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THE BOXER REBELLION 
 
 A Political and Diplomatic Review 
 
 jjJU^j^-^ 
 
 BY 
 
 PAUL H. CLEMENTS, A. M. 
 
 Sometime Fellow in International Law^ Columbia University 
 
 Lecturer at Columbia on Far Eastern 
 
 Politics and Diplomacy 
 
 SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
 
 FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 IN THE 
 
 Faculty of Political Science 
 Columbia University 
 
 NEW YORK 
 19IS 
 
;i]s77/ 
 
 C!^ 
 
 11 
 
 
MY FATHER AND MOTHER 
 
 327799 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The present volume comprises an examination into the 
 causes of the Box RebeUion and its international complica- 
 tions, and a discussion of the Joint Note of 1900 and the 
 Peace Protocol of 1901, whereby relations between China 
 and the world were again established on an amicable basis. 
 
 There need be no apology for contributing an additional 
 work to the literature on this fascinating period of history. 
 When the circumstances and results of this remarkable ex- 
 hibition of wrath against the outside world are fully con- 
 sidered and appreciated, it can be realized how, at one stroke, 
 entirely unforeseen by critics of the day, it shook China out 
 of the sleep of centuries, revolutionized the history and 
 politics of a race possessing great inherent possibilities, and 
 formed the background, the cause, in fact, of momentous 
 events which are taking place in the Far East to-day and the 
 ultimate trend of which it is impossible to foretell. As the 
 period of Chinese history under discussion, from 1895 to 
 1902, occupies a unique place in international politics and 
 diplomacy, the author has carefully examined as source the 
 invaluable British " Blue Books " dealing with the affairs of 
 China; the reports and correspondence of the Department 
 of State respecting the foreign relations of the United 
 States, as well as numerous treaties, notes and declarations 
 found elsewhere. 
 
 The author desires to acknowledge the invaluable assist- 
 ance of Professor John Bassett Moore, who, at great sacri- 
 fice of time, went over the entire work with him; and to 
 Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman for his instruction and 
 419] 7 
 
8 PREFACE [420 
 
 advice in preparing the volume for the press. Acknowledg- 
 ment is also due to Professors Ellery C. Stowell, Friedrich 
 Hirth, and James Harvey Robinson for their many kindly 
 criticisms and suggestions. It may be added that the studies 
 of the author were first encouraged and directed into the 
 Far Eastern field by his friend, Professor Amos S. Hershey, 
 of Indiana University. P. H. C. 
 
 Columbia University in the City of New York, July, 1915. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 
 Causes of the Boxer Rebellion 
 
 ^ Meaning of the Boxer Rebellion 15 
 
 - China and the world in past history 16 
 
 The Manchu conquest ... 17 
 
 China and Europe in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries 18 
 
 Results of the Opium war 20 
 
 - Real significance of the Chino-Japanese war 25 
 
 Territorial aggressions of the Powers 26 
 
 Restraining influence of the Hay circular note of September, 1899. 37 
 
 Character of the Emperor Kuang Hsu 40 
 
 Dismissal of Weng Tung-ho 42 
 
 Kang Yu-wei as Adviser 43 
 
 First reform decree of June 11, 1898 44 
 
 Further decrees 46 
 
 Decree of September 5 49 
 
 The Coup d ' Etat 54 
 
 Tzu Hsi's resumption of the regency 56 
 
 Reasons for failure of reform 56 
 
 Indifference of Powers to *' Palace revolution " . . • • • 59 
 
 Persecution of reformers ... 60 
 
 'V' Policy of Empress Dowager 63 
 
 Reception*to wives of diplomats 66 
 
 Health of Emperor 67 
 
 V Resumption of regency by Tzu Hsi a vital cause of the Rebellion . 69 
 
 Other immediate causes 70 
 
 The missionary question. 72 
 
 XThe outbreak in Shantung 76 
 
 <Other outbreaks .... 82 
 
 ^Europe's failure to appreciate the situation. 84 
 
 421] 9 
 
lO CONTENTS [422 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PART II 
 The International Complications of the Boxer Rebellion 
 
 Question of the Kangsu troops 89 
 
 First Legation guards 93 
 
 Second Legation guards 97 
 
 Attitude of Chinese Government towards the Boxers. 100 
 
 Imperial decrees concerning Boxers. . ,. lOi 
 
 Distinction between " good and bad " s6cieties 108 
 
 Instructions to Viceroys. 112 
 
 Arrival of foreign warships at Taku 113 
 
 Dynastic succession. . . 114 
 
 Attitude of the Yangtse Viceroys 119 
 
 Policy of United States 125 
 
 Bombardment of Taku 128 
 
 A state of war existing ? 130 
 
 Seymour expedition. . 132 
 
 Capture of Tientsin 134 
 
 Second Allied army 135 
 
 Capture of Peking 136 
 
 PART III 
 
 The Restoration of Order and the Peace Protocol of 
 September 7, 1901 
 
 Letter of Emperor of China to President McKinley 139 
 
 Reply of the President 140 
 
 Letters to Europe and replies 142 
 
 V Li Hung-chang appointed Commissioner 145 
 
 His proposed armistice 147 
 
 y Prince Ching co-Plenipotentiary -. 151 
 
 Their credentials . 152 
 
 Renewal of punitive expeditions 155 
 
 Paotingfu 155 
 
 Chuchow 157 
 
 Situation at Shanghai. . 158 
 
 Proposed resumption of hostilities '. 161 
 
 ' Foreign extensions at Tientsin 164 
 
 *^ Attitude of the United States 167 
 
 ^ Occupation of Imperial Palace at Peking 173 
 
 Beginning of negotiations. . . • • • 175 
 
 The German proposal for punishment 17c 
 
 Replies of the Powers i'^6 
 
423] CONTENTS II 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Edict of September 25 inadequate 180 
 
 The French proposals ... 184 
 
 t/ Acceptance by the Powers 185 
 
 Bases of negotiations ... 187 
 
 The Joint Note 189 
 
 Elaboration by Diplomatic Body at Peking 193 
 
 Further Imperial decrees 199 
 
 Final Protocol of September 7, 1901 203 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. The Joint Note 207 
 
 II. Reply of Chinese Plenipotentiaries to Joint Note ... 211 
 
 III. Final Protocol of September 7, 1901 213 
 
 Bibliography 223 
 
 Index 235 
 
PART I 
 CAUSES OF THE BOXER REBELLION 
 
V 
 
 I 
 
 PART I 
 Causes of the Rebellion 
 
 Meaning of the Boxer Rebellion — China and the World in Past History 
 — The Manchu Conquest — China and Europe in the XVIth and 
 XVIIth Centuries — Results of the Opium War— nReal Significance of 
 the Chino-Japanese War — Territorial Aggressions of the Powers — 
 Restraining Influence of the Hay Circular Note of September, 1899 
 — ^Character of the Emperor Kuang Hsu — Dismissal of Weng Tung- 
 ho — Kang Yu-wei as Adviser — First Reform Decree of June 11, 
 1898 — Further Decrees — Decree of September 5 — The Coup d'Etat — 
 Tzu Hsi's Resumption of the Regency — Reasons for Failure of 
 Reform— Indifference of Powers to " Palace Revolution " — Perse- 
 cution of Reformers — Policy of Empress Dowager — Reception to 
 Wives of Diplomats — Health of Emperor — ^Resumption of Regency 
 by Tzu Hsi a Vital Cause of the Rebellion — Other Immediate 
 Causes — The Missionary Question — The Outbreak in Shantung — 
 Other Outbreaks — Europe's Failure to Appreciate the Situation. 
 
 The Boxer Rebellion may be regarded as the culmination 
 of misunderstandings between China and the Powers in 
 every phase of international activity. It was the last, the 
 supreme, the most desperate effort of all to keep the Middle 
 Kingdom riveted to the standards of antiquity, and its fail- 
 ure, complete in every respect, even from the viewpoint of 
 the Chinese themselves, made possible and inevitable the 
 China of to-day. 
 
 A detailed examination of the causes, immediate and re- 
 mote, of this final protest against western civilization would 
 demand an exhaustive review of Chinese institutions, char- 
 acter and customs entirely beyond the scope of this volume, 
 an examination leading back at least to the days of Con- 
 fucius. A brief outline, however, may be given in passing, 
 427] 15 
 
1 6 THE BOXER REBELLION [428 
 
 showing how contributory events, one piled upon the other, 
 at last brought about this racial cataclysm, with conse- 
 quences so momentous and far-reaching that they could not 
 be understood at the time, much less fully appreciated. In 
 effect, the Boxer Rebellion, through the very completeness 
 and humiliation of its failure, made possible the future posi- 
 tion of China as a real member of the sisterhood of na- 
 tions ^ this, however, at a heart-breaking cost, involving a 
 shock to the national consciousness such as stands without 
 parallel in history. 
 
 The Qiinese had not always been isolated from the rest 
 of mankind. Before the Manchu conquest in the XVIIth 
 century there had been quite an extensive though spas- 
 modic commercial intercourse with the west and a slight 
 acquaintance with western culture. The products of China 
 had been interchanged with those of the Roman Empire; 
 Chinese engineers had been employed on the construction 
 of public works in Persia; Buddhism had been introduced 
 from India ; a Chinese army had penetrated as far west as 
 the Caspian region; Marco Polo and his two uncles had 
 found a flattering welcome; the Jesuits had flourished at 
 Peking; the Nestorian Tablet had been erected, a mute re- 
 minder to-day of what the current of history might have 
 been; and the first embassies from Europe had been gra- 
 ciously received, provided they kowtowed. By such means 
 a healthy curiosity toward the outside world had been occa- 
 sionally stimulated. But, on the other hand, the Chinese 
 had already developed to a great extent that exclusiveness 
 characteristic of them up to the close of the last century. 
 Nor is this to be wondered at, for such was the inevitable 
 resultant of their past history, national ideals and environ- 
 ment. 
 
 Surrounded by tribes in a savage or semi-civilized state, 
 which were greatly inferior from every point of view, it is 
 
/ 
 
 429] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 1 7 
 
 not surprising that the Chinese should have looked upon 
 these as barbarians, fitly to be designated by the radical 
 for dog. Furthermore, a vast expanse of desert and moun- 
 tain and sea made intercourse with the advanced parts of 
 the world extremely hazardous and uncertain, all the more 
 so when the favorite land routes were cut off by the fall of 
 Constantinople and the ascendancy of the Seljuk Turks in 
 western Asia. Moreover, the occasional exchanges of 
 goods and ideas with European nations had been too small 
 in volume appreciably to affect the Chinese race or to in- 
 fluence its development. Yet these little beginnings, if care- 
 fully fostered, might have led to greater things, and such 
 undoubtedly would have been the case had it not been for 
 the rigid policy of seclusion adopted by the alien Manchu 
 monarchs, the greatest misfortune, considering that age of 
 world expansion, which China could have suffered. Al- 
 though in this the Manchus only copied the preceding Ming 
 d3^nasty, yet the XVI Ith century was not the century for 
 the continuance of such a state policy, and therein lay the 
 evil, to be accentuated all the more in the years to come. 
 
 The Manchurian conquerors of one of the most favored 
 regions of the globe were not slow in realizing that, being 
 relatively few in numbers, it was to their interest, as over- 
 lords of an intelligent and law-abiding though passive race 
 constituting one-fourth of the human family, to close all 
 avenues of approach from outside, to interdict all efforts 
 at change, to seal the cotmtry so that a repetition of their 
 own exploit, or disaffection with their own rule resulting 
 from outside influences, would be impossible. In other 
 words, it was the policy of the Manchu monarchs to keep the 
 ideas of the country as they found them, in statu quo, and 
 to prevent any expansion of these ideas either from without 
 or from within. *" Thus the innate conservatism of the 
 Chinese was immeasurably increased, thus antiquity was 
 
\ 
 
 1 8 THE BOXER REBELLION [430 
 
 lauded as the only period of Chinese history worth while, 
 thus the sages were exalted as the teachers of wisdom such 
 as had never been heard since and never would be heard 
 again by mortal man. Thus a careful watch was kept on all 
 the frontiers; intercourse with Europe was practically pro- 
 hibited, and humiliating concessions were demanded of the 
 few embassies and traders who braved the discouraging 
 conditions of entry. Thus by degrees the inherent pre- 
 judices of the Chinese were encouraged, generation after 
 generation, through a monotonous repetition of this dead- 
 ening policy, all the more successful as it emanated from 
 the " Son of Heaven ", until was reached that stage of over- 
 weening national conceit and that dense, impenetrable ignor- 
 ance of the outside world, unmoved by reason or fact or 
 experience, which may be described as the antithesis of 
 western progress and enlightenment. 
 
 Nor was the renewed contact with Europeans, from the 
 XVIth century onward, at all likely to change the precon- 
 ceived opinions of them on the part of the Chinese. In- 
 stead of being advance agents of a higher, or at least a more 
 universal civilization, the early representatives from the 
 Occident could not have been better chosen to harden in the 
 Chinese mind all of the previous mistaken impressions. 
 First in 1506 arrived the " Falanki " (Franks) at Canton, 
 " and by their tremendously loud guns shook the place far 
 and near ". About contemporaneously with these maraud- 
 ers came the Hollanders, who ^' inhabited a wild territory ", 
 whose '' feet were one cubit and two-tenths long ", and 
 whose " strange appearance frightened the people ".^ Next 
 arrived the Portuguese in 15 16, to ruin by their execra'ole 
 conduct what promised to be a fair beginning. A like series 
 of disreputable acts brought failure to the Spaniards, whose 
 
 1 From a Chinese account, quoted by Douglas, Europe and the Far 
 East (Cambridge, 1904; rev. ed., New York, 1913), p. 10. 
 
43 1 ] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 19 
 
 outrages resulted in swift retaliation, twenty- three of their 
 embassy suffering the " lingering death ". With the excep- 
 tion of the Russian missions of 1689 and after, and the 
 British in 1793 and 18 16, these determined efforts of 
 Europe, exerted primarily, so it seemed, not for the estab- 
 lishment of friendly relations with China but for selfish 
 purposes of gain by fair means or foul, were those of 
 " pirates rather than peaceably disposed men ", whose 
 methods of dealing with the Chinese, directly opposite to 
 what they should have been, " went far to justify the 
 Chinese Government in its policy of rigid seclusion from all 
 associations with Europeans "/ Either, like the Dutch mis- 
 sion of 1656, they groveled for favors contemptuously 
 doled out to them,^ or they appeared in the faintly concealed 
 guise of punitive expeditions, harrying the coast and com- 
 mitting every act of brigandage and uncivilized warfare, 
 such as burning, killing, rapine and robbery, upon the de- 
 fenceless inhabitants. That atavistic modes of thought were 
 indelibly fixed in the minds of the Chinese by such a course 
 of action on the part of European governments and people 
 is not strange. Neither can the Chinese be blamed for 
 condemning the whole world alike, for by these examples, 
 each almost a repetition of the other, they were forced to 
 place all nations in the same category. Thus, primarily 
 the fault of Europe, all efforts to establish commercial rela- 
 tions with China proved futile until the country was par- ^ 
 tially opened by England in 1840, through the agency of 
 the Opium war.^ 
 
 ^ Holcomb, China's Past and Future (London, — ) , p. 108. 
 
 ' For like Dutch experiences in Japan and at the Deshima " factory," 
 see Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, 1903), pp. 12-16. 
 
 ' For original sources on the early embassies preceding the Opium 
 war, see Johan Nieuhof, L'Amhassade de la Compagnie Orientate des 
 Provinces Unis vers I'Empereur de la Chine . . . fait par P. de Goyer 
 
20 '^'///•" I^OXER REBELLION [432 
 
 Whatever may he said of the niorahty of Eng^land's act 
 in waging this particular war, the fact remains that by such 
 means, after diplomacy had completely failed/ China was 
 at last forced into definite trade relations with the world, 
 and that, through the sacrifice of British blood and treasure, 
 other nations were enabled equally to participate in the ad- 
 vantages thus wrung from China. The Chinese, totally 
 
 it Jac de Keyser, trans, into Krencli by J. clc Carpentier (London, 1665), 
 and an English trans, by Jolm Ogilhy (2d ed., London, 1673) ; Adam 
 Brand, Journal of the Embassy from Muscovy into China, i6(^3-95> 
 trans, from High-Dutch by W. II. Lndolf (lx>ndon, 1698) ; E. Y. Ides, 
 From Moscow Overland to China (London, 1706) ; vEneas Anderson, 
 A Narrative of the British Embassy to China in the Years 179^, i793 
 and 1^94 (London, 1795) ; Houckgcest A. E. van Braam, Authentic 
 Account of the Embassy of the Dutch East India Company to China, 
 1794-95, trans, from the French of L. E. Moreau de Saint- Mery, 2 vol. 
 (London, 1798) ; Sir. G. L. Staunton, Authentic Account of the Em- 
 bassy to the Emperor of China, undertaken by Order of the King of 
 Great Britain . . . taken principally from the Papers of Earl Macartney 
 (London, 1797) ; Henry Ellis, Journal of the Late Embassy to China 
 {Amherst Mission), 2 vol. (London, 1818) ; George Timkowski, 
 Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China and Resi- 
 dence in Peking in the Years 1S20, 1821, trans, into English by H. E. 
 Lloyd, 2 vol. (London, 1827) ; Edmund 'Roberts, Embassy to the East- 
 em Courts of Cochin-China, Siam and Muscat, in the U. S. Sloop-of- 
 War Peacock, 18$^- 34 (New York, 1837). See- also Mrs. Helen Hen- 
 rietta Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China, an Account of the 
 Life of George, Earl of Mac^tney. icith Extracts from his Letters, and 
 the Narrative of his Experiences, as told by himself (London, 1908). 
 Other accounts of early embassies and dealings with China are 
 found in Sir John Davis, The Chinese (New York, 1857); A. Delano, 
 Narrative of Voyages (Boston, 1857) ; Sir Robert K. Douglas, Europe 
 and the Far East; John W. Foster, American Diplopnacy in the Orient; 
 Charles GutzlafT, History of China, 2 vol. (New York. 1834): Walter 
 A. P. Martin, Cycle of Cathay (New York, n)ob) ; S. Wells Williams, 
 The Middle Kingdom, 2 vol., rev. ed. (New York, 1907). 
 
 * The imposing embassy under Lord Napier in 1834 was the last 
 diplomatic efVort of Great Britain before the Opium war to arrive at a 
 peaceful understanding with the Peking Court. With its f.nilure Great 
 Britain resorted to military force as the last argument. 
 
433] CAUSES OF THE REBELUON 21 
 
 defeated, and unable further to stem the advance of inter- 
 natioyjd relations and commerce, concluded peace with 
 Great Britain under heavy penalties/ and later extended like 
 privileges of trade to the United States and France.* 
 
 I By the ln.il\ .il X.iiikim'. \iir,ir,( lo. i-'r, i . mi. Iii.lni;' llu- ( ^piiutv 
 war, Chui.i .ir.icr,! l,. ..iumi in.- iumI'. (>. l.u>i'Mi li.i,lc, llic.r li\r .niiMiial 
 "treaty poil:. '" lu-nn- ( .mi, mi, \in.>\, !• , x .. I u >\\ . \m;'i.,. .iiul .Mi.iii"! i.ii. 
 In addition llu- i.sl.nul ol IUmh^ K.mii- w ,is i iiU-il m pi-i piMiuly ami a 
 war indctunity of Jfji.cxxuxK) p.n.l l.\ ( hm a, which included within tliat 
 sum the damages for British ..|Miim .K .(i..\.-,I .\\ ('.midn in iS^g hy the 
 famous Commissioner l.in. A iiiMil.ii i.iuii w.i. ( i.iMi .lu-.l, and it 
 
 was aiMccl thai hciirclOi 111 all .hpU'iinln ml n . , uii -.r jiriwrcil (he tWO 
 nations w.is 1(1 lie iiMi.liuicd on a li.i.f. ol al'',,.|iih- (■.|iialil\\ 
 
 ^ Tlie Unit^'il Sl.ilc, ua'. I.Mlmi.ilr in ■..•(iiimr, |m.>1i.iM\ (lie most 
 
 expert man in AinciKa loi ilu;.r lU'.'oiiaii.'ii-., ( aid. i u'.lmiK,. .i ;.nc- 
 ccssful hiwyer, later Attorney-(uMi. i al (hi'. ..|imi..ii', wluK- oianpying' 
 that office still being quoted .-is anih..Mi\, cNp.. i.iiu .c, 1.-..11.I, . .up.nl-.), 
 a skilled diplomat and a brilhanl pn s..ii.ilil\ na.liU .i.l.ipi.il.l.- 1.. ihc5 
 intricacies of dealing' with ili.- ihi.ni.il mind. .\ . .1 1. uli ..i his/ 
 talents, the American {vc:\\\ ...in.mu.l sixteen mon- piovisn.ns than 
 the British treaty oi iw,. \r.ii-. pi.-\i,.ii.. .ml .iP... ,1 i.n clearer embodi- 
 ment of th<> primapic nl c.vtia U'l i ilmi.il ii \ 
 
 It sr.iii'. (jMiir iiic fashion with •..um- wiiuas, when comparing 
 Cuslnng's iicaty ol VVang-hia with the lie.ily "I Nanking, to disparage 
 the latter and unduly praise the former. In lin; i.p.ard it must b© 
 remcmhered that luigland was dealinp, uiih a .KU.ii. .1 enemy granting 
 concessions only at the sword's poini , m..n.i\ti, ha. I it not been for 
 ilCngland's successful conduct of the war, lushiiD.' . (m sion in all 
 prohahility would have been a total faihu'e. 
 
 For President Tyler's comprehensive report on affairs with the Far 
 'Fast at this time, which report was written by Wchsicr in his capacity 
 as Secretary of State, see Richardson, Messaurs ami l^apers of the 
 Presidents, 10 vol. (Washington, 1896), vol j, p|i 1 ; 14. I'or the act 
 of Congress of March 3, 1842, appropriaim j.|. ...... lor the purpose 
 
 of establishing ConmKaci.il icliili.ai'. Ih'|\\(.ii ( lim.i iml the I'Milcd 
 
 States on a treaty h.i.is, .<■.• , / '. ,s. ,'w.i/., (k'i. |..lm i;.i •..•11 M.M.ie, 
 // Difjest of lutanational Imxv, H vol. ( VVa .limcion, i(jn<.), vol. 5, 
 p. 416. The full text of Webster's instructions lo ( n limi' 1 foimd 
 in Webster's Works, vol. 6, p. 467, and in part in M...,i. I'l./.-.st, vol. 
 5, pp. 416, 417. 
 
 Tyler's unique letter to the Emperor of China is given in Foster, 
 o/>. (it., p. H.>, and in United States 28th Congress, 2d Session, Senate 
 
22 THE BOXER REBELLION [434 
 
 The Opium war begins a new epoch in the relations of 
 China with the Powers, a period which may roughly be esti- 
 mated as extending from 1840 to 1895, marked on one side 
 by the unreasoning hostility of China to everything foreign 
 and on the other side by constant aggressions of Europe, 
 these aggressions, however, still tempered by a belief in and 
 respect for China's latent military power and the prestige 
 naturally accorded to so vast an empire. 
 
 But it was not to be expected that, through the defeats 
 of a single war, China would or even could have reversed 
 the policy and habits of centuries. In fact, there was little 
 to show at the time that the war of 1840 had resulted in any 
 material or moral benefit. The opening of the treaty ports 
 was delayed, on the ground that they were " unsafe " for 
 foreigners, and the same offensive tactics and thousand 
 petty exactions were religiously adhered to by China as 
 before the first international conflict. Only in the payment 
 of the indemnity to England did China act with any degree 
 of celerity, and then for the sole purpose of ridding certain 
 Chinese territories of British troops, who were quartered 
 ^ upon the land until such payment was forthcoming. Gov- 
 ernment and people were united in the common cause of 
 f^ opposition to all demands of the foreign Powers. The 
 Peking Court, following the customary practice of Oriental 
 nations, pursued a policy of masterly inactivity coupled 
 with a contemptuous disregard for treaty stipulations, al- 
 though it must be admitted that China was as yet unac- 
 quainted with international law and the binding qualities of 
 
 Documents, no. 139. Another version, slightly differing in detail, is 
 found in Williams' Middle Kingdom, vol. 2, pp. 565, 566, Says Wil- 
 liams concerning this letteY, op. cit., p. 565 : " Caleb Cushing . . . 
 "brought a letter . . . which is inserted in full as an instance of the 
 singular mixture of patronizing and deprecatory address then deemed 
 suitable for the Grand Khan by western nations." 
 
435] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 23 
 
 formal agreements. Especially was China unacquainted 
 with agreements imposed through the agency of force. 
 The great Taiping Rebellion, inspired by the disappointed ~ 
 scholar Hung Sui-tsuen, who had failed in his attempts at 
 advance standing among the literati, furnished another ele- 
 ment of uncertainty and disorder.^ Trade was paralyzed, 
 merchants complained ; all was confusion. It was plain that 
 further corrective punishment was necessary, and this finally 
 came in 1857, indirectly through the accumulation of griev- 
 ances and abuses ever since 1842, directly on account of 
 the indignity to the supposedly British lorcha "Arrow ". 
 
 France and Great Britain joined forces in the sharp and 
 decisive struggle which followed. It was soon over, but 
 again China misjudged the trend of international events. 
 A supplementary punitive expedition in i860, as the last 
 argument of the exasperated Allies, struck at the very heart 
 of the Chinese Government, burned the Summer Palace, 
 drove the Court into hasty flight, and by these drastic meas- 
 ures gained that final step in diplomacy for which Europe 
 had been laboring for centuries, namely, representation at. 
 Peking and recognition of equality. * 
 
 A period of comparative international tranquility fol- 
 lowed, one phase of which was the unique Burlingame mis- 
 sion in 1868 to the United States and Europe.^ It seemed 
 that China at last understood the impossibility of keeping 
 foreigners out of the Middle Kingdom, and that the attempt 
 
 1 The Taiping IRebellion is interesting from an international point of 
 view as several times Europe was on the verge of recognizing the 
 rebels. But sympathy for the movement soon changed to disgust at 
 the lawless character and impossible claims of the revolutionary gov- 
 ernment, which finally collapsed through the victories of the Imperial 
 troops led by Generals Ward and Gordon. 
 
 2 For a sympathetic treatment of Burlingame and his career, see 
 F. W. Williams, Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to 
 Foreign Powers (New York, 1912). 
 
24 THE BOXER REBELLION [436 
 
 to refuse all diplomatic and commercial intercourse with 
 the rest of the world could be henceforth hardly more than 
 a Utopian dream, a condition of the past never again to be 
 realized. Therefore to all outward appearances China 
 made the best of the unwelcome situation and, barring a 
 desultory war with France over Tongking in 1885, re- 
 / mained on fairly good terms with the rest of mankind 
 until 1894-95. 
 
 Nevertheless, the outbreak at the close of the last century 
 revealed conclusively that ever since 1842, though outwardly 
 acquiescent, China never forgave nor forgot, and that when 
 the supreme moment should come, as it was judged to have 
 come in 1900, in it would be expressed to the fullest meas- 
 ure the '' concentrated wrath and hate of sixty years "/ 
 Defeated with monotonous regularity by Europe, forced at 
 the cannon's mouth to conform to a mass of new and be- 
 wildering and in their eyes onerous treaty stipulations, none 
 of which they desired, at no time had the Chinese met the 
 Powers in a mutuality of interests. The Burlingame peace 
 mission was an episode in itself, inspired by the idealism of 
 one man, and may be regarded as entirely detached from the 
 general current of Chinese politics. Though gifted with a 
 vision of the future, Burlingame was fifty years ahead of 
 his time, and his ideas regarding China's relations with the 
 rest of the world were impossible of realization in his day 
 as each country had to learn by bitter experience the les- 
 sons which culminated in the establishment of the Far East- 
 ern Republic. 
 
 A further fact to be noted is, that by successfully weather- 
 ing the great Taiping Rebellion, the Manchu monarchy 
 gained a new lease on life, and, gradually increasing in 
 power, by 1895 seemed strong enough to last indefinitely. 
 
 1 Holcomb, Outlook, 1904, P- 407. 
 
437] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 25 
 
 Consistent in its opposition to the foreigner and foreign 1 
 relations, with the exception of the first two emperors of \^ 
 the dynasty, this recovery of power in the monarchy meant _\ _ 
 that the poHcy of closing the country would become stronger 
 than ever, coupled as it was with the instincts of self-pres- 
 ervation; and that, once sure of its ground, the Peking 
 Court would not hesitate to throw down the gauntlet to 
 united Europe if necessary. It was the war with Japan 
 that brought matters to a climax, revealed China's rotten- 
 ness to the world, struck a blow at royalty comparable only 
 to the disasters of i860, and hastened the inevitable conflict 
 with the Powers, a struggle which, considering all events, 
 was bound to come sooner or later, and the surprise was 
 that it so soon followed the humiliation of 1895. 
 
 Contrary to the general impression, the Chino- Japanese 
 war cannot be called a national conflict in so far as China 
 was concerned. Strictly speaking, it was regarded as an 
 affair of the Manchu regime; its disasters were their dis- 
 asters, its mistakes their mistakes. Also, the war was prin- 
 cipally fought in a region foreign to the " Eighteen Prov- 
 inces ", the invading Japanese for the most part entering, 
 not China proper, but the dependency of Manchuria, the 
 ancestral home of the reigning dynasty, and which the latter 
 alone in duty were bound to defend. Therefore the Chinese 
 considered themselves removed from all responsibility, and 
 persisted in viewing the conflict as an incident of the 
 Manchu foreign policy of no intimate concern to any but 
 the Manchus. A like analogy to this somewhat curious rea- 
 soning was revealed a decade later when the Russian bu- 
 reaucracy, not the Russian people, was supposed to have 
 engaged Japan in this identical region. Of course, had both 
 wars been successful instead of dismal failures, the train of 
 reasoning in both instances would have been precisely the 
 opposite in the case of all those affected. Thus the appar- 
 
\ 
 
 26 THE BOXER REBELLION [438 
 
 ent lack of patriotism in both countries is afforded an easy 
 and convenient explanation, as an unfortunate situation in 
 which the governments were involved, but not the people. 
 Granting the above weak argument, why should the Chinese 
 have cared much about the unexpected turn of events ? As a 
 matter of fact, the mass of them did not care ; they remained 
 indifferent, aloof, almost neutral, one might say. It was 
 not the war itself which in the main contributed to the cy- 
 clonic frenzy of a few years later. It was the consequences 
 of that war, the revelation of the weakness of China to the 
 world, the fastening of the stupendous indemnity, by which 
 Japan realized a hundred per cent profit, upon the people at 
 large, who thus had to pay a heavy price for Manchu folly ; 
 and, above all, the territorial loot of the Empire by Europe 
 following the intervention at Chefoo. These staggering re- 
 sults in turn were among the causes of the catastrophe of 
 1 1900. 
 
 In order fully to understand the position of the European 
 ♦ Powers in regard to the Far East at the time of the Boxer 
 Rebellion, it will be necessary to sketch their territorial ag- 
 gressions in China during the years immediately preceding 
 the conflict. Of all immediate causes of this last upheaval 
 \oi China against the Occident, these aggressions were the 
 most important factor. Had they never occurred, it is 
 doubtful whether there would have been a rebellion. _To 
 Europe's land-greed this sorry page of history is primarily 
 due; and more than that, furnished the example and ex- 
 cuse for a series of recent events so effectively limiting 
 China's sovereignty and integrity that even to-day the ulti- 
 mate consequences cannot be foreseen. 
 
 After the intervention of Russia, France and Germany 
 at Chefoo in 1895 on China's behalf, for which China well 
 knew there would be a heavy reckoning in the near future, 
 Russia was the first to show her hand. This, however, was 
 
439] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 27 
 
 done in a friendly manner and with perfect diplomacy, 
 through the floating of a 4 percent loan of 400,000,000 
 francs at 94 J^ payable in thirty-six years, without security, 
 the Czar himself guaranteeing the interest by royal ukase. ^ 
 This unexampled generosity enabled China to liquidate half 
 the war indemnity to Japan. The next step of Russia was 
 to " facilitate the execution of the loan ", which was the 
 ostensible purpose of founding the Russo-Chinese Bank 
 with its thirty branches throughout Siberia and the Far 
 East.^ The bank proved of immense service to Russia as 
 it was a desirable and necessary screen for demands on 
 China, which demands, though seemingly obtained for this 
 corporation, supposedly a private one, were in reality 
 granted to the Imperial Russian Government through this 
 convenient agency. The climax of early Russian conces- 
 sions was revealed by the unauthorized publication of an 
 agreement known as the Cassini Convention, the first part 
 of which dealt primarily with railway and mining grants 
 and the second with unusual privileges accorded Russia in 
 Manchuria. Most significant of all was the provision that, 
 as Russia " has never possessed a seaport in Asia which is 
 free from ice and open the year around ", China was " will- 
 ing " to lease the port of Kiaochau (Tsingtao) for fifteen 
 years (Art. I). Russia was also to help fortify Port 
 Arthur and Talienwan (Dalny, now called Dairen by the 
 
 ipor the negotiations of M. Witte, Russian Minister of Finance, 
 with Hottinguer and Co. and other French bankers, see Henri Cordier, 
 Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 
 3 vol. (Paris, 1902), vol. 3, pp. 304-308. 
 
