3 1822 01117 8043 U w k vStiKlciTSiTl 1 wnili'MHHHalaiftiltm 1 lituPul IUhHr! Imlltir 1 tHllllli! mIIhf'I flilHilH''! I''l!{ BI1 ifit^Hnu f tH!niliHnin!RiK'i»KH'H*lrur !fi{iu'n)rTHtw : M'w itiiipillnvlf ffiffiS? IHIiilrt' t'lTii! HifewHI iil'HlIjt lllli till!) Ilwfi , {f^' i 'fl!i- LIBRARY 1 r? J UNIVERSITY 0€ CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO 31 822 01117 8043 VA S3 , W6 a r> *■ Empire and Armament The Evolution of American Imperialism and the Problem of National Defence By Jennings C. Wise Late Professor Political Science and International Law Virginia Military Institute G. P. Putnam's Sons New York and London Gbe "fcnicfterbocfcer press 1915 Copyright, 1915 BY JENNINGS C. WISE "Cbc Ifcnfcfccrbocfeer iprcss, IRcw U?orfe Go MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD PREFACE IF I were asked to state what I believed to be the most practical method of procedure for Ameri- can pacifists, I should unhesitatingly answer, the honest writing of history for the rising generation. It may be patriotism to present the history of one's country in the best possible light, but, in the United States, we have gone beyond patriotism by actually misrepresenting the facts to our own advantage. It is just that kind of mistaken patriotism which tends to convince the American people that they have always been peculiarly just and pacific, and that fosters among them the growth and continuance of a spirit of intolerance and aggression. The American people should learn from history that the United States has not been a white dove among political hawks, if only that they may profit by the errors that have been made in the past. If they were fully aware how much they have provoked other nations, and how little they have really contributed to the cause of international peace, concerning which they talk so much, and in which, by reason of their inde- fensive condition, their interest lies, they would regard international questions with a spirit more conducive to that peace they profess to cherish. vi Preface The pacifists should impress upon Americans the fact that foreign nations do not always accept them at their own estimate, but naturally look to the facts of history which are capable of a construction adverse to the claim that the Ameri- cans as a nation are of a peaceable, exclusive, un- aggressive nature. We may with some assurance point to the attitude of our Government in the present diplomatic controversy with Germany as evidence of the pacific nature of our people, but there are those who attribute that attitude more to a natural unwillingness to jeopardize interests than to a, real love of peace. Certain it is, when his rights are involved, the average American is not yet "too proud to fight." In this study of the evolution of American im- perialism, it has been sought to disclose the po- litical doctrines which gradually, step by step, led to an aggressive national expansion, and to show that between imperialism, with all its dangers, and militarism there exists no essential connection. It has been attempted, without cynicism, to stress the fact that the American people have deluded themselves into believing that, because they were not militaristic, they were not aggressive or mili- tant in their dealings as a nation with the world. This it was attempted to do by dwelling concur- rently upon an ever-readiness on their part to resort to force to attain their political ends, not- withstanding a persistent antipathy for militarism and militaristic policies; that inherent antagonism Preface vu which has been persistently but erroneously cited as proof of their pacific nature. The truth is, popular history, in its utter falsity as written for Americans, has actually succeeded in convincing them that they are the most exclusive, amicable, and just people in the world, when as a matter of fact they have "spoiled for a fight" on every occa- sion when it seemed advantageous for them to provoke one, and have officially meddled in the affairs of every country with which they have come in contact. Special attention has been devoted to Jefferson's inconsistencies, not for lack of appreciation of his greatness, but because his characteristics typify the American people in respect to their sentiments on war — self -professed peacefulness of disposition coupled with an underlying spirit of keen ag- gressiveness. That the United States has become a great empire, practically without fighting for its ex- pansion, I have attempted to show to be due not to the fact that the American people have con- tributed greatly to the avoidance of war, but be- cause they have not been sufficiently opposed in most cases to make war necessary. The Monroe Doctrine I have not undertaken to establish as good or bad, wise or unwise; but the abuses of that doctrine, together constituting our present Monroeism, which has become more of a national fetich than a national shibboleth, I have pointed out as sources of danger. viii Preface American imperialism in all its aggressiveness I have shown to have been based on a doctrine which has long been held up as a peaceful influence, a fact which is thoroughly in accord with the anomaly of American national character; for the Monroe Doctrine, as shown by the history of its pronouncement, was nothing more nor less than an aggressive measure adroitly veiled in words of a pacific sound. It is not in a cynical spirit, nor through lack of patriotism, that I have endeavoured to picture Americans as others see us, but in the sincere con- viction that an appreciation of the defects of our national character may aid us in overcoming those defects. I may have erred in the judgment I have passed, I may have been influenced too greatly by foreign comment and criticism, but the fact remains that abroad the impression of Americans is generally an unfavourable one as to their spirit of tolerance and respect for foreign rights. The reason is, history is not written in the same way for Ameri- cans and for foreigners. Errors exist in both versions, it is true, but if we correct our own by expunging the palpable evasions and distortions of fact, we shall at least receive credit for good faith, and the frank confession of political sins in the past will do much to prevent their repetition, as well as to convince the world that we are cog- nizant of our shortcomings and sincerely desirous of overcoming them. Preface ix Surely it cannot be unpatriotic to urge upon Americans : "Make it thy business to know thyself, which is the most difficult lesson in the world." J. C. W. Lexington, Virginia, June, I, 1915. CONTENTS PAGE Preface ....... v PART I THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM The Origin of a National Prejudice CHAPTER I. — Historical .... II. — The Revolutionary Period . III. — Inadequacy of the Old Policy IV. — The Hamiltonian Doctrine . V. — The Federal Constitution . VI. — The Washingtonian Doctrine 3 33 38 46 57 VII. — Jefferson and his Military Policy 76 VIII. — What Was the Jefferson Doctrine of War? ..... 87 IX. — The Clay-Calhoun Doctrine .106 X. — The Monroe Doctrine . .121 XI. — The Jacksonian Doctrine . .135 XII. — The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 156 xii Contents ■AGE CHAPTER PAGE XIII. — Jingoism Rampant . . .178 XIV. — Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers . 193 PART II ARMAMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCE CHAPTER XV. — Adequate Defence Indispensable to Pacifism .... 227 XVI. — Adequate Defence Confounded with Militarism . . . 250 XVII. — The Evolution of the False Philosophy of War . . .281 XVIII. — What Is Adequate National De- fence? 312 Bibliography 331 Index 337 PART I THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN IMPERI- ALISM The Origin of a National Prejudice CHAPTER I HISTORICAL THE armies of mediaeval days were made up of the retainers, dependents, and followers of the nobility. The personnel for the most part was unskilled, but a sprinkling of professional soldiers, men who had acquired experience in war under many banners and in many quarters, were ever at hand seeking the employment of baron or king, ready to shed their blood in the cause of the high- est bidder. Many of the celebrated warriors of feudal days whom we style knights were nothing more than itinerant soldiers knighted in many cases solely for their personal prowess and skill at arms. Most of the righting in which the untrained bands of the Middle Ages engaged was petty in nature, and even when the king summoned his military chieftains to assemble their nondescript forces to make war upon the so-called common enemy, the cause of conflict was an individual and selfish one, or at best an unpopular affair. The plain soldier was primarily a plain civilian; that is his welfare lay in peace. The military service 3 4 Empire and Armament he was called upon to render his lord became a burden by reason of its frequency, and his own lack of personal interest in the issue. But he paid his rent with his "sword and buckler," and when the landlord called for the use of the vassal's good right arm, with a curse ~.nd a groan the plough was left in the furrow. What was a burden to the common man was an opportunity for the roving professional soldiery. The interests of the two were as wide apart as the sympathy that existed between them. Small wonder then that the great mass of the people in time acquired and then transmitted intense dis- trust and hatred of the "trained soldier," to whom they attributed so many of their ills. The feeling was a most natural one. Not only were the pro- fessional warriors closely identified in the minds of the people with the useless fighting in which the common man suffered most, but among the trained soldiers there were none of the lofty ideals we find in the armies of today. In character, the profes- sional soldier was decidedly inferior to the un- skilled man whom he regarded with such contempt. And then there was slight reward for the plain man who did his duty on the field of battle; the fruits of victory went to the nobles and their mili- tary experts ; the vassals returned to their neglected fields. The success of the king invariably meant gifts of land or privileges to the military caste. The common people belonged to the land. The more Historical 5 ambitious the owner of the land the greater was the military burden of the people. It was natural, then, that, among the people, military service was regarded with great disfavour in an age when want of intellectual occupation made war the favourite pastime of the higher classes. At this time, military science was unknown. Individual prowess and bravery won battles, the fate of a battle frequently depending on a personal combat between two knights. Under such cir- cumstances, the science of war could never attain a high degree of efficiency, nor could any general or permanent military organization be effected whereby to relieve the common man of his ever- present burden, or to distribute the weight of military service among the masses. The Crusades did much to develop the idea of co-operation between small military units united for common action, and it is not too much to say that to them may be traced the origin of larger and more permanent armed forces than had been hitherto employed. But it was not until the reign of Charles VII. of France that any regular attempt at organizing a standing army was made, although at that time the Turkish janizaries had been in existence for almost a century. As the demand for trained soldiers increased, the profes- sion of arms became more popular. Not only were there skilful officers now to be had, as for- merly, for a price, but "men-at-arms," as well; and these men often banded together under their 6 Empire and Armament own leaders and sold the services of their organiza- tion. The Swiss mercenaries were in great demand during the Middle Ages, their superior military qualities often successfully deciding the issue of a battle. The employment of mercenaries conse- quently became popular, and soon general; so much so that voluntary patriotic service ceased altogether and also the practice of calling upon quotas of unskilled fighting men. The mercenary was, therefore, in a sense the liberator of the masses from enforced military service, except in time of war. In their freedom, the people tasted the sweets of peaceful pursuits and grew all the more antagonistic to compulsory military service. While their distaste for personal military service even- tually became traditional, their lack of respect for the professional soldier, or the mercenary, was always a present fact. Recruited from the very dregs of society, and often of foreign blood, the soldier, and consequently the profession of arms, fell into disrepute. Even the redeeming features of knighthood no longer existed, for chivalry was sunk in a system of organization which afforded no opportunity for individual feats of arms and examples of personal skill. Wide-spread dissatisfaction with the mercenary system developed, however, with the increased dependence upon the system. The great expense of maintaining a mercenary force, and the proven danger of intrusting the safety of the state to hired foreigners of low caste, brought about a Historical 7 reaction which led directly to a new system. Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Louis XIV. and his great marshals, and finally Frederick the Great, each contributed something to military science and much to organization. Together they succeeded in reshouldering the military bur- den upon the people, although all of them to some extent employed mercenaries in their wars. In theory, however, armies during the seventeenth century were largely composed of volunteers, and the people were more or less free to serve with the colours or follow peaceful pursuits as they saw fit. Economic and social conditions were such, never- theless, that while no man was forced by the state to serve in the ranks, yet, in fact, he was compelled to seek a livelihood in the army. It was not until 1798 that France, after the exhaus- tion of her great levies in the wars she waged from 1792 to 1797, enacted a law establishing compul- sory military service, an act which compelled all Continental Europe to follow Napoleon's example, so that today Great Britain and the United States alone of all the great Powers rely on volunteers for their armies. In England, the development has been some- what different from that on the Continent, and in England, we find the source of American ideals. The right to bear arms was inherent in .the English people ; in fact, under early laws, was com- pulsory. The feudal barons who, in their petty struggles with each other, laid such a heavy burden 8 Empire and Armament upon their vassals, were in turn required to support their king in war. The same complaint which the people made against the barons, the barons made against the king, for they early objected to being led out of the kingdom, and King John's insist- ence upon foreign service was the principal cause of Runnymede. The objection of the English people to foreign service at the sole will of the king or chief executive is reflected in every Ameri- can constitutional document. On the other hand, the English people from the first displayed the keenest antipathy towards mercenaries. Indeed, there were practically none employed in England until the time of the Stuarts, though a small force of Italian and German — "Brabazon" — soldiers were hired by Henry VI. in 1449, with which to suppress Jack Cade. To their employment on this occasion is commonly attributed the preservation of English freedom and parliamentary government. Removed by the isolation of the realm from the maelstrom of continuous inter-state strife in Central Europe, the people of the British Isles in their formative period principally indulged their warlike tastes in intra-state war. The wars of the Continent had a direct tendency to evolve a greater measure of central military power in the states involved, in order that they might contend the more successfully with their neigh- bours, and in as much as a centralized power was essential to the existence of their states, the people Historical 9 submitted more or less willingly to the process of centralization. But, in England, where frequent encroachments from the outside did not intervene to compel the surrender of individual liberties in the common defence, the democratic spirit pre- vailed. Indeed, not only were the very causes which led the people of the Continent to accept militarism almost entirely absent, but in England, the people recognized the fact that centralized military power meant for them a compulsory sur- render, without compensating advantages, of control over the state. Consequently, they re- tained all military power in themselves, relying upon militia rather than upon a trained and per- manent army at the beck and call of a ruler or faction. The objection of the English people to the crea- tion of an army, which might be used to establish military tribunals and to overawe the people, is apparent in a long range of constitutional de- cisions and statutes of the realm. There are many early statutes protesting against the Laws of the Forest, and prohibiting martial law. Indeed, it is difficult to discover when the principle that the military must never be independent of or superior to the civil power was first established. The militia, the ancient defence of the realm, was re- vived only seventeen years after the Norman con- quest; the Norman ordeal of battle was abolished in 12 13. So zealously have the English people adhered to their early ideas that they have re- io Empire and Armament tained to the present day the constitutional provision requiring the annual re-enactment by Parliament of the laws for the government of the army and navy, lest those laws become estab- lished by custom independent of, and superior to, the authority of the people. In the Petition of Rights we find the following significant complaint: ... of late great companies of soldiers and mari- ners have been dispersed into divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been compelled to receive them into their houses and there to suffer them to sojourn, against the laws and customs of this realm. ... (31 Car., ii.) and again : . . . certain persons have been appointed commission- ers, with power and authority to proceed . . . accord- ing to . . . martial law . . . and by such summary course and order as is agreeable to martial law, and as is used in armies in time of war, to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, and then to cause to be executed and put to death according to the law martial. By pretext whereof some of your Majesty's subjects have been by some of the said commissioners put to death, when and where, if by the laws and statutes of the land they had deserved death, by the same laws and statutes also they might and by no other ought to have been judged and exe- cuted. . . . and that the foresaid commissioners, for pro- ceeding by martial law, may be revoked and annulled Historical n . . . that your Majesty would be pleased to remove the said soldiers and mariners, and that your people may not be so burdened in time to come. In the Bill of Rights we also find significant clauses : That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law. That the raising or keeping a standing army, within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law. (a. d. 1688.) Knowing what were the early sentiments and convictions of the English people, — sentiments and convictions which have remained unaltered even by three centuries of armed aggression and empire building, — it is not difficult to understand the views of the colonial Americans with respect to military service, for their ideals were those of their native country. Throughout the early period of settlement in the American Colonies, the old English localized militia system was relied upon for purposes of defence against the Indians, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch, or whatever enemy might threaten. Permanent armed forces did not exist, though all men were liable to be called into military service when needed. In 1754, when the French and Indian War threatened, and the Lords of Trade suggested that 12 Empire and Armament an intercolonial conference be held for the purpose of entering into "articles of union and confedera- tion with each other for mutual defence of his Majesty's subjects and interests in North America in time of peace as well as war," a permanent armed force for the Colonies was first discussed. On June 19th, commissioners from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New York, New Hampshire, and Maryland assembled at Albany, and, after arranging for the participa- tion of the "Five Nations" in the war as allies of the Colonies, adopted with some modifications the plan proposed by Benjamin Franklin for inter- colonial union. This plan provided, among other things, for the appointment by the Crown of a President-general, who was to nominate and com- mission military officers, and for the enlistment and pay of troops and the building of forts. But the plan was everywhere opposed and rejected by the Colonies, because they believed its adoption would centralize colonial authority to such an extent that the king could more readily usurp it, and by the king and the English people on the ground that it made the Colonies too powerful. The final action in this first attempt at union among the Colonies is a striking example of the Englishman's inborn distrust of centralized power. The very people the plan was designed to benefit were as fearful that the military power it involved would be turned against them as the Crown was that the development of military strength in the Historical 13 Colonies would make the Colonials too inde- pendent — neither was willing to trust an army! And here we should pause to consider how pleased the French sovereign would have been had he possessed a sturdy body of colonial subjects in Canada out of whom to create an army of 20,000 men or more. CHAPTER II THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD ENGLAND'S policy throughout the colonial period was to discourage every development among her American Colonies tending towards independence of the mother country, but while she succeeded in preventing the creation of a force of trained soldiery, and saw to it that no navy yards and arsenals were erected in the Colonies, which might prove to be dangerous weapons in the hands of her growing children, she could not sup- press the British spirit of independence which her own selfish policy aroused in them. There is no need here to trace the events which led up to the American Revolution. Suffice it to say that, in 1774, the Colonies began preparations for an armed conflict with Great Britain. The Congress which met in September at Phila- delphia adopted a military measure it is true, a measure providing for the higher officers of the force to be raised, for the training of the troops, and the procuring of arms and supplies, but still the old plan of relying on the militia was adhered to, and no troops were to be called out until The Revolutionary Period 15 actually needed for active service. The Second Provincial Congress which met in Philadelphia in May, 1775, was endowed with power to raise and support such a military force as it might deem proper to resist the execution of the acts of Par- liament. Under the powers conferred upon it by this Congress, the Committee of Safety under- took to organize militia companies and regiments throughout the Colonies, designating a third part of the force organized on paper as "minute men," who agreed to respond promptly to the call of the committee when needed. Thus we see that, in spite of the imminency of armed conflict, the people of the Colonies were unable to abandon their old military ideals and to create in their midst a reg- ularly organized and trained body of soldiery. The idea of a "standing army" was still too ab- horrent to the English-born Colonial to be seri- ously entertained by him, and the events of Lexington and Bunker H 11 only confirmed him in the belief that militia was able to cope success- fully with the best trained soldiery. Accordingly, in June, 1775, the Second Continental Congress resolved that the militia which had assembled about Boston from the various Colonies should be employed in the service of the United Colonies, and with this army commanded by George Wash- ington, it undertook to make war upon the well- organized and disciplined British troops. No sooner, however, had Washington assumed command of the nondescript mob of 17,000 mili- 16 Empire and Armament tia at Cambridge than he undertook to impress upon Congress the necessity of providing an army which would owe its allegiance to the United Colonies exclusively. Obedient to Washington's will, Congress, by resolution of June, 1775, author- ized the raising of ten companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia; but so great was the fear of a standing army that the term of enlistment of the regular troops was fixed at one year. The force originally authorized was soon augmented, but, at this time, nothing could induce the extension of the prescribed term of service for the Continental troops. In July, 1775, still jealous of the growth of mili- tary power, instead of providing for the mainte- nance of an adequate army subject only to its own authority, Congress contented itself with recommending to the Colonies that all effective men between sixteen and fifty years of age be formed into companies of militia with elective officers, which militia could be called out only with the consent of the colonial legislatures and was not subject to service beyond the borders of the Colony to which it belonged. It did, however, empower Washington to maintain around Boston an army not to exceed 22,000 men; but no pro- vision whatever was made as to how he should maintain them, and as most of the militia had only enlisted to serve to December 1st, a serious problem presented itself. The necessity of providing troops to take the The Revolutionary Period 17 place of those whose enlistments would expire within the year, led Congress to appoint a special committee to confer with Washington and the Colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. In October, the committee reported that an army of about 20,000 men should be organized, and Congress called upon the four Colonies consulted to furnish their proportionate quotas of this number to serve until January 15th following. But enlistments were very slow, so slow, in fact, that late in Decem- ber but 6000 men had been enrolled. It is need- less to add that the discipline among the troops at Washington's disposal was such as to render them totally ineffective. The Continental Congress of 1775 should not be charged with too much blame for the inadequate measures it adopted, for the Colonies intentionally withheld from their representatives the power to enforce effective measures for defence. Having no authority to levy taxes or to raise revenue, the Congress was after all but an advisory body, with- out real power to raise or support a single soldier. Nor was it intended that it should exercise such power. General Upton has fully set forth in his unanswerable book — The Military Policy of the JJyiited States — the evils in all stages of our history of the American military policy. It is designed here only to develop the nature of that policy and to examine into the underlying reasons for the support it has commanded. 18 Empire and Armament During the first part of the year 1776, the Con- tinental Congress was induced to augment the regular army little by little, always safeguarding against too much regularly organized military strength. Many of the benefits that might have been derived from the gradual extension of the term of enlistment for the regulars were lost through the failure of Congress to provide for the extension of the term of enlistment in the militia. Very naturally, men preferred short term service in the "home" militia to long enlistments in more severely disciplined organizations subject to the call of Congress. This preference rendered it almost impossible to keep up the Continental army at more than half its authorized strength, a strength which was never allowed, even on paper, to approach that of the militia. The sentiment of the people of the Colonies is well expressed in the Virginia Bill of Rights, drafted by George Mason, and adopted by the Virginia Convention June 15, 1776, in which it is declared: That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of -the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing armies in time of peace should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. One need only compare the words in the Virginia Bill of Rights with those in the British Declaration The Revolutionary Period 19 of Rights to see that no change of sentiment with respect to standing armies had come about among Englishmen since William and Mary ascended the throne. It was not until five days after Virginia declared her independence of Great Britain that the Con- tinental Congress promulgated the "Declaration of Independence" for the United Colonies. In that declaration, many grievances against the King were specified, among which were the fol- lowing : He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures. (Clause 15.) For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us; For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punish- ment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States. (Clauses 18 and 19.) These grievances should also be compared with those set forth in the British Petition of Rights. Having braced themselves, under Virginia's leadership, to take the irretrievable step of declar- ing their political independence of Great Britain, upon first consideration it seems strange that the Colonies should have continued a course of inde- cision, and that they should have failed to adopt well-digested measures for the expulsion of the British troops from American soil. In raising an effective army of such size as to overwhelm the 20 ■ Empire and Armament few British troops on this continent, the old risk of providing the king with an instrument of coer- cion no longer existed, but what, upon cursory consideration, seems inexplicable, is, in fact, readily accounted for. The truth is, the Colonies were in 1776,' and for years thereafter, as jealous and fearful of each other as so many individual states, highly conscious of their own weakness and given to exaggerate the strength and unfriendly designs of the others, are today wont to be. To understand the condition of affairs existing in 1776, one must constantly bear in mind the fact of the wide diversity of interests among the Colo- nies, and that not only had there been no fusion of interests in the heat of a common cause, but that on the contrary there actually existed serious antagonisms born of the most diverse political and economic situations. Consequently, the Con- tinental Congress was not a central executive body with plenary power to act for the common welfare of the Colonies, but a mere body of colonial agents whose prime function was to yield up as little and to secure as much for their respective principals as shrewdness and selfish intrigue might enable them to do. These are unpleasant facts, but they are amply borne out by the history of the Revolutionary War, in which we search in vain for evidence of any real willingness on the part of most of the Colonies to afford material support to the war when the invading armies had departed from their own territory, or when the The Revolutionary Period 21 threat of bringing the war home to them was even temporarily averted. During the Revolution [wrote Upton], the intense feeling of opposition to a standing army almost wrought the ruin of our cause. Since then, this feeling has been diligently kept up and has formulated itself into the maxim that "A standing army is dan- gerous to liberty." The maxim quoted by Upton has by no means been formulated since the Revolutionary War, as he seemed to believe. It was formulated, as we have seen, in England centuries before that war. It was the general adherence of Englishmen to the time-worn principle expressed in this maxim that made Washington's task so onerous, and compelled him, at Harlem Heights on the 24th of September just after the militia under his com- mand had been driven like a flock of sheep from Long Island by the British, to address to the President of Congress that memorable letter, in which he said : "To place any dependence upon militia is as- suredly resting upon a broken staff." Referring to the attitude of the people of the Colonies towards regular troops in the same letter he wrote: The jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting 22 Empire and Armament one, according to my ideas, formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For if I was called upon to decide upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter. Although Washington was never able to enforce his views upon his countrymen, who were willing enough to rest the great burden of defence upon his shoulders while they ignored in great measure his advice, circumstances compelled them twice during the first two years of the war to admit tacitly the groundless nature of their own fear of military dictation; for on two occasions they were forced to invest him as their military chief- tain with dictatorial powers. On both occasions, as dictator, he saved the Colonies from defeat, and on neither occasion did he give evidence of a desire to establish himself permanently as a ruler with the aid of the army at his command. But, the danger having passed, the old distrust of the mil- itary soon revived and manifested itself as before. Just at the time when the Continental Congress was becoming more and more impressed by Wash- ington with the necessity of encouraging the Colo- nies to assent to the creation of a permanent and centralized armed force, a new form of govern- ment was adopted. The union of the Colonies under the Articles of Confederation, which went into effect in July, 1778, was in every way but one a distinct advance over the old plan of co-operation The Revolutionary Period 23 through a Congress of delegates which possessed no executive power. But with respect to defen- sive power the new government was decidedly inferior to the Continental Congress, which had established a small regular army, however in- adequate this may have been. The new govern- ment was not only unequipped with power to raise an army, but the right to maintain an armed force was expressly denied it, and was reserved to the constituent States. And to make matters worse, the States themselves were denied the right of maintaining, in time of peace, ships of war or troops without the consent of Congress. The Articles, then, not only divested the central government of all authority to raise and maintain troops for the common defence, but prohibited the individual States from preparing in advance of actual hostilities for their own defence. Nor could any State engage in war without the ap- proval of at least eight other States. But the crowning folly of all was the provision that when war was declared by Congress the troops provided by the States were to be paid out of the common treasury ! Instead of resting the war power in a central govern- ment which alone could insure its vigorous exercise, Congress was reduced to a mere consultative body or congress of diplomats, with authority to concert only such measures for common defence as might receive the sanction of nine of the allied sovereignties they represented. 24 Empire and Armament If any State became lukewarm or conceived that its local interests were neglected, it could promptly recall its delegates. Weak as had been our military policy under the government of the Continental Congress, it was to become still more imbecile through the inherent de- fects of the new system. To the indecision and delays of a single Congress were now superadded the inde- cisions and delays of at least nine more deliberative bodies. Shortly before the formation of the new govern- ment Washington wrote a member of Congress : The other point is the jealousy which Congress unhappily entertains of the Army and which, if reports are right, some members labour to establish. You may be assured there is nothing more injurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a State. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their not having, in general cases, any of the ties, the con- cerns, or interests of citizens, or any other dependence than what flowed from their military employ, in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war, though they are citizens, having all the ties and inter- ests of citizens, and, in most cases, probably totally unconnected with the military life. As declared by Washington, the Americans made no distinction whatever between the hire- The Revolutionary Period 25 lings of a despot and an army of citizens created by the representatives of a free people. They could not perceive that the character of the indi- viduals composing a standing army might have a marked effect upon the tendencies of that army; that the mere fact of extending the term of enlist- ment sufficiently to enable men to be properly disciplined and trained would not, of itself, destroy the sentiments of patriotism which induced citizens to shed their blood in defence of their country. They were unwilling to credit themselves, or their kind, with the same high purpose and unselfish motives so strikingly displayed by Washington, who, as we have seen, did not attempt to usurp the reins of government or to oppress the people while entrusted with dictatorial powers. Their evident lack of faith in themselves is a sad com- mentary upon the early American character, and constituted a serious self -accusation. It was not until 1780 that the people of Mas- sachusetts adopted the State constitution which in its fundamental principles remains unchanged to this day. The Bill of Rights prefixed to this constitution contains the following clauses: In time of peace, no soldier ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; and in time of war such quarters ought not to be made but by the civil magistrate, in a manner ordained by the legislature. (Clause xxvii.) No person can in any case be subject to law-martial, or to any penalties or pains, by virtue of that law, 26 Empire and Armament except those employed in the army or navy, and except the militia in actual service, but by authority of the legislature. (Clause xxviii.) The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be main- tained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subor- dination to the civil authority, and be governed by it. (Clause xvii.) The fact that it was generally believed in the Colonies at large as in Massachusetts that the military should ' ' always be held in an exact subor- dination to the civil authority, and be governed by it," undoubtedly explains why the consecutive governing bodies set up by the Colonies pursued such an inadequate military policy. In other words, in seeking to keep the military within close bounds, they so circumscribed it as to prevent it from developing any power whatever. It is indeed a notable fact that, at the most critical stage of the war, and in spite of the glaring defects in the traditional military system, the people of Massachusetts, who had with the Virginians taken the lead in the war, persisted in their prejudices against trained soldiers. If ever there were a time when those prejudices might have been set aside, even though temporarily, it was at the very time they were so forcefully and unequivocally expressed in the organic law of the State, a State The Revolutionary Period 27 which had acted with more deliberation in the matter of its constitution than any of its sisters. A careful survey of contemporaneous history discloses an explanation for the inhibition against standing armies in the Virginia Bill of Rights, even more satisfactory than the traditional con- victions of the people, taken by themselves. At the very hour the Virginia convention of 1776 was deliberating upon the expediency of declaring the independence of the Colony, the soldiery were clamouring outside the convention hall for the radical action finally determined upon. Thomas Nelson, Jr., addressing a member of the convention, wrote : The military in particular, men and officials, are out- rageous on the subject; and a man of your excellent discernment need not be told how dangerous it would be in our present circumstances to dally with the spirit, or disappoint the expectations of the bulk of the people. The letter quoted was, in all probability, but one of many evidences of the power of the military, before the convention. The very violence of the military demonstrators alone would have directed atten- tion to the danger of unrestrained military power and would have caused the spectre of military tyranny to stalk before the convention. But in Massachusetts, the State constitution was not framed by a radical body of revolutionists labour- ing under the stress of excitement and the neces- sity of meeting the pressing demands of the hour. 28 Empire and Armament On the contrary, that constitution was framed by a convention, regularly organized for the purpose, which confined its activity to the single function of drawing up an instrument of government. This convention moved slowly and deliberately, and the inhibition against standing armies con- tained in the Bill of Rights owed nothing to present fears, but everything to traditional prejudice. Diverted from a serious prosecution of the American war by France, Spain, her East Indian troubles, and a large section of her own people at home, whose representatives in Parliament cham- pioned the cause of the Colonies more efficiently than did the American legislators themselves, England finally abandoned her attempt to coerce her former subjects. The failure of England proved the success of the Americans . That success , proximately due to extraneous causes in the nature of British home troubles, and immediately due to the perseverance of Washington and a few other patriots aided by the French, was accepted by the American people as a vindication of their war policy. But how much it was due to the American war policy and how much to the French may be strikingly determined by an examination of the relative number of French and American graves at Yorktown. The sad military record of the Americans in the Revolutionary War is relieved, however, by the loyalty and patriotic self-sacrifice of the Conti- nental or regular troops, those troops who retained The Revolutionary Period 29 throughout their career the jealous and fearful regard of the people they so loyally served, and to whom they so promptly surrendered their arms and titles upon the termination of hostilities. The greatest service the Continental troops rendered the country was not that they performed in campaign, but in emphasizing two great facts: 1st: That troops subject to the disposition of the central government are effective out of all proportion to their numbers as compared with militia not subject to central control. 