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DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
 CONVENTION 
 
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 HELD IN THE YEAR 
 
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 AND WHICH FINALLY B.ATIFIED THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Printed by authority of Resolves of the Legislature. 1856. 
 
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 BOSTON: 
 
 WILLIAM WHITE, 
 
 PRINTER TO THE COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 1856. 
 
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PREFACE. 
 
 There have been four " Constitutional Conventions " in 
 the history of Massachusetts. The first was that which 
 formed the State Constitution in 1779-80 ; the second was 
 that which adopted and ratified the Constitution of the 
 United States in 1788 ; the third was held in 1820-21, 
 and proposed fourteen Articles of Amendment to the State 
 Constitution, of which nine were adopted by the people ; 
 the fourth was held in 1853, and proposed a new State 
 Constitution which was not adopted by the people. 
 
 The Journal of the first Convention was printed by order 
 of the legislature in 1832, on the recommendation of the 
 Joint Committee on the Library, of which the late Hon. 
 Alexander H. Everett was chairman. 
 
 The proceedings of the second Convention were of great 
 importance, and were so regarded throughout the country 
 at the time. It is quite certain that if Massachusetts had 
 refused her assent to the Constitution of the United States, 
 that well-devised scheme of government, the careful work 
 of the patriots and statesmen of the last century, under 
 which the nation has enjoyed so large a degree of pros- 
 perity, would have failed. There is ample evidence of 
 this in the letters which are printed at the end of this 
 volume. 
 
 263770 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 The Constitution was adopted in the Massachusetts Con- 
 vention, after a full discussion, by a majority of nineteen 
 in a vote of three hundred and fifty-five. Certain amend- 
 ments were recommended by the Convention, a portion of 
 which were in substance agreed to by all the States. It is 
 believed that at the beginning of the session of the Con- 
 vention there was a majority against the Constitution. 
 The determination which was reached must thus be as- 
 cribed, in a large degree, to the arguments which were 
 used by the speakers. 
 
 The debates were reported in the Boston newspapers of 
 the time, the " Independent Chronicle " and the " Massa- 
 chusetts Centinel," and these reports were collected into a 
 volume printed soon after the adjournment of the Conven- 
 tion. A second edition of this volume was printed in 
 Boston in 1808 ; and its contents were afterwards repeated 
 in Elliott's Debates. 
 
 In the course of the session of the Massachusetts legis- 
 lature, in 1856, the attention of the Joint Committee on 
 the Library was called by the State Librarian to the fact 
 that the volume of Debates was rare, there being but a 
 single copy, and that imperfect, in the possession of the 
 Commonwealth. The interest 'and value of the work were 
 obvious. Accordingly the chairman of the Committee 
 offered the following Resolve, which passed both houses 
 without opposition, and was approved by the Governor, 
 March 5, 1856:— 
 
 " Resolved, That the Report of the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Con- 
 vention of the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight be reprinted 
 under the direction of the Committee on the Library ; that the same number 
 be printed as of ordinary legislative documents ; and that one copy be fur- 
 nished to each member of the executive and legislative departments of the 
 government for the present political year." 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 Upon inquiry in the office of the Secretary of the Com- 
 monwealth, it was discovered that the official journal, and 
 a small file of documents relating to the Convention, 
 which had never been printed, were in a perishable condi- 
 tion. It was thought that their publication would add es- 
 sentially to the value of the Report, and that they were 
 even necessary, at the present time, to throw light upon the 
 discussions. The Committee also learned that an original 
 manuscript, containing the clear and striking notes of the 
 debates kept by Chief Justice Parsons, of Newburyport, 
 who was a member of the Convention, was in the posses- 
 sion of the Boston Athenaeum, and the Committee were 
 kindly permitted to take a copy of it. 
 
 The printed report of the debates was not in itself an 
 official document ; and in order to give a full view of the 
 transactions of the Convention, it seemed to be necessary 
 that the official journal, together with the record of certain 
 other preliminary and subsequent legislative proceedings 
 should be presented at the same time, while Judge Par- 
 sons's notes, together with a few of the more elaborate 
 discussions in the public prints, would serve to exhibit a 
 clearer idea of the tone and scope of the Debates. Induced 
 by these considerations, the Committee proposed the fol- 
 lowing additional Resolve, which, also, passed both houses 
 with the same unanimity as the former, and was approved 
 by the Governor, April 8, 1856 : — 
 
 " Resolved, That in the reprint of the Report of the Proceedings of the Mas- 
 sachusetts Convention, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, there 
 shall be included the Official Journal of the Convention, now in the archives of 
 the State ; and such other documents relating to the subject, as in the opinion 
 of the Committee on the Library may be necessary." 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 In discharge of the duty enjoined by these Resolves, the 
 Committee, after a full discussion of the plan, appointed 
 two of their number — Bradford K. Peirce and Charles 
 Hale — as a sub-committee to prepare and arrange the ma- 
 terials of the volume, and to supervise its passage through 
 the press. 
 
 This work has been attended to with such diligence and 
 ability as we were able to bring to it. It has been our 
 understanding of the Resolves, that we were not to digest 
 the various papers coming into our hands in order to pre- 
 sent a new report, but to obtain and arrange such original 
 documents as had been preserved, illustrating the transac- 
 tions of the Convention. We have not sought to multiply 
 unnecessary notes, but when an explanation seemed to be 
 required, or when a quotation from the press of the day 
 illustrated the text, we have appended it at the foot of the 
 page. In order to preserve the official journal exactly as 
 it was kept by the Secretary (with the exception of the 
 errors in spelling) we have introduced the documents to 
 which it refers, in the form of notes. Among these papers 
 will be found several of permanent historical value. 
 
 We have given special attention to the correction of the 
 press ; the original report and many of the papers being 
 sadly disfigured by typographical errors. 
 
 We have been indebted to the attentions of Hon. George 
 S. Boutwell, the State Librarian, to his Assistant, Dr. Jack- 
 son, and to Hon. F. DeWitt, Secretary of the Common- 
 wealth, for their assistance in consulting and using the 
 archives of the Commonwealth ; to the Boston Athenaeum, 
 for the privilege of copying Judge Parsons's Minutes, 
 already mentioned, and for the use of its files of newspa- 
 pers ; to Charles Folsom, Esq., and William F. Poole, Esq., 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 the past and present Librarians of the Athenaeum, for 
 facilities in using the rich literary stores of that institution ; 
 to Hon. Josiah Quincy, senior, Hon. Edward Everett, 
 Jared Sparks, LL.D., Hon. George Bancroft, and Richard 
 Hildreth, Esq., for their kind answers to questions asked 
 by the Committee in the prosecution of their labors. Mr. 
 Quincy remembers attending the debates in the gallery of 
 the meeting-house in Federal Street. Mr. Bancroft has 
 supplied us with two letters, which are printed at the 
 close of the volume, and others have been copied from 
 Mr. Sparks' s valuable collections. 
 
 It will be observed that three separate and independent 
 records of the proceedings of the Convention are included 
 within this volume. The first is the Official Journal kept 
 by the Secretary of the Convention, occupying pages 29 to 
 94, inclusive. The second is the Report of Debates, taken 
 by the* editors of the newspapers, occupying pages 95 to 
 284, inclusive. The third is Judge Parsons's Minutes, oc- 
 cupying pages 285 to 320, inclusive ; — this record unfor- 
 tunately closes abruptly, ten days before the adjournment 
 of the Convention. The first and third of these records 
 are here printed for the first time. The second is printed 
 from the volume published hi 1808, which was the second 
 edition of the Debates. The Constitution and documents 
 following it, beginning at page 1 and ending at page 17 
 of this volume, are printed in the order and style of the 
 volume published in 1808. 
 
 B. K. p. 
 
J 
 
 COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY, 
 i8oe, 
 
 BRADFORD K. PEIRCE, 
 WILLIAM S. BRAKENRIDGE, 
 AUGUSTUS C. CAREY, 
 
 Of the Senate. 
 
 LEVI THAXTER, 
 GEORGE BEAL, Jb, 
 CHARLES HALE, 
 
 Of the House of Representatives. 
 
NOTE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE DEBATES. 
 
 [The following Note was appended to the first edition of the Debates.] 
 
 *** The Printers who took the minutes of the preceding Debates, are con- 
 scious that there are some inaccuracies, and many omissions made in them. It 
 could not be otherwise, as they were inexperienced in the business,' and had 
 not a very eligible situation to hear in the Convention. But this they can say, 
 that through the whole of them, they have had a sacred regard to justice and 
 impartiality ; and therefore they are emboldened to hope for the candor and 
 pardon of the gentlemen in whose observations they occur, (from whom they 
 have not been able to obtain corrections,) and of the public in general. 
 
Correction. — The note on page 60 is erroneous in stating that the meeting- 
 house where the sessions of the Convention were held, is the building still 
 standing. The present building, however, stands on the same site as the former 
 building, where the Convention sat. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface, iii 
 
 Note to the First Edition of the Debates, xi 
 
 Commission of the Massachusetts Delegates to the Federal Convention, xv 
 Constitution of the United States as proposed for ratification 
 
 by the Federal Convention, 1 
 
 Resolutions of the Federal Convention, 15 
 
 Letter from George Washington, President of the Federal Convention, 
 
 to the President of Congress, . . . . . ' . . . 16 
 
 Message of Governor Hancock to the Massachusetts Legislature, . . 18 
 
 Proceedings of the Legislature, before the Convention, . . . 19 
 
 Resolves of Massachusetts calling a Convention, . - . . . . 22 
 
 Letter of Hon. Elbridge Gerry, read in the legislature, ... 24 
 
 Official Journal, 29 
 
 Debates, .95 
 
 Judge Parsons's Minutes, 285 
 
 Proceedings of the Legislature, after the Convention, .... 321 
 
 Public Sentiment of the Day, 323 
 
 Spirit of the Press, 335 
 
 Letters, 399 
 
 Amendments to the Constitution adopted since the ratification by the 
 
 Convention, 418 
 
 Dates of the ratification by the thirteen States, 418 
 
 Index, . 419 
 
COMMISSION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DELEGATES. 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 By his Excellency, James Bowdoix, Esq., Governor of the Commonwealth 
 
 of Massachusetts. 
 
 To the Honorable Fraxcis Daxa, Elbridge Gerry, 
 
 Nathaxiel Gorham, Rufus King, and Caleb Stroxg, Esqrs., 
 
 Greeting : — 
 
 Whereas, Congress did, on the 21st day of February, A. D. 1787, resolve, 
 " That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient that, on the second Monday 
 in May next, a Convention of Delegates, who shall have been appointed by the 
 several States, to be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of 
 revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress, and the 
 several Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when 
 agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Con- 
 stitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the 
 Union." And whereas, the General Court have constituted and appointed you 
 their delegates, to attend and represent this Commonwealth in the said pro- 
 posed Convention, and have, by a resolution of theirs of the tenth of March 
 last, requested me to commission you for that purpose. 
 
 Now, therefore, know ye, that in pursuance of the resolutions aforesaid, I 
 do, by these presents, commission you, the said Francis Dana, Elbridge Gerry, 
 Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King, and Caleb Strong, Esqrs., or any three of 
 you, to meet such delegates as may be appointed by the other, or any of the 
 other States in the Union, to meet in Convention at Philadelphia, at the time, 
 and for the purposes aforesaid. 
 
 In testimony whereof, I have caused the public seal of the Commonwealth 
 aforesaid to be* hereunto affixed. Given at the Council Chamber, in 
 [l. s.] Boston, the ninth day of April, A. D. 1787, and in the eleventh year 
 of the independence of the United States of America. 
 
 JAMES BOWDOIN. 
 By his Excellency's command. 
 
 John Avery, Jux., Secretary. 
 

CONSTITUTION 
 
 UNITED STATES, 
 
 AS PROPOSED FOR RATIFICATION BY THE SEVERAL STATES, AT THE GRAND FEDERAL 
 CONVENTION, SEPT. 17, 1787. 
 
 PREAMBLE 
 
 WE, the people of the United States, in order to form a 
 more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tran- 
 quillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
 welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and 
 our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for 
 the United States of America. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 LEGISLATIVE POWER. 
 
 The House of Representatives. 
 
 Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be 
 vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist 
 of a senate and house of representatives. 
 
 Sect. 2. The house of representatives shall be composed 
 of members chosen every second year, by the people of the 
 several states ; and the electors in each state shall have the 
 qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch 
 of the state, legislature. 
 
 No person shall be a representative who shall not have 
 attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years 
 1 
 
2 : \ \ : .•: •;; ;'•/;: : p^opdsijD constitution. [1787. 
 
 a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, 
 be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. 
 
 Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
 the several states which may be included within this Union, 
 according to their respective numbers, which shall be deter- 
 mined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including 
 those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding 
 Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual 
 enumeration shall be made within three years after the first 
 meeting of the congress of the United States, and within 
 every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they 
 shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not 
 exceed one for every thirty thousand ; but each state shall have 
 at least one representative ; and until such enumeration shall 
 be made, the state of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose 
 three; Massachusetts, eight; Ehode Island and Providence Plan- 
 tations, one ; Connecticut, five ; New York, six ; New Jersey, 
 four ; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, six ; Vir- 
 ginia, ten ; North Carolina, five ; South Carolina, five, and 
 Georgia, three. 
 
 When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, 
 the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to 
 fill such vacancies. 
 
 The house of representatives shall choose their speaker and 
 other officers ; and shall have the sole power of impeachment. 
 
 Senate. 
 
 Sect. 3. The senate of the United States shall be composed 
 of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature 
 thereof, for six years ; and each senator shall have one vote. 
 
 Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of 
 the first election, they shall be divided, as equally as may be, 
 into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class 
 shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year ; of the 
 second class at the expiration of the fourth year ; and of the 
 third class at the expiration of the sixth year ; so that one- 
 third may be chosen every second year ; and if vacancies hap- 
 pen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 3 
 
 legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make tem- 
 porary appointments, until the next meeting of the legislature, 
 which shall then fill such vacancies. 
 
 No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to 
 the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the 
 United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhab- 
 itant of that state for which he shall be chosen. 
 
 The vice-president of the United States shall be president 
 of the senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally 
 divided. 
 
 The senate shall choose their other officers, and also a pres- 
 ident pro tempore , in the absence of the vice-president, or when 
 he shall exercise the office of president of the United States. 
 
 The senate shall have the sole power to try all impeach- 
 ments ; when sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath 
 or affirmation. When the president of the United States is 
 tried, the chief justice shall preside ; and no person shall be 
 convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members 
 present. 
 
 Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend fur- 
 ther than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and 
 enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United 
 States ; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and 
 subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment accord- 
 ing to law. 
 
 Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections 
 for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
 state by the legislature thereof ; but the congress may, at any 
 time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the 
 places of choosing senators. 
 
 THE GENERAL CONGRESS. 
 
 The congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and 
 such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless 
 they shall by law appoint a different day. 
 
 Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, 
 returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority 
 
4 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 of each shall constitute a quorum to do business ; but a smaller 
 number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized 
 to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, 
 and under such penalties, as each house may provide. 
 
 Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, 
 punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the 
 concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. 
 
 Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and 
 from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as 
 may in their judgment require secrecy ; and the yeas and nays 
 of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at the 
 desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. 
 
 Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without 
 the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor 
 to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be 
 sitting. 
 
 Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a 
 compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and 
 paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall, in 
 all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be 
 privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of 
 their respective houses, and in going to and returning from 
 the same ; and for any speech or debate in either house, they 
 shall not be questioned in any other place. 
 
 No senator or representative shall, during the time for which 
 he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the au- 
 thority of the United States, which shall have been created, or 
 the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such 
 time ; and no person holding any office under the United 
 States shall be a member of either house during his contin- 
 uance in office. 
 
 THE POWERS OF CONGRESS. 
 
 Sect. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the 
 house of representatives ; but the senate may propose or con- 
 cur with amendments, as on other bills. 
 
 Every bill which shall have passed the house of representa- 
 tives and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION, 5 
 
 to the president of the United States; if he approve, he shall 
 sign it ; but if not, he shall return it with his objections, to 
 that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter 
 the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to recon- 
 sider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that 
 house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together 
 with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall like- 
 wise be reconsidered, and, if approved by two-thirds of that 
 house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes 
 of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays ; and the 
 names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be 
 entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill 
 shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sun- 
 days excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 
 same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, 
 unless the congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, 
 in which case it shall not be a law. 
 
 Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of 
 the senate and house of representatives may be necessary, 
 (except on a question of adjournment,) shall be presented 
 to the%president of the United States ; and before the same 
 shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disap- 
 proved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the senate 
 and house of -representatives, according to the rules and limita- 
 tions prescribed in the case of a bill. 
 
 Sect. 8. The congress shall have power : — To lay and 
 collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises ; to pay the debts, 
 and provide for the common defence and general welfare of 
 the United States ; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be 
 uniform throughout the United States : — To borrow money on 
 the credit of the United States : — To regulate commerce with 
 foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
 Indian tribes: — To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, 
 and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout 
 the United States : — To coin money, regulate the value thereof, 
 and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and 
 measures : — To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting 
 the securities and current coin of the United States; — To 
 
6 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 establish post offices and post roads : — To promote the progress 
 of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
 authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
 writings and discoveries : — To constitute tribunals inferior to 
 the supreme court : — To define and punish piracies and felo- 
 nies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law 
 of nations : — To declare war, grant letters of marque and 
 reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and 
 water : — To raise and support armies ; but no appropriation 
 of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years : 
 — To provide and maintain a navy : — To make rules for the 
 government and regulation of the land and naval forces : — To 
 provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
 Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions : — To pro- 
 vide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and 
 for governing such part of them as may be employed in the 
 service of the United States, reserving to the states respec- 
 tively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of 
 training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by 
 congress : — To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases what- 
 soever, over such district, (not exceeding ten miles squa§e,) as 
 may by session of particular states, and the acceptance of con- 
 gress, become the seat of the government of the United States ; 
 and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by 
 consent of the legislature of the state in which the same 
 shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock- 
 yards and other needful buildings : and to make all laws 
 which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execu- 
 tion the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this 
 constitution in the government of the United States, or in any 
 department or officer thereof. 
 
 RESTRICTIONS UPON CONGRESS. 
 
 Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as 
 any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, 
 shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one 
 thousand eight hundred and eight : but a tax or duty may be 
 imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for 
 each person* 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 7 
 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus- 
 pended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the 
 public safety may require it. 
 
 No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 
 
 No capitation or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in 
 proportion to the census or enumeration, herein before directed 
 to be taken. 
 
 No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any 
 state. 
 
 No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce 
 or revenue, to the ports of one state over those of another ; 
 nor shall vessels bound to or from one state, be obliged to 
 enter, clear, or pay duties in another. 
 
 No moneys shall be drawn from the treasury but in conse- 
 quence of appropriations made by law ; and a regular state- 
 ment and account of the receipts and expenditures of all 
 public money shall be published from time to time. 
 
 No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States ; 
 and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, 
 shall, without the consent of the congress, accept of any pres- 
 ent, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from 
 any king, prince, or foreign state. 
 
 RESTRICTIONS UPON RESPECTIVE STATES. 
 
 Sect. 10. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
 confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin 
 money ; emit bills of credit ; make any thing but gold and 
 silver coin a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of 
 attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
 contracts ; or grant any title of nobility. No state shall, with- 
 out the consent of the congress, lay any imposts, or duties 
 on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely neces- 
 sary for executing its inspection laws ; and the net produce 
 of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or 
 exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United 
 States ; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and 
 control of the congress. No state shall, without the consent 
 of congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of 
 
8 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 war, in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact 
 with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, 
 unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will 
 not admit of delay. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 EXECUTIVE POWER. 
 
 Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a presi- 
 dent of the United States of America. He shall hold his 
 office during the term of four years ; and, together with the 
 vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 Each state shall appoint, in such a manner as the legislature 
 thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole 
 number of senators and representatives to which the state may 
 be entitled in the congress : but no senator or representative, 
 or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United 
 States, shall be appointed an elector. 
 
 The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
 by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be 
 an inhabitant of the same state with themselves: and they 
 shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the num-. 
 ber of votes for each ; which list they shall sign and certify, and 
 transmit, sealed, to the seat of government of the United States, 
 directed to the president of the senate. The president of the 
 senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of repre- 
 sentatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be 
 counted. The person having the greatest number of votes, shall 
 be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole 
 number of electors appointed : And if there be more than one 
 who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, 
 then the house of representatives shall immediately choose by 
 ballot one of them for president; -and if no person have a 
 majority, then from the five highest on the list, the said house 
 shall, in like manner, choose the president : but in choosing the 
 president, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
 from each state having one vote ; a quorum for this purpose 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 9 
 
 shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the 
 states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a 
 choice. In every case, after the choice of the president, the 
 person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall 
 be the vice-president. But if there shall remain two or more 
 who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them, by 
 ballot, the vice-president. 
 
 The congress may determine the time of choosing the elec- 
 tors, and the day on which they shall give their votes : which 
 day shall be the same throughout the United States. 
 
 No person, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the 
 United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, 
 shall be eligible to the office of president ; neither shall any 
 person be eligible to that office, who shall not have attained to 
 the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident 
 within the United States. 
 
 In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his 
 death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and 
 duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice- 
 president ; and the congress may by law provide for the case 
 of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the presi- 
 dent and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act 
 as president ; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the 
 disability be removed, or a president shall be elected. 
 
 The president shall, at stated times, receive for his services a 
 compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished 
 during the period for which he shall have been elected ; and 
 he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument 
 from the United States, or any of them. 
 
 Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take 
 the following oath or affirmation : — 
 
 " I do solemnly swear, (or affirm,) that I will faithfully exe- 
 cute the office of president of the United States, and will, to 
 the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the consti- 
 tution of the United States." 
 
 Sect. 2. The president shall be commander-in-chief of the 
 army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the 
 several states, when called into the actual service of the United 
 2 
 
10 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 States. He may require the opinion, in writing, of the princi- 
 pal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any 
 subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he 
 shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences 
 against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 
 
 He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of 
 the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators 
 present concur ; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the 
 advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, 
 other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme 
 court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appoint- 
 ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
 be established by law : but the congress may by law vest the 
 appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in 
 the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
 departments. 
 
 The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that 
 may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting com- 
 missions which shall expire at the end of their next session. 
 
 Sect. 3. He shall, from time to time, give to the congress 
 information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their 
 consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and 
 expedient ; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both 
 houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between 
 them, with respect to, the time of adjournment, he may adjourn 
 them to such time as he shall think proper ; he shall receive 
 ambassadors and other public ministers ; he shall take care 
 that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all 
 the officers of the United States. 
 
 Sect. 4. The president, vice-president, and all civili officers 
 of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeach- 
 ment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high 
 crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 11 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 JUDICIARY POWER. 
 
 Sect. 1.. The judicial power of the United States shall be 
 vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the 
 congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The 
 judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
 their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times, 
 receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be 
 diminished during their continuance in office. 
 
 Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in 
 law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the 
 United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, 
 under their authority ; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other 
 public ministers and consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and 
 maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United 
 States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more 
 states ; between a state and citizens of another state ; between 
 citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state 
 claiming lands under grants of different states, and between 
 a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or 
 subjects. 
 
 In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
 consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme 
 court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases 
 before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate juris- 
 diction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and 
 under such regulations, as the congress shall make. 
 
 The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, 
 shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state 
 where the said crimes shall have been committed ; but when 
 not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place 
 or places as the congress may by law have directed. 
 
 Sect. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist 
 only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their ene- 
 mies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be con- 
 
12 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 victed of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to 
 the same overt act, or on confession in open court. 
 
 The congress shall have power to declare the punishment 
 of treason ; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption 
 of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person 
 attainted. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each 
 state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
 every other state : and the congress may, by general laws, 
 prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceed- 
 ings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. 
 
 Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
 the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. 
 
 A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other 
 crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another 
 state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state 
 from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state 
 having jurisdiction of the crime. 
 
 No person held to service or labor in one state, under the 
 laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of 
 any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service 
 or labor ; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to 
 whom such service or labor may be due. 
 
 GENERAL REGULATIONS. 
 
 Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the congress into 
 this Union ; but no new state shall be formed or erected within 
 the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any state be formed by 
 the junction of two or more states or parts of states, without 
 the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well 
 as of the congress. 
 
 The congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all 
 needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
 
1787.] 
 
 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 13 
 
 property belonging to the United States ; and nothing in this 
 constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of 
 the United States, or any particular state. 
 
 Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state 
 in this Union, a republican form of government ; and shall 
 protect each of them against invasion : and, on application of 
 the legislature, or of the executive, (when the legislature can- 
 not be convened,) against domestic violence. 
 
 ARTICLE ' V. 
 
 PROVISION FOR AMENDMENTS. 
 
 The congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem 
 it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution : 
 or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
 several states, shall call a convention for proposing amend- 
 ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and 
 purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the 
 legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conven- 
 tions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of 
 ratification may be proposed by the congress ; provided, that no 
 amendment which may be made prior to the year one thou- 
 sand eight hundred and eight, shall, in any manner affect the 
 first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article ; 
 and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its 
 equal suffrage in the senate. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 GENERAL REGULATIONS. 
 
 All debts contracted, and engagements entered into, be- 
 fore the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against 
 the United States, under this constitution, as under the con- 
 federation. 
 
 This constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
 shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or 
 
14 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
 shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every 
 state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or 
 laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the 
 members of the several state legislatures, and all executive 
 and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the 
 several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support 
 this constitution ; but no religious test shall ever be required as 
 a qualification to. any office or public trust under the United 
 States. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 The ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be 
 sufficient for the establishment of this constitution, between the 
 states so ratifying the same. 
 
 Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the states 
 present, the seventh day of September, in the year of our 
 Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the 
 Independence of the United States of America, the twelfth. 
 
 In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, 
 
 President and Deputy from Virginia. 
 
 tit tt i • ( John Langdon. 
 New Hampshire. ] mnxjnjka arrAI 
 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 Connecticut, 
 
 Nicholas Gilman. 
 
 Nathaniel Gorham. 
 Rufus King. 
 
 William Samuel Johnson. 
 Roger Sherman. 
 
 New York. Alexander Hamilton. 
 
 ( William Livingston. 
 , r 7 J David Brearly. 
 
 New Jersey. { WlLLIAM Patterson. 
 
 ^ Jonathan Dayton. 
 
1787.] 
 
 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 
 
 15 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 Delaware. 
 
 Maryland. 
 Virginia. 
 North Carolina. 
 
 South Carolina. 
 
 Georgia. 
 
 ( Benjamin Franklin. 
 Thomas Mifflin. 
 Robert Morris. 
 George Clymer. 
 Thomas Fitzsimons. 
 Jared Ingersoll. 
 James Wilson. 
 Gouveneur Morris. 
 
 ( George Read. 
 
 Gunning Bedford, Jr. 
 < John Dickinson. 
 
 Richard Basset. 
 
 Jacob Broom. 
 
 James M'Henry. 
 
 Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer. 
 
 Daniel Carrol. 
 
 John Blair. 
 James Madison. 
 
 Jr 
 
 William Blount. 
 Richard Dobbs Spaight. 
 Hugh Williamson. 
 
 John Rutledge. 
 
 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. 
 
 Charles Pinckney. 
 
 Pierce Butler. 
 
 William Few. 
 Abraham Baldwin. 
 
 Attest. William Jackson, Secretary. 
 
 In Convention, Monday, September 17, 1787. 
 
 Present — The States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con- 
 necticut, Mr. Hamilton, from New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
 sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
 South Carolina and Georgia. 
 
 Resolved, That the preceding constitution be laid before the 
 United States in congress assembled, and that it is the opinion 
 of this convention that it should afterwards be submitted to a 
 convention of delegates, chosen in each state, by the people 
 
16 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their 
 assent and ratification ; and that each convention assenting 
 to, and ratifying the same, should give notice thereof to the 
 United States in congress assembled. 
 
 Resolved, That it is the opinion of this convention, that as 
 soon as the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this 
 constitution, the United States, in congress assembled, should 
 fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states 
 which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the 
 electors should assemble to vote for the president, and the time 
 and place for commencing proceedings under this constitution. 
 That after such publication the electors should be appointed, 
 and the senators and representatives elected : That the electors 
 should meet on the day fixed for the election of the president, 
 and should transmit their votes, certified, signed, sealed and 
 directed, as the constitution requires, to the secretary of the 
 United States, in congress assembled, that the senators and 
 representatives should convene at the time and place assigned ; 
 that the senators should appoint a president of the senate for 
 the sole purpose of receiving, opening and counting the votes 
 for president ; and that after he shall be chosen, the congress, 
 together with the president, should, without delay, proceed to 
 execute this constitution. 
 
 By the unanimous order of the convention. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, President, 
 William Jackson, Secretary. 
 
 In Convention, September 17, 1787. 
 
 Sir, — We have now the honor to submit to the consideration 
 of the United States, in congress assembled, that constitution 
 which has appeared to us the most advisable. The friends of 
 our country have long seen and desired that the power of 
 making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and 
 regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and 
 judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in 
 the general government of the Union ; but the impropriety of 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 17 
 
 delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident, 
 hence results the necessity of a different organization. 
 
 It is obviousjy impracticable in the federal government of 
 these states to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to 
 each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. ''Indi- 
 viduals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to 
 preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend 
 as well on situation and circumstance, *as on the object to be 
 obtained. 'It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the 
 line between those rights which must be surrendered and those 
 which may be reserved fand on the present occasion this diffi- 
 culty was increased by a difference among the several states as 
 to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests. ^ 
 
 In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in 
 our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every 
 true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is 
 involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national 
 existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply 
 impressed on our minds, led each state in the convention to be 
 less rigid on points of inferior magnitude than might have been 
 otherwise expected ; and thus the constitution which we now 
 present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual 
 deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political 
 situation rendered indispensible. 
 
 That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every 
 state, is not, perhaps, to be expected ; but each will doubtless 
 consider that had her interests been alone consulted, the conse- 
 quences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious 
 to others ; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reason- 
 ably have been expected, we hope and believe ; that it may 
 promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, 
 and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. 
 With great respect, we have the honor to be, 
 Sir, your Excellency's most obedient 
 and humble servants. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, President. 
 
 By unanimous order of the convention. 
 
 His Excellency the President of iJongress. 
 
 3 
 
18 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [178' 
 
 MESSAGE OF GOVERNOR HANCOCK. 
 
 [Extract from the Message of His Excellency John Hancock, to 
 the Legislature of Massachusetts, relating to the Federal Constitu- 
 tion, as published in the Independent Chronicle, October 25, 
 
 1787.] 
 
 Boston, October 25. 
 Thursday last, His Excellency the Governor went to the 
 State House, where, in presence of the two branches of the 
 legislature, who had met in the representatives' chamber for 
 the purpose, he addressed them in a speech, as follows : — 
 
 Gentlemen of the Senate, and 
 
 Gentlemen of the House of Representatives : 
 
 * * * * * ***** 
 
 The general convention having completed the business of 
 their appointment, and having reported to congress, " a con- 
 stitution for the United States of America,' 9 I have received 
 the same from that honorable body, and have directed the Sec- 
 retary to lay it, together with the letter accompanying it, before 
 the legislature, that measures may be adopted for calling a con- 
 vention in this Commonwealth, to take the same into considera- 
 tion. It not being within the duties of my office to decide 
 upon this momentous affair, I shall only say, that the charac- 
 ters of the gentlemen who have compiled this system, are so 
 truly respectable, and the object of their deliberations so vastly 
 important, that I conceive every mark of attention will be paid 
 to the report. Their unanimity in deciding those questions 
 wherein the general prosperity of the nation is so deeply in- 
 volved, and the complicated rights of each separate state are so 
 intimately concerned, is very remarkable ; and I persuade 
 myself that the delegates of this state, when assembled in con- 
 vention, will be able to discern that which will tend to the 
 future happiness and security of all the people in this extensive 
 country. 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 19 
 
 THE ACTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. 
 
 [Report of a Discussion upon the Report of a Joint Committee 
 appointed to consider that part of the Governor's Message relating 
 to the Constitution, from the Independent Chronicle, October 25, 
 
 1787.] 
 
 Boston, October 25. 
 
 Last Friday a committee of the two branches of the legisla- 
 ture, appointed to consider that part of his Excellency's com- 
 munication which related to the constitution proposed by the late 
 convention of the states, laid their report before the honorable 
 senate ; who, after debating thereon, with that freedom, good 
 humor and candor, which forever does honor to a republican 
 assembly, agreed to the report, with some amendments, and 
 sent it, the day following, to the honorable house of represen- 
 tatives for their concurrence. The substance of the resolu- 
 tions of the senate, as we are informed, is a reccommendation 
 to the several towns and districts within the Commonwealth, 
 to elect delegates not exceeding the numbers they are em- 
 powered respectively by law, to send as members to the house 
 of representatives, and an order to the secretary to transmit 
 printed copies of the papers received from congress relating to 
 the subject, together with the resolutions, to the sheriffs of the 
 counties, by express, with positive directions to them, by them- 
 selves, or their deputies, personally, to deliver them to the 
 selectmen of every town and district within their respective 
 counties. 
 
 Ten o'clock, yesterday, being the time assigned by the hon- 
 orable house of representatives, for considering the question, 
 whether the house would concur with the senate in a resolve 
 to call a convention according to reccommendation of con- 
 gress for the acceptance of the newly proposed plan of federal 
 government, Mr. Parsons moved for the orders of the day, 
 when the resolve which was sent down from the senate, was 
 opened and debated. Dr. Kilham rose and argued very warmly 
 upon the impropriety of being in a hurry about a measure of so 
 much consequence to the community ; and said that he under- 
 stood, many people thought the new system would not go down, 
 
20 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 if not suddenly pushed, which was one reason why lie was 
 against the measure. He observed upon the right the legisla- 
 tures had to appoint the late convention, upon the commission 
 under which our members went to the convention, and upon 
 the question, how far they had abided by that commission. Dr. 
 Kilham dwelt some time, also, upon the right of either conven- 
 tion or people, to absolve the old Confederation, unless in the 
 way stated in the articles themselves. Mr. Parsons and Dr. 
 Jarvis, in what they observed, appeared to express the sense of 
 the house, that so far as Dr. Kilham slid into the merits of the 
 proposed government, so far he was out of the question, which 
 was in fact, only whether the house would concur with the 
 senate, to call the convention. General Brooks made a more 
 particular reply to Dr. Kilham's observations, and pointed out 
 clearly that what the Dr. had said, was matter much better to 
 be before the convention than before that house ; and that the 
 Dr. was premature as he was zealous in his reflections upon the 
 subject. Mr. Dawes rose and said, that he should not have 
 arisen, but to combat one idea of Dr. Kilham which, he thought, 
 had not been observed upon by the other gentlemen, which was, 
 " that an adoption of the new constitution would be an unjust 
 breach of tlie old compact." Mr. Dawes remarked, that he 
 was sorry Dr. Kilham disputed the people's rights so warmly ; 
 and that the Dr. was so much against the people's being per- 
 mitted to think for themselves. Mr. Dawes said, that as to 
 the clause in the old Confederation, that it could not be an- 
 nulled or altered but in a certain way ; he thought it not 
 unlike that law of the Romans, which contained a clause pro- 
 hibiting any future repeal, — but which succeeding legislatures 
 soon found a way to annul, by repealing that very prohibitory 
 clause. Mr. Dawes ridiculed Dr. Kilham's expectation of civil 
 war and misery being the consequence of only nine states 
 acceding to the new measures ; and said that some writers had 
 thought that the house of Hanover was brought to the English 
 throne by not more than a third of the people, and yet that civil 
 liberty never flourished higher than in the administration of 
 that house ; whereas, he said, " the probability was, that the 
 proposed government would take place, if at all, by the wishes 
 of almost all the people of all or most of the states." Many 
 
1787.] . PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 21 
 
 other observations were made by the above and other gentle- 
 men, but we have neither recollection nor opportunity to add 
 further, only that the question for a concurrence being put, it 
 passed in the affirmative, by a majority of 129 out of 161 
 voters. 
 
 By this resolution, the convention is to meet at the Court 
 House, in Boston, the second Wednesday in January. The 
 senate had determined the meeting at an earlier period, but 
 this was overruled in the house, in consideration of the neces- 
 sity of sufficient time being allowed to the people to consider 
 and digest a system of government with which the prosperity 
 and happiness of the people of this country is so ultimately con- 
 nected. The members of the convention are to be chosen in 
 the same manner, by the same description of persons, and to 
 receive the same pay as representatives, with this difference, 
 that the sums due to them in consequence of their services, are 
 to be defrayed from the public treasury, out of any money that 
 shall be there anterior to the sitting of the convention, from 
 any unappropriated funds under the control of government. 
 The words of this resolution correspond exactly with the words 
 of the resolution of the federal convention, and of congress, 
 empowering the respective legislatures to call a convention ; 
 and this mode of expression, we suppose, is wisely calculated 
 to prevent those difficulties that might otherwise have arisen. 
 
 We have the pleasure of assuring our readers, that the 
 utmost candor and good humor subsisted on this interesting 
 occasion. The galleries were crowded, and hundreds of spec- 
 tators were admitted on the floor, and on the unoccupied seats 
 of the house, drawn thither by their extreme curiosity and 
 impatience to know the result of this novel and extraordinary 
 debate. On the whole, every thing terminated to the entire 
 satisfaction of this numerous concourse of citizens ; and we 
 can only hope and believe from the unanimity on this, that the 
 same liberality and candor will prevail, when this town will be 
 honored by its being the seat of as august a body, as ever sat 
 in this Commonwealth, to amend the defects and imperfections 
 which have so long been complained of in the former Confeder- 
 ation, and to secure peace, liberty and safety to this extensive 
 continent. 
 
22 
 
 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [178' 
 
 RESOLUTIONS FOR THE ASSEMBLING OF THE 
 CONVENTION. 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OP MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 In Senate, October 20, 1787. 
 
 Whereas, the convention lately assembled at Philadelphia, 
 have reported to congress a constitution for the United States 
 of America, in which convention were represented the states 
 of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
 South Carolina and Georgia; which constitution was unani- 
 mously approved by the said states in convention assembled : 
 And whereas, that convention resolved that the said constitu- 
 tion should be laid before the United States in congress assem- 
 bled, and that it was their opinion that it should be submitted 
 to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people 
 thereof, under the reccommendation of its legislature, for 
 their assent and ratification ; and that each convention assent- 
 ing to, and ratifying the same, should give notice thereof to 
 the United States in congress assembled. 
 
 And whereas, the United States, in congress assembled, by 
 their resolution of the 28th of September last, unanimously 
 resolved, " That the constitution so reported, be transmitted 
 to the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a con- 
 vention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, 
 in conformity to the resolves of the said convention, in that 
 case made and provided." And whereas, the said constitution 
 has been transmitted to the legislature of this Commonwealth 
 accordingly : 
 
 It is, therefore, Resolved, That it be, and it is hereby recom- 
 mended to the people of this Commonwealth, that a conven- 
 tion of delegates be chosen agreeably to, -and for the purposes 
 mentioned in the resolution of congress, aforesaid, to meet at 
 the State House in Boston, on the second Wednesday of Janu- 
 ary next, and that the constitution so reported, be submitted 
 to the said convention for their assent and ratification ; and 
 
1787.] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 23 
 
 that the said convention assenting to, and ratifying the same, 
 give notice thereof to the United States in congress assembled, 
 in conformity to the resolves of the said convention, in that case 
 made and provided. 
 
 And it is further Resolved, That the selectmen of the several 
 towns and districts within this Commonwealth, be, and they 
 are hereby, directed to convene as soon as may be, the inhabi- 
 tants of their several towns and districts, qualified by law to 
 vote in the election of representatives, for the purpose of choos- 
 ing delegates to represent them in said convention. 
 
 And to preserve an equality to the people in their represen- 
 tation in the said convention, that the several towns and dis- 
 tricts elect respectively, by ballot, not exceeding the same 
 number of delegates as by law they are entitled to send repre- 
 sentatives to the general court. 
 
 And it is further Resolved, That the secretary immediately 
 procure to be printed a sufficient number of copies of these 
 resolutions, as also of the said constitution, with the resolu- 
 tions of the convention, and their letter to the president 6.f 
 congress, accompanying the same ; and also of the resolution 
 of the United States in convention assembled, thereupon ; and 
 that he may transmit three copies of the same, as soon as may 
 be, by expresses, to the sheriffs of the several counties within 
 this Commonwealth, with positive directions to be by them, or 
 their deputies, without delay, personally delivered to the 
 selectmen of each town and district within their respective 
 counties. 
 
 And it is further Resolved, That the several delegates of the 
 said convention, be allowed for their travel and attendance, 
 out of the public treasury, the same pay as will be allowed to 
 the representatives therefor, this present session, and that the 
 same be defrayed at the public expense. * 
 
 And it is further Resolved, That his excellency the govern- 
 or, be, and he hereby, is requested, with advice of the council, to 
 issue his warrant upon the treasurer, directing him to dis- 
 charge the pay roll of the said convention, out of any moneys 
 which will then be in the treasury, not appropriated. 
 
 And it is further Resolved, That if there shall not be suffi- 
 cient moneys then in the treasury for that purpose, the treasurer 
 
24 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 is hereby authorized and directed to borrow sufficient moneys 
 therefor, on such funds of the government as are not appropri- 
 ated. 
 
 Sent down for concurrence. 
 
 Samuel Adams, President. 
 
 In the House of Representatives, October 25, 1787. 
 Read and concurred. 
 
 James Warren, Speaker. 
 
 Approved, John Hancock. 
 A true copy. Attest : 
 
 John Avery, Jun., Secretary, 
 
 LETTER OF HON. ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 * The following letter on the subject of the American Consti- 
 tution, from the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., one of the dele- 
 gates representing this Commonwealth in the late Federal 
 Convention, to the legislature, was, on Wednesday of last week, 
 read in the senate and sent down to the house of representa- 
 tives, where it was, on Thursday, read and sent up. — Independ- 
 ent Chronicle, November 8, 1787. 
 
 New York, 18th October, 1787. 
 
 Gentlemen, — I have the honor to enclose, pursuant to my 
 commission, the constitution proposed by the federal conven- 
 tion. 
 
 To this system I gave my dissent, and shall submit my objec- 
 tions to the honorable legislature. 
 
 It was painful for me, on a subject of such national impor- 
 tance, to differ from the respectable members who signed the 
 constitution ; but, conceiving as I did, that the liberties of 
 America were not secured by the system, it was my duty to 
 oppose it. 
 
 My principal objections to the plan are, that there is no 
 adequate provision for a representation of the people — that 
 
1787] PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 25 
 
 they have no security for the right of election — that some of 
 the powers of the legislature are ambiguous, and others indefi- 
 nite and dangerous — that the executive is blended with, and 
 will have an undue influence over the legislature — that the 
 judicial department will be oppressive — that treaties of the 
 highest importance may be formed by the president with the 
 advice of two thirds of a quorum of the senate — and that the 
 system is without the security of a bill of rights. These are 
 objections which are not local, but apply equally to all the 
 states. 
 
 As the convention was called for " the sole and express 
 purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting 
 to congress and the several legislatures such alterations and 
 provisions as shall render the federal constitution adequate to 
 the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 
 Union, " I did not conceive that these powers extended to the 
 formation of the plan proposed, but the convention being of a 
 different opinion, I acquiesced in it, being fully convinced that 
 to preserve the Union, an efficient government was indispensably 
 necessary ; and that it would be difficult to make proper amend- 
 ments to the Articles of Confederation. 
 
 The constitution proposed has few federal features, but is 
 rather a system of national government. Nevertheless, in many 
 respects, I think it has great merit, and by proper amendments, 
 may be adapted to the " exigencies of government," and pre- 
 servation of liberty. 
 
 The question on this plan involves others of the highest im- 
 portance : 1st. Whether there shall be a dissolution of the fed- 
 eral government ? 2dly. Whether the several state governments 
 shall be so altered, as in effect to be dissolved ? and 3dly. 
 Whether in lieu of the federal and state governments, the 
 national constitution now proposed shall be substituted, with- 
 out amendments? Never, perhaps, were a people called on 
 to decide a question of greater magnitude. Should the citi- 
 zens of America adopt the plan as it now stands, their liberties 
 may be lost ; or, should they reject it altogether, anarchy may 
 ensue. It is evident, therefore, that they should not be precipi- 
 tate in their decisions ; that the subject should be well under- 
 
26 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. [1787. 
 
 stood, lest they should refuse to support the government, after 
 having hastily accepted it. 
 
 If those who are in favor of the constitution, as well as those 
 who are against it, should preserve moderation, their discus- 
 sions may afford much information, and finally direct to a 
 happy issue. 
 
 It may be urged by some that an implicit confidence should 
 be placed in the convention. But, however respectable the 
 members may be who signed the constitution, it must be 
 admitted that a free people are the proper guardians of their 
 rights and liberties — that the greatest men may err — and that 
 their errors are sometimes of the greatest magnitude. 
 
 Others may suppose that the constitution may be safely 
 adopted, because therein provision is made to amend it. But 
 cannot this object be better attained before a ratification than 
 after it ? And should a free people adopt a form of government 
 under conviction that it wants amendment ? 
 
 And some may conceive that if the plan is not accepted by 
 the people, they will not unite in another. But surely, whilst 
 they have the power to amend, they are not under the neces- 
 sity of rejecting it. 
 
 I have been detained here longer than I expected, but shall 
 leave this place in a day or two for Massachusetts, and on my 
 arrival shall submit the reasons (if required by the legislature) 
 on which my objections are grounded. 
 
 I shall only add that as the welfare of the Union requires a 
 better constitution than the Confederation, I shall think it my 
 duty as a citizen of Massachusetts, to support that which shall 
 be finally adopted, sincerely hoping it will secure the liberty 
 and happiness of America. 
 
 I have the honor to be, gentlemen, with the highest respect 
 for the honorable legislature and yourselves, your most obedi- 
 ent, and very humble servant, 
 
 E. GERRY' 
 The Hon. Samuel Adams, Esq., 
 
 President of the Senate, and 
 The Hon. James Warren, Esq., 
 
 Speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts 
 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL. 
 
A JOURNAL 
 
 OP A 
 
 CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, 
 
 Chosen by the people of the Commonwealth of Massachu- 
 setts, FOB, THE PUBPOSE OF CONSIDEBING A CONSTITUTION OB 
 
 Fbame of Govebnment, bepobted by a Convention of Dele- 
 gates, held at Philadelphia, on the fibst Monday of May, 
 
 1787. 
 
 Begun and held at Boston, on the second Wednesday of 
 Januaby, Anno Domini 1788, pubsuant to a Resolve of the 
 Geneeal Coubt of the said Commonwealth, passed the 
 25th day of Octobeb, 1787. 
 
JOURNAL. 
 
 Wednesday, January 9, 1788. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Ordered, That Mr. Gorham, Mr. Carries, Dr. Jarvis, Mr. 
 Dalton, Mr. Spooner and Mr. Davis, be a Committee to receive 
 the returns of the several towns. 
 
 By the returns from the several towns, it appeared that the 
 following gentlemen were chosen to represent them in Conven- 
 tion, viz. : — 
 
 COUNTY OF SUFFOLK. 
 
 Boston, .... His Excellency John Hancock, Esq. 
 
 Hon. James Bowdoin, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Samuel Adams, Esq. 
 
 Hon. William Phillips, Esq. ^ 
 
 Hon. Caleb Davis, Esq. 
 
 Charles Jarvis, Esq. 
 
 John Coffin Jones, Esq. 
 
 John Winthrop, Esq. 
 
 Thomas Dawes, Jr., Esq. # 
 
 Rev. Samuel Stillman. 
 
 Thomas Russell, Esq. 
 
 Christopher Gore, Esq. 
 Roxbury, .... Hon. William Heath, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Increase Sumner, Esq. 
 Dorchester, . . . James Bowdoin, Jr., Esq. 
 
 Ebenezer Wales, Esq. 
 Milton, .... Rev. Nathaniel Robbins. 
 Weymouth, . . . Hon. Cotton Tufts, Esq. 
 Hingham, .... Hon. Benjamin Lincoln, Esq. 
 
 Rev. Daniel Shute. 
 
32 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Braintree, 
 
 Brookline, 
 Dedham, . 
 
 Needham, . 
 Medfield, . 
 Stoughton, 
 
 Wrentham, 
 
 Walpole, . 
 Sharon, . 
 Cohasset, . 
 Franklin, . 
 Medway, . 
 Bellingham, 
 Hull, . . 
 Chelsea, . 
 Foxborough, 
 
 Hon. Richard Cranch, Esq. 
 Rev. Anthony Wibird. 
 Rev. Joseph Jackson. 
 Rev. Thomas Thacher. 
 Fisher Ames, Esq. 
 Col. William Mcintosh. 
 Capt. John Baxter, Jr. 
 Hon. Elijah Dunbar, Esq. 
 Capt. Jedidiah South worth. 
 Mr. Thomas Mann. 
 Mr. Nathan Comstock. 
 Mr. George Payson. 
 Mr. Benjamin Randall. 
 
 Hon. Jabez Fisher, Esq. 
 Mr. Moses Richardson, Jr. 
 Rev. Noah Alden. 
 Mr. Thomas Jones. 
 Rev. Phillips Payson. 
 Mr. Ebenezer Warren. 
 
 COUNTY OF ESSEX. 
 
 Salem, 
 
 Danvers, . . . 
 
 Newbury, . . . 
 
 Newbury Port, . 
 
 Beverly, . . . 
 
 . Richard Manning, Esq. 
 
 Edward Pulling, Esq. 
 
 Mr. William Gray, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Francis Cabot. 
 . Hon. Samuel Hoi ten, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Israel Hutchinson, Esq. 
 . Hon. Tristram Dalton, Esq. 
 
 Enoch Sawyer, Esq. 
 
 Ebenezer March, Esq. 
 . Hon. Rufus King, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Benjamin Greenleaf, Esq. 
 
 Theophilus Parsons, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Jonathan Titcomb, Esq. 
 . Hon. George Cabot, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Joseph Wood. 
 
 Capt. Israel Thorndike. 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 33 
 
 Ipswich, . 
 
 Marblehead. 
 
 Gloucester, 
 
 Lynn and 
 Lynnfield, 
 Andover, . 
 
 Rowley; . 
 Haverhill, 
 
 Topsfield, . 
 Salisbury, 
 
 Almsbury, 
 
 Boxford, . 
 Bradford, . 
 Methuen, . 
 Wenham, . 
 Manchester 
 Middleton, 
 
 . Hon. Michael Farley, Esq. 
 
 John Choate, Esq. 
 
 Daniel Noyes, Esq. 
 
 Col. Jonathan Cogswell. 
 . Isaac Mansfield, Esq. 
 
 Jonathan Glover, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Azor Orne, Esq. 
 
 John Glover, Esq. 
 . Daniel Rogers, Esq. 
 
 John Low, Esq. 
 
 Capt. William Pearson. 
 ( John Carnes, Esq. 
 I Capt. John Burnham. 
 . Capt. Peter Osgood, Jr. 
 
 Dr. Thomas Kittridge. • 
 
 Mr. William Symmes, Jr. 
 . Capt. Thomas Mighill. 
 . Bailey Bartlett, Esq. S 
 
 Capt. Nathaniel Marsh. 
 . Mr. Israel Clark. 
 . Dr. Samuel Nye. 
 
 Mr. Enoch Jackman. 
 . Capt. Benjamin Lurvey. 
 
 Mr. Willis Patten. 
 . Hon. Aaron Wood, Esq. 
 . Daniel Thurston, Esq. 
 . Capt. Ebene.zer Carlton. 
 . Mr. Jacob Herrick. 
 . Mr. Simeon Miller. 
 
 COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX. 
 
 Cambridge, . . . Hon. Francis Dana, Esq. 
 
 Stephen Dana, Esq. 
 Charlestown, . . Hon. Nathaniel Gorham, Esq. 
 Watertown, . . . Dr. Marshall Spring. 
 Woburn, .... Capt. Timothy Winn. 
 
 Mr. James Fowle, Jr. 
 Concord, .... Hon. Joseph Hosmer, Esq. 
 
34 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Newton, . . . 
 
 . Hon. Abraham Fuller, Esq. 
 
 Reading, . . . 
 
 . Mr. William Flint, 
 
 
 Mr. Peter Emerson. 
 
 Marlborough, . 
 
 . Mr. Jonas Morse. 
 
 
 Maj. Benjamin Sawin. 
 
 Billerica, . . . 
 
 . William TonipsQn, Esq. 
 
 Framingham, 
 
 . Capt. Lawson Buckminster. 
 
 Lexington, . . 
 
 . Benjamin Brown, Esq. 
 
 Chelmsford, . . 
 
 . Maj. John Minot. 
 
 Sherburne, . . 
 
 . Daniel Whitney, Esq. 
 
 Sudbury, . . . 
 
 . Capt. Asahel Wheeler. 
 
 Maiden, . . . 
 
 . Capt. Benjamin Blaney. 
 
 'Weston, . . . 
 
 . Capt. Abraham Bigelow. 
 
 Medford, . . . 
 
 . Maj. Gen. John Brooks. 
 
 Hopkinton, . . 
 
 . Capt. Gilbert Dench. 
 
 Westford, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Jonathan Keep. „ 
 
 Stow, .... 
 
 . Dr. Charles Whitman. 
 
 Groton, . . . 
 
 , Dr. Benjamin Morse. 
 
 
 Joseph Sheple, Esq. 
 
 Shirley, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Obadiah Sawtell. 
 
 Pepper ell, . . 
 
 . Mr. Daniel Fisk. 
 
 Waltham, . . . 
 
 . Leonard Williams, Esq. 
 
 Townsheud, . . 
 
 . Capt. Daniel Adams. 
 
 Dracut, . . . 
 
 . Hon. Joseph Bradley Varnum, Esq 
 
 Bedford, . . . 
 
 . Capt. John Webber. 
 
 Holliston, . 
 
 . Capt. Staples Chamberlin. 
 
 Acton and Carlisle, Mr. Asa Parlin. 
 
 Dunstable, . . 
 
 . Hon. John Pitts, Esq. 
 
 Lincoln, . . . 
 
 . Hon. Eleazer Brooks, Esq. 
 
 Wilmington, . . 
 
 . Capt. John Harnden. 
 
 Tewksbury, . . 
 
 . Mr. Newman Scarlett, 
 
 Littleton, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Samuel Reed. 
 
 Ashby, .... 
 
 . Mr. Benjamin Adams. 
 
 Natick, . . . 
 
 . Maj. Hezekiah Broad. 
 
 Stoneham, . . 
 
 . Capt. Jonathan Green. 
 
 ifosZ Sudbury, . 
 
 . Mr. Phineas Gleazen. 
 
 Boxborough, . . 
 
 • 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 35 
 
 COUNTY OF HAMPSHIRE. 
 
 Springfield, . . 
 West Springfield, 
 
 Wilbraham, . . 
 Northampton and 
 Easthampton, 
 Southampton, 
 Hadley, . . 
 Southadley, . 
 Amherst, . . 
 Granby, . . 
 Hatfield, . 
 Whateley, . . 
 Williamsburg , 
 Westfield,. . 
 
 Deerfield, . . 
 
 Greenfield, . 
 Shelburne, 
 
 Conway, . . 
 
 Sunderland, . 
 Montague, 
 Northfield, 
 
 Brimfield, . . 
 South BrimfieM, 
 
 Monson, . . 
 
 Pelham, . . 
 
 Greenwich, . 
 
 Blanford, . . 
 
 Palmer, . . 
 Granville, 
 
 New Salem % . 
 
 . William Pynchon, Esq. 
 . Col. Benjamin Ely. 
 
 Capt. John Williston. 
 . Capt. Phinehas Stebbins. 
 \ Hon. Caleb Strong, Esq. 
 ( Mr. Benjamin Sheldon. 
 . Capt. Lemuel Pomeroy. 
 . Brig. Gen. Elisha Porter. 
 . Hon. Noah Goodman, Esq. 
 . Mr. Daniel Cooley. 
 . Mr. Benjamin Eastman. 
 . Hon. John Hastings, Esq. 
 . Mr. Josiah Allis. 
 . Mr. William Bodman. 
 . John Ingersoll, Esq. 
 
 Mr. John Phelps. 
 . Mr. Samuel Field. 
 . Mr. Moses Bascom. 
 . Mr. Robert Wilson. 
 . Capt. Consider Arms. 
 
 Mr. Malachi Maynard. 
 . Capt. Zacheus Crocker. 
 . Mr. Moses Severance. 
 . Mr. Ebenezer Janes. 
 . Abner Morgan, Esq. 
 . Capt. Asa Fisk. 
 . Mr. Phinehas Merrick. 
 . Mr. Adam Clark. 
 . Capt. Nathaniel Whitcomb. 
 . Mr. Timothy Blair. 
 . Mr. Aaron Merrick. 
 . Mr. John Hamilton. 
 
 Mr. Clark Cooley. • 
 . Mr. John Chamberlin. 
 
 1 [Hampshire County, in 1788, included the present counties of Hampshire, 
 Hampden and Franklin.] 
 
36 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Belchertown, 
 
 . . Mr. Justus Dwight. 
 
 Colrain, . 
 
 . . Mr. Samuel Eddy. 
 
 Ware, . . . 
 
 . . Mr. Isaac Pepper. 
 
 Warwick anc 
 Orange, 
 
 j . . Capt. John Goldsbury. 
 
 Bernardston, 
 
 . . Capt. Agrippa Wells. 
 
 Chester, . . 
 
 . . Capt. David Shepard. 
 
 Charlemont, 
 
 . . Mr. Jesse Eeed. 
 
 Ashfield, . . 
 
 . . Mr. Ephraim William. 
 
 Worthington, 
 
 . . Nahum Eager, Esq. 
 
 Shutesbury, 
 
 . . Mr. Asa Powers. 
 
 Chesterfield, . 
 
 . . Col. Benjamin Bonney. 
 
 Goshen, . 
 
 . 
 
 Southivick, 
 
 . . Capt Silas Fowler. 
 
 Norwich, . . 
 
 . Maj. Thomas James Douglass 
 
 Ludlow, . . 
 
 . . Mr. John Jennings. 
 
 Leverett, . . 
 
 . . Mr. Jonathan Hubbard. 
 
 Westhampton. 
 
 . . Mr. Aaron Fisher. 
 
 Montgomery, 
 
 . 
 
 Cummington 
 
 and I Mr. Edmund Lazell. 
 
 Plainfield, 
 
 
 Buckland, 
 
 . . Capt. Thompson Maxwell. 
 
 Longmeadow. 
 
 . . Mr. Elihu Colton. 
 
 Middlefield, . 
 
 . 
 
 Wendell, . 
 
 • i- 
 
 
 COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH. 
 
 Plymouth, 
 
 . . Joshua Thomas, Esq. 
 
 
 Mr. Thomas Davis. 
 
 
 Mr. John Davis. 
 
 Scituate, . 
 
 . . . Hon. William Cushing, Esq. 
 
 
 Hon. Nathan dishing, Esq. 
 
 
 Hon. Charles Turner, Esq. *- 
 
 Duxborongh, 
 
 . . . Hon. George Partridge, Esq. 
 
 Marshfield, 
 
 . . . Rev. William Shaw.. 
 
 Bridgwater', 
 
 . . . Daniel Howard, Esq. -» 
 
 Mr. Hezekiah Hooper. 
 Capt. Elisha Mitchell. 
 Mr. Daniel Howard, Jr. 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 37 
 
 Middleborough, . 
 
 . Rev. Isaac Backus. 
 
 
 Mr. Benjamin Thomas. 
 
 
 Isaac Tomson, Esq. 
 
 
 Mr. Isaac Soul. 
 
 Rochester, . . 
 
 . Mr. Nathaniel Hammond. 
 
 
 Mr. Abraham Holmes. - 
 
 Plympton, . . . 
 
 . Capt. Francis Shurtliff. 
 
 
 Mr. Elijah Bisbee, Jr. 
 
 Pembroke, . . 
 
 . Capt. John Turner. 
 
 
 Mr. Josiah Smith. 
 
 Kingston, . . . 
 
 . William Sever, Jr., Esq. 
 
 Hanover, . . . 
 
 . Hon.. Joseph dishing, Esq 
 
 Abington, . . . 
 
 . Rev. Samuel Niles. 
 
 Halifax, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Freman Waterman. 
 
 Wareham, . . 
 
 . Col. Israel Fearing. 
 
 COUNTY OF BARNSTABLE. 
 
 Barnstable, . . 
 
 . Nymphas Mars ton, Esq. » 
 
 
 Shearjashub Bourn, Esq. 
 
 Sandwich, . . 
 
 . Dr. Thomas Smith. 
 
 
 Mr. Thomas Nye. 
 
 Yarmouth, . . 
 
 . David Thacher, Esq. 
 
 
 Capt. Jonathan Howes. 
 
 Eastham, . . . 
 
 
 Harwich, . . . 
 
 . Hon. Solomon Freeman, E 
 
 • 
 
 Capt. Kimbal Clark. 
 
 Welfleet, . . . 
 
 . Rev. Levi Whitman. 
 
 Falmouth,. . . 
 
 . Capt. Joseph Palmer. 
 
 Truro, .... 
 
 
 Chatham, . . . 
 
 . 
 
 Province Town,. 
 
 • 
 
 COUNTY OF BRISTOL. 
 
 Taunton, . . . 
 
 . James Williams, Esq. 
 
 
 Col. Nathaniel Leonard. 
 
 
 Mr. Aaron Pratt. 
 
 Rehoboth,. 
 
 . Capt. Phanuel Bishop. 
 
 Maj. Frederick Drown. 
 
38 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788, 
 
 Rehoboth, .... William Winsor, Esq. 
 Swanzey, . . . . Mr. Christopher Mason. 
 
 Mr. David Brown. 
 Dartmouth, . . . Hon. Holder Slocum, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Meletiah Hathaway. 
 Norton, .... Hon. Abraham White, Esq. 
 Attleborough, . . Hon. Elisha May, Esq. 
 
 Capt. Moses Willmarth. 
 Digkton, .... Col. Sylvester Richmond, 
 
 Hon William Baylies, Esq. 
 Freetown, . . . Hon. Thomas Durfee, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Richard Bordon. 
 Rainham, .... Israel Washburn, Esq. 
 Easton, .... Capt. Ebenezer Tisdell. 
 Mansfield, . . . Capt. John Pratt. 
 Berkley, .... Samuel Tobey, Esq. 
 New Bedford, . . Hon. Walter Spooner, Esq. 
 
 Rev. Samuel West. 
 Westport, .... Mr. William Almy. 
 
 York, . . 
 
 Kittery, . 
 
 Wells, . . 
 
 Berwick, . 
 
 Arundell, . 
 Biddeford, 
 Pepperellboro 
 Lebanon, . 
 Sanford, . 
 Buxton, . 
 Fryeburg, 
 
 COUNTY OF YORK/ 
 
 . Capt. Esaias Preble. 
 
 Nathaniel Barrell, Esq. 
 . Mr. Mark Adams. 
 
 Mr. James Neal. 
 . Rev. Dr. Moses Henimenway. 
 
 Hon. Nathaniel Wells, Esq. 
 . Capt. Elijah Thayer. - 
 
 Dr. Nathaniel Low. 
 
 Mr. Richard Fox Cutts. 
 
 . Thomas Cutts, Esq. 
 
 . Mr. Thomas M. Wentworth. 
 
 . Maj. Samuel Nasson. 
 
 . Jacob Bradbury, Esq. 
 
 . Mr. Moses Ames. 
 
 [In the present State of Maine.] 
 
1788.] 
 
 Coxhall, . 
 Massabeseck. 
 Limerick, . 
 Broivnfteld, 
 Little Falls, 
 Shapleigh, 
 Pearsonfield, 
 Waterborough 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 Capt. John Low. 
 
 39 
 
 Mr. Jeremiah Emery. 
 Rev. Pelatiah Tingley 
 
 Edgartown, 
 Chilmark, . 
 Tisbury, • 
 
 Sherburne, 
 
 COUNTY OF DUKES COUNTY. 
 
 . . . Mr. William Mayhew. 
 . . . Mr. Cornelius Dunham. 
 
 COUNTY OF NANTUCKET. 
 
 COUNTY OF WORCESTER. 
 
 Worcester, . . 
 
 . Hon. Samuel Curtis, Esq. 
 
 
 Mr. David Bigelow. 
 
 Lancaster, . . 
 
 . Hon. John Sprague, Esq. 
 
 Mendon, . . . 
 
 . Edward Thompson, Esq. 
 
 Brookfield, . . 
 
 . Mr. James Nichols. 
 
 
 Mr. Daniel Forbes. 
 
 
 Mr. Nathaniel Jenks. 
 
 Oxford, . ' . . 
 
 . Capt. Jeremiah Learned. 
 
 Charlton, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Caleb Curtis. 
 
 
 Mr. Ezra Mclntier. 
 
 Sutton, . . . 
 
 . Mr. David Harwood. 
 
 
 Hon. Amos Singletary, Esq 
 
 Leicester, . . . 
 
 . Col. Samuel Denny. 
 
 Spencer, . . .' 
 
 . Mr. James Hathaway. 
 
 Rutland, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Asaph Sherman. 
 
 Paxton, . . . 
 
 . Mr. Abraham Smith. 
 
 Oakham, . . . 
 
 . Capt. Jonathan Bullard. 
 
 Barre, .... 
 
 . Capt. John Black. 
 
 Hubbardston, 
 
 . Capt. John Woods. 
 
 New Braintree, . 
 
 . Capt. Benjamin Josselyn. 
 
40 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Southborough, 
 
 Westborough, 
 
 Northborough, 
 
 Shrewsbury, 
 
 Lunenburgh, 
 
 Fitchburgh, 
 
 Uxbridge,. 
 
 Harvard, . 
 
 Dudley, . 
 
 Bolton, 
 
 Upton, . . 
 
 Sturbridge, 
 
 Leominster, 
 
 Hardwick, 
 
 Holden, . 
 
 Western, . 
 
 Douglass,. 
 
 Grafton, . 
 
 Petersham, 
 
 Royalston, 
 Westminster, 
 Templeton, 
 Princeton, 
 Ashburnham, 
 Winchendon, 
 Northbridge, 
 Ward, . . 
 Athol, . . 
 Milford, . 
 Sterling, . 
 Boylston, . 
 
 . Capt. Seth Newton. 
 . Capt. Stephen Maynard. 
 . Mr. Artemas Brigham. 
 . Capt. Isaac Harrington. 
 . Capt. John Fuller. 
 . Mr. Daniel Putnam. 
 . Dr. Samuel Willard. 
 . Josiah Whitney, Esq. 
 . Mr. Jonathan Day. 
 . Hon. Samuel Baker, Esq. 
 . Capt. Thomas M. Baker. 
 . Capt. Timothy Parker. 
 . Maj. David Wilder. 
 . Maj. Martin Kinsley. 
 . Rev. Joseph Davis. 
 . Mr. Matthew Patrick. 
 . Hon. John Taylor, Esq. 
 . Dr. Joseph Wood. 
 . Jonathan Grout, Esq. 
 
 Capt. Samuel Peckham. 
 . John Frye, Esq. 
 . Mr. Stephen Holden. 
 . Capt. Joel Fletcher. 
 . Mr. Timothy Fuller. 
 . Mr. Jacob Willard. 
 . Mr. Moses Hale. 
 . Capt. Josiah Wood. 
 . Mr. Joseph Stone. 
 . Mr. Josiah Goddard. 
 . Mr. David Stearns. 
 . Capt. Ephraim Wilder. 
 . Mr. Jonas Temple. 
 
 COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND. 
 
 Falmouth, . . . Daniel Ilsley, Esq. 
 
 John K. Smith, Esq. 
 Portland, .... Mr. John Fox. 
 
 [In the present State of Maine.] 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 41 
 
 Portland, . . . 
 North Yarmouth, 
 
 Scarborough, 
 Brunswick, . . 
 Harpswell, . . 
 Cape Elizabeth,. 
 Gorham, . 
 New Gloucester, 
 Gray, . . . . 
 Windham, . . 
 Standish, . 
 Royalsborough, . 
 Raymondstoivn, . 
 Bakerstoivn, . . 
 Sylvester, . . . 
 Bridgtown, . 
 Shepardstown, . 
 
 . Capt. Joseph McLellan. 
 . David Mitchell, Esq. 
 Samuel Merrill, Esq. 
 . William Thompson, Esq. 
 . Capt. John Dunlap. 
 . Capt. Isaac Snow. 
 . Mr. Joshua Dyer. 
 . Mr. Stephen Longfellow, Jr 
 . Mr. William Wedgery. 
 . Rev. Samuel Perley. 
 
 Poivnalborough, 
 
 Georgetown, 
 Newcastle, 
 Woolwich, 
 Waldoborough , 
 Top sham, . 
 Winslow, . 
 Bowdoinham, 
 Boothbay, . 
 Vassalborough, 
 Bristol, 
 Edgcomb, . 
 Halloicell, 
 St. George's, 
 Warren, . 
 Thomaston, 
 
 COUNTY OF LINCOLN. 
 
 Thomas Eice, Esq. 
 Mr. David Sylvester. 
 Mr. Nathaniel Wyman. 
 Mr. David Murray. 
 Mr. David Gilmore. 
 
 Hon. Samuel Thompson, Esq. 
 Mr. Jonah Crosby. 
 Mr. Zacheus Beal. 
 William McCobb, Esq. 
 Capt. Samuel Grant. 
 William Jones, Esq. 
 Moses Davis, Esq. 
 Capt. James Carr. 
 
 David Fales, Esq. 
 
 4 [In the present State of Maine.] 
 
42 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Bath , . 
 Winthrop, 
 Lewistown, 
 Ballstown, 
 Walpole, . 
 Wales, . . 
 Canaan, . 
 Pittston, . 
 Medumcook, 
 Norridgwalk 
 Sterling-ton, 
 Belfast, . 
 Machias, . 
 Camden, . 
 Hancock* . 
 
 Dummer Sewall, Esq. 
 Mr. Joshua Bean. 
 
 COUNTY OF BERKSHIRE. 
 
 Sheffield and ) 
 Mt. Washington, ) 
 Great Barrington, 
 Stockbridge, . . 
 Pittsfield, . . . 
 Richmond, . . 
 
 Lenox,. . . . 
 
 Lanesborongh, . 
 
 Williamstown, . 
 
 Adams, . . . 
 
 Egremont, . . 
 
 Becket, . . . 
 IF<?s£ Stockbridge, 
 
 Dalton, . . . 
 
 Alford, . . . 
 
 iVew Ashford, . 
 iVcw? Marlborough, 
 
 Tyringham, . . 
 Loudon, . 
 
 Windsor, . . . 
 
 Partridgefield, . 
 
 John Ashley, Jr., Esq. 
 
 Hon. Elijah D wight, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Theodore Sedgwick, Esq. 
 
 Capt. David Bush. 
 
 Mr. Valentine Rathbun. 
 
 Mr. Comstock Betts. 
 
 Mr. Lemuel Collins. 
 
 Hon. Jonathan Smith, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Tompson J. Skinner, Esq. 
 
 Capt. Jeremiah Pierce. 
 
 Ephraim Fitch, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Elisha Carpenter. 
 
 Maj. Thomas Lusk. 
 
 Mr. John Hurlbert. 
 
 Capt. Daniel Taylor. 
 Capt. Ezekiel Herrick. 
 Mr. Joshua Lawton. 
 Mr. Timothy Mason. 
 Ebenezer Peirce, Esq. 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 43 
 
 Hancock, .... Mr. David Vaaghan. 
 
 Lee, Capt. Jesse Bradley. 
 
 Washington, . . . Mr. Zenos Noble. 
 
 Sandisfield, . . . Mr. John Picket, Jr. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Ordered, That Mr. Gorham, Mr. Carnes, Dr. Jarvis, Mr. 
 Dalton, Mr. Spooner, Mr. Davis and Dr. Taylor, be a Commit- 
 tee to receive the returns of the several towns. 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee of five persons be appointed to 
 collect, count and sort the votes for Secretary. 
 
 Mr. Davis, Mr.. Dalton, Mr. Wood, Mr. Brooks and Mr. 
 Turner, were appointed on the said committee. 
 
 The Convention then proceeded to the choice of a Secretary, 
 by ballot, and the votes being taken, it appeared that George 
 Richards Minot, Esquire, was chosen, who accepted of the 
 choice, and was duly sworn, to qualify him for exercising the 
 duties of that office. 
 
 Voted, That Mr. Jacob Kuhn, the Messenger of the General 
 Court, be appointed Messenger to this Convention. 
 
 Voted, That 4 o'clock, P. M., be assigned for coming to the 
 choice of a President. 
 
 Voted, That five Monitors be chosen. 
 
 The following gentlemen were then elected, viz. : Hon. 
 Noah Goodman, Esq., Mr. Phanuel Bishop, Mr. Daniel Cooley, 
 Hon. Azor Orne, Esq., and Mr. Thomas Davis. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of seven be appointed to prepare 
 Rules and Orders for the regulation of the Convention. 
 
 Mr. Gorham, Dr. Jarvis, Dr. Taylor, Mr. Wedgery, Mr. Dal- 
 ton, Mr. Sedgwick, and Mr. BoAvdoin, of Dorchester, were 
 appointed on the said committee. 
 
 Ordered, That the Committee who were appointed to receive 
 the returns of the members, be instructed to examine them, 
 and report. 
 
 Adjourned to 4 o'clock, P. M. 
 
44 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded to the choice of a President, by 
 ballot, according to assignment, and a Committee of five being- 
 appointed to collect, count and sort the votes, it appeared that 
 His Excellency John Hancock, Esquire, was chosen. 
 
 Voted, That the Convention proceed to the choice of a Vice- 
 President. 
 
 The Convention then proceeded to the choice of a Vice-Pres- 
 ident accordingly, by ballot, and a Committee being appointed 
 to collect, count and sort the votes, it appeared that the Hon. 
 William Cushing, Esquire, was chosen. 
 
 Voted, That the Vice-President be requested to take the 
 chair, who took the chair accordingly. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of five be appointed to wait upon 
 His Excellency John Hancock, Esq., and acquaint him that 
 this Convention have made choice of him for their President, 
 and to request his Excellency's acceptance of that appointment. 
 
 Mr. Russell, Dr. Holten, Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Turner and Mr. 
 Dalton were then appointed on the said committee. 
 
 Voted, That the Convention will attend morning prayers 
 daily, and that the gentlemen of the clergy in Boston, of every 
 denomination, be requested to officiate in turn. 
 
 The members from Boston were appointed to wait upon them 
 and acquaint them thereof. 
 
 A vote of the Church in Brattle Street, in Boston, offering 
 the use of their meeting-house to the Convention, having been 
 communicated, 5 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of nine be appointed to view the 
 accommodations in the said meeting-house, and report. 
 
 5 [The proprietors of the Church sent the following communication to the 
 Convention. 
 
 " At a meeting of the Proprietors of the Meeting-house in Brattle Street. 
 Boston, Jan. 6th, 1788 :— 
 
 Whereas, The State Convention appointed to consider the reported Federal 
 Constitution are to meet at the State House, in Boston on the 9th instant, and 
 the said house being unsuitable for the convenient reception of so large a body. 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 45 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick, Gen. Lincoln, Dr. Taylor, Gen. Brooks, of 
 Lincoln, Dr. Jarvis, Dr. Holten, Mr. Strong, Mr. Nasson and 
 Mr. Thacher, were then appointed on the said committee. 
 
 Adjourned to Thursday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Thursday, January 10, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee appointed to wait upon his Excellency the 
 Governor, to inform him of his being chosen President of the 
 Convention, &c, reported verbally, that his Excellency signified 
 his acceptance of that appointment, and expressed his expecta- 
 tion of soon attending to the duties of the office. 
 
 Ordered, That Gen. Heath, Gen. Titcomb, Mr. Fuller and 
 Dr. Spring, be on the Committee for examining the returns of 
 the members, in the room of Mr. Gorham, Dr. Jarvis, Mr. Dal- 
 ton and Dr. Taylor, excused. 
 
 The Committee appointed to examine the accommodations in 
 
 and this Society being desirous of accommodating them in the fed^manner 
 they are able, 
 
 Voted, unanimously, That the meeting-house in Brattle Street, belonging to 
 this Society, shall be for the use of that honorable body, for holding their 
 meetings on the said business, whenever they shall signify their pleasure for 
 that purpose to the Committee of this Society ; and that a copy of this vote be 
 communicated to them as soon as they shall be convened. 
 A true copy from the Records. 
 
 Attest: Danl. Bell, Clerk."] 
 
 [The following is the note of acceptance addressed by Governor Hancock 
 to the Committee. 
 
 " The Governor presents his respectful compliments to Mr. Russell, and the 
 other gentlemen of the Committee of the Convention, from whom he had the 
 honor of receiving a message this evening, and begs the fevor of their report- 
 ing to the honorable Convention that he has* -a lively sense of the honor done 
 him, by their electing him President, and that he hopes soon to attend his duty, . 
 and afford his feeble assistance in the important business before them. 
 
 Wednesday Evening, 9th January, 1788."] 
 
46 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 the meeting-house in Brattle Street/ reported verbally, that it 
 would be convenient for the Convention to sit in that place, and 
 that the galleries only should be assigned for the spectators, 
 which report was accepted, and it was 
 
 Ordered, That the Sexton usually attending at the- said 
 meeting-house, be appointed to assist the Messenger. 
 
 Ordered, That the Messenger prepare the said meeting-house 
 for the reception of the Convention this afternoon. 
 
 Voted, That the thanks of this Convention be given to the 
 proprietors of the meeting-house\ in Brattle Street, in Boston, 
 for their offer of the use of the said house to the Convention, 
 and that Mr. Turner, Mr. Nasson anci Mr. Carnes, be a Com- 
 mittee to communicate this vote to the said proprietors, and to 
 acquaint them that the Convention have agreed to sit therein. 
 
 The Committee appointed to examine the returns of the 
 members, requested the sense of the Convention as to the rule 
 of examining the said returns. Whereupon, it was made a 
 question whether the Convention will give a rule to the said 
 committee, and, the same being put, it passed in the affirma- 
 tive, and it was 
 
 Ordered, That, if the said committee find that any town 
 hath deputed more delegates than by the last valuation such 
 town was entitled to send representatives to the general court, 
 according to the return of the said valuation, they report a 
 state of the facts relative to such town, to the Convention. 
 
 The Committee appointed to prepare Rules and Orders for 
 the regulation of the Convention, made report, and the same 
 being debated in part, the further consideration thereof was 
 postponed to the afternoon. 
 
 Voted, That, after the next adjournment, the Convention will 
 assemble at the meeting-house, in Brattle Street, in this town. 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Voted, That another Monitor be chosen, and that the several 
 Monitors take their divisions in the meeting-house. 
 
 7 [This was the building marked with the cannon ball, still standing in 
 Brattle Square.] 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 47 
 
 The House then proceeded to the choice of a Monitor, by 
 nomination, and the Hon. Abraham White, Esq., was chosen. 
 
 Voted, That seats be assigned for the gentlemen of the clergy 
 who may attend the debates, upon the lower floor, without the 
 seats occupied by the members. 
 
 The Convention resumed the consideration of the report of 
 the Committee appointed to prepare Rules and Orders for their 
 regulation, which being amended to read as follows, was ac- 
 cepted, and ordered to be put up in a conspicuous place. 
 
 RULES AND ORDERS. 
 
 1st. No person shall sit at the table except the President 
 and Secretary. 
 
 2d. No person shall speak without first rising and addressing 
 the President, and he shall sit down as soon as lie lias done 
 speaking. 
 
 3d. No person shall be interrupted while speaking, but by 
 being called to order, or to correct a mistake. 
 
 4th. No member shall speak more than once to any one 
 question until any other member who has not spoken shall speak, 
 if he desire it, nor more than twice until any other has spoken 
 twice that desires to speak. 
 
 5th. When any member shall make a motion, and such mo- 
 tion shall be seconded by another, the same shall be considered 
 by the Convention, and not otherwise. 
 
 6th. No member shall declare a question a vote, until the 
 President has declared it to be a vote or not. 
 
 7th. No member shall nominate more than one person for 
 one committee, provided the person by him nominated shall be 
 chosen. 
 
 8th. No vote shall be reconsidered unless there be as many 
 members in the house at the time of the motion for a reconsid- 
 eration, as there were when it passed, provided a return of the 
 house shall be called for at the time such motion is made, and 
 in all such cases there shall be an injunction upon the members 
 to attend until the question shall be determined, and no other 
 question shall be previously determined, excepting for an ad- 
 journment. 
 
 9th. No member shall be permitted to stand up to the inter- 
 
48 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 ruption of another while any member is speaking, or pass 
 between the President and the person speaking. 
 
 10th. When a vote is declared by the President, and any 
 member rises to doubt the vote, the house shall be returned, 
 and the vote made certain without any further debate upon the 
 question. 
 
 11th. The Monitors who are or shall be appointed, shall see 
 the due observance of the foregoing orders, one to be set in 
 each division of the house, and, if required by the President, 
 to return the number of votes and members in their respective 
 quarters. 
 
 12th. No member shall be considered at liberty to leave the 
 Convention without the permission of the same, unless by con- 
 sent of his constituents. 
 
 Voted, That Mr. Goodman and Dr. Tufts, be on the Commit- 
 tee for examining the returns, in the room of Gen. Heath and 
 Gen. Titcomb, excused. 
 
 Adjourned to Friday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Friday, January 11, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 A remonstrance from certain inhabitants of Sheffield, against 
 the election of Col. John Ashley, Jr., as a delegate to this Con- 
 vention. Read and committed to Dr. Taylor, Mr. Sumner, Mr. 
 Strong, Mr. Tufts, MiO Rice, Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln, and Mr. 
 Adams. 
 
 A remonstrance from certain inhabitants of Great Barring- 
 ton, against the election of the Hon. Elijah Dwight, Esq. Read 
 and committed to Mr. Cabot, Mr. Nasson, Gen. Whitney, Mr. 
 Phelps, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Bourn and Mr. dishing. 
 
 A remonstrance from certain inhabitants of Williamstown, 
 against the election of the Hon. Tompson J. Skinner, Esq. 
 Read and committed to Mr. Varnum, Mr. Wales, Mr. West, 
 Mr. Wedgcry, Mr. Sylvester, Mr. Dunbar and Mr. Sprague. 
 
 Ordered, That the Committees be enjoined to sit. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 49 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee appointed to wait upon the proprietors of the 
 meeting-house in Brattle Street, &c, reported that they had 
 attended that service, agreeably to their commission. 
 
 The Committee on the remonstrance of certain inhabitants of 
 Sheffield, made report that there was no evidence to support 
 the said remonstrance. Ordered that the same lie on file. 
 
 The Committee appointed to examine the returns of the 
 members, made report, whereupon, it was 
 
 Voted, That the returns certified by the selectmen be consid- 
 ered as valid, except in the disputed cases specially committed. 
 
 There being two returns from the town of Taunton, 
 
 Voted, That the return of the last date, which was not at- 
 tested by the selectmen, be committed to a Committee of five. 
 
 Mr. Davis, Mr. Nasson, Mr A Thompson, of Topsham, Dr. 
 Taylor and Mr. Winthrop, were appointed on the committee. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee be appointed to consider of the 
 expediency of the Convention removing to another place in 
 Boston, and to ascertain whether a more convenient house can- 
 not be obtained for their use. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, Gen. Lincoln, Mr. Bowdoin, of Dorchester, Mr. 
 Sedgwick, Dr. Spring, Mr. Nasson and Mr. Wedgery, were 
 appointed on the 'said committee. 
 
 Dr. Tufts and Mr. White had leave of absence. 
 
 Voted, That when the Convention are adjourned they be 
 adjourned to meet in the Representatives' Chamber. 
 
 Voted, That the Convention be adjourned to 10 o'clock in the 
 morning. 
 
 Adjourned accordingly. 
 
 Saturday, January 12, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee appointed to consider of the expediency of 
 the Convention's removing to another place, &c, being called 
 
 7 
 
50 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1878. 
 
 upon to report, a motion was made that the said committee be 
 enjoined to proceed in the business of their commission, and 
 the question being put, passed in the negative. 
 
 The Committee on the return from the town of Taunton, 8 
 made a report of a state of facts, whereupon it was moved that 
 the sense of the House be taken whether the two members mcn- 
 
 8 [The following remonstrance was received from Taunton. 
 
 * To the Honorable the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to be 
 holden at Boston, on the second Wednesday of January, A. D. 1 788 : — 
 
 The Memorial of the subscribers, Selectmen, Freeholders and Inhabitants of 
 the Town of Taunton, in the County of Bristol, humbly represents, 
 
 That at a meeting of the inhabitants of said town of Taunton, qualified to 
 vote for representatives to the General Court, on the twenty-sixth day of 
 November last past, duly warned and assembled agreeably to a Resolve of the 
 Legislature, passed on the twenty-fifth day of October last past, for the pur- 
 pose of choosing a Convention to consider of the proposed Federal Constitution, 
 the said inhabitants made choice of James Williams, Esq., to represent lliem 
 in said Convention, agreeably to the copy No. 1, hereto annexed, and also 
 voted they would choose no other person for that purpose, and thereupon the 
 said meeting was dissolved. That afterwards, a number of the inhabitants of 
 the town aforesaid, petitioned the Selectmen thereof to call a meeting of the 
 inhabitants of the same town, qualified to vote in town affairs, for the purpose 
 of choosing one or more persons in addition to the one already chosen, to rep- 
 resent them in said Convention. That in compliance with said request, the 
 Selectmen aforesaid called a meeting of the said inhabitants qualified to vote 
 in town affairs, to be held on the day of the date hereof; that the same inhabi- 
 tants have on this day assembled, and upon the question whether they would 
 proceed to choose one or more members, agreeably' to the request aforesaid, 
 there appeared in favor of the question, 156, against it, 140 ; and thereupon, 
 Capt. Nathaniel Leonard and Mr. Aaron Pratt were chosen to join with the 
 said James Williams, Esq., to represent the inhabitants of said town in the 
 Convention aforesaid. The subscribers, part of the 140 aforesaid, and who 
 are fully convinced that the rest of them are clearly of the same opinion, 
 humbly conceive that the elections aforesaid, of the said Leonard and Pratt, 
 were wholly illegal, and not supported by the Resolve of the Legislature afore- 
 said. Wherefore they pray that they may not be admitted as members of said 
 Convention, being not properly authorized for that purpose. And as in fluty 
 bound will pray. 
 
 Taunton, January 7th, 1 788." 
 
 Signed by five Selectmen and others.] 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 51 
 
 tioned in the last return from the said town be entitled to their 
 seats ? and the question being put, passed in the affirmative. 3 
 
 The Committee on the remonstrance from certain inhabitants 
 of Williamstown, 10 reported that they did not find any evidence 
 
 9 [The Committee made the following report. 
 
 " Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In Convention, Jan. 12th, 1788. 
 The Committee to whom was committed the two returns from the town of 
 Taunton, report the following state of facts, which is humbly submitted : — 
 
 That the first return, dated on the 26th November, is certified by the Select- 
 men agreeable to the order of the General Court, and is legal. 
 
 That on the 1 7th December, about one hundred and thirty of the inhabi- 
 tants of said town petitioned the Selectmen for another meeting, to make a 
 further choice, which meeting was called on the 7th January inst, and appears 
 to have been legal ; but before they proceeded to the election, the Selectmen 
 withdrew, saying they had done their duty in certifying the person chosen at 
 first meeting, and should not certify any more. The town then proceeded 
 to the election of two more delegates, in addition to the first person chosen, 
 which two persons last chosen are certified by the Moderator and Town Clerk. 
 It further appears to your Committee that the town of Taunton have sufficient 
 number of polls to entitle them to three delegates. 
 
 Per order : Caleb Davis."] 
 
 10 [The following, with other remonstrances, was received from Williamstown. 
 
 " To the Honorable Chairman and Convention of the Commonwealth of Massa- 
 chusetts, assembled on the second Wednesday in January, 1788, for the pur- 
 pose of ratifying or rejecting the Federal Constitution : — 
 May it please your Honors : We, whose names are hereunder written, 
 freeholders of Williamstown, in the County of Berkshire, beg leave to repre- 
 sent to your honors, the pointed partial election of Capt. Tompson J. Skinner, 
 as a member of your honoraoie body. 
 
 Agreeable to the order or recommendation of the Legislature, in their last 
 session, a meeting was warned, and the inhabitants, qualified to vote, elected 
 Mr. William Young to be their delegate, by a great majority. It was then 
 motioned to dissolve the meeting. The Moderator then replied that the meet- 
 ing was dissolved. The people then began to draw off, and in the evening, 
 when but few people were present, they proceeded to adjourn the meeting to a 
 future day, and on the day of the adjournment, precisely at the time, a small 
 riumber only being present, the meeting was opened, a number of persons 
 present put in their votes, and the Moderator turned the hat, before the people 
 from the remote parts of the* town could come in, and the Moderator declared 
 Col. Tompson J. Skinner to be chosen. 
 
 The town generally being dissatisfied with the proceedings, they voted the 
 adjourned meeting was illegal, and immediately proceeded, as the law directs, 
 
52 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 to support the facts stated by the remonstrants, or that the elec- 
 tion of the Hon. Tompson J. Skinner, Esq., was illegal. Which 
 report was accepted. 
 
 A paper called a remonstrance 11 of seven inhabitants of the 
 
 to call a new meeting, which was held on the first day of January instant, 
 when Mr. William Young was elected by a majority of ninety-one votes. We 
 have, therefore, thought proper to state to your honors, the particular circum- 
 stances attending the choice of Capt. Skinner, and remonstrate against such 
 illegal proceedings, judging the adoption or rejection of the Federal Constitu- 
 tion to be a matter of too much consequence to be thus trifled with. 
 Williamstowx, Jan. 3d, 1 788."] 
 
 11 [The following is a copy of said remonstrance 
 
 " To the Honorable Convention of Delegates, to be convened at Boston, on the 
 second Wednesday in January, 1788, for the purpose of taking into consider- 
 ation the new Federal Constitution : — 
 
 We, the subscribers, inhabitants of the town of Sheffield, in the County of 
 Berkshire, being freeholders, think it our indispensable duty to remonstrate 
 against John Ashley, Jr., Esq., being admitted to a seat in your honorable 
 Convention, as he has not been elected by the said town of Sheffield for that 
 purpose. Your remonstrants have applied to Lemuel Barnard, Esq., in Shef- 
 field, a Justice of Peace for said county, who obstinately refuses to take our 
 depositions respecting the illegal conduct of the Selectmen who presided 
 at the said election. We, therefore, severally and solemnly, declare as follows, 
 viz. : — I, David Clark, and I, Augustin Austin, saw Elias Ransom and Stephen 
 Stevens put in their votes for a delegate, at a meeting of the inhabitants of 
 said town, on the seventeenth day of December last, for the purpose of choos- 
 ing a delegate, neither of which persons had resided in said town more than 
 seven months. I, Zadok Loomis, do solemnly affirm and declare, that I saw. 
 clearly and plainly, a certain person put two votes into the hat at the meeting 
 before mentioned. I, Isaac Salsburgh, saw a certain other person than that 
 which Zadok Loomis saw, put two votes into the hat at the said meeting. And 
 I, Anthony Austin, saw Jacob Johnson put a vote into the hat at the said meet- 
 ing, which said Jacob Johnson had not been an inhabitant of the town of 
 Sheffield more than eight months. And furthermore, we, the subscribers, sol- 
 emnly affirm and declare, that there were nine other persons which voted at 
 the forementioned meeting, for a delegate to the said Convention, which 
 said several persons, we, for several years, have been well acquainted witli, 
 and their several circumstances, and that they were not qualified to vote in 
 said meeting, unless they were put into possession of property fraudulently, 
 with a view solely to qualify them to vote in the said meeting. 
 
 We think it our duty further to inform your honors, that the said John 
 Ashley, Jr., Esq., being one of the Selectmen, presided in the meeting, and 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 53 
 
 town of Sheffield, having been read and committed, and there 
 appearing no evidence, nor any person in support of the allega- 
 tions therein contained, 
 
 Ordered, That the said remonstrance be dismissed. 
 
 On motion, that the vote for not enjoining the Committee 
 appointed to consider of the expediency of the Convention's 
 removing to another place, <fcc, to proceed in the business of 
 their commission, be reconsidered, and that the said committee 
 be directed to sit again for further inquiry, the question of re- 
 consideration was put and passed in the negative. 
 
 The Committee on the remonstrance 12 of certain inhabitants of 
 Great Barrington, reported, unanimously, that it was not sup- 
 held the hat for receiving the votes. But instead of sitting it fair and open on 
 the table, as usual, held it in his left hand, pressed close to his breast, receiving 
 the votes from the voters, in general, in his right hand, and putting (or pre- 
 tending to put) them into the hat himself, at the same time, suffering others 
 to put their hand, shut, into the crown of the hat, so that it could not be 
 known whether they put in one vote or ten. 
 
 Your remonstrants can truly say that we wish for nothing more than to have 
 a firm, stable, energetic government, both Federal and State, and that these 
 are heartily willing to invest Congress with all those powers which are neces- 
 sary to enable them to order, direct, protect, secure and defend the United 
 States ; but when we see a certain set of men among "us not only ravenously 
 greedy to swallow the new Federal Constitution themselves, but making the 
 greatest exertions to ram it down the throats of others, without giving them 
 time to taste it — men, too, who we have reason to imagine expect to have a 
 share in administering the new Federal government — when we see such men 
 fraudulently and basely depriving the people of their right of election, threat- 
 ening, awing, deceiving, cheating and defrauding the majority in the manner 
 above-mentioned, it is to us truly alarming. 
 
 We, therefore, beg leave to protest against the pretended election of John 
 Ashley, Jr., Esq., as a delegate for the town of Sheffield, as he has not been 
 elected by the said town for that purpose, and we humbly trust he will not be 
 permitted to a seat. 
 
 Sheffield, 4th January, A. D. 1788."] 
 
 12 [The following is a copy of the remonstrance. 
 
 " To the Honorable Convention of Delegates, to sit at Boston, on the second 
 Wednesday in January, A. D. 1788, for the purpose of talcing into consider- 
 ation the new Federal Constitution : — 
 
 We, the subscribers, inhabitants of the town of Great Barrington, in the 
 County of Berkshire, and freeholders, beg leave to remonstrate to your honors 
 
54 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 ported, and that the remonstrants have liberty to withdraw the 
 same. Report accepted, and ordered accordingly. 
 Adjourned to Monday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Monday, January 14, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Constitution or Frame of Government for the United 
 States of America, as reported by the Convention of Delegates, 
 from the United States, begun and held at Philadelphia, on the 
 
 against the partial and illegal conduct of the Selectmen of said town, at a late 
 meeting for choosing a delegate to represent the said town in said Convention, 
 viz. : — The inhabitants of said town, being convened in town meeting, on the 
 twenty-sixth day of November last, for that purpose, the said Selectmen made 
 proclamation to the people to bring in their votes for a delegate. We soon ob- 
 served that only two persons were voted for, viz.: William Whiting and Elijah 
 Dwight, Esq. In receiving the votes the Selectmen discovered a strong par- 
 tiality in favor of the last mentioned candidate, particularly in permitting persons 
 of their own party to vote, who, we presume, were by no means legally quali- 
 fied, and refusing several of the other party who possessed those qualifications 
 required by the Constitution. Notwithstanding wTiich, after sorting and count- 
 ing the votes, the said Selectmen made proclamation to the town, that they 
 had chosen Dr. William Whiting to be their delegate, and directed him to be 
 called, that it might be known whether he accepted the office ; upon which the 
 said Dr. Whiting publicly declared his acceptance. A Committee was then 
 chosen to draw instructions for his conduct at said Convention, and after 
 withdrawing for some time they returned and offered to report their draft, and 
 although this motion was seconded, and strongly urged by a number of the 
 members, yet no regard was paid to it by the said Selectmen ; and at this time 
 it was abundantly evident that the Selectmen had a design to embarrass the 
 meeting, and to nullify their former proceedings, although there was a much 
 larger number of voters collected at this meeting than had been known to 
 attend a town meeting in this town for many years, and although no person 
 pretended to make the least objection to the regularity and legality of the elec- 
 tion. And to this end, after deciding several votes by their own authority when 
 they were objected to by a number of the members as not being votes, who 
 urged to have them made certain to no purpose, some time late in the evening, 
 when they imagined so many of their opposers to be gone home that they 
 could carry a majority, a motion was made by their partisans, and immediately 
 put, for adjourning the meeting for one week, and although we presume to 
 say there was not a majority of the voters, then present, in the affirmative, and 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 55 
 
 first Monday of May, 1787, <fcc, together with the Resolution of 
 Congress, of the 28th of September, 1787, for transmitting the 
 same to the several Legislatures ; and the Resolution of the 
 General Court of this Commonwealth, of the 25th day of Octo- 
 ber, 1787, for calling a Convention, agreeably to the said reso- 
 lution of Congress, were ordered to be read. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Voted, That the Convention, sensible how important it is that 
 the great subject submitted to their determination should be 
 discussed and* considered with moderation, candor and deliber- 
 ation, will enter into a free conversation on the several parts 
 thereof, by paragraphs, until every member shall have had 
 opportunity fully to express his sentiments on the same, after 
 which the Convention will consider and debate at large the 
 (jiiestion, whether this Convention will adopt and ratify the 
 proposed Constitution, before any vote is taken expressive of 
 the sense of the Convention, upon the whole or any part thereof. 15 
 
 Resolve of the General Court of this Commonwealth, of the 
 10th of March, 1787, appointing Delegates for the Convention 
 of the States, held at Philadelphia, ordered to be read. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded that the Hon. Elbridge 
 
 ■ 
 
 although a number of the members cried out, l No vote ! ' and moved to have 
 it made certain, yet no regard was paid thereto, but after declaring it to be a 
 vote, and that the meeting was adjourned, the Selectmen and Town Clerk took 
 up the papers and left the house. 
 
 As we presume this to all intents and purposes to be a dissolution of the 
 meeting, we will not trouble your honors with a detail of the irregular and 
 illegal proceedings of the pretended adjourned meeting, but will refer your 
 honors to the depositions herewith exhibited. Therefore, as the said William 
 Whiting was regularly and legally elected by a considerable majority, in a very 
 full meeting, legally warned and convened for that purpose, and was declared 
 so by the Selectmen who there presided, and as he there (being called upon 
 by the Selectmen) publicly declared his acceptance, and as no objection has, 
 or ever could be, made to the legality of his election, and as the pretended 
 election of his competitor is the reverse in almost every circumstance, Ave ap- 
 peal to your honors, who doubtless have a right to determine the legality of the 
 election of your own members, and humbly request that he may be admitted 
 to his seat in the Convention, the refusal of the Selectmen to give him a cer- 
 tificate, and the pretended election of Elijah Dwight, Esq., notwithstanding. 
 Great Barrixgton, December, 1787."] 
 
 13 [See reconsideration and addition, next day, page 57.] 
 
/ 
 
 56 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. . [1788. 
 
 Gerry, Esq., be requested to take a seat in the House, to 
 answer any question of fact, from time to time, that the 
 Convention may want to ask respecting the passing of the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 A motion was then made and seconded that the consideration 
 of the said motion subside, to give place to the follow- 
 ing, viz. :— 
 
 That, whereas, the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., was a dele- 
 gate from this Commonwealth in the Convention held at Phila 
 delphia, and whereas, he did not sign the Constitution reported 
 by the said Convention, 
 
 Voted, That the said Elbridge Gerry, Esq., be requested to 
 attend this Convention to state the facts and reasons which in- 
 duced him to decline signing the same. 
 
 A motion was then made and seconded, that the consideration 
 of both questions should subside, and the question being put, 
 passed in the negative. The motion that the first question 
 should subside to give place to the second, was then put, and 
 passed in the negative also. 
 
 The first motion was then put, and passed in the affirma- 
 tive. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee of three be appointed to wait 
 upon the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., and acquaint him with 
 the vote of this morning, requesting him to take a seat in the 
 House, to answer any question of fact, from time to time, that 
 the Convention may want to ask respecting the passing of the 
 Constitution. 
 
 Mr. Bishop, Mr. Wedgery and Dr. Spring, were appointed on 
 the said committee. 
 
 Ordered, That the Secretary be permitted to furnish any 
 printer with the proceedings of the Convention, who may apply 
 for the same for the press. 
 
 On the petition of Benjamin Russell and Messrs. Adams and 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 57 
 
 Nourse, printers, praying to be allowed a place for the purpose 
 of taking minutes of the debates, 14 
 
 Ordered, That the Monitors assign a place for the purpose 
 requested. 
 
