SANTA CRUZ 
 
 Gift of 
 Henry J. McFarland 
 
> ' 
 
 u 
 
 i- 
 
 
THE WILSON 
 
 ADMINISTRATION AND 
 
 THE GREAT WAR 
 
 j 
 
 ERNEST W. YOUNG,, LL.M. 
 
 \ I -^ 
 
 Author of "Comments on the Interchurch Report on the 
 Steel Strike of igig n 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 THE GORHAM PRESS 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Made in the United States of America 
 The Gorham Press, Boston, U.S.A. 
 
POINT OF VIEW 
 
 The following pages attempt to treat of Functioning 
 Governmental Functioning at a time of peculiar crisis in 
 the nation's career. They do not assume to be a history of 
 the Great War. They undertake, rather, to select a few 
 of the greater matters which engaged the attention of the 
 Wilson Administration in that notable period, those that 
 came nearest the hearth, the heart-center of the great Re- 
 public; those that the history of the future will necessarily 
 select as the chief center of the impulses of the nation's 
 throbs for humanity. 
 
 As these touch upon matters of history, perhaps of 
 statecraft, it is proper to add that it is not only war-time 
 orders of the President of the mightiest republic of re- 
 corded time, or the thrilling utterance of eloquent lips; not 
 the laws of Congress or the decrees of a great and orderly 
 Senate; nor yet the surge and urge of irresistible armies 
 not these alone constitute history. They are a part. No 
 less a part thereof are the din and uproar and tumult in the 
 busy places of trade or where crowds gather to hear their 
 spokesmen or the spokesmen of their opponents; the 
 shout and noise and clash of opposing social and economic 
 forces; the ringing of bells, the blasts of whistles, the toot 
 of horns, the "confusion worse confounded" in the celebra- 
 tion of victory or the signing of an armistice, yet order in 
 it all these constitute an essential part of history. 
 
 But chief of all and center of all is that place where the 
 child is taught its mother's tongue and lisps its early 
 prayers; where father and son, mother and daughter are ac- 
 customed to meet on common ground ; where tears are shed 
 and griefs are shared, where fond love first finds its joys; 
 
 iii 
 
iv Point of View 
 
 where the infirm ease their pains and the strong learn to 
 bear the burdens of the weak; where God is revered, and 
 the nation's unassailable foundations are based the fire- 
 side. It is here that the historian who would seek the start- 
 ing point, the very center and the whole circumference of 
 the fabric of the nation's greatness, must search; omitting 
 which, he fails of truth. Bolshevism, anarchism, destruc- 
 tion of all kinds can never disturb the nation's balance, until 
 they first shake these sure foundations. But once these 
 finest elements are lost out of the nation's life, once the 
 nation's women are nationalized, turned into cattle, then 
 these foundations are shaken, the nation loses its morale, 
 and the Republic of the fathers is at an end. 
 
 If the course of the Wilson Administration at any time 
 caused depression because admitting the dernier forces to 
 a partial temporary control, it passed with the breaking of 
 the new day. The night of gloom is gone, let it be hoped 
 forever. 
 
 The author felt that when Mr. Bryan swung the Balti- 
 more convention to Woodrow Wilson, after his chief com- 
 petitor had a majority of the convention, he performed one 
 of the most notable acts of our entire political history and 
 for the public good. With an open mind, he was favorably 
 inclined toward Mr. Wilson when he entered upon his first 
 term in the presidency, and resented Theodore Roosevelt's 
 first broadsides against the President after the European 
 conflagration started. Yet, in common with millions of 
 others, was compelled to admit the correctness of Mr. 
 Roosevelt's position. 
 
 In the matter of labor his sympathies always have been, 
 and now are, ardently with the real working man as dis- 
 tinguished from the professional agitator-man. Brought 
 up on a hill farm in an eastern state, where, at the age of 
 sixteen, and not yet grown, he cut the grain in the hilly 
 fields by swinging the cradle with strong men, he knows 
 from personal experience the hardest of manual labor. If 
 
Point of View v 
 
 the following pages reveal the fact that he has no more 
 sympathy with autocracy in labor circles than in industrial 
 capitalism, the presidency, or Prussia, that is a necessary 
 incident to this study. He has no sympathy with a so-called 
 laboring man, who, merely because he is in an organized 
 group, will smite an honest laboring man merely because 
 he happens to be outside of that group, as the great majority 
 are. "A man's a man for a 1 that. 11 His brand of democ- 
 racy is as broad and deep as humanity itself. He regards 
 America as the great hope of the world's democracy, be- 
 cause she is free and her people unshackled. 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I COMING STORM AND PREPARATION 9 
 
 II THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION ...... 28 
 
 III THE FUEL ADMINISTRATION 41 
 
 IV LABOR AND WAGES 51 
 
 V SHIPBUILDING 66 
 
 VI GOVERNMENT RAILROADING 83 
 
 VII SECRETARY BAKER AND MR. CREEL IN WAR . . 107 
 
 VIII THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT 140 
 
 IX THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 154 
 
 X LIQUOR AND VICE 169 
 
 XI RUSSIA AND BOLSHEVISM 188 
 
 XII DISLOYALTY 221 
 
 XIII LOOKING TOWARD PEACE 234 
 
 XIV THE WORLD'S PEACE CONGRESS 261 
 
 XV THE TREATY OF PARIS 300 
 
 XVI THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ....... 325 
 
 XVII THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS .... 346 
 
 XVIII WILSON AND WILSONISM 365 
 
 XIX PROFITEERING 387 
 
 XX RECONSTRUCTION 398 
 
 XXI INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION 420 
 
 XXII THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 429 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 450 
 
 INDEX 457 
 
 vii 
 
THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION 
 AND THE GREAT WAR 
 
THE WILSON 
 
 ADMINISTRATION AND 
 
 THE GREAT WAR 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 COMING STORM AND PREPARATION 
 
 The low, long roll of thunder was heard along the east- 
 ern horizon on a morning of that fateful last week in July, 
 1914. The sound of it stretched across the sea and 
 reached America and circled the globe. No cloud was in 
 sight; no cause apparent. Yet the first peal grew into a ter- 
 rific roar, the whole heaven was darkened, and the world 
 was caught in an awful storm. Thick darkness was round 
 about. 
 
 The diplomatic battle, with Sir Edward Grey as the 
 center of all the parleys having for their end the peace of 
 the world, was ended within ten days. England held aloof, 
 warning France that for her to advance toward Germany 
 beyond the line of diplomatic prudence would endanger 
 her support. The first week in August saw military force 
 arrayed against military force. The usual poise of the 
 world was upset by the fierceness and ruthlessness of the 
 onslaught, and little Belgium was first made to feel the 
 heavy blow of the cruel ravager; and her endurance for 
 the first ten days of self-effacement, together with Eng- 
 land's ready navy saved to the world that civilization which 
 was the product of twenty centuries of human effort. For 
 it enabled France to gather her forces and England to 
 
 9 
 
io The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 assemble her resources and to get her bearings in the new 
 relationships. 
 
 America was in a maze. To her the situation was 
 stupefying. The Thing seemed unreal. It was like a tale 
 from cloudland impossible. The American was confused, 
 baffled. He knew that there was disordered movement in 
 the world; that the world was out of joint. He witnessed 
 a combat of giants on an unheard-of scale. The world was 
 beginning to sway and reel like a drunken man. Events 
 were not taking place in their usual course. History seemed 
 to have come to an end; and history seemed to be begin- 
 ning anew. Had mankind gone mad? Was civilization's 
 very foundation to be destroyed? Was all that had been 
 built upon the teachings of the Christ to be discarded? Was 
 civilization itself sagging? 
 
 These were the questions that ran through the mind of 
 America from day to day and from week to week. 
 
 Then came the quick and mighty forging forward 
 toward Paris, once Belgium was prostrate. It seemed that 
 nothing would stop the onward sweep, and that the French 
 capital must be reached within a few weeks and surrender 
 to the sword. But the marvel of it was that within a few 
 miles of the city the tide was stemmed. And at this time, 
 but a few weeks after the titanic struggle began, the dis- 
 tinctively American citizen was glad that the tide had been 
 turned back and that Paris was saved. For already, with 
 incomplete knowledge, there was a growing feeling that 
 Germany was in the wrong, that the outrage on Belgium 
 would not bear the scrutiny of modern civilization, and that 
 the German government proposed to use every means 
 within its power, fair or foul, civilized or savage, to ac- 
 complish its purpose. 
 
 And treachery and propaganda were at work in Amer- 
 ica, but by the Central Powers only. Cunningly devised, it 
 was so insidiously operated as to mislead thoroughgoing 
 Americans. Its purpose was to win America to the Ger- 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 1 1 
 
 man cause; or, failing in that, so to confuse judgment and 
 blur vision by falsehood and innuendo as to weaken any 
 attempt to align American sentiment with the Allies. In 
 fact, this had begun years before, when, by some means, 
 even American textbooks used in the schools were prepared 
 in such form as to laud Germany and things German. 
 Thousands of American students attending German uni- 
 versities imbibed of the materialistic and hideous doctrines 
 which Germany, through her universities, had been foisting 
 upon the world; and at the ripe moment many of them stood 
 by Germany, eminent Americans, teaching public law in 
 great seats of American learning, aiding in the literary 
 propaganda prepared in Germany for American consump- 
 tion. 
 
 The extent of this treacherous propaganda was not fully 
 known to the American public until the United States en- 
 tered the war, and in its fullest extent will probably never 
 be revealed. It was open and notorious in large population 
 centers, but was by no means confined to the cities. North 
 Dakota, an almost solidly agricultural section, was sedu- 
 lously cultivated through the pro-German leaders of the 
 Nonpartisan League; others soon became well known. 
 
 Openly where it seemed best, elsewhere clandestinely, 
 Germany zealously backed up these efforts. If it was not 
 an attempt to frighten America with a vision of Japan 
 reaching out for the Philippines, Hawaii, and even Cali- 
 fornia, then it was a setting forth of how England was 
 seeking to catch unwary America in an effort to break down 
 her commerce, or to push the Irish question to the front. 
 
 This persistent propaganda had a distinct anti-Ally in- 
 fluence, both immediately and for the future. By dividing 
 American sentiment, it served well its purpose at the begin- 
 ning of hostilities in Europe, as well as when America 
 should have entered the armed conflict, when the first steps 
 toward peace were contemplated, and while the Peace Con- 
 gress was in session, as well as in the execution of the Treaty. 
 
12 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 On the other hand, it was a potent force helpful to the 
 cause of the Allies, in that it caused the organizing of the 
 American forces everywhere as they had not been previously 
 organized. And these, fortifying the American public with 
 the facts in the case, cleared the way for a fairer understand- 
 ing of the conflict in Europe and strengthened Allied senti- 
 ment in America. 
 
 For each time the Allies undertook to state the justice 
 of their cause, there immediately came into existence a 
 stream of literature and of pronouncements from certain 
 pulpits that told how false was every statement thus made. 
 On September 7, 1914, the German kaiser himself pro- 
 tested to President Wilson against the conduct of the enemy 
 in using dumdum bullets. The sole purpose was to blur the 
 vision, at a time when the American public was not aware 
 of the dastardly attempts of the German Government, 
 aided by the pro-Germans in the United States, to put forth 
 any false statements that might tend to show the Germans 
 right, the Allies wrong. 
 
 And this influence reached Administration circles where 
 it seemingly had more influence than upon the general pub- 
 lic. Not only did it influence individual congressmen so 
 that they were at all times pro-German, but it influenced 
 Congress as a whole. 
 
 The chief prop of this official propaganda in America 
 was the German-American Alliance, whose wishes found 
 expression in resolutions in the House offered by their chief 
 spokesmen, Vollmer and Bartholdt. The Alliance at Minne- 
 apolis telegraphed a member of the House : u ln the name 
 of Christian humanity and the spirit of neutrality we beg 
 your support of Bartholdt's bill to stop munitions of war 
 from America reaching Europe." It was not that they 
 cared one iota about Christian humanity or the spirit of 
 neutrality or the stopping of munitions from reaching 
 Europe; what did concern these pro-German organizations 
 was that Germany, barred by the effective naval operations 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 13 
 
 of Great Britain, was unable to receive these munitions. 
 Germany made no objections to any neutral country, her- 
 self included, shipping munitions of war in the Boer War. 
 
 About this time a great neutrality meeting was an- 
 nounced for Philadelphia by the newly formed American 
 Neutrality League, and its secretary invited Dr. Rhine- 
 lander, Bishop of Pennsylvania, to be one of its vice-presi- 
 dents. But the good bishop saw through this neutrality 
 scheme, and declared that from information which had 
 then lately reached him it appeared that this agitation was 
 chiefly "not really in the interest of neutrality, but in hos- 
 tility to the Allied nations, and with the hope of helping 
 Germany and Austria in their campaign." And further 
 stated : "As an American citizen pledged to uphold Ameri- 
 can ideals, I am altogether against Germany and Austria 
 in this war, on the ground that they are threatening, and 
 would destroy, as far as they have opportunity, those politi- 
 cal and personal liberties and rights which we Americans 
 have made the foundation of our government." 
 
 Here was the reply of a real American who saw through 
 all the jugglery of pro-Germanism. And, of course, in the 
 opinion of the secretary of the League, this letter showing 
 real Americanism placed the Bishop of Pennsylvania as a 
 partisan and made him ineligible as a vice-president of a 
 neutrality meeting. But eminent men were present, and to 
 get them into such meetings was always a large part of the 
 plan. Governor Brumbaugh presided, while congressmen 
 made bitter anti-British speeches, and resolutions were 
 adopted which were zealously anti-Ally and vigorously pro- 
 German; and the enormous throng unable to gain entrance 
 to the meeting turned itself into a overflow meeting which 
 manifested its neutrality by singing "Die Wacht am Rheim" 
 and "Deutschland Ueber Alles." The influence of such 
 meetings entered very emphatically into Administration 
 circles in Washington. 
 
 Yet, the Administration presumably had at hand inti- 
 
14 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 mate knowledge of all the transactions of a foreign nation 
 a belligerent, in the country. But it was never explained tc 
 the American people why the Administration did not kno\\ 
 what the German Imperial Government was doing by wa> 
 of violation of the requirements of international law; or, 
 knowing, why it did not put a stop to this underhanded, 
 insidious campaign to drag America into the side that was 
 wrong, and which men of the perspicacity of Bishop Rhine- 
 lander and others, who at this time were proclaiming the 
 inhumanity and heartlessness of the German Government 
 and the justice and righteousness of the Allied cause, could 
 see so clearly. 
 
 The war in Europe had scarcely more than begun when 
 the German-American Alliance, through its president, Dr. 
 J. C. Hexamer, requested President Wilson to ask Japan 
 to keep her hands off in the East at the time she demanded 
 of Germany withdrawal of armed ships from that quarter. 
 Immediately thereafter, on August 18, 1914, President Wil- 
 son delivered one of his notable war addresses to the 
 American people. Coming at that time, it was regarded as 
 the Administration's reply. Among other things, he said: 
 
 The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon 
 what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves 
 America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is 
 the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all con- 
 cerned. 
 
 ******* 
 
 I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn 
 word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essen- 
 tial breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out 
 of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in 
 fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. 
 We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a 
 curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might 
 be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before 
 another. 
 
 My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 15 
 
 wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great coun- 
 try of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our 
 hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit 
 beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the 
 dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action ; a nation 
 that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own 
 counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest 
 and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world. 
 
 As this address, in some respects of the finest, came after 
 the ravishment of Belgium, the President was most se- 
 verely criticised for asking red-blooded Americans to be 
 "neutral in thought," as his address was understood to mean, 
 after the brutality shown toward little Belgium; and to 
 maintain the "fine poise of undisturbed judgment" and to 
 remain "dispassionate" after the blood-thirsty methods of 
 brute force exhibited toward innocent women and children 
 of a prostrate people. One of the picture-posters after- 
 ward used very effectively by the Administration in seeking 
 enlistments, showing a stalwart young American, when he 
 heard the tale of brutality, throwing off his coat to settle 
 with the offender, accompanied by the injunction: "Tell it 
 to the marines," was a very clear expression of the feelings 
 of the real American. He was not dispassionate or neutral 
 in the face of outraged conscience. 
 
 And as the people now began to complain of the do- 
 nothing spirit of the Administration, in the face not only 
 of the great wrong in Europe but of the attempted violation 
 of American neutrality by the outrageous German propa- 
 ganda carried on officially in the nation's capital, Dr. Bern- 
 hard Dernberg, the chief propagandist on the rostrum, was 
 gently invited to discontinue his operations. But the propa- 
 ganda continued in greater volume and with greater effect 
 than ever. A great effort was made to control the leading 
 newspapers of the country. 
 
 On the other hand, the method was being delved into. 
 The facts were being set before the Administration, not by 
 
1 6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 its own agents, but by some of the shrewdest private detec- 
 tives in the land. The revelations made by the Providence 
 Journal astonished the country. Even the Administration, 
 with the proof in its own hands, was slow to believe. It 
 did not like to admit that while it was asking the people 
 to be neutral in thought and undisturbed in spirit, there was 
 being carried on, under the very shadow of the White 
 House, by the accredited ambassador of Germany, a scheme 
 to divide the Republic by enemies within and by force with- 
 out. 
 
 And when the notable book of James M. Beck, "The 
 Evidence in the Case," set before the people the causes 
 leading up to the open rupture in Europe, there was such 
 a revulsion as is seldom seen, in so short a time. 
 
 It is doubtful whether history can credit the Adminis- 
 tration with dealing fairly with the American people in 
 this matter. With all the evidence it had or should have 
 had with the opportunities of knowledge, it is difficult to 
 credit the Administration with the purpose of square-deal- 
 ing with the people, in its effort to lead them in a direction 
 not warranted by the facts. The President's own accred- 
 ited and trusted minister to the Netherlands at the time the 
 conflagration burst forth, in referring to the events of vast 
 magnitude that were rapidly crowding upon each other 
 beginning with the last week in July, 1914, said: 
 
 We who stood outside the secret councils of the Central Powers 
 were both bewildered and dismayed. Could it be that Europe of 
 the twentieth century was to be thrust back into the ancient barbarism 
 of a general war? It was like a dreadful nightmare. There was 
 the head of the huge dragon, crested, fanged, clad in glittering scales, 
 poised above the world and ready to strike. We were benumbed and 
 terrified. There was nothing that we could do. The monstrous 
 thing advanced, but even while we shuddered we could not make 
 ourselves feel that it was real. It had the vagueness and the horrid 
 pressure of a bad dream. 1 
 
 1 Henry van Dyke's "Fighting for Peace," p. 45, Scribners, New York, 1917. 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 17 
 
 Doctor van Dyke was keenly aware of the unblushing bru- 
 tality of the Hohenzollerns, and all that belong with them, 
 whom he best knew as the Potsdam Gang. 
 
 And yet, two years later the President went so far 
 as to declare : 
 
 This Great War that broke so suddenly upon the world two years 
 ago, . . . has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at 
 liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of 
 the great interests of civilization which it affects. With its causes 
 and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which 
 its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search 
 for or explore. 
 
 Is that true? Was not Bishop Rhinelander's perception of 
 the great moral issues involved the keener? And had it 
 become true that America had no conscience? Where 
 there is a lively conscience in a great people there is cer- 
 tain to be a lively interest against a wrong-doer, whether he 
 be a private or a public character, and there will be an ever- 
 increasing volume gathering until the wickedness is swept 
 away. At first the people resented Theodore Roosevelt's 
 broadsides against President Wilson; but as the conflict pro- 
 ceeded and the right and wrong of it became clearer, they 
 swerved from Washington to Oyster Bay; they were learn- 
 ing that it was not the President of the United States, but 
 the sage of Sagamore who was to pilot America through 
 safe channels in the storm that was rocking the world. 
 
 Indeed, the President knew better, as witness his next 
 inaugural expressions : 
 
 The war inevitably set its mark from the first alike upon our 
 minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics, and our social 
 action. To be indifferent to it or independent of it was out of the 
 question. 
 
 And on the same occasion he described the German methods 
 as "organized wrong." 
 
 It was during this period that there came into being 
 
1 8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 many societies with beguiling names to win American favor. 
 Among these were American Neutrality League, American 
 Independence Union, American Truth Society, American 
 Peaceful Embargo Society, Friends of Peace, Friends of 
 Truth. 2 That these influenced Mr. Wilson may be ac- 
 cepted as fact. His sense of right was not so far gone that 
 he did not know. It may have been blunted by an over- 
 weening ambition. The course of the presidential campaign 
 and the methods used by his managers and accepted by him, 
 suggest that it was held in abeyance. He was unsteady, 
 wavered when firmness in the right was the only safe course 
 to pursue. It led to doubt, created uncertainty. This led 
 a prominent member of Congress to declare, when urged 
 to stand by the President, that he would gladly do so if the 
 President would but take a stand for something. It was 
 this wobbling that gave Germany her opportunity which she 
 used to the full. The President, while in the attitude of 
 what he described as "watchful waiting" in another interna- 
 tional matter, displayed what became a marked character- 
 istic of his as he remained the longer in the presidency an- 
 tagonizing the course which he admittedly knew to be the 
 right, and showing favor to the admittedly wrong. 
 
 At this time of serious business in the world's history, 
 the President manifested a partiality for pacifists. He had 
 them in all the cabinet positions that were of chief impor- 
 trance at such a time as then marked the world. Mr. Garri- 
 son, a fighting secretary of war, was displaced by a man 
 so notedly a pacifist as to be known as antagonistic to the 
 best Americanism. Henry Ford, who later received Mr. 
 Wilson's support for United States senator, spent freely 
 of his money, said to run into the millions, first in full-page 
 advertisements in American newspapers, and then on his 
 peace-ship trip to Europe, a plan that received adverse at- 
 tention in the English Parliament. Prominent men in the 
 
 2 John B. McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 140, D. 
 Appleton & Co., New York, 1918. 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 19 
 
 President's cabinet were prominently connected with dis- 
 tinctively pro-German meetings in New York, his former 
 Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, openly identifying himself 
 with one of them. 
 
 These pacifists, who exerted a powerful influence in the 
 Administration, sought to create in the United States a senti- 
 ment that was at all times of the greatest value to Germany, 
 whether before, during, or after the war. They divided 
 sentiment when it should have been united and firm against 
 the brute forces then seeking to overturn civilization; they 
 weakened the already weak Administration in a clear per- 
 ception of duty to country and to humane principles. 
 
 But in time the forces of righteousness swept all bar- 
 riers away. The dignity of the American nation had been 
 flung to the winds. Her vessels on lawful missions were 
 sunk. Her peaceful citizens lawfully travelling the high- 
 ways of the sea were murdered. Even her government's 
 representatives going to or from their posts of official duty 
 were drowned in the depths. All these things were as noth- 
 ing to a pacifist and pro-German. But the shame of it was 
 that a national Administration permitted it. Good ringing 
 notes were written by the American Government, and then 
 the same outrages were permitted repetition. The Admin- 
 istration faltered when it should have been strong in action; 
 it wavered when it should have been clear and unhesitating; 
 it talked when it should have performed. It led to the 
 expression that became common throughout the land : "Oh, 
 for a Roosevelt in the White House I" 
 
 When, on May 7, 1915, the "Lusitania" was sunk by a 
 German torpedo, after advertisements in American news- 
 papers by the German Embassy at Washington warning that 
 American travellers on it would be endangered, and of the 
 1,153 persons who thereby lost their lives, 114 were Ameri- 
 can men, women and children, a cry of horror mingled with 
 rage went up from every quarter of the land. May 16 the 
 Secretary of State sent his first "Lusitania" note to Germany 
 
2O The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 on the outrage. Midway between these two events, Presi- 
 dent Wilson in an address to a vast throng in Philadelphia 
 used the words, "There is such a thing as a man being too 
 proud to fight." This became known as his "too-proud-to- 
 fight" speech. All other incidents connected with it were 
 soon forgotten. But it was a sad commentary upon the 
 President's shrewdness and mental acumen that he could 
 not have seen that that was a poor answer to the German 
 militaristic power which had already determined that no 
 sense of right or honor or neighborly obligation or treaty 
 obligation should interfere with its desperate purpose. 
 
 Sinkings now come in rapid succession. On April 19, 
 1916, the President went before Congress with the whole 
 question, declaring that "tragedy had followed tragedy on 
 the seas in such fashion" and that "the roll of Americans 
 who have lost their lives on ships thus attacked and de- 
 stroyed has grown month by month until the ominous total 
 loss mounted into the hundreds." And he declared that 
 the severance of diplomatic relations was the only course 
 open unless Germany immediately and radically mended her 
 ways. And in this he met the best thought of the nation. 
 
 But the presidential election was to be held that year, 
 and again he dallied. And the campaign slogans of his 
 party are suggestive of motives : "He kept us out of war," 
 and "You are at work, not at war." He had repeatedly 
 told the German Government that no further outrages would 
 be tolerated, and there was the same reason for a war with 
 Germany April 6, 1916, as April 6, 1917. 
 
 After the election he sought to ascertain upon what 
 terms peace between the warring nations could be made. 
 To this end, he went before the Senate January 22, 1917. 
 It is not clear why he went or what he expected to accom- 
 plish; but it is a part of the Administration's record. And 
 in this address he used a notable phrase that has been fol- 
 lowing him as a nemesis ever since, when he declared for 
 "peace without victory" willing to condone all the worst 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 21 
 
 horrors and brutalities imposed upon civilized society. It 
 took a permanent place with his u too proud to fight" and 
 "with its causes and objects we are not concerned." 
 
 When James J. F. Archibald, pro-German lecturer in 
 the United States, was detained by the British in August, 
 1915, he was found to possess high recommendations from 
 the Austrian Ambassador Dumba and the German Ambas- 
 sador Bernstorff. By papers found on him it was also dis- 
 closed that Bernstorff, while making explanations to the 
 State Department of his connections with compromising 
 transactions, was seeking to purchase or destroy manufac- 
 turing plants in the United States, and to cause strikes 
 among the employes and disloyal union labor. It was early 
 in 1916 that the noted u sink-without-a-trace" messages were 
 being sent, and that Bernstorff was a party to acts of war 
 against the United States. He was a party to the infamous 
 Zimmerman notes seeking to engage Mexico and Japan 
 in disrupting the integrity of the American Republic. The 
 President knew, the world knew, these things. 
 
 But no step had been taken by the Administration look- 
 ing toward preparation for eventualities. General Leonard 
 Wood opened at Plattsburg, N. Y., the training-camp that 
 became the model for the Government once war was de- 
 clared. It brought down upon his head the wrath of the 
 Administration. Colonel Roosevelt stirred the people to 
 the importance of getting ready for the war into which the 
 country was drifting, pleading for one hundred per cent 
 robust Americanism, for a united front against German 
 encroachments upon American rights, for substituting in 
 the fighting departments of the Government fighting men for 
 pacifists, and above all for preparation for the inevitable 
 conflict. 
 
 The Administration at first sought to neutralize the ef- 
 fects of Roosevelt's speeches and his articles written for 
 magazines and newspapers. He became the leader of 
 robust Americanism, while President Wilson became the 
 
22 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 leader and exponent of diluted Americanism and robust 
 pacifism. "The two stood for irreconcilable doctrines: the 
 one for justice at any cost; the other for peace at any price; 
 the one for decision and preparedness to enforce it, the 
 other for evasion and compromise. " The pacifist War Sec- 
 retary Baker declared there was ample time to prepare, 
 since the war was 3,000 miles away; George Creel, social- 
 ist and internationalist, was chairman of the committee on 
 public information. Men of this stamp at such a time cast 
 a shadow over the entire Administration, which side-tracked 
 the resolution of Representative Gardner for a National Se- 
 curity Commission, introduced October 15, 1915, for the 
 purpose of ascertaining the state of the nation's prepared- 
 ness. 
 
 And the President, after seeking to lull the people to 
 sleep, declared they did not want war. Meanwhile, Col- 
 onel Roosevelt's editorials appearing in the Kansas City 
 Star, with its wide circulation, were having a marked influ- 
 ence through the central West. The President toured the 
 central northwest and the section in which the Star circu- 
 lated. He returned to Washington and stated that the peo- 
 ple wanted war. The company Mr. Bryan was keeping in 
 those large days of history-making was not up to Roosevelt's 
 standard. After the sinking of the "Lusitania," Mr. 
 Bryan issued an address to German-Americans stating that 
 the President was their warm friend. At the moment they 
 were seeking to destroy America, he received numerous tele- 
 grams from German-American societies, and under the aus- 
 pices of one he gave an address in New York City, presided 
 over by the president of the United German-American 
 Societies of that State. Others addressing this meeting 
 were Frank Buchanan, later of rather undesirable notoriety 
 for alleged unamericanism ; Henry Vollmer, noted pro-Ger- 
 man; the notorious Jeremiah O'Leary of pro-German fame; 
 and among the worthies at the meeting were the Turkish 
 ambassador; Austrian Ambassador Dumba, who did all in 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 23 
 
 his power to destroy American integrity; Captain Boy-Ed 
 and Captain von Papen, both notoriously active against 
 Americanism. 
 
 And these were the influences that were operating upon 
 the President until he went out among the people where 
 Roosevelt had been preaching by pen and by tongue that 
 form of Americanism that always prevails when right is 
 matched against wrong, and the people are permitted to 
 see the truth. At a late day he admitted the dernier forces 
 at work had "poured the poison of disloyalty into the vari- 
 ous arteries of our national life," and that the time had 
 come to make greater preparation. And on Flag Day, June 
 14, 1916, he marched at the head of a parade in the interest 
 of preparedness, in Washington. In an address on that 
 occasion he said: 
 
 There is a disloyalty active in the United States and it must be 
 crushed. It proceeds from a minority, a very small minority but a 
 very active and subtle minority. It works underground but it also 
 shows its ugly head where we can see it, and there are those at this 
 moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying, 
 "Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will 
 wreak our vengeance at the polls." That is the sort of thing 
 against which the American Nation will turn with a might and 
 triumph of sentiment which will teach these gentlemen once for all 
 that disloyalty to this flag is the first test of tolerance in the United 
 States. 
 
 Herein President Wilson was speaking America's best 
 thought. But soon thereafter came another sagging, as 
 witness the campaign slogan of the party of which he was 
 the head, "He kept us out of war." 
 
 Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on 
 February 3. The McLemore resolution, seeking to block 
 the President's policy of arming merchantmen, had been 
 ardently debated in and out of Congress, and every force 
 standing for Germany and pro-Germanism backed the 
 resolution. The President was bitterly attacked by his own 
 
24 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 party, and every power Germany could exert was now used. 
 Bernstorff sought to influence Congress and the newspapers. 
 This was a year before diplomatic relations were severed. 
 President Wilson replied to the vicious attacks : "You are 
 right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to 
 keep the United States out of war." But when the time for 
 action came, he was ready to assume his part of the respon- 
 sibility after the breaking off of diplomatic relations. 
 April 2 he went before Congress and asked for the declara- 
 tion that a state of war existed. This was granted by reso- 
 lution on April 6. 
 
 Thus the nation was thrust into the stupendous conflict 
 without adequate preparation, a condition for which the 
 pacifist Secretary of War Baker thanked God. And the cost 
 in money and blood for this condition can never be com- 
 puted. America was suddenly turned into a military camp, 
 making "confusion worse confounded." At the nation's 
 capital everything was topsy-turvy. Men were getting into 
 each other's way in the attempt to do something. "The call 
 to arms found our country ill prepared for the great work 
 that lay before it." 3 The herculean task thus laid upon the 
 nation by pacifism must be undertaken with the utmost ex- 
 pedition. The military and naval forces in great numbers 
 were to be gathered and trained. Money in unheard-of 
 sums must be raised. Peace industries had to be placed on 
 a war footing. Transportation facilities must be converted 
 to war purposes. The Council of National Defense must be 
 organized and set about its serious duties, and there came 
 into being a great number of boards, and committees of 
 various sorts and sizes. 
 
 The President, on April 15, urgently appealed to pro- 
 ducers of war material and foods to increase their output. 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt was granted authority by Congress, 
 in the face of strenuous opposition from the President's 
 supporters, to raise a force of 100,000 men at once from 
 
 3 McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 366. 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 25 
 
 men outside the draft age of 21 to 31 years, to go to the 
 front in Europe. Men from every section of the land, 
 even from Alaska, were eager to join his standard, and as 
 soon as Congress acted some even took the long trip from 
 Alaska. But the President said him nay: "The business 
 now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific 
 definiteness and precision." 
 
 At once the country was immersed in the task of armies, 
 airplanes, navies, finance. The order for mobilization of 
 the navy showed a lack by 35,000 of the 87,000 authorized 
 for peace. To put it on a war footing required substan- 
 tially 100,000 regulars and 45,000 reserves. The work of 
 enlistment began at once, with all the devices of novelty 
 known to American ingenuity. The countryside was at- 
 tracted by cartoons and posters put up on fences, trees, 
 stumps, rocks, and in every other conceivable place where 
 they would catch the public eye. In the cities they were 
 displayed in shop windows, at recruiting stations, in hall- 
 ways of public buildings, on billboards, on vehicles. Naval 
 men gifted in speech and song went in groups or singly in 
 automobiles and caught the crowds on street corners where 
 the throngs were passing, the hour of special value being at 
 noon. And it was remarkable how the boys poured out of 
 the unexpected places; as the lumber town of Bemidji, in 
 the woods of northern Minnesota, or the prairie town of 
 Pierre, South Dakota, both of which went quickly far be- 
 yond their quotas. 
 
 Appeals for army service were not less cogent, and vol- 
 unteering went rapidly forward until the time for the draft. 
 Meanwhile Congress, in a bitter debate over the selective 
 draft measure, was closely divided, and compromise meas- 
 ures were offered. All of these the President wisely turned 
 aside and stood firmly by his position for the selective draft, 
 and June 5 was made registration day. The Census Bur- 
 eau estimated the number who would fall within the regis- 
 try at 10,000,000. The number actually was 9,586,508. 
 
26 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Mobilization began September 5, when five per cent of the 
 men went to the sixteen instruction and training camps of 
 the country, one-fifth of them starting each of five succes- 
 sive days. After October 3, the remaining fifteen per cent 
 went as soon as practicable. It was a new event in the 
 nation's history to witness these young men physicians, 
 clerks, farmers, lawyers, laborers, business men, rich and 
 poor alike leaving their homes in every city, town and 
 hamlet of the land, to go into training to be made fit to 
 fight in Europe. 
 
 Two days before the first men started for their camps, 
 President Wilson took occasion to address them in this 
 fine message worthy of place by every fireside : 
 
 You are undertaking a great duty. The heart of the whole coun- 
 try is with you. 
 
 Everything that you do will be watched with the deepest interest 
 and with the deepest solicitude, not only by those who ate near and 
 dear to you, but by the whole nation besides. 
 
 For this great war draws us all together, makes us all comrades 
 and brothers, as all true Americans felt themselves to be when we 
 first made good our national independence. 
 
 The eyes of the world will be upon you, because you are in some 
 special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, 
 to show all men everywhere not only what good soldiers you are but 
 also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in 
 everything, and pure and clean through and through. 
 
 Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory 
 to live up to it and add a new laurel to the crown of America. 
 
 My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and 
 every test. God keep and guide you. 
 
 But, true to their color, all who were willing to assist 
 the German autocracy in every way possible, except to go 
 to the German front and fight like men, were ready to do 
 everything in their power to thwart the purposes of Amer- 
 ica, once she had taken a definite stand, ready to stab her 
 soldier boys in the back. Anti-draft, anti-war, anti-America 
 
Coming Storm and Preparation 27 
 
 demonstrations were made by Socialists and slackers in every 
 large city of the land. They paraded the streets carrying 
 red flags with such inscriptions as, "War is Hell We De- 
 mand Peace." The Young People's Socialistic Society, or- 
 ganized throughout the country in the larger cities, held 
 secret meetings to protest the war, though unwittingly they 
 furnished some of the best secret-service material the Gov- 
 ernment had. Like the larger and more open meetings, 
 such as that addressed by Mr. Bryan in New York, they 
 were doing the things German autocracy liked best to have 
 done. Some had taken their cue from men high in admin- 
 istration circles, getting their inscriptions from pre-war 
 utterances such as Speaker Champ Clark's that a conscript 
 looked much like a convict. In Oklahoma there was open 
 resistance that amounted to civil war, in which several were 
 killed and some two hundred were made prisoners and held 
 under a charge of treason to the United States. 
 
 Everywhere pacifists, Socialists, Industrial Workers of 
 the World, anti-war, anti-conscription, anti-America, pro- 
 German organizations were busy with their propaganda, and 
 operated under almost every conceivable name and designa- 
 tion, chief of which became "conscientious objectors to 
 war." They were usually of the radical type found in 
 European countries, chiefly from the Central Powers. 
 
 A call for funds with which to prosecute the war ear- 
 nestly engaged the Treasury Department immediately the 
 war was declared. Sums beyond the common reach of the 
 American imagination, big as it is accustomed to view things, 
 were asked. Seven billion dollars was asked by popular 
 subscription, the largest sum any nation had ever under- 
 taken to raise at one time in all the world's history. And 
 it was over-subscribed, as were all the subsequent amounts, 
 totalling some $30,000,000,000, part of which was loaned 
 to the Allies. 
 
 America's conscience must never be dulled to a great 
 wrong, by a lulling pacifism in high places of power. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION 
 
 Once the country had engaged in the world struggle, the 
 Administration wisely perceived that food was a vital fac- 
 tor in determining the tide of conflict. 
 
 The Council of National Defense appointed Herbert 
 C. Hoover chairman of the Commission on Food Supply 
 and Prices. His experience and success at the head of the 
 Belgium Relief Commission, until the brutal acts of Ger- 
 many made it no longer possible for him to serve there, 
 pointed to him at once as the individual best fitted for such 
 service. His Commission was charged with the high task 
 of gaining the co-operation of all food distributing agencies, 
 and of securing an increased production of food while pre- 
 venting profiteering and waste. And nine days after our 
 declaration of war, in a public appeal, the President urged 
 the supreme need to be "especially foodstuffs," calling upon 
 men and boys, "to turn in hosts to the farms" and declaring 
 that it was "the time for America to correct her unpardon- 
 able fault of wastefulness and extravagance." To the 
 South he particularly appealed to raise food as well as 
 cotton. 
 
 The nation gave quick and generous response. Gardens 
 were intensively cultivated. Vacant lots became gardens. 
 Front yards, boulevards, railway rights-of-way, even in 
 the great agricultural states of Minnesota and the Dakotas, 
 were turned into lots. A campaign was started to teach 
 saving in the kitchen with printed instructions from the 
 Food Administration. "Preach the gospel of the clean 
 plate" became a cardinal principle of patriotic housekeep- 
 ing. 
 
 28 
 
The Food Administration 29 
 
 In mid-summer, 1917, the Food-Control Law was 
 enacted, placing in the hands of Mr. Hoover so great 
 powers over food that he was termed the Food Dictator. 
 And he forthwith stated to the public that while it was not 
 the purpose of the Food Administration to seek to apply 
 punitive measures, he would not hesitate to apply in full 
 measure "the drastic, coercive powers" with which Congress 
 had invested him should occasion arise. And promptly there 
 was mapped out a course of action for control of dealers as 
 well as for conservation by consumers. Wisdom and tact 
 marked the course of the Administration in dealing with 
 the food problem during the war period. 
 
 "Food Will Win the War Don't Waste It" became a 
 slogan on farm, in mill, in kitchen, everywhere. The peo- 
 ple, a great people, always accustomed to plenty, merely 
 upon a request denied themselves of what they had grown 
 to be accustomed to. There was never a murmur, except 
 in a few isolated instances. The administration of Mr. 
 Hoover has become one of the bright spots in the national 
 Administration during the Great War. His work was thor- 
 ough and scientific. 
 
 Once the American people were placed on a war diet, 
 they were brought into immediate touch with one large 
 meaning of war and understood the better. It brought war 
 home to the people repeatedly every day. The form of the 
 appeals made by the Food Administration, "for the boys 
 over there," gave a patriotic turn to American thought in 
 the saving of food. The importance of saving such prime 
 foods as wheat, sugar and meat was advertised everywhere 
 and all the time. It was before the people riding on trains, 
 eating their meals in public places, in the thoroughfares of 
 business, in the home. Corn bread and corn cakes, bran 
 bread and bran muffins these graced the tables of 
 American eaters and were good for the health. They were 
 aided by rye bread and rice cakes, and the value of barley 
 as a food was soon learned. To all was added the joy of 
 
30 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the humor of it; for there came the "wheatless days" and 
 the "meatless days." 
 
 "Sugar save a lump every day for the boys over 
 there," became a part of the daily menu. Sugar became 
 scarce because of the wasted beet fields of Europe, and be- 
 cause of the lack of ships to carry it where abundant. Fac- 
 ing all passengers on railroad trains were large cards 
 neatly printed in colors with this: 
 
 SUGAR 
 
 1. None on Fruits 
 
 2. None on Desserts 
 
 3. Less on Cereals 
 
 4. Less in Coffee and Tea 
 
 5. Less in Preserving 
 
 6. Less Cake and Candy 
 
 7. Use Other Sweeteners. 
 
 SAVE IT. 
 
 Errors were made here as elsewhere. While sugar 
 was piled up in Honolulu because of no vessels to carry it, 
 yet the refined product was being carried into the Hawaiian 
 Islands, a large sugar producer with an abundance of the 
 kind the people in the United States would have been glad 
 to use. 
 
 With the shortage, unnecessary confections were cut 
 down, though to but a limited degree, soda-fountains were 
 closed, sugar-bowls were removed from the tables in pub- 
 lic eating places, and families were limited to three pounds 
 per person a month, then to two, still later to three, then 
 again to four, and at length the limit was removed. It 
 was not until the month before the armistice was signed 
 that the Food Administration discovered that by permitting 
 the public to purchase sugar weekly at the rate of two pounds 
 per person for each four weeks instead of for the calendar 
 month, it was allowing the people to use approximately 
 200,000,000 pounds of sugar extra, annually. Accord- 
 ingly, new regulations went into effect October 15, 1918, 
 
The Food Administration 31 
 
 requiring that thereafter purchases be made semi-monthly 
 instead of bi-weekly. 
 
 Admittedly, Mr. Hoover's administration was scarcely 
 less than miraculous when the unpreparedness of the nation 
 with which he had to contend in the first onrush of the war 
 is considered. Notwithstanding this great efficiency, it was 
 not understood why a limit was placed upon the price and 
 use of primary food articles, such as wheat and wheat- 
 flour, while substitutes which people were compelled to use 
 were given an unlimited range in price. 1 This gave a solid 
 basis for severe criticism of the Food Administration, and 
 there grew up in the great grain-growing sections of the 
 country, even, a feeling of antagonism toward the Food 
 Administration that was akin to disloyalty, during the most 
 stressful days of the war, because of the open profiteering on 
 substitutes. 2 
 
 Bacon was in first rank as the meat of the soldier, since 
 most easily kept and most easily shipped. Readily the peo- 
 ple granted the request to use less of it "for the boys over 
 there." Already accustomed to heatless Monday, lightless 
 Tuesday, wheatless Wednesday, meatless Thursday, the 
 people, with light heart, talked of "earless days" which 
 never came. For all through the campaign for food con- 
 servation the people were admonished not to allow them- 
 selves to be undernourished. 
 
 Among the injunctions of the Food Administration were 
 those of dispensing with the fourth meal, using simple hos- 
 pitality in the home, at church and community suppers serv- 
 
 1 Under the Food Administration's orders, when bran wag selling at $28 
 per ton in carload lots, the housewife was compelled to pay for that same 
 bran at the rate of $180 per ton. While this was put up in paper boxes, she 
 could not purchase it in any other form, even at the world's greatest primary 
 market, Minneapolis. She could not obtain this palatable substitute in 5-, 
 10-, or 25-pound packages as she could the wheat flour. 
 
 2 At that period of the war, the author, while awaiting a belated 
 train at the little town of Philbrook, Minnesota, listened to the townsmen 
 engaged in a quiet discussion of this matter at the station platform. Their 
 views were unanimous. While none of them objected to the use of rye flour 
 as a substitute, they protested vigorously the permitted profiteering on an 
 enforced substitute. 
 
32 The Wilson Administration, and the Great War 
 
 ing the simplest kinds of home products well cooked and 
 making such suppers a substitute for one of the three regu- 
 lar meals. A new word coined, bearing a cordial signifi- 
 cance, was u hooverize," meaning the clean platter. It 
 meant even more in war time, signifying elimination of 
 waste as in the injunction not to "nibble crackers" while 
 waiting for one's order to be brought on the table. It 
 meant eating just sufficient to keep life at its best, wasting 
 nothing. 
 
 Some splendid gains were shown as the result of this 
 gastronomical self-denial of the people. For it was largely 
 through the economies they practiced that in wheat and 
 other cereals the fiscal year of 1917-1918 showed an in- 
 crease over the preceding year of nearly 31 per cent in 
 exports; while in meats, meat products and fats there was 
 an increase in exports of 844,000,000 pounds, or nearly 39 
 per cent. And large as was this increase, it is still greater 
 when contrasted with the conditions before the war. 
 
 But it was in the increased production that the Food 
 Administration's chief opportunity for winning the war 
 lay. While politicians and statesmen were arguing about 
 $2.20 wheat and a minimum of $2.50 a bushel for wheat, 
 the farmers, aided by the towns-people, were seeding and 
 harvesting. For it became the practice, during the shortage 
 of labor with the millions in the army and navy, for business 
 men to close their places of business early and in automobile 
 loads hurry to the fields to aid the farmers in caring for the 
 crops. 
 
 At the very beginning of America's share in the armed 
 conflict, the President's call was sounded to 6,000,000 farm- 
 ers. During that year, these farm units planted in food 
 crops 23,000,000 acres more than in 1916, and 32,000,000 
 acres more than the five-year pre-war average. During 
 1918 this acreage was still further increased. Every farmer 
 in the land was on the firing line of food production, with 
 no pacifism and slackism in the task. It was well that it 
 
The Food Administration 33 
 
 was so; for the appalling fact was later .revealed that at 
 the opening of the wheat harvest in 1918 there was on hand 
 but a ten-day wheat supply. It was one of the real crises 
 of the Great War. Yet, there was a slight decrease in the 
 production of all grains in 1918, the difference as compared 
 with that of 1917 being 160,000,000, bushels. This, how- 
 ever, was not a reduction in nutritive value; for the wheat 
 crop of that year totalling 918,920,000 bushels was a dis- 
 tinct advance; and the corn crop of 2,749,000,000 bushels 
 exceeded the five-year pre-war average by 17,000,000 
 bushels, and greatly superior to that of 1917. 
 
 And in the matter of live-stock, the total of beef, pork 
 and mutton in 1918 was 19,495,000,000 as compared with 
 16,587,000,000 pounds in 1914, the year preceding the 
 European outbreak. On January i, 1918, there were on 
 American farms 23,284,000 milch cows, compared with 20,- 
 676,000 of the previous five-year average; and 43,546,000 
 other cattle as compared with the five-year average of 38,- 
 000,000; also 71,374,000 swine to the previous five-year 
 average of 61,865,000. In 1918 the milk produced was 
 8,429,000,000 gallons, or 141,000,000 more than in 1917; 
 299,921,000 pounds of wool, or 18,029,000 more than in 
 1917; 1,921,000,000 dozen of eggs, which is 37,000,000 
 dozen more than in 1917; and 589,000,000 head of poul- 
 try, exceeding the 1917 product by 11,000,000. 
 
 On the morning of January 29, 1919, with President 
 Wilson in Europe, the people were confronted with a news 
 item of strange import. It was that a bill, drawn by the 
 Administration and taken on the previous day to the capitol 
 by W. A. Glasgow, chief counsel of the Food Administra- 
 tion, asked for an appropriation of $1,250,000,000 to be 
 available at once and to be used in such manner as Presi- 
 dent Wilson should desire in carrying out the 1918 and 
 1919 guarantees to the farmers, through such agencies as 
 he might create, or to utilize any department or agency of 
 the Government; by the terms of which the President was 
 
34 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 authorized to buy and sell wheat and wheat products and 
 "foods and foodstuffs," and was given power to assume 
 absolute control over dealers, millers, elevators, exchanges, 
 and all others having anything to do with the distribution; 
 and he was given complete control of all exports and im- 
 ports of such articles of food. It placed in one man's hands 
 virtual control of all the food of the country for a year and 
 a half following. Compared with this proposed measure, 
 the Food-Control Law of war time was mild in the powers 
 delegated to the President. 
 
 There sprang up at once general opposition and there 
 was created in the minds of the people a suspicion touching 
 the matter of appropriating a billion and a quarter dollars 
 and telling the President to use it as he might see fit. The 
 bill was passed only in greatly modified form by the Con- 
 gress in which the President's own party was the majority. 
 
 The average consumption of beans by the army was 
 125,000 pounds per day. Dried beans were a favorite food 
 with the soldiers, and their food value was high and they 
 were especially suitable under intensive training. Early 
 in October, 1918, the War Department stated to the public 
 that 2,000 carloads of potatoes and onions had been pur- 
 chased for the army in the United States for that month, 
 representing 36,000,000 pounds of potatoes and nearly 3,- 
 000,000 of onions, supplying the 119 camps, training-sta- 
 tions and posts. Nearly a thousand bids were received for 
 delivery of these vegetables. 
 
 A report giving the subsistence stocks on hand as of 
 November i, 1918, and covering the more important arti- 
 cles shows the following, among others, for the camps and 
 depots in the United States and France: 123,772,643 
 pounds of bacon, 52,850,249 pounds of fresh frozen beef; 
 26,247,563 pounds of canned roast beef; 44,664,577 
 pounds of canned corn beef; 14,493,479 pounds of canned 
 beef hash; 39,383,656 pounds of canned salmon; 353,- 
 
The Food Administration 35 
 
 377,836 pounds of flour; 19,823,364 pounds of hard bread; 
 9,722,521 pounds of corn meal; 3,816,785 pounds of oat- 
 meal; 53,375,065 pounds of dry beans; 76,534,807 pounds 
 of canned baked beans; 24,180,947 pounds of rice; 1,139,- 
 224 pounds of hominy; 86,512,001 pounds of canned toma- 
 toes; 27,306,466 pounds of canned peas; 17,778,075 
 pounds of canned corn; 2,656,311 pounds of canned string- 
 less beans; 4,105,064 pounds of dehydrated vegetables; 
 12,597,987 pounds of prunes; 9,280,288 pounds of evapor- 
 ated fruit; 12,364,599 pounds of jam; 2,560,160 pounds of 
 canned apples; 2,051,543 pounds of canned peaches; 2,998,- 
 299 pounds of canned apricots; 1,688,794 pounds of canned 
 pears; 1,275,530 pounds of canned cherries; 1,170,034 
 pounds of canned pineapple; 31,269,335 pounds of coffee; 
 80,924,813 pounds of sugar; 82,355,725 pounds of evapo- 
 rated milk; 7,368,108 pounds of lard and lard substitutes; 
 3,099,960 pounds of butter and butter substitutes; 956,467 
 gallons of vinegar; 572,155 gallons of pickles; 17,239,631 
 pounds of salt; 2,693,793 gallons of syrup; 2,129,098 
 pounds of candy and sweet chocolate; 752,371 pounds of 
 full cream cheese; 4,317,556 pounds of chewing tobacco; 
 18,982,095 pounds of smoking tobacco; 49,314,150 cigars; 
 95,257,399 cigarettes. The meats included 465,604 
 pounds of ham. 
 
 Also, early in December, 1918, it was announced that 
 contracts were made for the purchase of 9,000,000 pounds 
 of candy for the American Expeditionary Forces, to supply 
 each overseas soldier with a half-pound of candy every ten 
 days as a part of his regular ration. And later in the same 
 month it was officially announced that the largest single 
 order for candy of record had been given. This, too, was 
 for overseas soldiers, consisting of the highest grade of can- 
 dies, including bar chocolate, sweet chocolate, chocolate 
 vanilla bars, almond bars and peanut bars, aggregating i,- 
 412,000,00 pounds. At the same time announcement was 
 
36 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 made that the largest single purchase of chewing-gum in the 
 history of the army had been made, consisting of 11,686,- 
 ooo packages of the most popular brands. 
 
 Gradually, even before the signing of the armistice, the 
 ban on the use of foods was lifted. In the early autumn 
 of 1918, in the use of flour there was a change made from 
 the required 50 per cent of substitutes with 50 per cent of 
 wheat flour to a proportion of substitutes as low as 20 per 
 cent. Yet at this time it was found necessary to apply some 
 strictures in order to conserve more fully essential foods 
 of the nation, particularly in hotels and restaurants, it be- 
 ing estimated that approximately 9,000,000 people ate their 
 meals at public eating places. 
 
 And on December 4 there went throughout the country 
 from Washington the joyous dispatch that all restrictions 
 on the use of sugar were lifted; for immediately prior 
 thereto, grocers were required to keep a record showing 
 the amounts of sales to individual purchasers. And on 
 December 25, new joy was added to Christmas by the 
 sugar-bowls going back onto the tables in public eating 
 places. 
 
 In the first week in December, 1918, the prices of some 
 of the substitutes were these: ten pounds of barley, 65 
 cents; ten pounds of corn-meal, 65 cents; ten pounds of com- 
 mon buckwheat 83 cents; ten pounds of New York special 
 buckwheat, $1.22. While bananas were 70 cents a dozen 
 for a very common grade, eggs 70 cents a dozen, and but- 
 ter 70 cents per pound. These were Twin City prices. 
 
 And at his weekly conference with newspaper men, Mr. 
 Hoover stated, on the afternoon of the day the armistice 
 was signed, that since October, 1917, from reports re- 
 ceived throughout the United States, the combined prices 
 per unit of twenty-four most important foodstuffs were of 
 the average cost of $6.55 for the quarter ending June 30, 
 1918, as against $6.62 in October, 1917. This showed a 
 small drop, notwithstanding the fact that there had been 
 
The Food Administration 37 
 
 a steady increase in costs : wages, materials, rents, and 
 transportation. 
 
 A fine quality developing from the necessities of co-op- 
 eration during the war was the cordial spirit in which the 
 United States Food Administration worked with various 
 food administrations of the Allies. Ample food of proper 
 nutritive quality for the fighting forces is always a matter 
 of vital importance. And with the submarine menacing the 
 food supply of our own men as well as the Allies, food must 
 be sent to France, submarines or no submarines. There was 
 cordial support from the naval forces of the Allies in giv- 
 ing protection, there was no less cordial co-operation from 
 our Food Administration in the distribution of the food 
 from America. 
 
 For the Food Controller of France, after the 1918 crop 
 had been gathered, reported to his government that the total 
 nutrition value of the crop of cereals for that year, as well 
 as of beans and potatoes, in France, was below the total 
 nutrition value of those products for the preceding year; 
 the potato crop yielding but 7,500,000 tons, while the aver- 
 age for the ten preceding years had been 12,000,000, and 
 yet they must supply all the armies in France, including Eng- 
 lish and American troops, out of this decreased potato 
 crop. 
 
 And on September 24, 1918, the United States Food Ad- 
 ministration stated that under agreement entered into with 
 the food controllers of the Allies our footstuffs-export pro- 
 gram for the ensuing year was:- wheat, rye, barley and 
 corn, and flours calculated as grain for breadstuffs, 429,- 
 320,000 bushels, of which some 100,000,000 to 165,000,- 
 ooo might be cereals other than wheat. 
 
 And it had become clearly apparent a full month before 
 the armistice was signed that the necessity for feeding not 
 only the millions of soldiers, but as well the hundreds of 
 millions of less-than-half-fed peoples in Europe, would re- 
 quire still greater food need. 
 
38 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 These obligations necessitated sending 50 per cent more 
 food than was sent the year previous. Whereas 1 1,750,000 
 tons had gone then, now 17,500,000 tons must be provided 
 by America. And it was made plain to the people that vir- 
 tually the same estimate would stand whether the war 
 would end then or a year later, the Food Administration 
 putting out this suggestive announcement: 
 
 For 1918-1919 we have a clear-cut, business-like program that 
 calls for steady marching and hard campaigning. We have pooled 
 food resources with the Allies and planned to distribute the food to 
 meet the needs of the hour. That means to keep in full health and 
 strength the Allies, the armies, and our people at home; and at the 
 same time to build up safe food reserves in this country. .We know 
 now how much food there is, where it is needed, and just .how much 
 can be shipped. The program agreed to calls for 67 per cent more 
 meat and fat, 52 per cent more breadstuff, and 21 per cent more 
 sugar than was shipped last year. . . . The army of women, trained 
 by a year of food-saving in the United States, must forge ahead 
 relentlessly, and sweep even laggards with them. 
 
 While this program was planned before the armistice 
 was signed, the Food Administration did not relax its effort 
 after that event. Late in November it planned to have 
 read in all the churches of the land at a fixed date a state- 
 ment showing even an enlarged program to save famishing 
 Europe. This statement informed the people that, 
 
 America's food pledge for this year is 20,000,000 tons, two- 
 thirds more than last year ; for the relief of more than three hundred 
 million hungry people of the world will be brought home to the 
 people of the United States during the first week in December. An 
 intensive campaign to be known as conservation week for world relief 
 will be carried on. 
 
 With Europe famished, its millions dead from under- 
 nourishment and absolute starvation, its many more millions 
 in serious condition from lack of proper food, America 
 would have been derelict in its moral obligations to the 
 world had it not exerted itself as a great people to the 
 
The Food Administration 39 
 
 utmost to serve Europe in its supreme distress when the 
 clash of arms had ceased. And President Wilson's first 
 legislative recommendation based on a study of conditions 
 in Europe looked to the relief of distress of populations 
 "outside of Germany." He asked for an appropriation of 
 $100,000,000 to be used at his discretion to supply food to 
 liberated peoples of Austria, Turkey, Poland and western 
 Russia peoples who had no recognized governments and 
 were unable to finance international obligations. The ap- 
 propriation was granted and on March 2 President Wilson 
 appointed Mr. 'Hoover as Director-General of the Ameri- 
 can Relief Administration. The United States food-relief 
 ship "Westward Ho" arrived at Danzig on March 6, and 
 it was the first vessel to pass through the Kiel Canal after 
 the outbreak of the war. 
 
 Public opinion was agreed that the national Food Ad- 
 ministration was free in a remarkable degree from anything 
 savoring of scandal, when the general Administration 
 seemed like a seething mass of scandal in one form or an- 
 other. This is peculiarly gratifying when it is remembered 
 that the forces and individuals with whom and through 
 whom it had to operate were so diverse in their char- 
 acteristics. Perhaps the most scathing contribution to 
 the literature of the subject is that of Alfred W. 
 McCann, 3 who declared that the last week in April, 1919, 
 witnessed a shameless drive upon the wheat necessities of 
 the nation with no justification other than the greed of the 
 grain speculators and millers, and accused Food Adminis- 
 trator Hoover of predicting a needlessly high price for 
 wheat. 
 
 While profiteers in food have the age merit back of 
 them, and are regarded with no less favor in modern days 
 than they were in ages past, they have always been looked 
 upon with detestation. Hoarders of food were severely 
 punished in ancient days. Pericles, the Athenian, 450 years 
 
 * Reconstruction for June, 1919, New York. 
 
40 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 before Christ issued a decree that persons found hoarding 
 food should be compelled to drink the fatal hemlock; and 
 some 700 years later the Roman Emperor Diocletian issued 
 decrees similar to a modern "fair-price list" and directed 
 that profiteers should be put to death. 
 
 With alacrity America will feed a famishing world; 
 with equal alacrity will she smite those who would tear 
 her down from her pedestal of fairness and justice and 
 generosity. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE FUEL ADMINISTRATION 
 
 But fuel became the inseparable and essential partner 
 of food in winning the war. This fact became well estab- 
 lished after some depressing delays. 
 
 As in practically all things else when the country was 
 hurried into war unprepared, it was to the Council of 
 National Defense to which the country had to turn for ac- 
 tion in the matter of fuel. Accordingly, in May, the next 
 month after the declaration of war, this Council appointed 
 a commission on coal production, which, in turn, called to- 
 gether coal operators, some four hundred in number. 
 These, through a committee, agreed upon a price for coal, 
 of $3 a ton east of Pittsburg, and $2.75 west thereof. Sec- 
 retary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane was chairman of 
 the committee making these prices, with what was believed 
 ample precaution to avoid congestion of traffic and to speed 
 production to the utmost limit, so that ample reserve stores 
 could be accumulated. The Columbus, Ohio, and other 
 papers attacked the prices as too high, and Secretary of 
 War Baker, chairman of the Council of Defense repudiated 
 the agreement as fixing too high a price. He was unwilling 
 that the operators should receive more than $2.45 a ton. 
 The result was that many operators were compelled to close 
 their mines, while those that continued operation could not 
 increase their output as would have been done at the 
 higher and previously-fixed price by the Lane committee. In 
 consequence, a fuel famine followed with the loss of hun- 
 dreds of millions of dollars to the industry of the country 
 and the still further enforced and more serious delay in war 
 equipment, incalculable suffering, disease and death. And 
 
 41 
 
42 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 after all the mischief was done, the Administration sanc- 
 tioned an increase in price to a figure higher than had been 
 provided in the agreement made with the Lane committee. 
 
 It was in the midst of these chaotic conditions in Au- 
 gust, that President Wilson appointed Harry A. Garfield, 
 president of Williams College, to the position of national 
 Fuel Administrator. 
 
 Previous to this, orders for coal by the million of tons 
 were cancelled and little coal was moving. But now, with 
 the approach of cold weather, new orders came in great 
 volume. And there followed such a congestion of freight 
 on the Atlantic seaboard for lack of ships to take it abroad, 
 and such a dearth of cars to haul the coal, that by the end 
 of the year the situation, because of the coal shortage, be- 
 came most threatening, and was particularly serious in New 
 England and New York. 
 
 On December 28 the Government had taken over con- 
 trol of the railroads; and the Director-General of Railroads 
 promptly directed such routeing of cars as would most 
 promptly and effectually relieve the situation which arose 
 from the disastrous fuel shortage then confronting the coun- 
 try. 
 
 In these circumstances, for the purpose of saving fuel, 
 manufactured gas was burned in some cities for heating pur- 
 poses. Churches were urged to consolidate; coal on the 
 sidetracks or in transit was seized for local use; the use of 
 electricity, whose production required the use of coal, in 
 hallways and offices, and for advertising purposes on the 
 streets as well as for street lighting, was ordered cut. But 
 in this matter there was a very generous difference of action 
 in different sections of the country, even in different cities 
 of the same section of the country. In Indianapolis, saloons, 
 poolrooms, and theaters were closed until further notice; in 
 Philadelphia, office buildings were required to eliminate 
 the use of steam for heating purposes from seven o'clock in 
 
The Fuel Administration 43 
 
 the evening until seven in the morning, and all on Sundays 
 and holidays except to keep pipes from freezing; in Michi- 
 gan, churches were not allowed to be heated more than 
 six hours a week, or business places more than nine hours 
 each week day; in St. Paul there was a radical cut in street 
 lighting, while in Duluth the streets blazed with light as 
 though nothing had happened. 
 
 So serious a situation developed that on January 16, 
 1918, the Fuel Administrator ordered a drastic cut in the 
 use of coal and directed the order in which coal-sellers were 
 to give preference in coal deliveries. In all the country 
 east of the Mississippi River, including Minnesota and 
 Louisiana, all industrial plants, including those manufactur- 
 ing war munitions, were required to shut down for five days, 
 January 18 to 22, and in them no fuel was to be used ex- 
 cept in the manufacture of perishable foods, the printing 
 of daily newspapers and the current issues of other periodi- 
 cals. The priority of deliveries was in the following order : 
 railroads; domestic users, hospitals, food stores and hotels; 
 public utilities; bunkers; municipal, county and state gov- 
 ernments and public use generally; manufacturers of per- 
 ishable goods. 
 
 Immediate and angry protest came from all parts of 
 the country affected by the order. Even newspapers in 
 west-Mississippi territory voiced pronounced opposition. 
 Industry declared that it was uneconomical and would have 
 disastrous effects and entail great loss upon industry and 
 hardships upon working men of whom it would deprive 
 wages aggregating millions of dollars. The United States 
 Senate by resolution requested the Fuel Administrator to 
 u delay for five days the order suspending the operation of 
 industrial plants in portions of the United States in order 
 that protests may be heard, investigation made and informa- 
 tion presented." 1 Had this request been heeded, the whole 
 
 1 McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 422, op. cit. 
 
44 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 purpose of the order would have been nullified. Winter and 
 the emergency would have passed before hearings could 
 have been completed. 
 
 Holding to the order, Fuel Administrator Garfield de- 
 clared that it was necessary in order to prevent a crisis and 
 widespread suffering. And when appeal was made to the 
 President, his reply was : 
 
 This war calls for many sacrifices, and the sacrifices called for by 
 this order are infinitely less than sacrifices of life which might other- 
 wise be involved. . . . Halfway measures would not have accom- 
 plished the desired end. 
 
 In fact, the local fuel administrator in Chicago had an- 
 nounced that in Chicago industrial plants and factories 
 would be obliged to close in five or six days unless relief 
 came. 
 
 The fact is that when the stress in the fuel situation 
 came during the severe winter of 1917-1918, the industrial 
 production of the country was greater than the available 
 ships could transport, with the delay caused by the lack of 
 coal. The measure was drastic; but it Was a war emergency 
 and anything short of a drastic measure would have been 
 futile. 
 
 Moreover, there immediately followed another order 
 that for ten consecutive Mondays, beginning January 28, 
 no fuel, other than necessary to prevent freezing pipes, 
 could be used to heat business places except those used as 
 public official offices and other specified places, such as for 
 food supplies, physicians' offices and drugstores. It was esti- 
 mated that this would effect a saving of 30,000,000 tons of 
 coal and return the supply to normal. 
 
 Besides, it is doubtful whether there was any one single 
 event, save the calling of the sons of the nation to arms, 
 that so completely brought the American people to a sharp 
 realization of the kind of war that was upon them. 
 
 To emphasize the seriousness of the situation yet 
 
The Fuel Administration 45 
 
 further, "heatless Mondays" were followed by "lightless 
 Tuesdays. " Church services were greatly curtailed and 
 many schools were compelled to close, while many other 
 unusual conditions attended the Government's successful 
 efforts to keep coal moving toward industrial establishments; 
 particularly to munition plants and all those engaged in war- 
 equipment operations, and to the seaboard for the country's 
 naval and merchant vessels. The extensive industries that 
 sprang up because of the war, the railroad congestion due 
 to the heavy shipment of material across the continent to 
 the Atlantic seaboard, the most severe and exacting of 
 thirty winters, and unsettled labor conditions all these con- 
 tributed to the fuel famine the first year the country was in 
 the war. The winter of 1917-1918 was probably the most 
 difficult for the people to pass through of any experienced 
 since modern appliances came into use. 
 
 The saving effected by these several measures was 
 large. In early August, 1918, the Fuel Administrator made 
 public the statement that from the records which had been 
 kept there was shown a saving of more than 60,000 kilo- 
 watt-hours, the equal of about 100 tons of coal, on the first 
 of the "lightless nights" in the borough of Manhattan, New 
 York City, indicating a saving in Manhattan alone of 40,000 
 tons of coal a year. 
 
 As a further means of saving as a war measure, day- 
 light saving was put into operation by turning the clock one 
 hour ahead. It was estimated that by this method, from the 
 facts gathered from various sections of the country by the 
 Fuel Administration to determine the saving in fuel that 
 might be -effected by the operation of the daylight saving 
 law, a saving of 1,250,000 tons of coal had been effected 
 during the seven months' operation of the law during the 
 summer of 1918. 
 
 Broadly speaking, farmers opposed the plan while city 
 workers favored it. Laboring people in the cities probably 
 received the greatest benefit from its operation workers 
 
46 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 in factories, shops, stores and offices, for it not only gave 
 them more hours of daylight for recreation in the evening, 
 or for gardening, but it meant a large saving to the house- 
 holder in the matter of lighting. To the last, those who 
 furnished artificial light were witnesses, for it entailed an 
 appreciable reduction in the aggregate of their income. And 
 the total of savings from it, in homes and places of busi- 
 ness, is estimated as high as $60,000,000 each summer. 
 
 The position of the farmers on this plan is well stated 
 by a newspaper correspondent in the heart of the agricul- 
 tural West: 
 
 The daylight-saving plan takes an hour from the morning and 
 adds it in the evening. When there has been a heavy dew during 
 the night, which is true most of the time, we cannot begin work in 
 the fields until this has dried off, usually between eight and nine 
 o'clock by the old time. 
 
 That wouldn't be so bad if one didn't have hired help. I stay in 
 the field myself until seven or eight in the evening, but my men, 
 hired by the month, insist that their day's work is done at five or six, 
 and won't stay on into the evening. That is their right, of course. 
 Not all of them are that way, but the majority of them are. They 
 wait around until the dew is gone, for they are not hired to do chores 
 in many cases, then go out and work in the field until twelve, and 
 quit at five so that they can go to town in the evening. 2 
 
 Also came "gasless Sundays," the requirements of which 
 the people accepted with the utmost good nature. It was 
 not by an order, but merly a request on the part of the Fuel 
 Administrator, that the people forego automobiling on Sun- 
 day, for the purpose of saving gasoline for war needs. 
 Though criticism resulted, and some that was not good- 
 natured, the result was more than the mere saving of essen- 
 tials in war needs, important as was that. The people were 
 alert, and keen to see who was unwilling to forego a mere 
 personal pleasure for the sake of successfully carrying for- 
 ward the war. On the first of the few Sundays it was in 
 
 a Sioux Falls, S. D., Daily Argus-Leader, July 21, 1919. 
 
The Fuel Administration 47 
 
 operation, there was alertness on the part of the public to 
 note to what extent the request was observed. Weight of 
 public opinion was probably never felt more than in the 
 matter of this one simple request. They were but few who 
 ventured out; but whoever had the hardihood to ignore the 
 request, whether rich or poor, were made to understand 
 unmistakably that ignoring the request would not be tol- 
 erated. This was made plain in the yellow stripes that were 
 made to adorn the automobiles of offenders, in almost any 
 town in which they stopped in any part of the nation. And 
 if they did not stop, they were made to stop long enough to 
 apply the yellow stripes of disapproval of disregard of the 
 Fuel Administrator's course as to "gasless Sundays." 
 
 On October 17, 1918, he withdrew his request for gas- 
 olineless Sundays. The loyal response of the people to the 
 appeal east of the Mississippi River, it was stated by the 
 Fuel Administration, had saved at least 1,000,000 barrels, 
 and to have made it possible to give to the men at the front 
 the supplies required in the prosecution of the war. 
 
 The Fuel Administrator found it necessary to fix the 
 price of coke and coal even after the signing of the armis- 
 tice. On November 15, 1918, he ordered: 
 
 Coke produced in Taylor County, in the State of West Virginia, 
 may be sold at prices per ton of 2,000 pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, 
 not to exceed the following, viz., for blast-furnace coke, $6.75 ; for 
 selected 72-hour foundry coke, $7.75. 
 
 Coke produced in Hopkins County, in the State of Kentucky, may 
 be sold at prices per ton of 2,ooo pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, not 
 to exceed the following, viz., for blast-furnace coke, $7.25 ; for se- 
 lected 72-hour foundry coke, $8.25. 
 
 This order shall be effective at seven a. m., November 18, 1918. 
 
 Also this, pertaining to a wholly different section of the 
 country : 
 
 Bituminous coal mined by Temple Fuel Company, at its mine 
 in the State of Colorado, may be sold at prices f. o. b. cars at the 
 
48 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 mine, not to exceed $2.15 per net ton for run of mine, $3.40 per 
 net ton for prepared sizes, $1-55 per net ton for slack or screenings 
 passing through a 1. 25-inch screen. To these prices may be added the 
 forty-five cents allowance for wage increase if the producing company 
 is entitled to add such allowance under the President's order of 
 October 27, 1917. The maximum price herein-above fixed for pre- 
 pared sizes is subject to the following monthly summer reductions: 
 April i, 70 cents; May i, 50 cents; June i, 35 cents; July i, 15 
 cents. 
 
 This order to become effective at seven a. m., November 18, 1918. 
 
 One of the best results of the Fuel Administration's 
 efforts was the order against putting upon the market dirty 
 coal. After the signing of the armistice it had not relaxed 
 its vigorous dealing with mine operators who willfully ig- 
 nored the regulations laid down for the careful prepara- 
 tion of coal to free it from impurities before placing it on 
 the market for consumers. During the week ending No- 
 vember 1 6, 1918, four mines were ordered shut down be- 
 cause of this offense. After the Fuel Administration had 
 placed the ban on dirty coal, a total of 119 mines had been 
 closed, 12 of which, up to the week ending November 16, 
 1918, had received permission to resume operations. 
 
 The order of the Fuel Administrator that coal might be 
 delivered to the curb and dumped there without further ado, 
 raised a furor in certain circles. But it was war time, and 
 there was a great shortage of men; the people smilingly 
 accepted any hard or undesirable situation that arose, while 
 fortifying themselves for the next. But when the man 
 ordering coal was informed by the dealer that he might 
 have the coal but that he would have to put it into the bin 
 himself because of the lack of man power, and that he 
 would therefore have a reduction of thirty-five cents per 
 ton, and the driver delivering it, when about to dump it on 
 the sidewalk as ordered, said that for a dollar-and-half per 
 ton he would put it into the bin, the householder looked less 
 philosophically upon the new situation. 
 
The Fuel Administration 49 
 
 The severe criticism heaped upon Fuel Administrator 
 Garfield's shoulders, following his drastic fuel-saving order 
 of January 16, 1918, was hardly properly placed. The sit- 
 uation in which the country was found was the logical result 
 of the pacifist practices of the Administration for the previ- 
 ous three years, long before Doctor Garfield had any connec- 
 tion with the Administration's activities. It was only three 
 days after this order that Senator Chamberlain made his 
 notable speech in New York, declaring that the Adminis- 
 tration had ceased to function in practically all branches, 
 though his criticism was directed at the War Department. 
 
 The serious fuel situation had developed before Doctor 
 Garfield was appointed. When Secretary of War Baker 
 overthrew the coal prices fixed by the Lane Committee in 
 June, 1917, two months before Doctor Garfield was ap- 
 pointed, he committed the first serious blunder in the fuel 
 situation, as he had constantly blundered in the War De- 
 partment; and before Fuel Administrator Garfield could 
 remedy the error, the railroads were ceasing to furnish full 
 service to the country, either under private or government 
 control. And immediately thereafter followed the ex- 
 tremely severe winter eating into the coal stocks to an un- 
 precedented extent. 
 
 To-day scarcely anyone denies the wisdom of Fuel Ad- 
 ministrator Garfield's course. As soon as the extreme win- 
 ter was past, he began gripping the situation in a manner 
 promising well for the months to follow. He had deter- 
 mined that whatever difficulties might ensue for the follow- 
 ing winter, the country would be well cared for in the matter 
 of fuel. In October, 1918, the nation's fuel supplies were 
 adequate and well distributed, but he still urged the need 
 of economy. The coal stocks then on hand were greater 
 than ever before; but he urged that the needs were also 
 greater. The upper Great Lakes territory which cuts most 
 deeply into transportation, had received the greatest pro- 
 portionate supply. Fewer workers than ever before had 
 
50 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 produced 38,000,000 tons more coal in the first six months 
 of 1918 than were produced in the corresponding months of 
 1917. But now the railroads, under public control, had 
 awakened to the situation which Fuel Administrator Gar- 
 field had tried to impress upon them before the desperate 
 situation in the winter of 1917-1918, when the Director- 
 General of Railroads failed to place an embargo upon the 
 transportation of non-essentials. 
 
 Bolshevism, whether of American citizens or aliens, must 
 never be permitted to control an essential to all the activi- 
 ties of the genuine American life. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 LABOR AND WAGES 
 
 With two large movements President Wilson's name 
 must be inextricably linked: Labor and League. The big- 
 ness of the former was so lost sight of in the overshadowing 
 importance of the other that, in large measure, it dropped 
 from the public thought. In the form in which it was pre- 
 sented it became a problem, the solution of which would 
 have been sufficiently notable in the career of any one man 
 to give him a worthy place in the history of his country in 
 time of peace ; doubly so in time of war. 
 
 When, however, any man by his deliberate purpose, 
 whether that purpose be high or low, creates his own prob- 
 lem and seeks to make it the problem of society, he deserves 
 no consideration from history, other than the bare record, 
 if he fails to solve that problem for the future. And if his 
 handiwork leaves incomplete the solution of a problem which 
 is of his creation and not of the demands of either the pres- 
 ent or the future, he cannot be assigned the role of states- 
 man, but rather of blunderer or traducer. 
 
 When, in the summer of 1916, President Wilson under- 
 took to secure an understanding between the railroads and 
 their trainmen, the public at once took keen interest, hoping 
 for a happy solution. When, however, he undertook to 
 force through Congress the Adamson bill, the interest was 
 no less keen, but it became a depressing episode in the 
 Administration's labor activities. It then, for the first time, 
 became plain to the great public that President Wilson was 
 willing to play autocrat to favor a strongly organized body 
 of voters. That a subservient Congress yielded in ill humor 
 did not relieve of executive odium. This course on the part 
 
 51 
 
52 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 of the President marks the labor policy, if it be worty of 
 such designation, pursued by the Administration in time of 
 peace. 
 
 But the Administration's attitude on the matter of sal- 
 aries, labor, and the wage problem was a strange jumble 
 during the entire eight years. That its course was inconsist- 
 ent was a matter of minor importance ; that it was a matter 
 of injustice was a matter of great importance; that it was 
 a matter involving Americanism itself was a matter of prime 
 importance. Even for his own reputation the President 
 failed to see in advance the natural consequences of his 
 driving through the Adamson bill in 1916. Or if he did see 
 it, that was a matter of minor importance at that moment. 
 It was the presidential election, then just before him, that 
 was of leading importance. But when the same unions that 
 forced his hand in 1916, came three years later with a like 
 demand for increase of wages, he woke to the peril he had 
 stirred in 1916. Now it was almost the time to begin se- 
 curing delegates for the presidential conventions, and once 
 more the organized labor forces deemed it time to strike. 
 They again approached the President with well-defined 
 threats unless their demands for increased wages were 
 granted. This time they came with some basis for their 
 demands : greatly increased cost of living. That the great 
 mass of the people, the great unorganized public, had to 
 meet this increased cost of living without the greatly in- 
 creased pay granted to the railroad men by the President's 
 action of 1916 and by the Railroad Administration during 
 the war and now by their new demand for increased pay, all 
 of which must be loaded upon the public, did not disturb the 
 trainmen. 
 
 The Adamson law had given the Big Four Brotherhoods 
 firemen, engineers, conductors, and brakemen a wage 
 increase of about $70,000,000; to these was given a further 
 increase of about $160,000,000 two years later upon the 
 recommendations of the Lane Commission to Director-Gen- 
 
Labor and Wages 53 
 
 eral McAdoo. While all this was added to the burdens of 
 the public with little or no increase in salaries or wages, the 
 trainmen unblushingly came with the still larger demand of 
 1919, at which time the President was getting ready to 
 tour the country in the interest of the League of Nations, 
 and after Mr. McAdoo had added to the rail employes 
 approximately $250,000,000 per annum in addition to that 
 of the Lane report. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the President did not meet 
 the issue squarely as in 1916. He went immediately before 
 Congress with the matter, apparently to seek a way to re- 
 duce living costs, so as to meet the complaint of the train- 
 men that it was because of the increased cost of living that 
 they came; and he frankly spoke of the "vicious cycle" 
 which another increase of railroad wages would but con- 
 tinue. And in order to rid himself of the matter until he 
 could tour the country in the interest of the Covenant of 
 the League of Nations, he agreed to call a conference of 
 labor men, with others, to meet in Washington two months 
 later. This met his immediate purpose. Always accommo- 
 dating toward organized labor, the other laborers mattered 
 little. Seeking to support the contention that while, under 
 the enormous totals added to the railway pay-rolls of em- 
 ployes, the increase of wages had been but fifty per cent 
 while the increased cost of living was fifty-five per cent, no 
 heed was paid to the more imperative demands of the third 
 party, the great unorganized public. The Housewives 1 
 League of the country, the Consumers' League of the na- 
 tion, representing the tens of millions of the common folks, 
 had published far and wide the intolerable increases in the 
 costs of living. To it all the President was deaf. One 
 might have thought he would feel some interest in the em- 
 ployes directly under his jurisdiction, the employes of the 
 executive departments of the government, some of wRom 
 were receiving the same salaries that were paid before the 
 Civil War with an increase of thirty-three cents a day; or, 
 
54 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 one might think that he would take an interest in a matter 
 of supreme importance in the District of Columbia, at the 
 very seat of government, where seventy-five per cent of the 
 teachers are paid annually $800 or less. But they could 
 not get his ear. Yet as soon as organized voters made de- 
 mands, they had his attention. 
 
 But this time the "rubber-stamp" Congress had gone 
 out of existence. 
 
 On the floor of the Senate, December 5, 1919, Senator 
 Kellogg, of Minnesota, stated that while he had no criti- 
 cism upon the wage increases given to railroad workers 
 upon the report of the Wage Commission, of which Secre- 
 tary Franklin K. Lane was chairman, he did criticise the 
 Administration's issuing many orders reclassifying em- 
 ployes, placing them in the higher-wage class without change 
 in actual employment. In this connection he pointed out 
 that office boys of twelve or thirteen years, studying short- 
 hand or going to school part of the time, had their wages 
 raised to as high as eighty and ninety dollars a month, and 
 that in many instances men in subordinate positions were 
 receiving salaries higher than their superiors; he also added 
 that these gross inequalities added greatly to the cost of 
 operation of the railroads, created unrest! and had a bad 
 effect on the morale of the service. Proceeding in his re- 
 marks, the Senator further stated: 
 
 Men are constantly being taken out of one class and placed in 
 
 a higher skilled class In one case, men engaged in cleaning 
 
 Pullman cars were taken out of the ordinary day-labor class and 
 placed in the class of expert upholsterers and their pay raised from 
 40 cents to 68 cents an hour, and they still continue to perform their 
 old duties. . . . That is going on all over the country. 
 
 As a matter of fact it was not a reduction in the number 
 of hours of labor that the railroad men sought in their 
 1916 demands. What they put out for the public was just 
 that. What they really demanded and obtained was a ten- 
 
Labor and Wages 55 
 
 hour wage for an eight-hour day, and pay-and-half for all 
 time over the eight hours. Indeed, they hoped to work 
 every hour they could crowd in at that pay, up to the six- 
 teen-hour limit. 1 And they accomplished that, in the de- 
 velopment of this personal policy of President Wilson. 
 
 For there was no more demand for the President's 
 backing a demand such as that made by the Big Brother- 
 hoods of 1916, as a public policy, than that his forced meas- 
 ure should embrace all underpaid groups of workers or 
 individual workers. Indeed, there was relatively less de- 
 mand than for increased pay for such social forces of the 
 nation as teachers who had to pay out large sums in prepara- 
 tion for their work, while the others were always receiving 
 pay while in preparation for their life calling. The Presi- 
 dent's policy tended to develop the material side of the na- 
 tion rather than the spiritual. 
 
 As a further result of this policy, when the nation found 
 itself suddenly thrust into the war it was thrown into as 
 great a muddle, with all its opportunity for preparation, as 
 
 *I had occasion to be in Williston, N. D., in November, 1918, from 
 which town I took an early freight to a station a few miles east. In the 
 caboose alone with a commercial traveller and myself, the brakeman was 
 freely expressing his joy over conditions. He said the next day "the ghosts 
 would be about," which he explained as meaning that it was pay-day, and 
 he would receive $110 for half a month's work. He stated further that he 
 had been on the railroad but a short time, that he had no experience as a 
 railroad man, that he was aged about 22 or 23 years, that their trains were 
 very light, and that unless they had at least one way-car they could not go 
 out; that his run to Minot was very light, that they had to reach that point 
 not later than 9 o'clock, since at that hour the 1 6-hour limit expired, and that 
 they had to kill time on the way to make it cover the sixteen hours (a cold- 
 blooded method of bleeding the people with which any intelligent travelling 
 man of experience is wholly familiar). That evening I met him in Minot 
 at 9 o'clock and when I asked how long he had been in, he hilariously re- 
 plied: "Just now got in." 
 
 In Minneapolis at the Soo shops worked a boy of 17 years, with little 
 education, who had no one dependent upon him, and lived at home with his 
 parents. He received upwards of $200 a month. His preparation had cost 
 him nothing, and he was paid for every hour of his preparation for his 
 work. 
 
 In the P. R. R. shops at Sunbury, Pa., was a man engaged who gleefully 
 wrote his friends that he had scarcely time to write as he was receiving 
 $11 for every day he was at work. These three instances in three widely 
 separated sections of the country came to my attention at about the same 
 time. Author. 
 
56 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was England or France with the shells dropping at their 
 doors and the very integrity of their territory threatened, 
 with not a day for preparation. In consequence, there was 
 an immediate demand for labor in all branches of industry 
 in war preparation; and labor, in turn, made immediate de- 
 mands for increased pay to meet that allowed the railroad 
 brotherhoods under the President's pressure in 1916. It 
 was confusion worse confounded; the "cost-plus-a-per- 
 cent" plan was adopted by the Administration, under which 
 grabbing contractors cared nothing as to how much they 
 paid for labor for it was merely added to the cost and to 
 that the per cent, which put into their pockets the more 
 money as the cost became the greater a plan under which 
 even the cantonments were built by contractors, instead of 
 having it done by the government's own engineer corps and 
 other suitable branches of the service, thereby releasing 
 hundreds of thousands of skilled laborers for essential 
 work elsewhere, as was done in France. 
 
 Nor was it till the war was well done that the Adminis- 
 tration adopted a general labor policy. On June 15, 1918, 
 Secretary of Labor Wilson in a letter to the President 
 stated : 
 
 A dispensable industry competes for the labor of an essential 
 plant. Instances are frequent where one government project secures 
 men at the expense of another. As a result, the labor turnover is 
 alarmingly great, with a loss in war efficiency which we cannot 
 afford. 
 
 And he added that one of the serious consequences of this 
 situation was the effect upon the morale of the workers, 
 producing and encouraging restlessness. And the Presi- 
 dent responding to the Secretary's suggestion that a central 
 agency should be established to determine where labor 
 should go, pointed to the United States Employment Serv- 
 ice. Prior to this, the Administration was fumbling to find 
 a policy that would fit the emergency of backing up at 
 
Labor and Wages 57 
 
 home the boys that were doing the fighting at the front. 
 
 From this grew the u work-or-fight" order. When this 
 policy was announced it met approval from one end of the 
 land to the other. But some of the edge was taken from it 
 by the announcement in early July that it would apply only 
 to men of draft age. In his explanatory statement, Gen- 
 eral Crowder said that it was not a satisfying spectacle to 
 see a contingent of one class of men marching down the 
 street to camp, while other men of their own age, patching 
 them from the shop windows remained behind to sell cigar- 
 ettes or dispense soda-fountain drinks. 'Work or 
 fight' there is no alternative," he declared, to the delight 
 of real Americans. 
 
 And the later draft law meant the same principle was 
 to become operative; for the conscripting of all men be- 
 tween the ages of 18 and 45 was not so much a conscription 
 of men to fight as it was of men to work. It meant work 
 or fight and meant it with a certainty that could not be mis- 
 understood. 2 The new edict became effective July i, 1918. 
 
 And from about this time, the federal employment serv- 
 ice became a most effective branch of government activity. 
 Starting originally as a part of the immigration service, it 
 was later placed upon a firm foundation that enabled it to 
 render real service to the nation. As the harvest season 
 of 1918 approached, the director-general at Kansas City, 
 as an example, was in receipt of daily reports from his 
 representatives in the field whereby he was fully informed 
 as to the stages of the ripening grain, the probable time 
 when harvesters would be required, and the number at 
 each place. It linked the mariless job with the jobless man. 
 It did good service in aiding the returned fighters, at the 
 close of hostilities, to get employment promptly and with 
 little loss of time. 
 
 2 General Crowder stated it naively in this way: "I believe the effect 
 of the additional registration will be to recruit industry up to the point 
 where there will be no shortage of industrial man power." 
 
58 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The growth of unionism was a notable result of the 
 Adamson law. The government had opposed the unioniz- 
 ing of its employes; but as soon as the railways passed 
 under its control, the Director-General prohibited inter- 
 ference with efforts of the employes to organize. If per- 
 missible in one branch of the service, why not in all? Ac- 
 cordingly, every branch of the service in the departments 
 in Washington and out was unionized. The irony of it 
 all was that it was done to protect the employe against the 
 government's injustice itself one of the sternest comments 
 upon President Wilson's social-justice ideas in forcing upon 
 the country the demands of the railroad brotherhoods in 
 1916, while some of the employes in his own executive de- 
 partments were living on starvation salaries, 3 established 
 in 1857, when a $500 salary was as good as a $1500 salary 
 in 1916. And it was known that the greatly increased pay 
 then allowed to the railroad men, in addition to the previous 
 advances, $300,000,000 increase recommended in the Lane 
 report, effective January i, 1918, and still later another 
 $500,000,000, with still other increases later, was all added 
 to the increased cost of living, of which those whose sal- 
 aries had not been increased had to pay the larger pro- 
 portionate share. 
 
 If President Wilson did not foresee some of the logical 
 results of the policy which he inaugurated in 1916 when, 
 under threat of a strike on the part of the railroad men, 
 he discarded the principle of arbitration, that fact does 
 not add to his qualification as statesman. It was the threat 
 that was repeated in 1919 by the railroad workers, one 
 of whose leaders declared they were using the method of 
 the cavemen sheer brute force to gain their ends. And on 
 September 22, four days before the tie-up of the British 
 railroads, the great steel strike in the United States oc- 
 curred, led by one Fitzpatrick, a horseshoer who had never 
 
 "Hearings by House Committee on Labor, spring of 1916. And in 1918 
 cabinet and other high officials asked that salaries of department employes 
 be based at least upon decency and humanity. 
 
Labor and Wages 59 
 
 worked in a steel plant, and William Z. Foster, a syndicalist. 
 These were followed by the soft-coal strike on November 
 i, 1919, in violation of a contract of the miners with the 
 government. These were not bona fide labor moves, but 
 plans to break the will of the public. And yet another con- 
 sequence of President Wilson's labor policy was the inordi- 
 nately high wages paid in industrial centers, withdrawing 
 from the farms the essential help that would otherwise have 
 remained on the farm. And the warning going out from 
 the farms is that the farmers will produce what they may 
 be able to supply the hungry world in the great depletion 
 of help, but that if the world goes hungry it will not be 
 their fault. 4 This is a serious problem for the future, 
 created by President Wilson when he whipped the Adamson 
 bill through Congress in 1916 to aid a favored class. And 
 from that day, classism has grown by leaps and bounds in 
 the United States. It sought to control the Administration 
 and to become the government during 1919. By this time 
 the Administration seeing its plight took the firm position 
 it should have assumed in 1916. It is well illustrated in the 
 attitude of laboring men in the "outlaw" switchmen's strike, 
 April, 1920. John Grunau, Chicago radical leader, de- 
 clared that "the fight has become one between the new and 
 old unions"; while W. G. Lee, president of the brother- 
 hoods of railroad trainmen, demanded that some law be 
 enforced against the "outlaw" strikers. Yet Lee was among 
 the first to object to the anti-strike clause in the Esch-Cum- 
 mins railroad bill. The logic of this is that he was willing 
 that his brotherhood may strike against the interest of the 
 public but that he rejected the idea that any organization 
 might strike against the policy of his own brotherhood. In 
 other words, he was ready to exalt his Brotherhood above 
 
 4 See Senator Capper of Kansas in the North American Review, August, 
 1920. A serious omission in the review, as Senator Capper sees it, is that 
 he fails to call attention to marked decrease in the number of farm-pro- 
 duced boys and girls in the last two decades, a factor upon which the farmer 
 and the whole nation has relied heretofore. 
 
60 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Government and People. If, as held by organized labor 
 leaders, the unrestricted right to strike is "natural and in- 
 herent," then it must be a right common to all and cannot 
 be monopolized by some favored Brotherhood or Federa- 
 tion. But this was an unworthy frame of mind into which 
 they were led by the favoritism of the coddling Adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Was labor loyal during the war? This was a question 
 often asked by the public. Labor as a whole was thor- 
 oughly loyal. Too many labor leaders were utterly disloyal, 
 though they took every precaution to conceal it from the 
 public. They adopted the camouflaging method character- 
 istic of the National Administration. In support of this 
 view are cited the Bridgeport strike which was completely 
 demolished by the energetic action of President Wilson; 
 the threatened strike of railroad laborers, in which Direc- 
 tor-General McAdoo's prompt action was decisive ; and the 
 letter Samuel Gompers, President of the American Feder- 
 ation of Labor, wrote Senator Thomas when the news- 
 papers were stating that the latter was about to introduce 
 a bill to penalize workmen who absented themselves from 
 their employment in war plants, which meant in war time, 
 when stating: 
 
 The workmen in the United States are doing their full share of 
 service and duty. They are whole-heartedly supporting the war 
 program. They are giving themselves, their sons, their brothers, and 
 other blood relations on the firing line. 5 
 
 In this pronouncement Mr. Gompers appears to proclaim 
 the doctrine of vicarious patriotism, and to hold that men 
 engaged in war plants were to be privileged above any 
 other class in the country; that labor, per se, had a right 
 to a preferred classification. And, like so many other labor 
 leaders, he placed these highly-paid laborers above any other 
 
 'Contrast, in Collier's Weekly for September 14, 1918, a statement of 
 a shirk paid $9.90 a day a method quite common by laborers on govern- 
 ment work during the war. 
 
Labor and Wages 61 
 
 civilian class and even above the very men who, at that 
 time, were giving their lives to the country and even for the 
 high-priced shirks in war plants. Then, was labor loyal? 
 
 It was common for labor, in its organized form, to 
 point the finger at the men fattening in the munition plants 
 and in war industries of all kinds. It was proper. Profiteer- 
 ing by such industries was notorious. Yet these same labor- 
 ing men were willing to fatten off the very life-blood of 
 the boys who so earnestly put themselves into the conflict 
 for civilization. The labor man was willing to grasp all 
 he could in the hour of the Government's need, while the 
 boys fighting for the very man who hid himself as a work- 
 man in the munition plants at home was suffering and dying 
 in the trenches for a miserable pittance. Nor was this all. 
 While the so-called laboring man was squeezing the last 
 possible nickel out of the Government through organized 
 labor and was receiving it with commendable regularity, 
 the man with the fighting forces found it difficult to receive 
 his little pay from the government, because of the ineffi- 
 ciency of the Administration, for himself, his wife, and his 
 babe at home. 6 
 
 Why the Administration of the war period should be 
 willing to tolerate any such condition was inexplicable. The 
 money was on hand for the government civilian employe who 
 
 B This became so notorious as to amount to a national scandal. The 
 Administration promptly advanced the pay of well-organized railroad men, 
 at first by the tens of millions, then by hundreds of millions, and later by the 
 billion; while the neglect of the pay to the fighting men tarnished the na- 
 tion's fair name. No civilian officer of the Administration from President 
 down went without his pay regularly, nor did well-paid laboring men 3000 
 to 6000 miles from the firing line. One case illustrates the method. It is 
 within my personal knowledge: No allotment was being paid *the wife of 
 the enlisted man until a law was enacted that all allotments to the wife 
 should date back to the man's entry into the service. Then the Admin- 
 istration, instead of acting in a straight-forward manner, took from the 
 pay of the fighter the $15 per month of governmental allotment due 
 the wife, and dating this allotment from January 13, 1918, though he had 
 been in the service a full month previous; and up to the following December 
 he had not been able to get from the Government any of that due to his 
 infant child. This is in marked contrast with the Administration's care 
 to pay promptly and with enormously increased wages organized labor. 
 Author. 
 
62 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 remained away from danger and at a high salary or wage; 
 why not for the fighting man who left wife and babe behind 
 at one-third to one-fifth of the pay the other was receiving? 
 Nor was this the only matter pertaining to labor and wages 
 in which the Administration's attitude will not bear scru- 
 tiny. The public, after hostilities ceased, asked why organ- 
 ized labor was making so frequent appeals for amnesty for 
 political prisoners of the Debs and Mooney type, and why 
 the Administration was responding by the release of those 
 of the type of Kate O'Hare. Other elements of the Ameri- 
 can citizenship were not worried lest some disloyalist should 
 serve in prison the sentence imposed by the courts in the 
 regular course of legal procedure after full sifting of the 
 case. The public also wanted to know why, after the Ad- 
 ministration's marked favors to organized labor, the pay- 
 roll of labor was two and a half times as high as before the 
 war while labor was less efficient, the work produced per 
 man being greatly reduced. When Lloyd George was fight- 
 ing the bolshevistic tendency of workingmen in England, he 
 won by the proof that every previous wage increase had been 
 followed by a lessening of production: that with 100,000 
 more miners at work at wages 172 per cent higher there 
 was a decline of 16 per cent in production. 7 His position 
 was quite in contrast with that of the American Adminis- 
 tration in favoring the coal strikers in the fall of 1919. 
 Fuel Administrator Garfield fixed, upon a scientific basis, 
 the miners' wages at a 14 per cent increase. His position 
 was favored by the cabinet. President Wilson, however, 
 overturned all in favor of the radical element among the 
 miners who were violating a contract with the Government 
 and practically threatening rebellion. 
 
 In that connection Doctor Garfield uttered the words of 
 a statesman when he said: 
 
 If one class of workers demands more than like workers are get- 
 ting, that class is trying to levy tribute upon the people of the coun- 
 ' See page 78, 
 
Labor and Wages 63 
 
 try arid does not differ from corporations which seek profits for the 
 few at the expense of the many. They certainly put themselves in 
 the position of law-breakers. 
 
 This attitude of sound sense was more than the Adminis- 
 tration could bear, and Doctor Garfield promptly resigned 
 his position of national Fuel Administrator, thwarted in 
 his efforts to aid the vast unorganized public in its battle 
 against organized labor and organized industry; for it was 
 becoming notorious that between these two the public was 
 being crushed, and in some instances evidence was not want- 
 ing that the two were working in harmony to squeeze from 
 the purse of the public all it would endure. Garfield felt 
 that sound principle had been deserted for a makeshift; he 
 was unwilling to keep step in a march that was sure to be 
 fatal to the future. 
 
 The public was glad of the opportunity to meet with 
 captains of industry and captains of labor, in the Industrial 
 Conference called by President Wilson to meet in Washing- 
 ton, October 6, 1919. It was the first of the kind. The 
 great steel strike was on at this time, and passions were 
 aroused. The public group had little opportunity in this 
 Conference, which was presided over by Secretary of the 
 Interior Franklin K. Lane, representing this group. He 
 stated practically the same principle as Garfield, He 
 declared that "Increase in the wage rate does not always 
 give relief. The more productive we are, the sooner we 
 shall replace the wastage of war, return to normal price 
 levels and abolish the opportunity of profiteering." But the 
 conference was dashed to pieces on the rocks of selfishness 
 of the industrial and labor groups. 
 
 It is always thus. And it is doubtful whether the prin- 
 ciple of the right to strike announced by Judge George W. 
 Anderson, 8 of the federal bench in Boston, is as sound as it 
 may appear at first sight. For in almost all instances it is 
 the great unorganized public that suffers, while the labor 
 
 8 Opinion in the deportation of aliens cases, June 23, 1920. 
 
64 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 leaders and the industrial leaders continue to bleed this pub- 
 lic. Says one writer touching this matter of the relations of 
 the two selfish groups toward the public : 
 
 Labor unions and manufacturers' associations are morally on a 
 par. Both are recruited by a changing personnel concerned about 
 "getting on." 9 
 
 The public is coming to understand this unity of purpose 
 on the part of these two groups, so well concealed under 
 the cloak of a savage warfare in too many instances; and 
 it is one of the items charged by the public sternly against 
 the Wilson Administration from the time President Wilson 
 undertook, as a personal policy, to favor strongly organized 
 voters, while ignoring the general public and workers in 
 more important positions at a greatly less salary or wage. 
 The insolence of wealth may deserve all the anathemas 
 hurled against it; but the relentlessness of the autocracy of 
 organized labor cannot escape the scathing it is receiving 
 from the great American public now arousing itself to 
 the real situation. If the Administration has innocently 
 brought this about, it should be so recorded as a matter of 
 historical significance. 
 
 During the spring of 1920, the cost of materials and 
 of labor was so exorbitant that building operations were 
 practically at a standstill. At that time builders would not 
 assure any prospective building patron that material could 
 be obtained, and owing to the uncertainty of the labor situa- 
 tion some would contract to erect houses only on the cost- 
 plus plan an adaptation of the plan upon which the 
 Administration operated during the war period. But it did 
 not work. The people were better economists than the 
 National Administration. And while the situation was 
 eased as to material by July i, there was no change in 
 the labor situation. Soon there was a shortage of houses 
 in the United States estimated at a million. 
 
