\' \ THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY FOR COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS ^S WE LL AS T^£ NAL 9o ■^ BY ^ N^TITUTION^^ PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSltY, NEW YORK<'«^ AUTHOR OF " THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY " ^t*** FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS, M.A., Ph.D RK' Vdost . THE MACMILLAN COMPANY LONDON : MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 1902 All rights -reserved r b .a^ Copyright, 1898, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped September, 1898. Reprinted March, 1899 ; August, 1900 ; April, 1901 ; August, 1902. • •• • • • • • • • • • • i i Norinooti IPrrss J. 8. Cuihing & Co. Brrwick ft Smith Norwood Mms. U.S.A. I 1. PREFACE The present volume is what its title implies, an ele- mentary text-book of Sociology. It has been written in response to a persistent and growing demand for an untechnical but scientific and reasonably complete state- ment of sociological theory, for the use of college and school classes. No other subject calls for such serious attention from teachers and students of educational philosophy at the present time as that of the best preparation for an inte l- l igent and responsible citizenship . Marvellous as the| development of the United States has been^ during the century that is now closing, greater destinies are yet to be realized. ^ Our task in furthering the civilization of the world is to be a large and responsible one; no other nation can assume it for us or perform it if we fail.xl Delicate as our international relations have been during our attempt to establish a secure republic in a world of monarchies, they are to be more delicate and more diffi- cult in the near future when the European powers attempt to rectify their colonial boundaries. Complicated as our financial problems have already been, they will hereafter call for greater wisdom than has been bestowed upon them hitherto. Difficult as has been the attempt to i vi Preface organize efficient, economical, and honest municipal government for cities numbering millions of inhabitants, the difficulties will continue to increase as population grows and wealth accumulates. Neither good luck nor any mere intuition of common sense will enable us to f^aintain the reality of republican ireedom unless we have other resources to draw upon. Besides common sense and energy, we must have knowledge, training, and an unselfish devotion to the cause of human progress. It is certain, however, that schools and colleges cannot furnish detailed courses in all branches of economic, legal, and political science. The field is too vast and the years of study are too brief. To a majority of teachers the alternative seems to be to give either a thorough course in some one subject — Political Economy, for example — or a superficial course in many subjects, including "Civics" (or Elementary Constitutional Law), International Law, and Political Ethics. •/ In the judgment of the present writer, it would be wise to devote a large part of the time available for such dis- ciplines to a careful study of the nature and laws of human_society. This study would familiarize the pupil with the principal forms of social organization ; with the t houghts, the sympathies^ the purposes, and the vi r tues that make society possible ; with the benefits that society confers ; and with the conduct that worthy membership of society requires. These are the facts and principles that underlie all details of law and politics, all sound political economy, and all public morality. Well instructed in these matters, the student is fitted to continue his study of Preface vii society and public policy throughout life. Without this foundation, no acquaintance with legal or historical detail can give him a comprehensive grasp of s ocial relation s. That this opinion is shared by many teachers the author has abundant evidence; and because of it the present text- book has been written. Sociology, as here set forth, ^^\ nothing more or less than an_ elementary description of \ socjet}r^j n^cl^r_aiLd simple scientific term s. It will notj be found more difficult as a class subject than Algebra, Chemistry, or Elementary Psychology. This volume is not an abridgment of the author's '* Principles of Sociology," but is a new book. Many paragraphs, however, and here and there entire pages, have been adapted from the larger work. New York, August, 1898. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2008 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/elementsofsociolOOgiddrich TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I PACK Fopulation and Society i CHAPTER II Where Aggregations of People are Formed . • . • '3 CHAPTER III How Aggregations of People are Formed . • . • • 22 CHAPTER IV The Composition and the Unity of a Social Population . . 29 CHAPTER V The Practical Activities of Socii .....•• 34 CHAPTER VI Socialization 53 CHAPTER VII Cooperation 76 CHAPTER VIII Social Pleasure 88 CHAPTER IX The Social Nature 95 ix X Table of Contents CHAPTER X rAGB The Classes of Socii 103 CHAPTER XI The Preeminent Social Class . . . . , , .113 CHAPTER XII The Social Mind : Modes of Like-mindedness . • • .119 CHAPTER XIII Sympathetic Like-mindedness and Impulsive Social Action . 129 CHAPTER XIV Formal Like-mindedness : Tradition and Conformity . • .141 CHAPTER XV Rational Like-mindedness : Public Opinion and Social Values . 155 CHAPTER XVI Social Organization , • . .172 CHAPTER XVII Component Societies 179 CHAPTER XVIII Constituent Societies 193 CHAPTER XIX The Character and Efficiency of Organization . • • .216 CHAPTER XX The Early History of Society . . * . . • .231 Table of Contents xi CHAPTER XXI t- PAGE Tribal Society 254 CHAPTER XXH Civilization , . 272 CHAPTER XXHI Progress 290 CHAPTER XXIV Democracy 302 CHAPTER XXV The Theory of Society . 330 THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY 3jOic CHAPTER I Population and Society The Groupings of Like Things. — If we wish to under- stand the world in which we live, we must cultivate the habit of noticing what things are like_o.n_e_another. It is true that we must also notice what things are unlike one another. If we were unaware of differences, we should not know. If our eyes were not sensitive to differences of brightness and of colour, if our ears were deaf to gradations of sound, and if the nerves of the skin detected no inequalities of pressure, the external world would remain, for our minds, a blank. Discrimination, then, is the beginning of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is only a beginning. If we knew nothing but the differences of things, we should soon reach the limit of the detail that our minds could hold. Endless progress in knowledge is possible^ only because we observe resemblances as well as differ-^ ences. As rapidly as we discover that things are alike, we put them together in our thought as a group, or class, or kind. This enables us to think about them collectively by a single effort of attentk)?!,^ instead of, separately by B "I 2 The Elements of Sociology innumerable efforts. We owe all science to this possibility of economizing our mental energies, by grouping things lin our thoughts into classes or kinds. Comparatively few persons make their mental groupings I in a strictly methodical way. To observe systematically I and classify with precision — that is, to group like things j ' together with accuracy — is to be scientific. . Classification, then, is the foundation of all scientific knowledge; and classification consists simply in putting together in our thought those things that are truly and ] essentially alike. When we have formed the habit of scientific observa- tion, we presently discover that, in the world of external things, objects which are so much alike that we group them in our thought are usually grouped together also j in space. If we follow the windings of a stream through the meadows, and notice the Vc^.ious weeds and wild flowers that grow on its banks, the insects that wing over its stagnant pools, and the birds that nest in the thickets along its borders, we quickly learn that it is unusual to. find only one object of the same kind in a given place. We are much more likely to come upon great masses of cowslips or violets, swarms of gnats, bands of butterflies, two or three dragon-flies darting about together, and pairs, or even flocks, of the same species of birds, than to en- counter individual specimens. In like manner, if we extend our observations over wide regions in the same country, and then over the entire surface of the globe, we find that particular rock forma- tions, soils, and mineral deposits are found together in certain areas,' and not' .^sicattered in a haphazard way Population and Society .3 throughout the continents ; and that species of plants and animals have their well-known habitats or haunts, or, as the naturalists say, their areas of characterization. The same is true of the varieties of Aiankind. The white, yellow, red, and black races are not indiscriminately mingled over the face of the earth ; but each has its own fairly well-defined division. The natural home of the white races is Europe, northern Africa, and western Asia ; and from Europe they have spread to America, southern ^ Asia, and Australia. The natural home of the yellow r races is northern and eastern Asia. The natural home of the red races is America. The natural home of the black races is Africa, southern Asia, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean. Even of the national varieties of the white races this is true. The Semitic groups dwell together east of the Mediterranean, the Slavic in the east and north of Europe, the Scandinavian in northwestern Europe. Population. — Any group of \uman beings of the same kind or description — that is, a group composed of persons who, in a number of important respects, resemble one another, and dwell together in a geographical area that I can be fairly well-defined — may be called a population. Ir The most interesting pecuHarity of populations is one that is to form the subject of our present study. The individuals that compose a population are endowed with intelligence, and therefore have the habit of noticing re- semblances and differences, of which we have just been speaking. Among the resemblances and differences that they observe are those which they discover among them- selves — and it is in these that they become chiefly inter- ested. They become keen in noticing likenesses and unlikenesses of colour, race, and nationality, resemblances 4 The Elements of Sociology and differences of character and conduct, of tastes and habits. The individuals composing a population, like most other objects that are found in groups, are, to a great extent, alike; but unlike other objects, they also know thai \ they are alike. "^ Besides knowing that they are alike, the individuals that make up a population usually find enjoyment in their , resemblances, and are likely to quarrel and make them- selves w^retched over their differences. The white man, as a general thing, is glad that the men about him also are . white men ; and white men often entertain feelings not ^ altogether agreeable towards groups of black men with which they are obliged to have much contact. In like manner, men who believe or think alike about some ques- tion or interest that concerns them — for example, a ques- tion of religion, or of politics, or a question of political economy, like that of gold or silver money, or of a protec- tive tariff — find great pleasure in their intellectual sym- pathy, and habitually quarrel with those who differ from them. Finally, men who thus recognize their resemblances and take pleasure in their agreements find that they can work s/ together for common ends. It is possible for them to have similar purposes in life, to agree upon the best means of achieving them, to understand one another, and there- fore to cooperate sympathetically and with success. Of all the resemblances which the individuals of a pop- ulation thus discover among themselves, and turn to good account, the most important are those mental and moral resemblances which thus make cooperation possible. Dif- ferences of race or of colour, of speech even, may be over- looked if there are agreements of thought and feeling. Population and Society 5 But without these, harmony, happiness, and successful cooperation are not possible. Society. — The facts that we have here been describing are called social facts or facts of society. ' The word "society" is derived from the Latin word sociics, meaning a companion or associate. As soon as any person associates with another, or has a companion or friend, he is already aware of important resemblances be- tween that companion and himself. He knows that they are interested in the same things or like to do the same things, or that they have similar tastes, beliefs, or sympa- thies ; or perhaps even that they are alike in all of these matters. He finds, however, that in some things they differ ; but that their acquaintance and conversation often bring them to agreement or sympathy upon subjects which, at first, divided them. This process of discovering both differences and similarities, and of coming to agreement upon various subjects, yields a large part of the charm of their friendship. Just this process goes on in every population, not only between each person and some one other person or com- panion, but between each and many associates. That is to say, wherever many individuals dwell or mingle to- gether in one place, there goes on an active interchange of ideas and sympathies, a cultivation of acquaintance and of like-mindedness. Consequently the word " society," which originally means companionship or association, has been ex- tended to mean also this process of pleasurable conversation and cultivation of both acquaintance and like-mindedness^ Society, the n, as a mode of activity of intelligent iadividu-X ^ als, _is the cultiv ation of acquai ntance and like-mindednesS'.'^ This mode of activity, of course, yields a certain result 6 The Elements of Sociology or product. It makes those who associate more and more alike in mental aim moral qualities. Its product, there- fore, is a group of like-minded persons who enjoy and keep up this mode of activity. Such a group or prodijct is called a society. A society, therefore, is any group or number of indi- viduals who cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement ; that is to say, like-mindedness. It is a group of socii. Such activity, however, as has already been intimated, is found only if there is a good degree of like-mindedness to begin with. Consequently, we need to enlarge and slightly modify our definition of a society as follows : — ♦ A society is a number of like-minded individuals — \A socii — who know and enjoy their like-mindedness, and j are therefore able to work together for common ends. Kinds of Societies. — This is a general definition. Socie- l ties are of different kinds ; and the word " society," there- fore, has a number of special meanings, all of which are consistent with the general definition. Natural Society. — A population, as has already been said, is a group or number of individuals who, in many im- portant ways, are alike, arfd who live within the same fairly well-defined area. It has also been shown that the habit of cultivating acquaintance and like-mindedness, making them more nearly perfect, extends throughout the popu- PTation. An entire population, therefore, is, or tends to V become, a single social group or society. The^jDrocess is a natural one, which goes on just the same whether indi- viduals give much conscious attention to it or not. A population maintaining social activities may therefore be Icalled a social population or natural society. A natural society is a population that is composed of. Population and Society 7 like-minded individuals who know and enjoy their like- mindedness, and are therefore able to work together for ' common ends. The Integral Society, — A natural society which is large ' enough to carry on every known kind of social activity and cooperation, including such activities as government, industry, education, religion, science, and art, and which, independently of any other society, maintains control over the territory that it occupies, may be called an integral society. Thus, each of the great modern nations, the I United States, England, France, Germany, for example, is an integral society,. Component Societies. — Within each integral society are I to be found social groups that, in many respects, but not in all, are complete and independent. Each of these groups if left to itself could maintain its existence and perfect a complete social life. But in fact it is subordi- nate in certain matters to the larger society which includes it. Such social groups are the several commonwealths or states of the American Union, and the originally indepen- dent kingdoms of the now United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Such also are counties, townships, ^ cities, and villages ; and such, finally, is the smallest social group that could, if left to itself, grow into an entire pop- ulation or integral society, namely, the family. Social groups that could exist as complete and indepen- dent societies, but which in fact are only component parts of integral societies to which they are, in certain respects, subordinate, may be called component societies. | Constitnent Societies. — Within each integral society, and within most of the component societies, are formed social groups of another kind. Their origin is always 8 The Elements of Sociology f^rtificial. A certain number of individuals come together and, as they say, form or organize a society for achieving ' some purpose which they have in mind. Such a society, for example, is a business corporation ; such is a political ^ party, a church, a scientific association, or a club. Socie- ties of this kind carry on the work of the community by i/a division of labour. They are not independent of one '^another. None of them could exist unless others also existed. Together they make up or constitute the com- plete social organization of the integral society. They may, therefore, be called constituent societies. Sociology. — In modern times every class of objects in the natural world, and every kind of human activity, has been made the subject of scientific study. Society and social activities were among the latest facts to be studied in a scientific spirit and by scientific methods. This was because a scientific study of society was possible only after a great deal of knowledge about other things had been accumulated. Social relations are more complicated than relations of any other kind. y r I'he scientific study of society is called Sociology. y The object of all scientific study is to arrive at a com- I plete description of the thing studied. C The word "descrip- tion " is used in various ways, however, and we must be careful to distinguish scientific description from a descrip- tion that is merely pictorial or dramatic. A scientific description does not stop when the different parts of an object have been successfully presented to the mental vision so that we see them in imagination as we might see a building or a city. In scientific description, we go on to show how an object behaves or acts, and to show further how different acts or events are related to one Population and Society 9 another in a complete system. We show also the propor- tions, numbers, or other quantitative facts that may be discovered in the relations which objects and events bear to one another. Scientific description thds results in the~l discovery of what are called causes and laws, which are simply certain uniformities of order, sequence, proportion, and so on, among the facts that have been described. Using the word " description" in this sense, we may say that Sociology is the scientific description of society^ I The Unit of Investigation. — The scientific description of any object or group of facts must start from that imperfect discrimination which common knowledge has already made of the object itself from all other things. Thus the sciences of Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Botany, and Zoology start from the familiar distinctions between one and another of the changing forms of matter, between the heavenly bodies and the earth, between living and non-living objects, and between plants and animals. But just because the scientific mind is dissatisfied with off-hand knowledge and abhors vagueness, it always be- gins its systematic classifying of things by trying to make its preliminary observations as exact as possible. This is ' done by stripping away from the subject of investigation all irrelevant, accidental, and occasional facts, and looking for what is simple, elementary, and persistent. The sim- plest form of the subject-matter of a science is called the Unit of Investigation. The chemists have long known that their science is con- cerned with the elementary forms of matter; namely, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, aluminium, chlorine,., sodium, and some sixty more, — their number, qualities, atomic weights, and combinations with one another. The lO The Elements of Sociology element, then, is the unit of investigation in Chemistry. The astronomers have long known that the specific object of their investigation is not the heavens in general, but the particular planet or star, — its motion, shape, size, dis- tance, composition, and history. The geologists have learned that their subject-matter is rock, — its composition, density, texture, shape, fracture, cleavage, position, strati- fication, and history. The biologists, both botanists and zoologists, have found their unit of investigation in the organic cell; they observe its structure, development, and combinations. The psychologists have two units of in- vestigation, because they study both consciousness and the activity of a particular form of matter ; namely, that which is found in nerve and brain. The unit of investiga- tion in the study of consciousness is sensation, which is the simplest of all mental facts. The unit of investigation in the study of nerve and brain activity is the nerve cell and its reaction to irritation or stimulus. What, now, is the unit of investigation in Sociology } The answer has already been partly disclosed. In its ^' j! simplest form, society exists whenever an individual has a / ' companion or associate. The socius, then, is the unit_of any social group or society ; and his conduct is the unit of social activity. Every human being is at once an animal, ia^conscious individual mind, and a socius. As an animal he is studied by the anatomist and physiologist ; as a con- scious mind he is studied by the psychologist ; as a socius, loving and seeking acquaintance, forming friendships and alliances with other socii like himself, imitating them and setting examples for them, teaching them and learning from them, and engaging with them in many forms of common activity, — he is studied by the sociologist. Popiilatio?i and Society II The imit_of investigation, then, in Sociology is the socius — that is to say, the individual who is not only an animal and a conscious mind, but also a companion, a learner, a teacher, and co-worker. ' Sociology studies the nature of the socius, his habits u and his activities. Whether there are different kinds or classes of socii, how socii influence one another, how they combine and separate, what groups they form, — all these questions also are questions of Sociology. The Problems of Sociology. — When a science has descrip- vx tively marked out its subject-matter and found its unit of investigation, it has accomplished the first of four tasks which every complete science must undertake. The second task of science is carefully to examine the ' activities or processes that may be observed in the object, or group of things, or group of interests, under investi- gation. Thus the chemist, when he has discovered the_j elementary forms of matter, observes how each element behaves in all possible combinations with other elements. The biologist tries to discover all possible modes of cell formation and cell development. The third task of science is to show what new products r or combinations of facts or things are brought into exist- ence as a result of the activities or processes. Thus the chemist tries to discover what complex products can be made by combining the chemical elements in all possible ways. The biologist observes all the forms of tissue, and the different kinds of organisms that are produced by the different combinations of living cells. The fourth task of science is to discover and formulate "' the exact relations or laws which prevail amo ng ac tivities and in the evolution of their products. 12 The Elements of Sociology In a rough general way, the first scientific task of Soci- ology has been performed in this chapter. We have shown what group of facts Sociology studies, and determined the unit of investigation. We have now to go on and examine more carefully the processes or activities of society, the products which result from them, and, finally, the laws which explain both activities and products. PARALLEL STUDY Read Spencer's " Study of Sociology." CHAPTER II Where Aggregations of People are Formed Inhabitable Areas. — Natural societies are found only where the physical features of land and climate are favour- able to the grouping of living beings in relatively large aggregations. There can be no social activity without communication and acquaintance; and these are impossi- ble if individuals are so widely separated in space that they must pass most of their time in isolation. Rather more than half of the land surface of the earth is unfavourable to any massing of population. Mountain ranges, deserts, tropical jungles, and the intensely cold regions of the Arctic zones together make up this forbid- ding part of the world. Natural societies flourish where soil is productive and elevation is not too great an obsta- cle to industry and communication, and where climate is endurable. North America. — So far as climate is concerned, nearly every part of North America could be inhabited by man. But there are large areas here where subsistence could not easily be obtained. The Graiitless North. — The northern limit of grain production i^|a Hne that extends from southeastern Labra- dor to near the head of Lake Superior, thence to the southern end of Lake Athabasca, and thence to the mouth of the Fraser River. North of this line, the winter cold, 13 14 The Elements of Sociology though severe and prolonged, is not unendurable. The summer is warm ; but it is too short for the purposes of a varied agriculture. The primeval forests of this region are still the home of moose, musk oxen, and reindeer, and of many fur-bearing animals. Its rivers and lakes are well stocked with fish. Hunting tribes of Indians can live here ; but settlements of civilized white men can hardly be expected to flourish. So well informed a man as Professor Shaler predicts that this region will *' remain a wilderness, unsought as the dwelling-place of civilized man." . The Western Desert. — Another part of North America at present unfavourable to population is the so-called great Western Desert. It is an arid region which lies westward from the one hundredth meridian to the coast ranges of the Pacific, and stretches from the Canadian border, where it is nearly a thousand miles wide, into Mexico, where it is three or four hundred miles wide. It would be unsafe to predict that this region will never be occupied by a dense population, since we know from the success of the Mor- mon settlements in Utah, that, by means of irrigation, the arid lands may be made habitable. Indeed, it is possible that they may yet become the seat of great and prosper- ous communities. As yet, however, the population of this fourth great desert of the world is less than two inhabi- tants to the square mile. The Region of Fertility. — In wonderful contrast is the region east of the one hundredth meridian. Here the rainfall is greater than is necessary for agriculture ; and the fertility is of a degree almost unknown elsewhere out- side of the tropics. In no other land of equal extent does the soil bring forth so great a variety of products fit for human use. Nowhere else are drought and flood so nar- WJiere Aggregations of People are Formed 15 rowly localized by topography and by the direction of atmospheric currents, as to make a general failure of the harvests so nearly impossible. The population of this region in 1790 was 3,929,214; in 1890, 59r594>637. Local Areas. — Within this region, however, is a great variety of conditions and resources to which the local dis- tribution of population conforms. 1. The Coast Swamps. — One subdivision is known as the Coast Swamps. These are found along the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts, from southeastern Virginia to the mouth of the Rio Grande in Texas. Their greatest breadth, occasionally as much as one hundred miles, is in North Carolina and Louisiana. While nearly level, these swamps have slope enough for drainage ; and in the Caro- linas large areas of them are utilized for rice plantations. In colonial days one of their important products was indigo. In 1890 the Coast Swamps had a population of 21.5 to the square mile. It was composed mainly of negroes, who alone can successfully withstand the malarial climate. 