 The Convention entered upon the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Tuesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Tuesday, January 15, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee appointed to wait upon the Hon. Elbridge 
 Gerry, Esq., reported that they had attended the service 
 assigned them. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the vote of yesterday 
 prescribing the manner of proceeding in the consideration of 
 the Constitution under debate, should be reconsidered, for the 
 purpose of making the following addition thereto, viz. : " It is, 
 nevertheless, the opinion of this Convention, that if any mem- 
 ber conceives any other clause or paragraph of the Constitution 
 to be connected with the one immediately under consideration, 
 that he have full liberty to take up such other clause or para- 
 graph for that purpose," and the question of reconsideration 
 being put, passed in the affirmative. 
 
 14 [The following petition was sent to the Convention by the printers. 
 
 *' To the Honorable Convention : — t 
 
 The utility, to the public at large, of a faithful account of the proceedings, 
 debates, &c, of the honorable Convention, being taken and published, being 
 generally acknowledged, and the subscribers wishing to furnish, as far as 
 possible, such an account, (and being prevented, by the great numbers who 
 attend in the gallery, from making minutes in that place,) pray this honorable 
 Convention to allow them a place within the walls for that purpose. And, as- 
 in duty, shall pray. Benj. Russell. 
 
 Adams & Nourse. 
 Boston, January 14, 1788."] 
 
 8 
 
58 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 On the question whether the addition should be made, it was 
 determined in the affirmative. 
 
 A letter 15 from the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., informing that 
 he would attend the Convention agreeably to their request of 
 yesterday. Read. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. JL 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Ordered, That the Messenger exclude from the floor of the 
 House all persons not belonging to the Convention, except such 
 as are admitted by special order. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration thereof to the morning. 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee be appointed to provide a more 
 convenient place for the Convention to sit in. 
 
 Mr. Dalton, Mr. Field, Mr. Nasson, Mr. Spooner, Dr. Jarvis, 
 Mr. Dawes and Dr. Taylor, were appointed on the said com- 
 mittee. 
 
 Adjourned to Wednesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 ls [Mr. Gerry accepted the request of the Convention, in the following note. 
 
 "Cambridge, 15th January, 1788. 
 Sir : — I was honored, last evening, with a vote of the honorable Convention, 
 by Jfre hands of their Committee, requesting me ' to take a seat in the house, 
 to answer any question of facts, from time to time, that the Convention may 
 want to ask respecting the passing of the Constitution/ and I shall, in compli- 
 ance with their request, wait on that honorable body, this afternoon, if possi- 
 ble, and continue with them during their session. 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, 
 
 With the highest respect for the Convention and yourself, 
 Your most obedient and very humble servant, 
 
 E. Gerry. 
 His Excellency j the President of the Convention of Massachusetts."'] 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 59 
 
 Wednesday, January 16, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and -having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration thereof to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Thursday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Thursday, January 17, 1788. lfi 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Ordered, That Mr. Carnes, Mr. Shurtliff, Mr. Neal, Mr. 
 Hosmer and Mr. Webber, be a Committee to prepare a pay roll 
 
 16 [We find the following letter to the Convention sent in, this morning, 
 from Gen. Heath. 
 
 " Roxbury, January 1 7th, 1 788. 
 Honored Sir : — Having been absent from my duty since yesterday morn- 
 ing, I conceive it to be incumbent on me, to acquaint the honorable Conven- 
 tion, that great indisposition of body has been the only cause of my absence, 
 and that my indisposition is increased by my anxiety to be present on the all- 
 important business now before the Convention. I shall attend the moment my 
 health will permit ; but should Providence forbid what I so ardently wish, may 
 the great Counsellor direct the honorable Convention in all their deliberations, 
 and to such a decision on the ultimate question, as shall tend to secure the 
 invaluable rights and privileges of these States, redound to their honor abroad, 
 their safety, prosperity and happiness at home, to the latest generations. 
 I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
 
 Your Honor's, and the honorable Convention's, 
 Most obedient, humble servant, 
 
 W. Heath. 
 Hon. "William Cushixg, Esquire, Vice-President, §-c."] 
 
60 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 for the travel and attendance of the members of the Conven- 
 tion, and report. 
 
 A letter from his Excellency Samuel Huntington, Esq., Gov- 
 ernor of Connecticut, enclosing a copy of the doings of the 
 Convention of that State, dated January 9, 1788. Read. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 The Committee appointed to provide a more suitable place 
 for the Convention to sit in, made report, 17 that the meeting- 
 house in Long Lane, in Boston, was prepared for that purpose, 
 whereupon, 
 
 Voted, That when the Convention adjourn they will adjourn 
 to that place. 
 
 Voted, That the said committee return the thanks of the 
 Convention to the said proprietors, for their offer of the use of 
 the said meeting-house. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 17 [The Committee made the following report. 
 
 " The Committee appointed to ' provide a more convenient place for the sit- 
 ting of the Convention,' have attended to that service, and ask leave to 
 report : — 
 
 That they have examined the meeting-house in Long Lane, wherein the 
 Rev. Mr. Belknap officiates, and are unanimously of opinion that the members 
 of the Convention can all be commodiously disposed so as to hear and be 
 heard, by having the pews on the ground floor assigned for that purpose. 
 
 That the galleries will well accommodate the spectators. 
 
 That gentlemen have offered to put up, at their own expense, a stove, tem- 
 porary stairs, a temporary porch, and to make other dispositions for the accom- 
 modating of the Convention. 
 
 And that the "Committee of the proprietors of said meeting-house have 
 offered the use of the same during the sitting of the Convention. 
 
 That the Committee of the Convention have given directions for the neces- 
 sary preparations to be made for their reception. 
 
 Per order: Tristram Daltox. 
 
 January 1G, 1788." 
 
 " The meeting-house in Long Lane," to which the Convention adjourned on 
 the recommendation of the Committee, is the building still standing, where, 
 since Dr. Jeremy Belknap's time, the pulpit has been filled Ify Dr. John 8. 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 61 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Voted, That the pulpit be assigned for the gentlemen of the 
 clergy who may be in town, and that the Monitors provide seats 
 for such as cannot be accommodated there. 
 
 Voted, That the stairs under the galleries be assigned for the 
 printers. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Friday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Friday, January 18, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 
 Popkin, the celebrated Dr. William E. Charming, and his colleague, Dr. Ezra 
 S. Gannett, who is the present minister. '> Long Lane " took its present name 
 of Federal Street, from the circumstance of the meeting of the Convention 
 here. In the Massachusetts Centinel, of February 13, 1788, the place, time and 
 authority of this change are given. It appears to have taken place during the 
 progress of the " grand procession " which was called forth in honor of the 
 ratification of the Federal Constitution by the Convention : — 
 
 " The following is the form of the ordinance by which the People, on Friday 
 last, altered the name of the avenue called Long Lane, to Federal Street ; 
 and which we have obtained from the records, to gratify the curious. It is 
 verbatim as read by the Chairman of the Committee that day, in the proces- 
 sion : — 
 
 To all persons unto whom these Presents shall come, 
 
 Greeting. 
 
 BE IT KNOWN— That upon this eighth day of the month of February, 
 in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred eighty-eight, 
 and in the twelfth year of the Independence of the United States of America, 
 WE, THE PEOPLE, in GRAND PROCESSION moving, have ordained, 
 resolved and declared, and by these presents, DO ordain, resolve and declare, 
 THAT for, and in consideration, that the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
 
62 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 held at Philadelphia, and after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Upon an invitation from the Hon. Samuel Adams, Esq., to 
 the delegates in convention, to attend the funeral of his son, 
 to-morrow afternoon, precisely at four o'clock, 
 
 Voted, That the Convention will adjourn to-morrow to attend 
 the funeral accordingly. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and after debate, 
 
 Avas by the CONVENTION of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
 ASSENTED to, RATIFIED, fully CONFIRMED and ADOPTED in the 
 Me e ting-House, situated and being in the avenue leading from Milk Street to 
 Purchase Street, and commonly called LONG LANE, the said avenue, BE, 
 and it hereby IS, denominated, appellated and christened 
 FEDERAL STREET. 
 And we, the PEOPLE aforesaid, do enjoin that all our loving fathers, friends 
 and fellow citizens, observe, duly adhere, and attend to, this our ordinance, 
 resolution or declaration, as they wish to promote justice, preserve our friend- 
 ship, insure domestic tranquillity, and provide for the diffusion of federal 
 sentiments. 
 
 GIVEN under our auspices, this eighth day of February, Anno Domini one 
 thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, of American sovereignty the twelfth, 
 and the FIRST YEAR of OUR real, political, federal existence. 
 
 THE PEOPLE. 
 God speed the Constitution ! " 
 
 The following ditty, originating at the time of the change of the name of 
 the street, is still remembered : — 
 
 " Convention did in State House meet— 
 And, when it would not hold them, 
 They all went down to Federal Street, 
 And there the truth was told them." 
 
 It must be remembered that the State House in 1 788, which was insufficient 
 for the accommodation of an assembly of three hundred delegates, was not 
 the present State House on Beacon Hill, with its spacious Representatives' 
 Chamber, which has accommodated a House of seven hundred — but the " Old 
 
 State House," the ancient building still standing in the centre of State Street.] 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 63 
 
 Voted, That the following question be put to the Hon. E. 
 Gerry, Esq., viz. : u Why, in the last requisition of Congress, 
 the portion required of this State was thirteen times as much 
 as of Georgia, and yet we have but eight representatives in the 
 general government, and Georgia has three?" and that he be 
 requested to put his answer in writing. 
 
 The further consideration of the said Constitution was post- 
 poned to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Saturday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Saturday, January 19, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Hon. E. Gerry, Esq., answered the question proposed to 
 him yesterday, as follows, viz. : — 
 
 Saturday Morning-, 19th January. 
 Sir : — I have no documents in Boston, and am uncertain 
 whether I have any at home, to assist me in answering the 
 question, " Why, in the last requisition of Congress, the pof- 
 tion required of this State was thirteen times as much as of 
 Georgia, and yet we have but eight representatives in the gen- 
 eral government, and Georgia has three ?" but if my memory 
 serves me, the reason assigned by the committee who made the 
 apportionment for giving such a number to Georgia, was, that 
 that State had of late greatly increased its numbers by migra- 
 tion, and if not then, would soon be entitled to the proportion 
 assigned her. 1 think it was also said, that the apportion- 
 ment was made, not by any fixed principle, but by a compro- 
 mise. These reasons not being satisfactory, a motion was made 
 on the part of Massachusetts, for increasing her number of 
 representatives, but it did not take effect. 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, 
 
 With the highest respect, 
 
 Your most obedient, and 
 
 Very humble servant, 
 
 E. Gerry. 
 Hon. Mr. Cushing, Vice-President of the Convention. 
 
64 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate, a motion was made and 
 seconded that the Hon. E. Gerry, Esq., be requested to give what 
 information he may have in his mind respecting the Senate. 
 
 A motion was then made and seconded, that the Convention 
 adjourn, and on the question for ^journment, it was deter- 
 mined in the affirmative. 
 
 Adjourned to Monday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Monday, January 21, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Resolved, as follows, viz. : — Whereas, there is a publication 
 in the Boston Gazette and the Country Journal, of this day, as 
 follows, viz. : — 
 
 "Bribery and Corruption!!! The most diabolical plan 
 is on foot to corrupt the members of the Convention who 
 oppose the adoption of the new Constitution. Large sums 
 ■ of money have been brought from a neighboring State for that 
 purpose, contributed by the wealthy ; if so, is it not probable 
 there may be collections for the same accursed purpose nearer 
 home ? Ckntinel." 
 
 Resolved, That this Convention will take measures for inquir- 
 ing into the subject of the said publication, and for ascertaining 
 the truth or falsehood of the suggestion therein contained. 
 
 Ordered, That the Messenger be directed to request the 
 printers of the said Gazette to appear before this Convention 
 forthwith, to give information respecting the said publication. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 65 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Messenger informed the Convention that he had acquaint- 
 ed the printers of the Boston Gazette, &c, of the Order of this 
 morning, respecting them, and was answered that one of them 
 would attend the Convention this afternoon. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Consti- 
 tution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 A letter from Benjamin Edes and Son, printers of the Boston 
 Gazette, &c, relative to the publication entered this morning. 
 Read, and committed to Mr. Parsons, Mr. Nasson, Mr. Gorham, 
 Mr. Wedgery,»Mr. Porter, Mr. Gore, and Mr. Thomas, of Ply- 
 mouth. 
 
 Adjourned to Tuesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Tuesday, January 22, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate, postponed the further 
 consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 A letter from the Hon. E. Gerry, Esq., referred to the after- 
 noon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 A letter 18 from the Hon. E. Gerry, Esq., with a state of facts* 
 
 18 [The communication of Mr. Gerry, which we copy in this note, will be 
 read with interest. 
 
 "Cambridge, 21st January, 1788. 
 Sir : — It is with great reluctance that I trespass a moment on the time of 
 the honorable Convention, employed as it is, on a subject of the highest im- 
 9 
 
66 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 relative to the construction of the Federal Senate. Read, and 
 after debate, 
 
 Voted, That the further consideration of the said letter sub- 
 side. 
 
 portance to this country, but I am under the necessity of stating some facts, 
 and their consequences, as they relate to myself. 
 
 On the 14th of this month, the Convention passed a vote, requesting me 
 * to take a seat in the house, to answer any question of fact, from time to 
 time, that the Convention may want to ask, respecting the passing of the Con- 
 stitution.' This request was unexpected, and I complied with it, contrary to 
 my inclination, not doubting in the least, that I should be treated with deli- 
 cacy and candor. 
 
 Every gentleman who will reflect but a moment, must be sensible that my 
 situation on the floor of the Convention was not eligible : that it was a humil- 
 iating condition, to which nothing could have produced my submission, but the 
 respect I entertained for the honorable Convention, and the desire I had of 
 complying with their wishes. 
 
 After having, on Saturday morning, stated an answer to the question pro- 
 posed the preceding evening, I perceived that your honorable body were con- 
 sidering a paragraph which respected an equal representation of the States in 
 the Senate, and one of my honorable colleagues observed, that this was agreed 
 to by a committee consisting of a member from each State, and that I was 
 one of the number. This was a partial narrative of facts, which I conceived 
 placed my conduct in an unfavorable point of light, probably without any such 
 intention on the part of my colleague. 
 
 I was thus reduced to the disagreeable alternative of addressing a letter to 
 your honor, for correcting this error, or of sustaining the injuries resulting 
 from its unfavorable impressions : not in the least suspecting, that when I had 
 committed myself to the Convention without the right of speaking in my own 
 defence, any gentleman would take an undue advantage from being a member 
 of the house, to continue the misrepresentation, by suppressing every attempt 
 on my part to state the facts. I accordingly informed your honor, that I was 
 preparing a letter to throw light on the subject, and at my request you was so 
 obliging as to make this communication to the house. My sole object was, to 
 state the matter as it respected my conduct, but I soon perceived that it was 
 misunderstood by the honorable Judge Dana, who rose with an appearance of 
 party virulence which I did not expect, and followed one misrepresentation 
 with another, by impressing the house with the idea that I was entering into 
 their debates. I requested leave repeatedly to explain the matter, but he be- 
 came more vehement, and I was subject to strictures from several parts of the 
 house, till it adjourned, without being even permitted to declare that I dis- 
 dained such an intention, and did not merit such unworthy treatment. 
 
 I confess to you, Sir, that the indelicacy and disingenuity of this procedure, 
 distressed my feelings beyond any thing I had ever before experienced : for, 
 had every member of the honorable house requested me by a vote to partake 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 67 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Wednesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 in their debates, I should have considered it as improper and unconstitutional, 
 and from principles of decency and propriety, should have declined their 
 request : and Judge Dana has been too long in public life, with me, not to 
 know that it has never been my practice to attain objects by improper means. 
 Indeed, Sir, so remote were my wishes from entering into your debates, that 
 after having passed a judgment on the Constitution, in the Federal Convention, 
 I would not have taken a seat in the State Convention, with the unanimous 
 suffrages of the citizens of Massachusetts, because, in a matter of such impor- 
 tant consequence, it was my wish that the final decision should be made by 
 themselves. This was a fact early known to my particular friends, and I do 
 not mention it to suggest an impropriety in accepting a seat in both conven- 
 tions, but merely to show the injustice done me on this occasion. 
 
 If Judge Dana was apprehensive that the facts which I should state would 
 eventually prejudice the cause he so ardently advocated, still, I conceive, he 
 could not be justified in precluding those facts which were necessary to do me 
 justice ; for bad indeed must be that cause which will not bear the light of truth. 
 
 Judge Dana took sanctuary under the rules of the house, but I never yet 
 heard of a rule that was intended to prevent an injured person from addressing 
 .a letter to the body who should redress his wrongs, or from giving information 
 of such an intention : and I conceive, Sir, that neither the honorable Conven- 
 tion, or any republican body on earth, who had requested an individual to attend 
 them for the purpose of giving information, would have had any objection to 
 granting him leave to speak, much less to address to them a letter, merely for 
 the purpose of setting a matter right, which, in the progress of debates, had, 
 by an erroneous statement, tended to his injur}-. 
 
 It is true, Sir, I differ in opinion from a number of respectable members of 
 your honorable house, on the subject of the proposed Constitution, but, I flat- 
 tered myself that not a member could be found so deficient in liberality as to 
 bear animosity towards me on this account. The strong impressions which I 
 felt, and which I still feel, that this system, without amendment, will destroy 
 the liberties of America, inferred on me an indispensable obligation to give it 
 my negative : and having done this, I feel the approbation of my own mind, 
 which is infinitely preferable to universal applauses without it If, neverthe- 
 less, my conduct in this instance has given offence ; if there is at this time so 
 little freedom in America, as that a person in discharging a most important 
 public trust, cannot conduct according to the obligations of honor and dictates 
 of his conscience, it appears to me of little consequence what form of govern- 
 ment we adopt, for we are not far removed from a state of slavery. 
 
 I shall only add, Sir, that I have subjoined a state of facts, founded on doc- 
 
68 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Wednesday, January 23, 1788. 
 
 Met according^ to adjournment. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that his Honor the Lieu- 
 tenant-Governor, the members of the honorable Council, the 
 
 nments relative to my consent that the lesser States should have an equal 
 representation in the Senate — that I still entertain the highest respect for the 
 honorable Convention, who, I am sure, will never countenance unfair pro- 
 ceedings — but that I cannot again place myself in a situation where I must 
 hear my conduct misrepresented without the privilege of requesting leave of 
 your honorable body to establish facts and promote justice. 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, 
 
 With the highest respect for the 
 
 Honorable Convention and yourself, 
 
 Your most obedient and very humble servant, 
 
 E. Gerry. 
 His Honor Judge Cushing, 
 
 Vice-President of the Convention of Massachusetts. 
 
 A STATE OF FACTS, REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING LETTER. 
 
 The business of the Federal Convention having been opened by Governor 
 Randolph, of Virginia, and the outlines of a plan of government having been 
 proposed by him, they were referred to a Committee of the whole house, and 
 4 after several weeks' debate, the committee reported general principles for 
 forming a Constitution, amongst which were the following : — 
 
 ' 7th. That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the National Legis- 
 lature ' (by which was intended the House of Representatives) ' ought not to be 
 according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, but accord- 
 ing to some equitable ratio of representation, viz. : in proportion to the whole 
 number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and 
 condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three- 
 fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, 
 except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State. 
 
 ' 8th. That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the National 
 Legislature ' (meaning the Senate) ' ought to be according to the rule estab- 
 lished for the first.' 
 
 In the Committee of the Whole, the eighth article above recited, for which 
 I voted, was carried, if my memory serves me, by six States against five ; and 
 when under consideration of the Convention, it produced a ferment, and a 
 separate meeting, as I was informed, of most of the delegates of those five 
 States, the result of which was, a firm determination on their part not to relin- 
 quish the right of an equal representation in the Senate, confirmed, as it was, 
 to those States, by the Articles of Confederation. The matter at length be- 
 came so serious as to threaten a dissolution of the Convention, and a Commit- 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 69 
 
 Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of 
 the Commonwealth, be admitted to seats on the floor of the 
 house, to hear the debates. 
 
 A motion was then made and seconded, that the considera- 
 
 tee, consisting of a member from each State, was appointed, to meet (if possible) 
 on the ground of accommodation. The members from the three large States of 
 Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, were Mr. Mason, Doctor Franklin 
 and myself, and after debating the subject several days, during which time the 
 Convention adjourned, the Committee agreed to the following Report : — 
 
 ' That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention, on 
 condition that both shall be generally adopted : — 
 
 ' First. That in the first branch of the Legislature, each of the States now 
 in the Union be allowed one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of 
 the description reported in the seventh resolution of the Committee of the 
 whole House — that each State not containing that number shall be allowed 
 one member — that all writs for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing 
 the salaries of the officers of government of the United States, shall originate 
 in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended bv^ 
 the second branch — and that no money shall be drawn from the treasury of 
 the United States, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the 
 first branch. 
 
 ' Secondly. That in the second branch of the Legislature each State shall 
 
 have an equal vote.' 
 
 i 
 
 The number of forty thousand inhabitants to every member in the House of 
 Representatives, was not a subject of much debate, or an object insisted on, as 
 some of the Committee were opposed to it. Accordingly, on the 10th of July, 
 a motion was made ' to double the number of representatives, being sixty-five,' 
 and it passed in the negative. 
 
 The admission, however, of the smaller States to an equal representation in 
 the Senate, never would have been agreed to by the Committee, or by myself, 
 as a member of it, without the provision ' that all bills for raising or appro- 
 priating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of government,' 
 should originate in the House of Representatives, and ' not be altered or 
 amended ' by the Senate, ' and that no money should be drawn from the trea- 
 sury ' ' but in pursuance of such appropriations.' 
 
 This provision was agreed to by the Convention, at the same time and by 
 the same vote, as that which allows to each State an equal voice in the Senate, 
 and was afterwards referred to the Committee of Detail, and reported by them 
 as part of the Constitution, as will appear by documents in my possession. 
 Nevertheless, the smaller States having attained their object of an equal voice 
 in the Senate, a new provision, now in the Constitution, was substituted, where- 
 by the Senate have a right to propose amendments to revenue bills, and the 
 provision reported by the Committee was effectually destroyed. 
 
 It was conceived by the Committee to be highly unreasonable and unjust 
 
70 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 tion of the said motion subside, and the question for subsiding 
 being put, passed in the affirmative. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 
 that a small State, which would contribute but one sixty-fifth part of any tax, 
 should, nevertheless, have an equal right with a large State, which would con- 
 tribute eight or ten sixty-fifths of the same tax, to take money from the pock- 
 ets of the latter, more especially as it was intended that the powers of the new 
 legislature should extend to internal taxation. It was likewise conceived, that 
 the right of expending should be in proportion to the ability of raising money 
 — that the larger States would not have the least security for their property if 
 they had not the due command of their own purses — that they would not have 
 such command, if the lesser States in either branch had an equal right with 
 the larger to originate, or even to alter, money bills — that if the Senate should 
 have the power of proposing amendments, they may propose that a bill, origi- 
 nated by the House, to raise one thousand, should be increased to one hundred 
 thousand pounds — that although the House may negative amendments proposed 
 by the Senate, yet the giving them power to propose amendments, would ena- 
 ble them to increase the grants of the House, because the Senate (as well as 
 the House) would have a right to adhere to their votes, and would oblige the 
 House to consent to such an increase, on the principle of accommodation — that 
 the lesser States would thus have nearly as much command of the property of 
 the greater, as they themselves — that even if the representation in the Senate 
 had been according to numbers, in each State, money bills should not be origi- 
 nated or altered by that branch, because, by their appointments, the members 
 would be farther removed from the people, would have a greater and more 
 independent property in their offices, would be more extravagant, and not 
 being so easily removed, would be ever in favor of higher salaries than mem- 
 bers of the House — that it was not reasonable to suppose the aristocratical branch 
 would be as saving of the public money as the democratical branch : — but 
 that, on the other hand, should the Senate have only the power of concurrence 
 or non-concurrence of such bills, they would pass them, although the grants 
 should not equal their wishes, whilst, with the power of amendment, they would 
 never be satisfied with the grants of the House — that the Commons of Great 
 Britain had ever strenuously and successfully contended for this important 
 right, which the Lords had often, but in vain, endeavored to exercise — that 
 the preservation of this right, the right of holding the purse-strings, was essen- 
 tial to the preservation of liberty — and that to this right, perhaps, was princi- 
 pally owing the liberty that still remains in Great Britain. 
 
 These are the facts and reasons whereon was grounded the admission of the 
 smaller States to an equal representation in the Senate, and it must appear 
 that there is an essential difference between an unqualified admission of them 
 to an equal representation in the Senate, and admitting them from necessity, 
 on the express condition provided in the recited report of the Committee ; and 
 it must also appear, that had that provision been preserved in the Constitution, 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OP CONVENTION. x 71 
 
 held at Philadelphia, and, having debated thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 and the Senate precluded from a right to alter or amend money or revenue 
 bills, agreeably to the said report, the lesser States would not have that undue 
 command of the property of the larger States which they are now to have by 
 the Constitution, and that I never consented to an equal representation of the 
 States in the Senate, as it now stands, in the new system." 
 
 In the Massachusetts Centinel of February 2, 1788, we find the following 
 spirited account of the excitement produced in the Convention by the 
 announcement of Mr. Gerry, that he was preparing a letter for the Conven- 
 tion : — 
 
 " A SHORT HISTORY OF A RECENT FREAK. 
 
 Mr. Russell : You seem to apologize for the publication of the very extra- 
 ordinary letter of the Hon. Mr. Gerry, to the Vice-President of the State 
 Convention, occasioned by a debate upon a question of mere order, in that 
 body, by saying, ' The public being desirous to know the result of the conver- 
 sation in Convention, on Saturday last, on the propriety of Mr. Gerry being 
 permitted to give any other information than of facts particularly asked for, 
 and which it appears has given Mr. Gerry offence, we lay before our readers a 
 copy of that gentleman's letter, as read yesterday afternoon.' 
 
 If, Sir, the desire of the public is only to be informed of the propriety or 
 impropriety of that honorable gentleman's giving any other information than 
 of facts ' particularly asked after,' I think that gentleman has said enough in 
 his letter to convince them of the impropriety of his attempting to do more. 
 For, says he, ' on the 14th of this month, the Convention passed a vote, re- 
 questing me ' ' to take a seat in the house, to answer any question of fact, from 
 time to time, that the Convention may want to ask, respecting the passing the ' 
 Constitution.' Now, Sir, let the public judge (for to them has he appealed 
 from the judgment of the Convention) whether the honorable gentleman could 
 with propriety give any other information than of facts, particularly asked 
 after, by some member of the Convention, or even then, before the Convention 
 itself had approved of the inquiry, or, in the language of their vote, had sig- 
 nified their ' want ' of such an information from him. He, indeed, seems dis- 
 posed not only to give information, in point of fact, before it is asked after, but 
 also to obtrude upon the Convention his opinion respecting the Constitution, 
 provided such opinion has a tendency to obstruct the acceptance of it. In 
 proof of this, we find that honorable gentleman declaring in this very letter, 
 thus : ' The strong impressions which I felt, and which I still feel, that this sys- 
 tem, without amendments, will destroy the liberties of America, inferred on 
 me an indispensible obligation to give it my negative.' Had the honorable 
 gentleman been requested to give his opinion of the consequences of accept- 
 ing the Constitution without amendments ? If not, was it not indecent, not to 
 
72 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the vote for consider- 
 ing the new Constitution by paragraphs, be reconsidered, and 
 
 say impertinent, in him to do it ? Does that honorable gentleman think the 
 Convention deficient in point of sagacity, to discern the probable effects and 
 consequences of the system submitted to their consideration, and that they need 
 a portion of his wisdom, and public virtue, to point them out, and to prevent 
 their sacrificing the liberties of America ? Was he accountable to that honor- 
 able body for having given his negative to the system ? On what other suppo- 
 sition, than that above-mentioned, can we then account for his very extraor- 
 dinary conduct ? But slightly to pass over his officious letter to the legislature 
 of this State, endeavoring to vindicate himself, before he had been called upon 
 by them, for giving his negative to the proposed system of government, I 
 would state a few facts, necessary for the information of the public, to enable 
 them to make up a right judgment in the present case. 
 
 The Convention, as Mr. E. Gerry says, were considering that part of the 
 Constitution which relates to the equal representation of the States in the 
 Senate, when Mr. Strong, one of his honorable colleagues in tne Continental 
 Convention, rose, and informed the house, that this was agreed to by a Com- 
 mittee consisting of a member from each State, and that Mr. Gerry was one 
 of the number. This information, however harmless in itself, roused the very 
 irritable passions of Mr. E. Gerry ; he changed his seat instantly to the table 
 before the President, pulled forth his budget of peccadilloes, displayed them in 
 order before him, took pen, ink and paper, and, as he now informs us, set about 
 writing ' a letter to the President for correcting this error ' of his honorable 
 colleague. Rkum teneatis amici? But stop, what may be sport to us, might 
 . be death to hjm — I mean political death. What, shall it be understood in that 
 honorable body, that Mr. E. Gerry had reported in favor of an equal repre- 
 sentation of the States in the Senate ? For this is the utmost extent of the 
 information of his honorable colleague. Yet is he greatly alarmed at it, and 
 determines, in a rage, to wipe away ' the injuries resulting from its unfavora- 
 ble impressions.' He writes, then strikes out, writes on, strikes out again, until 
 at last, no longer able to keep his seat, (where he was left to go on without 
 molestation from any mortal,) he rises in the midst of the debates on that par- 
 agraph, to use his own words, ' to inform the President that he was preparing 
 a letter ' (for the gentleman has chosen that mode of opposition to the federal 
 government) • to throw light on the subject,' and request him to make this 
 communication to the house. He did so. But what was to be done ? Were 
 all the debates to be suspended until Mr. E. Gerry had finished his very im- 
 portant letter to the President upon the subject ? Were the honorable Con- 
 vention so benighted, in the opinion of Mr. E. Gerry, that it was not safe to 
 leave them to go on in their debates, until he should have an opportunity ' to 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 73 
 
 that the Convention take the whole Constitution into consider- 
 ation and mature deliberation. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the consideration of 
 the said motion be referred to to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock, 
 and the question of reference being put, passed in the negative. 
 
 throw light * in their path ? Mr. E. Gerry well knew that no question was to 
 be taken upon separate paragraphs, had he been capable of a moment's reflec- 
 tion ; therefore, he must have seen that by waiting until the irritation of his 
 spirits had subsided, even to the next week, he would not have lost an oppor- 
 tunity to have done his utmost to rescue ' the liberties of America from destruc- 
 tion,' of which he seems to conceive himself to be the great champion. But 
 so it was, friend Russell, Mr. E. Gerry could not rest quiet a moment under 
 such atrocious imputations as his honorable colleague had cast upon him. 
 
 Thus matters stood, when the honorable gentleman with whose name and 
 character Mr. E. Gerry has taken such indecent liberties, and who had but 
 just before come into the house, rose, and asked the President, whether there 
 was any question in writing laid on the table for that gentleman to answer ; 
 being told that there was not, he added, that it seemed to be the sense of the 
 house that the question should be reduced to writing, and the answer also. 
 This idea was questioned by some, and a debate ensued. The same gentleman 
 arose again, and said, he did not wish to exclude light from the house by his 
 inquiry, but that it ought to come in an orderly manner : the reason why he 
 supposed it to be the sense of the house, that both question and answer should 
 be in writing, was, that the day before, one, and the first, too, was proposed to 
 that gentleman verbally ; it was so done, and the answer also. Further, that 
 the honorable gentleman had applied to him the evening before, and proposed 
 that every question to be asked him, should be reduced to writing and laid on 
 the table, that he might consider them deliberately, and give his answer in 
 writing also ; that he then told the gentleman he approved of his proposal, as 
 well for the sake of preventing unnecessary discussion in the house, as a mis- 
 representation to his disadvantage. That for these reasons, he had been 
 induced to make the inquiry. A motion was then made by Mr. Wedgery, that 
 the house should depart from their vote, and leave the honorable gentleman 
 (Mr. Gerry) at full liberty to give his reasons at large, respecting the Consti- 
 tution, without waiting for any question whatever to be put to him. This 
 changed the nature of the debate, and brought up a gentleman from Newbury 
 Port, who said to this effect : If this house should signify their wishes to have 
 the honorable gentleman admitted to enter fully into their debates, as a mem- 
 ber of it, he was so far from wishing to exclude any light from this house, that 
 he would not oppose it, but would acquiesce in their decision, however humil- 
 iating and mortifying it might be to him. Hereupon the subject of debate was 
 again changed, by a motion from another part of the house, by Gen. Thomp- 
 son, that the honorable gentleman should be admitted into the debates, as a 
 member of it. This made the debate still more serious, when the honorable 
 10 
 
74 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the Convention adjourn 
 till to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock, and the question of adjourn- 
 ment being put, passed in the negative. The first motion was 
 then withdrawn by the leave of the Convention. 
 Adjourned to Thursday morning, 9 o'clock. 
 
 member from Dracut, arose, and said, that he considered this a violation of the 
 right of election of the inhabitants of Cambridge, (the residence of the letter- 
 writer,) who had not thought fit to send him as their delegate — they certainly 
 well knew, he said, the gentleman's sentiments upon the subject, and they had 
 chosen others to represent them — this motion would make him a member of 
 the house, to every purpose but that of voting. He said he was therefore 
 against it. The gentleman who is the principal subject of Mr. E. Gerry's let- 
 ter, said : To admit the honorable gentlemen, agreeably to this motion, would 
 be going further under the idea of obtaining light, than this house had a right 
 to go. To-day, one gentleman would wish to introduce his friend in support of 
 his own sentiments, and to-morrow, a member of opposite sentiments would 
 expect the same indulgence, with the same view, for his friend ; and thus, in- 
 stead of our being the representatives of the people, we should convert our- 
 selves, in effect, into electors of their representatives. The motion was then 
 called for in writing. Mr. Wedgery reduced it into writing, to the following 
 effect : ' That the honorable gentleman should have liberty to give any infor- 
 mation to the house he should have to communicate, respecting the passing of 
 the Constitution,' or, (for I am not certain which,) ' respecting the subject in 
 debate.' The Hon. Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln, then observed, the motion was 
 ambiguous — the word information, might mean either information in matters of 
 fact, or information resulting from reasoning upon facts. He wished, there- 
 fore, to be informed which was the gentleman's meaning. Mr. Wedgery cried 
 out, ' both.' The debates were then continued on this explanation, until an 
 adjournment was called for, which took place, without any decision of the 
 house upon the foregoing matters. 
 
 Thus have I gone through a state of facts relative to the transaction 
 alluded to in Mr. E. Gerry's letter, and which is all the foundation he 
 could have had in support of the very bitter and indelicate assertions or 
 charges against the Hon. Judge Dana. Nothing more personal, that I 
 recollect, fell from that gentleman, than is mentioned. The only cause of 
 offence against him, seems to be, that his first inquiry led on to all the 
 debates which ensued, for which he cannot justly be made responsible. His 
 motion, or inquiry, was as certainly in order, as Mr. E. Gerry's conduct was 
 out of order and improper. He must therefore thank himself for all the con- 
 sequences of it. If his ' situation was not eligible,' or his ' condition was 
 humiliating,' he had consented to be placed there ; and had he kept up to the 
 terms of his invitation, nothing of the sort which did happen, could have hap- 
 pened, to mortify his feelings. 
 
 The gentleman conceives that he was denied ' leave to speak' and even ' to 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 75 
 
 Thursday, January 24, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the vote for consider- 
 ing the new Constitution by paragraphs, be reconsidered, and 
 that the Convention take the whole Constitution into consider- 
 ation and mature deliberation, and the question being put, 
 passed in the negative. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 address a letter merely for the purpose of setting a matter right, which, in the 
 progress of debates, had, by an erroneous statement, tended to his injury.' 
 Was this the case ? How easy would it have been for him to have desired 
 leave to set his honorable colleague right in point of fact, and to have done it 
 instantaneously. Surely no member would have opposed so reasonable a re- 
 quest. But, instead of this, the gentleman rose only to request the President 
 to inform the house ' he was preparing a letter to throw light on the subject ' 
 generally ; and not with any design to clear himself from any imputations 
 which he had conceived affected his character. If, therefore, ' he was misun- 
 derstood by the Hon. Judge Dana,' as he says ' he soon perceived he was,' 
 ought not Mr. Gerry to have reflected that he himself had led that gentleman 
 into the error (if any there was) of suggesting ' that he was entering into their 
 debates.' In short, it is questionable, in any view of this matter, whether Mr. 
 E. *Gerry can justify the indecent, illiberal treatment of that gentleman, he has 
 so acrimoniously dealt out in his letter ; apparently written before he had given 
 time for his passions to subside, and his reason to dictate his pen. Besides, if 
 his charges were in fact true, does it not follow that the honorable Convention 
 themselves must bear their portion of them, for permitting one of their mem- 
 bers to persist (according to his representation) in a course of conduct disor- 
 derly in the extreme. Certainly, every one will suppose, had they viewed it 
 in that light, they would soon have reminded that gentleman of his duty, and 
 set him down in his turn. But I believe no member of the house thought 
 Judge Dana's conduct in the least disorderly or reprehensible. If it had been, 
 Mr. Gerry not being destitute of friends in that house, some of them would 
 have been ready enough to have called Judge Dana to order, and have given 
 Mr. Gerry complete protection from the abuse of any man. 
 
 A Spectator. 
 Boston, Jan. 29, 1788."] 
 
76 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Friday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Friday, January 25, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Saturday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Saturday, January 26, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to Monday morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Monday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 77 
 
 Monday, January 28, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government, reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed the 
 further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate, postponed the further 
 consideration thereof to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Tuesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Tuesday, January 29, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration .of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate thereon, postponed 
 the further consideration of the same to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Wednesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
78 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Wednesday, January 30, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate, postponed the further 
 consideration of the same to the afternoon. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, after debate, postponed the further 
 consideration thereof to the morning. 
 
 Adjourned to Thursday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Thursday, January 31, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the Con- 
 stitution or Frame of Government reported by the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, and, having debated upon all the para- 
 graphs thereof, a motion was made and seconded, that this Con- 
 vention assent to and ratify the Constitution agreed upon by 
 the Convention of Delegates from the United States, at Phil- 
 adelphia, on the 17th day of September, 1787, and, after debate 
 on the said motion, 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 Ordered, That the Committee on the Pay Roll make the same 
 up including Tuesday next. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 79 
 
 that this Convention do assent to and ratify the Constitution 
 agreed upon by the Convention of Delegates from the United 
 States, at Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September, 1787. 
 
 The following was proposed to the Convention by his Excel- 
 lency the President, viz. : — 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Common- 
 wealth of Massachusetts, 1788 : — 
 
 The Convention having impartially discussed and fully con- 
 sidered the Constitution for the United States of America, 
 reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the 
 United States of America, and submitted to us by a Resolution 
 of the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the 
 twenty-fifth day of October last past ; and acknowledging, with 
 grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Uni- 
 verse, in affording the people of the United States, in the course 
 of his providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, 
 without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and sol- 
 emn compact with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a 
 new constitution, in order to form a more perfect union, estab- 
 lish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the com- 
 mon defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the bles- 
 sings of liberty to themselves and their posterity ; do, in the 
 name, and in behalf of the people of the Commonwealth of 
 Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitution for 
 the United States of America. 
 
 And as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain 
 amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would 
 remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the 
 good people of this Commonwealth, and more effectually guard 
 against an undue administration of the federal government ; 
 the Convention do therefore recommend that the following 
 alterations and provisions be introduced into the said Constitu- 
 tion : — 
 
 First. That it be explicitly declared that all powers not 
 expressly delegated to Congress, are reserved to the several 
 States, to be by them exercised. 
 
80 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Secondly. That there shall be one representative to every 
 thirty thousand persons, until the whole number of representa- 
 tive's amount to . 
 
 Thirdly. That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in 
 them by the fourth section of the first article, but in cases where 
 a State shall neglect or refuse to make adequate provision for 
 an equal representation of the people, agreeably to this Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 Fourthly. That Congress do not lay direct taxes, but when 
 the moneys arising from the impost and excise are insufficient 
 for the public exigencies. 
 
 Fifthly. That Congress erect no company of merchants with 
 exclusive advantages of commerce. 
 
 Sixthly. That no person shall be tried for any crime, by 
 which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, 
 until he be first indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases 
 as may arise in the government and regulation of the land and 
 naval forces. 
 
 Seventhly. The Supreme Judicial Federal Court shall have 
 no jurisdiction of causes between citizens of different States, 
 
 unless the matter in dispute be of the value of dollars, 
 
 at the least. 
 
 Eighthly. In civil actions between citizens of different States, 
 every issue of fact arising in actions at common law, shall be 
 tried by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, request it. 
 
 Ninthly. That the words, " without the consent of the Con- 
 gress," in the last paragraph of the ninth section of the first 
 article, be stricken out. 
 
 And the Convention do, in the name and in behalf of the 
 people of this Commonwealth, enjoin it upon their Representa- 
 tives in Congress, at all times, until the alterations and provis- 
 ions aforesaid have been considered, agreeably to the fifth article 
 of the said Constitution, to exert all their influence, and use 
 all reasonable and legal methods to obtain a ratification of the 
 said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided 
 in the said article. 
 
 And that the United States, in Congress assembled, may have 
 due notice of the assent and ratification of the said Constitu- 
 tion, by this Convention, it is 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 81 
 
 Resolved, That the assent and ratification aforesaid be 
 engrossed on parchment, together with the recommendation and 
 injunction aforesaid, and with this Resolution, and that his 
 Excellency John Hancock, Esquire, President, and the Honor- 
 able William Cushing, Esquire, Vice-President of this Conven- 
 tion, transmit the same, countersigned by the Secretary of the 
 Convention, under their hands and seals, to the United States, 
 in Congress assembled. 
 
 After debate, 
 
 Adjourned to Friday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Friday, February 1, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion 
 that this Convention do assent to and ratify the Constitution 
 agreed upon by the Convention of Delegates from the United 
 States, at Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September, 1787, 
 and of the propositions made by his Excellency the President 
 yesterday. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Voted, That the decision with respect to the final adoption 
 or rejection of the proposed Federal Constitution be not taken 
 before Tuesday next. 
 
 Mr. Varnum had leave of absence till Tuesday next. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion 
 that this Convention assent to and ratify the Constitution 
 agreed upon by the Convention of Delegates from the United 
 States, at Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September, 1787, 
 and of the propositions made by his Excellency the President, 
 yesterday. 
 
 Adjourned to Saturday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 11 
 
82 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Saturday, February 2, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion 
 that this Convention do assent to and ratify the Constitution 
 agreed upon by the Convention of Delegates from the United 
 States, at Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September, 1787, 
 and of the propositions made by his Excellency the President, 
 the 31st ultimo. After debate, 
 
 Voted, That a Committee, consisting of members from each 
 county, be appointed to take into consideration the subject of 
 the propositions of his Excellency the President, of the 31st 
 ultimo, at large, and report. 
 
 The following gentlemen were then appointed on the said 
 committee, viz. : — 
 
 Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, Mr. Southworth, Mr. Parsons, Hon. 
 Mr. Hutchinson, Hon. Mr. Dana, Mr. Winn, Hon. Mr. Strong, 
 Mr. Bodman, Hon. Mr. Turner, Mr. Thomas, of Plymouth, 
 Dr. Smith, Mr. Bourn, Hon. Mr. Spooner, Mr. Bishop, Rev. 
 Dr. Hemmenway, Mr. Barrell, Mr. Mayhew, Hon. Mr. Taylor, 
 Hon. Mr. Sprague, Mr. Fox, Mr. Longfellow, Mr. Sewall, Mr. 
 Sylvester, Mr. Lusk, Hon. Mr. Sedgwick. 
 
 Adjourned to Monday next. 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Monday, February 4, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee appointed on the subject of the propositions 
 of his Excellency the President, on Saturday last, reported as 
 follows, viz. : — 
 
 The Committee appointed by the Convention to take into 
 consideration the subject of the propositions of his Excellency 
 the President, of the 31st ultimo, at large, and report, beg leave 
 to report the alterations hereafter mentioned, to the said propo- 
 sitions, and that the whole of the said propositions, so altered, 
 be accepted and passed by the Convention, viz. : — 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 83 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Common- 
 wealth of Massachusetts, 1788 : — 
 
 The Convention having impartially discussed and fully con- 
 sidered the Constitution for the United States of America, 
 reported to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the 
 United States of America, and submitted to us by a Resolution 
 of the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the 
 twenty-fifth day of October last past ; and acknowledging with 
 grateful hearts the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Uni- 
 verse, in affording the people of the United States, in the course 
 of his providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, 
 without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and sol- 
 emn compact with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a 
 new Constitution, in order to form a more perfect union, estab- 
 lish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the com- 
 mon defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the bles- 
 sings of liberty to themselves and their posterity ; do, in the 
 name and in behalf of the people of the Commonwealth of 
 Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitution for 
 the United States of America. 
 
 And as it is the opinion of this Convention, that certain 
 amendments and alterations in the said Constitution would re- 
 move the fears and quiet the apprehensions of many of the 
 good people of this Commonwealth, and more effectually guard 
 against an undue administration of the federal government, the 
 Convention do therefore recommend that the following altera- 
 tions and provisions be introduced into the said Constitution. 
 
 First. That it be explicitly declared, that all powers not 
 expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution, are reserved 
 to the several States, to be by them exercised. 
 
 Secondly. That there shall be one representative to evety 
 thirty thousand persons, according to the census mentioned in 
 the Constitution, until the whole number of representatives 
 amounts to two hundred. 
 
 Thirdly. That Congress do not exercise the power vested in 
 them by the fourth section of the first article, but in cases when 
 a State shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein 
 
84 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights 
 of the people to a free and equal representation in Congress, 
 agreeably to the Constitution. 
 
 Fourthly. That Congress do not lay direct taxes but when 
 the moneys arising from the impost and excise are insufficient 
 for the public exigencies, nor then, until Congress shall have 
 first made a requisition upon the States, to assess, levy and pay 
 their respective proportions of such requisition, agreeably to 
 the census jixed in the said constitution, in such way and man- 
 ner as the legislatures of the States shall think best ; and, in 
 such case, if any State shall neglect or refuse to pay its propor- 
 tion, pursuant to such requisition, then Congress may assess 
 and levy such State's proportion, together with interest thereon, 
 at the rate of six per cent, per annum, from the time of pay- 
 ment prescribed in such requisition. 
 
 Fifthly. That Congress erect no company with exclusive 
 advantages of commerce. 
 
 Sixthly. That no person shall be tried for any crime, by 
 which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, 
 until he be first indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases 
 as may arise in the government and regulation of the land and 
 naval forces. 
 
 Seventhly. The supreme judicial federal court shall have no 
 jurisdiction of causes between citizens of different States, unless 
 the matter in dispute, whether it concern the realty or person- 
 alty, be of the value of three thousand dollars, at the least ; 
 nor shall the federal judicial powers extend to any actions be- 
 tween citizens of different States, where the matter in dispute, 
 whether it concerns the realty or personalty, is not of the value 
 of fifteen hundred dollars, at the least. 
 
 Eighthly. In civil actions between citizens of different States, 
 every issue of fact arising in actions at common law, shall be 
 tried by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, request it. 
 
 Ninthly. Congress shall at no time consent that any person 
 holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, 
 shall accept of a title of nobility, or any other title or office, 
 from any king, prince, or foreign state. 
 
 And the Convention do, in the name and in behalf of the 
 people of this Commonwealth, enjoin it upon their representa- 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 85 
 
 tives in Congress, at all times, until the alterations and provis- 
 ions aforesaid have been considered, agreeably to the fifth article 
 of the said Constitution ; to exert all their influence, and use 
 all reasonable and legal methods to obtain a ratification of the 
 said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided 
 in the said article. 
 
 And that the United States, in Congress assembled, may have 
 due notice of the assent and ratification of the said constitution, 
 by this Convention, it is 
 
 Resolved, That the assent and ratification aforesaid be en- 
 grossed on parchment, together with the recommendation and 
 injunction aforesaid, and with this Kesolution ; and that his 
 Excellency John Hancock, Esquire, President, and the Honor- 
 able William Cushing, Esquire, Vice-President of this Conven- 
 tion, transmit the same, countersigned by the Secretary of the 
 Convention, under their hands and seals, to the United States, 
 in Congress assembled. 
 
 Adjourned to Tuesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Tuesday, February 5, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The report of the Committee on the propositions of his Ex- 
 cellency the President, of the 31st ultimo, read again. It was 
 then moved and seconded, 
 
 That to-morrow, 11 o'clock, A. M., be assigned to take the 
 question, by yeas and nays, whether the Convention will accept 
 of the said report. 
 
 A motion was then made and seconded, that, for the purpose 
 of informing the good people of this Commonwealth of the 
 principles of the proposed Federal Constitution, and the amend- 
 ments offered by his Excellency the President, and reported by 
 the Committee, and of uniting their opinions respecting the 
 same, this Convention do adjourn to a future day. After 
 debate, 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
86 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion, 
 that, for the purpose of informing the good people of this Com- 
 monwealth of the principles of the proposed Federal Constitu- 
 tion, and the amendments offered by his Excellency the Presi- 
 dent, and reported by the Committee, and of uniting their 
 opinions respecting the same, this Convention do adjourn to a 
 future day, and, after debate, the question being put, was deter- 
 mined in the negative, 329 members being present, and 115 
 only voting in the affirmative. 
 
 Adjourned to Wednesday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Wednesday, February 6, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded in the consideration of the motion 
 that to-morrow, 11 o'clock, A. M., be assigned to take the ques- 
 tion, by yeas and nays, whether this Convention will accept of 
 the report of the Committee made on Monday last ; and, the 
 question being put, passed in the negative. 
 
 It was then voted that 4 o'clock, P. M., be assigned for that 
 purpose. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the report of the 
 Committee made on Monday last, be amended, so far as to add 
 the following to the first article therein mentioned, viz. : " And 
 that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Con- 
 gress to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of 
 conscience ; or to prevent the people of the United States, who 
 are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms ; or to raise 
 standing armies, unless when necessary for the defence of the 
 United States, or of some one or more of them ; or to prevent 
 the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner, 
 the federal legislature, for a redress of grievances ; or to sub- 
 ject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 87 
 
 persons, papers or possessions, 
 was determined in the negative. 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 And the question being put, 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Convention proceeded to the consideration of the report 
 of the Committee on the subject of the propositions of his 
 Excellency the President, of the 31st ultimo, made on Monday 
 last, and the question, whether this Convention will accept of 
 the said report, being put, was determined by yeas and nays, 
 as follows, viz. : — 
 
 YEAS. 
 
 His Excellency John Hancock, 
 
 Esq. 
 Hon. James Bowdoin, Esq. 
 Hon. Samuel Adams, Esq. 
 Hon. William Phillips, Esq. 
 Hon. Caleb Davis, Esq. 
 Charles Jarvis, Esq. 
 John Coffin Jones, Esq. 
 John Winthrop, Esq. 
 Thomas Dawes, Jr., Esq. 
 Rev. Samuel Stillman. 
 Thomas Russell, Esq. 
 Christopher Gore, Esq. 
 Hon. William Heath, Esq. 
 Hon. Increase Sumner, Esq. 
 James Bowdoin, Jr., Esq. 
 Ebenezer Wales, Esq. 
 Rev. Nathaniel Robbins. 
 Hon. Richard Cranch, Esq. 
 Rev. Anthony Wibird. 
 Hon. Cotton Tufts, Esq. 
 Hon. Benjamin Lincoln, Esq. 
 Rev. Daniel Shute. 
 Rev. Joseph Jackson. 
 
 Rev. Thomas Thacher. 
 
 Fisher Ames, Esq. 
 
 Col. William Mcintosh. 
 
 Capt. John Baxter, Jr. 
 
 Hon. Elijah Dunbar, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Thomas Mann. 
 
 Mr. George Payson. 
 
 Hon. Jabez Fisher, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Thomas Jones. 
 
 Rev. Phillips Payson. 
 
 Mr. Ebenezer Warren. 
 
 Richard Manning, Esq. 
 
 Edward Pulling, Esq. 
 
 Mr. William Gray, Jr. 
 
 Mr. Francis Cabot. 
 
 Hon. Michael Farley, Esq. 
 
 John Choate, Esq. 
 
 Daniel Noyes, Esq. 
 
 Col. Jonathan Cogswell. 
 
 Hon. Tristram Dalton, Esq. 
 
 Enoch Sawyer, Esq. 
 
 Ebenezer March, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Rufus King, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Benjamin Greenleaf, Esq. 
 
88 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Theophilus Parsons, Esq. 
 Hon. Jonathan Titcomb, Esq. 
 Hon. George Cabot, Esq. 
 Mr. Joseph Wood. 
 Capt. Israel Thorndike. 
 Isaac Mansfield, Esq. 
 Jonathan Glover, Esq. 
 Hon. Azor Orne, Esq. 
 John Glover, Esq. 
 Daniel Rogers, Esq. 
 John Low, Esq. 
 Capt. William Pearson. 
 John Carnes, Esq. 
 Capt. John Burnham. 
 Mr. William Symmes, Jr. 
 Bailey Bartlett, Esq. 
 Capt. Nathaniel Marsh. 
 Mr. Israel Clark. 
 Dr. Samuel Nye. 
 Mr. Enoch Jackman. 
 Capt. Benjamin Lurvey. 
 Mr. Willis Patten. 
 Daniel Thurston, Esq. 
 Mr. Jacob Herrick. 
 Mr. Simeon Miller. 
 Hon. Francis Dana, Esq. 
 Stephen Dana, Esq. 
 Hon. Nathaniel Gorham, Esq. 
 Hon. Joseph Hosmer, Esq. 
 Hon. Abraham Fuller, Esq. 
 Capt. Lawson Buckminster. 
 Benjamin Brown, Esq. 
 Daniel Whitney, Esq. 
 Capt. Asahel Wheeler. 
 Capt. Benjamin Blaney. 
 Capt. Abraham Bigelow, 
 Maj. Gen. John Brooks. 
 Dr. Charles Whitman. 
 Leonard Williams, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Joseph Bradley Varnum, 
 
 Esq. 
 Hon. John Pitts, Esq. 
 Hon. Eleazer Brooks, Esq. 
 William Pynchon, Esq. 
 Hon. Caleb Strong, Esq. 
 Mr. Benjamin Sheldon. 
 Capt. Lemuel Pomeroy. 
 Brig. Gen. Elisha Porter. 
 Hon. Noah Goodman, Esq. 
 Hon. John Hastings, Esq. 
 John Ingersoll, Esq. 
 Mr. Ebenezer Janes. 
 Abner Morgan, Esq. 
 Capt. David Shepard. 
 Mr. Jesse Reed. 
 Nahum Eager, Esq. 
 Col. Benjamin Bonney. 
 Maj. Thomas James Douglass. 
 Mr. Aaron Fisher. 
 Mr. Edmund Lazell. 
 Capt. Thompson Maxwell. 
 Mr. Elihu Colton. 
 Joshua Thomas, Esq. 
 Mr. Thomas Davis. 
 Mr. John Davis. 
 Hon. William Cushing, Esq. 
 Hon. Nathan Cushing, Esq. 
 Hon. Charles Turner, Esq. 
 Hon. George Partridge, Esq. 
 Rev. William Shaw. 
 Daniel Howard, Esq. 
 Mr. Hezekiah Hooper. 
 Capt. Elisha Mitchell. 
 Mr. Daniel Howard, Jr. 
 Rev. Isaac Backus. 
 Isaac Thomson, Esq. 
 Capt. John Turner. 
 Mr. Josiah Smith. 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 89 
 
 William Sever, Jr., Esq. 
 Hon. Joseph Cushing, Esq. 
 Rev. Samuel Niles. 
 Mr. Fr eman Waterman. 
 Col. Israel Fearing. 
 Shearjashub Bourn, Esq. 
 David Thatcher, Esq. 
 Capt. Jonathan Howes. 
 Hon. Solomon Freeman, Esq. 
 Capt. Kimball Clark. 
 Rev. Levi Whitman. 
 Capt. Joseph Palmer. 
 James Williams, Esq. 
 Hon. Elisha May, Esq. 
 Capt. Moses Willmarth. 
 Col. Sylvester Richmond. 
 Hon. William Baylies, Esq. 
 Hon. Thomas Durfee, Esq. 
 Israel Washburn, Esq. 
 Hon. Walter Spooner, Esq. 
 Rev. Samuel West. 
 Mr. William Almy. 
 Nathaniel Barrell, Esq. 
 Rev. Dr. Moses Hemmenway. 
 Hon. Nathaniel Wells, Esq. 
 Thomas Cutts, Esq. 
 Jacob Bradbury, Esq. 
 Capt. John Low. 
 Mr. William Mayhew. 
 Mr. Cornelius Dunham. 
 Hon. John Sprague, Esq. 
 Capt. Seth Newton. 
 
 Hon. Samuel Baker, Esq. 
 
 Maj. David Wilder. 
 
 Mr. Matthew Patrick. 
 
 Mr. Josiah Goddard. 
 
 Capt. Ephraim Wilder. 
 
 John K. Smith, Esq. 
 
 Mr. John Fox. 
 
 Capt. Joseph McLellan. 
 
 David Mitchell, Esq. 
 
 Samuel Merrill, Esq. 
 
 William Thompson, Esq. 
 
 Capt. John Dunlap. 
 
 Capt. Isaac Snow. 
 
 Mr. Joshua Dyer. 
 
 Rev. Samuel Perley. 
 
 Thomas Rice, Esq. 
 
 Mr. David Sylvester. 
 
 Mr. Nathaniel Wyman. 
 
 Mr. David Gilmore. 
 
 William McCobb, Esq. 
 
 Capt. Samuel Grant. 
 
 Moses Davis, Esq. 
 
 David Fales, Esq. 
 
 Dummer Sewall, Esq. 
 
 John Ashley, Jr., Esq. 
 
 Hon. Elijah Dwight, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Theodore Sedgwick, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Jonathan Smith, Esq. 
 
 Hon. Thompson J. Skinner, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Elisha Carpenter. 
 
 Capt. Daniel Taylor.— 18T. 
 
 Capt. Jedidiah Southworth, 
 Mr. Nathan Comstock. 
 Mr. Benjamin Randall. 
 
 12 
 
 NAYS. 
 
 Mr. Moses Richardson, Jr. 
 
 Rev. Noah Alden. 
 
 Hon. Israel Hutchinson, Esq. 
 
90 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 Capt. Peter Osgood, Jr. 
 Dr. Thomas Kittridge. 
 Capt. Thomas Mighill. 
 Hon. Aaron Wood, Esq. 
 Capt. Ebenezer Carlton. 
 Dr. Marshall Spring. 
 Capt. Timothy Winn. 
 Mr. William Flint. 
 Mr. Peter Emerson. 
 Mr. Jonas Morse. 
 Maj. Benjamin Sawin. 
 William Thompson, Esq. 
 Maj. John Minot. 
 Capt. Gilbert Dench. 
 Mr. Jonathan Keep. 
 Dr. Benjamin Morse. 
 Joseph Sheple, Esq. 
 Mr. Obadiah Sawtell. 
 Mr. Daniel Fisk. 
 Capt. Daniel Adams. 
 Capt. John Webber. 
 Capt. Staples Chamberlin. 
 Mr. Asa Parlin. 
 Capt. John Harnden. 
 Mr. Newman Scarlett. 
 Mr. Samuel Reed. 
 Mr. Benjamin Adams. 
 Maj. Hezekiah Broad. 
 Capt. Jonathan Green. 
 Mr. Phineas Gleazen. 
 Col. Benjamin Ely. 
 Capt. John Williston. 
 Capt. Phinehas Stebbins. 
 Mr. Daniel Cooley. 
 Mr. Benjamin Eastman. 
 Mr. Josiah Allis. 
 Mr. William Bodman. 
 Mr. Samuel Field. 
 
 Mr. Moses Bascom. 
 
 Mr. Robert Wilson. 
 
 Capt. Consider Arms. 
 
 Mr. Malachi Maynard. 
 
 Capt. Zacheus Crocker. 
 
 Mr. Moses Severance. 
 
 Capt. Asa Fisk. 
 
 Mr. Phinehas Merrick. 
 
 Mr. Adam Clark. 
 
 Capt. Nathaniel Whitcomb. 
 
 Mr. Timothy Blair. 
 
 Mr. Aaron Merrick. 
 
 Mr. John Hamilton. 
 
 Mr. Clark Cooley. 
 
 Mr. John Chamberlin. 
 
 Mr. Justus Dwight. 
 
 Mr. Samuel Eddy. 
 
 Mr. Isaac Pepper. 
 
 Capt. John Goldsbury. 
 
 Capt. Agrippa Wells. 
 
 Mr. Ephraim William. 
 
 Mr. Asa Powers. 
 
 Capt Silas Fowler. 
 
 Mr. John Jennings. 
 
 Mr. Jonathan Hubbard. 
 
 Mr. Benjamin Thomas. 
 
 Mr. Isaac Soul. 
 
 Mr. Nathaniel Hammond. 
 
 Mr. Abraham Holmes. 
 
 Capt. Francis Shurtliff. 
 
 Mr. Elijah Bisbee, Jr. 
 
 Dr. Thomas Smith. 
 
 Mr. Thomas Nye. 
 
 Col. Nathaniel Leonard. 
 
 Mr. Aaron Pratt. 
 
 Capt. Phanuel Bishop. 
 
 Maj. Frederick Drown. 
 
 William Winsor, Esq. 
 
1788.] 
 
 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 
 
 91 
 
 Mr. Christopher Mason. 
 Mr. David Brown. 
 Hon. Holder Slocum, Esq. 
 Mr. Meletiah Hathaway. 
 Hon. Abraham White, Esq. 
 Capt. Ebenezer Tisdell. 
 Capt. John Pratt. 
 Capt. Esaias Preble. 
 Mr. Mark Adams. 
 Mr. James Neal. 
 Capt. Elijah Thayer. 
 Dr. Nathaniel Low. 
 Mr. Richard Fox Cntts. 
 Mr. Thomas M. Wentworth. 
 Maj. Samuel Nasson. 
 Mr. Moses Ames. 
 Mr. Jeremiah Emery. 
 Rev. Pelatiah Tingley. 
 Mr. David Bigelow. 
 Edward Thompson, Esq. 
 Mr. Daniel Forbes. 
 Mr. Nathaniel Jenks. 
 Capt. Jeremiah Learned. 
 Mr. Caleb Curtis. 
 Mr. Ezra Mclntier. 
 Mr. David Harwood. 
 Hon. Amos Singletary, Esq. 
 Col. Samuel Denny. 
 Mr. James Hathaway. 
 Mr. Asaph Sherman. 
 Mr. Abraham Smith. 
 Capt. Jonathan Bullard. 
 Capt. John Black. 
 Capt. John Woods. 
 Capt. Benjamin Josselyn. 
 Capt. Stephen Maynard. 
 Mr. Artemas Brigham. 
 Capt. Isaac Harrington. 
 
 Capt. John Fuller. 
 
 Mr. Daniel Putnam. 
 
 Dr. Samuel Willard. 
 
 Josiah Whitney, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Jonathan Day % 
 
 Capt. Thomas Marshall Baker. 
 
 Capt. Timothy Parker. 
 
 Maj. Martin Kinsley. 
 
 Rev. Joseph Davis. 
 
 Hon. John Taylor, Esq. 
 
 Dr. Joseph Wood. 
 
 Jonathan Grout, Esq. 
 
 Capt. Samuel Peckham. 
 
 John Frye, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Stephen Holden. 
 
 Capt. Joel Fletcher. 
 
 Mr. Timothy Fuller. 
 
 Mr. Jacob Willard. 
 
 Mr. Moses Hale. 
 
 Capt. Josiah Wood. 
 
 Mr. Joseph Stone. 
 
 Mr. David Stearns. 
 
 Mr. Jonas Temple. 
 
 Daniel Ilsley, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Stephen Longfellow, Jr. 
 
 Mr. William Wedgery. 
 
 Capt. David Murray. 
 
 Hon. Samuel Thompson, Esq. 
 
 Mr. Jonah Crosby. 
 
 Mr. Zacheus Beal. 
 
 William Jones, Esq. 
 
 Capt. James Carr. 
 
 Mr. Joshua Bean. 
 
 Mr. Valentine Rathbun. 
 
 Mr. Comstock Betts. 
 
 Mr. Lemuel Collins. 
 
 Capt. Jeremiah Pierce. 
 
 Ephraim Fitch, Esq. 
 
92 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Maj. Thomas Lusk. Ebenezer Peirce, Esq. 
 
 Mr. John Hurlbert. . Mr. David Vaughan. 
 
 Capt. Ezekiel Herrick. Capt. Jesse Bradley. 
 
 Mr. Joshua Lawton. Mr. Zenos Noble. 
 
 Mr. Timothy Mason. Mr. John Picket, Jr. — 168. 
 
 Adjourned to Thursday morning, 10 o'clock. 
 
 Thursday, February 7, 1788. 
 
 Met according to adjournment. 
 
 The Committee on the Pay Roll reported the same, amount- 
 ing to four thousand four hundred and ninety-nine pounds two 
 shillings. Read and accepted, and 
 
 Voted, That his Excellency the Governor be, and he hereby 
 is requested, by and with the advice and consent of Council, to 
 draw his warrant on the treasury of this Commonwealth for 
 the aforegoing sum of <£4,499 2s., to be paid to the members 
 of the Convention, in the proportion mentioned in the said roll. 
 
 Voted, That when the business of the Convention shall be 
 completed, the members will proceed to the State House, to 
 proclaim the ratification of the Federal Constitution, and to 
 take an affectionate leave of each other. 
 
 Whereas, It is of importance that the good people of this 
 Commonwealth should be informed of the reasons which in- 
 duced the Convention to assent to and ratify the Constitution 
 for the United States of America, it is therefore 
 
 Resolved, That the Hon. George Cabot, Esq., Theophilus 
 Parsons, Esq., Ebenezer Peirce, Esq., and the Hon. Caleb 
 Strong, Esq., together with the Secretary of the Convention, be 
 a Committee to prepare an Address to the People, stating the 
 principles of the said Constitution, the various objections which 
 were made against it, and the answers they received ; and ex- 
 plaining the absolute necessity of adopting some energetic sys- 
 tem of federal government for the preservation of the Union. 
 And that the same be published and transmitted to every town 
 
1788.] JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. 93 
 
 within this Commonwealth, one copy thereof to be for the use 
 of each member of this Convention. And that the Convention 
 do recommend to the General Court that they make provision 
 for the publication of the said address, a'nd give such directions 
 for the distribution thereof as that court shall judge proper. 
 
 Ordered, That the Secretary of this Convention lodge the 
 journals thereof in the office of the Secretary of this Common- 
 wealth. 
 
 Voted, unanimously, That the thanks of this Convention be 
 given to his Excellency the President, for his generous and 
 patriotic efforts, during a painful illness, to unite the members 
 of this body in such a decision upon the subject of their de- 
 liberation, as, in his opinion, was essential to the safety and 
 happiness of the people of the United States ; and also for the 
 patient attention and perfect impartiality with which his Excel- 
 lency has presided, while his health permitted him, to regulate 
 their debates. 
 
 Voted, unanimously, That his Honor the Vice-President be 
 requested to accept the united thanks of this Convention for 
 the uniform candor and impartiality exhibited by his Honor 
 while presiding in the absence of the President. 
 
 Voted, unanimously, That the thanks of this Convention be 
 presented to the reverend clergymen of the town of Boston, 
 who have kindly officiated as Chaplains to this Convention 
 during their session. 
 
 Voted, unanimously, That the thanks of this Convention be 
 given to the proprietors of the meeting-house in Long Lane, in 
 Boston, for the accommodation the Convention have received in 
 their house. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of five be chosen to wait upon 
 his Excellency the President, and the honorable Vice-President, 
 with the votes giving the thanks of the Convention to them 
 respectively. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Phillips, the Hon. Mr. Turner, Mr. Ames, the 
 Hon. Mr. Adams, and the Hon. Mr. King, were appointed on 
 the said committee. 
 
 Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the reverend clergymen 
 of Boston, and the proprietors of the meeting-house, in Long 
 Lane, of the votes passed respecting them. 
 
94 JOURNAL OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 An invitation from certain inhabitants of Boston, requesting 
 the members of the Convention to take refreshment at the Sen- 
 ate Chamber, when the ratification of the Constitution should 
 be declared. Read, and 
 
 Voted, That the thanks of the Convention be given to the 
 inhabitants of Boston for their polite invitation, and that the 
 Convention will attend as requested. 
 
 The business which was before the Convention being finished, 
 on motion that the Convention adjourn to the State House, for 
 the purpose of declaring the ratification of the Constitution for 
 the United States of America, 
 
 Adjourned accordingly. 
 
 The Convention assembled again at the State House, where 
 the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid was publicly 
 declared, after which, 
 
 This Convention was dissolved. 
 
REPORT OF THE DEBATES 
 
 CONVENTION OF 1788, 
 
 RATIFYING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
DEBATES. 
 
 In Convention, January 9, 1788. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Ordered, That the Hon. Nathaniel Gorham, Esq., John 
 Carnes, Esq., Dr. Charles Jarvis, Hon. Tristram Dalton, Esq., 
 Hon. Walter Spooner, Esq., Hon. Caleb Davis, Esq., and Hon. 
 John Taylor, Esq., be a Committee to receive the returns of the 
 several towns. 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee of five persons be appointed to 
 collect, count and sort the votes for a Secretary. 
 
 And the Hon. Caleb Davis, Tristram Dalton, Aaron Wood, 
 Eleazer Brooks and Charles Turner, Esquires, were appointed. 
 
 The Convention then proceeded to the choice of a Secretary 
 by ballot, and the votes being taken, it appeared that George 
 Richards Minot, Esquire, was chosen, who accepted of the 
 choice, and was duly sworn, to qualify him for exercising the 
 duties of that office. 
 
 Voted, That Mr. Jacob Kuhn, the Messenger of the General 
 Court, be appointed Messenger to this Convention. 
 
 Voted, That five Monitors be chosen. 
 
 The following gentlemen were elected, viz. : the Hon. Noah 
 Goodman, Esq., Mr. Phanuel Bishop, Mr. Daniel Cooley, Hon. 
 Azor Orne, Esq., and Mr. Thomas Davis. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of seven be appointed to prepare 
 rules and orders for the regulation of the Convention. 
 
 The Hon. Nathaniel Gorham, Esq., Dr. Charles Jarvis, Hon. 
 John Taylor, Esq., Mr. William Wedgery, Hon. Tristram Dal- 
 ton, Esq., Hon. Theodore Sedgwick, Esq., and James Bowdoin, 
 Jr., Esq., were then appointed on the said committee. 
 
 13 
 
98 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 The Convention proceeded to the choice of a President, by 
 ballot, according to assignment, and a Committee of five being 
 appointed to collect, count and sort the votes, it appeared that 
 his Excellency John Hancock, Esquire, was chosen. 
 
 Voted, That the Convention proceed to the choice of a Vice 
 President. 
 
 The Convention then proceeded to the choice of a Vice-Pres- 
 ident accordingly, by ballot, and a Committee being appointed 
 to collect, count and sort the votes, it appeared that the Hon. 
 William Cushing, Esquire, was chosen, who by request took 
 the chair. 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of five be appointed to wait upon 
 his Excellency John Hancock, Esq., and acquaint him that this 
 Convention have made choice of him for their President, and 
 to request his Excellency's acceptance of that appointment. 
 
 On motion of the Hon. Mr. Adams, 
 
 Voted, That the Convention will attend morning prayers 
 daily, and that the gentlemen of the clergy of every denomina- 
 tion, be requested to officiate in turn. 
 
 The members from Boston were appointed to wait upon them 
 and acquaint them thereof. 
 
 A vote of the Church in Brattle Street, in Boston, offering 
 the use of their meeting-house to the Convention, being com- 
 municated by the Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, 
 
 Voted, That a Committee of nine be appointed to view the 
 accommodations of the said meeting-house, and report. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick, Mr. Lincoln, Dr. Taylor, Gen. Brooks, of 
 Lincoln, Dr. Jarvis, Dr. Holten, Mr. Strong, Mr. Nasson, and 
 Mr. Thacher, were then appointed on said committee. 
 
 Thursday, January 10, 1788. 
 
 The Committee appointed to examine the returns of delegates 
 desired a rule, whereby they might determine whether the towns 
 had exceeded their privilege to send members. After a long 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 99 
 
 debate, a motion was made, that the valuation of the different 
 towns returned in 1784, should be the rule to determine the 
 number. 
 
 An offer having been made by the Church in Brattle Street, 
 of that meeting-house, for the use of the Convention, and a 
 Committee having viewed the accommodations, it was 
 
 Voted, That when the Convention do adjourn, that it adjourn 
 to meet at 3 o'clock at the meeting-house, in Brattle Street. 
 
 Friday, January 11, 1788. 
 
 Committees were raised to inquire respecting the contested 
 elections and enjoined to sit immediately. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 The house in which the Convention were sitting, on account 
 of the difficulty of hearing, being found inconvenient, a Com- 
 mittee was raised to provide one more suitable — after which it 
 was voted to adjourn to Saturday morning, then to meet in the 
 Representatives' Chamber. 
 
 Saturday, January 12, 1788. 
 
 The honorable Convention met again in, the Representatives , 
 Chamber, where they decided all the disputed elections in favor 
 of the members returned. The sense of the Convention was 
 twice taken against removing to any other place. 
 
 Monday, January 14, 1788. 
 
 The Constitution for the United States of America, as report- 
 ed by the Convention of Delegates, held at Philadelphia, in 
 May last, together with the resolutions of the General Court of 
 
100 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 this Commonwealth, for calling a Convention, agreeably to the 
 recommendation of Congress, were ordered to be read. 
 
 On motion of Mr. Strong, 
 
 Voted, That this Convention, sensible how important it is 
 that the great subject submitted to their determination should 
 be discussed and considered with moderation, candor and delib- 
 eration, will enter into a free conversation on the several parts 
 thereof, by paragraphs, until every member shall have had op- 
 portunity to express his sentiments on the same ; after which 
 the Convention will consider and debate at large the question, 
 whether this Convention will adopt and ratify the proposed 
 Constitution, before any vote is taken expressive of the sense of 
 the Convention upon the whole or any part thereof. 
 
 The resolve of the General Court of this Commonwealth, of 
 March, 1787, appointing Delegates for the Convention of the 
 States, held at Philadelphia, was ordered to be read. 
 
 A motion was made and passed, that the Hon. Elbridge 
 Gerry, Esq., be requested to take a seat in the Convention, to 
 answer any questions of fact, from time to time, that the Con- 
 vention may ask, respecting the passing of the Constitution. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee of three be appointed to wait 
 upon the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., and acquaint him with 
 the vote of this morning, requesting him to take a seat in the 
 Convention, to answer to any questions of fact, from time to 
 time, that the Convention may ask, respecting the passing 
 the Constitution. 
 
 Agreeably to the resolution passed in the forenoon, the Con- 
 vention proceeded to consider the first section of the Consti- 
 tution, and after a short conversation, entered upon the discus- 
 sion of the second section, the first paragraph of which caused 
 a lengthy debate. 
 
 The Convention entered upon the consideration of the pro- 
 posed Constitution, and having debated thereon, through the 
 day, postponed the further consideration thereof to the next 
 morning. 
 
 It had been mentioned by some gentlemen, that the introduc- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 101 
 
 tion of tyranny into several nations had been by lengthening 
 the duration of their parliaments, or legislative bodies ; and the 
 fate of those nations was urged as a caution against lengthen- 
 ing the period for which Congress is to be chosen. The Hon. 
 Mr. Sedgwick wished to know what were the nations which had 
 been thus deprived of their liberties ; he believed they were few 
 in number — in fact, he did not recollect any. After showing 
 by several examples how nations had been deprived of their 
 liberties, he continued : Is it not necessary, Mr. President, that 
 the Federal Representatives should be chosen for two years ? 
 Annual elections in a single State may be the best for a variety 
 of reasons ; but when the great affairs of thirteen States — where 
 their commerce may be extended, and where it is necessary to 
 be restricted — what measure may be most expedient, and best 
 adapted to promote the general prosperity thereof, are to be the 
 objects of deliberation — is not such a period too short ? Can a 
 man called into public life divest himself of local concerns, and 
 instantly initiate himself in a general knowledge of such exten- 
 sive and weighty matters ? After several other arguments in 
 favor of the section, he begged the indulgence of the Conven- 
 tion while he made a personal observation : " It has been given 
 out, Sir, by several persons, that I have said the Constitution 
 must go down, right or wrong. I beg leave to declare, Sir, on 
 my honor, that, so far from having made such a declaration, the 
 idea of it has not ever entered my mind. ,, 
 
 Mr. Gr. Dench wished to know how the representation was 
 secured ; as, by the fourth section, Congress were empowered to 
 make or alter the regulation of the times, places and manner 
 of holding elections. Mr. Dench was continuing, but was called 
 to order by Mr. Parsons, who said the subject in debate was the 
 expediency of biennial elections, and that an answer to the gen- 
 tleman from Hopkinton would more properly be given when the 
 fourth section was under consideration. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. Mr. President, I am opposed to biennial, and 
 am in favor of annual elections. Annual elections have been 
 the practice of this State ever since its settlement, and no ob- 
 jection to such a mode of electing has ever been made. It has, 
 indeed, Sir, been considered as the safeguard of the liberties of 
 the people ; and the annihilation of it, the avenue through 
 
102 debates OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 which tyranny will enter. By the articles of confederation, 
 annual elections are provided for, though we have additional 
 securities in a right to recall any, or all of our members from 
 Congress, and a provision for rotation. In the proposed Constitu- 
 tion there is no provision for rotation ; we have no right by it 
 to recall our delegates. In answer to the observation, that, by 
 frequency of elections, good men will be excluded, I answer, if 
 they behave well, it is probable they will be continued ; but if 
 they behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil ? It is possible 
 that rulers may be appointed who may wish to root out the lib- 
 erties of the people. Is it not, Mr. President, better, if such a 
 case should occur, that at a short period they should politically 
 die, than that they should be proceeded against by impeach- 
 ment ? These considerations, and others, said the Doctor, make 
 me in favor of annual elections ; and the further we deviate 
 therefrom, the greater is the evil. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Sprague was in favor of the section as it stood. 
 He thought the same principles ought not to guide us, when 
 considering the election of a body whose jurisdiction was coexten- 
 sive with a great continent, as when regulating that of one 
 whose concerns are only those of a single State. 
 
 Mr. T. Dawes, after a short exordium, said, he had not heard 
 it mentioned by any gentleman who had spoken in the debate, 
 that the right of electing representatives in the Congress, as 
 provided for in the proposed Constitution, will be the acquisi- 
 tion of a new privilege by the people, as it really will be. The 
 people will then be immediately represented in the Federal Gov- 
 ernment ; at present they are not ; therefore it will be in favor 
 of the people, if they are even chosen for forty instead of two 
 years : and he adduced many reasons to show that it would 
 not conduce to the interest of the United States or the secu- 
 rity of the people, to have them for a shorter period than two 
 years. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. White said he was opposed to the section. He 
 thought the security of the people lay in frequent elections. 
 For his part, he would rather they should be for six months 
 than for two years : and concluded by saying, he was in favor 
 of annual elections. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis, Gen. Brooks, Gen. Heath, and Hon. Mr. Turner, 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 103 
 
 each spoke a few words on the subject, when a motion was made 
 to postpone the consideration of the second section until the 
 next morning, which passing, the Convention adjourned. 
 
 Tuesday, January 15, 1788. 
 
 A motion was made by Mr. Dana, that the vote of yesterday, 
 prescribing the manner of proceeding in the consideration of 
 the Constitution, should be reconsidered, for the purpose of 
 making the following addition thereto, viz. : — 
 
 " It is, nevertheless, the opinion of this Convention, that if 
 any member conceives any other clause or paragraph of the 
 Constitution to be connected with the one immediately under 
 consideration, that he have full liberty to take up such other 
 clause or paragraph, for that purpose." 
 
 And the question <5f reconsideration being put, passed in the 
 affirmative. 
 
 On the question, whether the addition should be made, it was 
 determined in the affirmative. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Strong rose to reply to the inquiry of the Hon. 
 Mr. Adams, why the alteration of elections from annual to bien- 
 nial was made, and to correct an inaccuracy of the Hon. Mr. 
 Grorham, who, the day before, had said that that alteration was 
 made to gratify South Carolina. He said he should then have 
 arisen to put his worthy colleague right; but his memory was 
 not sufficiently retentive to enable him immediately to collect 
 every circumstance. He had since recurred to the original 
 plan. When the subject was at first discussed in convention, 
 some gentlemen were for having the term extended to a consid- 
 erable length of time ; others were opposed to it, as it was con- 
 trary to the ideas and customs of the Eastern States ; but a 
 majority were in favor of three years, and it was, he said, urged 
 by the Southern States, which are not so populous as the East- 
 ern, that the expense of more frequent elections would be great. 
 He concluded by saying that a general concession produced the 
 
104 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 term as it stood in the section, although it was agreeable to the 
 practice of South Carolina. 
 
 Mr. Ames. I do not regret, Mr. President, that we are not 
 unanimous upon this question. I do not consider the diversity 
 of sentiment which prevails, as an impediment in our way to 
 the discovery of truth. In order that we may think alike upon 
 this subject at last, we shall be compelled to discuss it, by 
 ascending to the principles upon which the doctrine of repre- 
 sentation is grounded. 
 
 Without premeditation, in a situation so novel, and awed by 
 the respect which I feel for this venerable assembly, I distrust 
 extremely my own feelings, as well as my competency to prose- 
 cute this inquiry. With the hope of an indulgent hearing, I 
 will attempt to proceed. I am sensible, Sir, that the doctrine 
 of frequent elections has been sanctified by antiquity ; and is 
 still more endeared to us by our recent experience, and uniform 
 habits of thinking. Gentlemen have expressed their zealous 
 partiality for it. They consider this as a leading question in 
 the debate, and that the merits of many other parts of the 
 Constitution are involved in the decision. ' I confess, Sir, and I 
 declare, that my zeal for frequent elections is not inferior to 
 their own. I consider it as one of the first securities for popu- 
 lar liberty, in which its very essence maybe supposed to reside. 
 But how shall we make the best use of this pledge and instru- 
 ment of our safety ? A right principle, carried to an extreme, 
 becomes useless. It is apparent that a delegation for a very 
 short term, as for a single day, would defeat the design of rep- 
 resentation. The election in that case would not seem to the 
 people to be of any importance, and the person elected would 
 think as lightly of his appointment. The other extreme is 
 equally to be avoided. An election for a very long term of 
 years, or for life, would remove the member too far from the 
 control of the people, would be dangerous to liberty, and, in 
 fact, repugnant to the purposes of the delegation. The truth, 
 as usual, is placed somewhere between the extremes, and I be- 
 lieve is included in this proposition : The term of election must 
 be so long, that the representative may understand the interests 
 of .the people, and yet so limited, that his fidelity may be secured 
 by a dependence upon their approbation. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 105 
 
 Before I proceed to the application of this rule, I cannot for- 
 bear to premise some remarks upon two opinions which have 
 been suggested. 
 
 Much has been said about the people divesting themselves of 
 power, when they delegate it to representatives ; and that all 
 representation is to their disadvantage, because it is but an im- 
 age, a copy, fainter and more imperfect than the original, the 
 people, in whom the right of power is primary and unborrowed, 
 which is only reflected by their delegates. I cannot agree to 
 either of these opinions. The representation of the people is 
 something more than the people. 1 know, Sir, but one purpose 
 which the people can effect without delegation, and that is, to 
 destroy a government. That they cannot erect a government 
 is evinced by our being thus assembled on their behalf. The 
 people must govern by a majority, with whom all power resides. 
 But how is the sense of this majority to be obtained ? It has 
 been said that a pure democracy is the best government for a 
 small people, who may assemble in person. It is of small con- 
 sequence to discuss it, as it would be inapplicable to the great 
 country we inhabit. It may be of some use in this argument, 
 however, to consider, that it would be very burdensome, subje'ct 
 to faction and violence ; decisions would often be made by sur- 
 prise, in the precipitancy of passion, by men who either under- 
 stand nothing, or care nothing about the subject, or by inter- 
 ested men, or those who vote for their own indemnity. It would 
 be a government, not by laws, but by men. Such were the 
 paltry democracies of Greece and Asia Minor, so much extolled, 
 and so often proposed as a model for our imitation. I desire to 
 be thankful that our people are not under any temptation to 
 adopt the advice. I think it will not be denied, that the people 
 are gainers by the election of representatives. They may de- 
 stroy, but they cannot exercise the powers of government, in 
 person ; but by their servants they govern. They do not re- 
 nounce their power ; they do not sacrifice their rights ; they 
 become the true sovereigns of the country, when they delegate 
 that power, which they cannot use themselves, to their trustees. 
 
 I know, Sir, that the people talk about the liberty of nature, 
 and assert that we divest ourselves of a portion of it when we 
 enter into society. This is declamation against matter of fact, 
 n 
 
106 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 We cannot live without society ; and as to liberty, how can I be 
 said to 'enjoy that which another may take from me when 
 he pleases ? The liberty of one depends not s« much on the 
 removal of all restraint from him, as on the due/ restraint upon 
 the liberty of others. Without such restraint, there can be no 
 liberty. Liberty is so far from being endangered or destroyed 
 by this, that it is extended and secured. For I said, that we 
 do not enjoy that which another may take from us. But civil 
 liberty cannot be taken from us, when any one may please to 
 invade it ; for we have the strength of the society of our side. 
 
 I hope, Sir, that these reflections will have some tendency to 
 remove the ill impressions which are made by proposing to 
 divest the people of their power. 
 
 That they may never be divested of it, I repeat that I am in 
 favor of frequent elections. They who commend annual elec- 
 tions, are desired to consider, that the question is, whether 
 biennial elections are a defect in the Constitution ; for it does 
 not follow, because annual elections are safe, that biennial are 
 dangerous. Both may be good. Nor is there any foundation 
 for the fears of those who say that if we, who have been accus- 
 tomed to choose for one year only, now extend it to two, the 
 next stride will be to five, or seven years, and the next for term 
 of life : for this article, with all its supposed defects, is in favor 
 of liberty. Being inserted in the Constitution, it is not subject 
 to be repealed by law. We are sure that it is the worst of the 
 case. 
 
 It is a fence against ambitious encroachments, too high and 
 too strong to be passed. In this respect, we have greatly the 
 advantage of the people of England, and of all the world. 
 The law which limits their parliaments is liable to be repealed. 
 
 I will not defend this article by saying that it was a matter 
 of compromise in the Federal Convention : it has my entire ap- 
 probation as it stands. I think that we ought to prefer, in this 
 article, biennial elections to annual, and my reasons for this 
 opinion are drawn from these sources : — 
 
 From the extent of the country to be governed, 
 
 The objects of their legislation, 
 
 And the more perfect security of our liberty. 
 
 It seems obvious, that men who are to collect in Congress 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 107 
 
 from this great territory, perhaps from the Bay of Fundy, or 
 from the banks of the Ohio, and the shore of Lake Superior, 
 ought to have a longer term in office, than the delegates of a 
 single State, in their own legislature. It is not by riding post 
 to and from Congress, that a man can acquire a just knowledge 
 of the true interests of the Union. This term of election is 
 inapplicable to the state of a country as large as Germany, or 
 as the Roman Empire in the zenith of its power. 
 
 If we consider the objects of their delegation, little doubt will 
 remain. It is admitted that annual elections may be highly fit 
 for the State legislature. Every citizen grows up with a knowl- 
 edge of the local circumstances of the State. But the business 
 of the Federal Government will be very different. The objects 
 of their power are few and national. At least two years in 
 office will be necessary to enable a man to judge of the trade 
 and interests of States which he never saw. The time, I hope, 
 will come, when this excellent country will furnish food, and 
 freedom (which is better than food, which is the food of the 
 soul) for fifty millions of happy people. Will any man say that 
 the national business can be understood in one year ? 
 
 Biennial elections appear to me, Sir, an essential security to 
 liberty. These are my reasons : — 
 
 Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which popu- 
 lar governments are destroyed. We need not talk of the power 
 of an aristocracy. The people, when they lose their liberties, 
 are cheated out of them. They nourish factions in their bosoms, 
 which will subsist so long as abusing their honest credulity shall 
 be the means of acquiring power. A democracy is a volcano, 
 which conceals the fiery materials of its own destruction. These 
 will produce an eruption, and carry desolation in their way. 
 The people always mean right, and if time is allowed for reflec- 
 tion and information, they will do right. I would not have the 
 first wish, the momentary impulse of the public mind, become 
 law. For it is not always the sense of the people, with whom I 
 admit that all power resides. On great questions, we first hear 
 , the lQud clamors of passion, artifice and faction. I consider 
 biennial elections as a security that the sober second thought of 
 the people shall be law. There is a calm review of public 
 transactions, which is made by the citizens who have families 
 
108 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 and children, the pledges of their fidelity. To provide for pop- 
 ular liberty, we must take care that measures shall not be 
 adopted without due deliberation. The member chosen for two 
 years will feel some independence in his seat. The factions of 
 the day will expire before the end of his term. 
 
 The people will be proportionally attentive to the merits of a 
 candidate. Two years will afford opportunity to the member to 
 deserve well of them, and they will require evidence that he 
 has done it. 
 
 But, Sir, the representatives are the grand inquisition of the 
 Union. They are, by impeachment, to bring great offenders to 
 justice. One year will not suffice to detect guilt, and to pursue 
 it to conviction ; therefore, they will escape, and the balance of 
 the two branches will be destroyed, and the people oppressed 
 with impunity. The senators will represent the sovereignty of 
 the States. The representatives are to represent the people. 
 The offices ought to bear some proportion in point of impor- 
 tance. This will be impossible if they are chosen for one year 
 only. 
 
 Will the people then blind the eyes of their own watchmen ? 
 Will they bind the hands which are to hold the sword for their 
 defence ? Will they impair their own power, by an unreasona- 
 ble jealousy of themselves ? 
 
 For these reasons, I am clearly of opinion that the article is 
 entitled to our approbation as it stands ; and as it has been de- 
 manded, why annual elections were not preferred to biennial, 
 permit me to retort the question, and to inquire, in my turn, 
 what reason can be given, why, if annual elections are good, 
 biennial elections are not better ? 
 
 The inquiry in the latter part of Mr. Ames's speech being 
 directed to the Hon. Mr. Adams, that gentleman said, he only 
 made the inquiry for information, and that he had heard suffi- 
 cient to satisfy himself of its propriety. 
 
 Mr. Dench said his objections to biennial elections were re- 
 moved. But he wished to recur to the fourth section, and to 
 inquire, whether that election was secured, as, by this section, 
 Congress has power to regulate the time, place and manner of 
 holding it. 
 
 [A question now arose, whether the consideration of the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 109 
 
 fourth section was in order, and much debate was had thereon 
 — but the propriety, as expressed by a worthy member, of " elu- 
 cidating scripture by scripture," being generally admitted, the 
 motion made by the Hon. Mr. Dana, passed, which put an end * 
 to the conversation.] 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Bowdoin remarked on the idea suggested by 
 the honorable gentleman from Scituate, [Mr. Turner,] who had 
 said that nature pointed out the propriety of annual elections, 
 by its annual renewal, and observed, that if the revolution of 
 the heavenly bodies is to be the principle to regulate elections, 
 it was not fixed to any period ; as in some of the systems it 
 would be very short ; and in the last discovered planet it would 
 be eighty of our years. Gentlemen, he said, who had gone be- 
 fore him in the debate, had clearly pointed out the alteration of 
 the election of our federal representatives, from annual to bien- 
 nial, to be justifiable. Annual elections may be necessary in 
 this State ; but in the choice of representatives for the conti- 
 nent, it ought to be longer ; nor did he see any danger in its 
 being so. Who, he asked, are the men to be elected ? Are 
 they not to be from among us ? If they were to be a distinct 
 body, then the doctrine of precaution, which gentlemen use, 
 would be necessary. But, Sir, they can make no laws, nor levy 
 any taxes, but those to which they themselves must be subser- 
 vient — they themselves must bear a part ; therefore, our secu- 
 rity is guaranteed, by their being thus subject to the laws, if by 
 nothing else. 
 
 Gen. Heath. Mr. President, I consider myself not as an in- 
 habitant of Massachusetts, but as a citizen of the United States. 
 My ideas and views are commensurate with the continent ; they 
 extend in length from the St. Croix to the St. Maria, and in 
 breadth from the Atlantic to the Lake of the Woods ; for over 
 all this extensive territory is the Federal Government to be 
 extended. 
 
 I should not have risen on this paragraph, had it not been for 
 some arguments which gentlemen have advanced, respecting 
 elections, and which I think tend to make dangerous impres- 
 sions on the minds of the rising generation. It has been the 
 general opinion that the liberties of the people are principally 
 secured by the frequency of elections, and power returning 
 
110 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 again into their hands. The first parliament ever called in 
 Europe, was called by Constantine the Third, and to continue 
 for one year. The worthy gentleman from Boston, [Mr. Dawes,] 
 ♦ has mentioned a writer as a good authority, and who, he says, 
 was twenty years compiling his works. I will produce one ob- 
 servation from this celebrated writer (Baron Montesquieu) ; 
 it is as follows : " The greatness of power must be compensated 
 by the brevity of the duration : most legislators have fixed it to 
 a year ; a longer space would be dangerous." Here, Sir, we 
 have not only the opinion of this celebrated writer, but he has 
 also mentioned that most legislators were of the like opinion. 
 But I shall come to our own country, where we shall find in 
 what respect annual elections have always been held. This was 
 the wisdom of our ancestors ; it has been confirmed by time : 
 therefore, Sir, before we change it, we should carefully examine 
 whether it be for the better. Local circumstances may render 
 it expedient, but we should take care not to hold up to the ris- 
 ing generation that it is a matter of indifference whether elec- 
 tions are annual or not ; and this is what induced me to rise. 
 
 It is a novel idea that representatives should be chosen for a 
 considerable time, in order that they may learn their duty. The 
 representative is one who appears in behalf of, and acts for, 
 others ; he ought, therefore, to be fully acquainted with the 
 feelings, circumstances and interests of the persons whom he 
 represents, and this is learnt among them, not at a distant court. 
 How frequently, on momentary occasions, do the members of 
 the British Parliament wish to go home and consult their con- 
 stituents, before they come to a decision. This shows from what 
 quarter they wish to obtain information. With respect to the 
 obtaining a knowledge of the circumstances and abilities of the 
 other States, in order to an equal taxation, this must be acquired 
 from the returns of the number of inhabitants, <fcc, which are 
 to be found on the files of Congress ; for I know not how length 
 of time could furnish other information, unless the members 
 should go from State to State, in order to find out the circum- 
 stances of the different States. I think representatives ought 
 always to have a general knowledge of the interests of their 
 constituents, as this alone can enable them properly to represent 
 them. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. Ill 
 
 But, Sir, if there be charms in the paragraph now under con- 
 sideration, they are these : Congress at present are continually 
 sitting, but under the new Constitution it is intended that Con- 
 gress shall sit but once annually, for such time as may be neces- 
 sary, and then adjourn ; in this view, every gentleman acquaint- 
 ed with the tmsiness of legislation, knows that there is much 
 business in every session, which is taken up and partly con- 
 sidered, but not finished ; an adjournment keeps all this business 
 alive, and at the next session it is taken up and completed, to 
 the benefit of the people, in great saving of expense, which 
 would otherwise be lost ; for a new legislature would not see 
 through the eyes of those who went before them, consequently 
 all business partly finished would be time lost, to the injury of 
 the public. Therefore, as it seems to be intended that Congress 
 shall have but two sessions in the two years for which the rep- 
 resentatives are to be chosen, this consideration has reconciled 
 me to the paragraph, and I am in favor of biennial elections. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Turner, in reply to the Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, 
 said he thought it an important consideration whether the elec- 
 tions were to be for one year or for two years ; he was, he said, 
 greatly in favor of annual elections, and he thought, in the 
 present instance, it would be establishing a dangerous precedent 
 to adopt a change ; for, says he, the principle may so operate, 
 as, in time, our elections will be as seldom as the revolution of 
 the star the honorable gentleman talks of. 
 
 Mr. Dawes, in answer to Gen. Heath, said, that the passage 
 quoted from Montesquieu, applied to single governments, and 
 not to confederate ones. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, (of Medford,) in reply to Gen. Heath, said, he 
 recollected the passage of Montesquieu, but he also recollected 
 that that writer had spoken highly of the British government. 
 He then adverted to the objection to this section of Gen. Thomp- 
 son and others, that biennial elections were a novelty, and said, 
 we were not to consider whether a measure was new, but wheth- 
 er it was proper. Gentlemen had said that it had been the es- 
 tablished custom of this country to elect annually : but, he 
 asked, have we not gone from a colonial to an independent sit- 
 uation ? We were then provinces, we are now an independent 
 empire ; our measures, therefore, says lie, must change with 
 
112 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 our situation. Under our old government, the objects of legis- 
 lation were few, and divided ; under our present, they are many, 
 and must be united ; and it appears necessary that, according 
 to the magnitude and multiplicity of the business, the duration 
 should be extended — he did not, he, said, undertake to say how 
 far. He then went into a view of the history of Parliaments. 
 The modern northern nations, he said, had parliaments, but 
 they were called by their kings, and the time, business, &c, of 
 them, depended wholly on their wills. We can, therefore, says 
 he, establish nothing from these. One general remark was, 
 that in the reigns of weak princes, the power and importance of 
 parliaments increased ; in the reigns of strong and arbitrary 
 kings, they have always declined ; and, says he, they have been 
 triennial, and they have been septennial. The General com- 
 bated the idea, that the liberties of the people depended on the 
 duration of parliament, with much ability. Do we hear, asked 
 he, that the people of England are deprived of their liberties — 
 or that they are not as free now as when they had short parlia- 
 ments ? On the contrary, do not writers agree that life, liberty 
 and property are no where better secured than in Great Britain 
 — and that this security arises from their parliaments being 
 chosen for seven years. As such is the situation of the people 
 of England, and as no instance can be given wherein biennial 
 elections have been destructive to the liberties of the people, he 
 concluded by asking, whether so much danger is to be appre- 
 hended from such elections as gentlemen imagined ? 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Sir, gentlemen have said a great deal about 
 the history of old times. I confess, I am not acquainted with 
 such history — but I am, Sir, acquainted with the history of my 
 own country. I had the honor to be in the general court last 
 year, and am in it this year. I think, Sir, that had the last 
 administration continued one year longer, our liberties would 
 have been lost; and the country involved in blood : not so much, 
 Sir, from their bad conduct, but from the suspicions of the peo- 
 ple of them. But, Sir, a change took place ; from this change 
 pardons have been granted to the people, and peace is restored. 
 This, Sir, I say, is in favor of frequent elections. 
 
 [Gen. Thompson was called to order, on the idea that he 
 reflected on the last administration. A debate ensued, which 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 113 
 
 ended on the Hon. Mr. White's saying he wished to put out 
 every spark of the fire that appeared to be kindling — there- 
 fore moved to adjourn.] 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Dr. Taylor opened the conversation of the afternoon, by 
 calling upon Gen. Thompson to proceed. 
 
 Gen. Thompson accordingly said, that, however just, however 
 good, and however upright, the administration may be, there 
 was still a great necessity for annual elections. 
 
 He thought a change of election was for the best, even if the 
 administration pleased the people. Do the members of Con- 
 gress, says he, displease us, we call them home, and they obey. 
 Now where is the difference of their having been elected for one 
 or two years ? It is said that the members cannot learn suffi- 
 ciently in that time. Sir, I hope we shall never send men who 
 are not learned. Let these members know their dependence upon 
 the people, and I say it will be a check on them, even if they 
 were not good men. Here the General broke out in the follow- 
 ing pathetic apostrophe : " my country ! never give up your 
 annual elections ; young men, never give up your jewel ! " He 
 apologized for his zeal. He then drew a comparison between 
 the judges, <fcc, of this country, before the Revolution, who were 
 dependent on Great Britain for their salaries, and those repre- 
 sentatives dependent on the continent. He concluded by hop- 
 ing that these representatives would be annually elected, and 
 thereby feel a greater dependence on the people. 
 