2d: That regular troops, enlisted for long peri- ods, carefully trained and disciplined, are the only safe reliance of a state in war. While the foregoing facts were emphasized by the experiences of the war, it must not be thought the American people as a whole accepted them. In vain did Washington declare that to place any dependence upon militia was to rest upon a broken staff. They exalted him and proclaimed him as the father of their country, his political views they adopted, and they took his advice upon many other subjects, but when it came to matters military, not his long and fruitful experience, but their own outworn traditional prejudices dictated the course they elected to pursue. Regular troops alone [he wrote] are equal to the exigencies of modern war as well for defence as offence, and when a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. 30 Empire and Armament No militia will ever acquire the. habits necessary to resist a regular force. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been a witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in a material degree, to so precarious a defence. The American people based their views upon an ancient prejudice. Washington based his opinions not only upon his own bitter experience with militia, extending over eight years, in which time nearly 400,000 men came under his command, but upon the history of war in all ages. Surely, when he penned the foregoing advice he must have had in mind the sagacious words of Bacon who, in his essay entitled Of the True Greatness of King- doms and Estates, wrote : Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like: all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. Nay, number itself, in armies, importeth not much, where the people is of weak courage; for, as Virgil saith, it never troubles a wolf how many the sheep be. The army of the Persians, in the plains of Arbela, was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in Alex- ander's army; who came to him therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night ; but he answered, he The Revolutionary Period 3 1 would not pilfer the victory ; and the defeat was easy. When Tigranes the Armenian, being encamped upon a hill, with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the Romans , being not above fourteen thousand, marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said: "Yonder men are too many for an em- bassage, and too few for a fight." But before the sun set, he found them enow to give him the chace, with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds between number and courage; so that a man may truly make a judgment, that the principal point of greatness in any state is to have a race of military men. Neither is money the sinews of war, as it is trivially said, where the sinews of men's arms, in base and effeminate people, are failing. For Solon said well to Croesus, when in ostentation he shewed him his gold, "Sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold. ' ' Therefore, let any prince or state think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers. And let princes on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength, unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. As for mercenary forces, which is the help in this case, all examples shew, that whatso- ever estate or prince doth rest upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them soon after. Despite Washington's advice, the moment independence was established, the Continental army was disbanded and certain States were called upon to furnish their quotas of a force of 32 Empire and Armament about 700 men to garrison the western frontiers, where several forts were to be evacuated by the Brit- ish troops. For a number of years, this regiment constituted the only military force of the United States of America, the population of which was 3,500,000, or half that of Belgium when in 1914 that brave little country was able to place in the field an army capable of checking the superb fighting machine of the war-mad Kaiser. But, as events soon showed them, it was beyond the power of the deluded Americans, to create an Uto- pia. That the United States existed for nearly four years practically without an armed force of any kind, is a unique fact in the history of nations. CHAPTER III INADEQUACY OF THE OLD POLICY IT was a hopeful sign when, in 1786, John Adams of Massachusetts declared national defence to be one of the cardinal duties of a statesman. "On this head," he wrote, "I recollect nothing with which to reproach myself." Was it a guilty- conscience that made him thus disavow respon- sibility for the absurd situation of the infant re- public? Perhaps not, but it was certainly his own personal experience of the events following close upon the Revolution that made him add, "The subject [national defence] has always been near my heart. The delightful imaginations of universal and perpetual peace have often amused, but have never been credited by me." The developments which inspired such senti- ments on the part of Adams are not difficult to discover. Hardly had the new government been established when its impotence became manifest, especially in Massachusetts. The large public debt in that State had necessitated heavy taxes, and the attempts of creditors to recover debts due them added to popular discontent. 3 33 34 Empire and Armament A levelling, licentious spirit [says Mr. Curtis], a restless desire for change, and a disposition to throw down the barriers of private rights, at length broke forth in conventions, which first voted themselves to be the people and then declared their proceedings to be constitutional. At these assemblies the doctrine was publicly broached that property ought to be common, because all had aided in saving it from con- fiscation by the power of England. Taxes were voted to be unnecessary burdens, the courts of justice to be intolerable grievances, and the legal profession a nuisance. A revision of the [State] constitution was demanded, in order to abolish the Senate, reform the representation of the people, and make all civil officers eligible by the people. . . . Had the government of the State been in the hands of a person less firm and less careless of popularity than Bowdoin, it would have been given up to anarchy and civil confusion. In December, 1786, violence began to develop, and soon Daniel Shay at the head of 2000 armed malcontents, after forcing the Supreme Court of the State to adjourn, moved against Springfield Arsenal, finding sympathy for his rebellious acts throughout New England. Governor Bowdoin called out 4000 militia and, with General Lincoln at their head, succeeded in restoring order; but the alarming possibility that such an uprising might recur and bring about the overthrow of constituted authority called attention to the defects of a central government which was power- less to aid a State in so serious a crisis. Inadequacy of the Old Policy 35 Shay's Rebellion is an important landmark in American history, for it indicates a very radical turn in the military policy of the United States, whose people awoke with a start to the fact that what had transpired in Massachusetts threatened in other quarters. Adams was but a spokesman for the general body of property holders in the States, who, when they perceived that their prop- erty was actually imperilled,' reflected his views as to the necessity of protection. From this time on they were more willing to tolerate, if they did not demand, protection in a form which before they had so persistently feared. Fortunately many of our statesmen at this time, having been officers under Washington, were imbued with his ideas concerning national defence, and it was not difficult in view of the popular change of heart for them to impress the Constitutional Convention of 1787 with their views. It must also be borne in mind that the members of this Convention were in no sense popular representatives, as is so commonly claimed. Theoretically they did represent the people; but in fact they represented the class by which they were chosen, or the property class which largely monopolized the elective franchise in the States. There may have been political theo- rists in this Convention, or extreme democrats, but there were positively no anarchists or even members with strong socialistic tendencies. Fur- thermore, those who a few years before might have embraced disarmament in their program of 36 Empire and Armament pacifism were no longer enthusiastic over that principle, for they did not deem it prudent to experiment further with their novel theories at a time when a veritable epidemic of anarchistic tendencies was abroad. Even from Jefferson, known to history as an extreme democrat, but who may properly be classed today as a socialist of pronounced type, came no serious plaint against the obvious trend of thought towards an increase of centralized power, and we shall see that his views concerning the necessity and wisdom of adequate measures for defence constantly ex- panded, though he did in a feeble way seek to block the ratification of the Constitution on the ground that it contained no declaration of ancient rights including an inhibition against a standing army. Hamilton was an ardent advocate of Washing- ton's military views, and supported him in them as in all things. The Pinckneys, Randolph, and others were now positive in their demands, Ran- dolph publicly declaring that the Confederacy was not only utterly powerless against foreign inva- sion but had not even the power to prevent war. And Madison, who within ten years had concurred in the inhibition contained in the Virginia Bill of Rights against a standing army in time of peace, was now, if his written expressions are to be relied upon, of quite a different conviction. What he had regarded as unnecessary and dangerous be- fore the Revolution, he now regarded as essential. Inadequacy of the Old Policy 37 Public men then, from Massachusetts to the Caro- linas, if they had not experienced a change of heart, were loud in their advocacy of a new policy. Indeed, in their expressions, they were already anticipating Tocqueville, who some years later, in his Democracy in America, wrote : Any law which, in repressing the turbulent spirit of the army, should tend to diminish the spirit of free- dom in the nation, and to overshadow the notion of law and right, would defeat its object ; it would do much more to favour, than to defeat, the establishment of military tyranny. We may interpret this passage to mean simply this : a government which did not possess the power to maintain domestic order and prevent foreign encroachments would promptly be overthrown, and arbitrary power be assumed by the strongest element of the people at the expense of the weaker elements. War [wrote Tocqueville] is nevertheless an occur- rence to which all nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. Whatever taste they may have for peace, they must hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or in other words they must have an army. CHAPTER IV THE HAMILTONIAN DOCTRINE WE have seen what was the frame of mind, not perhaps of the people, but certainly of the public men of 1787. We are, therefore, better prepared to understand the radical increase of the central power in matters of national defence which was soon to be bestowed upon Congress by the Federal Constitution. But it is a mistake to assume public opinion stopped at the idea of mere defence — it went far beyond such a conception. The United States had arrived at a stage at which commercial development was essential to progress, and a doctrine of commercial expansion was rapidly formulating itself in the minds of the American people. Even in its early stages that doctrine contemplated a vigorous govern- ment policy to advance the world trade of the United States. The way to accomplish such an expansion was, as far as the writer can discover, first hinted at by Edmund Randolph in a letter to Madison in which he enumerated the more glaring defects of the Articles of Confederation. "There are many advantages," he wrote, "which the 38 The Hamiltonian Doctrine 39 United States might acquire which were not attain- able under the Articles of Confederation — such as productive import, counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations — pushing of commerce ad libitum, etc." Can it be doubted that Randolph even at this early day had in mind the "pushing of commerce" under the fostering protection of American guns? If so the doubt may readily be dispelled by the most casual examination of the Federalist, which was so widely circulated during the struggle to establish the present Federal Government, and which presents in great detail the political theories of the proposed system of government as conceived by three of the profoundest thinkers of the period, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. If the Federalist be not sufficient to dispel our doubts, being regarded by us as merely evidence of the personal convic- tions of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, it is only necessary, then, to consult the records of the pro- ceedings in the Philadelphia Convention, and the pamphlets and newspapers of the day, which together will conclusively reveal the successive steps in the building of the framework of the new government, and disclose the contemporary ideas of the creators of that government. The results of such an investigation will come as a surprise to most of those Americans who point to the traditional peace policy of our government with such pride and assurance, not knowing that the considerations which led to the creation of our 4-o Empire and Armament standing army under the Federal Constitution were identical with those underlying the aggressive national policy of Bismarck, which Wilhelm II. has only extended. Americans have long argued from the diminutive size of our army that its creators necessarily contemplated a purely defensive policy, when as a matter of fact the size of the army was dictated solely by considerations of economy, and had nothing whatever to do with the purpose for which it was contemplated that it would be employed. It is not the writer's intention from now on to dwell upon early American views regarding the desirability of a standing army for the purpose of maintaining domestic tranquillity. While that object was indeed in itself a compelling one, the arguments in its support are too obvious to require elaboration, and that their force was felt in 1787 may be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of an army. It is now only intended to show that a desire for domestic tranquillity was by no means the sole reason for the revulsion in public opinion which led to the abandonment of the old militia ideal. The authors of the Federalist [writes Mr. Beard] carry over into the field of international politics the concept of economic antagonisms which lie at the basis of their system of domestic politics. Modern wars spring primarily out of commercial rivalry, although the ambitions of princes have often been a source of international strife. The Hamiltonian Doctrine 41 Mr. Beard's view is based upon the argument of Hamilton, who wrote: Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were be- fore occasioned by the cupidity of territory or do- minion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? For an answer to the questions he propounds, Hamilton calls upon history in a series of remark- able papers, which it is the duty of every disarma- mentist to read at this time. He further points out that in the world-wide and age-long conflict for commercial advantages, the United States cannot expect to become a non-resistant, an idle spectator. Even were pacific ideals to dominate American policy, she could not overcome the scruples of her ambitious rivals. In union, there- fore, is strength, not only against aggression, he declares, but in support of offensive operations. Moreover, he points out, the Union will be better able to settle disputes amicably because of the greater show of power which it can make! "Ac- knowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatis- 42 Empire and Armament factory if offered by a State or a Confederacy of little consideration or power." The foregoing remarks of Hamilton smack exceedingly much of the later German doctrine of the mailed fist so widely condemned today. Yet Hamilton but gave expression to the dominant American view of his time, a view which not only contemplated that the Government with a strong army at its back might enforce a high degree of respect for its demands but that it might exact better terms for itself in the settlement of disputes. x It should here be noted that the covert suggestion is made that the desired ends might be attained ir- respective of the validity or the justice of the claims. Jay pointed out that the safety of the American people depended not only upon their forbearing to give offence, but upon their ability to resent foreign insults and encroachments. "It is too true," he declared, "however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it." He then argued that, in the extension of her foreign commerce, the United States would necessarily come into contact with France, England, Spain, and other countries, not only in Europe, but in the Orient; and he added that we are not to expect they should regard our ad- vancement in union, in power and consequence by 1 By dominant American view is not meant the view of the masses but the view of the majority in the Convention which framed the Constitution. The Hamiltonian Doctrine 43 land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and com- posure. The people of America are aware that in- ducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present; and whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to colour and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider Union and a good National Govern- ment as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defence, and necessarily depends on the Government, the arms, and the re- sources of the country. It is not difficult to detect in the foregoing words of Jay, tactfully as the proposition may be put, an argument in favour of aggressive power. Hamilton, always more blunt and straight to the point than Jay or Madison, tears the veil from the face of the idea in Jay's mind and boldly declares that the selfish restrictions of European nations upon our expanding trade might be removed by the establishment of a strong Federal navy. A few ships of the line [he declared] sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a very commanding one. And if, to this consideration, we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived, that a 44 Empire and Armament situation so favourable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set, not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America; and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world, as our interest may dictate. The early American doctrine of commerce and foreign trade, as enunciated by Hamilton, was not only highly selfish but extremely unpacific in nature. In brief, and in substance, it amounted to this : for reasons of economy it were unwise for the United States to maintain an extensive naval establishment because by skilful diplomacy and artfully playing upon the jealousies of foreign na- tions, coupled with a timely employment of a small navy, our own selfish ends could be secured. The very idea that we were to hold the balance of naval power in foreign disputes of our own creation, a trump card in the game of diplomacy so to speak, is not suggestive of a truly pacific com- mercial policy. What other nations thought of our reiterated expressions of peaceful intent and pro- fessed desire to remain aloof from foreign entangle- ments is not difficult to imagine. In the European mind, the principle subsequently laid down in the Monroe Doctrine must have seemed inconsistent at least, but American policy for Americans and American policy for Europeans were two separate and distinct things. The Hamiltonian Doctrine 45 While Hamilton and Jay certainly contemplated a policy of intermeddling with foreign commerce and forcing open foreign markets through the medium of a navy, they were none the less desirous of placing the United States in a position to main- tain its neutrality when interference in foreign affairs offered no prospect of advantage. "The rights of neutrality will only be respected," wrote Hamilton, "when they are defended by an ade- quate power. A nation despicable by its weak- ness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral." CHAPTER V THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IT has been shown that the feeble military policy of the States until the adoption of the present Federal Constitution in 1787 was primarily due to the jealousy of a standing army on the part of the people which manifested itself in the inade- quate powers they conferred upon 'their govern- ment. Under the Constitution, however, the authority vested in Congress ' ' to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," "to levy and collect taxes," and "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," was unquali- fied and gave every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask. Fortunately, the debates of the Convention were secret so that the delegates could give full expression to their intentions without fear of having them published to the world before they had been clothed, and in some cases veiled, in tactful phrases. It was not chicanery but only common sense that dictated the necessity of word- ing the Constitution in a way best calculated to insure its ratification by the people at large. 46 The Federal Constitution 47 Hence, while the members of the Convention were fully aware of the fact that the proposed govern- ment, if put into effect, would rely in the main upon a standing army for defence, yet it was perceived by all that the prejudices of the people had best be respected. Consequently, as little as possible was written into the Constitution about a standing army, and much about militia, from which it might be inferred by the people that the latter was still to be largely depended upon and that it was regarded by the framers as of superior importance. The foregoing conclusion, in view of all that was said in the Convention and that appears in the Federalist concerning the standing army, seems well justified. The provisions of the Constitution as ratified concerning the military powers of Congress are as follows : Congress shall have power: To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. To provide and maintain a navy. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, 48 Empire and Armament reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the Officers and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. A casual reading of the four clauses of the Con- stitution dealing with the military powers of Con- gress might readily have justified the people in believing that the militia was really to be relied upon in the main to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions, and that the power conferred on Congress to raise and support armies included only the right to raise armies of militia. It must be remembered that the men who framed our Constitution were highly astute, and that they were bent upon designing a government capable, above all else, of securing to themselves and the property class they represented every possible guarantee of protection. If, then, they did resort to the finesse suggested, it is rather more creditable to them as statesmen than otherwise. To believe that under the circumstances they did not invoke every art of diplomacy would be to attribute to them a dulness inconsistent with what we know of their characters. It is not to be inferred, however, that because they employed diplomacy, which has been so often styled the polite art of lying, they substituted subterfuge for tact. The interpretation which the people gave those clauses of the Constitution providing for a stand- The Federal Constitution 49 ing army was practically that which in compara- tively recent years John Randolph Tucker has applied to them. In his Commentaries, Mr. Tucker says : The next clause is "To provide and maintain a navy." It will be seen that the two years' limit on appropriations for this purpose is omitted. A navy on the seas cannot be used, as an army on the land may be, for the destruction of liberty. The words used as to these two forces are different. The words "to raise and support armies" have not the idea of permanency in them, because there is the intimation that the army may be raised only when a contingency arises making it necessary. It involves the idea of raising it when needed, and supporting it while needed; but let it disband under two years' limit if there be no need for it. But there is, in the words "to provide and maintain a navy," a very significant intimation of its permanency in maintaining it, that is, holding it in the hand. It is according to the genius of our Constitution, then, that while standing armies are to be avoided, the maintenance of a navy is to be favoured. On this same point Reinsch, in his recent Treat- ise on World Politics presents the American view concerning the army and navy, which, if it be greatly exaggerated, may be regarded as the view of the people of the United States at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. He says : Navies are by some deemed especially compatible with democracy, while standing armies are always 50 Empire and Armament regarded as aristocratic or monarchical institutions — aristocratic, because fostering an official military- caste; monarchical, because requiring the single and permanent headship which is best afforded in a strong monarchy. The social organization favoured by a strong army is thoroughly opposed to democracy; an artificial code of caste, honour, special privileges for a military aristocracy, subordination of all interests to those of the army, are almost inevitable results of militarism. The navy, on the other hand, cannot exert such a deep and immediate influence on the internal social and political life of the nation. Without laying too much stress on the fact that Athens, Holland, and Great Britain, the greatest naval powers of the ancient and modern world, were popular republics, and that no admiral has ever overturned his country's liberties, we may justify the belief that large navies are safer instruments of power for democratic states than standing armies, from the very nature and character of the two. Notwithstanding the view of the people that the standing army authorized by the Constitution was only to come into being under certain contin- gencies, to be "raised" only in time of need, rather than maintained in time of peace, the Constitution did not in the popular mind sufficiently emphasize the ancient rights in the people of which they were so jealous, and during the struggle which occurred in many States over the acceptance of the new plan of government, it was manifest that much of the opposition to it was due to this fact. Indeed, The Federal Constitution 51 Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time the Con- vention finished its work, opposed the ratification of the instrument submitted to the people on the ground that it contained no declaration of rights, stipulating, among other things, against the crea- tion of a standing army. Fortunately, Jefferson was unable to block the ratification of the Consti- tution, but in 1 79 1 ten amendments were adopted so closely after the ratification of the original instrument that they may be deemed almost a part of it. By these amendments, a number of old and familiar lights are reflected. The military provisions in them are : A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. But it is to the State constitutions that one must look for the popular expression of faith in the ancient English institution of the militia. In four State constitutions, it is declared that every member of society is bound to yield his personal service, or an equivalent thereto, to the State for the defence of life, liberty, and property. r In many States, it is declared that a person con- scientiously opposed to bearing arms will not be 1 Mass., N. H., Ore., and Vt. 52 Empire and Armament compelled thereto if he will pay an equivalent. 1 In a few it seems that he may be compelled to bear arms in time of war, as the exemption applies only to military duty in time of peace. 2 "Upon such terms as may be prescribed by law," he will be relieved from such service. 3 And in Maine, Quakers and Shakers are excused. In several States, besides Virginia, the militia is declared the proper and natural defence of a free State. 4 It would seem that the reason why the doctrine that the militia is the proper and natural defence of a free State was announced more emphatically in the Southern States was because the principal threat of danger in the South lay in the presence of a large negro population, against which the militia would be effective. In the North, where the danger of internal disorder was found in the presence of dense urban populations, it was seen that the militia might be largely composed, as it has always actually been, of those whom the State most feared. The more concentrated a population the greater the danger of public passion and up- heavals; consequently the great willingness of the people on sober reflection to provide for a force to counteract mob action and violence. The militia consists in most of the States of all 'Col., Ida., 111., Ind., Io., Ky., La., Me., Mo., N. D., N. H., Ore., S. C, Term., Tex., Vt., and Wash. a Col., Ida., 111., Io., N. D., Ore., S. D., and Wash. 3 Fla., Kans., Mich., Mo., N. C, N. Y., and Wy. < Ga., La., Md., N. C, N. H., S. C, and Tenn. The Federal Constitution 53 able-bodied male persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, twenty-one and forty-five, or twenty-one and forty. r In a few they must be white as in Indiana and Kansas. In others, the whole matter of the qualifications for the militia is left to the Legislature to determine by law. 2 In New York the minimum strength of the militia is fixed at 10,000 men fully armed, equipped, disciplined, and ready for action. The military is, in all States except New York, declared to be forever subordinate to the civil authority, though no such specific provision is included in the Federal Constitution. In Tennessee, martial law is declared to be inconsistent with a free government, and in Okla- homa it is expressly prohibited. In Massachu- setts, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia, no person can be subjected to martial law except he be in the army, navy, or in the militia in actual service. But in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, any person can be subjected to martial law by authority of the Legislature. Although the constitutions of but a few States expressly declare the militia to be the proper de- fence of a free State, most of them declare standing 1 Eighteen to forty-five in Ala., Ark., Col., Fla., Ida., 111., Ind., Io., Ky., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mon., N. D., 0., Ore., S. C, S. D., Utah, Wash., and N. Y. Twenty-one to forty-five in Kansas. Twenty-one to forty in N. C. 2 Ala., Cal., Ga., Ida., Ky., La., Md., Minn., Mon., Miss., Neb., Nev., N. D., N. J., N. Y., Okla., Pa., S. D., Tex., and Wis. 54 Empire and Armament armies dangerous to liberty, and condemn their maintenance in time of peace. Appropriations for standing armies, even in time of war, are limited to one or two years in some of the States. It is only in Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Hamp- shire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, that a standing army may be maintained in time of peace by the Legislature. The ancient British restriction against billeting soldiers in private houses in time of peace without the consent of the owners is included in the consti- tutions of all the States except those of Vermont, New York, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Mississippi. Even in time of war, billeting must generally be in accordance with law. In a large number of States, the governor may call out the militia to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasion, but in Mas- sachusetts, New Hampshire, and Tennessee the militia may not be called into service unless the Leg- islature declares by law that the public safety re- quires it. In Texas it may be called out only to protect the frontiers; in Oklahoma to protect the public health, and in Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming to preserve the public peace. From the foregoing analysis of the constitu- tional provisions for defence in the various States, one gathers a very definite impression that the people of the United States in ratifying the Federal The Federal Constitution 55 Constitution really surrendered none of their traditional prejudices against, and that they had lost none of their fears of, military power. It is a significant fact that in Oklahoma, one of the most recently formed States, the constitutional restric- tions against the military are the most stringent. Whatever, then, may have been the convictions of the framers of the Federal Constitution, however much they may have discounted the fear of a standing army and have held the old institution of the militia in contempt as a means of defence, certain it is their views made little headway in the popular mind. They did, however, secure to the Federal Government the power to maintain a standing army without limitation upon its size^ but the people never contemplated for an instant that a large standing army should be created, and only consented to a small one in the belief that its size would render it harmless to themselves and yet enable them in its use to secure certain foreign commercial and domestic advantages. Unalterably opposed in principle to a standing army, they were willing, for selfish reasons, to tolerate one too weak to be of real danger. In conclusion, attention must be called to the fact that during the Revolutionary War nearly 300,000 American citizens served in the Continen- tal or regular military establishment from the beginning to the end of the war. In 1787, a large majority of these men were still living and about equally distributed among the population 56 Empire and Armament of the thirteen States. Much of their prejudice against a standing army may be assumed to have been lost, and their influence must have of itself constituted a very important factor in support of a central military establishment, for they read with keen appreciation the century-old lines of John Dryden: And raw in fields the rude militia swarms, Mouths without hands; maintain'd at vast expense, In peace a charge, in war a weak defence; Stout once a month they march, a blustering band, And ever but in times of need at hand. CHAPTER VI THE WASHINGTONIAN DOCTRINE THE best evidence of the fact that the people were not responsible for the vesting of the Federal Government with such unlimited military- power as it possesses under the Constitution, is that, for years, Congress was practically prohibited by the jealousy of the people from exercising its power to establish a standing army worthy of the name. And this was not because no need of pro- viding for the national defence was felt ; for hardly had the Constitution gone into effect when Con- gress undertook, in 1792, to meet the situation by- enacting a comprehensive law looking to the more effective establishment of the militia. No effort, whatever, was made at this time to establish a standing army, notwithstanding past experience and the most ample constitutional authority to create an effective regular army. The military edifice proposed in 1792 was an absurd reversion to the old system from which Washington and Hamilton and Jay had laboured apparently in vain to wean the people. Again, the States were to maintain paper armies, the 57 58 Empire and Armament sole reliance of the central government. There was one wise provision in the new law which authorized the President to employ, under certain conditions, the militia of any of the other States to suppress insurrection in a State incapable of maintaining order without such aid. Thus, in 1794, the central government was able, by calling out 15,000 militia of the States of New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania which consisted of an attempt on the part of 7000 malcontents, who as- sembled in arms, to resist the collection of Federal excise taxes. "Liberty and no excise" was the motto expressive of their principles. Had the people of the States called upon to aid in putting down the rebellion been in sympathy with it, no excises would have been collected. Excises only differ in form from other taxes ; a successful refusal to pay excises would soon have induced opposition to the payment of other taxes, and the Federal Government would have been reduced to a help- less state of bankruptcy, for there was no standing army with which to enforce its laws. The people had been warned against these evil contingencies by Hamilton and Jay with unusual force of argu- ment; but to no avail. Their advice with respect to internal order was ignored as completely as their doctrine of trade expansion was accepted; the first rejected because adverse to the people's prejudices, the second adopted because productive of selfish advantage. The Washingtonian Doctrine 59 Washington was able to make but little impres- sion upon the people with respect to the necessity of a standing army; in matters pertaining to the navy, which so far existed on paper in the antici- patory authority for its creation, they were also most unreasonable. In January, 1794, a resolution was agreed to in the House of Representatives declaring "that a naval force adequate to the protection of the com- merce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs ought to be provided." The force pro- posed by the administration was to consist of but six frigates. This measure had been urged by Washington, who had despaired of negotiating a peace with the Dey of Algiers, whom he believed to be actually preparing to undertake fresh attacks upon American merchantmen on the Atlantic. The grounds of the violent opposition which beset the administration's measure disclose the popular sentiments of the time. It was viewed solely in the light of present protection to com- merce, and at the same time, with striking incon- sistency, as but the corner-stone of a great and permanent naval edifice which the people did not want. The force contemplated was too small to accomplish the object it was designed for, and then it was added that even if large enough it could not be brought into use soon enough to be of value. By such a course of reasoning its op- ponents arrived at the conclusion that the measure was totally inefficacious. Besides, it was argued, 60 Empire and Armament a peace might be obtained with money as had been done by other nations possessing large navies. The purchase of peace was held to be more effica- cious as well as more economical, for, unless our commerce was respected, the tribute would not have to be paid. Then, too, it was proposed to purchase protection for our commerce from Euro- pean Powers possessing navies capable of restrain- ing the Algerians. This also would be cheaper than the building of our own navy. The principal objection to the measure, how- ever, was based on the prejudice of the people to a permanent navy. Not only would the cost of its creation and maintenance interfere with, if it did not prevent, the payment of the national debt, but it would reduce the country to the intolerable condition of Europe, where, it was asserted, the expensiveness of the navy had brought oppression upon the British people, and led to the French Revolution. It was argued that the expensive- ness of government was the true ground of op- pression, and to that expense, kings, the nobility, the priesthood, the army, and above all, the navy, contributed. All