 H. M. Kallen, "The League of Nations," pp. 168-169, Marshall Jones 
 Company, Boston, 1919. 
 
Labor and Wages 65 
 
 Nor did the condition greatly change in the spring of 
 1921. It was only after the Railroad Labor Board ren- 
 dered its decision, effective July i, materially reducing 
 wages on the railroads, that labor was forced to confess 
 that it could not remain the only favored class in the coun- 
 try. Though late in the season to begin building operations, 
 there was a very perceptible increase in activities in July. 
 
 Autocracy of labor controlling the Government and 
 ruling the people means unfree labor and enforced sub- 
 serviency of a helpless public. America must be kept free. 
 The people are determined it shall be. The unwarranted 
 threat of a strike October 30, 1921, on the part of railroad 
 employes was so heartily disapproved by the public as a 
 strike against the public rather than against the railroads, 
 that its failure was foredoomed. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 SHIPBUILDING 
 
 Here are some of the familiar sayings uttered during 
 the war: 
 
 President Wilson: "Food and other supplies must be 
 carried across the seas, no matter how many ships are sent 
 to the bottom." 
 
 Edward N. Hurley of the United States Shipping 
 Board: "The whole war depends upon ships ships de- 
 pend upon labor, and labor depends upon the ability of this 
 board, through an adequate reserve, to supply the yards." 
 
 David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain : 
 "The road of victory, the guarantee of victory, the absolute 
 assurance of victory, has to be found in one word, ships, 
 and a second word, ships, and a third word, ships. 
 
 "The collapse of Russia and the reverses to Italy make 
 it even more imperative that the United States send as many 
 troops as possible across the Atlantic as early as possible." 
 
 The Shipping Board made its promises and statements 
 to the country extravagant enough to appeal to one of 
 America's most fundamental characteristics a spirit of 
 boastfulness that likes to believe in its own ability to accom- 
 plish anything that can be accomplished by man. The 
 Shipping Board said, "We will build ships." America said: 
 "Of course we will build ships." The Shipping Board said: 
 "We will span the ocean with ships; we will carry grain and 
 munitions and men to Europe over this bridge of ships, and 
 not over a bridge of sighs." America said : "We will span 
 the seas; we will carry grain and munitions and men to 
 Europe over this bridge; we will send the pirates to the 
 
 66 
 
Shipbuilding 67 
 
 bottom of the ocean; we will back our Allies to the last 
 dollar." But the bridge of ships became a bridge of 
 sighs. 1 
 
 To any one knowing the real situation which was de- 
 veloping, the game played by the chairman of the Shipping 
 Board and his associates during the last half of 1917 and 
 early part of 1918 was a staggering commentary on the 
 power of publicity upon the people when administered 
 through the governmental agencies of that day. It was also 
 a somewhat disquieting commentary upon the intelligence of 
 American public opinion, except for the fact that America 
 had no standard by which to judge the propaganda put out 
 by the Administration. 
 
 Long before America entered upon the armed conflict 
 of , the world, it was a recognized truth that the issue would 
 be determined by the world's shipping. When it became 
 an acknowledged reality that the ruthless destruction advo- 
 cated as a policy by the German naval leader Tirpitz had 
 become the policy of his government, then the world under- 
 stood. America then understood. 
 
 Accordingly, by virtue of the Act of September 7, 1916, 
 the United States Shipping Board was created and it, in 
 turn, created the Fleet Corporation. And as a consequence, 
 America went into shipbuilding as no other nation had ever 
 previously gone into the business. 
 
 But it was put aside for so long a time, that when the 
 crisis came, affairs came to be a muddle and efforts had to 
 be redoubled to straighten them out, at a very great ex- 
 penditure. 
 
 The upshot of the matter, however, shows that when 
 America was aroused and set her shoulder to the wheel, she 
 was capable of bringing to pass things hardly conceivable ; 
 that a prodigious program could be executed, even under 
 the handicap of previous neglect and incapable management. 
 
 *War Weekly. 
 
68 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 This chapter will seek to set out some of the things that 
 should become a matter of permanent record for the gen- 
 eral reader. 
 
 In April, 1917, when war was declared by the United 
 States, there were in the thirty-seven steel shipyards of 
 the country only 162 launching ways. In June, 1918, there 
 were 398 ways so designed as to permit the construction of 
 steel ships, three-fourths of them on the Atlantic coast north 
 of Norfolk, or on rivers directly tributary. Upon the 
 operation of these depended the success of the nation's ship- 
 building project for the purpose of prosecution of the Great 
 War's aims replacing the shipping which the Central 
 Powers had been destroying at the rate of a million tons a 
 month, and transporting to Europe food, soldiers, and war 
 implements. 
 
 But at a time when prompt action was urgently needed, 
 there arose an unfortunate and aggravating wrangle be- 
 tween Mr. Goethals and Mr. Denman, men holding official 
 positions of equal authority, as to whether steel or wooden 
 ships should be built under the circumstances, including 
 the great need of haste then demanded. Wooden ships, at 
 first decided upon, were later discarded in favor of steel, 
 for which Mr. Goethals contended from the first. 
 
 The urgent need of united, prompt, and efficient action 
 at this time was indicated by the wholesale destruction of 
 shipping by the submarines of the enemy countries. At 
 the beginning of the Great War, the total tonnage of the 
 merchant marine of the Allies and neutral powers was ap- 
 proximately 40,050,000. Of this, some 21,404,000 tons 
 were destroyed, and the destruction was at an appalling 
 rate when the Allies were not ready to replace it with new 
 ships; this was what made it look, at one time, as if the 
 toll of shipping which the enemy U-boats were taking would 
 settle the war by starving the Entente Powers into submis- 
 sion before the United States could furnish sufficient ships 
 to replace the excessive losses. But when the ravages of 
 
Shipbuilding 69 
 
 the under-sea enemy boats were slackened, there was a 
 breathing space during which this country had opportunity 
 to retrieve, in a measure, its past errors. 
 
 But while more than half of the Allies' shipping was 
 going to the bottom of the sea, it was replaced by two-thirds 
 of the amount destroyed, or 14,270,000 tons of new ship- 
 ping, besides 3,795,000 tons of enemy shipping seized. 
 How much new shipping was constructed by the enemy is 
 not known. 
 
 An error made by the United States Emergency Fleet 
 Corporation in the beginning of its existence was the policy 
 of not using to the full the shipbuilding facilities which then 
 existed in the country and expanding them to the limit. 
 Instead, it constructed many and expensive and extensive 
 new yards, some of which were located in mere swamps. 
 This policy not only delayed the start in the construction 
 of new ships, but it rendered less simple the problems of 
 labor and management most important factors at a time 
 when the enemy was destroying 1,000,000 tons of ships 
 a month. 
 
 A man in the person of Edward N. Hurley, who was 
 not a shipbuilder and who had had no experience in ship- 
 ping matters, was placed at the head of the Shipping Board. 
 As if this were not bad enough, he persistently ignored the 
 advice of practical shipping men and began making the 
 country the most extravagant promises, so that he led the 
 people to forget that there was any submarine menace. 
 Before he had been in office many weeks, the country was 
 told that something like 10,000,000 tons had been con- 
 tracted for. His press agents made the most of this prom- 
 ise to convince the country that this amount of tonnage 
 was to be expected in 1918. Later the figure was reduced 
 to 8,000,000, then to 6,000,000. Real shipbuilders warned 
 the chairman against his unfounded promises, and urged 
 him to save wrecking the facilities that already existed, since 
 his policy was merely disturbing normal production without 
 
yo The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 enlarging it, while it was hopelessly congesting transporta- 
 tion facilities. But the warnings went unheeded, men who 
 had spent their lives in shipbuilding were cast aside, and 
 Mr. Hurley's press agents filled the newspapers with prom- 
 ises which led the public to believe that a thousand or more 
 ships would be available for transportation of troops and 
 supplies during 1918, of which number two hundred would 
 be turned out at Hog Island yard alone. 
 
 This method of misleading the people continued 
 throughout the fall and winter of 1917-1918. And when 
 the promises were not fulfilled, Mr. Hurley pleaded rail 
 congestion, the most severe winter known and the labor 
 situation, and at length, no longer able to hold back the 
 demands of the country, he, directly or indirectly, laid the 
 blame upon the shipbuilders, and in an address at South 
 Bend, Indiana, middle of July, 1918, he named 3,000,000 
 tons, merely adding that Mr. Schwab "believes 3,000,000 
 tons can be exceeded." 
 
 The situation became acute by the early spring of 1918. 
 On March 26, just five days after the tremendous drive 
 of the enemy began and within a few days of a year after 
 we had entered the conflict, Mr. Hurley, in an address in 
 New York before the National Marine League of the 
 United States stated that all of the shipyards of the coun- 
 try were full when the Shipping Board took them over, and 
 added: 
 
 It is only recently that America awoke to the vital needs of ships 
 at a belated hour. At a belated hour came the realization that con- 
 stant supplies must go to our boys already on the fighting line. At a 
 belated hour came the realization that without ships we can neither 
 keep up the line of supply nor get our new armies to the front. We 
 are faced with the necessity of creating an entirely new industry. 
 We had to undertake a job that would have daunted anyone but 
 America. 
 
 And his hearers knew that had the Shipping Board kept 
 hands off, the ships then filling the yards would have slipped 
 
Shipbuilding 7 1 
 
 off the ways a good deal sooner than they did. And the 
 real shipbuilders of the country knew that the statements 
 of the chairman were not based upon fact. The truth is, 
 he was an amateur and easily accepted proposals of men 
 who had nothing to lose by experimenting. 
 
 Secretary of War Baker's serious error of judgment may 
 have had something to do with the bad shipbuilding situa- 
 tion in January, 1918, when seventy 8,oooton troop-ships 
 were under construction. Believing that the war would be 
 won without sending a large army to Europe, he changed 
 the order for these vessels to cargo carriers, causing serious 
 delay. Then when the great March German offensive 
 showed the necessity for sending help quickly, the order for 
 transports was renewed. And yet later it was again changed 
 to cargo carriers. 
 
 But though the plans of the Shipping Board may have 
 been slightly interrupted by this wavering attitude of Mr. 
 Baker, it was not sufficient warrant for the propaganda so 
 vigorously put out by the Board to deceive the public, by 
 taking credit for seized and commandeered vessels, as if 
 they were ships constructed by the Shipping Board and 
 added that much to what the country could not have had 
 otherwise. 
 
 But while the American public was being fed on false 
 propaganda as to the amount of shipping that could be 
 put out by the Shipping Board, the British admiralty was 
 in possession of something akin to the truth. Sir Eric 
 Geddes, first lord of the admiralty, in discussing the sub- 
 marine menace before the House of Commons on March 
 5, 1918, said, among other things: "Despite glowing re- 
 ports in the American press, there is no doubt that a con- 
 siderable time must elapse before the desired output is 
 obtained." 
 
 The Shipping Board had actually built and placed in 
 foreign service up to and including March 22, 1918, two 
 vessels aggregating 17,600 dead-weight tons. And this 
 
72 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 contribution to the world's supply of shipping in the months 
 when it was needed by the million tons a month represented, 
 according to the British admiralty's somewhat cryptic re- 
 ports of the day, the amount that was being destroyed 
 every eight hours by the submarines for the eighteen months 
 just previous. 
 
 In brief, notwithstanding the promises of what might 
 have been success had the war lasted long enough, America's 
 shipbuilding program was a failure. But the situation was 
 so obscured by misleading propaganda, as were the failures 
 in other important war branches of the government, that the 
 public did not sense what was going on. It had no standard 
 of measurement. 
 
 And this system of camouflaging was so thorough in its 
 operation that Congress was no better informed than the 
 general public. Nor was this latter fact known until it 
 came out in a hearing before the Senate Committee on 
 Commerce in March, 1918, when Harris D. H. Connick, 
 vice-president of the American International Corporation, 
 which was responsible for the Hog Island yard, the most 
 extensive of them all, was called before the committee. It 
 was his testimony that disillusioned the country. It ran 
 in this fashion: 
 
 SENATOR NELSON : When will we get the first ships? How soon 
 will we get any on the water, so we can use them? 
 
 MR. CONNICK: You are going to get twenty-five A ships the 
 first of October, or, say, the first of November. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: Those are the first we will get? 
 
 MR. CONNICK : Those are the first you will get. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: And that will not be until next October? 
 
 MR. CONNICK: That will be next October. You get your 
 twenty-five B ships in the middle of December. It will be over seven 
 months then before we can get any ships out of those ways. We have 
 to build the yard and then build the ships. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: It will be over seven months before we can 
 get any of these ships? 
 
Shipbuilding 73 
 
 MR. CONNICK: Yes, sir; I would say up to that date. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON : And then we may get as many as twenty-five ? 
 
 MR. CONNICK: You will get fifty. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: Within seven months? 
 
 MR. CONNICK: I will count up. (After making calculation.) 
 It is going to be about eight months before you can get your first 
 twenty-five ships, and it is going to be about nine and one-half 
 months before you get your next twenty-five ships. We can not get 
 them by October. In eight months you are going to get about twenty- 
 seven or twenty-eight, and then you are going to get the fifty ships in 
 the next six weeks. 
 
 And after that they come very fast. You are going to have fifty- 
 nine ships that is, if the material and the labor functions as it has 
 done before by the first of April; you will have your fifty small 
 ships and your seventy big ships by the middle of July that is, if we 
 get the material and everything comes along the way it is supposed to 
 come. We see no reason now why it should not do so. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: The main thing I am interested in what 
 are we going to get soon this year? 
 
 MR. CONNICK : All you can expect are those fifty ships this year. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: And we will not get any until next winter? 
 
 MR. CONNICK: That is right, you will not get any ships until 
 next winter; no, sir; not one. 
 
 SENATOR HARDING: We are not getting many ships this year 
 at all except commandeered ships that have been completed ? 
 
 MR. CONNICK : I do not know what the Shipping Board is doing 
 at other yards. 
 
 SENATOR NELSON: Not over ten outside of the commandeered 
 ships. 
 
 SENATOR HARDING: That is what I say all of our ships put 
 into service will be the requisitioned ships, English and Norwegian 
 shi^:, which are built here in the yards, the biggest share being Eng- 
 lish ships. 2 
 
 And this was the most optimistic statement of the situa- 
 tion that could be offered. That it was disheartening to that 
 real veteran of heroic mould, Senator Nelson, is evident 
 from his form of questioning. 
 
 3 War Weekly. 
 
74 The Wilson Administration and the Great W ar 
 
 When hostilities had ceased and the country was no 
 longer fearful of permitting the light to shine in, various 
 investigations were started to let the public know who 
 was at fault in the serious delays and great waste that 
 grew out of the perilous situation in which the country was 
 found when the war was upon it. And then it developed 
 how accurate had been the outlining of the situation by Mr. 
 Connick. 
 
 In speaking to one such resolution adopted by the Senate 
 on November 22, 1918, Senator Harding severely criti- 
 cized the shipping situation. Three great fabricating ship- 
 building plants had been built by the government to save 
 the nation from the ravages of the enemy submarines. Of 
 these, to the end of 1918, the total output was four ships. 
 One plant which was to have delivered 124, delivered one; 
 while another which was to have delivered 24, failed to 
 deliver even one. 
 
 It was frequently asked why the government during the 
 crisis such as the world then saw often selected the wrong 
 man for an important position. For the man selected is 
 the heart of the program. Every problem is a problem 
 of personnel. It appeared to be the politics that was at 
 the bottom of it. 
 
 The Administration discarded men of practical ship- 
 ping experience, though it would have seemed to appeal to 
 the ordinary intelligence that that was a most essential quali- 
 fication, for a man serving in so important a position at a 
 crucial time. There was no argument whatever for making 
 up a shipping board of non-shipping members except the 
 argument of prejudice. What was needed was a ship- 
 ping board to centralize shipbuilding and ship-operating 
 in the hands of a federal agency and to control rates and 
 prices and to enter into arrangements with similar agencies 
 in the Allied countries. American shipping men were the 
 first to recognize this necessity. 
 
 The conspicuous failure of the non-shipping board was 
 
Shipbuilding 75 
 
 on the score of general policies. The board had, for the 
 last half of 1917 and early in 1918, definitely starved the 
 existing ship facilities of the country at the expense of new 
 units which were its own creation. It had fostered competi- 
 tion in the labor market, established immense new yards in 
 the vicinity of old yards, diverted materials to the new 
 yards, and at the same time failed to come to proper 
 financial agreements with the old yards, thus making it diffi- 
 cult or even impossible for them to hurry the work. 
 
 But by mid-summer of 1918, with Charles M. Schwab 
 as director-general of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the 
 Administration appeared to get a grip on the labor situa- 
 tion and to prevent the labor turn-over which had been dis- 
 astrous to shipbuilding and every other war energy at a 
 crucial period in war time. 
 
 The main results of the Administration's shipbuilding 
 policy were, first, less tonnage was launched in America 
 during the last six months of 1917 and early 1918 than 
 would have been launched if the Shipping Board had not 
 been in existence; second, the new units, children of the 
 Shipping Board, were just getting ready to build ships when 
 hostilities ceased, and had proved to be the prime profiteers 
 of the war. Hog Island became a synonym of profiteering. 
 
 After hostilities ceased, there appeared to persist the 
 same lack of policy. There appeared to be no reason why 
 shipping men, whose ships had been taken over by the gov- 
 ernment during the war emergency, should not have their 
 ships returned to them. They went to Washington to 
 ascertain what they might expect. Mr. Hurley had gone 
 to Europe, no one in Washington seemed to be authorized 
 to speak on the matter. 
 
 The purpose of the government to place at the dis- 
 posal of all the forces opposing Germany's raid upon the 
 cause of civilization was nowhere manifested more clearly 
 than in prodigious plans for shipbuilding such a large 
 scheme of shipbuilding as the world had never before seen 
 
76 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 or contemplated. In such enormous, almost inconceivably 
 large, undertakings much must be allowed for errors in the 
 human factor. The American people have always been 
 generous in their estimate of what is accomplished in rela- 
 tion to what is undertaken, whether in war or in peace, but 
 particularly in time of war. 
 
 Yet so ample had been the warning given to the Ameri- 
 can Administration that the United States was almost cer- 
 tain at any moment to be thrust headlong into the war, 
 that the apparent indifference upon the part of the Adminis- 
 tration to making adequate preparation for the inevitable 
 conflict will always stand as a stigma upon America's fair 
 name and upon her record for efficiency and energy. Had 
 war been thrust upon America in a manner in which it was 
 thrust upon France and Belgium and Great Britain, there 
 would have been excuse for almost any deficiency in admin- 
 istrative processes. But two years and a half of the terrible 
 conflagration in Europe appeared to be no warning to the 
 national Administration in America. Apologists for the 
 Administration have been quick, when burning criticism was 
 heaped upon Mr. Wilson's failure of accomplishment, to 
 call attention to the blunders of the European Allies, as if 
 they had had as ample warning to prepare for the conflict as 
 America had. The two cases are in no respect parallel or 
 even approaching a parallel. 
 
 As a consequence of the tremendous scope of the gov- 
 ernment's plan for shipbuilding, in the great effort to rush 
 everything at top speed, there were failures that were so 
 inexcusable that they must be set down in history as against 
 American efficiency, though as a matter of fact it was simply 
 administrative incompetency. It was in view of these facts 
 that Senator Calder, about two months after the close of 
 the armed conflict, called attention to the deplorable failure 
 that was unfolded to the American public after the armi- 
 stice was signed. Aggravating as were these failures, there 
 was no one on the Democratic side of the Senate chamber 
 
Shipbuilding 77 
 
 capable of or willing even to attempt a defense of Mr. Hur- 
 ley, except Senator Fletcher of Florida. It was shown that 
 virtually all the shipping that Mr. Hurley advertised as 
 his own accomplishment was laid down in private yards, on 
 private order, and was taken over by the Shipping Board 
 and completed by virtue of the President's order com- 
 mandeering all shipping. 
 
 Leaving out of consideration altogether the gross waste 
 of the people's money in construction of yards and ships, 
 and discussing merely the results from this, the principal 
 part of Mr. Hurley's endeavor, Senator Calder gave this 
 resume : 
 
 Complete failure to deliver ships in time to be of actual 
 use in the war program. Ninety-three were promised, none 
 was delivered. 
 
 Failure to the extent of 87 per cent in the number of 
 ships launched. 164 were promised, 22 were launched. 
 
 Failure to the extent of 57 per cent in the number of 
 ships placed in construction. 249 were promised, 107 were 
 laid down. 
 
 Failure to the extent of 66 per cent in the amount of 
 steel erected and of 74 per cent in the number of rivets 
 driven. 
 
 The supply of steel from the mills was nearly up to 
 scheduled requirements and much in excess of the quantity 
 actually used in construction. 
 
 The supply of fabricated steel was 35 per cent short of 
 estimated requirements, but always exceeded the actual re- 
 quirements of the shipbuilders by many thousands of tons. 
 
 Senator Harding in a statement on the floor of the Sen- 
 ate in November, 1918, said: 
 
 No matter what the policy of the government may be in the 
 future, and no matter how earnestly we all favor the construction 
 of the largest mechant marine in the world, it is inconceivable that 
 the government will go on appropriating money for ship construction 
 at the present rate, which is from four to six times the normal cost. 
 
78 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The shipbuilding costs became so notorious, during the 
 war emergency, as to threaten to become a national scandal. 
 
 In the case of a well-managed yard on the Pacific coast 
 in which the number of men increased threefold in a little 
 over a year, a comparison of wages and output with cor- 
 responding items of two years before revealed the fact 
 that before the signing of the armistice wages had ad- 
 vanced seventy per cent of the former output. The result 
 was a labor cost 2.4 times that of two years previous. In 
 the case of two well-managed yards on the Atlantic coast 
 the results in the one were: Labor advance, 120 per cent; 
 output, 80 per cent; resulting labor cost, two and three- 
 quarters times that of the former period. In the other, 
 labor advance, 100 per cent; output, 66 2/3 per cent; re- 
 sulting labor cost, three times that of two years ago. 3 
 
 In defending the item of $660,000,000 for the Shipping 
 Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation in the sundry civil 
 appropriation bill, Representative Shirley, chairman of the 
 Appropriation Committee, stated on the floor of the House 
 near the end of February, 1919, that while the investment 
 of the completed shipping program would be nearly $4,000,- 
 000,000, the actual value of the ships would not exceed 
 $2,000,000,000. Andhestateu. 
 
 That there has been great extravagance and waste in many par- 
 ticulars, I haven't the slightest doubt. . . . The only justification 
 was the great need for many ships at a period when it was feared 
 the war would be lost without them. 
 
 We authorized the expenditure altogether of $3,900,000,000 for 
 the ship construction. Of this $2,800,000,000 was for building 
 ships ourselves, $515,000,000 payment for requisitioned ships, $55,- 
 000,000 was for yards, $75,000,000 was for housing at shipyards. 
 
 Notwithstanding these dismal failures, whose lesson 
 should not be lost on the future, America planned in the 
 large; and had the war continued another year, her great 
 weight could not have failed to impress itself with irresist- 
 
 8 North American Review, March, 1919. 
 
Shipbuilding 79 
 
 ible power. Despite all efforts, the deadly problem of the 
 submarine remained until after this nation began its ample 
 shipbuilding operations. 
 
 And the stupendous shipbuilding project of America 
 grew into reality. Hog Island, the greatest plant of the 
 kind in the world, rose like magic where there had been 
 but a desolate swamp. The German leaders discerned the 
 sign, and were convinced that this nation was at length in 
 the war whole-heartedly, and that America's productive 
 power had doomed the mightiest weapon of Prussianism 
 on sea. This gigantic enterprise put fear into the heart of 
 autocracy. The evidence that this country would be able 
 eventually to launch a great ocean steamship every forty- 
 eight hours was as much an inspiration to America as it was 
 a shock to their enemies. 
 
 It was on the first Sunday in May, 1918, that the 5500- 
 ton collier "Tuckahoe" went into the waters of the Dela- 
 ware at Camden, New Jersey. The launching of this boat 
 formed the front-page stories for the newspapers of Amer- 
 ica and lines for the bulletins of London and Paris and 
 probably interesting news for the consideration of royal 
 eyes in Germany. 
 
 This ship was built in twenty-seven days, and never be- 
 fore in all shipbuilding history had a ship of its size been 
 done in that time, virtually a complete vessel in every de- 
 tail, 330 feet long and 50 feet beam. On May 15, it 
 steamed out of the yards of the New York Shipbuilding 
 Corporation at Camden, ready to take her place in smiting 
 the German pirates. 
 
 On the same day, a few miles down the Delaware, there 
 was a double launching at the shipbuilding yards at Chester, 
 Pennsylvania. And from that time on the country was 
 thrilled by the frequent reports given to the public on what 
 was being done on shipbuilding, sometimes true, unfor- 
 tunately often untrue. 
 
 Yet the general trend was in the right direction. It 
 
8o The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was not until the middle of 1918 that the country was get- 
 ting its swing in the shipbuilding operations. 
 
 By August i, 1918, America's great chain of ship- 
 building plants was approaching completion. At that time 
 there were 118 fully-equipped yards in the United States 
 and 44 others partly completed. Many of these were built 
 from the ground up, while others were enlarged to so 
 great an extent as to make them practically new plants. 
 One of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation was au- 
 thorized to add ten new ways at a cost of $20,000,000, and 
 three more to the same company's yards at another point. 
 The New York Shipbuilding .Corporation at Camden, New 
 Jersey, was at that time building five new ways at a cost 
 of $7,000,000. Of the 118 completed, the Pacific coast 
 had 48, the Atlantic 38, the Great Lakes 16, the Gulf of 
 Mexico 1 6. 
 
 Then came such a rapid succession of broken records 
 in the shipbuilding line as had never been known in all 
 shipbuilding history. On July 25, 1918, Secretary Daniels 
 announced the breaking of the record in shipbuilding at the 
 Mare Island navy yard, California, in these words : "Be- 
 fore the war from 20 to 24 months were required to com- 
 plete a destroyer. The keel of the "Ward" was laid at 
 7:30 a. m. on May 15. The vessel was launched at 8:30 
 p. m. June i seventeen and one-half days after her keel 
 was laid. She was put into commission July 24 seventy 
 days after the laying of her keel." 
 
 And while men had been pinning steel-plates together 
 for a generation with pneumatic hammers, one who could 
 average more than sixty rivets an hour was a first-rate 
 riveter. But by mid-summer, 1918, there were riveters on 
 the shipbuilding job who could drive 400 rivets an hour 
 and exceed it. 
 
 In the early autumn of 1918, building had made so 
 great strides in the United States that the country was 
 then the greatest shipbuilding country in the world, having 
 
Shipbuilding 8 1 
 
 leaped from third to first place in a little over a year. At 
 that time the number of ships under our flag was 2,185, 
 with a total dead-weight tonnage of 9,511,915, and there 
 were over 200 yards engaged in construction work, with 
 1,020 ways. 
 
 In the building of her merchant fleet, America was 
 planning first of all, to win the war; after that her purpose 
 was to overcome her own neglect in providing ocean trans- 
 portation for her own trade. 
 
 The outlook of the American merchant fleet as it stood 
 in the first month of 1919, was as follows: Steamers now 
 owned by the United States, 3,000,000 tons; steamers under 
 construction for the United States, 6,000,000 tons; steamers 
 owned by private individuals, 3,000,000 tons; a total of 
 twelve million tons dead-weight. 
 
 April 29, 1919, Mr. Hurley, chairman of the United 
 States Shipping Board, announced the cancellation of 2,000,- 
 ooo tons more of shipping contracts, making a total to 
 that time of 5,500,000 tons. 
 
 The low estate to which our merchant marine had fallen 
 prior to the Great War is common knowledge. Americans 
 should feel a blush of shame when they realize that in the 
 golden days before the Civil War 80 per cent of our com- 
 merce was carried in American bottoms, and that prior 
 to the outbreak of war in 1914 only 9 per cent of our ex- 
 ports and imports were carried under the American flag. 
 But twelve million tons of ships is another picture. 
 
 In the opinion of competent and impartial commen- 
 tators, there were two achievements of ttu's country during 
 the war that surpassed all others. One was the rapid and 
 orderly registration of 10,000,000 men for military service, 
 under a law which was a complete innovation in American 
 history followed by another of 14,000,000; the other was 
 the sending of more than 2,000,000 troops to Europe within 
 a few months, an unequaled feat in transportation. 
 
 Of the 2,079,880 men taken over up to mid-December, 
 
82 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 more than 1,000,000 were carried on British ships, which 
 were diverted to that undertaking from the vital work of 
 conveying food. 
 
 The performances wrought a decisive effect upon the 
 world's history at one of its great critical junctures. Credit 
 for this movement is assigned in large measure to the Allies, 
 to the Brkish in particular, since approximately half of the 
 troops were carried in their ships. But of the cargo of 
 5,153,000 tons, less than 5 per cent was carried by Allied 
 ships. Of all the cargo shipped, only 79,000 tons were 
 lost at sea. 
 
 Just prior to the middle of December, 1918, the Navy 
 Department gave out the statement that of the men in the 
 army transported from America to France, forty-six and 
 one-fourth per cent were carried in American ships, forty- 
 eight and one-half in British, the balance in French and 
 Italian vessels. Of the total strength of the naval escort, 
 the United States furnished eighty-two and three-fourths 
 per cent, Great Britain fourteen and one-eighth per cent and 
 France three and one-eighth per cent. 
 
 It gave the people a rude shock to be informed that 
 most of the transports used to carry America's soldiers 
 were furnished by other nations. 
 
 Developments by investigations of wastefulness, profit- 
 eering and fraud in connection with shipbuiling, after the 
 close of the war, pointed to the fact that the government 
 should not engage in business that properly belongs to pri- 
 vate enterprise. 
 
 Socialism must not be permitted to throttle the best 
 there is in American initiative. The capacity is in the 
 average American. Yet, at the end of June, 1921, the 
 government was seeking to dispose of $300,000,000 worth 
 of shipping and to eliminate the shipping board's monthly 
 deficit of $16,000,000 for operating purposes. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 GOVERNMENT RAILROADING 
 
 When, a few decades ago, a Senator on the floor of 
 the United States Senate made the famous motion that, "If 
 the Pennsylvania Railroad Company has no further busi- 
 ness to come before this body, I move that the Senate do 
 now adjourn," or words of similar purport, even when 
 spoken ironically, it was implied that the people had at that 
 time come to believe that arrogance and gratuitous assump- 
 tions were manifesting themselves on the part of the rail- 
 road companies in operating a public utility under a public 
 franchise. It was this intolerable arrogance and these un- 
 warranted assumptions that drove the people to compel 
 Congress during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the 
 first decade of the twentieth century to adopt regulative 
 measures which became steadily more drastic, despite the 
 strenuous and continuous resistance on the part of the cor- 
 porations. And some of the States adopted regulations 
 even more severe. 
 
 This regulative process became cumulative in volume. 
 So onerous were the resulting restrictions that the roads 
 were hampered in obtaining credits necessary for extensions 
 and improvements. Then came the war with its extraor- 
 dinary demands, the railroads were found inadequately 
 equipped, the transportation system was unable to bear the 
 strain, and the whole life of the nation was threatened with 
 disorganization. It was at this point that the govern- 
 ment stepped in and took over the country's transportation 
 system. 
 
 This control began December 28, 1917, and ended 
 February 29, 1920, with a modified control six months 
 
 83 
 
84 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 longer. When the federal Administration assumed opera- 
 tion of the railroads, President Wilson announced that it 
 was done for three chief reasons: To enable them to 
 handle more traffic, to save the companies from bankruptcy 
 and thereby prevent a national financial catastrophe, and to 
 solve the railroad labor problem. The claim made by advo- 
 cates of government operation was that under that policy 
 the railways would be able to handle more traffic and to 
 handle it better than under private operation, that the sys- 
 tem would be operated more economically, and that under 
 it labor would be treated better. 
 
 William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was 
 appointed by the President the Director-General of Rail- 
 roads, a position which placed him in possession of a power 
 never surpassed by that of any manager of any industry, 
 governmental or private, in all the world. One of the most 
 forceful, aggressive and daring of men, Mr. McAdoo, 
 with astonishing dash and thoroughness, proceeded in mas- 
 terful fashion to administer the operation of the various 
 transportation systems of the country, upon a plan favored 
 by advocates of government operation by first of all unify- 
 ing operation of the complication of systems. 
 
 Not only the railway systems were involved in this con- 
 trol. Besides the 397,014 miles of railroad controlled by 
 2,907 companies and employing 1,700,814 persons, he 
 swayed with a free hand steamship lines engaged in coast- 
 wise transportation and navigating an inland waterways 
 system which included fifty-seven canals aggregating 3,057 
 miles, as well as many thousands of miles of navigable 
 rivers, lakes, bays, sounds and inlets. And it was with prac- 
 tically unnanimous approval that the public greeted the 
 President's announcement that the government would take 
 over the operation of the country's transportation system. 
 The readiness of all parties for expected results the labor 
 men and the general public was evident in the desire to 
 
Government Railroading 85 
 
 waive all special preferences in a genuine purpose to co- 
 operate for the common good and for the winning of the 
 war. The public saw the government take over all these 
 systems of transportation and advance almost immediately 
 carrying charges from 25 to 50 per cent, a right which the 
 interstate commerce commission had emphatically refused 
 the companies. 
 
 And it was freely stated by Administration officials that 
 from the very beginning Mr. McAdoo had to contend with 
 a practically broken-down transportation system, that the 
 government caught and saved the wreck just as it was slip- 
 ping over the brink, and that he then had to contend immedi- 
 ately with the worst winter ever known to transportation 
 circles, causing one of the worst freight blockades in eastern 
 territory, with New York City as a center, ever known, 
 with a resulting unparalleled transportation tangle. 
 
 Mr. McAdoo declared his policy to be u to humanize 
 the railways and negative the idea that corporations have no 
 souls." He stated succinctly his purposes to be: First, 
 the winning of the war ; second, service to the public at the 
 lowest cost consistent with the payment of fair wages to 
 railroad employes and the maintenance of the transporta- 
 tion system as a self-supporting, rather than a money-mak- 
 ing, agency. In his report to the President after seven 
 months of government operation he stated that under gov- 
 ernment control the highest salaries, ranging from $40,000 
 to $50,000 per annum, were paid to regional directors whose 
 responsibilities were far greater than those of the railroad 
 presidents who had been receiving as high as $100,000; 
 and that the 2,325 officers receiving salaries of $5,000 and 
 over, aggregating $21,320,187 yearly, were reduced in 
 number to 1,925, with an aggregate of salaries reduced by 
 $4,814,889. This was after he had performed one of the 
 most spectacular acts of his administration in dismissing, 
 in the spring of 1918, the presidents of all the large lines 
 
86 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 of railroad. Whatever had been the salaries of some of 
 the men dismissed, as President Ripley of * the Santa Fe, 
 no sum equaled his value to the road in its upbuilding, his 
 constructive genius taking the road from the clutches of 
 bankruptcy and making a property worth three-quarters 
 of a billion, earning seven per cent annually, and at the 
 same time winning popular support which is only too likely 
 to be hostile to railroads. But Mr. McAdoo was at the 
 head of all the nation's rail systems as a part-time employ- 
 ment and without compensation and he resigned. 
 
 The Administration made large claims in efficiency and 
 expedition in transportation after the passing of the exas- 
 perating situation which developed from the congestion of 
 traffic immediately after the government took control. It 
 deserves credit for many suggestions which railroads could, 
 and in some instances did, profitably adopt, both for their 
 own benefit and to the advantage of the public. A poster 
 that became an old familiar friend of everyone about rail- 
 road stations and that was well known to all travellers 
 contained many valuable suggestions. It appeared in 1918 
 in this form: 
 
 SAVE A CAR A DAY AND HELP WIN THE WAR 
 
 Transportation is a vital necessity and may be the deciding factor. 
 
 1. Avoid Congestion. 
 
 2. Unload Cars Promptly. 
 
 3. Order Only What Cars Can Be Loaded Promptly. 
 
 4. Load to Capacity. 
 
 5. If Loads Are Light, Load to Cubic Capacity. 
 
 6. Ship Direct. 
 
 7. Give Shipping Directions in Time to Bill Same Day as Loaded. 
 
 8. Avoid Shipping "To Order." 
 
 We loaded one million, four hundred fifty-five thousand, three 
 hundred eighty-one (1,455,381) cars in 1917. A saving of half a 
 car a day would equal seven hundred twenty-seven thousand, six 
 hundred ninety car-days, equal to the continuous use of two thousand 
 
Government Railroading 87 
 
 cars, and two thousand cars would handle fifty thousand additional 
 car-loads in the same period. 
 
 Few additional cars can be obtained. There is more freight to 
 transport. Therefore we must 
 
 "DO MORE WITH LESS" 
 If the commerce of the country is to be moved 
 YOU MUST HELP. 
 
 This was suggestive of methods at all times urged by 
 the government during its control of the railroads. But 
 the autocratic powers which the Director-General exercised 
 should have been entirely effective. His first great admin- 
 istrative act was to sweep away all barriers that savored 
 of competition and to unite all lines into one harmonious 
 whole. By one wave of the magic wand, the law against 
 pooling, theretofore looked upon as the very palladium of 
 the liberties of the people, was cast into the discard; the 
 whole structure of orders and decisions, so industriously 
 erected through the years for the regulation of railroads, 
 was thrown to the winds. After seven months of govern- 
 ment operation, he estimated that the elimination of solicit- 
 ing freight traffic and of exploitation of passenger routes 
 had effected a saving of $23,566,633. For the saving of 
 time and energy, all freight was routed most directly, re- 
 gardless of the roads that were to carry it. 
 
 At the same time there were given to the public reports 
 of great improvement in freight movement, of cars in sup- 
 ply abundant. 1 For the two-month period of June-July 
 the director of the Allegheny region reported conditions fair 
 and improving, with no congestion, since business to the 
 larger industrial centers and for export were governed by 
 
 1 The Georgia Fruit Exchange of Atlanta reported that it was about to 
 complete, in the first week in August, 1918, the movement of the largest 
 crop of peaches ever shipped from that or any other state, the largest 
 single day's shipment being 600 cars, and a total to July 17 of 7,432 cars. 
 Similar reports were coming from the West Virginia coal snippers and the 
 Pacific Coast lumbermen. 
 
88 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 permits; and that the car supply had been met, with 64,187 
 cars of anthracite coal loaded in June, as against 59,008 
 a year earlier; and 191,767 of bituminous, an increase of 
 22,781 over June, 1917, with a similar increase in July; and 
 that the coal dumped at tidewater was increased by 223,537 
 tons in June and by 444,916 in July. 
 
 And as young men were being drafted for military serv- 
 ice, the Railroad Administration opened schools for the 
 training of women to take their places as ticket-sellers. 
 But when complaints began to reach him in August of a 
 lack of courtesy upon the part of the employes that was 
 unknown under private operation, Director-General Mc- 
 Adoo issued strict orders requiring the utmost courtesy at 
 all times. In that connection he invited attention to the in- 
 crease of operating expenses of over $475,000,000 per an- 
 num because of increased pay. 
 
 When the much-heralded efficiency of government opera- 
 tion of railroads is written sight should not be lost of the 
 fact that there was never known in railroad history in the 
 United States such centralization of authority as was pos- 
 sessed by the Director-General. To this the people did not 
 object; but they felt that by virtue thereof they had the 
 right to expect correspondingly better results. Not once 
 did the public feel aggrieved over accomplishment, even in 
 the most direct and drastic form. On the contrary, they 
 approved when it brought results which they knew to be 
 essential to success in the conflict across the seas. Pas- 
 senger and sleeping-car service were severely curtailed in 
 order to produce speed results in getting food to its destina- 
 tion, in the transcontinental movement of lumber for ship- 
 building, 2 and in hastening the shipment of munitions ma- 
 terial. 
 
 "It was no unusual matter along northern routes of transcontinental 
 travel to see residents gazing in amazement at double-headers pulling 
 trains of great length that dashed through their towns loaded with lumber 
 or grain with the speed of limited passenger trains. 
 
Government Railroading 89 
 
 To this end every known means was brought into play. 
 Waste was brought to a minimum, but through regulations 
 that cannot govern in the free play of competition. Yet 
 it seemed like good sense to which Director-General Mc- 
 Adoo gave expression in his testimony before the interstate 
 commerce committee of the Senate in January, 1919, when 
 he declared for heavy loading of cars, pooling of repair- 
 shops, unification of terminals, consolidation of ticket-offices, 
 universal mileage tickets, uniform rate classification, high 
 demurrage rates, way-billing of freight from point of origin 
 to destination, and the utilization of water routes for the 
 relief of crowded rail lines. There is probably no civilized 
 nation in the world with so little appreciation of the value 
 of its water means of transportation as the United States. 
 
 Though the Administration sought to discourage pas- 
 senger traffic in order to speed the transportation of war 
 materials and increased passenger fares 50 per cent, pas- 
 senger traffic during the first calendar year of the war in- 
 creased 1 6 per cent. And for the first nine months of 1918, 
 the number of persons carried one mile totalled 32,586,- 
 390,878 as compared with 28,513,155,775 passenger-miles 
 for the corresponding period of 1917, a figure largely in- 
 creased by the soldiers and sailors, as well as very many 
 others carried incident to the war. In August, 1918, the 
 Railroad Administration stated that over 5,000,000 sol- 
 diers had been transported on American railroads in four- 
 teen months half of which time they were under gov- 
 ernment control. In the district west of the Mississippi 
 the elimination of passenger-train mileage totalled 2,000,- 
 ooo a year, with further reduction to be made; while in 
 the section east of the Mississippi the elimination aggre- 
 gated 26,420,000. 
 
 Mr. McAdoo was a man of very real accomplishment. 
 Bold, energetic, courageous, he was undismayed in grap- 
 pling with the largest problems of administration, whether 
 
90 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Liberty Loans or railroads. And his leaving the govern- 
 ment service was a distinct loss to the country, the removal 
 of a chief pillar of the Administration. 
 
 And yet, what became the general practice of the Wilson 
 Administration of taking credit for accomplishment that 
 did not belong to it, serving to the people in their homes 
 news that was not fact, crept into Mr. McAdoo's depart- 
 ment. Later developments led the country to ask whether 
 government railroading was the success people had been 
 led to believe it was. That it should have been was plain. 
 The method was direct. Redtape was cut to bits. The 
 power vested in the Director-General was autocratic. Pro- 
 cedure was aptly described in this fashion by a leading 
 weekly : 
 
 Under government control, the Secretary of the Treasury merely 
 dropped in on the Director-General of Railroads, handed out a cigar 
 and a new story, mentioned casually that he would like a billion to 
 meet railroad bills, and walked out with the increased-rate order in 
 his pocket. 3 
 
 But in time the people were disillusioned. They came 
 to see the real accomplishment in railroading by the gov- 
 ernment. The Administration had taken over stations, 
 shops, rolling stock, rights of way, rails all of which had 
 been built up through long years of arduous effort by private 
 enterprise. And when, in January, 1919, Mr. McAdoo 
 was giving his testimony before the Senate committee in 
 favor of continued government operation, Edmond Pen- 
 nington, president of the Soo system, was asking this perti- 
 nent question : 
 
 We hear much from the news bureau of the Administration. . . . 
 The talk of economy has not been hacked by a single set of figures. 
 I should like to know where the money is coming from to meet the 
 tremendous overhead expenses of the railway administration and the 
 cost of the expensive office force maintained by the Director-General. 
 
 * Leslies Weekly, June 22, 1918. 
 
Government Railroading 91 
 
 Within ten days after the adverse elections in the fall 
 of 1918, Mr. McAdoo resigned as Director-General of 
 Railroads and as Secretary of the Treasury. This came 
 as a real surprise to the public. Various reasons were as- 
 signed for his action, such as that he had differed with the 
 President over the latter's partisan appeal to the country 
 immediately preceding the election, that he had urged 
 against the President's contemplated trip to Europe, and 
 that he himself had designs upon the presidential nomina- 
 tion in 1920. The reason he gave was that his salary was 
 insufficient. It was not publicly announced that the moun- 
 tains of debt piling up in government operation of the rail- 
 roads had anything to do with his resignation; yet there 
 was a strong suspicion in the public mind that Mr. McAdoo 
 did not care to shoulder the burden of the reaction that was 
 sure to follow full knowledge of the situation of the rail- 
 roads. Upon leaving office, he announced that the total 
 sum advanced to December 31, 1918, by the United States 
 Railroad Administration to all transportation lines under 
 government control was $689,034,759. 
 
 In a long and carefully prepared statement to the Senate 
 committee on interstate commerce, in January, 1919, Mr. 
 McAdoo asked Congress to permit government control for 
 five years, instead of the twenty-one months authorized in 
 the Control Act under which the government assumed con- 
 trol in the first instance. The reasons he gave were, chiefly, 
 that the twenty-one months period was insufficient time to 
 give the matter a fair test, that the war period had required 
 methods that could have little application in time of peace, 
 and that the months immediately following the war were 
 certain to be so abnormal in conditions as to be practically 
 worthless as a test. 
 
 This was the signal for the two sides to align their 
 forces, one for government control, the other for private 
 control. Unfortunately for the merits of the matter, Mr. 
 McAdoo expressed his purpose of turning back the roads 
 
92 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 at once to private control unless his wish as to the five-year 
 plan were acquiesced in. For this threat brought forth 
 a bill in Congress to prevent this action on the part of the 
 Administration, action that would have tended to entail 
 financial chaos upon the railroad world, if, indeed, it did 
 not bring a financial crash upon the nation. This one stroke 
 on his part unsettled the public's confidence in him as a 
 public administrator. 
 
 The prompt action of Congress was probably hastened 
 by a letter from President Wilson in Europe, addressed to 
 Congress, in which he declared that the roads "will be 
 handed over to their owners at the end of the calendar 
 year." 
 
 Organized labor as a class had fared so well under 
 Administration auspices that immediately after Mr. Mc- 
 Adoo's five-year proposal, the railroad brotherhoods 
 throughout the country made a drive on Congress to force 
 its adoption. Beginning the very week next after the Mc- 
 Adoo plan was submitted to Congress, a deluge of petitions, 
 resolutions and individual letters began pouring in upon 
 members of both branches of the national legislature. It 
 grew to so great a volume that the Senate committee on 
 interstate commerce began considering the advisability of 
 investigating what source was responsible for this propa- 
 ganda. There was a notable textual similarity in it all. 4 
 
 On the other hand, at the same time the presidents of 
 one hundred and twenty-five railroads, representing every 
 large system in the country, with the single exception of the 
 Southern Railroad, met in Philadelphia and drew up a list 
 of proposals to submit to the Senate committee as the 
 
 * These substantially uniform resolutions coming from all railroad cen- 
 ters of the country began in these words: 
 
 "Whereas, The public press is boldly circulating the news that the 
 people want the roads back to private ownership; and, 
 
 "Whereas, We consider this to be an injustice, because private owner- 
 ship has proved a failure in peace as well as in war, it being demon- 
 strated to everybody's satisfaction by facts" . . , 
 
Government Railroading 93 
 
 recommendation of the railroads of the country. Among 
 them were these : 
 
 1. Opposition to the McAdoo plan for a five-year extension of 
 government control. 
 
 2. Refusal to accept a return of the roads in their present 
 "scrambled" state brought about by the Administration. 
 
 3. 'Demand for thoroughgoing remedial legislation that will pre- 
 serve all the good features of governmental control, with the inclusion 
 of the benefits of private ownership. 
 
 4. Inauguration of some form of national control that will per- 
 mit pooling of stations, ticket-offices, and equipment. 
 
 5. Rate revision upward to care for increase of expenses. 
 
 6. Combination of the rate-making power with the legislative con- 
 trol over railroads. 
 
 7. Removal of railroads from politics. 
 
 It was at this time that the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission was taking a firm stand against government owner- 
 ship or operation of railroads. In its statement to the same 
 Senate committee, it said: 
 
 Considering and weighing as best we can all of the arguments for 
 and against the different plans, we are led to the conviction that with 
 the adoption of appropriate provisions and safeguards for regulation 
 under private ownership, it would not be wise or best at this time to 
 assume government ownership or operation of the railways of the 
 country. 
 
 This, however, was no simple problem of two and two 
 make four. There were subtractions, divisions, and multi- 
 plicity galore. Many diverse elements were involved 
 fairness to the companies, fairness to individuals, industrial 
 justice, social justice, the destructive forces of radicalism 
 then at work seeking to undermine the whole mighty indus- 
 trial and governmental structure. To this last, the organ- 
 ized railroad men, wittingly or unwittingly, gave their 
 influence. 
 
94 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 And this last was a large factor in determining the 
 problem. The matter of the increase of wages was brought 
 to the front on all occasions. And as a final attempt the 
 railroad unions placed themselves behind the Plumb Plan. 
 The author of this scheme, Glenn E. Plumb, maintained 
 palatial offices in Washington and was supplied with a large 
 fund to care for all expenses. He proposed that the rail- 
 road management be placed in the hands of three parties 
 to, be equally represented: employes, officials, the public, 
 under government ownership. It was thought the public 
 was in a frame of mind to take the bait. But the public was 
 sitting by and quietly noting events. It had observed at- 
 tempts at Winnipeg to overcome the public through de- 
 stroying the railroads; it had noted the desperate attempt 
 to overthrow the Seattle government; it had its eyes on 
 the steel and coal strikes and the defiance of the United 
 States government itself. It was in no mood for further 
 trifling on the part of radicalism, whether found in Admin- 
 istration circles, organized railroad employes, or elsewhere. 
 Moreover, it was making up its mind to u be done with 
 wiggle and wobble." It had its mind set upon steadiness 
 of purpose and back to American tradition. It had seen 
 the railroads manhandled and bedevilled to the limit of 
 endurance, and was ready to demand their return to their 
 owners and with new demands for improvements. 
 
 And it began to appear to the great public that the per- 
 sistent demand of the railroad employes for an increase of 
 wages out of all proportion to the demands of others who 
 were receiving much smaller pay had some ulterior motive. 
 The facts seemed to warrant the suspicion. The brother- 
 hoods were insisting that they must be paid more to meet 
 the increased cost of living. But such demands had been 
 met under private management. In 1907 the average wage 
 of the rail worker was $641 per year, while in 1917 it was 
 $1,003, an increase of 56 per cent. This kept pace with 
 the increased cost of living. But under government control, 
 
Government Railroading 95 
 
 the workers insisted that the pay was not keeping pace with 
 living costs. In 1916 the payrolls of rail employes totalled 
 $1,470,000,000, which grew to $1,739,000,000 in 1917, 
 to $2,500,000,000 in 1918 and to substantially $3,000,- 
 000,000 in 1919, and, had the demands of the workers been 
 yielded to, they would have received $3,800,000,000 in 
 1920. At no time was the United States Railroad Admin- 
 istration free from controversy and threat of a strike to en- 
 force a higher scale of wages, though the amount had to 
 be made up out of the pockets of the people receiving less 
 than half the pay of these organized men who had never 
 lost any time or spent any money, as had teachers of the 
 country and many others, in learning their business; but 
 on the contrary were being paid while learning railroading. 
 
 When radicalism was asserting itself in mid-summer 
 of 1919 among these organized railroad men, Director- 
 General Hines, who had succeeded Mr. McAdoo as head 
 of the Railroad Administration, reporting to the President 
 on July 30, declared that a deadlock existed over the de- 
 mands of the shopmen, and that the granting of their de- 
 mands and of the others to follow involved another increase 
 of $800,000,000 a year, and at a time when the railroads 
 were already piling up an enormous deficit every month. 
 
 President Wilson was ready with the simple expedient 
 of loading the burden onto the already overburdened pub- 
 lic; and the very next day asked Congress to create a body 
 to determine all railroad wage questions. Congress as 
 promptly rejected his suggestion upon the ground that he 
 was already invested with full power to deal with the 
 matter. 
 
 In all this controversy it is well to note that the Presi- 
 dent was now confronted with the growing fire which not 
 only he lacked the courage to stamp into and extinguish in 
 1916, but which he at that time actually fanned into a blaze; 
 that these demands were not the demands of the great pub- 
 lic who had for months been beseeching the President 
 
96 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 unavailingly for relief or recognition; and that the organ- 
 ized labor of the railroads declared its purpose to enforce 
 these demands upon the government and the public by a 
 nation-wide strike that would compel the American people 
 on their knees to beseech organized classism to spare them 
 the agony of freezing and starvation. 
 
 For it was the Winnipeg experience to be repeated. Mr. 
 Hines' report to President Wilson and the latter's appeal 
 to Congress to be rid of a threatening matter at the very 
 moment that he was preparing to give his undivided atten- 
 tion to laying his League-of-Nations scheme before the peo- 
 ple, were followed immediately by the threatened railroad 
 strike in August, 1919, jeopardizing transportation and the 
 lives of the people in southern California, Nevada, and 
 Arizona. And now Director-General Hines took a firm 
 stand, such as Director-General McAdoo had taken in a 
 similar crisis during the war, making it plain that no further 
 mutiny against the United States would be tolerated. He 
 gave warning that in those states he would undertake to 
 restore complete railroad service at a specified hour and that 
 all who did not return to work by that time would be out of 
 a job; and that any one undertaking to interfere with or 
 to impede the use of railroad property would be dealt with 
 as having committed an offense against the United States. 
 His firm stand was backed by the American public. The 
 days of the "rubber-stamp" Congress had already been 
 written into history. Organized classism was losing ground, 
 though the railroad men felt that they had chosen a most 
 propitious time when the country was in the grip of an 
 unsettled state following the war and at the moment when 
 the President's chief concern was to obtain support for the 
 Covenant. It was on this occasion that a member of the 
 President's own party in Congress declared: "The broth- 
 erhoods got a taste of power when the Adamson law was 
 passed under whip and spur, and they have been intoxicated 
 by it ever since." 
 
Government Railroading 97 
 
 And in referring to the Plumb Plan, to which the rail- 
 road -brotherhoods were now turning, one public journal 
 stated the situation in brief when it said: 
 
 Most of us feel that the interests of a hundred million people are 
 of greater importance than the interests of either railroad owners or 
 workers. For either of these two groups to endeavor to secure some 
 permanent advantage at the cost of permanent advantage to the 
 body of the nation would be wrong and unfair. 5 
 
 But all through the war and during the reconstruction days, 
 the leaders of organized labor and a few select groups, 
 as the railroad brotherhoods, manifested as thoroughly a 
 selfish spirit as did the capitalistic groups, and with more 
 classism attaching to its conduct. 
 
 Whatever other cause may be assigned, it is probable 
 that, in large measure, the Administration's failure in rail- 
 roading must be laid at the door of this class spirit which 
 puts the selfishness of its group above the public good and 
 above the government itself. But did the Administration 
 fail? 
 
 Before government operation was adopted, advocates 
 of the policy held that under it the railways would be oper- 
 ated much more economically than when operated pri- 
 ately. Do the facts bear out or support this theory? 
 
 Government operation reduced the quantity of freight 
 handled per car daily and failed to increase the amount of 
 freight per train in any degree approaching the proportion 
 of increase under private operation a fact which accounts, 
 in large measure, for the increase in expenses. In fact, there 
 was practically no increase in the freight moved; yet there 
 
 5 Times-Union, Rochester, N. Y. 
 
 Plumb was the general counsel of the railroad brotherhoods. On Au- 
 gust 2, the president of the four brotherhoods and the head of the Feder- 
 ation employes' department stated that their unions "were in no mood to 
 brook the return of the railway lines to their former control"; and that 
 economic disaster would follow unless the Plumb Plan was adopted. And on 
 August 3 the president of the brotherhood of locomotive engineers said 
 the Plan would be made an issue in the next congressional campaign. 
 The public accepted this as a threat 
 
98 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was an increase of 1 1 per cent, almost 200,000, in the 
 number of men employed. It was chiefly because of de- 
 creased efficiency 'in operation that there was so great an 
 increase in operating expenses. Under private operation 
 the railways had increased wages during the ten-year period 
 of 1907-1917 by over $600,000,000, in face of the fact 
 that freight and passenger rates were lower in 1917 than 
 in 1907. But the companies did not accumulate a deficit. 
 It became a passing remark, in referring to a railroad man 
 under government operation, that "he was wearing out the 
 seat of his overalls in looking for something to do." Yet 
 at the time the roads were returned to private operation, 
 the employes were claiming advances in wages aggregating 
 another $1,000,000,000. 
 
 In his statement to the Senate committee, in January, 
 1919, Mr. McAdoo expressed the hope that there would 
 be no considerable deficiency in government operation. The 
 event did not justify the hope. With all the advantages 
 of pooling, which privilege was forbidden the companies 
 by law, the first year of government operation cost the sum 
 of $4,007,000,000, an increase of 40 per cent over that 
 of 1917. True, war was a disturbing factor. But the next 
 year, when the war was past, it had increased to $4,420,- 
 000,000. And while a large part of this was in wages alone, 
 $1,200,000,000 from 1917 to 1919, yet wages had been 
 keeping pace with living costs under private operation. 
 
 When Congress, in the Control Act, gave the Adminis- 
 tration the power to increase rates to cover operating ex- 
 penses and the returns guaranteed the companies, it ob- 
 viously meant that the rates should be made sufficiently 
 high to cover all by rates to be paid by those who used the 
 transportation, without laying any portion of the burden 
 upon the taxpayers of the country. And in June, 1918, 
 the Railroad Administration increased passenger rates to 
 three cents a mile, an increase of 50 per cent; and freight 
 rates by 25 per cent, in addition to the increase granted 
 
Government Railroading 99 
 
 the February previous, making a total in freight to that 
 time of 32^ per cent higher than had been allowed under 
 private operation. Thereupon, Mr. McAdoo issued a state- 
 ment that it was expected that the increased earnings would 
 cover all increases in expenses, basing his estimates upon 
 the returns actually made by the roads during the three 
 years ending June 30, 1917. 
 
 Yet, the first year of government operation fell short of 
 this estimate by almost $240,000,000, the deficit officially 
 admitted by the Railroad Administration. And upon his 
 surrender of his office at the end of that year, he estimated 
 that the roads should earn a surplus over the guarantees of 
 $100,000,000. But after paying expenses, including taxes, 
 there was a deficit of about $360,000,000 for the year 1919 ; 
 and for the last two months of government operation, Janu- 
 ary and February, 1920, the deficit was $103,000,000. 
 
 When government operation ceased on March I, 1920, 
 Director-General Hines estimated the total losses to the 
 government during the twenty-six months of its operation 
 at $904,000,000, in his statement submitted to the House 
 committee on appropriations. But the committee found 
 other items which he had omitted, and stated that before 
 the accounts were closed u the total loss to the government 
 chargeable to federal control and operation of railroads 
 would amount to $1,375,000,000." This was loaded upon 
 the taxpayers of the country. And Mr. Hines asked for an 
 appropriation of the people's money to see the roads 
 through the year 1919 in the sum of $1,200,000,000; on 
 June 10 Congress gave him $750,000,000. 
 
 Much of the beginning of government failure in rail- 
 roading was attributed to the extreme weather in its second 
 month of operation and to the scarcity of coal. But the 
 corresponding month of 1919, when freight rates had been 
 materially increased, coal was plentiful, and the weather 
 was extraordinarily mild and pleasant, was a worse month 
 for the railroads financially than the direful February, 
 
ioo The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 1918. For in the later month the net operating income of 
 the roads was $2,225,000 less than for the disastrous Febru- 
 ary of 1918. While rates were increased fully 25 per cent, 
 the income decreased 14 per cent and with slower service. 
 And there was a progression of deficits. During the year 
 1918 the monthly average of deficits was $17,000,000; 
 the first quarter of 1919, they averaged $37,000,000. And 
 Mr. Hines' request of Congress for $1,200,000,000 to 
 the end of that year, suggests a very great increase. 
 
 Were these great deficits due to better service under 
 government operation? Scarcely had the Railroad Ad- 
 ministration given to the public the statement that traffic of 
 all kinds was being handled with expedition and with cars 
 in abundance to spare, when it became known that there 
 was an acute car shortage in the central northwest. On 
 September 4, 1918, the grain elevators were closing be- 
 cause they were full, with no cars available to carry the 
 wheat to the great markets of the east. In 1917 the rail- 
 roads of the country handled 10 per cent more freight 
 than in 1916, in which latter year it was of much greater 
 volume than in any previous year. In freight traffic the in- 
 crease alone of 1917 over that of 1916 was 135,000,000,- 
 ooo ton-miles substantially equal to the combined total 
 of all the railroads of Canada, Great Britain, France, Rus- 
 sia, Germany and Austria for an entire year. 
 
 Nor was the tremendous deficit under government opera- 
 tion the whole of the story. The Administration ineffi- 
 ciency was demonstrated further by the condition in which 
 the equipment and traffic were found when the companies 
 received the roads back from the government. On March 
 i, 1920, there were over 90,000 loaded cars accumulated 
 in the various terminals awaiting movement. The follow- 
 ing months came the railroad strikes and the number soon 
 ran up to 300,000. In July of that year the Railroad Labor 
 Board rendered an award granting employes advances in 
 wages aggregating $625,000,000. During the last month 
 
Government Railroading 101 
 
 of government operation, though there was a great deficit 
 and the business was greater than ever before handled in 
 any February, the Administration had not adequately main- 
 tained the properties, laying upon the companies the im- 
 mediate necessity of largely increasing their maintenance 
 expenditures in tracks and equipment. After seven months 
 of returned private control, the number of loaded cars 
 awaiting movement was normal, or about 50,000. 
 
 And the railroad executives had already taken steps to 
 improve the service^ in spite of the "outlaw" strike in April, 
 agreeing that the matter of first importance was an increased 
 daily average in the movement of freight cars, an increase 
 in the average loading, and a reductiop in the number of 
 cars in bad order. 
 
 To this end they turned every energy. The greatest 
 average freight mileage per car per day ever attained was 
 in 1916, when it was 26.9 miles. Under government opera- 
 tion, this mileage had decreased to less than 25 in 1918, 
 to 23 in 1919, and at the time the roads were returned on 
 March i, 1920, it was only 22 mfles. Every increase of 
 one mile per car per day is equivalent to the addition of 
 100,000 cars to the available supply. In July, 1920, the 
 average for all railroads had increased to 25 miles and the 
 executives agreed to attempt to reach 30 miles. Increase 
 in loading, urged strongly by the United States Railroad 
 Administration, was also urged by the companies when the 
 roads came back into their hands ; since an increase of one ton 
 in the average car-load is equivalent to increasing the avail- 
 able car supply by about 75,000. 
 
 With the roads the government took over 129,000 
 freight cars in bad order, or 5.7 per cent of the total. When 
 it returned the properties it reported 153,727 bad-order 
 cars, an increase of nearly 25,000, or approximately 20 
 per cent. Moreover, the cars were scattered all over the 
 
 ""The Railroad Situation to Date": an address by Samuel M. Felton, 
 president of the C. G. W. R. R., before the Central Manufacturing Dis- 
 trict Club, Chicago, September 29, 1920, p. 3. 
 
102 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 country; 7 and when returned home, the number in bad 
 order was found to be much larger than the Railroad Ad- 
 ministration reported. It was estimated that to meet the 
 demand of the freight traffic of the next two years 800,000 
 new cars were needed; and so greatly was the greatest rail- 
 way system in the world neglected under government control 
 that these cars had not been ordered when it was turned 
 back to private control. 
 
 But there was a more appalling deficit than the financial 
 deficit or that in maintaining equipment. One of the most 
 disastrous effects of government control was the undermin- 
 ing of the railway organizations and of the discipline of 
 the employes. One leading newspaper of the Atlantic sea- 
 board, after showing how government operation had de- 
 pleted the railroad equipment and after citing the decreased 
 production per man with greatly increased wages, said : 
 
 But the most damaging result was that it destroyed the morale 
 of the workers and sowed discord between them and the manage- 
 ments. By urging all the workers to organize under the union 
 rules, the government helped to transform the railroad brother- 
 hoods from the most conservative, contented and loyal labor organi-* 
 zation in the country into an aggressively radical machine, which is 
 now in open competition with the managements for future control 
 of this great industry. 8 
 
 The Administration's method of government, which found 
 ready expression in its railroading as in other directions, 
 produced a greater deficit in the morale of the people than 
 the financial deficit, whether in airplanes, shipbuilding, mu- 
 nitions of war, or railroading. It taught the spendthrift 
 habit by the most open and notorious concrete examples, 
 in utter disregard of the first principles of business man- 
 agement. Staggering as the figures are in dealing with 
 
 T It was not unlike the situation in which the shipping men of the 
 country found themselves at the close of hostilities. They could find neither 
 their ships nor any one at Washington who could tell them where they 
 were, or when or how they could get them back. See chapter on "Ship- 
 building." 
 
 "Philadelphia North American, March 5, 1920. 
 
Government Railroading 103 
 
 railroad operation, it is scarcely a matter of wonder that 
 the American people are charged with spending annually 
 $22,000,000,000 on non-essentials. 
 
 The Act of Congress restoring the railroads to private 
 operation and control, insured the railroads against bank- 
 ruptcy and collapse ; assured labor of no reduction in wages 
 for six months and the companies an income for the same 
 period, and instead of penalizing pooling as in the past, 
 it was encouraged. The Act forbade any increase of wages 
 during the six months, a feature of the bill that brought a 
 storm of protest from labor organizations. A prominent 
 feature of the law related to the adjustment of wages and 
 the conditions of labor, creating a board of appeals con- 
 sisting of nine members: three representing the roads, em- 
 ployes and the public each. This board was to reach a de- 
 cision by a majority, including at least one representative 
 of the public. It was made compulsory, under penalty, for 
 both sides to submit their dispute to this board. But a re- 
 markable fact is that neither party was required to accept 
 the decision and the board was given no power to enforce 
 its findings. 
 
 Pleased to have the government take over the railroads, 
 the public was more pleased to have them returned to pri- 
 vate control. Inefficiency and the attempt to play politics 
 with the thing created a violent reaction in public sentiment 
 touching government operation. Said one newspaper that 
 has always stood firmly for working people's rights: 
 
 Never did the pendulum of popular judgment on any economic 
 question swing so far in so short a time from virtually unanimous 
 approval when the lines were taken over by the Government twenty- 
 six months ago, to virtually unanimous relief when they were given 
 back. 9 
 
 Indeed, there was practically nothing to be said in favor 
 of government operation after the Administration had tried 
 
 "Philadelphia North American. 
 
IO4 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 it for over two years. The public was not at first permitted 
 to know the facts concerning the monumental deficits that 
 were loaded upon the people. And when the light was per- 
 mitted to shine out from the dark corners, the Administra- 
 tion, in answer to the outcry, felt obliged to explain. This 
 Director-General Hines undertook to do before the mem- 
 bers and guests of the Chamber of Commerce and Traffic 
 Club of Philadelphia in June, 1919. But the figures later 
 given out indicated that the situation was far worse than 
 he at that time permitted the public to know. The gross 
 figures later showed that the last year before the govern- 
 ment took over the roads, operating expenses aggregated 
 $2,957,000,000. And though there was notable failure to 
 maintain the properties at the standard at which taken over, 
 the operating expenses the year the government ended con- 
 trol totalled about $5,350,000,000, an annual increase of 
 about $2,400,000,000, of which some $2,000,000,000 is 
 chargeable to labor. And with the total operating expenses 
 and taxes aggregating $5,600,000,000 per annum, while 
 the total earnings for the year 1919 were $5,200,000,000, 
 there was a shortage of $400,000,000 merely to meet ex- 
 penses, with nothing on investment. The employes in Sep- 
 tember, 1920, were receiving more than twice as much in 
 wages as in 1916. 
 
 The people were gradually learning the truth. On the 
 floor of the Senate on December 5, 1919, Senator Kellogg 
 stated that federal operation of the previous two years had 
 demoralized the railroad service and impoverished the rail- 
 road properties. He cited the fact that in the last nine 
 months of 1917 the roads, under private operation, handled 
 virtually as much business as during the same months in 
 1918, and more than for the corresponding months of 1919; 
 and that they did it with 190,000 fewer men and at a cost 
 less by $1,500,000,000. And that notwithstanding the in- 
 crease in rates from 25 to 50 per cent, the Government was 
 losing in operation at the rate per year of $350,000,000. 
 
Government Railroading 105 
 
 Thus had the Administration written another chapter 
 in the history of its operations during the Great War. But 
 it did not end with that. When the roads were returned to 
 private management in March, 1920, the law perpetuated 
 the system of adjusting the relations of the workers through 
 a board, now in the Railroad Labor Board, to fix the rates 
 of wages the roads should pay, and the system was made 
 nationally applicable. In July, 1920, an increase in freight 
 rates from 25 to 40 per cent and in passenger rates of 20 
 per cent was granted. This, it was estimated, would yield 
 an additional revenue of $1,500,000,000. It did not ma- 
 terialize. Wages remained the same, while revenues de- 
 creased. At the beginning of 1921 it was evident that the 
 lines were facing financial straits, and in April the Railroad 
 Labor Board abrogated the national rules effective July i. 
 And early in June it granted the request of the roads that 
 there be a cut in wages approximating an average of 12 per 
 cent, effective July i. Thereafter the roads were on a safer 
 basis. But in the late summer of 1921, the amounts due 
 the roads from the government for the obligations incurred 
 during the war were still unpaid and the lines were ham- 
 pered for the want of this money. 
 
 As a logical result of the Administration's policy in 
 showing favoritism to a strongly organized class beginning 
 in 1916, this same class, "big four" brotherhoods of rail- 
 road employes, to which was added a fifth, the switchmen, 
 undertook to play the game that was played in Winnipeg 
 two years previously starving and freezing the people 
 into submission to their demands by refusing to move 
 trains. The strike which they called for October 30, 1921, 
 ostensibly a strike against the railroads, was in fact a strike 
 against the people and the people's government. With no 
 popular support, the strike order was cancelled by the lead- 
 ers three days before it was to become effective. 
 
 The transportation system of the country, the best in 
 the world, is the main artery of the nation's progress. And 
 
IO6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the radical element of society must never be permitted to 
 gain control thereof. The President or other official at- 
 tempting to sell the nation's birthright for a mess of politi- 
 cal pottage deserves the execration of his countrymen. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 SECRETARY BAKER AND MR. CREEL IN WAR 
 
 As delightful a gentleman as any one could care to meet 
 personally; as studiously scholarly as any in the land; as 
 rich in experience as one could wish along certain but ill- 
 defined lines; a pacifist of pacifists such is the man whom 
 President Wilson, of his own accord, selected for the all- 
 important fighting branch of the government's service in the 
 greatest war of recorded time, displacing Secretary of War 
 Garrison, who was a real fighting man. 
 
 It was when the Germans were making great headway 
 in their terrific March drive against the Allies in 1918 
 that Mr. Baker made a notable address that was heralded 
 throughout the country and the world; for the War De- 
 partment had been excoriated in Congress and by the peo- 
 ple for its failures at the crucial time, and the world hung 
 breathlessly upon the words of the nation's war head. 
 
 This address to the publishers in New York is an in- 
 stance of what he was confidently seeking to lead the Ameri- 
 can public to believe. He spoke well of our soldiers, "men 
 prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in order that we 
 who remained behind and those who come after us may be 
 free from a philosophy too hateful to govern the world." 
 As to our own country, he said: "Long live the United 
 States not a place on the map, not a system of political 
 institutions hemmed in by the seas, but a living moral in- 
 fluence in the world, liberating the spirits of men and pre- 
 serving the freedom of opportunity for the children of 
 
 men." 
 
 Then Mr. Baker concluded his address with an impres- 
 sive and characteristic reference to the magnitude of our 
 
 107 
 
io8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 task as indicated by the alleged fact that the warehouses 
 planned for American use, "now in France and projected to 
 be there," would cover a tract of land fifty feet wide by 
 two hundred and fifty miles long his imagination un- 
 equaled except probably by the actual production of one 
 airplane whose arrival in France had not yet been heralded 
 to the world, when 20,000 were promised. 
 George Harvey put it thus : 
 
 This is substantially all that Mr. Baker had to say, the same 
 old slush about things too beautiful to perish; the lulling of our 
 people to sleep upon the theory that the French and English can 
 win without our aid; the virtual intimation that we should be most 
 careful not to tread upon German toes; the plain declaration that 
 we are in the war only to keep free from a hateful "philosophy"; 
 the easy putting aside as of slight importance the breaking of the 
 vital battle line, the inferential but no less certain loading of the 
 whole burden upon our stricken Allies; the cautious avoidance of 
 distinguishing between the causes for which the two forces were 
 striving with might and main and the very hearts' blood of millions 
 of men, women and children. . . . 
 
 Not a word about the war itself; not a suggestion of warning; 
 not a shadow of appeal for help from the people in hurrying forward, 
 "for God's sake," the work of succor and relief; not a syllable of 
 denunciation of the barriance; not a sound above a whisper in praise 
 and appreciation of our brothers in arms; not a hint of peril to the 
 mother and sister countries and to our own; not one clear bugle 
 note to rouse and thrill a mighty people into overpowering action; 
 nothing, nothing under heaven but piffle piddling, pacifist piffle 
 from an American Secretary of War, basking in the sunlight of his 
 chief while hundreds of thousands of those left at home, no less surely 
 than the best of our manhood who have gone and are going, sit in 
 the shadow of death. 
 
 Can one wonder that, after having seen and heard such a repre- 
 sentative of our great and fearless Nation, our Allies began to look 
 askance at America, and even to murmur their doubts and misgiv- 
 ings? For more than a year they have held their breath in suspense, 
 in hope, in unparalleled generosity and considerateness, and for policy's 
 sake. How they have felt during the past few months, many of us, 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 109 
 
 to our humiliation and shame, know only too well, but it took their 
 own death agonies, accentuated by the smiling smugness of our 
 Secretary of War to fetch utterance of their disappointment and 
 dispair. 1 
 
 It is doubtful whether a better idea of the two views 
 at that time prevailing in the country is obtainable than in 
 this characteristic speech of Mr. Baker and the comment 
 of George Harvey the one the Administration view, the 
 other the popular view. The one is given to glittering 
 generalities; the other to pushing the war preparation to the 
 limit, both in men and equipment. The one is intended 
 to soothe the people; the other to arousing the people 
 to the critical situation and to the fighting spirit. If 
 each is extreme, each best represents the views then cur- 
 rent. 
 
 If it seems strange that two men as unlike as George 
 Creel and Secretary Baker are linked together in recording 
 events of the Great War, it must not be forgotten that 
 three outstanding facts bring them into this connection: 
 Both were members of the federal Committee on Publicity, 
 of which Creel was made chairman ; both were imbued with 
 the so-called liberal spirit and of definite pacifist taint; 
 each believed he was better able to endure difficult situations 
 which their beliefs had engendered than were the great 
 public, for which reason each believed it was right to mis- 
 lead, even grossly to deceive, the public, and in his own way 
 this each sought to do. 
 
 The extent to which this was done will be revealed only 
 when the records of all departments of the government shall 
 be made accessible to the world, records which were then 
 hidden away from the public for fear of the result had the 
 people been permitted to know the exact facts concerning 
 the failures of the Administration in its efforts to make it 
 appear that it and its partisans had conducted a great war 
 to a successful conclusion. 
 
 1 War Weekly, May 4, 1918. 
 
no The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The Great War brought into popular use some new 
 words that are likely to become living parts of the language, 
 as Bolshevist, camouflage, over the top, Hooverize. The 
 last named is used fondly at every table. There is one, 
 however, that is not used to conjure with, but which has 
 gotten for itself a place rather of obloquy than of affection. 
 It is the term Bakerize, which came to symbolize official 
 deception, official promises without fulfillment, shiftiness. 
 And there is its near relative, Creelism. Though each has 
 but a brief history, it is not known whether the verb or 
 the noun came first into being. The latter means all that the 
 former does; but though it has less of official flavor, it is 
 a slightly stronger term, a senator from Missouri intimat- 
 ing that it meant licensed lying. 
 
 Nor is it strange that these two men should thus char- 
 acterize the two words. To Secretary Baker the nation 
 owes the creation and operation of an elaborate system of 
 official deception designed to protect incompetence, conceal 
 failure, and mislead the public. Close examination showed 
 that the prepared statements which he made to the Senate 
 Committee on Military Affairs were wholly untrustworthy, 
 while his communications to the public were almost always 
 descriptive, sometimes mere fabrication. Creelism was his 
 conception a system of propaganda using the war powers 
 of the government to compel the local press to spread 
 official misinformation. 2 
 
 More discouraging to millions of Americans than all 
 the rest of his failures was the fact that Secretary Baker 
 continued his efforts to deceive the public after exposure. 
 It seemed that he did not, and could not, learn; that re- 
 peated exposure of mendacity and duplicity on his part 
 taught him nothing; that his conception of the important 
 duties of his office was camouflaging and deceiving the 
 American public, rather than making the performance of his 
 
 2 See chapter on "The Press and Public Opinion." 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War ill 
 
 department conform to the expectations of the people and 
 the necessities of war. 
 
 When Mr. Kahn, of California, was obliged to assume 
 the duties of Chairman Dent, of Alabama, to carry for- 
 ward the work of the chairman of the Military Affairs Com- 
 mittee of the House because Mr. Dent was not ready to 
 turn in to help drive the crusher of civilization out of busi- 
 ness when Mr. Kahn artlessly asked whether the statement 
 made by the War Department in 1917 that we would have 
 20,000 airplanes in France by July i, 1918, was not re- 
 sponsible for this tendency in all branches of the govern- 
 ment service to exaggerate, he put his finger on the exact 
 spot. The department's aircraft statement, and a dozen 
 other incorrect statements, were distinctly responsible for 
 the evil tendency toward exaggeration during the entire 
 career of the Administration in the war. The War Depart- 
 ment was the source of more and worse exaggerations than 
 came from any other quarter. It became the father of 
 exaggerations. 
 
 It was along many lines and in regard to many situations 
 that Secretary Baker sought to mislead the public and to 
 cover up the facts. The people came to accept it as a fixed 
 habit of his thought. And the partisan newspaper organs, 
 to avoid embarrassment for the Administration, aided 
 wherever possible. When Governor Allen of Kansas, who 
 had been on the front lines, spoke from personal ex- 
 perience and unquestioned knowledge as to the casualties, 
 Mr. Baker replied by stating that it was not excessive at 
 some other time than that to which Governor Allen referred. 
 When the Associated Press dispatches were telling the coun- 
 try that the fighters were coming home penniless and de- 
 pendent upon charity while the government was owing them 
 for months of service, Secretary Baker replied by referring 
 to certain camps which were free from the condition charged 
 and stated the men were paid in full up to the time of leav- 
 
112 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ing Europe. This statement led the Boston Transcript to 
 say: 
 
 The impression conveyed and, as we believe, intended to be 
 conveyed, by this cunningly deceitful official declaration, is that there 
 is no truth in the reported return to this country of soldiers whose 
 penniless condition is due to their failure to receive the pay due 
 them for periods ranging from one to ten months; no truth in the 
 report that such soldiers have arrived at Camp Devens, Camp Sher- 
 man, Camp Funston, and various Army hospitals; no truth in the 
 report that General McCain, General Wood and one or two other 
 courageous divisional commanders have, upon their own personal 
 responsibility, without awaiting any authority from the War De- 
 partment, ordered these returning heroes to be paid forthwith; no 
 truth in the report that the Red Cross had been lending money to 
 some of the more seriously wounded among these penniless defenders. 
 But all these reports are true, and the condition is even more dis- 
 graceful than the reports published describe. 
 
 Likewise, when charged with dilatoriness in the work of 
 the War Department in connection with the Archibald 
 Stevenson affair, Mr. Baker promptly abolished the par- 
 ticular branch of the Military Intelligence to which Mr. 
 Stevenson belonged and then wrote to Senator Overman 
 that no such man as Stevenson belonged to that branch of 
 the service which was technically true when he so wrote. 
 
 He carried through the same principle when, in regard 
 to the severe criticisms of his department, he wrote con- 
 cerning the very efficient Edward Stettinius : 
 
 It is within his province to keep track of the capacity and pro- 
 duction of contractors. Mr. Stettinius will also watch closely the 
 transportation and shipping situation in order that the production and 
 deliveries of war materials may properly proceed. In other words, 
 Mr. Stettinius, a business man and purchasing agent of vast experi- 
 ence, may figuratively be called "the surveying eye of the Director 
 of Purchases and Supplies." 
 
 Mr. Baker very well understood that the duties which 
 were to devolve upon Mr. Stettinus were simply advisory, he 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 113 
 
 having no authority to compel execution. But he hoped 
 it would serve its purpose of quieting the disturbed public. 
 
 When Mr. Gutzon Borglum undertook to uncover the 
 facts in the airplane scandal, in the winter of 1917-18, the 
 War Department connived at an attempt to blackmail him 
 into silence. The files of the department were searched, 
 and an unsubstantiated series of allegations charging Mr. 
 Borglum with attempting, to sell his influence with the 
 President were handed to one of the Administration's 
 trusted press agents. They were printed far and wide. 
 The evidence appeared to be damning. But Mr. Borglum 
 scorned it all and insisted on telling the truth. Time has 
 vindicated his character and proved his charges. 
 
 Who were the men powerful enough to use the War 
 Department in an attempt to blackmail Mr. Borglum into 
 silence? Every man whom the Senate committee found re- 
 sponsible for the failure was appointed by Mr. Baker. 
 
 One of the most marked characteristics of the Admin- 
 istration during the war was deliberate evasion of responsi- 
 bility, failure to measure up to the demands of the occasion. 
 This was particularly pronounced in the head of the War 
 Department. It was on the fifth day of December, 1917, 
 that he said : 
 
 From the moment the "Lusitania" was sent to a watery grave by 
 the hand of the assassin, the United States had only two choices. 
 The United States could have crawled on its knees to the Hohen- 
 zollerns, crying out that their frightfulness and military efficiency 
 were too great, that we submit and become their vassals, or as an 
 alternative we could fight. We chose to fight. 
 
 The "Lusitania" was sunk May 5, 1915. Two months 
 later the field secretary of the National Security League re- 
 ported that Mr. Baker, then Mayor of Cleveland, "refused 
 absolutely to co-operate with the League because he said 
 he was a pacifist and opposed to the agitation for pre- 
 paredness," and then declared that "of all the mayors 1 
 
114 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 interviewed Mr. Baker was the most pronounced opponent 
 of preparedness." At that time, therefore, and with full 
 understanding he preferred that his country ^hould crawl 
 on its knees to the Hohenzollerns rather than fight them. 
 He also turned aside the idea that his nation should be 
 equipped for acceptance of what he knew to be the only 
 alternative open to a self-respecting people. He declared 
 on December 28, 1917, in his New York address that "this 
 nation has shown that in time of war a peace-loving, prog- 
 ress-making people, when the time came had but to watch 
 the magnet of the spirit to defend itself." But the idle 
 dream and more idle talk were immediately dispelled by 
 the rude shock of the Senate's investigation. "A gentle 
 egotist commissioned as the vice-regent of Mars. Pacifism 
 twirling its thumbs while hellish Mars was wrecking the 
 universe. Murder, rapine, and sudden death, horror piled 
 upon horror, the world feverishly burnishing its armour 
 while a lamb-like little gentleman, serene in his security 
 in the triumph of morality sat like a monk in his cell, un- 
 vexed by gross passions rubricating the golden rule!" 3 
 
 As if the fatuous policy of unpreparedness when the 
 war burst upon the land had not been sufficiently impressed 
 upon the nation, Secretary Baker appeared to be always 
 looking for a way of escape from the consequences of his 
 policy of delay and evasion. He always found a story to ac- 
 count for the responsibility of delay and shifting. When his 
 department was receiving a gruelling in the beginning of 
 1918 for the results of its delay, evasion, and incompetence, 
 he told the country it was idle to draw men from industrial 
 pursuits for training in France when there were no ships to 
 carry them, and urged the absurdly inadequate restriction 
 of ages from 21 to 26 years for army service. Six months 
 later, on July 4, he stated, when the country insisted upon 
 the most ample army possible to crush civilization's enemy, 
 that he desired u to learn the effect upon vital industries." 
 
 9 North American Review, March, 1918, 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 115 
 
 Eight days later he appeared at the capitol and stated that 
 he was opposed to any change in the draft ages, without re- 
 vealing to the astonished Senate the cause for this complete 
 change of front. And then he regaled the country with a 
 statement that shows the turnings and twistings of a mind 
 that seemed to warrant the conclusion that it was incapable 
 of straight-forward utterance, declaring that the War De- 
 partment was "constantly anxious to expand its military 
 program" and was "now very actively considering an in- 
 crease, if that increase is possible" ; and that after the sen- 
 ators would return from their recess in September he might 
 recommend further appropriations for men and measures. 
 At the very time he was making the lack-of-ships argument, 
 Chairman Hurley was promising ships to the limit, what- 
 ever might be the number of men to be transported. 
 Mr. Baker continued: 
 
 The War Department has from the beginning been expanding 
 its military program. We are many months ahead of what was our 
 original hope in regard to the transportation of men. We are con- 
 stantly seeking ways to expand that, and we are in the midst of a 
 plan now to expand it again. Should we so expand the program it 
 may turn out that we will need an increased number of men and 
 it may turn out that the best we can do won't require it. When we 
 have determined what is best we will then ask congress to provide 
 additional money and men. For the present there is no such 
 necessity. 
 
 As put by George Harvey in his War Weekly : 
 
 This was the same old song! The war may be over! Schwab 
 may not produce the ships! We may all be dead! Anything, any- 
 thing for an excuse for doing nothing. 
 
 Senator Wadsworth depicted the situation succinctly in 
 these words : 
 
 Can we not get out of that habit of mind which leads us to en- 
 deavor to meet emergencies after they overtake us, in this country and 
 in the management of this war at large, not only by ourselves but by 
 
n6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 our Allies? Can we not anticipate emergencies before they over- 
 take us? ... It passes my understanding how those responsible for 
 the conduct of the military preparations of this great republic can 
 solemnly advise us at this day that for the time being nothing more 
 is desired. 
 
 One of the glaring outrages of Secretary Baker was his 
 attempt to throttle the press that was not willing to do his 
 bidding. This was exemplified in his treatment of the 
 newspapers which, without any notice from him or his de- 
 partment not to do so, printed the official report of the com- 
 mittee of the United States Senate on the airplane failure, 
 the first summary of which was given out by the committee 
 for the evening papers of August 22, 1918. After the re- 
 port had been given to the news agencies of the country, had 
 been printed in the Congressional Record, and was given 
 full liberty of the press anywhere in the world, Mr. Baker 
 forbade copies of the American newspapers carrying the 
 report to leave the country. But the papers were already 
 in the mails, and on the way to the soldiers in Europe, hun- 
 dreds of thousands of whom had paid their subscriptions 
 thereto, with postage prepaid. 
 
 When the second installment of the committee's report 
 was ready two days later, Mr. Baker sent a confidential 
 warning against using it for overseas circulation; and im- 
 mediately thereafter a second confidential communication 
 to the effect that it did not make so much difference whether 
 the part of the report dealing with the aircraft failure went 
 abroad, provided the newspapers would see to it that the 
 overseas editions contain no hint of the disclosures made 
 in the report of the committee of the program which Mr. 
 Baker was preparing for the following year. In fact, this 
 time it was practically the "official denial" in advance. 4 
 
 4 The three great agencies carried as their introduction to this portion 
 of the report on the appalling failure, this paragraph: "America's aircraft 
 program for the great army that is counted on to win the war next year 
 allows for 350 complete squadrons of planes, and the main part of the 
 program already is ahead of the schedule, with 3,000 trained pilots." 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 117 
 
 There could be no pretense that it was necessary to 
 the military success of the United States to keep the Sen- 
 ate report out of the American newspapers. It was an 
 official document and was already sent abroad and in the 
 hands of the Allies, neutrals and enemy alike, a fact which 
 Mr. Baker's censorship already knew. He appeared to 
 believe that by harassing the newspapers of the United 
 States he could intimidate the press into suppressing vital 
 facts and make of it a reptile press. But it was regrettable 
 that the same censorship did not see its way clear to pre- 
 vent Mr. Creel's pure fabrications, to which the Senate's re- 
 port was giving the lie. Said the eminent writer, George 
 Harvey : "Surely truth should not be handicapped and ham- 
 strung in her effort to overtake falsehood." 
 
 Each time an investigation to determine the progress 
 of the war program was proposed, Secretary Baker blocked 
 it. And as the startling truths leaked out he, in keeping 
 with his habitual practice of misleading the public, made use 
 of the official denial, knowing that the public would prefer 
 the denial that anything was wrong to believing the almost 
 unbelievable facts concerning War Department shortcom- 
 ings. The investigators went off the stage branded by his 
 Department officials as friends of Germany bent upon giv- 
 ing "information of value to the enemy." President Wil- 
 son sustained this attitude when he undertook to brand Sen- 
 ator Chamberlain, who first fully opened to the public the 
 deplorable situation in January, 1918. 
 
 One of the phases of Secretary Baker's war activities 
 was his effort to save the slacker who became known as the 
 "conscientious objector." Treated more fully elsewhere, 5 
 this matter cannot properly be wholly passed over in con- 
 nection with its chief exponent in high circles of the Ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 That there were organized efforts to encourage draft- 
 dodgers in refusal to obey military orders when inducted 
 
 "Chapter on "Disloyalty." 
 
n8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 into camps was but common knowledge to Secretary Baker. 
 Conspicuous among these efforts was the National Civil 
 Liberties Bureau of New York, which issued, two months 
 prior to Secretary Baker's "Confidential" Order, a confi- 
 dential pamphlet which stated : 
 
 We see no reason to change our policy of handling this matter 
 quietly, without any publicity. Secretary Baker has been and is 
 giving the whole subject personal attention, and nothing would be 
 gained by our going into the press where hostile news notices and 
 damning editorials are certain. We have far more to gain, both 
 for the men themselves and for the cause itself, through Secretary 
 Baker than through the newspapers. 
 
 While there are those who are conscientiously opposed to 
 war, such as the Quakers, they have been conscientious 
 through the centuries, and did not become so over night 
 as a war threatening the nation's integrity approached. 
 
 But these "conscientious objectors" who feared public 
 opinion and counted on Secretary Baker's support, were far 
 from the Quaker type. And if they did not know of his 
 "confidential order" two months before it was issued, they 
 could not have better written their own confidential pam- 
 phlet if they had known it. The records are crowded with 
 instances of Secretary Baker's expressions of warm sym- 
 pathy with the scoundrels ready to stab the nation in its 
 day of distress. 6 
 
 At the end of his first year's work, Mr. Creel asked 
 Congress for $2,000,000 with which to carry forward his 
 scheme for the ensuing year. He was granted $125,000 
 by the House measure, only because the President had de- 
 clared the work of the Committee on Public Information as 
 a means of winning the war. Said one keenly analytical 
 editorial comment, solid to the core in its Americanism : 
 
 e A valuable contribution to the literature of this subject is found in 
 Basil M. Stevens' "With Kindly Consideration" in The North American 
 Review for January, 1920, p. 57. 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 119 
 
 The real purpose of the propaganda in which Creel is the most 
 active figure is to overlay the facts of history with studied inventions, 
 in order to build up the reputation and influence of President Wilson 
 and his Administration. The official utterances that are being sent 
 throughout the world are calculated to make it appear that from the 
 beginning Mr. Wilson was for war, but could not act because the 
 American people had not reached his heights of discernment and 
 moral inspiration. 
 
 False in substance and implication, this propaganda under the 
 present circumstances is an especially atrocious thing. For Wash- 
 ington authority behind it causes it to find reflection in the press of 
 the Allied countries, which pays glowing tribute to President Wilson 
 for having overcome the reluctance and stimulated the patriotism of 
 his countrymen, so that they were at last aroused to defend them- 
 selves and civilization. 
 
 It is discreditable enough that public funds should be employed to 
 serve partisan political interests. But it is shameful that this means 
 should be employed to pervert history for the benefit of a blundering 
 statesmanship by traducing a loyal people; and it is indecent that 
 because of this campaign American troops on the way to the battle- 
 field should meet the suggestion abroad that they represent a nation 
 of slackers regenerated by President Wilson's leadership. 7 
 
 The cost to the country, it developed when the official report 
 came before Congress almost a year after the armistice was 
 signed, of the operation of the Committee on Public Infor- 
 mation was about $6,600,000. 
 
 Like so many other matters touching the relations of the 
 Administration to the Great War, the appointment of 
 George Creel as chairman of this committee of vast im- 
 portance during war has always been a deep mystery 
 to the American people, unless they regard it as an ex- 
 pression of Wilsonism; then it becomes plain. He was a 
 "liberal," and with that class President Wilson seemed 
 desirous of aligning himself, though it developed that they 
 were the dangerous element of the country, and very far 
 
 T Philadelphia North American, August 28, 1918. 
 
I2O The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 from liberal. Mr. Creel's views on public questions, and 
 particularly upon constitutional government, if known to the 
 Administration when appointed to his responsible position, 
 were damning to the Administration itself. 
 
 His attitude to German propaganda was not less dan- 
 gerous. He wrote the introduction to the book "Two 
 Thousand Questions and Answers About the War," de- 
 claring that in his view it "constitutes a vital part of the 
 national defense, " a book which the National Security 
 League, a patriotic organization, pronounced "a master- 
 piece of Hun propaganda," declaring that the German gov- 
 ernment itself "could not have devised anything more in- 
 siduous, more calculated to destroy our faith in our Allies 
 and to insinuate into the American mind excuses for Ger- 
 many." And an indorsement, such as Creel's, gave the 
 work almost an official character, making it particularly 
 dangerous. His known sympathies with syndicalism and 
 various radical programs, even before the war, created such 
 an incongruity in his appointment to become the chief of 
 American propaganda for democracy as to become ludi- 
 crous, except for the seriousness of it. He used his official 
 position to give wide publicity to writings whose tendency 
 was to weaken the national cause. That politics was at the 
 bottom of the whole of it is hardly questioned. His resort 
 to distortion of the truth and the fabrication of official 
 "news" brought from Senator Reed, after citing typical 
 Creelisms, the title of "licensed liar," so named after his 
 aircraft inventions. 8 
 
 When, at Christmas time, 1918, Mr. Creel announced 
 at Paris that he had severed his relations with the United 
 States government, as the news reached America it came 
 as a refreshing breath of pure air after a night of dense- 
 ness, with* the prospect of his complete extinguishment as 
 
 8 A crushing editorial expose of his mendacity is contained in the 
 Philadelphia North American for September 25, 1918. 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 121 
 
 a public character and official. There was a sense of relief 
 from a heavy burden in the land. 
 
 All the distortions of fact, the wrenching of truth to con- 
 ceal blunders piled upon blunders mountain high, the cov- 
 ering up of the need of a man with a plan at the head of 
 the War Department these were ample to warrant the 
 contortions of Mr. Creel and Secretary Baker when they 
 lacked the courage to permit the public to know the facts. 
 The situation was appalling and almost beyond human 
 conception. 
 
 The nation richest in material resources and in genius 
 for accomplishment, as well as having had amplest time for 
 thorough preparation, when the great German drive began, 
 on March 21, 1918, had been at war almost a year, with a 
 stubborn warning of a full year-and-half before that we were 
 practically certain to enter the war before its conclusion; and 
 when the Allies had been worn down by the continuous 
 pounding the greatest war machine the world had ever seen 
 could administer to them on Belgian and French soil, we 
 had two regiments engaged somewhere in the line two 
 regiments of American soldiers and there were a million 
 men on each side. It was just two regiments from a nation 
 of 100,000,000 people, too, "making the world safe for 
 Democracy," against the mightiest and most ruthless war 
 machine of recorded history, and they were railroad en- 
 gineers. 
 
 Secretary Baker's department produced the two out- 
 standing scandals of the whole war, hardly exceeded in 
 magnitude by those due to the corruption and incapacity of 
 Russian bureaucracy under czarism. The one billion dol- 
 lars devoted to aviation did not place the first squadron of 
 American fighting machines at the front until sixteen months 
 after the declaration of war, and the program as a whole 
 was a disastrous failure. With billions appropriated for 
 ordnance, the department did not place at the front, in 
 
122 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 time to be used, a single American gun of 6-inch caliber or 
 over, nor a single high-explosive shell larger than the 3-inch. 
 
 The ordnance collapse in the midst of the greatest ex- 
 actions of the fiercest battling on the front in Europe was 
 astounding. But those on the inner side were particularly 
 careful to keep the facts from public view, some of which 
 will be read with amazement by future generations : Total 
 appropriations to September 24, 1918, for facilities and 
 munitions were $4,837,044,550, of which slightly over 
 $600,000,000 went for facilities, leaving a good margin 
 over $4,000,000,000 for artillery munitions alone. 
 
 What the American army in France was urgently de- 
 manding and not getting were 8-inch guns and 9.2-inch 
 guns with which to blast the enemy out of his position. The 
 appalling facts were that from the time the independent 
 American army began its drive toward the strong German 
 front up to the end of the war, there was not received in 
 France from the United States one shell, either shrapnel 
 or high explosive, for a 4.7-inch, a 5-inch, a 6-inch, an 
 8-inch, a 9.2-inch, or a lo-inch gun. Not a finished gun, 
 with a complete round of ammunition, of a caliber above 
 6 inch, was ever shipped from the United States to the 
 army in France up to the time of the signing of the armi- 
 stice. 
 
 Complete and utter failure to deliver American artillery 
 and shells to the fighting front marked the floundering of 
 the ordnance bureau; and as late as the month when the 
 armistice was signed, General Pershing, after repeatedly 
 calling for proper material, virtually demanded the reor- 
 ganization of that bureau. 
 
 When the cabled demands of the American comman- 
 ders became insistent, the War Department replied that our 
 rate of fire was too high they were sending too many 
 shells at the Germans. The fact is our ordnance bureau 
 did not supply the American troops in France with ammu- 
 nition adequate in size or in quantity; and that its troops 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 123 
 
 had to win their battles by sheer courage, and the expendi- 
 ture of blood and by means of supplies they obtained from 
 the French. 
 
 At a time when the First American Army was engaged 
 in its greatest effort, ammunition was supplied only by the 
 most strenuous efforts. It had no reserve supply, and it was 
 officially reported that troops could not be sent forward be- 
 cause of the shortage of guns and ammunition. The definite 
 statement was given out in September that 155-mm. guns 
 (6-inch) were shipped to France; and as late as October 16, 
 1918, word came from the supply bases in France that 
 no such guns were received, nor the ammunition to fit 
 them. 
 
 Two months after we entered the war, Mr. Baker 
 issued an official bulletin in which he admitted the "diffi- 
 culty, disorder, and confusion in getting things started, 
 but," he said, "it is a happy confusion. I delight in the 
 fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our 
 adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and 
 inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready. 77 
 
 In the following October he announced with undis- 
 guised self-satisfaction: "We are well on the way to the 
 battle-field." This was too much for Roosevelt, who wrote : 
 "For comparison with this kind of military activity we must 
 go back to the days of Tiglath-Pileser, Nebuchadnezzar 
 and Pharaoh. The United States should adopt the stand- 
 ard of speed in war which belongs to the twentieth century 
 A.D. ; we should not be content with, and still less boast 
 about, standards which were obsolete in the seventeenth 
 century B.C." 9 
 
 On December 31, 1917, General Crozier, head of the 
 Ordnance Department, testified before the Senate committee 
 on military affairs that in the first seven months in the war 
 contracts for $1,500,000,000 had been let. "All the huge 
 machinery of the War Department has been going at top 
 
 9 North American Review, November, 1919. 
 
124 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 speed for months. The work accomplished is something of 
 which the people may be proud," he declared. 
 
 On January 10, 1918, Secretary Baker told the commit- 
 tee of contracts totaling $1,677,000,000 out of an appro- 
 priation of almost twice that amount. On the next day 
 under cross-examination he stated: "Our initial needs have 
 been met, every man in France has full equipment." On 
 January 18, Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the commit- 
 tee, declared in a public address: "The military establish- 
 ment of America has fallen down." On January 21, Presi- 
 dent Wilson characterized this as an astonishing and abso- 
 lutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth," and declared: 
 "The War Department has performed a task of unparal- 
 leled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness 
 and efficiency. . . . My association and constant confer- 
 ence with the Secretary of War have taught me to regard 
 him as one of the ablest public officers I have ever known." 
 
 January 24. Senator Chamberlain, replying on the floor 
 of the Senate, said: "America today is unprepared so far 
 as ordnance is concerned. France is furnishing our troops 
 with heavy ordnance and machine guns. If we relied upon 
 the Ordnance Department to supply our troops with heavy 
 ordnance, the war would be over before the guns got to 
 the front." 
 
 January 28. Secretary Baker testified before the com- 
 mittee: "The American army in France, now and to be 
 there is provided (by the Allies) with artillery of the types 
 they want as rapidly as they could use it. Our own manu- 
 facture is in process. Deliveries of some pieces are al- 
 ready begun, with a rising and steadily increasing stream of 
 American production." 
 