 Mr. Gore. It has been observed, that in considering this 
 great and momentous question, we ought to consult the senti- 
 ments of wise men, who have written on the subject of govern- 
 ment, and thereby regulate our decision on this business. A 
 passage is adduced from Montesquieu, stating, that where the 
 people delegate great power, it ought to be compensated for by 
 the shortness of the duration. Though strictly agreeing with 
 the author, I do not see that it applies to the subject under con- 
 sideration. This might be perfectly applicable to the ancient 
 governments, where they had no idea of representation, or dif- 
 ferent checks in the legislature or administration of govern- 
 
 15 
 
114 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 ment ; but in the proposed Constitution, the powers of the 
 whole government are limited to "certain national objects, and 
 are accurately defined ; the House of Representatives is but 
 one branch of the system, and can do nothing of itself; Mon- 
 tesquieu, in the sentiment alluded to, must have had in his mind 
 the Epistates of Athens, or the Dictators of Rome, but certain- 
 ly observations drawn from such sources can have no weight in 
 considering things so essentially different. Again, Sir, gentle- 
 men have said, that annual elections were necessary to the pres- 
 ervation of liberty, and that in proportion as the people of dif- 
 ferent nations have lengthened, beyond the term of a year, the 
 duration of their representatives, they have lost their liberties, 
 and that all writers have agreed in this. I may mistake, but I 
 know no such thing as a representation of the people in any of 
 the ancient republics. In England, from whence we receive 
 many of our ideas on this subject, King John covenanted with 
 his people to summons certain classes , of men to parliament. 
 By the constitution of that country, the king alone can convoke, 
 and he alone, previous to the revolution, could dissolve, the 
 parliament ; but in the reign of William III. the patriots ob- 
 tained an act limiting the duration of parliaments to three 
 years. Soon after, a parliament then sitting and near expiring, 
 a rebellion broke out, and the tories and Jacobites were gaining 
 strength to support the Pretender's claim to the crown. Had 
 they dissolved themselves, and a new parliament been convoked, 
 probably many of the very opponents to the government might 
 have been elected. In that case, they might have effected by 
 law, what they in vain attempted by arms. 
 
 The parliament, therefore, extended their duration from tri- 
 ennial to septennial ; this was acquiesced in by the people, and 
 the next parliament sanctified the act. No evil, but great good, 
 has been supposed to follow from their duration being thus ex- 
 tended ; and if Montesquieu and Doctor Adams think the Brit- 
 ish Constitution so perfect, how much greater must be our secu- 
 rity, when we reflect that our representation is equal ; that the 
 powers of the government are so limited, and the checks so 
 nicely appointed. If there be a representation of the people in 
 any other countries, and annual elections therein have been 
 considered as the basis of their freedom, I pray gentlemen to 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 115 
 
 mention the instances ; I confess I know none. People adopt a 
 position which is certainly true, viz. : that elections ought to be 
 frequent ; but then, as we have been in the custom of choosing 
 our representatives annually, we have determined annually to 
 be frequent, and that biennially, or any longer term than annual, 
 is not frequent. But if gentlemen will only consider the ob- 
 jects over which this government is to have rule and authority, 
 and the immense and wide extended tracts of country over 
 which the representatives are to pass before they reach the seat 
 of government, I think they will be convinced that two years is 
 a short time for the representatives to hold their office. Fur- 
 ther, Sir, we must consider this subject with respect to the gen- 
 eral structure of the Constitution. The Senate represents the 
 sovereignty of the States ; the House of Representatives the 
 people of the United States. The former have a longer term in 
 their office ; it is then necessary that that body which represents 
 the people should have a permanence in their office to resist any 
 operations of the Senate which might be injurious to the peo- 
 ple. If they were annual, I submit it to the good sense of this 
 house, whether they would be able to preserve that weight in 
 the system, which the Constitution intended they should have, 
 and which is absolutely necessary for the security of the rights 
 of the people. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. King said, he would not detain the Convention 
 by any exordium, for the purpose of obtaining their attention. 
 He declared, however, that he thought the subject might be 
 freed from certain prejudices connected with its examination, 
 and that thereby the question might receive a fairer decision. 
 This should be the object of his address. 
 
 The honorable gentleman observed, that the Convention would 
 do well to lay aside the terms annual or biennial, and consider 
 the subject as it could be supported by principles. Much has 
 been said of the instruction to be derived from history on this 
 point; he said, he presumed to doubt whether this was the 
 case. From the continent of Europe he believed that we could 
 receive no instruction ; their parliaments, after the overthrow 
 of the Roman empire, were not constructed upon the principle 
 of a representation of the people. The conqueror of a given 
 district of country was, by the feudal system, the prince or king 
 
116 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 of the people within his conquered territories : when he wished 
 the advice of any persons, he summoned usually a number of 
 his principal officers, or the barons of his kingdom, to give him 
 their counsel ; but the people, or, as they were degradingly 
 called, the vassals, were never consulted. This certainly cannot 
 be considered as a representation of the people. This mode of 
 assembling a parliament probably obtained in the early stages 
 of the English history ; but those who have written on this sub- 
 ject agree that their information is very imperfect relative to 
 the origin of English parliaments ; they are not certain who 
 composed the parliament, how long they held their office, or 
 concerning what points they were consulted. 
 
 Nothing clear on this subject appears before the twelfth cen- 
 tury. Magna Charta is the foundation of the imperfect repre- 
 sentation of England. Improvements have since been made in 
 favor of the more equal and certain representation of the peo- 
 ple ; but it is still extremely imperfect and insecure. Perhaps 
 the people of America are the first, who, by the social compact, 
 ever obtained a right to a full and fair representation in making 
 the laws of their country. 
 
 If, then, continued Mr. King, history can afford little or no 
 instruction on the subject, the Convention must determine the 
 question upon its own principles. It seems proper that the rep- 
 resentatives should be in office time enough to acquire that in- 
 formation which is necessary to form a right judgment ; but that 
 the time should not be so long as to remove from his mind the 
 powerful check upon his conduct that arises from the frequency 
 of elections, whereby the people are enabled to remove an un- 
 faithful representative, or to continue a faithful one. If the 
 question is examined by this standard, perhaps it will appear 
 that an election for two years is short enough for a representa- 
 tive in Congress. If one year is necessary for a representative 
 to be useful in the State legislature, where the objects of his 
 deliberations are local, and within his constant observation ; 
 two years does not appear too long, where the objects of delib- 
 eration are not confined to one State, but extend to thirteen 
 States ; where the complicated interests of united America are 
 mingled with those of foreign nations, and where the great du- 
 ties of national sovereignty will require his constant attention. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 117 
 
 When the representatives of the colony of Massachusetts were 
 first chosen, the country was not settled more than fifteen or 
 twenty miles from Boston. They then held their offices for one 
 year. The emigrants from Massachusetts, who settled on Con- 
 necticut River, appointed the Representatives to meet in the 
 General Court of that Colony, for only six months. Massachu- 
 setts, although her settlements have extended over almost her 
 whole territory, has continued to depute representatives for only 
 one year, and Connecticut for only six months ; but as in each 
 of these colonies, when under the British government, the du- 
 ties of the representatives were merely local, the great duties 
 of sovereignty being vested in their king, so since the Revolution 
 their duties have continued local, many of the authorities of 
 sovereignty being vested in Congress. It is now proposed to 
 increase the powers of Congress. This will increase the duties 
 of the representatives, and they must have a reasonable time 
 to obtain the information necessary to a right discharge of 
 their office. 
 
 It has been said, that our ancestors never relinquished the 
 idea of annual elections. This is an error. In 1643, the colo- 
 nies of Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Haven, 
 united in a confederacy, which continued for about forty years : 
 each colony sent two commissioners as their representatives, and 
 by the articles they were to be annually elected. About the year 
 1650, the General Court of Massachusetts instructed their com- 
 missioners to propose that the elections, instead of being an- 
 nual, should be only once in three years. The alteration did 
 not take place, but the anecdote proves that our ancestors have 
 not had an uniform predilection for annual elections. 
 
 Mr. King concluded by observing, that on a candid examina- 
 tion of this question, he presumed that the Constitution would 
 not be objected to on account of the biennial election of the 
 House of Representatives. 
 
 Judge Dana. Mr. President : The feeble state of my health 
 will not permit me to enter so largely into the debates of this 
 house, as I should otherwise be inclined to do. The intention 
 of my rising, at present, is to express my perfect acquiescence 
 in the sentiments advanced by the honorable gentleman from 
 Newburyport, (Mr. King,) in favor of the expediency of bien- 
 
118 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 nial elections of our federal representatives. From my own 
 experience, I think them preferable to annual elections. I have, 
 Sir, seen gentlemen in Congress, and delegates from this State, 
 too, sitting in that honorable body without a voice — without 
 power to open their mouths, or lift up their hands — when mat- 
 ters of the highest importance to their State have been under 
 consideration. I have seen members in Congress, for the space 
 of three months, without power, Sir, waiting for evidence of 
 their reelection. Besides, Sir, the more frequent elections 
 are, the oftener States will be exposed to be deprived of their 
 voice and influence in the national councils. I think annual 
 elections are too short for so extensive an empire. They keep 
 the members always travelling about ; and I am of opinion that 
 elections for two years are in no way subversive of the liberties 
 of the people. I, Sir, am one of the people, thank God ! and 
 am happy in having an opportunity of expressing my personal 
 satisfaction of such elections. For these, and a variety of other 
 reasons, Mr. Dana suggested that he thought this State ought to 
 be the first to adopt this method of election. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. White still thought that Congress might per- 
 petuate themselves, and so reign emperors over us. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Gorham observed, (iii continuation of Mr. Dana's 
 observation,) that there was not now a Congress, although the 
 time of their meeting had considerably elapsed. Rhode Island, 
 Connecticut, and several other States, had not gone on ; that 
 there were now only five States in Congress, when there ought 
 to have been thirteen two months ago. 
 
 Mr. Carnes rose to confirm it, and accordingly read part of 
 a letter from the Hon. Mr. Otis, the purport of which was, that 
 there was much business to do — that only five States were rep- 
 resented, and that the probability of an Indian war, &c, evinced 
 the great necessity of the establishment of an efficient federal 
 government, which will be the result of the adoption of the 
 proposed Constitution. 
 
 Dr. Taylor rose to answer two objections which *had been 
 made against annual elections. The distance of place was not 
 so great but the delegates might reach Philadelphia in a fort- 
 night ; and as they were answerable to the people for their con- 
 duct, he thought it would prevent a vacancy ; and concluded by 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 119 
 
 saying he did not conceive the arguments in favor of biennial 
 elections well founded. 
 
 A letter from the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., informing them 
 that he would attend the Convention, agreeably to their vote of 
 yesterday, was received and read. 
 
 On motion of Mr. Nasson, 
 
 Ordered, That a Committee be appointed to provide a more 
 convenient place for the Convention to sit in. 
 
 Wednesday, January 16, 1788. 
 
 The second paragraph of the second section of the first arti- 
 cle, was read at the table. A desultory conversation ensued on 
 the mode of conducting the discussion. It was again agreed, 
 that in the debate on any paragraph, genllemen might discuss 
 any other part they might suppose had relation to that under 
 consideration. 
 
 Mr. Pierce, (from Partridgefield,) after reading the fourth 
 section wished to know the opinion of gentlemen on it ; as Con- 
 gress appeared thereby to have a power to regulate the time, 
 place and manner of holding elections. In respect to the man- 
 ner, said Mr. Pierce, suppose the legislature of this State should 
 prescribe that the choice of the Federal Representatives should 
 be in the same manner as that of Governor — a majority of all 
 the votes in the State being necessary to make it such — and 
 Congress should deem it an improper manner, and should order 
 that it be as practiced in several of the Southern States, where 
 the highest number of votes makes a choice — have they not 
 power by this section so to do ? Again, as to the place, contin- 
 ues Mr. Pierce, may not Congress direct that the election for Mas- 
 sachusetts shall be held in Boston ? And if so, it is possible 
 that previous to the election, a number of electors may meet, 
 agree upon the eight delegates, and propose the same to a few 
 towns in the vicinity, who, agreeing in sentiment, may meet on 
 the day of election, and carry their list by a major vote. He 
 did not, he said, say that this would be the case ; but he wished 
 
120 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 to know if it was not a possible one. As the Federal Represen- 
 tatives, who' are to form the democratical part of the general 
 government, are to be a check on the representatives of the 
 sovereignty, the Senate, he thought the utmost caution ought 
 to be used, to have their elections as free as possible. He ob- 
 served, that as men have been ever fond of power, we must sup- 
 pose they ever will continue so ; and concluded by observing, 
 that our caution ought in the present case to be greater, as by 
 the proposed Constitution no qualification of property was re- 
 quired in a representative ; and it might be in the power of 
 some people thereby to choose a bankrupt for their representa- 
 tive, in order to give such representative employment, or that 
 he might make laws favorable to such a description of people. 
 
 Gen. Porter (from Hadley) endeavored to obviate the objec- 
 tions of Mr. Pierce, by showing the almost impossibility of Con- 
 gress making a law whereby eight men could be elected as Mr. 
 Pierce had supposed ; and he thought it equally impossible for 
 the people to choose a person to take care of their property, who 
 had none himself. 
 
 Mr. Bishop rose and observed, that by the fourth section Con- 
 gress would be enabled to control the elections of representa- 
 tives. It has been said, says he, that this power was given in 
 order that refractory States may be made to do their duty ; but 
 if so, Sir, why was it not so mentioned? If that was the inten- 
 tion, he asked why the clause did not run thus : " The times, 
 places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Repre- 
 sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature 
 thereof; but" if any State shall refuse or neglect so to do, 
 " Congress may," &c. This, he said, would admit of no pre- 
 varication. I am, says Mr. Bishop, for giving Congress as much 
 power to do good as possible. It has been said, Mr. President, 
 that the conduct of Rhode Island, in recalling its delegates 
 from Congress, has demonstrated the necessity of such a power 
 being lodged in Congress. I have been informed by the people 
 belonging to Rhode Island, Sir, that that State never has recalled 
 its delegates from Congress. I do not believe it has. And I 
 call upon the gentleman who mentioned it, to authenticate the 
 fact. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. King rose, and assured the Convention .that 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 121 
 
 the State of Rhode Island did, by a solemn resolution, some 
 time since, recall its delegates from Congress. 
 
 The Hon Mr. Gorham confirmed what Mr. King had said, 
 and added, that during the session of the Federal Convention, 
 when seven States only were represented in Congress, applica- 
 tion was made by two companies for the purchase of lands, the 
 sale of which would have sunk seven or eight millions of dollars 
 of the continental debt, and that the most pressing letters were 
 sent on to Rhode Island to send on its delegates, but that State 
 refused. The consequence was, the contract could not then be 
 made. 
 
 Mr. Bishop confessed himself convinced of the fact. He 
 proceeded to observe, that if the States shall refuse to do their 
 duty, then let the power be given to Congress to oblige them to 
 doit: but i% they do their duty, Congress ought not to have 
 a power to control elections. In an uncontrolled representation, 
 says Mr. Bishop, lies the security of freedom ; and he thought 
 by these clauses, that freedom was sported with. In fact, 
 says he, the moment we give Congress this power, the liberties 
 of the yeomanry of this country are at an end. But he trusted 
 they would never give it ; and he felt a consolation from the 
 reflection. 
 
 The fourth section, which provides that the State legislatures 
 shall prescribe the time, place and manner of holding elections, 
 and that Congress may at any time make or alter them, except 
 in case of Senators, [though not in regular order,] was now 
 under deliberation. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Strong followed Mr. Bishop, and pointed out 
 the necessity there is for the fourth section. The power, says 
 he, to regulate the elections of our federal representatives must 
 be lodged somewhere. I know of but two bodies wherein it 
 can be lodged — the Legislatures of the several States, and the 
 General Congress. If the legislative bodies of the States, who 
 must be supposed to know at what time, and in what place and 
 manner, the elections can best be held, should so appoint them, 
 it cannot be supposed that Congress, by the power granted by 
 this section, will alter them. But if a legislature of a State 
 should refuse to make such regulations, the consequence will 
 be, that the representatives will not be chosen, and the general 
 
 16 
 
122 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 government will be dissolved. In such case, can gentlemen 
 say that a power to remedy the evil is not necessary to be lodged 
 somewhere ? And where can it be lodged but in Congress ? I 
 will consider its advantage in another respect : we know, Sir, 
 that a negligence in the appointment of rulers is the character- 
 istic of all nations. In this State, and since the establishment 
 of our present Constitution, the first officers of government 
 have been elected by less than one-tenth part of the electors in 
 the State. We also know that our town meetings, for the 
 choice of officers, are generally attended by an inconsiderable 
 part of the qualified voters. People attend so much to their 
 private interest, that they are apt to neglect this right. Nations 
 have lost their liberties by neglecting their privileges ; conse- 
 quently Congress ought to have an interposing power to awaken 
 the people, when thus negligent. Even supposing! Sir, the pro- 
 visional clause suggested by the worthy gentleman from Norton, 
 should be added — would not Congress then be the judges 
 whether the elections in the several States were constitutional 
 ,and proper ? If so, it will then stand on the same ground it 
 now does. It appears evident that there must be a general 
 power to regulate general elections. Gentlemen have said, the 
 proposed Constitution was in some places ambiguous. I wish 
 they would point out the particular instances of ambiguity ; for 
 my part I think the whole of it is expressed in the plain, com- 
 mon language of mankind. If any parts are not so explicit as 
 they could be, it cannot be attributed to any design ; for I be- 
 lieve a great majority of the men who formed it were sincere 
 and honest men. 
 
 Mr. Bishop said, the great difficulty with him was, that the 
 power given by the fourth section was unlimited ; and he did 
 not yet see that any advantage would arise from its being so. 
 
 Mr. Cabot (of Beverly) not having spoke upon the question 
 of biennial elections of representatives, begged leave to revert 
 to that subject, so far as to add to what had been said by others, 
 ithat we should consider of the particular business which that 
 ■body will be frequently called upon to transact, especially in 
 .the way of revenue. We should consider, that on a question 
 -of supplies of money to support a war, or purchase a treaty, it 
 will be impossible for those representatives to judge of the ex- 
 
1788.1 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 123 
 
 J • 
 
 pediency or inexpediency of such supplies, until they shall have 
 had time to become acquainted with the general system of fed- 
 eral politics, in its connection or relation to foreign powers ; be- 
 cause upon the situation of those must depend the propriety or 
 impropriety of granting supplies. If to this be added a due 
 attention to the easiest way of raising such supplies, it must 
 appear, that biennial elections are as frequent as is consistent 
 with using the power of the representatives, for the benefit of 
 their constituents. 
 
 Mr. Cabot then turned to the fourth section, now under debate, 
 and said : It gives me no pain to see the anxiety of different 
 gentlemen concerning the paragraph under consideration, as it 
 evidences a conviction in their minds of what I believe to be 
 true, that a free and equal representation is the best, if not the 
 only, foundation upon which a free government can be built, and 
 consequently that the greatest care should be taken in laying 
 it. I am, Sir, one of the people ; such I shall continue, and 
 with their feelings I hold " that the right of electing persons 
 to represent the people in the federal government, is an impor- 
 tant and sacred right." The opinions that have been offered 
 upon the manner in which the exercise of this right is provided 
 for by the fourth section, satisfy me that we are all solicitous 
 for the same end, and that we only differ as to the means of at- 
 taining it ; and for my own part I confess that I prize the fourth 
 section as highly as any in the Constitution ; because I consider 
 the democratic branch of the National Government, the branch 
 chosen immediately by the people, as intended to be a check on 
 the federal branch, which latter is not an immediate represen- 
 tation of the people of America, and is not chosen by them, 
 but is a representation of the sovereignty of the individual 
 States, and its members delegated by the several State legisla- 
 tures ; and if the State legislatures are suffered to regulate con- 
 clusively the elections of the democratic branch, they may, by 
 such an interference, first weaken, and at last destroy, that 
 check ; they may at first diminish, and finally annihilate, that 
 control of the General Government which the people ought 
 always to have through their immediate representatives. As one 
 of the people, therefore, I repeat, that, in my mind, the fourth 
 section is to be as highly prized as any in the Constitution. 
 
124 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. ["1788. 
 
 Mr. Parsons contended for the vesting in Congress the pow- 
 ers contained in the fourth section, not only as those powers 
 were necessary for preserving the Union, but also for securing 
 to the people their equal rights of election. He considered the 
 subject very fully, but we are able to give our readers very im- 
 perfectly the heads of his speech. In the Congress, not only 
 the sovereignty of the States is represented in the Senate, but, 
 to balance their power, and to give the people a suitable and 
 efficient check upon them, the Federal Representatives are intro- 
 duced into Congress. The legislatures of the several States are 
 the constituents of the Senate, and the people are the constitu- 
 ents of the Representatives. These two branches therefore, have 
 different constituents, and as they are designed as mutual checks 
 upon each other, and to balance the legislative powers, there 
 will be frequent struggles and contentions between them. The 
 Senate will wish to control, depress and render inefficient, the 
 Representatives. The same disposition in the Representatives 
 towards the Senate, will produce the like exertions on their 
 part. The Senate will call upon their constituents, the legisla- 
 tures, for aid. The Representatives will look up to the people 
 for support. If, therefore, the power of making and altering 
 the regulations denned in this section, are vested absolutely in 
 the legislature, the Representatives will very soon be reduced 
 to an undue dependence upon the Senate, because the power of 
 influencing and controling the election of the representatives of 
 the people, will be exerted without control by the constituents 
 of the senators. He further observed, that there was much less 
 danger in trusting these powers in Congress, than in the State 
 legislatures ; for if the Federal Representatives wished to intro- 
 duce suqfr regulations as would secure to them their places, and 
 a continuance in office, the Federal Senate would never consent, 
 because it would increase the influence and check of the Rep- 
 resentatives ; and, on the other hand, if the Senate were aim- 
 ing at regulations to increase their own influence by depressing 
 the Representatives, the consent of the latter never would be 
 obtained, and no other regulations would ever obtain the con- 
 sent of both branches of the legislature, but such as did not 
 affect their mutual rights and the balance of government — and 
 those regulations will be for the benefit of the people. But a 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 125 
 
 State legislature, under the influence of their Senators, who 
 would have their fullest confidence, or under the influence of 
 ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular commo- 
 tion, and when faction and party spirit run high, would intro- 
 duce such regulations as would render the rights of the people 
 insecure, and of little value. They might make an unequal 
 and partial division of the State into districts for the election of 
 representatives, or they might even disqualify one-third of the 
 electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can 
 have no remedy. But the fourth section provides a remedy, a 
 controlling power, in a legislature composed of senators and 
 representatives of twelve States, without the influence of our 
 commotions and factions, who will hear impartially, and pre- 
 serve and restore to the people their equal and sacred rights of 
 election. Perhaps it then will be objected, that, from the sup- 
 posed opposition of interests in the Federal legislature, they 
 may never agree upon any regulations ; but regulations neces- 
 sary to the interests of the people can never be opposed to 
 the interests of either of the branches of the Federal legisla- 
 ture, because the interests of the people require that the mutual 
 powers of that legislature should be preserved unimpaired, in 
 order to balance the government. Indeed, if the Congress 
 could never agree on any regulations, then certainly no objec- 
 tion to the fourth section can remain, for the regulations intro- 
 duced by the State legislatures will be the governing rule of 
 elections, until Congress can agree upon alterations. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery insisted that we had a right to be jealous of 
 our rulers, who ought never to have a power which they could 
 abuse. The fourth section ought to have gone further — it ought 
 to have had the provision in it mentioned by Mr. Bishop. There 
 would then be a mutual check : and he still wished it to be 
 further explained. The worthy gentleman contested the simil- 
 itude made by the honorable gentleman from Newburyport, be- 
 tween the power to be given to Congress by the fourth section, 
 to compel the States to send representatives, and the power 
 given to the legislature by our own Constitution, to oblige towns 
 to send representatives to the general court, by observing that 
 the case was materially different ; as, in the latter, if any town 
 refuses to send representatives, a power of fining such town 
 
126 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 only is given. It is in vain, says Mr. Wedgery, to say that 
 rulers are not subject to passions and prejudices. In the last 
 general court, of which I was a member, I would, willingly have 
 deprived the three western counties from sending delegates to 
 this house, as I then thought it unnecessary. But, Sir, what 
 would have been the consequence ? A large part of the State 
 would have been deprived of their dearest privileges. I men- 
 tion this, Sir, to show the force of passion and prejudice. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. White said, we ought to be jealous of rulers. 
 All the godly men we read of have failed — nay, he would not 
 trust " a flock of Moseses." If we give up this section, says 
 he, there is nothing left. Suppose the Congress should say 
 that none should be electors but those worth 50/. or an 100/. 
 sterling — cannot they do it ? Yes, says he, they can ; and if 
 any lawyer (alluding to Mr. Parsons) can beat me out of it, I 
 will give him ten guineas. 
 
 Col. Jones (of Bristol) thought, by this power to regulate 
 elections, Congress might keep themselves in to all duration. 
 
 The Rev. Mr. Perley wished Mr. Gerry might be asked some 
 questions on this section. 
 
 [But Mr. Gerry was not in the house.] 
 
 Mr. J. C. Jones said, it was not right to argue the possibility 
 of the abuse of any measure, against its adoption. The power 
 granted to Congress by the fourth section, says he, is a neces- 
 sary power ; it will provide against negligence and dangerous 
 designs. The senators and representatives of this State, Mr. 
 President, are now chosen by a small number of electors ; and 
 it is likely we shall grow equally negligent of our Federal elec- 
 tions ; or, Sir, a State may refuse to send to Congress its repre- 
 sentatives, as Rhode Island has done. Thus we see its neces- 
 sity. To say that the power may be abused, is saying what will 
 apply to all power. The Federal representatives will represent 
 the people; they will be the people, and it is not probable they 
 will abuse themselves. Mr. Jones concluded with repeating, 
 that the arguments against this power could be urged against 
 any power whatever. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. Many gentlemen have inferred from the right 
 of regulating elections, by the fourth section being invested in 
 the federal head, that the powers of wresting this essential priv- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 127 
 
 ilege from the people would be equally delegated : but it ap- 
 peared to him, he said, that there was a very material distinc- 
 tion in the two cases : for, however possible it may be that this 
 controlling authority may be abused, it by no means followed, 
 that Congress in any situation could strip the people of their 
 right to a direct representation. If he could believe in this, 
 he should readily join in sentiment with gentlemen on the other 
 side of the house, that this section alone would be a sufficient 
 objection to the Constitution itself. The right of election, 
 founded on the principle of equality, was, he said, the basis on 
 which the whole superstructure was erected. This right was 
 inherent in the people ; it was unalienable in its nature, and it 
 could not be destroyed without presuming a power to subvert 
 the Constitution of which this was the principle ; and by recur- 
 ring to the second section it would appear that " representatives 
 and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
 according to their respective numbers;" it equally appeared 
 that thirty thousand inhabitants were entitled to send a repre- 
 sentative, and that wherever this number was found they would 
 have a right to be represented in the Federal legislature. If it 
 was argued that Congress might abuse their power, and, by 
 varying the places of election, distress the people, it could only 
 be observed, that such a wanton abuse could not be supposed : 
 but if it could go to the annihilation of the right, he contended 
 the people would not submit. He considered the Constitution 
 as an elective democracy, in which the sovereignty still rested 
 in the people, and he by no means could believe that this article 
 was so alarming in its nature, or dangerous in its tendency, as 
 many gentlemen had supposed. 
 
 Mr. Holmes, in reply to Dr. Jarvis, said, the worthy gentle- 
 man's superstructure must fall to the ground, for the Constitu- 
 tion does not provide that every thirty thousand shall send a 
 representative, but that it shall not exceed one for every thirty 
 thousand. 
 
128 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Thursday, January 17, 1788. 
 
 The fourth section still under deliberation. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Turner. Mr. President : I am pleased with the 
 ingenuity of some gentlemen in defence of this section. I am 
 so impressed with the love of liberty so dearly bought, that I 
 heartily acquiesce in compulsory laws, for the people ought to 
 be obliged to attend to their interest. But I do not wish to 
 give Congress a power which they can abuse ; and I wish to 
 know whether such a power is not contained in this section. I 
 think it is. I now proceed, Sir, to the consideration of an idea 
 that Congress may alter the place of choosing representatives 
 in the General Congress. They may order that it may be at 
 the extremity of a State, and, by their influence, may there 
 prevail, that persons may be chosen who otherwise would not ; 
 by reason that a part of the qualified voters in part of the State 
 would be so incommoded thereby, as to be debarred from their 
 right, as much as if they were bound at home. If so, such a 
 circumstance would militate against the Constitution, wlwch 
 allows every man to vote. Altering the place, will put it so far 
 in the power of Congress as that the representatives chosen will 
 not be the true and genuine representatives of the people, but 
 creatures of the Congress ; and so far as they are so, so far are 
 the people deprived of their rights, and the choice will be made 
 in an irregular and unconstitutional manner. When this alter- 
 ation is made by Congress, may we not suppose whose reelec- 
 tion will be provided for ? Would it not be for those who were 
 chosen before ? The great law of self-preservation will prevail. 
 It is true, they might, one time in a hundred, provide for a 
 friend, but most commonly for themselves. But, however hon- 
 orable the Convention may be who proposed this article, I think 
 it is a genuine power for Congress to perpetuate themselves ; a 
 power that cannot be unexceptionably exercised in any case 
 whatever. Knowing the numerous arts that designing men are 
 prone to, to secure their election, and perpetuate themselves, it 
 is my hearty wish that a rotation may be provided for. I re- 
 spect and revere the Convention who proposed this Constitution. 
 In order that the power given to Congress may be more palata- 
 ble, some gentlemen are pleased to hold up the idea that we 
 
1788.] ' DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 129 
 
 may be blessed with sober, solid, upright men in Congress. I 
 wish that we may be favored with such rulers ; but I fear they 
 will not all, if most, be the best moral or political characters. 
 It gives me pain, and I believe it gives pain to others, thus to 
 characterize the country in which I was born. I will endeavor 
 to guard against any injurious reflections against my fellow- 
 citizens. But they must have their true characters ; and if I 
 represent them wrong, I am willing to make concessions. I 
 think that the operation of paper money, and the practice of 
 privateering, have produced a gradual decay of morals, intro- 
 duced pride, ambition, envy, lust of power, produced a decay 
 of patriotism and the love of commutative justice ; and I am 
 apprehensive these are the invariable concomitants of the lux- 
 ury in which we are unblessedly involved, almost to our total 
 destruction. In the lower ranks of people, luxury and avarice 
 operate to the want of public duty and the payment of debts. 
 These demonstrate the necessity of an energetic government. 
 As people become more luxurious, they become more incapaci- 
 tated for governing themselves. And are we not so ? Alike 
 people, alike prince. But suppose it should so happen that the 
 administrators of this Constitution should be preferable to the 
 corrupt mass of the people, in point of manners, morals and 
 rectitude ; power will give a keen edge to the principles I have 
 mentioned. Ought we not, then, to put all checks and controls 
 on governors, for the public safety ? Therefore, instead of giv- 
 ing Congress powers they may not abuse, we ought to withhold 
 our hands from granting such as must be abused if exercised. 
 This is a general observation. But to the point : At the time 
 of the Restoration, the people of England were so vexed, har- 
 rassed and worn down by the anarchical and confused state of 
 the nation, owing to the Commonwealth not being well digested, 
 that they took an opposite career — they ran mad with loyalty, 
 and would have given Charles any thing he could have asked. 
 Pardon me, Sir, if I say I feel the want of an energetic govern- 
 ment, and the dangers to which this dear country is reduced, 
 as much as any citizen of the United States ; but I cannot pre- 
 vail on myself to adopt a government which wears the face of 
 power, without examining it. Relinquishing an hair's breadth 
 in a Constitution is a great deal ; for by small degrees has lib- 
 17 
 
130 DEBATES OF CONTENTION. ' [1788. 
 
 erty in all nations been wrested from the hands of the people. 
 I know great powers are necessary to be given to Congress, but 
 I wish they may foe well guarded. 
 
 Judge Sumner, remarking on Gen. Thompson's frequent 
 exclamation, of " 0, my country!" expressed from an appre- 
 hension that the Constitution would be adopted, said, that ex- 
 pression might be used with greater propriety should this Con- 
 vention reject it. The honorable gentleman then proceeded to 
 demonstrate the necessity of the fourth section ; the absurdity 
 of the supposition that Congress would remove the places of 
 election to remote parts of the States ; combated the idea that 
 Congress would, when chosen, act as bad as possible ; and con- 
 cluded by asking, if a war should take place, (and it was sup- 
 posable,) if France and Holland should send an army to collect 
 the millions of livres they have lent us in the time of our dis- 
 tresses, and that army should be in possession of the seat of 
 government of any particular State, (as was the case when Lord 
 Cornwallis ravaged Carolina,) and the State legislature could 
 not appoint the elections, is not a power to provide for such 
 elections necessary to be lodged in the general Congress ? 
 
 Mr. Wedgery denied the statement of Dr. Jarvis (that every 
 thirty thousand persons can elect one representative) to be just, 
 as the Constitution provides that the number shall not exceed 
 one to every thirty thousand. It did not follow, he thought, 
 that the thirty thousand shall elect one. But admitting that 
 they have a right to choose one, we will suppose Congress should 
 order an election to be in Boston, in January, and from the 
 scarcity of money, &c, not a fourth part could attend, would 
 not three-quarters of the people be deprived of their right ? 
 
 Rev. Mr. West. I rise to express my astonishment at the 
 arguments of some gentlemen against this section. They have 
 only started possible objections ; I wish the gentlemen would 
 show us that what they so much deprecate is probable. Is it 
 probable that we shall choose men to ruin us ? Are we to ob- 
 ject to all governments ? and because power may be abused, 
 shall we be reduced to anarchy and a state of nature ? What 
 hinders our State legislature from abusing their power ? They 
 may violate the Constitution ; they may levy taxes, oppressive 
 and intolerable, to the amount of all our property. An argu- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 131 
 
 ment which proves too much, it is said, proves nothing. Some 
 say, Congress may remove the place of elections to the State of 
 South Carolina. This is inconsistent with the words of the 
 Constitution, which says, " that the elections shall be prescribed 
 in each State by the legislature thereof," &c, and that repre- 
 sentation shall be apportioned according to numbers. It will 
 frustrate the end of the Constitution, and is a reflection on the 
 gentlemen who formed it. Can we, Sir, suppose them so wick- 
 ed, so vile, as to recommend an article so dangerous ? Surely 
 gentlemen who argue these possibilities, show they have a very 
 weak cause. That we may all be free from passions, prepos- 
 sessions and party spirit, I sincerely hope, otherwise reason will 
 have no effect. I hope there are none here but who are open 
 to conviction, as it is the surest method to gain the suffrages of 
 our consciences. The honorable gentleman from Scituate has 
 told us that the people of England, at the Restoration, on ac- 
 count of the inconveniences of the confused state of the Com- 
 monwealth, ran mad with loyalty. If the gentleman means to 
 apply this to us, we ought to adopt this Constitution ; for if the 
 people are running mad after an energetic government, it is best 
 to stop now, as, by his rule, they may run further and get a 
 worse one ; therefore the gentleman's arguments turn right 
 against himself. Is it possible that imperfect man can make a 
 perfect Constitution ? Is it possible that a frame of government 
 can be devised by such weak and frail creatures, but what must 
 savor of that weakness ? Though there are some things 
 that I do not like in this Constitution, yet I think it necessary 
 that it should be adopted. For may we not rationally conclude 
 that the persons we shall choose to administer it, will be, in 
 general, good men ? 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Mr. President, I have frequently heard of 
 the abilities and fame of the learned and reverend gentleman 
 last speaking, and now I am witness to them. But, Sir, one 
 thing surprises me : It is, to hear the worthy gentleman insin- 
 uate that our Federal rulers will undoubtedly be good men, 
 and that, therefore, we have little to fear from their being in- 
 trusted with all power. This, Sir, is quite contrary to the com- 
 mon language of the clergy, who are continually representing 
 mankind as reprobate and deceitful, and that we really grow 
 
132 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 worse and worse day after day. I really believe we do, Sir, and 
 I make no doubt to prove it before I sit down, from the Old 
 Testament. When I consider the man that slew the lion and 
 the bear, and that he was a man after God's own heart ; when 
 I consider his son, blest with all wisdom, and the errors they 
 fell into, I extremely doubt the infallibility of human nature. 
 Sir, I suspect my own heart, and I shall suspect our rulers. 
 
 Dr. Holten thought this paragraph necessary to a complete 
 system of government. 
 
 [But the honorable gentleman spoke so low that we could not 
 hear him distinctly throughout.] 
 
 Capt. Snow. It has been said, Mr. President, that there is 
 too much power delegated to Congress by the section under con- 
 sideration. I doubt it. I think power the hinge on which the 
 whole Constitution turns. Gentlemen have talked about Con- 
 gress moving the place of elections from Georgia to the Mohawk 
 River, but I never can believe it. I will venture to conjecture 
 we shall have some honest men in our Congress. We read that 
 there were two who brought a good report — Caleb and Joshua. 
 Now, if there are but two in Congress who are honest men, and 
 Congress should attempt to do what the gentlemen say they will, 
 (which will be high treason,) they will bring a report of it ; 
 and I stand ready to leave my wife and family — sling my knap- 
 sack — travel westward — to cut their heads off. I, Sir, since the 
 war, have had commerce with six different nations of the globe, 
 and I have inquired in what estimation America is held; and, 
 if I may believe good, honest, credible men, I find this country 
 held in the same light by foreign nations as a well-behaved negro 
 in a gentleman's family. Suppose, Mr. President, I had a 
 chance to make a good voyage, but I tie my captain up to such 
 strict orders that he can go to no other island to sell my vessel, 
 although there is a certainty of his doing well. The conse- 
 quence is, he returns, but makes a bad voyage, because he had 
 not power enough to act his judgment (for honest men do 
 right). Thus, Sir, Congress cannot save us from destruction, 
 because we tie their hands and give them no power ; (I think 
 people have lost their privileges by not improving them ;) and 
 I like this power being vested in Congress as well as any para- 
 graph in the Constitution — for as the man is accountable for his 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 133 
 
 conduct, I think there is no danger. Now, Mr. President, to 
 take all things into consideration, something more must be said 
 to convince me to the contrary. 
 
 [Several other gentlemen went largely into the debate on the 
 fourth section, which those in favor of it demonstrated to be 
 necessary : first, as it may be used to correct a negligence in 
 elections ; secondly, as it will prevent the dissolution of the 
 government by designing and refractory States ; thirdly, as it 
 will operate as a check, in favor of the people, against any de- 
 signs of the Federal Senate, and their constituents, the State 
 legislatures, to deprive the people of their right of election ; 
 and, fourthly, as it provides a remedy for the evil, should any 
 State, by invasion, or other cause, not have it in its power to 
 appoint a place where the citizens thereof may meet to choose 
 their Federal representatives. Those against it urged, that the 
 power is unlimited and unnecessary.] 
 
 The Committee appointed to provide a more suitable place for 
 the Convention to sit in, reported that the meeting-house in 
 Long Lane, in Boston, was prepared for that purpose ; where- 
 upon, 
 
 Voted, That when this Convention adjourn they will adjourn 
 to that place. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 The second paragraph of the second section of the first article 
 was reverted to, and some debate had thereon. 
 
 Gen. Thompson thought there should have been some quali- 
 fication of property in a representative ; for, says he, when men 
 have nothing to lose, they have nothing' to fear. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick said, that this objection was founded on 
 an anti-democratical principle ; and he was surprised that gen- 
 tlemen who appeared so strenuously to advocate the rights of 
 the people, should wish to exclude from the Federal government 
 a good man because he was not a rich one. 
 
 Mr. King said that gentlemen had made it a question, why a 
 qualification of property in a representative is omitted, and that 
 they thought the provision of such a qualification necessary. 
 He thought otherwise ; he never knew that property was an 
 
134 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 index to abilities. We often see men, said he, who, though 
 destitute of property, are superior in knowledge and rectitude. 
 The men who have most injured the country, have most com- 
 monly been rich men. Such a qualification was proposed in 
 Convention, but by the delegates of Massachusetts, it was con- 
 tested that it should not obtain. He observed, that no such 
 qualification is required by the Confederation. In reply to Gen. 
 Thompson's question, why disqualification of age was not added, 
 the honorable gentleman said that it would not extend to all 
 parts of the continent alike. Life, says he, in a great measure 
 depends on climate. What in the southern States would be 
 accounted long life, would be but the meridian in the northern ; 
 what here is the time of ripened judgment, is old age there. 
 Therefore the want of such a disqualification cannot be made 
 an objection to the Constitution. 
 
 The third paragraph of the second section being read, 
 Mr. King rose to explain it. There has, says he, been much 
 misconception on this section. It is a principle of this Consti- 
 tution, that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. 
 This paragraph states that the number of free persons shall be 
 determined, by adding to the whole number of free persons, in- 
 cluding those bound to service for a term of years, and exclud- 
 ing Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. These 
 persons are the slaves. By this rule is representation and tax- 
 ation to be apportioned. And it was adopted, because it was 
 the language of all America. According to the Confederation, 
 ratified in 1781, the sums for the general welfare and defence 
 should be apportioned according to the surveyed lands, and im- 
 provements thereon, in the several States. But it hath never 
 been in the power of Congress to follow that rule ; the returns 
 from the several States being so very imperfect. 
 
 Dr. Taylor thought that the number of members to be chosen 
 for the House of Representatives, was too small. The whole 
 Union was entitled to send but sixty-five ; whereas, by the old 
 Confederation, they send ninety-one ; a reduction of thirty per 
 cent. He had heard it objected, that if a larger number were 
 sent, the house would be unwieldy. He thought our House of 
 Representatives, which sometimes consists of one hundred and 
 fifty, was not unwieldy ; and if the number of the Federal repre- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 135 
 
 sentatives was enlarged to twice sixty-five, he thought it would 
 not be too large. He then proceeded to answer another objec- 
 tion, " that an increase of numbers would be an increase of 
 expense," and by calculation demonstrated that the salaries of 
 the full number he wished, would, in a year, amount only to 
 .£2,980 — about one penny on a poll ; and by this increase, he 
 thought every part of the Commonwealth would be represented. 
 The distresses of the people would thereby be more fully known 
 and relieved. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery asked, if a boy of six years of age was to be 
 considered as a free person ? 
 
 Mr. King, in answer, said, all persons born free were to be 
 considered as freemen ; and to make the idea of taxation by 
 numbers more intelligible, said, that five negro children of South 
 Carolina are to pay as much tax as the three governors of New 
 Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut. 
 
 Mr. Gorham thought the proposed section much in favor of 
 Massachusetts ; and if it operated against any State, it was 
 Pennsylvania, because they have more white persons bound than 
 any other. Mr. Gorham corrected an observation of Dr. Tay- 
 lor's, that the States now send ninety-one delegates to Congress 
 — which was not the case. The States do not, he said, send 
 near that number ; and instanced Massachusetts, which sends 
 but four. He concluded by saying, that the Constitution pro- 
 vides for an increase of members, as numbers increase, and 
 that in fifty years there will be three hundred and sixty — in one 
 hundred years, fourteen or fifteen hundred, if the Constitution 
 last so long. 
 
 Judge Dana, remarking on the assertions of Dr. Taylor, that 
 the number of representatives 'was too small, that the whole 
 Union was now entitled to send but sixty-five, whereas by the 
 Confederation they might send ninety-one, a reduction of thirty 
 per cent., said, if the Constitution under consideration was, in 
 fact, what its opposers had often called it, a consolidation of the 
 States, he should readily agree with that gentleman that the 
 representation of the people was much too small ; but this was 
 a charge brought against it without any foundation in truth. 
 So far from it, that it must be apparent to every one, that the 
 Federal government springs out of, and can alone be brought 
 
136 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 into existence by, the State governments. Demolish the latter, 
 and there is an end of the former. Had the Continental Con- 
 vention, then, doubled the representation, agreeably to that 
 gentleman's ideas, would not the people of this Commonwealth 
 have been the first to complain of it as an unnecessary burden 
 laid upon them ; that, in addition to their own domestic gov- 
 ernment they had been charged with the support of so numer- 
 ous a national government. Would they not have contended 
 for the demolition of the one or the other, as being unable to 
 support both. Would they have been satisfied by being told 
 that doubling the representation would yearly amount only " to 
 about one penny upon a poll." Does not the gentleman know 
 that the expense of our own numerous representation lias excit- 
 ed much ill will against the government ? Has he never heard 
 it said among the people that our public affairs would be as well 
 conducted by half the number of representatives ? If he has 
 not, I have, Sir, and believe it to be true. BiU the gentleman 
 says there is a reduction of thirty per cent, in the Federal rep- 
 resentation, as the whole Union can send but sixty-five mem- 
 bers, when under the Confederation they may send ninety-one. 
 The gentleman has not made a fair calculation. For if to the 
 sixty-five representatives under the proposed Constitution we 
 add two senators from each State, amounting to twenty-six in 
 all, we shall have the same number, ninety-one, so that in this 
 respect there is no difference. Besides, this representation will 
 increase with the population of the States, and soon become 
 sufficiently large to meet that gentleman's ideas. I would just 
 .observe, that by the Confederation this State has a right to send 
 seven members to Congress ; yet although the legislature hath 
 sometimes chosen the w r hole number, I believe at no time have 
 they had or wished to have more than four of them actually in 
 Congress. Have any ill consequences arisen from this small 
 representation in the national council ? Have our liberties been 
 endangered by it ? No one will say they have. The honorable 
 gentleman drW a parallel between the eastern and southern 
 States, and showed the injustice done the former, by the present 
 mode of apportioning taxes, according to surveyed land and 
 improvements, and the consequent advantage therefrom to the 
 latter, their property not lying in improvements, in buildings, <fec. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 137 
 
 In reply to the remark of some gentlemen, that the southern 
 States were favored in this mode of apportionment, by having 
 five of their negroes set against three persons in the eastern, 
 the honorable judge observed, that the negroes of the southern 
 States work no longer than when the eye of the driver is on 
 them. Can, asked he, that land flourish like this which is cul- 
 tivated by the hands of freemen ? And are not three of these 
 independent freemen of more real advantage to a State, than 
 five of those poor slaves ? As a friend to equal taxation, he 
 rejoiced that an opportunity was presented in this Constitution, 
 to change this unjust mode of apportionment. Indeed, con- 
 cluded he, from a survey of every part of the Constitution, I 
 think it the best that the wisdom of man could suggest. 
 
 Mr. Nasson remarked on the statement of the Hon. Mr. King, 
 by saying, that the honorable gentleman should have gone fur- 
 ther, and shown us the other side of the question. It is a 
 good rule that works both ways f .and the gentleman should 
 also have told us, that three of our infants in the cradle are to 
 be rated as high as five of the working negroes of Virginia. 
 Mr. Nasson adverted to a statement of Mr. King, who had said, 
 that five negro children of South Carolina were equally rata- 
 ble as three governors of New England, and wished, he said, 
 the honorable gentleman had considered this question upon the 
 other side, as it would then appear that this State will pay as 
 great a tax for three children in the cradle, as any of the south- 
 ern States will for five hearty working negro men. He hoped, 
 he said, while we were making a new government, we should 
 make it better than the old one ; for if we had made a bad 
 bargain before, as had been hinted, it was a reason why we 
 should make a better one now. 
 
 Mr. Randal begged leave to answer a remark of the Hon. 
 Mr. Dana, which he thought reflected on the barrenness of the 
 southern States. He spoke from his own personal knowledge, 
 he said, and he could say, that the land in general in those 
 States was preferable to any he ever saw. 
 
 Judge Dana rose to set the gentleman right. He said it was 
 not the quality of the lands, but the manner of tilling it, that 
 he alluded to. 
 
 18 
 
138 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Friday, January 18, 1788. 
 
 The third paragraph of the second section of Article I. still 
 under consideration. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dalton opened the conversation with some remarks 
 on Mr. Randal's positive assertions of the fertility of the south- 
 ern States ; he said, from his own observation, and from ac- 
 counts he had seen, which were better, he could say that the 
 gentleman's remark was not perfectly accurate. The honorable 
 gentleman showed why it was not so, by stating the inconsider- 
 able product of the land ;• which, though it might in part be 
 owing to the faithlessness and ignorance of the slaves who cul- 
 tivate it, he said, was in a greater measure owing to the want 
 of heart in the soil. 
 
 Mr. Randal. Mr. President, I rise to make an observation 
 on the suggestion of the honorable gentleman from Newbury. 
 I have, Sir, travelled in the southern States, and should be glad 
 to compare our knowledge on the subject, together. In Caro- 
 lina, Mr. President, if they do not get more than twenty or 
 thirty bushels of corn from an acre, they think it a small crop. 
 On the low lands they sometimes get forty. I hope, Sir, these 
 great men of eloquence and learning will not try to make argu- 
 ments to make this Constitution go down, right or wrong. 
 An old saying, Sir, is, that a good thing- don't need praising; 
 but, Sir, it takes the best men in the State to gloss this 
 Constitution, which they say is the best that human wisdom 
 can invent. In praise of it, we hear the reverend clergy, the 
 judges of the supreme court, and the ablest lawyers, exerting 
 their utmost abilities. Now, Sir, suppose all this artillery 
 turned the other way, and these great men would speak half as 
 much against it, we might complete our business, and go home 
 in forty-eight hours. Let us, Sir, consider we are acting for 
 the people, and for ages unborn ; let us deal fairly and above- 
 board. Every one comes here to discharge his duty to his con- 
 stituents, and 1 hope none will be biased by the best orators ; 
 because we are not acting for ourselves. I think Congress 
 ought to have power, such as is for the good of the nation, but 
 what it is, let a more able man than I, tell us. 
 
 Mr. Dawes said, he was sorry to hear so many objections 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 139 
 
 raised against the paragraph under consideration. He thought 
 them wholly unfounded ; that the black inhabitants of the 
 southern States must be considered either as slaves, and as so 
 much property, or in the character of so many free men ; if the 
 former, why should they not be wholly represented ? Our own 
 State laws and Constitution would lead us to consider those 
 blacks as free men, and so indeed would our own ideas of nat- 
 ural justice. If then, they are free men, they might form an 
 equal basis for representation as though they were all white 
 inhabitants. In either view, therefore, he could not see that 
 the northern States would suffer, but directly to the contrary. 
 He thought, however, that gentlemen would do well to connect 
 the passage in dispute with another article in the Constitution, 
 that permits Congress in the year 1808, wholly to prohibit the 
 importation of slaves, and in the mean time to impose a duty 
 of ten dollars a head on such blacks as should be imported 
 before that period. Besides, by the new Constitution, every 
 particular State is left to its own option totally to prohibit the 
 introduction of slaves into its own territories. What could the 
 Convention do more ? The members of the southern States, 
 like ourselves, have their prejudices. It would not do to abol- 
 ish slavery by an act of Congress, in a moment, and so destroy 
 what our southern brethren consider as property. But we 
 may say, that although slavery is not smitten by an apoplexy, 
 yet it has received a mortal wound, and will die of a consump- 
 tion. 
 
 Mr. Dawes said, the paragraph in debate related only to the 
 rule of apportioning internal taxes, but gentlemen had gone 
 into a consideration of the question, whether Congress should 
 have the power of laying and collecting such taxes ; which he 
 thought would be more properly discussed under the section 
 relative to the powers of Congress. But as objections had been 
 suggested, the answers might be hinted as we went along. By 
 the old articles, said he, Congress have a right to ascertain 
 what sums are necessary for the Union, and to appropriate the 
 same ; but have no authority to draw such moneys from the 
 States. The States are under an honorary obligation to raise 
 the moneys ; but Congress cannot compel a compliance with 
 the obligation. So long as we withhold that authority from 
 
140 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Congress, so long we may be said to give it to the other nations. 
 Let us contemplate the loan we have negotiated with the Dutch. 
 Our ambassador has bound us all jointly and severally to pay 
 the money borrowed. When pay-day shall come, how is the 
 money to be raised ? Congress cannot collect it. If any one 
 State shall disobey a requisition, the Dutch are left in such a 
 case to put their own demand in force for themselves. They 
 must raise by arms what we are afraid Congress shall collect by 
 the law of peace. There is a prejudice, said Mr. Dawes, against 
 direct taxation, which arises from the manner in which it has 
 been abused by the errors of the old ' Confederation. Con- 
 gress had it not in their power to draw a revenue from com- 
 merce, and therefore multiplied their requisitions on the States. 
 Massachusetts, willing to pay her part, made her own trade- 
 law, on which the trade departed to such of our neighbors as 
 made no such impositions on commerce. Thus we lost what 
 little revenue we had, and our only recourse was to a direct 
 taxation. In addition to this, foreign nations, knowing this 
 inability of Congress, have on that account been backward in 
 their negotiations, and have lent us money at a premium which 
 bore some proportion to the risk they had of getting payment ; 
 and this extraordinary expense has fallen at last on the land. 
 Some gentlemen have said that Congress may draw their reve- 
 nue wholly by direct taxes. But they cannot be induced so to 
 do ; it is easier for them to have resort to the impost and excise. 
 But as it, will not do to over-burden the impost, (because that 
 would promote smuggling, and be dangerous to the revenue,) 
 therefore Congress should have the power of applying, in 
 extraordinary cases, to direct taxation. War may take place, 
 in which case it would not be proper to alter those appro- 
 priations of impost which may be made for peace estab- 
 lishments. It is inexpedient to divert the public funds ; the 
 power of direct taxation would in such circumstances be a very 
 necessary power. As to the rule of apportioning such taxes, 
 it must be by the quantity of lands, or else in the manner laid 
 down in the paragraph under debate. But the quantity of 
 lands is an uncertain rule of wealth. Compare the lands of 
 different nations of Europe : some of them have great compar- 
 ative wealth, and less quantities of land, while others have 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 141 
 
 more lands^and less wealth. Compare Holland with Germany. 
 The rule laid down in the paragraph is the best that can be 
 obtained for the apportionment of the little direct taxes which 
 Congress will want. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Messrs. King, Gore, Parsons and Jones (of Boston) spoke 
 of the advantage to the northern States, the rule of apportion- 
 ment in the third paragraph (still under debate) gave to 
 them — as also the Hon. Judge Dana, the sketch of whose 
 speech is as follows : 
 
 The learned judge began with answering some objections to 
 this paragraph, and urging the necessity of Congress being 
 vested with power to levy direct taxes on the States ; and it 
 was not to be supposed that they would levy such, unless the 
 impost and excise should be found insufficient in case of a war. 
 If, says he, a part of the Union is attacked by a foreign ene- 
 my, and we are disunited, how is it to defend itself? Can it by 
 its own internal force ? In the late war, this State singly was 
 attacked, and obliged to make the first defence. What has 
 happened may happen again. The State, oppressed, must 
 exert its whole power, and bear the whole charge of the 
 defence : but common danger points out for common exertion; 
 and this Constitution is excellently designed to make the dan- 
 ger equal. Why should one State expend its blood and treas- 
 ure for the whole ? Ought not a controlling authority to exist, 
 to call forth, if necessary, the whole force and wealth of all the 
 States ? If disunited, the time may come when we may be 
 attacked by our natural enemies. Nova Scotia and New Bruns- 
 wick, filled with tories and refugees, stand ready to attack and 
 devour these States, one by one. This will be the case, if we 
 have no power to draw forth the wealth and strength of the 
 whole, for the defence of a part. Then shall we, continues the 
 honorable gentleman, see, but too late, the necessity of a power 
 being vested somewhere, that could command that wealth and 
 strength when wanted. I speak with earnestness, said he, but 
 it is for the good of my native country. By God and nature 
 made equal, it is with remorse I have heard it suggested by 
 
142 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 some, that those gentlemen who have had the superior advan- 
 tages of education, were enemies to the rights of their country. 
 Are there any among this honorable body, who are possessed of 
 minds capable of such narrow prejudices ? If there are, it is in 
 vain to reason with them ; we had better come to a decision 
 and go home. After dilating on this matter a short time, the 
 learned judge begged gentlemen to look around them, and see 
 who were the men that composed the assembly. Are they not, 
 he asked, men who have been foremost in the cause of their 
 country, both in the cabinet and in the field ? and who, with 
 halters about their necks, boldly and intrepidly advocated the 
 rights of America, and of humanity, at home and in foreign 
 countries ? And are they not to be trusted ? Direct taxation 
 is a tremendous idea : but may not necessity dictate it to be 
 unavoidable ? We all wish to invest Congress with more power. 
 We disagree only in the quantum, and manner in which Con- 
 gress shall levy taxes on the States. A capitation tax is abhor- 
 rent to the feelings of human nature, and I venture to trust 
 will never be adopted by Congress. The learned judge pointed 
 out, on various grounds, the utility of the power to be vested in 
 the Congress, and concluded by observing, that the proposed 
 Constitution was the best that could be framed ; that, if adopted, 
 we shall be a great and happy nation ; if rejected, a weak and 
 despised one : we shall fall as the nations of ancient times have 
 fallen; that this was his firm belief; and, says he, I would 
 rather be annihilated than give my voice for, or sign my name 
 to, a Constitution, which in the least should betray the liberties 
 or interests of my country. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. I hope, Sir, the honorable gentleman will not 
 think hard of it, if we ignorant men cannot see as clear as he 
 can. The strong must bear with the infirmities of the weak; 
 and it must be a weak mind indeed that could throw such illib- 
 eral reflections against gentlemen of education, as the honorable 
 gentleman complains of. To return to the paragraph. If Con- 
 gress, continues Mr. Wedgery, have this power of taxing directly, 
 it will be in their power to enact a poll tax. Can gentlemen 
 tell why they will not attempt it, and by this method make the 
 poor pay as much as the rich ? 
 
 Mr. Dench was at loss to know how Congress could levy the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 143 
 
 tax, in which he thought the difficulty of many consisted ; yet 
 had no doubt but that Congress would direct that these States 
 should pay it in their own way. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Fuller begged to ask Mr. Gerry — " Why, in the 
 last requisition of Congress, the portion required of this State 
 was thirteen times as much as of Georgia, and yet we have but 
 eight representatives in the general government, and Georgia 
 has three ? " Until this question was answered, he was at a 
 loss to know how taxation and representation went hand in 
 hand. 
 
 [It was then voted, that this question be asked Mr. Gerry. A 
 long and desultory debate ensued on the manner in which the 
 answer should be given. It was at last voted that Mr. Gerry 
 reduce his answer to writing.] 
 
 Saturday, January 19, 1788. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Singletary thought we were giving up all our 
 privileges, as there was no provision that men in power should 
 have any religion ; and though he hoped to see Christians, yet 
 by the Constitution, a papist or an infidel were as eligible 
 as they. It had been said that men had not degenerated. 
 He did not think men were better now than when men after 
 God's own heart did wickedly. He thought in this instance we 
 were giving great power to — we know not whom. 
 
 Gen. Brooks (of Medford). If good men are appointed, 
 government will be administered well. But what will prevent 
 bad men from mischief, is the question. If there should be 
 such in the Senate, we ought to be cautious of giving power ; 
 but when that power is given with proper checks, the danger is 
 at an end. When men are answerable, and within the reach of 
 responsibility, they cannot forget that their political existence 
 depends upon their good behavior. The Senate can frame no 
 law but by consent of the representatives, and is answerable to 
 to that house for its conduct. If their conduct excites sus- 
 picion, they are to be impeached — punished (or prevented from 
 holding any office, which is a great punishment.) If these 
 
144 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 checks are not sufficient, it is impossible to devise such as will 
 be so. 
 
 [Mr. Gerry's answer to Mr. Fuller's question was read. The 
 purport was, that Georgia had increased in its numbers by mi- 
 gration, and if it had not then, would soon be entitled to the 
 proportion assigned her.] 
 
 Hon. Mr. King. It so happened that I was both of the Con- 
 vention and Congress at the same time, and if I recollect right, 
 the answer of Mr. Gerry does not materially vary. In 1778, 
 Congress required the States to make a return of the houses 
 and lands surveyed. But one State only complied therewith — 
 New Hampshire. Massachusetts did not. Congress consulted 
 no rule ; it was resolved that the several States should be taxed 
 according to their ability, and if it appeared any State had paid 
 more than her just quota, it should be passed to the credit of 
 that State, with lawful interest. 
 
 Mr. Dalton said we had obtained a great deal by the new 
 Constitution. By the Confederation, each State had an equal 
 vote. Georgia is now content with three-eighths of the voice 
 of Massachusetts. 
 
 Col. Jones (of Bristol) objected to the length of time. If 
 men continue in office four or six years, they will forget their 
 dependence on the people, and be loth to leave their places. 
 Men elevated so high in power, they would fall heavy when they 
 came down. 
 
 Mr. Ames observed, that an objection was made against the 
 Constitution, because the senators are to be chosen for six years. 
 It has been said, that they will be removed too far from the 
 control of the people, and that, to keep them in proper depend- 
 ence, they should be chosen annually. It is necessary to pre- 
 mise, that no argument against the new plan has made a deeper 
 impression than this, that it will produce a consolidation of the 
 States. This is an effect which all good men will deprecate. 
 For it is obvious, that if the State powers are to be destroyed, 
 the representation is too small. The trust, in that case, would 
 be too great to be confided to so few persons. The objects of 
 legislation would be so multiplied and complicated, that the 
 government would be unwieldy and impracticable. The State 
 governments are essential parts of the system, and the defence 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 145 
 
 of this article is drawn from its tendency to their preserva- 
 tion. 
 
 The senators represent the sovereignty of the States ; in the 
 other house individuals are represented. The Senate may not 
 originate bills. It need not be said, that they are, principally, 
 to direct the affairs of war and treaties. They are in the qual- 
 ity of ambassadors of the States, and it will not be denied that 
 some permanency in their office is necessary to a discharge of 
 their duty. Now, if they were chosen yearly, how could they 
 perform their trust ? If they would be brought, by that means, 
 more immediately under the influence of the people, then they 
 will represent the State legislatures less, and become the rep- 
 resentatives of individuals. This belongs to the other house. 
 The absurdity of this, and its repugnancy to the Federal prin- 
 ciples of the Constitution, will appear more fully, by supposing 
 that they are to be chosen by the people at large. If there 
 is any force in the objection to this article, this would be proper. 
 But whom in that case would they represent ? Not the legis- 
 latures of the States, but the people. This would totally 
 obliterate the Federal features of the Constitution. What 
 would become of the State governments, and on whom would 
 devolve the duty of defending them against the encroachments 
 of the Federal government? A consolidation of the States 
 would ensue, which, it is conceded, would subvert the new 
 Constitution, and against which this very article, so much con- 
 demned, is our best security. Too much provision cannot be 
 made against a consolidation. The State governments repre- 
 sent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. 
 They are the safeguard and ornament of the Constitution — they 
 will protract the period of our liberties — they will afford a 
 shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural 
 avengers of our violated rights. 
 
 A very effectual check upon the power of the Senate is pro- 
 vided. A third part is to retire from office every two years. 
 By this means, while the senators are seated for six years they 
 are admonished of their responsibility to the State legislatures. 
 If one-third new members are introduced, who feel the senti- 
 ments of their States, they will awe that third whose term will 
 be near expiring. This article seems to be an excellence of 
 
 19 
 
146 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 the Constitution, and affords just ground to believe, that it 
 will be in practice, as in theory, a Federal republic. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 The third section, respecting the construction of the Senate, 
 under debate. 
 
 Col. Jones said, his objection still remained — that senators 
 chosen for so long a time will forget their duty to their con- 
 stituents. We cannot, says he, recall them. The choice of 
 representatives was too long ; the senate was much worse. It 
 is, says he, a bad precedent, and is unconstitutional. 
 
 Mr. King said, as the Senate preserved the equality of the 
 States, their appointment is equal. To the objection to this 
 branch, that it is chosen for too long a period, he observed, if 
 the principle of classing them is considered, although it appears 
 long, it will not be found so long as it appears. One class is 
 to serve two years, another four, and another six years ; the 
 average, therefore, is four years. The senators, said Mr. King, 
 will have a powerful check, in those men who wish for their 
 seats, who will watch their whole conduct in the general gov- 
 ernment, and will give the alarm in case of misbehavior. And 
 the State legislatures, if they find their delegates erring, can 
 and will instruct them. Will not this be a check ? When they 
 hear the voice of the people solemnly dictating to them their 
 duty, they will be bold men indeed to act contrary to it. These 
 will not be instructions sent them in a private letter, which can 
 be put in their pockets ; they will be public instructions, which 
 all the country will see ; and they will be hardy men indeed to 
 violate them. The honorable gentleman said, the power to 
 control the Senate, is as great as ever was enjoyed in any gov- 
 ernment ; and that the members, therefore, will be found not 
 to be chosen for too long a time. They are, says he, to assist 
 the executive in the designation and appointment of officers ; 
 and they ought to have time to mature their judgment. If for 
 a shorter period, how can they be acquainted with the rights 
 and interests of nations, so as to form advantageous treaties? 
 To understand these rights is the business of education. Their 
 business being naturally different, and more extensive than the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 147 
 
 other branch, they ought to have different qualifications-; and 
 their duration is not too long for a right discharge of their 
 duty. 
 
 Dr. Taylor said, he hoped the honorable gentleman did not 
 mean to deceive us, by saying that the Senate are not to be 
 chosen for six years ; for they are really to be chosen for six 
 years ; and as to the idea of classing, he did not know who, 
 when chosen for that time, would go out at a shorter. He re- 
 marked on Mr. King's idea of checks, and observed, that such 
 indeed were the Articles of Confederation, which provides for 
 delegates being chosen annually — for rotation, and the right 
 of recalling. But in this, they are to be chosen for six years ; 
 but a shadow of rotation provided for, and no power to recall ; 
 and concluded by saying, that if they are once chosen, they are 
 chosen forever. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Strong mentioned the difficulty which attended 
 the construction of the Senate in the Convention ; and that a 
 committee, consisting of one delegate from each State, was 
 chosen to consider the subject, who reported as it now stands ; 
 and that Mr. Gerry was on the committee, from Massachusetts. 
 
 [Mr. Gerry rose, and informed the President that he was 
 then preparing a letter on the subject in debate, which would 
 set the matter in its true light, and which he wished to com- 
 municate ; this occasioned considerable conversation, which 
 lasted until the Convention adjourned.] 
 
 Monday, January 21, 1788. 
 
 Fourth section considered in its order. 
 
 Mr. Ames rose to answer several objections. He would for- 
 bear, if possible, to go over the ground which had been already 
 well trodden. The fourth section had been, he said, well dis- 
 cussed, and he did not mean to offer any formal argument, or 
 new observations, upon it. It had been said, the power of 
 regulating elections was given to Congress. He asked, if a 
 motion was brought forward in Congress, on that particular, 
 subjecting the States to any inconvenience, whether it was 
 
148 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 probable such a motion could obtain. It had been also said, 
 that our Federal legislature would endeavor to perpetuate 
 themselves in office ; and that the love of power was predomi- 
 nant. Mr. Ames asked how the gentlemen prevailed on them- 
 selves to trust the State legislature. He thought it was from a 
 degree of confidence that was placed in them. At present we 
 trust Congress with power — nfty, we trust the representatives 
 of Rhode Island and Georgia. He thought it was better to 
 trust a general government, than a foreign State. Mr. Ames 
 acknowledged he came with doubts of the fourth section. Had 
 his objections remained, he would have been obliged to vote 
 against the Constitution : but now he thought, if all the Con- 
 stitution was as clear as this section, it would meet with little 
 opposition. 
 
 Judge Dana. This section, Mr. President, has been subject 
 to much dispute and difficulty. I did not come here deter- 
 mined to vote for every paragraph of this Constitution. I 
 supposed this clause dangerous. It has been amply discussed ; 
 and I am now convinced that this paragraph is much better as 
 it stands, than with the amendment, which is, that Congress be 
 restricted in the appointing of time, place, &c, unless when 
 the State legislatures refuse to make them. I have altered my 
 opinion on this point. These are my reasons : It is apparent 
 the intention of the Convention was, to set Congress on a dif- 
 ferent ground — that a part should proceed directly from the 
 people, and not from their substitutes the legislatures ; there- 
 fore the legislatures ought not to control the elections. The 
 legislature of Rhode Island has lately formed a plan, to alter 
 their representation to corporations, which ought to be by 
 numbers. Look at Great Britain, where the injustice of this 
 mode is apparent: eight-tenths of the people there have no 
 voice in the elections. A borough, of but two or three cot- 
 tages, has a right to send two representatives to parliament, 
 while Birmingham, a large and populous manufacturing town 
 lately sprung up, cannot send one. The legislature of Rhode 
 Island are about adopting this plan, in order to deprive the 
 towns of Newport and Providence of their weight ; and that, 
 thereby, the legislature may have a power to counteract the 
 will of the majority of the people. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 149 
 
 Mr. Cooley (of Amherst) thought Congress, in the present 
 instance, would, from the powers granted by the Constitution, 
 have authority to control elections, and thereby endanger lib- 
 erty. 
 
 Dr. Taylor wished to ask the gentleman from Newburyport, 
 whether the two branches of Congress could not agree to play 
 into each other's hands, and, by making the qualifications of 
 electors £100, by their power of regulating elections, fix the 
 matter of elections so as to keep themselves in. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King rose to pursue the inquiry, why the place and 
 manner of holding elections were omitted in the section under 
 debate. It was to be observed, he said, that in the Constitution 
 of Massachusetts, and other States, the manner and place of 
 elections were provided for ; the manner was by ballot, and the 
 places towns ; for, said he, we happened to settle originally in 
 townships. But it was different in the southern States. He 
 would mention an instance. In Virginia there are but fifteen 
 or twenty towns, and seventy or eighty counties ; therefore no 
 rule could be adopted to apply to the whole. If it was practi- 
 cable, he said, it would be necessary to have a district the fixed 
 place. But this is liable to exceptions ; as a district that may 
 now be fully settled, may in time be scarcely inhabited ; and 
 the back country, now scarcely inhabited, may be fully settled. 
 Suppose this State thrown into eight districts, and a member 
 apportioned to each : if the numbers increase, the representa- 
 tives and districts will be increased. The matter, therefore, 
 must be left subject to the regulation of the State legislature, 
 or the general government. Suppose the State legislature, the 
 circumstance will be the same. It is truly said, that our repre- 
 sentatives are but a part of the Union, and that they may be 
 subject to the control of the rest ; but our representatives make 
 a ninth part of the whole, and if any authority is vested in 
 Congress it must be in our favor. But to the subject : in Con- 
 necticut they do not choose by numbers, but by corporations. 
 Hartford, one of their largest towns, sends no more delegates 
 than one of their smallest corporations, each town sending two, 
 except latterly, when a town was divided. The same rule is 
 about to be adopted in Rhode Island. The inequality of such 
 representation, where every corporation would have an equal 
 
150 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 right to send an equal number of representatives, was apparent. 
 In the southern States, the inequality is greater. By the Consti- 
 tution of South Carolina, the city of Charleston has a right to 
 send thirty representatives to the General Assembly, the whole 
 number of which amounts to two hundred. The back parts of 
 Carolina have increased greatly since the adoption of their Con- 
 stitution, and have frequently attempted an alteration of this un- 
 equal mode of representation ; but the members from Charleston, 
 having the balance so much in their favor, will not consent to 
 an alteration ; and we see that the delegates from Carolina in 
 Congress have always been chosen from the delegates of that 
 city. The representatives, therefore, from that State, will not 
 be chosen by the people, but will be the representatives of a 
 faction of that State. If the general government cannot con- 
 trol in this case, how are the people secure ? The idea of the 
 honorable gentleman from Douglass, said he, transcends my 
 understanding ; for the power of control given by this section 
 extends to the manner of election, not the qualifications of the 
 electors. The qualifications are age and residence, and none 
 can be preferable. 
 
 On motion, 
 
 Resolved, as follows, viz. : Whereas, there is a publication in 
 The Boston Gazette and the Country Journal, of this day, as 
 follows, viz. : — 
 
 " Bribery and Corruption ! ! ! — The most diabolical plan is 
 on foot to corrupt the members of the Convention who oppose 
 the adoption of the new Constitution. Large sums of money 
 have been brought from a neighboring State for that purpose, 
 contributed by the wealthy. If so, is it not probable there may 
 be collections for the same accursed purpose nearer home ? 
 
 Centinel." 
 
 Resolved, That this Convention will take measures for inquir- 
 ing into the subject of the said publication, and for ascertain- 
 ing the truth or falsehood of the suggestion therein contained. 
 
 Ordered, That the Messenger be directed to request the 
 printers of the said Gazette to appear before this Convention 
 forthwith, to give information respecting the said publication. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 151 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 The Messenger informed!' the Convention that he had ac- 
 quainted the printers of the Boston Gazette, &c, of the order 
 of this forenoon respecting them, and was answered that one of 
 them would attend the Convention this afternoon. 
 
 A letter from Messrs. Benjamin Edes & Son, printers of the 
 Boston Gazette, &c, relative to the publication entered this 
 morning. Read, and committed to Mr. Parsons, Mr. Nasson, 
 Mr. Gorham, Mr. Wedgery, Mr. Porter, Mr. Gore, and Mr. 
 Thomas, of Plymouth. 
 
 The fifth section being read, 
 
 Dr. Taylor wished to know the meaning of the words " from 
 time to time," in the third paragraph. Does it mean, said he, 
 from year to year, from month to month, or from day to day. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. King rose, and explained the term. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery read the paragraph, and. said, by the words, 
 " except such parts as may require secrecy," Congress might 
 withhold the whole journals under this pretence, and thereby 
 the people be kept in ignorance of their doings. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Gorham exposed the absurdity of any public 
 body publishing all their proceedings. Many things in great 
 bodies are to be kept secret, and records must be brought to 
 maturity before published. In case of treaties with foreign 
 nations, would it be policy to inform the world of the extent of 
 the powers to be vested in our ambassador, and thus give our 
 enemies opportunity to defeat our negotiations ? There is no 
 provision in the Constitution of this State, or of Great Britain, 
 for any publication of the kind ; and yet the people suffer no 
 inconveniency. The printers, no doubt, will be interested to 
 obtain the journals as soon as possible for publication, and they 
 will be published in a book, by Congress, at the end of every 
 session. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Perley described the alarms and anxiety of the 
 people at the commencement of the war, when the whole coun- 
 try, he said, cried, with one voice, " Why don't General Wash- 
 ington march into Boston, and drive out the tyrants?" But, 
 said he, Heaven gave us a commander who knew better than to 
 do this. The reverend gentleman said he was acquainted with 
 
152 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 the Roman history, and the Grecian, too, and he believed there 
 never was, since the creation of the world, a greater general 
 than Washington, except, indeed, Joshua, who was inspired by 
 the Lord of Hosts, the God of the armies of Israel. Would it, 
 he asked, have been prudent for that excellent man, General 
 Washington, previous to the American army's taking possession 
 of Dorchester Heights, to have published to the world* his in- 
 tentions of so doing ? No, says he, it would not. 
 
 The first paragraph of the sixth section read. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. Mr. President : It has hitherto been customary 
 for the gentlemen of Congress to be paid by the several State 
 legislatures, out of the State treasury. As no State has hith- 
 erto failed paying its delegates, why should we leave the good 
 old path ? Before the Revolution it was considered as a griev- 
 ance, that the governors, &c, received their pay from Great 
 Britain. They could not, in that case, feel their dependence on 
 the people, when they received their appointments and salaries 
 from the crown. I know not why we should not pay them now, 
 as well as heretofore. 
 
 Gen. Porter. Have not delegates been retained from Con- 
 gress, which is virtually recalling them, because they have not 
 been paid ? Has not Rhode Island failed to pay their delegates? 
 Should there not be an equal charge throughout the United 
 States, for the payment of the delegates, as there is in this 
 State for the payment of the members of this Convention, met 
 for the general good ? Is it not advantageous to the people at 
 large that the delegates to this Convention are paid out of the 
 public treasury ? If any inconvenience, however, can be shown 
 to flow from this plan, I should be glad to hear it. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick hoped gentlemen would consider that 
 the federal officers of government would be responsible for 
 their conduct ; and as they would regard their reputations, 
 will not assess exorbitant wages. In Massachusetts, and in 
 every other State, the legislatures have power to provide for 
 their own payment ; and, he asked, have they ever established 
 it higher than it ought to be ? But on the contrary, have they 
 not made it extremely inconsiderable ? The Commons of 
 Great Britain, he said, have the power to assess their own 
 wages, but for two centuries they have never exercised it. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 153 
 
 Can a man, he asked, who has the least respect for the good 
 opinion of his fellow-countrymen, go home to his constituents 
 after having robbed them by voting himself an exorbitant sal- 
 ary ? This principle will be a most powerful check : and, in 
 respect to economy, the power, lodged as it is in this section, 
 will be more advantageous to the people, than if retained by 
 the State legislatures. Let us see what the legislature of Mas- 
 sachusetts have done. They vote the salaries of the delegates 
 to Congress, and they have voted them such as have enabled 
 them to live in a style suited to the dignity of a respectable 
 State ; but these salaries have been four times as much, for the 
 same time, as they ever voted themselves. Therefore, con- 
 cluded the honorable gentleman, if left to themselves to pro- 
 vide for their own payment, as long as they wish for the good 
 opinion of mankind, they will assess no more than they really 
 deserve, as a compensation for their services. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King said, if the arguments on the fourth section 
 against an undue control in the State legislatures over the Fed- 
 eral representatives, were in any degree satisfactory, they are 
 so on this. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Mr. President: The honorable gentleman 
 means well, and is honest in his sentiments — it is all alike — 
 when we see matters at large, and what it all is, [the Constitu- 
 tion taken as a whole,] we shall know what to do with it. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. In order that the general government should 
 preserve itself, it is necessary it should preserve justice between 
 the several States. Under the Confederation, the power in 
 this section would not be just, for each State has a right to 
 send seven members to Congress, though some of them do not 
 pay one-tenth so much of the public expenses as others ; it is a 
 mere federal government of States, neither equal or propor- 
 tionate. If gentlemen would use the same candor that the 
 honorable gentleman from Topsham (Gen. Thompson) does, 
 considering all the parts as connected with others, the Consti- 
 tution would receive a better discussion. 
 
 The second paragraph of the sixth section read. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Gorham said, that this Constitution contained 
 restrictions which were not to be found in any other ; and he 
 wished gentlemen who had objected to every paragraph which 
 
154 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 had been read, would give the Convention credit for those parts 
 which must meet the approbation of every man. 
 
 The eighth section of Article I., containing the powers of 
 Congress, being read, 
 
 Gen. Brooks (of Lincoln) said this article contained more mat- 
 ter than any one yet read ; and he wished to know whether there 
 are not to be some general restrictions to the general articles. 
 
 Hon Mr. King. Mr. President : It is painful to me to 
 obtrude my sentiments on the Convention so frequently. How- 
 ever, Sir, I console myself with the idea that my motives are as 
 good as those of more able gentlemen, who have remained 
 silent. Sir, this is a very important clause, and of the highest 
 consequence to the future fortune of the people of America. It 
 is not my intention to go into any elaborate discussion of the 
 subject. I shall only offer those considerations which have 
 influenced my mind in favor of the article, in the hope that it 
 may tend to reconcile gentlemen to it. It shall not be with a 
 view of exhibiting any particular knowledge of mine, for such 
 is not my intention.' Hitherto we have considered the con- 
 struction of the general government. We now come, Sir, to 
 the consideration of the powers with which that government 
 shall be clothed. The introduction to this Constitution is in these 
 words: " We, the people," Sfc. The language of the Confed- 
 eration is : " We, the States" Sfc. The latter is a mere Federal 
 government of States. Those, therefore, that assemble under it 
 have no power to make laws to apply to the individuals of the' 
 States confederated ; and the attempts to make laws for collective 
 societies, necessarily leave a discretion to comply with them or 
 not. In no instance have there been so freque^ deviations from 
 first principles, as in neglect or refusal to comply with the requi- 
 sitions of general governments for the collection of moneys. In 
 the ancient governments, this has been a principal defect. In 
 the United Provinces of the Netherlands, it has been conspic- 
 uously so. A celebrated political writer, I mean John deWitt, 
 formerly pensioner of Holland, says, that in the Confederacy of 
 1570, though the articles were declared equally binding on the 
 several provinces, yet any one had it in its power to comply with 
 the requisitions of the generality, or not ; and some provinces, 
 taking advantage of this discretionary power, never paid any 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 155 
 
 thing. During forty years of their war with Spain, the prov- 
 ince of Holland paid fifty-eight parts of an hundred, of all the 
 expenses thereof. Two or three of the provinces never so 
 much as passed a resolution to pay any thing ; and de Witt 
 says, that two of them paid not a single gilder. What was the 
 consequence ? In one instance Holland compelled a neighbor- 
 ing province to comply with the requisitions, by marching a 
 force into it. This was a great instance of usurpation, made in 
 the time of a war. The Prince of Orange, and the generality, 
 found that they would not continue the war in this manner. 
 What was to be done ? They were obliged to resort to the 
 expedient of doubling the ordinary requisitions on the States. 
 Some of the provinces were prevailed upon to grant these requi- 
 sitions fully, in order to induce Holland to do the same. She, 
 seeing the other States appearing thus forward, not only granted 
 the requisitions, but paid them. The others did not. Thus 
 was a single province obliged to bear almost the whole burden 
 of the war ; and one hundred years after, the accounts of this 
 war were unsettled. What was the reason ? Holland had but 
 one voice in the States-General. That voice was feeble when 
 opposed by the rest. This fact is true. The history of our own 
 country is a melancholy proof of a similar truth. Massachu- 
 setts has paid, while other States have been delinquent. How 
 was the war carried on with the paper money ? Requisitions 
 on the States for that money were made. Who paid them ? 
 Massachusetts, and a few others. A requisition of twenty-nine 
 millions of dollars was quotaed on Massachusetts, and it was 
 paid. This State has paid in her proportion of the old money. 
 How comes it, then, that gentlemen have any of this money by 
 them ? Because the other States have shamefully neglected to 
 pay their quotas. Do you ask for redress ? you are scoffed at. 
 The next requisition was for eleven millions of dollars, six mil- 
 lions of which were to be paid in facilities, the rest in silver 
 money, for discharging the interest of the national debt. If 
 the legislatures found a difficulty in paying the hard money, 
 why did they not pay the paper ? But one million and two 
 hundred thousand dollars have been paid. And six States 
 have not paid a farthing of it. 
 
 After mentioning another requisition equally disregarded, 
 
156 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Mr. King said, two States have not paid a single farthing, from 
 the moment they signed the Confederation, to this day, if my 
 documents are to be depended on ; and they are open to the 
 inspection of all. Now, Sir, what faith is to be put in requisi- 
 tions on the States, for moneys to pay our domestic creditors, 
 and discharge our foreign debts — for moneys lent us in the day 
 of difficulty and distress ? Sir, experience proves, as well as 
 any thing can be proved, that no dependence can be placed on 
 such requisitions. What method, then, can we devise to compel 
 the delinquent States to pay their quotas ? Sir, I know of none. 
 Laws, to be effective, therefore, must not be laid on States, but 
 upon individuals. Sir, it has been objected to the proposed 
 Constitution, that the power is too great, and by this Constitu- 
 tion is to be sacred. But if the want of power is the defect in 
 the old Confederation, there is a fitness and propriety in adopt- 
 ing what is here proposed, which gives the necessary power 
 wanted. Congress now have power to call for what moneys, 
 and in what proportion they please ; but they have no authority 
 to compel a compliance therewith. It is an objection in some 
 gentlemen's minds, that Congress should possess the power of 
 the purse and the sword. But, Sir, I would ask, whether any 
 government can exist, or give security to the people, which is 
 not possessed of this power ? The first revenue will be raised 
 from the impost, to which there is no objection ; the next from 
 the excise ; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be 
 laid. To conclude, Sir, if we mean to support an efficient Fed- 
 eral government, which under the old Confederation can never 
 be the case, the proposed Constitution is, in my opinion, the 
 only one that can be substituted. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White said, in giving this power we give up every 
 thing ; and Congress, with the purse-strings in their hands, will 
 use the sword with a witness. 
 
 Mr. Dawes said, he thought the powers in the paragraph 
 under debate should be fully vested in Congress. We have 
 suffered, said he, for want of such authority in the Federal 
 head. This will be evident if we take a short view of our agri- 
 culture, commerce and manufactures. Our agriculture has not 
 been encouraged by the imposition of national duties on rival 
 produce ; nor can it be, so long as the several States miay make 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 157 
 
 contradictory laws. This has induced our farmers to raise only 
 what they wanted to consume in their own families ; I mean, 
 however, after raising enough to pay their taxes ; for I insist, 
 that upon the old plan, the land has borne the burden. For, 
 as Congress could not make laws whereby they could obtain a 
 revenue, in their own way, from impost or excise, they multi- 
 plied their requisitions on the several States. When a State 
 was thus called on, it would perhaps impose new duties on its 
 own trade, to procure money for paying its quota of Federal 
 demands. This would drive the trade to such neighboring 
 States as made no such new impositions. Thus the revenue 
 would be lost with the trade, and the only resort would be a 
 direct tax. 
 
 As to commerce, it is well known that the different States 
 now pursue different systems of duties in regard to each other. 
 By this, and for want of general laws of prohibition through the 
 Union, we have not secured even our own domestic traffic, that 
 passes from State to State. This is contrary to the policy of 
 every nation on earth. Some nations have no other commerce. 
 The great and flourishing empire of China has but little com- 
 merce beyond her own territories ; and no country is better 
 circumstanced than we, for an exclusive traffic from State to 
 State. Yet even in this we are rivalled by foreigners — by those 
 foreigners to whom we are the least indebted. A vessel from 
 Roseway or Halifax finds as hearty a welcome with its fish and 
 whalebone at the southern ports, as though it was built, navi- 
 gated and freighted from Salem or Boston. And this must be 
 the case, until we have laws comprehending and embracing 
 alike all the States in the Union. 
 
 But it is not only our coasting trade ; our whole commerce is 
 going to ruin. Congress has not had power to make even a 
 trade-law which shall confine the importation of foreign goods 
 to the ships of the producing or consuming country : if we had 
 such a law, we should not go to England for the goods of other 
 nations ; nor would British vessels be the carriers of American 
 produce from our sister States. In the States southward of the 
 Delaware, it is agreed, that three-fourths of the produce are 
 exported, and three-fourths of the returns are made, in British 
 bottoms. It is said, that for exporting timber, one-half of the 
 
158 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 property goes to the carrier ; and of the produce in general, it 
 has been computed, that when it is shipped for London from a 
 southern State, to the value of one million of dollars, the Brit- 
 ish merchant draws from that sum three hundred thousand 
 dollars, under the names of freight and charges. This is money 
 which belongs to the New England States, because we can fur- 
 nish the ships as well as, and much better than, the British. 
 Our sister States are willing we should receive these benefits, 
 and that they should be secured to us by national laws ; but 
 until that is done, their private merchants will, no doubt, for 
 the sake of long credit, or some other such temporary advan- 
 tage, prefer the ships of foreigners. And yet we have suffered 
 these ignominious burdens rather than trust our own repre- 
 sentatives with power to help us, and we call ourselves free and 
 independent states. We are independent of each other, but we 
 are slaves to Europe. We have no uniformity in duties, imposts, 
 excises or prohibitions. Congress has no authority to withhold 
 advantages from foreigners, in order to obtain advantages from 
 them. By the ninth of the old articles, Congress may enter 
 into treaties and alliances under certain provisos, but Con- • 
 gress cannot pledge that a single State shall not render the 
 whole treaty of commerce a nullity. 
 
 Our manufactures are another great subject, which has received 
 no encouragement by national duties on foreign manufactures, 
 and they never can by any authority in the Confederation. It 
 has been said, that no country can produce manufactures until 
 it be overstocked with inhabitants. It is true, the United States 
 have employment, except in the winter, for their citizens, in 
 agriculture — the most respectable employment under heaven ; 
 but it is now to be remembered, that since the old Confedera- 
 tion, there is a great emigration of foreign artisans hither, some 
 of whom are left here by the armies of the last war, and others, 
 who have more lately sought the new world, from hopes of 
 mending their condition. These will not change their employ- 
 ments. Besides this, the very face of our country leads to 
 manufactures. Our numerous falls of water, and places for 
 mills, where paper, snuff, gunpowder, iron works, and numerous 
 other articles, are prepared — these will save us immense sums 
 of money, that otherwise would go to Europe. The question 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 159 
 
 is, have these been encouraged ? Has Congress been able, by- 
 national laws, to prevent the importation of such foreign com- 
 modities as are made from such raw materials as we ourselves 
 raise ? It is alleged, that the citizens of the United States have 
 contracted debts within the last three years, with the subjects 
 of Great Britain, for the amount of near six millions of dollars, 
 and that consequently our lands are mortgaged for that sum. 
 So Corsica was once mortgaged to the Genoese merchants for 
 articles which her inhabitants did not want, or which they could 
 have made themselves, and she was afterwards sold to a foreign 
 power. If we wish to encourage our own manufactures — to 
 preserve our own commerce — to raise the value of our own 
 lands — we must give Congress the powers in question. 
 
 The honorable gentleman from Norton, last speaking, says, 
 that if Congress have the power of laying and collecting taxes, 
 they will use the power of the sword. I hold the reverse to be 
 true. The doctrine of requisitions, or of demands upon a whole 
 State, implies such a power ; for surely a whole State, a whole 
 community, can be compelled only by an army ; but taxes upon 
 • an individual, implies only the use of a collector of taxes. That 
 Congress, however, will not apply to the power 6f direct taxa- 
 tion, unless in cases of emergency, is plain ; because, as thirty 
 thousand inhabitants will elect a representative, eight-tenths of 
 which electors perhaps are yeomen, and holders of farms, it will 
 be their own fault if they are not represented by such men as 
 will never permit the land to be injured by unnecessary taxes. 
 
 Mr. Bodman said, that the power given to Congress, to lay 
 and collect duties, taxes, &c, as contained in the section under 
 consideration, was certainly unlimited, and therefore dangerous ; 
 he wished to know whether it was necessary to give Congress 
 power to do harm, in order to enable them to do good. It had 
 been said, that the sovereignty of the States remains with them ; 
 but if Congress has the power to lay taxes, and, in cases of neg- 
 ligence or non-compliance, can send a power to collect them, he 
 thought that the idea of sovereignty was destroyed. This, he 
 said, was an essential point, and ought to be seriously consid- 
 ered. It had been urged, that gentlemen were jealous of their 
 rulers. He said he thought they ought to be so — it was just 
 they should be so ; for jealousy was one of the greatest securi- 
 
160 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 ties of the people, in a republic. The power in the .eighth 
 section, he said, ought to have been defined ; that he was willing 
 to give power to the Federal head, but he wished to know what 
 that power was. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick, in answer to the gentleman last speak- 
 ing, said, if he believed the adoption of the proposed Constitution 
 would interfere with the State legislatures, he would be the last 
 to vote for it ; but he thought all the sources of revenue ought 
 to be put into the hands of government, who were to protect 
 and secure us ; and powers to effect this had always been neces- 
 sarily unlimited. Congress would necessarily take that which 
 was easiest to the people ; the first would be impost, the 
 next excise, and a direct tax will be the last ; for, says the 
 honorable gentleman, drawing money from the people by direct 
 taxes, being difficult and uncertain, it would be the last source 
 of revenue applied to, by a wise legislature ; and hence, says 
 he, the people may be assured, that the delegation of a power 
 to levy them would not be abused. Let us suppose — and we 
 shall not be thought extravagant in the supposition — continued 
 Mr. Sedgwick, that we are attacked by a foreign enemy ; that' 
 in this dilemma our treasury was exhausted, our credit gone, our 
 enemy on our borders ; and that there was no possible method of 
 raising impost or excise. In this case, the only remedy would 
 be a direct tax. Could, therefore, this power being vested in 
 Congress, lessen the many advantages which may be drawn 
 from it ? 
 
 Mr. Singletary thought no more power could be given to a 
 despot, than to give up the purse-strings of the people. 
 
 Col. Porter asked, if a better rule of yielding power could 
 be shown than in the Constitution ; for what we do not give, 
 said he, we retain. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Mr. President : I totally abhor this para- 
 graph. Massachusetts has ever been a leading State ; now let 
 her give good advice to her sister States. Suppose nine States 
 adopt this Constitution, who shall touch the other four ? Some 
 cry out, Force them. I say, Draw them. We love liberty. 
 Britain never tried to enslave us until she told us we had too 
 much liberty. We cannot have too much liberty. The Con- 
 federation wants amendments ; shall we not amend it ? The 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 161 
 
 Convention were sent on to Philadelphia to amend this Confed- 
 eration ; but they made a new creature ; and the very setting 
 out of it is unconstitutional. In the Convention, Pennsylvania 
 had more members than all New England, and two of our dele- 
 gates only were persuaded to sign the Constitution. Massachu- 
 setts once shut up the harbors against the British. There I 
 confess I was taken in. Don't let us be in a hurry again. Let 
 us wait to see what our sister States will do. What shall we 
 suffer if we adjourn the consideration of it for five or six months ? 
 It is better to do this than to adopt it so hastily. Take care 
 we don't disunite the States. By uniting we stand, by dividing 
 we fall. 
 
 Major Kinsley. Mr. President: After so much has been 
 said on the powers to be given to Congress, I shall say but a 
 few words on the subject. By the Articles of Confederation, 
 the people have three checks on their delegates in Congress ; 
 the annual election of them, their rotation, and the power to 
 recall any, or all of them, when they see fit. In view of our 
 Federal rulers, they are the servants of the people ; in the new 
 Constitution, we are deprived of annual elections, have no rota- 
 tion, and cannot recall our members ; therefore our Federal 
 rulers will be masters, and not servants. I will examine what 
 powers we have given to our masters. They have power to lay 
 and collect all taxes, duties, imposts and excises ; raise armies, 
 fit out navies, to establish themselves in a Federal town of ten 
 miles square, equal to four middling townships, erect forts, 
 magazines, arsenals, <fcc. Therefore, should the Congress be 
 chosen of designing and interested men, they can perpetuate 
 their existence, secure the resources of war ; and the people 
 will have nothing left to defend themselves with. Let us look 
 into ancient history. The Romans, after a war, thought them- 
 selves safe in a government of ten men, called the Decemviri : 
 these ten men were invested with all powers, and were chosen 
 for three years. By their arts and designs they secured their 
 second election ; but finding, from the manner in which they 
 had exercised their power, they were not able to secure their 
 third election, they declared themselves masters of Rome, im- 
 poverished the city, and deprived the people of their rights. It 
 has been said that there was no such danger here ; I will sup- 
 21 
 
162 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 pose they were to attempt the experiment, after we have given 
 them all our money, established them in a Federal town, given 
 them the power of coining money, and raising a standing army ; 
 and to establish their arbitrary government ; what resources 
 have the people left ? I cannot see any. The Parliament of 
 England was first chosen annually ; they afterwards lengthened 
 their duration to three years ; and from triennial they became 
 septennial. The government of England has been represented 
 as a good and happy government ; but some parts of it, their 
 greatest political writers much condemn ; especially that of the 
 duration of their Parliaments. Attempts are yearly made to 
 shorten their duration, from septennial to triennial ; but the 
 influence of the ministry is so great, that it has not yet been 
 accomplished. From this duration, bribery and corruption are 
 introduced. Notwithstanding they receive no pay, they make 
 great interest for a seat in Parliament, one or two years 
 before its dissolution, and give from five to twenty guineas for 
 a vote ; and the candidates sometimes expend from ten thou- 
 sand to thirty thousand pounds. Will a person throw away 
 such a fortune, and waste so much time, without the probability 
 of replacing such a sum with interest ? Or can there be security 
 in such men ? Bribery may be introduced here, as well as in 
 Great Britain ; and Congress may equally oppress the people ; 
 because we cannot call them to an account, considering that 
 there is no annual election — no rotation — no power to recall 
 them, provided for. 
 
 Tuesday, January 22, 1788. 
 
 Section eighth still under consideration. 
 
 Judge Sumner. The powers proposed to be delegated in this 
 section are very important, as they will in effect place the purse- 
 strings of the citizen in the hands of Congress for certain pur- 
 poses. In order to know whether such powers are necessary, 
 we ought, Sir, to inquire what the design of uniting under one 
 government is. It is, that the national dignity may be sup- 
 ported, its safety preserved, and necessary debts paid. Is it 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 163 
 
 not necessary, then, to afford the means by which alone those 
 objects can be attained ? Much better, it appears to me, would 
 it be for the States not to unite under one government, which 
 will be attended with some expense, than to unite, and at the 
 same time withhold the powers necessary to accomplish the 
 design of the union. Gentlemen say, the power to raise money 
 may be abused. I grant it ; and the same may be said of any 
 other delegated power. Our general court have the same 
 power ; but did they ever dare abuse it ? Instead of voting 
 themselves six shillings and eight pence, they might vote them- 
 selves twelve pounds a day ; Imt there never was a complaint 
 of their voting themselves more than what was reasonable. If 
 they should make an undue use of their power, they know a loss 
 of confidence in the people would be the consequence, and they 
 would not be reelected ; and this is one security in the hands 
 of the people. Another is, that all money-bills are to originate 
 with the House of Representatives ; and can we suppose the 
 representatives of Georgia, or any other State, more disposed to 
 burden their constituents with taxes, than the representatives of 
 Massachusetts ? It is not to be supposed ; f<& whatever is for 
 the interest of one State, in this particular, will be the interest 
 of all the States, and no doubt attended to by the House of 
 Representatives. But why should we alarm ourselves with 
 imaginary evils ? An impost will probably be a principal source 
 of revenue ; but if that should be insufficient, other taxes, 
 especially in time of war, ought to supply the deficiency. It is 
 said, that requisitions on the States ought to be made in cases 
 of emergency ; but we all know there can be no dependence on 
 requisitions. The honorable gentleman from Newburyport gave 
 us an instance from the history of the United Provinces to prove 
 it, by which it appears they would have submitted to the arms 
 of Spain, had it not been for the surprising exertions of one 
 Province. But there can be no need of recurring to ancient 
 records, when the history of our own country furnishes an 
 instance, where requisitions have had no effect. But some 
 gentlemen object further, and say, the delegation of these great 
 powers ivill destroy the State legislatures ; but I trust this never 
 can take place, for the general government depends on the 
 State legislatures for its very existence. The President is to 
 
164 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 be chosen by electors under the regulation of the State legisla- 
 tures ; the Senate is to be chosen by the State legislatures ; and 
 the representative body, by the people ; under like regulations 
 of the legislative body in the different States. If gentlemen 
 consider this, they will, I presume, alter their opinion ; for 
 nothing is clearer, than that the existence of the legislatures in 
 the different States is essential to the very being of the general 
 government. I hope, Sir, we shall all see the necessity of a 
 Federal government, and not make objections, unless they 
 appear to us to be of some weight. 
 
 Mr. Gore. This section, Mr. President, has been the subject 
 of many observations, founded on real or pretended jealousies 
 of the powers herein delegated to the general government ; and 
 by comparing the proposed Constitution with things in their 
 nature totally different, the mind may be seduced from a just 
 determination on the subject. Gentlemen have compared the 
 authority of Congress, to levy and collect taxes from the people 
 of America, to a similar power assumed by the Parliament of 
 Great Britain. If we but state the relation which these two 
 bodies bear to America, we shall see that no arguments drawn 
 from one, can be applicable to the other. The House of Com- 
 mons, in the British Parliament, which is the only popular 
 branch of that assembly, was composed of men chosen exclu- 
 sively by the inhabitants of Great Britain, in no sort amenable 
 to, or dependent upon, the people of America, and secured, by 
 their local situation, from every burden they might lay on this 
 country. By impositions on this part of the empire, they might 
 be relieved from their own taxes, but could in no case be injured 
 themselves. The Congress of the United States is to be chosen, 
 either mediately or immediately, by the people. They can im- 
 pose no burdens but what they participate in, in common with 
 their fellow-citizens. The senators and representatives, during 
 the time for which they shall be elected, are incapable of holding 
 any office which shall be created, or the emolument of which 
 shall be increased, during such time. This is taking from can- 
 didates every lure to office, and from the administrators of the 
 government, every temptation to create or increase emoluments 
 to such degree as shall be burdensome to their constituents. 
 Gentlemen, who candidly consider these things, will not say 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 165 
 
 that arguments against the assumption of power by Great Brit- 
 ain can apply to the Congress of the United States. Again, 
 Sir, it has been said, that because ten men of Rome, chosen to 
 compile a body of laws for that people, remained in office after 
 the time for which they were chosen, therefore the Congress of 
 America will perpetuate themselves in government. The De- 
 cemviri, in their attainment to their exalted station, had influ- 
 ence enough over the people to obtain a temporary sovereignty, 
 which superseded the authority of the senate and the consuls, 
 and gave them unlimited control over the lives and fortunes of 
 their fellow-citizens. They were chosen for a year ; at the end 
 of this period, under pretence of not having completed their 
 business, they, with the alteration of some few of their mem- 
 bers, were continued for another year ; at the end of the second 
 year, notwithstanding the business for which they were chosen 
 was completed, they refused to withdraw from their station, 
 and still continued in the exercise of their power. But to what 
 was this owing ? If history can be credited, it was to an idea, 
 universally received by the Roman people, that the power of the 
 magistrate was supposed to determine by his own resignation, 
 and not by expiration of the time for which he was chosen. 
 This is one, among many instances which might be produced, 
 of the small attainments of the Roman people in political knowl- 
 edge ; and I submit it, Sir, to the candor of this Convention, 
 whether any conclusions can be fairly drawn against vesting 
 the proposed government with the powers mentioned in this 
 section, because the magistrates of the ancient republics usurped 
 power, and frequently attempted to perpetuate themselves in 
 authority. 
 
