GOLD AND SILVER 
 
 AS CURRENCY 
 
 IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE, HISTORICAL 
 ECONOMICAL, AND PRACTICAL 
 
 ^ 0cne0 of Paper6 
 
 WRITTEN FOR THE TRAVELERS RECORD 
 
 HV 
 
 JAMES G. BattersON, President 
 
 or 
 
 THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 HARTFORD, CONN. 
 
 1896 
 
 HARTFORD, CONN, 
 press of Zbe Case, locftwoo^ & 3Bra(nar^ Compan? 
 
 1 896
 
 Ht 
 
 3£ 
 
 GOLD AND SILVER 
 
 THE WORLD'S EXPERIENCE — ECONOMICAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
 
 PRACTICAL. 
 
 I^^^HE economic questions of the day are a thousand 
 ^"'^ times more important to the welfare of the people 
 
 at large than any partisan interest which they 
 ,^- may have in the distribution of political patronage. It is 
 ^i not the time for experiments with theoretical fancies which 
 would set aside the experience of centuries ; and it behooves 
 every thinking man to cling to that which he knows to be 
 ^ practical, rather than follow those visionary-schemes which 
 '■^ can only promise success at the end of a rambow. 
 
 The electric telegraph, swift ships, and modern inven- 
 ' tions of every description have brought all nations so close 
 together that we can no longer ignore the claim which each 
 has upon the industries of the other. The products of 
 American industry are everywhere to be found, and the 
 United States is a la rge consumer of the products of all 
 other countries. /This universal barter, which is the distri- 
 bution of the surplus~abundance of one country for that of 
 another, makes up the principal volume of the world's com 
 merce, and is the great force in the civilization of mankind. 
 The productions comprised in this universal barter or ex- 
 change have all to be weighed and measured in order that 
 justice may everywhere be done. There is as yet no uni- 
 versal standard either of weights or measures, but the stand- 
 ards of each country are within very small limits convertible 
 into the standards of all. The adjustment of the final balance 
 in all transactions of barter is by a payment in coin which 
 measures the difference in values at the point where the 
 exchange is made. 
 
 386383
 
 The division of labor, also, not only between the states 
 and the peoples of a single country, but between the nations 
 of the earth, is the highest type of universal civilization. 
 The exchange of products, skilled labor, and inventions 
 being the substance of commerce, is the bond of social inter- 
 course both at home and abroad. Every impediment in the 
 way of building up our own commerce and extending our 
 trade with other nations is a hindrance to the progress of 
 civilization and a hindrance to the payment of our just 
 debts, which can only be paid with our own products and the 
 thrift of our own people. England, France, Germany, and 
 Holland have purchased our securities with gold : we cannot 
 legislate their payment in silver. By the full amount of our 
 foreign indebtedness, we are now under bonds to preserve a 
 gold basis with those countries, and we cannot change it 
 until we pay our debts, and then we will not want to. De- 
 stroying our credit is a very poor way to pay debts. 
 
 Before the Civil War "cotton was king," and supplied a 
 larger volume of exchange on London than any other pro- 
 duct in this country. When the writer was in Egypt in 1859 
 cotton was a very scarce commodity in the port of Alexan- 
 dria; now every mill in New England and old England 
 buys Egyptian cotton, and cheap labor in the valley of the 
 Nile and in India affects the great staple of our Southern 
 States unfavorably. We cannot prohibit its importation 
 without promoting increased cultivation in Egypt and India. 
 The Soudan is the natural cotton country of the world, and 
 it is larger than the United States. England has long been 
 reaching out for that prize and will get it soon. 
 
 These economic questions cannot be controlled by legis- 
 lation, any more than we can force the cultivation of tea and 
 coffee in Colorado and Montana. The silver miners in those 
 States get from $3.50 to $4.00 per day for their labor ; the 
 Egyptian fellaheen are content to raise cotton for a mere 
 fraction of such wages, where food, shelter, and clothing 
 cost little, and being deprived of the last would not cause 
 them to suffer.
 
 5 
 
 The world's supply of cotton is so large that the foreign 
 demand on the Southern States has fallen off, and this great 
 industry of our country has suffered seriously in consequence. 
 Cultivators of wheat, corn, and tobacco, with all other indus- 
 tries, have experienced the same loss of demand for their 
 products, and the values have been greatly diminished. 
 
 The silver producing States have had a like experience in 
 loss of demand for their product, but they now ask their sis- 
 ter vStates to join them in creating such an artificial demand 
 for the silver product as will give it an advantage over all 
 other products, which in turn would reap no corresponding 
 benefit, but on the contrary would find the gain to silver an 
 additional burden to themselves. 
 
 The theory that silver can be coined into money, and 
 that the mint stamp can arbitrarily fix its value, and thereby 
 make money plenty for everybody, is founded on the theor}^ 
 proposed for the relief of all who are suffering, not from 
 any "scarcity of money," but a diminished demand for their 
 products. 
 
 The fallacy of attempting to create an additional value by 
 the mere stamp of the mint is demonstrated by the fact that 
 the present difference between the nominal value of the 
 silver dollar coined under the acts of 1878 and 1890, and the 
 market value of the same as bullion, is just about $200,000,000 
 which the people at large have had to pay or must pay, as 
 the measure of relief already given to the producers of silver 
 in this country. The same proportionate expenditure for 
 sustaining the prices of cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and 
 potatoes would have bankrupted the government. The 
 citizen who digs potatoes and the citizen who digs for silver 
 should have the same measure of protection, or both should 
 be left to the natural laws of supply and demand. 
 
 Further demonstration, if needed, is found in the his- 
 torical and practical experience of all countries and all ages 
 with the commercial relations of
 
 GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE. 
 
 Both of the metals named, when extracted from their 
 native ores and remaining- in bulk, are termed bullion. After 
 refinement and admixture with the legal proportion of alloy 
 to secure hardness, it is called standard bullion. 
 
 Charlemagne was the first to establish a pound weight 
 of silver as the unit of value. The same unit was subse- 
 quently adopted by England, France, and Italy, and it be- 
 came by its multiples and sub-multiples the foundation of 
 the English nomenclature, pounds, shillings, and pence, and 
 assumed the function of money as a convenient measure of 
 value in exchange for all other commodities. The single 
 pound of standard bullion, divided into twenty equal parts, 
 made twenty shilling pieces, each weighing one-twentieth 
 of a pound. Divided into four pieces, each weighing 
 one-quarter of a pound, they were called crowns. Two 
 shillings sixpence was half a crown, a sixpenny piece weighed 
 six two-hundred-and-fortieths of a pound, or a pound divided 
 into forty equal parts. 
 
 Edward I. changed the ratios slightly by coining 243 
 pence out of the silver pound. Up to the time of Elizabeth 
 repeated changes had been made until they reached 744 
 pence to the pound of silver, making sixty-two light shil- 
 lings where there was only twenty by the original standard. 
 
 During the reign of Charles II. the English African 
 Company sent home a large quantity of gold from the coast 
 of Guinea. Charles coined this gold into pieces which he 
 called guineas, and were intended to conveniently represent 
 the silver pound in value. By the bullion values in the 
 markets of different countries it was found that the guinea 
 was worth 20^-. 8^/. as compared with the relative value of 
 a pound of silver; but the government declared it to have 
 the current value of twenty-one shillings silver, and both 
 gold and silver were made legal tenders to any amount. 
 For this reason debts could be paid more profitably in gold 
 than silver, as it had a legal tender value of ^d. in the 
 pound over silver, which being depressed at home was sent 
 abroad, under the operation of Gresham's economic law.
 
 In 1816 o-old was declared to be the only measure of 
 value to an unlimited anioimt, and the gold sovereign was 
 struck to represent the value of twenty shillings in silver, 
 or the pound unit. This gave silver an artificial value of 
 about six per cent., and was likely to drive the new sov- 
 ereign out of circulation, but the mischief was averted by 
 limiting the legal tender in silver to forty shillings. 
 
 Aristophanes was the first to discover that a base or 
 depreciated coinage always remained in circulation, while 
 the better coins immediately disappeared from the markets. 
 The same fact has been noticed by careful observers ever 
 since, and it has become a well-settled economic law. The 
 reason is obvious : if coins of full weight and value are 
 allowed to circulate with those which are depreciated, the 
 bad will remain and the good will disappear ; for every one 
 will try to pay his debt with the depreciated coin, while 
 those of full weight will go to the money-changers in ex- 
 change for coins of the same legal value but of less real 
 value, and thus make a profit by withdrawing the best cur- 
 rency from circulation. 
 
 The United States trade dollar, which was 7^ grains 
 heavier than the ordinary dollar, was coined for inter- 
 national circulation. The ordinary or light dollar was a 
 legal tender, but the trade dollar was not ; the consequence 
 was, the trade dollars were all exported and never came 
 back, being worth more as bullion than as dollars. 
 
 In this connection the variable character of the ratios at 
 different historical periods is worthy of attention. Herodo- 
 tus gives it as i to 13, Plato i to 12, Menander i to 10, and 
 in Caesar's time it was i to 9. From 1663 to 17 17 silver was 
 the standard of value in England, and gold passed at its 
 market value only, but the guinea was sometimes rated at 
 thirty shillings silver. After the re-coinage in 1696 the 
 guinea stood at 2^-. dd. Sir Isaac Newton, who was 
 master of the mint, proposed to reduce the guinea to a cir- 
 culating value of 2\s. At a parity with silver it should have 
 been 20^-. 8^/. Remaining at 2\s.^ a difference of only four 
 pence to the pound, drove out the white metal, and England
 
 was forced to a gold currency. The opposite treatment in 
 France gave that country a silver currency, and the silver 
 standard prevailed. On the other hand, the discovery of gold 
 in California and Australia added so immensely to the stock 
 of the world's gold that the ratios were changed by their 
 new conditions ; the fundamental law before referred to 
 asserted itself, and the currency of France became gold in 
 place of silver. 
 
 Such fluctuations as we have quoted under a double 
 standard cannot be prevented by the combined power of all 
 nations. An international congress cannot suspend the laws 
 of gravitation. No bimetallic ratio of 1 6 to i or 30 to i can 
 prevent one or the other from having its value as bullion, 
 regardless of its stamp at the mint, which determines noth- 
 ing but the r|uality and quantity of the bullion in the coin. 
 
 An act of Congress may make one metal or the other or 
 both a legal tender for debts, and thereby create a fictitious 
 value; but with a very slight change of the ratio in market 
 values, one or the other will be sold as bullion, and that 
 which remains for a circulating medium will always be the 
 least valuable as bullion. Such is the immutable law which 
 has governed this cjuestion in all ages, and no power on 
 earth can change it. 
 
 What is the best course for this country to pursue for the 
 advancement of its permanent prosperity, is a matter of 
 judgment, but the facts of history are the common property 
 of mankind and the true guides to wisdom for the formation 
 and exercise of a sound judgment. 
 
 EXCHANGE. 
 
 The artificial impediments created by different systems 
 of coinage in various countries having commercial inter- 
 course are regulated and adjusted by the nominal rate of 
 exchanging the coinage of one country for that of another. 
 
 The gold coinage of England has twenty-two carats pure 
 metal to two carats alloy, each coin having a percentage of 
 8.33+ alloy. If the United vStates coinage is below this 
 standard, and has only twenty or twenty-one carats pure
 
 metal to three or four carats alloy, we cannot exchange it 
 for English coin of the same weight without paying the 
 difference in value, which difference is the fixed nominal 
 exc/ia/ige. When the two countries have the same standard 
 for coinage, then the exchange is reckoned at par. If 
 however, they use different metals, gold and silver, there 
 can be no such thing as par of exchange, because the relative 
 market value is constantly changing. 
 
 COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE. 
 
 When the bankers in London and New York owe each 
 other equal amounts, the debts of one offset the other, and 
 the accounts being balanced no mone)' passes. If, however, 
 on settling day New York owes London one or two or three 
 millions the most, then the balance of trade is against us, 
 and we must pay the difference in coin. During this con- 
 dition of trade bankers' bills and commercial bills drawn 
 against bank credits, shipments of corn, cotton, wheat, sil- 
 ver, or any other product, will sell at a premium, because 
 they are payable in gold of the highest standard and at a 
 foreign port. This premium, it will be seen, can never ex- 
 ceed the specie pointy which is the cost of shipping gold from 
 New York to London or vice versa, which, with insurance 
 and carriage, is reckoned at about $5,000 for each million 
 shipped, and is the cost of maintaining such commercial 
 transactions on a specie basis. So, also, when the balance 
 of trade is in our favor, London exchange will be at a dis- 
 count ; but that discount can never fall below the cost of 
 shipping gold from London to New York. The two specie 
 points of premium and discount, therefore, mark the ex- 
 treme limits of commercial exchange between these two 
 great countries, because when the limit is reached the gold 
 will be shipped one way or the other as the balance may be. 
 
 The rate of interest at different points also affects the 
 movement of gold. If the Bank of England will lend its 
 surplus gold at two per cent, and New York will pay six 
 per cent., the London bankers will ship gold to New York 
 and meet the demand ; but when the surplus is being re-
 
 lO 
 
 daced towards the point fixed for the reserve, then the bank 
 raises the rate of interest and stops the outward flow of its 
 gold by making the shipment abroad unprofitable. So it is 
 also with wheat, cotton, or any other commodity. When 
 the demand is great and the price is high in England, large 
 shipments will be made from America imtil the English 
 price falls so as to make further shipments unprofitable. 
 
 A depreciated currency necessarily creates an adverse 
 condition of the market for exchange and destroys credit. 
 All history shows that there is no cure for the evil but a 
 prompt return to sound conditions. 
 
 Gold naturally flows to the cheapest point for the pur- 
 chase of commodities, 'and is borne thither by enterprising 
 traders who find their best profits in the most abundant 
 and cheapest markets. 
 
 VALUE. 
 
 While gold has been selected as the most stable measure 
 of value in exchange, so dtviajid has always pre-determined 
 the value of commodities to be measured for exchange or 
 commercial distribution. Any commodity for which there 
 is no demand has no value. Gold as the standard of meas- 
 ure is constant : but the demand for commodities is subject 
 to great fluctuations. The only commodity for which there 
 is no limit to the demand must always be the best standard 
 of measure for all other commodities. 
 
 When the law arbitrarily fixes the equation of i6 to i 
 for silver and gold, the people will experience very serious 
 trouble when the commercial ratios are at variance with the 
 law. For example, the law declares that in payment of 
 debts sixteen ounces of silver shall be received as the equiv- 
 alent for one ounce of gold ; but if the debtor or buyer has 
 gold, or a gold credit, he will never use it in payment of his 
 debt, for with the ounce of gold he can under some condi- 
 tions buy thirty ounces of silver, pay his debt with sixteen 
 ounces, and have fourteen ounces of silver left, making a 
 saving of 47 per cent, on his debt. It will be observed, how- 
 ever, that the possessor of gold is the only one who can
 
 1 1 
 
 make this saving; for he who has only silver cannot buy the 
 gold without a loss in silver which is fully equal to the 
 amount saved in paying his debt. English traders who deal 
 so largely in American products, will first buy silver with 
 their gold, and pay it to the planter for his cotton, and the 
 farmer for his wheat, the effect of which would l)e to export 
 gold and import silver where there is enough already. 
 
 It will be claimed, however, that the demand for silver 
 will be so great that in the course of time these abnormal 
 conditions will disappear by reason of a readjustment of 
 prices: but when India and Egypt with their cheap labor 
 control the price of cotton, and Russia, India, and the Ar- 
 gentine Republic control the price of wheat in Liverpool, 
 we shall have these and similar external difficulties to over- 
 come, and the road to readjustment will be long and diffi- 
 cult. 
 
 The holders of $9,000,000,000 of obligations in the form 
 of life insurance policies will not be made happy if they are 
 paid in silver or any other depreciated currency; and yet if 
 the premiums are to be paid in silver, the policies will have 
 to be paid in the same coin. 
 
 If the merchant who has insured his goods against de- 
 struction by^ fire on a gold value, can only collect his damage 
 in silver, whenever it is made a legal tender, he will suffer 
 largely thereby ; and this applies to every man's house or 
 business building in the country as the immediate effect of 
 a loss by fire, unless the policies are re-written to fit the 
 changed conditions. 
 
 The adoption of a bimetallic currency on the basis of 16 
 to I, making both metals a legal tender for debts, every 
 thoughtful man must know will lead us into silver mono- 
 metallism and multiply the evils from which we would 
 escape. 
 
 Congress has no power to fix the value of any commod- 
 ity, except as a legal tender ; and when this legal value is 
 above the world's markets it is purely fictitious, but it will 
 pay any man's debt who has something he can exchange for 
 it, but which does not possess an equal debt-paying power as
 
 12 
 
 legal tender. The difference between the purchasing- power 
 of gold and silver is evidenced by the premium on gold, 
 which is only another expression for the discount or diminu- 
 tion in the relative value of silver, but does not necessarily 
 signify a relative increase in the value of gold. So the term 
 "scarcity of money " does not mean that there is really any 
 less money than before, but that the condition of trade in- 
 vites its employment and circulation in business affairs. A 
 " tight money market " generally means that the banks have 
 been drained by the demands of an active business, and the 
 rate of interest is high. 
 
 INVESTMENTS. 
 
 Savings banks, trust companies, insurance companies, 
 estates, and private persons hold an enormous volume of 
 bonds issued by States, counties, towns, railroad and other 
 corporations, payable principal and interest in gold ; such 
 being the contract when the bonds were sold, and the price 
 and rate of interest w^ere then adjusted to that basis. Now 
 if Congress, the supreme law-making power, shall enact that 
 silver on the basis of 1 6 to i of its weight with gold shall be a 
 legal tender for " all debts " and for " all amounfs," it may be very 
 serious, unless the contract shall take precedence, and render 
 the legal tender act inoperative as to this most important 
 class of securities, for otherwise they would decline in value 
 more than fifty per cent., and the distress and indignation of 
 the people would rise superior to that of any power which 
 could so mistake its duty to the public. Hundreds of mil- 
 lions have been added to the public debt in the vain en- 
 deavor to legislate a parity of silver with gold on a basis 
 which is not only arbitrary but impossible. There is no 
 more reason for governmental bounties on the production of 
 sugar and silver than there is on cotton and wheat. The 
 decline in the price of these products has been greater than 
 the decline in the price of silver, and the distress has been 
 very great. We seem to forget that the products of the United 
 States are not a national monopoly ; all the nations of the 
 earth are in sharp competition with us, and the laws of sup-
 
 13 
 
 ply and demand will everywhere prevail without respect to 
 the acts of Coni^^-ress. 
 
 Natural laws are adjusted to changing- conditions auto- 
 matically. The closer we observe and the closer we keep to 
 natural conditions the better it will be, and the nearer we 
 shall come to an automatic adjustment of our currency with 
 the affairs of the people. 
 