such machinery lessened the number of productive, and increased the number of unproductive, hands in a nation. It was said the United States had already advanced far enough in the useless system of Europe. In addi- tion to a large civil list, an army had been created at immense expense, and now it was proposed to build a navy ! To build that navy the debt would The Washingtonian Doctrine 61 have to be increased, and nothing constituted a more refined system of tyranny than the mainte- nance of a public debt. Therefore, to build a navy would be to hold the liberty of the American people at a lower value than armed vessels ! It is not necessary to give here the arguments advanced by the supporters of the measure to refute the absurd contentions of its opponents. The original resolution was finally carried by a majority of only two votes in the House, concurred in by the Senate, and approved by Washington. The strength of the opposition is indicative of the attitude of the people, who were of course generally more prejudiced and narrow in their views than their representatives. Notwithstanding the popu- lar opposition, however, Washington had succeeded in laying the keel of the American navy. The Whiskey Rebellion and other evidences of domestic unrest led, in 1795, to the creation of a standing army of about 5000 men. Successive measures during the next three years, inspired by growing foreign hostilities, effected small additional increases of the regular army, and steps were taken to fortify the principal harbours of the Atlantic seaboard. These measures had been forcefully urged by Washington in a speech to Congress in December, 1795, in which he said: Fellow-citizens, amongst the objects which will claim your attention in the course of the session, a review of our military establishment will not be the least important. It is called for by the events which 62 Empire and Armament have changed, and are likely still further to change, the relative situation of our interior frontier. In this review, you will no doubt allow due weight to the con- sideration, that the questions between us and certain foreign powers are not yet finally adjusted, that the war in Europe is not yet terminated, and that the evacuation of our Western posts, when it shall happen, will demand a provision for garrisoning and securing them. You will consider this subject with a compre- hensiveness equal to the extent and variety of its relations. It was but a year later that Washington de- livered his famous farewell address in the writing of which he was so materially assisted by Hamilton, and in which, while he warned his countrymen against party violence, sectional jealousies, and entangling foreign alliances, he declared prepared- ness for war to be the surest guarantee of peace. The Washingtonian doctrine was clearly enun- ciated in Washington's farewell address, and though Hamilton's influence in formulating it may be detected, it must be differentiated from that doctrine which he and Jay had sought to establish some years before. Washington was by no means prepared to counsel a policy of commercial ag- gression. On the contrary, he was among the first, if not the first, to declare for peaceful com- mercial expansion. His doctrine was in no sense aggressive, but on the contrary pacific. He had abiding faith in an all-wise Providence and be- lieved that the destiny of his people lay in The Washingtonian Doctrine 63 peaceful pursuits. He had constantly counselled against entangling foreign alliances and that grow- ing offensive nationalistic spirit of which he per- ceived traces while the nation was yet in its swaddling clothes. But, while he detested every form of Jingoism, and urged strict neutrality towards all European affairs, yet he never failed to encourage a healthy consciousness of national strength. In expressing his doctrine so clearly, and under circumstances which so forcefully emphasized it, Washington had a very obvious purpose. During his second term, difficulties had arisen with no less than three foreign nations. France, after overthrowing the Bourbon monarchy and estab- lishing a moderate form of republican government, much influenced by developments in America, had, in turn, overthrown the Republic and entered upon a reign of terror. The United States, shocked as were all other nations by the excesses of the French, declined to respond to their call for assistance under the treaty of alliance of 1778 between France and the United States. Out of this refusal arose innumerable difficulties and the bitterest feelings. Disputes had arisen with Great Britain over the North- West Territory, and the arbitrary searching of American vessels by British seamen, which led to the Jay treaty difficulties; and Spain had threatened to repudiate the treaty of 1795 dealing with the navigation of the Missis- sippi River. Under such circumstances, it was 64 Empire and Armament not difficult for Washington to foresee the dangers ahead, which dangers prompted him to give his timely warning to his countrymen. Adams's administration was indeed a stormy one, and a grave military problem demanded solu- tion upon his taking over the reins of government. Relative to the national defence, his views were clearly expressed. In a speech to both Houses of Congress, May 16, 1797, he said: But although the establishment of a permanent system of naval defence appears to be requisite, I am sensible it cannot be formed so speedily and exten- sively as the present crisis demands. . . . But besides a protection of our commerce on the seas, I think it highly necessary to protect it at home, where it is collected in our most important ports. The distance of the United States from Europe, and the well-known promptitude, ardour, and courage of the people in the defence of their country, happily diminish the probability of invasion. Nevertheless, to guard against sudden and predatory incursions, the situation of some of our principal seaports demands your consideration; and as our country is vulnerable in other interests besides those of its commerce, you will seriously deliberate whether the means of general defence ought not to be increased by an addition to the regular artillery and cavalry, and by arrangements for forming a provisional army. With the same view, and as a measure which, even at a time of universal peace, ought not to be neglected, I recommend to your consideration a revision of the laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the mili- The Washingtonian Doctrine 65 tia, to render that natural and safe defence of the country efficacious. By the foregoing speech Adams virtually de- clared his allegiance to the conservative but firm Washingtonian doctrine, and, however unwilling he may have been to plunge into war, there was no doubt that he was desirous of preparing for the contingency of a conflict. In May, 1798, an act of Congress provided for a provisional force of 10,000 men to be enlisted for a period of three years in the event of a decla- ration of war by France against the United States, or in case of imminent or actual invasion by the enemy, and, in addition to this force, the President was empowered to accept volunteers. This law, undoubtedly greatly influenced by Washington, who was to be commander-in-chief of the pro- posed army, marks a very notable departure in our military policy, for regulars and volunteers were to be relied on instead of militia. The fact, however, that the law was good in this respect did not relieve the seriousness of the situation, for the contemplated army was not to come into being until the enemy had actually assailed, or prepared to assail, the United States. Writing to James McHenry, Secretary of War, in October, 1798, John Adams deplored the lack of a comprehensive and well-considered plan of national defence and in an address to both Houses of Congress the following December, he said: 66 Empire and Armament Among the measures of preparation which appear expedient I take the liberty to call your attention to the naval establishment. The beneficial effects of the small naval armament provided under the acts of the last session are known and acknowledged. Perhaps no country ever experienced more sudden and remark- able advantage from any measure of policy than we have derived from the army for our maritime protec- tion and defence. We ought, without loss of time, to lay the foundation for an increase in our navy, to a size sufficient to guard our coast and protect our trade. Such a naval force as it is doubtless in the power of the United States to create and maintain, would also afford to them the best means of general defence, by facilitating the safe transportation of troops and stores to every part of our extensive coast. April 27, 1799, Adams had written Stoddert, Secretary of the Navy, as follows : I own that the navy has not afforded to our com- merce that complete protection which might have been expected from it, considering the vast inferiority of all the French force, both of public and private ships, in the West Indies And in replying to the answer of the House of Representatives to a speech delivered by him December 23, 1798, Adams wrote* . . . With you I cordially agree, that so long as predatory war is carried on against commerce, we should sacrifice the interests and disappoint the ex- The Washingtonian Doctrine 67 pectations of our constituents, should we for a moment relax that system of maritime defence, which has re- sulted in such beneficial effects. With you I con- fidently believe, that few persons can be found within the United States who do not admit that a navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient defence of this country against all foreign hostility. But while Adams w T as not remiss in directing the attention of Congress to the need of a plan of national defence, Hamilton was the man of the hour. At the time of the Whiskey Rebellion, Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, had actually accom- panied the troops dispatched against the insur- gents. Throughout this whole affair, he had urged the adoption of a vigorous repressive policy on the part of the National Government. In January, 1795, he had retired to private life, but continued in close touch with public affairs, and was con- stantly consulted by Washington. In 1798, at Washington's request, he had been placed at the virtual head of the army when hostilities with France first appeared imminent, and, while acting in this capacity with the rank of major-general and the duties of inspector-general, he devoted himself with energy and consummate ability to the task of organizing the army. He was particularly energetic in preparing for the invasion of Louisiana and the Floridas. Hamilton's aggressive military policy at this time was in striking contrast to the vacillation 68 Empire and Armament and indecision of Congress. In a letter to Otis dated December 27, 1798, he wrote: In the enclosed extract of a letter to another of the government, you will find my ideas generally on the subject of your letter. I adopt this method of com- munication as equally effectual and best adapted to the multiplicity of my avocations. Some additional remarks in direct reference to your particular ques- tions may perhaps be requisite to fulfil your object. Any reduction of the actual force appears to me inexpedient. It will argue to our enemy that we are either very narrow in our resources or that our jealousy of his designs is abated. Besides that, with a view to the possibility of internal disorder alone, the force authorized is not too considerable. The efficiency of militia for suppressing such disorders is not too much to be relied upon. The experience of the west- ern expedition ought not to be forgotten. That was a very uphill business. There were more than one appearances to excite alarm as to the perseverance of the troops, and it is not easy to foresee what might have been the result had there been serious resistance. The repetition of similar exertions may be found very difficult, insomuch as to render it extremely needful, in these precarious times, to have the government armed with the whole of the force which has been voted. There are several defects in the military estab- lishment which demand reform as well for economy as efficiency. On these there has been an ample com- munication from the commander-in-chief to the De- partment of War. I cannot conceive why nothing The Washingtonian Doctrine 69 has yet gone to progress. Will it be amiss informally to interrogate the minister? If the silence is per- sisted in, you shall know from me the objects. The extract answers your question as to the pro- visional army. I think the act respecting the eighty thousand militia ought likewise to be revived. The effect abroad will be good, and it will likewise be so at home, as the evidence of a reliance of the govern- ment on the militia. Good policy does not appear to me to require ex- tensive appropriations for fortifications at the present juncture. Money can be most usefully employed in other ways. A good deal of previous examination ought to lead to a plan for fortifying three or four cardinal points. More than this will be a misappli- cation of money. Secure positions for arsenals and dockyards are in this view a primary object. Your last question respecting the West India Islands, I shall reserve for a future communication. June 27, 1799, he wrote McHenry, Secretary of War, as follows: It is a pity, my dear sir, and a reproach, that our administration have no general plan. Certainly there ought to be one formed without delay. If the chief is too desultory, his ministry ought to be the more united and steady, and well-settled in some reasonable system of measures. Among other things, it should be agreed what pre- cise force should be created, naval and land, and this proportioned to the state of our finances. It will be ridiculous to raise troops, and immediately after dis- band them. Six ships of the line, and twenty frigates 70 Empire and Armament and sloops of war are desirable. More would not now be comparatively expedient. It is desirable to com- plete and prepare the land force which has been pro- vided for by law. Besides eventual security against invasion, we ought certainly to look to the possession of the Floridas and Louisiana, and we ought to squint at South A merica. l It is possible that the accomplishment of these objects can be attended with financial difficulty? I deny the possibility. Our revenue can be consider- ably reinforced. The progress of the country will quickly supply small deficiencies, and these can be temporarily satisfied by loans, provided our loans are made on the principle that we require the aliment of European capital, — that lenders are to gain, and their gains to be facilitated, not obstructed. If all this is not true, our situation is much worse than I had any idea of. But I have no doubt that it is easy to devise the means of execution. And if there was everywhere a disposition, without prejudice and nonsense, to concert a rational plan, I would cheerfully come to Philadelphia and assist in it ; nor can I doubt that success may be insured. Break this subject to our friend Pickering. His views are sound and energetic. Try together to bring the other gentlemen to a consulation. If there is everywhere a proper temper, and it is wished, send for me, and I will come. Yours truly, A. Hamilton. In December, 1799, Hamilton drew up the following plan of national defence: 1 Author's italics. An imperialistic squint? The Washingtonian Doctrine 71 Further Measures Advisable to be Taken without Delay: I. To authorize the President to proceed forthwith to raise the 10,000 men already ordered. II. To establish an academy for military and naval instruction. This is a very important measure and ought to be permanent. III. To provide for the immediate raising of a corps of non-commissioned officers, viz., sergeants and corporals, sufficient with the present establish- ment for an army of 50,000 men. The having these men prepared and disciplined, will accelerate ex- tremely the disciplining of an additional force. IV. To provide before Congress rise, that in case it shall appear that an invasion of this country by a large army is actually on foot, there shall be a draft from the militia to be classed, of a number suffi- cient to complete the army of 30,000 men. Provi- sion for volunteers in lieu of drafts. A bounty to be given. V. To authorize the President to provide a further naval force of six ships of the line, and twelve frigates, with twenty small vessels not exceeding sixteen guns. It is possible the ships of the line and frigates may be purchased of Great Britain to be paid for in stock. We ought to be ready to cut up all the small privateers and gunboats in the West Indies, so as at the same time to distress the French Islands as much as possible and protect our trade. The war with France, which had seemed so imminent, was avoided more by reason of France's preoccupation with the great coalition of Powers 72 Empire and Armament which Napoleon's startling successes had given rise to, than by any act of the United States, the weakness of which caused it to be held in contempt by the French people. There occurred one sharp naval engagement, resulting in success for the American seamen under Commodore Truxton, and some privateering took place, but peaceful relations between the two countries were re-estab- lished in September, 1800. Soon after the peace convention was concluded Adams addressed Con- gress in the following words: . . . While our best endeavours for the preservation of harmony with all nations will continue to be used, the experience of the world and our own experience admonish us of the futility of trusting too confidently to their success. We cannot, without committing a dangerous imprudence, abandon those measures of self-protection, which are adapted to our situation, and to which, notwithstanding our pacific policy, the violence and injustice of others may again compel us to assent. While our vast extent of seacoast, the commercial and agricultural habits of our people, the great capital they will continue to trust on the ocean, suggest the system of defence which will be most bene- ficial to ourselves, our distance from Europe, and our resources for maritime strength, will enable us to employ it with effect. Seasonable and systematic arrangements, so far as our resources will justify, for a navy adapted to defensive war, and which may in case of necessity be brought quickly into one, seem to be recommended as much by a wise and true econ- omy as by a just regard for our future tranquillity, The Washingtonian Doctrine 73 for the safety of our shores, and for the protection of our property entrusted to the ocean. The present navy of the United States, called sud- denly into existence by a great national exigency, has raised us in our own esteem; and by the protection afforded to our commerce has effected to the extent of our expectations the objects for which it was created. In connection with a navy ought to be contemplated the fortification of some of our principal seaports and harbours. A variety of considerations, which will readily suggest themselves, urge an attention to this measure of precaution. To give security to our prin- cipal ports, considerable sums have already been ex- pended, but the works remain incomplete. It is for Congress to determine whether additional appropria- tions shall be made in order to render competent to the intended purposes the fortifications which have been commenced. The manufacture of arms within the United States still invites the attention of the national legislature. At a considerable expense to the public this manufac- tory has been brought to such a state of maturity as, with continued encouragement, will supersede the necessity of further importations from foreign countries. The writer has endeavoured to show by means of the writings and speeches of Washington, Hamilton, Adams, and Jay, how continuously a number of our foremost statesmen had laboured to educate their countrymen up to the appreciation of the necessity of some plan of national defence. It cannot be said that Hamilton and Jay had made 74 Empire and Armament any considerable headway in establishing their doctrine of foreign commercial aggression, but certain it is that much progress had been made along more conservative lines. Indeed, the Wash- ingtonian doctrine had almost become established. At this juncture, however, Jefferson at the head of democracy came into power, and, within a year, a distinct retrogression had set in, for, by act of March 16, 1802, the regular army was greatly reduced. From this time until the end of Jefferson's second term of office, all military measures, whether offensive or defensive in char- acter, looked solely to the employment of volun- teers and militia, and, even when war with Spain was impending in 1803, no provision whatever was made for the increase of the regular army. Jefferson may have been an ardent advocate of peace, but he was no more so than Washington. The difference between them on this point was: Washington believed in being prepared to prevent war by a show of force which would compel respect, while Jefferson professed to believe that he could maintain peace by removing what he viewed as a tempting cause of war. From Paris, when war with France was threatening the United States, he wrote Washington : Upon the whole, I think peace advantageous to us, necessary for Europe, and desirable for Humanity. A few days will decide, probably, whether all these considerations are to give way to the bad passions of kings, and those who would be kings. The Washingtonian Doctrine 75 It is possible Jefferson intended a veiled refer- ence in this letter to certain Americans as well as to Napoleon as belonging to the category of those "who would be kings." Mr. Bancroft says of Washington: "Like almost every great warrior, he hated war, and wished to see the plague of mankind banished from the earth." In 1785, Washington himself said to one of the French officers who had served under him: I never expect to draw my sword again. I can scarcely conceive the cause that would induce me to do it. My wish is to see the whole world in peace, and its inhabitants one band of brothers striving who would contribute most to the happiness of mankind. Washington did stand prepared, however, in 1798, to draw his sword again, when his country called him to its defence; but he never failed to plead for peace when compatible with the dignity of this country, and he was not disappointed to keep his sword sheathed even though prepared to draw it if needs be. We must not hold Jeffer- son's mere professions in more esteem than Washington's frequent demonstrations of the love of peace. CHAPTER VII JEFFERSON AND HIS MILITARY POLICY WE may accept it as a fact that Jefferson was the first great American to give impulse to the propaganda of disarmament. Of course he did not originate the theory of disarmament, nor did he repose for any length of time his faith in the theory, but his early actions as President did do much to give strength to the innumerable theorists who believed that an Utopia of peace was at hand and ready to be proclaimed. A distinction must be made between a pacifist and a mere lover of peace. A man may ardently long for peace without entertaining any visionary theories as to how to secure it. A pacifist, on the other hand, is one who is not only devoted to the cause of peace but who entertains some "ism" which he claims to be an elixir for the ill of war. He either rejects in toto the evolutionary theory of Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley, that human strife is a concomitant of human progress, or ac- cepting the facts of nature as revealed in history, sets himself to the task of establishing a substitute 76 Jefferson and his Military Policy 77 for the underlying cosmic principles which pro- duce those facts. The writer has already suggested that Jefferson might now properly be styled a socialist. His assaults on the established institutions of his day, for instance the State church, estates entail, primo- geniture, and his uncompromising attacks on capital, certainly distinguish him in the democracy of his day, if together they do not differentiate him from the ordinary man who claimed to be of his political faith. In his views on peace and how to attain it, we find but another evidence substan- tiating our claim that he should be rated as a pre- cursor of Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Blanc, Marx, Engels, and others, closely or distantly related as their disciples may claim them to be. Their creeds may have differed, but a common conviction was entertained by them all: "A wonderful day a-coming when all shall be better than well." Jefferson, then, holding such convictions, at first claimed that as President he could do much to hasten the coming of that "wonderful da ," though perhaps he might not actually be able to bring it about. Among his first measures, there- fore, were those reducing the army and navy. His views on the necessities of armament and the national defence may best be established by his own words. In a letter to Kosciusko, dated April 2, 1802, he made the boast : 78 Empire and Armament We keep in service no more than men enough to garrison the small posts disposed at great distances on the frontier. . . . They [Congress, *. e., the first Congress convened since republicanism had gained its ascendancy] have reduced the army and navy to what is above necessity. They are disarming execu- tive patronage, and preponderance, by putting down half the officers of the United States which are no longer necessary. Jefferson was at least premature in seeking to put into effect his theories of disarmament, and of this fact his own actions are the best proof. Hardly had he begun to enforce his policy when the Barbary States of North Africa, despising our flag for its weakness, ignored their treaties with the United States and undertook to break up that trade which Hamilton and Jay and Adams had done so much to encourage with our guns. Added to the overt acts of the Mohammedans was the secret treaty of Napoleon with Spain looking to the transfer of Spanish Louisiana to France. Jefferson's theories of peace at once went up in smoke. His note was now very discordant with the tone of peace. In a letter dated February 25, 1803, in which he appealed to the State govern- ments to enforce rigidly the existing militia law, he added: None but an armed nation can dispense with a standing army; to keep ours armed and disciplined is, therefore, at all times important, but is especially so at a moment when rights the most essential to our Jefferson and his Military Policy 79 welfare have been violated, and an infraction of Treaty committed without colour or pretext; and although we are willing to believe that this has been the act of a subordinate agent only, yet it is wise to prepare for the possibility that it may have been the leading measure of a system. Then he writes, while peace negotiations are being conducted, "let us arm the strength of the nation and be ready to do with promptitude and effect whatever a regard to justice and our future security may require." From this letter, we see that, whatever Jeffer- son's theories of peace may have been at the time he became President, in 1803 he had in mind no practicable substitute for national arms with which to maintain peace. That his practice was abso- lutely inconsistent with his theories is further evidenced by the fact that not even during the peace negotiations of which he spoke and had full knowledge, was he willing to forego that threat of armed conflict which ordinarily proves to be an immediate cause of war. Arbitration is capable of embracing only the subjugation or control of the proximate and immediate causes of disputes — it rarely embraces the ultimate causes which can be perceived only in the retrospect and out of which the proximate and immediate causes grow. These latter are but the excrescences, the super- ficial signs, of an old distemper which has irre- vocably produced its ill effects. In these facts 80 Empire and Armament are to be found the impotence of peace confer- ences which rely for the removal of the cancer of international antagonisms exclusively upon the application of the arbitral balm to the surface sore. Peace advocates are unable, as a rule, to detect the generative process of the malignant growth of war until its roots are firmly imbedded in the national body, and until the proximate and immediate causes of strife make their ap- pearance. Jefferson's theory had been that to disarm the nation of which he was the political head would remove those dangerous temptations which lead to war. He failed at first to perceive, as do all disarmamentists, that these temptations which he sought to remove from his own nation might pre- sent themselves to some nation that did not disarm, or even if disarmed, one that was capable of arming more quickly and efficiently than his own. The fallacy of Jefferson's position was estab- lished by his own energetic course in calling his country to arms to back up a dispute in which it became involved while disarmed, and even while it was being sought to solve the difficulties by arbitration. That he had slight faith in arbitra- tion and was unwilling to depend upon peaceful methods in this dispute is proved conclusively by his own words — "let us arm the strength of the nation and be ready to do with promptitude and effect whatever a regard to justice and our future security may require." Jefferson and his Military Policy 81 From the foregoing words of counsel, which do not seem at all consistent with Disarmament, Pacifism, and Jefferson's other "isms," we are compelled to conclude that he did not really be- lieve in disarmament in practice, but only in theory, and that his theory was based on the same ancient prejudice against standing armies that had so firmly gripped the American people from the first. Events proved that he was willing enough to employ force in the settlement of an international dispute so long as force was to be exerted through the old medium of the militia. He had, therefore, utterly failed to learn the military lessons of the Revolution, and sacrificed the economy of pre- paredness to his unreasoning prejudice, which prejudice he sought to veil by professions incon- sistent with his acts and his own words. Fortunately, for the United States, the necessity of fighting Napoleon's superb legions with Ameri- can militia did not arise, for, in 1803, the United States acquired by purchase from France the Louisiana territory, thus removing the cause of the trouble between the two countries. The internal dissensions arising out of Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana, an act declared by many to be unconstitutional, caused Jefferson to relin- quish all idea of relying on the militia of the States for the sole support of the Federal Government. He could not now fail to perceive the advantages of a standing army over the "paper troops" of States in no less than six of which secession from 82 Empire and Armament the Union was actually being discussed! It was in the new light which spread over him at this time that he approved the act providing for the establishment of a national military academy on the Hudson, the creation of which had been so ardently urged by Knox, Washington, Steuben, Hamilton, Pickering, and McHenry. The purpose of this academy was, of course, to furnish the country with a permanent corps of trained officers ! The rumblings of an impending conflict, this time with Great Britain, were now again all too audible to permit Jefferson to theorize on peace and attempt to put into effect those theories in which apparently he had grown to repose less faith than formerly. But the harm had been done and the evils which he had induced by his policy of dismantling the navy were upon the country, for British seamen were again offensively active in their depredations upon our trade. For years the British policy had been to restrain our commercial growth. As early as 1803, an English statesman was believed to have declared, ' ' If there were no Algiers, we would have to con- struct one," and yet, in the face of such a threat, Jefferson had successfully persisted in his efforts to render our foreign trade helpless, and place our growing merchant marine at the mercy of hostile interference. To counteract the evils of which he was the author, Jefferson, in 1807, resorted to retaliatory measures in the form of embargo acts, which of Jefferson and his Military Policy 83 course did not compensate for our own loss of trade, however much they may have annoyed Great Britain. As a matter of fact they not only proved disastrous to our commercial and agricultural interests, but constituted new proximate causes for the war which followed. Indeed, our com- mercial interests openly charged that Jefferson was seeking to provoke Great Britain into hostili- ties, a view which the British very naturally adopted. In the midst of the difficulties with Great Britain, Congress authorized the President to employ the land and naval forces of the United States in the same manner and under the same conditions as prescribed for the militia, and this within four years of the time when Jefferson declared that by keeping up the militia a regular army could be dispensed with! It was but a step from the creation of the Mili- tary Academy, and the authorization of the Pre- sident to make greater use of the regular army than had been allowed him in the past, to the increase of the Federal military force in 1808 when war seemed probable. All this happened during Jeffer- son's second term in office; that he sanctioned it is an unquestionable fact. In 1809, Madison succeeded as President to the "political mess" Jefferson had stewed for him. Connecticut and Massachusetts had actually enunciated the doctrine of nullification as a result of Jefferson's retaliatory policy against Great 84 Empire and Armament Britain, which had so disastrously affected their trade. Insults had been heaped upon the national flag both by France and England, and, going unre- sented, had caused an evident loss of national respect at home and abroad. A navy worthy of the name did not exist; the small regular army existed only on paper ; and American shipping lay idle in home harbours, or helpless on the high seas. Such had been Jefferson's uncertain and mixed military policy of disarmament and sudden re- armament, arbitration and retaliation, and peace- ful submission to insults followed by sudden threats of war, that not only the British but the American people were provoked into a state of dangerous resentment. In the eight years he served as President, not a single advance towards the peaceful solution of our international problems did he bring about. Leaving the country involved in the most serious difficulties, domestic and for- eign, he devoted the next few years to theorizing, and to an attempt to excuse its losses by dwelling on the loss he had caused the enemy ! In another famous letter to Kosciusko, dated April 13, 181 1, written in the tranquillity of his Virginia home, far removed from the turmoil which he had created, he wrote : We, therefore, remained in peace, suffering frequent injuries, but on the whole multiplying, improving, prospering beyond all example. It is evident to all that in spite of great loss much greater gains have Jefferson and his Military Policy 85 ensued. When these gladiators shall have worried each other into ruin or reason, instead of lying among the dead on the bloody arena, we shall have acquired a growth and strength which will place us hors but of course such a small force was easily controlled, and besides, necessity had saddled it upon the country. The Canadian difficulties in one section had hardly been settled when a fresh altercation broke out along the Maine border. The old dispute had never been entirely ended and now flared up with added heat. The British and American people were both passionate in demanding war, and to meet the situation Congress in March, 1839, directed the President to resist British encroach- ments and empowered him to call on the States for such a force of militia as circumstances might require. At this time nine of the thirteen regular regiments, including all the artillery, were in Florida, and the rest distributed along the fron- tier. To make the militia more efficient it was designed by the War Department to concentrate The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 161 State troops at various points, for purposes of training, without regard to State territory. The plan produced a storm of protest, and even Daniel Webster in his famous Bunker Hill speech of September 10, 1840, vigorously assailed it as an unconstitutional measure. Said Webster: We protest against the plan of the Administration respecting the training and disciplining of the militia. The President now admits it to be unconstitutional; and it is plainly so, on the face of it, for the training of the militia is by the Constitution expressly reserved to the States. If it were not unconstitutional, it would yet be unnecessary, burdensome, entailing enormous expenses, and placing dangerous power in executive hands. It belongs to the prolific family of executive projects, and it is a consolation to find that at least one of its projects has been so scorched by public rebuke and reprobation, that no man raises his hand or opens his mouth in its favour. And in Richmond, on the 5th of October, he delivered an address in which he said: The terms used are the most precise and particular : "Congress may provide for calling out the militia to execute the laws, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion." These three cases are specified, and these are all. . . . March the militia of Virginia to Wheeling to be drilled! Why such a thing never entered into the head of any man, never, never. . . . It adds a negative in those golden words reserving to the States the appointment of officers and the training of the militia. That's it. Read this clause, 162 Empire and Armament and then read Mr. Poinsett's project that the militia are to be trained by the President ! Poinsett's wise plan met with such little favour that it was abandoned. It is mentioned here simply to indicate the beginning of a struggle on the part of the Federal Government to get control of the militia that continues to the present day and which must ultimately succeed if the State troops are to be of any real value to the country in time of serious need. The Doctrine of Federal Coercion, asserted by Jackson, had not only estranged Clay and Calhoun from the Democratic party, but as time passed and their influence made itself felt more and more in the South, the feeling against coercion intensified and extended. Neither Clay nor Calhoun pos- sessed the strength to obtain the Presidency, but Clay was strong enough to dictate a candidate to defeat Van Buren for re-election. As a Demo- crat Van Buren represented the Jacksonian Doc- trine of Federal Coercion, which lost him the vote of the South, and as a President unwilling to plunge the country into war with England on every pretext, he antagonized the Jingoes of the North. Clay perceived the opportunity he had to con- solidate the Jingo opposition with that of the South, and shrewdly brought about the strange combination of two elements, one deprecating the use of too much force, the other demanding that more be used, by nominating General William The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism T63 Henry Harrison. The South knew that Harrison's election would be a virtual victory for Clay who would be the real power behind the throne. The West largely supported Harrison because he was its own rough and ready son. The Jingoes only knew that he was a soldier who had won great repute in the War of 18 12, and they wanted above all things a soldier President — such another as Jackson. They desired to capitalize the very qualities of the soldier which are responsible for the prejudices ordinarily existing against him. In the popular mind it is too often assumed that all soldiers are inherent autocrats, incapable of exercising their power except for arbitrary ends; it erroneously concludes that, between the rapid decision of the soldier and his determination in enforcing his will, there exists some essential rela- tion to a predisposition lending itself to radical views and conduct. The mental process by which the man uninitiated into military affairs by educa- tion or training arrives at such beliefs is not as strange as it appears to be to military men in general, who overlook the fact that tyrants have invariably set themselves up and maintained their sway by the employment of military force, and that only the tyrants, and not those who have exercised great military power to the sole advan- tage of the people, are ordinarily recalled to the popular mind. They fail to understand that men like Washington and Jackson, who exercised almost dictatorial military power, soon lose their 164 Empire and Armament features as military dictators because of the fact that their power was not arbitrarily employed against the people; in other words, that when a military leader employs his power to the advantage of his country he is known to posterity as a states- man or as a wise ruler, and that when he uses it to the end of self-aggrandizement he is known in history as an ambitious, designing, tyrannical soldier. The result is that time tends to hide the patience, the loyalty, the devotion, the faith- fulness, and the self-sacrifice of military men as a class, and to throw into relief the vicious nature of a few as the