 March 26. (Five days after the opening of the Ger- 
 man offensive) Senator Lodge declared: "We have no 
 guns in France except a few old coast guns for which the 
 French are making cartridges." 
 
 May 8. Following a minute investigation, the Senate 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 125 
 
 committee declared: "The condition respecting ordnance is 
 comparable only to the failure of the aircraft program." 
 Members said that production of 6-inch, 8-inch, and 9.2- 
 inch Howitzers, the three vital pieces of heavy artillery, was 
 "pitifully small." Of the largest, they said, not one would 
 be delivered in France this year and of the 6thers the de- 
 liveries would be "negligible." 
 
 May II. Said an official statement from the Ordnance 
 office : "The Ordnance Department has thus far met every 
 demand imposed by the new program for over-seas ship- 
 ment of American troops. Tonnage is a limiting factor in 
 the shipment of ordnance. Sufficient supplies of artillery 
 French 75-mm. and 155-mm. and American heavy rail- 
 way artillery are already in France to meet the present 
 demand." 
 
 May 17. After visiting many ordnance plants, the 
 Senate committee reported: "The first 8-inch Howitzers 
 were delivered this week, and the 9.2-inch Howitzers are 
 in an advanced state of manufacture. But during the present 
 year we shall be compelled to depend very largely, as here- 
 tofore, on France for our small field guns and to some ex- 
 tent on Great Britain for our large field guns." 
 
 June 28. Secretary Baker wrote to the House Military 
 Affairs Committee : "The artillery program is now ap- 
 proaching a point where quantity production is beginning." 
 
 July 2. A New York World dispatch from Washing- 
 ton states: "The American-built 155-mm. Howitzers are 
 moving to France. One American firm is turning out How- 
 itzers at the rate of ten a day. These are of an approxi- 
 mately 6-inch bore, and are the heavy barrage guns which 
 support infantry advances into intrenched positions." 
 
 At various times, also, the committee on public informa- 
 tion issued bulletins and photographs respecting the ship- 
 ment of American guns. 
 
 On November 20, 1918, General Pershing, making an 
 official report, said: 
 
126 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, 
 aviation and tanks. We accepted the offer of the French government 
 to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of 3-inch and 
 6-inch guns for thirty divisions. There were no guns of the calibers 
 mentioned manufactured in America, on our front at the date the 
 armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home 
 thus far received in France are 109 75-mm. (3-inch) guns. In avia- 
 tion, we were in the same situation. We obtained from the French 
 the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have pro- 
 vided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation and bombing 
 planes. As to tanks we were also compelled to rely upon the French. 
 Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the 
 French production could barely meet the requirements of their own 
 armies. 10 
 
 After the severe drubbing given the War Department 
 in the early part of 1918, not only by the Senate Commit- 
 tee on Military Affairs, but from all unbiased sources and 
 from all sections of the country, there was a spirit of work 
 and co-operation developed that produced marvelous re- 
 sults in some directions though not in all. One of the bu- 
 reaus most severely criticized was that of ordnance. It took 
 a new stride, the entire Administration having felt bitterly 
 the attack that was being made upon it from all sides and 
 knowing the criticisms were well based. It resulted in a 
 marked showing of improvement soon after the year was 
 half over. In mid-summer, 1918, a report was authorized 
 by the War Department showing that upwards of two bil- 
 lion cartridges had been put out by that time, the average 
 daily approximating fifteen million which, however, would 
 be only fifteen for each man of an army of one million for 
 all kinds of arms: rifles, pistols, machine-guns. And the 
 total number of rifles made was then 1,886,769, about one 
 for each man in the service, but none to replace the fearful 
 destruction of modern battles, as compared with the almost 
 nothing of five or six months earlier. This improvement, 
 
 10 Confirming this deficiency is Andre Tardieu's "Truth about the Treaty," 
 p. 35, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1921. 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 127 
 
 however, but strongly brought into relief the fearful short- 
 comings of the entire previous period of the year and a 
 quarter that the nation had been in the war. 
 
 Not only was the American soldier now armed with a 
 weapon superior in range and adaptability, but capable of 
 from 30 to 50 per cent greater quickness in action. That 
 is to say, two men could fire approximately as many bullets 
 in a given space of time as three men using inferior rifles. 
 
 In the summer of 1918 there was established an Ameri- 
 can assembling plant for tanks in France, and contracts were 
 let to English, French and Americans for about 500 tanks 
 each. When, in a short time, the thousand tanks con- 
 tracted for in France and Great Britain had been delivered 
 and assembled, the parts of not one complete American 
 tank had arrived. The War Department program provided 
 for the contract for 4,400 tanks in this country. On Sep- 
 tember i, just eight tanks had been completed. There was 
 prospect, it was officially stated to members of the Senate 
 Military Affairs Committee, that the total of 40 tanks 
 would be delivered during that month. Months previously 
 a tank training-camp was established in Gettysburg, Penn- 
 sylvania. On September i, not one tank had been deliv- 
 ered at the camp, and the men who had enlisted for and 
 been assigned to tank service were being trained with blue 
 prints, paper representations of the machines they were 
 supposed to master. 
 
 The United States was capable of turning out more 
 tanks in a given time than England and France combined. 
 When members of Congress asked Secretary Baker about 
 the collapse of the tank program, his reply was that it was 
 "military information not proper to disclose." 
 
 At first an attempt was made by the War Department 
 to deny that no American-made gas in an American shell 
 was ever fired by the American forces overseas. A little 
 later, however, General William L. Sibert admitted the fail- 
 ure of the War Department in this respect General 
 
izS The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Sibert, who took charge of the chemical warfare service in 
 the summer of 1918, when it was in a deplorable state, made 
 it efficient by the time the war ended. 
 
 Some of the ardent friends of the Administration, par- 
 ticularly apologists for Secretary Baker, doubted that he 
 ever made the statement that the war was 3,000 miles away, 
 when seeking to excuse the dilatoriness of his department. 
 On page 1615, of Part III, of Senate public documents, in 
 a hearing before the committee on military affairs, are these 
 words : 
 
 SECRETARY BAKER: The War was not on us in the the sense 
 that the enemy was at our doors. He was 3,000 miles away. 
 
 And on the next page was this: 
 
 SECRETARY BAKER: I ask permission to call your attention to the 
 fact that the battle front was 3,000 miles away. 
 
 SENATOR WEEKS: I want to say that, to my mind, it does not 
 make any difference practically whether it was 10,000 miles away 
 or one mile away. Our obligation was the same. 
 
 When the criticism of the War Department was at its 
 height, following the celebrated speech of Senator Cham- 
 berlain in New York, in January, 1918, Secretary Baker 
 started in upon the theory that his patchwork reorganiza- 
 tion of his department would placate public opinion. Per- 
 haps the best single example of the way his plan was work- 
 ing out is shown by his method of letting contracts, at that 
 time five different branches of the W,ar Department bidding 
 against each other for leather, this sending the price rap- 
 idly upwards and the government buying at the top price. 
 
 In September, 1918, there were millions of fully-loaded 
 shells on this side of the water waiting to be shipped to the 
 front. Most of them lacked some essential part. Others, 
 which had been manufactured for Russia, were in perfect 
 condition, but the ownership of them was in question. 
 Orders for twenty million small caliber shells had been 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 129 
 
 placed in Canada, and they were not delivered; for the Can- 
 adian manufacturers seemed to be in doubt as to whether 
 they were to manufacture the shells complete or simply 
 build them in parts and ship them to the United States to 
 be finished. Also a firm in Indiana had a contract for 
 some ten million parts. It was expected that it would be 
 producing about 20,000 of these parts each day beginning 
 months before the armistice was signed. But after some 
 thousand of them had been finished, it was discovered that 
 they were made wrong, they were worthless. Delay fol- 
 lowed delay, there must be correction of fault after fault, 
 while precious days and weeks and months were lost in the 
 crucial days of 1918, and finally production was begun again 
 just as the conflict closed. The entire trouble from begin- 
 ning to end of the war, so far as the Administration was 
 concerned, was an entire failure to co-ordinate. 
 
 Said a member of the United States Chamber of Com- 
 merce, a business man, as a witness before the investigating 
 committee : 
 
 There is no central control or planning. What is needed is 
 someone who shall have power or responsibility for making decisions. 
 The difficulty in getting decisions in Washington to-day is apparent 
 to every one. It is an extraordinarily difficult thing to have any 
 matter definitely and positively decided. The thing that we are trying 
 to impress upon you is that the experience of business men has been 
 universal, that without central control and responsibility no enterprise, 
 large or small, could succeed. 11 
 
 "President Ferguson, of one of the large ship-building plants that were 
 relied upon to put out the ships necessary to carry forward the war, told 
 how there was no head work in the preparation of places in which to carry 
 forward the great plan. He told how in one little town where they could 
 not get water in the shipyard, though he was ordered to hasten the ship- 
 building work, the army had 15,000 horses all using water and 20,000 
 soldiers all using water, and that in the same week he had instructions 
 from either one of two government departments to give its work priority. 
 And he stated: 
 
 "We cannot get hard coal, for which our houses are built with latrobe 
 stoves, yet the army has put a lot of hard-coal stoves in their camps which 
 might as well have burned soft coal. I took this matter up with the Secretary 
 
130 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 And it was at this point that the very personality of the 
 war secretary due to his mental attitude created the chief 
 difficulty. 
 
 The record is crowded with examples of failure to co- 
 ordinate, to plan ahead. The Secretary of War appeared 
 to have no appreciation of the size of his job. Up to Jan- 
 uary i, 1918, there had been ordered over 21,000,000 pairs 
 of shoes. That was more shoes than had been ordered for 
 the very much larger British army during the entire three 
 and one-half years of war. At the same time, the army 
 was short by several hundred thousand of the number of 
 overcoats needed. Clothing in the navy was so worthless 
 that the sailors had to pay out of their own slender pay 
 about as much to replenish them as the whole was supposed 
 to cost in the first place. Our shortage in several lines of 
 arms and ammunition was serious, one alarming shortage 
 being in powder, our shortage in production for our own 
 use at that time being about a million pounds a day when 
 we were supposed to be also supplying the Allies, and 
 orders for the new buildings to increase our powder supply 
 were not given until December, 1917, though the great 
 shortage was already alarming by the middle of 1917. 
 
 What Secretary Baker cost the country in money and 
 lives will probably never be known. Some of his state- 
 ments, however, may suggest it. When, early in 1918, 
 Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Committee on Mili- 
 tary Affairs, declared that "the military establishment of 
 America has fallen down;" and when, a few weeks later, 
 
 of War, and wrote him a letter, and discussed it with everybody in Washing- 
 ton I could discuss it with, and the Secretary is investigating, and, I under- 
 stand, proposes to put up some temporary quarters for the soldiers and the 
 regular officers." 
 
 Then followed this colloquy: 
 
 SENATOR JOHNSON: "That indicates lack of management and utter lack of 
 co-operation. 
 
 MR. FERGUSON: "It is due to the fact that the people have the power to 
 arbitrarily give orders without knowing the consequence of the orders they 
 give. 
 
 SENATOR JOHNSON: "And without knowing who else gives orders?" 
 
 MR. FERGUSON: "Yes, sir." 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 131 
 
 Senator Hitchcock, one Democratic member of the commit- 
 tee, arraigned the department for "confusion, red tape, and 
 incapacity," and supported his charges with an extended 
 summary of delay and neglect in equipping the soldiers, they 
 were letting the country know something about the disasters 
 which were certain to befall as a result of this utter con- 
 fusion in the War Department, and that Mr. Baker's fail- 
 ure to place men with a just sense of proportion, at the head 
 of important bureaus, was the chief cause. 
 
 To the soldiers across the sea, failure to receive their 
 pay was a matter secondary to failure to hear from their 
 loved ones at home. While many of these poor fellows 
 were lying sick or wounded in hospitals, to their physical 
 suffering was added the mental torture of not being able 
 to get a line from the folks at home. They were kept in 
 the dark as to whether fathers, mothers, wives were dead 
 and buried. Tons of these precious letters which they were 
 longing for were being dumped in great masses in France, 
 until the pathetic missives were boxed up for reshipment 
 to the distracted souls back in the old home who, on their 
 return, were unable to learn from the War Department as 
 to whether and how their sick and wounded ones were. 
 It was one of the shameful things which attended the in- 
 competence of the War Department in its direct dealing 
 with American soldiers. 12 
 
 13 Representative Mann, on the floor of the House, read a batch of 
 these letters both from soldiers and from soldiers' wives and mothers bear- 
 ing on this unhappy state of affairs. Some of these missives from the sol- 
 diers to the home folks were fairly heartrending in their pitiful appeal for 
 tidings of any sort from those dear to them. On the other hand, he read 
 letters from agonized mothers and wives here who knew their soldiers 
 were wounded and ill somewhere, but who could get no information other 
 than this maddening fact from the War Department. In one such case 
 Adjutant General Parker told the applicant for information to write to the 
 Red Cross in Washington. Commenting on this, Mr. Mann said: 
 
 "Here is a man wounded severely in the service of the United States 
 on the firing line in September last. His wife has been informed of the 
 injury, and, as I shall show later, with other letters, is probably unable 
 to get into communication directly with the soldier and writes to the Adju- 
 tant General's office to inquire about him. Now it would be just as cheap 
 for the Adjutant General's office to cable to France as it is for the Red 
 Cross to do it. I can conceive no meaner disposition on the part of the 
 
132 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Cruel was the infliction of suspense and anguish through 
 deception and delay in publication of the casualty lists. Be- 
 fore election Mr. Baker had assured the country that a 
 total number of killed and wounded would not exceed 100,- 
 ooo; after election the estimate was raised to "more than 
 200,000," then to 262,000 and late January, 1919, it was 
 disclosed that the lists might not be completed until the 
 following September. Final announcement was made on 
 Armistice Day, 1919, showing a total of casualties of 293,- 
 089 to the American forces, the wounded in action number- 
 ing 215,489. 
 
 Great criticism was leveled at the War Department for 
 its failure in reporting casualties as they occurred. The 
 Red Cross, not a government service, had the confidence of 
 the men in the service as well as of the people at home who 
 knew their method. Why the Red Cross should be able to 
 get information as to what had happened to a boy at the 
 front more quickly than the regular Government channels 
 of the War Department was never explained but the fact 
 is that people learned to have confidence in the one and to 
 distrust the other. The latter forbade the former to send 
 home lists and this ban was not removed until September 
 27, 1918. 
 
 The negligence of the War Department service respon- 
 sible for the announcement of casualties in the American 
 forces was admitted December 9, 1918, by Assistant Secre- 
 tary of War Keppel to the Senate committee on military 
 affairs. 
 
 The very first day that Congress was in session in the 
 year of 1919 an attack was made upon Mr. Baker for his 
 carelessness, if not deliberate method, in notifying parents 
 as to what had happened to their sons on the European bat- 
 tle front. Senator Weeks declared that the War Depart- 
 
 Government than to tell a wondering and grieving wife, "Your husband 
 was severely wounded nearly four months ago, and if you want to know 
 how he is, communicate with a private party." 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 133 
 
 ment information as to casualties had been wrong. He 
 stated that during the week ending December 14, 1918, the 
 Red Cross had received an average of twenty letters a day 
 from parents who had been advised by the War Depart- 
 ment that their sons had been killed on a specific date, and 
 that in every one of these cases the parents wrote that they 
 had received communication from their boys subsequent to 
 the date of death given by the War Department. Referring 
 to the Red Cross methods, Senator Weeks said that agency 
 in August located in French hospitals 200 American soldiers 
 reported missing by the War Department. And he stated 
 that they believed that through it their relatives would 
 learn of their condition; but that information was never 
 transmitted because of the order by the War Department 
 prohibiting the mailing of such letters. 
 
 When Senator Chamberlain made his attack upon the 
 failure of the War Department in taking care of disabled 
 men after the armistice was signed he stated: "Take the 
 number of men on the battle front and the casualties the 
 dead, wounded and missing there has been practically 17.6 
 per cent of the boys on the front killed, wounded or miss- 
 ing." Then he stated that what he criticised was the fact 
 that we have not the hospital facilities. "If the War De- 
 partment," he declared, "had paid half the attention to 
 preparation for receiving these boys as they are to getting 
 legislation through Congress in order to protect contractors 
 who made contracts for war supplies over the telephone and 
 in violation of law, this matter would soon be settled." 
 
 No satisfactory reason was ever given for the gross 
 misrepresentation of the nation's losses and the shocking 
 delay in making known the names of the victims. But the 
 matter of greatest moment was the high percentage of casu- 
 alties, nearly three-eighths of the force being put out of 
 action. It is true that American divisions were heavily en- 
 gaged and severe losses were to be expected. But what 
 makes the figures significant is the disclosure that to the 
 
134 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 very end of the conflict the American forces were imper- 
 fectly armed; that they had to go against the German de- 
 fensive, bristling with machine-guns, insufficiently supported 
 by artillery and with supply of ammunition dangerously in- 
 adequate. 
 
 Although forced to abandon the Red Cross home-com- 
 munication's service, Governor Allen pointed out that the 
 system of personal letters was being used by the British 
 without any interference with war office reports. Colonel 
 Davis retorted: 
 
 Because one army wears red pants is no reason why our army 
 should wear red pants. 
 
 Secretary Baker felt called upon to issue a statement 
 in reply to criticisms of the unpublished casualties after the 
 armistice was signed, declaring none had been held back. 
 
 The rapidity with which the American troops were 
 transported to Europe in the summer of 1917 and until the 
 American army had reached the proportion of a million 
 and more men was characteristic of America's method once 
 she got down to real business. It was as much as the most 
 optimistic could hope for. 
 
 The greater part of these troops, however, was taken 
 over in ships of the Allies. While the efforts of the navy 
 were laudable in the extreme, we were simply short of the 
 necessary means of transportation. In returning the troops 
 there was a different situation. They were returned with 
 all the speed that any one within reason could have asked, 
 and far beyond the expectation of a great majority of the 
 people. They were returned at about the same rate at 
 which they were sent over. Of the 320,000 troops brought 
 home from overseas during May, 1919, vessels operated 
 by the cruiser and transport force of the United States 
 Navy carried more than 300,000. 
 
 In the spring of 1919, the country was stirred by the dis- 
 pute between Secretary Baker and General Ansell over the 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 135 
 
 court-martial system of the country, resulting in the de- 
 motion of the latter to his pre-war rank of lieutenant colonel. 
 It brought Senator Chamberlain again to the front in de- 
 fending those whom the position of Secretary Baker per- 
 mitted him to castigate in what he denominated the inter- 
 ests of discipline. It was well known that Mr. Baker sanc- 
 tioned the intolerable terms of the system upon some all but 
 innocent youth, while he was making use of all the prestige 
 of his position to favor worthless scoundrels known to the 
 War Department as "conscientious objectors" to military 
 service to their country in time of war. Under the system 
 he accepted the sentence of a half-witted youth "to 99 years 
 at hard labor for absence without leave, desertion, and es- 
 cape," while Captain Samuel H. Hodgson, of the United 
 States Army, tried on charges showing him favorable to 
 the Germans at a time when his country was at war with 
 Germany, and particularly to Germans in Mexico, sen- 
 tenced to dismissal from the army and confinement to hard 
 labor for two years, all finally commuted to a reprimand by 
 the general commanding the camp in Porto Rico. 
 
 The New York World described the system as "lynch 
 law for the army," while the Washington Post declared 
 that "there is sometimes justice in a court-martial, but it is 
 purely accidental." Writing Secretary Baker concerning 
 the injustice of the system and the Secretary's attitude 
 toward those with whom he might differ, Senator Chamber- 
 lain pointedly stated, on March 20, 1919: 
 
 On March 10 you were blind to any deficiencies in the existing 
 system; as indeed the evidence abundantly shows, you have been 
 deaf throughout the war to complaints about the injustice of this 
 system, complaints which should at least have challenged your earnest 
 attention, rather than provoked your undisguised irritation. 
 
 And then again: 
 
 You elbowed aside the one officer who even then had the courage 
 to condemn the system and the prevision to point out its terrible re- 
 
136 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 suits General Ansell and took into the bosom of your confidence 
 a trio of men who are pronounced reactionaries. 
 
 And he pointed out to the Secretary of War circum- 
 stances indicating that the Secretary's position was not 
 taken in good faith but simply designed to allay public 
 apprehension and inquiry by the appearance of doing some- 
 thing, and added: 
 
 The existing system does injustice gross, terrible, spirit-crushing 
 injustice. Evidence of it is on every hand. The records of the 
 judge advocate general's department reek with it. ... 
 
 You have taken a terrible stand upon a subject which lies close 
 to a thousand American hearthstones. The American people will not 
 be deceived by self-serving, misleading reports and statistics. Too 
 many American families have made a pentecostal sacrifice of their 
 sons upon the altar of organized injustice. 
 
 A group of lawyers who held commissions during the 
 war and were assigned to the Judge Advocate General's 
 Department joined in giving out a statement to the press 
 which declared that: 
 
 Our court-martial system has been inherited from English law 
 as it existed prior to the American Revolution ; it had its inception in 
 medieval days when soldiers were not free citizens of the flag under 
 which they served, but were either paid mercenaries or armed retainers 
 of petty lords. Those were times when armies were made up of men 
 who constituted the dregs of society, or were no more than the chat- 
 tels of military commanders. England, France, and other democratic 
 countries have changed and liberalized their military codes so as to 
 insure justice to their soldiers; but our armies are still governed by 
 this brutal, medieval court-martial system which has survived outside 
 of the United States only in Germany and in Russia. 
 
 But these were the things, not only which the pacifist 
 Secretary of War tplerated, but which he insisted upon 
 when it came to punishing the peccadillos of real men wear- 
 ing their country's uniform and ready to lay down their 
 lives. But when it came to the contemptible cowards who 
 saved their hides by sneaking under pleas that they were 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 137 
 
 "conscientious objectors" then the pacifist secretary was all 
 tenderness and consideration. "For a real soldier caught 
 smoking a cigarette and refusing to obey a petty order, 40 
 years at hard labor with no appeal to a reviewing court. 
 For a cowardly cur openly refusing to wear a uniform, re- 
 fusing to obey any military orders, openly defying the whole 
 authority of military law for such as these, considerate 
 treatment and no punishment until the Secretary of War had 
 passed upon the case !" 13 
 
 Similarly, when the demand for a universal draft be- 
 came so great that General Crowder was called before the 
 Senate committee, and he there showed the compelling and 
 immediate need for enlarged man power, Secretary Baker 
 and General March took an opposite view. General Crow- 
 der's advice was followed, and the great army which was 
 sent across the seas came as a result. 
 
 But General Crowder's patriotism was his undoing. 
 Secretary Baker and General March could no more en- 
 dure his activities than they could those of General Wood. 
 Accordingly, General March ordered General Crowder to 
 his office and reprimanded him for having encroached on 
 the duties of the general staff; yet Crowder was wholly re- 
 sponsible for the men until they were actually sworn into 
 the service. But the reprimand was stamped on General 
 Crowder's record, and the Secretary of War did not lift a 
 finger to stay the unjust act against this soldier, this officer 
 who had never blundered when the whole war machine of 
 the W^ar Department was blundering; who hewed to the 
 line when the Secretary of War was wobbling; who had 
 prepared, perfected, and executed the mechanism for a draft 
 which had done more than any other single thing in our his- 
 tory to make a great army possible. 
 
 There is a large element in the consideration of Mr. 
 Baker's elevation to his high place. Judge Garrison, from 
 the day he took office, devoted himself zealously to strength- 
 
 " Harvey's Weekly, February 22, 1919. 
 
138 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ening the national defenses, and as the shadow of coming 
 war darkened the country's path he redoubled his efforts 
 to promote preparedness. Then came the inadequately ex- 
 plained resignation of Secretary Garrison. When Presi- 
 dent Wilson, in the first months of 1916 made a series of 
 addresses in New York and the middle west in behalf of 
 the policy of preparation for the inevitable conflict, the 
 President went so far as to urge that the United States 
 should have "incomparably the greatest navy in the 
 world." After the President's return, Secretary Garrison 
 called at the White House to express his loyal enthusiasm 
 and to say that preparedness was to be forwarded. To his 
 amazement, the response was an expression of disapproval, 
 the President declaring he would tolerate no agitation or 
 activity in this direction until after election the presiden- 
 tial election of the coming fall, when the issue, as it later 
 developed, was to be, "he kept us out of war." Hurt and 
 bewildered, Secretary Garrison remarked that their ideas 
 seemed to be at variance ; he was told that they were. He 
 suggested that his resignation might be acceptable. Presi- 
 dent Wilson said promptly that it would; moreover, on his 
 western tour he had selected Mr. Garrison's successor, a 
 man who would not embarrass the Administration with 
 schemes of preparedness. 
 
 Such was the manner and inspiration of the appointment 
 of Newton D. Baker, avowed pacifist placed in charge of 
 the defense of a nation that was being driven irresistibly 
 into war. His function was to strangle preparedness and 
 cultivate the pacifist sentiment of the country until after the 
 election in 1916. He had, besides, other valued political 
 qualifications influence with the radical element and a 
 readiness, as was shown, to use even the laws against sedi- 
 tion and espionage to promote the Administration's political 
 interests. And he was retained, in the face of a record of 
 incompetence written in the waste of colossal wealth ,and 
 unnumbered lives, because he served those interests and re- 
 
Secretary Baker and Mr. Creel in War 139 
 
 fleeted secretly the spirit and purposes of the Wilson 
 regime. 14 
 
 The editor of Harvey's Weekly, facetious at times, de- 
 nunciatory almost beyond endurance at other times, freely 
 told its readers how it had misplaced its trust in one mem- 
 ber of the cabinet, and did it in this fashion: 
 
 Oddly enough, the one member of the Cabinet in whose favor 
 we were most strongly prepossessed was Mr. Baker; we valued his 
 brains as a sort of oasis in a comparative desert. But he quickly 
 proved himself to be utterly incapacitated by surpassing egotism for 
 the performance of his great tasks and consequently was a positive 
 menace. Anything more dangerous than his attempts to lull the 
 American people into a sense of false security or more damnable than 
 his perpetual evading, sidestepping, deceiving and, when cornered, 
 actually lying, we simply cannot imagine. 
 
 Never again should the American nation permit paci- 
 fists to be in control of the government when the country's 
 life is threatened. 
 
 "Philadelphia North American, January 31, 1919. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT 
 
 From some forms of distemper, President Wilson's 
 administration made fairly good recovery; but never from 
 the blight which fell upon the Post-Office Department. 
 
 By some it was called incompetence in Washington, by 
 some inefficiency throughout the country; some said it was 
 failure, others that it was wreckage. All agreed that the 
 Department was not functioning this one Department 
 that comes closest to the American hearth, this one service 
 of the government that freely enters the home daily. 
 
 For its letter-carrier walks the crowded street and as- 
 cends the tower-like office building whose head is buried in 
 the cloud ; or hastens with his car into the thrifty forty-acre 
 farmer settlements of Jersey or of the Keystone State, and 
 back home for dinner; or glides along the western trail 
 which, as a huge serpent, stretches itself from the Great 
 River away to the snow-capped Rockies; or more slowly 
 with horse and cart threads his way to the secluded home 
 among the mountain passes this carrier who bears the 
 heat of summer and faces the blistering blasts of winter, 
 who drags his weary way through sticky mud and flounders 
 through unbroken drifts he who brings the expected or 
 the unlooked-for message of love or sadness, of joy or sor- 
 row, of hope or disaster; this man whose step or cart or 
 car is eagerly watched for, and whose coming sets the heart 
 a-throb or brings depression to the spirit this man is al- 
 ways welcome. And he failed not. 
 
 Under such circumstances it was very fitting that the 
 first criticism directed against this great Department of the 
 
 140 
 
The Post-Office Department 141 
 
 people should be on the social side, rather than on the ma- 
 terial. It squares best with America's idealism. 
 
 This early criticism was aimed at a pronouncement made 
 officially in the Administration's beginning days, declaring 
 that its old employes, when they became aged and infirm 
 from long service, were entitled to no further consideration 
 from the government. The official statement further an- 
 nounced that the people would never consent to civil pen- 
 sions, and with a self-assurance suggestive of the final word 
 on the matter. Yet it is the irony of history that before the 
 ruthless incumbent left his place of power, civil employees in 
 his Department were not pensioned, it is true, but were re- 
 tired on part pay with the greatest favor shown to them of 
 any in the government service. He poorly assessed the 
 public temper when he assumed the position that as the eye 
 became dim and the hand shaky these faithful servants who 
 had given the best of their years to the government on a 
 salary insufficient to lay aside anything for the uncertain 
 day, were to be tossed to the scrap-heap, placing the gov- 
 ernment in the class of the soulless employer who used men 
 and women only as cogs in a machine. The Department's 
 procedure of that day was described as "a mighty mean 
 policy." 
 
 This social side bore a close relation to the material 
 side. It was induced by Postmaster-General Burleson's de- 
 sire to make a showing for economy. Its tendency was to 
 weaken the morale of the entire force. Protest after pro- 
 test was entered until it was piling Ossa on Pelion. Officials 
 became hardened to the process and gave little or no heed. 
 As complaint after complaint came in, their reply became a 
 stock: "Oh, well, I guess a few complaints, more or less, 
 will not make much difference." 
 
 The criticism grew in strength and scope, involving every 
 feature of the Department's activities. It would have been 
 more severe but for the fact that war activities diverted the 
 
142 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 thoughts and energies of the people. A subservient Con- 
 gress did nothing to uncover the blight. Secrecy was the 
 final official word in this Department, as in many of them, 
 throughout President Wilson's incumbency. It was impos- 
 sible for the people to get the light. 
 
 The treatment accorded drove the railway-mail men 
 into the American Federation of Labor for protection 
 against the ravages of the Department. Immediately 
 thereafter came the unionizing of every department and 
 bureau of the government service as a protection of the 
 employe against the government itself. The Administra- 
 tion sowed the wind; the nation will reap the whirlwind. 
 
 Business men, as well as others, fully aware of the de- 
 generation of the postal service, used what means they 
 commanded for getting the facts to set before the people. 
 The Department refusing all information, as though the 
 public has no right to know about its own business, they 
 set out to gather facts showing the truth of the matter. To 
 this end the New York Merchants' Association conducted an 
 investigation in 38 states, through 165 business agencies, 
 representing 119 cities, giving substantial basis for a re- 
 port upon the deficiencies of the service as found up to the 
 middle of 1918. The essential facts thus developed were 
 these : 
 
 That mails were not dispatched with former frequency. 
 
 That they were not fully worked in transit. 
 
 That in consequence much "stuck" letter-mail was turned into 
 the terminal stations and there materially delayed. 
 
 That inferior mails moved with extreme slowness. 
 
 That train delays were not a principal cause of slowness in the 
 mails; but that 
 
 Insufficiency in the number of railway postal cars, their with- 
 drawal from a great number of routes throughout the United States, 
 and the reduction of the crews on the railway postal cars appeared 
 as the main causes of the condition shown. 1 
 
 *In eighteen months there was either total abolishment or heavy cur- 
 tailment in the sorting of mails on 1612 trains. Railway-mail clerks well 
 
The Post-Office Department 143 
 
 That space rental on trains, instead of charge by weight, was a 
 fertile cause of inefficient service. 
 
 Of 9,612 letters sent out by business men as a fair test, to 
 and from all parts of the country, 56 per cent were delayed 
 from a day to weeks in delivery. Local-delivery letters 
 bearing special delivery stamps were subject to the same 
 delays. During the year 1919, there were mailed from New 
 York 119 letters at an hour when proper service would 
 have delivered them the same day, and 81 of them were 
 not delivered until the next day. 2 
 
 Curtailment in the sorting of mails on the trains was one 
 of the economies upon which Mr. Burleson prided himself. 
 In his 1918 annual report he stated enthusiastically that 
 during the preceding year postal revenues exceeded ex- 
 penditures by something over $19,600,000. Was the gov- 
 ernment in the postal business for the purpose of making 
 money regardless of how it was made? The reduction of 
 the human mechanism to the position of mere machinery, 
 resulting in human wreckage and wastage, and a loss of 
 morale resulting in loss in efficiency and service, is a mat- 
 ter of greater consequence to the nation than the saving of 
 one cent every eighteen days of the year for each person. 
 Through his effort to get credit for cutting expenses he 
 earned the title of postal-service wrecker. 
 
 In the same report he further stated that there were 
 formerly "frequent and unnecessary dispatches of mail;" 
 but those paying for the service did not think they were 
 
 knew that, owing to the reduction in their forces in face of a largely in- 
 creasing mail volume, between important terminal points, as Chicago to 
 the Twin City or Chicago to Omaha, mail was worked to the extent possible 
 and the rest was left to be worked on the trip back or left to its own devices, 
 thus carrying it back and forth indefinitely before reaching its destination. 
 
 2 When complaint was made by publishers of weekly newspapers in 
 New York that they were four-and-half days reaching the homes of sub- 
 scribers in Washington, the Department stated that the cause was the 
 unprecedened rail congestion. Questioning and testing this reason, a num- 
 ber of the papers were taken to Washington and there deposited in the post- 
 office just before midnight Thursday, and were delivered in that same 
 city, within two miles of the post-office, the following Monday, some not 
 before Tuesday. 
 
144 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 unnecessary. The fact is, no date was permitted to be 
 stamped on some of the inferior mail, and if it was delayed 
 a month no one was the wiser. 
 
 It was a theory of Mr. Burleson that the cost of de- 
 livery of newspapers and magazines was too great for long 
 distances. Accordingly, upon his recommendation the coun- 
 try was divided into eight zones, effective July i, 1918, 
 with a higher rate of postage for each successive zone far- 
 ther from the place of mailing. This created opposition 
 among publishers of such papers. Others knew little of 
 the matter, though it was really they who suffered, for in 
 many instances the additional cost was placed upon the 
 reader. 
 
 In this proposed method of saving, the Postmaster- 
 General sectionalized the nation, establishing a system ob- 
 noxious to the whole plan of government under the Con- 
 stitution. It was bringing back the system under which the 
 government under the Articles of Confederation had failed, 
 the plan so opposed to the American's sense of the fitness of 
 things that no one ever objected to paying the same rate of 
 postage for sending a letter from New York to Brooklyn 
 as from New York to Seattle. 
 
 The direct reply to this theory of the too great cost was 
 that the method of the Department's bookkeeping was so 
 defective that it was impossible to determine, with even 
 approximate accuracy, the cost to the Department of the 
 various branches of its service. 
 
 It was further observed, and with more point, that the 
 system worked a discrimination against the man or woman 
 of the distant, outlying and sparsely-settled sections of the 
 country; for while enduring the hardships of pioneers, they 
 were thus penalized for seeking the best in the way of 
 current magazine literature; when, as a matter of history, 
 the government had always theretofore conceded to the 
 pioneer the privilege of having the best obtainable as well 
 as he whose abode was near the centers of wealth and popu- 
 
The Post-Office Department 145 
 
 lation and of publications. 3 Said one weekly of the highest 
 standing: u ln this eight-zone system, what could the brain 
 of man devise that is more unbusiness-like and more un- 
 scientific?" 4 
 
 Another favorite plan of Mr. Burleson was to rest con- 
 trol of the wires of the country in his Department. On so 
 important a matter, the Senate did not like to yield hastily; 
 it blustered for a week with the declaration that it wquld 
 not be forced into hasty action. Its committee was making 
 preparation for extensive hearings in the early hours of the 
 day, July 10, 1918; but when the order was given from the 
 White House, Senate leaders were convinced that it was 
 time to take a vote, and on that day capitulated, not even 
 members of the committee having opportunity to express 
 their views. One senator in picturesquely describing the 
 swiftly developing situation said: "The whip has been 
 cracked and the Senate will jump through the hoop just as 
 the House did last week." Accordingly, by order of Presi- 
 dent Wilson the government took over control of all land 
 wires on August i, 1918, placing them in the hands of the 
 Post-Office Department. 
 
 In taking control, Mr. Burleson issued a public state- 
 ment in which he said: 
 
 I earnestly request the loyal co-operation of all officers, operators 
 and employes, and the public, in order that the service rendered shall 
 be not only maintained at a high standard, but improved wherever 
 possible. It is the purpose to co-ordinate and unify these services 
 so that they may be operated as a national system with due regard 
 to the interests of the public and the owners of the properties. 
 
 With what loyalty of compliance on the part of any, will 
 be seen presently. In his 1918 annual report, prepared 
 
 8 In the spring of 1918, the author personally witnessed on the great 
 ranches of Wyoming and Montana, scores of miles from any railroad, 
 magazines of the highest class in the homes of humble herders, the ranch- 
 houses on wheels ready to be moved from place to place where pasturage 
 could be found for the flocks, among them Harper's, Leslie's, and Scien- 
 tific American. 
 
 4 Scientific American, New York, June 15, 1918, p. 542. 
 
146 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 but a few weeks later, he disclosed his desire for govern- 
 ment ownership of these utilities when he stated: 
 
 The experiences as a result of the present war have fully demon- 
 strated that the principle of government ownership of the telegraphs 
 and telephones is not only sound but practicable. 
 
 Soon after he had taken over the wires, his procedure was 
 described as having reduced all competitive systems to a 
 state of chaos; as having changed the best telegraph and 
 telephone systems the world had ever known to one of the 
 worst; while running the latter at a loss of millions of dol- 
 lars which he loaded upon the taxpayers, besides loading 
 telephone users with heavily increased rates and a greatly 
 depreciated service. 
 
 On December 6, 1919, Chairman Steenerson of the 
 House Committee on Post-offices and Post-roads, having 
 before him the annual report of the Postmaster-General, 
 then but recently issued, criticised on the floor of the House, 
 Mr. Burleson's mismanagement of the telegraph and tele- 
 phone wires, declaring that he had gotten out of the tax- 
 payers of the country $9,000,000 to make up deficits, in 
 addition to $30,000,000 in increased rates; and he sharply 
 questioned the figures by which the attempt wa,s made to 
 show the savings in his Department, declaring that while 
 the report showed a net surplus of $35,000,000 in the previ- 
 ous seven years, it was not true in fact and was misleading 
 to the public, and in all probability claims for losses and 
 increases for carrying the mail would wipe out the entire 
 alleged net savings or more. 
 
 While Mr. Burleson undertook the next day to reply 
 to this statement, he did not undertake to deny the enor- 
 mously increased cost of inferior service to the public. And 
 on the 23rd of the same month, the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission rendered a decision whereby on space-rental 
 plan on trains, compensation for carrying the mail was in- 
 creased 33 per cent from November i, 1916, and 50 per 
 
The Post-Office Department 147 
 
 cent from March i, 1920, which, as Assistant Postmaster- 
 General Praeger stated in the Senate hearings, amounted 
 to between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 a year, at 50 per 
 cent. And in discussing the necessary appropriation, Mr. 
 Steenerson on the floor of the House declared on April 15, 
 1920, that the space rental would cost about 8 per cent more 
 than the old weight-rental method, amounting to between 
 $4,000,000 and $5,000,000 a year on the slower space-rent 
 plan. 
 
 Chairman Steenerson knew whereof he spoke. So did 
 Mr. Burleson. Announcement by the latter that there would 
 be a reduction in telephone rates under government control 
 was immediately followed by an increase ranging from 14 
 to 36 per cent. So sharp was this increase from the various 
 states that it brought vigorous protest from practically 
 every section of the land. 
 
 North Dakota found that her increase approximated 
 30 to 33 per cent, and resented interference on any such 
 basis. Ohio gave deliberate publicity to the fact that any 
 attempt to increase rates in that state by the Post-Office De- 
 partment would be resisted by the State. In Minnesota, 
 Massachusetts, and other states, the public service com- 
 missions served notice of rigid scrutiny at points of interfer- 
 ence with local regulations, with promise of contest should 
 the government attempt to override rates fixed by local 
 authorities. Some one declared that Mr. Burleson's state 
 was about the only one in the union whose rates would not 
 be about doubled; and even in Houston the city council re- 
 fused to put the new rates into operation, and at a largely 
 attended meeting of business men the council's action was 
 warmly endorsed. Surely Mr. Burleson was getting a taste 
 of the State Rights doctrine. 
 
 In Illinois there was actually started a conflict which as- 
 sumed a serious aspect. Following the order of Postmaster- 
 General Burleson fixing a schedule of rates in excess of 
 those then in force, an action brought by the Attorney- 
 
148 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 General of Illinois resulted in a decision rendered by the 
 Superior Court whereby the State refused to be bound by 
 the action of the Postmaster-General, and whereby the 
 telephone companies of the state were restrained from in- 
 creasing the toll rates. 
 
 As further illustrating the method during Mr. Burle- 
 son's incumbency, a well-known weekly, referring to the 
 delivery of night letters assuming to be sent by wire, when 
 under government control, recites this episode: 
 
 THE CLERK: That will be all right; we are not telegraphing 
 night letters to New York; we are sending them by mail. 35 cents 
 please. 
 
 MYSELF: You are going to send this telegram by mail and deliver 
 it by mail? 
 
 THE CLERK: That's so. 
 
 MYSELF: And can you tell me why I should pay you 35 cents 
 to deliver a letter when I can put a 3-cent stamp on it and get the 
 same result? 
 
 THE CLERK: Well, that's the way it's being done these days. 5 
 
 Nor was the increase in rates the sole objection to the 
 Post-Office Department's wire management. Soon after 
 it assumed control, strikes and threatened strikes became 
 the daily news served to a patient public. Of them all 
 probably the most serious was that of Boston and vicinity, 
 threatening the welfare of all New England. In this, the 
 incapacity of the Department's head was acknowledged 
 when, after a good deal of bitterness, he agreed to leave the 
 matter to the managers of the properties and the operators ; 
 then a settlement was quickly reached. 
 
 So far as the public knew of his order of December 2, 
 1918, as to courtesy on the part of wire employes, warning 
 that indifference to the public would not be tolerated, it was 
 but to smile. Users of telephones in those strenuous days 
 of strikes and threatened strikes, became accustomed to 
 waiting fifteen to forty-five minutes to get the operator and 
 
 5 Harvey's Weekly, New York, February i, 1919. 
 
The Post-Office Department 149 
 
 then meeting withering insolence from the operator or the 
 unblushing statement that the line was busy. 
 
 As if these things were not enough for the public to 
 endure at the hands of government operation of the wires, 
 when hostilities were at an end and the silence of arms 
 reigned supreme the President ordered that the cables be 
 taken over as a war necessity for which purpose alone the 
 authority had been invested in the President and placed 
 them into the hands of the Postmaster-General. It is prob- 
 able that there was no single act of the Administration for 
 which both officials were so severely condemned. It was 
 looked upon as a self-assumed authority, autocratic, arbi- 
 trary, unwarranted. The discussion on the floor of the 
 Senate brought out the fact that there was some strange and 
 unwarranted manipulation in the matter of the signing of 
 the order of the President taking over the wires, assuming 
 to have been signed November 2, nine days before the sign- 
 ing of the armistice, but incomplete because not counter- 
 signed by the Secretary of State. After inviting attention 
 to this unusual course, Senator Kellogg stated: 
 
 The law authorized the President to take over the cables and tele- 
 graph lines as a war necessity, and not a senator on this floor or any- 
 where else dreamed that we were giving the Postmaster-General 
 power to force on this country government ownership whether the 
 people wanted it or not. 
 
 And Senator Hitchcock, Senate leader of the President's 
 party, declared that even if the order had been signed on 
 November 2 and was regular in every other respect, it was 
 yet a breach of faith with Congress; for by the terms of the 
 resolution granting the power and by the reiterated assur- 
 ances of its advocates when it was up for consideration it 
 was explicitly set forth that only in case of danger from war 
 to the country's security was the authority to be exercised. 
 And it had not been found necessary to exercise it until 
 after war had ceased. It was bitterly denounced in the 
 
150 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Senate as an attempt to foist socialism upon the nation by 
 executive order and the President was freely charged with 
 playing to the radical element. 
 
 In taking over the cables, the President said the neces- 
 sity for the act lay in the need of keeping two cables open 
 between France and the War and State departments in 
 Washington. While Mr. Burleson declared: 
 
 There never was a time in the history of this war, for which this 
 joint resolution was passed giving the President the right to con- 
 trol the wire and cable systems, which calls for such a close control 
 of the cable system as to-day, and which will continue during the 
 period of readjustment. The absolute necessity for uninterrupted, 
 continuous communication should be apparent to all. 
 
 He stated further that the cables had been insufficiently 
 managed during hostilities. 
 
 It was asked why, if this were true, no action to remedy 
 the evil had been taken until hostilities ceased. And the 
 public wondered why the necessity arose November 16, five 
 days after the armistice was signed, when the President's 
 order was published, and at the same time that the Presi- 
 dent made known his intention of going to Europe as a mem- 
 ber of the Peace Congress, and why they were placed in 
 charge of the man known to be the politician of the Admin- 
 istration. 
 
 But caustic criticism met the President's statement, com- 
 ing from every section of the country and from every com- 
 plexion of political view, denouncing the President for du- 
 plicity in his treatment of Congress and the people. If his 
 reason were valid, they wanted to know why, after the war 
 was ended, he seized fourteen or fifteen cables between 
 America and Europe and all the cables from the Pacific 
 coast to China, Japan, the Philippines and Hawaii, as well 
 as those to South America, Central America, and the West 
 Indies, including all of the Gulf-of-Mexico lines all this 
 that there might be two clear cables between Paris and 
 
The Post-Office Department 151 
 
 Washington. The people saw through it as the sole pur- 
 pose of keeping from them knowledge of what was trans- 
 piring at the World's Peace Congress at Paris the center 
 of the world's interest. 
 
 With the postal and the wire services of the country in 
 the hands of a politician and both deteriorating in useful- 
 ness, with the President in a European capital instead of at 
 the American, with reconstruction problems pressing for 
 settlement at home and no one to give them direction with 
 these matters and others of imposing stature forging to the 
 front, the outburst of the people became so violent in the 
 spring of 1919 that the President, stung to action by the 
 criticisms heaped upon himself and the Postmaster-General, 
 directed that the wires be returned to private control. So 
 virulent and insistent became the strictures upon the Ad- 
 ministration that, though Mr. Burleson announced that the 
 land wires would be returned as soon as Congress should 
 make provision therefor, the country was surprised the very 
 next day, May 2, by his turning them back on that date with- 
 out awaiting further "provision;" and the cables were re- 
 turned more than a week earlier than the announced date. 
 
 The most vitriolic of these attacks upon the Administra- 
 tion came from the President's own party, one group of 
 whom cabled the President at Paris demanding that Mr. 
 Burleson be immediately relieved of his office. 
 
 The two main reasons for the inveterate attacks upon 
 the Administration's wire control were inefficiency of service 
 and attempted political manipulation, including government 
 ownership. But the immediate cause was the refusal of 
 telegraph officials, under government control, to transmit a 
 message from the New York World offering other news- 
 papers an article in which Mr. Burleson was criticised. 
 Said Collier's Weekly: "The newspapers are making a 
 fight for self-preservation." And the veteran journalist of 
 the Southland, Henry Watterson, declared : 
 
152 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 That war involves autocracy I understand well enough, but in the 
 field, not in the White House; over the international situation, not 
 over our domestic affairs. ... I reject, loathe and spit upon the plea 
 that, because of war, the press should abdicate its duty to the people. 
 
 Mr. Burleson undertook to answer the complaints at a 
 meeting of representatives of business organizations and of 
 postal service, held in Washington in April, 1919. But it 
 was only when the wires were taken out of his hands that 
 the wrath of the people subsided. 
 
 It is a matter of historic interest that postal air service 
 was established in the most pressing of war activities, on 
 May 15, 1918. The first route lay between New York and 
 Washington. This route was later discontinued, because 
 it was said mail between the two terminals was delayed 
 rather than hastened by the service. 
 
 The War Department at first operated the mail planes; 
 but on August 12, 1918, the transfer of the equipment and 
 flying operations of the aerial mail service to the Post- 
 Office Department was effected. The New York-Chicago 
 route was inaugurated the following December, and in three 
 legs: New York to Belief onte, Pennsylvania, 215 miles; 
 thence to Cleveland, 250 miles; the last, to Chicago, 323 
 miles. Each had a midway emergency station. In Decem- 
 ber the War Department turned over to the Post-Office 
 Department one hundred other airplanes, it having been 
 found feasible to carry mail by air. These included large 
 bombing planes capable of carrying a ton or more. 
 
 Though there had been doubt among aeronautic au- 
 thorities as to the ability to maintain the service in all kinds 
 of weather, the Post-Office department demonstrated its 
 practicability. During the second year of Its service, postal 
 airplanes covered 498,664 miles, carrying 538,734 pounds 
 of mail, with a reported average of 87 per cent perfect per- 
 formance, including all conditions of weather. This is far 
 higher than the train service, which is placed at 62 per cent 
 on time. 
 
The Post-Office Department 153 
 
 America's best ideals must be saved to the world, and 
 demagogic performances smothered. The nation has put 
 too much into its Post-Office Department, and its operation 
 conies too close to the daily life of the people to have it 
 turned into a politician's paradise. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 One of the undimmed glories of America is the liberty 
 of the press and freedom of speech. This is an enduring 
 heritage from her foundation, and it shall continue to the 
 last roll-call of her free sons and daughters. 
 
 If ever it shall be lost, then America of noble tradition 
 is lost, replaced by an alien America. If ever it shall wane 
 or grow dim, it will be because of sinister influences seek- 
 ing, not America's honor, but personal aggrandizement. It 
 can be brought about only by some stupendous cataclysm, 
 when a seeming danger may close the eyes of her citizenship 
 to the real danger. 
 
 There was suggestion of this during the Great War. 
 There was evident at the very fountain-head of the gov- 
 ernment an autocratic assumption of responsibility for 
 public opinion. The nation came to be governed by organ- 
 ized opinion. It was a result of this system that the Ameri- 
 can people were kept in ignorance as to the conduct of the 
 war which they fought, for which so extravagant a price 
 was paid. 
 
 As a means of getting to the public such information as 
 it was deemed proper for the public to have there was es- 
 tablished a daily newspaper, under the control of the gov- 
 ernment, edited and managed by the committee on publicity 
 with George Creel at its head. This was the Official Bul- 
 letin. While this assumed to give out orders and state- 
 ments that were deemed proper from the various branches 
 of the government service, it was turned largely into a pub- 
 licity political bureau to bring the President into favorable 
 light, by the shading and coloring that were given to much 
 
 154 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 155 
 
 that appeared in its columns. Hence, despite the fact that 
 the committee's publicity matter was supported by the Gov- 
 ernment, it soon fell into discredit. The New York World, 
 an Administration organ, declared the President of the 
 American Newspaper Publishers' Association demanded 
 that the "incompetent and disloyal" head of the committee 
 be let out. Stung by criticism, Mr. Creel himself admitted 
 in a public meeting in Philadelphia, that the ostensible pur- 
 pose of the committee was a failure. He stated: "The 
 fundamentally important news of the war for the enlighten- 
 ment of Americans has been available, but not one paper in 
 a hundred has had the brains to publish it." He referred to 
 the Official Bulletin. 
 
 There were three classes of American public opinion 
 at the outbreak of the war in Europe : A powerful minor- 
 ity, clear-eyed on the fundamentals of the issue ; a viciously 
 pro-German, unscrupulous, determined, and abundantly 
 financed class; and that composed of persons who knew 
 nothing about the issues raised by the attack of the German 
 people upon civilization, and who cared less, known as 
 "neutrals" the class who inspired timid statesmanship 
 with a fear at the ballot-box. It was at this time, when the 
 Administration should have been outspoken and should have 
 aroused the American people to their danger in clarion 
 notes, that the nation was deliberately permitted, if not 
 actively encouraged, by the Administration to drift or to 
 be carried away with pro-German propaganda put out by 
 such men as Dernberg. The nation thus faced the home 
 problem, as serious as that across the water. And while 
 the newspapers felt it to be necessary to deal with it by 
 drastic methods, they found themselves already shackled 
 by the Administration forces. Learning of dangerous hap- 
 penings beneath the surface, they dared not print them. It 
 was practically impossible to use facts in a way to benefit 
 the country by speeding up the war. The newspapers, by 
 assisting in the lynching of public opinion, had created such 
 
156 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 a disordered state of mind in the country that if they them- 
 selves had raised their voices to full strength in protest 
 against inefficiency they would have been denounced as "pro- 
 German." That fear hung over the head of everybody. 
 The very incompetents who should have been shown up and 
 thrown out sought refuge behind this psychological bar- 
 rier. Newspapers above all things dreaded that German- 
 propaganda charge, and rightly. The country was so 
 worked up that any newspaper might have been ruined by 
 falling under that suspicion, however baseless. The trouble 
 was that the public, that was getting its denatured news 
 from the government news factories, had nothing upon 
 which to base an intelligent and honest opinion. Congress 
 itself was all but terrorized. 1 
 
 How far American newspapers would have sunk in this 
 slough into which the Administration had driven them, had 
 not they received encouragement from some strong man in 
 a commanding position, it would be difficult to say. Roose- 
 velt in stentorian tones was proclaiming Americanism at all 
 times. Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Military Af- 
 fairs Committee, in his New York speech charged that in 
 some branches the War Department had almost ceased to 
 function ; and he gave courage to some of the more daring 
 newspapers in the investigation of the War Department 
 which he conducted and which did so much to speed up the 
 war. His boldness brought forth a volley of denunciation 
 from President Wilson. The titanic struggle brought to 
 Washington Theodore Roosevelt who declared he cared 
 less what they were saying about Jiim personally than he 
 did as to what the Administration was trying to do to Sen- 
 ator Chamberlain. The issue was immediately formulated 
 between the Administration forces seeking to cover up reck- 
 less squandering and more reckless benumbing of the Ameri- 
 can conscience on the one hand, and on the other the forces 
 that were urging America's utmost in getting into the war, 
 
 * George Rothwell Brown in North American Review for June, 1919. 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 157 
 
 represented by such men as Roosevelt and Chamberlain. 
 It gave the thoroughgoing American newspapers a new 
 courage and a new dignity. 
 
 The arrogant methods which were actually applied to 
 American newspapers by the Administration, and to which 
 the American newspapers out of a sheer feeling of patriot- 
 ism submitted, out-distanced anything that the American 
 mind could conceive in advance. If anything appeared in 
 some newspaper more fearless than the rest, that was dis- 
 pleasing to the Administration press agent, the editor would 
 receive a haughty communication, stating: "please make a 
 correction and send us a copy of the paper containing it!" 
 It is almost unthinkable that self-respecting newspapers 
 would ever be compelled to submit to such autocratic im- 
 perialism. But the few Washington correspondents during 
 the war, who revolted at the surrender of a noble profes- 
 sion, and who still undertook to write frankly the truth as 
 they found it in occasional undefiled channels, were threat- 
 ened and insulted. 
 
 The situation became unbearable. In consequence of 
 the Administration method there was a steady decline in 
 the morale of newspaper men in Washington. Their con- 
 ferences with responsible heads of departments or bu- 
 reaus degenerated into farces, and correspondents who had 
 been proud of their profession lost that pride and all but 
 their self-respect. The situation became so bad in Wash- 
 ington during the war period that practically every little 
 minor official had a press agent of his own for his own per- 
 sonal glorification. 
 
 It was this system that worked so well so long as the 
 American people knew nothing better. Denatured news 
 which turned the noble and highly responsible calling of 
 news gathering to doing the will of incompetent or head- 
 strong officials, was all that the American people were al- 
 lowed to receive. It was this kind of news that told the 
 people, and led them to accept as fact, the story of a mar- 
 
158 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 velous sea battle on July 4, which was never fought, and 
 made possible the Liberty Motor hoax; the kind of news 
 that caused uselessly many lives to be lost because American 
 soldiers had to fight hand to hand with the veterans of the 
 German army in the Argonne Forest, looking anxiously into 
 the skies for the fleets of Yankee airplanes which they had 
 read about in every deceived American newspaper, but 
 which never came to their aid because they did not exist. 
 
 A form of control exercised over newspapers defied all 
 but an official inquiry. To quote the editor of a daily in 
 Portland, Maine: 
 
 Two editors of my acquaintance have been called to the phone 
 recently by local government officials who notified them that if fur- 
 ther material of the nature mentioned was published their papers 
 would be suppressed. 
 
 This occurred just previous to the Maine election early 
 in September. The matter referred to was solely Republi- 
 can political matter, and its only bearing on the war lay in 
 the fact that it aimed to prevent the election of Democrats 
 in the place of Republicans of sound war record. 
 
 When the President sought to obtain from Congress a 
 drastic censorship law, there was one time that Congress re- 
 fused to become a rubber stamp in his hands. The remorse- 
 lessness with which the censorship could be used by the 
 Administration was clearly manifested in the fictitious manu- 
 factures that were sent out from Paris while the World 
 Congress was in session. It was also shown how it could 
 be abused when Washington was giving out that the total 
 of American losses in the war would not exceed 100,000 
 at the very time when it was well known that they would 
 exceed 250,000. And this was after the armistice was 
 signed when the Administration felt that the American peo- 
 ple could not stand the truth about our battle casualties. 
 
 Early in August, 1918, Mr. Burleson announced that, 
 in order to "provide for the press the most efficient wire 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 159 
 
 facilities under government control," he purposed taking 
 over the news wire. The intent of this was plain to all 
 newspaper men, for the u news wire" had long been known 
 as the best organized part of the entire telegraph service. 
 It had been given preference over market and commercial 
 wires, and was always the first wire up after disasters such 
 as the Galveston flood, the San Francisco fire, or the loss 
 of the "Titanic." It was always as nearly perfect as any- 
 thing human could make it ; and it was less in need of atten- 
 tion than any other mechanical device in the country. 
 
 The fact of the matter is that Mr. Burleson's bring- 
 ing the news service under his control and the political in- 
 terests he represented was to mean a censorship of all news 
 not by the usually frank method of the blue pencil, but by 
 the winding method of official delay, holding it up until its 
 news value was lost. It was easy for Burleson and his 
 associates to say to correspondents handling material ob- 
 noxious to him, that "the pressure of official business" re- 
 quired the full capacity of the news wires. 
 
 When the New York Nation was suppressed and op- 
 pressed by the Post-Office Department, it threatened to 
 establish its rights by carrying to the Supreme Court the 
 case of its disbarment from the mails. In this manner it 
 succeeded in having the Post-Office Department remove the 
 ban against its circulation. 
 
 Referring to its experience with Mr. Burleson it stated: 
 
 Obviously, what happens to the Nation itself is, despite its fifty- 
 three years of honorable and patriotic service, of little importance 
 compared to the principles at stake. . . . Freedom of dissent is a true 
 national safety valve; more than that, it is a mark of true democracy 
 without which in war time any pretension to democracy lays itself 
 open to the charge of hypocrisy. 
 
 It was apparent to all intelligent observers that Mr. 
 Burleson was no longer merely seeking 1 to prevent sedition 
 and treason, but he aimed more to control public opinion. 
 
160 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The one central will which dominated the powers of 
 government in Washington was that one in the White 
 House. Gathering into his own hands all the powers of 
 press and legislature, he parceled them out according to his 
 pleasure, to bureaus and extra-governmental boards and 
 commissions. It was impossible for one man to keep track 
 of and to disseminate all the news, though all was retained 
 in his grasp. The news agent developed. He became an 
 important figure in Washington to newspapers of the coun- 
 try be became a dominant figure. Two institutions sprang 
 into existence fatal to the free press the press agent, and 
 its corollary, the official denial. These two were insepa- 
 rable. The institution thus developed, the press agent 
 became a pernicious factor in the formulating of public 
 opinion. It developed, during the war, into the like of 
 which this country had never before known. The "denial" 
 by a government official was as essential to government- 
 owned publicity as was the press agent himself. The pur- 
 pose of the denial was to strike the venturesome newspaper 
 that would seek to uncover official fiction by invading the 
 forbidden fields of fact. Both publishers and news gath- 
 erers, in many instances, felt it to be a patriotic duty to 
 close their eyes to what was obviously going on, and accept 
 the output of the official news factories and send it broad- 
 cast, accepting the theory that in so doing they were per- 
 forming a conscientious duty. 
 
 It became evident, after a little close observation, that 
 the activities of the Administration in suppressing news- 
 papers were directed not solely against pro-German publi- 
 cations. The Christian Science Monitor of Boston, a news- 
 paper in no way radical in its editorial policy and very con- 
 servative in its news policy, was denied circulation for 
 three days as a punishment for its publication of the avia- 
 tion report and comment thereon. The Detroit News was 
 barred, for the same reason, from circulation in Canada, 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 161 
 
 where it circulates 30,000 copies. The absurdity of this 
 action was seen in the fact that its direct competitor for 
 the Canadian circulation, the Montreal Star, published the 
 committee's report almost in full and, of course, without 
 punishment. The New York Times, never accused of di- 
 vulging military secrets, suffered the penalty of having its 
 foreign edition containing the report suppressed without 
 notification. 
 
 Commenting on these facts Senator Lodge, in an au- 
 thorized interview, said: 
 
 The purpose of the government is plain. If material appears 
 which the government says cannot be sent abroad, that will tend to 
 make every newspaper refuse to publish that matter. The effect of 
 this governmental order would be to prevent the publication of any- 
 thing relating to the aircraft situation in the newspapers by refusing 
 the mails to them to go abroad. All important newspapers send more 
 or less copies to Europe. If the publication of any matter will pre- 
 vent their going abroad, cost them money, involve the loss of postage 
 and all of that, of course, they will omit such matter altogether, and 
 it will never reach the American people. . . . 
 
 In addition to all this, reports have come to me that many small 
 newspapers throughout the country fear to make any independent 
 report of, or any independent comment on, the news of the day be- 
 cause of coercion, and the attitude taken by most of them is the easy 
 one of preferring existence on the government's terms rather than 
 the surely hazardous one of attempting to perform a difficult duty 
 toward their readers. . . . 
 
 If it is possible to prevent the full text and meaning of such a 
 report as that of the Senate Sub-Committee on Aviation from reach- 
 ing all classes of American citizens, then how are our people, who 
 deserve to know the truth about their war, for it is emphatically their 
 war, to be sure that any of the information being served them is reli- 
 able? If the corps of specially trained writers accustomed to serve 
 the newspapers from Washington and other chief centers is to have 
 its opportunity for expression choked off, then who henceforth will 
 have confidence in the dry official reports, relieved only by the ques- 
 tionable interpretation of an official press bureau? 
 
1 62 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The effect on the people was inevitable. Deprived of 
 fact, they often ran into fancy, forming erroneous conclu- 
 sions upon misinformation. Public opinion was lynched. 
 Freedom of thought for the first time in American history 
 was suppressed. Only a few brave voices were heard in 
 the land. 
 
 The evidence of the abject servitude of the Associated 
 Press was made notable by a fulsome eulogy of the wonder- 
 ful results of the diplomacy of Edward M. House abroad 
 which was spread all over the country in an Associated 
 Press dispatch from Paris under date of November 25, 
 1918. It undertook to establish the fact that upon his ar- 
 rival there he "found little disposition among American and 
 European friends to accept as a totality the framework of 
 peace as expressed by President Wilson." And making it 
 plain that through his efforts the desired object of the Ad- 
 ministration was fully realized. 
 
 With the Associated Press and other press agencies 
 under its authority, the Administration not only distributed 
 but manufactured the news of the day to suit its own exi- 
 gencies. 
 
 Shortly after the beginning of the war, the various news 
 agencies, such as the Associated Press and the United Press, 
 voluntarily announced that they would send to their clients 
 only such material as would conform to government re- 
 quirements. While the attempt was made to have this 
 appear as a restriction to prevent the circulation of infor- 
 mation of value to the enemy, in effect it became a political 
 control denying circulation of all facts which it was proper 
 that the American public should know, but which certain 
 agents of the Administration might desire not to have 
 known. Such an instance was that of the report of the 
 Senate Committee on Military Affairs on aircraft condi- 
 tions. This was a matter of momentous import to the 
 American public. Yet only one newspaper, the New York 
 Times, carried it in full. The Associated Press sent out a 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 163 
 
 relatively small amount of it, and that made up largely 
 of generalizations and evidently a dispatch previously sub- 
 mitted for official approval. The reason given was that 
 the papers feared to publish what the Administration de- 
 sired to have kept under cover. The reason officials gave 
 was they did not wish it to reach the enemy, as it would re- 
 veal the military secrets of the United States Government. 
 
 Senator Lodge very truthfully stated on the floor of 
 the Senate: "Our enemies know the contents of the re- 
 port, our Allies know the contents of it, and the only people 
 who do not know about it are the people of the United 
 States." It would hardly be denied that the people of the 
 United States were the ones who had the most right to 
 know what a committee of their senators had to say after 
 a full investigation of the aircraft situation. 
 
 Had the newspapers submitted to the outraged sense of 
 decency in the action of Mr. Baker in refusing newspaper 
 distribution containing the Senate committee's report on the 
 aircraft collapse, it would have meant the end of a free 
 press. It would have marked the beginning of the decay 
 of American manhood. It would have foreshadowed the 
 killing at home of the American freedom for which the 
 nation made sacrifices so many and so great on the fields of 
 France. 2 
 
 Already the cry was raised by the more alert American 
 newspapers, Are we to have a reptile press? And with 
 abundant reason, in view of the methods pursued by the 
 Administration in seeking to create a public opinion through 
 the news columns that would exalt and magnify each official 
 under Administration influence and who had his own press 
 agent. 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt's expose was the first complete view 
 given the public of how the Administration favored power- 
 ful papers that fawned upon its acts. Yet it was well 
 known to intelligent editors who publish throughout the 
 
 'Philadelphia North American, September 9, 1918. 
 
164 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 country that the Administration sought control of the press 
 through rewards of favor and threats of punishment. 
 
 One of the first demands made by President Wilson, 
 after the declaration of war, was the enactment of a law 
 that would have empowered him to suppress arbitrarily any 
 critical publication. To its credit Congress declined to 
 accede to this. There was, however, a measure enacted 
 sufficiently drastic to intimidate many papers that did not 
 flatter the Administration. Often the position of the pub- 
 lic press was humiliating and intolerable for loyal American 
 papers. The Administration undertook to supply informa- 
 tion deemed proper for the public to have, and issued daily 
 great masses of official statements, not only reciting alleged 
 facts, but urging Administration aims and policies. In 
 large part, the statements were inaccurate, misleading, and 
 conflicting. Newspapers disseminating this material knew 
 that in so doing they were often helping to deceive their 
 readers. But there was nothing else for them to do if 
 they were to continue as newspapers. It was sent to all 
 alike; and if any of the flagrant official misrepresentations 
 were modified or omitted, the offending newspaper laid it- 
 self open to the charge of not "supporting the govern- 
 ment." Few newspapers had sufficient command of the 
 facts to make it safe for them to risk a controversy by chal- 
 lenging statements they knew to be untrue. The method 
 was simple but deadly. 
 
 As a whole, the system brought the American press 
 under a reign of terrorism, few of the newspapers daring to 
 challenge the displeasure of an Administration which had 
 shown that it did not scruple to use the postal service and 
 the Department of Justice to exact servility. Few of them 
 had the strength or the courage to risk such an assault as 
 President Wilson made upon Senator Chamberlain when 
 he undertook to tell the nation the truth. 
 
 One Philadelphia newspaper, a keen analyst of the Ad- 
 ministration's acts and one that stood notably at all times 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 165 
 
 for unadulterated Americanism and always firmly against 
 the murderous tactics of Prussianism, whether in Europe or 
 under the sea or on the sea or in the air or in the German 
 propaganda in America, had an experience that is worthy 
 of permanent record, though a shameful one for the Ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 The case is not isolated or singular. It is typical of 
 the entire Administration method in dealing with that class 
 of papers which was so independent that it would not fawn 
 upon Administration officials, and was so thoroughly Ameri- 
 can that it would not lower its standard for any false propa- 
 ganda, German or other. Because of this the story is re- 
 corded in substantially its own words: 
 
 In discussing editorially, February 4, 1918, the Liberty Motor, 
 it remarked that soon the original model "was found to be obsolete" 
 and "was scrapped and the name adopted for a new and radically 
 different model." A few days later the newspaper received an 
 insolent letter from one Robert C. Benchley, written on the letter 
 paper of the chairman of the aircraft board, stating that the news- 
 paper had "put itself in the position of American representative of the 
 Berliner Tageblatt" by spreading such "rumors." There had been 
 only the "normal" change, said the writer of the letter, from eight 
 to twelve cylinders, and he bitterly denounced the suggestion that that 
 meant the original model had been found "obsolete." A newspaper 
 less sure of its facts might have been alarmed by this "official" re- 
 buke, with its impudent charge of disloyalty. The newspaper simply 
 kept on telling the truth until, on May 15 (more than three months 
 later), the War Department, in a formal description of the Liberty 
 Motor, itself employed the very word the newspaper had used, when 
 the report said: "The first sample was an 8-cylinder model. This, 
 however, was never put into production, as advices from France indi- 
 cated that demands for increased power would make the 8-cylinder 
 model obsolete before it could be produced." Again, on March 25, 
 the same newspaper printed over the day's account of the great Ger- 
 man drive a 7-column headline in more conservative form than the 
 dispatches, reading: "British Line Bends, But Holds," and on the 
 same page a 2-column head, strictly accurate, reading: "Germans 
 
1 66 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Capture Peronne: Berlin Boasts of Victory." At midnight, news- 
 boys selling the paper were threatened by a secret-service agent ; who 
 later took into custody the office employe in charge of the boys and 
 conducted him nearly to the federal building before he would state 
 what charge he intended to make against him. When he said that the 
 newsboys were giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" by calling out 
 that the Germans had captured a town and added that this was a 
 part of the North Americans pro-Germanism, the preposterous 
 charge, once stated in words, appeared to frighten him, he lost his 
 nerve, released the employe, with a warning that the newspaper would 
 hear from the Department of Justice. When the newspaper under- 
 took to ascertain who the agent was, the department declined to per- 
 mit his name to be known. 
 
 Einer Barfod, of the staff of the same paper, is of Danish birth. 
 His passionate loyalty to America is equaled only by his detestation 
 of Germany. Yet from government circles there emanated an insin- 
 uation that he was a German spy employed by a German sheet. 
 Reginald Wright Kauffman, a former correspondent of the same 
 newspaper at the front, a member of the vigilantes, a group of writers 
 standing for Americanism above all else, and standing for it when 
 the Administration was truckling to German frightfulness, and whose 
 utter devotion to the cause of the United States and the Allies was 
 so well known that he had confidential relations with Lloyd George, 
 Mr. Bryce, high French statesmen and General Foch, because he 
 questioned the wisdom of some Administration policies the whisper 
 was sent out against him that he was pro-German, and agents of the 
 Department of Justice were instructed to examine his record. The 
 system of intimidation was so villainous that even the name of the 
 editor of the newspaper, Van Valkenburg, was seized upon with the 
 false suggestion that he was a German, though it is no more German 
 than Wilson and Baker, and his ancestors had been in America 250 
 years before some of the Bolsheviki who fawn upon the Administra- 
 tion had set feet on American soil. 
 
 The revolting disclosures respecting the system is that seditious 
 utterances against the United States might be safely made by news- 
 papers which adulate the President, while truthful and helpful criti- 
 cism of the Administration had become dangerous for publications 
 which were wholly and devotedly loyal to the country, and it was 
 shown that the price of immunity was undiluted servility. Just criti- 
 
The Press and Public Opinion 167 
 
 cism of governmental blundering and inefficiency mortally offended 
 the authorities which tolerated downright disloyalty from journals 
 which flattered the President. 3 
 
 Perhaps in all the developments that the Great War 
 produced there was none more sinister in character than the 
 lowering of the American press to idealize an individual, 
 cloud an issue, confuse public opinion, as seen from the 
 point of view of American institutions of liberty. It bred 
 subserviency, disguised failure, clothed incompetency with 
 the plumage of efficiency. Back of the wall of secrecy and 
 deceit, reared by the agile manipulators of public opinion 
 throughout the war, blunders were made without exposure 
 and repeated the frightful course because of that very lack. 
 Gold was dissipated without detection, fictitious personages 
 were created out of nothingness and pigmies magnified to 
 the stature of giants. 4 
 
 The plan of the Administration was merely aided by the 
 surrender of Congress itself. Congress had no press agent, 
 had no need for any under conditions that existed. As a 
 consequence, congressmen were as ignorant of what was 
 going on in Administration circles as any one else. The 
 only real source of news was an inaccessible figure who ter- 
 minated his intercourse with newspaper men shortly after 
 proclaiming the policy of "pitiless publicity," and who re- 
 sumed those relations only after his return from Paris 
 when he found the country in an uproar over the League 
 of Nations. 
 
 As illustrative of the method in vogue, Mr. Taft's ad- 
 vocacy of the League of Nations through news channels was 
 given the widest publicity. Although long a private citizen, 
 as an advocate of the President's program he had a wider 
 use of newspaper columns than he could have obtained when 
 
 3 Philadelphia North American, May 30, 1918. 
 
 4 A very enlightening contribution to the literature of the war upon 
 the method adopted by the Administration for the purpose of formulating 
 public opinion in covering up its own defects which it did not dare to per- 
 mit to come to public notice, by George Rothwell Brown in the North 
 American Review for June, 1919. 
 
1 68 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 he was President, except in interviews and signed statements. 
 
 As a result of the thoroughness of the Administration 
 in securing control of the news channels, by fair means or 
 foul, there came to exist in the United States a control of 
 the press and a suppression of vital news and public discus- 
 sion which it would be difficult to parallel in English-speak- 
 ing countries except to go back 300 years. 
 
 On the great issues of the war with Germany the Ameri- 
 can newspapers were almost universally right. Loyal to 
 the government, they were far in advance of the Adminis- 
 tration in upholding the views of liberty and proclaiming 
 the duty of America. There were perhaps not to exceed a 
 half-dozen that failed to exemplify the principles of democ- 
 racy and international justice. 
 
 Never shall a free press loyal to free institutions be 
 stifled for political partisan purposes or personal aggran- 
 dizement. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 LIQUOR AND VICE 
 
 An invariable accompaniment of war has been the social 
 evil. And the social evil accepts and demands intoxicating 
 liquor as its constant companion and partner. It were not 
 just to President Wilson to charge that he in any manner or 
 degree supported the former. But as indicated elsewhere, 1 
 it appeared to be a marked characteristic of his to be found 
 on the wrong side of important matters affecting the great 
 public; so he was found on the great matter of dealing with 
 the latter. 
 
 But members of his cabinet who had to take care of the 
 interests of the fighting boys of the nation and to look after 
 the morale, not only of these boys but of the nation at 
 large, accepted the challenge and met the issue squarely 
 for the nation's interests. It was a matter of large con- 
 cern to the millions of homes whence these boys came; it 
 was a matter of grave interest for the nation's future. 
 
 For decades the liquor problem was becoming more 
 acute as a political problem; for it had entered the political 
 arena under the guise of the old political parties which, 
 in large measure, it controlled, the liquor power seeking to 
 keep itself hidden from public view. But the activities of 
 this real power were being uncovered just before the Great 
 War; and when the war forced to the front the necessity 
 of conserving the nation's man-power and its fuel and food 
 supplies, and of its utmost efficiency in workmanship in war 
 preparations, the opposition to using any of these to accom- 
 modate the politcal and commercialized liquor traffic be- 
 came more emphatic. And when the Senate's investigation 
 1 Chapter on "Wilson and Wilsonism." 
 
 169 
 
170 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 of the pro-German propaganda bared the fact that liquor's 
 interests were inseparably intertwined with that propaganda, 
 the opposition became an avalanche. 
 
 As to the social vice, it is a matter of history that Con- 
 gress had taken cognizance of it as an interstate affair some 
 years previously in the Mann Act; in war time it took dras- 
 tic action in dealing with its associate evil. For war imparts 
 new life and new energy to both; and it was realized that at 
 such a time both must be handled with energy, the training- 
 camp being a particularly fruitful field for their nefarious 
 trade at the time when the best that is in man is demanded 
 for the increased burdens. Said the eminent Englishman, 
 Lord Haldane : "If the country were free from tuberculosis 
 and venereal disease, the nation would have strength and vi- 
 tality to undertake almost any burden." And the British 
 Royal Commission, seeking to overcome the recognized 
 handicap, declared that venereal disease was responsible 
 for more than fifty per cent of the incapacity of the race 
 to have children. It aims straight at the power of the race 
 to perpetuate itself. Likewise, Surgeon-General Gorgas 
 of the United States, in urging measures that were later 
 successfully adopted to control venereal disease within the 
 American army during the war, stated that if it were pos- 
 sible to get rid of either all of the wounds or all of venereal 
 disease he would prefer to be rid of the latter. 
 
 The first attack upon the social evil during the war 
 was made by the Council of National Defense and the Com- 
 mission on Training-Camp Activities. It was a hard fight 
 against the forces of evil organized for selfish purposes 
 even against the boys who were to do the fighting and 
 against the very morale of the nation. The success of 
 the crusade is shown by the fact that one hundred and ten 
 cities abolished the "red-light" districts. Laws and regula- 
 tions were adopted in the various states requiring physi- 
 cians to report all such cases, as other communicable dis- 
 eases were reported. 
 
Liquor and Vice 171 
 
 The local draft boards had everywhere uncovered the 
 ugly fact that about five times as much venereal disease ex- 
 isted in civil life as was found proportionately in the army. 
 This determined the army and navy to carry its fight into 
 civil life. In doing so it might have met opposition, had 
 not wide circles of civilian life, which otherwise would have 
 remained ignorant and complacent, become as thoroughly 
 aroused at the conditions thus uncovered as did the army. 
 And what Great Britain and the United States undertook 
 in the way of fighting this fearful thing came as a result of 
 this unwelcome discovery. The fight carried on by the 
 United States Public Health Service after the war became 
 a matter of utmost importance. 
 
 But this grievous state of affairs was a sad admission of 
 inefficiency in American municipal government. The evil 
 power had gained the upper hand largely because of co- 
 operation or connivance on the part of the local authorities. 
 Great cities, when called upon by the federal authorities 
 to close these places of infamy, at the beginning of the war, 
 declared that it could not be done, that the police forces 
 were incapable of it. Secretary of the Navy Daniels in- 
 formed, first the local, then the state authorities, that unless 
 they were able to abate the evil, he would either withdraw 
 the men from training at those places, or else would take 
 possession by the strong arm of the navy. It had become a 
 question whether these corrupt and corrupting forces were 
 mightier than the municipal and state authorities, and had 
 become so powerful as to dictate to the national govern- 
 ment in time of war. 
 
 It was this unyielding attitude toward these twin vices 
 that brought down upon his head the malediction of power- 
 ful interests and powerful newspapers. His efforts to save 
 the men under him from these evils caused vituperations 
 to be heaped upon him which one would think would have 
 been heaped rather upon the evils he was seeking to be rid 
 of. It was the very old story over: selfishness seeking its 
 
172 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 own, at no matter what cost in money, health, self-respect, 
 and morale for the sake of the nation. 
 
 But while war is the prime opportunity of these evils, it 
 is also the opportunity to organize against and to combat 
 them. In a public statement touching this phase of the 
 matter, Secretary Daniels declared: 
 
 One of the compensations of the tragedy of the war is the fact 
 that an enlightened opinion is behind the organized campaign to pro- 
 tect the youth against venereal disease. The campaign begun in war 
 to insure the military fitness of men for fighting is quite as necessary 
 to save men for civil efficiency. 
 
 And future generations of those who had a peculiar interest 
 in the sailor boys, many of whom came from Christian 
 homes, will rise to bless the Secretary for his determined 
 action in seeking to rid naval stations of these training 
 dens of vice that sprang into existence as if by magic as 
 soon as training stations were opened when the country 
 entered the Great War. The nation was placed under a 
 great debt for his faithfulness to the trust reposed in him. 
 Secretary of War Baker likewise took advanced ground 
 in this important matter. It had ever been declared that 
 the evil was an inevitable accompaniment of war; that where 
 armies were gathered, there it was sure to be found; that it 
 could not be resisted. Secretary Baker declared not only 
 that it could be prevented, but that it must be prevented. 
 In a letter to mayors of cities he plainly stated: 
 
 The only practical policy which presents itself in relation to this 
 problem is the policy of absolute repression. This policy involves, of 
 course, constant vigilance on the part of the police. 
 
 Thus he was strongly backing up the Council of National 
 Defense and the Commission on Training-Camp Activities, 
 and Secretary Daniels was in hearty accord. 
 
 Yet the forces of unrighteousness continued their efforts 
 to thwart these measures; and just prior to the middle of 
 
Liquor and Vice 173 
 
 August, 1918, as a police regulation badly needed, and its 
 enforcement no less required because of the incompetence 
 or indifference of the police of the various cities where camps 
 were located, there were issued by both Secretary Baker and 
 Secretary Daniels, the result of conferences held by repre- 
 sentatives of their departments with the Department of 
 Justice and the Training-Camp Commission, orders against 
 prostitution within a radius of ten miles of any army or navy 
 camp, station, post or fort, and against the aiding or abet- 
 ting of it in any way. 
 
 In the same manner an effort was made in good faith 
 to break up the sale of intoxicants in the vicinity of camps 
 and to those in the camps; and stringent measures were 
 taken to enforce the orders. Special care was taken to seek 
 to instil into the minds of the men in army and camp the 
 value of a clean life, not only while in the fighting forces 
 of the country but for success after the war should have 
 concluded. It was well expressed in a crude manner by 
 a somewhat crude mind: "If the man in the army cannot 
 mind what he learned there how to take care of himself 
 after he gets out, it is all the worse for him; I'll say they 
 learned me somethings I didn't know about." 
 
 One of the important results attained by the unceasing 
 efforts in behalf of the men made during the war was this 
 looking to the future welfare. It set civilian agencies at 
 work that had been dormant. Said Chairman Fosdick of 
 the War Department Commission on Training-Camp Ac- 
 tivities, in his report to the Secretary of War in 1918 : 
 
 It has been our purpose to keep the man in uniform healthy and 
 clean, physically and mentally, by safeguarding him against evil influ- 
 ences and surrounding him with opportunity for sane, beneficial occu- 
 pation for his spare time. 
 
 And after stating that the army section and the navy section 
 were so closely related in method and material as to be 
 treated jointly, he adds: 
 
174 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Their purpose is to give to every soldier and sailor in the service 
 of the United States such essential facts regarding the nature and 
 prevention of venereal disease as will contribute to the protection of 
 his health and to the efficiency of his services as a fighting man. 
 
 These activities began in August, 1917, under the direction 
 of the Council of National Defense, and were transferred, 
 early in 1918, to the Commission on Training-Camp Ac- 
 tivities. And it was the more than 50,000 letters written 
 to citizens in 700 communities requesting them to investigate 
 local conditions and to urge new legislation in support of 
 the government's program against vice and liquor, that 
 brought the communities into full co-operation with the 
 army and navy. 
 
 The annual reports 2 of both the Secretary of War and 
 the Secretary of the Navy for 1918, stress the conditions 
 under which the men trained for the Great War, both in 
 the army and the navy; and state how men that had for- 
 merly been turned away because affected by the vile disease 
 were now accepted into the service and cured. Secretary 
 Daniels called attention to the establishment of the interde- 
 partmental social hygiene board in the effort to abate and 
 prevent vice conditions throughout the country. 
 
 In furtherance of this general clean-up plan, fraternal 
 organizations and commercial bodies wrote the Surgeon- 
 General that they were ready to stand by him shoulder to 
 shoulder in the work. And medical journals and physicians 
 everywhere enlisted in the fight; as did employers in industry 
 by awakening their employes to the gravity of the danger. 
 And the United States Public Health Service entered upon 
 a campaign of education for the public, immediately the war 
 ended. In December, 1918, among other things it stated: 
 
 Whatever the cost of this campaign, whether that cost is counted 
 in terms of money, scientific striving, self-sacrificing, educational 
 
 3 Both of these reports are full of food for reflection on this vital mat- 
 ter. 
 
Liquor and Vice 175 
 
 effort, or wise restraint in personal conduct, it will be immeasureably 
 exceeded by the gains. 
 
 The efforts of Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels 
 to keep the army and navy free from the damning influence 
 of intoxicants were seconded by Director-General of Rail- 
 roads McAdoo in an order of wide influence issued August 
 12, 1918, wherein he stated: 
 
 The sale of liquors and intoxicants of every character in dining- 
 cars, restaurants, and railroad stations under federal control shall be 
 discontinued immediately. 
 
 In the midst of all this effort to keep the fighting boys 
 in the best possible trim and to return them to their home 
 as free from the liquor taint as when they were taken thence 
 to fight the nation's battles; and in the midst of all the 
 effort to conserve man-power, fuel, food, and efficiency to 
 carry the war to a successful conclusion, there is one instance 
 in which President Wilson made an order that appears to 
 be against the liquor business and in favor of the boys. It 
 was issued June 27, 1918, promulgating regulations pro- 
 hibiting the furnishing of liquor to officers and men of the 
 army anywhere in the United States, even in private homes ; 
 and establishing dry zones of a half-mile within any camp 
 where as many as 250 men were stationed for more than 
 thirty consecutive days where there was a city permitting 
 the sale of liquors, and five miles in all other places. And 
 this order was issued upon recommendations by representa- 
 tives of the Attorney-General, the Judge Advocate General 
 of the army, and the War Department Commission on 
 Training-Camp Activities, and not upon the President's 
 initiative. 
 
 On the contrary, Secretary Baker continued to the end 
 to plead for the fighting men, even on December 6, 1918, 
 appealing to friends of the returning soldiers for assistance 
 in discontinuing the giving of intoxicating liquors to the 
 men as a part of home-coming celebrations ; 
 
176 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 A drunken soldier is a disgrace to his uniform, an insult to the 
 flag, a shame to himself, and a danger to the community. . . . 
 
 I appeal to the friends of our boys at the front to discourage this 
 abuse of hospitality. Our army in service has made a record for 
 cleanness and sobriety of which the country has the right to be proud. 
 I appeal to that pride to help the men to live up to their record. 
 
 This was the first effort on a large scale to reduce to 
 the minimum the evils of drink and the social vice in time 
 of war. Yet even in this effort, the voice of the head of 
 the Administration in support of the liquor interests, when 
 the acute stage was reached during the struggle at arms, 
 found ready echo in all parts of the land. It gave encour- 
 agement to the saloonists and the lawless elements they 
 represented. This was true of the lamentable situation 
 that arose at the great naval station at Newport, Rhode 
 Island; of the worse situation that developed at Chicago; 
 of that in Philadelphia, where the governor of the state 
 had to inform the mayor that unless the local authorities 
 could cope with the situation the state troops would be 
 used. Even little country towns in the inland Middle West 
 felt this baneful influence. 3 
 
 It was this consistent attitude on the part of President 
 Wilson toward the liquor interests of the nation that en- 
 couraged them in the hope and opportunity of waging a 
 campaign against war-time prohibition long before it was 
 authorized by Congress. After Congress had authorized 
 him to declare war-time prohibition, he delayed as long 
 
 'The small village of Blooming Prairie, Minn., is so typical an in- 
 stance of this influence that the main facts are cited. In mid-summer, 1918, 
 the saloonmen of this village, backed by some stronger but unseen hand, 
 became the nucleus of lawless bands. The state commission of public 
 safety found it necessary, owing to this condition in war time, to order 
 the saloons closed. Open defiance of this order caused the governor of the 
 state to station troops in the village to enforce the commission's orders. 
 The saloonists going to a state judge, a man of the creation of their own 
 element, undertook to hale the governor of the commonwealth, commander- 
 in-chief of the state's military forces, into court, in time of war, to answer 
 the charge of contempt of court on his part for not telling the court why 
 it was necessary to enforce the orders of the commission touching the 
 dangers of open connivance at law violation at such a time! 
 
Liquor and Vice 177 
 
 as it seemed possible. Before action by Congress, he in- 
 terfered with every move to discontinue the manufacture 
 of liquor from the beginning of the war. Immediately after 
 the country entered the war, both houses of Congress, re- 
 gardless of party lines, went on record for the suppression 
 of the liquor traffic as a necessary means of conserving 
 the nation's resources and energies for the conflict. Senti- 
 ment throughout the country backed this action. Hostile 
 orders from the White House prevented. As early as June, 
 1917, the sentiment was so strong that the House passed, 
 by a vote of 365 to 5, an amendment to a food bill, for- 
 bidding the use of foodstuffs in the manufacture of intoxi- 
 cants during the war. President Wilson intervened and 
 had the Senate adopt a compromise which stopped the mak- 
 ing of distilled spirits and empowered the President to limit 
 the alcoholic content of beer. From the time this bill be- 
 came a law in August, 1917, the President had the power 
 of life and death over the liquor industry. It was from this 
 time on that the campaign of the liquor forces became more 
 vigorous than ever. They now knew that the President was 
 with them. It was not difficult to account for the outbreaks 
 of disorder and the resistance to the orders of the state 
 commissions of public safety in war time. 
 
 The intelligence of the nation could not understand the 
 President's conduct in this matter. The pound of coal re- 
 quired to make a pint of beer he was unwilling to have saved 
 to warm shivering children, to heat school-houses and 
 churches so that they might be kept open, to save three 
 million tons a year for legitimate purposes. Moreover, 
 reports indicated that the twenty-five per cent increased out- 
 put of fuel requested by the national fuel administration 
 was promptly forthcoming in the states in which prohibition 
 of the liquor traffic was already enforced, while the other 
 states had to report that it was impossible to get out the 
 desired increase. The President's action was understood 
 only from one possible angle he was angling for the liquor 
 
178 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 vote, with the hope that he might win thereby the labor vote. 
 At all events, it was not till September 16, 1918, that he 
 issued his proclamation under Act of Congress of August 
 10, 1917, forbidding the use of foods to produce malt 
 liquors after November 30, 1918, a few months before war- 
 time prohibition became effective. And he let it be known 
 that his action was taken after a conference with the Food, 
 Fuel, and Railroad Administrations and the War Indus- 
 tries Board. Had it not been for his determined opposition, 
 suspension of the liquor traffic would have ceased nearly 
 two years earlier than it did. It was June, 1918, that an 
 irrepressible movement for war prohibition began. White 
 House Intervention postponed action until the end of Au- 
 gust, and it was November 21 (after the armistice was 
 signed) that the President signed the emergency food bill 
 with an amendment making the whole country dry for the 
 period of the war and demobilization. 
 
 Here again the President used his influence and the 
 power of his official position to defer suspension of the 
 traffic. An overwhelming majority in Congress wanted the 
 act to become effective at the end of 1918 ; President Wilson, 
 without stating any sufficient reason, urged postponement 
 to the end of 1919. This would have given the liquor busi- 
 ness another extension of twelve months. It was finally 
 agreed that the time limit be fixed at June 30, 1919. This 
 constant favor shown the business by the President led 
 Homer W. Tope, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League 
 of Pennsylvania, to criticize President Wilson's stand as u a 
 discrimination in favor of the liquor interests for which 
 the Hearst papers and the German-American Alliance have 
 been fighting for years." 
 
 While the important measure known as the war-time 
 prohibition bill was but a rider to the emergency agricul- 
 tural appropriation bill, it became the chief measure, the 
 agricultural feature being wholly forgotten. In the con- 
 troversy, the two forces, those representing the liquor in- 
 
Liquor and Vice 179 
 
 terests and those against them, showed the old "line-up of 
 booze or bread; between special privilege and war efficiency; 
 between waste and conservation; between instinctive whole- 
 hearted patriotism and alcoholic patriotism," as put by one 
 leading newspaper. The fact is, the President maneuvered 
 until he succeeded in having lodged in his hands all power 
 to commandeer all stocks of distilled liquors and to control 
 or stop the production of beer. From that time on the 
 traffic continued only by his permission. And a large propa- 
 ganda was put forth to blindfold the people a customary 
 practice of the Administration when it had something to 
 bring forth that would not bear investigation. It was on 
 this occasion that Mr. Hoover gave out his statement that 
 the diversion of a mere 40,000,000 bushels of grain an- 
 nually to the brewers was negligible, though he had been 
 sedulously instructing the housewives of the land to save 
 every ounce of flour and that the winning of the war de- 
 pended upon it. These wives of the country sat up and 
 took notice. Mr. Hoover also gave out the opinion that 
 the troops might be debauched with whiskey and gin, if not 
 allowed beer, though that matter was fully in the hands of 
 the President. 
 
 So insistent was the Administration head to have liquor 
 continued that it was declared that efficiency in shipbuilding 
 required it. Bainbridge Colby, formerly a Progressive 
 and who had held to saner views, declared for liquid effi- 
 ciency in shipbuilding; he had only opinion to offer, but 
 that opinion was that efficiency might be expected to drop 
 25 per cent without the stimulant. But this was good ma- 
 terial for extensive liquor advertising and it was used to 
 the utmost. Postmaster-General Burleson, the politician 
 of the Administration and seemingly the direct representa- 
 tive thereof, an ardent pro-liquor advocate, was against 
 prohibition on the ground that it would "cause a fight in 
 every congressional district." Samuel Gompers, president 
 of the American Federation of Labor, found in the union 
 
180 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 sixty thousand bartenders, and he was also against it. And 
 as President Wilson had declared that he liked "to lay his 
 mind along side" of that of Mr. Gompers, it was not diffi- 
 cult for the two Presidents to think alike on this matter. 
 Mr. Hurley, of the Shipping Board, also was of opinion 
 that efficiency demanded liquor. But these were chiefly 
 opinions. 
 
 On the other hand, Fuel Administrator Garfield in- 
 formed the brewers that they need not expect to be allowed 
 more fuel than actually required to "utilize the materials 
 in the process of manufacture, including malt already manu- 
 factured." This was taken to mean the end of the brewing 
 business whether Congress acted or not. And while the 
 President approved it, it was believed he did so in order 
 to snatch the credit from Congress ; it was in great contrast 
 with the Administration's opposition to the House rider on 
 the ground that it would put the country on a "whiskey 
 basis." In his order of July 3, 1918, Fuel Administrator 
 Garfield prohibited the use of fuel by brewers in excess of 
 fifty per cent of the average they had used 1915-1917. 
 
 To make matters hard for the efficiency plea of the pro- 
 liquor members of the Administration, there came, on July 
 12, 1918, the declaration of the National Coal Association 
 to the fuel administrator that "immediate nation-wide pro- 
 hibition is absolutely necessary if the extra hundred-million 
 tons of coal a year needed by the country in its war on Ger- 
 many is to be mined." This association represented the 
 bituminous operators, producing 400,000,000 tons of coal 
 yearly. 
 
 The same month that the shipbuilders were seeking to 
 retain the liquor traffic for efficiency's sake, an inspector 
 from the quartermaster's department of the federal gov- 
 ernment was sent to Kenosha, Wisconsin, to ascertain the 
 cause of failure to keep up with the war contracts with the 
 government. He reported that the delay was due to the 
 wide-open and law-breaking saloons; that after spending 
 
Liquor and Vice 181 
 
 Sunday in carousing, many of the men did not report for 
 duty Monday. Immediately the manufacturers, local au- 
 thorities, and saloonists entered into an agreement whereby 
 saloons were to close Saturday evenings and not open 
 until the men had gone to work Monday morning, rather 
 than lose the hundreds of thousands of dollars in con- 
 tracts. 
 
 It was an open secret that the President's action upon 
 matters touching the liquor traffic reflected the fact that 
 his three trusted advisers in political affairs were three men 
 who stood well with the liquor forces of the nation : Post- 
 master-General Burleson, Samuel Gompers, and Private 
 Secretary Tumulty. However, his attitude had little influ- 
 ence with Congress, which body was hearing from the "folks 
 back home." It is probable that there was never a presi- 
 dential veto handled with so little respect for the vote power 
 as was President Wilson's veto of the bill to enforce con- 
 stitutional prohibition. 4 In spite of the efforts of the liquor 
 people, it required the House a scant two hours to pass 
 it over his veto by a vote of 176 to 55 ; and in still less time 
 for the Senate, on the following day, to pass it by a vote 
 of 65 to 20. 
 
 The extraordinary vacillation of the Attorney-General 
 in the execution of the prohibition, whether the war-time 
 prohibition act or the constitutional amendment, was in 
 conformity with the whole procedure of the Administra- 
 tion in dealing with the liquor problem. One day the policy 
 announced was that there was no governmental machinery 
 for enforcement; directly after, the country was served with 
 notice that stern prosecutions would follow violation of the 
 law. And to the end of the Wilson Administration there 
 
 4 In his veto message, the President stated that the measure "has to do 
 with the enforcement of an act which was passed by reason of the emer- 
 gency of the war and whose objects have been satisfied by the demobilization 
 of the army and navy." Yet in his message to the coal strikers he had de- 
 clared just two days before: "The country is confronted with this project 
 at a time when the war is still a fact, when the world is still in suspense 
 as to negotiations for peace." (Message of October 25, 1919.) 
 
1 82 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was constant, open, and notorious violations of law, so com- 
 mon, even in prohibition states, as to become a national 
 scandal. 5 And it is a remarkable fact that at the time when 
 President Wilson was taking his last strong stands for the 
 traffic and his Attorney-General was wobbling on the mat- 
 ter of execution, the Senate's investigations had already dis- 
 closed the intimate relations between the brewery interests 
 which the President was seeking to save and the thoroughly 
 disloyal German-American Alliance. 6 
 
 The outstanding facts of President Wilson's relations 
 with the liquor traffic during the war are summarized as 
 follows : 
 
 1. His vigilant opposition prevented adoption by Con- 
 gress, but a few months after America entered the war, 
 of prohibition when the country was eager to eliminate the 
 waste of fuel and grain at a time when the nation was gath- 
 ering its energies for the final struggle. 
 
 2. Regardless of party, Congress promptly responded 
 to this sentiment. When the House caucus of the Presi- 
 dent's party voted to promote war-time prohibition, the 
 White House immediately declared that no legislation was 
 
 "When President Wilson declared his purpose to take the ending of 
 war-time prohibition into his own hands in 1919, his action led the head 
 of the New York Anti-Saloon League to declare: "By throwing a monkey- 
 wrench into the enforcement machinery, President Wilson is running true 
 to form on the liquor question. In 1917 it was the prohibition forces 
 and not the brewers that he asked to quit. In 1918 he suggested that 
 the operation of war prohibition be postponed a year. Last month he tried 
 to prevent its going into effect at all, even though he had signed it, and 
 he now gives the liquor traffic to understand that he will come to its rescue 
 if it can hold on in the meantime. His assurance that he will do away 
 with the law entirely at the earliest possible moment will be taken by the 
 brewers as an implied invitation to violate the law in the interim. His 
 suggestion will tend to paralyze the enforcement machinery; no official can 
 have any heart in enforcing a law which he knows may be wiped out at 
 any minute. The responsibility for any disorder or confusion due to viola- 
 tion of war prohibition is now located with the President." 
 
 8 As early as December n, 1918, Major E. Lowry Humes, of the Judge 
 Advocate's office, conducting the Senate inquiry, read into the record com- 
 munications showing the relations of the Alliance and the Protective Bu- 
 reau of the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association. His records 
 disclosed that this Bureau had expended $1,168,071, which had been deposited 
 to its credit in two Pittsburgh banks; and he charged that it was the politi- 
 cal agency of the Association. 
 
Liquor and Vice 183 
 
 to be considered that he did not initiate. The caucus action 
 was rescinded. 
 
 3. A little later the Senate added to the espionage bill 
 a provision forbidding the use of grain in making liquor. 
 The President objected and the amendment was stricken 
 out. 
 
 4. On July 23, 1917, by a vote of 365 to 5, the House 
 added to the food-control bill an amendment that no food- 
 stuffs should be used in the manufacture of alcoholic bever- 
 ages. Under strict orders from the President to the Senate 
 leaders, this body receded from its clearly defined purpose 
 to accept the House measure. 
 
 5. From the day the food-control measure passed, in 
 August, 1917, the President had in his hands absolute power 
 over the liquor traffic, and he permitted it to flourish undis- 
 turbed. 
 
 6. The growing insistence of the people for conservation 
 of food, fuel, and man-power became so strong that it could 
 no longer be ignored. Then the President served notice 
 that there must be no prohibition riders to appropriation 
 bills, though he well knew that this meant no action at all. 
 
 7. It was at this time that he and Mr. Hoover were so 
 in accord on this one great issue that Mr. Hoover inter- 
 vened with the statement that 40,000,000 bushels of grain 
 were a negligible item; and members of the Shipping Board 
 declared that liquor was a necessary item in acquiring effi- 
 ciency in building ships. 
 
 8. But the answer of the country was so firm and pro- 
 nounced that the measure would have become a law July i, 
 1918, had not the President managed to delay consideration 
 until the end of August. 
 
 9. Then Congress and the country were so overwhelm- 
 ingly in favor of the law taking effect January i, 1919, that 
 that would have been the result had not the President in- 
 sisted upon a year later. A compromise then made it effec- 
 tive July i, 1919. 
 