 2 See Kanichi Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict (New York, 
 1904), p. 85, from "Statutes of the Bank," published Dec. 8, 1896, in a 
 Japanese source, the Tokushu Joyaku, pp. 642-660. 
 
 See W. W. Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with or concerning 
 China and Korea, 1894-1904 (Washington, 1904), pp. 207-211, for 
 "Charter of the Russo-Chinese Bank," Dec. 10, 1895, Engl, version. 
 
28 THE BOXER REBELLION [440 
 
 Japanese), and was not to ''permit any other foreign Power 
 to encroach upon them", while China bound herself "never 
 to cede them to another country" (Art. X)/ But in ob- 
 taining these far-reaching concessions the Russian diplo- 
 mats failed to take into account the tremendous uproar 
 which Europe surely would raise and certainly did raise 
 when the alleged Russian advantages appeared in the North 
 China Herald. This convinced Russia that she had gone 
 too far, and the existence of the Cassini Convention was 
 flatly denied both by Russia and by China. By this simple 
 expedient the agitation in Europe was quieted; and, Rus- 
 sian diplomacy having suffered a decided setback in the 
 Far East, matters rested for a while, and Russia concerned 
 herself only with building the Eastern Chinese Railway 
 under an agreement obtained through the subsidiary Russo- 
 Chinese Bank. 
 
 European spoliation of China was soon reopened, from 
 an unexpected quarter, and it was Germany who gave Rus- 
 sia, and all the world for that matter, a practical illustra- 
 tion of how to deal with China regarding leases and con- 
 cessions. Germany herself had looked longingly upon 
 Kiaochau, and the reported leasing of that harbor to 
 Russia through the Cassini Convention, though quickly repu- 
 diated, yet prompted Germany to action. An admirable 
 pretext soon came in the murder of two German mission- 
 aries in the province of Shantung, where Kiaochau was 
 located. Germany at once struck with the mailed fist. A 
 naval expedition, despatched in all haste to Kiaochau, ex- 
 pelled the Chinese garrison, seized the port, and raised the 
 
 1 The text of the Cassini Convention is given in Weale, Re-Shaping 
 of the Far East, 2 vol. (London, 1905), vol. 2, p. 439, and Beveridge, 
 Russian Advance (New York, 1904), p. 469. A French version ia 
 found in Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 343-347; also in Revue Generate 
 de Droit Internationale Public, vol. xii, 1905, note to pp. 226-228. 
 
441 ] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 29 
 
 German flag to the salute of twenty-one guns and three 
 cheers for the Kaiser. Then began the tortuous negotia- 
 tions with the Chinese Foreign Office, the Tsung-H Yamen, 
 from the date when they first met " to consider this seizure 
 of territory by a friendly Power ", to the time when China 
 was forced to give way. Baron von Heyking, Grerman Min- 
 ister at Peking, finally announced to the world that Ger- 
 many had received a lease of Kiaochau (city of Tsingtao 
 and Kiaochau Bay) for ninety-nine years, preferential 
 treatment in Shantung, railway and mining grants, and 
 indemnity for the murdered missionaries. All this on ac- 
 count of the death of two priests of whom the German Gov- 
 ernment had never before heard. ^ 
 
 Russia in particular was much impressed ^ by the Ger- 
 man action and immediately arranged to do likewise, but 
 with far greater tact. Conceding Germany's right to Kiao- 
 chau, after an extensive correspondence between Berlin 
 and St. Petersburg, Russia transferred her activities else- 
 where, and soon had " permission " to winter her fleet at 
 Port Arthur. To allay Japanese apprehensions, Russia 
 
 * The treaty for the lease of Kiaochau is given in British Parliamentary- 
 Papers, China No. i (1899), Inclosure in no. 66, reprinted from the 
 Reichsanzeiger of April 29, 1898; also in United States For. Rel., 1898, 
 Inclosure in no. 2884, pp. 187-190; Weale, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 455-459; 
 Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 357-361 ; Alexis Krausse, The Far East: 
 Its History and its Question, 2d ed. (London, 1903), pp. 344-346. 
 
 ' So was Great Britain. Notice the following appreciation of the 
 German action by the London Times of November 16, 1897 : 
 
 " Instead of wasting time in making remonstrances at Peking, which 
 would assuredly have been met as usual by the innumerable dilatory 
 devices of Chinese diplomacy, the Germans have landed a force in 
 Kiao-chou Bay, in order to bring to bear the only kind of influence 
 that Chinamen seem able to understand . . . The experiment is one 
 which we ourselves have tried on one or more occasions, with results 
 so excellent as compared with any obtainable by diplomatic negotiation 
 that there is reason to wonder why we do not always follow the more 
 effectual method." 
 
30 THE BOXER REBELLION [442 
 
 notified the Japanese Government that '' Port Arthur had 
 been lent to Russia only temporarily as a winter anchor- 
 age ", and Japan replied that she " credited this assur- 
 ance "/ The British also were disinclined at first to oppose 
 Russian attempts to gain a satisfactory Far Eastern harbor, 
 doubtless as an added precaution at that time for Constan- 
 tinople. In fact, Mr. Balfour went so far as to say that 
 " we had always looked with favor upon the idea of Russia 
 obtaining an ice-free harbor on the Pacific ".^ It was not 
 that which alarmed England and later caused a sharp diplo- 
 matic struggle ending in British defeat, but, as the Marquis 
 of Salisbury expressed it : '' The Russian Government had 
 now given a most unfortunate extension to this policy '', 
 by which Lord Salisbury meant the three Russian demands 
 which were being made on China, as follows : 
 
 '' I. The lease of Port Arthur. 
 
 11. The lease of Talienwan (Dalny). 
 "' III. The construction of a railroad to Port Arthur and 
 Talienwan, connecting either city with the Russian lines, 
 and thus making either one a terminus of the Great Siberian 
 Railway, 
 
 These demands were, of course, quite an elaboration of 
 the original innocent desire for an ice-free harbor. 
 
 Encouraged by England, China endeavored to persuade 
 Russia to consider the question of Port Arthur and Talien- 
 wan separately, but was peremptorily informed that the 
 lease of both places must be granted before March I'j, 
 1898, " failing which, Russia would take hostile meas- 
 ures ".^ China delayed until the last day, then signed the 
 
 * China No. i {1898), no. 29. 
 ^Ibid,, no. loi. 
 ' Ibid., no. 126. 
 
443] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 3 1 
 
 convention ceding Port Arthur and Talienwan, as well as 
 the adjacent waters, " in usufruct " to Russia for twenty- 
 five years, with the privilege of renewal if mutually agree- 
 able/ The Russian press, which means particularly the 
 Novoe Vremya, was jubilant over this '' new and undoubted 
 diplomatic disaster to Lord Salisbury's Government ".^ In 
 this the Novoe Vremya was quite right. All that Great 
 Britain had succeeded in accomplishing after a prolonged 
 diplomatic struggle was to put her objections " on record ". 
 Germany was silenced because of the Kiaochau affair ; France 
 was Russia's ally, therefore her friend. Japan received the 
 disquieting news in ominous silence, which alone should 
 have been enough to forewarn Russia. All outward ex- 
 pressions of opposition to Russia in Japanese military and 
 diplomatic circles remained practically unspoken, carefully 
 concealed, to pour out in a resistless flood at the appointed 
 time. 
 
 As the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, not for com- 
 merce but as a fortified naval base, was held to '' disturb 
 the balance of power " in north China, the British began 
 to press the Yamen for the lease of Weihaiwei, directly op- 
 posite from the Russian acquisition. A short time before, 
 Great Britain had declined the offer of this identical port 
 on the praiseworthy ground that the Foreign Office aimed 
 at " discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory ". 
 This, however, with the reservation that the " existing posi- 
 tion " would not be '' materially altered by the action of 
 
 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1898, pp. 184, 186; " Precis " in China No. i (1899) r 
 no. 187, pp. 127-129; Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 130, 131; Beveridge, op. cit., 
 pp. 118, 119; Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 362-364; Krausse, op. cit., 
 PP- 349, 350 ; Rockhill, op. cit., pp. 50-52 ; Weale, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 459- 
 462. 
 
 "^ Novoe Vremya of March 21 (April 2), 1898; trans, in China No. i 
 (1899), Inclosure in no. 14. 
 
32 THE BOXER REBELLION [444 
 
 other Powers "/ Such an unusual attitude could not have 
 been expected to last in Far Eastern diplomacy, and, as it 
 was soon discovered that Russia had subjected the above 
 " existing position " to a " rude shock ", Downing Street 
 considered itself released from the above rather odd declar- 
 ation. But to palliate matters. Sir Claude MacDonald, 
 British Minister at Peking, announced that England was at 
 Weihaiwei solely to preserve the balance of power, and that 
 England " would give it up to-morrow " if Russia would 
 evacuate Port Arthur. Little difficulty was experienced in 
 persuading China beyond '' wearisome discussions " over 
 minor details, and as soon as the Japanese stepped out the 
 British stepped in, on terms '' similar to those granted to 
 Russia for Port Arthur ".^ 
 
 The Germans were not interested in England's new pos- 
 session. To them it was '' a matter of indifference which 
 flag floats over Weihaiwei ", but they pointed out that the 
 British action " implies a change for the worse in the rela- 
 tions between Russia and England " (Norddeutsche Zei- 
 tung).^ This proved true, and Russia brought all possible 
 pressure to bear upon China to prevent the port from fall- 
 ing into British hands, but was unsuccessful. The Japan- 
 ese, on their part, were only too glad to have a friendly 
 power take their place and thus offer a welcome counter- 
 part to Russian aggression. It may be noted that, although 
 
 ^.China No. i (1898), nos. 90, 91. 
 
 ^U. S. For. Rel, 1898, p. 190; China No. i {1899), p. I99; iRockhill, 
 op. cit., pp. 60, 61. For Great Britain's " formal " declaration to Ger- 
 many, "that in establishing herself at Wei-hai Wei, she has no in- 
 tention of injuring or contesting the rights and interests of Germany 
 in the province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties for her in that 
 province," see Rockhill, op. cit., p. 180; China No. i, {1899), pp. 27-31. 
 
 ^ Norddeutsche Zeitung of April 6, 1898. These comments first ap- 
 peared in the Kolnische Zeitung, and were reproduced in the Berlin 
 newspapers. See trans, in China No. i {1899), no. 12 and Inc. 
 
445] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 33 
 
 Weihaiwei was occupied on the pretext of preserving the 
 balance of power, such " necessity " has long since passed; 
 nevertheless, though the Russians have been driven out of 
 Port Arthur, the British are still in possession of the town 
 on the opposite mainland. 
 
 Through fear of French encroachments in the south, 
 England found excuse for similar undertakings on the 
 Chinese littoral directly across from Hong Kong, and de- 
 manded an extended territory upon the sudden discovery 
 that the British colony lacked adequate protection. China 
 was persuaded, we might rather say forced, to cede some 
 two hundred square miles, " nothing more than was neces- 
 sary ", before British apprehensions were relieved. Origi- 
 nally the British intention was to demand absolute cession, 
 as with the island of Hong Kong in the Opium war, but 
 this was by no means advisable, as both Germany and Rus- 
 sia had obtained their proprietory rights by leases of ninety- 
 nine and twenty-five years respectively. In deciding be- 
 tween the two, England modestly chose the ninety-nine year 
 lease, thus emulating Germany. One clause of the en- 
 suing agreement referred to opium, both the high contract- 
 ing parties engaging to unite in eradicating the evil as much 
 as possible. Credit for this stipulation was due mainly to 
 Sir Robert Hart."^ 
 
 But England was not yet through with China. From 
 having been the nation seemingly least disposed (always 
 excepting the United States) to take advantage of China's 
 helplessness she turned out to be one of the worst. Further- 
 more, China had earlier refused a British loan and this had 
 greatly irritated Downing Street. To make the British 
 position doubly secure in spite of the loan failure, now that 
 
 * See China No. i (1899), "O- 225 for a discussion of the Hong Kong 
 Extension, and Inclosure in no. 225 for the Convention. 
 
34 THE BOXER REBELLION [446 
 
 the partition of China seemed imminent, Great Britain in 
 1898 secured a pledge that the Yangtze Valley would never 
 be alienated to another Power, thus arrogating the vast ter- 
 ritories of central China and the richest provinces of the 
 Empire as British sphere of influence/ Then Japan 
 judged it high time to act, and exacted a similar pledge 
 from China as regarded the province of Fukien, and China, 
 having again established the necessary precedent, again 
 could not refuse. Later the Japanese also negotiated for 
 and received a settlement at Amoy.^ 
 
 France, meanwhile, had been far from idle. The year 
 of the Chino-Japanese war saw the French already firmly 
 established in Annam, Cambodia, Cochin-China and Tong- 
 king, embracing a territory of 315,250 square miles and a 
 population of 18,000,000 souls. And now while Russia, 
 Germany and England were seizing provinces right and 
 left France serenely appeared with similar demands, which 
 apparently combined all that the former three had obtained. 
 On April 11, 1898, the Yamen received an enumeration of 
 what France expected, namely : 
 
 I. Kwangchouwan to be leased for ninety-nine years as a 
 coaling station. 
 
 II. The right to construct a railway to Yunnanfu from 
 the Tongking frontier. 
 
 III. The promise of China not to alienate to another 
 Power the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan, 
 or the island of Hainan. 
 
 Like the Germans at Kiaochau, the French disembarked 
 
 1 See China No. i (1899). Inclosures 2 and 3 in no. 20. 
 
 ^Ibid., nos. 41, 45, 164. The United States for a time seemed inter- 
 ested in a settlement at Amoy as a Chinese base of supplies for the 
 Philippines, but fortunately the idea was given up. See U. S. For. 
 ReL, 1899, no. 132, p. 150; no. 42, p. 151; no. 169, p. 151; no. 211, p. 
 152; no. 290, p. 153. 
 
447] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 35 
 
 an armed force at Kwangchouwan and raised the French 
 flag with the same salutes and hurrahs. Even the inevitable 
 proclamation to the inhabitants was not forgotten. But 
 friction developed. It seemed that the Viceroy at Canton 
 offered determined opposition to the French demands, which 
 was very irritating, as he ^'rendait toute entente impossible", 
 a convenient and customary way at that time of deprecating 
 the conduct of patriotic Chinese. Though the Viceroy was 
 unsuccessful, the native population continued their resist- 
 ance, with the result that two French sailors were set upon 
 and beheaded. Of course this gave an excellent opportu- 
 nity for further demands, and later came the welcome news 
 of an additional murder, that of a French missionary. To 
 such extent had good fortune thus come to France's aid 
 that on June 9, 1898, M. Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, was able to announce to his colleagues that the 
 French demands had been met in full by China. ^ 
 
 Next, France raised quite an international disturbance 
 when she suddenly demanded an extension of her settle- 
 ment at Shanghai. That the ground to be incorporated was 
 in part an old cemetery did not deter the French in the least. 
 The difficulty lay not in the observance of the sacred cus- 
 toms and institutions of the Chinese, over which Europe 
 rode roughshod at will, but in the fact that the English and 
 Americans resident in Shanghai had property situated in 
 the proposed extension. Consequently, France found the 
 British Foreign Office and the American Department of 
 State united in opposition. The usual diplomatic threats 
 and parleys followed, until France either shaved down her 
 demands or gave the necessary assurances. This ended all 
 
 * See Cordier, op. jcit., vol. iii, "Projet de Convention relatif a 
 Kouang-tcheou Wan," pp. 370372; U. S. For. ReL, 1898, p. 191; 
 Rockhill, op. cit., pp. 55-57; France, Documents Diplomatiques, Chine, 
 1898-1899, pp. 2-4. 
 
36 THE BOXER REBELLION [448 
 
 disputes, and everyone was highly pleased with the course 
 affairs had taken, all but China, whose wishes, however, 
 did not count/ 
 
 These leases and concessions marked the definite amount' 
 of territory actually placed under foreign administration, 
 always with the saving clause that '' China's rights were to 
 be respected ", which rights were not respected at all. But 
 actual cession of territory did not limit the extent of Euro- 
 pean aggression. The surrounding province or provinces 
 were invariably designated by each Power as constituting a 
 " sphere of influence ", wherein that individual Power con- 
 sidered itself entitled to dominate all others. Thus Ger- 
 many, leasing Kiaochau, declared the entire province of 
 Shantung as the German " sphere ". Russia, by virtue of 
 the cession of Port Arthur and Dalny, claimed the Three 
 Chinese Eastern Provinces (Manchuria). Japan, through 
 a settlement at Amoy and a promise of non-alienation, 
 claimed the province of Fukien. France claimed the terri- 
 tory bordering on Tongking; and England, through the 
 " shadowy claim " over the Yangtze Valley, was supposed 
 to have the first call upon the rich lands watered by that im- 
 portant tributary. In all there were eighteen provinces of 
 the Chinese Empire, and of these eighteen thirteen were 
 pre-empted by the Powers, the thirteen most populous, most 
 wealthy, and most desirable, including within them all the 
 important waterways, harbors, mines and economic centres 
 that were possible of access to foreign commerce. 
 
 ^ For a complete review of the negotiations for the extension of the 
 French settlement at (Shanghai, see China No. i (1899), nos. 319, 325, 
 359, 370, 384, 407, 409, 410, 416, 432, 437, 439, 440, 444, 448, 449, 452, 
 454, 455, 463; China No. i (jgoo), nos. 24, 33, 44, 45, 5i, 55, nP, 124, 
 127, 128, 131, 132, 182, 186, 197, 198, 200, 201, 204, 209, 233, 234, 235, 
 266, 388, 402, 413, 414, 444, 450, 458, 462; U. S. For. ReL, 1899, nos. 
 129, 146, 168, 171, 183, 18^, 203, 206, 228, 231, pp. 143-150; Cordier, 
 op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 438-446. 
 
449] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 37 
 
 There were a few redeeming features of this sordid chap- 
 ter of history, most prominent of which was the attitude 
 taken by the United States. True to its time-honored poHcy, 
 the American Government decHned to participate in the ter- 
 ritorial loot of the Empire. Instead, the moral support of 
 the State Department, as directed by John Hay, was con- 
 tinually exercised for the benefit of China, protesting here 
 and there against these unexampled aggressions, and in prac- 
 tical isolation standing aloof from the land-hunger of 
 Europe. Finally, seeing that American commercial inter- 
 ests were being jeoparidized by the conflicting policies of the 
 Powers, Secretary Hay submitted a Circular Note, Septem- 
 ber, iSgp, in which he requested the aaherence of every na- 
 tiorf concerned to the following propositions : 
 
 I. Non-interference with any treaty port or vested inter- 
 ests of the " sphere " or leased territory of any Power. 
 
 n. Application of the Chinese treaty tariff, except in free 
 ports, under Chinese control. 
 
 III. Equality of treatment as to harbor dues and railroad 
 charges in the various " spheres ".^ 
 
 This note was not political, as is popularly supposed, but 
 economic, on the face of it merely to protect American and 
 other commercial interests in China. Each Power was ap- 
 proached separately, consequently each Power was obliged 
 to answer separately. By this diplomatic strategy Secre- 
 tary Hay revealed diplomatic ability of a high order. The 
 correspondence which followed with the government^ of 
 Europe and Japan was gratifying in results. Italy was un- 
 
 ^See U. S. For. ReL, 1899, no. 664, pp. 128, 129; no. 927, pp. 129-131 ; 
 no. 205, pp. 131-136; no. 434, PP- 136-138; no. 26^, pp. 138, 139; no. 82, 
 pp. 140, 141; no. 761, p. 142; China No. i {1900), nos. 345, 415, 422. 
 See also Asaka-yva, op. cit., ch. v, "Secretary Hay's Circular Note," 
 pp. 135-139; Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, "La Porte lOuverte," pp. 446-448; 
 Mahan, The Interest of America in International Conditions (Boston,. 
 1910), ch. iv, "The Open Door," pp. 185-212. 
 
38 THE BOXER REBELLION [450 
 
 qualified in her acceptance ; Great Britain, France, Germany 
 and Japan agreed, provided every Power did likewise. Rus- 
 sia, as was expected, gave the usual involved diplomatic 
 reply, but practically acquiesced, and then closed with the 
 beautiful sentiment that the Imperial Government attached 
 the " highest value " to anything which would " consolidate 
 the traditional relations of friendship existing between the 
 two countries ",^ which the State Department took for what 
 it was worth. 
 
 Although no final agreement was made, Hay notified the 
 American Ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, St. Peters- 
 burg and Rome, and the American Minister at Tokyo that 
 he regarded these expressions of adherence as " final and 
 definitive ". It is, of course, impossible to state the exact 
 benefits of this note, inasmuch as these benefits were largely 
 of a moral nature vastly greater than the mere acceptance 
 of the commercial principles therein stated. . However, by 
 this skillful stroke of diplomacy, the territorial entity of 
 China was doubly assured, for so long as a " sphere " was 
 not alienated to another Power exclusively, there was little 
 danger of it passing entirely into that Power's hands. Sec- 
 retary Hay well knew that exclusive economic domination 
 is the invariable forerunner of political absorption; there- 
 fore, by insisting upon an equality of commercial treatment 
 -and economic opportunity for all nations, he was able to 
 prevent that final step towards complete political control. 
 
 But the Hay note could not do the impossible; it could 
 not reconcile the great mass of Chinese, who were unaware 
 of the note, with existing conditions as brought about 
 largely by the extraordinary political policies of Europe, 
 the effects of which upon China in the year 1899 were most 
 unfortunate. The Chinese, unable to help themselves, and 
 
 1 U. S. For. Rel, 1899, no. 761, p. 142. 
 
45 1 ] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 39 
 
 seeing city after city leased out to foreign Powers and en- 
 tire provinces dominated by foreign influence, grew ex- 
 tremely suspicious of every move made by Europe, and 
 many of them, not understanding the policy of the Ameri- 
 can Government, placed the United States in the same cate- 
 gory. The Powers, in their mad scramble for land, did not 
 take into account the rights of the Chinese, but arranged 
 among themselves where their particular " spheres " and 
 leases should be located, and not until the disastrous year 
 of the Boxer Rebellion did they realize and reluctantly con- 
 cede that China, after all, possessed remarkable innate vigor 
 and was far less decrepit than had been imagined; that 
 she was, in fact, capable of something more than mere re- 
 taliation by mob violence and riots. In 1899, however, thei 
 united opinion of Europe was that China would soon dis-J 
 appear as a sovereign entity, dismembered and divided. 
 Everything then pointed that way, partly because China had 
 not yet shown any determined resistance to European ag- 
 gression, and also because the European demands had been 
 comparatively easy of realization. Besides acquisitions of 
 territory, there were numberless other demands too tedious 
 to mention, consisting mainly of religious and commercial 
 concessions, railway grants, and heavy indemnities for 
 every conceivable item that could possibly be called an in- 
 jury. Europe seemed under the impression that China was 
 an immense golden harvest to be reaped by the first comer, 
 and in the pursuit of this agreeable task little thought was 
 given to international law and still less to international 
 comity and ethics. 
 
 Now to return to the internal situation of the Empire as 
 it affected the Government and the reigning dynasty, upon 
 whom fell the brunt of criticism and blame for this dis- 
 astrous condition of affairs. 
 
 Because of the crushing defeats which overtook the Court 
 
40 THE BOXER REBELLION [452 
 
 in its personal quarrel, as the non-Manchu part of the Em- 
 pire viewed it, with Japan, the Manchu monarchy '' lost 
 face" with its subject Chinese; and of those who felt the 
 weight of responsibility and humiliation heaviest upon them 
 the Emperor was the foremost. Kuang Hsu will live in 
 history as the instigator of reform in China, even though 
 the sum total of his efforts, with the exception of the Uni- 
 versity of Peking, was doomed to failure. Frail, in delicate 
 health, with a sensitive, almost feminine face; subject at 
 times to melancholia, but again to violent outbursts of tem- 
 per; a dreamer, of a poetic, philosophical cast of mind, 
 Kuang Hsu was a well-intentioned man ; but he lacked that 
 firmness of character, that deliberate disregard of conse- 
 quences, that ruthless pursuit of a fixed policy necessary 
 to make of himself another Peter the Great, who had, one 
 might say, the like mission to perform. Although he had 
 been chosen by the Empress Dowager on the death of the 
 preceding Emperor Tung Chih mainly on account of his 
 minority and the negligible qualities which he possessed 
 and apparently would retain, yet for a while he seemed cap- 
 able of great things. As it was, he astonished the world for 
 a brief period, but it was only a momentary flash. His 
 physical disabilities, his indecision, his fears, his lack of 
 princely attributes, his negative training in governmental 
 affairs during his years of preparation, due to the enervat- 
 ing surroundings into which a corrupt Court had deliber- 
 ately thrust him, made of this pathetic descendant of the 
 wise Kang Hi another Louis XVI, and like that unfortunate 
 monarch, though filled with ambition to ameliorate the con- 
 dition of his people and to rehabilitate the nation, he lacked 
 those essentials of greatness, that knowledge of individual 
 character and ability, that Napoleonic trait of correctly esti- 
 mating current events, that prophetic insight into the future 
 and moulding the future to his particular desires which were 
 
453] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 41 
 
 indispensable to the institution of permanent reforms such 
 as he attempted. Considering the extreme difficulty of his 
 situation, it was the complete absence of every one of these 
 characteristics essential for success which makes the life of 
 the well-meaning Kuang Hsu a tragedy in history. He was 
 unequal to his appointed task, and, lacking genius, was 
 crushed by obstacles which at that time only a superman 
 could have overcome. 
 
 As early as December, 1890, and again in June of the fol- 
 lowing year Kuang Hsu had endeared himself to the for- 
 eign element in China by decrees in which he pointed out to 
 his subjects that Christianity was protected by existing 
 treaties with the Powers and by instructions to officials is- 
 sued from the Court. Said he : 
 
 The doctrines of the western religion have for their purpose 
 the teaching of men to be good, and although our people become 
 converts they do not cease to be subjects of China, and are 
 amenable to the local authorities. There is no reason why 
 peace and quiet should not prevail between the people and the 
 adherents of the new religion. 
 
 Officials in the cities and provinces were admonished to pro- 
 tect Christians and foreigners, and punishment was to fol- 
 low in case of disobedience or negligence. 
 
 But Kuang Hsu at that early date had not yet found him- 
 self. Lacking a commanding intellect and personality, he 
 needed some strong support to lean upon, some spirit bolder 
 than his to blaze the way, to inspire him to action. As 
 has been noted, the defeats of the Chino- Japanese war had 
 been most keenly felt by him, and these disasters in them- 
 selves made him more than ever susceptible to schemes for 
 retrieving the face of China by a glorious return to ancient 
 prosperity and power, this on a new basis, however. 
 
 Always an omnivorous reader, especially interested in 
 
 I 
 
42 THE BOXER REBELLION [454 
 
 foreign books, among which missionaries place the Bible, 
 the Emperor soon became imbued with foreign ideas of cul- 
 ture and progress, as contrasted with the ultra-conservative 
 tenets of the Chinese sages. Some credit is due the Im- 
 perial tutor, Weng Tung-ho, associated with the Emperor 
 since the latter's childhood, for not having hampered the 
 Imperial desires. Weng was a man of considerable force 
 of character in his way; in fact, he was the leader of the 
 Southern or Chinese party at the Court, as opposed to the 
 Northern or Manchu, composed mainly of the Empress 
 Dowager, her satellites, and the Imperial Court. An en- 
 lightened Chinese scholar of the old school, but not wholly 
 lacking modern tendencies, Weng deserves praise for hav- 
 ing allowed his pupil free rein ; possibly he contributed to a 
 certain extent to the brief but momentous era of reform, 
 the '' Hundred Days " as this melancholy bit of history has 
 aptly been described.^ His curt dismissal on June 15, 1898, 
 through the general shake-up following the death of Prince 
 Kung, came as a surprise to the Court circle and to the 
 Diplomatic Corps at Peking. No doubt the Imperial pupil 
 found his master too cautious, for, although Weng has 
 been favorably viewed by some writers,^ yet Sir Claude 
 MacDonald, British Minister at Peking, found him " ex- 
 tremely obstructive, notably during the Burmah frontier 
 and West River negotiations ". MacDonald acknowledged, 
 however, that Weng was " prepossessing, courteous, and 
 scholarly — an excellent type of the Conservative Chinese 
 statesman ".* 
 
 * Albert Maybon, La Politique Chinoise: Etude sur les Doctrines des 
 Partis en Chine (Paris, 1908), title to ch. iii of pt. ii. 
 
 ' For a good critical estimate of Weng Tung-ho, see J. O. Bland and 
 Edward Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager (Philadelphia, 
 1910), pp.234, 235. 
 
 ^ China No. i {1899), no. 268. 
 
455] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 43 
 
 Weng was dismissed because another had found more 
 favor in the Emperor's eyes. The Chinese destined to be 
 the right-hand man of Kuang Hsu in this initial progres- 
 sive movement was one Kang Yu-wei, native of a small vil- 
 lage near Canton and author of a work on the development 
 of Japan which the Emperor had read and appreciated. In 
 January, 1898, Kang Yu-wei had obtained an interview with 
 the Tsung-li Yamen and in a three hours' harangue had 
 expounded his political theories to them. The Yamen, 
 though composed entirely of the old order, with rare impar- 
 tiality advised him to memorialize the Throne. The result 
 of this suggestion was a meeting of Kang Yu-wei with the 
 Emperor. A partnership was struck between the two which 
 lasted throughout the reform period and ended only with 
 
 Following is the holograph decree dismissing Weng, Ibid., Inc. i 
 in no. 268: 
 
 An Imperial Mandate 
 
 Weng Tung-ho, Assistant Grand Secretary and President of the 
 Board of Revenue, has of late made many errors in the conduct of 
 business, and has forfeited all confidence; on several occasions he has 
 been impeached to the Throne. 
 
 At his private audiences with the Emperor he has replied to His 
 Majesty's questions with no regard for anything except his own per- 
 sonal feeling and opinion, and he has made no attempt to conceal his 
 pleasure or displeasure either in his speech or in his countenance. It 
 has gradually become clear that his ambition and rebellious feeling have 
 led him to arrogate to himself an attempt to dictate to the Emperor. 
 It is impossible to permit him to remain in the responsible position of 
 a Grand Councillor. In former days a strict inquiry would have been 
 held, and his crime punished with the utmost rigor of the law. Taking 
 into consideration, hpwever, his long service as tutor to the Emperor, 
 His Majesty cannot bring himself to meet out to him such a severe 
 penalty. 
 
 Let Weng Tung-ho vacate his posts, and retire into private life, as 
 a warning that he is preserved (from a worse fate). 
 
 Kuang Hsu, 24th year, 4th moon, 27th day. 
 (June 15, 1898). 
 
44 THE BOXER REBELLION [456 
 
 the Coup d'Etat, when the Empress Dowager destroyed 
 everything by a single blow. 
 
 The reform movement consisted in all of some twenty- 
 seven decrees. Three of them were promulgated while ' 
 Weng Tung-ho was still in office, but a veritable deluge fol- 
 lowed the appointment of Kang Yu-wei. The first revolu- 
 tionary decree, published to the world in the official Peking 
 Gazette of June 11, 1898, is noteworthy in that it clearly 
 states what the Emperor was trying to do and what abuses 
 he would endeavor to correct.^ In fact, it is the outline of 
 the Emperor's policy throughout the reform period. It is 
 also a fine example of Chinese literary effort. The decree 
 reads as follows : 
 
 For a long time past the condition of Imperial afifairs has^ 
 been a subject of discussion among the officials of the Empire, 
 Doth metropolitan and provincial, with a view to bring about 
 changes necessary for improvement. Decrees have been fre- 
 quently issued by the Emperor, for a special system of examin- 
 ations, for doing away with the surplus soldiery, for the alter- 
 ation of the military examinations and for the institution of 
 colleges. 
 
 In spite of the fact that these things have been so often care- 
 fully thought out, and so many plans have been formed, there 
 is no general consensus of opinion, and discussion is still rife 
 as to which plans are best. There are some among the older 
 officials who affirm that the old ways are best and need no alter- 
 ation, and that the new plans are not required. Such babblings 
 are vain and useless. 
 
 The Emperor puts the question before you thus: In the 
 present condition of Imperial affairs, with an untrained army, 
 
 ^ Said MacDonald rather cynically in forwarding the first two de- 
 crees to Lord Salisbury : "They show that a real need for radical reform 
 is thoroughly recognized by the Court at last, but there is little reason 
 to hope that the Imperial admonitions will move the Chinese bureau- 
 cracy deeply." China No. i (1899), no. 266. 
 
457] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 45 
 
 with limited funds, with ignorant " literati," and with artisans 
 untaught because they have no fit teachers, is there any diffi- 
 culty in deciding, when China is compared with foreign nations, 
 who is the strong and who is the weak? It is easy to distin- 
 guish between the rich and the poor. How can a man armed 
 with a wooden stick smite his foe encased in a coat of mail ? 
 
 The Emperor sees that the affairs of the Empire are in an 
 unsettled condition, and that his various decrees have availed 
 nothing. Diversity of opinion, each unlike another as fire 
 differs from water, is responsible for the spread of the exist- 
 ing evil. It is the same evil as that which existed in the Sung 
 and Ming Dynasties (circa A. D. 1000 and 1500). Our pres- 
 ent system is not of the slightest use. We cannot in these 
 modern days adhere to the ways of the Five Kings (circa 
 B. C. 2500) ; even they did not continue exactly after the 
 manner of their respective predecessors. It is like wearing 
 thick clothes in summer and thin ones in winter. 
 
 Now, therefore, the Emperor orders all officials, metro- 
 politan and provincial, from prince down to " literati," to give 
 their whole minds to a real effort at improvement. With per- 
 severance, like that of the saints of old, do your utmost to 
 discover which foreign country has the best system in any 
 branch of learning and learn that one. Your great fault is 
 the falseness of your present knowledge. Make a special 
 effort and determine to learn the best of everything. Do not 
 merely learn the outside covers of the books of knowledge, and 
 do not make a loud boast of your own attainments. The 
 Emperor's wish is to change what is now useless into some- 
 thing useful, so that proficiency may be attained and handed 
 on to posterity. 
 
 The Metropolitan College will be the chief one, and must be 
 instituted at once. The Emperor orders that the Grand Coun- 
 cillors consult with the Tsung-li Yamen on the subject, and 
 to come to a decision as soon as possible, and then to memorial- 
 ize the Throne. 
 
 Any of the compilers and graduates of the Hanlin College, 
 
46 THE BOXER REBELLION [^^g 
 
 the secretaries of the Boards, the officers of the Palace Guards, 
 expectant Intendants, Prefects, district magistrates and sub- 
 ordinate officials, sons and brothers of officials, the hereditary 
 officials of the Eight Banners, and the sons of the military 
 officials of the Empire, can enter the College who wish to do so. 
 By this means knowledge will be handed down from one 
 generation to another. It will be strictly forbidden to mem- 
 bers of the College to be careless or dilatory in their studies, 
 or to introduce as students any of their friends without regard 
 for the latter's capabilities; for such things would frustrate 
 the benefit of this excellent plan of His Imperial Majesty. 
 Kuang Hsu, 24th year, 4th moon, 23d day, 
 (June II, 1898). 1 
 
 On the heels of this momentous decree followed another 
 designated for the '' Viceroys and Governors of the Em- 
 pire ", who were commanded to '' select from all grades of 
 their subordinate officials such men as are to their knowl- 
 edge of good reputation in everyday life, and who are 
 honest, and have some knowledge of modern things, and 
 have no grave faults". These candidates were to be further 
 examined by the Tsung-li Yamen and the successful ones 
 recommended to the Emperor for special posts in the offi- 
 cial service.^ 
 
 So far so good ; nothing startling had as yet appeared to 
 frighten the conservative gentry. The next day, however, 
 a decree was announced containing two distinct parts, one 
 of which related to commerce and foreign intercourse. 
 " Commercial matters are of the highest importance and 
 the suggestion (for the appointment of special Ministers of 
 Commerce) is one which deserves to be acted upon. . . . 
 It is to be hoped that strict conformity to these regulations 
 (the establishment of Commercial Bureaus) w'ill lead to a 
 
 1 China No. i (1899), Inc. in no. 266. 
 
 2 Ibid., Inc. 2 in no. 266. 
 
459] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 47 
 
 daily improvement in trade ". Therefore, officials and mer- 
 chants were exhorted " to consult together for the most 
 speedy and satisfactory arrangement of commercial matters. 
 . . . We must not adhere blindly to our old customs" ; and 
 provincial officers were advised to memorialize the Throne 
 in order to inform the Emperor how things were progress- 
 ing. 
 
 The other half of the decree contained a " suggestion " 
 from some one (it might have been Weng Tung-ho, and 
 probably the rock upon which his fortunes were wrecked) 
 which recommended that " members of the Imperial Family 
 should go abroad ". The decree rightly commented upon 
 this as " a new departure ", but " quite in accordance with 
 modern custom ". Therefore, the Court of the Imperial 
 clan was ordered " to select from the Princes of the first 
 three ranks any who were well versed in modern affairs 
 and ideas, and who are on the side of modern improve- 
 ment ". These were to await the Emperor's instructions.^ 
 
 In the opinion of the Court, the above " startling inno- 
 vation " ^ was carrying matters too far, and even those 
 Princes designated as " well versed in modern affairs and 
 ideas ", if there were any such, failed to greet the Emperor's 
 plan with any degree of enthusiasm, favoring as it did a 
 radical change in their hitherto circumscribed political ac- 
 tivities as regulated by the Empress Dowager. Weng's dis- 
 missal followed as a matter of course, largely through Pal- 
 ace intrigue, and Kang Yu-wei became the man of the hour,^ 
 soon to emerge into world prominence by fathering a mass 
 of reforms which, because of their very magnitude and 
 rapidity of appearance, nullified their purpose and whatever 
 utility they might have possessed. 
 
 ^ China No. i (1899), Inc. in no. 267. 
 
 ' As characterized by Sir Claude MacDonald in Ibid., no. 267. 
 
48 THE BOXER REBELLION [460 
 
 The results of Kang Yu-wei's association with the Em- 
 peror were amazing. First of all came the definite abolition 
 ^of the old examination system. In the future, instead of 
 solely embracing literary efforts and caligraphy, the can- 
 didate's ability was to be tested mainly by practical ques- 
 tions, in other words by western learning. The Pa-ku or 
 literary essay, the nation's pride from time immemorial and 
 heretofore the piece de resistance of all Chinese scholars 
 and prospective Chin-shih's, was to be relegated to an in- 
 ferior position.^ ^^By this far-reaching decree the entire 
 system of education in China was for the time being over- 
 thrown, and the literati, discredited, reduced in rank and 
 practically useless, almost became a public charge. Then 
 
 -followed the reorganization of the army, particularly of 
 the eight Manchu " Banners ", at one time a fine lot of 
 medieval soldiery but in 1899 as scandalous a rabble as ever 
 existed;^ the founding of institutions of learning in the 
 provinces as " feeders " to the new Peking University; the 
 
 ^establishment of official Gazettes throughout the Empire; 
 the right of any and all Chinese to memorialize the Throne ; ^ 
 
 ^he proposed creation of a new navy ; the installation of cen- 
 
 J:ral mining, agricultural and railway bureaus at the capital ; 
 
 ^ The British Minister considered this decree " probably the most 
 important ordinance." He continued : "A species of essay, of which 
 the composition is governed by highly artificial rules, has hitherto been 
 one of the most prominent features of these examinations. For this 
 is now to be substituted a form of essay of a more practical character. 
 The effect of this reform may be compared with the change that 
 would be brought about if in England an absolute mastery of Sanscrit 
 verse had been obligatory on all public servants, and were now dis- 
 pensed with. In other words, the large army of students in the Empire 
 will save some years of almost useless study. The change has been 
 made with such suddenness that injustice is done to those who have 
 been preparing for the examination under present conditions, and con- 
 siderable discontent must be aroused, but the future effect cannot be 
 otherwise than good." China No. i (1899), no. 297. 
 
 ' Hitherto restricted to high officials, if the documents were sealed. 
 
461] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 49 
 
 and, what caused the most consternation of all, the abolition ^ 
 of many of the sinecures and fat allowances that had been 
 enjoyed as perquisites by the Manchus for generations, thus 
 reducing a number of the useless horde to penury/ Fur- 
 ther measures designed to secure for China a budget like 
 those of the European Powers, defined the mode of sub- 
 scription to the Chinese Internal Loan, abolished some of/ 
 the Grain and Salt offices and their attendant grafts ; ^ 
 founded the " Chinese Progress Magazine " ; provided for a 
 railway from Peking to Hankow ; * protected the Christian 
 religion and relations with the foreigner; converted many 
 of the temples into schools; planned a total revenue of 
 70,000,000 taels annually ; * and offered liberal rewards or 
 official employment, if capable, to those who introduced 
 " new books ",^ or established colleges, or arsenals for the 
 manufacture of rifles and cannon, or opened up mines, or 
 invented something useful, or improved agriculture. 
 Criticism and suggestion concerning the policy of the Gov- 
 ernment was to be freely allowed in the official newspapers. 
 In the decree of September 5th, a rather pathetic com- 
 mentary on this ill-starred movement, the Emperor realized 
 that all was not plain sailing, and that it was " one thing to 
 issue a reform edict and another to get it obeyed ".® Speak- 
 
 ^ One of the very last decrees gave the Manchus permission to settle 
 in the provinces if they wished to " earn their living." Bland and 
 Backhouse, op. cit., p. 198. 
 
 "^ Those abolished were " all Comptrollers of the Grain Tax in 
 provinces where there is no grain transport, and Comptrollers of the 
 Salt Revenue in provinces where no salt is produced." China No. i 
 {1899), no. 362. 
 
 ^Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 405. 
 
 * Douglas, op. cit., p. 326. 
 
 ^ " Presumably books that show originality of thought." China 
 No. I (1899), no. 362. 
 
 ^Ibid., no. 371. 
 
50 THE BOXER REBELLION [462 
 
 ing of the difficulties of his task, and the opposition which 
 he had aroused, Kuang Hsu thus addressed his subjects : 
 
 In promoting reforms, we have adopted certain European 
 methods, because, while China and Europe are both alike in 
 holding that the first object of good government should be the 
 welfare of the people, Europe has travelled further on this 
 road than we have, so that, by the introduction of European 
 methods, we simply make good China's deficiencies. But our 
 statesmen and scholars are so ignorant of what lies beyond our 
 borders that they look upon Europe as possessing no civiliza- 
 tion. They are all unaware of those numerous branches of 
 western knowledge whose object is to enlighten the mind and 
 increase the national prosperity of the people. Physical well- 
 being and increased longevity of the race are hereby secured for 
 the masses. 
 
 Is it possible that I, the Emperor, am to be regarded as a 
 mere follower after new and strange ideas because of my 
 thirst for reform? My love for the people, my children, 
 springs from the feeling that God has confided them to me 
 and that to my care they have been given in trust by my illus- 
 trious ancestors. I shall never feel that my duty as sovereign 
 is fulfilled until I have raised them all to a condition of peace- 
 ful prosperity. Moreover, do not the foreign Powers surround 
 our Empire, committing frequent acts of aggression? Unless 
 we learn and adopt the sources of their strength, our plight 
 cannot be remedied. The cause of my anxiety is not fully 
 appreciated by my people, because the reactionary element de- 
 liberately misrepresents my objects, spreading the while base- 
 less rumors so as to disturb the minds of men. When I reflect 
 how deep is the ignorance of the masses of the dwellers in the 
 innermost parts of the Empire on the subject of my proposed 
 reforms, my heart is filled with care and grief. Therefore do 
 I hereby now proclaim my intentions so that the whole Empire 
 may know and believe that their sovereign is to be trusted and 
 that the people may cooperate with me in working for reform 
 and the strengthening of the country. This is my earnest hope. 
 
463] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 5 1 
 
 I command that the whole of my reform decrees be printed 
 on yellow paper and distributed for the information of all men. 
 The district magistrates are henceforward privileged to submit 
 memorials to me through the provincial viceroys, so that I may 
 learn the real needs of the people. Let this decree be ex- 
 hibited in the front hall of every public office in the Empire 
 so that all men may see it.^ 
 
 From July nth to September 20th, the Emperor and his 
 advisers, first Weng Tung-ho, then Kang Yu-wei, had their 
 own way with little or no interference from the Empress 
 Dowager who, true to her word, seemed to have gone into 
 complete retirement. Filial piety, however, was one of the 
 predominant traits in the composition of Kuang Hsu's char- 
 acter, and at first he had unconsciously bowed to his Im- 
 perial aunt's former absolutism by commanding that equal 
 honors and presents be conferred upon Tzu Hsi as if she- 
 were still jointly associated with him in authority.^ The 
 alliance with Kang Yu-wei altered the situation. With all 
 his flights of imagination and inability to forecast the 
 future, Kang had wit enough to appreciate the fact that the 
 real power still lay with the Empress ^Dowager, whom he 
 hated and feared with the intensity born of a presentiment 
 of impending disaster. Knowing that she repaid his an- 
 tagonism with interest, he strove with all his energy to elim- 
 inate the " Old Buddha " from Chinese politics by driving 
 from the Emperor's mind all emotions of gratitude to the 
 one who had placed him upon the throne. It being impos- 
 sible for Kang, in the nature of things, to keep his designs 
 secret, the knowledge of his active hostility towards Tzu 
 Hsi soon became public property in the Palace. The good- 
 himiored tolerance with which she had previously regarded 
 
 *As reprinted by Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., pp. 199, 200. 
 
 ^ Imperial decree of June 11. China No. i (1899), Inc. 2 in no. 268. 
 
52 THE BOXER REBELLION [464 
 
 the reform movement then gave place to a realization of its 
 perils, which might even result in her being forcibly assisted 
 on the road to Heaven. Though fully cognizant of the 
 drift of events, each succeeding day more unfavorable, she 
 bided her time, holding her impatient satellites in check 
 until the danger to herself and to her party became over- 
 whelming. Then her inactivity, which the Emperor had as- 
 sured himself meant indecision and a sense of security, was 
 transformed into one of those Hghtning-like acts of which 
 she alone in all China seemed capable. As by a bolt from 
 the blue, the shell of reform was crushed by a single blow, 
 well directed and dealt with astonishing rapidity. 
 
 The Emperor had severely crippled the existing official 
 system by abolishing six of the Government Boards and ap- 
 portioning their duties among the remainder,^ thus turning 
 loose a large staff of dispossessed office-holders to swell the 
 ranks of the malcontents against reform. But worse was to 
 follow. A secretary of the Board of Rites, Wang Chao, 
 had the misplaced courage to submit a memorial which 
 easily outdistanced even the grandiose schemes of Kang 
 Yu-wei. This document contained the astonishing recom- 
 mendations that the queue be abolished, that Christianity-be 
 established as the state religion, that a national parliament 
 be assembled, and that the Empress Dowager and the Em- 
 peror make a journey of observation to Japan and Europe, 
 to witness with their own eyes the contrast in civilization 
 and progress with China and to profit thereby. It can be 
 imagined how these proposals amazed the ultra-Confucian 
 
 ^ These six Boards were abolished "on the score of economy," as 
 their duties were " largely nominal." Thereby, however, 160 officials 
 were dismissed. The Emperor had also resolved that "the horde of 
 expectant officials at the various provincial capitals" should be like- 
 wise "carefully weeded out." China No. i {1899), no. 362. See also 
 no. 371. 
 
 « 
 
465] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 53 
 
 members of the Board. In an interview with Wang, they 
 begged him to reconsider. He had the temerity to refuse, 
 and insisted that the memorial be sent as it was to the Em- 
 peror. That was accordingly done, but the Board attached 
 as a rider a counter-communication denouncing Wang as a 
 visionary and praying that his recommendations be inter- 
 preted as impracticable and absurd. An unlooked-for 
 result, the Emperor was furious at this attempt, as he 
 chose to regard it, of the Board to dictate his actions and to 
 aid the Imperial mind with advice, no matter how humbly 
 given. It seemed that Kuang Hsu was not as open to con- 
 viction by arguments from outside as his edicts had pro-j 
 claimed him. In a fit of anger of the martinet variety^ 
 such as he frequently displayed, with a stroke of the vermil- 
 lion pencil he dismissed in disgrace the two Presidents of 
 the Board (one a Chinese and the other a Manchu) and 
 four Vice-Presidents ^ for having dared to offer sugges- 
 tions, and further for having broken the seal of Wang's 
 memorial, instead of submitting it unopened. The inju- 
 dicious' author of the communication was himself rewarded 
 by a position as Judge in one of the provinces.^ That was 
 the last important act of Kuang Hsu in his brief but not in- 
 glorious career as reform dictator. The cashiered officials 
 of the Board of Rites, together with their Manchu and 
 Chinese sympathizers, proceeded in a body to the palace of 
 the Empress Dowager where, en retraite, the amiable old 
 lady was enjoying herself among her flowers and satis fy- 
 
 * The Imperial wrath also fell upon Li Hung-chang, who was dis- 
 missed, September 7, from the Tsung-li Yamen, an act which gave 
 great pleasure to Englishmen in China, as they feared Li's pronounced 
 (Russian proclivities. " He has recently shown himself markedly anta- 
 gonistic to our interests." MacDonald to Salisbury, China No i (1899), 
 no. 321. 
 
 ^ Wang was not able to enjoy his reward, as the reform movement 
 collapsed shortly afterwards. 
 
54 THE BOXER REBELLION [466 
 
 ing her passion for theatricals. On their knees the humili- 
 ated bureaucrats besought her to resume the reins of gov- 
 ernment, and Tzu Hsi, feminine to the last by dismissing 
 them without indicating her mind, perceived that the psycho- 
 logical moment had arrived for a return to that power 
 which she coveted.^ 
 
 Kang Yu-wei and the Emperor sensed the danger and re- 
 solved to act before the Empress Dowager could have her 
 plans perfected. Kuang Hsu, completely under the influ- 
 ence of his adviser, at last was willing to seize Tsu Hsi and 
 hold her a prisoner, thus to prevent her from doing any 
 further mischief to reform. To accomplish this, it was nec- 
 essary first of all that Jung Lu, Viceroy of Chihli and com- 
 mander of the northern military and naval forces, should 
 be disposed of, as he was the main reliance and support of 
 Tzu Hsi and next to her the chief obstacle to the new 
 regime. The commission to make an end of Jung Lu fell 
 upon Yuan Shih-kai, protege of Li Hung-chang and later 
 governor of Shantung, who had assembled through his own 
 initiative and energy the best and only foreign-drilled troops 
 in China at that time, some seven thousand in all.^ His 
 instructions were to repair immediately to Tientsin, arrest 
 Jung Lu, summarily behead him and return in all haste to 
 Peking, surround the palace of the Empress Dowager and 
 take her captive. Unfortunately for the Emperor, Yuan 
 Shih-kai, although a modern Chinese, elected to do other- 
 wise. Of liberal nature and tendencies, the most popular 
 native official with the foreigners, yet he feared, and 
 rightly so, that the reform movement was but a creation of 
 the mist, doomed to failure through the inability of his 
 
 ^ Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., p. 197; Douglas, op. cit., pp. 328-330; 
 Sergeant, op. cit., p. 178; Smith, China in Convulsion, vol. i, pp. 145, 146. 
 
 ^Drilled by the German von Hanneken. See Cordier, op. cit., vol. 
 iii, p. 408. 
 
^Sy-^ CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 55 
 
 country to grasp it ; and that the future of China, instead of 
 brightening, was in reaHty getting darker. As might have 
 been expected, far from decapitating his blood-brother Juna 
 Lu, Yuan, in a scene of Shakespearian intensity,^ merely 
 informed him of the sentence, and together they hurried 
 back to Peking and laid bare the plot to the Empress Dow- 
 ager, who already had more than an inkling of it. Imme- 
 diately, this energetic old woman, accompanied solely by 
 an escort of eunuchs picked up on the spur of the moment, 
 hastened to the palace where the Emperor was living in 
 solitary grandeur, and taking him utterly by surprise, over- 
 whelmed him with her wrath and contempt. " You are 
 after all but an unsophisticated child. Return at once to 
 your inner apartments! It is evident that I must resume 
 control to save the Empire, which you, in your extreme un- 
 wisdom and foolishness, seem to be doing your best to 
 drive to perdition "." Her swift action, so characteristic of 
 her conduct in every one of the many crises of her life, 
 completely unnerved the mild-mannered Kuang Hsu. With- 
 out opposition either by word or deed he surrendered the 
 great seal and his authority with it. But he managed to 
 warn Kang Yu-wei in advance. " My heart is filled with 
 very great sorrow, which pen and ink cannot describe. You 
 must go abroad at once, and without a moment's delay de- 
 vise some means of saving me ".* 
 
 The decree of September 21st, in name only from the / 
 Emperor, marked his fall from power and the ruin of his 
 party : 
 
 ^ For interesting accounts, differing in detail, of the meeting between 
 Yuan Shih-kai and Jung Lu, see Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., p. 206; 
 Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 408. 
 
 '^ As reprinted in Douglas, op. cit., p. 331. 
 
 ^ As reprinted in Sergeant, op. cit., p. 185. 
 
56 THE BOXER REBELLION [468 
 
 The affairs of the nation are at present in a difficult position, 
 and everything awaits reform. I, the Emperor, am working 
 day and night with all my powers, and every day arrange a 
 multitude of affairs. But, despite my careful toil, I constantly 
 fear to be overwhelmed by the press of work. 
 
 I reverently recall that Her Majesty the Empress Dowager 
 has on two occasions since the reign of Tung Chih (1861) as- 
 sumed the reins of Government with great success in critical 
 periods. In all she did Her Majesty showed perfection. 
 
 Moved by a deep regard for the welfare of the nation, I 
 have repeatedly implored Her Majesty to be graciously pleased 
 to advise me in government, and have received her assent. 
 
 This is an assurance of prosperity to the whole nation, 
 officials and people. 
 
 Her Majesty will commence to transact business from today 
 in the side Hall. 
 
 On the 23rd of September I, the Emperor, will lead my 
 princes and high officials to make obeisance in the Chih Chang 
 Hall. Let the proper officials reverently and carefully prepare 
 the fitting programme of the ceremony.^ 
 
 ^ Such was the Coup d'Etat, in itself a bloodless revolu- 
 tion and the end of reform. The reasons for the failure of 
 the " New China " are easily understandable. In attempt- 
 ing too much, the reformers accomplished practically noth- 
 ing at all. Their ideal structure was top-heavy, and, built 
 upon no foundation worth speaking of, was crushed by its 
 own weight. Their mistakes were many; one blunder fol- 
 lowed another; no adjustment was offered to harmonize 
 existing conditions. Old China was completely discarded 
 in this craze for the modern order, and institutions and cus- 
 toms which heretofore had been the backbone of the na- 
 
 '^ China No. i {1899), Inc. in no. 386. Also reprinted in Bland and 
 Backhouse, op. cit., p. 208; Sergeant, op. cit., p. 186; U. S. For. Rel, 
 1898, Inc. in no. 49, p. 218. A French version is given in Cordier, op. 
 cit., vol. iii, p. 408. 
 
469] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 57 
 
 tional existence, were henceforth to be regarded, if not as 
 entirely useless, at least as of secondary importance. Un- 
 doubtedly the main reason why the movement collapsed 
 was the poor judgment displayed by Kang Yu-wei and the 
 Emperor. In their zeal for innovation and change, they 
 struck too deeply at the root of " things Chinese ", at insti- 
 tutions conservative to a fault and the most difficult in the 
 world to modify or change. The edicts, covering as they 
 did a great variety of subjects, military, political, educa- 
 tional, social and civil, were presented to the nation in 
 helter-skelter fashion, in head-long haste, and their accept- 
 ance and observance could have been possible only through 
 a complete revolution in Chinese life, manners and thought, 
 a breakaway in two months from the civilization of two 
 thousand years. No attempt was made to placate opposi- 
 tion or to allay prejudices; the reformers rode rough-shod 
 over many, in fact almost all, of those cherished ideals 
 which had becpme atavisms with the Chinese centuries ago. 
 They entirely forgot time and place, and exhibited through- 
 out that unconsciousness of existing conditions to be met 
 and overcome before success is assured which seems typical 
 of most idealists when placed in a position of authority. It 
 was as impossible for the China of 1898 to swallow the in- 
 digestible remedies which the reformers proposed as to be 
 governed by the Republic of Plato, and as far as the ability 
 of the masses was concerned at that time to understand and 
 assimilate what was being offered them, Plato would have 
 done as well as Kang Yu-wei. 
 
 The reformers, through their lack of foresight and of 
 ability to strike the happy medium, had the misfortune to r 
 antagonize everyone in the Empire not of their own party, 
 both Manchus and Chinese, from the highest to the lowest. 
 First, the literati, the pride of the people, symbolic to them 
 of the heights of human attainment, were thrust aside with 
 
58 THE BOXER REBELLION [470 
 
 scarcely an effort made to incorporate them into tfie new 
 order, their labors discredited, their honors automatically 
 removed, themselves reduced to failures. Thus at the out- 
 set the innate conservatism of the Chinese received an un- 
 expected shock, and the most powerful, the most numerous, 
 the most revered leaders among the masses, these literati 
 to be found in every village, hamlet and wayside inn, be- 
 came the most insistent opponents of the new regime. In 
 addition, the Manchus were practically unanimous against 
 the movement, for they understood that were it to succeed, 
 its triumph would mean their annihilation, existing as they 
 did solely on sufferance ; by bribery, corruption, and the dis- 
 inclination of the subject race to a violent change of any 
 kind. They were not alone in their whole-hearted opposition 
 to the abolition of official sinecures and grafts ; the attempt 
 to eliminate the " squeeze " likewise alienated the thou- 
 sands of petty Chinese magistrates in the provinces, who, 
 without these illegal perquisites, could not exist on their 
 miserably inadequate salaries. By the conversion of tem- 
 ples into schools for " western learning '*, the religious sen- 
 sibilities of the people were outraged, and those sensibilities 
 were still further inflamed by the multitude of priests who 
 feared the apparent favoritism of the edicts towards Chris- 
 tianity. Still more distasteful were the actions of a certain 
 proportion of the " Young China ", whose display of ego- 
 tistical ignorance of the fundamentals of human nature pro- 
 duced exactly the opposite effect to that which they de- 
 sired.^ A goodly number of them ridiculed the literati, 
 made light of filial piety, scorned the national heroes, thus 
 holding up to contempt the most sacred traditions of China, 
 ingrained ages ago in the Chinese character, and among its 
 
 * " I consider that the cause of true reform in China has been much 
 injured by the injudicious conduct of Kang Yu-Wei and his friends." 
 MacDonald to Salisbury, China No. i (1899), no. 401. 
 
471 ] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION ^g 
 
 finest attributes. Thus the reform was discredited mainly 
 through its own violence and lack of ability to appreciate 
 the past, to conciliate the present and to interpret the future. 
 The movement is analogous to many of the purist and re- 
 hgious waves of unrest which sweep every once in a while 
 over the United States, such as the abolitionist fanaticism 
 which brought on the Civil War, and the perennial " revi- 
 vals " which spring up here and there. Like each of these 
 the reform movement was at cross-purposes with humanity>/ 
 at large, and like each of these must either destroy the oppo- 
 sition in to to or fail in the attempt, either everything or 
 nothing. 
 
 It may seem rather curious on first thought that the Powers 
 should have been so indifferent to this struggle for the re- 
 habilitation of China, and that no encouragement was re- 
 ceived by the reform party from the foreign representatives 
 at Peking. The fault for this, however, lies with the re- 
 formers themselves. They made no attempt to enlist for- 
 eign sympathy or foreign co-operation, and the only infor- 
 mation that the Ministers received of the movement was 
 when each successive edict was published in the official 
 Peking Gazette. As to the purposes of Kang Yu-wei and 
 his ultimate plans, the foreign representatives were as much 
 in the dark concerning these as the rest of China, and each 
 new surprising innovation startled them as much as it did 
 the outside world. Neither the Emperor nor any of his 
 advisers had any diplomatic ability, and the capable and ex- 
 perienced Li Hung-chang, as has been noted, was in the 
 opposite camp. Kang's knowledge of world politics was 
 small; the term embraced a sphere which lay outside his 
 special line of activities. To quote a British critic : 
 
 It must be remembered . . . that his knowledge of China's 
 relations with foreign Powers and of negotiations with them 
 
6o THE BOXER REBELLION [472 
 
 is very slight; he appears to have been absorbed in questions 
 of internal reform and to have paid little or no attention to 
 matters of foreign policy. He speaks generally of the desir- 
 ability of an Anglo-American alliance for the protection of 
 China, and the danger to the world of Russian control of the 
 masses of Chinese, but only as a man repeating what he has 
 read in the way of wide political speculation.^ 
 
 In fact, the reformers underrated the value of foreign sym- 
 pathy for the cause and the benefits which might have ac- 
 crued to them from foreign diplomatic aid. They seemed 
 content only with the internal aspects of the situation, which 
 was a serious mistake. Consequently, it is small wonder 
 that the British consular and diplomatic corps should have 
 termed the Coup d'Etat a " Palace revolution ",^ under- 
 standing thereby merely the triumph of one Court faction 
 over the other.^ 
 
 Although the Coup d'Etat itself was accomplished with- 
 out loss of life, succeeding events revealed choice instances 
 of that brutish hate and persecution generally found in Ori- 
 ental despotisms. The arch-conspirator Kang Yu-wei es- 
 caped,* much to the chagrin of the Empress Dowager, who 
 doubtless had reserved for him the most exquisite tortures 
 at her command. We learn with surprise that Kang ''formed 
 a party for his own selfish purposes; therefore his offense 
 is very grave ". Such was Tzu Hsi's denunciation of her 
 
 * Henry Cockburn, Memorandum of conversation with Kang Yu-wei 
 on Voyage from Shanghai to Hong Kong, September 27-29, 1898, in 
 China No. i {1899), Inc. 2 in no. 401. 
 
 ^Acting Consul-General Brenan (Shanghai) to Lord Salisbury, 
 ibid., no. ZZ7- The term is used extensively in the cited volume of 
 the Parliamentary Papers. 
 
 ' For a criticism of the inactivity of the Powers see Smith, China 
 in Convulsion, vol. i, p. 150. 
 
 *With the help of British sympathizers. See China No. i {1899),. 
 nos. 343, 379 and Inc., 386, 387, 401 and Inc. 
 
473] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 6 J 
 
 greatest enemy. Nor was that all. The decree of Septem- 
 ber 29th is an illuminating document not alone for its mis- 
 representation of Kang's reform program, which, in spite 
 of its many glaring errors, was attempted with the highest 
 and most laudable motives possible, but also as illustrating 
 how, in times of national hate, fear or distress, history and 
 current events are often deliberately distorted by educated 
 and uneducated alike in the blind effort to justify or con- 
 demn the action in question. In presenting the other sidv^. 
 of the lantern, a wholly false view by the way, Tzu Hsi 
 said: 
 
 Whereas the present times and affairs are full of difficulties, 
 the Court has diligently planned for the Government, seeking 
 reforms for its prosperity according to the plans for the wel- 
 fare of the people as handed down by our ancestors. The 
 Emperor has labored night and day with unwearied diligence, 
 but unexpectedly there appeared a manager of affairs, Kang 
 Yu-wei, a leader of false doctrines, a deceiver of the age, a 
 slanderer of men, who led a crowd of low followers and took 
 advantage of the attempt at reforms to impose his own re- 
 bellious conduct. ... It is also reported that his murderous 
 band had formed a society to preserve China, but not the 
 Manchu dynasty. This rebellious conduct is certainly to be 
 detested. My great filial affection for the Empress Dowager 
 (the edict is Tzu Hsi's, and in name only from the Emperor) 
 must be known to foreigners and Chinese. Kang Yu-wei's 
 learning is crafty and false. Those books which he constantly 
 made were opposed to the classics, misleading and destructive 
 of the sages and laws. Because of his constant advocacy of 
 reforms he was appointed to a post in the Foreign Office, and 
 we (meaning Kuang Hsu) appointed him to immediately re- 
 pair to Shanghai to take charge of the Government press (the 
 reform Gazette), but he lingered in the capital to stir up strife 
 and practice his dark designs. Unless the protection of our 
 ancestors had enabled us to clearly see his schemes before- 
 
62 THE BOXER REBELLION [474 
 
 hand, there is no telling what would have happened. Kang 
 Yu-wei, the chief of rebels, has now absconded; therefore let 
 all the provincials strenuously seek him out and arrest him for 
 severest punishment.^ 
 
 Unfortunately, Kang's brother was captured, together 
 I with five other young men, all of these of good family, well 
 j educated, and of high standing in Chinese social life. These, 
 I brave to the last, were publicly decapitated without a 
 ' moment's delay for their share in the late movement. But 
 the Empress Dowager proceeded no further than with the 
 pursuit of the sponsors of reform. It was deemed good 
 policy to let their misguided followers alone. " Besides the 
 persons arrested, there is no guaranteeing that among offi- 
 cials and literati there may not be others who were seduced 
 by him (Kang Yu-wei) ; but the Court will act with great 
 forbearance, and will not probe deeply, in order to make 
 known our caution in inflicting punishments." ^ 
 
 One of the most prominent of those who fell under sus- 
 picion was Chang In-huan, who was one of the two members 
 of the first Chinese Peace Commission to Japan in 1895. 
 Although it was satisfactorily proved that Chang " did not 
 belong to Kang Yu-wei's party ", yet '' his reputation is a 
 bad one" (decree of September 26th). The ''reprehen- 
 sible" Chang was further stigmatized (decree of Septem- 
 ber 29th) as " very clever at imposing on people ", and it 
 further developed that " his actions were deceitful, myster- 
 ious, and fickle, and he sought after the rich and powerful". 
 The truth of the matter was that Chang had the misfor- 
 tune to be an enemy of Li Hung-chang, who was now re- 
 turning to power with the Empress Dowager. September 
 25 th it was rumored in Peking that Chang was to be exe- 
 
 ^U. S. For. ReL, 1898, Inc. in no. 54, p. 221. 
 