2. The Atlantic Plain. — Another subdivision of the densely populated region east of the one hundredth meridian is called the Atlantic Plain. It is a strip of land lying beyond the Coast Swamps, and extending to a somewhat abrupt rise of the surface which is known as the fall line, because from New York down to the Gulf and as far as the Mississippi River, all the eastward-flowing riv- ers at this line drop by falls or rapids from a higher level extending westward. The Atlantic Plain is nearly level, seldom reaching an elevation of 200 feet above the sea; and, except where cleared by man, is covered by a growth of pine forests. Long since, however, most of it was 1 6 The Elements of Sociology cleared and reduced to cultivation ; and it is now the seat of the chief commercial and manufacturing towns of the East. Its surface is covered with a network of great rail- road and telegraph lines; and wide areas of the rural spaces between cities and towns are devoted to market gardens under high cultivation. The population of the Atlantic Plain in 1890 was 74.4 to the square mile, and consisted chiefly of whites. 3. The Piedmont Region. — Next in density to the Atlan- tic Plain is the so-called Piedmont Region, which comprises a strip of country extending from Maine to Alabama, and lying between the fall line on the east and the Blue Ridge Mountains on the west. It is a region of beautiful scenery and of varied products. Its sweet grasses make it the choicest dairy region of America. It yields every kind of fruit native to temperate regions. It is rich also in min- eral wealth ; and, in a good degree, its water-power is util- ized in manufacturing. Its population in 1890 was 69.5 to the square mile. 4. Mountain Regio7ts. — The population of the New Eng- land Hills — a term applied to the northern part of New England, including the upper counties of Maine, the White Mountains of New Hampshire, the Green Moun- tains of Vermont, and the- Adirondacks of New York, a broken mountainous country ranging in elevation from 1000 to 6000 feet, and covered with forests — was 40.7 to the square mile. Agriculture in this region is difficult, and the returns are meagre ; but timber lands and quar- ries are sources of wealth. A population of 49.8 to the square mile was found in the Appalachian Mountain re- gion, which includes the Blue Ridge and the Appalachian valley north and west of it, and extends from New Jersey Where Aggregations of People are Formed ij to Alabama and Georgia. The maximum elevation of this region, 6700 feet, is found in North Carolina. The Appa- lachian valley is drained in New Jersey and Pennsylvania by the Delaware and Susquehanna rivers, in Virginia by the Potomac, the James, and Kanawha rivers, and in Tennessee by the Tennessee River. Its occupations and sources of wealth are much like those of the New Eng- land Hills. 5. The Great Plateau. — From the northwestern border of the Appalachian valley, rises an escarpment which ex- tends almost continuously from northeastern Pennsylvania through Maryland, Virginia, and Tennessee into Alabama. From the summit of this escarpment stretches a plateau with a general slope to the northwest. It is everywhere deeply scored by streams flowing in a northwesterly direc- tion, which have cut the plateau into irregular ridges and gorges, and made it one of the most intricate mountain re- gions of the globe. It is densely covered with forests. Its population in 1890 was 59.3 to the square mile. 6. Timber and Lake Regions. — Southern Ohio, and In- diana, the western half of Kentucky and Tennessee, the northeastern part of Mississippi, and parts of adjoining states are together known as the Interior Timbered Re- gion. Portions of it have been cleared and converted into prosperous farming areas. Other portions yield coal and other mineral products. Its population in 1890 was 44.3 to the square mile. A narrow strip of country bordering the Great Lakes, and including parts of New York, Penn- sylvania, Ohio, and most of Michigan, Wisconsin, and northern Minnesota, is known as the Lake Region, be- cause it has the characteristics of a coast climate. The atmosphere is moist, the winters abnormally warm, and 1 8 The Elements of Sociology the summers abnormally cool. This region is especially well adapted to grape-growing. Its population in 1890 was 25.1 to the square mile. In northwestern Arkansas, southwestern Missouri, and the eastern part of the Indian Territory, lies the Ozark Mountain Region, consisting in Arkansas of a succession of narrow ranges of 2CXX) to 3000 feet in height, and separated by broad valleys, and farther to the west of an area of confused hills and valleys without system. Its population in 1890 was 22.8 to the square mile. 7. The Southern Alhcvial Regiott. — Southward from Cairo, where the Ohio joins the Mississippi River, to the Coast Swamps of Louisiana stretches the Alluvial Region of the Mississippi. It includes parts of the states of Mis- souri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and smaller parts of Kentucky and Tennessee. Most of the land of this re- gion is marshy and lies below the level of the water in the rivers. The dry land along the banks of the streams has been formed by overflows. Much of this region is cov- ered by forests. The soil is of the highest fertility ; but the climate is unfavourable to the white race. The popula- tion in 1890 was 23.6 to the square mile, and consisted chiefly of negroes. 8. The Prairie Region. — Finally, west of the Mississippi River, and east of the one hundredth meridian, lies the granary of the country, known as the Prairie Region. It comprises a small portion of western Indiana, most of IlHnois and Iowa, southern Wisconsin and Minnesota, northern Missouri, and eastern North Dakota, South Da- kota, Kansas, and Nebraska, and extends into the Indian Territory and Texas. Its surface is level or undulating, and in its natural state, before settlement by white men, Where Aggregations of People are Formed 19 it was covered with luxuriant grasses. Forests do not thrive here without protection ; but they are increasing under cultivation. The population of this region in 1890 was 28.3 to the square mile. t. Pacific Regions. — West of the Rocky Mountains only two regions have as yet a population approaching or ex- ceeding ten inhabitants to the square mile. The Pacific valley, lying west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada ranges, and extending from Puget Sound to southern California, has a population of 9.1 to the square mile. The lesser valleys of the coast ranges themselves are of great fertility, and have a population of 14.3 to the square mile. Altitude and Temperature ^ as well as resources, have their effect upon the distribution of population. The average altitude in the United States is about 2500 feet above sea- level. More than three-fourths of the population, how- ever, live below the level of 1000 feet above the sea, and more than nine-tenths below that of 1500 feet. Three- fourths live between the isotherms of forty-five and sixty degrees. Europe and Asia. — If we look beyond the borders of the United States, we find still more strikingly exemplified the truth that population is dense where natural resources are great and climate is favourable. In Europe the areas of dense population are the fertile valleys, of the Po in Italy, of the Rhine in Germany, of the Seine in France, and of the Thames in England. In Asia the millions of India and of China are concentrated in the valleys of the Ganges, the Indus, and the Yellow rivers. Agricultural fertility, however, is not always the deter- 20 The Elements of Sociology mining cause of aggregation. Mineral resources, oppor- tunities for manufacturing and trade, may support vast populations in regions which would hardly produce suffi- cient food supplies from their own soil. Such, for ex- ample, is Belgium with its population of nearly 550 per square mile. In the natural course of things, however, regions which are capable of exporting food become, in time, centres of dense population if commerce and manu- ' factures are locally developed on the basis of the agricult- ural resources. Thus, at the present time, the countries that export wheat in great quantities are the United States, Russia, India, Australia, and the Argentine Republic ; and these are the countries which are, on the whole, most rapidly increasing in population. Primary and Secondary Sources of Subsistence. — The mass- ing of population at any given point is itself a condition favourable to further aggregation, because it affords pro- tection to individuals, and makes possible the development of those forms of cooperation which most rapidly increase \ wealth. Civilized populations in particular are, to a great extent, distributed with reference to these artificial condi- tions. The strictly primitive means of subsistence are edible fruits, grains, roots, fish, and game in their natural state. Human beings unacquainted with the arts of agri- culture and manufacture could live only where these strictly natural food supplies could be obtained. Foods preserved and stored up are a secondary means of subsist- ence which enable men to engage in other than extractive industries. The tendency everywhere observed is to ac- cumulate the secondary means of subsistence in great cities, where the secondary occupations of commerce and manufacture can be carried on to advantage. For WJiere Aggregations of People are Formed 21 this reason cities are becoming powerful centres of at- traction. PARALLEL STUDY »■ In the volumes of the "American Commonwealths" Series, study the history of the settlement and development, by a white population, of the local areas described in this chapter. CHAPTER III How Aggregations of People are Formed Two Ways of Increase. — We have seen where aggrega- tions of people are formed. Let us now notice how they are formed. Everyday observation shows us that there are two ways in which populations increase. One is by the birth of new individuals, the other is by immigration from populations dwelling in other parts of the world. The first way, if birth rates exceed death" rates, increases the total population of the world. The second method merely redistributes it, increasing some populations at the expense of others. Genetic Aggregation. — At the present time, different populations are increasing by births in excess of deaths in very unequal degrees. According to the census of 1890, the United States has an annual birth rate for the whole population of 26.68 per thousand. The rate for whites alone is 26.35 ; for the coloured it is 29.07. The death rate is given as 19.64 per thousand for the whole population ; as 17.00 per thousand for native-born whites of native parents ; as 24.42 per thousand for native-born whites of foreign parents ; as 19.85 per thousand for foreign-born whites ; and as 19.57 per thousand for the coloured. These figures, which probably understate the birth rate and are not altogether accurate for the death rate, show a rapid net increase of population by birth. The United Kingdom 22 How Aggregations of People are Formed 23 has a birth rate of 29.9 per thousand, and a death rate of 19. 1, leaving a large annual increase. Germany has a birth rate of 36.7 and a death rate of 24.6. Austria has a birth rate of 36.2 and a death rate of 2^.8. Italy has a birth rate of 36.6 and a death rate of 25.3. Thus it ap- pears that all these countries are rapidly increasing in population by births in excess of deaths. The most remarkable extremes are those of Norway and France. Norway has a birth rate of 30.7 and a death rate of only 16.4; France has a birth rate of only 22.1 and a death rate, in 1892, of 22.6, showing in that year an actual slight decrease of population. A population re produc ed by its birth rate irrespective of immigration may be called a genetic aggregation. More strictly defined, a gene tic aggregation is a group of kin- d red individuals that have lived together in one locality fr om their birth . The smallest genetic aggregation is merely a natural family composed of parents and their children of the first generation. A larger genetic group is an aggregation of two or three generations of descendants of a single pair. On a scale yet larger and more complex, the genetic group is an aggregation of families that may have been related or not at some former time, but that now are undoubtedly of one blood through marrying in and in. In taking the form of genetic aggregations, human populations reproduce the chief mode of aggregation among lower forms of animal life, a patient observation of which richly rewards the student of Sociology. The great colonies of social insects — ants, bees, and wasps — are genetic aggregations of a simple sort. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know how far the schools of fish, the flocks 24 The Elements of Sociology of birds, the herds or bands of gregarious mammals, are merely genetic aggregations. It is certain that, to some extent, they are of mixed origin. In many respects, the uncivilized tribal societies of mafi- kind are the most nearly perfect of all examples of genetic aggregation. Their whole scheme of social organization, presently to be explained, is based on kinship. In civilization each nation, and within the nation each town and hamlet, is, in a great degree, a genetic aggrega- tion. The population of England so far as it is of English blood, the population of Ireland so far as it is of Irish blood, the population of Hungary so far as it is of Magyar blood, are in a broad sense of the term genetic aggregations. No large community, however, is a pure genetic aggre- gation. To be and to maintain itself as such, it would be necessary that no individuals should come into the group from groups dwelling elsewhere, and that, therefore, all marriages should be contracted between individuals already belonging to the community. In the United States and in other countries there are small local communities which are nearly, though never quite, pure genetic aggre- gations. Such, for example, are the Acadian settlements of Louisiana, many of the Pennsylvania Dutch commu- nities, many of the smaller Quaker hamlets of the same state, and many of the Canadian- French hamlets of the province of Quebec. When individuals continue to live where they were born and for generations to intermarry, it is usually because the region is one of abundant resources, or because of mental inertia. The effective desire to seek fortune elsewhere is lacking. Sometimes, however, close intermarriage is a How Aggregations of People are Formed 25 consequence of some peculiarity of religious or political belief. Congregation. — The growth of a population by immi- gration is a process of congregation ; and dt may be called bylHat name to distinguish it from genetic aggregation. It is a gathering in one place or area of individuals from many other places, or even from remote parts of the world, who are attracted by the resources or other oppor- tunities of a new home. Even more unequal than the increase of different popu- lations by births in excess of deaths, is their increase by immigration. The so-called new countries where vast resources are yet unexhausted, and unlimited opportunities seem to be offered to the adventurous and enterprising, most strongly attract population from its older centres. On the one hand, the United States, Australia, Africa, and the Argentine Republic are to-day the countries which are most rapidly gaining population by immigration. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, with an excess of births over deaths of 452,000 per annum, loses 32.7 per cent of it by emigration; Germany, with an excess of 537,000 per annum, loses 20. i per cent of it in like manner ; Sweden, with 56,000, loses 50 per cent ; Norway, with 28,000, loses 55.4 per cent; Switzerland, with 22,000, loses 34.1 per cent; Denmark, with 27,000, loses 22.2 per cent; France, with 92,000, loses 5.1 per cent. Congregation is a local no less than a national or general phenomenon. Wherever new opportunities are opened, men rush to them from every quarter. In i860 families moved from every Eastern state into the oil fields of Pennsylvania. In 1877 the town of Leadville, in Col- orado, sprang up with almost incredible rapidity, to dis- 26 The Elements of Sociology f appear a few years later as quickly. In 1889, 50,000 ** boomers" poured into Oklahoma in a single day; and in 1893 the scene was repeated by 90,000 like advent- urers. The cosmopolitan city of Johannesburg, with 50,000 inhabitants, sprang up in seven years on the deso- late steppe of the Transvaal, in the heart of the gold- bearing region of Africa. \ Emigration, immigration, and congregation, like genetic aggregation, in populations of civilized men reproduce I the habits of the lower animals, of savages, and of bar- ( barians — all of whom were wanderers on the earth for B ages before civilized man appeared. "" Detachment from the parent group results from an in- crease of animal energy as commonly and as certainly as does procreation. Flocks and herds in any given habitat have a normal size which is a phase of the established . equilibrium of nature, and which is maintained, as num- bers increase by birth, by throwing off small bands that seek new feeding grounds. There they meet and com- mingle with groups from other birthplaces, attracted like themselves by the food supplies, the nesting places, or other advantages of the new habitat. The congregating of the mammalia is governed in part by the distribution of such necessaries of their lives as water and salt. Prob- ably the most remarkable of all congregations, however, is the enormous aggregation of migrating birds and ani- mals in high northern latitudes during the short Arctic summer. In savagery there is a pressure from all directions towards the best hunting and fishing grounds, which brings unacquainted or unrelated bands into contact, and causes chronic hostility. The frightful struggles between How Aggregations of People are Formed 27 Algonquin and Iroquois tribes before the European settle- ment of North America were an incident of their conver- gence upon the valley of the Mohawk. The valleys of the Delaware, the Ohio, the upper Mississippi, the Colum- bia, and the Colorado rivers were repeatedly the centres of similar converging movements and the scenes of exter- minating wars. Among more advanced peoples, congregation has usually been the initial step in their history, as when Semitic, Hamitic, and Aryan tribes pushed into Palestine, or as when Germanic tribes pushed into England. Primary and Seco7idary Congregation. — For the pur- poses of sociological study it is necessary to distinguish between a primary and a secondary congregation. By the first of these terms we designate a coming together of individuals or families, that, although strangers and hitherto widely scattered, are yet remotely related, being' perhaps of the same nationality, or, at least, of the same race. By secondary congregation we mean a coming to- gether of different nationalities or races. It is secondary because the unlike stocks have themselves been produced by an earlier or preliminary congregation of elements less unlike. The mingling of immigrants in the United States shows us both the primary and the secondary forms of congregation on a great scale. Causes of Aggregation. — We are now prepared to say, in somewhat more scientific terms, how aggregations of peo- ple are formed. The physical surface of the earth, and the living creatures that dwell on it, are continually acting and reacting upon one another. Animal life, including that of human beings, derives its energy from the food supply and the atmosphere and sunshine of the land where 28 The Elements of Sociology it dwells. This energy is expended in three ways. The first is in the search for, and appropriation of, new food supplies to maintain the life already in existence. The ', second is in reproduction, the birth of new individuals,'^ and a birth rate in excess of death rate may always be taken as a rough measure of the surplus vitality of any species, race, or group. The third way is in wandering and adventure. It is this latter expenditure of energy that takes the form of emigration and congregation. Populations are formed, then, by genetic aggregation and by congregation. The place where a population dwells is determined by physical conditions, and espe- cially by food-producing resources. But the cause of the formation of the population itself is found in the processes j of genetic and congregate grouping. PARALLEL STUDY In Mayo-Smith's "Statistics and Sociology," study Chapters V, VII, and XIV. CHAPTER IV The Composition and the Unity of a Social Popu- lation Demotic Composition. — Because genetic aggregation is practically never the only way in which a population grows, a population is always a mixture and composition of elements more or less unlike. This proposition is not in contradiction of the statement made in the first chapter, that a population is composed of individuals in many respects alike. Likeness and unlikeness are facts of degree. Moreover, individuals may be alike in some respects and unlike in others. These facts, of degrees and kinds of resemblance, will receive attention later on. Usually the unlikeness of the elements of a popula- tion extends to differences of nationality, and often to differences of race. This is true of all modern nations, and especially true of the people of the United States. The intermingling of elements bred of different parent stocks and having, therefore, unlike qualities and habits, may be called the demotic composition. The word " demotic " means pertaining to the demos ^ the Greek word for people. The demotic composition, therefore, > is the admixture of various elements of nationality and race in a people or population. It is the ceaseless emigration of individuals that creates in modern civil communities a demotic composition on 29 30 The Elements of Sociology the greatest scale. In the United States, in 1890, there were 9,249,547 foreign-born inhabitants. Since 1820 1 5,427,657 immigrants, drawn by the life opportunities that are here offered, have come to this country from Eng- land, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy, and other lands. Besides all these diverse elements, the United States has 7,470,040 negroes and 248,253 Indians. In the distribution of native and foreign born elements, no peculiarity of situation, industry, government, or faith prevents the normal intermingling. Thus, in Utah, pre- vious to 1880, polygamy was still practised and encour- aged by the dominant Mormon church; and by most of the Gentile world, polygamy was abhorred. Nevertheless, the census of 1880 found that while 69.5 per cent of the population of Utah was born within the United States, 13.7 per cent had come from England, 5.4 per cent from Denmark, 2.6 per cent from Sweden, 2.2 per cent from Scotland, 1.7 per cent from Wales, .9 per cent from Ireland, .8 per cent from Norway, .7 per cent from Switzerland, .7 per cent from British North America, .6 per cent from Germany, and 1.2 per cent from other countries. Every local community, as well as every country, shows this heterogeneity of population; and every great city shows it conspicuously. In each 1000 inhabitants of London, 630 are natives of that city, 307 are from other parts of England and Wales, 21 are from Ireland, 21 are from foreign countries, 13 are from Scotland, 7 are from the Colonies, and i is from the islands in the British seas. But no demotic composition, modern or ancient, can be compared with that of New York City. Within that part of New York City which is included The Composition and Unity of a Social Population 31 in New York County, which is substantially though not precisely the borough of Manhattan, the composition of the 639,943 foreign-born is as follows : natives of Canada and Newfoundland, 8398; of South America, 471; of Cuba and the West Indies, 2202; of Ireland, 190,418; of England, 35,907; of Scotland, 11,242; of Wales, 965 ; of Germany, 210,723; of Austria, 27,193; of Holland, 1384; of Belgium, 626; of Switzerland, 4953; of Nor- way, 1575; of Sweden, 7069; of Denmark, 1495; of Russia, 48,790; of Hungary, 12,222; of Bohemia, 8099; of Poland, 6759; of France, 10,535; of Italy, 39,951; of Spain, ZZy ; of China, 2048 ; of Australia, 342 ; of Euro- pean countries not specified, 3364; born at sea, 135; natives of all other countries, 1890. Next after New York, Chicago, perhaps, contains the most interesting mixture of nationalities. A map of the region bounded by Polk, State, Twelfth, and Halstead streets, prepared by the residents of Hull House, shows eighteen nationali- ties living, in 1894, within that district, one mile long by one-third of a mile wide. Autogeny. — We will now return to the assertion that, notwithstanding this remarkable unlikeness in the ele- ments of a population, a population is characterized by the likeness rather than by the unlikeness of its elements. Colonies and new cities in the first or second generation of their existence are occasionally exceptions. All other populations are perpetuated mainly by their birth rate rather than by immigration. For the purposes of Sociol- ogy we may designate this fact by a technical term, and say that a population is normally autogenous, that is, self-generating, self-perpetuating. • Notwithstanding the enormous immigration into the 32 The Elements of Sociology United States, by far the greater proportion of the 63,000,000 inhabitants who were counted in the eleventh census were born within our territorial limits. Most of them had in their veins at least some mixture of the blood of the colonists and of those Europeans who came to America before 1821. In like manner, while there is an increasing mobility of population from state to state, from country to city, and from town to town, each local community is perpetuated mainly by its birth rate. New York City had, in 1890, 875,358 native-born inhabitants to overbalance her 639,943 foreign-born. The popula- tion of Greater London was increased during the ten years 1871-80 by 574,385 births in excess of deaths, and by 306,635 accessions from without, in excess of emigration. The same relation of natural increase to immigration is true of other cities, of smaller towns, and of all countries, though the proportions vary in- definitely. Thus every population, while it has a demotic composi- >/ tion, and presents many species of unlikeness among its component individuals, is after all a unity. To a great extent of one blood, its members are always tending by intermarriage to become more and more homogeneous in this respect. At the same time, this tendency is being counteracted by new accessions of heterogeneous elements from without. The differences, however, are quantitatively less than the agreements. Likeness overbalances the un- likeness. The likeness, as we shall see later on, is the basis and cause of social cohesion or unity. The unlike- ness is the cause of variation and progress. Only as both are present in a social population can there develop a ; society at once stable and progressive. The Composition and Unity of a Social Population 33 PARALLEL STUDY Using the " Compendium of the Eleventh Census " of the United States and outline maps, make shaded or coloured maps shpwing the demotic composition of the United States as a whole, and in greater detail, that of the several commonwealths. CHAPTER V The Practical Activities of Socii Simple Activities. — Thus far we have observed popula- tion in its physical aspect only. We have looked at it as consisting of a number of living objects found together in certain places, and have examined the origin and the kinds of these objects, and the proportions in which different kinds are combined. We have now to recall the fact that these living objects are conscious individuals, who think and feel ; who have appetites, desires, passions ; who form purposes in life and try to achieve them. It is with these . mental facts, rather than with the physical ones, that we \are chiefly concerned in the study of Sociology. The sociologist, however, does not study the mental facts presented by a population for the purpose of under- standing the human mind. That is the business of the psychologist. The sociologist is interested in the prac- tical activities that spring from thought and desire. What men do, how they behave toward one another and with one another, how they form groups and unite in common action, — these, as has already been explained in the first ^ chapter, are some of the important questions of Sociology. '^ The social activities of a population arc not by any means the whole of the practical activities in which the population engages. There are many kinds of useful work which are, or might be, carried on by individuals 34 i The Practical Activities of Socii 35 without social cooperation. There are also modes of con- duct that are called moral, and that are studied by the student of Ethics, some of which do not depend for their existence upon social conditions. Therefor^', that we may understand just what the social facts of life are, and how they are related to facts of other kinds, we must glance at the whole field of man's practical activity. We have seen that population is increased from two sources; namely, birth and immigration. There is no bet- ter way of discovering what are the important practical activities of mankind than by observing, first, what things children become interested in, learn to do, and are taught to do as they grow to manhood; and, secondly, what things immigrants become interested in and learn to do as they become adapted to the ways and conditions of their adopted country. App7'eciation. — The first years of a child's life are oc- cupied chiefly in getting acquainted with people and things, and establishing preferences — that is to say, likes and dislikes. The child, however, does not get used to the world into which he has been born by learning about people and things in an entirely indiscriminate fashion. It is true that from the first he has experiences of contact with objects of many different kinds, living and non-living. But some experiences are repeated so much more fre- quently than others that he gets really familiar with cer- tain groups of things in the external world long before he learns much about others. The group that he has most frequent experience of and first learns to know well is made up of those living beings who are nearest to him and are usually closely related to him as kindred. His mother and father, brothers and sisters, and his nurse he knows 36 The Elements of Sociology better than he knows any other class of objects in the world. But not only does he know them better ; in an even greater degree does he care more for them. However fond he may be of his toys and various articles of house- hold furniture with which he amuses himself, he is usually ready to leave them to go to his mother for love and caresses, or to his brothers and sisters for play. Next to these kindred beings, he learns to know fairly well other human beings who, from time to time, come into the household. Among these he discriminates with liking and disliking, usually showing strong preferences. To some strangers he goes readily, showing a fearless willingness to adopt them into his little circle of friends. With others he will have nothing whatever to do. It is not until after these gradations of human acquaint- ance and preference have been well established that the child learns with any accuracy of detail the inorganic world which is so different from his own personality. Indeed, the great majority of human beings never, in all their lives, do learn the inorganic world with any such accuracy of knowledge as they learn their fellow-men. The great truths of human nature were commonplaces of popular philosophy for ages before mankind had any true knowledge of the material constitution of the inorganic world. For many years of his immature life the child thinks of inanimate objects as if they were in some degree personal like himself. He talks to them, gets angry with them, or approves of them, quite as he would do with one of his living playmates. How is it with the immigrant.!