 William the Conqueror put one-twentieth of a pound 
 weight of silver into his shilling. Elizabeth only one-third 
 as much, but William's shilling would buy as much bread as 
 three of Elizabeth's. We must either put a dollar's worth of 
 silver in a silver dollar, or the farmer will have to change 
 the size of his bushel and the merchant his yard-stick so as 
 to be on equality with the measure of silver. If silver is not 
 given a fictitious value as a legal tender, silver dollars will 
 then pass at their real value in exchange for wheat or pay- 
 ment of debts. Make the legal tender value and the bullion 
 value alike, and it will wrong no one. Free coinage will 
 then do no harm and honest dollars will multiply automat- 
 ically to fill the demands of trade. 
 
 If these historical facts are worth anything as guides to 
 the future, then it is certainly true that the United States 
 government cannot maintain the world's volume of silver 
 at parity with gold, on the basis of i6 to i, without bank- 
 ruptcy. 
 
 The demand for a silver standard, about i,ioo years ago, 
 was a long step forward. The demand for it now is a long 
 step backward. 
 
 To say that the millions of savings bank depositors, who 
 are mostly poor people, may be paid off with dollars worth 
 only fifty-three cents, would be an ugly item in our financial 
 history. 
 
 The bimetallic scheme for reducing the purchasing 
 power of the laborer's wages fifty per cent, will not go un- 
 challenged in the workshops and fields. 
 
 The theory that tmlimited coinage of silver with an 
 unlimited legal tender, will be a great relief to the debtor, 
 is unwittingly a confession of its iniquity. The debts which
 
 14 
 
 one man owes, another man owns. A poor man sells his 
 farm because he lacks the means or the health to work it; 
 his more thrifty neighbor buys it and executes a mortgag-e 
 for payment upon the interest of which the poor man must 
 live. By what principle of equity must the poor man be 
 robbed of half his bread, in order that the thrifty buyer of 
 his land may get it at half the price he agreed to pay ? 
 From the standpoint of commercial honesty this doctrine is 
 wrong end up. 
 
 The railway indebtedness of this country is the largest of 
 all; said to be over $6,000,000,000. It is owned everywhere, 
 at home and abroad, and interest and principal is largely 
 payable in gold ; making the income payable in silver would 
 double the debt and bankrupt the companies, filling the land 
 with beggars and relieving neither the one who owes, nor 
 the one who owns. 
 
 We may pump indefinitely the waters of the sea into 
 capacious cisterns, but we cannot change its level. One 
 Congress after another may force the purchase of silver by 
 the sale of gold-bearing bonds, and bankrupt the treasury; 
 while its vaults are filled to repletion, not a grain will there- 
 by be added to or taken from the world's stock of bullion, 
 and the government ^''fiat " will be the jest of mankind. 
 
 PROTECTION. 
 
 The most extravagant protectionist has never presumed 
 to ask the government to '''fiat'' his product and then make 
 the fiat good by selling bonds and purchasing the wares 
 which the markets will not take. That sort of protection 
 feeds upon its own vitals, and is of short duration. 
 
 INTRINSIC VALUE. 
 
 Very many people have an idea that silver has an intrinsic 
 value which does not pertain to other commodities. From 
 an economic standpoint, however, it has been well estab- 
 lished that the value of any commodity is to be judged by 
 its relation to other commodities entirely extraneous to 
 itself and for which it may be exchanged.
 
 15 
 
 The term intrinsic must necessarily refer to a quality 
 within itself and not to anything- external. xVny commodity, 
 therefore, which has no subject of comparison other than 
 itself cannot be said to have a definite value in an economic 
 sense. The value of use may have its effect on the value of 
 exchange, but in economics there can be no other value 
 than that of exchange, and the value of use is not con- 
 sidered; neither is the amount nor cost of the labor required 
 to produce it. It may cost double to produce a given 
 quantity of silver from low grade ores in one State than it 
 costs under more favorable conditions in another; but that 
 fact has no consideration in the bullion market. A Bank of 
 England note which will exchange for gold has an economic 
 value but no intrinsic value, and the labor of its production 
 is not considered. The concurrent demand for two com- 
 modities in diff-rcnt possession, is the original source of 
 value and the cause of exchange, which, being common to 
 all commodities, determines the relation of one to the other, 
 and gives a definition of value which is natural and con- 
 sistent. 
 
 ARTIFICIAL VALUES. 
 
 Artificial values are created by excessive and unnatural 
 demands. Congress may arbitrarily order the purchase of 
 three or four millions of silver per month and coin it into dol- 
 lars, for which there is no other need or demand than the 
 desire of the producer to sell; but the time comes when it 
 has to stop, and the reaction is more disastrous to com- 
 mercial affairs than the entire value of the silver pur- 
 chased. 
 
 The stock of silver owned and controlled by the United 
 States government is a menace to the whole world, and has 
 done the silver-producing states more harm than it is all worth. 
 Stimulating production at extravagant cost in order to take 
 advantage of a forced, arbitrary, and unnatural demand 
 must always be ruinous when the time comes for restoration 
 to the natural order of all things.
 
 i6 
 
 THE UNIT. 
 
 The unit of value in the United States is twenty-five and 
 eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine ; and this quan- 
 tity and quality is called a dollar. Its principal use is the 
 service which it renders as the standard measure of all other 
 commodities for which it may be exchanged. The selection 
 of this material for the office which it performs is the result 
 of an experience in trade which covers the entire history of 
 civilization, and the experiments and practice of mankind in 
 all nations with divers other substances and things as substi- 
 tutes and legal equivalents, the chief of which is silver. 
 
 Gold and silver have been termed the precious metals, for 
 the reason that they have useful and desirable properties 
 other than the money value of exchange. Their intrinsic 
 qualities are imperishable and unchangeable. Pure gold and 
 silver have but one quality of metal, and there are no adjec- 
 tives like good, better, and best to describe such quality. 
 They have great utility in the arts, and b.eing indestructible 
 are most desirable for possession, and take high rank in the 
 confidence of all men as security for debt and a certificate of 
 credit for the prompt supply of all needful commodities. 
 The selection of these metals to perform the functions of 
 money has been the natural development of the ages, and is 
 witness to the universal judgment of all nations that they 
 are best qualified for that service. So long as the supply 
 and demand kept the two metals on a natural parity, it was 
 only a matter of convenience or choice whether it should be 
 one pound of gold or sixteen pounds of silver ; but when the 
 markets are everywhere overstocked with silver, and the 
 pressure to sell is greater than the demand, then the parity is 
 lost, confidence disturbed, and it is utterly repudiated as a 
 standard of measure, except to that extent which the law 
 compels its reception for debt. For this disastrous condition 
 of things there is only one remedy, and that is to stop pro- 
 duction until the natural parity is restored. Passing laws to 
 restore parity at the cost of the public treasury would only 
 be another name for a charge or tax on all other commodities 
 for the amount required. This would stimulate further pro-
 
 •7 
 
 duction, multipl}' the evil, destroy confidence, and make the 
 crash all the more terrible by its postponement, at the cost 
 of national credit. 
 
 If silver has been demonetized, who in the wide world is 
 responsible for it but the silver producers who have so 
 choked the bullion markets of the world that the demand 
 has been smothered by an over supply. The very fact that 
 the vaults of the United States Government are all full and 
 can hold no more is a constant hazard to the bullion markets 
 of the world. The German government relieved its own 
 surcharged vaults by selling its silver for so much gold as 
 they could get for it. It was a relief to Germany, but a load 
 on the general market. The United States Government 
 cannot now sell its stock of silver for one-half its original 
 cost. The silver producers now propose to relieve them- 
 selves by such legislation as will force all other industries to 
 buy the product at a higher price than it is worth in any 
 market in the world, for they tell us that this forced demand 
 would put up the price of bullion, and increase the purchas- 
 ing power of the silver dollar. What reason in the world 
 the farmer can have for putting up the price of silver, when 
 by the same act he is forced to buy it with a larger quantity 
 of wheat, does not appear ; as the price of wheat is gov- 
 erned by the market in Liverpool, and the farmer cannot 
 mark up his wheat to meet the price of silver. It is for the 
 interest of all industries that they be allowed to buy silver 
 dollars if they want them on the best terms possible, and 
 without any interference on the part of government in the 
 interest of silver at the people's expense. 
 
 The claim that free coinage and unlimited tender would 
 make money plenty for every man's use is squarely against 
 the experience of ages and opposed to well-known principles 
 of economic science. If it is true that the price of silver 
 would rise by reason of the unnatural pressure of law and 
 artificial demand, it cannot possibly be true that the price of 
 wheat and cotton would be higher in the same proportion, 
 for Russia, India, Egypt, and the Argentine Republic con-
 
 j8 
 
 trol the price of wheat and cotton in this country by making- 
 the price in Liverpool ; and this cannot be prevented by acts 
 of Congress, neither by the rise or fall of silver. 
 
 Bimetallism means a double standard, two metals both of 
 which being declared by Congress to have a fixed relative 
 and nominal value, and either ma}^ be taken at its nominal 
 value as the true measure of all other values in exchange ; 
 but in payment of debts the debtor may take /lis iJwice which 
 metal he will use, and he always uses that which has the low- 
 est market or exchange value. Quick to perceive the effect 
 of the double standard, the seller now takes his oftion and 
 marks up his goods to a point where opposite the dollar-mark 
 we read fifty per cent, discount for payment in gold and no 
 credit. He has discovered that a measure which is at one 
 time four per cent, too long and at another is fifty per cent, 
 too short, is not much of a standard for anything. He has 
 also found an economic truth that there can be only one 
 standard and that exactness in the measure of values in use 
 and values in exchange, does not reside permanently in 
 anything. 
 
 The advocates of bimetallism and a double standard con- 
 tend, that the differences referred to do not show a decline 
 in the exchange value of silver, but a rise in the exchange 
 value of gold. If this claim is true, how can it be demon- 
 strated so that the fact may be considered proven and no 
 longer left open as an item in the dispute ? 
 
 From i860 to 1873 it is certain that silver commanded a 
 premium over the gold standard continuously from one to 
 four per cent., and for that reason disappeared entirely from 
 circulation, and fractional paper currency took its place. 
 During the year 1873 the decline in silver reached its parity 
 with gold. 
 
 The average price per fine ounce in 1873 was $1.28.24. 
 The average value of the silver dollar in 1873 was .98.87. 
 The commercial ratio of silver to gold in 1873 was 16.17 to i. 
 The average price per fine ounce in 1893 was .70.17. 
 The average value of the silver dollar in 1893 was .54-27. 
 The commercial ratio of silver to gold in 1893 was 29.45 to i.
 
 19 
 
 The same corresponding" values and ratios prevailed in 
 the exchanges of Europe. 
 
 This enormous decline over a period of twenty years is 
 to be accounted for so that we can determine whether it is 
 to be attributed to a rise in gold, or fall in silver, and the 
 question should be met fairly. 
 
 First. In 1873 the world's production of silver for the 
 year was $81,800,000. 
 
 Year by year the rate of production increased until it 
 reached in 1892 an annual production of $196,105,000, an 
 increase of more than 239 per cent, over the year 1873, when 
 silver was par with gold. 
 
 Second. In 1873 Germany adopted the single gold stand- 
 ard, and threw upon the bullion markets of Europe her 
 large stock of silver, which caused a sharp decline. 
 
 lliird. In 1873-4-5 Denmark, Norwa}^, vSweden, and 
 Holland adopted the gold standard and stopped the coinage 
 of silver except for small change. 
 
 Fourth. In 1878 the Latin Union stopped the coinage of 
 full legal tender silver coins and it has not been resumed. 
 
 Fifth. In 1876 Russia suspended the coinage of silver 
 except for such amounts as were required for her trade with 
 China. 
 
 Sixth. In 1879 Austria, and in 1892 Hungary, suspended 
 the free coinage of silver, and adopted the gold standard. 
 
 Seventh. In 1893 India closed her mints to free coinage, 
 and the United States repealed the purchasing clause of the 
 act of 1890, which called for 4,500,000 ounces per month. 
 
 There was nothing to prevent the declination of silver, 
 which simply obeyed the laws of gravitation, and it was 
 excessive production more than all other causes combined 
 which forced it down. An increase of the supply and a 
 decrease in the demand, produced its natural result. 
 
 In this connection it would be unwise to say that the in- 
 creased demand for gold in those countries where it had 
 been made the single standard did not have any effect upon 
 the exchange value of gold for other commodities. But as it 
 has been made tJie standard by which all other values are
 
 20 
 
 measured, there is no other "bench-mark" or fixed point, 
 above or below which the fluctuations, if any, can be meas- 
 ured as to its own value in exchange, therefore such standard 
 measure or unit of value must be treated as constant and 
 invariable for economic questions. Every attempt to erect 
 another standard by which the constancy of the gold stand- 
 ard shall be tried, will only result in confusion, and disturb 
 rather than create confidence in any standard. 
 
 There are but three options : The single gold standard, 
 the bimetallic or double standard, and the single silver 
 standard. 
 
 To the single gold standard, the objection is raised that 
 there is not gold enough in the world for that purpose, and 
 in all fairness it must be admitted, that if all nations should 
 suddenly adopt the single gold standard the strain at certain 
 points would be very great, and for a time considerable in- 
 convenience would follow. Those countries would suffer 
 the most where the people are their own bankers and every- 
 thing bought is paid for in cash from hand to hand. 
 
 Banks are the natural and convenient clearing-houses for 
 the people ; and where they exist under proper regulations 
 and restrictions the actual volume of cash required by the 
 community which they serve is only a fraction of that which 
 would otherwise be an absolute necessity. A check for one 
 thousand dollars may transfer a bank credit from A. to B., 
 and again from B. to C, and C. to D., until the actual trade 
 liquidations of that one payment may amount to ten, twenty, 
 or thirty thousand dollars, without the handling of a single 
 specie dollar. This is illustrated on a large scale by the 
 daily bank clearings in the city of New York. The day 
 would not be long enough and the risk would be very great 
 for each bank to collect the checks which in a single day's 
 business are received over its counter on many other city 
 banks ; whereas, by sending them all into the clearing- house 
 the exchanges are made in an hour, and the balance only has 
 to be provided for, which is but a mere fraction of the busi- 
 ness transacted. So, also, between commercial nations the
 
 21 
 
 exchanges are made by bills of exchange, drafts, letters of 
 credit, etc., and coin is only shipped to cover balances which 
 are comparatively small. But a single gold standard would 
 not prevent the use of silver in moderate transactions, nor 
 for purposes of change. If its legal-tender value is limited 
 to ten dollars there will be no less silver in active circulation than 
 there is now. 
 
 A bimetallic or double standard is an utterly impossible 
 thing ; two weights for a standard pound, two lengths for a 
 standard yard, are gross absurdities. 
 
 The third option is a single silver standard, by means of 
 which gold would become a commodity, with its central mar- 
 ket in London, and none in the United vStates, for it would 
 all leave us. 
 
 The strong reasons in favor of a single silver standard 
 are : — 
 
 First. It is one of the great products of the country, and 
 we want to sell it. In this respect it occupies the same posi- 
 tion as wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, and all other products, 
 the surplus of which we are compelled to sell at the market 
 price, whatever it may be. The silver farmer cannot sell his 
 crop in Europe because the markets are overstocked and the 
 price is low, therefore he goes to Congress and asks the gov- 
 ernment to buy his product and take the risk of holding it. 
 This gives the silver producer an advantage which no other 
 producer enjoys, and is unfair to every other industry which 
 takes the risk of its own production. 
 
 Second. " If silver is made the standard measure of all 
 values in this country then the demand for its use as money 
 would be so largely increased that the price would go up im- 
 mediately to par with gold," which means an advance of 50 
 per cent, in the price of silver. 
 
 If that is true, then the cotton planter, and the wheat 
 raiser, would have to pay in their products double price for 
 their dollars, because the government cannot use its power 
 to put up the price of wheat and cotton as well as silver. It 
 will be observed that the plan for a silver standard means 
 also that the silver producer can exchange his surplus
 
 22 
 
 product for gold, while uU other industries must exchang-e 
 their surplus products for silver. The silver producer does 
 not care to exchange silver for silver, unless the silver he 
 gets in return is made a /eg a/ tc/ider iov all amounts — and 
 in that condition he can exchange it for gold. 
 
 It is a great fallacy, however, to suppose that the in- 
 creased use of silver for currency will materially advance 
 the price unless all other nations adopt the same standard, 
 for it is certain that even a small advance in the price would 
 bring to the United States a sufficient supply from Europe 
 to force it down again. 
 
 FREE COINAGE. 
 
 Will do no harm unless silver is made a legal-tender for all 
 amounts ; limit the legal-tender to ten dollars and no one 
 will waste breath on free coinage. 
 
 Nothing can be permanent which gives any one product 
 an unjust advantage over all other products at government 
 expense. It is purely a question of economics and just 
 trade, and not a question of party politics. 
 
 The cry for '■'cheap money and J>/eji(v of it,'' is a catch 
 phrase, and a bait to the unwary. When business is good, 
 good money abounds. When business is bad, bad money 
 does not make it better. The laborer cannot obtain even 
 bad money for idleness ; but when his labor is in demand he 
 has no trouble in getting the best. 
 
 The treasury vaults in Washington and elsewhere are 
 filled with silver until there is no room for more, but it does 
 not promote business. 
 
 The governinent is issuing bonds and buying gold to 
 maintain the parity of idle silver, and stimulate the produc- 
 tion of more, but it does not stimulate business nor inspire 
 confidence either at home or abroad. It is a policy in direct 
 opposition to the experience of the ages, and the best 
 authorities the world over condemn it. The drastic remedy 
 for an over-production of tenantless houses is to stop building. 
 If on the contrary a booming city government in order to 
 provide employment for its idle masons and carpenters sells 
 bonds, lays out new streets, and continues to build, it in-
 
 23 
 
 volves the whole community in a o-eneral bankruptcy, and 
 the remedy is worse than the disease. Buying- four hundred 
 millions of silver gave temporary relief to the miners, and 
 a lasting burden to the people. It did not stop the decline, 
 but hastened it by continued production. The extra session 
 of 1893 stopped further buying, but the stock now piled up 
 in the government vaults could not be quickly sold for more 
 than one-third its cost. Such is the result of applying 
 artificial force to the natural laws of supply and demand. 
 
 LIFE INSURANCE AND SAVINGS BANKS. 
 
 The advocates of a silver standard have severely con- 
 demned the officers of those companies which have given 
 warning that a silver standard with a silver deposit and a 
 silver premium will bring forth nothing but silver. By thus 
 rejecting the natural crop from the seed they sow, they con- 
 demn themselves. They are, indeed, of those who would 
 gather grapes from thorns, and figs from thistles. The 
 people's reserve for the future is largely with life insurance 
 companies and savings banks. The resulting possibilities 
 are the effects of accumulating compound interest. If this 
 accumulation is silver then the dividends and payments 
 must be silver, and the officers and directors of these com- 
 panies have no power to do otherwise, for whatsoever is 
 sown that they must reap, and of all men the advocates of a 
 silver standard should not reject the fruit from their own 
 planting. Nothing can be more significant of the danger 
 which lurks in this scheme than the bad temper with which 
 its advocates have received the suggestion that they may, 
 some day, have to accept their own coin in payment of their 
 own claims. 
 