typical characteristic of all soldiers. But if the American people had drawn unwar- ranted conclusions as to Jackson, the Jingoes were destined to do the same in the case of Harrison. He was a soldier, but was also a rational man, and there was nothing arbitrary or ultra-radical about his nature. Harrison wanted Clay to become his Secretary of State, but for political reasons Clay preferred to remain independent, and Webster accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs, retaining it after the death of Harrison and the succession of Tyler. Tyler and Webster together solved the difficul- ties of the Maine-Canada boundary dispute with England, which, due to the passions of the people, seriously threatened war. Jingoism was again rampant; the Senate was hostile to Tyler, and it was not due to any desire or effort on the part of the American people as a whole that war was The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 165 averted. Indeed, their insistance upon war seri- ously embarrassed Webster. In 1843, Webster retired from office and Cal- houn became Tyler's Secretary of State. That Jackson had not failed to establish the right of the Federal Government to employ Federal troops in suppressing internal disorders was evidenced by the use of such troops during Tyler's Adminis- tration to put down Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island. Thus we see that the principle of coer- cion was adopted by the Whigs. As early as 1 836 Calhoun had declared in favour of the annexation of Texas, and the project was revived upon his becoming Secretary of State. Learning of the movement on foot, Mexico noti- fied the United States that annexation would be regarded as a cause of war. Calhoun was a strong advocate of annexation. One reason, among others, why he desired annexa- tion may have been suggested in a speech he made in the Senate on the "Three Million Bill," provid- ing funds for the prosecution of the Mexican War, in February, 1847. On that occasion, in referring to the country's need of more territory, he said: What we want is space for our growing population — and what we ought to avoid is the addition of other population of a character not suited to our institu- tions. We want room to grow. We are increasing at the rate of 600,000 annually, and in a short time the increase will be at the rate of 1,000,000. To state it more strongly — we double once in twenty-three 166 Empire and Armament years ; so that at the end of that period we will number forty millions, and in another twenty-three years, eighty millions, if no disaster befalls us. For this rapidly growing population all the territory we now possess, and even that which we might acquire, would in the course of a few generations be needed. It is better for our people and institutions, that our popu- lation should not be too much compressed. But it must not be assumed that Calhoun had any imperialistic designs upon Mexico. On the contrary, in the speech already quoted from, he delivered an opinion on what our relations to Mexico should be that might be pondered with advantage today. His counsel was as follows : When I said there was a mysterious connection between the fate of our country and that of Mexico, I had reference to the great fact that we stood in such relation to her that we could make no disposition of Mexico, as a subject or conquered nation, that would not prove disastrous to us; nor could we conquer and subdue her without great sacrifice and injurious effects to our institutions. Hence my opinion, already expressed, that it is our true policy not to weaken or humble her, but to desire to see her under a safe and stable government, and capable of sustaining all the relations which ought to exist between independent nations. Clay, Benton, and Webster succeeded in de- feating the treaty of annexation when first brought before the Senate, notwithstanding Calhoun's The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 167 advocacy of the measure. Their successful oppo- sition, however, at this time only postponed the consummation of the plan. Polk, who was nomi- nated to succeed Tyler on a platform of expansion which contemplated the annexation of Texas and Oregon, was elected in 1844. In December, 1845, the independent Republic of Texas was annexed, and in 1846 war was declared upon Mexico. Polk brought the Mexican War to a successful close in 1848. The fruits of that war were an agreement on the part of Mexico relinquishing all claims to all her former territory north of the Rio Grande, and the cession by Mexico to the United States of New Mexico and Upper California. The empire that the United States gained by the war embraced the present territory of Texas, California, Nevada, and Utah, with parts of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming. Again it must not be assumed that because the spirit of nationalism had seized upon the American people, that because the Jingo had made them more aggressive, they were less prejudiced against permanent military institutions in 1846 than they had been three quarters of a century before. Our public men were deep students of Tocque- ville, whose celebrated work, Democracy in Amer- ica, written in 1835, had become the national political primer. Tocqueville had done much to lull them into a false sense of security. "The great advantage of the United States," he wrote, ' ' does not consist in a Federal Constitution which i68 Empire and Armament allows them to carry on great wars, but in a geo- graphical position which renders such enterprises improbable." And, adds Tocqueville: "After all, and in spite of all precautions, a large army and a democratic people will always be a source of great danger; the most effectual means of di- minishing that danger would be to reduce the army. . . ." Statistics would seem to indicate that our Government had weaned itself from such fallacies, for they show that 31 ,024 regular troops and 73,532 volunteers were employed during the Mexican War. These features alone would indicate that our military policy had improved in as much as United States volunteers instead of militia were employed, and in as much as the regular army bore a higher proportion to the raw troops than in any previous war. The facts are, however, that the first battles were fought with but 2000 regulars, and that General Scott was forced to enter the Mexican capital with but 6000 men. The largest number vScott ever had before that event was 13,500. Had adequate measures been taken to provide him at first with the great army finally raised, the war would have been shorter and far less costly in men and money. But notwithstanding its un- necessary prolongation and the stupidity with which it was conducted, the Mexican War did in one respect mark a great revolution in American military policy, for it witnessed the complete decay of the old militia system. No longer was The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 169 the militia to be regarded as the "great bulwark of national defence." But the lesson was only partly learned for President Polk himself in lauding the expedient of employing volunteers, admitted his failure to perceive the utterly absurd extravagance of the system, however superior it may have been to the old one. In his message to Congress, December, 1846, he stated: Well may the American people be proud of the energy and gallantry of our regular and volunteer officers and soldiers. The events of these few months afford a gratifying proof that our country can, under any emergency, confidently rely for the maintenance of her honour and the defence of her rights on an effective force ready at all times voluntarily to relin- quish the comforts of home for the perils and privations of the camp. And though such a force may be for the time expensive, it is in the end eco- nomical, as the ability to command it removes the ne- cessity of employing a large standing army in time of peace and proves that our people love their institu- tions and are ever ready to defend and protect them. It can hardly be denied that President Polk anticipated war with Mexico by at least two years. Mexico had since 1 837 threatened war in the event Texas were annexed, and in 1844, the very plat- form on which Polk was elected demanded an- nexation. For him, then, in 1846 to speak of the economy of employing over 73,000 volunteers and 31,000 regulars against the 36,000 troops of the 170 Empire and Armament enemy, when the regular army alone if increased to 30,000 in time, would have sufficed, was nothing short of criminal stupidity. That others beside Polk were obsessed with such ignorance is manifest from the speech of Webster, at this same time (December, 1846), in which he said, in part: I might go further, and say that at Bunker Hill the newly raised levies and recruits sheltered them- selves behind some temporary defences, but at Mon- terey the volunteers assailed a fortified city. At any rate, Gentlemen, whatever we may think of the origin of the contest which called them there, it is gratifying to see to what extent the military power of the Union may be depended on, whenever the exigencies of the country may require it. It is grati- fying to know that, without the expense or the danger of large standing armies, there is enough military spirit, enough intelligence, enough perseverance, and patience, and submission to discipline, amongst the young men of the country to uphold our stars and stripes whenever the Government may order them to be unfurled. The views expressed by Polk and Webster, were not only generally entertained in 1846, but in 1866, and they are widely adhered to at the present time. John Randolph Tucker, an eminent com- mentator on the Constitution, writing well after the war between the States, in enumerating the agencies which lend themselves to despotism, says: The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 171 Another and more fearful instrument of despotism is a standing armed force, which, organized to and habituated to the discipline of obedience to author- ity, are the reliable defenders of power against the unorganized forces of rebellion. In this unqualified expression Mr. Tucker at- tempts no distinction between a permanent force of trained citizens and a permanent force of mer- cenaries, and he has done more harm than good, for it is certainly in the unqualified sense that his remark will be accepted by the people whose prejudices time and experience have done so little to remove. Story, Curtis, Burgess, and other commentators on the Constitution, admitting the necessity of a Federal military force, have sought to teach the American people that such a force is indispens- able to their own protection and that of the Govern- ment. Their works have done much to obliterate among the educated the prejudices engendered by Jefferson, De Tocqueville, and other writers of authority, and to show them that such a standing army as may be maintained under our Constitu- tion is necessarily bereft of the vicious features of ancient mercenary forces which were indeed "instruments of tyranny." But the old prejudice continues to find expression in the highest counsels. Mr. Bryan, the late Secretary of State, exerts himself on every possible occasion to foment it. It was but recently that Senator Teller said in the Senate: "The fighting force of a republic is the 172 Empire and Armament great body of the people, and not a paid soldiery- called regulars. You must rely upon the people and not upon an army. An army is a vain delu- sion. It may today be for you; it may be against you tomorrow." Thus do such statesmen of mediaeval thought mislead their people. The national policy represented by Polk may justly be deemed imperialistic in as much as it had in view the addition of, and actually did succeed in leading to the acquisition of, so vast an empire at the expense of a foreign Power. Polk not only totally disregarded the Washingtonian doctrine of strict neutrality, but he went even beyond the Hamiltonian conception of mere trade expansion, and the Clay-Calhoun doctrine that government is protection, and that a State is not limited to defensive measures to preserve its rights. In vain did Calhoun seek to stem the tide of imperialism. Declaring that he had op- posed the war, which his own determination to annex Texas had brought about, first on the ground that it was easily avoidable, second on the ground that the President had exceeded his authority in ordering troops into the disputed territory, and third on the ground of policy, in 1848 he cried out against its continuance. Said he : But now other topics occupy the attention of Con- gress and of the country — military glory, extension of the Empire, and the aggrandizement of the country. To what is this great change to be attributed? Is it because there has been a decay of the spirit of liberty The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 173 among the people? I think not. I believe that it was never more ardent. The true cause is, that we have ceased to remember the tenure by which liberty alone can be preserved. We have had so many years of prosperity — passed through so many difficulties and dangers without the loss of liberty — that we begin to think that we hold it by right divine from heaven itself. Under this impression, without thinking or reflecting, we plunge into war, contract heavy debts, increase vastly the patronage of the Executive, and indulge in every species of extravagance, without thinking that we expose our liberty to hazard. It is a great and fatal mistake. The day of retribution will come; and when it does, awful will be the reckon- ing, and heavy the responsibility somewhere. And again the same year, when hostilities had just ceased, Calhoun said: I hope we shall never take, by an aggressive war, one foot of territory by conquest. We pay by the treaty the full value — more than the full value — a hundred times more than the full value, as far as Mexico is concerned; for it is worse than useless to her, and I rejoice it is so. I wish to square accounts liberally and justly with Mexico, and we have done so, and hence my desire that Mexico shall ratify this treaty and receive this money. Were the foregoing remarks intended for pure sarcasm? Whether so or not, Calhoun had been too late in his protests against war and his pro- testations of regret. It was beyond his power, in 1848, by such methods, as it was on the part of 174 Empire and Armament the Government by the payment of money, to destroy the spirit and correct the evils of the grow- ing imperialism. For them he was largely respon- sible, and his attitude was typical of others who loudly deplore war while their double dealings with peace induce it. And so in Calhoun, the self-professed lover of peace, we find much guilt of war, just as we found the great pacifist Jeffer- son in one breath declaring peace desirable at all cost, but war to be Providential, and secretly egging on his Government to renew the strife on the slightest pretence! The truth is these great men, like so many others who profess to love peace, wanted, as pointed out by Tolstoi, only that peace which would enable them to impose upon the world the pax Romana. Polk was at least frank. He professed none of the philosophic optimism of Rousseau and Jefferson. His policy was distinctly realistic; he felt that his duty was to secure the existence of his State and he set about his self-imposed task with an energy and lack of regard for consequences truly Teutonic. During Tyler's Administration, Webster as Secretary of State had declined to consider a pro- position from England and France for a joint agreement with Spain as to the disposition of Cuba, stating that, while the United States did not intend to interfere with the control of Cuba by Spain, it could not consent to the ownership of the island by any other Power. The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 175 Meantime the Texan Government, after its proposals of annexation had been made to the United States in 1837, had been playing a double game. It had come to an agreement with Great Britain whereby, in return for the latter's action in securing the recognition of its independence by Mexico, Texas pledged itself not to be annexed to any other country. This agreement had been approved by Mexico, and was awaiting the final action of Texas when Calhoun became Secretary of State. Knowledge of the dealings of Texas hastened action on Calhoun's part. He entered office March 6th, and on April 12th a treaty of annexation was signed. The Russian dispute over the northwest terri- tory having been settled by treaty in 1826, the United States and Great Britain became involved, in 1845, in another serious altercation, this time over the possession of the Oregon territory. The Democratic National Convention, which nomi- nated Polk, had passed a resolution declaring for the " reoccupation " of Oregon, as well as for the " reannexation " of Texas, and the Jingoes were loudly crying "Fifty-four Forty or Fight." Thus, when Polk came into office he found the United States in contact with a foreign Power at three different points, and a high state of excitement existing in England as well as in the United States. The occasion was a propitious one for him to propose an extension of the Monroe Doctrine in furtherance of his imperialistic designs. In his 176 Empire and Armament inaugural address in 1845, he not only advocated the Oregon claim in its entirety, that is up to the fifty-fourth parallel, but he took occasion to say: It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no European colony or do- minion shall with our consent be planted or estab- lished in any part of the North American continent. This bold extension of the Monroe Doctrine only served to popularize Polk with the Jingoes at his back. Congress actually upheld him by a resolution authorizing him to give notice that the joint occupation of the disputed territory would be terminated. Fortunately for the United States the treaty finally entered into with Great Britain in June, 1846, fixing upon the forty-ninth parallel, just as the American army was entering Mexican territory, again averted war with that country. But peace was due to James Buchanan, Secretary of State, and the British Government, and not to the American people on this occasion any more than it was in 1842; indeed, in each succeeding crisis, the frenzied cries of the Jingoes for war grew less restrained. In 1848, the insurgents who had succeeded in temporarily setting aside the Mexican Govern- ment, tendered the sovereignty of Yucatan to Great Britain, Spain, and the United States. In his annual message to Congress for that year, Polk practically repeated the warning to European Governments given by him three years before. The Polk Doctrine of Imperialism 177 But not alone did the doctrine of Polk include an inhibition against the acquisition by a foreign Power of territory in the Western Hemisphere by voluntary transfer or conquest of occupied terri- tory, and against a protectorate over other American States in North America. In 1846 the encroachments of the British on the Mosquito Coast and other portions of Central America, drew from Polk some pointed declarations respecting the paramount interest of the United States in the Isth- mus of Panama, all tending to broaden the applica- tion of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was in the treaty of that year with New Granada, or Colom- bia, that the most radical departure brought about by Polk was effected. In Article 35 of that treaty the United States bound itself to ' ' guarantee posi- tively and efficaciously . . . the perfect neutral- ity of the Isthmus" [of Panama] and "the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory." Thus we see that the doctrine of Polk not only embraced coercion of the States of the Union, armed aggression against foreign States, the pre- servation of the Western Hemisphere free from foreign influence, peaceful or hostile, a protectorate over all American States in North America, but an actual guarantee of independence for at least one South American State. Verily was Polk the greatest American imperialist, by and with the consent of the American people! CHAPTER XIII JINGOISM RAMPANT THE inconsistencies in the foreign policy of the United States — that is, a self -professed deter- mination not to interfere with other American States or with the colonies of foreign States, and its actual concrete interference under Polk, natu- rally resulted in grave embarrassments. Polk had openly advocated the military occupation of Yucatan, and a bill had been introduced in the Senate authorizing such a step. Calhoun, the only surviving member of Monroe's Cabinet, combatted this action as an unwarranted extension of Monroe's Doctrine, declaring that Monroe had never contemplated the use of force, but evidence was adduced tending to show that the views of John Quincy Adams, recently deceased, were in conflict with those of Calhoun, for it was shown that Adams during Polk's Administration had de- clared it indispensably necessary to make large expenditures on armament to maintain the exclu- sive policy of Monroe. Calhoun was undoubtedly right in his contention that the Yucatan case was one to which the Monroe Doctrine was not prop- 178 Jingoism Rampant 179 erly applicable, and he so impressed his views upon Congress that Polk's recommendations were ignored. We thus see that at an early date, a President, Congress, and Monroe's Secretary of War were in thorough disaccord over the scope of the national doctrine of exclusion. But it was in 1850, during Taylor's Administra- tion, that Monroe's true policy of exclusion was fatally abandoned in the execution of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty of 1850, having for its dual objects the promotion of the construction of an inter- oceanic canal across the isthmus of Central America and the restriction of British territorial dominion in that quarter. Territorial developments on the Pacific Coast had concentrated the attention of the country upon the importance of a connecting link between the East and the West, and British activity in Central America was regarded in the United States with jealous disfavour. The settle- ment of Belize had already become a virtual col- ony of Great Britain, and it was feared that the growing British influence would soon establish a protectorate over the Mosquito Coast notwith- standing Polk's firm stand in 1846. The fatal treaty embraced a joint guarantee by Great Britain and the United States concerning the canal to be constructed, and it was agreed that neither of the signatory parties would occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise any do- minion over any part of Central America. This treaty was the first instance in which the United 180 Empire and Armament States joined with a European Power in the man- agement of political interests in the Western Hemi- sphere, and it is notable not only because it was a distinct and radical departure from the exclusive policy of Monroe, but because it undertook in concert with a foreign Power to regulate important American interests. Says Wharton: "It under- takes, in concert with a foreign Power, to deter- mine a question the most important to the United States that can arise outside of our own territory." And says Mr. Foster, Secretary of State under Harrison : The treaty marks the most serious mistake in our diplomatic history; and is the single instance, since its announcement in 1823, of a tacit disavowal or disregard of the Monroe Doctrine, by the admission of Great Britain to an equal participation in the protection and control of a great American enterprise. Upon the accession of Taylor to the Presidency in 1848, an event occurred which strikingly illus- trates the temper of the American people and their willingness to interfere in foreign affairs. The Hungarian revolt was then in progress and a great democratic uprising throughout Europe threatened the existing forms of government on that continent. The American people, far from letting foreign political affairs take their own course were intensely interested in the outcome, and Taylor, secretly dispatched an agent to Europe to study political conditions with a view Jingoism Rampant 181 to the recognition of Hungary if a way could be found to do it. Taylor went so far as to declare in his annual message to Congress in 1849, that his action had been taken in obedience to American sentiment in order that the United States might be the first to welcome Hungary, should her inde- pendence be established, into the sisterhood of nations. This confession disclosed the most fla- grant disregard of Austria's rights on the part of the Administration, which openly resorted to the device of excusing itself on the ground of the hostility of American sentiment to Austria. The fact that it was the duty of the Government to assuage that hostility instead of utilizing it for political advantage, does not seem to have occurred to the President and his advisers. Whatever American sentiment may have been, as a neutral it was the duty of the United States to withhold all official support, moral or physical, until Kos- suth and his revolutionists should have estab- lished the independence of Hungary. To do otherwise was but to intermeddle in international affairs. The Austrian diplomatic agent strenuously protested against President Taylor's action in sending an agent among the revolutionists, and against the tone of his message. A diplomatic controversy arising out of Taylor's acts ensued, continuing over into Fillmore's Administration when Webster as Secretary of State gave voice to Jingoism in a most undignified and undiplo- 182 Empire and Armament matic reply to the insistent Austrian representa- tions. Webster's correspondence was a veritable Jingo tirade, setting forth, with a fervid eloquence more suited to the stump than to diplomacy, the growth and destiny of the United States. It created the greatest enthusiasm among the Ameri- can people whose blatancy was only intensified by the undignified tenor of Webster's reply, which was so impregnated with the spirit of the Jingo that even Webster himself sought to excuse its temper on the ground: first, that he "thought it well enough to speak out and tell the people of Europe who and what we are, and awaken them to a just sense of the unparalleled growth of this country; second, I wished to write a paper which would touch the national pride." Webster's explanation of his letter is of course no excuse whatever, but only convicts him by his own words of having succumbed to the popular frame of mind. Such was the national attitude that in 1851 by a resolution of Congress Kossuth was brought from his refuge in Turkey in an Ameri- can ship of war to the United States, praised by the President in his annual message, publicly presented to the President by the Secretary of State, ceremoniously received by both Houses of Congress, and accorded a triumphal progress throughout the country. These attentions, de- signed to be offensive to Austria, encouraged Kossuth to attempt to enlist the United States Government in the cause of Hungarian independ- Jingoism Rampant 183 ence. The nation was all but swept from its feet by the popular hero, possessing as he did no mean abilities as an orator. One who reads the press of the time cannot but conclude that the Ameri- cans had become utterly careless of their inter- national obligations to Austria and were at one time quite willing to render Kossuth the political and financial aid he desired, from which outrageous action they were saved by a sober second thought that seemed to intervene as if through Providence. But the Kossuth episode so offended the Austrian Government that, after protesting in vain against the moral support the American State officials by their reception of Kossuth and their public utterances were affording the revolution, it sanc- tioned the withdrawal of its diplomatic represen- tative from Washington. Two years after this important altercation the United States almost became involved in war with Austria over one Martin Koszta, a former aide- de-camp of Kossuth's, who had escaped to America and taken out preliminary naturalization papers. In 1853, he was arrested by Austrian authority in Smyrna at which place his release from deten- tion was demanded by an American naval officer in command of a United States sloop-of-war. Threatening to open fire upon the Austrian vessels unless his demand was complied with, Captain Ingraham cleared his vessel for action in the face of tremendous odds, with the result that Koszta was released to the French authorities. The 184 Empire and Armament boldness of Ingraham appealed to the Jingoes with great force. He was heralded as a hero and made much of. The American people neither knew nor cared whether he had been right or wrong in his conduct. His willingness to fight was the main thing; it gratified the national pride beyond words, and appealed to the aggressive spirit of the Ameri- cans. What cared they for Austria? Had they not already bearded her until they despised her threats ? And here it should be noted that Ingra- ham's attitude was typically American. He was no more prepared to assail the Austrian forces at Smyrna than the United States was prepared with a handful of ships and less than 15,000 soldiers to engage in a war with Austria or Spain, both of which countries she had with impunity given re- peated causes for war. ' ' We have whipped England twice, and we can do it again," was the popular belief, a sentiment which fortified the American people in their utter contempt for the international rights of other nations. Pierce's Administration, following that of Fill- more, is noted in American annals as the ' ' Heyday of the Filibuster." Young America and Jingoism were by this time rampant. In the attitude of the Federal Government and public sentiment at large, much encouragement for the active aggressions of United States citizens upon neigh- bouring States was found. Just as the germs of Burr's conspiracy may be found in the sentiment for expansion and inter- Jingoism Rampant 185 meddling in the affairs of neighbouring States which existed in 1804, so to the aggressive Ameri- can policy during Polk's, Tyler's, and Fillmore's administrations may other attempts on the part of American citizens to overthrow neighbouring sovereignties be traced. Ever since the days when Louisiana was first purchased an element of the people of the Mississippi Valley had dreamed of the extension of the national territory to include Central America in order to bring the entire Gulf under the sway of the United States. By these people the Mexican War was welcomed as an opportunity to accomplish the desired end, but when the war failed in this, it remained for William Walker, an American adventurer, to attempt, in 1853, with the connivance of the authorities at Washington it is thought by some, to con- quer the Mexican State of Sonora and to secure for the United States one or more of the Central American countries. Fully arming and equip- ping an expeditionary force on United States soil, the bold filibuster landed his men at La Paz, in Lower California, captured several towns, proclaimed himself President, and took up his march for the interior. To escape capture at the hands of the superior Mexican force dispatched against him, he crossed over into the United States and surrendered to the United States authorities at San Diego. Tried in the Federal Court at San Francisco for violating the neutrality laws, he was acquitted, much to the disgust of Mexico 1 86 Empire and Armament whose sovereignty had been violated. Had the Mexican general done on this occasion what Jackson did with respect to the marauders of Florida when he followed them into neighbouring territory, a war would certainly have resulted between the United States and Mexico. Walker was not satisfied with the failure of his Mexican invasion. The United States had by Polk's treaty of 1846 guaranteed the neutrality of New Granada, and declared her paramount interest in the Isthmus of Panama and Central America generally. Walker, however, now actu- ally undertook to secure for American interests the State of Nicaragua in which a revolution was raging. Landing in 1855 at Realejo, with another armed force fitted out in the United States, he succeeded in capturing Granada and making an arrangement with General Corral, the President, whereby he became Secretary of War and com- mander-in-chief. Soon Walker and Corral quar- relled, with the result that Walker had the latter tried and shot. After waging a successful war against Costa Rica, Walker had himself proclaimed President of Nicaragua, but he was soon compelled to deliver himself up to an American ship of war which transported him to New Orleans where he was placed under bond to keep the peace! This ab- surd action was an affront to the dignity of Nicar- agua and Costa Rica, and only encouraged Walker to further prosecute his plans, so that in November, Jingoism Rampant 187 1857, but six months after his release in New Or- leans, he was back in Nicaragua with a large force of Americans and insurrectionists behind him. Again driven from this country, in 1858, he set out from the United States to subjugate Honduras and, failing at first in his plan, succeeded in land- ing in i860 with a fresh expedition at Ruatan. After capturing Truxillo he was compelled to flee, this time seeking asylum on a British vessel, the commander of which properly turned him over to the outraged Honduran authorities, by whom he was tried and shot. Thus did the United States permit its citizens to violate the sovereignty of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras, of which countries it posed before Europe as the great and unselfish protector. Not only did President Pierce receive a minister from Walker while the latter was in illegal possession of Nicaragua, but he went so far as to write a letter to an enthusiastic Walker meeting in New York, commending the "heroic efforts" of the international brigand in behalf of Nicaragua, and later in his annual message he condemned the action of the naval officer who turned Walker over to the civil authorities in New Orleans as " a great error." Pierce at this time was an avowed advocate of the "Americanization" of Central America; in spirit if not in letter, going beyond Polk's policy of insuring its neutrality, and openly violating the spirit of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Central America. 1 88 Empire and Armament Another prominent Jingo imperialist of this proud era in American history was one John An- thony Quitman, a New Yorker by birth, a general officer in the United States Volunteers during the Mexican War, and governor of Mississippi in 1849. In 1836 he had taken a conspicuous part in the Texas revolution and in the Mexican War he had rendered gallant service, leading the assault at Vera Cruz and commanding the expedition against Alvarado. While governor of Mississippi he was solicited by General Lopez to lead a filibustering expedition for the capture of Cuba, in which island a revolu- tion headed by Lopez was in progress. Learning of Quitman's negotiations with Lopez, Mexico, Central America, and Spain strenuously protested to the Government in Washington, and upon their just representations, Quitman was indicted, as Walker had been, in the United States Court. Resigning his office, he was tried in the district court for East Louisiana, the jury disagreeing. In 1854, ne was a gai n arrested because of his interest in another Cuban expedition but this time he was not even tried, being elected a member of Congress in 1855 and appointed chairman of the Military Committee as a mark of governmental disfavour ! The circumstances connected with these cases naturally led Spain, Mexico, and the States of Central America, to repose little faith in the in- tegrity of the United States whose Government Jingoism Rampant 189 viewed with apathy the most flagrant violation by its citizens of every law of neutrality. Further- more, it was confidently believed abroad that these violations were instigated by that Government. So notoriously lax at this time was the United States Government in preventing filibustering ex- peditions from leaving its shores for Cuba, that the governments of Great Britain and France, sympathizing with Spain, actually gave instruc- tions to their naval officials to co-operate with Spanish war vessels in preventing the landing of these American armed meddlers. These Powers then sought, with the most pacific intent, to nego- tiate a tripartite treaty with the United States, guaranteeing the possession of Cuba to Spain, but their efforts were futile. The expeditions continued until Lopez, leader of the Cuban revolu- tion, was captured and executed along with a large part of his force which was mainly composed of Americans. This caused a storm of indignation in the United States, and the Spanish consulate at New Orleans was actually stormed and de- molished by a mob. So thoroughly in sympathy with this act was American sentiment that the demand of the Spanish Minister in Washington for redress was at the time virtually denied. Notwithstanding the attitude of the United States with respect to the transfer of the possession of Cuba by Spain, an act unequivocally opposed by Jefferson in 1808, and by Clay and by Web- ster at later dates, Polk made a serious but un- 190 Empire and Armament successful effort in 1848 to purchase for the United States the "Gem of the Antilles." Europe and Latin America, of course, felt that opposition on the part of the United States to the transfer of Cuba by Spain to a European Power was simply due to the fact that the Americans wanted the island for themselves, and it would seem that this was true, for the American imperialists were not long satisfied to let the matter rest, so that when Pierre Soule was appointed Minister to Spain by Pierce, in 1853, the question was reopened. Soule was an ardent imperialist, especially inter- ested in the acquisition of more slave territory. He did his best to involve his country in a foolish war with Spain over a trivial incident occurring in connection with an American merchant vessel at Havana, and publicly sympathized with the insur- rection of 1854 i n Madrid, while officially repre- senting the United States at the Spanish Court. Failing to plunge his country into war, notwithstand- ing a high state of popular excitement over the Havana incident, he next addressed himself to the task of securing Cuba without regard to the willing- ness of Spain to part with her possession. Having been instructed to confer with the American minis- ters at Paris and London with a view to devising some plan for the acquisition of Cuba that would be satisfactory to France, England, and Spain, Soule, in concert with Mason and Buchanan, drew up a remarkable document, mainly his own work, known as "The Ostend Manifesto." This instru- Jingoism Rampant 191 ment, after citing the reasons why Spain should sell Cuba to the United States, the price deemed reasonable, and the benefits that would accrue to European governments from such a transfer, announced that should Spain decline the offer of the United States, the latter would be justified "by every law, human and divine," in taking the island by force. This somewhat Prussian prin- ciple of right on the part of the United States, as asserted by Soule, was not popularly received as he had believed it would be, and the people of the United States magnanimously decided that if Spain would not voluntarily sell Cuba it should not be seized. While the people of the United States should not be charged with the instigation of Soule's manifesto to Europe, certainly it was the aggres- sive sentiment among them that made such an absurdity possible. Soule was but the extreme of extremists. Cuba was ardently desired by a large number of Americans who would have been glad of a pretext upon which to seize the island, though not as frank in admitting it as was Soule; four years after the Ostend Manifesto the President in his message again urged the purchase of Cuba and a proposal was made in the United States Senate to authorize another offer to Spain for the island. It was in 1853 that the spirit of American impe- rialism was highly gratified by the dispatch of Com- modore Perry to Japan for the purpose of opening trade relations with the exclusive island kingdom 192 Empire and Armament of the Pacific. Various other attempts to estab- lish such relations had failed, but the Western Hemisphere had grown all too small for Americans and their demands were now insistent. Entering the Bay of Yeddo with his fleet, by firm persistence, Perry succeeded in concluding a treaty in 1854. In the words of an American statesman, Japan was "gently coerced." Perry's success, justly hailed as a great diplo- matic achievement, initiated the extension of American interests into the Orient, with what astounding results need not here be commented upon. Mention of the incident is important at this point as showing the irresistible spirit of impe- rialism of the times. And how out of accord with the declaration of Monroe was that spirit! Said Monroe : "With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered nor shall we interfere." If brought before the assembled nations under a count of interference in violation of the self- imposed national pledge of Monroe, how would plead Polk and Pierce and all the other offenders who have followed them? CHAPTER XIV IMPERIALISM A FACT: ITS DANGERS IN 1848, for the third time in twenty years, a popular war hero was elevated by the American people to the highest office in their gift. The election of General Zachary Taylor, largely by the Jingo influence, marks an epoch in the history of the empire over which he was called to rule. As the old soldier surveyed from his proud emi- nence, the nation, he could but see that its territo- rial and political horizons in no sense coincided. Far, far off into the illimitable distance American influence and interests extended themselves — how far no man might know — for the American empire was then, as now, undefined. What an empire was that which had been erected by Washington, the Adamses, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Clay, Calhoun, Web- ster, and Polk! Nor was it, as we have seen, erected at the expense of the American people, whose liberties remained intact. This, the great American Empire, owed nothing to militarism; no more to pacificism. The inborn prejudices of the people had rendered 13 193 194 Empire and Armament militarism impossible, but their suddenly formed spirit of aggressive nationalism was none the less entirely out of accord with the philosophic optim- ism of Kant and St. Pierre and Rousseau. These two great facts the author has persistently sought to throw into relief by concurrently dwelling, first upon the traditional prejudice of the American people against armies, which at times seemed to have been subdued, only to flare up again with un- diminished intensity, and second, upon the Jingo- ism which made the early American always careless of the consequences of his own conduct in relation to the rights and claims of others. Not in a single instance in the early history of the United States was a leader, however wise, however adroit, able to erect a military institution of any strength, even though the constitutional foundation for one was secured. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the utter lack of military pre- paredness at all times, no leader, however popular, was able to restrain the popular desire, or tone down the popular clamour for war, whenever a seeming cause therefor arose, without serious loss of influence. So striking are these inconsistencies that they would seem to deny the contention of the pacifist that disarmament is a guarantee of peace. Certainly history discloses no people who in the valour of their ignorance have been more willing to provoke war whenever they conceived a material right to be at stake, or race of men more intemperate in asserting their claims, than Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 195 the Americans. Their early history negatives the general and unqualified claim that in govern- ments rather than in peoples are to be found the germs of war. The history of the United States during the half- century succeeding the war between the States, like that of the period preceding that titanic con- flict, also evidences the fact that people as well as governments may be responsible for national aggressions. Over the French occupation of Mexico the American people became greatly excited and, im- mediately upon the close of the war between the States, demanded that a large veteran army com- manded by one of their most aggressive military leaders, be massed along the Rio Grande ready for action. In this case there was no evidence whatever of a disposition on the part of the Ameri- cans to arbitrate the question of France's claim. They simply announced their own decision and declared they would fight if it were not accepted forthwith by France. In 1892 the United States became involved in a dispute with Great Britain over the Bering Sea fisheries, and by assuming a most arbitrary atti- tude caused great embarrassment to the British Government which all along had been willing to arbitrate the question at issue. Arbitration even- tually resulted in a decision against the United States on most of the points at issue. The same year the United States became involved in a most 196 Empire and Armament unfortunate dispute with Chile by reason of un- warranted intermeddling in a local revolution by the United States Minister. The outcome was the killing by an irresponsible mob of two Ameri- can sailors and the injury of a number of others. The people of the United States, who knew nothing of the real causes of the trouble, loudly demanded satisfaction, and great enthusiasm for the threat- ened war was everywhere manifested. War was averted by an apology and the payment of an indemnity on the part of Chile. In 1893-4 aggressive action was taken by the United States Government in connection with the Brazilian revolution. In this case the Govern- ment was entirely justified and its uncompromis- ing action undoubtedly exerted a material influ- ence in bringing about the failure of the attempt to re-establish monarchical government in Brazil. The point to be noted here is the enthusiastic acclaim with which the readiness on the part of the American admiral to fight was received by the peaceably disposed Americans. The press of the period discloses an entire ignorance of, and care- lessness as to, the undetermined rights of the Chilians and the Brazilian revolutionists. The truth is, as declared by John Bassett Moore, the American people enjoy wars, and it had been a long time since their desire for one had been gratified. It was but a short time after the Chilian and Brazilian incidents when they all but forced one. For a long time Venezuela and Great Britain Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 197 had been waging a diplomatic contest over the western boundary of British Guiana. When, in 1895, it became apparent that Great Britain did not intend to yield her points in the case, Venezuela began to clamour for protection at the hands of the United States. In July, 1895, the American Secretary of State, Richard Olney, demanded that Great Britain answer whether she was willing to arbitrate the question and boldly announced that the United States was master in the Western Hemisphere, saying: The United States is practically sovereign on this Continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other Powers. These were bold remarks to address to Great Britain, but their very boldness and the threat they contained caused them to be hailed with a frenzy of delight in the United States. War was everywhere discussed without a semblance of mis- giving as to the ability of the United States to overcome the "Mistress of the Seas" on her own element. 198 Empire and Armament Mr. Olney's extraordinary document fortu- nately did not arouse the warlike sentiment of the Britons as it did that of the Americans. Lord Salisbury replied with moderation but firmness, declaring that this startling extension of the Monroe Doctrine was unacceptable in the present controversy, whereupon President Cleveland com- municated a message to Congress, December 17, 1895, which created in the United States at least all the outward and visible signs of the prelimina- ries to war. He requested that a commission be appointed to ascertain the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, and declared it to be the duty of the United States "to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." He declared that he was conscious of the responsibilities which he thus incurred, but intimated that war between Great Britain and the United States, much as it was to be deplored, was not comparable to "a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the conse- quent loss of national self-respect and honour." "In other words," observes Mr. Beard, "we were to decide the dispute ourselves and go to war on Great Britain if we found her in possession of lands which in our opinion did not belong to her." Contrary to expectation, and the ill-concealed Imperialism a Fact : Its Dangers 199 hope of the Jingoes, Mr. Cleveland's attitude was not opposed by bluster and temper in Great Brit- ain, but it was greatly deplored as an unreasoning threat to the natural good feeling existing between the countries, and the sacrifice of a valued friend- ship to an insignificant matter. The British Government courteously aided the American Commissioners in their search for evidence. Pend- ing the search, dealing directly with Venezuela, Lord Salisbury arranged for an international court of arbitration. The good humour of the British on this occasion saved the situation, but the out- come was hailed in America as the result of Mr. Cleveland's boldness, and he was lauded as "a sterling representative of the true American spirit." The arbitration resulted in the substan- tiation of Great Britain's claims on every point. The whole incident might be styled "An ex-parte war in embryo." Had Great Britain shown the slightest excitement or desire to fight it would almost surely have resulted in a serious conflict between the two great English-speaking empires which would have been an inestimable calamity to the world. Yet, the press of the United States seemed to cherish the so-called American victory far more than it did the averting of actual hostilities. Years after the event one great journal summed up the Venezuelan episode as follows : Lord Salisbury and the British Government came down from their high horse, the British lion slunk 200 Empire and Armament away with its much twisted tail between its legs, and England agreed to arbitrate the boundary dispute. England got most of the territory it claimed in the final outcome, but it got it by a judicial decree and not by force of arms. This is a truly characteristic sample of Ameri- can pacifism, naively formulated as a taunt to a foreign State that it had been compelled to secure by arbitration what it could not seize by force of arms. Less honour to Great Britain for such a dastardly act ! It is such unwitting disclosures of the inner conscience that exhibit the true spirit of the speaker. "The true American spirit" found expression in 1898. The Spanish War, while fully justified, was most acceptable to the Americans. There was little real regret. The pressure of imperial- ism was too great to be longer confined. In i860 Buchanan, in 1866 Seward, in 1870 Grant, in 1880 Hayes, in 1881 Garfield, had referred in pub- lic documents to the foreign interests of the United States in such a way that there could be no doubt as to the gradual extension of those interests and the rights in connection with them which the United States proposed to exercise. In 1889, the United States had joined Great Britain and Ger- many in a protectorate over the Samoan Islands, departing absolutely and irrevocably from what Secretary Gresham declared to be: "the traditional and well-established policy of avoiding entangling Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 201 alliances with foreign Powers in relation to objects remote from this hemisphere. ' ' During Harrison's Administration provision had been made for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, after a revo- lution fomented in great part by American inter- ests. The Spanish War afforded the opportunity to annex these islands to the United States. And so the Empire grew. If the empire which President Taylor surveyed in 1848 was a vast one, how shall we characterize the American Empire of today? How shall we answer those who, looking merely at the form and not at the substance, deny that our course is an imperialistic one? Shall we be compelled to urge upon them the conception that interests and com- munications go to make up empire as well as territory? Or shall we accept their view that the lack of a national army and a navy equal in strength to those of other Powers who frankly claim the title of empire, makes of the United States a purely domestic, self-centred Republic, without interests extending over, and across the world, and into realms scarce known to man? Surely we cannot close our eyes to the facts of Empire. Because time has not tended to remove the early anomaly of American national char- acter, and because today Americans are no nearer militarism than in the days of Jefferson, we are not justified in the belief that the United States is not an empire. Indeed, there is no essential connection between 202 Empire and Armament empire building and militarism, notwithstanding the fact that militarism lends itself to national expansion, as it does to the glorification of mon- archs. Machiavelli taught that the State was the real source of all happiness, a teaching that appealed to kings on their tottering thrones, and who promptly seized upon this doctrine and, on the plea of strengthening their States, incidentally secured themselves through the medium of mili- tarism which cries out in unison with the Grand Monarch — L'etat c'est moi. But if militarism is not necessarily the progenitor of imperialism, neither is it essentially the offspring of imperialism. Calhoun, Clay, and Webster laid down forever their work of empire building almost simultane- ously; Calhoun in 1850; Clay and Webster in 1852. But they carried with them to the grave their prejudices against militarism. The speech of Webster, delivered July 4, 1851, the seventy-fifth anniversary of American Inde- pendence, embodying the military conceptions of our empire builders, shows those conceptions to be so strikingly similar to American ideals of today that it must be quoted here at length. While the country has been expanding in dimensions, in numbers, and in wealth, the Government has ap=- plied a wise forecast in the adoption of measures necessary, when the world shall no longer be at peace, to maintain the national honour, whether by appro- priate display of vigour abroad, or by well-adapted means of defence at home. A navy, which has so Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 203 often illustrated our history by heroic achievements, though in peaceful times restrained in its operations to narrow limits, possesses in its admirable elements, the means of great and sudden expansion, and is justly looked upon by the nation as the right arm of its power. An army still smaller, but not less perfect in its detail, has on many a field exhibited the military ap- titudes and prowess of the race, and demonstrated the wisdom which has presided over its organization and government, while the gradual and slow enlargement of these respective military arms has been regulated by a jealous watchfulness over the public treasure, there has nevertheless, been freely given all that was needed to perfect their quality ; and each affords the nucleus of any enlargement that the public exi- gencies may demand, from the millions of brave hearts and strong arms upon the land and water. The navy is the active and aggressive element of national defence; and, let loose from our own sea- coast, must display its power in the seas and channels of the enemy. To do this, it need not be large; and it can never be large enough to defend by its presence at home all our ports and harbours. But, in the absence of the navy, what can the regular army or the volunteer militia do against the enemy's line of battle- ships and steamers, falling without notice upon our coast? What will guard our cities from tribute, our merchant-vessels and our navy yards from conflagra- tion? Here, again we see a wise forecast in the system of defensive measures, which, especially since the close of the war with Great Britain, has been steadily followed by our Government. While the perils from which our great establishments had just escaped were yet fresh in remembrance, a 204 Empire and Armament system of fortifications was begun, which now, though not quite complete, fences in our important points with impassable strength. More than four thousand cannon may at any moment, within strong and per- manent works, arranged with all the advantages and appliances that the art affords, be turned to the pro- tection of the sea-coast, and be served by the men whose hearths they shelter. Happy for us that it is so, since these are means of security that time alone can supply ; and since the improvements of maritime warfare, by making distant expeditions easy and speedy, have made them more probable, and at the same time, more difficult to anticipate and provide against. The cost of fortifying all the important points of our coast, as well upon the whole Atlantic as the Gulf of Mexico, will not exceed the amount expended on the fortifications of Paris. In this connection one most important facility in the defence of the country is not to be overlooked; it is the extreme rapidity with which the soldiers of the army, and any number of the militia corps, may be brought to any point where a hostile attack shall at any time be made or threatened. And this exten- sion of territory embraced within the United States, increase of its population, commerce, and manufac- tures, development of its resources by canals and rail- roads, and rapidity of inter-communication by means of steam and electricity, have all been accomplished without overthrow of, or danger to, the public liber- ties, by any assumption of military power ; and, indeed, without any permanent increase of the army, except for the purpose of frontier defence, and of affording a slight guard to the public property; or of the navy, any further than to assure the navigator that in what- Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 205 soever sea he shall sail his ship, he is protected by the stars and stripes of his country. This, too, has been done without the shedding of a drop of blood for treason or rebellion; while systems of popular repre- sentation have regularly been supported in the State governments, and in the general Government; while laws, national and State, of such character have been passed, and have been so wisely administered, that I may stand up here today, and declare, as I now do declare, in the face of all the intelligence of the age, that, for the period which has elapsed, from the day that Washington laid the foundation of this Capitol, to the present time, there has been no country upon earth in which life, liberty, and property have been more amply and steadily secured, or more freely en- joyed, than in these United States of America. Who is there that will deny this? Who is there prepared with a greater or a better example ? Who is there that can stand upon the foundation of facts, acknowledged or proved, and assert that these our republican insti- tutions have not answered the true ends of govern- ment beyond all precedent in human history? A change of date, a change of name, is all that need be made in Webster's speech to give the twentieth century American orator his annual patriotic address. Indeed, the annual message of President Wilson in 19 14 is strikingly similar in sentiment to this address of Webster which has been quoted. The two should be carefully compared by the historian. It is just such authoritative declarations of peaceful temper and intent as the one made by 206 Empire and Armament Webster that have beguiled the American people into believing, and that has confirmed them in the conviction that their really aggressive, militant foreign policy has been one of respect of the rights of all nations, and total abstinence from interfer- ence with foreign affairs. Over and over again our statesmen have adverted to Washington's warning against "foreign entanglements," always assert- ing that his advice has been rigidly adhered to. But invariably, whenever the occasion has made it possible, the old spirit of aggression has mani- fested itself. Clausewitz may have expounded the philosophy of war to Europe ; Darwin and Spencer and Huxley may have forced upon the scientific world their theories of evolution, applicable to organisms and societies alike ; Fichte and Hegel and Haeckel may have adopted these theories to the ends of govern- ment; Bagehot may have preached the doctrine of national evolution in England, and Nietzsche and Treitschke in Germany; and De Vries may have presented a theory of evolution more in har- mony with the sudden mutations of war than are the earlier doctrines of evolution based on the principle of the survival of the fittest, but no philosophy or influence has served to materially alter American military policy as formulated a century ago. It may also be said that the people of the United States pay as little heed today to the warning that temporary weakness may mean loss of national existence as they did in the days Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 207 of Washington, and they refuse absolutely to accept it as an inexorable law of progress that inferior races are made for the purpose of serving the superior. But while they may reject these Machiavellian maxims, they should not blind themselves to certain incontrovertible facts, writ large upon their own imperial record, nor are they by their rejection of those facts able to becloud their record. Militarism did not lead to the acquisition by the United States of Alaska, of the Hawaiian Islands, of Porto Rico, of Tutuila in the Samoan group, of Guam in the Ladrones, of the Philip- pines, or to the building of the Panama Canal. For these, not militarism, but a great resistless undercurrent of national imperialism, the force of which was generated by our early statesmen, is responsible. In their persistent denial of the fact of our imperialism which transcends mere territorial boundaries, however extensive, the American people are untrue to themselves. Turning backward through the pages of Ameri- can history they ascribe to our statesmen, as for instance to Monroe, motives unsuspected by those persons and their contemporaries alike, but which nevertheless led inevitably to the present, and would have the world believe that they have created an empire without knowing it. The empire has been created, however, and no force of logic can reverse the current of history or com- pel the national subconsciousness back into an 208 Empire and Armament attitude of mere nationalism. American imperial- ism lies deep in the soul of the nation; nor can it be disturbed by the opposition of a political ad- ministration. It is a great popular movement and, as in all such movements, there is in it a power- ful element of passionate, unreasoning, almost un- conscious national enthusiasm which is regarded in a very unfavourable light by the people of South America whose interpretation of our history does not harmonize with our own. Their con- victions are well summarized by the able publicist, Calderon, who says : The northern Republic has been the beneficiary of an incessant territorial expansion; in 1803, it ac- quired Louisiana; in 1819, Florida; in 1845 and 1850, Texas; the Mexican provinces in 1848 and 1852, and Alaska in 1858. The annexation of Hawaii took place in 1898. In the same year Porto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and one of the Marianne Islands, passed, by the Treaty of Paris, into the hands of the United States. They obtained the Samoan Islands in 1890, wished to buy the Danish West Indies in 1902, and planted their imperialistic standard at Panama in 1903. Interventions have become more frequent with the expansion of frontiers. The United States have recently intervened in the territory of Acre, there to found a republic of rubber gatherers; at Panama, there to develop a province and construct a canal; in Cuba, under cover of the. Piatt amend- ment, to maintain order in the interior; in San Domingo to support the civilizing revolution and overthiow the tyrants; in Venezuela, and in Central America, Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 209 to enforce upon these nations, torn by intestine dis- orders, the political and financial tutelage of the impe- rial democracy. In Guatemala and Honduras the loans concluded with the monarchs of North American finance have reduced the people to a new slavery. Supervision of the customs and the dispatch of pacifi- catory squadrons to defend the interests of the Anglo- Saxon have enforced peace and tranquillity; such are the means employed. . . . The Yankee ideal, then, is fatally contrary to Latin- American independence. 1 Now it is not the accuracy of Calderon's infer- ences but the truth of his summary of our expan- sive acts that is important in this study. Again, it is not whether those inferences are correct or not, but the fact that they are believed by the world to be correct that matters. That summary should impress upon us the fact that the orbit of the American planet is no longer a circle, or even an eccentric ellipse, uncrossed by the paths of other national bodies. Indeed, its path since the days of Monroe and Polk has been the parabola of imperialism tracing its course far off into the infinity of the future. The fact that collision with other imperialistic bodies has not so far occurred, does not justify the belief that no such collision ever will occur. Let us cease to view this direful contingency in the prejudiced spirit of the Jingo, that spirit always so restless of restraint when danger threatens. A confession of willingness to consider the possible dangers of the future, now, 'F. Garcia Calderon, Latin America, pp. 303-304; 306. 210 Empire and Armament in the calmness of the peace which we enjoy with all the world, does not demand that we shall com- mit ourselves to a program of excessive armament, that we shall "weight Mars down so heavily with armour" as to reduce him to a state of inertia, or that we shall revert to an obsolete social state through militarism, by misconstruing, as do the Germans, the principle of survival of the fittest to be the equivalent of devil take the hindmost. Our national danger is certainly not that of mili- tarism, but it is one even greater — impertinent imperialism which fosters the invasion of one- half of the world while reserving to its exclusive exploitation the other half. Our greatest danger and most serious threat of war is found in that present day Monroeism which has led us on to an imperialism transcending the wildest fancies of Monroe and Polk, until in 19 12 the United States Senate actually resolved : That when any harbour or other place on the American Continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbour or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government, not Ameri- can, as to give that government practical power of control for national purposes. And such now is Monroeism. Even at this hour when an empire of American interests and Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 211 territory spreads itself world-wide over the uni- verse, when what Webster said of England might be applied in his exact words to America — a Power which has dotted over the surface of the whole globe with her possessions and military posts; whose morning drum-beat, following the sun and keeping company with the hours, circles the earth with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of the United States. And yet it is not altogether futile for those who really cherish peace to seek to remove the ultimate cause of war which the subconscious and ever- swelling enthusiasm of American imperialism, coupled with perverted Monroeism, sustains, and that there is such a present cause and that it is possible to remove it cannot well be doubted. It is a sound general principle that a poor doc- trine, well and consistently applied, is better than a good doctrine constantly perverted or misap- plied. So that even if we accept the Monroe Doctrine in its original form as a good one, we cannot deny that its effect has been to lead to fre- quent misapplications and perversions, for there has, perhaps, never been a national doctrine that has been so illy defined and so variously construed. This is unfortunate, for if there is anything that would seem to require clarity of expression, and a common understanding, certainly on the part of those called upon to put it into effect, it is a national doctrine which by its persistence has assumed the character of a popular shibboleth. 212 Empire and Armament The Monroe Doctrine has never been under- stood, either in America or abroad. The proof of this assertion is to be found, it is submitted, in the fact that President John Quincy Adams, who was Secretary of State under James Monroe, when he asserted the doctrine in 1826, as has been shown, sought to apply it in a way conclusive of the fact that his conception of the doctrine was not that so commonly attributed to its framer. Again, in 1848, when Polk, without invoking the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, sought to apply the principle of exclusion first proclaimed in that doctrine, Calhoun, who had been Secretary of War under Monroe and Secretary of State under Tyler, declared that Monroe's doctrine did not apply to the Yucatan case in question, and in conformity with his view the recommendation of the Chief Executive was overruled by Congress. These facts clearly establish the point that at an early day there existed a complete disagreement between the President, Congress, and Calhoun who had not only held the foreign portfolio but had actually been a member of the Cabinet of Monroe who announced the doctrine which gave rise to the misunderstanding. Some weight should also be attached to the fact that Calhoun, like Clay, was an original exponent of American nationalism, and that his tendencies were very naturally selfish respecting national rights as conceived by him. But the attitude of John Quincy Adams is even more significant than that Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 213 of Calhoun, for while Calhoun contributed much to Monroe's state policy, Adams was actually the American Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time Monroe proclaimed his doctrine and undoubtedly aided materially in its formulation. Indeed the actual conception of that doctrine has been fre- quently attributed to Adams. It would seem then, that if Adams did not know Monroe's intent as to the scope of his foreign policy, no one could have known it except Monroe himself. What Adams's conception of that policy was we may infer from the fact that in instructing his delegates to the Panama Congress of 1826, he expressly excluded the idea that "a joint resistance against any future attempt to plant a colony ' ' on the two American continents by a foreign Power should be proposed, but that each South American state should be urged to adopt separately the doctrine of foreign exclusion proclaimed by Monroe on behalf of the United States. But even in the face of such facts the extensions of Monroe's doctrine, sought to be applied by Polk, and actually applied by others, are all bundled together under the title of the Monroe Doctrine, until now it requires a judicial examination to isolate the real doctrine from its perverted forms. In this fact lurks the gravest danger. Whatever view of the Monroe Doctrine one may present, whatever interpretation of a particular case in which it is invoked one may accept, it is certain that he will find serious opposition along 214 Empire and Armament historical as well as political lines. Were this lack of accord restricted to the ignorant, or to those who exerted no national influence, the danger would not be so great, but as a matter of fact the most divergent views on our most important national doctrine exist among our statesmen, public men, and eminent scholars. In 191 3, a prominent scholar, perhaps the fore- most authority in this country on Latin-America and its affairs, produced a work entitled The Mon- roe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth. Reference is here made, of course, to Hiram Bingham of Yale University. The contents of his thoughtful book accorded well with its title, and the dedication of the work to James Bryce was but a covert en- couragement of the foreign sentiment on our South American policy. So forceful and important were Bingham's arguments against the American policy, that an attempt was actually made to have his presentation of the case officially considered by Congress. But Bingham is only one of many. There are those who assert that the Monroe Doctrine, including its extensions and perversions, has proved the salvation of political liberty, not only in America, North and South, but through- out the world; and there are those who contend that it has made of South America an enormous Santo Domingo, by preserving it for a people incapable of retaining their own liberties. There are those who claim that the Monroe Doctrine has been a blessing to all mankind through the Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 215 hope and encouragement it has given oppressed humanity by the virile potency of its example; and there are others who declare that it has barred the progress of civilization by denying the over- crowded millions of Europe from seeking oppor- tunity in South America, and that in many ways it has been more fatal to humanity than the ferocity and ignorance of the Turk ; that it has gal- vanized into the appearance of republics political cadavers, reeking with rottenness and degradation and crying out for decent burial; that it has pre- vented Switzerlands from developing for the sake of Uruguays and Paraguays and continual revo- lution ; that it protects vice, ignorance, and general unenlightenment. And there are others who assert that it tends to mongrelize, and to depress wages in the United States by directing the course of immigration to North America; and that it re- tards the development of American trade by main- taining an unproductive and uncommercial people in exclusive possession of the rich and almost untouched resources of South America. And then it is asserted that a strict adherence to the doctrine of foreign exclusion in South America is essential on the part of the United States as a defensive military measure, and that for that purpose if for no other, it should receive national support, but it is even more strenuously argued that the continuance of our present Latin-Ameri- can policy in the present age of imperialism is the surest possible guarantee of war with foreign 216 Empire and Armament Powers across whose path of inevitable expansion it throws us; that the countless, starving hordes of Europe and the Orient will not relinquish their designs upon the only remaining field of exploita- tion without a struggle; and that our own course of imperialism and impertinence is bound, sooner or later, to aggravate the growing resentment of other Powers beyond the point of peaceable submission to our will. However extravagant many of the assertions in connection with our Latin-American policy may be, the mere fact of those assertions evidences a surprising lack of unanimity of mind as to our national policy. It is submitted that in that very lack of accord is to be found a graver danger than any of those hereinbefore pointed out in the extravagant condemnations of the Monroe Doc- trine, for if our foremost statesmen, those actually entrusted with the helm of the American ship of State, and our foremost publicists and most eminent scholars, entertain conflicting views as to the wisdom of the policy to which we continue to adhere, and as to the real scope of the national doctrine, it stands to reason that foreign govern- ments will not always interpret it in the way most favourable to the United States. Indeed, they are far more apt to take that view most favourable to their own ends. Let us assume, however, that the nations of the earth are really desirous of respecting American claims — how shall they do so when the United Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 217 States itself is uncertain as to what those claims really are? May we reasonably expect that for- eign governments will take the pains to inform themselves of the view which each new administra- tion takes of the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we compel foreign ministers to keep constantly in touch with the American political market, so to speak, and inform themselves whether Monroe Doctrine stock is up or down? And suppose an erroneous interpretation of that doctrine be made in foreign councils, an honest misinterpretation such as that made by President Polk and others in authority in the United States, shall the penalty for the mistake be war? In all probability, yes, emphatically, yes. War would undoubtedly result from an inten- tional violation of the principles laid down in the Monroe Doctrine, or in any popular conception of that doctrine in vogue at the time, almost as a matter of course, for the reason that the Monroe shibboleth has in reality become a fetish with the people of the United States. Our President and his ministry would be powerless under the cir- cumstances to restrain American Jingoism, which even in time of national calm dominates Congress. A cool-headed President may be able to restrain the nation in such a case as the recent one involv- ing the landing of troops at Vera Cruz, but even then his hands will be full, nor will every President be capable of breasting the tide in the same manful way that Mr. Wilson did, assuming that he is 218 Empire and Armament willing to do so. But no President would be able to resist the popular demand for war were the national fetish involved. In the event of an unintentional violation, in all probability the result would not be different. In the first place the innocent offender would either be given no opportunity to explain before a na- tional insult was passed, or an explanation would be demanded in such stentorian tones as to cause just affront. In the second place no explanation that was not coupled with complete retraction and a virtual acknowledgment of our protectorate in South America would be satisfactory to Jin- goism rampant, and that acknowledgment has never been made, nor ever will be, by Europe or Japan. It may be argued that statesmanship and the pacific temper of our people would enable war to be averted in the cases assumed for discussion. This would be possible if our people have really become pacific at heart, and if the violation were not the result of a well-considered act, but at this time expansion falls within a predetermined policy of imperialism, whereas formerly it was more or less fortuitous. Then again formerly it was easier for a foreign Power to ' ' try us out ' ' than it is now, and retract without serious loss of dignity, as in the case of France in Mexico. At that time France had announced no definite policy of expansion and her real motives could be covered up. It was also easier to plead a misinterpretation of our Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 219 doctrine then than now, for events since 1866 have proved to the world that an inhibition against foreign political activity of every kind is embraced in our Monroe fetish. As it was, in 1866, in spite of the most polite assurances on the part of France that she had no sinister designs, and not- withstanding the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was not involved, public opinion compelled the massing of our veteran army under Sheridan along the Rio Grande. The explanations which France made then could not be made now without a loss of dignity which her people would not tolerate. There is no reason to suppose that Jingoism would be less blatant now than it was in 1866 when war had somewhat chastened the nation and toned down the desire for war; certainly it would not be less so than in 1895 when Cleveland brought the country to the very brink of war which was averted principally by reason of the good humour of the British and the good sense of their minister to Venezuela, who practically ignored the screams of the American eagle and went on about his business in a really pacific way. We have seen that there is slight chance that the American people will ever contribute much to lessen the immediate causes of war; in fact that one of their most persistent national traits seems to be to cry out for war when the real crisis comes, notwithstanding all their claims to a peaceful disposition. Now let us illustrate the point that even our own pacifists do not deal with the ulti- 220 Empire and Armament mate causes of war in an intelligent and serious way. ' ' The one way for a man to rise above the Pre- sidency of the United States is to ascend into the international realm and there work for peace through justice. Mr. Taft has taken this upward step." So declares Mr. Hamilton Holt in his fore- word to a series of the published lectures under the title of The United States and Peace, which were delivered by Mr. Taft under the auspices of the New York Peace Society. The following is what Mr. Taft contributes to the question of Monroeism, and how he proposes to remove the dangers arising out of that vexed question. While the assertion of the doctrine covers both continents, the measures of the United States in ob- jecting to an invasion of the policy [he says] might be much less emphatic in the case where it was attempted in countries as remote as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile than in the countries surrounding the Caribbean Sea or brought close to the United States by the opening of the Panama Canal. And again he says: In other words, the extent of our intervention to enforce the policy is a matter of judgment, with a notice that it might cover all America. It therefore follows that the Monroe Doctrine, so far as it applies to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the so-called ABC governments of South America, is now never likely to be pressed, first because they have reached such a Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 221 point that they are able to protect themselves against any European interference, and, second, because they are so remote from us that a violation of the doctrine with respect to them would be little harmful to our interests and safety. 