of California i Regional r Facility PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. , PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, BY DUGALD STEWART, ESQ. F. R. SS. LOND. & EDIN. HONORARY MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AT ST PETERSBURGH ; MEMBER. OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF BERLIN ; AND OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY HELD AT PHILADELPHIA ; FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. SECOND EDITION. EDINBURGH : Printed by George Ramsay and Company, FOR ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE AND COMPANY, EDINBURGH ; CADELL AND DA VIES ; LONGMAN, HURST, HEES, ORME, AND BROWN ; J. MURRAY ; BALDWIN, CRADOCK, AND JOY ; AND GALE AND FENNER, LONDON. 1816. TO M. PREVOST, PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE ACADEMY OF GENEVA J FELLOW OF THE ROYAL .SOCIETIES OF LONI>ON AND OF EDINBURGH ; MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF BERLIN ; CORRESPONDENT OP THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, 4rC. #C, SfC. In the interrupted state of our correspon- dence at present, you will pardon the liberty I take, in prefixing your name to this Volume. The honour you have lately done me, by your French translation of my book on the Human Mind, and the warm interest you have always taken in the success of that work, since the pe- riod of its first appearance, I feel as the most flattering marks of approbation which it has ever received ; and they might perhaps have tempted me to indulge, more than becomes me, the vanity of an author, had it not been repressed by the still more pleasing idea, that 1 am indebted for them chiefly to the partiality of your friendship. [tSJ Permit me, Sir, to inscribe to you the fol- lowing Essays, in testimony of my respect and attachment ; and as a slight but sincere ac- knowledgment of the obligations you have laid me under by your long-continued kindness, as well as of the instruction and pleasure I have derived from your philosophical writings. DUGALD STEWART. June 1810. ADVERTISEMENT. THE state of my health having interrupt- ed, for many months past, the continuation of my work on the Human Mind, I was in- duced to attempt, in the mean time, the easier task of preparing for the press a vo- lume of Essays. I have not, however, abandoned the design which I ventured to announce eighteen years ago ; and in the execution of which I have already made considerable progress. After thirty-eight years devoted to the various pursuits con- nected with my different academical situa- tions, I now indulge the hope of enjoying, in a more retired scene, a short period of private study; and feel myself sufficiently warned, by the approaching infirmities of age, not to delay any longer my best exertions for the accomplishment of an undertaking, which I have hitherto prosecuted only at ac- cidental and often distant intervals; but [ viii ] which I have always fondly imagined (whether justly or not others must deter- mine) might, if carried into complete effect, be of some utility to the public. Kinneil-House, l&thjune 1810. CONTENTS. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Page CHAPTER I. 1 CHAPTER II. - 26 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART I. ESSAY FIRST* On Locke's Account of the sources of Human Knowledge, and its influence on the doctrines of some of his successors, 71 CHAPTER I. Introductory Observations, - ib. CHAPTER II. Inconsistency of our conclusions in the foregoing chapter, with Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge, - - - 80 CHAPTER III. Influence of Locke's account of the origin of our knowledge on the speculations of various eminent writers since his time, more par- ticularly on those of Berkeley and Hume, - 92 CHAPTER IV. The same subject continued, 104 ESSAY SECOND. On the Idealism of Berkeley, - 115 CHAPTER I. On some prevailing mistakes with respect to the import and aim of the Berkeleian system, - ib. CHAPTER II. Section I. On the foundation of our belief of the existence of the material world, according to the statement of Reid. Strictures on that statement, . 134 1 X CONTENTS. Page Section 2. Continuation of the subject. Indis- tinctness of the line drawn by Reid, as well as by Descartes and Locke, between the pri- mary and the secondary qualities of matter. Distinction between the primary qualities of matter, and its mathematical affections, 149 ESSAY THIRD. On the influence of Locke's authority upon the Philosophical systems which prevailed in France during the latter part of the eighteenth century, 159 ESSAY FOURTH On the metaphysical Theories of Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin, - 183 ESSAY FIFTH. On the tendency of some late Philolo- gical speculations, 201 CHAPTER I. ib. CHAPTER II. - 212 CHAPTER III. - 226 CHAPTER IV. - . 239 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART II. ESSAY FIRST. On the Beautiful, . 253 Introduction, - * ^ ib. PART FIRST, On the Beautiful, when presented imme- diately to our senses, ... 355 CHAPTER I. General observations on the sub- ject of inquiry, and on the plan upon which it is proposed to examine it, - - ib. CHAPTER II. -Progressive Generalizations of the word Beauty, resulting from the natural progress of the mind. Beauty of Colours of Forms of Motion. Combinations of these. Uniformity in works of art. Beauty of Nature, - 273 CHAPTER 111. Remarks on some of Mr Burke's principles which do not agree with the foregoing conclusions, ... 287 CONTENTS. XI Page CHAPTER IV Continuation of the critical stric- tures on Mr Burke's fundamental principles con- cerning Beauty. Influence of these principles on the speculations of Mr Price, 295 CHAPTER V. Continuation of the same subject, 308 CHAPTER VI Of the application of the theory of Association to Beauty Farther generaliza- tions of this word, in consequence of tha influence of the associating principle, - 327 CHAPTER VII. Continuation of the subject. Objections to a theory of Beauty proposed by Father Buffier and Sir Joshua Reynolds, 346 PART SECOND. On the Beautiful, when presented to the power of imagination, . . 354 ESSAY SECOND. On the Sublime, . 373 Preface, .... ib. CHAPTER I Of Sublimity, in the literal sense of the word, ... 376 CHAPTER II Generalizations of the word Sub- limity, in consequence of the influence of religious associations, - - 393 CHAPTER III Generalizations of Sublimity, in consequence of associations resulting from the phenomena of gravitation, and from the other physical arrangements with which our senses are conversant, . . 409 CHAPTER IV. Confirmation of the foregoing theory from the natural signs of Sublime emotion. Reciprocal influence of these signs on the asso. ciations which suggest them, . - . 431 CHAPTER V. Inferences from the foregoing doc- trines, with some additional illustrations, 438 ESSAY THIRD On Taste, - 449 CHAPTER I. General observations on our ac- quired powers of judgment, Application of these to the subject of this Essay, . ib. Xli CONTENTS. Page CHAPTER II. Gradual progress by which Taste is formed, - - - - 461 CHAPTER III. Different Modifications of Taste. Distinction between Taste and the natural sensi- bility to Beauty, 485 CHAPTER IV Continuation of the subject- Specific pleasure connected with the exercise of Taste. Fastidiousness of Taste. Miscellaneous remarks on this power, considered in its connec- tion with character and happiness, - 499 ESSAY FOURTH On the culture of certain intellectual habits connected with the first elements of Taste, 519 CHAPTER 1 Dependence of Taste on a relish for the pleasures of Imagination. Remarks on the prevailing idea, that these are to be enjoyed in perfection in youth alone, ib. CHAPTER II. Continuation of the subject- Reply to an objection founded on the supposed vigour of imagination in the earlier periods of society, . 540 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, - - 551 APPENDIX, ..... 605 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. CHAPTER FIRST. 1 HE chief aim of the following Dissertation is, to correct some prevailing mistakes with respect to the Philosophy of the Human Mind. In the introduc- tion to a former work, I have enlarged, at consider- able length, upon the same subject ; but various publications which have since appeared, incline me to think, that, in resuming it here, I undertake a task not altogether superfluous. Of the remarks which I am now to state, a few have a particular reference to the contents of this volume. Others are intended to clear the way for a different series of discussions, which I hope to be able, at some future period, to present to the pub- lic. I. In the course of those speculations on the Mind, to which I have already referred, and with which, I trust, that my present readers are not alto- gether unacquainted, I have repeatedly had occasion to observe, that " as our notions both of Matter and 2 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I, " of Mind are^merdy relative / as we know the " one only by such sensible qualities as extension, " figure, and solidity, and the other by such opera- " tions as sensation, thought, and volition ; we are " certainly entitled to* say, that Matter and Mind, " considered as Objects of Human Study, are es- " sentially different j the science of the former rest- " ing ultimately on phenomena exhibited to our " senses, that of the latter on phenomena of which " we are conscious. Instead, therefore, of object- " ing to the scheme of Materialism, that its conclu- " sions are false, it would be more accurate to say, " that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on a " misapprehension of the extent and the limits of " genuine science ; the difficulty which it professes "to remove being manifestly placed beyond the ** reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt *' to explain the nature of that principle, which " feels, and thinks, and wills, by saying, that it is a " material substance, or that it is the result of ma- " terial organization, we impose on ourselves by " words ; forgetting that Matter, as well as Mind, " is known to us by its qualities alone, and that we " are equally ignorant of the essence of either." In the farther prosecution of the same argument, I have attempted to shew, that the legitimate pro- vince of this department of philosophy extends no farther than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of observation and experiment ; and I have, accord- ingly, in my own inquiries, aimed at nothing more, than to ascertain, in the first place, the Laws of our Constitution, as Jar as they can be discovered by Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. S attention to the subjects of our consciousness ; and afterwards to apply these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phe- nomena of the understanding. It is on this plan that I have treated of the Association of Ideas, of Memory, of Imagination, and of various other intel- lectual powers ; imitating, as far as I was able, in my reasonings, the example of those who are allow- ed to have cultivated the study of Natural Philoso- phy with the greatest success. The Physiological Theories which profess to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibra- tions, and other changes in the state of the senso* rium,if they be not altogether hypothetical and vision- ary, cannot be considered, even by their warmest ad- vocates, as resting on the same evidence with those conclusions which are pen to the examination of all men capable of exercising the power of Reflection ; and, therefore, scientific distinctness requires, that these two different classes of propositions should not be confounded together under one common name. For my own part, I have no scruple to say, that I consider the physiological problem in question, as one of those which are likely to remain for ever among the arcana of nature ; nor am I afraid of being contradicted by any competent and candid judge, how sanguine soever may be his hopes con- cerning the progress of future discovery, when I as- sert, that hitherto it has completely eluded all the efforts which have been made towards its solution. As to the metaphysical romances above alluded to, they appear to me, after all the support and illustra- 4f PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. R tion which they have received from the ingenuity o Hartley, of Priestley, and of Darwin, to be equally unscientific in the design, and uninteresting in the execution ; destitute, at once, of the sober charms of Truth, and of those imposing attractions, which Fancy, when united to Taste, can lend to Fiction. In consequence of the unbounded praise bestowed upon them by some whose opinions are entitled to much respect, I have repeatedly begun the study of them anew, suspecting that I might be under the in- fluence of some latent and undue prejudice against this new mode of philosophizing, so much in vogue at present in England ; but notwithstanding the strong predilection which I have always felt for such pursuits, my labour has uniformly ended in a senti- ment of regret, at the time and attention which I had misemployed in so hopeless and so ungrateful a task. Mr Locke, although he occasionally indulges him- self in hints and conjectures, somewhat analogous to those of Hartley and Darwin, seems to have been perfectly aware how foreign such speculations are to the genuine Philosophy of the Human Mind. In the second paragraph of the Introduction to his Es- say, he thus expresses himself : " This, therefore, " being my purpose, to inquire into the original, " certainty, and extent of human knowledge ; to-' *' gether with the grounds and degrees of belief, opi- " nion, and assent, I shall not, at present, meddle " with the physical consideration of the Mind, or " trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence " consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or al- -Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 5 " teration of our bodies, we come to have any sensa- " tion by our organs, or any ideas of our under- " standings ; and whether these ideas do in their " formation, any or all of them, depend on Matter ** or not. These are speculations, which, however ** curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying ** out of my way in the design I am now upon." It is much to be wished, that Mr Locke had adhered invariably to this wise resolution. I flatter myself it will not be inferred, from what has been here said of the common theories. of phy- siologists about -the causes of the intellectual pheno- mena, that I entertain any doubt of the intimate connection which exists between these phenomena and the organization of the body. The great prin- ciple I am anxious to inculcate is, that all the theories which have yet been offered on this subject, are entirely unsupported by proof ; and, what is worse, are of such a kind, that it is neither possible to confirm or to refute them, by an appeal to expe- riment or observation. That I was all along fully aware of the dependence, in our present state, of the mental operations on the sound condition of the cor- poreal frame, appears sufficiently from what I re- marked, many years ago, concerning the laws of this connection between mind and body, as presenting one of the most interesting objects of examination connected with the theory of human nature. * I have been induced to caution my readers against the possibility of such a misapprehension of my mean- * 1 hilosophy of the Hun. an Mind, pp. 11, 12, 3d ed. (5 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. ing, by the following passage in a late publication : " What that affection of the brain is," says Mr Bel- sham, " which, by the constitution of human na- " ture, causes Memory, we cannot absolutely ascer- " tain. The hypothesis of Vibrations, which has " already been explained, is the most probable. It is " trifling to object, that if the existence of impres- ** sions on the brain could be proved, Memory would " remain as unaccountable as before : all which this " hypothesis pretends to, is to advance a step in " tracing the process of the connection between exr " ternal objects and mental feelings."' " It is cu-? " rious to observe," the same author continues, " that " Dr Reid, after starting several objections against " the commonly received hypothesis, is obliged to ad- " mit, that * many Avell-known facts lead us to con- " elude, that a certain constitution or state of the " brain is necessary to Memory.' ' On this passage I shall offer only two remarks. The first is, that, notwithstanding Mr Bel sham's zeal for Hartley's Theory of Vibrations, he confes- ses explicitly, that *' we cannot absolutely ascertain, " what that affection of the brain is, which, by the " constitution of human nature, causes memory ;" and that, '* the theory of Vibrations, though more " probable than some others, is still but a hypothe- " sis." Secondly, that Mr Belsham, after making this explicit acknowledgment, is nevertheless pleas- ed to insinuate, that all who presume to object to this particular hypothesis, are bound by their own principles to assert, that memory has no dependence tchat&c-er on the state of the brain. Where the in- Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 7 consistency lies in Dr Reid's admission, that a cer- tain constitution or state of the_brain is necessary to memory, after he had stated some objections against the commonly received theories, I am at a loss to perceive. Indeed, I should be glad to know, what philosopher, ancient or modern, has ever yet assert- ed, that memory is not liable to be injured by such affections of the brain as are produced by intemper- ance, disease, old age, and other circumstances which disturb the bodily mechanism. The philosophical inference, however, from this concession is, not that the hypothesis of Dr Hartley, or the hypothesis of Mr Belsham, must necessarily be true ; but that, lay- ing aside all hypotheses, we should apply ourselves to collect such facts as may lead us, in due time, to the only satisfactory conclusions we have much chance of ever forming concerning the connection between Mind and Body the discovery .of some of the general laws by which this connection is regu- lated. In offering these strictures on the physiological metaphysics of the present day, it is proper for me, at the same time, to observe, that I object to it merely as an idle waste of labour and ingenuity, on questions to which the human faculties are altoge- ther incompetent ; and not because I consider any .of the theories, to which it has given birth, as stand- ing in the way of my own doctrines. The facts which I wish to ascertain rest on their own proper evidence ; an evidence which would remain entire and unshaken, although a demonstration should be produced in favour of the animal spirits of Des- 8 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. cartes, or of the Vibrations of Hartley ; and which would not gain the slightest accession of strength, if both these hypotheses were to fall into the con- tempt they deserve. The circumstance which pe- culiarly characterizes the inductive Science of the Mind is, that it professes to abstain from all specu- lations concerning its nature and essence ; confining the attention entirely to phenomena, which every individual has it in his power to examine for him- self, who chooses to exercise the powers of his un- derstanding. In this respect, it differs equally in its scope, from the pneumatological discussions con- cerning the seat of the Soul, and the possibility or the impossibility of its bearing any relation to Space or to Time, which so long gave employment to the subtilty of the schoolmen ; and from the physiolo- gical hypotheses which have made so much noise at a later period, concerning the mechanical causes on which its operations depend. Compared with the first, it differs, as the inquiries of Galileo concern- ing the laws of moving bodies differ from the dis- putes of the ancient sophists concerning the exist- ence and the nature of Motion. Compared with the other, the difference is analogous to what exists between the conclusions of Newton about the law of gravitation, and his query concerning the invisible ether, of which he supposed it might possibly be the effect. It may be worth while to add, in pas- sing, that the diversity of opinion among Newton's followers, with respect to the verisimilitude of this query, while they have unanimously acquiesced in the physical conclusions of their master, affords an hap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 9 instructive proof, how little the researches of induc- tive science are liable to be influenced by the wan- derings of Imagination, in those regions which hu- man reason is not permitted to explore. Whatever our opinion concerning the unknown physical or metaphysical cause of gravitation may be, our rea- sonings concerning the System of Nature will be equally just, provided only we admit the general fact, that bodies tend to approach each other with a force varying with their mutual distances, according to a certain law. The case is precisely similar with respect to those conclusions concerning the Mind, to which we are fairly led by the method of Induction. They rest upon a firm and indisputable basis of their own ; and (as I have elsewhere re- marked) are equally compatible with the meta- physical creeds of the Materialist and of the Berke^ leian. * * The hypothesis which assumes the existence of a subtle fluid in the nerves, propagated by their means from the brain to the different parts of the body, is of great antiquity ; and is cer- tainly less repugnant to the general analogy of our frame, than that by which it has been supplanted. How very generally it once prevailed, may be inferred from the adoption into common speech of the phrase animal spirits, to denote that unknown cause which (according to Johnson's definition) "gives vigour " or cheerfulness to the mind ;'' a phrase for which our lan- guage does not, at this day, afford a convenient substitute. The late Dr Alexander Monro (one of the most cautious and judicious of medical inquirers) speaks of it as a fact which ap- peared to him to be almost indisputable. " The existence of a " liquid in the cavities of the nerves, is supported by little short M of demonstrative evidence." See some observations of his, published by Cheselden in his Anatomy. 10 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. II. Intimately connected with the physiological hypothesis of the Hartleian school, is their meta- physical theory of Association, from which single principle they boast to have explained synthetically all the phenomena of the Mind. In Dr Priestley's Remarks on Reid's Inquiry, there is an attempt to turn into ridicule, by what the author calls a Table of Dr Reid's Instinctive Principles, the application of the Inductive Logic to these phenomena. How far this Table is faithfully extracted from Dr Reid's book, it is unnecessary to consider at present. * Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the Twelve Principles enumerated by Priestley had been actual- ly stated by his antagonist as instinctive principles, or as general laws of our nature, it is difficult to see for what reason the enumeration should be re- garded as absurd, or even as unphilosophical, after the explanation given by Reid himself of the sense The hypothesis of Vibrations first attracted public notice in the \\ ritings of Dr William Briggs. It was from him that Sir Isaac Newton derived his anatomical knowledge ; along with which he appears plainly, from his Queries, to have imbibed also some of the physiological theories of his preceptor. In the Monthly Review for 1808, I observe the following passage : " For the partiality which he (Dr Cogan) shews to " Dr Reid, we may easily account, as being a just tribute to the " ingenuity and industry of that writer, and to the numerous " valuable observations which enrich his works, unconnected " with Iris crude hypothesis on the subject of the Human Mind." In what part of Dr Reid's writings is this crude hypothesis proposed ? * The reader will be enabled to form a judgment on this point, by the Note (A) at the end of this Volume. Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 11 in which he wished his conclusions to be under- stood. " The most general phenomena we can reach, are " what we call Laws of Nature. So that the laws (( of nature are nothing else but the most general " facts relating to the operations of nature, which " include a great many particular facts under them. " And if, in any case, we should give the name of a " law of nature to a general phenomenon, which " human industry shall afterwards trace to one more " general, there is no great harm done. The most " general assumes the name of a law of nature when " it is discovered ; and the less general is contain- " ed and comprehended in it." * In another part of his work, he has, introduced the same remark. " The labyrinth may be too in- " tricate, and the thread too fine, to be traced " through all its windings ; but if we stop where " we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground " we have gained, there is no harm done ; a quicker " eye may in time trace it farther." t In reply to these passages, Priestley observes, that " the suspicion that we are got to ultimate princi- " pies, necessarily checks all farther inquiry, and is " therefore of great disservice in philosophy. Let " Dr Reid," he continues, " lay his hand upon his *' breast, and say, whether, after what he has writ- ** ten, he would not be exceedingly mortified to '* find it clearly proved, to the satisfaction of all the * Reid's Inquiry, p. 223, 3d ed. f Ibid. p. 9. 11 Ig PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. " world, that all tlie instinctive principles in the *' preceding Table were really acquired ; and that " all of them were nothing more than so many dif- w ferent cases of the old and well-known principle " of Association of Ideas." With respect to the probability of this supposi- tion, I have nothing to add to what I have stated on the same head, in the Philosophy of the Human Mind ; " that, in all the other sciences, the pro- " gress of discovery has been gradual, from the less " general to the more general laws of nature ; and tf that it would be singular indeed, if, in this science, " which but a few years ago was confessedly in its *' infancy, and which certainly labours under many M disadvantages peculiar to itself, a step should all " at once be made to a single principle, compre- " hending all the particular phenomena which we * know." * As the order established in the intellectual world seems to be regulated by laws perfectly analogous to those which we trace among the phenomena of the material system ; and as, in all our philosophical in- quiries (to whatever subject they may relate), the progress of the mind is liable to be affected by the same tendency to a premature generalization, the following extract from an eminent chemical writer may contribute to illustrate the scope, and to con- firm the justness of some of the foregoing reflec- tions. * Elements, &c. p. 398 (3d edition), where I have enlarged en this point at some length. Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. IS " Within the last fifteen or twenty years, several " new metals, and new earths, have been made " known to the world. The names that support " these discoveries are respectable, and the expe- " riments decisive. If we do not give our assent to " them, no single proposition in chemistry can for a " moment stand. But whether all these are really " simple substances, or compounds not yet resolved " into their elements, is what the authors themselves " cannot possibly assert ; nor would it, in the least, " diminish the merit of their observations, if future " experiments should prove them to have been mis- " taken, as to the simplicity of these substances. " This remark should not be confined to later disco- " veries ; it may as justly be applied to those earths " and metals with which we have been long ac- " quainted." " In the dark ages of chemistry, the " object was to rival nature ; and the substance '* which the adepts of those days were busied to " create, was universally allowed to be simple. In a " more enlightened period, we have extended our " inquiries, and multiplied the number of the ele- " ments. The last task will be to simplify ; and, by " a closer observation of nature, to learn from what a " small store of primitive materials, all that we be- " hold and wonder at was created." * This analogy between the history of Chemistry and that of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, * Inquiries concerning the nature of a metallic substance, lately sold in London as a new Metal, under the title of Palla- dium, By Rich. Chenevix, Esq. 1 i PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. which has often struck me in contrasting the views of the Alchemists with those of Lavoisier and his fol- lowers, has acquired much additional value and im- portance in my estimation, since I had the pleasure to peruse a late work of M. De Gerando ; in which I find, that the same analogy has presented itself to that most judicious philosopher, and has been ap- plied by him to the same practical purpose, of ex- posing the false pretensions and premature generali- zations of some modern metaphysicians. " It required nothing less than the united splen- " dour of the discoveries brought to light by the " new chemical school, to tear the minds of men " from the pursuit of a simple and primary ele- " ment ; a pursuit renewed in every age with an in- " defatigable perseverance, and always renewed in " vain. With what feelings of contempt would the " physiologists of former times have looked down " on the chemists of the present age, whose timid " and circumscribed system admits nearly forty dif- " ferent principles in the composition of bodies ! " What a subject of ridicule would the new nomen- " clature have afforded to an Alchemist !" " The Philosophy of Mind has its Alchemists al- " so ; men whose studies are directed to the pur- " suit of one single principle, into which the whole " science may be resolved j and who flatter them- " selves with the hope of discovering the grand se- " cret, by which the pure gold of Truth may be " produced at pleasure." * * De Gerando, Hist, des Systemes, Tom. II. pp. 481, 482. Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 15 Among these Alchemists in the science of Mind, the first place is undoubtedly due to Dr Hartley, who not only attempts to account for all the phe- nomena of human nature, from the single principle of Association^ combined with the hypothetical as- sumption of an invisible fluid or ether, producing Vibrations in the medullary substance of the brain and nerves ; but indulges his imagination in anti- cipating an rera, " when future generations shall " put all kinds of evidences and inquiries into ma- " thematical forms ; reducing Aristotle's ten catego- " ries, and Bishop Wilkins* forty summa genera, " to the head of Quantity alone, so as to make ma- " thematics and logic, natural history and civil his- " tory, natural philosophy, and philosophy of all " other kinds, coincide omni ex parte." If I had never read another sentence of this author, I should have required no farther evidence of the unsound- ness of his understanding. It is, however, on such rash and unwarranted as- sertions as this, combined with the supposed com- prehensiveness of his metaphysical views, that the peculiar merits of Hartley seem now to be chiefly rested by the more enlightened of his admirers. Most of these, at least whom I have happened to converse with, have spoken of his physiological doc- trines as but of little value, compared with the won- ders which he has accomplished by a skilful use of the Associating Principle. On this head, there- fore, I must request the attention of my readers to a few short remarks. III. Of the most celebrated theorists who have 16 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. f. appeared since the time of Lord Bacon, by far the greater part have attempted to attract notice, by displaying their ingenuity in deducing, from some general principle or law, already acknowledged by philosophers, an immense variety of particular phe- nomena. For this purpose, they have frequently found themselves under the necessity of giving a false gloss to facts, and sometimes of totally misre- presenting them ; a practice which has certainly contributed much to retard the progress of experi- mental knowledge ; but which, at the same time, must be allowed (at least in Physics) to have, in some cases, prepared the way for sounder conclu- sions. The plan adopted by Hartley is very differ- ent from this, and incomparably more easy in the execution. The generalizations which he has at- tempted are merely verbal ; deriving whatever spe- ciousness they may possess, from the unprecedented latitude given to the meaning of common terms* After telling us, for example, that " all our inter- " nal feelings, excepting our sensations, may be " called ideas ;" and giving to the word Associa* tlon a corresponding vagueness in its import, he seems to have flattered himself, that he had resolved into one single law, all the various phenomena, both intellectual and moral, of the Human Mind. What advantage, either theoretical or practical, do we reap from this pretended discovery ; a discovery necessarily involved in the arbitrary definitions with which the author sets out ? I must acknowledge, that I can perceive none : while, on the other hand, its effect must clearly be, by perverting or- Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 1? dinary language, to retard the progress of a science, which depends, more thari any other, for its im- provement, on the use of precise and definite ex- pressions. * With respect to the phrase association of ideas, which makes such a figure, not only in Hartley, but in most of the metaphysical writers whom England has since produced, I shall take this opportunity to remark, how very widely its present acceptation dif- fers from that invariably annexed to it in Locke's Essay. In his short chapter on this subject (one of the most valuable in the whole work), his observa- tions relate entirely to " those connections of ideas " that are owing to chance ; in consequence of which " connections, ideas that, in themselves, are not at " all a-kin, come to be so united in some men's " minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; and " the one no sooner, at any time, comes into the * Under the title of Association, Hartley includes every con- nection which can possibly exist among our thoughts ; whether the result of our natural constitution, or the effect of accidental circumstances, or the legitimate offspring of our rational powers. Even our assent to the proposition, that twice two is four, is (ac- cording to him) only a particular case of the same general law. " The cause that a person affirms the truth of the proposition, twice two is four ', is the entire coincidence of the visible or tangi- ble idea of twice two with that of four, as impressed upon the mind by various objects. We see everywhere, that twice two and four are only different names for the same impression. And it is mere association which appropriates the word truth, its de- finition, or its internal feeling, to this coincidence." Hartley on Man, Vol. I. p. 325. 4th edit. a 18 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION'. (jiiap. J, ^ understanding, but its Associate appears with it*'* H\s reason for dwelling on these, he tells us express- ly, is, " that those who have children, or the charge of " their education, may think it worth their while dili- " g;ently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue " connection of ideas in the minds of young people. " This," he adds, "is the time most susceptible of last- " ing impressions ; and though those relating to the " health of the body are, by discreet people, minded " and fenced against ; yet I am apt to doubt, that " those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and " terminate in the understanding, or passions, have " been much less heeded than the thing deserves ; " nay, those relating purely to the understanding " have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly over- " looked." From these quotations, it is evident that Mi- Locke meant to comprehend, under the association of ideas, those Associations alone, which, for the sake of distinction, I have characterized, in my former work, -by the epithet casual. To such as arise out of the nature and condition of man (and which, in the following Essays, I generally denominate uni- versal Associations J, Mr Locke gives the title of Natural Connections ; observing, with regard to them, that " it is the office and excellency of reason " to trace them, and to hold them together in " union." If his language on this head had been more closely imitated by his successors, many of the errors and false refinements into which they have fallen, would have been avoided. Mr Hume was , one of the first who deviated from it, by the enlarg- Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 19 ed sense in which he used Association in his writ- ings ; comprehending, under that term, all the va- rious connections or affinities among our ideas, na- tural as well as casual ; and even going so far as to anticipate Hartley's conclusions, by representing " the principle of union and cohesion among our " simple ideas as a kind' of attraction^ of as univer- " sal application in the Mental world as in the Na- " tural." * As it is now, however, too late to re- monstrate against this unfortunate innovation, all that remains for us is to limit the meaning of As- sociation, where there is any danger of ambiguity, by two such qualifying adjectives as I have already mentioned. I have, accordingly, in these Essays, employed the word in the same general accepta- tion with Mr Hume, as it seems to me to be that which is most agreeable to * present use, and con- sequently the most likely to present itself to the generality of my readers ; guarding them, at the same time, as far as possible, against confounding the two very different classes of connections^ to which he applies indiscriminately this common title. As for the latitude of Hartley's phraseology, it is altogether incompatible with precise notions of our intellectual operations, or with anything approach- ing to logical reasoning concerning the Human Mind ; two circumstances which have probably contributed not a little to the popularity of his book, among a very numerous class of inquirers. For my own part, notwithstanding the ridicule to * Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I. p. 30. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. which I may expose myself, by the timidity of my researches, it shall ever be my study and my pride to follow the footsteps of those faithful interpreters of nature, who, disclaiming all pretensions to con- jectural sagacity, aspire to nothing higher than to rise slowly from particular facts to general laws. I trust, therefore, that while, in this respect, I pro- pose to myself the example of the Newtonian School, I shall be pardoned for discovering some solicitude, on the other hand, to separate the Philo- sophy of the Human Mind from those frivolous branches of scholastic learning with which it is commonly classed in the public opinion. With this view, I have elsewhere endeavoured to explain, as clearly as I could, what I conceive to be its pro- per object and province ; but some additional illus- trations, of a historical nature, may perhaps contri- bute to place my argument in a stronger light than it is possible to do by any abstract reasoning. IV. It is a circumstance not a little remarkable, that the Philosophy of the Mind, although in later times considered as a subject of purely metaphysical research, was classed among the branches of physical science, in the ancient enumeration of the objects of human knowledge. To this identification of two sciences, so extremely dissimilar in the subjects of which they treat, insurmountable objections might easily be stated ; but that the arrangement implies in its authors, the justest views of the logical rules applicable in common to both, appears from this ob- vious consideration, that, in the study of Mind, as well as in that oi Matter, the only progress we are Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 21 able to make, is by an accurate examination of par- ticular phenomena, and a cautious reference of these to the general laws or rules under which they are comprehended. Accordingly, some modern writers, of the first eminence, have given their decided sanction to this old and almost forgotten classifica- tion, in preference to that which has obtained uni- versally in modern Europe. " The ancient Greek philosophy," says Mi- Smith, " was divided into three great branches ; " Physics, or Natural Philosophy ; Ethics, or Mo- *.' ral Philosophy ; and Logic." " This general di- " vision," he adds, " seems perfectly agreeable to " the nature of things." Mr Smith afterwards ob- serves, " that as the human mind, in whatever its " essence may be supposed to consist, is a part of the " great system of the universe, and a part, too, pro- " ductive of the most important effects, whatever " was taught in the ancient schools of Greece, con- " cerning its nature, made a part of the system of " Physics." * Mr Locke, too, in the concluding chapter of his Essay, proposes, as what seemed to him the most ge- neral, as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding, an arrangement coinciding exactly with that of the ancients, as explained by Mr Smith in the foregoing passage. To the first branch of science he gives the name of 4>u(nx,T] ; to the second, that of npax.Tix.ri j to the third, that of X of Aoyiw ; adding, with respect to the word * Wealth of Nations, Vol. III. pp. 163, l66 } pth edit, 22 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. I. (or Natural Philosophy), that he employs it to com- prehend, not merely the knowledge of Matter and Body, but also of Spirits ; the end of this branch being bare speculative truth, and consequently every subject belonging to it, which affords a field of spe- culative study to the human faculties. To these authorities may be added that of Dr Campbell, who, after remarking, that " experience " is the principal organ of truth in all the branches " of physiology," intimates, " that he employs this " term to comprehend not merely natural history, *' astronomy, geography, mechanics, optics, hydro- " statics, meteorology, medicine, chemistry, but also " natural theology and psychology, which," he ob- serves, " have been, in his opinion, most unnatural- " ly disjoined from physiology by philosophers." " Spirit," he adds, " which here comprises only the ** Supreme Being and the human Soul, is surely as " much included under the notion of natural object " as body is ; and is knowable to the philosopher " purely in the same way, by observation and expe- " rience." * . * Philosophy of Rhetoric, Vol. I. p. 143 (1st edit.) It were to be wished that Locke and Campbell, in the passages quoted above, had made use of the word mind instead of spirit, which seems to imply a hypothesis concerning the nature or essence of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether unconnected with our conclusions concerning its phenomena and their general laws. For the same reason, I am disposed to object to the words Pneumatology and Psychology ; the former of which was intro. duced by the ichoolmen ; and the latter, which appears to me equally exceptionable, has been sanctioned by the authority of tlhap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 2& In what manner the Philosophy of the Human Mind came to be considered as a branch of meta- physics, and to be classed with the frivolous sciences which are commonly included under the same name, is well known to all who are conversant with literary history. It may be proper, however, to mention here, for the information of some of my readers, that the word Metaphysics is of no older date than the publication of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes, one of the learned men into whose hands the manuscripts of that philosopher fell, after they were brought by Sylla from Athens to Rome. To fourteen books in these manuscripts, which had no distinguishing title, Andronicus is said to have pre- fixed the words, Ta ^ercc ret, QIHTIKO,, either to de- note the place which they occupied in Aristotle's own arrangement (immediately after the physics), or to point out that which it appeared to the Editor they ought to hold in the order of study. Notwithstanding the miscellaneous nature of these books, the Peripatetics seem to have considered them as all belonging to one science ; the great object of which they conceived to be, first, to treat of those at- tributes which are common to Matter and to Mind ; secondly, of things separate from Matter ; particu- larly of GOD, and of the subordinate Minds which they supposed to carry on the physical changes ex- hibited in the universe. A notion of Metaphysics nearly the same was adopted by the Peripatetics of some late writers of considerable note ; in particular, of Dr Campbell, and of Dr Beattie. 24i PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. L the Christian Church. They distinguished its two branches by the titles of Ontology and Natural Theology ; the former relating to Being in gene- ral, the latter to GOD and to Angels. To these branches the schoolmen added the Philosophy of the Human Mind, as relating to an immaterial sub- stance ; distinguishing this last science by the title of Pneumatology. From this arrangement of Natural Theology, and of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, they were not very likely to prosper, as they gradually came to be studied with the same spirit as Ontology, which may safely be pronounced to be the most idle and absurd speculation that ever employed the human faculties. Nor has the evil been yet remedied by the contempt into which the schoolmen have fallen in more modern times. On the contrary, as their ar- rangement of the objects of Metaphysics is still very generally retained, the Philosophy of the Mind is not unfrequently understood, even by those who have a predilection for the study of it, as a specu- lation much more analogous to Ontology than to Physics ; while, in the public opinion, notwithstand- ing the new aspect it begins to assume, in conse- quence of the lights struck out by Bacon, Locke, and their followers, it continues to share largely in that discredit, which has been justly incurred by the greater part of those discussions, to which, in common with it, the epithet Metaphysical is indis- criminately applied by the multitude. I have been led into this detail, not from the most distant idea of proposing any alteration in that Chap. I. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 25 use of the words Metaphysics and Physics, which has now universally obtained, but merely to guard myself against the charge of affectation or singulari- ty, when I so often recur in these pages to the ana- logy between the inductive science of Mind, and the inductive science of Matter. The attempt which has been made of late, by some very inge- nious writers, to dispute the claims of the former to so honourable an affinity, must plead my apology for the length of the preceding discussion ; as well as for some remarks which I now propose to offer, upon the arguments which have been alleged in op- position to its pretensions. To myself, I must own, that the more I reflect on the subject, the more close and striking does the analogy appear. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II, CHAPTER SECOND. WHEN I first ventured to appear before the public t , * " compositionis et divisionis^judictt, et reliquorum ; " quam de calido, etfrigido, aut Ittce, aut vegeta- " tione, aut similibus." The effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced, have indeed been far more conspicuous in Physics than in the science of Mind. Even here, however, they have been great and most important, as well as in some collateral branches of knowledge (such as natural jurisprudence, political economy, criticism, and morals), which spring up from the Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 53 same root, or rather which are branches of that tree .of which the science of Mind is the trunk. Of the truth of this assertion I shall afterwards have occa- sion to produce abundant evidence. That our conclusions concerning the principles and laws of the human constitution differ, in many respects, from discoveries in physics, I do not de- ny ; nor will I enter into a verbal dispute with those who maintain that the word discovery is in no sense applicable to these conclusions. It is sufficient for my purpose to remark, that this criticism, ad- mitting it to be just, ought not, in any respect, to lower our estimate of their practical value, or of the merits of the writers to whom we owe them. Among Bacon's aphorisms there is not one single sentence which contains a discovery, as that word has been lately defined ; but what discoveries can vie with them in the accessions which they have brought to the happiness and to the power of the human race ! * * D'Alembert was one of the first who insisted on this nicety in the use of the word discovery.. In one passage he seems to exclude the possibility of discoveries from mathematics as well as metaphysics ; and, what is still more curious, to do so on ac- count of the perfect evidence which it is possible for us to attain in both these sciences. " La reflexion, en partant des idees directes, peut suivre deux " routes differences : ou elle compare les qualites des corps, et " alors, d'abstractions en abstractions, elle arrive aux notions les " plus simples, relies for the moral lesson they may convey to the guar- dians of youth, and to the rulers of nations. It must indeed be granted, that, in the best works which have yet appeared on the science of Mind, the mere refutation of scholastic errors occupies a large and melancholy space. Accordingly, it has been mentioned, with an air of triumph, as a fact which, since the time of Reid, " seems now to be admitted " with regard to perception, and some of the other " primary functions of mind, that philosophy can *' be of no use to us, and that the profoundest rea- ** sonings lead us back to the creed, and to the ig- " norance of the vulgar." The reflection is un- doubtedly just, if by philosophy be here meant the theory of Perception which prevailed universal- ly before the time of Reid. But I must be allow- ed to refuse my assent to the statement, if it is to be understood as calling in question the utility of that philosophy by which this theory was exploded, after having reigned in the schools for more than two thousand years, and bewildered, not more than a century ago, the speculations of Locke, of Clarke, and of Newton. In order to prepare the way for the mechanical inquiries of the moderns, it was ne- cessary to begin with exposing the futility of the scholastic explanations of phenomena, by occult qualities, and Nature's horror of a void. After the darkness in which every theory relating to the study of Mind has been so long involved, by means of hypotheses consecrated by time, and interwoven with the inmost texture of language, some prelimi- nary labour, in like manner, may be expected to be 60 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II. necessarily employed in clearing away the metaphy- sical rubbish of the ancients, and of the middle ages ; and it is a circumstance highly honourable to the sagacity and zeal, both of Locke and of Reid, that they have devoted to this ungrateful, but indis- pensable task, so large a portion of their writings. What the latter of these philosophers has said con- cerning the doctrine of his illustrious predecessor on the subject of definitions, may be applied to va- rious other parts of the Essay on Human Under- standing, as well as to many discussions which occur in his own publications ; that "it is valuable, not " so much because it enlarges our knowledge, as " because it makes us sensible of our ignorance ; and " shews that a great part of what speculative men " have admired as profound philosophy, is only a " darkening of knowledge by words without un- " derstanding." Nor must it be forgotten, that it is on this very hypothesis concerning Perception, which has been successfully exploded by Reid, that the scepticism of Hume, concerning the existence both of Matter and of Mind, rests fundamentally. Has this scep- ticism had no effect in unsettling the opinions of mankind ? or, granting (as I believe will not be dis- puted) that the effect has been great and extensive, shall we deny the practical utility of disentangling human reason from such a labyrinth ? After all, it is not on this or similar 'articles of the science of Mind, that I am inclined to lay any great stress in this part of my argument. The points to which I wish chiefly to draw the reader's Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 61 attention, are the intimate connection between this science and the general conduct of the understand- ing ; and its obvious tendency, by facilitating the analysis of whatever casual combinations the fancy may have formed, to dissolve the charm of those as- sociations, against which the most conclusive argu- ments spend their force in vain. I have always been convinced, that it was a fun- damental error of Aristotle (in which he has been followed by almost every logical writer since his time) to confine his views entirely to Reasoning or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at the im- provement of our nature in all its various parts. Granting, however, for a moment, that this very limited idea of the object of their study was to be adopted, a more comprehensive survey of our facul- ties and powers was necessary than they appear to have suspected ; for it is in corners of our frame which seem, on a superficial view, to have the least connection with our speculative opinions, that the sources of our most dangerous errors will be found to lurk. It is sufficient for me to mention here, the Association of Ideas ; Imagination ; Imita- tion ; the use of Language as tlie great Instru- ment of Thought; and the Artificial Habits of Judging, imposed by the principles and manners in which we have been educated. If this remark be well founded, it obviously fol- lows, that, in order to prepare the way for a just and comprehensive system of Logic, a previous survey of our nature, considered as one great whole, is indis- pensably requisite* To establish this fundamental 62 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II. principle, and to exemplify it in some of its practical applications, was one of the main objects I had in view, when I first entered upon my inquiries into the Human Mind ; and I am not without hopes, that, if my original design shall ever be completed, the imperfect sketch I have presumed to attempt will be regarded, by competent judges, as no incon- siderable step towards the accomplishment of this great undertaking by some abler hand. If health and leisure allow me to put in writing some speculations which have long been familiar to my own thoughts, I shall endeavour to place -the defects of our common logical systems in a still stronger light, by considering them in their applica- tion to the fundamental doctrines of Ethics ; and more particularly, by examining how far, in research- es of this sort, our moral feelings or emotions are entitled to consideration ; checking, on the one hand, our speculative- reasonings, when they lead to con- clusions at which our nature revolts ; and, on the other, sanctioning those decisions of the understand- ing, in favour of which the head and the heart unite o 7 their suffrages. According to the prevailing maxims of modern- philosophy, so little regard is paid to feeling and sentiment in matters of reasoning, that, instead of being understood to sanction or confirm the intellec- tual judgments with whjch they accord, they are very generally supposed to cast a shade of suspicion on every conclusion with which they blend the slight- est tincture of sensibility or enthusiasm. The prosecution of this idea will, if I do not Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 63 much deceive myself, open some new views with respect to the Logic of Morals ; and I am induced to suggest it here, in the hopes of directing the curiosity of some of my readers to an inquiry, which, I am persuaded, will lead them to conclusions deeply interesting to their own happiness. As to Logic in general, according to my idea of it, it is an art yet in its infancy, and to the future advancement of which it is no more possible to fix a limit, than to the future progress of human know- ledge. The aphorism of Lord Bacon applies, in this instance, with peculiar force. " Certo sciant " homines, artes inveniendi solidas et veras adoles- " cere et incrementa sumere cum ipsis inventis." In the meantime, it is the duty of all who devote themselves to scientific pursuits, to treasure up care- fully, as materials to be collected and arranged after- wards by others, whatever general rules or methods may have occurred to them in the course of their studies. Even at present, numberless scattered lights might be gathered from the labours of our predeces- sors, both ancient and modern ; nor would it perhaps be possible to supply a desideratum of greater value to philosophy, than to concentrate these dispersed rays, and to throw them on the regions which are yet to be explored. * From such a concentration much aid might be expected, both in directing the * To those who may turn their attention to the Logic of Mathematical Science, many invaluable hints may be collected from the works of D'Alembert, and from the preliminary Dis- courses prefixed by some of his countrymen to their Mathemati- cal Works. 64 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II. studies of others, and in the conduct of our own un- derstanding ; and it is chiefly on this slow, but con- tinued accession to our stock of logical principles, arising from a systematical accumulation, at proper intervals of time, of individual contributions, that I rest my hopes of the farther advancement of that science in after ages. To speak, in the actual state of the world, of a complete system of logic (if by that word is meant anything different from the logic of the schools), betrays an inattention to the object at which it aims, and to the progressive career of the human mind; but, above all, it betrays an over- weening estimate of the little which logicians have hitherto done, when compared with the magnitude of the task which they have left to their successors. It was not, however, with a view to the advance- ment of Logic alone, that I was led to engage in these inquiries. My first and leading aim was to take as comprehensive a survey as possible of the human constitution, in order to shew how limited our com- mon plans of education are, when compared with the manifold powers, both of intellect and of enjoyment, by which Nature has distinguished our species. The cultivation of Reason, with a view to the investiga- tion of truth, is only one of the means, although one of the most essential means, towards the improve- ment and happiness of the individual ; and it is merely on account of its high comparative import- ance in this respect, that I so often recur to it in the prosecution of my undertaking. The two last Essays of this volume will, I hope, be useful in illustrating my general idea. 11 Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 65 I have been insensibly led into a much longer de- tail than I intended about my future plans. I should be sorry if any of my readers should ascribe this prolixity to an idle egotism. Had I enjoyed a more unbroken leisure, my design would have been many years ago completed, as far as the measure of my abilities enabled me. I still look forward, though with hopes less sanguine than I once in- dulged, to the prosecution of my task ; and if (as is more than probable) these hopes shall be disap- pointed, it will afford me some satisfaction to have . left behind me this memorial, slight as it is, of what I had meditated. I have only to repeat once more, before the close of this Dissertation, that the correction of one single prejudice has often been attended with conse- quences more important and extensive than could be produced by any positive accession to the stock of our scientific information. Such is the condi- tion of man, that a great part of a philosopher's life must necessarily be spent, not in enlarging the circle of his knowledge, but in unlearning the errors of the crowd, and the pretended wisdom of the schools ; and that the most substantial benefit he can bestow on his fellow-creatures, as well as the noblest species of Power to which he can aspire, is to impart to others the lights he has struck out by his meditations, and to encourage human reason, by his example, to assert its liberty. To what did the discoveries made by Luther amount, but to a detection of the impostures of the Romish church, E PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II. and of absurdities sanctioned by the authority of Aristotle ? Yet, how vast the space which is filled by his name in the subsequent history of Europe ! and how proud his rank among the benefactors of mankind ! I am doubtful if Bacon himself did so much by the logical rules he gave for guiding the inquiries of his followers, as by the resolution with which he inspired them; to abandon the beaten path of their predecessors, and to make excursions into regions untrodden before ; or if any of his suggestions, concerning the plan of experimenting, can be compared in value to his classification and illustration of the various prejudices or idols which mislead us from the pure worship of Truth. If the ambition of Aristotle has been compared, in the vastness of its aim, and the plenitude of its success, (and who can say that it has been compared unjust- ly ?) to that of his Royal Pupil who conquered the world ; why undervalue the efforts of those who first raised the standard of revolt against his uni- versal and undisputed despotism ? Speedily after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian empire was dismembered among his principal officers. The empire founded by the philosopher continued one and undivided for the period of two thousand years j and, even at this day, fallen as it is from its former grandeur, a few faithful and devoted veterans, shut up in its remaining fortresses, still bid proud defi- ance, in their master's name, to all the arrayed strength of Human Reason. In consequence of this slow and gradual emancipation of the Mind, the means by which the final result has been accom- Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 6j plished attract the notice only of the reflecting in- quirer ; resembling in their silent, but irresistible operation, the latent and imperceptible influence of the roots, which, by insinuating themselves into the crevices of an ancient edifice, prepare its infallible ruin ages before its fall ; or that of the apparently inert moisture, which is concealed in the fissures of a rock, when enabled, by the expansive force of con- gelation, to rend asunder its mass, or to heave it from its basis. As it is seldom, in such instances, easy to trace to particular individuals what has resulted from their exertions, with the same precision with which, in physics or mechanics, we refer to their respective inventors the steam-engine or the thunder-rod, it is not surprising, that the attention of the multitude should be so little attracted to the intellectual do- minion of superior minds over the moral world j but the observer must be blind indeed, who does not perceive the yastness of the scale on which spe- culative principles, both right and wrong, have ope- rated upon the present condition of mankind ; or who does not now feel and acknowledge how deep- ly the morals and the happiness of private life, as well as the order of political society, are involved in the final issue of the contest between true and false philosophy. In selecting the subjects of the Essays contained in the First Part of this volume, I have had in view chiefly the correction of some mistaken opinions concerning the origin of our Knowledge (or, to 6*8 PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. Chap. II. use the more common phraseology, concerning the origin of our Ideas), which, as they are naturally suggested by certain figurative modes of speaking, sanctioned by the highest authorities, are apt to warp the judgment in studying the most elemen- tary principles of abstract science. I have touched slightly on the same question in one of the sections of my former work ; where the doctrine maintained with respect to it coincides exactly with that which it is now my object to establish by a more ample dis- cussion. At that time, I did not imagine that it differed so widely from the current maxims of the learned, as I have since found from various later publications ; and accordingly (as the point in dis- pute is intimately connected with almost every other question relating to the Human Mind), I have avail- ed myself of the present opportunity to throw upon it some additional light, before resuming my analysis of the Intellectual Powers. With this view, I have been led to canvass, pretty freely, the doctrines not only of my predecessors, but of several of my con- temporaries ; and to engage in various arguments, which, however unconnected they may appear in a table of contents, will be all found, upon examina- tion, to bear upon the same conclusion. I flatter my- self, therefore, that those who may take the trouble to follow the train of thought which has led me from one Essay to another, will discover, in this part ef my book, a greater degree of unity than its title- page seems at first to promise. The Essays which fill up the rest of the volume have no necessary dependence on the disquisitions Chap. II. PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. 69 to which they are subjoined ; and may perhaps be read with some interest by readers who have little relish for scholastic controversy. The choice, how- ever, even of these, was not altogether arbitrary ; as, I trust, will appear evident to such as may honour the whole series with an attentive perusal. Of the speculations with respect to the origin of our ideas, the greater part were committed to writing, for the first time, during the course of the last sum- mer and winter; the materials of some of them being supplied by very imperfect hints, noted down at dif- ferent periods of my life. The business of compo- sition was begun at a time when I had recourse to it occasionally as a refuge from other thoughts ; and has been carried on under circumstances which, I doubt not, will incline those to whom they are known to judge of the execution with some degree ef indulgence. PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART FIRST. ESSAY FIRST. ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DOC* TRINES OF SOME OF HIS SUCCESSORS, CHAPTER FIRST. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. IN speculating concerning any of the intellectual phenomena, it is of essential importance constantly to recollect, that, as our knowledge of the Material World is derived entirely from our external senses, so all our knowledge of the Human Mind is derived from consciousness. As to the blind or the deaf, no words can convey the notions of particular colours, or of particular sounds ; so to a being who had never been conscious of sensation, memory, imagination, pleasure, pain, hope, fear, love, hatred, no intelli- gible description could be given of the import of 7# ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. these terms. They all express simple ideas or no- tions, which are perfectly familiar to every person who is able to turn his thoughts inwards, and which we never fail to involve in obscurity when we attempt to define them. * The habits of inattention which all men contract, in their early years, to the operations of their own minds, have been pointed out, by various writers, as the most powerful of all obstacles to the progress of our inquiries concerning the theory of human nature. These habits, it has also been remarked, are to be conquered only by the most persevering industry in accustoming the thoughts to turn themselves at plea- sure to the phenomena of this internal world ; an ef- fort by no means easy to any individual, and, to a large proportion of mankind, almost impracticable. " Magni est ingenii," says Cicero, " reypcare men- " tern a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine ab- " ducere." The observation, as thus expressed, is perhaps somewhat exceptionable ; inasmuch as the power which Cicero describes has but little connec- tion with Genius, in the ordinary acceptation of that word ; but it cannot be denied, that it implies a capacity of patient and abstracted meditation, which does not fall to the lot of many. To this power of directing the attention steadily and accurately to the phenomena of thought, Mr Locke and his followers have very properly given the name of Reflection. It bears precisely the same relation to Consciousness which Observation does to * See Note (B.) Chap. I. .SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. ?3 Perception ; the former supplying us with the facts which form the only solid basis of the science of Mind, as we are indebted 1;o. the latter for the ground- work of the whole fabric of Natural Philosophy. * With respect to the exercise of reflection, the fol- lowing precept of an old-fashioned writer is so judi- cious, and the caution it suggests of so great moment in the inquiries on which we are about to enter, that I shall make no apology for introducing it here, al- though not more immediately connected with the subject of the present Essay, than with those of all the others contained in this volume. * The French language affords no single word to express con- sciousness, but conscience} a word which is also frequently em- ployed as synonymous with the moral sense. Thus it is equally agreeable to the usage of the most correct writers to say, I'Aomme a la conscience de sa liberte ; and to speak of un homme de con- science, in the English acceptation of that phrase. Hence an oc- casional indistinctness in the reasonings of some of the best French metaphysicians. [When the foregoing paragraph was printed in the first edi- tion, of this work, I was not aware that this defect in the French metaphysical phraseology had been previously remarked by my learned and ingenious friend M. Prevost. His words are these : " Consciousness est un mot Anglois, auquel j'avoue que je ne '* trouve point d'equivalcnt dans notre langue. C'est la facultf " de connoitre ce qui se passe dans notre esprit. Je 1'ai remplace " tantot par le mot sentiment, ou sentiment intime, tantot par le " mot conscience, ou conscience psychologique, selpn les determi- " nations accessoires qui pouvoient servir a prevenir toute equi- " voque." Elemens de la Philosophic de 1'Esprit Humain, Tra- duit de 1'Anglois. Preface du Traducteur, p. xix. A Geneve, 1 808-j Note to the Second Edition. 74 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. " When I speak," says Crousaz, in his Art of Thinking, " of desire, contentment, trouble, appre- " hension, doubt, certainty ; of affirming, denying, " approving, blaming ; I pronounce words, the " meaning of which I distinctly understand ; and " yet I do not represent the things spoken of under " any image or corporeal form. While the intel- " lect, however, is thus busy about its own pheno- " mena, the imagination is also at work in present- " ing its analogical theories j but so far from aiding *' us, it only misleads our steps, and retards our pro- " gress. Would you know what thought is ? It " is precisely that which passes within you when " you think : Stop but here, and you are sufficient- " ly informed. But the imagination, eager to pro- " ceed farther, would gratify our curiosity by com- " paring it to fire, to vapour, or to other active and " subtile principles in the material world. And to " what can all this tend, but to divert our attention " from what thought is, and to fix it upon what it " is not ?" The belief which accompanies consciousness, as to the present existence of its appropriate phenomena, has been commonly considered as much less ob- noxious to cavil, than any of the other principles which philosophers are accustomed to assume as self- evident, in the formation of their metaphysical sys- tems. No doubts on this head have yet been sug- gested by any philosopher, how sceptical soever; even by those who have called in question the exist- ence both of Mind and of Matter : And yet the fact is, that it rests on no foundation more solid than. Chap. I. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 7-0 our belief of the existence of external objects ; or our belief, that other men possess intellectual powers and faculties similar to those of which we are con- scious in ourselves. In all these cases, the only ac- count that can be given of our belief is, that it forms a necessary part of our constitution ; against which metaphysicians may easily argue so as to perplex the judgment, but of which it is impossible to divest our- selves for a moment, when called on to employ our reason, either in the business of life, or in the pur- suits of science. While we are under the influence of our appetites, passions, or affections, or even of a strong speculative curiosity, all those difficulties which bewildered us in the solitude of the closet va- nish before the essential principles of the human frame. According to the common doctrine of our best philosophers, it is by the evidence of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves exist. The propo- sition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately true ; for our own existence is not a direct or im- mediate object of consciousness, in the strict and lo- gical meaning of that term. We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition ; but we are not conscious of the existence of Mind itself ; nor would it be possible for us to arrive at the knowledge of it (supposing us to be created in the full possession of all the intellectual capacities that belong to human nature), if no impression were ever to be made on our external senses. The moment that, in conse- quence of such an impression, a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once ; the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings : 7^> ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. in other words, the very first exercise of conscious- ness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the pre- sent existence of what is felt, but of the present ex- istence of that which feels and thinks ; or (to em- ploy plainer language) the present existence of that being which I denote by the words / and myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which we can properly be said to be conscious, agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the ex- pression. The latter is made known to us by a suggestion of the understanding consequent on the sensation, but so intimately connected with it, that it is not surprising that our belief of both should be generally referred to the same origin. If this distinction be just, the celebrated enthy- meme of Descartes, Cogito, ergo sum, does not de- serve all the ridicule bestowed on it by those writers who have represented the author as attempting to demonstrate his own existence by a process of rea- soning. To me it seems more probable, that he meant chiefly to direct the attention of his readers to a circumstance which must be allowed to be not unworthy of notice in the history of the Human Mind ; the impossibility of our ever having learn- ed the fact of our own existence, without some sen- sation being excited in the mind, to awaken the fa- culty of thinking. * * After looking again into the Meditations of Descartes, I am doubtful if I have not carried my apology for him a little far- ther than his own words will justify. I am still of opinion, how- ever, that it was the remark which I have ascribed to him, that first led him into this train of thought. Chap. I. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 77 As the belief of our present existence necessarily accompanies every act of consciousness, so, from a comparison of the sensations and thoughts of which we are now conscious, with those of which we re- collect to have been conscious formerly, we are im- pressed with an irresistible conviction of our per- sonal identity. Notwithstanding the strange diffi- culties that have been raised upon the subject, I cannot conceive any conviction more complete than this, nor any truth more intelligible to all, whose understandings have not been perplexed by meta- physical speculations. The objections founded on the change of substance in certain material objects to which we continue to apply the same name, are plainly not applicable to the question concerning the identity of the same person, or of the same thinking being ; inasmuch as the words sameness and identity are here used in different senses. Of the meaning of these words, when applied to persons, I confess I am not able to give a logical defini- tion ; but neither can I define sensation, memory, volition, nor even existence ; and if any one should bring himself by this and other scholastic subtilties to conclude, that he has no interest in making pro- vision for to-morrow, because personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing, I can think of no' argument to convince him of his error. But although it is by consciousness and memory that the sameness of our being is ascertained to our- selves, it is by no means correct to say with Locke, that consciousness constitutes personal identity ; a doctrine which, as Butler justly remarks, " in- 78 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE i^say I. " volves, as an obvious consequence, that a person " has not existed a single moment, nor done one " action but what he can remember ; indeed, none " but what he reflects upon." * " One should " really think it self-evident," as the same author further remarks, " that consciousness of personal " identity presupposes, and therefore cannot consti- " tute, personal identity, any more than knowledge,. " in any other case, constitutes those truths which " are its own objects." The previous existence of the truths is manifestly implied in the very supposi- tion of their being olyects of knowledge. While, however, I assent completely to the sub- stance of these acute and important strictures upon Locke's doctrine, I think it necessary to observe, that the language of Butler himself is far from being unexceptionable. He speaks of our consciousness -af personal identity ; whereas it must appear evi- dent, upon a moment's reflection, even to those who acquiesce in the common statement which ascribes immediately to consciousness our belief of our 'pre- sent existence, that our belief of our personal iden- tity presupposes, over and above this knowledge, the exercise of memory r , and the idea of time. The importance of attending carefully to the dis- tinction between the phenomena which are the im- mediate objects of Consciousness, and the concomi- tant notions and truths which are suggested to our thoughts by these phenomena, will appear from the * Sec the Dissertation on Personal Identity, subjoined to r's Analogy. Chap. I. SOURCES OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 79 considerations to be stated in the next chapter ; in following which, however, I must request my readers to remember, that the distinction becomes import- ant merely from the palpable refutation it affords of the prevailing theory concerning the origin of our knowledge ; and not from any difference between, the two classes of truths, in point of evidence. 80 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. CHAPTER SECOND. INCONSISTENCY OF OUR CONCLUSIONS IN THE FORE- GOING CHAPTER WITH LOCKE*S ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. IT was already observed, that it is from Conscious- ness, or rather from Reflection, that we derive all our notions of the faculties and operations of the Mind j and that, in analyzing these, we must lay Our account with arriving, sooner or later, at certain simple notions or ideas, which we have no means of conveying to others, but by teaching those to whom our reasonings are addressed, how to direct their at- tention with accuracy to what passes within them. These mental phenomena form the direct and ap- propriate subjects of Consciousness ; and, indeed, the only direct and appropriate subjects of Con- sciousness, in the strict acceptation of that word. It must not, however, be concluded from this, that the proper subjects of Consciousness (when the phrase is thus understood) comprehend all the simple notions or ideas about which the science of Mind is conversant ; far less (as some philosophers have imagined) that they comprehend all the elements into which human knowledge may, in the last result, be analyzed. Not to mention such notions as those Chap. II. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 81 of extension and figure (both of which are insepa- rable concomitants of some of our external percep- tions, and which certainly bear no resemblance to anything of which we are conscious within our- selves), there is a great variety of others so connect- ed with our different intellectual faculties, that the exercise of the faculty may be justly regarded as a condition indispensably necessaiy to account for the first origin of the notion. Thus, by a mind des- titute of the faculty of memory, neither the ideas of time, nor of motion, nor of personal identity, could possibly have been formed ; ideas which are confessedly among the most familiar of all those we possess, and which cannot be traced immediately to consciousness, by any effort of logical subtilty. In like manner, without the faculty of abstraction, we never could have formed the idea of number, nor of lines, surfaces, and solids, as they are considered by the mathematician ; nor would it have been pos- sible for us to comprehend the meaning of such words as classes or assortments, or, indeed, of any one of the grammatical parts of speech, but proper names. Without the power of reason or understanding, it is no less evident, that no comment could have helped us to unriddle the import of the words, truth, cer- tainty, probability, theorem, premises, conclusion ; nor of any one of those which express the various sorts of relation which fall under our knowledge. In such cases, all that can be said is, that the exercise of a particular faculty furnishes the occasion on which certain simple notions are, by the laws of F 82 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. our constitution, presented to our thoughts ; nor does it seem possible for us to trace the origin of a particular notion any farther, than to ascertain what the nature of the occasion was, which, in the first instance, introduced it to our acquaintance. The conclusions we thus form concerning: the o origin of our Knowledge, constitute what may be properly called the First Chapter of the NatHral His- tory of the Human Mind. They constitute, at the same time, the only solid basis of a rational Logic ; of that part of logic, more especially, which relates to the theory of Evidence. In the order of in- vestigation, however, they necessarily presuppose such analysis of the faculties of the mind as I have attempted in another work ; a consideration of which I do not know that any logical writer has been hitherto aware ; and to which I must request my readers carefully to attend, before they pass a judgment on the plan I have followed in the ar- rangement of my philosophical speculations. If the foregoing remarks be well-founded, they are fatal to a fundamental principle of Locke's philosophy, which has been assumed by most of his successors as a demonstrated truth ; and which, under a form somewhat disguised, has served to Hume as the basis of all his sceptical theories. It appears to me, that the doctrines of both these eminent authors, with respect to the Origin of our Ideas, resolve into the supposition, that consciousness is exclusively the source of all our knowledge. Their language, indeed, particularly that of Locke, seems to imply the contrary ; but that this was Chap. II. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 83 really their opinion, may, with certainty, be infer- red from their own comments. My reason for say- ing so, I shall endeavour to explain as clearly and concisely as I can. " Let us suppose," says Locke, " the mind to be, " as we say, white paper, void of all characters, " without any ideas : How comes it to be furnish- " ed ? Whence comes it by that vast store which " the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted " on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence " has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? " To this I answer in a word, from experience. In " that all our knowledge is founded, and from that " it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, em- " ployed either about external sensible objects, or " about the internal operations of our minds, per- ** ceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which " supplies our understanding with all the materials " for thinking. These two are the fountains of " knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, " or can naturally have, do spring.** " First, our senses, conversant about particular " sensible objects, do convey into the mind several " distinct perceptions of things, according to those " various ways wherein those objects do affect them : '* And thus we come by those ideas we have of " yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, " and all those which we call sensible qualities ; " which, when I say the senses convey into the " mind, I mean, they, from external objects, convey " into the mind what produces there those percep- " tions. This great source of most of the ideas we 84 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I, *' have, depending wholly upon our senses, and de- " rived by them to the understanding, I call SENSA- " TION. " Secondly, the other fountain from which experi- " ence furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is " the perception* of the operations of our own " minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas " it has got ; which operations, when the soul comes " to reflect on and consider, do furnish the under- " standing with another set of ideas, which could " not be had from things without ; and such are " perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reason- ' ing, willing, and all the different actings of our " own minds ; which we, being conscious of, and " observing in ourselves, do from these receive into " our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from " bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas " every man has wholly in himself; and though it " be net sense, as having nothing to do with exter- " nal objects, yet it is very like it, and might pro- " perly enough be called internal sense. But as I " call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION ; " the ideas it affords being such only as the mind " gets by reflecting on its own operations within it- " self. These two, I say, viz. external material " things, as the objects of sensation, and the opera- " tions of our own minds within, as the objects of " reflection, are to me the only originals from " whence all our ideas take their beginnings." t " AVhen the understanding is once stored with * For perception read consciousness. r Locke's Essay, Book ii. Chap. i. 2, 3, &c. Chap. If. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 85 " these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, com- " pare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite va- " riety,and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted ** wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness " or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame one " new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the " ways before mentioned ; nor can any force of the " understanding destroy those that are there. The " dominion of man, in this little world of his own " understanding, being much the same as it is in " the great world of visible things, wherein his " power, however managed by art and skill, reaches " no farther than to compound or divide the mate- " rials that are made to his hand, but can do no- " thing towards the making the least particle of new " matter, or destroying one atom of what is already '* in being." * Thus far there seems to be little reprehensible in Locke's statement, as it might be fairly interpreted (notwithstanding some unguarded expressions) as implying nothing more than this, that the first oc- casions on which the mind is led to exercise its, va- rious faculties, and to acquire the simple notions which form the elements of all its knowledge, are furnished either by impressions made on our exter- nal senses, or by the phenomena of sensation and thought of which we are conscious. In this sense of the words, I have, in a former work, not only ex- pressed my assent to Mr Locke's doctrine, but have * Locke's Essay, Book ii. Chap. ii. 2. 86 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. admitted as correct the generalization of it adopted by most of his present followers ; " that the first " occasions on which our various faculties are exer- " cised, and the elements of all our knowledge ac- " quired, may be traced ultimately to our inter- " course with sensible objects." This generaliza- tion, indeed, is an obvious and necessary consequence of the proposition as stated by Locke ; the mind being unquestionably, in the first instance, awaken- ed to the exercise of consciousness and reflection by impressions from without. * The comments, however, which Locke has intro- duced on this cardinal principle of his system, in different parts of his Essay, prove, beyond a doubt, that he intended it to convey a great deal more than is implied in the interpretation of it which has just been given ; and that, according to the meaning he annexed to his words, Sensation and Reflection are not merely affirmed to furnish the occasions which suggest to the understanding the various simple or elementary modifications of thought, to which he gives the name of Simple Ideas ; but to furnish the mind directly and immediately with these ideas, in the obvious and literal sense of the expression ; in- somuch, that there is not a simple idea in the mind which is not either the appropriate subject of con- sciousness (such as the ideas which the mind forms of its own operations), or a copy of some quality perceived by our external senses. It appears far- ther, that Locke conceived these copies^ or images 9 * See Philosophy of the Human Mind, Chap. i. 4. Chap. II. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 87 to be the immediate objects of thought, all our infor- mation about the material world being obtained by their intervention. And it was for this reason, I before asserted, that his fundamental principle re- solves into the supposition, that consciousness is ex- clusively the source of all our knowledge. * That I may not be suspected of doing Locke any injustice on this occasion, I shall quote a few pas- sages in his own words. " The next thing to be considered is, how bodies " produce ideas in us ; and that is manifestly by im- " pulse, the only way we can conceive bodies to " operate in." " If, then, external objects be not united to our " minds, when they produce ideas in it ; and yet " we perceive these original qualities in such of " them as singly fall under our senses, 'tis evident, " that some motion must be thence continued by "our nerves or animal spirits, or by some parts of " our bodies to the brain, or the seat of sensation, " there to produce in our minds the particular ideas " we have of them. And since the extension, fi- " gure, number, and motion of bodies of an observ- * A remark, the same in substance with this, is made by Dr ileid in the conclusion of his Inquiry. " When it is asserted, ' that all our notions are either ideas of sensation, or ideas of " reflection, the plain English of this is, that mankind neither " do, nor can think of anything, but of the operations of their " own minds." Inquiry, &c. p. 376, (3d Edition.) In some places, Locke speaks of the ideas of material things as being in the brain; but his general mode of expression sup- poses them to be in the mind; and, consequently, the immediate objects of consciousness. 88 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. " able bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the " sight, 'tis evident, some singly imperceptible bodies " must come from them to the eyes, and thereby " convey to the brain some motion which produces ." these ideas which we have of them in us." * A few sentences after, Mr Locke, having previous- ly stated the distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter, proceeds thus : " From whence I think it easy to draw this obser- " vation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bo- " dies are resemblances of them, and their patterns " do really exist in the bodies themselves ; but the " ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities " have no resemblance of them at all." t What notion Mr Locke annexed to the word re- semblance^ when applied to our ideas of primary qualities, may be best learned by the account he gives of the difference between them and our ideas of secondary qualities, in the paragraph immediately following. " Flame is denominated hot and light ; \ " snow, white and cold ; and manna, white and " sweet ; from the ideas they produce in us : which " qualities are commonly thought to be the same ** in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one " the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are " in a mirror ; and it would by most men be judged " very extravagant, if one should say otherwise." " I pretend not," says the same author in a sub- sequent chapter, " to teach, but to inquire ; and * Locke's Essay, Book ii. Chap. viii. 11 and 12. t 4 15. The instances mentioned by Locke of primary quali- ties are, solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number. J For light read luminous-. Chap. II. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 89 " therefore cannot but confess here again, that ex- " ternal and internal sensation are the only passages " that I can find of knowledge to the understand- " ing. These alone, as far as I can discover, are " the windows by which light is let into this dark " room. For, methinks the understanding is not " much unlike a closet, wholly shut from light, with " only some little openings left, to let in external " visible resemblances, or ideas of things without. " Would the pictures coming into a dark room but " stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon " occasion, it would very much resemble the under- " standing of a man, in reference to all objects of " sight, and the ideas of them." * I have been induced to multiply these quotations, as some writers have alleged, that an undue advan- tage has been taken of the unguarded use which Locke has made in them of the word resemblance ; which, it has been asserted, he could not possibly mean to be understood in its literal sense, t On this point I must leave my readers to judge from his own language ; only remarking, that if this language be considered as at all metaphorical or figurative, the most important inferences, drawn both by him- self and his successors, from his celebrated theory concerning the origin of our ideas, amount to nothing better than a play upon words. For my own part, I can see no good reason for supposing that Locke did not believe that our ideas of primary qualities are really resemblances or copies * Locke, Book ii. Chap. xi. IT. jr See Priestley's Examination of Rekl, &d p. 28. ft seq. 90 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE K SS ay I. of these qualities, when we know for certain that, till our own times, this has been the universal doc- trine of the schools, from Aristotle downwards. Even Leibnitz himself, while he rejected the suppo- sition of these ideas coming into the mind from without, expresses no doubt of their resemblance to the archetypes which they enable us to think of. The soul he considered as a living mirror of the universe ; possessing within itself confused or imper- fect ideas of all the modifications of things external, whether present, past, or to come : that is to say, lie retained that part of the scholastic doctrine which is the most palpably absurd and unintelligible ; the supposition, that we can think of nothing, unless either j the original or the copy be actually in the mind, and the immediate subject of consciousness. All these philosophers have been misled by a vain anxiety to explain the incomprehensible causes of the phenomena of which we are conscious, in the simple acts of thinking, perceiving, and knowing ; and they all seem to have imagined that they had advanced a certain length in solving these problems, when they conjectured, that in every act of thought, there exists some image or idea in the mind, distinct from the mind itself; by the intermediation of which its intercourse is carried on with things re- mote or absent. The chief difference among their systems has turned on this, that whereas many have supposed the mind to have been originally provided with a certain portion of its destined furniture, in- dependently of any intercourse with the material world j the prevailing opinion, since Locke's time, Chap. II. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 91 lias been, that all our simple ideas, excepting those which the power of reflection collects from the phe- nomena of thought, are images or representations of certain external archetypes with which our different organs of sense are conversant ; and that, out of these materials, thus treasured up in the repository of the understanding, all the possible objects of hu- man knowledge are manufactured. " What incon- *' sistency !" (might Voltaire well exclaim) " We " know not how the earth produces a blade of grass ; *' or how the bones grow in the womb of her wJio is " with child ; and yet we would persuade ourselves " that we understand the nature and generation of " our ideas." * It is, however, a matter of comparatively little consequence to ascertain what were the notions which Locke himself annexed to his words, if it shall appear clearly, that the interpretation which J have put upon them coincides exactly with the meaning annexed to them by the most distinguished of his successors. How far this is the case, my readers will be enabled to judge by the remarks which I am to state in the next chapter, t * " Selon Leibnitz, 1'ame cst une concentration, wn miroir " vivant de tout 1'univers, qui a en soi toutes les idees confuses " de toutes les modifications de ce moiide pr6sentes, passees, et ' futures," &c. &c. " Chose etrange, nous tie savons pas comment la terre pro- " duit un brin d'herbe, comment une femme fait un enfant, et " on croit savoir comment nous faisons des idees." (See the chapter in Voltaire's account of Newton's Discoveries, entitled JJe VAme et des Idees.) t Note (C.) ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay i. CHAPTER THIRD. INFLUENCE OF LOCKE*S ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE ON SPECULATIONS OF VA- RIOUS EMINENT WRITERS SINCE HIS TIME, MORE PARTICULARLY ON THOSE OF BERKELEY AND oV HUME. W E are percipient of nothing, " says Bishop Berkeley, " but of our own perceptions and ideas." " It is evident to any one who takes a survey of " the objects of human knowledge, that they are " either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, * " or else such as are perceived by attending to the " passions and operations of the mind ; t or, lastly, " ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, " either compounding, dividing, or barely represent- " ing those originally perceived in the foresaid " ways." t " Light and colours," he elsewhere observes, " heat and cold, extension and figure ; in " a word, the things we see and feel, what are they, " but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impres- " sions on the senses : and is it possible to separate, " even in thought, any of these from perception ? " For my own part, I might as easily divide a thing " from itself." * Ideas of Sensation. f Ideas of Reflection. J Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. I. Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 5. Chap. III. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 93 No form of words could shew more plainly, that, according to Berkeley's construction of Locke's lan- guage, his account of the origin of our ideas was conceived to involve, as an obvious corollary, " that " all the immediate objects of human knowledge " exist in the mind itself, and fall under the direct " cognizance of consciousness, as much as our sen- " sations of heat and cold, or of pleasure and pain." Mr Hume's great principle with respect to the origin of our ideas, which (as I before hinted) is on- ly that of Locke under a new form, asserts the same doctrine, with greater conciseness, but in a manner still less liable to misinterpretation. " All our ideas are nothing but copies of our im- " pressions ; or, in other words, it is impossible for " us to think of anything which we have not antece- ** dentlyjelt, * either by our external or our inter- " nal senses." t Mr Hume tells us elsewhere, that " nothing can be present to the mind but an image " or perception. The senses are only the inlets " through which these images are conveyed, with- " out being able to produce any immediate inter- " course between the mind and the object." t That both of these very acute writers, too, under- stood, in its literal sense, the word resemblance, as employed by Locke, to express the conformity be- tween our ideas of primary qualities and their sup- * The \\on\fceling, whether used here literally or figurative- ly, can ? it is evident, be applied only to what is the immediate subject of consciousness. t Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, Part I. J Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. Ot ON LOCKE* S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay i. posed archetypes, is demonstrated by the stress which they have laid on this very word, in their ce- lebrated argument against the existence of the ma- terial world. This argument (in which Hume, en- tirely acquiesces) is thus stated by Berkeley : " As for our senses, by them we have the know- " ledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things ** that are immediately perceived by sense, call them " what you will ; but they do not inform us, that " things exist without a mind, or unperceived ; " like to those which are perceived." * On the contrary, " as there can be no notion or thought " but in a thinking being, so there can be no sensa- " tion but in a sentient being ; it is the act or feel- " ing of a sentient being ; its very essence consists " in being felt. Nothing can resemble a sensation, " but a similar sensation in the same, or in some " other mind. To think that any quality in a thing " inanimate can resemble a sensation is absurd, and " a contradiction in terms." It has been already observed, how inconsistent this account of the origin of our ideas, as given by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, is with some conclu- sions to which we were led, in a fonner part of this discussion ; our conclusions, for example, with re- spect to the origin of our notions concerning our own existence, and our personal identity. Nei- ther of these notions are derived immediately from consciousness ; nor are they copies of anything of which the human mind could ever have been con- * Principles of Human Knowledge, Sect. 18. Chap. III. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. <)5 scions ; and accordingly Mr Hume, true to his prin- ciples, rejects the belief, not only of the existence of the Material World, but of the Human Mind itself, and of everything else but impressions and ideas. The force of his argument on this subject, as well as of that alleged by Berkeley, to disprove the exist- ence of matter (both of which I consider as demon- stratively deduced from Locke's Theory), I propose to examine afterwards in a separate Essay. At pre- sent, I only wish to infer from what has been stated, that, according to the most probable interpretation of Locke's own meaning, and according to the unques- tionable interpretation given to his words by Berke- ley and Hume, his account of the origin of our ideas amounts to this, that we have no knowledge of any- thing which we do not either learn from conscious- ness, at the present moment, or which is not trea- sured up in our minds, as a copy of what we were conscious of on some former occasion. The constant reference which is made, in these times, by philosophers of every description, to sen- sation and reflection, as the sources of all our know- ledge ; and the variety of acceptations in which this language may be understood, renders it a matter of essential importance, in the examination of any par- ticular system, that it should be distinctly ascertain- ed, not only in what precise sense the author has adopted this very indefinite and ambiguous principle, but whether he has adhered uniformly to the same interpretation of it, in the course of his reasonings. In one sense of the proposition (that, I mean, in which it stands opposed to the innate ideas of Des- 9<> ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay i. cartes), I have already said, that it appears to myself to express a truth of high importance in the science of Mind ; and it has probably been in this obvious and unsuspicious acceptation, that it has been so readily and so generally assented to by modern phi- losophers. The great misfortune has been, that most of these, after having adopted the proposition in its most unexceptionable form, have, in the sub- sequent study of the applications made of it by Locke, unconsciously imbibed, as an essential part of it, a scholastic prejudice with which it happened to be blended in his imagination, and which, since his time, has contributed, more than any other error, to mislead the inquiries of his successors. In order to illustrate a little further this very ab- stract subject, I shall add to the quotations already produced two short extracts from Dr Hutcheson ; an author by no. means blind to Locke's defects, but who evidently acquiesced implicitly in his ac- count of the origin of our ideas, according to the most exceptionable interpretation of which it admits. " All the ideas, or the materials of our reasoning " and judging, are received by some immediate " powers of perception, internal or external, which " we may call Senses. Reasoning or intellect seems " to raise no new species of ideas, but to discover "or discern the relations of those received." Of the full import of this proposition in the writer's own mind, he has put it in our power to judge, by a passage in another of his publications, where he has remarked, with singular acuteness, that " exten- " sion, figure, motion, and rest, seem to be more Chap. III. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 97 ** properly ideas accompanying the sensations of " sight and touch, than the sensations of either of " those senses." The exception made by Hutche- son with respect to the particular ideas here enume- rated, affords a satisfactory comment on the mean- ing which he annexed to Locke's principle, in its general applications. From the cautious and doubt- ful manner in which it is stated, it is more than pro- bable that he regarded this exception as almost, if not altogether, solitary. The peculiarity which Hutcheson had the merit of first remarking, with respect to our ideas of ex- tension, figure, and motion, might, one should have thought, have led him to conjecture, that Locke's principle, when applied to some of the other objects of our knowledge, "would perhaps require an analo- gous latitude of construction. But no hint of such a suspicion occurs, so far as I recollect, in any part of his writings ; nor does it appear that he was at all aware of the importance of the criticism on which he had stumbled. The fact is, as I shall have oc- casion to shew in another Essay, he had anticipated the very instances which were afterwards appealed to by Reid, as furnishing an experimentum cruets, in support of his own reasonings against the ideal theory. The clause, however, in these extracts which bears most directly on our present subject, is Dr Hut- cheson's assertion (in exact conformity to Locke's doctrine), " that all the ideas or materials of our rea- " soning are received by certain senses, internal pr G 98 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. *' external ; and that reasoning or intellect raises no " new species of ideas, but only discerns the rela- " tions of those received." To this assertion various conclusions, which we have been led to in a former part of this chapter, present unsurmountable objections ; those conclu- sions, more especially, which regard the simple ideas implied or involved in certain intuitive judgments of the mind. Thus, it is surely an intuitive truth, that the sensations of which I am now conscious, and all those of which I retain any remembrance, belong to one and the same being, which I call myself. Here is an intuitive judgment, involving the simple idea of personal identity. In like manner, the changes of which I am conscious in the state of my own mind, and those which I perceive in the exter- nal universe, impress me with a conviction, that some cause must have operated to produce them. Here is an intuitive judgment, involving the simple idea of causation. To these, and other instances of the same kind, may be added our ideas of time ; of num- ber ; of truth; of certainty ; of probability ; all of which, while they are manifestly peculiar to a ration- al mind, necessarily arise in the human understand- ing, when employed in the exercise of its different faculties. To say, therefore, with Cudworth, and some of the Greek philosophers, that Reason, or the Understanding, is a source of new ideas, is not so ex- ceptionable a mode of speaking, as it may appear to be, at first sight, to those whose reading has not extended beyond Locke's Essay. According to the system there taught, Sense furnishes our ideas, and Reason per- Chap. III. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 99 ceives their agreements or disagreements. But the fact is, that what Locke calls agreements and disa- greements, are, in many instances, simple ideas, of which no analysis can be given ; and of which the origin must therefore be referred to Reason, accord- ing to Locke's own doctrine. * These observations seem to go far to justify the remark long ago made by the learned and ingenious Mr Harris, that, " though sensible objects may " be the destined medium to awaken the dormant " energies of the understanding, yet are the ener- " gies themselves no more contained in sense y than " the explosion of a cannon in the spark that gave it fire." t The illustration which Cudworth had given, al- most a century before, in his simple and unadorned language, of the same important truth, while it is correctly and profoundly philosophical, exhibits a view, so happily imagined, of the characteristical endowments or capacities of the human intellect, considered in contrast with the subordinate ministry of the senses, as to rival in its effect the sublime im- pressions of poetical description. " The mind per- '* ceives, by occasion of outward objects, as much " more than is represented to it by sense, as a leam- *' ed man does in the best written book, than an il- " literate person or brute. To the eyes of both the " same characters will appear ; but the learned man, " in those characters, will see heaven, earth, sun, * The same observation is nnde by Dr Price in liis Review of Ike Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, p. 49, 2d Edit, t Hermes^ Book jii. chap. iv. 100 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. ' and stars ; read profound theorems of philosophy " or geometry ; learn a great deal of new knowledge " from them, and admire the wisdom of the com- " poser ; while to the other nothing appears but " black strokes drawn on white paper." * In the works of Leibnitz various passages occur, extremely similar in their spirit to those which have just been quoted. One of these I select, in prefe- rence to the rest, because it shews how early and how clearly he perceived that very vulnerable point of Locke's philosophy, against which the foregoing reasonings have been directed. 1 In Locke's Essay, there are some particulars " not unsuccessfully expounded ; but, on the whole, ;< he has wandered widely from his object ; nor has he " formed a just notion of the nature of truth and of " the human mind. He seems, too, not to have been " sufficiently aware, that the ideas of existence, of " personal identity, of truth, besides many others, " may be said (in one sense) to be innate in the " mind ; inasmuch as they are necessarily unfolded " by the exercise of its faculties. In other words, " when we affirm that there is nothing in the intel- " lect which was not previously in the senses, we " must be always understood to except the intel- " lectual powers themselves, and the simple ideas ' which are necessarily implied in our intellectual " operations." t * Treatise of Immutable Morality, B. iv. c. ii. t As, in the above paragraph, I have departed a little from Leibnitz's language, in order to render his meaning somewhat more obvious to my readers, I think it proper t;o subjoin the words of the original. Chap. III. SOURCES OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 101 In quoting these strictures upon Locke, I would not be understood to approve of the use which Leib- nitz has here made of the word innate ; as I think it liable, in some degree, to the same objections which apply to the innate ideas of Descartes. In both authors, this form of expression seems to imply, not only that ideas have an existence distinct from the faculty of thinking, but that some ideas, at least, form part of the original furniture of the mind ; presenting to it treasures of knowledge, which it has only to examine by abstracted meditation, in order to arrive at the most sublime truths. The same remark may be extended to certain doctrines, which Mr Harris has connected with a passage al- ready quoted from his Hermes ; and also to the speculations of Dr Price concerning the origin of our ideas, in his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals. Of the limited func- tions of sense, these two very candid and profound inquirers were fully aware ; but, like the other wri- ters, they have blended, with their statement of this important fact, hypothetical expressions and notions, calculated to impose on an unreflecting reader, by a specious explanation of a mystery, placed beyond the " In Lockio sunt quaedam particularia non male exposita, sed " in summa longe aberravit a janua, nee naturam mentis verita- " tisque intellexit. Idem non satis animadvertit ideas entis, sub- " stantiae, unius'etejusdem, veri, boni, aliasque multas menti nos- " tree ideo mnatas esse, quia ipsa innata est sibi, et in se ips& hsec " omnia deprehendit. Nempe, nihil est in intellectu, quod non " fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus," Tom. V. pt 355. (Edit. Dutens. ) 102 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. reach of the human faculties. * The supposition in which all these different philosophers seem to have agreed, of the existence of latent ideas in the mind, previous to the exercise of the senses (a supposition bordering nearly on the old Platonic scheme of the soul's reminiscence), cannot be guarded against with too great caution ; but, as to the arguments in the Essay of Human Understanding, which have expos- ed the phrase innate ideas to the ridicule of Locke's followers, I must own, that they have very little weight with me, when I recollect that Locke him- self, no less than Descartes, gave his express sanc- tion to the Ideal Theory. If that theory be reject- ed, and the word idea be understood as exactly syno- nymous with thought or notion, the phrase innate ideas becomes much less exceptionable; implying nothing more (though perhaps not in the plainest language) than the following propositions, which I have already endeavoured to prove : " That there " are many of our most familiar notions (altogether *' unsusceptible of analysis) which relate to things " bearing no resemblance either to any of the sensi- " ble qualities of matter, or to any mental operation " which is the direct object of consciousness ; which " notions therefore, (although the senses may fur- * What I mean, in this instance, by a mixture of fact and of hypothesis, will be still more clearly illustrated by two quotations from Mr Harris's notes ; which have the merit of stating fairly and explicitly the theories of their respective authors, without any attempt to keep their absurdity out of view (according to the practice of their modern disciples) by a form of words, in which they are only obscurely hinted to the fancy. For these quota- tions, see Note (D.) Chap. III. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 103 " nish thejlrst occasions on which they occur to the " understanding), can neither be referred to sensa- " tion nor to reflection, as their fountains or sources, " in the acceptation in which these words are em- " ployed by Locke." * The period at which these thoughts first arise in the mind is a matter of little consequence, provided it can be shewn to be a law of our constitution that they do arise, whenever the proper occasions are pre- sented. The same thing may be said with respect to what Locke calls innate practical principles ; and also with respect to what other writers have called innate affections of human nature. The existence of both of these some have affirmed, and others de- nied, without any suspicion that the controversy be- tween them turned on little more than the meaning of a word. * D'Alembert's opinion on this question, although not uni- formly maintained through all his philosophical speculations, appears to have coincided nearly with mine, when he wrote the following sentence : " Les idees inees sont une chimere que Pexperience reprouve; " mais la maniere dont nous acquerons des sensations et des idees " reflechies, quoique prouvees par la meme experience, n'est " pas moins incomprehensible." Elem. de Phil, article Meta- physique. From various other passages of D'Alembert's writings, it might be easily shewn, that by the manner of acquiring sensations, he here means, the manner in which zee acquire our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter ; and that the incomprehensibility he alludes to, refers to the difficulty of conceiving how sensations, which are the proper subjects of consciousness, should suggest the knowledge of external things, to which they bear no resemblance. 104< ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. CHAPTER FOURTH. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. * MR Locke's quibbles, founded on the word innate, were early remarked by Lord Shaftesbury. " Innate " is a word he poorly plays upon ; the right word, * If any of my readers should think, that, in this section, I make too wide, and too abrupt a transition from the question con- cerning the Origin of our Knowledge,*to that which relates to the moral constitution of human nature, I must beg leave to remind them that, in doing so, I am only following Mr Locke's arrange- ment in his elaborate argument against innate ideas. The inde- finite use which he there makes of the word idea, is the chief source of the confusion which runs through that discussion. It is justly observed by Mr Hume, that " he employs it in a very " loose sense, as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensa- " tions and passions, as well as thoughts."" Now, in this sense," continues Mr Hume, " I should desire to know what can be meant " by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, "or the pas- " sion of love between the sexes, is not innate ?" The following passage, which forms a part of the same note, bears a close re- semblance in its spirit to that quoted in the text from Lord Shaftesbury. " It must be confessed, that the terms employed by those who " denied innate ideas, were not chosen with such caution, nor so " exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. " For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natu- " ral, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be al- " lowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the Chap. IV. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 105 " though less used, is connatural. For what has " birth, or progress of the fcetus out of the womb, 4f to do in this case ? The question is not about the " time the ideas entered, or the moment that one " body came out of the other ; but whether the con- " stitution of man be such, that being adult or grown " up, at such or such a time, sooner or later (no " matter when) certain ideas will not infallibly, in- " evitably, necessarily spring up in him." * It has often struck me as a remarkable circum- stance, after what Locke has written with so much zeal against innate principles, both speculative and practical, that his own opinion upon this subject, as distinctly stated by himself in other parts of his works, does not seem to have been, at bottom, so very different from Lord Shaftesbury's, as either of these eminent writers imagined. All that has been commonly regarded as most pernicious in the first book of his Essay, is completely disavowed and done away by the following very explicit declaration : " He that hath the idea of an intelligent, but " frail and weak being, made by and depending on *' latter word, whether in opposition to uncommon, artificial, or " miraculous. If by innate be meant contemporary to our birth, 41 the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to in. ' quire at what time thinking begins, whether before or after our " birth." .Hume's Essays, Vol. II. (Note A.) * I have substituted, in this quotation, the phrase certain ideas, instead of Shaftesbury's example, the ideas of order, administra- tion, and a God ; with the view of separating his general observa- tion from the particular application which he wished to make of it, in the tract from which this quotation is borrowed. (Sec Let- ters to a Student at the University, Letter 8.) 100 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. " another, who is omnipotent, perfectly wise and " good, will as certainly know, that man is to " honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines " when he sees it. For if he hath but the idea of " two such beings in his mind, and will turn his " thoughts that way and consider them, he will as cer- " tainly find, that the inferior, finite, and dependent, " is under an obligation to obey the supreme and in- " finite, as he is certain to find that three, jour, and " seven, are less than Jifteen, if he will consider and " compute those numbers ; nor can he be surer in " a clear morning that the sun is risen, if he will " but open his eyes, and turn them that way. But " yet these truths being never so certain, never so " clear, he may be ignorant of either or all of them, " who will never take the pains to employ his facul- " ties as he should to inform himself about them." * It would not be easy to find a better illustration than this of the truth of Locke's observation, that most of the controversies among philosophers are merely verbal. The advantage, in point of unequi- vocal expression, is surely, in the present instance, not on his side ; but, notwithstanding the apparent scope of his argument, and still more, of the absurd fables which he has quoted in its support, the fore- going passage is sufficient to demonstrate, that he did not himself interpret (as many of his adversaries, and, I am sorry to add, some of his admirers, have done) his reasonings against innate ideas, as lead- ing to any conclusion inconsistent with the certainty * Locke's Essay, B. iv. c. xiii. 3. Chnp. IV. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 107 of human knowledge, or with the reality and immu- tability of moral distinctions. I have enlarged on this collateral topic at greater length than I would otherwise have done, in conse- quence chiefly of the application which has been made, since Locke's time, of the principles which I have been controverting in the preceding chapters, to the establishment of a doctrine subversive of all our reasonings concerning the moral administration of the universe. Dr Hutcheson, one of the most zealous, and most able advocates for morality, seems to have paved the way for the scepticism of some of his successors, by the unguarded facility with which, notwithstanding his hostility to Locke's conclusions concerning innate practical principles, he adopted his opinions, and the peculiarities of his phraseology, with respect to the origin of our ideas in general. I have already observed, that, according to both these writers, " it is the province of sense to intro- " duce ideas into the mind ; and of reason, to com- " pare them together, and to trace their relations ;" a very arbitrary and unfounded assumption, un- doubtedly, as I trust has been sufficiently proved in a former part of this argument ; but from which it followed, as a necessary consequence, that, if the words right and wrong express simple ideas, the origin of these ideas must be referred, not to reason, but to some appropriate power of perception. To this power Hutcheson, after the example of Shaftes- bury, gave the name of the moral sense ; a phrase which has now grown into such familiar use, that it is occasionally employed by many who never think 108 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay r. of connecting it with any particular philosophical theory. Hutcheson himself was evidently apprehensive of the consequences which his language might be sup- posed to involve ; and he has endeavoured to guard against them, though with very little success, in the following caution : " Let none imagine, that " calling the ideas of virtue and vice perceptions of " sense, upon apprehending the actions and affec- " tions of another, does diminish their reality, more " than the like assertions concerning all pleasure and " pain, happiness or misery. Our reason often cor- " rects the report of our senses about the natural " tendency of the external action, and corrects such " rash conclusions about the affections of the agent. " But whether our moral sense be subject to such a " disorder as to have different perceptions from the " same apprehended affections in any agent, at dif- " ferent times, as the eye may have of the colours " of an unaltered object, it is not easy to determine : " perhaps it will be hard to find any instances of " such a change. What reason could correct, if it " fell into such a disorder, I know not ; except sug- " gesting to its remembrance its former approba- " tions, and representing the general sense of man- " kind. But this does not prove ideas of virtue " and vice to be previous to a sense, more than a " like correction of the ideas of colour in a person " under the jaundice, proves that colours are per- " ceived by reason, previously to sense." Mr Hume was not to be imposed upon by such an evasion, and he has accordingly, with his usual Chap. IV. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 109 acuteness, pushed this scheme of morals (which he evi- dently adopted from Hutcheson and Shaftesbury) to its ultimate and its legitimate conclusion. The words right and wrong (he asserted), if they express a dis- tinction at all analogous to that between an agree- able and a disagreeable colour, can signify nothing in the actions to which they are applied, but only certain effects in the mind of the spectator. As it is improper, therefore (according to the doctrines of Locke's philosophy) to say of an object of taste that it is sweet, or of heat that it is in the jire, so it is equally improper to speak of morality as a thing independent and unchangeable. " Were I not," says he, " afraid of appearing too philosophical, I " should remind my readers of that famous doctrine, " supposed to be fully proved in modern times, " * that taste and colours, and all other sensible " qualities, lie, not in the bodies, but merely in the "senses.* The case is the same with beauty and " deformity, virtue and vice." * In consequence of this view of the subject, he has been led to repre- sent morality as the object, not of reason, but of taste ; the distinct offices of which he thus describes: " The former conveys the knowledge of truth and "falsehood ; the latter gives the sentiment of beauty " and deformity, vice and virtue. The one dis- *' covers objects, as they really stand in nature, " without addition or diminution ; the other has a " productive quality, and, gilding or staining all na- " tural objects with the colours borrowed from in- * Hume's Essays, Vol. I. Note (F.) 110 ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OP THE Essay i. " ternal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new crea- tion." * Without abandoning the hypothesis of a moral sense, Hutcheson might, I think, have made a plau- sible defence at least against such inferences as these, by availing himself of the very ingenious and original remark already quoted t from his own works, with respect to extension, Jigure, and motion. Un- fortunately, he borrowed almost all his illustrations from the secondary qualities of matter ; whereas, had he compared the manner in which we acquire our notions of right and wrong, to our perception of such qualities as extension and figure, his language, if not more philosophical than it is, would have been quite inapplicable to such purposes, as it has been since made subservient to, by his sceptical followers. Extension was certainly a quality peculiarly fitted for obviating the cavils of his adversaries ; the no- tion of it (although none can doubt that it was ori- ginally suggested by sense} involving in its very nature an irresistible belief that its object possesses an existence, not only independent of our percep- tions, but necessary and eternal, like the truth of a mathematical theorem. The solid answer, however, to the sceptical con- sequences deduced from the theory of a moral sense, is to deny the hypothesis which it assumes with re- spect to the distinct provinces of sense and of rea- son. That the origin of our notions of right and * Hume's Essays, Vol. II. Appendix, concerning Moral .V. -nli- ment. f See p, 9$. Cliap. IV. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 111. wrong is to be referred to the latter part of our con- stitution, and not to the former, I shall endeavour to shew in another work. At present, I shall only observe, that how offensive soever this language may be to those whose ears have been exclusively fami- liarized to the logical phraseology of Locke, it is per- fectly agreeable to the common apprehensions of mankind ; which have, in all ages, led them to con- sider it, not only as one of the functions of reason, but as its primary and most important function, to guide our choice, in the conduct of life, between right and wrong, good and evil. The decisions of the understanding, it must be owned, with respect to moral truth, differ from those which relate to a mathematical theorem, or to the result of a chemical experiment, inasmuch as they are always accompa- nied with some feeling or emotion of the heart ; but on an accurate analysis of this compounded senti- ment,* it will be found, that it is the intellectual judgment which is the ground-work of the feeling, and not the feeling of the judgment. Nor is the language which I have adopted, in preference'to that of Locke, with respect to the Ori- gin of our Moral Notions, sanctioned merely by popular authority. It coincides exactly with the mode of speaking employed by the soundest philoso- phers of antiquity. In Plato's Theatetus, Socrates observes, " that it cannot be any of the powers of " sense that compares the perceptions of all the " senses, and apprehends the general affections of " things ;" asserting, in opposition to Protagoras, * See Note (K.) lie ON LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF THE Essay I. that " this power is reason, or the governing prin- " ciple of the mind." To illustrate what he means by the general affections of things, he mentions, as examples, identity, number, similitude, dissimilitude, equality, inequality, jcaAor KO.I aiy/pov ; an enume- ration which is of itself sufficient to shew how very nearly his view of this subject approached to the conclusions which I have been endeavouring to esta- blish concerning the Origin of our Knowledge. * The sentence which immediately follows could not have been more pointedly expressed, if the author had been combating the doctrine of a moral sense, as explained by Dr Hutcheson : " It seems to me, " that for acquiring these notions, there is not ap- " pointed any distinct or appropriate organ ; but " that the mind derives them from the same powers " by which it is enabled to contemplate and to in- " vestigate truth." t * See upon this subject Cudworth's Immutable Morality, p. 100, et seq. and Price's Review, &c. p. 50, 2d Edit. t Ms/ etAA' abTM autut (sT;r,wi f ) f> stHrQnrti rt aa.fa.Ttit.it et\\ tt utiivn TU eto/uttn, iti irot't%ti M 4-y^ orr *I/T na.Q'a.u'mi n-pAyftetrtimTAi irtft TA ONTA. The reproduction of the same philosophical doctrines, in differ- ent ages, in consequence of a recurrence of similar circum- stances, has been often remarked as a curious fact in the history of the human mind. In the case now before us, the expressions which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, can be accounted for only by the wonderful similarity between the doctrines of Pro- tagoras and those of some modern sceptics. " Nothing," accord- ing to Protagoras, " is true or false, any more than sweet or sour " in itself, but relatively to the perceiving mind."" Man is the ? measure of all things ; and every thing is that, and no other, Chap. IV. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 113 The discussion into which we have been thus led almost insensibly, about the ethical scepticism which seems naturally to result from Locke's account of the origin of our ideas, while it serves to demon- strate how intimate the connection is between those questions in the science of Mind, which, on a super- ficial view, may be supposed to be altogether inde- pendent of each other, will, I hope, suggest an apo- logy for the length of some of my arguments upon scholastic questions, apparently foreign to every pur- pose of practical utility. I must, more especially, re- quest, that this consideration may be attended to, when I so often recur in these pages to the paradox of Hume and Berkeley concerning the existence of the Material World. It is not that I regard this theory of idealism^ when considered by itself, as an error of any serious moment ; but because an exami- nation of it affords, in my opinion, the most palpable and direct means of exploding that principle of Locke, to which the most serious of Mr Hume's sceptical conclusions, as well as this comparatively inoffensive tenet, may be traced as to their com- mon root. In offering this apology, I would not be understood to magnify, beyond their just value, the inquiries in which we have been now engaged, or those which are immediately to follow. Their uti- " which to every one it seems to be ; so that there can be nothing *' true, nothing existent, distinct from the mind's own percep- " tions." This last maxim, indeed, is mentioned as the funda- mental principle of the theory of this ancient sceptic. IT*KTF T* $a.ivinA ex*?-, T*vTa. *v KatSfucfo/ufv, j ira.vii. d SietyxfjtiStt oe/5 as the most essential of all desiderata for insur- ing the success of their researches. Till this great end be, in some measure, accomplished, we must limit our ambition to the approbation of the discern- ing few ; recollecting (if I may borrow the words of Mr Burke), that our conclusions are not fit- ted " to abide the test of a captious controversy, " but of a sober and even forgiving examination ; " that they are not armed, at all points, for battle, " but dressed to visit those who are willing to give ' a peaceful entrance to truth." e * See Note (K.) Chap. II. ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. 149 SECTION SECOND. Continuation of the subject. Indistinctness of the line drawn by Reid, as well as by Descartes and Locke, between the Primary and the Secondary qualities of Matter. Distinction between the Primary qualities of Matter and its Mathemati- cal Affections. 1 HAVE yet another criticism to offer on Dr Reid's reasonings with respect to perception ; a criticism not founded upon any flaw in his argument, but upon his inattention, in enumerating the primary qualities of matter, to a very essential distinction among the particulars comprehended in his list ; by stating which distinction, he might, in my opinion, have rendered his conclusions much more clear and satisfactory. Into this oversight Dr Reid was very naturally led by the common arrangement of his immediate predecessors; most of whom, since the time of Locke, have classed together, under the general title of primary qualities, hardness, softness, rough- ness, smoothness, &c. with extension, Jigure, and motion. * In this classification he has invariably * According to Locke, the primary qualities of matter are so- lidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number. (Book ii. chap. viii. 9.) I the theory of Berkeley, the word solidity is employed as synonymous with hardness and resistance. (Berke- ley's Works, p. 133. Vol. I. Dublin edition of 1784.) Following these guides, Reid has been led to comprehend, in his enumera- tion (very inadvertently in my opinion), the heterogeneous quali- ties specified in the text. 150 ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. Essay II. followed them, both in his Inquiry into the Human Mind, and in his Essays on the Intellectual Pow- ers ; a circumstance the more remarkable, that he has incidentally stated, in different parts of his works, some very important considerations, which seem to point out obviously the necessity of a more strictly logical arrangement. After observing, on one occasion, that " hardness " and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure " and motion, do all suppose extension, and cannot " be conceived without it ;" he adds, that " he " thinks it must, on the other hand, be allowed, " that if we had never felt anything hard or soft, " rough or smooth, figured or moved, we should " never have had a conception of extension : so that, " as there is good ground to believe that the notion " of extension could not be prior to that of other " primary qualities ; so it is certain that it could " not be posterior to the notion of any of them, be- " ing necessarily implied in them all." * In another passage, the same author remarks, that " though the notion of space seems not to enter " at first into the mind, until it is introduced by " the proper objects of sense ; yet, being once in- " troduced, it remains in our conception and belief, " though the objects which introduced it be removed. " We see no absurdity in supposing a body to be " annihilated ; but the space that contained it re- " mains ; and to suppose that annihilated, seems to "be absurd, "t * Inquiry, chap. v. sect. 5. t Essays on the Int. Ppwers, p. 262, 4to edition. Chap. H. ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. Among the various inconveniences resulting from this indistinct enumeration of primary qualities, one of the greatest has been, the plausibility which it has lent to the reasonings of Berkeley and of Hume, against the existence of an external world. Solidity and extension being confounded together by both, under one common denomination, it seemed to be a fair inference, that whatever can be shewn to be true of the one, must hold no less when applied to the other. That their conclusions, even with respect to solidity, have been pushed a great deal too far, I have already endeavoured to shew ; the resistance opposed to our compressing force, manifestly im- plying the existence of something external) and altogether independent of our perceptions : but still there is a wide difference between the notion of independent existence, and that ascribed to extension or space, which, as Dr Reid observes, carries along with it an irresistible conviction, that its exist- ence is eternal and necessary, equally incapable of being created or annihilated. The same remark may be applied to the system of Dr Hutton, who plainly considered extension and hardness as quali- ties of the same order ; and who, in consequence of this, has been led to blend (without any advantage whatever to the main object of his work) the meta- physics of Berkeley with the physics of Boscovich, so as to cast an additional obscurity over the systems of both. It is this circumstance that will be found, on examination, to be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which distinguishes it from that of the Hindoos, and from all others com- ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. Essay II. monly classed along with it by metaphysicians ; that it involves the annihilation of space as an external existence -, thereby unhinging completely the natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which, of all within the reach of our faculties, we seem to be the most completely ascertained ; and which, accordingly, was selected by Newton and Clarke as the ground-work of their argument for. the necessary existence of God. * * This species of sophistry, founded on an indistinctness of classification, occurs frequently in Berkeley's writings. It is thus that, by confounding primary and secondary qualities un- der one common name, he attempts to extend to both, the con- clusions of Descartes and Locke with respect to the latter. " To what purpose is it/' he asks, " to dilate on that which may " be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to " any one that is capable of the least reflection ? It is but looking " into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can con- " ceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to " exist without the mind, or unperceived. This easy trial may " make you see, that what you contend for is a downright con- " tradiction ; insomuch, that I am content to put the whole on " this issue, if you can but conceive it possible for one extended " moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything " like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I " shall readily give up the cnuse.''--- Principles of Human Know- ledge, section xxii. The contusion of thought which runs through the foregoing passage was early remarked by Baxter, in his Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. In the Jirst sentence, he observes, that " Jigure and motion are nicely shuffled in with colour and " sound, though they are qualities of a different kind ; and, in " the last, that extended moTcable substance is supposed to be " a species of idea;"~" in which case," he adds, " Dr Berke- " !-y is very safe in his argument." (Vol. II. p. 2?6. 3d edit.) Chap. II. ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. 153 I am always unwilling to attempt innovations in language ; but I flatter myself it will not be consi- dered as a rash or superfluous one, after the remarks now made, if I distinguish Extension and Figure by the title of the mathematical affections of mat- ter ; * restricting the phrase primary qualities to hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, and other properties of the same description. The line which I would draw between primary and se- condary qualities is this ; that the former necessa- rily involve the notion of extension, and conse- quently of externality or outness-^ whereas the* latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations ; and, when Jirst apprehended by the mind, do not imply the existence of any- thing locally distinct from the subjects of its own consciousness. But these topics I must content my- self with merely hinting at on the present occa- sion, t * This phrase I borrow from some of the elementary trea- tises of Natural Philosophy. t The word outness, which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berke- ley in his Principles of Human Knowledge (sect, xliii.) ; and, at a still earlier period of his life, in his Essay towards a new Theory of Vision (sect, xlvi.) I mention this, as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation. J For Locke's distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities, see his Essay, Book ii. chap. iii. p. Of its logical accuracy some judgment may be formed from its influence in leading so very acute an inquirer to class number in the same list with solidity and extension* The reader will find some ad- ditional illustrations on the subject of Secondary Qualities in note (L.) 154 ON THE IDEALISM OP BERKELEY. Essay II. If these observations be well-founded, they esta- blish three very important facts in the History of the Human Mind. 1. That the notion of the ma- thematical affections of matter presupposes the ex- ercise of our external senses ; inasmuch as it is sug- gested to us by the same sensations which convey the knowledge of its primary qualities. 2. That this notion involves an irresistible conviction, on our part, not only of the external existence of its ob- jects, but of their necessary and eternal existence ; whereas, in the case of the primary qualities of mat- ter, our perceptions are only accompanied with a belief, that these qualities exist externally, and in- dependently of our existence as percipient beings ; the supposition of their annihilation by the power of the Creator, implying no absurdity whatsoever. 3. That our 'conviction of the necessary existence of extension or space, is neither the result of rea- soning nor of experience, but is inseparable from the very conception of it ; and must therefore be considered as an ultimate and essential law of hu- man thought. The same conclusion, it is manifest, applies to the notion of time ; a notion which, like that of space y presupposes the exercise of our external senses ; but which, when it is once acquired, pre- sents irresistibly its object to our thoughts as an ex- istence equally independent of the human mind, and of the material universe. Both these existences, too, swell in the human understanding to infinity, the one to immensity the other to eternity ; nor is it possible for imagination itself to conceive a li- Chap. II. ON THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. 155 mit to either. How are these facts to be recon- ciled with that philosophy which teaches that all our knowledge is derived from experience ? The foregoing reasonings have led us, by a very short, and, I hope, satisfactory process, to the ge- neral conclusion which forms the fundamental prin- ciple of the Kantian system ; a system plainly sug- gested to the author, by the impossibility he found of tracing any resemblance between extension and the sensations of which we are conscious. " The " notion (or intuition) of space," he tells us, " as " well as that of time, is not empirical ; that is, it *' has not its origin in experience. On the con- " trary, both these notions are supposed, or implied, " as conditions in all our empirical perceptions ; in- " asmuch as we cannot perceive nor conceive an " external object, without representing it to our " thoughts as in space ; nor can we conceive any- " thing, either without us or within us, without re- " presenting it to ourselves as in time* Space and " time, therefore, are called, by Kant, the two forms " of our sensibility. The first is the general form " of our external senses ; the second the general "form of all our senses, external and internal. " These notions of space and of time, however, " although they exist in us d priori, are not, " ac- cording to Kant, " innate ideas. If they are an- " terior to the perceptions of our senses, it is only " in the order of reason, and not in the order " of time. They have, indeed, their origin in our- " selves ; but they present themselves to the under- " standing only in consequence of occasions furnish. 156 0N THE IDEALISM OF BERKELEY. Essay II. " ed by our sensations ; or (in Kant's language) by " our sensible modifications. Separated from these " modifications, they could not exist ; and, without " them, they would have remained for ever latent " and sterile.*' * * De Gerando,' Hist, des Syste'mes, Tom. II. p. 208, 209. It is proper tor me to observe here, that, for the little I know of Kant's philosophy, 1 am chiefly indebted to his critics and com- mentators ; more particularly to M. De Gerando, who is allow- ed, even by Kant's countrymen, to have given a faithful exposi- tion of his doctrines ; and to the author of a book published at Copenhagen, in 1796> entitled, Philosvphice Criticce secundum Kantium Expositio Systematica. Some very valuable strictures on the general spirit of his system may be collected from the appendix subjoined by M. Prevost to his French translation of Mr Smith's posthumous Essays ; from different passages of the Essais Philosophiques of the same author ; and from the first ar- ticle in the second number of the Edinburgh Review. As to Kant's own works, I must acknowledge, that, although I have frequently attempted to read them in the Latin edition printed at Leipsic, I have always been forced to abandon the un- dertaking in despair ; partly from the scholastic barbarism of the style, and partly from my utter inability to unriddle the author's meaning. Wherever I have happened to obtain a momentary glimpse of light, I have derived it, not from Kant himself, but from my previous acquaintance with those opinions of Leibnitz, Berke- ley, Hume, Reid, and otheis, which he has endeavoured to ap- propriate to himself under the deep disguise of his new phraseo- logy. No writer certainly ever exemplified more systematically, or more successfully, the precept which Quinctilian (upon the authority of Livy) ascribes to an ancient rhetorician ; and which, if the object of the teacher was merely to instruct his pupib how to command the admiration of the multitude, must be allowed to reflect no small honour on his knowledge of human nature. " Neque id novum vitium est, cum jam apud Titum Livium in- " vfniam fuisse praeceptorera aliquem, qui discipulos obseuiare ehap. II. ON THE IDEALISM OP BERKELEY. 157 The only important proposition which I am able to extract from this jargon is, that, as extension and duration cannot be supposed to bear the most dis- tant resemblance to any sensations of which the mind is conscious, the origin of these notions forms a ma- nifest exception to the account given by Locke of the primary sources of our knowledge. This is pre- cisely the ground on which Reid has made his stand against the. scheme of Idealism: and I leave it to my readers to judge, whether it was not more philo- sophical to state, as he has done, the fact, in simple and perspicuous terms, as a demonstration of the im- perfection of Locke's theory, than to have reared upon it a superstructure of technical mystery, simi- lar to what is exhibited in the system of the Ger- man metaphysician. In justice, at the same time, to Kant's merits, I must repeat, that Dr Reid would have improved greatly the statement of his argument against Berke- ley, if he had kept as constantly in the view of his readers, as Kant has done, the essential distinction which I have endeavoured to point out between the. mathematical affections of matter, and its primary " quae dicerent, juberent, Graeco verbo utens Gillies's Arist. 2d edition, Vol. I * p. 47. I must remark here, that the clause, which I have distinguished by italics^ in the above quotation from DE lf>i ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay III, What was the interpretation annexed by Helve- tius himself to Locke's doctrine on this point, ap- pears clearly from the corollary which he deduced from it, and which he has employed so many pages in illustrating ; " that everything in man resolves " ultimately into sensation, or the operation offeel- " ing." This, therefore, is the whole amount of the discovery which Helvetius considered as the ex- clusive glory of Locke. "It is to Aristotle we owe," says Condorcet, " that important truth, the first step in the science " of mind, that our ideas, even such as are most ab- " stract, most strictly intellectual (so to speak), have " their origin in our sensations. But this truth he " did not attempt to support by any demonstration. " It was rather the intuitive perception of a man of " genius, than the result of a series of observations " accurately analyzed, and systematically combined, " in order to derive from them some general con- " elusion. Accordingly, this germ, cast in an un- " grateful soil, produced no fruit till after a period " of more than twenty centuries. * " At length, Locke made himself master of the " proper clue. He shewed, that a precise and ac- " curate analysis of ideas, resolving them into other Gillies, is somewhat too unqualified, at least vrhcn applied to the writers of this country. Mr Harris (whose Hermes happens now to be lying before me) mentions explicitly the phrase in question, as a noted school axiom. (Harris's Works, Vol. I. p. 41 9.) Nor do I at present recollect any one author of reputation who has considered it in a different light. * Outlines of Historic. View, &c. Eng. Trans, pp. 107, 10S Kssay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 16,5 *" ideas, earlier in their origin, and more simple in " their composition, was the only means to avoid be- *' ing lost in a chaos of notions, incomplete, incohe- " rent, and indeterminate- j destitute of order, be- " cause suggested by accident; and admitted among ** the materials of our knowledge without due ex- " animation. " He proved by this analysis, that the whole circle " of our ideas results merely from the operation of il our intellect upon the sensations we have receiv- " ed ; or, more accurately speaking, that all our " ideas are compounded of sensations, offering " themselves simultaneously to the memory, and af- 4f ter such a manner, that the attention is fixed, " and the perception limited to a particular collec- " tion, or portion of the sensations combined."* The language, in this extract, is so extremely vague and loose, that I should have been puzzled in my conjectures about its exact import, had it not been for one clause, in which the author states, with an affectation of more than common accuracy, as the general result of Locke's discussions, this short and simple proposition, that all our ideas are compound- ed of sensations. The clause immediately preced- ing these words, and of which they are introduced as an explanation, or rather as an amendment, cer- tainly seems, at first sight, to have been intended to convey a meaning very different from this, and a meaning not liable, in my opinion, to the same * Outlines, &c. pp. 240 and 241. Not having the original in my possession, I have transcribed the above passage very near- Jy from the English Translation, published at London in 1795. 160 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay nr. weighty pbjections. But neither the one interpre- tation nor the other can possibly be reconciled with Locke's doctrine, as elucidated by himself in the particular arguments to which he applies it in va- rious parts of his Essay. I shall only add to these passages a short quota- tion from Diderot, who has taken more pains than most French writers to explain, in a manner per- fectly distinct and unequivocal, his own real opinion with respect to tjie origin and the extent of human knowledge. " Every Jidea must necessarily, when brought to " its state of ultimate decomposition, resolve itself " into a sensible representation or picture,; and, " since everything in our understanding has been *' introduced there by the channel of sensation, *' whatever proceeds out of the understanding is ** either chimerical, or must be able, in returning " by the same road, to re-attach itself to u;s sensi- ** ble archetype. Hence an important rule in phi- " losophy, That every expression which cannot ** find an external and a sensible object to which it " can thus establish its affinity, is destitute of sig- " nification." * * " Toute id6e doit se rcsoudre, en derniere decomposition, en " une representation sensible, et puisque toutcequi est dans notre " entcndement est venu par la voie de notre sensation, tout ce qui " sort de notre entendement est chimerique,ou do}t, en retournant " par le ineme chemin, trouver, hors de nous, un ohjct sensible " pour s'y rattacher. DC la une grande regie en philosophic ; c'est " que toute expression qui ne trouve pas hors de nous un objet " sensible auquel elle puisse se rattacher, est vuide de sens." (Ewcrcs de Diderot, Tom. VI. Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. When we compare this conclusion of Diderot's with the innate ideas of Descartes, the transition from one extreme to the other seems wonderful in- deed. And yet I am inclined to ascribe to the lateness of the period when Locke's philosophy be- came prevalent in France, the extravagance of the length to which his doctrines have since been push- ed by some French writers. The implicit faith which was so long attached by their immediate pre- decessors to the Cartesian system, naturally prepar- ed the way for the sudden and blind admission of a contrary error : so just is the remark of a candid and judicious inquirer, that " the first step from a " complete ignorance of a philosophical principle, is " a disposition to carry its generalization beyond all " reasonable bounds." * In this philosophical rule, Diderot goes much farther than Hume, in consequence of the different interpretation which he has given to Locke's principle. In other respects, the passage now quoted bears, in its spirit, a striking resemblance to the re- ference which Hume has made, in the following argument, to -his own account of the origin of our ideas, as furnishing an in- controvertible canon of sound logic, for distinguishing the legiti- mate objects of human knowledge, from the illusions of fancy and of prejudice. " One event follows another ; but we never " can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but " never connected. And, as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense, or inward senti- " ment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no " idea of connexion, or power, at all; and that these words are " absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in " philosophical reasonings or common life." Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, Part ii. * " Rien n'est plus voisin de 1'ignorance d'un principe, que sen " excessive generalisation." De Gerando, Introduct. p. xx. 168 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay nr. It is remarked by D'Alembert, as a curious cir- cumstance in the literary character of his country- men, that, though singularly fond of novelty in mat- ters of taste, they have always shewn themselves, in the pursuits of science, extremely bigoted to old opinions. " These two biasses," he adds, " ap- " parently so strongly contrasted with each other, " have their common origin in various causes, and " chiefly in that passion for enjoyment, which " seems to be the characteristical feature in our " minds. Objects which are addressed immediate- " ly to feeling or sentiment, cannot continue long " in request, for they cease to be agreeable when " the effect ceases to be instantaneous. The ardour, " beside, with which we 'abandon ourselves to the " pursuit of them, is soon exhausted ; and the " mind, disgusted, almost as soon as satisfied, flies to " something new, which it will quickly abandon for a " similar reason. The understanding, on the con- " trary, is furnished with knowledge, only in con- " sequence of patient meditation ; and is therefore " desirous to prolong, as much as possible, the en- " joyment of whatever information it conceives it- " self to have acquired.'* In illustration of this remark, he mentions the obstinate adherence of the French philosophers to To this maxim I would beg leave to subjoin another, that " no step is more natural or common, than to pass all at once " from an implicit faith in a philosophical dogma, to an unqua- " lified rejection of it, with all the truths, as well as errors, which " it embraces." The fault, in both cases, arises from a weak and slavish subjection of the judgment to the authority of others. 11 .Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. lG9 the scholastic doctrines ; which they did not aban- don till the period when the succeeding school, which first triumphed over the dogmas of Aristotle, had, in several of the other countries of Europe, shared the fate of its predecessor. " The theory of " the Vortices," he observes, " was not adopted " in France, till it had received a complete refuta- " tion by Newton. It is not yet thirty years," he adds, " since, we began to renounce the system of " Descartes. Maupertuis was the first person who " had the courage openly to avow himself a New- " toman." * As a farther confirmation of D J Alembert's obser- vation, I must take the liberty to add (at the risk, perhaps, of incurring the charge of national partiali- ty), that, on most questions connected with the Phi- losophy of the Human Mind, his countrymen are, at least, half a century behind the writers of this island, t While Locke's account of the origin of our ideas continued to be the general creed in Great Britain, it was almost unknown in France ; and now that, after long discussion, it begins, among our best reasoners, to shrink into its proper dimen- sions, it is pushed, in that country, to an extreme, * Melanges, &c. Tom. I. p. 149- (Amsterdam edition, 1770.) This Discourse was first published in 1751. t I need scarcely add, that, in this observation, I speak of the general current of philosophical opinion, and not of the conclu- sions adopted by the speculative few who think for themselves. On many important points, every candid Englishman, who studies the history of this branch of science, will own, with gratitude, the obligations we owe to the lights struck out by Condillac and Lis successers. 170 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay in. which hardly any British philosopher of the small- est note ever dreamed of. In consequence of the writings of Reid, and of a few others, the word idea itself is universally regarded here, even by those who do not acquiesce implicitly in Reid's conclusions, as at the best a suspicious and danger- ous term ; and it has already nearly lost its techni- cal or Cartesian meaning, by being identified as a synonyme with the simpler and more popular word notion. Our neighbours, in the meantime, have made choice of the term ideology (a Greek com- pound, involving the very word we have been at- tempting to discard), to express that department of knowledge, which had been previously called the science of tlie human mind ; and of which they themselves are always reminding us, that it is the great object to trace, in the way of induction, the intellectual phenomena to their general laws. It is a circumstance somewhat ludicrous, that, in select- ing a new name for this branch of study, an appel- lation should have been pitched upon, which seems to take for granted, in its etymological import, the truth of a hypothesis, which has not only been completely exploded for more than fifty years, but which has been shewn to be the prolific parent of half the absurdities both of ancient and modern me- taphysicians. * * We are told, by one of the most acute and original partizans of this new nomenclature, that Ideology is a branch of Zoology ; " having, for its object, to examine the intellectual faculties of " man, and of other animals." The classification, I must own, appears to myself not a little extraordinary ; but my only reason Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 171 Among the French philosophers above mention- ed, there is one whom I ought, perhaps, to have taken an earlier opportunity of separating from the rest, on account of the uncommon union displayed in his writings, of learning, liberality, and philoso- phical depth. To those who have read his works, it is scarcely necessary for me to add the name of De Gerando; an author, between whose general views and my own, I have been peculiarly flattered to remark a striking coincidence ; and whose dissent from sonie of the conclusions which I have endea- voured to establish, I would willingly believe, is owing more to the imperfect statement I have yet given of my opinions, than to the unsoundness of the arguments which led me to adopt them. In the present instance, at least, his opinion seems to* me to be, at bottom, nearly, if not exactly, the same with that which I proposed in my first volume ; and yet a careless reader would be apt to class us with two sects diametrically opposed to each other. " All the systems which can possibly be imagined, " with respect to the generation of our ideas, may " be reduced," according to M. De Gerando,* " as to their fundamental principle, to this simple " alternative : either all our ideas have their origin for objecting to it here is, that it is obviously intended to prepare the way for an assumption, which at once levels man with the brutes, without the slightest discussion. " Penser, c'est toujours " sentir, et ce tfest rien que sentir." Elem. d'ldfcologie, par L. C. Destutt-Tracy, Senateur. Paris, 1804. * That I may do no injustice to M. De Gerando, by any mis- apprehension of his meaning on so nice a question, I have quot- f d the original in Note (N.) 172 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay I If. " in impressions made on our senses , or there are " ideas which have not their origin in such impres- " sions ; and which, of consequence, are placed in " the mind immediately, belonging to it as apart of " its nature or essence. " Thus, the opinions of philosophers, whether " ancient or modern, concerning the generation of " our ideas, arrange themselves in two opposite co- ft lumns ; the one comprehending the systems which " adopt for a principle, nihil est in intellectu quin " prius fuerit in sensu; the other, the systems " which admit the existence of innate ideas, or of " ideas inherent in the understanding." That M. De Gerando himself did not consider this classification as altogether unexceptionable, ap- pears from the paragraph immediately following ; in which he remarks, that, " among the philosophers " who have adopted these contradictory opinions, " there are several, apparently attached to the " same systems, who have not adopted them from " the same motives ; or who have not explained " them in the same manner ; or who have not dedu- " eed from them the same consequences." Nothing can be juster or better expressed than this obser- vation ; and I have only to regret, that it did not lead the very ingenious and candid writer to specify, in the outset of his work, the precise import of the various systems here alluded to. Had he done so, he could not have failed to have instantly perceived, that, while some of the opinions which he has clas- sed under one common denomination, agree with each other merely in language, and are completely Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 173 hostile in substance and spirit ; others which, agree- ably to his principle of distribution, must be con- sidered as disputing between them the exclusive possession of the philosophical field, differ, in fact, chiefly in phraseology ; while, on every point con- nected with the foundations of a sound and en- lightened logic, they are perfectly agreed. If, in endeavouring to supply this omission in my friend's treatise, I should be successful in establish- ing the justness of the criticism which I have hazard- ed on some of his historical statements, the conclusion resulting from my argument will, I am confident, be not less acceptable to him than to me, by shewing, not only how very nearly we are agreed on this fun- damental article of our favourite science, but that the case has been similar with many of our prede- cessors, who little suspected that the difference be- tween the tenets, for which they contended so zeal- ously, was little more than nominal. Without entering into a nice discrimination of systems, evidently the same in their nature and ten- dency, and distinguished only by some accessory pe- culiarities (such, for example, as the respective doc- trines of Descartes and Malebranche concerning in- nate ideas), it appears to me, that the most noted opinions of modern philosophers, with respect to the origin of our knowledge, may be referred to one or other of the following heads. 