1 84 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 10. He cabled an urgent request from Paris that the 
 law be repealed. 
 
 11. Failing in that, he sent a further message stating 
 that when demobilization should be completed "my power 
 to act without congressional action will be exercised." 
 
 12. This was, in effect, notice by the President that en- 
 forcement of the law would be lax. Liquor-selling contineud 
 with virtual paralysis of enforcement. 
 
 13. Every Administration influence was exerted to pre- 
 vent legislation looking to the enforcement of the act. 
 
 14. Congress, yielding to the overwhelming demands 
 of the country, rather than to White House dictation, passed 
 the enforcement measure on October 16 by a very large 
 majority, becoming operative October 28, 1919, with a 
 drastic provision defining intoxicating liquors as those con- 
 taining more than one-half of one per cent alcohol. The 
 liquor interests had already announced their readiness to 
 obey the law, when the entire country was amazed to learn 
 that the President had vetoed the bill on October 27. The 
 bill had been withheld from him, on account of illness, from 
 October 16 to October 27, though a pro-liquor organ, a 
 leading newspaper supporter of the President, stated that 
 u he inquired about it almost daily" and then requested that 
 it be brought to him. 
 
 15. This veto constitutes one of the remarkable state 
 papers of the President, whether considered in its tone or its 
 reasoning. He indicated a willingness to create a situation 
 in which a law of the United States, with its violation in- 
 vited, would become a mockery. 
 
 1 6. With scant courtesy for the President's reasons, 
 this enforcement measure became law over his veto, admin- 
 istering what was, up to that time, probably the most de- 
 cisive rebuke ever given to any chief executive of the nation. 
 
 17. From that time on, President Wilson manifested 
 no interest in the enforcement of that law up to the time 
 
Liquor and Vice 185 
 
 the constitutional prohibition amendment became effective, 
 January 16, 1920; and no more in the enforcement of this 
 prohibition by the basic law of the land after that date. 
 
 That the dealers were hoping that the business would 
 be revived was indicated in the various signs posted, many 
 written in a humorous vein. Everywhere there was evidence 
 of the confident belief that prohibition would fail because of 
 resentment. One complaint of the dealers was that the vote 
 had been taken when the soldier boys were absent from the 
 country and had no opportunity to express themselves. 
 This, however, amounted to no more than a wrong idea 
 of what these soldier boys wanted, as was shown in their 
 ready acceptance of the new condition upon their return 
 from abroad. When war-time prohibition went into effect, 
 virtually all the hotels of the land discontinued the sale of 
 liquors at their bars and in their restaurants. And while 
 the saloons generally remained open, only a few sold 
 strongly alcoholic beverages ; the others relied on soft drinks 
 or else "2.75 per cent" beer to keep their business going. 
 And much to their chagrin, they soon discovered that the 
 American public manifested no resentment at the closing 
 of the liquor traffic. 
 
 Many notices were given to the public by the liquor 
 craft to stock up before July i, 1919, some indicating that 
 all hope was gone of ever opening again. Said one notice 
 by one of the largest dealers in the country, in an expensive 
 sign placed high on his building and in characters large 
 enough to be readily read some blocks distant : 
 
 "BONE DRY FOREVER. STOCK 
 UPNOW FOR THE REST OF YOUR 
 LIFE. STOCK UP BEFORE JULY i." 
 
 And on July i, could be read these notices posted on saloon 
 doors as one walked up and down the street: "For rent," 
 or "Closed"; while another advised the people, "Closed 
 
1 86 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 until further notice"; and yet another, "Closed; we have 
 gone fishing." 
 
 This was six months before constitutional prohibition 
 went into effect, all of which time the war-time prohibition 
 was operative, but the traffic went on in great volume, owing 
 to lax enforcement of the law. While in most places the 
 sale was surreptitious, in many cities it was open and un- 
 hindered. Said the pro-liquor and pro-Administration 
 World, of New York, on Saturday, January 17, 1920, the 
 first day of constitutional prohibition: 
 
 Many places were openly selling everything from wine to whisky 
 at sky-high prices yesterday afternoon and up to midnight. The sub- 
 ways were full of men and women heading for Broadway with suit- 
 cases and parcels full of liquor. Some were taking the stuff home, 
 some taking it from their homes to hotels and restaurants. In the 
 afternoon many bars and cafes were crowded. . . . Liquor flowed 
 freely in Broadway places . . . till midnight. It was a hard-drink- 
 ing indoor spree, rather than an outdoor affair. . . . Besides the 
 oceans of liquor sold and drunk yesterday, a tremendous amount was 
 unloaded surreptitiously. During the last few days, hundreds of 
 thousands of dollars' worth of wines and whiskies have been sold in 
 New York. 
 
 National prohibition, under an amendment to the United 
 States Constitution, went into effect at midnight at the end 
 of Friday, January 16, 1920, barring manufacture, sale, or 
 transportation of liquor in the United States. 
 
 One of the last official acts of Attorney-General Palmer, 
 just as the Wilson Administration was passing out of exist- 
 ence, was a ruling that beer might be prescribed as a medi- 
 cine using his official position to nullify, in large measure, 
 the clear intent of the fundamental law of the land. This 
 climaxed the Administration's method of enforcing the law, 
 in many instances by men selected from lists prepared by 
 Wilson politicians, men who had been engaged in the liquor 
 traffic and who were inveterate enemies of prohibition. In 
 the summer of IQ2I Congress remedied this defect caused 
 
Liquor and Vice 187 
 
 by Mr. Palmer's ruling, by a more stringent measure than 
 had ever previously been considered. 
 
 The nation must be kept clean for future efficiency; and 
 no liquor-pro-German alliance can be tolerated if the nation 
 is to be kept safe. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 RUSSIA AND BOLSHEVISM 
 
 Russia is the land Wonderful. With its vast area, its 
 variety of climate, its boundless material resources, its rivers 
 and lakes and seas, the appeal to the imagination is irre- 
 sistible. But the splendid idealism and spiritual aspirations 
 of its people make it most wonderful. 
 
 Then why did not Russia stand true in its fight by the 
 side of the Allies against Prussian autocracy? Russia, in 
 her rulers, had an autocracy of her own. This autocracy 
 was saturated with Prussianism in men and purposes. The 
 men from the Russian masses fought with the courage of 
 men imbued with a holy idealism and were slaughtered like 
 cattle until their battle front became a shambles. But 
 treachery lurked in the ruling powers above, and the fighting 
 men could not longer endure the attacks of the enemy in 
 front and a worse enemy in the rear. 
 
 Then came the revolution of March, 1917, overthrow- 
 ing the autocratic government of the czar. This was the 
 joint product of all political parties in Russia, whose ulti- 
 mate aims differed greatly. On March n the revolution 
 broke out spontaneously, the soldiers joining the citizens, 
 army and people together turning on the government which 
 had betrayed them and sweeping it out of existence in a five- 
 days 1 battle. 
 
 Now followed a race between the Parliamentary Party, 
 warmly pro-Ally and representing the great middle class, 
 and the Revolutionary Party, leading the ignorant and in- 
 flamed masses, proclaiming all kinds of wild social theories 
 and openly scorning any kind of international obligation. 
 The popular government was organized with Kerensky at 
 
 188 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 189 
 
 its head. The Duma, the representative body in session, 
 stood its ground in refusing to disperse upon the czar's 
 order. 
 
 The Anarchist party did not cease its efforts. Germany, 
 seizing the opportune moment, thrust in a wedge in the 
 astute Lenine. Throughout the summer of 1917 the strug- 
 gle between Kerensky and Lenine seesawed up and down, 
 while Russia disintegrated ever more rapidly into a state 
 of anarchy. In October the Anarchists successfully directed 
 a counter-revolution in Petrograd, sending Kerensky into 
 exile. This ended the brief period of the only representative 
 free government Russia experienced. Directing with vigor 
 the situation thus developed, Germany succeeded in bring- 
 ing about at Brest-Litovsk, a treaty whereby Russia was 
 betrayed into the hands of Germany, the champions of the 
 social revolution in Russia agreeing with military autocracy 
 in signing away their country's birthright of freedom. Len- 
 ine stood for anarchy the destruction of the existing social 
 order, not only in Russia but throughont the world, as a 
 preliminary to the construction of a new society. He was 
 enthusiastically supported by all those elements ready to 
 enter blindly into the reaction against the existing order. 
 
 History can scarcely do less than ask the American 
 Administration to show cause why it should not be charged 
 with the defection of Russia from the cause of the Allies 
 in March, 1917, because too slow in entering the Great War, 
 and the resulting treachery at Brest-Litovsk just a year 
 later. 
 
 While invariably declaring that the social revolution 
 should not be interfered with, it is a fact that Lenine called 
 Colonel Raymond Robins, then active in Red Cross work 
 in Russia, into conference in the expressed hope that some 
 assistance might be obtained from the United States that 
 would assure Russia's standing with the Allies. For days, 
 while Colonel Robins awaited reply to his cablegrams to 
 Washington, Lenine held the diverse elements by his speech, 
 
190 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 meanwhile meeting Robins repeatedly. No word received, 
 Lenine and the forces back of him were lost to the cause 
 of the Allies, and the fatal treaty of March 3, 1918, at 
 Brest-Litovsk, resulted. And as a resulting disaster to the 
 world, the destructive force known as Bolshevism was 
 erected on the wreck of incipient free government in Russia. 
 
 When the Senate committee was conducting an investi- 
 gation of this new phase of the social order, David R. 
 Francis, United States ambassador to Russia, called as 
 a witness, testified that he had told Raymond Robins to 
 say to the Bolshevists that he would recommend a modus 
 vivendi if they would organize an opposition to Germany; 
 and he stated it as his opinion that if Russia had remained 
 in the war it would have ended a year earlier than it did 
 and millions of lives would have been saved, then added: 
 "Russia lost more men in the war than any other country 
 although she quit the war a year before it ended." 
 
 It was strange that President Wilson repeatedly called 
 this counter-revolution the revolution, as if it were that 
 which had overthrown czarism. Either he was confused 
 in his ideas or else in the use of terms. His confusion of 
 purposes seems to indicate that it was the former. Had the 
 democratic governments of the world maintained their first 
 attitude in standing by the revolution which overthrew 
 czarism and Germanism in Russia, Europe could have been 
 saved the terrorism that reigned after the end of the Great 
 War. The Allies, regarding the menacing rise of Bol- 
 shevism as a temporary phenomenon, failed to see in it a 
 danger to the peace of the world. They thought that at 
 worst it could harm only Russia. Though the warning given 
 by clear-visioned men was ample, the vision of the states- 
 men occupying the world's stage was limited. 
 
 Chief among these was President Wilson, who went 
 before the world with a special message on this new thing. 
 As early as May, 1917, it had been made so clear to keen 
 observers from the evidence of events that the Bolsheviki 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 191 
 
 were atrociously undemocratic that a warning was sounded. 
 This warning went unheeded. The President, when, in 
 November, 1917, it usurped the powers of government in 
 Russia, hailed this new autocracy as the manifestation of 
 the new day. He had ample warning that it was no democ- 
 racy in action but a movement of "zealots incapable of 
 patriotism and whose conception of democracy is a travesty 
 upon the name." Early in 1918, when these rulers in Rus- 
 sia were betraying their country to Germany at Brest-Li- 
 tovsk, he declared that they were working u in the true spirit 
 of modern democracy" and that theirs was the "voice of 
 the Russian people," which was giving expression to their 
 ideas of right "with a largeness of view, a generosity of 
 spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must chal- 
 lenge the admiration of every friend of mankind." 1 Just 
 eight days after the Brest-Litovsk infamy, he gave to the 
 world a special message on the occasion of the meeting 
 of the Congress of the Soviets, in which he assumed that 
 L/enine's militaristic government in Russia would "free 
 themselves forever from autocratic government." 
 
 With the evidence before the world at the time he was 
 making these statements, it seems incomprehensible that 
 President Wilson, with his opportunity to know the facts, 
 could believe what he was then saying to civilization. 
 
 In September, 1918, President Wilson declared that the 
 rule of the Bolshevists was a "campaign of mass terrorism," 
 and called upon all civilized nations to "register an abhor- 
 rence of such barbarism." Their record was summarized by 
 Herman Bernstein, an American investigator whose sym- 
 pathies were with the supposed ideals of the Bolsheviki, 
 when, after seeing the results of their course, he stated: 
 
 They demoralized the Russian army; they unchained the mob 
 spirit; they incited civil war; they signed the treaty which dismem- 
 bered Russia; they paralyzed the industries; they encouraged looting, 
 terror and murder ; they muzzled the press ; they abolished the courts 
 Address to Congress, January 8, 1918, 
 
192 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 of justice; they dispersed the Constituent Assembly by force of arms, 
 and set up a brutal dictatorship. 
 
 This new power rising in the East was not Russia, nor 
 was it the voice of the Russian people. The first principle 
 of its creed was the repudiation of nationality. It declared 
 that it represented a class, not a nation; and it spoke of a 
 class in France, Britain, and the United States as well as 
 Russia. Yet, in the early days of the world's Peace Con- 
 gress there was the weakening of the assembled statesmen 
 to the point of giving it representation in a conference called 
 to meet on one of the Prince's Islands in the Sea of Mar- 
 mora, which became known as the Prinkipo Conference. 
 And to this conference President Wilson appointed a dele- 
 gate who had written of him in these glowing words : 
 
 Woodrow Wilson has dared to believe divinely ; and his faith that 
 a federate world is possible, and the challenge of that faith to the na- 
 tions, is the most creative collective act since the French Revolution. 
 By his faith he has set a goal from which mankind can never take 
 its eyes ; he has sent forth the word that can never return. 
 
 This delegate, George D. Herron, a former Congre- 
 gational minister of the gospel and teacher in an Iowa 
 college, was dismissed from both positions for his discredit- 
 able personal life. Of this appointment one eminent Ameri- 
 can citizen said: 
 
 We have become accustomed during these past six years to the 
 President's fondness for surrounding himself with intellectual and 
 political midgets; but we have heretofore been spared anything so 
 shocking as this appointment. 2 
 
 And in his official capacity, a noted American prelate 
 gave utterance to these words : 
 
 The case of George D. Herron, under appointment of the Presi- 
 dent of the United States as representative of this Christian country 
 to Prince's Islands for conference with the Bolsheviks, is the most 
 disreputable appointment ever made in the United States. . . . The 
 3 Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 193 
 
 attack in his appointment is on the Christian home, which is the core 
 of the American life. Without it, America might be Bolshevik. 
 There is no republic possible where there is not God and where there 
 is no Christian home. 3 
 
 Of the many things done by President Wilson while in 
 his high office, which demanded constant explanation by his 
 friends and apologies by those who would like to be his 
 friends, it is probable that his course with the Bolshevists 
 was the strangest and the character of his appointments as 
 representatives of Americanism was most strange of all. 
 Accepting the fact that the appointment of Mr. Herron had 
 not the least basis for even an excuse, his commissioners, 
 Lincoln Steffens and William C. Bullitt, were markedly 
 strange representatives of America to show Bolshevist 
 Russia what America really is. They were probably made 
 upon the principle that "it takes a thief to catch a thief" 
 in this instance, a Bolshevist to catch a Bolshevist. The 
 public was never offered any other reason. It was apparent 
 on the surface, however, that numerous of the President's 
 like appointments were of men who had been fulsome in 
 speaking the President's praises. Notably among them were 
 William Bayard Hale and Norman Hapgood. And it is 
 a remarkable fact that all of these men, to the list of whom 
 should be added George Creel, were men whose large aim 
 was to overturn American tradition, perhaps pushing to 
 one side the Constitution itself. 
 
 It was recognized that at the Prinkipo Conference there 
 would come from Russia's 180,000,000 people representa- 
 tives from none but the 40,000,000 under Bolshevik domi- 
 nation, and that none but that "bloody and disorderly 
 tyranny" would have representation; for in all that vast 
 region of aspiring peoples democratic expression was stifled 
 by violence. And this was the people in whom Wilson saw 
 the rising hope of the world. The Philadelphia Public 
 Ledger, in large measure warm toward Bolshevist doc- 
 
 8 William A. Quayle, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. 
 
194 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 trines both in Russia and the United States, published from 
 its Paris correspondent, a recognized authority on European 
 affairs at the time of the armistice and a particularly well- 
 informed commentator on Russian affairs, these words re- 
 ferring to the situation as it developed in late January, 1919, 
 at the Paris Conference of the world's statesmen: 
 
 The decision has definitely extinguished all hope of settling Rus- 
 sian affairs through the medium of the peace conference. The invita- 
 tion was a fatal mistake, both in form and substance. The unkindest 
 cut of all is to abandon the stanch friends of the Allies to their in- 
 human butchers. 
 
 And in the same public journal, Vladimir Bourtzeff, an ar- 
 dent revolutionist, declared in unmistakable terms : 
 
 Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson, in the name of 
 England and America, are doing much, we believe unwittingly, for 
 the development of the Bolshevist scourge throughout the world, and 
 especially in Russia. Their responsibility before history is great. 
 
 In the sinking of Hungary into the Bolshevist chaos 
 was witnessed the fulfillment of warnings often repeated. 
 One of the least excitable of experienced European observers 
 of the time had warned the whole world but a little while 
 before : 
 
 The spectacle of European ruin is simply appalling. Nineteenth 
 century civilization has broken down. I do not mean merely that 
 famine and pestilence are creeping over Europe, but that there is a 
 collapse of human moral energy, a revival of the primitive, barbaric 
 instincts, and the fierce endeavor to have one's little private will by 
 force. . . . Up through the European chaos is surely creeping the 
 menace of Bolshevism that Bolshevism which is the revengeful 
 shadow of reckless modern materialism. 
 
 While loyal Americans will applaud the stern indictment 
 which the Administration framed, in the early autumn of 
 1918 immediately after declaring that there would be no 
 negotiation with undefeated Prussianism, calling upon civil- 
 ized nations to "register their abhorrence of the organized 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 195 
 
 official massacres in Russia," history will not forget that it 
 was but a few months before that these creatures, the blood- 
 stained persecutors of the Russian people, were reprd- 
 sented in Washington "as high-minded champions of peace 
 and justice, whose generous idealism was a reproach to 
 the imperialism of the Allies and a summons to American 
 recognition." And now, in the Peace Congress, President 
 Wilson-once more turns to dally with the foul thing, in send- 
 ing representatives to meet it in the Prinkipo Conference. 
 Fortunately there was a collapse of the planned meeting 
 and America was spared the further humiliation of negoti- 
 ating with this insensate brute of proletarian autocracy. It 
 was Clemenceau who had the vision to see and the grit to 
 declare the move to be a "contract with crime." It was 
 President Wilson who was looked upon by the Bolshevists 
 as their advocate. A few days before the matter came up 
 in the Peace Congress, the former Bolshevist ambassador 
 at London said: "It is not President Wilson's fault that 
 our government was not represented at the Peace Confer- 
 ence." And the President's declaration that the democratic 
 governments "recognized the absolute right of the Russian 
 people to direct their own affairs without dictation or di- 
 rection of any kind from outside" recalled his former fa- 
 mous statement that "with the causes and issues of the war 
 we have no concern." 
 
 Outside of a few groups, as the Bolshevists in Russia, 
 the socialist and pacifist sympathizers almost everywhere, 
 and those who looked upon it as a well-meant device that 
 might be worth trying in a perilous situation, the proposal 
 was unsparingly denounced. In England characteristic com- 
 ments were: "hopelessly weak," "politically hazardous," 
 "ethically wrong." In France, except among organs of so- 
 cialism, stronger terms of dissent designated it as "strange," 
 "perilous," "insane," one paper charging it to "ideology, 
 ignorance, and electioneering politics." 
 
 In his determination to recognize the Lenine govern- 
 
196 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ment, President Wilson, in this third position he assumed 
 toward Bolshevism, leaned heavily upon men of pronounced 
 Bolshevist tendencies. This is why it was declared, by men 
 in responsible positions, that if it would be known where the 
 strength of the Lenine despotism lay, the trail to the Hotel 
 Crillon was the right trail. Nor does any wonder when one 
 of the President's commissioners, Mr. Herron, could write 
 these ghastly words found in his previously published works : 
 
 I have no expectation that the present kind of civilization can 
 be amended it can only be ended. . . . 
 
 It is already too late to reform society in America. It is no 
 longer a question whether you will have a socialistic revolution. It 
 is only left to you to decide what kind of a revolution you will have. 
 
 The teachings of this personal representative of the Presi- 
 dent of the United States conform to the edicts, and his 
 practices no less, of Lenine and Trotzky. Discarding one 
 wife and seeking another, and compelled to flee the country 
 because of his relations with the fairer sex, he was also a 
 full-fledged internationalist and a budding Bolshevik, warm 
 in his praises of President Wilson's internationalism, and 
 ready to treat, in the name of America, with Russian Bol- 
 shevism, the very negation of democracy. 
 
 That history may be kept clear, it should be made mat- 
 ter of record that it was January 22, 1919, that President 
 Wilson wrote his Prinkipo memorandum. When presented 
 to the fighting factions in Russia, one after another declined 
 to accept, contrary to the President's expectations, his pro- 
 posals. Then it was discovered that the French Foreign 
 Office had been in communication with the Ukrainian and 
 other anti-Bolshevist governments, assuring them that if 
 they refused the proposals the French government would 
 support them. 4 It was thus that America was spared the 
 deeper humiliation, and spared through the efforts of France 
 
 4 William C. Bullitt, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Com- 
 mittee of the United States Senate, investigating Bolshevism. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 197 
 
 and in spite of the deadly efforts of President Wilson's pur- 
 poses. 
 
 The fourth position of the Administration toward the 
 Bolshevist regime in Russia was similar to the second. 
 There is ample evidence that the note expressive of this 
 attitude was the production of Secretary of State Colby, 
 and not of the President. But it expressed the views of the 
 latter. It was written in the period of Poland's gravest 
 danger from Bolshevism's fiercest drive of armed forces 
 in August, 1920. It emphatically reversed the former atti- 
 tude of the Administration and gave expression to America's 
 judgment. It came at a time when most needed. For 
 England, forced by the radical labor element, was committed 
 to peace at any price with the Bolshevists; and it strength- 
 ened the hand of France, which, in spite of Great Britain's 
 position, had announced her intention of supporting Gen- 
 eral Wrangel in his South Russia scheme of fighting Bol- 
 shevism at home France, again the pioneer in democracy, 
 to which the American Administration was a good second. 
 
 In this new and fourth position, the American Admin- 
 istration said: 
 
 That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or con- 
 sent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incon- 
 testable fact. . . . The Bolsheviki, although in number an incon- 
 siderable proportion of the people, by force and cunning seized the 
 powers and machinery of government and have continued to use them 
 with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power. 
 
 And then the note stated further: 
 
 In the view of this government there cannot be any common 
 ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of 
 international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly 
 repugnant to its moral sense. . . . We cannot recognize, hold official 
 relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a govern- 
 ment which is determined and bound to conspire against our institu- 
 tions. 
 
198 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 This looked like irrevocably committing the Administra- 
 tion, as some keen American journals declared, against Bol- 
 shevism. But in his personal appointment of George D. 
 Herron, to the American people "so utterly repugnant to 
 its moral sense," the President was not deterred. And the 
 language is so like that used by the Administration toward 
 Germany in the Metropolitan Opera House less than two 
 years previously, and then almost immediately forgot his 
 own words, when he declared that Germany and the United 
 States "do not speak the same language of agreement." 
 
 At all events, in this fourth position the Administra- 
 tion was, in a measure, wiping out the great stain of the 
 diplomatic absurdity and the moral atrocity of its attempt, 
 in the early days of the World's Peace Congress, to admit 
 to the Prinkipo Conference on equal terms the Moscow 
 terrorists and their victims; and which abortive attempt 
 of the President did so much to bring about the Red con- 
 quest of all of Russia. And it was of the utmost importance 
 for the influence it had upon the sweep of events at the 
 moment. England and Italy were ready to recognize the 
 Russian Soviet Government. France, as ever, was steel- 
 faced against Bolshevism. As in the face of the great Ger- 
 man drive in the spring of 1918, so now, in the face of the 
 great Bolshevist drive at Poland, there was division of 
 counsel among the Allies. The note from the American 
 government had a steadying effect. That in the Bolshevist 
 plan of subjugation Poland is but a way station is evident. 
 Germany and all of central Europe were the real goal. In 
 the fall of 1917 Lenine had boldly declared: "Germany 
 forms the most important link in the revolutionary chain; 
 and the success of our world revolution depends to the 
 greatest degree upon Germany." This was the plan for 
 conquering France and reaching England. Already, for 
 nearly a year before this American note of August, 1920, 
 Bolshevist propaganda was active in Asia, reaching eagerly 
 toward India to stab Eno-lnnd in the back. Next to be 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 199 
 
 attacked was America. For Italy had already succumbed 
 in mid-September, 1920, later partially recovering. 
 
 Indeed, it was in Milan, the hotbed of Socialism in Italy, 
 where President Wilson reached the pinnacle of his popu- 
 larity. His friends declare that it was there that he was 
 worshipped as a god by those who set his picture by the side 
 of^the crucifix. There he declared: 
 
 Here in Milan, where I know so much of the pulse of interna- 
 tional sympathy beats, I am glad to stand up and say that that pulse 
 beats also in my own veins. 
 
 He had just stated that the working classes, "by their con- 
 sciousness of community of interest and spirit, have done 
 more, perhaps, than an other influence to establish a world 
 which is not of nations, but is the opinion, one might say, 
 of mankind." This was his announced internationalism as 
 against nationalism. It is a foundation doctrine of Bol- 
 shevism that there must be no nationalism, no nation. It 
 caught in Italy while the President was there. But as soon 
 as he touched Italian pride in the matter of nationality over 
 Fiume, his popularity toppled to the dust, and Orlando, 
 their premier, fell because he failed to measure up to their 
 demands of nationality, not because of his disagreement with 
 President Wilson, as writers in support of the President like 
 to say. 5 
 
 To charge that President Wilson brought Bolshevism to 
 America, as some do openly, does not accord with the facts. 
 But history will lay a severe charge to his account in this one 
 count. Before sitting in the great World's Peace Congress, 
 he went up and down Europe, with an imposing retinue, 
 turning loose the anarchistic elements against orderly organ- 
 ized governments at the very time when stabilized society 
 was the first demand. Statesmen should have sought to 
 show uncertain, restless elements a better way. It was these 
 same radicals, whether in Europe or America, who later set 
 
 'Particularly Ray Stannard Baker in "What Wilson Did at Paris" and 
 George Creel in "The War, the World, and Wilson." 
 
2OO The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the pace which President Wilson was compelled to meet. 
 He unchained the tiger which he was never able afterward 
 to restrain. He released the monster which later showed 
 its ugly head in America. He was as helpless to meet the 
 menacing situation in America as he was to meet the appall- 
 ing disaster which he had invited in Europe. Originating 
 in the perversion of the developing revolution in Russia 
 which he had failed to recognize in its real character, it 
 swept eastward and southward into farther Russia and 
 Asia, sank Hungary in the slough, grasped Italy in its tenta- 
 cles, struck at Poland, sought Germany, aimed at France 
 and England, and reached out toward America. The at- 
 tempt to starve and freeze Winnipeg to its knees; the at- 
 tempt to overthrow civil government in Seattle; the plan 
 to starve the people of the United States in the "outlaw" 
 railroad strike and to freeze them into submission in the 
 coal strike; the steel strike directed by a horse-shoer who 
 had never worked at a steel plant; the planned dynamiting 
 of the home of the attorney-general of the United States 
 and many others in nine eastern cities at one time ; the con- 
 stant demand for higher wages among highly-paid employes 
 regardless of the burden it placed upon the shoulders of 
 those outside of their particular class; the fostering of class 
 spirit, particularly of the obstructionist or destructionist 
 class these were symptoms manifested during President 
 Wilson's incumbency that had never been seen before in like 
 manner in the history of America. Its blow was aimed at 
 so-called capitalism and at the very foundations of civil 
 government itself. 
 
 Nor were these solely outgrowths of the Great War. 
 Indeed, in the splendid economic condition in which the 
 country found itself at the conclusion of the war, there was 
 no reason or excuse for this destructive tendency. People 
 were never better fed, clothed, or cared for after a great 
 war; wages were exceptionally good, money was plentiful, 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 201 
 
 there was no unemployment. America was unscathed by 
 the Great War. Yet the President, after the shifting of 
 responsibility and the delays characteristic of the man, be- 
 came aroused to the dangerous situation at a late day, and 
 in his annual message to Congress in December, 1919, 
 stated in regard to Bolshevism: 
 
 Let us be frank about this solemn matter. The evidences of the 
 world-wide unrest which manifest themselves in violence throughout 
 the world bid us pause and consider the means to be found to stop 
 the spread of this contagious thing before it saps the very vitality of 
 the nation itself. 
 
 It was the poisonous serpent stretching its ugly self to 
 America out of the noisomeness of the European pestilence 
 created by the delays incident to a wilful persistence in seek- 
 ing to arrange a super-government for the world in the 
 Peace Congress. 
 
 "Let us be frank about this solemn matter." The sin- 
 ister symptoms in the United States already mentioned 
 were preceded by the celebrated Mooney trial in Cali- 
 fornia. Thomas J. Mooney, a Russian, was convicted in 
 the California courts on the charge of a most atrocious 
 crime setting a bomb on July 22, 1916, so placed and 
 timed as to inflict the greatest degree of suffering upon the 
 innocent. The occasion was the preparedness parade in 
 San Francisco when the streets and sidewalks were crowded 
 with people and other thousands were in the parade. Ten 
 persons were killed by the terrific explosion and about fifty 
 others were mutilated or maimed. Mooney was deeply in- 
 terested in The Blast, a newspaper started to oppose pre- 
 paredness. 
 
 The trial began January 3, 1917, and he was convicted 
 by unanimous vote of the jury on the first ballot on Febru- 
 ary 9, and on February 24 was sentenced to death. Said the 
 attorney for Billings, charged with the same crime : 
 
2O2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 We have had a fair trial. . . . This jury was impanelled by a 
 member of the district attorney's staff with absolute fairness and im- 
 partiality. 
 
 Mooney himself at his trial was represented by the choice 
 legal talent of the country, including W. Bourke Cochran, 
 the silver-tongued orator of New York and former con- 
 gressman. There was an enormous fund of money at his 
 disposal. On the other hand, the prosecution had scarcely 
 sufficient to pay the expenses of getting essential witnesses 
 to the place of trial, a teacher in Hawaii having to lose 
 his own time without pay. 
 
 After every recourse known to civilized legal procedure 
 was exhausted, including appeal to the Supreme Court of 
 his state, to the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
 to the Governor of the State, an appeal was made to Presi- 
 dent Wilson outside the course of legal procedure. Grave 
 charges were set up against the courts of California, par- 
 ticularly against the county attorney of San Francisco who 
 conducted the trial, perjured evidence was submitted against 
 him; and by means of the most persistent and widespread 
 propaganda of falsehood carried on by the International 
 Workers 7 Defense League, than which there is no more 
 radical organization in the world, with money at their dis- 
 posal running to upwards of $1,000,000, the people were 
 made to believe that the courts of California were corrupt 
 and that, perhaps, Mooney had not had a square deal. 
 This propaganda was carried on, chiefly in the important 
 industrial centers of the East, by Alexander Berkman, since 
 deported as an anti-American and whose very name is a 
 stench in the nostrils of decency in his relations with Emma 
 Goldman, deported with him. In conducting his propa- 
 ganda, he always applied this rule: "No importance is to 
 be attached to the guilt or innocence of the accused." The 
 country was plastered from center to circumference with 
 the little stickers printed in red: "Remember Mooney." 
 The vigor of the propaganda, backed by such men as W. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 203 
 
 Bourke Cochran and Felix Frankfurter, gave it momentum 
 and standing; and some sections of organized labor were 
 led to believe that an attack was being made upon labor 
 by the California courts. That was the purpose of this 
 million-dollar propaganda put out by American Bolshevism. 
 
 President Wilson had appointed a Mediation Commis- 
 sion to settle labor disputes during the war. Directed by its 
 chairman, Secretary of Labor Wilson, to inquire into the 
 Mooney case, it took quarters at a prominent San Fran- 
 cisco hotel, where it heard the Mooney side of the case. 
 But no one was called to give the people's side, and its re- 
 port was made up wholly from material offered by the de- 
 fense, was written by Stanley Arnold, a San Francisco at- 
 torney, and with date of January 16, was published in full 
 in the Official Bulletin, a government publication, in its issue 
 of January 28, 1918. This report, giving only the side of 
 the man convicted as indicated above of the most atrocious 
 of crimes, stated that "from Russia and the Western States 
 protest spread to all the country until it has gathered 
 momentum from many sources"; that u the liberal (Bol- 
 shevik) sentiment of Russia was aroused"; that "the liberal 
 sentiment of the United States was aroused because the 
 circumstances of Mooney's prosecution, in the light of his 
 history, led to the belief that the terrible and sacred instru- 
 ments of criminal justice were consciously or unconsciously 
 made use of against labor by its enemies in an industrial 
 conflict." About the same time that this report was put 
 out, another member of the Commission and its attorney, 
 Felix Frankfurter, issued statements that were widely cir- 
 culated through the public press "that a desire to appease 
 the liberal element in Russia was paramount in the minds 
 of the Commission." 
 
 This action on the part of United States officials, who 
 appeared to be anxious to save the neck of a vile criminal 
 who was willing to kill many and mutilate and maim for 
 life many more innocent people who were interested in a 
 
204 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 patriotic parade, led the attorney who tried the case to 
 comment upon the Commission's report in these withering 
 words : 
 
 The Commission in their conclusion moralize upon the duties we 
 all owe to the cause of democracy. We venture to suggest in this 
 regard, however, that democracy has no worse enemy than the man 
 or set of men who, upon the unsworn statements of interested persons 
 and without considering both sides of the case, undertake to set aside 
 the verdict of two juries, which said verdicts have been sustained hy 
 the trial and appellate tribunals, in order to satisfy the demands of 
 anarchists on a different continent whose views are entirely out of 
 harmony with democracy as well as with any other kind of organized 
 government. Anarchy and murder will never assist the cause of 
 democracy, nor will an effort to overturn the Constitution and laws 
 of our country to save murderers and anarchists increase the regard 
 for democracy entertained by honest and patriotic citizens. . . . 
 Making the world safe for Mooney and his ilk will not make it safer 
 for democracy ; neither will it stimulate patriotism nor inspire respect 
 for our institutions. 6 
 
 Prior, however, to the report of this Commission and 
 prior to Mooney's trial, while anarchist Berkman was con- 
 ducting his propaganda in the East, deceiving the labor 
 unions and the uninformed public, he hired George P. West, 
 who had deceived the public by his propaganda in the Mc- 
 Namara cases, to prepare a report in behalf of Mooney, 
 the purpose being to set out to the public that the Mooney 
 case was a labor case pure and simple. West was employed 
 as an investigator by the Industrial Relations Committee, of 
 which Frank P. Walsh was chairman, later joint chairman 
 of the federal War Labor Board. And West's report was 
 put out in the name of the federal committee, though its 
 author received $300 for it from Mooney's most intimate 
 associate in his anarchistic activities, including publication of 
 
 '"Review of the Mooney Case," page 65, by John M. Olin, Madison, 
 Wis., 1919 a most thorough study and faithful digest of this whole matter 
 by a trained mind. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 205 
 
 the destructionist paper, The Blast. 7 It was because of the 
 fact that the public kept the Industrial Relations Committee 
 in mincj as a federal body that its name was used by the prop- 
 agandists to influence public sentiment. 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt, writing to Felix Frankfurter rela- 
 tive to the matter, as brought out in the Commission's re- 
 port, said: 
 
 I answer it (his letter) at length because you have taken, and are 
 taking, on behalf of the Administration an attitude which seems to 
 me to be fundamentally that of Trotzky and the other Bolsheviki 
 leaders in Russia an attitude which may be fraught with mischief 
 to this country. . . . 
 
 The reactionaries have in the past been a great menace to this 
 republic ; but at this moment it is the I. W. W., the Germanized So- 
 cialists, the anarchists, the foolish creatures who always protest 
 against the suppression of crime, the pacifists and the like under the 
 lead ... of the Bergers, and Hillquits, the Fremont Olders, and 
 Amos Pinchots and Rudolph Spreckels who are the really grave 
 danger. These are the Bolsheviki of America, and the Bolsheviki are 
 just as bad as the Romanoffs, and are at the moment a greater menace 
 to orderly freedom. . . . When you, as representing President 
 Wilson, find yourself obliged to champion men of this stamp, you 
 ought, by unequivocal affirmative action, to make it evident that you 
 are sternly against their general and habitual line of conduct. 
 
 After the report of the Mediation Commission, John B. 
 Densmore, nephew of Secretary of Labor Wilson, was ap- 
 pointed by this cabinet official to make further investiga- 
 tion. After six months, during which he received instruc- 
 tions from time to time, he submitted a report in which he 
 stated that he had "continued a secret and altogether in- 
 formal inquiry into the Mooney case," a report submitted 
 as Director General of Employment under the Department 
 of Labor. And prior to his connection therewith, he was 
 an agitator in behalf of the noted McNamara case, in which 
 the accused admitted their guilt of the atrocious crime 
 7 id, p. 69. 
 
206 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 charged against them, when real labor awoke to the fact 
 that it had been hoodwinked by men of the stamp of Dens- 
 more, West, and Arnold. Thus, there was submitted a 
 second secret report by Administration officials in which the 
 people were not permitted to be heard, though it cannot be 
 conceived how anarchists, criminals, traitors in time of war 
 or any other time, such as Berkman, Mooney, and their 
 kind could have any more right to be heard than the people 
 who were innocent. Only those who were enemies of the 
 people and whom the people had convicted in the regular 
 process of court procedure were permitted to know what 
 was being done. The methods of Catiline were not ex- 
 hausted in the days of Rome's beginning decline. The 
 notorious International Workers' Defense League knew the 
 contents of the report and had made arrangements with 
 the editor of the San Francisco Call, edited by Fremont 
 Older, to print 25,000 extra copies containing this report, 
 for which $750 was paid, before the report had reached the 
 Department in Washington. But the reviewer of the 
 Mooney case was never able to obtain an official copy of this 
 report, even for the purpose of setting out before the peo- 
 ple the true state of facts; and to-day this report remains 
 an unconfirmed, unsubstantiated government document 
 based upon the utmost perversion of fact. A writer who 
 has gone thoroughly into the substance of the Densmore 
 report and what was back of it, sums up his views thus : 
 
 Densmore was in former years a supporter of the McNamara 
 murderers and agitator in their behalf. His relations with various 
 reds was close. He went out at the expense of the United ' States 
 and is said to have had in his employ some thirty detectives, including 
 some of the men employed by the friends of anarchist Mooney. . . . 
 He and his gang tapped the wires between the district attorney's 
 office and the United States Naval Intelligence office, the Army In- 
 telligence office and United States Marshal's office and stole various 
 documents and gave the information so obtained to reds and disloyal- 
 ists who were subjects of investigation and prosecution by United 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 207 
 
 States and state authorities. Then choosing a ... paper, ... ed- 
 ited by'. . * Fremont Older, who is a friend of the reds and had 
 publicly entertained Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, he 
 published a scurrilous attack upon District Attorney Fickert. . . . 
 Then after Densmore was subpoenaed as a witness in the United 
 States Court and was wanted by the grand jury, he fled the state and 
 in spite of all efforts on the part of the Governor and the district 
 attorney to get him back, he is still a fugitive from justice. 8 
 
 But it remained for the grand jury, which went into the 
 matter with conspicuous thoroughness under the personal 
 direction of the attorney general of the state to make the 
 most complete and overwhelming reply to the padded Dens- 
 more report: 
 
 It was expected that as these charges had been made in a pub- 
 lished report by an official of the United States Government, the 
 grand jury would be assisted in its investigation by such official and 
 those of his subordinates who might have been employed in procuring 
 the evidence upon which the report was based. ... Mr. Densmore 
 departed and refused to answer the subpoena of the grand jury. 
 
 And all appeals to William B. Wilson, head of the Depart- 
 ment, by the Governor of California, by the mayor of San 
 Francisco, by the presiding judge of the superior court, and 
 by the foreman of the special grand jury were equally un- 
 availing, although Secretary of Labor Wilson, under date 
 of November 27, 1918, wired the Governor: "I am in- 
 structing Mr. Densmore to put into your hands a complete 
 copy of his report to me and I am also instructing him to 
 place himself entirely at your disposal." A few days later 
 the Governor replied that it was desired that Mr. Densmore 
 report to the attorney general of the state. He did not re- 
 port. Secretary Wilson then appointed William Denman, 
 the man who came in conflict with General Goethals over 
 ships, and he declined to represent him. And after then 
 appointing G. Stanley Arnold for the same purpose, Mr. 
 
 8 Id., p. 92, quoting "America's Greatest Peril The Bolsheviki and 
 the Mooney Case," by Francis R. Welsh, Philadelphia. 
 
208 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Arnold informed Governor Stephens, on December 23, that 
 he was directed by the Secretary of Labor "to state that he 
 will not at this time direct either Mr. Densmore or his 
 assistants, Messrs. McCarthy and Parsons, to return to San 
 Francisco." And William Armstrong, another of Dens- 
 more's assistants, declined to testify before the grand jury 
 on the ground that he might incriminate himself. For over 
 a month this grand jury had been led to believe that the 
 author of the unfounded official government report or some 
 one else representing the Department of Labor would ap- 
 pear before it to get at the facts in the case; but no one 
 appeared. It was evident that Densmore did not dare to 
 face a grand jury under oath. 
 
 The International Workers' Defense League, within two 
 weeks after Mooney's arrest and even before the defense 
 had decided upon its counsel, began its propaganda work. 
 Men, like West and Densmore, who had poisoned the pub- 
 lic mind in the case of the McNamaras, brutal murderers 
 who afterward admitted their guilt in blowing up the Los 
 Angeles Times Building, resulting in the death of twenty 
 three persons, were engaged to carry through the same 
 methods in the Mooney case, in utter disregard of courts 
 and the methods of procedure of orderly society. 
 
 Also came the President of the United States disre- 
 garding the efficacy of courts, even courts of the last resort 
 and the power of executive review. In January, 1918, the 
 Governor of California received from President Wilson 
 "the urgent appeal," asking whether it would not be possible 
 "to postpone the execution of Mooney until he could be 
 tried upon one of the other indictments against him." The 
 very suggestion seems almost too preposterous to be credi- 
 ble. On March 27, the President wired the Governor, "if 
 you could see your way to commute the sentence of Mooney, 
 it would have a most heartfelt effect upon certain interna- 
 tional affairs which his execution would greatly complicate." 
 Again on June 4 he wired the State executive : "I would not 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 209 
 
 venture again to call your attention to the case did I not 
 know the international significance which attaches to it." 
 Very properly Governor Stephens refused to take action 
 while the case was pending in the State Supreme Court, 
 which disposed of it August 23. And an appeal to the 
 United States Supreme Court was disposed of November 
 1 8, 1918. For the Governor of the State to take the case 
 out of the court would have been an unwarranted inter- 
 ference with the course of justice in any case and would have 
 shown him fitted to be a tyrant. If he made a mistake, it 
 was in yielding to the importunities of President Wilson, 
 to whom Samuel Gompers, president of the American Fed- 
 eration of Labor, had been urged by many resolutions en- 
 gineered through labor organizations by radicals in sympa- 
 thy with Mooney and his fellow anarchists, to make an 
 appeal. 
 
 Said a careful and fair reviewer of the Mooney case : 
 
 This is the first time in the history of this country that an organ- 
 ized movement has been made to prevent the enforcement of deci- 
 sions of our courts. If this movement should be successful, then the 
 days of this Republic are numbered. So long as laws regularly 
 enacted by the people are fairly and honestly enforced through the 
 decisions of the courts honestly rendered, this country will be safe 
 from any attack within our borders. 9 
 
 The national Administration, as a result of the efforts 
 of radicals working through Samuel Gompers and the De- 
 partment of Labor, was constantly interfering with the 
 operations of the courts in the Mooney case, many radicals 
 being then employes of the Government. Just why Presi- 
 dent Wilson was so bent upon saving the life of this desper- 
 ado, destructionist, traitor, was never revealed. But it was 
 not the only instance. He besought Governor Spry of Utah 
 to spare the life of another duly convicted anarchist, Joe 
 Hillstrom, who, in cold blood, had murdered a seventeen- 
 id., P. 4. 
 
2io The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 year-old boy and his father. In that case Mooney, as secre- 
 tary and treasurer of the International Workers' Defense 
 League, wrote Governor Spry a threatening letter. Reply- 
 ing to President Wilson's second appeal, in the Hillstrom 
 case, Governor Spry made this manly, straightforward 
 reply : 
 
 I feel that a further postponement at this time would be an un- 
 warranted interference with the course of justice. Mindful of the 
 obligations of my oath of office to see to it that the laws are enforced, 
 I cannot, and will not lend myself, nor my office, to such interference. 
 Tangible facts must be presented before I will further interfere in 
 this case. 
 
 Hillstrom was executed in accordance with the law. The 
 attempt to blow up the home of Governor Spry was dis- 
 covered in time to avert the disaster. 
 
 Mooney was interested in other cases, notably those of 
 Suhr and of Ford, anarchistic murderers, to the extent of 
 threatening the life of Hiram Johnson, then Governor of 
 California, unless he interfered to spare them. 
 
 These cases are cited to illustrate the general scheme 
 resorted to by the International Workers' Defense League, 
 which is made up entirely of the extreme radicals from the 
 Socialist Labor party, the anarchists, the I. W. W.'s, the 
 International Radical Club, the Free Discussion League, 
 and some extreme radical members of labor unions. They 
 are cited for the further purpose of indicating still further 
 how the Administration was as intimately interwoven with 
 radical internationalists and anti-nationalists as it believed 
 the Covenant of the League of Nations to be with the 
 Paris Peace Treaty. 
 
 And this would not be complete without referring to the 
 relations of the Administration to Robert A. Minor. If 
 the Department of Labor, with William B. Wilson at its 
 head, was responsible for Johannsen, a well-known anar- 
 chist and I. W. W., friend of anarchists and dynamiters 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 21 1 
 
 Caplan and Schmidt who stopped at his home when making 
 their purchases of dynamite with which to commit their 
 dastardly deeds for which they were convicted with the 
 McNamaras if he received his appointment as federal 
 Mediator of Munitions Strikes by the Department of 
 Labor over the protest of federal officials, while un- 
 der indictment in the United States courts for com- 
 plicity with the McNamaras in blowing up the Times 
 Building, Los Angeles, and while attending the Hay- 
 wood trial as an I. W. W. delegate, yet some one 
 else or some other Department was responsible for Robert 
 A. Minor, son of a Texas federal judge. Minor was editor 
 of two anarchist papers, The Blast and The Masses, con- 
 tributed to others, was an associate of Berkman, Emma 
 Goldman, Johannsen, and other notorious Reds; testified 
 that he wished to overthrow the American government and 
 institutions, and in his public addresses and his writings 
 advocated violence to that end; was the author of much 
 inflammatory and infamously untruthful literature that did 
 much to incite the Bolsheviki in Russia against the United 
 States; was denied passport by the State Department upon 
 the recommendation of the Department of Justice ; and yet, 
 through some mysterious processes of the powers at work 
 at Washington, was sent to Russia as a representative of 
 George Creel, though all of these facts had been called to 
 the attention of the appointing power. There he served 
 well in the cause of Lenine and Trotzky, head of the Bol- 
 shevist autocracy. He was the successor of Mooney as 
 secretary and treasurer of the International Workers' De- 
 fense League, when Mooney was arrested for the San 
 Francisco bomb explosion. It was under his leadership that 
 the nation-wide propaganda campaign was begun that mis- 
 led the public, immediately Mooney was arrested. And it 
 was while the Reds were marching in New York in the 
 interest of this campaign of falsehood, on November 12, 
 carrying red flags above the United States flag, that some 
 
212 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 of the loyal boys who had returned from overseas handled 
 one of these anarchists, J. Edward Morgan, roughly, the 
 same Morgan who, when arrested in California, was found 
 in possession of a letter from President Wilson's private 
 secretary, Tumulty, authorizing him to travel over the coun- 
 try as a Mooney propagandist. 10 As the loyal soldiers and 
 sailors did not see it from Secretary Tumulty's viewpoint, 
 carrying red flags on New York's streets was forbidden 
 thereafter. 
 
 There is a yet more serious connection between this anar- 
 chist Minor and the Administration. It was on June 8, 
 1919, in a Paris cafe, while chatting with Lincoln Steffens, 
 friend, confidant, and Russian adviser of President Wilson, 
 that Minor was asked by a French secret service agent to 
 accompany him to police headquarters. There he was 
 promptly placed under arrest by waiting members of the 
 American Military Intelligence and taken to Coblenz to the 
 commanding officer of the Third American Army. Steffens 
 went to the Hotel Crillon, which was President Wilson's 
 headquarters, and informed friends that this time Minor 
 would certainly face the firing squad. 
 
 Ten days after the arrest, the Military Intelligence of 
 the Third Army presented to the Judge Advocate at Cob- 
 lenz evidence to establish against Minor charges that he 
 had been employed at Petrograd by Lenine and Trotzky to 
 publish an English-language paper to be circulated in the 
 American and British armies for the purpose of creating 
 mutiny through the dissemination of Bolshevistic doctrines ; 
 that this plan failing because of the armistice, he moved to 
 Berlin where he was associated with the Sparticides, the 
 German Bolshevists; that yet later, he moved to Coblenz, 
 shortly after the American army crossed the Rhine, where 
 he was caught publishing and seeking to circulate a Bol- 
 shevist pamphlet designed to foment mutiny in the Ameri- 
 
 10 "America's Greatest Peril," pp. 11-12. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 213 
 
 can ranks. But he could not be arrested within the German 
 lines. 
 
 Two days later a commission was set to try him on these 
 grave charges, which he made no attempt to deny. The 
 officers in charge of the case were confident of a speedy 
 verdict, when, on the eve of the trial, a peremptory order 
 was received from General Pershing's Chief of Staff that no 
 further action be taken pending a report upon an investi- 
 gation by the Judge Advocate General of the Expedition- 
 ary Forces. It is readily understood that General Persh- 
 ing's only interest in a notorious military criminal would be 
 to administer certain and severe punishment. After an in- 
 vestigation, however, the Judge Advocate reported that 
 Minor was "charged with as serious an offense as a man 
 can commit" and that he "thoroughly believed him to be 
 guilty" but that because of the great desirability of secur- 
 ing a conviction, the trial should await the arrival of wit- 
 nesses in the hands of the French and British. The Ameri- 
 can, British, and French were working together on the case, 
 and witnesses were en route to Coblenz, when Minor was re- 
 leased on General Pershing's order. 
 
 Minor was hurried to Paris when permitted to go, and 
 he proceeded to America where he next appears at the head 
 of a mob of Reds seeking to make a demonstration on Fifth 
 Avenue, New York, until dispersed by the police. And next 
 he is found back in his old haunts with the radical agitators 
 on the Pacific Coast. 
 
 When Minor was arrested, his father hurried to Wash- 
 ington. Whom he saw there the records fail to disclose. 
 But anarchist Minor was a friend of Secretary of War 
 Baker and of George Creel, both members of the federal 
 Committee on Publicity during the war, the latter editor 
 of the Official Bulletin. Evidently Lincoln Steffens saw 
 some one high in authority at the Hotel Crillon; and 
 Minor's father saw some one high in authority in Washing- 
 
214 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ton. And when Secretary Baker was asked to reopen the 
 case, he refused on the ground that it was a matter of the 
 Department of Justice a statement which he knew was not 
 true, since the country was still at war with Germany, and 
 Minor could have been sent back for trial. 11 
 
 It is doubtful whether any investigation could ever re- 
 veal the devious ways of the Wilson Administration in deal- 
 ing with slackers, disloyalists, and destructionists. 
 
 Nor did it appear to be necessary. For Ludwig C. A. 
 K. Martens issued a statement on March 19, 1919, in New 
 York, to the effect that he was the official representative in 
 the United States of the Lenine-Trotzky government, his 
 credentials being signed by George Tchicherin, Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs and bearing the seal of the Russian Com- 
 missariat of Foreign Affairs. He was not recognized by 
 the State Department, when he demanded recognition; but 
 he opened offices in New York as the official envoy of the 
 Soviet Government, with various departments and an official 
 staff, including a Bolshevist disseminator of Soviet infor- 
 mation, and prepared to open trade relations with the 
 United States on behalf of his Government, with a guar- 
 anteed deposit of $200,000,000 in gold. On April 2, he 
 preached Bolshevism at Hunt's Point Palace to an audi- 
 ence of 3,000 people. This brought a protest from the cur- 
 ator of the New York Zoological Park addressed to the 
 Attorney General of the United States. Six days later the 
 Union League Club of New York City unanimously adopted 
 a resolution calling upon the Government to take immedi- 
 ate action to put an end to the activities of Martens as 
 Soviet representative. But these activities continued unin- 
 terruptedly. Large quantities of Bolshevist literature were 
 distributed, a great mass of which came through the office 
 of Martens in New York. His declared purpose to open 
 trade relations between this country and his had a two-fold 
 object: To appeal to the assumed cupidity of America and 
 
 "Harvey's Weekly, New York, May i, 1920. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 215 
 
 blind the people to the deeper design of propagandizing 
 America. Whether the I. W. W. boast is true or not that 
 the Russian counter-revolution, which sent the real revolu- 
 tion under Kerensky to its death when the Constituent 
 Assembly was dispersed by armed forces, was planned in 
 Seattle at the time that Lenine and Trotzky were in that 
 city on their way to Russia, it is yet true that tons of Bol- 
 shevist literature were distributed containing the most in- 
 cendiary appeals. And in October, 1919, the Attorney- 
 General of the State of New York, after a careful survey 
 of radical publications in New York City, made a report in 
 which he stated that these reports were, in large measure, 
 subsidized by the New York parlor radicals, and declared 
 that they 
 
 are, in general, the same people who subsidized the pro-German 
 propaganda and furnished the money for the pacifist, peace-at-any- 
 price campaigns, and contributed to the cause of the conscientious 
 objectors; 
 
 the central idea advocated being "the overthrow of the 
 present system of Government, the abolition of the wage 
 system, and dictatorship of the proletariat." 
 
 And this system of propaganda was in operation on 
 American soil from the time Lenine and Trotzky took over 
 the Soviet Government in Russia. Even while this nation 
 was engaging all of its energies in preparing for and pros- 
 ecuting the Great War, Bolshevism had a far-reaching or- 
 ganization at work directed by the trained agents of Lenine 
 and Trotzky. Even as early as the middle of 1918 the 
 national headquarters of the propaganda were made known 
 to the United States Secret Service, which then obtained 
 the names and addresses of 1,200 members of the Phila- 
 delphia branch, these latter embracing 15 Soviets operating 
 under the direction of the All-Russia Soviets of America in 
 New York. The movement and its propaganda were not 
 haphazard, but were conducted by experienced revolution- 
 
2i6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 aries to whom democracy is as hateful as czarism or Prus- 
 sian autocracy. Destruction in America is as much a part 
 of their plan as it is elsewhere. Said the noted Socialist 
 writer, William English Walling: 
 
 Nothing could be more untrue than to exonerate the Bolsheviki 
 of the anarchistic taint. Their doctrine is rather a socialistic anar- 
 chism than an anarchistic socialism. 
 
 When this propaganda had been operating for some 
 time, it was recognized that the leaders must strike, lest 
 the psychological hour pass. The Winnipeg strike, the 
 Seattle attempt upon the life of that city's government, the 
 great steel strike, the coal strike, the attempt to force the 
 Plumb plan upon the country by the organized railroad 
 men, the "outlaw" railroad strike, the dynamiting outrages 
 in nine large eastern cities and upon the lives of prominent 
 men and government officials these are some of the re- 
 sults of the previous propaganda. And an eastern news- 
 paper of wide influence declared: 
 
 The Fitzpatricks and Fosters, the Plumbs and the Lewises sup- 
 ported to some extent even by the Gompers group are really en- 
 gaged in a movement whose aim is to establish in this country the 
 philosophy of Lenine and Trotzky instead of the principles of Lincoln 
 and Roosevelt, to substitute classism for democracy and American- 
 ism. 12 
 
 How this was worked out, at least in part, by writers 
 who received their inspiration from the Bolshevism of Rus- 
 sia was told by G. A. Simonds in his testimony before the 
 Senate committee on February 12, 1919, as it was investi- 
 gating Bolshevism. For many years and until compelled to 
 leave in October, 1918, he was head of the Methodist 
 church in Russia. He informed the committee that Bol- 
 shevism was being proclaimed in the United States by means 
 of speakers, pamphlets, and articles in newspapers and 
 magazines; and he named writers who had been closely 
 
 "The Philadelphia North American, October, 30, 1919. 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 217 
 
 affiliated with the Bolshevik government in Russia, and 
 pointed out publishers of Bolshevik literature in the United 
 States. 
 
 Indeed, in the very month that he was giving his testi- 
 mony to the Senate committee, there was held in the na- 
 tional capital, and almost within the shadows of the place 
 where Congress meets and of the White House, a largely 
 attended meeting at which the soviet government in Russia 
 was enthusiastically defended. 
 
 Trotzky knew whereof he spoke when he said to Colonel 
 Raymond Robins: 
 
 Listen to me carefully. Follow me step by step. We have started 
 our peace negotiations with the Germans. We have asked the Allies 
 to join us in starting peace negotiations for the whole world on a 
 democratic basis no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, 
 and a full acceptance of the principle of the self-determination of all 
 peoples. The Allies have refused to accept our invitation. We still 
 hope, of course, to compel them. 
 
 Surprised, Colonel Robins was desirous of knowing more 
 and asked, in simple monosyllable, How? Trotzky re- 
 plied: 
 
 By stirring up the comrades in France and in England and in 
 America to upset the policy of their governments by asserting their 
 own revolutionary socialist will. 
 
 An official order of Lenine dated December 13, 1917, 
 showed an appropriation of 2,000,000 rubles, slightly over 
 $1,000,000, for the spread of Bolshevik propaganda. And 
 Roger Simmons, representing the United States Depart- 
 ment of Commerce in Russia, in his testimony before the 
 Senate committee, which began its investigations of the at- 
 tempts of Russian Bolshevism upon the United States in 
 February, 1919, stated that Lenine had declared that "the 
 power that had crushed Germany is also the power that, in 
 the end, will crush England and the United States." 
 
 And this was the power at first insidiously, then more 
 
218 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 openly, that was threatening just as surely, if in less tangi- 
 ble form, the integrity of the United States as was Germany. 
 It did it through Berkman and Johannsen and West and 
 Arnold and Densmore and Mooney and Minor and thou- 
 sands of others, many of them in official positions, and 
 others, to the end under the protecting care of men very 
 high in authority under the Wilson Administration. And 
 whenever President Wilson lifted his voice or used the 
 influence of his high office to shield anarchists, Bolshevists, 
 traitors to the country of the stamp of Mooney, Hillstrom, 
 and Minor, he was unworthy any more favorable considera- 
 tion than any other man who did the same. And some 
 departments of the government under his Administration 
 were abundantly loaded with men of Bolshevist taint. To 
 quote him again, "Let us be frank about this solemn mat- 
 ter." It was not President Wilson who saw the danger 
 and warned the country. As usual, he trailed. 
 
 Said Lieutenant D. C. Van Buren, of the Army Intelli- 
 gence Service, in October, 1919, in his testimony before the 
 Senate committee investigating the steel strike, that during 
 the summer of that year the Russians in Gary, Indiana, 
 started a movement to organize a Red Guard in prepara- 
 tion for the revolution which they then saw for this country. 
 They sought to get all of the former soldiers in Gary 
 together and drill and equip them; at the same time agi- 
 tators were telling the people to prepare to manage and 
 operate their industries just the thing that happened a 
 year later in Italy. The witness stated further that the 
 situation had become such that it was necessary to find a 
 man with a bomb in his hands before the immigration 
 officers would act. 
 
 By this disclosure the Administration officials were 
 stirred to unwonted activity; and on the morning of No- 
 vember 8, newspaper readers were met with large headlines 
 telling that there had been a general round-up of destruc- 
 tionists in various industrial centers of the country: 200 in 
 
Russia and Bolshevism 219 
 
 New York, 175 in Chicago, and smaller numbers in other 
 cities, and that 50 would be deported. The officials has- 
 tened to say that this action had been in contemplation for 
 several weeks. 
 
 A man who was American to the core and who had been 
 through the thick of the fight with Bolshevism in its most 
 glaring form stated the Administration's policy very aptly 
 in these words: 
 
 Many of the I. W. W.'s were arrested during the war and some 
 were punished. The Government started, stopped, started again, 
 conciliated, pandered, and generally pursued a skimmed-milk policy. 
 Argument was tried, kindness, public statements appealing to patrio- 
 tism, and this to a class of men who know but one argument, force; 
 who think kindness is weakness, and who have no patriotism." 13 
 
 This was but a manifestation of a pronounced character- 
 istic of the Wilson Administration: ''Watchful waiting" 
 shirking a responsibility until the urgency became so great 
 that it could not longer be ignored and in some instances un- 
 til great damage had resulted. In this instance, forced by the 
 situation which developed as a result of the Administration's 
 coddling this monster within the nation's fold, aroused at 
 last by a public sentiment which it felt no longer able to 
 resist and by open manifestations of hostility to the Gov- 
 ernment, Secretary Baker, in a public address at Cleveland 
 a year after the end of the Great War took a position that 
 heartened real Americans and that dampened the ardor of 
 the destructionists at whose machinations the Administra- 
 tion had been conniving. He said: 
 
 Our newspapers are daily filled with accounts of violent agita- 
 tion by so-called Bolsheviki and radicals, counseling violence and 
 urging action in behalf of what they call "social revolution." The 
 American people will not exchange the solid foundations of their so- 
 cial order for any of these fantastic programs. 
 
 13 "Americanism versus Bolshevism," by Ole Hanson, published 1919-1920, 
 by Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, 
 
22O The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 This time it was more than words. When Ole Hanson, 
 mayor of Seattle, asked for United States troops to save 
 the overthrow of that city's government, they were 
 promptly sent. Secretary Baker notified the Governors of 
 all states in which disorder threatened to get beyond local 
 control to call upon the armed forces of the United States 
 for assistance; at the same time telegraphing each army 
 department commander to respond instantly to any call 
 from any Governor who found himself unable to cope with 
 disorders and to enforce the laws. 
 
 In marked contrast with the faltering and paltering 
 course of President Wilson and those directly under his 
 authority were the inspiring words of Vice President Mar- 
 shall: 
 
 I believe that America belongs to American citizens, native and 
 naturalized, who are willing to seek redress for their grievances in 
 orderly and constitutional ways; and I believe that all others should 
 be taught, peacefully if we can and forcefully if we must, that our 
 country is not an international boarding house nor an anarchistic cafe. 
 
 NOTE. The treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed at 
 Rapallo, April 16, 1922, substantially abrogated the treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
 of March 3, 1918. Coming at the end of the first week of the Genoa Con- 
 ference, to which Germany and Soviet Russia were admitted, called to re- 
 establish Europe economically, this agreement, with the apparent intent of 
 combating, in large measure, the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty and of 
 challenging Western Europe, caused deep resentment among the leading 
 nations, which felt themselves tricked, and severely strained the integrity 
 of the Conference. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 DISLOYALTY 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter it is but fair that the 
 reader be permitted to ask whether any acts can be more 
 disloyal than those indicated in the chapter dealing with 
 Bolshevism. That Bolshevism, meaning "the most," as 
 practiced in the Soviet Government of Lenine and Trotzky 
 and as transplanted in America by their adherents, Mooney 
 and Minor and Johannsen, Foster and Fitzpatrick and 
 Lewis, to say nothing of Herron and Steffens and Creel, be- 
 sides the large number of parlor Bolshevists seeking to 
 undermine constitutional government in the United States, 
 leads directly to disloyalty to civil government, and chiefly 
 to the American form of government, there can scarcely be 
 a shadow of doubt. And that chapter discloses the organ- 
 ized attempt to overturn civil government in America. The 
 present chapter will attempt to disclose the disloyalty of 
 those who do or do not profess to suport Bolshevism, 
 though men of the stamp of Victor L. Berger admit openly 
 that they train with Bolshevists. 
 
 Through all the ages of human relationships, dis- 
 loyalty to one's country has been recognized as one of the 
 most despicable acts; the disloyalist as one of the most 
 despised of human kind. Whatever dereliction may be 
 found in President Wilson's Administration in this matter 
 must be assigned to other cause than ignorance on the part 
 of the nation's chief executive touching this simple phase 
 of human history. Among his utterances are to be found 
 some of the noblest sentiments in extant literature. Among 
 the acts of his administration some of the most questionable 
 in all history, the more's the pity. 
 
 221 
 
222 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 During the pre-war period, the Administration's atti- 
 tude toward the European struggle gave encouragement to 
 all the disloyal elements in the country to carry on, in 
 clandestine or open fashion, their nefarious schemes to 
 build upon a strong foundation any kind of structure they 
 chose. With a foresight surpassing that of the Administra- 
 tion, they prepared America for the conflict in which they 
 knew she must become a mighty factor. With the aid of the 
 German and Austrian ambassadors, plans were devised and 
 put into operation for creating a powerful sentiment 
 against the Allies and favorable to Germany; for crippling 
 the war industries of the nation as soon as it should become 
 a participant in the conflict; even for an attack upon the 
 nation's physical integrity by dismemberment through a 
 stab in the back by Mexico and Japan. 
 
 But much of the beauty of his patriotism as expressed 
 in words was lost in his subsequent wavering in action. 
 What influence caused this unsteadiness of purpose was 
 never determined. True, it was not new in the President's 
 official career that he should veer from a previously-stated 
 clear course. That he could stand through thick and thin 
 was shown in his position on the League Covenant. But his 
 swerving toward internationalism must be regarded as a 
 factor in his uncertain later position on Americanism. When 
 he declared in his September, 1919, address that the 
 internationalism represented in the League of Nations was 
 greater than the Government, it appears that he was willing 
 to subordinate the free office of the American nation to 
 something outside and beyond that free office; that it was 
 satisfactory to him that America should not longer be the 
 free agent for service to the world that she had been from 
 the very foundation of her markedly aggressive and pro- 
 gressive system of constitutional government. 
 
 With this as the Administration's ideal and attitude of 
 subordinating this government to some over-government 
 whose seat should be beyond the confines of America, it was 
 
Disloyalty 223 
 
 not difficult for those having similar or more radical views 
 of internationalism's mission to seek to weaken the hold 
 which the American system had always had upon the affec- 
 tion of the people ; to undermine that affection by declaring 
 something else better for the individual and for the world; 
 to hold up to ridicule the government which Mr. Wilson 
 said was not the greatest, while seeking to emasculate its 
 very vitality. It will be difficult for history not to lay a 
 heavy responsibility upon the Wilson Administration at 
 this point. 
 
 With the unaccountable characteristic of President Wil- 
 son of leaning toward the side which he should have been 
 combating, he gave ample room for Bernhard Dernberg, 
 representing the German government, to make a large sow- 
 ing of seeds that was certain to produce a large crop of* 
 weeds that must later be eradicated before this soil could 
 be in fit condition for sowing the good seed. Co-operating 
 with Ambassador Bernstorff in Washington, the mischief 
 was done while the pacifist Administration sat idly by. 
 While the husbandman slept, the enemy sowed tares in his 
 field. Bernstorff knew every avenue of approach; he knew 
 every channel of information. He cultivated pro-German 
 newspapers, knowing well upon whom he could rely. He 
 knew those that had a price and what the price was. He 
 knew the entire congressional personnel, and had them 
 classified as pro-German, pacifist, and demagogues with 
 German constituencies. But he misjudged in believing that 
 German money would settle with American indignation. 
 Though on a modified plan, the methods that had proved 
 effective in Russia were in operation in America. To the 
 middle of 1918, many a hand that treacherously waved the 
 United States flag to conceal villainy, would not have hesi- 
 tated, had occasion offered, to seize the dirk in the disloyal 
 bosom to plunge it into the true-hearted American. Later 
 the American people had open demonstration of this atti- 
 tude in the slaughter of the American Legion boys in Cen- 
 
224 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 tralia while celebrating the first anniversary of the armis- 
 tice. 
 
 When these plottings of Bernstorff and Dernberg were 
 laid before the American public, after the nation was at 
 war, it was let out in such manner as to lead the people to 
 believe, indeed it was openly stated, that the country never 
 had so efficient a secret service as was shown in the plottings 
 at the German embassy in Washington to dismember the 
 nation and to "sink without a trace" in the South American 
 waters. The secret service should have all the credit be- 
 longing to it, but it should be known that we were greatly 
 indebted to the efficiency of the British Secret Service for 
 the disclosures made. 
 
 Nor was all of the wickedness and insidiousness of the 
 disloyalty found in the open enemies of the nation. It was 
 found in men holding close relationships with the President. 
 In his book "The War, the World, and Wilson," George 
 Creel tells openly of his close contact with Mr. Wilson, who 
 had appointed him to the important position of chairman 
 of the federal Committee on Publicity during the war. 
 Yet, early in the autumn of 1918, the military censorship 
 found it necessary to exclude from libraries for use of the 
 soldiers a book containing an introduction by Mr. Creel, 
 because of its distinctly pro-German utterances, "Two 
 Thousand Questions and Answers About the War" a 
 book probably surpassing in German propaganda qualities 
 the distinctly propaganda book of Dernberg entitled "Ger- 
 many and the War." It was the more dangerous because 
 it came so close to the Administration's approval. Mr. 
 Creel recommended it as giving "the background of diffi- 
 culties out of which the war rose," and in his warm indorse- 
 ment stated that it "constitutes a vital part of the national 
 defense." On the other hand, the National Security 
 League, a patriotic organization, pronounced it " a mas- 
 terpiece of Hun propaganda" and declared that the Ger- 
 man government itself "could not have devised anything 
 
Disloyalty 225 
 
 more insidious, more calculated to destroy our faith in our 
 Allies, and to insinuate into the American mind excuses for 
 Germany." In the Senate there wa vigorous protest 
 against its sale, and it was openly declared that probably no 
 single man in the United States was doing more to aid the 
 cause of the country's enemies than George Creel. 
 
 On the other hand, the Department of Justice acting 
 promptly probably averted the necessity of resorting to the 
 lamp-post method, our Ambassador had suggested to the 
 German Emperor, by seizing enemy subjects on the eve of 
 the declaration of war, rather than waiting until they had 
 done something for which they could be shot. And the 
 ringleaders of whatever conspiracies they had planned were 
 in irons before any of their plans could be carried out. 
 
 The methods of accomplishing their nefarious purposes, 
 in addition to those indicated elsewhere, were various. 
 Lives, property, or families of loyal citizens were threat- 
 ened; 1 loyal citizens were defeated for office because of 
 their loyalty; munition plants were destroyed; ships were 
 sunk and many other attempts were made to sink them; there 
 was interference with the patriotic, orderly operation of the 
 school; 2 burning the grain-fields just before harvest time. 
 In some sections of the country, these tactics were employed 
 with so great vigor as to create a veritable reign of terror. 
 And in numerous instances it was carried on under the guise 
 of a labor problem, when, in fact, no problem of labor was 
 involved in any manner. 
 
 Perhaps the most powerful single organization backing 
 up disloyalty to the nation was the German-American Alli- 
 ance with its roots deeply imbedded in Germany and in 
 Germanism. Theodore Roosevelt, the great American 
 voice that spoke Americanism when the Administration was 
 
 *In some instances, as Norwood, Minnesota, bank deposits had to be 
 removed to other places for safety. 
 
 *In some instances, the local authorities attempting to prevent the 
 teacher's effort to show the pupils how to do Red Cross work, the authorities 
 from the state capital had to step in to back the teacher. 
 
226 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 pandering to disloyalty, raised an outcry against this unholy 
 Alliance that stirred the country from center to circum- 
 ference, and caused its charter to be revoked. Its leaders 
 were men of local prominence and often in positions of pub- 
 lic trust. In public matters they stood together, thus gain- 
 ing strength in the control of local public affairs, so that no 
 ordinary man could withstand their opposition. Almost 
 wholly identified with the liquor interests, they were not 
 properly assessed in the mind of the public until an in- 
 vestigation by the Senate disclosed the relations of the brew- 
 ing interests with the pro-German propaganda. This dis- 
 loyal organization was the backbone of what the kaiser 
 termed his three million men in America upon whom he 
 could rely in case of war with the United States, the real 
 force which Theodore Roosevelt designated as "the Hun 
 within our gates." It attacked in every way possible the 
 Allies while encouraging disloyalty in the United States and 
 prostituting our politics to Germany's needs. It deliber- 
 ately and confessedly sought to prevent Americanization, 
 aiming to perpetuate the use of the German language, man- 
 ners and customs, and their children's attachment to the 
 foreign land, and inculcated the principle of remaining Ger- 
 man at heart. It enabled the kaiser to boast that no Ameri- 
 can administration could remain in power against his will. 
 Documentary evidence produced by its treasurer showed 
 that it put at least $313,000 into the hands of Bernhard 
 Dernberg and Mayer Gerhardt, men whom the Administra- 
 tion permitted to sow seeds of dissension in this country, to 
 foment strikes, organize sedition, and commit sabotage, 
 arson, and murder, Gerhardt being Zimmerman's right-hand 
 man in the effort to get Mexico and Japan to seize New 
 Mexico, Arizona, and California. 
 
 The Nonpartisan League, which originated in North 
 Dakota, the home of Senator Gronna, one of the "wilful 
 twelve" who voted against the war, became a kind of ap- 
 pendage of the German-American Alliance. It was in that 
 
Disloyalty 227 
 
 state that Kate O'Hare was entertained by United States 
 officials, she who declared that mothers who raised sons 
 who would become soldiers were no better than brood sows, 
 who was convicted for her disloyalty, sent to the peniten- 
 tiary, then pardoned by President Wilson. It was under the 
 auspices of this League that Senator La Follette, address- 
 ing a mass-meeting in St. Paul, gave utterance to sentiments 
 regarded as so mischievous in their effects that it became 
 necessary to send Theodore Roosevelt to speak from the 
 same platform to overcome their viciousness. So disloyal 
 to the country was this League regarded all through the war 
 that every meeting it announced was watched either by 
 United States secret-service men or by local loyal men and 
 women. And in many sections the loyal sentiment would 
 not permit it to hold meetings, after Senator La Follette's 
 St. Paul address. It also became known that where the 
 pro-German sentiment was the strongest, there the League 
 was the strongest. Later its president and chief organizer, 
 Arthur C. Townley and Joseph Gilbert, were both con- 
 victed for their disloyal acts during the war. After the 
 visit of Townley to New York, in the autumn of 1917, the 
 notoriously pro-German paper, the New York Evening Mail 
 became an enthusiastic supporter of this League; and its 
 publisher, Edward A. Rumely, gave a series of articles and 
 editorials backing its operations. In sections where it was 
 vigorous, in the vote for United States senator, Peterson, 
 convicted in the federal court for disloyalty, received three 
 votes to one for the veteran loyalist, Senator Nelson. The 
 official newspaper of this organization, under the direction 
 of Townley, in January, 1920, rose to the defense of Berk- 
 man and Goldman, declaring that their preaching of an- 
 archy for twenty years was no wrong and that "they did no 
 harm whatever." The Nonpartisan League rendered just 
 such service as William of Hohenzollern would have it 
 render during the Great War. And George Creel zealously 
 supported it with every ounce of the power of the Adminis- 
 
228 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 tration he could command, and after the war gave it highest 
 praise and commendation for its loyal service during the 
 war. 3 
 
 The Hearst newspapers, of which there are a dozen in 
 the United States, were strongly pro-German. The revela- 
 tions made by the Senate investigation of the pro-German 
 and liquor propaganda amazed the country almost to stupe- 
 faction. The disclosure of Mr. Hearst's name with the 
 Zimmerman intrigue was hideous, and when the intrigue 
 was first revealed these papers went so far as to declare it 
 a probable forgery designed by the United States Attorney- 
 General. It was further shown in the investigation that 
 just before we entered the war, William Bayard Hale, on 
 the Hearst pay-roll at $300 per week, was also receiving 
 a salary of $15,000 by a publicity organization formed in 
 the United States by the notorious Dernberg to poison pub- 
 lic opinion. So notoriously disloyal were these newspapers 
 considered by the public safety commission of the Hawaiian 
 Islands that their sale was prohibited there. 4 In this con- 
 nection, the fact should not be lost sight of that it was this 
 same Mr. Hale who wrote most glowingly of President 
 Wilson, and whom President Wilson appointed on an im- 
 portant mission. 
 
 Individual communities were markedly Germanized and 
 in the Great War held to Germany rather than to America. 
 This was especially true where foreign languages were tol- 
 erated and cultivated. New Ulm, in the state of Minnesota, 
 is practically a community picked up bodily out of Germany 
 and set down in the United States. Its people cultivate 
 things German, not things American. It bears the distinc- 
 tion of being the first city in the country to oppose openly 
 the government in its war efforts, when, to its amazement, 
 
 3 The American Magazine, March, 1919, an article roundly condemned 
 by the loyalist Governor Burnquist for its brazen falsehoods. 
 
 * When this decision was reached, the largest news dealer in the city 
 of Hilo declared that a newspaper so disloyal should be excluded from the 
 United States mails. 
 
Disloyalty 229 
 
 it found an avalanche of loyal sentiment heaped upon it in 
 condemnation. The Nebraska branch of the National De- 
 fense League investigations disclosed the fact that there 
 were communities in which were schools where the pupils 
 were punished for using the English language ; that in some 
 sections of that state the encroachments of the German 
 schools were so great that the English-speaking schools had 
 to close their doors for want of attendance or because of so 
 small an attendance as to become farcical; and that many of 
 the teachers in these German schools had never been natur- 
 alized. 5 
 
 Some courts stood unequivocally for Americanism in 
 cases coming 'before them under the Espionage Act which 
 became a law May 21, 1917, giving the Administration 
 sweeping powers in dealing with disloyalty. Had the Ad- 
 ministration acted as unequivocally and as certainly, there 
 could have been nothing of which to complain by loyalists. 
 Some federal judges cancelled citizenship papers, thus mak- 
 ing the adopted citizen of the United States again an alien 
 enemy. This was action which the person affected could 
 understand in any language. One judge declared that "If 
 necessary, we will cancel every certificate of citizenship in 
 the United States"; and in sentencing a disloyal minister 
 who was educated in Germany until aged 16 years, when he 
 
 6 Harvey's War Weekly, August 31, 1918. So incredible seemed this 
 statement that I wrote to Harvey W. Morrow, Omaha, member of the war 
 Activities Committee, and he informed me that the War Weekly is correct. 
 And he adds that there is a large stretch of territory "where I used to 
 have to use an interpreter to talk to men who had lived there for forty 
 or fifty years. They did not know the English language, did not want 
 to know it, or to have their children know it," and then describes them 
 as he knew the Germans in Ohio, a wealthy, slovenly, unprogressive group 
 of German farmers, who, when they want to purchase the farm of an 
 English-speaking neighbor who does not want to sell, make it so uncom- 
 fortable for him that he is glad to sell and get away, and thus they get 
 a hold on the land, on the schools, on the churches of the more bigoted 
 character, and discourage their children from learning the English language. 
 "The Council of Defense found a good many similar communities," he adds. 
 "We had laws which compelled County Boards to publish their proceed- 
 ings in German and Bohemian, as well as English, . . . and in various 
 ways tended to perpetuate just what we are supposed to be trying to 
 eliminate. . . . They have all since been repealed." The Author. 
 
230 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 came to the United States where he graduated from a sem- 
 inary in 1893 and was admitted to citizenship in 1898, after 
 declaring that his oath of allegience meant that he would 
 "set about earnestly growing an American soul, and put 
 away your German soul," added : 
 
 Have you done that? . . . You have cherished everything Ger- 
 man, and stifled everything American. You have preached German, 
 prayed German, read German, sung German. Every thought of your 
 mind, and every emotion of your heart through all these years has 
 been German. Your body has been in America, but your life has 
 been in Germany. If you were set down in Prussia to-day you 
 would be in harmony with your environment. . . . There have been 
 a good many Germans before me in the last month. They have 
 lived in this country, like yourself, 10, 20, 30, 40 years, and they 
 had to give their evidence through an interpreter. As I looked at 
 them and tried, as best I could, to understand them, there was written 
 all over every one of them, "Made in Germany." 6 
 
 Every section of the land had this kind of disloyalty to 
 meet. The Administration dealt very leniently with the 
 offenders, and particularly with the so-called conscientious 
 objectors. Indeed, in its dealing with this class of offen- 
 ders, the course of the Administration bordered upon a 
 national scandal. It ran every stage of possibility from 
 President Wilson's direct intervention to save from the 
 clutches of the law murderers, anarchists, and traitors, to 
 the "kindly consideration" extended by Secretary Baker to 
 conscientious objectors, but which he forbade coming to the 
 knowledge of the public as he knew the Administration had 
 gone as far in that matter as the public would bear, and so 
 stated in his official capacity. The investigation of the 
 Senate committee developed, in December, 1918, that Wil- 
 liam Bayard Hale, a Hearst newspaper writer and former 
 confidential representative of President Wilson in Mexico, 
 
 "Federal Judge Charles F. Amidon in pronouncing sentence of three 
 years to the Leavenworth penitentiary upon Rev. John Fontana of New 
 Salem, North Dakota. 
 
Disloyalty 231 
 
 became the head of the German propaganda forces in the 
 United States, and that within two weeks after the begin- 
 ning of hostilities in 1914, there were landed in this coun- 
 try 31 German agents, who became the nucleus of an or- 
 ganized force of between 200,000 and 300,00 volunteers, 
 mainly German-Americans. And it was with this force 
 back of them that the "conscientious" objectors made bold 
 to make their demands and defy authority, even refusing to 
 cook their own food. And in one of his official communica- 
 tions with his government, Ambassador Bernstorff de- 
 clared that Hale, who had been a confidential agent of the 
 Embassy since the beginning of the war, was the man se- 
 lected when the time had arrived u to get Hearst to send 
 a first-rate journalist to Berlin." 7 This witness also told 
 the Senate committee that the Hearst papers were the most 
 pronouncedly pro-German of all the newspapers in the 
 United States. It was not until these disclosures were made 
 through the Senate investigation that the State Department 
 revealed to the public, what it had evidently known all the 
 time. Accordingly, on December 7, 1918, this Depart- 
 ment issued copies of telegrams showing Ambassador 
 Bernstorff's activity in the pro-German propaganda in this 
 country. 
 
 With this distinctively pro-German powerful backing, 
 together with their own organized efforts, chief of which 
 was the Civil Liberty League of New York, and the 
 friendly attitude of Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, 
 they had little to fear, and the slacker became a favored 
 group of the Administration and a stench on the nostrils of 
 real Americans. That Mr. Baker secretly aided their pro- 
 gram is indicated in an order which was not permitted to 
 reach the public until after the conclusion of hostilities. A 
 sample is this: 
 
 T Dispatch of June 2, 1916, as submitted to the Senate committee inves- 
 tigating German propaganda, in December, 1918, by A. Bruce Bielaski, 
 Chief of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. 
 
232 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 With reference to the attitude objecting to military service, these 
 men are not to be treated as violating military laws, thereby sub- 
 jecting themselves to the penalties of the Articles of War, but their 
 attitude in this respect will be quietly ignored and they will be 
 treated with kindly consideration. 
 
 Under no circumstances are the instructions contained in the fore- 
 going to be given to the newspapers. 8 
 
 Though an insignificant sheet like Tom Watson's of 
 Georgia, and the Christian Science Monitor of Boston were 
 made to feel the weight of the Administration wrath, the 
 all-powerful and pro-German and pro-liquor papers were 
 fawned upon by the Administration. Its chief effect was to 
 develop disloyalty under Administration influence. But a 
 more insidious scheme ran all through the Administration's 
 conduct during the war. When Charles A. Lindberg, can- 
 didate of the disloyal Nonpartisan League for the nomina- 
 tion for Governor of Minnesota was defeated by the loyal 
 Burnquist, in the summer of 1918, he was immediately 
 offered an appointment by the Administration to an impor- 
 tant office, though he had opposed war loans to such an 
 extent that it was known that no headway could be made 
 with the Fourth Liberty Loan drive, then about to begin, 
 should he be appointed. His book, "Why is Your Country 
 at War?" was looked upon as so disloyal a production that 
 the opinion was freely expressed that he should have been 
 vigorously prosecuted for his utterances rather than ap- 
 pointed to a post on the War Industries Board. And when 
 the secretary of the America First Association, a loyal 
 organization of 100,000 membership in Minnesota, went 
 to see President Wilson to secure the right kind of speaker 
 to offset the propaganda work of the disloyal Nonpartisan 
 League, he was referred to A. C. Townley, president of 
 the Nonpartisan League and later convicted for disloyalty. 
 
 But there was ever a brighter side. Large numbers of 
 
 'Order dated October 10, 1917. 
 
Disloyalty 233 
 
 Germans who had accepted citizenship in their adopted 
 country as a matter of pride and real opportunity, were more 
 than a match for their disloyal kindred by nationality; they 
 served well the adopted country which they revered. And 
 in their action they were as brave as the others were cow- 
 ardly. They showed the genuine American spirit. 
 
 There came a time when America became impatient with 
 the Administration's trifling with disloyalty. At first 
 trusted, the Administration showed such a wobbling course 
 as to excite suspicion on the part of those who had the 
 nation's welfare at heart. And in view of the ruin, whether 
 social or material, left in the wake of the Administration's 
 war policy; and in view of the profuseness of its apologists, 
 from Creel to Hale and Herron, for its demonstrated en- 
 tanglements with Hearst's pro-Germanism, Henry Ford's 
 pacifism and red-flagism, Townley's Nonpartisan German- 
 ism, the Alliance-brewers' liquorism and the Mooney and 
 Minor disloyal anarchism, perhaps the American public has 
 some ground for believing that they were all part of the 
 scheme of President Wilson, culminating in his political 
 appeal of October, 1918, for continuance of power, to at- 
 tain some ulterior end of personal power and aggrandize- 
 ment. Else why all these close affiliations with disloyalty 
 utter and absolute? 
 
 Blazoned high and forever ringing in the ears of the 
 people, let the immortal words of Theodore Roosevelt, 
 uttered the night before he died, be the motto of America : 
 WE HAVE ROOM FOR BUT ONE FLAG, THE 
 AMERICAN FLAG WE HAVE ROOM FOR BUT 
 ONE LOYALTY, AND THAT IS LOYALTY TO THE 
 AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 LOOKING TOWARD PEACE 
 
 People in touch with the activities of that day will not 
 readily forget the easy phrase of President Wilson's cam- 
 paign managers in the autumn of 1916, when he was seek- 
 ing re-election: "He kept us out of war"; also, that twin 
 phrase: "You are not at war, you are at work." They 
 answered their immediate purpose that of the political 
 campaign. But it soon became a bitter reflection for some 
 of the Administration supporters; for even then it was 
 known that no human power could keep America neutral 
 when civilization was at stake, and even America's liberty 
 itself. 
 
 But the spirit back of the phrase misled many Americans 
 of the highest type of patriotic citizenship. Even so keen 
 and lofty-minded an American as Theodore Roosevelt 
 admitted that he had been betrayed into trusting the Ad- 
 ministration in the early period of the European conflict. 
 When a school book quoted him as at first supporting the 
 President's neutrality policy, he demanded that the mis- 
 leading statement be eliminated, unless his later position 
 on the war be stated. And he issued this statement : 
 
 I notified the school superintendent that it was sheer suppression 
 of the truth to make such a quotation without giving what I had 
 said and done during the next four years. During the first sixty days 
 I followed Mr. Wilson's lead, believing him to have special infor- 
 mation. . . . Then I saw the Belgian Commission and I became 
 convinced that President Wilson's attitude was wholly unjustified by 
 the facts, and immediately thereupon I took the attitude which I have 
 ever since held. 1 
 
 1 See chapter on "The Spirit of America" for quotation to which ex- 
 ception was taken. 
 
 234 
 
Looking Toward Peace 235 
 
 While the United States was yet a neutral, President 
 Wilson had suggested to the belligerent powers that a state- 
 ment of acceptable terms of peace was considered desirable 
 by this government. The following day, Lloyd George,, 
 speaking for Great Britain, referred to "restitution, liber- 
 ation, and guarantees against repetition." This was made 
 the basis of the Allies' formal and detailed reply to Wilson's 
 request the following month, on January 10, 1917 a year 
 before the promulgation of the Fourteen Points. In this 
 reply, the essential terms of peace were named. But Mr. 
 Wilson had also before him the statements of the Special 
 National Labor Conference in London published less, than 
 two weeks before announcing his Fourteen Points, as well 
 as the speech of Lloyd George delivered at the Trade 
 Union Conference on man-power three days before the 
 President stated his Points. As Mr. Wilson declared at 
 the time, these were both fresh in his mind on January 8, 
 1918. And Lloyd George, in an address to Parliament, 
 stated: "Before the war was over we stated our peace 
 terms. ... A few days later President Wilson proposed 
 his famous Fourteen Points which practically embodied 
 my statement." 
 
 In his address before Congress, January 8, 1918, Presi- 
 dent Wilson declared his distrust of the German rulers 
 and demanded to know for whom the negotiators at Brest- 
 Litovsk spoke. It was on that occasion that he enunciated 
 the Fourteen Points which are substantially these : 
 
 i. Open diplomacy. 2. Freedom of navigation in 
 peace and in war. 3. Removal of international economic 
 barriers. 4. Reduction of armaments. 5. Impartial ad- 
 justment of colonial claims, the interests of the populations 
 concerned having equal weight with governmental claims. 
 
 6. Evacuation of all Russian territory, and such settlement 
 of questions affecting Russia as to give her opportunity for 
 determining her political development and national policy. 
 
 7. Belgium to be evacuated and restored. 8. Alsace-Lor- 
 
236 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 raine restored to France. 9. Adjustment of Italian fron- 
 tiers. 10. Peoples of Austria-Hungary accorded freest op- 
 portunity for own development, n. Roumania, Serbia, 
 and Montenegro evacuated and restored, Serbia to have 
 access to the sea, and the political and economic independ- 
 ence of the Balkan states to be guaranteed internationally. 
 
 12. Turkey to be assured sovereignty of Turkish portion 
 of Ottoman Empire, but those of other nationalities under 
 Turkish rule to have autonomous development, Dardanelles 
 to be free for all nations under international guarantees. 
 
 13. Independent Polish state. 14. A league of nations. 
 One writer upon the League of Nations pointed out that 
 
 a day or two after President Wilson had stated his Four- 
 teen Points, Lloyd George, in answering the same call as 
 to the terms of peace, u made a statement which was prac- 
 tically an Anglo-French declaration. It was, in substance, 
 identical with President Wilson's." 2 The inference might 
 well be that Lloyd George was following President Wil- 
 son's lead; when, as a matter of fact, the reverse was true. 
 And, as pointed out by George Harvey in an analysis of 
 the genesis of Mr. Wilson's fourteen principles, not more 
 than one originated with him. 3 
 
 But they were thrown into his phraseology and the peo- 
 ple generally came to regard them as the product of his> 
 intellect. All forgotten by a busy world, they then sprang 
 suddenly into prominence when the President himself re- 
 vived them in his conversations during the German peace 
 drive in the autumn of 1918. 
 
 An unfortunate feature about them was that they were 
 no sure guide to peace. After declaring them to be "the 
 
 a Kallen, "The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow," pp. XIV-XV. 
 
 3 The North American Review, February, 1919. 
 
 And for a marked similarity between the Russian Soviet's peace terms 
 and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the former announced nearly 
 three months earlier than the latter, see pages 260-263 of Edward A. Ross' 
 "The Russian Bolshevik Revolution," The Century Company, New York, 
 1921. 
 
Looking Toward Peace 237 
 
 only possible program of peace," he dismissed them as 
 "only a provisional sketch." And the next month after 
 formulating them for the nations, he offered to negotiate 
 upon four abstract principles. 4 And though given very 
 great publicity, as a set of principles they scarcely survived 
 the armistice, and in the peace treaty were practically ig- 
 nored; while the thirteen principles submitted by Lord 
 Northcliffe, eminent English journalist and shaper of pub- 
 lic opinion, as indispensable to peace, received little publicity 
 and were accepted by the peace congress, substantially in 
 full. 
 
 When President Wilson proposed his terms of peace, 
 including the Fourteen Points as the condition of an armis- 
 tice, there was an outburst of protest in the United States 
 and there arose a loud cry for unconditional surrender as 
 the only acceptable preliminary of peace. Americans and 
 Allies alike were startled when the President insisted that 
 it must be accepted by the democratic nations without 
 amendment. The first complete acceptance of his peace 
 program came from Germany. On January 24, 1918, 
 Count Hertling, speaking before the Reichstag for Ger- 
 many, and Count Czernin, speaking before the Reichsrath 
 for Austria, replied to the addresses of Lloyd George and 
 President Wilson. 
 
 Between the time of these early statements of peace 
 terms and the autumn enemy peace drive, there was issued 
 a statement that is worthy of being writ in gold. It is that 
 of the committee of British workingmen in charge of the 
 Labor and Socialist demonstration held in London, July 
 14, 1918, containing these notable words: 
 
 Let it be known to the democracy of America that, come what 
 may, even if Paris should fall and the channel ports be taken, the 
 people of Great Britain are resolved to support the Allied Nations 
 to the fullest extent of their energy and power, 
 4 Address to Congress, February n, 1918. 
 
238 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 This meant that the British workingmen purposed to 
 fight the war to a victorious finish and to crush Prussian- 
 ism before there could be so much even as consideration 
 of peace. And the resolutions add: "What would follow 
 peace negotiations with the Central Powers victorious can 
 be judged by the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest." 
 It gave a bracing to America's workingmen; and, perhaps 
 chiefly, served as a warning to her statesman who had de- 
 clared for making the world safe for democracy. It was 
 a strange irony that should bring this warning from a 
 European monarchy to the America which had always been 
 the outstanding democracy of the world. 
 
 There is of record, however, at an earlier date, an 
 American contrast with the President's uncertain course 
 during these crucial months, that is refreshing. It was 
 the certain and wholesome notes, in May, 1918, that came 
 from the Philadelphia convention of the League to Enforce 
 Peace. It was determined upon winning the war for per- 
 manent peace. In this convention were two dominant notes : 
 One, that in the struggle then on we were in opposition 
 to a nation conclusively proved to be a criminal at the 
 bar of history and humanity; the other, that in the contest 
 with this guilty and vicious enemy the war must be fought to 
 an overwhelming finish. At that time President Lowell 
 of Harvard University said we must be on our guard against 
 an inconclusive peace to which we were likely to be tempted 
 any day; and Senator Williams of Mississippi declared that 
 we could not even talk peace with Germany; and former 
 President Taft told the audience, in words that expressed 
 the sentiment of the gathering, that since Germany's char- 
 acter was at that time fully revealed, the slogan must be 
 stern, implacable war, and exclaimed: "Shall we not be 
 open to the shame of history if we do not carry this thing 
 through to the limit?" 
 
 The developments of the next few months showed that 
 the basis of President Lowell's warning was substantial. 
 
Looking Toward Peace 239 
 
 When President Wilson, without consulting the nations 
 with which America was allied in the Great War, under- 
 took his conversations with the enemies of the country 
 for peace proposals within two months after the warning 
 from the British workingmen and in less than four months 
 after the warnings from the Philadelphia convention, the 
 better thought of the nation was led by such men as James 
 M. Beck, who declared that the President's peace proposals, 
 at the very time when he was using all the prestige of his high 
 office to control, for partisan purposes, the state election 
 in Wisconsin on the ground of loyalty, were paralyzing the 
 will of the American people. And his wavering raised a 
 question as to what kind of Americanism he represented. 
 
 The President's idea of peace appeared to be different 
 from that of the nations with which we were allied in 
 carrying on the Great War. They had been through the 
 death struggle from the beginning; and their idea of peace 
 was a cessation of hostilities after complete defeat of the 
 enemy. President Wilson's idea appeared to be to take the 
 Germans in to aid in fixing the terms of peace a negotiated 
 peace instead of a dictated peace. He entered the danger 
 zone of diplomacy when he opened the doors of conversa- 
 tion with the enemy in the great peace drive directed by 
 Germany. 
 
 His minister to The Netherlands had a distinctly differ- 
 ent view when he stated : 
 
 The duty of the present is to fight on beside France, Great Brit- 
 ain, Italy, Belgium, Servia, Roumania, and, we hope, Russia, "to 
 bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the 
 war." 
 
 To talk of any other course is treason, not only to our country 
 but to the cause of true peace. 5 
 
 The President's supporters declared that he stood for 
 unconditional surrender. But there was the avowed peace 
 
 5 Henry Van Dyke in "Fighting for Peace," p. 212, Charles Scribners 
 Sons, New York, 1917. 
 
240 The Wilson* Administration and the Great War 
 
 program of the first serious effort at the peace drive, begun 
 by Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. 
 It was what became known as the September "peace of- 
 fensive." Beginning early in the month with vague and un- 
 official statements to newspaper men, it continued until the 
 fourteenth, when an official invitation was extended to the 
 Allies to send delegates to a secret conference for an ex- 
 change of terms to be binding on none. That refused, the 
 effort culminated on October 5 in a note proposing, through 
 President Wilson, to conclude with him and his Allies a gen- 
 eral armistice on land, on sea, and in air; and to begin, with- 
 out delay, negotiations for peace, these negotiations to be 
 based upon the President's address of January 8, including 
 the Fourteen Points, and his subsequent addresses of Febru- 
 ary 12 and September 27. This was generally understood to 
 be merely a "feeler" put forward by Germany. The next 
 day brought to the newspapers the text of a note from Ger- 
 many, asking President Wilson to take in hand the restora- 
 tion of peace, inviting the Allies to send plenipotentiaries 
 "for the purpose of opening negotiations." Thus the issue 
 of peace or continued war was presented to the nations. 
 
 Whatever the real reason for this action of the enemy, 
 it is not flattering to the greatest world democracy that its 
 President was so much more in sympathy with the brutal- 
 izing forces of autocracy and with the game to slaughter 
 civilization than were statesmen of other nations, as to be 
 selected by Germany in carrying forward her peace cam- 
 paign. It created unpleasant, something of uncanny, feel- 
 ings in the American bosom to have this country made the 
 mark by the arch enemy of civilization for this distinction. 
 
 Nor was this feeling mollified by what became known 
 as the general German plan and attitude, whether before 
 or after the armistice was declared, an attitude indicated 
 by a series of resolutions adopted, after the signing of the 
 armistice, by the chamber of commerce of Cologne, one of 
 the Rhine cities held at the time by the Allied armies of 
 
Looking Toward Peace 241 
 
 occupation; resolutions embodying the hope that u the de- 
 struction of French and Belgian industries would allow a 
 rapid recovery of German commercial power." These 
 brutal calculations sought a peace, using the United States 
 as a medium, that would give the unsubdued enemy the ad- 
 vantage of a long start over the victims of her crimes. They 
 were seeking to bring their diabolical plan of wholesale de- 
 struction of these industries and the equally wholesale mur- 
 ders of the civilian population of invaded territories to 
 bear upon the United States in order to have its President 
 intervene in their behalf, that their own country might be 
 spared invasion and destruction of its industries. 
 
 The persistent assumption that the President of the 
 United States, a member of the court writing the judg- 
 ment upon Germany's crimes, should descend from his place 
 and appear before that tribunal as her counsel probably 
 seemed to the German a subtle form of flattery; and the 
 President's course, it was generally admitted, invited the 
 doubtful compliment. 
 
 In all, it was very promptly recognized that the main- 
 spring of the German peace policy was to separate the 
 United States from its Allies in the settlement. Autocracy 
 had lost the war; its only hope was to save itself and some 
 of its power by skilful negotiation. The most obvious de- 
 vice was to make all possible out of the fact that President 
 Wilson's policy was ostentatiously independent; that he had 
 criticized and rebuked the Allies for their alleged failure 
 to serve the ends of justice; and that he had declared a 
 peace program to which he demanded allegiance from all 
 belligerents. Prussianism accepted his terms, thereby bind- 
 ing him to seek a like acceptance from the Allies. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian note of September 14 was de- 
 livered to the State Department in Washington at 6 :2O in 
 the evening of the 1 6th. President Wilson had prepared his 
 reply upon the newspaper text that had been available all 
 day. As soon as the official note arrived and was com- 
 
242 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 pared with the newspaper account, his reply was made pub- 
 lic within a half-hour after the invitation was formally 
 received. The reply stated : 
 
 The government of the United States feels that there is only one 
 reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro- 
 Hungarian government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor 
 stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, 
 and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter 
 concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain. 
 