 WANT OF CONFIDENCE. 
 
 England takes first rank as a commercial power because 
 of the integrity and stability of her monetary system. The 
 pound-sterling is known and respected at its true value in 
 every port of the world. To our shame this is not true of 
 the United States dollar, and the merchant who buys goods 
 in China, Japan, India, Australia, or South America must
 
 24 
 
 pay for them by sterling exchange on London, which is 
 good everywhere. This is mainly owing to want of confi- 
 dence in our monetary system, which is likely to imdergo 
 some radical change at any session of Congress. The per- 
 manent establishment of our money unit on a gold basis 
 would be an effectual remedy for the evil, and confidence 
 would be everywhere established. 
 
 NOT GOLD ENOUGH. 
 
 The claim that there is not gold enough for the business 
 transactions of the country is a great mistake. Where 
 there is confidence enough there is gold enough, and no 
 amount of silver will suffice for the lack of confidence. 
 Two or three twists of the British lion's tail and a foolish 
 threat of paying our debts with silver, will give wings to a 
 few millions of gold, which flies away to London, taking the 
 place of our own securities. Then we employ J. P. Morgan 
 & Co. to coax it back again, and pay the freight both ways. 
 With the confidence inspired by a sound monetary system 
 all the gold required wnll come to us for the asking, so long 
 as our rates of interest exceed the rates in England. 
 
 Business is paralyzed and stagnant at all points in the 
 United States, not from want of money or other facilities, 
 but for want of confidence. Every business man is distrust- 
 ful and anxious for the immediate future, therefore he folds 
 his hands and waits. 
 
 We cannot look for a permanent revival of business until 
 this question is settled and the United vStates adopts a mone- 
 tary system equal to the best. Our present system is de- 
 monstrably the worst in the world. If we take to our grocer 
 five dollars in silver and five dollars in gold, he will take 
 either or both in exchange for his goods, although one metal 
 is worth only half as much as the other. Pie does this 
 because the United States Government makes good the differ- 
 ence and pays it out of the public treasury. Hundreds of millions 
 have been paid out in this way for the purpose of holding up 
 silver to parity with gold regardless of its commercial value. 
 All this has been done for the protection of the silver pro-
 
 25 
 
 diicer alone, and to the detriment of every other industry. 
 It is time that the silver industry should seek its own mar- 
 kets and stop drawing gold from the United States treasviry 
 for proteetion. 
 
 If there is too much silver, stop the production; if there 
 is not too much, then let those who have it sell to those who 
 want it, just as all other commercial products are sold, and 
 no one will interfere. An immense amount of silver will 
 always be required for fractional coins and the payment of 
 small debts even under a single gold standard ; and these 
 are said to embrace the greatest amount of all human trans- 
 actions where money actually passes from hand to hand. 
 
 By the United States treasury reports we find that about 
 87 per cent, of our imports and more than 92 per cent, of 
 our exports are from and to countries where gold is the sin- 
 gle standard. It is evident, therefore, that any other stand- 
 ard would be inconvenient, confusing, and detrimental to 
 trade. 
 
 Under free coinage acts over a period of eighty years 
 only $8,000,000 were called for by the people of the United 
 States. Under forced coinage acts $215,000,000 were coined 
 in eight years, but few went into circulation. Nobody will 
 export them because our legal tender acts cannot go with 
 them. Nobody will melt them because their bullion value 
 is fifty per cent, less than the cost. To this extent, there- 
 fore, we will have to remain bimetallists, unless the govern- 
 ment re-melts and sells the bullion at a loss of $107,000,000 
 more. Verily the experiment of holding up the price of 
 silver against all other nations has been a very costly and 
 instructive lesson to the people of the United States, and the 
 time has come when silver must take its natural place with 
 all other products, and its appropriate place Avith the moneys 
 of the world, regardless of all other considerations. 
 
 BIMETALLISM. 
 
 Gold and silver cannot both be made a measure of the 
 exchange values which applied to commodities constitutes 
 the commerce of the w^orld. The standard must be con-
 
 26 
 
 stant. It may be gold or it may be silver ; but it cannot be 
 both for the perfect reason that their relations to each other 
 are not constant and cannot be made so even by interna- 
 tional law. 
 
 If gold is the standard, the weight and fineness of the 
 metal being established, then the money unit of one dollar 
 becomes invariable ; and a contract which has twenty days 
 or twenty months or twenty years to run will be adjusted 
 and satisfied without any appreciation or depreciation of the 
 standard. But if it may be discharged and satisfied with 
 dollars made either of gold or silver, then the payor may 
 gain an enormous advantage by exercising his option, and 
 the payee will lose what the payor gains. Such possibilities 
 as this would prevent the inaking of any contracts or en- 
 gagements which could be thus exposed, and the sale of 
 long-time bonds, whether state, municipal, or corporate, 
 would be impossible, and both public and private affairs 
 would be sadly impeded and confused. 
 
 A piece of gold containing twenty-five and eight-tenths 
 grains standard metal is made by law the unit of value, and 
 is called a dollar. Possessing two of these pieces, with or 
 without the mint stamp, they will exchange each for the 
 other on equal terms, and one as well as another for other 
 commodities. There can be no such thing as rise or fall, 
 appreciation or depreciation, shrinkage or expansion in the 
 use or relation of these dollars to each other, nor in relation 
 to the commodities whose value they measure in exchange. 
 But when we erect another standard and make another 
 dollar out of silver, calling four hundred and twelve and 
 one-half grains of standard silver the exact equivalent of 
 twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold, each dollar hav- 
 ing the same function as the other and each being a legal 
 standard of measure, we find ourselves in the midst of diffi- 
 culties. The relation of one silver dollar to another silver 
 dollar is constant, but the relation of a silver dollar to a gold 
 dollar, and also to the commodities being measured, has 
 changed materially ; in fact, as much as fifty per cent. The 
 result is that one or the other of these coins has ceased to be
 
 27 
 
 a dollar; the gold coin is 150 cents, or the silver coin is only 
 50 cents, which is it ? The gold partisan says that silver as 
 a value in exchange has fallen ; the silver partisan says gold 
 has appreciated, — which is right ? We go into the markets 
 and we find everywhere a surplus stock of silver for sale. 
 The great decline has created a suspicion as to its stability, 
 and it is so abundant that all fear it may go still lower ; 
 therefore no one cares to take the risk of holding it. The 
 same testimony comes from all foreign markets ; there is a 
 manifest over-production, and the supply is greater than the 
 demand. Silver is everywhere being dropped as a proper 
 measure because it is inconstant ; the gold standard is ev- 
 erywhere being established because it is stable and constant. 
 We find that the mint values for gold show but trifling fluc- 
 tuations anywhere, while the mints have very generally 
 ceased the coining of silver except for small change, and the 
 price at the mint is not in excess of the market for bullion. 
 The evidence, in fact, all points one way, and we are forced 
 to the conclusion that an over-production of silver has di- 
 minished the demand, and therefore four hundred and twelve 
 and one-half grains of standard silver are no longer one 
 dollar, but that twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold 
 still fits the standard, and is therefore our only standard 
 dollar, and it cannot rise above the standard in respect to 
 itself. There may be a great variation in respect to silver 
 and all other commodities, but none in respect to gold, 
 which is the standard measure by which all fluctuations are 
 determined, or it is not a standard. 
 
 All this proves conclusively that the stamp at the mint 
 certifies nothing but the actual weight and fineness of the 
 coin, and has nothing to do with values in exchange. 
 
 Holding silver to parity with gold when there is only half 
 a dollar's worth of silver in a silver dollar is like offering a 
 premium on clipped coins and counterfeits. 
 
 We deplore as much as any one can the condition of 
 things which checks the production of silver and affects in- 
 juriously a large industry in the mining states. We have 
 large interests there which must share in the general de-
 
 28 
 
 pression; but there are fundamental principles which lie at 
 the roots of our national prosperity the discarding of which 
 will involve the whole country in disaster and ten times 
 greater loss. Our present indebtedness must be paid in 
 gold ; and to this the good faith and honor of every good 
 citizen in the United States is pledged, and it will be 
 fulfilled. 
 
 Another evidence that it is silver which has declined, and 
 not gold which has risen, is shown in the bad temper of 
 the silver party and the means they employ to force upon 
 the markets an artificial demand for a product for which 
 there is no room. Let us not be deceived. The silver 
 partisan, by the very means which he employs to force his 
 goods upon an unwilling market, confesses that silver has lost 
 its exchange power, and for that reason the price has fallen. 
 In the bullion markets for gold there is no such disturbance, 
 and the standard is maintained without artifice in any of its 
 various phases. 
 
 Can the people of the United States restore the standard 
 of measure to silver which it has lost, and by what means 
 can it be done so that it will be permanent ? This is the 
 question which is now agitating the people, and from center 
 to circumference the whole country seeks a complete answer 
 to the question. 
 
 The double standard partizan says that it must be accom- 
 plished by legislation, and the commercial world must accept 
 nolens volens the exchange values which are established by 
 law. The single standard partisan says that the question 
 must be governed by the natural force of economic laws, 
 which cannot be regulated by statutes. 
 
 The double standard advocate claims that Congress has 
 the power to fix the quantity of gold in a dollar and the 
 quantity of silver in a dollar, and then to declare that the 
 exchange value of these respective cpiantities is equal and 
 that each shall be a legal tender for all amounts. The single 
 standard advocate says that gold and silver are by nature 
 both economic quantities, and that the exchange value will
 
 29 
 
 always be subject to variations under an economic law stated 
 as follows: The value of silver to gold will increase — 
 
 First, by a decrease of the quantity ; 
 
 Second, by an increase of the demand. 
 
 So also the value will decrease — ) Macleod. 
 
 First, by an increase of the quantity; 
 
 Second, by a decrease of the demand. 
 
 He claims also that the means for the increase of one and 
 the decrease of the other cannot be made permanent by any 
 statutory act which can be passed by any power or conven- 
 tion of powers. 
 
 He claims also that while it is possible for legislative 
 power to create a standard by fixing the unit of gold, thus 
 making gold's value constant, and by which standard the 
 increase or decrease of all other values must be measured, 
 he denies that there can be two standards for the same meas- 
 ure, any more than there can be two specific gravities for 
 the same substance. He admits that the standard unit may 
 be fixed in silver, and that for economic purposes the use of 
 silver by all nations could be made the universal measure. 
 He denies the expediency of such a change, for the reason 
 that ninety-five per cent, of all our foreign commercial trans- 
 actions are with countries using the gold standard which will 
 not change, and that such a change would be of great inter- 
 national embarrassment, ver}^ damaging to trade both foreign 
 and domestic, and of no benefit to anybody other than the 
 silver producer himself, and of no permanent benefit to him, 
 for sooner or later continued production will overwhelm the 
 demand, the standard will be disregarded, and chaos will 
 prevail. The economic law will then assert itself, and the 
 statute become obsolete. 
 
 To this the silver advocate replies : — " The fifty-cent 
 silver dollar was caused by the demonetization of silver. By 
 reason of the appreciation of gold the farmer's products have 
 fallen in value. If other things which the farmer wants 
 have fallen also, he does not get the benefit of it because he 
 sells at wholesale and buys at retail. What we want is a 
 dollar which will hold its parity with the property which 
 that dollar is to buy." — [Bryan's speeches.
 
 30 
 
 Economist replies: — 
 
 Speaking of dollars as measures of value, there are no 
 fifty-cent dollars in the United States, for the government 
 has maintained their parity with gold and has paid the cost. 
 A silver dollar will therefore buy just as much wheat as a 
 gold dollar. It is a blunder, therefore, to say that the farm- 
 er's products have fallen because gold has appreciated ; gold 
 has not appreciated, and the farmer can get gold dollars for his 
 wheat just as well as silver dollars, if he wants them. It 
 does not seem probable that under free coinage the farmer 
 will be any more likely to buy at wholesale than before. 
 What is meant by ' a dollar which will hold its parity with 
 property,' I do not understand. There is no such thing as 
 parity with property, and there is no standard for parity 
 other than gold. Parity with wheat, cotton, and dried cod- 
 fish would be nonsense, and yet dried codfish was once used 
 as money. The farmer knows very well that the price of 
 silver and gold bullion in the United States can have noth- 
 ing to do with the price of wheat, for that is determined by 
 the supply in Liverpool and Russia and the Argentine ; 
 when the crops are large the price is small. On the other 
 hand, he would have the miner believe that multiplying 
 dollars under a free coinage act is going to put up the price 
 of silver dollars and pull down the price of gold, thus revers- 
 ing the law of supply and demand. The farmer wants to 
 sell his product and buy dollars ; the owner of dollars wants 
 to sell his dollars and buy wheat ; what object then has the 
 farmer in putting up the price of dollars ? The price of 
 wheat is controlled by conditions beyond the seas. 
 
 The silver advocate continues : — 
 
 " A double standard and free coinage will make money 
 abundant and easy to get, so that the western farmer can 
 pay off his mortgage to the eastern money grabber and get 
 out of debt, rather than lose his farm by process of fore- 
 closure. 'A young man buys a farm, pays $r,ooo down 
 and gives a mortgage for the other thousand. Money rises 
 in value until it is worth twice as much as it was when the 
 man gave the mortgage, so that it takes twice as much 
 wheat to pay the interest, twice as much to pay the taxes, 
 and twice as much to pay the debt. The value of the land
 
 31 
 
 has g'one down, and the farm is no longer security even for 
 the $r,ooo mortgat^e. The man who holds the mortgage 
 ^ets the farm back, and is twice as well off as he was before. 
 The young man who bought has lost everything, and must 
 begin life again.' " — [Bryan's speeches. 
 
 Economist replies : — 
 
 From an economic standpoint here is a queer condition 
 of things. Money has risen one hundred per cent, above 
 its own standard, land has fallen over fifty per cent., and farm 
 products and taxes have not changed at all. Such a condition 
 of things cannot exist as has been here stated, for if the 
 5''oung man sells his farm product for money under the precise 
 condition stated, then one-half of it will pay off just as 
 much indebtedness as the whole would pay at the time he 
 bought his farm. The illustration is a romance of the imag- 
 ination, but not a fact in business life. When the silver 
 advocate talks to the producer of silver, he wants free coin- 
 age and a full legal tender so as to appreciate the value of his 
 silver money to parity with gold. When he talks to the 
 farmer, he wants free coinage so as to make money cheap and 
 abundant and thus appreciate the value of his product, but he 
 says nothing about the legal tender. When he talks to the 
 laborer, he wants free coinage, cheap money and enough of 
 it, so as to appreciate the nominal wages paid for his toil, but 
 he does not tell him that if his wages are paid in gold one- 
 half the amount is better than the whole if paid in silver. 
 Now he talks legal tender for the purpose of making the 
 laborer believe that his silver has the same purchasing power 
 as gold, and in that case he gets his wages doubled. If the 
 legal tender clause is repealed then the silver dollar will 
 only pass for its commercial value, fifty cents. Repeal the 
 legal tender clause as to the gold dollar and it will still pass 
 at its standard value, one hundred cents. The manifest ob- 
 ject, then, of the full legal tender clause is to force the 
 people of this country to accept fifty cents' worth of silver in 
 place of one hundred cents' worth of gold. This is contrary 
 to every principle of sound economics, contrary to every 
 principle of commercial honesty, and it will never be done. 
 To say that money (meaning gold) is worth twice as
 
 32 
 
 much at one time as it is at another, is simply darkening 
 counsel by words without knowledge. In respect to itself 
 gold cannot rise above its own standard. An ounce of stand- 
 ard gold in one man's hands will always exchange for an 
 ounce of standard gold in another man's hands, an ounce of 
 silver for another ounce of silver. The relation of an ounce 
 of gold to an ounce of silver may change and so also the rise 
 and fall of commodities can be determined by the relation to 
 other commodities. When one commodity like gold or silver 
 is separated from all other commodities and made the stand- 
 ard of measure then it can never rise or fall as a measure by 
 the value of a single grain, for it has no other standard of 
 comparison than its own quantity, and one quantity must 
 always be equal to the same quantity of the same thing. If, 
 however, for the sake of multiplying money we make a 
 double standard and decree that sixteen ounces of silver 
 shall be the equivalent of one ounce of gold, we immediately 
 introduce an element of comparison ; the law of supply and 
 demand asserts itself, and a question arises as to the true 
 equation of the double standard ; there is an apparent differ- 
 ence in the measure ; has the gold standard lengthened ? or 
 has the silver standard shortened ? Our inquiry is limited 
 to the conditions which apply to the two measures, and we 
 find that from i860 to 1873 the silver measure was the 
 longest by from two to four per cent.; in 1896 it is the short- 
 est by 50 per cent. The gold standard has been treated as 
 being constant : it did not lengthen to the silver standard 
 when it was the longest, nor does it shrink to its smaller di- 
 mension when it is shortest, therefore, gold has not risen nor 
 fallen but silver has reached such extremes of fluctuation, as 
 to prove conclusively that a double standard cannot be main- 
 tained without a never-ending change of the commercial 
 ratio. A scarcity of money may by increasing the rate of 
 interest show an apparent increase in the demand for all 
 kinds of money but it does not change the standard measure. 
 Bimetallism, then, means silver monometallism and noth- 
 ing else.
 
 33 
 
 The silver advocate says : — 
 
 " Every nation which goes to the gold standard increases 
 the demand for gold, and every increase in the demand for 
 gold raises the purchasing power of an ounce of gold and 
 lowers the purchasing power of wheat and corn and other 
 products of the farm. You enshrine gold as the one thing 
 to be desired and all mankind pavs tribute to the golden 
 calf. 
 
 " While we want to get rid of the gold standard we must 
 keep the thing which we don't want t:ntil aliens shall bring 
 ns the relief which we should achieve for ourselves. — 
 [Bryan's speeches. 
 
 Economist replies : — 
 
 The purchasing power of wheat and cotton are not in 
 any way affected by the question of a gold standard in 
 foreign countries. Cheap labor in Russia, Egypt, and India 
 can put these products in the warehouses of Liverpool 
 cheaper than Iowa, Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois, or Kansas. 
 It is that fact and not the kind of money used in payment 
 which governs the price. India is on a silver basis, and 
 practically so is the Argentine Republic, their crops are paid 
 for in silver ; the English merchant first buys the money of 
 the country with which he trades, and then pays it out for the 
 commodities he wants. When wheat brought $1.35 per bushel 
 in Dakota the price of gold and silver bullion in New York and 
 London had nothing to do with it. The demand was great, 
 crops were short, and the supply was relatively small, it was 
 purely a question of supply and demand. And. now when 
 wheat is worth about one-third what it was then, it is still 
 a question of supply and demand, and the ' rise of gold ' or 
 ' fall of silver ' has nothing to do with it ; the controlling 
 factor is, how much have the competing countries got to 
 sell and at what price will they sell it ? 
 