1. The opinion of those who hold the doctrine of innate ideas, in the sense in which it was under- stood by Descartes and Malebranche ; that is, as implying the existence in the mind, of objects of ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay ur. thought distinct from the mind itself; coeval with it as an essential part of its intellectual furniture ; and altogether independent of any information collected from without. Of this description (according to the Cartesians) are the ideas of God, of existence, of thought, and many others, which, though clearly apprehended by the understanding, bear no resem- blance to any sensation ; and which, of consequence, they concluded must have been implanted in the mind at the moment of its first formation; It is against the hypothesis of innate ideas, thus interpreted, and which, in the present times, scarce- ly seems to have ever merited a serious refutation, that Locke directs the greater part of his reason- ings in the beginning of his Essay. In England, for many years past, this doctrine has sunk into complete oblivion, excepting as a monu- ment of the follies of the learned ; but we have the authority of De Gerando to assure us, that it was taught in the schools of France till towards the very conclusion of the last century. * Perhaps this cir- cumstance may help to account for the disposition * " L'idee de Dieu, celle de I' existence, celle de Izpensee, disent- " ils, ne ressemblent & aucune sensation. Cependant elles sont " clairement dans 1'esprit : il faut done qu'elles viennent d'une " autre source que des sens, et par consequent, qu'elles soient " plactes immediatcment dans notre ame. Ces opinions ont etc, *' presque jusqii 1 li la Jin du dernier siccle, ensdgnees dans les ecoles " de France." De la Generation des Connoissances Humaines, p. &2, (A Berlin, 1802.) This fact affords an additional confirmation of a remark for* merly quoted from D'Alemberti See p. 168 of this volume. .0 Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 175 which so many French philosophers have shewn, in later times, to reject, indiscriminately, every prin- ciple which they conceived to have the most remote connection with that absurd hypothesis. 2. The opinion of Locke, in the sense in which it was understood, not only by himself, but by Berkeley and Hume, and, indeed (with a very few exceptions), by all the most eminent philosophers of England, from the publication of the Essay on the Human Understanding, till that of Reid's Inquiry into the Mind. This opinion leads (as has been already observed), by a short and demonstrative pro- cess of reasoning, to Berkeley's conclusion with re- spect to the ideal existence of the material world, and to the universal scepticism of Hume. 3. The opinion of Locke, as interpreted by Di- derot ; in which sense it leads obviously to an ex- travagance diametrically opposite to that of Berke- ley, the scheme of materialism. Nor does it lead merely to materialism, as that scheme has been ex r plained by some of its more cautious advocates. It involves, as a necessary consequence (according to the avowal of Diderot himself), the total rejec- tion, from the book of human knowledge, of every word which does not present a notion copied, like a picture or image, from some archetype among the objects of external perception. 4. The opinion, or rather the statement, of Locke, modified and limited by such a comment as I have attempted in the 4th section of the first chapter of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. The sub- stance of that comment, I must beg leave once more 176 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay nf. to remind my readers, amounts to the following ge- neral proposition : All our simple notions, or, in other words, all the primary elements of our knowledge, are either pre- sented to the mind immediately by the powers of consciousness and of perception, * or they are- gra- dually unfolded in the exercise of the various facul- ties which characterize the human understanding. According to this view of the subject, the sum total of our knowledge may undoubtedly be said to ori- ginate in sensation, inasmuch as it, is by impressions from without that consciousness is first awakened, and the different faculties of the understanding put in action ; but that this enunciation of the fact is, from its conciseness and vagueness, liable to the grossest misconstruction, appears sufficiently from the interpretation given to it by Locke's French commentators, and more particularly by Diderot, in the passage quoted from his works in a former part of this Essay. It must appear obvious to every person who has read, with due attention, M. De Gerando's memoir, that it is precisely in the qualified sense which I have attached to Locke's words, that he all along defends them so zealously ; and yet I am strongly inclined to consider Locke's words, when thus interpreted, as far more widely removed from the opinion of Diderot, than from the antiquated theory of innate ideas. Perhaps I might even venture to say, that were the ambiguous and obnoxious epithet innate * See Note (O.) Essay Ilf. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 177 laid aside, and all the absurdities discarded, which are connected, either with the Platonic, with the Scholastic, or with the Cartesian hypothesis, con- cerning the nature of ideas, this last theory would agree, in substance, with the conclusion which I have been attempting to establish by an induction of facts. For my own part, at least, I must acknow- ledge that, in the passages formerly quoted from Cudworth, Leibnitz, and Harris, * there are only a few peculiarities of hypothetical phraseology to which I am able to oppose any valid objection. The statements contained in them exhibit the whole truth, blended with a portion of fiction ; whereas, that to which they stand opposed not only falls short of the truth, but is contradicted by many of the most obvious and incontrovertible phenomena of the understanding. On this, as many other occasions, I have had much pleasure in recalling to recollection an obser- vation of Leibnitz. " Truth is more generally dif- " fused in the world than is commonly imagined ; " but it is too often disguised, and even corrupted, " by an alloy of error, which conceals it from notice, " or impairs its utility. By detecting it wherever it " is to be found, among the rubbish which our pre- " decessors have left behind them, we have not only " the advantage resulting from the enlargement of " our knowledge, but the satisfaction of substituting, " instead of a succession of apparently discordant See pp. 09, 100, 101. M 178 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON THE Essay III. " systems, a permanent and eternal philosophy {per- ** ennem quandam phtiosophiam}, varying widely " in its forms from age to age, yet never failing to " exhibit a portion of truth, as its immutable basis." The mistakes into which modern philosophers have fallen, on the important question now under our review, may, I think, be traced to a rash extension, or rather to a total misapplication, of Bacon's maxim, tliat all our knowledge is derived from experience. It is with this maxim that Locke prefaces his theory concerning sensation and reflection, and it is from that preface that M. De Gerando borrows the motto of his own speculations upon the origin of our ideas. " ^.et us suppose," says Locke, " the mind to be, "as we say, white paper, void of all characters, " without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? " Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy " and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, " with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it " all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To " this I answer, in a word, from experience. In " that all our knowledge is founded, and from that " it ultimately derives itself." * * It is a circumstance somewhat curious in Locke's Essay, that in no part of it are the works of Bacon quoted, or even his name mentioned. In taking notice of this, I do not mean to in- sinuate, that he has been indebted to Bacon for ideas which he was unwilling to acknowledge. On the contrary, I think that the value of his Essay would have been still greater than it is, if he had been better acquainted with Bacon's writings. The chief sources of Locke's philosophy, where he does not give scope to his own powerful and original genius, are to be found in Gassendi Hobbes. * Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 179 In what sense this celebrated maxim ought to be understood, I shall endeavour to shew more par- ticularly, if I should live to execute a plan which I have long meditated, of analyzing the logical pro- cesses by which we are conducted to the different classes of truths; and of tracing the different kinds of evidence to their respective sources in our intel- lectual frame. For my present purpose, it is suffi- cient to observe, in general, that however universal- ly the maxim may be supposed to apply to our know- ledge of facts, whether relating to external nature, or to our ovrn minds, we must, nevertheless, pre- suppose the existence of some intellectual capacities or powers in that being by whom this knowledge is to be acquired ; powers which are necessarily ac- companied, in their exercise, with various simple notions, and various ultimate laws of belief, for which experience is altogether incompetent to ac- count. How is it possible, for example, to explain, upon this principle alone, by any metaphysical re- finement, the operations of that reason which ob- serves these phenomena ; which records the past ; which looks forward to the future ; which argues synthetically from things known, to others which it has no opportunity of subjecting to the examina- tion of the senses ; and which has created a vast science of demonstrated truths, presupposing no knowledge whatever but of its own definitions and axioms? To say that, even in this science, the ideas of extension, oi'jigure, and of quantity, are originally acquired by our external senses, is a childish play upon words, quite foreign to the point 180 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE UPON TriE Essay III. at issue. Is there any one principle from which Euclid deduces a single consequence, the evidence of which rests upon experience, in the sense in which that word is employed in the inductive logic ? If there were, geometry would be no longer a demon- strative science. Nor is this all. The truths in mathematics (ad- mitting that of the hypotheses on which our reason- ings proceed) are eternal and necessary ; and conse- quently (as was early remarked, in opposition to Locke's doctrine), could never have been inferred from experience alone. " If Locke," says Leibnitz, " had sufficiently considered the difference between " truths which are -necessary or demonstrative, and " those which we infer from induction alone, he " would have perceived, that necessary truths could " only be proved from principles which command " our assent by their intuitive evidence ; inasmuch " as our senses can inform us only of what is, not " of what must necessarily be." * But, even with respect to facts, there are certain limitations with which this maxim must be received. Whence arises our belief of the continuance of the laws of nature? Whence our inferences from the past to the future ? Not surely from ex- perience alone. Although, therefore, it should * " Si I.ockius discrimen inter veritates necessarias seu de- " monstratione perceptas, et cas quae nobis sola inductione ut- " cunque innotescunt, satis corisiderasset, animadvertisbct, ne- " cessarias non posse comprobari, nisi ex principiis menti insitis ; " cum scnsus quidem doceant quid fiat, sed nou quid necessavio " fiat." Tom. V. p. 358. (.Edit. Dutens.) Essay III. SYSTEMS OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS. 181 be granted, as I readily do, that in reasoning concerning the future, we are entitled to assume no fact as a datum which is not verified by the ( experience of the past (which, by the way, is the sole amount of Bacon's aphorism), the question still remains, what is the origin of our confident belief, that past events may be safely assumed as signs of those which are yet to happen ? The case is precisely the same with the faith we repose in human testimony ; nor would it be at all altered, if, in the course of our past experience, that testimony had not once deceived us. Even, on that supposi- tion, the question would still recur, whence is it we conclude, that it will not deceive us in future ? or (what comes nearly to the same thing) that we give any credit to the narratives of men who existed two thousand years ago ? No proposition, surely, can be more evident than this, that experience, in the ac- ceptation in which Locke and his followers profess to understand it, can inform us of nothing but what has actually fallen under the retrospect of memory. Of the truth and importance of these consider- ations, no philosopher seems to have been fully aware, previous to Mr Hume. "As to past experience," he observes, " it can be allowed to give direct and " certain information of those precise objects only, " and that precise period of time, which fell under " its cognizance ; but why this experience should be " extended to future times, and to other objects, " this is the main question on which I would in- " sist. " * What is the proper answer to this ques- * See Hume's Essay, entitled Sceptical Doubts, c. 182 ON LOCKE'S INFLUENCE, &c. Essay III. tion is of no moment to our present argument. It is sufficient, if it be granted, that Experience alone does not afforjj an adequate explanation of the fact. In concluding this Essay, it may not be altogether useless to remark the opposite errors which the pro- fessed followers of Bacon have committed, in study- ing the phenomena of Matter, and those of Mind. In the former, where Bacon's maxim seems to hold without any limitation, they have frequently shewn a disposition to stop short in its application ; and to consider certain physical laws (such as the relation between the force of gravitation, and the distance of the gravitating bodies), as necessary truths, or truths which admitted of a proof, a priori ; while, on the other hand, in the science of Mind, where the same principle, when carried beyond certain limits, involves a manifest absurdity, they have attempted to extend it, without one single exception, to all the primary elements of our knowledge, and even to the generation of those reasoning faculties which form the characteristical attributes of our species. ESSAY FOURTH. Q5J THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AND DAKWIN. WHEX I hinted, in the preceding Essay, that the doctrines prevalent in this country, with respect to the origin of our knowledge, were, in general, more precise and just than those adopted by the disciples of Condillac, I was aware that some remarkable ex- ceptions might be alleged to the universality of my observation. Of those, indeed, who, in either part of the united kingdom, have confined their research- es to the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pro*- perly so called > I do not recollect any individual of much literary eminence, who has carried Locke's principle to such an extravagant length as Diderot and Helvetius ; but, from that class, of our authors, who have, of late years, been attempting to found a new school, by jumbling together scholastic meta- physics and hypothetical physiology, various instan- ces might be produced of theorists, whose avowed opinions on this elementary question, not only rival, but far surpass those of the French Materialists, in point of absurdity. Among the authors just alluded to, the most 184 ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF Essay IV. noted are Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin ; all of whom, notwithstanding the differences among them on particular points, agree nearly in their conclu- sions concerning the sources of our ideas. The first of these, after telling us, that " all our internal feel- " ings, excepting our sensations, maybe called ideas ; " that the ideas which resemble sensations may " be called ideas of sensation, and all the rest intel- " leclual ideas ;" adds, " that the ideas of sensa- " tion are the elements of which all the rest are com- " pounded." * In another passage he expresses his hopes, that, " by pursuing and perfecting the doc- " trine of association, he may, sometime or other, be " enabled to analyze all that vast variety of complex " ideas, which pass under the name of ideas of re- "Jlection and intellectual ideas 1 into their simple " compounding parts ; that is, into the simple ideas " of sensation of which they consist." t And in a subsequent part of his work, he points out, still more explicitly, the difference between his own doctrine and that of Locke, in the following words : " It " may not be amiss here to take notice how far the " theory of these papers has led me to differ, in re- " spect of logic, from Mr Locke's excellent Essay " on the Human Understanding, to which the world " is so much indebted for removing prejudices and " encumbrances, and advancing real and useful know- " ledge." " First, then, it appears to me, that all the most * Hartley or. Man, 4th edition, p. 2. of the Introduction, t Ibid. pp. 75, 76. a . Essay IV. HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AND DARWIN. 185 " complex ideas arise from Sensation ; and that re- "faction is not a distinct source, as Mr Locke " makes it." * The obvious meaning of these different passages is, that we have no direct knowledge of the opera- tions of our own minds ; nor indeed any knowledge whatsoever, which is not ultimately resolvable into sensible images. As to Dr Hartley's grand arcanum, the principle of Association, by which he conceives that ideas of sensation may be transmuted into ideas of reflection, I have nothing to add to what I have already re- marked, on the unexampled latitude with which the words association and idea are, both of them, em- ployed, through the whole of his theory. His ulti- mate aim, in this part of it, is precisely the same with that of the schoolmen, when they attempted to explain, by the hypothesis of certain internal senses, how the sensible species received from external ob- jects, are so refined and spiritualized, as to become, first, .objects of Memory and Imagination ; and, at last, objects of pure Intellection. Such reveries are certainly not entitled to a serious examination in the present age. t * Hartley on Man, p. 360. j- 1 do not recollect that any one has hitherto taken notice of the wonderful coincidence, in this instance, between Hartley's Theory, and that of Condillac, formerly mentioned, concerning the transformation of sensations into ideas, Condillac's earliest work (which was published in 1746, three years before Hartley's Observations on Man) is entitled, " Essai sur i'origine des Connois- " sances Humaines. Outrage ou Von reduit d un seul principc 186 ON THE METAPHYSICAL -THEORIES OF Essay IV", It must not, however, be concluded from these extracts, that Hartley was a decided materialist. On the contrary, after observing, that " his theory " must be allowed to overturn all the arguments " which are usually brought for the immateriality " of the soul from the subtilityof the internal senses, " and of the rational faculty," he acknowledges can- didly his own conviction, that " matter and motion, " however subtly divided or reasoned upon, yield " nothing but matter and motion still ;" and there- u tout ce qni concerns Ttnfendement fiumain." Tiiis scul principe is precisely the association of ideas. " J'ai, ce me semble," the author tells us in his introduction, " trouvc la solution d* Urns " ces problemes dans la liaison des idees, soit avec lessignes,soit " entr'elles." In establishing this theory, he avails himself of a licence in the use of the words idea and association (although, in my opinion, with far greater ingenuity), strictly analogous to what we meet with in the works of Hartley. Another coincidence, not less, extraordinary, may be remarked between Hartley's Theory of the Mechanism of the Mind, and the speculations on the same subject, of the justly celebrated Charles Bonnet of Geneva. In mentioning these historical facts, I have not the most dis- tant intention of insinuating any suspicion of plagiarism ; a sus- picion which I never can entertain with respect to any writer of original genius, and of fair character, but upon the most direct and conclusive evidence. The two very respectable foreigners, whose names have been already mentioned in this note, have fur- nished another example of coincidence, fully as carious as either of the preceding : I allude to the hypothesis of the animated sta- tue, which they both adopted about tlie same time, in tracing the origin and progress of our knowledge ; and which neither seems to have borrowed, in the slightest degree, from any pre- vious acquaintance with the speculations of the other. Essay IV. HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AND DARWIN. 187 fore requests, that " he may not be, in any way, in- " terpreted so as to oppose the immateriality of the *' soul." * I mention this in justice to Hartley, as most of his later followers have pretended, that, by rejecting the supposition of a principle distinct from body, they have simplified and perfected his theory. With respect to Hartley's great apostle, Dr Priestley, I am somewhat at a loss, whether to class him with Materialists, or with Immaterialists ; as I find him an advocate, at one period of his life, for what he was then pleased to call the immateriality of matter, and, at another, for the materiality of mind. Of the former of these doctrines, to which no words can do justice but those of the author, I shall quote his own statement from his " History of " Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Co- " lours," first published in 1772. " This scheme of the IMMATERIALITY OF MAT- " TER, AS IT MAY BE CALLED, or rather the mutual "penetration of matter, first occurred to my friend " Mr Mitchell, on reading " Baxter on the Imma- *' teriality of the SouL" He found that this au- " thor's idea of matter was, that it consisted, as it " were, of bricks, cemented together by an imma- " terial mortar. These bricks, if he would be con- " sistent to his own reasoning, were again composed " of less bricks, cemented likewise by an immaterial " mortar, and so on ad infinitum. This putting Mr " Mitchell upon the consideration of the several ap- " pearances of nature, he began to perceive, that * Hartley's Nervations, pp. 511 and ,512. 188 ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF Essay IV. "the bricks were so covered with this immaterial " mortar, that if they had any existence at all, it " could not possibly be perceived, every effect being " produced, at least in nine instances in tencertain- " ly, and probably in the tenth also, by this imma- " terial, spiritual, and penetrable mortar. Instead, " therefore, of placing the world upon the giant, " the giant upon the tortoise, and the tortoise upon " he could not tell what, he placed the world at once " upon itself; and finding it still necessary, in order " to solve the appearances of nature, to admit of ex- " tended and penetrable immaterial substance, if he " maintained the impenetrability of matter, and ob- " serving farther, that all we perceive by contact, " &c. is this penetrable immaterial substance, and " not the impenetrable one, he began to think he " might as well admit of penetrable material, as of " penetrable immaterial substance, especially as we " know nothing more of the nature of substance, " than that it is something which supports proper- " ties, which properties may be whatever we please, " provided they be not inconsistent with each other, " that is, do not imply the absence of each other. " This by no means seemed to be case, in suppos- " ing two substances to be in the same place at the " same time, without excluding each other ; the ob- " jection to which is only derived from the resist- " ance we meet with to the touch, and is a pre- " judice that has taken its rise from that circum- " stance, and is not unlike the prejudice against " the Antipodes, derived from the constant experi- Essay IV. HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AND DARWIN. 189 *' ence of bodies falling, as we account it, down- " wards." * In the Disquisitions on matter and spirit, by the same author (the second edition of which appeared in 1782), the above passage is quoted at length ; t but it is somewhat remarkable, that, as the aim of the latter work is to inculcate the materiality of Mind, Dr Priestley Has prudently suppressed the clause which I have distinguished in the first sen- tence of the foregoing extract, by printing it in ca- pitals. In one opinion, however, this ingenious writer seems to have uniformly persevered since he first republished Hartley's Theory, that " man does not " consist of two principles so essentially different " from one another as matter and spirit ; but that '* the whole man is of some uniform composition ; t " and that either the material or the immaterial " part of the universal system is superfluous." To this opinion (erroneous as I conceive it to be) I have no inclination to state any metaphysical ob- jections at present ; as it does not interfere, in the slightest degree, with what I consider as the appro- priate business of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. I object to it merely as it may have a ten- dency to mislead our logical conclusions, concern- ing the origin and certainty of human knowledge. * Pages 392, 393. t Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, 2c! edit. p. 26. I Preface to Disquisitions, p. 7- Ibid. p. 0'. 190 ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF Essay IV. .Highly important as the question concerning the nature of Mind may be supposed to be, when consi- dered in connection with its future prospects, it is evidently altogether foreign to the speculations in which we are now engaged. The only proposition I insist upon is, that our knowledge of its phenome- na, and of the laws which regulate them, is to be obtained, not by looking without, but by looking within. This rule of philosophising (the most es- sential of all in this branch of science) is, as I for- merly observed, not founded upon any particular theory, but is the obvious and irresistible suggestion of those powers of Consciousness and Reflection, which are the exclusive sources of our information with respect to that class of facts, which forms the appropriate object of our study. It has become customary, of late, for Materialists to object to those who profess to study the mind in the 'way of reflection, that they suffer themselves to be misled, by assuming rashly the existence of a principle in man, essentially distinct from anything which is perceived by our senses. The truth is, that while we adhere to the method of reflection, we never can be misled by any hypothesis. The moment we abandon it, what absurdities arc we apt to fall into ! Dr Priestley himself furnishes me with an instance in point ; after quoting which, I shall leave my readers to judge which of the two parties in this dispute is most justly chargeable with the error, of arguing rashly from a gratuitous as- sumption concerning the nature of Mind, to esta- Essay IV. HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AKD DARWIN, 191 blish a general conclusion with raspect to its princi- ples .and laws. " If man," says Priestley, " be wholly a material " being, and the power of thinking the result of a " certain organization of the brain, does it not fol- " low, that all his functions must be regulated by " the laws of mechanism, and that, of consequence, " all his actions proceed from an irresistible neces- " sity ?" In another passage he observes, that " the doc- " trine of necessity is the immediate result of the " doctrine of the materiality of man ; for meclianism *' Is the undoubted consequence vf materialism" * According to this argument, the scheme of ma- terialism leads, by one short and demonstrative step, to the denial of man's free agency ; that is, -a mere hypothesis (for what Materialist can pretend to of- fer a shadow of proof in its support ?) is employed to subvert the authority of Consciousness, the only tribunal competent to pass any judgment whatever on the question at issue. It is remarkable, that the argument here proposed by Dr Priestley, with so, much gravity, or, at least, one extremely similar to it, was long ago introduced ironically by Dr Berkeley, in . his ingenious dia- logues, entitled the Minute Philosopher. " Cor- " poreal objects strike on the organs of sense ; *' whence issues a vibration in the nerves, which, " being communicated to the soul, or animal spirit in " the brain, or root of the nerves, produceth there- * Disquisitions, &c. Introd. p. /) ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF Essay IV. " in that motion called volition : and this produceth " a new determination in the spirits, causing them * " to flow in such nerves, as must necessarily, by the " laws of mechanism, produce such certain actions. " This being the case, it follows, that those tilings " which vulgarly pass for human actions are to be " esteemed mechanical, and that they are falsely as- " cribed to a free principle. There is, therefore, " no foundation for praise or blame, fear or hope, " reward or punishment, nor consequently for reli- " gion, which is built upon, and supposeth those " things." It will not, I trust, be supposed by any of my readers, that I mean to ascribe to Dr Priestley any partiality for the dangerous conclusions which Berke- ley conceived to be deducible from the scheme of Necessity. How widely soever I may dissent*from most of his philosophical tenets, nobody can be dis- posed to judge more favourably than myself of the motives from which he wrote. In the present case, at the same time, truth forces me to add to what I have already said, that the alteration which he has made on Berkeley's statement is far from being an improvement, in point of sound logic ; for his pe- culiar notions about the nature of matter (from which he conceives himself to have * " wiped off " the reproach of being necessarily inert, and ab- " solutely incapable of intelligence, thought, or ac- " tion"J render the argument altogether nugatory, upon his own principles, even if it were admitted to * Disquisitions, &c. Vol. F. p. 14-1, 2<1 edit. Essay IV. HARTLEY, PRIESTLEY, AND DARWIN. 1Q3 hold good upon those which are generally received. It plainly proceeds on the supposition, that the common notions concerning matter are well-founded; and falls at once to the ground, if we suppose mat- ter to combine, with the qualities usually ascribed to itself, all those which consciousness teaches us to belong to mind. On the question concerning the origin of our knowledge, Priestley has nowhere explained his opi- nion fully, so far as I am able to recollect ; but from his reverence for Hartley, I take for granted, that, on this point, he did not dissent from the conclusions of his master. In one particular, I think it probable that he went a little farther ; the general train of his speculations concerning the human Mind lead- ing me to suspect, that he conceived our. ideas them- selves to be material substances. In this conjecture I am confirmed by the following remark, which he makes on a very puerile argument of Wollaston, " that the mind cannot be material, because it is " influenced by reasons :** In reply to which, Priestley observes, " that to say that reasons and " ideas are not things material, or the affections of " a material substance, is to take for granted the " very thing to be proved.** * But whatever were Priestley's notions upon this question, there can be no doubt of those entertained by his successor, Dr Darwin, who assumes, as an ap- pertained fact, that " ideas are material things," * Disquisitions, &c. Vol. I. pp. 1J4, 115. 194 ON THE METAPHYSICAL THEORIES OF Essay IV. and reasons about them as such through the whole of his book. * Jn this respect, our English physio- logists have far. exceeded Diderot himself, who ventured no farther than to affirm, that " every idea " must necessarily' resolve itself ultimately into a " sensible representation or picture.'* This lan- guage of Diderot (a relic of the old ideal system) they have not only rejected with contempt, bu^they have insisted, that when it was used by the Aristo- telians, by Descartes, and by Locke, it was meant by them to be understood only as a figure or meta- phor. They have accordingly substituted, instead of it, the supposition, that the immediate objects of thought are either particles of the medullary sub- stance of the brain, or vibrations of these particles, a supposition which, according to my apprehen- sion of it, is infinitely more repugnant to common sense, than the more enigmatical and oracular lan- guage transmitted to us from the dark ages j while, * In the very outset of his work he informs us, that " the word (t idea, which lias various meanings in metaphysical writers, " may be defined to be a contraction, or motion, or configura- *' tion of the fibres, which constitute the immediate organ of " sense ;" -(Zoonomia, Vol. I. p, 11, 3d edit.) and, in an adden* dum to the same volume, he compares " the universal prepos- *' session, that ideas are immaterial beings, to the stories of ghosts " and apparitions, which have so long amused the credulous, are nothing more than the grammatical elements of speech / - the logical doctrine about the comparison of ideas, bearing a much closer affinity to the task of a school -boy in parsing his lesson, jthaa to the researches.of philosophers, able to form a just conception of the mystery to be explained. These observations are general, and apply to every case in which language is employed. When the subject, however, to which it relates, involves notions which are abstract and complex, the process of interpretation becomes much more complidated Chap. I. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. and curious ; involving, at every step, that species of mental induction which I have already endeavour- ed to describe. In reading, accordingly, the most perspicuous discussions, in which such notions form the subject of the argument, little instruction is re- ceived, till we have made the reasonings our own, by revolving the steps again and again in our thoughts. The fact is, that, in cases of this sort, the function of language is not so much to convey know- ledge (according to the common phrase) from one mind to another, as to bring two minds into the same train of* thinking ; and to confine them, as nearly as possible, to the same track. Many authors have spoken of the wonderful mechanism of speech ; but none has hitherto attended to the far more wonderful mechanism which it puts into action be- hind the scene. The speculations of Mr Home Tooke (whatever the conclusions were to which he meant them to be subservient) afford, in every page, illustrations of these hints, by'shewing how imperfect and disjointed a thing speech must have been in its infant state, prior to the developement of those various com- ponent parts, which now appear to be essential to its existence. But on this particular view of the sub- ject I do not mean to enlarge at present. 212 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. CHAPTER SECOND. IF the different considerations, stated in the preced- ing chapter, be carefully combined together, it will: not appear surprising, that, in the judgment of ar great majority of individuals, the common analogical t phraseology concerning the mind should be mistaken for its genuine philosophical theory. It is only by the patient and persevering exercise of Reflection on the subjects of Consciousness, that this popular pre- judice can be gradually surmounted. In proportion as the thing typified grows familiar to the thoughts, the metaphor will lose its influence on the fancy ; and while the signs we employ continue to discover, by their etymology, their historical origin, they will be rendered, by long and accurate use, virtually equi- valent to literal and specific appellations. A thousand instances, perfectly analogous to this, might be easi- ly produced from the figurative words and phrases which occur every moment in ordinary conversation. They who are acquainted with Warburton's account of the natural progress of writing, from hierogly- phics to apparently arbitrary characters, cannot fail to be struck with the similarity between the history of this art, as traced by him, and the gradual pro- cess by which metaphorical terms come to be strip. Chap. II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. ped of that literal import, which, at first, pointed them out to the selection of our rude progenitors. Till this process be completed, with respect to the words denoting the powers and operations of the un- derstanding, it is vain to expect any success in our inductive researches concerning the principles of the human frame. In thus objecting to metaphorical expressions, as solid data for our conclusions in the science of Mind, I would not be understood to represent them as of no use to the speculative inquirer. To those who delight to trace the history of language, it may, un- doubtedly, form an interesting, and not unprofitable employment, to examine the circumstances by which they were originally suggested, and the causes which may have diversified them in the case of different nations. To the philologer it may also afford an amusing and harmless gratification (by tracing, to their unknown roots, in some obscure and remote dialects, those words which, in his mother tongue, generally pass for primitives), to shew, that even the terms which denote our most refined and abstracted thoughts, were borrowed originally from some ob- ject of external perception. This, indeed, is no- thing more than what the considerations, already stated, would have inclined us to expect a priori ; and which, how much soever it may astonish those who have been accustomed to confine their studies to grammar alone, must strike every philosopher, as the natural and necessary consequence of that pro- gressive order in which the mind becomes acquaint- ed with the different objects of its knowledge, and ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. of those general laws which govern human thought in the employment of arbitrary signs. While the philologer, however, is engaged in these captivating researches, it is highly necessary to remind him, from time to time, that his discoveries belong to the same branch of literature with that which furnishes a large proportion of the materials in our common lexicons and etymological dictionaries ; that after he has told us (for example) that imagination is bor- rowed from an optical image, and acuteness from a Latin word, denoting the sharpness of a material in- strument, we are no more advanced in studying the theory of the human intellect, than we should be in our speculations concerning the functions ef money, or the political effects of the national debt, by learn- ing, from Latin etymologists, that the word pecunia and the phrase ces alienum had both a reference, in their first origin, to certain circumstances in the ear- ly state of Roman manners. * From these slight hints, considered in their con- nection with the subject which introduced them, some of my readers must have anticipated the use of them I intend to make, in prosecuting the argument concerning the Origin of Human Knowledge. To those, however, who have not read Mr Tooke's work, or who, in reading it, have not been aware of the very subtile and refined train of thinking which latently connects his seemingly desultory etymolo- gies, it may be useful for me to select one or two ex- amples, where Mr Tooke himself has been at pains * See Note (P.) Chap. II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. to illustrate the practical application, of which he conceived his discoveries to be susceptible, to philo- sophical discussions. This is the more necessary, that, in general, he seems purposely to have confin- ed himself to the statement of premises, without pointing out (except by implication or innuendo) the purposes to which he means them to be applied ; a mode of writing, I must beg leave to observe, which, by throwing an air of mystery over his real design, and by amusing the imagination with the prospect of some wonderful secret afterwards to be revealed, has given to his truly learned and original disquisitions, a degree of celebrity among the smat- terers of science, which they would never have ac- quired, if stated concisely and systematically in a di- dactic form. " RIGHT is no other than RECT-WTW (regitum)^ * l the past participle of the Latin verb regere. In " the same manner, our English verb JUST is the " past participle of the \erbjubere. " Thus, when a man demands his RIGHT he asks " only that which it is ordered he shall have. " A RIGHT conduct is, that which is ordered. " A RIGHT reckoning is, that which is ordered. " A RIGHT line is, that which is ordered or di- " rected (not a random extension, but) the short- " est distance between two points. " The RIGHT road is, that ordered or directed to " be pursued (for the object you have in view.) " To do RIGHT is, to do that which is ordered te *'* be done* * * The application of the same word to denote a straight line, 216 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. " To be in the RIGHT is, to be in such situations " or circumstances as are ordered. " To have RIGHT or LAW on one's side is, to have " in one's favour that which is ordered or laid down. " A RIGHT and JUST action is, such a one as is " ordered and commanded. " A JUST man is, such as he is commanded to be " qui leges juraque servat who observes and obeys the things laid down and commanded." " It appears to me highly improper to say, " that God has a RIGHT, as it is also to say, that God " is JUST. For nothing is ordered, directed, or " commanded, concerning God. The expressions " are inapplicable to the Deity ; though they are " common, and those who use them have the best " intentions. They are applicable only to men j to and moral rectitude of conduct, has obtained in every language I know ; and might, I think, be satisfactorily explained, without founding the theory of morality upon a philological nostrum con- cerning past participles. The following passage from the Ayeen Akberry (which must recal to every memory the line of Horace, Scilicet ut possem curvo dignoscere rcctumj deserves to be quoted as an additional proof of the universality of the association which has suggested this metaphor. " In the beginning of the reign, Mollana Muksood, ,seal-en- " graver, cut on steel, in the Roka character, the name of his " majesty, with those of his predecessors, up to Timur ; and af- " ter that, he cut another in the Nustaleek character, with his *' majesty's name alone. For everything relative to petitions, " another seal was made, of a semicircular form. On one side " was, " Rectitude is the means of pleasing God : " I never saw any one lost in a straight road." Ayeen Akberry, Vol. I. p. 67. Chap, II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 217 41 whom alone language belongs, and of whose sen- 41 sations only words are the representatives to men, " who are, by nature, the subjects of orders and com- ** mands, and whose chief merit is obedience." In reply to the objection, that, according to this doctrine, everything that is ordered and command- ed is RIGHT a.nd JUST, Mr Tooke not only admits the consequence, but considers it as an identical pro- position. " It is only affirming," he observes, " that what " is ordered and commanded is ordered and com- " manded" * With regard to WRONG, he observes afterwards, that " it is the past participle of the verb to wring, " wringan, torquere. The word answering to it in " Italian is tor to, the past participle of the verb tor- " quere ; whence the French also have tor t. It " means merely wrung, or wrested from the RIGHT, *' or ordered, line of conduct." Through the whole of this passage, Mr Tooke evidently assumes, as a principle, that, in order to as- certain, with precision, the philosophical import of any word, it is necessary to trace its progress his- torically through all the successive meanings which it has been employed to convey, from the moment that it was first introduced into our language ; or, if the word be of foreign growth, that we should pro- * It must not, however, be concluded from this language, that Mr Tooke has any leaning to Hobbism. On the contrary, in the sequel of the discussion, he lays great stress on the distinc- tion between what is ordered by human authority, and what the laws of our nature teach us to consider as ordered by God. 18 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. secute the etymological research, till we ascertain the literal and primitive sense of the root from whence it sprung. It is in this literal and primitive sense alone, that, according to him, a philosopher is en- titled to employ it, even in the present advanced state of science ; and whenever he annexes to it a meaning at all different, he imposes equally on him- self and on others. * To me, on the contrary, it appears, that to appeal to etymology in a philosophi- cal argument (excepting, perhaps, in those cases where the word itself is of philosophical origin), is al- together nugatory j and can serve, at the best, to throw an amusing light on the laws which regulate the operations of human fancy. In the present in- stance, Mr Tooke has availed himself of a philo- iogical hypothesis (the evidence of which is far from being incontrovertible) to decide, in a few sentences, and, in my opinion, to decide very erroneously, one of the most important questions connected with the theory of morals. I shall only mention another example, in which Mr Tooke has followed out, with still greater intre- * " As far as we know not our own meaning ;" as far " as our " purposes are not endowed with words to make them known ;' f so far, " we gabble like things most brutish." " But the im- " portance rises higher, when we reflect upon the application of ' words to metaphysics. And when I say metaphysics, you will " be pleased to remember, that all general reasoning, all politics, " law, morality, and divinity, are merely metaphysic" For what reason, I must beg leave to ask, has Mr Tooke omit- ted mathematics in this enumeration of the different branches of metaphysical science ? Upon his own principle, it is fully as well entitled to a place as any of the others. Diversions of Purity, jPart ii. p. 121. Chap. II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 219 pidity, his general principle to its most paradoxical and alarming consequences. " TRUE, as we now write it ; or TREW, as it was *' formerly written ; means simply and merely,- " that which is TROWED. And instead of being a " rare commodity upon earth, except only in words, '* there is nothing but TRUTH in the world. " That every man, in his communication with *' others, should speak that which he TROWETH, is " of so great importance to mankind, that it ought " not to surprise us, if we find the most extravagant " praises bestowed upon TRUTH. But TRUTH sup- " poses mankind ; for wham, and by whom, alone " the word is formed, and to whom only it is appli- " cable. If no man, no TRUTH. There is, there- " fore, no such thing as eternal, immutable, ever- " lasting TRUTH j unless mankind, sitch as they are " at present, be also eternal, immutable, and ever- " lasting." * But what connection, it may be asked, have these quotations with the question about the Origin of Human Knowledge ? The answer will appear ob- vious to those who have looked into the theories * MrTooke observes immediately afterwards, that" the Latin " vents also means TROWED, and nothing else." In proof of which he reasons thus : " Res, a thing, gives REOR, i. e. 1 am " thing-ed ; Vereor, I am strongly thing-ed ; for ve, in Latin com. " position, means valde, i. e. valide. And vents, i. e. strongly im- " pressed upon the mind, is the contracted participle of vereor." It was not without some cause that Mr Tooke's fellow dia- logist (whom he distinguishes by the letter F.) ventured to ex- claim, on this occasion : " / am (kinged ! Who ever used such (i language before f" ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. .which have been built on the general principle just referred to ; a principle which it seems to have .been the main object of Mr Tooke's book to con- firm, by an induction of particulars j * and which, * I think it proper to quote here a few sentences from Mr Tooke, in confirmation of this remark. " Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a " mistake) which Mr Locke made, when he called his book an " Essay on Human Understanding ; for some part of the inesti- " mable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, " reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have " done, had he called it (what it is merely) a grammatical essay, " or a treatise on words, or on language." " It may appear presumptuous, but it is necessary here " to declare my opinion, that Mr Locke, in his 'Essay, never did " advance one step beyond the origin of ideas, and the compo- " sition of terms." In reply to this and some other observations of the same sort, Mr Tooke's partner in the dialogue is made to express himself thus : " Perhaps you may imagine, that if Mr Locke had been aware '* that he was only writing concerning language, he might have *' avoided treating of the origin of ideas ; and to have escaped " the quantity of abuse which has been unjustly poured upon " him for his opinion on that subject." Mr Tooke answers : " No. I think he would have set out " just as he did, with the origin of ideas ; the proper starting- " post of a grammarian who is to treat of their signs. Nor is ' he singular in referring them all to the tenses ; and in begin- " ning an account of language in that manner." To this last sentence, the following note is subjoined, which may serve to shew in what sense Mr Tooke understands Locke's doctrine ; and that, in expounding it, so far from availing him- self of the light struck out by Locke's successors, he has pre- ferred the dark comments of an earlier age. " Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, is, as well as its, " converse, an ancient and well known position. Chap. II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. if it were admitted as sound, would completely un- dermine the "foundations both of logic and of ethics. In truth, it is from this general principle, combined with a fact universally acknowledged among philo- sophers (the impossibility of speaking about mind or its phenomena, without employing a metaphorical phraseology), that so many of our late philologists and grammarians, dazzled, as it should seem, with the novelty of these discoveries, have shewn a dispo- sition to conclude (as Diderot and Helvetius for- merly did from other premises), that the only real knowledge we possess relates to the objects of our external senses ; and that we can annex no idea to the word mind itself, but that of matter in the most subtile and attenuated fonn which imagination can lend it. Nor are these the only, or the most dan- gerous consequences, involved in Locke's maxim, when thus understood. I point them out at present, in preference to others, as being more nearly re- lated to the subject of this Essay. Mr Tooke has given some countenanee to these inferences, by the connection in which he intro- duces the following etymologies from Vossius. " Animus^ Anima, Uviv^a. and "^fv^-n are parti- " ciples." Anima est ab Animus. Animus vero " est a Graco Afgjw.cs, quod dici volunt quasi " Sicut in sfeculo ea quas vidcntur non sunt, scd eorum " species : ita quae intelligimus, ea sunt re ip&d extra nos, " eorumque species in nobis. EST ENIM QUASI RERUM SPE- " CULUM INTELLECTUS FOSTER; CUI, NISI PER SENSUM UE- " PRESEMTENTUR RES, KIHIL SCIT IPSE." - (J. C. Scaliger, chap. 66.) Diversions of Parley, Vol. I. pp. 42, 43, 46, 47. ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. " ab Aft> sive Ae^u, quod est riven ; et Latinis a Spi- rando, Spiritits. Immo et ^u^ est a u%a) quod " Hesychius exponit Flrgw." I have already, on various occasions, observed, that the question concerning the nature of mind is altogether foreign to the opinion we form concern- ing the theory of its operations ; and that, granting it to be of a material origin, it is not the less evi- dent, that all our knowledge of it is to be obtained by the exercise of the powers of Consciousness and of Reflection. As this distinction, however, has been altogether overlooked by these profound ety- mologists, I shall take occasion, from the last quota- tion, to propose, as a problem not unworthy of their attention, an examination of the circumstances which have led men, in all ages, to apply, to the sentient and thinking principle within us, some appellation synonymous with spiritus or jrveufjitt ; and, in other cases, to liken it to a spark ofjire, or some other of the most impalpable and mysterious modifications of matter. Cicero hesitates between these two forms of expression ; evidently, however, considering it as a matter of little consequence which should be adopt- ed, as both appeared to him to be equally uncon- nected with our conclusions concerning the thing they are employed to typify : " Anima sit animus, " ignisve nescio : nee me pudet, fateri nescire quod 1 * nesciam. Illud si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare " possem, sive anima sive ignis sit animus, eum ju- " rarem esse divinum." This figurative language, with respect to Mind, has been considered by some of our later metaphysicians as a convincing proof, Chap. II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 223 that the doctrine of its materiality is agreeable to general belief; and that the opposite hypothesis has originated in the blunder of confounding what is very minute with what is immaterial. To me, I must confess, it appears to lead to a con- clusion directly opposite. For, whence this disposi- tion to attenuate and subtilize, to the veiy verge of existence, the atoms or elements supposed to pro- duce the phenomena of thought and volition, but from the repugnance of the scheme of Materialism to our natural apprehensions ; and from a secret anxiety to guard against a literal interpretation of our metaphorical phraseology ? Nor has this dispo- sition been confined to the vulgar. Philosophical materialists themselves have only refined farther on the popular conceptions, by entrenching themselves against the objections of their adversaries in the mo- dern discoveries concerning light and electricity^ and other inscrutable causes, manifested by their ef- fects alone. In some instances, they have had re- course to the supposition of the possible existence of Matter, under forms incomparably more subtile than what it probably assumes in these, or in any other class of physical phenomena ; a hypothesis which it is impossible to describe better than in the words of La Fontaine : " Quintessence d'at&me, extrait dc la lumiere." It is evident that, in using this language, they haw only attempted to elude the objections of their ad- versaries, by keeping the absurdity of their theory a little more out of the view of superficial inquirers j divesting Matter completely of all those properties ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V, by which it is known to our senses ; and substituting, instead of what is commonly meant by that word, infinitesimal or evanescent entities, in the pursuit of which imagination herself is quickly lost. The prosecution of this remark would, if I be not mistaken, open a view of the subject widely different from that which modern materialists have taken. But as it would lead me too far aside from my pre- sent design, I shall content myself with observing here, that the reasonings which have been lately brought forward in their support, by their new phi- lological allies, have proceeded upon two errors, ex- tremely common even among our best philosophers : first, the error of confounding the historical pro- gress of an art with its theoretical principles when advanced to maturity ; and, secondly, that of consi- dering language as a much more exact and complete picture of thought, than it is in any state of society, whether barbarous or refined. With both of these errors, Mr Tooke appears to me to be chargeable in an eminent degree. Of the latter, I have already produced various instances ; and of the former, his whole work is one continued illustration. After stating, for example, the beautiful result of his re- searches concerning conjunctions, the leading infer- ence which he deduces from it is, that the common arrangement of the parts of speech, in the writings of grammarians, being inaccurate and unphilosophi- eal, must contribute greatly to retard the progress of students in the acquisition of particular languages : whereas nothing can be more indisputable than this, that his speculations do not relate, in the least, to the analysis of a language, after it has assumed a re- Chap, II. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. gular and systematical form ; but to the gradual steps by which it proceeded to that state, from the inarti- ficial jargon of savages. They are speculations, not of a metaphysical, but of a purely philological na- ture ; belonging to that particular species of disqui- sition which I have elsewhere called theoretical his- tory. * To prove that conjunctions are a derivative part of speech, and that, at first, their place was sup- plied by words which are confessedly pronouns or articles, does not prove that they ought not to be considered as a separate part of speech at present, any more than Mr Smith's theory with respect to the gradual transformation of proper names into ap- pellatives, proves that proper names and appellatives are now radically and essentially the same ; or than the employment of substantives to supply the place of adjectives (which JNr Tooke tells us is one of the signs of an imperfect language), proves that no gram- matical distinction exists between these two parts of speech, in such tongues as the Greek, the Latin, or the English, Mr Tooke, indeed, has not hesitated to draw this last inference also ; but, in my own opi- nion, with nearly as great precipitation as if he had concluded, because savages supply the want of forks by their fingers, that therefore a finger and a fork are the same thing. The application of these considerations to our me- taphorical phraseology relative to the Mind, will ap- pear more clearly from the following chapter. * See the Account of the Life and Writings of Mr Smith, pre- fixed to his Posthumous Essays. P 226 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. CHAPTER THIRD. J ME incidental observations which I have made in dif- ferent parts of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, on the circumstances which contribute to deprive that branch of science of an appropriate and specific phraseology, together with those on the same sub- ject in the former chapter of this Essay, preclude the necessity of a formal reply to the philological comments of Mr Tooke on the origin of our ideas. If anything farther be wanting for a complete re- futation of the conclusion which he supposes them to establish, an objection to it, little short of demon- strative, may be derived from the variety of meta- phors which may be all employed, with equal pro- priety, wherever the phenomena of Mind are con- cerned. As this observation (obvious as it may seem) has been hitherto very little, if at all attended to, in ' its connection with our present argument, I shall en- deavour to place it in as strong a light as I can. A very apposite example, for my purpose, presents itself immediately, in our common language with re- spect to memory, in speaking of that faculty, everybody must have remarked, how numerous and how incongruous are the similitudes involved in our expressions. At one time, we liken it to a recep- Chap. III. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. tacle, in which the images of things are treasured up in a certain order ; at another time, ,w,e fancy it to resemble a tablet, on wl^ich these images are stamped, more or less Deeply,; on other occasions, again, w ( e$eem to consider it as something analogous to -the canvas of a painter. Instances of all these modes of speaking may be collected from no less a writer .thaju Mr Locke. " Methiuks," sbe of fo- reign growth, and transmitted to us from some dia- lect of our continental ancestors, that we should prosecute the etymological research, till we ascertain the literal and primitive sense of the root from 210 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. whence it sprung. * Nor is this idea peculiar to Mr Tooke. It forms, in a great measure, the ground-work of a learned and ingenious book on French Synonymes, by M. Roubaud ; and, if we may judge from the silence of later writers^ it seems to be now generally acquiesced in, as the soundest criterion we can appeal to, in settling the very nice disputes to which this class of words have frequently given occasion. For my own part, I am strongly inclined to think, that the instances are few indeed (if there are, in truth, any instances), in which etymology furnishes effectual aids to guide us, either in writing with propriety the dialect of our own times ; or in fixing the exact signification of ambiguous terms j or in drawing the line between expressions which seem to be nearly equivalent. In all such cases, nothing can, in my opinion, be safely trusted to, but that habit of accurate and vigilant induction, which, by the study of the most approved models of writing and of thinking, elicits gradually and insensibly the precise notions which our best authors have annex- ed to their phraseology. It is on this principle that Girard and Beauzee have proceeded in all their cri- tical decisions ; and, although it cannot be denied, * In one passage, he seems to pay some deference to usage : " Quern penes arbitrium esl ot jus et norma loquendi." But the whole spirit of bis book proceeds on the opposite prin- ciple ; and even in the page to which I allude, he tells us, that " capricious and mutable fashion has nothing to do in our in- " quiries into the nature of language, and the meaning of " words." Vol. II. p. 95. Chap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. that there is often a great deal of false refinement in both, they must be allowed the merit of pointing out to their successors the only road that could con- duct them to the truth. In D'Alembert's short but masterly sketch on Synonymes, he has follow- ed precisely the same track. * How very little advantage is to be gained from etymology, in compositions where Taste is concern- ed, may be inferred from this obvious consideration, That, among words deriving their origin from the same source, we find some ennobkd by the usage of one country ; while others very nearly allied to them, nay, perhaps identical in sound and in ortho- graphy, are debased by the practice of another. It is owing to this circumstance, that Englishmen, and still more Scotchmen, when they begin the study of German, are so apt to complain of the deep root- ed associations which must be conquered, before they are able to relish the more refined beauties of style in that parent language on which their own has been grafted. On the other hand, when a word, originally low or ludicrous, has, in consequence of long use, been once ennobled or consecrated, I do not well see what advantage, in point of taste, is to be expected from a scrupulous examination of its geneal r y or of its kindred connexions. Mr Tooke has shewn, in a very satisfactory manner, that some English words which are now banished, not only from so- * See Note at the end (R.) Q ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. lemn discourse, but from decent conversation, are very nearly allied, in their origin, to others which rank with the most unexceptionable in our language ; and he seems disposed to ascribe our prejudice against the former to a false delicacy. * I should be glad to know what practical inference Mr Tooke would wish us to draw from these discoveries. Is it that the latter should be degraded, on account of the infamy of their connexions ; or, that every word which can claim a common descent with them from a respectable stem is entitled to admission into the same society ? May there not be some risk that, by such etymo- logical studies, when pushed to an excess, and mag- nified in the imagination to an undue importance, the Taste may lose more in the nicety of its dis- crimination, than the Understanding gains in point of useful knowledge ? One thing I can state as a fact, confirmed by my own observation, so far as it has reached ; that I have hardly met with an indi- vidual, habitually addicted to them, who wrote his own language with ease and elegance. Mr Tooke himself is, indeed, one remarkable exception to the general rule ; but even with respect to him, I am inclined to doubt if the style of his composition be improved, since he appeared with such distinction as the antagonist of Jimius. Nor will this effect of these pursuits appear sur- prising, when it is considered that their tendency is to substitute the doubtful niceties of the philologer and the antiquarian, as rules of decision in cases * Vol. II. pp. 67 and 134. Chap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 243 where there is no legitimate appeal but to custom and to the ear. Even among those who do not cany their*researches deeper than the superficial aspect of our vernacular speech, we know what a deceitful guide etymology frequently is, in questions about the propriety or impropriety of expression. How much more so, when such questions are judged of on principles borrowed from languages which are seldom studied by any who have made the cultivation of Taste a serious object ! * As an illustration of this, I shall only take notice of the absurdities into which we should inevitably fall, if we were to employ the conclusions of the etymologist as a criterion for judging of the pro- priety of the metaphors involved in our common forms of speech. In some cases, where such meta- phors, from their obvious incongruity, form real and indisputable blemishes in our language, necessity forces us to employ them, from the want of more unexceptionable substitutes ; and, where this ne- cessity exists, it would be mere pedantry to oppose to established use the general canons of criticism. My own opinion is, that this pedantry has, for many * " II est si rare que 1'etymologie d'un mot coincide avec sa " veritable acception, qu'on ne peut justifter ces sortes de re- " cherches par le pretexte de mieux fixer par-la le sens des mots. " Les ecrivains, qui savent le plus de langues, sont ceu\ qui com- " mettent le plus'd'improprietes. Trop occupes de 1'ancienne " energie d'un terme, ils oublient sa valeur actuelle, et negligent " les nuances, qui font la grace et la force du discours." See the notes annexed to the ingenious memoir read before the Academy of Berlin, by M. de Rivarol, entitled, De I'Universa- liti de la JLangue Erancoise, 244 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V- years past, been carried farther than the genius of the English tongue will justify, and has had a sen- sible influence in abridging the variety of its native stores of expression ; but it is only of late that, in separating the primitive from the metaphorical mean- ings of words, it has become customary for critics to carry their refinements farther than the mere English scholar is able to accompany them ; or to appeal from the authority of Addison and Swift to the woods of Germany. * * The argument against the critical utility of these etymologi- cal researches might be carried much farther, by illustrating their tendency, with respect to our poetical vocabulary. The power of this (which depends wholly on association) is often in- creased by the mystery which hangs over the origin of its conse- crated terms ; as the nobility of a family gains an accession of lustre, when its history is lost in the obscurity of the fabulous A single instance will at once explain and confirm the fore- going remark Few words* perhaps, in our language, have been used more happily by some of our older poets than Harbinger ; more particularly by Milton, whose Paradise Lost has rendered even the organical sound pleasing to the fancy. " And now of love they treat, till th' evening star, " Love's Harbinger, appear'd." How powerful are the associations which such a combination of ideas must establish in the memory of every reader capable of feeling their beauty ; and what a charm is communicated to the word, thus blended in its effect with such pictures as those of the evening star, and of the loves of our first parents ! When I look into Johnson for the etymology of Harbinger, I find he derives it from the Dutch Herberger, which denotes one who goes to provide lodgings or a harbour for thbse that follow. Whoever may thank the author for this conjecture, it certainly will not be the lover of Milton's poetry. The injury, however, which is here done to the word in question, is slight in compari- Chap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 24-5 The following principle may, I think, be safely adopted as a practical rule ; that as mixed metaphors displease solely by the incongruous pictures they pre- sent to the imagination, they are exceptionable in those cases alone where the words which we combine appear obviously, and without a moment's reflection, to have a metaphorical signification ; and, conse- quently, that when, from long use, they cease to be figurative, and become virtually literal expressions, no argument against their propriety can have any weight, so far as it rests on metaphysical or philo- logical considerations concerning their primitive roots. In such cases, the ear of a person familiar- ized to the style of our standard authors, ought to silence every speculative argument, how plausible so- ever it may appear to the theorist, in point of etymo- logical verisimilitude. In confirmation of this principle, it may be observ- ed, that, among our metaphorical expressions, there are some where the literal sense continues to maintain its ascendant over the metaphorical ; there are others where the metaphorical has so far supplanted the literal, as to present itself as the more obvious inter- pretation of the two. The words acuteness, deliberation, and sagacity, are examples of the latter sort ; suggesting im- mediately the ideas which they figuratively ex- press ; and not even admitting of a literal interpre- tation, without some violence to ordinary phraseolo- son of what it would have been, if its origin had been traced to some root in our own language equally ignoble, and resembling it as nearly in point of orthography. 24-6 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. gy. In all such instances, the figurative origin of the word appears to me to be entitled to no attention in the practice of composition. It is otherwise, however, where the literal mean- ing continues to prevail over the metaphorical ; and where the first aspect of a phrase may, of course, present an unpleasing combination of things ma- terial with things intellectual or moral. The verb to handle, as employed in the expressions to han- dle a philosophical question to handle a point of controversy seems to me to be in this predicament. It is much used by the old English divines ; more particularly by those who have been distinguished by the name of Puritans ; and it is a favourite mode of speaking, not only with Lord Kames in his Elements of Criticism, but .with a still higher au- thority, in point of style, Mr Burke, in his book on the Sublime and Beautiful. It is, perhaps, owing to some caprice of my own taste, but I must acknowledge, that I had always a dislike to the word when thus applied ; more espe- cially when the subject in question is of such a nature as to require a certain lightness and delicacy of style. For many years past, it has been falling gradually into disuse ; its place being commonly supplied by the verb to treat ; a verb which, when traced to its root (tractare) in the Latin language, is precisely of the same import ; but which, in conse- quence of its less obvious extraction, does not ob- trude its literal meaning on the imagination, in a manner at all offensive. In most cases of the same 11 Ghap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. 24-7 sort, it will be found convenient to avail ourselves of a similar artifice. " It might be expected," says Burke, " from " the fertility of the subject, that I should consider " Poetry, as it regards the Sublime and Beautiful, " more at large ; but it must be observed, that in " this light it has been often and well handled al- " ready." In the following sentence, the use of the same word strikes me as still more exceptionable : " This seems to me so evident, that I am a good ' deal surprised that none who have handled the " subject have made any mention of the quality of " smoothness, in the enumeration of those that go to " the forming of beauty." Upon the very same principle, I am inclined to object to the phrase go to, as here employed. I- know that the authority of Swift and of Addison may be pleaded in its favour ; but their example has not been followed by the best of our later writers; and the literal meaning of the verb GO, when con- nected with the preposition TO, has'now so decided an ascendant over the metaphorical, as to render it at present an awkward mode of expression, whatever the case may have been in the days of our ancestors. In forming a judgment on questions of this kind, it must not be overlooked, whether the expression is used as a rhetorical ornament addressed to the fancy, or as a sign of thought destined for the com- munication of knowledge. On the former suppo- sition, it is possible that the same phrase may offend j which, on the latter, would not only be unexception- 248 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. able, but the most simple and natural turn of ex- pression which the language supplies. I have elsewhere contrasted some of the opposite perfections of the philosophical, and of the rhetorical or poetical style. The former, I have observed, ac- complishes its purposes most effectually, when, like the language of algebra, it confines our reasoning faculties to their appropriate province, and guards the thoughts against any distraction from the oc- casional wanderings of fancy. How different from this is the aim of poetry ! Sometimes to subdue reason itself by her syren song ; and, in all her higher efforts, to revert to the first impressions and to the first language of nature ; clothing every idea .with a sensible image, and keeping the fancy for ever on the wing. Nor is it sufficient, for this end, to speak by means of metaphors or symbols. It is necessary to employ such as retain enough of the gloss of novelty to stimulate the powers of concep- tion and imagination ; and, in the selection of words, to keep steadily in view the habitual associations of those upon whom they are destined to operate. Hence, to all who cultivate this delightful art, and still more to all who speculate concerning its theory, the importance of those studies which relate to the associating principle, arid to the History of the Hu- man Mind, as exemplified in the figurative me- chanism of language. Of this remark I intend to offer various illustrations in the Essays which are to follow : but, before entering upon any pew topics, it yet remains for me to add a few hints, which have a more particular reference to style in those instances 12 Chap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS* 249 where the object of the writer is merely to attain the merits of perspicuity and simplicity. In cases of this last description, the considerations which have been already stated lead me to conclude, that the general rules which reprobate mixed meta- phors ought to be interpreted with a greater degree of latitude than critics are accustomed to allow. I have heard, for example, the phrase fertile source censured more than once as a trespass against these rules. I think I may venture to appeal to a great majority of my readers, whether this impropriety ever occurred to them, when they have met with the phrase, as they often must have done, in the best English authors ; nay, whether this phrase does not strike their ear as a more natural and obvious com- bination than copious source, which some would substitute instead of it. Why, then, should we re- ject a convenient expression, which custom has al- ready sanctioned ; and, by tying ourselves down, in this instance, to the exclusive employment of the ad- jective copious, impoverish the scanty resources which the English idiom affords for diversifying our phraseology?* On the same principle, I would f If there be any one English word, which is now become vir- tually literal, in its metaphorical applications, it is the word source. Who ever thinks of a spring or fountain of water, in speak- ing of God as the source of existence ; of the sun as the source of light and heat ; of land as one of the sources of national wealth ; or of sensation and reflection, as the only sources (according to Locke) of human knowledge; propositions which it would not be easy to enunciate with equal clearness, and conciseness in any other manner ? The same observation may be extended to the adjective fertile ; which we apply indiscriminately to a produc- 250 ON THE TENDENCY OF SOME LATE Essay V. vindicate such phrases as the following ; to dwell, or to enlarge, on a particular point ; or on a par- ticular head of a discotirse ; or on a particular branch of an argument. Nor do I see any criticism to which they are liable, which would not justify the vulgar cavil against golden candlestick, and glass inJchorn ; expressions which it is impossible to dis- pense with, but by means of absurd circumlocutions. In these last cases, indeed, the etymology of the words leads the attention back to the history of the arts, rather than to that of the metaphorical uses of speech ; but in both instances the same remark holds, that when a writer, or a speaker, wishes to express himself plainly and perspicuously, it is childish in him to reject phrases which custom has consecrated, on account of the inconsistencies which a philological analysis may point out between their primitive im- port and their popular acceptations. In the practical application, I acknowledge, of this general conclusion, it requires a nice tact, aided by a familiar acquaintance with the best models, to be able to decide, when a metaphorical word comes to tive field \ ; to an inventive genius ; and even to he mines which supply us with the precious metals. I cannot, therefore, see the shadow of a reason why these two words should not he joined to- gether in the most correct composition. A similar combination lias obtained in the French language, in which the phrase source feconde has been long sanctioned by the highest authorities. It is necessary for me to observe here, that I introduce this, and other examples of the same kind, merely as illustrations of my meaning ; and that it is of no consequence to the argument, \vhethcr my decisions, in particular cases, be right or wrong. Chap. IV. PHILOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS. have the effect of a literal and specific term ; or (what amounts to the same thing) when it ceases to present its primitive along with its figurative mean- ing : And whenever the point is at all doubtful, it is unquestionably safer to pay too much, than too little respect, to the common canons of verbal criti- cism. All that I wish to establish is, that these canons, if adopted without limitations and excep- tions, would produce a style of composition different from what has been exemplified by the classical au- thors, either of ancient or of modern times ; and which no writer or speaker could attempt to sustain, without feeling himself perpetually cramped by fet- ters, inconsistent with the freedom, the variety, and the grace of his expression. * If these remarks have, any foundation in truth, when applied to questions which fall under the cog- nizance of illiterate judges, they conclude with in- finitely greater force in favour of established practice, when opposed merely by such arcana as have been brought to light by the researches of the scholar or the antiquary. Considering, indeed, the metaphori- cal origin of by far the greater proportion of words in every cultivated language (a fact which Mr Tooke's ingenious speculations have now placed in a point of view so peculiarly luminous), etymology, * The following maxim does honour to the good sense and good taste of Vaugelas : " Lorsqu'une fagon de parler est usitec " des bons auteurs, il ne faut pas s'amuseraen faire 1'anatomje, " ni a pointiller dessus, comme font une infinite de gens ; mais " il faut be laisser emporter au torrent, et parler comme les au- " tres, sans daigner ecouter ces eplucheurs de phrases." 252 ON THE TENDENCY, &C. Essay V. if systematically adopted as a test of propriety, would lead to the rejection of all our ordinary modes of speaking ; without leaving us the possibility of communicating to each other our thoughts and feel- ings in a manner not equally liable to the same ob- jections. END OF PART FIRST. PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. PART SECOND. ESSAY FIRST. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. INTRODUCTION. IN the volume which I have already published on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, when I have had occasion to speak of the Pleasures of Imagination, 1 have employed that phrase to denote the pleasures which arise from ideal creations or combinations, in contradistinction to those derived from the realities which human life presents to our senses. Mr Ad- dison, in his well-known and justly admired papers on this subject, uses the same words in a more ex- tensive acceptation ; to express the pleasures which Beauty, Greatness, or Novelty, excite in the mind, when presented to it, either by the powers of Per- ception, or by the faculty of Imagination ; distin- guishing these two classes of agreeable effects, by calling the one primary, and the other secondary fc j.rl. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. pleasures. As I propose to confine myself, in tliis Essay, to Beauty, the first of the three qualities mentioned by Addison, it is unnecessary for me to inquire how far his enumeration is complete, or how far his classification is logical. But, as I shall have frequently occasion, in the sequel, to speak of the Pleasures of Imagination, I must take the liberty of remarking, in vindication of my own phraseology, that philosophical precision indispen- sably requires an exclusive limitation of that title to what Mr Addison calls secondary pleasures ; be- cause, although ultimately founded on pleasures de- rived from our perceptive powers, they are yet (as will afterwards appear) characterized by some very remarkable circumstances, peculiar to themselves. It is true, that when we enjoy the beauties of a cer- tain class of external objects (for example, those of a landscape), Imagination is often, perhaps always, more or less busy ; but the case is the same with various other intellectual principles, which must operate, in a greater or less degree, wherever men are to be found ; such principles, for instance, as the association of ideas ; sympathy with the enjoy- ments of animated beings ; or a speculative cu- riosity concerning the uses andjitness, and systema- tical relations which are everywhere conspicuous in Nature j * and, therefore, to refer to Imagination * To these principles must be added, in such a state of so- ciety as ours, the numberless acquired habits of observation and of thought, which diversify the effects of the same perceptions in the rniuds of the painter ; of the poet ; of the landscape-gardene/; Essay I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 55 alone, our perception of these beauties, together with all the various enjoyments, both intellectual and moral, which accompany it, is to sanction, by our very definitions, a partial and erroneous theory. I shall, accordingly, in this, and in the following Essays, continue to use the same language as former- ly ; separating, wherever the phenomena in ques- tion will admit of such a separation, the pleasures we receive immediately by our senses, from those which depend on ideal combinations formed by the Intellect. * Agreeably to this distinction, I propose, in treat- ing of Beauty, to begin with considering the more simple and general principles on which depend the pleasures that we experience in the case of actual perception ; and after which, I shall proceed to in- vestigate the sources of those specific and character* istical charms which Imagination lends to her own productions. of the farmer ; of the civil or the military engineer ; of the geo- logical theorist, &c. &c. &c. * What Mr Addison has called the Pleasures of Imagination, might be denominated, more correctly, the pleasures received from the objects of Taste ; a power of the mind which is equally conversant with the pleasures arising from sensible things, and with such as result from the creations of human genius. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. PART FIRST. ON THE BEAUTIFUL, WHEN PRESENTED IMMEDIATELY TO OUR SENSES. CHAPTER FIRST. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF IN- QUIRY, AND ON THE PLAN UPON WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO EXAMINE IT. r i I HE word Beauty, and, I believe, the correspond ing term in all languages whatever, is employed in a great variety of acceptations, which seem, on a superficial view, to have very little connection with each other ; and among which it is not easy to trace the slightest shade of common or coincident meaning. It always, indeed, denotes something which gives not merely pleasure to the mind, but a certain refined species of pleasure, remote from those grosser indulgences which are common to us with the brutes ; but it is not applicable universally in every case where such refined pleasures are re- ceived ; being confined to those exclusively which form the proper objects of intellectual Taste. We speak of beautiful colours, beautiful forms, beautiful Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 257 pieces of music : * We speak also of the beauty of virtue ; of the beauty of poetical composition ; of the beauty of style in prose ; of the beauty of a ma- thematical theorem ; of the beauty of a philosophi- cal discovery. On the other hand, we do not speak of beautiful tastes, or of beautiful smells j nor do we apply this epithet to the agreeable softness, or smoothness, or warmth of tangible objects, consi- dered solely in their relation to our sense of feel- ing, t Still less would it be consistent with the common use of language, to speak of the beauty of high birth, of the beauty of a large fortune, or of the beauty of extensive renown. It has long been a favourite problem with philo- sophers, to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitles a thing to the denomination of beau- tiful ; but the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them but the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The author of the ar- ticle Beau in the French Encyclopedic, t after ?ome severe strictures on the solutions proposed by * " There is nothing singular in applying the word beauty to " sounds. The ancients observe the peculiar dignity of the *' senses of seeing and hearing ; that in their objects we discern " the KaXov which we don't ascribe to the objects of the other " senses." Hutcheson's Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, Sect, 2, 14. t See Note (S.) \ Diderot, if my memory does not deceive me. I do not refer to this theory on account of its merit, for, in that point of view, it is totally unworthy of notice ; but because the author has stated, 258 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. his predecessors, is led, at last, to the following con- clusions of his own, which he announces with all the pomp of discovery : r" That Beauty consists in " the perception of Relations." " Place beauty in " the perception of relations, and you will have the " history of its progress from the infancy of the " world to the present hour. On the other hand, " choose for the distinguishing characteristic of the " beautiful in general, any other quality you can " possibly imagine, and you will immediately find " your notion limited in its applications to the " modes of thinking prevalent in particular coun- " tries, or at particular periods of time. * The per- " ception of Relations is therefore the foundation " of the beautiful ; and it is this perception which, " in different languages, has been expressed by so " many different names, all of them denoting differ- " ent modifications of the same general idea.'* The same writer, in another article, defines Beau- ty " to be the power of exciting in us the perception " of agreeable relations ;" to which definition he adds the following clause : " I have said agreeable, " in order to adapt my language to the general and more explicitly than any other I at present recollect, the funda- mental principle on which his inquiries have proceeded ; a prin. ciple common to him with all the other theorists on the same sub- ject, of whom I have any knowledge. * This is the only intelligible interpretation I am able to put on the original. The strictly literal version is : " You will find *' your notion concentrated in some point of space and of time." (Votre notion se trouvera tout.a-coup concentree dans un point de 1'espace et du terns,) 5 Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 259 " common acceptation of the term Beauty j but I " believe, that, philosophically speaking, every ob- " ject is beautiful, which is fitted to excite in us the " perception of relations." On these passages I have nothing to offer, in the way either of criti- cism or of comment ; as I must fairly acknowledge my incapacity to seize the idea which the author wishes to convey. To say that " beauty consists in " the perception of relations," without specifying what these relations are ; and afterwards to qualify these relations by the epithet agreeable, in deference to popular prejudices, .would infer, that this word is philosophically applicable to all those objects which are vulgarly denominated deformed or ugly ; in- asmuch as a total want of symmetry and propor- tion in the parts of an object does not, in the least, diminish the number of relations perceived ; not to mention, that the same definition would ex- clude from the denomination of Beautiful all the different modifications of colour, as well as various other qualities, which, according to the common use of language, fall unquestionably under that de- scription. On the other hand, if the second, and more restricted definition be adhered to (that " beauty consists in the perception of such rela- " tions as are agreeable"}, no progress is made to- wards a solution of the difficulty. To inquire what the relations are which are agreeable to the mind, would, on this supposition, be only the original pro- blem concerning the nature of the Beautiful, pro- posed in a different and more circuitous form. The speculations which have given occasion to 260 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. these remarks have evidently originated in a preju- dice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages ; that when a word admits of a va- riety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus ; and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied. In the article just quoted, this prejudice is assumed as an indisputable maxim. " Beautiful " is a term which we apply to an infinite variety of " things ; but, by whatever circumstances these " may be distinguished from each other, it is cer- " tain, either that we make a false application of the " word, or that there exists, in all of them, a com- " mon quality, of which the term Beautiful is the " sign." * Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity and mystery in the different sci- ences, it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility ; but, on the present occasion, I shall only remind my readers of the absurdities into which it led the Aristotelians on the subject of cau- sation ; the ambiguity of the word, which, in the Greek language, corresponds to the English word cause, having suggested to them the vain attempt of tracing the common idea which, in the case of any effect, belongs to the efficient, to the matter, to * " Beau est un terme quc nous appliquons a une infinite *' (litres. Mais, quelque difference qu'il y ait entre ces elres, " il faut, ou que nous fossions une fausse application du terme " beau; ou qu'il y ait dans tous ces etres une qualite dont Ic *' terme beau soit le signe." Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. the form, and to the end. The idle generalities we meet with in other philosophers, about the ideas of the good, the Jit, and the becoming, have taken their rise from the same undue influence of popular epithets on the speculations of the learned. Socrates, whose plain good sense appears in this, as in various other instances, to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtilties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully of the justness of the foregoing remarks ; if any reliance can be placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversa- tion with Aristippus about the Good and the Beau- tiful. "Aristippus (we are told) having asked him, " if he knew anything that was good ?" " Do " you ask me (said Socrates) if I know anything " good for a Jever, or for an inflammation in the " eyes, or as a preservative against & famine ?" " By no means, returned the other." " Nay, " then (replied Socrates), if you ask me concern- " ing a good which is good for nothing, I know of " none such 5 nor yet do I desire to know it." Aristippus still urging him " But do you know " (said he) anything Beautiful ?" " A great many," returned Socrates. ".Are these all like to one another?" " Far from it, Aristippus ; there is a very consi- " derable difference between them." " But how (said Aristippus) can beauty differ " from beauty *" * The, question plainly proceed- * Translation of the Memorabilia, by Mrs Fielding. 262 ON THE BEAUTIFUL Essay I. ed on the same supposition which is assumed in the passage quoted above from Diderot ; a suppo- sition founded (as I shall endeavour to shew) on a total misconception of the nature of the circum- stances, which, in the history of language, attach different meanings to the same words ; and which often, by slow and insensible gradations, remove them to such a distance from their primitive or ra- dical sense, that no ingenuity can trace the succes- sive steps of their progress. The variety of these circumstances is, in fact, "so great, that it is impos- sible to attempt a complete enumeration of them ; and I shall, therefore, select a few of the cases, in which the principle now in question appears most obviously and indisputably to fail. I shall begin with supposing that the letters A, B, C, D, E, denote a series of objects ; that A pos- sesses some one quality in common with B ; B a quality in common with C ; C a quality in common with D ; D a quality in common with E ; while, at the same time, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any three objects in the se- ries. Is it not conceivable, that the affinity between A and B may produce a transference of the name of the first to the second j and that, in consequence of the other affinities which connect the remaining objects together, the same name may pass in succes- sion from B to C ; from C to D ; and from D to E ? In this manner, a common appellation will arise between A and E, although the two objects may, in their nature and properties, be so widely distant from each other, that no stretch of imagina- Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. tion can conceive how the thoughts were led from the former to the latter. The transitions, never- theless, may have been all so easy and gradual, that, were they successfully detected by the fortunate ingenuity of a theorist, we should instantly recog- nise, not only the verisimilitude, but the truth of the conjecture ; in the same way as we admit, with the confidence of intuitive conviction, the cer- tainty of the well-known etymological process which connects the Latin preposition e or ex with the Eng- lish substantive stranger, the moment that the inter- mediate links of the chain are submitted to our exa- mination *. These observations may, I hope, throw some ad- ditional light on a distinction pointed out by Mr Knight, in his Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste, between the transitive and the metaphori- * E, ex, extra, extraneus, etranger, stranger. The very same prejudice which I have now been attempting to refute will be found to be at the bottom of many of Mr Tooke's speculations concerning language . " Johnson/' he observes in the beginning of his second volume, " is as bold and profuse in asser- " tion, as he is shy and sparing in explanation. Ho says that " RIGHT means true. Again, that it means passing true judg- " ment ; and passing a judgment according to the truth of " things. Again, that it means happy. And again, that it " means perpendicular. And again, that it means in a great " degree.*' " All false," MrTcoke adds, " absurd, and impossible." Vol. II. p. 6. How far the epithets/a/se and absurd are justly applied in this instance, I do not presume to decide; but if there be any foun- dation for the preceding remarks, I certainly may be permitted to ask, upon what ground Mr Tooke has concluded his climax with the word impossible f ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. cal meanings of a word. " As all epithets," he re- marks, " employed to distinguish qualities perceiv- " able only by intellect, were originally applied to " objects of sense, the primary words in all lan- " guages belong to them, ; and are, therefore, ap- " plied transitively, though not always figuratively, " to objects of intellect or imagination." * The distinction appears to me to be equally just and im- portant ; and as the epithet transitive expresses clearly and happily the idea which I have been at- tempting to convey by the preceding illustration, I shall make no scruple to adopt it in preference to figu- rative or metaphorical, wherever I may find it better adapted to my purpose, in the farther prosecution of this subject. It may not be altogether superfluous to add, that I use the word transitive as the generic term, and metaphorical as the specific ; every me- taphor being necessarily a transitive expression, al- though there are many transitive expressions which can, with no propriety, be said to be metaphorical. A French author of the highest rank, both as a mathematician and as a philosopher (M. D'Alem- bert), had plainly the same distinction in view when he observed, that, beside the appropriate and the figurative meanings of a word, there is another (somewhat intermediate between the former two), which may be called its meaning par extension, t In the choice of this phrase, he has certainly been * Analyt. Inquiry, &c. p. 11. 3d edition. t The same phrase is used by M. Du Marsais in his ingenious Treatise on Tropes. See, in particular, the second part, article Cetachrese. \ \ Chap. L ON THE BEAUTIFUL less fortunate than Mr Knight ; but, as he has en- larged upon his idea at some length, and with his usual perspicuity and precision, I shall borrow a few of his leading remarks, as the best comment I can offer on what has been already stated ; taking the liberty only to substitute in my version the epithet transitive, instead of the phrase par extension, wherever the latter may occur in the original. " Grammarians are accustomed to distinguish " two sorts of meaning in words ; first, the literal, " original, or primitive meaning ; and, secondly, " the figurative or metaphorical meaning, in which " the former is transferred to an object to which it " is not naturally adapted. In the phrases, for ex- " ample, I' eclat de la lumiere, and I' eclat de la ver- " tu, the word eclat is first employed literally, and " afterwards figuratively. But, besides these, there " is a sort of intermediate meaning, which may be " distinguished by the epithet transitive. Thus, " when I say, I' eclat de la lumiere, V eclat du son, " V eclat de la vertu, the word eclat is applied tran- " sitively from light to noise ; from the sense of " sight, to which it properly belongs, to that of hear- " ing, with which it has no original connection. It " would,at the same time, be incorrect to say, that the " phrase I' eclat du son is figurative j inasmuch as " this last epithet implies the application to some " intellectual notion, of a word at first appropriated M to an object of the external senses.'* After illustrating this criticism by various other examples, the author proceeds thus : " There is " not, perhaps, in the French language* a single ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay t " word susceptible of various interpretations, of " which the different meanings may not all be " traced from one common root, by examining the " manner in which the radical idea has passed, by " slight gradations, into the other senses in which " the word is employed : And it would, in my opi- " nion, be an undertaking equally philosophical " and useful, to mark, in a dictionary, all the pos- " sible shades of signification belonging to the " same expression, and to exhibit, in succession, " the easy transitions by which the mind might " have proceeded from the first to the last term of " the series." * In addition to these excellent remarks (which I do not recollect to have seen referred to by any suc- ceeding writer), I have to observe farther, that, among the innumerable applications of language which fall under the general title of transitive, there are many which are the result of local or of casual as- sociations ; while others have their origin in the con- stituent principles of human nature, or in the uni- versal circumstances of the human race. The for- mer seem to have been the transitions which D'Alembert had in his view in the foregoing quo- tation ; and to trace them belongs properly to the compilers of etymological and critical dictionaries. The latter form a most interesting object of exami- nation to all who prosecute the study of the Human Mind ; more particularly to those who wish to in- vestigate the principles of philosophical criticism, * Eclaircissemens sur les Elemens de Philosophic, ix. Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 267 A few slight observations on both may be useful, in preparing the way for the discussions which are to follow. 1. That new applications of words have been frequently suggested by habits of association pe- culiar to the individuals by whom they were first introduced, or resulting naturally from the limited variety of ideas presented to them in the course of their professional employments, is matter of obvious and common remark. The genius even of some languages has been supposed to be thus affected by the pursuits which chiefly engrossed the attention of the nations by which they were spoken ; the ge- nius of the Latin, for instance, by the habitual at- tention of the Romans to military operations ; * that of the Dutch by the early and universal famili- arity of the inhabitants of Holland with the details connected with inland navigation, or with a sea- faring life. It has been remarked by several writers, that the Latin word intervallum was evidently bor- rowed from the appropriate phraseology of^a camp ; inter vallos spatium, the space between the stakes or palisades which strengthened the rampart. None of them, however, has taken any notice of the insen- sible transitions by which it came successively to be employed in a more enlarged sense j first, to ex- press a limited portion of longitudinal extension in general j and afterwards limited portions of time as well as of space. * " Ut quoniam intervallo loco- * " Medium in agmen, in pulverem, in clamorem, in castra, " atque aciem forensem." Cic. de Oratore. t How remote are some of the following applications of the word from its primitive meaning ! 268 OX THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. " rum et temporum disjunct! sumus, per liter as tc- " cum quam scepissime colloquar." The same word has passed into our language ; and it is not a little remarkable, that it is now so exclusively appropriat- ed to time, that to speak of the interval between two places would be censured as a mode of expres- sion not agreeable to common use. Etymologies of this sort are, when satisfactory, or even plausible, amusing and instructive : but when we consider how very few the cases are, in which we have access thus to trace words to their first origin, it must ap- pear manifest, into what absurdities the position of the Encyclopedists is likely to lead those who shall adopt it as a maxim of philosophical investigation. * Other accidents, more capricious still, sometimes " Numerum in cadentibus guttis, quod interoallis distinguun- M tur, notare possumus." Cic. de Orat. " Dolor si longus, levis: dat enim iniercalla et relaxat." Cic. Acad. t( Vide quantum intercallum sit interjectum inter majorura " nostrorum consilia, et istorum dementiam." Cic. pro Rab. " Neque quisquatn hoc Scipione elegantius intervalla negotio- " rum otio dispunxit." Paterc. * A considerable number of the idiomatical turns of French expression have been traced to the ceremonial of Tournaments ; to the sports of the field ; and to the active exercises which form- ed the chief amusement of the feudal nobility. See a Disserta- tion on Gallicisms (strongly marked with the ingenuity and re- fined taste of the author), by M. Suard, of the French Academy. Similar remarks may be extended to the English Tongue ; on examining which, however, it will be found (as might be expect- ed a priori), that the sources of its idiomatical and prover- bial phrases are incomparably more diversified than those of the French. Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 269 operate on language ; as when a word is transferred from one object or event to another, merely because they happened both to engross public attention at the same period. The names applied to different colours, and to different articles of female dress, from the characters most prominent at the moment in the circles of fashion, afford sufficient instances of this species of association. But, even where the transference cannot be cen- sured as at all capricious, the application of the max- im in question will be found equally impracticable. This, I apprehend, happens in all the uses of lan- guage suggested by analogy ; as when we speak of the morning of our days ; of the chequered condi- tion of human life ; of the lights of science ; or of the rise and the fall of empires. In all these in- stances, the metaphors are happy and impressive ; but whatever advantages the poet or the orator may derive from them, the most accurate analysis of the different subjects thus brought into contact, will never enable the philosopher to form one new con- clusion concerning the nature either of the one or of the other. I mention this particularly, because it has been too little attended to by those who have speculated concerning the powers of the Mind. The words which denote these powers are all borrowed (as I have already observed repeatedly) from mate- rial objects, or from physical operations j and it seems to have been very generally supposed, that this im- plied something common in the nature or attributes of Mind and of Matter. Hence the real origin of those analogical theories concerning the former, S70 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. which, instead of advancing our knowledge with re- spect to it, have operated mcfre powerfully than any other circumstances whatever, to retard the progress of that branch of science. There are, however, no cases in which the trans- ferences of words are more remarkable, than when the mind is strongly influenced, either by pleasurable or by painful sensations. The disposition we have to combine the causes of these, even when they arise from the accidental state of our own imagination or temper, with external objects presented simultane- ously to our organs of perception ; and the extreme difficulty, wherever our perceptions are complex, of connecting the effect with the particular circumstan- ces on which it really depends, must necessarily pro- duce a wide difference in the epithets which are em- ployed by different individuals, to characterize the supposed sources of the pleasures and pains which they experience. These epithets, too, will natural- ly be borrowed from other more familiar feelings, to which they bear, or are conceived to bear some re- semblance ; and hence a peculiar vagueness and looseness in the language used on all such subjects, and a variety in the established modes of expression, of which it is seldom possible to give a satisfactory explanation. 2. But although by far the greater part of the transitive or derivative applications of words depend on casual and unaccountable caprices of the feelings or of the fancy, there are certain cases in which they open a very interesting field of philosophical specu- lation. Such are those, in which an analogous trans- Chap. I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 271 ference of the corresponding term may be remarked universally, or very generally, in other languages ; and in which, of course, the uniformity of the result must be ascribed to the essential principles of the human frame. Even in such cases, however, it will by no means be always found, on examination, that the various applications of the same term have arisen from any common quality, or qualities, in the ob- jects to which they relate. In the greater number of instances, they may be traced to some natural and universal associations of ideas, founded in the com- mon faculties, the common organs, and the common condition of the human race ; and an attempt to in- vestigate by what particular process this uniform re- sult has been brought about, on so great a variety of occasions, while it has no tendency to involve us in the unintelligible abstractions of the schools, can scarcely fail to throw some new lights on the history of the human Mind. I shall only add, at present, upon this prelimi- nary topic, that, according to the different degrees of intimacy and of strength in the associations on which the transitions of language are founded, very different effects may be expected to arise. Where the association is slight and casual, the several mean- ings will remain distinct from each other, and will often, in process of time, assume the appearance of capricious varieties in the use of the same arbitrary sign. Where the association is so natural and habi- tual, as to become virtually indissoluble, the transi- tive meanings will coalesce into one complex concep- tion 5 and every new transition will become a more 0N THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. comprehensive generalization of the term in ques- tion. With these views, I now proceed to offer a few observations on the successive generalizations of that word of which it is the chief object of this Essay to illustrate the import. In doing so, I would by no means be understood to aim at any new theory on the subject ; but only to point out what seems to me to be the true plan on which it ought to be studied. If, in the course of this attempt, I shall be allowed to have struck into the right path, and to have sug- gested some useful hints to my successors, I shall feel but little solicitude about the criticisms to which I may expose myself, by the opinions I am to ha- zard on incidental or collateral questions, not essen- tially connected with my general design. Chap. If. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 278 CHAPTER SECOND. PROGRESSIVE GENERALIZATIONS OF THE WORD BEAU- TY, RESULTING FROM THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF THE MIND. BEAUTY OF COLOURS OF FORMS OF MOTION. COMBINATIONS OF THESE. UNI- FORMITY IN WORKS OF ART. BEAUTY OF NA- TURE. NOTWITHSTANDING the great- variety of qualities, physical, intellectual, and moral, to which the word beauty is applicable, I believe it will be admitted, that, in its primitive and most general acceptation, it refers to objects of Sight. As the epithets sweet and delicious literally denote what is pleasing to the palate, and harmonious what is pleasing to the ear j as the epithets soft and warm denote certain quali- ties that are pleasing in objects of touch or of feel- ing ; so the epithet beautiful literally denotes what is pleasing to the eye. All these epithets, too, it is worthy of remark, are applied transitively to the perceptions of the other senses. We speak of sweet and of soft sounds ; of warm, of delicious, and of harmonious colouring, with as little impropriety as of a beautiful voice, or of a beautiful piece of music. s ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. Mr Burke, himself, has somewhere spoken of the soft green of the soul. If the transitive applications of the word beauty be more numerous and more hete- rogeneous than those of the words sweetness, soft- ness, and harmony, is it not probable that some ac- count of this peculiarity may be derived from the comparative multiplicity of those perceptions of which the eye is the common organ? Such, accordingly, is the very simple principle on which the following speculations proceed ; and which it is the chief aim of these speculations to establish. In prosecuting the subject, however, I shall not fetter myself by any regular plan, but shall readily give way to whatever discussions may naturally arise, either from my own conclusions, or from the remarks I may be led to of- fer on the theories of others. The first ideas of beauty formed by the mind are, in all probability, derived from colours. * Long be- * It is, accordingly, upon this assumption that I proceed in tracing the progressive generalizations of these ideas; but the in. telligent reader will immediately perceive, that this supposition is not essentially necessary to my argument. Supposing the first ideas of beauty to be derived horn forms, the general conclusions which I wish to establish would have been precisely the same. In the case of a blind man, whatever notions he attaches to the word Beautiful (which I believe to be very different from ours), must necessarily originate in the perception of such forms or shapes as are agreeable to his sense of touch ; combined, per- haps, with the grateful sensations connected with softness, smooth- ness, and warmth. If this view of the subject be just, an easy explanation may be deduced from it, of the correct and consist, ent use of poetical language, in speaking of objects of sight, by uch a writer as the late Dr Blacklock. . II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 275 fore infants receive any pleasures from the beauties of form or of motion (both of which require, for their perception, a certain effort of attention and of thought), their eye may be caught and delighted with brilliant colouring, or with splendid illumina- tion. I am inclined, too, to suspect, that, in the judgment of a peasant, this ingredient of beauty pre- dominates over every other, even in his estimate of the perfections of the female form ; * and, in the in- animate creation, there seems to be little else which he beholds with any rapture. It is, accordingly, from the effect produced by the rich painting of the clouds, when gilded by a setting sun, that Akenside infers the existence of the seeds of Taste, where it is impossible to trace them to any hand but that of Nature. " Ask the swain " Who journeys homewards from a summer-day's " Long labour, why, forgetful of his toils, " And due repose, he loiters to behold " The sunshine gleaming, as through amber clouds, " O'er all the western sky ; full soon, I ween, " His rude expression, and untutor'd airs, " Beyond the power of language, will unfold " The form of Beauty smiling at his heart." Nor is it only in the judgment of the infant or of the peasant, that colours rank high among the con- stituents of the beautiful. The spectacle alluded to by Akenside, in the foregoing lines, as it forms the * The opinion of Shenstone, on a point of this sort, is of some weight. " It is probable," he observes, "that a clown would " require more colour in las Chloe's face than a courtier." ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. most pleasant of any to the untutored mind, so it continues, after the experience of a life spent in the cultivation of taste, to retain its undiminished attrac- tions : I should rather say, retains all its first attrac- tions, heightened by many stronger ones of a moral nature. " HIM have we seen, the greenwood side along, " As o'er the heath we hied, our labour done, " Oft as the wood-lark piped his evening song, " With wishful eye pursue the setting sun." Such is one of the characteristical features in a por- trait, sketched for himself, by the exquisite pencil of Gray ; presenting an interesting counterpart to what he has elsewhere said of the poetical visions which delighted his childhood. " Oft before his infant eye would' run " Such forms as glitter in the muses ray, " With orient hues." " Among the several kinds of beauty," says Mr Addison, " the eye takes most delight in colours. " We nowhere meet with a more glorious or pleas- " ing shew in nature, than what appears in the hea- " vens, at the rising and setting of the sun, which is " wholly made up of those different stains of light, " that shew themselves in clouds of a different situa- " tion. For this reason we find the poets, who are " always addressing themselves to the imagination, " borrowing more of their epithets from colours " than from any other topic" * From the admiration of colours, the eye gradually * Spectator, No. 412. Chap. II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. advances to that ofjbrms ; beginning first with such as are most obviously regular. Hence the pleasure which children, almost without exception, express, when they see gardens laid out after the Dutch man- ner ; and hence the justness of the epithet childish, or puerile, which is commonly employed to charac- terize this species of taste ; -one of the earliest stages of its progress both in individuals and in nations. When, in addition to the pleasures connected with colours, external objects present those which arise from certain modifications of form, the same name will be naturally applied to both the causes of the mixed emotion. The emotion appears, in point of fact, to our consciousness, simple and uncom- pounded, no person being able to say, while it is felt, how much of the effect is to be ascribed to either cause, in preference to the other ; and it is the phi- losopher alone who ever thinks of attempting, by a series of observations and experiments, to accomplish such an analysis. The following expressions of Vir- gil shew how easily the fancy confounds these two ingredients of the Beautiful under one common epi- thet. " Edera formosior alba" " O formose " puer, nimium ne crede colori." That the adjec- tive formosus originally referred to the beauty of form alone, is manifest from its etymology; and yet it would appear that, even to the correct taste of Virgil, it seemed no less applicable to the beauty of colour. In another passage the same epithet is employed, by the same poet, as the most comprehensive which the language afforded, to describe the countless 278 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. charms of nature, in the most beautiful season of the year : " Et nunc omnis ager, nunc omnis parturit arbos ; " Nunc frondent sylvae, nunc formosissimus annus." Similar remarks may be extended to the word Beauty, when applied to motion, a species of beauty which may be considered as in part a modification of that of form ; being perceived when a pleasing out- line is thus sketched, or traced out, to the spectator's fancy. The beauty of motion has, however, beside this, a charm peculiar to itself; more particularly when exhibited by an animated being ; above all, when exhibited by an individual of our own species. In these cases, it produces that powerful effect, to the unknown cause of which we give the name of race ; an effect which seems to depend, in no in- considerable degree, on the additional interest which the pleasing form derives from its fugitive arid evanes- cent existence ; the memory dwelling fondly on the charm which has fled, while the eye is fascinated with the expectation of what is to follow. A fasci- nation, somewhat analogous to this, is experienced when we look at the undulations of a flag streaming to the wind ; at the wreathings and convolutions of a column of smoke ; or at the momentary beauties and splendours of fireworks, amid the darkness of night. In the human figure, however, the enchant- ing power of graceful motion is probably owing chief- ly to the living expression which it exhibits ; an ex- pression ever renewed and ever varied, of taste and of mental elegance. n Chap. II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. From the combination of these three elements (of colours, of forms, and of motion) what a variety of complicated results may be conceived ! And in any one of these results, who can ascertain the re- spective share of each element in its production ? Is it wonderful, then, that the word Beauty, supposing it at first to have been applied to colours alone, should gradually and insensibly acquire a more extensive meaning ? In this enlargement, too, of the signification of the word, it is particularly worthy of remark, that it is not in consequence of the discovery of any quali- ty belonging in common to colours, to forms, and to motion, considered abstractly, that the same word is now applied to them indiscriminately. They all, in- deed, agree in this, that they give pleasure to the spectator ; but there cannot, I think, be a doubt, that they please on principles essentially different ; and that the transference of the word Beauty, from the first to the last, arises solely from their undis- tinguishable co-operation in producing the same agreeable effect, in consequence of their being all perceived by the same organ, and at the same instant. It is not necessary for any of the purposes which I have at present in view, that I should attempt to investigate the principles on which Colours, Forms, or Motion, give pleasure to the eye. With the greater part of Mr Alison's remarks on these quali- ties, I perfectly agree ; although, in the case of the first, I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere or- ganic impression, independently of any association 280 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. or expression whatever, than he seems willing to allow. * The opinion, however, we may adopt on this point, is of little importance to the following argument, provided it be granted that each of these classes (comprehended under the generic term Beautiful) ought, in a philosophical inquiry into the nature of Beauty, to form the object of a separate investiga- tion ; and that the sources of these pleasing effects should be traced in analytical detail, before we pre- sume to decide how far they are all susceptible of explanation from one general theory. In this re- spect, Mr Alison's work seems to me to be peculiar- ly valuable. It is eminently calculated to awaken and to direct the observation of his readers to parti- cular phenomena, and to the state of their own feel- ings ; and whoever peruses it with due attention, cannot fail to be satisfied, that the metaphysical ge- neralizations which have been so often attempted on this subject, are not more unsuccessful in their exe- cution, than they are unphilosophical in their design. Mr Hogarth and Mr Burke are also entitled to much praise, for a variety of original and just re- marks, with which they have enriched this part of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. But although they appear to have aimed at a plan of inquiry found- ed on the rules of a sound logic ; and although their good sense has kept them at a distance from that vague and mysterious phraseology concerning Beauty in general, in which so many of their predecessors * See Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste, by the Reverend Archibald Alison, F. R. SS. Lond. and Edin. Chap. II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 281 delighted, they have, nevertheless, been frequently misled by the spirit of system ; attempting to erect the critical inferences which their good taste had formed in some particular departments of the fine arts, into established maxims of universal applica- tion. The justness of this criticism, so far as it re- fers to Hogarth, has been shewn in a very satisfac- tory manner by Mr Alison ; and it will appear, in the course of our present speculations, that Mr Burke falls, at least in an equal degree, under the same censure. Before, however, I proceed to any comments on the conclusions of this eminent writer, it is necessary, in the first place, to follow out, a few steps farther, the natural progress or history of the mind, in its conceptions of the Beautiful. I have already taken notice of the pleasure which children very early manifest at the sight of regular forms, and uniform arrangements. The principles on which these produce their effects, and which ren- der one regular form more pleasing than another, have engaged the attention of various authors j but it is sufficient for my purpose if the general fact be admitted ; and about this there cannot possibly be any room for dispute. With respect to the theories which profess to acccount for the phenomena in question, I must own, that they appear to me more fanciful than solid ; although I am far from being disposed to insinuate, that they are totally destitute of foundation. The same love of regular forms, and of uniform arrangements, continues to influence powerfully, in the maturity of reason and experience, the judg- 282 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. ments we pronounce on all works of human art, where regularity and uniformity do not interfere with purposes of utility. In recommending these forms and arrangements, in the particular circum- stances just mentioned, there is one principle which seems to have no inconsiderable influence ; and which I shall take this opportunity of hinting at slightly, as I do not recollect to have seen it any- where applied to questions of criticism. The prin- ciple I allude to is that of the siiffident reason, of which so much use is made (and in my opinion sometimes very erroneously made) in the philosophy of Leibnitz. What is it that, in anything which is merely ornamental, and which, at the same time, does not profess to be an imitation of nature, renders irregular forms displeasing ? Is it not, at least in part, that irregularities are infinite ; and that no circumstance can be imagined which should have decided the choice of the artist in favour of that particular figure which he has selected ? The va- riety of regular figures (it must be acknowledged) is infinite also ; but supposing the choice to be once fixed about the number of sides, no apparent caprice of the artist, in adjusting their relative proportions, presents a disagreeable and inexplicable puzzle to the spectator. Is it not also owing, in part, to this, that in things merely ornamental, where no use, even the most trifling, is intended, the circular form possesses a superiority over all others ? In a house, which is completely detached from all other buildings, and which stands on a perfectly level foundation, why are we offended when the door Chap. II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. is not placed exactly in the middle ; or when there is a window on one side of the door, and none cor- responding to it on the other ? Is it not that we are at a loss to conceive how the choice of the architect could be thus determined, where all circumstances appear to be so exactly alike ? This disagreeable ef- fect is, in a great measure, removed, the moment any purpose of utility is discovered ; or even when the contiguity of other houses, or some peculiarity in the shape of ground, allows us to imagine, that some reasonable motive may have existed in the artist's mind, though we may be unable to trace it. An irregular castellated edifice, set down on a dead flat, conveys an idea of whim or of folly in the designer ; and it would convey this idea still more strongly than it does, were it not that the imitation of something else, which we have previously seen with pleasure, makes the absurdity less revolting. The same, or yet greater irregularity, would not only satisfy, but delight the eye, in an ancient citadel, whose ground- work and elevations followed the rugged surface and fantastic projections of the rock on which it is built. The oblique position of a window in a house would be intolerable ; but utility, or rather necessity, re- conciles the eye to it at once in the cabin of a ship. In hanging up against the wall of an apartment a number of pictures, of different forms and sizes, the same consideration will be found to determine the propriety of the arrangement. A picture placed near one extremity of the wall will require a com- panion at the same distance from the other extre- mity, and in the same horizontal line j and if there ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. be any one which, in point of shape or size, is unique, it must be placed somewhere in the vertical line, which is equally distant from both. Numberless other illustrations of this principle crowd on me ; but I have already said enough to ex- plain the notion which I annex to it, and perhaps more than, to some of my readers, its importance may appear to justify. The remarks which have now been made apply, as is obvious, to the works of Man alone. In those of Nature, impressed, as they are everywhere, with the signatures of Almighty Power, and of Unfa- thomable Design, we do not look for that obvious uniformity of plan which we expect to find in the productions of beings endowed with the same facul- ties, and actuated by the same motives as ourselves. A deviation from uniformity, on the contrary, in the grand outlines sketched by her hand, appears per- fectly suited to that infinity which is associated, in our conceptions, with all her operations ; while it en- hances, to an astonishing degree, the delight arising from the regularity which, in her minuter details, she everywhere scatters in such inexhaustible pro- fusion. It is, indeed, by very slow degrees that this taste for Natural Beauty is formed ; the first impulse of youth prompting it (as I before hinted) to subject nature to rules borrowed from the arts of human life. When such a taste, however, is at length acquired, the former not only appears false, but ludicrous ; and perishes of itself, without any danger of again reviving. The associations, on the other hand. Chap. II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 285 by which the love of Nature is strengthened, having their root in far higher and nobler principles of the mind than those attached to the puerile judgments which they gradually supplant, are invariably con- firmed more and more, in proportion to the advance- ment of reason, and the enlargement of experi- ence. The traces of art, which formerly lent an addi- tional charm to the natural beauties which it was employed to heighten, become now themselves offen- sive wherever they appear ; and even when it has been successfully exerted in supplying defects and correcting blemishes, the effect is destroyed, in pro- portion as its interposition is visible. The last stage of Taste, therefore, in the progress of its improve- ment, leads to the admiration of what Martial calls Rw verum et barbarum ; -" Where, if Art " E'er dar'd to tread, 'twas with unsandal'd foot, " Printless, as if the place were holy ground.'' To analyze the different ingredients of the Beauty which scenery of this kind presents to an eye qualified to enjoy it, is a task which I do not mean to attempt ; perhaps a task to which the faculties of man are not completely adequate. Not that this furnishes any objection to the inquiry, or diminishes the value of such approximations to the truth, as we are able to establish on a solid induction. But I confess it appears to me, that few of our best writers on the subject have been sufficiently aware of its dif- ficulty j and that they have all shewn a disposition 286 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. to bestow upon observations, collected from particu* lar classes of facts (and perhaps accurately and happily collected from these), a universality of appli- cation little suited to the multiplicity and variety of the phenomena which they profess to explain. * That this remark is not hazarded rashly, will, if I do not deceive myself, appear sufficiently from the critical strictures on some of Mr Burke's principles, which I find it necessary to introduce here, in order to obviate certain objections which are likely to occur to his followers, against the general scope of the foregoing doctrines. The digression may appear long to some of my readers ; but I could not hope to engage any attention to the sequel of these dis- cussions, till I had first endeavoured to remove the chief stumbling-blocks, which a theory, recommend- ed by so illustrious a name, has thrown in my way. In the animadversions, besides, which I have to offer on Mr Burke, I flatter myself I shall have an opportunity of unfolding my own ideas more clearly and fully, than I could have done by stating them at once in a connected and didactic form. * See Note (T.) Chap. III. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. CHAPTER THIRD. REMARKS ON SOME OF MR BURKE*S PRINCIPLES WHICH DO NOT AGREE WITH THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS. AMONG the various writers who have turned their attention to the Beautiful, with a design to trace the origin, and to define the nature of that idea, there is, perhaps, none who has engaged in the in- quiry with views more comprehensive and just than Mr Burke ; but, even with respect to him, it may be fairly questioned, if any one of the conclusions to which he has been led concerning the causes of beauty, amounts to more than a critical inference, applicable to some particular class or classes of the phenomena in question. In examining the opinions of this author, it is ex- tremely worthy of observation, that although his good sense has resisted completely the metaphysical mysteries of the schools, he has suffered himself to be led astray by a predilection for that hypothetical physiology concerning the connection between Mind and Matter, which has become so fashionable of late years.* His generalizations, too, proceed on an as- * This sort of philosophy was much in vogue, all over Europe, 288 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. sumption, not, indeed, so unlimited as that already quoted from the Encyclopedic, but yet much more extensive than the nature of the subject will admit of; That, in the objects of all our different ex- ternal senses, there is some .common quality to which the epithet Beautiful may be applied ; and that this epithet, in all these different cases, conveys the same meaning. Instead, for example, of supposing (agree- ably to the doctrine already suggested) that the epithet in question is applied to colours and to forms, in consequence of their both producing their plea- sing effects through ,the medium of the same organ, he endeavours to shew, that there is an analogy be- tween these two classes of our pleasures ; or, to use his own words, that " the beauty, both of shape and " colouring, are as nearly related as we can well *' suppose it possible for things of such different " natures to be." * In both cases, he asserts, that the beautiful object has a tendency to produce an agreeable relaxation in thejibres ; and it is in this about the time when Mr Burke's book first appeared; in conse- quence, perhaps, chiefly of the enthusiastic admiration every. where excited by the Spirit of Laws, then recently published. The microscopical observations on the papillae of a sheep's tongue, to which Montesquieu has there appealed ip his reasonings con- cerning the operation of physical causes on the Mind, bear a re- markable resemblance to some of the data assumed by Mr Burke in his physiological conclusions with respect to our perception of the Beautiful. Something, also, which looks like an imitation of the same great man, is observable in the extreme shortness and abruptness of the sections, which incessantly interrupt the natu- ral flow of Mr Burke's composition. * Part III. sect. 17. 10 Chap. III. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 289' tendency that he conceives the essence of the Beauti- ful to consist. In farther illustration of this, he observes, " that smooth things are relaxing j that " sweet things, which are the smooth of taste, are " relaxing too ; and that sweet smells, which bear a " great affinity to sweet tastes, relax very remark- " ably." He adds, that " we often apply the quali- *' ty of sweetness metaphorically to visual objects ; J> after which observation, he proposes, " for the bet- " ter carrying on this remarkable analogy of the " senses, to call sweetness the beautiful of the taste." In order to convey a still more adequate idea of Mr Burke's mode of philosophizing on this subject, I shall quote a few of his remarks on the causes, " why Smoothness and Sweetness are beautiful." The quotation is longer than I could have wished ; but I was unwilling to attempt an abridgment of it in my own words, from my anxiety that his reason- ing should have all the advantages which it may de- rive from his peculiar felicity of expression. " There can be no doubt, that bodies which are " rough and angular, rouse and vellicate the organs " of feeling ; causing a sense of pain, which consists " in the violent tension or contraction of the muscu- " lar fibres. On the contrary, the application of " smooth bodies relax ; gentle stroking with a " smooth hand allays violent pains and cramps, and " relaxes the suffering parts from their unnatural " tension ; and it has therefore, very often, no " mean effect in removing swellings and obstruc- " tions. The sense of feeling is highly gratified " with smooth bodies. A bed smoothly laid and T ON THE BEAUTIFUL. - Essay I. " soft, that is, where the resistance is every way in- " considerable, is a great luxury ; disposing to an " universal relaxation, and inducing, beyond any- " thing else, that species of it called sleep. " Nor is it only in the touch that smooth bodies " cause positive pleasure by relaxation. In the " smell and taste we find all things agreeable to " them, and which are commonly called sweet, to " be of a smooth nature,* and that they all evident- " ly tend to relax their respective sensories. Let " us first consider the taste. Since it is most easy " to inquire into the properties of liquids, and since " all things seem to want a fluid vehicle to make " them tasted at all, I intend rather to consider " the liquid than the solid parts of our food. The " vehicles of all tastes are water and oil. And what " determines the taste, is some salt which affects *' variously, according to its nature, or its manner * In this part of his theory, Mr Burke has very closely follow- ed Lucretius, whose fancy anticipated the same hypothesis, with- out the aid of microscopical observation. ' Hue accedit, uti niellis lactisque liquores " Jucundo sensu linguae, tractentur in ore; ' At contra tetra absinthi natura, ferique " Centaiu i t'oudo pertorquent ora sapore : " Ut facile agnoscas e laevibus, atque rotundis *' Essc ea, quae sensiis jncnnde langere possnnt. " At contra, quae amara, atque aspera, cunque vidcntur, " Haze tuagis haniatis inter se nexa teneri ; " Proptereaque solere vias rescindere nostris " Sensibns, introituque suo perrumpere corpus. *' Omnia postremo," &c. Lucret. Lib. II. I. JOB. The continuation of the passage is not less curious. Chap. III. ON THE BEAUTIFUL* " of being combined with other things. Water and " oil, simply considered, are capable of giving some " pleasure to the taste. Water, when simple, is " insipid, inodorous, colourless, and smooth ; it is " found, when not cold, to be a great resolver of " spasms, and lubricator of the fibres : this power it " probably owes to its smoothness. For, as fluidity " depends, according to the most general opinion, " on the roundness, smoothness, and weak cohesion " of the component parts of any body, and, as water " acts merely as a simple fluid, it follows, that the " cause of its fluidity is likewise the cause of its re- " laxing quality ; namely, the smoothness and slip- " pery texture of its parts. The other fluid vehicle " of tastes is oil. This, too, when simple, is insipid, " inodorous, colourless, and smooth .to the touch "and taste. It is smoother than water, and, in. " many cases, yet more relaxing. Oil is, in some " degree, pleasant to the eye, the touch, and the " taste, insipid as it is. Water is not so grateful ; " which I do not know on what principle to account " for, other than that water is not so soft and smooth. " Suppose that to this oil, or water, were added a " certain quantity of a specific salt, which had a " power of putting the nervous papillce of the " tongue in a gentle vibratory motion ; as suppose " sugar dissolved in it j the smoothness of the oil, " and the vibratory power of the salt, cause the sense " we call sweetness. In all sweet bodies, sugar, or " a substance very little different from sugar, is con- " stantly found ; every species of salt, examined by " the microscope, has it own distinct, regular, invari- 292 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay L " able form. That of nitre is a pointed oblong ; " that of sea-salt an exact cube ; that of sugar a per- " feet globe. If you have tried how smooth globu- " lar bodies, as the marbles with which boys amuse " themselves, have affected the touch, when they are " rolled backward and forward, and over one another, " you will easily conceive how sweetness, which " consists in a salt of such nature, affects the taste ; " for a single globe (though somewhat pleasant to " the feeling), yet, by the regularity of its form, and *' the somewhat too sudden deviation of its parts from " a right line, it is nothing near so pleasant to the " touch as several globes, where the hand gently " rises to one, and falls to another ; and this plea- " sure is greatly increased if the globes are in mo- " tion, and sliding over one another ; for this soft va- " riety prevents that weariness, which the uniform " disposition of the several globes would otherwise " produce. Thus, in sweet liquors, the parts of the ' fluid vehicle, though most probably round, are yet " so minute, as to conceal the figure of their compo- " nent parts from the nicest inquisition of the micro- *' scrope ; and consequently, being so excessively " minute, they have a sort of flat simplicity to the " taste, resembling the effects of plain smooth bodies " to the touch ; for if a body be composed of round " parts, excessively small, and packed pretty closely " together, the surface will be, both to the sight and " touch, as if it were nearly plain and smooth. It is " clear, from their unveiling their figure to the mi- " croscope, that the particles of sugar are consider- " ably larger than those of water or oil ; and coitse- Chap. III. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 293 " quently, that their effects, from their roundness, " will be more distinct and palpable to the nervous " papillae of that nice organ the tongue. They will " induce that sense, called sweetness, which, in a " weak manner, we discover in oil, and in a yet weak- " er in water ; for, insipid as they are, water and " oil are, in some degree, sweet ; and it may be ob- " served, that insipid things of all kinds approach " more nearly to the nature of sweetness than to " that of any other taste. " In the other senses, we have remarked that " smooth things are relaxing. Now, it ought to " appear that sweet things, which are the smooth " of taste, are relaxing too." " That sweet " things are generally relaxing is evident, because " all such, especially those which are most oily, taken " frequently, and in a large quantity, very much en- ** feeble the tone of the stomach. Sweet smells, " which bear a great affinity to sweet tastes, relax " very remarkably. The smell of flowers disposes " people to drowsiness ; and this relaxing effect is " further apparent from the prejudice which people " of weak nerves receive from their use.'* If this theory of Mr Burke had led to no practical consequences, I should not have thought it worth while, notwithstanding its repugnance to my own opinions, to have made any reference to it here ; but as it is intimately connected \vith some of his subse- quent conclusions concerning Beauty, which I con- sider as not only unsound in their logical foundation, but as calculated to bias and mislead the Taste, I was anxious, before proceeding to an examination of 29 i ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. these, to satisfy my readers, how little support they derive from the hypothetical disquisitions premised to them, in order to prepare the way for their more easy admission. As for the physiological discussion itself, I am inclined to think that few, even of Mr Burke's most partial admirers, will now be disposed to estimate its merits very highly. By some others, I would willingly believe, that it may be valued chiefly as an illustration of the absurdities in which men of the most exalted genius are sure to involve themselves, the moment they lose sight, in their in* quiries concerning the Human Mind, of the sober rules of experimental science. Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. CHAPTER FOURTH. CONTINUATION OF THE CRITICAL STRICTURES ON JVIR BURJKE'S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CONCERN- ING BEAUTY. INFLUENCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES ON THE SPECULATIONS OF MR PRICE. IN enumerating the qualities constantly observable in beautiful objects, Mr Burke lays a peculiar stress on that of smoothness ; " a quality," he observes, " so essential to beauty, that he cannot recollect any- " thing beautiful that is not smooth. In trees arid " flowers, smooth leaves are beautiful ; smooth " slopes of earth in gardens ; smooth streams in " landscapes ; smooth coats of birds and beasts in " animal beauty ; in fine women, smooth skins ; and, " in several sorts of ornamental furniture, smooth " and polished surfaces. A very considerable part " of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality 5 " indeed the most considerable. For, take any " beautiful object, and give it a broken and rugged " surface, and however well formed it may be in " other respects, it pleases no longer. Whereas, " let it want ever so many of the other constituents, ** if it wants not this, it becomes more pleasing than " almost all the others without it. This seems to 96 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. " me," continues Mr Burke, " so evident, that I ' am a good deal surprised that none who have ?' handled the subject have made any mention of " the quality of smoothness, in the enumeration of " those that go to the forming of beauty. For, in- " deed, any rugged, any sudden projection, any " sharp angle, is, in the highest degree, contrary to " that idea." . These observations contain the whole of Mr Burke's doctrine on this essential constituent of beauty ; and, I confess, I cannot recollect any phi- losophical conclusion whatever, more erroneous in itself, or more feebly supported. That the smoothness of many objects is one con- stituent of their beauty, cannot be disputed. In consequence of that intimate association which is formed in the mind between the perceptions of sight and those of touch, it is reasonable to expect that those qualities which give pleasure to the latter sense, should also be agreeable to the former. Hence the agreeable impression which the eye re- ceives from all those smooth objects about which the sense of touch is hatiitually conversant ; and hence, in such instances, the unpleasant appearance of ruggedness or of asperity. The agreeable effect, too, of smoothness is often heightened by its reflect- ing so copiously the rays of light ; as in the surface of water, in polished mirrors, and in the fine kinds of wood employed in ornamental furniture. In some instances, besides, as in the last now mention- ed, smoothness derives an additional recommenda- Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 297 tion from its being considered as a mark of finished work, and of a skilful artist, * To all this we may add, that the ideas of beauty formed by our sex are warped, not a little, by the notions we are led to entertain concerning the charms of the other. That in female beauty a smooth skin is an essential ingredient, must be granted in favour of Mr Burke's theory : Nor is it at all difficult to conceive how this association may influence our taste in various other instances, t * In general, we consider roughness as characterizing the pro- ductions of nature ; smoothness as the effect of human industry. I speak of those natural productions which were intended to fur- nish the materials of our various arts. In other cases, as in the plumage of birds, the glossy skins of many quadrupeds, &c. &c. Nature has given to her own work a finished perfection, which no art can rival. By an easy metaphor, we transfer these words to human cha- racter. We sptak of rough good sense as familiarly as of a rough diamond ; while to the artificial manners formed by the inter- course of the world, we apply the epithets smooth, polished, polilf. t The idea of female beauty was evidently uppermost in Mr Burke's mind when he wrote his book ; and it is from an induc- tion, confined almost exclusively to the qualities which enter into its composition, that he draws the whole of his inferences, with respect to beauty in general. Even in treating of the beauty of Nature, his imagination always delights to repose on her soft- est and most feminine features ; or, to use his own language, on " such qualities as induce in us a sense of tenderness and affec- " tion, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these. 1 ' So far as this particular application of the word is concerned, the induction appears to me just and comprehensive ; arid I rea- dily subscribe to the opinion of Mr Price, when he assumes it " as perfectly clear, that Mr Burke's general principles of beauty " smoothness, gradual variation, delicacy of make, tender co. 298 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. E ssa y I. Still, however, Mr Burke's general proposition is very far from holding universally. In objects which have little or no relation to the sense of touch, it fails in numberless instances. What more beautiful objects in nature than the stalk and buds of the moss-rose ! To the sense of touch they are positively disagreeable ; but we think of them only with a re- ference to the sense of smelling and sight ; and the effect is, on the whole, delightful. * " lours, and such as insensibly melt into each other, are strictly " applicable to female beauty ; so much so, that not one of them " can be changed or diminished without manifest diminution " of beauty." Essay on Beauty, prefixed to Mr Price's Dialogue) p. 22. In speculating on the idea of the beautiful in general, it seems evident that we ought to begin with selecting our instances from objects intended to produce their effect on the eye alone ; and afterwards proceed to examine the various modifications of this idea, produced by associations arising from the" perceptions of the other senses ; by associat.ons of a moral nature ; by con- siderations of utility, &c. &c. &c. By following the opposite plan, and fixing (unconsciously perhaps) on female beauty as his standard, Burke has fallen into the very mistake against which he has so judiciously cautioned his readers ; that of " cir- " cumscribing nature within the bounds of a partial definition " or description." See the Essay on Tas.te, prefixed to the In- quiry into the Sublime and Beautiful. * Mr Price has not only acknowledged the beauty of the moss- rose, but has connected with this fact some others, all of them equally inconsistent, in my opinion, with the peculiar notions which he has adopted from Mr Burke. " Flowers are the most " delicate and beautiful of inanimate objects ; but their queen, " the rose, grows on a rough bush, whose leaves are serrated, t; and which is full of thorns. The moss-rose has the addition of a rough hairy fringe, that almost makes a part of the flower Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 299 In natural objects, too, which are of so great a magnitude that we never think of subjecting them to the examination of touch, as well as in artificial objects, which are intended to be placed at an alti- tude beyond our reach, roughness, and even rugged- ness, may often be considered as ingredients of beauty ^ as in rock-scenery, fretted ceilings, and va- rious other cases. The fantastic fonns of frost- work, and the broken surface of shell-work in artifi- cial grottos, are obvious illustrations of the same re- mark. In some of these last instances, the beauty of roughness arises, in part, from the very same cause which, in other cases, gives beauty to smoothness ; the aptitude of the object to reflect, in an agreeable manner, the rays of light. Hence, too, the beauty of the brilliant cut in diamonds, and of the number- iess angular forms (so contrary to Mr Burke's theo- ry) in ornaments of cut crystal. " itself." " Among the foreign oaks, maples, &c. those are " particularly esteemed Avhose leaves (according to a common, " though perhaps contradictory phrase J are BEAUTIFULLY JAG. *' GED." " The vine leaf has, in all respects, a strong resemblance to lt the leaf of the plane, and that extreme richness of effect, which " everybody must be struck with in them both, is greatly owing " to those sharp angles, those sudden variations, so contrary to ** the idea of beauty, when considered by itself."- ." The tf- '* feet of these jagged points and angles is more strongly marked " in sculpture, especially of vases of metal, where, the vine leaf, <; if imprudently handled, would at least prove that sharpness is " very contrary to the beautiful in feeling." Price on the Piety- p. $4>, et seq. 300 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. The agreeable effect of the " smooth shaven " green" in gardens, seems also to arise from circum- stances foreign to the sense of sight ; particularly from the ideas of comfort connected with the use which is to be made of them ; and the intimations they convey of the industry, attention, and art, em- ployed in forming them and in keeping them in or- der. The same smoothness and trim regularity would make a very different impression, if we should meet with them out of tJieir proper place ; on the surface, for example, of a sheep-walk, or of a deer-park ; or (where we have sometimes the mis- fortune to see them) in the immediate neighbour- hood of a venerable ruin. In the section immediately following that to which I have now referred, Mr Burke observes further, " That, as perfectly beautiful bodies are not com- " posed of angular parts, so their parts never con- " tinue long in the same right line. They vary " their direction every moment, and they change " under the eye, by a deviation continually carrying " on, but for whose beginning or end you will find " it difficult to ascertain a point." He afterwards adds : " I do not find any natural object which is " angular, and at the same time beautiful. Indeed, " few natural objects are entirely angular. But I " think those which approach the most nearly to it " are the ugliest." To the disagreeable effect which is here ascribed to angles, the same remark may be extended which was formerly made upon roughness ; that it is con- fined chiefly to things destined to be handled, Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 301 which we know, from experience, would offend or in- jure the sense of touch. It is felt, too, in some cases, in which objects are considered in relation to certain uses or purposes for which they are intend- ed ; as in the sharp and inconvenient turnings of a road. But, abstracting from these and other analo- gous exceptions, it does not occur to me that angles, and other sudden variations, are offensive to the eye. I have already mentioned the angular forms of cut crystal, and of gems which have passed through the hands of the lapidary ; and also the more irregular and broken shapes of rock scenery. The same thing is still more strongly illustrated in such spectacles as belong to the sense of sight exclusively ; as in fire- works ; in the painting and gilding of the clouds ; and, above all, in the zig-zag course of the ragged lightning. A sharp angle is offensive in a river, partly be- cause the gentle progress of the stream is too abrupt- ly and rudely forced into a new direction ; but chief- ly because the usual and natural course of rivers ex- hibits a different appearance, in consequence of the gradual influence of the current in wearing whatever is angular into an easy and sweeping curvature. For the same reason, habit, co-operating with (what is always agreeable) a clear perception of the physical cause by which a geological effect is produced, be- stows a beauty on the regular correspondence of the saliant and re-entering angles of the opposite banks. It is, however, curious, and a strong confirmation of the truth of these remarks, that we judge of the beauty of a lake on principles perfectly different ; 302 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. and that nothing in nature ean be conceived more pleasing, than when its shores are deeply indented by bays and creeks ; or when sharp promontories ad- vance boldly towards each other from opposite sides of the water. On this circumstance (as the Abbe de Lille has well remarked) is founded the charac- teristical difference between the beauties of a lake and those of a river. " Autant que la riviere en sa molle souplesse " D'un rivage anguleux redoute la rudesse r " Autant Ics bords aigus, les longs enfoncemens " Sont d'un lac etendu les plus beaux oniemens. " Que la terre tan tot s'avance au sein des ondes, lf Tantot qu'elle ouvre aux flots des retraites profondes ; " Et qu'ainsi s'appellant d'un mutuel amour, *' Et la terre et les eau\ se cherchewt tour-a-tour. " Ces aspects varies amusent votre vue." * The doctrine which I have been now controvert- ing, with respect to the effects of smoothness and of asperity, is entitled to more than common attention-, as it forms the ground- work of a very ingenious and elegant Essay on the Picturesque, which, for several years past, has deservedly attracted a great deal of public attention. Indeed, it was chiefly with a view to this work (the author of which seems to me to have been misled in his phraseology, and in some of his theoretical opinions, by too implicit an acquies- * Les Jardins. The same observation had been previously made by Mr Wheatley, in his Observations on Modern Garden' ing, 4th edit. p. 66. " In a lake, just the reverse qf a river, " creeks, bays, recesses of every kind, are always in character, *' sometimes necessary, and generally beautiful : the objections " to them in tte one, are recommendations of them in the other." Chap. IV. . ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 303 cence in Mr Burke's conclusions) that I was led to select the subject of the foregoing discussion, in pre- ference to various other points connected with the same system, which I consider as no less open to fair criticism. According to Mr Price, the circumstances which please, both in natural scenes and in the composi- tions of the painter, are of two kinds ; the Beautiful and the Picturesque. These, he thinks, are radical- ly and essentially distinct ; though both must unite together in . order to produce an effect completely agreeable. Smoothness, waving lines, and the other circumstances mentioned by Burke, are characteris- tical of the Beautiful j asperity, sharp angles, &c. of the Picturesque. To this conclusion Mr Price was naturally, or rather necessarily led, by his admission, at his first outset, of Mr Burke's peculiar tenets as so many incontrovertible axioms. In the progress of his sub- sequent researches, finding numberless ingredients in agreeable compositions, that could not be brought under Burke's enumeration of the qualities which " go to the composition of the beautiful," he was forced to arrange them under some new name ; whereas, he ought rather to have concluded, that the enumeration was partial and defective, and ex- tended the application of the word Beauty, to what- ever qualities in natural objects affect the mind with agreeable emotions, through the medium of sight. Instead, for example, of objecting to that style of landscape-gardening, which has been carried to such an excess by some of the followers of Brown, on the 504< ON TflE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. ground of its not being picturesque, would it not have been more agreeable to common language, to have objected to it on the ground of its not being beautiful ? For my own part, I am inclined to ad- mit asperity, sharp angles, and irregularity (when introduced in their proper places), among the con- stituents of Beauty, as well as their opposites ; and I would study the art of combining them happily, not in the arbitrary definitions of theorists, but in the great volume of Nature herself. The conjec- tures of various modern writers concerning the prin- ciples upon which different forms produce their ef- fects, and the conclusions of some of them (particu- larly of Hogarth) with respect to the waving line, do great honour to their ingenuity, and may pro- bably admit, in some of the arts, of very useful prac- tical applications ; but philosophical distinctness, as well as universal practice, requires that the meaning of the word Beauty, instead of being restricted in conformity to any partial system whatever, should continue to be the generic word for expressing every quality which, in the works either of Nature or of Art, contributes to render them agreeable to the eye. I would not therefore restrict, even to Hogarth's line, the appellation of the line of beauty, if that phrase be understood to imply anything more than that this line seems, from an examination of many of Nature's most pleasing productions, to be one of her favourite forms. Before dismissing the theories of Hogarth ami Burke, I think it proper again to remind my read- ers, that I do not dispute their practical value in Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 305 some of the fine arts. I only object to such systems when they profess to embrace all the principles on which the complicated charms of Nature depend ; or when, without any reference to a particular de- sign, they are converted into universal maxims, arising out of the veiy definition of Beauty ; and to which, of consequence, artists may conceive it to be incumbent on them to adhere, in order to insure success. In works which are merely ornamental, they are much more likely to hold, than when some further end is proposed ; for, in cases of the latter sort, the pleasing or disagreeable effects connected with material forms, considered abstractly, are so easily overpowered by the more weighty considera- tions suggested by views of fitness and utility, that the maxims adapted to one art will seldom be found of much use when applied to another : the maxims, for example, of architecture, when applied to land- scape-gardening ; or those of landscape-gardening, when applied to architecture. The beauty of a winding approach to a house, when the easy deviations from the straight line are all accounted for by the shape of the ground, or by the position of trees, is universally acknowledged ; but what more ridiculous than a road meandering through a plain, perfectly level and open ? In this last case, I am inclined to refer the disagreeable ef- fect to the principle of the sufficient reason already mentioned. The slightest apology for a sweep sa* tisfies the taste at once. It is enough that the de- signer has the appearance of humouring Nature, u 300 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. and not of indulging his own caprice. The pleasing effect of the irregular tracks worn out upon the surface of broken ground, by the frequent footsteps of shepherds, or of their flocks, will be found, on examination, to turn on the very same principle. How much our feelings, in such cases, are influ- enced by considerations ofjltness or utility, appears from the different judgments we pronounce on the beauty of the same line, according to the purpose for which we conceive it to be destined. In judging of an approach to a house, we have always a secret re- ference^to the form and mechanism of our common wheel-carriages. It does not follow from these remarks, that there is no beauty in the serpentine line ; but only that, in things destined for any useful purpose, its pleasing effect may be destroyed by the most trivial circum- stances. I recollect the period when serpentine ridges, in ploughed land, were pretty generally considered in Scotland as beautiful ; and if they were equally con- sistent with good husbandry, I have no doubt that they would be more pleasing to the eye than straight ones. The association, however, which is now uni- versally established between the former, and the ideas- of carelessness, sloth, and poverty ; between the latter and the ideas of industry, skill, and prospe- rity, has completely altered our notions concerning both. Mr Burke, indeed, rejects utility from his enumeration of the constituents of beauty ; but I am persuaded that I speak in perfect conformity to the common feelings and common language of man- Chap. IV. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 307 kind, when I say, that nothing is more beautiful than a highly dressed Jield. Such, too, I am hap- py to add, was the opinion of Cicero. " Agro bene " culto, nil potest e&se, riec usu uberius, nee specie " ornatius" 308 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay L CHAPTER FIFTH. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT, 1 o the latitude in the use of the word Beauty, of which I have been thus attempting to vindicate the propriety, it has been objected, both by Mr Burke and Mr Price, that it has a tendency to produce a confusion of ideas, and to give rise to ill-judged ap- plications of the term. The inconveniencies, how- ever, of which they complain, appear to have arisen entirely from their own inattention to a very im- portant distinction among the various elements, or ingredients, which may enter into the composition of the Beautiful. Of these elements, there are some which are themselves intrinsically pleasing, without a reference to anything else ; there are others which please only in a state of combination. There are certain colours which every person would pronounce to be pleasing, when presented singly to the eye ; there are others, which, without possess- ing any such recommendation, produce a pleasing effect when happily assorted. The beauty of the former may be said to be absolute or intrinsic j that of the latter to be only relative. Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 309 Numberless other instances might be mentioned of things that have only a relative beauty. This, indeed, is the case with most things which nature has destined to be only parts of some whole ; and which, accordingly, are beautiful only in tlieir pro- per places. A few years ago, it was not unusual to see a picture of a lady's eye in the possession of her friend or admirer ; and there is a possibility that the effect might not be disagreeable to those whose me- mory was able to supply readily the rest of the fea- tures. To a stranger (if I may judge from my own feelings) it was scarcely less offensive than if it had been painted in the middle of her forehead. In reasoning about the Beautiful, Mr Burke con- fines his attention, almost exclusively, to those ele- ments of Beauty which are intrinsically pleasing, as- suming it probably in his own mind, as self-evident, that Bieauty, when exhibited in the works of Nature, and in the compositions of Art, is produced by a combination of these alone. If, instead of follow- ing this synthetical process, he had begun with con- sidering the Beautiful in its more complicated forms (the point of view unquestionably in which it is most interesting to a philosopher to examine it, when his aim is to illustrate its relation to the power of Taste), he could not have failed to have been led analytically to this distinction between the intrinsic and the re- lative beauties of its constituent elements, and te perceive that the one class is as essential as the other to the general result. The same remark may be .extended to that ex- ternal sense from which the-ewex of Taste borrows 310 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. its name ; and to which, in a variety of respects, it will be found to bear a very close analogy. Among simple tastes, such as sweet, sour, bitter, hot, pun- gent, there are some which are intrinsically grateful ; while others, which are not less necessary ingredi- ents in some of our most delicious mixtures, are po- sitively disagreeable in a separate state. At the head of the former class, sweet seems to be placed by universal consent ; and, accordingly, it is called by Mr Burke the beautiful of taste. In speaking, however, of those more refined and varied gratifica- tions of the palate to which the arts of luxury mi- nister, it is not to any one simple taste, but to mix- tures or compositions, resulting from a skilful com- bination of them, that the epithet beautiful (sup- posing this new phraseology to be adopted) ought, according to strict analogy, to be applied. Agree- ably to this view of the subject, sweet may be said to be intrinsically pleasing, and bitter to be relative- ly pleasing ; while both are, in many cases, equally essential to those effects, which, in the art of cook- ery, correspond to that composite beauty, which it is the object pf the painter and of the poet to create. A great deal of what Mr Price has so ingeniously observed, with respect to the picturesque, is appli- cable to what I have here called relative beauty ; and so far as this is the case, instead of making the Picturesque a distinct genus from the Beautiful, it would certainly have been more logical to say, that the former is, in some cases, an important element in the composition of the latter. For my own part, Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 311 I cannot conceive any principle whatever on which we can reasonably refuse a place among the elements or constituents of beauty, to a class of qualities which are acknowledged, on all hands, to render what was formerly beautiful more beautiful still. But it is not on this ground alone that I object to Mr Price's language. The meaning he has an- nexed to the word picturesque is equally exception- able with the limited and arbitrary notion concern- ing the beautiful, which he has adopted from Mr Burke. In both cases, he has departed widely from established use ; and, in consequence of this, when he conies to compare, according to his peculiar de- finitions, the picturesque and the beautiful together, he has given to many observations, equally just and refined, an air of paradox, which might have been easily avoided, by employing a more cautious phrase- ology. In justification of this criticism, it is neces- sary to introduce here a few remarks on the differ- ent acceptations in which the epithet picturesque has been hitherto understood in this country, since it was naturalized by the authority of our classical writers. * And first, as to the oldest and most general use of the word ; it seems to me an unquestionable pro- position, That if this is to be appealed to as the standard of propriety, the word does not refer im* mediately to landscapes, or to any visible objects, but to verbal description. It means that graphical power by which Poetry and Eloquence produce e? * See Note (U.) 312 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. fects on the rind analogous to those of a picture. Thus, every person would naturally apply the epi- thet to the following description of a thunder-storm in Thomson's Seasons : " Black from the stroke above, the mountair.