* His first experiences inj I the new land of his choice are curiously like the child'i » first experiences in the world. Like the child, the immi* The Practical Activities of Socii 37 grant first learns to know well, and shows a strong pref- erence for those human beings who are of his own kin- dred. He associates with the men and women of his own nationality and speech, who have come t(* the new land before him, and have not yet forgotten their mother tongue or the ideas and habits of their fatherland. With these people the immigrant feels at home ; and for a long time he is loath to break away from their hospitality and influence. Little by little, however, he becomes acquainted with the men and women of another nationality and speech, the native inhabitants of the country. He feels that they are much less like himself in ideas and habits than are his own countrymen. But he gradually gets used to them, and finds that he is establishing in his own mind many likes and dislikes towards these new acquaintances and their ways. Last of all, he begins to be familiar with the new coun- try itself, its resources, products, the details of its geogra- phy, its railways, buildings, machinery. The chances are, however, that he never learns this latter group of facts thoroughly well. Thus both the child and the immigrant find that their first business in life is to get used to the world in which y they themselves are living. This process of getting used is partly intellectual; it consists partly in acquiring know- ledge ; but it includes also something more. With the knowledge is mixed a great deal of preference, of liking and disliking. With every act of learning some degree of pref- erential feeling is combined. In a rough way, every person and everything that is brought into the widen- ing circle of acquaintance is valued, and is assigned a 38 The Elements of Sociology certain place in a scale of values. This mental process in which knowledge, preference, and valuation are com- bined may be called appreciation. It is not that critical appreciation which we look for in the artist, the poet, or the scientific man, and of which we shall have more to say presently. It is a rough, preliminary, practically useful appreciation which serves every man as a mental guide for the purposes of everyday life. ^ ^ The first great practical activity of life, then, is appre- ^^ ciation. Utilization. — The second interest that appears in the child's life has to do with the uses that he can make of things and of persons. * As rapidly as he learns about persons and things, and finds himself regarding them with different degrees of pleasure or approval, he begins to try experiments with them. He tries to see what he can do with each new object that comes within his reach. These experiments are attended with different degrees of success. A great many things he can play with as he wills. Others resist his attempts, and cause him the disappointment of thwarted effort. On the whole, he finds that he can exercise his , own will more successfully over that group of things which he learns last of all to appreciate — namely, the inanimate objects that are least like himself; and that his efforts to control, adapt, and use are least successful when applied to those objects which he first learns to appreciate — namely, the persons of his own kindred who are most like himself. The immigrant comes to a new country with habits of controlling and using things in the world about him already formed. Nevertheless, among his very early ex- The Practical Activities of Socii 39 periences in his new home are those of being brought into contact with new objects and circumstances which he had previously known only in surmise or imagination. As rapidly as he learns about these new things, and finds himself regarding them with different degrees of liking or disliking, he does exactly as the child does in his out- look upon the world. He tries many experiments with the new things that surround him, and the new circum- stances in which he is placed. New kinds of food are offered to him and he tries them. New kinds of clothing appeal to him ; and these also he tries. New amusements, too, are offered, and new forms of occupation, many of which he experiments with almost as persistently and unsystematically as the child does with his toys. Now all of these experiments by both the child and the immigrant have one common characteristic : they are attempts to use the external world, to adapt the things ^ which it contains to one's own purposes, to control and apply them as one likes. To this process of trying to control, adapt, and use the things of the external world, we may give the name utiliza- tion. Utilization, then, is the second great practical activity of \\2^ life. Characterization. — It was said a moment ago that the child's attempts to make use of things and persons are sometimes unsuccessful. Many disappointments attend his early experimenting with the objects that make up his little world. On a larger scale this is true also of the im- migrant's first efforts to appropriate and enjoy the new things and the new objects among which he finds himself placed in the new home. He encounters many rebuffs ; \ 40 The Elements of Sociology he fails in many undertakings ; and he is often obliged to abandon cherished plans and to form new ones better adapted to the circumstances of his position. These failures and disappointments, whether they affect the child or the immigrant, have certain important conse- quences. They act upon the character of the unsuccess- ful or disappointed person. If he is morally weak and has but little will power, he may become discouraged and continue through life to fail in nearly everything that he undertakes. But if he is strong, and resolute, and quick- witted, his experiences have a different effect. Failure only strengthens his resolution to try again. Ill success leads him to reflect upon the causes of his failure, and discover how he can do better another time. Mentally and morally he changes, as a result of his imperfect at- tempts to change and adapt the things about him. While trying to adapt the world to himself, he also begins to adapt himself to the world. He learns to be persistent, to control his temper, to face disappointment bravely, and to be ready at all times to abandon an imperfect plan and adopt another that promises better results. All these are changes in his own character. This kind of activity which consists in so shaping one's own character as to make it more and more nearly adapted to the kind of world in which one lives, may be called char- acterization. The third great practical activity of life, then, is charac- ^terization. Socialization. — When the child encounters disappoint- ment, or finds that he has undertaken tasks too great for his strength, or too complicated for his wisdom, he turns for comfort, or help, or guidance, to those persons of his The Practical Activities of Socii 41 own kindred whom, in the process of appreciation, he has already learned to love and trust before all others. Al- though, in the attempts to use and control the objects about him, he has learned that he cannot do as he wills with these persons who are his kindred, he now discovers that they are always ready to help and advise him in his moments of trouble. Acting on this discovery, he begins to extend and to cultivate his acquaintance with a new interest and purpose. His motive is no longer a mere curiosity to know and an instinct to prefer. It is a desire /^ for sympathy and for help. A little later, when he has passed from the home life into the larger circle of the school and schoolmates, he continues to carry on the selective cultivation of acquaintances and friends. It has now become a large part of his daily interest to develop these social relations. Very similar, indeed, are the experiences of the immi- grant in the land of his adoption. He too, in days of dis- appointment, turns for sympathy and help to the little group of his own countrymen who understand him and whom he trusts. They can help him in his distress, or advise him in his perplexity. Gradually he learns that his | circle of helpful friends can be greatly widened. He is becoming acquainted with men of a different nationality from his own ; he is obtaining from them opportunities for employment; and he discovers that among them he can make strong and trustworthy friends. Little by little, ; he widens the circle, both making himself acquainted with the character, habits, and thought of the people about him, and endeavouring himself to become sufficiently like them to be acceptable to them as their fellow-citizen. In the course of time he has thus extended his social relations X 42 The Elements of Sociology until they touch all the activities of business, politics, reli- gion, and education in his adopted country. The practical activity which we have now described, consisting in the systematic development of acquaintance and of helpful social relations, may be called socialization. Socialization, then, is the fourth of the practical activi- ties of life. Complex Activities. — These four practical activities, of appreciation, utilization, characterization, and socialization are the simple modes of all the practical activities known to a population. The remaining modes now to be de- scribed are more or less complicated combinations of these four simple processes. The native-born inhabitants of a country who have lived to adult years, and the immigrants who have become in a degree adapted to their new sur- roundings, together carry on these more complex practical activities. Economic Activity. — The most fundamental of these is the economic. It consists in a systematic attempt to sat- isfy human wants by the production, exchange, and dis- tribution of material wealth. Economic activity, it is ^ obvious, is a development of utilization. Utilization is the first and essential part of the economic process. Economic activity, however, is more than utilization. It is the result of combining with utilization the two other practical activi- ties of characterization and socialization. To carry on economic activity, men must not only have the instinct to utilize and the habit of trying all. sorts of experiments in adapting the external world to man's purposes, but they must have acquired that discipline of character which en- ables them to work persistently and with intelligent pur- pose ; and they must have formed the habit of helping The Practical Activities of Socii 43 one another in their work in all possible ways. Economic activity, then, is a moralized and socialized process of utili- zation. It cannot be understood by any one who ignores either the moral or the social factors. %■ Legal Activity. — Next to economic activity in point of "%) time, and of essential importance, is legal activity, or the development and application of rules of law. A rule of law is one of those principles of right action which ex- perience in the task of developing human character has discovered and reduced to the forms of intelligent expres- sion ; which has been accepted as a sound principle by a population; and which has been put into the form of a command, which the population will compel all men to obey. In a sense, then, law is an expression of the rules or principles of characterization — that is, of moral con- duct, as the people composing any given population un- derstand and are prepared to enforce them. But legal activity, like economic activity, is a complex process. It is not characterization simply. It is characterization with the cooperation of utilization and of socialization. In the development and application of the rules of law, a popu- lation keeps in mind the necessity of paying attention to utility and to material well-being. A great many of the rules of law have reference to the control of individuals over material things. This control, when it is permitted or authorized by the entire population, is called the right of property. Cooperating with characterization and utili- zation also is the process of socialization. The rules of law are not merely the rules of right action as they appear to any particular individual. They are the rules which appeal to men generally, and which men generally can agree to abide by. Legal activity is thus a complex form of 44 The Elements of Sociology practical endeavour, constituted by the blending of utilization and of socialization with the moral process of characterization. Political Activity. — A third complex mode of practical activity in all large populations is the political. Its basis is socialization. It is a development on a large scale of the effort to form a sympathetic, helpful group; to in- clude among the objects of cooperation a defence against enemies and an organization of means to preserve order within the population; and to enforce the rules of right conduct. It will be seen that utilization and characteriza- tion are both combined with socialization in creating po- litical activity. But more than this -^ so very complicated is political conduct — the complex economic and legal processes also are combined with socialization in creating political activity. The industrial interests, the property rights, and other legal privileges of men are all important factors of political development. Political activity, then, is that form of the practical ac- tivity of a population which results from the combination of utilization, of characterization, of economic, and of legal activity with socialization. Ctiltiiral Activity. — There is a fourth mode of compli- cated activity of populations, yet to be mentioned. As a result of all the activities thus far described, the individ- uals composing a population are continually acquiring a new interest in the world itself, in themselves as conscious human beings, and in their own well-being and destiny. They begin to ask themselves what they work, and organ- ize, and strive for; and the answer that they make to themselves is that they work, and strive, and organize, in order to perfect their own lives, to improve their minds and characters, and to enjoy the happiness that comes of The Practical Activities of Socii 45 bodily exercise, intellectual inquiry, the friendship of com- panions, and the love of kindred. This answer means that, after all, appreciation, which is the first practical activity, is also the object of all other endeavours. Consequently men begin systematically to review, criti- cise, and develop their appreciations ; namely, their knowledge, their preferences, their affections. This final form of the process of appreciation, which appears after the other practical activities have been developed, may be called critical appreciation. It finds expression in all the forms of science, art, religion, and philosophy ; and it is systematically cultivated by means of education. This fourth great group of practical activities, which pre- supposes all the others that have been described, may be called the cultural activities. The Motives of Activity. — We have now roughly de- scribed all the kinds of practical activity that may be discovered in a population. Before we leave this subject, however, it is necessary to show how these activities arise, and by what methods they are carried on. All the conscious activities of mankind spring from cer- tain internal motives, such as passions, appetites, desires of various kinds, and ideas. It is necessary for the stu- dent of Sociology to become in some degree familiar with the motives of action because it is in them that the causes of social change, as of many other things in human life, are to be found. The Motives of Appreciation are discovered partly in the pleasures of sensation, and partly in the pleasures of thought. Light, colour, musical tones, soft and delicate surfaces, give us pleasure through the sensory organs of sight, hearing, and pressure. The child is continually 46 The Elements of Sociology moved to experiment with external objects because of these pleasures of sensation which they afford him. As soon as the mental life is somewhat developed, the more complicated intellectual pleasures of admiration and curi- osity begin to play an important part ; and they continue through adult life to provoke men to search for knowledge. Q^ The Motive of Utilization is that mode of feeling which we call appetite. The craving for food is the primary cause of most of the first efforts put forth by any living creature. Somewhat later appear those desires which prompt the efforts of men to find shelter, to make cloth- ing, to provide themselves with comfortable houses, arti- cles of convenience, and adornment. The motive back of all these efforts is appetite in some form. The Motive of Characterization is a little more difficult to describe. It is a vague form of desire which springs y- from the needs of the entire bodily and mental self, rather than from the need or activity of any particular organ. If, for example, a man were spending nearly all of his time and effort in satisfying his hunger, many organs of his body which did not happen to be called into play would feel the need of exercise, and grow restive under restraint. The powers of his mind, too, would clamor for opportunity. Now this vague desire of the entire self for opportunity and activity is the primary form ^ of the moral motive, — the motive of characterization. It is a desire for completeness and expansion of life, a pro- test against any incompleteness, failure, discouragement, lack of resolution, or breadth of view. We may call it the desire for integral — that is, complete — satisfaction. The Primary Motive of Socialization is the pleasurable- ness of acquaintance, companionship, and sympathy. The Practical Activities of Socii 47 When we first begin to associate and to extend our ac- quaintance, we do so simply because the acquaintance and companionship give us pleasure. After a while, however, when companionship and cooperation are found to serve many useful ends, such as making life more secure, and enabling us to do many things that no man could do for himself without the aid of his fellows, we discover a second motive of socialization ; namely, the usefulness of social ' relations. The Methods of Activity. — These various motives work out the processes or practical activities that have been described, through various methods, which, also, the stu- dent of Sociology should observe. Methods of Appreciation. — The motives of appreciation work out the activities of actual appreciation through two chief methods. 1. Response to Stimnli. — One of these is known to stu- dents of Psychology as responsiveness to stimulus. A stimulus is anything that excites the activity of an organ of sense. Thus, light is a stimulus to the nerves of the retina of the eye ; the sound waves that may be produced by a piano, the human voice, a violin, or any other musi- cal instrument, are a stimulus to the auditory nerves of the ear. The responsiveness of the organs of sense , to any stimulus is the primary method through which the processes of appreciation are developed. 2. Imitation. — A secondary method is imitation. Imita-, / tion, as we shall presently see, is one of the most important methods of human action, especially in social affairs. To a very large extent the child's appreciations are arrived at through the method of imitation. Seeing something that excites his admiration and curiosity, he tries to copy it; 48 The Elements of Sociology and in the effort to copy, he becomes familiar with it and strengthens his admiration of it to a degree that otherwise would be quite impossible. Methods of Utilization. — The motives of utilization work themselves out through methods that are known by the names attack, impression, imitation, and invention. 1. Attack includes the exertion of muscular force against any living or non-living object which we desire to take and use for our own purposes. It includes also the feelings and the ideas that are associated with such muscular efforts. These feelings are of all degrees, from the mere consciousness of strength to an active hatred of the object seized if it resists or proves to be dangerous. 2. Impression is the mental, as distinguished from the muscular power, that one person or animal has over an- other. Fear, and that not easily described mental state which is often called fascination, enter into impression, as, for example, they do when a timid bird is paralyzed by the snake. Impression, however, may exist when fear is hardly discoverable. The man of ordinary mental abilities always feels the superior power of a person of great intel- lectual gifts and executive ability, although that person may be physically weak. Napoleon Bonaparte was physi- cally a short, small man ; but he never failed to impress those who came into his presence with a sense of his men- tal power and strength of will. Impression is one of the chief factors in all social affairs. 3. Invention. — Imitation has already been described. Invention, as the word is used here, means more than the mechanical invention which the word usually calls to mind. In the psychological and sociological sense, inventions include all new combinations of ideas, acts, things, and The Practical Activities of Socii 49 forces. Thus the plot of a novel is an invention ; a suc- cessful act of legislation for overcoming some public wrong or inconvenience is an invention ; a new device in military or naval strategy is likewise an invention. '' Methods of Characterization. — The methods through 3 which the motive of characterization manifests itself are persistence, accommodation, and self-control. Persistence and self-control do not need to be described. I. Accommodatioti is that change which takes place in any living being, whether plant, animal, or man, when new combinations or circumstances make necessary some modi- fication of previous habits. When, for example, a shrub is transplanted to a soil and climate different from those of its native place, the continued life of the plant depends upon its ability to adapt itself, that is, to accommodate itself, to the new conditions. We have shown how the immigrant coming to a new land has to make many changes of habit in respect to almost every detail of his life. All these changes are accommodations. Method of Socialization. — The method through which the motives of socialization manifest themselves is called assimilation. I. Assimilation is a reciprocal accommodation. Two or more minds accommodate themselves to one another; each learns something from the others ; each gives some- thing to the others ; each nature is changed by the in- fluence of the others. Assimilation is the method through which the thousands of foreign-born residents of the United States who have come from Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, Russia, and other countries are all becoming Americans. All are learning from native-born Americans, and native-born Americans are learning from 50 The Elements of Sociology them. Each is setting examples to all the others; and each is imitating all the others. Conflict. — All of these methods, — namely, response to stimulus, imitation, attack, impression, invention, per- sistence, accommodation, self-control, and assimilation — are so many modes of one universal method which is found in every form of matter and in every state of mind. That universal method is called conflict. Every change that takes place in matter is a conflict of I atoms or of molecules. Life is a continual conflict be- tween the organic matter of plant or animal and the forms of matter in surrounding space. So long as the living matter is able to overcome, appropriate, and make use of various forms of matter external to itself, life con- tinues. But when, in the conflict, the external forms of matter become stronger, and wear away, or, as we say, dis- organize the matter of the living body, life presently ceases. All thought and feeling are a conflict of sen- sations, ideas, or groups of ideas. Even the pleasant friendship of companions is a conflict; for it must be remembered that not all conflicts are painful or even unpleasant. The discussion of differing opinions, the attempt to reconcile different plans, the struggle between two opposing wills, — all these are forms of conflict ; but they yield most of the pleasure as well as much of the unhappiness of life. All the sports that awaken the in- terest of boys on the playground, and afford them a chief part of the pleasures of youth, are keen forms of conflict. It is necessary to observe what forms of conflict are de- structive and painful and what are constructive and pleasur- able. Any student may see for himself that there are two gradations of conflict. In one there is such unlikeness or I The Practical Activities of Socii 51 inequality between the contending objects or persons that the complete destruction or subordination of the weaker is the only possible outcome of the encounter. This sort of conflict, which results in complete destruction or sub- ordination, may be called primary conflict. All animal life is maintained by a primary conflict. Animal life is sustained only by organic matter. Even if mankind should become strictly vegetarian in its habits, human life would still be sustained by the primary conflict, because it would still be necessary to destroy vegetable organisms. Conflict, however, may be merely the opposition and struggle of objects, persons, or states of mind that are . so nearly alike and so nearly equal that the outcome is / merely a modification of the nature, position, or point of view of the contestants. This relatively mild kind of con- flict is secondary, and is more often than not stimulating, pleasurable, and helpful. It could be shown that the secondary forms of conflict all depend upon the continuation of the primary conflict. It is not necessary, however, for the purposes of our present study, to go into the more abstract details of the theory of universal evolution, to which this subject properly belongs. Toleration. — Primary and secondary conflicts appear in all the practical activities of life. What we call progress is a continual change in the proportion of secondary to primary conflicts. If, with so much of primary conflict as is essential to maintaining life and defending social organi- zation against enemies who would invade and destroy, we can continue to multiply those mild secondary conflicts that are pleasurable and helpful, we may truthfully say that we are making progress. But, as we have seen, secondary conflict is possible only $2 The Elements of Sociology where the contending objects are much alike and nearly equal in power. When it is possible for one contestant to annihilate, enslave, or suppress the other, the propor- tion of misery and disorganization may be greater than the proportion of happiness and organization in the result. But where the contestants are alike and equal, neither , having any fear of ruin or of permanent injury, the strug- gle ends in a better understanding and a more complete cooperation. I Happily, the normal tendency of conflict is towards ^ equality and the milder forms of strife. The antagonism of primary conflict is self-limiting. It necessarily termi- nates in a kind of equilibrium which we call toleration. The very strong kill off the very weak. Then the very strong in turn are overborne by the numerical superiority of the individuals of average power. The majority then left are too nearly equal in strength for one to hope to vanquish the other ; and they are obliged to live on those terms of toleration which make possible the reassertion and renewed activity of the socializing motives. The equilibrium is nevertheless tested from time to time, and so is