 ' Decree of September 26, in China No. i {1899), Inc. 4 in no. 386. 
 
475] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 63 
 
 cuted, *' the same evening or next morning ". Sir Claude 
 MacDonald, the British Minister, immediately bestirred 
 himself " to make an appeal on his (Chang's) behalf for at 
 least due consideration of any charge brought against him". 
 MacDonald continues : 
 
 The report reached me late in the afternoon, and it was there- 
 fore necessary to take prompt measures. It was supposed 
 that Li Hung-chang had been consulted by the Empress 
 Dowager in the matter. I accordingly addressed a letter to 
 his Excellency pointing out the horror with which such sudden 
 executions were regarded by all western nations, and the bad 
 effect the secret and hasty condemnation of an official of 
 Chang's rank, who was so well known in Europe, would pro- 
 duce, and begged his Excellency to use whatever influence he 
 possessed to prevent such hurried action. I concluded my 
 letter by saying that I appealed to him, Li, because he was the 
 only statesman now in Peking who was conversant with Euro- 
 pean methods, and would, therefore, thoroughly realize the 
 disastrous impression which such a summary execution would 
 produce throughout the western world. 
 
 Thanks to the British Minister's efficient aid, Chang was 
 saved from probable death, but was detained in prison and 
 later banished to the frontier of Chinese Turkestan.^ 
 
 As a concession to Europe and to the foreigners in 
 China, dtoubtless to allay foreign apprehension and avert 
 diplomatic interference, the Empress Dowager announced 
 that " we shall endeavor to arrive at a happy medium, and 
 not simply follow our own inclinations. Therefore all offi- 
 cials, great and small, ought to sympathize with us, and 
 earnestly strive to aid us in the administration of the Gov- 
 ernment and to proclaim the truth ". But the effect of 
 
 ^ China No. i (1899), nos. 339, 343, 386, 387; U. S. For. ReL, 1898, 
 Inc. 3 and 5 in no. 54, pp. 220, 221. 
 
64 THE BOXER REBELLION [476 
 
 these fine words was diminished by the repressive meas- 
 ures against reform. Tzu Hsi reasoned correctly that the 
 object of the Emperor in aboHshing the six Government 
 Boards in Peking and many other sinecures had been " to 
 sift out and reduce the number of supernumeraries " and 
 " all necessary duties ". However, Tzu Hsi discovered that 
 the " provincial officials did not investigate the matter ", 
 with the result that " numerous memorials recommending 
 great changes " poured in upon the Government. In rea- 
 soning on these memorials, said an edict : 
 
 Falsehoods have been propagated. What will be the end? 
 If the truth is not made known there is reason to fear that 
 the people will become excited by this random talk, and tran- 
 quility will cease to prevail, and all our efforts for the pros- 
 perity of the Empire will avail nothing. 
 
 As an easy solution of the difficulty and to her own satis- 
 faction and that of the entire Manchu tribe, the Empress 
 Dowager ordered the six Boards to be " restored and con- 
 duct their affairs as usual ".^ As regards the Emperor's 
 dismissals of useless officials in the provinces, these orders 
 were declared void. Also, the task of deciding which of 
 the ''official posts and officers in the various provinces ought 
 to be abolished ", and which " unemployed officials " should 
 be " dispensed with " was left to the discretion of the "Gov- 
 ernors and Governors- General '^ who, understanding per- 
 fectly the present state of affairs at Court, naturally enough 
 did nothing. 
 
 The permission given by Kuang Hsu allowing anyone to 
 
 * These six Boards, of no use whatever to the efficient administra- 
 tion of the Government, were (i) the Imperial Supervisorate of In- 
 struction, (2) the Office of Transmission, (3) the Grand Court of 
 Revision, (4) the Court of Imperial Entertainments, (5) the Court of 
 the Imperial Stud, (6) the Court of Imperial Ceremonial. 
 
477] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 65 
 
 memorialize the Government, so that " we should see with 
 the eyes and hear with the ears of everybody " was taken 
 away. The result was that only high officials, as hereto- 
 fore, could present sealed communications. But these offi- 
 cers were instructed " to say what they have to say in fitting 
 language ". The Empress Dowager had been pained to find 
 that the reform edicts were " full of frivolous statements; 
 some even touch on the extravagant ", and all were " much 
 wanting in order ". It was the last error which was above 
 all a deadly sin with the literati. The Chinese Progress 
 Magazine was declared "of no benefit to good government 
 and will vainly distract men's minds ", therefore Tzu Hsi 
 recommended that it " be abolished at once ". The Imperial 
 (Peking) University was allowed to stand, as it was " for 
 the culture of the people ". As for the new education in 
 the provinces, '' let the local officials in all prefectures and 
 districts where it is proposed to establish minor colleges 
 consider the local conditions and the convenience of the peo- 
 ple ", which meant, as the people at large did not concern 
 themselves about colleges, that nothing would be done. 
 Regarding temples, these " shall continue as formerly " and 
 " need not be converted into schools " as the reformers 
 had planned. This order was for the reason " that the peo- 
 ple may not be offended " in their religious, or rather their 
 Confucian and Taoist, susceptibilities. Regarding trade, 
 agriculture, the reorganization of the army, and the devel- 
 opment of revenue, all of these " are of undoubted conse- 
 quence to the State ", but " must imperatively be introduced 
 gradually 'V in other words, not at all. Furthermore, "all 
 business must be deliberated upon with the greatest care in 
 order to decide what should be introduced and what re- 
 jected, so that the good may be retained and not a single 
 
 ^The italics are the author's. 
 
66 THE BOXER REBELLION [478 
 
 flaw remain ". What '' good " would thus be '' retained ", 
 as far as new ideas were concerned, may be judged by the 
 admonition that " all obey the teachings ", which meant 
 Confucius and the ancient system only, with no modern 
 hybrid. This ended reform, and China, with hardly a dis- 
 senting voice, contentedly slid back into the old groove/ 
 
 Two phases immediately connected with the Empress 
 Dowager's return to power demand comment. One of these 
 was the reception given to the wives of the foreign repre- 
 sentatives. Report has it that Prince Henry of Prussia, the 
 first " barbarian " to meet Her August Majesty face to face, 
 had solicited the interview at the instigation of Lady Mac- 
 Donald. Whatever may have been the determining cause, 
 the meeting itself was probably no more than a clever bit 
 of diplomacy on the part of Tzu Hsi to make herself agree- 
 able to anyone of influence, so as to gloss over as much as 
 possible her practical usurpation of the throne. As for the 
 reception, it was a distinct success. Lady MacDonald made 
 a brief address in which she expressed the '' feelings of 
 respect and pleasure " of the ladies at this permission " to 
 offer personally our congratulations upon the 64th birth- 
 day of Your Imperial Majesty ", and concluded with the 
 hope that now " the peoples of the East and West will con- 
 tinue to draw nearer to each other in social intercourse ", 
 which was hoping a great deal at that time. To which Tzu 
 Hsi, through Prince Ching, replied that Lady MacDonald's 
 words were '' propitious and pleased me greatly ". In fact. 
 Her Majesty almost overacted. Each of the visiting ladies 
 was embraced and given a pearl ring, and later Tzu Hsi 
 sent each a portrait painted by herself, which must have 
 been a fair copy, as she was quite a skillful artist. She 
 also drank a " loving cup of tea " with an individual sip for 
 
 ^ China No. i {1899), Inc. 3 in no. 386; U. S. For. ReL, 1898, Inc. 
 2 and 6 in no. 54, pp. 219-221. 
 
479] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 67 
 
 each guest, to give weight to her reiterated phrase of all 
 being in " one family "/ It was confidently beheved at the 
 time, however, that at last the barriers were down and that 
 a new era was to begin. Minister Conger gave the opinion 
 that the reception might " inspire within the Imperial Pal- 
 ace a desire to see and know more of western people and 
 western things; and that when it is once known by the 
 Chinese people generally that the Empress Dowager is her- 
 self willing to see and entertain foreigners, some of their 
 antipathy will be allayed ". But events proved otherwise, 
 and by the irony of fate these same ladies with their dis- 
 tinguished husbands, who no doubt had been included by 
 Tzu Hsi in her transient friendship, were trapped in their 
 own Legations, the one place sacred the world over by in- 
 ternational law and immemorial custom, fighting for .their 
 lives with the energy of despair.^ 
 
 The other phase dealt with the health of the unfortunate 
 Kuang Hsu. Never of robust constitution, always inclined 
 towards illness and melancholia, it is small wonder, consid- 
 ering the terrific strain of the last few weeks on his sensi- 
 tive nature, together with his present close confinement, 
 that mind and body should have suffered a serious relapse. 
 As early as September 25th, but two days after the Empress 
 Dowager assumed full powers, an Imperial edict announced : 
 
 ^"At the instance of the foreign ladies of the Legations, this touch- 
 ing interview was repeated at the beginning of the year 1900, under 
 Hke conditions. Five months later Her Majesty was issuing Edicts 
 which ordered her troops, in large numbers and constantly recruited 
 with fresh men, to throw Krupp shells and fire Mauser and Mann- 
 licher bullets into the dwelling-places of these same ladies from the 
 West, with a view of their speedy extinction, thus leaving only the 
 Chinese (and Manchu) contingent of the "one family" surviving. 
 Smith, China in Convulsion, vol. i, p. 28. See also Sergeant, op. cit., 
 pp. 198-202. 
 
 *See U. S. For. Rel., 1898, no. 114 and Inc. i and 2 in no. 114, pp. 
 223-225; China No. i (1899), no. 426; China No. i (1900), no. 22. 
 
 ¥ 
 
6S THE BOXER REBELLION [480 
 
 Ever since the fourth moon we have constantly been indis- 
 posed, and although for a long time have been under treatment 
 there has been no improvement. Therefore, if there is any 
 person who is skilled in the science of medicine, let him be re- 
 commended immediately by any official in the Empire, and if 
 he is now residing in some other province, let him come to 
 Peking speedily and without delay. ^ 
 
 No competent Chinese physician, even with foreign train- 
 ing, seems to have appeared, and some three weeks later the 
 subject was voluntarily broached to the British Minister by 
 Prince Ching and the Tsung-li Yamen. In the interview 
 which followed, the Chinese Foreign Office intimated that 
 " the rumors with regard to the Emperor's health and de- 
 signs upon his life were well known to them", by which they 
 referred to the persistent talk going the rounds in Peking 
 that Kuang Hsu would soon " ascend on High " through 
 the instrumentality of his august aunt. Prince Ching took 
 advantage of the occasion to act as apologist for the Em- 
 press Dowager, stating that she was " not wholly opposed 
 to reform, but China was not prepared for such sweeping 
 reforms as those recently laid before the Emperor ", which 
 was probably the truth. In conclusion, the Prince " confi- 
 dentially " asked the British Minister '' how the present un- 
 rest could best be calmed down ", and MacDonald sug- 
 gested the happy expedient that a foreign physician be called 
 upon to give " a certificate as to the Empetor's health ", 
 which would have '' a very reassuring effect ". The advice 
 of MacDonald was received " with every sign of approval", 
 although he was quite sure it would be disregarded. Some 
 days later, October i8th, a pleasant surprise was given him 
 when he learned that his suggestion had been acted upon 
 
 ^ U. iS. For. ReL, 1898, Inc. i in no. 54, p. 219. 
 
48l] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 69 
 
 and that Dr. Detheve of the French Legation was commis- 
 sioned to examine the Emperor and " certify as to his con- 
 dition ". The Doctor's diagnosis showed that Kuang Hsu 
 was suffering from Bright's disease, but was in no imme- 
 diate danger. The part of this incident which seems to have 
 rankled in Tzu Hsi's mind was not the consultation with the 
 foreign physician but the " semi-official " warning of Mac- 
 Donald to the Yamen in which he expressed his " firm con- 
 viction that should the Emperor die at this juncture of af- 
 fairs, the effect produced among western nations would be 
 most disastrous to China ". The British Minister's timely 
 protest, falling little short of diplomatic interference, may 
 have saved the Emperor's life, but no doubt it also carried 
 with it a further addition to that legacy of hate and retalia- 
 tion which the Manchu Court was storing up against 
 Europe, to be settled at the first convenient opportunity.^ 
 
 The resumption of the regency by the Empress Dowager I 
 was most unfortunate for China and the world, and its dis- 
 astrous consequences were exceeded only by the territorial 
 aggressions of the Powers. Together with the land-greed 
 of Europe it was the determining cause of the Boxer Re- 
 bellion, at least it greatly accelerated the conflict. It pro- 
 vided the excuse by which the revolt against outside civili- 
 zation and intercourse, growing steadily ever since 1840^ 
 could be brought to a head and expressed, as it were, in a 
 nationalistic way. The interpretation given in the length 
 and breadth of China to the overthrow of reform, crushed 
 as it had been by those now highest in authority, could mean 
 nothing else to the overwhelming mass of Chinese than thaf 
 a recurrence to the old order would quickly result, that 
 everything at variance with their own mode of life and af- 
 fairs, such as Europe willed and not as they wished, would 
 
 ^ China No. i (1899), nos. 358, 363, 373, 401. 
 
 r 
 
70 THE BOXER REBELLION [482 
 
 be repudiated ; and that a united, a supreme effort, would be 
 made to free the land once for all from that '' unceasing 
 stream ", the hated foreigner and his work. The Boxer 
 Rebellion was that effort, and it had for prelude a score of 
 spasmodic attacks on foreigners and missionaries, varying 
 in intensity but gradually growing worse, all of which, it is 
 significant to note, occurred after the Coup d'Etat, an d in 
 spirit and inception are directly traceable to that event. 
 
 There were other immediate causes. The burden of the 
 Japanese indemnity has already been touched upon and was 
 misfortune enough in itself. To make the financial situa- 
 tion worse, agrarian and taxation troubles brought on acute 
 distress in the congested districts of certain provinces. With 
 two years of bad weather and bad crops and the always sen- 
 sitive economic balance was disturbed, as even in normal 
 times the line of demarcation between sufficiency and star- 
 vation in some parts of China is very thinly drawn. 
 This reduced thousands to a give-and-take existence ; robber 
 bands increased as never since the Taiping Rebellion; 
 brigandage and piracy flourished,^ and the ranks of the 
 
 * Constant complaints from the British in Hong Kong and south 
 China " of the disgraceful prevalence of piracy in the Cantonese waters, 
 both on the rivers and along the coast," aroused the British Min- 
 ister, especially as the Governor of Canton was adjudged "singularly 
 helpless in the matter," and as the pirates had become a " serious 
 scandal and hindrance to trade." The British authorities sent a small 
 gunboat, the " Sandpiper," to patrol the West River, which action 
 irritated Viceroy Tan, who announced that "hereafter, should a 
 British man-of-war come into conflict with pirates on the inland 
 waters and people be wounded in the encounter, China cannot be held 
 responsible, nor can China be blamed if, owing to remissness, the 
 British war-ship is not able to protect itself. ... If British men-of- 
 war cease to come (up the West River), China will afford protection 
 as before." But the Chinese authorities seemed unable to cope with 
 the situation. British Consul Mansfield at Canton wrote, July 27, 
 1899, that, " at the present moment there is a feeling of uncertainty 
 in regard to both life and property, which is unprecedented. Rob- 
 beries on land and by water are of daily occurrence. Blackmailitig 
 
483] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 7 1 
 
 " Fists of Righteous Harmony " Society were swelled by 
 the discontented and the famishing. Naturally all of these 
 difficulties reacted against the foreigners. The Yellow 
 River, appropriately termed '' China's sorrow ", overflowed 
 again/ covering immense areas, destroying villages, and 
 driving a multitude from home and kindred to subsist on 
 charity, on anything whatever to keep body and soul to- 
 gether. Superstition, the popular and dreaded fung-shui, 
 held the foreigner accountable for the disaster. The likin 
 
 and the abduction of persons go on with practical impunity. The 
 robbers and pirates are driving a flourishing trade, and their successes, 
 coupled with the almost certain immunity from any sort of punish- 
 ment, add continually to their numbers, which are now said to aggre- 
 gate several thousands." Accordingly, another vessel was dispatched, 
 H. M. S. " Tweed," assisted by a torpedo boat as tender. Admiral 
 Seymour of the China Station was of the opinion that the three 
 British ships would have only a " very partial effect," and that, " if 
 China is to be relieved of the responsibility of policing these rivers, 
 and it is undertaken by Great Britain," it was essential that a " numer- 
 ous flotilla of shallow draft vessels " be sent. Then came the Boxer 
 Rebellion, and the piracy question was left to the local authorities 
 to deal with as best they could, while England, along with the other 
 Powers, busied herself to relieve Peking. 
 China No. i {1900), no. 74 and Inc. in no. 74, no. 83 and Inc. i and 
 
 2 in no. 83, nos. 96, 99, 102, 113, 120, 156 and Inc. i, 2 and 3 in nos. 
 156, 258 and Inc. in nos. 258, 274-276, 287 and Inc. i, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in nos. 
 287, 301 and Inc. in nos. 301, 302-305, 320 and Inc. i, 2 and 3 in nos. 
 320, 323 and Inc. in nos. 323, 325 and Inc. i and 2 in nos. 325, 341 and 
 Inc. I, 2 and 3 in nos. 341, 343 and Inc. in nos. 343, 350 and Inc. i, 2, 
 
 3 and 4 in nos. 350, 361 and Inc. i and 2 in nos. 361, 362, 365, 372 and 
 Inc. in nos. 372, 374 and Inc. i, 2 and 3 in nos. 374, 377 and Inc. i and 
 2 in nos. 377, 382 and Inc. i and 2 in nos. 382, 389, 403 and Inc. in nos. 
 403, 405, 411, 416, 418. 
 
 ^ Li Hung-chang was ordered by Imperial decree to confer with the 
 Controller-General of the Yellow River and the Governor of Shantung 
 as to schemes to prevent future floods. As McDonald said, Li's 
 task was "an arduous one." The Yamen also asked the British Min- 
 ister whether English engineers were available as advisers. Great 
 Britain offered to send three competent engineers from India, but again 
 the Boxer 'Rebellion intervened and cut negotiations short. China No. 
 I {1899), nos. 388, 390, 403, 424, 434, 461. 
 
 
72 THE BOXER REBELLION [484 
 
 question/ always a bone of contention between China and 
 Europe, came into prominence at the worst possible time 
 and added its share to the prevailing discontent. The evils 
 of the contraband trade in opium, severely felt because of 
 the general lack of prosperity, became acute, and here with- 
 out doubt the foreigner was to blame. 
 
 It soon developed that the antipathy of the native popu- 
 lation to the missionaries was as strong as in the preceding 
 generation. "^The propagator of the Gospel was regarded as 
 the advance-agent of his particular Government, sent to 
 China not for religion's sake but in a political capacity thus 
 disguised. Nor does it seem possible how the Chinese could 
 have reasoned otherwise when the Catholic clergy, openly 
 aided by France, actually demanded and obtained jnandarin 
 rank for their bishops and a sliding-scale of lesser dignities 
 for the lower priesthood, with singular foresight providing 
 even for the ceremonial cannon-shotj It is to be regretted 
 
 ^ Serious rioting, especially at Hankow, followed the transfer of the 
 likin and salt taxes to the Imperial Maritime Customs, where they were 
 to be hypothecated for the Anglo-German loan. 
 
 Ihid., nos. 100, 103, iii, 145, 147 and Inc. in nos. 147, 185, 212 and 
 Inc. in nos. 212, 218, 460 and Inc. i, 2, 3 and 4 in nos. 460, 468; 
 China No. i (1900), no. 75 and Inc. in no. 75, no. 107 and Inc. in no. 107. 
 
 '-^An excellent discussion of the question of rites is given in Cordier, 
 op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 478-495, a review of the entire period of Catholic 
 activities in China. See also China No. i {1900), no. 176 and Inc., 
 188, the memorial of March 15, 1899, for the above political status to 
 Catholics. "The same day the Imperial assent was given" (Inc. in 
 no. 176). 
 
 Speaking of these ceremonies, says Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 478: 
 ** II faut bien reconnaitre que le chiffre de 720,866 Chretiens (Cordier's 
 work was pubUshed in 1902) pour toute la Chine est mediocre; il fut 
 plus eleve au XVIIe siecle; si Ton recherche les causes de cet in- 
 succes des missionaires catholiques dans I'Empire du Milieu, on' 
 trouvera que la Question des Rites a ete la pierre d'achoppement sur 
 laquelle est venue se heurter I'figlise romaine, grace aux intrigues qui 
 se sont nouees autour des Souverains Pontifes ignorants des choses de 
 Chine et ne les entrevoyant que par les yeux de conseillers souvent de 
 mauvaise foi." 
 
485] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 7^ 
 
 that no criticism on this attitude of the Chinese can be ad- 
 vanced, as argument would be too much confounded by fact. 
 Fortunately, the Protestants declined like political ostenta- 
 tion, although their magnanimity to China was overlooked 
 by the Boxers in the catastrophe which followed. Equally 
 exasperating were the difficulties experienced with the mixed 
 courts (extra-territoriality) and with the administration 
 of the law in general, and here both Protestants and Cath- 
 olics were equally culpable. ' It was claimed and in many in- 
 stances proved that the Christian convert, too many times a 
 " rice-Christian ", was unduly favored, that with either mis- 
 sionary, priestly or consular intervention at his call he 
 would escape scot-free or with a light sentence, while the 
 orthodox Chinese was punished as the letter of the law de- 
 manded j Also, considering the nature of missionary activi- 
 ties, it was inevitable that among the representatives of the 
 Christian religion there would be some who were unfit for 
 their extremely difficult calling, who were narrow-minded . 
 prejudic ed, intplerant^ viewing the totally different condi- 
 tions and standards of life in the Chinese community through 
 the distorted vision of the average New England village. 
 Tolerance for and a sympathetic understanding of the faults 
 and failures of mankind, together with a correct under- 
 standing of mankind itself, is always difficult for the ideal- 
 ist and the reformer. Especially is it hard for him to real- 
 ize that a code of conduct and morals of great success, ap- 
 parently, in one part of the world, may be a total failure 
 when transplanted to another part, due to the different en- 
 vironment, to racial atavisms, and to the variability of 
 human nature, which can never successfully be bound down 
 to one philosophy applying to all alike. Thus it was that 
 the native convert was weaned from filial piety, which the 
 majority of his Christian advisers confused with ancestor 
 worship, through a lack of knowledge of Chinese social 
 
74 THE BOXER REBELLION [486 
 
 conditions J For a time, although this policy is now hap- 
 pily reversed, he was taught to reject the teachings of his 
 native literature, the moral guide of the race for centuries 
 and imperishably linked with it, for the spiritual benefits of 
 the Scriptures. He was led to expect that the judges, 
 through foreign pressure, would treat him with partiality. 
 He was instructed to refuse his tithe for the humble village 
 festivals, parades and theatricals, the only pleasures, be- 
 sides a fight or an accident, which relieve the fearfully 
 monotonous existence of the laboring classes, this because 
 he was made to understand that such innocent amusements 
 were sinful according to the Bible, or to whatever religious 
 sect the particular missionary happened to belong. ^Even 
 in those fields wherein the missionaries did a truly wonder- 
 ful service for China and the Chinese, for which they de- 
 served and have received unstinted praise, such as increas- 
 ing the comforts of life and raising the standard of living, 
 introducing sanitation, hospitals, medical attendance, and 
 spreading general education, their work was either ignored 
 or misunderstood, because of its obvious correlation with 
 the religion of EuropeJ The fault lies largely with Chris- 
 ^ : tianity. It has the misfortune in every alien land of running 
 counter to almost all the cherished local institutions. It 
 offends everyone, it antagonizes every creed, it mingles 
 with none, because its fundamental tenets deny the co- 
 existence of any other faith or standard of morality. In 
 China, Christianity encountered further opposition. This 
 was the predilection of the vast majority of Chinese, es- 
 pecially the educated classes, for their own code of life and 
 morals, which leaves little to be desired as it is eminently 
 practical and earthly, with no speculations on divinity and 
 the hereafter. Probably China never will become Christian- 
 ized, for the Chinese mind does not lend itself to theologi- 
 cal dogmaj It would indeed be a misfortune if the Far 
 
487] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION y^ 
 
 East, in emulating the development of Europe, had yet to 
 undergo that course of instruction in Christianity which 
 marked its path even in modern history, such as the Revolt 
 of the Netherlands, the Thirty Years' war, the Inquisition, 
 the Edict of Faith, the fires of Smithfield, or, granting 
 these lamentable aftermaths of the " religion of peace " as 
 impossible to-day, to suffer intestine persecution, political 
 discrimination, Catholic disabilities, the Kulturkampf, the 
 warfare between science and theology, and the factional dif- 
 ferences of our score of antagonistic denominations. Better 
 Stygian darkness, of course according to our view, than light 
 at such a cost. The Chinese have never had a religious 
 war ; in that they have been thrice blessed. 
 
 But what above all was an impenetrable mystery to the 
 Chinese at this time was the fact that Christian Powers, in- 
 stead of themselves being guided by the doctrine of "peace 
 on earth and good will to men ", to which they gave such 
 constant lip-service through their clerical representatives, 
 should have followed the diametrically opposite policy that 
 '' might makes right ", that whatever could not be obtained 
 by fair means should be acquired by a resort to blood and 
 iron. It was the European code of political morals, essen- 
 tially Machiavellian, which counteracted every good result 
 obtained by the missionary, which predestined reform to 
 failure, and which fittingly wound up with the greatest dis- 
 aster of all, the Boxer Rebellion. The mistakes of the time 
 were largely Europe's mistakes, even to that final blunder, 
 the bombardment of the Taku forts, which instantly united\ 
 all the rebellious and anti- foreign elements against western/ 
 aggression. An enumeration of the immediate determining 
 causes of the Boxer Rebellion is more to be found in diplo- 
 matic archives than in a study of any other sources. Leases, 
 commercial servitudes, the loss of sovereignty over the finest 
 harbors, the hypothecation of likin and salt revenues, the 
 
76 THE BOXER REBELLION [488 
 
 contracts to promoters and concessions to missionaries 
 forced at the cannon's mouth, the talk of partition, the dip- 
 lomatic wrangles over " spheres of influence " and " bal- 
 ance of power ", the exaction of the last possible farthing 
 as indemnity for acts for which neither Europe nor the 
 United States would have granted indemnity or apology — 
 the answer of the Chinese to all these national humiliations 
 was the outbreak of 1900. In fact, from the day of the 
 German seizure of Kiaochau, which there introduced the 
 sorry argument of the mailed fist in Chinese politics, the 
 Boxer Rebellion was a foregone conclusion, and apology 
 and blame for succeeding events should primarily be laid 
 at Europe's door, not at China's. 
 
 Naturally, the Chinese population of the foreign 
 " spheres ", in their fear over what seemed then the cer- 
 tain dissolution of the Empire, wreaked their vengeance 
 first upon the missionaries, as these were nearest at hand 
 and in the imagination of the people symbolized the pres- 
 ence of the Powers in China and could not be dissociated 
 from them. It seems rather appropriate that the province 
 of Shantung, the scene of the initial European aggression 
 and of the German Hinterland, should likewise have cradled 
 the Boxer movement ^ and furnished the first concerted op- 
 position to Europe. It so happened that three American 
 missionaries in this locality were roughly handled. With- 
 out going too much into detail over this particular affair, it 
 may be noted that the missionaries submitted a correspond- 
 
 N ^ For accounts of the organization of the Boxer' movement and its 
 preliminary stages, see Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, ch. xxiv, "Les Boxeurs," 
 pp. 451-462; "Smith, vol. i, ch. x, "Genesis of the Boxer Move- 
 ment," pp. 152-174; ch. xi, "Gathering of the Storm," pp. i75-i95; 
 ch. xii, "(Spread of the Rising," pp. 196-217; Bland and Backhouse, 
 op. cit., ch. xvi, "The Genesis of the Boxer Movement," pp. 247-250; 
 Rev. F. L. Hawks Pott, The Outbreak in China (New York, 1900), 
 pp. 79-91. 
 
489] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION jy 
 
 ence later sent to the American Minister at Peking, giving 
 the following conclusions, which are valuable as they typify 
 the situation in the early months of the Rebellion : 
 
 1. It (their particular affair in Shantung province) is clearly 
 not an isolated case, but one of several simultaneous occur- 
 rences, showing a widespread and violent antiforeign feeling. 
 
 2. The present outbreak is directly connected with the Coup 
 d'Etat at Peking. The people are led to believe that the re- 
 action against the Reform Government, of which they have 
 vaguely heard, involves the expulsion of the foreigners. 
 
 3. Vigorous measures must at once be taken in the way of 
 stringent instructions to local officials, and plain-spoken pro- 
 clamations, backed up by the necessary force, if this antiforeign 
 feeling is to be subdued before worse things happen. 
 
 4. We have no complaint to make of the civil authorities, 
 with whom we have had to deal. The Prefect Ting Cheng 
 and the hsien or county official of I-chou-fu, Chen Kung 
 Liang, certainly did all in their power to answer the appeal of 
 the ladies for help. 
 
 The action of the Chu Chou official, as related above, was 
 prompt and effective. The prefect for six days travelled liter- 
 ally day and night. 
 
 None of these named was responsible for the trouble, as 
 they made every exertion to rescue us and the German priest. 
 It would be a great injustice if they were made to suffer in 
 the premises. 
 
 5. We can not say as much for the military authorities of 
 I-chou-fu. The hsieh tai, or resident colonel in command of 
 the regular troops ^ of the prefecture, is a Mahomedan named 
 Li Ying. When the Jadies appealed to him he refused to do 
 anything, on the absurd ground that the country of Ji Chao is 
 the territory of his subordinate, the tu ssu, commandant of 
 Ngan Tung Wei, on the seacoast. Colonel Li has, it is true, 
 very few soldiers under his command, but that lack is in itself 
 
 ^ The italics are the author's. 
 
 / 
 
y% THE BOXER REBELLION [490 
 
 a just cause for complaint, and besides he did not use any of 
 the few men he has, as he might well have done. Still more 
 culpable is the case of Brig. Gen. Tai Shou Li, who was sent 
 down from Chinan-fu in the spring under pressure from you 
 (Consul Fowler),^ as he himself admitted, for the express pur- 
 pose of protecting the foreigner. He is supposed to command 
 a liang (500) of troops, but at present has here in the city 
 (I-chou-fu) only about 80 or 100 men. When the ladies ap- 
 pealed to him on this occasion for soldiers to go to our rescue 
 he said that he could not comply without an order from the 
 governor. In response to this we have simply to say that if 
 it be true that every time an emergency arises he must wait 
 for orders from Chinan-fu, 640 li away, he is not of much use 
 here, and the sooner he gets the necessary authority the better 
 for the foreigner. 
 
 6. If the Ho Chia Lou ^ people carry out their promise to make 
 full restitution for the damage done by them, we are not dis- 
 posed to prosecute them for their flagrant lawlessness. That 
 would probably be a wise step, if only to bring home to them 
 the gravity of their crime. We should feel disposed, however, 
 in view of our compact made with them, to intercede with the 
 authorities for them at the proper time. 
 
 7. We agreed to a settlement upon the basis of their simply 
 making good the damage, because : 
 
 (i). Although we were ourselves placed by them in un- 
 doubted peril of our property, if not of our lives, we 
 were not actually attacked ; 
 
 (2). We recognize the fact that the people of. Ho Chia Lou,, 
 while inexcusably in the wrong themselves, had a cer- 
 tain amount of real grievance against some of our 
 Christians (meaning the native converts), which, while 
 not enough to justify their resort to lawless violence, 
 
 * American consul at Chefoo. 
 ^ One of the neighboring villages. 
 