 Some gentlemen suppose it is unsafe and unnecessary to vest 
 the proposed government with authority to " lay and collect 
 taxes, duties, imposts and excises." Let us strip the subject 
 .of every thing that is foreign, and refrain from likening it with 
 governments which in their nature and administration have no 
 affinity ; and we shall soon see that it is not only safe, but 
 indispensably necessary to our peace and dignity, to vest the 
 Congress with the powers described in this section. To deter- 
 mine the necessity of investing that body with the authority 
 alluded to, let us inquire what duties are incumbent on them. 
 
166 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 To pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and gen- 
 eral welfare of the United States ; to declare war, <fcc. ; to raise 
 and support armies ; to provide and maintain a navy : these are 
 authorities and duties incident to every government. No one 
 has, or I presume will, deny that whatever government may be 
 established over America ought to perform such duties. The 
 expense attending these duties is not within the power of cal- 
 culation. The exigencies of government are in their nature 
 illimitable ; so then must be the authority which can meet these 
 exigencies. Where we demand an object, we must afford the 
 means necessary to its attainment. Whenever it can be clearly 
 ascertained, what will be the future exigencies of government, 
 the expense attending them, and the product of any particular 
 tax, duty or impost, then, and not before ? can the people of 
 America limit their government to amount and fund. Some 
 have said that the impost and excise would be sufficient for all 
 the purposes of government in times of peace ; and that in war, 
 requisitions should be made on the several States for sums to 
 supply the deficiencies of this fund. Those who are best in- 
 formed, suppose this fund inadequate to, and none pretend that 
 it can exceed, the expenses of a peace establishment. What 
 then is to be done ? Is America to wait until she is attacked, 
 before she attempts a preparation for defence ? This Avould 
 certainly be unwise ; it would be courting our enemies to make 
 war upon us. The operations of war are sudden, and call for 
 large sums of money. Collections from States are at all times 
 slow and uncertain ; and in case of refusal, the non-complying 
 State must be coerced by arms, which in its consequences would 
 involve the innocent with the guilty, and introduce all the hor- 
 rors of a civil war. But it is said, we need not fear a war — we 
 have no enemies. Let gentlemen consider the situation of our 
 country ; they will find we are circumscribed with enemies, 
 from Maine to Georgia. I trust, therefore, that upon a fair and. 
 candid consideration of the subject, it will be found indispensa- 
 bly requisite to the peace, dignity and happiness of America, 
 that the proposed government should be vested with all the 
 powers granted by the section under debate. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Phillips (of Boston.) I rise to make a few obser- 
 vations on this section, as it contains powers absolutely neces- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 167 
 
 sary. If social government did not exist, there would be an 
 end of individual government ; therefore our very being de- 
 pends on social government. On this article is founded the 
 main pillar of the building. Take away this pillar, and where 
 is your government ? Therefore, I conceive, in this view of 
 the case, this power is absolutely necessary. There seems to 
 be a suspicion that this power will be abused ; but is not all 
 delegation of power equally dangerous ? If we have a castle, 
 shall we delay to put a commander into it, for fear he will turn 
 his artillery against us ? My concern is for the majesty of the 
 people ; if there is no virtue among them, what will the Congress 
 do ? If they had the meekness of Moses, the patience of Job, and 
 the wisdom of Solomon, and the people were determined to be 
 slaves, Sir, could the Congress prevent them ? If they set 
 Heaven at defiance, no arm of flesh can save them. Sir, I 
 shall have nothing to do in this government. But we see the 
 situation we are in ; we are verging towards destruction, and 
 every one must be sensible of it. I suppose the New Eng- 
 land States have a treasure offered to them better than the 
 mines of Peru ; and it cannot be to the disadvantage of the 
 southern States. Great Britain and France come here with 
 their vessels, instead of our carrying our produce to those 
 countries in American vessels, navigated by our own citizens. 
 When I consider the extensive sea-coast there is to this State 
 alone, so well calculated for commerce, viewing matters in this 
 light, 1 would rather sink all this continent owes me, than that 
 this power should be withheld from Congress. Mention is 
 made that Congrsss ought to be restricted of the power to keep 
 an army except in times of war. I apprehend that great mis- 
 chiefs would ensue from such a restriction. Let us take means 
 to prevent war, by granting to Congress the power of raising an 
 army. If a declaration of war is made against this country, 
 and the enemy's army is coming against us, before Congress 
 could collect the means to withstand this enemy, they would 
 penetrate into the bowels of our country, and every thing dear 
 to us would be gone in a moment. The honorable gentleman 
 from Topsham has made use of the expression, " 0, my coun- 
 try ! " from an apprehension that the Constitution should be 
 adopted ; I will cry out, " 0, my country I " if it is not adopt- 
 
168 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 ed. I see nothing but destruction and inevitable ruin, if it is 
 not. The more I peruse and study this article, the more con- 
 vinced am I of the necessity of such a power being vested in 
 Congress ; the more I hear said against it, the more I am con- 
 firmed in my sentiments of its expediency : for it is like the 
 pure metal ; the more you rub it the brighter it shines. It is 
 with concern I hear the honorable gentleman from Topsham 
 make use of language against the gentlemen of the law. Sir, I 
 look on this order of men to be essential to the liberties and rights 
 of the people ; and whoever speaks against them, as speaking 
 against an ordinance' of Heaven. Mr. President, I hope every 
 gentleman will offer his sentiments candidly on this momentous 
 affair ; that he will examine for himself, and consider that he 
 has not only the good of his Commonwealth under his consid- 
 eration, but the welfare of the United States. 
 
 Dr. Willakd entered largely into the field of ancient history, 
 and deduced therefrom, arguments to prove that where power 
 had been trusted to men, whether in great or small bodies, 
 they had always abused it, and that thus republics had soon 
 degenerated into aristocracies. He instanced Sparta, Athens, 
 and Rome. The Amphictyonic League, he said, resembled the 
 Confederation of the United States. While thus united they 
 defeated Xerxes ; but were subdued by the gold of Phillip, 
 who bought the council to betray the interest of their 
 country. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Gorham (in reply to the gentleman from Ux- 
 bridge) exposed the absurdity of conclusions and hypotheses 
 drawn from ancient governments, which bore no relation to 
 the Confederacy proposed ; for those governments had no idea 
 of representation, as we have. He, however, warned us 
 against the evils which had ruined those states, which he 
 thought was the want of an efficient Federal government. As 
 much as the Athenians rejoiced in the extirpation of a Lacede- 
 monian, will, if we are disunited, a citizen of a Massachusetts, 
 at the death of a Connecticut man or a Yorker. With respect 
 to the proposed government degenerating into an aristocracy, 
 the honorable gentleman observed, that the nature and situa- 
 tion of our country rendered such a circumstance impossible ; 
 as from the great preponderance of the agricultural interest in 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 169 
 
 the United States, that interest would always have it in its 
 power to elect such men as would, he observed, effectually 
 prevent the introduction of any other than a perfectly demo- 
 cratical form of government. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Cabot went fully into a continuation of the argu- 
 ments of the honorable gentleman last up. In a clear and 
 elegant manner he analyzed the ancient governments men- 
 tioned by Dr. Willard, and, by comparing them with the pro- 
 posed system, fully demonstrated the superiority of the latter, 
 and in a particular manner the section under debate. 
 
 Mr. Randal said, the quoting of ancient history was no 
 more to the purpose, than to tell how our fathers dug clams at 
 Plymouth. He feared a consolidation of the thirteen States. 
 Our manners, he said, were widely different from the southern 
 States — their elections were not so free and unbiassed ; there- 
 fore, if the States were consolidated, he thought it would 
 introduce manners among us which would set us at continual 
 variance. 
 
 Mr. Bowdoin pointed out other instances of dissimilarity 
 between the systems of the ancient republics and the proposed 
 Constitution, than those mentioned by the honorable gentlemen 
 from Charlestown and Beverly ; in the want of the important 
 checks in the former, which were to be found in the latter ; to 
 the want of which, in the first, was owing, he said, the usurpa- 
 tion which took place. He instanced the Decemviri, who, 
 though chosen for a short period, yet, unchecked, soon subvert- 
 ed the liberties of the Romans ; "and concluded with a decided 
 opinion in favor of the Constitution under debate. ^ 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Mr. Symmes. Mr. President : In such an assembly as this, 
 and on a subject that puzzles the oldest politicians, a young 
 man, Sir, will scarcely dare to think for himself; but if he 
 venture to speak, the effort must certainly be greater. This 
 Convention is the first representative body in which I have 
 been honored with a seat ; and men will not wonder that a 
 scene at once so new and so augusfy, should confuse, oppress, 
 and almost disqualify me to proceed. 
 22 
 
170 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Sir, I bespeak the candor of the Convention — that candor 
 which I know I need but ask to have it extended to me, while 
 I make a few indigested observations on the paragraph now in 
 debate. I have hitherto attended with diligence, but no great 
 anxiety, to the reasoning of the ablest partisans on both sides 
 of the question. Indeed, I could have wished for a more effect- 
 ual, and (if I may term it so) a more feeling representation in 
 the lower house, and for a representation of the people in the 
 Senate. I have been, and still am, desirous of a rotation in 
 office, to prevent the final perpetuation of power in the same 
 men. And I have not been able clearly to see why the place 
 and mariner of holding elections should be in the disposal of 
 Congress. 
 
 But, Sir, in my humble opinion, these things are comparative- 
 ly the lesser things of the law. They doubtless have their 
 influence in the grand effect, and so are essential to the system. 
 But, Sir, I view the section to which we have at length arrived, 
 as the cement of the fabric, and this clause as the key-stone, or 
 (if I may apply the metaphor) the magic talisman on which 
 the fate of it depends. 
 
 Allow me, Sir, to recall to your remembrance that yesterday, 
 when States were in doubt about granting to Congress a five 
 per cent, impost, and the simple power of regulating trade — the 
 time when, so delicate was the patriotic mind, that power was 
 to be transferred with reluctant, with a sparing hand, and the 
 most obvious utility could scarcely extort it from the people. 
 It appears to me of some importance to consider this matter, 
 and to demand complete satisfaction upon the question, why an 
 unlimited power in the affair of taxation is so soon required ? 
 Is our situation so vastly different, that the powers, so lately 
 sufficient, are now but the dust of the balance ? I observe, 
 Sir, that many men, who within a few years past were strenu- 
 ous opposers of an augmentation of the power of Congress, are 
 now the warmest advocates of power, so large as not to admit 
 of a comparison with those which they opposed. Cannot some 
 of them state their reasons then, and their reasons now, that 
 we may judge of their consistency ? or shall we be left to sup- 
 pose that the opinions of politicians, like those of the multi- 
 tude, vibrate from one extreme to the other, and that we have 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 171 
 
 no men among us to whom we can intrust the philosophic task 
 of pointing out the golden mean ? 
 
 At present, Congress have no power to lay taxes, &c, nor even 
 to compel a compliance with their requisitions. May we not 
 suppose, that the members of the great Convention had severely 
 felt the impotency of Congress, while they were in it, and there- 
 fore were rather too keenly set for an effectual increase of 
 power? That the difficulties they had encountered, in obtain- 
 ing decent requisitions, had wrought in them a degree of impa- 
 tience, which prompted them to demand the purse-strings of the 
 nation, as if we were insolvent, and the proposed Congress were 
 to compound with our creditors ? Whence, Sir, can this great, 
 I had almost said, this bold demand, have originated ? Will it 
 be said that it is but a consistent and necessary part of the gen- 
 eral system ? I shall not deny these gentlemen the praise of 
 inventing a system completely consistent with itself, and pretty 
 free from contradiction ; but I would ask, (I shall expect to be 
 answered,) how a system can be necessary for us, of which this 
 is a consistent and necessary part ? 
 
 But, Sir, to the paragraph in hand — Congress, &c. 
 
 Here, Sir, (however kindly Congress may be pleased to deal 
 with us,) is a very good and valid conveyance of all the property 
 in the United States, to certain uses, indeed, but those uses 
 capable of any construction the trustee may think proper to 
 make. This body is not amenable to any tribunal, and there- 
 fore this Congress can do wrong. It will not be denied that 
 they may tax us to any extent ; but some gentlemen are fond 
 of arguing that this body never will do any thing but what is 
 for the common good. Let us consider that matter. 
 
 Faction, Sir, is the vehicle of all transactions in public bodies ; 
 and when gentlemen know this so well, I am rather surprised 
 to hear them so sanguine in this respect. The prevalent faction 
 is the body ; these gentlemen, therefore, must mean that the 
 prevalent faction will always be right, and that the true patriots 
 will always outnumber the men of less and selfish principles. 
 From this it would follow that no public measure was ever 
 wrong, because it must have been passed by the majority ; and 
 so I grant no power ever was or will be abused. In short, we 
 know that all governments have degenerated, and consequently 
 
172 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 have abused the powers reposed in them ; and why we should 
 imagine better of the proposed Congress than of myriads of 
 public bodies who have gone before them, I cannot at present 
 conceive. 
 
 Sir, we ought (I speak it with submission) to consider that 
 what we now grant from certain motives, well grounded, at 
 present, will be exacted of posterity as a prerogative, when we 
 are not alive to testify the tacit conditions of the grant ; that 
 the wisdom of this age will then be pleaded by those in power ; 
 and that the cession we are now about to make will be actually 
 clothed with the venerable habit of ancestral sanction. 
 
 Therefore, Sir, I humbly presume we ought not to take 
 advantage of our situation in point of time, so as to bind pos- 
 terity to be obedient to laws they may very possibly disapprove, 
 nor expose them to a rebellion which at that period will very 
 probably end only in their farther subjugation. 
 
 The paragraph in question is an absolute decree of the peo- 
 ple. The Congress shall have power ; it does not say they shall 
 exercise it ; but our necessities say they must, and the experi- 
 ence of ages says that they will, and finally, when the expenses 
 of the nation, by their ambition, are grown enormous, that they 
 will oppress and subject. For, Sir, they may lay taxes, duties, 
 imposts and excises ! One would suppose that the Convention, 
 Sir, were not at all afraid to multiply words, when any thing 
 was to be got by it. By another clause, all imposts and duties 
 on exports and imports, wherever laid, go into the Federal 
 chest ; so that Congress may not only lay imposts and excises, 
 but all imposts and duties that are laid on imports and exports 
 by any State, shall be a part of the National revenue ; and, be- 
 sides, Congress may lay an impost on the produce and manufac- 
 tures of the country, which are consumed at home. And all 
 these shall be equal through the States. Here, Sir, I raise two 
 objections : First, that Congress should have this power. It is 
 a universal, unbounded permission ; and as such, I think no 
 free people ought ever to consent to it, especially in so important 
 a matter as that of property. I will not descend, Sir, to an 
 abuse of this future Congress, until it exists, nor then, until it 
 misbehaves, nor then, unless 1 dare. But I think that some 
 certain revenue, amply adequate to all necessary purposes, upon 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 173 
 
 a peace establishment, but certain and definitive, would have 
 been better, and the collection of it might have been guaranteed 
 by every State to every other. We should then have known to 
 what we were about to. subscribe, and should have cheerfully 
 granted it. But now, we may indeed grant, but who can cheer- 
 fully grant he knows not what ? 
 
 Again, Sir, I object to the equality of these duties through 
 the States. It matters not with me, in the present argument, 
 which of them will suffer by this proportion. Some probably 
 will, as the consumption of dutied articles will not, if we may 
 judge from experience, be uniform in all. 
 
 But some say, with whom I have conversed, it was for this 
 reason that taxes were provided, that by their assistance the 
 defect of duties in some States ought to be supplied. Now, 
 then, let us suppose that the duties are so laid, that if every 
 State paid in proportion to that which paid most, the duties 
 alone would supply a frugal treasury. Some States will pay 
 but half their proportion, and some will scarcely pay any thing. 
 But those in general who pay the least duty, viz., the inland 
 States, are least of all able to pay a land tax, and therefore I do 
 not see but this tax would operate most against those who are 
 at least able to pay it. 
 
 I humbly submit it, Sir, whether, if each State had its propor- 
 tion of some certain gross sum assigned, according to its num- 
 bers, and a power was given to Congress to collect the same, in 
 case of default in the State, this would not have been a safer 
 Constitution. For, Sir, I also disapprove of the power to col- 
 lect, which is here vested in Congress. It is a power, Sir, to 
 burden us with a standing army of ravenous collectors — har- 
 pies, perhaps from another State, but who, however, were never 
 known to have bowels for any purpose but to fatten on the life- 
 blood of the people. In one age or two this will be the case, 
 and when the Congress shall become tyrannical, these vultures, 
 their servants, will be the tyrants of the village, by whose pres- 
 ence all freedom of speech and action will be taken away. 
 
 Sir, I shall be told that these are imaginary evils ; but I hold 
 to this maxim, that power was never given (of this kind espe- 
 cially) but it was exercised, nor ever exercised but it was finally 
 abused. We must not be amused with handsome probabilities, 
 
174 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 but we must be assured that we are in no danger, and that this 
 Congress could not distress us, if they were ever so much 
 disposed. 
 
 To pay the debts, &c. 
 
 These words, Sir, I confess, are an ornament to the page, 
 and very musical words, but they are too general to be under- 
 stood as any kind of limitation of the power of Congress, and 
 not very easy to be understood at all. When Congress have 
 the purse, they are not confined to rigid economy, and the word 
 debts here is not confined to debts already contracted, or, in- 
 deed, if it were, the term "general welfare" might be applied 
 to any expenditure whatever. Or if it could not, who shall 
 dare to gainsay the proceedings of this body at a future day, 
 when, according to the course of nature, it shall be too firmly 
 fixed in the saddle to be overthrown by any thing but a general 
 insurrection ? an event not to be expected, considering the ex- 
 tent of this continent, and if it were to be expected, a sufficient 
 reason in itself for rejecting this or any Constitution that would 
 tend to produce it. 
 
 This clause, Sir, contains the very sinews of the Constitution. 
 And I hope the universality of it may be singular ; but it may 
 be easily seen, that it tends to produce, in time, as universal 
 powers in every other respect. As the poverty of individuals 
 prevents luxury, so the poverty of public bodies, whether sole 
 or aggregate, prevents tyranny. A nation cannot, perhaps, do 
 a more politic thing, than to supply the purse of its sovereign 
 with that parsimony which results from a sense of the labor it 
 costs, and so to compel him to comply with the genius of his 
 people, and conform to their situation, whether he will or not. 
 How different will be our conduct, if we give the entire disposal 
 of our property to a body, as yet almost unknown in theory, in 
 practice quite heterogeneous in its composition, and whose 
 maxims are yet entirely unknown ! 
 
 Sir, I wish the gentlemen who so ably advocate this instru- 
 ment, would enlarge upon this formidable clause, and I most 
 sincerely wish that the effect of their reasoning may be my con- 
 viction. For, Sir, I will not dishonor my constituents by sup- 
 posing that they expect me to resist that which is irresistible, the 
 force of reason. No, Sir, my constituents ardently wish for a 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 175 
 
 firm, efficient, continental government, but fear the operation 
 of this which is now proposed. Let them be convinced that 
 their fears are groundless, and I venture to declare, in their 
 name, that no town in the Commonwealth will sooner approve 
 the form, or be better subjects under it. 
 
 Mr. Jones (of Boston) enlarged on the various checks which 
 the Constitution provides, and which, he said, formed a security 
 for liberty, and a prevention against power being abused — the 
 frequency of elections of the democratic branch, representation 
 apportioned to numbers, the publication of the journals of Con- 
 gress, <fcc. Gentlemen, he said, had compared the people of 
 this country to those of Rome ; but, he observed, the compari- 
 son, was very erroneous. The Romans were divided into two 
 classes — the nobility and plebeians. The nobility kept all kinds 
 of knowledge to their own class, and the plebeians were in gen- 
 eral very ignorant ; and, when unemployed, in time of peace, 
 were ever ready to revolt, and to follow the dictates of any de- 
 signing patrician. But, continued the worthy gentleman, the 
 people of the United States are an enlightened, well-informed 
 people, and are therefore not easily imposed on by designing 
 men. Our right of representation, concludes Mr. Jones, is 
 much more just and equitable than the boasted one of Great 
 Britain, whose representatives are chosen by corporations, or 
 boroughs, and those boroughs, in general, are the property, 
 or at the disposal of, the nobility and rich gentry of the 
 kingdom. 
 
 [The Vice-President having informed the Convention in the 
 forenoon, that he had received a long letter from the Hon. Mr. 
 Gerry, the same was read, as soon as the Convention proceeded 
 to business in the afternoon. When the Vice-President had 
 read the letter, Mr. Gore rose and objected to the reading a 
 state of facts respecting the construction of the Senate in the 
 Federal Convention, which accompanied the letter ; " not," lie 
 said, " from a wish to preclude information from his own mind, 
 or from the minds of the Convention, but from his duty to his 
 constituents, and the desire he had to guard against infringe- 
 ments on the orders of the Convention." Mr. Gore was inter- 
 rupted, as being out of order, but was proceeding on his objec- 
 tion, when the Hon. Judge Dana begged Mr. Gore's leave to 
 
176 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 say a few words, which he did ; after which he retired from the 
 Convention until the consideration of the letter should be gone 
 through with.] 
 
 Wednesday, January 23, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Peirce rose, he said, to make a few observations on the 
 powers of Congress, in this section. Gentlemen, he said, in dif- 
 ferent parts of the house (Messrs. Dalton, Phillips and Gore) 
 had agreed that Congress will not lay direct taxes except in 
 cases of war ; for that to defray the exigencies of peace, the 
 impost and excise would be sufficient ; and as that mode of 
 taxation would be the most expedient and productive, it would 
 undoubtedly be adopted. But it was necessary Congress should 
 have power to lay direct taxes at all times, although they will 
 not use it, because when our enemies find they have sufficient 
 powers to call forth all the resources of the people, it will pre- 
 vent their making war, as they otherwise would. As the Hon. 
 Mr. Phillips used this proverb, " A stitch in time will save nine," 
 his meaning, I suppose, was, that we should have war nine 
 times if Congress had not such powers, where we should once 
 if they had such powers. But these arguments to me are not 
 conclusive ; for if our enemies know they do not use such pow- 
 ers except in a war, although granted to them, what will be the 
 difference if they have the powers only in the time of war ? 
 But, Mr. President, if Congress have the powers of direct taxes, 
 in the manner prescribed in this section, I fear we shall have 
 that mode of taxation adopted in preference to imposts and 
 excises ; and the reasons of my fears are these : When the 
 impost was granted to Congress in this State, I then, being a 
 member of court, well remember the gentlemen in trade, almost 
 with one consent, agreed that it was an unequal tax, bearing 
 hard on them, for although it finally was a tax on the consum- 
 er, yet in the first instance it was paid by persons in trade, and 
 also, that they consumed more than the landed interest of du- 
 tied articles, and nothing but necessity induced them to submit 
 to grant said impost, as that was the only way Congress could 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 177 
 
 collect money to pay the foreign debt, under the regulations 
 they were then under ; and I fear part of this State's members 
 in Congress, when this Constitution is adopted, will resume 
 their own opinion, when they can lay direct taxes; and as 
 Rhode Island has always been against an impost, and as they 
 have an equal representation in the Senate, and part of Con- 
 necticut will be interested with them, and the southern States 
 having no manufactures of their own, and consuming much 
 more foreign articles than the northern, it appears to me we are 
 not certain of availing ourselves of an impost, if we give Con- 
 gress power to levy and collect direct taxes in time of peace. 
 
 While I am up, Mr. President, I would make some observa- 
 tions on what has been passed over, as I think it is within the 
 orders of the house. The Hon. Mr. Sedgwick said, if I under- 
 stood him right, that if he thought that this Constitution con- 
 solidated the union of the States, he should be the last man 
 that should vote for it ; but I take his meaning to be this, 
 according to the reasoning of Mr. Ames, that it is not a consoli- 
 dation of the Union, because there are three branches in the 
 Union, and therefore, it is not a consolidation of the Union. 
 But, Sir, I think I cannot conceive of a sovereignty of power, 
 existing within a sovereign power, nor do I wish any thing in 
 this Constitution to prevent Congress being sovereign in matters 
 belonging to their jurisdiction ; for I have seen the necessity of 
 their powers in almost all the instances that have been men- 
 tioned in this Convention ; and also last winter, in the rebellion, 
 I thought it would be better for Congress to have stilled the 
 people, rather than people from amongst themselves, who are 
 more apt to be governed by temper than others, as it appeared 
 to me we were in the disqualifying act, as in my opinion, we 
 then did not keep strictly to our own Constitution ; and I 
 believe such a superior power ought to be in Congress. But I 
 would have it distinctly bounded, that every one may know the 
 utmost limits of it, and I have some doubts on my mind as to 
 those limits, which I wish to have solved. I have also an 
 objection as to the term for which the Senate are to be in office ; 
 for as the democratical branch of the Federal legislature is to 
 continue in office two years, and they are the only check on the 
 Federal, and they, the Senate, to continue in office six years, 
 
 23 
 
178 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 they will have an undue advantage on the democratic branch, 
 and I think they ought not to continue in office for a longer time 
 than the other ; and also, that if they conduct ill we may have 
 a constitutional revolution in as short a period as two years, if 
 needed. The Hon. Mr. King said, some days past, that the 
 Senate going out by classes, if rightly considered, were not for 
 but four years ; because one-third part were never more than 
 six, another four, and a third two — therefore the medium was 
 four. But I think that way of arguing would argue that if 
 they were all to go out at the end of six years, that they were 
 but three years in office, because half their time they were 
 under the age of three years, and the other half over "the age of 
 three years in office ; therefore his arguing in that respect to me 
 was not well founded. 
 
 Col. Varnum, in answer to an inquiry, why a bill of rights 
 was not annexed to this Constitution, said, that by the Consti- 
 tution of Massachusetts, the legislature have a right to make 
 all laws not repugnant to the Constitution. Now, says he, if 
 there is such a clause in the Constitution under consideration, 
 then there would be a necessity for a bill of rights. In the sec- 
 tion under debate, Congress have an expressed power to levy 
 taxes, &c, and to pass laws to carry their requisitions into exe- 
 cution. This, he said, was express, and required no bill of 
 rights. After stating the difference between delegated power, 
 and the grant of all power, except in certain cases, the Colonel 
 proceeded to controvert the idea that this Constitution went to 
 a consolidation of the Union. He said it was only a consolida- 
 ion of strength ; and that it was apparent Congress had no 
 right to alter the internal regulations of a State. The design 
 in amending the Confederation, he said, was to remedy its 
 defects. It was the interest of the whole to confederate against 
 a foreign enemy, and each was bound to exert its utmost abil- 
 ity to oppose that enemy ; but it had been done at our expense 
 in a great measure ; and there was no way to provide for a 
 remedy, because Congress had not the power to call forth the 
 resources of every State, nor to coerce delinquent States. But, 
 under the proposed government, those States which will not 
 comply with equal requisitions, will be coerced. And this, he 
 said, is a glorious provision. In the late war, said the Colonel, 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 179 
 
 the States of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, for two or 
 three years, had in the field half the Continental army under 
 General Washington. Who paid these troops? The States 
 which raised them were called on to pay them. How, unless 
 Congress have a power to levy taxes, can they make the States 
 pay their proportion ? In order that this, and some other 
 States, may not again be obliged to pay eight or ten times their 
 proportion of the public exigencies, he said, this power is highly 
 necessary to be delegated to the Federal head. He showed the 
 necessity of Congress being enabled to prepare against the 
 attacks of a foreign enemy, and he called upon the gentleman 
 from Andover, (Mr. Symmes,) or any other gentleman, to pro- 
 duce an instance, where any government, consisting of three 
 branches, elected by the people, and having checks on each 
 other, as this has, abused the power delegated to them. 
 
 Mr. Choate said, that this clause gives power to Congress to 
 levy duties, excises, imposts, &c, considering the trust delegat- 
 ed to Congress, that they are to " provide for the common 
 defence, promote the general welfare," <fec. If this is to be the 
 object of their delegation, the next question is, whether they 
 shall not be vested with powers to prosecute it. And this can 
 be no other than an unlimited power of taxation, if that defence 
 requires it. Mr. Choate contended that it was the power of the 
 people concentred to a point ; that, as all power is lodged in 
 them, this power ought to be supreme. He showed the neces- 
 sity of its being so, not only for our common defence, but for 
 our advantage in settling commercial treaties. Do we wish to 
 make a treaty with any power of Europe, we are told we have 
 no stability, as a nation. As Congress must provide "for the 
 common defence, shall they, asked Mr. Choate, be confined to 
 the impost and excise ? They alone are the judges whether five 
 or one per cent, is necessary or convenient. It has been the 
 practice of all nations to anticipate their resources by loans. 
 This will be the case of the United States, in war; and, he 
 asked, if our resources are competent and well established, and 
 no doubt remained of them, whether in that case the individ- 
 uals who have property, will not cheerfully offer it for the 
 general defence ? After adverting to the idea of some, of its 
 being a consolidation of the Union, Mr. Choate concluded, by a 
 
180 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 brief display of the several checks contained, and securities for 
 the people to be found in this system. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Sir, the question is, whether Congress shall 
 have power. Some say, that if this section was left out, the 
 whole would fall to the ground. I think so too, as it is all of a 
 piece. We are now fixing a national consolidation. This sec- 
 tion, I look upon it, is big with mischiefs. Congress will have 
 power to keep standing armies. The great Mr. Pitt says stand- 
 ing armies are dangerous. Keep your militia in order — we 
 don't want standing armies. A gentleman said, we are a rich 
 State. I say so too. Then why shall we not wait five or six 
 months, and see what our sister States do ? We are able to 
 stand our own ground against a foreign power. They cannot 
 starve us out — they cannot bring their ships on the land — we 
 are a nation of healthy, strong men — our land is fertile, and we 
 are increasing in numbers. It is said we owe money ; no mat- 
 ter if we do ; our safety lies in not paying it. Pay only the 
 interest. Don't let us go too fast. Shall not Massachusetts be 
 a mediator ? It is my wish she may be one of the four dissent- 
 ing States ; then we shall be on our old ground, and shall not 
 act unconstitutionally. Some people cry, it will be a great 
 charge ; but it will be a greater charge, and be more dangerous 
 to make a new one. Let us amend the old Confederation. 
 Why not give Congress power only to regulate trade ? Some 
 say, that those we owe will fall upon us ; but it is no such 
 thing ; the balace of power in the old countries will not permit 
 it — the other nations will protect us. Besides, we are a brave 
 and a happy people. Let us be cautious how we divide the 
 States. By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall. We are in 
 our childhood yet ; don't let us grow too fast, lest we grow out 
 of si 1 ape. If I have proved that we are a respectable people, in 
 possession of liberty, property and virtue, and none in a better 
 situation to defend themselves, why all this racket ? Gentlemen 
 say we are undone if we cannot stop up the Thames : But, Mr. 
 President, nations will mind their own interest, and not ours. 
 Great Britain has found out the secret to pick the subjects' 
 pockets, without their knowing of it — that's the very thing 
 Congress is after. Gentlemen say this section is as clear as the 
 sun, and that all power is retained which is not given. But 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 181 
 
 where is the bill of rights which shall check the power of this 
 Congress, which shall say, thus far shall ye come, and no farther? 
 The safety of the people depends on a bill of rights. If we build 
 on a sandy foundation, is it likely we shall stand ? I appeal to 
 the feelings of the Convention. There are some parts of this 
 Constitution which I cannot digest ; and, Sir, shall we swallow 
 a large bone for the sake of a little meat ? Some say, swallow 
 the whole now, and pick out the bone afterwards. But I say, 
 let us pick off the meat, and throw the bone away. 
 
 This section, Sir, takes the purse-strings from the people. 
 England has been quoted for their fidelity ; but did their Con- 
 stitution ever give such a power as is contained in this Constitu- 
 tion ? Did they ever allow Parliament to vote an army but for 
 one year ? But here we are giving Congress power to vote an 
 army for two years — to tax us without limitation — no one to 
 gainsay them, and no inquiry yearly, as in Britain. Therefore, 
 if this Constitution is got down, we shall alter the system en- 
 tirely, and have no checks upon Congress. 
 
 The Rev. Mr. Niles wished the honorable gentleman would 
 point out the limits to be prescribed to the powers given by this 
 section. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Bowdoin. Mr. President : On the subject of gov- 
 ernment, which admits of so great a variety in its parts and 
 combinations, a diversity of opinions is to be expected ; and it 
 was natural to suppose, that in this Convention, respectable for 
 its numbers, but much more so for the characters which com- 
 pose it, there would be a like diversity concerning the Federal 
 Constitution, that is now the subject of our consideration. 
 
 In considering it, every gentleman will reflect, how inade- 
 quate to the purposes of the Union the Confederation has been. 
 When the plan of the Confederation was formed, the enemy 
 were invading us ; and this inspired the several States with 
 such a spirit of union, and mutual defence, that a mere requisi- 
 tion or recommendation of Congress was sufficient to procure 
 the needful aids, without any power of coercion; and for 
 that reason, among others, no such power was given by the 
 Confederation. But since that reason has ceased, and the 
 idea of danger being removed by the peace, the requisitions of 
 Congress have, in most of the States, been little regarded; 
 
182 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 notwithstanding they solemnly pledged their faith to comply 
 with them. 
 
 This non-compliance has compelled Congress to increase the 
 foreign debt of the Union, by procuring further loans, to pay 
 the interest and instalments due on former loans ; and in that 
 way to preserve the public faith, which had been pledged to 
 foreign powers. It has compelled them, in order to prevent the 
 consequences of a breach of faith, as relative to those powers, to 
 enter repeatedly into those ruinous negotiations by which " the 
 United States jointly, and each of them in particular, together 
 with all their lands, chattels, revenues and products, and also 
 the imposts and taxes already laid and raised in the same, or in 
 time to come to be laid and raised, are, for the whole," mort- 
 gaged for the repayment of those loans by instalments, and for 
 payment of the interest on them annually. These debts must 
 be paid, bona fide, according to contract ; or be further increased 
 by procuring, if procurable, further loans ; which, ruinous as 
 the measure is, must be continued, unless the States empower 
 Congress to raise money for the discharging those debts. It 
 will not be in the power of the United States, and I am sure it 
 will not be in their inclination, to rid themselves of those debts 
 in the same base and ignominious manner in which a faction, 
 in one of them, are endeavoring to get rid of theirs. To the 
 same cause (a non-compliance with Congressional requisitions) 
 are owing the repeated but necessary breaches of public faith in 
 regard to the payment of the Federal domestic debt. And 
 hence, as relative to the joint consolidated debt, the inefficiency 
 of the public finances, and the bankrupt state of the Federal 
 treasury ; which can never be remedied without empowering 
 Congress to levy adequate duties and taxes. Without such a 
 power, the accumulating debt will never be paid, but by a forci- 
 ble collection, which our foreign creditors know how, and are 
 able to apply, if unhappily it should be necessary. The several 
 loans, which by contract are to be paid by instalments, will, in 
 case of the failure of any o£ the stipulated payments, become, 
 the whole of them, immediately payable ; and any of the prop- 
 erty of any of the States, whether public or private, that can be 
 most easily come at, will in that case be seized and applied for 
 that purpose. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 183 
 
 This mode of reimbursement or reprisal will be upon the 
 trade and navigation of the United States ; and in proportion as 
 ours of this State may be larger and more extensive, than the 
 trade and navigation of other States, we shall be the greatest 
 sufferers. This ruin of our trade will involve in it not only the 
 ruin of the mercantile part of the State, and of the numerous 
 body of mechanics dependent upon it, but will most essentially 
 affect every other class of citizens, and operate most extensively 
 to the injury of the Commonwealth. 
 
 These are some of the consequences, certain and infallible, 
 that will flow from the denial of that power to Congress. Shall 
 we, then, we of this State, who are so much interested in this 
 matter, deny them that power — so essential to our political 
 happiness ? 
 
 But if we attend to our trade, as it is at present, we shall 
 find, that the miserable state of it is owing to a like want of 
 power in Congress. Other nations prohibit our vessels from 
 entering their ports, or lay heavy duties on our exports carried 
 thither ; and we have no retaliating or regulating power over 
 their vessels and exports to prevent it. Hence a decrease of 
 our commerce and navigation, and of the duties and revenue 
 arising from them. Hence an insufficient demand for the pro- 
 duce of our lands, and the consequent discouragement of agri- 
 culture. Hence the inability to pay debts, and particularly 
 taxes, which by that decrease are enhanced. And hence, as the 
 necessary result of all these, the emigration of our inhabitants. 
 If it be asked, How are these evils, and others that might be 
 mentioned, to be remedied ? the answer is short : By giving 
 Congress power, and adequate power. . Whether such power be 
 given by the proposed Constitution, it is left with the Conven- 
 tions from the several States, and with us, who compose one of 
 them, to determine. 
 
 In determining on this question, every gentleman will doubt- 
 less consider the importance of cultivating a spirit of union 
 among ourselves, and with the several States. This spirit pro- 
 cured our emancipation from British tyranny ; and the same 
 spirit, by uniting us in the necessary means, must secure to us 
 our dear-bought, blood-purchased liberty and independence, 
 and deliver us from evils which, unless remedied, must end in 
 
184 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 national ruin. The means for effecting these purposes are 
 within our reach ; and the adoption of the proposed Constitu- 
 tion will give us the possession of them. Like all other human 
 productions, it may be imperfect ; but most of the imperfections 
 imputed to it are ideal and unfounded ; and the rest are of such 
 a nature that they cannot be certainly known, but by the ope- 
 ration of the Constitution : and if in its operation it should in 
 any respect be essentially bad, it will be amended in one of the 
 modes prescribed by it. I say, will be amended, because the 
 Constitution is constructed on such principles, that its bad 
 effects, if any such should arise from it, will injure the mem- 
 bers of Congress equally with their constituents ; and therefore 
 both of them must be equally induced to seek for and effectuate 
 the requisite amendments. 
 
 There have been many objections offered against the Consti- 
 tution ; and of these the one most strongly urged has been the 
 great power vested in Congress. On this subject, I beg leave to 
 make a few general observations, which ought to be attended 
 to, as being applicable to every branch of that power. 
 
 It may therefore be observed, that the investiture of such 
 power, so far from being an objection, is a most cogent reason 
 for accepting the Constitution. The power of Congress, both 
 in the legislative and executive line, is the power of the people, 
 collected, through a certain medium, to a focal point ; at all 
 times ready to be exerted for the general benefit, according as 
 circumstances or exigencies may require. If you diminish or 
 annihilate it, you diminish or annihilate the means of your 
 own safety and prosperity ; which means, if they were to be 
 measured like mathematical quantities, would be in exact pro- 
 portion, as the power is greater or less. But this is not the 
 case ; for power that does not reach, or is inadequate to the 
 object, is worse than none. An exertion of such power would 
 increase the evil it was intended to remove, and at the same 
 time create a further evil, which might be a very great one — 
 the expense of a fruitless exertion. 
 
 If we consider the objects of the power, they are numerous 
 and important ; and as human foresight cannot extend to many 
 of them, and all of them are in the womb of futurity, the 
 quantum of the power cannot be estimated. Less than the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 185 
 
 whole, as relative to Federal purposes, may, through its insuffi- 
 ciency, occasion a dissolution of the Union, and a subjugation 
 or division of it among foreign powers. Their attention is 
 drawn to the United States ; their emissaries are watching our 
 conduct, particularly upon the present most important occasion ; 
 and if we should be so unhappy as to reject the Federal Consti- 
 tution proposed to us, and continue much longer our present 
 weak, unenergetic Federal government, their policy will probably 
 induce them to plan a division or partition of the States among 
 themselves ; and unite their forces to effect it. 
 
 But, however that may be, this is certain, that the respecta- 
 bility of the United States among foreign nations, our commerce 
 with them on the principles of reciprocity, and our forming 
 beneficial treaties with them on those principles, their estima- 
 tion of our friendship and fear of losing it, our capacity to 
 resent injuries, and our security against interior as well as 
 foreign attacks, must be derived from such a power. In short, 
 the commercial and political happiness, the liberty and proper- 
 ty, the peace, safety and general welfare, both internal and 
 external, of each and all the States, depend on that power ; 
 which, as it must be applied to a vast variety of objects, and to 
 cases and exigencies beyond the ken of human prescience, must 
 be very great ; and which cannot be limited without endanger- 
 ing the public safety. 
 
 It will be and has been said, this great power may be abused; 
 and, instead of protecting, may be employed by Congress in 
 oppressing their constituents. A possibility of abuse, as it may 
 be affirmed of all delegated power whatever, is by itself no 
 sufficient reason for withholding the delegation. If it were a 
 sufficient one, no power could be delegated ; nor could govern- 
 ment of any sort subsist. The possibility, however, should 
 make us careful, that in delegations of importance, like the one 
 contained in the proposed Constitution, there should be such 
 checks provided, as would not frustrate the end and intention of 
 delegating the power, but would, as far as it could be safely 
 done, prevent the abuse of it : and such checks are provided in 
 the Constitution. Some of them were mentioned the last even- 
 ing by one of my worthy colleagues ; but I shall here exhibit 
 all of them in one view. 
 
 24 
 
186 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 The two capital departments of government, the legislative 
 and executive, in which the delegated powers reside, consisting 
 of the President, Vice-President, Senate and Representatives, 
 are directly, and by their respective legislatures and delegates, 
 chosen by the people. 
 
 The President, and also the Vice-President, when acting as 
 President, before they enter on the execution of the office, shall 
 each u solemnly swear, or affirm, that he will faithfully execute 
 the office of president of the United States, and will, to the best 
 of his ability, preserve, protect and defend, the Constitution of 
 the United States." 
 
 " The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the 
 members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and 
 judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several 
 States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this 
 Constitution." 
 
 "• The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the 
 United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, 
 and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes or 
 misdemeanors." 
 
 " No senator or representative shall, during the time for 
 which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office, which 
 shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have 
 been increased, during such time ; and no person holding any 
 office under the United States, shall be a member of either 
 house, during his continuance in office." 
 
 " No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, 
 or by any particular State ; and no person, holding any office 
 of profit or trust under the United States, shall, without the 
 consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, 
 office or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or 
 foreign state." 
 
 " The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
 Union, a republican form of government, and shall protect each 
 of them against invasion and domestic violence." 
 
 To these great checks may be added several other very essen- 
 tial, ones, as, the negative which each house hath upon the acts 
 of the other ; the disapproving power of the President, which 
 subjects those acts to a revision by the two houses, and to a final 
 
1788.1 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 187 
 
 -J Mi 
 
 negative, unless two-thirds of each house shall agree to pass the 
 returned acts, notwithstanding the President's objections ; the 
 printing the journals of each house, containing their joint and 
 respective proceedings ; and the publishing, from time to time, 
 a regular statement and account of the receipts and expendi- 
 tures of all public money, none of which shall be drawn from 
 the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made bylaw. 
 
 All these checks and precautions, provided in the Constitu- 
 tion, must, in a great measure, prevent an abuse of power, at 
 least in all flagrant instances, even if Congress should consist 
 wholly of men who were guided by no other principle than 
 their own interest. Under the influence of such checks, this 
 would compel them to a conduct, which, in the general, would 
 answer the intention of the Constitution. But the presump- 
 tion is, (and if the people duly attend to the objects of their 
 choice, it would be realized,) that the President of the United 
 States, and the members of Congress, would, for the most part, 
 be men, not only of ability, but of a good moral character, in 
 which case an abuse of power is not to be apprehended, nor any 
 error in the government, but such as every human institution 
 is subject to. 
 
 There is a further guard against the abuse of power, which, 
 though not expressed, is strongly implied in the Federal Con- 
 stitution, and indeed in the Constitution of every government, 
 founded on the principles of equal liberty ; and that is, that 
 those who make the laws, and particularly laws for the levying 
 of taxes, do, in common with their fellow-citizens, fall within 
 the power and operation of those laws. 
 
 As then the individuals of Congress will all share in the bur- 
 dens they impose, and be personally affected by the good or 
 bad laws they make for the Union, they will be under the 
 strongest motives of interest to lay the lightest burdens possi- 
 ble, and to make the best laws, or such laws as shall not unne- 
 cessarily affect either the property or the personal rights of their 
 fellow-citizens. 
 
 With regard to rights, the whole Constitution is a declaration 
 of rights, which primarily and principally respect the general 
 government intended to be formed by it. The rights of partic- 
 ular States and private citizens not being the object or subject 
 
18S DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 of the Constitution, they are only incidentally mentioned. In 
 regard to the former, it would require a volume to describe 
 them, as they extend to every subject of legislation, not 
 included in the powers vested in Congress, and in regard to the 
 latter, as all government is founded on the relinquishment of 
 personal rights in a certain degree, there was a clear impropri- 
 ety in being very particular about them. By such a particu- 
 larity, the government might be embarrassed, and prevented 
 from doing what the private as well as the public and general 
 good of the citizens and States might require. 
 
 The public good, in which private is necessarily involved, 
 might be hurt by too particular an enumeration ; and the 
 private good could suffer no injury from a deficient enumera- 
 tion, because Congress could not injure the rights of private 
 citizens without injuring their own ; as they must, in their 
 public as well as private character, participate equally with 
 others in the consequences of their own acts. And by this 
 most important circumstance, in connection with the checks 
 above mentioned, the several States at large, and each citizen 
 in particular, will be secured, as far as human wisdom can 
 secure them, against the abuse of the delegated power. 
 
 In considering the Constitution, we shall consider it in all 
 its parts, upon these general principles, which operate through 
 the whole of it, and are equivalent to the most extensive bill 
 of rights that can be formed. 
 
 These observations, which are principally of a general nature, 
 but will apply to the most essential parts of the Constitution, 
 are, with the utmost deference and respect, submitted to your 
 candid consideration ; with the hope that as they have influ- 
 enced my own mind decidedly in favor of the Constitution, 
 they will not be wholly unproductive of a like influence on the 
 minds of the gentlemen of the Convention. 
 
 If the Constitution should be finally accepted and estab- 
 lished, it will complete the temple of American liberty ; and, 
 like the keystone of a grand and magnificent arch, be the bond 
 of union to keep all the parts firm, and compacted together. 
 May this temple, sacred to liberty and virtue — sacred to jus- 
 tice, the first and greatest political virtue, — and built upon the 
 broad and solid foundation of perfect union, — be dissoluble only 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 189 
 
 by the dissolution of nature ; and may this Convention have 
 the distinguished honor of erecting one of its pillars on that 
 lasting foundation. 
 
 Dr. Taylor said, the consideration of the eighth section had 
 taken up a great deal of time ; that gentlemen had repeated 
 the same arguments over and over again ; and although the 
 order of the Convention was, that the proposed Constitution 
 should be considered by paragraphs, he was pleased, he said, 
 to observe that the honorable gentleman last speaking, had 
 gone into the matter at large ; and therefore, he hoped that 
 other gentlemen would take the same liberty, and that all 
 further observations might be on the system at large. 
 
 Mr. Parsons (of Newburyport.) Mr. President : A great 
 variety of supposed objections have been made against vesting 
 Congress with some of the powers denned in the eighth 
 section. Some of the objectors have considered the powers as 
 unnecessary, and others, that the people have not the proper 
 security that these powers will not be abused. To most of these 
 objections, answers, convincing in my opinion, to a candid 
 mind, have been given. But as some of the objections have 
 not been noticed, I shall beg the indulgence of the Convention, 
 while I very briefly consider them. And as it is my intention 
 to avoid all repetition, my observations will necessarily be 
 unconnected and desultory. 
 
 It has been said that the grant in this section includes all the 
 possessions of the people, and divests them of every thing ; 
 that such a grant is impolitic, for, as the poverty of an individ- 
 ual gaurds him against luxury and extravagance, so poverty in 
 a ruler is a fence against tyranny and oppression. Sir, gentle- 
 men do not distinguish between the government of an hered- 
 itary aristocracy, where the interest of the governors is very 
 different from that of the subjects, and a government to be 
 administered for the common good by the servants of the 
 people, vested with delegated powers by popular elections at 
 stated periods. The Federal Constitution establishes a govern- 
 ment of the last description, and in this case the people divest 
 themselves of nothing. The government and powers which the 
 Congress can administer, are the mere result of a compact 
 made by the people with each other for the common defence 
 
190 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 and general welfare. To talk, therefore, of keeping Congress 
 poor, if it means any thing, must mean a depriving the people 
 themselves of their own resources. But if gentlemen will still 
 insist, that these powers are a grant from the people, and con- 
 sequently improper, let it then be observed that it is now too 
 late to impede the grant. It is already completed. The Con- 
 gress under the Confederation are invested with it by solemn 
 compact. They have powers to demand what moneys and 
 forces they judge necessary for the common defence and gen- 
 eral welfare ; powers as extensive as those proposed in this 
 Constitution. But it may be said, as the ways and means are 
 reserved to the several States, they have a check upon Congress 
 by refusing a compliance with the requisitions. Sir, is this 
 the boasted check — a check that can never be exercised but by 
 perfidy and a breach of public faith — by a violation of the most 
 solemn stipulations ? It is this check that has embarrassed us 
 at home, and made us contemptible abroad : and will any hon- 
 est man plume himself upon a check which an honest man 
 would blush to exercise ? 
 
 It has been objected, that the Constitution provides no 
 religious test by oath, and we may have in power unprincipled 
 men, atheists and pagans. No man can wish more ardently 
 than I do, that all our public offices may be filled by men who 
 fear God and hate wickedness - ; but it must remain with the 
 electors to give the government this security : an oath will not 
 do it. Will an unprincipled man be entangled by an oath ? 
 Will an atheist or a pagan dread the vengeance of the Chris- 
 tian's God — a being, in his opinion, the creature of fancy and 
 credulity ? It is a solecism in expression. No man is so illiberal 
 as to wish the confining places of honor or profit to any one sect 
 of Christians ; but what security is it to government, that every 
 public officer shall swear that he is a Christian ? For what 
 will then be called Christianity ? One man will declare that 
 the Christian religion is only an illumination of natural relig- 
 ion, and that he is a Christian ; another Christian will assert 
 that all men must be happy hereafter in spite of themselves ; a 
 third Christian reverses the image, and declares, that let a man 
 do all he can, he will certainly be punished in another world ; 
 and a fourth will tell us, that if a man use any force for the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 191 
 
 common defence, he violates every principle of Christianity. 
 Sir, the only evidence we can have of the sincerity and excel- 
 lency of a man's religion, is a good life ; and I trust that such 
 evidence will be required of every candidate by every elector. 
 That man who acts an honest part to his neighbor, will most 
 probably conduct honorably towards the public. 
 
 It has been objected, that we have not so good security against 
 the abuse of power under the new Constitution, as the Confed- 
 eration gives us. It is my deliberate opinion, that we have a 
 better security. Under the Confederation the whole power, 
 executive and legislative, is vested in one body, in which the 
 people have no representation, and where the States, the great 
 and the small States, are equally represented ; and all the 
 checks the States have, is a power to remove and disgrace an 
 unfaithful servant, after the mischief is perpetrated. Under 
 this Constitution, an equal representation, immediately from 
 the people, is introduced, who by their negative, and the exclu- 
 sive right of originating money-bills, have the power to control 
 the Senate, where the sovereignty of the States is represented. 
 But it has been objected, that in the old Confederation the 
 States could at any time recall their delegates, and there was a 
 rotation. No essential benefit could be derived to the people 
 from these provisions, but great inconveniences will result from 
 them. It has been observed by a gentleman who has argued 
 against the Constitution, that a representative ought to have an 
 intimate acquaintance with the circumstances of his constitu- 
 ents, and after comparing them with the situation of every part 
 of the Union, so conduct as to promote the common good. The 
 sentiment is an excellent one, and ought to be engraved on the 
 hearts of every representative. But what is the effect of the 
 power of recalling ? Your representative, with an operating 
 revocation over his head, will lose all ideas of the general good, 
 and will dwindle to a servile agent, attempting to secure local 
 and partial benefits by cabal and intrigue. There are great 
 and insuperable objections to a rotation. It is an abridgment 
 of the rights of the people, and it may deprive them, at critical 
 seasons, of the services of the most important characters in the 
 nation. It deprives a man of honorable ambition, whose high- 
 est glory is the applause of his fellow-citizens, of an efficient 
 
192 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 motive to great and patriotic exertions. The people individually 
 have no method of testifying their esteem, but by a reelection ; 
 and shall they be deprived of the honest satisfaction of wreath- 
 ing for their friend and patriot a crown of laurel more durable 
 than monarchy can bestow ? 
 
 It has been objected, that the Senate are made too indepen- 
 dent upon the State legislatures. No business under the Con- 
 stitution of the Federal Convention could have been more 
 embarrassing, than the constructing the Senate ; as that body 
 must conduct our foreign negotiations, and establish and pre- 
 serve a system of national politics, an uniform adherence to 
 which can alone induce other nations to negotiate with and 
 confide in us. It is certain, the change of the men who com- 
 pose it should not be too frequent, and should be gradual. At 
 the same time suitable checks should be provided to prevent an 
 abuse of power, and to continue their dependence on their con- 
 stituents. I think the Convention have most happily extricated 
 themselves from the embarrassment. Although the senators 
 are elected for six years, yet the Senate, as a body composed of 
 the same men, can exist only for two years, without the consent 
 of the States. If the States think proper, one-third of that body 
 may, at the end of every second year, be new men. When the 
 Senate act as legislators they are controllable at all times by the 
 representatives ; and in their executive capacity, in making 
 treaties and conducting the national negotiations, the consent of 
 two-thirds is necessary, who must be united, to a man (which 
 is hardly possible) or the new men biennially sent to the Sen- 
 ate, if the States choose, it can control them ; and at all times 
 there will also be one-third of the Senate, who at the expiration 
 of two years must obtain a reelection, or return to the mass of 
 the people. And the change of men in the Senate will be so 
 gradual as not to destroy or disturb any national system of 
 politics. 
 
 It is objected, that it is dangerous to allow the Senate a right 
 of proposing alterations or amendments in money-bills ; that the 
 Senate may by this power increase the supplies, and establish 
 profuse salaries ; that for these reasons the Lords in the. British 
 Parliament have not this power, which is a great security to 
 the liberties of Englishmen. I was much surprised at hearing 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 193 
 
 this objection, and the grounds upon which it was supported. 
 The reason why the Lords have not this power, is founded on a 
 principle in the English Constitution, that the Commons alone 
 represent the whole property of the nation ; and as a money-bill 
 is a grant to the king, none can make the grant but those who 
 represent the property of the nation ; and the negative of the 
 Lords is introduced to check the profusion of the Commons, and 
 to guard their own property. The manner of passing a money- 
 bill, is conclusive evidence of these principles ; for after the 
 assent of the Lords, it does not remain with the clerk of the 
 Parliament, but is returned to the Commons, who, by their 
 Speaker, present it to the King, as the gift of the Commons. 
 But every supposed control the Senate by this power may have 
 over money-bills, they can have without it ; for by private com- 
 munications with the representatives, they may as well insist 
 upon an increase of the supplies, or salaries, as by official com- 
 munications. But had not the Senate this power, the Repre- 
 sentatives might tack any foreign matter to a money-bill, and 
 compel the Senate to concur or lose the supplies. This might 
 be done in critical seasons, when the Senate might give way to 
 the encroachments of the Representatives, rather than sustain 
 the odium of embarrassing the affairs of the nation. The bal- 
 ance between the two branches of the legislature, would in 
 this way be endangered, if not destroyed, and the Constitution 
 materially injured. This subject was fully considered by the 
 Convention for forming the Constitution of Massachusetts, and 
 the provision made by that body, after mature deliberation, is 
 introduced into the Federal Constitution. 
 
 It was objected, that by giving Congress a power of direct 
 taxation, we give them power to destroy the State governments 
 by prohibiting them from raising any moneys. But this objec- 
 tion is not founded in the Constitution. Congress have only 
 a concurrent right with each State, in laying direct taxes, not 
 an exclusive right ; and the right of each State to direct taxa- 
 tion is equally extensive and perfect as the right of Congress. 
 Any law, therefore, of the United States for securing to Con- 
 gress more than a concurrent right with each State, is usurpa- 
 tion, and void. 
 
 It has been objected, that we have no bill of rights. If gen- 
 
 25 
 
194 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 tlemen who make this objection would consider what are the 
 supposed inconveniences resulting from the want of a declara- 
 tion of rights, I think they would soon satisfy themselves that 
 the objection has no weight. Is there a single natural right 
 we enjoy, uncontrolled by our own legislature, that Congress 
 can infringe ? Not one. Is there a single political right 
 secured to us by our Constitution, against the attempts of our 
 own legislature, which we are deprived of by this Constitution ? 
 Not one, that I can reccollect. All the rights Congress can 
 control, we have surrendered to our own legislature ; and the 
 only question is, whether the people shall take from their own 
 legislature a certain portion of the several sovereignties, and 
 unite them in one head, for the more effectual securing of the 
 national prosperity and happiness. 
 
 The honorable gentleman from Boston, has stated at large, 
 most of the checks the people have against usurpation and the 
 abuse of power under the proposed Constitution ; but from the 
 abundance of his matter he has, in my opinion, omitted two or 
 three, which I shall mention. The oath the several legislative, 
 executive, and judicial officers of the several States take to sup- 
 port the Federal Constitution, is as effectual a security against 
 the usurpation of the general government, as it is against the en- 
 croachment of the State governments. For an increase of the 
 powers by usurpation, is as clearly a violation of the Federal 
 Constitution, as a diminution of these powers by private encroach- 
 ment; and that oath obliges the officers of the several States, as 
 vigorously to oppose the one as the other. But there is another 
 check, founded in the nature of the Union, superior to all 
 parchment checks that can be invented. If there should be an 
 usurpation, it will not be upon the farmer and merchant, 
 employed and attentive only to their several occupations ; it 
 will be upon thirteen legislatures, completely organized, pos- 
 sessed of the confidence of the people, and having the means, 
 as well as inclination, successfully to oppose it. Under these 
 circumstances, none but madmen would attempt an usurpa- 
 tion. But, Sir, the people themselves have it in their power 
 effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an 
 appeal to arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory, it is 
 not law ; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 195 
 
 him be considered as a criminal by the general government, 
 yet only his own fellow-citizens can convict him ; they are his 
 jury ; and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of 
 Congress can hurt him ; and innocent they certainly will pro- 
 nounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of 
 usurpation. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 As soon as the Convention met this afternoon, Mr. Nasson, in 
 a short speech, introduced a motion to this effect : " That this 
 Convention so far reconsider their former vote to discuss the 
 Constitution by paragraphs, as to leave the subject at large, 
 open for consideration." This motion met with a warm oppo- 
 sition from several parts of the house. 
 
 Mr. Wales said, that the time which had been spent in the 
 discussion, had been well spent ; and that he was much sur- 
 prised to see gentlemen wishing thus to hurry the matter. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery said, that necessity compelled them to 
 hurry. 
 
 Mr. D alton. Mr. President, we have been but six or seven 
 days in the discussion of the Constitution. Sir, has not para- 
 graph after paragraph been considered and explained ? Has 
 not great light been thrown on the articles we have considered ? 
 For my part, I profess to have received much light on them. 
 We are now discussing the powers of Congress. Sir, shall we 
 pass that over ? Shall we pass over the article of the judiciary 
 power without examination ? I hope, Sir, it will be particu- 
 larly inquired into. 1 am sorry to hear gentlemen allege that 
 they have been a long time from home ; and that the want of 
 money necessitates them to wish for an early decision. Sir, 
 have not the general court provided for the payment of the 
 members of this Convention ? and the treasurer, I am informed, 
 is collecting money to comply with that provision. There are 
 many parts which ought to be explained : I hope we shall attend 
 to them with deliberation ; and that for the sake of saving a little 
 money, we may not pass over the Constitution without well 
 considering it. 
 
 Judge Sumner wished the motion might be withdrawn. 
 
196 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Mr. Nasson said he would withdraw his motion for the pres- 
 ent ; but mentioned his intention of again making it at ten 
 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 
 Thursday, January 24, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Nasson renewed his motion for reconsidering a former 
 vote to discuss the Constitution by paragraphs, so that the 
 whole might be taken up. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Adams said he was one of those who had 
 difficulties and doubts respecting some parts of the proposed 
 Constitution. He had, he said, for several weeks after the 
 publication of it, laid by all the writings in the public papers 
 on the subject, in order to be enabled leisurely to consider 
 them. He had, he said, still some difficulties on his mind ; but 
 that he had chosen rather to be an auditor, than an objector, 
 and he had particular reasons therefor. As this was the case 
 with him, and as others, he believed, were in a similar situa- 
 tion, he was desirous to have a full investigation of the subject ; 
 that thereby such might be confirmed, either in favor, or 
 against the Constitution. He was therefore against the mo- 
 tion. We ought not, he said, to be stingy of our time, or the 
 public money, when so important an object demanded them; 
 and the public expect that we will not. He was sorry, he said, 
 for gentlemen's necessities ; but he had rather support the gen- 
 tlemen who were thus necessitated, or lend them money to do it, 
 than that they should hurry so great a subject. He therefore 
 hoped that the question would be put, and that we should 
 proceed as we began. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Pitts said it was impossible to consider the whole 
 until the parts had been examined ; our constituents, said he, 
 have a right to demand of us the reasons which shall influence 
 us to vote as we shall do : he must, he said, therefore, oppose 
 the motion. 
 
 The honorable Mr. King, Col. Smith, and several other gen- 
 tlemen, spoke against the motion. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery opposed the motion's being winked out of 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 197 
 
 sight. He wished he said, the question might be put, that the 
 sense of the Convention respecting it, might be taken. 
 
 Gen. Thompson said it was not essential how the matter 
 was considered, but he wished to have the whole subject at 
 large, open to discussion, so that every body might speak to it. 
 A member, says he, gets up and speaks, but he is called to 
 order, as not confining himself to the particular paragraph 
 under debate, and this puts him out. In his opinion, he said, 
 the Constitution, and the reasons which induced gentlemen to 
 frame it, ought to have been sent to the several towns, to be 
 considered by them. My town, says he, considered it seven 
 hours, and after this there was not one in favor of it. If this 
 had been done, we should have known the minds of the people 
 on it ; and should we dare, he asked, to act different from the 
 sense of the people ? It is strange, he said, that a system which 
 its planners say, is so plain that he that runs may read it, 
 should want so much explanation. 
 
 [The question being generally called for, the motion was 
 put, and negatived without a return of the house. The 
 endeavors of gentlemen to hush to silence, a small buzz of con- 
 gratulation among a few citizens in the gallery, being mistaken 
 by some of the members for a hiss, created a momentary agita- 
 tion in the Convention ; which, however, after a short conver- 
 sation, subsided.] 
 
 The eighth section was again read. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Sedgwick went into a general answer to 
 the objections which had been started against the powers to be 
 granted to Congress by this section. He showed the absolute 
 necessity there was that the body which had the security of the 
 whole for their object, should have the necessary means al- 
 lowed them to effect it ; and in order to secure the people 
 against the abuse of this power, the representatives and people, 
 he said, are equally subject to the laws, and can therefore have 
 but one and the same interest ; that they never would lay 
 unnecessary burdens, when they themselves must bear a part of 
 them ; and from the extent of their objects, their power ought 
 necessarily to be illimitable. Men, says he, rarely do mischief 
 for the sake of being mischievous. With respect to the power 
 in this section to raise armies, the honorable gentleman said, 
 
198 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 although gentlemen had thought it a dangerous power, which 
 would be used for the purpose of tyranny, yet they did not 
 object to the Confederation in this particular ; and by this, 
 Congress could have kept the whole of the late army in the 
 field, had they seen fit. He asked, if gentlemen could think it 
 possible, that the legislature of the United States should raise 
 an army unnecessarily, which, in a short time, would be under 
 the control of other persons ? For if it was not to be under 
 their control, what object could they have in raising it ? It 
 was, he said, a chimerical idea to suppose that a country like 
 this could ever be enslaved. How is an army for that purpose 
 to be obtained ? From the freemen of the United States ? 
 They, certainly, said he, will know to what object it is to be 
 applied. Is it possible, he asked, that an army could be raised 
 for the purpose of enslaving themselves and their brethren ? 
 or, if raised, can they subdue a nation of freemen, who know 
 how to prize liberty, and who have arms in their hands ? 
 He said it was a deception in gentlemen to say that this power 
 could be thus used. The honorable gentleman said that in 
 the Constitution, every possible provision against an abuse 
 of power was made ; and if gentlemen would candidly investi- 
 gate for themselves, they would find that the evils they lament 
 cannot ensue therefrom. 
 
 Mr. Dawes observed, upon the authority of Congress to 
 raise and support armies, that all the objections which had 
 been made by gentlemen against standing armies, were inap- 
 plicable to the present question ; which was that as there 
 must be an authority somewhere, to raise and support armies, 
 whether that authority ought to be in Congress. As Congress 
 are the legislature, upon the proposed plan of government, in 
 them only, said he, should be lodged the power under debate. 
 Some gentlemen seem to have confused ideas about standing 
 armies. That the legislature of a country should not have, 
 power to raise armies, is a doctrine he had never heard before. 
 Charles II. in England, kept in pay an army of five thousand 
 men, and James II. augmented them to thirty thousand. This 
 occasioned a great and just alarm through the nation ; and ac- 
 cordingly when William III. came to the throne, it was declared 
 to be unconstitutional to raise or keep a standing army in time 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 199 
 
 of peace, without the consent of the legislature. Most of our 
 own State constitutions have borrowed this language from the 
 English declaration of rights ; but none of them restrain their 
 lsgislatures from raising and supporting armies. Those who 
 never objected to such an authority in Congress, as vested by 
 the old Confederation, surely ought not to object to such a 
 power in a Congress, where there is to be a new branch of rep- 
 resentation, arising immediately from the people, and which 
 branch alone must originate those very grants that are to 
 maintain the army. When we consider that this branch 
 is to be elected every two years, there is great propriety 
 in its being restrained from making any grants in support of 
 the army for a longer space than that of their existence. If 
 the election of this popular branch were for seven years, as in 
 England, the same men who would make the first grant, might 
 also the second and third, for the continuance of the army ; 
 and such an acquaintance might exist between the representa- 
 tives in Congress and the leaders of the army, as might be 
 unfavorable to liberty. But the wisdom of the late Conven- 
 tion has avoided this difficulty. The army must expire of 
 itself in two years after it shall be raised, unless renewed by 
 representatives, who at that time will have just come fresh 
 from the body of the people. It will share the same fate as 
 that of a temporary law, which dies at the time mentioned in 
 the act itself, unless revived by some future legislature. 
 
 Capt. Dench said, it had been observed, and he was not 
 convinced that the observation was wrong, that the grant of the 
 powers in this section would produce a consolidation of the 
 States ; and the moment it begins, a dissolution of the State 
 governments commences. If mistaken, he wished to be set 
 right. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Dr. Taylor asked, why there was to be a Federal town, over 
 which Congress is to exercise exclusive legislation ? 
 
 Hon. Mr. Strong said, that every gentleman must think that 
 the erection of a Federal town was necessary, wherein Congress 
 might remain protected from insult. A few years ago, said the 
 
200 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 honorable gentleman, Congress had to remove, because they 
 were not protected by the authority of the State in which they 
 were then sitting. He asked whether this Convention, though 
 convened for but a short period, did not think it was necessary 
 that they should have power to protect themselves from insult ? 
 much more so must they think it necessary to provide for 
 Congress, considering they are to be a permanent body. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Davis (of Boston) said, it was necessary that 
 Congress should have a permanent residence ; and that it was 
 the intention of Congress, under the Confederation, to erect a 
 Federal town. He asked, would Massachusetts, or any other 
 State, wish to give to New York, or the State in which Congress 
 shall sit, the power to influence the proceedings of that body 
 which was to act for the benefit of the whole, by leaving them 
 liable to the outrages of the citizens of such States ? 
 
 Dr. Taylor asked, why it need be ten miles square, and 
 whether one mile square would not be sufficient. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Strong said, Congress were not to exercise juris- 
 diction over a district of ten miles, but one not exceeding- ten 
 miles square. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Stillman said, that whatever were the limits of the 
 district, it would depend on the cession of the legislature of 
 one of the States. 
 
 Mr. Dench said, that he wished further light on the subject ; 
 but that from the words, " We, the people," in the first clause 
 ordaining this Constitution, he thought it was an actual consol- 
 idation of the States, and that, if he was not mistaken, the 
 moment it took place, a dissolution of the State governments 
 will also take place. t 
 
 Gen. Brooks (of Lincoln) rose, he said, to consider the idea 
 suggested by the gentleman last speaking, that this Constitution 
 would produce a dissolution of the State governments, or a 
 consolidation of the whole, which, in his opinion, he said, was 
 ill founded, or rather a loose idea. In the first place, says he, 
 the Congress under this Constitution cannot be organized with- 
 out repeated acts of the legislatures of the several States ; and 
 therefore, if the creating power is dissolved, the body to be 
 created cannot exist. In the second place, says the General, it 
 is impossible the general government can exist, unless the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 201 
 
 governments of the several States are forever existing, as the 
 qualifications of the electors of Federal representatives are to 
 be the same as those of the electors of the most numerous 
 branch of the State legislatures. It was, therefore, he said, 
 impossible, that the State governments should be annihilated 
 by the general government; and it was, he said, strongly 
 implied, from that part of the section under debate, which gave 
 Congress power to have exclusive jurisdiction over the Federal 
 town, that they should exercise it over no other place. When 
 we attend to the Constitution, we shall see, says the General, that 
 the powers to be given to Congress amount only to a consolida- 
 tion of the strength of the Union, and that private rights are 
 not consolidated. The General mentioned the rights which 
 Congress could not infringe upon, and said, that their power to 
 define what was treason was much less than is vested in the 
 legislature of this State, by our own Constitution ; as it was 
 confined, in the third section of Article III., to levying war 5 or 
 adhering to, and comforting enemies, only. He mentioned the 
 restraint upon Congress in the punishment of treason, and 
 compared it with the extended powers lodged in the Parliament * 
 of Great Britain, on like crimes ; and concluded by observing, 
 that, as the United States guarantee to each State a republican 
 form of government, the State governments were as effectually 
 secured as though this Constitution should never be in force. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King said, in reply to the inquiry respecting a 
 Federal town, that there was now no place for Congress to 
 reside in, and that it was necessary that they should have a 
 permanent residence, where to establish proper archives, in 
 which to deposit treaties, state papers, deeds of cession, &c. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Singletary said, that all gentlemen had said about 
 a bill of rights to the Constitution, was, that what is written is 
 written ; but he thought we were giving up all power, and that 
 the States will be like towns in this State. Towns, says he, 
 have a right to lay taxes to raise money, and the States possibly 
 may have the same. We have now, says he, a good republican 
 Constitution, and we do not want it guaranteed to us. He did 
 not understand what gentlemen meant by Congress guaranteeing 
 a republican form of government. He wished they would not 
 play round the subject with their fine stories, like a fox round 
 
 26 
 
202 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 a trap, but come to it. Why don't they say that Congress will 
 guarantee our State Constitution ? 
 
 Gen. Thompson said, Congress only meant to guarantee a 
 form of government. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King asked, whether, if the present Constitution 
 of this State had been guaranteed by the United States, the 
 honorable gentleman from Sutton would not have considered it 
 as a great defect in the proposed Constitution, as it must have 
 precluded the State from making any alteration in it, should 
 they see fit so to do, at the time mentioned in the Constitution ? 
 
 [Several other gentlemen spoke, in a desultory conversation, 
 on various parts of the Constitution, in which several articles 
 from the Constitution of this State, and the Confederation, 
 were read ; many questions asked the honorable gentlemen who 
 framed the Constitution, to which answers apparently satisfactory 
 were given.] 
 
 Friday, January 25, 1788. 
 
 The eighth section still under debate, but the conversation 
 continued desultory, and much attention was paid to the inqui- 
 ries of gentlemen on different parts of the Constitution, by 
 those who were in favor of it. 
 
 Mr. Ames, in a short discourse, called on those who stood 
 forth in 1775, to stand forth now ; to throw aside all interested 
 and party views, to have one purse and one heart for the whole ; 
 and to consider, that as it was necessary then, so was it neces- 
 sary now, to unite, or die we must. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Singlet ary. Mr. President: I should not have 
 troubled the Convention again, if some gentlemen had not 
 called upon them that were on the stage in the beginning of 
 our troubles, in the year 1775. I was one of them. I have 
 had the honor to be a member of the court all the time, Mr. 
 President, and I say, that if any body had proposed such a 
 Constitution as this, in that day, it would have been thrown 
 away at once. It would not have been looked at. We con- 
 tended with Great Britain, some said, for a three-penny duty 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 203 
 
 on tea ; but it was not that — it was because they claimed a right 
 to tax us and bind us in all cases whatever. And does not this 
 Constitution do the same ? Does it not take away all we have, 
 all our property ? Does it not lay all taxes, duties, imposts and 
 excises ? And what more have we to give ? They tell us Con- 
 gress won't lay dry taxes upon us, but collect all the money they 
 want by impost. I say there has always been a difficulty about 
 impost. Whenever the general court was agoing to lay an 
 impost, they would tell us it was more than trade could bear, 
 that it hurt the fair trader, and encouraged smuggling ; and 
 there will always be the same objection — they won't be able to 
 raise money enough by impost, and then they will lay it on the 
 land, and take all we have got. These lawyers, and men of 
 learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over 
 matters so smoothly, to make us, poor illiterate people, swallow 
 down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves ; they 
 expect to be the managers of this Constitution, and get all the 
 power and all the money into their own hands, and then they 
 will swallow up all us little folks, like the great leviathan, Mr. 
 President ; yes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah. This 
 is what I am afraid of; but I won't say any more at present, 
 but reserve the rest to another opportunity. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Smith. Mr. President: I am a plain man and get 
 my living by the plough. I am not used to speak in public, but 
 I beg your leave to say a few words to my brother plough- 
 joggers in this house. I have lived in a part of the country 
 where I have known the worth of good government by the want 
 of it. There was a black cloud that rose in the east last winter, 
 and spread over the west. [Here Mr. Wedgery interrupted : Mr. 
 President, I wish to know what the gentleman means by the east ?] 
 I mean, Sir, the county of Bristol. The cloud rose there, and 
 burst upon us, and produced a dreadful effect. It brought on 
 a state of anarchy, and that leads to tyranny. I say, it brought 
 anarchy. People that used to live peaceably, and were before 
 good neighbors, got distracted, and took up arms against gov- 
 ernment. [Here Mr. Kinsley called to order, and asked, what 
 had the history of last winter to do with the Constitution ? 
 Several gentlemen, and among the rest, the Hon. Mr. Adams, 
 said the gentleman was in order, let him go on in his own way.] 
 
204 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 I am agoing, Mr. President, to show you, my brother farmers, 
 what were the effects of anarchy, that you may see the reasons 
 why I wish for good government. People, I say, took up arms, 
 and then, if you went to speak to them, you had the musket of 
 death presented to your breast. They would rob you of your 
 property, threaten to burn your houses ; oblige you to be on 
 your guard night and day ; alarms spread from town to town ; 
 families were broke up ; the tender mother would cry : 0, my 
 son is among them ! What shall I do for my child ! Some 
 were taken captive, children taken out of their schools and 
 carried away. Then we should hear of an action, and the poor 
 prisoners were set in the front, to be killed by their own friends. 
 How dreadful, how distressing was this ! Our distress was so 
 great that we should have been glad to snatch at any thing that 
 looked like a government, for protection. Had any person, that 
 was able to protect us, come and set up his standard, we should 
 all have flocked to it, even if it had been a monarch, and that 
 monarch might have proved a tyrant ; so that you see that 
 anarchy leads to tyranny ; it is better to have one tyrant than so 
 many at once. 
 
 Now, Mr. President, when I saw this Constitution, I found 
 that it was a cure for these disorders. It was just such a thing 
 as we wanted. I got a copy of it and read it over and over. I 
 had been a member of the Convention to form our own State 
 Constitution, and had learnt something of the checks and 
 balances of power, and I found them all here. I did not go to 
 any lawyer, to ask his opinion ; we have no lawyer in our town, 
 and we do well enough without. I formed my own opinion, 
 and was pleased with this Constitution. My honorable old 
 daddy there (pointing to Mr. Singletary) won't think that I 
 expect to be a Congressman, and swallow up the liberties of 
 the people. I never had any post, nor do I want one, and 
 before I am done you will think that I don't deserve one. But 
 1 don't think the worse of the Constitution because lawyers, 
 and men of learning, and moneyed men, are fond of it. I don't 
 suspect that they want to get into Congress and abuse their 
 power. I am not of such a jealous make. They that are 
 honest men themselves are not apt to suspect other people. I 
 don't know why our constituents have not as good a right to be 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 205 
 
 jealous of us, as we seem to be of the Congress, and I think 
 those gentlemen who are so very suspicious that as soon as a 
 man gets into power he turns rogue, had better look at home. 
 
 We are by this Constitution allowed to send ten members to 
 Congress. Have we not more than that number fit to go ? I 
 dare say, if we pick out ten, we shall have another ten left, and 
 I hope ten times ten — and will not these be a check upon those 
 that go ? Will they go to Congress and abuse their power, and 
 do mischief, when they know that they must return and look 
 the other ten in the face, and be called to account for their 
 conduct ? Some gentlemen think that our liberty and property 
 are not safe in the hands of moneyed men, and men of learning. 
 I am not of that mind. 
 
 Brother farmers, let us suppose a case now : Suppose you had 
 a farm of fifty acres, and your title was disputed, and there was 
 a farm of five thousand acres joined to you, that belonged to a 
 man of learning, and his title was involved in the same diffi- 
 culty ; would not you be glad to have him for your friend, 
 rather than to stand alone in the dispute ? Well, the case is 
 the same ; these lawyers, these moneyed men, these men of 
 learning, are all embarked in the same cause with us, and we 
 must all swim or sink together ; and shall we throw the Consti- 
 tution overboard because it does not please us alike ? Suppose 
 two or three of you had been at the pains to break up a piece 
 of rough land, and sow it with wheat ; would you let it lie 
 waste, because you could not agree what sort of a fence to 
 make ? Would it not be better to put up a fence that did not 
 please every one's fancy, rather than not fence it at all, or keep 
 disputing about it, until the wild beasts came in and devoured 
 it. Some gentlemen say — don't be in a hurry, take time to 
 consider, and don't take a leap in the dark. I say — take things 
 in time, gather fruit when it is ripe. There is a time to sow, 
 and a time to reap. We sowed our seed when we sent men to 
 the Federal Convention ; now is the harvest, now is the time to 
 reap the fruit of our labor, and if we don't do it now, I am 
 afraid we never shall have another opportunity. 
 
 Mr. Parsons considered the several charges of ambiguity 
 which gentlemen had laid to the Constitution, and with a great 
 deal of accuracy stated the obvious meaning of the clauses thus 
 
206 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 supposed to be ambiguous. He concluded his explanation by- 
 saying, that no compositions which men can pen, could be 
 formed, but what would be liable to the same charge. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dalton. Mr. President: It has been demanded 
 by some gentlemen in opposition to this Constitution, why those 
 who were opposed to the augmentation of the powers of Con- 
 gress a few years since, should now be the warmest advocates 
 for the powers to be granted by the section under debate. Sir, 
 I was opposed to the five per cent, impost being granted to 
 Congress, and I conceived that such a grant, under the Confed- 
 eration, would produce great difficulties and embarrassments. 
 But, Sir, as Congress is, by the proposed Constitution, to be 
 differently constructed ; as a proportionate voice of the States 
 in that body is to be substituted for the present equal (or rather 
 unequal) one — my objections will be removed. In my opinion, 
 the delegating of power to a government, in which the people 
 have so many checks, will be perfectly safe, and consistent with 
 the preservation of their liberties. 
 
 Mr. Ames said, that in the course of the debates, gentlemen 
 had justified the Confederation ; but he wished to asked, whether 
 there was any danger in this Constitution, which is not in the 
 Confederation ? If gentlemen are willing to confederate, why, 
 he asked, ought not Congress to have the powers granted by 
 this section. In the Confederation, said Mr. Ames, the checks 
 are wanting, which are to be found in this Constitution. And 
 the fears of gentlemen, that this Constitution will provide for a 
 permanent aristocracy, are therefore ill founded ; for the rulers 
 will always be dependent on the people, and, like the insects of 
 a sunshine day, may, by the breath of their displeasure, be 
 annihilated. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. Mr. President : Enough has, I think, been 
 said on the eighth section. It has been repeated over and over 
 again, that the adoption of the Constitution will please all ranks 
 of people ; that the present inefficiency of the Confederation is 
 obvious ; and that blessed things will surely be the result of this 
 Constitution. Many say, ask the merchants ; ask the yeomanry. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 207 
 
 But they do not tell us what the answer of these will be. All 
 we hear is, that the merchant and farmer will flourish, and that 
 the mechanic and tradesman are to make their fortunes directly, 
 if the Constitution goes down. Is it, Sir, because the seat of 
 government is to be carried to Philadelphia ? Who, Sir, is to 
 pay the debts of the yeomanry, and others ? Sir, when oil will 
 quench fire, I will believe all this, and not till then. On the 
 contrary, I think the adopting this Constitution makes against 
 them, though it may be something in favor of the merchants. 
 Have hot Congress power to tax polls ? — for there is no other 
 way of levying a dry tax ; and by this means the poor will pay 
 as much as the rich. Gentlemen say we are undone, and that 
 there is no resource, unless this Constitution is adopted. I 
 cannot see why we need swallow a great bone for the sake of a 
 little meat, which, if it should happen to stick in our throats, 
 can never be got out. Some gentlemen have given out, that 
 we are surrounded by enemies, that we owe debts, and that the 
 nations will make war against us, and take our shipping, &c. 
 Sir, I ask, if this is a fact ? or whether gentlemen think as 
 they say? I believe they do not. For I believe they are con- 
 vinced, that the nations we owe do not wish us at present to pay 
 more than the interest. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery, after considering some other observations which 
 had dropped from gentlemen in the course of the debates on 
 the eighth section, concluded by saying, that he could not see 
 the great danger that would arise from rejecting the Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Gorham adverted to the suggestion of some 
 gentlemen, that by granting the impost to Congress, this State 
 would pay more than its proportion ; and said, that it could be 
 made an objection as much against one government as another. 
 But he believed, gentlemen would accede that the impost was 
 a very proper tax. As to the tax on polls, which the gentleman 
 from New Gloucester had said would take place, he saw, he 
 said, no article in the Constitution which warranted the asser- 
 tion. It was, he said, a distressful tax, and would never be 
 adopted. By impost and excise, the man of luxury will pay, 
 and the middling and poor parts of the community, who live by 
 their industry, will go clear ; and as this would be the easiest 
 
208 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 method of raising a revenue, it was the most natural to suppose 
 it would be resorted to. Twenty per cent., he said, may as well 
 be paid for some luxuries, as five ; nay, one hundred per cent, 
 impost on some articles might be laid on, as is done in England 
 and France. How often, observed the honorable gentleman, 
 has Mr. Adams tried to accomplish a commercial treaty with 
 England ! But they think Congress but a feeble power. They 
 prohibit our oil, fish, lumber, pot and pearl ashes, from being 
 imported into their territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, 
 for they know we cannot make general retaliating laws. They 
 have a design in Nova Scotia to rival us in the fishery, and our 
 situation at present favors their design. From the abundance 
 of our markets we could supply them with beef, butter, pork, 
 &c. ; but they lay what restrictions on them they please, which 
 they dare not do, was there an adequate power lodged in the 
 general government to regulate commerce. 
 
 Mr. Jones, Col. Porter and Col. Varnum said a few words 
 in favor of the article, when the Convention proceeded to the 
 consideration of the ninth section. 
 
 Mr. Neal (from Kittery) went over the ground of objection 
 to this section, on the idea, that the slave trade was allowed to 
 be continued for twenty years. His profession, he said, obliged 
 him to bear witness against any thing that should favor the 
 making merchandise of the bodies of men ; and unless his 
 objection was removed, he could not put his hand to the Con- 
 stitution. Other gentlemen said, in addition to this idea, that 
 there was not even a provision that the negroes ever shall be 
 free ; and 
 
 Gen. Thompson exclaimed — Mr. President : Shall it be said, 
 that after we have established our own independence and 
 freedom, we make slaves of others ? 0, Washington, what a 
 name has he had ! How he has immortalized himself! But 
 he holds those in slavery who have as good right to be free as he 
 has. He is still for self, and, in my opinion, his character has 
 sunk fifty per cent. 
 
 On the other side, gentlemen said, that the step taken in this 
 article, towards the abolition of slavery, was one of the beauties 
 of the Constitution. They observed, that in the Confederation 
 there was no provision whatever for its ever being abolished ; 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 209 
 
 but this Constitution provides that Congress may, after twenty 
 years, totally annihilate the slave trade ; and that, as all the 
 States, except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might 
 reasonably be expected that it would then be done. In the 
 interim, all the States were at liberty to prohibit it. 
 
 Saturday, January 26, 1788. 
 
 [The debate on the ninth section still continued desultory, 
 and consisted of similar objections a"nd answers thereto, as had 
 before been used. Both sides deprecated the slave trade in 
 the most pointed terms. On one side it was pathetically 
 lamented, by Mr. Nasson, Major Lusk, Mr. Neal, and others, 
 that this Constitution provided for the continuation of the 
 slave trade for twenty years. On the other, the Hon. Judge 
 Dana, Mr. Adams, and others, rejoiced that a door was now to 
 be opened, for the annihilation of this odious, abhorrent practice, 
 in a certain time.] 
 
 The paragraph which provides that " the privilege of the writ 
 of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of 
 rebellion or invasion," was read, when 
 
 Gen. Thompson asked the President to please to proceed. 
 We have, says he, read the book often enough ; it is a consistent 
 piece of inconsistency. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Adams, in answer to an inquiry of the Hon. Mr. 
 Taylor, said that this power, given to the general government 
 to suspend this privilege in cases of rebellion and invasion, did 
 not take away the power of the several States to suspend it, if 
 they see fit. 
 
 Dr. Taylor asked why this darling privilege was not express- 
 ed in the same manner it was in the Constitution of Massachu- 
 setts. [Here the honorable gentleman read the paragraph 
 respecting it, in the Constitution of this State, and then the one 
 in the proposed Constitution.] He remarked on the difference 
 of expression, and asked why the time was not limited. 
 
 Judge Dana said, the answer, in part, to the honorable gen- 
 tleman must be, that the same men did not make both Consti- 
 
 27 
 
210 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 tutions — that he did not see the necessity or great benefit of 
 limiting the time. Supposing it had been, as in our Constitution, 
 " not exceeding twelve months," yet, as our legislature can, so 
 might the Congress, continue the suspension of the writ from 
 time to time, or from year to year. The safest and best restric- 
 tion, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in 'which 
 Coiigress are authorized to exercise that power at all, namely, in 
 those of rebellion or invasion. These are clear and certain 
 terms; facts of public notoriety. And whenever these shall 
 cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily ceas 
 also. He thought the citizen had a better security for his 
 privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the Federal than 
 under the State Constitution ; for our legislatur e may suspen 
 the writ as often as they judge " the most urgent and pressing 
 occasions" call for it. He hoped these short observations would 
 satisfy the honorable gentleman's inquiries, otherwise he should 
 be happy in endeavoring to do it, by going more at large into 
 the subject. 
 
 Judge Sumner said, that this was a restriction on Congress, 
 that the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, except 
 in cases of rebellion and invasion. The learned judge then 
 explained the nature of this writ. When a person, said he, is 
 imprisoned, he applies to a judge of the supreme court — the 
 judge issues his writ to the jailer, calling upon him to have the 
 body of the person imprisoned, before him, with the crime on 
 which he was committed. If it then appears that the person 
 was legally committed, and that he was not bailable, he is 
 remanded to prison ; if illegally confined, he is enlarged. This 
 privilege, he said, is essential to freedom — and therefore the 
 power to suspend it is restricted. On the other hand the State, 
 he said, might be involved in danger : the worst enemy may lay 
 plans to destroy us, and so artfully as to prevent any evidence 
 against him, and might ruin the country, without the power to 
 suspend the writ was thus given. Congress have only power to 
 suspend the privilege to persons committed by their authority. 
 A person committed under the authority of this State, will still 
 have a right to this writ. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 211 
 
 Monday, January 28, 1788. 
 
 This, and the two following days, were taken up in consider- 
 ing the several sections of the second and third articles — every 
 one of which was objected to by those who were opposed to the 
 Constitution ; and the objections were obviated by gentlemen 
 in favor it. Wr. do not think it essential to go into a minute 
 detail oi the conversation ; as, in the speeches on the grand 
 question, the field is again gone over. We can only say, that 
 with the utmost attention every objection, however trifling, was 
 answered ; and that the unremitted endeavors of gentlemen 
 who advocated the Constitution, to convince those who were in 
 error, were not without effect. The main objections to the 
 judiciary power, are contained in the following speech delivered 
 on Wednesday, January 30. 
 
 Mr. Holmes. Mr. President: I rise to make some remarks 
 on the paragraph under* consideration, which treats of the 
 judiciary power. 
 
 It is a maxim universally admitted, that the safety of the 
 subject consists in having a right to a trial as free and impartial 
 as the lot of humanity will admit of. Does the Constitution 
 make provision for such a trial ? I think not : for in a criminal 
 process a person shall not have a right to insist on a trial in the 
 vicinity where the fact was committed, where a jury of the peers 
 would, from their local situation, have an opportunity to form 
 a judgment of the character of the person charged with the 
 crime, and also to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 
 There a person must be tried by a jury of strangers — a jury 
 who may be interested in his conviction ; and where he may, 
 by reason of the distance of his residence from the place of trial, 
 be incapable of making such a defence as he is in justice enti- 
 tled to, and which he could avail himself of, if his trial was 
 in the same county where the crime is said to have been com- 
 mitted. 
 
 These circumstances, as horrid as they are, are rendered still 
 more dark and gloomy, as there is no provision made in the 
 Constitution to prevent the attorney-general from filing informa- 
 tion against any person, whether he is indicted by the grand 
 jury or not ; in consequence of which the most innocent person 
 
212 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 in the Commonwealth may be taken by virtue of a warrant 
 issued in consequence of such information, and dragged from 
 his home, his friends, his acquaintance, and confined in prison, 
 until the next session of the court which has jurisdiction of the 
 crime with which he is charged, (and how frequent those ses- 
 sions are to be, we are not yet informed of,) and after long, 
 tedious and painful imprisonment, though acquitted on trial, 
 may have no possibility to obtain any kind of satisfaction for 
 the loss of his liberty, the loss of his time, great expenses, and 
 perhaps cruel sufferings. 
 
 But what makes the matter still more alarming is that the 
 mode of criminal process is to be pointed out by Congress, and 
 they have no constitutional check on them, except that the 
 trial is to be a jury ; but who this jury is to be, how qualified, 
 where to live, how appointed, or by what rules to regulate their 
 procedure, we are ignorant of as yet ; whether they are to live 
 in the county where the trial is ; whether they are to be chosen 
 by certain districts ; or whether they are to be appointed by the 
 sheriff, ex officio ; whether they are to be for one session of the 
 court only, or for a certain term of time, or for good behavior, 
 or during pleasure ; are matters which we are entirely ignorant 
 of as yet. 
 
 The mode of trial is altogether indetermined. Whether the 
 criminal is to be allowed the benefit of counsel ; whether he is 
 to be allowed to meet his accuser face to face ; whether he is to 
 be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantage of 
 cross-examination, we are not yet told. 
 
 These are matters by no means of small consequence, yet we 
 have not the smallest constitutional security that we shall be 
 allowed the exercise of these privileges, neither is it made cer- 
 tain in the Constitution, that a person, charged with a crime, 
 shall have the privilege of appearing before the Court or jury 
 which is to try him. 
 
 On the whole, when we fully consider this matter, and fully 
 investigate the powers granted, explicitly given, and specially 
 delegated, we shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling 
 them to institute judicatories, little less inauspicious than a 
 certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of 
 Christendom : I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition, 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 213 
 
 What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy cir- 
 cumstances is, the consideration that Congress have to ascertain, 
 point out, and determine, what kind of punishments shall be 
 inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are no where 
 restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard of pun- 
 ishments, and annexing them to crimes, and there is no consti- 
 tutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be 
 amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline. 
 
 There is nothing to prevent Congress from passing laws 
 which shall compel a man who is accused or suspected of a 
 crime, to furnish evidence against himself, and even from estab- 
 lishing laws which shall order the court to take the charge 
 exhibited against a man for truth, unless he can furnish evi- 
 dence of his innocence. 
 
 I do not pretend to say Congress will do this, but, Sir, I 
 undertake to say that Congress (according to the powers pro- 
 posed to be given them by the Constitution) may do it ; and if 
 they do not, it will be owing entirely — I repeat it, it will be 
 owing entirely to the goodness of the men, and not in the least 
 degree owing to the goodness of the Constitution. 
 
 The framers of our State Constitution took particular care to 
 prevent the general court from authorizing the judicial author- 
 ity to issue a warrant against a man for a crime, unless his 
 being guilty of the crime was supported by oath or affirmation, 
 prior to the warrant being granted ; why it should be esteemed 
 so much more safe to intrust Congress with the power of enact- 
 ing laws, which it was deemed so unsafe to intrust our State 
 legislature with, I am unable to conceive. 
 
 Mr. Gore observed, in reply to Mr. Holmes, that it had been 
 the uniform conduct of those in opposition to the proposed form 
 of government, to determine, in every case where it was possi- 
 ble that the administrators thereof could do wrong, that they 
 would do so, although it were demonstrable that such wrong 
 would be against their own honor and interest, and productive 
 of no advantage to themselves. On this principle alone have 
 they determined that the trial by jury would be taken away in 
 civil cases, when it had been clearly shown that no words could 
 be adopted, apt to the situation and customs of each State in 
 this particular. Jurors are differently chosen in different 
 
214 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 States, and in point of qualification the laws of the several 
 States are very diverse ; not less so, in the causes and disputes 
 which are entitled to trial by jury. What is the result of this ? 
 That the laws of Congress may and will be conformable to the 
 local laws in this particular, although the Constitution could 
 not make an universal rule equally applying to the customs and 
 statutes of the different States. Very few governments (cer- 
 tainly not this) can be interested in depriving the people of 
 trial by jury in questions of meum et tuum. In criminal cases 
 alone are they interested to have trial under their own control ; 
 and in such cases the Constitution expressly stipulates for trial 
 by jury. But then, says the gentleman from Rochester, (Mr. 
 Holmes,) to the safety of life it is indispensably necessary the 
 trial of crimes should be in the vicinity — and the vicinity is 
 construed to mean county. This is very incorrect, and gentle- 
 men will see the impropriety, by referring themselves to the 
 different local divisions and districts of the several States. But 
 further, said the gentleman, the idea that the jury, coming from 
 the neighborhood, and knowing the character and circumstances 
 of the party in trial, is promotive of justice, on reflection will 
 appear not founded in truth. If the jury judge from any other 
 circumstances but what are part of the cause in question, they 
 are not impartial. The great object is, to determine on the 
 real merits of the cause, uninfluenced by any personal consider- 
 ations. If, therefore, the jury could be perfectly ignorant of 
 the person in trial, a just decision would be more probable. 
 From such motives did the wise Athenians so constitute the 
 famed Areopagus, that when in judgment, this court should sit 
 at midnight, and in total darkness, that the decision might be 
 on the thing, and not on the person. Further, said the gentle- 
 man, it has been said, because the Constitution does not 
 expressly provide for an indictment by grand jury in criminal 
 cases, therefore some officer under this government will be 
 authorized to file informations and bring any man to jeopardy 
 of his life, and indictment by grand jury will be disused. If 
 gentlemen who pretend such fears, will look into the Constitu- 
 tion of Massachusetts, they will see that no provision is therein 
 made for an indictment by grand jury, or to oppose the danger 
 of an attorney- general filing informations ; yet no difficulty or 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 215 
 
 danger has arisen to the people of this Commonwealth from 
 this defect, if gentlemen please to call it so. If gentlemen 
 would be candid, and not consider that wherever Congress may 
 possibly abuse power, that they certainly will, there would be 
 no difficulty in the minds of any in adopting the proposed 
 Constitution. 
 
 Mr. Dawes said, he did not see that the right of trial by jury 
 was taken away by the article. The word court does not, either 
 by a popular or technical construction, exclude the use of a 
 jury to try facts. When people in common language talk of a 
 trial at the court of common pleas, or the supreme judicial 
 court, do they not include all the branches and members of 
 such court, the jurors, as well as the judges ? They certainly 
 do, whether they mention the jurors expressly or not. Our 
 State legislature have construed the word court in the same 
 way ; for they have given appeals from a justice of peace to the 
 court of common pleas, and from thence to the supreme court, 
 without saying any thing of the jury. But in cases which, 
 almost time out of mind, have been tried without jury, there 
 the jurisdiction is given expressly to the justices of a particular 
 court, as may be instanced by suits upon the absconding act, so 
 called. 
 
 Gentlemen have compared the article under consideration to 
 that power which the British claimed, and which we resisted at 
 the Revolution, namely, the power of trying the Americans 
 without a jury. But surely there is no parallel in the cases ; 
 it was criminal cases in which they attempted to make this 
 abuse of power. Mr. Dawes mentioned one example of this, 
 which, though young, he well remembered, and that was the 
 case of Nickerson, the pirate, who was tried without a jury, 
 and whose judges were the governors of Massachusetts, and of 
 some neighboring provinces, together with Admiral Montague, 
 and some gentlemen of distinction. Although this trial was 
 without a jury, yet, as it was a trial upon the civil law, there 
 was not so much clamor about it, as otherwise there might 
 have been ; but still it was disagreeable to the people, and was 
 one ground of the then complaints. But the trial by jury was 
 not attempted to be taken from civil causes. It was no object 
 of power, whether one subject's property was lessened, while 
 
216 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 another's was increased ; nor can it now be an object with the 
 Federal legislature. What interest can they have in constitut- 
 ing a judiciary, to proceed in civil causes without a trial by 
 jury ? In criminal causes by the proposed government, there 
 must be a jury. It is asked, why is not the Constitution as 
 explicit in securing the right of jury in civil, as in criminal 
 cases ? The answer is : Because it was out of the power of the 
 Convention. The several States differ so widely in their modes 
 of trial, some States using a jury in causes wherein other States 
 employ only their judges, that the Convention have very wisely 
 left it to the Federal legislature to make such regulations as 
 shall, as far as possible, accommodate the whole. Thus our 
 own State Constitution authorizes the general court to erect 
 judicatories, but leaves the nature, number and extent of them 
 wholly to the discretion of the legislature. The bill of rights 
 indeed secures the trial by jury in civil causes, except in cases 
 where a contrary practice has obtained. Such a clause as this 
 some gentlemen wish were inserted in the proposed Consti- 
 tution ; but such a clause would be absurd in that Constitution, 
 as has been clearly stated by the honorable gentleman from 
 Charlestown, (Mr. Gorham,) because the " exception of all 
 cases where a jury have not heretofore been used,' , would 
 include almost all cases that could be mentioned, when applied 
 to all the States, for they have severally differed in the kinds of 
 causes where they have tried without jury. 
 
 Gen. Heath. Mr. President: By my indisposition, and 
 absence, I have lost several important opportunities. I have 
 lost the opportunity of expressing my sentiments, with a candid 
 freedom, on some of the paragraphs of the system, which have 
 lain heavy on my mind. I have lost the opportunity of express- 
 ing my warm approbation on some of the paragraphs. I have 
 lost the opportunity of asking some questions for my own infor- 
 mation, touching some of the paragraphs, and which naturally 
 occurred, as the system unfolded. I have lost the opportunity 
 of hearing those judicious, enlightening and convincing argu- 
 ments, which have been advanced during the investigation of 
 the system. This is my misfortune, and I must bear it. The 
 paragraph respecting the migration or importation of such 
 persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 217 
 
 admit, &c, is one of those considered during my absence, and 
 I have heard nothing on the subject, save what has been men- 
 tioned this morning ; but I think the gentlemen who have 
 spoken, have carried the matter rather too far on both sides. I 
 apprehend that it is not in our power to do any thing for or 
 against those who are in slavery in the southern States. No 
 gentleman within these walls detests every idea of slavery more 
 than I do ; it is generally detested by the people of this Common- 
 wealth ; and I ardently hope that the time will soon come, when 
 our brethren in the southern States will view it as we do, and put 
 a stop to it ; but to this we have no right to compel them. Two 
 questions naturally arise, if we ratify the Constitution : Shall 
 we do any thing by our act to hold the blacks in slavery ? or 
 shall we become partakers of other men's sins ? I think neither 
 of them. Each State is sovereign and independent to a certain 
 degree, and they have a right, and will regulate their own 
 internal affairs, as to themselves appears proper ; and shall we 
 refuse to eat, or to drink, or to be united, with those who do 
 not think or act just as we do ? Surely not. We are not in 
 this case partakers of other men's sins, for in nothing do we 
 voluntarily encourage the slavery of our fellow men. A restric- 
 tion is laid on the Federal government, which could not be 
 avoided, and a union take place. The Federal Convention went 
 as far as they could. The migration or importation, &c, is 
 confined to the States now existing only ; new States cannot 
 claim it. Congress, by their ordinance for erecting new States, 
 some time since declared that the new States shall be republi- 
 can, and that there shall be no slavery in them. But whether 
 those in slavery in the southern States will be emancipated after 
 the year 1808, 1 do not pretend to determine. I rather doubt it. 
 