 If the legal tender clause should be repealed to-morrow 
 and the outstanding certificates redeemed it would not put 
 up the price of wheat, but it would take about twice as much 
 coined silver to buy a bushel as it does now, and it would be 
 worth no more to the farmer than the currency he gets now. 
 It would not increase the purchasing power of his wheat, 
 3
 
 34 
 
 even for another slice from the 'golden calf,' but it would 
 send his children through the fires uni.. Moloch to get the 
 last quotation for silver. 
 
 The leading advocates for a silver standard reject gold 
 for the reason that its value has risen so high and so rapidly 
 that the purchasing power of all commodities and products 
 have been greatly reduced. 
 
 The advocates for a gold standard reject silver because it 
 has fallen so low and so rapidly that double the quantity is 
 required for the purchase of commodities that was needed 
 before the decline, unless parity is maintained at govern- 
 ment expense. 
 
 Only one of these propositions can be true in the main. 
 The facts which bear upon the question are historical ; but 
 the conclusions are controlled in part by prejudice and in 
 part by argument. The result is that different conclusions 
 are drawn from the same state of facts, for the reason that a 
 like cause does not invariably have the same effect ; conse- 
 quently the postulate assumed in one case will not apply to 
 the other, for example ; the sudden influx of gold between 
 the years 1850 and 1875, greater in volume than the entire 
 product for the previous 357 years, would quite naturally call 
 for a marked decline in the exchange value, as the world's 
 product for these twenty-five years was over three thousand 
 three hundred niilHons of dollars. vSo far, however, from its caus- 
 ing a serious decline it was quickly sought for and absorbed 
 by those far-seeing countries which desired to substitute a 
 standard of gold for that of silver, and the result was that it 
 crowded out an equal value in silver and took its place. This 
 caused a decline in silver which was looked for in gold and 
 gave an exception to the rule of excessive production, with a 
 competent witness to the law of supply and demand. 
 
 A considerable proportion of that gold was from Califor- 
 nia, and if the United States had purchased it as a cover for 
 gold certificates, this country would have been firmly estab- 
 lished on a gold basis, its credit largely improved, and 
 France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland would probably 
 have been still on a silver basis. Keeping our gold would
 
 35 
 
 have improved our market for silver, of which we had 
 enough and to spare, and fortified our national credit beyond 
 the assaults and jibes of men. 
 
 Far-sii^hted Germany, having- more wisdom, did just that 
 thing. Seeing her opportunity to get the gold, she made a 
 prompt sacrifice of her silver,, but got nearly double what 
 it would sell for now, and made the grandest financial stroke 
 fi the century. The United States did just the reverse, — 
 bought silver and rashly agreed to maintain the certificates 
 issued thereon at parity with gold. Permitting a re-issue of 
 the same certificates brought the world's stock of silver 
 within reach of a centrifugal pump demanding the price 
 of parity, and unless it is stopped will bankrupt the govern- 
 ment ; for a single five-dollar certificate, rotated often 
 enough, will exhaust the treasury of its gold. It was the 
 worst financial blunder ever made, in striking contrast with 
 the German policy, and we are paying dearly for it now. 
 
 It is not what you think or I think about the quality of 
 the reserves which are the basis of our national credit. It is 
 what the world thinks ; and if we have that which the world 
 will take from us at any moment and at full face value, then 
 our credit will be the best in the world, and we can get any- 
 thing we want at the lowest price. But, on the other hand, 
 if we have that which the world does not want and will not 
 take except for the reason that we have nothing else to give, 
 then the cost of keeping our credit on an equality with Great 
 Britain, Germany, and Holland will be enormously greater 
 than the difference in cost of filling our treasury with gold, 
 which everybody wants, or filling it with silver, which has 
 no market and nobody wants or can afliord to keep for a rise. 
 
 The disturbance caused by the fall in silver has involved 
 the country in losses more than double the value of all the 
 silver in the vaults of the treasury. All of which would 
 have been prevented if we had possessed financial wisdom 
 enough to have backed our treasury certificates with gold 
 instead of silver. That mistake cannot be too speedily 
 repaired. 
 
 To the amazement of all other nations the United States
 
 36 
 
 stands alone as the guarantor of a price for the world's 
 silver, which shall be at parity with gold on the basis of 
 16 to I. It is the most reckless and the most stupendous 
 imdcrtaking- ever entered into by any nation, and imperils 
 the property, the prosperity, and the social welfare of every 
 family in the whole countr5^ • Our national credit is already 
 seriously impaired for this reason, and its resources are 
 insufficient for the task which has been undertaken in sup- 
 port of a single industr}', which has grown into such import- 
 ance within the past twenty-five years. 
 
 LEGISLATION ABOUT DOLLARS. 
 
 In 1772 the United vStates dollar contained 377% grains 
 of pure silver. 
 
 In 1785 the Federal Congress adopted the silver dollar 
 as the money unit and fixed its quantity at 375.64 grains 
 pure silver. The vSpanish milled dollar contained 386^ 
 grains pure. 
 
 The Act of 1792 fixed the weight at 37 iK grains pure 
 and 416 grains standard, 44.75 grains being alloy. 
 
 The same act made the gold equivalent 24.73 grains 
 pure, on the basis of 15 to i. In 1809 the market value of 
 gold was rated at i6)4 times the weight of gold. Gold 
 was then treated as a commodity, disappeared from circula- 
 tion and was shipped abroad for foreign exchange. Silver 
 became by its comparative cheapness the circulating me- 
 dium, was everywhere recognized as the money unit. The 
 ratio of 15 to I was the proposal of Alexander Hamilton and 
 had the approval of Thomas Jefferson, who was then Pres- 
 ident, under the belief that both metals would circulate to- 
 gether under the ratio fixed by the act of 1792, but in this 
 he was mistaken. 
 
 The mint was fully occupied in the coinage of silver, but 
 none of the dollars came into circulation. It was then dis- 
 covered that the bullion which came to the mint for coinage 
 was principally in the shape of Spanish milled dollars, and 
 that the new dollars were immediately shipped to the West 
 Indies and to Mexico for exchange at par for Spanish dol-
 
 37 
 
 lars, and these were directly brought to the mint for re- 
 coinage. Thus an honest Quaker banker in Philadelphia 
 turned a handsome profit by the free use of the mint in 
 coining our light dollars out of the heavy Spanish dollars, 
 which trick coming to the knowledge of President Jefferson 
 he issued an order stopping the coinage of dollars, and the 
 Philadelphia banker had to quit that profitable business. 
 
 The coinage of the silver dollar was thus suspended 
 until the year 1836. A special committee appointed in 1830 
 to consider the condition of the currency reported that since 
 the establishment of the mint in 1794 about $37,000,000 had 
 been Qomed., four-fifths of which had been exported, leaving only 
 seven or eight millions in the United States after an expend- 
 iture of nearly one million dollars, which Upton finds was 
 ''^ the net result of free coinage of both metals for a period of fifty 
 years." 
 
 Then came the war against the United States bank and 
 the clamor for a change of the ratio from 15 to i to 16 to i, 
 which was approved by President Jackson, June 28, 1834. 
 
 The intention of the government was to restore gold to 
 the currency and drive out the paper dollars issued by the 
 United States bank. Silver was no longer thought of, and 
 was completely demonetized. A bill was introduced to pro- 
 vide for a limited coinage of subsidiary coins for change 
 and small transactions, but it received no attention. 
 
 To promote the circulation of gold President Jackson 
 directed that public officers should receive only specie in 
 payment of public dues. 
 
 In 1846 the sub-treasury act provided that nothing but 
 specie should be received by the government on any ac- 
 count, and when received should be held until disbursed by 
 public officers, and should not be deposited in any bank, 
 hoping by this means to create a demand for hard money. 
 
 In 1852 the Senate passed a bill authorizing the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury to purchase silver bullion and to coin 
 it into fractional pieces reduced by seven per cent, as to 
 weight to be issued only at par in exchange for gold. This 
 bill was introduced by the bimetallist, R. M. T. Hunter, 
 
 386383
 
 3S 
 
 who admitted that the only way to circulate both gold and 
 silver was by the subordination of silver to gold. The 
 double standard was admitted to be impracticable as one 
 would always be subservient to the other. Mr. Dunham, 
 who had charge of the bill, said : 
 
 " Gentlemen talk about a double standard of gold and sil- 
 ver as a thing that exists, but that we propose to change. 
 We have had but a single standard for the last three or 
 four years. That has been and is now gold. We propose 
 to let it remain so, and adapt silver to it, and to regulate 
 silver by it." 
 
 The bill became the law in February, 1S53, and gave 
 general satisfaction. Every one could get silver or gold 
 either for labor or commodities, and the return to free coin- 
 age was not considered or desired by anybody. Fractional 
 silver was abundant, and Upton says that for "the first time 
 in the history of the country we had a true bimetallic cur- 
 rency, silver and gold circulating in harmony side by side," 
 the market for silver being a little stronger than gold. 
 
 In April, 1S70, the Secretary of the Treasury prepared 
 and submitted a bill making new regulations in regard to 
 the mint assay officers and coinage with a full report giving 
 the reasons and the necessity for the changes recommended. 
 The report stated that under the existing and legal ratio 
 between gold and silver, the silver dollar was at a premium 
 of three and one-half per cent., but as the gold dollar was 
 the unit of account no change of ratio was desirable, and the 
 bill made no provision for further coinage of silver dollars 
 as they could not be put in circulation when they were 
 worth more for the melting pot than for money. On Decem- 
 ber 9th, the same year, the finance committee reported the 
 bill to the Senate with amendments, and it was ordered to be 
 printed. After a discussion which occupied two days it was 
 passed and sent to the House. 
 
 On Jan. 13, 1871, the House ordered the bill to be printed 
 and referred to the committee on coinage. 
 
 On February 25th the coinage committee reported the
 
 39 
 
 bill with another amendment, when it was again ordered to 
 be printed and re-committed. 
 
 On March 9, 1871, the bill was again reported to the 
 House and ordered to be printed. On Jan. 9, 1872, Mr. 
 Kelley of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee, rec- 
 ommended the passage of the bill, saying that the commit- 
 tee had considered the bill " with great deliberation, section 
 by section, line l)y line, and word by word." 
 
 After considerable discussion the bill was again re-com- 
 mitted, again reported, again printed, only to be again re- 
 ported, again printed and made the special order for March 
 12, 1872, until disposed of. Then came a most exhaustive 
 discussion. Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts explained each 
 section of the bill, which explanation and argument occu- 
 pied ten columns of the Congressional Globe, dwelling at great 
 length upon the reasons for discontinuing the coinage of 
 the silver dollar, the principal reason being that if put in 
 circulation the manufacturers of silver-ware could use them 
 at a profit over bullion, and they would immediately dis- 
 appear. 
 
 Mr. Potter of New York contended that the legal tender 
 coin of the country should be of one metal instead of two, 
 and that should be of gold alone. 
 
 Mr. Kelley called attention to the fluctuating character of 
 two metals as a standard and urged that it would promote 
 domestic convenience by having a subsidiary coinage of 
 silver circulating in all parts of the country as a legal ten- 
 der for small amounts. 
 
 On May 27, 1872, the bill passed the House, yeas no, 
 nays 13. 
 
 The bill was prepared at the Treasury Department, and 
 amended by Congress, providing for the coinage of a silver 
 dollar weighing 384 grains, and making all the silver coins 
 a legal tender for $5 in any one payment instead of all sums 
 less than one dollar. 
 
 The bill was sent to the Senate and referred to Senate 
 committee on coinage and printed. Upon being reported 
 by that committee it was again printed. Further amend-
 
 40 
 
 ments beings made by the Senate it was again printed with 
 the amendments, and after a discussion which occi:pied 
 nineteen columns in the Congressional Globe it passed the 
 Senate. 
 
 The bill was then sent to the House, again printed and 
 referred to a committee of conference, which committee re- 
 ported the bill without further amendments and it became 
 a law Feb. 12, 1873. The Senate amendments struck out 
 the subsidiary dollar of 384 grains, and substituted the trade 
 dollar of 420 grains for use in the China and Japan trade, 
 but did not make it a legal tender. 
 
 This is the story of '■^ the crime of iSjj,'' and the so-called 
 " surreptitious passage" oi a bill, which was printed thirteen 
 times by order of Congress, and the discussion and debates 
 of which between April, 1870, and February, 1873, occupied 
 no less than one hundred and forty-four columns in the Cofi- 
 gressional Globe, printed and re-printed in ever}^ prominent 
 newspaper in the country, and is now denounced by free 
 silver orators, who have the cheek to say that they did not 
 know what the bill meant or what it contained, although 
 they voted for its final passage. 
 
 The claim of concealment and fraud, which these men 
 set up regarding the passage of that bill, if it proves any- 
 thing, proves that they were grossly neglectful of what was 
 going on in the Congress where they had seats, and with 
 whose acts they are charged with knowledge and responsi- 
 bility. If they did not know what the bill contained, it is a 
 shameful confession of neglect of public duty. If they did 
 know, then their present claim is a still more shameful impo- 
 sition upon the people whom they seek to deceive. 
 
 We have taken Upton's carefully studied account of the 
 passage of this bill for an orderly presentation of the facts, 
 which we have not seen disputed. \^Money in Politics, pp. 
 201 et seq^ 
 
 The arguments made in Congress during the pendency of 
 the bill against the propriety of coining silver dollars when 
 they were worth more for the melting pot than for circula- 
 tion, were unanswerable and unanswered. Under the condi-
 
 41 
 
 tion of things which existed when the bill was enacted, the 
 silver producer did not care whether his silver was made into 
 dollars or forks and spoons, for it did not affect the price of 
 his product. But when a few months after the bill became a 
 law, the silver men's product began to fall, then they wanted 
 full silver coinage to provide an outlet for their bullion and 
 they began to denounce the law and all those who had a 
 hand in its making, including themselves. 
 
 At no period in the world's history has there been any 
 such great and continued decline in the silver product as we 
 have seen since 1873, and that, and that only, is the cause of 
 the present disturbance and the revolt of the silver producer. 
 
 The act of 1873 did not demonetize silver. It proscribed 
 no coin from circulation. It sold neither coin nor bullion. 
 It did not diminish its value by taking away its character as 
 a legal tender. It prevented any further purchases except 
 for subsidiary coins on government account which it was not 
 profitable to send abroad, or melt for silver plate. For the 
 same reason, the coining of silver dollars was suspended in 
 1806, but in 1873 no silver dollars were in circulation. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND CONGRESS. 
 
 The first general convention was the result of discussions 
 by the delegates to the Latin Union. France took the initia- 
 tive, and the convention was held at Paris, June 17, 1867. 
 The United vStates, Great Britain, France, Austria, Bavaria, 
 Baden, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy, the Nether- 
 lands, Portugal, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Norway, Switzer- 
 land, Turkey, and Wurtemburg, Eight sessions were held 
 and the conference was closed July 6, 1867. All of the States 
 represented declared in favor of a single gold standard. The 
 president, Dr. Parieu, in his valedictory speech, declared that 
 the opinion of the conference "was in favor of a gold mono- 
 metallic standard," and that was the limitation of the power 
 conferred upon the convention, except its recommendations 
 respecting a universal unit of money. 
 
 England, on the i8th of February, 1868, appointed a com- 
 mission to consider the recommendations of the Paris confer-
 
 42 
 
 ence. The commission sat from March 13th to July Sth, but 
 arrived at nothing decisive except the rejection of the pro- 
 posal to change the vahie of the pound sterling. 
 
 In France public opinion was strongly in favor of gold 
 as the single standard, and so continued until the result of 
 the war with Germany, which took the question of monetary 
 legislation as an international question out of her hands. 
 
 Germany, however, did not neglect the opportunity of 
 reforming her monetary system by a gold standard on the 
 basis of 15.5 to i. The legal tender act demonetized silver, 
 and the silver coin was called in, put in the crucibles and 
 sold as bullion, to the extent of two-thirds the eirculation. 
 In 1 87 2 the Scandinavian States adopted gold in place of a 
 silver standard. In May, 1876, the Netherlands changed 
 from a silver to the gold standard. 
 
 Before and during the adjustment of these important 
 changes the increasing production of silver in the United 
 States so affected international exchanges that all nations 
 found themselves in serious complications growing out of 
 the rapid decline in silver. 
 
 The tribute payable by India to Great Britain, amounting 
 to the gold value of about $80,000,000 per annum, was enor- 
 mously increased when considered with the decreasing value 
 of Indian rupees. 
 
 In March, 1876, Parliament appointed a commission to 
 inquire into the causes for the depreciation in silver, but 
 without power to suggest a remedy. 
 
 August 15, 1876, the United States Congress appointed a 
 commission to inquire into the causes for the depreciation in 
 silver and the feasibility of a bimetallic system as well as the 
 resumption of specie payments. The majority, Jones, Bogy, 
 Willard, Groesbeck, and Bland, reported a recommendation 
 to remonetize silver, and to invite another international 
 conference. The resulting act was known as the Bland bill. 
 It authorized the coinage of the standard dollar and restored 
 its legal tender character Feb. 28, 1878. On invitation from 
 France the conference authorized by the same act met in 
 Paris Aug. 10, 1878. The United States members recom-
 
 43 
 
 mended the free coinage of silver by a general agreement 
 with full legal tender. Belgium, Switzerland, and Norway 
 opposed this. England refused to modify her monetary 
 system. Germany did not take part in the conference. 
 France considered it useless to discuss an international ratio 
 which was unattainable, and nothing was accomplished. 
 
 The situation was so serious that in May, 1879, Germany 
 suspended the sales of silver. 
 
 On April 19, 1881, by request of the United States and 
 on the invitation of France, a third international convention 
 assembled in Paris. All of the European States, Canada, 
 and India were represented, as well as the United States. 
 
 France, the United States, Austria, Italy, the Nether- 
 lands, and British India declared for bimetallism. Belgium, 
 Switzerland, Greece, and the Scandinavian States declared 
 against bimetallism. England and Germany declared that 
 no change in their systems could be entertained, but in case 
 of agreement among the nations, something might be done 
 to increase the use of silver. 
 
 The convention closed July 8, 1881, by adjournment to 
 April 12, 1882, to see what might be done by legislation in 
 the interval. The convention, however was not again called 
 together. 
 
 Agitation continued, and a bimetallic congress assembled 
 at Cologne in October, 1882, but its resolutions did not have 
 any influence on the Powers. 
 
 In the United States the proposed repeal of the compul- 
 sory coining clause in the Bland bill attracted general 
 attention. 
 
 In England, Sept. 20, 1886, a royal commission was 
 appointed to "inquire into the present changes in the rel- 
 ative values of the precious metals." 
 
 A divided report made no recommendation of any 
 change, but suggested another international conference. 
 
 During the Paris Exhibition in 1889 a free International 
 Congress was held, and on invitation of the committee 194 
 members attended ; but the congress closed without coming
 
 44 
 
 to any practical conclusion. The declination in the value of 
 silver continued. 
 