49 1 ] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION yg 
 
 must still be taken into account in judging their 
 conduct.^ 
 
 Such was the situation as early as November, 1898. Min- 
 ister Conger acted with vigor and promptitude to have the 
 above case adjudicated by indemnity and punishment. 
 After months of weary negotiations with the Yamen, he 
 was able to report in October, 1899, that a " satisfactory 
 indemnity '' had been paid, and thus, although the Ameri- 
 can Minister failed to secure the punishment of the rioters,^ 
 
 ^ Report by Messrs. Killie, Faris and Chalfant, in U. S. For. ReL, 
 1899, Inc. I in no. 142, pp. 154-157. 
 
 These three able missionaries later, December 26, 1898, sent a second 
 report to Consul Fowler (Ibid., Inc. 6 in no. 142, pp. 159, 160), saying 
 in part: 
 
 "It should be added that the attacks upon the Christians (still mean- 
 ing the native converts) are of a most vindictive character. . . . The 
 affair (in the same vicinity) has not yet assumed the proportions of an 
 organized rebellion, but is rapidly drifting in that direction." 
 
 They were also of the opinion that: 
 
 " I. The present outbreak shows conclusively that the military force 
 in this prefecture is not adequate enough to police the territory. 
 
 "2. The country south of us is in a constant state of disturbance, 
 owing to the local banditti who come and go over the border lines 
 between Shantung and Kiangsu. 
 
 " 3. There is now a state of famine in northern Kiangsu and lawless 
 outbreaks are occurring there and in the extreme southern parts of 
 this province. 
 
 " 4. It is quite likely that some of the German syndicates who are 
 visiting our city from time to time may attempt to buy lands and open 
 mines here in the spring, a proceeding which, however commendable in 
 itself, is almost sure to give rise to local disturbances." 
 
 ^"Upon this showing (an enumeration of what Conger had accom- 
 plished) the Department (of State) is disposed to think that, while the 
 procedure suggested by you may operate to bring about a settlement 
 of this particular case satisfactory to the immediate sufferers, you 
 have foregone a convenient opportunity for insisting upon the respon- 
 sibility of the local authorities of I Chou-fu, whose punishment you 
 might have continued to urge on the lines of the policy laid down in the 
 instructions heretofore sent to the legation in analogous cases, such 
 
8o THE BOXER REBELLION [492 
 
 this particular incident was regarded as closed/ 
 
 Germany meanwhile received a welcome opportunity to 
 display her military organization. A punitive expedition 
 of 125 soldiers, *' for the purpose of enforcing order and 
 peace ", penetrated inland to within fifteen miles of the 
 Ichoufu disturbances, and with characteristic German thor- 
 oughness burned two small villages because the inhabitants 
 had attacked a German lieutenant and engineer. Another 
 detachment 120 strong marched to Jihchao where a German 
 Catholic priest had been maltreated, and quickly restored 
 order, carrying away, it was reported, a number of the local 
 officials and gentry to be held as hostages until the inevitable 
 indemnity had been satisfactorily arranged. 
 V* While such was the melancholy prelude, far worse dis- 
 " *turbances characterized the closing months of 1899 in this 
 same region. The lawlessness was now distinctly of Boxer 
 character, the combination between the Fists of Righteous 
 Harmony and the Big Sword Societies producing a new 
 crop of riots, looting and massacres. It seemed that the 
 officials made hardly an effort to quell the disorders ; in fact, 
 if not actually encouraging or assisting, they sympatheti- 
 cally delayed or ignored the prosecution of the prominent 
 
 punishment being in complete accord with Chinese ideas, and being, 
 moreover, apparently the only recognized method of preventing the 
 recurrence of such inquiries. There is ground for apprehension lest 
 an omission, the appropriate case arising, to strongly bring to the 
 knowledge of the Tsung-li Yamen the purpose of this Government 
 to insist upon the punishment of the local officials rriay tend to weaken 
 any representations you may hereafter be called upon to make in that 
 sense under standing instructions." 
 
 Act. — ^Sec. A. A. Adee to Min. Conger, U. S. For. ReL, 1899, no. 
 203, p. 176. 
 
 1 Ihid., no. 142 and Inc. i, 2, 3 and Subinclosure,. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, g, 10, 
 II and 12, no. 148 and Inc. i and 2, nos. 151, 160, 181 and Inc. i and 2, 
 no. 186 and Inc., nos. 191, 196, 211 and Inc. i, 2 and 3, no. 215 and Inc. 
 I and Subinclosure, no. 232 and Inc. i, 2, 3, 4 and Subinclosure, 5, 6 
 and 7, no. 265 and Inc. and Subinclosure. 
 
493] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 8 1 
 
 malefactors. The indignation of the Diplomatic Corps at 
 this open favoritism to the Boxers in Shantung and else- 
 where reached such a pitch that the Peking Court judged it 
 expedient to remove the Governor, Yu Hsien, who was 
 called to the capital " on consultation ", and though re- 
 lieved of his duties in the turbulent province, was decor- 
 ated with the character Fu^ signifying happiness, " because 
 of his failure to protect the Christians and their property"/ 
 As a further mark of favor, he was transferred as Governor 
 to Shansi. To square itself with the aroused diplomats, the 
 Court appointed Yuan Shih-kai Governor of Shantung, the 
 l^est selection possible, whom the American Minister pro- 
 nounced an " able, brave, courageous man ", and who " has 
 mingled much with foreigners, and it is believed that if the 
 right kind of orders are given him from the Throne, the 
 rioting will be stopped and order restored ".^ But such 
 orders were not given, and the new Governor was too 
 shrewd a statesman to work his individual will against a 
 movement which apparently had the good wishes of the Im- 
 perial Government. Had he been unhampered by advice 
 from Peking, and allowed to use his great natural abilities 
 and his foreign-drilled army against the undisciplined 
 hordes opposing all authority, the Rebellion would have 
 been nipped in the bud. Possibly, however, Yuan Shih-kai 
 arrived too late. Shortly after his appearance upon the 
 scene in Shantung the murder of the British missionary 
 Brooks vastly complicated the situation,^ and although the 
 courageous Governor did all in the limited power allowed 
 him to undo the work of his predecessor, the riots had al- 
 ready reached that stage (January, 1900) which clearly 
 
 * Minister Conger, in U. S. For. ReL, 1900, no. 316, pp. 93, 94. 
 
 ^ Ibid., no. 289. 
 
 ' China No. 3 (1900), nos. 1-5, 9, 10, 18, 22, 26, 30, 31. 
 
82 THE BOXER REBELLION [494 
 
 foreshadowed the international catastrophe of the same 
 year.^ 
 
 Meanwhile, like disturbances were taking place in other 
 parts of the Empire, separate though sympathetic move- 
 ments which, growing rapidly worse in volume and inten- 
 sity of hatred to Christianity and the foreigner, finally coal- 
 esced through their affinity of purpose in the tragedy we 
 know as the Boxer Rebellion. There was the riot at 
 Shashih, directed against the British and Japanese, in which 
 " nothing was spared " : the Custom House, Haikwan Bank, 
 Commissioner of Custom's house, China Merchants' prop- 
 erty, Jardine, Matheson and Co.'s property (one of the 
 great English trading companies in China), and the Japan- 
 ese Consulate — all were destroyed.^ There were the riot 
 in Chihli,* the anti-foreign and anti-Christian disturbances 
 in central Szechwan,* the Kwangsi insurrection," the anti- 
 missionary riot at Foochow,^ the trouble in Yunnanfu,^ the 
 terrible outbreaks in Paotingfu,* the Kienning riots,^ the 
 murder of the British missionary Fleming,^® of Robinson 
 
 ^On the Shantung disturbances, see China No. i (1899), no. 446; 
 China No. i {1900), no. 401; China No. 3 (1900), nos. 8, 9, 11, 16; 
 U. S. For. Rel., 1900, nos. 223, 228, 234, 246, 249, 252, 289, 307, 312, 
 316, 332, 338, 339, 345, 356, 368. 
 
 ^ China No. i (1900), nos. 83, 170, 223, 269, 270, 346, 364, 411, 415, 
 417, 419, 453, 458. 
 
 ^ China No. 3 {1900), nos. 11, 19, 21. 
 
 ^ China No. i {1899), nos. 330, 341; China No. i (1900), no. 194. 
 For the riots in Szechwan in 1895, see U. S. For. Rel., iSgs, nos. 87-172. 
 
 ' China No. i {1899), nos. 230, 247, 298, 305, 315; China No. i {1900), 
 no. 222. 
 
 ^ China No. i (1900), no. 181. ' China No. 3 (1900), no. 40. 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), nos. 37, 62. 
 
 * China No. i {1900), nos. 202, 205, 206, 210, 213, 214, 293, 313, 318, 
 347, 355, 364, 384, 439. 
 
 ^^ China No. i (1899), nos. 393, 43i, 466, 471; China No. i {1900), 
 nos. 5, 10, 49, 108, 118, 157, 170, 180, 193, 199, 207, 215, 216, 218, 219, 
 237, 241, 249, 256, 265, 269, 326, 334, 338, 393, 407. 
 
495] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 83 
 
 and of Norman/ These calamities were all contributory to 
 those in Shantung, inspired by the same motives, produc- 
 ing the same results, and directed towards the same ends. 
 
 Serious trouble in Peking itself gave the foreign repre- 
 sentatives their first unmistakable hint of coming misfor- 
 tunes. As early as September, 1898, the temper of the 
 rabble in the capital, reinforced as they were, by 10,000 
 Kangsu troops temporarily quartered there, revealed itself 
 as a conclusive index to the future. At the annual mid- 
 autumn festivals the trouble began, simultaneously in four 
 different places. To quote M. Cologan, Dean of the Diplo- 
 matic Corps: 
 
 It is not necessary to mention them (the attacks) in detail. It 
 is sufficient to state that the father of a member of the Legation 
 of the United States was severely wounded, and that a member 
 of the British Legation and an English lady, a French citizen, 
 and two Japanese subjects were wounded or attacked or in- 
 sulted — all while proceeding from the railroad station.* / 
 
 The British Minister observed : 
 
 There were a large number of bad characters in the streets, 
 which, to a certain extent, accounted for this behavior on the 
 part of the mob, but there has been, since the so-called Coup ^ 
 d'Etat, a very considerable amount of unrest in the city, mor^ 
 especially since the execution of six of the reform party. 
 These men were supposed by the common people to have been 
 put to death by order of the Empress Dowager because they 
 had dealings with foreigners. It was, therefore, considered 
 safe to insult foreigners in every possible way.* 
 
 Sir Claude MacDonald further remarked that the inci- 
 
 * China No. 3 {1900), nos. ^, 70, 71, 75. 
 "^ U. S. For. Rel., 1898, Inc. in no. 81, p. 233. 
 ^ China No. i {1899), no. 399. 
 
84 THE BOXER REBELLION [496 
 
 dents referred to were due not to individual feeling against 
 the persons concerned but to the fact that they were Euro- 
 peans, Americans, and Japanese; in other words, that they 
 represented the races which, as the populace believed, would 
 soon be driven out of China forever. Of course the Yamen 
 expressed regret, and later even punished those responsible 
 for the outrages. What makes this particularly notable is 
 the welcome opportunity it gave the Ministers of object- 
 ing to the presence of the Kangsu troops in the capital and 
 also of demanding Legation guards. As these two factors 
 may be considered the beginning of international compli- 
 cations with China, they will be treated in the next part. 
 
 In closing, it is pertinent to observe how singularly the 
 Europe of 1899 misread events. None looked for an or- 
 ganized resistance of the Chinese people, much less of the 
 Chinese Government, and the possibilities of any opposition 
 to the wishes or acts of the Powers were then as lightly 
 entertained as later they were tremendously overestimated. 
 The journals of Europe saw in the approaching storm only 
 incipient riots against Christianity, to be regarded merely 
 as the usual pot-luck attending the fortunes of missionaries 
 in the Far East. The deep, underlying cause of this inter- 
 national misunderstanding, immensely greater than the mis- 
 sionary or religious question, to wit, the recent territorial 
 aggressions of the Powers, in fact, the conduct of Europe 
 ever since 1840, entirely escaped notice. Referring to the 
 fears of the British, who alone seemed to have an inkling 
 of what was coming, the Ost Asiatisches Lloyd (repro- 
 duced by the BerHn Post of March 20, 1900) , in protesting 
 against the " attitude of certain organs of the English and 
 Chinese press that have circulated the most incredible 
 rumors about events in China of a nature to make people 
 in Europe believe that China is either on the threshold of a 
 revolution or of a general collapse of her system of gov- 
 
497] CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 85 
 
 One could heartily laugh over the whole affair, were it not 
 that the question has undoubtedly a most serious side to it. 
 The reports which even the most respectable papers have pub- 
 lished during the last few weeks have made a deep impression 
 which will not be easily removed upon the Chinese population, 
 and more especially among traders, who naturally know little 
 about the dynastic and political conditions of their country, 
 but who place implicit confidence in the statements of 
 Europeans. 
 
 The wild tales that are telegraphed to Europe and America 
 must influence the value of Chinese stock, but more especially 
 the confidence of the home market in Chinese affairs. 
 
 Do the English press organs realize the result of their 
 attitude ? 
 
 Thus English newspapers recently announced to the world 
 the sensational news of the dethronement of Huang- fu (Kuang 
 Hsu), a report which the world endeavored to better by adding 
 that perhaps the Emperor had committed suicide. Confidence 
 in the stability of the present state of things in China is natur- 
 ally seriously shaken by such rumors, the effect of which is al- 
 ready making itself sufficiently felt in the Far East.^ 
 
 Equally was the Chinese character misunderstood. 
 Europe, wholly influenced by the superficial estimate gath- 
 ered from the results of the Chino- Japanese war and the 
 ease with which territory had been filched from the Em- 
 pire, was unable to entertain a contrary opinion, and not 
 until the siege of the Legations and the difficulties of the 
 Allies in reaching Peking (a curious resemblance, by the 
 way, to Lord Wolseley's advance on Khartoum), was it 
 believed that such a display of patriotism and resolution on 
 the part of the alien race would ever have been possible, 
 and not till then were certain capabilities of the Chinese 
 character critically regarded, if not with admiration, at 
 least with respect. 
 
 * China No. 3 {1900), no. 25. 
 
PART II 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS OF 
 THE BOXER REBELLION 
 
I 
 
 PART II 
 
 The International Complications of the Boxer 
 Rebellion 
 
 Question of the Kangsu Troops — First Legation Guards — ^Second 
 Legation Guards — Attitude of Chinese Government towards the 
 Boxers — Imperial Decrees concerning Boxers — Distinction between 
 " Good and Bad " Societies — Instructions to Viceroys — 'Arrival of 
 Foreign Warships at TaKu — Dynastic Succession — Attitude of the 
 Yangtse Viceroysy^Policy of United States — Bombardment of Taku 
 — A State of War existing? — Seymour 7 Expedition — Capture of 
 Tientsin — Second Allied Army— Capture of Peking. 
 
 From an international standpoint the Boxer Rebellion 
 consists of four parts : 
 
 / I. Preliminary diplomatic affairs. 
 ^; II. Siege of the Legations. 
 
 III. Efforts of the Allies to reach Peking. 
 
 IV. The punishment inflicted upon China, 
 
 After the assault upon Mr. Campbell, Assistant Chinese 
 Secretary of the British Legation, while visiting the rail- 
 way bridge in course of construction at Lukouchiao, by a 
 party of the Kangsu troops then encamped in the Imperial 
 Hunting Park at Peking, the British Minister addressed a 
 note to the Tsung-li Yamen " protesting against the pres- 
 ence of these uniformed brigands near Peking and the rail- 
 way lines ", and, " in view of their well-known anti-foreign 
 professions ", he demanded " their removal without loss of 
 time to a safe distance ". He insisted further " on a thor- 
 ough investigation and punishment of the offenders ". The 
 same afternoon he repeated his demands. 
 
 501] 89 
 
po THE BOXER REBELLION [^02 
 
 The Yamen was " very apologetic " and seemingly 
 showed every disposition to conciliate Minister MacDon- 
 ald. They informed him that a decree had already been 
 issued to inquire into the affair, and they promised '' that 
 steps would be taken to pen the whole army (between 
 10,000 to 15,000 men) temporarily in the Hunting Park, 
 and keep them out of mischief until they were drafted 
 gradually to more distant stations ". As MacDonald added 
 to Lord Salisbury : " There can also be little doubt that the 
 Chinese Government are themselves (in addition to the 
 Legations) afraid of these Mahommedan brigands — for 
 they cannot be called soldiers ". 
 
 That was on October 24, 1898. The matter was brought 
 up at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, October 27th, ad- 
 vising the Yamen, for the sake of peace and prevention of 
 further outrages, to have the troops removed at once.^ To 
 this collective note the Yamen replied substantially as to 
 the British Minister, agreeing that if the troops were left 
 in Peking, " grave disorders might ensue ". Therefore, 
 ** it had been decided to send these troops elsewhere soon". 
 In the opinion of the Diplomatic Body, the Yamen's reply 
 was " not entirely satisfactory ", and " further and more 
 energetic steps " must be taken by the united Ministers to 
 force immediate action. 
 
 Two of the soldiers concerned in the previous attacks 
 were punished by the authorities quickly enough. But, as 
 the Chinese Government " had, as far as could be ascer- 
 tained, taken no steps whatever for the removal of the 
 Kangsu troops " it was " unanimously decided " to address 
 
 * In conclusion M. Cologan, the Doyen, said : " En prevenant le Yamen 
 a temps, le Corps Diplomatique accomplit un acte amical et il s'efforce 
 de mettre fin a une situation anormale, qui au lieu de s'apaiser, semble 
 devenir chaque jour plus delicate et critique." China No. i (1899), 
 Inc. I in no. 422. 
 
503] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 91 
 
 another note to the Yamen of a more peremptory charac- 
 ter, adding that '' the Kangsu troops should quit the Prov- 
 ince of PechiH not later than the 15th of November, and 
 further that the place to which they were going should be 
 stated ".^ The representatives of the Powers were united 
 in this demand. The Japanese Minister, M. Fumio Yano, 
 informed the Diplomatic Corps that, should China refuse 
 to accede to the above stipulations, " Japan would join with 
 the other Powers in compelling them (the Yamen) to 
 do so ". 
 
 In answer the Yamen pointed out, following a further 
 note of November nth, that " it has now been settled that 
 these troops are to leave in detachments, beginning on the 
 15th or 1 6th instant, until they have been withdrawn. The 
 troops are to go to the west of Chichow and to be stationed 
 along the mountains ".^ The Diplomatic Body answered 
 that this arrangement, although " inspired by a desire to 
 put an end to the difficulties which have arisen, does not 
 completely satisfy them ", as, " contrary to one of the de- 
 mands made, the Kangsu troops will not leave the Province 
 
 * M. Cologan, Doyen of the Diplomatic Body, to the Tsung-li Yamen : 
 
 " En s'inspirant de ces idees, le Corps Diplomatique me charge 
 d'ecrire cette note au Yamen pour demander : 
 
 " I. Que ces troupes aient au plus tard le 15 November quitte la 
 Province du Pechihli. 
 
 " 2. Que la destination qui leur sera donnee soit indiquee. 
 
 " 3. Si ces decisions n'etaient pas prises et notifiees au Corps Diplo- 
 matique, ce serait pour les Gouvernements etrangers le cas d'aviser aux 
 mesures necessaires pour garantir la siirete des etrangers et pour as- 
 surer la circulation sur les chemins de fer et la liberte des communi- 
 cations telegraphiques." China No. i {1899), Inc. i in no. 443. 
 
 "^ "Although they (the troops) will not be outside the territory of 
 Chih-li, they will be very far from the railway, and we can certainly 
 assure you that the movements of the officials and merchants who 
 travel by the railway will in future not be interfered with in any way." 
 The Tsung-li Yamen to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body, China No. i 
 (1899), Inc. I in no. 462. 
 
 P 
 
g2 THE BOXER REBELLION [504 
 
 of Chihli immediately ". Therefore, at the end of their 
 patience, they considered it " their duty to refer the matter 
 to their Governments ", leaving it to the latter to decide 
 what should be done. Then Prince Ching and the Yamen 
 likewise considered it their duty '' to explain this matter ". 
 It was made clear to the Diplomatic Corps that "the Kangsu 
 troops came here (Peking) to be reviewed. They are more 
 than 10,000 in number, and were sent into camp at Nan- 
 yuan. A great many carts are required for the march, and 
 the troops must leave gradually in detachments. It is there- 
 fore difficult to act quickly ". But it was resolved that, 
 " when the day for their departure is fixed we will inform 
 your Excellency (the Doyen) immediately ". With the 
 question of these '' uniformed bandits " thus disposed of 
 in a half-way satisfactory manner,^ the attention of the 
 diplomats was taken up with the urgent need for Legation 
 guards, which was equally serious. 
 
 The necessary precedent for armed protection of the 
 Legations had already been established by a similar situa- 
 tion of insecurity during the Chino- Japanese war. There- 
 fore the Ministers were confident that without undue pres- 
 sure brought upon the Chinese Government their request 
 would be amicably granted. This matter had been care- 
 fully reasoned out by the American State Department in 
 1895. In response at that time to Minister Denby's state- 
 ment that " the question of the right of the Legations to 
 have escorts here (Peking) is abstract and independent of 
 the probability of its exercise ", Secretary of State Gres- 
 ham replied : " I do not find in any of the treaties with 
 China provisions authorizing the protection of the Lega- 
 tions by foreign troops ". But the Secretary equally ob- 
 
 ^ U. S. For. ReL, 1898, Telegram p. 225, Telegram p. 226, no. 56 and 
 Inc. I and 2, no. 81 and Inc. i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; China No. i (1899), nos. 
 421, 422, 435, 442, 443, 450, 462; Chitta No. i (1900), nos. 20, 28. 
 
505] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 93 
 
 served that " China, Hke any other Government, is bound 
 to offer adequate protection ", and if this were not forth- 
 coming, " there is no reason why the Legation should court 
 danger " by remaining defenceless. Therefore he author- 
 ized a military guard to be sent to Peking " under similar 
 conditions " as those of other Powers, in accordance with 
 the most- favored-nation clause of the American treaties/ 
 
 As Legation guards were again an urgent necessity, a 
 meeting was held by the Diplomatic Corps, October 4, 1898, 
 in which it was decided by unanimous vote " to notify the 
 Chinese Government of the proposed departure from Tien- 
 tsin for Peking to-morrow of bodies of British, German, 
 and Russian marines, and to ask that all facilities, includ- 
 ing a special train, should be extended to them by the 
 Chinese authorities ". It was also intimated that the 
 French, American, Japanese, and Italian marines were " to 
 come straight on to Peking on their arrival at Tientsin ". 
 Of course China objected, and the Chinese Minister at Lon- 
 don denounced the contemplated move as " a slur upon the 
 Chinese Government ". The Tsung-li Yamen, in answer 
 to the note of October 4th, replied : 
 
 We hope that your Excellency (Cologan) will ask your col- 
 leagues to be kind enough not to bring their soldiers for pro- 
 
 ^ " The President sees no reason why the Legation should court 
 danger by remaining at Peking in the face of imminent or threatening 
 peril; and you have the right to an adequate escort to assist you in 
 avoiding it by removal to a place of safety where you would be under 
 the immediate and legitimate protection of your own flag. Neverthe- 
 less, in view of your telegram of the i8th instant, reporting that other 
 Legations are bringing military guards to Peking with the consent of 
 the Chinese Government, I telegraphed the 19th instant, as follows: 
 
 " You say troops have arrived with China's consent to protect other 
 Legations. In cooperation with Carpenter you are authorized to bring 
 up marines under similar conditions." 
 
 U. S. For. ReL, 1895, vol. i, pp. 198, 199; Moore's Digest, vol. v, p. 626. 
 
94 '^HE BOXER REBELLION [506 
 
 tection. This for the purpose of preventing the spirit of the 
 people from being excited, the circulation of false rumors, and 
 provoking, we fear, other troubles. 
 
 Later followed an interview with the British Minister, in 
 which Prince Ching begged MacDonald to reconsider his 
 decision, assuming that his consent " would be sufficient to 
 stop the arrival of the guard of all the Legations ". In an- 
 swer, MacDonald advised the Prince and the Ministers of 
 the Yamen '' to accept the inevitable, and to accept it grace- 
 fully ". Then he promised them that, '' by taking stringent 
 measures to insure good order, they might hope to shorten 
 the stay of the guards in Peking ", but rem.arked that '' op- 
 position, while it would be futile, would certainly increase 
 the number of the guards and lengthen their stay in Peking". 
 After a two-hour discussion. Prince Ching decided to " ac- 
 cept the inevitable ", moreover, did it " gracefully " as re- 
 quested, for arrangements were made to supply a train in 
 which to convey the foreign detachments. 
 
 The British guard reached Tientsin first, and consisted 
 of an officer, 25 men, and a machine gun. On October 4th 
 the Russians arrived, 30 mounted Cossacks and 38 marines, 
 with a small field-gun. The Germans disembarked the fol- 
 lowing day, with 30 marines. It was the intention of these 
 three divisions to leave immediately for Peking, but they 
 were forbidden to do so by the Viceroy of Chihli until he 
 had orders from the Yamen to that effect. When they did 
 reach Peking, further trouble developed, as witnessed by 
 the communication of the Yamen to the Doyen of the Dip- 
 lomatic Body: 
 
 Peking, October 7, 1898. 
 From an official communication, it was stated in your Ex- 
 cellency's note of October 5, instant, that the number of soldiers 
 composing each of the escorts (Russian, English, and German) 
 
507] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 95 
 
 was about thirty. But the detachments arrived today, the 
 Germans had thirty, the English less than thirty, and the Rus- 
 sians alone had sixty-six. 
 
 This is not in accordance with the note which your Ex- 
 cellency sent us. 
 
 We request, therefore, that your Excellency will be kind 
 enough to reply immediately and explain to us the cause of it. 
 
 This is important. 
 
 M. Cologan got out of the difficulty by replying that he 
 had given approximate figures only to facilitate " the com- 
 position of the train " which the Chinese Government was 
 to furnish. However, although the matter was dropped, a 
 decidedly unpleasant feeling had been aroused, and the 
 Ministers of the Yamen again felt that they had been 
 tricked. 
 
 A short while after, the American contingent arrived, 
 "18 well-armed marines and a gatling-gun ". They also 
 rode in a special train. ^ When these various troops ar- 
 rived, the " demeanor of the crowd was quiet and respect- 
 ful ", for the sufficient reason that no other attitude was 
 possible. As it was, the Diplomatic Body held the Yamen 
 responsible for the whole affair, particularly because at the 
 meeting on the evening of the 4th of October, a despatch 
 from the Yamen was read in which the assaults on for- 
 eigners were treated '' very lightly ", and neither in this 
 despatch nor in a Red Letter which accompanied it was 
 there the least expression of regret for what had occurred. 
 This decided the foreign representatives to summon their 
 guards at once from Tientsin. However, MacDonald was 
 of the opinion, '' should no untoward event occur, and mat- 
 ters remain quiet ", that the guards could be withdrawn in 
 three weeks, with the reservation that it was impossible to 
 predict the future with any degree of accuracy. 
 
 ^ See U. S. For. Rel., 1898, vol. i, Inc. 10 and 11 in no. 81. 
 
 I 
 
96 THE BOXER REBELLION [508 
 
 As a matter of fact, the troops stayed much longer. The 
 Imperial Government, becoming impatient, early in Decem- 
 ber requested the diplomats " to decide as to the date on 
 which the guards can with safety be withdrawn ", but this 
 request " received no encouragement ". It is amusing how 
 naive the diplomacy of China and the Powers was every 
 once in a while at this time, not alone on the side of the 
 Peking Court but on that of the foreign Ministers as well. 
 Far from letting the question rest, the Chinese representa- 
 tives at the European capitals and at Washington continued 
 insistent in their demands that the objectionable troops be 
 removed. Finally, after these had spent a quiet winter in 
 Peking, conditions were adjudged such that their presence 
 was no longer necessary, and in early spring, 1900, com- 
 parative order and security having been restored, these 
 initial defenders of the Legations evacuated their respec- 
 tive compounds and marched away to the coast.^ 
 
 But the situation in China, though for a brief period qui- 
 escent, except here and there an explosion of wrath against 
 the foreigner and his proselytism, came to take a decided 
 turn for the worse. The cloud of the Boxer Rebellion, at 
 first a mere speck upon the horizon, spread slowly but surely, 
 gaining momentum and magnitude with every fresh out- 
 break of unbridled fury and misguided patriotism. From 
 Shantung, where the energetic Yuan Shih-kai had enforced 
 a sort of armed tranquility, the activities of the Boxers 
 spread to the neighboring provinces, leaving death and de- 
 struction in their wake, and setting the country around, 
 even to the gates of Peking, in a turmoil. The foreign 
 Ministers were not blind to what was going on, but hoped 
 that the Central Government would eventually suppress the 
 
 ^ China No. i {1899), nos. 345, 348-350, 355, 357, 400, 402, 405, 406, 
 414, 425; China No, i {1900), nos. 12, 145; U. S. For. Rel., 1898, pp. 
 228-232, 2ZS-^AA' 
 
I 
 
 509] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 97 
 
 unexampled lawlessness growing daily more unrestrained. 
 In this the authorities failed absolutely, and the publication 
 of ineffective decrees, the disinclination to denounce the 
 Boxers, and the laxity of the Imperial troops and officials 
 in punishing or even in apprehending the rioters convinced 
 the diplomats that, after an absence of guards for over a 
 year, it was again imperative to have the security of the 
 Legations insured by the presence of their own nationals. 
 
 Their decision came quickly, through the force of imme- 
 diate events. As Conger reported to the Department of 
 State : Xr 
 
 To the consternation of all, on Monday the 28th (of May,' 
 1900), word came that the railroad was attacked, two bridges 
 and two stations burned on the Paoting-fu line, and that all the 
 foreigners connected with the line had fled to Tientsin, or were 
 besieged in their homes. Later in the day it was learned that 
 Fengtai, the second station on the Tientsin line, only 10 miles 
 from Peking, and where are located the railroad machine shops, 
 was being burned, no trains were running between Tientsin and 
 Peking, and the Boxers were reported marching on Peking.^ 
 
 This disastrous news stirred the Diplomatic Body to in- 
 stant action. 
 
 A hurried meeting was called, in which " it was decided 
 to bring the Legation guards to the city without delay ". 
 The following letter was addressed to the Tsung-li Yamen : 
 
 Peking, May 28, 1900. \ 
 Your Highness and Your Excellencies: 
 
 I have the honor to inform your Highness (Prince Ching) 
 and your Excellencies that the representatives of Germany, 
 England, Austria- Hungary, United States, France, Italy, Japan, 
 and Russia have decided at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps 
 to bring immediately some detachments of troops to Peking. 
 
 ^ U. S. For. Rel, 1900, no. z^3, pp. 132, 133. 
 
gS THE BOXER REBELLION [510 
 
 1 am instructed to request of you, in the name of my col- 
 leagues, to give the necessary instructions, that the detach- 
 ments, whose arrival is expected at once, may find at Tangku 
 the trains to bring them to this capital. 
 
 It goes without saying, that this decision of the Ministers 
 does not authorize the Chinese Government to avoid taking the 
 measures, which the Ministers have demanded for so long a 
 time, necessary to put an end to the rebellion for which it is 
 responsible and the continuance of which can only aggravate 
 the present situation in China. 
 
 Accept, etc., Cologan, Doyen.^ 
 
 In reply the Tsung-li Yamen called the attention of the 
 diplomats to the fact that the Chinese Government " had 
 already sent troops to investigate and take the necessary 
 action ". But this communication lost all its force by their 
 admission that these troops were recruited from the Hou 
 Chen Ying, the camp commanded by the violent reactionary 
 Prince Tuan, and from the Wu Wei Kun, the army of Jung 
 Lu. As both of these armies and also Prince Tuan were 
 notoriously pro-Boxer and anti- foreign, all hope was elimi- 
 nated from that quarter. But the Yamen did beg the Min- 
 isters to delay their requisitions for guards at least three or 
 four days, by which time the measures of the Imperial 
 Government would be " crowned with success ". The Min- 
 isters waited two days, with no change for the better in the 
 situation. Then followed an interview in person with the 
 Yamen,^ in which Sir Claude MacDonald, opening the meet- 
 ing, asked " that permission be granted and facilities be 
 offered to transport guards to Peking for the purpose of 
 protecting the Legations ". He assured the members of 
 
 ^U. S. For. Rel, 1900, Inc. 8 in no. 383, p. 137; China No. 4 {1900), 
 Inc. 5 and Trans, in no. i. 
 