maintained, by frequent acts of aggression and re- venge — occurrences which may be witnessed not only between animals and savage men, but also, unfortunately, j in civilized communities. The relations of similarity and dissimilarity to social activities and results will be further considered in the following chapter. PARALLEL STUDY In any good elementary work on Psychology, such as James's " Briefer Course " or Titchener's " Outlines," study or review the sub- jects, Sensation, Reflex Action, Imitation, and Accommodation. CHAPTER VI Socialization The Modes of Resemblance. — At the end of the preced- ing chapter it was shown that if the individuals composing a population are very unlike in kind or very unequal in power, their relations are antagonistic in the extreme sense of primary conflict. If, however, there is substan- tial equality of power and a good degree of resemblance in nature or kind, association and cooperation are possible. It is necessary, therefore, to investigate the similarities that make socialization possible. In every population of conscious individuals, the simi- larities of kind that exist and that make society possible are of three chief modes ; and in each mode there are fur- ther subdivisions. Kinship. — The first mode of resemblance to be ob- served is that which we call kinship. It is the resem- blance of physical relationship, based upon identity of blood. Everywhere in the world this mode of resemblance plays an extremely important part in social affairs. Men of the same race have common prejudices ; men of the same nationality, in a still stronger degree, are drawn to- gether ; and in a degree yet stronger, men of the same family lineage show sympathies and common prejudices that play a part in all the affairs of their everyday lives. There are four important degrees or subdivisions of 53 54 The Elements of Sociology kinship. These are, namely, family, nationality, race, and colour. The family degree of kinship includes those who are most nearly related, as father, mother, children, brother, and sister ; and in some instances the slightly more re- mote degrees of kinship, as grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, and cousins. Nationality is the degree of kinship which includes all those of the same speech and political associations, as, for example, all Englishmen, all Frenchmen, all Germans or Italians. Race is the degree of kinship which includes all those of either one or more nationalities who are historically descended from some one stock and speech ; that is, all who are really of one blood and tradition, but who have been scattered through many nationalities. Thus, for example, the Saxon race is now found not only in England, but throughout North Amer- ica and in Australia. The Celts are found in Ireland, Scotland, France, Wales, and North America. The Scan- dinavian blood is found in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and in the northwestern commonwealths of the United States. Colour is that most remote degree of relationship which includes all nationalities and races of the same gen- eral external appearance in the matter of colour of the skin and certain other physical characteristics. Thus, for example, the white colour includes such races as the Semitic, which has long lived to the southeast of the Med- iterranean Sea, the Hamitic of Ancient Egypt and Phoe- nicia, the Greek, Etruscan, Latin, Germanic, Celtic, and other races of western Europe. Another way of distinguishing degrees of kinship is somewhat less accurate, but still very useful. It is that which is employed in statistical accounts of population. I Socialization 55 Census statistics of population include these distinctions, namely, native-born-of-native-parents, native-born-of-for- eign-parents, foreign-born, and coloured. These distinctions are important as showing to what extent the demotic composition is a product of genetic aggregation, and to what extent it is a congregation. The native-born-of-native-parents are obviously more closely related through long-continued intermarriage than are the native-born-of-native-parents plus the native-born- of -foreign-parents ; and the native-born-of-native-parents plus the native-born-of-foreign-parents are more closely related than are these two groups taken together plus the foreign-born. Mental and Moral Resemblance. — The second mode ^ of resemblance to be observed in every population is one that may be called mental and moral similarity. It may also be called like-mindedness — the name under which it has been briefly described in the first chapter. Mental and moral resemblance consists in a close simi- larity of the thoughts, of the sympathies and affections, of the purposes, or of all these together, of two or more individuals. These similarities do not exist except when there are similarities in those elementary mental processes of sensa- tion and in those elementary forms of nervous organiza- tion which were alluded to in Chapters I and V. That is to say, mental and moral resemblance is a consequence of ^ similar brain organization in two or more individuals; and^ the mental and moral resemblance itself, in its most ele- mentary form, is a similar responsiveness of two or more individuals to the same stimulus or stimuli. For example, if two or more children prefer a certain 56 The Elements of Sociology colour, as red, or blue, or yellow, to any other colour that is shown them, these children, reacting in the same way to the same stimulus, are, to this extent, mentally alike. If two or more men, when entering upon their life work, show a strong preference for a particular occupation, as, for example, that of the sailor, they are to this extent mentally alike. If many men, upon hearing that some great disaster has overtaken the commercial world, are so filled with fear that they sell their stocks or other invest- ments, these men are mentally and morally in a high degree alike. Or, finally, if hundreds or thousands of men are so affected by some great wrong as to organize in political parties, to hold public meetings, and carry on a prolonged agitation to do away with the evil that de- presses them, these men are so far mentally and morally alike. Like responsiveness to the same stimulus is discovered in three stages of development. The first is a mere initial responsiveness; it is a mere first interest in any object. This first interest, even if for the moment very strong, may not last. It may produce serious social re- sults, however, as, for example, in a momentary panic. A second degree is that persistent responsiveness which becomes a habit or fixed manner. Thus most of our forms of speech and of courtesy are like ways of respond- ing to the stimulus of personal meeting which have be- come habitual. A third degree is the rational responsiveness which involves the complex activity of all the powers of mind and will, and the varied adaptation of means to end. This degree of similar responsiveness is to be seen when many individuals, confronted with some common danger Socialization 57 to be avoided, or looking forward to some common inter- est to be developed, consult, plan, and organize, and, from time to time, modify plans and reorganize their forms of cooperation as changing circumstances make new com- binations of means necessary for the attainment of the end in view. It is obvious that complete mental and moral similarity of this high degree involves not only like responsiveness to the same stimulus on the part of the like-minded individuals, but also a substantial equality of mental and moral power. Potential Resemblance. — In every population there is to be seen one more important mode of similarity. This may be called potential resemblance. As the word ** po- tential " implies, the resemblance here referred to is not one already fully established. It is a resemblance that is possible or in the way of being established. Strictly speaking, it is that peculiarity of two or more minds which makes them so act and react upon one another that in ^ course of time they become alike. We all know from personal experience that there are some minds among our acquaintances that never become more sympathetic with our own. The oftener we engage in argument with them, the further apart do they and we seem to drift. With other minds the case is wholly different. The ripening of acquaintance is the ripening of sympathy and agreement. Our differences disappear or become of little consequence. We learn to see things in the same light and to regard them with the same feelings. This organization of two or more minds which makes their sympathetic approach or agreement certain is the thing which is meant by the term " potential resemblance." It is potential resemblance that makes possible the assimi- 58 The Elements of Sociology lation of the very different types of mind which come into a country by immigration, to the common mental and moral type of the land of their adoption. The Consciousness of Resemblance. — Such are the modes of resemblance that make socialization possible. Let us now look at the mental consequences of resemblance which enter into and constitute the process of socialization itself. Sensations of Meeting. — When two persons who have never before seen one another unexpectedly meet, some- thing happens in the nervous organization of each which, when examined, clearly shows that the meeting is as truly a conflict as would be a collision of two mortal enemies. J The only difference is that the one conflict may be almost infinitesimal in magnitude, and involve no unpleasant feelings whatsoever, while the other would involve perhaps both terror and pain. That which takes place, then, in the nervous apparatus of a person who unexpectedly meets a stranger is either a shock of unpleasant feeling or a certain thrill of pleas- urable feeling. Which of these it would be, no human intelligence could beforehand have predicted. Now the feeling of shock, surprise, anger, disgust, which may happen to be the experience in the case, is beyond doubt due to a very complicated impression of unlikeness which the stranger makes. This complicated impression is made up of sensations of many kinds : sensations of sight, sensations of hearing, perhaps also sensations of odour and of touch. The man's appearance as seen with the eye may be repellent or threatening ; his voice may grate unpleasantly on the ear; the touch of his hand may create something closely akin to a shudder. Suppose, however, that the experience is a thrill of Socialization 59 pleasure. Here the effect is produced by a complex combination of impressions of unlikeness with impressions of likeness ; namely, impressions of the difference of the stranger from the person who encounters him, with impres- sions of his apparent resemblance. It is instantly clear that this hitherto unknown individual has his own distinctive personality ; he is in many respects, perhaps in outward appearance, perhaps in tone of voice, almost certainly in mind and character, different from the one who confronts him. At the same time there is something in his face that pleases ; something in his voice or hand grasp that awakens confidence. This means that the activities of his mind, the peculiarities of his character, expressing themselves throughout his life in nerve and muscle reactions, have left in his manner and in the lines of his face a registration which the person encountering him instantly interprets as signs of a personality sympathetic with his own. It is a person- ality which awakens the familiar forms of thought and feeling of his own consciousness. It is quite possible for the first impression made by a stranger to be little more than sensation and emotion. Thoughts, ideas, perceptions, in the strict meaning of these words, may hardly enter into the matter at all. The whole occurrence may be little more than an awaken- ing of what may be called organic sympathy or organic repulsion in distinction from certain more highly devel- oped modes of the consciousness of difference and of likeness which are further on to be explained. Organic Sympathy. — The origins of this organic antag- onism or organic sympathy, as the case may be, must now be briefly explained. Many social facts would be alto- gether mysterious if they were not known to have a close 6o The Elements of Sociology connection with the simple mental processes in which or- ganic sympathy arises. Long before the infant begins to think, and while its mental life is little more than a series of sensations, it has entered upon a group of experiences which are preparing it to regard very differently the individuals who, in after years, will be found to be on the whole like its own self, and on the whole unlike that self. The infant does not yet know the difference between persons who are similar to himself and those who are very dissimilar from him- self. But he is undergoing experiences which will pres- ently make such knowledge inevitable. When he cries or coos, a certain impression is made upon his own organs of hearing by these explosions of his own voice. When his nurse or mother sings to him, a cer- tain impression is again made upon his organs of hearing. When the dog barks or the bird chirps in the cage, once more a definite impression is made upon the infantile nerves of hearing. But something else also is happening. The sound made by the mother's voice has been like that made by the child's own voice ; while the sounds made by the dog and bird have been unlike those made by the child's own voice. When the infant puts his hands to- gether or passes them over his face, he receives in his brain certain sensations of pressure. When he passes his hands over his mother's face and over her hands, he again receives sensations of pressure ; and they are very like the sensations that he has received from his own body. When he passes his hands over the sides of the crib or of the blankets or along the fur of the cat, he once more re- ceives sensations of pressure ; but they are unlike those received from his own body. Socialization 6 1 These simple illustrations serve as well as scores of others that might be offered to bring out a truth of great importance. This is, that long before a child perceives, or thinks, in the strict meaning of thesfc words, it has begun to lay up in its consciousness a multitude of experi- ences in the form of mere sensations of likeness or of un- likeness of kind or class. In all these experiences he himself is one term in the comparison. The external object is like himself or unlike himself. He does not yet know this ; but, at one time, he has sensations which are like the sensations received from himself, and at another time he has sensations which are unlike the sensations received from himself. When, a little older, the child is beginning to imitate the actions of people about him, if closely watched by an intelligent observer, he will be found to imitate more easily and more frequently the persons who are very like himself. Here again the child does not know that he is making any such discrimination. It is only the third party, the exter- nal observer, who can know this fact. None the less, the fact is one that will have important consequences for the child in later life. One of the simplest ways in which this truth can be proved by any student who cares to put it to the test is by observations of children learning to talk. Children can understand each other oftentimes when it is impossible for strangers to understand them, extremely difficult for the father, but much less difficult for the mother. That is to say, children imitate the sounds made by one another more easily than the sounds made by grown people. And, as a general rule, the child who has brothers and sisters a little older than itself learns to talk more readily than the child who associates only with adults. 62 The Elements of Sociology In the development of resembling individuals, the men- tal processes that have been described in the last five paragraphs are combined with a more general process previously mentioned; namely, the like response of like minds to like stimuli. Accordingly, there are three chief factors of organic sympathy ; namely, first, the like responsiveness of like individuals to the same stimulus ; second, like sensations received by like individuals from self and others ; third, the readier imitation of one another j by like individuals than by those who greatly differ. Perceptions of Likeness. — When the child begins to combine sensations of the moment with memories of simi- lar sensations in the past, and to connect these immediate and memory sensations with the objects which have pro- duced them, the process of perception has begun. The child now not only has like and unlike sensations ; he has perceptions of likeness and of unlikeness. These are much more complicated mental states. It seems probable that perceptions of unlikeness appear earlier in the experience of every individual than percep- tions of likeness. Indeed, likeness can be distinguished from absolute identity only by perceptions of the differ- ences that exist between things that are, in certain re- spects, alike. From this truth it follows that in the process of acquaint- ance the differences between one individual and another are first observed ; and that a sense of difference is always present in the mind to be more or less overcome by any growing sense of similarity. This is why it happens that when two strangers meet^ the mental experience in the first instance is one of surprise or shock, or of some milder form of conflict. Socialization 63 From this principle follow also certain other important sociological facts. In every mixed population, where men of different nationalities and different customs dwell side by side, the sense of difference long stande in the way of complete acquaintance and assimilation. For example, in any large American city, where are found the native-born and such groups of foreign-born as the Irish, the German, the Italian, the Russian Jew, and many others, the strong impression of difference between these types operates as a serious barrier to the complete adaptation of all types to a common American citizenship. The sense of difference, however, only impedes ; it does not prevent the appearance in consciousness of percep- tions of resemblance. If, in the population, there are in fact as many resemblances as are usually found in in- dividuals of the same species, much more of the same nationality, there presently appear in the minds of all who are sufficiently developed to be able to perceive dif- ferences (that is, to have perceptions of any kind) per- ceptions of a new order, namely, perceptions of similarity. Reflective Sympathy. — When the perception of resem- blance has arisen in consciousness, it immediately reacts upon that organic sympathy which has already been de- scribed. The sympathy between like individuals which takes the form of imitation and of like response to the same stimulus, now becomes an intelligent and reflective sympathy. It is awakened by the knowledge that an- other person is like one's self. When we perceive that some one who is organized as we are is doing a certain thing, we feel the impulse to act as he acts. If he ap- pears to be in pain, we feel a certain discomfort or even a certain degree of the pain that he experiences. If he 64 The Elements of Sociology • is evidently in a state of great joy, we also feel a certain degree of gladness. We have now noticed three important mental conse- quences of resemblance between one individual and an- other. Resembling individuals have like sensations and respond in like ways to the same stimulus. They uncon- sciously imitate one another. These facts together make up organic sympathy. In course of time, with further development of consciousness, resembling individuals per- ceive that they are alike ; they become aware of their similarity. And in the third place, the perception of similarity, in combination with organic sympathy, becomes reflective, intelligent sympathy. The resembling individ- uals not only sympathize with one another, but they know that they sympathize, and to a certain extent they are aware that their sympathy is affected by the perception of resemblance. Two more mental consequences of resemblance must now be noted. Affection. — The perception of resemblance and con- scious sympathy commonly develop into the stronger feel- ing which is variously named liking, friendliness, and affection, according to the degree of its strength. Those individuals who, as we say, have something in common, that is, those who are so much alike that they are sym- pathetic and have similar ideas and tastes, on the whole like one another better than individuals who have little or nothing in common. We must not make the mistake, however, of supposing that in all cases the strongest affec- tion springs up between persons who, at the moment of their first acquaintance, are actually very much alike in mental and moral qualities. Perhaps the more frequent Socialization 65 case is that of a growing affection between,, persons whose similarity is that which has been called potential resem- blance. Apparently it is the capacity of two or more per- sons to become alike in mental and moral nature, under each other's influence, that gives rise to the strongest friendship and the highest degree of pleasure in compan- ionship. Desire for Recognition. — The remaining mental fact to be noted as a consequence of resemblance is the desire which an individual feels for recognition, including a return of sympathy and affection. When a person per- ceives that his acquaintance resembles himself in mind and character, and is conscious of a certain sympathy and affection for his acquaintance, he looks for some manifes- tation of interest in himself. He expects the acquaintance also to recognize the points of similarity and to show feel- ings of sympathy and liking. This state of mind is the basis of some of the most important social passions, such as pride and ambition. The Consciousness of Kind. — The four modes of con- sciousness which have now been described must not be thought of as separate or as independent of one another. They are so intimately blended that it is only by a process of scientific analysis that they can be thought of singly. In actual experience, they are united in a state of mind that, for the moment, seems perfectly simple and homo- geneous. The perception of resemblance, the sympathy, the affection, and the desire for recognition that go with it, seem, for the time being, to be as perfectly one fact of consciousness as does the image of a person or of a land- scape upon the retina of the eye. This state of conscious- ness is pleasurable, and includes the feeling that we wish y 66 The Elements of Sociology to maintain it and to expand it. The feeling that it car- ries with it is, in fact, like that which one experiences while engaged in a pleasurable game or witnessing an engross- ing drama. One does not stop to ask whether it is useful or worth while, any more than he does when eagerly look- ing forward to the next successful move on a chess board. He simply enjoys it while it lasts, and feels that it is worth while in itself, quite irrespective of any consequences that may follow. We are now ready to give a name to this interesting mode of consciousness which springs from the resemblance of two or more individuals to one another. We call it the consciousness of kind. The consciousness of kindy then^ is that pleasurable state of mind wJiich includes organic sympathy ^ the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy ^ affection, and the desire for recognition. Complex as it is, the consciousness of kind is the sim- plest of all the states of mind that can be called social. All other states of the human mind which can be called social and which enter into social activities are found upon examination to be composed of the consciousness of kind in combination with various other ideas, desires, and pas- sions. The consciousness of kind is the cause of all the social activities and relations which men enter upon intel- ligently, knowing what they are about, in distinction from those acts that are merely automatic or impulsive. It is important to observe that, because the conscious- ness of kind is complex, it is necessarily an ever-changing mental state. It varies as one or another of its elements is predominant. At one time, it may be chiefly an idea ; at another time, chiefly sympathy ; at another time, chiefly Socialization 6/ the desire for recognition ; but never is it one of these elements alone. All are present in some degree. It must be observed also that the consciousness of kind varies with the degree of resemblance upon which it is based. Sympathy and affection decrease as resemblance becomes more general and vague. Thus, for example, there is usually a stronger sympathy among all members of a family than among all members of a nation ; and a stronger sympathy among men of a common nationality than among all men of the same race or colour. In like manner, there is a greater sympathy among Protestants than among Protestants and Roman Catholics taken to- gether; and more sympathy among Protestants and Ro- man Catholics taken together than among all devotees of all religions taken together. TJie Laiv of Sympathy. — The law of sympathy may therefore be expressed as follows : — The degree of sympathy decreases as the ge^terality of resemblance increases. ^ The Objective Process. — The growth of the conscious- ness of kind is the mental or subjective side of socializa- tion. Socialization must be examined, however, from what may be called the objective side ; that is, from the side of certain activities which spring from the consciousness of kind and react upon it, making it a broader and deeper experience, expanding the thought of resemblance, and enlarging the sympathies. Cofnmunication. — The first step in this outward or ob- jective process of socialization is communication — the systematic exchange of ideas and feelings. In every aggregation of individuals in which there are many differences, but also some positive resemblances 68 The Elements of Sociology and already some consciousness of kind, there is always some communication. The first impressions of meeting are usually confused. Impressions of difference and impressions of resemblance are so mingled in the mind that one is left in doubt as to the real degree of resemblance and the possible interest and pleasure of further acquaintanceship. The desire to have more definite knowledge on these points is the origi- nal motive of communication. Among both animals and men, in the presence of a fellow-being there is always an expression of feeling by muscular movements, tones of voice, or articulate lan- guage. The expression by means of involuntary move- ments is often quite sufficient to reveal to the onlooker what he most desires to know about the person in whose presence he happens to be. Especially is this true of the involuntary expression of any feeling of aggression or of shrinking. The quick interpretation of such changes is a perception, and even a judgment, of kind — a sort of instantaneous decision of the question, ** Is this fellow my sort of a man, or is he something else } " Among the more intelligent creatures, such as the higher species of animals and human beings, this first instantaneous judgment of kind is followed by a more deliberate and varied communication which corrects or verifies and expands the first impression. We have only to observe the action of two strange dogs when they en- counter one another, to get a correct idea of the origins of communication. Before concluding to fight or to make friends, they eye and sniff each other, show teeth, growl, and express a dozen shades of feeling and conviction by movements of the head and neck, haunches, and tail. All Socializatio7i 69 this is simply a way of " sizing up " one another and de- ciding what their immediate relations shall be. Much the same sort of thing may be observed on any school play- ground. The new boy is surrounded and subjected to all sorts of inquiries and tests to determine what sort of a fellow he is, and whether he is of the right kind to be accepted as a persona grata by those who already have the running of the playground in their hands. In col- leges the " rushing " of men for the fraternities is another good example of the same process. Among adults in po- lite society the process is a little more refined and long- drawn-out ; but it is not really different in character. Be- fore the basis of association is finally established for two or more persons, their inquisition of one another extends to a comparison of genealogies, of personal experiences, of tastes, beliefs, and ambitions. The motives of all this communication are the desires to impress and to influence one another, and to know one another thoroughly well, and so to define the consciousness of kind. After ac- quaintance is established, much communication takes place which seems to have its motive in our interest in the sub- ject that we talk about. Even then, however, the other motives that have been mentioned can always be detected ; and it is probable that they are in all cases the really pre- dominant ones, although we are not always conscious of the fact. Association. — When communication is indefinitely con- tinued, association, as distinguished from mere aggrega- tion, exists, and socialization is begun. Communication has satisfied the meeting individuals that they are too much alike and too nearly equal for either to attempt in any sense, physical or mental, to conquer the other. At 70 The Elements of Sociology this stage of their acquaintance, however, it is by no means certain that the secondary conflict which must continue among them will always be sympathetic and pleasurable. In a population of mixed elements such as congregation often brings together, contention is likely to be harsh or even bitter during a long period of assimilation. Assimilation, it will readily be understood from the name itself, is the process of growing alike. Two or more individuals so modify one another's ideas and dispositions that, in the course of their acquaintance, their differences become fewer or less serious ; antagonism gives place to agreement ; and their ideas and purposes grow more and more alike. The Socializing Motives and Methods. — It is obvious that this process .really consists in a modification of indi- vidualistic (that is, purely self-seeking) motives and activi- ties. The individualistic motives have been described in Chapter V. That which modifies them and produces assimilation and socialization is the consciousness of kind. Let us, then, observe the modifications of individ- ualistic motives, and of individualistic modes of activity, that result from the combination with them of a growing consciousness of kind. I . The consciousness of kind modifies appetite and desire. Few., if any, of our appetites and desires are what they would have been if each individual had lived by himself in contact only with the physical world and lower forms of life. When a strange food is first tasted, it is usually on the recommendation of one in whom we have confi- dence, and whose tastes in many other respects we know to be like our own. To a great extent we cultivate certain appetites and repress others merely because our associates Socialization yi do so. M ost of the consumers of tobaccc^ *' learn " to li ke it. Our clothing is chosen with as much reference to our class or set as to our comfort. In general, the standard of living is largely determined by the consciousness of kind. 2. T/ie conscioiis7iess of kind modifies the ideas and the desires that enter into the consciousness of integral self- satisfaction. Fortitude in bearing pain and disappoint- ment, courage in facing danger, and persistence of purpose are greatly strengthened by fellow-feeling and the desire for esteem and praise. Besides thus fortifying the original moral motives, the consciousness of kind contributes a new one, the very names of which are significant of its origin ; to wit, kindness, affection, love. This motive manifests itself in a new mode of conduct, namely, self- sacrifice. Affection and self-sacrifice probably originate in organic sympathy. 