 By invitation of the United vStates a conference was held 
 in Brussels in 1892, the purpose being stated as follows : — 
 '■ For the purpose of considering what measures, if any, could 
 be taken to increase the use of silver in the currency sys- 
 tems of nations." 
 
 The convention met 26th November and delegates were 
 present from Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, France, 
 Germany, Great Britain, India, Greece, Italy, Mexico, The 
 Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Sweden, 
 Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. 
 
 The usual discussion took place and a committee pro- 
 posed that the European States will buy in each year 
 30,000,000 ounces of silver on condition that the United 
 wStates continue to purchase 54,000,000 ounces per annum, 
 and that free unlimited coinage be maintained in British 
 India and ]\Iexico. It was also proposed to withdraw the 
 smaller gold coins and bank notes less than five dollars from 
 circulation. This proposal was not agreed to. The atten- 
 tion of the congress was then turned to the bimetallic pro- 
 posal of the United States. 
 
 The French delegate then stated clearly that he could 
 not advise his government to open the mints to the free 
 coinage of silver unless the monometallic states would do 
 so ; and that, as the question stood, the return to the free 
 coinage of silver must be regarded as settled. 
 
 The United States stood alone in the proposal for bimet- 
 allism. India had already acted by requesting a committee of 
 the British government to consider the proposal to close the 
 Indian mints to the coinage of silver, ivith a view to the adop- 
 tion of a gold standard. 
 
 HAS SILVER FALLEN IN VALUE ? 
 It is a very singular circumstance that in view of all these 
 international congresses, conventions, and conferences com- 
 prising the expert financiers and scientists of all nations to 
 consider what proper means should be employed to arrest the
 
 45 
 
 decline in silver that there should be any one so blind to the 
 fact, as to claim that it is not silver which has depreciated 
 but gold which has appreciated. 
 
 It is instructive to read the arguments, prophecies, and 
 declamations of senators and representatives on the passage 
 of the coinage act of 1878 which was p'assed over the veto 
 of the President. We were told then, as we are now, that 
 the act of remonetizing silver would stop its decline, put it 
 into circulation, make the rich contented, the poor happy, 
 advance wages and prices, and bring us general prosperity; 
 but it did nothing of the kind, and notwithstanding the pur- 
 chases made by government, has continued its downward 
 course. 
 
 Not a single speech made in favor of that bill will ever 
 go into our school books as an example of forensic eloquence 
 or statesmanship. 
 
 There was one, however, made against it by Senator 
 Lamar of Mississippi, which will go down to posterity as a 
 bright example of that honor and courage which abide, and 
 sustain an honest soul under most trying circumstances. 
 
 The legislature of Mississippi instructed its senators to 
 vote for the bill and also for the bill repealing the Resump- 
 tion Act. 
 
 Senator Lamar, in justification of his refusal to obey these 
 instructions, said : — 
 
 " Mr. President, between these instructions and my con- 
 victions there is a great gulf. I cannot pass it. . . .1 have 
 always endeavored to impress the belief that truth is better 
 than falsehood, honesty better than policy, courage better 
 than cowardice. 
 
 " To-day, my lessons confront me. To-day, I must be true 
 or false, honest or cunning, faithful or unfaithful to my 
 people. Even in this hour of their legislative displeasure 
 and disapprobation I cannot vote as these resolutions direct, 
 I cannot and will not shirk the responsibility which my 
 position imposes. My duty, as I see it, I will do, and I will 
 vote against this bill. . . Then it will be for them to de- 
 termine if adherence to my honest convictions has disquali- 
 fied me from representing them." 
 
 Those brave words will live, and that honest vote will be
 
 46 
 
 cherished with pride in future years, as a model for that 
 manliness and greatness of soul which refuses to lay official 
 duty under the feet of a legislative power, which could con- 
 demn and punish, but could not dishonor. 
 
 The senator was right : and the bill proved to be an i;tter 
 failure in all that was expected from it by its most ardent 
 friends. It was in violation of every principle of economic 
 law: and there was no power to clothe it with success. 
 
 The same reasons were urged for the passage of the act 
 in 1890. Like causes led to its failure and repeal in 1893. 
 
 INDIA AS A FACTOR. 
 
 The important place which India occupies as a factor in 
 the metallic currency systems of the world is not generally 
 understood. She has a population three and one-half times 
 larger than the United States, and has a very productive 
 soil. The excess of her net imports of silver over exports 
 for the year 1893 was $60,934,726. The excess for fifty-seven 
 years previous (1836 to 1863) was $1,698,999,075. Professor 
 Shaw tells us that during long periods India has been such 
 a " sink " or receptacle of the world's metallic currencies 
 as to be the recognized safety-valve of the nations, by 
 providing an outlet for any sudden inflow of the precious 
 metals, and thus has preserved the equilibrium when disas- 
 ter to the currency system was imminent. 
 
 There had for a long time been a constant balance of 
 trade in favor of India; but the steady fall in the value of 
 silver from 1873 to 1893 was such as to turn her annual 
 surplus into a large deficit, owing to her gold obligations to 
 England. 
 
 The impending disaster was stayed by the large silver 
 purchases made by the United States government, and it is 
 now claimed that the only practical solution of India's diffi- 
 culty is in the adoption of a gold standard. Such a course 
 would naturally have the serious effect of precipitating a 
 still further decline in silver, and might liberate such a vast 
 volume of coin and bullion as to overwhelm all countries.
 
 47 
 
 and bring on a crisis which no country has the strength to 
 stay or control. 
 
 For the United States to sit still and see other countries, 
 one after another, firmly established on a gold basis, remain- 
 ing alone as tlie indorser and giiara)itor of tJie parity value of the 
 world's gold and silver, is only to invite a disaster which would 
 be overwhelming and irreparable. 
 
 A free coinage act with unlimited tender, and a guar- 
 antee to maintain the parity of silver with gold " /// the mar- 
 kets and in the payment of debts,'' on the basis of 1 6 to i, or even 
 20 to 1, is the most reckless undertaking in the world, and 
 no power or combination of powers will take the hazard. 
 
 It is plain to see how a full-fledged anarchist or an ex- 
 treme socialist might advocate such a measure, for the result 
 would be more destructive than dynamite, and society would 
 have to be remodeled on some new plan. 
 
 A free coinage acton the basis indicated would immedi- 
 ately destroy the market for silver as a product of the United 
 States, for the bullion of other countries would flow in an 
 overwhelming stream to our mints, and at prices which 
 would close every mine in the country and exhaust the 
 treasury of its gold. 
 
 The scenes in the extra session of Congress in 1893 
 would be completely reversed, and all would hasten to 
 repeal the act as they would fly to the extinguishment of a 
 consuming fire. 
 
 So much for prophecy which is founded on the cupidity 
 of mankind rather than any economic law; for all such ques- 
 tions would take on an exceptional phase, and, by a suspen- 
 sion of every well-known principle, wait for such reorganiza- 
 tion and readjustment of human affairs as would mark a 
 new era in both domestic and foreign affairs. 
 
 The cable has already advised us that '' Englishmen are 
 protesting against the minting of silver coins which cost but 
 two shillings and sixpence per ounce, and selling it to the 
 people for five shillings and sixpence." It is claimed that 
 the government of Queen Victoria is pursuing the same dis- 
 graceful policy of the ministry of Queen Elizabeth who
 
 48 
 
 made sixty-two shillings out of twenty. As a silver-using 
 people Englishmen protest against a "depreciated currency." 
 The demand for a shilling's worth of silver in an English 
 shilling may have its echo in the demand for a dollar's worth 
 of silver in a silver dollar ; that will go a long way in pacify- 
 ing those who object to the fraud of a fifty-cent dollar. 
 Give the people the full worth of their money and they will 
 be peaceful and contented. There is no excuse which will 
 satisfy either the English or American workman that half 
 an ounce of silver is just as good as a whole one, because 
 it would tire him less to lug it about. If the half ounce 
 is only a token of the full ounce, and the mint must be paid 
 for the whole in order to get the half, it would be quite safe 
 to guarantee that the laborer would prefer the whole thing 
 to the token, and would not complain of the weight. 
 
 If free coinage means that anybody can take one dollar's 
 worth of silver to the mint and have free use of the ma- 
 chinery to stamp it as being two dollars, giving the silver 
 owner instead of the government the benefit of the fraud, it 
 is quite likely that the mints would be kept busy; but it 
 would be far better if they were kept idle. 
 
 Laboring men and men of small means would derive no 
 benefit from the free use of the mints, but the mine owners, 
 the bullion dealers, and speculators generally, would have it 
 all their own way, to the great detriment of the public. 
 
 FULL LEGAL TENDER. 
 
 Here lies the chief iniquity of the proposed act. Strip 
 the cheap dollar of the fraudulent force which is»given to it 
 by these three words, and it will stand before the world 
 on its honest merits. It will go to those who need and want 
 it, instead of being forced at double price on those who 
 do not want it. 
 
 The silver speculators and brokers could take contracts 
 for the payment of other men's debts and mortgages, taking 
 the same property thus improved by fifty per cent, as a 
 security, and the mortgage indebtedness of the country could 
 be liquidated by a quasi fifty per cent, bankrupt law, avail-
 
 49 
 
 able to those abundantly able to pay, as well to as those who 
 are not, thus legalizing the most stupendous system of fraud 
 which has ever stained the annals of history. 
 
 The credit and the integrity of the government which 
 would give sanction or opportunity to any such manipula- 
 tion of its currency, would be a by-word and a hissing in the 
 mouths of honest men the world over. 
 
 OVER-PRODUCTION. 
 
 When we speak of an over-production of gold or silver, 
 we refer to three noticeable changes or effects produced 
 by that cause, viz., the effect which an increasing supply 
 has on the demand ; the effect which such superabundant 
 supply has on the fixed or legal ratio of one to the other ; 
 and the effect which such supply has on the exchange 
 value for commodities and its relation to population. 
 
 It will be admitted without argument that the com- 
 modities which go into actual consumption have a demand 
 which is in the main governed by population. The home 
 market being supplied, the surplus flows into the channels 
 of foreign commerce. 
 
 In American history the extraordinary production of 
 the precious metals which is first noticed took place about 
 the middle of the sixteenth century, the date for its 
 beginning being fixed by the authorities at about 1545, 
 and refers to the output from the mines of Potosi, Mexico, 
 and Peru, being forty-five times more in silver than gold, 
 and reducing the exchange value of silver for gold from 
 thirty-five to forty per cent, in the course of the succeed- 
 ing century. Nowithstanding the increased production of 
 gold, which was subjected to the operation of the same 
 economic law of supply and demand, the great prepon- 
 derance of silver had the effect of changing the fixed 
 ratio from i to 11 to i to 15 by the end of the century. 
 The annual production not being consumed nor absorbed 
 by a proportionate increase of population, was added to 
 the pre-existing supply, and thus becoming an over-pro- 
 duction, had the effect stated.
 
 50 
 
 Professor Langhlin fixes the next noticeable period 
 from 1780 to 1820, during- which time, by reason of the 
 increasing- richness of the mines, especially those of ]\Iexico, 
 the product was much larger than for the entire century 
 between 1545 and 1660. The effect, however, was not so 
 marked, because of the much larger pre-existing mass to 
 be also affected thereb3^ At this point Prof. Laughlin calls 
 attention to the fact that the tables of prices do not disclose 
 " any diminution in the purchasing power of gold " ; for 
 which reason he concludes that the change of relations was 
 due to a further decline in silver. 
 
 The act of 1834 changed the ratio from 15 to i to 16 to i, 
 but diminished the weight of the gold coin as well, which 
 reduced its value by six per cent. Under the operation of 
 these changes gold came into circulation and silver retired. 
 
 The act of 1853, caused by the enormous influx of gold 
 from California, placed gold in the same position w^hich the 
 act of 1834 gave to silver. Gold was the standard money of 
 account, and no one concerned himself about ratios until the 
 great decline in silver in 1876. 
 
 The world's gold product, 185 1 to 1875, was $3,3i4,553,ooo 
 The silver product for same period was . $1,395,125,000 
 
 This enormous gold product in twenty-five years, by reason 
 of its great abundance crowded out silver, and by the in- 
 creased demand for gold and the lessened demand for silver 
 stayed the decline in gold and hastened the decline in silver. 
 During the twelve years, 1852 to 1864, France alone imported 
 $680,000,000 of gold and exported $345,000,000 of silver, 
 showing that at that time there was an abundance of silver, 
 and to spare. The production of silver in face of this cir- 
 cumstance was being rapidly increased. The silver product, 
 which for the United States in i860 was only $150,000, in 
 1873 was $35,750,000, and in 1892 $82,101,000. 
 
 From 1873 to 1S95 it amounted to 11,214,751,000 
 
 From 1873 to 1895 the gold product was . . . $830,660,000 
 
 These facts show an over-production sufficient to account 
 for the continuous decline in silver.
 
 51 
 
 COMPARED WITH WHEAT. 
 
 1866-95, average value wheat product per year, . . $335,674,260 
 
 1S66-95, average decrease in value per year. . . 3,194,487 
 
 1866-95, average price per bushel for period, . . 97.9 
 
 T866-95, average/a// in price per bushel per year (cents), 5.6 
 
 Average price per bushel in 1866, . . . $2.19.6 
 
 Average price per bushel in 1895, . . . -50.9 
 
 SILVER PRODUCT COMPARED WITH POPULATION. 
 SILVER 
 
 1860-95, average product per year, $37.983>36i 
 
 1860-95, average yearly increase, $1,997,250 
 
 POPULATION 
 
 1860-95, average population for period 48,146,409 
 
 1860-95, average increase per year, 1,067,630 
 
 Percentage of average yearly increase in silver product to 
 
 average production, 5-26^ 
 
 Percentage of average increase in population per year to 
 
 average population for period, 2.21^ 
 
 1873, value of silver per ounce, $1.29 
 
 1895, value of silver per ounce, .65 
 
 1873-95, ratio of value in '95 to value in '73, . . . 50-4/^ 
 
 WHEAT 
 1866-95, ratio of value in '95 to value in '66, . . . 23.1^ 
 
 The increase in the production of silver has been more 
 than double the increase in population. The decline in wheat 
 has been more than three times the decline in silver; all 
 of which demonstrates an overproduction of silver, which is 
 the most important factor in accounting for the decline, ex- 
 cept that the decline in wheat is owing to cause's other than 
 the decline in silver. It shows, also, that if gold is not abso- 
 lutely stable as a measure of value it is incomparably more 
 so than silver, which is liable in any year by excessive pro- 
 duction to overwhelm the commercial world with remediless 
 disaster.
 
 52 
 
 The facts before us demonstrate that a bimetallic 
 standard is utterly impossible; the chasm is too wide for 
 legislation, and the preferences of inankind the world over 
 cannot be changed by an act of Congress, nor by a congress 
 of nations. We have reached a point where any increase in 
 the production of gold will have the immediate effect of 
 displacing silver, w'ithout loss of prestige or demand for 
 the dominant metal. 
 
 The arts will be our future safety-valve for surplus 
 silver, and the demand for subsidiary coinage will increase 
 with the population. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Taking the price of wheat and cotton in Liverpool for 
 1873 as a basis, we find a decline if applied to the crop of 
 1893 amounting to no less than (wheat) $213,018,400 
 
 Decline in cotton crop, 1893, 310,200,000 
 
 Total decline for two items, $523,218,400 
 
 If the prices realized in 1873 could have been realized 
 in i893-'94-'95, the western farmer and the southern 
 planter would have been extremely happy. 
 
 We find also during the same period a decline of 50 
 per cent, in the price of silver, and we are told that this 
 decline in silver is the cause of the decline in wheat and 
 cotton, and that all we need to restore the price of 
 wheat and cotton to the price of 1873 ^^ to restore the 
 price of silver. 
 
 The stubborn fact remains, however, that the decline 
 in silver bullion has nothing to do with the decline in 
 wheat and cotton ; for during all this time the silver dol- 
 lar has been kept at parity with gold at government 
 expense, and if the total sales of wheat and cotton had 
 been paid for in gold dollars or silver dollars, it would 
 have made no difference to the farmer or the planter. 
 
 This shrinkage, then, of $523,218,000 must be accounted 
 for in some other way. Looking for the cause, we find 
 that Argentina in 1892 put in the same market 25,000,000 
 bushels of wheat; in 1893, 45,000,000 bushels; and in 1894,
 
 53 
 
 75,000,000. We find, also, Egypt, India, and Russia in the 
 same market with correspondingly large crops, and this 
 enormous production forced down the price, and the sil- 
 ver crop had nothing to do with it. Silver coin in point 
 of fact during all this time had the full benefit of friendly 
 legislation and the full power of the government to main- 
 tain its parity with gold. 
 
 The truth is that we are in great danger of losing our 
 foreign markets by means of foreign competition, and we 
 cannot meet that competition by any change in our mone- 
 tary standard. Great Britain will buy her wheat and cotton 
 where she can buy it the cheapest. With the Liverpool 
 merchant it is a question of business and not of sentiment. 
 He wants to know what our dollar weighs, and the inscrip- 
 tion, " In God we trust," is not taken as evidence of com- 
 mercial value. 
 
 The monsoons of the Indian Ocean and cheap foreign 
 labor have more to do with the price of wheat in Liverpool 
 than has the price of silver in the United vStates. 
 
 How can we protect our foreign markets against foreign 
 labor is a question which cannot be answered by the means 
 employed to protect our home markets against the same 
 force. 
 
 The orators who are so fond of proclaiming our inde- 
 pendence of foreign powers should address themselves to 
 the duty of finding the means by which these same foreign- 
 ers can be forced to pay us double the present price for our 
 own products. Cheap bread stuffs is the universal cry of 
 mankind, and the country which can meet that requirement 
 best will command the market and fix the price. 
 
 We cannot legislate double price for our silver product 
 any more than we can for our farm products. It is simply a 
 question of supply and demand. The nations of the whole 
 earth are our competitors, and we cannot overcome it by 
 putting up the price of our commodities, much less that of 
 silver, of which they have much more for sale even now 
 than we have. 
 
 Prof. Laughlin in his ''Gold and Prices since 1873,"
 
 54 
 
 gives many interesting facts which are instructive, as they 
 show that for the past twenty-five years food products 
 have increased faster than the population, and this fact 
 has to be considered in accounting for the decline in 
 prices as measured by gold, as well as the decreased cost 
 of production and delivery. 
 
 In 1870 acres planted to wheat in United States, 
 
 In 1884 acres planted to wheat in United States, 
 
 In 1870 India planted acres . 
 
 In 1S84 India planted acres . 
 
 In 1870 Europe planted acres 
 
 In 1884 Europe planted acres 
 
 In 1869-70 European imports of grainf value 
 
 In 1879 European imports of grain, value . 
 