-pine, " A leaning shatter'd trunk, stands scath'd to heaven, " The talk of future ages ; and below, " A lifeless group the blasted cattle lie : " Here the soft flocks, with that same harmless look " They wore alive, and ruminating still " In fancy's eye ; and there the frowning bull " And ox half raised." To prevent, however, any misapprehensions of my meaning, it is proper to add, that, in speaking of the graphical power of Poetry and Eloquence, I would not be understood to limit that epithet (ac- cording to its etymology) to objects of Sight ; but to extend it to all those details of whatever kind, by a happy selection of which the imagination may be forcibly impressed. In the following sentence, Dr Warton applies the word picturesque (and I think with the most exact propriety) to a passage of Thom- son, where it is somewhat curious, that every cir- cumstance mentioned recals some impression upon the Ear alone. " How full," says Warton, " how particular and " picturesque, is this assemblage of circumstances, " that attend a very keen frost in a night of win- ter!" " Loud rings the frozen earth, and hard reflects " A double noise ; while at his evening watch, * The village dog deters the nightly thief : Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 313 The heifer lows ; the distant waterfall " Swells in the breeze ; and with the hasty tread " Of traveller, the hollow-sounding plain " Shakes from afar." This use of the word picturesque is analogous to the common signification of other words which have a similar termination, and are borrowed from the Italian, through the medium of the French. The word arabesque, for example, expresses some- thing which is executed in the style of the Ara- bians j moresque, something in the style of the Moors : and grotesque, something bearing a resem- blance to certain whimsical paintings found in a grot- to, or subterraneous apartment at Rome. In like manner, picturesque properly means what is done in the style, and with the spirit of a painter ; and it was thus, if I am not much mistaken, that the word was commonly employed, when it was first adopted in England. Agreeably to the same idea, the Per- sians, it is said, distinguish the different degrees of descriptive power in different writers, by calling them painters or sculptors : in allusion to which practice, the title of a sculptor-poet has been bestow- ed by a very ingenious critic on Lucretius, in conse- quence of the singularly bold relief which he gives to his images. * Of late years, since a taste for landscape-painting came to be fashionable in this island, the word pic- turesque has been frequently employed to denote those combinations or groups or attitudes of objects, * Dr Waiton, Essay on the Genius of Pope, Vol. II. p. 165. 314} ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. that are fitted for the purposes of the painter. It is in this sense that the word is used by Mr Gilpin in his Observations on Picturesque Beauty ; * and I am inclined to think, that it is in this sense it is now most commonly understood, in speaking of natural scenery, or of the works of the architect. I do not object to this employment of the word (although I certainly think it an innovation), for it conveys a clear and definite idea, and one for which there was no appropriate expression in our language. Nor do I see any impropriety in connecting the words Picturesque and Beauty together ; for al- though an object may be beautiful without being picturesque, or picturesque without being beautiful, yet there is not any inconsistency or incompatibility in the ideas. On the contrary, it is only when the two qualities are united, that landscape-painting pro- duces its highest effect, t According to Mr Price, the phrase Picturesque Beauty is little better than a contradiction in terms ; but although this may be the case in the arbitrary interpretation which he has given to both these words, there is certainly no contradiction in the ex- pression, if we employ Beauty in its ordinary sense, and Picturesque in the sense very distinctly stated in Mr Gilpin's definition. $ * The same author, in another work, expresses himself thus: " Picturesque Beauty is a phrase but little understood. We pre- '* cisely mean by it, that kind of beauty which would look veil in " a picture." Gilpin's Observations on the Western Parts of _ Eng- land, 2d edit. p. 328. 1 See Note (X.) J Mr Price himself appears to be sensible of this, from the pa- Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 315 The same remark maybe extended to the Sublime; between which and the Beautiful there certainly does not exist that incongruity which most English writers have of late been pleased to suppose. * The renthcsis in the following sentence : " There is nothing more ill- " judged, or more likely to create confusion (if we agree with " Mr Burke in his idea of beauty), than the joining of it to the " picturesque, and calling the character by the title of Pictu- " resque Beauty." P. 42. * The prevalence of this idea (which does not seem to have gained much ground on the Continent) is to be ascribed chiefly to the weight of Mr Burke's authority. To many of the passa- ges which both he and Dr Blair have quoted from poets and ora- tors, as examples of the Sublime, a Frenchman would undoubted- ly consider the epithet Beau as at least equally applicable. Mr Burke's theory concerning the connection between Beauty and Smallness, could not fail to confirm him in his opinion of the incompatibility of the Beautiful with the Sublime. In this theory also, he has founded a general conclusion on certain local or tem- porary modes of judging, instead of consulting that more import- ant class of facts confirmed by the consent of different ages and natiops. With respect to the taste of the ancient Greeks upon this sub- ject, according to which, Magnitude and Strength were consider- ed as ingredients in the Beauty even of the female form, See the very learned and ingenious notes, subjoined by Mr Twining to his excellent translation of Aristotle's Treatise oil Poetry, pp. 263, 264, 265. From the contrast perpetually stated between the meanings of the words Beau and Joli, Mr Price concludes, that " the French, " like the more ancient Greeks, appear* to have considered " large stature as almost a requisite of beauty, and not only in " men, but in women." In this reference I am inclined to agree with him ; although I must, at the same time, confess, that I know of no French writer (not excepting the Abbe Girard)who * Pp. 16 and 21 of the Essay on Deadly, prefixed te Mr Price'? DLtt Jogue. 316 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. ssay I. Sublime Beauties of nature ; the Sublime Beauties qf tfie sacred writings ; as it is one of the most common, so it is also one of the most intelligible forms of expression employed by critics. The Sub- lime and the Picturesque, therefore, it would ap- pear, are most properly used as qualifying epithets, to limit the meaning of the generic name Beauty in particular instances. A great variety of other epi- thets besides these are found to be necessary, for the expression of our feelings on different occasions. It is thus that we speak of the simple beauties of the Doric order ; and of the rich or ornamented beau- ties of the Corinthian. It is thus that we contrast with the wild and savage beauties of Nature the re- gular, the refined, the chaste, the finished, the clas- sical beauties of Art. It is thus, too, that we con- trast, in the well-known picture of Garrick, the beau- ties of the tragic with those of the comic muse ; or, in the poetry of Milton, the gay and lively beauties of his Allegro with the serious and melancholy has enabled me to draw a line between these two epithets, com- pletely satisfactory to myself. I recollect at present two instan- ces, in which I should be glad to see their respective imports happily translated into our language. In the first, both epithets are applied to the same person, and at the same period- of her life; and, consequently, the one is not absolutely exclusive of the other. In neither instance can the contrast turn, in the slight- est degree, on any circumstance connected with stature. " Scliane, dans sa jeunesse, avoit etc jolie et belle : elle etoit " belle encore ; mais ellc commen^oit a n'etre plus jolie." Mar- mo ntel, Les Quatre Flacons. " Une femme ne peut gueres 6tre belle que d'une facon, mais " elle est jolie de cent mille." Montesquieu, Essai sur le Gout. Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. beauties of his Pemeroso. In a word, to oppose the Beautiful to the Sublime, or to the Picturesque, strikes me as something analogous to a contrast be- tween the Beautiful and the Comic ; the Beautiful and the Tragic ; the Beautiful and the Pathetic ; or the Beautiful and the Romantic. I have said, that it is only when the Beautiful and the Picturesque are united, that landscape-painting produces its highest effect. The truth of this pro- position seems to be unquestionable, unless we sup- pose that no part of the effect of a picture arises from its conveying the idea of a beautiful original. It is true that, in the details of a landscape, there are often many circumstances possessing no intrinsic beauty, which have a far happier effect than the highest beauties which could be substituted in their place. On examination, however, it will be found, that the effect of these circumstances does not de- pend on their intrinsic qualities, but on their acci- dental significance or expression, as hints to the imagination ; and, therefore, if we apply to such cir- cumstances the epithet Picturesque * (which is a use of the word not very remote from its meaning, when * Neither Mr Price nor MrGilpin appear to me to have been sufficiently aware of the difference between the meaning which they annex to the word Picturesque, when applied to those de- tails in a landscape, which are peculiarly characteristic and ex- pressive, and its meaning when applied to the general design and composition of the piece. In -the former sense, it conveys an idea quite distinct from the Beautiful, and (as will afterwards appear) sometimes at variance with it. In the other sense, there can be no doubt that the beauty of the scene represented will add proportionally to the pleasing effect of the picture. 318 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay t applied to verbal description), that the pleasure which the Picturesque in this case conveys, is ultimately resolvable into that which is connected by means of association with the perception of the Beautiful. Its effect depends on its power of conveying to the fan- cy more than the pencil of the artist has delineated, and, consequently, is to be referred ultimately to the beauties which are supplied or understood ; for the same reason that the pleasing effect of the profile, or silhouette, of a beautiful woman is ultimately to be referred, not to what is seen, but to what is re- called to the memory ; or (to take an instance still more general in its application) for the same reason that the pathetic effect of the veil thrown over the face of Agamemnon, in the Iphigenia of Timanthes, was owing, not to the veil, but to the features which it was imagined to conceal. " Velavit ejus caput," says Quinctilian, " et suo cuique animo dedit aesti- '* mandum." Of the same painter it is observed by Pliny : " In omnibus ejus operibus intelligitur plus " semper quam pingitur." Among the various applications of the word Picturesque to painting, this last use of it is more closely analogous to its primary application to verbal description, than any of the others. In this sense (which, for the sake of distinctness, I shall call its poetical sense) it does not denote what is actual- ly represented ; but what sets the imagination at work, in forming pictures of its own ; or, in other words, those parts of a picture where more is meant and suggested than meets the eye. Of this sort is a group of cattle standing in a river, or .collected Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 319 under the shade of a tree, when introduced into a landscape, to recal the impressions and scenery of a summer noon ; a ruined castle or abbey employed to awaken the memory of former times, accompanied with those feudal or monastic visions so dear to a ro- mantic fancy ; with numberless other instances of a similar sort, which must immediately occur to every reader. For some reasons, which will afterwards appear, the word Picturesque, in this poetical sense, is ap- plicable to many of the objects which are also pictu- resque, according to Mr Gilpin's definition ; and which, at the same time, unite the most remarkable of those properties which Mr Price has pointed out, as distinguishing the Picturesque from the Beautiful. Hence these ingenious writers have been led, on se- veral occasions, to ascribe much more effect to the mere visible appearance of such objects than really belongs to it. An example of this occurs in the stress which they have very justly laid on the form of the Ass, as peculiarly adapted to the artist's pen- cil ; a form which they have both pronounced to be picturesque in an eminent degree. But the Ass, it must be remembered, has, beside his appearance, strong claims, on other accounts, to the painter's attention. Few animals have so power- ful an effect in awakening associated ideas and feel- ings ; and, accordingly, it is eminently Picturesque, in the poetical sense of the word, as well as in the acceptation in which it is understood by Mr Price. Not to speak of the frequent allusions to it in Holy Writ, what interest are we led to attach to it, in our 320 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. early years, by the Fables of ^Esop ; by the similies of Homer ; by the exploits of Don Quixote ; by the pictures which it recals to us of the bye-paths in the forest, where we have so often met with it as the beast of burden, and the associate of the vagrant poor, or where we have stopped to gaze on the in- fant beauties which it carried in its panniers ; irt fine, by the circumstances which have called forth, in its eulogy, one of the most pleasing efforts of Buffon's eloquence, its own quiet and inoffensive manners, and the patience with which it submits to its life of drudgery. It is worthy, too, of remark, that this animal, when we meet with it in painting, is seldom the common ass of our own country, but the ass ennobled by the painter's taste ; or copied from the animal of the same species, which we have seen in the patriarchal journies, and other Scripture- pieces of eminent masters. In consequence of this circumstance, a pleasing association, arising from the many beautiful compositions of which it forms a part, comes to be added to its other recommendations already mentioned, and has secured to it a rank on the canvas, which the degradation of its name will for ever prevent it from attaining in the works of our English poets. These observations may be extended, in some de- gree, also to the Goat ; strongly associated as its figure is with the romantic scenes of an Alpine re- gion ; and with the precipitous cliffs, where it has occasionally caught our eye, browsing on the pendent shrubs in security and solitude. With respect to the peculiarities, in point of form,, Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. colouring, roughness of coat, &c. to which, according to Mr Gilpin and Mr Price, both these animals owe their Picturesque character, they seem to me to operate chiefly by the stimulus they give to the powers of imagination and of memory. Where this is the end which the artist has in view, such forms and colours possess important and obvious advantages over those which are much more decidedly beautiful ; inasmuch as these last, by the immediate pleasure which they communicate to the organ, have a ten- dency to arrest the progress of our thoughts, and to engage the whole of our attention to themselves. It is scarcely necessary to add, that a great part of what has just been observed is applicable to the art of embellishing real scenery, as well as to the com- positions of the painter. Many of Mr Price's sug- gestions for giving a Picturesque character to grounds and to buildings, turn upon circumstances which owe their whole effect to their poetical expression. When these different considerations are combined together, there will not, I apprehend, appear to be any sound foundation for distinguishing the Pictu- resque from the Beautiful as a quality essentially dif- ferent ; the pleasure we receive from the former, re- solving either into that arising from the conception or imagination of understood beauties, or into the ac- cessary pleasures excited in the mind, by means of the associating principle. On other occasions, the distinction stated by Mr Price between the Picturesque and the Beautiful coincides with the distinction between Natural and Artificial Beauty ; and the rules he gives for pro- x ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. ducing the Picturesque resolve into the old precept of employing art to conceal her own operations. In these, as indeed in all other cases, his rules (as far as I am able to judge) are the result of exquisite taste, and evince habits of the nicest, and most discriminating observation ; and it is only to be re- gretted that he had not been more fortunate in the choice, and more consistent in the use of his phrase- ology. * Notwithstanding, however, these occasional vari- ations in his interpretation of the word Picturesque, the prevailing idea which he annexes to it, through- out his work, coincides very nearly with the defini- tion of Mr Gilpin. In proof of this, it is sufficient to mention, that, in his title-page, what he professes to treat of is, tlie advantages to be derived from the study of paintings in improving real landscape; a circumstance which shews plainly that it was this notion of the Picturesque which was predominant in his mind while he was employed in the composition. The truth of the doctrine which he thus announces as his principal subject, I am by no means disposed to dispute ; but some limitations of it occur to me as so indispensably necessary, that I shall slightly touch * In some of the passages which I allude to at present, the word 'picturesque seems to be synonymous with romantic, as for- merly applied by our English writers to wild scenery. Milton uses grotesque nearly in the same sense : -" The champaign head " Of a steep wilderness, whose hairy sides " With thicket overgrown, grotesque and wild, " Access deny'd." Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 323 upon one or two of the most important, before I conclude this chapter. That the Picturesque (according to Mr Gilpin's definition of it) does not always coincide with what the eye pronounces to be Beautiful in the reality, has been often observed ; and is, indeed, an obvious con- sequence of the limited powers of painting, and of the limited range of objects which the artist can present to the eye at once. No pencil can convey a pleasure bearing any resemblance to that which we receive, when we enjoy, from a commanding emi- nence, an extensive prospect of a rich champaign country, or a boundless view of the ocean ; nor can it copy, with any success, many other of the most engaging aspects of nature. The painter, accord- ingly, when he attempts a portrait of real landscape, is obliged to seize such points of view as are adapted to the circumscribed resources of his art ; and, in his observation of Nature, is unavoidably led to the study of what Mr Gilpin calls picturesque effect. By these habits of study, he cannot fail to acquire a new interest in the beautiful objects he meets with ; a critical discrimination in his perceptions, unknown to common spectators ; and a sensibility to many pleasing details, which to them are invisible. " Quam " multa vident pictores," says Cicero, in the words of Mr Price's motto, " in umbris et in eminentia " quae nos non videmus !" Nor is this all. To the pleasure arising from what is presented to his senses, is superadded that which he anticipates from the exercise of his own art j or those which are re- vived in his memory, by the resemblance of what he ON THE BEAUTIFUL. E ssa y I. sees to the compositions of his favourite masters. The most trifling accident of scenery, it is evident (at least the most trifling to an unskilled- eye), may thus possess, in his estimation, a value superior to that which he ascribes to beauties of a far higher order ; his imagination, in some cases, filling up the picture where nature has but faintly sketched the outline j in other cases, the reality borrowing a charm from some associated painting, as, in the judg- ment of the multitude, paintings borrow their prin- cipal charm from associated realities. While the studies of the painter contribute, in this manner, to create a relish for the beautiful pictu- resque, is there no danger that they may produce, in a limited mind, habits of inattention or of indiffer- ence to those natural beauties which defy the imita- tion of the pencil ; and that his taste may, in time, become circumscribed, like the canvas upon which ' he works ? I think I have perceived, in some art- ists and connoisseurs, examples of this, within the narrow circle of my own observation. In such cases, we might almost be tempted to reverse the question in Mr Price's motto j " quam multa videmus nos " quae pictores non vident !" As to the application of the knowledge thus ac- quired from the study of paintings, to the improve- ment of natural landscape, I have no doubt that, to a superior understanding and taste, like those of Mr Price, it may often suggest very useful hints ; but if recognised as the standard to which the ulti- mate appeal is to be made, it would infallibly cover the face of the country with a new and systematical Chap. V. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 325 species of affectation, not less remote than that of Brown, from the style of gardening which he wishes to recommend. To this it may be added, that, as an object which is offensive in the reality may please in painting ; so many things which would offend in painting, may yet please in the reality. If, in some respects, there- fore, the study of painting be a useful auxiliary in the art of creating landscape ; in others there is, at least, a possibility that it may lead the judgment astray, or impose unnecessary fetters on an inventive imagination. I have only to remark farther, that, in laying out grounds, still more, perhaps, than in any other of the fine arts, the primary object of a good taste is, not to please the connoisseur, but to please the en- lightened admirer and lover of nature. The perfec- tion of all these arts is undoubtedly to give pleasure to both ; as they always will, and must do, when the taste of the connoisseur is guided by good sense and philosophy. Pliny justly considered it as the highest praise he could bestow on the exquisite beauties of a Corinthian antique, when he sums up his description of them by observing,- " Talia deni- " que omnia, ut possint artificum oculos tenere, de- " lectare imperitorum." Objects, of whatever kind, which please the connoisseur alone, prove only that there is something fundamentally wrong in the prin- ciples upon which he judges ; and most of all do they authorize this conclusion, when Nature herself is the subject upon which the artist is to operate, and where the chief glory of Art is to work unseen. 326 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. Upon the whole, let Painting be allowed its due praise in quickening our attention to the beauties of Nature; in multiplying our resources for their further embellishment ; and in holding up a stand- ard, from age to age, to correct the caprices of fa- shionable innovations; but let our Taste for these beauties be chiefly formed on the study of Nature herself ; nor let us ever forget so far what is due to her indisputable and salutary prerogative, as to attempt an encroachment upon it by laws, which derive the whole of their validity from her own sanc- tion. * * " I shall add no more to what I have here offered, than that " music, architecture, and painting, as well as poetry and ora- " tory, are to deduce their laws and rules from the general sense " and taste of mankind, and not from the principles of these arts " themselves ; or, in other words, the Taste is not to conform to. " the Art, but the Art to the Taste." Spectator, No. 29. Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL, 327 CHAPTER SIXTH. OF THE APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIA- TION TO BEAUTY. FARTHER GENERALIZATIONS OF THIS WORD, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE INFLU- ENCE OF THE ASSOCIATING PRINCIPLE. IN the foregoing remarks on Beauty, although 1 have occasionally alluded to the Association of Ideas, I have avoided all discussion with respect to the ex- tent of its influence. It is necessary for me, how- ever, now to consider, at some length, the effects of a principle which, in the opinion of many philoso- phers, furnishes a complete explanation of all the phenomena which have been under our considera- tion ; and which must be acknowledged, even by those who do not go so far, to be deeply concerned in the production of most of them. I had occasion to observe, in a former publication, that the theory which resolves the whole effect of beautiful objects into Association, must necessarily involve that species of paralogism, to which logicians give the name of reasoning in a circle, It is the province of Association to impart to one thing the agreeable or the disagreeable effect of another ; but Association can never account for the origin of a 328 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. class of pleasures different in kind from all the others we know If there was nothing originally and in- trinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating prin- ciple would have no materials on which it could ope- rate. Among the writers who have attempted to illus- trate the influence of Association on our judgments concerning the Beautiful, I do not know of any who seem to have been completely aware of the force of this objection but Mr Alison ; and, accordingly, the fundamental idea which runs through his book, and which, in my opinion, is equally refined and just, is entirely his own. He does not deny, that, inde- pendently of custom and habit, there are number- less sources of enjoyment in the human frame, arising from its adaptation to the various objects around it. He only asserts, that a large proportion of the qua- lities which proouce these pleasures, although they cannot be called Beautiful, while they affect the bo- dily organs immediately, may yet enter largely, by means of the Association of Ideas, into the beauty of the visible creation. Thus, the qualities which excite the agreeable sensations exclusively appropri- ated to the nostrils, cannot be said to be Beautiful, without departing altogether from the common use of language ; but who will deny, that the pleasing effect produced by the form and colour of a rose, even when viewed at a distance, is heightened by the sweet fragrance which we know that it possesses ? The effect of the appearance here presented to the eye, and that of the associated pleasure, are so inti- mately and so necessarily blended together in the Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 32Q mind of every individual, that it is impossible for any person to say how much of the complicated de- light is to be ascribed to each of the two ingredi- ents ; am 1 *, therefore, the pleasing conception which is linked with the appearance of the object, no less than the appearance itself, may be justly regarded as a constituent of its Beauty : it is unquestionably the union of both which has secured to the Rose her undisputed title as Queen of Flowers. The prin T ciple of Association is not, in this instance, employ- ed to acceunt for the pleasing effect which the smell of the rose produces on its appropriate sense ; but to explain in what manner the recollection of this agreeable sensation may enter, as an element, into the composition of an order -of pleasures distinguished by a different name, and classed with the pleasures of a different organ. In so far, therefore, as the sensations of Smelling minister to the Beauty of na- ture, it may, with great correctness, be said, that they do so only through the medium of that prin- ciple, which combines the conception of them in the mind of the spectator with the perception of the colours and the forms exhibited to his eye. What has now been remarked with respect to smell, is applicable to every other pleasing impres- sion or emotion which Association can attach to a visible object. In consequence of the close relation which subsists between the senses of Seeing and of Touch, it applies with peculiar force to those things about which the latter sense is likely to be employ- ed ; and hence, in many instances, the influence (formerly explained) of ideas connected with the 330 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. perceptions of the hand, in modifying the judgments concerning Beauty, which the eye pronounces. * It is, however, chiefly by Intellectual and Moral Associations that our notions of Beauty are influen- ced. How powerful the charm is which may be thus communicated to things of little intrinsic interest, may be judged of from the fond partiality with which* we continue, through the whole of life, to contrast the banks and streams of our infancy and youth, with " other banks and other streams." t In this manner, by means of Association, any one pleasing circumstance or occurrence in nature, how remote soever in itself from the idea of the Beautiful, may be yet so combined in our imagination with the Beautiful properly so called, that no philosophical analysis can separate them in their effect. On such occasions, the task of the philosopher is limited to the gratification of a speculative curiosity in collect- * " Chaque sens, par un herureux concours, " Pre'te aux sens allies un mutuel secours ; " Le frais gazon des eaux m'embellit leur murmure, " Leur murmure, a son tour, m'embellit la verdure. " L'odorat sert le gout, et 1'oeil sert 1'odorat ; " L'haleine de la rose ajoute a son eclat; " Et d'un ambre flatteur la peche parfumee, " Parait plus savoureuse a la bouche embaumee; " Voyez 1'amour heureux par un double larcin ! " La main invite 1'oeil, 1'oeil appelle la main, " Et d'une bouche fraiche ou le baiser repose " Le parfum esl plus doux sur des levres de rose. " Ainsi tout se repond, et doublant leurs plaisirs, " Tons les sens 1'un de 1'autre eveillent les desirs." De Lille, L' Imagination, Chant I. | Shenstone. Ode to Memory* Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 331 ing new illustrations of his theories ; or (where he experiences the inconveniencies of his own early pre- possessions) to a more judicious regulation of the habits of others, whose associations are yet to be formed. But on this view of the subject, although I consi- der it as by far the most curious and important of any, I do not mean to enlarge. The strong and happy lights which have been thrown upon it by Mr Alison render any farther illustration of it super- fluous ; and leave me nothing to add, in this part of my argument, but a few slight hints, tending to con- nect some of his conclusions with that peculiar idea of Beauty which I have been attempting to develope. It is scarcely necessary for me to observe, that, in those instances where Association operates in height- ening the pleasures we receive from sight, the pleas- ing emotion continues still to appear, to our con- sciousness, simple and uncompounded. How little soever the qualities that are visible may in them- selves, contribute to the joint result, it is these quali- ties which solely, or at least chiefly, occupy our at- tention. The object itself seems invested with the charms which we have lent to it ; and so completely are these charms united, in our apprehensions, with those attached to the organic impression, that we never think of referring them to different causes ; but conceive that the Beauty of the object increases in proportion to the rapture with which we gaze on it. Hence the surprise and disappointment we are apt to feel, when we strive in vain, by an exhibition of the supposed cause of our delight, to impart to a 332 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. stranger an enthusiasm similar to our own : And hence, upon all questions in which the affections are concerned, a diversity in the tastes and predilections of individuals, which is not to be reconciled by any general principles drawn from the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Nor is there anything in this process different from what the analogy of our other perceptions would lead us to expect. If the constant co-exist- tence of two such heterogeneous qualities as colour and extension in the objects of sight, renders them completely inseparable in our thoughts, why should we wonder, that the intellectual and more fugitive elements of Beauty, should be insensibly identified with whatever forms and colours may chance to em- body them to the eye or to the fancy ? The most striking illustration of this that can be produced is the complicated assemblage of charms, physical and moral, which enter into the composition of Female Beauty. What philosopher can presume to analyze the different ingredients ; or to assign to matter and to mind their respective shares in excit- ing the emotion which he feels ? I believe, for my own part, that the effect depends chiefly on the Mind ; and that the loveliest features, if divested of their expression, would be beheld with indifference. But no person thus philosophizes when the object is before him, or dreams of any source of his pleasure, but that Beauty which fixes his gaze. With what admirable precision and delicacy are its undefinable elements touched on in the following verses '. Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 333 " Rien ne manque a Venus, ni les lys, ni les roses, " Ni le melange exquis des plus aimables choses, " Ni ce charme secret dont 1'oeil est enchante, " Ni la grace plus belle encore que la beaute." * In Homer's description of Juno, when attiring her- self to deceive Jupiter, by trying " the old, yet still " successful cheat of love ;" it is remarkable that the poet leaves to her own fancy the whole task of adorning and heightening her personal attractions j but when she requests Venus to grant her -" Those conqu'ring charms, " That power which mortals and immortals warms," The gifts which she receives are, all of them, signi- ficant of mental qualities alone : -" The gentle vow, the gay desire, " The kind deceit, the still reviving fire, " Persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs, " Silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes." The exquisite allegory of the Cestus expresses, in one single word, how innumerable and ineffable were the enchantments, visible and invisible, which the Goddess of Love mingled together, in binding her omnipotent spell, t * La Fontaine. Adonis. f I have adopted, in the text, Pope's version (though some. what paraphrastical), in preference to the original ; as it com- bines at once the authority of ancient and of modern taste, in confirmation of the point which it is brought to illustrate. The words of Homer are at least equally apposite to my purpose with those of his translator : " EyO" zvi fj,sv p/Aorjjs, sv o' ifttgog, sv o (i TlaotpaiJi;, tir exXs-vj/s vow ffvxa fftg 33'i ON THE BEAUTIFUL. l-^ay L The intimate combination which, in this and va- rious other cases, exists between the immediate ob- jects of sight, and the moral ideas they suggest, led, in ancient times, Plato, as well as his master So- crates, and many later philosophers of the same school, to conclude, that the word Beauty, in its li- teral acceptation, denotes a quality, not of matter, but of mind / and that, as the light we admire on - the discs of the moon and planets is, when traced to its original source, the light of the sun, so what is commonly called the beauty of the material world is but a reflection from those primitive and underiv- ed beauties, which the intellectual eye can alone per- ceive. I have already said, that, in my opinion, the chief effect of Female Beauty depends on Expression. > A similar remark may be applied (though perhaps not altogether in the same extent) to the Material Universe in general ; the Beauty of which, it can- not be denied, is wonderfully heightened to those who are able to read in it the expressive characters of a Governing Intelligence. But still I think that The je ne spais quoi of the French, and the fortunate phrase in an English song (" the provoking charm of Ccelia altogether"), have been suggested by the same feeling with respect to the pro- blematical essence of female beauty. The very word charm, when its different meanings are attentively considered, will be found an additional confirmation of this remark. " Amoret, my lovely foe, " Tell me where thy strength does lie ; " Where the power that charms us so ; " In thy soul, or in thine eye ?" Walhr. Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 335 Beauty, in its literal sense, denotes what is present* ed to the organ of Sight ; and that it is afterwards transferred to moral qualities by an associating pro- cess, similar to that which combines the smell of a rose with its beautiful form and colour ; or which embellishes our native spot with the charms which it borrows from the pleasures of memory. The chief difference between the cases here mentioned, con- sists in the intimate and inseparable union, which, in the human face, connects soul and body with each other ; a union to which nothing completely analo- gous occurs in any other association whatsoever. -" Her pure and eloquent blood " Spoke in her cheek, and so distinctly wrought, " That one might almost say her body thought." To the peculiar intimacy of this connection (which, as long as the beautiful object is under our survey, blends the qualities of Matter and those of Mind in one common perception) it seems to be owing, that the word Beauty comes, in process of time, to be applied to certain moral qualities con- sidered abstractly. * The qualities which are thus * Such, too, seems to have been the opinion of Cicero, from the following passage, which coincides remarkably, in more re- spects than one, with the doctrine maintained in the text : " Itaque eorum ipsorum, quce adspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud " animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convcnientiam partium " sentit ; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad ani- " mum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constan- " tiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandum putat, &c. " &c. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem " Honesti vides ; quae, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut " ait Plalo) excitaret sapientiae." De Offic, Lib. i. 336 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. i , ay i. characterized in ordinary discourse are, in truth, exactly those which it gives us the greatest delight to see expressed in the countenance ; * or such as have a tendency (which is the case with various af- fections of the mind) to improve the risible beauty which the features exhibit. Is it surprising, that, to a person who has been accustomed to apply the epithet Beautiful to the smile of complacency and kindness, the same epithet should naturally occur as expressively characteristical of the disposition and temper, which it is the study of Beauty to display, when solicitous to assume her most winning form ? Such transitions in the use of words are daily ex- epplified in all the various subjects about which language is employed : And, in the present instance, the transition is so easy and obvious, that we are at a loss to say which is the literal and which the me- taphorical meaning. In the cases which have been hitherto under our consideration, the visible object, if it is not the phy- sical cause, furnishes, at least, the occasion of the pleasure we feel j and it is on the eye alone that any organic impression is supposed to be made. Our other senses, indeed, frequently contribute to the effect ; but they do so only through the me- dium of the associating principle, when, by its means, the pleasures originally derived from them are blended and identified with those peculiar to vi- sion. * TLongov ouv vo[i,tTst$ qdiov opav fiSy avSgufisz, 81 wv rat, xaXa r"s xayaOa ^ aya7r?jra TJ#>) (fxumrai, q o! &v rex, a/ff%ga rt ^ crovjjga, ^ tM(>qra,,Xen Mem. Lib. iii. cap. x. Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 337 The same observation is applicable to all the va- rious moral and intellectual enjoyments, which, by combining themselves with the effects of colours and of forms, may embellish the original beauties of those material objects, which, while they please the eye, exercise the understanding, awaken the fancy, or touch the heart. Hence, to a botanist, the lux- ury of a garden, where everything is arranged with a view to his favourite study ; hence, to the poet, the charms of a romantic retreat ; hence, to every mind alive to the common sympathies of nature, the inspiring influence of scenes consecrated to the me- mory of worth, of valour, or of genius. There is, however, nothing which places, in so strong a light, the truth of the preceding remarks, as the consent of all mankind in applying the word Beautiful to Order, to Fitness, to Utility, to Sym- metry ; above all, to that skill and comprehensive- ness, and unity of design, which, combining a mul- titude of parts into one agreeable whole, blend the charms of variety with that of simplicity. All of these circumstances are calculated to give pleasure to the understanding ; but as this pleasure is con- veyed through the medium of the eye, they are uni- versally confounded with the pleasing qualities which form the direct objects of its physical perceptions. * The only other external sense, to the objects of which the epithet Beautiful is directly and imme- * I shall have occasion, in another Essay, to make some addi- tional remarks on Utility, Fitness, &c. considered in their rela- tion to the idea of Beauty. Y 338 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay L diately applied, is that of hearing. But this use of the word appears to me to be plainly transitive, aris- ing, in part, from the general disposition we have to apply to one class of our perceptions, the epithets strictly appropriated to the agreeable qualities per- ceived by another. * It is thus we speak of the soft verdure of the fields, and of the sweet song of the nightingale ; t and that we sometimes heap, one upon another, these heterogeneous epithets, in the same description. ** Softltpfaedf in Lydiar. measures" The poverty of language is partly the cause of this ; but the substitution is, at the same time, pleas- ingly expressive to the fancy ; and its incongruity is never more likely to escape the severe examination of the judgment, than when the thing we wish to describe has any tendency to excite rapture, to rouse enthusiasm, or even to inspire gaiety. " Dulce ridentem Lalagen aniabo, " Dulce loquemem." " Still drink delicious poison from thy eye." * A very curious transition of this sort is remarked by Dr Gil- lies, in a note upon his version of Aristotle's Politics. (EueptfaX/itov axistseu}. " The expression," says Dr Gillies, " is remarkable ; the " first word, denoting what is pleasing to the eye, had come to ".denote what is agreeable in general ; and thence, joined with " axxSeu, what is pleasing to hear." Vol. II. p. 115, 2d ed. j- " It is remarkable that, in some languages, soft and sweet " have but one name. Doux, in French, signifies soft as well as " sweet. The Latin dulcis and the Italian dolce have, in many " cases, the same double signification." Burke, Part iv. sect. 22. Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 339 Perhaps it may appear to some, that the general analogy of these transitions is sufficient, of itself, in- dependently of all other considerations, to account for the application of the word Beauty to objects of hearings But although this analogy certainly goes a considerable way towards a solution of the problem, 1 it by no means removes the difficulty completely ; inasmuch as it suggests no reason why the epithet Beautiful should be applied to agreeable sounds, ra- ther than to agreeable tastes, or to agreeable odours. On a little farther examination, however, we shall find various other circumstances which render the transition much more natural and much more philo- sophical in the case before us, than it would be in any other class of our perceptions. (1.) The picturesque effect (if I may use the ex- pression) which custom, in many instances, gives to sounds. Thus, the clack of a mill, heard at a dis- tance, conjures up at once to the mind's eye the simple and cheerful scene which it announces ; and thus, though in an incomparably greater degree, the songs which delighted our childhood, transport us into the well-remembered haunts where we were accustomed to hear them. Is it surprising, that, on such occasions, the same language should be some- times transferred froni the things imagined, to those perceptions by which the imagination was awakened? (2.) The expressive power of sounds naturally pathetic. It is thus that the word Beauty, which is at first transferred from the face to the mind, comes to be re-transferred from the mind to the voice ; more especially, when its tones express such passions 340 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. as we have been led, in the manner already explain- ed, to consider as beautiful. Such a transference, which is at all times easy and obvious, seems to be quite unavoidable, when both face and voice, at the same moment, conspire in expressing the same af- fection or emotion. When the soft tones of female gentleness, and the benignity of an angel-smile, reach the heart at one and the same instant, the emotion which is felt, and the object by which it is excited, engage the whole of our attention ; the di- versity of organs by which the effect is conveyed disappears altogether ; and language spontaneously combines, under one common term, those mixed attractions which are already blended and united in the fancy. The Beauty of a musical voice, and the Harmony of beautiful features, are accordingly ex- pressions so congenial to our habits of thinking and of feeling, that we are unconscious, when we use them, of departing from their literal or primitive im- port. Nor is the case essentially different with some other sounds which, in consequence of early habit, have been very intimately associated with the plea- sures of vision. While we are enjoying, in some favourite scene, the beauties of nature, how power- fully do the murmur of fountains, the lowing of cat- tle, and the melody of birds, enhance the delight ! and how irresistibly are we led, by this joint influ- ence of " rural sights and rural sounds" to con- found, in our conceptions and in our speech, these two distinct sources of our pleasure ! If, on such occasions, the impressions produced by objects of Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 341 Sight predominate so far, as to render Beauty and not Harmony or Melody the generic word ; this is no more than might be expected, from the principles formerly stated with respect to the peculiar con- nection between the Eye and the power of Imagina- tion. The transference being once made in a few in- stances, the subsequent extension of the term Beauty to musical composition, and to all other cases in which the ear is concerned, will not appear won- derful to those who have been accustomed to study the natural proceedings of the Mind, as exhibited in the diversified applications of Language. (3.) The significant power of sounds, in conse- quence of conventional speech. In this way, they every moment present pictures to the imagination; and we apply to the description, as to the thing de- scribed (with hardly any consciousness of speaking figuratively), such words as lively, glowing, luminous, splendid, picturesque. Hence an obvious account (as will be afterwards stated more fully) of the application of the epithet Beautiful to Poetry ; and hence also (if the circumstances already suggested should not be thought sufficient for the purpose) an additional reason for its application to Music ; the natural expression of which is so often united with the conventional expression of her sister art. These different circumstances, when combined with the general causes, which, in other instances, produce transitive uses of words, account sufficiently, in my opinion, for the exclusive restriction (among our different external senses) of the term Beauty to 342 ON THE BEAUTIFUL, Essay I. the objects of Sight and of Hearing. To the fore- going considerations, however, I must not omit to add, as a cause conspiring very powerfully to the same end, the intimate association, which, in our ap- prehensions, is formed between the Eye and the Ear, as the great inlets of our acquired knowledge ; as the only media by which different Minds can communicate together ; and as the organs by which we receive from the material world the two classes of pleasures, which, while they surpass all the rest in variety ancj. in duration, are the most completely removed from the grossness of animal indulgence, and the most nearly allied to the enjoyments of the intellect. The unconsciousness we have, in both these senses, of any local impression on our bodily frame, may, perhaps, help to explain the peculiar facility with which their perceptions blend them- selves with other pleasures of a rank still nobler and more refined. It is these two classes, accordingly, of organical pleasures, which fall exclusively under the cognizance of that power of intellectual Taste, which I propose afterwards to examine ; and for the analysis of which, this disquisition, concerning some of the most important of its appropriate objects, seemed to me to form a necessary preparation. If the view of the subject now given be just, we are at once relieved from all the mystery into which philosophers have been insensibly led, in their theories of Beauty, by too servile an acquiescence in the exploded conclusions of the ancient schools con- cerning General Ideas. Instead of searching for the common idea or essence which the word Beauty Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 343 denotes, when applied to colours, to forms, to sounds, to compositions in verse and prose, to mathematical theorems, and to moral qualities, our attention is directed to the natural history of the Human Mind, and to its natural progress in the employment of speech. The particular exemplifications which I have offered of my general principle, may probably be exceptionable in various instances ; but I cannot help flattering myself with the belief, that the prin- ciple itself will bear examination. Some objections to it, which I can easily anticipate, may perhaps be in part obviated by the following remarks. Although I have endeavoured to shew that our rst notions of Beauty are derived from colours, it neither follows, that, in those complex ideas of the Beautiful which we are afterwards led to form in the progress of our experience, this quality must neces- sarily enter as a component part ; nor, where it does so enter, that its effect must necessarily predominate over that of all the others. On the contrary, it may be easily conceived in what manner its effect comes to be gradually supplanted by those pleasures of a higher cast, with which it is combined ; while, at the same time, we continue to apply to the joint result the language which this now subordinate, and seemingly unessential ingredient, originally sug- gested. It is by a process somewhat similar, that the mental attractions of a beautiful woman supplant those of her person in the heart of her lover ; and that, when the former have the good fortune to sur- vive the latter, they appropriate to themselves, by an imperceptible metaphor, that language, which, in its 344 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. literal sense, has ceased to have a meaning. In this case, a very pleasing arrangement of Nature is ex- hibited j the qualities of Mind which insensibly stole, in the first instance, those flattering epithets which are descriptive of a fair exterior, now restor- ing their borrowed embellishments, and keeping alive, in the eye of conjugal affection, that Beauty which has long perished to every other. The progress just remarked, in the instance of Colours, admits of an easy and complete illustration, in the gradual transference of the painter's admira- tion (in proportion as his taste is exercised and im- proved), from the merely organical charms of his art, to its sublimer beauties. It is not that he is less delighted with beautiful colouring than before ; but because his Imagination can easily supply its absence, when excellencies of a superior order en- gage his attention. * It is for the same reason, that a masterly sketch with chalk, or with a pencil, gives, to a practised eye, a pleasure to which nothing could be added by the hand of a common artist ; and that the relics of ancient statuary, which are beheld with comparative indifference by the vulgar of all countries, are surveyed by men of cultivated taste with still greater rapture, than the forms which live on the glowing canvas of the painter. Hence, too, it happens, that, in the progress of Taste, the word Beautiful comes to be more pecu- liarly appropriated (at least by critics and philoso- phers) to Beauty in its most complicated and im- * See Note (Y.) Chap. VI. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 345 pressive form. In this sense we plainly understand it, when we speak of analysing beauty. To Colour, and to the other simple elements which enter into its composition, although we may still, with the most unexceptionable propriety, apply this epithet, we more commonly (as far as I am able to judge) apply the epithet pleasing, or some equivalent expression. I shall only remark farther, on this head, that, in the imitative arts, the most beautiful colours, when they are out of place, or when they do not harmo- nize with each other, produce an effect which is pecu- liarly offensive ; and that, in articles of dress or of furniture, a passion for gaudy decoration is justly re- garded as the symptom of a taste for the Beautiful, which is destined never to pass the first stage of in- fancy. 346 *N THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. CHAPTER SEVENTH. CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. OBJECTIONS TO A THEORY OF BEAUTY PROPOSED BY FATHER BUF- FIER AND SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS. concluding these disquisitions concerning the influence of Association on our ideas of the Beautiful, I think it proper to take some notice of a theory upon the subject, adopted by two very emi- nent men, Father Buffier and Sir Joshua Reynolds, according to which we are taught, that " the effect " of Beauty depends on Habit alone ; the most f customary form in each species of things being in- f< variably the most beautiful." " A beautiful nose," for example (to borrow Mr Smith's short, but masterly illustration of Buffier 's principle), " is one that is neither very long nor very " short ; neither very straight nor very crooked ; ** but a sort of middle among all these extremes, and " less different from any one of them, than all of " them are from one another. It is the form which " nature seems to have aimed at in them all ; which, " however, she deviates from in a great variety of " ways, and very rarely hits exactly, but to which 3 Chap. VII. 6N THE BEAUTIFUL. 347 " all these deviations still bear a very strong resem- " blance. In each species of creatures, what " is most beautiful bears the strongest characters of " the general fabric of the species, and has the " strongest resemblance to the greater part of the " individuals with which it is classed. Monsters, " on the contrary, or what is perfectly deformed, " are always most singular and odd, and have the " least resemblance to the generality of that species " to which they belong. And thus, the beauty of " each species, though, in one sense, the rarest of " all things, because few individuals hit the middle * f form exactly, yet, in another, is the most common, " because all the deviations from it resemble it more " than they resemble one another." * The same opinion has been since stated in much stronger and more explicit terms, by a still higher authority than Buffier, Sir Joshua Reynolds. " Every species," he observes, " of the animal * as well as the vegetable creation, may be said to " have a fixed or determinate form, towards which f* Nature is continually inclining, like various lines '* terminating in the centre j and, as these lines all " cross the centre, though only one passes through " any other point, so it will be found, that perfect " beauty is oftener produced by nature than de- " formity : I do not mean than deformity in ge- " neral, but than any one kind of deformity. To " instance, in a particular part of a feature, the line " that forms the ridge of the nose is beautiful when * Theory of Moral Sentiments. 318 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. " it is straight. This, then, is the central form, " which is oftener found than either concave, con- " vex, or any other irregular form that shall be pro- " posed. As we are then more accustomed to beau- " ty than to deformity, we may conclude that to be " the reason why we approve and admire it, as we " approve and admire customs and fashions of dress, " for no other reason than that we are used to " them ; so that, though habit and custom cannot " be said to be the cause of beauty, it is certainly " the cause of our liking it : And I have no doubt, " but that, if we were more used to deformity than " beauty, deformity would then lose the idea now " annexed to it, and take that of beauty ; as if the " whole world should agree, that yes and no should " change their meaning ; yes would then deny, and " no would affirm." * As this theory has plainly taken its rise from a misconception of the manner in which the principle of Association operates, the objections to it which I have to offer form a natural sequel to the discus- sions contained in the preceding chapter. Among these objections, what strikes myself with the greatest force is, that, granting the theory to be just, so far as it goes, it does not at all touch the main difficulty it professes to resolve. Admitting it to be a fact (as I very readily do, in the sense in which the proposition is explained by Reynolds), " That iw each species of things, the most custom- " ary form is the most beautiful ;" and supposing, * Idler, No. 82. See also Reynolds's Works by Maione, 2d edit. p. 237. 1 Chap. VII. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 349 for the sake of argument, that this fact wan-anted the very illogical inference, " That the effect of " Beauty in that species depends on habit alone ;" the question still remains to be answered ; on what principle do we pronounce the Beauty of one species to be greater than that of another ? To satisfy the conditions of the problem, it is obviously necessary, not only to shew how one Rose comes to be consi- dered as more beautiful than another Rose ; one Peacock as more beautiful than another Peacock j one Woman as more beautiful than another Woman ; but to explain why the Rose is pronounced to be more beautiful than the Dandelion, the Peacock more beautiful than the Stork, and a Beautiful Wo- man to be the masterpiece of Nature's handywork. To such questions as these, the theory of Reynolds does not furnish even the shadow of a reply. This, however, is not the only objection to which it is liable. When applied to account for the com- parative Beauty of different things of the same kind, it will be found altogether unsatisfactory and erroneous. In proof of this assertion, it is almost sufficient to mention the consequence to which it obviously and necessarily leads, according to the acknowledgment of its ingenious authors ; That no individual object is fitted to give pleasure to the spectator, previous to a course of comparative observations on a number of other objects of the same kind. It will afterwards appear, that, in adopting this idea, Buffier and Rey- nolds have confounded the principle of Taste (which is an acquired power, implying comparison and re- 350 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. flection) with our natural susceptibility of the pleas- ing effect which Beauty produces. In the mean- time, it is of more importance to remark, that nei- ther of these writers has attempted to assign any rea- son why a pleasing effect should be connected with those qualities which are most commonly to be ob- served in nature ; and, therefore, granting that the general fact corresponds with their statement, it re- mains to be considered, whether particular objects are perceived to be Beautiful, in consequence of their coincidence with those arrangements at which Nature appears to aim ; or whether our perception of this coincidence be not a subsequent discovery, found- ed on a comparison of her productions with some no- tions of Beauty previously formed. To say, with Reynolds, that " we approve and admire Beauty, be- " cause we are more accustomed to it than Defor- " mity ; as we approve and admire customs and fa- " shions of dress, for no other reason than that " we are used to them," is manifestly an imperfect solution of the difficulty. Even in the article of dress, it is not custom alone, but the example of those whom we look up to as patterns worthy of imitation j that is, it is not the custom of the many, but the fashion of the few, which has the chief in- fluence on our judgments ; and, consequently, ad- mitting (what I am by no means disposed to yield) that one mode of dress is, in itself, as beautiful as another, this concession would only afford an addi- tional illustration of the power of the associating principle, without proving anything in favour of that conclusion which Reynolds wishes to establish; Chap. VII. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 351 Nor is the instance of monstrous animal produc- tions, appealed to by Buffier, more in point. The disgust which they excite seems to arise principally from some idea of pain or suffering connected with their existence ; or from the obvious unfitness of the structure of the individual for the destined purposes- of his species. No similar emotion is excited by an analogous appearance in the vegetable, or in the mi- neral kingdoms ; or even by those phenomena which contradict the uniform tenor of our past experience, with respect to Nature's most obvious and familiar laws. What occurrence so constantly presented to our senses as the fall of heavy bodies ! yet nobody ever thought of applying to it the epithet beautiful. The rise of a column of smoke is a comparative ra- rity ; and yet how often has it amused the eye of the infant, of the painter, of the poet, and of the philo- sopher ! Although the human form be necessarily fixed, by its own gravity, to the surface of this globe, how beautiful are those pictures of ancient poetry, in which the Gods are represented as transporting themselves, at pleasure, between earth and heaven ! Even the genius of Shakespeare, in attempting to amplify the graces of a favourite Hero, has reserved for the last place in the climax, an attitude suggested by this Imaginary attribute of the heathen divinities. " A station, like the herald Mercury, " New lighted on a heaven-kissing hill." A still more obvious example, leading to the same conclusion, may be drawn from the agreeable effects of lights and colours ; the very appearances from which I conceive our first notions of beauty are de- 352 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. rived. Few, I presume, will venture to assert, that it is altogether owing to custom, that the eye de- lights to repose itself oo the soft verdure of a field ; or that there is nothing naturally attractive in the splendid illuminations of summer. From the regu- lar vicissitudes of day and of night, custom (if no- thing else were to operate) should entitle them both, in the same degree, to the appellation of Beautiful ; but such, certainly, has not been the judgment of mankind in any age of the world. " Truly the light " is sweet, and it is a pleasant thing for the eyes to " behold the sun." The criticisms which I have hazarded on the spe- culations of these writers do not affect the certainty, nor detract from the importance of the assumption on which they proceed. The only point in dispute is, whether individual objects please in consequence of their approximation to the usual forms and co- lours of Nature ; or whether Nature herself is not pronounced to be Beautiful, in consequence of the regular profusion in which she exhibits forms and colours intrinsically pleasing ? Upon either supposi- tion, great praise is due to those who have so happi- ly illustrated the process by which taste is guided in the study of ideal beauty ; a process which Reynolds must be allowed to have traced and descrioed with admirable sagacity, even by such as think the most lightly of the metaphysical doctrine which he has blended with his statement of the fact. I must own, indeed, that it was not without some surprise I first read the Essay in which the opinion I have now been controverting is proposed by this Chap. VII. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 353 great artist. To have found the same paradox in the works of an abstract philosopher, however dis- tinguished for ingenuity and learning, would have been entirely of a piece with the other extravagan- cies which abound in books of science ; but it is dif- ficult to reconcile the genuine enthusiasm with which Reynolds appears to have enjoyed the Beauties, both of Nature and of Art, with the belief, that " if " Beauty were as rare as deformity now is, and de- " formity as prevalent as actual Beauty, these words " would entirely change their present meanings, in " the same manner in which the word yes might be- " come a negative, and no an affirmative, in conse-? " quence of a general convention among mankind." The truth has probably been, that, in the judgment of Reynolds (as too often happens to all men in the more serious concerns of life), a prepossession in favour of a particular conclusion, added verisimili- tude to the premises of which it was supposed to be the consequence ; and that a long experience of the practical value of the maxim which it was his lead- ing object to recommend, blinded him to the ab- surdity of the theory which he employed to support it.* * See Note (Z.) ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. PART SECOND. ON THE BEAUTIFUL, WHEN PRESENTED TO THE POWER OF IMAGINATION. FROM the account given of Conception in my Ana- lysis of the intellectual faculties, * it appears, that we have a power of representing to ourselves the absent objects of our perceptions, and also the sensa- tions which we remember to have felt. I can pic- ture out, for example, in my own mind, or (to ex- press myself without a metaphor) I can think upon any remarkable building, or any remarkable scene with which I am familiarly acquainted. I can, in like manner (though by no means with the same distinctness and steadiness), think of the Smell of a Rose, of the Taste of a Pine- Apple, or of the Sound of a Trumpet. In consequence of the various func- tions of this power, which extend to the provinces of all the different Senses, the old English writers (after the example of the schoolmen) frequently disr * See Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. 11 Part II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 355 tinguish it by the title of Sensus Communis, a phrase which they employ precisely in the same acceptation in which I use the word Conception. It is in this way that the phrase common sense (which has now so many other meanings, both popular and philoso- phical) is employed by Sir John Davis, in his Poem on the Immortality of the Soul ; by Dr Cudworth, in his Treatise of Immutable Morality ; and by many others, both of an earlier and of a later date. To the peculiar ease and vivacity with which we can recal the perceptions of Sight, it is owing, that our thoughts are incomparably more frequently occupied in such visual representations, than in con- ceiving Smells, Tastes, or Sounds ; and that, when we think of these last sensations, we generally strive to lay hold of them by means of some visible object with which they are associated. I can easily, for example, think of the fonn and colour of a Rose, with little or no idea of its smell ; but when I wish to conceive the smell as distinctly as possible, I find that the most effectual means I can use, is to con- ceive the flower itself to be presented to my eye. The sense of Sight, accordingly, maintains the same pre-eminence over our other senses, in furnishing ma- terials to the power of Conception, that, in its actual exercise, belongs to it, as the great channel of our acquired information, and the habitual medium of our intercourse with things external. If there be any difference between the two cases, its pre-emi- nence is still more remarkable in the former than in the latter. In treating of the Beauty of Perceptible Objects, 356 ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. I have already endeavoured to explain how this word cemes to be applied to qualities specifically and essen- tially different from each other, in consequence of the indivisible simplicity of the emotion which they excite in the mind, while they are presented to it at one and the same moment. The solution is more obviously satisfactory, where these qualities produce their effect through the same common channel of Vision ; and this they do in every case, but that of the beauties which we are supposed to perceive by the organ of Hearing. There, it must be owned, the former principles do not apply in all their ex- tent j but to compensate for any deficiency in their application to this class of our pleasures, a variety of peculiarities were mentioned as characteristical of Sounds, which seem to place their beauties nearly on a footing with those more immediately attached to the perceptions of the eye. The same observations hold still more completely with respect to the cor- responding Conceptions of these different qualities. The features of a Beautiful Woman ; the amiable af- fections which they express ; and the musical tones which accord with this expression, however intimate- ly connected in our thoughts when the object is be- fore us, are united still more completely, when the power of Conception (the Sensus Communis of the intellect) attempts to grasp them all in one combina- tion. In this last case, too, it is the picture alone which strongly and permanently fixes the attention ; and its agreeable concomitants add te the effect ra- ther by the association of fugitive impressions or feel- is Part II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 357 ings, than by that of Conceptions, on which we are able steadily to dwell. The manner in which Conception is subservient to Imagination, and the grounds of that conspicuous and prominent place which, in all the creations of the latter power, is invariably occupied by images borrowed from Sight, have been already sufficiently explained. It is from the sense of Sight, according- ly (as was formerly remarked), that Imagination has derived its name ; and it is extremely worthy of ob- servation, that to this power, and to the nearly allied one of Fancy, the epithet Beautiful has exclusively been applied among all our various intellectual facul- ties. We speak of a beautiful imagination, and a beautiful fancy ; and to the poet, who is supposed to unite both, we ascribe a beautiful genius. But it is not to visible things, nor to conceptions derived by any of our senses from the material world, that the province of Imagination is confined. We may judge of this from that combination of intellec- tual gratifications which we receive through the me- dium of Poetry ; an art which addresses itself, in the first instance, to the ear ; but which aspires to unite with the organic charm of numbers, whatever plea- sures imagination is able to supply. These plea- sures (as I have elsewhere observed) are as various as the objects of human thought, and the sources of human happiness. " All the beauties of external nature" (if I may be allowed to quote here a few sentences from another work) ; " all that is amiable " or interesting, or respectable in human character ; M all that excites and engages our benevolent affec- ON THE BEAUTIFUL. Essay I. " tions ; all those truths which make the heart feel " itself better and more happy; all these supply ma- " terials, out of which the poet forms and peoples a " world of his own, where no inconveniencies damp " our enjoyments, and where no shades darken our " prospects." " The measured composition in which the poet " expresses himself, is only one of the means which " he employs to please. As the delight which he " conveys to the imagination is heightened by the " other agreeable impressions which he can unite in " the mind at the same time, he studies to bestow, " upon the medium of communication which he em- " ploys, all the various beauties of which it is sus- " ceptible. Among these, the harmony of numbers " is not the least powerful ; for its effect is constant, " and does not interfere with any of the other plea- " sures which language produces. A succession of " agreeable perceptions is kept up by the organical " effect of words upon the ear, while they inform " the understanding by their perspicuity and pre- " cision, or please the imagination by the pictures " they suggest, or touch the heart by the associa- " tions they awaken. Of all these charms of lan- " guage the poet may avail himself; and they are all " so many instruments of his art. To the philoso- " pher, or to the orator, they may occasionally be " of use ; and to both they must be constantly so far " an object of study, that nothing may occur in their " compositions which may distract the attention, by " offending either the ear or the taste : but the " poet must not rest satisfied with this negative Part II. ON THE BEAUTIFUL. 359 " praise* Pleasure is the end of his art ; and the " more numerous the sources of it which lie can " open, the greater will be the effect produced by " the efforts of his genius." * To my own mind, the above passage appears to throw a strong light on the subject which is under our consideration at present. In the same manner in which the Eye (while we actually look abroad upon nature) attaches to its appropriate objects so great a variety of pleasures, both physical and moral ; so to the poet, Language serves as a common chan- nel or organ for uniting all the agreeable impres- sions of which the senses, the understanding, and the heart, are susceptible : And as the word Beauty is naturally transferred from colours and forms to the other pleasing qualities which may be associated with these, and to the various moral qualities of which they may be expressive ; so the same word is insensibly extended from those images which form at once the characteristical feature, and the most fas- cinating charm of poetry, to the numberless other sources of delight which it opens, t The meaning of the word Beautiful becomes thus * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. t Of the relation which the charm of Beautiful Imagery bears to the other pleasures of which language is the vehicle, Cowley seems to have formed an idea, equally poetical and just, in the. following simile, which he applies to the copious and figurative eloquence of his friend Dr Sprat. " It does, like Thames, the best of rivers, glide ; " And his bright fancy, all the way, " Does, like the sunshine, in it play." O in the following verses, which I quote chiefly on account of the additional proof they afford of the intimate association between the conception of mere height or superiority, and of that metaphorical sublimity which falls under the cogniz- ance of critical and of ethical inquirers. " Felices animos, quibus hzec cognoscere primis " Inque domos superas scandere cura fuit ! " Credibile est illos pariter vitiisque locisque " Altitis humanis cxseruisse caput. " Non Venus et Vinum SUBLIMIA pectora fregit, " Officiumve fori, militiaeve labor, " Nee levis ambitio, perfusaque gloria fuco, " Magnarumve fames sollicitavit opum. " Admovere oculis distantia sidera nostris, " jEtheraque ingenio supposuere suo. " Sic petitur coelum." Eminent moral qualities, too, particularly those of the more rare and heroical kind, are frequently cha- racterized by the same language. 12 Chap. I. ON THE SUBLIME. 383 " Pauci quos cequus amavit " Jupiter, aut ardens evexit ad aethera virtus, ' " Dis geniti, potuere." " Virtus, recludens immeritis mori " Coelum, negata tentat iter via : " Coetusque vulgar es ct udam " Spernit humum fugicntc penna." The more sober imagination of philosophical mo- ralists has, in general, disposed them to content themselves with likening the discipline of a virtuous life to a toilsome ascent up a rugged steep, growing less and less difficult at every step that we gain. In this, as in the allusions just quoted from the poets, the radical idea is, a continued course of active exer- tion, in opposition to the downward tendency of ter- restrial gravitation, * To the more eminent and distinguishing attain- ments, accordingly, of the virtuous man, some mo- dern writers have given the title of the moral sub- lime ; a metaphorical phrase, to which another na- tural association, afterwards to be mentioned, lends much additional propriety and force. Three other very conspicuous peculiarities distin- guish Sublimity from Depth, and also from horizon- tal Distance. 1. The vertical line in which Vege- tables shoot : 2. The erect form of Man, surmount- ed with the seat of intelligence, and with the ele- vated aspect of the human face divine : 3. The up- ward growth of the Human Body, during that pe- riod when the intellectual and moral progress of the mind is advancing with the greatest rapidity : AJJ * See Note (B b.) 38 -i ON THE SUBLIME. Essay IT. of them presenting the most impressive images of an aspiring ambition, or of a tendency to rise higher ; in opposition to that law of gravity which, of all physical facts, is the most familiar to our senses. * With these three circumstances, there is a fourth which conspires, in no inconsiderable degree, in im- parting an allegorical or typical character to literal sublimity. I allude to the Rising, Culminating, and Setting pf the heavenly bodies ;- more particularly to the Rising, Culminating, and Setting of the Sun ; accompanied with a corresponding increase and de- crease in the heat and splendour of his rays. It is impossible to enumerate all the various analogies which these familiar appearances suggest to the fan- cy, I shall only mention their obvious analogy to * The foregoing considerations (to which many others of a si- milar tendency will be added in the sequel) sufficiently account for the frequent recurrence of the idea of Power or Force among the elements of the Sublime. According to a theory already men- tioned, this idea is the radical or essential element of Sublimity ; but granting, for a moment, this to be the case, the question still recurs, whence the connection (so remarkably exemplified in the phraseology both of ancient and of modern languages) betweett this moral emotion, and the physical idea of height or elevation ? Is not this the obvious, though overlooked consequence, of the universality of the law of gravitation; and of the vertical direction in which that power operat.es all over the surface of the earth? The theory, however, which would resolve into the idea of Power all the impressions to which the epithet Sublime is appli- cable, will be found, on examination, much too narrow for such a superstructure ; while the Associations illustrated in the text af- ford at once an explanation of all the facts on which this theory rests, and of many others to which it cannot be extended, with- out much straining and over-refinement. Chap. I. ON THE SUBLIME. the Morning, Noon, and Evening of life ; and to the short interval of Meridian Glory, which, after a gra- dual advance to the summit, has so often presaged the approaching decline of human greatness. It is not, however, to be imagined, because Height is a source of Sublime emotion, that Depth must ne- cessarily affect the mind with feelings of an opposite description. Abstracting altogether from the state of the fact, which is decisive against such a supposi- tion, we should not be entitled to draw this conclu- sion from any of the theoretical considerations hither- to stated. For although, in most cases, motion downwards conveys the idea of a passive obedience to physical laws, it frequently implies active powers exactly the same with those which are displayed in the ascent of animated beings. Instances of this occur in the equable and regulated descent of a bird, when about to alight on the ground ; and (what is still more to our purpose) in the stooping flight of a hawk or of an eagle, darting upon its quarry ; a motion which is sometimes suddenly arrested in its accelerating career, and instantly succeeded by a re- treat into the clouds. It is to be remembered, besides, that, in the de- scent of bodies from a great height, their previous ascent is implied ; and, accordingly, the active power by which their elevation was effected, is necessarily recalled to the imagination, by the momentum ac- quired during the period of their fall. * * The same idea (as will afterwards appear more fully) 5s as- sociated with the metaphorical use of the same language. " Si cadendnm est niihi, ccelo cccidisse velim." Bb' ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. The feelings produced by looking downwards from the battlement of a high tower, or from the edge of a precipitous rock, have also had a frequent place in sublime descriptions ; and Mr Burke seems to have thought that they are still more powerful in their effect than those excited by the idea of great altitude. In this opinion I cannot agree with him, if it be understood to imply anything more than that a particular eminence may appear con- temptible when viewed from below, while it pro- duces an emotion allied to the sublime, on a spec- tator who looks down from its summit. Of the possibility of this every person must be satisfied from his own experience ; but it is altogether fo- reign to the question, whether Height or Depth in general is capable of producing the strongest im- pression of Sublimity ; a question, the decision of which appears to me to be not more difficult or du- bious than that of the former ; and which I shall en- deavour afterwards to place beyond the reach of con- troversy, in a subsequent part of this Essay. The feelings, at the same time, of which we are conscious in looking down from an eminence, are extremely curious ; and are, in some cases, modified by certain intellectual processes, which it is neces- say to attend to, in order to understand completely the principles upon which Depth has occasionally such a share in adding to the power of sublime emo- tions. The first and the most important of these proces- ses is, the strong tendency of the imagination to re- present to us, by an ideal change of place, the feel- Chap. I. ON THE SUBLIME. 