3. The consciousness of kind modifies impression. Im- pression produces two very different effects. One is fear, which may become terror, and terminate in paralysis ; the other is fascination and pleasure. The one mode of impression is the cause of submission, surrender, and the abject kind of obedience ; the other mode of impression is the cause of loyalty, fealty, and the voluntary attachment to a leader. The effect of the consciousness of kind upon the fear- inspiring mode of impression is reflected in the saying that familiarity breeds contempt. The sense of difference and its accompanying sense of mystery are a large element in fear. These disappear with the discovery of resemblance. Rulers and dignitaries who wish to inspire fear invariably surround themselves with an air of mystery, and foster the 72 The Elements of Sociology public delusion that, in some inexplicable way, they are unlike other men. The effect of the consciousness of kind upon the fascination-producing mode of impression is to intensify devotion. The more " in touch " our leader is with us, that is to say, the more like us he is in every respect except his superior sagacity and power, the more blind and unswerving is our allegiance. 4. The consciousness of kind modifies imitation. We do not imitate one example as readily as we imitate another. Other things being equal, we imitate the example that is set by an originative mind in our own class or circle. All of our motives and methods that are thus modified by the consciousness of kind become socializing motives and methods, and play their part in the gradual assimila- tion of the partially unlike elements of a heterogeneous population. It is, however, the socially modified imitation that is chiefly efficient. Social Imitation. — We imitate one another because our nervous apparatus is so organized that any sight or sound or touch is a stimulus which results in muscular move- ments that, by long habit, have become associated with such stimuli. If, for example, you see your friend reach out his hand for a glass of water, the chances are that unless you stop to think about it and deliberately restrain yourself, you also will reach out to take the glass of water that stands near you. We imitate, then, except when we consciously restrain ourselves; and this we do not do if the action imitated is pleasurable, and is obviously conducive to well-being. In this latter case our con- scious will reinforces the tendency to imitate, and we deliberately repeat our own and one another's acts in- definitely. In this way conscious imitations may extend Socialization 73 to populations numbered by millions, and^ be kept up for thousands of years. Modern civilization is the continuing imitation of Greece and Rome. This imitation was estab- lished in Germanic Europe by Charlemagne. It was carried to England by William the Conqueror, and to America by Columbus. It is now being spread by the nations of Europe and America throughout Asia, Africa, Australia, and Oceanica. Not all imitations, however, indefinitely survive. The imitation of examples in any way remarkable tends to overcome or to combine lesser imitations. It is for this reason that in each nation and in each local subdivision of a national population certain habits, such as customs in eating, clothing, and amusements, are practically uni- versal there, but are not found in other parts of the world. In every population, therefore, there may be ob- served a general approach to certain persistent types of action, expression, and character. This is the socializ- ing process in its most subtle and efficacious mode. It is this that ultimately blends the diverse elements of the most heterogeneous populations into a homogeneous type. It creates a common speech, common modes of thought, and common standards of living. By destroying or soften- ing many original differences of speech, belief, and prac- tice, it promotes intermarriage. It is these influences that will gradually assimilate all the foreign-born elements in the population of the United States to a persistent Ameri- can type. The Persistence of Conflict. — Imitations, however, are never perfect. The example or copy is never perfectly reproduced, and consequently, as any action or custom spreads from person to person and from group to group. 74 The Elements of Sociology it in some measure changes its form, just as a story re- peated by one person after another presently becomes so different from the original version that the one who first told it can hardly recognize it. Imitations, therefore, tend to multiply and subdivide and become differentiated. For this reason there may arise in any society a conflict among imitations. When this happens, one of two results must follow. If the conflicting imitations are irreconcilable, ' one must give way to the other. If, however, they can be combined, the outcome may be an entirely new thing or mode of activity; namely, an invention. The most important of the conflicts between imitations is that be- tween imitations of things old, venerable, long-standing, and the imitation of novelty. The one kind of imitation we call custom ; the other we call fashion. At times custom-imitation encroaches upon fashion ; at other times I fashion seems to encroach upon custom. While, therefore, imitation on the whole softens conflict and assimilates the unUke elements of a population, it at times becomes itself a cause of fresh conflict and an obstacle to assimilation. Thus, notwithstanding the socializing motives, there re- main in a population persistent causes of the more serious modes of conflict. First, of course, are the instincts of conquest which are kept alive by the necessity of destroying life to maintain life, and the instincts of aggression that are kept alive by the opposition always met with by those individuals and populations that develop more rapidly than others- Wherever civilization finds itself face to face with sav- agery, or a young and growing civilization finds itself opposed to one old and decaying, the antagonism is too Socialization 75 serious to expend itself in the lesser fofms of secondary conflict. Secondly, there are original differences of nature and habitjthat have not yet been blended or neutralized by the process of assimilation. Thirdly, there are the secondary differences that con- tinually arise through the conflicts of imitation. To these must be added occasional causes that at times operate with terrible effect. These are the failure of or- dinary food supplies, as in times of famine, and the occa- sional occurrence of some great calamity, like flood or pestilence, which demoralizes people with fear and so far destroys sympathy and self-sacrifice as to leave only the animal instincts of self-preservation in full activity. Subjective Toleration. — These lapses from toleration, however, are not enduring. The causes that establish toleration in the first instance tend to reestablish it after every failure. Cooperating with the tendency of primary conflict to bring about an equilibrium of strength, there is now, in addition, a conscious desire for the amelioration of strife. Socialization has moulded thought and charac- ter. In addition to toleration as a mere objective fact, there has at length appeared an idea of toleration and a wish to maintain it. There has come into existence a subjective toleration. PARALLEL STUDY Using the " Compendium of the Eleventh Census," make coloured or shaded maps showing degrees of kinship in different parts of the United States. In Psychology, study or review the subject " Percep- tion." Read Aristotle's " Nicomachean Ethics," Books VIII and IX, Adam Smith's " Theory of Moral Sentiments," Part I, Chapters I-V, and Tarde's " Les Lois de I'Imitation." CHAPTER VII Cooperation The Nature of Cooperation. — Of all social facts none has received so much attention or been so carefully studied as cooperation. This word stands for many kinds of mutual aid. We say that men cooperate when they combine their efforts to accomplish a particular task ; as, for example, that of lifting a heavy object which one man could not move. We say that they cooperate when they work together in more highly organized ways ; as, for example, in a man- ufacturing estabhshment. Again, we use the word "co- operation " for combined efforts in aggression or defence. The soldiers of a regiment cooperate with one another; regiments themselves cooperate; infantry and artillery, army and navy, cooperate. Yet again, we use the word " cooperation " for political organization. The combination of various agencies of government and of these with the obedience to law by all good citizens, is no less a coopera- tion than is the combination of efforts in industry or in military operations. It seems, then, that, from one point of view, nearly every kind of activity in human society is a form of co- operation. For this reason there have been writers on Sociology who have described cooperation as the essential 76 Cooperation yy and distinctive fact of society, and have thought that the science of Sociology was concerned chiefly with an account of the forms and methods of cooperation. This opinion can very easily be shown to be mistaken. Already the careful reader of the preceding chapters has become aware that the agreement, the unity of purpose and of method on the part of two or more individuals that cooperation requires, is not possible under any and all conditions that may be imagined. There can be no cooperation except among those who are, in a good degree, like-minded, and who are so far conscious of their agreement that they can intelligently plan their common activity. This is merely another way of saying that cooperation can be established only in a population which in a measure has become socialized. There must be a con- sciousness of kind, communication, habits of imitation; or, if these fail, where the population contains ele- ments not yet assimilated and too unlike for harmonious combination, there must at least be an established tolera- tion. Among these requisites for cooperation, the all-essential ones are the like-mindedness and the consciousness of kind. Why this is so must now be explained. Obviously, there can, be no cooperation unless there is among the individuals who are to combine their efforts a common interest in some object or end which they wish to attain. Now this common interest is that men- tal fact which has already been described as a like response to the same stimulus. If a score of men and boys on the street unite in chasing a thief who has snatched a purse from a pedestrian, it is because they yS The Elements of Sociology are all moved in like ways by the same occurrence ; their conduct is a similar response to the same stimulus. Moreover, there must be not only this common respon- siveness to the same stimulus, but also a perception by each of the cooperating individuals that he and all of those who are working with him are thus responding. That is, each must understand that all have the same interest and that all are endeavouring to accomplish the same end. If this perception were lacking, cooperation would be only a momentary occurrence that could not be continuously maintained. Besides these mental conditions of cooperation, there must of course be communication, and there must be con- fidence in one another. Already the student will have reflected that these men- tal conditions together are a consciousness of kind. Like responsiveness to the same stimulus and the perception by each that all have the same interest, are respectively a mode of like-mindedness and a consciousness of like- mindedness; while communication and confidence both grow out of the consciousness of kind and contribute to it. The actual relation of the consciousness of kind to cooperation can most clearly be seen from an examination of a few examples. Let us suppose that it is proposed to organize an expe- dition to develop the resources of some hitherto unoccu- pied portion of the world, which is believed to be rich in mineral deposits and to present fine opportunities for the development of agriculture and manufactures later on. The promoters of the enterprise will certainly not accept all who profess to desire to join the expedition. Only those will be taken who are thought to have the physical Cooperation 79 endurance, the ability to lead a life of hardship, the re- sourcefulness and presence of mind that are necessary in hours of danger, and, above all, the interest and faith in the expedition which will make them loyal to the enter- prise throughout all vicissitudes and disappointments. Suppose again, to take quite a different example, that a group of workingmen who are dissatisfied with their treatment by employers propose a combined resistance. One of two plans will be chosen : either a trade union will be organized, including those and only those who are engaged in the same craft or industry ; or a local organ- ization will be formed, including all those employed in many different industries, who have a common grievance. In either case it is obvious that the test of like-mindedness is applied. Devotion to a common interest is made a final condition of the proposed cooperation. Yet again, suppose that political cooperation is proposed. It is desired to convert large numbers of voters to a belief in the wisdom of a certain policy and to organize them effectively for campaign work. All voters who support this policy will be eagerly welcomed to the ranks of the party-following ; but diligence will be exercised in organ- izing the actual work of electioneering. Only those men will be accepted as campaign speakers, as officers of the clubs and committees, as interviewers, and as watchers at the polls, who are known to be earnestly in sympathy with the policy that is at stake. Once again, let it be a mere social organization or club that is to be brought into existence and, as long as possi- ble maintained for the pleasure and comfort of its members. Here also the tests of like-mindedness and the conscious- ness of kind are strictly applied. The man who is pro- 8o The Elements of Sociology posed for membership must be, as the saying is, a clubable man ; he must have the qualities of geniality, good-fellow- ship, good temper, ability to contribute his share to pleas- ant conversation, and to whatever form of social enjoyment happens at the moment to be uppermost. In all these cases, accordingly, we see that in organizing any form of cooperation, the men who have the enterprise in charge are not only aware of the importance of like- mindedness and of a consciousness of kind, but also actually make these things the basis of the selection of the cooperat- ing individuals. Like-mindedness, then, and the consciousness of kind are necessary antecedents of cooperation of any sort ; and cooperation is, therefore, not the fundamental or most ^ I general fact of society. > The Causes of Cooperation. — We have now further to observe that not only must like-mindedness precede coop- eration, but also that if the like-mindedness and the con- sciousness of kind exist, the cooperation necessarily fol- lows. When a population is undergoing socialization by the processes described in the preceding chapter, it en- gages in cooperative activities as a necessary consequence of the same causes and conditions that establish the mental and moral changes of socialization. This becomes clearly apparent to the student when once more he recalls the fundamental condition of all social ac- tivities^namely, the like responsiveness to the same stimuli, and remembers that like responsiveness is the doing of the same thing under the same or like circumstances. Like responsiveness to stimulus shades so gradually into coop- eration that it is often difficult to discover at what point the cooperation begins. Where, for instance, does it Cooperation v^^ begin in the pursuit of the thief on the §treet, mentioned a moment ago ? The question is obviously one of degrees or stages of responsiveness. If, for example, all the men and women and children of a village rush out of their houses to see a fire that has flamed up upon the horizon many miles away, the act is merely a like response to the same stimulus. If, a few hours later, the fire is discovered to be a prairie or forest conflagration that is sweeping on- ward with great rapidity towards their own hamlet, these people begin to take measures to prevent the destruction of their property. They go out with ploughs and spades to throw up furrows of earth which they hope the flames will not cross. We now speak of their activity as cooperation. The only difference, however, between their conduct at the first and at the last is that at the last the like respon- siveness is carried a stage or two further and results in the accomplishment of a purpose of common interest. In ways like this, as a matter of fact, all cooperation arises; and under favourable circumstances, all like respon- siveness to the same stimulus becomes cooperation. To the uncritical observer, the beginnings of cooperation such as may be seen among animals and, on a larger scale, among uncivilized men, seem to be merely accidental. | Beetles among insects ; mice, rats, and squirrels among rodents, often aid each other in moving objects too heavy for one alone to manage. Various species of hunting birds frequently drive fish into the corner of a bay or curve of a river by forming a line across the water. Packs of hunting animals carry cooperation of this simple sort yet further. In all these cases it is easy to say that the coop- eration has originally been purely accidental, and that it has become habitual through the development of instinct 82 The Elements of Sociology by natural selection. This explanation, however, does not go to the root of the matter. Instinct has not been devel- oped by natural selection without having had material to work on ; and that material, in all cases, has been the like responsiveness of the like nervous organizations of the cooperating animals or men to the same stimulus. Among like-minded individuals, cooperation thus neces- _^sarily initiated is necessarily further developed because it yields to the cooperating individuals the same kind of pleasure. The pleasure here referred to is not that which is af- forded by the remoter utilities, such as an abundance of food, or security against danger, in which the cooperation presently results ; it is the immediate pleasure of combined activity. When a boat crew rows or a football team plays for practice, it not only enjoys in anticipation the hoped-for triumph over a rival organization in some future contest, but it enjoys at the moment the pleasurable reac- tion of concerted physical and mental activity. In the ex- citement of play, the football men do not think of the future victory to be achieved; they are absorbed in the incidents of the immediate contest. All cooperation, bringing indi- viduals together in combined effort, yields this stimulating excitement in a greater or a less degree and therefore more or less of immediate pleasure, which becomes a motive for continuing and perfecting the cooperation. Thus begun and partially developed by like-minded in- dividuals, cooperation is yet further developed and per- / fected because the remoter utilities which it creates are by its like-minded participants regarded in like ways. If a particular mode of cooperation produces an unwonted abundance of food supplies, or establishes a degree of Cooperation 83 security hitherto unknown, the men who^ have engaged in cooperative activity because they are Uke-minded neces- sarily see and interpret the results in substantially the same way ; they reason in substantially the same way about the desirability of perpetuating and increasing such results by a further extension of their cooperation. For three reasons, then, cooperation, which can arise only among the like-minded, among them necessarily does arise as a consequence of their like-mindedness and social- , ization. They respond in like ways to the same stimuli, U^ and thus find themselves actually cooperating before they know why or how. They find the same pleasure in ^ cooperative activity ; and therefore, irrespective of its re- moter results, desire to continue and to perfect it. In like ways they perceive, interpret, and reason about the useful jO results more remotely flowing from cooperative activity, and therefore decide with a common judgment to continue and to extend it. The Forms of Cooperation. — Thus originating in like- mindedness, cooperation develops into various forms and through successive stages of complication, step by step with the development of like-mindedness itself and of the consciousness of kind. In its beginnings, cooperation is simple and direct in its plan or form. Such, for example, is the cooperation of rural neighbours in a barn-raising or a corn-husking. Another simple form of cooperation is indirect. In- stead of being a combination of the efforts of two or more individuals in doing precisely the same thing, it is a com- bination of their efforts in achieving the same general result through a performance of different specific things. For example, each of two men in a camping party gets an 84 The Elements of Sociology abundance of fish and meat for his supper, if one of them has spent the day in taking trout, and the other in shoot- ing game, and at night they trade portions of their day's product. The cooperation in this case takes the form of exchange. All trade is a simple but indirect form of cooperation. Cooperation becomes complex when the direct and in- direct forms are combined, as they are in any undertak- ing in which different individuals, engaged in creating the same product or result, produce very different parts of it or work in different ways. In a manufacturing establish- ment, the cooperation is direct because all the operatives, mechanics, foreman, superintendent, and other employes, are engaged in producing the same sort of goods. It is also indirect because some are working at one process with one kind of machinery, others at a different process with another kind of machinery ; and because some super- intend or direct, while others are directed and merely fol- low instructions. Any operation into which the principles of subordination and of the division of labour enter is a complex cooperation. In the modern industrial world, these complex forms of cooperation enter into further complications through their relations with one another in the market. Great manu- facturing businesses, themselves highly complex forms of cooperation, are so many units in the vast system of com- mercial exchange. In its entirety, therefore, the indus- trial and commercial organization of modern society is a cooperation which has become doubly and trebly complex to a degree that can be fully understood only by the advanced student of Political Economy. And even this marvellously complicated system is itself Cooperation 85 only a unit in that greater cooperation o{. industrial with political, religious, educational, and pleasurable enter- prises, which, together, make up the entire activity of modern communities. The extension of cooperation from its simple beginnings to these complicated higher forms obviously depends upon an extension of genuine like-mindedness throughout the population and a corresponding expansion of the con- sciousness of kind. In the higher forms of cooperation each individual is working for and with others who may be widely removed from him in space and even in time. The merchant who purchases supplies in Asia, South America, or Europe to sell in Nebraska or California assumes the risks of his undertaking only because he knows the wants, the capaci- ties, the habits of thought, and the reputation for honesty, of persons separated from one another by thousands of miles in space and whom he has never personally seen. Only the civilized man can do this thing, because the sav- age or the barbarian is incapable of understanding or even of believing that men beyond his own range of personal acquaintance are sufficiently like himself in needs, in abili- ties, and in character, to make cooperation with them a possible success. In like manner, the capitalist who in- vests large sums in a new and untried venture builds upon an assumption that there are thousands of human beings in the world who are so much alike in their mental and moral organization that they all will become pur- chasers of the highly special product which he proposes to put upon the market, and upon the further assumption that human nature will continue to be in the future so nearly what it has been in the past, that he can count 86 The Elements of Sociology upon the continuing cooperation of those who are to sup- ply his materials and distribute his product. The particular elements of like-mindedness that are most essential to the higher forms of cooperation are those which enter into what we call good faith ; and a common belief throughout the community in the general good faith of the individuals composing society is the par- ticular form of the consciousness of kind that also is essential. Although we have laws for the collection of debts and the enforcement of contracts, a majority of business transactions are really based upon good faith and good repute and nothing more. This is strikingly exem- plified in the enormous volume of transactions constituting what, in the United States, is known as interstate com- merce. Although attempts have been made for more than a generation to secure from Congress a national bankruptcy law, they have only recently been successful, and there is not yet any uniform law governing the col- lection of debts. Notwithstanding the uncertainty and the costliness therefore attending legal actions for the col- lection of disputed bills beyond the boundaries of the state in which the creditor resides, the distribution of goods from every state into every other state goes on as freely as if the legal machinery were of the most perfect de- scription. Every transaction is really based upon the good faith and reputed credit of the interested parties. This, in its turn, is only a mode of the consciousness of kind and of the underlying like-mindedness which is the basis of cooperation of every sort. Thus the study of cooperation at every point brings us back to the great fundamental truths of Sociology. The like-mindedness which is the essential social fact neces- Cooperation Sy sarily tends to establish and to perfect cooperation. All cooperation depends upon like-mindedness. All the higher and complicated modes of cooperation depend upon the extension of like-mindedness and the expansion of the consciousness of kind. PARALLEL STUDY Using the "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," prepare an analyti- cal table showing the principal forms of cooperation in the United States. I CHAPTER VIII Social Pleasure Forms of Social Pleasure. — We have seen that coopera- tion, important as it is in human society, is not the funda- mental or the most general social fact. Cooperation could not come into existence unless men were already, to a great degree, social. We have now to notice that cooperation falls short of being completely coextensive with social activity in an- other way also. When cooperation has been established, association is not, by any means, complete. The pleas- ures that companionship and cooperation yield have still to be perfected. Not until the pleasure of association has become so great and habitual that the temptation to purely selfish individual gratification would have to be very strong to overcome the counter attraction of social excitement, is socialization far advanced. Human beings living together in local proximity do not have to invent social pleasure ; but they soon acquire the habit of spending much time and thought in inventing and perfecting pleasurable forms of social intercourse. In every community a large proportion of time is spent in the various forms of social pleasure that have no other foreseen utility than the immediate enjoyment which they afford. Their object is not to make any- body richer, or more law-abiding, or more religious, but 88 Social Pleasure 89 solely to make as many persons as possible happy for the time being ; and those who participate in them have long since discovered that, of all means of happiness, the social pleasures are the most tempting and exhilarating. Already it has been shown that recognized like-minded- ness or the consciousness of kind is itself a pleasurable state of mind. Sympathy, affection, agreement in taste and in opinion, are in themselves so gratifying that no one thinks of asking of what use they are. They are their own reward. The pleasure that they afford, however, is only the be- ginning of social enjoyment, and the source of other spe- cialized and developed means of social pleasure. In the chapter on "How Aggregations of People are Formed," mention was made of the various modes in which the energies of a population are expended. One way, it was shown, is that of getting a living; another way is reproduction; and a third is wandering and migration. Whenever a population has become socially organized and, by means of cooperation, has economized its expendi- ture of energy in getting a living so that, with a given effort, a relatively abundant subsistence is obtained, it finds itself with a surplus of energy to dispose of in new ways. Much of this surplus is soon devoted to amusement, or other purely pleasurable activity. This is only the occurrence on a large scale of what occurs on a small scale in the life of every individual, and of the lower animals as well as men. When the imme- diate needs of the body are abundantly supplied for the time being, all living creatures use whatever surplus of energy remains in the exuberant activities of play. This expenditure, of course, is chiefly found among the young. 