 2 The Ministers of Great Britain, Russia, France and the United 
 States were present. 
 
51 1 ] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 99 
 
 K 
 
 the Yamen present ^ that it was a '* friendly request ", but, 
 should it be refused, *' the guards would come up without 
 permission and, no doubt, in larger numbers than at present 
 intended ". The interview terminated with the threat of 
 the Ministers that they would have their guards " permis- 
 sion or no permission ". On the first of June the Yamen 
 gave their official consent, but begged to state that there 
 was " really no necessity " for such action, " but if the for- 
 eign representatives insist on this step the Yamen will on 
 their part interpose no obstacles ". It was stipulated, how- 
 ever, that '' each Legation should have twenty to thirty men 
 on an average, and no more ", the same as eighteen months 
 previous. 
 
 XThe Ministers lost no time in communicating with Tien- 
 tsm, and the first train-load of guards, instead of the regu- 
 lation 20 to 30 as permitted by the Yamen, brought 75 Rus- 
 sians, 75 British, 75 French, 50 Americans, 40 Italians and \ 
 25 Japanese. The German and Austrian contingent ar- ! 
 rived the following day. In all there was at Peking during 
 the siege a total of 21 officers and 429 men.^ It was fortu- ^ 
 
 ^ Hsu Yung-i, Hsu Ching-cheng, Yuan Chang, Liao Shou-heng, and 
 Lien Yuan. 
 
 "^ Total of guards present, by nationality : 
 
 OfUcers Men 
 
 American 3 S3 
 
 Austrian 5 30 
 
 British 3 79 
 
 French 3 45 
 
 German i 50 > 
 
 ItaHan i 28 
 
 Japanese i 24 
 
 Russian 2 79 
 
 Total 19 388 
 
 French i 30 
 
 Italian i il 
 
 Grand total 21 429 
 
 U. S. For. ReL, 1900, Inc. 2 in no. 399, p. 190. 
 
< 
 
 lOO THE BOXER REBELLION [512 
 
 nate for every nation concerned, equally including China, 
 that these troops were at Tientsin awaiting the order to ad- 
 vance. Had they not arrived at Peking to take part in the 
 International Episode which began a few days later, no 
 relief of the Legations would have been necessary, as the 
 Legations would have ceased to exist/ 
 
 Now as to the attitude of the Chinese Government 
 towards the outbreaks, first against the native Christians 
 and later including the foreigners. To begin with, the Em- 
 press Dowager had no particular antipathy against the 
 west, but was forced to ally herself with the reactionaries 
 in order to crush Kang Yu-wei and the reform party, whose 
 program necessarily demanded her complete retirement 
 from Chinese politics. Her activities against the Emperor 
 and his friends were thus inspired by purely personal mo- 
 tives, ambition being her motive at all times and not hatred 
 of Europe. When the disturbances in Shantung began, 
 she was undoubtedly in favor of stamping out the riots, in 
 fact, started out by instructing the Government and people 
 by Imperial decrees to that effect. But the inefficient 
 methods of the army and the administration, and the half- 
 hearted manner in which punishment was meted out, and 
 then only when such action was absolutely necessary, con- 
 vinced the shrewd Tzu Hsi that the sympathies of the popu- 
 lation lay with the disturbers of the peace and not with the 
 restoration of order or the imposition of penalties such as 
 Europe demanded. A skillful prognosticator of current 
 events, she was more than anxious at this period to con- 
 ciliate her subjects and to meet their desires because of the 
 telling blows which had been dealt the Manchu monarchy 
 by the Chino- Japanese war, the signing-away of territorial 
 
 ipor review see China No. 3 (1900), nos. 50, 53-5^, 58-60, 65, 69, 72; 
 China No. 4 (1900), no. i and Inc. 5 and 6 in no. i; U. S. For. Rel., 
 1900, pp. 129, 131-133, 137-139, 142, 144, 190. 
 
513] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS jqi 
 
 and economic concessions, and the overturning of prece- 
 dents and other acts which had offended custom and tradi- y 
 tion. For the sake of the Throne, the wishes of the ma-. 1 
 jority of the people, whatever they were, must be upheld,\ 
 for Her Majesty was well versed in the history of the pre- 
 ceding dynasties. Also, the Manchu family quarrel had 
 ended with the elevation of Prince Tuan, bitterly anti-for- 
 eign, as spokesman for the Government, ably assisted by a 
 host of the old-fashioned. The result was a complete re-, 
 versal, helped, of course, by contemporary incidents, of the' 
 policy of the Court during the Rebellion. At the beginning 
 of the disorders it was deemed best, for the sake of a good 
 understanding with the Powers, to proceed energetically 
 against the rioters, in words if not in deeds. But the rebels, 
 far from dispersing, increased in numbers. As the Rebel- 
 lion changed at different periods, gradually acquiring na- 
 tional character, it finally reached that point where the 
 Chinese Government could not have subdued it even if they 
 had so wished, and with this increase of the Rebellion in 
 magnitude and power the policy of the _Court was altered 
 until at last, instead of suppressing, the authorities wereH 
 actually organizing, financing, and directing the war against \ 
 the world. ^ 
 
 %x 
 
 I 
 
 However, judging by appearances, the first decrees \^ 
 seemed entirely satisfactory. Regarding the initial disor- \ 
 ders in Shantung the edict of O^ ^bcr 6r -x8 a8. declared :. 
 
 Ever since foreign nations have had commercial relations 
 
 * Minister Conger to Secretary Hay, September 3, 1900 : " That the V y 
 Throne indorsed and encouraged the Boxers in their attacks against ^^ 
 foreigners, organized them, placed princes and ministers in command/^ •■ 
 of them, paid them, exhorted them, extolled them, and made common 
 cause with them is abundantly confirmed by the Imperial decrees 
 transmitted in my dispatch no. 395 of August 17, and is therefore re- 
 sponsible for the whole movement and its results." 
 
 U. S. For. Rel., 1900, no. 400, p. 190. 
 
I02 THE BOXER REBELLION [514 
 
 with China there has been no difference in their treatment. 
 The local officials have been repeatedly instructed to protect all 
 missionaries in China. Both officials and gentry in all the pro- 
 vinces should respect the desire of the Court to treat all alike. 
 They should exhibit sincerity and honesty and be without 
 doubt and suspicion, in order that there may be continual and 
 mutual peace, etc.^ 
 
 Somewhat later appeared a more explicit decree : 
 
 The customs and government orders of western nations are 
 different from those in China. Although these differences 
 exist, yet the adoption of western methods in military affairs, 
 agriculture and commerce have proved really beneficial. 
 Therefore, if what is good is selected and carried out in order, 
 the benefits will increase daily, etc. 
 
 Western people have come from afar and across many 
 oceans to China for the special purpose of exhorting people to 
 do right. Therefore they (meaning the missionaries) should 
 be protected, according to treaty, in order that friendly rela- 
 tions may be preserved. Moreover, it is to be feared that 
 ignorant and foolish persons will make false conjectures which 
 will prove misleading. They surely do not bear in mind that 
 the Empress Dowager is at all times earnestly striving to 
 prosper her country, and so she is kind to the people from 
 distant lands, and her treatment of foreigners and Chinese is 
 the same. 
 
 The people and missionaries of this province (Shantung) 
 have lived together amicably for a long time. The saying 
 " do not forget to entertain strangers " should be considered, 
 and more than this, strangers should be treated with great 
 courtesy. Moreover, Christians and natives, who live in the 
 same village and drink from the same well, are friends. Who, 
 with heaven over their head and earth beneath their feet are 
 not the sons of the Court ? How much more even should they 
 be mutual friends and not cherish any enmity or suspicion ! 
 
 ^U. S. For. ReL, 1899, p. 158. 
 
515] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 103 
 
 In addition to instructing the local authorities to exhort the 
 people, proclamations have been issued for their enlightenment. 
 KThis proclamation has been issued for the purpose that all 
 the soldiers and people of this province may understand that 
 hereafter they must obey the decrees which have frequently 
 been promulgated in order that the missionaries and native 
 Christians may all be treated as friends. Moreover, if any 
 dare disobey and spread rumors and cause trouble by inciting 
 the populace, they must be immediately apprehended and 
 severely punished, and will not be shown any leniency. 
 
 Beware ! ^ 
 
 Judged by a strict literal interpretation, the above edicts 
 left little to be desired. They expressed in forcible terms 
 clearly set forth and admitting of no cavil the Government's ^ 
 disapproval of the revolutionary movement, and the appar- 
 ently sincere efforts of the Court to enforce a settlement. 
 But it must be borne in mind that these were Oriental de- 
 crees, not the proclamations of western Powers, and ad- ^^ 
 dressed to an Oriental audience, not to a European. '^Y^Too-^ 
 often they were to be construed in a sense directly opposite 
 to the wording of the text. Again, even if intended to the 
 letter, they had to contend with the maladministration and 
 corruption of the Government, with the sympathy of the 
 ruling Manchus for the disturbing masses, with the covert 
 hostility of almost every one at this time, from the highest 
 to the lowest, to Europe and Europe's ways. True, had 
 Yuan Shih-kai been allowed to play his part alone, he 
 would have ended the Boxer Rebellion only a little while 
 after it began, but he was hampered by secret instructions 
 from the Court and the Yamen, by orders in direct contra- 
 diction to those intended for publication. Consequently, 
 
 1 U. S. For. Rel, 1890^ p. 158. 
 
 2 See Smith's fine criticism of the decrees in China in Convulsion, 
 vol. i, pp. 188, 189. 
 
1 04 THE BOXER REBELLION [516 
 
 when the ablest Governor failed, it goes without saying that 
 others failed likewise in crushing the revolt. Moreover, 
 these edicts seemed primarily to be designed for the pur- 
 pose of satisfying the demands of the Diplomatic Body, of 
 "jihrowing dust in their eyes, a plan which, though excel- 
 lently in accord with Manchu statescraft, did not work 
 very successfully. The tone of the foreign representatives 
 towards these ineffective efforts to restore order soon be- 
 came decidedly pessimistic, due to long and continued asso- 
 ciation with the tortuous methods ot the Chinese govern- 
 mental and diplomatic policy. 
 
 It will be remembered that Italy had appHed in 1899 for 
 a lease of Sanmen Bay and had been refused, to the wonder 
 of the world. Italy did not press her demand, preferring 
 to let the matter drop, but the consequent effect of this 
 slight diplomatic victory on the Peking Court was immense, 
 and was magnified out of all proportion to its real import- 
 ance, which was after all very slight. Italy, had she wished, 
 could have made short shrift of Chinese opposition, but 
 not caring much either way, had been counseled to refrain 
 from all attempts at force and thus save annoyance and pos- 
 sible embarrassment to the Triple Alliance. The result was 
 unfortunate for China because of the false estimate of hav- 
 ing beaten Europe at its own game. Notice the tone of 
 the following edict : 
 
 As the Italians have not had their ambition gratified in re- 
 spect to the cession of Sanmen Bay to them, it is apprehended 
 that they may try to seek opportunity for seizing other por- 
 tions of the coast. Moreover the arbitrary and aggressive 
 methods of the French at Kuang-chouan, where they are 
 stirring up disturbances in order to obtain pretexts for de- 
 manding further concessions from the Imperial Government, 
 may lead to actual hostilities between China and France. It 
 behooves us, therefore, to exercise the utmost vigilance and 
 
c^iy-j INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 105 
 
 watchfulness to guard against sudden aggression and to be 
 always prepared to resist an enemy. . . . This Yamen has 
 received the special commands of Her Imperial Majesty the \ 
 Empress Dowager and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor to /\ 
 grant you full power and liberty to resist by force of arms all 
 aggressions upon your several jurisdictions, proclaiming a state 
 of war, if necessary, without first asking for instructions from 
 Peking,'^ for this loss of time may be fatal to your security and 
 enable the enemy to make good his footing against your 
 forces, etc.^ 
 
 Before commenting on this decree, it may be advisable to 
 add the secret edict issued November 21, 1899, to the Vice- 
 roys, Governors, Tatar Generals and provincial command-' 
 ers, a communication even more significant than the above : 
 
 Our Empire is now laboring under great difficulties, which 
 are becoming daily more serious. The various Powers cast 
 upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their 
 endeavors to be the first to seize upon our innermost terri- 
 tories. They think that China, having neither money nor 
 troops, would never venture to go to war with them. They 
 fail to understand, however, that there are certain things 
 which this Empire can never consent to, and that, if hardly 
 pressed upon, we have no alternative but to rely upon the jus- 
 tice of our cause, the knowledge of which in our breasts 
 strengthens our resolves and steels us to present a united front 
 against our aggressors. No one can guarantee under such cir- 
 cumstances who will be the victor and who the conquered in 
 the end. But there is an evil habit which has become almost a 
 custom among our Viceroys and Governors which, however, 
 must be eradicated at all costs. For instance, whenever these 
 high officials have had on their hands cases of international dis- 
 
 ^ The italics are the author's. 
 
 "^Circular dispatch from the Tsung-li Yamen to the Viceroys and 
 Governors of the Maritime and Yangtse provinces. U. S. For. Rel.y. 
 1900, p. 85. 
 
X 
 
 Io6 THE BOXER REBELLION [518 
 
 pute all their actions seem to be guided by the belief in their 
 breasts that such cases would eventually be " amicably ar- 
 ranged." These words seem never to be out of their thoughts ; 
 hence when matters do come to a crisis, they of course find 
 themselves utterly unprepared to resist any hostile aggressions 
 on the part of the foreigner. We, indeed, consider this the 
 most serious failure in the duty which the high provincial au- 
 thorities owe to the Throne, and we now find it incumbent 
 upon ourselves to censure such conduct in the most severe 
 terms. 
 
 It is our special command, therefore, that should any high 
 official find himself so hard pressed by circumstances that noth- 
 ing short of war would settle matters, he is expected to set 
 himself resolutely to work out his duty to this end. Or per- 
 haps it would be that war has already actually been declared; 
 under such circumstances there is no possible chance of the 
 Imperial Government consenting to an immediate conference 
 for the restoration of peace. It behooves, therefore, that our 
 Viceroys, Governors, and Commanders-in-Chief throughout the 
 whole Empire unite forces and act together without the dis- 
 tinction of particularizing of jurisdictions so as to present a 
 combined front to the enemy, exhorting and encouraging their 
 officers and soldiers in person to fight for the preservation of 
 their homes and native soil from the encroaching footstep of 
 the foreign aggressor. Never should the word " peace " fall 
 from the mouths of our high officials, nor should they even 
 allow it to rest for a moment within their breasts. With such 
 a country as ours, with her vast areas stretching out several 
 tens of thousands of li, her immense natural resources, and 
 her hundreds of millions of inhabitants, if only each and all 
 of you would prove his loyalty to his Emperor and love of 
 country, what, indeed, is there to fear from any invader? 
 Let no one think of making peace, hut let each strive to pre- 
 serve from destruction and spoliation his ancestral home and 
 graves from the ruthless hands of the invader.^ Let these our 
 words be made known to each and all within our domain.^ 
 
 * The italics are the author's. 
 
 2 U. S. For. Rel, 1900, pp. 85, 86. 
 
-19] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 107 
 
 The foreign diplomats were not aware of these two de-.r 
 crees until the beginning of 1900, over a month after they/ i 
 had been issued to the Viceroys. On the second of Janu-[ 
 ary, Conger, the American Minister, transmitted them to 
 the Department of State. Although they had, he said, 
 " only just come to light ", yet it seems that they should 
 have given the Diplomatic Body fair and sufficient warning 
 of the coming catastrophe, appearing as they did almost half 
 a year before the Legations were finally in a state of siege. 
 
 With such unmistakable indications of the disasters 
 rapidly approaching, why were the second Legation guards 
 not ordered until the end of May ?^ Why was there not 
 sufficient discernment to have these troops in Peking by the 
 new year, thus taking time by the forelock, producing the 
 '* salutary effect " so much desired, and sparing China her 
 international disgrace? However, there is nothing so easy 
 as to prophesy the future when it is already past history. 
 The whole world at that time, diplomats, travelers, schol- 
 ars, merchants, saw only the China of the Japanese war, 
 the " China in decay ", the " break-up of China ", the "dis- 
 appearing Empire " ; and the other China, the one that was 
 soon to oppose the united energies of Europe, was not 
 thought of by even the boldest imagination. The reason r 
 was that China had as yet shown herself incapable of reA j 
 sistance in an organized and national way to the despoilers i 
 from over the seas. It was believed that such resistance \ 
 was not only improbable but actually impossible. As a 
 refutation of this fallacious theory the Boxer Rebellion is 
 alone noteworthy, for it revealed to mankind the then as- 
 tonishing and partly unwelcome fact that China as a politi- 
 cal entity was destined to endure the same as racially ; that 
 the period from 1840 to 1900 could never be repeated by 
 either side; that the Boxer outbreak, failure though it was '}\- 
 when judged by material advantages, yet agam gamed for 
 
 ./ 
 
/ io8 THE BOXER REBELLION [^20 
 
 China that respect due a sovereign power which had been 
 denied to the Empire during the preceding few years. Opin- 
 ions of the Far East in 1901 were in many ways the an- 
 tithesis of those not only firmly believed in but put into 
 practice in 1900 and before. China, unwittingly enough, 
 had gained a moral victory, in which was concealed the 
 foundation for future greatness. 
 
 One cannot help admiring in the above decree the ef- 
 fective manner in which the grandiloquent style aptly char- 
 acterized the recent activities of Europe. No better criti- 
 cism of European territorial aggression has been expressed 
 than this, where the Powers, amusingly enough, are repre- 
 sented as casting upon the defenceless Empire looks of 
 " tiger-like voracity ", and the accusation that they were 
 " hustling each other " to gather in the harvest of leases 
 and concessions was equally and painfully true. 
 
 The m ost di^scussed decxee. of all, which aroused, most 
 
 anger a nd comment among the diplomats.,.and__foreigners, 
 
 was the on^which'discnminated^^ to ''good and bad 
 
 socfeties "7 which""6rdered that certain organizations, mean- 
 ing the two essentially composing the Boxer union, ^ must 
 not be confounded in the public mind along with the ban- 
 ditti and other outlaws. The style of this edict was par- 
 ticularly ambiguous, more than typically Oriental, and was 
 expressly designed to defeat what seemed at first glance 
 to be its ostensible purpose. By reading between the lines 
 of this extraordinary communication, or having it carefully 
 explained to them by the literati, well versed in such gov- 
 ernmental hypocrasies, the Boxers naturally were charmed 
 with its contents, as it effectively encouraged them in future 
 acts of bloodshed and pillage and offered them immunity 
 from that punishment which heretofore had dampened their 
 
 * The "Fists of Righteous Harmony" and the "Great Knife" societies. 
 
 Y 
 
52l] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 109 
 
 enthusiasm and spoiled the thoroughness of their work. 
 Said the edict in part : 
 
 It must be borne in mind, however, that a discrimination 
 should be made in the nature or object of leagues or societies. 
 There are reckless and worthless fellows who associate them- 
 selves together and become joined in sworn brotherhood and, 
 relying on their numbers, create trouble and make disturbances. 
 
 If law-abiding and loyal people, attending to their proper 
 duties of life, should combine together to study and practice 
 the skill of experts in any art of science (of militia) for the 
 purpose of serving their own protection, or where villagers 
 band together for the mutual protection and guarding of their 
 villages and hamlets, this is moreover nothing more or less 
 than carrying out the duty of keeping watch and rendering 
 mutual help. 
 
 Should the local officers, when cases occur, not exercise 
 extra care in making a due discrimination between them, and 
 carelessly listen to rumors, and^regard all societies as being V 
 composed of evil doers and punish men recklessly with death, '^ \ 
 this would result in there being no discrimination made be- 
 tween the good and the bad. The people's minds would there- 
 fore be in fear and doubt, as the good and the bad would be 
 treated alike. Not only would the temper of the people be 
 disquieted, but the action of the officials would be bad and 
 improper, etc.^ 
 
 The natural result followed. The Boxers, immune from 
 punishment by their Imperial protection, became bolder and 
 before long appeared in the vicitlitY of the capital itself. 
 However, as it was necessary for the Government to save 
 its face with the Diplomatic Corpa.and the world at large, 
 admonitions exhorting the officials to act against the dis- 
 turbers continued to be issued. But these had no effect 
 whatever, and instead of alkviating the situation, in reality 
 
 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 88, 89. 
 
\, 
 
 no THE BOXER REBELLION [522 
 
 made it worse. The decree of May 17, 1900, though strin- 
 gent enough in tone, was absolufely useless, as the preced- 
 ing edict had already informed the Boxers that any com- 
 mand against them was but a dead letter and need not be 
 feared nor obeyed. Said the edict : 
 
 The society called the "Fists of Righteous Harmony" having 
 spread to Peking, we some time ago issued our instructions 
 direct from the Palace to the office of the gendarmerie to take 
 \ action in good earnest to prohibit its operation. 
 
 We have now learned that wicked and malicious persons, un- 
 der the name of the Society of Boxers, have posted placards ^ 
 containing false statements everywhere in the inner and outer 
 cities of Peking, the object being to create suspicion and dis- 
 turb the minds of the people, which it is greatly to be feared 
 will result in stirring up trouble. 
 
 Let the office of the commandant of the gendarmerie, the 
 Governor of Peking, and the police censors of the Wu Cheng 
 (the five divisions of the city and suburbs of Peking) confer 
 together as to the best manner of taking protective measures 
 to search out and prohibit this society and to decide upon 
 some satisfactory rules to be put into operation at once. The 
 result of their deliberations, however, must first be submitted 
 to us in a memorial. 
 
 Let Yu Lu (Viceroy of Chihli) in like manner take action to 
 stringently prohibit this society.^ 
 
 > 
 
 Again, on May 29, the Court expressed itself as follows : 
 
 Lately, in the vicinity and neighborhood of our Court, the 
 villagers and rustics have been practicing boxing and their 
 physical strength. There are the good and the evil-minded 
 scattered together, and as we entertained great fear that trouble 
 would happen, we issued our commands repeatedly to the vari- 
 
 ' * For books and proclamations against foreigners and Christirjiity^ 
 ■see U. iS. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 123-125. 
 2 Ibid., p. 134- 
 
523] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS m 
 
 ous Yamens, both inside and outside of Peking, to strictly 
 prohibit them from practicing. 
 
 We have now learned that the Boxers are very numerous, 
 and that there are traces of disbanded soldiers and rebels being 
 among them; that they have recklessly created disturbances 
 and brought about disorder; and they have even extended 
 their outrageous acts to killing a military officer, burning and 
 destroying the telegraph poles and railway. We are grieved 
 that they do not obey the law. And what is the difference 
 between them and the rebels? etc.^ 
 
 Again, on June 8, came a plainly-worded decree : 
 
 On account of the Boxers having created trouble in the 
 neighborhood of the capital, and the minds of the people hav- 
 ing become excited, and a feeling of unrest prevailing, we re- 
 peatedly issued our commands that stringent measures be taken 
 to investigate and deal with the matter. But of late there 
 are vagabonds and rowdies armed with swords and weapons 
 who roam about the streets and market places in gangs of from 
 three to five persons. They assemble together and disperse 
 at uncertain times, and if they are not at once stringently pro- 
 hibited a state of disorder will certainly prevail. The gen- 
 darmerie, the Governor of Peking, and the police censors of the 
 five cities are charged with and responsible for the arrest of 
 outlaws and patrolling and guarding the place. How is it 
 that this class of persons are allowed to band together at the 
 very gates of our Court and cause excitement in the minds of 
 the people? etc.^ 
 
 It is not necessary to quote further. As affairs in China 
 approached a climax the Empress Dowager, partly from 
 necessity and partly from choice, came more and more 
 under the influence of Prince Tuan and the reactionaries 
 and anti-foreigners. The Boxers, at first discouraged, then 
 
 ' 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 134. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 147. 
 
 / 
 
112 THE BOXER REBELLION [524 
 
 secretly countenanced, finally were openly aided by the 
 Court, and byjune 20th, less than a fortnight after the ap- 
 pearance of the preceding decree, we find them actually paid 
 and provisioned by the Imperial Government. Said an 
 edict in this regard : 
 
 Whereas the Boxers have now assembled together in Peking, 
 the Prince and Ministers (of the Tsung-li Yamen) are col- 
 lecting contributions of silver and rice in order to enable them 
 to accomplish the loyal and patriotic object they have in view, 
 and render it convenient for them to attack and exterminate 
 (the foreigners and Christians). The Prince and Ministers 
 have recently heard, however, that there are persons who have 
 no sense of shame, who impersonate others and fraudulently 
 solicit contributions with the avowed purpose of seeking their 
 own profit. This practice is certainly detrimental to the inter- 
 ests of the Boxers, etc.^ 
 
 As if that was not enough, telegraphic instructions were 
 sent out a week later from the station at Paotingfu to the 
 Viceroys and Governors in south and central China, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Whereas open war has now broken out between China and 
 the foreign Powers, and the Boxer Society around Tientsin, and 
 throughout Chihli, cooperating with the Imperial troops have 
 been victorious, — we have already issued decrees praising their 
 bravery. These loyal people are to be found throughout the 
 Empire, and all Governors and Viceroys, if they can raise 
 forces from their number, can rely on them to oppose insolence 
 of the foreigners with greatest success. The higher provincial 
 authorities shall, therefore, memorialize immediately regarding 
 their plans of campaign. The Viceroys of the Yangtse and 
 coast provinces are hereby commanded to use their most strenu- 
 ous endeavors to put these instructions into effect.^ 
 
 X 
 
 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 192. 
 ^ China No. 3 (zgoo), no. 240. 
 
525] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 113 
 
 Meanwhile, what was the attitude of the foreign diplo- 
 mats in regard to the '' Fists of Righteous Harmony " ? ^ 
 Their interview with the Yamen soon convinced them that ~ 
 little help towards a mutual understanding was to be ex- 
 pected from that quarter, as the Chinese Foreign Office had 
 stubbornly refused at first to publish decrees against the 
 Boxer society, and when finally forced by diplomatic pres- 
 sure to comply, had responded with the ineffectual docu- 
 ments cited above. There seemed little else for Jhie^diplo- 
 mats to do than to suggest a naval demonstration of the 
 P(5W'ers, in order Jo bring, ibe. Peking Court to its senses. 
 But to such action the Russian Minister, M. de Giers, wasj^ 
 strongly opposed, as ^^a^ the least it was an extreme step 
 arid might " give rise to unknown eventualities ".* There- 
 fore it was decided to bring guards to "tlie capital instead, 
 in the hope that this would have tKg "Hke " salutary ef- 
 fect' '''. However, to make doubly sure. Vice- Admiral Sey- 
 ifibuf of the China Station telegraphed "to the Admiralty 
 that, as affairs at Peking were " becoming more serious ", 
 he was proceeding to Taku with the warships Centurion 
 and Whiting, while the Fame and Endymion would shortly 
 follow. On June 6th, a further addition, the Phoenix and 
 Aurora, arrived from Weihaiwei. A meeting of the Allied 
 commanders of the warships in the harbor was held on 
 board the Centurion, in order " to discuss (the) situation 
 and arrange concerted action if necessary ". But to any 
 " concerted action " of a hostile nature the American com- 
 mander. Admiral Kempff, was of opinion contrary to the 
 rest of the Allied officers. This was because of the rather 
 anomalous attitude of the United States towards China, 
 
 ^ In the opinion of the British Minister, the term " League of 
 Patriotic Union" was "the nearest equivalent of the later Chinese 
 designation of the Boxers." China No. 4 (1900), no. 2, p. 21. 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), no. 43. 
 
114 ^^^ BOXER REBELLION [526 
 
 resulting from its traditional friendship for that country 
 and its disinclination to become embroiled with Europe in 
 Far Eastern hostilities. This attitude of the American Ad- 
 miral, which was not his personal view, as he was simply 
 following the dictates of the Department of State, later 
 subjected him in particular, and the United States in gen- 
 eral, to much adverse criticism. At present it is acknowl- 
 edged that the stand of the UnitecT States was the correct 
 " n one at the time under discussion, before the attack on the 
 r.X Taku Forts. Admiral Seymour was unhampered by in- 
 /^\l structions, the British Government telegraphing him as fol- 
 lows : " The situation is difficult, and your discretion must 
 be quite unfettered. You may take precisely what meas- 
 ures you think expedient ". An identical message was sent 
 the same day, June 7, 1900, to Sir Claude MacDonald at 
 Peking.' 
 
 As the time had now arrived when coming events were 
 casting their shadows before, the foreign representatives at 
 the Chinese capital acted with energy and decision. As a 
 final effort to come to a definite understanding before it was 
 too late, MacDonald proposed that the Diplomatic Corps 
 demand an audience with the Emperor and the Empress 
 Dowager. There was no longer any doubt how matters 
 stood at Court. The unfortunate Kuang Hsu was at last 
 reduced to a complete nonentity^... In an Imperial decree of 
 January 24, 1900, conveniently labeled ''by the Emperor's 
 own pien ", he had been forced to declare that, " since last 
 year we have suffered from ill health ", with the result that 
 " affairs of State have increased in magnitude and perplex- 
 ity, and we have lived in constant dread of going wrong ". 
 For this reason, " we therefore implored the Empress Dow- 
 ager to aid us in the Government. This was more than a 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), nos. 82 and Inc., 84. 
 
527] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS II5 
 
 year ago, but we have never been restored to health, and we 
 have not the strength to perform in person the great sacri- 
 fices at the altar of Heaven and in the temples of the spirits 
 of the land ". With affairs in this melancholy state, ac- 
 cording to the judgment of the Old Buddha and her crowd, 
 it was discovered that '' we (the Emperor) suffer from an 
 incurable disease ". Therefore, " it is impossible for us to 
 beget a son ", which meant that " the Emperor Mu Tsung 
 Yi (the preceding Emperor Tung Chih) has no posterity ", 
 and, as a result, " the consequences to the lines of succes- 
 sion are of the utmost gravity ". After " sorrowfully 
 thinking on this ", in addition to being browbeaten into sub- 
 mission, the puppet Emperor " humbly implored Her Sacred 
 Majesty carefully to select from among the near branches 
 of our family a good and worthy member ", the same to be 
 the Heir Apparent. And so, " after repeated entreaties ", 
 Tzu Hsi '' deigned to grant her consent that^_Pu_Chun^^.sgn 
 of Tsai Yi, Prince Tuan, should be adopted as tjie^ son of 
 the late Emperor MuTsting Yi ''.^^ The immediate effect 
 of this declaration was to eliminate Kuang Hsu entirely 
 from Chinese politics, and, as if that was not enough, the 
 reign of China's reform Emperor was further passed over 
 and ignored as if he had never existed. Typical Oriental 
 despotism here, where, for the sake of personal ambition, 
 the interests of the country and the welfare of the people 
 were lost sight of through Palace intrigues, by the sordid 
 gains and aggrandizements of the few at the cost of the 
 many. Had the Empress Dowager really been actuated by 
 sincere patriotism this act might be forgiven because of 
 existing conditions, but such was not the case. Instead of 
 ^hoosing a virile, able successor, for instance like Prince Pu 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), nos. 28, 29; U. S. For, ReL, 1900, pp. 91-93'- 
 Pu Chun was deposed as Heir Apparent by a decree of Nov. 30, 1900, - 
 on the ground that he was lacking in respect for Her Majesty. 
 
t 
 
 Il6 THE BOXER REBELLION [528 
 
 Lun, she merely took care that the Heir Apparent should 
 be one of tender years, so that her own continuance in 
 power as long as she was destined to live would not be en- ' 
 dangered. 
 
 By this arrangement of the dynastic succession the Court 
 committed itself to the Boxe;r cause, and this meant that 
 sooner or later collusion with the enemies of western civili- 
 zation was unavoidable. Indications of an abrupt change 
 in the attitude of the Chinese Government were soon mani- 
 fest. On June 8th the situation had become so threaten- 
 ing that the foreign diplomats petitioned the Yamen for 
 permission to increase their guards. Their request met 
 with a peremptory refusal. The next day the Court delib- 
 
 ^erately allied itself with the revolutionary movement by 
 appointing four new members to the Tsung-li Yamen, 
 Prince Tuan as President to succeed the able Prince Ching, 
 and three new Ministers, Chi Hsiu, Pu Hsing, and Na 
 Tung, all reactionaries of the extreme type. With Prince 
 Tuan as head of the Foreign Office there was no doubt that 
 'iharmony with the Throne would be assured, but, as Conger 
 remarked, his appointment as virtual Premier of China was 
 *' extremely unfortunate ". The American Minister at this 
 early stage (June nth) drew a correct portrait of the 
 
 ; Prince : 
 
 He is known to be malignantly antiforeign, a patron of the 
 Boxers, and has many of them in his division of the army. 
 His policy toward them cannot, therefore, be expected to be a 
 repressive one, but must mean continual persecution and at- 
 tacks upon missionaries and their followers, destruction of 
 their property, hindrance of trade, and constant menace and 
 danger to all foreigners and foreign interests.^ 
 
 1 See China No. 3 {1900), nos. 61, 186, 222, 225; U. S. For. Rel., 1900, 
 pp. 145, 154. 
 
529] INTERNA TIONAL COMPLICA TIONS 1 1 7 
 
 Within a month Prin^^uan was in practical control of 
 the capital, for the time being reducing even the Empress 
 Dowager to a secondary position. 
 