 After the fifth article was read at the table, 
 
 The Hon. Mr. King observed, that he believed gentlemen had 
 not, in their objections to the Constitution, recollected that this 
 article was a part of it, for many of the arguments of gentle- 
 men were founded on the idea of future amendments being 
 impracticable. The honorable gentleman observed on the 
 superior excellence of the proposed Constitution, in this partic- 
 ular, and called upon gentlemen to produce an instance in any 
 other national Constitution, where the people had so fair an 
 
 28 
 
218 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 opportunity to correct any abuse which might take place in the 
 future administration of the government under it. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. Mr. President : I cannot suffer the present 
 article to be passed, without rising to express my entire and 
 and perfect approbation of it. Whatever may have been my 
 private opinion of any other part, or whatever faults or imper- 
 fections I have remarked, or fancied I have seen, in any other 
 instance, here, Sir, I have found complete satisfaction. This 
 has been a resting-place, on which I have reposed myself in the 
 fullest security, whenever a doubt has occurred, in considering 
 any other passage in the proposed Constitution. The honorable 
 gentleman last speaking, has called upon those persons who are 
 opposed to our receiving the present system, to show another 
 government in which such a wise precaution has been taken to 
 secure to the people the right of making such alterations and 
 amendments, in a peaceable way, as experience shall have 
 proved to be necessary. Allow me to say, Sir, as far as the 
 narrow limits of my own information extend, I know of no such 
 example. In other countries, Sir, unhappily for mankind, the 
 history of their respective revolutions has been written in blo«d ; 
 and it is in this only that any great or important change in our 
 political situation has been effected, without public commotions. 
 When we shall have adopted the Constitution before us, we shall 
 have in this article an adequate provision for all the purposes 
 of political reformation. If, in the course of its operation, this 
 government shall appear to be too severe, here are the means 
 by which this severity may be attempered and corrected ; if, on 
 the other hand, it shall become too languid in its movements, 
 here, again, we have a method designated, by which a new por- 
 tion of health and spirit may be infused in the Constitution. 
 
 There is, Sir, another view which I have long since taken of 
 this subject, which has produced the fullest conviction in my 
 own mind, in favor of our receiving the government which we 
 have now in contemplation. Should it be rejected, I beg gen- 
 tlemen would observe, that a concurrence of all the States must 
 be had before a new Convention can be called to form another 
 Constitution, but the present article provides, upon nine States 
 concurring in any alteration or amendment to be proposed, 
 either by Congress or any future Convention, that this alteration 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 219 
 
 shall be a part of the Constitution, equally powerful and obli- 
 gatory with any other part. If it be alleged that this union is 
 not likely to happen, will it be more likely that an union of a 
 greater number of concurring sentiments may be had, as must 
 be, in case we reject the Constitution in hopes of a better ? 
 But that this is practicable, we may safely appeal to the history 
 of this country as a proof, in the last twenty years. We have 
 united against the British — we have united in calling the late 
 Federal Convention — and we may certainly unite again in such 
 alterations as in reason shall appear to be important for the 
 peace and happiness of America. 
 
 In the Constitution of this State, the article providing for 
 alterations is limited, in its operation to a given time ; but in 
 the present Constitution, the article is perfectly at large, 
 unconfined to any period, and may admit of measures being 
 taken, in any moment after it is adopted. In this point it has 
 undoubtedly the advantage. I shall not sit down, Sir, with- 
 out repeating that it is clearly more difficult for twelve States 
 to agree to another Convention, than for nine to unite in favor 
 of amendments, so it is certainly better to receive the present 
 Constitution, in the hope of its being amended, than it would 
 be to reject it altogether, with perhaps, the vain expectation of 
 obtaining another more agreeable than the present. I see no 
 fallacy in the argument, Mr. President ; but if there is, permit 
 me to call upon any gentleman to point it out, in order that it 
 may be corrected ; for at present it seems to me of such force 
 as to give me entire satisfaction. 
 
 Thursday, January 31, 1788. 
 
 In the conversation on Thursday, on the sixth article, 
 which provides that " no religious test shall ever be required, 
 as a qualification to any office," &c, several gentlemen urged 
 that it was a departure from the principles of our forefathers, 
 who came here for the preservation of their religion ; and that 
 it would admit deists, atheists, <fec. into the general govern- 
 ment ; and people being apt to imitate the examples of the 
 
220 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 court, these principles will be disseminated, and of course 
 a corruption of morals ensue. Gentlemen on the other side 
 applauded the liberality of the clause; and represented, in 
 striking colors, the impropriety and almost impiety of the 
 requisition of a test, as practised in Great Britain and else- 
 where. In this conversation, the following is the substance of 
 the observations of the 
 
 Rev. Mr. Shute. Mr. President : To object to the latter 
 part of the paragraph under consideration, which excludes a 
 religious test, is, I am sensible, very popular ; for the most of 
 men, somehow, are rigidly tenacious of their own sentiments 
 in religion, and disposed to impose them upon others as the 
 standard of truth. If, in my sentiments upon the point in view, 
 I should differ from some in this honorable body, I only wish from 
 them the exercise of that candor with which true religion is 
 adapted to inspire the honest and well-disposed mind. 
 
 To establish a religious test as a qualification for offices in 
 the proposed Federal Constitution, appears to me, Sir, would be 
 attended with injurious consequences to some individuals, and 
 with no advantage to the whole. 
 
 . By the injurious consequences to individuals, I mean, that 
 some, who in every other respect are qualified to fill some 
 important post in government, will be excluded by their not 
 being able to stand the religious test ; which I take to be a 
 privation of part of their civil rights. 
 
 Nor is there to me any conceivable advantage, Sir, that 
 would result to the whole* from such a test. Unprincipled and 
 dishonest men will not hesitate to subscribe to any thing that 
 may open the way for their advancement, and put them into a 
 situation the better to execute their base and iniquitous 
 designs. Honest men alone, therefore, howevfer well qualified 
 to serve the public, would be excluded by it, and their country 
 be deprived of the benefit of their abilities. 
 
 In this great and extensive empire, there is, and will be, a 
 great variety of sentiments in religion among its inhabitants. 
 Upon the plan of a religious test, the question I think, must be, 
 who shall be excluded from national trusts ? Whatever an- 
 swer bigotry may suggest, the dictates of candor and equity, I 
 conceive, will be, None. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 221 
 
 Far from limiting my charity and confidence to men of my 
 own denomination in religion, I suppose, and I believe, Sir, 
 that there are worthy characters among men of every denomi- 
 nation — among the Quakers, the Baptists, the Church of Eng- 
 land, the Papists, and even among those who have no other 
 guide in the way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of 
 natural religion. 
 
 I must therefore think, Sir, that the proposed plan of govern- 
 ment, in this particular, is wisely constructed : that as all have 
 an equal claim to the blessings of the government under which 
 they live, and which they support, so none should be excluded 
 from them for being of any particular denomination in reli- 
 gion. 
 
 The presumption is, that the eyes of the people will be upon 
 the faithful in the land, and, from a regard to their own safety, 
 they will choose for their rulers men of known abilities — of 
 known probity — of good moral characters. The apostle Peter 
 tells us, that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation 
 he that feareth him and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to 
 him. And I know of no reason, why men of such a character, 
 in a community, of whatever denomination in religion, cceteris 
 paribus, with other suitable qualifications, should not be accept- 
 able to the people, and why they may not be employed by them 
 with safety and advantage in the important offices of govern- 
 ment. The exclusion of a religious test in the proposed Con- 
 stitution, therefore, clearly appears to me, Sir, to be in favor of 
 its adoption. 
 
 Col. Jones (of Bristol) thought, that the rulers ought to 
 believe in God or Christ ; and that, however a test may be 
 prostituted in England, yet he thought if our public men were 
 to be of those who had a good standing in the church, it would 
 be happy for the United States ; and that a person could not 
 be a good man without being a good Christian. 
 
 The conversation on the Constitution by paragraphs being 
 ended, 
 
 Mr. Parsons moved, that this Convention do assent to and 
 ratify this Constitution. 
 
 Mr. Neal rose and said, that as the Constitution at large was 
 now under consideration, he would just remark, that the article 
 
222 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 which respected the Africans was the one which lay on his 
 mind ; and unless his objections to that were removed, it must, 
 how much soever he liked the other parts of the Constitution, 
 be a sufficient reason for him to give his negative to it. 
 
 Col. Jones said, that one of his principal objections was, the 
 omission of a religious test. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Payson. Mr. President: After what has been 
 observed relative to a religious test by gentlemen of acknowl- 
 edged abilities, I did not expect it would again be mentioned, 
 as an objection to the proposed Constitution, that such a test 
 was not required as a qualification for office. Such were the 
 abilities and integrity of the gentlemen who constructed the 
 Constitution, as not to admit of the presumption that they 
 would have betrayed so much vanity as to attempt to erect bul- 
 warks and barriers to the throne of God. Relying on the 
 candor of this Convention, I shall take the liberty to express 
 my sentiments on the nature of a religious test, and shall 
 endeavor to do it in such propositions as will meet the approba- 
 tion of every mind. 
 
 The great object of religion being God supreme, and the seat 
 of religion in man being the heart or conscience, i.e. the reason 
 God has given us, employed on our moral actions, in their most 
 important consequences, as related to the tribunal of God, hence 
 I infer, that God alone is the God of the conscience, and conse- 
 quently, attempts to erect human tribunals for the consciences 
 of men, are impious encroachments upon the prerogatives of 
 God. Upon these principles, had there been a religious test, as 
 a qualification for office, it would, in my opinion, have been a 
 great blemish to the instrument. 
 
 Gen. Heath. Mr. President : After a long and painful inves- 
 tigation of the Federal Constitution, by paragraphs, this honor- 
 able Convention are drawing nigh to the ultimate question : a 
 question as momentous as ever invited the attention of man. 
 We are soon to decide on a system of government, digested, not 
 for the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts only ; not 
 for the present people of the United States only ; but, in addi- 
 tion to these, for all those States which may hereafter rise into 
 existence within the jurisdiction of the United States, and for 
 millions of people yet unborn : a system of government, not for 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 223 
 
 a nation of slaves, but for a people as free and as virtuous as 
 any on earth ; not for a conquered nation, subdued to our will, 
 but for a people who have fought, who have bled, and who have 
 conquered ; who, under the smiles of heaven, have established 
 their independence and sovereignty, and have taken equal rank 
 among the nations of the earth. In short, Sir, it is a system of 
 government for ourselves, and for our children, for all that is 
 near and dear to us in life ; and on the decision of the question 
 is suspended our political prosperity or infelicity, perhaps our 
 existence as a nation. What can be more solemn ? What can 
 be more interesting ? Every thing depends on our union. I 
 know that some have supposed that although the Union should 
 be broken, particular States may retain their importance ; but 
 this cannot be. The strongest nerved State, even the right arm, 
 if separated from the body, must wither. If the great Union be 
 broken, our country, as a nation, perishes ; and if our country 
 so perishes, it will be as impossible to save a particular State, 
 as to preserve one of the fingers of a mortified hand. 
 
 By one of the paragraphs of the system, it is declared that 
 the ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be suffi- 
 cient for the establishment of the Constitution between the 
 States so ratifying the same ; but, Sir, how happy will it be, if 
 not only nine, but even all the States should ratify it ! It will 
 be a happy circumstance, if only a small majority of this Con- 
 vention should ratify the Federal system ; but how much more 
 happy if we could be unanimous ! It will be a happy circum- 
 stance if a majority of the people of this Commonwealth should 
 be in favor of the Federal system ; but how much more so, if they 
 should be unanimous ! and if there are any means whereby they 
 may be united, every exertion should be made to effect it. I 
 presume, Sir, that there is not a single gentleman within these 
 walls, who does not wish for a Federal government — for an 
 efficient Federal government ; and that this government should 
 be possessed of every power necessary to enable it to shed on 
 the people the benign influences of a good government. But 
 I have observed from the first, that many gentlemen appear 
 opposed to the system, and this I apprehend arises from their 
 objections to some particular parts of it. Is there not a way in 
 which their minds may be relieved from embarrassment ? I 
 
224 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 think there is ; and if there is, no exertions should be spared 
 in endeavoring to do it. 
 
 If we should ratify the Constitution, and instruct our first 
 members to Congress to exert their utmost endeavors to have 
 such checks and guards provided as appears to be necessary in 
 some of the paragraphs of the Constitution, and communicate 
 what we may judge proper to our sister States, and request 
 their concurrence, is there not the highest probability that 
 every thing which we wish may be effectually secured ? I think 
 there is ; and I cannot but natter myself that in this way, the 
 gentlemen of the Convention will have the difficulties under 
 which they now labor, removed from their minds ; we shall be 
 united. The people of this Commonwealth; and of our sister 
 States, may be united. Permit me, therefore, most earnestly 
 to recommend it to the serious consideration of every gentle- 
 man in the honorable Convention. 
 
 After Gen. Heath sat down, his Excellency the President 
 rose and observed, that he was conscious of the impropriety, 
 situated as he was, of his entering into the deliberations of the 
 Convention ; that, unfortunately, through painful indisposition 
 of body, he had been prevented from giving his attendance in 
 his place ; but, from the information he had received, and from 
 the papers, there appeared to him to be a great dissimilarity of 
 sentiments in the Convention. To remove the objections of 
 some gentlemen, he felt himself induced, he said, to hazard a 
 proposition for their consideration ; which, with the permission 
 of the Convention, he would offer in the afternoon. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 When the Convention met in the afternoon, 
 
 His Excellency the President observed, that a motion had 
 been made and seconded, that this Convention do assent to, and 
 ratify, the Constitution which had been under consideration ; 
 and that he had in the former part of the day intimated his 
 intention of submitting a proposition to the consideration of 
 the Convention. My motive, says he, arises from my earnest 
 desire to this Convention, my fellow-citizens, and the public at 
 large, that this Convention may adopt such a form of govern- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 225 
 
 ment as may extend its good influences to every part of the 
 United States, and advance the prosperity of the whole world. 
 His situation, his Excellency said, had not permitted him to 
 enter into the debates of this Convention : it however appeared 
 to him necessary, from what had been advanced in them, to 
 adopt the form of government proposed ; but, observing a 
 diversity of sentiment in the gentlemen of the Convention, he 
 had frequently had conversation with them on the subject ; and 
 from this conversation, he was induced to propose to them, 
 whether the introduction of some general amendments would 
 not be attended with the happiest consequences. For that 
 purpose he should, with the leave of the honorable Convention, 
 submit to their consideration a proposition, in order to remove 
 the doubts, and quiet the apprehensions of gentlemen ; and if 
 in any degree the object should be acquired, he should feel 
 himself perfectly satisfied. He should, therefore, submit them ; 
 for he was, he said, unable to go more largely into the subject, 
 if his abilities would permit him ; relying on the candor of the 
 Convention to bear him witness that his wishes for a good 
 Constitution were sincere. [His Excellency then read his 
 proposition. 19 ] This, gentlemen, concluded his Excellency, is 
 the proposition which I had to make ; and I submit it to your 
 consideration, with the sincere wish that it may have a tendency 
 to promote a spirit of union. 
 
 [The proposition submitted by his Excellency was committed 
 to a large committee, who reported some amendments.] 
 
 Hon. Mr. Adams. Mr. President : I feel myself happy in 
 contemplating the idea that many benefits will result from 
 your Excellency's conciliatory proposition, to this Common- 
 wealth and to the United States ; and I think it ought to pre- 
 cede the motion made by the gentleman from New bury port, 
 and to be at this time considered by the Convention. 1 have 
 said, that I have had my doubts of this Constitution. I could 
 not digest every part of it, as readily as some gentlemen ; but 
 this, Sir, is my misfortune, not my fault. Other gentlemen 
 have had their doubts, but in my opinion, the proposition sub- 
 mitted, will have a tendency to remove such doubts and to 
 
 19 [See Journal, page 79.] 
 29 
 
226 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 conciliate the minds of the Convention and the people without 
 doors. This subject, Sir, is of the greatest magnitude, and has 
 employed the attention of every rational man in the United 
 States ; but the minds of the people are not so well agreed on 
 it as all of us could wish. A proposal of this sort, coming 
 from Massachusetts, from her importance, will have its weight. 
 Four or five States have considered and ratified the Constitu- 
 tion as it stands ; but we know there is a diversity of opinion, 
 even in these States, and one of them is greatly agitated. If 
 this Convention should particularize the amendments neces- 
 sary to be proposed, it appears to me it must have weight in 
 other States where Conventions have not yet met. I have 
 observed the sentiments of gentlemen on the subject as far as 
 Virginia ; and I have found that the objections were similar, 
 in the newspapers, and in some of the Conventions. Consider- 
 ing these circumstances, it appears to me that such a measure 
 will have the most salutary effect throughout the Union. It is 
 of the greatest importance that America should still be 
 united in sentiment. I think I have not been heretofore 
 unmindful of the advantage of such an Union. It is essential 
 that the people should be united in the Federal government, to 
 withstand the common enemy, and to preserve their valuable 
 rights and liberties. We find, in the great State of Pennsyl- 
 vania, one-third of the Convention are opposed to it ; should 
 there then be large minorities in the several States, I should 
 fear the consequences of such disunion. 
 
 Sir, there are many parts of it I esteem as highly valuable, 
 particularly the article which empowers Congress to regulate 
 commerce, to form treaties, &c. For want of this power in our 
 national head, our friends are grieved and our enemies insult 
 us. Our ambassador at the court of London is considered as a 
 mere cipher, instead of the representative of the United States. 
 Therefore it appears to me, that a power to remedy this evil 
 should be given to Congress, and the remedy applied as soon 
 as possible. 
 
 The only difficulty on gentlemen's minds is, whether it is 
 best to accept this Constitution on conditional amendments, 
 or to rely on amendments in future, as the Constitution pro- 
 vides. When I look over the article which provides for a 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 227 
 
 revision, I have my doubts. Suppose, Sir, nine States accept 
 the Constitution without any conditions at all ; and the four 
 States should wish to have amendments, where will you find 
 nine States to propose, and the legislatures of nine States to 
 agree to the introduction of amendments ? Therefore it seems 
 to me that the expectation of amendments taking place at 
 some future time will be frustrated. This method, if we take 
 it, will be the most likely to bring about the amendments, as 
 the Conventions of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, 
 Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina, have not yet met. I 
 apprehend, Sir, that these States will be influenced by the 
 proposition which your Excellency has submitted, as the reso- 
 lutions of Massachusetts have ever had their influence. If this 
 should be the case, the necessary amendments would be intro- 
 duced more early, and more safely. From these considera- 
 tions, as your Excellency did not think it proper to make a 
 motion, with submission, I move that the paper read by your 
 Excellency, be now taken under consideration by the Conven- 
 tion. 
 
 The motion being seconded, the proposition was read by the 
 Secretary, at the table. 
 
 Dr. Taylor liked the idea of amendments ; but, he said, he 
 did not see any constitutional door open for the introduction of 
 them by the Convention. He read the several authorities which 
 provided for the meeting of Conventions ; but did not see in any 
 of them, any power given to propose amendments. We are, he 
 said, therefore, treading on unsafe ground to propose them. We 
 must take the whole or reject the whole. The honorable gen- 
 tleman was in favor of the adjournment ; and 'in a speech of 
 some length, deprecated the consequences, which, he said, 
 must arise if the Constitution was adopted or rejected by a 
 small majority ; and that the expenses which would accrue 
 from the adjournment would not exceed 4d. per poll through- 
 out the Commonwealth. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Cabot rose and observed on what fell from the 
 honorable gentleman last speaking — that the reason why no 
 provision for the introduction of amendments was made in the 
 authorities quoted by the honorable gentleman, was, that they 
 were provided for in the fifth article of the Constitution. 
 
\/ 
 
 228 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Friday, February 1, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Bowdoin (of Dorchester) observed that he could not 
 but express his hearty approbation of the propositions made by 
 his Excellency, as they would have a tendency to relieve the 
 fears and quiet the apprehensions of some very respectable and 
 worthy gentlemen, who had expressed their doubts whether 
 some explanation of certain clauses in the Constitution, and 
 some additional restrictions upon Congress, similar to those 
 proposed by his Excellency, were not necessary. But, he said, 
 as the propositions were incorporated with the great question, 
 whether this Convention will adopt and ratify the Constitu- 
 tion ; he conceived himself in order, and would, with the per- 
 mission of the Convention, make a few general observations 
 upon the subject, which were as follows : — 
 
 It was an answer of Solon's, when he was asked what kind of 
 a Constitution he had constructed for the Athenians, that he 
 had prepared as good a Constitution of government as the 
 people would bear ; clearly intimating that a Constitution of 
 government should be relative to the habits, manners and 
 genius of the people intended to be governed by it. As the 
 particular State governments are relative to the manners and 
 genius of the inhabitants of each State, so ought the general gov- 
 ernment to be an assemblage of the principles of all the govern- 
 ments ; for without this assemblage of the principles, the general 
 government will not sufficiently apply to the genius of the people 
 confederated ; and therefore by its meeting, in its operation, 
 with a continual opposition, through this circumstance it must 
 necessarily fail in its execution : because, agreeably to the idea 
 of Solon, the people would not bear it. 
 
 It may not, therefore, be improper to examine whether the 
 Federal Constitution proposed, has a likeness to the different 
 State Constitutions, and such alone as to give the spirit and 
 features of the particular governments. For Baron Montes- 
 quieu observes, that all governments ought to be relative to 
 their particular principles ; and that " a confederate government 
 ought to be composed of States of the same nature, especially of 
 the republican kind ;" and instances, that as " the spirit of 
 monarchy is war, enlargement of dominion ; peace and mod- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 229 
 
 eration, the spirit of a republic ; these two kinds of govern- 
 ments cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic." 
 
 From hence it follows, that all the governments of the States 
 in the Union, ought to be of the same nature — of the republi- 
 can kind ; and that the general government ought to be an 
 assemblage of the spirit and principles of them all. A short 
 comparison, pointing out the likeness of the general, to the 
 particular constitutions, may sufficiently elucidate the subject. 
 
 All the constitutions of the States consist of three branches, 
 except as to the legislative powers, which are chiefly vested in 
 two ; the powers of government are separated in all, and 
 mutually check each other. These are laid down, as funda- 
 mental principles, in the Federal Constitution. All power is 
 derived, either mediately or immediately, from the people, in 
 all the constitutions ; this is the case with the Federal Consti- 
 tution. The electors of representatives to the State govern- 
 ments are electors of representatives to the Federal govern- 
 ment. The representatives are chosen for two years ; so are 
 the representatives to the assemblies of some of the States. 
 The equality of representation is determined, in nearly all the 
 States, by numbers ; so it is in the Federal Constitution. 
 
 The second branch of the legislature, in some of the States, 
 is similar to the Federal Senate, having not only legislative, 
 but executive powers ; being a legislating, and at the same 
 time an advising body to the executive. Such are the assist- 
 ants of Rhode Island and Connecticut, and the councils of 
 New Jersey and Georgia. The senators of Virginia and New 
 York are chosen for four years, and so elected that a continual 
 rotation is established, by which one-quarter of their respective 
 Senates is annually elected ; and by which (as one of the Con- 
 stitutions observes) there are more men trained to public busi- 
 ness, and there will always be found a number of persons 
 acquainted with the proceedings of the foregoing years, and 
 thereby the public business be more consistently conducted. 
 The Federal senators are to be chosen for six years ; and there 
 is a rotation so established, for the, reasons above-mentioned, 
 that one-third of the Senate is to be chosen every two years. 
 
 The president and vice-president answer to offices of the same 
 name in some of the States, and to the office of governor and 
 
230 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 lieutenant-governor in most of the States. As this office is of 
 the utmost importance, the manner of choosing, for the better 
 security of the interests of the Union, is to be by delegates, to 
 be expressly chosen for the purpose, in such manner, as the dif- 
 ferent legislatures may direct. This method of choosing was 
 probably taken from the manner of choosing senators, under 
 the Constitution of Maryland. 
 
 The legislative powers of the president are precisely those of* 
 the governors of this State and of New York ; rather negative 
 than positive powers ; given with a view to secure the independ- 
 ence of the executive, and to preserve a uniformity in the laws, 
 which are committed to them to execute. 
 
 The executive powers of the president are very similar to 
 those of the several States, except in those points which relate 
 more particularly to the Union ; and respect ambassadors, 
 public ministers and consuls. 
 
 If the genius of the people of the States, as expressed by 
 their different constitutions of government; if the similarity of 
 each, and the general spirit of all the governments, concur to 
 point out the policy of a confederate government, by comparing 
 the Federal Constitution with those of the several States, can 
 we expect one more applicable to the people, to the different 
 States, and to the purposes of the Union, than the one proposed, 
 unless it should be contended that a Union was unnecessary ? 
 "^ " If a republic is small," says Baron Montesquieu, " it is 
 destroyed by a foreign force ; if it is large, it is ruined by an 
 internal imperfection. " " Fato potentice sua vi nixce." And if 
 mankind had not contrived a confederate republic, says the same 
 author, " a Constitution, that has all the internal advantages 
 of a republican, and the external force of a monarchical gov- 
 ernment,' ' they would probably have always lived under the 
 tyranny of a single person. Admitting this principle of Baron 
 yX Montesquieu's, the several States are either too small to be 
 defended against a foreign enemy, or too large for republican 
 constitutions of government. If we apply the first position to 
 the different States, which, reason, and the experience of the 
 late war, point out to be true, a confederate government is 
 necessary. But if we admit the latter position, then the several 
 governments, being in their own nature imperfect, will be neces- 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 231 
 
 sarily destroyed, from their being too extensive for republican 
 governments. 
 
 From whence it follows, if the foregoing principles are true, 
 that we ought to adopt a Confederation, presuming the different 
 States well calculated for republican governments ; for if they 
 are not, their corruption will work their destruction separately ; 
 and if they are destined for- destruction, from their natural 
 imperfection, it will certainly be more advantageous to have 
 them destroyed collectively than separately, as in that case we 
 should fall under one great national government. 
 
 But if the advantages of a confederacy, admitting the prin- 
 ciples of it to be good, are duly considered ; that it will give 
 security and permanency to the several States, not only against 
 foreign invasion, but against internal disputes, and wars with 
 one another ; if the wars in Europe, arising from jarring and 
 opposing interests, are a public calamity ; if it is for the benefit 
 of ourselves, and future generations, to prevent its horrid devas- 
 tations on this continent, to secure the States against such 
 calamities, it will be necessary to establish a general govern- 
 ment, to adjust the disputes, and to settle the differences, 
 between State and State. For, without a confederacy, the sev- 
 eral States, being distinct sovereignties, would be in a state of 
 nature, with respect to each other, and the law of nature, which 
 is the right of the strongest, would determine the disputes that 
 might arise. To prevent the operation of so unjust a title ; to 
 afford protection to the weakest State against the strongest ; to 
 secure the rights of all against the encroachments of any of the 
 States ; to balance the power of all the States, by each giving up 
 a portion of its sovereignty, thereby better to secure the remain- 
 der of it, are amongst the main objects of a confederacy. 
 
 But the advantages of a union of the States are not confined 
 to mere safety from within or from without. They extend not 
 only to the welfare of each State, but even to the interest of 
 each individual of the States. 
 
 The manner in which the States have suffered for the want 
 of a general regulation of trade, is so notorious, that little need 
 be said upon the subject, to prove that the continent has been 
 exhausted of its wealth, for the want of it ; and if the evil from 
 the not regulating it is not speedily remedied, by placing the 
 
232 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 necessary powers in the hands of Congress, the liberties of the 
 people, or the independence of the States, will be irretrievably 
 lost. The people, feeling the inconvenience of systems of gov- 
 ernment that instead of relieving, increase their perplexities ; 
 instead of regulating trade upon proper principles, instead of 
 improving the natural advantages of onr own country, and 
 opening new sources of wealth, our lands have sunk in their 
 value, our trade has languished, our credit has been daily 
 reducing, and our resources are almost annihilated — can we 
 expect, in such a state, that the people will long continue their 
 allegiance to systems of government, whether arising from the 
 weakness of their administration, or the insufficiency of their 
 principles, which entail on them so many calamities ? I pre- 
 sume not. The. well-being of trade depends on a proper regu- 
 lation of it ; on the success of trade, depends wealth ; on wealth, 
 the value of lands ; the strength, the welfare and happiness of 
 a country, upon the numbers, the ease and independence of its 
 yeomanry. For the want of this have our taxes most oppres- 
 sively fallen upon the most useful of all our citizens, our hus- 
 bandmen ; while trade, for the want of its being confined to 
 proper objects, has served rather to ruin than to enrich those 
 that have carried it on. 
 
 Shall we, then, let causeless jealousies arise, and distract our 
 councils ? Shall we let partial views and local prejudices influ- 
 ence our decisions ? Or shall we, with a becoming wisdom, 
 determine to adopt the Federal Constitution proposed, and 
 thereby confirm the liberty, the safety and the welfare of our 
 country ? 
 
 I might go on, Sir, and point out the fatal consequences of 
 rejecting the Constitution ; but, as I have already intruded too 
 much upon the time and patience of the Convention, I shall, 
 for the present, forbear any further observations, requesting the 
 candor of the Convention for those I have already made. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Adams. As your Excellency was pleased yesterday 
 to offer, for the consideration of this Convention, certain propo- 
 sitions intended to accompany the ratification of the Constitu- 
 tion before us, I did myself the honor to bring them forward 
 by a regular motion, not only from the respect due to your 
 Excellency, but from a clear conviction in my own mind that 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 233 
 
 they would tend to effect the salutary and important purposes 
 which you had in view, " the removing the fears and quieting 
 the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Common- 
 wealth, and the more effectually guarding against an undue 
 administration of the Federal government. " 
 
 I beg leave, Sir, more particularly to consider those proposi- 
 tions, and in a very few words to express my own opinion that 
 they must have a strong tendency to ease the minds of gentle- 
 men who wish for the immediate operation of some essential 
 parts of the proposed Constitution, as well as the most speedy 
 and effectual means of obtaining alterations in some other parts 
 of it, which they are solicitous should be made. I will not 
 repeat the reasons I offered when the motion was made, which 
 convinced me that the measure now under consideration will 
 have a more speedy, as well as a more certain influence in effect- 
 ing the purpose last mentioned, than the measure proposed in 
 the Constitution before us. 
 
 Your Excellency's first proposition is, " that it be explicitly 
 declared, that all powers not expressly delegated to Congress, 
 are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised. " 
 This appears to my mind to be a summary of a bill of rights, 
 which gentlemen are anxious to obtain ; it removes a doubt 
 which many have entertained respecting this matter, and gives 
 assurance that if any law made by the Federal government 
 shall be extended beyond the power granted by the proposed 
 Constitution, and inconsistent with the Constitution of this 
 State, it will be an error, and adjudged by the courts of law to 
 be void. It is consonant with the second article in the present 
 Confederation, that each State retains its sovereignty, freedom 
 and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, 
 which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the 
 United States in Congress assembled. I have long considered 
 the watchfulness of the people over the conduct of their rulers, 
 the strongest guard against the encroachments of power ; and 
 I hope the people of this country will always be thus watchful. 
 
 Another of your Excellency's propositions is calculated to 
 quiet the apprehensions of gentlemen, lest Congress should 
 exercise an unreasonable control over the State legislatures, 
 with regard to the times, places and manner of holding elec- 
 
 30 
 
234 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 tions, which by the fourth section of the first article, are to be 
 prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, subject to 
 the control of Congress. I have had my fears lest this control 
 should infringe the freedom of elections, which ought ever to 
 be held sacred. Gentlemen who have objected to this controlling 
 power in Congress, have expressed their wishes that it had been 
 restricted to such States as may neglect or refuse that power 
 vested in them, and to be exercised by them if they please. 
 Your Excellency proposes, in substance, the same restriction, 
 which, I should think, cannot but meet with their full appro- 
 bation. 
 
 The power to be given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, 
 duties, imposts and excises, has alarmed the minds of some 
 gentlemen. They tell you, Sir, that the exercise of the power 
 of laying and collecting direct taxes might greatly distress the 
 several States, and render them incapable of raising moneys for 
 the payment of their respective State debts, or for any purpose. 
 They say the impost and excise may be made adequate to the 
 public emergencies in the time of peace, and ask why the laying 
 direct taxes may not be confined to a time of war. You are 
 pleased to propose to us, that it be a recommendation, that 
 " Congress do not lay direct taxes but when the moneys arising 
 from the impost and excise shall be insufficient for the public 
 exigencies." The prospect of approaching war might necessa- 
 rily create an expense beyond the productions of impost and 
 excise. How, then, would the government have the necessary 
 means of providing for the public defence ? Must they not 
 have recourse to other resources besides impost and excise ? 
 The people, while they watch for their own safety, must and 
 will have a just confidence in a legislature of their own election. 
 The approach of war is seldom, if ever, without observation ; 
 it is generally observed by the people at large, and I believe no 
 legislature of a free country would venture a measure which 
 should directly touch the purses of the people, under a mere 
 pretence, or unless they could show, to the people's satisfaction, 
 that there had, in fact, been a real public exigency to justify it. 
 
 Your Excellency's next proposition is, to introduce the indict- 
 ment of a grand jury before any person shall be tried for any 
 crime, by which he may incur infamous punishment, or loss of 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 235 
 
 life ; and it is followed by another, which recommends a trial 
 by jury, in civil actions between citizens of different States, if 
 either of the parties shall request it. These, and several others 
 which I have not mentioned, are so evidently beneficial, as to 
 need no comment of mine. And they are all, in every partic- 
 ular, of so general a nature, and so equally interesting to every 
 State, that I cannot but persuade myself to think, they would 
 all readily join with us in the measure proposed by your Excel- 
 lency, if we should now adopt it. Gentlemen may make addi- 
 tional propositions, if they think fit ; it is presumed that we 
 shall exercise candor towards each other ; and that, whilst on 
 the one hand gentlemen will cheerfully agree to any proposition 
 intended to promote a general union, which may not be incon- 
 sistent with their own mature judgment, others will avoid the 
 making such as may be needless, or tend to embarrass the 
 minds of the people of this Commonwealth and our sister 
 States, and thereby not only frustrate your Excellency's wise 
 intention, but endanger the loss of that degree of reputation, 
 which, I natter myself, this Commonwealth has justly sustained. 
 Mr. Nasson. Mr. President : I feel myself happy, that your 
 Excellency has been placed, by the free suffrages of your fellow- 
 citizens, at the head of this government. I also feel myself 
 happy, that your Excellency has been placed in the chair of 
 this honorable Convention ; and I feel a confidence that the 
 proposition submitted to our consideration yesterday, by your 
 Excellency, has for its object the good of your country. But, 
 Sir, as I have not had an opportunity leisurely to consider it, I 
 shall pass it over, and take a short view of the Constitution at 
 large, which is under consideration, though my abilities, Sir, 
 will not permit me to do justice to my feelings, or to my con- 
 stituents. Great Britain, Sir, first attempted to enslave us, by 
 declaring her laws supreme, and that she had a right to bind us 
 in all cases whatever. What, Sir, roused the Americans to 
 shake off the yoke preparing for them ? It was this measure, 
 the power to do which we are now about giving to Congress. 
 And here, Sir, I beg the indulgence of this honorable body, to 
 permit me to make a short apostrophe to liberty. 0, liberty ! 
 thou greatest good ! thou fairest property ! With thee I wish to 
 live, with thee I wish to die ! Pardon me if I drop a tear on 
 
236 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 the peril to which she is exposed. I cannot, Sir, see this bright- 
 est of jewels tarnished ! a jewel worth ten thousand worlds ! 
 And shall we part with it so soon ! 0, no. Gentlemen ask, 
 can it be supposed that a Constitution,' so pregnant with danger, 
 could come from the hands of those who framed it ! Indeed, 
 Sir, I am suspicious of my own judgment, when I contemplate 
 this idea; when I see the list of illustrious names annexed to it; 
 but, Sir, my duty to my constituents obliges me to oppose the 
 measure they recommend, as obnoxious to their liberty and 
 safety. 
 
 When, Sir, we dissolved the political bands which connected 
 us with Great Britain, we were in a state of nature. We then 
 formed and adopted the Confederation, which must be consid- 
 ered as a sacred instrument ; this confederates us under one 
 head, as sovereign and independent States. Now, Sir, if we 
 give Congress power to dissolve that Confederation, to what can 
 we trust ? If a nation consent thus to treat their most solemn 
 compacts, who will ever trust them ? Let us, Sir, begin with 
 this Constitution, and see what it is. And first, " We, the 
 people of the United States, do," <fec. If this, Sir, does not go 
 to an annihilation of the State governments, and to a perfect 
 consolidation of the whole Union, I do not know what does. 
 What ! shall we consent to this ? Can ten, twenty or an hun- 
 dred persons in this State, who have taken the oath of alle- 
 giance to it, dispense with this oath ? Gentlemen may talk as 
 they please of dispensing in certain cases with oaths ; but, Sir, 
 with me they are sacred things. We are under oath ; we have 
 sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent State. 
 How, then, can we vote for this Constitution, that destroys that 
 sovereignty ? 
 
 The Hon. Col. Varnum begged leave to set the worthy 'gen- 
 tleman right. The very oath, he said, which the gentleman 
 has mentioned, provides an exception for the power to be granted 
 to Congress. 
 
 • Well, continued Mr. Nasson, to go on. Mr. President : Let 
 us consider the Constitution without a bill of rights. When I 
 
 give up any of my natural rights, it is for the security of the 
 
 rest ; but here is not one right secured, although many are 
 
 neglected. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 237 
 
 With respect to biennial elections, the paragraph is rather 
 loosely expressed. I am a little in favor of our ancient custom. 
 Gentlemen say they are convinced that the alteration is neces- 
 sary. It may be so ; when I see better, I will join with them. 
 
 To go on. Representation and taxation to be apportioned 
 according to numbers. This, Sir, I am opposed to ; it is une- 
 qual. I will show an instance in point. We know for certainty, 
 that in the town of Brooklyn, persons are better able to pay 
 their taxes, than in the parts I represent. Suppose the tax is 
 laid on polls. Why, the people of the former place will pay 
 their tax ten times as easy as the latter, thus helping that part 
 of the community which stands in the least need of help. On 
 this footing, the poor pay as much as the rich ; and in this a 
 way is laid, that five slaves shall be rated no more than three 
 children. Let gentlemen consider this. A farmer takes three 
 small orphans, on charity, to bring up ; they are bound to him ; 
 when they arrive at twenty-one years of age, he gives each of 
 them a couple of suits of clothes, a cow, and two or three young 
 cattle ; we are rated as much for these, as a farmer in Virginia 
 is for five slaves, whom he holds for life, they and their 
 posterity, the male, and the she ones, too. The Senate, Mr. 
 President, are to be chosen two from each State. This, Sir, 
 puts the smaller States on a footing with the larger, when the 
 States have to pay according to their numbers. New Hampshire 
 does not pay a fourth part as much as Massachusetts. We must, 
 therefore, to support the dignity of the Union, pay four times 
 as much as New Hampshire, and almost fourteen times as much 
 as Georgia, who, we see, are equally represented with us. 
 
 The term, Sir, for which the Senate is chosen, is a grievance. 
 It is too long to trust any body of men with power. It is 
 impossible but that such men will be tenacious of their places ; 
 they are to be raised to a lofty eminence, and they will be loth 
 to come down ; and in the course of six years, may, by man- 
 agement, have it in their power to create officers, and obtain 
 influence enough to get in again, and so for life. When we 
 felt the hand of British oppression upon us, we were so jealous 
 of rulers as to declare them eligible but for three years in six. 
 In this Constitution we forget this principle. I, Sir, think that 
 rulers ought, at short periods, to return to private life, that 
 
238 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 they may know how to feel for and regard their fellow-creatures. 
 In six years, Sir, and at a great distance, they will quite forget 
 them ; for 
 
 " Time and absence cure the purest love." 
 
 We are apt to forget our friends, except when we are conversing 
 with them. 
 
 We now come, Sir, to the fourth section. Let us see— .-the 
 times, places and manner of holding elections shall be prescribed 
 in each State by the legislature thereof. No objections to this ; 
 but, Sir, after the flash of lightning comes the peal of thunder. 
 " But Congress may at any time alter them," &c. Here it is, 
 Mr. President ; this is the article which is to make Congress 
 omnipotent. Gentlemen say this is the greatest beauty of the 
 Constitution ; this is the great security for the people ; this is 
 the all in all. Such language have I heard in this house ; but, 
 Sir, I say, by this power Congress may, if they please, order 
 the election of Federal representatives for Massachusetts, to be 
 at Great Barrington, or Machias ; and at such a time, too, as 
 shall put it in the power of a few artful and designing men to 
 get themselves elected at their pleasure. 
 
 The eighth section, Mr. President, provides that Congress 
 shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 
 excises, &c. We may, Sir, be poor ; we may not be able to 
 pay these taxes, <fcc We must have a little meal, and a little 
 meat, whereon to live ; and save a little for a rainy day. But 
 what follows ? Let us see. To raise and support armies. 
 Here, Sir, comes the key to unlock this cabinet ; here are the 
 means by which you will be made to pay your taxes ! But will 
 ye, my countrymen, submit to this ? Suffer me, Sir, to say a 
 few words on the fatal effects of standing armies, that bane of 
 republican governments ! A standing army ! Was it not with 
 this that Caesar passed the Rubicon, and laid prostrate the liber- 
 ties of his country ? By this have seven-eighths of the once 
 free nations of the globe been brought into bondage ! Time 
 would fail me, were I to attempt to recapitulate the havoc made 
 in the world by standing armies. Britain attempted to enforce 
 her arbitrary measures by a standing army. But, Sir, we had 
 patriots then who alarmed us of our danger ; who showed us 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 239 
 
 the serpent, and bid. us beware of it. Shall I name them ? I 
 fear I shall offend your Excellency ; but I cannot avoid it. I 
 must. We had an Hancock, an Adams, and a Warren. Our 
 sister States, too, produced a Randolph, a Washington, a 
 Greene,^and a Montgomery, who led us in our way. Some of 
 these have given up their lives in defence of the liberties of 
 their country ; and my prayer to God is, that when this race of 
 illustrious patriots shall have bid adieu to the world, that from 
 their dust, as from the sacred ashes of the phoenix, another race 
 may arise, who shall take our posterity by the hand, and lead 
 them to trample on the necks of those who shall dare to infringe 
 on their liberties. Sir, had I a voice like Jove, I would pro- 
 claim it throughout the world, and had I an arm like Jove, I 
 would hurl from the globe those villains who would dare attempt 
 to establish in our country a standing army. I wish, Sir, that 
 the gentlemen of Boston would bring to their minds the fatal 
 evening of the 5th of March, 1770, when by standing troops 
 they lost five of their fellow-townsmen. I will ask them, what 
 price can atone for their lives ? What money can make satisfac- 
 tion for the loss ? The same causes produce the same effects. 
 An army may be raised on pretence of helping a friend, or 
 many pretences might be used. That night, Sir, ought to be 
 a sufficient warning against standing armies, except in cases of 
 great emergency. They are too frequently used for no other 
 purpose than dragooning the people into slavery ; but I beseech 
 you, my countrymen, for the sake of your posterity, to act like 
 those worthy men who have stood forth in defence of the rights 
 of mankind, and show to the world that you will not submit to 
 tyranny. What occasion have we for standing armies ? We 
 fear no foe. If one should come upon us, we have a militia, 
 which is our bulwark. Let Lexington witness that we have the 
 means of defence among ourselves. If, during the last winter, 
 there was not much alacrity shown by the militia in turning 
 out, we must consider that they were going to fight their coun- 
 trymen. Do you, Sir, suppose, that had a British army invaded 
 us at that time, such supineness would have been discovered ? 
 No, Sir ! To our enemies' dismay and discomfort, they would 
 have felt the contrary ; but against deluded, infatuated men, 
 they did not wish to exert their valor or their strength. There- 
 
240 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 fore, Sir, I am utterly opposed to a standing army in time of 
 peace. 
 
 The paragraph that gives Congress power to suspend the writ 
 of habeas corpus, claims a little attention. This is a great bul- 
 wark ; a great privilege indeed, We ought not, therefore, to 
 give it up on any slight pretence. Let us see : How long is it 
 to be suspended ? As long as rebellion or invasion shall con- 
 tinue. This is exceeding loose. Why is not the time limited, 
 as in our Constitution ? But, Sir, its design would then be 
 defeated. It was the intent, and by it we shall give up one of 
 our greatest privileges. Mr. Nasson concluded by saying, he 
 had much more to say, but as the house were impatient, he 
 should sit down for the present, to give other gentlemen an 
 opportunity to speak. 
 
 Judge Sumner, adverting to the pathetic apostrophe of the 
 gentleman last speaking, said, he could, with as much sincerity, 
 apostrophize : 0, government ! thou greatest good ! thou best 
 of blessings ! With thee I wish to live ; with thee I wish to 
 die. Thou art as necessary to the support of the political body, 
 as meat and bread are to the natural body. The learned judge 
 then turned his attention to the proposition submitted by the 
 President, and said, he sincerely hoped that it would meet the 
 approbation of the Convention, as it appeared to him a remedy 
 for all the difficulties which gentlemen in the course of the 
 debates had mentioned. He particularized the objections that 
 had been started, and showed that their removal was provided 
 for in the proposition ; and concluded by observing, that the 
 probability was very great, that if the amendments proposed 
 were recommended by this Convention, they would, on the 
 meeting of the first Congress, be adopted by the general gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery said, he did not see the probability that these 
 amendments would be made, if we had authority to propose , 
 them. He considered, he said, that the Convention did not 
 meet for the purpose of recommending amendments, but to 
 adopt or reject the Constitution. He concluded by asking, 
 whether it was probable that those States who had already 
 adopted the Constitution*, would be likely to submit to amend- 
 ments ? 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 241 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 [When the Convention met, a short conversation ensued on 
 the time when the grand question should be taken. It was 
 agreed that it should not be until Tuesday. After this conver- 
 sation subsided, another took place on the division of the motion, 
 in order that the question of ratifying might be considered 
 separately from the amendments, but nothing final was deter- 
 mined upon.] 
 
 Judge Dana advocated the proposition submitted by his Ex- 
 cellency the President. It contained, he said, the amendments 
 generally wished for ; as they were not of a local nature, but 
 extended to every part of the union, if they were recommended 
 to be adopted by this Convention, it was very probable that 
 two-thirds of the Congress would concur in proposing them ; 
 or that two-thirds of the legislatures of the several States 
 would apply for the call of a Convention to consider them, 
 agreeably to the mode pointed out in the Constitution ; and 
 that he did not think that gentlemen would wish to reject the 
 whole of the system, because some part of it did not please 
 them. He then went into a consideration of the advantages 
 which would ensue from its adoption, to the United States, to 
 the individual States, and to the several classes of citizens, and 
 concluded by representing, in a lively manner, the evils to the 
 whole continent, and to the northern States in particular, 
 which must be the unavoidable attendants on the present 
 system of general government. 
 
 Mr. Russell rose, he said, with diffidence, to offer his senti- 
 ments on the subject in debate ; but he could" not, he said, 
 forbear to give his sentiments on the advantage which lie appre- 
 hended must result from the adoption of the proposed Consti- 
 tution, to thic State, and to the United States, in the advance- 
 ment of their commerce. Mr. Russell said, he believed, it had 
 always been the policy of trading nations, to secure to them- 
 selves the advantages of their carrying trade ; he observed, 
 how tenacious France, Holland and England were in this par- 
 ticular, and how beneficial it had proved to them. He then 
 went into an accurate and interesting statement of the quantities 
 of produce which were exported from the several States ; and 
 
 31 
 
242 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 showed the ability of the States to furnish from among themselves 
 shipping fully sufficient for the transportation of this produce ; 
 which, he observed, if confined by the general government to 
 American vessels, while the restriction would not increase the 
 rates of freightage to the southern States, as the northern and 
 middle States could produce a surplusage of shipping, and a spirit 
 of competition would call forth the resources, would greatly 
 increase our navigation, furnish us with a great nursery of sea- 
 men, give employment not only to the mechanics in constructing 
 the vessels, and the trades dependant thereon, but to the hus- 
 bandman, in cutting down trees for timber and transporting them 
 to the places of building, increase the demand for the products 
 of the land, and for our pork, butter, &c. ; and give such life 
 and spirit to commerce as would extend it to all the nations of 
 the world. These, he said, were some of the blessings he anti- 
 cipated from the adoption of the Federal Constitution ; and so 
 convinced was he of its utility and necessity, that, while he 
 wished, that on the grand question being put, there might not 
 be one dissenting voice, if he was allowed, he would hold up 
 both his hands in favor of it ; and he concluded, if his left 
 hand was unwilling to be extended with his right, in this all 
 important decision, he would cut it off, as unworthy of him, 
 and lest it should infect his whole body. 
 
 Mr. Pierce. Mr. President: The amendments proposed by 
 your Excellency are very agreeable to my opinion, and I should 
 wish to add several more, but will mention but one, and that is, 
 that the Senate should not continue in office more than two 
 years ; but, Sir, I think that if the want of these amendments 
 were sufficient for me- to vote against the Constitution, the ad- 
 dition, in the manner proposed by your Excellency, will not be 
 sufficient for me to vote for it, as it appears to me very uncer- 
 tain whether they ever are a part of the Constitution. 
 
 Several gentlemen said a few words each on the proposition 
 of amendments — which it was acceded to by gentlemen opposed 
 to the Constitution, was good — but that it was not probable it 
 would be interwoven in the Constitution. Gentlemen, on the 
 other side, said there was a great probability that it would, from 
 its nature, be also recommended by the several Conventions 
 which have not yet convened. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. . 243 
 
 Saturday, February 2, 1788. 
 
 The Hon. Mr. Strong went into a particular discussion of the 
 several amendments recommended in the proposition submitted 
 by his Excellency ; each of which he considered with much 
 attention. He anticipated the good effect it must have in con- 
 ciliating the various sentiments of gentlemen on the subject ; 
 and expressed his firm belief, that if it was recommended by the 
 Convention, it would be inserted in the Constitution. 
 
 Gen. Thompson said, we have no right to make amendments ; 
 it was not, he said, the business we were sent for. He was 
 glad, he said, that gentlemen were convinced it was not a per- 
 fect system, and that it wanted amendments. This, he said, 
 was different from the language they had formerly held. How- 
 ever, as to the amendments, he could not say amen to them, 
 but they might be voted for by some men — he did not say 
 Judases. 
 
 Mr. Parsons, Col.. Orne, Hon. Mr. Phillips, and the Rev. 
 Mr. Niles, and several other gentlemen, spoke in favor of the 
 proposition, as a conciliatory measure, and the probability of 
 the amendments being adopted. Mr. Nasson, Dr. Taylor, Mr. 
 Thomas, of Middleborough,and others, though in sentiment with 
 gentlemen on the propriety of their being admitted into the 
 Constitution, did not think it was probable they would be inserted. 
 
 Before the Convention adjourned, Gen. Whitney moved, that 
 a committee, consisting of two from each county, should be 
 raised to consider the amendments, or any other that might be 
 proposed, and report thereon. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick seconded the motion. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dalton. Mr. President : I am not opposed to the 
 motion ; but, Sir, that gentlemen may not again say, as has 
 been the case several times this day, that the gentlemen who 
 advocate the measure of the proposition were now convinced 
 that amendments to the Constitution are indispensable, I, Sir, 
 in my place, say, that I am willing to accept the Constitution 
 as it is : and I am in favor of the motion of proposing amend- 
 ments, only as it is of a conciliating nature, and not as a con- 
 cession that amendments are necessary. 
 
 The motion was put and carried unanimously. 
 
244 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 The following gentlemen were then appointed on the said 
 committee, viz. : — 
 
 Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, Mr. Southworth, Mr. Parsons, Hon. Mr. 
 Hutchinson, Hon. Mr. Dana, Mr. Winn, Hon. Mr. Strong, Mr. 
 Bodman, Hon. Mr. Turner, Mr. Thomas, of Plymouth, Dr. 
 Smith, Mr. Bourn, Hon. Mr. Spooner, Mr. Bishop, Rev. Dr. 
 Hemmenway, Mr. Barrell, Mr. Mayhew, Hon. Mr. Taylor, Hon. 
 Mr. Sprague, Mr. Fox, Mr. Longfellow, Mr. Sewall, Mr. Syl- 
 vester, Mr. Lusk, Hon. Mr. Sedgwick. 
 
 Monday, February 4, 1788. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Thatcher. Mr. President: While the different 
 paragraphs of the proposed Constitution have been debated, I 
 have not troubled this honorable Convention with any observa- 
 tions of my own upon the subject. Conscious that there were 
 men of deeper political knowledge, and of better abilities, than 
 myself, I conceived it my duty to attend to their instruction,, 
 that, having heard with attention, I might decide with integ- 
 rity. I view the object before us as of greater moment than 
 ever was known within the memory of man, or than hath 
 been recorded by the historic page. Were we, Mr. President, 
 this day to decide on the lives and fortunes of an hundred 
 of the best citizens of this Commonwealth, solemn would 
 that province be ; but much more interesting is the result of 
 the present question ; for in this case not a single City, not a 
 single State, but a Continent, wide and extended, may be happy 
 or wretched according to our judgment, and posterity will 
 either bless us for laying the foundation of a wise and equal 
 government, or curse us for neglecting their important interests, 
 and for forging chains for them, when we disdained to wear 
 them ourselves. Having, therefore, as I trust, a full view of 
 the magnitude of the object, I hope I shall be pardoned if I 
 offer my sentiments with freedom. I am sensible of the pre- 
 judices that subsist against the profession to which I belong ; 
 but yet, intrusted by my constituents with so solemn a charge, 
 I think they have a right to expect from me the reasons why I 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 245 
 
 shall finally consent to ratify the proposed form of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 There are three circumstances which deserve notice in con- 
 sidering the subject : these are, the necessity that all the States 
 have of some general band of union ; the checks upon the 
 government in the form offered for our adoption ; and, lastly, 
 the particular disadvantages to which we shall be exposed if 
 we reject it. 
 
 With respect to the first of these considerations, I trust 
 there is no man in his senses but what will own, that the whole 
 country hath largely felt the want of energy in the general 
 government. While we were at war with Britain, common 
 danger produced a common union ; but,*the cause being re- 
 moved, the effect ceased also. Nay, I do not know but we may 
 safely add, that that union, produced by uniform danger, was 
 still inadequate to general and national purposes. This Com- 
 monwealth, with a generous, disinterested regard to the good 
 of the whole, appeared foremost in the day of danger. At the 
 conclusion of the late war, two-thirds of the continental army 
 were from Massachusetts ; their provision and their clothing 
 proceeded also in a great measure from our extraordinary exer- 
 tions. The people did this in the fullest confidence that when 
 peace and tranquillity was restored, from the honor and justice 
 of our sister States, our supernumerary expenses would be 
 abundantly repaid. But, alas ! how much have our expecta- 
 tions been blasted ! The Congress, though willing, yet had no 
 power to do us justice. The small district of Rhode-Island put 
 a negative upon the collected wisdom of the continent. This 
 was done, not by those who are the patrons of their present 
 infamous system of paper currency ; but by that part of them 
 who now call themselves honest men. We have made exertions 
 to stop the importation of foreign luxuries. Our brethren in the 
 neighboring States, from the view of local advantages, have 
 taken occasion to distress us upon the same account. They 
 have encouraged, where we have prohibited ; and by those 
 iniquitous measures have made our virtue and public spirit an 
 additional cause of our calamity. Nor have our calamities 
 been local ; they have reached to all parts of the United States, 
 and have produced dissipation and indigence at home, and con- 
 
246 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 tempt in foreign countries. On the one hand, the haughty 
 Spaniard has deprived us of the navigation of the river Missis- 
 sippi ; on the other, the British nation are by extravagant 
 duties ruining our fisheries. Our sailors are enslaved by the 
 pirates of Algiers ; our credit is reduced to so low an ebb that 
 American faith is a proverbial expression for perfidy, as punic 
 faith was among the Romans. Thus have we suffered every 
 species of infamy abroad, and poverty at home. Such, in fact, 
 have been our calamities, as are enough to convince the most 
 sceptical among us, of the want of a general government, in 
 which energy and vigor should be established, and at the same 
 time the rights and liberties of the people preserved. 
 
 A constitution hath been presented to us which was composed 
 and planned by men who, in the council and field, have, in the 
 most conspicuous offices, served their country in the late war. 
 It comes authenticated by a man who, without any pecuniary 
 reward, commanded our army, and who retired to a private 
 station with more pleasure than he left it. I do not say, Mr. 
 President, that this proves the form of government to be per- 
 fect, or that it is an unanswerable argument that we should 
 adopt it. But it is a reason why we should examine it with care 
 and caution, and that we ought not rashly and precipitately to 
 reject it. 
 
 It will be objected : " There are more powers granted than 
 are necessary, and that it tends to destroy the local governments 
 of the particular States, and that it will eventually end either 
 in aristocracy or despotism.' ' To answer the objection two con- 
 siderations should be taken into view : the situation of the conti- 
 nent when a constitution was formed, and the impossibility of 
 preserving a perfect sovereignty in the States, after necessary 
 powers were ceded to a supreme council of the whole. As to 
 the first, let us candidly examine the state of these republics, 
 from New Hampshire to Georgia, and see how far vigor and 
 energy were required. During the session of* the late Conven- 
 tion, Massachusetts was on the point of civil war. In Vermont 
 and New Hampshire, a great disaffection to their several gov- 
 ernments prevailed among the people. New York absolutely 
 refused complying with the requisitions of Congress. In Vir- 
 ginia, armed men endeavored to stop the courts of justice. In 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 247 
 
 South Carolina, creditors by law were obliged to receive barren 
 and useless land, for contracts made in silver and gold. I pass 
 over the instance of Rhode Island ; their conduct was notori- 
 ous. In some States, laws were made- directly against the treaty 
 of peace ; in others, statutes were enacted which clashed directly 
 against any Federal union ; hew lands, sufficient to discharge a 
 great part of the continental debt, intruded upon by needy 
 adventurers ; our frontier settlements exposed to the ravages of 
 the Indians, while the several States were unable or unwilling 
 to relieve their distress. Lay all these circumstances together, 
 and you will find some apology for those gentlemen who framed 
 this Constitution. I trust you may charitably assign other 
 motives for their conduct than a design to enslave their country 
 and to parcel out to themselves its honors and emoluments. 
 
 The second consideration deserves its weight. Can these 
 local governments be sufficient to protect us from foreign ene- 
 mies, or from disaffection at home ? Thirteen States are formed 
 already. The same number are probably to be formed from 
 the lands not yet cultivated. Of the former, yet smaller divis- 
 ions may be made. The province of Maine hath desired a 
 separation ; in time a separation may take place. Who knows 
 but what the same may happen with respect to the old colony 
 of Plymouth ? Now conceive the number of States increased ; 
 their boundaries lessened ; their interests clashing ; how easy a 
 prey to a foreign power ! how liable to war among themselves ! 
 Let these arguments be weighed ; and I dare say, Sir, there is 
 no man but what would conceive, that a coercive power over 
 the whole, searching through all parts of the system, is neces- 
 sary to the preservation and happiness of the whole people. 
 
 But I readily grant all these reasons are not sufficient to 
 surrender up the essential liberties of the people. But do we 
 surrender them ? This Constitution hath been compared, both 
 by its defenders and opponents, to the British government. In 
 my view of it, there is a great difference. In Britain, the govern- 
 ment is said to consist of the three forms, monarchy, aristocracy 
 and democracy ; but in fact is but a few removes from absolute 
 despotism. In the crown is vested the power of adding, at 
 pleasure, to the second branch ; of nominating all the places of 
 honor and emolument ; of purchasing, by its immense revenues, 
 
248 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 the suffrages of the House of Commons. The voice of the 
 people is but the echo of the king ; and their boasted privileges 
 lie entirely at his mercy. In this proposed form, each branch 
 of power is derived either mediately or directly from the peo- 
 ple. The lower house are elected directly by those persons 
 who are qualified to vote for the representatives of the State ; 
 and at the expiration of two years become private men, unless 
 their past conduct entitles them a future election. The Senate 
 are elected by the legislatures of the different States, and rep- 
 resent their sovereignty. These powers are a check on each 
 other, and can never be made either dependant on one another, 
 or independent of the people. The President is chosen by the 
 electors, who are appointed by the people. The high courts of 
 justice arise from the President and Senate ; but yet the min- 
 isters of them can be removed only upon bad behavior. The inde- 
 pendence of judges is one of the most favorable circumstances 
 to the public liberty ; for when they become the slaves of a 
 venal, corrupt court, and the hirelings of tyranny, all property 
 is precarious, and personal security at an end. A man may be 
 stripped of all his possessions and murdered, with the forms of 
 law. Thus it appears that all parts of this system arise ulti- 
 mately from the people, and are still independent of each other. 
 There are other restraints, which, though not directly named 
 in this Constitution, yet are evidently discerned by every man 
 of common observation. These are, the governments of the 
 several States, and the spirit of liberty in the people. Are we 
 wronged or injured ? Our immediate representatives are those 
 to whom we ought to apply. Their power and influence will 
 still be great. But should any servants of the people, however 
 eminent their stations, attempt to enslave them, from this spirit 
 of liberty such opposition would arise as would bring them to 
 the scaffold. But, admitting that there are dangers in accept- 
 ing this general government, yet are there not greater hazards 
 in rejecting it ? Such is, Mr. President, the state of our affairs, 
 that it is not in our power to carve for ourselves. To avoid the 
 greatest, and to choose the least of two evils, is all that we can 
 do. What then will be the probable effects if this Constitution 
 be rejected ? Have we not reason to fear new commotions in this 
 Commonwealth ? If they arise, can we be always certain that 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 249 
 
 we shall be furnished with a citizen, who, though possessed of 
 extensive influence and the greatest abilities, will make no 
 other use of them than to quiet the tumult of the people, to 
 prevent civil war, and to restore the usual course of law and 
 justice ? Are we not in danger from other States, when their 
 interests or prejudices are opposite to ours ? And in some such 
 scenes of hostile contention, will not some Sylla drench the land 
 in blood, or some Cromwell or Caesar lay our liberties prostrate 
 at his feet ? Will not foreign nations attack us in our weak, 
 divided condition, and once more render us provinces to some 
 potentate of Europe ? Or will those powers to whom we are 
 indebted lie quiet ? They certainly will not. They are now 
 waiting for our decision ; but when they once see that our 
 union is broken, and that we are determined to neglect them, 
 they will issue out letters of marque and reprisal, and entirely 
 destroy our commerce. 
 
 If this system is broken up, will thirteen, or even nine, States 
 ever agree to another ? And will Providence smile on a people 
 who despise the privileges put into their hands, and who neglect 
 the plainest principles of justice and honesty ? After all, I by 
 no means pretend that there is complete perfection in this pro- 
 posed Constitution. Like all other human productions, it hath 
 its faults. Provision is made for an amendment, whenever 
 from practice it is found oppressive. I would add, the propo- 
 sals which his Excellency hath condescended to lay before this 
 honorable Convention, respecting future alterations, are real 
 improvements for the better, and we have no reason to doubt 
 but they will be equally attended to by .other States, as they 
 lead to common security and preservation. 
 
 Some of the gentlemen in the opposition have quoted ancient 
 history, and applied it to the question now under debate. They 
 have shown us the danger which arises from vesting magistrates 
 with too much power. I wish they had gone on to tell the 
 whole truth. They might have shown how nearly licentious- 
 ness and tyranny are allied ; that they who will not be gov- 
 erned by reason, must submit to force ; that demagogues, in all 
 free governments, have at first held out an idea of extreme 
 liberty and have seized on the rights of the people under the 
 mask of patriotism. They might have shown us a republic 
 
 32 
 
250 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 in which wisdom, virtue and order, were qualities for which a man 
 was liable to banishment ; and, on the other hand, boasting, 
 sedition and falsehood, the sure road to honor and promotion. 
 
 I am sorry that it hath been hinted by some gentlemen in 
 this house, as if there were a combination of the rich, the 
 learned, and those of liberal professions, to establish and sup- 
 port an arbitrary form of government. Far be it from me to 
 retort so uncharitable and unchristian a suggestion. I doubt 
 not but the gentlemen who are of different sentiments from 
 myself are actuated by the purest motives. Some of them I 
 have the pleasure to be particularly acquainted with, and can 
 safely pronounce them to be men of virtue and honor. They 
 have, no doubt, a laudable concern for the liberties of their 
 country ; but I would beg them to remember, that extreme 
 jealousy and suspicion may be as fatal to freedom as security 
 and negligence. 
 
 With respect to myself, I am conscious of no motive which 
 guides me in this great and solemn question, but what I could 
 justify to my own heart, both on the bed of death, and before 
 the tribunal of Omnipotence. I am a poor man : I have the 
 feelings of a poor man. If there are honors and emoluments 
 in this proposed Constitution, I shall, by my profession and cir- 
 cumstances in life, be forever excluded from them. It is my 
 wish and prayer, that in the solemn verdict we are very soon to 
 pronounce, we may be directed to that measure which will be 
 for the glory, freedom and felicity of my country. 
 
 I shall trouble this House no further, than by joining sin- 
 cerely in the wish of the honorable gentleman from Topsham, 
 that the people, in this their day, may know the things which 
 belong to thgir peace. 
 
 [The committee appointed on Saturday to consider his Excel- 
 lency's propositions, by their chairman, Hon. Mr. Bowdoin, 
 reported a few alterations to the amendments submitted to 
 them ; and that at the decision, the committee consisted of 
 twenty-four ; fifteen of whom agreed in the report ; seven were 
 against it ; one was absent, and one declined giving his opinion.] 
 
 Major Lusk concurred in the idea already thrown out in the 
 debate, that although the insertion of the amendments in the 
 Constitution was devoutly wished, yet he did not see any reason 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 251 
 
 to suppose they ever would be adopted. Turning from the 
 subject of amendments, the Major entered largely into the con- 
 sideration of the ninth section, and in the most pathetic and feel- 
 ing manner described the miseries of the poor natives of Africa, 
 who are kidnapped and sold for slaves. With the brightest colors, 
 he painted their happiness and ease on their native shores, and 
 contrasted them with their wretched, miserable and unhappy 
 condition in a state of slavery. From this subject, he passed 
 to the article dispensing with the qualification of a religious 
 test, and concluded by saying, that he shuddered at the idea, 
 that Roman Catholics, Papists and Pagans might be introduced 
 into office ; and that Popery and the Inquisition may be estab- 
 lished in America. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Backus. Mr. President : I have said very little in 
 this honorable Convention ; but I now beg leave to offer a few 
 thoughts upon some points in the Constitution proposed to us. 
 And I shall begin with the exclusion of any religious test. 
 Many appear to be much concerned about it ; but nothing is 
 more evident, both in reason and in the holy Scriptures, than 
 that religion is ever a matter between God and individuals ; 
 and therefore no man or men can impose any religious test 
 without invading the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ. Ministers first assumed this power under the Christian 
 name ; and then Constantine approved of the practice, when he 
 adopted the profession of Christianity, as an engine of state 
 policy. And let the history of all nations be searched, from 
 that day to this, and it will appear that the imposing of reli- 
 gious tests hath been the greatest engine of tyranny in the 
 world. And I rejoice to see so many gentlemen who are now 
 giving in the rights of conscience, in this great and important 
 matter. Some serious minds discover a concern lest, if all 
 religious tests should be excluded, the Congress would here- 
 after establish Popery or some other tyrannical way of worship. 
 But it is most certain that no such way of worship can be estab- 
 lished without any religious test. 
 
 Much, Sir, hath been said about the importation of slaves 
 into this country. I believe that, according to my capacity, no 
 man abhors that wicked practice more than I do, and would 
 gladly make use of all lawful means toward the abolishing of 
 
252 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 slavery in all parts of the land. But let us consider where we 
 are, and what we are doing. In the Articles of Confederation, 
 no provision was made to hinder the importation of slaves into 
 any of these States, but a door is now opened hereafter to do 
 it ; and each State is at liberty now to abolish slavery as soon 
 as they please. And let us remember our former connection 
 with Great Britain, from whom many in our land think we 
 ought not to have revolted. How did they carry on the slave 
 trade ? T know that the Bishop of Gloucester, in an annual 
 sermon, in London, in February, 1766, endeavored to justify 
 their tyrannical claims of power over us, by casting the reproach 
 of the slave trade upon the Americans. But at the close of 
 the war, the Bishop of Chester, in an annual sermon, in Feb- 
 ruary, 1783, ingenously owned, that their nation is the most 
 deeply involved in the guilt of that trade of any nation in the 
 world ; and also, that they have treated their slaves in the West 
 Indies worse than the French or Spaniards have done theirs. 
 Thus slavery grows more and more odious through the world ; 
 and, as an honorable gentleman said some days ago, " Though 
 we cannot say that slavery 'is struck with an apoplexy, yet we 
 may hope it will die with a consumption." And a main source, 
 Sir, of that iniquity, hath been an abuse of the covenant of cir- 
 cumcision, which gave the seed of Abraham power to destroy the 
 inhabitants of Canaan, and to take their houses, vineyards, and 
 all their estates, as their own ; and also to buy and hold others 
 as servants. And as Christian privileges are much greater than 
 those of Hebrews were, many have imagined that they had a 
 right to seize upon the lands of the heathen, and to destroy or 
 enslave them as far as they could extend their power. And 
 from thence the mystery of iniquity carried many into the 
 practice of making merchandise of slaves and souls of men. 
 But all ought to remember that when God promised the land 
 of Canaan to Abraham and his seed, he let him know that they 
 were not to take possession of that land until the iniquity of 
 the Amorites was full ; and then they did it under the imme- 
 diate direction of Heaven ; and they were as real executors of 
 the judgment of God upon those heathen, as any person ever 
 was an executor of a criminal justly condemned. And in 
 doing it they were not allowed to invade the lands of the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 253 
 
 Edomites, who sprang from Esau, who was not only of the 
 seed of Abraham, but was born at the same birth with Israel ; 
 and yet they were not of that church. Neither was Israel 
 allowed to invade the lands of the Moabites, or of the children 
 of Ammon, who were of the seed of Lot. And no officer in 
 Israel had any legislative power, but such as were immediately 
 inspired. Even David, the man after God's own heart, had no 
 legislative power, but only as he was inspired from above ; and 
 he is expressly called a prophet in the New Testament. And 
 we are to remember that Abraham and his seed, for four hun- 
 dred years, had no warrant to admit any strangers into that 
 church, but by buying of him as a servant, with money. And 
 it was a great privilege to be bought and adopted into a reli- 
 gious family for seven years, and then to have their freedom. 
 And that covenant was expressly repealed in various parts of 
 the New Testament ; and particularly in the first epistle to the 
 Corinthians, wherein it is said, " Ye are bought with a price ; 
 therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which 
 are God's." And again: " Circumcision is nothing, anduncir- 
 cumcision is nothing, but keeping of the commandments of 
 God. Ye are bought with a price ; be not ye the servants of 
 men ? " Thus the gospel sets all men upon a level ; very con- 
 trary to the declaration of an honorable gentleman in this 
 house, " That the Bible was contrived for the advantage of a 
 particular order of men." 
 
 Another great advantage in the Constitution before us, is its 
 excluding all titles of nobility or hereditary succession of 
 power ; which hath been a main engine of tyranny in foreign 
 countries. But the American Revolution was built upon the 
 principle that all men are born with an equal right to liberty 
 and property, and that officers have no right to any power but 
 what is fairly given them by the consent of the people. And 
 in the Constitution now proposed to us, a power is reserved to 
 the people, constitutionally to reduce every officer again to a 
 private station ; and what a guard is this against their inva- 
 sion of others' rights or abusing of their power ! Such a door 
 is now opened for the establishing of righteous government, 
 and for securing equal liberty, as never was before opened to 
 any people upon earth. 
 
254 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. Mr. President : The objections which gentlemen 
 have made to the form of ratification which has been submitted 
 by your Excellency, have arisen, either from a doubt of our 
 having a right to propose alterations, or from the supposed 
 improbability that any amendments recommended by this assem- 
 bly, will ever become a part of the Federal system. If we have 
 no right, Sir, to propose alterations, there remains nothing fur- 
 ther to be attempted, but to take the final question, independent 
 of the propositions for amendment. But, I hope that the mere 
 assertion of any one is not to operate as an argument in this 
 assembly ; and we are yet waiting for evidence to prove this 
 very singular position, which has been so often repeated. If 
 we have a right, Sir, to receive or reject the Constitution, 
 surely we have an equal authority to determine in what way 
 this right shall be exercised. It is a maxim, I believe univer- 
 sally admitted, that in every instance, the manner in which 
 every power is to be exerted, must be in its nature discretion- 
 ary with that body to which this power is delegated. If this 
 principle be just, Sir, the ground which has been taken to 
 oppose your Excellency's proposal, by disputing the right of 
 recommending alterations, must be necessarily relinquished. 
 But gentlemen say, that they find nothing about amendments 
 in the commission under which they were acting, and they 
 conceive it neither agreeable to the resolution of the legis- 
 lature, nor to the sense of their constituents, that such a 
 scheme should be adopted. Let us inquire then, Sir, under 
 what authority we are acting ; and to what tribunal we are 
 amenable. Is it then, Sir, from the late Federal Convention, 
 that we derive our authority ? Is it from Congress, or is it 
 even from the legislature itself? It is from neither, Sir: 
 we are convened in right of the people, as their immediate 
 representatives, to execute the most important trust which it is 
 possible to receive ; and we are accountable, in its execution, 
 to God only, and our own consciences. When gentlemen 
 assert, then, that we have no right to recommend alterations, 
 they must have ideas strangely derogatory to the influence and 
 authority of our constituents, whom we have the honor of rep- 
 resenting. But should it be thought there was even a part of 
 the people who conceived we were thus restricted as to the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 255 
 
 forms of our proceedings, we are still to recollect that their 
 aggregate sense, on this point, can only be determined by the 
 voices of the majority in this Convention. The arguments of 
 those gentlemen who oppose any propositions of amendments, 
 amount simply to this, Sir, that the whole people of Massachu- 
 setts, assembled by their delegates, on the most solemn and 
 interesting occasion, are not at liberty to resolve in what form 
 this trust shall be executed. When we reflect seriously and 
 coolly on this point, I think, Sir, we shall doubt no longer. 
 
 But with respect to the prospect of these amendments, which 
 are the subject of discussion, being adopted by the first Congress 
 which shall be appointed under the new Constitution, I really 
 think, Sir, that it is not only far from being improbable, but is 
 in the highest degree likely. I have thought long and often on 
 the subject of amendments, and I know no way in which they 
 could be more likely to succeed. If they were made conditional 
 to our receiving the proposed Constitution, it has ever appeared 
 to me, that a conditional amendment must operate as a total 
 rejection. As so many other States have received the Constitu- 
 tion as it is, how can it be made to appear that they will not 
 adhere to their own resolutions ? and should they remain as 
 warmly and pertinaciously attached to their opinion, as we 
 might be decidedly in favor of our own sentiments, a long and 
 painful interval might elapse before we should have the benefit 
 of a Federal Constitution. I have never yet heard an argument 
 to remove this difficulty. Permit me to inquire of gentlemen 
 what reason we have to suppose that the States which have 
 already adopted the Constitution, will suddenly consent to call 
 a new Convention, at the request of this State. Are we going 
 to expose the Commonwealth to the disagreeable alternative of 
 being forced into a compliance, or of remaining in opposition, 
 provided nine others should agree to receive if ? As highly as 
 some persons talk of the force of this State, I believe we should 
 be but a feeble power, unassisted by others, and . detached from 
 the general benefit of a national government. We are told, 
 that under the blessing of Providence, we may do much. It is 
 very true, Sir, but it must be proved, that we shall be most 
 likely to secure the approbation of Heaven by refusing the 
 proposed system. 
 
256 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 It has been insinuated, Sir, that these amendments have been 
 artfully introduced to lead to a decision which would not other- * 
 wise be had. Without stopping to remark on the total want of 
 candor in which such an idea has arisen, let us inquire whether 
 there is even the appearance of reason to support this insinua- 
 tion. The propositions are annexed, it is true, to the ratifica- 
 tion ; but the assent is complete and absolute without them. 
 It is not possible it can be otherwise understood by a single 
 member in this honorable body. Gentlemen, therefore, when 
 they make such an unjust observation, do no honor to the saga- 
 city of others. Supposing it possible that any single member 
 can be deceived by such a shallow artifice, permit me to do 
 justice to the purity of intention in which they have arisen, by 
 observing, that I am satisfied nothing can be farther from your 
 Excellency's intentions. The propositions are general, and not 
 local ; they are not calculated for the peculiar interests of this 
 State, but with indiscriminate justice comprehend the circum- 
 stances of the individual on the banks of the Savannah, as well 
 as of the hardy and industrious husbandman on the margin of 
 the Kennebec. Why then they should not be adopted, I confess 
 I cannot conceive. There is one of them in a particular man- 
 ner which is very agreeable to me. When we talk of our wanting 
 a bill of rights to the new Constitution, the first article proposed 
 must remove every doubt on this head ; as, by positively secur- 
 ing what is not expressly delegated, it leaves nothing to the 
 uncertainty of conjecture, or to the refinements of implication, 
 but is an explicit reservation of every right and privilege which 
 are nearest and most agreeable to the people. There has been 
 scarcely an instance where the influence of Massachusetts has 
 not been felt and acknowledged in the Union. In such a case, 
 her voice will be heard, Sir ; and I am fully in sentiment, if 
 these amendments are not engrafted on the Constitution, it will 
 be our own fault. The remaining seven States will have our 
 example before them, and there is a high probability that they, 
 or at least some of them, will take our conduct as a precedent, 
 and will perhaps assume the same mode of procedure. Should 
 this be the fact, their influence will be united to ours. But 
 your delegates will besides be subject to a perpetual instruction, 
 until its object is completed ; and it will be always in the power 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 257 
 
 of the people and legislature to renew those instructions. But 
 if they should fail, we must then acquiesce in the decision of 
 the majority ; and this is the known condition on which all free 
 governments depend. 
 
 Would gentlemen who are opposed to the Constitution wish 
 to have no amendments ? This does not agree with their reit- 
 erated objections to the proposed system. Or are they afraid, 
 Sir, that these propositions will secure a larger majority ? On 
 such an occasion we cannot be too generally united. The Con- 
 stitution is a great political experiment. The amendments have 
 a tendency to remove many objections which have been made to 
 it; and I hope, Sir, when it is adopted, that they will be 
 annexed to the ratification in the manner which your Excellency 
 has proposed. 
 
 Tuesday, February 5, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Ames observed, that at length it is admitted that the 
 Constitution, connected with the amendments, is good. Almost 
 every one who has appeared against the Constitution, has 
 declared that he approves it, with the amendments. One 
 gentleman, who has been distinguished by his zealous opposi- 
 tion, has declared that he would hold up both hands for it, if they 
 could be adopted. I admire this candid manner of discussing 
 the subject, and will endeavor to treat it myself with equal 
 care and fairness. The only question which seems to labor, is 
 this ; the amendments are not a part of the Constitution, and 
 there is nothing better than a probability to trust to, that they 
 will ever be adopted. The nature of the debate is totally 
 shifted, and the inquiry is now, not what the Constitution is, 
 but what degree of probability there is, that the amendments 
 will hereafter be incorporated into it. 
 
 Before he proceeded to discuss this question, he wished to 
 notice two objections which had been urged against his Excel- 
 lency's proposition : That this Convention, being confined in 
 their powers to reject or ratify the Constitution as it is, have 
 no right to propose amendments ; and that the very propositions 
 
 33 
 
258 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 imply the Constitution is not perfect, and amount to a confes- 
 sion that it ought to be rejected. It is well that these objec- 
 tions were not made by a lawyer ; they would have been called 
 quibbles, and he would have been accused of having learned 
 them at the bar. Have we no right to propose amendments ? 
 This is the fullest representation of the people ever known : 
 and if we may not declare their opinion, and upon a point for 
 which we have been elected, how shall it ever be known ? A 
 majority may not fully approve the Constitution ; and yet they 
 may think it unsafe to reject it : and they may fully approve 
 his Excellency's propositions. What shall they say ? That 
 they accept, or reject, and no more ? They may be embar- 
 rassed perhaps, to do either. But let them say the truth, that 
 they accept it in the hope that the amendments will obtain. 
 We are chosen to consider the Constitution and it is clearly 
 incident to our appointment to declare the result of our delib- 
 erations. This very mode of obtaining amendments is pointed 
 out in the Constitution itself. How can it be said that we 
 have no right then, to propose them ? If, however, there was 
 any irregularity in this proceeding, the General Court would 
 not delay to confirm it. 
 
 If it is insisted that the Constitution is admitted to be 
 imperfect, let those objectors consider the nature of their own 
 argument. Do they expect a perfect Constitution ? Do they 
 expect to find that perfection in government, which they well 
 know is not to be found in nature ? There is not a man who 
 is not more or less discontented with his condition in life, and 
 who does not experience a mixture of good and evil. And will 
 he expect that a whole society of men can exclude that imper- 
 fection which is the lot of every individual in it ? The truth 
 is, we call that condition good and happy, which is so upon the 
 whole. But this Constitution may be good without any 
 amendments, and yet the amendments may be good ; for they 
 ,are not repugnant to the Constitution. It is a gratification to 
 observe how little we disagree in our sentiments : but it is not 
 my purpose to compare the amendments with the Constitution. 
 Whatever opinion may be formed of it by others, Mr. Ames 
 professed to think it comparatively perfect. There was not any 
 government which he knew to subsist, or which he had ever 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 259 
 
 heard of, that would bear a comparison with the new Constitu- 
 tion. Considered merely as a literary performance, it was an 
 honor to our country ; legislators have at length condescended 
 to speak the language of philosophy ; and if we adopt it, we 
 shall demonstrate to the sneering world, who deride liberty 
 because they have lost it, that the principles of our govern- 
 ment are as free as the spirit of our people. 
 
 I repeat it, our debates have been profitable, because upon 
 every leading point we are at last agreed. Yery few among 
 us now deny that a federal government is necessary to save us 
 from ruin ; that the Confederation is not that government ; 
 and that the proposed Constitution, connected with the amend- 
 ments, is worthy of being adopted. The question recurs, will 
 the amendments prevail and become part of the system ? In 
 order to obtain such a system as the Constitution and the 
 amendments, there are but three ways of proceeding; to reject 
 the whole and begin anew ; to adopt this plan, upon condition 
 that the amendments be inserted into it; or to adopt his 
 Excellency's propositions. 
 
 Those who propose to reject the whole, are bound to show 
 that we shall possess some advantage in forming a system 
 which we do not enjoy at present, or that some obstacles will 
 be removed which impede us now. But will that be the case ? 
 Shall we adopt another Constitution with more unanimity than 
 we expect to find in this Convention ? Do gentlemen so soon 
 forget their own arguments ? We have been told that the new 
 Constitution will be rebellion against the Confederation ; that 
 the interests of the States are too dissimilar for an Union ; and 
 that Massachusetts can do without the Union, and is a match 
 for all the world. We have been warned of the tendency of 
 all power towards tyranny, and of the danger of trusting Con- 
 gress with the power of the purse and of the sword ; that the 
 system is not perfect ; there is no religious test, and slavery is 
 not abolished. Now, Sir, if we reject the Constitution, and 
 after two or three years exertion, another Constitution should 
 be submitted to another Convention of Massachusetts, shall we 
 escape the opposition which is made in this assembly ? Will 
 not the same objections then apply, with equal force, to another 
 system ? Or do gentlemen expect that a Constitution may be 
 
260 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 formed which will not be liable to those objections ? Do they 
 expect one which will not annul the Confederation, or that the 
 persons and properties of the people shall not be included in 
 the compact, and that we shall hear no more about armies and 
 taxes ? But suppose that it was so framed, who is there even 
 amongst the objectors who would give his vote for so paltry a 
 system ? If we reject, we are exposed to the risk of having no 
 Constitution, of being torn with factions, and at last divided 
 into distinct Confederacies. 
 
 If we accept, upon condition, shall we have a right to send 
 members to the new Congress ? We shall not ; and of course 
 this State would lose its voice and influence in obtaining the 
 adoption of the amendments. This is too absurd to need any 
 further discussion. 
 
 But in objection to your Excellency's propositions, it is said 
 that it is no more than probable that they will be agreed to by 
 the other States. I ask what is any future thing that we 
 devise, more than probable ? What more is another Constitu- 
 tion ? All agree that we must have one ; and it is easy to 
 perceive that such an one as the majority of the people approve 
 must be submitted to by this State ; for what right have an 
 eighth or a tenth part of the people to dictate a government for 
 the whole ? It comes to this point, therefore : is any method 
 more likely to induce the people of the United States to con- 
 cur with Massachusetts, than that proposed by your Excel- 
 lency ? If it is answered that there is none, as I think it 
 must be, then the objection that the chance of obtaining the 
 amendments is no more than probable, will come to the 
 ground, and it will appear that of all chances we depend upon 
 that which is the safest. For when will the voice of Massa- 
 chusetts have so powerful an influence as at present ? There 
 is not any government now to counteract or awe the people. 
 The attention of the people is excited from one end of the 
 States to the other, and they will watch and control the con- 
 duct of their members in Congress. Such amendments as 
 aflord better security to liberty will be supported by the people. 
 There will be a Congress in existence .to collect their senti- 
 ments and to pursue the objects of their wishes. Nine States 
 may insert amendments into the Constitution ; but if we reject 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 261 
 
 it, the vote must be unanimous. Our State in that case, would 
 lose the advantage of having representatives according to the 
 numbers, which is allowed by the Constitution. Upon a few 
 points, and those not of a local nature, unanimity may be 
 expected. But in discussing a whole Constitution, in which 
 the very amendments, that it is said will not be agreed to by 
 the States, are to be inserted, unanimity will be almost a mira- 
 cle. Either the amendments will be agreed to by the Union, 
 or they will not. If it is admitted that they will be agreed to, 
 then there is an end of the objection to your Excellency's 
 propositions, and we ought to be unanimous for the Constitu- 
 tion. If it is said that they will not be agreed to, then it must 
 be because they are not approved by the United States, or at 
 least, nine of them. Why shall we reject the Constitution, 
 then, for the sole purpose of obtaining that unanimous vote of 
 thirteen States, which it is confidently said it is impossible we 
 ever shall obtain from nine only ? An object which is impos- 
 sible is out of the question. The argument that the amend- 
 ments will not prevail is not only without force, but directly 
 against those who use it, unless they admit that we have no 
 need of a government, or assert that by ripping up the founda- 
 tions of compact, upon which we now stand, and setting the 
 whole Constitution afloat, and introducing an infinity of new 
 subjects of controversy, we pursue the best method to secure 
 the entire unanimity of thirteen States. 
 
 But shall we put everything that we hold precious to the 
 hazard, by rejecting this Constitution ? We have great advan- 
 tages by it in respect of navigation ; and it is the general inter- 
 est of the States that we should have them. But if we reject 
 it, what security have we that we shall obtain them a second 
 time, against the local interests and prejudices of the other 
 States ? W T ho is there that really loves liberty, that will not 
 tremble for its safety, if the Federal government should be dis- 
 solved ? Can liberty be safe without government ? 
 
 The period of our political dissolution is approaching. 
 Anarchy and uncertainty attend our future state ; but this we 
 know, that liberty, which is the soul of our existence, once fled, 
 can return no more. 
 
 The Union is essential to our being as a nation. The pillars 
 
262 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 that prop it, are crumbling to powder. The Union is the vital 
 sap that nourishes the tree. If we reject the Constitution, to 
 use the language of the country, we girdle the tree, its leaves 
 will wither and its branches drop off, and the mouldering 
 trunk will be torn down by the tempest. What security has 
 this single State against foreign enemies ? Could we defend 
 the mast country which the Britons so much desire ? Can we 
 protect our fisheries or secure by treaties a sale for the produce 
 of our lands in foreign markets ? Is there no loss, no danger, 
 by delay ? In spite of our negligence and perverseness, are we 
 to enjoy, at all times, the privilege of forming a Constitution 
 which no other nation has ever enjoyed at all ? We approve 
 our own form of State government, and seem to think ourselves 
 in safety under its protection. We talk as if there was no 
 danger in deciding wrong. But when the inundation comes, 
 shall we stand on dry land ? The State government is a beau- 
 tiful structure. It is situated, however, upon the naked beach. 
 The Union is the dike to fence out the flood. That dike is 
 broken and decayed, an$ if we do not repair it, when the next 
 spring-tide comes, we shall be buried in one common destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 Mr. Barrell (of York). Awed in the presence of this 
 august assembly ; conscious of my inability to express my 
 mind fully on this important occasion, and sensible how little 
 1 must appear in the eyes of those giants of rhetoric, who have 
 exhibited such a pompous display of declamation ; without any 
 of those talents calculated to draw attention ; without the 
 pleasing eloquence of Cicero, or the blaze of Demosthenian 
 oratory, I rise, Sir, to discharge my duty to my constituents, 
 who I know, expect something more from me than merely 
 a silent vote. With no pretension's to talents above the simple 
 language adapted to the line of my calling, the plain husband- 
 man, I hope the gentlemen who compose this honorable body will 
 fully understand me when I attempt to speak my mind of the 
 Federal Constitution as it now stands. I wish, Sir, to give my 
 voice for its amendment before it can be salutary for our 
 acceptance ; because, Sir, notwithstanding the Wilsonian ora- 
 tory, and all the learned arguments I have seen written, 
 notwithstanding the many labored speeches I have heard in 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 263 
 
 its defence, and after the best investigation I am able to give 
 this subject, I fear it is pregnant with baneful effects, although 
 I may not live to feel them. 
 
 Because, Sir, as it now stands, Congress will be vested with 
 more extensive powers than ever Great Britain exercised over 
 us, too great in my opinion to entrust with any class of men, let 
 their talents or virtues be ever so conspicuous, even though 
 composed of such exalted, amiable characters as the great 
 Washington : for while we consider them as men of like pas- 
 sions, the same spontaneous, inherent thirst for power with 
 ourselves ; . great and good as they may be, when they enter 
 upon this all important charge, what security can we have that 
 they will continue so ? And, Sir, were we sure they would 
 continue the faithful gaurdians of our liberties, and prevent 
 any infringement on the privileges of the people, what assur- 
 ance can we have that such men will always hold the reins of 
 government ; that their successors will be such ? History tells 
 us Rome was happy under Augustus, though wretched under 
 Nero, who could have no greater powerthan Augustus : and yet 
 this same Nero, when young in government, could shed tears 
 on signing a death warrant, though afterwards he became so 
 callous to the tender feelings of humanity, as to behold with 
 pleasure, Rome in flames. 
 
 Because, Sir, I think that six years is too long a term for any 
 set of men to be at the helm of government ; for in that time 
 they may get so firmly rooted, and their influence be so great 
 as to continue themselves for life. 
 
 Because, Sir, I am not certain we are able to support the 
 additional expense of such a government. 
 
 Because, Sir, I think a continental collector will not be so 
 likely to do us justice in collecting the taxes, as collectors of 
 our own. 
 
 Because, Sir, I think a frame of government on which all 
 laws are founded, should be so simple and explicit, that the 
 most illiterate may understand it, whereas this appears to me 
 so obscure and ambiguous that the most capacious mind can- 
 not fully comprehend it. 
 
 Because, Sir, the duties of excise and impost, and to be 
 taxed besides, appear too great a sacrifice : and when we have 
 
264: DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 given them up, what shall we have to pay our own debts but a 
 dry tax ? 
 
 Because, Sir, I do not think this will produce the efficient 
 government we are in pursuit of. 
 
 Because, Sir, they fix their own salaries, without allowing 
 any control. 
 
 And because, Sir, I think such a government may be disa- 
 greeable to men with the high notions of liberty we Americans 
 have. 
 
 And, Sir, I could wish this Constitution had not been in 
 some parts of the continent hurried on like the driving of 
 Jehu, very furiously, for such important transactions should 
 be without force, and with cool deliberation. These, Sir, were 
 my objections, and those of my constituents, as they occur to 
 my memory ; some of which have been removed in the course 
 of the debates, by the ingenious reasoning of the speakers ; I 
 wish I could say the whole were. But, after all, there are some 
 yet remain on my mind, enough to convince me, excellent as 
 this system is, in some respects it needs alterations ; therefore, 
 1 think it becomes us, as wise men, as the faithful guardians of 
 the people's rights, and as we wish well to posterity, to propose 
 such amendments as will secure to us and ours that liberty, 
 without which life is a burden. 
 
 Thus, Sir, have I ventured, to deliver my sentiments, in 
 which are involved those of my constituents, on this important 
 subject, cautiously avoiding every thing like metaphysical reas- 
 oning, lest I should invade the prerogative of those respectable 
 gentlemen of the law, who have so copiously displayed their 
 talents on this occasion. But, Sir, although you may perceive, 
 by what I have said, that this is not, in my view, the most per- 
 fect system I could wish ; yet as I am possessed with an assur- 
 ance that the proposed amendments will take place ; as I dread 
 the fatal effects of anarchy ; as 1 am convinced the Confederation 
 is essentially deficient, and that it will be more difficult to 
 amend that than to reform this ; and as I think this Constitu- 
 tion, with all its imperfections, is excellent compared with that ; 
 and that it is the best Constitution we can now obtain ; as the 
 greatest good I can do my country at present, I could wish for 
 an adjournment, that I might have an opportunity to lay it 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 265 
 
 before my constituents with the arguments which have been 
 used in the debates, which have eased my mind, and I trust 
 would have the effect on theirs, so as heartily to join me in 
 ratifying the same. But, Sir, if I cannot be indulged on this 
 desirable object, I am almost tempted to risk their displeasure 
 and adopt it without their consent. 
 
 Dr. Taylor examined the observations of several gentlemen, 
 who had said, that had the Constitution been so predicated as 
 to require a bill of rights to be annexed to it it would have been 
 the work of a year, and could not be contained but in volumes. 
 This, if true, he said, was an argument in favor of one being 
 annexed ; but so far from its being the case, he believed any 
 gentleman in that Convention could form one in a few hours ; 
 as he might take the bill of rights of Massachusetts for a guide. 
 He concluded by objecting to the amendments, because no 
 assurance was given that they ever would become a part of the 
 system. 
 
 Mr. Parsons demonstrated the impracticability of forming a 
 bill, in a national Constitution, for securing individual rights, 
 and showed the inutility of the measure, from the idea, that 
 no power' was given to Congress to infringe on any one of the 
 natural rights of the people by this Constitution ; and should 
 they attempt it, without constitutional authority, the act would 
 be a nullity and could not be enforced. 
 
 Several other gentlemen spoke in a desultory conversation on 
 the amendments. It was urged again and again, on one side, 
 that it was uncertain whether they would ever be interwoven 
 in the Constitution ; and that, therefore, they could not vote 
 for it on that precarious condition. On the other side, the 
 importance of the opinion of Massachusetts, in other States, in 
 determining on great political questions, the general nature of 
 the amendments proposed, &c, were repeatedly urged in favor 
 of their being a part of the ratification. 
 
 [A motion was made by Mr. Dench, and seconded : That for 
 the purpose of informing the good people of this Common- 
 wealth of the principles of the proposed Federal Constitution, 
 and the amendments offered by his Excellency the President, 
 and reported by the committee ; and of uniting their opinions 
 respecting the same, this Convention do adjourn to a future 
 
 34 
 
266 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 day. After debate, (which continued the best part of the day,) 
 the question was put, and was determined in the negative ; 
 three hundred and twenty-nine members being present, and one 
 hundred and fifteen only voting in the affiramtive.] 
 
 Wednesday, February 6, 1788. 
 
 [The Hon. Mr. Adams introduced some amendments to be 
 added to those reported by the committee ; but they not meet- 
 ing the approbation of those gentlemen whose minds they were 
 intended to ease, after they were debated a considerable time, 
 the honorable gentlemen withdrew them.] 
 
 Rev. Mr. Stillman. Mr. President : I rise, with deference 
 to gentlemen of superior abilities, to give my opinion on the 
 all important national question, and the reasons on which it is 
 founded ; an opinion, the result of the most serious delibera- 
 tion. 
 
 Upon entering the Convention, it was my full determination 
 to keep my mind cool and open to conviction, that so I might 
 profit by the discussion of this interesting subject ; and now, 
 Sir, return my sincere thanks to the gentlemen who have taken 
 opposite sides in the course of the debates. From both I have 
 received advantage : from one class, in bringing forward a great 
 variety of objections ; from the other class, in answering them. 
 Whatever my previous opinion was, I now stand on firmer 
 ground than ever, respecting the proposed Constitution. 
 
 But my present situation, Sir, is to me extremely affecting. 
 To be called by the voice of my fellow citizens to give my vote 
 for or against a Constitution of government that will involve 
 the happiness or misery of millions of my countrymen, is of so 
 solemn a nature as to have occasioned the most painful anxiety. 
 
 I have no interest to influence me to accept this Constitution 
 of government, distinct from the interest of my countrymen at 
 at large. We are all embarked in one bottom and must sink 
 or swim together. 
 
 Besides, Sir, Heaven has fixed me in a line of duty that pre- 
 cludes every prospect of the honors and the emoluments of 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 267 
 
 office. Let who will govern, I must obey. Nor would I ex- 
 change the pulpit for the highest honors my country can confer. 
 I, too, have personal liberties to secure, as dear to me as any 
 gentlemen in the Convention, and as numerous a family, prob- 
 ably, to engage my attention. Besides which, I stand here, 
 with my very honorable colleagues, as a representative of the 
 citizens of this great metropolis who have been pleased to 
 honor me with their confidence ; an honor, in my view, unspeak- 
 ably greater than a peerage or a pension. 
 
 The absolute deficiency of the Articles of Confederation is 
 allowed by all. Nor have I seen any publication that places 
 this subject in so convincing a point of light as a letter written 
 by his Excellency Governor Randolph, which has appeared in 
 several of our newspapers ; whom I the rather introduce on 
 this occasion, because he was a delegate in the late Federal 
 Convention, refused to sign the Constitution before us, and has 
 been twice mentioned by gentlemen in the opposition. His 
 candor, apparent in the letter referred to, does him honor, and 
 merits the esteem of every candid mind. I declare, Sir, I 
 revere his character, while I differ from him in opinion. 
 
 " Before my departure for the (Federal) Convention," says 
 he, " I believed that the Confederation was not so eminently 
 defective as it had been supposed. But after I had entered into 
 a free conversation with those who were best informed of the 
 condition and interest of each State ; after I had compared the 
 intelligence derived from them, with the properties that ought to 
 characterize the government of our Union, I became persuaded 
 that the Confederation was destitute of every energy which a 
 Constitution of the United States ought to possess." And 
 after he had in a most masterly manner proved its inefficiency, 
 he adds, " But now, Sir, permit me to declare, that in my hum- 
 ble judgment, the powers, by which alone the blessings of a 
 general government can be accomplished , cannot be interwoven 
 in the Confederation, without a change of its very essence ; or, 
 in other words, that that Confederation must be thrown aside." 
 Having stated his objections to it, he proceeded thus : " My infer- 
 ence from these facts and principles is, that the new powers 
 must be deposited in a new body, growing out of the consolida- 
 tion of the Union, as far as the circumstances of the States 
 
268 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 will allow." Thus fully and candidly does this gentleman 
 insist on the absolute necessity of a new Constitution of general 
 government, at the very time that he objected to the present 
 form, and concludes his letter with these memorable words, 
 which I most heartily wish may make a deep impression on the 
 mind of every gentleman in the opposition : " I hesitate not to 
 say, that the most fervent prayer of my soul is the establish- 
 ment of a firm, energetic government ; that the most inveterate 
 curse that can befal us is a dissolution of the Union ; and that 
 the present moment, if suffered to pass away unemployed, can 
 never be recalled. I shall therefore cling to the Union as the 
 rock of our salvation, and urge Virginia to finish the salutary 
 work which she hath begun. And if, after our best efforts for 
 amendments, they cannot be obtained, I scruple not to declare 
 (notwithstanding the advantage the declaration may give to 
 the enemies of my proposal) that I will, as an individual 
 citizen, accept the Constitution." 
 
 I pause, Sir, that every gentleman present may have time to 
 indulge those feelings which these excellent expressions must 
 occasion. May that God who has the hearts of all 'men under 
 his control, inspire every member of this Convention with a 
 similar disposition ! Then shall we lay aside every opposite 
 interest, and unite, as a band of brothers, in the ratification of 
 this Constitution of national government. 
 