90 The Elements of Sociology There is no more instructive observation than that which notes the ceaseless and beautiful play of young birds and animals. One can readily see that the incessant play of the young in animal societies is a chief means of develop- ing the social instincts. In human society the playtime of childhood serves a similar purpose. It is on the playground that boys and girls learn most of the lessons of toleration, sympathy, cooperation, and knowledge of human nature, and have those experiences of the pleasure of association that, in after life, make them both appreciative of the value of society and able to contribute to its defence or perfection. The simplest forms of social pleasure cultivated by young persons, as by animals and by savages, are to a great extent imitations of the more serious activities of life engaged in by adults. A great part of all play con- sists in mimic work or mimic war. Work and war have been the serious business of all animal species and of all human beings since their life upon this planet began. To get enough to eat, and to maintain life in the face of ene- mies, have been at all times the chief concern of intelli- gent creatures. In every part of the world, the play of young animals and the play of children consists largely of mimic combats in which agility, strength, skill, cun- ning, and daring have been developed and, by their exer- cise, have afforded keen enjoyment to the contestants and to spectators. All this is true also of social pleasures that have become somewhat more formal in character. Dancing is a good illustration. The forms of the dance, if they are carefully studied, are found to be derived from the serious business of life. The march, for example, describes itself as of Social Pleasure 9 1 such origin. Some of the less simple forms have been derived from imitations of the chase, and from imitations of animal movements of interest to the hunter. Among savage men dances are usually severe in form as com- pared with those of civilized people. This is because, to a certain extent, they are religious in character; and when the student of Sociology has continued his studies sufficiently to investigate the origin of the sacred dances of uncivilized peoples, he will discover that they are connected with forms of animal worship. They imi- tate the running, leaping, flying, and other spontaneous movements of the animal species that are worshipped and mimicked. From these origins, by a very slow evolution, have been derived the graceful movements of modern waltzes, polkas, and other dance forms. Another form of social pleasure among adult human beings is the common meal which, in its statelier forms, becomes the banquet. That the common meal should develop into a universally appreciated form of social pleasure is a most natural occurrence. It brings together those who have become weary in the labour of obtaining and preparing the food supply, whether by the primitive mode of hunting and fishing, by the toil of the farmer, or by the effort and thought of the business man. The common meal is the satisfaction for which the effort has been put forth; and. it affords occasion to combine with the gratification of bodily appetite the pleasures of dis- cussion, of story-telling, and of wit. From the primary social pleasures above described have been derived social pleasures of a secondary order which I are developed through the cultivation of various forms L" — 92 The Elements of Sociology grown our philosophy and our law. From the story-tell- ing of such occasions have been derived our higher forms of literature — the epic, the historical narrative, and the novel. From the primitive dance, with its mimicry and its choral song, have come our drama, our lyric poetry, and our music. The pleasures that we derive from all these creations of the mind are social. Even when we enjoy them in solitude we are in imagination living with our fellow-men ; participating with them in conflict, shar- ing in their loves and their hatreds, sympathizing with them in suffering, and rejoicing with them in success. The Function of Social Pleasure. — Social pleasures are so easily abused that it is not strange that in all ages large numbers of sincere men and women have called them evil, and have sought to diminish their power over the people. In the excitement of social pleasure, work and duty may be forgotten, and the strength of character which is main- tained by self-denying struggle may be lost. Nations that have surrendered themselves unreservedly to pleasure have become effeminate, cruel, and corrupt. No one can read of the moral abasement of the Roman people as, year by year, they gave themselves over to the enjoyment of the brutal contests of 'the arena and to the luxuries of their thermae, without feeling that ascetics have had reason for their hostility to any public recognition or systematic cultivation of pleasure. Nevertheless, nothing is more unscientific than to con- found the effects of excess and abuse with those of normal use. The anchorite of the Middle Ages, who cut himself off from association with his fellow-men and deprived him- self of every enjoyment, was not less a moral monstrosity than the sybarite of earlier days. Social Pleasure 93 Therefore, while no community can afford to forget that the cultivation of social pleasure at the exf^ense of sturdier social activities is a fatal error, it can no more afford to forget that social pleasure, under rational control, is the original motive of social development. We might as well expect the mechanism of our industrial establishments, of our railways, and of our steamships to move without steam and electricity, as to expect society to maintain its normal activities without social pleasure. The task of the social reformer is to contribute all that he can to the further refinement of social pleasure, to the elimination of modes of pleasure that are too coarse or too brutal to be longer tolerated among civilized human beings, and to perfect a rational control of the conditions under which social pleasures are enjoyed. He should remember, moreover, that true social pleasure is essentially unselfish. Those who participate in it should never forget that its perfect development demands of them solicitude for the happiness of their companions. Those who look upon social pleasure from this point of view are in little danger of carrying their own enjoyment to excess or of cultivating it by unworthy means. One of the most imperative duties of philanthropic men and women at the present time is that of improving the social pleasures of the neglected poor. Nothing would so greatly contribute to the moral uplifting and the political regeneration of our great cities as a development of true social pleasures among those who now seek relief from weariness and trouble in indulgences that merely drag them down to lower depths of misery and degradation. Perhaps no one subject in Sociology is, from the practical point of view, deserving of more painstaking study than 94 The Elements of Sociology this of the kinds and degrees of social pleasure that are necessary to the well-being of communities. PARALLEL STUDY Make an analytical and classificatory table of the prevailing social pleasures in a familiar local community. From Lecky's " History of European Morals " prepare a sketch showing the improvement in the character of social pleasures since the beginning of the Christian Era. CHAPTER IX The Social Nature Origins of the Social Nature. — From time to time, in the foregoing chapters, allusion has been made to mental and moral changes that occur in the individual as a conse- quence of his association with fellow-beings. We must now examine these changes in somewhat greater detail and discover how, in course of time, they develop in man a social nature. There was a time when the human mind was studied as if it were an independent thing. The various states of mind were analyzed and classified. No one thought of asking whether they had been produced by the inter- play of the mind with other minds and with physical nature. In short, the mind was studied as if it had either existed from all time without change, or had instantly come into existence complete and fully prepared for the experiences of life. Psychologists no longer think of the mind in any such way, or study it in any such imperfect manner. They now inquire how the mind develops from those simpler states of consciousness which are mere sensations until \/ it becomes capable of engaging in long and complicated reasoning processes, of forming judgments on difficult questions, and of experiencing such complex emotions as 95 g6 The Elements of Sociology are awakened by one of Shakespeare's tragedies, or Bee- thoven's symphonies, or Wagner's operas. In studying the mind from this evolutionary or genetic point of view, it is discovered that in almost every experi- ence and in every stage of growth, the social intercourse of an individual with his fellow-beings is one of the chief influences at work upon his own processes of thought, affection, and will. Intellectual Development. — In the chapter on " The Practical Activities of Socii " we have seen how, in the earliest years of a child's life, he learns to think of himself in terms of his observations of companions, and to think of them and of inanimate things also in terms of himself. In the same chapter and subsequently, we have further seen how important a fact imitation is, and how important also are impression, suggestion, sympathy, and affection. We therefore need not linger here to reconsider the mental and moral results of association that take the form of these mental states. We may rather give attention to some of the more complex and later developed results of associa- tion, which make the individual more and more fit for his place in a social group. Among the higher intellectual powers, without which there could be no such cooperation as one sees in modern civilized communities, no such organization of industry, law, and government, may be named the powers of persistent attention, generalization, and abstract reasoning. All sci- ence and philosophy are made possible by these attain- ments, and all the higher arts of civilization are made possible by science. Each of these mental attainments, however, is due chiefly to the association of the individual thinker with his The Social Nature 97 fellow-men. Children and savages are n€>toriously lacking in the power of sustained attention. Their minds easily wander from one subject to another. This is partly due to mere immaturity, and partly to a certain lack of vigour of the brain to sustain hard work. Power of attention is ac- quired through those experiences of association which fix attention for long periods together upon the same fact, such as an interesting event, a common danger, or an exciting strife. These experiences gradually strengthen attention until it can be sustained under less stimulating circumstances also. One of the chief means by which the attention of chil- dren is disciplined is that developed kind of play which we call a game. Any organized game requires for its successful practice perfect and prolonged attention to all its rules and details. Baseball, football, and rowing con- tests are among the best examples from out-of-door sports, while checkers, chess, and billiards are equally good exam- ples among indoor games. These, however, represent rather highly developed products of social amusement. A much earlier means of strengthening attention, both with children and among uncivilized men, is story-telling. The story is, in fact, the earliest means of fixing the attention of the child for any considerable number of minutes to- gether. The power of abstract thought, including generalization and reasoning, presupposes a perception of uniformity. This sort of perception grows out of the habit of noticing ■ resemblances. In a certain sense, all uniformities are re- ■ semblances. When, for example, the scientific man says ■ that hundreds of different species of animals may be put K in one great class together, as vertebrates, and that all L " J 98 The Elements of Sociology vetebrates show certain uniformities in their mode of life, especially in their locomotion, he is simply putting into the most general possible expression the results of many thousands of observations of the resemblances of these different species to one another. Such accumulations of the observations of resemblance and of difference cannot be made by any one man. They are made by thousands of men who communicate their observations to one another, and so make them the com- mon property of all scientific observers. Moreover, they are continued through successive generations, each of which inherits the observations made by the preceding generations and transmits them to the generations that follow. Generalization, then, and the abstract thought of science, are possible only in society. They depend upon the influence of one mind upon another, upon communica- tion and cooperation. Not only is this true, but also the scientific habit of mind itself, the love of scientific occupation, is produced chiefly by the influence of one mind upon another ; it is produced by example, by suggestion, by direct teaching, by sympathy, and by the love of approbation. Probably every man who has ever become distinguished through his intellectual attainments has been stimulated to his best endeavours by his knowledge of what other men before him have accomplished, and by his desire to equip himself as well as the best of them have done, and perhaps to discover new truths that they failed to perceive. Finally, what we call originality of thought is also a product of social relations. Original thought is possible only when one's beliefs admit of modification. If all of us were satisfied with the theories of the world and of The Social Nature 99 man that were taught to us by our elders, we should never give to the world any new truth. How, then, are the beliefs that we have received, from time to time modi- fied ? The answer is, by those new and varied experi- ences which afford us new points of view and discoveries of fact not before known by mankind. But these varied experiences, in their turn, we owe chiefly to association with our fellow-men. The continual movement of popu- lation in emigration, in travel, in exploration, colonization, war, and conquest, are the means by which the mental horizon of humanity is widened, by which old beliefs are subjected to new criticism, and new beliefs are established as a result of fuller experience. The Practical Judgment. — One intellectual product of social relations must be more particularly noticed. This is the practical judgment. As a result of their common ex- periences, men who live together in social groups, and in continual communication with one another, arrive at like judgments upon the important practical affairs of every- day life. How a man should conduct himself with refer- ence to his probable success in earning a living, what branches of knowledge he should endeavour to master, how he should treat his fellow-men in daily intercourse, how he should think about his country, its laws and government, — all these things are subjected to a judgment, in the ver- dicts of which a great majority of men are substantially agreed. It is a sort of judgment which fits the individual^ for life in society. If, on the whole, his opinions of these practical affairs are in agreement with those of his fellow- men, and with the results of the common experience of those who compose the social group, they say that he is a man of good or sound judgment. If, on the contrary, his 100 The Elements of Sociology views are very unlike those of men in general, he at once becomes an object of curiosity or of suspicion. If, for any reason, the community suspects that his notions are su- perior to those of the average man, he is regarded with a certain degree of respect or even veneration. This, how- ever, cannot happen unless, from time to time, his novel opinions turn out to be right, as demonstrated by some practical test. In the long run, experience is accepted by communities as the test of good judgment. If the individ- ual's judgments, differing from those of the average man, prove in experience to be bad, that is, if they often bring him and others into needless trouble or ridicule, he is regarded as a crank or dangerous person, more or less unfit for cooperation with his fellow-men in any prac- tical matter. / I Association, then, moulds the nature of individuals, making them more tolerant, sympathetic, and friendly, as was explained in preceding chapters ; more thoughtful, intelligent, and judicious, as has been explained in the foregoing paragraphs. In their totality, these changes develop a social nature; that is, a nature fit for life in social relations. Qualities of the Social Nature. — We will, therefore, in concluding this chapter, bring together in one view the qualities which association develops, and which together constitute the social nature. The true social nature is susceptible to suggestion and imitative, and thereby capable of learning from fellow- beings. This capacity is sufficient to make the social individual desirous to live at least as well as the fairly suc- cessful members of his community. He desires to enjoy what others enjoy, to do what others do, and to act as The EocicipNdtiir/ \ loi others act. It is true that the man who ha^ no other capac ity would be Httle better than a machine. He would be of little more account than a puppet in a punch-and-judy show. Nevertheless, unless to a great extent he is like his fellows, desiring what they desire, and doing what they do, society and practical cooperation of any kind are alto- gether impossible. Yet, since human beings living in society are not mere punch-and-judy puppets, the social nature is to some ^ extent originative. It not only learns from others ; it- ^^also teaches others. It makes new combinations of imita- tions7~it-makes inventions in the sphere of thought and conduct, and sets new examples. This it is.^£na]il£d-to-t!o' because, by varied contact with many phases of life made possible by wide association, it enjoys many different experiences which inevitably combine in peculiar ways and with peculiar results in the life of each separate individual. The social nature is tolerant. It has learned through ')) social experience that the primary conflict can successfully be waged only against those inferior creatures that can be utilized by man as a food supply, and against those persistently unlike and antagonistic members of his own race who choose to remain hostile to the social organiza- tion to which he belongs. So far as the members of his own social group are concerned, he realizes their likeness to himself and their equality with him in many important respects. He has learned to give them the same opportu- nities, immunities, and enjoyments that he claims for himself ; and he has not only decided as a matter of judg- ment that this is wise, but he has also learned to feel as an experience of his emotional nature that it is desirable and agreeable. The social nature, however, is not merely tol- 102 •'•'■'■ lj£eyR'le^ntji^§^\ojo have been superposed upon Celts, and Normans upon Saxons and Danes; and back of these conquests and comminglings there were throughout Europe, in prehis- toric times, successive overflowings of population by pop- ulation, of which evidences survive in stone and bronze implements, burial barrows, and skulls. Sovereignty and Institutions. — When a tribally organ- ized people has established itself upon a conquered ter- I 274 The Elements of Sociology ritory, and has been obliged to define its relations to a subject race, an active development of the political phases of the social mind has always followed. Sovereignty has then assumed a more definite form and a more positive character. Embodied in the council of a metronymic confederacy, sovereignty could hardly appear to free tribesmen as a power to compel obedience. Em- bodied in the hereditary king of a patronymic people, it could be thought of as a right to command. Even then, however, it could be regarded only as a semi-divine author- ity over the people, and not as an authority inherent in the people. But when, by united action, an entire people has imposed its rule upon a subjugated race, sovereignty has been revealed in its true character as the supreme expres- sion of the social will — as a law-making and an obedi- ence-compelling power to which every member of the state c/)ntributes his individual authority and his might. From this time on, therefore, sovereignty reacts vigor- ously upon the whole organization of society. The social mind, which has long reflected upon social relations, has hitherto expressed its approval and its disapproval through the ancient customs of clan and tribe. Now it begins to convert its judgments into formal decrees. Compelled by the contact of a ruling and a subject pop- ulation to face new problems of organization, it begins systematically to review the social system as it has hitherto reviewed the conduct of individuals, and to say explicitly what relations will be tolerated. Thus the rela- tions that are expressly authorized and sanctioned are con- verted into positive institutions. Sovereignty necessarily acts through the social constitu- tion, especially through the organs of government. For Civilization 275 this reason the social constitution presently becomes supe- rior in power and authority to the social composition/ Accordingly, the first institutions are those of govern- ment and religion — the kingship and the priesthood. At this time, however, religious, military, and political func- tions are all united in the king. Government is theocratic, . but there is no church. As yet, however, the social constitution is not separated from the social or from the demotic composition. There- fore in converting the organs of government into positive institutions, the sovereign will of the people necessarily converts confederacy, tribe, clan, and family also into "^ institutions. For a time, sovereignty accepts and sanc- tions the forms of these organizations that have been established by custom. It accepts and sanctions also the established distinctions in rank. When a confederated folk that has become feudal and monarchical takes pos- session of a conquered territory, it is already differentiated into royal, noble, free, and servile families. These dis-- tinctions of the social composition are now made the basis of the hierarchy of power, authority, and service in the social constitution. This identity of the social composition with the social constitution long persists. The conquerors, nevertheless, notwithstanding great differences of rank among themselves, in social functions ^^ remain sharply separated from the conquered. There is an identity of the social constitution with the composi- tion of the population that is not soon destroyed. The conquerors become a religious, military, and political class, ^^ and the conquered an industrial class. As the ruling class possesses the soil and forces the subject popula- ^ tion to cultivate it, there is no separation of the industrial u/ 276 The Elements of Sociology from the political organization of the community. The institutional organization of government, therefore, makes it necessary to convert industrial relations into a third group of positive institutions ; namely, those of property, and of slavery, or of serfdom. Thus the conquerors reserve to themselves all directive functions and organize themselves as a governing society. The conquered are organized as an industrial society, and are compelled to do directed labour. Developed Feudalism. — If the conquered territory is rela- tively wide in extent, so that the conquering tribes make but a scattered population in their new dominions, the semi-feudal organization, which arose before the migration, develops into that territorial feudalism which is familiar to readers of history. The conquered domain has been divided among tribes and subdivided among clans ; but the king, if there is one, and the great chieftains have received tracts over which their control is practically absolute, and their authority over the strictly tribal lands also tends continually to increase. If, for a long period, the state of society is unsettled, tribal lands become fiefs — tenures under a lord — through voluntary surrender. Every reader of European history knows how great a part voluntary surrender played in the development of continental feu- dalism before the eleventh century. Harassed by ma- rauding bands, the weaker owners gladly made over their holdings to some powerful chieftain in exchange for his protection. In this larger development of feudalism, wealth in lands plays a more important part than wealth in cattle ; and for this reason feudalism is often described as a ^ Civilization 277 system of land tenure. Strictly speaking, however, feu- dalism is a form of social organization, in which land tenure, or cattle ownership, or any other mode of prop- erty, is merely an incident. Developed feudalism, however, is in several important respects different can make a more fatal mistake than that of confounding ^ natural with artificial superiority. Democracy is fatal to the latter. Without the former, democracy itself cannot hope long to exist. In short, the success of democracy depends upon the j existence in society of that preeminent social class which was described in Chapter XI, and upon its domination or successful leadership. Perils of Democracy. — There are, however, grave obsta- cles to the continuous domination of the wisest elements of the social class. Some of these we have now to exam- ine in a further description of the third stage of civic evolution, and a further analysis of the task of democracy. 