1 Rarely will one find so much gall in a mixture obviously prescribed as a soothing syrup. In the first place the attempt to distinguish between South American countries on the ground of rela- tive remoteness is puerile in this day of rapid trans- portation. Brazil is nearer the United States than Uruguay and Paraguay ; not as distant as Ecuador, and no more remote than Bolivia and Peru. Mr. Taft must know that communications and not territorial location largely determines remoteness. In the second place, we find Mr. Taft as an avowed pacifist defending the right of the United States to exercise its own judgment as to when it shall apply the Monroe Doctrine, and to give a notice that it may cover all America. In other words, he sees in the indefiniteness of its application no danger whatever. This indefiniteness is some- what relieved by the fact, a fact which Mr. Taft does not seem to appreciate, that if the doctrine may cover all America, that it actually embraces all America at all times within the scope of its appli- cation, leaving only the uncertainty as to whether the United States in its sole judgment, a judgment 1 The italics in the foregoing passages are not those of Mr. Taft, but of the writer, who uses them for emphasis. 222 Empire and Armament depending upon the political caprice of any parti- cular administration, will invoke the doctrine. This uncertainty does not tend to that common understanding so essential to harmony. In the third place, Mr. Taf t admits that the ABC Powers are capable of protecting themselves against hostile aggression. Others might not be so willing to admit this, yet, granting for the sake of argu- ment that it is true, Mr. Taft sees no danger what- ever in a situation in which the United States is likely to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states capable of managing their own affairs. He fails utterly to see that it is the very likelihood of our interference that destroys the confidence of the ABC Powers in our Government and the Ameri- can people. It is that very likelihood which may materialize into actual interference when in the sole judgment of the United States it seems advis- able, that to the South American states seems inconsistent with their dignity, and seems to place them before the world in the position of protectorates of the United States. Mr. Taft, however conscientious and laudable may have been his attempt, has contributed little of value to the solution of the South American question. He has, however, strikingly emphasized the dangers it involves in attempting to deny that they exist, and for this reason his study of the Monroe Doctrine is a valuable one. Should war ever actually occur as a result of the Monroe fetish the historian will in the retro- Imperialism a Fact: Its Dangers 223 spect detect three causes for the conflict. The first, or ultimate cause, will be the present inde- terminate nature of Monroeism; the second, or the proximate cause, will be the desire of foreign Powers to share in the exploitation of South America; and the third, or immediate cause, will be some overt act in connection with that continent. The time, then, has come, it seems to the author, for American pacifists to recognize their greatest opportunity. Let them recall the attempt made in this country, in 1853, when the Cuban annexa- tion question was agitating the nation, to compel Congress to make a frank declaration of American policy by giving legislative sanction to the prin- ciples expressed in the doctrine of Monroe and Polk. If the ultimate cause of a future war lurks in the uncertainty of our Monroeism, surely it can- not be difficult to make a new, definite, and full declaration of our South American policy. If needs be, let it frankly embrace the Monroe, and the Polk, and the Grant, and the Cleveland, and the Roosevelt conceptions, but whatever it be designed to embrace, let it be fair and let it be definitely proclaimed to all the world in order that the peace lovers and the pacifists of other nations may aid in preventing their governments from provoking us into war. As surely as pacifism remains content to apply its balm to the running sore alone, its efforts at curing the cancerous growth of war will remain unavailing, for when it 224 Empire and Armament is too late the unmilitary but militant voice of America will again be heard to cry out for war ! — that war which her people have shown them- selves so willing to provoke, whenever self-interest seemed to dictate its expediency. PART II ARMAMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCE is 225 CHAPTER XV ADEQUATE DEFENCE INDISPENSABLE TO PACIFISM THE dangers attending a policy of national imperialism have been shown concurrently with the facts of the evolution of American im- perialism. Furthermore, it has been shown that along with the inherent dangers of an imperialistic policy there is, in the case of the United States, a national characteristic tending to aggravate those inherent dangers. But it must not be assumed that there is not a sincere conscious desire on the part of thinking Americans to subvert the evils of that underlying aggressive national spirit which has invariably manifested itself in the restless struggle group comprising the people of the United States. It is only contended that, so far, a pacific spirit has not been the controlling factor in Ameri- can history. Nor will it ever be until the true scope and the limitations of legitimate pacifism are generally understood and appreciated, for without this duality, cross purposes and conflict will only continue between men working for the same end — peace. While the word pacifism is not to be found 227 228 Empire and Armament except in the most recent dictionaries, I think one is justified in distinguishing between pacifism in its true sense and the fanciful theories advanced by those who claim the title of pacifist. Pacifism is that "ism" embracing within its scope meas- ures productive of peaceable relations between nations, states, and governments. It may have perpetual peace as an aim; it does not necessarily embody its attainment by disarmament or by means of an international posse comitatus, as a present possibility. And this we know — much harm is done the cause of pacifism by those who in its name proffer the world their various "elixirs" of universal and perpetual peace, most of which are to serious minded students of history obviously impotent quacks. True pacifism may best be defined as propa- ganda which to some extent is adequate to accom- plish the end of peace. The minute physical force, such as that exercisable by an international police, is proposed as a means of compelling peace, one demurs to the proposition that such a means is within the scope of pacifism, for the element of physical compulsion if brought into play is itself but a warlike force, war being the exercise of force through the use of arms. Pacifism em- braces no such means. War cannot be set aside by war. True pacifism, or pacifism that is adequate to accomplish the ends of peace — not immediate universal peace but more peaceable relations be- Adequate National Defence 229 tween men organized into states — must embody purely ethical propaganda as opposed to physical means. One who is unendowed with a spirit of patience and who is ignorant of the laws of nature will only become discouraged by the apparent failure of his efforts as a pacifist. The requisite amount of patience for a pacifist in the true sense is very great, nor will any amount suffice if it be not at- tended by a broad knowledge of the cosmic law. The path of pacifism is strewn all along with the fallen forms of the backsliders, once ardent and hopeful spirits whose patience was exhausted or whose knowledge was too limited to enable them to struggle on towards the promised but elusive haven of peace. Such a one, for instance, was John Adams, who in answer to an invitation to become a member of a society for the promotion of peace, replied : Quincy, February 6, 1816. Dear Sir, I have received your kind letter of the 23rd of January, and I thank you for the pamphlets inclosed with it. It is very true, as my excellent friend, Mr. Norton, has informed you, that I have read many of your publications with pleasure. I have also read, almost all the days of my life, the solemn reasonings and pathetic declamations of Eras- mus, of Fenelon, of St. Pierre, and many others against war, and in favour of peace. My understanding and my heart accorded with them at first blush. But, 230 Empire and Armament alas! a longer and more extensive experience has con- vinced me that wars are as necessary and as inevita- ble, in our system, as Hurricanes, Earthquakes, and Volcanoes. Our beloved country, sir, is surrounded by enemies, of the most dangerous, because the most powerful and most unprincipled character. Collisions of na- tional interest, of commercial and manufacturing rivalries, are multiplying around us. Instead of dis- couraging a martial spirit, in my opinion, it ought to be excited. We have not enough of it to defend us by sea or land. Universal and perpetual peace appears to me, no more nor less than everlasting passive obedience, and non-resistance. The human flock would soon be fleeced or butchered by one or a few. I cannot therefore, sir, be a subscriber or a member of your society. I do, sir, most humbly supplicate the theologians, the philosophers, and the politicians, to let me die in peace. I seek only repose. With the most cordial esteem, however, I am, sir, your friend and servant, John Adams. In this reply Mr. Adams displayed both a lack of patience and an ignorance of the cosmic law, the latter not having been formulated for him by the great pioneer trio of evolution. He, like many before him, including Plato and Dionysius and Luther, had experienced only enough of the cosmic process to know that war is inevitable, but not enough to know that it is within the power of man, Adequate National Defence 231 and that it is his ethical duty to strive to set aside the cosmic process in all its persistence, and that even though failing to set it aside, yet, to mitigate the severity of its sway. This is what Huxley meant when he wrote: . . . Society differs from nature in having a definite moral object; whence it comes about that the course shaped by the ethical man — the member of society or citizen — necessarily runs counter to that which the non-ethical man — the primitive savage, or man as a mere member of the animal kingdom — tends to adopt. The latter fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal; the former devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle. And again: Men in society are undoubtedly subject to the cosmic process. As among other animals, multipli- cation goes on without cessation, and involves severe competition for the means of support. The struggle for existence tends to eliminate those less fitted to adapt themselves to the circumstances of their exist- ence. The strongest, the most self-assertive, tend to tread down the weaker. But the influence of the cosmic process on the evolution of society is the greater the more rudimentary its civilization. Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen 232 Empire and Armament to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the condi- tions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best. As I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically best — what we call goodness or virtue — involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self- assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrust- ing aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladia- torial theory of existence. It demands that each man who enters into the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity shall be mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it; and shall take heed that no act of his weakens the fabric in which he has been permitted to live. Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to the commun- ity; to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not his existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage. . . . Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends ; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times . . . and our day lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope Adequate National Defence 233 that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success. It is just as wrong to argue from these words that the theory of evolution does not permit of ethical efforts directed against the cosmic process, as it is to assume that society, whatever the efforts of the aggregates thereof may be, is not subject to the cosmic process. The propaganda of true pacifism is justified then, by the theory of evolution, to the extent that the conditions of the struggle under the cosmic process may be mitigated by the ethical efforts of men, though it does not justify the belief that the cosmic process may be completely set aside; far less that it is already set aside. War is undoubtedly a great illusion, to borrow the phrase of Norman Angell, but so is crime, hate, envy, and in fact, all unsocial acts and tendencies. The facts of everyday life deny that man has reached a stage of ethical development in which unsocial acts cannot occur, and contemporary history refutes the contention that nations will no longer resort to war. Were nations no longer prone to resort to war as a justifiable agency it would be gramma- tically incorrect to refer to war as an illusion. In fact, human society has not yet progressed to an ethical stage in which force employed to compel right is regarded as immoral. Moral as well as political law is yet upheld by force. The power of the law is not referred to as an illusion because 234 Empire and Armament the existing limitations of human character are recognized. And so, in the code of international law, we find the armed intervention of a state justified upon certain grounds. Intervention in behalf of a population oppressed by its govern- ment, to assist a state in suppressing popular disorders which it itself cannot subdue, is a moral duty, moral because necessary to the welfare of society, and necessary because the ethical process has not yet superseded the cosmic process. "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth : I come not to send peace, but a sword." Thus spake Christ, but he did not mean, as the militarist assumes, that the strong should wield the sword against the weak, but that the strong should wield the sword in the defence of and for the uplift of the weak — as Huxley says, to make the unfit fitter. On the ground of material expediency the United States is no doubt justified in refusing to intervene in Mexico; the reasons given by the Administra- tion through the expressions of the President clearly establish the fact that ethical considerations are not the controlling factors in the policy of the Government. The interests of pacifism may be subserved by allowing the devil unrestrained sway, undisputed dominion in Mexico. But there are many, who like Huxley, are unwilling to admit that it is not the ethical duty of strong nations to allow the cosmic process in Mexico to work it- self out unchecked. Many also, who know noth- Adequate National Defence 235 ing whatever of the evolutionary theory, believe it is the moral duty of the strong to help the unfit to be fitter, even if the compulsion of arms is necessary to attain that end. If the United States justifies its intervention on behalf of the Cubans, in 1898, on moral grounds, it would seem inconsistent to attempt to justify itself on similar grounds for allowing the Mexicans to bleed themselves to death, for the gratification of a succession of factious leaders who apparently do not possess even a veneer of culture. The author is not prepared to say that it is not politically and economically wise for the United States to hold aloof from interfering in the affairs of Mexico. Many think it is, so many that the Administra- tion seems to find encouraging support for its policy. But this is certain : the more compelling the political and economic arguments in support of the President's policy, the more obvious it is that the selfish material interests of that state, so often declared to be "the hope of humanity," and not a conception of moral duty to the world, dictates its course in its dealing with the world, for no one can deny that Mexico would be ethi- cally better off if the United States were to take upon itself the burden of establishing law and order within its boundaries. As evidence, also, of the fact that the United States has not reached the plane of ethical development in which force is not apt to be misused, it is declared by many publi- cists that once in Mexico she would remain in posses- 236 Empire and Armament sion. That belief is assigned by many as a reason against the expediency of intervention. In this view it is the contemplated disadvantage of the United States and not the benefit of Mexico that controls. The time has not yet come when a great moral sacrifice on the part of one State for the benefit of another is seriously and generally contemplated, unless the material gains to be had will probably offset, if not exceed, the material losses, and when such is the case there is, of course, really no sacri- fice at all. The reader's thoughts at once return to Cuba, but who shall say how much of revenge for a national insult, how much of the spirit of imperialism, how much of a feeling of moral obligation, entered into the decision of the United States in that case? Certain it is the imperialists had long had their eyes on Cuba, and certain it is that intervention did not come until the supposed national insult compelled it, notwithstanding a decade of massacre and rapine in that unfortunate island, and which was no more revolting to the world in 1898 than it had been in 1897 and the years immediately preceding. But the United States twice abandoned Cuban soil, says the pacifist, and in doing so gave to the world a great moral precept. In reply one need only suggest the reading of the treaty which de- fines the relation of the United States to Cuba, and a review of the political situation in 1898. When the national press was able to enumerate the possible offsets to the losses a war of interven- Adequate National Defence 237 tion would entail, certain it is that the Government was not ignorant of the opportunity a war would afford to recoup those losses in territory, trade, and extended influence, and long since the United States has balanced the Cuban account which shows a startling profit. No. The world will not credit the United States with a sacrifice in the case of Cuba. These various conclusions lead to the practi- cal consideration of pacifism. Surely since it is impractical to regard the cosmic process as set aside, even if it may be gradually superseded in the future, it is irrational to launch forth upon a campaign of ethical opposition in the interest of mitigation, by subjecting society, more completely than it is at present, to the cosmic process of struggle. Just that is what the disarmamentists propose to do. But how unwise it would be to set out in search of the wolf of war whose presence we admit and which we propose to slay, while the lamb of peace remains unguarded in the pasture! Such is the illogical proposal of the disarmament- ists. Admitting in one breath that war is bane- fully present and that it is a menace to human happiness, in the next breath they ask the world to proceed on the assumption that it is not a menace. In one breath they characterize war as "the great illusion"; in the next they assure us that the end of strife is near at hand. The truth is, the Goddess of Peace is a woman of the most fickle nature. Cajoled by her charms, 238 Empire and Armament men cast discretion aside and flirt with the allur- ing creature, careless of all experience and the warnings of history. The counsels of the sages are either entirely forgotten or denied with impa- tience when recalled to our minds by the unin- fatuated. "Times are changed," we confidently aver; a single smile of the fair entrancer puts the lie upon every maxim which experience, the bit- terest experience, may have advanced. And so, with discredit, comes disuse, and finally atrophy of warlike powers, a process which attains its ultimate result at the very stage in the decay of physical resisting power when the hardy traits of men are most needed. Men grow to regard in- dividual wealth and luxury as the true sources of national power, forgetting that these are often the very causes of national weakness and dissolution. The first cost of insurance is high. Were eter- nal life guaranteed, who would assume the burden of an annual premium? The Goddess of Peace has promised the nation an enduring release from war. Nothing is more natural then, than that the demagogue, in looking for the source from which his own selfish wants are to be supplied, should assail the supposedly useless policy of national insurance, for by doing so he makes his capital — political capital as an economist, financial capital as a needy seeker of means for his own projects and aggrandizement. And then, the in- evitable occurs, the immutable laws of nature Adequate National Defence 239 assert themselves; death claims his due and the banners of war are once more unfurled. Then we see, but all too late, how cheap is the final cost of insurance against these dread and inevit- able contingencies. Then it is we turn in disgust from the fickle goddess who has only betrayed us as she did our forefathers, and who smiles no more upon the victims of her deceit. Such is the ever- recurring cycle of history, in every chapter of which evidence of the process is found. It seems inexplicable that man cannot heed the warning against that strange fatuity which persistently robs him of the power of perception — perception of the most fundamental facts. The scientific experiences of Archimedes, of Galileo, of Newton, of Bacon, are writ into the most modern texts. The political experience of mankind is seldom included in its bearing upon peace and war, and never heeded, if perchance presented. The most learned scholar accepts the principles of science so long as the science is not that of war. Rational men do not consult dentists upon medical questions, but they accept with the utmost confidence the views of a politician upon matters of a military nature. Who has not seen the views of a local editor presented with assurance, and accepted with confidence, in refutation of the views of the professional soldier? The cheap and senseless oratory of a single senator will consign to the national waste-basket the most thoughtful report of the Secretary of War. 240 Empire and Armament We read and reread, print and reprint, the words of Washington and other great statesmen until they touch upon the one subject of war and the danger of vv^ar. That portion we utterly ignore and would gladly expunge it from the record, for we believe it to be valueless because times, as we say, have changed in respect to that very element of human nature which has given history its same- ness throughout the ages. And so we read with approval and full credence reports of the early elimination of national strife, ignoring the fact that in the lifetime of those who herald the advent of universal peace, the greatest struggles in the history of man have occurred. Such is the strange fatuity of our people, that they bitterly resent the cry of wolf and condemn the foresighted advocate of adequate armament as a public enemy of good morals and a nuisance. Intellectual, capable men, characterized b}^ the sanity of their views in all other respects, simply close their eyes and refuse to consider the prob- ability of the persistence of war, however infre- quent it may become. They say: "We will cross the bridge when we come to it." Would these same men, who have learned from the process of nature that rain falls from an apparently clear sky, build a structure with no roof and refuse to provide protection for their possessions by placing a roof on the building until the storm broke ? No. Yet rainfall seems to be no more of a certainty than social conflict, however bright the political sky. Adequate National Defence 241 Today we are told by the deluded disarmament- ists that it is foolish extravagance to be prepared for war; that preparedness is not only an ineffec- tual means of preserving peace but that it provokes war; that a free people need not be armed and disciplined, and that no uniform and well-digested military policy is necessary. The wisdom of Washington is denied absolutely, and strange though it may be, our people accept the advice of ignorant demagogues and deluded theorists in preference to that of the founder of their liberties, whose whole life was devoted to the acquisition of peace. Shall we continue to heed the views of the disarmamentists ? Shall we follow them with their theories, or shall we take counsel from the experience of every age, while striving to change the nature of men and to elevate the conscience of their governments? Let us strive on and continue to enlighten the advocates of war, but let us be prepared to over- whelm every possible enemy with arms should he refuse to be educated and prefer to assail us instead. The pacifist must ever keep in mind the parable of the foolish virgins in the Gospel. He should also ponder the admonition contained in the text : ' ' Put on the whole armour of God. ' ' The emphasis, of course, is upon whole, — the moral and spiritual preparation for the fulfilment of social and international duty. If the spiritual and the moral concepts are duly correlated with the material concept of armament, all will be well 16 242 Empire and Armament with humanity in spite of the persistence of the cosmic process and the unsocial characteristics of man. Pacifism, to be adequate, must recognize the cosmic process. To be practical it must compound education and adequate defensive measures against the uneducated, or the "blond beasts" of the human race who wage a gladiatorial contest for survival. As the power of this element is re- duced by education, by ethical effort, armament may be correspondingly reduced; a too rapid dis- armament on the part of the ethical workers would only tend to reinvest the "blond beasts" with their pristine strength. And here let it be added that the "blond beasts" of the world are those states imbued with the morals of Nietzsche, who taught, "You shall love peace as a means to new wars. And the short peace better than the long . " " Men shall be trained for war, and woman for the solace of the warrior. Everything else is folly." With such a philosophy extant and openly professed by no inconsiderable portion of the world's society, to seriously consider disarming the more enlight- ened element of that society is but to court the submersion of its ideals in the depths of ignorance, is but to contemplate reversion to Teutonic bar- barism, or, regarded from the German viewpoint, is but to contemplate an advance to Prussian civilization. It is perfectly logical to seek to overthrow the sway of Mars and yet not assent to disarmament. Adequate National Defence 243 Mars must be recognized as the great Goliath of our day, and we must not throw away the sling with which he may be slain. The shirt of mail is too stoutly woven to be penetrated by words alone. The sling which pacifists must employ in as- sailing the giant Mars must not be robbed of its missile. Let education be the sling and adequate armament the missile. For the present there is need of both — education to eradicate the false philosophy of the "blond beast," and armament to save the enlightened portions of the earth from his dominion during the educative process. How truly spoke Nicholas Murray Butler when he said: Disarmament will never come by pressure from without a nation, but only by pressure from within. If justice is established between nations, peace will follow as a matter of course. The reign of peace will cause armaments to atrophy from disuse. Dis- armament will follow peace as an effect, not precede it as a cause. War as a pastime for autocratic rulers will eventually be eliminated by education ; as a cosmic agency it will continue, however infrequent the ethical efforts of man may make it. Already states venturing into war are beginning to justify their decision to fight when in the right, and to proffer the world apologetic lies when in the wrong. This is a hopeful sign. It does not indicate, how- 244 Empire and Armament ever, that a time is rapidly approaching when states in the right will not employ force to assert their right, for such a non-resisting attitude would be but the complete setting aside of the cosmic process in which the fit survive, the word "fit" as applied to society being used in its ethical rather than in its brute sense. Since society has not reached its highest attain- able stage of development there must be human elements below the attainable stage, and these elements stand at varying degrees of development. The lower in the scale an element stands the more subject it is to the cosmic process of which alone it has experience, and at whatever stage it stands it is always subject to the danger either of actual reversion to a lower stage by reason of moral de- terioration, or of relative retrogression by reason of being surpassed in the progressive struggle. It is this moving onward and upward, slipping back- ward and downward, at varying rates, that makes struggle between the elements of society, organ- ized into states, as much a law of the cosmic pro- cess today as it was in the dawn of history. Struggle implies friction; friction between states involves national rights. How fatal to human progress and enlightenment would be the quies- cent yielding of a progressing state obedient to the wish of one whose social leadership it were about to usurp by inherent right. Would even the Creator wish for such a condition ? Bagehot has shown that the evolution of society Adequate National Defence 245 is attended by the same contingencies, the same law of probability, the same law of the survival of the fit, as are organic bodies, and there are degrees of fitness in the scale of life. The fit survive, and the fittest lead and dominate, as did the reptiles in Mesozoic time and the mammals in Tertiary time. Among mammals man is dominant because he is the fittest. Nations break up or become extinct when they are no longer fit, or equal to the exigencies of the struggle of life. So wrote John Burroughs. But nowhere is it suggested except in Germany that a nation may undertake to help out the cosmic process or that a state by use of force is justified by cosmic law in "trampling down weaker nations, as we do weeds of the field, or in ploughing and harrowing the world" with siege guns and bayonets to plant its own Kultur, however good that Kultur may be. There may be several good cultures, the natural friction between which in the cosmic process may produce a still higher one. In the last analysis perpetual peace would eliminate this friction; therefore the impossibility of attaining perpetual peace inasmuch as the complete setting aside of the cosmic process is a prerequisite to its attain- ment. To the philosophic mind the outlook is by no means discouraging. Viewed in human perspec- tive the evolutionary theory in all its aspects seems to set at nought human effort. Cosmism 246 Empire and Armament approaches too near the infinite to be readily grasped by the unphilosophical mind ; to the care- ful thinker, on the contrary, it establishes perfect order out of chaos. The pacifist must be a cos- mologist; not a mere casualist ready to offset chance by theorizing on preventive methods. The cosmologist who undertakes the work of pacifism will recognize at the outset the limita- tions of ethical endeavour, and hence will not be disappointed by the recurrence of conflicts along the upward path of human progress. He will recognize adequate armament, not only as compatible with, but as indispensable to, pacifism, and he will know how to intelligently discern be- tween necessary measures for defending the van- tage he has gained with so much of patient toil, and militarism, which is the weapon of the "blond beast." Between the two there is no essential relation. Of this fact we have striking evidence in Switzerland where a larger proportion of men are trained in arms than in Germany. Who would say that Switzerland is a menace to peace ? It is time now that those who earnestly desire to labour for the cause of peace, in so far as it is possible of attainment, recognize certain limita- tions ; first of all let them understand that disarm- ament is a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent, to their end. Nations must be edu- cated and false philosophies eradicated. Were every nation on earth to beat its swords into ploughshares and its spears into pruning-hooks, a Adequate National Defence 247 race of men clothed in ignorance and armed with a false philosophy would prove a greater menace to peace than did the Imperial Army of Germany in 1914, for force, whether exerted by arms or com- merce or universities, is after all but relative in the struggle for social hegemony. Professors may be more dangerous than generals: in Germany they have been the creators of the warrior class. Arma- ment may or may not be the concomitant of mili- tarism. Disarmament is in no sense the equivalent of the repudiation of militarism. The so-called pacifists have until now erred in accepting as facts conclusions which are not facts. Built up upon a false hypothesis, their arguments appear irrefutable to the casual thinker. If we grant that war is an illusion we at the same time admit that it is believed in by the deluded, and the fact that a part of human society is de- luded makes disarmament illogical until the illu- sion is entirely destroyed or reduced to a negligible factor. After a long discussion of the folly of assuming that war is profitable, Mr. Norman Angell, in- advertently writes in The Great Illusion : "For it is a fact in human nature that men will fight more readily than they will pay, and that they will take personal risks much more readily than they will disgorge money, or, for that matter, earn it." He then gives a quotation from Bacon in support of his argument : ' ' Man loves danger better than travail." In the truth of these statements 248 Empire and Armament we find the reason for the necessity of defensive armament. War may be an illusion but, having admitted that men will fight rather than work, would Mr. Angell have those who want their due and are entitled to it place themselves at the mercy of the predatory by disarming? Turning to Isaiah the theoretical peacemakers read: And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people : and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks ; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more. But who shall say that the words of the Prophet have yet been fulfilled? Is not the acknowledged fact of that very selfishness of men and nations against which disarmamentists inveigh sufficient proof that Christ's kingdom has not yet come in its fulness? As long as a great imperial race of soldiers espouse the German philosophy of war, we are not justified in disarming, and may only say with the hymn-writer : Hasten the time appointed, By prophets long foretold, When all shall dwell together, One Shepherd and one fold. Let war be learned no longer, Let strife and tumult cease, All earth His blessed Kingdom, The Lord and Prince of Peace. Adequate National Defence 249 Tennyson was but dreaming when he Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue; Till the war drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle flags were furl'd In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. CHAPTER XVI ADEQUATE DEFENCE CONFOUNDED WITH MILITARISM IT has already been indicated that militarism and adequate national defence must not be con- founded by the workers for peace. A wise dis- crimination must be exercised in respect to these, otherwise the pacifist will but defeat his own end. First of all he must recognize the present limitations of human society, and second, he must thoroughly understand the nature of those political tendencies leading to militarism in order that he may guard against their development, or destroy them where they exist. The destruction of all armament or means of defence would not destroy militarism, which is a mental state evidenced by a physical condition. The physical condition, however, is in no sense conclusive of the mental state of mili- tarism. Militarism is that political state of mind which confuses government with force, and which, in order to attain the maximum power for govern- ment, commits it to the hands of a warrior class, which rules for the aggrandizement of the state 250 Adequate Defence not Militarism 251 rather than for the collective interest of the indi- viduals comprising it. 'It is evidenced by giving undue prominence and precedence to the military caste in the conduct of national affairs. It is not necessary that the military caste be highly trained in arms or that it be relatively numerous; the only essential is that it possess actual control of the will of the masses. Certainly no one would assert that Switzerland is committed to militar- ism, and yet a larger proportion of men are trained in arms in Switzerland than in Germany. At the same time the military proficiency of the Swiss army is probably greater than that of the Russian army. Again, any attempt to determine whether militarism exists by a mere consideration of the amount of money a nation expends on its army is futile. Gauged by such a standard the United States, which is not even a military nation, would stand high in the scale of militarism. This fact is illustrated by the following comparison between the approximate military expenditures of the five great Powers for the year 191 1. 