 This was perhaps the shortest and least rhetorical of 
 all of the state papers of President Wilson during the 
 war period, as well as one of the most momentous. It 
 thrilled the nation. It struck a very responsive chord 
 throughout the civilized world outside of the enemy coun- 
 tries. If the fine and lofty idealism of some of his other 
 declarations were inspiring to the world, this terse repudi- 
 ation of the German plan was electrifying. And in this 
 famous reply there was no delay, no hushed speculation as 
 to what policy was to be imposed upon the nation. It looked 
 as though, at last, the President had taken his stand with 
 the people. 
 
 It was what the people had desired. It seemed at last 
 the long-looked-for leader had appeared and was fully 
 equipped to lead them from the morass of doubt into which 
 he had permitted them to wander. The devastating swift- 
 ness of it all almost took the people's breath, while it 
 crushed with astounding force the elaborately-built struc- 
 ture of the Prussian peace plan, its stern brevity leaving no 
 chance for misunderstanding or rejoinder. It cut the ground 
 completely from under autocracy's feet, threatening its utter 
 confusion and destruction. The swiftness and bluntness of 
 the reply are said to be without precedent in the annals 
 of diplomacy. Never was government given more con- 
 vincing proof of its strength and decision, and never did 
 President Wilson display higher qualities of leadership than 
 
Looking Toward Peace 243 
 
 in thus expressing the unalterable judgment of the nation 
 fighting in a righteous cause. 
 
 On the same day Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Secre- 
 tary, said: "I cannot see the slightest hope in these pro- 
 posals that the goal we all desire, a peace which is some- 
 thing more than a truce, can be obtained. " And Premier 
 Clemenceau of France said: u We shall fight until the en- 
 emy comes to understand that bargaining between crime 
 and right is no longer possible/* 
 
 Eleven days after his swift and certain reply to the 
 Austrian note of September 16, President Wilson continued 
 the enthusiasm which it created by making in the New York 
 Metropolitan Opera House an address that expressed ideas 
 wholly in harmony with his reply, irrevocably confirming 
 the outlawry of autocracy. This address contains a pas- 
 sage worthy of a place with the finest of American tradi- 
 tion. Speaking of the perfidy of the Central Powers he 
 said: 
 
 They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not 
 intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but 
 force and their own interest. We cannot come to terms with them. 
 They have made it impossible. The German people must by this 
 time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who 
 forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or 
 speak the same language of agreement. 
 
 The address was somewhat confusing in its effort to 
 harmonize its author's previous stand with his new position. 
 As to the supreme issues of the day he stated : u They per- 
 haps were not clear at the outset but they are clear now." 
 Possibly this is as near to confession as one may expect; 
 yet the one incontrovertible fact respecting the war is that 
 the basic issues stood clearly defined in its first month. He 
 also stated concerning the war: "We came into it when 
 its character had become fully defined and it was plain that 
 no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its out- 
 come." Upon this statement it was April, 1917, that the 
 
244 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 meaning of the war became so plain that America's partici- 
 pation was necessary; yet only a few weeks before, Mr. 
 Wilson was insisting upon a compromise between right and 
 wrong in his declaration for a "peace without victory." 
 
 No higher tribute could be paid to the utterance of the 
 President in that notable address than the universal recog- 
 nition that it was worthy of the occasion. No statesman 
 ever had a greater audience or a more inspiring subject 
 than he in addressing the nation upon the essential terms 
 of peace. It was now the voice of American democracy 
 that spoke the soul of the nation; not the weak and craven 
 voice which said America was u too proud to fight," when 
 might was trampling upon right. It was not now the voice 
 that viewed the war against law and liberty as "none of our 
 concern." Speaking with the serene sureness which came 
 from conviction established in demonstrated facts, he spoke 
 also with the authority derived from the will of the great 
 nation which he represented. 
 
 No one should have known better than he why, in his 
 phrase, "the air every now and again gets darkened by 
 mists and groundless doubts and mischievous perversions of 
 counsel"; and it was through his own vague quest that the 
 country was brought to the point of dividing on the issue 
 which he himself raised in response to Germany's peace 
 drive. 
 
 In this connection, it is worthy of note that on the 
 same day that President Wilson obscurely hinted that the 
 issues of the war were not clear to him at first, another 
 member of the Administration was uttering a robust avowal 
 of error. This was Vice-President Marshall, who, in a 
 public address in the same city, boldly declared: 
 
 I come here partly to make an apology, an apology for my attitude 
 during almost two years and a half of that fateful conflict ; an apology 
 that a God-fearing man in the twentieth-century civilization could 
 have dreamed that any nation, any people, or any man could be 
 neutral when right was fighting with wrong. 
 
Looking Toward Peace 245 
 
 When Germany saw that her overwhelming military 
 defeat was certain and sought a way to avoid the inevitable 
 consequences, she directed her peace offensives toward 
 Washington. This course was logical: First, President 
 Wilson had undertaken to dominate the peace settlement; 
 second, This government was the only one of her opponents 
 not pledged against making a separate peace; third, Presi- 
 dent Wilson had proposed a set of terms, every item of 
 which was open to various interpretations and to contro- 
 versy, and Germany's acceptance of them would bring her 
 into closer association with him and might impel him to 
 demand like acceptance from the Allies. The correspond- 
 ence into which they drew the President went far toward 
 accomplishing these ends. In every note issued from Berlin 
 and Washington, the Fourteen Points were emphasized, 
 and were linked inseparably with the suggestion for an 
 armistice. 
 
 It was just eleven days after his notable New York 
 address of September 27 that President Wilson made his 
 faltering reply to Germany's request for peace terms, con- 
 sisting of a statement and two questions. In this note of 
 October 8, he stated that, owing to the "momentous in- 
 terests involved," he deemed it proper to make some in- 
 quiries as to the intent of Germany in seeking his assistance. 
 This is the famous note: 
 
 Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Gov- 
 ernment, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straight- 
 forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of 
 the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact 
 meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial 
 Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the 
 terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of 
 the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent ad- 
 dresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only 
 to agree upon the practical details of their application ? 
 
 The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of 
 
246 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of 
 arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United 
 States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies 
 of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discus- 
 sion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers 
 immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the 
 Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities 
 of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the 
 answer to these questions vital from every point of view. 
 
 It was with mingled astonishment, rage, and dismay 
 that the souls of men were possessed when the news of his 
 reply was published after what he had led the nation to 
 expect as results of his address of September 27. This 
 was evidenced by unvarying murmurs of "It is what we have 
 feared all along." The German Government, knowing that 
 a war was never won by talking peace, engaged the Ameri- 
 can Government in talking peace. The division of senti- 
 ment was instant, whereas it had been solidly back of the 
 President the day before. It led to James M. Beck's dec- 
 laration that the President's wavering course was "paralyz- 
 ing the will of the American people." The day before the 
 President's reply, Senator Lodge had pledged his unequivo- 
 cal support to the President's declared policy of refusing 
 to have anything to do with German peace except through 
 victory. The country was united. The leaders of the two 
 great political parties were in hearty accord on Monday, 
 while on Wednesday they were as far apart as the antipo- 
 des. The President had changed and the people were 
 disappointed. 
 
 This division in public sentiment was shown in the 
 two resolutions offered in the senate. That by Senator 
 Lodge: 
 
 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that there should be 
 no further communication with the German Government upon the 
 
Looking Toward Peace 247 
 
 subject of an armistice or conditions of peace, except a demand for 
 unconditional surrender. 
 
 That by Senator Lewis of Illinois was in these words: 
 
 Resolved, That the United States Senate approves whatever 
 course may be taken by the President of the United States in the 
 matter of his replies and in his dealings with the German Imperial 
 Government and the Austrian Imperial Government and the allies 
 of either or both, in response to the demand of either for peace or 
 armistice. 
 
 Smarting under the criticisms of his first temporizing 
 note to Germany, he essayed to issue, through Senator 
 Pittman of Nevada, a direct challenge to his opponents, 
 in this language : u The test in the coming election is inevita- 
 ble between the policies of Woodrow Wilson and the 
 policies of Henry Cabot Lodge." He uttered a great truth. 
 
 Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's capacity for fine phras- 
 ing, some of his state papers, which should have left no 
 possible scope for difference of opinion, were obscure in 
 the extreme. And this first reply to Germany, containing 
 fewer than 250 words, was so susceptible of differing con- 
 structions that the various interpretations given to it filled 
 many columns, some of them wholly in conflict with others. 
 A thoroughgoing American newspaper stated: "Once 
 more the American nation, eager for leadership, found 
 itself confronting, instead, a question-mark." And when 
 the outcry against the President's reply became too loud, 
 Secretary of State Lansing explained to the public that the 
 President's note was only a preliminary inquiry. That this 
 was mere pretense was shown by the inspired interpretations 
 issued from Washington describing it as the most powerful 
 and decisive document of the war, and which declared it 
 to exhibit "subtle dialectic skill," "majestic simplicity," and 
 " the force of an ultimatum." But when the President, yield- 
 ing to the enraged protest, changed his position and re- 
 ferred the entire matter to the Allies, where it belonged, 
 
248 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 in his next note to Germany, the nation was delivered from 
 a grave menace. 
 
 In his reply of October 8, he was led into what the 
 Germans desired conversations by an individual nation in 
 the hope of winning that nation from its Allies. And had 
 it not been for the sound American sentiments which 
 sounded the alarm with an outcry that was exceeded by 
 none during the war except that in the airplane scandal and 
 the failure of the war department to function after the 
 years of the do-nothing spirit, there was a fine prospect 
 of its success. 
 
 The German government seizing the opportunity, with 
 swift and deadly precision on October 12 answered fully 
 the President's two questions and in almost his exact words. 
 Forced by the articulate rage on the part of America, to say 
 nothing of the courteous protest of the European Allied 
 statesmen, he then, on October 14, informed Germany that, 
 "The unqualified acceptance by the present German Gov- 
 ernment and by a large majority of the German Reichstag 
 of the terms laid down by the President of the United States 
 of America . . . justifies the President in making a frank 
 and direct statement of his decision with regard to the com- 
 munications of the German Government of the 8th and I2th 
 of October, 1918." And he further stated that "it must be 
 understood that the process of evacuation and the condi- 
 tions of an armistice are matters which must be left to 
 the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the 
 Government of the United States and the Allied Govern- 
 ments." 
 
 Germany acceding to these conditions and asking for 
 an armistice in its reply of October 20, the President re- 
 plied by stating that he had referred all to the Allied na- 
 tions. 
 
 The peace conversations between President Wilson and 
 the enemy powers are well summed up by a leading eastern 
 newspaper as follows : 
 
Looking Toward Peace 249 
 
 1. Germany to President Wilson We request you to bring 
 about an immediate armistice, and a peace conference with your terms 
 as a basis of negotiations. 
 
 2. President Wilson to Germany I will not propose an armis- 
 tice so long as your armies are on invaded soil. Do you mean that 
 you accept my terms, and wish to discuss merely the details of their 
 application? Is your government still an autocracy? 
 
 3. Germany to President Wilson We have accepted your 
 terms and principles and wish merely to discuss their application. We 
 are ready to evacuate invaded territory, under an armistice arranged 
 by a mixed commission. We speak in the name of the German gov- 
 ernment and the German people. 
 
 4. President Wilson to Germany Conditions of an armistice 
 must be decided by the military advisers of your opponents jointly, and 
 must safeguard the military supremacy attained over you. Cessation 
 of illegal and inhumane practices is first required. Your government 
 is still arbitrary and autocratic, and it is within the choice of the 
 German people to alter it. We must know with whom we are 
 speaking. 
 
 5. Germany to President Wilson We again request an armis- 
 tice, the terms based upon the actual standard of power on both sides 
 in the field. We trust you will resist any demand injurious to the 
 honor of the German people. Charges of illegal war practices are 
 denied, but those guilty of such acts are being punished. You are 
 dealing with a government free from any arbitrary and irresponsible 
 influence and supported by the German people. 
 
 6. President Wilson to Germany Upon your assurances, I 
 have transmitted to the Allies your request for an armistice, the 
 understanding being that the terms would prevent your renewing 
 hostilities and enable your opponents to enforce the details of the 
 peace to which you have agreed. Extraordinary guarantees are re- 
 quired because your government is not yet satisfactorily made re- 
 sponsible to the German people. With veritable representatives of 
 the people a negotiated peace is possible; if we must deal with mili- 
 tarists and monarchical autocrats, our demand must be for surrender. 
 
 7. Germany to President Wilson This is a government of the 
 people, and it controls the military authorities. It awaits proposals 
 for an armistice, as a step toward peace on the Wilson terms. 6 
 
 "The Philadelphia North American. 
 
250 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 That is the documentary record, including an ultimatum 
 to the Allies in number 6. 
 
 In the Allied countries, the President's note of October 
 8 to Germany was praised; but the indorsements were cau- 
 tious and they soon gave way to frank dissent. An official 
 representative of Great Britain in Washington declared: 
 "We cannot win this war by talking peace." The London 
 Chronicle said: "It is expected here that President Wilson 
 will stipulate, instead of asking rhetorical questions." For 
 four years Lord Northcliffe's positive instructions to his 
 English newspapers were that there was to be no criticism 
 whatever of President Wilson in his newspapers. But under 
 the stress of the President's reply to Germany his patience 
 yielded and his London Times, chief of the papers, said : 
 
 We all have the greatest confidence in President Wilson, but we 
 think it would have been better if, instead of attempting any negotia- 
 tions, he had stated straight out that any peace offer from the Central 
 Powers must be presented to the Allies as a whole. 
 
 And another dispatch said: "It was hoped in Britain 
 that he would not be actuated by any desire to appropri- 
 ate an undue share of responsibility in answering Ger- 
 many." There was no word of approval from the great 
 English journals. 
 
 The only prominent man of the Allies in approval was 
 the English pacifist Lansdowne. It was all deep silence 
 from every European statesman from the democratic na- 
 tions. Propaganda given out from Washington undertook 
 to show Sir Eric Geddes, of the British admiralty, as 
 giving "unqualified approval" of the President's course. 
 But what he said was this: "We cannot win by talking 
 peace. To get us talking of peace is just what Germany 
 wants. Let the Kaiser talk while Foch shoots." And 
 Premier Lloyd George would speak only of the brilliant 
 success of the Allied arms against the common enemy. 
 
 Immediately after President Wilson's alarming reply 
 
Looking Toward Peace 251 
 
 to the German note requesting an armistice, Mr. Bonar 
 Law, government spokesman in the British House of Com- 
 mons, made an announcement in Parliament sounding the 
 alarm and giving warning to the civilized world that it 
 would be very unwise for any of the Allied governments to 
 make any statement as to the terms likely to be imposed 
 upon Germany, before an armistice should be granted. 
 
 In France the sentiment concerning President Wilson's 
 move was that there was developed among statesmen an 
 influential body of opinion which would be more practica- 
 ble if Mr. Wilson had said less. Le Temps, a semi-official 
 newspaper and the most powerful in France, said: "Ger- 
 many appears to believe that President Wilson intervenes 
 as an arbiter to put everybody right." On the same day 
 that the New York World was presenting on its first page 
 the evidence of the enthusiasm of the Allies over Mr. Wil- 
 son's move, there came from Paris this news: 
 
 Paris, October 9. While Paris waited for President Wilson's 
 reply to Germany, the French press contented itself with printing 
 long accounts of anti-armistice speeches in the United States Senate 
 and a full symposium of American newspaper opinion, which, as it 
 appears here, was unanimous against an interruption in the fighting. 
 In fact, the reports of the debates in the American Senate share first 
 pages with the news of the great military victories on the west front. 
 Senators McCumber, Nelson, and Lodge are as highly thought of in 
 France today as are the American generals. No news of the outcome 
 of any battle was ever awaited with more eagerness than was the 
 reply of the American President to the German Chancellor. 
 
 While there was among the Allied nations, as among 
 Americans, a disposition to accord to President Wilson the 
 fullest measure of recognition in his effort to bring about 
 a just peace, they were resolved that the Fate of autocracy 
 should not be committed exclusively to the judgment of one 
 arbitrary wavering will. 
 
 German newspapers, on the other hand, were rather par- 
 tial toward President Wilson's attitude. The first impres- 
 
252 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 sion was a feeling of dismay, due to a misapprehension of 
 the President's position. The Tageblatt stated that a 
 rumor spread like lightning through Berlin that he had 
 rejected the German offer. It said: "The emotion which 
 followed was indescribable. It seemed as if a terrible 
 catastrophe had descended on the city. Gloom and sulkiness 
 prevailed"; and that when a correction of the erroneous 
 report lifted the pall, unconfined joy supplanted it. In Stras- 
 burg the first report was that "the President had replied 
 favorably" and "at once glaring posters were put up an- 
 nouncing the glad news, and thousands gathered in the 
 streets to give wild expression to their joy." While the Post 
 of that city asked the people to "await the reply of the Presi- 
 dent of the United States with dignity and calmness. The 
 only hope lies in the fact that our Note was not entirely re- 
 jected." 
 
 There were those who believed that President Wilson's 
 question addressed to the German Chancellor, asking 
 whether it was the German Government or the German peo- 
 ple who spoke, was a master stroke. But sight was not 
 lost of the fact that his inquiry was directed to a source 
 which everybody knew and which he had then but recently 
 declared was an autocracy, "without the capacity for coven- 
 anted peace." Yet he invited it to write its own certificate 
 of character, enabling it to write into the record a declara- 
 tion that the German Imperial Government was a demo- 
 cratic and responsible institution a declaration completely 
 responsive to Mr. Wilson's challenge. It extracted all 
 efficacy from his repeated declarations that "we cannot take 
 the word of the present German government" and "we do 
 not think the same thoughts or speak the same language 
 of agreement." 
 
 Amidst all the fluctuations of public opinion during the 
 Great War, one thought remained permanent with the peo- 
 ple : That President Wilson's pre-war pacifism would gain 
 the upper hand and lead him into an inconclusive peace, into 
 
Looking Toward Peace 253 
 
 peace at an inopportune moment. It was a deadly fear. 
 There was no fear on the part of our soldiers and sailors 
 of the most destructive guns or the pirate submarine or the 
 sharp bayonet or the poisonous gas; no fear in the heart 
 of the red-blooded American father that his son would come 
 home to him a helpless cripple for the rest of his life or 
 that a grave in France might claim him. Clearly and with- 
 out hesitation the newly-married wife declared that she did 
 not fear the worst that German bullets could do; she de- 
 manded that the war be fought to a conclusion, that future 
 generations be safe. His program was declared acceptable 
 to Germany, and it was not wholly acceptable to the Allies. 
 "Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit" 
 were the words of our President in April, when he was re- 
 flecting American advanced thought; they should never 
 have been forgotten, never repudiated, never discounted or 
 modified in October. 
 
 Had the President been a man whose mind was open 
 to suggestion, he would have been glad to consider the 
 warning of his minister to The Netherlands as quoted above. 
 But warnings of the impending danger could not affect 
 Mr. Wilson's mind. They were, therefore, directed more 
 to the enlightening and shaping of public opinion to be 
 applied when the supreme test should come, and they came 
 from the most diverse sources. 
 
 When, as early as August, 1918, Senator Lodge declared 
 unequivocally on the floor of the Senate that this nation 
 would never agree to a negotiated peace, he voiced the senti- 
 ment of the American people. The same warning came to 
 the nation from other sources. In the early part of the 
 September drive, a prominent American prelate stated the 
 American point of view in this fashion: 
 
 Germany has ravished the women of Belgium, Servia, Roumania, 
 Poland, Armenia; Germany murdered the passengers of the "Lusi- 
 tania" and struck a medal to celebrate that German triumph, dating 
 it two days before the horrible occurrence; Germany has ruined 
 
254 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 cathedrals and cities in sheer wanton fury in such fashion as has not 
 been done in all the wars waged in Europe since the days of the 
 building of cathedrals; Germany has poisoned wells, crucified in- 
 habitants and soldiers, burned people in their houses, and this by sys- 
 tem; Germany has denatured men and boys, has wantonly defaced 
 the living and the dying and the dead. An eye-witness tells of seeing 
 women dead at a table with tongues nailed to the table and left to die. 
 Germany has stolen things little and big; playthings from children, 
 finery from women, pictures of incalculable worth, bank deposits, rail- 
 roads, factories; Germany has sunk hospital-ships, has bombed hos- 
 pitals and Red Cross camps; Germany has disclosed neither decency 
 nor honor from the day they started war, nor has a single voice in 
 Germany to date been lifted against the orgies of ruthlessness which 
 turn the soul sick and which constitute the chiefest barbarity of his- 
 tory; Germany remains unblushing and unconscious of its indecency; 
 Germany's egotist still struts like a kaiser; and to climax its horrid 
 crimes, Germany has inflicted compulsory polygamy on the virgins of 
 its own land. What must decency say to this? That is not war; that 
 is murder. Germany has slain and debauched more people in this 
 war than all the heathen hordes have since Nero. 
 
 Stern justice is what should be meted out; and unless it is, there 
 will be shameful injustice meted out to a world of ruined bodies and 
 befouled souls and bodies. 7 
 
 The peace leadership, loyally recognized and gladly 
 confirmed to the President by reason of his office, was can- 
 celled from the day he opened alone his peace conversations 
 with the common enemy. The nation's instant and stern 
 repudiation of Germany's attempt to make its chief execu- 
 tive her attorney to plead her cause with the other nations 
 and of his apparent acceptance of this new function, signal- 
 izing the nation's reply to his device of making what he 
 called an inquiry, was swift, clear, and determined; and the 
 outcry was so loud and spontaneous that it stood condemned 
 from the first publication. 
 
 While he excelled in stating the fundamental issues of 
 
 1 Bishop William A. Quayle in Northwestern Christian Advocate, Chi- 
 cago, September 18, 1918. 
 
Looking Toward Peace 255 
 
 the conflict, he so egregiously and so often misrepresented 
 the American spirit that he was repudiated at home. The 
 Associated Press was asked to say from Washington on 
 Sunday, the day after the receipt of the German note, that 
 "the Government asks the American people to withhold 
 their judgment of Germany's note until President Wilson 
 has had opportunity to consider it." It was similar to a 
 later request, when he was returning from Europe, that 
 the Senate withhold discussion of the League of Nations 
 Covenant until he should present it to that body in his own 
 way. Refraining from the discussion of the German note 
 was not what the American people would do at that time. 
 They discussed. 
 
 It seemed that his peace efforts would prove disastrous 
 to the loan then being asked of the nation. He felt im- 
 pelled to go to the people to help save the new loan. On 
 that occasion he said: 
 
 Recent events have enhanced, not lessened the importance of this 
 loan, and I hope that my fellow-countrymen will let me say this to 
 them very frankly. . . . Nothing has happened which makes it safe 
 or possible to do anything but push our effort to the utmost. The 
 time is critical and the response must be complete. 
 
 Other inspired statements were given out to ease the 
 desperate situation into which the Administration had 
 plunged itself and the country in its peace move. Secretary 
 Baker stated that the war department was pushing forward 
 as rapidly as possible. The President's Private Secretary 
 Tumulty gave out this statement at the White House: 
 "The Government will continue to send over 250,000 men, 
 with their supplies, every month and there will be no re- 
 laxation." 
 
 Said one paper in the central northwest, the Duluth 
 News-Tribune i 
 
 It might seem too much even to hope that the President would 
 ever decline to debate with Germany; that he would ever discover 
 
256 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 that the Great War was not merelv with the German Government, 
 but was with the German people. 
 
 With characteristic ingenuity, Berlin sent by wireless, 
 in advance of its official transmission to the President, its 
 reply. Thus blazoned from unnumbered millions of news- 
 paper pages the whole world read: 
 
 "GERMANY ACCEPTS PRESIDENT WILSON'S TERMS"; 
 "GERMANY MAKES UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"; 
 "GERMANY BEGS FOR ARMISTICE." 
 
 But the suppression of Germany's reply by the Admin- 
 istration in Washington, with the explanation that it was 
 in the nature of propaganda which might have an ill effect 
 upon the people, was so like the suppression of the Senate's 
 report on the aircraft investigation, when all the world 
 knew it, that it was placed in the same category that the 
 Administration thought itself more nearly proof against the 
 wiles of the enemy than the American people had proved 
 themselves to be. 
 
 Dr. Henry van Dyke, who rendered such excellent serv- 
 ice to the cause of freedom, writing upon peace more than 
 a year before the armed conflict closed, gave further advice 
 which might profitably have been heeded by the President. 
 Referring to the German Government, he stated: 
 
 Until that government is disabused of the delusion that it has 
 won, is winning, or will win a substantial victory in this war, it is not 
 likely to say anything sane or reasonable about peace. A pax Ger- 
 manica is what it is willing to discuss. 
 
 But that is just what we do not want. To enter into such a 
 discussion now would be both futile and perilous. 8 
 
 When President Wilson was furthering Germany's in- 
 terests by writing notes, in the summer of 1918, the wag's 
 toast, proposed in a cloak-room in the capitol in Washing- 
 ton carrying a savage significance, was not illy expressive 
 
 8 Henry van Dyke, "Fighting for Peace," p. 235. 
 
Looking Toward Peace 257 
 
 of the American view of the President's leadership : "Here's 
 to the Czar, last in war, first in peace, long may he waver!" 
 
 Mr. Wilson had been seeking to drive a wedge between 
 Austria and Germany. Whether he succeeeded will depend 
 upon the point of view from which the matter is examined. 
 That Austria, acting upon the initiative of Germany, opened 
 the September peace offensive is hardly open to question. 
 Germany immediately followed. From that time, the two 
 nations apparently operated in full harmony. 
 
 Thus, when, on October 28, 1918, Austria asked an 
 immediate armistice it is probable that she did so with 
 Germany's full knowledge and consent. On that date, 
 the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister instructed that a 
 note be sent to Washington, of which a part is in these 
 words : 
 
 Austria-Hungary accepting all the conditions the President has 
 laid down, for the entry into negotiations for an armistice and peace, 
 no obstacle exists, according to judgment of the Austro-Hungarian 
 government, to the beginning of these negotiations. 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian government declares itself ready, in con- 
 sequence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter 
 into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the states 
 in the opposing group and for an immediate armistice upon all Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian fronts. 
 
 It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures oni 
 this subject. 
 
 This was the beginning of the end of the great struggle. 
 From this on Germany's only effort was to be directed to 
 securing the best possible terms with her superior enemies. 
 
 November 5 the German Government was advised 
 through the Swiss minister in charge of German affairs in 
 this country that the President had the Allied reply, namely : 
 
 The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the 
 correspondence which has passed between the President of the United 
 States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications 
 
258 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the 
 Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the 
 President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles 
 of settlement enunciated in his subsequent address. 
 
 The Allied governments then made exception to the 
 condition relative to freedom of the seas, until it was clearly 
 defined. And then this other exception, which was of far- 
 reaching importance, as later developments showed: 
 
 Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to 
 Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded ter- 
 ritories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allied 
 Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to 
 what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensa- 
 tion will be made by Germany for all damages done to the civilian 
 population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Ger- 
 many by land, by sea, and from the air. 
 
 The President then stated that he was "in agreement 
 with the interpretations set forth in the last paragraph in 
 the memorandum above quoted. 7 ' And then the formal 
 closing that the President requests the Swiss minister to 
 notify the German Government that Marshal Foch had 
 been authorized by the government of the United States 
 and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited 
 representatives of the German Government and to communi- 
 cate to them the terms of the armistice. 
 
 Sometimes the question was asked, who surrendered? 
 Who was the German party to the armistice? We entered 
 into no terms and no compact with the Imperial Govern- 
 ment of Germany. The President himself had so declared. 
 It was true. The armistice was in fact not a treaty or a 
 compact, but a surrender. The word of no German au- 
 thority was taken in anything, nor was faith placed in any- 
 thing of German authority. We simply gave Germany a 
 certain number of days in which to deliver over her military 
 power and to make a partial restoration of stolen goods to 
 
Looking Toward Peace 259 
 
 her victims. The correspondence was carried on with u the 
 German Government," and was so concluded in the armis- 
 tice of November n, 1918. 
 
 The greatness of the event probably warranted two 
 seasons of rejoicing over the conclusion of the armistice. 
 These the country enjoyed. 
 
 On the afternoon of November 7, 1918, news dispatches 
 from France were received in New York erroneously re- 
 porting that the armistice had been signed. All over the 
 United States the people received the news with spontaneous 
 outbursts of joy, and the supposed end of the war was de- 
 liriously celebrated for several hours before official denials 
 from Washington checked the popular enthusiasm. 
 
 After the country had been notified and convinced that 
 the armistice had not actually been signed when the first 
 false reports spread throughout the land, it settled down 
 to await the news that signing had actually taken place. 
 When the news did reach this country and was telegraphed 
 to every village and city, it reached every cross-roads in 
 mountain and valley, on prairie and in the deep forests; 
 it penetrated every nook and corner of the land. But it 
 was in the cities and larger towns that the wild delirium 
 of joy broke forth in such an uproar of enthusiasm mingled 
 with confusion that would have set in wild-eyed wonder an 
 individual who might have dropped into its midst without 
 previous notice. 
 
 Trucks carrying young men and maidens beating upon 
 drums improvised from large tin cans, old tin stoves, water 
 tanks, or what not, yelling and shouting themselves hoarse 
 over the general expressions of joy; offices deserted without 
 any order or communication from heads of the concern; 
 factories evacuated by their employes without any formality 
 or notice ; streets crowded and jammed with men and women 
 who seemed to vie with each other and with the younger 
 portion of the population in keeping up the interminable 
 racket; automobiles of dignified business and official men 
 
260 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 with parts of stoves and tin cans chained to them rushed 
 up and down the streets hither and thither to add to the 
 clangor and uproar these were but some of the features 
 indicating the noisy demonstrations of the celebration in 
 America of the signing of the armistice. On many street 
 corners the Kaiser was hanged in effigy to the lamp-posts; 
 this same effigy was noticed in some business places or was 
 hanging out over balcony, and was given a place of promi- 
 nence wherever prominence would attract public attention. 
 In fact, in this form the Kaiser was honored by joy-rides 
 on automobile trucks, in fashionable automobiles, on drays 
 drawn by old horses or mules or oxen. It is probable that 
 never in the nation's history was there so spontaneous and 
 so complete an abandon on the part of the populace in gen- 
 eral to an exhibition of unqualified outbursts of delirium 
 as was witnessed in the United States November n, 1918. 
 
 When President Wilson announced his intention of 
 going to the Peace Congress, the announcement was met 
 with a storm of protest throughout the country, in which his 
 most ardent supporters joined. 
 
 The wisdom of one man never equalled the combined 
 counsels of many; and "in the multitude of counselors there 
 is safety." America must be kept free from the power of 
 one willful President to misguide and bind. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE WORLD'S PEACE CONGRESS 
 
 Up to the time of the President's personal appeal, on 
 October 24, 1918, for the country's support of his party, 
 the sole issue was support of the Government in the prosecu- 
 tion of the war. At that point the President changed it. 
 He made the issue: The American people to declare 
 whether they would leave wholly in his hands the policy 
 of peace, would give him authority to demand acceptance 
 by the democratic nations of his official program, until then 
 never passed upon by the country. If that judgment should 
 be adverse, he said he would abide by it. The judgment, as 
 expressed at the election, was decisively against him. He 
 then overrode an expression of public opinion which he had 
 himself requested and which he pledged himself to obey, 
 in going to Europe. Upon this, the New York Tribune re- 
 marked : "He goes abroad a rebuked and discredited leader 
 in his own nation." 
 
 It was immediately after the signing of the armistice 
 that reports from Washington were creeping into the news- 
 papers that President Wilson was planning to attend the 
 Peace Conference as one of the American delegates. When 
 the first studied hints went out from the White House, the 
 general attitude was an amused incredulity. 
 
 On November 18, however, formal announcement was 
 made that the President would sail for France immediately 
 after addressing Congress at the opening of its regular 
 session on December 2. It was said that he did not intend 
 to remain long at the conference but "his presence at the 
 outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disad- 
 vantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater 
 
 261 
 
262 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 outlines of the treaty about which he must necessarily be 
 consulted." This announcement produced a ferment of dis- 
 cussion throughout the United States, and much opposition 
 developed. Some details of the subsidiary organization of 
 the peace delegation were made public, and on November 
 29, it was announced that the delegation would consist of 
 the President himself, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 
 Colonel Edward M. House, a Texas politician, former Am- 
 bassador to France, Henry White, and General Tasker H. 
 Bliss, formerly chief of staff of the army, who had been in 
 Paris as a representative of the United States since he re- 
 tired as chief of staff. 
 
 He had been very reticent as to his trip to Europe, and 
 there was notorious propaganda from Washington to pre- 
 pare the people for what he had in view for a full year 
 previous. 
 
 A political writer, in a series of criticisms in the New 
 York Sun, referred to the propaganda as issued from the 
 White House as "resolving themselves into a polite imputa- 
 tion of growing megalomania and selfishness of motive.' 1 
 
 After the news was let out in a definite way that the 
 President had determined upon going as a member of the 
 peace commission, the distrust of the plan throughout the 
 country was shown in the protest of public opinion. As an 
 answer to this criticism the President went before Congress 
 and the country with a statement of his purpose in going 
 to Europe. This was a direct concession to the storm of 
 public opinion which voiced itself against the movement, in 
 the greatest diplomatic action of the country's history, by 
 one man with silence on his lips and his plans under his hat. 
 
 Upon the all-important subject of the coming Peace 
 Conference, there was no word of information in his an- 
 nual address to Congress. He merely declared that he 
 considered that his personal attendance in the Conference 
 was a transcendent duty, that he went to interpret, and to 
 press the adoption of, the terms and principles stated by 
 
The World's Peace Congress 263 
 
 him in public addresses, to see that "no false or mistaken 
 interpretation" was placed upon his ideals as announced, 
 and "no possible effort omitted to realize them." The status 
 of his program was admittedly obscure. When he sought 
 authority to interpret and enforce it according to his own 
 judgment, the people rejected his plea with an overwhelming 
 answer. 
 
 He said to Congress: "I shall be in close touch with 
 you, and you will know all that I do. . . . I am servant of 
 the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of 
 my own. ... I shall count upon your friendly counsel and 
 encouragement. I shall not be inaccessible, but available 
 for any counsel or service you may desire of me." 
 
 In every account of what occurred while he was deliv- 
 ering that message to Congress one could read such words 
 as "sternly set faces," the "coldly disapproving looks," the 
 "unconcealed resentment," the "ominous silence" in which 
 these statement were heard. 
 
 Apologists for the President's enterprise attempted to 
 dismiss the antagonism, which he had created, as a discredit- 
 able exhibition of partisanship. The explanation did not 
 stand scrutiny. Said an Administration organ: "The 
 whole atmosphere of the capital was redolent of estrange- 
 ment between Congress and the President." Another 
 friendly paper reported that "nearly every Democratic sen- 
 ator kept his seat during the brief period that the demon- 
 stration of approval was in progress." Said a third account : 
 "President Wilson met the strongest rebuff it is in power 
 of Congress to give." 
 
 The statement, "You will know all that I do," was an 
 assurance which he studiously and completely ignored, not 
 only throughout all the negotiations at Paris, but after his 
 return to America with the Treaty in his hands. 
 
 The most imposing corps of experts ever gathered to- 
 gether for such a purpose as the President had in view 
 in going to Europe had been quietly at work at Washington 
 
264 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 for more than year in advance charting every village, every 
 mile of ground in the belligerent countries of Europe and 
 western Asia, digesting every phase of history and tracing 
 the nationality of every affected community since the begin- 
 ning of recorded time. The material thus gathered was so 
 indexed as to be available at a moment's notice. One 
 hundred and fifty experts were at work quietly digging on 
 the task from November, 1917, all unknown to the world. 
 Tons of maps and documents were to tell the truth about 
 every hamlet and hillside from Havre to Teheran. Be- 
 sides, the American delegation at the Peace Conference had 
 a retinue of three hundred specialists and assistants. They 
 made an impressive array of college professors, technical 
 experts, ethnological experts and the like. Their particular 
 subjects related especially to European matters. 
 
 But the Senate of the United States, whose duty under 
 the Constitution requires it to pass upon the treaty, was 
 not represented. In all former peace conferences in which 
 the United States was a party, the most eminent men of 
 the nation were chosen for the performance of that solemn 
 duty, if we omit reference to the treaty concluding the 
 Mexican war. They represented both political parties, 
 were regularly confirmed and commissioned by Congress or 
 by the Senate, and in each instance care was taken that each 
 branch of the treaty-making power was represented. In the 
 case of the Spanish treaty, President McKinley took par- 
 ticular care to give representation not only to both political 
 parties, but selected the ablest man he could find in the 
 United States Senate of the opposite party for that re- 
 sponsible trust, George Grey, an international lawyer of 
 wide reputation. In the making of that treaty two mem- 
 bers, a cabinet secretary and an ambassador, represented the 
 the executive branch of the government, while the three 
 others were from the Senate, that body being a part of the 
 treaty-making power. President Wilson, characteristic of 
 the man, ignored not only precedent, but he appointed men 
 
The World's Peace Congress 265 
 
 with apparently no fitness for the great task before them. 
 Aside from Secretary Lansing, it is doubtful whether in all 
 the country's history so weak a body of commissioners was 
 ever appointed for even a much smaller task. None, even 
 of the President's most ardent partisans, undertook to 
 defend him in thus ignoring the nation's entire history. 
 
 Immediately these details were attended to, friendly 
 warnings from the Allied nations to one another began, 
 probably prompted by President Wilson's single-handed 
 undertaking in the peace proposals. Later they ran danger- 
 ously close to the hostile, beginning with the first prelimi- 
 nary meeting. This first meeting of delegates preliminary 
 to the Peace Conference took place in London on Decem- 
 ber 3, 1918. All of the Allied principal nations were repre- 
 sented by their premiers and foremost statesmen. The 
 United States was not represented. 
 
 The State Department at Washington promptly in- 
 formed the Associated Press "that any action looking to a 
 demand upon Holland for the extradition of William Ho- 
 henzollern will be held in abeyance until President Wilson 
 reaches Europe." Mr. Churchhill's declaration immedi- 
 ately followed the conference, to the effect that "we do not 
 intend, no matter what arguments and appeals are ad- 
 dressed to us, to lend ourselves in any way to any fettering 
 restrictions that will prevent the British Navy maintaining 
 her well-tried and well-deserved supremacy." This state- 
 ment the New York World correspondent regarded as be- 
 ing "addressed especially to Woodrow Wilson." The pur- 
 pose of it was probably to save Mr. Wilson for the humilia- 
 tion of asking for something which under no circumstance 
 would be granted. 
 
 A singular preparation for his diplomatic mission was 
 his repeated assertion that he alone held the keys to a 
 peace of justice, and that the Allied statesmen were in- 
 triguing for a peace of loot. Before he sailed, and while he 
 was on the ocean, and after landing in Europe, he let no 
 
266 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 occasion pass to declaim against the alleged imperialism 
 of the democratic governments of Europe and their hos- 
 tility to u the common thought" and the aspirations of the 
 "plain people." It was this attitude of the President of the 
 Republic that caused, soon after it was announced that Mr. 
 Wilson was to attend the Conference, Lord Northcliffe to re- 
 joice "that Mr. Wilson is to be brought personally into con- 
 tact with men who can convince him that the spirit which he 
 denominates unselfishness necessarily resolves itself into 
 'give and take.' ' And Mr. Balfour highly regarded a 
 League of Nations because the United States would have to 
 "bear a large share in the work it involves." It thus became 
 apparent that the prospective negotiations between Presi- 
 dent Wilson and the Allied Governments were coming so 
 early in the proceedings to be regarded by the British as 
 trading propositions. 
 
 Before the President sailed, a Washington dispatch de- 
 clared that this nation's naval program "will be a factor 
 in the discussion concerning the freedom of the seas"; and 
 "the size of the American navy, actually and potentially, 
 is to be used in support of the argument the President is 
 to make." And from the President's vessel carrying him 
 to the Peace Congress was wirelessed the message to the 
 whole world : "Should the present world policy of competi- 
 tive armaments continue, the United States could do more 
 than hold its own." * 
 
 The substance of the President's demand was that 
 Great Britain should surrender her position as the leading 
 naval power of the world, while it was a recognized fact 
 that it was Great Britain's naval power that saved civiliza- 
 tion against the onslaughts of Prussian autocracy. 
 
 Whether the disposition of the American people would 
 authorize such an unknown factor appears not to have been 
 
 1 A happy contrast was President Harding's call for a conference of 
 the leading nations to be held in Washington, November 12, 1921, and 
 the prodigious program outlined by Secretary Hughes, head of the American 
 delegation, on that date, surprising the world, on disarmament. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 267 
 
 taken into consideration. The British view appeared to be 
 that the United States had the undoubted right to build 
 as many dreadnaughts as her people were willing to pay for; 
 and that such an enterprise would increase, rather than 
 diminish, the safety of the world. Both the English and the 
 American people smiled at the President's open threat. 
 
 While the President was on his way to Europe, it was 
 casually announced by the secretary of the preliminary con- 
 ference that it had been there decided that Premier Clemen- 
 ceau should preside at the sessions of the Peace Congress 
 at Paris. 
 
 On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference of the 
 world held its first formal and plenipotentiary session an 
 occasion to become memorable in humanity's interest. 
 Apart from the merits of the matter, the President's diplo- 
 macy up to this point was singularly unfortunate. For 
 while making one purpose of his journey the proposal to 
 deprive the Allies of the chief weapon which enabled them 
 to destroy the German menace, persistent secrecy regarding 
 his purposes raised doubts and fears, while employing threat- 
 ening intimations hardened suspicion into bitter judgment. 
 
 Moreover, before going to the Peace Congress, he made 
 a tour of Italy, France and England, addressing vast 
 throngs, appealing to the masses as against their rulers. 
 For this he was temporarily paid homage by the masses 
 such as had never been accorded any human being. For 
 this he was severely criticized, not only in his own country, 
 but throughout the democratic nations of Europe. Later, 
 he was anathematized by the very masses who had rendered 
 the greatest applause, and upon the question of nationality. 
 
 But at length the Peace Conference had begun and that 
 was the paramount fact in the world at that day. There 
 had been unwarranted and mischievous delay. There had 
 been what was described as jockeying for position. 
 
 Five important resolutions were adopted by the Peace 
 Congress at its second open session. Two that were perti- 
 
268 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 nent and practical were the appointment of a commission to 
 determine the responsibility of the authors of the war, and 
 the punishment to be imposed for the crimes which were 
 committed. Another was the appointment of a commission 
 on reparation. 
 
 In his touring of Europe, even while urging his interest 
 in "men everywhere, " the President was sowing the seeds 
 for dissensions in the Peace Congress. Without making his 
 own purpose and intent plain to the understanding, he com- 
 mitted himself and assumed to commit the nation to a 
 vague scheme of a league comprising all of the nations of 
 the world to be formed concurrently with the making of 
 peace and not after it. It was said even then that there 
 was no probability that so amazing a proposal would meet 
 the approval of tfie United States Senate. As a matter of 
 fact, and as was very fitting, the challenge came first from 
 that nation which had chiefly borne the brunt of the war 
 and which by long and bitter experience had learned the 
 character of the Prussian autocracy. Georges Clemenceau, 
 before the French Chamber of Deputies, s-aid: 
 
 There is an old system which appears condemned today, and to 
 which I do not fear to say that I remain faithful at this moment. 
 Countries have organized the defense of their frontiers with the neces- 
 sary elements and the balance of power. This system appears to be 
 condemned by some very high authorities. Yet if such a balance had 
 preceded the war, if England, the United States, Italy, and France 
 had agreed that whoever attacked one of them attacked the whole, 
 the world war would not have occurred. There is in this system of 
 alliances, which I do not renounce, I say it most distinctly, my guid- 
 ing thought at the Conference, if your body permits me to go there. 
 
 He stated to them that if they desired a change of pilots 
 that was the time to change. "Are you with me or against 
 me ? Speak now or forever hold your peace. " The cham- 
 ber spoke with a voice of nearly three to one in approval 
 of the policy. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 269 
 
 President Wilson was prompt with retort. Speaking 
 the very next day at Manchester, England, undoubtedly with 
 the French Prime Minister's words in mind, he said: 
 
 If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the 
 world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would 
 take no interest, because she will join no combination which is not a 
 combination of all of us. 
 
 Thus the issue was joined. Clemenceau had referred 
 his policy to the popular chamber of the French Congress 
 for its judgment and received approval by a tremendous ma- 
 jority. President Wilson never even ventured to submit 
 his scheme to either house of Congress; but when he asked 
 the nation to approve his undefined course, he was turned 
 down by a majority of more than a million votes. 
 
 While the masses in Europe did not understand the Wil- 
 sonian world-confederacy, they did fully appreciate the 
 blessings he seemed to bring of release from the burden 
 of conscription, and thus the poor took the gospel home. 
 As stated by a leading French paper, the Petit Parisien: 
 
 Our sons are no longer to be taken off to barracks and our daugh- 
 ters shall not henceforth weep over slain sweethearts. Parents will 
 not live in daily terror of impending military crisis. Taxes will not 
 crush. These things are in the thoughts of the masses as they hail 
 Wilson in great cities and put his portrait above the fireplace. 
 
 No peace congress had ever faced so many intricate 
 problems, problems on whose wise and equitable solution 
 the whole future of the world depended making perma- 
 nent peace, creation of a League of Nations, reconciling con- 
 flicting boundary claims of many nations, setting -up new 
 states within the truncated areas of the vanquished powers, 
 the insuring of their liberty and unimpaired integrity, the 
 assigning of mandates over millions of humanity in Asia and 
 Africa, the creating of legislative machinery to improve 
 conditions of labor in all civilized nations of the world. 
 
 And in the midst of it all, never did it seem that this na~ 
 
270 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 tion had so great need of the stimulating voice and steadying 
 counsel of the leader who left, in Theodore Roosevelt, in 
 January, 1919. Never were the sanity, the far-seeing states- 
 manship; the splendid Americanism and sturdy common 
 sense of Theodore Roosevelt more to be desired than in 
 the hour when he was called hence, when the American 
 people were facing the most critical decision in their history, 
 and when their judgment was bewildered by conflicting 
 appeals inviting partisanship, patriotism, idealism and in- 
 ternationalism. 
 
 The supreme need of the world was the earliest pos- 
 sible settlement of the issues of war. That Mr. Wilson 
 prevented. His program, such as it was, demanded as the 
 first requisite the support of informed American public opin- 
 ion; that he spurned. The next requirement was that the 
 people of Europe should have confidence in the democratic 
 governments forming the foundation of the League; that 
 he very largely destroyed. It was above all things desirable 
 that there should be unity of sentiment among the Allies, 
 including the United States; that he undermined. And it 
 was absolutely necessary for success that he should have 
 a concrete program behind his idealistic generalizations; 
 that he never possessed. 
 
 As a result of the delays upon which the President in- 
 sisted, when he found the treaty draft complete upon his 
 return to Europe from America in mid-March, 1919, 
 France, the frontier of civilization, was suffering fiscal pros- 
 tration and was restrained from the supreme work of res- 
 toration; Great Britain was suffering an economic and in- 
 dustrial crisis of indescribable gravity; Germany was in 
 throes of civil war and danger of general anarchy; and 
 Bolshevism had taken charge in Hungary, and was inso- 
 lently challenging the western governments. It was truth- 
 fully charged that u he kept us out of peace. " 
 
 Berlin and Vienna greatly rejoiced over the schism in 
 
The World's Peace Congress 271 
 
 the Peace Congress. It was regarded as cause for regret 
 and shame that an American President should have been 
 foremost in providing them with this reason for exultation. 
 
 The Inner Council of the Peace Congress President 
 Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Or- 
 lando were meeting daily in a small room, after the Presi- 
 dent's return to Europe, from which even stenographers 
 were excluded, in an endeavor to speed up the peace terms 
 to avert the peril which the delay had invited. 
 
 The question of peace-making is a question between the 
 victorious and the vanquished belligerents and between them 
 alone, and should have been accepted and acted upon as 
 such. But about every other day in the Peace Congress 
 a task that threw its shadow over the deliberations, and for 
 the moment made everything else less important, was the 
 task of coping with Bolshevism. So severe had become 
 the charges of unnecessary delay, as due to the President's 
 insistence upon the League of Nations scheme being inter- 
 woven with the Peace Treaty, that Premier Lloyd George 
 came to his rescue with the statement as to how much more 
 rapidly the Peace Congress was moving than did the Vienna 
 Conference of over a hundred years previous. President 
 Wilson feeling the blows that were aimed at him, gave 
 out a statement, after his return to Paris in March, that 
 he believed the time was opportune for a statement which 
 would allay apprehension over the delay, and show that the 
 revision of the Covenant of the League of Nations had pro- 
 ceeded at night sessions without any interruption to the dis- 
 position of the other main questions. As early as February, 
 Harvey's Weekly put it in this fashion: 
 
 The gravest menace of the world today is in the futile fiddling 
 of the Peace Congress. Red herrings are being dragged across the 
 trail of justice, the essentials of peace-making are being delayed, the 
 agonizingly urgent work of reconstruction in France and other coun- 
 tries is being blocked, discontent and Bolshevism are being fostered 
 
272 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 even in our own land, and the Blond Beast beyond the Rhine is being 
 encouraged to lick his bloody chops and snarl at the world with re- 
 newed threats of war. 2 
 
 The perils due to the delaying of peace for the sake 
 of a headstrong policy became more manifest and more men- 
 acing, with a result that the President's arbitrary mission 
 diminished in importance. The vital parts of the peace to 
 be imposed upon Germany were framed in his absence, and 
 he returned to the Conference to find that the settlement 
 was carried further toward completion than during all the 
 weeks of his personal activity. 
 
 On March 12, 1919, Secretary Lansing stated: 
 
 Two words tell the story food and peace. If the present state 
 of chaos continues and political power continues to grow weaker, 
 there will be no responsible German government with which to make 
 peace; there will be no government strong enough to carry out the 
 conditions of the treaty. There is no time to be lost if we are to 
 save the world from the despotism of anarchy, even as we saved it 
 from the despotism of autocracy. We ought to make, we must make, 
 peace without delay. 
 
 On the next day Frank A. Vanderlip, described as "un- 
 emotional a banker as ever reduced human problems to fig- 
 ures," gave this startling picture and warning: 
 
 I doubt if America has begun to comprehend the appalling situa- 
 tion which confronts Europe and the wreck which the whole fabric 
 of civilization may be facing. America was once told there should 
 be peace without victory. What we have is victory without peace. 
 Production has ceased, and unless production can be speedily resumed 
 chaos may ensue. The great productive machine of Europe must be 
 started, or the world will be confronted with disaster such as no 
 experience has recorded. 
 
 The Germans made a great outcry against the terms 
 of the Treaty of Peace as presented to them for their sig- 
 nature. It would have been well for them to compare the 
 
 'February 15, 1919. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 273 
 
 document thus presented to them with that which they pre- 
 pared at Brest-Litovsk which deprived Russia of a region 
 cohering one-third of her railway mileage, three-fourths 
 of her iron, nine-tenths of her coal, and nearly her entire 
 industrial territory, together with a population of fifty- 
 six millions, and required an enormous indemnity besides. 
 That treaty was enthusiastically endorsed by the nation 
 which came to Paris crying out against far less drastic 
 terms. 
 
 Said Herr Ebert, speaking for the Germans, to the 
 Associated Press correspondent: "If the American de- 
 mocracy actually accepts the present terms of peace as its 
 own, it becomes an accomplice and abettor of political black- 
 mailers; it surrenders the traditional American principle of 
 fair play and sportsmanship," which leads a keen New York 
 weekly to observe : 
 
 This perjured violator of the most solemn pledges; this ravisher 
 of girls and kindergarten children; this wholesale murderer of aged 
 men, of priests at the altar and of women with babies in their arms; 
 this creature who at the point of the bayonet drove off tens of thou- 
 sands of men to slavery and of women to enforced debasement; this 
 common thief and incendiary ; this dynamiter of hospitals wherein lay 
 the sick, the maimed and the dying; this skulking assassin of the high 
 seas; this international brigand who in cold blood and of calculated 
 purpose made a shambles of the world to gratify his beastly greed for 
 plunder and power this unspeakable Caliban of nations, now ren- 
 dered impotent, has the unspeakable effrontery to whine about Ameri- 
 can "fair play" and American sportsmanship. 3 
 
 The French, to whom the treaty as drawn represented 
 the minimum of justice, stood for absolute rejection of the 
 enemy counter-proposal; but President Wilson favored 
 modification of the terms. The long delay in making peace 
 enabled the forces of pacifism and internationalism to organ- 
 ize in all the Allied countries. This gave ground for the 
 declaration that President Wilson was standing for terms, 
 
 8 Harvey's Weekly, May 24, 1919. 
 
274 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 not that would satisfy justice but that would satisfy Ger- 
 many. 
 
 The President's arbitrary methods, with the acute con- 
 troversies and long delays occasioned thereby, gave the 
 Germans renewed hope ; and as they saw the Allies divided, 
 their confidence grew to arrogance. They planned to chal- 
 lenge every item in the treaty that did not satisfy their own 
 interpretation of President Wilson's various statements; 
 to widen every breach that had been created among their 
 opponents; to incite, by appeals and propaganda, the paci- 
 fist, Bolshevist, and radical Socialist element which existed 
 in all countries. 
 
 When there was severe criticism of the Peace Congress, 
 and particularly of President Wilson, in the spring of 1919, 
 for his delays in getting the Peace Treaty completed, the 
 propaganda put out was that the League of Nations was 
 not causing the delay. It was put out that other things 
 were causing this delay. At the outset, however, before 
 the Congress opened, President Wilson had stated that 
 there should be no peace until the League of Nations could 
 simultaneously be formed. The President gave almost his 
 entire attention to the matter of the League, yet he was 
 unable to get the Constitution in shape to present to the 
 Peace Congress until just a few hours before he started 
 on his return trip to America. And nearly, if not quite, 
 all of the other issues which were alleged to be responsible 
 for the delay never arose until after the League Constitu- 
 tion had been pushed to the fore; and some of them could 
 never have arisen at all if the Peace Treaty had been made 
 promptly; they arose because of the delay. And to those 
 who were not bound by the President's view, it became clear 
 that if it had not been for his insistence upon putting the 
 League of Nations before everything else, the Treaty of 
 Peace would have been made, signed, and ratified months 
 before it was even presented to the United States Senate, 
 and the nations would have been far on the way in their 
 
The World's Peace Congress 275 
 
 work of restoration a work of the very greatest civic, so- 
 cial and economic importance. Moreover, these other issues 
 which were falsely alleged to be the causes of the delay 
 would have been disposed of long previously, if indeed they 
 had arisen at all. 
 
 President Wilson's famous demand for freedom of the 
 seas was cited as sufficient reason to justify his trip to 
 Europe. Yet when his attention was called to the fact, in 
 the notable White House Conference after his return from 
 Europe, that under the League of Nations there would be 
 no neutrals, and therefore no question as to freedom of 
 the seas, he admitted that his insistence upon the point 
 was something of a joke upon himself. By and by all the 
 Fourteen Points, which the President had declared as the 
 only possible basis of peace, had gone into the discard 
 except the last which was the League of Nations. He was 
 willing to yield everything to save this one. 
 
 When the Senate found itself wholly ignored by the 
 President in making up his peace commission, it knew it 
 would be called upon to consider in detail the terms of 
 the Treaty. When senators found themselves shut out, 
 they took the only course that was open by placing them- 
 selves on record. Speeches were made on the floor of the 
 Senate attacking the engagements to which the President 
 was committing the country in the League Covenant. It 
 served notice on the Peace Congress that the Senate, under 
 the Constitution, was a part of the treaty-making power 
 of this nation. 
 
 And all the world was crying out for peace, for a prompt 
 settlement that would close at the earliest date the dread- 
 ful chapter of war and permit the exhausted, famine- 
 haunted nations to resume the productive, restorative proc- 
 esses of peace. But this idea President Wilson spurned. 
 His decree was that the rebuilding of Europe should be 
 postponed until the future of the whole world had been 
 arranged. During all his activities he contributed nothing 
 
276 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 to the actual making of peace; on the contrary he ob- 
 structed it by his demand that it should be deferred until 
 the League-of-Nations question had been settled. 
 
 A desperate effort was being made by the end of March, 
 1919, to spread the belief that the delay in dealing with 
 Germany was due to British indecision, to Italian imperial- 
 ism, to French vindictiveness. Large propaganda was put 
 out from the American press bureau to support this view. 
 It was stated repeatedly by writers who were friendly to the 
 President and who were ready at all points to give the Presi- 
 dent a clean bill. It was pressed by Mr. Ray Stannard 
 Baker. 4 But the record was too clear for this propaganda 
 to prevail at the time it was issued. 
 
 In his speeches in Europe President Wilson took the 
 view that the most important thing was not peace but the 
 permanence of peace, and he spoke with something of im- 
 patience, almost with scorn, about those who were intent 
 on the details of the peace that was to be made during the 
 ensuing months at Paris. As he stated in his public ad- 
 dresses, prior to sitting in the Conference, it was not merely 
 with America, not merely with one nation, not even a group 
 of nations, but with humanity as a whole that he was con- 
 cerned. Yet there is always the problem of determining 
 the precise boundary where a statesman's concern for hu- 
 manity and the world at large should end, and his concern 
 for his own people and his own country should begin. 
 
 The President's attitude toward France drove her into 
 virtual isolation, since his exclusive concern was to create 
 a League of Nations. Great Britain's dominant aim was 
 to form some sort of alliance with the United States. Thus 
 the American and British delegation worked in harmony 
 to minimize the claims of France and to defer their satis- 
 faction. For weeks all the energies of the conference were 
 devoted to the League project and discussions of remote 
 
 4 "What Wilson Did at Paris," copyright, 1919, by Doubleday Page & Co., 
 PP- 56, 57, 58 and 65. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 277 
 
 territorial issues, while the supreme problem of France's 
 restoration and Germany's penalties were neglected. 
 
 On March 30, 1919, it was announced from Paris that 
 the commission on responsibility for the war had decided, 
 
 First, solemnly to condemn the violation of neutrality 
 and all the crimes committed by the Central Powers. 
 
 Second, to urge the appointment of an international 
 tribunal to charge all those responsible, including the for- 
 mer German Emperor. 
 
 But Secretary Lansing submitted a separate memoran- 
 dum in which Wilhelm's culpability was to be considered 
 from a legal point of view. While the overwhelming ma- 
 jority of the commission contended that the Kaiser was 
 responsible largely for the acts and violation of the rules 
 of war committed by land and naval forces, Mr. Lansing 
 took the ground that what was done in his name was sus- 
 tained by his own people, and that for that reason he could 
 not be held legally culpable. 
 
 The British Premier Lloyd George was merely echoing 
 the demands of his nation when he declared: 
 
 The Kaiser must be prosecuted. The war was a crime in the way 
 it was planned; in the wantonness with which it was provoked; in 
 the manner in which it was prosecuted. The men responsible must not 
 be let off because their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the 
 deeds. The government will use its whole influence at the Peace Con- 
 ference to see that justice is executed. 
 
 Misleading propaganda was put out upon almost every 
 conceivable topic from the world's Peace Conference of 
 Paris. This was no less true in regard to the damages suf- 
 fered by the various nations than in other matters. It was 
 made to appear that the United States stood third in suf- 
 fering the costs of the war. In actual money that was true, 
 as a real fact it was false. But it was put out for the pur- 
 pose of showing the commanding position that the United 
 States should take in the great Conference. But when it 
 
278 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 came to the relative wealth of the various nations, it was 
 found that the war had cost Serbia more than 53 per cent 
 of her total wealth, Great Britain more than 50 per cent, 
 Italy about 50 per cent, France 45 per cent, Russia 30 per 
 cent, and the United States less than 10 per cent, the 
 United States standing, instead of third, at the very bot- 
 tom of the list, getting off by far the most- cheaply of any. 
 And if there was to be anything of justice in the peace 
 settlement, the nations which were so greatly impoverished 
 by Germany's ruthless attack should have been reimbursed 
 to the limit, and those nations should have had most to say 
 in the settlement of damages. 
 
 Germany was required to accept responsibility for all 
 the losses and damages inflicted upon her adversaries by the 
 war, although not to guarantee full payment. The inter- 
 Allied Reparation Commission, appointed by the Peace Con- 
 gress in its second open session, was to determine the 
 total obligation to be met by Germany; this it was to do 
 within two years. Then it would present a schedule of pay- 
 ments to be made covering 30 years, reparation payments 
 to be a prior charge upon her revenues. This commission 
 was to consist of delegates representing the United States, 
 Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and Serbia. 
 While those of America, Great Britain, France and Italy 
 were participants in all proceedings the members for Japan 
 and Serbia would'vote only on questions affecting those coun- 
 tries; and the Belgian delegates would take part except when 
 Japanese or Serbian issues were under consideration. 
 
 In response to President Wilson's request that the Sen- 
 ate approve provisional appointment of an American repre- 
 sentative on the reparations commission to be created under 
 the Peace Treaty, the foreign relations committee of the 
 Senate adopted a resolution declaring that until the Treaty 
 was ratified, "no power exists" to carry out its provisions, 
 an objection well taken, in view of subsequent developments. 
 
 The British view was that all damages must be paid by 
 
The World's Peace Congress 279 
 
 the aggressor, meaning that Germany should be compelled 
 to pay the whole cost of the war, including the expense 
 to the Allies of raising, equiping, transporting and main- 
 taining their armies, as well as reparation for wanton dam- 
 age. The French view was that reparation should include 
 all that England would demand, requiring Germany first 
 to settle bills for destruction in violation of international 
 law, and pay the other bills later as she could. The Ameri- 
 can position was that reparation from Germany should 
 cover only such damages as could be included in wanton 
 destruction and violation of the laws of war and of nations. 
 The conference committee on reparation estimated 
 $120,000,000,000 as the amount which the enemy countries 
 ought to pay the Allied nations. For many days the ques- 
 tion of indemnities continued to be one of the most trouble- 
 some before the conference, the chief issue becoming not 
 what Germany should pay but what she could pay. Both 
 Lloyd George and Clemenceau had promised their constitu- 
 ents that Germany would be made to pay the full amount 
 of what the war had cost the Allies. This was estimated 
 by the British at one hundred and twenty billion dollars 
 and by the French as high as two hundred billions. The 
 financial experts of the conference, however, concluded that 
 the payment of any such sum by Germany was impossible. 
 In May, 1920, the amount was fixed at $30,000,000,000 
 
 6 In late April, 1921, the Reparations Commission fixed upon the sum 
 of approximately $33,000,000,000 for Germany to pay, it having until 
 May i, 1921, to conclude its work. The amount determined in January 
 was a great reduction from the $67,000,000,000 agreed upon in the previous 
 July. Yet in March, Germany submitted counter proposals offering about 
 one-third of the sum the Reparations Commission had fixed upon, and sought 
 the intervention of the United States in their behalf. But the new Ad- 
 ministration had come into power, and it very promptly declined to act 
 upon the suggestion. Thereupon the German ministry resigned. The 
 amount finally agreed upon was of the present sum of $21,000,000,000, which, 
 spread over the forty-two years allowed for payment, totalled $56,000,000,000, 
 including interest. 
 
 As the fateful May i approached, both sides mobilized their military 
 forces, France having declared that no more trifling would be permitted 
 on the part of Germany in fulfilling her obligations under the Treaty, by 
 the terms of whicb Germany accepted "responsibility for causing all the 
 loss and damage' inflicted upon the Allies, and undertook "compensation 
 
280 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 about what the war had cost the United States. None 
 of this, however, was to be paid to this country. 
 
 The treaty of peace contains an article whereby the 
 Powers "publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern for 
 a supreme offense ajgainst international morality and the 
 sanctity of treaties." And "a special tribunal to try the 
 accused," with five judges from the United States, Great 
 Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, is provided. While the 
 American commissioners at the Peace Congress gave partial 
 assent to the position of the majority standing for criminal 
 prosecution on the charge violating the usages of war, led 
 by Mr. Lansing they protested against including violations 
 of "the laws of humanity." This position of the American 
 commissioners has found support among international law 
 experts. An Italian parliamentary commission found: 
 
 Crimes attributed to the former kaiser were not contemplated in 
 any penal code. Nobody can be called to answer, and be punished, 
 for acts which, when committed, did not constitute a crime contem- 
 plated by law. It is impossible to ask Holland to extradite her guest 
 for political crimes not within the purview of present treaties. 
 
 On January 15, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies 
 made a demand upon the government of Holland for the 
 surrender of William of Hohenzollern, former emperor 
 of Germany, that he might be tried for the crimes of the 
 Great War. 
 
 To this demand, Holland's reply, on January 23, was a 
 peremptory denial. The reason given was that Holland 
 could not admit, "in the present case, any other duty than 
 that imposed on it by the laws of the kingdom and national 
 tradition." And that the former emperor was entitled 
 to the benefit of the country's laws and of the traditional 
 right of refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts; 
 
 for all damages done to the civilian population and their property" in Allied 
 countries. England was ready to back up the stand of France, and with 
 the United States refusing to take a hand in aiding Germany, there was but 
 one thing for Germany to do meet her legal international obligations in 
 the matter of reparations. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 281 
 
 and that the sacred duty of justice and national honor de- 
 manded of the government of Holland that it do not with- 
 draw from this refugee the benefit of its laws and this 
 tradition. 
 
 And it stated that "It rejects with energy, all suspicion 
 of wishing to cover with its sovereign right and its moral 
 authority, violations of the essential principles of the solid- 
 arity of nations; but It % cannot recognize an international 
 duty to associate itself with this act of high international 
 policy of the Powers." 
 
 The original One Hundred, selected to give guidance 
 to the Peace Congress, gave way to the Council of Ten; and 
 that in turn, in April, 1919 to the Council of Five, including 
 Japan; then Japan was dropped from the inner circle, and 
 Premiers Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Presi- 
 dent Wilson, known as the Council of Four, carried on the 
 discussions on the most important issues of the conference 
 among themselves. Later Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd 
 George with President Wilson, constituted the inner circle. 
 These came to be known as the "Big Five" the "Big Four" 
 and the "Big Three." 
 
 Instant approval followed the suggestion that the Peace 
 Congress hold open sessions. Such a proposition was in 
 harmony with the open-air diplomacy urged by President 
 Wilson. It was a part of the new and accepted order of 
 things. It was, therefore, with a shock that created a 
 shudder when the suggestion came to the people that not 
 only were the Americans to be deprived of direct and im- 
 mediate knowledge of the peace proceedings but that they 
 were to be furnished with such garbled information as the 
 plan of President Wilson demanded and the unworthy in- 
 genuity of Creel could supply 
 
 Increasing secrecy characterized the actions of the inner 
 circle as it became smaller. Very few decisions were given 
 out officially, and this led to speculations on the part of 
 correspondents, while discontent ^prevailed generally at 
 
282 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Paris over the news embargo. Articles attacking the Con- 
 ference for its secret diplomacy; charges that the proceed- 
 ings were unduly protracted; rumors of "dissensions," 
 "crises," "ultimatums" were numerous. It was during this 
 period that President Wilson's action, ordering his ship, the 
 "George Washington," to France was interpreted as a 
 threat to coerce his fellow delegates. There were other 
 wild rumors afloat as to Clemenceau's resignation and Italy's 
 premier breaking away ready to make a separate peace with 
 Austria. 
 
 With Mr. Wilson's first of his Fourteen Points for 
 "open Covenants of peace openly arrived at," attacked in 
 the Conference it seemed to be the first to be definitely and 
 completely nullified. He and others sought to blame the 
 Allies but the Paris correspondent of the New York Trib- 
 une gave a different explanation: 
 
 Judging from the New York newspapers arriving in Paris, the 
 impression prevails in America that President Wilson had made a 
 fight for his first point against the Allied delegates. This is hardly 
 correct. He has been throughout one of the most determined oppo- 
 nents of full publicity. He promptly agreed to closed sessions of the 
 conference. He has repeatedly protested to the other delegates be- 
 cause of the information they had given to the press. 
 
 Before President Wilson left America to enter the 
 Peace Congress at Paris he gave out the statement to the 
 effect that there would be no censorship of news passing 
 from the Peace Conference to America. Suddenly the news- 
 paper men in Paris became aware that every word they 
 wrote was being read by both French and American censors 
 and that on occasions some of it was held up, deleted, or en- 
 tirely censored. One of the ablest of American correspond- 
 ents found it necessary to adopt the formula which he had 
 used during the war when the only censorship was in the 
 hands of the French the device of always putting into 
 the first ten lines of his dispatches some allusion to "the 
 
The World's Peace Congress 283 
 
 glorious French." Another correspondent arranged an 
 understanding with his people in America to the effect that 
 his editors should "always look for the real story in the 
 fourth paragraph." 
 
 Strange as such devices may seem to Americans at home 
 they were practiced by two of the ablest American corre- 
 spondents in Paris. It was necessitated by the resolution 
 adopted in one of the preliminary conferences of the five 
 powers forbidding any delegate to the Peace Conference to 
 talk to newspaper men. And this secrecy was the precursor 
 of all kinds of garbled and manufactured news going out 
 from Paris. The irritation at the secrecy which enveloped 
 Mr. Wilson's negotiations abroad grew rapidly after his 
 arrival there. It broke out in the Senate in something like 
 open revolt. The last days of January and the first of 
 February, 1919, were noted days for assault upon the 
 secrecy in both the Senate and the House, in which both 
 political parties, the majority then being the Democratic, 
 engaged. 
 
 In the Senate the attack was upon the president himself 
 so far as he was responsible for the utter darkness in which 
 he saw fit to keep the country with reference to engagements 
 to which he was said to be committing the nation in the 
 Paris negotiations. Mr. Wilson's obsession for secretive- 
 ness, for cloistered seclusion, apparently took the form of 
 a fixed delusion that the affairs of the American people were 
 things with which the American people had no right to 
 meddle. 
 
 On April 7, 1919, the Chicago Daily News Peace 
 Conference Bureau at Paris gave out information that 
 there was great popular resentment against President 
 Wilson because he failed to tell the people what he was 
 doing. 
 
 A prominent writer in one of the leading American 
 weeklies, after declaring that Paris had become a whisper- 
 ing gallery, stated : 
 
284 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Secrecy has given Germany the handle with which to spread the 
 news that serious breaches are being made between the nations allied 
 in war. Secrecy has cloaked the vacillating policy which first sug- 
 gests that the Lenine government in Russia is unspeakable, next pro- 
 poses conferences with its representatives at Prinkipo, considers in- 
 vasion of Russia, counts its endless costs and rejects it, and finally 
 allows an American emissary to go to Russia, for a talk with Lenine 
 and hopes that the public won't find out that he has been sent. 
 Secrecy has made the peace a long way from a people's peace. 
 
 This secrecy on the part of the President had a tendency 
 to grow, causing him to lose favor with the large American 
 public. It manifested itself in a pronounced degree in his 
 dealing with the United States Senate after his return from 
 Paris. On August n, 1919, he declined to comply with a 
 request of the Senate foreign relations committee that he 
 furnish it with desired information as to the proceedings 
 of the Peace Conference. 
 
 Harvey's Weekly for May 3, 1919, stated, what was 
 probably a well substantiated truth when it said: "We 
 must doubt if ever there was a great international confer- 
 ence conducted with less frankness and openness, or with 
 more of furtive secrecy and subterranean intrigue, than 
 this has been under the President's domination." 
 
 What the American people desired above all else dur- 
 ing the days of the Paris Peace Conference was the truth as 
 to what was going on in Paris. Nothing damaged their 
 faith in the President more than the suspicion, however ill- 
 founded, that the news that was let out from Paris was not 
 the truth, but only something that was permitted to pass 
 the censors. This suspicion was increased by the knowledge 
 that the cables were controlled by a violent partisan, Post- 
 master-General Burleson. It should have been made plain, 
 and carried out to the letter, that the strangling of news at 
 its source was not to be permitted by willful subordinates. 
 The unfortunate thing about it was that the adopted method 
 fell in with the President's purpose. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 285 
 
 On April 14, 1919, President Wilson announced that in 
 view of the nearness of the completion of the whole work 
 of the conference, it had been decided to invite the Ger- 
 man peace plenipotentiaries to come to France on April 25. 
 
 After three months had elapsed from the signing of the 
 armistice the overshadowing urgent issues of the war re- 
 mained virtually untouched, while the energies of the con- 
 ference had been devoted to experimental innovations. Bel- 
 gium and France awaited the righting of wrongs they had 
 suffered, the terms to be imposed upon Germany had not 
 yet been framed, and the threatening Russian situation had 
 been put aside with an evasion, and the whole economic 
 recovery of the world had been retarded by continued un- 
 certainty, while expecting really vital settlements. 
 
 Owing to this acute situation there was an outcry against 
 unnecessary delays from every part of the Allied regions. 
 In the United States it took the form largely of placing the 
 blame upon President Wilson for delaying the treaty by 
 insisting upon his drafting of the League of Nations. It 
 was known that during his temporary absence in the United 
 States during the latter part of February and early March 
 great progress had been made on the treaty. Delay fol- 
 lowed immediately after his return. Lloyd George assumed 
 to speak for the conference, knowing that President Wil- 
 son's explanation would avail nothing, and declared that 
 matters were moving rapidly as compared with the great 
 Vienna Conference during which eleven months were con- 
 sumed in drafting the treaty. Lloyd George, however, 
 omitted to state that the world was moving much more 
 slowly in the time of the Vienna Conference than at the 
 time of the Paris Conference of 1919. Then there were 
 no telegraphs, telephones, automobiles, railroads and the 
 numerous other contrivances that the world has come to 
 regard as common acquisitions since that far-away time. 
 
 No. 14 in the President's Fourteen Points providing for 
 "a general association of nations," represented the single 
 
286 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 definite accomplishment of President Wilson's peace mis- 
 sion to Paris. 
 
 His demand of the "impartial adjustment of colonial 
 claims" resulted in annexation of the territories in question 
 by the powers which wanted them, under a nebulous sys- 
 tem of mandates. While invoking "self-determination" to 
 keep Danzig from the Poles, he was suspending it to award 
 Shantung to Japan and repudiating it in forbidding Italy 
 to possess Italian Fiume. 
 
 From the time /the President departed on his mission 
 to Europe in December, 1918, the chief theme of wonder- 
 ing writers was his commanding influence over the nations 
 and their leaders. Pictured as a benevolent dictator whose 
 wisdom and vision had captivated Europe, whose words 
 made peoples forget their traditions and desires, whose 
 lifted finger could be the signal for the overturning of 
 thrones and'governments, he was represented as the inspired 
 champion of justice and idealism against the forces of Allied 
 intrigue, ambition, and rapacity; but for his intrepid ideal- 
 ism, the world was daily informed in moving accents, the 
 lofty purposes of the war would be swept away in the cur- 
 rents of national passion and greed; and unless a "Wilson 
 peace" were made, militarism would triumph and all the 
 sacrifices of the struggle would have been in vain. 
 
 Yet when the treaty's terms were revealed, they were 
 found to bear scarcely a trace of his handiwork. The news- 
 papers, which for five months had been celebrating the 
 intervention of Mr. Wilson as the one safeguard of mankind 
 against a "peace of imperialism and loot," discussed the 
 Treaty with solemn approval and without mention of his 
 name. They found the terms "moderate," "even lenient," 
 marked by "cold, passionless justice," leaving "no rankling 
 wounds." The terms of the Treaty, however, are in vir- 
 tually every detail those which were laid down by the Allies 
 two years previously in answer to President Wilson's de- 
 mand for "peace without victory"; they are the identical 
 
The World's Peace Congress 287 
 
 terms which the Administration organs constantly de- 
 nounced as grossly imperialistic and hostile to the spirit of 
 the age, terms which the President had to go to Europe 
 to combat, as the spokesman of higher ideals of interna- 
 tional right and human liberty. 
 
 That Germany should acknowledge responsibility for 
 her crimes and pay for them to the limit of her capacity, 
 this most important feature in the Treaty was put there 
 by the Allies against the President's opposition. He op- 
 posed the provision for trial of the former kaiser, and that 
 went in. He wanted the German fleet sunk, and that failed. 
 He declared that the League-of-Nations Covenant should 
 not be amended, and it was changed in the particulars most 
 vital to this country. His theory was that Germany should 
 be admitted at once to the League of Nations, but severe 
 probation was imposed upon her. Perhaps his most empha- 
 tic declaration was that America would enter u no combina- 
 tion which is not a combination of all of us." "There can 
 be no leagues or alliances within the common family of the 
 League of Nations," was his decree. Yet he came back to 
 America and asked the Senate to ratify an alliance with 
 Great Britain and France requiring the United States to 
 give instant aid to France if she was attacked by Germany. 
 
 In fact the list of casualties among the principles put 
 forth by Mr. Wilson make a formidable list and explains 
 the silence of those who had predicted a peace dictated by 
 him. He did win some substantial victories: he compelled 
 the Peace Conference to offer virtual recognition to the 
 Bolshevist terrorists, and so he is described by a recent 
 writer, a confidant of the President and head of the Press 
 Bureau, as the "real liberal"; he forced a delaying of the 
 Peace Treaty by adoption of the League Covenant; he pre- 
 vented the naming of Brussels as capital of the League, be- 
 cause, as he explained, the Belgian city "incarnates the 
 enmity between races." 
 
 Mr. William C. Bullitt testified before the Senate For- 
 
288 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 eign Relations Committee that the English statesmen, 
 Lloyd George and Balfour, had as their confidential repre- 
 sentative constantly with Colonel House and President Wil- 
 son, Sir William Wiseman, through whom was arranged 
 the plan, later made a part of the Treaty, whereby the 
 United States agreed to recognize the British protectorate 
 over Egypt, which "took only a few minutes." On this 
 point The Nation asks, "How is it that the British. Prime 
 Minister and his Foreign Secretary were able to keep this 
 insidious janizary, this 'extra-confidential Foreign Office' 
 constantly with Colonel House and the President? . . . 
 what an ending of the Fourteen Points, after setting the best 
 instincts of America aflame, after getting the response they 
 had from every democratic element the world over! The 
 poor, disowned, tattered . . . unmentionable in the polite 
 society of the Peace Conference, . . . brandished at last in 
 the unscrupulous hand of the British Foreign Office as a 
 mere scarecrow to frighten its maker into a docile and un- 
 questioning obedience to the will of economic imperialism I 
 Really, except for the poor Egyptians, was there ever an 
 incident as comical as this in the whole history of inter- 
 national affairs?" 
 
 It is difficult to understand why Belgium of all nations 
 concerned should have had to suffer the pangs of neglect 
 and suspense, and should have been compelled to threaten 
 rejection of the Treaty in order to get approximate justice 
 from her friends. Challenged suddenly by an overwhelm- 
 ing power, forced to choose between surrender with safety 
 and resistance that meant a living martyrdom, Belgium did 
 not for one instant hesitate ; she met with her own flesh and 
 blood and her dauntless soul the onrush of the enemy, and 
 sank, overcome but unconquered, into four years of slav- 
 ery. The whole world rang with the glories of her fidelity 
 and heroism, and all mankind was stirred to new concep- 
 tions of faith and courage by the spectacle of her supreme 
 
 The Nation, New York, September 27, 1919. 
 
The World's Peace Congress 289 
 
 devotion to duty. The name of Belgium enlisted armies, 
 brought brave men hastening from the ends of the earth 
 to avenge her wrongs and made secure the civilization she 
 had saved by her sacrifice; the suffering of Belgium wrung 
 the hearts of humanity and turned to her such an outpour- 
 ing of sympathy as history had never seen; the honor and 
 valor of Belgium were the themes of statesmen and poets, 
 and her deliverance an inspiration of a mighty crusade. 
 
 In every statement of war aims by the adversaries of 
 Germany, the rescue and restoration of Belgium held first 
 place. Great Britain proclaimed that until her wrongs were 
 righted the empire's sword should never be sheathed; and 
 after the war had raged eighteen months Great Britain and 
 France and Russia united in the solemn pledge: "The 
 Allied Powers declare that when the moment comes the 
 Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in 
 the peace negotiations, and they will not end hostilities 
 without Belgium having re-established her political and 
 economic independence." Even President Wilson, who had 
 previously argued that with such things as Belgium's fate 
 America had u no concern," finally declared for her restora- 
 tion thus: "Without this healing act the structure and 
 validity of international law is forever impaired." 
 
 Yet, with the Conference of the nations assembled to 
 frame the decrees of justice and reorganization, Belgium was 
 slighted. There were allotted to her only two seats in the 
 Council of the peace delegates, while Brazil had three, and 
 this flagrant discrimination was corrected only after urgent 
 protest had been made. 
 
 The whole world had expected that her needs would be 
 the first considered. But weeks of secret deliberation pro- 
 duced no help for the prostrate nation, no assurance that 
 justice would ultimately be done. The cloistered statesmen 
 in Paris preoccupied themselves with problems of the Bal- 
 kans, of Central Europe, of the enemy powers, of turbulent 
 Russia. Contention rose and fell over the disposition of 
 
290 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 African colonies and Asiatic concessions and islands of the 
 remote Pacific. Above all there was debate over the 
 League of Nations, that would have to administer the affairs 
 of the world after peace; but for plundered, impoverished 
 Belgium there was nothing but vague intimations that event- 
 ually her rights would be established according to the ideas 
 of the controlling groups from which she was excluded. 
 
 Her condition was desperate; yet it was nearly six 
 months after the ending of hostilities before her pleas 
 found adequate response. She had counted most, perhaps, 
 upon the championship of President Wilson, whose solici- 
 tude for the smaller nations had been so eloquently ex- 
 pressed. 
 
 Yet the Belgians were to learn that precisely because 
 they sacrificed themselves for international law and justice, 
 they must be dissociated from the institution created to 
 make them secure. In the situation the needs for financial 
 and economic support were so urgent that the Peace Con- 
 ference appointed a special commission on February 15, 
 to report on the matter. Delay followed delay. The situ- 
 ation became so desperate that at the end of March, King 
 Albert went to Paris to make a personal appeal, in which he 
 stated: "The time for promises has passed. If Belgium is 
 to live the Council must act." So flagrant had become the 
 neglect of Belgium that the London Chronicle made this 
 bitter comment: "While other subjects are passionately 
 debated, this one, on which no debate ought to exist, is al- 
 lowed to go by default." At the end of April, the issue 
 still unsettled, the premier and other members of the cabi- 
 net made another appeal to the Council for an assurance of 
 justice and for an immediate advance of five hundred mil- 
 lion dollars from the indemnity. On May 3, the delegation 
 from Belgium was instructed not to sign the treaty, and 
 this in response to a nation-wide petition which declared: 
 "It would be better to risk having nothing rather than to 
 abdicate our right to the reparations and guarantees prom- 
 
The World's Peace Congress 291 
 
 ised by most solemn assurances." And it was not until May 
 5 that the Peace Conference awarded to Belgium full rep- 
 aration and priority of claim, which the whole world im- 
 mediately recognized as an act of utmost justice. Yet it was 
 President Wilson who declared in one of his peace prin- 
 ciples: "The impartial justice meted out must involve no 
 discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just 
 and those to whom we do not wish to be just." And "the 
 treatment accorded to Belgium seems to have been dictated 
 by this singular rule of conduct, an expression of idealism so 
 lofty that it forbids any distinction between aggressor and 
 victim." 7 
 
 If the President's course puzzled Americans, it puzzled 
 European statesmen more. Americans knew perfectly well 
 that he had gone to Europe in the first instance without any 
 authorization indeed had gone in defiance of the American 
 verdict given at the election in November, 1918. But the 
 fact that he was there led European statesmen to accept 
 him as the representative of America in fact. And the posi- 
 tion in which they found themselves in relation to the only 
 head of a nation in the Congress was not only puzzling but 
 exasperating with his lost prestige. 
 
 One of the rocks upon which President Wilson settled 
 as a firm foundation for the structure that he intended 
 building for the world was that of self-determination for 
 the smaller nations. When Venizelos, the statesman from 
 Greece, asked for an application of his principle of self- 
 determination, even after Greece had stood true to the 
 cause of democracy and at the cost of civil war, he still 
 had to face the stubborn hostility of President Wilson who 
 had arbitrarily prevented an American declaration of war 
 against Bulgaria, Greece's bitter enemy and a vassal of 
 Germany. For when the Greek statesman undertook at the 
 peace council to reward that country with territory popu- 
 lated by Greeks, President Wilson, disregarding his alleged 
 
 T Philadelphia North American, May 8, 1919. 
 
292 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 principle of self-determination, in every way possible under- 
 took to thwart the purpose, going so far even as to insist 
 upon delivering part of Grecian Thrace to the Bulgarians 
 and demanding that they have a strip of land leading to a 
 port on the ^gean this queer strip to be called Wilsonia. 
 But the San Remo conference in April heard Venizelos and 
 acted without regard to President Wilson's utter disregard 
 of his own principle of self-determination and ruled other- 
 wise. 
 
 The gravamen of the astounding revelation made by the 
 publishing of the Treaty was that Great Britain, to secure 
 Japanese support for her claims to the German islands in 
 the south Pacific, and France, to draw China into the war to 
 obtain the German vessels interned in her ports, entered 
 into an agreement with Japan to despoil China when the 
 time came to adjust conditions and territorial lines at the 
 close of the war. If this was a guilty and unspeakable act, 
 America was a party to it, as developed in the Peace Con- 
 ference. In what position we are left by the signing of the 
 peace pact by President Wilson, and his enthusiastic en- 
 dorsement of the Treaty which he described "as nearly 
 perfect as humanly possible" is shown by the fact that Mr. 
 Wilson traded off all he had in order to secure a League of 
 Nations which he afterward killed by his obduracy. For 
 he had nothing to compromise, no "common counsel" to 
 enter into with the Senate or his countrymen. 
 
 When President Wilson told the American Congress 
 that it was necessary for him to be at the World's Peace 
 Congress at Paris to see that proper interpretation was 
 given his self-enunciated principles, for which, he assured 
 the world, America had fought for the first time in Europe, 
 the country did not understand him. But what became 
 clear as the months of discussion of the League of Nations 
 lengthened, was discerned at once by the shrewd statesmen 
 of Europe his dominant purpose of returning to the 
 United States with a League-of-Nations Covenant. With 
 
The World's Peace Congress 293 
 
 this knowledge, they had in their hands the key to the sit- 
 uation, and they used it to the full throughout the Confer- 
 ence. To get the Covenant, President Wilson paid the 
 price demanded by sacrificing his principles one by one, as 
 he traded off what he had. Mr. Lansing, in his testimony 
 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that 
 the Fourteen Points were never discussed by the Confer- 
 ence a statement for which President Wilson never for- 
 gave him. 
 
 As the debate progressed, the determination of America 
 not to become entangled in the affairs of Europe strength- 
 ened and the League Covenant proportionately declined in 
 favor. 
 
 One of the President's definite statements made in the 
 early stages of the Peace Congress was that the United 
 States "will join no combination of power which is not a 
 combination of us all." It stands against the equally frank 
 declaration of Premier Clemenceau for the principle of 
 the "balance of power." Thus upon this vital point there 
 was a clear conflict of purpose. 
 
 Premier Clemenceau stated it very pointedly, toward 
 the end of the Peace Congress, as the President was about 
 to return to his own country in these words : 
 
 Now when peace is signed you are going home across the sea. 
 The English are going home, too. But France stays where she is. 
 
 Marshal Foch has told you that France is the barrier protecting 
 civilization, and so France and civilization must be protected. 
 
 You gentlemen have seen the character of the Germans along the 
 Rhine. You know there is no democracy in their hearts. You know 
 that their fawning attitude is as false as it can be. And so I say to 
 you, France wants no such people in her republic. 
 
 We don't want to annex Germany up to the Rhine, but we do 
 intend to see that the German military machine stays behind the 
 river. That is what Marshal Foch meant, I believe. If we don't 
 have that protection, France must maintain always an enormous army 
 to guard civilization. 
 
294 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 With our great loss of life in the war that would be a terrible 
 burden for France. We must have a natural barrier or else it would 
 be madness to demobilize our army. 
 
 I hope that Americans will see it in the same way. I hope that 
 the soft words of the Germans will not convince the Americans that 
 the leopard has changed his spots. So far I am unconvinced that the 
 Germans of today are not the Germans of yesterday, the foes of the 
 ideals of America, the ideals of France, the ideals of civilization, the 
 foes of all that is desired in the hearts of mankind. 
 
 A Paris dispatch of April 23, 1919, stated: "In a 
 statement issued by President Wilson today he declares 
 that Fiume cannot become a part of Italy." And he 
 "points out that every condition concerning the Adriatic 
 settlement has been changed since Italy entered the war 
 upon the promises of the pact of London, the Austro-Hun- 
 garian empire having disappeared. He notes that new 
 states have been created for which Fiume is the natural 
 outlet to the sea. . . . 
 
 "When Premier Orlando received President Wilson's 
 statement, he immediately called a full meeting of the 
 Italian delegation, which prepared a statement on the sit- 
 uation addressed to the Italian people." 
 
 As the conflict was developing between President Wil- 
 son and Premier Clemenceau when it was felt that Clemen- 
 ceau was right and his position unshakable, not only in the 
 eyes of France but in the eyes of enlightened thought every- 
 where among civilized nations, and it was apparent that 
 President Wilson was attempting to meddle in foreign af- 
 fairs, particularly in France which had suffered so greatly, 
 while Americans had suffered so little, the efforts at propa- 
 ganda sent out from Paris by the American delegation and 
 its press bureau, was stifling in the fact that it attempted to 
 belittle the ideals in France, urging her grasping disposition 
 and the greed of her statesmen in seeking a conclusion of 
 peace after America had won the Great War. And this 
 propaganda, the American people having no better guide 
 
The .World's Peace Congress 295 
 
 at that moment, went far toward poisoning the minds of 
 Americans against France. The Paris Matin published an 
 open letter to President Wilson from Harry de Jouvent, 
 spring of 1919, in which he maintained that if there was to 
 be a League of Nations, it should guarantee reparation from 
 Germany. He declared that France did not exact repara- 
 tion for herself alone, and continued: "Today as yester- 
 day France interprets the hopes of the nations. She is 
 their voice. " And he asks the President to sheer away 
 from those who would say that reparation was impossible 
 and then states: "If it were impossible that Germany, 
 which is as safe as before the war, can repair the crimes 
 which she has committed, it would be even more impossible 
 for her victims to do so. In that case there would be noth- 
 ing left but to despair of humanity." 
 
 And on this matter the Philadelphia Ledger stated: 
 
 False to the terms upon which the armistice was signed ; and false 
 therefore to her own plighted word and that of her Allies and her 
 enemy, is the demand of France that the peace treaty shall authorize 
 her expansion into the Saar basin. The principle upon which France, 
 with the nations that helped to save her, agreed to make peace is 
 antagonistic to such trickery as that by which France now seeks to 
 grab the Saar basin. 
 
 This latter is a mere suggestion of what the propa- 
 ganda put out from Paris by the American press bureau 
 was accomplishing in seeking to develop American thought 
 against even suffering France. 
 
 Perhaps one of the hardest things for her to bear was 
 the admonition, coming from America through its Presi- 
 dent, that she must not irritate the sensitive Germans. 
 
 The injustice of it all was intolerable, but the folly of it 
 was worse. The pleas of France were counting less with 
 President Wilson than the threats of Germany. It is doubt- 
 ful whether statesmanship ever produced a more fatuous 
 theory than that Germany, stripped of her fleet and her 
 colonies, would plot against a strengthened France or would 
 
296 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 regard weakened France with sentiment of fraternity and 
 gratitude. This was not a matter of territorial aggrandize- 
 ment, but of strict economic justice, which the President of 
 the United States sought to deny war-torn France. 
 
 As though it were not enough that France should be 
 compelled to contribute most to the peace, after contribut- 
 ing incomparably most to the war, sustained efforts were 
 being made to create the impression that she was obstruct- 
 ing a just peace by her u greed" and "selfish demands. " This 
 campaign of detraction seriously affected public opinion in 
 the United States; and it was supported by influential 
 American newspapers upon inspiration coming direct from 
 the American peace mission in Paris. This propaganda was 
 becoming a powerful factor in American public opinion in 
 early April, 1919. An Associated Press dispatch carried 
 the semi-official statement charging that "French claims are 
 open to construction as meaning something more than mili- 
 tary security and as verging upon territorial control." 
 
 Dispatches from Europe told, after he had been in 
 the Congress for some time, that "the President's position 
 is immensely stronger than when he arrived" and "it may 
 be authoritatively stated that he is feeling more optimistic 
 today regarding the general situation than at any time since 
 his arrival in Europe," and yet it was as early as the Satur- 
 day on which the Peace Council began sitting that the report 
 reached America of "future confirmation that Mr. Wilson 
 is greatly disillusioned" and "already sees the impossibility 
 of realizing all his ideals." 
 
 The afternoon papers of April 23, 1919, gave the first 
 intimation of a pending rupture in the delegations at the 
 Peace Congress. This was brought about by the President's 
 position on the matter of Fiume which the Italians claimed 
 under the London convention of 1917 and by President 
 Wilson's own announced principle of self-determination for 
 the smaller states. News began to reach America in a more 
 exacerbated form when it became evident that the Italian 
 
The World's Peace Congress 297 
 
 Premier Orlando, after President Wilson's appeal over the 
 Italian Government, was determined to withdraw from the 
 Conference, to return to his nation, and there determine 
 what steps should next be taken. The situation developed 
 into what leading American journals had predicted would 
 happen months before under President Wilson's policy of 
 dictation. The Italians charged that in issuing his appeal 
 to the Italian people, Mr. Wilson made one of the gravest 
 errors of diplomatic etiquette in the history of diplomacy. 
 They charged directly that at 3 130 on the afternoon of 
 April 23 they received from Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd 
 George and Mr. Wilson a proposal which gave them satis- 
 faction on the Dalmatian coast and proposed to make Fiume 
 a free city under neither the Italians nor Jugo-Slavs. And 
 that the next they knew was Mr. Wilson's appeal direct to 
 the Italian people over the heads of their duly accredited 
 representatives in the Peace Congress, instead of making 
 it to the Italian Government. 
 
 It would not have required great vision to see what 
 would have happened, had the delegates of some other na- 
 tion taken that action with reference to American duly ac- 
 credited representatives at the Peace Congress. American 
 newspapers, not under the influence of the Administration, 
 deplored the lack of judgment and finesse with which Presi- 
 dent Wilson gave out a decision as he did in the Italian 
 case. The Italian press backed Orlando in his position, 
 while flaying Mr. Wilson for a bad diplomatic break. The 
 French press, more reserved in its expressions, at every turn 
 flayed Mr. Wilson for his inconsistency. A poll of the 
 newspaper comment taken by the New York Tribune 
 showed that the press in the United States was divided on 
 the Italian crisis. 
 
 The situation that developed in the Conference in the 
 latter part of April, 1919, over the Fiume question, when 
 Premier Orlando withdrew from the Conference, returned 
 to his home and received an overwhelming vote of confi- 
 
298 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 dence and then returned to the Congress stronger than 
 before, became the most serious crisis for the Peace Con- 
 ference up to that time. Not only was Italy involved against 
 President Wilson's dictatorial manner, but the Poles, 
 Czecho-Slovaks and Greeks were indignant that Americans 
 resisted their territorial claims. Indeed, every nation rep- 
 resented had grievances against the United States. Eng- 
 land alone remained discreetly silent. 
 
 It was President Wilson who undermined the moral 
 authority and the actual power of the democratic govern- 
 ments by traveling over Europe preaching a crusade against 
 them, inciting the peoples to distrust their leaders as men 
 without vision or humane instincts or international honor. 
 But the revolt came later, not against the duly constituted 
 governments, but against President Wilson. 
 
 Frank H. Simonds, who had perhaps as firm a grasp 
 upon the situation in the Peace Congress as any newspaper 
 correspondent in the world, gives this view of the great 
 crisis in the conference: 
 
 The French Government, regretting that the break seems immi- 
 nent, is resolved to make no more surrender of the essential security of 
 France to Mr. Wilson, and is determined, if necessary, to endure the 
 evil consequences of his withdrawal rather than yield further. 
 
 Lloyd George has abandoned Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Wilson 
 knows it. 
 
 Mr. Wilson has a sketch of a separate treaty with Germany, 
 which is his final threat if his leadership does not prevail. 
 
 If he insists on going home there will be great disappointment, 
 but, I think, no further concessions. The possibility that he will go 
 home and attempt to make a separate peace with Germany has been 
 threatened here privately for weeks, and has at last been discounted. 
 
 Under the circumstances those at a distance could but 
 wonder and speculate. 
 
 The Congress of Vienna, though it attained a bad repu- 
 tation for its intrigues and secrecy, the Congress of Berlin, 
 and the conferences at The Hague, as well as all other 
 
The World's Peace Congress 299 
 
 known conferences drew protocols in which could be found 
 the substance of the opinions, the suggestions, propositions 
 and counter-propositions of the various states. Yet in the 
 most notable Peace Conference the world ever saw, that of 
 Paris, 1919, which was supposed to be the most open of 
 any the world ever knew, there was no record kept of any 
 such matters. The Ten, then the Five, and after that the 
 Four preferred not only to discuss in secret, but to leave 
 no trace of their deliberations. They did not have any 
 secretaries to record them. They broached and agitated all 
 questions without putting anything on paper. They re- 
 sumed on one day what they had settled the day before. 
 They protested against language attributed to them on the 
 outside. As nothing was written they could deny every- 
 thing and begin all over again. In the state of things as 
 they then existed, neither congresses nor parliaments nor 
 peoples are left with any authentic documents at their dis- 
 position, and they had to content themselves with the verbal 
 declarations of their government ministers, and on many 
 important matters no two of them seemed to agree as to 
 their meaning. Some day there will be some kind of a his- 
 tory written from the patching together of the various 
 memoranda and denials of the various members. It will 
 not, however, be an authentic record of the Congress. 
 
 America's honor must never be traded off for an indi- 
 vidual mess of pottage. America must never be made an 
 appendage to a super-government of the world. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 
 
 If the United States is still to be regarded as a nation, 
 then the most notable treaty in all the history of the making 
 of treaties is a matter of prime concern to all Americans, 
 from its very inception to the last syllable of the process 
 of its final acceptance. And who is it, in this day of "the 
 new order/' that dares to rise and say, This is no longer 
 the day of nations, but the new day of internationalism 
 which has superseded the other? Only the man who lacks 
 in his system the spark of vital Americanism. The United 
 States is yet a nation, under a republican form of govern- 
 ment, with a written constitution limiting the powers of 
 every branch of its vast energy. And this limiting constitu- 
 tion is the basic law of the land. 
 
 The basis, then, of this supreme interest of all Ameri- 
 cans is the preservation of the fundamental law of the land, 
 that freedom in its highest sense to the individual may be 
 kept safe. And that, after all, is the basis of the freedom 
 granted to human society. The Constitution of the United 
 States is but a means to this end. 
 
 It was in obedience to this Constitution that America 
 took upon itself the fateful task of engaging in armed con- 
 flict with a dread war machine. It was in obedience to the 
 same instrument that her delegates met with other assem- 
 bled statesmen of the world to close the direful struggle. 
 At this Peace Congress of the world at Paris these states- 
 men met to determine upon what terms the conflict should 
 be ended. Some held the view that this was the sole purpose 
 for which they met or could meet. Others declared that 
 they were at liberty to initiate any movement and to formu- 
 
 300 
 
The Treaty of Paris 301 
 
 late any program for the government of the world that they 
 might feel an inclination to take up. 
 
 It was upon these two simple views that the action of 
 the Congress depended. Accepting the latter view, it la- 
 bored and brought forth the document which is the Treaty 
 of Paris. It undertook the accomplishment of two purposes 
 in one instrument: Closing the armed conflict of the world 
 and defining for the nations a form of government for the 
 future. 
 
 The former, and that only, is properly the Treaty of 
 Peace. The other is known as the Covenant of the League 
 of Nations, and was made a constituent part of the former 
 at the insistence of one of the American members of the 
 peace commission, President Wilson. Thus, when the 
 Treaty was completed and came to the United States the 
 two were combined in one, and the whole instrument was 
 known as the Treaty of Peace. 
 
 This document reached the United States outside the 
 usual and regular channels. It leaked to America and into 
 the United States Senate, much to the chagrin of Presi- 
 dent Wilson; and its discussion there began May 23, 1919, 
 though the President did not present his copy of it in that 
 body until July 10. He had been called upon to submit the 
 Treaty through regular channels when the document was 
 known to be in the country. He refused, though it was on 
 sale in the leading capitals of Europe. Then Senator Borah 
 informed the country that if the paper was to be withheld, 
 he would read the entire document of some 85,000 words 
 into the Senate record. A cablegram from the President 
 was read by Senator Hitchcock, Administration leader in 
 that body, asking a thorough investigation to determine how 
 the Treaty had reached the Senate. This immediately 
 brought Senator Borah to his feet, with the statement that 
 he had the Treaty in his hands, and that he was authorized 
 by those from whom he received it to state how it came 
 into his possession, namely, through Frazer Hunt, a corre- 
 
302 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 spondent of the Chicago Tribune. He read it into the 
 record June 9 after points of order had been made against 
 it for an hour with a view to its suppression. 
 