3l8 The Elements of Sociology Costs of Progress. — Material progress is not an unmixed good. Progress costs not only effort, but also suffering. Every discovery and every invention destroys some busi- ness and throws wage-earners out of employment. Every development of social organization breaks up long-estab- lished relations. For the most part, these costs of prog- ress are borne by individuals who receive few of the benefits purchased by their sufferings, while the benefi- ciaries of change themselves rarely suffer the distress that is caused by the destruction of the old order. Some of those who are displaced by social or industrial progress, quickly find their way into new positions. Others have no power of adaptation : they sink to a lower plane of living and never recover from their misfortunes. Degeneration. — The cost of progress takes also the form of a moral and physiological degeneration, which is caused by excessive activity and the overstimulation of ambition. The greater the rate of progress, the heavier does this cost become ; the faster the march, the larger is the number of the exhausted who fall by the way. Prog- ress, like any other form of motion in the universe, starts reactions against itself. In the population, degeneration manifests itself in the various forms of suicide, insanity, crime, and vice, which most abound in the highest civilization, where the tension of life is extreme, and in those places from which civili- zation has ebbed and from which population has been drained, leaving a discouraged remnant to struggle against deteriorating conditions. Social Disintegration. — Degeneracy in the population is inevitably followed by degeneration in both the social composition and the social constitution. Democracy 319 In the social composition, the effect is felt chiefly in the family. There is a lowering of the moral tone of the community in regard to the obligations of family life, and a tendency to view marriage as a convenience or a pleas- ure, which can at pleasure be dissolved. Legal obstacles to its dissolution are not tolerated by a community of irri- table, sentimental, and egoistic men and women who have found life disappointing; and the result is a continuing increase in the number of divorces. Degeneration in the social constitution manifests itself chiefly in a disintegration of cities. In the city are all the startling contrasts of civilization. The enormous disparity of wealth, in which a highly organized industry has re- sulted, is here revealed to every eye. Knowledge and culture that are the perfect fruit of all human progress until now are brought face to face with brutish ignorance. Into this dangerous combination of conditions enters the demoralizing factor of personal degeneration. Many of the rich, although happily not a majority, forget their obligations to their fellow-men, and surrender themselves to the pursuit of personal enjoyments and ambitions. Many of the poor, although happily not a majority, give ear to anarchism or seek comfort in the socialistic dream. They withdraw themselves as far as possible from contact with the rich, and cherish the hope of organizing the working classes or "proletariat" into an irresistible force, and of taking possession of all the organs of government. This latter form of social disintegration, if it proceeds far, is the most serious of all dangers, since it attempts to establish that illegitimate democracy, which consists in the absolute rule of the least competent part of the popu- lation, to the exclusion of all remaining portions of the 320 The Elements of Sociology people. This has twice happened in modern history for short intervals of time : once in the closing days of the French Revolution ; and once in the reign of the Com- mune of Paris in 187 1. Emotionalism. — Even if all these dangers are held in check, there remains another that must continually be guarded against in a democratic society. It is the danger of a subordination of rational public action to emotional impulses. We have seen that in every population men are more alike in emotion and in impulse than in intellect. Consequently, it is only when the greatest respect for in- tellectual activity and for self-control is maintained, and when an efficient social organization largely destroys fear, that the danger of impulsive social action in a democracy is prevented from becoming threatening. The Safe-guarding of Democracy. — Let us not suppose, however, that these dangers, inherent in the third stage of civic evolution and characteristic of democracy, are so serious as to destroy our faith in the permanence of civili- zation or of popular government. Intelligent and brave men are not dismayed by danger. The good citizen sees in the perils that threaten society only an occasion for more active effort, more earnest thought, and more unself- ish devotion to duty. The third stage of civic evolution brings with it, as a characteristic product, an influence that counteracts the dangers which have been described, and offers to the community an assurance of continued stability and progress. That influence is a growing ethi- cal spirit, and the formation of the highest mode of like- mindedness, namely, the ethical. The Ethical Spirit. — The limitations and reactions of progress arrest public attention. Sympathy for the un- Democracy 321 fortunate is quickened by the spectacle of misery in the midst of splendour ; and the conscience of society begins to demand that systematic efforts shall be made to miti- gate suffering and thus to minimize the dangers that threaten the community. Private philar\thropy vies with legislation in attempts to diminish poverty and crime, and ultimately in attempts to improve the general life condi- tions of the masses. Much of this endeavour is senti- mental ; and not a little of it is mischievous. Gradually, however, intelligence is enlisted. In a measure, philan- thropic passion is brought under the direction of reason and made more efficient for good. The social mind under- goes a profound moral experience. It begins to develop an ethical character. It is this awakening of the moral reason which prevents any serious undoing of the work of social evolution. It is the rational-ethical consciousness that maintains social cohesion in a progressive democracy. The Stability of Democracy thus depends, first, upon the acceptance by the many of guidance from those whose superiority is real because consisting in intellectual abili- ties and in moral character, not in artificial social distinc- tions or in pretentious claims ; secondly, upon an unselfish activity on the part of the superior few. They must not only have the ability to plan and guide ; but they must also put forth that ability, if need be at the sacrifice of their personal comfort and ambition. As the patriot is willing to lay down his life in defence of his country, the good citizen must be willing to sacrifice convenience and business advantage in the effort to maintain an honest and efficient system of social order. He must freely give time and strength to the promotion of education, to the reform of social and industrial abuses, and to the 322 The Elements of Sociology betterment of the conditions under which the great majority of his fellow-men are compelled to live. In fact, this unselfish activity of individuals who by nature are qualified to plan and to guide, is the controlling ele- ment in the entire social order of an economic-ethical civilization. It is the fact upon which the fate of democ- racy ultimately turns, because, if the natural aristocracy among men is in fact unselfish, it will not fail to hold the allegiance and secure the faithful following of the many. ^The instincts of the mass of mankind are now, as they always have been, thoroughly sound. In all ages, the true patriot has received the unstinted homage of his fellow-men ; and they have been wilting to follow him, to make sacrifices with him, even to lay down their lives with him, just in the measure that they have believed in his sincerity. In this way men always will act as they always have acted. If those who are qualified to lead by their conduct show that they are actuated not by personal ambition but by love of country and of mankind, there will be no failure of the experiment of democracy. The Duties of Leadership. — This, however, is assum- ing that true leaders of the people bring their intelligence as well as their sincerity of motive to bear upon the duties that they owe to society. The normal function of leader- ship may well be conceived, as it has been by Mr. Mallock, in terms of that relation which, in the business world, is called supply and demand. In relation to "demand," men are far more alike and far more nearly equal than in relation to ** supply." For example, all men need clothing and houses ; they are alike and equal in this respect. It is only a small pro- portion of all men, however, that have the skill to design Democracy 323 and to manufacture clothing; that have the skill to design and to build houses. So it is with respect to other things. The preliminary work of supplying satisfactions for human needs consists of invention, planning, and organizing. In all its higher developments, it is a kind of work that can be accomplished only by men of great and special talent. Of all the millions of men that have lived in the world, less than a hundred have made important discover- ies in the adaptation of steam and electric power to the industrial arts, although many thousands have contributed lesser inventions in matters of detail. Less than a hundred thousand have contributed any strictly new thought or invention to the vast system of railroad, steamship, and telegraphic communication by which all parts of the world are now bound together in commercial and intellectual intercourse. Less than a single million have contributed any important thought or deed to the perfection of the sys- tem of constitutional government and law, whereby social order and individual liberty are combined and reconciled in a successfully working system. All mankind, then, par- ticipates in needs which call for satisfaction. All mankind participates in the work or labour of creating the supply of those things that serve as means of satisfaction ; but only a small part of mankind participates in that most difficult and fundamental work of all — the thinking of how to supply, the invention of means, and the organization of the various forms of cooperation by which the invented means are brought to bear upon the practical problem. Thus the function of those who have the ability to plan and to guide in a democratically organized society, is that of devising means to supply the necessities, to meet the aspirations, to fulfil the reasonable hopes of mankind. 324 The Elements of Sociology The masses are dependent upon the guidance and leader- ship of the few ; but the few can guide and lead only if they minister to the actual wants and the legitimate desires of the many. The relation is precisely that which was so clearly expressed generations ago in the words, "And whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant." The Real Demands of Democracyc — What, then, are the real and legitimate demands of the many ? What are the satisfactions that must continually be thought about, de- vised, and secured by the intelligence and unselfish activity of the few ? They are demands for the satisfaction of certain funda- mental needs, in respect of which all men are born equal. In recent years there has been among the educated a tendency to scoff at this famous phrase from eighteenth- century thought and the American Declaration of Inde- pendence. In many respects men are so obviously unequal — in physical strength, in intelligence, in moral qualities — that when all allowances and modifications have been made, it has seemed that very little meaning has remained in the assertion that men are born equal. If, however, we look a little more deeply into the matter, we discover that, after all, there is still in these words a meaning which it behooves us to understand and to respect. Wherein All Men are Equal. — All men are born sub- stantially equal, and throughout life remain substantially equal in respect of all the following needs : I. The need of such material necessaries of existence as food, clothing, and shelter. The amount needed and even the quality needed differ with different individuals ; but the poorest and the weakest, equally with the richest and Democracy 325 the strongest, experience the fundamental need for all these things. 2. The need of satisfaction of the family instinct ; the need of affection, of the love of husband and wife, of parent and child. There are, of course, individuals who seem devoid of this need ; but in most cases the appearance is not the reality, and where it is, it is pathological. 3. The need of opportunity for expansion and develop- ment of life. The desire to satisfy not merely one appe- tite of the body or craving of the mind, but by activity to satisfy every organ, and by free play every faculty, is the fundamental ethical motive — the source of all that we call conscience, of all aspiration for enlargement and growth. This need is common to all mankind. 4. The need of human sympathy and companionship, especially in suffering. After having shown so fully that the love of companionship is the fundamental passion of society, we need not stop here to prove that it is a funda- mental human need. Perhaps nothing that Abraham Lincoln ever said so clearly revealed the trait that en- deared him to the American people, and at the same time so perfectly demonstrated his wonderful insight into the nature of popular government, as his remark, in defence of the doctrine that all men are born equal, that whatever disparity of fortune or of ability may exist among human beings, all are substantially equal in their capacity for suffering, and in the certainty that during the years of their earthly life they will be obliged to encounter and endure it. In this equality of capacity for suffering, Lincoln saw one of the strongest bonds that unite a democratic people. 5. The need of emancipation from fear. Primitive men 326 The Elements of Sociology have found alleviation in their crude religious beliefs and in their rude forms of social organization. Civilized men have found it in more elaborate and efficient forms of social organization, in nobler forms of religion, in philosophy, and in science. Indeed, so effective in our own day have been these means of relief that many of us now fail to realize how terribly fear has oppressed mankind in the past, and how absolutely equal men are in their deep need of emancipation from its bondage. In all these needs, men are substantially equal. Through- out time, men will insist that wants like these shall be appeased ; and they will not tolerate any form of social organization or of government that fails to meet this fundamental demand. As a matter of historical fact, the popular insistence upon this truth is, and has ever been, the very essence of the democratic movement ; for, in truth, democracy has been far more an insistence that government shall be for the people who are governed, than that it shall be by the people. Insistence that it shall be by the people has been in order that it might more certainly be for the people. Accordingly, the social system that is thought about, perfected, maintained, and administered by those who have the ability to plan and to lead, must be one that meets these fundamental demands of democracy. Any system of laws that endangers material subsistence, that diminishes comfort, that makes the struggle for life an increasingly hard one for the masses, that attacks the essential features of family life, that seems to curtail the opportunity for mental and moral expansion, that weakens the bonds of sympathy, or that attacks the social organiza- tion and the knowledge that emancipate men from the Democracy 327 curse of fear, will be resisted by the masses of the people, and ultimately will be overthrown. Equality, Fraternity, and Liberty. — Besides seeing to it that social policy shall assure the satisfaction of these fundamental needs of mankind, the leaders of thought and activity must give careful attention also to those re- lations between liberty and fraternity, between fraternity and equality, that were explained in the chapter on the Efficiency of Social Organization. As was there shown, liberty in any sense, including that which democracy im- plies, is possible only if there is in the population a good degree of mental and moral homogeneity and of sympathy — a fact which is popularly expressed by the word *' fraternity." There must be brotherhood in a large and generous sense, if free institutions are to prevail. But, as we also know, there can be such brotherhood only if a certain approach towards equality of condition is secured. In the historical evolution of human society, nothing has proved to be more fatal to the spirit of brotherhood and to the maintenance of liberty than an unchecked growth of inequality in material conditions, possessions, and power. Necessary Modes of Equality. — Some of the modes of equality upon which fraternity and liberty depend, and which therefore must be sedulously maintained in a democratic community are the following : 1. Political equality ; universal and equal suffrage. 2. Equality before the law ; neither wealth, nor privi- lege, nor vice, nor ignorance, to control legislation or to receive consideration in the courts. 3. Equality of opportunity to serve the public accord- ing to the measure of ability ; men of equal ability to 328 The Elements of Sociology have absolutely equal chances of appointment to office under impartial civil service rules, irrespective of party service or allegiance. 4. Equality of rights in public places and in public conveyances. 5. Equality of sanitary conditions ; all streets to be equally cleaned and cared for, tenement houses to be made decent and wholesome. 6. Equality of opportunity to enjoy certain means of recreation and culture ; in public parks, libraries, mu- seums, and galleries of art. 7. Equality of elementary educational opportunities through a well-administered public school system. 8. Equality of fair play ; especially in all bargaining, between employer and employ^, and in the relations of workingmen to one another. 9. Equality of courtesy ; rich and poor to be treated with equal politeness. 10. Equality of good will to all men. Other modes of equality that, in addition to the above, are essential to fraternity, are those which assure the supremacy of rational over impulsive social action. They are, namely : 1. Equality of regard for certain fundamental social values, especially {a) respect for law, {b) respect for expert knowledge. 2. Equality of sobriety and calmness of judgment, and of common sense. These modes of equality can be approximately estab- lished by the perfection of an efficient system of public school education, but not by any other means. Finally, there must be maintained also that mode of Democracy 329 equality on which progress depends ; namely, equality of opportunity for potential inventiveness, greatness, and leadership to become actual. Democracy is Ethical Like-Mindedness. — Appreciation of these truths by the community and a practical application of them involve both intellectual agreement and a unity of purpose which, while containing elements of sympathy, contain also the judgments born of rational criticism of the social problem. Such unity is a mode of like-mindedness in which reason and conscience predominate. " Democracy, then, in terms of sociological theory, is the outworking or expression of ethical like-mindedness. Contributions to Well-being. — We have now in con- cluding this chapter only to mention the contributions made to social organization and human welfare by the third stage of civic evolution. These are, namely : material wealth, the growth of population, the genesis and development of the ethical spirit, and the elaboration of democracy in that large and legitimate sense of the word which has here been explained. PARALLEL STUDY Read Spencer's "Principles of Sociology," Volume II, Part V, Chapter XVIII, and Volume III, Part VIII; Spyer's '-The Labour Question " ; Stimson's " Hand Book to the Labour Law of the United States"; Wells's "Recent Economic Changes"; Brownell's "French Traits," Chapter I ; Lecky's " Democracy and Liberty," Chapters I and III; Rose's "The Rise of Democracy"; Matthew Arnold's essay on "Equality"; and James Russell Lowell's essay on "Democracy." ^CHAPTER XXV The Theory of Society n Physical and Psychical Processes. — The scientific de- scription of any subject is incomplete until relations are perceived between laws that have been discovered in the group of facts studied, and wider laws that prevail through- fout the universe. For example, the subject Biology is not completely ex- plained until the laws of growth and reproduction, of waste and repair, which characterize the group of facts called Biology, are studied in relation to the wider laws of chemical action, of heat, light, electricity, and other mani- festations of physical energy. In other words, the complete explanation of any subject must include an attempt to show that laws inductively dis- covered are deductively inferable from wider principles of cosmic phenomena. ' In the study of society, we have all along been obliged to look at the facts under consideration from two points of view. The facts have displayed themselves to our mental vision, sometimes in the guise of physical, and sometimes in the guise of mental, phenomena. This has inevitably happened because the individual man is a bun- dle of physical and mental facts, combined in ways that we can partly, but not wholly, understand. His bodily form and activities are as strictly physical facts as are the forms and activities of inorganic things ; while his thoughts, 330 The Theory of Society 331 emotions, and choices are facts of an entirely different order. Nevertheless, as we have from time to time ob- served, it is possible to study some of the relations be- tween thoughts, emotions, and choices on the one hand, and physical energy on the other hand, because, through the mechanism of the nervous system, mental processes are connected in perfectly definite ways with physical facts. Therefore, no study of the individual man would be A complete which did not include a double interpretation ' of his activity, one in terms of laws of physical energy, the other in terms of laws of mental processes. In Hke manner, no account of society is complete which does not include a similar double interpretation. This does not mean that the sociologist, or the anthro- pologist, or the psychologist, is committed to a dualistic philosophy of the universe. He may be convinced that, in the last analysis which philosophy is competent to make, all mental facts can be explained in terms of phys- ics — and he therefore may be a monistic materialist ; or he may be convinced that all physical facts must ulti- mately be explained in terms of thought — and he m^ therefore be an idealist. It is not, however, any part of the business of science to deal with these ultimate prob- lems of philosophy. Science stops short at the point where the possibility of verification ends and knowledge passes into speculation. Verification is a confirmation by the senses of conclusions reached by reasoning. \^e% for example, the astronomer, through the reasoning pro- cesses of mathematical thought, concludes that an eclipse of the sun will occur in a certain latitude and longitude on a particular day, and that it will begin at a second 332 The Elements of Sociology which also he predicts, his conclusion is verified if the eclipse is actually seen at that place and time. Science is unable to carry the processes of verification into the final problems of philosophy. It cannot, by any independent process of checking or confirming, prove the reasoned-out conclusion of the philosopher that the world is monistic. So far as verification goes, the facts of life will always appear in the two categories, physical and mental; and whatever the philosopher may believe, the scientific man can never prove that the two categories are reducible to one. Philosophy may be monistic ; science, in its account of man, will forever be dualistic. The scientific account then, of any subject in which man is a factor, must always include two parallel interpre- tations : one physical, the other psychological. Physical Causation and Laws. — Accordingly, let us now look for a moment at the ultimate explanation of facts of human society in so far as they are physical. All move- ments of population, such as birth rates, migrations, and groupings are, of course, physical facts ; and all the labour performed in society is also, of course, a group of physical facts. What, then, is- tl^e filial explanation, within the limits of verifiable science, of the physical phenomena of human society } To answer this question, we must call to mind the ele- mentary physical truth that matter and energy arc inde- structible, and remember certain important consequences of it ; namely, that because matter and energy are inde- structible, there is, throughout the universe, a tendency towards the establishment of a balance or equilibrium of forces ; that all motion is in the line of least resistance ; and that all motion is rhythmical in form. The Theory of Society 333 Every mass of matter contains more or less energy. Heat, light, and electricity no less than gravitation and the motion of a body through space are modes of energy. When, therefore, there is any degree of heat, of electricity, or of magnetism, or any possibility of chemical change in a mass of matter, that matter is energetic — it contains energy. All energy is a mode of motion. Heat, for example, is / the motion of the minute particles or molecules of matter. Molecular motion can be converted into motion of the mass; as, for example, when the heat contained in steam is converted into the motion of the locomotive. Motion of the mass, in turn, can be converted into molecular motion ; as, for example, when the application of brakes to the wheels of a moving train makes both wheels and brakes hot. Practically, it never happens that the energy contained in any given mass of matter is equal in amount or similar in form to that contained in surrounding objects. Con- sequently, there is a continual interchange of energy be- tween object and object, and between groups of objects and other groups. The tendency is towards a condition of things in which the energies of adjacent bodies are equal and in balance. In this change of energy from body to body and from mode to mode, motion follows the line of least resistance. The Source of Social Energy. — M any _ activities of a social population find their explanation in termsofTEese^ physi cal principles. The" energy of a population is never more than momentarily equal to the active and latent energies of the world about it. Consequently, there is a ' continual interchange of matter and energy between a 334 '^^^^ Elements of Sociology population and its environment. The inorganic forces of the land and climate are converted into organic and social energies ; social energies again are reconverted into physi- \ enforces. All the energy expended in the growth and activity of a population is thus derived from the physical world ; and the activity that any population is capable of manifesting, the degree of advancement in material and moral well- being that it is capable of attaining, in the last resort depends upon the interaction of inherited muscular and nervous energies of the race with the physical resources of the region that it occupies. Density of population depends on the quantity of food that can be produced either directly by agriculture, or in- directly through the exchange of manufactured products, themselves produced from the raw materials of the en- vironment. Other things being equal, the activity and progress of society in large measure depend upon the - density of the population. A sparse population, scattered over a poor soil, can carry on production only by primitive methods and on a small scale. It can have only the most rudimentary division of labour. It cannot have manufact- uring industries or good roads, or a highly developed intelligence. A highly developed political life, too, is found only where population is compact. Civil liberty, as we have seen, means discussion ; and discussion is dependent on the frequent meeting of considerable bodies of men who have varied interests and who look at life from different points of view. Education, religion, art, science, and lit- erature, also, are all dependent upon a certain density of population. f** The Theory of Society 335 Population being given, and other things remaining the same, social activity varies with the harvests. Certain social phenomena follow good and bad times with aston- ishing regularity. Among these are the marriage rate, the birth rate, and the death rate. 