 Then, Sir, will your terms of conciliation be attended to 
 with gratitude and candor. Your Excellency, depressed with 
 bodily infirmity, and exercised with severe pain, has stepped 
 forth at the critical moment, and, from the benevolence of your 
 heart, presented us with a number of proposed amendments, 
 in order, if possible, to quiet the minds of the gentlemen in 
 the opposition and bring us together in amity and peace ; 
 amendments which you, Sir, declare you do not think neces- 
 sary, except for the sole purpose of uniting us in a common 
 and most important cause. 
 
 r~"l?ut what has been the consequence of your Excellency's 
 conciliatory propositions ? Jealousy ; jealousy, Sir, that there 
 was a snake in the grass ; a secret intention to deceive ! I 
 shudder at the ungenerous suggestion ; nor will I dwell a 
 moment longer on the distressing idea.\ Be banished forever, 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 269 
 
 the groundless suspicion of him whose name stands foremost in 
 the list of American patriots ! Let love and harmony prevail. 
 
 The important hour is just arrived when the die will be cast, 
 that will, in a great measure, determine the fate of this Com- 
 monwealth and have a mighty influence on the general interest 
 of the Union ; for, from the best information I have been able 
 to collect from gentlemen of observation and of undoubted 
 veracity, there is the greatest reason to fear that the rejection 
 of this Constitution will be followed with anarchy and confusion. 
 
 The Convention, I doubt not, will bear with me while I take 
 a general view of the Constitution -before us. 
 
 From all that has been said on the subject of biennial elec- 
 tions, it is my decided opinion, that two years in the general 
 government will not be in proportion to one year in the local 
 governments ; because, in the former, the objects of govern- 
 ment will be great, numerous and extensive ; in the latter, 
 comparatively small and limited. The general government 
 involves all the States now in the Union ; all such as shall in 
 future accede to it ; all foreign nations with whom we are now, 
 or hereafter shall be, in alliance ; an extensive and growing 
 commerce ; war and peace, &c, &c. 
 
 It has been said, that this is a stride toward septennial elec- 
 tions or perpetuity in office. I answer, the Constitution itself 
 is to be the rule; that declares, that "representatives shall be 
 chosen every second year by the people of the several States." 
 Elections then of representatives must be every second year ; 
 nor can they be otherwise, without a direct violation of the 
 Constitution. The men who shall be wicked enough to do this, 
 would not be restrained had the elections been annual ; it being 
 equally easy to violate the Constitution in the one case as in 
 the other. Elections, indeed, ought to be so frequent as to 
 make the representatives feel that they are dependent on, and 
 amenable to, the people. The difference then between annual 
 and biennial elections is small ; and in either case will answer 
 the end just mentioned. 
 
 The powers that are granted to Congress by this instrument 
 are great and extensive ; but, Sir, they are defined and limited, 
 and, in my judgment, sufficiently checked ; which I shall prove 
 before I sit down. These powers have been the subject of long 
 
270 , DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 and ingenious debate. But the arguments that have been made 
 use of against delegating these powers to the general govern- 
 ment prove too much, being applicable to all delegated power ; 
 I mean the possible abuse of it. The very term, government, 
 implies a supreme, controlling power somewhere ; a power to 
 coerce, whenever coercion shall be necessary ; of which neces- 
 sity government must be the judge. This is admitted ; if so, 
 the power may be abused. Every gentleman must confess, that 
 we cannot give a power to do good, but it may be abused to do 
 evil. If a merchant commits the care of a ship and cargo to 
 the master, he may dispose of both and appropriate the money 
 to his own use. If we raise a body of men and put arms into 
 their hands for our defence, they may turn them against us and 
 destroy us. All these things prove, however, that in order to 
 guard as much as possible against the abuse of those powers 
 we delegate to government, there ought to be sufficient checks 
 to them ; every precaution should be used to secure the liber- 
 ties of the people on the one hand and not render the govern- 
 ment inefficient on the other. I believe, Sir, such security is 
 provided in this Constitution ; if not, no consideration shall 
 induce me to give my voice in its favor. But the people are 
 secured by the following circumstances : — 
 
 1st. All the offices in Congress are elective, not hereditary. 
 The president and senators are to be chosen by the interposi- 
 tion of the legislatures of the several States, who are the repre 
 sentatives and guardians of the people; whose honor and 
 interest will lead them, in all human probability, to have good 
 men placed in the general government. 
 
 2d. The representatives in Congress are to be chosen every 
 second year by the people in the several States. Consequently 
 it lies with the people, themselves, to say who shall represent 
 them. It will then be their own fault if they do not choose the 
 best men in the Commonwealth. 
 
 Who are Congress, then ? They are ourselves ; the men of 
 our own choice, in whom we can confide ; whose interest is insep- 
 arably connected with our own. Why is it, then, that gentle- 
 men speak of Congress as some foreign body — as a set of men 
 who will seek every opportunity to enslave us ? Such institu- 
 tions are repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution. 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 271 
 
 But a worthy gentleman from Middleborough has told us, 
 that though they may be good men when chosen, they may become 
 corrupt. They may so ; nor is it in the power of angels or 
 men to prevent it ; but should this be the case, the Constitution 
 has made provision for such an event. When it happens, we 
 shall know what method to adopt, in order to bring them to 
 punishment. 
 
 In all governments where officers are elective, there ever has 
 been, and there ever will be, a competition of interests. They 
 who are in office wish to keep in, and they who are out, to get 
 in ; the probable consequence of which will be, that they who 
 are already in place, will be attentive to the rights of the peo- 
 ple, because t\\ej know that they are dependent on them for a 
 future election which can be secured by good behavior only. 
 Besides, they who are out of office will watch them who are in 
 with a most critical eye, in order to discover and expose their 
 mal-conduct, if guilty of any, that so they may step into their 
 places. Every gentleman knows the influence that a desire to 
 obtain a place, or the fear of losing it, hath on mankind. Mr. 
 Burgh tells us, that towards the close of the seven years for 
 which the representatives are chosen in the British Parliament, 
 they become exceedingly polite to the people. Why ? Because 
 they know there is an approaching election depending. This 
 competition of interest, therefore, between those persons who 
 are in and those who are out of office, will ever form one 
 important check to the abuse of power in our representatives. 
 
 3d. Every two years there will be a revolution in the gen- 
 eral government in favor of the people. At the expiration of 
 the first two years there will be a new choice of representatives ; 
 at the expiration of the second two years there will be a new 
 choice of president and representatives ; and at the expiration 
 of the third term, making six years from the commencement 
 of the Congress, there will be a new choice of senators and 
 representatives. We all know, Sir, that power thus frequently 
 reverting to the people will prove a security to their liberties, 
 and a most important check to the power of the general 
 government. 
 
 4th. Congress can make no laws that will oppress the people 
 which will not equally involve themselves in the oppression. 
 
272 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 What possible motive then can Congress have to abuse their 
 power ? Can any man suppose that they will be so lost to their 
 own interest as to abuse their power, knowing, at the same 
 time, that they equally involve themselves in the difficulty ? It 
 is a most improbable supposition. This would be like a man's 
 cutting off his nose to spite his face. I place this, Sir, among the 
 securities of the liberties of my fellow-citizens, and rejoice in it. 
 
 5th. Congress guarantee to every State in the Union a 
 republican form of government, and engage to protect them 
 against all foreign and domestic enemies ; that is, as it hath 
 been justly observed by the honorable gentleman (Mr. Adams) 
 near me, of known and tried abilities as a politician, each 
 State shall choose such republican form of government as they 
 please, and Congress solemnly engage themselves to protect it 
 from every kind of violence, whether of faction at home or 
 enemies abroad. This is an admirable security of the people 
 at large, as well as of the several governments of the States ; 
 consequently the general government cannot swallow up the 
 local governments, as some gentlemen have suggested. Their 
 existence is dependent on each other, and must stand or fall 
 together. Should Congress ever attempt the destruction of 
 the particular legislatures, they would be in the same predica- 
 ment with Samson, who overthrew the house in which the 
 Philistines were making sport at his expense ; them he killed 
 indeed, but he buried himself in the ruins. 
 
 6th. Another check in favor of the people is this : That the 
 Constitution provides for the impeachment, trial and punish- 
 ment of every officer in Congress who shall be guilty of mal- 
 conduct. With such a prospect, who will dare to abuse the 
 powers vested in him by the people ? 
 
 7th. Having thus considered several of the checks to the 
 powers of Congress, which are interwoven with the Constitu- 
 tion, we will now suppose the worst that can take place in con- 
 sequence of its adoption : I mean that it shall be found in 
 some of its parts oppressive to the people ; still we have this 
 dernier resort — it may be amended. It is not like the laws of 
 the Modes and Persians, immutable. The fifth article provides 
 for amendments. 
 
 It has been said, it will be difficult after its ratification to 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 273 
 
 procure any alterations. By no means, Sir ; for this weighty 
 reason : it is a general government, and as such, will have a 
 general influence ; all the States in the Union will feel the 
 difficulty ; and, feeling it, will readily concur in adopting the 
 method provided by the Constitution. And having once made 
 the trial, experience will teach us what amendments are neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Viewing the Constitution in this light, I stand ready to give 
 my vote for it without any amendments at all. Yet, if the 
 amendments proposed by your Excellency will tend to concili- 
 ation, I readily admit them, not as a condition of acceptance, 
 but as a matter of recommendation only; knowing that, 
 " Blessed are the peace makers." I am ready, Sir, to submit 
 my life, my liberty, my family, my property, and, as far as my 
 vote will go, the interest of my constituents, to the general 
 government. 
 
 After all, if this Constitution was as perfect as the sacred 
 volume is, it would not secure the liberties of the people unless 
 they watch their own liberties. Nothing written on paper will 
 do this. It is therefore necessary that the people should keep 
 a watchful, not an over jealous, eye on their rulers ; and that 
 they should give all due encouragement to our colleges, schools 
 of learning, &c, that so knowledge may be diffused through 
 every part of our country. Ignorance and slavery, knowledge 
 and freedom, are inseparably connected. While Americans 
 remain in their present enlightened condition and warmly 
 attached to the cause of liberty, they cannot be enslaved. 
 Should the general government become so lost to all sense of 
 honor and the freedom of the people, as to attempt to enslave 
 them, they who are the descendants of a race of men who have 
 dethroned kings, would make an American Congress tremble, 
 strip them of their public honors and reduce them to the low- 
 est state of degradation. 
 
 AFTERNOON. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Turner. Mr. President : Being advanced in life, 
 and having endeavored, I hope, with a faithful attention, 
 according to my ability, to assist my country in her trying 
 
 36 
 
274 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 difficulties and dangers, for more than twenty years ; and as 
 for three weeks past my state of health has been such as to 
 render me unable to speak in this assembly, I trust I shall be 
 heard with some indulgence while I express a few sentiments 
 at this solemn crisis. I have been averse to the reception of this 
 Constitution while it was considered merely in its original form ; 
 but since the honorable Convention have been pleased to agree 
 to the recommendation of certain amendments, I acknowledge 
 my mind is reconciled. But even thus amended, I still see, or 
 think I see, several imperfections in it, and some which give 
 me pain. Indeed, I never expect to see a Constitution free 
 from imperfections ; and, considering the great diversity of 
 local interests, views and habits — considering the unparalleled 
 variety of sentiments among the citizens of the United States — 
 I despair of obtaining a more perfect Constitution than this, at 
 present. And a Constitution preferable to the Confederation 
 must be obtained, and obtained soon, or we shall be an undone 
 people. In my judgment there is a rational probability, a moral 
 certainty, that the proposed amendments will meet the appro- 
 bation of the several States in the Union. If there is any 
 respect due to the hoary head of Massachusetts, it will undoubt- 
 edly have its proper influence in this case. The minds of gen- 
 tlemen, throughout the nation, must be impressed with such a 
 sense of necessity of all important union, especially in our 
 present circumstances, as must strongly operate in favor of a 
 concurrence. The proposed amendments are of such a liberal, 
 such a generous, such a catholic nature and complexion, they 
 are so congenial to the soul of every man who is possessed of a 
 patriotic regard to the preservation of the just rights and 
 immunities of his country, as well as to the institution of a good 
 and necessary government, that I think they must, they will be 
 universally accepted. When, in connection with this confidence, 
 I consider the deplorable state of our navigation and com- 
 merce, and various branches of business thereon dependent, 
 the inglorious and provoking figure we make in the eyes of our 
 European creditors, the degree in which the landed interest is 
 burdened and depreciated, the tendency of depreciating paper 
 and tender acts to destroy mutual confidence, faith and credit, 
 to prevent the circulation of specie, and to overspread the 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 275 
 
 land with an inundation, a chaos of multiform injustice, 
 oppression and knavery ; when I consider that want of efficiency 
 there is in our government, as to obliging people seasonably to 
 pay their dues to the public, instead of spending their money 
 in support of luxury and extravagance, of consequence the 
 inability of government to satisfy the just demands of its 
 creditors, and to do it in season, so as to prevent their suffer- 
 ing amazingly by depreciation ; in connection with my anxious 
 desires that my ears may be no longer perstringed, nor my heart 
 pained with the cries of the injured, suffering widow and orphan ; 
 when I also consider that state of our finances which daily 
 exposes us to become a prey to the despotic humor even of an 
 impotent invader, I find my myself constrained to say, before 
 this Assembly, and before God, that I think it my duty to give 
 my vote in favor of this Constitution, with the proposed amend- 
 ments f and unless some further light shall be thrown in my 
 way to influence my opinion, I shall conduct accordingly. I 
 know not whether this Convention will vote a ratification of 
 this Constitution or not. If they should do it, and have the 
 concurrence of the other States, may that God, who has always 
 in a remarkable manner watched over us and our fathers for 
 good, in all difficulties, dangers and distresses, be pleased to 
 command his almighty blessing upon it, and make it instru- 
 mental of restoring justice, honor, safety, support and salva- 
 tion to a sinking land. But I hope it will be considered by 
 persons of all orders, rank and ages, that without the preva- 
 
 30 [We find the following interesting incident connected with the speech of 
 Mr. Turner, in the Centinel of March 8, 1788 :— 
 
 " On the day of the final decision on the question of ratifying the Federal 
 Constitution, by our Convention, when the Hon. Mr. Turner rose to make 
 some observations on the subject, Dr. S., a delegate from a neighboring town, 
 who voted in the minority, and who expected the honorable gentleman would 
 do so too, whispered to a worthy member in the pew with him, ' Now, Sir, you 
 will hear the truth.' When the honorable gentleman began to mention the 
 dangers of rejecting the Constitution, the Doctor began to stare, but at the 
 close of his speech, when he expressed his determination of voting in favor of 
 it, the Doctor, rolling up his eyes and raising his hands, ejaculated, • Help, 
 Lord, for the righteous man faileth — the faithful fail from among the children 
 of men.' "] 
 
276 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 lence of Christian piety and morals, the best republican Con- 
 stitution can never save us fr'om slavery and ruin. If vice is 
 predominant, it is to be feared we shall have rulers whose grand 
 object will be (slily evading the spirit of the Constitution) to 
 enrich and aggrandize themselves and their connections, to the 
 injury and oppression of the laborious part of the community ; 
 while it follows, from the moral constitution of the Deity, that 
 prevalent iniquity must be the ruin of any people. The world 
 of mankind have always, in general, been enslaved and miser- 
 able, and always will be, until there is a greater prevalence of 
 Christian moral principles ; nor have I an expectation of this, 
 in any great degree, unless some superior mode of education 
 shall be adopted. It is education which almost entirely forms 
 the character, the freedom or slavery, the happiness or misery, 
 of the world. And if this Constitution shall be adopted, I 
 hope the Continental Legislature will have the singular honor, 
 the indelible glory, of making it one of their first acts, in their 
 first session, most earnestly to recommend to the several States 
 in the Union, the institution of such means of education, as 
 shall be adequate to the divine, patriotic purpose of training up 
 the children and youth at large, in that solid learning, and in 
 those pious and moral principles, which are the support, the 
 life and soul of republican government and liberty, of which a 
 free Constitution is the body ; for as the body without the 
 spirit is dead, so a free form of government without the ani- 
 mating principles of piety and virtue, is dead also, being alone. 
 May religion, with sanctity of morals, prevail and increase, that 
 the patriotic civilian and ruler may have the sublime, parental 
 satisfaction of eagerly embracing every opportunity of mitigat- 
 ing the rigors of government in proportion to that increase of 
 morality which may render the people more capable of being a 
 law to themselves. How much more blessed this, than to be 
 employed in fabricating Constitutions of a higher tone, in obe- 
 dience to necessity, arising from an increase of turbulent vice 
 and injustice in society ! I believe your Excellency's patience 
 will not be further exercised by hearing the sound of my voice 
 on the occasion, when I have said : May the United States of 
 America live before God! May they be enlightened, pious, 
 virtuous, free and happy, to all generations ! 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 277 
 
 Capt. Southworth spoke a short time against the adoption 
 of the Constitution, but the worthy gentleman, from indisposi- 
 tion of body, not being able to complete his speech, we cannot 
 give it to the public. 
 
 Mr. Symmes. Mr. President: I hope, Sir, the Convention 
 will indulge me with a few words, and I promise them I will 
 not detain them long. It may be known to your Excellency, 
 that I have heretofore had the honor to address the Convention 
 in opposition to a certain paragraph in the Constitution. That 
 fact is the sole occasion of my craving a turn to be heard again. 
 
 Sir, it never was my opinion that we ought entirely to aban- 
 don this Constitution. I thought it had great defects, and I 
 still think it by no means free from blemishes ; but I ever 
 expected the worst consequences to follow a total rejection of it. 
 I always intended to urge amendments, and was in hopes that 
 the wisdom of this assembly would devise a method to secure 
 their adoption. Therefore, when your Excellency came forward, 
 as well became your high office, in the character of a mediator, a 
 ray of hope shone in upon the gloom that overspread my heart — 
 of hope, that we should still be united in the grand decision ! 
 
 Sir, a mortal hatred, a deadly opposition, can be deserved by 
 no government but the tyranny of hell, and perhaps a few sim- 
 ilar forms on earth. A government of that complexion, in the 
 present enlightened age, could never enter the heart of man ; 
 and if it could, and impudence enough were found to propose 
 it — nay, if it should be accepted — I affirm, Sir, that in America 
 it would never operate a moment. I should glory in debating 
 on my grounds for this assertion ; but who will dare to question 
 the truth of it ? 
 
 Mr. President: So ample have been the arguments drawn 
 from our national distress, the weakness of the present Confed- 
 eration, the danger of instant disunion, and perhaps some other 
 topics not included in these, that a man must be obstinate 
 indeed to say at this period, that a new government is needless. 
 One is proposed. Shall we reject it totally, or shall we amend 
 it? Let any man recollect or peruse the debates in this 
 assembly, and I venture to say, he shall not be a moment, if he 
 loves his country, in making his election. He would contem- 
 plate the idea of rejection with horror and detestation. But, 
 
278 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Sir, it has been alleged that the necessary amendments cannot 
 be obtained in the way your Excellency has proposed. This 
 matter has been largely debated. I beg a moment to consider 
 it. Our Committee, Sir, were pretty well agreed on the 
 amendments necessary to be made, and in their report it appears 
 that these amendments are equally beneficial to all the citizens 
 of America. There is nothing local in them. Shall we then 
 totally reject the Constitution, because we are only morally 
 certain that they will be adopted ? Shall we choose certain 
 misery in one way, when we have the best human prospect of 
 enjoying our most sanguine wishes in another ? God forbid ! 
 
 But, Sir, a great deal has been said about the amendments. 
 Here again I refer to the debates. Such has been said to have 
 been the past prevalence of the northern States, in Congress, 
 the sameness of interest in a majority of the States, and their 
 necessary adhesion to each other, that I think there can be no 
 reasonable doubt of the success of any amendments proposed 
 by Massachusetts. Sir, we have, we do, and we shall, in a great 
 measure, give birth to all events, and hold the balance, among 
 the United States. 
 
 The honorable gentleman, my respected friend from Scituate, 
 has so fully entered into the expediency of ratifying the Con- 
 stitution upon the basis of the report, and so ably stated the 
 unanswerable reasons he finds for giving his sanction to it, not- 
 withstanding his former different opinion, that I may decently 
 waive a task I could not half so well perform. 
 
 Upon the whole, Mr. President, approving the amendments, 
 and firmly believing that they will be adopted, I recall my 
 former opposition, such as it was, to this Constitution, and 
 shall, especially as the amendments are to be a standing 
 instruction to our delegates until they are obtained, give it my 
 unreserved assent. 
 
 In so doing, I stand acquitted to my own conscience, I hope 
 and trust I shall to my constituents, and (laying his hand on 
 his breast) I know I shall before my God. 
 
 The time agreed upon for taking the question being arrived, 
 and the same being called for from every quarter, 
 
 His Excellency the President rose, and addressed the honor- 
 able Convention as follows : — 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 279 
 
 Gentlemen — Being now called upon to bring the subject 
 under debate to a decision, by bringing forward the question, I 
 beg your indulgence to close the business with a few words. I 
 am happy that my health has been so far restored, that I am 
 rendered able to meet my fellow-citizens as represented in this 
 Convention. I should have considered it as one of the most 
 distressing misfortunes of my life, to be deprived of giving my 
 aid and support to a system, which, if amended (as I feel 
 assured it will be) according to your proposals, cannot fail to 
 give the people of the United States a greater degree of political 
 freedom, and eventually as much national dignity, as falls to 
 the lot of any nation on the earth. I have not, since I had the 
 honor to be in this place, said much on the important subject 
 before us ; all the ideas appertaining to the system, as well those 
 which are against as for it, have been debated upon with so 
 much learning and ability, that the subject is quite exhausted. 
 
 But you will permit me, gentlemen, to close the whole with 
 one or two general observations. This I request, not expecting 
 to throw any new light upon the subject, but because it may 
 possibly prevent uneasiness and discordance from taking place 
 amongst us and amongst our constituents. 
 
 That a general system of government is indispensably neces- 
 sary to save our country from ruin, is agreed upon all sides. 
 That the one now to be decided upon has its defects, all agree ; 
 but when we consider the variety of interests, and the different 
 habits of the men it is intended for, it would be very singular 
 to have an entire union of sentiment respecting it. Were the 
 people of the United States to delegate the powers proposed to 
 be given, to men who were not dependent on them frequently 
 for elections — to men whose interests, either from rank or title, 
 would differ from that of their fellow-citizens in common — the 
 task of delegating authority would be vastly more difficult ; 
 but as the matter now stands, the powers reserved by the people 
 render them secure, and until they themselves become corrupt, 
 they will always have upright and able rulers. I give my assent 
 to the Constitution, in full confidence that the amendments 
 proposed will soon become a part of the system. These amend- 
 ments being in no wise local, but calculated to give security and 
 ease alike to all the^States, I think that all will agree to them. 
 
280 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Suffer me to add, that let the question be decided as it may, 
 there can be no triumph on the one side, or chagrin on the 
 other. Should there be a great division, every good man, every 
 one who loves his country, will be so far from exhibiting extra- 
 ordinary marks of joy, that he will sincerely lament the want 
 of unanimity, and strenuously endeavor to cultivate a spirit of 
 conciliation, both in Convention, and at home. The people of 
 this Commonwealth are a people of great light, of great intelli- 
 gence in public business. They know that we have none of us 
 an interest separate from theirs ; that it must be our happiness 
 to conduce to theirs ; and that we must all rise or fall together. 
 They will never, therefore, forsake the first principle of society, 
 that of being governed by the voice of the majority ; and should 
 it be that the proposed form of government should be rejected, 
 they will zealously attempt another. Should it, by the vote now 
 to be taken, be ratified, they will quietly acquiesce, and where 
 they see a want of perfection in it, endeavor in a constitutional 
 way to have it amended. 
 
 The question now before you is such as no nation on earth, 
 without the limits of America, has ever had the privilege of 
 deciding upon. As the Supreme Ruler of the Universe has 
 seen fit to bestow upon us this glorious opportunity, let us 
 decide upon it, appealing to him for the rectitude of our inten- 
 tions, and in humble confidence that he will yet continue to 
 bless and save our country. 
 
 [The question being put, it was decided in the affirmative — 
 yeas 187, nays 168.] a 
 
 On the motion for ratifying being declared in the affirmative, 
 by a majority of nineteen, 
 
 The Hon. Mr. White rose and said, that notwithstanding he 
 had opposed the adoption of the Constitution, upon the idea 
 that it would endanger the liberties of his country, yet as a 
 majority had seen fit to adopt it, he should use his utmost 
 exertions to induce his constituents to live in peace under, and 
 cheerfully submit to it. 
 
 He was followed by Mr. Wedgery, who said that he should 
 return to his constituents, and inform them that he had opposed 
 
 21 [See Journal, pages 83 to 92.] 
 
1788.] DEBATES OF CONVENTION. 281 
 
 the adoption of this Constitution, but that he had been over- 
 ruled, and that it had been carried by a majority of wise and 
 understanding men ; that he should endeavor to sow the seeds 
 of union and peace among the people he represented ; and that 
 he hoped and believed that no person would wish for, or sug- 
 gest, the measure of a protest ; for, said he, we must consider 
 that this body is as full a representation of the people as can be 
 convened. After expressing his thanks for the civility which 
 the inhabitants of this town have shown to the Convention, and 
 declaring, as his opinion, that they had not in the least influ- 
 enced the decision, he concluded by saying, that he should 
 support, as much as in him lay, the Constitution, and that he 
 believed, as this State had adopted it, that not only nine, but 
 the whole thirteen, would come into the measure. 
 
 Gen. Whitney said, that though he had been opposed to the 
 Constitution, he should support it as much as if he had voted 
 for it. 
 
 Mr. Cooley (of Amherst) said, that he endeavored to govern 
 himself by the principles of reason ; that he was directed to vote 
 against the adoption of the Constitution, and that, in so doing, 
 he had not only complied with his directions, but had acted 
 according to the dictates of his own conscience ; and that, as it 
 had been agreed to by a majority, he should endeavor to 
 convince his constituents of the propriety of its adoption. 
 
 Dr. Taylor also said, he had uniformly opposed the Consti- 
 tution ; that he found himself fairly beaten ; and expressed his 
 determination to go home and endeavor to infuse a spirit of 
 harmony and love among the people. 
 
 Other gentlemen expressed their inclination to speak, but it 
 growing late, the Convention adjourned to the next morning, 
 ten o'clock. 
 
 Thursday, February 7, 1788. 
 
 The Convention met, when Major Nasson, in a short address, 
 intimated his determination to support the Constitution, and to 
 exert himself to influence his constituents to do the same. 
 
 36 
 
282 DEBATES OF CONVENTION. [1788. 
 
 Mr. Randal said, he had been uniformly opposed to the Con- 
 stitution. He had, he said, fought like a good soldier ; but, as 
 he was beat, he should sit down contented, hoping the minority 
 may be disappointed in their fears, and that the majority may 
 reap the full fruition of the blessings they anticipate. In the 
 hope that the amendments recommended by his Excellency the 
 President will take place, I shall, says he, go home and endeavor 
 to satisfy those that have honored me by their choice, so that 
 we may all live in peace. 
 
 Major Sawin declared, that the Constitution had had a fair 
 trial, and that there had not, to his knowledge, been any undue 
 influence exercised to obtain the vote in its favor ; that many 
 doubts which lay in his mind had been removed ; and that, 
 although he was in the minority, he should support the Consti- 
 tution as cheerfully and as heartily as though he had voted on 
 the other side of the question. 
 
 The Convention then passed the pay roll — amounting to 
 X4,499 2s. — and, after unanimously passing votes of thanks to 
 his Excellency the President, the honorable the Vice-President, 
 and the reverend clergymen of the town of Boston, who officia- 
 ted as Chaplains, for their services, it was 
 
 Voted, That when the business of the Convention shall be 
 completed, the members will proceed to the State House to 
 proclaim the ratification, and to take an affectionate leave of 
 each other. 
 
 An invitation from a number of the inhabitants of Boston, 
 requesting the members of the Convention to take refreshment 
 at the Senate Chamber, when the ratification of the Constitu- 
 tion should be declared, was read, and thereon 
 
 Voted, That the thanks of the Convention be given to the 
 inhabitants of Boston for their polite invitation, and that the 
 Convention will attend as requested. 
 
 The business being finished, the Convention proceeded to the 
 State House, when the ratification was proclaimed by Joseph 
 Henderson, Esq., High-Sheriff of the county of Suffolk, after 
 which the Convention was dissolved. 
 
1788.] MESSAGE OF GOVERNOR HANCOCK. 283 
 
 MESSAGE OF GOVERNOR HANCOCK. 
 
 [Extract from the Speech of Gov. Hancock, to the Senate and House 
 of Representatives, at the opening df the General Court, held, by 
 adjournment, at Boston, February 27, 1788.] 
 
 " In the beginning of your last session I laid before you the 
 Constitution and frame of government for the United States of 
 America, agreed upon by the late general Convention, and trans- 
 mitted to me by Congress. As the system was to be submitted 
 to the people, and to be decided upon by their delegates in Con- 
 vention, I forbore to make any remarks upon it. The Conven- 
 tion which you appointed to deliberate upon that important 
 subject, have concluded their session, after having adopted and 
 ratified the proposed plan, according to their resolution, a copy 
 whereof I have directed the secretary to lay before you. 
 
 The obvious imbecility of the Confederation of the United 
 States, has too long given pain to our friends, and pleasure to 
 our enemies ; but the forming a new system of government, for 
 so numerous a people, of very different views and habits, spread 
 upon such a vast extent of territory, containing such a great 
 variety of soils, and under such extremes of climate, was a task 
 which nothing less than the dreadful apprehension of losing our 
 national existence, could have compelled the people to under- 
 take. 
 
 We can be known to the world only under the appellation of 
 the United States ; if we are robbed of the idea of our union, 
 we immediately become separate nations, independent of each 
 other, and no less liable to the depredations of foreign powers, 
 than to wars and bloody contentions amongst ourselves. To 
 pretend to exist as a nation without possessing those powers of 
 coerce which are necessarily incident to the* national character, 
 would prove a fatal solecism in politics. The objects of the 
 proposed Constitution are, defence against external enemies, and 
 the promotion of tranquillity and happiness amongst the States. 
 Whether it is well calculated for those important purposes, has 
 been the subject of extensive and learned discussion in the Con- 
 vention which you appointed. I believe there was never a body 
 of men assembled, with greater purity of intention, or with 
 
284 MESSAGE OF GOVERNOR HANCOCK. [1788. 
 
 higher zeal for the public interest. And although when the 
 momentous question was decided, there was a greater division 
 than some expected, yet there appeared a candor, and a spirit 
 of conciliation in the minority, which did them great honor, 
 and afforded a happy presage of unanimity amongst the people 
 at large. Though so many of the members of the late Conven- 
 tion could not feel themselves convinced that they ought to vote 
 for the ratification of this system, yet their opposition was con- 
 ducted with a candid and manly firmness, and with such marks 
 of integrity and real regard to the public interest, as did them 
 the highest honor, and leaves no reason to suppose that the 
 peace and good order of the government is not their object. 
 
 The amendments proposed by the Convention are intended to 
 obtain a constitutional security of the principles to which they 
 refer themselves, and must meet the wishes of all the States. 
 I feel myself assured that they will very early become a part of 
 the Constitution, and when they shall be added to the proposed 
 plan, I shall consider it the most perfect system of government, 
 as to the objects it embraces, that has been known amongst 
 mankind. 
 
 Gentlemen : 
 
 As that Being in whose hands is the government of all the 
 nations of the earth, and who putteth down one, and raiseth up 
 another, according to His sovereign pleasure, has given to the 
 people of these States a rich and an extensive country ; has in a 
 marvellous manner given them a name and a standing among 
 the nations of the world, has blessed them with external peace 
 and internal tranquillity ; I hope and pray that the gratitude of 
 their hearts may be expressed by a proper use of those inesti- 
 mable blessings, by the greatest exertions of patriotism, by 
 forming and supporting institutions for cultivating the human 
 understanding, and for the greatest progress of the arts and 
 sciences, by establishing laws for the support of piety, religion 
 and morality, as well as for punishing vice and wickedness, and 
 by exhibiting on the great theatre of the world, those social, 
 public and private virtues, which give more dignity to a people 
 possessing their own sovereignty, than crowns and diadems 
 afford to sovereign princes." 
 
MINUTES 
 
 CHIEF JUSTICE PARSONS, 
 
 OF THE 
 
 DEBATES IN CONVENTION. 
 
MINUTES. 
 
 January 15, 1788. 
 
 The paragraph in debate was the biennial election of the 
 representatives. 
 
 Caleb Strong. Stated the grounds proceeded on in Federal 
 Convention ; determined at first to be triennial ; afterwards 
 reduced to biennial ; South Carolina having at home biennial 
 elections, and it was a compromise. 
 
 Fisher Ames. People cannot, without a representation, 
 exercise any powers but pulling down a government. Man has 
 no natural liberty in a state of nature, because he has no secu- 
 rity for it. Too long or too short a time for elections is dan- 
 gerous and inconvenient. The time must be regulated by the 
 nature of the business the representatives have to do. 1. The 
 extensive dominion to be governed. 2. The object of legisla- 
 tion. 3. The security of the liberties of the people. 
 
 Gilbert Dench. Immaterial whether biennial or annual. 
 My difficulty is, whether biennial elections are secured to the 
 people in the fourth section. He was called to order, for 
 reasoning on that section, by Mr. Dana. After debate, Mr. 
 Dench stated, he was satisfied he was out of order. 
 
 Gov. Bowdoin. Thought that Dench was in order. He was 
 called to order by Mr. Parsons, when, after some debate, the 
 following question was put : — 
 
 To reconsider the order of debate passed yesterday, so far as 
 to amend it by allowing any member to refer to any other par- 
 agraph which in his opinion relates to the paragraph under 
 debate, and it passed in the affirmative. 
 
 Then Gov. Bowdoin arose. There was no reason for annual 
 elections arising from the course of the sun, for the time of 
 election would then be varied in every planet. He then argued 
 in favor of a biennial election. 1. There was no danger, as 
 
288 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 they cannot alter the Constitution. 2. They can lay no burdens 
 but such as they bear their part of. 3. A shorter election would 
 not give sufficient time for information. 
 
 Gen. Heath showed the importance of the subject from the 
 extent of country. Opinions of the best writers show that short 
 s elections are necessary. Montesquieu says more than a year 
 would be dangerous. In this country we have always had 
 annual elections ; that length of time is necessary to acquaint 
 themselves with their business is a novel observation, for being 
 a representative of the people implies a knowledge of their 
 circumstances. While sitting in Congress how can they learn 
 the situation of other States ? Members of British Parliament 
 return home for the knowledge of the situation of their con- 
 stituents. He was, however, in favor of biennial elections, as 
 there will be but one session in a year, and all the business not 
 being then done will be left, if the same body cannot meet again. 
 
 Charles Turner, Esq. Is for a year, because it is the most 
 proper length of time. If we allow two years, then by some 
 means or other there will be a stretch as long as the new star's 
 revolution. 
 
 Mr. Dawes. Montesquieu's opinion applies only to single 
 governments, not to a confederated one. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Medford. Montesquieu gives the greatest 
 plaudits to the British government, where elections were never 
 annual. In answer to the objection that biennial elections are 
 novel : But our situation is new — which he states — rising from 
 dependent colonies to independent States. Then reasons from 
 the state of parliaments in Europe. 
 
 Gen. Sam. Thompson. Argues for frequent reelections, 
 because if the administration had not been changed last year, 
 we should now be in blood. He was called to order by Dr. 
 Jarvis. After debate, it was moved that he proceed. Then 
 Dr. Spring presented a letter to the Convention from Mr. Gerry. 
 After some debate, a motion was made to adjourn, which 
 passed in the affirmative. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 Gen. Thompson. Was in favor of annual elections, for the 
 end of government is to please the people, who can please them- 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. 289 
 
 selves by annual elections, and the people are quieted by a new 
 election, the last year. It is said the elected will want time to 
 learn, but he hopes the people will not send men who are 
 unlearned ; it is the duty of a representative to know the inter- 
 ests of his own constituents, and then to determine, by compar- 
 ing their situation with the state of the nation. Also, he objects 
 that the representatives pay themselves ; compares it to the 
 king's government and the judges being paid by the king ; here 
 they pay themselves. 
 
 Mr. Gore. We must be careful in taking the opinion of 
 writers on the subject of government. Opinions deduced from 
 the state of ancient governments do not apply. They did not 
 check their governments by having different branches, with 
 negatives. He then observes on the nature of British parlia- 
 ments, and applies his observations in favor of biennial elections ; 
 was in favor of frequent elections, but the true rule is to give 
 them time to inform themselves, and not too much time to 
 feel independent of the electors. 
 
 Mr. King. The rule is, that the elected should have tinie 
 enough to inform themselves, and not so much time as will 
 make them independent of the electors. He states the rise of 
 parliaments upon the feudal system. Elections longer than 
 annual have been thought of by Massachusetts ; instanced in 
 the confederation of the united New England colony. Remarks 
 on Heath's notion, that any man chosen a representative has 
 knowledge enough. Thought there was no danger of loss of 
 liberty from biennial elections. 
 
 Hon. Charles Turner charges King with ridiculing him 
 about the planets, and resents it. 
 
 Mr. King explains himself. He did not mean to ridicule any 
 argument, and had a profound opinion for the gentleman. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. From annual elections, States, in Congress, 
 have frequently been deprived of their votes for want of the 
 delegates receiving their commissions. 
 
 Hon. Abram White says, our delegates being chosen in June, 
 there is time enough. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. He applies to the southern States. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Gorham says, Congress is not represented at present 
 for the same reason ; observes, as Congress will have but one 
 
 37 
 
290 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 session a year, and our General Court have two, biennial 
 elections for Congress will not be longer than annual elections 
 for this State. 
 
 Mr. Nasson. If members will not engage in business for fear 
 of not finishing, then no man would undertake any business lest 
 he should die and leave it unfinished to his executors or 
 administrators. 
 
 Mr. Gorham, in reply, referred to the situation of our Gen- 
 eral Court the last session, when the whole session was employed 
 in collecting and arranging materials for the next session. 
 
 Mr. Carnes reads part of a letter from Mr. Otis, that Con- 
 gress was now not sitting, as only five States were represented. 
 
 Hon. Job Sprague. The advantages of biennial elections 
 have been sufficiently demonstrated. If any still object, it is 
 incumbent on them to prove the inconveniences. 
 
 Hon. Jno. Taylor. If one session in a year is not sufficient 
 to originate and complete the business, then let them have two 
 sessions, or sit all the year, if necessary. 
 
 Capt. Southworth, from Stoughton. He thought the advan- 
 tages of a biennial election had been sufficiently stated ; his 
 difficulty was, whether the fourth section did not render the 
 right of biennial elections insecure. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow. 
 
 January 16, 1788, A. M. 
 
 Voted to pass to the next paragraph. 
 
 Moved to reconsider the vote, and debate thereon, but it did 
 not prevail. The next paragraph was read, viz. : " No person 
 shall be a representative. &c, in which he shall be chosen." 
 
 Mr. Dench observed that he wished to add something on the 
 paragraph last debated, and asked leave, and it was granted. 
 His difficulty was, that no provision was made to qualify the 
 election but by the intervention of the State legislatures, and 
 still under the control of the Congress, and so the rights of 
 election are insecure. 
 
 Mr. Gorham cannot see how Mr. Dench's objection applies to 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. 291 
 
 biennial elections, for if biennial elections are insecure, so would 
 annual elections, or elections for any shorter time, be. 
 
 That the practice of the several States, in conducting elec- 
 tions, is various, and the legislature of each State will devise 
 the best possible way for itself. 
 
 That the age of twenty-five was necessary, that the man 
 might be old enough to understand public business, and a citi- 
 zenship of seven years is necessary to give his electors evidence 
 of his knowledge and attachment to their interests. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White. Though the legislature may devise and 
 ordain the manner of election, and Congress can and will con- 
 trol it, and so we shall be slaves to the southern States. 
 
 Mr. Gorham said, he did not mean to consider the effect of 
 the revising power of Congress ; it was time enough to consider 
 that when we come to it. 
 
 Mr. Pierce, of Partridgefield, said he had no objection to the 
 qualifications in the article under debate, but he wanted to be 
 satisfied why there was no qualification in point of property. 
 
 Mr. King said it was necessary to show the certainty of the 
 people's exercising the right of election. It is clearly certain 
 and positive in the paragraph last under debate, and the ques- 
 tion is, whether it is rendered insecure by the fourth section. 
 
 Now, that does not render it insecure ; for 1. Time of elec- 
 tion does not mean the term for which the representatives are 
 chosen ; 2. Nor the place where elections are held ; nor 3. The 
 manner of holding elections. Therefore the controlling power 
 of Congress does not extend to altering biennial elections. The 
 legislatures of the several States shall prescribe in these cases ; 
 it is their duty. But the difficulty is, why should Congress 
 have those powers ? For the same reasons that the General Court 
 have power to compel every town to send representatives ; other- 
 wise the electors may be negligent, and the liberties of the 
 people may be utterly destroyed, without the vigilance and 
 coercion of government. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. My difficulty is, Congress may make such regu- 
 lations as to deprive the people of the right of electing. I make 
 no difficulty as to the time, but as to the place ; Congress may fix 
 the place in Berkshire or Lincoln, where the people cannot 
 attend. 
 
292 JUDGE PARSONS^ MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick. We are to consider in what terms the 
 clauses are expressed. The first clause is in the affirmative and 
 positive, and the second clause extends only to the when, where 
 and how, and not to the term of election. Dr. Taylor's objec- 
 tion supposes the power will be used to the worst possible pur- 
 poses ; if we are to suppose that, we had better dissolve all 
 governments, and live as the savages. But in forming a gov- 
 ernment, we must grant the necessary powers, and not contem- 
 plate only the possible abuse of power ; otherwise there is the 
 same objection to our own government — they may call every 
 man into the field, take away all our money, erect courts in 
 every street, give judges .£10,000 a year, unite all the counties 
 into one, and make Penobscot a shire town. But to suppose 
 this, is to suppose the legislature devils, or worse. A sufficient 
 check against the wanton abuse of power is the spirit of the 
 people, as in the encroachments of Great Britain ; but where there 
 is a common interest we are not to presume an abuse of power. 
 
 But this controlling power is necessary to preserve the gen- 
 eral government. Those who wish this power alone existed in 
 the several legislatures, are influenced because it would be safe 
 from the common interest. The same reason applies to the 
 general legislature. Attend to the conduct of Rhode Island 
 last winter ; without any reason, they recalled their delegate 
 and refused to send any. The same may happen under the 
 general government. 
 
 If it should be said that the place may be fixed in Boston, 
 that the mercantile interest may choose their representatives ; 
 but if that was the case the country party within twelve miles 
 could come in and out-vote it. 
 
 Dr. Taylor rises, and asks whether he remembered the time 
 when a corrupt administration kept the General Court moving, 
 to inflame the members. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick replies: Yes; and that the effect was a greater 
 firmness in opposition to the administration. 
 
 Gov. Bowdoin observes that there is a positive injunction 
 upon the several legislatures to determine the time, place and 
 manner, and it is fit ; otherwise, as in the case of Rhode Island, 
 the Union may be dissolved. The controlling power in Congress 
 is necessary, from the different manner in which the elections 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSjONS's MINUTES. 293 
 
 are made in the different States, and to prevent partiality and 
 indirect and improper conduct in the several States. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. We have now got forward to the fourth 
 paragraph, and we had as good thump it about and see what is 
 in it. I do not know the hearts of men, but I believe men are 
 as wicked now as ever. I should make no difficulty to give 
 Congress this power, in case a State should refuse ; but now 
 Congress may order us to go to South Carolina, to choose where 
 they choose, over head and heels ; in which case we shall not 
 be safe. But as I shall have a further opportunity to thump 
 it, I will now sit down. N. B. He observed that there was no 
 danger from the legislature, but great danger from Congress. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Adams. We have gone from the point in debate. 
 We are now on the fourth section, which is a very different 
 subject, and spoke to order. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick spoke to order, and exculpated himself. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Mr. Pierce, of Partridgefield. He objects, 1. That Congress 
 may declare that he that has the most votes shall be chosen, not 
 he who has a majority of votes. 2. That Congress may order 
 Boston to be the place of election, and by that means may 
 influence elections. Congress may do so, and may have sufficient 
 motives so to do. 3. A bankrupt may be chosen. 
 
 Col. Porter. If a State should require a majority of the 
 votes in the State it ought to be altered, and there is no reason 
 to presume a majority of the people would choose a bankrupt. 
 
 Mr. Bishop. He should have no objection to the controlling 
 power of Congress in case the States refuse to make the necessary 
 regulations — but to give Congress this controlling power when 
 a State does not refuse, is to give up the liberties of the people. 
 
 Gov. Bowdoin. As to Rhode Island, he has not the records 
 of Rhode Island, but has always so understood it, and the 
 printed accounts of their journals, as published in the newspa- 
 pers, confirm it. 
 
 Mr. King affirms that the State of Rhode Island did recall 
 their delegates, as appears by the journals of Congress. 
 
 Mr. Bishop does not believe it. 
 
294 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788, 
 
 Mr. Gorham affirms as Mr. King did. 
 
 Mr. Bishop says he has been informed to the contrary. 
 
 Col. Porter. If Mr. Bishop will not believe it, it is- 
 
 Mr. Bishop now believes it, and repeats his former objections 
 to the Constitution. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Strong. It is clear that the Federal Constitution 
 could not provide a general regulation for elections, as the 
 practice of different States will be different. There were, then, 
 but two ways of obtaining this regulation — either by Congress, 
 or the State legislatures. But it will not be safe to trust it 
 wholly with the States ; the people will be remiss in exercising 
 their privileges, and a disunion may be the consequence. 
 
 Mr. Bishop admits that Congress may have this power in case 
 the States do not make proper regulations ; if this was the case, 
 still Congress must judge of the regulations, which comes to 
 the same tiling. 
 
 Mr. Bishop says his objection is against the unlimited power 
 to which he can see no end. 
 
 Mr. Cabot, of Beverly. As to the propriety of biennial elec- 
 tions he would add one thing — the necessity of continuing long 
 enough to form a system. But as to the fourth section. The 
 representative branch is the popular branch, they are designed 
 to balance and check the Federal Senate. 
 
 Mr. Adams, of Ashley. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. 
 
 Mr. Dalton. 
 
 Mr. Jones. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. 22 
 
 January 17, 1T88, A. M. 
 
 , a. i wu, 
 
 Hon. Mr. Turner objects to the fourth section. He has no 
 objection to a coercive power in Congress to make the people 
 attend to their privileges, but he does not see any such power 
 vested in Congress : by this section, Congress may fix on so 
 
 22 [These gentlemen appear from the Minutes to have taken part in the 
 debate ; but their names only were recorded.] 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 295 
 
 inconvenient a place as to influence the situation in favor of 
 creatures of Congress, and no reason can be given why the 
 place of election should be altered by Congress but for that 
 purpose, and that it be to influence the election in favor of the 
 members then in Congress, or their friends ; and therefore he 
 considers it as a system to perpetuate the members of Congress 
 in their places ; for the power can never be exercised unexcep- 
 tionably in any case whatever ; and he thinks a rotation neces- 
 sary in the lower house to guard against the deep arts of popular 
 men ; has well grounded fears that some of the rulers would 
 be bad men — we must therefore guard against them ; that paper 
 money and privateering has introduced corruption and immoral- 
 ity, and a disregard to private and public justice. In conse- 
 quence of that corruption, it requires a more energetic Federal 
 government ; but the rulers will be taken out of this corrupt 
 mass. Like prince, like people, and promotion will increase the 
 corruption. Every possible guard must be devised, therefore, 
 against rulers ; therefore, Congress must not have the power in 
 the fourth section, because they cannot use it without abusing 
 it. Let us not act like the people .of England at the Restora- 
 tion, who, from their sufferings under anarchy, run mad with 
 loyalty. He has a strong sense of the difficulties of this coun- 
 try, arising from the want of an energetic Federal government, 
 but is not disposed, for that cause, to adopt any government 
 without examination. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sumner. Our situation is very alarming. If this 
 Constitution should be rejected from trivial or ill founded 
 objections. The objection to the fourth section is of this kind. 
 The delegation of the powers in this section is not dangerous to 
 the people ; it is possible it may be abused, but it is exceedingly 
 improbable. It may be necessary that Congress may regulate 
 the time, for public convenience, and the manner, for uni- 
 formity. As to the place, if the Congress should enact an 
 inconvenient place, it must be but temporary, for the people 
 will certainly choose members to redress any grievance they 
 feel. But cases may arise when Congress ought to have this 
 power, as when by foreign force half a State may be possessed 
 by an enemy, as in South Carolina. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery is willing that the general government should 
 
296 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 have power to support itself, but shall they have a general 
 power ? The discretionary power is more safely trusted in the 
 State legislature than in Congress. Mr. King said the same 
 discretionary power is trusted in by the government over 
 towns. It is not true ; they can only fine. Dr. Jarvis has 
 raised an argument because every thirty thousand shall have a 
 member. It is not true. This power in the fourth section is 
 therefore unlimited, and to trust this power in Congress is more 
 dangerous than to trust the State ; is contented with this power 
 in Congress, when States refuse or neglect, but no further. 
 
 Rev. Mr. West. To argue against the grant of powers 
 because they may be abused, is an argument against all govern- 
 ments — against our own ; and an argument which proves too 
 much, proves nothing. Those who object ought to show that 
 it is probable Congress will abuse the power. It has been said 
 that Congress may appoint a place out of the State, but the 
 words of the article are against it, for the place is to be appoint- 
 ed in this place. It is not presumable Congress would appoint 
 an improper place. Also sorry to see obstinacy, party spirit 
 and prejudice. We are not. to reject the Constitution merely 
 because we have some objections ; we ought to determine, upon 
 comparing the advantages of adopting or rejecting. 
 
 Gen. Thompson is sensible all powers may be abused, but this 
 power can only be abused, and not used to any good ; the place 
 may be appointed out of the State ; then tells the story of 
 David and Absalom ; objects, because after a certain age, when 
 people grow old, they are not disqualified. 
 
 Col. Smith. Observes on the guarantee of a republican 
 form of government. 
 
 Dr. Holton. Observes on the supposition that the present 
 delegates are not as much the representatives of the people as 
 they were formerly. All agree the present Confederation is 
 defective. I will confine myself to state facts. When this 
 Convention has laid open to them every defect in the old gov- 
 ernment, they will determine better. He is in distress about 
 our present situation, but we should take care not to make bad 
 worse. If we agree to have this consolidated form, he thinks 
 the power in the fourth section proper, and necessary to give 
 energy. We are to consider whether the government can be 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 297 
 
 carried into effect without war ; it is imperium in imperio. 
 Questions between the general government and each State will 
 soon arise, and then force will settle it. 
 
 Dr. Snow. The question is, if Congress have this power, 
 whether it will not be more dangerous than beneficial. Most 
 of the objections have been considered. There will be some 
 good men and some bad men in the government. The bad men 
 will take off their heads if they are traitors. I think Congress 
 must have great powers, or we are ruined ; and we must be 
 careful whom we choose. Our character abroad is infamous, 
 like a negro in a rich family. He is for the powers in the fourth 
 section to be trusted in Congress, and there is no danger of 
 abuse, because it must be exerted by both branches, who will 
 be opposed to each other. 
 
 Gen. Lincoln thinks the danger of trusting Congress not 
 proved by Mr. Turner ; for, admitting the Federal representa- 
 tives may appoint a place, to continue themselves in place, yet 
 ambitious men in General Court may by this influence appoint 
 an improper place to obtain an election. Dr. Holton observed 
 that he had no objection to this power, if this form of govern- 
 ment is to be adopted. That is a general question, and cannot 
 now be considered. 
 
 Gilbert Dench. The difficulty he had yesterday is not alto- 
 gether removed. The argument of Mr. Cabot was so sweet, 
 that on any other occasion he should be convinced, but in this 
 case he had not such a relish as to satisfy him, because Congress 
 may make these regulations, whether the States neglect it or 
 not. Was it my own personal right alone concerned, I should 
 make no difficulty ; but it concerns the unborn. What will be 
 the law providing these regulations ? The first Congress will 
 probably please their constituents, as far as they can ; popular 
 commotions will probably occasion these regulations. Had any 
 Federal government ever such powers ? 
 
 Rev. Mr. Niles. As to Congress fixing on an inconvenient 
 place, let us suppose the worst. Suppose they fix on the most 
 inconvenient places for election, — it will then be considered as 
 an abuse, and the people will call a Convention and amend the 
 Constitution. What greater security can we wish for ? 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana proposes not to go into the debate, but to 
 
 38 
 
298 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 suggest one idea. It seems agreed there would be no objection 
 if Congress only had this power when the State neglected or 
 refused ; and it has been asked, what necessity there can be for 
 this power in any other case. I will state a case. A State may 
 make provision, but it may not be agreeable to the spirit of the 
 Federal Constitution. It is not enough that a State sends its 
 complement of representatives, but all the people ought to have 
 equal influence, and the State regulation is unequal and unjust. 
 Suppose a State should proportion the representatives according 
 to corporations, unequal among themselves. Though our 
 Constitution will restrain our legislature, yet our legislature is 
 not bound to incorporate new places, and give the people the 
 right of election ; or, when our Constitution is revised, the 
 present restraint may be removed. There may, therefore, be a 
 case put, when Congress ought to have this power, when a State 
 may not neglect. Power may be abused, but the spirit of the 
 people is the surest and a certain defence. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. Arguments drawn from the amendment of the 
 proposed Constitution, have no foundation. It will be almost 
 impossible to amend it ; and reasons from the manner in which 
 amendments are to be made, have also no foundation. We 
 have not in our Constitution an equal representation. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White objects to the qualifications, as no value in 
 property is required ; for I may have three sons, who may have 
 spent two or three thousand dollars that I have given them, and 
 then get into Congress and serve the States in the same manner. 
 
 Mr. Pierce says he has the same objection, for he should not 
 choose to trust any man with his concerns who had no property ; 
 and why should we trust a man in public matters ? 
 
 Hon. Mr. Sedgwick says, this objection is democratic ; the 
 people may choose at large, and no man without property will 
 ever be chosen, unless he is a man of great talents and virtues. 
 
 Gen. Thompson thinks the objection of no weight, as the 
 poor man has generally as much integrity as a rich man. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King thinks property no mark of integrity or 
 talents. Those who have ruined the liberties of their country, 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 299 
 
 were generally rich. If a certain property was required, still 
 it could not be ascertained whether the elected was qualified in 
 point of property or not. If property was required, the differ- 
 ent States would have different ideas on the subject. The old 
 Confederation requires no property. As to the exclusion of 
 men of advanced years, there is a difficulty ; for in the southern 
 States an old man, is, in the eastern States a man of vigor and 
 maturity of judgment. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Bristol. I could not hear him. 
 
 Mr. Backus. In Connecticut there is no exclusion on account 
 of age, and no inconvenience has resulted from it. 
 
 Mr. Hubbard. In Connecticut no qualification in point of 
 property is required of the electors, which is the reason why 
 the elected there have no qualifications either as to property or 
 age. Here we have qualifications for electors, therefore there 
 should be for the elected. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. If we consider the impossibility of ascer- 
 taining the quantum of property, we shall be satisfied. Beside, 
 why should we bridle the people in their elections ? and in 
 framing the Constitution the Convention have acted wisely. 
 
 Mr. Dench thinks the objection of no weight, from the great 
 number of electors every representative should have. 
 
 Mr. Thomas, of Middleborough, thinks they should have 
 property, otherwise they cannot feel the burdens they lay on 
 the people. ♦ 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. The people will take care of that. If a 
 man has not property they will not choose him, unless he has 
 qualifications that can dispense with his poverty. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery thinks there can be no weight in the objection. 
 Rich men will most commonly be the object of their choice. 
 
 Ordered to proceed to the next paragraph, viz. : " Represen- 
 tatives and direct taxes, <fec, &c. — Georgia three." 
 
 Hon. Mr. King. The principle on which this paragraph is 
 founded is, that taxation and representation should go hand in 
 hand. By the Confederation, the apportionment is upon sur- 
 veyed land, the buildings and improvements. The rule could 
 never be assessed. A new rule has been proposed by Congress, 
 similar to the present rule, which has been adopted by eleven 
 States — all but New Hampshire and Rhode Island. 
 
300 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery objects to the rule, as apprentices are not free- 
 men, but blunders about it. 
 
 Mr. King explains 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff. His difficulty is, our negroes are free, but 
 those of other States are not. But the number of representa- 
 tives first chosen 
 
 Gen. Thompson. The rule is unequal ; as we have more 
 children than the luxurious inhabitants of the southern States. 
 Congress will have no impost or excise, but lay the whole tax 
 on polls. We live longer than they live. We live to one hun- 
 dred ; they to forty. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. If eleven States have agreed to the rule of 
 polls, twelve have agreed to alter the Confederation. So the 
 agreement of eleven States is no reason. But I object to 
 another part ; the number of representatives shall not exceed 
 one to thirty thousand. The representation will not be numer- 
 ous enough. It may be objected, that if a larger number, it 
 would be unwieldy — but it is not unwieldy. It may not be 
 increased, it may be said, and that we may increase the expense. 
 But the expense will be trifling, compared to the advantage to 
 let every class be represented. The additional expense is but 
 three pence per poll. Supposed twelve instead of eight, at 
 forty shillings per day. The smallest representation that ever 
 was. It is trifling. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery wants to know whether all white infants are 
 free persons ? If they are, we are over-taxed. 
 
 Hon. Mr. King. All persons born free are counted among 
 free persons, to which three-fifths of all persons born or imported 
 slaves, make the census. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. If Mr. King is right, then we shall pay one- 
 quarter of the debt. 
 
 Mr. Gorham. Mr. Wedgery is totally in the wrong. It will 
 lessen our old proportion nearly one-seventh. As eleven States 
 have agreed to this rule, among which was Massachusetts, it is 
 a rule most likely to be adopted. As to representation men- 
 tioned 
 
 Col. Fuller. The arguments against the representation are 
 groundless. As the rule of proportion is by numbers, five slaves 
 to three freemen is but equal, for slaves are but chattels. 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 301 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. If this government was a consolidation and 
 not a confederation, he should then think the number too small. 
 But as it is Federal, and we have our own governments to 
 support, the expense would have been too great. We can send 
 seven on the old plan, but have only sent four or five, which 
 proves the sense of the people not to have a large representa- 
 tion. The Constitution provides for increasing the representa- 
 tives. 'Tis true Congress are not bound to increase representa- 
 tion as numbers increase, nor should they ; for, from the rapidity 
 of population, the representation would be enormous. We can 
 instruct our representatives ; they will not dare to disobey 
 them. The old rule of apportionment by lands was against 
 this State. Our lands are worth more by the acre. Lands 
 cultivated by slaves are not worth as much as lands cultivated 
 by freemen. Slaves are their masters' moneys, and at their 
 risk, and it would be unjust to tax a slave as much as a free- 
 man. If we think there should be a difference, the only ques- 
 tion would be, what difference. The States have agreed, in 
 Convention, on materials, which we have not. The southern 
 States have not half the value of buildings we have, arising 
 from the climate and manner of living. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White. If we are to be taxed by numbers, it will 
 ruin all the poor people ; but I do not understand the matter, 
 and will wait to hear it explained. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff wants to know whether five smart negro slaves 
 are to be equal to three of our children ? 
 
 Mr. Nasson thinks both sides should be stated. Mr. King 
 says five of their infant slaves are equal to three of our govern- 
 ors ; but three of our infants are equal to five of their healthy 
 strong slaves. Besides, though our climates make us build 
 houses, yet we have to work all summer for winter. Also, the 
 representation is unequal between us and New Hampshire; 
 also, our negroes are all free, and theirs are slaves. 
 
 Mr. Randal. Lands in the southern States are as good as 
 ours ; if not better. It produces every thing. Mr. Dana is 
 mistaken ; but as to the slaves, he is about right. The laboring 
 part of the free men in the southern States can live upon two 
 days' work, as easily as we can upon six. They can work all 
 winter, we cannot. 
 
302 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 January 18, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Dalton is in favor of the method of fixing the census ; 
 it is much in our favor. 
 
 Mr. Cooley asks how the direct [tax] is to be apportioned 
 among the inhabitants of any State ? 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln. No rule is fixed in the Constitu- 
 tion ; that is a legislative act, for Congress to determine. 
 
 Mr. Randal wants to know how far Mr. Dalton has travelled. 
 Denies Mr. Dalton's facts. 
 
 Dr. Holton rises to give light ; mentions the old rule of the 
 census ; found impracticable ; compelled to have recourse to 
 numbers, after long debate. As to the rule of representing a 
 State's proportion, Congress must hereafter determine the mat- 
 ter, and make an internal tax, which is an imperium in imperio ; 
 it will bring on a war. I think the new rule is not in our favor, 
 but am in favor of it, for it is all the rule we can get. 
 
 Dr. Davis wants to know of Dr. Holton, why our proportion 
 has been lessened ? 
 
 Dr. Holton does not recollect, but Massachusetts always 
 insisted we stood too high ; but the reduction was on no fixed 
 principle. 
 
 Sam. Thompson. What States, in the debate, opposed the 
 rule of numbers ? Asks Dr. Holton. 
 
 Dr. Holton does not recollect. He was against the rule of 
 numbers, because the southern States had more land and less 
 numbers, than the eastern. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. Answers Dr. Davis's question, as it lays in 
 his mind. The reason why our taxes were higher during the 
 war than since, was because we were free from the public 
 enemy, and money must be obtained where it could be had. 
 Since the war, other States have been recovering. 
 
 Mr. Dawes observes that Dr. Holton likes this paragraph, if 
 the Constitution prevails. Mr. Randal need no longer lament 
 the want of abilities and eloquence on his side, since Dr. Holton 
 has spoken. But to the question. Though slaves are reckoned 
 five equal to three now, yet in a few years slavery must be 
 abolished, and in the mean time, slaves may be taxed on impor- 
 tation, sixty shillings per head. Slavery will not die of an 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. 303 
 
 apoplexy, but of a consumption. As to direct taxation, Con- 
 gress now have powers to make requisitions, but not to enforce 
 them. Considers the revenue, as it relates to borrowing money 
 abroad. Congress may never exercise direct taxes. Lands are 
 not a proper rule of census ; numbers are a better rule. 
 
 Mr. Randal. Sorry to hear it said that after 1808 negroes 
 would be free. If a southern man heard it, he would call us 
 pumpkins. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery objects to Mr. Dana's description of the south- 
 ern States. Their land is better than ours. 
 
 Mr. Dana says he never compared the value of the eastern or 
 southern lands ; he compared only the mode of cultivation. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery says if this rule is for an equal poll tax, he 
 has no objection. But for a rule of apportionment, it is unjust, 
 southern land being better than ours. In Virginia, one thou- 
 sand acres has forty-eight polls ; in Massachusetts, a family of 
 six, to fifty acres, makes one hundred and twenty polls to the 
 one thousand polls [acres?]. In legislation, one southern 
 man with sixty slaves, will have as much influence as thirty- 
 seven freemen in the eastern States. 
 
 Mr. Strong. This mode of census is not new. Our General 
 Court have considered it, and the General Court have agreed. 
 The southern States have their inconveniences ; none but 
 negroes can work there ; the buildings are worth nothing. 
 When the delegates were apportioned, forty thousand was the 
 number. Massachusetts had eight, and a fraction ; New Hamp- 
 shire two, and a large fraction. New Hampshire was allowed 
 three ; Georgia three, &c. Representation is large enough, 
 because no private local interests are concerned. Very soon, 
 as the country increases, it will be larger. He considered the 
 increasing expense. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery asks whether the poverty of our lands was 
 considered ? 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick. 
 
 Mr. Randal talks a great deal, and says, as he sits down, 
 that he has done better than he expected. 
 
 Col. Porter. 
 
 Mr. Randal. 
 
 Col. Porter. 
 
304 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 Mr. , of Kittery, spoke against the slave trade. We 
 
 shall all suffer for joining with them, when they allow the slave 
 trade. 
 
 Mr. Cabot asks the gentleman from Sharon, whether, in his 
 five hundred miles travel, he saw five thousand people who live 
 as well as five thousand people of the lowest sort here. As to 
 the slave trade, the southern States have the slave trade, and 
 are sovereign States. This Constitution is the best way to get 
 rid of it. 
 
 Mr. Randal says he believes he has, but is not certain. If 
 they do not, it is their own fault. 
 
 Mr. Nasson. Southern States are not poor. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. As to age — slavery — religion. 
 
 Adjourned to 3 o'clock. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Mr. Gore spoke upon the rule of census, upon the number of 
 representatives. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Boston. 
 
 Mr. Cooley asks how the quota is to be apportioned upon the 
 inhabitants of the State. 
 
 Mr. King. Perhaps Congress may never exercise this power. 
 They must first demand it of the State, and if they will not assess 
 and pay it, then Congress will assess and collect it, and it is 
 to be presumed that Congress will adopt the usual rule in a 
 State. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff. He now understands it. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana. The question now seems to be, whether 
 Congress will ever have the necessity of levying direct taxes — 
 an attack of one State is an attack upon all — guards against 
 the prejudice of education — the advocates for the Constitution 
 are the friends of the people — high Whigs — they early braved 
 the common danger. The nation should have power to avail 
 itself of all the national resources. There is no danger — New 
 England will have a sufficient influence to preserve itself. No 
 standing army, because in no sudden danger. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. The question is, how that is to be appor- 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 305 
 
 tioned ? Merchants in Congress will oppose imposts, and have 
 direct taxation on polls. 
 
 Dench. He is satisfied. 
 
 Maj. Fuller is for direct taxes in time of war only. Georgia 
 has too many representatives. Remove these doubts, and I am 
 for the Constitution. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White has difficulty about Georgia, and two or 
 three States at the southward. 
 
 Mr. Randal moves Mr. Gerry may be asked to satisfy Major 
 Fuller's difficulty. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery objects, and moves that a time may be assigned 
 to ask questions, and it is seconded ; but the motion is with- 
 drawn, and Mr. Randal's motion prevailed, to ask Mr. Gerry 
 the reasons for the requisition. 
 
 Saturday, January 19, 1788. 
 
 Proceeded to the next paragraph — no debate. To the next — 
 no debate. To the next — the Senate — 
 
 Mr. Cooley. As it has been proved that the biennial elec- 
 tions are better than annual, so sexennial are better ; there- 
 fore, we had better proceed. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Singlet ary is against the Senate being chosen for 
 six years — they may make themselves perpetual — will move 
 their families there — have high wages — no religion is necessary 
 — we may have an atheist or a pagan. * 
 
 Dr. Davis. Mr. Singletary has not reverted to the rotation. 
 There will probably be but one session in a year, and there is 
 no reason to suppose senators for so short a time will carry their 
 families with them. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff. The rotation is only in the first choice ; 
 afterwards there is no rotation. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. The rotation is a shadow and not a substance, 
 and will be no security for the people. There will be more 
 than one session ; probably they will be there all the time. 
 
 Mr. Dawes. The senators can never feel independent ; every 
 two years one-third will come fresh from the people. They 
 
 39 
 
306 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 ought to have a longer tenure than the representatives, as a 
 balance ; and their business being more difficult, they should 
 have more time to inform themselves. 
 
 Gen. Thompson is against the power of the Senate, as each 
 State, however small, has as much influence as a great State. 
 
 Mr. Singletary repeats his old objections, and wishes to have 
 it discussed fully. 
 
 Mr. Cooley is against the present mode of arguing. We 
 should confine ourselves to mere inquiry and information, and 
 not go so deep into the merits of the several paragraphs. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Medford. His object is to grant the 
 necessary powers for the benefit of the people, and then to pro- 
 vide suitable checks ; that is the case here. 1. The choice by 
 the legislatures. 2. They feel all the inconveniences they lay 
 on others. 3. They can do nothing without the consent of the 
 representatives, who will always watch over them, and impeach 
 them if they behave amiss. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. They are only answerable to their constitu- 
 ents, by not being rechosen at the end of six years. 
 
 Mr. Gerry's answer, in writing, produced and filed — respect- 
 ing Georgia having three representatives. 
 
 Mr. King will give the answer, which he does at large. The 
 estimate by which the requisitions are made, was made in 1782; 
 no alteration since. Georgia has great additions and emigra- 
 tion, and is now in an Indian war. Connecticut and New 
 Hampshire have paid nothing. If I was for it now, it is 
 improper, till we are more united. 
 
 * Mr. Dawes reads resolves of Congress to support Mr. King's 
 statements. 
 
 Mr. Dalton. All the difficulties Gen. Thompson has made, 
 show the necessity of adopting this government, to do us 
 justice. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Dana says the reason why the small States have the 
 same weight in the Senate, is because the Senate represents the 
 sovereignty. The large gain by having the popular branch 
 introduced. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Strong. There were large debates on this subject 
 in the Convention. The Convention would have broke up if 
 it had not been agreed to allow an equal representation in the 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. 307 
 
 Senate. It was an accommodation, reported by a Committee, 
 of which Mr. Gerry was one. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Bristol, objects to length of time for which the 
 Senate are chosen. Is for their being chosen annually. If they 
 behave well, they may be rechosen, otherwise they ought not. 
 Senators will now carry their families with them to the seat of 
 government, and forget their own States. We had not yet 
 asked advice of God about it. Should have had a fast before. 
 He moved for one in the house ; he was not seconded. We 
 have hurried too much, and the election of delegates to this 
 Convention, was too soon. We first must adore God. 
 
 Mr. Ames. Senate not chosen for too long a time. Consol- 
 idation not proper — country too large for that purpose. We 
 must guard against the consolidation of the States — represen- 
 tation must therefore be equal among the States in the Union 
 who represent the sovereignty. They should have a longer 
 tenure than the representatives — their business is more impor- 
 tant — they negotiate with foreign powers — and every two years 
 one-third of the Senate will return to the people. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff. The Convention says they aimed at consol- 
 idating the Union. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. The distinction is between consolidation of 
 the States, and a consolidation of the Union. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Bristol, is still for annual elections — great 
 danger from a longer time. 
 
 Mr. King. The average length of time is but four years, for 
 every time one-third is chosen, one-third will vacate in two 
 years, and one-third in four years. As to their forgetting their 
 States, the legislature will instruct them from time to time. 
 No senator will dare to disobey — necessary they have time to 
 inquire into the character of men, as they advise to the appoint- 
 ment of officers, and negotiate with foreign States. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. Mr. King's object is to show that the election 
 of senators is not sexennial, and that the States have a greater 
 check now than in the old Confederation. But they are always 
 chosen for six years, and the check under the new Constitution 
 is not so great — they are chosen annually — a rotation — and are 
 liable to be recalled. 
 
 Mr. Cooley. Experience teaches us that rulers should be 
 
308 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 under restraint. Congress have great powers — sometimes a 
 majority of a quorum is required — sometimes two-tliirds pres- 
 ent, as in treaties. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln, denies the fact. 
 
 Mr. Reed moves Mr. Gerry may be asked about the matter. 
 Then Mr. Gerry said he was putting in writing a state of facts 
 upon this matter. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
 Monday, January 21, 1788, A. M. 
 
 Mr. Parsons assigns the reasons why two-thirds of the sena- 
 tors are requisite for convictions. 
 
 Mr. Ames, on the fourth section. Assigns two reasons in favor 
 of that section. 1. As the first Congress will be chosen pursu- 
 ant to State regulations, and therefore equal, if Congress were 
 to fix an unequal place, to influence the choice in favor of one 
 member, it would be opposed by the other members. 2. If we 
 can trust our own legislature, can we trust the legislatures of 
 the other States rather than Congress ? This section is not a 
 trap, but a security for the liberties of the people, and intro- 
 duced to guard them. 
 
 Mr. Dana once thought- it dangerous and unnecessary ; is 
 now convinced to the contrary. 1. The representation is to 
 proceed directly from the people — the people ought to be equally 
 represented, and have equal influence — remarks on Rhode 
 Island — there must be a power s 
 
 Mr. Cooley states any objection unnecessary, because the 
 rights of the people are secured by oath. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. 
 
 Mr. Parsons, in reply. 
 
 Mr. King. Distinct ideas of time, place and manner — pur- 
 sues Ames's ideas of trusting the legislatures of the other 
 States — corporate representation not the same as by numbers — 
 the present situation of Connecticut — South Carolina — Charles- 
 ton sends thirty, and given districts send given numbers of rep- 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 309 
 
 resentatives, without regard to the number of electors — the 
 controlling power, therefore, is necessary. 
 Adjourned. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M.' 
 
 Mr. Parsons gives the reasons why two-thirds are necessary 
 to expulsion. 
 
 Dr. Taylor objects. As to publishing journal from time to 
 time, is uncertain ; it means any thing or nothing. 
 
 Mr. King says, the phrase must be determined according to the 
 subject matter to which it is applied — from session to session. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. He has no doubt as to the words " from time 
 to time," but objects as to the clause of secrecy — each house 
 may think it proper to keep every thing secret. 
 
 Mr. Gorham. As to secrecy, the interest of the State 
 requires, many times, secrecy. No other government ever 
 required in its Constitution that the journals should be pub- 
 lished. In cases of treaties, secrecy is necessary. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. His only objection is, as to the time. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Perley. Alarms of Lexington — God raised up 
 Washington, a better man than General Thompson. Should 
 Washington have published his secret council to his armies, he 
 could not have defied Gen. Howe, &c. 
 
 Dr. Taylor, to the sixth section. Under the old Confedera- 
 tion, each State paid its own delegates, and no corruption ; is 
 not for an alteration. 
 
 Col. Porter. There has been complaint. Rhode Island 
 would pay their delegates in paper money — some States have 
 not sent because they had not money — equal, it should be a 
 common charge — this Convention is so supported. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick. In favor of the section — the practice in 
 every State. 
 
 Mr. King. If the section does not take place the people may 
 be deprived of privileges, by the legislatures refusing to make 
 provision. 
 
 Paragraph, exclusion from office. 
 
 Mr. Gorham. To take away all inducement to ill-adminis- 
 tration, the exclusion was provided. 
 
 Mr. Parsons added, that if a member was to resign, he could 
 
310 JUDGE PARSONS^ MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 not take a place until the time for which he was elected was 
 expired. 
 
 Section seventh — no debate. 
 
 Section eighth, first paragraph — for laying duty, &c. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln. Has doubts about the clause of 
 the general warfare [welfare] — whether there should not have 
 been some limitation. 
 
 Gen. Thompson seems to think nobody now understands it. 
 
 Mr. King. The present clause the most important. We 
 have already considered the organization of the legislature, and 
 now come to powers to be vested in it. This Constitution is to 
 be formed by the people, the old Confederation by the States — 
 the old Confederation radically defective as to raising money. 
 In Holland the several provinces never advanced the quota, 
 though strictly bound — Holland, by force, compelled one of the 
 states to .pay its quota — to relieve the state, they used to 
 demand double of what they wanted, and get what they could 
 — Holland advanced almost the whole, and having but one vote, 
 could never get the accounts settled. Considers the conduct of 
 the several American States during the late war. Nobody will 
 object to the impost and excise, but to direct taxation. 
 
 Hon. Mr. White. The other States will always out-vote us. 
 As to Holland, they are already got into Lordships — no collect- 
 ing the money but by the point of the sword — that is the design 
 of this Constitution, after they have built the forts and got the 
 ten miles square. 
 
 Mr. Dawes. The reason of giving this power is to render 
 the sword unnecessary, for without this power Congress cannot 
 compel a State to pay, without an army — perhaps Congress 
 may never have the necessity, as they now have imposts and 
 excises. But Congress will not raise direct taxes but for neces- 
 sity. They will be chosen by the people, and will feel as the 
 people feel, and therefore will not abuse their power — necessary 
 that Congress should have the power of imposts and excises — 
 that they encourage agriculture by checking the importation 
 and consumption of foreign produce — necessity of Congress 
 having the regulation of commerce — talks about agriculture 
 and manufactures — population from migration — convenient 
 places for mills for manufacturing. But we cannot encourage 
 
1788.] > JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 311 
 
 manufactures until Congress have these powers — when they 
 have these powers, Congress will have but little occasion for 
 direct taxation — we may have war, and want money — to collect 
 it by requisition is nugatory — without an army — Congress will 
 first demand it, and each State may raise it in such a way as 
 they like best. 
 
 Mr. Bodman. Objects to direct taxation. Congress should 
 have some powers, but it is difficult to draw the line, but it 
 ought to be drawn between the sovereignty .of general govern- 
 ment and of each State. Now, the sovereignty of this State is 
 given up, as the general government may prevent our collecting 
 any taxes. Now if the power had been conditional, if a State 
 refused, he should have no objection. Now, Congress may 
 prevent each State from supporting its own government. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick. The same objection applies as between a State 
 and its towns — states the necessity of Congress having this power. 
 
 Mr. Singletary. The power is unlimited in Congress — he 
 objects against it — a new case — as much power as was ever 
 given to a despotic prince — will destroy all power in this of 
 raising taxes, and we have nothing left — the only security is, 
 we may have an honest man, but we may not have — we may 
 have an atheist, pagan, Mahommedan — must take care of pos- 
 terity — few nations enjoy the liberty of Englishmen. Is for 
 giving up some power, but not every thing — no bill of rights — 
 civil and sacred privileges will all go. 
 
 Col. Fuller. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. He would not adopt the Constitution if it 
 was perfect, till he saw what our sister States will do. Massa- 
 chusetts being a leading State, ought to stand by. We send 
 delegates to Convention to amend, and not make a new one. 
 Only two of our delegates signed it — overpowered by Pennsyl- 
 vania delegates. This Constitution will not help our trade — if 
 the other States who have not paid, will not pay, we must make 
 them by fair means — better draw than drive — we must support 
 the old Confederation — if only nine accept, we cannot touch 
 the other four — if we attempt to force them, we shall be torn 
 to pieces, for foreign States will help them. The Constitution 
 is in doubtful terms ; it can't be understood. Union is neces- 
 sary ; division will destroy us. 
 
312 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. , [1788. 
 
 Maj. Kinsley. Power is not dangerous, if people have proper 
 checks — checks were proper under the old Confederation — we 
 have them not under the new. Under the old Confederation, 
 the delegates were our servants ; now they are our masters, and 
 we have no control over any usurpation of theirs — they have 
 all our money, a standing army, a Federal town. Tells the 
 story of the Decemviri, but mistakes it. The British Parlia- 
 ment first altered from annual to triennial, then to septennial — 
 people uneasy under it — every session an exertion is made to 
 repeal the septennial bill, but fails through bribery and corrup- 
 tion — our Senate, on an average, for four years — we shall soon 
 see the time when bribery and corruption will be employed 
 to obtain elections — under these circumstances, he is not for 
 trusting these powers with any one body of men. 
 
 Tuesday, January 22, 1788. 
 Not well enough to take Minutes. 
 
 Wednesday, January 23, 1788. 
 
 Mr. Pierce, of Partridgefield. Is [for] a general government 
 — if it will be safe — but if we grant a power to lay direct taxes, 
 Congress will not lay imposts. Congress should not have power 
 to lay direct taxes, but in war. Senate chosen for too long a 
 time — should not be chosen longer than the house, and the 
 house may balance them. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Varnum. The powers of Congress are sufficiently 
 defined in the grant, and no need of a bill of rights — Congress 
 have not all our resources, they have only a concurrent right to 
 taxes and excises, and can make laws only to support a concur- 
 rent right, and so no consolidation of States — union would 
 answer no purpose with these powers. Congress may abuse the 
 power, but there is no probability. If Congress have no power 
 to call on a delinquent State, it is an encouragement to delin- 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. 313 
 
 quency. He then considers the conduct of the States lately — 
 Congress must have this power in peace as well as in war — 
 they can make no law but what is necessary for the common 
 good. 
 
 Mr. Choate. Congress must defend us abroad, and preserve 
 to us peace at home — they must therefore have the means, and 
 the means are delegated by the people to their servants — depriv- 
 ing the delegates of these means, is depriving the people of 
 the means of defence and self-preservatipn — it would also 
 deprive us of the means of regulating our commerce and pro- 
 tecting our trade — there can be no dividing the supreme power 
 — it must be wholly delegated, or wholly remain with the peo- 
 ple, and limits are inconvenient — if direct tax was only when 
 imposts and excises are insufficient, Congress might lay trifling 
 imposts and excises — if it was limited, as to war, it would injure 
 us in hiring, for, the better security we can give, the easier will 
 be the terms — we may lay aside party spirit, as it is a subject of 
 the most importance — our security is in elections at stated 
 times. 
 
 Mr. Cooley asks, if Mr. Choate means that if the people 
 delegate any power, they must delegate all ? 
 
 Mr. Choate replies. He does not mean that if the people 
 grant one kind of power, they must grant all kinds of power, 
 but the kind of power we give, we must give all. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. Mr. Choate's ideas are agreeable to his own, 
 but asks why the French are pointed out as our best friends. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. Against^ these powers — not necessary — 
 standing armies are a curse — take care of the militia, they are 
 virtuous men — soldiers in a standing army are the worst men — 
 standing armies are never necessary, witness Burgoyne — we are 
 virtuous, enlightened, rich — raise our own produce — cannot be 
 starved, or taken by Britain — can live without trade — the riches 
 of the country are in a laboring people — Massachusetts will be 
 one of the four, he hopes, and will stand out — Clinton against 
 it before he knew what it was, but had a hint of it — nations 
 will not fall upon us — not true if one nation attacks us, another 
 will defend us — we are in debt — that is an advantage, for they 
 cannot carry the land — do not let us grow too fast, we shall 
 grow out of shape. Now, I have proved that we have liberty, 
 
 40 
 
314 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 property and virtue — we cannot influence other nations without 
 they find their account in it. The Constitution is not clear — no 
 bill of rights, which is a bar — the learned are not agreed 
 about it. Some people say we should swallow a bone for the 
 sake of the meat, and then pick the bone out. Now for the 
 section — Britain never authorized the Parliament to pay an 
 army for two years. 
 
 Rev. Mr. Niles, of Abington, wishes to know what limits 
 would suit him. 
 
 Gen. Thompson says he is now tired. 
 
 Gov. Bowdoin. A diversity of opinion is to be expected — 
 when the Revolution commenced, such was the spirit of the 
 people, that requisitions were sufficient, but not now. States 
 have refused, and compelled Congress to increase the public 
 debt by further loans — states the terms of the loans — they must 
 be punctually complied with — Congress will not act like a fac- 
 tion in Rhode Island. Our foreign creditors are able to force 
 payment by reprisal, which will essentially injure this Common- 
 wealth. 
 
 Dr. Taylor wishes to have the Constitution discussed at 
 large, and not by paragraphs. 
 
 Mr. Parsons. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 A motion was made to consider the Constitution, at large. 
 After debate, the motion was adjourned to ten o'clock, next 
 morning. 
 
 Adjourned to 9 o'clock, next morning. 
 
 Thursday, January 24, 1788. 
 
 Some unimportant debates till ten o'clock — then a motion 
 to consider the Constitution, upon the whole, and not by para- 
 graphs. After debate, it was ordered to subside, by a great 
 majority. The eighth section was then read, and some debate. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 315 
 
 , 3 O'CLOCK, P. M. 
 
 Eighth section. 
 
 Mr. Dench. These powers will dissolve the State govern- 
 ments. 
 
 Mr. Cabot answered Mr. Dench. 
 
 Mr. Dench replied. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Medford, answers Mr. Dench at large, by 
 showing the Federal government cannot exist, but on the exist- 
 ence of the several governments. 
 
 Maj. Hosmer wishes to have explained the Federal town. 
 
 Mr. Strong explains it. Congress must have exclusive legis- 
 lation where they sit, to prevent or punish insults. 
 
 Dr. Taylor. The district is too large — may contain barracks 
 and stores. 
 
 Mr. King. Words, in their nature and language, are imper- 
 fect. The Convention must either enumerate the rights of the 
 general government, or the rights of the State governments — 
 most for the liberties of the States to enumerate the powers of 
 the general government, and all not enumerated still remain to 
 the States — rights of all, therefore, accurately denned, which 
 he illustrates by direct taxes — the power of availing itself of the 
 whole resources, is essential — there is no government without 
 it, except Turkey. Under the new government, the wants of 
 each government will be confined, but the wants of the general 
 government must be unconfined — people suppose they can 
 increase the general government without lessening the State's 
 power — 'tis not true. Our State now, is not a sovereign State 
 — we cannot make peace, or war, or treaties — no aristocracy in 
 the new government. 
 
 Dr. Willard has the thirteenth article of the Confederation 
 read, and the tenth article of the sixth section of ours was 
 read, and observed that we ought to be jealous when our Con- 
 stitution is in danger. 
 
 Mr. King says, the people at all times have the control of 
 their Constitution. 
 
 Dr. Willard. Our governments are governments of laws 
 and not of men, and the Constitution cannot be altered but 
 according to the compact. 
 
316 JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Boston. The word consolidation has different 
 ideas, as different metals melted into one mass, two twigs tied 
 into oiip bundle. 
 
 Mr. Dench insists upon it, by consolidation under the Federal 
 government, will dissolve the powers of the States, /and render 
 our elections insecure. 
 
 Rev. Mr. West answered it. 
 
 Gem Thompson. Unconstitutional to adopt it — if we do, it 
 will be of no force — our delegates did not keep within the line 
 of their duty. 
 
 Mr. Gokham. The delegates kept within their line — the 
 powers authorized the reporting the Federal Constitution. Some 
 articles of our bill of rights read. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick. The only question is, what is for the general 
 good and happiness of the people. 
 
 Mr. Strong, (who did not sign,) says, the concurrence of 
 three to sign not necessary — a majority makes a quorum, viz., 
 three ; and a majority of the quorum gives the vote of the 
 State — through sickness he was obliged to return home, but 
 had he been there he should have signed it — then shows that 
 the delegates acted within their line — under the words provis- 
 ions and alterations, this new Constitution may be reported — 
 but we have nothing to do with it — our business is solely to 
 adopt or reject the Constitution. 
 
 Dr. Willard charges King with treating some of the members 
 illiberally, as insinuating that some of them listened to out-of- 
 doors whispers. 
 
 Mr. King denies the charge — he only said that if any people 
 did listen to such whispers, they did wrong. 
 
 Mr. Dalton observes that Mr. Singletary introduced out-of- 
 door talk, and gave a just foundation for Mr. King's observa- 
 tions. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, of Lincoln. The rights of the general govern- 
 ment are distinct from the particular governments, because all 
 rights not given to the general government remain to the 
 States — the word guaranty does not imply a gift or grant, but a 
 warrant and defence. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. Our Constitutions are not our defence — why 
 should Congress guarantee a republican form ? — they may, not- 
 
1788.] JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 317 
 
 withstanding, unite us into one republican form — every body 
 knows that Congress have no power but what is given them — 
 the question is, what is given them. 
 
 Hon. Mr. Adams. To guarantee is not to 
 
 Mr. Parsons, on the guarantee. 
 
 Mr. Dawes. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
 Friday, January 25, 1788, A. M. 
 
 Conversation of the ninth section. 
 
 Gen. Yarnum observes on the fourth section, first article, on 
 Turner's and Wedgery's arguments on that section ; then 
 observes on the ninth section : powers of regulating trade are 
 necessary for the good of the whole — to encourage our shipping 
 — and then makes a variety of excellent observations. 
 
 Mr. Choate. Suppose a power of attorney to transact a 
 particular object — the attorney can go no further — if the power 
 was general, and he afterwards gave a new power to a second 
 person, for a particular object, the second power can go no 
 further to control the first, than to the particular object to which 
 it extends. The same reasoning applies to the Constitution. 
 
 Mr. Shurtleff reads the section where the constitutional 
 laws of Congress are to be paramount to State laws, which he 
 says gives all unlimited powers. 
 
 Mr. Ames. If this Constitution will destroy the liberties of 
 the country, we should reject it ; but such -is the ruin if we 
 reject it, we ought to be sure our liberties are in danger before 
 we reject it. Our liberties cannot be preserved without union — 
 the Confederation is a dead letter — the country teeming with 
 new States — a seminal soil — without union the new States will 
 be opposed to us — surrounded by hostile enemies — Spain and 
 Britain, they injure us, because they despise us. He went on, 
 and made an elegant and pertinent speech. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. I am for union, and that something must 
 be done, but not adopt this Constitution — I hope we shall reject 
 "this — our sister States are divided — other States will follow us, 
 
318 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 we should therefore stand by, and not be too hasty. Suppose 
 only nine States adopt it — then four will not adopt it — no 
 foreign States know — thirteen not nine — we should unite, and 
 we can get a new system — send a new Convention — cruel and 
 wicked to alter, but on the terms of the old Confederation, 
 except at the last cast. 
 
 Mr. Singletary. I know the principles I formerly acted 
 upon, I act upon the same now — for the liberties, for the liber- 
 ties of the people — the English claimed all our property, and 
 to do what they please — the lands will bear all the burdens — gen- 
 tlemen now supporting this Constitution will be in government. 
 
 Col. Smith, of Lanesborough. The two things farmers have 
 to dread, are 1. Anarchy; 2. Tyranny. Anarchy leads to 
 tyranny, and while we are trying and trying for amendments, 
 some tyrant will set up, and the people, to relieve themselves 
 from anarchy [will obey him] . Our security is that the com- 
 mon interest is our common defence. 
 
 Mr. Parsons spoke on ambiguities. 
 
 Adjourned. 
 
 3 o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Mr. Ames called upon gentlemen to show why Congress, 
 under this new Constitution, has more power than under the 
 old Confederation. 
 
 Mr. Singletary, in answer, showed the checks were different 
 — annual elections — rotation — recall — in the old, and not in the 
 new. 
 
 Mr. Wedgery. By the new Constitution, Congress can lay 
 no direct tax butjon polls, where the poor will pay as much as 
 the rich — objects to representation — thirty thousand men on a 
 sand hill will pay as much as the same numbers in the Garden 
 of Eden — our debt is our safety, as long as we can pay the 
 interest. Mr. Ames appears to be conscience-struck ; a lawyer, 
 and conscience-struck ! — perhaps it is for the poor paying as 
 much as the rich. States ought not to have an equal represen- 
 tation in the Senate, according to interest — but it is said we 
 could not do better — very pretty — the great must give way to 
 the less — suppose nine adopt and four reject, what will you do ? 
 Use the sword ? No, we shall be ruined — the four will be jus-* 
 
1788. J JUDGE PARSONS'S MINUTES. 319 
 
 tified, because each State must consent by the old Confedera- 
 tion — some benefit will arise if nine States accept, as it will 
 prevent paper money, and save the States, by endorsing them 
 to a citizen of another State. 
 
 Mr. Gorham. His objection to impost goes to the old Con- 
 federation as well as to the new — one State has a provision in 
 its Constitution that there shall be no poll tax. 
 
 Mr. Cooley said, he never had advanced that all direct tax 
 was on the polls. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Boston, shows the advantages, to all classes, 
 from the new Constitution. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Bristol, says, power to regulate the trade 
 abroad is enough. 
 
 Col. Porter. To grant only an impost is to invite enemies 
 to attack us, for shutting up our ports is to destroy our 
 resources. 
 
 Col. Taylor says, he is now convinced we have no need of 
 granting a direct tax, as the impost is enough for war and 
 peace. 
 
 Gen. Varnum. To say we will not grant a direct tax to 
 Congress, is to say that we will not have the power of a direct 
 tax, for Congress are the people, especially as in war our imposts 
 are destroyed. 
 
 Mr. Dench wishes to go to the next session [section ?] . 
 
 Mr. King. If direct taxes can only be collected from polls, 
 a good reason for rejecting the Constitution — but it is not true 
 — the apportionment in the Constitution is only among the 
 States, and not upon the individuals in a State — in the last case, 
 Congress have a discretionary power — as to equal vote of States 
 in the Senate, we could have no union without it. 
 
 Mr. Pierce, of Partridgefield. Powers in Constitution are 
 dangerous; 1. Direct taxes ; 2. Duty on imposts include excises, 
 and so a State can, by the tenth section, lay excises. 
 
 Mr. Sedgwick was going to give an answer, but it was said 
 not to be in order, and the ninth section was read. 
 
 Mr. Dalton. In favor of first paragraph because we gain a 
 right in time to abolish the slave trade. 
 
 Mr. Kinsley wants to know the reason why vessels from one 
 State to another are not obliged to enter, &c. 
 
320 JUDGE PARSONS's MINUTES. [1788. 
 
 Mr. Jones. That no duties should be laid on the exports ot 
 a State. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. It is contrived to enable them to run. 
 
 Dr. Jarvis. It is when a vessel bound to one State makes a 
 harbor in another, he is held to pay duties. 
 
 Deacon Sever and Deacon Phillips give the same. 
 
 Mr. Gore the same. 
 
 Mr. Cabot explains it fully. 
 
 Mr. Neal talks against the slave trade. 
 
 Mr. Cooley asks, whether negro slaves, emigrating into this 
 State, will not be considered as a poll, to increase our ratio of 
 taxes ? 
 
 Rev. Mr. Backus answers Mr. Neal, and shows we have now 
 gained a check which we had not before, and hopes in time we 
 shall stop the slave trade. 
 
 Mr. Bodman says, those born slaves in the southern States 
 may still continue slaves. 
 
 Gen. Thompson. If the southern States would not give up 
 the right of slavery, then we should not join with them — Wash- 
 ington's character fell fifty per cent, by keeping slaves — it is all 
 a contrivance, and Washington at the head — our delegates over- 
 powered by Washington and others. 
 
 Mr. Jones, of Bristol, objects to Article V., because we can't 
 amend this section for twenty years. 
 
 Monday, January 28, 1788, 3 P. M. 
 
 First section, second article — Executive. 
 
 Mr. Gorham. All governments require an executive — this 
 section fixes the mode of appointment — the people at large could 
 not choose — the legislature of Congress could not choose, he 
 would then be their creature " 
 
 23 [Here the Minutes end abruptly.] 
 
1788.] LEGISLATIVE AfTION, 321 
 
 ACTION OF THE GENERAL COURT. 
 
 [Resolve to print the Address of the Committee appointed by the Convention.} 
 
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
 
 In Senate, March 29, 1788. 
 
 Whereas, a Convention, chosen by the People of this Com- 
 monwealth, by their Resolve of the 7th of February, 1788, 
 appointed a Committee to prepare " An Address to the People, 
 stating the principles of the said Constitution, the various 
 objections which were made against it, the answers they 
 received, and explaining the absolute necessity of adopting some 
 energetic system of Federal government for the preservation of 
 the Union, and that the same be published," and whereas, the 
 said Convention, by their said Resolve, recommended to the 
 General Court their making provision for the publication of the 
 same ; be it 
 
 Resolved, That Messrs. Adams & Nourse, Printers to the 
 General Court, print the said Address, and lay their accounts 
 before the General Court for allowance and payment. 
 
 Sent down for concurrence. . 
 
 S. Adams, President 
 
 In the House op Representatives, March 29, 1788. 
 Read and non-concurred. 
 
 J. Warren, Speaker. 
 
 [Extract from the Journal of the House of Representatives.] 
 
 Saturday, March 29, 1788, 9 o'clock, A. M. 
 
 The Hon. L. Thompson brought down a Resolve of Senate 
 of this day, directing the Printers to the General Court to print 
 
 41 
 
322 LEGISLATIVE ACTION. [1788. 
 
 the Address of the Committee of the late Convention to the 
 people, agreeably to their Resolution of the 7th of February 
 last — sent down for concurrence. 
 
 A motion was made and seconded, that the consideration of 
 the said Resolve be referred to the next session of the General 
 Court, and the question being put, passed in the negative. 
 
 The question of concurrence was then put, and passed in the 
 negative also. ** 
 
 [Extract from the Senate Journal.] 
 
 Saturday, March 29, 1788. 
 
 Resolve directing the Printers to print the Address of the 
 Convention, sent down for concurrence, came up non-concurred. 
 
 ** [We find no report of the discussion upon this question, or of the reasons 
 influencing the House in their action, in the newspapers of the day.] 
 
1788.] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 323 
 
 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 
 
 [Of the good feeling with which the large minority submitted 
 to the decision of the majority, and of the general enthusiasm 
 with which the harmonious conclusion of the Convention was 
 welcomed by the people, some idea may be formed from the 
 subjoined extracts from the columns of the Centinel, of February 
 9 and 13, 1788 :— ] 
 
 On the ratification being declared, a very large concourse of 
 spectators testified their satisfaction by repeated huzzas ; and 
 the whole Convention, having been previously invited, par- 
 took, with a number of the respectable citizens, at a decent 
 repast, prepared in the Senate Chamber ; where, in mutual 
 congratulations and testimonials of satisfaction, all party ideas 
 were done away, and such a spirit of joy, union and urbanity 
 diffused, as, if continued, must be attended with the most 
 happy consequences through the Commonwealth. The toasts 
 given, were truly conciliatory, and were, we believe, drank 
 with sincerity by every one present. All appeared willing to 
 bury the hatchet of animosity, and to smoke the calumet of 
 union and love. 
 
 After this repast, the Convention dissolved. Thus far, the 
 proceedings of the Convention. Now for those of the people. 
 
 The citizens of Boston have ever shown themselves advo- 
 cates for freedom ; therefore, when a motion had obtained, one 
 of the greatest objects of which is " to secure the blessings of 
 liberty to themselves and their posterity," they could not resist 
 the strong impulse they must have had, publicly to testify their 
 gratitude for the pleasing event. Nor have they. On the 
 decision being declared, the bells in the several public build- 
 ings, communicated the happy intelligence to every part of the 
 town, by a peal, which continued for several hours, and which 
 has been continued with short intervals ever since. The dis- 
 charge of cannon, and other demonstrations of joy, took place 
 
324: PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. [1788. 
 
 on Wednesday and Thursday, but it was left to yesterday to 
 produce an exhibition, to which, America 'has never before wit- 
 nessed an equal, and which has exceded any thing of the kind 
 Europe can boast of. 
 
 The Committee of Tradesmen met on Thursday, and by public 
 advertisements, requested the attendance of the mechanics and 
 artisans of every description, in town, at Faneuil Hall, at 9 
 o'clock, yesterday, in order to form, and proceed in Grand Pro- 
 cession therefrom, to testify their approbation of the ratification 
 of the Federal Constitution by the Convention of this Common- 
 wealth, the 9th inst., and deputed their Chairman to request 
 their brethren, the husbandmen of the adjacent towns, to join 
 them, who, though the notice was very short, accordingly 
 appeared in town at 9 o'clock ; when, the several trades being 
 met, at 11 o'clock, in real Grand Procession, the whole moved 
 from the hall, and the following was the 
 
 ORDER OF TJIE PROCESSION. 
 
 Sixteen Foresters, with axes, and brush scythes. 
 Music. 
 
 A PLOUGH, 
 
 drawn by two horses, and two yokes of oxen, with a person 
 
 holding it, and others clearing away the obstructions. 
 
 [The Sons of Freedom venerate the Plough.] 
 
 Three Sowers, with baskets strewing grain, and smoking their 
 
 pipes. 
 
 A Brush-Harrow, drawn by a horse. 
 
 A large Roller, drawn by a horse and pair of oxen. 
 
 Four Reapers, with sickles, &c. 
 
 Three Thrashers, with flails. 
 
 Four Mowers, witli scythes, followed by eighteen Haymakers, 
 
 with rakes, <fcc. 
 Eight Husbandmen, with hoes, spades, and other farming 
 
 utensils. 
 
 A Winnower, with a fan. 
 
 A Cart, drawn by a yoke of oxen, with flax-dressers at work, 
 
 and in working dresses. 
 
1788.] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 325 
 
 A yoke of fat Cattle, with killers, properly equipped. 
 
 A Cart, loaded with Beef, followed by eight master butchers, in 
 
 clean frocks, with cleavers, &c. 
 
 [The above were our worthy brethren of Roxbury.] 
 
 BLACKSMITHS, 
 
 Preceded by Messrs. Clough and Baker, 
 
 To the number of seventy-three, carrying implements of their 
 
 craft, decorated with ribbons, &c. 
 
 SHIPWRIGHTS, 
 
 Preceded by Deacon Sharp, 
 To the number of forty-three, with tools decorated, &c. 
 
 ROPE-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. J. Richardson, 
 
 To the number of seventy-five, their waists encircled with hemp, 
 
 with a cable sled, drawn by workmen, decorated with 
 
 colors, and attended with martial music. 
 
 MAST-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. S. Harris, 
 To the number of thirty, with tools decorated, <fec. 
 
 SAIL-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Deacon Barrett, 
 To the number of thirty, with their tools. 
 
 SHIP-JOINERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. T. Uran, 
 To the number of thirty-four, with their tools, decorated. 
 
 BLOCK-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. J. Brewer, 
 To the number of thirty, with tools, &q. 
 
 MATHEMATICAL INSTRUMENT MAKERS, 
 
 To the number of six, with instruments, &c. 
 
 COOPERS, 
 
 Preceded by Capt. J. Wheelwright, 
 To the number of fifty-three, with tools, decorated, &c. 
 
 BOAT-BUILDERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. T. Hichborn, 
 To the number of twenty, with tools, <fcc. 
 
326 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. [1788. 
 
 COACH AND CHAISE *MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Maj. Hawes, 
 To the number of eight, with a coach painted on paper. 
 
 PAINTERS, 
 
 Preceded by Col. Mason, 
 To the number of twenty-five, with pallets, <fcc, decorated. 
 