 Of course that ended all hopes of an Imperial audience 
 of the Diplomatic Corps. But a temporary concession was 
 granted the foreign representatives when three Ministers 
 of 'the Yamen paid a visit to Conger in the already barri- 
 caded American Legation. In the interview which fol- 
 lowed, Conger reproached the Government as being directly 
 responsible for the outbreak. He wanted to know " why 
 the Chinese troops did not fire upon the Boxers instead of 
 trifling with them ; nothing but killing them could ever bring 
 about order ". The Ministers acknowledged that the " na- 
 tive troops were practically useless ", and Conger retorted 
 in a burst of pardonable pride that with one thousand Amer- 
 ican soldiers he could kill every Boxer in Peking. It 
 seemed about all that the Chinese Ministers wanted was in- 
 formation concerning the first relief expedition to Peking; 
 but in this they were not enlightened. That was the last 
 personal interview;^ even by that time (June 17th) the 
 diplomats and their families were " completely besieged " 
 in their vSHous Legation compounds, '' with the entire city 
 in possession of a rioting, murdering mob ", and " with no 
 visible effort being made by the Government in any way to 
 restrain it ".^ This report was not received by the Depart- 
 ment of State until September 25th, for by June 13th the 
 curtain had practically been rung down on affairs in Peking. 
 
 The incidents of the siege of the Legations and of their 
 
 * See Memorandum of interview in U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 152, 153. 
 
 ^Ibid., no. 392, p. 154. Conger reports, June 15, that, "we are simply 
 trying to quietly defend ourselves until reinforcements arrive, but 
 nearly 100 Boxers have already been killed by the various Legation 
 guards." 
 
Il8 THE BOXER REBELLION [530 
 
 relief have been told by enough inters/ so that it would 
 be superfluous to add to the mass of already available ma- 
 terial. In conclusion we will note some of the instances 
 which demand comment in a work of this kind. 
 
 Efforts were made from the first to restrict the field of 
 operations to Peking and Tientsin, and instrumental in 
 bringing about this position was the Consular Body in cen- 
 tral and south China. At Shanghai the Consuls issued a 
 proclamation to the wavering inhabitants which was written 
 in Chinese and designed as much as possible to conform to 
 the Oriental mode of expression and thought. Such action 
 was imperative as all trade had stopped because of the 
 fighting in the north, and because, with eight foreign war- 
 ships in the harbor, with steamboat service discontinued, 
 and with cotton mills idle, conditions were peculiarly those 
 which incite the ignorant and lawless of the population to 
 mob violence and looting. Therefore, to reassure the 
 timid and to persuade them to remain, after thousands al- 
 ready had left the city, the Consular Body published the 
 following : 
 
 ^A graphic description of the siege of the Legations is found in 
 Smith's China in Convulsion. Thomson, China and the Powers: A 
 Narrative of the Outbreak of 1900 (London, 1902), gives a detailed 
 account of the attack on the Taku Forts, the siege of Tientsin and the 
 two expeditions. See also Allen, The Siege of the Peking Legations 
 (London, 1901) ; Hooker, Behind the Scenes in Peking, being Ex- 
 periences during the Siege of the Legations (London, 1910) ; Landor, 
 China and the Allies, 2 vol. (New York, 1901) ; Martin, The Siege in 
 Peking: China against the World, by an Eye-Witness (New York, 
 1900) ; Oliphant, Diary of the Siege of the Legations in Peking during 
 the Summer of igoo (London, 1901) ; Russel, Story of the Siege of 
 Peking (London, 1901) ; Simpson, B. L. ( Putnam- Weale), Indiscreet 
 Letters from Peking; being the Notes of an Eye-Witness (New York, 
 1911) ; Viaud, L. M. J. (Pierre Loti), The Last Days of Peking, trans, 
 from the French (Boston, 1902). For sources see MacDonald's Cor- 
 respondence of the Siege in Peking, China N^o. 4 (1900). See also 
 China No. 3 (1901) ; China No. 4 (1901) ; U. S. For. Rel., 1900, passim; 
 Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 516-537. 
 
53l] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 119 
 
 Owing to the troubles in the north, many rumors have been 
 circulated in Shanghai which have unsettled the minds of the 
 people. In their ignorance of the true state of affairs they 
 have frightened themselves and each other, and in fleeing home- 
 ward from Shanghai have in many cases fallen a prey to 
 robbers. 
 
 We, the Consular Body at Shanghai, have consulted with 
 the Chinese authorities regarding the protection of life and 
 property in this neighborhood, and have agreed to act in co- 
 operation in putting down any disturbances that may occur. 
 The municipal council holds the volunteer corps in readiness 
 for the protection of the (foreign) Settlement, and our war- 
 ships have taken up their positions in ^^^dyer for the same 
 purpose, and for that alone. ^^^^ 
 
 With such precautions, both on shor^Br afloat, and with 
 the cordial cooperation of the Chinese authorities, there is no 
 reason why the troubles in the north need spread into these 
 parts. There is no cause for alarm, and we hereby give notice 
 to all that the presence of foreign men-of-war in the river is 
 only a measure of precaution for the protection of the Settle- 
 ment, and that there is no foundation of truth in the idle 
 rumors with which many persons are now exciting themselves. 
 JoAQuiM Maria Travassos Valdez, 
 Consul-General for Portugal and Senior Consul.^ 
 
 It was necessary above all to obtain the assistance of the 
 leading Viceroys, Governors and taotais if peace in the 
 south was to be preserved. Fortunately for China and the 
 world, it so happened that some of the greatest Chinese 
 statesmen were then serving in provincial administrative 
 capacities, among them Li Hung-chang as Acting Viceroy 
 of the Two Kwangs (Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces) ; 
 Liu Kun-yi as Viceroy of Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Anhwei; 
 Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy of Hunan and Hupeh; Yuan 
 
 * U. S. For. Rei, 1900, p. 250. 
 
 I 
 
I20 THE BOXER REBELLION [^32 
 
 Shih-kai as Governor of Shantung, Wang Chih-chun as 
 Governor of Anhwei, and Yu Lien-san as Governor of 
 Hunan. The Viceroy of Chekiang was undecided at first, 
 as he had already pubHshed Prince Tuan's edict to the 
 people calling for active participation against the foreign 
 Powers; but he came around in due time. Yuan Shih-kai' s 
 position was particulary difficult. That he was more or less 
 on the fence at the beginning of the troubles is not to be 
 wondered at, but his attitude, though seemingly contra- 
 dictory in some respects, was clear enough to the observant 
 foreigner. His province of Shantung had cradled the 
 Boxer movement^|d was situated next door to Chihli prov- 
 ince. Moreove^^^^Governor, like Li Hung-chang, was 
 on good terms ^BRhe Empress Dowager and even with 
 the reactionary Court officials. And Yuan was too shrewd 
 a statesman and too clever a politician openly to alienate 
 the sympathy or support of either party, or, above all, to 
 become persona non grata to the rulers of his country. 
 However, Yuan Shih-kai's course, as has been intimated, 
 was correctly read by the diplomats and consuls; in fact, 
 he rendered invaluable aid. As the confidant of the Court, 
 he was the only one in touch with the situation in Peking, 
 but just how he got his news no one seemed to know. He 
 faithfully transmitted his scraps of information to the 
 foreigners in central and south China and to the Admirals 
 at Taku, and through his agency the world knew that the 
 tragedy in the capital was being strung out instead of 
 ended at a single blow, as most had feared. 
 
 No less remarkable in preventing the spread of the anti- 
 foreign movement was Liu Kun-yi, the Viceroy of Nanking, 
 at this time yy years of age, having for 35 years served 
 in this high official rank. He was regarded as the leader 
 of the Hunanese, the most warlike Chinese in the central 
 provinces. Having been summoned to Peking for an Im- 
 
533] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS I2i 
 
 perial audience, he had the rare courage to tell the Em- 
 press Dowager in outspoken terms that her policy would 
 be the ruin of the country. He succeeded in incurring the 
 enmity of Prince Tuan, Kang Yi and all the reactionaries. 
 These tried their best to prevent his reappointment in the 
 south, but Liu Kun-yi was too firmly established in the 
 friendship of Tzu Hsi, and so was permitted to resume his 
 duties. He was instrumental in arranging the league of 
 the Viceroys in south and central China, which was now 
 responding so favorably to the views of the foreign Min- 
 isters and Consuls. More than that, he associated himself 
 at the capital with the liberals, in opposition to the reac- 
 tionaries. That the unfortunate Rebellion did not spread 
 throughout the Empire was due to these half-dozen Vice- 
 roys and Governors, who saw beyond the events of the 
 moment and were not blinded by hate or prejudice in their 
 views as to what was best for China and the Chinese. 
 I^^^It^was not to be expected that all of the provinces af- . / 
 fected would unite against the Boxers. Honan and Shansi 
 joined the anti- foreign movement, which was natural, con- 
 sidering their proximity to Chihli province and the influ- 
 ence of the reactionary party upon their leaders. 
 
 The Chinese Minister at London had despatched a 
 memorandum to the Downing Street Office which read in 
 part: 
 
 The Viceroy (of Huquang) tenders his grateful acknowledg- 
 ments to Lord Salisbury for his friendly offer (of sending 
 ships and also giving asylum for the Viceroys on board 
 British vessels in case of personal danger), and will gladly 
 ivail himself of it in case of need. He, however, is persuaded 
 that he and his colleague, the Viceroy of Nanking, with whom 
 he has been in communication on the subject, will be more than 
 able to cope with the ** Boxers " or any other elements of dis- 
 order who, contrary to his expectations, may attempt to dis- 
 irb the peace and tranquility of the Yangtse provinces. 
 
122 THE BOXER REBELLION [^34 
 
 To the British offer of troops to assist in quelling any out- 
 breaks, the answer was : 
 
 The Viceroys have at their disposal very sufficient, well- 
 equipped and well-disciplined forces, on which they can im- 
 plicitly depend, and these they will so dispose and employ as 
 to give the fullest measure of protection to all residing within 
 their respective jurisdictions, whether native or foreigners, 
 and of whatever religion. 
 
 The Viceroys well knew that any display of force on the 
 part of the Powers in central and south China would imme- 
 diately inflame the passions of the people. Therefore, they 
 " would deprecate any obtrusive demonstration of British 
 naval force on the Yang-tse as being calculated rather to 
 make difficulties for the Chinese authorities than to aid 
 them in maintaining tranquility and good order in the 
 riverine provinces "/ Lord Salisbury credited these 
 Chinese officials with understanding the peculiarities of the ^ 
 situation, and so refrained from any demonstration or show 
 of force for the purpose of intimidation.^ But to make 
 doubly sure, the Hermione was ordered to Nanking " to 
 communicate with the Viceroy, assuring him of the sup- 
 port of her Majesty's Government in preserving order and 
 protecting British interests ".^ For the same purpose, the 
 Linnet was ordered to Hankow and the Undaunted to Woo- 
 sung. 
 
 By Julyjrd, the Viceroy s Li u Kun-yi_arid Chang Chih- 
 , tung made the ToTlo wing definite_£ledge; 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), no. I53- 
 
 '^When the revolt began, the natural inference had been at first that 
 the best way to prevent its spread would be by an " adequate force " 
 to prevent "possible disturbances." This force would undoubtedly 
 have been much larger than the few ships sent had not the Viceroys 
 effectively discouraged such action and, by proving it to be highly 
 injurious, prevented undue augmentation. 
 
 ' China No. 3 {1900), Inc. in no. 140. 
 
535] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 123 
 
 \^e, the Viceroys of the Liang Kiang and Liang Hu prov- 
 inces, undertake to hold ourselves responsible f of the secur- 
 ity of foreign life and property within our respective juris- 
 dictions, as well as in the province of Chekiang, so long as the 
 Treaty Powers do not land troops in either the Yang-tse 
 Valley or the province of Chekiang.^ 
 
 The American Department of State observed with pleas- 
 ure the trend of events in central and south China, and,' 
 Secretary Hay informed the Chinese Minister at Washing-| 
 ton, Wu '^^ng^ng, that the President was " much grati-f 
 fied at the asslrances contained in these telegrams (as th^ 
 one above) ".^ Hay further informed Wu that the United 
 States had '' no intention of sending any military or naval 
 forces into regions where their presence is not needed ".I 
 In addition, the position of the United States in this matter « 
 was communicated to the American Ambassadors at Lon- 
 don, Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg and to the American 
 Minister at Tokyo. 
 
 The Consular Body at Shanghai was able to inform the 
 Taotai, Yu Lien-yuen, that the Admirals at Taku were ex- 
 
 1 China No. 3 (1900), no, 244. 
 
 ' A further cable was sent, June 25, in part as follows : 
 
 "As no war decree has been received by any of the Viceroys or 
 Governors (thus ignoring Prince Tuan's Edict of June 20, already 
 referred to), it is evident that the Imperial Government has no in- 
 tention of breaking off friendly relations. . . . The Viceroys and 
 Governors of the provinces bordering on the Yang-tse and the coast 
 have assumed full responsibility and are doing all in their power to 
 afford protection (to life and property). Foreigners of all nationali- 
 ties need fear no solicitude. If there should be further conflict of 
 arms in or about Tientsin it would necessarily follow that southern 
 China would also be involved. . . . The above has the concurrence of 
 all the Viceroys and Governors, and a like message has been com- 
 municated, by cable, to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the dif- 
 ferent countries." 
 
 Cable from Chang Chih-tung to Minister Wu Ting-fang at Wash- 
 ington. U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 274, 275. 
 
124 ^^^ BOXER REBELLION [^36 
 
 erting themselves likewise to restrict the field of operations, 
 that '' they only fight against the Boxers and those who 
 strive to prevent the rescue of the foreigners in danger at 
 Peking and other places "/ The Consuls were able to re- 
 assure the Viceroys with the further comforting statement : 
 
 Our Governments have had no intention, and now have no 
 intention, either individually or collectively, to take any hostile 
 action or land any hostile force in the Yangtse Valley so long 
 as their Excellencies are able to, and do, maintain the rights 
 of the foreigners in their provinces as provided for in the 
 treaties with the Government of China.^ 
 
 The prompt action of the Viceroys and Governors and 
 the fair spirit in which Europe and America met their ad- 
 vances and adhered to their wishes received its reward. 
 Barring a few outlying skirmishes and riots, the Boxer 
 Rebellion was thus confined to the siege of the Legations, 
 to the capture of Taku and Tientsin, to the two relief ex- 
 peditions, and to various punitive expeditions in the neigh- 
 borhood of the above places. Though consequently limited 
 to a comparatively small area and to relatively few ob- 
 jectives, this was a large enough task, as the Allies soon 
 found out, and a great deal more than they had anticipated. 
 Of course, had all the Eighteen Provinces joined in the 
 anti-foreign movement, the result in the end would have 
 been exactly the same, with a still greater humiliation for 
 
 * Taku, June 20, 1900. 
 
 The Admirals and senior officers of the Allied Powers in China 
 desire to let it be known to all Viceroys and authorities on coast, 
 river provinces, and cities in China, that they intend use of their arms 
 only against the Boxers and those people who oppose them in their 
 march to Peking for the rescue of their fellow countrymen. 
 
 Published by request of the Senior Admiral at Taku. 
 
 U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 251, 252; China No. 3 {1900), Inc. in no. 164. 
 
 ' U. S. For. Rel, 1900, no. 267, p. 249. 
 
537] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 125 
 
 China and an indemnity not only greater but possibly in- 
 cluding territory. But in that case, with a united revolt 
 from one end of the vast Empire to the other, such as very 
 nearly took place, its subjugation would have been infinitely 
 more arduous and the loss of life and destruction of prop- 
 erty immeasurably greater. The attitude of China's great 
 Viceroys simplified the situation. Had they joined the 
 Boxers, it is safe to say that with their support the Court, 
 the Yamen and the reactionaries would have thrown off all 
 restraint, and every member of the Legations would have 
 shared the fate of Baron von Ketteler and the Japanese 
 Chancellor.^ 
 
 The policy of the United States throughout this period 
 did not deviate a hair's breadth from the one consistently 
 followed ever since it was enunciated in Webster's instruc- 
 tions to Cushing. In fact, the Far Eastern program of 
 the Department of State may be favorably compared in 
 definiteness and singleness of purpose to the attitude of 
 Great Britain in always opposing the strongest power on 
 the mainland of Europe. Both these policies seem to have 
 become permanent fixtures in international politics and 
 diplomacy. The American Minister at Peking, while given 
 authority to cooperate with the Diplomatic Body in the de- 
 mand for an Imperial audience and in other matters, was 
 nevertheless told to " act independently in protection of 
 American interests when practicable, and concurrently with 
 representatives of other Powers if necessity arise ". Later 
 followed the most definite of instructions : 
 
 We have no policy in China except to protect with energy 
 
 lU. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 248-252, 265, 273, 274, 276, 277; China 
 No. 3, {1900), nos. 128, 130, 135, 137, 140, 161, 162, 165, 166, 168, 172, 
 177, 179, 194-196, 198, 199, 204, 205, 222, 226, 240, 244, 249, 251, 261, 
 262, 270, 271. 
 
126 THE BOXER REBELLION ^^2,^ 
 
 American interests, and especially American citizens and the 
 Legation. There must be nothing done which would commit 
 us to future action inconsistent with your (Conger's) stand- 
 ing instructions. There must be no alliances.^ 
 
 Thus the national dictum of the United States, first enun- 
 ciated by Washington and thoroughly established in Ameri- 
 can diplomacy by the Genet experience and the mistakes of 
 the treaty of 1776 with France,^ has been followed with 
 scarcely a deviation ever since. This policy is, in effect, to 
 avoid all entangling alliances and to keep American foreign 
 affairs distinct and separate from the interests of Europe. 
 The Circular of July 3rd, sent by Secretary Hay to the 
 American representatives at London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, 
 Rome, St. Petersburg and Tokyo for presentation to the 
 respective Foreign Offices epitomized the course the United 
 States would pursue at present and upon the restoration of 
 order : 
 
 Department of State, 
 
 Washington, July 3, 1900. 
 In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed ap- 
 propriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as 
 present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to 
 the policy initiated by us in 1857 (the Reed treaty), of peace 
 with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, 
 and of protection of lives and property of our citizens by all 
 means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by 
 the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we pro- 
 pose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accoun- 
 tability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual 
 
 ^ U. S, For. Rel., 1900, p. 143. 
 
 2 Another exception to the general American policy was Article 
 XXXV of the treaty with New Granada (Colombia) in 1846. 
 
539] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 127 
 
 anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically de- 
 volved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they 
 are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power 
 to protect foreign life and property we regard them as repre- 
 senting the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in 
 peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is, as it 
 has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other Powers, 
 first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing 
 the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who 
 are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection 
 everywhere to American life and property ; thirdly, in guard- 
 ing and protecting all legitimate American interests; and 
 fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the 
 other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such dis- 
 asters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of 
 attaining this last result ; but the policy of the Government of 
 the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about 
 permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese terri- 
 torial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed ^ 
 to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safe- j 
 guard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade ^ 
 with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 
 
 You will communicate the purport of this instruction to the 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Hay.^ 
 
 * It is necessary to remark that the general principles outlined in 
 Hay's Circular of July 3, were on that same day and again on July 8 
 enunciated by Delcasse in the French Chamber, and that for the pre- 
 ceding month Delcasse had made this position of France clear to the 
 diplomatic world. The American Ambassador at Paris, Mr. Horace 
 Porter, in sending to Hay the statements of the French Minister, 
 remarked that "his (Delcasse's) definition of the policy of France 
 in China substantially agrees with us." 
 
 Said Delcasse on July 3 to the Chamber of Deputies : " I have 
 in my previous declarations, particularly last month, clearly explained 
 the tendencies of our policy in China. The Chamber will remember 
 that during the past two years I have repeatedly stated that France, 
 as mistress of Indo-China, has no interest in provoking or desiring 
 the break-up of China, which is, perhaps without sufficient reflection,. 
 
 I 
 
128 THE BOXER REBELLION [540 
 
 This statement of the various purposes of the American 
 diplomatic policy, being in the main already well-known, 
 met with no opposition in Europe/ ( I The only difficulty 
 seems to have been experienced with tne Allied Admirals 
 at Taku, when it was decided in conference to attack and 
 
 spoken of. What I can affirm is that France has no wish for war with 
 China, but she cannot evade the duty of protecting her citizens and 
 of obtaining for her merchants the guaranties obtained by others. It 
 is for this and this alone that the Government has taken the measures 
 necessitating these credits. France is certainly anxious for the main- 
 tenance of the equilibrium in the Far East. She will see that it is 
 not broken to her detriment, but she cherishes no secret designs. I 
 know not, moreover, who could have particular objects. What I 
 see is that a common peril demands a common aim, and this is com- 
 prehended by all the Powers. This is the reassuring feature of the 
 situation, the difficulties of which it would be as childish to deny as it 
 would be to be disturbed by them. I descend the Tribune after re- 
 peating the assurance that France, whose efforts are already employed 
 in facilitating the rapprochement of the Powers, will continue to 
 neglect nothing for maintaining and strengthening those sentiments of 
 internal and humane solidarity which would prevent them, if necessary, 
 from thinking of what might divide them." *• 
 
 See U. iS. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 312, 313. 
 
 As far as Germany's plans in China were concerned, these had been 
 sufficiently expressed by Count von Biilow in the Reichstag as far 
 back as April 27, 1898. Said the Count : " Mention has been made of 
 the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by 
 us, at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what may, 
 we shall not go empty-handed"; then adding, with the characteristic 
 German fondness for proverbs: "The traveller cannot decide when 
 the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it does 
 start. The devil takes the hindmost." By this the Count intimated 
 that the Powers could take the initiative in the partition of China, and 
 what they would do, that likewise would be the course pursued by 
 Germany, who was prepared for any event. See China No. i (1899), 
 p. 67. 
 
 Naturally it was to the interest of Japan to have a free and united 
 China as neighbor, with the hope of future domination, if not politi- 
 cally at least commercially. Russia on her part was slowly advancing 
 at this time by exceedingly shrewd and brilliant moves in the diplomatic 
 conquest of Manchuria. 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 299. 
 
54l] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 129 
 
 capture the Forts. To this action the American commander. 
 Admiral .ivempff, was opposed, on fiie ground "tfiat there 
 had been no declaration of war against China, and that the 
 attack would be tantamount to such declaration. In the 
 bombardment which followed, Junej[6th, he had the cour- 
 age to stand aside and take no part in the action or in the 
 capture which followed. He reasoned correctly. The im- 
 mediate effect of the injudicious conduct of the Allied Ad- 
 nitrarrw^s to place "tte"^ then 
 
 about half-way to Peking, in an exceedingly perilous posi- 
 tion from which it emerged with difficulty. The attack on 
 Taku further gave the Chinese troops the necessary^ ex- 
 cuse for joining the Boxers ; in fact, it united the Govern- 
 ment at Peking, the Imperial army, and the Boxer sympia- \/^ 
 thizers against the Powers, with the convenient argument.'? 
 that Europe had started the war. It is significant to note 
 that immediately after the Chinese '(?ourt received news of 
 the bombardment and loss of the Forts, an edict .i^ was pub- 
 
 ^ '^ ~"" ,.r:,;:.::::.:-v-....,....,,.., 
 
 ^ From the Edict of June 29 : 
 
 "To our surprise on the 20th of the fifth moon (June 16) foreign 
 (naval?) officers at Taku called upon Lo Jung-kwang, the General 
 commanding, and demanded his surrender of the Forts, notifying him 
 that failing to receive compliance they would, at 2 o'clock the next 
 day, take steps to seize the Forts by force. Lo Jung-kwang being bound 
 by the duties of his office to hold the Forts, how could he yield to the 
 demand? On the day named they actually first fired upon the Forts 
 (this was not true; the Forts fired first), which responded and kept 
 up a fighting all day and then surrendered. Thus the conflict of 
 forces began, but certainly the initiative did not come from our side. 
 Even supposing that China were not conscious of her true condition, 
 how could she take such a step as to engage in war with all the Powers 
 simultaneously, and how could she, relying upon the support of an 
 anarchistic populace, go into war with the Powers? Our position in 
 this matter ought to be clearly understood by all the Powers. . The 
 above is a statement of the wrongs we have suffered, and how China 
 was driven to the unfortunate position from which she could not 
 escape." 
 
 U. S. For, ReL, 1900, pp. 277, 278. 
 
 \ 
 
130 THE BOXER REBELLION [^42 
 
 ( lushed which meant practical affihation with the Boxers/ 
 \ while coincidently all members of the Legations were sum- 
 jrnarily ordered to leave Peking ; and a few days afterwards 
 joccurred the distressing murder of the German Minister.^ 
 /Admiral Kempff had defended his position on the ground 
 that neither his Government nor that of any other Power 
 was at war with China ; that China could not be considered 
 I otherwise than at peace with the world, in spite of internal 
 \ disorders over which the Chinese Government presumably 
 \jiad no control. In this he was supported by the ^Adminis- 
 tration at Washington. 
 
 The refusal of the American Admiral to. join the AUied 
 fleett in the bombardment of Taku raises the very interest- 
 ing question whether war existed between China and the 
 Powers. It seems that the solution of the argument must 
 be left with tHe individual reader. We have seen that the 
 United States was reluctant to make such interpretation of 
 the difficulties,* and that China herself did not regard the 
 disturbances as approaching the dignity and magnituife of 
 an armed conflict until forced to do so by the warships of 
 
 / *This soon developed into a certainty. A decree issued June 25 
 announced that " a sum of 100,000 taels is granted in reward to each\ 
 I of the following army corps : Sheng Tzu Ying, Fu Shang Ying, and ' 
 \ the corps of the Boxers, etc." 
 '^ In addition, four edicts on June 27 each promised pecuniary rewards 
 t"Q the Boxers, " as a stimulus to exertion." 
 See ibid., pp. 169, 170. 
 
 'Von Ketteler entered upon his last visit to the Yamen against the 
 advice of the entire Diplomatic Corps. For a graphic account of the 
 murder, see China No. 4 (1900), no. 2, pp. 22, 23^ As MacDonald 
 observed, the event strengthened the position of " a powerful party 
 determined on war at all hazards," since now there was no escape 
 from it. 
 
 ^ Secretary Hay to ld Lord Pauncefote that the United States " did 
 not -think that a state of war necessarily exTsts." China No. 3 {1900), 
 no. 178. 
 
543] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 131 
 
 Europe. Lord Salisbury was of the opinion, June 22d, that, 
 '* if the Forts at Taku fired without orders from the Gov- 
 ernment at Peking, and the attacks on the international : 
 troops (Seymour's expedition) are without authority, there/ 
 is no reason that it should be considered that a state of 
 war exists "/ Count Lamsdorff of the Russian Foreign/ 
 Office was then of the same opinion. Later, however, the 
 relief measures changed to a distinct state of hostilities, 
 call it a punitive expedition or international police or what 
 not. This was inevitable when it gradually leaked out that 
 the Legations were surrounded by Imperial troops) that the 
 Court had sided with the Boxers; that the authorities had 
 ordered the Ministers from Peking; had endeavored to 
 entice them into the open by false promises; had tried to 
 ambush them; and had subjected them from June 21st to 
 July 27th to a continued storm of shot, shell and firecrack- 
 ers. From then on the attacks became more intermittent. 
 Possibly the Court realized the futility of trying to exter- 
 minate the diplomats ; at any rate, on July 2 1 st the hungry 
 defenders received " three bags of flour, a few watermelons, 
 cucumbers, eggplants, and squashes ", but nothing more, 
 " no arms or any other defence ".^ The situation was 
 doubly curious because of the half-hearted policy of the 
 Chinese Government, alternately striving to feed and to 
 destroy the Legations, thus trying, so it appeared, to be 
 both at war and at peace with the world. No doubt what 
 held the Court back from decisive action were the momen- 
 tary spasms of fear at the terrible price which eventually 
 would have to be paid. Especially hesitating and spasmodic 
 grew the attacks when it was realized that China could not 
 possibly be victorious. What all this really amounted to 
 
 1 China No. 3 {igoo), no. 176. See also nos. 173-175. 
 ^ U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 199. 
 
132 THE BOXER REBELLION [544 
 
 was well expressed by Count Lamsdorff in conversation 
 with the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Said the 
 Count : 
 
 / We were at present dealing with a country which was in a 
 \^ complete state of anarchy, and which had no Government or 
 / constituted authority which it could be useful to menace, or 
 ^even address, but we were in a state of war with anarchists, 
 /and not with China. ^ 
 
 jT^y these '' anarchists " Count Lamsdorff was referring to 
 I Prince Tuan and the reactionaries ; yet these, it must in all 
 candidness be admitted, were for the time being in complete 
 possession of the Chinese Government. 
 
 The first expedition of the Allies from Tientsin to the 
 relief of the Legations was prompted to hasty action by. a 
 \Xtelegram, June loth, from MacDonald, which dissipated 
 any favorable illusions the Admirals may have entertained 
 concerning the state of . affairs. " Situation extremely 
 grave '', wrote the British Minister, " unless arrangements 
 are made for immediate advance to Peking it will be too 
 late ".^ That was sufficient warning, and all discussions 
 were dropped in the hurry of the moment. TJjis initial re- 
 lief column,, with Admiral Seymour as Commander and 
 \^ the Riissian Colonel as Chief-of-Staff, consisted of 900 
 X British," 500 French, 200 Germans, 200 Russians, 120 
 Americans,^ 100 Italians, 25 Austrians, and 200 Japanese. 
 Later, a party of 65 Frenchmen overtook them by rail.* 
 
 ^ Count^Lamsdorff to Sir C. Scott, China No. 3 (1900), no. 246. 
 
 ^ China No. 3 (1900), Inc. in no. 103, 
 
 'Under command of Captain McCalla of the Newark. 
 
 *Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 508, 509: " Le n juin, le commandant 
 de Marolles, du d'Entrecasteaux, avec 50 hommes et un cannon, re- 
 monte a Tien-tsin, trouve I'admiral Seymour parti, et le rattrappe avec 
 65 hommes par chemin de fer," 
 
545] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 133 
 
 With little difficulty they penetrated inland to the half-way 
 points, Langfang, Lofa Station and Anting, and there they 
 were decisively checked. It was impossible to advance 
 further, with every village full of Boxers, with Imperial 
 troops barring the way, with the railway line from there 
 on utterly destroyed, with scarcity of food and drink and 
 the knowledge that it was courting annihilation to persist 
 because of the unexpected and overwhelming forces op- 
 posing them. In fact, though they marched 30 miles the 
 first day, on the second they covered only three, while it 
 took almost every available man to care for the sick and 
 wounded. There was no alternative but to retreat, greatly 
 to the disajfjpointment of the officers and men, who feared 
 that the return to the coast would seal the^^ of the 
 
 Legations.l^_jBdeed, the outlook for the besieged Ministers 
 and their families was gloomy enough, when, assembled at 
 the railway station to welcome the expected Allies, they met 
 instead the taunts and jeers of the Boxer crowd and their 
 sympathizers. The abortive expedition, hard pressed on 
 the way back, was forced to deflect its course so as to cap- 
 ture the Imperial Hsiku Arsenal, a few miles from their 
 objective^ where they found a goodly supply of arms, am- 
 munition and provisions.^ Here they were augmented by 
 
 ^ Minister Conger : " It is now eight days since the relief party under 
 Admiral Seymour and Captain McCalla left Tientsin. We know they 
 have been within thirty miles of Peking, and we can not understand 
 why, if they find it impossible to readily repair the railway, they do 
 not, with the larger part of their command, march directly here." 
 U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 151. Conger was of course unaware of the 
 opposition offered Seymour, both Boxer and Imperial troops, in addi- 
 tion to an already inadequate commissary. 
 
 ^ " The capture of this Arsenal virtually saved the force from al- 
 most certain annihilation (there were only a few rounds of ammuni- 
 tion left per man), for in it they found abundance of three things of 
 which they were most in need — ammunition, food, and medical stores." 
 H. C. Thomson, China and the Powers, p. 15. See also China No. s 
 {1900), nos. 206, 227. 
 
134 T^HE BOXER REBELLION [546 
 
 a mixed force of 1,800 men commanded by the Russian 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Shirinsky, who had hastened to rein- 
 force their weakened ranks, and together they retreated 
 safely to Tientsin, reaching that city on the 26th of June. 
 Admiral Seymour's column had been in the field for 16 
 days, some of which had been spent in hard fighting and 
 in imminent peril, and returned with the respectable casu- 
 alty list of 62 killed and 228 wounded/ It was a noble 
 effort but failed because Chinese resistance, which no one 
 had thought at all likely or possible in such degree, was 
 underestimated. 
 