 The Treaty itself is a remarkable document. The long- 
 est ever written, it represents the combined product of over 
 two thousand experts working continually through a series 
 of commissions for three and a half months from January 
 18, 1919. It was printed in parallel pages of English and 
 French, recognized as of equal validity, though prior thereto 
 the French was understood to be the diplomatic language 
 of the world. It did not deal with questions affecting 
 Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, except in so far as to bind 
 Germany to accept any agreement reached with these for- 
 mer allies of hers. It covered a vast range of matters to 
 which Senator Moses called attention when, on the floor of 
 the Senate, he expressed himself humorously on this wise : 
 
 In this Treaty are considerations of many things of shoes and 
 ships and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings. It roams the plains, 
 sails the seas, delves into the earth and soars into the sky; Huns, 
 horses and huntsmen alike come within their purview; books, boun- 
 daries and bullets; guns, goats, guarantees and governments; war- 
 ships, 'water-ways, woman suffrage and Wilhelm II in short, the al- 
 phabet and alliteration alike are agonized in an attempt to deal ade- 
 quately with merely a topical index to this instrument which we are 
 asked to ratify in haste lest we break the heart of the world. 
 
 Thomas Jefferson, eminent in the early history of 
 the country, informed President Washington that it was 
 advisable, whenever possible, to consult the Senate concern- 
 ing a proposed treaty before beginning the negotiations. 
 Ignoring this advice prudent, since no treaty is valid with- 
 out approval of the Senate, President Wilson created un- 
 necessary opposition in the Senate, as he did in the country, 
 by his secret methods in the Peace Congress as well as when 
 preparing for his attendance thereon. His course there- 
 after only widened the breach between the executive and 
 the ratifying power, in particular when he refused informa- 
 
The Treaty of Paris 303 
 
 tion requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
 while it had the Treaty under consideration. 
 
 When President Wilson submitted to the Senate what he 
 said was the only authentic Treaty, he was described as 
 reading his address slowly and in a clear, quiet voice. His 
 manuscript, typewritten on small pages, he held in his left 
 hand and with his right he punctuated his utterance with an 
 occasional gesture, while before him on the Vice-President's 
 desk lay the Treaty brought by him in person from Paris. 
 
 In this message to the Senate the President stated that 
 to reject the Covenant of the League of Nations now would 
 "break the heart of the world" ; that many issues intervened 
 to make the Treaty of Peace u not exactly what we would 
 have written"; that the compromises, which were accepted 
 as inevitable, "nowhere cut to the heart of any principle" ; 
 that the Peace Treaty as a whole "squares" with the prin- 
 ciples that were agreed upon as the basis of peace. He 
 urged prompt ratification and with no substantial change. 
 
 When it was declared through the public press that in 
 submitting the Treaty to the Senate President Wilson had 
 fired the opening gun in his fight to force immediate ratifica- 
 tion of the League-of-Nations Covenant without reserva- 
 tion, it was also stated that the shell landed short of its 
 mark; that Mr. Wilson's address was disappointing to his 
 friends and encouraging to his opponents ; that for the most 
 part it was a repetition of what he had said on former 
 occasions; and that it furnished none of the information 
 that was expected by both sides in the League controversy. 
 It was recognized at the moment, however, that full and 
 complete information was promised later. 
 
 It was the first time that the Senate had ever received 
 a treaty from the executive in open session and began its 
 consideration with full publicity. For the first time a Presi- 
 dent of the United States reported as his own ambassador. 
 In the matter of actions and policies proposed there were 
 innovations of the most far-reaching nature. The situation 
 
304 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was described as unique in that it has no parallel elsewhere. 
 While the Peace Treaty and Covenant were subject to criti- 
 cism in Great Britain, France, and Italy, there were no such 
 conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of 
 the government the reason being that in those countries 
 the leaders had made the peace project a coalition agree- 
 ment and co-operation instead of arbitrary personal direc- 
 tion and partisan management. 
 
 The deliberations on the Treaty provoked one of the 
 most bitter and prolonged contests between the Senate and 
 the President in American history, with the controversy cen- 
 tering almost wholly about the League-of-Nations Cove- 
 nant. At the same time the newspapers of the nation took 
 up the discussion with vigor and the rostrum furnished 
 some of the ablest debaters the country possessed on both 
 sides of the great question. 
 
 There are three distinct stages of progression by which 
 the President encouraged the bitterness of this controversy : 
 First, when he passed over the Senate and thus ignored all 
 precedent and history and the advice of the early publicists 
 of the nation, as Thomas Jefferson, who advised President 
 Washington to confer with the Senate before undertaking 
 negotiation of a treaty, since that body must pass upon a 
 treaty before it can become operative; second, in refusing to 
 furnish the Senate information in his possession, and only 
 in his possession, so that it might reach a just and intelligent 
 conclusion in its consideration of the Treaty; third, his at- 
 tempt to create against the Senate a public sentiment, based 
 upon false foundations, and thus force the Senate to action 
 against its own better judgment. 
 
 The Senate's effort to get information from the Presi- 
 dent when seeking light so as to pass intelligently upon this 
 document of supreme importance to the nation and to the 
 world, resulted in a showing of efforts on the part of the 
 President at concealment from the public that were un- 
 worthy of a man in his high position. But in every instance, 
 
The Treaty of Paris 305 
 
 it indicated the President's conception of government under 
 the Constitution as revealed in his written works of years 
 previous: That the Senate must approve what the execu- 
 tive should choose to devise and that without question; that 
 the words of the Constitution, "advice and consent" of the 
 Senate were words with some meaning outside the ordinary 
 use of language that could be read into them by the execu- 
 tive. 
 
 This is shown in the President's refusal of August 28, 
 not given to the public until September i, to submit to the 
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee other treaties to which 
 the United States was to be a party, upon the ground that 
 compliance would set a precedent for encouragement of 
 senatorial encroachment upon the presidential prerogative; 
 and upon the further ground that it might create an embar- 
 rassment to give out the contents of a treaty before it was 
 ready for final action. Replying to this statement of the 
 President's reasons, Senator Lodge, chairman of the com- 
 mittee, said: 
 
 The declaration of the i6th of June was printed some time ago 
 in the Record, from the English White Book, the declaration having 
 been submitted to the House of Commons on the 4th of July, I be- 
 lieve. The committee asked for it merely because they thought it 
 would be better that it should be officially before them. 
 
 In reply to another request of the committee for infor- 
 mation upon an important point, so essential, in fact, that 
 the Senate would have stultified itself in passing upon the 
 point without seeking the information at its source, and 
 derelict in its duty as well, the President replied that as he 
 recollected the business, to use his phrase, no agreement 
 had been reached concerning it when he left France and he 
 had heard of none since. This was concerning the division 
 and apportionment of the war indemnity exacted from Ger- 
 many. He also stated that he was "not able to bring from 
 Paris a complete file of papers" relating to the Treaty, but 
 
306 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 "only those which happen to be in my hands" a remarkable 
 admission of incompetence and neglect of duty. If the 
 President could treat his Secretary of State as harshly as he 
 treated Mr. Lansing for what he termed his offenses, what 
 terms would he have used to condemn such indifference to 
 the public for an offense such as the President admits he 
 himself committed, in leaving essential records in a foreign 
 land, or what punishment would he have meted out to him? 
 Nor was the Secretary of State able to answer vital ques- 
 tions, his constant reply being that only the President or 
 Edward M. House had the information sought by the com- 
 mittee. The refusal of the President to furnish the com- 
 mittee essential documents 1 and every other avenue of in- 
 formation being closed by the Administration to the commit- 
 tee, the chairman was compelled to announce it would 
 report the Treaty with Germany to the Senate. 
 
 And all this occurred after the President had promised 
 explicitly that he would furnish the Senate with all informa- 
 tion in his possession. Instead, he suggested the White 
 House meeting of August 18. It was the President's action 
 which kept the Treaty in the committee as long as it was, 
 the period of sixty days, and under consideration forty-five 
 days. No just opinion by the Senate was possible with the 
 information withheld by the President. In violation of his 
 written stipulation with France that he would submit to the 
 Senate for its consideration the special treaty with that 
 nation at the same time he would submit the Treaty with 
 Germany, he withheld it until the Senate refused to proceed 
 further with the latter until the other was submitted. 
 
 It was during the stage of proceedings when the com- 
 mittee was seeking information from the President that the 
 
 1 A refreshing contrast to this attitude is that of President Harding in 
 submitting to the Senate, February 10, 1922, the treaties of Disarmament 
 Conference when he said: "It is a privilege as well as a duty to ask that 
 advice and consent which the Constitution requires to make these covenants 
 effective. Accompanying the treaties I bring to you the complete minutes 
 of both plenary sessions and committee meetings, and a copy of the official 
 report made to me by the American delegation to the Conference." 
 
The Treaty of Paris 307 
 
 White House Conference of the President with the Senate 
 Foreign Relations Committee took place. It was disillusion- 
 ing to the committee as well as to the American public and 
 to the world, when he solemnly declared to the committee 
 that he had no knowledge of the secret treaty entered into 
 by the Allies, by virtue of which Italy entered the conflict. 
 There were other treaties to which Senator Johnson in- 
 vited his attention the agreement with Rumania, in Au- 
 gust, 1916; the several agreements touching Asia Minor; 
 the agreements entered into in the winter of 1917-1918, be- 
 tween France and Russia relative to the frontiers of Ger- 
 many, and particularly concerning the Saar Valley and the 
 left bank of the Rhine and the President of the United 
 States declared that he had no knowledge of any of them 
 until he reached the Paris Conference. 
 
 Yet, on March 4, 1918, Mr. Balfour, in the House of 
 Commons, stated that "President Wilson is kept informed" 
 as to the treaties entered into by the Allies. It was the 
 Russian government that published to the world in Novem- 
 ber, 1917, the secret treaties. Late in 1917 and early in 
 1918, the English paper, the Manchester Guardian, pub- 
 lished almost all of them; and early in 1918 the New York 
 Evening Post published many of them. One cause of the 
 downfall of the Kerensky government in Russia was the 
 refusal of the Allies to revise certain of the secret treaties. 
 The secret treaty with Italy, known as the London Pact, 
 was made April 27, 1915; and May 10, 1915, it was out- 
 lined to the world by Sir Arthur Evans in a letter to the 
 Manchester Guardian. It was given to the American pub- 
 lic in various forms and in various publications, long prior 
 to the meeting of the Paris Conference. 
 
 And President Wilson was the statesman to represent 
 America among the statesmen of the world in the Peace 
 Congress, where he first knew anything of these secret 
 treaties! Yet, in the armistice agreements the boundary 
 lines were fixed almost as copied from the secret treaties. 
 
308 The Wilson Administration and the Great W ar 
 
 He was able to write and sign his statement upon the dis- 
 position of Fiume without having seen the secret treaty, as 
 he admitted under the questioning of Senator Moses of 
 New Hampshire. 
 
 But if it disillusioned Europeans, Americans even more. 
 Confidence, which crumbled when the President in seeking 
 personal advantage through a Democratic Congress which 
 he asked the people to elect in fall of 1918, was so shat- 
 tered after the August, 1919, White House Conference 
 that the President found it necessary to tour the country in 
 support of the Treaty he brought home and especially the 
 League of Nations. His advocacy of the matter was fatal, 
 for, as often, he attempted to make things appear what 
 they were not, and his temper did not draw the American 
 people to his cause. 
 
 And to all of this was added the adverse features of 
 Secretary Lansing's testimony before the Senate commit- 
 tee; then the statement of William C. Bullitt, and other cir- 
 cumstances that led the people to believe that the Presi- 
 dent was not giving them a square deal. It strengthened the 
 Senate's opposition to the President's arbitrary and wilful 
 manner of seeking to make treaties and of binding the coun- 
 try to unprecedented undertakings without consulting the 
 co-ordinate treaty-making power of the government. 
 
 In all the queer logic used by the President in his con- 
 ference at the White House with the Foreign Relations 
 Committee of the Senate, on August 18, 1919, none per- 
 haps was stranger than his seeking to answer Senator Bran- 
 degee as to the scope of Article X in regard to the express 
 "external aggression" when he stated: 
 
 I understand that Article to mean no nation is at liberty to invade 
 the territorial integrity' tot another. That does not mean to invade for 
 the purposes of warfare, but to impair the territorial integrity of an- 
 other nation. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed inter- 
 vention. It is destroyed by retention, by taking territory away from 
 it that impairs its territorial integrity. 
 
The Treaty of Paris 309 
 
 The logic of the President appeared to be that "exter- 
 nal aggression" or "invasion" of the territory does not 
 mean that the League could be effective in restraining it 
 until it came to the council table to arrange the terms, 
 which would mean that it might be invaded by a powerful 
 army, torn asunder, the property destroyed, the inhabitants 
 carried or driven away, or slaughtered; and yet the League 
 of Nations was not to become effective as touching that 
 invasion or "external aggression" until the terms of peace 
 were to be settled, with the aggressor in possession. 
 
 A weakness in the committee's report was that it failed 
 to recognize any good features in the Treaty. It did justly 
 demand, however, that this nation "declines to assume, ex- 
 cept by action of the Congress," any obligation "to preserve 
 the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
 other country, or to interfere in controversies between other 
 nations." It had been declared by the President that this 
 would "cut the heart out" of the League-of-Nations Cov- 
 enant. The committee report further declared that "the 
 United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to 
 determine what questions are within its domestic juris- 
 diction," and that "the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted 
 by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be 
 wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations," 
 clarifying the most vague and most important of the pro- 
 visions. 
 
 It was thus made clear that the Covenant of the League 
 of Nations was the danger from the outset to the Treaty's 
 ratification. And the President's rude and arbitrary treat- 
 ment of the Senate from the beginning, created a chasm that 
 was never bridged and which he appeared to desire to per- 
 petuate. 
 
 In this it is probable that history will conclude that the 
 President erred. In assuming his dictatorial attitude 
 toward the Senate, a body of co-equal constitutional author- 
 ity in treaty-making, he ignored history, tradition, and the 
 
3IO The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 written Constitution of the nation, to say nothing of the 
 respect and confidence which the people repose in this con- 
 stitutional body. It all appears to have come about as a 
 result of the President's misconception of executive functions 
 under the Constitution. Either that or an inborn desire to 
 assume autocratic powers for purposes of self-aggrandize- 
 ment. As a sequel, the Senate's position steadily grew 
 stronger, while that of the President as steadily waned. 
 
 As a result of his peculiar conception of executive func- 
 tions under the federal Constitution, or for some other rea- 
 son of equal validity, President Wilson appeared to think 
 it a duty that he should, or at all events believe that he could, 
 create a public sentiment that would carry him through, such 
 sentiment based uppn false statement of fact; in other 
 words, that he could make people believe what was not true, 
 and simply because he said it. Examples are but too nu- 
 merous. One will suffice to illustrate his method. 
 
 On September 25, 1919, in his tour across the country 
 in support of the League of Nations, President Wilson used 
 this remarkable argument at Pueblo, Colorado : 
 
 I had gone over there with, so to say, explicit instructions. Don't 
 you remember that we laid down fourteen points which should contain 
 the principles of settlement? They were not my points. In every 
 one of them I was conscientiously trying to read the thought of the 
 people of the United States, and after I uttered those points I had 
 every assurance given me that could be given me that they did speak 
 the moral judgment of the United States and not my single judg- 
 ment. 
 
 It was on this kind of argument that the President 
 sought to make the American people believe that they had 
 given him a mandate to insist upon his terms of peace as 
 promulgated in his Fourteen Points. He never disclosed, 
 however, who it was that had jointly with him worked out 
 the Fourteen Points to his entire satisfaction. But it was 
 with that kind of logic that the people were made suspicious 
 of President Wilson's right intentions and that discredited 
 
The Treaty of Paris 311 
 
 him from the time of his tour across the country as they 
 had never discredited him before. 
 
 Upon leaving the country to attend the Peace Congress, 
 President Wilson had assured the Congress of his own 
 country that it should know all that he did. It soon became 
 evident that he did not mean to keep that part of his agree- 
 ment. Immediately after he had submitted the Treaty to 
 the Senate for its consideration, it became evident that if 
 the people of the country were ever furnished "full and com- 
 plete" information about the League of Nations and the 
 Peace Treaty, together with a history of the negotiations 
 leading up to them, it would be in opposition to the Presi- 
 dent instead of with his aid as he had promised. To this 
 end, Administration leaders in the Senate Foreign Relations 
 Committee set out to oppose every move to obtain from the 
 President the reasons back of the Treaty and the Covenant. 
 
 When the situation became so grave that he no longer 
 dared face the country with further refusal, the President 
 stated that he would receive the committee at the White 
 House to talk over the great instrument. The Senate, 
 mindful of what had occurred in a similar meeting at the 
 White House in February, declined to accept this invitation 
 of the President, unless it was distinctly understood that 
 it was to be an open meeting and for the use of the public 
 and to become a matter of record, instead of a White House 
 secret conclave, as had been the former meeting. From this 
 mid-summer meeting the President emerged with a good 
 reputation as a casuist, but he lost tremendously as a de- 
 bater possessed of the rugged horse sense of the average 
 American. 
 
 The first decisive vote upon the reservations which the 
 Senate had determined to make to the Peace Treaty was 
 that upon the nation's right to leave the League of Na- 
 tions. This occurred on November 8, 1919, and the na- 
 tion's right was sustained by a vote of 50 to 35. This was 
 a severe blow to what had been the hopes of the Adminis- 
 
312 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 tration forces that the Treaty might be adopted precisely 
 as President Wilson brought it back with him from Europe 
 during the discussion. 
 
 The rejection of the Treaty, with the reservations 
 adopted by the Senate, took place November 19, 1919. 
 There were two distinct propositions before the Senate and 
 on these various propositions from three to ten Democrats 
 voted with the Republicans. When President Wilson was 
 disillusioned as to Senate procedure, he having been prev- 
 iously of opinion that it required two-thirds of the Senate 
 to adopt a reservation, the United States Supreme Court to 
 the contrary notwithstanding, and was made to face the 
 fact that reservations could be adopted by a majority vote 
 of that body, and that they had been so adopted, he sent 
 a written communication to his supporters demanding that 
 they vote for rejection of the Treaty; and two-thirds vote 
 being required to ratify, it was accordingly rejected with 
 the reservations. 
 
 After the rejection of the Treaty by the United States 
 Senate in a decisive vote in which the Republicans were 
 joined by prominent Democrats, the interest in the League 
 of Nations was not lessened. It continued to be discussed 
 in assemblies everywhere; votes were taken upon it by re- 
 ligious bodies particularly in urging ratification promptly, 
 many of them without knowing that in so doing they were 
 bartering away American sovereignty and independence; in 
 mid-January, 1920, the colleges and universities of the coun- 
 try took a vote upon the matter, the result of which indi- 
 cated a considerable majority in favor of reservations. The 
 paramount question then became whether there should be a 
 compromise between the position assumed by the President 
 of ratification of the Treaty as he presented it to the Sen- 
 ate and the reservations which had been adopted by the 
 Senate previous to rejection of the Treaty on November 
 19. At the Jackson Day dinner in Washington, the Presi- 
 dent showed the same obduracy that had characterized him 
 
The Treaty of Paris 313 
 
 throughout, while his former Secretary of State, William 
 J. Bryan, took the position that the majority in the United 
 States Senate had tl\e right to its own views without being 
 dictated to by the executive and a compromise should be 
 the order of the day. So prominent became this issue be- 
 tween the President and the former Secretary of State, 
 that all the other noted speakers on that occasion were lost 
 in the fog of discussion which followed. 
 
 The second rejection of the Treaty occurred just four 
 months from the time of its first failure of ratification. 
 Partisans of the President declared that it was due to 
 the partisanship of Senator Lodge and his following. The 
 fact is the President gave written instructions to his fol- 
 lowers to vote against ratification if any change was made 
 in the League-of-Nations Covenant. 
 
 During the long discussion in the Senate and over the 
 country of the Treaty, there was no time that it would 
 not have been ratified promptly but for the Covenant, a 
 wholly foreign matter, having been woven into it. There 
 would have been no serious objection on the part of either 
 the President or the Senate. It was the matter of the 
 League of Nations alone that occasioned controversy and 
 created violent opposition, that strained the relations be- 
 tween the United States and the nations associated with 
 her in the war, that greatly endangered the real association 
 for the purpose it was thought the League would fulfill, 
 and which delayed peace and threatened continued disaster 
 to the world. 
 
 History will ask, as thousands of Americans had already 
 asked, Who is responsible for the refusal to make peace? 
 Mr. Wilson sought to place the responsibility on the Sen- 
 ate; yet the Senate was eager to make peace and to ratify 
 a treaty of peace that would leave American institutions 
 and freedom of action unimpaired. If the President refused 
 to accept the advice and consent of the Senate as the 
 Constitution requires on a matter of making a treaty, the 
 
314 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 question arose whether he would not be responsible for 
 failure. 
 
 But he sought to carry the matter away from the Senate 
 and to take it before the country, for which there is no 
 provision in the Constitution. In other words he was 
 wholly willing to ignore the constitutional requirement that 
 he make treaties of peace with the advice and consent of 
 the Senate and to adopt a method outside of the Constitu- 
 tion by an appeal to a vote of the mass of the people. 
 
 And yet if there was to be a plebiscite, the President 
 had provided no means by which to force a vote on the 
 simple question, as he would have it passed upon: the 
 Treaty as he presented it or no treaty at all; or the par- 
 ticular Covenant of a League which he brought from Europe 
 or no international organization at all. He sought to 
 convince the people that he was with the people, as the 
 Senate was against the people; just as in an earlier day and 
 in another land Louis Bonaparte held himself put to be 
 the most advanced advocate of democratic ideas in France, 
 won a vote by the people and overturned the Republic. 
 And even should President Wilson be defeated in such an 
 appeal he could easily escape the obloquy of defeat by say- 
 ing, "I did the best I could, I bow to the will of the peo- 
 pie." 
 
 But the President showed plainly that his devotion to 
 the Treaty of Peace and to the Covenant of the League of 
 Nations was variable. He clearly told the Supreme Coun- 
 cil at Paris that unless his authority was recognized and 
 his decisions complied with he would withdraw the Treaty 
 from the Senate, and that he would relieve himself of all 
 responsibility if his will did not prevail in the dispute be- 
 tween Serbia and Italy. He did not hestitate to say this, 
 even though he would have to "face the unthinkable task 
 of making another and separate peace with Germany" and 
 though, to quote his words, he would have to "break the 
 heart of the world." 
 
The Treaty of Paris 315 
 
 When the President's proposal for a "great and solemn 
 referendum" was made, as stated in his Jackson Day let- 
 ter, it really meant this question: "Shall the President of 
 the United States conclude treaties without advice and con- 
 sent of the Senate?" And once that question is answered, 
 another President with the same characteristics as Wood- 
 row Wilson might easily take the next step and ask, Shall 
 the President make laws without the sanction of Congress? 
 One is as constitutional as the other. And the President 
 who would undertake to overthrow the Constitution on 
 one point could as readily assume to overthrow it on the 
 other. 
 
 Not only Republicans but millions of Democrats agreed 
 with William J. Bryan that the president's rejection of the 
 Treaty was "a colossal crime." 
 
 Said Senator Owen, one of the president's staunchest 
 adherents, in making his final speech before the roll was 
 called, on March 19, 1920: 
 
 I do not believe there is a single Democratic senator who would 
 not vote for this resolution of ratification if it were not for the belief 
 of such senator that the President of the United States desires them 
 to defeat the resolution of ratification now pending and would regard 
 their failure to do so as a refusal to follow his view as party leader. 
 
 And there was no senator in a better position than he 
 to gauge the sentiments of his colleagues; nor did any other 
 senator challenge his statement. The vote was 49 to 35, 
 and its return to the President was ordered by the Senate, 
 and there it remained to his term's close. 
 
 There was never any show for ratification in the dan- 
 gerous form in which President Wilson submitted it to 
 the Senate, July 10, 1919. His refusal to permit any 
 change, even to safeguard the interests of the United States, 
 made ratification impossible. His written instructions that 
 it be rejected if changes were to be made, sealed its fate. 
 
 And the event makes sardonic comment on his state- 
 
316 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 craft. At Paris he repeatedly sacrificed principle to save 
 the Covenant. At Washington he resisted any concession 
 to the demands for the nation's safety. The Kansas City 
 Star, in commenting upon the second failure of the Senate 
 to ratify the Treaty, said: 
 
 The Peace Treaty, with the League of Nations, is dead. It has 
 been killed by the President. In the Senate yesterday, including the 
 pairs, there was a majority of eighteen for the Americanized Treaty, 
 but the President refused to release the seven senators whose votes 
 would have ratified the document. 
 
 Both houses of Congress then took up the matter of 
 repealing the action whereby war was declared to exist be- 
 tween Germany and United States. On April 9, this meas- 
 ure passed the House by a vote of 242 to 150. In a 
 modified form, it passed the Senate. But the President 
 vetoed the measure, thus continuing technical war of his 
 own will, which he so much deprecated that he urged Con- 
 gress to take speedy action looking toward peace. It was 
 not peace he sought, but a subterfuge. 
 
 It was while the President was withholding from the 
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee the important treaty 
 with France, in direct violation of his solemn agreement, 
 that he was urging early ratification by the Senate of the 
 document he brought back with him from Europe, declar- 
 ing among other things these : 
 
 The channels of trade are barred by war when there is no war. 
 
 Our full normal profitable production waits on peace. Our mili- 
 tary plans wait upon it. 
 
 The nations that ratify the Treaty, such as Great Britain, Bel- 
 gium and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for con- 
 trolling the markets of the world without competition from us, if 
 we do not presently act. 
 
 Every element of normal life among us depends upon and awaits 
 the ratification of peace. 
 
The Treaty of Paris 317 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understand- 
 ing which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything 
 contained in the Covenant. 
 
 Immigration, tariffs and naturalization are incontestibly domestic 
 questions with which no international body could deal without ex- 
 press authority to do so. 
 
 The right of any sovereign state to withdraw had been taken for 
 granted. 
 
 The United States will undertake under Article X to "respect 
 and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
 existing political independence of all members of the league." And 
 that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obliga- 
 tion. 
 
 There can be no reasonable objection to ... interpretations ac- 
 companying the act of ratification, providing they do not form a part 
 of the ratification itself. 
 
 In the famous reply of the Allies to President Wilson, 
 on January n, 1917, declaring the objects for which they 
 were engaged in the war, they stated the principles that 
 became basic in the terms of the Treaty of Peace. It was 
 a solemn declaration from which they never swerved, 
 whether battles were lost or won, until the final victory. To 
 those terms they held when President Wilson was urging a 
 "peace without victory" ; they did not change their purposes 
 when Russia withdrew from the war, nor yet when the 
 United States entered it; they put those identical prin- 
 ciples into the armistice, and embedded them in the Peace 
 Treaty. The result was a settlement which the organs of 
 the Administration afterward hailed as a product of wis- 
 dom and justice. 
 
 In speaking of the American colonies, Edmund Burke, 
 the great Englishman, declared: "I do not know the 
 method of drawing up an indictment against a whole peo- 
 ple." If he were living to-day he might learn from the 
 indictment which delivers the German nation to a moral 
 
318 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 judgment from which there will be no appeal now or here- 
 after. The measured sentences fall upon Germany's self- 
 slain repute like clods into an open grave. 
 
 And in this connection it may be observed that it is 
 with strange irony that the words of President Wilson, 
 "a peace of justice," frequently upon his lips, were used 
 invariably as a demand, not upon Germany, but on Ger- 
 many's adversaries; a phrase which he never employed 
 except as a means of questioning the motives and decrying 
 the policies of the nations battling against the common 
 enemy; the habitual form of his warning and protest against 
 "imperialism" and "vindictiveness" and "greed" which he 
 attributed to the Allies; strange that these words should 
 enter so vividly into the indictment against Germany, 
 namely : 
 
 Justice is what the German delegation asks for and says that 
 Germany has been promised. But it must be justice for all. There 
 must be justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have 
 been orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prus- 
 sian despotism. There must be justice for the peoples that now stag- 
 ger for those millions whose homes and lands and property German 
 savagery has spoliated and destroyed. 
 
 What, then, are the terms? Only a few may be here 
 suggested as pointing to the character of others. The terms 
 of the Treaty were plainly stated and none too severe for 
 the crimes committed against civilization. Germany was 
 to concede the reduction of her territory in Europe from 
 208,825 square miles to 172,000 square miles. Her popu- 
 lation was to shrink from sixty-six millions to fifty-four 
 millions through the liberation of peoples held in unwilling 
 subjection. She was to renounce three million square miles 
 of colonial possessions with their populations of thirteen 
 millions. Her army, which in peace time numbered two 
 million men, was not to exceed 200,000, and after March, 
 1920, was to be cut to 100,000. She was to dismantle all 
 
The Treaty of Paris 319 
 
 fortifications on Helgoland and within the zone of 30 
 miles of the Rhine. The fleet which she treacherously scut- 
 tled after its surrender was not to be replaced, nor would 
 she be permitted to possess military or naval aircraft. Ac- 
 cepting responsibility for the war, she was to assume the 
 obligation of repairing all damages inflicted, and pay there- 
 for to her uttermost capacity under the supervision of an 
 international reparation tribunal. She was to devote her 
 resources for a generation to the work of restitution to 
 the nations she had wronged. 
 
 The main points in the Peace Treaty are as follows : 
 
 Alsace and Lorraine go to France. 
 
 All the bridges over the Rhine, on their borders, are to be in 
 French control. 
 
 The port of Danzig is permanently internationalized and most 
 of upper Silesia is ceded to Poland, whose independence Germany 
 recognizes. Poland also receives the province of Posen and that por- 
 tion of the province of West Prussia west of Vistula. 
 
 The Saar coal basin is temporarily internationalized. The coal 
 mines go to France. 
 
 Germany recognizes the independence of German-Austria and 
 Czecho-Slovakia. 
 
 Germany's colonies are taken from her by clauses in which she 
 renounces all her territorial and political rights outside of Europe. 
 The League of Nations will work out the mandatory system for gov- 
 erning these colonies. 
 
 Belgium is conditionally given the Malmedy and Eupen districts 
 of Prussia bordering on Belgium, with the opportunity to be given 
 the inhabitants to protest. The League of Nations has the final 
 decision. 
 
 Luxembourg is set free from the German customs union. 
 
 All concessions and territory in China must be renounced. Shan- 
 tung is ceded to Japan. 
 
 Germany recognizes the French in Morocco and the British pro- 
 tectorate over Egypt. 
 
 German troops and authorities must evacuate Schleswig-Holstein 
 north of the Kiel canal within ten days after peace. A commission 
 
320 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 will be appointed to supervise a vote of self-determination in the ter- 
 ritory, and the districts wishing to join Denmark will be ceded by 
 Germany. 
 
 Helgoland must be demolished, and by German labor. The Kiel 
 canal must be opened to all nations. 
 
 The German cables in dispute are surrendered. 
 
 Germany may not have an army of more than 100,000 men and 
 cannot resort to conscription. 
 
 She must raze all her forts for fifty kilometers east of the Rhine 
 and is almost entirely prohibited from producing war material. Vio- 
 lation of the 5O-kilometer zone restriction will be considered an act 
 of war. 
 
 Only six capital ships of not more than 10,000 tons each are al- 
 lowed Germany for her navy. She is permitted six light cruisers, 
 twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats in addition to six battle- 
 ships, but no submarines. 
 
 All civilian damages are to be reimbursed by Germany, her initial 
 payment to be 20,000,000,000 marks, with subsequent payments to 
 be secured by bonds. She must replace shipping ton for ton, handing 
 over a great part of her economic resources to rebuilding the devas- 
 tated regions. 
 
 Parts of Germany will be occupied on a diminishing scale until 
 reparation is made. 
 
 Germany must agree to the trial of former Emperor William by 
 an international court for a supreme offense against international 
 morality and to the trial of others of her subjects for violations of 
 the laws and customs of war. 
 
 The Allies and Germany accept the League of Nations, Germany, 
 however, only in principle and not as a member. 
 
 All treaties and agreements with Bolshevik Russia must be abro- 
 gated, as well as the treaty of Bucharest with Rumania. 
 
 German prisoners of war are to be repatriated, but the Allies 
 will hold German officers as hostages for Germans accused of crimes. 
 
 After months of uncertainty and disunion, this most mo- 
 mentous and far-reaching compact ever drawn was signed 
 by the envoys of virtually all the civilized and stable gov- 
 ernments of the earth; and after nearly five years of 
 strife, unparalleled in extent and destructiveness, peace was 
 
The Treaty of Paris 321 
 
 re-established by the signing of the Treaty. As President 
 Wilson declared, there was framed for better or worse, 
 "the charter for a new order of affairs in the world." 
 
 To the superficial view the Treaty looked like a finality 
 the nations had counselled together and established peace, 
 and the world, it seemed, was freed from war or the im- 
 minent threat of it. Yet upon sober examination it was 
 perceived that this was the least conclusive document of 
 the kind in history. Instead of solving the world's dangers 
 and difficulties, the Treaty merely declares the manner in 
 which civilization would endeavor to solve them. It was 
 really not a settlement. It was merely a program for a 
 settlement, and the test of its value lay in the application of 
 its provisions. 
 
 And herein it quickly exhibited its weakness. By mid- 
 October, 1919, it had been ratified by Great Britain, France, 
 Italy, and Germany. Under its terms, this was sufficient to 
 make it effective upon exchange. There was no immediate 
 exchange of ratification, as it was hoped that the United 
 States would become a party by ratification. Exchange by 
 the ratifying nations took place January 10, 1920, and the 
 Treaty became fully operative among these nations. When 
 news dispatches from Paris, on January 5, 1920, told the 
 country that the United States ambassador to France had 
 requested the Supreme Council to precede future decisions 
 of that body with the formula, "Allied Powers," instead 
 of "Allied and Associated Powers," as formerly used, the 
 French newspaper Echo de Paris declared: "This marks 
 the determination of the United States not to participate 
 officially in the decisions to be reached in Paris." 
 
 And now came the danger from the weakness of this 
 momentous document. When the Allies, in the spring of 
 1920, and even before that, were unwilling to exert them- 
 selves as a unit to save the Treaty from violation and be- 
 coming a mere scrap of paper in the hands of Germany, 
 France stepped in, as she did in the beginning of the world 
 
322 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 conflagration, and declared that Germany must observe 
 the terms of the Treaty, at least so far as movement toward 
 the French border was concerned. And Belgium, as she did 
 at the beginning of the world conflagration, boldly stepped 
 to her side, and shoulder to shoulder they served emphatic 
 notice upon Germany that at least that portion of the Treaty 
 was in force. Then President Wilson interposed an objec- 
 tion, and declared France had militaristic aims. 2 While 
 the fact is, Germany was plainly and openly violating the 
 most essential parts of the Treaty as affecting France, in- 
 cluding the requirement to furnish coal to replace that 
 wantonly destroyed, and the reduction of her army. When 
 the statesmen of Europe came together at San Remo, in 
 April, 1920, to take up these matters which affected Europe 
 primarily and almost solely, the matters were quickly ad- 
 justed. France's complete reply to President Wilson was, 
 See that Germany disarms, and then we shall disarm. And 
 in this conference, on April 21, Lloyd George stated rather 
 pointedly that the League Covenant was inserted in the 
 Peace Treaty out of deference to President Wilson; and 
 now that President Wilson was to all intents and purposes 
 out of European politics, the time had come to clear the 
 decks of impracticabilities. 
 
 In his statement the President is perfectly clear and 
 says that the purpose of the League of Nations is to protect 
 the world against the French government, and not against 
 a revival of kaiserism or the overwhelming terror of Bol- 
 shevism. That is to say, to curb the imperialistic ambitions 
 of the French democracy which, for the protection of its 
 own existence and the freedom of the world had lost over 
 a million men killed 57 per cent of the country's manhood 
 between the ages of 19 and 34 years 300,000 more mem- 
 bers missing and never recovered; her wounded numbering 
 above 3,000,000, of whom 700,000 were rendered per- 
 
 3 The most cordial reception given Marshal Foch when he visited the 
 United States in October and November, 1921, went far toward wiping 
 out this unwarranted blot upon the page of Franco-American friendship. 
 
The Treaty of Paris 323 
 
 manently helpless. With France's 40,000,000 of a popula- 
 tion it meant what would be the equivalent of 3,000,000 
 of Americans killed with over 800,000 more missing and 
 never recovered, 9,500,000 wounded of whom 2,000,000 
 would be so maimed as to be permanently helpless. This 
 should be sufficient answer to Mr. Wilson's accusation 
 against France which he singles out particularly to compare 
 with Germany under kaiserism as an unbridled aggressor. 
 
 It was proclaimed, however, in a joint statement by the 
 three Allied powers on April 26 that they stood unequivo- 
 cally for full execution of the Treaty. President Wilson 
 was not present and the Europeans found themselves cap- 
 able of settling European matters without his hand. Their 
 statement said: 
 
 The Allies are unanimous in declaring that they cannot tolerate 
 a continuance of these infractions of the Treaty; that the Treaty 
 must be executed, and remain as the basis of relations between Ger- 
 many and the Allies ; and that they are resolved to take all measures 
 even, if necessary, the occupation of additional German territory, in 
 order to insure execution of the Treaty. Germany must understand 
 that the unity of the Allies for the execution of the treaty is as solid 
 as it was for war. 
 
 Germany, still seeking a way of escape from the penalty 
 for her crimes against civilization, did not promptly comply 
 with these requirements. And when, July 8, 1920, another 
 critical point was reached in the conference of the Allies 
 with the Germans at Spa, in Belgium, Germany was plainly 
 told that the time limit for accepting the Franco-British 
 terms of disarmament was set for noon of the following day, 
 and that the German army was to be reduced to 150,000 
 by October i. It was France that had caused the Treaty to 
 be executed, and that in the face of President Wilson's 
 unfounded accusations. 
 
 In this connection history must note the fact that from 
 the time President Wilson returned from Europe with the 
 Treaty, embodying the undertakings to which he sought to 
 
324 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 bind the country without authority from the people, the 
 Administration was making large plans for a United States 
 army that seemed beyond all proportion to any demands, 
 except for such obligations. While Secretary Baker saw 
 no need of preparation when actual war was confronting 
 the nation and thanked God for lack of it, now when the 
 war was ended and the world was exhausted he was plan- 
 ning for an army of 576,000. It set the country to asking 
 why. 
 
 While President Wilson had declared in his New York 
 address, upon his second departure to attend the Peace 
 Congress, that the League-of-Nations Covenant should be 
 so inextricably interwoven with the Treaty that it could 
 not be untangled without destroying the whole document, 
 Secretary Hughes deftly performed the feat and the sepa- 
 rate treaty which he prepared was accepted by Germany, 
 and October, 1921, it was ratified by the Senate. 
 
 u ln the multitude of counsellors there is safety"; but 
 one headstrong man's wisdom may be fatal. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 As a policy of the Administration, the League of Na- 
 tions was given a place overshadowing any other. Upon 
 its success President Wilson declared that his place in his- 
 tory must be based. By it his reputation must be made; 
 without it, it must fall. 
 
 Whether it gave any individual or any administration a 
 standing in history is of little consequence. Whether a 
 great policy such as that proposed would advantage the 
 nation or the world is a matter of supreme importance. If 
 it could but put into practice in the world the great prin- 
 ciple of social justice, it would be worth all the efforts and 
 all the heart-burnings the throes of its bringing forth re- 
 quired. 
 
 And President Wilson was consistent, persistent, in- 
 sistent upon this one thing, however much he wavered in 
 the other great affairs of state. He held that The League, 
 The Covenant, and not some other, must prevail. He held 
 that the American people had given him a mandate which 
 he must obey, and which he did obey, in bringing from the 
 Paris Peace Congress the instrument at first called the 
 Constitution of the League, which later became the Cove- 
 nant of The League of Nations. And sight must never be 
 lost of the fact that there is a distinction with a difference 
 between a league and The League. The former is the 
 policy of the nation and the world; the latter, that of Presi- 
 dent Wilson. 
 
 From history's earliest dawn there have been associa- 
 tions of nations. These, in the earliest days, were almost 
 wholly for defensive or offensive purposes in war. In mod- 
 
 325 
 
326 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ern times they have been placed upon a firmer basis, as 
 they have been upon a higher plane. The more advanced 
 thought in the United States provoked and built up the idea 
 of a league of the more progressive nations of the world 
 to enforce peace upon all the nations of earth. Much had 
 already been accomplished in the way of education along 
 that line when the coming of the Great War gave added 
 impetus. Individuals and societies in all sections of the 
 country were giving of their energy to forward the move- 
 ment. Former President William H. Taft was chosen 
 president of the national organization. Once the new idea 
 of the League of Nations, as announced by President Wil- 
 son, was brought forward, Mr. Taft became its enthusiastic 
 supporter; so enthusiastic, in fact, that it was thought his 
 enthusiasm ran away with his better judgment. On the 
 Pacific coast speaking in behalf of the Covenant he went 
 so far as to declare that those who did not support it he 
 would not trust over night. Later he materially modified 
 his attitude, when the dangers lurking in the instrument 
 were pointed out to him concretely. 
 
 Very early in the days of the European conflict, Theo- 
 dore Roosevelt said : 
 
 The one effective move for obtaining peace is by an agreement 
 among the great Powers, in which each should pledge itself not only 
 to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back its deci- 
 sions with force. The great civilized nations should combine by 
 solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteous- 
 ness. 1 
 
 And this idea grew with him with the years of the Euro- 
 pean tragedy. He felt that in the group of democracies 
 whose representatives met in Paris to settle the issues of 
 the Great War there was the foundation of the structure, 
 ready built and cemented by the common ideals of govern- 
 ment and of law; and that this structure should be strength- 
 ened by creating confidence in it. In his last dictated article, 
 
 1 Philadelphia North American, October 18, 1914. 
 
The League of Nations 327 
 
 but which he had not the opportunity to correct when death 
 intervened, he gave to the world his idea of a real league 
 of nations in the beginning days of the World Peace Con- 
 gress. 
 
 Would it not be well to begin with the league which we actually 
 have in existence, the league of the Allies who have fought through 
 this Great War? . . . The American people do not wish to go into 
 an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is 
 absolutely plain. 2 
 
 At the same time he criticized the nebulousness of President 
 Wilson's expressions, so far as they were permitted to 
 reach this country, stating that it was u a serious misfortune 
 that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is hap- 
 pening on the other side," touching a league of nations, 
 while u we all earnestly desire such a league, only we wish 
 to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of 
 world peace and justice." 
 
 It was not until President Wilson began to grip, as he 
 believed, some international relationships, that he was cap- 
 able of assuming so advanced a position as the great former 
 President. Before American entered the war, and only 
 four years before he was in his mortal combat with the 
 Senate, he voiced his conviction in these words: "Every 
 man who stands in this presence should examine himself 
 and see whether he has a full conception of what it means 
 that America should live her own life." And referring to 
 the nation's relations with the rest of the world he de- 
 clared : 
 
 We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way ; 
 and in our might and majesty and in the confidence and definiteness 
 of our own purpose we need not and we should not form alliances 
 with any nation in the world. 
 
 But during the Great War he came to believe, according 
 to his public statements, that internationalism was greater 
 
 "Kansas City Star, January 13, 1919. 
 
328 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 than nationalism; that the Covenant, as he brought it 
 back from Europe, was greater than the American govern- 
 ment. It was by degrees that he reached this stage, and 
 only after association with European statesmen, as witness 
 his various statements; for in his original position his utter- 
 ances were merely in the negative form. 
 
 In his address to the League to Enforce Peace, on May 
 27, 1916, he declared that "the United States is willing 
 to become a partner in any feasible association of nations 
 ... to maintain inviolate the security of the highways 
 of the sea for the common and unhindered use of all the 
 nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either 
 contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full 
 submission of the cause to the opinion of the world." 
 
 Accepting, September 2, 1916, renomination for the 
 presidency, he declared that "the nations of the world must 
 unite in joint guarantee that whatever is done to disturb the 
 whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the 
 whole world's opinion before it is attempted." 
 
 On January 22, 1917, in an address to the Senate he 
 stated that "the peace must be followed by some definite 
 concert of power which will make it virtually impossible 
 that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again." 
 
 In his address to Congress asking a declaration of war, 
 on April 2, 1917, he declared that "our object is to set 
 up among the self-governed peoples of the world such a 
 concert of purpose and of action as will insure the observ- 
 ance of its principles." 
 
 To the Russian Provisional Government he stated in 
 his message of May 26, 1917: "The free peoples of the 
 world must draw together in some common covenant . . . 
 the brotherhood of mankind must be given a structure of 
 force and reality." 
 
 Stating his Fourteen Points in the address to Congress 
 on January 8, 1918, he announced as the last: 
 
The League of Nations 329 
 
 A general association of nations must be formed under specific 
 covenants having the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of po- 
 litical independence and territorial integrity to great and small na- 
 tions alike. 
 
 In his address to the Mexican editors at the White 
 House on June 7, 1918, he said: "The whole family of 
 nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation 
 shall violate its political independence or its territorial in- 
 tegrity." 
 
 While touring Europe, in response to the address of the 
 French socialists on December 14, 1918, he declared it to 
 be necessary that security against absolutism and militarism 
 "should be supported by a co-operation of the nations which 
 shall be based upon fixed and definite covenants and which 
 shall be made certain of effective action through the instru- 
 mentality of a league of nations." And while in Europe 
 he gave his definition of the league thus: 
 
 My conception of the league of nations is just this that it shall 
 operate as the organized moral force of man throughout the world, 
 and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or 
 contemplated this searching light of conscience will be turned upon 
 them and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you 
 hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world ?" 
 
 A keen analyst in collating these views of President 
 Wilson, declaring that his ideas as given out after reach- 
 ing Europe were more nebulous than before, commented: 
 "If an enduring league of nations is to be created, the 
 structure must be erected by statesmen who are builders. 
 It will never rise at the waving of an oratorical wand and 
 the utterance of vague formulas of aspirations." 3 It was 
 an uncontradicted fact that up to the end of 1918 the man 
 who had made the idea his own and then undertook to 
 establish it as an accomplished reality, was still promoting 
 
 "Philadelphia North American for December 30, 1918. 
 
33 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 abstract theory and unformulated plan. After urging it 
 for two and a half years, when called upon to present a 
 definite program he was able only to outline vague aspira- 
 tions. It was this that led Senator Knox to state: "I am 
 entirely ignorant of what the President means by a league 
 of nations" ; and a Democratic Senator to say that what he 
 could gather from the President's idea was a world federa- 
 tion to which a large part of the sovereignty of the United 
 States would be surrendered; while a third gave it as his 
 idea that Mr. Wilson sought to have Great Britain and the 
 United States give law to the nations; and yet others took 
 the view that he aimed at nothing but a general entente of 
 governments, based upon precepts of morality and justice. 
 
 It was in this frame of mind that President Wilson 
 began sitting with the world's statesmen at Paris to settle 
 peace upon the world. How he delayed the business that 
 was of first importance has been related elsewhere. 4 The 
 cables having been taken over, the public was kept in the 
 dark as to what was taking place by way of binding the 
 nation in a league. Nor was the nation aware that an 
 American plan for a league of nations was proposed, until 
 the fact was disclosed upon close questioning of the Presi- 
 dent by senators at a White House conference with the 
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee after the Treaty was 
 concluded. Even then the President did not permit this 
 plan to come to the light. The form adopted was drawn 
 by the British General Smuts and patterned upon the form 
 of government of the British Empire. 
 
 Just before President Wilson returned to the United 
 States in February, for the closing days of Congress, he 
 read to the peace conference the League-of-Nations Con- 
 stitution. This he permitted to reach this side of the 
 Atlantic. So violent and sweeping was the criticism of the 
 program that flared up in the Senate that some eager edi- 
 tors were asking whether, after all, the entire project was 
 
 4 See chapter on The Peace Congress. 
 
The League of Nations 331 
 
 to be wrecked by the nation that had been regarded as its 
 special sponsor. President Wilson had sent in advance of 
 his coming a message requesting that there be no discussion 
 of the League until he could present it to the people. This 
 request was wholly disregarded on all sides. The most 
 violent discussion ensued. Some of the staunchest of rock- 
 ribbed Democrats, as the veteran Henry Watterson of Ken- 
 tucky, took decisive stand against the constitution; while 
 some of the most prominent men of the opposite party, as 
 former President Taf t, took a firm stand for the instrument. 
 Promptly thirty-nine senators signed a statement that they 
 would not vote for ratification of the Treaty with this Con- 
 stitution as a part thereof. This doomed it to defeat. 
 President Lowell of Harvard University, favoring the Con- 
 stitution as a whole, thought it faulty in construction, some- 
 what loosely drawn, and requiring some amendments. 
 Senator Lodge, declaring in favor of the principle of a 
 league of nations to insure the peace of the world, strongly 
 opposed the form in which presented, one of about forty 
 plans suggested. It was felt that the one which President 
 Wilson accepted and brought to America had not safe- 
 guarded vital interests of the United States, but he an- 
 nounced that "there is good and sufficient reason for the 
 phraseology and substance of each article." And when he 
 failed to justify or even intelligently explain the new doc- 
 trine, there was immediate and fierce attack from all 
 quarters, and the country was being stirred as it had not 
 been since war days. 
 
 At noon of March 4 the new Senate began its existence. 
 When President Wilson, on the evening of that day, as he 
 was taking his departure a second time for the Paris Peace 
 Congress, appeared for a public address in New York, he 
 and former President Taft went upon the platform arm in 
 arm. The public interest was at high pitch. Of the 100,- 
 ooo applications for admission to the place of meeting, the 
 Metropolitan Opera House, all had to be denied except the 
 
33 2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 3,400 for whom there were seats and an additional 500 
 whom the law permitted to stand. Mr. Taft spoke first. 
 The President followed. He knew of the statement signed 
 by the 39 senators, namely: 
 
 Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate of the United States 
 in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to 
 treaties, that it is the sense of the Senate that, while it is the sincere 
 desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace 
 and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations 
 in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be ac- 
 cepted by the United States. 
 
 It cut him to the quick. He looked upon it as an attack 
 upon him and as an intrusion of the Senate upon executive 
 privilege of making such treaties as seemed best to him 
 without suggestion from that body. Braced by the inspira- 
 tion of what he accepted as popular approval, he lashed the 
 legislative body in a tone of jeering defiance, declaring that 
 Senators displayed "comprehensive ignorance of the state 
 of the world" and that he would hang them as high as 
 Haman, but hang them the other way, and that he "loathed 
 their pigmy minds." It was felt through the nation that 
 such intemperate language was beneath the dignity of the 
 high office occupied by Mr. Wilson; it was felt so all the 
 more since the nation was looking to him to make clear the 
 purposes and undertakings to which he was seeking to bind 
 the Republic; and when they asked for bread he gave them 
 a stone. For on that historic occasion he declared: 
 
 When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find 
 the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads tied to the Cove- 
 nant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without 
 destroying the whole vital structure. 
 
 And partisans of the President assailed the protesting sen- 
 ators as enemies of peace, pro-German marplots, and pet- 
 tifogging obstructionists. 
 
 Yet at the very time that these accusations were being 
 
The League of Nations 333 
 
 made, the Senate statement was opening the eyes of states- 
 men of other nations, and causing a change in the attitude 
 of the French press and of the European delegates to the 
 Peace Congress at Paris. And when President Wilson 
 reached Paris he was obliged to face the fact that the Peace 
 Congress had arranged, in his absence, a peace based on 
 practical considerations, with the League separate. He 
 thereupon halted the proceedings until the Covenant was 
 intertwined as a component part of the Treaty. It is a 
 fine part of the irony of the situation that it was Switzer- 
 land, and not Mr. Wilson or his associates, that urged an 
 amendment to the Covenant confirming the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, so far as that appears in the Covenant. So eager did 
 Mr. Wilson become to secure approval of his position 
 touching the Covenant that other nations, seeing his atti- 
 tude, took advantage of it to gain their own points. Ruth- 
 less he had been in the use of his great prestige in the Peace 
 Congress, ruthless became others in return. He was com- 
 pelled to engage in trading to gain his point. The Japanese 
 were keen students of his methods, and they drove a ruth- 
 less bargain, even with more poignancy than he. On April 
 2, Baron Makino, head of the Japanese delegation, de- 
 clared: "We are not too proud to fight, but we are too 
 proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing 
 with associate nations." As a result of their ruthlessness, 
 the Japanese acquired possession of a province inhabited 
 by 36,000,000 Chinese. And immediately President Wilson 
 returned to America, he was put on the defensive in this 
 deal of Japan, and which an American delegate, Secretary 
 of State Lansing, declared was not necessary to obtain 
 Japan's approval of the League Covenant. 
 
 President Wilson appeared conscienceless in his bold 
 statements to the assembled statesmen of the world that he 
 had from the American people a mandate to form a League 
 of Nations. If there was any mandate given it was in the 
 adverse verdict of the 1918 election, and its fair interpreta- 
 
334 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 tion would seem to indicate a command that he remain at his 
 constitutional post of duty in Washington rather than taking 
 up an unauthorized post in Paris. He had sought to blind- 
 fold European statesmen by taking over control of all the 
 ways of communication between the United States and Paris 
 under the subterfuge that it was a war necessity, and suc- 
 ceeded until the ways of communication were again open 
 and free to the world. It was on April 28, 1919, in refer- 
 ring to the League Covenant, that he made to the Peace 
 Congress this astounding declaration: 
 
 If we return to the United States without having made every 
 effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet 
 the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. They expect their leaders 
 to speak their thoughts. . . . We have no choice but to obey their 
 mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that 
 we accept that mandate. . . . We would not dare abate a single item 
 of the program which constitutes our instructions. 
 
 There was never a more audacious pretense than that the 
 people had given President Wilson a mandate or instruc- 
 tions to deliver the country unreservedly to international- 
 ism. Like so many of the war powers, it was taken upon 
 purely gratuitous assumption. But its chief evil lay in the 
 fact that it misled European statesmen, who did not feel 
 at liberty to set lightly aside the statements of the only 
 head of a nation in the Congress, even if they knew his 
 statements to be without foundation in fact. Yet, when 
 these same statesmen did permit themselves to be led 
 astray after the warning resolution signed by the thirty- 
 nine senators, they should not have accused the American 
 people, as some did, of dishonor. If they did not know the 
 Constitution of the United States, they should have known 
 it required action by the Senate in treaty making. 
 
 After the President's return to Europe in March, the 
 Constitution of the League of Nations became the Cove- 
 nant. In this country its supporters were termed Cove- 
 
The League of Nations 335 
 
 nanters. And while the instrument was given to the public 
 in all the leading capitals of Europe, it was denied the 
 American public. Even the Senate, which must pass upon 
 it officially, the President declined to furnish a copy, and 
 it was first given that body outside of official channels. 
 
 But on July 10, 1919, President Wilson appeared in 
 person before the Senate and read the text of the Treaty, 
 which contained the Covenant. Now the fight waxed more 
 fierce than before. Mr. Wilson appeared to use more 
 suave methods, evidently to gain senators to his side of the 
 controversy and to win the people. But both distrusted 
 him. Both sought enlightenment and found it not. The 
 first opportunity that offered, in his Boston speech when he 
 landed in his own country in February with the League 
 Constitution, he ignored. In his later efforts he was but 
 confusing. In his White House conference with the Senate, 
 his logic fared badly under questioning of the senators. 
 
 Meanwhile every means known to the propagandist was 
 being used to forestall a correct judgment on the part of 
 the public. 5 Mr. Taft's statements in support of the Cove- 
 nant were given more space than he could command while 
 President, except on special occasions. In August, 1919, 
 the joint committee on printing of the Senate and House 
 discovered that propaganda favoring the League Cove- 
 nant was printed and distributed at government expense. 6 
 In a speech in Boston, July 8, 1919, Senator Hiram W. 
 
 5 It was announced from Washington that arrangements had been com- 
 pleted whereby the Mount Clemens, Michigan, news bureau, the press 
 agency supported by Henry Ford for publicity in his libel suit against the 
 Chicago Tribune, would report President Wilson's tour across the country 
 in behalf of the League of Nations free of charge, for it had its own cor- 
 respondent on the President's train. An announcement sent to editors 
 throughout the country stated that it would supply the President's speeches 
 "in plate form of two or three columns free of charge, transportation pre- 
 paid, to such papers as desired them." The estimated cost of this service 
 was $500,000. The circular offering this free service did not state who 
 would pay the bills. 
 
 "Among the publications named were National School Service, with a 
 half-million circulation; School Life, with 40,000, a semi-monthly; the Great 
 Lakes Bulletin, daily, put out by the Naval Training Station at Great Lakes, 
 Illinois; and the Life Buoy, at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. 
 
336 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Johnson charged that the propaganda covering the whole 
 country was devoted, not to the dissemination of truth but 
 to deceiving the people, paid for by millions of dollars 
 wrung by taxation from an over-burdened people, and con- 
 cluded: "We have been picking our pockets to poison 
 our minds." 
 
 To combat the powerful influence of the Administration 
 with the people's money supporting it, there was organized 
 the League for the Preservation of American Independence, 
 in which prominent men of the country, regardless of politi- 
 cal affiliation, became active with a view to setting the es- 
 sential facts about the League-of-Nations Covenant before 
 the people in their true light. 
 
 And the people began gripping the situation. At first 
 apathetic, the several steps, whether of planned deception 
 or of purposed enlightenment, by which the people reached 
 the height stand out clear. And each step gained was but 
 gathering force to hurry the great mass of the people on 
 to the next. In it all, it is a remarkable fact that many 
 ministers, churches, and teachers were misled by the Presi- 
 dent's sophistry. But the momentum became so great as 
 to carry all before it. The first step was the President's 
 declaration that he would be bound by the decision of the 
 people at the polls in the 1918 election, and then deliber- 
 ately ignoring his pledge not only, but in violation of his 
 own pronouncement of "open covenants openly arrived at," 
 cutting off all communication with his own nation, sitting 
 in secret conclave to bind his nation to dangerous under- 
 takings. This was followed by his casting aside the first 
 opportunity offered him, in his Boston speech, to explain 
 to his countrymen to what he was pledging the nation. He 
 not only had thus ignored the people, but still more offen- 
 sively ignored the request of the Senate for information that 
 would enable it to pass intelligently upon the great instru- 
 ment as required by the Constitution. The next step of 
 
The League of Nations 337 
 
 enlightenment to the nation was his calling individual sen- 
 ators to the White House, one at a time, to talk over in- 
 formally the Covenant, and the views they gave out after 
 they had interviewed the President. But greatly more 
 enlightening was the White House conference 7 with the 
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he undertook to 
 state his views of the document; for he had been telling 
 the whole country, in season and out, that he could make 
 clear every point so that no one need hesitate in its sup- 
 port. Until then, many senators withheld judgment; so 
 did many people. Though he had repeatedly deceived them, 
 and they knew it, they willingly heard him yet again. But 
 they were thinking. He had not convinced the Senate. 
 He would now awaken the people to force the Senate to 
 action. When he submitted the Covenant to the Senate on 
 July 10, he asked prompt action. When the Senate asked 
 of him documents to aid in its consideration of the instru- 
 ment, he failed to furnish any. They called witnesses that 
 seemed to possess knowledge, among them Secretary of 
 State Lansing whose position antagonized the President. 
 Much time was lost in seeking information at the best 
 sources. 
 
 The next and final step on the part of the President was 
 to go before the country. He undertook a tour from the 
 
 T At the President's suggestion, this conference was arranged and it was 
 held in August, 1919. Asked as to Article X, of which he is said to be the 
 framer, whether it did not bind the United States to undertakings inconsist- 
 ent with the nation's fundamental law, he saidlit was not legally binding, 
 but that it had a moral obligation that was more binding than would be a 
 legal. He informed the committee that aside from the* Treaty itself there 
 is no record of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Congress. He said: 
 "Each day the matters discussed were summarized and the conclusions 
 reached were recorded as a process verbal" ; which means that these records 
 will be kept secret and that the only copies are held by members of the 
 Council. He further stated it as his "confident impression from the debates 
 that accompanied the formulation of the Covenant" that the unconditional 
 right of withdrawal from the League remained in the" United States, 
 adding: "That is my interpretation" and "I am confident that that was 
 the view." Yet he opposed putting that plainly in writing into the solemn 
 instrument, willing to hinge America's most vital interests upon his "inter- 
 pretation*' and a "view." 
 
338 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Atlantic to the Pacific and back again, speaking at the more 
 important centers. In the earlier of these addresses, he 
 again stepped a few paces beneath the dignity of his high 
 office when, in referring to the Senate, he termed those 
 opposing the Covenant as "contemptible quitters," and ad- 
 vised them to "put up or shut up." Throngs met him 
 everywhere. The people were eager to know what he had 
 to say of this new thing. His answers but confused the 
 people seeking information. In his Des Moines address 
 he declared: "I have come out to fight for a cause. That 
 cause is greater than the Senate. It is greater than the 
 government. It is as great as thecause of mankind." The 
 sophistry of this did not deceive the people. It stirred them 
 to a deeper study of the great issue between the President 
 and the Senate. Many condemned the Senate. Many good 
 people took issue with the Senate. Many church bodies 
 passed resolutions supporting the President and condemning 
 the Senate. 8 This, however, did not affect the thoughtful 
 leaders of the churches. It was the Senate that, in that 
 crucial hour, saved the fundamental law of the land, and 
 real leaders acknowledged the fact. In his commencement 
 address on June 8, 1919, Chancellor James R. Day, of 
 Syracuse University, condemned the Covenant as an in- 
 famous bargain, declaring: 
 
 The fear that should seize the heart of every red-blooded citizen of 
 this country to-day is that the position of the Constitution of the 
 United States is threatened in settlement of world controversies at 
 Paris. I would reject and overthrow everything before I would re- 
 ject the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 And referring to the safeguard of the vital instrument, 
 he said: 
 
 8 It became almost a fad for some one in such a body seeking a little 
 local notoriety to offer a resolution to that effect; and then to call for 
 a vote. As no one knew much about it, the vote was almost invariably 
 nearly unanimous for the resolution. These were published in the news- 
 papers and it operated as strong propaganda for the cause. 
 
The League of Nations 339 
 
 If there is any body of men of whom the American people should 
 be proud to-day it is their senators, standing firmly for the defense 
 of the sacred institutions of our country. Thank God that there is a 
 remnant of statesmanship left standing between America and the 
 imperial quagmires of internationalism. 
 
 This position was but typical of independent thinkers. 
 The bodies of men and women who voted for a resolution 
 because some one presented it, and for no better reason, 
 were not typical of the best traditions of the country. 
 
 And as President Wilson proceeded on his trip across 
 the continent, he constantly lost ground, while men of the 
 type of Chancellor Day who gave reasons for their faith 
 instead of sophistry for confusion of the inquiring mind 
 were winning. When, as he did at Des Moines, the Presi- 
 dent declared that u to alter that Treaty is to impair one 
 of the first charters of mankind," he was giving utterance 
 to statements, blasphemous to Americanism, that turned 
 Senate and people, without regard to party, against him 
 and his views. It was on September 14, while on his tour 
 of the country, that the week of celebration of the adoption 
 of the Constitution began, emphasizing the value of consti- 
 tutional government. One might have expected the Presi- 
 dent to pause long enough to give some expression upon 
 the importance of such government as opposed to oligarchic, 
 autocratic, or mob government, and of the value which the 
 Constitution and the government founded upon it had been 
 to mankind. But he did not do that; instead, he was urging 
 his countrymen to force their Senate to approve a Covenant 
 which was a theory with him, but which he expounded to 
 them as greater than the government. 
 
 The further he proceeded in his discussion, the more 
 the people obtained an insight into the weakness of his 
 position and the unworthiness of his demands. They raised 
 questions as to the instrument which he brought back with 
 him from Paris. He demanded that the nation make the 
 supreme sacrifice "without counting the cost." At Salt 
 
34 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Lake City he was questioned outright, as he had been in 
 less obvious form previously. He was hurt by these ques- 
 tionings. He had not convinced the people, except that 
 he was wrong. He had spent himself. Taken ill from 
 the great strain and disappointment, he was hurried back 
 to Washington, while the whole nation, forgetting for 
 the time his ill-conceived mission, eagerly read about and 
 discussed his critical condition. It is doubtful whether, in 
 all American history, there was a campaign of equal magni- 
 tude that was so sterile of result except as it stirred the na- 
 tion to its danger. 
 
 He was immediately followed by Senator Hiram W. 
 Johnson who stirred the people everywhere he went, as 
 far as the Twin City, when he returned to Washington. 
 This was the first revealment of how deeply the people 
 were interested in this rather abstruse and obscure subject. 
 At Kansas City delegations came to hear Senator Johnson 
 from four states, including Oklahoma and Texas. 
 
 The great issue, as raised by President Wilson, was be- 
 tween him and the Senate. As stated by an eminent publi- 
 cist, his attitude was that "at no lime shall the Senate be 
 permitted freely to perform its constitutional duty, which 
 is equivalent to saying that one man can absolutely deter- 
 mine the future destiny of the United States." 9 The Sen- 
 ate perforce accepted the challenge. The people became 
 referee. He sought to make it appear that the Senate was 
 against a league of nations, as he confused the people at 
 first when he declared that eighty per cent of the people 
 were in favor of a league of nations. He could as truth- 
 fully have said ninety per cent; for very few are not in 
 favor of a league. But to favor some league was one thing; 
 to favor the Covenant which he submitted to the Senate was 
 quite another matter. Therefore, the Senate wanted to 
 change the Covenant so as to meet America's demands. He 
 refused to permit any changes in the instrument itself, 
 
 "David Jayne Hill in North American Review for November, 1919. 
 
The League of Nations 341 
 
 but was willing that clarifying statements might be made 
 by the Senate outside of the Covenant. This would have 
 been of no value, except to confuse, since it would be no 
 part of the instrument. The conclusions reached by the 
 Senate committee majority presented the issue that came 
 before the country in acute form. It said: 
 
 The League as it stands demands sacrifices of American inde- 
 pendence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's 
 peace, but which are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future 
 safety and well-being of the United States. We exact nothing for 
 ourselves, but we insist that we shall be the judges, and the only 
 judges, as to the preservation of our rights, our sovereignty, our 
 safety, and our independence. 
 
 President Wilson declared that to change Article X of 
 the Covenant would u cut the heart out of the League." 
 This noted Article is this : 
 
 The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve 
 as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
 political independence of all members of the League. 
 
 In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger 
 of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which 
 this obligation shall be fulfilled. 
 
 The crucial test in the Senate's consideration of the 
 Treaty came on November 13, 19 19, when, by a vote of 
 46 to 33, it adopted a reservation to this Article. 10 And 
 though the President in his Cheyenne address had declared 
 that a reservation substantially this he would regard as 
 a rejection, it made no difference in the vote. 11 
 
 "This celebrated reservation is in these words: "The United States 
 assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political in- 
 dependence of any other country or to interfere with controversies between 
 nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Ar- 
 ticle X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States 
 under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in a particular case 
 the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare 
 war or authorize the employment of the military forces of the United 
 States, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide." 
 
 "Mr. Wilson entertained the delusion that a reservation could be 
 adopted only by a two-thirds vote, instead of by a majority vote. 
 
34 2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Around this issue waged one of the most hardly con- 
 tested struggles in all American history. It reached be- 
 yond the seas and involved statesmen of other great na- 
 tions. Because of this Covenant being made a component 
 part of the Treaty, it was rejected by the Senate on No- 
 vember 19, 1919, seven Democrats joining the majority 
 party in rejecting ratification of the unchanged Treaty. 
 Four Democrats voted with the Republicans to ratify with 
 the reservations that had been voted by a decisive majority 
 of the Senate. 
 
 Efforts at compromise were then made by such ardent 
 advocates of the Covenant as former President Taft. But 
 President Wilson was obdurate. The official statement of 
 his position was that u he has no concession or compromise 
 of any kind in mind." Prominent men of both political 
 parties, leaders in the League to Enforce Peace, sought 
 a compromise, all to no effect. Indeed, it was a fact no- 
 where disputed that ratification would have taken place 
 on November 19, had not the President intervened with 
 a letter to his partisans in the Senate to vote down the 
 resolution of ratification with reservations an attempt to 
 override the will of that body and to paralyze its constitu- 
 tional powers. 
 
 After this action there was a variety of statements as 
 to the President's position. This discussion he ended on 
 January 8, at the Jackson Day banquet in Washington, 
 by a formal statement that rather than permit any modi- 
 fication of the Covenant he would carry it into the presi- 
 dential campaign by a "great and solemn referendum." 
 On the same occasion William J. Bryan took issue with 
 the President, declaring that it was the Senate's right to 
 adopt reservations as it saw fit. Thus came the cleavage 
 that ran through the fall campaign to the undoing of execu- 
 tive arrogancy. 
 
 Immediately following the President's Jackson Day 
 statement, more than a score of Democratic senators framed 
 
The League of Nations 343 
 
 a plan for a bi-partisan conference with Republicans and 
 began a series of daily meetings on January 15 for thresh- 
 ing out their differences. Mr. Wilson still intervening, 
 stated as late as January 26 that the Lodge reservations 
 would "chill our relationship" with the associated European 
 powers. Unfortunately for this utterance of the President, 
 Viscount Edward Grey, special ambassador from Great 
 Britain to the United States, but whom President Wilson 
 declined to see, made public in England the result of his 
 observations on the situation in the United States. Febru- 
 ary i, 1920, he stated that Great Britain should not except 
 to the position of the United States in making reservations 
 to the Covenant. It at once put the President on the de- 
 fensive. It placed him and his supporters, as their oppo- 
 nents put it, in the position of being even more British than 
 the Britons, since Viscount Grey declared that there could 
 be no objection even to an increase of the vote of the United 
 States to more than one, should it so desire. Remarkable 
 as was the fact that a statement of a foreign ambassador 
 affecting American politics was made and published broad- 
 cast without resentment, it was yet more remarkable that 
 it was warmly received by Americans. This was due in 
 great measure to its timeliness, speaking as he did, not 
 only for Great Britain, but for the other Allied nations 
 who had done everything short of official proclamation to 
 indicate their willingness to have the United States make 
 such reservations as it deemed proper. 
 
 President Wilson had told the Senate that failure to 
 ratify the Treaty with the Covenant would "break the heart 
 of the world." Yet he prevented ratification on terms satis- 
 factory to the Senate, to the people, and to the nations of 
 Europe. He gave the impression not only to the American 
 public but to the European nations as well, that he was 
 willing that the heart of the world should break unless 
 all would submit to his one arbitrary will. 
 
 On the final vote by the Senate on ratification, March 
 
344 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 19, 1920, of the 49 voting in the affirmative 28 were Re- 
 publicans and 21 Democrats a gain of 14 of the Presi- 
 dent's party to his opponents since the vote on November 
 19, 1919. Just before this vote was taken, Senator Owen, 
 of the President's party, and one of his staunch supporters, 
 stated it as his belief that there was not a Democratic sen- 
 ator who would not vote for ratification if each did not 
 believe that the President wanted him to vote its defeat. 
 As a matter of history, every Democratic senator but six 
 voted for pne or more of the reservations under the leader- 
 ship of Senator Lodge. It was not a matter of partisanship 
 with them; it was a matter of Americanism. But partisan 
 newspapers attempted to accuse the leaders against the 
 dangerous Covenant of seeking partisan advantage; and 
 many good people were misled by the baselessness of the 
 charge. 12 
 
 From its lofty inception until eliminated by the final 
 vote of March 19, 1920, the League of Nations constantly 
 lost ground. The reasons assigned were many. Perhaps 
 the most potent was the method by which President Wilson 
 undertook to force the Covenant upon the people in the 
 first place without consideration or discussion; and, when 
 discussion became inevitable, by misleading the people by 
 false and illogical premises to believe the thing was right 
 but which the general discussion disclosed as all wrong from 
 the American point of view and in conflict with the United 
 States Constitution. And it looked as if, when the "great 
 and solemn referendum" was held on November 2, 1920, 
 there was nothing more to be said; that the avalanche of 
 ballots buried it beyond all possibility of resurrection. It 
 will probably be discovered, however, that there is a place 
 for an association of nations such as the American people 
 
 "A fair example is an article by Samuel Plantz, president of Lawrence 
 College, in the Northwestern Christian Advocate, Chicago, December 17, 
 1919. Such men failed to perceive that it was President Wilson, and not 
 the Senate, who was seeking to pull the wool over the eyes of the people. 
 The Senate was living up to the best traditions of that notable body, as 
 Chancellor Day recognized. 
 
The League of Nations 345 
 
 desire. But there is an end of the Covenant such as Presi- 
 dent Wilson brought from Paris and submitted to the 
 United States Senate on July 10, 1919. It was Wilsonism, 
 and not a league of nations, that brought disaster to the 
 President's political party a disaster which he himself in- 
 vited and in the face of warnings from those of his own 
 political faith who had at heart the best interests of the 
 nation and of the world. 
 
 The United States Constitution is the fundamental law 
 of the land, and is greater than internationalism; and he 
 who declares the latter the greater is of an unsafe type of 
 American. 
 
 The action of President Wilson's successor in July, 
 1921, calling a conference of the great powers to consider 
 disarmament seems a more direct and more efficient method 
 of helping the world to the path of peace than setting up a 
 kind of world government to which the fundamental law 
 of the land must be subordinated. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS 
 
 From its beginning, the American nation has success- 
 fully maintained popular government. This it has accom- 
 plished through definite, well-organized political parties, by 
 means of which all classes of people have been free to ex- 
 press their convictions upon any great public matter. This 
 is the antithesis of class domination as found, for example, 
 in Russia under the czar and in more pronounced form in 
 the present regime, where class rule is supreme, as it was 
 in Prussia prior to the Great War. 
 
 Two positions of President Wilson assumed during the 
 two terms he served, while seeming fatally inconsistent with 
 this view are really in accord. A partisan of the more nar- 
 row type, he has been regarded as a liberal. As a liberal, 
 however, he has not been found generous toward the most 
 thorough Americanism. In the liberal has been found the 
 man of great position favorable to a class that would 
 strengthen his position as an individual. If this liberalism 
 tended toward internationalism instead of nationalism, that 
 was no concern of his. The chief aim was greater power 
 within the grasp of the President. If that could be at- 
 tained through a strictly political organization, then that 
 was the channel of operation. If working through a class 
 seemed the more feasible, then that was the chosen channel. 
 A careful study of the acts of President Wilson's Adminis- 
 tration beneath the surface and out of view of the public, 
 where he chiefly worked, discloses that every act of the 
 first importance faithfully kept this one aim in view, sweep- 
 ing from the great circumference straight and rigidly to the 
 center, as the spokes of a great wheel from its rim to the 
 
 346 
 
The Administration and Politics 347 
 
 hub. Never was this purpose lost from sight. And any 
 study of the Administration's politics based upon any other 
 theory will be fatally defective. 
 
 Examples of this mode of operation are numerous and 
 glaring. One will well illustrate this view. Others will 
 be found in this chapter. When the President yielded to 
 the demands of the railway trainmen just prior to the presi- 
 dential election in 1916, he bowed to an imperious class 
 demand. It is probably the most considerable bribe ever 
 offered and paid for the presidency, though put into a form 
 that, on the surface, partook of the nature of an act of 
 virtue. Mr. Wilson was willing to operate through a 
 political party so long as that accomplished his purpose; 
 through any organized class, when that offered him more. 
 
 It accords well with his theory enunciated during the 
 years in his study prior to entering upon the presidency, 
 when seeking to express something of his philosophy of 
 American government. He declared that the chief execu- 
 tive engaged much in politics. And when placed on the 
 higher level, this is laudable; when dragged in the mire 
 for any purpose, and chiefly when for personal ambition, it 
 is most reprehensible to America's best thought. The 
 slogan of Jackson's administration that u to the victor be- 
 longs the spoils," was excepted to, even in that day. In 
 a measure, it was the practice in the Civil War period and 
 immediately after, when the spoils system again gained the 
 ascendency. But all this occurred when there was no civil- 
 service merit system in existence. Moreover, it was thought 
 that the nation had advanced somewhat in its view of pub- 
 lic office as a public trust between that day and President 
 Wilson's incumbency. 
 
 Indeed, prior to his occupying the office of chief execu- 
 tive of the nation, Woodrow Wilson had declared himself 
 repeatedly, and was looked to by civil-service reformers as, 
 a friend and champion of the civil-service merit system. 
 And when he became chief executive of the nation, it was 
 
348 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 stated broadly in the land that civil-service rules would be 
 strictly adhered to and the scope of the merit system en- 
 larged. It was announced with large publicity that the 
 post-offices throughout the country would be served by men 
 who had earned their position by their capacity for that 
 kind of service to the public. 
 
 Yet the Administration had scarcely ended these an- 
 nouncements to the public when it began its system of fla- 
 grant disregard of merit in the postal service. It was the 
 method that obtained throughout the two terms of the Ad- 
 ministration of announcing in advance its virtuous purposes 
 and then working to accomplish its concealed designs. An 
 early notable example was the displacing of Mr. Morgan, 
 the capable postmaster of New York City, who had worked 
 his way through the grades to the highest position of the 
 kind in the country, than whom there was no abler or more 
 dependable man for good service, to make way for a man 
 Tammany wanted, the chief organization of corruption in 
 New York politics. This was in contrast with the method 
 of Mr. Cleveland when he came to the presidency. He 
 was large enough a President to continue in that office a 
 capable official whom he found there. But it soon came to 
 be understood that Mr. Burleson was appointed to the office 
 of Postmaster-General for the purpose of building up a 
 strong partisan political system throughout the country. 
 It was discovered that he was using an appointee, covered 
 into the civil service by presidential order, to write political 
 letters to ascertain how a senatorial campaign was progres- 
 sing in Nevada, through the postmasters of that state. 
 The next day after this activity was divulged to the public, 
 an activity in violation of law and of the civil-service rules, 
 Mr. Burleson, evidently to divert public attention from his 
 own impropriety, issued this statement to the public: "I 
 sincerely regret that certain Republican leaders have thrust 
 partisanship into the congressional contest, which, under 
 our constitution, was unavoidable at this critical period 
 
The Administration and Politics 349 
 
 of the World's War," and referred in a sneering manner to 
 the suggestion of Will Hays, national chairman of the op- 
 position political party, that "We are not Republicans or 
 Democrats; we are Americans" and there should be a united 
 effort to elect members of Congress for their Americanism 
 and not for their political partisanship. 
 
 It has been frequently asked why Woodrow Wilson, 
 private citizen, professed so heartily his friendship for the 
 merit system in the civil service, while throwing it so strenu- 
 ously into the discard when he became President. The ques- 
 tion is capable of intelligent answer only as President Wil- 
 son's career is studied in the light of his personal ambitions. 
 A study of his acts shows that with him the end justified the 
 means of its attainment. He sought a place of power and 
 notoriety beyond that of any other of human kind. To this 
 end he sought to build up first of all a powerful partisan 
 machine which he sought later to convert into a yet more 
 powerful personal Wilson machine. If his public acts and 
 public omissions be looked upon from this point of view, 
 it will explain many things otherwise mystifying and in- 
 explicable. This will explain Mr. Burleson, who became 
 known as the most incompetent Postmaster-General the 
 country ever had and perhaps the most abject slave to po- 
 litical methods any President ever knew. It is true that 
 he overworked the method until the people protested, but 
 protests accomplished nothing either with Mr. Burleson or 
 the President, either to correct the error of his appoint- 
 ments or to rectify the wrong done to faithful men and 
 women by the execrable methods of the Postmaster-General. 
 
 The numerous cards and posters used by the Democratic 
 national committee to secure the re-election of President 
 Wilson in 1916 became familiar to the public at large. 
 What was used in one section of the country was used prac- 
 tically everywhere, except where it was feared their use 
 would alienate votes. Just before the election, the St. 
 Louis Republic contained this advertisement which was 
 
350 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 similar to those appearing simultaneously in hundreds of 
 newspapers : 
 
 YOU ARE WORKING: 
 
 Not Fighting! 
 
 ALIVE AND HAPPY: 
 
 Not Cannon Fodder! 
 
 WILSON AND PEACE WITH HONOR? 
 
 or 
 HUGHES WITH ROOSEVELT AND WAR? 
 
 Roosevelt says we should hang our heads in shame because we are 
 not at war with Germany in behalf of Belgium! 
 
 Roosevelt says that following the sinking of the "Lusitania" he 
 would have foregone diplomacy and seized every ship in our ports 
 flying the German flag. That would have meant war! 
 
 Hughes Says He and Roosevelt Are in Complete Accord! 
 
 The Lesson Is Plain: 
 
 IF YOU WANT WAR 
 VOTE FOR HUGHES! 
 
 If You Want Peace with Honor and Continued Prosperity, 
 VOTE FOR WILSON! 
 
 Mr. Wilson was re-elected by a tactical blunder on the 
 part of the opposition in California. 
 
 Mr. Wilson not only took a keen personal interest in 
 the primaries and elections in the several states; he took 
 a hand in directing them. Sometimes he wrote letters to 
 the people seeking to govern their action, sometimes his 
 trusted lieutenants went into the states to bring to fruition 
 his plans. In cases in which he was not able to bring under 
 his control the member of the House or of the Senate af- 
 fected, he sought to displace him with one more tractable. 
 His hand was noticeable in Alabama, in Georgia, and in 
 
The Administration and Politics 351 
 
 Mississippi, as unfailing Democratic states. In some sec- 
 tions, and particularly in Mississippi, his accomplishments 
 were for the betterment of the country. But the method is 
 obnoxious to America's political sense and to a sense of 
 justice. If carried to its logical conclusion, it would build 
 up so mighty a personal autocracy in the presidency that 
 no man, with any feeling of manhood or independence, 
 would dare raise so much as a finger, if displeasing to the 
 President. He sought to control states that were as un- 
 questionably Republican. While denying that he took 
 any direct part in the election in Maine, he did not deny 
 that men close to him and active in Administration circles 
 took an open and pronounced part in the canvass in that 
 state. The President's chief spokesman in the Senate, J. 
 H. Lewis, was active in the New Hampshire campaign. 
 He sought to overturn in his own state of New Jersey the 
 situation for his personal advantage. His senatorial spokes- 
 man, Senator Lewis, seeing the handwriting, was desirous 
 of withdrawing from the campaign in Illinois, until the 
 President urged his candidacy. In Wisconsin the Presi- 
 dent's activity was particularly obnoxious in that it was 
 placed upon the ground of loyalty against disloyalty, the 
 attack being upon Mr. Lenroot, the opposition-party candi- 
 date, though the President's candidate, Joseph E. Davies, 
 had never been in a position to vote upon any of the mat- 
 ters pertaining to the war. Even the Vice-President went 
 into that state to support the President's candidate. The 
 loyalist Lenroot's most convincing reply to the President's 
 interference in this state was contained in his speech de- 
 livered at Dodgeville, Wisconsin, March 27, 1918, preced- 
 ing a special election for filling a vacancy, when he said: 
 
 If before the war I was disloyal, then President Wilson, too, was 
 disloyal. 
 
 Three months before we entered the war, I did not say that the 
 European war must end by "peace without victory." President Wil- 
 son said that 
 
352 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Three days after the sinking of the "Lusitania," I did not say 
 "we were too proud to fight." It was President Wilson who said 
 that. 
 
 On the 1 8th day of January, 1916, I did not say that I was 
 "inclined to think that Germany had a right to sink belligerent mer- 
 chant ships without warning." It was President Wilson who said 
 that. 
 
 Five weeks before we entered the war I did not say that armed 
 neutrality would, in my opinion, be sufficient to protect American 
 rights upon the seas, nor did I then say that I was not then contem- 
 plating war or any steps that might lead to it. It was President 
 Wilson who said that. 
 
 I did not, on May 27, 1916, say that "with the causes and objects 
 of the European war we are not concerned." It was President 
 Wilson who said that. 
 
 If possible, the situation in Michigan threw a somewhat 
 darker shadow on the President's purposes, where the at- 
 tempt was made to win the election of a man, of the op- 
 position political party, in the person of Henry Ford, the 
 automobile manufacturer. Mr. Ford was known at all 
 times as outrageously and distinctively a pacifist who would 
 do President Wilson's bidding as a member of the Senate. 
 On the witness stand, in his action against the Chicago 
 Tribune for libel, he convicted himself of his anti-Ameri- 
 canism and showed that the only possible fact that brought 
 him prominently before the people and to the President's 
 attention was his millions made as a result of American in- 
 stitutions. He had declared that the American flag was 
 nothing but to arouse American sentiment by, and that 
 after the war the flags would come down from his factories 
 never to go up again, and that the American flag would be 
 superseded by the international flag. This is the man who 
 was President Wilson's choice for a seat in the United 
 States Senate, and to secure the election of whom all the 
 prestige of his high office was used. 
 
The Administration and Politics 353 
 
 With the President using all of the power of his great 
 office to gain the election of a man of the Ford type, and 
 using all the influence of the same high office to secure the 
 defeat of Lenroot who had been nominated on the loyalty 
 issue against the influence of the pacifist Senator La Follette 
 of the same state, the question is raised at once as to the 
 type of Americanism President Wilson represented and for 
 what purpose he wanted to use his type of men in the Senate. 
 As all these events occurred during the notable war year 
 of 1918, from early spring until the November election, 
 there seems little doubt that he sought to focus every 
 possible turn of public opinion in the November election 
 with a view to gaining a subservient Congress in both of 
 its branches. Once this was accomplished, the way was 
 clear to carrying out the purposes of his personal ambition. 
 The course of the President himself has permitted history 
 to question his motive, whether his purpose was to seek an 
 inconclusive peace with the backing of the nation, to gain 
 a place of first position in the world's history among others, 
 or to become the dominating figure in world politics. In 
 any event, history will question his loyal Americanism, as 
 well as his purpose. 
 
 Early in 1918, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Smoot 
 arraigned the President's partisanship in these true words: 
 
 We can only regret that our commander-in-chief in this stupen- 
 dous war, around whom we rally to a man in his efforts to achieve 
 victory, has not seen fit to abstain from partisan activities in contests 
 for specific political offices and thereby reciprocate in spirit and deed 
 the real non-partisanship so essential to success. 
 
 He recalled that whenever criticism was levelled at 
 those guilty of incompetence or worse, the retort was that 
 they were aiding the kaiser, as was true in the airplane 
 fiasco and in the munitions breakdown; and then added, 
 what was also known to be true : 
 
354 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Practically all Republicans of the Senate and House have laid 
 aside party lines since the declaration of war and have voted for leg- 
 islation asked by the President, though much of it was revolutionary 
 and socialistic in character, and in some cases unjustifiable and un- 
 necessary. 
 
 Late in the summer of 1918, after the President had 
 done everything it seemed possible for him to do to secure 
 the election of men he desired in Congress, except the last 
 eventful throw, he issued a statement declaring that politics 
 was adjourned till the war should end. This seemed too 
 good to be true, in view of what he had seen .It to do in 
 the line of building up a personal political machine from 
 the days the tremendous German drive began in France in 
 March to the time he made the announcement. But once 
 more he was taken at his word, as he hoped to be. For it 
 was a pet scheme of the Administration that whenever it 
 was about to do something that would outrage the Ameri- 
 can sense of right, it would announce something virtuous. 
 Taken at his word, that politics was really adjourned for 
 the period of the war, Republican national chairman, Will 
 H. Hays, proposed to the Democratic chairman a plan that 
 would minimize party strife during those dark days of the 
 war and promote the election of loyalists. The proffer was 
 evaded. And there was regret among loyalists that the 
 President himself declined to recommend such a course. 
 It did not harmonize with his ulterior plans. He wanted 
 men to do his personal bidding. Accordingly, after Henry 
 Ford had lost the Republican primary by a vote of two to 
 one, he sought election to the Senate as a Democrat. The 
 President's plans demanded that he have control of that 
 body in one form or another. 
 
 How much the President meant of his "Politics-is- 
 adjourned" statement, became apparent in October, ten 
 days before the national elections were to take place, 
 when he issued a statement to the country, beginning as 
 follows : 
 
The Administration and Politics 355 
 
 MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN : The congressional elections are at 
 hand. They occur in the most critical period our country has ever 
 faced or is likely to face in our time. If you have approved of my 
 leadership and wish me to continue as your unembarrassed spokesman 
 in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express 
 yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic ma- 
 jority to both the Senate and House of Representatives. I am your 
 servant and will accept your judgment without cavil. . . . 
 
 The leaders of the minority in the present Congress have unques- 
 tionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-Administration. At 
 almost every turn since we entered the war they have sought to take 
 the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and 
 put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing. 
 
 At the time of this appeal, the campaign was prac- 
 tically closed on account of the epidemic of influenza. This 
 the President knew. And when he added: 
 
 I need not tell you, my fellow countrymen, that I am asking your 
 support, not for my own sake or for the sake of a political party, but 
 for the sake of the nation itself 
 
 he raised a large question as to his sincerity by making 
 the appeal under such circumstances. He knew that much 
 he said was not true. He knew that it was his party that 
 had elected as speaker of the House, Champ Clark, who 
 left the speaker's chair to make a speech against the draft 
 act of his own Administration, declaring that to him a 
 conscript and a convict looked much alike, willing to stig- 
 matize the millions of America's splendid manhood that 
 left their colleges and places of business to go to Europe 
 to fight the battles of humanity. He knew, also, that not 
 Republicans but Democrats were blocking effective meas- 
 ures for prosecution of the war; that Claude Kitchen, 
 pacifist of the first order, chairman of the important ways 
 and means committee of the House, failed to put through 
 the necessary measures to carry forward the war to which 
 he was opposed; that S. Hubert Dent, chairman of the 
 House military affairs committee, was so much of a pacifist 
 
356 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 that the work of this most important wartime committee 
 had to be turned over to a Republican, Mr. Kahn, of Cali- 
 fornia, in order to get action on the Administration's pro- 
 gram. 
 
 For months the people were beginning to distrust the 
 President. But it was war time and they stood by him. 
 Now, however, the end of their patience with what they 
 believed to be his camouflaging was reached. He did not 
 state the truth and they knew it. It was impossible to 
 reconcile his recent renunciation of politics with this abrupt 
 substitution of partisanship at the nation's peril. It was 
 all too apparent. It came as a blow in the face of the 
 people that the President could, for personal advantage, 
 descend so far from his high estate. It was for the unmis- 
 takable purpose of furthering his own towering ambition 
 and was instinctively felt as a reflection upon the Republic 
 itself. The President recorded mental perversion when 
 he issued his statement; the people recorded clarity of vis- 
 ion at the ballot-box. 
 
 Generally speaking, politics was interned at the nation's 
 capital from April i, 1917, except for the President's ac- 
 tivities in a more or less clandestine manner, until he is- 
 sued this partisan appeal of October. After that there was 
 no end to the outcry and the battle-ground became fierce, 
 chiefly by means of printed matter. He had thrown down 
 the bars to all restraint upon the part of the opposition. 
 On the same day that the President issued this appeal, 
 there came statements from leaders of the minority in both 
 the Senate and the House. Said one : 
 
 The voters of Michigan, to take a single example, are called upon 
 to support Henry Ford notorious for his advocacy of peace at any 
 price, for his contemptuous allusions to the flag, for the exemption 
 of his son from military service on the sole ground that he will 
 blindly support the President. 
 
 Referring to the support the President had received 
 
The Administration and Politics 357 
 
 in war measures, the statement was most damning to the 
 President's appeal: 
 
 Although the Republicans of the House are in the minority, they 
 cast more actual votes on seven great war measures than the Demo- 
 cratic majority. 
 
 What is the record of the Senate ? On fifty-one roll-calls on war 
 measures between April 6, 1917, and the 29th of May, 1918, the 
 votes cast by Republicans in favor of such measures were 72 per cent, 
 while only 67 per cent of the votes cast on the Democratic side were 
 in favor of such measures. Those were the President's own measures. 
 
 The result of the election was most heartening to the 
 loyal American. It was not that he cared so much whether 
 Republicans or Democrats were chosen as whether real 
 Americans were chosen to the national legislature. While 
 the most that was looked for by any one prior to the elec- 
 tion was that the Republicans might win the House by a 
 small majority, overturning the overwhelming majority of 
 the Democrats, the nation laughed at the large majority 
 received in the House by the Republicans, they also having 
 a Senate majority. 
 
 By the end of the first month after the election, there 
 was scarcely any paper of consequence that did not con- 
 tain a sharp criticism of the President and his advisers, 
 when they found themselves free to speak. Papers which 
 had faithfully supported the President in his policies se- 
 verely censured his dictatorial interference in congressional 
 contests. The New York World saw in it grave dangers, 
 while the Times was "more than a little perplexed to find 
 the clue and key to Mr. Wilson's selections, indorsements, 
 and repudiations of candidates." 
 
 Some of the local results were particularly enlightening. 
 In Missouri, Champ Clark's state, which was regarded as 
 wholly safe for the President's party, the Republicans 
 elected their candidate to the Senate by a majority of 
 30,000, and Champ Clark himself was barely saved from 
 defeat. South Dakota, in which state George Creel had 
 
358 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 played to the Non-partisan appeal at the public's expense, 
 the Republicans elected the most one-sided legislature in its 
 history. Indeed, one meaning of the election was the elimi- 
 nation of Creelism, with its attemps to stifle honest criti- 
 cism and to substitute official opinion for public opinion. 
 
 It also meant cancelling the "advance veto," whereby 
 the President, by intervention, dictated what bills should 
 be passed by Congress, even what bills should be presented 
 to Congress for consideration. It was a stinging rebuke 
 for the President's attempt to maintain the political dic- 
 tatorship which he had set up. 
 
 Not less surprising, alike to friend and foe of the Presi- 
 dent's attitude, were the figures which the election returned. 
 No one thought that the President's appeal had stirred the 
 soul of America so deeply until the count was completed. 
 While two years previously the Democratic majority for 
 the presidency was nearly 600,000, now the Republican 
 majorities for representatives in Congress aggregated more 
 than 1,200,000. In 1916 the President carried 30 states 
 and his opponent 18; now the Democrats carried 19 and 
 their opponents 29 states. In the White House absolute 
 silence reigned, on results. 
 
 The President, as the people came to believe, willingly 
 played for the vote of a class, even the dangerous class, 
 in his practical politics. The vote of the laboring man 
 should always be prized as that of a man deserving high 
 consideration. But the vote of a class calling itself the 
 laboring people merely because they are organized, while 
 a vastly larger number who are unorganized are just as 
 truly laboring people, should not be sought more than that 
 of any other class as a class. Indeed, in their destructionist 
 tendency they deserve greatly less consideration unless it 
 be punitive consideration. 
 
 And yet it was to the selfishness of this class organiza- 
 tion that President Wilson showed himself ready to bow. 
 As director-general of railroads, William G. McAdoo, under 
 
The Administration and Politics 359 
 
 date of October 22, 1918, modified a former order as to 
 railroad men engaging in politics. The new order permitted 
 it in towns where the population was composed largely of 
 rail workers. He had not foreseen the result. Or, if he 
 did, it made no difference. The workers obeyed his edict. 
 They did not directly take active part in organized politics 
 in the 1918 campaign. They employed others to do it, 
 who were not in the active service of the railroads. A 
 circular sent out by the Railroad Employes' Department, 
 American Federation of Labor, Omaha, addressed to "the 
 railroad employes, State of Nebraska," signed by S. H. 
 Grace, an officer of the organization, stated: 
 
 The Democratic candidate for United States Senator, John H. 
 Morehead, has, through the public press, in answer to our inquiry, 
 stated that he favors Government operation of the railroads. It is, 
 therefore, to your interest to vote for him if you are of the same 
 opinion. 
 
 Making the world safe for Democracy is the duty of all who are 
 interested, regardless of the length of time it may require to do it; 
 and in order to strengthen the Administration of President Wilson 
 men should be elected to Congress at this time who will counsel and 
 work for him. 
 
 In view of the benefits already received from the present Admin- 
 istration, we, as Railroad Employes, should show our appreciation and 
 vote for all Democratic candidates for Congress at this time in order 
 to show that we, as a class, are with our President, Woodrow Wilson, 
 first, last, and all the time. 
 
 It was first of all to the class spirit that President Wil- 
 son appealed. It was not to the laboring man as such, 
 not to the American as such, but the organized crowd with 
 a vote that could be swung to him. This was his appeal 
 in 1916. The response is indicated by the method em- 
 ployed in 1918, as shown in the quotation from the circular, 
 put out by Mr. Grace who was only an employe of the rail- 
 road employes. 
 
 The politics of the Administration was not satisfied with 
 
360 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 these attempted manipulations in the several states and 
 in the nation at large and through the various channels 
 chosen. It extended to the nation's taxing powers. Speaker 
 Champ Clark of Missouri left the Speaker's chair to make 
 a speech from the floor of the House against the draft act, 
 declaring that to him a conscript looked much like a con- 
 vict. The chairmanships of the two most important war- 
 time committees of the House, ways and means and military 
 affairs, were respectively in the hands of Claude Kitchin of 
 North Carolina and S. Hubert Dent of Alabama. These 
 three prominent men sought to block measures for carry- 
 ing forward the war. 
 
 And it was these, with their sectional associates, who 
 showed marked favoritism to the one great industry of 
 the South. Ready to tax productions of all kinds from 
 the North and West, when a suggestion was made that a 
 maximum price be placed on cotton, as had been done in 
 the case of wheat, there was such an outburst of rage from 
 congressmen from that section that the matter was dropped, 
 though the price of its only competitor, wool, was con- 
 trolled by the government. These men controlled the leg- 
 islative machinery of the country and the President feared 
 that if he defied them he might find it difficult to gain his 
 end for the future. 1 
 
 Indeed, in view of the fact that under an agreement 
 entered into in August, 1918, the government fixed maxi- 
 mum prices on sixty-six items touching leather, the politics 
 in cotton became so notorious as to border on scandal. 
 
 The historian would gladly draw the veil over another 
 episode in the Administration's political activities in a> 
 dangerous way in time of the country's peril, and thus close 
 the chapter. 
 
 But history will ask about Leonard Wood and Theodore 
 Roosevelt why/ the two most notable fighting men in 
 
 *In this matter it is enlightening to compare Mr. Wilson's views as 
 expressed, prior to his entering upon the duties of the presidency, in his 
 "New Freedom," pp. 75, 91, 107, in, 130-131, and 161. 
 
The Administration and Politics 361 
 
 America were not permitted to fight for their country in 
 civilization's cause. 
 
 General Wood had the foresight to grasp the nation's 
 needs long before the country was at war. He planned 
 the Plattsburg training-camp and executed his plan. It 
 appears to have been his chief offense in the eyes of the 
 Administration. Yet it was upon this plan that all of 
 the training-camps brought into being during the war were 
 devised. The Allies knew him, knew his ability, and fully 
 expected him to be sent to Europe with the American 
 forces. Americans, regardless of political affiliation, ex- 
 pected no less. A thorough physical examination by a board 
 of capable surgeons showed the baselessness of the Admin- 
 istration's statement that he was not physically fit. More- 
 over, he had been in Europe during the great conflict and 
 knew conditions as no other American military leader knew 
 them. His views were so valuable that he was jfiven an 
 audience by the President of France. Heard by the Senate 
 committee on military affairs, President Wilson was then 
 urged to see and hear him. Senator Thomas of the com- 
 mittee and a member of the President's own party per- 
 sonally urged the President to hear the General on a mat- 
 ter of the utmost importance to the entire country. 
 
 On the other hand, Secretary of War Baker, the self- 
 satisfied pacifist, refused to hear him. The President was 
 obdurate. General Wood remained in Washington nine 
 days before being ordered by Secretary Baker to Kansas 
 to clean up a camp. But otherwise he was ignored by the 
 Administration, though the President had dates with many 
 others, some of really insignificant relative importance. 2 
 
 "Harvey's War Weekly is authority for a statement showing the Presi- 
 dent's officially registered appointments during these nine days: 
 
 Monday, March 25: 
 2:00 p.m. A newly appointed minister from Honduras, Antonio Lopez- 
 
 gutinez. 
 
 2:15 The Netherlands Minister. 
 2:30 Senator Hollis. 
 5 :oo Representative Helvering. 
 5:30 H. E. Wills and F. E. Burgess. 
 
362 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The country was stirred by this conduct on the part of 
 the Administration. The Administration offered no ex- 
 planation, after the falsity of its statement of his physical 
 unfitness was shown. It was assumed it could offer none. 
 A dignified, highly-respected, and strictly non-political 
 weekly stated: 
 
 The attention of the War Department is invited to the fact that 
 its treatment of General Wood carries on the face of it a suggestion of 
 discrimination and discourtesy so palpable and disconcerting that it 
 may well disturb the confidence of the country at the very time when 
 public confidence and public morale are of supreme importance. 
 