 HEAD-BUILDERS, 
 
 To the number of four, in one rank, with their moulds, 
 decorated. 
 
 CARVERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. J. Skillings, 
 With tools, <fcc, decorated, to the number of twelve. 
 
 RIGGERS, 
 
 To the number of eighteen, with tools, &c. 
 
 GLAZIERS AND PLUMBERS, 
 
 Preceded by Capt. Norton Brailsford, 
 To the number of sixteen, with diamonds, <fec. 
 
 FOUNDERS AND COPPER-SMITHS, ' 
 
 Preceded by Mr. Caldwell, 
 To the number of ten, with tools. 
 
 CABINET-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. Bright, 
 To the number of thirteen. 
 
 PEWTERERS, 
 
 To the number of six, in one rank. 
 
 TINMEN, 
 
 To the number of three, in one rank. 
 
 BAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. J. Jenkins, 
 To the number of forty, with their tools, &c. 
 
 TANNERS AND CURRIERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. S. Bass, 
 To the number of twenty-eight, with tools, <fcc. 
 
 SHOEMAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. S. Bangs, 
 To the number of fifty, with lasts, &c, decorated. 
 
1788.] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 327 
 
 TAILORS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. T. Capron, 
 To the number of fifty-six, with their tools, measures, <fcc. 
 
 HATTERS, 
 
 Preceded by Major Seward, 
 To the number of twenty-six, with their bows, furs, <fcc. 
 
 TALLOW-CHANDLERS , 
 
 To the number of eight, with a miniature press, moulds, &c. 
 Mr. Vose, on horseback. 
 
 The ship Federal Constitution, on runners, drawn by thirteen 
 
 horses, 
 John Foster Williams, Esq., Commander, 
 
 Lieut. Weeks, y t 
 
 Lieut. Adams, jJW$T Manned by 
 
 Mr. L& Mo'me, Master, jffi^^l thirteen seamen 
 
 Mr. E. Sigourney, ^^^^^^^ and marines. 
 Purser, *UB&*m£*^&&&&^& 
 
 With full colors flying, followed by captains of vessels, eighty- 
 five seamen, dressed in ribbons, and about two hundred 
 and fifty of the principal merchants in town. 
 
 SHIP-BUILDERS, 
 
 To the number of twenty, with a sled, drawn by thirteen 
 horses, bearing a large long boat, representing the old ship 
 Confederation hauled up, over which was erected a 
 large platform emblem of a dock-yard, with thir- 
 teen ships, of various sizes, therein ; the 
 workmen with their tools, <fec. 
 
 CARPENTERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. Crafts, 
 
 To* the number of one hundred and thirty-six, with tools of 
 
 every sort, decorated. 
 
 MASONS, 
 
 ' Preceded by Major Bell, 
 To the number of seventy, with trowels, &c, as at work. 
 
 WHEELWRIGHTS, 
 
 To the number of thirty, with the insignia of their crafts. 
 
328 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAT. [1788. 
 
 PRINTERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. B. Edes, 
 
 To the number of fifteen, with a stand, drawn on a sled, and 
 
 compositors at work. 
 
 BOOKBINDERS, 
 
 With their ploughs, &c. 
 
 CHAIR-MAKERS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. Allcock, 
 To the number of six. 
 
 To the number of twelve, with tools, decorated, <fcc. 
 
 TOBACCONISTS, 
 
 Preceded by Mr. McElroy, 
 To the number of thirteen, with tools, emblematical of their 
 
 profession. 
 
 To the number of fifteen, with hammers, <fcc. 
 
 HORN BUTTON AND COMB-MAKERS, 
 
 in one rank. 
 
 A MILLER. 
 LEATHER-DRESSERS, 
 
 Preceded by Major W. Dawes, on horseback, 
 
 (dressed in skins,) 
 
 To the number of twenty, with skins, and working tools. 
 
 CARD-MAKERS, 
 
 To the number of twelve, with wire, &c. 
 
 The Committee of Tradesmen, viz. : John Lucas, Esq., J\lr. 
 
 Joseph Clark, Col. Paul Revere, Capt. Rhodes, Deacon 
 
 William Bordman, Joshua Witherle, Esq., and 
 
 Capt. David Spear, with a band of music, in 
 
 a sleigh, drawn by four horses. 
 
 The Republican Volunteers, commanded by Capt. Gray, 
 closed the procession. 
 
1788."] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 329 
 
 The numbers stated are those of the master-workmen, and 
 were taken from an actual enumeration of the procession, at 
 two o'clock. At other times in the day, the procession was 
 much more full. 
 
 In this order the whole proceeded by the houses of the several 
 gentlemen who represented this town in Convention, and testi- 
 fied their approbation of their conduct by three huzzas from 
 the whole line and salutes from the ship, and the volunteer 
 company. About four o'clock the procession arrived at the 
 hall, where refreshment was liberally provided, at which as 
 many as could find admittance, partook ; but though the hall 
 will hold fifteen hundred men, not above one-third of the pro- 
 cession could get in. However, we were happy that our country 
 friends were accommodated to their wishes. 
 
 We have not time to give a just account of this beautiful 
 parade. We can only say, that the perfect order and urbanity, 
 the dignity and solemnity that marked the procession through 
 the whole day, were such as had a most interesting effect on the 
 numerous spectators which a scene so august and novel collected 
 together. 
 
 .At two o'clock, when the procession passed by the State 
 House, Capt. Johnson's company of artillery honored them 
 with a salute of thirteen guns. 
 
 [From the Centinel of February 13, 1788.] 
 
 On Friday evening last, the long boat, called the Old Con- 
 federation, which had been exhibited in the procession that day, 
 was drawn to the Common, where the officers, owners and crew, 
 called a jury of carpenters to inspect her, who after examining 
 every part, found her bottom so defective, and her timber and 
 planks so rotten, that they were unanimous in their verdict, to 
 condemn her, as unfit for any further service. She was accord- 
 ingly ordered to be burnt, which was immediately done, in 
 presence of an applauding concourse of citizens. 
 
 42 
 
330 
 
 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 
 
 [1788. 
 
 [The following song and ballad, (a verse of which has already 
 been quoted,) give a lively idea of the spirit of the times : — ] 
 
 THE RAISING. 
 
 A NEW SONG FOR FEDERAL MECHANICS. 
 
 It will yet rise. 
 
 Come muster, my lads, your mechanical tools, 
 
 Your saws and your axes, your hammers and rules ; 
 
 Bring your mallets and planes, your level and line, 
 
 And plenty of pins of American pine ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 A government firm, and our citizens free. 
 
 II. 
 
 Come, up with the Plates, lay them firm on the wall, 
 
 Like the people at large, they're the ground-work of all ; 
 
 Examine them well and see that they're sound, 
 
 Let no rotten parts in our building be found ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 Our government firm, and our citizens free. 
 
 in. 
 Now hand up the Girders, lay each in his place, 
 Between them the Joists must divide all the space ; 
 Like assembly-men, these should lie level along, 
 Like Girders, our Senate prove loyal and strong ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 
 A government firm, over citizens free. 
 
 86 [The New Hampshire Convention had, at this time, adjounaed to a future 
 day, without taking a vote upon the question of ratification.] 
 
1788.] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 331 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Rafters now frame — your King-Posts and Braces, 
 And drive your pins home, to keep all in their places ; 
 Let wisdom and strength in the fabric combine, 
 And your pins be all made of American pine ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 
 A government firm, over citizens free. 
 
 v. 
 
 Our King-Posts are judges — how upright they stand, 
 Supporting the Braces, the laws of the land — 
 The laws of the land, which divide right from wrong, 
 And strengthen the weak, by weak'ning the strong ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 Laws equal and just for a people that's free. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Up ! up with the Rafters — each frame is a State ! 
 
 How nobly they rise ! their span, too, how great ! 
 
 From the north to the south, o'er the whole they extend, 
 
 And rests on the walls, while the walls they defend, 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 Combined in strength, yet as citizens free. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Now enter the Purlins, and drive your pins through, 
 And see that your joints are drawn home, and all true ; 
 The Purlins will bind all the rafters together, 
 The strength of the whole shall defy wind and weather ; 
 
 For our roof we will raise, and our song still shall be — 
 
 United as States, but as citizens free. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Come, raise up the Turret — our glory and pride — 
 In the centre it stands — o'er the whole to preside ; 
 The sons of Columbia shall view with delight 
 Its pillars, and arches, and towering height ; 
 
 Our roof is now rais'd, and our song still shall be — 
 
 A Federal head, o'er a people still free. 
 
332 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. [1788. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Huzza ! my brave boys, our work is complete, 
 
 The world shall admire Columbia's fair seat ; 
 
 Its strength against tempests and time shall be proof, 
 
 And thousands shall come to dwell under our Roof. 
 
 Whilst we drain the deep bowl, our toast still shall be — 
 Our government firm, and our citizens free. 
 
 A YANKEE SONG. 
 
 The 'Yention did in Boston meet, 
 But State House could not hold 'em, 
 
 So then they went to Fed'ral Street, 
 And there the truth was told 'em — 
 
 Yankee doodle, keep it up ! 
 
 Yankee doodle, dandy, 
 Mind the music and the step, 
 
 And with the girls be handy. 
 
 They ev'ry morning went to prayer, 
 
 And then began disputing, 
 'Till opposition silenc'd were, 
 
 By arguments refuting. 
 
 Yankee doodle, <fcc. 
 
 Then 'Squire Hancock like a man, 
 
 Who dearly loves the nation, 
 By a concil'atory plan, 
 
 Prevented much vexation. 
 
 Yankee doodle, <fcc. 
 
 He made a woundy Fed'ral speech, 
 
 With sense and elocution ; 
 And then the 'Vention did beseech 
 
 T' adopt the Constitution. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
1788.] PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAY. 333 
 
 The question being outright put, 
 
 (Each voter independent,) 
 The Fed'ralists agreed t' adopt, 
 
 And then propose amendment. 
 
 Yankee doodle, <fcc. 
 
 The other party seeing then 
 
 The people were against 'em, 
 Agreed like honest, faithful men, 
 
 To mix in peace amongst 'em. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
 The Boston folks are deuced lads, 
 
 And always full of notions ; 
 The boys, the girls, their mams and dads, 
 
 Were fill'd with joy's commotions. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &o. 
 
 So straightway they procession made, 
 
 Lord ! how nation fine, Sir ! 
 For every man of every trade 
 
 Went with his tools to dine, Sir. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
 John Foster Williams in a ship, 
 
 Joined in the social band, Sir, 
 And made the lasses dance and skip, 
 
 To see him sail on land, Sir. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
 Oh, then a whapping feast begun, 
 
 And all hands went to eating ; 
 They drank their toasts, shook hands, and sung, 
 
 Huzza! for 'Vention meeting, 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
334 PUBLIC SENTIMENT OF THE DAT. [1788, 
 
 Now politicians of all kinds, 
 
 Who are not yet decided, 
 May see how Yankees speak their minds, 
 
 And yet are not divided. 
 
 Yankee doodle, <fec. 
 
 Then from this sample let 'em cease 
 
 Inflammatory writing, 
 For Freedom, Happiness and Peace, 
 
 Is better far than fighting. 
 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
 So here I end my Fed'ral song, 
 
 Composed of thirteen verses ; 
 May agriculture nourish long, 
 
 And commerce fill our purses ! 
 Yankee doodle, &c. 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 335 
 
 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 
 
 [In both the Chronicle and Centinel, series of elaborate essays 
 in favor of and opposed to the Federal Constitution, were con- 
 tinued during the period that the question of ratification was 
 pending. From many, as exhibiting the tone and scope of the 
 discussion, we have selected the following from the Independent 
 CJironicle.] 
 
 ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 NUMBER ONE. 
 
 It is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any nation 
 or country whatever, to be insensible to the present circum- 
 stances of America. Were I an East Indian or a Turk, I should 
 consider this singular situation of a part of my fellow creatures, 
 as most curious and interesting. Intimately connected with the 
 country, as a citizen of the Union, I confess it entirely engrosses 
 my mind and feelings. 
 
 To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it 
 may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United 
 States were originally settled and established.* Want of charity 
 in the religious systems of Europe and of justice in their polit- 
 ical governments, were the principal moving causes which drove 
 the emigrants of various countries to the American continent. 
 The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presbyterians and other Brit- 
 ish dissenters, the Catholics of England and Ireland, the 
 Huguenots of France, the German Lutherans,; Calvinists and 
 Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves 
 in the different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that 
 Catholicism in ecclesiastical affairs, which has been observable 
 since the late Revolution. Religious liberty naturally promotes 
 corresponding dispositions in matters of government. The Con- 
 stitution of England, as it stood on paper, was one of the freest 
 at that time existing in the world, and the American colonies 
 considered themselves as entitled to the fullest enjoyment of it. 
 Thus, when the ill-judged discussions of later times in England 
 brought into question the rights of this country as it stood con- 
 
336 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 nected with the British crown, we were found more strongly 
 impressed with their importance, and accurately acquainted 
 with their extent, than the wisest and most learned of our 
 brethren beyond the Atlantic. When the greatest names in 
 Parliament insisted on the power of that body over the com- 
 merce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all cases 
 whatsoever, America, seeing that it was only another form of 
 tyranny, insisted upon the immutable truth, that taxation and 
 representation are inseparable, and while a desire of harmony 
 and other considerations induced her into an acquiescence in 
 the commercial regulations of Great Britain, it was done from 
 the declared necessity of the case, and with a cautious, full and 
 absolute saving of our voluntarily suspended rights. The Par- 
 liament was persevering, and America continued firm till hostil- 
 ities and open war commenced, and finally the late Revolution 
 closed the contest forever. 
 
 'Tis evident from this short detail, and the reflections which 
 arise from it, that the quarrel between the United States and 
 the Parliament of Great Britain, did not arise so much from 
 objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a 
 better one by far is now within our reach, as from a difference 
 concerning certain important rights resulting from the essential 
 principles of liberty, which the Constitution preserved to all the 
 subjects actually residing within the realm. It was not asserted 
 by America that the people of the Island of Great Britain were 
 slaves, but that we, though possessed absolutely of the same 
 rights, were not admitted to enjoy an equal degree of freedom. 
 
 When the Declaration of Independence completed the separa- 
 tion between the two countries, new governments were neces- 
 sarily established. Many circumstances led to the adoption of 
 the republican form, among which was the predilection of the 
 people. In devising the frames of government it may have 
 been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of that we 
 had just rejected ; nevertheless, many of the State Constitutions 
 we have chosen, are truly excellent. Our misfortunes have 
 been, that in the first instance we adopted no national govern- 
 ment at all, but we kept together by common danger only, and 
 that in the confusions of a civil war we framed a Federal Con- 
 stitution, now universally admitted to be inadequate to the 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 337 
 
 preservation of liberty, property, and the Union. The question 
 is not, then, how far our State Constitutions are good, or other- 
 wise—the object of our wishes is, to amend and supply the 
 evident and allowed errors and defects of the Federal govern- 
 ment. Let us consider awhile, that which is now proposed to 
 us — let us compare it with the so much boasted British form of 
 government, and see how much more it favors the people, and 
 how completely it secures their rights, remembering at the same 
 time, that we did not dissolve our connection with that country 
 so much on account of its Constitution, as the perversion and 
 maladministration of it. 
 
 In the first place, let us look at the nature and powers of the 
 head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of ours. 
 
 The British King is the great Bishop or Supreme Head of an 
 established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In 
 this capacity he commands a number of votes in the House of 
 Lords, by creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes, have 
 votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort. They 
 have also many honorable and lucrative places to bestow, and 
 thus, from their wealth, learning, dignities, powers and patron- 
 age, give a great lustre and an enormous influence to the 
 crown. 
 
 In America, our President will not only be without these 
 influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of the 
 people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of a con- 
 test with him. All religious funds, honors and powers, are in 
 the gift of numberless unconnected, disunited and contending 
 corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality univer- 
 sally prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical tyranny, 
 that long standing and still remaining curse of the people — that 
 sacrilegious engine of royal power in some countries, can be 
 feared by no man in the United States. In Britain, their king 
 is for life ; in America, our president will always be one of the 
 people at the end of four years. In that country, the king is 
 hereditary, and may be an idiot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, 
 or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be 
 removed, for " he can do no wrong." In America, as the pres- 
 ident is to be one of the people at the end of his short term, so 
 will he and his fellow-citizens remember, that he was originally 
 
 43 
 
338 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 one of the people, and that he is created by their breath. Fur- 
 ther, he cannot be an idiot, probably not a knave or a tyrant, 
 for those whom nature makes so, discover it before the age 
 of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It 
 appears that we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but 
 have rather presupposed he may and will sometimes do wrong, 
 by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable 
 and complete removal. 
 
 In England, the king has a power to create members of the 
 upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as 
 legislators. Our president not only cannot make members of 
 the upper house, but their creation, like his own, is byihe 
 people, through their representatives, and a member of assem- 
 bly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year 
 for electing a weak or wicked senator, as for any other blunder 
 or misconduct. 
 
 The king of England has legislative power, while our presi- 
 dent can only use it when the other servants of the people are 
 divided. But in all great cases affecting the national interests 
 or safety, his modified and restrained power must give way to 
 the sense of two-thirds of the legislature. In fact, it amounts 
 to no more than a serious duty imposed upon him, to request 
 both houses to reconsider any matter on which he entertains 
 doubts or feels apprehensions, and here the people have a strong 
 hold upon him, from his sole and personal responsibility. 
 
 The president of the upper house (or the chancellor) in Eng- 
 land, is appointed by the king, while our vice-president, who is 
 chosen by the people through the electors and the senate, is not 
 at all dependent on the president, but may exercise equal pow- 
 ers on some occasions. In all royal governments an helpless 
 infant or an inexperienced youth, may wear the crown. Our 
 president must be matured by the experience of years, and 
 being born among us, his character at thirty-five must be fully 
 understood. Wisdom, virtue, and active qualities of mind and 
 body, can alone make him the first servant of a free and 
 enlightened people. 
 
 Our president will fall very far short indeed of any prince in 
 his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but the abso- 
 lute allowance of the people passing through the hands of their 
 
178&.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 339 
 
 other servants, from year to year, as it becomes necessary. 
 There will be no burdens on the nation to provide for his heir 
 or other branches of his family. 'Tis probable, from the state 
 of property in America, and other circumstances, that many 
 citizens will exceed him in show and expense, those daz- 
 zling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no 
 authority to make a treaty without two-thirds of the Senate, 
 nor can he appoint ambassadors or other great officers without 
 their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and 
 influence, and of personal obligation and dependence. The 
 appointment of even the inferior officers may be taken out of 
 his hands by an act of Congress, at any time ; he can create no 
 nobility or titles of honor, nor take away offices during good 
 behavior. His person is not so much protected as that of a 
 member of the House of Representatives ; for he may be pro- 
 ceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of 
 law. He appoints no officer of the separate States. He will 
 have no influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he 
 prorogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the treas- 
 ures of the state ; and lastly, as he is created through the 
 electors, by the people at large, he must ever look up to the 
 support of his creators. From such a servant, with powers so 
 limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when 
 we consider the solid foundations on which our national liber- 
 ties are immovably fixed by the other provisions of this excel- 
 lent Constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he pos- 
 sesses, is a delegated part of their majesty and their political 
 omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people themselves 
 for their own happiness. An American Citizen. 
 
 ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 NUMBER two. 
 We have seen that the late honorable Convention, in desig- 
 nating the nature of the chief executive office of the United 
 States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of 
 royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited 
 
340 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 powers. As our president bears no resemblance to a king, so 
 we shall see the senate have no similitude to nobles. 
 
 First then, not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, 
 wisdom and virtue, are not precarious, for by these qualities 
 alone are they to obtain their offices ; and they will have none 
 of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who possess 
 power merely because their fathers held it before them, for they 
 will be educated (under equal advantages and with equal pros- 
 pects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free 
 people. If we recollect the characters who have, at various 
 periods, filled the seats of Congress, we shall find this expecta- 
 tion perfectly reasonable. Many young men of genius, and 
 many characters of more matured abilities, without fortune, have 
 been honored with that trust. Wealth has had but few repre- 
 sentatives there, and those have been generally possessed of 
 respectable personal qualifications. There have also been many 
 instances of persons, not eminently endowed with mental qual- 
 ities, who have been sent thither from a reliance on their vir- 
 tues, public and private. As the senators are still to be elected 
 by the legislatures of the States, there can be no doubt of equal 
 safety and propriety in their future appointment, especially as 
 no further pecuniary qualification is required by the Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 They can hold no other office, civil or military, under the 
 United States, nor can they join in making provisions for them- 
 selves, either by creating new places, or increasing the emolu- 
 ments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they 
 will not be induced to aim at an increase or perpetuity of their 
 powers, at the expense of the liberties of the people, of which 
 those sons will be a part. They possess a much smaller share 
 of the judicial power than the upper house in Britain, for they 
 are not, as there, the highest court in civil affairs. Impeach- 
 ments alone are the cases cognizable before them, and in what 
 other place could matters of that nature be so properly and 
 safely determined ? Tho judges of the federal courts will owe 
 their appointments to the president and senate, therefore may 
 not feel so porfectly free from favor, affection and influence, as 
 the upper house, who receive their power from the people, 
 through their State representatives, and are immediately 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 341 
 
 responsible to those assemblies, and finally to the nation at 
 large. Thus we see when a daring or dangerous offender is 
 brought to the bar of public justice, the people who alone can 
 impeach him by their immediate representatives, will cause him 
 to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occasion, 
 but by two-thirds of a select body, chosen a long time before, 
 for various purposes, by the collected wisdom of their State 
 legislatures. From a pretence or affection of extraordinary 
 purity and excellence of character, their word of honor is the 
 sanction under which these high courts in other countries have 
 given their sentence ; but with us, like the other judges of the 
 Union, like the rest of the people of which they are never to 
 forget they are a part, it is required, that they be on oath. 
 
 No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced youth can 
 acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous 
 wealth or most powerful connections, till thirty years have 
 ripened his abilities and fully discovered his merits to his coun- 
 try — a more rational ground of preference surely than mere 
 property. 
 
 The senate, though more independent of the people as to the 
 free exercise of their judgment and abilities, than the house of 
 representatives, by the longer term of their office, must be older 
 and more experienced men, and the public treasures, the sinews 
 of the state, cannot be called forth by their original motion. 
 They may restrain the profusion or errors of the house of repre- 
 sentatives, but they cannot take the necessary measures to raise 
 a national revenue. 
 
 The people, through the electors, prescribe them such a presi- 
 dent as shall be best qualified to control them. 
 
 They can only, by conviction on impeachment, remove and 
 incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the punishment of him as 
 a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to 
 be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, 
 which exceedingly diminishes the importance of their judicial 
 powers. They are detached, as much as possible, from local 
 prejudices in favor of their respective States, by having a sepa- 
 rate and independent vote, for the sensible and conscientious 
 use of which, every member will find his person, honor and 
 character seriously bound. He cannot shelter himself, under a 
 
342 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 vote in behalf of his State, among his immediate colleagues. 
 As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily 
 governed by the majority of the deputation. He will be obliged, 
 by wholesome provisions, to attend his public duty, and thus in 
 great national questions must give a vote, of the honesty of 
 which he will find it necessary to convince his constituents. 
 
 The senate must always receive the exceptions of the presi- 
 dent against any of their legislative acts, which, without serious 
 deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will seldom disregard. 
 They will also feel a considerable check from the constitutional 
 powers of the State legislatures, whose rights they will not be 
 disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies to which they owe 
 their existence, and are moreover to remain the immediate 
 guardians of the people. 
 
 And lastly, the senate will feel the mighty check of the house 
 of representatives — a body so pure in its election, so intimately 
 connected, by its interests and feelings, with the people at large, 
 so guarded against corruption and influence ; so much, from its 
 nature, above all apprehensions, that it must ever be able to 
 maintain the high ground assigned to it by the Federal Consti- 
 tution. An American Citizen. 
 
 ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 NUMBER THREE. 
 
 In pursuing the consideration of the new Federal Constitu- 
 tion, it now remains to examine the nature and powers of the 
 house of representatives — the immediate delegates of the people. 
 
 Each member of this truly popular assembly will be chosen 
 by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. 
 No decayed and venal borough will have an unjust share in 
 their determinations— no old Sarum will send thither a repre- 
 sentative by a voice of a single elector. 36 As we shall have no 
 royal ministers to purchase votes, so we shall have no votes for 
 sale. For the suffrages of six thousand enlightened and inde- 
 
 x [This is the case (in 1788) with that British borough.] 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 343 
 
 pendent freemen are above all f 'price. When the increasing 
 population of the country should render the body too large at 
 the rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons, they 
 will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or 
 fifty thousand, which will render the electors still more incor- 
 ruptible. For this regulation is only designed to prevent a 
 smaller number than thirty thousand from having a representa- 
 tive. Thus we see a provision follows, that no State shall have 
 less than one member ; for if a new and greater number should 
 hereafter be fixed on, which shall exceed the whole of the 
 inhabitants of any State, such State, without this wholesome 
 provision, would lose its voice in the house of representatives — 
 a circumstance which the Constitution renders impossible. 
 
 The people of England, whose House of Commons is filled 
 with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liberties 
 would be perfectly secured by triennial parliaments. With us 
 no placemen can sit among the representatives of the people, 
 and two years are the constitutional term of their existence. 
 Here again, least wealth, powerful connections, or even the 
 unwariness of the people should place in this important trust 
 an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced youth, the wisdom 
 of the Convention has proposed an absolute incapacity till the 
 age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the 
 guardian of his own interest, but he cannot for a few years 
 more be intrusted with the affairs of the nation. He must be 
 an inhabitant of the State that elects him, that he may be inti- 
 mately acquainted with their particular circumstances. The 
 house of representatives is not, as the senate, to have a presi- 
 dent chosen for them from without their body, but are to elect 
 their speaker from their own number. They will also appoint 
 all their other officers. In great state cases, they will be the 
 grand inquest of the nation, for they possess the sole and uncon- 
 trollable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the 
 call nor abide the prorogations and dissolutions of a perverse or 
 ambitious prince, for they are to meet at least once in every 
 year, and sit on adjournments to be agreed on between them- 
 selves and the other servants of the people. Should they differ 
 in opinion, the president, who is a temporary fellow servant, 
 and not their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to 
 
344 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 adjust it for them, but cannot prevent their constitutional 
 meeting within the year. They can compel the attendance of 
 the members, that their public duty may not be evaded in 
 times of difficulty or danger. The vote of each representative 
 can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, 
 that so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those 
 in whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of 
 the senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, nor 
 increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by 
 which the people will be exempted from needless additions to 
 the public expenses on such sordid and mercenary principles. 
 They are not to be restrained from the firm and plain language 
 which becomes the independent representatives of freemen, for 
 there is to be a perfect liberty of speech. Without their consent 
 no moneys can be obtained, no armies raised, no navies pro- 
 vided. They alone can originate bills for drawing forth the 
 revenues of the Union, and they will have a negative upon 
 every legislative act of the other house. So far, in short, as the 
 sphere of Federal jurisdiction extends, they will be controllable 
 only by the people, and in contentions with the other brand), 
 so far as they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail. 
 
 Such, my countrymen, are some of the cautionary provisions 
 of the frame of government your faithful Convention have sub- 
 mitted to your consideration, such the foundation of peace, 
 liberty and safety, which have been laid by their unwearied 
 labors. They have guarded you against all servants but those 
 " whom choice and common good ordains," against all masters 
 " save preserving Heaven." 
 
 An American Citizen. 
 
 ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 NUMBER POUR. 
 
 In considering the respective powers of the president, the 
 senate and the house of representatives, under the Federal Con- 
 stitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome precautions, 
 which are contained in the new system. Let us examine what 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 345 
 
 farther securities for the safety and happiness of the people are 
 contained in the general stipulations and provisions. 
 
 The United States guarantee to every State in the Union a 
 separate republican form of government. From thence it fol- 
 lows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, 
 who shall make an alteration in the form of goverment of any 
 State, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted to be taken 
 out of the hands of the people at large, will stand guilty of high 
 treason ; or should a foreign power seduce or overawe the peo- 
 ple of any State so as to cause them to vest in the families of 
 any ambitious citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary 
 governors, whether as kings or nobles, that such investment of 
 powers would be void in itself, and every person attempting to 
 execute them, would also be guilty of treason. 
 
 No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or servant 
 of the United States. The people may employ any wise and 
 good citizen in the execution of the various duties of the gov- 
 ernment. In Italy, Spain and Portugal, no Protestant can hold 
 a public trust. In England every Presbyterian, and other per- 
 son not of their established church, is incapable of holding an 
 office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of men can 
 take place under the new Federal Constitution. The Conven- 
 tion has the honor of proposing the first public act, by which 
 any nation has ever divested itself of a power, every exercise of 
 which is a trespass on the majesty of Heaven. 
 
 No qualification in moneyed or landed property is required 
 by the proposed plan ; nor does it admit any preference from 
 the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office of 
 the president, a senator, and a representative, and every other 
 place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of 
 the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be his prop- 
 erty what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers of the 
 state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and politi- 
 cal virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence of his 
 fellow-citizens. 
 
 The importation of slaves from any foreign country is, by a- 
 clear implication, held up to the world as equally inconsistent 
 with the dispositions and the duties of the people of America. 
 A solid foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro 
 
 44 
 
346 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 slavery, in which many good men of all parties in Pennsylvania, 
 and throughout the Union, have already concurred. The tem- 
 porary reservation of any particular matter must ever be deemed 
 an admission that it should be done away. This appears to 
 have been well understood. In addition to the arguments 
 drawn from liberty, justice and religion, opinions against this 
 practice, founded in sound policy, have no doubt been urged. 
 Regard was necessarily paid to the peculiar situation of our 
 Southern fellow-citizens ; but they, on the other hand, have not 
 been insensible of the delicate situation of our national charac- 
 ter on this subject. 
 
 The people will remain, under the proposed Constitution, the 
 fountain of power and public honor. The president, the senate 
 and house of representatives, will be the channels through 
 which the stream will flow — but it will flow from the people, 
 and from them only. Every office, religious, civil and military, 
 will be either their immediate gift, or it will come from them 
 through the hands of their servants. And this, as observed 
 before, will be guaranteed to them under the State Constitu- 
 tions which they respectively approve ; for they cannot be royal 
 forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican. 
 . The people of those States which have faithfully discharged 
 their duty to the Union, will be no longer subjected alone to 
 the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will call 
 forth the just proportion of their sister States, and our national 
 •character will again be as unstained, as it was once exalted. 
 Elevation to independence, with the loss of our good name, is 
 only to be conspicuous in disgrace. The liberties of a people 
 involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty of an individual 
 in the same situation. Their virtue is more precarious. The 
 unfortunate citizen must yield to the operation of the laws, 
 while a bankrupt nation too easy annihilates the sacred obliga- 
 tions of gratitude and honor, and becomes execrable and infa- 
 mous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of 
 our near approach to that deplorable situation, which must be 
 our miserable condition, if the defects of the old Confederation 
 remain without amendment. The proposed Constitution will 
 cure the evil, and restore us to our rank among mankind. 
 
 Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 347 
 
 dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of 
 the most virtuous and shining characters in the world have 
 been put to death, by laws formed to render them punishable, 
 for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and to 
 which patriotism impelled them. These have been called 
 ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new s} r stem. If a 
 time of public contention shall hereafter arrive, the firm and 
 ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they 
 can push their noble opposition, on the foundation of the laws.. 
 Should their country's cause impel them further, they will be 
 acquainted with the hazard, and using those arms which Provi- 
 dence has put into their hands, will make a solemn appeal to 
 " the power above." 
 
 The destruction of the ancient republics was occasioned in 
 every instance by their being ignorant of a great political posi- 
 tion, which was left for America to discover and establish. 
 Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in 
 ancient Greece or Rome asserting, that taxation and representa- 
 tion were inseparable. The Roman citizens, proud of their own 
 liberty, imposed, in the freest times of the Commonwealth, the 
 most grievous burdens on their wretched provinces. At other 
 times we find thousands of their citizens, though residing with- 
 in the walls of Rome, deprived of legislative representatives. 
 When America asserted the novel truth, Great Britain, though 
 boasting herself as alone free among the modern nations, denied 
 it by her legislature, and endeavored to refute it by her arms — 
 the reasoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the 
 voice of truth was heard above the thunders of the war, and 
 reached the ears of all nations. Henceforth the people of the 
 earth will consider this position as the only rock on which they 
 can found the temple of liberty, that taxation and representa- 
 tion are inseparable. Our new Constitution carries it into 
 execution on the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a repre- 
 sentative will be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, 
 a senator by half a sovereign State, a president by a whole 
 nation. v 
 
 The old Federal Constitution "contained many of the same 
 things, which from error or disingenuousness are urged against 
 the new one. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does 
 
348 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 either notice the liberty of the press, because they are already 
 provided for by the State Constitutions ; and relating' only to 
 personal rights, they could not be mentioned, in a contract 
 among sovereign States. 
 
 Both the old and new Federal Constitutions, and indeed the 
 Constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use 
 is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of admi- 
 ralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the State of 
 Pennsylvania, as also the court of appeals under the old Con- 
 federation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be in 
 the express words of the Pennsylvania Constitution, " as hereto 
 fore," — almost always used, though sometimes omitted. Trials 
 for lands lying in any State between persons residing in such 
 State, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses, assump- 
 tions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any 
 States, will be held in the State courts by juries, as now. In 
 these cases the Federal courts cannot interfere. But when a 
 dispute arises between the citizens of any State about lands 
 lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had 
 between the citizens of any State, and those of another, or the 
 government of another, the private citizen will not be obliged 
 to go into a court constituted by the State, with which, or with 
 the citizens of which, his dispute is. He can appeal to a disin- 
 terested Federal court. This is surely a great advantage, and 
 promises a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial by 
 jury is not excluded in these Federal courts. In all criminal 
 cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizens is at 
 stake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeach- 
 ment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot 
 be fined, imprisoned or punished, but only may be disqualified 
 from doing public mischief by losing his office, and his capacity 
 to hold another. If the nature of his offence, besides its danger 
 to his country, should be criminal in itself — should involve a 
 charge of fraud, murder or treason — he may be tried for such 
 crime, but cannot be convicted without a jury. In trials about 
 property in the Federal courts, which can only be as above 
 stated, there is nothing in the new Constitution to prevent a 
 trial by jury. No doubt it will be the mode in every case, 
 wherein it is practicable. This will be adjusted by law, and it 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 349 
 
 could not be done otherwise. In short, the sphere of jurisdic- 
 tion for the Federal courts is limited, and that sphere only is 
 subject to the regulations of our Federal government. The 
 known principles of justice, the . attachment to trial by jury, 
 whenever it can be used, the instructions of the State legisla 
 tures, the instructions of the people at large, the operation of the 
 Federal regulations on the property of a president, a senator, a 
 representative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, 
 will certainly render those regulations as favorable as possible 
 to property ; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the 
 hands of the juries. Under the present Constitution of all the 
 States, a public officer may be condemned to imprisonment or 
 death on impeachment, without a jury ; but the new Federal 
 Constitution protects the accused, till he shall be convicted, 
 from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the indispensable 
 judges of all crimes. 
 
 The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exercise 
 in our affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision has been 
 made against it ; for no person holding an office under the 
 United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign honors, powers 
 or emoluments. 
 
 The apprehensions of the people have been excited, perhaps 
 by persons with good intentions, about the powers of the new 
 government to raise an army. Let us consider this point with 
 moderation and candor. As enemies will sometimes insult us, 
 invade our country, and capture our property, it is clear a power 
 in our government to oppose, restrain or destroy them, is neces- 
 sary to our honor, safety and existence. The military should, 
 however, be regarded with a watchful eye ; for it is a profession 
 that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the powers vested 
 in the Federal government do not go the length which has been 
 said. A standing army is not granted or intended, for there 
 can be no provision for its continuing three years, much less for 
 its permanent establishment. Two years are the utmost time 
 for which the money can be given. It will be under all the 
 restrictions which wisdom and jealousy can suggest, and the 
 original grant of the supplies must be made by the house of 
 representatives, the immediate delegates of the people. The 
 senate and president, who also derive their power from the pea- 
 
350 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 pie, appoint the officers ; and the heads of the departments, who 
 must submit their accounts to the whole legislature, arc to pay 
 and provide them, as shall be directed by the laws that shall 
 contain the conditions of the grant. The militia, who are in 
 fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many 
 troops quite unnecessary. They will form a powerful check 
 upon the regular troops, and will [generally be sufficient to 
 overawe them — for our detached situation will seldom give 
 occasion to raise an army, though a few scattered companies 
 may often be necessary. But whenever, even on the most obvi- 
 ous reasons, an army shall bo. raised, the several States will be 
 called, by the nature of things, to attend to the condition of the 
 militia. Republican jealousy, the guardian angel of these 
 States, will watch the motions of our military citizens,. even 
 though they will be the soldiers of a free people. There is a 
 wide difference between the troops of such a Commonwealth as 
 ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles, and those of 
 a regal government, where ambition and oppression are the pro- 
 fession of the king. In the first case, a military officer is the 
 occasional servant of the people, employed for their defence ; in 
 the second, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the 
 schemes of conquest or oppression, with which the mind of his 
 royal master may be disturbed. 
 
 Observations have been made on the power given to the Fed- 
 eral government, in regard to the elections of representatives 
 and senators. The regulations of these elections are, by the 
 first part of the clause, to be prescribed by the State legisla- 
 tures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always 
 execute the duty. But in case the Union or the public safety 
 should be endangered by an omission of this duty, as in the 
 case of Rhode Island, then the legislature of the United States 
 can name for the people a convenient time, and do other matters 
 necessary to insure the free exercise of their right of election. 
 The exception, in regard to the places of choosing senators, was 
 made from due respect to the sovereignty of the State legisla- 
 tures, who are to elect the senators, and whose place of meeting 
 ought not to be prescribed to them by any authority, except 
 indeed, as we always must, by the authority of the people. 
 This power given to the Federal legislature is no more than what 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 351 
 
 is possessed by the governments of all the States. The Consti- 
 tution of Pennsylvania permits two-thirds of such cities and 
 counties, as shall elect representatives, to exercise all the powers 
 of the General Assembly, " as fully and amply as if the whole 
 were present, " should any part of the State neglect or refuse to 
 perform their duty in this particular. In short, it is a power 
 necessary to preserve the social compact of each State and the 
 confederation of the United States. 
 
 Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising 
 out of the Federal government, they are guarded by their State 
 Constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate States. 
 The governor or president in each Commonwealth, the coun- 
 cils, senates, assemblies, judges, sheriffs, grand and petit juries, 
 officers of militia, clergy and lay officers of all churches, State 
 and county treasurers, prothonotaries, registers, presidents and 
 other officers of universities, colleges and academies, wardens of 
 ports and cities, burgesses of towns, commissioners of counties, 
 county lieutenants, and many other officers of power and influ- 
 ence, will still be chosen within each State, without any possible 
 interference of the Federal government. The separate States 
 will also choose all the members of the legislative and executive 
 branches of the United States. The people at large in each 
 State will choose their Federal representatives, and, unless 
 ordered otherwise by the State legislatures, may choose the 
 electors of the president and vice-president of the Union. And 
 lastly, the legislatures of the States will have the election of the 
 senate, as they have heretofore had of the members of Congress. 
 Let us then, with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves, 
 whether it can be feared that a majority of the representatives, 
 each of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened free- 
 men, can betray their country ? Whether a majority of the 
 senate, each of whom will be chosen by the legislature of a free, 
 sovereign and independent State, without any stipulations in 
 favor of wealth or the contemptible distinctions of birth or rank, 
 and who will be closely observed by the State legislatures, can 
 destroy our liberties, controlled as they arc too by the house of 
 representatives ? — or whether a temporary, limited executive 
 officer, watched by the representatives, by the senate, by the 
 State legislatures, by his personal enemies among the people of 
 
352 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 his own State, by the jealousy of the people of rival States, and 
 by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our 
 freedom ? 
 
 Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these observations by 
 remarking, that there is no spirit of arrogance in the new Fed- 
 eral Constitution. It addresses you with becoming modesty, 
 admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give it a trial ; 
 and when experience has taught its mistakes, the people, whom 
 it preserves absolutely all powerful, can reform and amend 
 them. That I may be perfectly understood, I will acknowledge, 
 its acceptance by all the States, without delay, is the second 
 wish of my heart. The first is, that our country may be virtu- 
 ous and free. An American Citizen. 
 
 OPINION OF DR. FRANKLIN. 
 
 The following Address of His Excellency Benjamin Franklin, 
 Esq., to the President of the late Continental Convention, 
 was delivered by him immediately before his signing the 
 proposed Constitution for the United States. It may be 
 relied on as authentic — coming from a gentleman of respecta- 
 bility. 
 
 Mr. President : I confess that I do not entirely approve of 
 this Constitution at present, — but, Sir, I am not sure I shall 
 never approve it: for having lived long, I have experienced 
 many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller 
 consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, 
 which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is 
 therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my 
 own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of 
 others. Most men, indeed, as well as most sects in religion, 
 think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever 
 others differ from them, it is so far error. Steele, a Protestant, 
 in a dedication, tells the Pope, that the only difference between 
 our two churches, in their opinions of the certainty of their 
 doctrine, is, the Romish church is infallible, and the church of 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 353 
 
 England is never in the wrong. But though many private per- 
 sons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as that of 
 their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady, 
 who, in a little dispute with her sister, said, I don't know how 
 it happens, sister, but I meet with no body but myself that is 
 always in the right. 
 
 In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all 
 its faults, if they are such ; — because I think a general govern- 
 ment necessary for us, and there is no form of government but 
 what may be a blessing to the people, if well administered ; — 
 and I believe, farther, that this is likely to be well administered 
 for a course of years, and can only end in despotism, as other 
 forms have done before it, when the people shall become so 
 corrupted as to need despotic government, being incapable of 
 any other. 
 
 I doubt, too, whether any other Convention we can obtain, 
 may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you 
 assemble a number of men, to have the advantage of their joint 
 wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their preju- 
 dices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, 
 aild their selfish views. From such an assembly, can a perfect 
 production be expected ? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to 
 find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does. 
 And I think it will astonish our enemies who are waiting with 
 confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those 
 of the builders of Babel, and that our States are on the point of 
 separation — only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting 
 one another's throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution, 
 because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is 
 not the best. Much of the strength and efficiency of any govern- 
 ment in procuring and securing happiness to the people, depends 
 on opinion, — on the general opinion of the goodness of that 
 government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its gov- 
 ernors. I hope, therefore, that for our own sakes as a part 
 of the people, and for the sake of our posterity, we shall 
 act heartily and unanimously in recommending this Constitu- 
 tion, wherever our influence may extend, and turn our future 
 thoughts and endeavors to the means of having it well admin- 
 istered. 
 
 45 
 
354 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every 
 member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, 
 would, with me on this occasion, doubt a little of his own infal- 
 libility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to 
 this instrument. 
 
 SPEECH OF JAMES WILSON. 
 
 Speech delivered by James Wilson, Esq., explanatory of the 
 general principles of the proposed Federal Constitution ; 
 upon a motion made by the Hon. Thomas M'Kean, in the 
 Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on Saturday, No- 
 vember 24th, 1787 : [a speech which exercised considerable 
 influence not only in Pennsylvania but also in Massachusetts.] 
 
 As the only member of this respectable body, who had the 
 honor of a seat in the late Federal Convention, it is peculiarly 
 my duty, Mr. President, to submit to your consideration the 
 general principles that have produced the national Constitution, 
 which has been framed and proposed by the assembled dele- 
 gates of the United States, and which must finally stand or fall 
 by the concurrent decision of this Convention, and of others 
 acting upon the same subject, under similar powers and author- 
 ity. To frame a government for a single City or State, is a 
 business both in its importance and facility, widely different 
 from the task intrusted to the Federal Convention, whose pros- 
 pects were extended not only to thirteen independent and 
 sovereign States, some of which in territorial jurisdiction, popu- 
 lation, and resource, equal the most respectable nations of 
 Europe, but likewise to innumerable States yet unformed, and 
 to myriads of citizens who in future ages shall inhabit the vast 
 uncultivated regions of the continent. The duties of that body, 
 therefore, were not limited to local or partial considerations, 
 but to the formation of a plan commensurate with a great and 
 valuable portion of the globe. 
 
 I confess, Sir, that the magnitude of the object before us, 
 filled our minds with awe and apprehension. In Europe the 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 355 
 
 opening and extending the navigation of a single river, has 
 been deemed an act of imperial merit and importance ; but how 
 insignificant does it seem when we contemplate the scene that 
 nature here exhibits, pouring forth the Potomac, the Rappahan- 
 nock, the Susquehanna, and other innumerable rivers, to dig- 
 nify, adorn and enrich our soil. But the magnitude of the 
 object was equalled by the difficulty of accomplishing it, when we 
 considered the uncommon dexterity and address that were 
 necessary to combat and reconcile the jarring interests that 
 seemed naturally to prevail, in a country, which, presenting a 
 coast of fifteen hundred miles to the Atlantic, is composed of 
 thirteen distinct and independent States, varying essentially in 
 their situation and dimensions, and in the number and habits 
 of their citizens. Their interests, too, in some respects really 
 different, and in many apparently so ; but whether really or 
 apparently, such is the constitution of the human mind, they 
 make the same impression, and are prosecuted with equal vigor 
 and perseverance. Can it then be a subject for surprise that 
 with the sensations indispensably excited by so comprehensive 
 and so arduous an undertaking, we should for a moment yield 
 to despondency, and at length, influenced by the spirit of con- 
 ciliation, resort to mutual concession, as the only means to 
 obtain the great end for which we were convened ? Is it a mat- 
 ter of surprise that where the springs of dissension were so 
 numerous and so powerful, some force was requisite to impel 
 them to take, in a collected state, a direction different from that 
 which separately they would have pursued ? 
 
 There was another reason, that in this respect increased the 
 difficulties of the Federal Convention — the different tempers 
 and dispositions of the people for whom they acted. But, how- 
 ever widely they may differ upon other topics, they cordially 
 agree in that keen and elevated sense of freedom and independ- 
 ence, which has been manifested in their united and successful 
 opposition to one of the most powerful kingdoms of the world. 
 Still it was apprehended by some, that their abhorrence of con- 
 straint would be the source of objection and opposition ; but, I 
 confess, that my opinion, formed upon a knowledge of the good 
 sense, as well as the high spirit of my constituents, made me 
 confident that they would esteem that government to be the best 
 
356 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 which was best calculated eventually to establish and secure the 
 dignity and happiness of their country. Upon this ground, I have 
 occasionally supposed that my constituents have asked the 
 reason of my assent to the several propositions contained in the 
 plan before us. My answer, though concise, is a candid, and, I 
 think, a satisfactory one — because I thought them right ; and 
 thinking them right, it would be a poor compliment indeed to 
 presume they could be disagreeable to my constituents — a pre- 
 sumption that might occasion a retort to which I wish not to 
 expose myself, as it would again be asked, " Is this the opinion 
 you entertain of those who have confided in your judgment ? 
 From what ground do you infer that a vote right in itself would 
 be disagreeable to us ? " and it might with justice be added, 
 " this sentiment evinces that you deserve not the trust which 
 we reposed in you." No, Sir ! I have no right to imagine that 
 the reflected rays of delegated power can displease by a bright- 
 ness that proves the superior splendor of the luminary from 
 which they proceed. 
 
 The extent of country^for which the new Constitution was 
 required, produced another difficulty in the business of the 
 Federal Convention. It is the opinion of some celebrated 
 writers, that to a small territory, the democratical, to a mid- 
 dling territory, (as Montesquieu has termed it,) the monarchical, 
 and, to an extensive territory, the despotic form of government, 
 is best adapted. Regarding, then, the wide and almost unbound- 
 ed jurisdiction of the United States, at first view, the hand of 
 despotism seemed necessary to control, connect, and protect it ; 
 and hence the chief embarrassment arose. For, we knew that, 
 although our constituents would cheerfully submit to the legis- 
 lative restraints of a free government, they would spurn at every 
 attempt to shackle them with despotic power. 
 
 In this dilemma, a Federal Republic naturally presented itself 
 to our observation, as a species of government which secured all 
 the internal advantages of a republic, at the time time that it 
 maintained the external dignity and force of a monarchy. The 
 definition of this form of government may be found in Mon- 
 tesquieu, who says, I believe, that it consists in assembling 
 distinct societies, which are consolidated into a new body, capa- 
 ble of being increased by the addition of other members ; — an 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 357 
 
 expanding quality peculiarly fitted to the circumstances of 
 America. 
 
 But, while a Federal Republic removed one difficulty, it intro- 
 duced another, since there existed not any precedent to assist 
 our deliberations ; for, though there are many single govern- 
 ments, both ancient and modern, the history and principles of 
 which are faithfully preserved, and well understood, a perfect 
 confederation of independent states is a system hitherto unknown. 
 The Swiss Cantons, which have often been mentioned hi that 
 light, cannot properly be deemed a Federal Republic, but merely 
 a system of united states. The united Netherlands are also an 
 assemblage of States ; yet, as their proceedings are not the result 
 of their combined decisions, but of the decisions of each State 
 individually, their association is evidently wanting in that qual- 
 ity which is essential to constitute a Federal Republic. With 
 respect to the Germanic body, its members are of so dispropor- 
 tionate a size, their separate governments and jurisdictions so 
 different in nature and extent, the general purpose and opera- 
 tion of their union so indefinite and uncertain, and the exterior 
 power of the House of Austria so prevalent, that little informa- 
 tion could be obtained or expected from that quarter. Turning, 
 then, to ancient history, we find the Achaean and Lycian Leagues, 
 and the Amphyctionic Council bearing a superficial resemblance 
 to a Federal Republic ; but of all these, the accounts which 
 have been transmitted to us are too vague and imperfect to 
 supply a tolerable theory, and they are so destitute of that 
 minute detail from which practical knowledge may be derived, 
 that they must now be considered rather as subjects of curiosi- 
 ty, than of use or information. 
 
 Government, indeed, taken as a science, may yet be consid- 
 ered in its infancy ; and with all its various modifications, it 
 has hitherto been the result of force, fraud, or accident. For, 
 after the lapse of six thousand years since the creation of the 
 world, America now presents the first instance of a people 
 assembled to weigh deliberately and calmly, and to decide leis- 
 urely and peaceably, upon the form of government by which 
 they will bind themselves and their posterity. Among the 
 ancients, three forms of government seem to have been correctly 
 known, — the monarchical, aristocrat ical, and democratical, — 
 
358 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 but their knowledge did not extend beyond those simple kinds, 
 though much pleasing ingenuity has occasionally been exercised 
 in tracing a resemblance of mixed government in some ancient 
 institutions, particularly between them and the British Consti- 
 tution. But, in my opinion, the result of these ingenious 
 refinements does more honor to the moderns in discovering, 
 than to the ancients in forming, the similitude. In the work of 
 Homer, it is supposed by his enthusiastic commentators, the 
 seeds of every science are to be found ; but, in truth, they are 
 first observed in subsequent discoveries, and then the fond 
 imagination transplants them to the book. Tacitus, who lived 
 towards the close of that period which is called ancient, who 
 had read the history of all antecedent and cotemporary govern- 
 ments, who was perfectly competent to judge of their nature, 
 tendency and quality, Tacitus considers a mixed government 
 as a thing rather to be wished than expected ; and, if ever it 
 did occur, it was his opinion, that it could not last long. One 
 fact, however, is certain, that the ancients had no idea of repre- 
 sentation, that essential to every system of wise, good, and 
 efficient government. It is surprising, indeed, how very imper- 
 fectly, at this day, the doctrine of representation is understood 
 in Europe. Even Great Britain, which boasts a superior 
 knowledge of the subject, and is generally supposed to have 
 carried it into practice, falls far short of its true and genuine 
 principles. For, let us inquire, does representation pervade the 
 constitution of that country ? No. Is it either immediately or 
 remotely the source of the executive power ? No. For it is 
 not any part of the British constitution, as practised at this time, 
 that the king derives his authority from the people. Formerly 
 that authority was claimed by hereditary or divine right ; and 
 even at the revolution, when the government was essentially 
 improved, no other principle was recognized but that of an 
 original contract between the sovereign and the people — a con- 
 tract which rather excludes than implies the doctrine of repre- 
 sentation. Again — is the judicial system of England grounded 
 on representation ? No. For the judges are appointed by the 
 king, and he, as we have already observed, derives not his maj- 
 esty or power from the people. Lastly, then, let us review the 
 legislative body of that nation, and even there, though we find 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 359 
 
 representation operating as a check, it cannot be considered as 
 a pervading principle. The lords, acting with hereditary right, 
 or under an authority immediately communicated by regal pre- 
 rogative, are not the representatives of the people, and yet they, 
 as well as the sovereign, possess a negative power in the para- 
 mount business of legislation. Thus the vital principle of the 
 British constitution is confined to a narrow corner, and the 
 world has left to America the glory and happiness of forming a 
 government, where representation shall at once supply the basis 
 and the cement of the superstructure. For, representation, 
 Sir, is the true chain between the people and those to whom 
 they intrust the administration of the government ; and though 
 it may consist of many links, its strength and brightness never 
 should be impaired. Another, and perhaps the most important 
 obstacle to the proceedings of the Federal Convention, arose in 
 drawing the line between the national and the individual gov- 
 ernments of the States. 
 
 On this point a general principle readily occurred, that what- 
 ever object was confined in its nature and operation to a partic- 
 ular State, ought to be subject to the separate government of 
 the States ; but whatever in its nature and operation extended 
 beyond a particular State, ought to be comprehended within 
 the Federal jurisdiction. The great difficulty, therefore, was 
 the application of this general principle, for it was found imprac- 
 ticable to enumerate and distinguish the various objects to 
 which it extended, and as the mathematics only are capable of 
 demonstration, it ought not to be thought extraordinary that 
 the Convention could not develop a subject involved in such 
 endless perplexity. If, however, the proposed Constitution 
 should be adopted, I trust that in the theory there will be found 
 such harmony, and in the practice such mutual confidence 
 between the national and individual governments, that every 
 sentiment of jealousy and apprehension will be effectually 
 destroyed. But, Sir, permit me to ask, whether on the ground 
 of a union, the individual or national government ought most 
 to be trusted ? For my part, I think it more natural to presume 
 that the interest of each would be pursued by the whole, than 
 the reverse of the proposition, that the several States would 
 prefer the interest of the confederated body ; for in the general 
 
360 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 government each is represented, but in the separate govern- 
 ments, only the separate States. 
 
 These difficulties, Mr. President, which embarrassed the Fed- 
 eral Convention, are not represented to enhance the merit of 
 surmounting them, but with a more important view, to show 
 how unreasonable it is to expect that the plan of government 
 should correspond with the wishes of all the States, of all the 
 citizens of any one State, or of all the citizens of the united 
 continent. I remember well, Sir, the effect of those surround- 
 ing difficulties in the late Convention. At one time the great 
 and interesting work seemed to be at a stand ; at another, it 
 proceeded with energy and rapidity ; and when at last it was 
 accomplished, many respectable members beheld it with wonder 
 and admiration. But having pointed out the obstacles which 
 they had to encounter, I shall now beg leave to direct your 
 attention to the end which the Convention proposed. 
 
 Our wants, imperfections and weakness, Mr. President, natu- 
 rally incline us to society ; but it is certain society cannot exist 
 without some restraints. In a state of nature each individual 
 has a right, uncontrolled, to act as his pleasure or his interest 
 may prevail ; but it must be observed that this license extends 
 to every individual, and hence the state of nature is rendered 
 insupportable by the interfering claims, and the consequent 
 animosities of men, who are independent of every power and 
 influence but their passions and their will. On the other hand, 
 in entering into the social compact, though the individual parts 
 with a portion of his natural rights, yet, it is evident that he 
 gains more by the limitation of the liberty of others, than he 
 loses by the limitation of his own — so that in truth, the aggre- 
 gate of liberty is more in society than it is in a state of nature. 
 
 It is then, Sir, a fundamental principle of society, that the 
 welfare of the whole shall be pursued and not of a part, and the 
 measures necessary to the good of the community must conse- 
 quently be binding upon the individuals that compose it. This 
 principle is universally allowed to be just with respect to single 
 governments, and there are instances in which it applies with 
 equal force to independent communities ; for the situation and 
 circumstances of states may make it as necessary for them as 
 for individuals, to associate. Hence, Mr. President, the impor- 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 361 
 
 tant question arises— are such the situation and circumstances 
 of the American States ? ' 
 
 At this period, America has it in her power to adopt either of 
 the following modes of government: She may dissolve the 
 individual sovereignty of the States, and become one consoli- 
 dated empire ; she may be divided into thirteen separate, inde- 
 pendent and unconnected commonwealths ; she may be erected 
 into two or more confederacies ; or, lastly, she may become one 
 comprehensive Federal Republic. 
 
 Allow me, Sir, to take a short view of each of these supposi- 
 tions. Is it probable that the dissolution of the State govern- 
 ments, and the establishment of one consolidated empire, would 
 be eligible in its nature, and satisfactory to the people in its 
 administration ? I think not, as I have given reasons to show 
 that so extensive a territory could not be governed, connected, 
 and preserved, but by the supremacy of despotic power. All 
 the exertions of the most potent emperors of Rome were not 
 capable of keeping that empire together, which in extent was 
 far inferior to the dominion of America. Would an independent, 
 an unconnected situation, without any associating head, be 
 advantageous or satisfactory. The consequences of this system 
 would at one time expose the States to foreign insult and depre- 
 dations, and, at another, to internal jealousy, contention, and 
 war. Then let us consider the plan of two or more confederacies, 
 which has often been suggested, and which certainly presents 
 some aspects more inviting than either of the preceding modes, 
 since the subjects of strife would not be so numerous, the 
 strength of the confederates would be greater, and their interests 
 more united. But even here, when we fairly weigh the advan- 
 tages and the disadvantages, we shall find the last greatly 
 preponderating ; the expenses of government would be consid- 
 erably multiplied, the seeds of rivalship and animosity would 
 spring up, and spread the calamities of war and tumult through 
 the country ; for though the sources of rancor might be dimin- 
 ished, their strength and virulence would probably be increased. 
 
 Of these three species of government, however, I must observe, 
 that they obtained no advocates in the Federal Convention, nor 
 can I presume that they will find advocates here, or in any of 
 our sister States. The general sentiment in that body, and, I 
 
 46 
 
362 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 believe, the general sentiment of the citizens of America, is 
 expressed in the motto which some of them have chosen, unite 
 or tiie ; and while we consider the extent of the country, so 
 intersected and almost surrounded with navigable rivers, so 
 separated and detached from the rest of the world, it is natural 
 to presume that Providence has designed us for an united peo- 
 ple, under one great political compact. If this is a just and 
 reasonable conclusion, supported by the wishes of the people, 
 the Convention did right in proposing a single confederated 
 republic. But in proposing it, they were necessarily led, not 
 only to consider the situation, circumstances, and interests of 
 one, two, or three States, but of the collective body ; and as it 
 is essential to society that the welfare of the whole should be 
 preferred to the accommodation of a part, they followed the 
 same rule in promoting the national advantages of the Union, 
 in preference to the separate advantages of the States. A prin- 
 ciple of candor, as well as duty, lead to this conduct ; for, as I 
 have said before, no government, either single or confederated, 
 can exist, unless private and individual rights are subservient 
 to the public and general happiness of the nation. It was not 
 alone the State of Pennsylvania, however important she may be 
 as a constituent part of the Union, that could influence the 
 deliberations of a Convention, formed by a delegation from all 
 the United States, to devise a government adequate to their 
 common exigencies, and impartial in its influence and operation. 
 In the spirit of union, inculcated by the nature of their commis- 
 sion, they framed the Constitution before us, and in the same 
 spirit, they submit it to the candid consideration of their con- 
 stituents. 
 
 Having made some remarks upon the nature and principles 
 of civil society, I shall now take a cursory notice of civil liberty, 
 which is essential to the well-being of civil government. The 
 definition of civil liberty is, briefly, that portion of natural liberty 
 which men resign to the government, and which then produces 
 more happiness than it would have produced if retained by the 
 individuals who resign it ; — still, however, leaving to the human 
 mind the full enjoyment of every privilege that is not incompat- 
 ible with the peace and order of society. Here I am easily led 
 to the consideration of another species of liberty, which has not 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 363 
 
 yet received a discriminating name, but which I will venture to 
 term Federal liberty. This, Sir, consists in the aggregate of 
 the civil liberty which is surrendered by each State to «the 
 national government ; and the same principles that operate in 
 the establishment of a single society, with respect to the rights 
 reserved or resigned by the individuals that compose it, will 
 justly apply in the case of a confederation of distinct and inde- 
 pendent States. 
 
 These observations have been made, Mr. President, in order to 
 preface a representation of the state of the Union, as it appeared 
 to the late Convention. We all know, and we have all felt, 
 that the present system of confederation is inadequate to the 
 government and the exigencies of the United States. Need I 
 describe the contrasted scene which the Revolution has presented 
 to our view ? On the one hand, the arduous struggle in the 
 cause of liberty, terminated by a. glorious and triumphant peace ; 
 on the other, contention and poverty at home, discredit and 
 disgrace abroad. Do we not remember what high expectations 
 were formed by others and by ourselves, on the return of peace ? 
 And have those honorable expectations from our national char- 
 acter been realized ? No ! What then has been the cause of 
 disappointment ? Has America lost her magnanimity or perse- 
 verance ? No. Has she been subdued by any high handed 
 invasion of her liberties ? Still I answer, no ; for, dangers of 
 that kind were no sooner seen, than they were repelled. But 
 the evil has stolen in from a quarter little suspected, and the 
 rock of Freedom, which stood firm against the attacks of a for- 
 eign foe, has been sapped and undermined by the licentiousness 
 of our own citizens. Private calamity and public anarchy have 
 prevailed, and even the blessing of independency has been 
 scarcely felt or understood by a people who have dearly achiev- 
 ed it. 
 
 Shall I, Sir, be more particular in this lamentable history ? 
 The commencement of peace was likewise the commencement ' 
 of our distresses and disgrace. Devoid of power, we could 
 neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged 
 the country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution to 
 the public revenue ; devoid of importance, we were unable to 
 command a sale for our commodities in a foreign market ; 
 
364 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 devoid of credit, our public securities were melting in the hands 
 of their deluded owners, like snow before the sun ; devoid of 
 dignity, we were inadequate to perform treaties on our own 
 part, or to compel a performance on the part of a contracting 
 nation. In short, Sir, the tedious tale disgusts me, and I fondly 
 hope it is unnecessary to proceed. The years of languor are 
 over. We have seen dishonor and destruction, it is true, but 
 we have at length penetrated the cause, and are now anxious to 
 obtain the cure. The cause need not be specified by a recapitu- 
 lation of facts ; every act of Congress, and the proceedings of 
 every State are replete with proofs in that respect, and all point 
 to the weakness and imbecility of the existing Confederation ; 
 while the loud and concurrent voice of the people proclaims an 
 efficient national government to be the only cure. Under these 
 impressions, and with these views, the late Convention were 
 appointed and met ; the end which they proposed to accomplish 
 being to frame one national and efficient government, in which 
 the exercise of beneficence, correcting the jarring interests of 
 every part, should pervade the whole, and by which the peace, 
 freedom and happiness of the United States should be perma- 
 nently insured. The principles and means that were adopted 
 by the Convention to obtain that end, are now before us, and 
 will become the great object of our discussion. But on this 
 point, as upon others, permit me to make a few general observa- 
 tions. 
 
 In all governments, whatever is their form, however they may 
 be constituted, there must be a power established from which 
 there is no appeal, and which is therefore called absolute, 
 supreme and uncontrollable. The only question is, where that 
 power is lodged ? A question that will receive different answers 
 from the different writers on the subject. Sir William Black- 
 stone says, it resides in the omnipotence of the British Parlia- 
 ment, or, in other words, corresponding with the practice of that 
 country, it is whatever the British Parliament pleases to do : so 
 that when that body was so base and treacherous to the rights 
 of the people as to transfer the legislative authority to Henry 
 the Eighth, his exercising that authority by proclamations and 
 edicts, could not, strictly speaking, be termed unconstitutional, 
 for under the act of parliament his will was made the law, and 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 365 
 
 therefore his will became in that respect the constitution itself. 
 But were we to ask some politicians who have taken a faint and 
 inaccurate view of our establishments, where does this supreme 
 power reside in the United States ? they would probably answer, 
 in their Constitutions. This, however, though a step nearer to 
 the fact, is not a just opinion ; for, in truth, it remains and 
 flourishes with the people, and under the influence of that truth 
 we, at this moment, sit, deliberate and speak. In other coun- 
 tries, indeed, the revolutions of government are connected with 
 war, and all its concomitant calamities. But with us, they are 
 considered as the means of obtaining a superior knowledge of 
 the nature of government, and of accomplishing its end. That 
 the supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the people, is, 
 in my judgment, the great panacea of human politics. It is a 
 power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, 
 and indefinite in its extent. For, I insist, if there are errors in 
 government, the people have the right not only to correct and 
 amend them, but likewise totally to change and reject its form ; 
 and under the operation of that right, the citizens of the United 
 States can never be wretched beyond retrieve, unless they are 
 wanting to themselves. 
 
 Then let us examine, Mr. President, the three species of 
 simple governments, which, as I have already mentioned, are 
 the monarchical, aristocratical and democratical. In a mon- 
 archy, the supreme power is vested in a single person ; in an 
 aristocracy, it is possessed by a body, not formed upon the prin- 
 ciple of representation, but enjoying their station by descent, 
 by election among themselves, or in right of some personal or 
 territorial qualification ; and, lastly, in a democracy, it is inher- 
 ent in the people, and is either exercised by themselves or by 
 their representatives. Each of these systems has its advantages 
 and its disadvantages. The advantages of a monarchy are 
 strength, dispatch and unity; its disadvantages are expense, 
 tyranny and war. The advantages of an aristocracy are experi- 
 ence, and the wisdom resulting from education ; its disadvan- 
 tages are the dissension of the governors, and the oppression of 
 the people. The advantages of a democracy are liberty, caution, 
 industry, fidelity, and an opportunity of bringing forward the 
 talents and abilities of the citizens, without regard to birth or 
 
366 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 fortune ; its disadvantages are dissension and imbecility, for the 
 assent of many being required, their exertions will be feeble, 
 and their counsels too soon discovered. 
 
 To obtain all the advantages, and to avoid all the incon- 
 veniences of these governments, was the leading object of the 
 late Convention. Having, therefore, considered the formation 
 and principles of other systems, it is natural to inquire of what 
 description is the Constitution before us ? In its principles, Sir, 
 it is purely democratical ; varying indeed, in its form, in order 
 to admit all the advantages, and to exclude all the disadvantages 
 which are incidental to the known and established constitutions 
 of government. But when we take an extensive and accurate 
 view of the streams of power that appear through this great and 
 comprehensive plan, — when we contemplate the variety of their 
 directions, the force and dignity of their currents, — when we 
 behold them intersecting, embracing, and surrounding the vast 
 possessions and interests of the continent, and when we see 
 them distributing on all hands, beauty, energy and riches, still, 
 however numerous and wide their courses, however diversified 
 and remote the blessings they diffuse, we shall be able to trace 
 them all to one great and noble source — the People. 
 
 Such, Mr. President, are the general observations with which 
 I have thought necessary to trouble you. In discussing the 
 distinct propositions of the Federal plan, I shall have occasion 
 to apply them more particularly to that subject, but at present, 
 I shall conclude with requesting the pardon of the Convention 
 for having so long intruded upon their patience. 
 
 BRUTUS.— No. I. 
 
 When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a 
 question in which not only the present members of the community 
 are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery 
 of generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the 
 benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly interested 
 in the result. 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 367 
 
 In this situation, I trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to 
 lead the minds of the people to a wise and prudent deter- 
 mination, cannot fail of being acceptable to the candid and 
 dispassionate part of the community. Encouraged by this con- 
 sideration, I have been induced to oifer my thoughts upon the 
 present important crisis of our public affairs. 
 
 Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their 
 political concerns. We have felt the feebleness of the ties by 
 which these United States are held together, and the want of 
 sufficient energy in our present Confederation, to manage, in 
 some instances, our general concerns. Various expedients 
 have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have suc- 
 ceeded. At length a Convention of the States has been assem- 
 bled, they have formed a Constitution which will now, probably, 
 be submitted to the people to ratify or reject, who are the foun- 
 tain of all power, to whom alone it of right belongs to make or 
 unmake constitutions or forms of government, at their pleasure. 
 The most important question that was ever proposed to the 
 decision of any people under heaven, is before you, and you are 
 to decide upon it byjnen of your own election, chosen specially for 
 this purpose. If the Constitution, offered to your acceptance, 
 be a wise one, calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of 
 liberty, to secure the inestimable rights of mankind, and pro- 
 mote human happiness, then, if you accept it, you will lay a 
 lasting foundation of happiness for millions yet unborn ; gen- 
 erations to come will rise up and call you blessed. You may 
 rejoice in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming 
 filled with freemen, who will assert the dignity of human nature. 
 You may solace yourselves with the idea, that society, in this 
 favored land, will fast advance to the highest point of perfection ; 
 the human mind will expand in knowledge and virtue, and the 
 golden age be, in some measure, realized. But if, on the other 
 hand, this form of government contains principles that will lead 
 to the subversion of liberty — if it tends to establish a despotism, 
 or, what is worse, a tyrannic aristocracy ; then, if you adopt it, 
 this only remaining asylum for liberty will be shut up, and 
 posterity will execrate your memory. 
 
 Momentous then is the question you have to determine, and 
 you are called upon by every motive which should influence a 
 
368 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 noble and virtuous mind, to examine it well, and to make up a 
 wise judgment. It is insisted, indeed, that this Constitution 
 must be received, be it ever so imperfect. If it has its defects, 
 it is said, they can be best amended when they are experienced. 
 But remember, when the people once part with power, they 
 can seldom or never resume it again but by force. Many 
 instances can be produced in which the people have voluntarily 
 increased the powers of their rulers ; but few, if any, in which 
 rulers have willingly abridged their authority. This is a sufficient 
 reason to induce you to be careful, in the first instance, how you 
 deposit the powers of government. 
 
 With these few introductory remarks, I shall proceed to a 
 consideration of this Constitution. 
 
 The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether 
 a confederated government be the best for the United States or 
 not ? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States 
 should be reduced to one great republic, governed by one legis- 
 lature, and under the direction of one executive and judiciary ; 
 or whether they should continue thirteen confederated repub- 
 lics, under the direction and control of a supreme Federal head 
 for certain defined, national purposes only ? 
 
 This inquiry is important, because, although the government 
 reported by the Convention does not go to a perfect and entire 
 consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if 
 executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it. 
 
 This government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable 
 powers, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every 
 object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 
 eighth, article first, it is declared, that the Congress shall have 
 power " to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
 carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
 powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the 
 United States, or in any department or office thereof." And 
 by the sixth article, it is declared, " that this Constitution, and 
 the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance 
 thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
 the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
 the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
 any thing in the Constitution or law of any State to the con- 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 369 
 
 trary notwithstanding." It appears from these articles, that 
 there is no need of any intervention of the State governments, 
 between the Congress and the people, to execute anyone power 
 vested in the general government, and that the Constitution 
 and laws of every State are nullified and declared void, so far 
 as they are or shall be inconsistent with this Constitution, or 
 the laws made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under 
 the authority of the United States. The government, then, so 
 far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It 
 is as much one complete government as that of New York or 
 Massachusetts ; has as absolute and perfect powers to make and 
 execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare 
 offences, and annex penalties, with respect to every object to 
 which it extends, as any other in the world. So far, therefore, 
 as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and 
 lost. It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or 
 to speak more properly, some small degree of power is still left 
 to the States ; but a little attention to the powers vested in the 
 general government, will convince every candid man, that if it 
 is capable of being executed, all that is reserved for the indi- 
 vidual States must very soon be annihilated, except so far as 
 they are barely necessary to the organization of the general 
 government. The powers of the general legislature extend to 
 every case that is of the least importance — there is nothing val- 
 uable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is 
 within its power. It has authority to make laws which will 
 affect the lives, the liberty, and property of every man in the 
 United States ; nor can the Constitution or laws of any State, 
 in any way prevent or impede the full and complete execution 
 of every power given. The legislative power is competent to lay 
 taxes, duties, imposts, and excises ; — there is no limitation to 
 this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the 
 use to which those taxes and duties shall be applied, may be 
 said to be a limitation ; but this is no restriction of the power 
 at all, for by this clause they are to be applied to pay the debts 
 and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the 
 United States ; but the legislature have authority to contract 
 debts at their discretion ; they are the sole judges of what is 
 necessary to provide for the common defence, and they only are 
 
 47 
 
370 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 to determine what is for the general welfare: this power, 
 therefore, is neither more nor less than a power to lay 
 and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure ; not 
 only the power to lay taxes unlimited, as to the amount they 
 may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise them in any 
 mode they please. No State legislature, or any power .in the 
 State governments, have any more to do in carrying this into 
 effect than the authority of one State has to do with that of 
 another. In the business, therefore, of laying and collecting 
 taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, and that of one 
 entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that 
 the authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of 
 any power that can be granted ; it connects with it almost all 
 other powers, or at least will in process of time draw all others 
 after it ; it is the great mean of protection, security, and 
 defence, in a good government, and the great engine of oppres- 
 sion and tyranny in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the 
 case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this 
 Constitution, to the State governments, on this article of raising 
 money. No State can emit paper money, lay any duties or 
 imposts, on imports, or exports, but by consent of the Congress; 
 and then the net produce shall be for the benefit of the United 
 States : the only means, therefore, left for any State to support 
 its government and discharge its debts, is by direct taxation ; 
 and the United States have also power to lay and collect taxes, 
 in any way they please. Every one who has thought on the 
 subject, must be convinced that but small sums of money can be 
 collected in any country, by direct tax ; when the Federal gov- 
 ernment begins to exercise the right of taxation in all its parts, 
 the legislatures of the several States will find it impossible to raise 
 moneys to support their governments. Without money they 
 cannot be supported, and they must dwindle away, and, as 
 before observed, their powers be absorbed in that of the general 
 government. 
 
 It might be here shown, that the power in the Federal legis- 
 lature, to raise and support armies at pleasure, as well in peace 
 as in war, and their control over the militia, tend not only to a 
 consolidation of the government, but the destruction of liberty. 
 I shall not, however, dwell upon these, as a few observations 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 371 
 
 upon the judicial power of this government, in addition to the 
 preceding, will fully evince the truth of the position. 
 
 The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in a 
 supreme court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may, 
 from time to time, ordain and establish. The powers of these 
 courts are very extensive ; their jurisdiction comprehends all 
 civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of the same 
 State ; and it extends to all cases in law and equity arising 
 under the Constitution. One inferior court must be established, 
 I presume, in each State, at least, with the necessary executive 
 officers appendant thereto. It is easy to see, that in the com- 
 mon course of things, these courts will eclipse the dignity, and 
 take away from the respectability, of the State courts. These 
 courts will be, in themselves, totally independent of the States, 
 deriving their authority from the United States, and receiving 
 from them fixed salaries ; and in the course of human events it 
 is to be expected, that they will swallow up all the powers of 
 the courts in the respective States. 
 
 How far the clause in the eighth section of the first article 
 may operate to do away all idea of Confederated States, and to 
 effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general gov- 
 ernment, it is impossible to say. The powers given by this article 
 are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a con- 
 struction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to 
 make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying 
 into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the 
 government of the United States, or any department or officer 
 thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite, and may, 
 for aught I know, be exercised in such manner as entirely to 
 abolish the State legislatures. Suppose the legislature of a 
 State should pass a law to raise money to support their govern- 
 ment and pay the State debt ; may the Congress repeal this 
 law, because it may prevent the collection of a tax which they 
 may think proper and necessary to lay, to provide for the general 
 welfare of the United States ? For all laws made, in pursuance 
 of this Constitution, are the supreme law of the land, and the 
 judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the 
 Constitution or laws of the different States to the contrary not- 
 withstanding. By such a law, the government of a particular 
 
372 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 State might bo overturned at one stroke, and thereby be depriv- 
 ed of every means of its support. 
 
 It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the 
 Constitution would warrant a law of this kind ! or unnecessarily 
 to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting that the Federal 
 legislature would be more likely to pass the limits assigned 
 them by the Constitution, than that of an individual State, fur- 
 ther than they are less responsible to the people. But what is 
 meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested 
 with the great and uncontrollable powers of laying and collect- 
 ing taxes, duties, imposts, and excises ; of regulating trade, 
 raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disci- 
 plining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers ; 
 and are by this clause invested with the power of making all 
 laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution ; 
 and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all 
 the State governments, and reduce this country to one single 
 government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they 
 will ; for it will be found that the power retained by individual 
 States, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the gov-" 
 ernment of the United States ; the latter, therefore, will be 
 naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a 
 truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every 
 man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever dis- 
 posed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every 
 thing that stands in their way. This disposition, which is 
 implanted in human nature, will operate in the Federal legisla- 
 ture to lessen and ultimately to subvert the State authority, 
 and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the 
 Federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident, 
 then, that what this Constitution wants of being a complete 
 consolidation of the several parts of the Union into one complete 
 government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and execu- 
 tive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily 
 acquire in its exercise in operation. 
 
 Let us now proceed to inquire, as I at first purposed, whether 
 it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one 
 great republic, or not ? It is here taken for granted, that all 
 agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 373 
 
 be a free one ; that it should be so framed as to secure the lib- 
 erty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of 
 a full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The ques- 
 tion, then, will be, whether a government thus constituted, and 
 founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised 
 over the whole United States, reduced into one State ? 
 
 If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and 
 wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of 
 government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free 
 republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, 
 containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing 
 in such rapid progression, as that of the whole United States. 
 Among the many illustrious authorities which might be pro- 
 duced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only 
 two. The one is the Baron De Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, 
 Chap, xvi., Vol. 1. " It is natural to a republic to have only 
 a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large 
 republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of 
 less moderation ; there are trusts too great to be placed in any 
 "single subject ; he has interest of his own ; he soon begins to 
 think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing 
 his fellow-citizens ; and that he may raise himself to grandeur 
 on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public 
 good is sacrificed to a thousand views ; it is subordinate to 
 exceptions, and depends on accidents. In. a small one, the 
 interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and 
 more within the reach of every citizen ; abuses are of less extent, 
 and of course are less protected." Of the same opinion is the 
 Marquis Beccarari. 
 
 History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing 
 like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics 
 were of small extent ; so also was that of the Romans. Both of 
 these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests 
 over large territories of country ; and the consequence was, that 
 their governments were changed from that of free govoi'iiments 
 to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world. 
 
 Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience 
 of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a 
 variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of 
 
374 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 things, againt it. In every government the will of the sovereign 
 is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme authority 
 being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily 
 expressed to a large, extensive territory as to a small one. In a 
 pure democracy, the people are the sovereign, and their will is 
 declared by themselves ; for this purpose they must all come 
 together to deliberate and decide. This kind of government 
 cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considera- 
 ble extent ; it must be confined to a single city, or at least 
 limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently 
 assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted 
 to them, and declare their opinion concerning it. 
 
 In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the 
 consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their con- 
 sent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by 
 them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constitu- 
 ents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind. 
 
 In every free government, the people must give their assent 
 to the laws by which they are governed. This is the true crite- 
 rion between a free government and an arbitrary one. The 
 former are ruled by the will of the whole, expressed in any 
 manner they may agree upon ; the latter by the will of one, or 
 a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by 
 persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the 
 choice and the number chosen must be such as to possess, be 
 disposed, and consequently qualified to declare the sentiments 
 of the people ; for if they do not know, or are not disposed to 
 speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not govern, 
 but the sovereignty is in a few. Now, in a large, extended 
 country, it is impossible to have a representation possessing the 
 sentiments, and of integrity to declare the minds of the people, 
 without having it so numerous and unwieldy as to be subject, in 
 great measure, to the inconveniency of a democratic govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The territory of the United States is of vast extent ; it now 
 contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing 
 much more than ten times that number. Is it practicable for a 
 country, so large and numerous as they will soon become, to 
 elect a representation that will speak their sentiments, without 
 
1788.] . SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 375 
 
 their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting 
 public business ? It certainly is not. 
 
 In a republic, the manners, sentiments and interests of the 
 people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be 
 a constant clashing of opinions ; and the representatives of one 
 part will be continually striving against those of the other. This 
 will retard the operations of government, and prevent such 
 conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply this 
 remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be con- 
 vinced that it forbids that we should be one government. The 
 United States includes a variety of climates. ' The productions 
 of the different parts of the Union are very variant, and their 
 interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits 
 differ as much as their climates and productions ; and their 
 sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs 
 of the several States are, in many respects, very diverse, and in 
 some opposite ; each would be in, favor of its own interests and 
 customs ; and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of repre- 
 sentatives from the respective parts, would not only be too 
 numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be com- 
 posed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as would 
 constantly be contending with each other. 
 
 The laws cannot be executed in a republic of an extent equal 
 to that of the United States, with promptitude. ' 
 
 The magistrates in every government must be supported in 
 the execution of the laws, either by an armed force, maintained 
 at the public expense for that purpose, or by. the people turning 
 out to aid the magistrate upon his command, in case of resist- 
 ance. 
 
 In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of 
 Europe, standing armies are kept up to execute the commands 
 of the prince or the magistrate, and are employed for this pur- 
 pose when occasion requires ; but they have always proved the 
 destruction of liberty, and are abhorrent to the spirit of a free 
 republic. In England, where they depend upon the parliament 
 for their annual support, they have always been complained of 
 as oppressive and unconstitutional, and are seldom employed in 
 executing the laws ; never except on extraordinary occasions, 
 and then under the direction of a civil magistrate. 
 
376 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute 
 its laws. It must depend upon the support of its citizens. But 
 when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the 
 citizens, it must be so constructed as to have the confidence, 
 respect, and affection of the people. Men who, upon the call of 
 the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are influ- 
 enced to do it either by affection to the government, or from 
 fear ; where a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, 
 every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, 
 when the magistrate calls, will obey ; but, where this is not the 
 case, the government must rest for its support upon the confi- 
 dence and respect which the people have for their government and 
 laws. The body of the people being attached, the government 
 will always be sufficient to support and execute its laws, and to 
 operate upon the fears of any faction which may be opposed to 
 it, not only to prevent any opposition to the execution of the 
 laws themselves, but also to compel the most of them to aid the 
 magistrate ; but the people will not be likely to have such con- 
 fidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United 
 States, as is necessary for these purposes. The confidence 
 which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises 
 from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them 
 for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing 
 them when they misbehave ; but in a republic of the extent of 
 this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with 
 very few of their rulers ; the people at large would know little 
 of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to 
 change them. The people in Georgia and New Hampshire 
 would not know one another's mind, and therefore could not 
 act in concert to enable them to effect a general change of 
 representatives. The different parts of so extensive a country 
 could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their 
 representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which 
 measures were founded. The consequence will be, they will 
 have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambi- 
 tious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will 
 not support the laws they pass. Hence the government will be 
 nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it 
 otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 377 
 
 laws at the point of the bayonet — a government of all others 
 the most to be dreaded. 
 
 In a republic of such vast extent as the United States, the 
 legislature cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of 
 its different parts. It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be 
 acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different 
 districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have sufficient 
 time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this 
 nature that would be continually arising. 
 
 In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government 
 would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse 
 their powers to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and 
 oppressing them. The trust committed to the executive offices, 
 in a country of the extent of the United States, must be various 
 and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and navy of 
 the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning 
 offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power 
 of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be 
 lodged and exercised in every State, in the hands of a few. 
 When these are attended with great honor and emolument, as 
 they always will be in large States, so as greatly to interest men 
 to pursue them, and to be proper objects for ambitious and 
 designing men, such men will be ever restless in their pursuit 
 after them. They will Use the power, when they have acquired 
 it, to the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, 
 and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them 
 to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of 
 power. 
 
 These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free 
 republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent 
 of these States. If then this new Constitution is calculated to 
 consolidate the thirteen States into one, as it evidently is, it 
 ought not to be adopted. 
 
 Though I am of opinion, that it is a sufficient objection to 
 this government, to reject it, that it creates the whole Union 
 into one government under the form of a republic, yet if this 
 objection was obviated, there are exceptions to it which are so 
 material and fundamental, that they ought to determine every 
 man, who is a friend to the liberty and happiness of mankind, 
 
 48 
 
378 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 not to adopt it. I beg the candid and dispassionate attention of 
 my countrymen, while I state these objections — they are such as 
 have obtruded themselves upon my mind upon a careful atten- 
 tion to the matter, and such as I sincerely believe are well 
 founded. There are many objections, of small moment, of 
 which I shall take no notice. Perfection is not to be expected 
 in any thing that is the production of man, and if I did not in 
 my conscience believe that this scheme was defective in the fun- 
 damental principles — in the foundation upon which a free and 
 equal government must rest — I would hold my peace. 
 
 Brutus. 
 
 BRUTUS.— No. II. 
 
 1 flatter myself that my last address established this position, 
 that to reduce the thirteen States into one government, would 
 prove the destruction of our liberties. 
 
 But lest this truth should be doubted by some, I will now 
 proceed to consider its merits. 
 
 Though it should be admitted, that the arguments against 
 reducing all the States into one consolidated government, are 
 not sufficient fully to establish this point, yet they will, at least, 
 justify this conclusion, that informing a tJonstitution for such a 
 country, great care should be taken to limit and define its pow- 
 ers, adjust its parts, and guard against an abuse of authority. 
 How far attention has been paid to these objects, shall be the 
 subject of future inquiry. When a building is to be erected 
 which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be 
 firmly laid. The Constitution proposed to your acceptance is 
 designed, not for yourselves alone, but for generations yet 
 unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which the social com- 
 pact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, 
 and the most express and full declaration of rights to have 
 been made. But on this subject there is almost an entire 
 silence. 
 
 If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America, 
 from their own most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 379 
 
 self-evident, that all men are by nature free. No one man, 
 therefore, or any class of men, have a right, by the law of 
 nature, or of God, to assume or exercise authority over their 
 fellows. The origin of society, then, is to be sought, not in any 
 natural right which one man has to exercise authority over 
 another, but in the united consent of those who associate. The 
 mutual wants of men at first dictated the propriety of forming 
 societies ; and when they were established, protection and 
 defence pointed out the necessity of instituting government. 
 In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest ; 
 in this pursuit it frequently happened, that the possessions or 
 enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and designs 
 of another ; thus the weak were a prey to the strong, the 
 simple and unwary were subject to impositions from those who 
 were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, 
 every individual was insecure ; common interest, therefore, 
 directed that government should be established, in which the 
 force of the whole community should be collected, and under 
 such directions, as to protect and defend every one who com 
 posed it. The common good, therefore, is the end of civil gov- 
 ernment, and common consent, the foundation on which it is 
 established. To effect this end, it was necessary that a certain 
 portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in order that 
 what remained should be preserved. How great a proportion 
 of natural freedom is* necessary to be yielded by individuals, 
 when they submit to government, I shall not inquire. So much, 
 however, must be given, as will be sufficient to enable those to 
 whom the administration of the government is committed, to 
 establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the communi- 
 ty, and to carry those laws into effect. But it is not necessary, 
 for this purpose, that individuals should relinquish all their 
 natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they cannot be 
 surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the 
 right of enjoying and defending life, &c. Others are not neces- 
 sary to be resigned in order to attain the end for which govern- 
 ment is instituted, these therefore ought not to be given up. To 
 surrender them, would counteract the very end of government, 
 to wit, the common good. From these observations it appears^ 
 that in forming a government on its true principles, the foiuida- 
 
380 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788 
 
 tion should be laid in the manner I before stated, by expressly 
 reserving to the people such of their essential rights as are not 
 necessary to be parted with. The same reasons which at first 
 induced mankind to associate and institute government, will 
 operate to influence them to observe this precaution. If they 
 had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of immu- 
 table righteousness, government would not have been requisite. 
 It was because one part exercised fraud, oppression and violence 
 on the other, that men came together, and agreed that certain 
 rules should be formed to regulate the conduct of all, and the 
 power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to 
 enforce an obedience to them. But rulers have the same propen- 
 sities as other men ; they are as likely to use the power witli which 
 they are vested, for private purposes, and to the injury and 
 oppression of those over whom they are placed, as individuals 
 in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another. It is 
 therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority, 
 as that government should have at first been instituted to 
 restrain private injuries. 
 
 This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason 
 and nature of things, is confirmed by universal experience. 
 Those who have governed, have been found in all ages ever 
 active to enlarge their powers and abridge the public liberty. 
 This lias induced the people in all countries, where any sense 
 of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments 
 of their rulers. The country from which we have derived our 
 origin, is an eminent example of this. Their magna charta and 
 bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the security 
 of that nation. I need say no more, I presume, to an American, 
 than that this principle is a fundamental one, in all the Consti- 
 tutions of our own States ; there is not one of them but what is 
 either founded on a declaration or bill of rights, or has certain 
 express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of them. 
 From this it appears, that at a time when the pulse of liberty 
 beat high, and when an appeal was made to the people to form 
 Constitutions for the government of themselves, it was their 
 universal sense, that such declarations should make a part of 
 their frames of government. It is, therefore, the more aston- 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 381 
 
 ishing, that this grand security to the rights of the people is not 
 to be found in this Constitution. 
 
 It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declara- 
 tion of rights, however requisite they might be in the Constitu- 
 tions of the States, are not necessary in the general Constitution, 
 because, " in the former case, everything which is not reserved 
 is given ; but in the latter, the reverse of the proposition prevails, 
 and every thing which is not given is reserved." It requires 
 but little attention to discover, that this mode of reasoning is 
 rather specious than solid. The powers, rights and authority, 
 granted to the general government by this Constitution, are as 
 complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as 
 that of any State government — it reaches to every thing which 
 concerns human happiness — life, liberty, and property are under 
 its control. There is the same reason, therefore, tiiat the exer- 
 cise of power, in this case, should be restrained within proper 
 limits, as in that of the State governments. To set this matter 
 in a clear light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the 
 bills of rights of the individual States, and apply them to the 
 case in question. 
 
 For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of 
 rights of most of the States have declared, that no man shall 
 , be held to answer for a crime until he is made fully acquainted 
 with the charge brought against him ; he shall not be compelled 
 to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself — the witnesses 
 against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be fully 
 heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security 
 of life and liberty, that trial of facts be in the vicinity where 
 they happen. Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in 
 the general government, as in that of a particular State ? The 
 powers vested in the new Congress extend in many cases to life ; 
 they are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety 
 of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exer- 
 cise, save only, that " the trial of all crimes, except in cases of 
 impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such trial shall be in the 
 State where the said crimes shall have been committed." No 
 man is secure of a trial in the county where he is charged to 
 have committed a crime ; he may be broxight from Niagara to 
 New York, or carried from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for 
 
382 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 an offence supposed to be committed. What security is there, 
 that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain description 
 of the charges against him ? That he shall be allowed to pro- 
 duce all proof he can in his favor? That he shall see the 
 witnesses against him face to face, or that he shall be fully- 
 heard in his own defence by himself or counsel ? 
 
 For the security of liberty it has been declared, " that exces- 
 sive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
 nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted. That all warrants, 
 without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or seize 
 any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppres- 
 sive." 
 
 These provisions are as necessary under the general govern- 
 ment as under that of the individual States ; for the power of 
 the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, 
 imposing fines, inflicting punishments, granting search war- 
 rants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, in certain cases, 
 as the other. 
 
 For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is 
 declared by all the States, " that in all controversies at law, 
 respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of 
 the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to 
 remain sacred and inviolable.' ' 
 
 Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right 
 under their national compact, as in that of the States ? Yet 
 nothing is said respecting it. In the bills of rights of the States 
 it is declared, that a well regulated militia is the proper and 
 natural defence of a free government ; that as standing armies 
 in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up, and 
 that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, 
 and controlled by, the civil power. 
 
 The same security is as necessary in this Constitution, and 
 much more so ; for the general government will have the sole 
 power to raise and to pay armies, and are under no control in 
 the exercise of it ; yet nothing of this is to be found in this new 
 system. 
 
 I might proceed to instance a number of other rights, which 
 were as necessary to be reserved, such as, that elections should 
 be free, that the liberty of the press should be held sacred ; but 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 383 
 
 the instances adduced are sufficient to prove that this argument 
 is without foundation. Besides, it is evident that the reason 
 here assigned was not the true one, why the framers of this 
 Constitution omitted a bill of rights ; if it had been, they would 
 not have made certain reservations, while they totally omitted 
 others of more importance. We find they have, in the ninth 
 section of the first article declared, that the writ of habeas 
 corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion, — 
 that no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed, — 
 that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, 
 &c. If every thing which is not given is reserved, what pro- 
 priety is there in these exceptions ? Does this Constitution any 
 where grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus, to 
 make ex post facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles 
 of nobility ? It certainly does not in express terms. The only 
 answer that can be given is, that these are implied in the 
 general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said, that 
 all the powers which the bills of rights guard against the abuse 
 of, are contained or implied in the general ones granted by this 
 Constitution. 
 
 So far is it from being true, that a bill of rights is less neces- 
 sary in the general Constitution than in those of the States, the 
 contrary is evidently the fact. This system, if it is possible for 
 the people of America to accede to it, will be an original com- 
 pact ; and being the last, will, in the nature of things, vacate 
 every former agreement inconsistent with it. For it being a 
 plan of government received and ratified by the whole people, all 
 other forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption, 
 must yield to it. This* is expressed in positive and unequivocal 
 terms in the sixth article: "That this Constitution, and the 
 laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
 thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
 the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of 
 the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
 any thing in the Constitution, or laws of any State, to the con- 
 trary notwithstanding." 
 
 " The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the 
 members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and 
 iwlicH officers, both of the United State?, and of the ror?rrJ 
 
384 SPIRIT OP THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this 
 Constitution." 
 
 It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but posi- 
 tively expressed, that the different State Constitutions are 
 repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are inconsistent 
 with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance 
 thereof, or with treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
 the authority of the United States. Of what avail will the Con- 
 stitutions of the respective States be to preserve the rights of its 
 citizens ? Should they be plead, the answer would be, the Con- 
 stitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance 
 thereof, is the supreme law, and, all legislatures and judicial 
 officers, whether of the General or State governments, -are bound 
 by oath to support it. No privilege, reserved by the bills of 
 rights, or secured by the State governments, can limit the power 
 granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. 
 It stands, therefore, on its own bottom, and must receive a con- 
 struction by/ itself, without any reference to any other. And 
 hence it was of the highest importance, that the most precise 
 and express declarations and reservations of rights should have 
 been made. 
 
 This will appear the more necessary, when it is considered, 
 that not only the Constitution and laws made in pursuance 
 thereof, but all treaties made, under the authority of the United 
 States, are the supreme law of the land, and supersede the- Con- 
 stitutions of all the States. The power to make -treaties, is 
 vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of 
 two-thirds of the senate. I do not find any limitation or restric- 
 tion to the exercise of this power. The most important article 
 in any Constitution may therefore be repealed, even without a 
 legislative act. Ought not a government, vested with such 
 extensive and indefinite authority, to have been restricted by a 
 declaration of rights ? It certainly ought. 
 
 So clear a point is this, that I cannot help suspecting that 
 persons who attempt to persuade people that such reservations 
 were less necessary under this Constitution than under those of 
 the States, are wilfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you 
 into an absolute state of vassalage. 
 
 Brutus. 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 385 
 
 BRUTUS.— No. III. 
 
 In the investigation of the Constitution, under your consid- 
 eration, great care should be taken that you do not form your 
 opinions respecting it from unimportant provisions, or fallacious 
 appearances. 
 
 On a careful examination, you will find that many of its parts, 
 of little moment, are well formed ; in these it has a specious 
 resemblance of a free government, but this is not sufficient to 
 justify the adoption of it ; the gilded pill is often found to con- 
 tain the most deadly poison. 
 
 You are not, however, to expect a perfect form of government, 
 any more than to meet with perfection in man ; your views, 
 therefore, ought to be directed to the main pillars upon which 
 a free government is to rest ; if these are well placed, on a 
 foundation that will support the superstructure, you should be 
 satisfied, although the building may want a number of orna- 
 ments, which, if your particular tastes were gratified, you would 
 have added to it. On the other hand, if the foundation is inse- 
 curely laid, and the main supports are wanting, or not properly 
 fixed, however the fabric may be decorated and adorned, you 
 ought to reject it. 
 
 Under these impressions, it has been my object to turn your 
 attention to the principal defects in this system. 
 
 I have attempted to show, that a consolidation of this exten- 
 sive continent, under one government, for internal as well as 
 external purposes, which is evidently the tendency of this Con- 
 stitution, cannot succeed without a sacrifice of your liberties ; 
 and therefore that the attempt is not only preposterous, but 
 extremely dangerous ; and I have shown, independent of this, 
 that the plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle, 
 which ought to be found in every free government, to wit, a 
 declaration of rights. 
 
 I shall now proceed to take a nearer view of this system, to 
 examine its parts more minutely, and show that the powers are 
 not properly deposited for the security of public liberty. 
 
 The first important object that presents itself in the organi- 
 zation of this government, is the legislature. This is to be 
 
 49 
 
386 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 composed of two branches — the first to be called the general 
 assembly, and is to be chosen by the people of the respective 
 States, in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, and is 
 to consist of sixty-five members, with powers in the legislature 
 to increase the number, not to exceed one for every thirty thou- 
 sand inhabitants. The second branch is to be called the senate, 
 and is to consist of twenty-six members, two of which are to be 
 chosen by the legislatures of each of the States. 
 
 In the former of these there is an appearance of justice, in 
 the appointment of its members ; but if the clause which pro- 
 vides for this branch be stripped of its ambiguity, it will be 
 found that there is really no equality of representation, even in 
 this house. 
 
 The words are, " representatives and direct taxes shall be 
 apportioned among the several States, which may be included 
 in this Union, according to their respective numbers, which 
 shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free per- 
 sons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and 
 excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.' ■ 
 What a strange and unnecessary accumulation of words are here 
 used to conceal from the public eye what might have been 
 expressed in the following concise manner : Representatives 
 are to be proportioned among the States respectively, according 
 to the number of freemen and slaves inhabiting them, counting 
 five slaves for three free men. 
 
 " In a free state," says the celebrated Montesquieu, " every 
 man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned 
 in his own government, therefore the legislature should reside 
 in the whole body of the people, or their representatives." But 
 it has never been alleged that those who are not free agents 
 can, upon any rational principle, have any thing to do in gov. 
 ernment, either by themselves or others. If they have no share 
 in government, why is the number of members in the assembly 
 to be increased on their account ? Is it because in some of the 
 States, a considerable part of the property of the inhabitants 
 consists in a number of their fellow-men, who are held in bond- 
 age, in defiance of every idea of benevolence, justice and religion, 
 and contrary to all the principles of liberty which have been 
 publicly avowed in the late glorious Revolution ? If this be a 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 387 
 
 just ground for representation, the horses in some of the States, 
 and the oxen in others, ought to be represented — for a great 
 share of property in some of them consists in these animals ; 
 and they have as much control over their own actions as these 
 poor unhappy creatures, who are intended to be described in 
 the above recited clause, by the words, " all other persons." 
 By this mode of apportionment, the representatives of the differ- 
 ent parts of the Union will be extremely unequal ; in some of 
 the Southern States the slaves are nearly equal in number to 
 the free men ; and for all these slaves they will be entitled to a 
 proportionate share in the legislature ; this will give them an 
 unreasonable weight in the government, which can derive no 
 additional strength, protection, nor defence from the slaves, but 
 the contrary. Why, then, should they be represented ? What 
 adds to the evil is, that these States are to be permitted to con- 
 tinue the inhuman traffic of importing slaves until the year 
 1808 — and for every cargo of these unhappy people which unfeel- 
 ing, unprincipled, barbarous and avaricious wretches may tear 
 from their country, friends and tender connections, and bring 
 into those States, they are to be rewarded by having an increase 
 of members in the general assembly. There appears, at the 
 first view, a manifest inconsistency, in the apportionment of 
 representatives in the senate, upon the plan of a consolidated 
 government. On every principle of equity and propriety, repre- 
 sentation in a government should be in exact proportion to the 
 numbers, or the aids afforded by the persons represented. How 
 unreasonable and unjust then is it, that Delaware should have 
 a representation in the senate equal to Massachusetts or Vir- 
 ginia ? The latter of which contains ten times her numbers, 
 and is to contribute to the aid of the general government in 
 that proportion ? This article of the Constitution will appear 
 the more objectionable, if it is considered, that the powers vested 
 in this branch of the legislature are very extensive, and greatly 
 surpass those lodged in the assembly, not only for general pur- 
 poses, but, in many instances, for the internal police of the 
 States. The other branch of the legislature, in which, if in 
 either, a faint spark of democracy is to be found, should have 
 been properly organized and established ; but upon examination 
 you will find, that this branch does not possess the qualities of a 
 
388 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788, 
 
 just representation, and that there is no kind of security, imper- 
 fect as it is, for its remaining in the hands of the people. 
 
