendentalists, the German, 226 
 
 U. 
 
 Understanding, faculty of, Kant, 200; Hegel, 267 
 
 Upanishads, 147, 278 
 
 Utilitarianism, ethics of universal happiness, 39, 305 
 
 V. 
 
 Vedic hymns, 46, 278 
 Vision theory, Berkeley, 155 
 Voltaire, 137 
 
 Weismann, biologist, 296 
 
 Will, Fichte, 246; Kant, 213; Schelling, 254; Schopenhauer, 280 
 
 Wrong, Schopenhauer, 283 
 

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