 "in 1873 Rio coffee shipped to New York, totis 
 
 In 1886 Rio coffee shipped to New York, tons 
 
 88,000,000 
 
 157,000,000 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 440,000,000 
 
 482,000,000 
 
 $409,000,000 
 
 $817,000,000 
 
 68,863 
 
 189,319 
 
 The general fall in prices has been rashly attributed 
 to appreciation in gold, when the causes to be found are 
 entirely distinct from any influence whatever by the 
 precious metals. Increased cheapness in production and 
 distribution has brought an over-supply, which has had 
 its natural effect in the markets of the world. Coinci- 
 dences are too frequently magnified into original causes, 
 and time is required to dispel the illusion. 
 
 The fact therefore that the decline in wheat, cotton, 
 corn, sugar, and silver, were contemporaneous events, is 
 no more conclusive that the decline of one has catised the 
 decline of the other, than is the large reduction of tonnage 
 dues at the Suez canal, the cause of a decline in silver, 
 while it is a direct cause for the decline of wheat in 
 Chicago. 
 
 The causes for the general decline in prices are complex, 
 world-wide, and various. It follows, therefore, if this be 
 true, that neither the reduction of gold to a parity with sil- 
 ver, nor the uplifting of silver to a parity with gold by inter- 
 national law, will necessarily advance the price of American 
 wheat and cotton.
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 56 
 
 TABLE I. 
 Com»iercial Ratio of Silver to Gold each Yeai- since i6Sj. 
 
 [Note. — From 1687 to 1832 the ratios are taken from Dr. A. Soetbeer ; from 18^3 
 to 1879 from Pixley and Abell's tables, and from 1879 to 1890 from daily cablegrams 
 from London to the Bureau of the Mint.] 
 
 Year. 
 
 Year. Ratio. 
 
 Year. Ratio. 
 
 Ratio. 
 
 Year. Ratio. 
 
 Year. Ratio. 
 
 1687 
 
 1688 
 
 1689 
 
 1690 
 
 1691 
 
 1692 
 
 1693 
 
 1694 
 
 1693 
 
 1696 
 
 1697 
 
 i6( 
 
 1699 
 
 1700 
 
 1 701 
 
 1702 
 
 1703 
 
 1704 
 
 1705 
 1706 
 1707 
 1708 
 1709 
 1710 
 1711 
 1712 
 
 1713 
 1714 
 
 1715 
 1716 
 1717 
 1718 
 1719 
 1720 
 1721 
 
 94 
 94 
 02 
 02 
 yS 
 92 
 83 
 87 
 02 
 00 
 20 
 07 
 94 
 81 
 
 07 
 52 
 17 
 22 
 II 
 27 
 44 
 41 
 31 
 
 22 
 29 
 31 
 24 
 13 
 II 
 09 
 
 13 
 II 
 09 
 04 
 05 
 
 :722 
 
 :723i 
 [724 I 
 
 ■725 
 :726 
 
 27 
 [72S 
 729 
 1730 
 [731 
 1732 
 
 ;33 
 
 734 
 
 C735 
 
 1736 
 
 [737 
 
 173S 
 
 t739 
 
 [740 
 
 [741 
 
 742 
 
 743 
 
 744 
 
 745 
 
 1746 
 
 1747 
 [748 
 [749 
 [750 
 
 [751 
 
 [752 
 1753 
 1754 
 [755 
 1756 
 
 758, 
 
 1759' 
 [760 
 
 :76i 
 :762 
 -63 
 764 
 765 
 [766 
 
 [767 
 [768 
 .769 
 1770 
 
 1771 
 [772 
 
 1773 
 
 774 
 
 1775 
 
 [776 
 
 777 
 
 [77S 
 
 79 
 
 [7 So 
 
 781 
 
 ;7S2 
 
 783 
 
 ■84 
 
 [785 
 
 [786 
 
 t787 
 
 [788 
 
 [789 
 
 '90 
 
 [791 
 
 14.87 
 ■4.S5 
 
 '792 
 t793 
 1794 
 795 
 [796 
 
 1797 
 -98 
 :799 
 rSoo 
 [801 
 1802 
 [803 
 [804 
 [So. 
 [806 
 1807 
 [808 
 [809 
 [810 
 [811 
 
 t8l2 
 
 t8i3 
 t8i4 
 [81 = 
 [S16 
 [817 
 \ii 
 [819 
 [820 
 [821 
 [S22 
 t823 
 [824 
 [825 
 [826 
 
 17 
 00 
 
 37 
 55 
 65 
 41 
 59 
 74 
 68 
 46 
 26 
 41 
 41 
 79 
 52 
 43 
 08 
 96 
 77 
 53 
 II 
 
 25 
 04 
 26 
 28 
 II 
 35 
 33 
 62 
 
 95 
 So 
 
 84 
 
 82 
 
 70 
 
 76 
 
 [827 
 
 [828 
 1829 1 
 
 1830 1 
 1S3I 
 
 [832 
 1833 
 C834 
 1835 
 
 1836 
 
 1837 
 [838 
 
 1839 
 
 [S40 
 [841 
 [842 
 
 t843 
 [844 
 1845 
 [846 
 
 [847 
 [848 
 
 t849 
 [850 
 [851 
 [852 
 [853 
 [854 
 1855 
 [856 
 
 [857 
 [858 
 
 1859 
 [860 
 [861 
 
 74 
 78 
 78 
 82 
 72 
 73 
 •93 
 73 
 80 
 72 
 83 
 85 
 .62 
 ,62 
 70 
 87 
 93 
 85 
 92 
 ,90 
 So 
 85 
 73 
 70 
 ,46 
 59 
 33 
 33 
 •38 
 38 
 27 
 38 
 19 
 29 
 50 
 
 1862! 
 1863: 
 1864 
 1865 I 
 1S66 
 
 S67i 
 1S68 
 1S69 
 
 870 
 1871 
 1S72 
 
 1873 
 1874 
 
 1875 
 
 1876 
 
 1877 
 
 1878 
 
 1879 
 
 1880 
 
 1881 
 
 1882 
 
 1883 
 
 [884; 
 
 1885 
 
 [8861 
 
 1887! 
 
 [8go 
 [891 
 [892 
 
 1893 
 1894 
 
 ■895 
 
 1896 
 
 6 mo. 
 
 5-35 
 5-37 
 5-37 
 5-44 
 5-43 
 5-57 
 5-59 
 5.60 
 
 5-57 
 
 5-57 
 
 15-63 
 
 1592 
 
 16.17 
 
 16.59 
 
 17.88 
 
 17.22 
 
 17.94 
 
 18.40 
 
 18.05 
 
 18.16 
 
 8.19 
 
 8.64 
 
 8.57 
 9.41 
 20.78 
 21.13 
 21.99 
 22.10 
 19.76 
 20.92 
 23.72 
 26.49 
 32.56 
 31-00 
 30.32
 
 57 
 
 TABLE II. 
 
 The following table exhibits the value of the pure silver in a silver 
 dollar, reckoned at the commercial price of silver bullion from $0.50 to 
 $1.2929 (parity), per ounce fine. 
 
 Value of 
 
 
 Value of 
 
 
 Value of 
 
 
 Value of 
 
 Price of pure sil- Pric 
 
 e of 
 
 pure sil- 
 
 Price of 
 
 pure sil- 
 
 Price of 
 
 pure sil- 
 
 silver per 1 ver in a silve 
 
 rper 
 
 ver in a 
 
 silver per 
 
 ver in a 
 
 silver per 
 
 ver in a 
 
 fineounce. silver dol- fineoi 
 
 jnce. 
 
 silver dol 
 
 fineounce. 
 
 silver dol- 
 
 fineounce. 
 
 silver dol- 
 
 1 
 
 ar. 
 
 
 lar. 
 
 
 lar. 
 
 
 lar. 
 
 1 
 $0.50 $0 
 
 3?7 $0 
 
 7^ 
 
 $0,549 
 
 $0.92 
 
 $0,712 
 
 $1.13 
 
 $0,874 
 
 .51 
 
 394 
 
 72 
 
 •557 
 
 •93 
 
 .719 
 
 1. 14 
 
 .882 
 
 .51 
 
 402 
 
 73 
 
 ■565 
 
 •94 
 
 • 727 
 
 I-I5 
 
 .889 
 
 .53 
 
 410 
 
 74 
 
 •572 
 
 •95 
 
 • 735 
 
 1. 16 
 
 •897 
 
 • 54 
 
 418 
 
 75 
 
 • 5S0 
 
 .96 
 
 • 742 
 
 1.17 
 
 •905 
 
 .55 
 
 425 
 
 76 
 
 .5S8 
 
 •97 
 
 •750 
 
 1. 18 
 
 •913 
 
 .56 
 
 433 
 
 77 
 
 •596 
 
 • 98 
 
 • 75S 
 
 1. 19 
 
 .920 
 
 .57 
 
 441 
 
 78 
 
 .603 
 
 • 99 
 
 .766 
 
 1.20 
 
 .928 
 
 ■ 58 
 
 449 
 
 79 
 
 .611 
 
 1. 00 
 
 • 773 
 
 1. 21 
 
 ■936 
 
 •59 
 
 456 
 
 80 
 
 .619 
 
 1. 01 
 
 .781 
 
 1.22 
 
 * ^944 
 
 .60 
 
 464 
 
 81 
 
 .626 
 
 1.02 
 
 • 789 
 
 1.23 
 
 •951 
 
 .61 
 
 472 
 
 82 
 
 .634 
 
 1.03 
 
 • 797 
 
 1.24 
 
 •959 
 
 .62 
 
 480 
 
 83 
 
 .642 
 
 1.04 
 
 .804 
 
 1-25 
 
 .967 
 
 .63 
 
 487 
 
 84 
 
 .650 
 
 1.05 
 
 .812 
 
 1.26 
 
 •975 
 
 .64 
 
 495 
 
 85 
 
 • 657 
 
 1.06 
 
 .820 
 
 1.27 
 
 .982 
 
 .65 
 
 503 
 
 86 
 
 .665 
 
 1.07 
 
 .828 
 
 1.28 
 
 .990 
 
 .66 
 
 510 
 
 87 
 
 •673 
 
 1.08 
 
 .835 
 
 1.29 
 
 •998 
 
 .67 
 
 518 
 
 88 
 
 .681 
 
 1.09 
 
 .843 
 
 '^1.2929 
 
 1. 000 
 
 .68 
 
 526 
 
 8q 
 
 .688 
 
 1. 10 
 
 .851 
 
 
 
 .69 
 
 534 
 
 90 
 
 .696 
 
 I. II 
 
 • 859 
 
 *Parity. 
 
 
 .70 
 
 541 
 
 91 
 
 .704 
 
 1. 12 
 
 .866 
 
 
 
 TABLE III. 
 
 The total redemptions of notes in gold and the exports ot that metal 
 during each fiscal year since the resumption of specie payments have 
 been as follows : 
 
 Fiscal Year. 
 
 United States 
 notes. 
 
 Treasury 
 notes of i8qc 
 
 1879 i $7,976,698 
 
 1880. 
 1881. 
 1882. 
 1883. 
 1884. 
 1885. 
 1886. 
 1887. 
 1888. 
 1889. 
 1890. 
 1891. 
 1892. 
 1893. 
 1894. 
 1895 • 
 1896. 
 
 3,780,638, 
 
 271,750 
 
 40,000 
 
 75,000] 
 
 590,000 
 
 2,222,000 
 
 6,863,6991 
 
 4,224,073' 
 
 692,596! 
 
 730,143 
 
 732,386 
 
 5,986,070 
 
 5-352,243 
 
 55,319,125 
 
 68,242,408 
 
 109,783,800 
 
 153.307.591 
 
 Total I $426,190,220 
 
 $3,773,600 
 
 46,781,220 
 
 16,599,742 
 
 7,570.398 
 
 5.348.365 
 
 ,073.325 
 
 Total. 
 
 Exports of 
 gold. 
 
 $7,976,698 
 
 3.780,638 
 
 271,750 
 
 40,000 
 
 75,000 
 
 590,000 
 
 2,222,000 
 
 6,863,699! 
 
 4.224,073j 
 
 692,596j 
 
 730,143 
 
 732,386 
 
 5,986,070 
 
 9,125,843 
 
 102,100,345 
 
 84,842,150 
 
 117,354,198 
 
 158,655.956 
 
 $4,587,614 
 
 3,639,025 
 
 2,565,132 
 
 32,587,880 
 
 11,600,888 
 
 41.081,957 
 
 8,477.892 
 
 42,952,191 
 
 9,701,187 
 
 18,376,234 
 
 59,952,285 
 
 17,274,491 
 
 86,362,654 
 
 50,195,327 
 
 108,680,844 
 
 76,978,061 
 
 66,131,183 
 
 112,309,186 
 
 $506,263,545 $753,453,981
 
 58 
 
 TABLE IV. 
 
 The following tables e.xhibit the amount and cost of silver bullion pur- 
 chased each year under the acts of February 28, 1878, and July 14, 1890, 
 the average price paid, and the bullion value of the standard silver dollar: 
 
 Amount, Cost, Average Price, and Bullion value of the Silver Dol- 
 lar of Silver purchased under act of February 28, iSjS. 
 
 
 
 
 Average 
 
 Bullion 
 
 Fiscal Year. 
 
 Fine ounces. 
 
 Cost. 
 
 price per 
 fine ounce. 
 
 value of a 
 silverd liar. 
 
 1878, 
 
 10*809,350.58 
 
 $13,023,268.96 
 
 $1.2048 
 
 $09318 
 
 1879 
 
 
 
 
 
 19,248,086.09 
 
 21,593,642.99 
 
 1.1218 
 
 .8676 
 
 1880 
 
 
 
 
 
 22,057,862.64 
 
 25,235,081.53 
 
 1.1440 
 
 .8848 
 
 1881 
 
 
 
 
 
 19,709,227.11 
 
 22,327,874.75 
 
 I. 1328 
 
 .8761 
 
 1882 
 
 
 
 
 
 21,190,200.87 
 
 24,054,480 47 
 
 I-I35I 
 
 •8779 
 
 1883 
 
 
 
 
 
 22,889,241.24 
 
 25.577.327-58 
 
 I.I174 
 
 .S642 
 
 1884 
 
 
 
 
 
 21,922,951.52 
 
 24,378,383-91 
 
 1.1120 
 
 .8600 
 
 1885 
 
 
 
 
 
 21,791,171.61 
 
 23,747,460.25 
 
 1.0897 
 
 .8428 
 
 1886 
 
 
 
 
 
 22,690,652.94 
 
 23,448,960.01 
 
 1-0334 
 
 .7992 
 
 1887 
 
 
 
 
 
 26,490,008.04 
 
 25,988,620.46 
 
 .9810 
 
 ■75S7 
 
 1888 
 
 
 
 
 
 25,386,125.32 
 
 24,237.553-20 
 
 •9547 
 
 •7384 
 
 1889 
 
 
 
 
 
 26,468,861.03 
 
 24,717,853.81 
 
 .9338 
 
 .7222 
 
 1890 
 
 
 
 
 
 27,820,900.05 
 
 26,899,326.33 
 
 .966S 
 
 • 7477 
 
 1891 
 
 
 
 
 2.797.379-52 
 
 3,049,426.46 
 
 1. 0901 
 
 .8431 
 
 
 Tota 
 
 l1, 
 
 
 
 291,272,018.56 
 
 308,279,260.71 
 
 1-0583 
 
 .S185 
 
 TABLE V. 
 
 Amount, Cost, Average Price, a)td Bullion Value of the Silver Dol- 
 lar of Silver purchased under act of July i^, i8go. 
 
 Fiscal Year. 
 
 Fine ounces. 
 
 Cost. 
 
 Average 
 Price per 
 fine ounce. 
 
 Bullion 
 value of a 
 silverdollar. 
 
 1891, 
 1892, 
 
 1893, . 
 
 1894, . 
 
 48,393,113.05 
 54.355.748.10 
 54,008,162.60 
 11,917,658.78 
 
 $50,577,498-44 
 51,106,607.96 
 
 45.531.374-53 
 8,715,521.32 
 
 $1.0451 
 .9402 
 .8430 
 •7313 
 
 $0.8083 
 .7271 
 .6520 
 .5656 
 
 Total, . 
 
 168,674,682.53 
 
 155,931,002.25 
 
 •9244 
 
 .7150 
 
 Total cost purchases under both acts, $464,210,262.96.
 
 59 
 
 TABLE VI. 
 
 [Senate Mis. Doc. No. 36, Fifty-third Congress, first session.] 
 Production of Gold and Silver in the World, ijg2-iSg2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Silver (coining 
 
 Calendar years. 
 
 
 
 ■ Gold. 
 
 value). 
 
 i7g2-iSoo, . 
 
 
 
 $106,407,000 
 
 $328,860,000 
 
 1801-1810, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 118,152,000 
 
 371,667,000 
 
 1811-1820, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 76,063,000 
 
 224,786,000 
 
 1821-1S30, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 94,479,000 
 
 191,444,000 
 
 1831-1840, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 134,841,000 
 
 247,930,000 
 
 1841-1848, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 291,144,000 
 
 259,520,000 
 
 1849, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 27,100,000 
 
 39,000,000 
 
 1850, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44,450,000 
 
 39,000,000 
 
 1851, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67,600,000 
 
 45,000,000 
 
 1852, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 132,750,000 
 
 40,600,000 
 
 1853. • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155,450,000 
 
 40,600,000 
 
 1854- • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127,450,000 
 
 40,600,000 
 
 1855, • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135,075,000 
 
 40,600,000 
 
 1856, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 147,600,000 
 
 40,650,000 
 
 1857. • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 133,275,000 
 
 40,650,000 
 
 1858, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124,650,000 
 
 40,650,000 
 
 1859, ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124,850,000 
 
 40,750,000 
 
 i860, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119,250,000 
 
 40,800,000 
 
 1861, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113,800,000 
 
 44,700,000 
 
 1862, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107,750,000 
 
 45,200,000 
 
 1863, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106,950,000 
 
 49,200,000 
 
 1864, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113,000,000 
 
 51,700,000 
 
 1865, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120,200,000 
 
 51,950,000 
 
 1866, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121,100,000 
 
 50,750,000 
 
 1867. . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104,025,000 
 
 54,225,000 
 
 1868, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109,725,000 
 
 50,225,000 
 
 1869, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106,225,000 
 
 47,500,000 
 
 1870, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106,850,000 
 
 51,575,000 
 
 1871, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107,000,000 
 
 61,050,000 
 
 1872, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99,600,000 
 
 65,250,000 
 
 1873- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96,200,000 
 
 81,800,000 
 
 1874, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99,750,000 
 
 71,500,000 
 
 1875. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97,500,000 
 
 80,500,000 
 
 1876, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103,700,000 
 
 87,600,000 
 
 1877, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114,000,000 
 
 81,000,000 
 
 1878, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119,000,000 
 
 95,000,000 
 
 1879, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109,000,000 
 
 96,000,000 
 
 1880, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106,500,000 
 
 96,700,000 
 
 1881, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103,000,000 
 
 102,000,000 
 
 1882, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 102,000,000 
 
 111,800,000 
 
 1883, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95,400,000 
 
 115,300,000 
 
 1884, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101,700,000 
 
 105,500,000 
 
 1885, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108,400,000 
 
 118,500,000 
 
 1886, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106,000,000 
 
 120,600,000 
 
 1887, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105,775,000 
 
 124,281,000 
 
 1888, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110,197,000 
 
 140,706,000 
 
 1889, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123,489,000 
 
 162,159,000 
 
 1890, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113,150,000 
 
 172,235,000 
 
 1891, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120,519,000 
 
 186,733,000 
 
 1892, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130,817,000 
 
 196,105,000 
 
 T 
 
 3tal, 
 
 
 • 
 
 ] 
 
 5,633,908,000 
 
 5,077,961,000
 
 6o 
 
 TABLE VII. 
 