 For General Wood is not merely an American and a soldier; he 
 is an American of the Americans, and a soldier whose professional 
 career has been an unbroken series of successes administrative, diplo- 
 matic, and military. Not only is he the ranking general of the 
 American army, an officer of proved and universally admitted ability, 
 but by the sheer force of his character and the fine quality of his 
 patriotism, he has become one of those really representative Americans 
 who are as greatly honored in the Old World as in the New. 3 
 
 Tuesday, March 26: 
 2:30 Cabinet. 
 4:30 Dr. Franklin Martin. 
 5 :oo Senator Wolcott. 
 
 Wednesday, March 27: 
 
 2:30 War Council Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board; McCormick, 
 
 of War Trade Board; Baruch of War Industries Board; Secretary 
 
 McAdoo; Food Administrator Hoover; Fuel Administrator Garfield; 
 
 Secretary of Navy Daniels; and Acting Secretary of War Crowell. 
 
 Thursday, March 28: 
 
 4:30 Former President Taft and Dr. Lanell. 
 5:00 Commissioner Harris. 
 5:30 E. W. Scudder, Editor of the Newark News. 
 
 Friday, March 29: 
 2:15 Charles Denby. 
 2:30 Cabinet. 
 
 4:15 Acting Secretary of War Crowell. 
 4:30 Representative Howard. 
 
 Saturday, March 30: No Callers 
 Sunday, March 31: No Callers. 
 Monday, April i : 
 2:00 The Archbishop of York. 
 4:30 Governor Guntor of Colorado. 
 5:00 Mr. George Creel. 
 10:00 Marine Barracks Army and Navy League Ball. 
 
 Tuesday, April 2: 
 
 Cabinet, A. Mitchell Palmer, and Dr. Garfield. 
 8 n8 Scientific American, 542. 
 
The Administration and Politics 363 
 
 And had the President been capable of rising above 
 the level of partisan and personal politics to that of a great 
 American, he would have found a place in which the great- 
 est living American would have fitted perfectly in carrying 
 forward the great tasks that lay upon the nation in over- 
 coming the destroyer of civilization. Theodore Roosevelt 
 sent to the battle line his four sons, one of whom found his 
 final resting-place in the eternal camping-ground of France 
 beyond the enemy's lines. But the great leader himself was 
 denied the privilege of gratifying his countrymen's expecta- 
 tions. 
 
 Keen was Clemenceau's understanding of the needs of 
 the hour when, in May, 1917, the great Frenchman ad- 
 dressed to President Wilson a remarkable open letter in 
 which he said: 
 
 At the present moment there is in France one name which sums 
 up the beauty of American intervention. It is the name of Roose- 
 velt. He is imbued with simple, vital idealism. It is possible that 
 your own mind, inclosed in the austere legal frontiers, has failed to 
 be impressed by the vital hold which personalities like Roosevelt have 
 on popular imagination. The name Roosevelt has a legendary force 
 in our country at this time, and in my opinion it would be a great 
 error to neglect the force which everything counsels us to make use of. 
 
 I only claim for Roosevelt what he claims for himself the right 
 to appear on the battle field surrounded by his comrades. With what 
 joy our soldiers have greeted the starry banner! Yet more than one 
 poilu asked his comrade, "But where is Roosevelt?" 
 
 In harmony with his treatment of Leonard Wood and 
 Theodore Roosevelt, was the President's practice of elimi- 
 nating from the nation's service in the time of great need 
 its great men in every line of activity, until the situation 
 became so appalling as to threaten disaster. Then a call 
 was made for such men as Charles M. Schwab and former 
 President Taft 
 
 And so camouflaged was the Administration's system 
 of political activity, that the people were led to believe it 
 
364 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was statesmanship, until the summer of 1918 revealed his 
 purpose. That President Wilson was one of the most con- 
 summate maladroit politicians America ever produced, 
 friend and foe alike must admit. He played the game in 
 "keeping the nation out of war," played it in getting the 
 nation into war, played it in keeping the nation at war 
 after hostilities ceased, played with the labor problem and 
 with the liquor problem, played it in sacrificing able men 
 whom he should have retained, as Secretary of War Gar- 
 rison, and in keeping in the background men whom he 
 should have been the first to send to the front. Men were 
 sacrificed by the ten thousand and money by the billion 
 upon the altar of a personal ambition when forbidding 
 preparation for the inevitable conflict of arms. In 1916 
 his popularity was high. Then a chief form of appeal by 
 a candidate for congressional honors was: "A vote for 
 William Hanks, Democratic candidate for Congress, is a 
 vote for President Wilson and his policies." Two years 
 later the glamor was gone and the form of appeal was gone 
 with it. 
 
 It is probably the most pronounced instance in American 
 history of a man riding on the high tide of popularity who 
 sacrificed an unequalled opportunity to serve America and 
 the world to an insatiable but narrow ambition conditioned 
 upon small politics and lost. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 WILSON AND WILSONISM 
 
 Wilson, the Man of Mystery ; Wilson, the Much Misun- 
 derstood around these phrases and others like them has 
 already gathered sufficient of the myth kind to build up, 
 in the decades to follow, a real Solon or a pseudo-Gracchus; 
 enough mystifying specimens to burden the centuries with 
 the task of unmasking the historical inaccuracies of the 
 present. 
 
 President Wilson is just of the human kind not more, 
 not less; with human capacities, with human frailties. If 
 it were to be recorded as a matter of history that he let 
 go of truth to accomplish his set purpose, it would be re- 
 garded as harsh and unbecoming; or that he undertook de- 
 liberately to deceive and mislead the public to attain per- 
 sonal ends, it would be resented as a libel upon a large 
 historic figure; or that he had an unconquerable passion to 
 outshine any other of human kind, there would at once fol- 
 low the challenge for the proof. 
 
 Yet, it may be recorded that any citizen who would 
 solemnly pledge his word before the whole world that he 
 "will accept your judgment without cavil" when asking 
 approval at a national election, and immediately the judg- 
 ment is adverse he deliberately prepares to flout that re- 
 quested judgment, as in the 1918 election, any such citizen 
 in the ordinary walks of life necessarily forfeits the confi- 
 dence of his fellows as a common prevaricator, and takes 
 his place in their judgment where he has himself fixed it. 
 
 If, then, a consideration of President Wilson's char- 
 acter and characteristics is prefaced with two simple facts, 
 all of the much-declared Mystery-Man disappears and he 
 
 365 
 
366 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 appears what he actually is the Human-Man and the more 
 likable. The old rule of the Latin poet still holds : Never 
 call in the gods to help out of a difficulty until the necessity 
 arises. It is most unfortunate for history that too many 
 "interpreters" felt that the necessity was upon them. And 
 the two simple facts that they so constantly overlooked are, 
 first, that President Wilson had an overweening ambition 
 for personal ends ; second, that his own chosen channels for 
 accomplishing his purposes were often outside the limits set 
 by present moral standards of society. Keeping in mind at 
 all times these two facts, much, if not all, of the so-called 
 mystery attaching to Mr. Wilson dissolves as readily as 
 the veil of mist in the bright sunshine. Then much of the 
 otherwise inexplicable is explained and many of the acts 
 of Mr. Wilson that have seemed strange are easily under- 
 stood. 
 
 If, indeed, those who have made him to appear largely 
 as a Man of Mystery, as Herron, Hapgood, Creel, Baker, 
 and Tumulty, had ceased "interpreting" him and his acts 
 for the people, there would have been no mystery; and if 
 President Wilson's methods had been other than of the 
 clandestine and furtive type, if he had dealt frankly with 
 the people and their representatives, there had been no need 
 of "interpreters" of him and his acts of administration. 
 And these were forced interpretations that were given to 
 the people from time to time, forced by the President's 
 confirmed habit of seclusion and failure to meet the people 
 openly and squarely. These interpretations put out so la- 
 boriously, at first deceived the people in no small measure; 
 but never after the President's partisan appeal just prior 
 to the 1918 elections. In that appeal the President was dis- 
 robed to nakedness before the country with a swiftness and 
 sureness not dreamed of. The interpreters had done their 
 last bit of deception upon the people. With that unfailing 
 insight of the American people into a moral purpose on 
 
Wilson and Wllsonism 367 
 
 the part of men in a position of commanding influence, they 
 grasped the idea back of the appeal and dealt a blow that 
 would have dazed a less obdurate individual. With an 
 audacity that amazed and a contempt for public opinion 
 that baffled the nation, President Wilson proceeded to carry 
 out his previously determined course of personally super- 
 vising the Peace Congress in Europe. Taking control of 
 the means of communication with his own country under the 
 pretext of a war necessity after the war had ended, as he 
 himself declared in his address to Congress in Washington, 
 he felt the more at liberty to state to the gathered states- 
 men of the world that he had a mandate from his nation 
 with a hardihood seldom found in the annals of states- 
 manship. And when done with his self-imposed mission 
 there, he returned to his own countrymen and declared that 
 the Covenant which he presented to them and which he 
 demanded that the Senate, a co-ordinate power in making 
 treaties, approve as written, was the "irreducible minimum" 
 which the European nations would accept as a compact 
 for a league of nations, until Viscount Grey visited this 
 country and let the American people know better. It was 
 this utter hardness and perversity to moral obligation on 
 the part of Mr. Wilson repeatedly exhibited to the people 
 that made him the Man Understood, the Man without Mys- 
 tery. He stood now before the people just as he was a 
 man who sought to accomplish his purposes through chan- 
 nels outside the moral code usually accepted in modern so- 
 ciety. His human frailties overcame his human moral 
 strength. With the mask pulled off by the people, he was 
 seen as his real self. The people turned from him and left 
 him in his self-imposed isolation and seclusion. Assuming 
 to force the hand of the Senate by a presumptuous appeal 
 to the people a second time, the people turned upon him and 
 his misrepresentations with a second blow, this time with 
 a paralyzing effect that astonished not only the country, but 
 
368 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the civilized world. The President was not misunderstood; 
 he was thoroughly understood. The President was not 
 misrepresented; he was misrepresenting. 
 
 It cannot be questioned that in his personal relations 
 Mr. Wilson was the acme of honor and a fine personality. 
 Born and educated in the South until he matriculated at 
 Princeton College in 1875 ' m hi nineteenth year, he par- 
 took of the qualities of gentlemen bred in the Southland; 
 but he cultivated the habit of seclusion and drilled himself 
 to the performance of difficult tasks. He set himself apart 
 from the people; and while he assumed to speak for the 
 people, it was not as one of them. It was in the abstract. 
 While of splendid idealism, his idealism almost invariably 
 ran counter to the best public thought, because it was in 
 the abstract. While a student in Johns Hopkins University, 
 only forty miles from the seat of government, he could 
 write freely on government without taking the trouble to 
 go to the nation's capital to see the government in operation. 
 Thus he developed idealism at the expense of prac- 
 ticality. It has been said by his admirers that he reminds 
 one of Lincoln. If he does, it is chiefly in contrast. Lin- 
 coln, too, was an idealist; but he came in touch with the 
 people; he was of the people; he came into contact with the 
 harsh realities of life. When he was flat-boating down the 
 Ohio and the Mississippi, he came into actual contact with 
 the horrors of slavery. The conviction that slavery was 
 wrong was burned into his soul by this contact, and led him 
 to declare that if ever the opportunity offered he would hit 
 the thing with a hard blow. With Mr. Wilson it was a 
 matter of abstracting upon government in the study, instead 
 of going to Washington to see it in operation. In the 
 matter of a league of nations he could erect an a priori 
 world government without so much as seeing how it would 
 affect his own nation when put into operation. 
 
 Cultivating the abstract, he was led to cultivate aloof- 
 ness from his fellows. Loving government in the abstract, 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 369 
 
 he loved men in the abstract. He appeared to have no very 
 real belief in the destiny of the United States as a political 
 entity; likewise he spoke freely of u men everywhere," but 
 he did not love men as human beings, as individuals. He 
 had less interest, except as it touched him in person, in 
 national feeling, that jealous affection for the United States 
 as an individual nation, which appeared so strongly in 
 two of his predecessors, Cleveland and Roosevelt; likewise 
 little interest in men as men, except as groups interested 
 him personally, as in the 1916 demands upon Congress in 
 a group that would support him in the election. He could 
 talk well of matters that seemed to be of interest to indi- 
 viduals, but it was to select bodies and his addresses were 
 cold. The response was similarly cold. When he met 
 great concourses of people in his tour westward to place the 
 Covenant before the country, it was chiefly artificial and 
 cold greetings that he received, lacking in the cordial spon- 
 taneity that met Roosevelt in any section of the country 
 he visited. 
 
 Comparison has been made of Wilson's style and com- 
 mand of English with that of Lincoln. Wilson was college 
 bred and a college professor of English; Lincoln was a rail- 
 splitter and a back-woodsman purely until he reached ma- 
 turity, when he studied law in the loose easy way of his 
 day. On the fiftieth anniversary of Lincoln's immortal 
 Gettysburg address, Mr. Wilson on the same spot delivered 
 the semi-centennial address. The former, though one of 
 ,the briefest ever delivered, is a classic studied in the great 
 universities of the world; the latter, though the set address 
 of the day, has been forgotten, if ever it was given a 
 thought afterward. So, also, with Mr. Wilson's short 
 letters. They were commonplace in contrast with Lincoln's 
 letter of eternal life to Mrs. Bixby, which he began by an 
 ordinary reference to the adjutant general's report. Per- 
 haps no finer of Mr. Wilson's style and sentiment is found 
 than that in his address accepting, on behalf of the nation, 
 
37 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the Lincoln Memorial built on the site of the log cabin 
 in which Lincoln was born; and yet it falls far below Mr. 
 Lincoln's best. 
 
 The two great men are said to be alike in their spirits, 
 both given largely to introspection. Lincoln, as a boy and 
 young man, was almost the antithesis of Wilson, however. 
 He engaged in and greatly enjoyed the crude sports of the 
 early day in the Ohio valley backwoods. Mr. Wilson, on 
 the other hand, was given to aloofness in his young man- 
 hood days, holding himself apart from the common run of 
 mankind, and cultivating the secluded life from his college 
 days to the end of his days in the presidency of the nation. 
 If ever Mr. Wilson saw an evil that penetrated his soul as 
 the sight of slavery which Mr. Lincoln saw as his boat 
 floated down the Mississippi penetrated the soul of the 
 latter, the world never knew it. If, as Mr. Wilson's 
 interpreters declare, he could view the barbarity of German 
 warfare which was sinking helpless women and children 
 into a degradation beneath that of American slavery of a 
 half-century previous, and not have it affect his view of 
 public duty, then there is a great difference between the 
 spirit of Woodrow Wilson and that of Abraham Lincoln 
 as related to God's humanity. 
 
 But these instances are sufficient to indicate that what- 
 ever likenesses there may be between Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
 Lincoln, the contrasts were so wide and so deep as to practi- 
 cally obliterate them. Likenesses are found between any 
 two men. It is the contrasts that differentiate them not 
 only the personal contrasts above indicated, but contrasts 
 in approaching public audiences. Mr. Lincoln's addresses 
 to the public, including his debates with Douglas, were en- 
 lightening. On the contrary, the addresses of Mr. Wilson 
 to enlighten the people upon the purposes of the Covenant 
 have no title to be considered .as the addresses of the 
 scholarly statesman intent upon informing the public upon 
 weighty matters of national moment. He sank to the level 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 371 
 
 of substituting personal vituperation for convincing argu- 
 ments which he could not command. His railings at the 
 Senate majority which refused to abdicate its constitutional 
 functions in obedience to his imperious will, are perhaps the 
 most humiliating episode our history of the presidency re- 
 cords; and coming from a gentleman distinguished for 
 scholarship and culture but adds to its revolting quality. 
 
 Nor is this chargeable to his changeableness, a marked 
 characteristic. His "interpreters" termed this a quality 
 indicative of growth. He himself rather gloried in the 
 quality, declaring that "consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
 minds." But the common sense of the common people could 
 see neither sense nor logic In his statement. It raised with 
 them the question of common honesty. In speaking to the 
 Daughters of the American Revolution on April 19, 1915, 
 he uttered these words: 
 
 America has a heart, and that heart throbs with all sorts of in- 
 tense sympathies; but America has schooled its heart to love the 
 things that America believes in, and it ought to devote itself only 
 to the things that America believes in. 
 
 If his later declaration, made while urging the Covenant 
 upon the people in September, 1919, that it was greater than 
 the American government, indicated a growth, then it was 
 a dangerous growth, which the people discovered and 
 checked. He had declared that the people of the United 
 States should remain neutral, even in thought; when the 
 "Lusitania" went down, that we were "too proud to fight" ; 
 as late as May, 1916, referring to the war, "with its causes 
 and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains 
 from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not 
 interested to search for or explore." And yet the causes 
 of the war were as well known at that time as they were 
 on April 2, 1917, when he advised Congress to declare 
 war, not by reason of those "causes," but solely because of 
 the German warfare against commerce which had destroyed 
 
37 2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 American ships and American lives and was substantially 
 a war against mankind. Yet again, in January, 1918, when 
 the country was in the midst of its war preparations, in 
 putting forth his Fourteen Points as the "only possible pro- 
 gram" for our consent to peace, four of the Points related 
 exclusively to those "controversies on the other side of the 
 water," previously denounced by him when action on the 
 part of the United States was urged by those with vision 
 compatible with America's best traditions in statesmanship. 
 And still later, in his Baltimore address of April 6, 1918, 
 the first anniversary of American's entrance into the war, he 
 referred to the occasion as "this moment of utter disillu- 
 sionment." This is what some termed "growth" of the 
 President he having reached the stage which the people, 
 as a whole, had reached three years previously. It is but a 
 suggestion of the President's opportunism, which is but 
 another word for seeking present personal or party ad- 
 vantage; and in this case party was but used for personal 
 advantage, the only rational explanation of President Wil- 
 son's otherwise strange statecraft. 
 
 Notwithstanding this personal relation to his methods, 
 perhaps because of it, there was a personal charm and mag- 
 netism that was for the moment winning. But it was felt 
 to be artificial, with the appearance of listening with defer- 
 ence and being governed by the opinion of the listener, until 
 out of sight, when, also, immediately out of mind. He was 
 seldom seen even by cabinet members. He was coldly intel- 
 lectual, caring little for companionship or counsel. To 
 the great masses of Americans, he was looked upon as un- 
 sympathetic, inscrutable, passionless. Those having official 
 business with him transacted their business and left, taking 
 away with them no atmosphere of a great personality, none 
 of the touch that made Mr. Wilson become a part of the 
 lives of other men, such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, Cleveland, 
 almost all Presidents imparted. He wore the gray mask, 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 373 
 
 and it was never removed. There was no spiritual contact 
 between President and people. 
 
 The shiftiness and vacillation of the President, if 
 prompted by opportunism, personal advantage, were then 
 grounded in selfishness. And it has been directly charged 
 that he was selfish. Certainly they were not due to lack of 
 self-confidence, with which he was always abundantly en- 
 dowed. His selfishness was indicated by his repeated in- 
 junction to take "common counsel," and then taking his 
 own counsel; by his ungenerous act in refusing to say to the 
 Senate, or its committee, that he had accepted its sugges- 
 tions for changes in the league constitution; but making the 
 changes in Paris and seeking credit for them. Indeed, it 
 w;as seen very early in his administration, in an episode 
 almost forgotten: He accepted the platform adopted in 
 which was urged a constitutional amendment for single 
 terms of Presidents; it declared the pledge in these words: 
 "We pledge the candidate of this convention to this prin- 
 ciple. " And when the amendment was proposed in Con- 
 gress he denounced it as "highly arbitrary and unsatisfac- 
 tory" and declared that any disapproval of his position in 
 the issue was to him "a matter of perfect indifference." 
 
 Nor was Mr. Wilson's self-confidence always well 
 grounded. Relying upon his own powers of accomplishment, 
 when he ignored the American people and the co-ordinate 
 treaty-making power of the Senate, in going to the Paris 
 Peace Congress, and there practically ignoring the four 
 commissioners whom he took with him, with all of the 
 prestige derived from the fact that he was the only head 
 of a nation, and that the most powerful nation, in the Con- 
 gress, he was outwitted; and from the beginning of his 
 unwarranted undertaking, began and continued to lose 
 ground to the end of his official career. His failure in the 
 Congress is noted by a writer who was in the Congress as 
 a member of the British corps on economics: 
 
374 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris 
 Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a 
 large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the 
 League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points 
 in an actual treaty of peace. But in fact the President had thought 
 out nothing; when it came to practice, his ideas were nebulous and 
 incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas what- 
 ever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he 
 had thundered from the White House. 1 
 
 This plain statement explains well why he could not convince 
 the Senate or the people of the United States that his 
 Covenant should be accepted without change he had not 
 thought out the matter to a final conclusion. As he heard 
 deficient students reply in his college days as student and 
 professor: "Not prepared," so now he. 
 
 Added to this defect was the fact that he lacked leader- 
 ship, a fatal lack in an attempt to carry out a large plan 
 of constructive work. While he had a consuming passion 
 for power, the only weapon he knew and used freely, never 
 relinquishing any that he could gain and retain, he could 
 not lead men. This was due to the defects in his make-up 
 indicated in the foregoing. He could not meet men as his 
 equals. He was incapable of team work. So long as any 
 one associated with him accepted his viewpoint, all went 
 well. But that was not team work; that was becoming his 
 clerk. And men with vision are not mere clerks. It is need- 
 less to name the strong men of his cabinet who left him. 
 Perhaps the most level-headed man associated as such was 
 Secretary Franklin K. Lane; and he is the man who said, 
 when overruled by Secretary Baker, "the people are not in- 
 terested in cabinet quarrels." Men of noted leadership, 
 and ready to meet any emergency were displaced by men 
 of small capacity for leadership. His essential weakness as 
 a leader lay in the fact that he failed to discover public 
 
 1 John Maynard Keynes, "Economic Consequences of Peace," pp. 42-43, 
 Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York, 1920. 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 375 
 
 opinion and to understand that America is not an autocracy 
 but a republic ruled by the majority. 
 
 He stated that he could do but one thing at a time 
 that he had a "one-track mind." While engaged in doing 
 a thing, in that he was absorbed to the exclusion of all else. 
 Some have declared that his was a "one-compartment mind" ; 
 that he could reach out and open one compartment of his 
 brain as a systematic man would reach into a drawer and 
 take out a paper, and when done with it return it, forgetting 
 all about it in taking up the next. Everybody wanted to 
 know what was going on in this mind, which was thought 
 to be of the greatest influence on the destinies of the world, 
 when he was at the height of his world power, late in 
 1918. Haughty, he was intolerant of opposition; wanted 
 people to agree with him, and did not want to be convinced 
 that he was wrong; did not like to have his vision clouded 
 or his confidence in his own conclusions shaken. Said one 
 of his interpreters: 
 
 Mr. Wilson keeps hirhself cloistered pondering the facts. There 
 is something almost uncanny in the man, in his seclusion, his ear 
 deliberately closed to suggestion, sifting and sorting his facts, work- 
 ing on them as a mathematician. 2 
 
 This writer also states that Mr. Wilson knew that most 
 men reach their conclusions in a superficial way and not 
 giving due weight to facts a method that is without appeal 
 to Mr. Wilson. 
 
 Mr. Wilson's powers are of a type that does not permit 
 him to be the servant of the people. While he spoke much 
 of a mandate from the people, his test of what the people 
 wanted appeared to be what he had determined to do. His 
 type is for solitary rule, not for a government of the people 
 and by the people. 
 
 His type is essentially destructive, not constructive. 
 When he appealed to the Italian people over the heads of 
 
 a "Woodrow Wilson an Interpretation," by A. Maurice Low, p. 290, 
 Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1918. 
 
376 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 their rulers, it involved the same principle as when he ap- 
 pealed to the people as against the Senate. In neither case 
 did he succeed. On the contrary, both attempts were flat 
 failures. The man who can make such an appeal may not 
 be capable of recognizing himself as an enemy of consti- 
 tutional government. But if given a free hand, he would, 
 perhaps, not see what he had brought upon the nation until 
 the forces of disintegration had gone so far that no deter- 
 rent could be found to save from utter destruction. His 
 example has shown what dangers lurk in granting large 
 and unnecessary powers to a willful executive. 
 
 A fatal defect in Mr. Wilson's character was his capac- 
 ity for creating division when unity was the demand of the 
 situation. He created division in American sentiment prior 
 to America's entrance into the Great War, until by the 
 continued efforts of the pro-Americans as against the pro- 
 Germans the sentiment became so overwhelming as to com- 
 pel action by the President; he created division in the Paris 
 Peace Congress when harmony on the part of the Allies 
 was a crying demand; he created division in his own party 
 until, early in 1920, it began to slip away from him and 
 became largely a party against him and anything which he 
 favored; again he created at first division in American 
 sentiment on the matter of a league of nations when senti- 
 ment was becoming almost solid for such an association, and 
 such division continued until the people began to understand 
 Mr. Wilson's purpose when they became almost a unit 
 against his Covenant. The Wilson myth was shattered in 
 America before it was in Europe; but once the image began 
 to totter overseas, the reaction was more pronounced than 
 in his own country. The people in America accepted many 
 things he said and did in their old-time spirit of raillery 
 and smiled. With Europeans, to whom he had become a 
 demigod, when they found that their idol was but human 
 clay of a type so different from what they had been led to 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 377 
 
 expect, the disappointment was so severe a strain that they 
 were furious. He made headway only so long as he was 
 able to maintain the illusion that his demands were backed 
 by America; but once the masquerade ended, the disillu- 
 sionment in Europe was something terrible. When the na- 
 tion entered the armed conflict for justice and liberty, the 
 sacrifice made the nation the best beloved in all the world; 
 and when it stood ready to take its full share in rebuilding 
 the broken civilization, the expectations of humanity were 
 the highest. But when he dashed these hopes, here is what 
 the French statesman Brieaux, whom America had the 
 right to look upon as a friend, said at the end of 1919 : 
 
 Your President came to France fortified by a prestige which he 
 owed to the courage of your soldiers and to the generosity of your 
 nation. ... At the peace table he asked us to make heavy conces- 
 sions. We tried to make him understand that he was wrong but he 
 insisted. . . . Recognize this, that our error in having thought that 
 Mr. Wilson spoke for America was excusable. It was the first time 
 that one of your Presidents ever came to Europe. You permitted him 
 to come and we had the right to assume that he had your word in his 
 valise and that he was authorized to say to us: "I speak for America, 
 and I alone." 
 
 Thus President Wilson's methods caused, not common, but 
 divided counsel among the Allies after the close of the 
 Great War and until he left the presidency, and placed 
 America in a position of humiliation before the world. The 
 fact that European statesmen should have known what the 
 United States Constitution required as to the making of 
 treaties and what the invariable practice of Presidents had 
 been in conformity with such requirements in great matters 
 did not take away the annoying sting of the rebuff, or re- 
 lieve of the sense of the division created by Mr. Wilson. 
 
 To say nothing additional to what has been said in this 
 chapter as to his political morality, one ground for this 
 constant division of sentiment where it should have been 
 
378 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 a determined unit was his constant willfulness in the face 
 of new and untried situations; u common counsel" he thrust 
 to the winds, though he so often urged it. This was well 
 illustrated in his relations to aspiring peoples. Brushing 
 lightly aside counsel from any source, he erred in his judg- 
 ment that the German people were backing the Imperial 
 German Government only because they were compelled 
 through force; for the German people backed the Hohen- 
 zollern Government to the last. Again, he erred in relation 
 to the Czecho-Slovaks, loyal to the last ounce of their man- 
 hood to the cause of the Allies and human liberty; for Euro- 
 pean monarchies and France had already acknowledged 
 their independence when, on September 3, 1918, Secretary 
 Lansing announced that the United States recognized their 
 National Council as a de facto government. It was felt as 
 a humiliation that the world's great democracy should be 
 so tardy in its recognition of the aspirations for demo- 
 cratic government on the part of these peoples just released 
 from autocracy's domination. He erred in pronouncing 
 the counter-revolution, headed by Lenine and Trotzky ter- 
 rorists, the revolution; he had failed to distinguish between 
 the government that rose on the ruins of czarism, and that 
 which crushed the life out of the only semblance of demo- 
 cratic government that Russia had known since the days 
 of czarism began. 
 
 And though this may be attributed to the President's 
 error of judgment, whether founded in ignorance or not, 
 sight must not be lost of the fact of the President's mental 
 perversity which is well set out by one of the best-informed 
 observers at the Paris Peace Congress : 
 
 President Wilson is conscious of his power of persuasion. That 
 power enables him to say one thing, do another, describe the act as 
 conforming to the idea, and with act and idea in exact contradiction 
 to each other, convince the people, not only that he has been consistent 
 throughout, but that his act cannot be altered without peril to the 
 nation and danger to the world. We do not know which Mr. Wilson 
 
W 'Us on and Wilsomsm 379 
 
 to follow the Mr. Wilson who says he will not do a thing or the 
 Mr. Wilson who does that precise thing. 3 
 
 Mr. Wilson's acts were in themselves sufficient to divide 
 public opinion until the people became so exasperated as to 
 unite against him. Among these acts were his defiance of 
 American history, including the right of the Senate to take 
 counsel with him; his absolute defiance of the constitutionl 
 right of the Senate in the matter of concluding treaties as 
 sustained by the United States Supreme Court; his vacilla- 
 tion in the face of impending events of great moment and 
 withal his unwillingness to accept advice; his evasions and 
 deceptions to gain a personal or partisan end, after exhib- 
 iting great ignorance or extreme carelessness in large mat- 
 ters of policy; his haughtiness and peremptoriness in dealing 
 with his peers or with other nations, creating antagonism 
 where harmony was the chief demand; his insulting epithets 
 hurled at the Senate, a part of a co-ordinate branch of the 
 government and chosen as directly by the people as he, for 
 no reason other than that it refused to sign on the dotted 
 line at his command; his meddling in European affairs that 
 were none of America's after the great conflict ceased, 
 though he wavered and vacillated when Prussian autocracy 
 was sapping the foundations of public opinion throughout 
 the land, and he then declared that with the causes of the 
 war we had no concern these and multifold other acts and 
 expressions of President Wilson kept the nation divided 
 when it should have been firmly knitted together for the 
 certain conflict, and separated friendly nations when they 
 should have been united in policy, and humiliated America 
 when it should have remained on the mountain top of the 
 world's esteem, and resulted in his own disastrous debase- 
 ment in the world's best thought after gaining the very 
 pinnacle of power and respect. Leaving the nation leader- 
 
 3 "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference," by E. J. Dillon, p. 134, 
 Harper & Brothers, New York, 1920, quoting The Tribune, Chicago, July 
 
380 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 less at a crucial hour by going to Europe threatened bewil- 
 dering consequences such as had never come to the nation 
 after a war. In the words of the eminent writer previously 
 quoted : 
 
 When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige 
 and a moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history. 4 
 
 But President Wilson seemed bent upon carrying out 
 in practice what he declared in earlier years when writing 
 in the privacy of his study, the morals of which, if he lost 
 sight of, the people with unerring judgment brought to 
 severe condemnation when opportunity offered : 
 
 The President's power of compelling compliance on the part of 
 the Senate lies in his initiative in negotiation, which affords him a 
 chance to get the country into such scrapes, so pledged in the view of 
 the world to certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to 
 bring about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its re- 
 fusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the indiscreet threats 
 of the Department of State. 5 
 
 Instead of meeting a matter four-square, this expression 
 indicates his determination to carry a point by fair means 
 or foul. When he was hailed in France, England, and 
 Italy as the hope of the world, it was the result of two 
 false assumptions : That in international policy he was the 
 representative man of America, and that when the Covenant 
 was incorporated in the peace treaty it was America's 
 special contribution to the settlement. By April, 1919, the 
 question was whether he could crystallize opinion in his own 
 country so as to sustain his own point of view of committing 
 the country to a place in the concert of powers. The mad- 
 ness of his course in attempting his domineering method in 
 America failed as it did in Europe. The people would have 
 none of the fair-or-foul method suggested in his written 
 works. It must be fair or none of it. 
 
 4 Keynes' "Economic Consequences of Peace," p. 38. 
 
 "Constitutional Government," by Woodrow Wilson, pp. 233-234. 
 
 Compare this threat with Brieaux' statement above. 
 
Wilson and Wihonism 381 
 
 It is not strange that, in conformity with the foregoing 
 characteristics of President Wilson, he was so often taking 
 the side that the event showed to be wrong and which the 
 better thought of the country felt to be the wrong; though 
 the people, in accordance with the best traditions of the 
 nation, held in abeyance its own judgment out of defer- 
 ence to the Chief Executive until he was shown unworthy of 
 such deference, a fact well illustrated in the case of Theo- 
 dore Roosevelt who, like almost all Americans, was misled 
 by the Administration at the beginning of the Great War. 
 Instances abound of this undesirable quality of Mr. Wil- 
 son's mental processes. When America's moral sense was 
 beginning to feel the stirrings within, he was not concerned 
 with the causes and declared for neutrality even in thought; 
 and when the conflict ceased and the world needed and 
 demanded peace, he refused it to America though he had 
 declared that to do so would break the heart of the world. 
 When the demands of the situation were insistent that he 
 remain at his sworn post of duty in Washington, he took 
 himself to Europe and sought to administer the affairs of 
 the nation from Paris. When the nation expected his oft- 
 proclaimed "open covenants openly arrived at" to be put 
 into operation, he closed all communication between Paris 
 and America by taking over all channels of information 
 as a war necessity. When America looked to him for some 
 word of enlightenment on the Paris processes at the earliest 
 opportunity, offered in his Boston address upon his first re- 
 turn to his own county he informed the people of the 
 impropriety of giving such information ; and when he under- 
 took to educate the American public as to the merits of the 
 Covenant in his tour of the country in September, 1919, so 
 turgid 6 was the stream of his language that people turned 
 
 8 Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's remarkably smooth language, often of 
 the most polished style, he displayed remarkable facility in murkiness where 
 the importance of the occasion demanded the most terse and clear ex- 
 pression. Vivid descriptions of his phrasings have been used to char- 
 acterize his language. A few picked up at random are these: "stimulating 
 rhetoric," "rhetorical persuasivness," "airy assumptions," "rhetorical rhap- 
 
382 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 away from him in largest proportion where they heard*.him 
 in largest numbers. 7 They declined longer to follow the 
 ignis fatuus of fine phrases seemingly designed to hide some 
 ulterior purpose. 
 
 Can anything be added that will help to define the in- 
 tangible thing known as Wilsonism? A key-statement of 
 his is that uttered during the 1916 presidential campaign: 
 "I am willing to play for the verdict of history." It was 
 looked upon by the best American opinion as a worthwhile 
 aim; as an expression of the vision that belongs to states- 
 manship. By that time, his "men-everywhere" idea was 
 gaining a prominent place in public addresses and state 
 papers. His statement of April 19, 1915, already quoted in 
 this chapter, indicates that at that time he held to American 
 tradition. Between that time, however, and the time of his 
 touring the country in behalf of the Covenant, in Septem- 
 ber, 1919, when he declared that the Covenant was greater 
 than the Senate, was greater than the government, a marked 
 change took place in his views of what America means. At 
 the latter time he had no word to speak in behalf of what 
 America meant or what the Constitution of the nation 
 meant to the world, though it was Constitution week. 
 
 This was a gradual change from nationalism, that force 
 which had made America a respected power in the whole 
 world, to internationalism in which America was to be 
 degraded from her lofty position of influence for right- 
 eousness among the nations. His declaration of interna- 
 
 sodies," "resounding phrases," "pious platitudes," "smug formulas," "tumid 
 rhetoric," "moving accents," "rhetorical generalities," "alluring rhetorical 
 phrases," "polished periods," "stately rhetoric," "poetic and eloquent utter- 
 ance," "skillful appeals," "resounding generalities," "resounding platitudes," 
 "pure rhetoric," "smoothly eloquent assertion," "rhetorical appeal," "unsub- 
 stantial rhetoric," 'high-sounding phrases," "platitudes that tickle the ear," 
 "rhetorical utterance," "fatal gift of phrase-mongering," "soaring oratorical 
 flights," "vain and flabby phrases," "seductive rhetoric," "cloudy rhetoric," 
 "vague dissertations." 
 
 While New York and Pennsylvania rolled up such tremendous ma- 
 jorities against Wilsonism in the national election on November 2, 1920, 
 they fell below the proportionate majorities through the west where Wilson 
 was comparatively strong in 1916 and where he made his direct appeal to 
 save the Covenant, September, 1919. 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 383 
 
 tionalism reached its height when he had gained the pinnacle 
 of his fame. This occurred while in Italy and when he 
 addressed the French Socialists, while touring Europe be- 
 fore sitting in the world's Peace Congress. He proclaimed 
 internationalism with all the force at his command, even 
 assuming that he could back up his statements with the 
 army and navy of the United States, 8 and appealing to 
 international socialists as against their governments, as 
 against nationalism. From that time to the close of his 
 administration he never made a ringing, soul-stirring address 
 as to the good that real Americanism could accomplish 
 among the sons of men. 
 
 This was logical from the bent of his own mind as indi- 
 cated by the character of men whom he placed in important 
 positions Creel, Steffens, Herron, Bullitt, Hale, Hapgood, 
 to mention only a few. His return to America witnessed 
 encouragement of internationalism and socialism. The lat- 
 ter became defiant, even of the Government. Some good 
 people failed to see the danger of his appeal, and in diluted 
 form re-presented it to the public, the favorite formula 
 being, u Now, if only our nationalism does not become too 
 strong." And this at the very moment when radicalism, 
 encouraged by the process, was seeking to tear the very 
 vitals from America radicalism, so greatly encouraged 
 by Mr. Wilson as to become a definite part of Wilsonism. 
 Anarchism was a part of the process. It received definite 
 encouragement from the Administration, as shown in the 
 chapters on "Disloyalty" and "Russia and Bolshevism." 
 When he undertook to frame a world order upon interna- 
 tionalism, declaring that it must be accepted "without count- 
 ing the cost," he was doing it to the exclusion of American 
 nationalism. And as a result radicalism became so bold 
 that he was compelled to take cognizance of it in his 1919 
 
 8 See his threatening statement announced but a few weeks before from 
 his vessel, the "George Washington," as he was on his way to meet the 
 assembled statesmen of the world. 
 
384 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 annual address. But Italy had already turned away from 
 his internationalism, resenting his intrusion; France and 
 England gave it no heed; and at the first opportunity, Amer- 
 ica so emphatically repudiated his suggestions as to leave 
 no hope of recovery for his ill-fated foreign doctrines. 
 
 Personal government, as distinguished from constitu- 
 tional government, was a marked feature of Wilsonism. 
 Making his personal representative, Edward M. House, 
 instead of the legally established channels, the means of 
 communication with foreign governments; creating the great 
 issue between the Senate and the people on the one hand as 
 standing for the laws and the Constitution, and himself on 
 the other as standing for personal government and inter- 
 nationalism; undertaking to initiate a peace policy affecting 
 all the Allies without consulting them in the matter; reveal- 
 ing a purpose to transform his legitimate leadership into 
 what was practically a dictatorship by employing, for the 
 establishment of revolutionary doctrines, powers which had 
 been created for or assumed by him for the conduct of the 
 war these acts and others of the same character were 
 symptoms of the disease. 
 
 Only the future will determine into what niche history 
 will place President Wilson. That he has bulked large 
 from the time America entered the world conflict, there can 
 be no dispute. That a sharp and swift decline came as a 
 result of Wilsonism is also a fact cut deeply into current 
 events. That early in his administration a literary coterie 
 of a certain political cult, not orthodox in Americanism, 
 men whom he favored in appointments, began to write him 
 down in a definite place in history, artificial though it was, 
 is well known to those even moderately informed. That 
 his own nation repudiated him and his doctrines in the 
 sweeping majorities of November 2, 1920, is too patent 
 to need further statement. But his vacillation, his evasion 
 of responsibility in making decision when prompt decision 
 was the imperative demand of the occasion, his willfulness 
 
Wilson and Wilsonism 385 
 
 and obduracy these kept him from attaining the maximum 
 of historic largeness which was within his grasp, which had 
 been flung to him by the swift tide of events. When civiliza- 
 tion was turning a critical corner he became the Hamlet in 
 the performance. "Wilson is the most pathetic example 
 of wasted opportunities our history or any other history 
 affords. As a dignified, firm, constitutional President of 
 the United States, remaining at home where he belonged, 
 sharing honors and responsibilities, forgetting Wilson once 
 in awhile, he could have gotten anything." 9 
 
 In view of the foregoing, Wilsonism may be defined as 
 the idea developed by Woodrow Wilson as President of 
 the United States, of internationalism over nationalism; a 
 moderate degree of radicalism bordering on anarchism; 
 vacillation and evasion of responsibility for decision when 
 decision was a clear demand; willfulness and obduracy run- 
 ning to personal government and disregarding written and 
 unwritten laws; seeking to cover from public view grave 
 errors of administration and policy, resulting in duplicity 
 and attempted deception of the public; and the sequel of 
 announcing open counsel and action, while practicing secret- 
 iveness and using furtive methods. 
 
 The public never lost interest in the notable personality 
 of President Wilson to the last moment of his incumbency. 
 Their sympathy followed his physical weakness as he left 
 the inaugural ceremonies of his successor and, almost help- 
 less, found his way through the capitol to the conveyance 
 waiting to carry him from the final scene of his official 
 career to his private home. Yet no sympathy followed his 
 statecraft. 
 
 That he has left a large impress upon the nation is be- 
 yond question. That there is danger to constitutional gov- 
 ernment with certain types of men is evidenced by the 
 processes through which he undertook to lead the people 
 
 9 Personal letter from Harvey W. Morrow, Omaha, October, n, 1920. 
 Author. 
 
386 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 to accept a super-government to replace the American Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Americanism as grounded in the Constitution must be a 
 cardinal principle of any man fit to be President of the 
 United States. Too great a price has been paid for orderly 
 government to permit it to be waved aside upon an untried 
 theory. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 PROFITEERING 
 
 Grand, noble, inspiring is the Spirit of America in war. 
 It has ever been so. Mean, degrading, despised of man- 
 kind is that other spirit which takes personal toll of disas- 
 ter. The ghoul is found on the field of the destruction 
 caused by earthquake, hurricane, flood, or fire. For him the 
 extremest penalty imposed by his fellows of the race is 
 none too extreme. In his class is the profiteer, who takes 
 advantage of the destruction of war. 
 
 History is always curious and prying after facts in 
 strange places and in strange ways. "Is it possible, " it 
 asks, "that there were found men and women so mean and 
 so demeaning as to take advantage of the horrors of the 
 Great War for selfish gains?" And if so, it wants to know 
 further whether these exactions were tolerated by the Ad- 
 ministration that looked after the interests of "men every- 
 where." 
 
 Of wrong views and taking untenable positions on al- 
 most every great public matter pertaining to the Great War, 
 whether on preparedness, on pushing it vigorously to a final 
 conclusion, on looking toward peace, on peace-making, or 
 on readjustment after the conflict ceased, it is beyond the 
 possibility of charge against the President that in the mat- 
 ter of profiteering he had any personal interest in the deadly 
 game of grab. But how did his Administration function in 
 this great game? 
 
 When he was entering upon his first term in the presi- 
 dency, his pronouncement was substantially this: "Woe be 
 to the business concern or individual that undertakes to 
 rule this Administration or to exact toll from the hard earn- 
 
 387 
 
388 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ings of the common people !" He hurled his anathemas 
 against those who plundered in the Civil War, of which he 
 had read. But this of which he had read was but a minia- 
 ture of the real plundering that occurred during his own 
 incumbency. It was always well for the bully to talk loud 
 when there was no danger; it was another matter to speak 
 softly and carry a big stick. 
 
 One prime cause of the opportunity for gambling with 
 the Government when the country was rushed into the war 
 was the state of unpreparedness in which the country found 
 itself when the cause of civilization called across the waves 
 for immediate action. A chief outcry against the war was 
 that it was forced upon the country by the munition manu- 
 facturers because of the opportunity it offered for pelf. 
 Unfortunately for this alarm, it came almost wholly from 
 two classes : The professional pacifist and the ardent pro- 
 German. That the munition-maker had always been a prof- 
 iteer, the records make clear. That they were such in 
 peace as well as in war, is shown by the figures : 
 
 The American Armor-Plate Syndicate sold Russia armor plate at 
 $249 per ton. The United States could not get it at less than $616. 
 It ought to be said that the low price to Russia was protested by 
 other manufacturers. The protest led to a conference in Paris and 
 that to an international agreement on armor plate. Three years later 
 the price was lowered to the United States, and from 1896 to 1914 
 the government bought plate from the trust at $440 per ton. But, 
 according to the report of the present chief of ordnance, Rear Ad- 
 miral Strauss, it was making the same plate in a factory of only 
 20,000 tons' capacity at $229 per ton. For powder which it makes 
 in its own factories at thirty-six cents per pound, the government paid, 
 in seven years, prices varying from fifty-three to eighty cents. 
 
 And this writer furnishes other valuable data touching this 
 matter. 1 
 
 1 "The League of Nations," pp. 102, 103, by Horace M. Kallen. Marsh- 
 all Jones Co. 
 
Profiteering 389 
 
 While these transactions were taking place under the 
 law, others were outside the law. The airplane scandal, the 
 shipbuilding contracts, the almost endless ramification of 
 deals put through in the various branches of the War De- 
 partment these made it look like one unified network of 
 grab; it looked as if the Administration was functioning 
 better along these lines than in getting the real war machine 
 into motion. In the middle of 1918, it was disclosed by 
 the Department of Justice, illegal transactions had gone so 
 far as to involve contractors, agents, and manufacturers in 
 soliciting, in Washington, government war orders under 
 agreements to pay illegal commissions. Simultaneously with 
 these announcements, raids were made on hundreds of busi- 
 ness offices of manufacturers throughout the United States 
 in search of papers to show the scope of the wanton practice. 
 These contracts made for the government ran into the 
 hundreds of millions of dollars, making a large profit for 
 the commission-fee agent as well as for the manufacturer 
 obtaining the contract. 2 
 
 The rush and hurry incident to the unprepared state of 
 the nation when war was upon it, after two full years of 
 warning, created the opportunity for the profiteer. It gave 
 no opportunity to select with any reasonable degree of 
 deliberation either the brain or the material forces that 
 were to direct the nation's latent energy for repelling the 
 onslaughts of the mightiest war machine the world had ever 
 known. President Wilson declared with much complacency 
 that the equanimity of his usual course of thought could 
 not and should not be disturbed. It was one of his general 
 statements, without reference to the concrete facts in the 
 
 2 As illustrative of this type of profiteering in manufacturers' contracts 
 in the war, there is cited the case of a contract drawn up in a Washington 
 hotel, whereby it was agreed that one Bittan was to pay the other party 
 a five per cent commission on a contract for about 100,000 raincoats, and 
 six per cent on all subsidiary contracts. With the statement that the $5000 
 cash payment asked was for an official in the Quartermaster's Department 
 in Washington, the assurance was given that they could obtain contracts 
 whenever the government was in the market. Bittan paid the $5000 and 
 the transaction was completed. 
 
39 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 case, that lay at the bottom of so much mischief to his ad- 
 ministration. His thought became disturbed. His whole 
 administration was upset. For now something had to be 
 done. At first the people did not know what was being done. 
 Senator Chamberlain, of the President's own party, pretty 
 completely overturned the Administration's equanimity by 
 his charge in his New York speech that the War Depart- 
 ment had ceased to function. Among the things to be done 
 was to get guns and anything else that might look like 
 preparation, no matter how or where. 3 
 
 How far petty and grand profiteering in high places 
 of the Administration became a virus that infected wider 
 circles of the Administration, and yet wider circles of busi- 
 ness after the war, can never be determined. That it under- 
 mined greatly the moral stamina of the nation there can 
 hardly be a doubt. It was only a few months after the 
 uncovering of the old-guns deal, that complaints were be- 
 coming general that rent-profiteering was the rule in the 
 great centers where war contracts were being carried out, 
 such as shipyards. The government found it necessary to 
 stay the process. At Wilmington the workers were notified 
 by the landlords to move out, unless they would agree to 
 
 3 In May, 1918, after Senator Chamberlain's New York address, when 
 the War Department was laying before the House Committee on Appropria- 
 tions its plans for carrying out the ordnance program, it developed that in 
 the schedule was an item for $450,000 for the purchase of thirty old guns 
 from Francis Bannerman, who had an assortment of old guns, and whose 
 place of business on an island in the Hudson River was known as Banner- 
 man's Arsenal; and that these were guns which the government had sold 
 five years previously at $87.67, now to be purchased by the government at 
 $15,000. Until this hearing, there was no publicity to the transaction. 
 
 And as illustrating the method of setting in operation the brain forces 
 of the nation, when the emergency was upon it, the instance is cited of 
 Bernard M. Baruch, former chairman of the War Industries Board and 
 later an adviser to President Wilson in the Peace Congress, and John 
 D. Ryan, head of the Anaconda Copper Company and who was placed at 
 the head of the aircraft-production service, two very capable men, who 
 were selected to organize the copper interests of the country to sell copper 
 to the government at prices fixed by the War Industries Board. The 
 Philadelphia North American of August 13, 1919, is authority for the state- 
 ment that, under this arrangement, the copper sold to the War Department 
 aggregated $153,334,478 in price, the copper interests making a clear profit 
 of $50,000,000, or over 30 per cent, as shown by the House investigation 
 of ordnance expenditures. 
 
Profiteering 391 
 
 pay a greatly increased rental. The government declared 
 that the landlord who attempted to profit thus at the ex- 
 pense of the shipyard employes or to eject the worker, 
 would be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. 
 At the same time, the government undertook to construct 
 houses for its workers at some of the industrial centers. 
 Other remedies were instructions to the local assessors by 
 the cities to increase the assessed value upon the basis of the 
 increased rent; local committees on rent profiteering being 
 established in thirty cities through the home-registration 
 service to call upon profiteering landlords to show improve- 
 ments and expenses justifying the rent increases demanded; 
 and, in case of refusal, to publish the facts in full without 
 comment. 
 
 This profiteering reached out into every branch and de- 
 partment of civil life after the clash of arms was silenced. 
 It was not because the nation's supplies had been exhausted. 
 America's great resources had scarcely been touched. Now 
 dealers were not satisfied with a fair profit of ten per cent; 
 they advanced prices of goods to make a fifty-per cent profit. 
 Profiteers seeing the great amount of money in the hands 
 of the workingmen, set about to get it; and the great mass 
 of people who had not been fawned upon by the Adminis- 
 tration, as had the organized laboringman, in increased pay, 
 stood amazed at the steady flow of money from these 
 people to whom it came easily. And these millions of men 
 and women, paid no more now than before the war, were 
 compelled to pay this additional fifty per cent for every- 
 thing they had to eat and wear. It was difficult for them 
 not to remember these things when they went to the polls 
 on November 2, 1920. 
 
 From the time of the armistice there were ebullitions con- 
 cerning the government's taking a hand in stopping profit- 
 eering. There was nothing visible, to the end of 1918, 
 to support it except talk and note-writing. Yet instances 
 were known and publicly cited in which prices charged by 
 
39 2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 some distributors of groceries netted them from 200 to 300 
 per cent, from that time on. 
 
 It was the memorandum of the Federal Trade Com- 
 mission's report, made public August 7, 1919, that removed 
 the mask as never before, showing the system of food 
 hoarding and of profiteering. 4 It stirred the entire country. 
 A nation-wide campaign was inaugurated to combat the 
 conscienceless pilfering of the people. Co-operation be- 
 tween state and federal authorities was sought. In some 
 instances stocks of foodstuffs were seized; some profiteers 
 sought to transfer the hoarded stocks. 5 The declaration 
 in the report that unless the packers were stopped, they 
 were about to dominate all important foods in the United 
 States, as well as the world meat trade, created as much 
 discussion by the public as any question since the armis- 
 tice. 
 
 Rent profiteering touched a few places during the war, 
 outside of government circles. But after the war it seemed 
 to fail none. In New York it became so aggravated that 
 churches were thrown open to shelter those turned into the 
 street. The legislature found it necessary to make new laws 
 governing landlords. 
 
 No less than these, did the workmen bring the blight of 
 
 4 This report showed no depletion of food stocks. On the contrary, sup- 
 plies on hand June i, 1919, ran from 3 to 298 per cent above those of a 
 year earlier, yet with a constant and large increase in prices. 
 
 6 On August 15, 1919, just eight days after the Commission's report 
 became public, a telegram was sent from the governor of Ohio to the 
 United States Attorney General, that one Cleveland concern was about 
 to remove its hoard to Chicago. Thereupon the federal attorneys in Ohio 
 were instructed to take necessary action, should the attempt be made. 
 
 At the same time, the federal attorney at Detroit informed the De- 
 partment of Justice at Washington that in three cases he had filed libels, and 
 had seized 10,460,000 eggs and 300,000 pounds of butter. 
 
 And the following day there were seized in St. Louis 15,664,880 eggs 
 held for seven owners by the Mound City Ice & Cold Storage Company. 
 
 In Newark, New Jersey, forty warehousemen, packers and wholesale 
 food dealers were required to appear, with their books, before a special 
 federal grand jury to testify as to profiteering in foodstuffs. 
 
 In Buffalo libels were filed involving thirty or forty firms, the stocks 
 including 3,590,000 pounds of butter and 3,000,000 dozen of eggs. 
 
 Other sections of the country furnished their quota of these leeches 
 sucking the life blood from the public. 
 
Profiteering 393 
 
 profiteering to the land. One of the worst types of profit- 
 eer during the war, and one of the first, was the workmen 
 engaged on war contracts, already receiving a wage out of 
 all proportion to the pay of others, notably government 
 clerks, clerks in banks, sales people in stores, stenographers 
 and the vast numbers who go to make up the great American 
 citizenship. Taking advantage of the government's needs, 
 he threatened and sulked, he shirked, he was a slacker. He 
 was less a better citizen than the poorly-paid clerk; and it 
 will be difficult for him to justify his conduct before the en- 
 lightened citizenship of his country as difficult as it was 
 for President Wilson to justify his coddling of him, shrink- 
 ing before his unwarranted demands. He was as low a type 
 of profiteer, whether in building worthless ships, in hiding 
 out of sight at nine dollars per day, or by pursuing any 
 like course, as was the profiteer in clothing, munitions, or 
 food. His kind was encouraged by the Administration, and 
 he flourished to the Administration's finish. It is true 
 that in mid-summer, 1919, the President, when organized 
 railroad men approached him for another increase in wages 
 or else a decided lowering of living costs, did not accede 
 to their demands but went to Congress with the matter. 
 Congress declared there were ample laws; that what was 
 needed was enforcement. Though the country had been 
 earnest and long in its complaints upon the high cost of 
 living, the Administration gave no heed to these scores of 
 millions, Americans all. It was once more the threat of a 
 few organized railroad men that gained his ear, a class 
 whose wages had kept approximate pace with living costs, 
 while those of the other great millions had not. Eager 
 to tour the country in support of the League-of-Nations 
 Covenant, he attempted to pass the responsibility on to Con- 
 gress by asking that body to enact what were practically the 
 same laws then in existence for the Administration's control 
 of profiteering. Neither the war-time food laws nor the 
 war-time fuel laws had been changed. 
 
394 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 The situation was well summarized by an eastern news- 
 paper keenly analytical of national situations : 
 
 Manufacturers have looted the purchasing public, not only by 
 cornering raw materials and inflating prices, but by shamelessly low- 
 ering the quality standards of their goods, until to-day merchants 
 who are jealous of their reputations have to fight to get products they 
 dare to guarantee as sound. Wholesalers, jobbers and retailers, down 
 to the smallest, have joined in the game of grab. Labor, yielding to 
 the prevailing spirit, has used its power of organization to get its 
 share. Nay, the whole public has been infected, and over the entire 
 country there is sweeping a wave of greed, of extravagance, of idle- 
 ness, of devil-may-care defiance of all the principles of economics and 
 morals. 6 
 
 But action of the government in the prosecution of pro- 
 fiteers was slow and uncertain. Immediately the President 
 went before Congress for action, the Attorney-General 
 began warnings through the public press. A blare of trum- 
 pets never frightened criminals of their type. The method 
 was described as u a gesture made by pointing the finger 
 at the profiteers. " The President began the crusade by 
 making the favorite gesture of a politician incapable of 
 doing anything substantial appealing for legislation. This 
 gesture is the special favorite when the politician is dealing 
 with economic forces which he does not understand and 
 does not so study that he may understand. From that time 
 on the office of the Attorney-General gave out threatening 
 statements with fair regularity to the end monthly state- 
 ments. The end came October 15, 1920, when the final 
 statement announced that the campaign would end Novem- 
 ber I the day before election one reason for which 
 was insufficient appropriation to carry on the work, while 
 another stated that falling prices made it less needful. The 
 people refused the bait. While Mr. Palmer was prose- 
 cuting, prices continued to rise ; and when the break came, it 
 came from other causes. So outrageous had become pro- 
 
 * Philadelphia North American, January i, 1920. 
 
Profiteering 395 
 
 fiteering in clothing by the spring of 1920, that what became 
 known as the overalls campaign was started as a protest 
 started as a local impulse, it became a nation-wide phenom- 
 enon. It grew so rapidly that through whom or where 
 it started was lost sight of. In public offices and in courts, 
 in halls of legislation and private business, overalls were 
 worn. Clubs and societies, eagerly formed associations 
 and individuals hastened to encourage the wearing of over- 
 alls. College undergraduates and high-school pupils, 
 learned professors and dignified presidents wore overalls. 
 Mayors were inaugurated in overalls; "denim and calico" 
 weddings were solemnized. It was a campaign more power- 
 ful than the thunderings monthly from the office of the 
 Attorney-General of the United States; more effective than 
 his prosecutions of profiteers, resulting in 181 convictions 
 (one to about each 600,000 people), fines aggregating 
 $275,000, and sentences aggregating ten years and ten 
 months, at a cost to the government of $500,000. The big 
 profiteers were not molested. They met their signal pun- 
 ishment in the inexorable law of supply and demand, a law 
 beyond the reach of Attorneys-General, Presidents or Pro- 
 fiteers. 
 
 It was this law, mightier than peoples, potentates and 
 powers, that bore with relentless weight, at first upon the 
 suffering people, then upon the shameless profiteer. The 
 difficulty with its operation was that the government did not 
 see to it that it had free course, and it played into the hands 
 of the evil-doers played by the people to an excess that 
 gave the profiteer the upper hand, while debauching the 
 former. 7 
 
 'Instances are as widely spread as the broad land. A few will illus- 
 trate : 
 
 In New York a leading Broadway clothing house making a whole- 
 window display of serviceable suits at $25, was unable to dispose of them 
 until the price was marked notably higher. In St. Paul a woman of most 
 modest means went to a leading store with $100 with which to purchase a 
 coat, and found nothing satisfactory until the salesman showed one at $300. 
 She wanted to pay the $100 cash, the balance of $200 on time. The head 
 of the department was called and refused; but a little later she returned 
 
396 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 But not spoiling the great masses who were under the 
 extreme pressure of high prices with a but slightly increased 
 income, it led to resentment everywhere at the profiteering 
 in sugar, a staple of home life. Here the mightier law was 
 strangled almost unto death. It was one of the things that 
 was probably not forgotten by the masses at the polls on 
 November 2, 1920. It was in late summer, 1919, that the 
 Sugar Equalization Board, in two separate communications 
 at two different times, warned President Wilson of sugar 
 shortage and that there would be an increase in the cost 
 of sugar if he did not agree to the purchase of the 1920 
 Cuban crop at the price then offered 6^/2 cents per pound. 
 He refused to act on these urgent representations. The 
 crop was sold elsewhere. Shortly afterward, Attorney- 
 General Palmer, without any warrant in law, suggested to 
 the Louisiana producers that they were permitted to charge 
 17 to 1 8 cents per pound at the plantation. The Cuban 
 planters readily took their cue from these suggestions. The 
 price of sugar immediately began to rise by leaps and 
 bounds. An increase of two cents per pound meant an in- 
 crease of $180,000,000 to the American people per year. 
 With sugar at the price of 1 8 to 22 cents per pound in Feb- 
 ruary, 1920, the American people were paying substantially 
 a billion dollars tribute to the sugar profiteers, through the 
 attitude of President Wilson and his Attorney-General 
 as Harvey's Weekly said at the time: "Because one man 
 was omniscient and another hebetudinous." By early May, 
 1920, after much false publication of the scarcity of sugar 
 in the world, it became known that imports of sugar from 
 
 with the additional $200 and took the coat. A Philadelphia dealer, unable 
 to sell a line of silk stockings at $2.50, cleared out the entire stock in a few 
 days by marking them up to $4. In a small up-state town in Pennsylvania, 
 a merchant was offering at $8 a good shoe that cost him $5.50 a pair. 
 An employe in a factory, after looking them over, said he would like some- 
 thing better, whereupon the merchant asked him to call later and he could 
 satisfy him. Changing the same shoes to other packages and marking them 
 up to $15 he made sale to the factory employe, who then informed fellow 
 workers of his bargain, and the merchant sold all his $8 shoes at the higher 
 figure. 
 
Profiteering 397 
 
 all sources for the year ending June 30, 1920, would show 
 an increase of about 14 per cent over those of the preced- 
 ing year, making a total of approximately two pounds of 
 sugar a week for the use of every man, woman, and child 
 in the country. Sugar prices continued advancing until in 
 some important centers was reached the price of 35 cents 
 per pound; and many grocers would sell it only in limited 
 quantities with other purchases in their stores. There was 
 a clear 20 cents a pound between the import price and the 
 retail price probably the largest scheme of bleeding the 
 whole mass of the American people ever forced upon the 
 country by a President contrary to the written advice of 
 men expert in the line of the duties laid upon them. When 
 the banks refused longer to back these profiteers, the infla- 
 tion began to disappear, they began to try to save one an- 
 other, the price of sugar dropped, after some dealers had 
 lost many hundreds of thousands of dollars, and by the 
 end of 1920, sugar was selling at 8 cents retail in the same 
 cities where it had reached the 35-cent price. 
 
 In February, 1921, the United States grand jury at In- 
 dianapolis accused mine operators and labor leaders of con- 
 spiring to mulct the public of every dollar possible, while 
 staging a conflict as a camouflage. 
 
 Let it never be forgotten that the interest of the great 
 mass of American citizenship is paramount to all others 
 combined. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 Readjustment or reconstruction? All understand that 
 it refers to the period immediately following the signing 
 of the armistice, when the nation was seeking to return to 
 normalcy; and while some writers insist that it was a period 
 of readjustment, others understand that it was a period of 
 reconstruction. The former would be correct if the coun- 
 try were simply getting back to where it was before the 
 clash of arms. But there was something more : a reconstruc- 
 tion of industrial and social forces. A new world came out 
 of the furnace of conflict; much of the dross was gone. It 
 would have been a disaster for America to seek to adjust 
 herself to the old status. It was the period of RECON- 
 STRUCTION. 
 
 It was not easy for the world to meet these conditions 
 thrust upon it by the Great War. Seven million of the choic- 
 est of the world's men slain in battle; 7,000,000 more so 
 seriously disabled as to be no longer available as producers 
 these 14,000,000 of the world's most capable laborers out 
 of the race created a condition in the economic world that 
 required time to meet. In the United States alone 5,000,- 
 ooo were taken from ordinary occupations to meet the fight- 
 ing requirements, while a very large number besides were re- 
 quired to manufacture and transport all kinds of war imple- 
 ments all withdrawn from the ordinary course of business 
 at a time when there was a correspondingly acute demand 
 for men and goods in every part of Christendom, confront- 
 ing this nation with an accumulated deficit of production and 
 productive power. 
 
 While the war was still in progress, the Administration 
 
 398 
 
Reconstruction 399 
 
 gave some slight attention to matters pertaining to the days 
 after. The Council of National Defense, organized pri- 
 marily for the war emergency, passed, as a permanent body, 
 into such reconstruction tasks as seemed imminent. As 
 early as June, 1918, a small staff from it was organized to 
 "survey, classify and digest the reconstruction activities" of 
 this and other lands, with instructions to report to the 
 proper department. If any other active effort looking 
 toward prepartion for the reconstruction period was made 
 by the Administration before the war ceased, it is so slight 
 as to be negligible. For this reason it was freely charged 
 against the Administration that it was as unprepared for 
 peace as it had been for war. 
 
 When President Wilson was asked to create a recon- 
 struction commission, he declined upon the ground that he 
 preferred to leave that work to the various war boards. In 
 fact, nothing was done, although it was pointed out to him 
 at the time that the chief commercial nations of Europe 
 were at that very time constituting commissions of their 
 ablest men for that purpose. The British were thinking of 
 reconstruction the next year after they entered the war; 
 and their government, even before Asquith was replaced 
 by Lloyd George, had taken action accordingly. The idea 
 grew with them, and they were so much impressed with the 
 importance of the "new world after the war" that an out- 
 and-out ministry of reconstruction was created. Not even 
 in the darkest days of their fiery ordeal did they fail in 
 steady preparation for the day they foresaw after the bat- 
 tling should cease. For the entire four years the British 
 Board of Trade had been co-ordinating the work; their 
 commissions had been at work for months at home and 
 abroad gathering data and making ready for the new era. 
 
 The United States Chamber of Commerce addressed to 
 President Wilson a letter indicating an anxiety among busi- 
 ness men of this country to know what course the Govern- 
 ment proposed pursuing. And immediately the armistice 
 
4OO The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was signed he took under consideration the appointment of 
 a reconstruction commission to develop a program for the 
 nation's return to a peace basis, such commission with ad- 
 visory powers only. Nothing came of it. As is now a 
 well-known part of the history of the time, he was engrossed 
 with international affairs to the almost total exclusion of 
 the affairs of his own nation. For nine months the nation 
 was plunging toward an economic and social crisis that was 
 appalling to contemplate. And the nation's head mani- 
 fested a profound unconcern for the seriousness of the sit- 
 uation. 
 
 This attitude was indicated when, in December, 1918, 
 he was asked by a notable gathering of the business men of 
 the country for suggestions of guidance. This was the 
 Reconstruction Congress, held at Atlantic City, of indus- 
 trial leaders, the most representative and important gather- 
 ing of that character ever held in this country. At such a 
 time it was of supreme importance. With nearly 5,000 
 delegates from all sections of the country, representing 380 
 different industries, it was of chief importance because of 
 what it proposed to accomplish. This congress, naturally 
 looking to the head of the nation for an expression as to 
 the Government's point of view in the serious situation then 
 confronting the country, asked him to state that position. 
 He paused long enough, in his preparations for sailing for 
 Europe, to make this amazing reply: 
 
 You may be sure that I would send a message to the meeting if I 
 knew what message to send ; but frankly, I do not. It is a time when 
 we must all thoughtfully take counsel and apply the wisest action 
 to circumstances as they arise. 
 
 In this mood of exalted preoccupation he left the country, 
 with no one in the nation's capital for seven months with 
 authority to speak or act for the executive branch of the 
 government. If he saw the storm clouds gathering over 
 the land, he manifested no concern until given a rude shock 
 
Reconstruction 401 
 
 by the demands of a few organized railroad men, in the 
 summer of 1919, who bluntly informed him of the disaster 
 in store unless he quickly awoke from his international 
 dream. "Let somebody drop a match, and it will be a 
 sorry day for all of us," is what the railroad man said, 
 truthfully portraying the result of a policy which the rail- 
 road men, with the aid of the President, had forced upon 
 the country. 
 
 An Administration lacking policy, program or leadership 
 at this time became an invitation to an economic debauch. 
 A spirit of recklessness seized the country, and "there en- 
 sued an orgy of profiteering which caught into its intoxicat- 
 ing influence well-nigh every class and group of popula- 
 tion." 
 
 Such being the attitude of the head of the Administra- 
 tion, there was not much to be expected from the heads of 
 the several departments. And whatever effort was made 
 was without concerted plan or co-ordination the same 
 weakness that had held the Administration helpless in its 
 war efforts. The industrial and social leaders of the coun- 
 try, after looking in vain for guidance and constructive 
 leadership from that source, concluded to proceed with 
 what measure of assistance they could obtain from any 
 quarter. It was thought that a federal employers' indus- 
 trial body could accomplish something by going to Europe 
 and there at first-hand study conditions in the devastated 
 part of the world. Accordingly, a little more than two 
 months after the conflict closed, Secretary of Labor Wil- 
 son commissioned such a body to go to Europe to inquire 
 into the industrial conditions and the method by which the 
 industrial leaders and laborers there were meeting the sit- 
 uation. 
 
 A suggestion of the results of the lack of a head at 
 Washington was found in the antagonism that developed 
 between the Department of Commerce and the Railroad 
 Administration in the spring of 1919, while the President 
 
402 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was in Paris. The Industrial Board of the department 
 had made an attempt at stabilizing prices. This the Rail- 
 road Administration attacked upon the ground that it was 
 interfering with prices of steel rails. 1 Abolishment of the 
 board by Secretary Redfield on May 9, 1919, brought to an 
 end a bitter controversy of almost two months between 
 these two federal branches of the public service that were 
 very important at that particular time, Mr. Redfield de- 
 claring that so far as his department was concerned the 
 law of supply and demand would be permitted to govern 
 in problems of industrial reconstruction. He later resigned 
 his cabinet position. 
 
 But before he resigned, he assumed the position appar- 
 ently that the United States should not seek to extend its 
 trade until the other countries of the world had had an 
 opportunity to gain a firm footing, in the markets of South 
 America and other lands. In an authorized interview, he 
 is quoted by the Federal Trade Service, published by the 
 Publicity Corporation of Washington, as saying: 
 
 We have a great decision to make. It is whether we shall take 
 this opportunity and the immediate rich profits it offers, or whether 
 we shall restrain our energies for awhile, giving France, England, 
 Belgium, Italy, the neutrals and even Germany's reborn people a fair 
 and free opportunity to get on their feet. 
 
 And Secretary of Labor Wilson declared, at an even earlier 
 date, that we had made about all the provision that could be 
 made for foreign trade as a means of securing additional 
 markets. "The first thing is to know where the trade can 
 be had, and through the commercial attaches of our con- 
 sulates operating through the Department of Commerce we 
 have kept continually in touch with the possible opportuni- 
 
 1 Director-General of Railroads Hines made public a statement on May 
 23, announcing that he had been compelled to purchase 200,000 tons of 
 steel rails at the steel trust's own price, upon ascertaining that six large 
 companies had sent in bids that were identical, not only in price, but as 
 to conditions, and that all were in strict accordance with those approved 
 by the federal Industrial Board. 
 
Reconstruction 403 
 
 ties.*' 2 And he properly added that shipping was an impor- 
 tant factor to be considered. It was a remarkable contrast 
 with the position of the head of the Department of Com- 
 merce himself. 
 
 But in the midst of all the confusion and lack of co-or- 
 dination on the part of the Administration at this crucial 
 time, there remained one man who maintained his balance 
 and who had a plan Secretary of the Interior, Franklin 
 K. Lane. He planned to locate the returning fighters on 
 the public lands of the United States, of which there were 
 millions of acres: 15,000,000 of arid land to which it was 
 proposed to bring water for irrigation; 70,000,000 of 
 swamp lands that might be drained; 200,000,000 of cut- 
 over land, that which was once timbered, from which were 
 to be cleared brush and stumps. These he offered to the 
 returning men on easy terms. It was a worthy idea. But it 
 failed for two chief reasons: First, wages were too good 
 at easier employment in great industrial centers; and, sec- 
 ond, the Anglo-Saxon of to-day, though his ancestors were 
 the greatest subduers of wild prairies and the greatest van- 
 quishers of stumps and swamps the world ever saw and that 
 with the small means of civilized life at hand, wants the 
 modern school and church and all that goes with a com- 
 munity furnished with these easier means of helping his 
 children at once to the higher step in a progressive life. 
 Had life been found less attractive in the larger wages at 
 the great centers of life, Mr. Lane's plan would have been 
 more attractive. It deserved better consideration than it 
 received. 
 
 The foregoing is substantially the efforts of the Admin- 
 istration at the beginning of the crucial period known as 
 the Reconstruction. Other efforts on its part were defensive, 
 as shown elsewhere. 3 They were in no sense aggressive 
 reconstructive programs. Even the Conference of Gov- 
 
 * Collier's Weekly, February i, 1919. 
 'Chapter on "Profiteering." 
 
404 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ernors and Mayors called for the White House March 3 
 and 4, while the President was temporarily in the country, 
 was of this character, the resolutions then adopted con- 
 demning the doctrines which inveigh against God and gov- 
 ernment. For then it was already seen to what the Presi- 
 dent's recently proclaimed internationalism and his more 
 recent dallying with the Bolshevistic doctrines of Russia 
 were leading in this country. 
 
 Thus it devolved upon the leadership of the country's 
 business men to supply the lack. Even in the midst of the 
 rejoicing over victory and peace there ran an undercurrent 
 of uncertainty and apprehension in the business world be- 
 cause of the realization that the Government faced the 
 great change without policy or program. Manufacturers, 
 bankers, and merchants had beseiged Washington in vain 
 for some suggestion as to a definite plan on the part of 
 the Government. Its inertia was again indicated in its 
 process of laying down keels by the shipping board and of 
 floundering in shipping, while fighting to maintain shipping 
 rates ten times as high as before the war and the billions 
 put into shipping was rapidly tied up to the docks to perish, 
 with no plan or program, and clerks and supervisors no 
 longer required crowded the shipping service, eating up the 
 government payroll. In contrast, within forty-eight hours 
 after the signing of the armistice, the director general of 
 the British mercantile marine began demobilizing his forces, 
 and in six months had sold more than 1,200 ships, realizing 
 more than $300,000,000 without loss; and not a clerk or 
 cent of expense in that once vast department of that gov- 
 ernment remained. It was completely out of the shipping 
 business. 
 
 First in importance in the matter of private leadership 
 in the reconstruction period was the Atlantic City Congress 
 of December, 1918. Most prominently announced through 
 the public press of all the acts of this congress was the 
 roundly applauded declaration of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
 
Reconstruction 405 
 
 that "in these days, the selfish pursuit of personal ends at 
 the expense of a group cannot and will not longer be tol- 
 erated." His industrial creed, as it was termed, took the 
 very important position of recognizing three equally inter- 
 ested parties in all industrial activity capital, labor, and 
 the community. This was a matter of fundamental impor- 
 tance, as neither of the other two groups had ever seemed 
 to think that the great mass of the people had any right to 
 consideration in their quarrels that were so disastrous to 
 the community at large. 
 
 In the early months after the armistice signing, all in- 
 dustries were waiting for "the bottom to drop out of 
 prices." But there was a constant rise. Some were of 
 opinion that prices were up to remain high permanently 
 and made extensive contracts accordingly. But in early 
 February, 1920, there began the fall in prices, and it was 
 at once realized that manufacturers must at once make a 
 readjustment and purchase with greater caution. By this 
 time exchange was so out of balance that $69 would enable 
 an American to purchase $100 worth of goods in London, 
 while $36 in France and $29 in Italy would purchase the 
 same amount. 
 
 It was a year previous that there was on all sides the 
 great fear of unemployment in the country, bringing into 
 existence a considerable quantity of written matter urging 
 that all kinds of work proceed at once, of which probably 
 the most famous appeal is that of Richard H. Edmonds in 
 the Manufacturers' Record, when he said: 
 
 Build that house now; construct that highway at once; build that 
 school, that church ; repair that broken pavement ; build that garage, 
 and even that chicken-coop, now not to-morrow. Go ahead with 
 your plans; speed the nation on the road to full employment, and 
 thus hasten the day of individual and national prosperity and safety. 
 Preach this from the pulpit, ye ministers of the gospel; act it from 
 the pews, ye laymen who profess a love of humanity; put it into ef- 
 fect, ye county, municipal, and state officials; and remember, ye busi- 
 
406 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 ness men of America, . . . that there is something in this infinitely 
 higher and more important than the small amount of money involved 
 which you think you could save by waiting. 
 Government officials, particularly those in high positions in 
 the Department of Labor, were urgent in their utterances 
 in this direction. 
 
 And the great employers acted upon the idea with 
 good results. Indeed, many of them planned for conversion 
 of their war plants into peace-time operations as soon as 
 hostilities should cease. Such was the plan of the monster 
 Eddystone plant at Philadelphia, owned by the Baldwin 
 Locomotive Works, and which had made a great record 
 during the war. Likewise the Du Pont Powder Company, 
 with plants in various states, affords a striking example of 
 the foreseeing method of dealing with the employment 
 problem precipitated by peace. At that time, of its 100,- 
 ooo men and women employes, 80 per cent were engaged 
 wholly in war work, three-fourths of these were transferred 
 into peace industries with scarcely a ripple, such as chemi- 
 cals, dyes, paints, leather substitutes. When the Adminis- 
 tration was helpless to point the way, business men pro- 
 ceeded without regard to the Government's purposes, even 
 though it was the Administration which was responsible 
 for an increase of wages for labor out of all proportion to 
 the returns for vastly more exacting service to the commu- 
 nity, such as teaching. And from these abnormal levels in 
 wages and consequently in materials it was known that 
 there must inevitably be a sharp recession. And while 
 both labor and capital recognized this fact, neither was will- 
 ing to make the first concession; and between the two, the 
 public met the usual fate of being the chief sufferer. 
 
 In the early months of 1919, the Employment Service 
 of the federal government and of the several States was 
 watching anxiously for the bad spots of unemployment over 
 the country; and even within a month of the close of the 
 fighting reports were received. The reports at the end of 
 
Reconstruction 407 
 
 the first week in December, 1918, showed that of the 122 
 cities reporting to Washington, only 16 showed unemploy- 
 ment conditions; and in 91 of these cities the relations be- 
 tween capital and labor were reported good, in 8 as un- 
 settled, and in 5 as acute. In the New England area, 
 Bridgeport reported 7,500 unemployed, Derby 1,000, Hart- 
 ford 3,000, an increase of 1,500 over the preceding week, 
 and Meriden 1,500, an increase over the preceding week 
 of 500. The steel and iron industries were laying off men. 
 In Boston, Worcester, and Lynn upwards of 23,000 were 
 out of employment among textile workers, while many con- 
 cerns were on two-thirds time. There was heavy unem- 
 ployment among boot and shoe workers, brick-layers, car- 
 penters, laborers and machinists. Only in New Hampshire 
 and Vermont did the demand for workers equal the supply. 
 
 About Albany a surplus of 6,000 was reported, an in- 
 crease of 200 in a week; while Buffalo's increase was 1,000, 
 making a total of 20,000. Newark's surplus was 6,000, 
 Jersey City's 5,000, Trenton's 3,000; while Pittsburg re- 
 ported 12,000 unemployed common laborers, 6,000 semi- 
 skilled workers, and 1,000 clerks, besides 1,700 miners; 
 and similar reports came from other large industrial cen- 
 ters of the Eastern States. Cleveland reported 75,000 
 unemployed workers, Dayton 1 1,000, and other Ohio points 
 large numbers. 
 
 The middle west, the south, and the Pacific coast all 
 reported substantially the same conditions. Of all the cities 
 of the country reporting to Washington for the week end- 
 ing February 24, 1919, sixty per cent reported heavy unem- 
 ployment an increase of fifty-eight per cent over the week 
 previous and fifty-seven per cent over the week before that; 
 the number of cities reporting an approximated equality of 
 demand and supply decreased twenty-nine per cent in the 
 one week. Every week for the first three months after the 
 signing of the armistice showed the same tendency. 
 
 And now, at a rather late day, the Administration was 
 
408 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 becoming alarmed and sent out danger signals. November 
 19, 1918, a week after the armistice was signed, Roger W. 
 Babson, head of the statistical organization which furnished 
 merchants, bankers and investors with a periodical "barome- 
 ter letter," urged concessions to labor, closing with this 
 question: "Shall we all voluntarily give up something, or 
 shall we all run the risk of losing everything?" It was 
 stated that fundamental economic conditions were bad, 
 and that a period of trouble and depression was just ahead 
 and could not be sidetracked. The number out of employ- 
 ment at the end of four months after the conflict of arms 
 closed was formidable, the number between December 3, 
 1918, and January 31, 1919, being multiplied twenty-five 
 times, the number at the latter date being about 1,500,000 
 which had increased in two weeks to 2,000,000. President 
 Wilson summoned to Washington governors of the various 
 States to consider the situation; and while they expressed 
 confidence that there was little danger of violence during 
 the reconstruction period, there was, throughout the land, 
 clearly defined expression of doubt as to the validity of this 
 opinion. The United States Employment Service, reorgan- 
 ized to find positions for the returned fighting men of the 
 nation, practically suspended activities on March 22, 1919, 
 because of the failure of Congress to make an appropria- 
 tion for its maintenance. Its agents performed their most 
 efficient service in efforts at the demobilization camps to 
 put the discharged service men into suitable employment, 
 unless they already had something definite in view. And 
 through their efforts, communities throughout the land were 
 organizing bureaus for this purpose, managed by local com- 
 mittees. 4 It was a highly commendable plan. 
 
 * The Employment Service showed itself effective in many lines. Start- 
 ing as a small beginning in the immigration service, it suddenly leaped to 
 a position of usefulness and importance that challenged the admiration 
 of the world. Unknown until about January, 1918, as an essential unit 
 of service, in ten months it moved 2,500,000 men from peace to war activity; 
 and by the middle of January, 1919, operating the reverse process, it had 
 placed twenty-five per cent of all war workers who wanted employment. 
 
Reconstruction 409 
 
 But it was severely criticized. It was declared to be 
 one form of the propaganda used by the Administration to 
 make things appear what they were not. While the figures 
 given in the foregoing paragraphs are from official sources, 
 whereby the press of the country was made to believe that 
 its continuance was a necessity, the deductions are open 
 to question, and in some cases the figures themselves. 
 Industry, a newspaper interested in the country's industrial 
 development, declared that fewer men were out of work 
 at the end of six months after the war ended than in any 
 year preceding the war. The Iron Trade Review criticized 
 the method of the service in securing the figures as to the 
 number of unemployed. 5 The Washington Evening Star 
 published figures taken from representative papers in Wash- 
 ington, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit, Pittsburg, New 
 York, Boston, Cleveland and Buffalo showing that the ad- 
 vertising for help in January and February, 1919, was 
 larger by 1,406 advertisements than for the same months 
 a year earlier. 6 And an inspection of the pages of adver- 
 tising in the metropolitan newspapers in late 1919 and early 
 1920 shows page after page given to the most expensive 
 advertising for "help wanted." Common laborers were 
 
 In early 1918, it devised plans for effecting the wheat harvest of that 
 year with the minimum of loss. Establishing offices in the great centers 
 of the wheat belt, speed and efficiency marked every movement of the great 
 land army of harvesters numbering nearly 10,000 under its direction. Co- 
 operation was sought from newspapers, and other agencies used were mov- 
 ing pictures, the national grange, commercial organizations, and rural 
 telephone lines. 
 
 Owing to the failure of appropriation to continue its service, the re- 
 duction ordered in March, 1919, cut its force 80 per cent, leaving a mere 
 skeleton of its former force. 
 
 5 In the case of the Cleveland figures, it stated that the Employment 
 Service asked for an estimate from its local office there, which, in turn, 
 asked for an estimate from the Cleveland Federation of Labor, and 
 then the two were to make a guess. This guess was then forwarded to 
 Washington where it was given out as fact. 
 
 The advertising for female help amounted to 265,095 lines as com- 
 pared with 210,443 for the same period of the preceding year. On the other 
 hand, the papers selected from eight cities for the same months showed 61,095 
 lines of advertising for "situations wanted" (male) as against 57,509 
 for a year earlier. 
 
410 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 those most readily taken up in the early days of reconstruc- 
 tion. 
 
 The period immediately after the war closed was 
 marked by strikes of unusual violence in the United States, 
 with the avowed purpose of destroying so-called capitalism 
 and orderly government. It is to be regretted that promi- 
 nent in this effort at destruction were noted leaders of 
 organized labor who herded many of the honest laborers 
 like so many sheep into the wrong fold. And it was with 
 less basis for strikes than ever known in history. There 
 was never less need for increased wages than at that time, 
 or for improved conditions of work or living of the laborer, 
 as shown elsewhere. 7 The propaganda was actively at work 
 blowing smoke into the eyes of the American people, seek- 
 ing to blind them to the fact that it was the European 
 variety of Bolshevism finding its way in America. And by 
 the time of the next presidential election, the people were 
 awake to the fact that the broad announcement of Samuel 
 Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, 
 that it was the duty of organized labor to support the party 
 and policies of President Wilson, was not sound either in 
 sentiment or principle. Honest laboring men by the hun- 
 dreds of thousands repudiated the whole destructionist 
 scheme. Said a leading newspaper on the Atlantic sea- 
 board: 
 
 Whatever may be the constructive aims of Mr. Gompers and 
 his followers in the American Federation of Labor, the purpose is that 
 which was proclaimed on the very first day of the strike by John Fitz- 
 patrick, head of the strike committee: "We are going to socialize the 
 basic industries of the United States. This is the beginning of the 
 fight." And with radicalism in control of the basic industries the 
 necessaries of existence there would be created such a condition of 
 civil war as now threatens Great Britain. 8 
 
 1 Chapters on "Labor and Wages" and "Russia and Bolshevism." 
 8 Philadelphia North American of September 30, 1919. 
 
Reconstruction 411 
 
 It was the time chosen by Bolshevism and all of its hy- 
 brid associates to overturn the best government the world 
 ever knew and for a class purpose wholly. The situation 
 was sobering, even alarming, almost desperate. It gave 
 serious-minded people pause. But the result of the 1920 
 national election was as hard a hit at radical laborism, with 
 which Mr. Gompers was dallying, as it was at Wilsonism. 
 Indeed, upon the statements of both President Wilson and 
 President Gompers, the minds of the two lay alongside 
 of each other, and to strike one was to strike both. The 
 blow was sent home. 
 
 When, in the face of a national calamity, in the summer 
 of 1916, the organized railroad men, aided by President 
 Wilson, forced their demands upon the country through 
 a servile Congress, they set a pace that was followed by 
 all classes where it was possible, for increases in prices 
 and costs of living. Had the government conscripted labor 
 and capital at the same wages it paid the fighting boys, 
 there might have been a modicum of justice in the process. 
 But the debauch begun in 1916 continued throughout the 
 reconstruction period. 
 
 The first feeling of timidity and uncertainty, immedi- 
 ately following the cessation of hostilities, soon gave way 
 to a riot .of money-spending. Hotels everywhere demand- 
 ing exorbitant rates were crowded to capacity and travellers 
 found it difficult to secure lodging unless engaged well in 
 advance. Theaters the country over were doing a record- 
 breaking business. High-priced restaurants were patron- 
 ized beyond anything ever before known. Dealers in? 
 jewelry and in the most expensive kinds of men's and wom- 
 en's apparel, purveyors of all the infinite varieties of things 
 unnecessary and of high cost did an unheard-of business. 
 Nor was this on the part of the rich people who could well 
 afford to indulge in such a riot of buying. But it was while 
 they were turning their suits and having them retailored, 
 that men and women working for modest salaries and in 
 
412 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 humble position were freely purchasing of jewelry and gar- 
 ments that cost hundreds of dollars apiece. 
 
 Now the country was reaping the reward of the enor- 
 mously bulged prices that were forced by organized labor 
 upon the country in 1916. Office boys who were receiving 
 $8 to $10 per week were put on the war-plant pay-rolls at 
 $20 to $30; unskilled laborers jumped from $15 to $40. 
 The farmers were stripped of labor by the lure of the prices 
 paid by industrial centers, while his costs were rising, ne- 
 cessitating a rise in cost of the food he produced. Then 
 labor, finding that its bulkier envelope brought no better 
 living, made fresh demands. Building ceased because of 
 excessive prices for material and labor, rents shot skyward, 
 railroad rates increased and labor insisted on higher 
 wages. The vicious cycle was in full swing. It was at this 
 time that organized railroad men again made demand upon 
 President Wilson for further increase of wages unless there 
 was to be a reduced cost of living; and while the President 
 was discoursing upon "the judgment of society" and dwell- 
 ing upon his constructive statesmanship in world affairs, 
 A. B. Garretson, chairman of union railroad representatives, 
 was frankly describing the contest as one between the cave- 
 men when he said : 
 
 In times like these, men go back to primal instinct to the day of 
 the caveman, who, with his half-gnawed bone, snarled at the other 
 caveman who wanted to take his bone away. We leaders are fighting 
 for our men, the railroads are fighting for their stockholders, and the 
 shippers for themselves. The public will pay. 
 
 It was shortly after this, in late 1919, that public jour- 
 nals were comparing prices and other conditions after the 
 close of the Civil War with conditions prevailing at the 
 close of the Great War. Referring to the earlier period, 
 a New York correspondent of the London Times stated at 
 that time: 
 
 This war has brought the levity of the American character out 
 in bold relief. The indulgence in every variety of pleasure, luxury, 
 
Reconstruction 413 
 
 and extravagance is simply shocking. There is something saddening 
 in the high glee with which the people here look upon a grievous 
 national calamity. The jewelers' shops . . . have trebled their 
 trade; the love of fine dresses and ornaments on the part of women 
 amounts to madness. They have money and they must enjoy it. 
 
 Suggestive of the increased cost of living at that time, 
 these figures are cited: 
 
 Eggs jumped from fifteen to twenty-five cents a dozen, cheese 
 from eight to eighteen cents a pound, potatoes from $1.50 to $2.25 
 per bushel. All necessities rose in value from sixty to one hundred 
 per cent. Wages lagged behind, the average increase in all trades 
 being about twenty-five per cent. 
 
 But one who passed through the high-living costs after 
 the Great War may smile at the foregoing figures, especially 
 when it is remembered that the paper-dollar value of that 
 time was far below that of gold, while in the reconstruction 
 period of 1919-1921 they possessed equal value. For 
 now eggs went to $1.00 a dozen, and in late 1920 sold 
 in the middle West at $1.20; turkeys at Thanksgiving, 1920, 
 retailed at fifty cents per pound. Potatoes were sold at 
 $6.00 per bushel, in the spring of 1920, in a distinctively 
 potato section of the central Northwest, where butter 
 reached $1.00 a pound in a famous^dairying. State. These 
 prices fairly represent costs of the time, as affected by 
 foodstuffs. 
 
 As touching the building costs in early 1920, an architect 
 in a section of the country where the lumber business is 
 prominent stated publicly that the general-contract low bid 
 of $4,090 on a house in 1915 had been raised to $11,800 
 for exactly the same specifications, and that a $4,265 house 
 of 1915 would cost $12,950 at the beginning of 1920, while 
 number-one maple flooring costing $37 per thousand feet in 
 1916 was held at $200 in February, 1920. 
 
 According to the National Industrial Conference Board, 
 during the period from July, 1914, to March, 1920, the 
 increase in living cost was 95 per cent, or about 1.4 per 
 
414 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 cent a month; but that during the year previous the total 
 was 21 per cent, or about 1.75 per cent a month. Begun 
 by the reckless extravagance in all directions on the part of 
 the Administration, the unprecedented inflation of prices 
 was continued by equally reckless buying by the public until 
 the first sign of a break came with the overalls movement 
 late April, 1920. The hoarders and profiteers tried to 
 laugh it out of court as an absurd transitory fad, but it 
 proved their undoing. Negligible in itself in the quantity 
 of clothing purchased, the movement, by the sympathy en- 
 gendered among all classes of the general public, created 
 a determined sentiment against swollen prices that was of 
 great value at that particular time. 
 
 And while it had been fact that to mention the possi- 
 bility of a lowering of wages was taboo, and particularly 
 among newspapers, it was evident that in mid-autumn of 
 1920, a decisive slackening was shown in dropping over- 
 time work. With this elimination came a just demand for 
 a higher standard of production per man. From that 
 time on there was a constant and strong recession. By De- 
 cember of that year there was a sharp decline in wages, in 
 many instances upon the initiative of the workers them- 
 selves. And as 1921 dawned, men were out of employ- 
 ment who, but a short six months previous, could have had 
 any one of a half-dozen remunerative positions. Organ- 
 ized labor had overshot the mark, creating a deep-seated 
 public opposition; now the high wages had disappeared 
 in riotous living of a year earlier, and self-respecting men, 
 going about looking for something to do, brought back 
 into current vernacular the old familiar, but long-lost, 
 "tramp." 
 
 The November, 1920, letter to the public, put out by 
 the National City Bank of New York stated: 
 
 For the first time in the history of the United States, a period of 
 expansion has been checked and prices have turned decisively down- 
 ward without a banking panic. 
 
Reconstruction 415 
 
 And for this fact, the banks of the country deserve great 
 credit for refusing longer to aid those who were going the 
 swift short road to financial oblivion until, about the middle 
 of 1920, the banks of the land called a firm halt to the 
 ruinous pace. But so sudden was this step which should 
 have been taken earlier, that before mid-December so many 
 men were out of employment that governors of States and 
 mayors of cities were called upon to take up public work 
 that had been in contemplation, in order that men might 
 not suffer through the winter. 9 
 
 And at this very time, dealers of the country were going 
 through an ordeal that tested the strongest fiber. Said 
 one of them: 
 
 The world's commerce is going through the fires. . . . The 
 clouds are black, but thank God there is sunshine behind the clouds. 
 It took neither a bright man nor a courageous man to prosper during 
 the boom just past, but you must have a backbone now, you must be 
 a fighter in this great game of commerce and you must be prepared 
 to fight clean. 10 
 
 The problem with every dealer in commodities was to get 
 rid of his war-priced stocks with the least possible loss 
 when the crisis came. Each group of dealers thought his 
 suffered most. Each winced under the galling load, yet 
 bravely met his fate. The wage-earner who was first to be 
 favored by the arbitrary demands upon the nation through 
 the President in 1916, was the last to meet the losses. The 
 farmer was probably hit the hardest and complained the 
 most bitterly. But all were touched manufacturer, job- 
 ber, retailer, farmer, toiler. It was inevitable that each 
 group had to absorb his portion of the loss due to the prick- 
 ing of the bubble. There was sympathy with all, except 
 
 8 See resolutions of the Manufacturers' and Employers' Association of the 
 State held at Jackson, Michigan, December 10, 1920. This severe condi- 
 tion of unemployment continued to grow until President Harding called 
 a conference in Washington, autumn of 1921 to devise means for its 
 abatement. A month later it was said 1,000,000 of the unemployed had 
 been put to work. 
 
 10 George H. Capper of Chicago, in December, 1920. 
 
4i 6 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the profiteer, whether among the capital class or the organ- 
 ized-labor class whose production was far below standard 
 with an immoderately increased pay coming from the great 
 unorganized third party, the large general public, for whom 
 no President entered a plea. A full year before the final 
 adjustment came, there were warnings of the coming de- 
 cline in unprecedented prosperity and high prices, that the 
 country was entering upon the final phase of the delirium 
 the delirium of the profiteer in commercial and industrial 
 life as well as of the organized labor; the delirium of spend- 
 ing without considering the possible lean years of the period 
 that was to follow. 
 
 But prices of garments, cost of housing with 1,000,000 
 houses fewer than the demands, wages, and pricking of the 
 inflation bubble were not all that demanded serious atten- 
 tion during the reconstruction days. There was a'so a 
 crying need for education in the spirit of American ideals, 
 a need emphasized with the discovery that in some sections 
 of the country there had been tampering with schoolbooks 
 in the interest of German propaganda. From the splendid 
 public service rendered by the schools during the war came 
 an impetus to project school effort further into civic and 
 national affairs; and this at the very time when the pay of 
 teachers was far below that of wage-earners who paid noth- 
 ing to prepare for their common toil, resulting in a deplet- 
 ing of the ranks of the more competent teachers. So deep 
 was the impression the war made upon educators that at 
 the meeting of the National Education Association, early 
 in 1919, the greater number of the topics discussed were 
 upon the war's reconstruction of educational aims and ideals. 
 
 In all of the great aims of the reconstruction period, 
 perhaps nothing surpassed in importance that of this educa- 
 tional purpose. On approximately the same plane, however, 
 was the insistent demand for social justice, particularly a 
 more equitable system by insurance against the hazards of 
 sickness, unemployment, and old age, relieving workers of 
 
Reconstruction 417 
 
 the anxieties tormenting beyond endurance. To this end, 
 there was a large demand for full recognition of the dignity 
 and authority of labor in the scheme of democratic civiliza- 
 tion not merely a group who happened to be of organized 
 labor and urged the debarment of all who happened not 
 to belong to their group, the closed-shop workers, but 
 equally of all honorable laborers. For the disclosures in the 
 building profiteering investigations of New York, late in 
 1920, besmirched prominent organized labor leaders as 
 badly as it did the contractors. And the laborer who is 
 ready to smite the honorable laboring man simply because 
 he happens not to belong to the organization is not less a 
 danger to society than the employer who will smite a labor- 
 ing man because he does belong to the labor union. And 
 the investigation revealed the pitiable fact that the Bethle- 
 hem Steel operators boycotted dealers who employed union 
 men; and union labor boycotted those employing men who 
 did not belong to the union. Again it was the great third 
 party, the general public, that suffered; and this third party 
 was unable to distinguish between the tactics of the other 
 two. Both were accursed in its view. 
 
 But the materialism of these two antagonistic forces, 
 dominant for the moment, could not persist without extreme 
 danger to the nation. It was the force seeking the upper 
 hand the first year-and-half after the close of the war; but 
 when the people saw through their purpose, the nation 
 turned its back, deserting the materialism for the spiritual 
 forces. At the beginning of 1919, the president of the Uni- 
 versity of Minnesota in a public address, relating to the 
 spiritual forces operating in reconstruction, declared that 
 labor was then face to face with its most critical situation 
 in history, and urged all groups to set their faces in the 
 right direction and work for a better mutual understanding. 
 He added: 
 
 Present conditions are calling for the new American. Changes 
 have come, and more are coming. The new American must have 
 
41 8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 initiative, a spirit of independence, and an appreciation of honesty. 
 The present period is one of clash between things that are old and 
 things that are new. 
 
 This was the sentiment calling for an honest day's work 
 for a full day's pay; and a square deal on the part of the 
 employer for the employe ; and a square deal on the part of 
 the union man toward his fellow outside of the union. It 
 called for a square deal all around. 
 
 If captains of industry and captains of unionized labor 
 were pilfering the great public of the last obtainable nickel 
 in a quiet, gentlemanly fashion, others sought their end 
 in a less canonical manner, during this period. A crime 
 wave swept the nation from the close of the war, with 
 increasing pressure and volume, until its crest was reached 
 by the ushering in of the year 1921. So violent did it be- 
 come that in many cities the police were unable to cope with 
 it. New York, Chicago, even Philadelphia, and other cities 
 became notorious centers of lawlessness and lax .morals. 
 In other places men of the American Legion offered their 
 services to help subdue the criminals. Private citizens armed 
 themselves for self-defense. Officers were instructed to 
 shoot to kill. And when the public became so fully aroused 
 that it would not permit itself longer to be trifled with in 
 the pursuit of its orderly and legitimate business, the ter- 
 rorism began to diminish. 11 In large measure the great 
 impetus given these outbursts of the criminal instinct must 
 be attributed to the profligacy and dishonesty of the Ad- 
 ministration in dealing with the public during the Great 
 War. 
 
 While this deplorable side of human nature was mani- 
 festing itself; while shameless employers were battening 
 on some employes; while no less shameless labor leaders 
 were aiding in the pilfering of the general public, it was 
 a great relief to know that God was not lost sight of in 
 
 "The character of the criminal features changed, but not immediately 
 the degree. In November, 1921, United States Marines were placed on 
 guard to protect the mail against robbery, with instructions to shoot to kill. 
 
Reconstruction 419 
 
 the greatest period in which it was man' privilege to live. 
 Though the ill-starred Inter-Church World Movement cre- 
 ated a feeling of depression, it taught valuable lessons. 
 And other movements of world-wide import came into being 
 in individual denominations. Scarcely had the clash of 
 arms ceased, when these denominations began to make ap- 
 peal, for world-rebuilding of civilization, for sums running 
 into the hundreds of millions, additional to regular expenses. 
 After all the endless millions poured out for welfare work 
 in the war, it seemed like an unwise move to call for other 
 millions at such a time. The Methodist church started 
 the appeals by asking for $85,000,000, or, conditionally, 
 $105,000,000; it received $120,000,000. The Baptists 
 then asked for $100,000,000 and other prominent denomi- 
 nations in similarly large sums. 
 
 In the year 1920 lay the crisis of reconstruction. The 
 most dangerous corner was turned in safety, the speed hav- 
 ing slackened. As the year died away, an age passed into 
 history. The supreme efforts of Bolshevism to capture the 
 great democracy of the western hemisphere, materially 
 aided by the indifference if not actual sympathy of the Ad- 
 ministration, failed. Falsifying organized-labor leaders 
 were taught a severe lesson in the trouncing it, together with 
 Wilsonism, received at the hands of the great mass of the 
 people in the national election of that year. Profiteers and 
 domineering captains of industry were shown that a new 
 day had dawned. Social justice and higher ideals of even 
 the traditional Americanism were given a new impetus. 
 The world looked brighter than ever before. President 
 Harding's harking back to the Americanism of Washington 
 and Lincoln, in his inaugural address, stirred the great mass 
 of the people to new enthusiasms. 
 