1 . Great Britain $364,000,000 2. Russia 321 ,000,000 3. Germany 315,000,000 4. United States 266,000,000 5. France 263,000,000 All that is necessary to be done to disclose the fallacy of such a rating is to figure the above expen- ditures per capita of the population, thus arriving 252 Empire and Armament at the individual military burden in each of these countries based on the above figures, which is approximately : Great Britain $8.00 France 6.00 Germany 4.80 United States 3.00 Russia 2.10 The reason why the United Kingdom and the United States compare so favourably with the European countries in point of military expendi- ture is, of course, because theirs are not national armies based on compulsory service; their soldiers are paid. In addition, in the United States the military system is highly uneconomic and expen- ditures are largely in the hands of politicians, who secure tremendous appropriations for new army posts and navy yards of little real value in the problem of national defence. If the pension ap- propriations were added to those for the army and navy, the United States would stand near the top in both of the scales given. During the past thirteen years the four great Powers of Europe have expended vast sums of money on their military establishments, as follows : Army Navy Great Britain $2,915,900,000 $858,070,000 France 2,488,603,000 389,530,000 Russia 4,284,000,000 283,645,000 Germany 2,380,000,000 515,520,000 Adequate Defence not Militarism 253 Average Total Annual Expenditure Great Britain $3>773>97o,ooo $290,305,384 France 2,878,133,000 221,394,846 Russia 4,567,645,000 351.357,307 Germany 2,895,520,000 222,732,307 The military and naval appropriations of the United States for the year 191 5 aggregate $240,- 146,492, which is very little less than the average of the appropriations of the four great Powers of Europe for the past decade, or $271,441,711. In other words, the United States is spending nearly as much on its actual military establishment as the average expenditure of the European Powers, and more than Germany and France spent while at peace. Its total military burden, $240,146,492 for army and navy plus $174,484,093 for pensions, or $414,630,545, is vastly in excess of the peace burden of any European power. It is also a noteworthy fact that the individual military burden of the people of the United States for the year 191 5 was $4.60, whereas the average individual burden of the German people for the past thirteen years was but $3.70. In the sweep- ing generalizations so commonly encountered al- together too little consideration is given the individual military burden which alone forms the basis of just comparisons. It is not the aggre- gate amount expended by a state but how much its citizens or subjects are called upon to contri- 254 Empire and Armament bute individually that determines the real weight of their military burden. Militarism, then, has derived its name, not from itself but from that medium through which it manifests its power — the military institution. But obviously some other gauge is necessary to test militarism than the relative proportion of trained soldiers and the cost of maintaining them. Nations may be classified both with respect to the status of their military institutions and the temper of the national disposition, as follows: 1. Militaristic, militant; German type. 2. Military, militant; French type. 3. Military, pacific; Swiss type. 4. Unmilitary, militant; American type. 5. Unmilitary, pacific; Dutch type. To one or the other of these five classes all nations belong; to which class a particular one belongs depends upon the opinion of the judge in the case. The difference between the German and the French types is the difference between mili- tancy and militarism, and to express that difference it may be allowable in this age of philological expe- diency to employ the newly coined word "militar- istic" as a peculiarly appropriate derivative of militarism. It will be recalled that militarism has been defined as that excess of militancy which commits government to the military as the best means of applying force to government. Where states possessing the various characteris- Adequate Defence not Militarism 255 tics enumerated actually exist side by side in the narrowed world of today, when states are neither insulated from dangerous contact with each other by time or distance, it is obvious that the Swiss type is the one that the practical pacifist should hold as his model for the time being, and until by patient toil he can eliminate both militancy and militarism as ruling factors in the other types. The distinction between a state in which militar- ism exists and a militant state, so far as the practi- cal pacifist is concerned, is that the former is an existing threat to peace economically equipped for the uneconomic and unsocial conflict it tends to provoke, while the latter may be no less a threat to peace but is uneconomically organized from a military point of view. Thus, Germany prepared herself to attain the ends of militarism at the least cost to herself, while the United States, which is characterized, as shown by its history, by an ag- gressive spirit easily aroused, has never prepared itself. The latter contemplates instantaneous prep- aration rather than advance preparation. Of the two, the German method has proved the more effective and relatively the less costly, from a purely economic standpoint. The American idea is briefly and pointedly summed up by certain of our so-called pacifists, one of whom, Mr. Bryan, says: "The President knows that if the country needed 1,000,000 men, and needed them in a day, the call would go out at sunrise and the sun would go down on 1 ,000,000 men in arms." And by Sen- 256 Empire and Armament ator Teller, who sees economy in lack of prepara- tion because, as he says, "The fighting force of a republic is the great body of the people, and not a paid soldiery called 'regulars.' You must rely upon the people, not upon an army. An army is a vain delusion. It may today be for you; it may be against you tomorrow." These authorities, if they be such, fail to per- ceive that a people capable of yielding such instan- taneous military support to their government must necessarily be maintained at a very high pitch of militancy, else they would be incapable of doing that which they are depended upon to do. They also fail to understand that it is the aggres- sive spirit of the warrior and not merely the exist- ing means of defence that leads to breaches of international peace. Militarism is thoroughly misunderstood by the world at large, and by the people of the United States in particular. It is confounded with every- thing of a military nature. It is not generally believed that a small, more or less ineffective, army constitutes militarism, but an army of any magnitude and efficiency is at once put down as militarism. This mistake manifests itself in the annual message of President Wilson, in 1914, from which is extracted the following discussion of national defence: The other topic I shall take leave to mention goes deeper into the principles of our national life and policy. It is the subject of national defence. Adequate Defence not Militarism 257 It cannot be discussed without first answering some very searching questions. It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms? Of course, we are not ready to do that; and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack ? We have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in times of peace. Allow me to speak with great plainness and direct- ness upon this great matter and to avow my convic- tions with deep earnestness. I have tried to know what America is, what her people think, what they are, what they most cherish, and hold dear. I hope that some of their finer passions are in my own heart, some of the great conceptions and desires which gave birth to this government, and which have made the voice of this people a voice of peace and hope and liberty among the peoples of the world, and that, speaking my own thoughts, I shall, at least in part, speak theirs also, however faintly and inadequately, upon this vital matter. We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities can say that there is reason to fear that from any quarter our inde- pendence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. Dread of the power of any other nation we are incap- 17 258 Empire and Armament able of. We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce or of any other peaceful achievement. We mean to live our own lives as we will, but we mean also to let live. We are, indeed, a true friend to all nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possessions of none, desire the overthrow of none. Our friendship can be accepted, and is accepted with- out reservation, because it is offered in a spirit and for a purpose which no one need ever question or suspect. Therein lies our greatness. We are the champions of peace and of concord. And we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought to earn. Just now we should be particularly jealous of it, be- cause it is our dearest present hope, that this character and reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations. This is the time above all others when we should wish and resolve to keep our strength by self-possession, our influence by preserving our ancient principles of action. From the first we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. We never have had, and while we retain our present principles and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army. If asked, Are you ready to defend yourselves? we reply, Most assuredly, to the utmost; and yet we shall not turn America into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves. There is another sort of energy in us. It will know how to declare itself Adequate Defence not Militarism 259 and make itself effective, should occasion arise. And especially when half the world is on fire we shall be careful to make our moral insurance against the spread of the conflagration very definite and certain and adequate, indeed. Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the only thing we can do or will do. We must depend in every time of national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a standing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, right American policy, based upon our accustomed principles and practice, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and manoeuvre, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline, which our young men will learn to value. It is right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for mere health's sake, if for nothing more. Every means by which such things can be stimulated is legitimate, and such a method smacks of true American ideas. It is right too, that the National Guard of the States should be developed and strengthened by every means which is not inconsistent with our obligations to our own people or with the established policy of our govern- ment. And this, also, not because the time or occa- sion specially calls for such measures, but because it should be our constant policy to make these provisions for our national peace and safety. 260 Empire and Armament More than this carries with it a reversal of the whole history and character of our policy. More than this, proposed at this time, permit me to say, would mean merely that we had lost our self-possession, that we had been thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportuni- ties of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble. This is assuredly the opportunity for which a people and a government like ours were raised up, the opportunity not only to speak, but actually to embody and exemplify the counsels of peace and amity and the lasting concord which is based on justice and fair and generous dealing. A powerful navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defence ; and it has always been of defence that we have thought, never of aggres- sion or of conquest. But who shall tell us now what sort of navy to build? We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past; and there will be no thought of offence or of provoca- tion in that. Our ships are our natural bulwarks. When will the experts tell us just what kind we should construct — and when will they be right for ten years together, if the relative efficiency of craft of different kinds and uses continues to change as we have seen it change under our very eyes in these last few months ? But I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There is no new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it because some amongst us are nervous and excited. We shall easily and sensibly agree upon a policy of defence. The question has not changed its aspects because the times are not Adequate Defence not Militarism 261 normal. Our policy will not be for an occasion. It will be conceived as a permanent and settled thing, which we will pursue at all seasons, without haste and after a fashion perfectly consistent with the peace of the world, the abiding friendship of states, and the unhampered freedom of all with whom we deal. Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defence. We are not unmindful of the great respon- sibility resting upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new circum- stance; and what is needed will be adequately done. In this message of Mr. Wilson the old national prejudice looms up in all its pristine strength. Like so many that have gone before him he proffers the people a conclusion, based upon a premise to the falsity of which their prejudice blinds them. His views may be formulated as follows : Standing Army = Militarism Militarism = Loss of Popular Liberty Loss of Popular Liberty = Despotism . ' . Standing Army = Despotism The keystone of his conclusion is based on the utterly false premise that an enlarged regular military force would inevitably result in militar- ism. He does not perceive that militarism is not a product of an army but of a false philosophy that turns over the nation to the army. He makes no distinction between a state in which an auto- cratic government can force upon the people the 262 Empire and Armament false philosophy of militarism, and one in which the government must derive its philosophy from the people. He sees in the creation of a regular army adequate to his country's needs a danger of foisting the false philosophy of militarism upon the nation, and in the military training of a rela- tively much larger number of men by the States no danger whatever of diffusing that same philo- sophy. But the great evil of his message is that in declaring against the danger of militarism he actually lulls the nation into the belief that other dangers do not now surround the empire, nor does he perceive the fact that a regular force inadequate to the purposes for which it is maintained has no economic justification whatever. If our army is incapable of defending the country, as declared by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and every other military expert in the world, then it is a useless burden in its inadequate state. If means of defence are unnecessary, then why maintain any army? If we accept as correct the statement that the army is unnecessary then we are com- pelled to believe that the United States with the sanction of the Government is maintaining an unnecessary institution at a cost exceeding that of the great peace army of the German Empire. If we accept as correct the statement that the army is inadequate to the national defence, the logical inference is that a vast sum of money is being wasted by the government upon an army which is incapable of doing that for which it is Adequate Defence not Militarism 263 supported. Which view of the situation shall one take? In either case is the cause of pacifism advanced? In but one definite conclusion are we justified. In view of the complete disagreement between the President and the Secretary of War, either the President has repudiated his Minister, or the Minister has repudiated his President. The writer cannot go the full pace of Treitschke. Like Mr. Garrison, the Secretary of War, he prays that America may be spared both what he con- siders the delusions of Mr. Bryan, the former Secretary of State, and the militarism of Hegel, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi. But Treit- schke is not in error in all things, and especially sound were his views on national defence. He wrote: Under ordinary circumstances the right to bear arms must always be looked upon as the privilege of a free man. It was only during the last period of the Roman Empire that the system of keeping mercena- ries was adopted. And, as mercenary troops consisted, except for their officers, of the lowest dregs of society, the idea soon became prevalent that military service was a disgrace, and the free citizen began to show himself anxious not to take part in it. This conception of the mercenary system has gone on perpetuating itself through the ages, and its after-effects have been strikingly demonstrated even in our own day. Our century has been called on to witness, in the formation of the national and civil guards, the most immoral and unreasonable developments of which the military 264 Empire and Armament system is capable. The citizens imagined themselves too good to bear arms against the enemies of their country, but they were not averse to playing as soldiers at home, and even to being able to defend their purse if it should happen to be in danger. Hence the truly disgusting institution of the national guard, and the inhuman legal provision that in the event of a popular disturbance the adored rabble might receive an immediate shaking at the hands of the guard. The army was only to interfere if things became serious. This shows a complete failure to realize the moral nobility of the duty of defence. The right to bear arms will ever remain the honorary privilege of the free man. All noble minds have more or less recognized the truth that "The God who created iron did not wish men to be thralls." And it is the task of all reasonable political systems to keep this idea in honour. The National Guard in the United States is, of course, now on a higher plane than that of Europe which is referred to by Treitschke, and should be encouraged in every way possible. As a matter of fact its status is merely that of a less efficient and relatively more costly regular force than the one completely controlled by the Federal Govern- ment and known as the regular army. In any discussion of the militia a wide distinction must be made between the present organized militia of the United States and the unorganized male population of which about 15,000,000 men are said to be capable of bearing arms. The average Adequate Defence not Militarism 265 military qualities of these men cannot, of course, be compared with those of the hardy colonists of our early history, or of the volunteers of the middle nineteenth century. It is to the unorgan- ized militia that Treitschke's remarks should be taken to apply, and of this militia his views are not opposed to those of Washington, who wrote : The jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas, formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I were called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter. It is proper here to enquire what experience on the part of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Bryan, and Mr. Teller leads them to deny the wisdom of Washing- ton, whose experience of militia was as extensive as it was unfortunate? "From the first," writes Mr. Wilson, "we have had a clear and settled policy with regard to mili- tary establishments." This declaration reminds one of the chapter on snakes in the natural history of Ireland. The only clear and definite feature of the military policy of the United States has been a prejudice against soldiery that has persistently prevented the provision of adequate national defence, and the economic and efficient organiza- 266 Empire and Armament tion of the inadequate armament which has been provided. Much of the opposition to adequate armament seems to be based on the erroneous conviction that armament is uneconomic. This is due to the fact that the true meaning of economy is not thoroughly understood. In the first place there is a marked distinction between the economics of war and the economics of armament, which dis- tinction is as a rule completely ignored. The crux of the whole armament question which is so deeply stirring the national mind at present is not whether armament is costly and is a burden. Everyone knows that it is costly. The real point at issue is whether it is an unnecessary burden. It is submitted that in view of the mental state of other peoples, as shown by their national philo- sophy, adequate national armament is not as burdensome as would be our condition without proper means of defence. Here again one runs the risk of being character- ized as a militarist if he advocates adequate de- fensive measures. The author reserves the right, however, to deprecate war and at the same time advocate adequate national armament, holding without apology the conviction of Washington, the father of our country, that the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war. The fact that the views of Washington and Treitschke on this point are identical does not weaken the position of Washington. One can accept some Adequate Defence not Militarism 267 of Treitschke's philosophy, as was said before, without going his full pace. For instance, when he asserted that a state not possessing an army, under existing conditions, would suffer tremen- dously in trade and prestige, and that its loss of revenue through such a lack would be incalculable, he was right, and not only Washington's views but those of Mr. Taft, the avowed peace advocate, are in accord with his. Says Mr. Taft : I am strongly in favour of bringing about a condition of securing international peace in which armies and navies may either be dispensed with or be maintained at a minimum size and cost; but I am not in favour of putting my country at a disadvantage by assum- ing a condition in respect to international peace that does not now exist, and I am opposed to injuring the useful prestige and weight of her international influ- ence, which under present conditions an adequate army and an adequate navy are required to maintain. It is anticipated that the old arguments will be advanced : that sharp weapons in the hands of na- tions are dangerous possessions; that familiarity with them tempts men to test their skill ; and that, therefore, armament induces war. These conten- tions are sound if it be conceded that the army is free to dictate war whenever it desires to experi- ment with its weapons, or if the people possessing the armament is a "Nation in Arms," labouring under the delusion of a false philosophy. It is not true, however, where the military caste is ab- 268 Empire and Armament solutely subordinate to a civil government as in the United States it is bound to be. And then there are the arguments that arma- ment has only a relative adequacy, and that to be of real value even for defence, it must be main- tained at a parity with that of the state against which it is designed to defend; that if carried to their logical conclusions efforts looking to an armament that is adequate must lead to the absurd attempt to weight down Mars so heavily with armour as to render him immobile. The fallacy of these arguments is that they ignore the fact that a nation is free to determine for itself what is adequate to its circumstances, and that its terri- torial and political situations coupled with its reserve power of defence largely determine the adequacy of armament. The point may be il- lustrated by the case of the United States. It is absurd to contend that we must maintain an army of the size of that of Germany or Japan in order to safeguard our country against their possible aggressions. Adequate armament for the United States contemplates only a force capable of re- sisting such sudden assaults as any Power may be tempted to make upon us, and which, if success- ful, would prevent or greatly hinder the develop- ment of our reserve power of resistance, which, undeveloped, however limitless in latent strength, is as useless in a crisis as iron in a mine is to a rolling mill or undiscovered gold nuggets in Alaska are to a government mint. We may know that Adequate Defence not Militarism 269 such resources exist but of what practical use can they be if the facilities for transforming them are destroyed? One of the most common economic fallacies concerning armament is found in the conclusion that a state is necessarily oppressed by the weight of an armament which consumes a large portion of its fiscal budget. Thus it was argued that the German people who were taxed but $4.80 per capita for military purposes when the individual burden of the people of Great Britain was $8.00, France $6.00, the United States $3.00 not includ- ing the pension, were being crushed by the cost of their armament because over one third of their budget was devoted to the support of the military establishment. The cost of that establishment was of course enormous, but national expenditures for any purpose, however large, are only relatively large, and the actual military burden of the indi- viduals of a state is not to be reckoned from the portion of the budget devoted to armament. In other words, the fact that one third of the budget is expended on armament does not mean that the people are being crushed by that armament. The full force of this contention will be appreciated if we recall that even Germany expended on the maintenance of her huge peace establishment less than three per cent, of the actual income of the German people, whereas three times that amount was expended by those same people on intoxicat- ing beverages. Professor Emery is the authority 270 Empire and Armament for this estimate. If it be correct, the German people, as Professor Emery points out, were able to fully provide for that military burden which in the opinion of many was crushing them, by drink- ing one third less beer! Such a course might have been fatal to the Germans but it would have been a very simple way for most people to avoid being crushed. Truly is the picture the disarm- amentist paints a ludicrous one. He would have us see a poor peasant reluctantly turning over to a ruthless imperial official his last greasy penny while he holds in his left hand a three-cent flagon of beer! He would have us see a race of people noted for the prosperity of their commerce, noted for their educational institutions and their good government, leaders of scientific thought and in the forefront of all the arts and sciences, bowed down beneath the weight of an annual military appropriation which was not as large in time of peace as that of the United States! How can serious-minded persons continue to gaze with complacence upon such caricatures of the facts ? It may be argued that the uneconomic consump- tion of intoxicants is not evenly distributed among the German people, whereas the war tax is uni- formly imposed; that, therefore, many are com- pelled to contribute their pennies to the support of the army who cannot reduce their consumption of beer for the reason they do not consume any. This point cannot well be taken. The fact that the imperial tax is not fairly levied does not make Adequate Defence not Militarism 271 the cost of armament uneconomic. A defective system of taxation cannot make rain unproduc- tive, nor men, nor battleships a burden out of all proportion to their value. During the past fifty years, the German people transformed the "dark and bloody ground" of Europe into a garden of peace and prosperity. The one great war they waged during that time lasted less than a year. By being prepared, Ger- many compelled the conquered enemy to defray the cost of the war and to contribute a handsome balance to her treasury. The preparation that enabled her to do this cost the people, as we have seen, one third as much as their beer. In return for the outlay she not only attained victory over her enemy, but other economic advantages as well. The fact that a false philosophy has led to the misuse of Germany's armament in the war of 1914, does not in the least affect the economic advantages obtained with that armament in the past. Was the reign of peace which Germany en- joyed during half a century, with all the oppor- tunity for industrial development and commercial expansion it afforded, worth the amount the United States has paid its military pensioners in that time? Another economic fallacy concerning armament is found in the belief that for every soldier taken from the ranks of the industrials, a loom stands idle and national productiveness is reduced to that extent. As a matter of fact the army of any 272 Empire and Armament country is a valuable agency in the absorption of the unemployed. It is not claimed, of course, that the army is directly recruited from among the unemployed, only that the unemployed ele- ment is reduced by the army. Professor Ely, one of the deepest thinkers of our time, concedes this fact when he states that from the present condition of concentrated production in private hands there results a vast industrial reserve army of unemployed men vainly seeking work, an army which depresses wages at all times, and which in periods of unusual prosperity cannot be entirely exhausted, while periods of depression swell it to enormous proportions. Those nations which maintain large standing armies based on compulsory service do not con- cede that national productiveness is diminished by the amount of industrial labour of which the men in the army are capable. If there were not unemployed in such countries it might more prop- erly be held that national productiveness was reduced. If the 546,000 men of the French and the 640,000 men of the German peace establish- ments had been turned back to industrial pursuits, how much larger would have been the army of unemployed in those countries it is not easy to calculate. We should in attempting such a cal- culation also have to consider the loss of em- ployment due to the vast demands which the supply of the army entails, — the machine shops, the factories, the navy yards that would be idle. Adequate Defence not Militarism 273 Compulsory military service and the absorption of surplus workers by the army involves the prin- ciple of national socialism. For that very reason it will always be decried by the labour socialists who make great capital out of the army of the unemployed in their attacks upon the army of the employed. Wherever military service tends to reduce unemployment most, there socialist opposi- tion to the army will be the most vehement. National socialism is but a governmental an- ticipation of the arguments of popular socialism, and, therefore, not only weakens the latter, but strengthens the state. The ultimate destruc- tion of centralized power being the avowed aim of socialism, armies are the special objects of attacks by socialists. In England we hear less of the uneconomic nature of the navy than in Ger- many, notwithstanding the fact that the British navy is many times more costly than the German navy. The explanation may in part be found in the difference between the Fabian and the labour socialists. The real gist of the armament problem is not whether armament is costly or not — everyone admits that it is costly — but whether it is more costly than the lack of it. John Stuart Mill, the great economist, claimed that until labourers and employers performed the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry would never be moralized; that armies would remain in spite 18 274 Empire and Armament of the anti-social character of their direct object. He also declared that armies had proved the chief school of moral co-operation. These truths must be taken into consideration as economic factors as well as moral factors. They account for the unparalleled industrial development of the United States during the Civil War and subsequent thereto when a highly developed spirit of co-operation, moral and physical, alone made possible many peaceful conquests which would not have been effected without such a spirit. They account for the phenomenal development of Japan which in a generation has been transformed from bar- barism to a state of industrial and commercial pre-eminence in the Orient; they account for the late supremacy of German industrialism in Europe. It would seem then that military pay-rolls are not altogether unproductive. Indeed, they pro- duce much that would not be had were it not for them. The disarmamentist fails to see that an army is but a school for future wage earners in which they undergo a thorough and rigid course of moral, mental, and physical development preparing them to compete more successfully with their fellow-men upon being discharged from the service. Where compulsory service, the very best form of military service, is in effect, the training which the young soldier undergoes is received by him at the form- ative period of his life when habits of discipline and high ideals of manhood can best be impressed Adequate Defence not Militarism 275 upon him, indirectly giving to the future army of wage earners those qualities of the soldier so highly esteemed by the economist, Mill. Is the agency that accomplishes this result uneconomic ? Surely it would be superfluous to contrast with such an advantage as that afforded by the army to in- dustrialism, the disadvantages of the anti-social circumstances which beset the army of the unem- ployed, the offspring of which we find in socialism, communism, anarchism, and all the other "isms" from brotherly love down to unrestrained violence. Some people seem to think that the money expended on armament might just as well be loaded on a lighter in the form of bullion, carried out to sea, and the ship scuttled. It never occurs to them that the demand for ships, arms, equip- ment, ammunition consumed in time of peace, and military supplies in general, affords employ- ment to a vast army of employees and industrial workers, or that the money paid to soldiers is used by them for any useful purpose. They simply consider the military budget as representing so much capital lost to the world — a total economic loss. As a matter of fact the money expended on armament is just so much capital put into circula- tion. The people of the state that spends the least on armament are apt to lose more of what is expended than the people of a state where vast sums are demanded for the military establish- ment, for the greater the home demand for arms and military supplies the more apt the state is to 276 Empire and Armament be self-sufficing and the less the capital that goes abroad. In other words, the demand, if large enough, will justify the investment of capital for the production of the necessaries of armament at home. The functions of armament are essentially economic. Even if it be conceded that armament invariably produces a military caste and that a military caste possesses unsocial tendencies, arma- ment cannot be charged with the uneconomic nature of the abuses to which it is subjected, any more than a flail can be said to be uneconomic because the thresher is apt in his anger to turn it upon his neighbour. Prestige is an economic product of armament. It enables the nationals of a state possessing it to go abroad and seek opportunities in foreign lands whose governments respect their rights and afford them protection. The degree of the protection those governments afford an alien, the extent of his rights, are largely based on the prestige of his national flag, and that prestige depends largely upon the ability of that flag to protect its subjects ; that ability in turn depends directly upon the adequacy of armament. Police protection at home and abroad, to person and property, is an economic product of armament. No one, not even the most insane optimist, con- siders the municipal police force of New York City an uneconomic institution because he accepts human nature as it is and perceives that the cost Adequate Defence not Militarism 277 of police protection is but the cost of opportunity for productive efforts. It is not uneconomic to purchase opportunity. An adequate armament is only a necessary police force, to provide that protection throughout the nation and throughout the world which municipal police forces cannot guarantee. It enables our ships to sail the seas free from hostile interference just as the metro- politan police force prevents highwaymen from waylaying the city resident on the streets. The security of our merchant vessels and citizens abroad is guaranteed by our armament just as a city police force protects a visitor from the rural districts or from some other town. But most im- portant of all, armament through the security it affords encourages foreign trade and commerce, and promotes intercourse between foreign peoples, all of which tends toward a better understanding between the nations of the earth and to tone down those racial antagonisms which constitute the ultimate causes of war. Foreign capitalists and merchants would not invest in American property, nor ours in foreign property, unless they knew that their governments afforded them protection, any more freely than a man would set up in business in a town notorious for lack of police protection. Venturesome spirits would take the chance in either case, but legitimate business intercourse would be discouraged and the ordinary man would look elsewhere for his opportunity. But we need not enter the field of speculation. We need only 278 Empire and Armament consider the tangible protection armament renders vested property rights of foreigners in such coun- tries as China, Turkey, and Mexico where aliens are admitted but not fully protected by local government. Guarantees of protection in many other countries are secured by threats of force, and though yielded reluctantly are given for fear of the punishment that foreign ships of war, marines, and soldiers will inflict. Surely an agency which promotes commercial intercourse between the nations and protects vested property rights on foreign soil cannot be rightly called uneconomic. Insurance against loss by domestic and foreign violence is an economic function of armament. This function is closely akin to the police func- tion, but it embraces more than mere protection. Armament enables a state to compel the reim- bursement of its nationals who have suffered loss from the neglect of foreign states. At home it not only protects them against the violation of their person and property to the extent that it is ade- quate to do so, but it provides the means by which their redress may be enforced in the event they suffer remedial injury. It has completely set aside, as far as the individual is concerned, the old maxim that might makes right. It makes the rights of the weakest individual in society as strong as those of the strongest. Shall we call such an agency uneconomic? Notwithstanding the valuable uses to which Adequate Defence not Militarism 279 wars have been put and the progress that has been made through war in the civilization of the world, it is a sound philosophy that declares war to be uneconomic and seeks to substitute some less de- structive agency to accomplish the progressive ends of man. But it is an unsound philosophy that declares adequate armament uneconomic in an age of unsocial habits among men. There is a fundamental distinction between war and arma- ment which the disarmamentist and the other dreamers do not see. This distinction is that war, whatever the social credits may be in any par- ticular case, destroys wealth or consumes without economic replacement, and that armament both produces and makes full replacement for all that it consumes. War is a devastating fire. The city that rises on the old site may be a vast improve- ment over the original one, humanity may be better off for the loss of the old and the upbuilding of the new one, but yet there was an economic loss. Adequate armament is a protective insti- tution, a police and a fire department and an insurance company combined. If the protective, preventive, and indemnifying features of armament are economic, then armament itself if adequate is a valuable institution in the economy of a state. But this is granted — when human nature is purged of the violence and the heat and the selfishness of which it is compounded, then armament will be uneconomic. We have seen that no regard for the final warn- 280 Empire and Armament ing of Washington has ever been displayed by the people of the United States. Until now it has been attempted to justify the neglect upon one of three grounds: that a standing army of ade- quate size is dangerous; that armament is un- necessary; or that even if necessary preparedness is too costly. But from the inherited jealousy of an army, the opposition to the creation of the means of adequate national defence has now in part shifted to a professed fear of militarism. Is it not sad to contemplate that there can be a think- ing man in the United States, statesman, scholar, or historian, who seriously believes that a regular army of 200,000 men, which would be adequate in size to our needs, would really endanger his civic liberties? Such a belief is a reflection upon the character of the other 100,000,000 people of the United States which should be made with caution. On this point one recalls with pride the stirring words of Henry Clay, uttered at a time when our political institutions were far less secure than at present. That there are many who enter- tain the convictions of the President is, alas, too true, a fact due to a complete misconception of the meaning of militarism, a meaning which can best be elucidated by tracing the evolution of militarism as it exists in the world today, and as it is expressed in the German philosophy of war, for it is that philosophy itself that is militarism. CHAPTER XVII THE EVOLUTION OF THE FALSE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR 1 PROBING deep into the soil of history we find petrified forms, familiar as living organisms to us today. The forms have not changed. In 500 B.C. Heraclitus, the sage of Ephesus, whom Zeno and the Stoics praised, held that "War is the father of all things." His philosophy found complete survival and expression, near twenty- five hundred years later, in the words of John Ruskin of England, who in his famous essay on "War" claimed that war was the in- spiration of all art and the source of all human achievement. Following close upon Heraclitus, Dionysius taught (b.c. 431-367) that It was a law of nature common to all mankind, which no time shall annul or destroy, that those who have more strength and excellence shall bear rule over those who have less. 1 Extracted from a pamphlet containing several of the author's lectures at the Virginia Military Institute, and before the Bel- gian Relief Association of Richmond, Va. 281 282 Empire and Armament And Plato, his contemporary, held: All states are in perpetual war with all. For that which we call peace is no more than merely a name, whilst in reality nature has set all communities in an unproclaimed but everlasting war with each other. It was Vegetius (350 a.d.) who, in his great military work, declared that "who would desire peace should be prepared for war," and Horace (b.c. 65-8) who said, "In peace, as a wise man, he should make suitable preparation for war." Bear- ing in mind these maxims, the Venetians at an early date inscribed in their great armory the words : ' ' Happy is that city which in time of peace thinks of war." And so, when Washington ad- vised his countrymen that "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserv- ing peace," he was but repeating the age-old coun- sels of the sages, whose convictions are perfectly reflected today in the works of many eminent scholars. It was Walter Bagehot, of England, who in his epochal work, Physics and Politics (1872), developed as his main thesis the idea of race character and the advancement of civiliza- tion through the continuous struggle of competing groups for expansion and supremacy, in which the process of natural selection operated, as in the case of all organic life, to bring about the survival of the fittest — the word fittest, of course, express- ing no essential relation to physical superiority, as assumed by the Germans. The False Philosophy of War 283 Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley had anticipated Bagehot in the application of the theory of survival of the fittest to biology in general. While they had not attributed to war the meritorious func- tion claimed for it by their contemporary, they had proclaimed human strife to be a primary agency of selection in the evolution of men and nations. Indeed, was it not Huxley who declared that supra-national society is continually in danger of reverting to the state of nature in which con- tracts are void and the binding force of treaties unknown, a state in which the only way of settling disputes is to fight them out ? In this connection we should consider the utterances of Bethmann- Hollweg with reference to the value of treaties. The views of Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Bagehot, Ruskin, English all, are fully incorporated in the philosophy of our own great American sociologist, Lester Frank Ward, who asserts that war or human conflict is the prime element of human progress, and who declares that war can be miti- gated but never eliminated; that when nations cease to war they cease to progress. And in Hol- land Hugo de Vries has answered the objection that the sudden changes wrought by modern war are not in accord with the Darwinian theory of gradual selection through the slow process of evo- lution, by advancing his theory of sudden and accidental mutation, a theory of evolution applic- able to nations which has been accepted by Henri Bergson, of France, and Steinmetz, of Holland. 