 The silver product is given at its commercial value, reckoned 
 at the average market price of silver each year, as well as its 
 coining value in United States dollars. 
 
 P}-oducf of gold and silver front mines in the United States, 
 j873-iSgs. 
 
 
 
 
 Gold. 
 
 
 Silver. 
 
 
 Calendar 
 year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fine 
 ounces. 
 
 Value. 
 
 Fine 
 ounces. 
 
 Commercial 
 
 value. 
 
 Coining value. 
 
 1873. • 
 
 1,741,500 
 
 $36,000,000 
 
 27,650,000 
 
 $35,890,000 
 
 $35,750,000 
 
 1874 
 
 
 
 1,620,563 
 
 33,500,000 
 
 28,849,000 
 
 36,869,000 
 
 37,300,000 
 
 1875 
 
 
 
 1,615,725 
 
 33,400,000 
 
 24,518,000 
 
 30,549,000 
 
 31,700,000 
 
 1S76 
 
 
 
 1,930,162 
 
 39,900,000 
 
 30,009,000 
 
 34,690,000 
 
 38,800,000 
 
 1877 
 
 
 
 2,268,788 
 
 46,900,000 
 
 30,783,000 
 
 36,970,000 
 
 39,800,000 
 
 1878 
 
 
 
 2,476,800 
 
 51,200,000 
 
 34,960,000 
 
 40,270,000 
 
 45,200,000 
 
 1879 
 
 
 
 1,881,787 
 
 38,900,000 
 
 31,550,000 
 
 35,430,000 
 
 40,800,000 
 
 1880 
 
 
 
 1,741,500 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 30,320,000 
 
 34,720,000 
 
 39,200,000 
 
 1881 
 
 
 
 1,678,612 
 
 34,700,000 
 
 33,260,000 
 
 37,850,000 
 
 43,000,000 
 
 1882 
 
 
 
 1.572,187 
 
 32,500,000 
 
 36,200,000 
 
 41,120,000 
 
 46,800,000 
 
 1883 
 
 
 
 1,451,250 
 
 30,000,000 
 
 35,730,000 
 
 39,660,000 
 
 46,200,000 
 
 1884 
 
 
 
 1,489,950 
 
 30,800,000 
 
 37,800,000 
 
 42,070,000 
 
 48,800,000 
 
 1885 
 
 
 
 1,538,325 
 
 31,800,000 
 
 39,910,000 
 
 42,500,000 
 
 51,600,000 
 
 1886 
 
 
 
 1,693,125 
 
 35,000,000 
 
 39,440,000 
 
 39,230,000 
 
 51,000,000 
 
 1887 
 
 
 
 1,596,375 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 41,200,000 
 
 40,410,000 
 
 53,350,000 
 
 1888 
 
 
 
 1,604,841 
 
 33,175,000 
 
 45,780,000 
 
 43,020,000 
 
 59,195,000 
 
 1889 
 
 
 
 1,587,000 
 
 32,800,000 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 46,750,000 
 
 64,646,000 
 
 i8go 
 
 
 
 1,588,880 
 
 32,845,000 
 
 54,500,000 
 
 57,225,000 
 
 70,465,000 
 
 i8qi 
 
 
 
 1,604,840 
 
 33,175,000 
 
 58,330,000 
 
 57,630,000 
 
 75,417,000 
 
 1892 
 
 
 
 1,596,375 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 63,500,000 
 
 55,563,000 
 
 82,101,000 
 
 1893 
 
 
 
 1,739,323 
 
 35,955,000 
 
 60,000,000 
 
 46,800,000 
 
 77,576,000 
 
 1894 
 
 
 
 1,910,813 
 
 39,500,000 
 
 49,500,000 
 
 31,422,000 
 
 64,000,000 
 
 1895 
 
 
 
 2,254,760 
 
 46,610,000 
 
 55,727,000 
 
 36,445,000 
 
 72,051,000 
 
 Total, . 
 
 40,183,481 
 
 $830,660,000 
 
 939,576,000 
 
 $943,083,000 
 
 $1,214,751,000
 
 6i 
 
 TABLE VIII. 
 
 Product of gold and silver in the United States from i'jg2 to 1844, and 
 
 au7iually since. 
 
 [The estimate for 1792-1873 is by R. W. Raymond, Commissioner, and since by 
 Director of the Mint.) 
 
 Year. 
 
 Ratio. 
 
 Gold. 
 
 Silver. 
 
 Total. 
 
 April 2, I792-Julv3^ 1S34, 
 
 
 $14,000,000 
 
 Insignificant. 
 
 $14,000,000 
 
 July 31, i834-Uec.3i, i^S44, 
 
 
 
 7,500,000 
 
 $250,000 
 
 7,750,000 
 
 1845, .... 
 
 15 
 
 92 
 
 1,008,327 
 
 50,000 
 
 1,058,327 
 
 1846 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 90 
 
 I-139.357 
 
 50,000 
 
 1,189,357 
 
 1847 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 80 
 
 889,085 
 
 50,000 
 
 939,085 
 
 1848 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 85 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 10,050,000 
 
 1849 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 78 
 
 40,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 40,050,000 
 
 1850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 70 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 50,050,000 
 
 1851 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 46 
 
 55,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 55,050,000 
 
 1852 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 49 
 
 60,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 60,050,000 
 
 1853 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 33 
 
 65,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 65,050,000 
 
 1854 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 33 
 
 60,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 60,050,000 
 
 1855 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 38 
 
 55,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 55,050,000 
 
 1856 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 38 
 
 55,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 55,050,000 
 
 1857 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 27 
 
 55,000,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 55,050,000 
 
 1858 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 38 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 50,500,000 
 
 1859 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 19 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 100,000 
 
 50,100,000 
 
 i860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 29 
 
 46,000,000 
 
 150,000 
 
 46,150,000 
 
 1861 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 50 
 
 43,000,000 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 45,000,000 
 
 1862 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 35 
 
 39,200,000 
 
 4,500,000 
 
 43,700,000 
 
 1863 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 37 
 
 40,000,000 
 
 8,500,000 
 
 48,500,000 
 
 1864 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 37 
 
 46,ioo,ouo 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 57,100,000 
 
 1865 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 44 
 
 53,225,000 
 
 11,250,000 
 
 64,475,000 
 
 1866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 43 
 
 53,500,000 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 63,500,000 
 
 1867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 57 
 
 51,725,000 
 
 13,500,000 
 
 65,225,000 
 
 1868 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 59 
 
 48,030,000 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60,000,000 
 
 1869 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 60 
 
 49,500,000 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 61,500,000 
 
 1870 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 57 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 66,000,000 
 
 1871 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 57 
 
 43,500,000 
 
 23,000.000 
 
 66,500,000 
 
 1872 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 63 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 28,750,000 
 
 64,750,000 
 
 1873 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 92 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 35,750,000 
 
 71,750,000 
 
 1874 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 33,500,000 
 
 37,300,000 
 
 70,800,000 
 
 1875 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 59 
 
 33,400,000 
 
 31,700,000 
 
 65,100,000 
 
 1876 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 88 
 
 39,900,000 
 
 38,800,000 
 
 78,700,000 
 
 1877 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 22 
 
 46,900,000 
 
 39,800,000 
 
 86,700,000 
 
 1878 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 94 
 
 51,200,000 
 
 45,200,000 
 
 96,400,000 
 
 3879 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [8 
 
 40 
 
 38,900,000 
 
 40,800,000 
 
 79,700,000 
 
 1880 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 OC 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 39,200,000 
 
 75,200,000 
 
 1881 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 16 
 
 34,700,000 
 
 43,000,000 
 
 77,700,000 
 
 1882 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 32,500,000 
 
 46,800,000 
 
 79,300,000 
 
 1883 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 64 
 
 30,000,000 
 
 46,200,000 
 
 76,200,000 
 
 1884 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 57 
 
 30,800,000 
 
 48,800,000 
 
 79,600,000 
 
 1885 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 41 
 
 31,800,000 
 
 51,600,000 
 
 83,400,000 
 
 1886 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 78 
 
 35,000,000 
 
 51,000,000 
 
 86,000,000 
 
 1887 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 13 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 53,350,000 
 
 86,350,000 
 
 1888 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 99 
 
 33,175,000 
 
 59,195,000 
 
 92,370,000 
 
 1889 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 10 
 
 32,800,000 
 
 64,646,000 
 
 97,446,000 
 
 1890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 76 
 
 32,845,000 
 
 70,465,000 
 
 103,310,000 
 
 1891 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 92 
 
 33,175,000 
 
 75,417,000 
 
 108,592,000 
 
 1892 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 72 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 82,101,000 
 
 115,101,000 
 
 1893 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 49 
 
 35,955,000 
 
 77,576,000 
 
 113,531,000 
 
 1894 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 56 
 
 39,500,000 
 
 64,000,000 
 
 103,500,000 
 
 1895 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 60 
 
 46,610,000 
 
 72,051,00c 
 
 118,661,000 
 
 1896 
 
 (6 mos.) 
 
 30 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 Total, 
 
 
 $2,059,946,769 
 
 $1,368,901,000 
 
 $3,428,847,769
 
 62 
 
 TABLE IX. 
 
 Statement of the coin and paper cz'rcula/wn of the United States 
 from iS6o to iSg6, inclusive, with amount of circulation per capita. 
 
 
 Coin in 
 
 United 
 
 States, 
 
 including 
 
 bullion in 
 
 Treasury. 
 
 Paper 
 
 money 
 
 in United 
 
 States. 
 
 Total 
 money. 
 
 Coin, bul- 
 lion, and 
 
 paper 
 money in 
 
 Treas- 
 ury. 
 
 Circula- Popula- 
 tion, tion. 
 
 Money 
 
 in 
 United 
 States 
 
 per 
 capita. 
 
 Circu- 
 lation 
 
 per 
 capita. 
 
 i860 
 
 $235,000,000 
 
 $207,102,477 
 
 $442,102,477 $6,695,225 
 
 1 
 $435,407,25231,443,321 
 
 $14.06 
 
 $13.85 
 
 1861 
 
 250,000,000 
 
 202,005,767 
 
 452,005,767 
 
 3,6oo,oool 448,405,76732,064,000 
 
 14.09 
 
 13.98 
 
 1862 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 333,452,079 
 
 358,452,079 
 
 23,754,335 
 
 334,697,74432,704,000 
 
 10.96 
 
 10.23 
 
 1863 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 649,867,283 
 
 674,867,283 
 
 79,473,245 
 
 595,394.03833.365,000 
 
 20.23 
 
 17.84 
 
 1864 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 680,588,067 
 
 705,588,067 
 
 35,946,589 
 
 669,641 ,478 34,046,000 
 
 20.72 
 
 19.67 
 
 1865 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 745. 129.755 
 
 770,129,755 
 
 55.426,760 
 
 714,702,99534,748,000 
 
 22.16 
 
 20.57 
 
 1866 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 729,327,254 
 
 754.327.254 
 
 80,839,010 
 
 673,488,24435,469,000 
 
 21.27 
 
 18.99 
 
 1867 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 703,200,612 
 
 728,200,612 
 
 66,208,543 
 
 661,992,069 36,211,000 
 
 20.11 
 
 18.28 
 
 1868 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 691,553.578 
 
 716,553.578 
 
 36,449,917 
 
 680,103,661136,973,000 
 
 19.38 
 
 18.39 
 
 1869 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 690,351,180 
 
 715,351,180 
 
 50,898,289 
 
 664,452,891 37,756,000 
 
 18.9s 
 
 17.60 
 
 1870 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 697,868,461 
 
 722,868,461 
 
 47,655,667 
 
 675,212,79438,558,371 
 
 18.73 
 
 17-50 
 
 1871 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 716,812,174 
 
 ■741,812,174 
 
 25,923,169 
 
 7'5.889.oo5|39, 555,000 
 
 18.75 
 
 18.10 
 
 1872 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 737.721,565 
 
 762,721,565 
 
 24,412,016 
 
 738,309,54940,596,000 
 
 18.70 
 
 18.19 
 
 1873 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 749.445.610 
 
 774,445.610 
 
 22,563,801 
 
 751,881,809,41,677,000 
 
 18.58 
 
 18.04 
 
 1874 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 781,024,781 
 
 806,024,781 
 
 29,941,750 
 
 776,083,031 
 
 42,796,000 
 
 18.83 
 
 18.13 
 
 1875 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 773.273.509 
 
 798,273,509 
 
 44,171,562 
 
 754,101,947 
 
 43,951,000 
 
 18.16 
 
 17.16 
 
 1876 
 
 52,418,734 
 
 738,264,550 
 
 790,683,284 
 
 63,073,896 
 
 727,609,388 
 
 45,137,000 
 
 17.52 
 
 16.12 
 
 1877 
 
 65.837.506 
 
 697,216,341 
 
 763,053,847 
 
 40,738,964 
 
 722,3x4,883 
 
 46,353,000 
 
 16.46 
 
 15-58 
 
 1878 
 
 102,047,907 
 
 68(5,205,669 
 
 791.253,576 
 
 62,120,942 
 
 729,132,634 
 
 47,598,000 
 
 16.62 
 
 15-32 
 
 1879 
 
 357,268,178 
 
 694.253.363 
 
 1,051,521,541 
 
 232,889,748 
 
 818,631,793 
 
 48,866,000 
 
 21.52 
 
 16.75 
 
 1880 
 
 494,363,884 
 
 711,565,313 
 
 1,205,929,197 
 
 232,546,969 
 
 973,382,228 
 
 50,155,783 
 
 24.04 
 
 19.41 
 
 1881 
 
 647,868,682 
 
 758,673,141 
 
 1,406,541,823 
 
 292,303,704 
 
 1,114,238,11951,316,000 
 
 27.41 
 
 21.71 
 
 1882 
 
 703,974,839 
 
 776,556,880 
 
 1.480,531.719 
 
 306,241,300 1,174,290,419 52,495,000 
 
 28.20 
 
 22.37 
 
 1883 
 
 769,740,048 
 
 873.749.768 
 
 1,643,489,816 
 
 413,184,120 1,230,305,696 
 
 53,693,000 
 
 30.60 
 
 22 91 
 
 1884 
 
 801,068,939 
 
 904,385,250 
 
 1,705,454,189 
 
 461,528,2201,243,925,969 
 
 54,911,000 
 
 31.06 
 
 22.65 
 
 1885 
 
 872,175,823 
 
 945.482,513 
 
 1,817,658,336 
 
 525,089,721 
 
 1,292,568,615 
 
 56,148,000 
 
 32.37 
 
 23.02 
 
 1886 
 
 903,027,304 
 
 905.532.390 
 
 1,808,559,694 
 
 555,859,160 
 
 1,252,700,525 
 
 57,404,000 
 
 31-50 
 
 21.82 
 
 1887 
 
 1,007,513,901 
 
 892,928,77. 
 
 1,900,442,672 
 
 582,903,529 
 
 1,317.539. '43 
 
 58,680,000 
 
 32-39 
 
 22.45 
 
 1888 
 
 1,092,391,690 
 
 970,564,259 
 
 2,062,955,949 
 
 690,785,070 
 
 1,372,170,870 
 
 59,974,000 
 
 34-39 
 
 22.88 
 
 1889 
 
 1,100,612,434 
 
 974.738,277 
 
 2,075,350,7" 
 
 694,989,062 
 
 1,380,361,649 
 
 61,289,000 
 
 33.86 
 
 22.52 
 
 1890 
 
 1,152,471,638 
 
 991. 754.521 
 
 2,144,226,159 
 
 714,974,889 
 
 1,429,251,270 
 
 62,622,250 
 
 34 24 
 
 22.82 
 
 189 1 
 
 1,163,185,054 
 
 1,032,039,021 
 
 2,195,224,075 
 
 697,783,368 
 
 1.497.440,707 
 
 63.975.000 
 
 34-31 
 
 23-41 
 
 1892 
 
 1,232,854,331 
 
 1,139.745.170 
 
 2,372,599,501 
 
 771,252,314 
 
 1,601,347,187 
 
 65,520,000 
 
 36.21 
 
 24.44 
 
 18931,213,413,584 
 
 1,109,988,808 
 
 2,323,402,392 
 
 726,701,147 
 
 1,596,701,245 
 
 66,946,000 
 
 34-70 
 
 23-85 
 
 18941,251,543,158 
 
 1,168,801,62^ 
 
 2,420,434,781 
 
 759,626,073 
 
 1,660,808,708 
 
 68,397,000 
 
 35-39 
 
 24.28 
 
 1895 1,260,987,506 
 
 I, I37,6i9,9i4!2, 398, 607,420 
 
 796.638,947 
 
 1,601,968,473 69,878,000 
 
 34-33 
 
 2293 
 
 1896 1,225,618,792 
 
 i,iio,oi2,536|2,345,63i,328 
 
 839,000,302 
 
 1,506,631,026171,390,000 
 
 32.86 
 
 21. 10 
 
 Note i. —Specie payments were suspended from January i, 1862, to January i, 
 1879. During the greater part of that period gold and silver coins were not in circu- 
 lation except on the Pacific Coast, where, it is estimated, the specie circulation was 
 generally about $25,ock>,ooo. This estimated amount is the only coin included in the 
 above statement from 1862 to 1875, inclusive. 
 
 Note 2. — In 1876 subsidiary silver again came into use, and is included in this 
 statement, beginning with that year. 
 
 Note 3. — The coinage of standard silver dollars began in 1878 under the act of 
 February 28, 1878. 
 
 Note 4. — Specie payments were resumed January i, 1879, and all gold and silver 
 coins, as well as gold and silver bullion in the Treasury, are included in this state- 
 ment from and after that date. 
 
 Note 5. — This table represents the circulation of the United States as shown by 
 the revised statements of the Treasury Department for June 30 of each of the years 
 specified.
 
 63 
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE TABLES. 
 
 Table i shows the changes in the commercial ratio of 
 Silver to Gold from 16S7 to 1896 inclusive, 210 years. In 
 1687 14.94 ounces of silver was the equivalent of one ounce 
 of gold. In 1896 30.32 ounces of silver is required to pur- 
 chase one ounce of gold. Has the purchasing power of 
 silver decreased, or the exchange value of gold increased 1 
 
 TABLE III. 
 