 Never again should the nation be permitted to be head- 
 less in the severely exacting days of a crisis. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION 
 
 From its foundation, the nation has been grateful to 
 those who went forth in time of peril to fight its battles. 
 One manifestation of its gratitude has been in taring for 
 the disabled and aged veteran, and for his widow and chil- 
 dren. The large aggregate of its pension bill 1 for wars 
 preceding the Great War is but suggestive of other care it 
 has bestowed, such as soldiers' homes, orphans' schools. 
 
 During the Great War there was added a new and 
 greatly improved feature to the pay of the man in service 
 and those dependent upon him. This was an allotment by 
 the government to the wife and child left at home, in part 
 deducted from the man's pay, in part paid from the United 
 States treasury, but all sent direct to the wife by the gov- 
 ernment. Most beneficent in its conception, the execution 
 of this law became a farce and a national disgrace by reason 
 of the Administration's failure to meet these payments as 
 they became due; and the anxiety of the fighting man for 
 his wife and babe at home became to him a greater horror 
 than facing the guns of the enemy war-machine. 2 
 
 A yet greater improvement upon the government's plan 
 for caring for the fighting man and his dependents was the 
 law prepared by Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. 
 The Act of October 6, 1917, permitted each man in the 
 service to take out a life insurance policy to the amount 
 of $10,000, for the payment of which the government was 
 responsible. No safer insurance was ever known in all the 
 
 *The total to June 30, 1920, was $5,830,815,717, of which $5,502,445,815 
 was for Civil War pensions. 
 
 "See chapter on "Labor and Wages." 
 
 420 
 
Insurance and Compensation 421 
 
 world's history, and none at so low a rate. The insured 
 is permitted to carry this insurance for five years after peace 
 shall have been- declared by presidential proclamation. 
 
 The same law granted the fighting man compensation 
 for disability incurred in the service; and, in case of his 
 death, to his widow and children, or other relatives depend- 
 ent upon him. At the same time provision was made for 
 rebuilding the men after their fight in the war was over, 
 so that they might continue the battle in life's keen struggle 
 on a more nearly even footing. It undertook to rehabilitate 
 the disabled so as to restore them, at least in some meas- 
 ure, for useful activity, indemnifying them, so far as may 
 be, for the loss occasioned through any incurable lessening 
 of efficiency. 
 
 It was the most advanced position ever taken by any 
 government since governments began to exist among men, 
 in a matter of this kind. At the time of the enactment of the 
 law it was aptly described as "the most generous piece of 
 legislation ever written on the statute books of a grate- 
 ful nation." And the nation assigned large credit to those 
 who conceived and brought it forth. 
 
 By the end of July, 1918, the total amount of insurance 
 taken by the nation's fighting men was $25,000,000,000, an 
 amount exceeding the fondest dreams of the most sanguine, 
 that for July alone being $4,000,000,000. At the close of 
 the war, the total had grown to $39,669,198,000, taken 
 by 4,539,048 men, the average per policy being the amount 
 of $8,740. The claims made for payment on these policies 
 amount to $900,000,000 during the war activities; and dur- 
 ing the same period the premiums paid in on all policies 
 amounted to $2OO,ooo,ooo. 3 Great energy was displayed 
 by the officials having the matter in charge to see that, so 
 
 'The law, embracing the allotment, insurance, compensation, and re- 
 habilitation features, originally provided compulsory allotment of at least 
 $15 monthly to the wife. The government's allowances were made only 
 on request and after payment of the compulsory allowances. The gov- 
 ernment allowed $15 for wife alone, $25 for wife and one child, $32.50 
 for wife and two children, and $5 for each additional child up to the 
 
422 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 far as may be, every man in the service was insured. The 
 success in the widely scattered sections of Europe was due 
 in great measure to the efforts of 35 officers and 65 men 
 who left Washington and on Christmas, 1917, sailed from 
 New York to urge the importance of insurance upon the 
 men. 
 
 This just provision for the fighting men of the nation 
 must be attributed, at least in very marked measure, to 
 Secretary McAdoo, as one more of the notable things his 
 great brain was able to accomplish for the country. When 
 the bill was drawn, he gave to the public through the usual 
 news channels the statement that the scandal connected with 
 the old pension system, in vogue up to that time, was to 
 be avoided; and that the American public, as well as ad- 
 ministrative officials, would be spared the humiliation of 
 having repeated the unworthy conduct that had attached 
 to the old pension system. The idea caught the eye of the 
 American people, and they were misled by not inquiring 
 into the basis for any such statement. Even intelligent men, 
 those accustomed to investigate and to set before the public 
 only well-established facts, were relying upon Mr. Mc- 
 Adoo's statement. 4 
 
 That the various laws providing pensions for the sol- 
 maximum of $50. For one child alone $5 was allowed; for two, $12.50; for 
 three, $20; for four, $40; and $5 for each additional. 
 
 The compensation feature, which originally allowed a man $30 a 
 month for total disability, was increased to $80 by the amendment known 
 as the Sweet bill, which became law December 24, 1919; and thereunder, a 
 man with wife, from $45 to $90; with wife and one child, $55 to $95; with 
 wife and two or more children, $65 to $100. 
 
 There is preserved in a steel cabinet in the insurance division of the 
 War Risk Bureau a paper of rare historic significance. It is the original, 
 grimy with the soil of the trench, bearing the names of those who signed 
 on it for insurance the night before going out at daybreak into No Man's 
 Land, signed under a strong enemy offensive, some of the signers never 
 to return. It is preserved with the sacredness of the last will and testa- 
 ment of those boys. 
 
 4 In the Editor's Preface to the publication, "Effects of War upon In- 
 surance, with Special Reference to the Substitution of Insurance for Pen- 
 sions," issued as No. 6 of Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, by 
 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, appears this statement: 
 "The old-fashioned method of pensions was unsatisfactory from several 
 points of view. Not only was it inadequate in numerous instances, but it 
 
Insurance and Compensation 423 
 
 diers in wars preceding the Great War were abused is well 
 known. All were based upon disability of the applicant up 
 to a few years before the Great War shook Europe. The 
 Act of October 6, 1917, the basic law governing in the 
 Great War, is also based upon disability; and, in case of 
 widows, the provisions are not greatly unlike those govern- 
 ing pensions. When two widows claim the same compensa- 
 tion, the same kind of evidence will be required to determine 
 their claimed rights as has always been required since the 
 Government existed. A man who was not in the service, 
 but claims that he was, will have to seek to establish his 
 right to the compensation just as men always have in the 
 past. If an ex-service man claims that he was disabled in 
 the service or in any manner provided by law, that claim 
 will have to be established by human records and human 
 testimony, just as it has been heretofore. And unless human 
 nature has undergone a revolution since October 6, 1917, 
 there will be the same tendency to corruption, to intrigue, to 
 securing something for nothing that there always has been. 
 It may be lessened; but even that is doubtful, if there is 
 any basis for an opinion in the duplication of wives who 
 appeared for allotment upon the same man's service, even 
 before the author of the law had left office, or the war was 
 concluded. The law is great, the greatest of the kind ever 
 enacted by man; but that is hardly sufficient reason for mis- 
 leading the public as to its unequalled merits. In brief, in 
 
 afforded many opportunities for corruption, political intrigue and unfair 
 distribution." 
 
 The learned author of this publication states (p. 153) with perhaps 
 something more of reserve: "Pensions have not infrequently been used 
 to further political ends. Considerations of fairness and equity as be- 
 tween individual pensioners have been so often disregarded that the old 
 pension system in the United States became a reproach to the representa- 
 tive form of government. The generosity of a grateful people to those 
 who gave their lives and services to the perpetuation of the republic was 
 prostituted by selfish considerations. 
 
 "The contrast between the old system of pensions and that provided 
 by the war-risk insurance acts of 1917 is most striking. The feature of 
 compensation, so far as such an end is possible, is made the basis of the 
 new laws." 
 
 Name of Bureau later became Veterans Bureau. 
 
424 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the underlying idea of disability in this law, as in previous 
 enactments, it seems that three words, "Compensation for 
 disability," have been substituted for the single word "Pen- 
 sion." And already charges are being made of political 
 intrigue in seeking advantages additional through Congress; 
 and, to their credit be it said as a matter of early history 
 in the affair, the ex-service boys as a whole are standing 
 firmest against it. The one great, distinguishing, and bene- 
 ficent feature of the law is the provision for rehabilitating 
 the disabled fighter and financial aid to his wife and children 
 while he is undergoing the rebuilding process. There is 
 nothing in it to prevent intrigue, corruption, whether politi- 
 cal or other, or scandal, more than in preceding laws. 
 
 The War Risk Bureau originated when the Great War 
 began in Europe. It began in September, 1914, with the 
 intention of providing facilities for the insurance of Ameri- 
 can vessels, cargoes, and seamen against the risks of war, 
 and had as its office two small rooms in the basement of 
 the Treasury Building in Washington, and three years later 
 the Bureau had only 93 employes. 
 
 Then came the great law of October 6, 1917, creating 
 the military and naval divisions for consideration of allow- 
 ances to the fighting men and their dependents, and swiftly 
 it became the largest bureau to meet the immediate demands 
 upon its energy. In August, 1918, the employes numbered 
 over 8,000, while by the following March they had in- 
 creased to more than 17,000. These were officed in eighteen 
 widely separated buildings, of which the insurance division 
 alone occupied four. By the late summer of 1919, the 
 number of employes was reduced to about 15,000. Later 
 all were officed in one building of eleven stories. 
 
 At the time when this work was so heavily thrown upon 
 the bureau, it was necessary to scour the country for help, 
 and green clerks without any office experience whatever were 
 accepted, and yet the cry was for more clerks. 
 
 Added to this impediment was the more serious one, be- 
 
Insurance and Compensation 425 
 
 cause the more fundamental, of undertaking to establish 
 it in a new bureau without organization and at a time when 
 every conceivable organization facility of Government was 
 employed to the utmost in forwarding measures for the 
 battle-front; a bureau without proper records and without 
 the proper trained force of clerks. And this was in face of 
 the fact that the Bureau of Pensions, thoroughly organized, 
 with a large trained office force in operation for decades, 
 with records and the card index system, with its own work 
 lessening by reason of the depleting of the Civil War pen- 
 sion lists, could have handled the matter most efficiently. 
 
 It appeared to be another manifestation of the Admin- 
 istration malady of seeking something new upon the ground 
 that the old and tried must be corrupt or untrustworthy; of 
 disregarding experience and probable results. The results 
 soon appeared. Speaking of the administration of this 
 notable statute, President Wilson said : 
 
 This nation has no more solemn obligation than healing the hurts 
 of our wounded and restoring our disabled men to civil life and op- 
 portunity. The Government recognizes this, and the fulfilment of 
 the obligation is going forward, fully and generously. ... It is 
 merely the payment of a draft of honor which the United States of 
 America accepted when it selected these men and took them in their 
 health and strength to fight the battles of the nation. They have 
 kept the faith. Now we keep faith with them. 
 
 The words were nobly spoken. But what of the event? 
 In any great and new undertaking suddenly thrust upon 
 a new organization, particularly governmental organization, 
 there are sure to be mistakes and resulting complaints. But 
 what reason ever existed for withholding the pay and allot- 
 ments, small though they were, from the fighting lads and 
 their wives and babes at home when they went willing to 
 pay the price with their lives, while men enjoying the com- 
 forts of home who did not leave their firesides to go into 
 the trenches were regularly paid two to four or six times 
 as much from the United States treasury, never missing a 
 
426 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 pay-day on schedule time? What reason ever existed for 
 the failure of an efficient administration of the trust to 
 which the President so eloquently referred? 
 
 Yet, after fifteen months from the armistice which 
 brought the armed conflict to a close, nineteen months after 
 the Federal Board for Vocational Training was organized, 
 the Administration was not keeping faith with those who, 
 the President declared and the world knew, had kept the 
 faith. Of the more than 300,000 injured in the war, more 
 than 200,000 were registered as disabled. Of these, no,- 
 ooo were recognized as eligible for training under the 
 Board of Vocational Training, and there were placed in 
 actual training slightly over 24,000, of whom, after nine- 
 teen months, 217 had been placed in useful and gainful 
 occupations at a time when positions were crying on all 
 hands for persons to come and occupy. 
 
 In the War Risk Bureau, complaints arose from every 
 section of the country by the tens of thousands. The clerks 
 were occupied, they worked hard enough to bring results. 
 But it was the treadmill process. There ensued delay, 
 confusion, and aggravation of claimants who should have 
 had immediate attention. The administration of the office 
 was severely criticized, both from within and from with- 
 out. Affairs in the Bureau were topsy-turvy and apparently 
 without head to any portion of it, without capacity to 
 manage a large undertaking. It but emphasized Senator 
 Chamberlain's statement that the Government had ceased 
 to function an outstanding characteristic of the Adminis- 
 tration, though as many as 3,000 clerks in Washington were 
 working on the list of 110,000 eligible for vocational train- 
 ing, at the beginning working under a code of rules compris- 
 ing 522 sections. The Federal Board of Vocational Educa- 
 tion denied with vigor the charges of neglect against it, ex- 
 cept as to delays due to the War Risk Insurance Division. 
 
 This was the one bureau of the Government where, 
 above all others, once the nation was fully in the war, ex- 
 
Insurance and Compensation 427 
 
 pedition was the great demand. It should have met its 
 obligations to the splendid fellows who went to the front at 
 least as promptly as it did with those whose profiteering 
 was reinforced by contracts whose preparation required 
 great time and the nicety of exactness, or the officials who 
 remained in Washington from the President down. 
 
 Overwhelmed by the mass of business for which it 
 was utterly unprepared, the War Risk Bureau became a 
 mass of inefficiency. Under these circumstances, Secretary 
 McAdoo asked Colonel Henry D. Lindsley to accept the 
 position of Director of the Bureau, in the hope of saving 
 it and preventing billions of dollars of insurance lapsing. 
 Colonel Lindsley accepted upon condition that he be given 
 a free hand to effect necessary reforms and to introduce 
 business methods. When he found the indescribable condi- 
 tion of affairs in the Bureau, he asked Secretary Glass, 
 who in the meantime had succeeded McAdoo, to aid in the 
 removal of some obstacles that existed in the endless red- 
 tape, so that he might meet the requirements of the law 
 looking toward the real aid that he found was denied the 
 soldiers and sailors of recent service. In reply, Secretary 
 Glass asked for Colonel Lindsley's resignation. He and 
 all his assistants promptly resigned, leaving this most im- 
 portant bureau practically without a head a tragedy in 
 the nation. 
 
 This new and great bureau had fallen into disrepute. 
 Demoralization, utter and profound, appears to have set- 
 tled down upon its operations. A special committee, with 
 Charles E. Hughes, former Republican candidate for Presi- 
 dent, at its head, was appointed in mid-summer, 1919, to 
 investigate the situation and devise some way for extricat- 
 ing it from its sad state. The country received something 
 of a shock when informed by this committee that three- 
 fourths of the men who had taken out insurance had failed 
 to keep up their payments, though with every advantage 
 of governmental organization, authority and backing. And 
 
428 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 the Government literally placarded the entire country in a 
 campaign urging the insured o keep up their insurance. 
 And just before the holidays, end of 1920, large display 
 advertisements appeared in the newspapers urging friends 
 to present the insured with receipts showing premiums paid 
 up to that time as a Christmas gift. 
 
 So disastrous was the failure of the bureau to func- 
 tion, that the complaints became so grievous as to make the 
 whole Country feel that it was scarcely less than an outrage 
 against the boys who suffered at the front and who were 
 now made to suffer doubly. And at a conference held at 
 Indianapolis, Indiana, early in November, 1920, the na- 
 tional commander of the American Legion declared to 
 the department adjutants from thirty states that it was 
 necessary for the Legion to place itself between the dis- 
 abled service men and government incompetency. Middle 
 of the following month, a Montana delegation went to 
 Washington to seek relief from Congress, and in that state 
 cases of neglected disabled men became so glaring as to 
 threaten legal steps to compel action. 
 
 The enormous load placed upon this newly organized 
 bureau was sufficient to swamp any organization at the be- 
 ginning, an error chargeable to the Administration. The 
 new bureau failed to meet the requirements of the situa- 
 tion, when, after the war had been closed for more than 
 two years, it was still floundering while the disabled men 
 were suffering and unprovided for. As late as October, 
 
 1921, a special Senate committee reported that to July i, 
 of that year, there had been 388,000 applications for vo- 
 cational training, but only 5,000 had been rehabilitated, 
 and added: "It is with deep regret that we report this 
 melancholy fact." 
 
 The country will never look kindly upon any organiza- 
 tion or institution that neglects its disabled fighters. For 
 
 1922, however, the expenditures for disabled ex-service 
 men will be $510,000,000. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 
 
 There is an abounding literature upon the Spirit of '76, 
 some of it boastful, all of it cheerful. It creates an ex- 
 hilarating spirit among real Americans. There is ample, 
 also, upon the Spirit of '61, which, however, partakes of 
 something of a sectional character, though it relates to the 
 preservation of the Union. There is a lesser literature 
 upon the Spirit of '98, when America as one man flew to 
 arms to redress the outrage of Spanish tyranny. And there 
 are other Spirits which have gained a place in American 
 history, even if they do not grip present-day American 
 thought. 
 
 It remained, however, for the conflagration which be- 
 gan its devastation of Europe in the summer of 1914, to 
 bring forth the real Spirit of America. In '76 there was 
 no America; in '61 it was a divided America; and in '98 
 it required so little of America. But in 1914-1918 there 
 was a real demand for the genuine American Spirit from 
 the very moment disaster to civilization was threatened by 
 the destructive forces at militarism's command. And this 
 spirit promptly began to take shape, once the purpose of 
 Prussianism was discerned. True, there was propaganda 
 spread insidiously throughout the land by the Prussian forces 
 at work and by the destructive forces of anarchism in our 
 own land, most of which were operating in Germany's be- 
 half, and the no less insidious forces of pacifism among 
 American citizens led in large measure by those in high places 
 in Administration circles. As leaders of the American 
 thought there stood forth a few souls preeminent in their 
 Americanism, who grasped the situation and understood 
 
 429 
 
43 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 how the various forces in operation were related to the 
 preservation or destruction of American institutions. It 
 was an extremely unfortunate moment for America that 
 none of these outstanding men were found in governmental 
 positions. It is no less unfortunate that those in the Admin- 
 istration who did undertake to represent the genuine Amer- 
 ican spirit were excluded from the Administration counsels. 
 The statements put forth by Administration leaders at 
 first confused, then baffled, American opinion. When 
 America was attacked, deliberately and murderously, by 
 the German government in the sinking of the "Lusitania," 
 sending to the bottom of the sea innocent men, women, and 
 children, there was such an outcry at the outrage, which 
 was known clearly to be an outrage, that President Wilson 
 felt called upon to state that the people should not be seized 
 with hysteria, that he could not be unbalanced from his nor- 
 mal course of thought, and that some people were too proud 
 to fight. This the Spirit of America looked upon as scarcely 
 less an outrage than that committed upon the "Lusitania." 
 The American Administration had been looked to to give 
 guidance to American thought and purpose in the devastat- 
 ing conflict of arms in Europe. But it now knew that it 
 had been looking to the wrong source. Even Theodore 
 Roosevelt, sane and clear-eyed citizen that he was, admitted 
 that he had been misled by assuming that those in high au- 
 thority had information which he and other private Ameri- 
 can citizens did not possess; but from that moment he be- 
 came the embodiment of the American spirit, and to him 
 the American people turned for guidance in the hour of dis- 
 tress. 1 
 
 1 School books in New York were ordered changed because they con- 
 veyed an erroneous idea of this great American, then still living. In 
 December, 1918, Superintendent of Schools William L. Ettinger notified all 
 high-school principals to eliminate all reference to Theodore Roosevelt's 
 attitude toward the Great War in its earlier stages. These are the por- 
 tions ordered eliminated: 
 
 The Germans invaded Belgium August 4, 1914. The same day our 
 official proclamation of neutrality was issued. Two weeks later Presi- 
 dent Wilson sent an appeal to the American people in which he said: 
 
The Spirit of America 431 
 
 So pronounced was the spirit of America in the emer- 
 gency that tens of thousands, not relying upon the Admin- 
 istration's lead, crossed the line into Canada and enlisted 
 with the Canadian forces in order that they might get into 
 the fight of right against wrong; while yet other thousands 
 crossed the seas to enlist directly with the British or French 
 forces. 
 
 But America became fully aroused by the gravity of 
 the situation. Then neither the President nor a supine 
 Congress could prevent that stirring of the American spirit 
 which has always been profound in times of national crisis, 
 or where right is matched against wrong. 
 
 And there was probably never a greater manifestation 
 of eagerness to serve than was found in America in the 
 first weeks the nation was in the war. The sum of the effort 
 that grew out of that impulse for service was tremendous, 
 incalculable. 
 
 And in it all, there was found nowhere a finer mani- 
 festation of the real spirit of America, the spirit to serve, 
 than was found in its institutions of higher learning, where 
 it might be thought to be most apathetic. For there was 
 a large and growing class in all of America's older colleges, 
 commonly known as the rich or well-to-do class, city bred, 
 who accepted college life largely as a social tradition, that 
 
 "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true 
 spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and 
 friendliness to all concerned." The following month ex-President Roose- 
 velt in a magazine article wrote: "It is certainly desirable that we 
 should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would 
 warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other." 
 Replying to this statement in the New York text-books, former President 
 Roosevelt declared that he had assumed, as he had a right to assume, 
 that the national Administration was dealing fairly with the American 
 people, knowing the inside facts of the diplomacy in connection with the 
 Great War, instead of misleading and egregiously deceiving them by its 
 conduct of foreign affairs; and that it was under this misapprehension 
 that he had written the words quoted. He objected strenuously and 
 righteously to school books quoting him when he was laboring under a mis- 
 apprehension, as was all America, because of the deception practiced by 
 the Administration upon the people ; and not quoting his thorough American 
 spirit after he was put into possession of the facts as to neutrality through 
 channels outside of the Administration. 
 
 In this connection see also the chapter "Looking Toward Peace," 
 
43 2 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 was moved to a deeper seriousness by the events of war. 
 A large proportion of them entered the military or naval 
 forces as soon as possible after our declaration of war. 
 They met danger, endured discipline, and suffered privation 
 in the finest spirit. Practically all of the leading colleges 
 of the nation were transformed into army posts, and scarcely 
 a man was found shirking his duty colleges that were 
 thought to be beyond the reach of war, whether on the 
 plains of the West or in the mountains of the East or on 
 the seaboard. The men in the colleges possessed of this 
 spirit quickly grasped the situation and were ready for the 
 utmost trial and the supreme sacrifice. 
 
 It was in June of the year 1917. The occasion was a 
 college commencement. Many of the young men of the 
 college had already entered the fighting ranks of the nation, 
 so that the college was depleted by a high percentage of its 
 student body. The ample rains had carpeted the expansive 
 lawns with a perfect green. The sky overhead was of the 
 deepest blue. The air was balmy. The warmth of the 
 sunshine permitted the choice of summer garments. The 
 mountains round about were as great fortresses, and at 
 their base flowed the gentle stream through the undis- 
 turbed quiet of the valley. Platoons of student soldiers 
 were in regular formation of battle or of maneuver. The 
 alumni of the century-old institution had gathered from every 
 section of the nation. Young ladies in their gayest summer 
 costumes, gazing upon the scene, wore the smile becoming 
 the perfect day it was. The procession across the campus 
 headed by the institution's president was a thing to be re- 
 membered. The oratory of the day was different from the 
 oratory of other days. The whole procedure was quiet and 
 without ostentation. Boys from the institution, boys from 
 the homes of those who had returned for the events of this 
 great day, were in the ranks in other sections of the country 
 or were crossing the seas to engage in the death struggle 
 of autocracy against democracy. This scene, wonderful 
 
The Spirit of America 433 
 
 in its conception, surpassing in its impressiveness, could 
 be repeated whether in the mountains of New England or 
 in the plains of Kansas or Oklahoma. It was, in the con- 
 crete, the American spirit as manifested in the outward 
 form among the most intelligent. 
 
 In the early days of the war, they were joined by the 
 tens of thousands of comrades from every walk of life a 
 thing to remember with pride. But no less a demonstra- 
 tion of magnificent loyalty was the spectacle of 10,000,000 
 young Americans quietly assembling at their polling places; 
 and placing their lives at the disposal of their government, 
 to which, at a later date, were added 14,000,000. As finely 
 phrased by President Wilson: "This is in no sense a con- 
 scription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a 
 nation that has volunteered in the mass." 
 
 And all these, like the men they were, stood ready to 
 meet the shock of battle in the manner of America's best 
 tradition. Many made the supreme sacrifice ; all were ready. 
 America never exhibited a finer spirit on the battle-front, 
 or one more universal. This spirit was well illustrated in 
 the unequal conflict in which the 8,000 officers and men com- 
 posing the Marine Brigade engaged near Chateau Thierry 
 on June 5, 1918. This was to stop the German thrust at 
 Paris, and was thrown into the breach at the crucial hour. 
 The marines, in the fighting, took Lucy-le-Bocage, cleared 
 Belleau Wood, and captured Bouresches. But before it 
 could be relieved at the end of the month, the brigade had 
 lost 126 officers and 5,073 men. 
 
 This was not exceptional, save for the opportunity for 
 sacrifice which it offered. A writer in a national weekly, 
 as he saw it on the American battle-front from Vaux to Sois- 
 sons, gives this incident: 
 
 All our boys lay stretched exactly in the same direction, as if by 
 some mysterious magnetic current they had been pointed toward some 
 spiritual pole the pole of their avenging purpose. They lay stretched 
 exactly in the line of the advance, head toward the foe, and bodies 
 
434 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 still beautiful and lithe, while the Germans were in huddles at the 
 bottom of shell holes. 2 
 
 The nation is very proud of the war record of its splen- 
 did fellows over there. At Belleau Wood; at Chateau 
 Thierry; in the dashing sweep by which the St. Mihiel 
 salient was wrested from the enemy after it had been held 
 with a grip of steel for four years; in the dogged, terrible 
 weeks of deadly combat in the Argonne our men added 
 laurels to the American arms as fine as any in our history. 
 
 It is the same story by all of them the very old story 
 told over and over. It is the same story which had been 
 writ large across the pages of history whenever the deeds 
 of American soldiers have been recorded. Never staling in 
 the telling, it thrills American hearts at every repetition, and 
 never did it thrill more than in this, the latest telling. 
 
 The only thing that stopped the victorious American 
 soldiers on the trail of the German armies was an order 
 issued on the day the armistice became effective. The news 
 that the German command had thrown into the lines op- 
 posite the United States army its last available division 
 came simultaneously with the order to American divisions 
 to halt in their tracks at n a. m., November n, 1918. 
 The news of the armistice was sent by telephone, telegraph, 
 radio, and runner to all headquarters. The formal field 
 order, timed fifteen minutes after the armistice was in 
 effect, furnishing written confirmation of these, runs as 
 follows, and is the last field order of the Meuse-Argonne 
 drive : 
 
 I Army, Am. E. F. 
 
 II November, 1918, 11:15 H. 
 SECRET. 
 
 FIELD ORDERS 
 
 NO. 112 (MAPS: No change.) 
 
 I. (a) Yesterday the enemy threw into the line opposite our 3rd 
 Corps his last available division on the western front. 
 2 James Hopper in Colliers, December 14, 1918. 
 
The Spirit of America 435 
 
 (b) An armistice with Germany has been signed and all hos- 
 tilities cease at n hours, November nth. 
 
 (c) The Allied Armies hold themselves in readiness for fur- 
 ther advance. 
 
 2. The I. American Army while holding its present front will 
 prepare for further advance. 
 
 3. (a) ARMY CORPS, ARTILLERY AND SERF ICES. 
 The present line attained will be organized in depth. Troops will 
 
 be disposed so as to obtain the maximum rest and comfort consistent 
 with the necessary arrangements or security and with preparations for 
 further advance. 
 
 (X) No troops will pass the line reached at II hours, Novem- 
 ber nth, until they receive further orders. 
 
 All communication with the enemy is forbidden pending further 
 instructions. The cessation of hostilities is an armistice only, and 
 not a peace, and there must be no relaxation of vigilance. The troops 
 must be prepared at any time for a rapid forward movement. 
 
 Special steps will be taken by all commanders to insure the strict- 
 est discipline and to be prepared for any eventuality. Troops must 
 be held well in hand and higher commanders will personally inspect 
 all organizations with the foregoing in view. 
 
 4. Administrative details No change. 
 
 5. P. C.'s. and exes of liaison No change. 
 By command of Lieut. General Liggett: 
 
 H. A. DRUM, 
 
 Chief of Staff. 
 OFFICIAL: 
 
 G. C. MARSHALL, JR. 
 
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. 
 
 Preeminent as an aid to the fighting spirit is the con- 
 sciousness of a worthy cause. Then comes the maintenance 
 of morale, a mighty factor in any cause in which co-opera- 
 tion is essential. The Administration did well to recog- 
 nize the value of the manly sports in developing this ele- 
 ment. To this end, it made liberal allowance, and cannot 
 be given too high credit therefor. 
 
 August i, 1918, The War Department made announce- 
 ment that for use in training-camps, the Department, with 
 
436 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 $250,000, had purchased sufficient material to equip all 
 the training camps with sporting goods. This included 
 17,500 sets of boxing-gloves, 7,000 baseball bats, 21,100 
 baseballs, 3,500 play-ground baseball bats, 10,500 play- 
 ground balls, 3,000 Rugby footballs, 7,000 soccer-balls, 
 3,500 volley-balls. 
 
 At the Great Lakes Naval Training Station alone were 
 used 7,000 baseballs for the season of 1918. At the same 
 station, footballs were ordered by the gross, and sweaters, 
 jerseys, stockings for football, and the like, were ordered by 
 the car-lot. 
 
 At the same time the War Department made public 
 the statement that the amount of clothing delivered since 
 April i, 1918, as shown by the latest statistical report of 
 the Clothing and Equipage Division of the Quarter-master 
 Corps, was as follows: 4,373,000 pairs of spiral puttees; 
 55>958,ooo pairs of woolen stockings; 10,507,000 pairs of 
 woolen breeches; 8,069,000 woolen coats; and 5,377,000 
 overcoats. 
 
 It was not strange, therefore, when the American sol- 
 dier returned from his service overseas that he was found 
 to be self-restrained, self-contained, and at the same time 
 ready to be helpful. It was on the train out of Rockford 
 (Camp Grant) that carloads of soldiers, on their way 
 home from discharge, were met constantly. One could 
 hardly have felt that he was among those who had gone 
 through trials like Chateau Thierry and the Argonne. No 
 loud word was heard in a two-hours' ride toward Madison; 
 no discordant note. The train was crowded. There was 
 every opportunity to become noisy and more or less fluent 
 in uncouth language. There was none of it. Some were 
 studying time-tables; some asked questions of the half-dozen 
 civilian passengers, to get a true idea of home conditions, 
 or told how New York was closed to those not from the 
 metropolis and how open-armed was Chicago in the warmth 
 of its welcome; some eagerly devoured the news of the lat- 
 
The Spirit of America 437 
 
 est edition of the city papers, while others were deep in the 
 magazine short story; yet others were reading books to 
 which they had fallen heir, or trying to catch up in the mat- 
 ter of lost sleep. 
 
 One thing was markedly noticeable : As the last woman 
 left the car there was an eager scramble to light pipes, 
 cigars, cigarettes. Not a suggestion, however, of smoking 
 in the presence of a woman in the coach was to be seen or 
 heard anywhere. 
 
 It is none too strong to accord with the facts to say that 
 the world had never possessed such an army as that which 
 went forth from field and factory, from rail and boat, from 
 office and street-cleaning force, from college professor's 
 chair and scavenger's dump, known as the Yankee army. 
 They went forth to fight the world's battle for democracy 
 with those other nations that had stood the shock of the 
 mightiest military machine the world had ever seen until it 
 was difficult to stand longer under a strain such as history 
 had not, till then, recorded. If the Roman legion was effi- 
 cient, the free spirit of the American doughboy was more 
 efficient. If the Prussian military machine was mighty, the 
 free fighting spirit of the American doughboy was mightier. 
 If the Spartan was taught to have his entrails gnawed out 
 by a wild beast rather than complain, the American dough- 
 boy of the "lost battalion," 3 or any other, would gnaw roots 
 of trees and plants to keep himself alive in order to send 
 defiance at an overwhelming enemy in a more worthy cause. 
 
 That President Wilson was capable, on occasion, of 
 rising to the highest flights in real appreciation of things 
 accomplished was demonstrated on various occasions. Such 
 an occasion was his tribute to the American army and navy, 
 on December 2, 1918, when he said: 
 
 Their officers understood the grim and exacting task they had 
 
 * Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Whittlesey, outnum- 
 bered overwhelmingly when surrounded and commanded by the enemy to 
 surrender, defiantly refused, though without food, sustained life by eating 
 the bark of roots until relieved. 
 
43 8 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 undertaken and performed it with an audacity, efficiency and unhesi- 
 tating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with im- 
 perishable distinction at every turn whether the enterprise were great 
 or small. . . . Such men as these hardly need to be commanded and 
 go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence 
 of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud 
 to be the fellow countryman of men of such stuff and valor. Those 
 of us who stayed at home did our duty ; the war could not have been 
 won or the gallant men who fought it given their opportunity to 
 win it otherwise; but for many a long day we shall think ourselves 
 "accursed we were not there, and hold our manhood cheap while any 
 speaks that fought" with these at St. Mihiel or Thierry. The mem- 
 ory of those days of triumphant battle will go with these fortunate 
 men to their graves ; and each will have his favorite memory. 
 
 Nor were the Allies unappreciative of this fighting spirit. 
 Expressing what was the general sentiment of the Allies 
 toward the Yankee soldier, the French Government, on 
 January i, 1919, paid this tribute to America's dead in 
 France : 
 
 The French government wishes to express its profound sympathy 
 and gratitude to the American families whose sons have met a glorious 
 death on French soil during the war. It wishes to share in their 
 mourning. The graves of the young soldiers of America are as 
 sacred in its eyes as are those of their French comrades and it will 
 take the necessary measures to provide that they shall be respected 
 and tended with a reverent and patriotic care. 
 
 And while it was at all times admitted that to the men 
 who went through the trial of battle America gave its 
 thanks and admiration, it was realized that the men who 
 did not "get across" were ready and eager and would have 
 given of themselves to the glory of the flag and the suc- 
 cess of our cause as freely as those who laid down their 
 lives in battle. 
 
 But fighting was only one form of the spirit of the 
 American soldier. Dashing, heedless, dare-devil in their 
 spirit on the field of battle, the American soldiers won other 
 
The Spirit of America 439 
 
 and finer tributes than these tributes calculated to stir all 
 as profoundly as any that were won by their conduct in 
 the smoke and uproar and fiery hell at the front. The 
 Marquise de Nosilles, in a letter to a New York friend, 
 used these words: 
 
 Bring a smile on somebody's face! That seems to be the motto of 
 all Americans over here. Sugar plums, chocolate, gasoline, tires, deli- 
 cious white bread, all luxuries now unknown, are given to the French 
 by your people. One of the things that touches me most is the love 
 of the Americans for little children. In all villages you can see little 
 tots shrieking out in laughter while a huge boy in khaki romps about 
 for their own particular amusement. 
 
 As if this were not enough she proceeds to give an in- 
 stance of a poor, shriveled granny seeking to cross a muddy 
 street along which the motors were running wildly, and 
 fearful lest she be caught in the mud and between the ma- 
 chines, when a big burly United States soldier picked her 
 up and trotted off across the street and set her down in 
 safety. And she refers, in her letter to the inborn gentle- 
 ness of the men, who did not forget their mothers and 
 sisters at home, and who were always glad to extend the 
 friendly hand to children. Tributes like these fell as thick 
 as showers on our passing regiments by the hands of women 
 and children once left in the brutal wake of war. 
 
 Every American that is 100 per cent a man cannot but 
 tingle with pride when he reads of deeds like these, as 
 much as he does when he reads of the dare-devil fighting 
 fury of the same men when they hurled themselves against 
 the brutal Germans who wrought all the wreck and ruin 
 possible. His eyes, blazing with pride in the warrior, may 
 become dimmed as emotion unsteadies his frame when he 
 sees in the same man the cheery, light-hearted, bright-faced 
 soldier in khaki, carrying the burdens of the weak and help- 
 less, romping with laughing children, sharing his food and 
 scanty luxuries with the hungry and heart-sick victims of an 
 inexpressible wrong. It was all possible. There was no 
 
44 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 sentimentalizing. It was all in the routine of the day's 
 work the instinctive matter-of-course routine of the gentle- 
 man. 
 
 When the first of the American forces landed in France, 
 France was almost bled white. They had good reason to 
 feel downcast, though there was not a thought of surrender. 
 And when the French people saw the laughing, singing, 
 rollicking youngsters from across the sea marching through 
 Paris as if it were a mere holiday affair, they stood aghast. 
 Horrified at the thought that these men could ever be of 
 service in battling the German war machine, they turned 
 aside with drooping spirit. They had not seen anything 
 like it; had not conceived anything so incongruous. It was 
 beyond the stretch of the splendid French imagination. But 
 it was all there, and was all true, as the noble French dis- 
 covered to their delight, when the opportunity came to face 
 the machine. 
 
 But the Spirit of America manifested itself not alone 
 in the fighting man. The same spirit that pushed him into 
 the hell of battle, was breathed into those who had to re- 
 main at home. It manifested itself in many and diverse 
 forms. 
 
 The housekeeper accepted the suggestions of Herbert 
 Hoover, Food Administrator, as a religious decalogue; if 
 the householder did not act with religious care upon the sug- 
 gestions of Fuel Administrator Garfield as to how to run 
 his furnace or sift his ashes or the many details as to the 
 saving of fuel, it was because he understood it less readily. 
 When the Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo asked the peo- 
 ple to buy bonds to help the nation, they bought, often 
 skimping themselves in the actual necessaries of life for the 
 purpose. 
 
 But nowhere was the Spirit of America more freely and 
 openly shown than in compliance with the simple request of 
 the American Red Cross Society that everything in the na- 
 ture of tin and tinfoil be saved and turned into its hands. 
 
The Spirit of America 441 
 
 In this small act of service, dignified elderly gentlemen vied 
 with young men and maidens in gathering from the side- 
 walks, even from the gutters of the cities and towns and 
 the country villages, all scraps from cigarette wrappings 
 or cigars or any other source that would be a compliance 
 with the Red Cross request all for the sake of the spirit 
 which it manifested and not with any thought or suggestion 
 of money remuneration. 
 
 One feature of the developments growing out of 
 America's relations to the Great War that accomplished 
 much for the better community spirit throughout the land, 
 was the helpfulness rendered by neighbor to neighbor and 
 by community to community. It is to the credit of the 
 Administration that it gave great encouragement to this 
 spirit; and it should be recorded as one of the ennobling 
 features of the Administration's relation to the Great War. 
 Mrs. A. would take care of the children of her next-door 
 neighbor Mrs. B, while the latter visited the downtown cash- 
 and-carry store to make purchases for herself or for both. 
 Mrs. C. would gather all the neighbors her automobile 
 would carry and together they would visit the store where 
 they could make purchases for their families to the best 
 advantage. Mrs. D. made her home the center for collect- 
 ing all the clothing to take care of the needy children in 
 her immediate vicinity. And Mrs. A. and Mrs. B. and 
 Mrs. C. and Mrs. D. with all their neighbors gathered at 
 the home of some one of them for the forenoon or the 
 afternoon or the entire day to knit and sew and do any other 
 work that was necessary to relieve the suffering not only in 
 their immediate vicinity but in the large community, per- 
 haps to clothe some Belgian orphans brought to America 
 or to provide clothing for suffering humanity across the sea. 
 There came also the larger service when the neighbors of 
 a whole community would meet at the public library or in 
 the public-school building or in the guild-hall or in the 
 church to carry on the larger and broader work for the Red 
 
442 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 Cross. Thus there developed in America that neighborly, 
 home-like spirit, which was the spirit of Jesus when he was 
 upon earth, that became so helpful in administering to the 
 acute conditions that arose after the war due to the unrest 
 and the uncertainty in the settlement of the social problem. 
 
 Republics, and democratic nations generally, have been 
 accused of being slow in action, and probably not without 
 reason. But once America took a decisive stand, there 
 was never any question of the achievement. With 2,000,- 
 ooo men in France, and with the assurance of 5,000,000 
 more ready, had the war continued until the middle of the 
 next year; and with a war budget of more than $25,000,- 
 000,000 for the year 1918, the conviction that the demo- 
 cratic system was necessarily inefficient was dispelled. The 
 nation was turning out rifles at the rate of more than 3,000,- 
 ooo a year a rate that was constantly increasing ma- 
 chine guns at the rate of more than 400,000 a year, with 
 shells, shrapnel, and small-arms ammunition in correspond- 
 ing quantities. Whereas in 1917 the nation was turning out 
 13,000 rifles monthly, a year later they were being turned 
 out at the rate of 264,000 every month. 
 
 With every man from 18 to 45 years of age registered 
 for military service, with most of the nation's industrial 
 plants transformed to factories of war materials, with clubs, 
 schools and miscellaneous buildings every day converted into 
 hospitals, with all the agencies of transportation becoming 
 avenues of traffic leading directly to the front in France, 
 with homes half deserted because the members were en- 
 gaged in Red Cross work, in selling bonds to carry on the 
 war, in gathering funds for the Y. M. C. A. and other wel- 
 fare agencies, with all these the American spirit was being 
 manifested in its real form in the American nation. 
 
 By the middle of October, 1919, announcement was 
 made that 8,000,000 American women, aided by many boys 
 and girls, produced in the twenty months ending February 
 28, 1919, more than 371,500,000 relief articles, valued at 
 
The Spirit of America 443 
 
 approximately $94,000,000, for the benefit of American 
 and Allied soldiers and sailors and destitute civilians. Be- 
 sides this, the report of the American Red Cross, covering its 
 activities during the war, showed that 23,822 of America's 
 women enrolled themselves as Red Cross nurses; while 
 others who remained at home, through the canteen service 
 of the Red Cross furnished refreshments such as sand- 
 wiches, candy, cigarettes, ice-cream, etc., to soldiers and 
 sailors 39,948,733 times. All of this was done at an oper- 
 ating cost of only 1.7 per cent. 
 
 Indeed, the ardor and unanimity with which the Ameri- 
 can people enlisted in the cause of democracy and made it 
 virtually a national religion is one of the outstanding phe- 
 nomena of history. 
 
 The artists of the country'played a very important part 
 in the manifestation of the American Spirit during the war, 
 through posters, large and small, on billboards occupying 
 as many feet as the space to be had permitted. Picture 
 posters of rare beauty and aptitude were placed before the 
 people showing facts that were essential for the informing 
 of the public upon the great needs of war. Space for these 
 posters was amply and generously donated by individuals, 
 organizations, and municipal and state bodies on promi- 
 nent vacant lots, in front of courthouses, on church lots, on 
 the grounds of state buildings anywhere and everywhere 
 that they would serve the desired end. 
 
 They were among the many influences uniting to win 
 the war. Not much was written about them, though they 
 weighed heavily for victory. It was the National Pictorial 
 Publicists Association, of which Charles Dana Gibson was 
 the head, that took in hand the chief part of this work. It 
 might appear a little out of order to consider the pencil 
 and brush as weapons of warfare; but these are the facts 
 that the story of the war brings to light. To win the war, 
 the boys had to be fed and armed; to buy food and guns, 
 money was needed; to raise money, an appeal had to be 
 
444 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 made. The poster, the painting, the cartoon were used 
 with telling effect to drive home the appeal. 
 
 The most noted and highest paid artists of the country 
 banded into this Association to give their service freely for 
 the maintenance of morale and cultivation of donations 
 or money. Between April 17, 1917, and November 15, 
 1918, fifty-eight departments worked steadily to create the 
 national spirit through posters and pictured stories. Seven 
 hundred poster designs, 287 cartoons, 60 paintings for the 
 Food Administration, and 1438 labor drawings were turned 
 over to the Government free by the organized artists. The 
 posters are to perpetuate the art of the decade through the 
 centuries, as every war poster has been preserved by the 
 Government. 
 
 In the conduct of the great mass of Americans of Ger- 
 man blood there was a fine and enduring testimonial to the 
 power of America's spirit. It stood steadfast and with 
 marvelous patience under the lash of humiliation. But these 
 Germans that were so loyal to the land of their adoption 
 were an offset to the disloyalty of Germans of distinctly 
 pro-German sentiments who stood for the Fatherland rather 
 than for the land to which they had come to secure their 
 education, gain a livelihood and more, but of which they did 
 not actually become a component part. There was none 
 among all the races of earth that were ready to endure 
 more than the distinctively American of German blood. 
 
 As the reply to the un-American doctrine of these pro- 
 Germans, backed by the international Socialists, the Ameri- 
 can Legion gave expression to the ringing American doc- 
 trine in the preamble to its constitution as follows : 
 
 For God and Country we associate ourselves together for the fol- 
 lowing purposes: To uphold and defend the Constitution of the 
 United States of America, to maintain law and order, to foster and 
 perpetuate a 100 per cent Americanism, to preserve the memories and 
 incidents of our association in the Great War, to inculcate a sense 
 of the individual obligation to the community, state and nation, to 
 
The Spirit of America 445 
 
 make righr the master of might, to promote peace and good will on 
 earth, to safeguard and transmit to posterity the principles of free- 
 dom, justice and democracy, to sanctify our comradeship by our devo- 
 tion to mutual helpfulness. 
 
 But one of the rich fruits of the war was the arousing 
 of the American spirit throughout the nation. This mani- 
 fested itself in the adoption of loyalty pledges, a determina- 
 tion to serve the country better, to stand for service to others 
 rather than for personal selfishness or personal glory. 
 
 A typical stand of this character is that of the people of 
 Spokane, Washington, in adopting a loyalty pledge in April, 
 1919. Among other things stated are these: 
 
 I am proud that the United States of America is my country, the 
 Stars and Stripes my flag. No matter from what race I sprang, or 
 what nation may claim my friendship, my watchword shall be, 
 America first. A citizen by birth or choice, I will ever strive to 
 make my government revered at home and respected abroad. I 
 believe in open, just and honorable covenants with other nations to 
 establish, in keeping with the laws of God, a world of justice and 
 peace. . . . 
 
 Therefore, I pledge to my country the love of my heart, a true, 
 constant and absolute loyalty; I pledge respect and obedience to her 
 laws. I pledge my property, my service, my honor, and, if need be, 
 my life, to defend her. I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the 
 republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and 
 justice for all. 
 
 And the Spirit of America marches on and in many 
 divisions. When the national assembly of the American 
 Legion was in cession at Minneapolis on the first anni- 
 versary of the signing of the armistice, the chairman, Colo- 
 nel Henry D. Lindsley, as the hour of n o'clock ap- 
 proached, stated to the assembly: 
 
 We are approaching the moment when the world ceased that great 
 struggle which resulted in victory for democratic peoples all over the 
 world. I am going to ask every delegate here to rise and bow his 
 head as the moment arrives, thinking what it means, particularly to 
 
446 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 those comrades lying on the other side, who made the supreme sacri- 
 fice for the cause of free people. 
 
 Let us have a thought in our hearts and our prayers because these 
 men, our comrades, went there and gave their lives in the great cause. 
 
 Every delegate rose and stood with bowed head as 
 faint organ notes sounded through the hall. Eleven strokes 
 of the clock marked the first anniversary of Germany's sur- 
 render. 
 
 As the last echo died away, the organ pealed out the 
 "Star Spangled Banner." The massed ranks of delegates 
 standing, furtively wiped away tears. 
 
 And why all the awful sacrifice? Why were Americans 
 willing to enact this tragedy in a million homes? 
 
 The President undertook to assure the American peo- 
 ple that this great nation had put itself behind some abstract 
 principles, and that it was for these that the people striving 
 at home and the fighting men in the conflict of battle were 
 putting forth every energy they possessed. There was prob- 
 ably not one soldier, either at home or overseas, who ever 
 thought for a moment that he or the country was carrying 
 on a war "against the attitude of the balance of power" 
 or in behalf of the Fourteen Points, or to establish a League 
 of Nations. 
 
 But they knew what they went out to fight for: they 
 were fighting the Germans, because the Germans were bru- 
 talizing mankind, violating international law, and destroy- 
 ing people's homes and happiness and liberty. Nor was 
 there a man among them who would not fight again for the 
 same thing. 
 
 The story is related of a young American soldier found 
 dead on the battlefield of France on whose body was found 
 a card with these words : "America stands for freedom and 
 justice and is always ready to give the lives of her citizens 
 that all the world may be freed from tyranny and live in 
 peace and happiness." It is not known who wrote these 
 
The Spirit of America 447 
 
 words. Printed by hand, they were unsigned and undated. 
 
 And where was this mighty power lodged, which drove 
 America with all her energy into this war, compelling her 
 Administration to accept her dictum of no neutrality, of 
 not too proud to fight, of no peace without victory? 
 
 The English writers took the view that in any democ- 
 racy like America there is an oligarchy, whether of intellect, 
 of interest, or of mere popularity. In the present instance 
 they declared it was the sovereign will of the President that 
 carried the American people into the war. A writer cited 
 the case of conscription, which, in America, became a law 
 over night, though 3000 miles separated America from the 
 scene of conflict, while it took England two years because 
 their democracy would not accept an oligarchy. 
 
 As was well pointed out by a noted American publicist, 
 this was a misapprehension of the American point of view, 
 admitting that the people of the United States were singu- 
 larly united and obedient to leadership but stating that the 
 English comment failed to find a true interpretation of the 
 fact. This American writer says : 
 
 This nation has never bowed to "the sovereign will of the Presi- 
 dent." It has respected the voice of individual conscience. It beheld 
 in the conduct of Germany an inexpressable wrong of gigantic pro- 
 portions. It shuddered but it did not hesitate to judge or condemn. 
 Millions, tens of millions, of men in America wanted to fight Ger- 
 many when the will of the President was not yet for war, and chafed 
 under the neutrality of their Government. Thousands of our young 
 ment went to Canada and to France, in order to help in defeating 
 Germany before any "sovereign will" had expressed itself in the 
 United States. Here was a peaceful nation that did not want peace, 
 but victory; a nation that would have accused and cursed itself if 
 it had not been allowed to fight. The "oligarchy," if there be one, 
 responded to the "sovereign will" of an aroused people, not to the 
 leadership of a President. It adhered to him in war, not because he 
 commanded it, but because it had commanded him. 
 
448 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 And he declared that the principle involved was not 
 the enunciation of the Government; "it was a deep-seated 
 and almost universal declaration of the national mind." 4 
 
 In his annual report in 1918 Secretary Baker showed 
 that in the nineteen months elapsing from the declaration 
 of war to the signing of the armistice, the army created an 
 embarkation service which succeeded in shipping overseas 
 2,075,834 men and 5,153,000 tons of cargo. Even these 
 large figures do not tell the whole story. For time was 
 required in drafting and training the men and for organiz- 
 ing the production of supplies, and most of these stupendous 
 movements occurred in the last half of our active partici- 
 pation in the war. From January i, 1918, to the signing 
 of the armistice, a period of ten months, the army embarked 
 i>88o,339 men and shipped 4,660,000 tons of cargo. Noth- 
 ing to compare with the movement of these numbers of men 
 and tons of supplies across the Atlantic is known to the mili- 
 tary history of the world. 
 
 An epochal chapter of the world's history has been 
 closed. The tragedy has been enacted. Those who initi- 
 ated the crime against civilization that personal aggrand- 
 izement might result have been overwhelmed. The curtain 
 has dropped on the horrid scene. Autocracy has crumbled. 
 Democracy is supreme. Though America played a belated 
 part, its spirit was ready from the beginning. The be- 
 numbed soul of America has re-awakened. Other demands 
 upon her vital energies will be made and met. Her sons 
 and daughters will crush any autocracy that rears its head, 
 however insidious in method or comely in form. They will 
 maintain constitutional government that liberty and justice 
 may live; and through the nation's vitality, happiness may 
 spread to all mankind. 
 
 Applying the challenge of Colonel John McCrae's "In 
 Flanders Fields" to America's own brave dead in France, 
 the answer, to-day as then, is : 
 
 4 David Jayne Hill, 209 North American Review, 18-19. 
 
The Spirit of America 449 
 
 Rest ye in peace, ye Flanders dead. 
 The fight that ye so bravely led 
 We've taken up. And we will keep 
 True faith with you who lie asleep, 
 With each a cross to mark his bed 
 In Flanders fields. 
 
 Fear not that ye have died for naught. 
 The torch ye threw to us we caught. 
 Ten million hands will hold it high, 
 And Freedom's light shall never die! 
 We've learned the lesson that ye taught 
 In Flanders fields. 
 
 And perhaps nothing that came from lip or pen dur- 
 ing the Great War surpassed in vivid expression of Ameri- 
 ca's passion, now as on the yesterday, those thrilling words. 
 Yet there is always to be persistently kept in mind the in- 
 spirational words of such men as Washington when he de- 
 clared : 
 
 The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is 
 also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it is the main pillar in the 
 edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at 
 home and your peace abroad ; of your prosperity, of that liberty which 
 you so highly prize. 5 
 
 Until America loses her vital spirit, she will be ever 
 ready to rise and crush any attempt from within or without 
 to overthrow constitutional government, civil liberty, and 
 the opportunity for the legitimate pursuit of individual or 
 community happiness through orderly and well-established 
 channels. To quote the heartening words of President Wil- 
 son's successor, a contrast with the "Covenant greater than 
 Government :" 
 
 To make the real America to which we all aspire, we must have 
 distinctly an American spirit, and must become a race born of a 
 national inspiration. 
 'Farewell Address, 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 From the foregoing pages, some fair conclusions touch- 
 ing the relations of the Wilson Administration to the Great 
 War would seem to be: 
 
 1. In the first place it should be remembered that at 
 the beginning of his term in the presidency, Mr. Wilson 
 held in his hands the high hopes of the nation; and for two 
 chief reasons: First, as Governor of New Jersey he had 
 gained for himself, whether rightly or otherwise is not 
 here discussed, a reputation for standing by the people; 
 and, second, he made large promises, as shown in his book, 
 "The New Freedom," J which is "the result of the editorial 
 literary skill of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who has put 
 together here, in their right sequences, the more suggestive 
 portions of my campaign speeches," as stated by Mr. Wil- 
 son in the preface. Relying upon these two facts, a reputa- 
 tion and promises, one following directly upon the other, 
 the people placed full confidence in Mr. Wilson's disinter- 
 ested purposes and his capacity. 
 
 2. When the demands of the Great War were upon 
 the nation, not from the European point of view, but from 
 the standpoint of Americanism and for humanity's sake, the 
 Administration appeared to be honeycombed with a pacifism 
 most deadly to the rousement of the people to the hour's 
 great needs and with a leadership possessed of a tendency 
 to lean toward Germany's cause rather than toward that 
 of the Allies, notwithstanding that the latter were hero- 
 ically battling with inadequate equipment against the fright- 
 ful barbarities of the greatest war machine known to all 
 
 "The New Freedom, a Call for the Emancipation of the Generous 
 Energies of a People," Doubleday, Page & Company, New York, 1913. 
 
 450 
 
Conclusions 45 1 
 
 human records. Witness to this is the part taken by the 
 Secretary of State in pro-German meetings and his dallying 
 with pro-German societies and individuals. Treachery and 
 perfidy were permitted full sway in the land, as witness the 
 hostile acts of the German and Austrian ambassadors. 
 
 As if this were not sufficient, when it was found that 
 there was a real Secretary of War in the cabinet, he was 
 displaced by a pacifist of so pronounced a type that his acts 
 or do-nothing plans sickened his own people, declaring that 
 no preparation for the inevitable conflict was to be hurried, 
 since the war was 3,000 miles away, and who thanked God 
 that, when the country was plunged into the thick of battle, 
 it was without preparation. And as a result, the country 
 was stampeded into such a furor of haste, disorder, con- 
 fusion, and waste as to result in great unnecessary sacrifice 
 of life, the development of profligacy, and all the kindred 
 evils of the unwarranted situation, following the clear note 
 of warning sounded on all sides except the German. 
 
 3. Once the country was in the mighty conflict, and even 
 before that event, President Wilson would take a stand that 
 met the demands of the patriotic mind of America; and 
 would then waver in his purpose. Thus American senti- 
 ment was divided, when unity was the stern demand of the 
 hour. 
 
 So pronounced became this vacillation of the Adminis- 
 tration as to lead those urged to stand by the President to 
 inquire where he stood. Moreover, he had placed in promi- 
 nent places for influencing the public, men whose American- 
 mindedness was severely open to question men like George 
 Creel, William Bayard Hale, Lincoln Steffens, and numer- 
 ous others, to all of whose writings attached more or less 
 of official flavor. And while he showed his zeal for the 
 cause of preparedness by marching at the head of a parade 
 in its interest in Washington, he could as insistently and per- 
 sistently urge leniency toward the murderous anarchist 
 Mooney who set a bomb that killed and maimed scores in- 
 
452 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 terested in a preparedness parade in San Francisco, giving 
 no adequate reason therefor. 
 
 Indeed, there was such a leaning toward pacifism at the 
 first, and latterly toward the so-called liberal minds, those 
 willing to adopt internationalism even to the undoing of 
 constitutional government, that the question was raised as 
 to the quality of the Americanism Mr. Wilson was willing 
 to represent. 
 
 4. As the Great War approached its close, Mr. Wilson 
 seemed glad to accept all power lawfully conferred upon 
 him and to usurp other powers to some end never made 
 clear by him to the nation; as witness the taking over of 
 wire control after the close of hostilities, a power granted 
 him for war purposes only. The people gladly confer ex- 
 tensive powers, with all the privileges attaching thereto, 
 upon an Executive who is with the people and who pro- 
 poses to use it solely for the people's benefit. They de- 
 terminedly resist its appropriation for some remoter pur- 
 pose. 
 
 5. War is always a matter for most serious considera- 
 tion before undertaking it. So many possibilities are in- 
 volved as to make the issue uncertain. The Great War 
 was no exception, with this consideration noted: That with 
 the two sides so nearly balanced, there was assured in ad- 
 vance an outcome favorable to the side on which the United 
 States would throw its great weight, not merely because 
 of its resources, both in men and material, but because of 
 the moral influence upon other neutrals. And it is a mo- 
 mentous responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of any 
 regime that carries to a conclusion a war of unexampled 
 proportions. No fair-minded man will deny to the Wilson 
 Administration due credit for its share in the vast undertak- 
 ing. And once it threw itself into war-making as a business 
 for the time being, it made prodigious strides, whatever may 
 have been its previous shortcomings. For this the people 
 were pleased to give, and to this day do give, all credit. 
 
Conclusions 453 
 
 The difficulties were legion, and far beyond the vision of 
 ordinary men do these difficulties project themselves. 
 
 6. But difficulties piled mountain high do not warrant 
 shirking. To meet them as the occasion requires is one 
 of the glories of Americanism, one of the duties and one of 
 the marked privileges that belong to high position and great 
 power. Besides, the people cheerfully placed themselves 
 at the ready disposal of their Chief Executive and with their 
 might support his worthy efforts. Yet, they want to know 
 that he is right at least approximately right; and they like 
 the idea of reciprocal confidence. They are willing to 
 trust him even after he has made many mistakes and serious 
 blunders. But there may come a time, in the course of 
 events of his own shaping, when their confidence is sapped, 
 when their trust is gone and the last tie of moral obliga- 
 tion to him is sundered. This was never more true in the 
 whole history of the presidency than during President Wil- 
 son's Administration. Buoyant with hope at the beginning, 
 the people wanted to trust him to the end, but felt so out- 
 raged as events succeeded one another in swift course that 
 the cord was snapped. 
 
 7. True, they remembered that Mr. Wilson was their 
 President; they knew him as the legal Chief of their nation. 
 They further knew that he was a very sick man so ill 
 and so secluded that a committee from the Senate waited 
 upon him to ascertain his condition and whether able to 
 carry on the onerous duties of his office; when it found him 
 sufficiently alert to inform them that Senator Moses could 
 be assured, though he might be disappointed. But the peo- 
 ple felt that his conduct warranted the withdrawal of their 
 confidence from his measures and proposed measures. 
 
 8. They remembered with satisfaction his bold declara- 
 tions against organized and established wrongs; they dis- 
 trusted his favoring classism. At first divided over his 
 vacillation and shirking in the face of German brutalities, 
 they finally carried him in their sweep against Prussian 
 
454 The Wilson Administration and the Great War 
 
 militarism and butchery. They were stirred when pacifism 
 was found rampant in official circles and by the discovery of 
 public enemies at the nation's capital and within the shadow 
 of the White House, under the protection of the Admin- 
 istration, in the persons of the Ambassadors of Germany 
 and Austria threatening to destroy the integrity of the na- 
 tion. They massed almost solidly against the delays and 
 consequent wastes of the war preparations, and yet more 
 against the carefully planned deceptions to cover the blun- 
 derings of the Administration. They resented President 
 Wilson's telling them that any member of his cabinet was 
 as good as any he ever knew, when they knew better. They 
 took determined position against the alleged liberalism, 
 amounting practically to Germanism and socialism, found 
 in the men officially seeking to create an artificial public 
 opinion through an enforced reptile press. They stood 
 by him when the war was forwarded to the utmost of the 
 nation's capacity and resources, they gave him unstinted 
 support when he declared there was to be no peace with 
 an unsubmitting Germany. They resented his individual 
 efforts at peace when other nations equally to be considered 
 and having suffered vastly more should have been consulted. 
 They applauded his swift and certain, as well as devastat- 
 ing, reply to Germany's peace proposals made through Aus- 
 tria. They took him severely to task for his partisan ap- 
 peal in the congressional elections, fall of 1918, and sharply 
 turned down his proposal that he be given carte blanche 
 liberty to become their "unembarrassed spokesman" at the 
 peace table; and, though they were willing to hear him yet 
 again, he from that time completely forfeited their confi- 
 dence. They defiantly resented his taking control of all 
 of the nation's wire lines as a war measure after the war 
 was ended, and no less his secrecy in the Peace Congress 
 after proclaiming zealously open counsels. They became 
 deeply concerned over his undertaking to bind the Govern- 
 ment to unprecedented obligations at a time when the coun- 
 
Conclusions 455 
 
 try had had no opportunity to express itself upon the issue, 
 closing the freedom of the nation's action, and his failure 
 to explain it intelligently after declaring that he could make 
 it all clear. They showed their sympathy in his illness, but 
 little with the cause that produced it. And as a finale, 
 they concluded that the best way to be rid of Wilsonism 
 was to administer the most crushing rebuke within their 
 power; and this was done in the overwhelming defeat of 
 his party in the presidential election of 1920, which he 
 zealously supported. 
 
 9. Beginning with his act forcing the Adamson bill 
 through a servile Congress immediately prior to the presi- 
 dential election at which he was a candidate for re-election, 
 a piece of legislation prepared and whipped through Con- 
 gress by a class for its own benefit as against the people by 
 a subterfuge, President Wilson continued his favor to that 
 class. Against this classism the people turned in its wrath 
 with swift and unerring precision, once they grasped the 
 facts. 
 
 10. The people are more trustworthy on the problems 
 of maintaining national integrity and freedom of action 
 than a Chief Executive who may have some ulterior pur- 
 pose in view, once they are permitted to view the situation 
 as it is and not have it discussed only in a closet. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Act of October 6, 1917, 419 
 Adamson Law 
 
 forced through Congress, 51, 59, 
 
 . 4 . 55 
 unionism a result, 58 
 
 what it granted, 52 
 Advance veto cancelled, 358 
 Air-mail service inaugurated, 152 
 Airplane scandal, 113 
 Allen, Governor, in, 134 
 Allies and Bolshevism, 192 
 Allotment of pay to fighters, 421, 
 
 .423 
 
 America confused, glad, 10 
 America-First Association, 232 
 American Legion, 223, 418, 428, 445 
 American Magazine, 228 
 American students in Germany, n 
 Amidon, Judge Charles F., 230 
 Anderson, Judge George W., 63 
 Ansell, Samuel T., 134, 136 
 Archibald, James F., 21 
 Armaments 
 
 and naval power, 267 
 President Harding on, 266 
 Secretary Hughes' program, 266 
 threat by President Wilson, 266 
 Armistice, 259 
 Arnold, Stanley, 203, 207 
 Article X of the Covenant, 341 
 Associated Press, in, 162 
 Athletics in war, 435 
 
 Babson, Roger W., 408 
 Baker, Newton D. 
 
 controlling the press, 116, 163 
 
 on courtmartial system, 135 
 
 and deceptions, in 
 
 described, 107 
 
 evasions of, 114 
 
 large army asked, 324 
 
 opposed national security, 113 
 
 reply to criticism, 134 
 
 and slackers, 117, 231 
 
 stand against Bolshevism, 219 
 vice and liquor, 172, 175 
 
 stated war 3000 miles away, 128 
 
 Baker, Ray Stannard, 276 
 Balfour, Arthur, 243, 307 
 Bannerman guns, 414 
 Bartholdt, Congressman, 12 
 Beck, James M., 16, 246 
 Beer officially medicine, 186 
 Belgium's claim, 288 
 Berkman, Alexander, 202, 206, 227 
 Bernstein, Herman, 191 
 Bernstorff, Count, 21, 223, 224, 231 
 Blast, The, 201, 205 
 Bolshevism 
 
 and Allies, 192 
 brought to America, 199 
 Herman Bernstein on, 191 
 and Herron, George D., 192 
 Nicholas Murray Butler on, 192 
 President Wilson's message on, 
 
 201 
 
 opposed, 191, 197 
 supported, 191, 196 
 Vladimir Bourtzeff on, 194 
 Borah, Senator, reads Treaty, 301 
 Borglum, Gutzon, 113 
 Boy-Ed, Captain, 23 
 Bourtzeff, Vladimir, 194 
 Brandegee, Senator, 308 
 Brest-Litovsk, 189, 191, 235, 273 
 Brieau, M., quoted, 377 
 Brumbaugh, Governor, 13 
 Bryan, William J. 
 
 address in New York, 19 
 
 to German-American societies, 
 
 22 
 
 on Treaty adoption, 313, 315 
 Buchanan, Frank, 22 
 Bullitt, William C., 193, 287, 308 
 Burian, Baron, 240 
 Burleson, Albert S. 
 
 drives employes to A. F. of L., 
 142. 
 
 given wire control, 145 
 
 later, cable control, 150 
 
 mean policy of, 141 
 
 news control by, 159 
 
 reply to criticisms, 146, 152 
 
 tergiversation of, 348 
 
 457 
 
458 
 
 Index 
 
 Burnquist, Governor 
 condemns Creels falsehoods, 228 
 nominated as a loyalist, 232 
 
 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 192 
 
 Cables taken by Government, 150 
 
 action criticized, 132 
 
 returned to owners, 151 
 Calder, Senator, 76 
 Candy supplied the army, 35 
 Capper, George H., 415 
 
 Senator, 59 
 Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. 
 
 address to President Wilson, 399 
 Chamberlain, Senator, on 
 
 courts-martial, 135 
 
 failure of War Department, 124, 
 128, 130, 156, 390 
 
 neglect of fighters, 133 
 Christian Science Monitor, 160, 232 
 Churches and the Covenant, 338 
 Civil Service, 347, 348 
 Clark, Champ, 27, 355, 360 
 Clemenceau, Premier 
 
 address to England and America, 
 293 
 
 announced as president of the 
 Peace Congress, 267 
 
 on Balance of Power, 268 
 
 on Bolshevism, 195 
 
 in conflict with President Wilson, 
 294 
 
 reply to by President Wilson, 269 
 
 on Roosevelt in the army, 363 
 Cleveland, President, 347 
 Coal, dirty, 48 
 
 dumped at curb, 48 
 Cochran, W. Bourke, 202, 203 
 Colby, Bainbridge 
 
 for liquid efficiency, 179 
 
 to Russian Bolshevists, 197 
 Colleges in the war, 431 
 Collier's Weekly 
 
 Secretary Wilson in, 403 
 
 on wire control, 151 
 Commission on Camps, 170, 172, 
 
 173 
 
 Compensation for disability, 421 
 erroneous idea on, 422 
 
 Congressional Record, 116, 305 
 
 Connick, Harris D. H., 72 
 
 "Conscientious Objectors," 26, 27, 
 117, 231 
 
 Constitution week, ignored by Presi- 
 dent Wilson, 339 
 
 "Constitutional Government," 380 
 
 Co-ordination, lack of, 130 
 
 Correspondents of newspapers, 160 
 
 Cost-plus system, 56 
 
 Council of National Defense, 29, 
 
 170, 172, 399 
 
 Court-martial system, 135 
 Covenant of League of Nations 
 and the churches, 338 
 Article X of, 337, 341 
 propaganda at public expense, 335 
 Covenanters, 334 
 Creel, George 
 book excluded library, 224 
 chairman committee on publicity, 
 
 22, 109 
 
 close to President Wilson, 224 
 failure admitted, 155 
 Minor a friend of, 213 
 
 a representative of, 211 
 nd propaganda for Administra- 
 tion, 119 
 
 for Germany, 120 
 quality of Americanism of, 451 
 resigned, 120 
 
 Crime during Reconstruction, 418 
 Crowder, Enoch H. 
 
 on meaning of draft, 57 
 patriotic record tarnished with- 
 out cause, 137 
 and work-or-fight order, 57 
 Czernin, Count, 237 
 
 Daily News, Chicago, 283 
 Daniels, Secretary 
 
 criticized, 171 
 
 for clean men in navy, 172 
 
 on shipbuilding records, 80 
 Danzig, 286 
 
 Day, James R., 338, 344 
 Daylight saving, 45 
 Debs, Eugene, 62 
 Deception, official, no 
 Denman and Goethals, 68 
 Densmore report 
 
 condemned by grand jury, 207 
 
 prepared in secret, 205 
 Dent, S. Hubert, in, 355, 360 
 Department of Commerce, 401 
 Dernberg, Bernhard, 15, 223, 224, 
 
 226 
 
 Dillon, E. J., quoted, 379 
 Dirty coal, 48 
 Draft, the service, 25 
 
 meaning of second, 57 
 Duluth and fuel saving, 43 
 Dumba, Ambassador, 21, 22 
 Du Pont Powder Company, 406 
 
 Ebert, Herr, quoted, 273 
 Eddystone plant, 406 
 
Index 
 
 459 
 
 Elections, in 1916, 20 
 
 President Wilson's appeal in 1918, 
 
 355 
 
 reply to the appeal, 356 
 
 results of in 1918, 357 
 Emergency Fleet Corporation, 69 
 Employment service 
 
 aided labor policy, 56 
 
 criticized, 409 
 
 origin of, 57, 408 
 
 suspended, 408 
 Edmonds, Richard H., 405 
 Educational ideals, 416 
 England, at beginning of the war, 
 
 9 
 
 transported American troops, 82 
 Enlisting for the war, 25 
 Espionage Act, 229 
 Evening Mail, New York, 227 
 "Evidence in the Case," 16 
 
 Federal Board of Training, 426 
 Federal judges and disloyalty, 229 
 Federal Trade Commission's report 
 
 on profiteering, 392 
 Federal trade service, 40 
 Field order ending the war, 434 
 Fighters and labor, 61 
 Flag-Day address of President, 23 
 Fleet corporation, 67 
 Food 
 
 administrations of Allies, 37 
 
 administration of after war, 38 
 charge against, 39 
 
 consumption of by the army, 34 
 
 Control Law, 29 
 
 increase of, 33 
 
 law for control proposed, 33 
 
 prices, 36 
 
 profiteering in 
 ancient, 39 
 recent, 31, 392 
 
 substitutes, 29, 36 
 
 urgency of, 28 
 Ford, Henry 
 
 loses Republican primary, 354 
 
 supported pacifism, 18 
 Fosdick, Chairman, 173 
 Fourteen Points 
 
 origin of, 235 
 
 in peace congress, 293 
 
 in peace proposals, 237 
 
 what they provide for, 235 
 France 
 
 aided America, 82 
 
 and war loss, 322 
 
 and the war's start, 9 
 
 militaristic, said Wilson, 322 
 
 France, thwarts Bolshevism, 195 
 
 treatment of after war, 294 
 Francis, David R., 190 
 Frankfurter, Felix, 203 
 Fuel 
 
 price of, 41, 47 
 
 dirty coal, 48 
 
 saving of, 42 
 Fuel Administration 
 
 origin of, 42 
 
 outcry against, 43 
 
 Gardner, Representative, on the na- 
 tional security, 22 
 Garfield, Harry A. 
 
 appointed Fuel Administrator, 42 
 
 criticism of, 49 
 
 fixed fair wages for miners, 63 
 
 and gasless Sundays, 46 
 
 not responsible for fuel shortage, 
 49 
 
 order against dirty coal, 48 
 
 order to deliver at curb, 48 
 
 resigned office, 63 
 
 wisdom of course, 49 
 Gasless Sundays, 46 
 Gas failure in war, 127 
 Garrison, Secretary of War 
 
 displaced, 18, 107 
 
 energy of in national defense, 138 
 Garretson, A. B., quoted, 412 
 Geddes, Sir Eric, 71, 250 
 Genoa Conference, 220 
 George, Lloyd 
 
 excused peace delays, 271, 285 
 
 and origin of the Fourteen Points, 
 
 235 
 
 on ships' importance, 66 
 
 on trying the kaiser, 277 
 
 on under-production, 62 
 Gerhardt, Mayer, 226 
 German-American Alliance, 12, 14, 
 
 225 
 Germanism in the United States, 
 
 228 
 
 Germans loyal to United States, 232 
 German societies with good names, 
 
 18 
 
 German universities, teaching of, n 
 Gilbert, Joseph, 227 
 Glasgow, W. A., 33 
 Goethals, George W., 68 
 Gompers, Samuel 
 
 labor patriotic, 60 
 
 and Reconstruction, 410 
 
 urged support of Wilson, 410 
 Grey, Edward 
 
 on the Covenant, 343, 367 
 
460 
 
 Index 
 
 Grey, Edward, a storm center, 9 
 Governors and Mayors 
 
 asked to give employment, 415 
 
 conference of, 404, 408 
 Gronna, Senator, 226 
 Grunau, John, 59 
 
 Habits of President Wilson, 368 
 
 Haldane, Lord, quoted, 170 
 
 Hale, William B. 
 American-mindedness open to 
 
 question, 451 
 
 among President Wilson's eulo- 
 gists, 193 
 
 confidential agent of Wilson, 230 
 a Hearst writer, 228, 230 
 publicity writer for Germans, 228 
 put together "New Freedom," 450 
 
 Hanson, Ole, quoted, 219 
 
 Hapgood, Norman, lauded Wilson, 
 
 i93 
 Harding, Warren G. 
 
 asks as to shipbuilding, 73 
 called disarmament conference, 
 
 266 
 called unemployment conference, 
 
 415 t u- 
 
 on appropriations for ships, 77 
 
 inaugural address cited, 419 
 
 Harvey, George 
 
 on Secretary Baker's speech, 108 
 on Secretary Baker's delays, 115 
 
 Harvey's Weekly 
 on Herr Ebert, 273 
 misplaced trust in Baker, 139 
 on Peace Congress delays, 271 
 on pro-Germanism, 229 
 on secrecy in Peace Congress, 284 
 on sugar profiteering, 396 
 
 Hays, Will H., 349 
 
 Hearst papers, 228, 231 
 
 "He kept us out of war," 20 
 
 Herron, George D. 
 Quayle on appointment of, 192 
 Nicholas M. Butler on, 192 
 on President Wilson, 192 
 on the social revolution, 196 
 
 Hertling, Count, 237 
 
 Hexamer, J. C., 14 
 
 Hill, David Jayne, quoted, 340, 448 
 
 Hillstrom case, 210 
 
 Hines, Walker D., Director-General 
 and Department of Commerce, 402 
 explained railroad deficits, 104 
 on railroad wage increase, 95 
 warned railroad strikers, 96 
 
 Hodgson, Captain Samuel H., 135 
 
 Hog Island shipyard, 70, 72, 75, 79 
 
 Hoover, Herbert C. 
 chairman of commission on food 
 
 and supply and prices, 28 
 Food Commissioner, 29 
 workmanship of efficient, 29 
 
 House, Edward M. 
 confidential clerk of Lloyd George 
 and Mr. Balfour constantly 
 with, 288 
 
 diplomacy of extolled, 162 
 on peace delegation, 262 
 Secretary Lansing on, 316 
 
 Hughes, Charles E. 
 
 report of, on War Risk Bureau, 427 
 disarmament proposals, 266 
 
 Hunt, Frazer, 301 
 
 Hurley, Edward N. 
 head of Shipping Board, 69 
 ignored shipping men, 70 
 issued erroneous statements, 70 
 neglected existing facilities, 69 
 New York address, 70, 77 
 no defenders of, 76 
 
 Industrial conference, 63 
 
 Industrial Relations Commission 
 aided anarchy, 204 
 
 Industry on unemployment, 409 
 
 "Insurance, Effects of War upon," 
 422 
 
 Inner Council, 277, 281 
 
 Insurance in war 
 amount of, 421 
 
 law of October 6, 1917, on, 421 
 President Wilson on duty to, 425 
 
 International Workers Defense 
 League, 202, 206, 208, 210 
 
 Iron Trade Review on unemploy- 
 ment, 409 
 
 Jackson Day banquet, 312, 315 
 Jefferson, Thomas, on treaty mak- 
 ing, 302 
 Johnson, Hiram W. 
 
 followed President Wilson on 
 
 tour for Covenant, 340 
 quizzed the President on secret 
 
 treaties, 307 
 Journal, of Providence, 16 
 
 Kahn, acted chairman, in 
 Kaiser to President Wilson, 12 
 
 prosecution of, 277, 280 
 Kallen, Horace M., quoted, 388 
 Kellogg, Senator 
 
 on classifying rail workers, 54 
 
 on taking over wires, 149 
 
 on railroad deficits, 104 
 
Index 
 
 461 
 
 Keynes, John M., quoted, 374, 380 
 Kitchen, Claude, 355, 360 
 
 Labor, decreased production, 62, 78 
 and the fighting man, 60 
 and politics, 349 
 was it loyal, 60 
 
 Labor policy first adopted, 56 
 
 Labor unions 
 
 in government employment, 58 
 sought railroad control, 92 
 
 La Follette, Senator 
 
 against Lenroot's nomination, 353 
 answered by Roosevelt, 227 
 St. Paul address of, 227 
 
 Land for fighters, 403 
 
 Lane, Franklin K. 
 
 in Industrial Conference, 63 
 level-headed in work, 374 
 planned to employ fighters, 403 
 
 Lane Committee 
 
 fixed coal prices, 41 
 overturned by Secretary Baker, 49 
 report of Wage Commission, 52 
 
 Lansing, Secretary 
 
 as peace delegate, 262, 265 
 contradicted President Wilson, 333 
 harshness of Wilson toward, 306 
 on kaiser's culpability, 277 
 saw danger of peace delays, 272 
 witness on Covenant, 337 
 
 Law, Bonar, 251 
 
 League for Preservation of Amer- 
 ican Independence, 36 
 
 League of Nations 
 constitution read, 330 
 fight on begins in America, 335 
 at Jackson Day dinner, 341 
 in the past, 325 
 in the Peace Congress, 274 
 people question, 338 
 people stirred against, 339 
 propaganda for, 335 
 Roosevelt on, 327 
 to be entwined in Treaty, 330 
 voted on in Senate, 341, 342 
 Wilson's changing views on, 328 
 Wilson went to country on, 337 
 
 League to Enforce Peace, 238 
 
 Ledger, Philadelphia, 193, 295 
 
 Lee, W. G., 59 
 
 Lenroot, Irvin L. 
 
 replies to disloyalty charge, 351 
 nominated, 353 
 
 Letter carriers, 140 
 
 Lewis, Senator 
 
 campaign aid to Wilson, 351 
 on peace conversations, 247 
 
 Lightless Tuesdays, 45 
 Lincoln and Wilson, 368-370 
 Lindberg, Charles A., 232 
 Lindsley, Henry D. 
 
 appointed, War Risk Bureau, 427 
 
 asked to resign, 427 
 
 commander American Legion, 445 
 Liquor 
 
 "booze versus bread," 179 
 
 Congress against, 177 
 
 and efficiency, 180 
 
 execution of laws against, 181 
 
 favored by President Wilson, 182 
 
 and German-American Alliance, 
 179, 225 
 
 lawlessness of, 176 
 
 opponents of, 180 
 
 opposed by President Wilson, 175 
 
 prohibition of in effect, 186 
 
 Secretary Baker's appeal to elim- 
 inate, 175 
 
 Secretaries Baker, Daniels, and 
 McAdoo on, 174-175 
 
 supporters of, 180 
 Loans, 27 
 Lodge, Senator 
 
 against a negotiated peace, 253 
 
 offered resolution on powers to the 
 President, 246 
 
 on suppression of news, 161, 163 
 
 reply to Wilson on separate 
 
 treaty, 305 
 Lost Battalion, 437 
 Low, A. Maurice, quoted, 375 
 Lowell, President 
 
 on the Covenant, 331 
 
 on the peace drive, 238 
 Loyalty of political parties com- 
 pared, 357 
 "Lusitania," the, 19, 22, 113, 430 
 
 McAdoo, William G. 
 accomplishments of, 90 
 appointed Director-General of 
 
 Railroads, 84 
 asked five-year Railroad control, 
 
 9i 
 as to railroad men in politics, 
 
 .359 
 
 devised war insurance law, 420 
 opposed liquor on railroads, 175 
 resigned office, 91 
 
 McLemore resolution, 23 
 
 McMaster, John B., quoted, 18, 24, 
 
 Mail 
 
 and cost of periodicals 
 curtailment of dispatches of, 143 
 
462 
 
 Index 
 
 Mail, delay in delivery, 143 
 
 failure of investigated, 142 
 
 force in defending, 418 
 
 to soldiers, 131 
 
 zoning of, 145 
 Mail-planes, 152 
 Makino, Baron, "not too proud to 
 
 fight," 333 
 
 Mann, James R., 131 
 Manufacturers' Record, 405 
 Marine Brigade, 433 
 Marshall, Vice-President 
 
 regretted pacifist measures, 244 
 
 on Bolshevism in the United 
 
 States, 220 
 
 Martens, Ludwig C. A. K., 214 
 Mayors and Governors 
 
 asked to employ idle, 415 
 
 conference of, 404, 408 
 Mediation Commission, report of on 
 
 Mooney case, 205 
 
 "Men everywhere" and Wilson, 369 
 Merchants Association of New York, 
 
 142 
 
 Merchant marine low, 81 
 Metropolitan Opera House address, 
 
 243 
 
 Mexican editors at White House, 329 
 Minor, Robert A., and Administra- 
 tion, 212 
 
 Money-spending riot, 411, 414 
 Mooney, Thomas J., 62, 201, 202, 
 
 208, 212 
 
 Morgan, Postmaster, 348 
 Morrow, Harvey W., 229, 385 
 Moses, Senator 
 
 gives humorous view of Treaty, 
 
 302 
 
 President Wilson to, 453 
 questioned President Wilson, 308 
 Municipal inefficiency, 171 
 Munitions, failure, 122 
 
 improvement in production of, 126 
 Mystery of Wilson, 366 
 
 caused by "interpretations," 366 
 
 Nation, The 
 
 on jazinary, 288 
 
 suppressed, 159 
 
 treats on suppression, 159 
 National Security League on Creel's 
 
 activities, 224 
 
 Nebraska pro-Germanism, 229 
 Nelson, Senator 
 
 on shipbuilding, 72 
 
 veteran loyalist, 227 
 Neutrality in thought, 72 
 "New Freedom," the, 360, 450 
 
 News and Mr. Burleson, 159 
 News, The Detroit, 160 
 Newspapers 
 
 arrogance toward, 157, 158 
 
 censored news of, 158 
 
 humiliated, 164 
 
 right and loyal, 168 
 
 shackled, 156 
 
 suppressed, 160 
 New Ulm, 228 
 New York Merchants' report on in- 
 
 efficienct mail service, 143 
 Non-Partisan League 
 
 defended Berkman and Goldman, 
 227 
 
 disloyal, 232 
 
 origin of in North Dakota, 226 
 
 propaganda of in North Dakota, 
 ii 
 
 supported by Rumley and Creel, 
 
 227 
 North American, Philadelphia 
 
 on Belgium's treatment in Peace 
 Congress, 291 
 
 on government railroading, 102, 
 
 iroJit 
 
 on profiteering, 390, 394 
 
 on purposes of Samuel Gompers, 
 
 410 
 
 on suppression of news, 165 
 on Wilson's nebulousness, 329 
 sums peace conversations, 248 
 
 North American Review 
 
 on "conscientious objectors," 118 
 David Jayne Hill in, 340, 448 
 George Rothwell Brown in, 156 
 on deficiency in production, 78 
 quoted, 114 
 
 Northcliffe, Lord 
 on peace conversations, 250 
 on Wilson's going to Europe, 266 
 thirteen principles of, adopted in 
 Peace Congress, 237 
 
 North Dakota, propaganda in, n 
 
 Official Bulletin, The, 154, 155, 203 
 
 O'Hare, Kate, 62, 227 
 
 Official denial, the, 160 
 
 Oklahoma, draft resistance in, 27 
 
 Olin, John M., Review of Mooney 
 Case, 204 
 
 O'Leary, Jeremiah, 22 
 
 Order ending fighting, 434 
 
 Ordnance collapse, 122 
 
 Orlando, Premier 
 
 break with President Wilson, 296 
 on the inner council, 271, 281 
 and Wilson's Fiume attitude, 294 
 
Index 
 
 463 
 
 Outcry against peace conversations, 
 
 246 
 
 Overalls crusade, 395, 414 
 Owen, Senator, 315 
 
 Pacifism's consequences, 24 
 Pacifists influenced Administration, 
 
 J 9 
 Palmer, Attorney-General 
 
 in profiteer prosecutions, 394 
 
 prosecutions of violators of liquor 
 laws, 186 
 
 ruled that beer was medicine, 186 
 Papen, von, 23 
 Paris almost taken, 22 
 Peace Congress 
 
 announcement of President Wil- 
 son's intention to attend, 260 
 
 commissioners to, 262 
 
 early criticism of, 274 
 
 no records of, 299, 337 
 
 opened, 267 
 
 preliminary meeting for, 265 
 
 preparation for, 263 
 
 propaganda from, 295 
 
 secrecy of, 281, 283, 284 
 
 threatened break in, 282, 297 
 
 two important commissions- ap- 
 pointed by, 267 
 Peace conversations 
 
 how received, 250 
 
 summarized, 248 
 Peace making 
 
 false propaganda in, 295 
 
 France against German counter- 
 proposals in, 273 
 
 German outcry against terms, 
 272 
 
 perils of delays in, 272, 273 
 
 public opinion affected by false 
 propaganda in, 295 
 
 Senate attacked the Covenant in, 
 275 
 
 Wilson against France in, 276 
 
 Wilson and secrecy in, 281 
 
 Wilson's delays renewed German 
 
 hopes, 274 
 
 Pennington, Edmond, 90 
 Pensions paid after wars, 419 
 Perils in peace delays, 272 
 Peterson, James A., 227 
 Phrasings of President Wilson, 381 
 Pittman, Senator, 247 
 Plattsburg Camp, 21, 361 
 Plumb Plan, 94, 97 
 Political campaign of 1916, 234, 347, 
 
 349; of 1918, 351 
 Political campaign cards, 364 
 
 Politics 
 
 "is adjourned," 354 
 
 camouflaged, 363 
 
 in price-fixing, 360 
 
 interned, 356 
 Preparation for war, lack of, 23, 
 
 76 
 Preparedness day, President Wilson 
 
 on, 23, 451 
 Press agent, the, 160 
 Post, The, Washington, 135 
 Prices in reconstruction, 412 
 Primary elections, Wilson in, 350 
 Prinkipo Conference, 192, 193, 195, 
 
 196, 198 
 Profiteering 
 
 among laborers, 392 
 
 ancient, 39 
 
 due to preparation failure, 389 
 
 how to overcome in war, 391 
 
 Federal Trade Commission's Re- 
 port on, 392 
 
 in government contracts, 389 
 
 in rents, 390, 392 
 
 in sugar, 396 
 
 outside of the law, 389 
 
 prosecutions of threatened, 392, 
 
 394 . 
 
 spasdomic prosecutions, 395 
 Prohibition 
 
 execution of law, 181 
 
 war-time and constitutional in op- 
 eration, 1 86 
 
 Wilson's course in, 181 
 Propaganda 
 
 extent of, 1 1 
 
 for the Covenant, 335 
 
 for Germany, 10 
 
 for Thomas J. Mooney, 204 
 
 influence of, 12, 13 
 
 method of, 15 
 
 not fully known, n 
 
 purpose of, 12 
 
 revealed, 16 
 Providence Journal, 16 
 Public Health Service, 174 
 Public information, committee on, 
 
 109 
 Public Ledger, Philadelphia, 295 
 
 Quayle, William A. 
 on Bolshevism's method, 193 
 on peace conversations, 253 
 
 Radical publications in New York, 
 
 215 
 Railroads 
 
 employes of, in politics, 359 
 
464 
 
 Index 
 
 Railroads, government control of 
 
 asked, 91 
 
 aligning of forces on, 92 
 began, 84 
 failure of, 97 
 regulative process under, 83 
 
 restored to owners' control, 103 
 Railroad Administration 
 
 advanced costs, 85 
 
 conflicted with Department of 
 Commerce, 401 
 
 courtesy required by, 88 
 
 disillusionment as to accomplish- 
 ments, 90 
 
 improved service of, 87 
 
 McAdoo director of, 84 
 
 methods of, 87 
 
 policy of, 85 
 
 and railroad officers, 85 
 
 traffic under, 89 
 
 trained women agents, 88 
 Railroad Labor Board, 105 
 Railroad Strike, October, 1921, 65 
 Rapallo Treaty, 220 
 Reconstruction 
 
 aims of in Great Britain, 399 
 
 and the banks, 415 
 
 and Bolshevism, 411 
 
 and business men, 406 
 
 Congress at Atlantic City, 400, 
 
 404 
 Wilson's address to, 400 
 
 and Council of Defense, 399 
 
 created anxiety, 405 
 
 and crime, 418 
 
 and demands of social justice, 416 
 
 and Department of Commerce, 401 
 
 education during, 416 
 
 materialism in, 417 
 
 neglected, 400, 403 
 
 prices during, 412 
 
 and Secretary Lane's plan, 403 
 
 spiritual forces during, 418 
 
 unemployment during, 406, 414 
 
 wages during, 409, 412 
 Red Cross and soldiers, 132, 443 
 Redfield, Secretary 
 
 conflicted with Railroad Adminis- 
 tration, 401 
 
 on extending trade, 402 
 "Remember Mooney," 202 
 Reparations, German, 278 
 Reptile press, 163 
 Responsibility, evasions of, 113 
 "Review of Mooney Case," 204 
 Rhinelander, Bishop, 13, 14, 17 
 Riot of spending, 411 
 Robins, Raymond, 189, 217 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore 
 combatted 
 
 German-American Alliance, 225 
 Non-Partisan League, 227 
 pacifism, 156 
 
 denied army service, 24, 360, 363 
 desired in public affairs, 19 
 directed American thought, 17 
 to Felix Frankfurter, 205 
 missed at death, 270 
 on a league of nations, 327 
 on loyalty, quoted, 233 
 statement as to neutrality, 234, 430 
 textbooks misquoted, 234, 430 
 
 Rumely, Edward A., 227 
 
 Russia, greatest loser in war, 190 
 
 "Russian Bolshevik Revolution," 236 
 
 Scandals, two outstanding of war, 
 
 121 
 
 Schwab, Charles M., 75 
 S dent fie American 
 
 on ignoring General Wood, 362 
 
 on mail zoning, 145 
 Secrecy in Peace Congress, 281, 284 
 Secret Service, 224 
 Secret treaties, 307 
 Self-determination, 291 
 Senate against League Covenant, 275 
 Shantung, 286, 333 
 Shipbuilders, real, 69, 74 
 Shipbuilding 
 
 costs, 77 
 
 Representative Shirley on, 78 
 
 results of policy of, 75, 77 
 
 vast plan for, 79 
 
 records made in, 80 
 Shipping Board 
 
 accomplishments of, 71 
 
 created, 67 
 
 deficit of, 82 
 
 headed by Hurley, 69 
 Ships 
 
 importance of, 66 
 
 loss of, 68 
 
 Shirley, Representative, 78 
 Sibert, William L., on war gas, 127 
 Simmons, Roger, 217 
 Simonds, G. A., testimony of, 216 
 Sinking of vessels by Germany, 20 
 Slackers and the Administration, 230 
 Smoot, Senator, 353 
 Smuts, General, drew Covenant, 330 
 Social evil 
 
 and city government, 171, 172 
 
 and the public, 174 
 
 and training camps, 173 
 
 and war, 172 
 
Index 
 
 465 
 
 Societies during the war, 18 
 Spirit of America 
 
 artists in, 443 
 
 in colleges, 431 
 
 in community helpfulness, 441 
 
 in community life, 447 
 
 in conduct when free, 440 
 
 in American Legion, 445 
 
 in home life, 442 
 
 in registration for service, 433 
 
 in relief work, 442 
 
 in her soldiers, 437, 439, 440, 442 
 
 on the battlefield, 439 
 
 President Wilson on, 437 
 
 why fighting spirit, 447 
 Spokane loyalty pledge, 445 
 Sporting goods in war, 435 
 Spry, Governor, to Wilson, 210 
 Standing by the President, 18 
 Star, The, Kansas City, 22, 316 
 
 Montreal, 161 
 
 Washington, 409 
 State Department to Austria on 
 
 peace move, 241 
 
 Steenerson, Representative, 146, 147 
 Steffens, Lincoln 
 
 American-mindedness of f 451 
 
 commissioner to Bolshevists, 293 
 
 with Robert A. Minor, 212 
 Stephens, Governor, to Wilson, 209 
 Stettinius, Edward, 112 
 Stevens, Basil M., 118 
 Stevenson, Archibald, 112 
 Strikes 
 
 during Reconstruction, 410 
 
 on wires, 148 
 
 of October, 1921, 65 
 Sugar, 30, 36 
 Sun, New York, 262 
 
 Taft, William H. 
 
 of League to Enforce Peace, 343 
 on stern implacable war, 238 
 given publicity on Covenant, 167 
 with Wilson on Covenant, 326, 
 
 33i, 335 
 
 Tank failure, 127 
 Teachers' pay, 55 
 Thirty-nine senators, 331, 334 
 Thomas, Senator, 361 
 Times, New York 
 
 on election appeal, 357 
 
 published aircraft report, 163 
 
 punished, 161 
 Tirpitz, Admiral, 67 
 Tonnage of the world, 68 
 "Too proud to fight" 
 
 Makino, Baron, 333 
 
 "Too proud to fight," President Wil- 
 son, 20 
 
 Tope, Homer W., 178 
 Tour of country for Covenant, 310, 
 
 Townley, Arthur C., 227 
 Transcript, Boston, 112 
 Transportation of troops, 81, 134 
 Treaty of Peace 
 
 and church bodies, 312 
 
 and colleges, 312 
 
 controversy over encouraged by 
 
 President Wilson, 303-304 
 execution of, 321 
 expounded by President Wilson, 
 
 308 
 
 first vote on by Senate, 311 
 Germany's evasion of, 322 
 inconclusive, 321 
 how made up, 302 
 leaked to America, 301 
 presented to the Senate by Pre- 
 sident Wilson, 303 
 provisions of, 319 
 provoked bitter contest, 304 
 read to the Senate by Senator 
 
 Borah, 301 
 rejection 
 first time, 312 
 responsibility for, 313, 315 
 second time, 313, 315 
 stages of antagonism to, 304 
 Treaty with France withheld, 316 
 Tribune, The, Chicago 
 and Ford's suit, 352 
 Frazer Hunt, correspondent of, 
 
 and leaking of Treaty, 301 
 Tribune, The, New York 
 poll on Italian crisis, 297 
 on Wilson's European trip, 261 
 on Wilson's publicity abroad, 282 
 Tumulty, Private Secretary, 212 
 
 Unemployment, 406, 409, 414 
 Unionizing government service, 58 
 United German-American Societies, 
 
 Van Buren, D. C., 218 
 
 Van Dyke., Henry, 16, 17, 239, 256 
 
 Vanderlip, Frank A., 272 
 
 Venereal disease, 170 
 
 Venizelos, Premier, 291, 292 
 
 Veterans Bureau, 423 
 
 Veto, advance, 358 
 
 Vice in war, 170, 174 
 
 Vienna Congress, 271 
 
466 
 
 Index 
 
 Vocational Training Board 
 denied charge of neglect, 426 
 eligibles recognized by, 426 
 failure to aid men charged, 426 
 
 Vollmer, Henry, 22 
 
 Wadsworth, Senator, 116 
 
 Wages of railroad employes, 54 
 
 Walsh, Frank P., 204 
 
 War Department 
 
 neglect in casualty lists, 132 
 failure in munitions program, 122 
 improvement in munitions, 127 
 
 War diet, 29 
 
 War Risk Bureau 
 
 administration force ' resigned, 427 
 
 complaints against, 426 
 
 failure of, 427 
 
 growth of, 424 
 
 Lindsley, Henry D., director, 427 
 
 origin of, 424 
 
 War Weekly 
 
 on Germanism in America, 229 
 on Secretary Baker's delays, 115 
 on Secretary Baker's speech, 108 
 on treatment of Leonard Wood, 
 361 
 
 Watterson, Henry, 151, 331 
 
 White, Henry D., 262 
 
 White House conferences, 307, 311, 
 
 337 
 
 Whittlesey, Charles W., 437 
 Wilson, Secretary of Labor 
 and Densmore report, 207 
 chairman mediation commission, 
 
 203 
 shielded those making false report 
 
 in Mooney case, 207 
 on trade extension, 402 
 Wilson, President 
 
 address of at Manchester, 269 
 address to D. A. R., 371 
 appealed to class spirit, 359 
 cold in manner, 369 
 and "common counsel," 373, 378 
 compared with Lincoln, 368-370 
 created divisions, 376 
 demand as to critical publica- 
 tions, 164 
 
 destructive in type, 375 
 disloyalty struck by, 23 
 disregarded people's appeals, 53 
 first draftees addressed by, 26 
 explained Article X in Treaty, 308 
 flag-day address, 23 
 followed by Senator Johnson, 340 
 handiwork of in Treaty, 286 
 haughty, 375 
 
 President Wilson, headed flag-day 
 
 parade, 23 
 
 heeded organized labor, 51 
 held people's confidence, 450 
 ignorant of secret treaties, 307 
 incapable of team work, 374 
 and internationalism, 382 
 and "interpreters," 366, 371 
 intervened to save Mooney, 208 
 influence of in primaries, 350 
 man of mystery, 366 
 mental perversity of, 378 
 method of work, 368 
 and nationalism, 380 
 neutrality address, 14 
 and personal government, 375, 385 
 personal relations of, 368 
 phrasings of, described, 381 
 place of in history, 384 
 political appeal of in 1918, 355 
 reply of to Clemenceau, 269 
 results of labor policy of, 59 
 self-confidence of, 373 
 spoke in the abstract, 368 
 taken ill on Covenant tour, 340 
 taking wrong side, 481 
 urged to hear General Wood, 361 
 unfair to the nation, 16 
 vacillating, 395 
 
 Wilsonia, 291 
 
 Wilsonism defined, 385 
 
 Wire control 
 chaos in, 146 
 criticized, 145, 146 
 method of taking over, 150 
 news wire, 159 
 purpose of taking over, 151 
 rates increased under, 146 
 returned to private control, 151 
 request of Burleson in taking con 
 
 trol, 145 
 strikes under, 148 
 
 Wiseman, Sir William, 288 
 
 Wood, General Leonard, 21, 361, 362 
 
 World, The, New York 
 on court-martial system, 135 
 on Creel and the Official Bulletin, 
 
 155 
 
 on President Wilson's 1918 elec- 
 tion appeal, 357 
 
 on prohibition enforcement at in- 
 ception, 1 86 
 on wire control, 151 
 Workingmen, British, on war, 237 
 Work-or-fight policy, 57 
 
 Zimmerman notes, 21, 226 
 Zone system of mail, 144 
 
THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ 
 
 This book is due on the last DATE stamped below. 
 
 MAY 25 1968 
 
 NOV 3 RECX 
 
 MAY 5 1982 REC'D 
 
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 Jim 1 1988 
 
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