 It has been observed, that the happiness of society is the end 
 of government — that every free government is founded in com- 
 pact ; and that, because it is impracticable for the whole com- 
 munity to assemble, or when assembled, to deliberate with 
 wisdom and decide with dispatch, the mode of legislating by 
 representation was devised. 
 
 The very term, representative, implies that the person or body 
 chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint 
 them. A representation of the people of America, if it be a true 
 one, must be like the people. It ought to be so constituted, 
 that a person who is a stranger to the country, might be able to 
 form a just idea of their character by knowing that of their rep- 
 resentatives. They are the sign — the people are the thing signi- 
 fied. It is absurd to speak of one thing being the representative 
 of another, upon any other principle. The ground and reason 
 of representation, in a free government, implies the same thing. 
 Society instituted government to promote the happiness of the 
 whole, and this is the great end always in view in the delegation 
 of powers. It must then have been intended, that those who 
 are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments 
 and feelings, and be governed by their interests, or, in other 
 words, should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose 
 room they are substituted. It is obvious, that for an assembly 
 to be a true likeness of the people of any country, they must be 
 considerably numerous. One man, or a few men, cannot possi- 
 bly represent the feelings, opinions, and characters of a great 
 multitude. In this respect, the new Constitution is radically 
 defective. The house of assembly, which is intended as a repre- 
 sentation of the people of America, will not, nor cannot, in the 
 nature of things, be a proper one. Sixty-five men cannot be 
 found in the United States who hold the sentiments, possess the 
 feelings, or are acquainted with the wants and interests of this 
 vast country. This extensive continent is made up of a number 
 of different classes of people ; and to have a proper representa- 
 tion of them, each class ought to have an opportunity of choosing 
 their best informed men for the purpose ; but this cannot possi- 
 bly be the case in so small a number. The State of New York, 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 389 
 
 on the present apportionment, will send six members to the 
 assembly ; I will venture to affirm that number cannot be found 
 in the State, who will bear a just resemblance to the several 
 classes of people who compose it. In this assembly, the farmer, 
 merchant, mechanic, and other various orders of people, ought 
 to be represented according to their respective weight and num- 
 bers ; and the representatives ought to be intimately acquainted 
 with the wants, understand the interests of the several orders in 
 the society, and feel a proper sense and becoming zeal to pro- 
 mote their prosperity. I cannot conceive that any six men in 
 this State can be found properly qualified in these respects to 
 discharge such important duties ; but, supposing it possible to 
 find them, is there the least degree of probability that the choice 
 of the people will fall upon such men ? According to the com- 
 mon course of human affairs, the natural aristocracy of the 
 country will be elected. Wealth always creates influence, and 
 this is generally much increased in large family connections ; this 
 class in society will for ever have a great number of dependents ; 
 besides, they will always favor each other. It is their interest to 
 combine — they will therefore constantly unite their efforts to 
 procure men of their own rank to be elected ; they will con- 
 centre all their force in every part of the State into one point, 
 and by acting together, will most generally carry their election. 
 It is probable that but few of the merchants, and those of the 
 most opulent and ambitious, will have a representation from 
 their body — few of them are characters sufficiently conspicuous 
 to attract the notice of the electors of the State in so limited a 
 representation. The great body of the yeomen of the country 
 cannot expect any of their order in this assembly — the station 
 will be too elevated for them to aspire to — the distance between 
 the people and their representatives will be so very great, that 
 there is no probability that a farmer, however respectable, will 
 be chosen. The mechanics, of every branch, must expect to be 
 excluded from a seat in this body ; it will and must be esteemed 
 a station too high and exalted to be filled by any but the first 
 men in the State, in point of fortune ; so that in reality there 
 will be no part of the people represented but the rich, even in 
 that branch of the legislature which is called the democratic. 
 The well-born, and highest orders in life, as they term them- 
 
390 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 selves, will be ignorant of the sentiments of the middling class 
 of citizens, strangers to their ability, wants and difficulties, and 
 void of sympathy and fellow feeling. This branch of the legis- 
 lature will no# only be an imperfect representation, but there 
 will be no security in so small a body against bribery and cor- 
 ruption. It will consist at first, of sixty-five, and can never 
 exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. A majority of 
 these, that is, thirty-three, are a quorum, and a majority of 
 which, or seventeen, may pass any law. A majority of the sen- 
 ate, or fourteen, are a quorum, and eight of them may pass any 
 law ; so that twenty-five men will have the power to give away 
 all the property of the citizens of these States. What security, 
 therefore, can there be for the people, where their liberties and 
 property are at the disposal of so few men ? It will literally be 
 a government in the hands of the few, to oppress and plunder 
 the many. You may conclude, with a great degree of certain- 
 ty, that it, like all others of a similar nature, will be managed 
 by influence and corruption, and that the period is not far dis- 
 tant when this will be the case, if it should be adopted ; for even 
 now there are some among us whose characters stand high in 
 the public estimation, and who have had a principal agency in 
 framing this Constitution, who do not scruple to say, that this 
 is the only practicable mode of governing a people who think 
 with that degree of freedom which the Americans do. This 
 government will have in their gift a vast number of offices of 
 great honor and emolument. The members of the legislature 
 are not excluded from appointments ; and twenty-five of them, 
 as the case may be, being secured, any measure maybe carried. 
 
 The rulers of this country must be composed of very different 
 materials from those of any other of which history gives us any 
 account : if the majority of the legislature are not, before 
 many years they will be entirely at the devotion of the execu- 
 tive, and these States will be soon under the absolute domina- 
 tion of one or a few, with the fallacious appearance of being 
 governed by men of their own election. 
 
 The more I reflect on this subject, the more firmly am I per- 
 suaded, that the representation is merely nominal — a mere 
 burlesque, and that no security is provided against corruption 
 and undue influence. No free people on earth, who have 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 391 
 
 elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confi- 
 dence in so small a number. The British House of Commons 
 consists of five hundred and fifty-eight members ; the number 
 of inhabitants in Great Britain is computed at eight millions — 
 this gives one member for a little more than fourteen thousand, 
 which exceeds double the proportion this country can ever 
 have ; and yet we require a larger representation in proportion 
 to our numbers, than Great Britain, because this country is 
 much more extensive, and differs more in its productions, inter- 
 ests, manners and habits. The democratic branch of the legis- 
 latures of the several States in the Union consists, I believe, at 
 present, of near two thousand ; and this number was not thought 
 too large for the security of liberty by the framers of our State 
 Constitutions. Some of the States may have erred in this 
 respect, but the difference between two thousand and sixty-five 
 is so very great that it will bear no comparison. 
 
 Other objections offer themselves against this part of the 
 Constitution — I shall reserve them for a future paper, when I 
 shall show, defective as this representation is, no security is 
 provided, that even this shadow of the right will remain with 
 the people. Brutus. 
 
 BRUTUS.— No. IV. 
 
 There can be no free government where the people are not 
 possessed of the power of making the laws by which they are 
 governed, either in their own persons, or by others substituted 
 in their stead. 
 
 Experience has taught mankind, that legislation by repre- 
 sentatives is the most eligible, and the only practicable mode in 
 which the people of any country can exercise this right, either 
 prudently or beneficially. But then it is a matter of the highest 
 importance, in forming this representation, that it be so consti- 
 tuted as to be capable of understanding the true interest of the 
 society for which it acts, and so disposed as to pursue the good 
 and happiness of the people as its ultimate end. The object of 
 
392 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 every free government is the public good, and all lesser interests 
 yield to it. That of every tyrannical government is the happi- 
 ness and aggrandizement of one, or a few, and to this the public 
 felicity and every other interest must submit. The reason of 
 this difference in these governments is obvious. The first is so 
 constituted as to collect the views and wishes of the whole peo- 
 ple in that of their rulers, while the latter is so framed as to 
 separate the interests of the governors from that of the governed. 
 The principle of self-love, therefore, that will influence the one 
 to promote the good of the whole, will prompt the other to fol- 
 low its own private advantage. The great art, therefore, in 
 forming a good Constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it 
 as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject 
 to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people 
 do who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible 
 way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation ; 
 this, therefore, is the great desideratum in politics. However 
 fair an appearance any government may make, though it may 
 possess a thousand plausible articles, and be decorated with ever 
 so many ornaments, yet if it is deficient in this essential princi- 
 ple of a full and just representation of the people, it will be only 
 like a painted sepulchre, — for, without this, it cannot be a free 
 government ; let the administration of it be good or ill, it still 
 will be a government, not according to the will of the people, 
 but according to the will of a few. 
 
 To test this new Constitution then, by this principle, is of the 
 last importance. It is to bring it to the touch-stone of national 
 liberty, and I hope I shall be excused, if, in this paper, I pursue 
 the subject commenced in my last number, to wit, the necessity 
 of an equal and full representation in the legislature. In that, 
 I showed that it was not equal, because the smallest States are 
 to send the same number of members to the senate as the larg- 
 est, and because the slaves, who afford neither aid nor defence to 
 the government, are to increase the proportion of members. To 
 prove that it was not a just or adequate representation, it was 
 urged, that so small a number could not resemble the people, 
 or possess their sentiments and dispositions. That the choice of 
 members would commonly fall upon the rich and great, while 
 the middling class of the community would be excluded. That 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 393 
 
 in so small a representation there was no security against bribery 
 and corruption. 
 
 The small number which is to compose this legislature will 
 not only expose it to the danger of that kind of corruption, and 
 undue influence, which will arise from the gift of places of 
 honor and emolument, or the more direct one of bribery, but it 
 will also subject it to another kind of influence no less fatal to the 
 liberties of the people, though it be not so flagrantly repugnant 
 to the principles of rectitude. It is not to be expected that a 
 legislature will be found in any country that will not have some 
 of its members who will pursue their private ends, and for 
 which they will sacrifice the public good. Men of this character 
 are, generally, artful and designing, and frequently possess bril- 
 liant talents and abilities ; they commonly act in concert, and 
 agree to share the spoils of their country among them ; they will 
 keep their object ever in view, and follow it with constancy. To 
 effect their purpose, they will assume any shape, and, Proteus 
 like, mould themselves into any form. Where they find mem- 
 bers proof against direct bribery or gifts of offices, they will 
 endeavor to mislead their minds by specious and false reason- 
 ing, to impose upon their unsuspecting honesty by an affectation 
 of zeal for the public good ; they will form juntos, and hold 
 out-door meetings ; they will operate upon the good nature of 
 their opponents by a thousand little attentions, and tease them 
 into compliance by the earnestness of solicitation. Those who 
 are acquainted with the manner of conducting business in 
 public assemblies, know how prevalent art and address are in 
 carrying a measure, even over men of the best intentions and of 
 good understanding. The firmest security against this kind of 
 improper and dangerous influence, as well as all other, is a 
 strong and numerous representation ; in such a house of assem- 
 bly, so great a number must be gained over, before the private 
 views of individuals could be gratified, that there could be scarce 
 a hope of success. But in the Federal assembly seventeen men 
 are all that is necessary to pass a law. It is probable it will 
 seldom happen that more than twenty-five will be requisite to 
 form a majority. When it is considered what a number of places 
 of honor and emolument will be in the gift of the executive, the 
 powerful influence that great and designing men have over the 
 
 60 
 
394 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 honest and unsuspecting, by their art and address, their sooth- 
 ing manners and civilities, and their cringing flattery, joined 
 with their affected patriotism, — when these different species of 
 influence are combined, it is scarcely to be hoped that a legisla- 
 ture, composed of so small a number as the one proposed by the 
 new Constitution, will long resist their force. A farther objec- 
 tion against the feebleness of the representation is, that' it will 
 not possess the confidence of the people. The execution of the 
 laws in a free government must rest on this confidence, and this 
 must be founded on the good opinion they entertain of the 
 framers of the laws. Every government must be supported, 
 either by the people having such an attachment to it as to be 
 ready, when called upon, to support it, or by a force at the 
 command of the government, to compel obedience. The latter 
 mode destroys every idea of a free government ; for the same 
 force that may be employed to compel obedience to good laws, 
 might, and probably would be used to wrest from the people 
 their constitutional liberties. Whether it is practicable to have 
 a representation for the whole Union sufficiently numerous to 
 obtain that confidence which is necessary for the purpose of 
 internal taxation, and other powers to which this proposed gov- 
 ernment extends, is an important question. I am clearly of 
 opinion it is not, and therefore I have stated this in my first 
 number, as one of the reasons against going into so entire a 
 consolidation of the States. One of the most capital errors in 
 the system is, that of extending the powers of the Federal gov- 
 ernment to objects to which it is not adequate, which it cannot 
 exercise without endangering public liberty, and which it is not 
 necessary they should possess, in order to preserve the Union 
 and manage our national concerns ; of this, however, I shall 
 treat more fully in some future paper. But, however this may 
 be, certain it is, that the representation in the legislature is not 
 so formed as to give reasonable ground for public trust. 
 
 In order for the people safely to repose themselves on their 
 rulers, they should not only be of their own choice, but it is 
 requisite they should be acquainted with their abilities to man- 
 age the public concerns with wisdom. They should be satisfied 
 that those who represent them are men of integrity, who will 
 pursue the good of the community with fidelity, and will not be 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 395 
 
 turned aside from their duty by private interest, or corrupted 
 by undue influence ; and that they will have such a zeal for the 
 good of those whom they represent, as to excite them to be 
 diligent in their service ; but it is impossible the people of the 
 United States should have sufficient knowledge of their repre- 
 sentatives, when the members are so few, to acquire any rational 
 satisfaction on either of these points. The people of this State 
 will have very little acquaintance with those who may be chosen 
 to represent them ; a great part of them will, probably, not 
 know the characters of their own members, much less that of a 
 majority of those who will compose the Federal assembly ; they 
 will consist of men whose names they have never heard, and of 
 whose talents and regard for the public good they are total 
 strangers to ; and they will have no persons so immediately of 
 their choice so near them, of their neighbors and of their own 
 rank in life, that they can feel themselves secure in trusting 
 their interest in their hands. The representatives of the people 
 cannot, as they now do, after they have passed laws, mix with 
 the people, and explain to them the motives which induced the 
 adoption of any measure, point out its utility, and remove objec- 
 tions, or silence unreasonable clamors against it. The number 
 will be so small that but a very few of the most sensible and 
 respectable yeomanry of the country can ever have any knowl- 
 edge of them ; being so far removed from the people, their station 
 will be elevated and important, and they will be considered as 
 ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed by the peo- 
 ple as part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them, and 
 having separate interests to pursue ; the consequence will be, 
 that a perpetual jealousy will exist in the minds of the people 
 against them ; their conduct will be narrowly watched, their 
 measures scrutinized, and their laws opposed, evaded, or reluc- 
 tantly obeyed. This is natural, and exactly corresponds with 
 the conduct of individuals towards those in whose hands they 
 intrust important concerns. If the person confided in be a 
 neighbor, with whom his employer is intimately acquainted, 
 whose talents, he knows, are sufficient to manage the business 
 with which he is charged, his honesty and fidelity unsuspected, 
 and his friendship and zeal for the service of his principal 
 unquestionable, he will commit his affairs into his hands with 
 
396 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 unreserved confidence, and feel himself secure ; all the trans- 
 actions of the agent will meet with the most favorable construc- 
 tion, and the measures he takes will give satisfaction. But, if 
 the person employed be a stranger, whom he has never seen, 
 and whose character for ability or fidelity he cannot fully learn 
 — if he is constrained to choose him, because it was not in his 
 power to procure one more agreeable to his wishes, he will trust 
 him with caution, and be suspicious of all his conduct. 
 
 If, then, this government should not derive support from the 
 will of the people, it must be executed by force, or not executed 
 at all ; either case would lead to the total destruction of liberty. 
 The Convention seemed aware of this, and have* therefore pro- 
 vided for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the 
 Union. If this system was so framed as to command that 
 respect from the people which every good free government will 
 obtain, this provision was unncessary — the people would sup- 
 port the civil magistrate. This power is a novel one in free 
 governments ; these have depended for the execution of the laws 
 on the posse comitatus, and never raised an idea that the people 
 would refuse to aid the civil magistrate in executing those laws 
 they themselves had made. I shall now dismiss the subject of 
 the incompetency of the representation, and proceed, as I prom- 
 ised, to show, that impotent as it is, the people have no security 
 that they will enjoy the exercise of the right of electing this 
 assembly, which, at best, can be considered but as the shadow 
 of representation. 
 
 By section four, article one, the Congress are authorized, at 
 any time, by law, to make, or alter, regulations respecting the 
 time, place and manner of holding elections for senators and 
 representatives, except as to the places of choosing senators. 
 By this clause the right of election itself is, in a great measure, 
 transferred from the people to their rulers. One would think 
 that if any thing was necessary to be made a fundamental article 
 of the original compact, it would be that of fixing the brandies 
 of the legislature, so as to put it out of its power to alter itself 
 by modifying the election of its own members at will and pleas- 
 ure. When a people once resign the privilege of a fair election, 
 they clearly have none left worth contending for. 
 
 It is clear that under this article, the* Federal legislature may 
 
1788.] SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. 397 
 
 institute such rules respecting elections as to lead to the choice 
 of one description of men. The weakness of the representation 
 tends but too certainly to confer on the rich and well-born all 
 honors ; but the power granted in this article may be so exer- 
 cised as to secure it almost beyond a possibility of control. The 
 proposed Congress may make the whole State one district, and 
 direct that the capital (the city of New York, for instance) 
 shall be the place for holding the election ; the consequence 
 would be, that none but men of the most elevated rank in socie- 
 ty would attend, and they would as certainly choose men of 
 their own class, as it is true what the Apostle Paul saith, " that 
 no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cher- 
 isheth it." They may declare that those members who have 
 the greatest number of votes shall be considered as duly elected ; 
 the consequence would be that the people,- who are dispersed in 
 the interior parts of the State, would give their votes for a 
 variety of candidates, while any order, or profession, residing in 
 populous places, by uniting their interests, might procure whom 
 they pleased to be chosen, — and by this means the representa- 
 tives of the State may be elected by one-tenth part of the people 
 who actually vote. This may be effected constitutionally, and 
 by one of those silent operations which frequently takes place 
 without being noticed, but which often produces such changes 
 as entirely to alter a government, subvert a free constitution, 
 and rivet the chains on a free people before they perceive they 
 are forged. Had the power of regulating elections been left 
 under the direction of the State legislatures, where the people 
 are not only nominally but substantially represented, it would 
 have been secure ; but if it was taken out of their hands, it 
 surely ought to have been fixed on such a basis as to have put 
 it out of the power of the Federal legislature to deprive the 
 people of it by law. Provision should have been made for 
 marking out the States into districts, and for choosing, by a 
 majority of votes, a person out of each of them, of permanent 
 property and residence in the district which he was to repre- 
 sent. 
 
 If the people of America will submit to a Constitution that 
 will vest in the hands of any body of men a right to deprive 
 them by law of the privilege of a fair election, they will submit 
 
398 SPIRIT OF THE PRESS. [1788. 
 
 to almost any thing. Reasoning with them will be in vain, they 
 must be left until they are brought to reflection by feeling 
 oppression. They will then have to wrest from their oppressors, 
 by a strong hand, that which they now possess, and which they 
 may retain if they will exercise but a moderate share of pru- 
 dence and firmness. 
 
 I know it is said that the dangers apprehended from this 
 clause are merely imaginary, that the proposed general legisla- 
 ture will be disposed to regulate elections upon proper principles, 
 and to use their power with discretion, and to promote the pub- 
 lic good. On this, I would observe, that constitutions are not 
 so necessary to regulate the conduct of good rulers as to restrain 
 that of bad ones. Wise and good men will exercise power so 
 as to promote the public happiness under any form of govern- 
 ment. If we are to take it for granted that those who administer 
 the government under this system will always pay proper atten- 
 tion to the rights and interests of the people, nothing more was 
 necessary than to say who should be invested with the powers of 
 government, and leave them to exercise it at will and pleasure. 
 Men are apt to be deceived, both with respect to their own dis- 
 positions and those of others. Though this truth is proved by 
 almost every page of the history of nations, to wit, that power, 
 lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost 
 always exercised to the oppression of the people, and the aggran- 
 dizement of themselves ; yet most men think if it was lodged in 
 their hands they would not employ it in this manner. Thus 
 when the prophet Elisha told Hazael, " I know the evil that 
 thou wilt do unto the children of Israel ; their strongholds wilt 
 thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the 
 sword, and wilt dash their children, and rip up their women 
 with child." Hazael had no idea that he ever should be guilty 
 of such horrid cruelty, and said to the prophet, " Is thy servant 
 a dog that he should do this great thing." Elisha answered, 
 " The Lord hath showed me that thou shalt be king of Syria." 
 The event proved, that Hazael only wanted an opportunity to 
 perpetrate these enormities without restraint, and he had a dis- 
 position to do them, though he himself knew it not. 
 
 Brutus. 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 399 
 
 LETTERS. 
 
 [The following letters are quoted for the purpose of giving 
 an idea of the interest which was felt throughout the country, 
 in the progress of the discussion in Massachusetts. The two 
 letters from Knox to Livingston were kindly furnished to the 
 Committee by Mr. George Bancroft. The others have been 
 copied from the "^Writings of Washington," edited by Mr. 
 Jared Sparks, and the " Correspondence of the Revolution," 
 by the same learned and faithful editor.] 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM HENRY KNOX. 
 
 New York, 14 January, 1788. 
 
 The Massachusetts Convention were to meet on the 9th. 
 The decision of Connecticut will influence, in a degree, their 
 determination, and I have no doubt the Constitution will be 
 adopted in Massachusetts. But it is at this moment questiona- 
 ble whether it will be by a large majority. There are three 
 parties existing in that State at present, differing in their num- 
 bers, and greatly differing in their wealth and talents. 
 
 The first is the commercial part of the State, to which are 
 added all the men of considerable property, the clergy, the 
 lawyers, including the judges of all the courts, and all the 
 officers of the late army, and also the neighborhood of all the 
 great towns. Its numbers may include three-sevenths of the 
 State. This party are for the most vigorous government. Per- 
 haps many of them would have been still more pleased with 
 the new Constitution, had it been more analagous to the British 
 constitution. 
 
 The second party are the eastern part of the State, lying 
 beyond New Hampshire, formerly the province of Maine. This 
 party are chiefly looking towards the erection of a new State, 
 and the majority of them will adopt or reject the new Constitu- 
 tion as it may facilitate or retard their designs, without regard- 
 ing the merits of the great question ; this party, two-sevenths. 
 
400 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 The third party are the insurgents, or their favorers, the 
 great majority of whom are for an annihilation of debts, public 
 and private ; and therefore they will not approve the new Con- 
 stitution ; this party, two-sevenths. 
 
 If the first and second party agree, as is most probable, and 
 also some of the party stated as in the insurgent interest, the 
 Constitution will be adopted by a great majority, notwithstand- 
 ing all the exertions to the contrary. 
 
 JAMES MADISON, IN CONGRESS, TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 [extract.] 
 
 New York, 20 January, 1788. 
 
 The intelligence from Massachusetts begins to be very 
 ominous to the Constitution. The anti-Federal party is rein- 
 forced by the insurgents, and by the province of Maine, which 
 apprehends greater obstacles to her scheme of a separate gov- 
 ernment from the new system, than may be otherwise experi- 
 enced. And according to the prospect at the date of the latest 
 letters, there was very great reason to fear, that the voice of 
 that State would be in the negative. The operation of such an 
 event on this State may easily be foreseen. Its legislature is 
 now sitting, and is much divided. A majority of the Assembly 
 are said to be friendly to the merits of the Constitution. A 
 majority of the senators actually convened are opposed to a 
 submission of it to the Convention. The arrival of the absent 
 members will render the voice of that branch uncertain on the 
 point of a Convention. The decision of Massachusetts either 
 way will involve the result in this State. The minority in Penn- 
 sylvania is very restless under their defeat. If they can get an 
 Assembly to their wish, they will endeavor to undermine what 
 has been done there. If backed by Massachusetts, they will 
 probably be emboldened to make some more rash experiment. 
 The information from Georgia continues to be favorable. The 
 little we get from South Carolina is of the same complexion. 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 401 
 
 JAMES MADISON, IN CONGRESS, TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 New York, 25 January, 1788. 
 
 Dear Sir : — I have been favored, since my last, with yours of 
 the 10th instant, with a copy of the Governor's letter to the 
 Assembly. I do not know what impression the latter may make 
 in Virginia. It is generally understood here that the argu- 
 ments contained in it in favor of the Constitution are much 
 stronger than the objections which prevented his assent. His 
 arguments are forcible in all places, and with all persons. His 
 objections are connected with his particular way of thinking on 
 the subject, in which many of the adversaries to the Constitu- 
 tion do not concur. 
 
 The information from Boston by the mail, on the evening 
 before last, has not removed our suspense. The following is an 
 extract of a letter from Mr. King, dated on the 16th instant : — 
 
 " We may have three hundred and sixty members in our 
 Convention. Not more than three hundred and thirty have 
 yet taken their seats. Immediately after the settlement of elec- 
 tions, the Convention resolved that they would consider and 
 freely deliberate on each paragraph, without taking a question 
 on any of them individually ; and that, on the question whether 
 they would ratify, each member should be at liberty to discuss 
 the plan at large. This resolution seems to preclude the idea 
 of amendments, and hitherto the measure has not been sug- 
 gested. I however do not, from this circumstance, conclude 
 that it may not hereafter occur. 
 
 " The opponents of the Constitution moved that Mr. Gerry 
 should be requested to take a seat in the Convention, to answer 
 such inquiries as the Convention should make concerning facts 
 which happened in the passing of the Constitution. Although 
 this seems to be a very irregular proposal, yet, considering the 
 jealousies which prevail with those who made it, (who are cer- 
 tainly not the most enlightened part of the Convention,) and 
 the doubt of the issue, had it been made a trial of strength, sev- 
 eral friends of the Constitution united with the opponents, and 
 the resolution was agreed to, and Mr. Gerry has taken his seat. 
 
 51 
 
402 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 To-morrow, we are told, certain inquiries are to be moved for 
 by the opposition, and that Mr. Gerry, under the idea of stating 
 facts, is to state his reasons, &c. This will be opposed ; and 
 we shall, on the division, be able to form some idea of our rela- 
 tive strength. From the men who are in favor of the Consti- 
 tution, any reasonable explanation will be given ; and argu- 
 ments really new, and in my judgment, most excellent, have 
 been and will be produced in its support. But what will be its 
 fate, I confess I am unable to discern. No question ever classed 
 the people of this State in a more extraordinary manner, or 
 with more apparent firmness." 
 
 A Congress of seven States was made up on Monday. Mr. 
 Cyrus Griffin has been placed in the chair. This is the only 
 step yet taken. 
 
 I remain, with the highest respect and attachment, &c, 
 
 James Madison, Jr. 
 
 BENJAMIN LINCOLN TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 Boston, 27 January, 1788. 
 
 My Dear General : — I have the pleasure of inclosing two news- 
 papers, in which are the debates of the Convention to Saturday, 
 the 19th. They are not forward enough to give your Excel- 
 lency a just state of the business. I therefore am induced to 
 observe, that, yesterday, we were on the ninth section. The 
 opposition seem now inclined to hurry over the business, and 
 bring on, as soon as possible, the main question. However, 
 this they are not permitted to do. It is pretty well known what 
 objections are on the minds of the people ; it becomes, there- 
 fore, necessary to obviate them, if possible. We have, hitherto, 
 done this with success. The opposition see it, and are alarmed, 
 for there are a vast many people attending in the galleries, (we 
 now assemble in one of our meeting-houses,) and most of the 
 arguments are published in the papers. Both are of use. 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 403 
 
 Your Excellency will see, in the paper, propositions for 
 adopting the Constitution on conditions. This will not be 
 attended to. It is possible, if we adopt it absolutely, that the 
 Convention may recommend certain amendments. It will 
 never, I presume, be adopted on any conditions. It will pass 
 absolutely, or be rejected. I have now higher expectations that 
 it will pass than when I last wrote. I think the friends to it 
 increase daily. However, I would not raise your Excellency's 
 expectations too high. It is yet impossible to determine, abso 
 lutely, its fate. Mr. Gerry, as mentioned in my last, left the 
 Convention in dudgeon. He has not since returned to it. 1 
 presume he will not return. 
 With the highest esteem, 
 
 I have the honor of being, my dear General, &c, 
 
 Benjamin Lincoln. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON TO BENJAMIN LINCOLN. 
 
 Mount Vernon, 31 January, 1788. 
 
 Dear Sir : — Your favor of the 9th instant came to hand last 
 evening. As you know whatever concerns your happiness and 
 welfare cannot be indifferent to me, you will very readily be- 
 lieve me, when I assure you, that I take a feeling part in your 
 anxiety and distress on account of your son, and most sincerely 
 wish for his recovery. 
 
 I thank you, my dear Sir, for your observations upon the 
 advantages which might accrue from a settlement of the eastern 
 parts of your State. 37 I am very sorry to find there is likely to 
 be so powerful an opposition to the adoption of the proposed 
 plan of government with you ; and I am entirely of your opin- 
 ion, that the business of the Convention should be conducted 
 with moderation, candor and fairness, which are not incompat- 
 ible with firmness. Although, as you justly observe, the friends 
 of the new system may bear down the opposition, yet they 
 
 87 The new lands in the District of Maine. 
 
404 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 would never be able, by precipitate or violent measures, to 
 soothe and reconcile their minds to the exercise of the govern- 
 ment, which is a matter that ought as much as possible to be 
 kept in view, and temper their proceedings. 
 
 "What will be the fate of the Constitution in this State is im- 
 possible to tell, at a period so far distant from the meeting of 
 the Convention. My private opinion of the matter, however, 
 is, that it will certainly be adopted. There is no doubt but the 
 decision of other States will have great influence here, particu- 
 larly of one so respectable as Massachusetts. 
 
 I feel myself much obliged by your promise to inform me of 
 whatever transpires in your Convention worthy of attention, 
 and assure you that it will be gratefully received. 
 
 With the sincerest regard, and the most ardent desire that 
 your distress may be removed by the recovery of your son, I 
 am, dear Sir, <fcc, 
 
 George Washington. 
 
 BENJAMIN LINCOLN TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 Boston, 3 February, 1788. 
 
 My Dear General : — Your Excellency will find, by the papers 
 of yesterday, which I do myself the pleasure to inclose, that the 
 Governor has taken his seat as President of the Convention ; 
 and that he came forward with a motion for the adoption of the 
 Constitution, and subjoined a recommendation that some alter- 
 ations may take place in it. The motion has taken up a con- 
 siderable time. Those in the opposition want the Constitution 
 to be accepted upon condition that the alterations be made. 
 This they will not be able to carry. 
 
 Yesterday noon, a motion was made that the motion under 
 consideration should be committed. This was agreed to, and a 
 large committee was raised, consisting of two members from 
 each of the large counties, and of one for two small ones. It 
 was also agreed that each county should nominate their own 
 members, and that they should take one who had given his 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 405 
 
 opinion for, and one who had given his opinion against, the 
 Constitution, in each county wherein two were chosen. I 
 expect they will report to-morrow afternoon, to which time the 
 Convention stands adjourned. I hope good will arise from the 
 measure, and that the main question will he taken by Wednes- 
 day next. The gentlemen in the opposition urge that the Gov- 
 ernor's motion ought to be divided,, and that the first question 
 be taken simply, " Whether they will or will not accept the 
 Constitution ?" They are opposed in this, and I hope the large 
 committee will adjust the matter, and put an end to any further 
 dispute upon the question. 
 
 We find ourselves exceedingly embarrassed by the temper 
 which raged the last winter in some of the counties. Many of 
 the insurgents are in the Convention ; even some of Shays's 
 officers. A great proportion of those men are high in the oppo- 
 sition. We could hardly expect any thing else ; nor could we, 
 I think, justly suppose that those men who were so lately intox- 
 icated with large draughts of liberty, and who were thirsting 
 for more, would, in so short a time, submit to a Constitution 
 which would further take up the reins of government which, 
 in their opinion, were too strait before. I hope people abroad 
 will consider this matter, and make proper allowances for a clog 
 of this kind. I think the Constitution will pass. 
 
 I have the honor of being, my dear General, 
 With perfect esteem, &c, 
 
 Benjamin Lincoln. 
 
 JAMES MADISON, IN CONGRESS, TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 New York, 3 February, 1788. 
 
 Dear Sir : — Another mail has arrived from Boston, without 
 terminating the conflict between our hopes and fears. I have 
 a letter from Mr. King of the 27th, which, after dilating some- 
 what on the ideas in his former letters, concludes with the 
 following paragraph : — 
 
406 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 " We have avoided every question which would have shown 
 the division of the house. Of consequence, we are not positive 
 of the members on each side. By the last calculation we made 
 on our side, we were doubtful whether we exceeded them, or 
 they us, in numbers. They, however, say that they have a 
 majority of eight or twelve against us. We by no means 
 despair." 
 
 Another letter of the same date, from another member, gives 
 the following picture : — 
 
 " Never was there an assembly in this State in possession of 
 greater ability and information than the present Convention ; 
 yet I am in doubt whether they will approve the Constitution. 
 There are, unhappily, three parties opposed to it. First : all 
 men who are in favor of paper money and tender laws. Those 
 are more or less in every part of the State. Second : all the 
 late insurgents and their abettors. In the three great western 
 counties they are very numerous. We have in the Convention 
 eighteen or twenty who were actually in Shays's army. Third : 
 a great majority of the members from the Province of Maine. 
 Many of them and their constituents are only squatters upon 
 other people's land, and they are afraid of being brought to 
 account. They also think, though erroneously, that their favor- 
 ite plan of being a separate State will be defeated. Add to 
 these, the honest, doubting people, and they make a powerful 
 host. The leaders of this party are a Mr. Wedgery, Mr. Thorn-' 
 son and Mr. Nasson, from the Province of Maine ; a Dr. Tay- 
 lor, from the county of Worcester, and Mr. Bishop, from the 
 neighborhood of Rhode Island. 
 
 " To manage the cause against them, are the present and late 
 governor, three judges of the supreme court, fifteen members of 
 the senate, twenty from among the most respectable of the 
 clergy, ten or twelve of the first characters at the bar, judges 
 of probate, high-sheriffs of counties, and many other respecta- 
 ble people, merchants, &c. ; Generals Heath, Lincoln, Brooks, 
 and others of the late army. With all this ability in support 
 of the cause, I am pretty well satisfied we shall lose the ques- 
 tion, unless we can take off some of the opposition by amend- 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 407 
 
 ments. I do not mean such as are to be made conditions of 
 the ratification, but recommendatory only. Upon this plan I 
 flatter myself we ma^ possibly get a majority of twelve or 
 fifteen, if not more.'' 
 
 The legislature of this State has voted a Convention on June 
 17th. I remain, &c, - 
 
 James Madison, Jr. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON TO JAMES MADISON, IN CONGRESS. 
 
 [extract.] 
 
 Mount Vernon, 5 February, 1788. 
 
 I am sorry to find by yours and other accounts from Massa- 
 chusetts, that the decision of its Convention, at the time of their 
 respective dates, remained problematical. A rejection of the 
 new form by that State would invigorate the opposition, not 
 only in New York, but in all those which are to follow ; at the 
 same time it would afford materials for the minority, in such as 
 have actually agreed to it, to blow the trumpet of discord more 
 loudly. The acceptance by a bare majority, though preferable 
 to a rejection, is also to be deprecated. It is scarcely possible 
 to form any decided opinion of the general sentiment of the 
 people of this State on this point. Many have asked me with 
 anxious solicitude if you did not mean to get into the Conven- 
 tion, conceiving it of indispensable necessity. Colonel Mason, 
 who returned but yesterday, I am told has offered himself for 
 Stafford county, and his friends say he can be elected not only 
 in that, but in the counties of Prince William and Fauquier 
 also. The truth of this I know not. I rarely go from home, 
 and my visitors, who, for the most part, are travellers and 
 strangers, have not the best means of information. 
 
408 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 BENJAMIN LINCOLN TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 Boston, 6 February, 1788. 
 
 My Dear General : — The Convention this evening ratified the 
 Constitution ; present, three hundred and fifty-five members ; 
 one hundred and eighty-seven yeas, and one hundred and sixty- 
 eight nays ; nineteen majority in favor of the adoption. 
 
 As I mentioned to you in my last, the spirit which operated 
 the last winter had its influence in the appointment of members 
 for the Convention, and was a clog upon us through the whole 
 business. To this source may be ascribed the great opposition 
 we have experienced through the long debates, and the small- 
 ness of the majority. I hope the neighboring States will con- 
 sider this, and not suffer it to weigh in their decisions. 
 
 Yesterday there was a motion for an adjournment, which cost 
 us the whole day. Upon the question at evening, there were 
 about one hundred majority against it ; this was a damper upon 
 the opposition, and they had little hope after. When, this even- 
 ing, the question went against them, some of the leaders arose, 
 and assured the Convention that they were convinced that the 
 debates had been conducted with fairness and candor, and that 
 they should return with dispositions to satisfy the minds of their 
 constituents, and to preserve the peace and order of the people 
 at large. I hope and trust they will, and that we shall soon 
 enjoy the blessings of a good government. 
 
 I shall continue to write to your Excellency, whilst any thing 
 relative to this great subject shall turn up here worthy your 
 notice. Forgive the haste ; the post-office will be shut. 
 And believe me, with the sincerest esteem and regard, 
 My dear General, &c, 
 
 Benjamin Lincoln. 
 
 P. S. Upon the issue of the question, every demonstration 
 of joy was discovered among the people. 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 409 
 
 BENJAMIN LINCOLN TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 [extract.] 
 
 Boston, 9 February, 1788. 
 
 Nothing very material has taken place since my last, saving 
 what is mentioned in the inclosed paper. By that you will 
 learn what was the temper of many of those who had been in 
 the opposition. I think they discovered a candor, which does 
 them honor, and promises quiet in the State. Some, however, 
 will, I fear, sow the seeds of discontent, and attempt to inflame 
 the minds of the people in the country. They have no. real 
 object, as they cannot be certain that it will ever pass nine 
 States. I hope and trust this consideration will quiet them at 
 present ; when it shall have passed nine States, it will be too 
 late for any one State to think of opposing it. 
 
 Considering the great disorders, which took place in this 
 State the last winter, and considering the great influence that 
 the spirit which then reigned has had since upon all our opera- 
 tions, it may be supposed that we have got through this business 
 pretty well ; and, considering, also, that when we came together 
 a very decided majority of the Convention were against adopt- 
 ing the Constitution. Every exertion will be made to inform 
 the people, and to quiet their minds. It is very fortunate for 
 us, that the clergy are pretty generally with us. They have in 
 this State a very great influence over the people, and they will 
 contribute much to the general peace and happiness. 
 
 HENRY KNOX TO GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 [extract.] 
 
 New York, 10 February, 1788. 
 
 The Constitution has labored in Massachusetts exceedingly 
 more than was expected. The opposition has not arisen from 
 a consideration of the merits or demerits of the tiling itself, as 
 a political machine, but from a deadly principle levelled at the 
 
 52 
 
410 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 existence of all government whatever. The principle of insur 
 gency expanded, deriving fresh strength and life from the im- 
 punity with which the rebellion of last year was suffered to 
 escape. It is a singular circumstance, that in Massachusetts, 
 the property, the ability, and the virtue of the State, are almost 
 solely in favor of the Constitution. Opposed to it are the late 
 insurgents, and all those who abetted their designs, constituting 
 four-fifths of the opposition. A few, very few indeed, well- 
 meaning people are joined to them. The friends of the Consti- 
 tution in that State, without overrating their own importance, 
 conceived that the decision of Massachusetts would most prob- 
 ably settle the fate of the proposition. They therefore proceed- 
 ed most cautiously and wisely, debated every objection with the 
 most guarded good nature and candor, but took no questions 
 on the several paragraphs, and thereby prevented the establish- 
 ment of parties. This conduct has been attended with the most 
 beneficial consequences. It is now no secret, that, on the open- 
 ing of the Convention, a majority were prejudiced against it. 
 
 HENRY KNOX TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON. 
 
 New York, Sunday, 10 February, 1788. 
 
 Dear Sir : — I send you a summary statement of my last 
 information from Boston. In a few days I expect to be able to 
 congratulate you on the adoption of the new Constitution by 
 Massachusetts. On Wednesday, the 30th ultimo, Mr. Hancock 
 was well enough to take his seat in the Convention. On Thurs- 
 day he brought forward the proposition for adopting the Consti- 
 tution, and for recommending certain alterations, agreeably to 
 the paper herein inclosed. The propositions were seconded by 
 Mr. Samuel Adams, and committed to a large committee of two 
 members from each county, a majority of the committee being 
 Federalists. As the propositions were the production of the 
 Federalists, after mature deliberation, there cannot be a doubt 
 that the committee will report in favor of the propositions as 
 they are stated. 
 
1788.] LETTERS. 411 
 
 The final question was most certainly taken in the Conven- 
 tion somewhere between the 5th and 8th inst. The members 
 of the Convention, and others, who wrote to me on the 3d inst., 
 have no doubt with respect to the adoption of the Constitution, 
 bnt they do not flatter themselves with a large majority. A 
 most perfect nnion was effected between the friends of Mr. 
 Hancock and Mr. Bowdoin. Handsome things are said of the 
 open and decisive conduct of Mr. Hancock, and also of Mr. S. 
 Adams, notwithstanding his neutrality in the first part of the 
 business. Please to let Mr. Benson see this letter. 
 1 am, with great esteem, dear Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient humble servant, 
 
 H. Knox. 
 
 HENRY KNOX TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON. 
 
 New York, 13 February, 1788. 
 
 My Dear Sir : — The new Constitution was adopted in Massa- 
 chusetts on the 6th instant, by a majority of 19. The whole 
 present, 355 ; 187 for it, 168 against it. 
 
 The minority behave with magnanimity on the occasion, 
 declaring they will support it with their lives and fortunes. 
 The Boston people have lost their senses with joy. 
 
 Your affectionate 
 
 H. Knox. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON TO JAMES MADISON, IN CONGRESS. 
 
 [extract.] 
 
 Mount Vernon, 2 March, 1788. 
 
 Sir : — The decision of Massachusetts, notwithstanding its 
 concomitants, is a severe stroke to the opponents of the proposed 
 Constitution in this State ; and, with the favorable decision of 
 those States which have gone before it, and such as are likely 
 
 •/ 
 
412 LETTERS. [1788. 
 
 to follow, will have a powerful operation on the* minds of men, 
 who are not more influenced by passion, pique and resentment, 
 than they are by candor, moderation and judgment. Of the 
 former description, however, I am sorry to say there are too 
 many ; and among them some who would hazard every thing 
 rather than fail in their opposition, or have the sagacity of their 
 prognostications impeached by the issue. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON TO HENRY KNOX. 
 
 [extract.] 
 
 Mount Vernon, 3 March, 1788. 
 
 My Dear Sir : — I pray you to accept my acknowledgments of 
 your favors of the 10th and 14th ultimo, and congratulation on 
 the acceptance of the new Constitution by the State of Massa- 
 chusetts. Had this been done without its concomitants, and 
 by a larger majority, the stroke would have been more severely 
 felt by the anti-Federalists in other States. As it is, it operates 
 as a damper to their hopes, and is a matter of disappointment 
 and chagrin to them all. 
 
 Under the circumstances enumerated in your letters, the 
 favorable decision which has taken place in that State could 
 hardly have been expected. Nothing less than the good sense, 
 sound reasoning, moderation and temper of the supporters of 
 the measure, could have carried the question. It will be very 
 influential on the equivocal States. In the two which are next 
 to convene, New Hampshire and Maryland, there can be no 
 doubt of its adoption, and in South Carolina but little, which 
 will make nine States, without a dissentient. The force of this 
 argument is hardly to be resisted by local sophistry. Candor 
 and prudence, therefore, it is to be hoped will prevail ; and yet 
 I believe there are some characters among us, who would hazard 
 every thing rather than cease their opposition, or leave to the 
 operation of the government the chance of proving the fallacy 
 of their predictions, by which their sagacity and foresight might 
 be impeached. 
 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
ARTICLES 
 
 IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, 
 THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 Proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the 
 several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original 
 Constitution. 
 
 Article 1. Congress shall make no law respecting an 
 establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
 thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or 
 the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
 the government for a redress of grievances. 
 
 Art. 2. A well regulated militia, being necessary to the 
 security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and 
 bear arms, shall not be infringed. 
 
 Art. 3. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
 any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of 
 war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
 
 Art. 4. The right of the people to be secure in their per- 
 sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
 and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue 
 but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
 particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
 or things to be seized. 
 
 Art. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
 otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict- 
 
416 AMENDMENTS. 
 
 merit of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
 naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of 
 war or public danger ; nor shall any person be subject for the 
 same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; nor 
 shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
 himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
 due process of law ; nor shall private property be taken for 
 public use, without just compensation. 
 
 Art. 6. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
 enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
 jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
 committed, which district shall have been previously ascer- 
 tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
 the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
 him ; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
 favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
 
 Art. 7. In suits at common law, where the value in con- 
 troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
 shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be other- 
 wise re-examined in any court of the United States, than 
 according to the rules of the common law. 
 
 Art. 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
 fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
 
 Art. 9. The enumeration in the constitution, of certain 
 rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
 retained by the people. 
 
 Art. 10. The powers not delegated to the United States by 
 the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
 to the States respectively, or to the people. 
 
 Art. 11. The judicial power of the United States shall not 
 be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
 or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of 
 another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. 
 
AMENDMENTS. 417 
 
 Art. 12. The electors shall meet in their respective States, 
 and vote by ballot for president and vice-president, one of 
 whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State 
 with themselves ; they shall name in their ballots the person 
 voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted 
 for as vice-president, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
 persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as 
 vice-president, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
 they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
 the government of the United States, directed to the president 
 of the senate ; the president of the senate shall, in presence of 
 the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates 
 and the votes shall then be counted ; the person having the 
 greatest number of votes for president, shall be the president, 
 if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors 
 appointed ; and if no person have such majority, then from the 
 persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on 
 the list of those voted for as president, the house of representa- 
 tive shall choose immediately, by ballot, the president. But in 
 choosing the president the votes shall be taken by States, the 
 representation from each State having one vote ; a quorum for 
 this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two- 
 thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be 
 necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives 
 shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice shall 
 devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next 
 following, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in 
 the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the 
 president. The person having the greatest number of votes as 
 vice-president, shall be the vice-president, if such number be a 
 majority of the whole number of electors appointed ; and if no 
 person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on 
 the list, the senate shall choose the vice-president ; a quorum 
 for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number 
 of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be neces- 
 sary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to 
 the office of president shall be eligible to that of vice-president 
 of the United States. 
 
 53 
 
The Constitution was adopted on the 17th September, 1787, 
 by the Convention appointed in pursuance of the Resolution of 
 the Congress of the Confederation of the 21st February, 1787, 
 and was ratified by the Conventions of the several States, as 
 follows, viz. : 
 
 Delaware, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dec. 7, 1787. 
 
 Pennsylvania, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 " 12, 1787. 
 
 New Jersey, 
 
 
 
 
 
 " 18, 1787. 
 
 Georgia, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jan. 2, 1788. 
 
 Connecticut, 
 
 
 
 
 
 " ' 9, 1788. 
 
 Massachusetts, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 Feb. 6, 1788. 
 
 Maryland, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 April 28, 1788. 
 
 South Carolina, 
 
 
 
 
 
 May 23, 1788. 
 
 New Hampshire, ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 June 21, 1788. 
 
 Virginia, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 26, 1788. 
 
 New York, 
 
 
 
 
 
 July 26, 1788. 
 
 North Carolina, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nov. 21, 1789. 
 
 Rhode Island, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 May 29, 1790. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Abington, Delegate from, 37 
 
 Acton and Carlisle, Delegate from 34 
 
 Adams, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Adams, Benjamin, Delegate, 34 
 
 Daniel, Delegate, 34 
 
 John, 208, 239 
 
 Mark, Delegate, 38 
 
 Samuel, . . . . . : 24, 26 
 
 Delegate 31, 203, 272 
 
 Remarks by, 108, 196, 209, 293 
 
 Speech of, 225,232 
 
 Convention vote to attend the funeral of his Son, . . 62 
 Amendments introduced and withdrawn by, . . 266 
 
 Dr . . 114 
 
 & Nourse, printers, place assigned to for the purpose of taking 
 
 minutes, 56, 57 
 
 Adoption of the Constitution 418 
 
 Alden, Noah, Delegate, 32 
 
 Alford, Delegate from 42 
 
 Allis, Josiah, Delegate, 35 
 
 Almsbury, Delegate from 33 
 
 Almy, William, Delegate, ... . 38 
 
 Amendments to the Constitution, 413 
 
 American Revolution, built upon the principle of the equal right of all men 
 
 to liberty and property, . 253 
 
 Ames, Fisher, Delegate, 32, 177 
 
 Speech of, 104, 108, 257, 287 
 
 Remarks by, / . . . 144, 147, 202, 206, 307, 308, 317, 318 
 
 Moses, Delegate, 38 
 
 Amherst, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Andover, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Arms, Consider, Delegate, 35 
 
 Articles of Confederation, Convention called for revising the, ... 25 
 
 Ashburnham, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Ashby, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Ashfield, Delegate from, 36 
 
420 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Ashley, John, Jun'r, Delegate, 42 
 
 Remonstrance against election of, . . 48, 52, 53 
 
 Athol, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Attleborough, Delegates from, 38 
 
 Augustus, Emperor of Rome 263 
 
 Austin, Anthony, 52 
 
 Augustin, 52 
 
 Avery, John . . . k . . . . 24 
 
 Backus, Isaac, Delegate, 37 
 
 Speech of, 251, 291 
 
 Remarks by, 320 
 
 Baker, Samuel, Delegate, 40 
 
 Thomas M., Delegate, 40 
 
 Baldwin, Abraham, 15 
 
 Bancroft, George, Letters furnished by, 399 
 
 Barnard, Lemuel 52 
 
 Barnstable, Delegate from 37 
 
 Barre, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Barrell, Nathaniel, Delegate, 38 
 
 Speech of, 262 
 
 Bartlett, Bailey, Delegate 33 
 
 Bascom, Moses, Delegate 35 
 
 Bassett, Richard, 15 
 
 Bath, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Baxter, John, Jun'r, Delegate, 32 
 
 Baylies, William, Delegate 38 
 
 Beal, Zaccheus, Delegate, . 41 
 
 Bean, Joshua, Delegate, . . 42 
 
 Becket, Delegate|from 42 
 
 Bedford, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Bedford, Gunning, Jun'r 15 
 
 Belchertown, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Belknap, Jeremy, 60 
 
 Bell, Daniel, 45 
 
 Bellingham, Delegate from, . 32 
 
 Berkley, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Bernardston, Delegate from, . 36 
 
 Berwick, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Betts, Comstock, Delegate, 42 
 
 Beverly, Delegates from 32 
 
 Bigelow, Abraham, Delegate, • 34 
 
 David, Delegate 39 
 
 Billerica, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Bisbee, Elijah, Jun'r, Delegate, 37 
 
 Bishop, Phanuel, Delegate, 37 
 
 Remarks of, 120,121,122,293,294 
 
 Black, John, Delegate, 39 
 
 Blair, John, 15 
 
INDEX. 421 
 
 Page. 
 
 Blair, Timothy, Delegate, 35 
 
 Blaney, Benjamin, Delegate, 34 
 
 Blanford, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Blount, William, 15 
 
 Bodman, William, Delegate 35 
 
 Remarks by, 159,311,320 
 
 Bolton, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Bonney, Benjamin, Delegate, 36 
 
 Boothbay, Delegate from, . 41 
 
 Bordon, Richard, Delegate, 38 
 
 Boston, Delegates from, 31 
 
 the Clergy of, invited to officiate in the Convention, ... 44 
 
 Vote of thanks to the inhabitants of, 94, 282 
 
 Procession in 323—328 
 
 Massacre, March 5, 1770, 239 
 
 Gazette, &c, extracts from 64 
 
 Bourn, Shearjashub, Delegate, 37 
 
 Bowdoin, James, Delegate, 31, 250, 287 
 
 Remarks by, .... 109,111,169,292,293,314 
 
 Speech of, . 181,228,287 
 
 Jun'r, Delegate, 31 
 
 Bowdoinham, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Boxford, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Boylston, Delegate from 40 
 
 Bradbury, Jacob, Delegate, 38 
 
 Bradford, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Bradley, Jesse, Delegate, 43 
 
 Braintree, Delegates from, 32 
 
 Brattle Street, Meeting-house in, vote offering the use of to the Convention, 44 
 
 Vote of thanks to the Proprietors for 
 
 their offer of the use of said house, 46, 49 
 Convention to assemble at, . . . 46 
 
 Brearly, David, 14 
 
 Bribery and Corruption, charge of, published in the Boston Gazette and the 
 
 Country Journal, ..... G4, 150 
 
 Action of Convention in relation to the publication, 64, 65 
 
 Bridgewater, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Brigham, Artemas, Delegate, 40 
 
 Brimfield, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Bristol, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Broad, Hezekiah, Delegate, 34 
 
 Brookfield, Delegates from, 39 
 
 Brookline, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Brooks, Eleazer, Delegate, 34 
 
 Remarks by, . . . . 154, 200, 302, 308, 310, 316 
 
 John, Delegate, 34 
 
 Remarks by 102,111,143,288,306,315 
 
 Broom, Jacob, 15 
 
422 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Brown, Benjamin, Delegate, 34 
 
 David, Delegate, 38 
 
 Brunswick, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Brutus, Essays with the signature of, 366 — 398 
 
 Buckland, Delegate from, . . 36 
 
 Buckminster, Lawson, Delegate, 34 
 
 Bullard, Jonathan, Delegate, 39 
 
 Burnham, John, Delegate, 33 
 
 Bush, David, Delegate, 42 
 
 Butler, Pierce, 15 
 
 Buxton, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Cabot, Francis, Delegate 32 
 
 George, Delegate, 32 
 
 Remarks by, 122, 169, 227, 294 
 
 Mr., Remarks by, . . . . . . 304, 315, 320 
 
 Cambridge, Delegates from, 33 
 
 Cape Elizabeth, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Carlisle and Acton, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Carlton, Ebenezer, Delegate, 33 
 
 Carnes, John, Delegate 33 
 
 Remarks by, 118,290 
 
 Carpenter, Elisha, Delegate, 42 
 
 Carr, James, Delegate, 41 
 
 Carroll, Daniel 15 
 
 Centinel, newspaper. See Massachusetts Centinel 
 
 Chamberlin, John, Delegate -. . . 35 
 
 Staples, Delegate, . . . . . . • . . . 34 
 
 Channing, "William E., 61 
 
 Charlemont, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Charles II, 198 
 
 Charlestown, Delegate from, . . . 33 
 
 Charlton, Delegates from, 39 
 
 Chelmsford, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Chelsea, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Chester, Delegate from, 36 
 
 The Bishop of, owns that England is deeply involved in the guilt of 
 
 the Slave Trade, 252 
 
 Chesterfield, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Choate, John, Delegate, 33 
 
 Remarks by, 179,313,317 
 
 Cicero, 262 
 
 Clark, Adam, Delegate, 35 
 
 David, 52 
 
 Israel, Delegate, 33 
 
 Kimbal, Delegate 37 
 
 Clergy in Boston, invitation to, 44 
 
 attending the Debates, seats assigned for, 47, 61 
 
 Clymer, George, 15 
 
INDEX. 423 
 
 Page. 
 
 Cogswell, Jonathan, Delegate, 33 
 
 Collins, Lemuel, Delegate, 42 
 
 Colrain, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Colton, Elihu, Delegate, 36 
 
 Committee Qn Credentials 31 
 
 to receive the Returns of the several towns, . . . . 43, 49 
 
 to examine them and report, 43 
 
 rule of examining given to 46 
 
 Ileport of, 49, 50 
 
 to collect, count, and sort the votes for Secretary, . . . 43 
 
 to prepare Rules and Orders, 43 
 
 Report of, 46, 47 
 
 to collect, &c, votes for President and Vice-President, . . 44 
 to wait upon the President, and inform him of the choice, and 
 
 request his acceptance, 44 
 
 their Report, .45 
 
 to view the accommodations in the Meeting-house in Brattle 
 
 Square, 44 
 
 their Report, 45 
 
 to examine returns of members to fill vacancies, . . . 45, 48 
 to communicate vote of thanks to proprietors of Brattle Street 
 
 Meeting-house, 46 
 
 to consider expediency of the Convention removing to another 
 
 place in Boston, 49, 50, 53 
 
 on the Return from Taunton, Report of accepted, . . . 50, 51 
 on the Remonstrance of certain inhabitants of Williamstown, 
 
 Report of accepted, 51, 52 
 
 on the Remonstrance of certain inhabitants of Great Barring- 
 ton, Report of, 53, 64 
 
 to wait on Hon. Elbridge Gerry, and request him to take a seat 
 
 in the House . 56, 57 
 
 to provide a more convenient place for the Convention to sit in, 58 
 
 Report of, 60 
 
 to prepare a Pay Roll, 58, 59, 78, 92 
 
 to return thanks to the proprietors of the Meeting-house in Long 
 
 Lane, 60 
 
 on communication from the printers of the Boston Gazette, rel- 
 ative to a charge of Bribery, published in that paper, . 64 
 to take into consideration the subject of the propositions of the 
 
 President of the Convention, 82 
 
 their Report, ........ 82—85 
 
 to prepare an Address to the People, 92 
 
 to wait upon the President of the Convention, and Vice-Presi- 
 dent, with votes of thanks, 93 
 
 Committees, enjoined to sit, 48 
 
 on Remonstrances against elections of members, . . . 48 
 
 Reports of, 49,50—54 
 
 Compensation of Senators and Representatives, 152 
 
424 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Comstock, Nathan, Delegate, 32 
 
 Concord, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Confederacy of the United Colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connec- 
 ticut and New Haven, in 1643, 117 
 
 Confederation, Articles of, Convention called for revising, .... 25 
 
 Congress, the Constitution to be laid before, &c . 15 
 
 the Constitution submitted to, 16, 17 
 
 Powers of, 154 
 
 Connecticut 14, 15, 418 
 
 Constantine, 251 
 
 Constitution of the United States 1—15 
 
 to be laid before Congress, and submitted to Conventions of 
 
 Delegates, 15, 16 
 
 read in the Convention, 99 
 
 Ratification of, by nine States, necessary, . . . . 16 
 
 Letter of Elbridge Gerry, concerning, 24 
 
 the Convention enter upon the consideration of, . . . 57, 99 
 
 Ratified 85—87 
 
 Ratification publicly declared at the State House, . . 94, 282 
 Amendments and Adoption of the, .... 413—418 
 Ratification by the Conventions of the several States, . . 418 
 Convention, Grand Federal, held Sept. 17, 1787, proceedings of, . . 1, 17 
 of Delegates, held in Boston, on the second Wednesday of Jan- 
 uary, A. D. 1788, 29 
 
 Action of the Legislature as to convening, . .' . . 19 
 Resolutions of the General Court for calling, .... 22 
 
 Journal of, . • 31—94 
 
 agree to sit in Brattle Street Meeting-house, .... 46 
 enter upon the consideration of the Constitution, . . . 57, 99 
 adjourn to the Meeting-house in Long Lane, ... ^ 60 
 Propositions submitted to by the President of, ... 79 
 
 referred to a Committee, 82 
 
 Report of the Committee, 82 — 85 
 
 Constitution ratified by, 85 
 
 Members of to proceed to the State House to proclaim the rati- 
 fication of the Federal Constitution, and take an affectionate 
 
 leave of each other 92 
 
 adjourn to the State House, 94, 282 
 
 thanks of voted to the inhabitants of Boston, .... 94 
 
 dissolved, . . 94, 282 
 
 Debates of the 95 
 
 Pay Roll allowed, 282 
 
 Minutes of the Debates in, kept by Chief Justice Parsons, . 285 
 called for revising the Articles of Confederation, ... 25 
 
 Conventions of Delegates of the several States, 15,16 
 
 Ratification of the Constitution by, 418 
 
 Conway, Delegates from 35 
 
 Cooley, Clark, Delegate 35 
 
INDEX. 425 
 
 Page 
 
 Cooley, Daniel, Delegate, 85 
 
 Remarks by, . . 149, 281 
 
 Mr., Remarks by, . . . 302,304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 313, 319, 320 
 Correspondence of the Revolution, edited by Jared Sparks, extracts from, . 399 
 
 Coxhall, Delegate from, . 39 
 
 Cranch, Richard, Delegate, 32 
 
 Credentials of members, Committee to receive, 31 
 
 Crocker, Zacheus, Delegate, . 35 
 
 Crosby, Jonah, Delegate 41 
 
 Cummington and Plainfield, Delegate from,. 36 
 
 Curtis, Caleb, Delegate, 39 
 
 Samuel, Delegate 39 
 
 Cushing, Joseph, Delegate, 36 
 
 Nathan, Delegate, . 36 
 
 William, Delegate, 3G 
 
 chosen Vice-President of the Convention, ... 44 
 
 Cutts, Richard Fox, Delegate, 3S 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, .38 
 
 Dalton, Tristram, Delegate, . 32, 176 
 
 Remarks by, 138, 144, 195, 206, 297, 299, 301, 302, 304, 316, 319 
 
 Dana, Francis, Delegate, 33 
 
 Speech of, 117,135,141,209,289 
 
 Remarks by, 137, 148, 175, 176, 209, 303, 306, 308 
 
 Stephen, Delegate 33 
 
 Mr., Motion offered by, .103 
 
 r.9 
 
 • ;■ 6, 
 
 Danvers, Delegates from, ......... 
 
 Dartmouth, Delegates from, 38 
 
 Davis, Caleb, Delegate, 31 
 
 Remarks by, 200 
 
 John, Delegate, 36 
 
 Joseph, Delegate, 40 
 
 Moses, Delegate, 41 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 36 
 
 Dr., Remarks by, . . 302, 305 
 
 Dawes, Thomas Jun'r 31 
 
 Remarks of, . 102, 111, 139, 198, 288, 302, 305, 306, 310 
 
 Speech of, 156, 215 
 
 Day, Jonathan, Delegate, . 40 
 
 Dayton, Jonathan, . 14 
 
 Debates, place assigned to Benjamin Russell and Messrs. Adams & Nourse 
 
 for the purpose of taking minutes of the, , . . . 56, 57 
 
 Report of the, 95 
 
 Minutes of, kept by Chief Justice Parsons, 285 
 
 Decemviri of Rome, 161 
 
 Dedham, Delegates from, 32 
 
 Deerfield, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Delaware, 15, 418 
 
 Dench, Gilbert, Delegate, 34 
 
 54 
 
426 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Dench, Gilbert, Speech of, 101, 108, 287 
 
 Remarks by, 142, 199, 200, 241, 290, 297, 299, 305, 315, 316, 319 
 
 Motion by, 265 
 
 Denny, Samuel, Delegate, . . 39 
 
 DeWitt, Francis, Secretary of the Commonwealth, . . . (Preface) iv 
 
 John, a celebrated political writer, 154 
 
 Dickinson, John, 15 
 
 Dighton, Delegates from, 38 
 
 Dorchester, Delegates from, 31 
 
 Douglass, Delegate from 40 
 
 Douglass, Thomas James, Delegate, 36 
 
 Dracut, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Drown, Frederick, Delegate, 37 
 
 Dudley, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Dunbar, Elijah, Delegate 32 
 
 Dunham, Cornelius, Delegate 39 
 
 Dunlap, John, Delegate, 41 
 
 Dunstable, Delegate from 34 
 
 Durfee, Thomas, Delegate, 38 
 
 Duxborough, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Dwight, Elijah, Delegate, . 42, 48, 54, 55 
 
 Justus, Delegate, .36 
 
 Dyer, Joshua, Delegate, 41 
 
 Eager, Nahum, Delegate, 36 
 
 Easthampton and Northampton, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Eastman, Benjamin, Delegate, . . 35 
 
 Easton, Delegate from, .38 
 
 East Sudbury, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Eddy, Samuel, Delegate, 36 
 
 Edes, Messrs. Benjamin, and Son, printers, Letter from referred, . 64, 65, 151 
 
 Edgartown, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Edgcomb, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Egremont, Delegate from 42 
 
 Election, Speeches on, . . ... . . 101—133, 148, 149, 269 
 
 Ely, Benjamin, Delegate, 35 
 
 Emerson, Peter, Delegate, 34 
 
 Emery, Jeremiah, Delegate, 39 
 
 Fales, David, Delegate 41 
 
 Falmouth, Maine, Delegates from, 40 
 
 Massachusetts, Delegate from, ....... 37 
 
 Farley, Michael, Delegate, 33 
 
 Fearing, Israel, Delegate, 37 
 
 Federal Constitution, the ship 327 
 
 Government, Essays on, 335 — 352 
 
 Street, name of Long Lane, changed to 60—62 
 
 Few, William 15 
 
 Field, Samuel, Delegate, 35 
 
 Fisher, Aaron, Delegate, 36 
 
INDEX. 427 
 
 Page. 
 
 Fisher, Jabez, Delegate, 32 
 
 Fisk, Asa, Delegate, 35 
 
 Daniel, Delegate, 34 
 
 Fitch, Ephraim, Delegate, 42 
 
 Fitchburg, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Fitzsimons, Thomas, 15 
 
 Fletcher, Joel, Delegate 40 
 
 Flint, William, Delegate, 34 
 
 Forbes, Daniel, Delegate, 39 
 
 Fovvle, James, Jun'r, Delegate, 33 
 
 Fowler, Silas, Delegate 36 
 
 Fox, John, Delegate, 40 
 
 Foxborough, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Framingham, Delegate from, . . . • 34 
 
 Franklin, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, 15,69 
 
 Address of, immediately before signing the Constitution, 352 
 
 Freeman, Solomon, Delegate, 37 
 
 Freetown, Delegates from 38 
 
 Frye, John, Delegate, . . • . . 40 
 
 Fryeburg, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Fuller, Abraham, Delegate, 34, 143 
 
 John, Delegate, 40 
 
 Timothy, Delegate, ... 40 
 
 Colonel, Remarks by, 300 
 
 Gannett, Ezra S 61 
 
 General Court, Action of, 321, 322 
 
 Georgetown, Maine Delegate from, 41 
 
 Georgia, 15, 133, 418 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge 126, 143, 144, 147 
 
 Letter of in relation to the American Constitution, . . 24 
 requested to take a seat in the House, . . .55, 56, 100 
 
 requested to attend the Convention 56 
 
 Letter from, accepting the invitation, ... 58, 288 
 Letter from, in answer to question respecting representa- 
 tives, 63 
 
 Motion made and seconded, that he be requested to give 
 
 information respecting the Senate, .... 64 
 Letter from, with a statement of facts relative to the con- 
 struction of the Federal Senate, . . . 65 — 71 
 Account of excitement produced by the announcement 
 
 that he"was preparing a Letter for the Convention, 71 — 75 
 
 Letter of, read in the Convention, 175 
 
 Gilman, Nicholas, 14 
 
 Gilmore, David, Delegate, 41 
 
 Gleazen, Phineas, Delegate, . . . 34 
 
 Gloucester, Delegates from, 33 
 
428 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 Gloucester, The Bishop of, casts the reproacli of the Slave Trade upon the 
 
 Americans 252 
 
 Glover, John, Delegate 33 
 
 Jonathan, Delegate, . - 33 
 
 Goddard, Josiah, Delegate, 40 
 
 Goldsbury, John, Delegate 36 
 
 Goodman, Noah, Delegate, 35 
 
 Gore, Christopher, Delegate, 31, 176 
 
 Speech of, 113,164,213,288 
 
 Remarks by 141, 175, 304, 320 
 
 Gorham, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Gorhara, Nathaniel, Delegate, 14, 33 
 
 Remarks by, 118, 135, 151, 153, 168, 207, 289, 290, 291,294, 300, 309, 
 
 316, 319, 320 
 
 Grafton, Delegate from 40 
 
 Granby, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Grant, Samuel, Delegate, ....41 
 
 Granville, Delegates from, . 35 
 
 Gray, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Gray, William, Delegate, 32 
 
 Great Barrington, Delegate from 42 
 
 Remonstrance from certain inhabitants of, . . 48, 53—55 
 
 Green, Jonathan, Delegate, 34 
 
 Greene, Gen. Nathaniel, 239 
 
 Greenfield, Delegate from, .35 
 
 Greenleaf, Benjamin, Delegate, 32 
 
 Greenwich, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Groton, Delegates from, 34 
 
 Grout, Jonathan, Delegate, 40 
 
 Ilabeas Corpus, m . 209, 210, 240 
 
 Hadley, Delegate from 35 
 
 Hale, Moses, Delegate 40 
 
 Halifax, Delegate from, 37 
 
 Hallowell, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, 14 
 
 John, Delegate, 35 
 
 Hammond, Nathaniel, Delegate, 37 
 
 Hancock, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Hancock, John, . . . 24, 239 
 
 Governor, extract from Message of, 18 
 
 Delegate 31 
 
 chosen President of the Convention, 44 
 
 Speech of, 224 
 
 Speech of, at the time of taking the question of ratification 
 
 of the Constitution 278 
 
 Proposition submitted by, 225 
 
 extract from the Speech of, at the General Court, Peb. 27, 
 
 1788 283 
 
INDEX. 429 
 
 Page. 
 
 Hanover, Delegate from, 37 
 
 Hardwick, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Harnden, John, Delegate 34 
 
 Harpswell, Delegate from, . . . 41 
 
 Harrrington, Isaac, Delegate, 40 
 
 Harris, S., 325 
 
 Harvard, Delegate from, .... 40 
 
 Harwich, Delegates from, . 37 
 
 Harwood, David, Delegate, 39 
 
 Hastings, John, Delegate, 35 
 
 Hatfield, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Hathaway, James, Delegate, 39 
 
 Meletiah, Delegate, 38 
 
 Haverhill, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Heath, William, Delegate, 31 
 
 Letter from, 59 
 
 Remarks by, 102 
 
 Speech of, 109,111,216,222,288 
 
 Hemmenway, Moses, Delegate 38 
 
 Henderson, Joseph, High- Sheriff of Suffolk, ratification of the Constitution 
 
 proclaimed by, 282 
 
 Herrick, Jacob, Delegate 33 
 
 Ezekiel, Delegate, 42 
 
 Hingham, Delegates from, 31 
 
 Holden, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Holden, Stephen, Delegate, 40 
 
 Holliston, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Holmes, Abraham, Delegate, 37 
 
 Remarks by 127,214 
 
 Speech of, 211 
 
 Golten, Samuel, Delegate, 32 
 
 Remarks by, 132, 296, 302 
 
 Homer, 358 
 
 Hooper, Hezekiah, Delegate, 36 
 
 Hopkinton, Delegate from 34 
 
 Hosmer, Joseph, Delegate, 33 
 
 Remarks by, 315 
 
 Howard, Daniel, Delegate, 36 
 
 Jun'r, Delegate, 36 
 
 Howes, Jonathan, Delegate, . . . - 37 
 
 Hubbard, Jonathan, Delegate, 36 
 
 Remarks by, 299 
 
 Hubbardston, Delegate from 39 
 
 Hull, Delegate from 32 
 
 Huntington, Samuel, Governor of Connecticut, Letter from, read, . . 60 
 
 Hurlbert, John, Delegate, 42 
 
 Hutchinson, Israel, Delegate, 32 
 
 Ilsley, Daniel, Delegate, 40 
 
430 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 Independent Chronicle, newspaper, extracts from, . . . 18,19, 24,335 
 
 Ingersoll, Jared, 15 
 
 John, Delegate, 35 
 
 Ipswich, Delegates from 33 
 
 Jackman, Enoch, Delegate, 33 
 
 Jackson, Joseph, Delegate, 32 
 
 William, 15, 16 
 
 James II 198 
 
 Janes, Ebenezer, Delegate, 35 
 
 Jarvis, Charles, Delegate, '. . . . 31, 288 
 
 Remarks of, ... . 102, 126, 127, 130, 218, 313, 320 
 
 Speech of, 254 
 
 Jenifer, Daniel of St. Thomas, 15 
 
 Jenks, Nathaniel, Delegate, 39 
 
 Jennings, John, Delegate, 36 
 
 John, King of England, covenants to summon certain classes of men to 
 
 Parliament 114 
 
 Johnson, Jacob, 52 
 
 William Samuel, 14 
 
 Jones, John Coffin, Delegate, . . . 31 
 
 Remarks by, ... 126, 141, 175, 208, 316, 319 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 32 
 
 William, Delegate, 41 
 
 Remarks by, . . . 126, 144, 146, 221, 299, 307, 319, 320 
 
 Josselyn, Benjamin, Delegate, 39 
 
 Journal of the Convention held in Boston, 31 — 94 
 
 Julius Caesar, 238 
 
 Keep, Jonathan, Delegate, 34 
 
 King, Rufus, 14 
 
 Delegate, 32 
 
 Speech of, 115,117,154,289 
 
 Remarks by, 121, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 
 
 153, 178, 196, 201, 202, 217, 291, 293, 298, 299, 300, 
 
 304, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 315, 316, 319 
 
 Kingston, Delegate from, 37 
 
 Kinsley, Martin, 40, 203 
 
 Speech of, 161 
 
 Remarks by, 312,319 
 
 Kittery, Delegates from 38 
 
 Remarks by Delegate from, 304 
 
 Kittridge, Thomas, Delegate, 33 
 
 Knox, Henry, Letter from, 399 
 
 Letter to George Washington, ...... 409 
 
 Letter to Robert R. Livingston, 410,411 
 
 Letter from George Washington to, 412 
 
 Kuhn, Jacob, chosen Messenger 43 
 
 Lancaster, Delegate from 39 
 
 Lanesborough, Delegate from, 42 
 
INDEX. 
 
 431 
 
 Page. 
 
 Langdon, John, 14 
 
 Lawton, Joshua, Delegate, .... 52 
 
 Lazell, Edmund, Delegate, 36 
 
 Learned, Jeremiah, Delegate 39 
 
 Lebanon, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Lee, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Legislature of Massachusetts, Action of in relation to calling Convention, 19 — 24 
 
 in relation to printing an Address 
 
 to the People, . . . 321, 322 
 
 Leicester, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Lenox, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Leominster, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Leonard, Nathaniel, Delegate, 37, 50 
 
 Letter from Henry Knox, 399 
 
 400, 401, 405 
 
 402, 404, 408, 409 
 
 . 403 
 
 407, 411 
 
 . 409 
 
 . . 410,411 
 
 . 412 
 
 36 
 
 . 239 
 
 34 
 
 34 
 
 31 
 
 . 297 
 
 40£, 404, 408, 409 
 
 . 403 
 
 34 
 
 410,411 
 
 14 
 
 60—62 
 
 41 
 
 36 
 
 52 
 
 42 
 
 39 
 
 33 
 
 38 
 
 36 
 
 40 
 
 33 
 
 42 
 
 from James Madison to George Washington, . 
 from Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, 
 from George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, 
 from George Washington to James Madison, . 
 from Henry Knox to George Washington, 
 from Henry Knox to Robert R. Livingston, 
 from George Washington to Henry Knox, 
 
 Leverett, Delegate from, 
 
 Lexington, 
 
 Delegate from, 
 
 Lincoln, Delegate from, 
 
 Lincoln, Benjamin, Delegate, 
 
 Remarks by 
 
 Letters to George Washington, . 
 Letter from George Washington to, 
 
 Littleton, Delegate from, 
 
 Livingston, Robert, Letters from Henry Knox, to, 
 
 William, 
 
 Long Lane, name changed to Federal Street, 
 Longfellow, Stephen, Jr., Delegate, .... 
 
 Longmeadow, Delegate from, 
 
 Loomis, Zadok, 
 
 Loudon, Delegate from, 
 
 Low, John, Delegate from Coxhall, .... 
 Delegate from Gloucester, 
 
 Nathaniel, Delegate, 
 
 Ludlow, Delegate from, 
 
 Lunenburgh, Delegate from, 
 
 Lurvey, Benjamin, Delegate, 
 
 Lusk, Thomas, Delegate, 
 
 Remarks by, 208, 250 
 
 Lynn and Lynnfield, Delegates from 33 
 
 Madison, James, Jun'r, 15 
 
 Letters from, to George Washington, . . 400, 401, 405 
 
432 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Madison, James, Letters from George Washington to, 407, 411 
 
 Magna Charta, the foundation of the imperfect representation of England, 116 
 
 Maine, Province of, 247 
 
 Maiden, Delegate from 34 
 
 Manchester, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Mann, Thomas, Delegate, . * 32 
 
 Manning, Richard, Delegate, 32 
 
 Mansfield, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Mansfield, Isaac, Delegate, 33 
 
 Marblehead, Delegates from, 33 
 
 March, Ebenezer, Delegate, 32 
 
 Marlborough, Delegates from, 34 
 
 Marsh, Nathaniel, Delegate, 33 
 
 Marshfield, Delegate from 36 
 
 Marston, Nymphas, Delegate, 37 
 
 Maryland 15, 418 
 
 Mason, Christopher, Delegate, 38 
 
 Timothy, Delegate, 42 
 
 Mr 68 
 
 Massachusetts 14, 15, 155, 418 
 
 Massachusetts Centinel, extracts from relating to change of name of Long 
 
 Lane to Federal Street, . * . . . 61 
 Account of an excitement in the Convention by the 
 announcement of Mr. Gerry that he was pre- 
 paring a Letter for the Convention, . 71 — 75 
 
 of Feb. 9th and 13th, 1788, .... 323, 329 
 
 Maxwell, Thompson, Delegate . . 36 
 
 May, Elisha, Delegate, 38 
 
 Mayhew, William, Delegate, 39 
 
 Maynard, Malachi, Delegate, 35 
 
 Stephen, Delegate, 40 
 
 McCobb, William, Delegate, 41 
 
 McHenry, James, 15 
 
 Mclntier, Ezra, Delegate, 39 
 
 Mcintosh, William, Delegate, 32 
 
 McKean, Thomas . 354 
 
 McLellan, Joseph, Delegate, 41 
 
 Medfield, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Medford, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Medway, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Meeting-house in Brattle Street, use of offered to the Convention, . . 44 
 
 Vote of thanks to the proprietors of, . 46 
 
 the Convention agree to sit therein, . 46 
 
 in Long Lane, prepared for the Convention to sit in, . . 60 
 
 Mendon, Delegate from 39 
 
 Merrick, Aaron, Delegate 35 
 
 Phinehas, Delegate, 35 
 
 Merrill, Samuel, Delegate 41 
 
INDEX. 433 
 
 Page. 
 Messenger chosen, 43 
 
 to exclude persons not admitted by special order, . . . 58 
 
 Methuen, Delegate from, . 33 
 
 Middleborough, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Mifflin, Thomas, 15 
 
 Mighill, Thomas, Delegate 33 
 
 Miller, Simeon, Delegate 33 
 
 Milton, Delegate from, 31 
 
 Minot, George Richards, chosen Secretary, 43 
 
 John, Delegate 34 
 
 Minutes kept by Chief Justice Parsons, of the Debates in Convention, 285—320 
 
 Milford, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Mitchell, David, Delegate 41 
 
 Elisha, Delegate,- 36 
 
 Monitors, chosen, . . . 43, 46, 47 
 
 to take their divisions in the Meeting-house 46 
 
 to assign a place to Benjamin Russell and Messrs. Adams & 
 
 Nourse, printers, for the purpose of taking Minutes, . . 5Q, 57 
 
 Monson, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Montague, Delegate from • 35 
 
 Montague, Admiral, 215 
 
 Montesquieu, Baron, quoted, . . 110, 111, 113, 114, 228, 230, 288, 373, 386 
 
 Montgomery, Gen. Richard, 239 
 
 Morgan, Abner, Delegate, 35 
 
 Morning Prayers, to be attended by the Convention daily, .... 44 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, . . . .» 15 
 
 Robert, 15 
 
 Morse, Benjamin, Delegate, 34 
 
 Jonas, Delegate, 34 
 
 Mt. Washington and Sheffield, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Murray, David, Delegate, 41 
 
 Nasson, Samuel, Delegate, 38 
 
 Remarks by, 137,208,243,290,301,304 
 
 Motion introduced by, 195, 196 
 
 Speech of, 235—240, 281 
 
 Natick, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Neal, James, Delegate, 38 
 
 Remarks by, 209, 221, 320 
 
 Needham, Delegate from, ~. . . 32 
 
 Nero, 263 
 
 New Bedford, Delegates from, 38 
 
 New Braintree, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Newbury, Delegates from, 32 
 
 Newbury Port, Delegates from 32 
 
 Newcastle, Delegate from 41 
 
 New Gloucester, Delegate from, 41 
 
 New Hampshire, . . . 14, 15, 418 
 
 New Jersey, 14, 15, 418 
 
 55 
 
434 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 New Marlborough, Delegate from 42 
 
 New Salem, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Newton, Delegate from 34 
 
 Newton, Seth, Delegate, 40 
 
 New York, 14, 15, 418 
 
 Nichols, James, Delegate, 39 
 
 Nickerson, , a pirate, tried without a jury, 215 
 
 Niles, Samuel, Delegate, 37, 181 
 
 Remarks by 243,297,314 
 
 Noble, Zenos, Delegate, 43 
 
 Northborough, Delegate from 40 
 
 Northbridge, Delegate from, . . . 40 
 
 North Carolina 15, 418 
 
 Northfield, Delegate from, • .... 35 
 
 Northampton, Delegate from, 35 
 
 North Yarmouth, Delegates from, 41 
 
 Norton, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Norwich, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Nourse. See Adams & Nourse 
 
 Noyes, Daniel, Delegate, 33 
 
 Nye, Samuel, Delegate 33 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 37 
 
 Oakham, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Old Confederation, the ship, ordered to be burnt 329 
 
 Old State House, 62 
 
 Orange and Warwick Delegate, . . : 36 
 
 Orders. See Rules and Orders 
 
 Orne, Azor, Delegate, 33 
 
 Remarks by, 243 
 
 Osgood, Peter, Jun'r, Delegate, 33 
 
 Otis, Hon. Mr. 118, 290 
 
 Oxford, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Palmer, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Palmer, Joseph, Delegate, 37 
 
 Paper Money, 155 
 
 Parker, Timothy, Delegate, 40 
 
 Parliament of England, 114 
 
 Parlin, Asa, Delegate, 34 
 
 Parsons, Theophilus, Delegate 32, 126, 287 
 
 Speech of, 124, 189 
 
 Remarks by, . 141, 153, 205, 243, 265, 307, 308, 309, 318 
 moves that the Convention assent to and ratify the 
 
 Constitution, 221 
 
 Minutes kept by, of the Debates in Convention, 285—320 
 
 Partridge, George, Delegate, 36 
 
 Partridgefield, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Patrick, Matthew, Delegate, 40 
 
 Patten, Willis, Delegate, 33 
 
INDEX. 435 
 
 Page. 
 
 Patterson, "William 14 
 
 Paxton, Delegate from 39 
 
 Pay Roll, Committee on, 58, 59, 78, 92 
 
 passed by the Convention, 282 
 
 Pay son, George, Delegate, 32 
 
 Phillips, Delegate, 32 
 
 Speech of, 222 
 
 Pearson, William, Delegate, 33 
 
 Peckham, Samuel, Delegate, 40 
 
 Peirce, Ebenezer, Delegate, 42 
 
 Remarks by, 119, 291,293,312,319 
 
 Mr., Remarks by, 176 
 
 Pelham, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Pembroke, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Pennsylvania, 15, 418 
 
 Pepper, Isaac, Delegate, 36 
 
 Pepperell, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Pepperellboro', Delegate from 38 
 
 Perley, Samuel, Delegate, 41, 126 
 
 Remarks by, . 151, 309 
 
 Petersham, Delegates from, 40 
 
 Phelps, John, Delegate, 35 
 
 Phillips, William, Delegate 31, 176, 320 
 
 Speech of, 166—168 
 
 Remarks by 243 
 
 Pickett, John, Jun'r, Delegate, 33 
 
 Pierce, Jeremiah, Delegate, 42 
 
 Mr., Remarks by, 242, 298 
 
 Pinckney, Charles, 15 
 
 Cotesworth, 15 
 
 Pitts, John, Delegate, 34 
 
 Remarks by, 196 
 
 Pittsfield, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Plainfield and Cummington, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Plymouth, Delegates from, 36 
 
 Flympton, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Pomeroy, Lemuel, Delegate, . 35 
 
 Popkin, John S., 60 
 
 Porter, Elisha, Delegate, 35 
 
 Remarks by, 120, 152, 160, 208, 293, 294, 309, 319 
 
 Portland, Delegates from, 40, 41 
 
 Powers, Asa, Delegate, 36 
 
 Pownalborough, Delegates from, 41 
 
 Pratt, Aaron, Delegate, 37, 50 
 
 Pratt, John, Delegate, - ... 38 
 
 Prayers, morning, to be attended by the Convention daily, . . . 44 
 
 Preble, Esaias, Delegate, 38 
 
 President and Vice-President of the Convention chosen, .... 44 
 
436 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Princeton, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Printer, any who may apply, to be furnished with the proceedings of the 
 
 Convention, 56 
 
 Printers, a place to be assigned to, for the purpose of taking Minutes, . 57 
 
 place assigned, 61 
 
 of the Boston Gazette requested to appear before the Convention, 64, 65 
 
 Pulling, Edward, Delegate, 32 
 
 Putnam, Daniel, Delegate, 40 
 
 Pynchon, William, Delegate, 35 
 
 Qualifications of Representatives 133,298 
 
 Rainham, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Randall, Benjamin, Delegate, 32 
 
 Remarks of, . .137, 138, 169, 282, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305 
 
 Randolph, , Governor of Virginia, extract from Letter of, . . 267 
 
 Ransom, Elias, 52 
 
 Rathbun, Valentine, Delegate, 42 
 
 Ratification of the Constitution, 85, 94, 282 
 
 Read, George, 15 
 
 Reading, Delegates from, 34 
 
 Reed, Jesse, Delegate, .......... 36 
 
 Reed, Samuel, Delegate, 34 
 
 Mr., Motion by, 308 
 
 Refreshment, members of the Convention invited to, by inhabitants of Boston, 94 
 
 Rehoboth, Delegates from, 37, 38 
 
 Religious Test, 190,222,251 
 
 Remonstrances against elections of Members, .... "48,50,51 — 55 
 Report of the Debates of the Convention, ....... 95 
 
 Representation in Congress, Speeches on, 100, 101, 133 
 
 Resolutions for calling Convention in Boston, 22 
 
 Returns of the several Towns, Committee to receive and examine, . . 43, 48 
 Revolution, American, built upon the equal right of all men to liberty and 
 
 property, 253 
 
 Rhode Island, . . . . .418 
 
 State of, recalls its Delegates from Congress, . . 120,152 
 
 upon request of Congress refuses to send them on, . . 121 
 
 Consequences of refusal, .121 
 
 Rice, Thomas, Delegate, 41 
 
 Richardson, Moses, Jun'r, Delegate, 32 
 
 Richmond, Delegates from, 42 
 
 Richmond, Sylvester, Delegate, 38 
 
 Robbins, Nathaniel, 31 
 
 Rochester, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Rogers, Daniel, Delegate, 33 
 
 Rome, people of, deprived of their rights, 161 
 
 Rowley, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Roxbury, Delegates from, 31 
 
 Royalston, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Rules and Orders, Committee to prepare, 43 
 
INDEX. 437 
 
 Page. 
 Rules and Orders, amended, accepted, and to be put up in a conspicuous 
 
 place 47 
 
 Russell, Benjamin, place assigned to, for the purpose of taking Minutes, . 56, 57 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 31 
 
 Speech of, . . . 241 
 
 Rutland, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Rutledge, John, 15 
 
 Salem, Delegates from, . . 32 
 
 Salisbury, Delegates from, 33 
 
 Salsburgh, Isaac 52 
 
 Sandisfield, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Sandwich, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Sanford, Delegate from, 38 
 
 Sawin, Benjamin, Delegate, 34 
 
 Speech of, 282 
 
 Sawtell, Obadiah, Delegate, 34 
 
 Sawyer, Enoch, Delegate, 32 
 
 Scarlett, Newman, Delegate, . 34 
 
 Scarborough, Delegate from, . ., 41 
 
 Scituate, Delegates from, . 36 
 
 Secretary chosen, 43 
 
 to furnish any printer with the proceedings, . . . . 56 
 Secretary of the Commonwealth, Lieutenant-Governor, and Speaker of the 
 House of Representatives admitted to seats on the floor of the house to 
 
 hear the Debates, 69 
 
 Sedgwick, Theodore, Delegate, 42, 176, 303 
 
 Speech of, 101, 292, 293, 298 
 
 Remarks by, . 133, 152, 160, 197, 243, 309, 311, 316, 319 
 
 Senate, 144—147, 305 
 
 Senate Chamber, Members of Convention invited to take refreshments at, 94 
 
 Sever, William, Jun'r, Delegate, 37 
 
 Remarks by, 320 
 
 Severance, Moses, Delegate, 35 
 
 Sewall, Dummer, Delegate, 42 
 
 Shapleigh, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Sharon, Delegate from, 32 
 
 Shaw, William, Delegate 36 
 
 Sheffield and Mount Washington, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Remonstrance from certain inhabitants 
 
 of, 48, 49, 52, 53 
 
 Remonstrance dismissed, . . . . 53 
 
 Shelburne, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Sheldon, Benjamin, Delegate, 35 
 
 Shepard, David, Delegate 36 
 
 Sheple, Joseph, Delegate, 34 
 
 Sherburne, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Sherman, Asaph, Delegate 39 
 
 Roger, 14 
 
438 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Shirley, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Shrewsbury, Delegate from 40 
 
 Shurtliff, Francis, Delegate 37 
 
 Speech of, . . . . 300, 301, 304, 305, 307, 317 
 
 Shute, Daniel, Delegate, 31 
 
 Speech of, 220 
 
 Shutesbury, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Singletary, Amos, Delegate, 39, 204 
 
 Speech of, 266, 305, 306, 311, 318 
 
 'Remarks by, 143, 160, 201, 202 
 
 Skinner, Tompson J., Delegate 42,48,51,52 
 
 Slavery and the Slave Trade, 134, 138, 208, 217, 237, 251, 252, 300—304, 320, 387 
 
 Slocum, Holder, Delegate 38 
 
 Smith, Abraham, Delegate, 39 
 
 John K., Delegate, 40 
 
 Jonathan, Delegate, 42 
 
 Remarks by, 196, 203, 296, 318 
 
 Jonah, Delegate, 37 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 37 
 
 Snow, Isaac, Delegate, 41 
 
 Remarks by, 132 
 
 Dr., Remarks by, 297 
 
 Solon, 228 
 
 Song and Ballad, 330—334 
 
 Soul, Isaac, Delegate, 37 
 
 South Hadley, Delegate from 35 
 
 Southampton, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Southborough, Delegate from, 40 
 
 South Brimfield, Delegate from, 35 
 
 South Carolina 14, 15, 418 
 
 Southwick, Delegate from 36 
 
 Southworth, Jedidiah, 32 
 
 Capt. , Speech of, 277 
 
 (from Stoughton) Remarks by, 290 
 
 Spaight, Richard Dobbs, 15 
 
 Sparks, Jared, Extracts from the « Writings of Washington," edited by, . 399 
 
 Spencer, Delegate from 39 
 
 Spooner, Walter, Delegate, 38 
 
 Sprague, John, Delegate 39 
 
 Remarks by 102, 290 
 
 Mr., Remarks by, «... 102 
 
 Spring, Marshall, Delegate, 33 
 
 presents a Letter to the Convention from Mr. Gerry, . 2S8 
 
 Springfield, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Standing Armies 180, 198 
 
 States, Conventions of, for assent and ratification of the Constitution, 15, 16, 418 
 
 Stearns, David, Delegate, 40 
 
 Stebbins, Phinehas, Delegate, 35 
 
INDEX. 439 
 
 Page. 
 
 Sterling, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Stevens, Stephen, 52 
 
 Stillman, Samuel, Delegate, 31 
 
 Remarks by, 200 
 
 Stockbridge, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Stone, Joseph, Delegate, «... 40 
 
 Stoneham, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Stoughton, Delegates from, 32 
 
 Stow, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Strong, Caleb, Delegate, 35 
 
 Remarks by, 103, 121, 147, 199, 200, 243, 287, 294, 303, 306, 315, 316 
 
 Sturbridge, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Sudbury, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Sumner, Increase, Delegate, 31, 195 
 
 Speech of, 130,162,210,240,295 
 
 Sunderland, Delegate from, . . . 35 
 
 Sutton, Delegates from, . . . • 39 
 
 Swanzey, Delegates from, 38 
 
 Sylvester, David, Delegate, . . . ■ . . . . 41 
 
 Symmes, William, Jun'r, Delegate, . 33, 179 
 
 Speech of, . 169, 277 
 
 Tacitus, 358 
 
 Taunton, Delegates from, . . . 37 
 
 Remonstrance from, 50, 51 
 
 Taylor, Daniel, Delegate, 42, 113 
 
 John, Delegate, 40 
 
 Remarks by, 290, 304, 308 
 
 Speech of, on Elections, 101 
 
 Remarks by, 118, 134, 135, 147, 149, 151, 189, 199, 200, 209, 227, 
 243, 265, 281, 291, 292, 298, 300, 305, 307, 309, 313, 314, 315, 319 
 
 Taxation and Representation inseparable, 336, 347 
 
 Taxes, 139, 207, 263, 299, 311, 312, 318, 319 
 
 Temple, Jonas, Delegate, 40 
 
 Templeton, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Tewksbury, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Thacher, David, Delegate 37 
 
 Thomas, Delegate, 32 
 
 Speech of, 244 
 
 Thayer, Elijah, Delegate, 38 
 
 Thomas, Benjamin, Delegate, 37 
 
 Remarks by, 243, 249 
 
 Joshua, Delegate, 36 
 
 Thomaston, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Thompson, Edward, Delegate 39 
 
 William, Delegate 41 
 
 Hon. L., 321 
 
 Samuel, Delegate, 41 
 
440 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Thompson, Samuel, Remarks by, 111, 112, 131, 133, 153, 160, 197, 202, 209, 243, 
 
 293, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316, 
 
 3,17, 320 
 
 called to order 112 
 
 Speech of 113,180,208,288 
 
 Thorndike, Israel, Delegate, 32 
 
 Thurston, Daniel, Delegate, 33 
 
 Tingley, Pelatiah, Delegate, 39 
 
 Tisbury, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Tisdale, Ebenezer, Delegate, 38 
 
 Titcomb, Jonathan, Delegate 32 
 
 Tobey, Samuel, Delegate, 38 
 
 Tompson, William, Delegate, 34 
 
 Tomson, Isaac, Delegate, , ... 37 
 
 Topsfield, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Topsham, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Tories and Refugees, . . . . . . . . . . 141 
 
 Townshend, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Trial by Jury, 214, 215, 348 
 
 Tufts, Cotton, Delegate, . . . 31 
 
 Turner, Charles, Delegate, 36 
 
 Remarks by 102,109,111,273,289,294 
 
 Speech of, 128, 288 
 
 Incident connected with the Speech of, . . . .275 
 
 John, Delegate, 37 
 
 Tyringham, Delegate from, . 42 
 
 Upton, Delegate from, . . 40 
 
 Uxbridge, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Varnum, Joseph Bradley, Delegate * . . . . 34 
 
 Remarks by, .. . 178,208,236,312,317,319 
 
 Vassalborough, Delegate from, 41 
 
 Vaughn, David, Delegate, 43 
 
 Virginia, 14, 15, 268, 418 
 
 Wales, Ebenezer, Delegate, 31 
 
 Remarks by, « 195 
 
 Walpole, Delegate from, .32 
 
 Waltham, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Ward, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Ware, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Wareham, Delegate from 37 
 
 Warren, Ebenezer, Delegate, 32 
 
 James, . 24, 26 
 
 Joseph, . 239 
 
 Warwick and Orange, Delegate from 36 
 
 Washburn, Israel, Delegate, 38 
 
 Washington, Delegate from, 43 
 
 Washington, George, 14, 16, 17, 152, 239, 320 
 
 Letters from James Madison to,. . . 400, 401, 405 
 
INDEX. 441 
 
 Page. 
 Washington, George, Letters from Benjamin Lincoln to, . 402, 404, 408, 409 
 
 Letter to Benjamin Lincoln, 403 
 
 Letters to James Madison, .... 407,411 
 
 Letter from Henry Knox to 409 
 
 Letter to Henry Knox, • 412 
 
 Waterborough, Delegate from, 39 
 
 "Watertown, Delegates from, 33 
 
 Waterman, Freman, Delegate, 37 
 
 Webber, John, Delegate, 34 
 
 Wedgery, William, Delegate, 41 
 
 Remarks by, 124, 130, 135, 142, 151, 195, 196, 203, 206, 207, 
 240, 280, 295, 298, 300, 303, 304, 305, 306, 309, 316, 318 
 
 Wellfleet, Delegate from, 37 
 
 Wells, Delegate from 38 
 
 Wells, Agrippa, Delegate, 36 
 
 Wells, Nathaniel, Delegate, 38 
 
 Wenham, Delegate from, 33 
 
 Wentworth, Thomas M., Delegate, 38 
 
 West, Samuel, Delegate, ' . 38, 316 
 
 Speech of, . 130 
 
 Remarks by, 296 
 
 Westborough, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Western, Delegate from, 40 
 
 Westfield, Delegates from, .......... 35 
 
 Westford, Delegate from, •. . . 34 
 
 Westhampton, Delegate from, 36 
 
 Westminster, Delegate from, . . 40* 
 
 Weston, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Westport, Delegate from,' * 38 
 
 West Springfield, Delegates from, 35- 
 
 West Stockbridge, Delegates from, 42 
 
 Weymouth, Delegate from, 31 
 
 Whateley, Delegate from, . . 35 
 
 Wheeler, Asahel, Delegate, 34 
 
 Whitcomb, Nathaniel, Delegate, ........ 35 
 
 White, Abraham, Delegate, . . • 38> 
 
 Remarks by, 102, 113, 118, 126, 156, 280, 289, 291, 298, 301, 
 
 305, 310» 
 
 Whiting, William, 54, 55 
 
 Whitney, Daniel, Delegate, . 34 
 
 Josiah, Delegate, 40 
 
 Gen., Speech of, 281 
 
 Whitman, Charles, Delegate, 34 
 
 Levi, Delegate, 37 
 
 Wibird, Anthony, Delegate, 32 
 
 Wilbraham, Delegate from, 35 
 
 Wilder, David, Delegate, 40 
 
 Ephraim, Delegate, . 40 
 
 56 
 
442 INDEX. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Willard, Jacob, Delegate, 40 
 
 Samuel, Delegate 40 
 
 Remarks by, 168,169,315,316 
 
 William III 198 
 
 Duration of Parliaments limited to three years in the reign of 114 
 
 William, Ephraim, Delegate, 36 
 
 Williams, James, Delegate, 37, 50 
 
 John Foster, Commander of the Ship Federal Constitution, . 327 
 
 Leonard, Delegate, 34 
 
 Williamsburgb, Delegate from 35 
 
 Williamson, Hugh, 15 
 
 Williamstown, Delegate from 42 
 
 Remonstrances from certain inhabitants of, . . . 48, 51, 52 
 
 Williston, John, Delegate, 35 
 
 Willmarth, Moses, Delegate, 38 
 
 Wilmington, Delegate from, 34 
 
 Wilson, James, 15 
 
 Speech of, 354 
 
 Robert, Delegate, 35 
 
 Winchendon, Delegate from, * . . . . 40 
 
 Windsor, Delegate from 42 
 
 Winn, Timotby, Delegate, 33 
 
 Winslow, Delegate from 41 
 
 Winsor, William, Delegate, 38 
 
 Winthrop, Delegate from, 42 
 
 Winthrop, John, Delegate, . . . * 31 
 
 Woburn, Delegates from, 33 
 
 Wood, Aaron, Delegate, 32 
 
 Joseph, Delegate, . . . . . * . . . . 32 
 
 Josiah, Delegate 40 
 
 Woods, John, Delegate, 39 
 
 Woolwich, Delegate from, . . . . * . . \ . . . 41 
 
 Worcester, Delegate from, 39 
 
 Worthington, Delegate from 36 
 
 Wrentham, Delegate from .... 32 
 
 Writings of Washington, edited by Jared Sparks, extracts from, . . 399 
 
 Wyman, Nathaniel, Delegate 41 
 
 Yarmouth, Delegates from, 37 
 
 Yeas and Nays, on propositions of the President of the Convention, . S7— 92 
 
 York, Delegates from 38 
 
 Young, William 51, 92 
 
 2 
 
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