 This table shows that when specie payments were re- 
 sumed on the ist of January, 1879, public confidence was so 
 great in the outstanding paper issues of the United States, 
 that, although the treasury was provided with $135,000,000 of 
 gold, only $7,976,698 were presented for redemption during 
 the balance of the fiscal year. It shows also, that the silver 
 fright in 1896 sent in no less than $158,655,956 for redemp- 
 tion in about the same time. 
 
 TABLES IV AND V 
 
 Show the cost of silver purchased under the Acts of 1878 
 and 1890, $464,210,262.96 and which to-day is not worth one- 
 half the cost. 
 
 TABLE VI 
 
 Shows the world's total product of gold and silver for one 
 hundred years, 1792 to 1S92, the difference being only 
 
 $5,559,470- 
 
 TABLE VII 
 
 Product of gold and silver from the mines in the United 
 States from 1873 to 1895. 
 
 TABLE VIII 
 
 Product of gold and silver in the United vStates from 1792 
 to 1896, showing the annual increase in volume. 
 
 TABLE IX 
 
 Shows the amount and kind of currency and bullion in the 
 United States, the amount in circulation per capita, and the 
 amount in reserve.
 
 64 
 
 [From Treasury Documents.] 
 
 SUMMARY OF MONETARY EVENTS SINCE 1786. 
 
 Ij86. — Establishment of the double standard in the United 
 States with a ratio of i to 15.25; that is, on the basis of 123.134 
 gfrains of fine gold for the half eagle, or 85 piece, and 375.64 grains 
 of fine silver for the dollar, without any actual coinage. 
 
 I7g2. — Adoption of the ratio of i to 1 5 and establishment of 
 a mint with free and gratuitous coinage in the United States; the 
 silver dollar equal to 37I/4 grains fine, the eagle to 247 >< grains 
 fine. 
 
 iSoj. — Establishment of the double standard in France on 
 the basis of the ratio of i to 1 5 ><, notwithstanding the fact that 
 the market ratio was then about i to 1 5. 
 
 1810. — Introduction of the silver standard in Russia on the 
 basis of the ruble of 17.99 grams of fine silver, followed in 1871 by 
 the coinage of imperials, or gold pieces of 5 rubles, of 5.998 grams; 
 therefore, with a ratio of i to 15. This ratio was changed by the 
 increase of the imperial to 5 rubles 1 5 copecks, and later to i to 
 
 15.45. 
 
 1813. — Great depreciation of paper money in England, reach- 
 ing 26X per cent, in May. Cost of gold, /;5 6s., and of silver, 
 71)4(1. per ounce standard. In December the loss was only 6 
 percent.; gold at this period was quoted at ^4 3s., and silver at 
 64d. 
 
 1816. — Abolition of the double standard in England, which 
 had had as its basis the ratio of i to 15.21, and adoption of the 
 gold standard on the basis of the pound sterling at 7.322 grams fine 
 in weight. 
 
 Coinage of divisional money at the rate of 66d. per ounce. 
 Extreme prices, £4. 2s. for gold and 64d. for silver; in January, £i 
 1 8s. 6d., and 59X in December 
 
 18/6. — Substitution for the ratio of i to 15.5 in Holland, estab- 
 lished by a rather confused coinage, of the ratio of i to 15 J^. 
 
 /8/(^. — AboHtion of forced currency in England. Price of gold 
 £2 17s. 10;^ d., and of silver, 62d.* per ounce in October, against 
 £4 IS. 6d. and 67d. in February. 
 
 /c?j2.— Introduction of the monetary system of France into 
 Belgium, with a decree providing for the coinage of pieces of 20 
 and 40 francs, which, however, were not stamped. Silver, 59^4 d. 
 
 *The price of silver giVen hereafter represents the average rate per ounce 
 standard — that is, the mean between the highest price and the lowest price 
 quoted during the year.
 
 65 
 
 l8j4- — Substitution of the ratio of i to i6 for that of i to 15 in 
 the United States by reducing the weight of the eagle, ten-dollar 
 gold-piece, from 270 grains to 258 grains. 
 
 In 1837 the fineness of the United States gold coins was raised 
 from .899225 to .900, and the silver coins from .8924 to .900, giving 
 a ratio of i to 15.988 and fixing the standard weight of the silver 
 cor.ar at 4i2>^ grains. Silver .59-i5/i6d. 
 
 i8j6. — Introduction of the company rupee, a piece of silver 
 weighing 165 grains fine, in India in place of the sicca rupee. 
 Creation of a trade coin — the mohur, or piece of 1 5 rupees — con- 
 taining 165 grains of fine gold. Silver, 59T^d. 
 
 1S44. — Introduction of the double standard in Turkey, with 
 the ratio of i to 15.10. Silver 59J'2d. 
 
 1S4J. — Abolition of the double standard in Holland by the in- 
 troduction of the silver standard on the basis of a i-fiorin piece 
 0.945 grams fine, the coinage of which had already been decreed 
 in 1839. Silver, 59xgd. 
 
 1841. — Discovery of the gold mines of California. 
 
 1848. — Coinage in Belgium of pieces of 10 and 25 francs in 
 gold, a shade too light. These pieces were demonetized and with- 
 drawn from circulation in 1884. Silver, 59^^. 
 
 1848. — Replacing the ratio of i to 16 in Spain, which had been 
 in force since 1786, by that of i to 15.77. 
 
 18^0. — Introduction of the French monetary system in Switzer- 
 land without any actual coinage of gold pieces. Silver, 60('gd. 
 
 i8ji. — Discovery of the gold mines of Australia. 
 
 183J. — Lowering of the weight of silver pieces of less value 
 than Si to the extent of 7 per cent, in the United States, and lim- 
 itation of their legal tender power to $5. Silver, 61 'i'd. 
 
 i8^j. — Maximum of the production of gold reached in Califoi"- 
 nia, when it amounted to $65,000,000. 
 
 1834. — Introduction of the gold standard in Portugal on the 
 basis of the crown of 16.257 grams fine. Before this period the 
 country had the silver standard, with a rather large circulation of 
 gold coins stamped on the basis of i to i5>-2 in 1835 ^-^^d i to 16;^ 
 in 1847. Silver, 6i>^d. 
 
 1834.^ Modification of the ratio of i to 15.77 in Spain by rais- 
 ing it to I to 15.48, and by lowering the piaster from 23.49 grams 
 to 23.36 grams fine. 
 
 1834. — Introduction of the silver standard, as it existed in the 
 mother country, in Java, in place of the ideal Javanese money, 
 and coinage of colonial silver pieces. 
 5
 
 66 
 
 i8j7. — Conclusion of a monetar}' treaty between Austria and 
 the German States, in accordance with which i pound of fine sil- 
 ver (one-half a kilogram) was stamped into 30 thalers or 52 >^ 
 florins of south 'Germany, or 45 Austrian florins, resultins^ in i 
 thaler equaling 1 34 German florins or lYz Austrian florins. Sil- 
 ver, (i\)idi. 
 
 1861. — Law decreeing the coinage of gold pieces of 10 and 20 
 francs exactly equal to French coins of the same denomination i.i 
 Belgium. Silver, 6i)4^d. 
 
 1S62. — Adoption of the French monetary system by Italy. 
 Silver, 6i,"gd. 
 
 i86_5. — Formation of the Latin Union between France, Bel- 
 gium, Switzerland, and Italy on the basis of a ratio of i to \S%- 
 Silver, 6i,igd. 
 
 j868. — Adoption of the French monetary system by Roumania 
 with the exclusion of the 5-franc silver piece, which was, however, 
 stamped in 1881 and 1S83. Silver, 6o>2d. 
 
 186S. — Admission of Greece into the Latin Union. The defin- 
 ite a-nd universal introduction of the French monetary system into 
 the country was effected only in 1883. 
 
 1S6S. — Adoption of the French monetary system, with the 
 peseta or franc as the unit, by Spain. The coinage of gold al- 
 phonses d'or of 25 pesetas was made only in 1876. 
 
 187J. — Replacing of the silver standard in Germany by the 
 gold standard. Coinage in 1873 of gold pieces of 5, 10, and 20 
 mark pieces, the latter weighing 7.168 grams fine. Silver, 6o>2d. 
 
 iSyi.— Establishment of the double standard in Japan with the 
 ratio of i to 16.17 by the coinage of the gold yen of 1.667 grams 
 and of the silver yen of 26.956 grams, both with a fineness of 
 o. 900. 
 
 iSyj. — Increase of the intrinsic value of the subsidiary coins of 
 the United States. Replacing of the double standard by the gold 
 standard. Reduction of the cost of coinage of gold to one-fifth 
 per cent., the total abolition of which charge was decreed in 1875. 
 Creation of a trade dollar of 420 grains with a fineness of 0.900. 
 Silver, 59>4d. 
 
 i8jj. — Suspension of the coinage of 5-franc pieces in Belgium. 
 
 i8jj. — Limitation of the coinage of 5-francs on individual 
 account in France. 
 
 iSjj. — Suspension of the coinage of silver in Holland. 
 
 1 87 J. — Formation of the Scandinavian Monetary LTnion. Re- 
 placing of the silver standard in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway
 
 6/. 
 
 by that of gold on the basis of the ki'one. Coinage of pieces of lo 
 and 20 kroner, the later weighing 8.961 grams, with a fineness of 
 o 900. 
 
 i8j4. — Introduction of the system of contingents for the coin- 
 age of 5-franc silver pieces in the Latin Union. Silver, 58,^gd. 
 
 iS'/j. — Suspension of the coinage of silver on individual ac- 
 count in Italy. Silver, 56j^d. 
 
 iSj^. — Suspension of the coinage of silver on account of the 
 Dutch colonies. 
 
 i8j^. — Introduction of the double standard in Holland on the 
 basis of the ratio of i to 15.62 by the creation of a gold piece of 10 
 florins, weighing 5.048 grams fine, with the maintenance of the 
 suspension of the coinage of silver. 
 
 i8j6. — Great fluctuations in the price of silver, which declined 
 to 463:(d., representing the ratio of i to 20. 172, in July. Recovery, 
 in December, to 58;4d. Average pi-ice, 523^' d. 
 
 iSjj. — Coinage of 5-franc silver pieces by Spain continued 
 later, notwithstanding the decline of silver in the market. Silver, 
 54>4"d. 
 
 i8jj. — Replacing of the double standard in Finland by that of 
 gold on the basis of the mark or franc. 
 
 1878. — Act of United States Congress providing for the pur- 
 chase, from time to time, of silver bullion, at the market price 
 thereof, of not less than $2,000,000 worth per month as a minimum, 
 nor more than $4,000,000 worth per month as a maximum, and its 
 coinage as fast as purchased into silver dollars of 4i2>2 grains. 
 The coinage of silver on private account prohibited. Silver, 
 52,\d. 
 
 i8j8. — Meeting of the first international monetary conference 
 in Paris. Prolongation of the Latin Union to January i, 1886. 
 
 i87g. — Suspension of the sales of silver by Germany. Silver, 
 51 "id. 
 
 18S1.— Second international monetary conference in Paris. 
 A-er, Siy^d. 
 
 iSS_5. — Introduction of the double standard in Egyyt. Silver, 
 4S>Hd. 
 
 iSS^. — Prolongation of the Latin Union to January 1, 1891. 
 
 1886.— Great decline in the price of silver, which fell in August 
 to 42d., representing a ratio of i to 22.5, and recovery, in Decem- 
 ber, to 46d. Modification of the coinage of gold and silver pieces 
 in Russia. Silver, 45>^d. 
 
 i88y.— Retirement of the trade dollars by the Government of
 
 68 
 
 the United States in ]\Iarch. Demonetization of the Spanish pias- 
 ters, known as Ferdinand Carolus, whose reimbursement at the 
 rate of 5 pesetas ended on March 11. Xew decHne of silver in 
 March to 44d., representing the ratio of i to 21.43. Silver, 44>!5d. 
 
 iSgo. — United States — Repeal of the act of February 28, 1878, 
 commonly known as Bland-Allison law, and substitution of author- 
 ity for purchase of 4,500,000 fine ounces of silver each month to be 
 paid for by issue of Treasury notes payable in coin. (Act of July 
 14, 1890.) Demonetization of 25,000,000 lei in pieces of 5 lei 
 in Roumania in consequence of the introduction of the gold stand- 
 ard by the law of October 27th. Silver. 47|^d. 
 
 i8gi. — Introduction of the French monetary system in Tunis 
 on the basis of the gold standard. Coinage of national gold coins 
 and bullion. .Silver, 45i'6<^^- 
 
 iSg2. — Replacing of the silver standard in Austria-Hungary by 
 that of gold by the law of August 2. Coinage of pieces of 20 
 crowns, containing 6.090 grams fine. The crown equals one-half 
 florin. Meeting of the third international monetary conference at 
 Brussels. Production of gold reaches its maximum, varying be- 
 tween 675,000,000 and 734,000,000 francs. Silver, 39||d. 
 
 i8g3. — Suspension of the coinage of silver in British India and 
 of French trade dollars on individual account. Panic in the silver 
 market in July in London, when the price fell below 3od., repre- 
 senting the ratio of i to 31.43. Repeal of the purchasing clause of 
 the act of July 14, 1890, by the Congress of the United States. 
 
 iSgj. — Adoption of the gold standard by Chile. 
 
 iSgs. — Russia decides to coin 100.000,000 gold rubles in 1896. 
 
 MONETARY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 In 1786 the Congress of the Confederation chose as the mone- 
 tary unit of the United States the dollar of 375.65 grains of pure 
 silver. This unit had its origin in the Spanish piaster or milled 
 dollar, which constituted the basis of the metallic circulation of 
 the English colonies in America. It was never coined, there being 
 at that time no mint in the United States. 
 
 The act of April 2, 1792, established the first monetary system 
 of the United States. The bases of the system were : The gold 
 dollar or unit, containing 24.75 grains of pure gold, and stamped 
 in pieces of $10, $5, and S2>4, denominated, respectively, eagles, 
 half eagles, and quarter eagles ; the silver dollar or unit, contain- 
 ing 371.25 grains of pure silver. A mint was established. The 
 coinage was unlimited and there was no mint charge. The ratio
 
 69 
 
 of gold to silver in coinage was 1:15. Both gold and silver were 
 legal tender. The standard was double. 
 
 The act of 1793 undervalued gold, which was therefore ex- 
 ported. The act of June 28, 1834, was passed to remedy this, by 
 changing the mint ratio between the metals to i : 16.002. This 
 latter act fixed the weight of the gold dollar at 25.8 grains, but 
 lowered the fineness from 0.91673 to 0.899225. The fine weight of 
 the gold dollar was thus reduced to 23.2 grains. The act of 1834. 
 undervalued silver as that of 1792 had undervalued gold, and silver 
 was attracted to Europe by the more favorable ratio of i : isj-a- 
 The act of January 18, 1837, was passed to make the fineness of 
 the gold and silver coins uniform. The legal weight of the gold 
 dollar was fixed at 25.8 grains, and its fine weight at 23. c- grains. 
 The fineness was, therefore, changed by this act to 0.900 and the 
 ratio to i : 15.9884-- 
 
 Silver continued to be exported. The act of F'ebruary 21, 1853, 
 reduced the weight of the silver coins of a denomination less than 
 $1, which the acts of 1792 and 1837 had made exactly proportional 
 to the weight of the silver dollar, and provided that they should 
 be legal tender to the amount of only $5. Under the acts of 1792 
 and 1837 they had been full legal tender. By the act of 1853 the 
 legal weight of the half dollar was reduced to 192 grains and that 
 of the other fractions of the dollar in proportion. The coinage of 
 the fractional parts of the dollar was reserved to the Government. 
 
 The act of February 12, 1S73, provided that the unit of value 
 of the United States should be the gold dollar of the standard 
 weight of 25.8 grains, and that there should be coined besides the 
 following gold coins : A quarter eagle, or 2}^ dollar piece ; a 
 3-dollar piece ; a half eagle, or 5-dollar piece ; an eagle, or lo-dol- 
 lar piece, and a double eagle, or 20-dollar piece, all of a standard 
 weight proportional to that of the dollar piece. These coins were 
 made legal tender in all payments at their nominal value when 
 not below the standard weight and limit of tolerance provided in 
 the act for the single piece, and when reduced in weight they 
 should be legal tender at a valuation in proportion to their actual 
 weight. The silver coins provided for by the act were a trade 
 dollar, a half dollar, or 50-cent piece, a quarter dollar, and a 
 lo-cent piece ; the weight of the trade dollar to be 420 grains 
 Troy; the half dollar 12;^ grams; the quarter dollar and the 
 dime, respectively, one-half and one-fifth of the weight of the half 
 dollar. These silver coins were made legal tender at their nom- 
 inal value for any amount not exceeding §5 in any one payment.
 
 70 
 
 The charge for converting standard gold bullion into coin was 
 fixed at one-fifth of i per cent. Owners of silver bullion were 
 allowed to deposit it at any mint of the United States to be formed 
 into bars or into trade dollars, and no deposit of silver for other 
 coinage was to be received. 
 
 Section II of the joint resolution of July 22, 1S76, recited that 
 the trade dollar should not thereafter be legal tender, and that 
 the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized to limit the 
 coinage of the same to an amount sufficient to meet the export 
 demand for it. The act of March 3, 1887, retired the trade dollar 
 and prohibited its coinage. That of September 26, 1890, discon- 
 tinued the coinage of the i -dollar and 3-dollar gold pieces. 
 
 The act of February 28, 1878, directed the coinage of silver 
 dollars of the weight of 412;^ grains troy, of standard silver, as 
 provided in the act of January 18, 1837, and that such coins, with 
 all standard silver dollars theretofore coined, should be legal tender 
 at their nominal value for all debts and dues, public and private, 
 except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized and directed by 
 the first section of the act to purchase from time to time silver 
 bullion at the market price thereof, not less than $2,000,000 worth 
 nor more than §4,000,000 worth per month, and to cause the same 
 to be coined monthly, as fast as purchased, into such dollars. A 
 subseqiient act, that of July 14, 1890, enacted that the Secretary 
 of the Treasury should purchase silver bullion to the aggregate 
 amount of 4,500,000 ounces, or so much thereof as might be 
 offered, each month, at the market price thereof, not exceeding 
 $1 for 371.25 grains of pure silver, and to issue in payment thereof 
 Treasury notes of the United States, such notes to be redeem- 
 able by the Government, on demand, in coin, and to be legal 
 tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except where 
 otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. The act directed 
 the Secretary of the Treasury to coin each month 2,000,000 ounces 
 of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of the act 
 into standard silver dollars until the ist day of July, 1891, and 
 thereafter as much as might be necessary, to provide for the 
 redemption of the Treasury notes issued tuider the act. The pur- 
 chasing clause of the act of July 14, 1890, was repealed by the act 
 of November i, 1893. 
 
 The act of June 9, 1879, made the subsidiary silver coins of the 
 United States legal tender to the amount of $10. The minor 
 coins are legal tender to the amount of 25 cents.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
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