387 ings of those who are below ; or to recal to us our own feelings, previous to our ascent. This tenden- cy of the imagination we are the more disposed to indulge, as it is from below that altitudes are most frequently viewed ; and as we are conscious, when we look downwards, of the unusual circumstances in which we are placed. We compare the apparent Depth with the apparent Height, and are astonish- ed to find how much we had underrated the latter. It is owing to this, that mountains, when seen from the contiguous plain, produce their sublimest effect on persons accustomed to visit their summits ; and that a lofty building, like the dome of St Paul's, ac- quires ever after tenfold grandeur in our estimation, when we have once measured its height, step by step, and have looked down from it upon the hum- ble abodes of its ordinary spectators. On the other hand, in looking upwards to a pre- cipice, if one of our fellow-creatures, or even one of the lower animals, should be placed on the brink, the principle of sympathy transports us instantly, in imagination, to the critical spot ; exciting in us some degree of the same feelings, which we should there have experienced. " On the cliffs above," says Gray, in the journal of one of his tours, " hung a " few goats ; one of them danced and scratched an " ear with its hind foot, in a place where I would " not have stood stock-still for all beneath the " moon." It is by such unexpected incidents as this, that the attention is forcibly roused to the se- cret workings of thought ; but something of the same kind takes place on almost every occasion, when Al- 388 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. titude produces the emotion of Sublimity. In ge- neral, whoever examines the play of his imagination, while his eye is employed either in looking up to a lofty eminence, or in looking down from it, will find it continually shifting the direction of its move- ments; " glancing," as the poet expresses it, " from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven." Of this mental process we are more peculiarly conscious in reading the descriptions of poetry : " On a rock, whose haughty brow " Frowns o'er old Conway's foaming flood, " Robed in the sable garb of woe, " With haggard eye the poet stood. " Loose his beard and hoary hair " Streamed like a meteor to the troubled air." Of these lines, the two first present a picture which the imagination naturally views from below : the rest transport us to the immediate neighbour- hood of the bard, by the minuteness of the delinea- tion. As an obvious consequence of this rapidity of thought, it may be worth while here to remark, that the conceptions of the Painter, which are ne- cessarily limited, not only to one momentary glimpse of a passing object, but to one precise and unchange- able point of sight, cannot possibly give expression to those ideal creations, the charm of which de- pends, in a great degree, on their quick and varied succession ; and on the ubiquity (if I may be allow- ed the phrase) of the Poet's eye. No better illus- tration of this can be produced than the verses just quoted, compared with the repeated attempts which Chap. I. ON THE SUBLIME. 389 have been made to represent their subject on canvas. Of the vanity of these attempts it is sufficient to say, that, while the painter has but one point of sight, the poet, from the nature of his art, has been en^ abled, in this instance, to avail himself of two, with- out impairing, in the least, the effect of his descrip- tion, by this sudden and unobserved shifting of the scenery. * In consequence of the play of imagination now described, added to the influence of associations for- merly remarked, it is easily .conceivable in what manner Height and Depth, though precisely oppo- site to each other in their physical properties, should so easily accord together in the pictures which ima- gination forms ; and should even, in many cases, be almost identified in the emotions which they produce. * I cannot help thinking that Gray, while he professes to con- vey a different sentiment, has betrayed a secret consciousness of the unrivalled powers which poetry derives from this latitude in the management of her machinery, in his splendid but exagge- rated panegyric on the designs with which Mr Bentley decorated one of the editions of his book. The circumstances he has pitched on as characteristical of the genius of that artist, are certainly those in which the prerogatives of poetry are the most incontestible. " In silent gaze, the tuneful choir among, " Half pleased, half blushing, let the muse admire, " While Bentley leads her sister art along, " And bids the pencil answer to the lyre. " See, in their course, each transitory thought, " Fixed by his touch, a lasting essence take / * Each dream, in fancy's airy colouring wrought* " To local symmetry and life awafc*." 390 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay IT, Nor will there appear anything in this doctrine savouring of paradox, or of an undue spirit of theory, in the judgment of those who recollect, that, although the humour of Swift and of Arbuthnot has accustomed us to state the T^OX and the BA0OS as standing in direct opposition to each other, yet, according to the phraseology of Longinus, the old- est writer on the subject now extant, the opposite to the sublime is not the profound, but the humble, the low, or the puerile.* In one very remarkable passage, which has puzzled several of his commen- tators not a little, v\>o$ and |3a6os, instead of being stated in contrast with each other, seem to be par- ticularized as two things comprehended under some one common genus, corresponding to that expres- sed by the word altitudo in Latin. c Hjw.n> e ex.eivo ia.'7ropnreov tv <*/>% ti e" The ground-work of this last species of Taste (if it deserves the name) is a certain facility of asso- ciation, acquired by early and constant intercourse with society ; more particularly, with those classes of society who are looked up to as supreme legis- lators in matters of fashion ; a habit of mind, the tendency of which is to render the sense of the Beautiful (as well as the sense of what is Right and Wrong) easily susceptible of modification from the contagion of example. It is a habit by no means inconsistent with a certain degree of original sensi- bility ; nay, it requires, perhaps, some original sensi- bility as its basis : but this sensibility, in conse- quence of the habit which it has itself contributed to establish, soon becomes transient and useless ; losing all connection with Reason and the Moral Principles, and alive only to such impressions as fa- shion recognises and sanctions. The other species of Taste, founded on the study of Universal Beauty (and which, for the sake of distinction, I shall call. Philosophical Taste J, implies a sensibility, deep and 492 ON TASTE. Essay III. permanent, to those objects of affection, admiration, and reverence, which interested the youthful heart, while yet a stranger to the opinions and ways of the world. Its most distinguishing characteristics, ac- cordingly, are strong domestic and local attachments, accompanied with that enthusiastic love of Nature, Simplicity, and Truth, which, in every department, both of art and of science, is the best and surest pre- sage of Genius. It is this sensibility that gives rise .to the habits of attentive observation by which such a Taste can alone be formed ; and it is this also that, binding and perpetuating the associations which such a Taste supposes, fortifies the mind against the fleeting caprices which the votaries of fashion watch and obey. In the farther prosecution of this subject, as well as in the former part of this Essay, my observations must be understood as referring chiefly to that sort of Taste which I have now distinguished by the epithet 'philosophical. It may, at the same time, be proper to remark, that a great part of these observa- tions, particularly those which I have already made on the process by which Taste acquires its discrimi- nation and its promptitude of perception, are appli- cable, with some slight alterations, to that which has for its object local and temporary modes, no less than to the other, which is acquired by the study of Universal Beauty. The two distinguishing characteristics of Good Taste (it has been justly observed by different writers) are correctness and delicacy ; the former having for its province the detection of Blemishes, Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. CHAPTER SECOND. GENERALIZATIONS OF THE WORD SUBLIMITY, IN CON- SEQUENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS AS- SOCIATIONS. BESIDE the circumstances already mentioned, a variety of others conspire to distinguish Sublimity or Altitude from all the other directions in which space is extended ; and which, of consequence, con- spire to invite the imagination, on a correspondent variety of occasions, into one common track. The idea of Sublimity which is, in itself, so grateful and so flattering to the mind, becomes thus a common basis of a great multitude of collateral associations ; establishing universally, wherever men are to be found, an affinity or harmony among the different things presented simultaneously to the thoughts; an affinity, which a man of good taste never fails to re- cognise, although he may labour in vain to trace any metaphysical principle of connection. It is in this way I would account for the application of the word Sublimity to most, if not to all the different qualities enumerated by Mr Burke, as its consti- tuent elements ; instead of attempting to detect in these qualities some common circumstance, or cir- ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. ctunstances, enabling them to produce similar effects. In confirmation of this remark, I shall point out, very briefly, a few of the natural associations attach- ed to the idea of what is physically or literally Sub- lime, without paying much attention to the order in which I am to arrange them. It will contribute greatly to assist my readers in following this argument, always to bear in mind, that the observations which I am to offer neither imply any dissent, on my part, from the critical de- cisions of former writers, nor tend to weaken, in the smallest degree, the authority of their precepts, so far as they are founded on a just induction of parti- culars. A universal association furnishes a basis of practice, as solid and as independent of the caprice of fashion as a metaphysical affinity or relation ; and the investigation of the former is a legitimate object of philosophical curiosity no less than the latter. In the present instance, I am disposed to assent to most of the critical conclusions adopted both by Mr Burke and by Mr Price ; and were the case otherwise, I should be cautious in opposing my own judgment to theirs, on questions so foreign to my ordinary pur- suits, how freely soever I may have presumed to canvass the opinions which they have proposed on some other points of a more speculative and abstract nature. Of all the associations attached to the idea of 'Sub- limity, the most impressive are those arising from the tendency which the religious sentiments of men, in every age and country, have had to carry their thoughts towards, towards the objects of their wor- Chap. II, ON THE SUBLIME. 395 ship. To what this tendency is owing, i must not at present stop to inquire. It is sufficient for my purpose, if it be granted (and this is a fact about which there cannot well be any dispute), that it is the result of circumstances common to all the vari- ous conditions of mankind. In some cases, the Heavens have been conceived to be the dwelling- place of the Gods ; in others, the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies, have themselves been deified ; but, in all cases, without exception, men have con- ceived their fortunes to depend on causes operating from above. Hence those apprehensions which, in all ages, they have been so apt to entertain, of the influence of the Stars on human affairs. Hence, too, the astrological meaning of the word ascendant, together with its metaphorical application to denote the moral influence which one Mind may acquire over another. * The language of Scripture is ex- * In the following line of Ennins, Jupiter and the Starry Sub* lime are used as synonymous expressions: " Aspice hoc sublime candens, qnem invocant onmes Jorm." It is observed by Sir William Jones, that " the JUPITER or Di- " ESPITER, here mentioned by Ennius, is the Indian God of the " visible heavens, called INDRA, or the King, and DIVESPITER, " or Lord of the Sky ; and that most of his epithets in Sanscrit lt are the same with those of the Ennian JOVE.- His wea- " pon is the thunderbolt ; he is the regent of winds and showers ; < c and though the East is peculiarly under his care, yet hisOlym- " pus is Men/, or the North pole, allegorically represented as a il mountain of gold and gems." Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India. The same natural association has evidently suggested the tow- ering forms so common in edifices consecrated to the memory of ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. actly consonant to these natural associations. " If " I beheld the Sun when it shined, or the Moon " walking in brightness, and my heart hath been " secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my " hand, this also were an iniquity to be punished by " the Judge, for I should have denied the GOD " THAT IS ABOVE." 1 AM THE HIGH AND THE " LOFTY ONE, WHO INHABITETH ETERNITY-" " As THE HEAVENS ARE HIGH ABOVE THE EARTH, " SO ARE MY THOUGHTS ABOVE YOUR THOUGHTS, " AND MY WAYS ABOVE YOUR WAYS." How closely the literal and the religious Sublime were associated together in the mind of Milton (whose taste seems to have been formed chiefly on the study of the poetical parts of the sacred writings), appears from numberless passages in the Paradise Lost, " Now had th* Almighty Father from above, " From the pure empyrean where be sits, " High throned above all height, bent down his eye." In some cases, it may perhaps be doubted, whe- ther Milton has not forced on the mind the image of literal height, somewhat more strongly than ac- cords perfectly with the overwhelming sublimity which his subject derives from so many other sources. the dead, or to the ceremonies of religious worship ; -the forms, for example, of the pyramid ; of the obelisk ; of the column ; and of the spires appropriated to our churches in this part of the >vorld. " The village church, among the trees, " Shall point, with taper spire, to Heaven." Rogers. Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 397 At the same time, who would venture to touch; with a profane hand, the following verses ? " So even and morn accomplish'd the sixth day. " Yet not till the Creator from his work " Desisting, though unwearied, up returned, " Up to the heaven of heavens, his high abode, " Thence to behold this new created world." " Up he rode " Followed with acclamation, and the sound " Symphonious of ten thousand harps, that tuned u Angelic harmony ; the earth, the air, " Resounding (thou rememberest, for thou heardst), " The heavens and all the constellations rung, " The planets in their stations listening stood, " While the bright pomp ascended jubilant." Is it not probable that the impression, produced by this association, strong as it still is, was yet stronger in ancient times? The discovery of the earth's sphericity, and of the general theory of gra- vitation, has taught us that the words above and be- low have only a relative import. The natural as- sociation cannot fail to be more or less counteracted in every understanding to which this doctrine is familiarized ; and although it may not be so far weakened as to destroy altogether the effect of poe- tical descriptions proceeding on popular phraseology, the effect must necessarily be very inferior to what it was in ages, when the notions of the wise con- cerning the local residence of the Gods were pre- cisely the same with those of the vulgar. We may trace their powerful influence on the philosophy of Plato, in some of his Dialogues ; and he is deeply indebted to them for that strain of sublimity which 398 ON THE SUBLIME. ILssay II. characterizes those parts of his writings which have more peculiarly excited the enthusiasm of his fol- lowers. The conclusions of modern science leave the ima- gination at equal liberty to shoot, in all directions, through the immensity of space ; suggesting, un- doubtedly, to a philosophical mind, the most grand and magnificent of all conceptions ; but a concep- tion not nearly so well adapted to the pictures of poetry, as the popular illusion which places heaven exactly over our heads. Of the truth of this last remark no other proof is necessary than the doctrine of the Antipodes, which, when alluded to in poetical description, produces an effect much less akin to the sublime than to the ludicrous. Hence an additional source of the connection be- tween the ideas of Sublimity and of Power. The Heavens we conceive to be the abode of the Al- mighty ; and when we implore the protection of his omnipotent arm, or express our resignation to his irresistible decrees, by an involuntary movement, we lift our eyes upwards.* As of all the attributes of God, Omnipotence is the most impressive in its effects upon the imagina- tion, so the sublimest of all descriptions are those which turn on the infinite Power manifested in the fabric of the universe ; in the magnitudes (more * The same account may be given of the origin of various other natural signs, expressive of religious adoration (palmas ad sidcra tendens, &c. &c.) ; and of some ceremonies which have ob- tained very generally over the world, particularly that of offering up incense. Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 399 especially), the distances, and the velocities of the heavenly bodies ; and in the innumerable systems of worlds which he has called into existence. " Let " there be light, and there was light" has been quoted as an instance of sublime writing by almost every critic since the time of Longinus ; and its sublimity arises partly from the divine brevity with which it expresses the instantaneous effect of the creative fiat ; partly from the religious sentiment which it identifies with our conception of the mo- ment, when the earth was first " visited by the day- *' spring from on high." Milton appears to have felt it in its full force, from the exordium of his hymn: " Hail, holy light! offspring of heaven first-born."* The sublimity of Lucretius will be found to de- pend chiefly (even in those passages where he de- nies the interference of the gods in the government of the world) on the lively images which he indi- rectly presents to his readers, of the Attributes against which he reasons. In these instances, no- thing is more remarkable than the skill with which he counteracts the frigid and anti-poetical spirit of his philosophical system; the sublimest descriptions of Almighty Power sometimes forming a part of his argument against the Divine Omnipotence. In point of logical consistency, indeed, he thus sacri- fices everything ; but such a sacrifice he knew to be essential to his success as a poet. * Note (D d.) 400 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. " Nam (proh sancta Deum tranquilla pcctora pace, lt Quae placidum degunt aevum, vitamque serenatn !) " Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi " Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas ? " Quis pariter ccelos bmneis convertere ? et omn'eis " Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraceis ? " Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto? " Nubibus ut tenebras facial coelique sercna " Concutiat sonitu ? turn fulmina mittat, et aedes " Saepe suas disturbet, et in deserta recedens " Saeviat exercens telum, quod saepe nocenteis u Prneterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis ?" ** The sublime effect of rocks and of cataracts ; of huge ridges of mountains ; of vast and gloomy fo- rests ; of immense and impetuous rivers ; of the boundless ocean ; and, in general, of everything which forces on the attention the idea of Creative Power, is owing, in part, t to the irresistible tenden- cy which that idea has to raise the thoughts toward Heaven. The influence of some of these spectacles, in awakening religious impressions, is nobly exem- plified in Gray's ode, written at the Grande Char- treuse ; an Alpine scene of the wildest and most awful grandeur, where everything appears fresh from the hand of Omnipotence, inspiring a sense of !*he more immediate presence of the Divinity. " Proesentiorem et conspicimus Deum " Per invias rupes, fera per juga, " Clivosque praeruptos, sonantes " Inter aquas, nemorumque noctem ; " Quam si repostus sub trabe citrea " Fulgeret auro, et Phidiaca manu." Lucret. Lib. 2. 1092. 1 1 say in part, as it will afterwards appear that other circum- stances, of a very different sort, conspire to the same end. Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 401 The same very simple theory appears to me to afford a satisfactory account of the application of the word Sublimity to Eternity, to Immensity, * to Omnipresence, to Omniscience ; in a word, to all the various qualities which enter into our concep- tions of the Divine Attributes. It is scarcely neces- sary to remark the marvellous accession of solemnity and of majesty, which the Sacred Writings must have added, all over the Christian World, to these natural combinations. If the effect of mere eleva- tion be weakened in a philosophical mind, by the discoveries of modern science, all the adjuncts, phy- sical and moral, which Revelation teaches us to con- nect with the name of the " Most High," have gained infinitely as elements of the Religious Su- blime. From the associations thus consecrated in Scrip- ture, a plausible explanation might be deduced, of the poetical effect of almost all the qualities which Mr Burke, and other modern critics, have enume- rated as constituents of the Sublime ; but it is grati- fying to the curiosity to push the inquiry farther, by shewing the deep root which the same associa- tions have in the physical and moral nature of the human race ; and the tendency which even the superstitious creeds of ancient times had to confirm their authority. In some respects, indeed, these creeds were ad- mirably fitted for the purposes of poetry ; in none * Notc(Ec.) c e 402 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II . more than in strengthening that natural association between the ideas of the Sublime and of the Terri- ble, which Mr Burke has so ingeniously, and I think justly, resolved into the connection between this last idea and that of Power. The region from which Superstition draws all her omens and anticipa- tions of futurity lies over our heads. It is there she observes the aspects of the planets, and the eclip- ses of the sun and moon ; or watches the flight of birds, and the shifting lights about the pole. This, too, is the region of the most awful and alarming meteorological appearances, " vapours and clouds " and storms ;" and (what is a circumstance of pecu- liar consequence in this argument) of thunder, which has, in all countries, been regarded by the multitude, not only as the immediate effect of super- natural interposition, but as an expression of dis- pleasure from above. It is accordingly from this very phenomenon (as Mr Burke has remarked) that the word astonishment, which expresses the strong- est emotion produced by the Sublime, is borrowed. If the former observations be just, instead of con- sidering, with Mr Burke, Terror as the ruling prin- ciple of the religious sublime, it would be nearer the truth to say, that the Terrible derives whatever character of Sublimity belongs to it from religious associations. The application of the epithet Sub- lime to these has, I trust, been already sufficiently accounted for. It may not be improper to add, with respect to the awful phenomenon of thunder, that the intimate Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 403 combination between its impression on the ear, and those appearances in the heavens which are regarded as its signs or forerunners, must not only co-operate with the circumstances mentioned by Mr Burke, in imparting to Darkness the character of the Terrible, but must strengthen, by a process still more direct, the connection between the ideas of Darkness and of mere Elevation. " Fulmina gigni de crassis, alteque putandum est " Nubibus extructis : nara ccelo nulla sereno, " Nee ieviter densis mittuntur nubibus unquam."* " Eripiunt subito nubes coelumque diemque " Teucrorum ex oculis ; ponto nox incubat atra : " Intonuere poli."f The same direction is naturally given to the fancy, by the Darkness which precedes hurricanes ; and also, during an eclipse of the sun, by the dis- astrous twilight shed on half the nations. Even in common discourse, as well as in poetry, we speak of the fall of night, and of the Jail of evening. - Og&jgg; 3* naavoSiv vu. J " Down rushed the night." In general, fancy refers to the visible heavens the source of Darkness as well as of Light ; and, ac- cordingly, both of these (as Mr Burke has remark- ed) have sometimes an important place assigned to them in sublime descriptions. They both, indeed, * See the rest of this passage, Lucret. Lib. . t ^Eneid. Lib. 1. J Odyss. Lib. 5. 294. ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. accord and harmonize perfectly with this natural group of associations ; abstracting altogether from the powerful aid which they occasionally contribute in strengthening the other impressions connected with the Terrible. And here T must beg leave to turn the attention of my readers, for a moment, to the additional effect which these conspiring associations (more particular- ly those arising from religious impressions) lend to every object which we consider as Sublime, in the li- teral sense of that word. I before took notice of the sublime flight of the Eagle ; but what an accession of poetical sublimity has the Eagle derived from the attributes ascribed to him in ancient mythology, as the sovereign of all the other inhabitants of the air ; as the companion and favourite of Jupiter ; and as the bearer of his armour in the war against the giants ! In that celebrated passage of Pindar (so no- bly imitated by Gray and by Akenside), where he describes the power of music in soothing the angry passions of the gods ; the abruptness of the transi- tion from the thunderbolt to the eagle, and the pic- turesque minuteness of the subsequent lines, suffi- ciently shew what a rank was occupied by this bird in the warm imagination of Grecian idolatry. * Of the two English poets just mentioned, it is observ- able that the former has made no farther reference to Jupiter, than as carrying " the feathered king " on his scepter'd hand ;" but, in order to compen- * Ka/ rov a/^aarccc xegawov Aivdou crugoj. Bu- ds; ava, a/MX-Ty Aio; anro;, &C. &C. 6 Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 405 sate for this omission, he has contrived, in his picture of the eagle's sleep, by the magical charm of figura- tive language, to suggest, indirectly, the very same sublime image with which the description of Pindar commences : " Quench'd in dark clouds of slumber lie, " The terror of his beak, and lightning of his eye." * After these remarks, it will not appear surprising that the same language should be transferred from the objects of religious worship, to whatever is cal- culated to excite the analogous, though comparative- ly weak, sentiments of admiration and of wonder. The word suspicere (to look up) is only one example out of many which might be mentioned. Cicero * May I be permitted to add, that in Akenside's imitation, as well as in the original, the reader is prepared for the short episode of the Eagle (which in all the three descriptions is unquestion- ably the most prominent feature), by the previous allusion to the xsgavvov atvaov Trvgos ; and to suggest my doubts, whether in Gray, the transition to this picture from Thracia's Hills and the Lord of War, be not a little too violent, even for lyric poetry ? The English reader may judge of this from the verses of Akenside. -" Those lofty strings " That charm the mind of gods ; that fill the courts ' Of wide Olympus with oblivion sweet ' Of evils, with immortal rest from cares, ' Assuage the terrors of the throne of Jove; ' And quench the formidable thunderbolt ' Of unrelenting fire. With slacken'd wings, " While now the solemn concert breathes around, " Incumbent o'er the sceptre of his lord, " Sleeps the stern eagle ; by the number'd notes " Possess'd, and satiate with the melting tone : " Sovereign of birds." 406 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. has furnished us with instances of its application, both to the religious sentiment, and to the enthusi- astic admiration with which we regard some of the objects of taste. " Esse prasstantem aliquam aeter- " namque naturam, et earn suspiciendam admiran- " damque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi or- " doque rerum coelestium cogit confiteri." * " Elo- " quentiam, quam suspicerent onines, quam admira- " rentur," &c. t On the latter occasion, as well as on the former, the words suspicio and admiror are coupled together, in order to convey more forcibly one single idea. On this particular view of the Sublime, consider- ed in connection with religious impressions, I have only further to take notice of a remarkable coinci- dence between their influence and that of the feel- ings excited by literal Sublimity, in assimilating the poetical effects of the two opposite dimensions of Depth and of Height. In the case of literal Sub- limity, I have already endeavoured to account for this assimilation. In that now before us, it seems to be the obvious result of those conceptions, so na- tural to the human mind, which have universally sug- gested a separation of the invisible world into two distinct regions; the one situated at an immense distance above the earth's surface ; the other at a corresponding distance below ; the one a blissful and glorious abode*, to which virtue is taught to aspire as its final reward j the other inhabited by * De Divinat. Lib. 2. 1 f Orat. 28. Chap. II. ON THE SUBLIME. 407 beings in a state of punishment and of degradation. * The powers to whom the infliction of this punish- ment is committed, cannot fail to be invested by the fancy, as the ministers and executioners of divine, justice, with some of the attributes which are charac- teristical of the Sublime ; and this association it seems to have been a great object of the heathen mythology to strengthen, as much as possible, by the fabulous accounts of the alliances between the celes- tial and the infernal deities ; and by other fictions of a similar tendency. Pluto was the son of Saturn, and the brother of Jupiter ; Proserpine, the daugh- ter of Jupiter and of Ceres ; and even the river Styx was consecrated into a divinity, held in venera- tion and dread by all the Gods. The language of the Inspired Writings is, on this as on other occasions, beautifully accommodated to the irresistible impressions of nature ; availing itself of such popular and familiar words as upwards and downwards, above and below, in condescension to the frailty of the human mind, governed so much by sense and imagination, and so little by the abstrac- tions of philosophy. Hence the expression of fallen Angels, which, by recalling to us the eminence from which they fell, communicates, in a single word, a character of Sublimity to the bottomless abyss : -" Turn Tartarus ipse " Bis patet in praeceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras, " Quantus ad aethereum caeli suspectus Olympum. " Hie genus antiquum terra?, Titania pubes, " Fulmine dejecti, fundo volvuntur in imo." JEntid. Lib. vi. I. 408 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. " How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son " of the morning !" The Supreme Being is himself represented as filling hell with his presence ; while the throne where he manifests his glory is conceived to be placed on high : " If I ascend into heaven, " thou art there ; if I make my bed in hell, thou art " there also." To these associations, Darkness, Power, Terror, Eternity, and various other adjuncts of Sublimity, lend their aid in a manner too palpable to admit of any comment. Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 409 CHAPTER THIRD. GENERALIZATIONS OF SUBLIMITY IN CONSEQUENCE OF ASSOCIATIONS RESULTING FROM THE PHENO- MENA OF GRAVITATION, AND FROM THE OTHER PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH WHICH OUR SENSES ARE CONVERSANT. WHEN we confine our views to the earth's surface, a variety of additional causes conspire, with those al- ready suggested, to strengthen the association be- tween Elevated Position and the ideas of Power, or of the Terrible. I shall only mention the security it affords against a hostile attack, and the advantage it yields in the use of missile weapons ; two circum- stances which give an expressive propriety to the epithet commanding, as employed in the language of Fortification. In other cases, elevated objects excite emotions still more closely allied to admiration and to awe, in consequence of our experience of the force of heavy bodies falling downwards from a great height. Masses of water, in the form of a mountain-torrent, or of a cataract, present to us one of the most impressive 410 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. images of irresistible impetuosity which terrestrial phenomena afford ; and have an effect, both on the eye and on the ear, of peculiar Sublimity, of which poets and orators have often availed themselves to typify the overwhelming powers of their respec- tive arts. " Monte decurrens velut amnis, imbres " Quern super notas aluere ripas, " Fervet, immeususque ruit profundo " Hndarus ore." " Now the rich stream of music winds along, " Deep, majestic, smooth, and strong ; " Through verdant vales, and Ceres' golden reign ; " Now rolling down the steep amain, " Headlong impetuous see it pour, " The rocks and nodding groves re-bellow to the roar." " At ille," says Quinctilian, speaking of the dif- ferent kinds of eloquence, " qui saxa devolvat, et " pontem indignetur, et ripas sibi faciat, multus et " torrens, judicem vel nitentem contra feret, coget- " que ire qua rapit." * The tendency of these circumstances, in conjunc- tion with others before mentioned, to associate a sub- lime effect with motion downwards, is too obvious to require any illustration ; and, accordingly, it opens a rich field of allusion to poets, wherever an idea is to be conveyed of mighty force and power ; or where emotions are to be produced, allied to terror. Mo- tion upwards, on the other hand, and perhaps still more, whatever is able to oppose an adequate resist- * Quinct. L. 12; c. x. Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME, 411 ance to a superincumbent weight, or to a descending shock, furnishes, for reasons hereafter to be explain- ed, the most appropriate images subservient to that modification of the Sublime, which arises from a strong expression of mental energy. In looking up to the vaulted roof of a Gothic Cathedral, our feelings differ, in one remarkable cir- cumstance, from those excited by torrents and cata- racts ; that whereas, in the latter instances, we see the momentum of falling masses actually exhibited to our senses ; in the former, we see the triumph of human art, in rendering the law of gravitation subservient to the suspension of its own ordinary ef- fects : " The ponderous roof, " By its own weight made steadfast and immoveable." An emotion of Wonder, accordingly, is here added to that resulting from the Sublimity of Loftiness and of Power. As we are placed, too, immediately un- der the incumbent mass, the idea of the Terrible is brought home to the imagination more directly ; and would, in fact, totally overpower our faculties with the expectation of our inevitable and instant destruction, were it not for the experimental proof we have had of the stability of similar edifices. It is this natural apprehension of impending danger, checked and corrected every moment by a rational conviction of our security, which seems to produce that silent and pleasing awe which we experience on entering within their walls ; and which so perfectly accords with the other associations awakened by the 412 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay If. sanctity of the place, and with the sublimity of the Being in whom they are centered. * The effect of the habits of thought and of feeling which have been just described, give not only a pro- priety but a beauty to epithets expressive of the Ter- rible, even when applied to the great elevation of things from which no danger can, for a moment, be conceived to be possible. " Where not a precipice frowns o'er the heath " To rouse a noble horror in the soul." " Mark how the dread pantheon stands " Amid the domes of modern hands ; " Amid the toys of idle state, " How simply, how severely great !" * An emotion of wonder, analogous to that excited by the vaulted roof of a cathedral, enters deeply into the pleasing effect produced by a majestic arch thrown across a river or a gulf. That it does not depend merely on the beauty of form, or upon vastness of dimension, appears clearly from the comparative meanness of an iron bridge, though executed on a far greater scale. I was never more disappointed in my life than when I first saw the bridge at Sunderland. In the following rude lines of Churchill, which Mr Tooke's letter to Junius has made familiar to every ear, the feelings which give to the stone arch its peculiar character of grandeur are paint- ed with equal justness and spirit : " Tis the last key-stone ' That makes the arch : the rest that there were put, ' Are nothing till that conies to bind and shut. ' Then stands it a triumphal mark : then men ' Observe the strength, the height, the why and when ' It was erected ; and still, walking under, " Meet some new matter to look up and wonder." Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 413 To all this it may be added, that the momentum of falling bodies is one of the most obvious resources of which Man avails himself for increasing his physical power, in the infancy of the mechanical arts. Even in the hostile exertions made with the rudest wea- pons of offence, such as the club and the mace, power is always employed from above ; and the same circumstance of superiority, in the literal sense of that word, is considered as the most decisive mark of victory in still closer conflict. The idea of Power, accordingly, comes naturally to be associated with the quarter from which it can alone be exerted in the most advantageous and effectual manner ; and that of weakness with prostration, inferiority, and submission. When these different considerations are combined, it will not appear surprising, that the ideas of Power and of High Station should, in their application to our own species, be almost identified ; insomuch that, in using this last expression, we are scarcely con- scious of speaking metaphorically. A similar re- mark may be extended to the following phrases : High rank High birth High-spirited High- minded ; High-Priest High-Churchman Serene Highness High and Mighty Prince. The epithet Sublime, when applied to the Ottoman Court, af- fords another example of the same association. Sir William Temple's comparison of the subordination and gradations of ranks in a mixed monarchy to a Pyramid ; and Mr Burke's celebrated allusion to the '* Corinthian Capitals of Society," are but expan- 414 ON THE SUBLIME. E ssa y H. sions and illustrations of this proverbial and unsus- pected figure of speech. The same considerations appear to me to throw a satisfactory light on that intimate connection be- tween the ideas of Sublimity and of Energy which Mr Knight has fixed on as the fundamental princi- ple of his theory. The direction in which the ener- gies of the human mind are conceived to be exerted will, of course, be in opposition to that of the powers to which it is subjected ; of the dangers which hang over it ; of the obstacles which it has to surmount in rising to distinction. Hence the metaphorical ex- pressions of an unbending spirit ; of bearing up against the pressure of misfortune ; of an aspiring or towering ambition, and innumerable others. Hence, too, an additional association, strengthening wonderfully the analogy, already mentioned, between Sublimity and certain Moral qualities ; qualities which, on examination, will be found to be chiefly those recommended in the Stoical School ; implying a more than ordinary energy of mind, or of what the French call Force of Character. In truth, Energy, as contradistinguished from Power, is but a more particular and modified conception of the same idea ; comprehending the cases where its sen- sible effects do not attract observation ; but where its silent operation is measured by the opposition it resists, or by the weight it sustains. The brave man, accordingly, was considered by the Stoics as partaking of the sublimity of that Almighty Being who puts him to the trial j and whom they conceived Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. as witnessing, with pleasure, the erect and undaunt- ed attitude in which he awaits the impending storm, or contemplates the ravages which it has spread around him. " Non video quid habeat in terris Ju- " piter pulchrius, quam ut spectet Catonem, jam " partibus non semel fractis, stantem nihilominus " inter ruinas publicas rectum." It is this image of mental energy, bearing up against the terrors of overwhelming Power, which gives so strong a poetical effect to the description of Epicurus, in Lucretius ; and also to the character of Satan, as conceived by Milton. But in all these cases, the sublimity of Energy, when carefully ana- lyzed, will be found to be merely relative ; or, if I may use the expression, to be only a reflection from the sublimity of the Power to which it is opposed. It will readily occur as an objection to some of the foregoing conclusions, that horizontal extent, as well as great altitude^ is an element of the Sublime. Up- on the slightest reflection, however, it must appear obvious, that this extension of the meaning of Subli- mity arises entirely from the natural association be- tween elevated position and a commanding prospect of the earth's surface, in all directions. As the most palpable measure of elevation is the extent of view which it affords, so, on the other hand, an enlarged horizon recals impressions connected with great ele- vation. The plain of Yorkshire, and perhaps still in a greater degree, Salisbury plain, produces an emotion approaching to sublimity on the mind of a Scotchman, the first time he sees it ; an emotion, I am persuaded, very different from what would be ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. experienced, on the same occasion, by a Fleming or a Dutchman ; and this abstracting altogether from the charm of novelty. The feelings connected with the wide expanse over which his eye was accustomed to wander from the summits of his native mountains, and which, in hilly countries, are to be enjoyed ex- clusively, during the short intervals of a serene sky, from eminences which, in general, are lost among the clouds, these feelings are, in some measure, awakened by that enlarged horizon which now every- where surrounds him ; the principle of Association, in this, as in numberless other cases, transferring whatever emotion is necessarily connected with a par- ticular idea, to everything else which is inseparably linked with it in the memory. This natural association between the ideas of Ele- vation and of Horizontal Extent is confirmed and enlivened by another, arising also from the physical laws of our perceptions. It is a curious, and at the same time a well known fact, that, in proportion as elevation or any other circumstance enlarges our ho- rizon, this enlargement adds to the apparent height of the vault above us. It was long ago remarked by Dr Smith of Cambridge, that " the known distance " of the terrestrial objects which terminate our view, " makes that part of the sky which is towards the " horizon appear more distant than that which is to- " wards the zenith ; so that the apparent figure of " the sky is not that of a hemisphere, but of a smal- " ler segment of a sphere." To this remark a later writer has added, that " when the visible horizon is " terminated by very distant objects, the celestial vault Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 417 " seems to be enlarged in all its dimensions." " Whetf I view it," he observes, " from a confined " street or lane, it bears some proportion to the " buildings that surround me ; but when I view it " from a large plain, terminated on all hands by hills " which rise one above another, to the distance of * twenty miles from the eye, methinks I see a new " heaven, whose magnificence declares the greatness " of its author, and puts every human edifice out of ** countenance ; for now, the lofty spires and the " gorgeous palaces shrink into nothing before it, and " bear no more proportion to the celestial dome, " than their makers bear to its maker." * Let the same experiment be tried from the summit of a lofty mountain, commanding an immense prospect all a- round of land and of sea ; and the effect will be found to be magnified on a scale beyond description. To those who have verified this optical phenome- non by their own observation, it will not appear sur- prising, that the word Sublimity should have been transferred from the vertical line, not only to the horizontal surface, but also to the immense concavi- ty of the visible hemisphere. As these various mo- difications of space are presented to the eye at the same moment, each heightening the effect of the others, it is easily conceivable, that the same epithet should be insensibly applied to them in common ; and that this common epithet should be borrowed from that dimension on which so much of the gene- ral result primarily depends, t * Reid's Inquiry, chap. vi. sect. 22. i Note (F f. ) Pd 418 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. Another extension of the word Sublimity seems to be in part explicable on the same principle j I mean the application we occasionally make of it to the emotion produced by looking downwards. For this latitude of expression I already endeavoured to account from other considerations j but the solution will appear still more satisfactory, when it is recol- lected, that, along with that apparent enlargement of the celestial vault, which we enjoy from a high mountain, there is an additional perception, which comeshome still more directly to our personal feelings, that of the space by which we are separated from the plain below. With this perception a feeling of Awe (arising partly from the giddy eminence on which we stand, and partly from the solitude and remote- ness of our situation) is, in many cases, combined ; a feeling which cannot fail to be powerfully instrumen- tal in binding the association between depth, and the other elements which swell the complicated emotion excited by the rare incident of an Alpine prospect. " What dreadful pleasure there to stand sublime, " Like shipwrecked mariner on desert coast , 11 And view th ? enormous waste of vapours toss'd <{ In billows length'ning to th' horizon round ; " Now scoop'd in gulfs, in mountains now emboss'd."* With respect to the concavity over our heads (and * Accordingly, we find the poets frequently employing words synonymous with Height and Depth, as if they were nearly con- vertible terms : " Blue Profound :" (Akenside.) " Rode Sub- " lime, The secrets of th' Abyss to spy :" (Gray.) " Cselum, " Profundum :" (Virgil.) The phrase Profuuda Altitude is used, even by prose writers. An example of it occurs in Livy; 38. 23. 7 Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 41 9 of which, how far soever we may travel on the earth's surface, the summit or cope is always exactly coinci- dent with our shifting zenith), it is farther observable, that its sublime effect is much increased by the mathe- matical regularity of its form ; suggesting the image of a vast Rotundo, having its centre everywhere, and its circumference nowhere ; a circumstance which forces irresistibly on the mind the idea of something analogous to architectural design, carried into exe- cution by Omnipotence itself. This idea is very strongly stated in the passage which was last quoted; and it is obviously implied in the familiar transfer- ence of the words Vault and Dome, from the edifi- ces of the builder to the Divine handy work. " This " mqjestical rooj] fretted with golden fires," an expression which Shakespeare applies to the firma- ment, has been suggested by the same analogy. As the natural bias of the imagination, besides, is to conceive the firmament to be something solid, in which the sun, moon, and stars, are mechanically fixed, a sentiment of Wonder at the unknown means by which the law of gravity is, in this instance, coun- teracted, comes to be superadded to the emotion ex- cited by the former combination of circumstances. This sentiment is very frequently expressed by chil- dren ; and the feelings of childhood have often an in- fluence of which we are little aware (more especially in matters of Taste) on those which are experienced in the maturity of our judgment. * The sublime effect of the celestial vault is still far- " A spice convexo nu tan tern poijderc mundum." Vir. BucoL iv. 1. 60, ON THE SUBLIME. s$ay II. ther heightened by the vast and varied space which the eye has to travel over in. rising gradually from the horizon to the zenith : contemplating, at one time, the permanent glories of the starry expanse 5 at another, enjoying the magical illusions with which, from sunrise till sunset, the clouds diversify the sky. To this immediate impression produced upon the senses, must be added the play given to the imagi- nation, supplying th,e remainder of that grand spec- tacle under which we are placed, and of which the sight can take in only, at one and the same moment, a limited portion. As the smallest arch of a circle enables us to complete the whole circumference, so the slightest glance of the heavens presents to our conceptions the entire hemisphere ; inviting the thoughts to grasp, at once, what the laws of vision render it impossible for us to perceive, but in slow succession. The ingenious and well-known remark which Mr Burke has made on the pleasure we re- ceive from viewing a Cylinder, appears to. me to hold, with much greater exactness, when applied to the effect of a Spacious Dome on a spectator placed under its concavity. In all such cases, however, as have been now un- der our consideration, notwithstanding the variety of circumstances by which the effect is augmented or modified, I am inclined to think, that Sublimity, li- terally so called, will be found, in one way or ano ther, the predominant element or ingredient. In the description, for example, which Mr Brydone has given of the boundless prospect from the top of ./Etna, the effect is not a little increased by the as- Chap. III. ON tHE SUBLIME. tonishing elevation of the spot from whence we con- ceive it to have been enjoyed ; and it is increased in a degree incomparably greater, by the happy skill with which he has divided our attention between the spectacle below, and the spectacle above. Even in the survey of the upper regions, it will be ac- knowledged by those who reflect carefully on their own experience, that the eye never rests till it reach- es the zenith ; a point to which numberless accessary associations, both physical and moral, unite in lend- ing their attractions. o After the remarks which have been already made on the natural association between the ideas of ele- vation, and of horizontal amplitude in general, it may, at first sight, appear superfluous to say any- thing farther with respect to the Sublimity which is universally ascribed to the Ocean, even when its waves are still. In this particular case, however, the effect is so peculiarly strong, that it may be fair- ly presumed, other collateral causes conspire with those which have been hitherto mentioned ; and, ac- cordingly, a variety of specific circumstances instant- ly occur, as distinguishing the surface of a smooth sea from all the other instances in which the epithet Sublime is applied to what is perfectly flat or level. 1. Of these circumstances one of the most promi- nent is the unfathomable depth of the ocean ; or, in other words, the immeasurable elevation above its bot- tom, of those who navigate upon its surface. Agree- ably to this idea, mariners are described in Scripture as those " who see the wonders of the great deep ;" and the same language is employed by Gray, to ex- 422 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. alt our conceptions even of the sublime flight of the eagle. " Sailing with supreme dominion " Thro' the azure deeps of air." 2. The sympathetic dread associated with the pe- rilous fortunes of those who trust themselves to that inconstant and treacherous element. It is owing to this, that, in its most placid form, its temporary effect in soothing or composing the spirits is blended with feelings somewhat analogous to what are excited by the sleep of a lion ; the calmness of its surface pleas- ing chiefly, from the contrast it exhibits to the ter- rors which it naturally inspires. * 3. The idea of literal sublimity inseparably com- bined with that of the sea, from the stupendous spectacle it exhibits when agitated by a storm. The proverbial phrase of mountain billows sufficiently il- lustrates the force and the universality of this com- bination. A. tempestuous sea of mountains is ac- cordingly an expression applied by an ingenious writer, to the prospect which is seen in one direction from the top of Skiddaw ; and it would not be easy, in the same number of words, to convey a juster con- ception of what he wished to describe. To those who have actually navigated the deep, at a distance from every visible coast, the same combination of ideas must present itself, even when the surface of * Gray had manifestly this analogy in his view when he wrote the following lines : " Unmindful of the sweeping whirlwind's sway " That huih'd in grim repose expects its evening prey." Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME!. the water is perfectly tranquil. Homer has accu- rately seized this natural impression of the fancy* " AXX' ore foj r^v vqsov eXti'irofAw, xfie rt$ XX?j " t&a/vsro ya/awv, tfXX' xgavot, ydi SaXatfffa." * Odyss. Lib. 12. I. 403. 4. The complete dependence of the state of th6 ocean on that of the atmosphere ; and the associa- tion, or rather identification, of winds and waves in the common images of danger which they both suggest. In the descriptions of shipwrecks, which occur in the ancient poets, the sublimity will be found to re- sult in no inconsiderable degree from this identifica^- tion ; and, indeed, in this, as in many other instances, the language of mythology is little more than a per- sonification of the natural workings of the mind. tiwaytv vspsXag, graga|s 8s KOVTOV, " Xsgff/ rgiatvav iXwi>. Traffag # og&vvtv " Tlavroiuv avtftuv. ffuv ds vsipztfffft " Touav opx ^ vovrov. ogwg & xgavodtv wi?," -j- Odyss. Lib. 5. 1. 250. " AXXors fitv r& NOT( *' AXXors 5' avr Eug- Zs^ygw ti!*affx.f diux&v.'' J Odyss. Lib. 5. 1. 331. * " Past sight of shore, along the surge we bound ; " And all above is sky, and ocean all around.'* t " He spoke, and high the forky trident hurl'd " Rolls clouds on clouds, and stirs the watery world, " At once the face of earth and sea deforms, " Swells all the winds, and rouses all the storms." J " And now the south, and now the north prevails, } " Now o'er the ocean sweep the eastern gales, > " And now the west-winds rend the fluttering sails/' ^ 42 4 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. 5. The aid which the art of navigation, in all the stages of its progress, derives from the observation of the stars ; and the consequent bias given to the fan- cy, to mount from the ocean to the heavens. A pi- lot seated at the helm, with his eye fixed on the Pole, while the rest of the crew abandon themselves to sleep, forms an interesting picture in some of the no- blest productions of human genius. In the Odys- sey, this astronomical association is employed with wonderful success by the genius of Homer, to impart a character of Sublimity, even to the little raft of Ulysses, during his solitary voyage from Calypso's island. " Avrag o xaXixtttv, " 'H r a\jra ggspsrai, ^ r fleiuva, doxsvei. Odyss. Lib. 5.1. 270. Agreeably to the same bias of the fancy, the prin- cipal constellations in our astronomical sphere have been supposed, with no inconsiderable probability, to be emblematical of circumstances and events con- nected with the oldest voyage alluded to in profane * " Plac'd at the helm he sate, and mark'd the skies, " Nor clos'd in sleep his ever-watchful eyes. " There view'd the Pleiads, and the Northern Team, " And great Orion's more refulgent beam, " To which, around the axle of the sky " The Bear, revolving, points his golden eye ; " Who shines exalted on th' etherial plain, " Nor bathes his blazing forehead in the main." Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 426' history, the expedition of the Argonauts. What an accession of strength must have been added, in every philosophical mind, to this natural association, in consequence of the methods practised by the mo- derns for finding the latitude and the longitude ! On the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that the poetical effect must, to a certain degree, have been weakened by the discovery of the polarity of the needle. In minds which have been impressed, in early life, with the fabulous and popular accounts of the origin of astronomy, the same association of literal sublimity with the objects of that study, imparts somewhat of the same character, even to the plains and to the shepherds of ancient Chaldea. * 6. The variety of modes in which the ocean pre- sents to us the idea of power. Among these, there are two which more particularly deserve attention. (1.) Its tendency to raise our thoughts to that Being whose " hand heaves its billows ;" and who " has " given his decree to the seas, that they might not " pass his commandment." (2.) Its effect in re- calling to us the proudest triumph of Man, in ac- complishing the task assigned to him, of subduing the earth and the elements. Beside these associa- tions, however, which are common to the inhabi- tants of all maritime countries, a prospect of the sea * " Principle Assyrii, prupter planiticm magnitudinemque re- " gionum quas incolebant, cum calum ex omni parte patens atque " upertum intuerentur^ trajcctiones motusque stellarum ob-.ervavc- " runt. .Qua in natione, Chaldaei, diuturnaobservationesiderurft " scientiam putantur effecisse," c. Sec. Cic. de Divinat. ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. must frequently awaken, in every native of this island, many sublime recollections which belong exclusive- ly to ourselves ; those recollections, above all others, which turn on the naval commerce, the naval power, and the naval glory of England ; and on the nume- rous and triumphant fleets which " bear the British " thunder o'er the world." * 7. The easy transition by which a moralizing fancy passes from a prospect of the sea, to subjects allied to the most interesting of all the various clas- ses of our sublime emotions ; from the ceaseless suc- cession of waves which break on the beach, to the fleeting generations of men ; or, from the boundless expanse of the watery waste, to the infinity of Space* and the infinity of Time. " Iferes " Haereclem alterius, velut unda supervenit undam." " Walk thoughtful on the silent, solemn shore " Of that vast ocean thou must sail so soon" In which last lines (as Well as in Shakespeare's bank and shoal of time), the complete union of the sub- ject and of the simile proves, how intimately they were combined together in the mind of the poet. Before closing this long discussion concerning the effects produced on the imagination by the connec- tion between the ideas of Altitude and of Horizon- tal Extent, I think it of great importance to remark farther, in illustration of the same argument, that a similar association attaches itself to these words when * Thomson. Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 427 employed metaphorically. A good example of this occurs in a passage of the Novum Organon, where the author recommends to the students of particular branches of science, to rise occasionally above the level of their habitual pursuits, by gaining the van- tage-ground of a higher philosophy. " Prospecta- " tiones fiunt a turribus aut locis prsealtis ; et impos- " sibile est, ut quis exploret remotiores interiores- " que scientiae alicujus partes, si stet super piano *' ejusdem sciential, neque altioris scientiae veluti " speculum conscendat :" An allusion not more lo- gically appropriate, than poetically beautiful ; and which probably suggested to Cowley his comparison of Bacon's prophetic anticipations of the future pro- gress of experimental philosophy, to the distant view of the promised land, which Moses enjoyed from the top of Mount Pisgah : " Did on the very border stand " Of the blest promis'd land ; " And from the mountain.top of his exalted wit) " Saw it himself, and shew'd us it." The metaphorical phrases of scala ascensoria et scala descensoria, which Bacon applies to the Ana- lytical and Synthetical Methods, shew, in a still more explicit manner, the strong impression which the natural association between Altitude and Ho- rizontal extent had made on his imagination ; inas- much as he avails himself of it, as the most signifi- cant figure he could employ to illustrate, in the way of analogy, the advantages which he expected to re- sult from his own peculiar mode of philosophizing. Indeed, the analogy is so close and so irresistible. 428 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II, that it is scarcely possible to speak of Analysis and Synthesis, without making use of expressions ill which it is implied. * When, agreeably to the rules of the former, we rise or ascend from par- ticular phenomena to general principles, our views become more enlarged and comprehensive, but less precise and definite with respect to minute details. In proportion as we re-descend in the way of syn- thesis, our horizon contracts ; but at every step, we find ourselves better enabled to observe and to ex- amine, with accuracy, whatever individual objects attract our curiosity. In pure Mathematics, it is to the most general and comprehensive methods of inquiry, that we ex- clusively appropriate the title of the higher or sub" timer parts of the science j a figurative mode of speaking, which is rendered still more appropriate by two collateral circumstances : First, that all these methods, at the time when this epithet was original- ly applied to them, involved, in one form or another, the idea of Infinity ; and, Secondly, that the earli- est, as well as the most successful applications of them hitherto made, have been to Physical Astro- nomy, t With this exception, and one or two others, for which it is easy to account, it is remarkable, that the epithet universally applied to the more abstruse branches of knowledge is not sublime but profound. We conceive truth to be something analogous to a - * See Note (G g.) t Note (H h.) Chap. III. ON THE SUBLIME. 429 Treasure hid under ground j or to the Precious Metals, which are not to be obtained but by digging into the mine ; or to Pearls placed at the bottom of the sea, inaccessible to all but such as dive into the deep. Agreeably to this analogy, we speak of a profound mathematician j a profound metaphysician - 9 a profound lawyer ; a profound antiquary. * The effect of this analogy has probably been not a little strengthened by an idea which (although I believe it to be altogether unfounded) has prevailed very generally in all ages of the world. I allude to the vulgar opinion, that, while poetical genius is the immediate gift of heaven, confined exclusively to a few of its favoured children, the most recondite truths in the most abstruse sciences are within the reach of all who can submit to the labour of the search. A philosopher of the first eminence has given to this prejudice the sanction of his authority, remarking, that " it is genius, and not the want of " it, that adulterates science, and fills it with error " and false theory ;" and that " the treasures of " knowledge, although commonly buried deep, may " be reached by those drudges who can dig with " labour and patience, though they have not wings to fly." f * These opposite analogies are curiously combined together in the following sentence of Maclaurin. Speaking of Leibnitz, he remarks : " We doubt not, that if a full and perfect account " of all that is most profound in the high geometry could have " been deduced from the doctrine of infinites, it might have been V expected from this author." Fluxions, V. I. p. 45. t In this criticism on Dr Reid, I have been anticipated by his 430 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II- The justness of this doctrine I shall take another opportunity to examine at some length. I have re- ferred to it here, merely as an additional circum- stance which may have influenced human fancy, in characterizing poetical and philosophical genius by two epithets, which in their literal sense express things diametrically opposite. It is, at the same time, extremely worthy of obser- vation, with respect to the metaphorical meaning of both epithets, that as the opposite of the Poetical Sublime is not the Profound, but the Low or the Grovelling; so the opposite of the Philosophical Pro- found is not what is raised Above the level of the earth, but the Superficial or the Shallow. learned and ingenious friend Dr Gerard ; who, after quoting the above passage, observes, " that the author's modesty under- " rates his own abilities ; and, in this instance, renders his dc> " cision inaccurate." Gerard on Genius^ pp. 382, 383- Chap. IV. ON THE SUBLIME. 431 CHAPTER FOURTH. CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING THEORY PROM THE NATURAL SIGNS OF SUBLIME EMOTION. RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE OF THESE SIGNS ON THE ASSOCIATIONS WHICH SUGGEST THEM. 1 HE strength and power of the associations which have been now under our review (how trifling and capricious soever some of them may appear to be in their origin) may be distinctly traced in the arts of the Actor and of the Orator, in both of which they fre- quently give to what may be called Metaphorical or Figurative applications of Natural Signs, a propriety and force which the severest taste must feel and ac- knowledge. While the tongue, for example, is em- ployed in pronouncing words expressing elevation of character, the body becomes, by a sort of involun- tary impulse, more erect and elevated than usual ; the eye is raised, and assumes a look of superiority or command. Cicero takes notice of the same thing as a natural effect, produced on the Bodily Expres- sion, by the contemplation of the universe ; and more particularly of objects which are exalted and celestial, either in the literal or the metaphorical acceptations of these words. " Est animorum in- ON TUB SUBOME. Essay II. " geniorumque quoddam quasi pabulum, considera- " tio contemplatioque nature. Erigimur, elevatio- " res Jieri videmur ; humana despicimus ; cogitan- " tesque supera atque crelestia, haec nostra ut exigua " et minima contemnimus." Even in speaking of anything, whether physical or moral, which invites Imagination upwards, the tones of the voice become naturally higher j while they sink spontaneously to a deep bass, when she fol- lows a contrary direction, This is the more remark- able, that the analogy apprehended between high and low in the musical scale, and high and low in their literal acceptations, seems to be the result of circumstances which have not operated universally among our species, in producing the same association of ideas. * The various associations connected with Sublimity become thus incorporated, as it were, with the Lan- guage of Nature j and, in consequence of this in- corporation, acquire an incalculable accession of in- fluence over the human frame. We may remark this influence even on the acute and distinguishing judgment of Aristotle, in the admirable description of MsQ/aAo^t^a. in the third chapter of his Nico- machian Ethics ; the whole of which description hinges on an analogy (suggested by a metaphorical word) between Greatness of Stature and Greatness of Mind. The same analogy is the ground-work of the account of Sublimity in writing, given by who, although he speaks only of the * See Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. ch. v. partii. 1. 11 Chap. IV. ON THE SUBLIME. 433 effect of sublimity on the Mind, plainly identifies that effect with its Bodily expression. The Mind," he observes, " is naturally elevated by the true Su- " blime, and, assuming a certain proud and erect atti- " tude, exults and glories, as if it had itself produ- *' ced what it has only heard." The description is, I think, perfectly correct ; and may be regarded as a demonstrative proof, that, in the complicated effect which sublimity produces, the primary idea which has given name to the whole, always retains a decid- ed predominance over the other ingredients. It seems to be the expression of Mental Elevation, conveyed by the " os sublime" of man, and by what Milton calls the looks commercing with the skies, which is the foundation of the Sublimity we ascribe to the Human figure. In point of actual height, it is greatly inferior to various tribes of other animals ; but none of these have the whole of their bodies, both trunk and limbs, in the direction of the verti- cal line ; coinciding with that tendency to rise or to mount upwards, which is symbolical of every species of improvement, whether intellectual or mo- ral ; and which typifies so forcibly to our species, the pre-eminence of their rank and destination among the inhabitants of this lower world. * * " Omiiis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animali- " bus, summa ope niti decet, vitam silentio ne transeant, veluti " pecora, quae natura prona, atque ventri obedientia, finxit." - Sallust. " Separat hoc nos " A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli 5* Sortili uigenium, divinornmque capaces s EC ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. " When I look up to the Heavens which thou " hast made," says an inspired writer ; " to the Sun " and Stars which thou hast ordained ; " Then say I, what is man that thou art mindful " of him, or the son of man that thou shouldst visit " him ! " For thou hast made him but a little tower than " the angels ; thou hast crowned Ins head with " glory and honour. '* Thou hast put all things under his feet." Intimately connected with the sublime effect of man's erect form, is the imposing influence of a su- periority of stature over the mind of the multitude. " And when Saul stood among the people, he was " higher than any of them, from his shoulders and " upward. And all the people shouted and said, " God save the King." Even in the present state of society, a superiority of stature is naturally accompanied with an air of au- thority, the imitation of which would be ludicrous in a person not possessed of the same advantages ; and, in a popular assembly, every one must have remark- ed the weight which it adds to the eloquence of a speaker, " proudly eminent above the rest in shape i" and gesture." * From these observations, it is easy to explain how the fancy comes to estimate the intellectual and mo" " Atqne exercendis capiemiisqne artibus apti, " Sensum a ccrhsti demissmn traximus arcf , 11 Cnjus egent puma ft terrain spectantia." Juvenal, XT. Sat 14^. * See Note (I i.-) V Chap. IV. ON THE SUBLIME. 435 ral excellencies of individuals, in a way analogous to that in which we measure their stature (I mean by an ideal scale placed in a vertical position) j and to employ the words above, below, superiority, inferi- ority, and numberless others, to mark, in these very different cases, their relative advantages and disad- vantages. * We have even a bias to carry this ana- logy farther j and to conceive the various ' orders of created beings, as forming a rising scale of an inde- finite Altitude. In this manner we are naturally led to give the title of Sublime to such attainments and efforts, in our own species, as rise above the common pitch of humanity j and hence the origin of an additional association, conspiring with other circumstances formerly pointed out, as suggesting a metaphorical application of that word to a particular class of the higher beauties of Style. It appears to me probable, that it was by a vague extension of this meaning of the Sublime to excel- lence in general, that Longinus was led to bestow this epithet on Sappho's Ode t ; and on some other specimens of the Vehement or Impassioned, and also of the Nervous, and of the Elegant, which do not seem to rise above the common tone of classical composition in any one quality, but in the finished perfection with which they are executed. I confess, * A trifling, but curious instance, of an analogous association may be remarked in the application we make of the terms High and Low to the Temperature of bodies, in consequence of the vertical position of the scale in our common Thermometers. f Note ^K k.) 436 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. at the same time, my own opinion is, that, with all his great merits as a critic, and as an eloquent writer, his use of this word throughout his treatise can nei- ther be accounted for nor rendered consistent by any philosophical theory whatever. In various places, he evidently employs it precisely in the same sense in which it is now generally understood in our language ; and in which I have all along used it, in attempting to trace the connection between its dif- ferent and apparently arbitrary significations. * It is wonderful that Longinus was not induced, by his own very metaphorical description of the ef- fects of sublime writing, to inquire, in the next place, to what causes it is owing, that sublime emotions have the tendency which he ascribes to them, to ele- vate the thoughts, and to communicate literally a momentary elevation to the body. At these effects he has stopped short, without bestowing any atten- tion on what seems to me the most interesting view of the problem. Mr Burke has adopted the description of Longi- nus, and has stated the fact with still greater clear- ness and fulness. If he had followed out his ideas a little further, he would probably have perceived, more distinctly than he appears to have done, that the key to some of the chief metaphysical difficulties sup- posed to be connected with this inquiry, is to be found in the principles which regulate the progressive tran- ^itionsand generalizations of the import of words j and * See Note (LI.) Chap. IV. ON THE SUBLIME. 437 in those laws of association, which, while they insen- sibly transfer the arbitrary signs of thought from one subject to another, seldom fail to impart to the lat ter a power of exciting, in some degree, the same emotions which are the natural or the necessary ef- fects of the former. 438 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. CHAPTER FIFTH. INFERENCES FROM THE FOREGOING DOCTRINES, WITH SOME ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS. BEFORE I conclude this Essay, it may be proper to remind my readers, in order to prevent misapprehen- sions with respect to the foregoing observations, That my aim is not to investigate the principles on which the various elements of Sublimity give pleasure to the Mind ; but to trace the associations, in consequence of which the common name of Sublimity has been applied to all of them ; and to illustrate the influence of this common name in re-acting on the Imagina- tion and the Taste. It is not, for instance, my aim to shew, that the 'whole effect of Horizontal Ampli- tude arises from its association with Elevation, or Height ; far less, that it is this association alone which delights us in viewing the celestial vault, with all the various wonders it exhibits by day and by night ; but merely to explain, from this principle, the transference of the epithet Sublime, from one modification of space to all the others. In like man- ner, I have abstained altogether from giving any opinion on the very curious question concerning the pleasure arising from certain modifications of Terror ; Chap. V. ON THE SUBLIME. 439 because it did not appear to me to have any imme- diate connection with the train of my argument. It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have succeeded in accounting for the place which the Terrible, when properly modified, is generally allowed to occupy among the constituents, or at least among the natu- ral adjuncts of the Sublime. Although I have attempted to shew, at some length, that there is a specific pleasure connected with the simple idea of Sublimity or Elevation, I am far from thinking, that the impressions produced by such adjuncts as Eternity or Power, or even by the physical adjuncts of Horizontal Extent and of Depth, are wholly resolvable into their association with this common and central conception. I own, however, I am of opinion, that, in most cases, the pleasure at- tached to the conception of literal sublimity, identi- fied, as it comes to be, with those religious impres- sions which are inseparable from the human mind, is one of the chief ingredients in the complicated emotion ; and that, in every case, it either palpably or latently contributes to the effect. From the constant ot very general connection, too, which these different ingredients have with each other, as well as with the central idea of Elevation, they must necessarily botli lend and borrow much accessory influence over the mind. The primary effect of Elevation itself cannot fail to be astonish- ingly increased by its association with such interest- ing and awful ideas as Immensity, Eternity, Infinite Power, and Infinite Wisdom ; blended as they are in our conceptions with that still sublimer attribute -110 t)N THE SUBLIME. Essay II. of God, which encourages us to look up to him as the Father of All. On the other hand, to all of these attributes, Elevation imparts, in its turn, a common character and a common epithet. . Supposing, therefore, the foregoing conclusions to be admitted as just, a wide field of speculation lies open to* future inquirers. To some of these, I flat- ter myself, the hints which I have suggested may be useful, if not in conducting them into the right path, at least in diverting them from the vain attempt to detect a common quality in the metaphysical essence of things, which derive their common name only ' from the tie of Habitual Association. To trace the origin of this Association, so as to obtain a key to the various transitive meanings of the word in ques- tion, is a problem, the solution of which is not only necessary to give precision to our ideas on the sub- ject, but forms an indispensable preliminary to any subsequent discussions concerning the simple and elementary pleasures mingled together in that com- plex emotion which the epithet sublime, or some cor- responding term, so significantly expresses in so great - a variety of languages. * . * Since the first Edition of this Work appeared, it has been al- leged, that I had carried my Philological Theory so far, as to resolve the Sublimity of Physical Astronomy into the circum- stance of " the stars being high up in the air." If there be any foundation for this criticism, I have certainly been most unsuc- cessful in Conveying u> my readers a clear idea of the scope of 'this .Essay. Jnto the innumerable sources of emotion which may arise in a contemplative mind on a survey of the starry firma- ment, it was not my purpose to inquire. My only aim was to Chap. V. ON THE SUBLIME. 441 In confirmation of what I have just stated concern- ing the primary or central idea of Elevation, it may be farther remarked, that when we are anxious to communicate the highest possible character of Subli- mity to anything we are describing, we generally contrive, somehow or other, either directly, or by means of some strong and obvious association, to in- troduce the image of the Heavens, or of the Clouds ; or, in other words, of Sublimity literally so called. The idea of Eloquence is unquestionably sublime in itself, being a source of the proudest and noblest species of Power which the mind of one man can ex- ercise over those of others : but how wonderfully is its sublimity increased when connected with the image of Thunder ; as when we speak of the Thun- der of Demosthenes ! " Demosthenis non tarn vibra- " rent fulmina, nisi numeris contorta ferrentur." Milton has fully availed himself of both these asso- ciations, in describing the orators of the Greek re^ publics : point out the Natural and Universal Association which has sug- gested the application of the metaphorical epithet Sublime (or Hig K) to the study which is directed to these objects; and to illustrate the influence of this very expressive and powerful epi- thet in re- acting upon the Imagination and the Taste. The Same remark may be extended to my observations on all the other ap- plications of the same word. Much ingenuity has been display- ed by some late writers in examining the mutual influence of Language and of Reason upon each other ; but the action and re-action of Language and of Imagination in matters of Taste, is a subject cf speculation not less curious, and hitherto almost en- tirely unexplored; a subject which will be found intimately connected with the principles on which many of the most refined beauties of composition, both in prose and in verse, depend. 442 ON THE SUBLIME. Essay II. " Resistless eloquence " Wielded at will the fierce democracy; " Shook th' arsenal, and fulmin'd over Greece, " To Macedon, and Artaxerxes' throne." In Collins's ode to Fear, the happy use of a single word identifies at once the Physical with the Moral Sublime, and concentrates the effects of their united force. " Tho* gentle pity claim her mingled part, " Yet all the thunders of the scene are thine !" The same word adds not a little to the effect of one of the sublimest descriptions in the book of Job. "' Hast thou given the horse strength ; hast thou " clothed his neck with thunder ?" * In the concluding stanza of one of Gray's odes, if the bard, after his apostrophe to Edward, had been represented as falling on his sword, or as drowning himself in a pool at the summit of the rock, the Mo- ral Sublime, so far as it arises from his heroical de- termination " to conquer and to die," would not have been in the least diminished ; but how differ- ent from the complicated emotion produced by the images of altitude ; of depth j of an impetuous and foaming flood ; of darkness ; and of eternity ; all of which are crowded into the two last lines : * : lie spoke and headlong from the mountain's height " Deep in the roaring tide he plunged to endless night." Among the Grecian sages, Plato has been always more peculiarly characterized by the epithet Su- blime ; and, indeed, on various accounts, it is strong- ly and happily descriptive of the feelings inspired by * Note (M m.) Chap. V% ON THE SUBLIME. 