'J'he harvests them- . selves depend on the amount of physical energy utilized by society in agricultural operations. Once more, population and harvests remaining the same, social activity depends upon the amount of physi- cal energy utilized otherwise than in producing food. No one can measure, or even estimate, how enormously polit- ical, religious, and educational activities have been multi- plied by steam and electricity. The Line of Least Resistance. — Like all other modes of motion in the universe, social activity follows the line of least resistance. Population is relatively dense in warm climates. Colonization follows coast lines and river val- leys. Expanding states respect the territory of strong rivals, and encroach upon the domain of the weak. Aggregations of men are formed where the economic opportunities are greatest ; and there they remain until diminishing returns drive them 'on to yet newer openings. The concentration of population in cities is but another exemplification of the same law; for the cities, on the whole, afford the best opportunities for employment. It is the line of least resistance that determines also occupations, the course of exchanges, the lines of com- munication, the movements of labour and capital, legislative and administrative policy, and the direction of religious, scientific, and educational movements. RhytJim. — Li social as in other activities action and ■ reaction are necessarily equal ; and all motion, therefore, ' 33^ The Elements of Sociology is necessarily rhythmical. Harvests and food supplies are alternately abundant and meagre. Exchanges in fairs and markets are periodic. The balance of international trade is ever changing. Industrial depressions alternate with periods of industrial prosperity. The tide of immi- gration rises and falls. War and peace, conservatism and liberalism, alternate. Religion, morals, philosophy, sci- ence, literature, art, and fashion are all subject to the| law of rhythm. Evolution. — In further explanation of the physical as- pects of society, it is necessary to explain the meaning of the word "evolution " in its physical sense. Whenever the internal or molecular motion of any mass of matter is diminished through communication to sur- rounding space or to other bodies, as, for instance, when a heated mass of iron is left to cool, the particles of the body draw more closely together. Whenever molecular motion is absorbed from surrounding space, as when the iron is heated again, the particles separate more widely. In the one case, the mass contracts, and in the other it expands. From time to time in this book we have used the word J "integration." In the physical sense, all integration is a drawing together of masses or particles of matter into a more compact whole. All drawing together of masses or particles of matter is integration. Furthermore, integra- tion never takes place except through a loss of contained motion ; and contained motion never is lost without caus- ing integration. t Now this process of integration is the first step in what is called "evolution." Whenever an object or mass of matter is so situated that it parts with some of its energy, The Theory of Society 337 as happens, for example, when a hot substance is placed in contact with a cold one, and loses heat, integration and the process of evolution begin. Social ^integration. — In the redistributions of matter and motion between society and its eavironment, either there is a greater increase of mass than of motion in the population, and the change is on the whole one of social integration, or there is a greater loss of matter than of energy, and the change is on the whole one of social disin- tegration. Either population encroaches on the environ- ment, or the environment encroaches on the population. A tendency towards a dispersion of population exists when, concurrently with a multiplication of numbers and an increase of individual energy, industry fails to secure increasing returns. Usually this tendency does not become powerful enough to overcome inertia until the group is large. Until then, therefore, the group holds together, and is subject to any influences that tend to establish further integration. Social Differentiation. — The second step in evolution is called differentiation. It is a process in which different parts of the integrating mass become unlike. Since the units of matter in the integrating mass are in different positions, they cannot be equally affected by the escaping motion. For example, in the mass of cooling iron, the exterior cools more rapidly than the interior; and if the mass is large, it happens that at some stage in the process of cooling the exterior becomes a solid crust, while the interior is still molten. Further changes, due to unequal contraction, may appear in the form of cracks or breaks ; and these may be of the most unequal and unlike character in different parts of the mass. Again, unlike 33^ The Elements of Sociology exposure to like forces, or like exposure to unlike forces, must change the character and the arrangements of the units. If a stream of water is permitted to play upon one part of the molten iron, and a stream of oil upon another part, the two parts in cooling assume unlike characteristics of texture and strength. These facts of differentiation appear in society concur- rently with every increase and concentration of population. This was shown in our account of the beginnings of civili- zation, where, as a result of the integration by conquest of different race elements, one portion was made a subject industrial class. It was further shown in the account of the rise of cities which, rapidly growing by the influx of elements from many different quarters, soon became or- ganized by the appearance of different occupations and professions, beginning with the rise of an artisan class. It was yet further shown in an account of the enormous complication of society in the third stage of demogenic evolution as a result of the increase of population. Social Segregation. — A third stage in evolution is known as segregation. When different kinds and arrangements of units have been produced, like units that are exposed to the same or like forces are affected in like ways. Their similarity becomes more marked, and they are drawn together. In the social population, the external conditions of climate and food group like natures together. Racial likenesses bring together men of like mental and moral qualities, and so constitute the basis of nationality ; and like national types, when they have been separated, tend to reunite. Men of like qualities are brought together also by occupations. There is a segregation of politicians, The Theory of Society 339 priests, professional men, literary men, actors and artists, mechanics and labourers. Various sub-groupings result in the formation of political parties, religious sects, and social cliques. This law is strikingly exemplified in tjie distribution of immigrants. Germans spread westward from New York and Pennsylvania to Illinois and Iowa. Four-fifths of the whole German immigration is found in the northern cen- tral division of the United States. The Irish remain in the East along the coast from New York to Maine. The Swedes and Norwegians seek homes in Minnesota, Wis- consin, and Illinois ; while the great stream of Italian immi- gration sets steadily southward to the Argentine Republic which apparently is destined to be as distinctly an Ameri- can Italy as New England has been an American Britain. Co7npoimd EvohUioii. — A fourth and final stage in the process of evolution is an increase of definiteness and of coherence. It is evident that so long as integration continues, the internal energy of the mass has not wholly disappeared. Furthermore, in no aggregation is the dissipation of motion and the integration of matter wholly unaccompanied by a counter process. Some matter is lost from time to time, and some energy is absorbed. This is a conspicuous phase of evolution in organic bodies. When evolution is thus complicated by an absorption of energy, it is called compound evolution. It is compound inasmuch as the internal motion causes further complications of the evolutionary process. In con- sequence of the new arrangements of matter that are occurring, the internal motion itself undergoes a redistribu- tion within the mass. Thus, there is a further multiplica- 340 The Elements of Sociology tion of effects ; there are new differentiations and new segregations ; and there is an increasing definiteness of both differentiation and segregation. I In the social population, more than in any other mass of matter, is yotion s imultaneously lQSt__and absorbed. Therefore, a social population is more mobile ancfmore plastic than any other aggregate ; and secondary redis- tributions of matter and motion are more frequent and more complicated in society than elsewhere. Social evo- \ lution is in the highest degree compound. A high degree of evolution can be attained by society only if the motion lost is but slightly in excess of the mo- tion gained, so that the evolutionary process goes on slowly, allowing abundant time for those small internal secondary changes that have just been mentioned. Rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing. Psychical Causation and Laws. — The psychological laws of social activity, no less than the physical laws, are de- ducible from a general principle. The ultimate psychological principle is closely analogous to the physical principle of the indestructibility of matter and motion. Minor and derivative psychological princi- ples are closely analogous to the physical principles, that motion is in the line of least resistance and that the redis- ^^y tributions of matter result in a process of evolution. The Ultimate Psychological Motive is the persistent desire of consciousness to be clear and painless and, if i j)0ssible, pleasurable. Consciousness itself may cease. We cannot say that, like matter, it is indestructible. It may even desire to cease. But so long as it exists, and contemplates existence, its desire to be clear and painless TJie Theory of Society 341 or positively pleasurable is inextinguishable. Conscious- ness is intolerant of obscurity, perplexity, obstruction, and suffering. The Laiv of Least Ejfort. — It is an immediate corollary of this fundamental truth that consciousness endeavours to attain painless clearness or positive pleasure with least difficulty, v^rhich is a mode of either perplexity or pain. This principle may be called the law of least effort; and it is perfectly analogous to the physical law of motion in the line of least resistance. In whatever processes of thought or endeavour we may be engaged, we strive to attain a maximum of clearness or of pleasure in some form, with a minimum of exertion or of pain. This is sometimes called the attempt to secure a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain. It is doubtful if such is the best way to express the general law. In the more complicated processes of reasoning, our attention is occu- pied with neither pleasure nor pain. None the less, we endeavour to avoid all unnecessary complications in the reasoning process, and to secure our results as simply and as straightforwardly as possible. Therefore, it is better to include all the modes of consciousness — sensation, percep- tion, attention, memory, reasoning, pain, and pleasure — in our general formula, and to state the law of consciousness in the proposition that consciousness endeavours to attain painless clearness, or positive pleasure, with a minimiun of difficulty. In terms of this law, we find our ultimate explanation of that fundamental fact of human society which we have called the consciousness of kind. Ejective Interpretation. — All knowledge proceeds through a comparison of the unknown with the known. This is 342 The Elements of Sociology simply one form of the method of least effort. If, in the object hitherto unknown, we can find something that recalls a state of consciousness heretofore experienced, we have to that extent diminished the difficulties of our observation or investigation. In the opening chapter of this book, it was shown that classification enables us to extend our knowledge to a degree that would be utterly impossible if we had no other means of dealing with new experiences but that of carrying every detail consciously in mind. Classification, then, is one of the methods that y follow from the law of least effort. And this is the procedure that is followed when individ- uals interpret one another in terms of themselves. They apply the method of least effort in its form of classification to the problem of determining their individual relations to their fellow-men. Discovering that some of their acquaint- ances in certain particulars are very like themselves ; that other individuals are much less like themselves ; that yet others are but little like themselves, save in those human qualities that mark the entire species of mankind, they quickly form mental classes that are based upon these degrees of resemblance. This interpretation of others in terms of one's self may be called ejective interpretation. The word "eject" means a mental image of another which is derived largely from one's experiences of one's self. When the child, observing an object that walks, talks, and smiles as he himself does, interprets that object in terms of himself, and concludes that it is a human being like himself, the mental process which has resulted in this conclusion is ejective. The child has mentally thrown him- self into the perceived object, and he understands it because he has done so. The Theory of Society 343 Thus, all interpretation of our fellow-beings is ejective. It proceeds through a comparison of themselves and our- selves in which the various points of resemblance and of difference are observed and classified. Ejective interpre- tation is the intellectual element in the consciousness of kind, which, therefore, is so far simply a consequence of the law that mental activity follows the line of least effort. The Limits of Sympathy. — But the same is true also of the sympathetic and emotional elements of the conscious- ness of kind. Sympathy and affection go out to those who most resemble ourselves, simply because such is the direc- tion of least difficulty. This was shown in some detail in the account of sympathy in Chapter VI. Sympathy and affection, as there described, result from the habits of like response to the same stimuli. Therefore, there is much material for the genesis of sympathy between re- sembling individuals, and comparatively little between greatly differing individuals. To perfectly satisfy our- selves that the interpretation of sympathy in terms of the law of least effort is the true one, we have only to ask our- selves what happens when we have the feeling that we ought to sympathize with some person or class of persons, as distinguished from a spontaneous outgoing of sympathy towards them Any student who will carefully think over this problem, will have no difficulty in convincing himself that sympathy and affection are simply cases of mental activity in the direction of least effort. The Diversifying of Satisfactions. — Once more, it is equally true that the law of least effort affords us our only interpretation of the desire for recognition. The source of all our satisfactions ultimately is to be found in the external world. We first obtain satisfaction 344 '^^^ Elements of Sociology of our bodily desires in forms of food and of material com- fort. Soon, however, we discover a principle known to economists, and occasionally referred to in this volume, which may be called the law of incremental utility. Addi- tional quantities of the same means of satisfaction fail to afford us proportionately large returns of pleasure ; or, in other words, beyond a certain point, equal degrees of effort expended in the same direction fail to yield corresponding returns of satisfaction. By changing the means of satis- faction, we for a time obtain increasing returns with dimin- ished effort. Therefore, it is a deduction from the law of least effort that we seek to vary our means of satisfaction. In this search, however, we are still governed by the law of least effort. We seek our means of satisfaction first among objects and activities with which we are already familiar, or that are most like things with which we are familiar. Causes and Limits of the Desire for Recognition. — Among the very earliest pleasures of life are those that we derive from the ministering attentions of mother and other family relatives and friends. It is they who provide us with our first satisfactions of every kind ; and it is their attentions that, by continued association with bodily comfort and by direct stimulation of all our senses, give us increasing pleasure. Therefore, we learn to take delight in recogni- tion and attention by the fellow-beings that are nearest to us. Then, according to the law that we seek to increase satisfaction by searching for new means or new sources of pleasure among objects that most closely resemble those with which we are already 'familiar, we begin to look for recognition, attention, and sympathy from those The Theory of Society 345 fellow-beings who most closely resemble our immediate family friends and ourselves. Little by little the circle is widened, until we have formed the habit of expecting recognition and sympathy from all human beings, in a gradation that corresponds to their degrees of resemblance to ourselves. Thus, in its entirety, the consciousness of kind is seen to be a consequence of the persistence of mental activity in the lines of least difficulty. The Precedence of Immediate Pleasure. — In the same law lies the explanation of the social principle that society is primarily created by the immediate pleasurableness of companionship, and that the beneficial reactions of asso- ciation, in mutual protection and increasing wealth, are later recognized. It is obvious that immediate pleasure appeals to the mind more directly than considerations of remoter utility." In choosing immediate pleasure in pref- erence to remoter utility, the mind simply follows the law of activity in the direction of least effort. Only when immediate pleasure begins to be a diminishing return, does the mind reach out by a new effort to discover and to obtain the possible remoter utilities. Causes of Impulsive and Formal Cofidicct. — We pass now to a consideration of those laws of sympathetic and im- pulsive social action, of tradition and authority, and of rational social choice that were formulated in the chapters on The Social Mind. Primary social action is sympathetic and impulsive, and the social action in which a majority of individuals in the population are competent pd participate is sympathetic and impulsive for the perfectly obvious reason that sym- pathy and impulse are less difficult than rational self-con- f^ 346 The Elements of Sociology trol. In like manner, conformity to a course of conduct once entered upon, uncritical obedience of authority, un- critical acceptance of belief, are all far easier than inde- pendent judgment. Consequently, formal like-mindedness and conformity to an established order are more general than rational social choice. Causes of Rational Conduct. — How, then, can it possibly happen that rational social choice can occur at all } The answer is, because, in accordance with the law of least effort, we are compelled from time to time to vary our means of satisfaction. Sympathetic and formal like- mindedness yield diminishing returns. Impulsive social action frequently proves to be enormously costly and destructive. Formal like-mindedness, conformity to tradi- tional belief and authority, as was shown in the chapters on Civilization and Progress, carry us a long way towards the attainment of social and material satisfactions ; but beyond a certain point they bar further progress. They stand in the way of the further exploitation of new means of satisfaction. When this point is reached, further activity in the line of least effort is necessarily rational. It is the attempt to secure satisfactions by indirect means, as was explained in Chapter XIII, after direct means have failed. This process, however, begins subjectively in individual minds before it becomes an objective organi- zation of social cooperation. Here again, in accordance with the law of least effort, it begins in those most highly developed minds in which it is least difficult. These are the comparatively few. For this reason, rational social choice, the formation of true public opinion, and the rational leadership of social activity are, and must always continue to be, the function of the few. The Theory of Society 347 Specific Laws. — We might here continue to show in detail that the specific laws of the growth of impulsive social action by geometrical progression, of the strength of authority and tradition in proportion to their antiquity, and in proportion to the predominanpe of belief over reasoned conclusions are all corollaries of the fundamental psychological principles ; but these the student will have /^ no trouble in thinking out for himself. The same is true of the specific laws of rational choice, of preference, of combination, and of means. Causes of Civilization and Progress. — Finally, we have^ \ to point out that the laws of social organization, of civiliza-- -^ tion, and of progress are all, in like manner, corollaries of the fundamental psychological principle. Nothing is easier than for men who understand one another to live without coercive government, because they can anticipate |>f{ one another's conduct, and can depend upon each other's \^ good faith and kindly intentions. Therefore, to a com- munity of such men, liberty is possible. To a community of extremely heterogeneous men, it is impossible because of the insuperable mental difficulty of sympathy and com- prehension. Civilization we found to be a product of the \ passion for homogeneity, and its policies to be expressions of that passion. No passion is more immediately a conse- ^ quence of the persistence of consciousness in the paths of least difficulty than is the desire to overcome the hinderances to sympathy, to mutual agreement, and to social organiza- tion that present themselves in a chaos of mental and moral qualities. To assimilate these to a common type is the first step towards achieving the satisfactions of civilization with least effort. The toleration of variety, of criticism and discussion, I 348 The Elements of Sociology in their turn, are those later consequences of mental activity in the lines of least difficulty that appear when the returns of immediate satisfaction through homogeneity begin to diminish. A few pages back, it was said that the mental and moral consequences of activity in the line of least difficulty are analogous to evolution in physical phenomena. How this comes about has been partially indicated in a preceding paragraph. When immediate satisfactions, obtained by any given kind and degree of effort, begin to diminish,. the outreach- ing of the mind for new means of satisfaction is analogous to the equilibration of energy between a material mass and its environment. The immediate consequence is an integration of consciousness. The sum total of experi- ences, of knowledge, of sensations, is increased. In the very process of integration, however, differentiation and segregation begin. New pleasures and a continual in- crease of satisfaction, in proportion to effort, come only with variation in the means of satisfaction and through a putting forth of effort in that new and indirect mode which we call reason. In the social passion for homo- geneity, we see the process of integration; in the de- velopment of discussion and of criticism, we see mental differentiation and segregation. These higher intellectual processes, therefore, are differential consequences of mental activity in the paths of least effort, as truly as physical dif- ferentiation is a consequence of equilibration in the lines of least resistance. Intellectual Strife. — One further analogy discloses a law of the psychological process in human society that is of more momentous practical importance than any other. The Theory of Society 349 Compound evolution and continuing differentiation in* the physical world were shown to depend upon the com-* parative slowness with which the contained energy of any* material mass is dissipated. A too rapid integration re- sults in a speedy termination of evolution, and prevention of those more delicate transformations that can occur only through the slow redistribution of contained motion. ' Thus it appears that, although differentiation depends upon integration, beyond a certain point the rate of differ- entiation varies inversely with the rate of integration. ji In the description of conflict in Chapter IV, it was shown JW that those secondary conflicts which include the pleasura- Af ble activities of thought, sympathy, association, and dis- cussion are dependent upon the ruder forms of primary conflict. Primary conflict is essentially identical with in- tegration, and secondary conflict with differentiation. Now, in the psychical processes of society, homogeneity, as was set forth in the chapter on Civilization, and in the chapters on Sympathetic and Formal Like-mindedness, is not infrequently brought about by an extremely rapid in- tegration. On the psychological side, primary conflict or rapid integration is a rapid discharge of motor impulse. Its external expression is the use of physical force in war- fare and persecution. These methods, then, are inconsist- ent with that high degree of evolution which includes the more delicate adaptations. In terms of the process itself, this is expressed by saying that, just as the rates of differentiation and integration beyond a certain point vary inversely, so, beyond a certain point, the rates of physical and intellectual strife vary inversely. This means, first, that all harsh, passionate attempts to 350 The Elements of Sociology hasten organization by coercive methods are subversive of the higher intellectual activities. It means, secondly, that intellectual strife gradually diminishes physical strife with all its wastefulness and misery. It means, finally, that only through the supremacy of intellectual over physical strife can the higher and finer results of social evolution be attained. So far, then, from its being a duty for men and women to suppress their intellectual convictions, to yield tamely their independently thought-out views of truth and right and policy, in the mistaken notion that intellectual conten- tion is disreputable or unmannerly or unkind, as are the forms of physical strife, the precise opposite is true. In- tellectual strife makes for rational, and ultimately for ethi- cal, like-mindedness ; it makes for peace, prosperity, and happiness. The highest duty of every rational being is to, engage with sincere and disinterested earnestness in the glorious contests of intellectual strife. The Two Processes. — Thus social^^gyolutioa is primarily a physical process. Physical laws determine the aggre- gation, the growth,^ the movements, and arrangements of population ; they determine the amount, the kinds, and the combinations of social activities. But within aggregations of men, mental activities are continually asserting themselves and working themselves out in conformity to psychological law. In this process the human mind, aware of itself, deliberately forms and carries out policies for the organization and perfection of social life, in order that the great end of society, the per- \ fection of the individual personality, may be completely \ attained. Society is not a purely mechanical product of physical evolution. To a great extent it is an intended product of .psychological ev olutio n. The Theory of Society 351 Social Survival. — Nevertheless, the final forms that social relations assume, the institutions, laws, and policies that are ultimately incorporated in social organization and activity, are determined, not by conscious social choice, but by a process of survival, which is itsdf conditioned by cosmic law over which man has no control. In fine, the ultimate forms of society are determined by a process of natural selection and survival. Not all objects of social choice are long-enduring. Many social rules and forms that were once sanctioned by the social mind have become only a memory; thou- sands of laws and institutions have become extinct. Ex- isting social values and arrangements are survivals. Social products sometimes disappear through the extinc- tion of races, communities, or classes. Usually, however, the relations, forms, laws, and institutions that perish fail through the indifference and defection of those individuals who have undertaken to maintain them. The poUtical, industrial, religious, or other associations that cease to exist usually fail through a decrease of their membership ; and laws become a dead letter because the community ceases to care or think about them. Con- versely, the social forms, laws, and institutions that sur- vive, persist through their power to hold the interest and allegiance of individuals who are able to enforce or to sup- port them. In the long run, all such power to interest and to hold allegiance springs from utility. It is when the law or the institution ceases to benefit that its power over men fails. Nattiral Selection. — As thus brought about, the survival and the extinction of forms, laws, and institutions is a true natural selection. 352 The Elements of Sociology Natural selection is commonly thought of as a survival of individuals through some superiority of organization. This, however, is an inadequate conception of the actual process. In the struggle for existence, an organism perishes if its food-getting, food-assimilating, or other vital organs fail to perform their functions, or perform them in maladjustment to environment and conditions. A race, in like manner, perishes if the reproductive organs fail in function. Conversely, any superiority of function, whether due to a beneficial variation in organization or to any other cause, insures survival. Natural selection, therefore, is survival through a supe- rior adaptation and performance of function, in a com- petition in which non-adaptation or non-performance of function is fatal. And this is exactly what happens among social forms, laws, and institutions. The failure to benefit, to interest, and to hold allegiance is a failure of function ; and the selection that results among laws and institutions from successes and failures of function is therefore a true natural selection. TJie Law of Survival. — The successful performance of functions by institutions, as by vital organs, depends upon an increasing nicety of adaptation to an ever-complicating environment. "The environment" is an ever-changing group of rela- tions. Like the thing or organism environed, it is under- going ceaseless evolution, and is becoming more and more diversified through differentiation. Accordingly, the law of the survival of social interests and relations — forms, laws, and institutions — is as fol- lows : Those social valuations and relations persist which are TJie Theory of Society <^ component parts of a total of values and relations that is becoming ever more complex through the inclusion of new interests and new relations, and at the same time more thor- ou.ghly harmonious and coherent. Thus, social causation is a process of psychical activity I / conditioned by physical processes and cosmic law. i | ^ PARALLEL STUDY Read Spencer's "First Principles," Part II; Ward's "Outlines of Sociology," or "Psychic Factors of Civilization"; Kidd's "Social Evolution " ; and Mackenzie's " Introduction to Social Philosophy," Chapters III, IV, Vj 'S cji»M **>.*nt to ^-o «.v--»a.w. 2A 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. RENEWALS ONLY— TEL NO. 642-3405 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. 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