284 Empire and Armament Aristotle formulated, in the fourth century before Christ, a conception of an ideal state, and in that state centralized power was emphasized, as it might be assumed it would have been by the mentor of Alexander the Great. Near two thou- sand years later, Machiavelli (a.d. 1469-1527), the Florentine, in The Prince, and other works, cham- pioned the cause of state nationalism and held that a people found their highest expression in the power of the state. His political philosophy em- braced the principles that in great historical de- velopments, as at the birth of nations, ordinary rules of morality cannot be held binding upon governments, whose sole duty it is to secure the existence of a state in which morality and civiliza- tion can thrive, and that the national end justifies the political means employed in its furtherance. "War," said Machiavelli, "ought to be the only study of a prince " ; and by a prince he meant every sort of state, however constituted. "He ought," says this great political doctor, ' ' to consider peace only as a breathing-time, which gives him leisure to contrive, and furnishes ability to execute military plans." In England, Sir Thomas More, the contem- porary of Machiavelli, preached the doctrine of Utopia, a model state, in which peace and content- ment were elements of the fanciful conception, while Francis Bacon, a few years later (1561-1626), in thorough accord with the ancient pessimists, declared human conflict to be inevitable; that The False Philosophy of War 285 force and warlike qualities would alone enable a state to survive; and adhered to the Machiavel- lian principle that in the weakness of one state is found the opportunity and strength of another. Then came Thomas Hobbes (1 588-1 679), whose deep study of politics and human nature led the old philosopher to declare that war was the state of nature. Was it strange that Bacon and Hobbes should have embraced the philosophy of Luther? Martin Luther (1 483-1 546) was the founder of what is now regarded as a distinct German litera- ture. In a sense his works gave birth to a German nation just as they gave expression to German thought. Having traced the philosophic concep- tions of war from the ancients to our own time, without regard to the influence of German thought, let us now develop the Teutonic conception, and in doing so, we shall see that the Germans, under a malevolent influence, have gone entirely astray in their efforts to formulate a philosophy justifying their aim of world empire. It no doubt comes as a surprise to many, upon undertaking an investigation of the philosophy of war, to discover that Luther, the great Christian Reformer, ushering in the Renaissance, adhered rigidly to the philosophy of war which, as expressed by modern Germany, seems so vicious to the world. Said Luther: It will be shown that it [war] is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work. 286 Empire and Armament Now, of course, it is impossible to isolate the philosophic influence of Luther, the German, from the rest of the world. Not only did he inspire much of the philosophy of Bacon, in the century following his death, but his influence has exerted itself upon every philosopher since his time, includ- ing Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Bagehot, Ruskin, de Vries, Bergson, and the others we have con- sidered, and those we shall consider hereafter. Out of the reaction resulting from the universal suffering and degradation of Central Europe during the period of the Marlborough wars, arose the pacific philosophy of the optimist, the Abbe de St. -Pierre. In a sense, this French clerical may be regarded as the father of modern pacifism, though the humanizing influence of Grotius, Erasmus, and Fenelon must not be forgotten. In a notable series of works, he stigmatized war as hostile to religion and first sought to array the influence of the Church, an institution itself erected in war, against human conflict and the political wars of the time. The writings of St.- Pierre elicited about as much refutation as they did support, producing, however, a number of disciples in later years, among whom the most prominent have been, perhaps, Immanuel Kant, Count Lyoff Tolstoi, and Norman Angell and Andrew Carnegie of the present day. Rousseau (i 712-1778) is supposed to have exerted much influence against war, as did also Thomas Jefferson. Of the latter I can only deny that he contributed The False Philosophy of War 287 anything to the cause of peace but sweeping profes- sions of pacific tenor, coupled with the substantial assertion that it was a law of nature that war was inevitable and providential. One who reads the correspondence of Jefferson certainly cannot con- scientiously classify him as a pacifist in spirit, although it has become the habit of latter-day writers, even scholars of authority such as Profes- sor Reinsch, to couple the name of Jefferson with those of St. -Pierre and Kant. 1 During the days of the French Revolution and the War of Liberation, Germany produced the two great thinkers, Immanuel Kant (1 724-1 804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1 770-1 831), the latter often confused with his son, the historian, of a later period. Writes Ernest Barker of Oxford : Kant was the philosopher of Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God — duty, supreme over all alleged "interests," and dominant over all pretensions of power. He held before Europe the ideal of a per- manent peace achieved by "a federal league of na- tions, in which even the weakest member looks for protection to the united power." An austere sense of law, pervading and controlling at once individual life, the life of the state, and even the life of the Euro- pean comity or commonwealth of states — this was the note of his teaching. Hegel, in reaction against what he regarded as the bare austerity of Kant, preached a different doctrine. Duty, he held, was the fulfilling of a station in the community. It was an empty 1 See pages 86, 88 supra. 288 Empire and Armament concept apart from the state. Faithfully to dis- charge his function as a member of his state — this is the duty of man. Along this line Hegel — perhaps influenced by admiration for Prussia — advanced to a conception of the state as something of an absolute, something of an ultimate, to which the individual must be adjusted, and from his relation to which he draws his meaning and being. The state, he could write, is the Universal, which has become "for itself," consciously and explicitly, all that it is "in itself," in its latent and potential nature. Thus self-con- scious and self-moved, it is a real individual, which can exist by itself in the world as an ultimate. As for the citizen, the apparent individual — why, he is an atom, which, "seeking to be a centre for itself, is brought by the state back into the life of the universal substance." Absolute, ultimate, universal — the state becomes a sort of transcendental majesty, cui nihil viget simile aut secundum. It is significant that Hegel, in his philosophy of the state, devotes less than a page to international law; it is still more significant that he can say, "the state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality; country and father- land are then the power, which convicts of nullity the independence of individuals." It is here — in this neglect of international law, and in this glorification of war — that one lays one's finger on a permanent and essential attribute of German political thought and practice. If Kant is the philosopher of one side of Prussia; if he expresses that deep sense of duty which made Frederick the Great the first servant of the state, Hegel is the philosopher of another side, and Hegel expresses that sense of the absolute finality of the state which made Frederick seize Silesia in spite of an The False Philosophy of War 289 international guarantee of the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and impelled him to carry Prussia further and further along the paths of militarism. Whether or not the more practical philosophy of Hegel annulled the idealism of Kant, the latter was the first great German exponent of perpetual peace. Had there been no Hegel, Kant's philo- sophy might have taken root in the German humus, but it was doomed to be sown in a soil fertilized for another growth. Kant's philosophy was based on the optimistic principle that man by his con- scious effort could create the laws under which he existed, and it neither accepted the principles of the ancient and mediaeval philosophy of war, nor embraced the pessimism of -the theory of evolution. It denied alike the Platonian and the Darwinian concepts. But just as Grotius, Erasmus, Fene- lon, and St. -Pierre gave impetus to pacifism in Europe, so Kant aroused interest in his dream of perpetual peace in the New World where the optim- ism of Rousseau and Jefferson had made itself felt. The reaction incident to the Napoleonic wars led certain philanthropists in Massachu- setts to establish a society for the discourage- ment of war which published the expressions of many public men of the time in its journal, known as The Friend of Peace. Mr. Jefferson, when called upon, evaded the question completely in an adroitly framed reply, pleading pre-occupation and infirmity of age, I but John Adams, with char- 1 See supra. 290 Empire and Armament acteristic boldness, declined to subscribe to the fanciful theories of Perpetual Peace. Wrote he: I have also read, almost all the days of my life, the solemn reasonings and pathetic declamations of Erasmus, of Fenelon, of St. -Pierre, and many others against war, and in favour of peace. My understand- ing and my heart accorded with them, at first blush, but alas! a longer and more extensive experience has convinced me that wars are as necessary and inevita- ble, in our system, as Hurricanes, Earthquakes, and Volcanoes. . . . Instead of discouraging a martial spirit, in my opinion it ought to be excited. We have not enough of it to defend us by sea or land. Uni- versal and perpetual peace appears to me, no more nor less than everlasting passive obedience, and non- resistance. The human flock would soon be fleeced and butchered by one or a few. Adams's views are thus also seen to be more in accord with those of Luther than with those of Kant, and may be taken as typical of those of the majority of the American publicists of his time. ' The lack of philosophic influence exerted by Kant upon the thought of his own countrymen is well illustrated by a few passages from the works of two of his contemporaries, whose names are the greatest in German literature — Goethe and Schil- ler. Like Skylarks in the Teuton dawn, Poets of the German morn, 1 See those of Washington, Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and others, supra. The False Philosophy of War 291 these peerless bards sang their martial and inspir- ing songs at the cradle-side of the new-born nation. Wrote immortal Goethe (1749-1832): Dreams of a peaceful day? Let him dream who may! "War" is our rallying cry, Onward to victory! and also That which thou didst inherit from thy sires, In order to possess it, must be won. While the great Schiller (1 759-1805) wrote: Man is stunted by peaceful days, In idle repose his courage decays. Law is the weakling's game, Law makes the world the same. But in war man's strength is seen, War ennobles all that is mean, Even the coward belies his name. It was Goethe who, in Faust, expressed the opinion that it was the work of Germans to make the habitable world worth living in, while Schiller boasted, ' ' Our language shall reign over the whole world," and that "the German day lasts until the end of time." These modest claims found echo in Heine, who declared that "not Alsace and Lor- raine, but all France shall be ours." Following close upon Goethe and Schiller, the 292 Empire and Armament great national poets,"dramatists, prose writers, and historians of the infant Germany, whose stirring words filled the mind and fired the imagination of every patriot in the Teutonic fatherland, came Karl von Clausewitz (i 780-1 831). Like Goethe and Schiller, Clausewitz was the product of the most heroic age in German history — the War of Liberation. At this time, not the dove of Kant, but the blood and iron doctrine of Frederick the Great was foremost in the German mind. Gnie- senau, Scharnhorst, and Blucher were the names the nation cherished, and it was as their pupil that Clausewitz prepared his epochal treatise on War, embodying a philosophy of war as complete as it has proved convincing to the political and military scientists of the whole world. The philosophy of Clausewitz is as fundamental as it is profound. Withal it is adapted to the martial nature as is the Koran to the denizen of the desert. It portrays war stripped of all accessories, as the scientific exercise of force for the attain- ment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency. It does not concern itself with the ethics of group struggle, nor has it regard to its moral features, but accepts war as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms. Upon it the German people based their hopes of national greatness, and though differing as to minor details every prominent statesman and soldier has given it a common in- terpretation — Durch Nacht und Blut zur Licht — ■ The False Philosophy of War 293 "through ignorance and strife to light." Thus do the Germans interpret their national colours — black, red, and white — the red streak representing the scientific war of Clausewitz as a means of attaining the national destiny; the white streak representing that coveted place in the sun of which Bismarck and the Kaisers have spoken so much. Clausewitz preceded Darwin by a score or more of years, and, says the brilliant Colonel Maude of England : ' ' What Darwin accomplished for Biology Clausewitz did for the Life-History of Nations." And here, it should be added, biologically the philosophy of Clausewitz is sound. The perverted form of the evolutionary theory of nations is not the creation of Clausewitz, who simply recognized the unethical nature of men in society and sought by the scientific employment of force to counteract the cosmic process to the advantage of his own nation. Immanuel Hermann von Fichte (1 797-1 879), the son of Gottlieb Fichte, exerted a great influence upon the thought of his country by his historical writings, as did his father's philosophy. Thor- oughly in accord with the philosophy of Luther, Schiller, Goethe, and Clausewitz, he preached that the regeneration of Christianity was only to be accomplished by making it the vital organizing power in the state, instead of leaving it solely occupied, as in the past, with the salvation of individuals. And so, to the patriotic fervour of his predecessors, he added an uplifting spirituality 294 Empire and Armament which found expression upon every page of German history that he wrote. To Karl Hegel (i 8 1 3-1 901) it remained to inject into German history a finalism derived from the philosophy of the great trio of English evolution- ists, so readily seized upon and extended by Ernst Haeckel in Germany. With Hegel, force is but the index or measure of fitness; as the strongest, the most resourceful, survive, these must be the true agents of civilization — through them the human spirit realizes itself. From the Egyptian to the Greek, from the Greek to the Roman, the torch of civilization was passed along to be grasped at last by the hand of the vigorous Germanic races. To Hegel, it is the Prussian state which is the ultimate representative of civilization. Now it is at about this stage of its evolution that the German philosophy begins to show a definite development along false lines. Bismarck's "blood and iron" policy becomes Weltpolitik, which in turn becomes "world-dominion" as a matter of right by reason of assumed social superiority. To bring about this development the theory of evolution was skilfully perverted and in its vitiated form drilled into a nation by every available means. The principle of "fitness" as applied to the evolution of man and society by Bagehot, Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley was misapplied to national politics by Hegel, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Haeckel to the infinite satisfaction of a power- mad Kaiser and his Prussian militarists. No- The False Philosophy of War 295 where in their philosophy do we find a suggestion of the real meaning of Huxley, who himself de- clared that while ' ' men in society are undoubtedly subject to the cosmic process," yet that social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best. Contemporaneously, but not always in accord as to details, and with little tolerance of each other, worked the two men who did more than any others have done to poison the intellect of Germany by foisting upon the nation a false philosophy, Hein- rich Gotthard von Treitschke (1834-1896) and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1 844-1 900). Exponent of "Weltpolitik" and the Mailed Fist, Treitschke taught that no state could bind itself over into the future by a treaty, and that all treaties were made with the silent stipulation — rebus sic stantibus. In other words, that when conditions change a treaty becomes a "scrap of paper." He held that a state found its highest duty in war, and that the people were created for the state and not the state to serve the people. As to the British Empire he taught that its ' ' setting sun is our aurora." Eloquent beyond words to describe, fired with a spirit of patriotism, unex- celled, was Treitschke. His name is today revered 296 Empire and Armament in Germany as that of the greatest historian and the soundest, most astute political philosopher of his nation. Nietzsche, far less beloved and popular than Treitschke, exerted an influence upon his country- second only to that of Treitschke. Real happi- ness, according to his philosophy, was to be found only in strife and the knowledge of power — increas- ing power. He taught not only that a good cause would hallow any war, but that a good war would hallow any cause; that weakness was loathsome; and that weak states were the just prey of stronger ones ; that it was the duty of the strong to conquer, conquer, conquer, and extend their culture for the benefit of mankind. Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars, and the short peace better than the long. Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the solace of the warrior. All else is folly. I do not counsel you to work, but to fight. I do not counsel you to peace, but to conquest. Let your work be a battle, your peace a victory. These are but typical examples of the principles making up the mad philosophy of Nietzsche, the insane worshipper of the "great blond beast" whose divine mission and whose right by virtue of physical fitness it is to rule the world according to that same philosophy. It seems beyond the possible that a race of men, noted for the intellectuality of its scholars, could The False Philosophy of War 297 have swallowed whole the philosophy of one whom even Treitschke characterized as a madman, with all its egoism, its egotism, its inhumanity, and its obvious falseness. But it was done, however incredible the miracle may seem, as proved by the writings of those who have followed Nietzsche. In this brief study of the evolution of the Ger- man philosophy of war, in this hasty survey of the path of German imperialism, only the towering hilltops have been examined, but all through the German historical and philosophic literature of the past century are lesser landmarks. Thus we find in Schlegel : ' ' War is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in Nature," which is but a virtual repetition of Luther. And in Clauss Wagner we read: The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the law of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of intra- social struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. The extra social, the supersocial struggle which guides the external development of societies, nations, and races is war. The internal development, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work — struggle of thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward development, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle of nations — war. In growth and decay, in the victory of one factor and in the defeat of the other ! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates. 298 Empire and Armament The anthropologist Woltman said that "the German is the superior type of the species homo sapiens, from the physical as well as from the in- tellectual point of view." To Germany, Wirth gave the whole credit for the civilization of the world and asserted that the time was near when Germany must inevitably conquer the whole world. Paulsen declared that humanity was aware of and admires the German omnipresence, while Hartmann taught that the European family is divided into two races, male and female, the first being exclusively Germans, and the second including Latins, Celts, and Slavs. In a work by Hummel, which is in general use in German pri- mary schools, it is said that the French are monkeys and the Russians slaves. It was but recently that Adolf Lasson, a distinguished professor of philosophy in the University of Berlin, said: "A man who is not German knows nothing of Ger- many. We are morally and intellectually superior to all, without peers. ... In a world of wicked- ness we represent love, and God is with us." The foregoing passages are not extracted from the ir- responsible literature of the Germans but, as the name of the author in each case shows, from the most serious works of the age, all of which are saturated with the poison of the Nietzschean philosophy. And now we come to Frederick von Bernhardi, the Prussian Cavalry General, who seems to have set America agog of late with his book — Germany The False Philosophy of War 299 and the Next War, appearing in revised form under the title, England Germany's Vassal. Ministers in their pulpits, professors in their lyceums, and statesmen from their rostrums are all engaged in bitterly assailing poor Bernhardt Is this not passing strange? For the object of all this vitu- peration is not, as we have seen, the prophet but only one of the many disciples of the doctrine — Durch Nacht und Blut zur Licht. The explanation of the remarkable reception of Bernhardi's book is a psychological one. It is only now that in our ignorance, self-confidence, or what you please to call it, our mental attitude has become such as to cause our minds to focus upon the propaganda of the German national im- perialists. For nearly a century it has been going on beneath our very eyes. Writers innumerable have preceded Bernhardi. Von der Goltz wrote his Nation in Arms a full decade ago. But, like the British, lulled into a dangerous lethargy of mind by the pacifists, we have refused to believe that the tree of war would again put forth its noxious bloom. The reason why Cramb and Usher so well un- derstood the German people of today, the motives which inspired them, the ambitions which first tempted, then lured them into the present struggle for world-supremacy, was because they had eyes unblinded by prejudice, and ears undulled by the vapourings of perpetual peace advocates. They perceived that the philosophic tree which had been so carefully nurtured by the German nation had 300 Empire and Armament matured, and would soon bear fruit. They knew, as the world might have known had it harkened to the soulful cry of the German people, that the perverted evolutionary theory of war had become a creed-doctrine of the German nation, a creed- doctrine embodied in the very colours of the im- perial banner, representing as it does a national determination to dispel darkness with sunlight, and to seek national supremacy by means of arms and blood, thus fulfilling the destiny which nature seemed to promise them for their race. And Bernhardi? What has been his humble part in the reaching out of Germany towards the goal which has been set before the Empire by its poets, its historians, its scholars, its statesmen, and its soldiers? Not to propound novel theories, as the world seems to think, but merely to place before the world, without apology, a cleverly dis- torted doctrine, which, seemingly, all races had sustained, and to put before the Teutonic race in popular and untechnical form, the doctrine which has inspired German statecraft since first the German Empire was erected on the field of battle. His part has been, as the semi-official spokesman of the empire builders of Prussia, to place their vicious creed before Pan-Germany in order that the Teutonic people might become indoctrinated with the false philosophy and thereby be rendered a nation in arms to the last man, homogeneous in thought and purpose, and united in action for the achievement of the racial destiny. The False Philosophy of War 301 Truly, may we say, he who ran might have seen, and yet the world, the stupid, over-intelligent, over-trustful world, busy with the boiling of its industrial and commercial fat, at last bestirs itself and cries out against Bernhardi for the exposition of a cold, material, sordid, cruel, and inhuman philosophy, the tenets of which it professes never to have heard before ! Indeed the world now, but all too late, stands aghast at the natural spectacle of a virile, ambitious, martial, struggling race, loyal to the principles embodied in the very na- tional standard it has borne for half a century while the German bard has sung — Dream ye of peaceful sway? Dream on, who dream it may. War still is Empire's word! Peace? By the victor's sword! And yet we say the world is wise and that with knowledge peace will come ! One may now enquire, even if it be granted that the great thinkers and the universities of Germany have expounded the philosophy we have outlined, wherein lies the real difference between that philo- sophy and the teachings common to the ancient, mediaeval, and the modern philosophers of other countries? The answer to this question is, as already suggested, that while the philosophers of all countries seem to agree that group struggle or war is inevitable and necessary to social progress, or that it is an essential element of the cosmic 302 Empire and Armament process, yet it is only the Germans that have undertaken to deny the function of the ethical process in mitigation of the cosmic process, and it is only the Germans that have undertaken to direct the operation of nature in their own exclusive interest. Again, it may be asked, in what lies the proof that the philosophy of the Germans has proved the pole star of their course and guided their conduct with respect to other nations in any material sense ? The answer to this question is to be found in history. Everyone knows that the history of the German Empire as it exists today is the history of war and militarism. Beginning with Frederick the Great, and continuing through- out the Napoleonic period, the Prussians strove to assert their independence. However unjusti- fiable the policy of Frederick, the aim of his people was a worthy one — liberty and independence. Nor are Stein and Hardenberg to be censured for their patriotic labour to erect a German state. It is only when Bismarck enters upon the scene that we find the laudable patriotism of a free people giving way to motives of selfish national aggrandizement. The German wars then became not struggles for liberty, but for excessive Imperial power in order that Germany might extend her sway over those whose rule she herself had spurned. The unrighteous war with Denmark in which a helpless state was despoiled of its territory, the coolly calculated war with Austria in which Prus- The False Philosophy of War 303 sian hegemony was the sole stake, and the war with France induced by jealousy, greed of power, and falsehood, cannot be called justifiable in the ethical sense, however expedient and advantageous they may have been in a political sense. Bismarck was only the pupil of Frederick ; the blood and iron maxim of the latter was his guiding principle. And so, William is only the pupil of Frederick and Bismarck, seeking as he does to justify their policy by substituting for their self-confessed chicanery and immorality, a self -professed con- viction in a divine mission. Frederick and Bis- marck frankly tell us that they were inspired by expediency and power-lust; William that he is inspired by God. Their acts are evidence of a common policy. Truly may one say of William: "He is come to open the purple testament of bleeding war," his soul harkening to "ancestral voices prophesying war." We have seen that Frederick the Great did not hesitate to violate the neutrality of the Austrian dominions notwithstanding an international guar- antee of the integrity of Silesia. Frederick, as we have said, was at least honest in declaring himself to be guided by expediency. He did not appeal to God for justification, nor proclaim himself the chosen agent of the Almighty in this seizure of Austrian territory. "As to war, it is a trade, in which the least scruple would spoil everything, and, indeed, what man of honour would ever make war if he had not the right to make rules that 304 Empire and Armament should authorize plunder, fire, and carnage?" So wrote the great Prussian to his nephew. Some of Frederick's general ideas on the man- aging of a state, expressed with the "ruthless Ger- man directness" spoken of by Treitschke, seem to have some application to the policies of his coun- try today. Frederick wrote : . . . never be ashamed of making alliances, and of being yourself the only party that draws advantage from them. Do not commit that stupid fault of not abandoning them whenever it is to your interest so to do; and especially maintain vigorously this maxim, that stripping your neighbours is only to take away from them the means of doing you a mischief. . . . These policies may be reduced to three heads, or principles. The first, self-preservation and aggran- dizement, according to circumstances. Second, alli- ances never to be made but for one's own advantage. And the third, to make one's self respected and feared in the most difficult times. . . . When Prussia, dear nephew, shall have made her fortune, it will be time enough for her to give herself an air of fidelity to engagements and of constancy. ... I have already told you, dear nephew, that politics and villainy are almost synonymous terms and I told you the truth. . . . Should it be necessary to make a treaty with other Powers, if we remember that we are Christians, we are undone. William's belief in the doctrines of Frederick may be seen in the war of today, especially in the The False Philosophy of War 305 violation of Belgium's neutrality, however much he may seek to cover up his real convictions by frequent and specious references to his divine mission. Other rulers may have been influenced by the law of nations which has been formulated at the cost of so much blood and suffering, but not William. With him war in the twentieth century is the same ruthless, barbaric struggle it was conceived to be by his illustrious ancestor in the eighteenth century. The ethical process enters not into his calculations. The obsolete conception of the law of unmitigated struggle is his, and turning to Browning, he reads and mis- construes the words: "Progress is the law of life: man is not Man as yet," while in one breath his Chancellor declares that "necessity knows no law," and in the next gives himself and his master the lie by acknowledging responsibility for the wrong being done to Belgium. Said he: "The wrong that we are committing we will endeavour to repair as soon as our military goal has been reached." One only need read the proclamations posted in Belgium by German military commanders to thoroughly understand the influence which the German philosophy of war has had upon the na- tion. Truly were those proclamations inspired by the spirit of Nietzsche's great "blond beast," the gory wolf -man. In bidding farewell to his troops bound for China, in 1900, William used this language: 306 Empire and Armament Preserve the old Prussian thoroughness. You know very well you are to fight against a cunning, brave, well-armed, and terrible enemy. If you come to grips with him be assured quarter will not be given, no prisoners will be taken. Use your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance. Show your man- liness. . . . Open the way for culture once for all. The Germans today resent the characteriza- tion of Hun as applied to them, but it was their own Emperor who claimed the proud title for his troops when they were leaving for China. He is reported to have said in one of his five speeches on this occasion : When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him; no quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns one thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German. We are not informed that William thus addressed the Huns that ravaged Belgium, but it is not strange that the former admonitions of the War Lord were borne in mind by them. And so we see that the world has been unduly harsh in its judgment of the German soldier, who has only done that which he was taught by his rulers and The False Philosophy of War 307 his preceptors to do. The fundamental principles of international law seem to have been omitted in his education. It is Frederick, and Bismarck, and William that must answer at the bar of human- ity for the crimes committed in the name of Ger- many, whose "Kultur" is not apt to be well received by the world, now that a practical example of it has been given. It is a very common error to assume that the German people are only misguided by their states- men and political leaders, and that sooner or later will their eyes open to the truth. When the Mus- sulman abjures Mahomet, when the Catholic denies the virginity of Mary, when the Puritan adopts the confessional, then may we hope that the German race will voluntarily cast aside as false the philosophy with which it has been nur- tured for a century. Whether sound or false, that philosophy has long since been elevated in the national mind above the plane of mere political or diplomatic policy. It is no longer a philosophy of mere academic interest. It has become a burn- ing conviction inseparable in the national mind from religion and patriotism, embodying as it does the duty of every loyal Teuton to his God and his fatherland. For us to condemn the German citizen of today, be he high or low, for the political doc- trine he adheres to, is equivalent to blaming the Hindoo because he is a Brahmin, or the Chinaman for accepting the philosophy of Confucius. The pacifist can never eradicate the German philo- 308 Empire and Armament sophy of war by disarming the Imperial army; it would not help the cause of peace to do so, for armament is at most only the proximate cause of war. To remove the ultimate cause the German people must be converted by reason just as is the pagan from a false theology. The condemnation of war, which in the abstract is abhorred by the Germans as well as by the Americans, will not convert the former. They do not relish war for its own sake any more than we do, but they do cherish war as the sole means of achieving a glori- ous destiny. The task of the pacifist, then, is to convince the German people that even if their doctrine of racial evolution be correct, the falli- bility of human judgment is such that no man or race of men should assume the burden of deter- mining what race or nation is fittest to survive. Such a decision is God's province and not that of political ministers, however wise they may be. How sad a world would be this had those of God's creatures with the most brawn and sharpest claws been the sole arbiters of fitness! Just as hunger among brutes is dangerous, so it is with national imperialists. It is a sociological fact, which disarmamentists ignore, that man is selfish, pre- datory, and a fighter. It is natural, therefore, that a race of men, when territorially or politically hungry, is not apt to perceive the finer qualities of a people physically weaker than itself. It is far too human for the weakness of a state to be regarded as the measure of the unfitness of the The False Philosophy of War 309 individuals composing it, to permit men to usurp the function of the Almighty in determining fitness. Let it be repeated, that if every state in the world beat its swords into ploughshares, disarmament would only have begun, for under such conditions a people imbued with the evolutionary philosophy in its perverted form, with the belief that they themselves were endowed with the divine right to determine fitness to survive, would be relatively better armed against their rivals, and a graver threat to peace and civilization, than was the Imperial army of Germany in 1914. Before uni- versal peace can be established, must go the spiri- tual conviction that countenances and encourages the practice of destroying the physically and politically weak, for even though pruning-hooks take the place of spears they may be employed in the attempt to establish social as well as political hegemony. So long as a single race of men remains convinced that it is the chosen of God and impressed with the divine mission of elevating its type over, and enforcing its culture upon, all mankind, peace, as said by Plato, will be no more than a word, whether battle-ships or harvest- ing machinery be employed in the struggle for supremacy. This is the idea Nicholas Murray Butler had in mind when he wrote : Disarmament will never come by pressure from within. If justice is established between nations, peace will follow as a matter of course. The reign of 310 Empire and Armament peace will cause armaments to atrophy from disuse. Disarmament will follow peace as an effect, not precede it as a cause. It was not the overdevelopment of armament, as thought by some, that is responsible for bringing the German Empire into the thraldom of militar- ism. On the contrary, it was the German univer- sities, as we have seen, subsidized by the Prussian kings and committed to Machiavellism, that brought about excessive armament. It was not the Prussian army that gave Germany her most untiring apostles of militarism. Germany, it must be remembered, has had a Fichte, a Hegel, a Nietszche, a Treitschke, and a Haeckel, ex- pounding the philosophy of militarism in the universities of the people. Reverting to Machia- vellism they taught that only the state was good; that whatever ills the people suffered from, the best way to escape them was to make strong the state. A splendid theory is this, viewed from the standpoint of emperors. Can we wonder that kings on their tottering thrones seized upon it as a means of damming back the swelling flood of Democracy ? Militarism, then, is not the outgrowth of arma- ment, not even of excessive armament, but of a perverted philosophy, expounded in the national universities of Germany for the benefit of ambi- tious rulers, and seized upon with avidity by a martial and aspiring race. It was not the army The False Philosophy of War 311 but the intellectuals of Germany that perverted the evolutionary theory of survival of the fittest, to be in practice the equivalent of "Devil take the hindmost." The fallacy of the German doctrine of war lies not in the theory of racial evolution, but in its mis-interpretation and mis- application. CHAPTER XVIII WHAT IS ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCE? WE have seen that true pacifism embraces both ethical effort and adequate defence; the first to make possible a gradual reduction of armament, the second to protect the ethical work- ers while combating the cosmic process, or the mere gladiatorial contest for survival and supre- macy. Having considered the scope of practical pacifism, and seen the necessity of destroying the power of the false philosophy of militarism, the question naturally arises — how shall the people of the United States proceed in an economic way, to provide the essentials of an adequate national defence. The problem is both social and econo- mic, social in its political and economic in its mate- rial aspect. Such proposals as may be made should, therefore, take into consideration both these aspects, in as much as the two are insepar- ably involved in the solution of the problem. It is a mistake to assume that the power of a state depends beyond a certain point on its actu- ally developed military power. Militarism errs in evaluating too highly the factor of developed power; disarmamentists in ignoring that factor. 312 What Is Adequate Defence ? 313 The problem of adequate armament may be reduced to figures. Let P a and Pb represent the ultimate physical power of two states; A a and Ab the developed physical power in the form of arma- ment, and R a and Rb the reserve power which may be transformed from its latent form to the form of developed power. Then, Pa = A a +R a and P b = A b +Rb To determine whether P a is greater than Pb, we must not merely consider the variable factor A but the factor R as well. Even though A a may be vastly greater than Ab, P a may be equal to or smaller than P b if conditions are such that Rb may be developed so as to satisfy the equations A a +Ra = A b +Rb A a +R a