443 the genius of that author j by the lofty mysticism of his philosophy ; and even by the remote origin of the theological fables which are said to have de- scended to him from Orpheus. The following pas- sage paints the impressions of a German scholar, * when he first met with the Indigitamenta, or Or- phic Hymns, during an accidental visit to Leipsic ; and the scenery which he has employed to embel- lish his picture, is worthy of the imagination of Plato himself. The skill with which he has called in to his aid the darkness and silence and awfulness of midnight, may be compared to some of the finest touches of our master-poets ; but what I wish, at present, chiefly to remark, is the effect of Altitude and of the Starry Firmament in exalting our con- ceptions of those religious mysteries of the fabulous ages, which had so powerfully awakened the enthu- siasm of the writer. " Incredibile dictu quo me " sacro horrore afflaverint indigitamenta ista deo- " rum : nam et tempus ad illorum lectionem eligere " cogebar, quod vel solum horrorem incutere animo " potest, nocturnum j cum enim totam diem con- " sumserim in contemplando urbis splendore, et in " adeundis, quibus scatet urbs ilia, viris doctis, sola " nox restabat, quam Orpheo consecrare potui. In " abyssum quendam mysteriorum venerandae anti- u quitatis descendere videbar, quotiescunque silente " mundo,solis vigilantibusastris et luna, j u,gAa>'M53 certainly by no means self-evident) Newton is said to have told his friend Mr Cotes, that he saw at once the truth, without the intermediation of any process of reasoning whatsoever. For an explanation of the fact, according to my idea of it, I must refer my readers to some observations which I have stated in the Philosophy of the Human Mind. At present I shall only add, as another circumstance which may occasionally mislead a mathematician in estimating the quickness of his own perceptions, That, after having once ascertained the connection between two propositions by a process of reasoning, and fixed this connection in the memory, the one proposition will, in future, suggest the other as its necessary and im- mediate consequence. In this manner, an experi- enced mathematician proceeds, as it were, by leaps, from one truth to another ; and may sometimes mis- take, for an intuitive judgment, a conclusion dedu- ced from a long process of thought, now obliterated from the mind. Another instance of extraordinary rapidity of thought occurs in individuals who are daily conver- sant with mechanical inventions. Where a person, possessed of equal intellectual ability, would find himself bewildered and lost among the details of a machine, the practised mechanician comprehends, in an instant, all the relations and dependencies of the different parts. We are apt to ascribe this quick- ness to a difference of natural capacity ; but it is, n through the vertices of any two of its conjugate diameters, is al-? ways of the same magnitude. 454 ON TASTE. Essay III. reality, chiefly, if not entirely, the effect of Habit in familiarizing the mind to artificial combinations of circumstances ; in the same manner in which the general physical laws, which are obvious to the senses of all men, insensibly adapt to themselves the order of their ideas, and render a correspondent set of Ha- bits apparently a Second Nature. Hence it is, that, in viewing a complicated machine, the experienced engineer finds himself at home (if I may use a fa- miliar, but very significant phrase) ; while, on the same occasion, a person of different pursuits feels as if transported into a new world. The quickness and variety of intellectual combina- tion, exemplified in every sentence uttered by an extempore speaker, is the result of analogous habits : And where such a talent includes, not merely a flu- ency of correct and eloquent expression, but a per- fect command of whatever powers he may possess, whether of argument, of persuasion, of fancy, or of wit, it furnishes unquestionably the most splendid of all the proofs that can be produced, of the asto- nishing capacities of human genius. But on this to- pic (which I have often destined for the subject of a separate Essay) I forbear to enlarge at present. Similar observations to these might be extended to all the various applications of the understanding. Not that I would insinuate, with Helvetius, that, in point of quickness, or of any other mental quality, the whole of our species stand originally on the same level. All that I would be understood to assert amounts to this, that wherever we see the intellec- tual faculties displayed on particular subjects, with 3 Chap. I. ON TASTE. 4f55 a celerity far surpassing what we are accustomed to remark in ordinary life ; instead of forming any rash inference concerning the inequalities of genius in different individuals, we shall, in general, judge more safely, by considering the fact in question, merely as an illustration of those habits of observa- tion and of study, to which some peculiarity of in- clination has predisposed, or some peculiarity of si- tuation has trained the mind. * To exemplify this conclusion, I can think of no better instance, than that military eye in the survey of a country, which, in some men, appears almost in the form of a Sixth Sense. The French writers al- * A classical author has elegantly conveyed the same maxim, by the order in which he has arranged the qualities enumerated in the following sentence: " Vincebatomnes cura, vigilantia, pa- " tientia, calliditate, et celeritate ingenii." The last of the cata- logue he plainly considered as only the result of the habits im- posed by the former. Montaigne had probably an idea somewhat similar to this when he remarked (in speaking of the game of chess) " La precel- " lence rare et au-dessus du commun messied a un homme " d'honneur en chose frivole." A marked and unrivalled pre-emi- nence in such accomplishments he seems to have considered as, at once, evidence of a more than ordinary degree of industry and perseverance, directed to an object of little comparative value, and as symptomatic of an undue desire to display advantages over others, which would cease to attract wonder, if the secret were discovered of the time and labour sacrificed to their acquisi- tion. 1 The weakness alluded to by Montaigne is, in a more peculiar manner, characteristical of those who have been trained up, from childhood, in the habits and prejudices connected with elevated rank. 456 ON TASTE. Essay III. lude forcibly to the rapidity of its perceptions, by the phrase coup cFcetl, which they employ to express it. " It is a talent," says Guibert, in his Essay on Tac- tics, " which may be improved, but which is not to " be acquired by practice. It is an intuitive facul- " ty, and the gift of Nature ; a gift which she be- " stows only on a few favourites in the course of an " age." The same author, however, elsewhere qua- lifies these very strong assertions, by remarking, that the principal means by which a military man ac- quires it, is daily practice in his youth ; constantly keeping in view its culture and improvement, not only when actually employed in and it is impossible for us, " by any reasoning d priori, to explain how the plea- " sure or the pain is produced. In the works of " Nature, we find, in many instances, the elements " of Beauty involved among circumstances, which " are either indifferent, or which obstruct the gene- " ral effect : and it is only by a train of experiments * that we can separate these circumstances from the '< rest, and ascertain with what particular qualities V the pleasing effect is connected. Accordingly, ** the inexperienced artist, when he copies Nature^ 474' ON TASTE. Essay III. will copy her servilely, that he may be certain of " securing the pleasing effect ; and the beauties of " his performances will be encumbered with a num- " ber of superfluous or of disagreeable concomitants. " Experience and observation alone can enable him " to make this discrimination : to exhibit the prin- " ciples of beauty pure and unadulterated, and to " form a creation of his own, more faultless than " ever fell under the examination of his senses." " This analogy," I have added, " between the na- " tural progress of taste, and the natural progress of " physical knowledge, proceeds on the supposition, " that as, in the material world, there are general " facts, beyond which philosophy is unable to pro- " ceed ; so, in the constitution of man, there is an " inexplicable adaptation of the mind to the objects " with which his faculties are conversant ; in con- *' sequence of which, these objects are fitted to pro- " duce agreeable or disagreeable emotions. In both *' cases, reasoning may be employed with propriety *' to refer particular phenomena to general prin- " ciples ; but in both cases, we must at last arrive " at principles of which no account can be given, " but that such is the will of our Maker." Notwithstanding, however, the strong analogy be- tween the two cases, there are some important cir- cumstances in which they differ from each other. One of these was already hinted at, when I remark- ed, in a former part of this discussion, that as, in our experimental researches concerning the laws of Mat- ter, the ultimate appeal is always made to our exter- nal senses, so, in our experimental researches con- Chap. II. ON TASTE. 475 cerning the principles of Beauty, the ultimate appeal is always made to our own pleasant or unpleasant emotions. In conducting these last experiments, we cannot, it is evident, avail ourselves of any thing analogous to the instrumental aids which the mecha- nical arts have furnished to our bodily organs ; and are somewhat in the same situation in which the che- mist would be placed, if he had nothing to appeal to in his estimates of Heat, but the test of his own sen- sations. The only expedient we can have recourse to for supplying this defect is to repeat our experi- ments, under every possible variation of circum- stances by which the state and temper of our minds are likely to be effected ; and to compare the gene- ral result with the experience of others, whose pecu- liar habits and associations are the most different from our own. On the other hand, it is important to observe, that if the circumstance just remarked lays us under some inconvenience in our researches concerning the prin- ciples of Beauty, we possess, in conducting these, the singular advantage of always carrying about with us the materials of our experiments. In the infan- cy of Taste, indeed, the first step is to compare ob- ject with object ; one scene with another scene j one picture with another picture ; one poem with another poem ; and, at all times, such comparisons are pleasing and instructive. But when the mind has once acquired a certain familiarity with the beau- ties of Nature and of Art, much may be effected, in the way of experiment, by the power of Imagination alone. Instead of waiting to compare the scene ON TASTE, Essay III. .now before me with another scene of the same kind, or of actually trying the effects resulting from the various changes of which its parts are susceptible, I can multiply and vary my ideal trials at will, and can anticipate from my, own feelings, in these differ- ent cases, the improvement or the injury that would result from carrying them into execution. The fact js still more striking, when the original combination is furnished by Imagination herself, and when she compounds and Decompounds it, as fancy or curio- sity may happen to dictate. In this last case, the materials of our experiments, thje instruments em- ployed in our analysis or synthesis, and the laborato- ry in which the whole process is carried on, are all alike intellectual. They all exist in the observer's mind ; and are all supplied, either immediately by the principles of his nature, or by these principles cultivated and assisted by superinduced habits. The foregoing comparison is not the less just, that experimental researches concerning the principles of Beauty are seldom or never instituted with the same scientific formality as in chemistry or physics ; or, that the mind is, in most cases, wholly unconscious that such experiments have ever been made. When the curiosity is once fairly engaged by this particu- lar class of objects, a series of intellectual experi- ments is from that moment begun, without any guid- ance from the rules of philosophizing. Nor is this a singular fact in human nature ; for it is by a pro- cess perfectly similar (as I remarked in a former Es* say), that the use of language is at first acquired. It is by hearing the same word used, on a variety of Chap. II. ON TASTE. 4*77 different occasions, and by constant attempts to in- vestigate some common meaning which shall tally with them all, that a child comes at last to seize, with precision, the idea which the word is generally employed to convey ; and it is in the same manner that a person of mature understanding is forced ta proceed, in decyphering the signification of particu- lar phrases, when he studies, without the help of a dictionary, a language of which he possesses but a slight and inaccurate knowledge. There is here carried on, in the mind of the child, a process of na- tural induction, on the same general principles which are recommended in Bacon's philosophy : and such exactly do I conceive the process to be, by which the power of Taste acquires, insensibly, in the course of a long and varied experience, a perception of the ge- neral principles of Beauty. The account which has now been given of the ha- bits of observation and comparison, by which Taste acquires its powers of discrimination or discernment, explains, at the same time, the promptitude with which its judgments are commonly pronounced. As the experiments subservient to its formation are car- ried on entirely in the mind itself, they present, every moment, a ready field for the gratification of curiosity ; and in those individuals whose thoughts are strongly turned to the pursuit, they furnish mat- ter of habitual employment to the intellectual facul- ties. These experiments are, at the same time, exe- cuted with an ease and celerity unknown in our operations on Matter ; insomuch, that the experi- ment "and its result seem both to be comprehended 4-78 ON TASTE. Essay ill. in the same instant of time. The process, accord- ingly, vanishes completely from our recollection ; nor do we attempt to retrace it to ourselves in thought, far less to express it to others in words, any more than we are disposed, in our common es- timates of distance, to analyse the acquired percep- tions of vision. In the experimental proceedings of Taste, -ano- ther circumstance conspires to prevent such an ana- lysis ; I mean the tendency of the pleasurable effect to engross, or at least to distract, the attention. I took notice, in the work last quoted, of " the pe- " culiar difficulty of arresting and detecting our fleet- " ing ideas, in cases where they lead to any inte* " resting conclusion, or excite any pleasant emo- " tion ;" and I mentioned, as the obvious reason of this difficulty, that " the mind, when once it has en- " joyed the pleasure, has little inclination to retrace " the steps by which it arrived at it." I have ad- ded, in the same place, that " this last circumstance " is one great cause of the difficulty attending phi- " losophical criticism." * In order to illustrate the full import of this re- mark, it is necessary for me to observe, that when any dispute occurs in which Taste is concerned, the only possible way of bringing the parties to an agree- ment, is by appealing to an induction similar to that by which the judging powers of Taste are insensibly formed ; or by appealing to certain acknowledged principles which critics have already investigated by * Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. Chap, ii, * Chap. II. ON TASTE. 479 such an induction. Indeed, it is in this way alone that any general conclusions, in matters of this sort, can be ascertained. The difference which has been so much insisted on by some writers, between philo- sophical criticism, and that which they have been pleased to call experimental or tentative, turns en- tirely on the greater or less generality of the princi- ples to which the appeal is made. Where the ten- tative critic contents himself with an accumulation of parallel passages and of critical authorities, the philosopher appeals to the acknowledged sources of pleasure in the constitution of human nature. But these sources were at first investigated by experi- ment and induction, no less than the rules which are deduced from an examination of the beauties of Homer and of Virgil ; or, to speak more correctly, it is the former alone that are ascertained by induc- tion, properly so called ; while the others often amount to little more than the statements of an em- pirical and unenlightened experience. A dispute somewhat analogous to this might be conceived.to arise about the comparative distances of two different objects from a particular spot (about the distances, I shall suppose, of two large and spread- ing Oaks) j each party insisting confidently on the evidence of his senses, in support of his own judgment. How is it possible to bring them to an agreement, but by appealing to those very circum- stances, or signs, upon which all our perceptions of distance proceed, even when we are the least aware of any exercise of thought ? If the one party should observe, for instance, to his companion, that the 480 ON TASTE. Essay lit minute parts of the tree, which the latter affirms to be the most remote, that its smaller ramifications, its foliage, and the texture of its bark, are seen much more distinctly than the corresponding parts of the other ; he could not fail in immediately convincing him of the inaccuracy of his estimate. In like man- ner, the philosophical principles of criticism, when obtained by an extensive and cautious induction, may be fairly appealed to in questions of Taste ; al- though Taste itself, considered as a power of the mind, must, in every individual, be the result of his own personal experience ; no less than the acquired powers of perception by which his eye estimates the distances and magnitudes of objects. In this point of view, therefore, we may apply literally to intel- lectual Taste, the assertion formerly quoted from Quinctilian : " Non magis arte traditur quam gus- " tus aut odor." I must not conclude this branch of my subject without doing justice to some authors who appear to have entertained perfectly just and correct ideas con- cerning the nature of Taste, as an acquired princi- ple, although none of them, as far as I know, has at all examined the process by which it is generated. The first author I shall quote is Sir Joshua Rey- nolds, whose sagacity often seizes happily on the truth, without the formality of logical deduction. " The real substance," he observes, " of what goes " under the name of Taste, is fixed and established " in the nature of things. There are certain and " regular causes by which the imagination and the " passions of men are affected j and the knowledge 11 Chap. II. ON TASTE. 481 " of these causes is acquired by a laborious and dili- *" gent investigation of nature, and by the same " slow progress, as wisdom or knowledge of every " kind, however instantaneous its operations may " appear when thus acquired.'* Mr Burke has stated still more explicitly his dis- sent from the opinion, that " Taste is a separate fa- " culty of the mind, and distinct from the judgment " and imagination ; a species qf instinct, by which " we are struck naturally, and at the first glance, " without any previous reasoning, with the excel- ** lencies or the defects of a composition.*' " So " far," he continues, " as the imagination and the " passions are concerned, I believe it true, that the " reason is little consulted ; but where disposition, " where decorum, where congruity, are concerned, in " short, wherever the best taste differs from the worst, * I am convinced that the understanding operates, " and nothing else ; and its operation is in reality " far from being always sudden, or, when it is sud- " den, it is often far from being right. Men of the best *' taste, by consideration, come frequently to change *' those early and precipitate judgments, which the " mind, from its aversion to neutrality and doubt, " loves to form on the spot. It is known that the " taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly as we " improve our judgment, by extending our know- " ledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by " frequent exercise. They who have not taken " these methods, if their taste decides quickly, it is " always uncertainly 5 and their quickness is owing Hh 482 ON TASTE. Essay III. " to their presumption and rashness, and not any " hidden irradiation that in a moment dispels ail " darkness from their minds. But they who have " cultivated that species of knowledge which makes " the object of taste, by degrees, and habitually, at- " tain not only a soundness, but a readiness of judg- " ment, as men do by the same methods on all other " occasions. At first they are obliged to spell, but " at last they read with ease and with celerity ; but " this celerity of its operation is no proof that the " taste is a distinct faculty. Nobody, I believe, has " attended the course of a discussion, which turned " upon matter within the sphere of mere naked rea- " son, but must have observed the extreme readi- " ness with which the whole process of the argu- " ment is carried on, the grounds discovered, the " objections raised and answered, and the conclu- " sions drawn from premises, with a quickness al- " together as great as the taste can be supposed to -" work with ; and yet where nothing but plain rea- " son either is, or can be suspected to operate. To " multiply principles for every different appearance " is useless, and unphilosophical too, in a high de- " gree." The only other passage I shall add to these quo- tations is from Mr Hughes, who, almost a century ago, described the nature and genesis of taste, with admirable good sense and conciseness, in the follow- ing terms : " What we call Taste, is a kind of ex- . " tempore judgment; it is a settled habit of dis- " tinguishing, without staying to attend to rules or 1 Chap. II. ON TASTE. 48S " ratiocination, and arises from long use and expe- " rience." I intend to resume, on some future occasion, the subject of this Chapter, and to illustrate that pro- gress of Taste from rudeness to refinement, which accompanies the advancement of social civilization. In this respect, its history will be found to be some- what analogous to that of human Reason ; the taste of each successive age being formed on the study of more perfect models than that of the age before it j and leaving, in its turn, to after times a more elevated ground-work, on which they may raise their own superstructure. This traditionary Taste (imbibed in early life, part- ly from the received rules of critics, and partly from the study of approved models of excellence) is all that the bulk of men aspire to, and perhaps all that they are qualified to acquire. But it is the province of a leading mind to outstrip its contemporaries, by instituting new experiments for its own improve- ment ; and, in proportion as the observation and ex- perience .of the race are enlarged, the means are fa- cilitated of accomplishing such combinations with success, by the multiplication of those selected ma- terials out of which they are to be formed. In individuals of this description, Taste includes Genius as one of its elements ; as Genius, in any one of the fine arts, necessarily implies a certain por- tion of Taste. In both cases, precepts and models. ON- TASTEi Essay III, although of inestimable value, leave much to be done by an inventive imagination. In the mind of a man who feels and judges for himself, a large proportion of the rules which guide his decisions exist only in his own understanding. Many of them he probably never thought of cloth- ing with language even to himself ; and some of them would certainly, if he should attempt to em- body them in words, elude all his efforts to convey their import to others. " What we call genius," says Reynolds, " be- " gins, not where rules, abstractedly taken, end ; " but where known, vulgar, and trite rules have no " longer any place." " It is true, these refined " principles cannot be always made palpable, like " the more gross rules of art ; yet it does not follow, " but that the mind may be put in such a train, that " it shall perceive, by a kind of scientific sense, that " propriety, which words can but very feebly sug- " gest." All this will be found to apply literally to original or inventive Taste, and to suggest matter for very curious and useful reflection. But some other views of this power appear to me to form a more natural sequel to the foregoing observations ; and to these, . accordingly, I shall confine myself at present, in the farther prosecution of the subject of this Essay. -Chap. III. ON TASTE. 486 CHAPTER THIRD. DIFFERENT MODIFICATIONS OF TASTE. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TASTE, AND THE NATURAL SENSIBILITY TO BEAUTY. the account formerly given of the origin and progress of our notions with respect to the Beauti- ful? it appeared, that the circumstances which please in objects of Taste are of two very different kinds. First, those which derive their effect from the or- ganical adaptation of the human frame to the external universe ; and Secondly, those which please in con- sequence of associations gradually formed by experi- ence. Among the various particulars belonging to this second class (a class which comprehends by far the most important elements which, in such an age as ours, enter into the composition of the beautiful), a very obvious distinction may be made. (1 .) Such beauties as owe their existence to associations result- ing necessarily from the common circumstances of the human race ; and, therefore, extending their influence, more or less, to all mankind. Examples of these universal associations occur in the unifor- mity of language (remarked in the two preceding Essays) among various civilized nations, in speaking 486 ON TASTE, Essay III. of Beauty and of Sublimity. (2.) Beauties which have no merit but what depends on custom and fashion ; or on certain peculiarities in the situation and history of the individual. Of the two last de- scriptions oJ beauty, the former, it is evident, agree in one very essential respect, with the organical beauties first mentioned. Both of them have their source in the principles of Human Nature (compre- hending, under this phrase, not only the natural constitution, but the natural condition of man) ; and, accordingly, they both fall under the consi- deration of that sort of criticism which forms a branch of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. The associations on which they are founded have equally a claim to a place among the elements of the Beautiful ; nor can any theory of Beauty be admit- ted as sufficiently comprehensive, in which either the one or the other is overlooked. As an illustration of this, I shall mention only Mr Burke's theory, which excludes from the idea of Beauty all considerations of proportion, fitness, and utility. In order to justify such exclusions as these, it surely is not sufficient to shew, that the qualities just mentioned cannot be brought under a particular and arbitrary definition. The question for the philosopher to consider is, what has led man- kind, in ancient as well as in modern times, to class together these, and a variety of other qualities, under one common name ; and frequently to employ the name of some one of them to comprehend the whole. A passage formerly quoted from Cicero affords an instance in point : " Itaque eorum iy- -orum, Chap. III. ON TASTE. 487 " adspectu sentinnlur, nulhim aliud animal pulchri- " tudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sen- " tit ; quam similrtudinem natura ratioque ab oculis " ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pul- " chritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis " factisque conservandum putat," &c. &c. " For- " mam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem " Honesti vides ; qua?, si oculis cerneretur, mira- " biles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiae." In favour of Mr Burke's opinion, it must indeed be admitted, that those systems are completely erroneous, which would resolve the whole of Beauty into any one of the three qualities which he excludes from the idea of it, or even into all the three combined, without the co-operation of anything else. But it is going, at least, as far into the opposite extreme, to say that none of these is entitled to a place among the elements which can possibly belong to its com- position. * According to this view of the subject, it would be quite unnecessary to distinguish, in our subse- quent reasonings, that species of Beauty which re- sults from the physical relation between our organs of perception and external objects, from that which depends on natural and universal associations ; and I shall therefore apply to them the common appella- tion of Universal Beauties, in opposition to those Arbitrary Beauties, the admiration of which has been confined to particular places, or to particular periods. * Note (Q q.) 488 ON TASTE. Essay III, Among the associations, however, on which these arbitrary beauties depend, there are some varieties, of which it may be proper to take notice, before we proceed to consider the various appearances which Taste may assume in different minds. The follow-. ing list seems tp comprehend those which are chiefly entitled to our attention. 1. Classical Associations : - Inspired by the re- mains of ancient Greece and Rome ; and, of course, extending to all who receive the advantages of a learned education in every quarter of the civilized world. The authority of these is, in all cases, great ; and, in some cases (particularly in sculp- ture and in architecture), is now so consecrated by established opinion, as almost to preclude all criti- cism or discussion. In poetry, also, they have add- ed immensely to our natural resources, particularly by the beautiful system of mythology with which they are interwoven ; but they have, at the same time, warped our Taste in various instances ; and have certainly no claims tp our servile imitation, where they happen to deviate from the standard of Nature. In every instance where there is no such deviation, their authority seems justly entitled to the next place (but a very subordinate .place) after those associations which belong universally to our species. It must not, however, be imagined, that, in any in- stance, they furnish us with principles from which there lies no appeal ; nor should it be forgotten, that their influence does not reach to the most numerous class of the people, in the most refined so- cieties. H Chap. III. OX TASTE. 489 2. National or local Associations. Where these are not widely at variance with universal associations, they exert over the heart a power greater, perhaps, than that of any other associations whatsoever ; and sometimes (as seems to have happened in the case of most French critics) they acquire an ascendant even over the impressions of Nature herself. But this influence being confined necessarily within the national pale (however ample the resources are which it furnishes for local and fugitive Poetry), is much more likely to mislead than to guide our re- searches concerning the principles of Philosophical Criticism. 3. Personal Associations : Such as those which arise from the accidental style of natural beauty in the spot where we have passed our childhood and early youth ; from the peculiarities in the features of those whom we have loved ; and other circum- stances connected with our own individual feelings. o Of these it is necessary that every man, who aspires to please or to instruct others, should divest himself to the utmost of his power ; or, at least, that he should guard against their undue ascendant over his mind, when he exercises either his Imagination or his Taste, in works addressed to the public. Under this head, I must not omit to mention the influence of vanity and selfishness on the judgments of some men, even concerning the beauties of na- ture ; the interest which the attachment to pro- perty creates, rendering them alive to every trifling recommendation belonging to what is their own, while it blinds them to the most prominent beauties 490 ON TASTE. Essay HI. in the property of their neighbours. Gresset has seized happily this intellectual and moral weakness, in his charming comedy of the Mechanl. But, as it is more connected with the study of Character, than with that of Philosophical Criticism, I shall not enlarge upon it farther at present. Corresponding to the distinction which I have been attempting to illustrate between Universal and Arbitrary Beauties, there are two different modifi- cations of Taste ; modifications which are not al- ways united (perhaps seldom united) in the same person. The one enables a writer or an artist to rise superior to the times in which he lives, and em- boldens him to trust his reputation to the suffrages of the human race, and of the ages which are yet to come. The other is the foundation of that humbler, though more profitable sagacity, which teaches the possessor how to suit his manufactures to the mar- ket ; to judge before-hand of the reception which any new production is to meet with, and to regulate his exertions accordingly. The one must be culti- vated by those habits of abstraction and study, which, withdrawing the thoughts from the unmeaning par- ticularities of individual perception, and the capri- cious drapery of conventional manners, familiarize the mind to the general forms of beautiful nature ; or to Beauties which the classical genius of antiquity has copied from these, and which, like tliese* are nn- fading and immortal. The proper sphere of the other is such a capital as London or Paris. It is there that the judges are to be found from whose decision it acknowledges no appeal j and it is irt Chap- HI. ON TASTE - such a situation alone that it can be cultivated with advantage. Dr Johnson has well described (in a prologue spoken by Garrick, when he first opened the theatre at Drury-Lane) the trifling solicitudes and the ever-varying attentions to which those are doomed, who submit thus to be the ministers and slaves of public folly : " Hard is his fate, who here, by fortune plac'd, " Must watch the wild vicissitudes of Taste ; " With every meteor of caprice must play, " And catch the new-blown bubbles of the day.", The ground-work of this last species of Taste (if it deserves the name) is a certain facility of asso- ciation, acquired by early and constant intercourse with society ; more particularly, with those classes of society who are looked up to as supreme legis- lators in matters of fashion ; a habit of mind, the tendency of which is ' to render the sense of the Beautiful (as well as the sense of what is Right and Wrong) easily susceptible of modification from the contagion of example. It is a habit by no means inconsistent with a certain degree of original sensi- bility ; nay, it requires, perhaps, some original sensi- bility as its basis : but this sensibility, in conse- quence of the habit which it has itself contributed to establish, soon becomes transient and useless ; losing all connection with Reason and the Moral Principles, and alive only to such impressions as fa- shion recognises and sanctions. The other species of Taste, founded on the study of Universal Beauty (and which, for the sake of distinction, I shall call Philosophical Taste J, implies a sensibility, deep and 492 ON TASTE. Essay IIL permanent, to those objects of affection, admiration, and reverence, which interested the youthful heart, while yet a stranger to the opinions and ways of the world. Its most distinguishing characteristics, ac- cordingly, are strong domestic and local attachments, accompanied with that enthusiastic love of Nature, Simplicity, and Truth, which, in every department, both of art and of science, is the best and surest pre- sage of Genius. It is this sensibility that gives rise to the habits of attentive observation by which such a Taste can alone be formed ; and it is this also that, binding an.d perpetuating the associations which such a Taste supposes, fortifies the mind against the fleeting caprices which the votaries of fashion watch and obey. In the farther prosecution of this subject, as well as in the former part of this Essay, my observations must be understood as referring chiefiy to that sort of Taste which I have now distinguished by the epithet philosophical. It may, at the same time, be proper to remark, that a great part of these observa- tions, particularly those which I have already made on the process by which Taste acquires its discrimi- nation and its promptitude of perception, are appli- cable, with some slight alterations, to that which has for its object local and temporary modes, no less than to the other, which is acquired by the study of Universal Beauty. The two distinguishing characteristics of Good Taste (it has been justly observed by different writers) are correctness and delicacy ; the former having for its province the detection of Blemishes, Ohap. III. ON TASTE. the latter the perception of those more refined Beauties which cultivated minds alone can feel. This distinction has been illustrated (and I think not unhappily) by the general complexion of Swift's criticisms contrasted with that of Addison's. Of that quality, more particularly, which is properly called delicacy of taste, no better exemplifications can anywhere be found, than occur in some critical papers on Paradise Lost, published in the Specta- tor. Where this intellectual power exists in its most perfect state, both these qualities are necessarily implied. It was remarked, in the beginning of these inqui- ries, concerning Taste, that although it presupposes a certain degree of sensibility, yet it is not by men whose sensibility is most exquisite, that it is com- monly cultivated with the greatest success. One principal reason of this seems to be, that in such men, the pleasures which they receive from beauti- ful objects engross the attention too much to allow the judgment to operate coolly ; and the mind is disposed to dwell passively on its own enjoyment, without indulging a speculative curiosity in analysing its sources. In all our perceptions, from the gros- sest to the most refined, the attention is directed to the effect or to the cause, according to the viva- city or to the faintness of the sensation. " If I lay " my hand," says Dr Reid, " gently on the table, "and am asked what I feel, I naturally answer, " that / feel the table ; if I strike it against the '* same object with such violence as to receive a pain- ** ful sensation from the blow, I as naturally answer 494 ON TASTE. Essay III. " the same question, by saying, that / feel pain in " my kancl." A similar observation may be appli- ed to the pleasures which are derived from objects of Taste. Where these pleasures rise to ecstasy, they produce a state of vague enthusiasm and rapture, in which our reasoning faculties have little share : where they are more moderate and sober, they rouse the curiosity, like other physical effects ; and create insensibly those habits of observation, of comparison, and of intellectual experiment, of which I have endeavoured to shew, in the last Chapter, that the power of Taste is the gradual and slow result. In proportion, too, as the temper of the mind in- clines to extreme sensibility, the casual associations of the individual may be expected to be numerous and lasting ; for nothing tends so powerfully to bind the associating tie, as the circumstance of its being originally formed when the mind was strongly agi- tated by pleasure or by pain. In recollecting any particular occurrence, whether prosperous or adverse, of our past lives, by which we were deeply affected at the moment, how indelible do we find the im- pression left on the memory, by the most trifling and accidental details which distinguished the never- to-be-forgotten day on which it happened ; and how apt are similar details, if at any time they should present themselves in somewhat of the same combi- nation, to inspire us with gaiety or with sadness, ac- cording to the complexion of the event with which they are associated ! It is in the same way, that, to a mind tremblingly alive to impressions of beauty, a charm is communicated to -whatever accessories or Chap. III. ON TASTE. 490 appendages happen to invest any object of its admi- ration ; accessories which are likely to leave a far less permanent trace in the memory of a more indif- ferent spectator. The consequence will be, that in a person of the former temper, the cultivation of a correct taste will be a much more difficult task than in one of the latter, and a proportionally greater at- tention will be requisite, on the part of his instruc- tors, to confine his habitual studies to the most fault- less models. Of the caprices and singularities of judgment to which all men are more or less liable from causes of this sort, but which are more peculiarly incident to men of very warm and lively feelings, no better illustration can be given than a noted fact, which Descartes mentions with respect to himself, in one of his letters. " During the whole of his life," this philosopher tells us, " he had a partiality for " persons who squinted ;" and he adds, that " in " his endeavour to trace the cause of a taste ap- " parently so whimsical, he at last recollected, that " when a boy, he had been fond of a girl who had " that blemish." " The affection he had for this " object of his first love," says Malebranche, " seems " to have diffused itself to all others who any way " resembled her." Hence the disposition which young and susceptible minds discover so frequently, to copy the peculiarities in dress, pronunciation, and manner, of those they admire or are attached to ; the agreable impressions associated in their fancy with everything which marks the individual the most strongly to the eye or the ear, leading them to 496 ON conclude very rashly, that, by an imitation of circum- stances which are to themselves so characteristical and expressive, they cannot fail to secure a similar charm to their own exterior. Among the ancients, we are told by Plutarch, there were many who imi- tated the stuttering of Aristotle, and the wry neck of Alexander ; nor has this strong bias of our na- ture escaped the all-observant eye of Shakespeare : He was jntleeu the glass " Wherein the noble youth did dress themselves. " lie had no legs that practis'd not his gait ; " And speaking thick, which nature made his blcmfsh, " Became the accents of the valiant." Hence, too, the effect of those writers, who unite with any transcendent excellencies, some affected peculiarities of manner or style, in misleading and corrupting the taste of their contemporaries. " How " many great qualities/' says Mr Smith, " must " that writer possess, who can thus render his very " faults agreeable ! After the praise of refining the " taste of a nation, the highest eulogy, perhaps, " which can be bestowed on any author, is to say " that he corrupted it." Proceeding on the same idea, Dr Johnson remarks, very justly and perti- nently, that " if there is any writer whose genius " can embellish impropriety, or whose authority can " make error venerable, his works are the proper " objects of critical inquisition." It is hardly neces- sary for me to add, that the business of the critic, in such cases, is to break asunder the casual associa- tions which an unreflecting admiration of genius has established in the public judgment j and that, Chap. III. ON TASTE. 497 in proportion to the degree of sensibility and en- thusiasm which accompanies this admiration in the mind of any individual, will be the difficulty of the task which the critic has to perform. The foregoing observations seem sufficiently to shew, not only that a sensibility to Beauty does not necessarily imply the power of Taste ; but that, in a mind where the degree of sensibility is extreme, the acquisition of a correct taste is, in ordinary cases, next to impossible. Such a mind may indeed be conceived to have been so circumstanced, as to have been conversant alone with the best models ; or it may be so fortified by habits of philosophical study as to resist the influence of casual associations, even while it feels their force ; but these cases occur so seldom, that the exceptions rather confirm than weaken the truth of the general conclusion. Neither is it, perhaps, in minds where sensibility forms the principal feature, that the utmost delicacy of taste is to be looked for. The more prominent beauties of the object are apt to engross the whole soul, and to divert the attention, not only from its defects, but from those nicer touches which charac- terize the finer shades and gradations of art. On the other hand, it is a self-evident truth, that where there is no sensibility, there can be no taste ; and that even where sensibility is not altogether want- ing, it may exist in a degree so very trifling, as not to afford a sufficient inducement or motive for the cul- tivation of those habits by which taste is formed. There exists, therefore, a certain measure of sensi- i i 498 ON TASTE. Essay III. bility, which at once predisposes the mind to the cultivation of Taste, and constitutes an aptitude for its acquisition ; such a measure of it, as renders that class of our pleasures with which taste is conversant, an interesting object of examination and study ; while, on the other hand, it does not rise so high as to discourage habits of observation and analysis, or to overpower the judgment, by lending irresistible force to casual combinations. In the practical application, however, of this con- clusion, it is of essential consequence to remember, that the degree of sensibility must always be esti- mated relatively to the state of those intellectual powers with which it is combined. A degree of sensibility which a man of vigorous understanding knows how to regulate and to .control, may, in a weaker mind, not only become a source of endless inconvenience and error, but may usurp the mas- tery of all its faculties. The truth of this remark is daily exemplified in that sort of sensibility which is affected by the pleasures and pains of human life ; and it will be found to hold equally with respect to the feelings which enter as elementary principles into the composition of Taste. Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 499 CHAPTER FOURTH. CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. SPECIFIC PLEA- SURE CONNECTED WITH THE EXERCISE OF TASTE. FASTIDIOUSNESS OF TASTE. MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS ON THIS POWER, CONSIDERED IN ITS CONNECTION WITH CHARACTER AND HAPPINESS. BEFORE I quit this part of the subject, it is import- ant for me to add, that, in proportion as taste is cul- tivated and matured, there arises a secondary plea- sure peculiar to this acquired power ; a pleasure es- sentially distinct from those primary pleasures which its appropriate objects afford. A man of strong sensibility, but destitute of taste, while he enjoys the beauties of a poem or a picture, will re- ceive no positive uneasiness from the concomitant details which may diminish or obstruct the pleasing effect. To a person* on the contrary, of a culti- vated taste, these will necessarily appear offensive blemishes, betraying a want of skill and judgment in the author ; while, 011 the other hand, supposing them to have been avoided, and the genuine prin- ciples of beauty to have been exhibited pure and unadulterated, there would have been superadded to the pleasures operating on his natural sensibility, the acquired gratification of remarking the Taste as well as Genius displayed in the performance. ON TASTE. Essay III. It is, however, in a very small number, compara- tively speaking, of individuals, that taste is the na- tive growth of the original principles and unborrow- ed habits of their own minds. In by far the greater proportion of men, what usurps that name, and is too frequently acknowledged as having a right to as- sume it, consists merely of a prompt application of certain technical rules, which pass current in the common circles of fashion or of literature ; and which are adopted by the multitude, without the slightest examination, as incontrovertible axioms. Such, for example, is that mechanical and pedantic taste which is imbibed passively on the authority of Aristotle or of Bossu, and which may, in general, be distinguished by a fluent command of that con- venient and imposing phraseology, which is called by Sterne " the cant of criticism.** These technical rules, at the same time, although often abused, are not without their value ; for, al- though they can never supply the want of natural sensibility, or inspire a relish for beauty in a mind insensible to it before, they may yet point out many of the faults which an artist ought to avoid, and teach those critics how to censure, who are inca- pable of being taught how to admire. They may even communicate to such a critic, some degree of" that secondary pleasure which was formerly men- tioned as peculiar to taste ; the pleasure of remark- ing the coincidence between the execution of an artist, and the established rules of his art ; or, if he should himself aspire to be an artist, they may enable him to produce what will not much offend, if it Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 501 should fail to please. What is commonly called fastidiousness of taste, is an affectation chiefly ob- servable in persons of this description ; being the natural effect of habits of common-place criticism on an eye blind to the perception of the beautiful. In- stances, at the same time, may be conceived, in which this fastidiousness is real ; arising from an unfortunate predominance of the secondary plea- sures and pains, peculiar to taste, over those primary pleasures and pains which the object is fitted to pro- duce. But this, I apprehend, is a case that can rarely occur in a mind possessed of common sensi- bility ; more especially, if the cultivation of taste has been confined to that subordinate place which be- longs to it, among the various other pursuits to which we are led by the speculative and active principles of our nature. The result of these observations is, that the ut- most to be expected from rules of criticism is a tech- nical correctness of taste ; meaning by that phrase, a power of judging, how far the artist has conform- ed himself to the established and acknowledged ca- nons of his art, without any perception of those nameless excellencies, which have hitherto eluded the grasp of verbal description. There is another species of Taste (unquestion- ably of a higher order than the technical taste we have now been considering), which is insensibly ac- quired by a diligent and habitual study of the most approved and consecrated standards of excellence ; and which, in pronouncing its critical judgments, is secretly, and often unconsciously guided, Jby an ido- 502 ON TASTE. Essay III. latrous comparison of what it sees, with the works of its favourite masters. This, I think, approaches nearly to what La Bruyere calls le Gout de Com- paraison. It is that kind of taste which commonly belongs to the connoisseur in painting ; and to which something perfectly analogous may be remark- ed in all the other line arts. A person possessed of this sort of taste, if he should be surpassed in the correctness of his judg- ment by the technical critic, is much more likely to recognise the beauties of a new work, by their re- semblance to those which are familiar to his memo- ry ; or, if he should himself attempt the task of ex- ecution, and possesses powers equal to the task, he may possibly, without any clear conception of his own merits, rival the originals he has been accustom- ed to admire. It was said by an ancient critic, that, in reading Seneca, it was impossible not to wish, that he had written " with the taste of ano- " ther person, though with his own genius ;" suo ingenio, alieno judicio ; *- and we find, in fact, that many who have failed as original writers, have seemed to surpass themselves, when they attempted to imitate. Warburton has remarked, and, in my opinion, with some truth, that Burke himself never wrote so well, as when he imitated Bolingbroke. If, on other occasions, he has soared higher than in his Vindication of Natural Society, he has certain- ly nowhere else (I speak at present merely of the style of his composition) sustained himself so long * Velles cum suo ingenio dixisie, alieno judicio. Quinct . Lib. x. cap. I. Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 503 upon a steady wing. I do not, however, agree with Warburton in thinking, that this implied any defect in Mr Burke's genius, connected with that faculty of imitation which he so eminently possessed. The defect lay in his Taste, which, when left to itself, without the guidance of an acknowledged standard of excellence, appears not only to have been warped by some peculiar notions concerning the art of writ- ing ; but to have been too wavering and versatile, to keep his imagination and his fancy (stimulated as they were by an ostentation of his intellectual riches, and by an ambition of Asiatic ornament) under due control. With the composition of Bolingbroke present to his thoughts, he has shewn with what ease he could equal its most finished beauties, while, on more than one occasion, a consciousness of his own strength has led him to display his superiority, by brandishing, in his sport, still heavier weapons than his master was able to wield. To one or other of these two classes, the taste of most professed critics will be found to belong ; and it is evident that they may both exist, where there is little or no sensibility to Beauty. That genuine and native Taste, the origin and growth of which I attempted to describe in the last chapter, is perhaps one of the rarest acquisitions of the human mind : nor will this appear surprising to those who consider with attention the combination of original qualities which it implies ; the accidental nature of many of the circumstances which must conspire to afford due opportunities for its improvement j and the per- severing habits of discriminating observation by 504- ON TASTE. Essay IIL which it is formed. It occurs, indeed, in its most perfect state, as seldom as originality of genius j and, when united with industry, and with mode- rate powers of execution, it will go farther, in such an age as the present, to secure success in the arts with which it is conversant, than the utmost fertility of invention, where the taste is unformed or per- verted. With respect to this native or indigenous Taste, it is particularly worthy of observation, that it is al- ways more strongly disposed to the enjoyment of Beauties, than to the detection of Blemishes. It is, indeed, by a quick and lively perception of the for- mer, accompanied with a spirit of candour and indul- gence towards the latter, that its existence in the mind of any individual is most unequivocally marked. It is this perception which can alone evince that sensi- bility of temperament, of which a certain portion, although it does not of itself constitute Taste, is ne- vertheless the first and most essential element in its composition ; while it evinces, at the same time, those habits of critical observation and cool reflec- tion, which, allowing no impression, how slight so- ever, to pass unnoticed, seem to awaken a new sense of Beauty, and to create that delicacy of feeling which they only disclose. We are told of Saunder- son, the blind mathematician, that in a series of Ro- man medals, he could distinguish by his hand the true from the counterfeit, with a more unerring dis- crimination than the eye of a professed Virtuoso ; and we are assured by his biographer, Mr Colson, that when he was present at the astronomical obser- Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 505 vations in the garden of his college, he was accus- tomed to remark every cloud that passed over the sun. The effect of the blindness of this extraordi- nary person was not surely to produce any organi- cal change in his other perceptive powers. It serv- ed only to quicken his attention to those slighter perceptions of touch, which are overlooked by men to whom they convey no useful information. The case I conceive to be perfectly analogous in matters which fall under the cognizance of intellectual taste. Where nature has denied all sensibility to beauty, no study or instruction can supply the defect ; but it may be possible, nevertheless, by awakening the attention to things neglected before, to develope a latent sensibility where none was suspected to exist.. In all men, indeed, without exception, whether their natural sensibility be strong or weak, it is by such habits of attention alone to the finer feelings of their own minds, that the power of taste can acquire all the delicacy of which it is susceptible. While this cultivated sensibility enlarges so wide- ly to the man who possesses it the pleasures of Taste, it has a tendency, wherever it is gratified and de- lighted in a high degree, to avert his critical eye from blemishes and imperfections ; not because he is unable to remark them, but because he can appre- ciate the merits by which they are redeemed, and loves to enjoy the beauties in which they are lost. A Taste thus awake to the Beautiful seizes eagerly on every touch of genius with the sympathy of kind- red affection ; and, in the secret consciousness of a congenial inspiration, shares, in some measure, the 506 ON TASTE. Essay ill. triumph of the Artist. The faults which have es- caped him, it views with the partiality of friendship; and willingly abandons the censorial office to those who exult in the errors of superior minds as their appropriate and easy prey. Nor is this indulgent spirit towards the works of others at all inconsistent with the most rigid severi- ty in an author towards his own. On the contrary, both are the natural consequences of that discrimi- nating power of taste, on whibh I have already en- larged as one of its most important characteristics. Where men of little discernment attend only to ge- neral effects, confounding beauties and blemishes, flowers and weeds, in one gross and un distinguish- ing perception, a man of quick sensibility, and culti- vated judgment, detaches, in a moment, the one from the other ; rejects, in imagination, whatever is offensive in the prospect, and enjoys without alloy what is fitted to please. His taste, in the meantime, is refined and confirmed by the exercise ; and, while it multiplies the sources of his gratification in pro- portion to the latent charms which it detects, be- comes itself, as the arbiter and guide of his own ge- nius, more scrupulous and inflexible than before. " The tragedy of Douglas," says Gray in one of his letters, " has infinite faults ; but there is one scene " (that between Matilda and the Old Peasant) so " masterly, that it strikes me blind to all the de- " fects of the piece." These, I apprehend, are the natural impressions of genuine taste in pronoun- cing on the merits of works of genuine excellence ; impressions, however, which they who are conscious Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 50? of them have not always the candour either to in- dulge or to avow. Such, also, was the feeling which dictated a memorable precept of La Bruyere, of which I will not impair the force, by attempting a translation : " Quand une lecture vous eleve 1 'esprit, " et qu'elle vous inspire des sentimens nobles et " courageux, ne cherchez pas une autre regie pour "juger de 1'Ouvrage ; il est bon, et fait de main " d'Ouvrier." How different both sentiments from that fastidiousness of Taste, by an affectation of which it is usual for little minds to court the repu- tation of superior refinement ! * In producing, however, this fastidiousness, whe- ther affected or real, various moral causes, such as jealousy, rivalship, personal dislike, or the spleen of conscious inferiority, may conspire with the intel- lectual defects which have been mentioned : Nay, the same moral causes may be conceived to be so powerful in their influence, as to produce this un- fortunate effect, in spite of every intellectual gift which nature and education can bestow. It is ob- served by Shenstone, that " good taste and good " nature are inseparably united ;" and, although the observation is by no means true when thus stated as an unqualified proposition, it will be found to have a sufficient foundation in fact, to deserve the attention of those who have a pleasure in studying the varieties of human character. One thing is cer- tain, that as a habitual deficiency in good humour is sufficient to warp the decisions of the soundest taste, so the taste of an individual, in proportion as it ap- 508 ON TASTE. Essay III. pears to be free from capricious biasses, affords a strong presumption, that the temper is unsuspicious, open, and generous. As the habits, besides, which contribute spontaneously to the formation of Taste, all originate in the desire of intellectual gratifica- tion, this power, where it is possessed in an eminent degree, may be regarded as a symptom of that ge- neral disposition to be pleased and happy, in which the essence of good-nature consists. " In those " vernal seasons of the year," says Milton, in one of the finest sentences of his prose writings, " when " the air is soft and pleasant, it were an injury and " sullenness against nature, not to go out and see " her riches, and partake of her rejoicings with " heaven and earth." Such is the temper of mind by which, in our early years, those habits which form the ground-work of Taste are most likely to be formed ; and such, precisely, is the temper which, in .our intercourse with our fellow-creatures, disposes us, both for their sakes and for our own, to view their actions and characters on the fairest side. I need scarcely add, in confirmation of some remarks formerly made, hat the same temper, when trans- ferred from the observation of nature to the study of the fine arts, can scarcely fail to incline the taste more strongly to the side of admiration than of cen- sure. After all, however, maxims of this sort must ne- cessarily be understood as liable to many exceptions. The love of nature itself, even when accompanied with that general benevolence towards our own spe- cies with which it is in youth invariably attended, is Chap. IV. ON TASTE. not always united with that good humour towards individuals, to which it seems so nearly allied in the- ory, and with which it is, in fact, so closely connect- ed, in a great majority of instances: Nay, this love of nature sometimes continues un diminished in men, who, in consequence of disappointed hopes and ex- pectations, have contracted a decided tendency to misanthropy. It is not, therefore, surprising, that an enthusiastic admiration of natural beauty should occasionally meet in the same person, with a cold and splenetic taste in the fine arts ; at least in in- stances where the productions of the present times are to be judged of. But such exceptions do not invalidate the truth of the general proposition, any more than of every other general conclusion rela- tive to human character. Their explanation is to be sought for in the accidental history of individual minds ; and, when successfully investigated, will constantly be found (supposing our results to be cau- tiously drawn from a comprehensive survey of hu- man life) to lend additional evidence to the very rules which they seem, at first view, to contradict. One very obvious consideration furnishes, of itself, in the case now before us, a key to some apparent inconsistencies in the reflections which I have al- ready hazarded. In such maxims concerning Taste, as that which I have quoted from Shenstone, due at- tention is seldom paid to the diversified appearances it exhibits, according to the two very different pur- poses for which it may be exercised : First, as a prin- ciple in the artist's mind, regulating and directing the exertions of his own genius j and Secondly, as 310 ON TASTE. Essay III. a principle in the mind of the critic, who judges of the works produced by the genius, of another. In the former case, where none of the moral causes by which taste is most liable to be warped have room to operate, it cannot be denied, that it is sometimes displayed in no inconsiderable degree (although, I believe, never in its highest perfection) by indivi- duals, in whose characters neither good humour nor any other amiable quality is at all conspicuous. In the latter case, an habitual justice and mildness in its decisions, more particularly where works of con- temporary genius are in question, is an infallible test of the absence of those selfish partialities and peevish jealousies, which encroach so deeply on the happi- ness of many, whom nature has distinguished by the most splendid endowments ; and which, wherever they are allowed to operate, are equally fatal to the head and to the heart. It is a melancholy fact with respect to artists of all classes ; painters, poets, orators, and eloquent writers ; that a large proportion of those who have evinced the soundest and the surest taste in their own productions, have yet appeared totally destitute of this power, when they have assumed the office of critics. How is this to be accounted for, but by the influence of bad passions (unsuspected, probably, by themselves) in blinding or jaundicing their critical eye ? In truth, it is only when the mind is perfect- ly serene, that the decisions of taste can be relied on. In these nicest of all operations of the intel- lect, where the grounds of judgment are often so shadowy and complicated, the latent sources of error Chap. IV. ON TASTE. are numberless ; and to guard against them, it is necessary that no circumstance, however trifling, should occur, either to discompose the feelings, or to mislead the understanding. Among our English poets, who is more vigorous, correct, and polished, than Dr Johnson, in the few poetical compositions which he has left ? Whatever may be thought of his claims to originality of ge- nius, no person who reads his verses can deny, that he possessed a sound taste in this species of compo- sition ; and yet, how wayward and perverse, in many instances, are his decisions, when he sits in judgment on a political adversary, or when he treads on the ashes of a departed rival ! To myself (much as I admire his great and various merits, both as a critic and as a writer), human nature never appears in a more humiliating form, than when I read his Lives of the Poets ; a performance which exhibits a more faithful, expressive, and curious picture of the author, than all the portraits attempted by his biographers ; and which, in this point of view, com- pensates fully by the moral lessons it may suggest, for the critical errors which it sanctions. The er- rors, alas ! are not such as any one who has perused his imitations of Juvenal can place to the account of a bad taste ; but such as had their root in weak- nesses, which a noble mind would be still more un- willing to acknowledge. If these observations are well-founded, they seem to render it somewhat doubtful, whether, in the dif- ferent arts, the most successful adventurers are like- ly to prove, in matters of criticism, the safest guides ; 5Ii2 ON TASTE. Essay III. although Pope appears to have considered the cen- sorial authority as their exclusive prerogative : " Let such teach others, who themselves excel, " And censure freely who h;ive written well." That the maxim is founded in good sense, as long as the artist confines himself to general critical pre- cepts, or to the productions of other times, I do not mean at present to dispute ; although even on this point I entertain some doubts. But, in estimating the merits of a contemporary candidate for fame, how seldom do we meet witji an artist, whose deci- sions are dictated by Taste alone, without a palpable admixture of caprice or of passion ; and how often have we, on such occasions, to lament that oracular contempt of public opinion and public feeling which conscious superiority is too apt to inspire? Other causes, besides, of a much more secret and obscure nature than these moral weaknesses, co-operate powerfully in producing the same effect. Such, for example, are the biasses, originating in casual and inexplicable associations, which, in powerful but limited minds, are frequently identified with the cha- racteristical stamina of genius ; furnishing matter of wonder and of pity to others, whose intellectual features are less strongly marked by individual pe- culiarities. " Thomson has lately published a poem, " called T/te Castle of 'Indolence ', in which there are " some good stanzas.*' Who could have expected this sentence from the pen of Gray ? In an prdi- nary critic, possessed of one hundredth part of Gray's sensibility and taste, such total indifference Chap. IV. ON TASTE. tp the beauties of this exquisite performance would fye utterly impossible. * But I will not multiply illustrations on a topic so peculiarly ungrateful. The hints which I have al- re^dy thrown out are, I hope, sufficient to lead the thoughts of my younger readers to those practical reflections which they were intended to suggest. They have, indeed, but little originality to boast of ; but they point at some sources of false taste, over- looked in our common systems of criticism ; and which, however compatible with many of the rarest and most precious gifts of the understanding, are inconsistent with that unclouded reason, that unper- verted sensibility, and that unconquerable candour, which mar.k a comprehensive, an upright, and an elevated mind. When ^Eschines, after his retreat to Rhodes, was, one day, reading aloud to some friends the oration Treft crTgfpai'ou which had occasioned his exile ; and when his hearers were lost in wonder at the elo- quence of Demosthenes ; " What," said he, " wouljd you have thought, if you had heard him " pronounce it ?" Such is the language (if I may borrow the words of Mr Gibbon) " in which one * La Bruyere (according to the usual practice of writers of maxims) has pushed this train of thinking to an extreme, in or- der to give more point to his apothegm. Yet there is some truth, as well as wit, in the following sentences : " Si une belle femme approuve la beaute d'une autre femme, " on peut conclure qu'elle a mieux que ce qu'elle approuve. " Si un poete loue les vers d'un autre poete, il y a a parier qu'ils " sont rnauvais et sans consequence.'' K k ON TASTE. Essay Ifl. " great man should speak of another ;" and which they who are truly great will feel a peculiar plea- sure to employ, when the well-merited fame of an adversary is in question. Nor is this magnanimity without its reward in the judgment of the world. Where is the individual to be found, who, in read- ing the foregoing story of ^schines, does not envy the feelings he enjoyed at that proud moment of his life, far more than the palm of eloquence which he yielded to his enemy ? * Why do not men of superior talents, if they should not always aspire to the praise of a candour so heroic, strive at least, for the honour of the arts which they love, to conceal their ignoble jealousies from the malignity of those, whom incapacity and mortified pride have leagued together, as the cove- nanted foes of worth and genius ? What a triumph has been furnished to the writers who delight in le- velling all the proud distinctions of humanity ; and what a stain has been left on some of the fairest pages of our literary history, by the irritable passions and petty hostilities of Pope and of Addison ! The complete forgetfulness of every selfish pas- sion (so beautifully exemplified in the anecdote of * " Quo mihi melius etiam illud ab yEschine dictum " videri solet, qui cum propter ignominiam judicii cessisset " Athenis, et se Rhodum contulisset, rogatus a Rhodiis, legisse " fcrtur oratiouem illam egregiam, quam in Ctesiphontem contra " Demosthcnem dixerat : qua perlecta, petitum est ab eo pos- " tridie, ut legeret illam etiam, quae crat contra a Demosthene " pro Ctcsiphonte edita : quam cum suavissima et maxima " voce Jegissct, admirantibus omnibus, Quanto, inquit, magis ad- " miraremini, si audissetis ipsunl !" Cic. de Orat. Lib. III. Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 515 ./Eschines), when the mind is agitated by the enthu- siasm of admiration j the sympathetic identification which then takes place of the hearer or reader with the author, was probably what Longinus felt, when he observed, in his account of the Sublime, that " it fills the mind with a glorying and sense of in- " ward greatness, as if it had itself conceived what " it has only heard." If the remark should be cen- sured as out of place, when introduced into his state- ment of the characteristics of Sublimity, it must, at least, be allowed to be happily descriptive of that temper and frame which are essential to its complete enjoyment. " Voila le sublime 1 Voila son veri- " table caractere I" is said to have been the excla- mation of the great Conde, when Boileau read to him his translation of the above passage. Having been insensibly led into these reflections on some of the moral defects by which Taste is liable to be injured, I cannot help quoting, before I close this view of my subject, a remark of Sir Joshua Reynolds (not altogether unconnected with it), which appears to me equally refined and just. " The " same habit of mind," he observes, " which is ac- " quired by our search after truth in the more se- " rious duties of life, is, in matters of taste, only " transferred to the pursuit of lighter amusements. " The same disposition, the same desire to find " something steady, substantial, and durable, on " which the mind can lean as it were, and rest " with safety. The subject only is changed. We " pursue the same method in our search after the " idea of beauty and perfection in each ; of virtue, .516 ON TASTE. Essay III. " by looking forwards beyond ourselves, to society " and' to the whole ; of arts, by extending our views " in the same manner to all ages and all times." In farther illustration of the same idea he observes, " that the real substance of what goes under the '* name of Taste is fixed and established in the nature " of things ; that there are certain and regular causes " by which the imagination and passions of men are " affected ; and that the knowledge of these causes " is acquired by a laborious and diligent investigation " of nature, and by the same slow process as wisdom " or knowledge of every kind." I would only add (by way of limitation), that these observations apply rather to that quality of Taste which is denoted by the words justness or soundness, than to its sensibility and delicacy ; which last circumstances seem to de- pend, in no inconsiderable degree, on original tem- perament. The former is unquestionably connect- ed very closely with the love of truth, and with what is perhaps only the same thing under a differ- ent form, simplicity of character. If the account be just which has now been given, of the process by which Taste is formed, and of the various faculties and habits which contribute their share to its composition, we may reasonably ex- pect, where it exists in its highest perfection, to find an understanding, discriminating, comprehensive, and unprejudiced ; united with a love of truth and of nature, and with a temper superior to the irrita- tion of little passions. While it implies a spirit of accurate observation and of patient induction, ap- plied to the most fugitive and evanescent class of our Chap. IV. ON TASTE. 517 mental phenomena, it evinces that power of sepa- rating universal associations from such as are local or personal, which, more than any other quality of the mind, is the foundation of good sense, both in scientific pursuits, and in the conduct of life. The intellectual efforts by which such a taste is formed are, in reality, much more nearly allied than is com- monly suspected, to those which are employed in prosecuting the most important and difficult branches of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Nor am I inclined to think, that this conclusion will, on examination, appear inconsistent with fact. That a partial taste, confined to some particular art, such as music, painting, 'or even poetry, may be often found united with an intellect which does not rise above the common level, I very readily grant ; al- though I think it questionable, whether, in such an intellect, supposing example and imitation to be al- together out of the question, even a partial taste of this kind could have been originally formed. But the fair test of the soundness of the foregoing rea- sonings is an instance, in which the good taste of the individual has been the fruit of his own exertions ; and in which it extends, more or less, to all the arts which he has made the objects of his study, and which nature has not denied him, by some organical defect in his original constitution, a capacity of en- joying. Where a good taste has been thus formed, I am fully persuaded, that the inferences which I have supposed to follow with respect to the other in- tellectual powers involved in its composition, will be 518 ON TASTE. Essay III. justified, in all their extent, by an appeal to expe- rience. The subject might be prosecuted much farther, by examining the varieties of taste in connection with the varieties of human character. In study- ing the latter, whether our object be to seize the in- tellectual or the moral features of the mind, the former will be found to supply as useful and steady a light as any that we can command. To myself it appears to furnish the strongest of them all ; more particularly, where the finer and more delicate shades of character are in question. But the illustration of this remark belongs to some speculations, which I destine for a different work. ESSAY FOURTH. ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL HA- BITS CONNECTED WITH THE FIRST ELEMENTS OF TASTE. CHAPTER FIRST. DEPENDENCE OF TASTE ON A RELISH FOR THE PLEA- SURES OF IMAGINATION. REMARKS ON THE PRE- VAILING IDEA, THAT THESE ARE TO BE ENJOYED IN PERFECTION IN YOUTH ALONE. IN what I have hitherto said with respect to Taste, I have considered it chiefly as the native growth of the individual mind to which it belongs ; endeavour- ing to trace it to its first principles or seeds in our intellectual frame. In cases, however, where na- ture has not been so liberal as to render the forma- tion of this power possible, merely from the mind's own internal resources, much may be done by judi- cious culture in early life ; and in all cases whatever, in such a state of society as ours, its growth, even when most completely spontaneous, cannot fail to be influenced, in a greater or less degree, by instnic- 520 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. tion, by imitation, by the contagion of example, and by various other adventitious causes. It is reasonable also to believe, that there are numberless minds, in which the seeds of taste, though profusely sown, continue altogether dormant through life ; either in consequence of a total want of opportunity to cultivate the habits by which it is to be matured, or of an attention exclusively direct- ed to other objects. In instances such as these, it is the province of education to lend her succour ; to invigorate, by due exercise, those principles in which an original weakness may be suspected ; and by removing the obstacles which check the expan- sion of our powers in any of the directions in which nature disposes them to shoot, to enable her to ac- complish and perfect her own designs. To suggest practical rules for this important pur- pose would be inconsistent with the limits of a short Essay ; and I shall, therefore, confine myself to a few slight hints with respect to some of the more essential propositions on which such rules must pro- ceed. Before I enter on this subject, it is necessary to premise, that my aim is not to explain how a vitiat- ed or false taste in any of the fine arts may be cor- rected ; or in what manner an imperfect taste may be trained by culture to a state of higher refinement ; but to inquire, in the case of an individual, whose thoughts have hitherto been totally engrossed with other pursuits, how far it may be possible, by en- gaging his attention to a new class of pleasures, to bring his mind into that track of observation and Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. study, by the steady pursuit of which alone (as I have already endeavoured to shew) the power of taste is to be gradully and slowly formed. In pro- secuting this speculation, I shall have a view more particularly to that species of Taste which has for its object the beauties of External Nature, whether presented directly to the senses, or recalled to the imagination, with the modifications and heightening? of poetical or creative invention. Without some portion df this taste, while an essential blank is left in the circle of his most refined enjoyments, the in- tellectual frame of man is incomplete and mutilated ; and, although the fact be undoubtedly the same, more or less, with a taste in music, in painting, in architecture, and various other arts, the difference in point of degree is so immense, as to render the effects unsusceptible of comparison. Nor is this all. The transition from a Taste for the beautiful, to that more comprehensive Taste which extends to all the other pleasures of which poetical fiction is the vehicle, is easy and infallible ; and accordingly we shall find, as we prqceed in our argument, the sub- ject to which it relates swell insensibly in its dimen- sions, and branch out on every side into numberless ramifications. The hints, therefore, which I am now to suggest, limited as some of them may appear to be in their immediate scope, may, perhaps, contri- bute to direct into the right path, such of my read- ers as may aim at conclusions more general than mine. In the meantime, I must beg leave to re- mind them, that, amid such an infinity of aspects as $he objects and the principle of taste present to our 522 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. curiosity, a selection of the happiest points of view is all that is possible ; and that, in fixing iinpn these, I must necessarily be guided by the intimacy of that relation, which they seem to myself to bear to the Philosophy of the Human Mind. I have observed, in a former work, that what is commonly called sensibility depends, in a great mea- sure, on the state of the imagination. * In the pas- sage to which I allude, my remark has a more pecu- liar reference to moral sensibility, or to what may be called, for the sake of distinction, the sensibility of the heart. But it will be found to apply also with great force (although I acknowledge, not without some limitations) to the sensibility of taste. In so far as the pleasures of Taste depend on association ; on the perception of uses orjitnesses ; on sympathy with the enjoyments of animated things, or on other circumstances of a similar nature, the remark will, I apprehend, apply literally ; and it only fails with respect to those organical pleasures (the pleasures, for example, depending on the sensibility of the eye to colours, and of the ear to musical tones) over which the imagination cannot be supposed to have much influence. But, that these organical pleasures, although the parent stock on which all our more complicated feelings of Beauty are afterwards graft- ed, as well as the means by which the various excit- ing causes of these feelings are united and consoli- dated under the same common appellation ; that these organical pleasures, I say, form by far the * Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I. p. 509, 3d edit. Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 523 most inconsiderable part of that general impression or effect which is produced by the objects of taste on a cultivated mind, has, I trust, been already suffi- ciently shewn. The sensibility of taste, therefore (we may con- clude), depends chiefly, in the mind of any indivi- dual, on the associations and other intellectual pro- cesses connected with the objects about which taste is conversant ; and, consequently, the only effectual means of developing this sensibility (the most essen- tial of all the elements of Taste, and, indeed, the se- minal principle of the whole), must begin with the culture of Imagination. With respect to this last power, it may contribute to the clearness of some of the following reasonings, to premise, that although, according to the idea of it which I endeavoured formerly to illustrate, * its most distinguishing characteristic is a faculty of cre- ation (or, to speak more correctly, of invention and of new combination), yet, when considered in its re- lation to Taste, this inventive faculty is the least im- portant ingredient in its composition. All that is essentially necessary is a capacity of seizing, and comprehending, and presenting in a lively manner to one's own mind, whatever combinations are form- ed by the imagination of others. When such com- binations have for their materials nothing but what is borrowed from sensible objects, this capacity differs so little from what I before called Conception, t * Philosophy of the Ilutnqn Mind, Vol. I. + Ibid. 524 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. that if I had been to confine myself to these exclu- sively, I should not have wished for any other word to convey my meaning at present. As, in other parts of my writings, however, Imagination is com- monly to be understood in the most enlarged sense, as possessing a sway over the Intellectual and Moral Worlds, as well as over the Material, an expression of more comprehensive import than Conception may be sometimes convenient ; and I shall, therefore, for want of a better phrase, avail myself of the epithet apprehensive, to distinguish that modification of Ima- gination which is subservient to Taste, from that in- ventive or creative imagination, which forms the chief element in poetical genius* Notwithstanding, however, the justness of this theoretical distinction, I shall seldom, if ever, have occasion, in the sequel of this volume, to employ the epithets which I have now proposed to introduce. The transition from the apprehensive to the inven- tive operations of imagination, appears to me to be, in reality, much simpler and easier than is com- monly suspected : In other words, I conceive, that where the mind has been early and familiarly con- versant with the fictions of poetry, the acquisition of that inventive or creative faculty which charac- terizes the poet, depends, in a great measure, on the individual himself; supposing that there exists no extraordinary deficiency in his other intellectual capacities. In what remains, therefore, of this Essay, I shall make use of the word Imagination, without any epithet whatever ; premising only in general, that it is the apprehensive power of imagi- Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. nation, and not its inventive power, which I have solely in view, when I speak of its culture as an im- portant object of Education. In what manner Imagination may be encouraged and cherished in a mind where it had previously made little appearance, may be easily conceived from what was stated in a former Essay, with re- spect to the peculiar charm which sometimes accom- panies the pleasures produced by its ideal combina- tions, when compared with the corresponding reali- ties in nature and in human life. The eager cn- riosity of childhood, and the boundless gratification which it is ,so easy to afford it by well-selected works of fiction, give, in fact, to education, a stronger purchase, if I may use the expression, over this fa- culty, than what it possesses over any other. The attention may be thus insensibly seduced from the present objects of the senses, and the thoughts ac- customed to dwell on the past, the distant, or the future ; and, in the same proportion in which this effect is in any instance accomplished, " the man" as Dr Johnson has justly remarked, " is exalted in " the scale of intellectual being." The tale of fic- tion will probably be soon laid aside with the toys and rattles of infancy ; but the habits which it has contributed to fix, and the powers which it has brought into a state of activity, will remain with the possessor, permanent and inestimable treasures, to his latest hour. To myself, this appears the most solid advantage to be gained from fictitious compo- sition, considered as an engine of early instruction ; I mean, the attractions which it holds out for en- 526 ON THE CULTURE OP CERTAIN Essay IV. couraging an intercourse with the authors best fitted to invigorate and enrich the imagination, and to quicken whatever is dormant in the sensibility to beauty : or, to express myself still more plainly, the value of the incidents seems to me to arise chiefly from their tendency to entice the young readers in- to that fairy-land of poetry, where the scenes of ro- mance are laid. Nor is it to the Young alone that I would confine these observations exclusively. In- stances have frequently occurred of individuals, in whom the Power of Imagination has, at a more ad- vanced period of life, been found susceptible of cul- ture to a wonderful degree. In such men, what an accession is gained to their most refined pleasures ! What enchantments are added to their most ordina- ry perceptions ! The mind awakening, as if from a trance, to a new existence, becomes habituated to the most interesting aspects of life and of nature ; the intellectual eye is " purged of its film ;" and things the most familiar and unnoticed, disclose charms invisible before. The same objects and events which were lately beheld with indifference, occupy now all the powers and capacities of the soul ; the contrast between the present and the past serving only to enhance and to endear so unlooked-for an acquisition. What Gray has so finely said of the pleasures of vicissitude, conveys but a faint image of what is experienced by the man, who, after having lost in vulgar occupations and vulgar amusements, his earliest and most precious years, is thus intro- duced at last to a new heaven and a new earth : Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 527 " The meanest flowret of the vale, " The simplest note that swells the gale, " The common sun, the air, the skies, " To him are op'uing Paradise." The effects of foreign travel have been often re- marked, not only in rousing the curiosity of the tra- veller while abroad, but in correcting, after his re- turn, whatever habits of inattention he had contract- ed to the institutions and manners among which he was bred. It is in a way somewhat analogous, that our occasional excursions into the regions of imagi- nation increase jour interest in those familiar realities from which the stores of imagination are borrowed. We learn insensibly to view nature with the eye of the painter and of the poet, and to seize those " hap- " py attitudes of things" which their taste at first selected ; while, enriched with the accumulations of ages, and with " the spoils of time," we unconsci- ously combine with what we see, all that we know, and all that we feel ; and sublime the organical beauties of the material world, by blending with them the inexhaustible delights of the heart and of the fancy. And, here, may I be allowed to recommend, in a more particular manner, the Pleasures of Imagina- tion to such of my readers as have hitherto been im- mersed in the study of the severer sciences, or who have been hurried, at too early a period, into active and busy life ? Abstracting from the tendency which a relish for these pleasures obviously has to adorn the more solid acquisitions of the one class, and to ennoble, with liberality and light, the habits ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. of the other, they may both be assured, that it will open to them sources of enjoyment hitherto inexpe- rienced, and communicate the exercise of powers of which they are yet unconscious. It was said, with truth, by Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, that he who was ignorant qf the arithmetical art was but half a man ; un homme d demi. With how much greater force may a similar expression be applied to him, who carries to his grave the neglected and un- profitable seeds of faculties, which it depended on him- self to have reared to maturity, and of which the fruits bring accessions to human happiness, more precious than all the gratifications which power or wealth can command ! I speak not of the laborious orders of society, to whom this class of pleasures must, from their condition, be, in a great measure, necessarily denied ; but of men destined for the higher and more independent walks of life, who are too often led, by an ignorance of their own possible attainments, to exhaust all their toil on one little field of study, while they leave, in a state of nature, by far the most valuable portion of the intellectual in- heritance to which they were born. If these spe- culations of mine, concerning the powers of the un- derstanding, possess any peculiar or characteristi- cal merit, it arises, in my own opinion, chiefly from their tendency (by affording the student a general knowledge of the treasures which lie within himself, and of the means by which he may convert them to his use and pleasure) to develope, on a greater scale than has been commonly attempted, all the various capacities of the mind. It is by such a plan of study Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. alone, that the intellectual character can attain, in every part, its fair and just proportions ; and we may rest assured, that wherever these are distorted from their proper shape or dimensions, the dignity of the man is so far lowered, and his happiness impaired. It was with these views, chiefly, that I was led to at- tempt, in another publication, as comprehensive a survey of the principles of human nature as my own acquirements enabled me, however imperfectly, to execute ; and it is with the same views, that, in the execution of this design, I have occasionally stop- ped short at what appeared to myself the most in- teresting and commanding stations, in order to open to the companions of my journey, such vistas on either hand, as might afford them a glimpse of the fertility and beauty of the regions through which they are travelling. This consideration will, I hope, suggest an apology for what may to some appear di- gressions from the principal line of inquiry pursued in that work ; as well as for the space which I have allotted, in this volume, to my discussions concern- ing the Objects and the Principle of Taste. To those who wish to prosecute the study of the Human Mind, the subject to which these last discus- sions relate possesses many additional recommenda- tions. While it affords a pleasing avenue to their favourite department of knowledge, it turns the at- tention to a very numerous class of phenomena, without a knowledge of which it is impossible to form a just idea, either of the intellectual or moral consti- tution of Man. But, what is of far greater conse- Ll 530 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. quence to themselves, considered individually, it fur- nishes (as will appear more fully in the course of some of my future inquiries) the most effectual of all remedies for those peculiarities of judgment and of feeling, which are the natural consequences of meta- physical pursuits, when indulged in to excess. In cases where the cultivation of Imagination and of Taste has been altogether neglected in early life, I would beg leave to recommend the study of Philo- sophical Criticism, as the most convenient link for connecting habits of abstract thought with these lighter and more ornamental accomplishments ; and, although it would be too much to promise, to a per- son whose youth has been spent in metaphysical dis- quisition, that he may yet acquire a complete relish for the intellectual pleasures which he has so long overlooked, he may be confidently assured, that enough is still within his reach to recompense amp- ly the time and pains employed in its pursuit. Even if little should be gained in point of positive enjoy* ment, his speculative knowledge of the capacities of the Mind cannot fail to be greatly and usefully en- larged. A sense of his limited powers will produce that diffidence in his own judgment, which is one of the most important lessons of philosophy ; and, by engaging his attention to his personal defects, may be expected to render his plans of education, for those who are to come after him, more comprehen- sive and enlightened than that which was followed by his own instructors. In thus recommending the study of Philosophical Criticism as a preparation for the culture of the arts Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 531 to which Imagination and Taste are subservient, I am perfectly aware that I propose an inversion of what may, in one point of view, be regarded as the order of nature : but, in the instances now in ques- tion, the mind is supposed to be in a morbid or mu- tilated state ; and the effect to be produced is the developement of powers and capacities which have never yet been unfolded. In such circumstances, we must necessarily avail ourselves of the aid of such habits as happen to be already formed, in order to call forth whatever faculties and principles are still wanting to complete the intellectual system. In cases, on the other hand, in which the Imagi- nation or the Taste may be suspected to have gained an undue ascendant over the other powers of the un- derstanding, the Philosophy of the Human Mind (supposing the attention to be judiciously and skil- fully led to it, and the intellectual capacities not to be altogether unequal to the attempt) must neces- sarily prove the most profitable and interesting of all studies ; and for this purpose, that branch of it which relates to Philosophical Criticism forms a con- necting link, of which it is much easier for an in- structor to avail himself, than when the curiosity is to be enticed (as was before proposed) in the contra- ry direction. The plan of study here suggested is copied from the order of Nature herself; the curi- osity being led from known and familiar phenomena to an investigation of their general laws. Nor do I apprehend, that there is any danger of weakening the pleasures of Imagination, by thus philosophizing concerning their sources ; notwith- 53% ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV, standing what Mr Burke has alleged in support of this conclusion, in the following very curious passage. I call it curious, as it appears to myself to be much more strongly marked with enthusiasm and extrava- gance, than with good sense and sober reflection. In point of mere expression, it is unquestionably one of the happiest in Mr Burke's writings ; and even, in point of thought, I am far from considering it as altogether destitute of truth. " The pleasures of imagination are much higher " than any which are derived from a rectitude of the " judgment. The judgment is, for the greater part, " employed in throwing stumbling-blocks in the way " of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its " enchantment, and in tying us down to the dis- " agreeable yoke of our reason ; for almost the on- " ly pleasure that men have in judging better than " others, consists in a sort of conscious pride and su- " periority, which arises from thinking rightly ; but " then, this is an indirect pleasure ; a pleasure " which does not immediately result from the ob- " ject which is under contemplation. In the morn- " ing of our days, when the senses are unworn and ** tender, when the whole man is awake in every " part, and the gloss of novelty fresh upon all the " objects that surround us, how lively at that time " are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate " the judgments we form of things ? I despair of " ever receiving the same degree of pleasure from " the most excellent performances of genius, which " I felt, at that age, from pieces which my present "judgment regards as trifling and contemptible. 12 Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 533 *' Every trivial cause of pleasure is apt to affect the " man of too sanguine a complexion j his appetite " is too keen to suffer his taste to be delicate ; and " he is in all respects what Ovid says of himself in " love : " Molle meum levibus cor est violabilc telis, " Et semper causa est, cur ego semper amem." In this passage, the very eloquent writer states the pleasures of Imagination, and those connected with the exercise of Reason, as much more exclusive of each other than seems consistent with fact. In- deed, I am strongly inclined to think (although I do not mean at present to enter into the argument), that they are both enjoyed in their greatest perfec- tion when properly combined together. The plea- sures which Burke has so finely and pathetically touched upon, as peculiar to the imagination in the morning of our days, are the effects, not of the weakness of our reasoning powers, but of novelty, of hope, of gaiety, and of a great variety of other ad- ventitious causes, which then concur to enhance the enjoyment ; and with which the intellectual plea- sures which come afterwards (so unfortunately, as Burke seems to suppose) to co-operate, are by no means, in the nature of things, incompatible, how- ever rarely they may be combined in early youth. I question much, whether, in the picture he has here drawn, the numberless other enjoyments, which dis- tinguish that happy stage of life, did not contribute powerfully to exalt in his conceptions that particular class of pleasures, on the memory of which he dwells 534f ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. with so much rapture ; and whether, in estimating their comparative intenseness at different periods, he made due allowances for the effects of Association in modifying all our recollections of the past, and more particularly of our tenderest years. I can easily conceive, that a man of taste should now persuade himself that, when a boy, he read Blackmore's Ar- thur, with far greater pleasure than that which he receives at present from the ^Eneid or Paradise Lost ; because, in the former case, the original im- pressions received from the poem rise to his remem- brance with a thousand borrowed charms : but I never can believe, that the pleasure communicated to the most enthusiastic school-boy by such a perform- ance bears, in fact, any proportion, even in intense- ness, to what Virgil and Milton must necessarily impart to every person possessed of a cultivated taste and an enlightened understanding. * If Reynolds should have happened, in his old age, to revisit the village where he was born, with what transport would he probably recognise the most indifferent paintings to which the opportunities of his childhood afforded him access ; and how apt would he be to overrate * " Si done on se refroidit sur les vers a mesure qu'on avance " en age, ce n'est point par mepris pour la posie ; c'est au con- " traire par 1'idee do perfection qu'on y attache. C'est parce " qu'on a senti par les reflexions, et connu par 1'experience, la " distance enorme du mfediocre a 1'excellent, qu'on ne peut plus " souffrir le mediocre. Mais 1'excellent gagne a cette compa- " raison ; moins on peut lire de vers, plus on goute ceux que " le vrai talent sail produire. II n'y a que les vers sans genie " qui pendent a ce refroidissement, et ce n'est pas & un grand " malheur." D'Alcmbert. Reflexions tvr la Po&ie. Chap. J. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 535 the pleasing impressions which he first received from these, by confounding them with the other attrac- tions of his native spot ! It is far from being unlikely he would fancy, for the instant, that he had never since been equally delighted : yet how extravagant would be the illusion, to compare any gratification of which his inexperienced mind could possibly be sus- ceptible, with what he enjoyed at that moment of his after life, so admirably fancied by the poet : " When first the Vatican " Unbarr'd its gates, and to his raptur'd eye " Gave Raffaellc's glories!" The passive gratifications connected with the sen- sible impression of visible objects, were probably then much impaired by long use and habit ; but how trif- ling this abatement, in the general effect, when com- pared with the intellectual pleasures so copiously su- peradded by his experience and observation? by his professional studies ; by his own practice as a painter ; by his powers of judgment, comparison, and reasoning ; by his philosophical curiosity con- cerning the principles of his favourite art and the genius of this particular artist ; in short, by every faculty and principle belonging to a rational and sen- sitive being, to which such an occasion could possi- bly afford any exercise ? The greater the number of such intellectual enjoyments, that we can contrive to attach to those objects which fall under the province of Taste, the more powerful must the effect of these objects become : Nor would I be understood to ex- clude, in this observation, the pleasures connected 636 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. with the severer sciences that regulate the mechani- cal processes of the different arts. Akenside has taken notice of the additional charms which Physical Science lends even to the beauties of Nature; and has illustrated this by an example, which to me has always appeared peculiarly fortunate, the redoubled delight which he himself experienced, when he first looked at the rainbow, after studying the Newtoni* an theory of light and colours : *' Nor ever yet " The melting rainbow's vermeil-tinctur'd hues, " To me have shone so pleasing, as when first " The hand of Science pointed out the path " In which the sun-beams, gleaming from the west, " Fall on the wat'ry cloud, whose darksome veil " Involves the orient." * By waving these considerations, and granting Mr Burke's general doctrine to be true, that the plea- sures of imagination are enjoyed with the most ex- quisite delight, when they are altogether uncontrol- led by the reasoning faculty, the practical lesson will still be found, on either supposition, to be exactly the same ; for it is only by combining the pleasures arising from both parts of our frame, that the dura- tion of the former can be prolonged beyond the thoughtless period of youth ; or that they can be enjoyed even then, for any length of time, without ending in satiety and languor. The activity which always accompanies the exercise of our reasoning powers seems, in fact, to be a zest essentially neces- Note (S s.) Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 537 sary, for enlivening the comparatively indolent state of mind, which the pleasures of Imagination and of Taste have a tendency to encourage. I will venture to add, however contrary to the prevailing opinion on this subject, that by a judici- ous combination of the pleasures of Reason with those of the Imagination, the vigour of the latter faculty may be preserved, in a great measure, unim- paired, even to the more advanced periods of life. According to the common doctrine, its gradual de- cline, after the short season of youth, is not merely the natural consequence of growing reason and ex- perience, but the necessary effect of our physical or- ganization : And yet numberless examples, in di- rect opposition to this conclusion, must immediately occur to every person at all acquainted with literary history. But as I must not enter here into details with respect to these, I shall content myself with a short quotation from Sir Joshua Reynolds, whose opinion on this point, I am happy to find, coincides entirely with my own ; and whose judgment, con- cerning a matter of fact so intimately connected with his ordinary habits of observation and of thought, is justly entitled to much deference. His opinion, too, it is to be remarked, is not only stated with perfect confidence ; but the prejudice, to which it stands opposed, is treated with contempt and ridicule, as not entitled to a serious refutation. " We will allow a poet to express his meaning, " when his meaning is not well known to himself, " with a certain degree of obscurity, as it is one " source of the sublime. But when, in plain prose, 538 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. " we gravely talk of attending to times and seasons " when the imagination shoots with the greatest " vigour ; whether at the summer solstice or the " equinox ; sagaciously observing, how much the " wild freedom and liberty of imagination is cramp- " ed by attention to vulgar rules; and how this " same imagination begins to grow dim in advanced " age, smothered and deadened by too much judg- " ment : when we talk such language, and enter- " tain such sentiments as these, we generally rest *' contented with mere words, or at best entertain *' notions, not only groundless, but pernicious." " I can believe, that a man, eminent " when young for possessing poetical imagination, " may, from having taken another road, so neglect " its cultivation as to shew less of its powers in his " latter life. But I am persuaded, that scarce a poet "is to be found, from Homer down to Dryden, " who preserved a sound mind in a sound body, and " continued practising his profession to the very " last, whose latter works are not as replete with " the fire of imagination, as those which were pro- " duced in his more youthful days." * After all, however, it cannot be denied, that the differences among individuals, in the natural history of this power, are immense ; and that instances very frequently occur, from which the prejudice now un- der consideration seems, on a superficial view, to re- ceive no small countenance. If examples have now and then appeared of old men continuing to display it in its full perfection, how many are the cases, in * Discourse delivered 10th Dec. 1776. Chap. I. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 539 which, after a short promise of uncommon exube- rance, the sources of nourishment have seemed all at once to dry up, and the plant to wither to its very roots, without the hope or the possibility of a revival ? In instances of this last description, I could almost venture to assert, that if circumstances be accurately examined, it will invariably be found, that a lively imagination is united with a weak judgment ; with scanty stores of acquired knowledge, and with little industry to supply the defect. The consequence is, that the materials, which it is the province of Ima- gination to modify and to combine, are soon exhaust- ed ; the internal resources of Reason and Medita- tion are wanting ; and the Imagination either' dis- appears altogether, or degenerates into childishness and folly. In those poets and other artists, on the contrary, who have retained to the last all the powers of their genius, Imagination will be found to be one only of the many endowments and habits, which con- stituted their intellectual superiority j an understand- ing enriched every moment by a new accession of in- formation from without, and fed by a perennial spring of new ideas from within ; a systematical pursuit of the same object through the whole of life, profit- ing, at every step, by the lessons of its own experi- ence, and the recollection of its own errors ; above all, the steady exercise of Reason and good sense in controlling, guiding, and stimulating this important, but subordinate faculty ; subjecting it betimes to the wholesome discipline of rules, and, by a constant ap- plication of it to its destined purposes, preserving to it entire all the advantages which it received from the hand of Nature. S40 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV r , CHAPTER SECOND. CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. REPLY TO AN OB- JECTION FOUNDED ON THE SUPPOSED VIGOUR OF IMAGINATION IN THE EARLIER PERIODS OF SO- CIETY. IT now only remains for me, before concluding these speculations, to obviate an objection against a suppo- sition, involved in many of the preceding reasonings, and more especially in the remarks which have been just stated, on the possibility of prolonging the plea- sures of Imagination, after the enthusiasm of youth has subsided. The objection I allude to is found- ed on -a doctrine which has been commonly, or ra- ther universally, taught of late ; according to which, imagination is represented as in its state of highest perfection, in those rude periods of society, when the faculties shoot up wild and free. If imagination re- quire culture for its developement j and if, in the mind of an individual, it may be rendered more vi- gorous and luxuriant when subjected to the disci- pline of reason and good sense, what account (it may be asked) shall we give of those figurative strains of oratory which have been quoted from the harangues Chap. II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 541 of American Indians ; and of those relics of the poe- try of rude nations, which it is the pride of human genius, in its state of greatest refinement, to study and to imitate ? In order to form correct notions with respect to this question, it is necessary to consider, that when I speak of a cultivated imagination, I mean an ima- gination which has acquired such a degree of activity as to delight in its own exertions ; to delight in con- juring up those ideal combinations which withdraw the mind from the present objects of sense, and transport it into a new world. Now, of this activity and versatility of imagination, I find no traces among rude tribes. Their diction is, indeed, high- ly metaphorical ; but the metaphors they employ are either the unavoidable consequences of an imperfect language, or are inspired by the mechanical impulse of passion. In both instances, imagination operates to a certain degree ; but in neither is imagination the 'primary cause of the effect ; inasmuch as in the one, it is excited by passion, and in the other, called forth by the pressure of necessity. A strong confirmation of this remark may be drawn from the indolence of savages, and their improvidence concerning futifrity; a feature in their character, in which all the most authentic pictures of it agree.* Dr Robertson him- self, notwithstanding the countenance which he has occasionally given to the doctrine which I am now combating, has stated this circumstance so very strongly, that it is surprising he was not led, by his own description, to perceive that his general conclu- sions, concerning the poetical genius of savages, re- 542 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV. quired some limitation. " The thoughts and atten- " tion of a savage are confined within the small circle " of objects immediately conducive to his preserva- *' tion and enjoyment. Every thing beyond that " escapes his observation, or is perfectly indifferent " to him. Like a mere animal, what is before his " eyes interests and affects him : what is out of sight, " or at a distance, makes no impression. When, on " the approach of the evening, a Caribbee feels him- " self disposed to go to rest, no consideration will " tempt him to sell his hammoc. But, in the morn- " ing, when he is sallying out to the business or pas- " time of the day, he will part with it for the slight- " est toy that catches his fancy. At the close of " winter, while the impression of what he has sufier- ' ed from the rigour of the climate is fresh in the " mind of the North American, he sets himself with " vigour to prepare materials for erecting a comfort- " able hut to protect him against the inclemencies " of the succeeding season ; but, as soon as the wea- " ther becomes mild, he forgets what is past, aban- " dons his work, and never thinks of it more, until " the return of cold compels him, when too late, to " resume it." How is it possible to reconcile these facts with the assertion, that Imagination is most lively and vigorous in the ruder periods of society ? The indifference of savages to religious impres- sions, gives additional evidence to the foregoing con- clusion. " The powers of their uncultivated under- " standings are so limited," says the eloquent and faithful historian just now quoted, " that their ob- " servations and reflections reach little beyond the Chap. II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 543 " mere objects of sense. The numerous and splen- " did ceremonies of popish worship, as they catch " the eye, please and interest them ; but when their " instructors attempt to explain the articles of faith " with which these external observances are connect- " ed, though they listen with patience, they so little " conceive the meaning of what they hear, that their " acquiescence does not merit the name of belief. " Their indifference is still greater than their inca- " pacity. Attentive only to the present moment, " and engrossed by the objects before them, the In- " dians so seldom reflect on what is past, or take " thought for what is to come, that neither the pro- " mises nor threats of religion make much impres- " sion upon them ; and while their foresight rarely " extends so far as the next day, it is almost impos- " sible to inspire them with solicitude about the con- " cerns of a future world." In critical discussions concerning the poetical re- lics which have been handed down to us from the earlier periods of society, frequent appeals have been made to the eloquence of savage orators, as a proof of the peculiar relish with which the pleasures of imagi- nation are enjoyed by uncultivated minds. But this inference has been drawn from-a very partial view of circumstances. The eloquence of savages (as I al- ready hinted) is the natural offspring of passion im- patient to give vent to its feelings, and struggling with the restraints of a scanty vocabulary ; and it implies none of those inventive powers which are dis- played in the creation of characters, of situations, of events, of ideal scenery j none of the powers, in ON THE CULTURE OP CERTAIN Essay IV, short, which form the distinguishing attributes of Poetical Genius. In the mind of the poet, on the other hand, it happens much less frequently, that imagination is inspired by passion, than passion by imagination ; and, in all cases, the specific pleasures of imagination are most completely enjoyed when the passions are at rest. In order, besides, to ren- der these pleasures a solid accession to human hap- piness, it is necessary that the individual should be able, at will, so to apply the faculty from which they arise, to its appropriate objects, as to find in its ex- ercise an unfailing source of delight, whenever he wishes to enliven the intervals of bodily labour, or of animal indulgence ; a capacity, surely, which is by no means implied in the use of that figurative dic- tion by which savages are said to convey their ideas ; and which is utterly irreconcilable with the most au- thentic accounts we have received of the great fea- tures of their intellectual character. On this occa- sion we may, with confidence, adopt the beautiful words which one of our poets has, with a more than questionable propriety, applied to a gallant and en- lightened people, entitled to a very high rank in the scale of European civilization : " Unknown to them, when sensual pleasures cloy, " To fill the languid pause with finer joy." Where particular circumstances, indeed, have given any encouragement, among rude tribes, to the pacific profession of a bard ; still more, where an or- der of bards has formed a part of the political esta- . blishment, individuals may be conceived to have oc- Chap. II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 545 casionally arisen, whose poetical compositions are likely to increase in reputation as the world grows older. Obvious reasons may be assigned, why Ima- gination should be susceptible of culture, at a period when the intellectual powers which require the aid of experience and observation must necessarily con- tinue in infancy ; anci the very peculiarities, which, in such circumstances, its productions exhibit, al- though they would justly be regarded as blemishes in those of a more refined age, may interest the phi- losopher, and even please the critic, as characteristi- cal of the human mind in the earlier stages of its progress. The same circumstances, too, which in- fluence so powerfully the eloquence of the savage orator, furnish to the bard a language peculiarly a- dapted to his purpose, and in which the antiquaries of a distant age are to perceive numberless charms of which the author was unconscious. In the com- positions of such a poet, even the defects of his taste become, in the judgment of the multitude, proofs of the vigour of his imagination ; the powers of genius, \vhere they are irregularly displayed, producing, up- on a superficial observer, an imposing but illusory ef- fect in point of magnitude, similar to that of an ill- proportioned human figure, or of a building which violates the established rules of architecture. No prejudice can be more groundless than this ; and yet it seems to be the chief foundation of the common doctrine which considers Imagination and Taste as incompatible with each other, and measures the for- mer by the number and the boldness of its trespasses 546 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV, against the latter. My own opinion, I acknowledge, is, that, as the habitual exercise of Imagination is es- sential to those intellectual experiments of which a genuine and unborrowed Taste is the slow result, so, on the other hand, that it is in the productions of genius, when disciplined by an enlightened Taste, that the noblest efforts of Imagination are to be found. Nor is there any thing in these conclusions at all inconsistent with what I have already asserted, con- cerning the dormant and inactive state of Imagina- tion in the mind of a savage ; or with the account given, in the preceding Essay, of the gradual process by which Taste is formed. To a professional bard, in whatever period of society he may appear, the ex- ercise of his imagination, and, as far as circum- stances may allow, the culture of his taste, must ne- cessarily be the great objects of his study ; and, there- fore, no inference can be drawn from his attainments and habits to those of the mass of the community to which he belongs. The blind admiration with which his rude essays are commonly received by his con- temporaries, and the ideas of inspiration and of pro- phetic gifts which they are apt to connect with the efforts of his invention, are proofs of this ; shewing evidently, that he is then considered as a being, to whose powers nothing analogous exists in the ordi- nary endowments of human nature. In such a state of manners as ours, when the advantages of educa- tion are in some degree imparted to all, the institu- tion of a separate order of bards would be impos- sible ; and we begin even to call in question the old Chap. II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 547 opinion,"that poetical genius is more the offspring of nature than of study. The increasing frequency of a certain degree of poetical talent, both among the higher and the lower orders of the community, renders this conclusion not unnatural, in the present times ; and the case seems to have been somewhat the same in the Augustan age : " Scribimus inuocti doctique poemata passim." If these remarks are well-founded, the diffusion of the Pleasures of Imagination, as well as the dif- fusion of Knowledge, is to be ranked among the bles- sings for which we are indebted to the progress of society : And it is a circumstance extremely wor- thy of consideration, that the same causes which ren- der Imagination more productive of pleasure, render it less productive of pain than before. Indeed, I am much inclined to doubt, whether, without the con- trolling guidance of Reason, the pleasures or the pains of Imagination are likely to preponderate. Whatever the result may be in particular instances, it certainly depends, in a great measure, upon acci- dents unconnected with the general state of man- ners. I cannot, therefore, join in the sentiment so pleasingly and fancifully expressed in the following lines of Voltaire ; in which (by the way) a strong resemblance is observable to a passage already quot- ed from Burke : " O 1'heureux terns que celui de ces fables, " Des bons demons, des esprits familiers, ** Des farfadets, aux mortels secourables ! " On 6coutait tous ces faits admirables 548 ON THE CULTURE OF CERTAIN Essay IV- " Dans son chateau, pies d'un large foyer: " Le pere et 1'oncle, et la mere et la fille, " Et les voisins, et toute la famille, " Ouvraient 1'oreille a Monsieur I'Aumomer, " Qui leur faisait des contes de sorcier. " On a banni les demons ct les fees; " Sous la raibon les graces etouffees, " Livrent nos cceurs a Pinsipidite ; " Le raisonner tristement s'accredite ; " On court, helas ! apres la verite ; " Ah ! croyez moi, 1'erreur a son merite." * For my own part, I think I can now enjoy these? tales of wonder with as lively a relish as the most credulous devotee hi the superstitious times which gave them birth. Nor do I value the pleasure which they afford me the less, that my reason teaches me to regard them as vehicles of amusement, not as articles of faith. But it is not reason alone that operates, in an age like the present, in correcting the credulity of our forefathers. Imagination her- self furnishes the most effectual of all remedies a- gainst those errors of which she was, in the first in- stance, the cause ; the versatile activity which she acquires by constant and varied exercise, depriving superstition of the most formidable engine it was able heretofore to employ, for subjugating the infant understanding. In proportion to the number and diversity of the objects to which she turns her atten- tion, the dangers are diminished which are apt to arise from her illusions, when they are suffered al- ways to run in the same channel ; and in this man- * Contes de Guillaume Vade. Chap. II. INTELLECTUAL HABITS, &C. 54$ ner, while the sources of enjoyment become more copious and varied, the concomitant pains and incon- veniences disappear. This conclusion coincides with a remark in that chapter of the Philosophy of the Human Mind which relates to Imagination ; that, by a frequent and habitual exercise of this faculty, we at once che- rish its vigour, and bring it more and more under our command. " As we can withdraw the attention " at pleasure from objects of sense, and transport " ourselves into a world of our own, so, when we " wish to moderate our enthusiasm, we can dismiss " the objects of imagination, and return to our or- " dinary perceptions and occupations. But in a " mind to which these intellectual visions are not *' familiar, and which borrows them completely " from the genius of another, imagination, when " once excited, becomes perfectly ungovernable, and " produces something like a temporary insanity." " Hence," I have added, " the wonderful effects " of popular eloquence on the lower orders ; effects " which are much more remarkable than what it pro- " duces on men of education." In the history of Imagination, nothing appears to me more interesting than the fact stated in the fore- going passage ; suggesting plainly this practical les- son, that the early and systematical culture of this faculty, while it is indispensably necessary to its fu- ture strength and activity, is the most effectual of all expedients for subjecting it, in the more serious conr cerns of life, to the supremacy of our rational powers. And, in truth, I apprehend it will be found, that, 550 ON THE CULTURE, &C. Essay IV. by accustoming it in childhood to a frequent change of its objects (one set of illusions being continually suffered to efface the impressions of another), the understanding may be more successfully invigorated than by any precepts addressed directly to itself; and the terrors of the nursery, where they have un- fortunately overclouded the infant mind, gradually and insensibly dispelled, in the first dawning of rea- son. The momentary belief with which the visions of imagination are always accompanied, and upon which many of its pleasures depend, will continue unshaken ; while that permanent or habitual belief, which they are apt to produce, where it gains the ascendant over our nobler principles, will vanish for ever. But the subject grows upon me in extent, and rises in importance, as I proceed ; and the size of my Volume reminds me, that it is now more than time to bring these speculations to a close. Here, therefore, I pause for the present ; not, however, without some hope of soon resuming a more systema- tical analysis of our Intellectual Powers and Capa- cities. NOTJES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Note (A.) p. 10. TABLE of Dr REID'S Instinctive Principles, extracted from Priestley's Examination, p. 9. J j ^ Memory Imagination Mental affections present sensation suggests I ^belief of the present ex. t istence of an object. the belief of its past existence. no belief at all. __^____^ f the idea and belief of our ~" {_ own existence. Odours, tastes, \ sounds, andf c ., . certain affec- V I their pec . uhar '^responding tions of the f I sensations - optic nerve ) A hard substance 8 f An extended substance. All the primary"! qualities of > bodies ) A body in motion Certain forms of the features, t articulations of the voice, i and attitudes of the body Inverted images 7 on the retina j Images in cor-~) responding / parts of both f" eyes J _ f the sensation of hardness, and " \ thebelief of something hard, -the idea of extension and space, -their peculiar sensations, -the idea of motion. the idea and belief of certain thoughts, purposes, and dispositions of the mind. upright vision. single vision. 554 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 9 Pains in any"! , , part of the}- suggest -f the ' dea of tbe P'ace where body j 1 the pain is seated. He also enumerates the following among instinctive faculties or principles , viz. 10 The parallel motion of tbe eyes, as necessary to distinct vision. 11 The sense of veracity, or a disposition to speak truth. 32 A sense of credulity, or a disposition to believe others. 13 The inductive faculty, by which we infer similar ellects from similar causes. To this table Priestley has subjoined (under the title of Autho- rities) a series of quotations from Reid's Inquiry, which he seems to have considered as justifying the statement which the table ex- hibits of the leading opinions contained in that work. How far the statement is correct, those who have at all entered into the spirit of Reid's reasonings, will be able to judge completely from the 4th and 5th articles ; according to which, Reid is repre- sented as having maintained, that a hard substance suggests the sensation of hardness, and the belief of something hard ; an ex- tended substance, the idea of extension and space ; and the pri- mary qualities of bodies in general, their peculiar sensations. The authority produced for the first of these charges is the fol- lowing sentence : " By an original principle of our constitution, a certain sen- 11 sation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of " hardness, and creates the belief of it; or, iu other words, this " sensation is a natural sign of hardness. " It is perfectly evident that the authority here is not only at va. riauce with the charge, but is in direct opposition to it. Ac. cording to Reid, the sensation suggests the conception of hard- ness ; according to Priestley's comment, ho maintains the absurd and nonsensical proposition, that " a hard substance suggests the " sensation of hardness." The other two misrepresentations are equally gross ; and, indeed, precisely of the same description. Note (B.) p. 72. That there are many words used in philosophical discourse, which do not admit of logical definition, is abundantly manifest. This is the case with all those words that signify things uiicom- pounded, and consequently unsusceptible of analysis ; a proposi- tion, one should think, almost self-evident; and yet it is surprising how very generally it has been overlooked by philosophers. That Aristotle himself,with all his acuteness, was notaware of it, appears sufficiently from the attempts he has made to define various words denoting some of the simplest and most elementary objects of human thought. Of this, remarkable instances occur in his definitions of time and of motion f - definitions which were long NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 555 the wonder and admiration of the learned ; but which are now re- membered only from their singular obscurity and absurdity. It is owing to a want of attention to this circumstance, that meta- physicians have so often puzzled themselves about the import of terms, employed familiarly, without the slightest danger of mis- take, by the most illiterate ; imagining, that what they could not define must involve some peculiar mystery; when, in fact, the diffi- culty of the definition arose entirely from the perfect simplicity of the thing to be defined. " Quid sit Tempus," said St Augustine, *' si nemo quadrat a me, scio ; -si quis intcrroget, nescio." According to Dr Reid, Descartes and Locke are the earliest writers in whom this fundamental principle of logic is to be found. Locke seems to have considered the merit of introducing it as ex- clusively his own. (Essay, Book III. chap. iv. iv.) Neither of these statements is quite correct. I do not know if Locke himself has expressed the doctrine in question more clearly than our cele- brated Scottish /awyer Lord Stair, in a work published several years before the Essay on Human Understanding; and it is worthy of observation, that if the French Philosopher had the start of our countryman in perceiving its truth and importance, when applied to the Philosophy of the Mind, he was by no means so fully aware of the attention due to it, in explaining the first principles of Physical Science. " Necesse cst quosdam tcrminos esseadeo claros, nt clarioribus tl eluciclari nequeant, alioquin infinitus esset progressus in ter. " minorum explication, adeo ut nulla possit esse clara cognitio, t( nee ullus certo scire possit alterius conceptus." *' Tales termini sunt Cogitatio^ Motus, quibus non dantur cla- " riores conceptus aut termini, et brevi apparebit, quam inutiliter u Aristoteles et Cartesius conati sunt dcfiuire Motum." Physiologia Nova Experimentalis, &c. (p. 9.) Authore D. dc Stair, Carolo II. Britanniarum Regi a Consiliis Juris et Status. Ludg. Batav. 1686. See also p. 79 of the same book. Locke's Essay (as appears from the dedication) was first print- ed in 1689. Lord Stair's work must have been published a con. siderable time before. The Latin translation of it (which is the only edition I have seen) is dated 1686; and bears, on the title- page, that the original had appeared before. Nuper Lutinitate donata. According to a learned and ingenious writer, Aristotle himself u had taught, before Mr Locke, that what the latter calls simple ** ideas could not be defined." (Translation of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, by Dr Gillies, Vol. I. p. 138, 2d edit.) The pas- sages, however, to which he has referred, seem to me much less decisive evidence in support of this assertion, than Aristotle's own definitions are against it. Nor can I bring myself to alter this opinion, even by Dr Giilies's attempt to elucidate the celebrated definition of Motion. 656 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Not*- (o.) p. 91. It may be of use to some of my readers, before proceeding to the third chapter, to read with attention the following extracts from Dr Reid : " The word idea occurs so frequently in modern philosophical " writings upon the mind, and is so ambiguous in its meaning. " that it ;s necessary to make some observations upon it. There " are chiefly two meanings of this word in modern authors, a po- * e pular and a philosophical, u First, In popular language, idea signifies the same thing as F ( conception, apprehension, notion. To have an idea of any thing, ".is to conceive it. To have a distinct idea, is to conceive it dis- *' tinctly. To have no idea of it, is not to conceive it at all. ** When the word is taken in this popular sense, no man can *' possibly doubt whether he has ideas. For he that doubts must " think, and to think is to have ideas. " Secondly^ According to the philosophical meaning of the ** word lUea, it does not signify that act of the mind which we call " thought or conception, but some object of thought. Ideas, *' according to Mr Locke (whose frequent use of this word has t ." probably been the occasion of its being adopted into common <; language), ' are nothing but the immediate objects of the mind " in linn king.' But of those objects of thought called ideas, dif. *' lorent sects of philosophers have given a very different ac- " count. " . -r Locke, who uses the word idea so very frequently, tells *' us, that he means the same thing by it as is commonly meant <( by species or ''phantasm, Gasseudi, from whom Locke bor- *' rowed more than from any other author, says the same. The Responsiu ad Primas Objectiones in Mediiationes Cartesii. 1 may not have a better opportunity of observing afterwards, that Descartes rejected entirely that part of the i eiipai^c sys- tem which accounts for perception by species or idea* proceeding: from external things, and transmitted to the mind through the 558 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. channel of the senses. His arguments against that hypothesis were so clear and conclusive, that Gravcsandc, in a small treatise pub- lished in 1737, speaks of it as unworthy of refutation : " Explo. " sam dudum. de speciebus a rebus procedentibus, et mentiimpres- " sis, scntentiam explicare et refellere, inutile credimus." * In- troductio ad Philosophiam, p, 98. While Descartes, however, dissented on this point from the schoolmen, he maintained, in common with them, that what we immediately perceive is not the external object, but an idea or image of it in our mind. Among our later writers, I do not recollect any who have en- tered into so elaborate an explanation of the nature of ideas, con- sidered as the objects of thought, as the ingenious author of a \vork entitled, The Light of Nature Pursued. The following passage, which he gives as the substance of his own creed on this point, is, I suspect, a tolerably faithful exposition of prejudices which still remain in most minds ; and which are insensibly imbibed in early life, from the hypothetical phraseology bequeathed to us by the schoolmen. ** Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a " receptacle of images : but image being appropriated, by com- *' mon use, to visible objects, could not well be extended to other < e things without confusion ; wherefore learned men have import, *< ed the Greek word idea, signifying image or appearance, to y thoughts, and to have no " rcsemblince to them. Thejact is wonderful, but it is not the '* less incontestable." Jn Baxter's Treatise on the Immateriality of the Soul, the same observation is not only repeated, but is employed expressly tor the refutation of the lieikeleian system. It is, However, worthy of remark, that this ingenious writer has pusiicd his conclusion farther than he was warranted to do by his premises, and, indeed, farther than his own aigument required. " ii our ideas have iin parts, und yet if we perceive parts, it is *' plain v/e perceive sontetHmg mvre than our own perceptions. " But both these are certain : we are conscious that we perceive u parts, when we look upon a house, a tree, a river, the dial. " plate of a cluck or uaich. Thin is a short and ea*y way of * { being certain that something exists without the mind.*' (V. 11. p. 3U.) It is evident, that the fact here stated furnishes no positive proof of the existence ol external objects. It only destroys the force ot Berkeley's ivdsomngs against the possibility of their existence. )>y its obvious incompatibility with the fundamental principle on which all these reasonings proceed. The inference, theietore, which tiaxter ought to have drawn was this; that by our sensations \ve do receive notions of qualities which bear no resemblance to these sensations ; and, consequently, that Berke- ley's reasonings are good for nothing, being founded on a false hypothesis. This is precisely Reid's argument; and it is some- what curious that Baxter, after having got possession of the pre- mises, was not aware of the important consequences to which they lead. Of all the writers, however, who touched upon this subject, prior to the publication of Reid's Inquiry, none seems to hare had a clearer perception of the truth, or to have expressed it with greater precision, than D'Alembert. u It is doubtless," he observes in one passage, *' by the sense of touch we are enabled *' to distinguish our own bodies from surrounding objects ; but " how does it convey to us the notion of that continuity of parts " in which consists properly the notion of extension? Here is a u problem on which, it appears to me, that philosophy is able to " throw a very imperfect light. In a word, the sensation by *' means of which we arrive at the knowledge of extension is, in *' its nature, as incomprehensible as extension itself." (Ele- 568 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. naens de la Philosophic, Article M eta physique.) On a different occ sin, the same writer has remarked, that, " as no relation " whatever can be discovered between a sensation in the mind, *' and the pi ject by which it is occasioned, or at least to which " we refer it, there does not seem to be a possibility of tracing, " by dint of reasoning, any practicable passage from the one " to the other." And hence he is led to ascribe our belief of the existence of things external to " a species of instinct; 1 '' *' a principle," he adds, " more sun- in its operation than reason " itself." Disc, Prelim, de VEncyclop. In ciirect opposition to the fact which D'Alembert has thus not only admitted, but pointed out to his readers as involving a mys- tery not to be explained, it is astonishing to find him expressing, again and again, in different parts of his works, his complete ac- qu< scence in Locke's doctrine, that all our ideas are derivedjrom our sensations ; and that it is impossible for us to think of any thing which ha,* no resemblance to something previously known to us by our own consciousness. The remarks, accordingly, just quoted from him, are nowhere turned to any account in his Subsequent reasonings. All these passages reflect light on Reid's philosophy, and af- ford evidence, that the difficulty on which he has laid so great stress, with respect to the transition made by the mind from its sensations to a knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, is by no means (as Priestley and some others have asserted) the off- spring of his own imagination. They prove, at the same time, that none of the authors from whom I have borrowed them, with the single exception of Baxter, have availed themselves of this dif. fkulty to destroy the foundations of Berkeley's scheme of ideal- ism ; and that Baxter himself was as unapprised as the others of the extensive applications ot which it is susceptible to various other questions connected with the philosophy of the human mind. '1 he celebrated German professor, Einanuel Kant, seems at last to have got a glimpse of this, notwithstanding the scho- lastic fog through which he delights to view every object to which he turns his attention. As his writings, howevei, were of a much later date than those of Dr Reid, they do not properly fall under our consideration in this note ; and, at any rate, I must not no add to its length, by entering upon a topic of such extent and difficulty. Note(H) p. 117. The following strictures on Reid's reasonings against the ideal theory occur in a work published by Dr Priestley in 1774 : " Ijetore our author had rested so much upon this argument, " it behoved him, 1 think, to have examined the strength of it '' a little more carefully than he seems to have done : for he ap- 6 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 569 et pears to me to have suffered himself to be misled in the very *' foundation of it, merely by philosophers happening to call ** ideas the images of external things; as if this uias not known " to be ajigurative expression, denoting, not that the actual shapes " of things were delineated in the brain, or upon the mind, but " only that impressions ot some kind or other were conveyed to " the mind by means of the organs of sense and their correspond. " ing nerves, and that between these impressions and the sensa- ** tions existing in the mind, there is a real and necessary, though " at present an unknown connection." To those who have perused the metaphysical writings of Berke- ley and of Hume, the foregoing passage cannot fail to appear much too ludicrous to deserve a serious answer. Do not all the reasonings which have been deduced from Locke's philosophy a- gainst the independent existence of the material world hinge on that very principle which Priestley affects to consider as merely an accidental mode of speaking, never meant to be understood li- terally ? Where drd he learn that the philosophers who have *' happened to call ideas the images of external things," employed this term " as a figurative expression, denoting, not that the actual " shapes of things were delineated in the brain or upon the mind, *' but only, that impressions of some kind or other wera conveyed ** to the mind by means of the organs of sense and their correspond- " ing nerves?" Has not Mr Locke expressly told us, that " the u ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, " and that their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; 11 but that the ideas produced in us by secondary qualities have * c no resemblance of them at all?"* And did not Mr Hume understand this doctrine of Locke in the most strict and literal meaning of the words when he stated, as one of its necessary consequences, " That the mind either is no substance, or that it " is an extended and divisible substance ; because (he ideas of " extension cannot be in a subject which is indivisible and uuex- " tended." t Vol. I. p. 99, 13th edit, of his Essay. t " The most vmgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can " make itself' know .. to the mind immediati ly, and without the interposition " of an image or perception. That (able, which just now app ars to me, is " only a perception, au-i ail its quali'its are qualities or a perception. Now, " the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. Tin- perception consists " of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance " and contiguity ; of length, breadth, and thickness. The termination of these " three dimensions is what we call figure. This figure is moveablc, separable, " and divisible. Mobility and separability are tne distinguishing properties " of extended objects. And to cut short all disputes, the ve y idea ot exten- " sion is copied from nothing but an impression, and, consequently, must per- " fectly agree to it. I o say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to 44 say it is extended." " The free-thinker may now triumph in bis turn ; and having found there 570 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. But why should I refer, on this occasion, to Hume or to Locke, when quotations to the very same purpose arc furnished by various writers of a much later date ? The following is from a book published in 1782: " It will not be disputed, but that sensations or ideas proper- *' ly exist in the soul, because it could not otherwise retain them " so as to continue to perceive and think after its separation from " the body. Now, whatever ideas are in themselves, they are " evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore " correspond to them ; and since many of the objects or arche- " types of ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows, that the ideas '* themselves are divisible also. The idea of a man, for instance, " could in no sense correspond to a man, which is the archetype ** of it, and THEREFORE COULD NOT BE THE IDEA OF A MAN *' if it did not consist of the ideas of his head, arms, trunk, legs, *' &c. It therefore consists of parts, and consequently is divi- *' sible. And how is it possible, that a thing (be the nature of for the cause of understanding also, they say '* the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, that " is, an intelligible being seen; which, coming into trie under. u standing, makes us understand." " 1 say not this," continues llobbes, " as disapproving of the use of Universities, but bec;use, *' as 1 am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, u I must let you see, on all occasions, by the way, what tn.ngs u should be amended in them, amongst which, the frequency ofin- tl significant speech is one" Oj \lun, Part i. Cltap. i. About 150 years ago, when the dreams of the cloister were beginning to vanish before the dawning light of experimental science, the arguments which the schoolmen were obliged to have recourse to in their own defence, aitord a commentary on the real import of their dogmas, which we should search for in vain in the publications of those ages, when they were regarded as oracles of truth, which it was the business oi the philosopher not to dis- pute, but to unriddle. With this view, 1 shall extract a few re- marks from a vindication of the Aristotelian doctrines, in oppo. sition to some discourses of Sir Kenolm Digby, by an author of considerable celebrity among his contemporaries; but who is in- debted chiefly for the small portion of iame which he now enjoys to a couplet of Hudibras. The aim of the reasonings which i am to quote is to shew, as the author himselr informs us, that objects tvork not materially, but intentionally, on the sense ; and not* i in- standing the buffoonery blended with them, they may be ivgji-d. ed as an authentic exposition of the scholastic opinion on thi- :ne- morable question; a question which Alexander Ross app^i :o have studied as carefully, and as successfully, as any of the writers who have since undertaken the task of resolving it 44 The atoms are your sanctuary to which you fly upon all oc 572 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. " casions. For you will now have these material parts of bodies * e work upon the outward organs of the senses, and, passing " through them, mingle themselves with the spirits, and so to the " brain. These little parts must needs get in at the doors of our " bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits in the nerves, and, e< of necessity, must make some motion in the brain. Doubtless, '* if this be true, there must needs be an incredible motion in the ** brain ; for, if the atoms of two armies fighting should rush in- ge- " neralisations, dans lesquelles lest differences specifiques et indivi- " duelles sont oubliees, et qui reunisseut une multitude de souve- " nirs en un seul point de ressemblance, ne sont qu'une tacilite " que se donue 1'esprit pour soulager sa vue. C'est une position " commode qu'il prend pour dominer sur un plus grand nombre " d'objets ; et, de cette espece d'eminence ou il s'est place, sa ve. " ritable action consiste a redescendre 1'ecbjelle des idees, t-n resti- " tuant a chacune les differences de son objet, ses proprietes dis- " tinctives ; et en recomposant, par la syntKese ce que par V analyse " il avoit simplified" Grammaire, p. 8. Note (H h.) p. 428. Mr Maclaurin has taken notice of the former of these circum- stances in the introduction to his Treatise of Fluxions : " Others, " in the place of indivisible, substituted infinitely small divisible " elements, of which they supposed all magnitudes to be formed. " After these came to be relished, in infinite scale of infinitudes " and infinitesimals (ascending and descending always by infinite " steps) was imagined and proposed to be received into geometry, " as of the greatest use for penetrating into its abstruse parts. " Some have argued for quantities more than infinite ; and others " for a kind of quantities that are said to be neither finite nor infi- " nite, but of an intermediate and indeterminate nature. " This way of considering what is called the sublime part of geo- " metry has so far prevailed, that it is generally known by no less a " title than the science, the arithmetic, or the geometry of infinities. " These terms imply something lofty but mysterious ; the contem- " plation of which may be suspected to amaze and perplex, rather " than satisfy or enlighten the understanding ; and while it seems " greatly to elevate geometry, may possibly lessen its true and real " excellency, which chiefly consists in its perspicuity and perfect " evidence." Maclaurin s Fluxions, Vol. I. p. 2. Fontenelle, who possessed the rare talent of adorning mathema- tical science with the attractions of a refined wit and a lively elo- quence, contributed perhaps more than any other individual, by the popularity of his writings, to give a currency to this para* doxical phraseology. In one passage he seems to reproach his predecessors for the timid caution with which they had avoided these sublime speculations ; ascribing it to something resembling the holy dread inspired by the mysteries of religion : A remark, by the way, which affords an additional illustration of the close alliance between the sublime and the awtul. ' Quand on y etoit " arrive, on s'arretoit avec une espece d'effroi ft de sainte hor- " reur. On regardoit 1'innni comuie un ruystere qn'il falloit <; respecter, et qu'il n'6toit pas permis d'approt'ondir." Preface des Elem. de la Geom. de Vlnfini, 598 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. In the farther prosecution of the same subject, T have obserred in the text, that, 4< with the exception of the higher parts of ma- ** thematics, and one or two others, for which it is easy to ac- " count, the epithet universally applied to the more abstruse " branches of knowledge is not sublime but profound." One of the exceptions here alluded to is the application occasionally made of the former of these words to moral speculations, and also to some of those metaphysical researches which are connect, ed with the doctrines of religion ; a mode of speaking which is fully accounted for in the preceding part of this Essay. Agreeably to the same analogy, Milton applies to the metaphy- sical discussions of the fallen angels the word high in preference to deep. The whole passage is, in this point of view, deserving of attention, as it illustrates strongly the facility with which the thoughts unconsciously pass and repass from the literal to the metaphorical sublime. " Others apart sat on a hill retired, " In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high " Of Providence, foieknowledge, will, and late : " Fix'd fate, free-will, foi eknowledge absolute." Note (I i.) p. 434. In the effect of this superiority of stature, there seems to be something specifically different from that produced by an appa- rent superiority of strength. A broad Herculean make would suggest ideas much less nearly allied to sublimity, and would even detract from the respect which the same stature, with a less athletic form, would have commanded. A good deal must here be ascribed to that apprehended analogy between a towering shape and a lofty mind, which has transferred metaphorically so many terms from the former to the latter ; and, perhaps, some. thing also to a childish but natural association, grafting a feeling of reverence on that elevation of body to which we are forced to look upwards. The influence of similar associations may be traced in the uni- versal practice of decorating the helmets of warriors with plumes of feathers ; in the artificial means employed to give either a real or apparent augmentation of stature to the heroes of the buskin ; and in the forms of respectful salutation prevalent in all conn- tries ; which forms, however various and arbitrary they may at first sight appear, seem all to agree (according to an ingenious re- mark of Sir Joshua Reynolds) in the common idea of making the body less, in token of reverence. Note (K k.) p. 435. Longinus has expressed this idea very unequivocally, when he tells us : < Axgvrqf *J fyyji n$ \oyw sen ra u-fyn ;" and, if possible. NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 599 still more explicitly, his French translator, Boileau; " Le sublime " tst en effit ce quijorme f excellence et la souveraine perfection du " discours." To this version Boileau adds, " Cela s'entend plus " aisement que cela ne se peut rendre en Franfois. Axgorjjg vcut " dire swmmitas, Fextremite en hauteur ; ce qu'il y a de plus Sieve dans " ce qui est eleve. Le mot t%o%r) signifie a pcu pres la meme chose, " c'est & dire, eminenlia, ce qui s'elene au-dessus du reste. C'est sur " ces deux termes, dont la signification est superlative, et que Lon- " gin prend ati figure, qne je me sttis fonde pour soutenir que son " dessein est de trailer du genre sublime del' eloquence dans son plus " haut point de perfection." (Remarques sur la Traduction du Trait6 du Sublime.) Oeuvres de Boileau, Tom. V. Amsterdam, 1775. In defence of Longinus's application of the epithet sublime to Sappho's Ode, Mr Knight maintains, that the Pathetic is always Sublime. " All sympathies," he observes, " excited by just and " appropriate expression of energic passions, whether they be " of the tender or violent kind, are alike sublime, as they all tend " to expand and elevate the mind, and fill it with those enthusias- " tic raptures, which Longinus justly states to be the true feelings " of sublimity. Hence that author cites instances of the sublime " from the tenderest odes of love, as well as from the most terrific " images of war, and with equal propriety." In a subsequent part of his work, Mr Knight asserts, that " in all the fictions, either of " poetry or imitative art, there can be nothing truly pathetic, un- " less it be at the same time in some degree sublime." In this as- sertion he has certainly lost sight entirely of the meaning in which the words Sublime and Pathetic are commonly understood in our language ; a standard of judgment, upon questions of this sort, from which there lies no appeal to the arbitrary definition of any theorist ; not even to the authority of Longinus himself. Upon an accurate examination of the subject, it will be found that, like most other authors who have treated of Sublimity, he has pro- ceeded on the supposition of the possibility of bringing under one precise definition, the views of sublimity taken both by the ancients and by the moderns, without making due allowances for the num- berless modifications of the idea, which may be expected from their different systems of manners, from their different religious creeds, and from various other causes. Whoever reflects on the meaning of the word Virtus as employed by the earlier Romans, and compares it with tht: Virtu of their degenerate descendants, will not be surprised at the anomalies he meets with, in attempting to reconcile completely the doctrines of ancient and modern critics concerning the Sublime : and will find reason to be satisfied, when he is able to give a plausible account of some of these anomalies from their different habits of thinking, and their different modes of philosophising upon the principles of criticism, 600 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. " Appellate est a Viro virtus. Viri autem propria maximfe est " fortitude, cujus munera duo maxima sunt, mortis dolorisque con- " temptio." Cic. Tusc. 2. 1. " Virtus sigmfia d'abord la force, ensuite le courage, ensuite la " grandeur morale. Chez les It.iliens, virtu ne designe guere que " la pratique des beaux arts ; et le mot qui, dans son origine, ex- " primait la qualite qui distingue eminemment 1'homme, est donne " aujourd'hui k des etres qui ont perdu la qualite distinctive de " I'homme. Un Soprano est le Virtuoso par excellence." Suard. Essai sur la vie et le caractere du Tasse. In the instance of the sublime, it seems to me to be much less wonderful that there should be some anomalies in the use made of this word by Longinus, when compared with our present modes of thinking and of speaking, than that the points of coincidence should be so many between his view of the subject, and that which we meet with in the best books of philosophical criticism which have yet appeared. I shall take this opportunity to remark (although the observation has no immediate connection with the foregoing train of thinking), that a talent for the pathetic, and a talent for humour, are generally united in the same person. Wit is more nearly allied to a taste for the sublime. I have found the observation verified, as far as my own knowledge extends, whether of men or of books. Nor do 1 think it would be difficult to explain the fact, from the acknowledged laws of the human mind. Note (L 1.) p. 436. The eloquent and philosophical passage which I am now to quote, with respect to the final cause of the pleasures connected with the emotion of Sublimity, affords a proof, that the views of Longinus occasionally rose from the professed and principal ob- ject of his book to other speculations of a higher and more com- prehensive nature. I shall give it to my readers in the words of Dr Akenside. u Those godlike geniuses were well assured, that nature had tf not intended man for a low-spirited or ignoble being ; but, M, P, R. Succurro, suffero, suggero, sullevo, summitto, suppeto, surripio. Id Aeolea- 612 APPENDIX. sium more, qui xdrtirtaev, xaaXsv, dicebant praecedcntem sequen- tis vi pronunciantes. Ncque tauienin omnibus his literis semper eadcm conncxio est. Malimenim SUSLIMEM, quam SULLTMEM di. cere. * * * B non mutatur ante T 9 in S, ut dixere in sus- tollo, namque fuit vetus vox, SMS, quae motum coelum versus sig- niiicarct, viroQiv ; fortasse autem fuerat, subs, sicut abs, quanquam hoc videtur fuisse a-v}/, et a sus fuit susum : fecit autem ex se sus- tuli, non enim a siiffero, venit. Eadem est ante C. Suscipio, quud veteres succipio, ut diximus, Aeolensium more, quemadmodum su- pra declaratum est, quos prisci etiam iu aliis observarunt j ut est apud Flautum in Asinaria. " Sujipendas potius me, quam tacita haec anferas." Quod nos suspendas. Pari exemplo, suscipio, sustineo, sus- cito, susum cito" What Scaliger says upon the Aeolic doub- ling of letters in compound words is true. But I must beg leave to observe, that in words uncom pounded, the old Romans pro- nounced, but never wrote a double letter till the time of Eunius, and for this assertion I must bring my proof. " Ubi Macelam invenimus scriptum, pro Macettum, Cluseis pro classes, sumas pro summas, olorom pro illorum, numei pro nummi, observari meretur, antiquissimos, qui Latina lingua scrip- sere, ad usque tempora Ennii poetae, literas consonantes in ea- dem voce duplicatas, et immediate alterant alteri annexam, ut nunc quidcm fieri perpetuo videmus, minime gentium voluisse. Et hoc ipse Festus (in v. Solitaurilia. Idem in v. Ab oloes et Aulas. Cum istud veteres pro ab illis t et hoc pro olios dixerint: vid. etiam Morhof. De Ling. Teuton. Pt. I. c. 3. p. 50), erudi- tissimus scriptor et praeclarus antiquitatis indagator, si modo in- teger ad nos pervenisse potuisset, clarissime testatur : ' nomen,' inquiens, * Solitaurilia anliqua consuetudine per unum JL enim. ciari, non est nnrum, quia nulla tune geminabatur litera inscri- bendo : quam consuetudinem Ennius mutavisse fertur.' Idem rursus alibi (in v. Torum, cf. idem in v. porigam et folium) : * Torum ut significet torridum, aridum, per unum quidem R an- tiqua consuetudine scribitur. Sed quasi per duo RR scribatur, pronunciari oportet. .Nam antiqui nee mutas, nee semivocales litteras geminabant/ Quod proin etiam Isidorus (Orig. L. I. c. 26. in fine) confirmavit, ubi * veteres,' inquit, * non duplica- bant literas, sed supra sicilicos apponebant, qua nota admoneba- tur lector, geminaudam esse literam, et siciltcus vocatur, quia in Sicilia inventus est primo.' Unde forsan usu venit, ut in recen- tioribus monumentis etiam scriptitaverint liomani, Juentus pro juventus, Fluium i>rojiuvium t Dumvir pro duumvir, Flaus pro Jlccous (Vid. Aldus Man a this in Orthographia, p. 451. Cf. Jo. Schulzii Florum Sparsio ad Loca quajii.mi in Re litcraria contro- versa, p. 221.)" ^J. N. Funccii De Origins et Pueritia Lot* p. 319, 20. APPENDIX. 613 We shall hereafter turn a part of this long quotation to some account. I am chiefly concerned in opposing Scaliger, when he says that sus, signifying u motion towards the sky," comes from vfodevj that it formerly was subs like abs, that abs came from \p, that susum is from sus, and that suscipio was " apud ve- *' teres succipio" Long was I puzzled with the contrary powers of sub in com- pounded words. 1 knew that in Latin the sibilant letter is often substituted for the aspirate for as t%> gives sex and I^TTW, serpo, so iwro would become sub. Reflecting upon the subject, 1 perceived that sub, when it signifies " elevation," came from iwreg, and that i/Tgg, like I"TO, lost the closing letters, and that p was changed into I. I never saw this stated in any book, directly or indirectly. But no conjecture was ever more clear, or more satisfactory to iny mind ; and it solves all difficulties. The letters, and the sound of sub, are the same when their signification is different, because they flow from different Greek words. I think that Mr Stewart will be convinced in one moment. Sub then, signifying " elevation," comes not from I/TO, but from iwreg, and sus does not immediately come from sub only, but by another process, as we shall soon see. Scaliger's second position upon subs, like abs, is erroneous ; and erroneous, too, is the notion which he took from Festus, that abs came from okp. There is no vestige whatsoever, that sub existed in the form of sup ; and as to abs, it came not from a\J/, but from aTo. Of abs, Cicero tells us, in Orat. 158. c. 47. *' Una praepositio est abs (so Robert Stephens reads, not ab) eaque nuric tantum in acccpti tabulis manet, ne his quidem om- nium ; in reliquo sermone mutafa est. Nam amotit dicimus, et abegit, et abstulit, ut jam nescias abac verum sit, an abs. Quid si etiam abfvgit turpe vitiuin est, et abfer nolucrunt, aufer malue- runt ? qua; praepositio, praeter haec duo verba, nullo alio in verbo reperitur." Cicero's words must be understood with some limi- tation. For we find abs compounded in abstemius, and abstineo 9 and when it is uncompounded, we always ought to write abs te. We find absse in Caesar. There is a doubt upon abs Suessa in Livy, L. xxxii. 1. But we read ABS quivis homine in the Adelphi of Terence. Gesner gives, from Quinctilian, the reason for which ab sometimes took the old final s, which, even among the old Romans, was not always used. " Quid ? quod syllabaj nostrae in B literam et D innituntur adeo aspere, ut plerique mollire tentaverint, in przepositione B literae ob sonum et ipsam S sub. jiciendo," XII. 10. 32. Against Scaliger's third position, I contend that susum did not come from sus, but versa vice (as we ought to say, instead of vice versa) sus comes from susum. As retrovorsum was contracted in- to rursum } so svpervorsum was contracted into sursum, and sunwm 614 APPENDIX. was softened into susum , and susum, when compounded, shortened into SKS. As to the fourth position, that suscipio was u apod ve- feres awectpw," Scaliger is mistaken. Suscipio is capio susum, " I take up" suspendo is susum pendo, " I hang up" sustineo is susum teneo, u 1 hold up" suscito is, by Scaliger's own confes- sion, susum cito, c< I stir up" suspicio is susum specio, '* I look up," and, as specio begins with an s, the final letter of sus, con- tracted from susum) is omitted upon the above mentioned prin- ciple of avoiding, as the old Romans avoided, the gemination of the same letter. Well, then, we sometimes have sus, as in sustineo we sometimes have sub, as in subjicere, and subjectare used by Virgil >we sometimes have the final letter changed into the initial letter of the verb, as in summitto. Sometimes in different parts of a word, having the same signification, we have both sus and tub, and this is apparent in sustuli and sublatum. I really give myself a little credit for my solution of difficulties, which must often perplex others, as they long perplexed me. ARTICLE II. (p. 391.) The general scope of Dr Parr's manuscript, referred to in pp. 378 and 391, is thus stated by himself in the introductory para, graph. u As it is not my fortune to agree with my friend Mr Stewart upon a controverted passage in the Pseudo-Longinus, I shall, first, consider the general principle how far depth is, or is not used by the Greek and Roman writers for height, and in the course of my investigation, I shall take occasion to write some. what copiously upon the Latin prepositions which are employ- ed to express them respectively ; secondly, I shall, in a more direct way, state my objections to the reading in Longinus for which Mr Stewart contends; thirdly, I shall endeavour to vindi- cate that etymological explanation of the word sublimis which Mr Stewart rejects ; and, finally, I shall trespass upon his patience, by assigning some of the reasons which lead me to sus- pect, that the Longinus, usually supposed to be the author of the Book Tsg/ u i 4/s, did not in reality write it." In the foregoing article, I have selected various passages from that part of Dr Parr's manuscript which relates to the etymo- logy of the word sublimis ; and I intended to attempt here a similar abstract of his very learned and profound comments on the disputed sentence in Longinus, which I have quoted in the APPENDIX. 615 text. Haying found, however, upon a more careful review of these comments, that they did not admit, without much injury to their force and evidence, of such retrenchments and omissions as were necessary for my present purpose, I was forced to abandon this design. They who know the overflowing riches of Dr Parr's erudition, and the marvellous promptitude and dis- crimination with which he can at all times avail himself of his literary resources, will easily conceive the impossibility of con. veying, by any brief summary, an adequate idea of the substance and spirit of his discussions on the doubtful reading of an ancient author, involving (as in the present instance) not only a ques. tion of philology, but some collateral and very interesting points of philosophical criticism. As an atonement to my readers for this disappointment, I shall do my utmost to prevail on my excellent friend to allow the whole of his manuscript to appear in a separate publication : And, if I should be so fortunate as to succeed in my request, I shall feel no slight gratification in having given occasion, by my Essay on the Sublime, to so precious an accession to the stores of critical science. THE END. 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