 It was fortunate for the small number of Allies then at 
 Tientsin that the 1,800 Russian troops on thei^ way from 
 Port Arthur did not arrive in time to join Seymour's col- 
 umn, as had been intended. Their coming too late was a 
 stroke of fortune, for on June 17th, at three o'clock in the 
 afternoon, the Chinese attacked in force the foreign con- 
 cessions in the city and reduced them to a state of siege. 
 The day before, at one in the morning, the great Roman 
 Catholic Cathedral had been burned and scores of native 
 Christians butchered. This siege of the concessions in Tien- 
 tsin was glorious enough in itself, a companion act to the 
 drama which was being so curiously strung out in Peking. 
 
 * The killed and wounded of the Seymour expedition : 
 
 Killed Wounded 
 
 British 27 97 
 
 American 4 25 
 
 French i 10 
 
 German 12 62 
 
 Italian 5 3 
 
 Japanese 2 3 
 
 Austrian I i 
 
 Russian 10 27 
 
 Total 62 228 
 
 Report of Seymour to Admiralty, China No. 3 (ipoo), no. 219. 
 
547] INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 135 
 
 Only 2,500 soldiers and marines were on hand to maintain 
 a position some ten miles in length, with all communica- 
 tion with the fleet cut off for a considerable time. But the 
 troops of the Powers were being rushed to the scene with 
 the utmost dispatch possible. Not, however, until July 
 14th ^ had enough reinforcements arrived from the coast 
 to relieve after severe fighting the beleaguered force and to 
 capture the entire city, which was indispensable as a base 
 of operations against Peking.^ 
 
 Then came another distressing wait before the advance 
 on the capital could begin. This was largely on account of 
 the changed opinions regarding Chinese valor and the ef- 
 fectiveness of their resistance to the Seymour expedition. 
 As it was, the Allies would have tarried at Tientsin for 
 additional reinforcements some weeks longer had not 
 the British and American commanders threatened to pro- 
 ceed alone with their contingents and risk the consequences. 
 Although it was felt, so had the estimation of Chinese 
 prowess been increased, that at least 50,000 troops were 
 necessary, some thought 70,000, successfully to invade the 
 interior, the second relief expedition to Peking finally got 
 under way, August 4th, with an impressive total of 18,800 
 men. This number included 8,000 Japanese, 3,000 British, 
 4,500 Russians, 2,500 Americans, and 800 French. The 
 Germans were unrepresented, as it was judged best to re- 
 serve some strength for Kiaochau and the coast, in case of 
 
 ^ About 200 Americans and 300 Russians on June 22 made a desperate 
 attempt to enter Tientsin by following the railway. When within two 
 miles they were ambushed and forced to retire, the Americans losing 
 3 killed and 13 wounded. But upon receiving reinforcements they re- 
 turned on the 24th and forced their way in, causing the Chinese to 
 withdraw from their position on the east, which enabled the besieged 
 again to have communication with Taku. 
 
 ^ See the interesting Report by U. S. Consul Ragsdale on the "Siege 
 of Tientsin " in U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 268-273. 
 
136 THE BOXER REBELLION [548 
 
 the failure to relieve Peking and the need of further hos- 
 tilities. For the same reasons the British concentrated half 
 their number at Hong Kong and elsewhere. To Germany, 
 however, fell the honor of commanding the Allied forces 
 in China, ^ and the choice of Field-Marshal Count von 
 Waldersee as Generalissimo, to please the Kaiser, gave en- 
 tire satisfaction. 
 
 The start was made at last, and once having been put in 
 motion, the Allied army progressed rapidly enough, in spite 
 of the determined opposition of the Boxers and Imperial 
 troops en route, especially at Pehtang and Yangtsung. 
 With the object of the expedition constantly in mind, the 
 Allies kept up a persistent advance, undiscouraged by hun- 
 ger, thirst, heat, and the discomforts of a trying climate. 
 In two days, by August 13th, Peking was reached, stormed 
 at different points and entered, and the Legations relieved, 
 or rather what was left of them.^ The following day the 
 work of conquest was completed; the entire city, Tatar 
 and Chinese, was occupied by the invaders, and the war of 
 China with the world was over. 
 
 ^ Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 536, 537 : "Au commencement d'aout, 
 I'Empereur d'Allemagne presentait les gouvernements au sujet de la 
 nomination du feld-marechal comte Waldersee comme commandant 
 en chef des troupes Internationales en Chine. L'Empereur Nicolas 
 repondit qu'etant donnees la si grave offense faite a I'Allemagne par 
 I'assassinat de son ministre en Chine et la haute situation militaire du 
 comte d'Waldersee, li ne voyait pas, en ce qui le concernait, d'incon- 
 venient a cette designation. L'ltalie le 9 et I'Angleterre le 10 aout 
 accepterent la creation d'un generalissime et le choix propose du 
 marechal de Waldersee. 
 
 ^ The Belgian, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, and most of the French 
 Legations had been burned; also the Post Office, three foreign banks, 
 the houses and offices of all the customs officials, and all the mission- 
 ary compounds except the Peitang (Catholic Cathedral). The Lega- 
 tion forces had lost 65 killed, 135 wounded, and 7 deaths by disease. 
 
 See Report of Minister Conger to Secretary Hay, U. S. For. Rel., 
 igoo, pp. 161-167. 
 
PART III 
 
 THE RESTORATION OF ORDER AND THE 
 PEACE PROTOCOL OF SEPTEMBER, 1901 
 
PART III 
 
 The Restoration of Order and the Peace Protocol of 
 September^ 1901 
 
 Letter of Emperor of China to President McKinley — Reply of the 
 President — Letters to Europe and Replies — Li Hung-chang ap- 
 pointed Commissioner — His Proposed Armistice — Prince Ching Co- 
 Plenipotentiary — Their Credentials — Renewal of Punitive Expedi- 
 tions — Paotingfu — ^Chuchow — Situation at Shanghai — Proposed Re- 
 sumption of Hostilities — Foreign Extensions at Tientsin — Attitude 
 of the United States — ^Occupation of Imperial Palace at Peking — 
 Beginning of Negotiations — The German Proposal for Punishment — 
 iReplies of the Powers — Edict of September 25 Inadequate — The 
 French Proposals — Acceptance by the Powers — Bases of Negotia- 
 tions — The Joint Note — Elaboration by Diplomatic Body at Peking — 
 Further Imperial Decrees — Final Protocol of September 7, 1901. 
 
 On July 19, 1900, with the Boxer comphcations at their *"^ 
 height and the conviction already rooted in the mind of the 
 Chinese Court that a heavy reckoning with the Powers 
 would assuredly come in the near future, there was ad- 
 dressed to President McKinley, in the name of the Em- 
 peror, a letter which again illustrated that trusting faith in 
 American friendship and fairness which China had ex- 
 pressed since her international relations began: 
 
 China has long maintained friendly relations with the United 
 States, and is deeply conscious that the object of the United 
 States is international commerce. Neither country entertains 
 the least suspicion or distrust toward the other. Recent out- 
 breaks of mutual antipathy between the people and Christian 
 missions caused the foreign Powers to view with unwarranted 
 suspicion the position of the Imperial Government as favorable 
 to the people and prejudicial to the missions, with the result 
 551] 139 
 
I40 THE BOXER REBELLION [^^^ 
 
 that the Taku Forts were attacked and captured. Conse- 
 quently, there has been clashing of forces, with calamitous con- 
 sequences. The situation has become more and more serious 
 and critical. We have just received a telegraphic memorial 
 from our envoy, Wu Ting-fang, and it is highly gratifying to 
 us to learn that the United States Government, having in view 
 the friendly relations between the two countries, has taken a 
 deep interest in the situation. Now China, driven by the ir- 
 resistible course of events, has unfortunately incurred well- 
 nigh universal indignation. For settling the present difficulty 
 China places special reliance in the United States. We address 
 this message to your Excellency in all sincerity and candidness, 
 with the hope that your Excellency will devise measures and 
 take the initiative in bringing about a concert of the Powers for 
 the restoration of order and peace. The favor of a kind reply 
 is earnestly requested and awaited with the greatest anxiety.^ 
 
 July 23rd, President McKinley, through Secretary Hay, 
 answered this appeal for help by a skillfully constructed 
 letter which intimated plainly enough that it was within 
 China's power to remedy her situation, and that this, once 
 done, would lead to immediate and universal peace: 
 
 I have received Your Majesty's message of the 19th of July, 
 and am glad to know that Your Majesty recognizes the fact 
 that the Government and people of the United States desire of 
 China nothing but what is just and equitable. The purpose for 
 which we landed troops in China was the rescue of our Lega- 
 tions from serious danger and the protection of the lives and 
 property of Americans who were sojourning in China in the 
 enjoyment of rights guaranteed them by treaty and by inter- 
 national law. The same purposes are publicly declared by all 
 the Powers which have landed military forces in Your 
 Majesty's Empire. 
 
 I am to infer from Your Majesty's letter that the male- 
 
 ^U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 294. 
 
553] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER I4I 
 
 factors who have disturbed the peace of China, who have 
 murdered the Minister of Germany and a member of the 
 Japanese Legation, and who now hold besieged in Peking those 
 foreign diplomatists who still survive, have not onlyjiot re - 
 ceiv£d_anyJ[avor or encouragement from Your Majesty, but 
 are actually in rebellion against the Im perial authqrit}^. If this 
 be the case, I most solemnly urge upon Your Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment to give public assurance whether the foreign Ministers 
 are alive, and if so, in what condition. 
 
 2. To put the diplomatic representatives of the Powers in 
 immediate and free communication with their respective Gov- 
 ernments and to remove all danger to their lives and liberty. 
 
 3. To place the Imperial authorities of China in communi- 
 cation with the relief expedition so that cooperation may be 
 secured between them for the liberation of the Legations, the 
 protection of foreigners, and the restoration of order. 
 
 If these objects are accomplished it is the belief of this 
 Government that no obstacles will be found to exist on the 
 part of the Powers to an amicable settlement of all the ques- 
 tions arising out of the recent troubles, and the friendly good 
 offices of this Government will, with the assent of the other 
 Powers, be cheerfully placed at Your Majesty's disposition 
 for that purpose.^ 
 
 To this guarded response there was no immediate reply, 
 and there the matter rested. Chiik, was of course unable 
 to conform to the President's stipulations, as by July 19th 
 the policy pursued against the Boxers, at first one of indi- 
 rection and inactivity, then indifference, and finally open 
 encouragement to the rebels, had resulted in the movement 
 reaching the proportions of a whirlwind which not even a 
 united Imperial Court could have quelled. It was necessary 
 for the revolt to burn itself out and then trust to the mag- 
 nanimity of the Powers when the time for settlement came. 
 
 P * U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 294, 295. See also China No. i (igoi), ] 
 Tio. 74. 
 
( 
 
 142 ^^£ BOXER REBELLION [^24 
 
 The principal Powers received communications similar 
 to the letter to America. The President of France took ad- 
 vantage of the occasion to outline terms such as the French 
 later insisted upon as bases of negotiations/ The responses 
 of France and the United States were made quickly, and 
 answers from the other Powers came in due time. Lord 
 Salisbury informed the Chinese Minister in the course of a 
 conversation : 
 
 Whenever the European Ministers should return to us unhurt, 
 we should be very glad to discuss, and to discuss in the most 
 favorable manner, any appeal which the Imperial Government 
 of China might have to make to Her Majesty's Government, 
 but as long as there remained this terrible doubt as to the fate 
 which they might have incurred at the hands of the Chinese 
 soldiery or the Boxers, it was impossible for Her Majesty's 
 Government to enter into further negotiations with that of the 
 Empire.^ 
 
 Count von Biilow, in his note verhale to the Chinese Lega- 
 tion at Berlin, was not able to 
 
 find himself in a position to submit this telegram (the Em- 
 peror's letter) to His Majesty the Emperor and King so long 
 
 *" 1° Qu'une protection efficace et I'entiere liberte de leurs communi- 
 cations avec leurs Gouvernements sont assurees au representant de la 
 Republique et a ses collegues du corps diplomatique : 
 
 " 2° Que le prince Touan et les hauts f onctionnaires responsables des 
 evenements actuels ont ete eloignes du Gouvernement, en attendant le 
 chatiment inevitable : 
 
 " 3° Que les autorites et les corps de troupes, dans toute I'etendue 
 de I'Empire, ont regu I'ordre de cesser les hostilites contre les 
 etrangers." 
 
 " 4° Que des mesures ont ete prises pour la repression rigoureuse 
 du mouvement insurrectionnel des Boxeurs : 
 
 Cordier, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 522, 523. See also China No. i (igoi)^ 
 Inc. in no. 79 and Trans., Letter to the President of France, reprinted 
 from "Agence Havas" of July 25, 1900. 
 
 ^ China No. i (1901), no. 69. 
 
555J THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 14^ 
 
 as the fate of the foreign Missions shut up in Peking and of 
 the other foreigners there has not been cleared up, and so long 
 as the Imperial Chinese Government have not made atonement 
 for the outrageous murder of the Imperial Minister, and given 
 adequate guarantees that their conduct in the future will be in 
 accordance with the law of nations and with civilization.^ 
 
 Russia, reluctant to let the splendid chance for diplomacy 
 slip by, returned an answer which was at once a declina- 
 tion and a veiled acceptance. The Official Gazette of Au- 
 gust 2nd published the reply of the Russian Government 
 to Kuang Hsu's letter begging the Czar to take the initia- 
 tive in securing a cessation of hostilities (as the Chinese 
 Court similarly begged the other Powers). The Russian 
 statement was to the effect that the Government, while 
 " deploring the serious events now happening in China ", 
 found that '* the absence of news respecting the fate of the 
 Russian and foreign representatives " rendered " all idea 
 of mediation in favor of China very difficult at the present 
 time ". However, in spite of all this : 
 
 The efforts of Russia have but one object in view, namely, to 
 assist in the re-establishment of order and tranquility in the 
 Chinese Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship 
 for China, the Imperial Government have decided to render 
 to the Chinese Government every assistance with a view to 
 repressing the present troubles.^ 
 
 Japan returned a curt refusal. Viscount Aoki replying 
 through the Chinese Minister at Tokyo that '* the gravest 
 breach of international law which any country could com- 
 mit was an attack on diplomatic representatives ", and that, 
 *' until the suppression of the insurrection there could be 
 no question of amicable negotiations ".* Thus there was 
 
 1 China No. i (1901), no. 79 and Inc. 
 
 ^ Ibid., no. 105. ^Ibid., no. 51. 
 
144 ^^^ BOXER REBELLION [^56 
 
 small consolation in these responses to the letters and tele- 
 grams which Governor Yuan Shih-kki had sent over the 
 world at the bidding of the Peking Court. A crumb of 
 comfort might have been found in the Russian answer 
 were it not for the fact that China was already becoming 
 wary of Russia's constant " traditional friendship " with 
 " but one object in view ", especially when applied to a case 
 such as the present, where China had been so grievously at 
 fault/ 
 
 ^ Later, October 14, 1900, the Emperor, or rather the Chinese Court, 
 sent another letter to McKinley: 
 
 "We are extremely grateful to your Excellency for taking the 
 initiative in the withdrawal of troops (from Peking) and for con- 
 senting, in the interest of friendly relations, to use your kindly offices 
 between China and the friendly Powers who have been offended on 
 account of the recent unexpected uprising in China. 
 
 " We therefore especially delegate our Envoy Extraordinary and 
 Minister Plenipotentiary, Wu Ting-fang, to personally deliver this 
 telegraphic letter to your Excellency conveying our sincere expres- 
 sions of thanks. 
 
 " We beg that your Excellency, in the interest of peace and inter- 
 national good relations, will exert your friendly influence with the 
 other Powers toward the complete effacement of all ill feeling and the 
 speedy determination on their part to negotiate for a peaceful settle- 
 ment. For this we shall feel unbounded gratitude toward your Ex- 
 cellency, whose good offices we are now earnestly beseeching." 
 
 To which the President replied: 
 
 "I cordially share Your Majesty's wish that there may be a peaceful 
 settlement of all questions between China and the Powers whose inter- 
 ests and nationals have so grievously suffered wrong in Your Majesty's 
 dominions, and that the outcome may be the complete effacement of 
 ill feeling between them. The desire of this Government that such a 
 settlement may be brought about speedily has been made known to all 
 the Powers, and I trust that negotiations may begin so soon as we and 
 the other offended Governments shall be effectively satisfied of Your 
 Majesty's ability and power to treat with just sternness the principal 
 offenders, who are doubly culpable, not alone toward the foreigners, but 
 toward Your Majesty, under whose rule the purpose of China to dwell 
 in concord with the world has hitherto found expression in the welcome 
 and protection assured to strangers." 
 
 See U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 295, 296. 
 
557] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER I45 
 
 Obviously, the first prerequisite of universal peace would ' * 
 be the appointment on the part of China of plenipotentiaries 
 to treat with the Powers, and for this delicate and extremely 
 difficult task Li Hung-chang, the grand old man of Chinese 
 diplomacy, was again called upon to aid his country in its I 
 extremity. As early as August 8th, roughly speaking a I 
 week before the Legations were relieved, an Imperial edict J 
 announced : 
 
 We hereby appoint Li Hung-chang as our Envoy Plenipoten- 
 tiary, with instructions to propose at once by telegraph to the 
 Governments of the several Powers concerned for the imme- 
 diate cessation of hostile demonstrations pending negotiations 
 which he is hereby authorized to conduct for our part for the 
 settlement of whatever questions may have to be dealt with. 
 The questions are to be severally considered in a satisfactory 
 manner and the result of the negotiations reported to us for 
 our sanction.^ 
 
 The Government of the United States was particularly 
 well pleased with the appointment of Li, partly because of 
 the fact that, aside from Prince Ching and probably Yuanl 
 Shih-kai, the hero of Shimonoseki was one of the few J 
 statesmen in the Empire, if not the only one, who possessed 
 the requisite ability, training and characteristics to press 
 
 * Imperial Edict forwarded by the Privy Council at Peking, Aug. 8-, 
 to Governor Yuan Shih-kai at Tsinan, Shantung, and transmitted by 
 him, Aug. II, to the Taotai at Shanghai, by whom it was re-transmitted 
 to Minister Wu at Washington, who received it on the night of the 
 same day (Aug. 11). See U. S. For. Rei, 1900, pp. 285, 286. 
 
 The same edict is given with different wording in China No. i (ipoi), 
 no. 167. As to the need for negotiations, says the decree: "The 
 present hostilities between certain Chinese subjects and foreign nations 
 are caused partly by the misunderstandings of the foreign Powers and 
 partly by the mismanagement of the Chinese local authorities. It 
 would be a misfortune to the whole world, and contrary to the wishes 
 of China, should such a complication be allowed to evolve out of 
 itself." Therefore the appointment of Li. 
 
146 THE BOXER REBELLION [^^g 
 
 such negotiations on China's part as much as possible to a 
 successful conclusion. The Department of State, it was 
 declared, " learned with satisfaction of the appointment of 
 Earl Li Hung-chang as Envoy Plenipotentiary to conduct 
 negotiations with the Powers, and will, on its part, enter 
 upon such negotiations with a desire to continue the friendly 
 relations so long existing between the two countries ".^ 
 Other Powers also seemed satisfied, and offered no objec- 
 tion if, as M. Delcasse expressed it, Li " really can furnish 
 bona fide credentials ". That was an important point, con- 
 sidering the state of governmental affairs in China, and 
 later will be touched upon again. 
 
 Sir Claude MacDonald, on being sounded by Downing 
 Street as to Li's appointment, replied that Li seemed to 
 have " full powers to arrange all matters with the Foreign 
 Officers of the Powers ". MacDonald must have realized 
 the possible trend of the preliminary negotiations in his 
 warning that the " march of troops on Peking should not 
 be delayed by any negotiations whatever ". This message, 
 dated from Peking August loth, goes on to say: " We are 
 still being fired at daily, and our supplies are and have been 
 entirely cut off, so that we must surrender unless we are 
 shortly relieved ".^ Things turned out as the British Min- 
 ister feared, for as early as July 30th (unknown of course 
 to MacDonald because of the siege) Li had made a " sug- 
 gestion to the United States " that " the Ministers might 
 be sent under safe escort to Tientsin, provided the Powers 
 would engage not to march on Peking ". The Secretary of 
 State gave a skillful answer to this proposition, and also 
 to the proposal of Li that the march on Peking should be 
 halted during the negotiations. He said : 
 
 * U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 286; China No. i (1901), no. 328. 
 2 Peking, August 10, viu Shanghai August 14; received telegraphic 
 at London, August 14. China No. i {1901), no. 192. 
 
559] -^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 147 
 
 I do not think it expedient to submit the proposition of 
 Earl Li to the other Powers (at this time the United States was 
 the only one approached) ; free communication with our repre- 
 sentatives in Peking is demanded as a matter of absolute right, 
 and not as a favor. Since the Chinese Government admits that 
 it possesses the power to give communication, it puts itself in 
 an unfriendly attitude by denying it. No negotiations seem 
 advisable until the Chinese Government shall have put the 
 diplomatic representatives of the Powers in full and free com- 
 munication with their respective Governments, and removed 
 all danger to life and liberty. We would urge Earl Li earnestly 
 to advise the Imperial authorities of China to place themselves 
 in friendly communication and cooperation with the relief 
 expedition; they are assuming heavy responsibility in acting 
 otherwise.^ 
 
 That ended the matter for the time being, as Lord Salis- 
 bury, on being approached by Ambassador Choate, found 
 that he '' entirely concurs in the terms of the reply of the 
 Secretary of State ".^' 
 
 At this early stage of affairs, it must be remembered that 
 Li was at Canton and had received at that place the notifi- 
 cation of his designation as peace commissioner. Commu- 
 nication with the north was uncertain and news of the 
 progress of the Allies very meagre; and for some time Li 
 remained unaware of the capture of Peking by the Allied 
 forces on August 14th. From Canton, Li went to Shanghai 
 and there, August 15th, sent a message to Sir Chihchen 
 Lofenglu, Chinese Minister at London, in which he stated 
 that by this time it must be certain " the treaty Powers 
 fully appreciate the difficult position in which both the Em- 
 peror and Empress Dowager are now situated ". He was 
 under the impression that so far the Allies had only reached 
 
 1 China, No. i {1901), no. 99. 
 ^Ihid., no. 108. 
 
148 THE BOXER REBELLION [560 
 
 the village of Tungchow, on the road to Peking. There- 
 fore he asked the British Government ''most respectfully" 
 not to proceed further, assuring Salisbury that to persist 
 would " shed the blood of innocents " and " cause irre- 
 parable damage to the present dynasty ", and in addition 
 would '' hurt the feelings of 400,000,000 of the Chinese 
 population "/ The same request was telegraphed to Rus- 
 sia, France, Germany, the United States and Japan. 
 
 The proposed armistice met with no favor. To Li's 
 suggestion that the Legations be sent to Tientsin (a 
 suggestion later elaborated by Russia), Great Britain 
 replied that, " until the British Legation has been al- 
 lowed to return to Tientsin under the escort of an ade- 
 quate European force. Her Majesty's Government can 
 enter into no such negotiations ".^ The actual removal of 
 the Legation from Peking, Downing Street seems never to 
 have considered seriously, and Minister MacDonald dis- 
 tinctly discouraged the idea. Delcasse, in his answer to Li, 
 said that, *' the only means of proving the good faith shown 
 by the Chinese Government in their arrangements with re- 
 gard to the foreign Ministers was to command the soldiers 
 to give in to the international troops ".^ Russia would act 
 only as the other Powers acted.* The United States never 
 considered the idea of removing the Legation.^ 
 
 'Eater, the idea of leaving Peking and thus sparing as 
 much as possible the feelings of China met with much favor 
 with the Russian Foreign Office and was adopted as one of 
 the cardinal points of the Russian program. With this 
 end in view the Russian Legation was for a time actually 
 
 ^Chind No. i (1901), no. 202. 
 ^Ibid., no. 209. 
 
 * Ibid., no. 213. 
 
 * Ibid., no. 245. 
 
 * U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 204. 
 
561] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER I49 
 
 removed to Tientsin/ But Russia's method of thus ingra- 
 tiating herself with China was frowned upon by the other 
 Powers. They considered it a serious diplomatic mistake 
 to leave Peking, as it certainly was. Said Lord Salisbury, 
 in commenting on the Russian proposal for this purpose: 
 "The present moment (September 29th) did not seem to 
 me opportune for the withdrawal to Tientsin of Her Ma- 
 jesty's Minister ".^ Italy likewise did ** not favor the pro- 
 posal ", but was willing to join the Powers in united action; 
 while the United States had no " present intention " to ac- 
 commodate the Russian Government in this regard. All 
 the foreign Ministers at Peking, except the Russian repre- 
 sentative, agreed with Sir Claude MacDonald in his opinion 
 that, " the departure of the Legations now would be most 
 inexpedient, and I think that their withdrawal from the 
 capital would hinder future negotiations ".^ But Russia 
 had a purpose, and in spite of these adverse replies pro- 
 ceeded with her plan. By October 19th, having produced 
 the desired effect upon Chinese sympathies, the Russian 
 Minister, M. de Giers, received instructions to return, bag 
 and baggage, to Peking.* 
 
 Li Hung-chang, meanwhile, was at Shanghai on his jour- 
 ney to the north, which seemed to be much delayed. Dif- 
 ferences soon arose because of the divergent views held by 
 
 '^Journal de Saint-Petershourg, Sep. 12 (25) : "Several members of 
 the Russian Legation and the first divisions of the expeditionary de- 
 tachments have already started for Tientsin; the departure of the rest 
 of the troops is being gradually carried out, and will be completed as 
 soon as the local conditions permit." 
 
 Reprinted in China No. i {1901), no. 397 and Inc. 
 
 ' Ibid., no. 401. 
 
 * Ibid., no. z^7- 
 
 * On the removal of the Russian Legation to Tientsin, see China No. i 
 (1901), nos. 140, 172, 281, 287, 318, 327, 356, 383, 397, 403; China No. 5 
 (1901), nos. 64, 77; U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 205, 214, 375-377- 
 
150 THE BOXER REBELLION [^62 
 
 Li and the foreign Ministers. Naturally, it was Li's ambi- 
 tion to begin the peace proposals at once, the sooner the 
 better, but to this plan the British Minister was strongly op- 
 posed. At this date, August 24th, the situation in Peking 
 was described by MacDonald as " very complicated ", while 
 " rumors of intended attacks are prevelant". He continued : 
 *' It is useless to attempt serious negotiations with the 
 Chinese Government until the Chinese military power is 
 disheartened and completely crushed, and communications 
 with Tientsin are made thoroughly secure ".^ 
 
 Then it developed that Li's powers to negotiate were in- 
 complete, and ''we (the Ministers) must ask him to produce 
 fresh powers ", or at least have his credentials re-affirmed. 
 Japan was unwilling to recognize Li's powers on the ground 
 that there was no responsible and '' no representative Gov- 
 ernment in Peking ". , These difficulties were removed by 
 two decrees, one of which, August 24th, said : '' Li Hung- 
 chang must act at Plenipotentiary, and make the best terms 
 he can as quickly as possible. Being at this distance 
 (Sianfu) we (the Court) will not interfere ".^ Three days 
 later another edict announced : " We hereby summon the 
 Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang, who has been furnished 
 with full powers to negotiate with the Plenipotentiaries of 
 the Allied Powers, to come, without delay, to Peking, in 
 order to cooperate with Prince Ching in the transaction of 
 important State affairs ".^ 
 
 Li had announced that he would leave Shanghai for Tien- 
 tsin after the Chinese festival of September 8th. Why the 
 Grand Secretary delayed his arrival at Peking in this 
 fashion it is somewhat hard to understand, all the more 
 
 ^ China No. i ( 1901) , no. 240. 
 2 Ibid., no. 313. 
 ^Ibid., no. 319. 
 
563] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER i^I 
 
 since everyone in the capital was on edge to receive him. 
 However, the two decrees just mentioned, ordering him to 
 proceed " without delay ", settled the matter, as a com- 
 mand from the Court was not to be disobeyed. In explana- 
 tion of Li's dilatory tactics, it must be remembered that at 
 this time he was a very old man who had sacrificed his 
 health and strength in the service of his country.^ Consid- 
 ering the unsettled conditions, with all sorts of rumors fly- 
 ing around in south China of the terrible events in the 
 north, it was but natural that, at his advanced age, Li should 
 have had serious misgivings in undertaking the journey. 
 As a precaution he applied to both the British and Ameri- 
 can Governments for protection in case his person was not 
 respected, and both Powers gave him their generous sup- 
 port. - Finally, September 14th, under a safe-conduct fur- 
 nished by Sir Robert Hart, Li at last set sail in a British 
 vessel for Tientsin, the " steamer flying a flag denoting that 
 he is a Plenipotentiary ". He arrived without mishap in 
 Peking, where Prince Ching, escorted by " Bengal and 
 Japanese cavalry ", had already preceded him. 
 
 One side was by this time about as impatient as the other 
 to begin negotiations. Already a whole month had passed 
 since Peking had been relieved and as yet nothing had been 
 done. One Power seemed to be waiting for another to act 
 decisively. The news that Prince Ching had also been ap- 
 pointed peace commissioner ^ gave universal satisfaction, 
 for the Prince was highly esteemed by Europe as a diplomat 
 and broad-minded Chinese statesman. 
 
 But the question of credentials was not yet settled. It 
 seemed that Japan was the most dubious of all over the ade- 
 
 ^ Li Hung-chang's death occurred on Nov. 7, 1901. 
 
 2 Li had memorialized the Throne for co- Plenipotentiaries. See 
 
 China No. i {1901), nos. 282, 285. 
 
152 THE BOXER REBELLION [564 
 
 quacy of Li's and Ching's '' full powers ". The British 
 representative at Tokyo wrote Lord Salisbury of the fol- 
 lowing conversation with Viscount Aoki : 
 
 Viscount Aoki went on to say that the only credentials which 
 could be considered satisfactory would be a document signed 
 by the Emperor of China himself. The Chinese Imperial edicts 
 were usually issued in the name of the Emperor by some of the 
 Ministers or by some Board, but his Excellency thought that 
 in this case the Emperor's autograph signature should be in- 
 sisted on. At the same time, unless some Government had 
 been formed and had gained power in China, from which the 
 violently anti-foreign elements, such as Prince Tuan, Kang-yi^ 
 and General Tung had been eliminated, and unless Li Hung- 
 chang could show that he represented such a Government, 
 negotiations with him would be quite useless. The above- 
 named men, who were to blame for the recent disturbances^ 
 would keep their hold upon the persons of the Emperor and 
 the Empress Dowager as long as they possibly could, and no 
 other authoritative Government could be formed so long as 
 they succeeded in doing so.^ 
 
 Li had applied first to Japan for a warship to carry him 
 north, but Viscount Aoki had answered that '* he would do 
 better to apply to Her Majesty's Government for such es- 
 cort ". At the same time Aoki " once more warned him 
 against proceeding to the north without fresh credentials, 
 as he might thereby lay himself open to humiliating re- 
 buffs ".^ But now it appeared that Japan would be satis- 
 fied provided Li's credentials were satisfactory to Great 
 Britain. MacDonald intimated to Lord Salisbury : " We 
 had better, I should say, accept both above-mentioned (Li 
 and Ching), with an understanding that these are purely 
 preliminary negotiations, and reference will be made to the 
 
 ^ China No. 5 {1901), no. 31. "^ Ibid., no. 126. 
 
565] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 53 
 
 Governments of the Powers "/ To which Downing Street 
 replied, September 27th : "If the powers of Prince Ching 
 and Li Hung-chang are deemed sufficient and on clear un- 
 derstanding that negotiations are purely preliminaries for 
 reference to Governments, you are authorized, in conjunc- 
 tion with your colleagues, to commence negotiations with 
 them ".^ 
 
 The final outcome of this tiresome but highly important 
 discussion was that the sufficiency of the powers of the 
 Chinese Plenipotentiaries ^ should be determined by the 
 Diplomatic Corps of the Powers at Peking. This was really 
 not done until late in December, when the demands of the 
 Powers were first handed to Prince Ching and Li Hung- 
 chang. The Grand Secretary unfortunately was prevented 
 by illness from attending the meeting mentioned, so Prince 
 Ching exchanged all formalities. Upon being requested 
 to produce his credentials, Prince Ching submitted eleven 
 documents, one of which was given to each of the Minis- 
 
 ^ China No. i (1901), no. 372. ^Ibid., no. 396. 
 
 'By an Edict of August 31, the Viceroys of Nanking and Wuchang 
 were ordered to cooperate with Prince Ching and Earl Li. The Decree 
 of September 9 further appointed Jung Lu, Yuan Shih-kai's blood 
 brother, as Minister Plenipotentiary to assist Li, Ching, and the 
 Yangtse Viceroys. 
 
 Jung Lu was reluctant to serve but obeyed the summons. The 
 British Minister did not relish his appointment, " several of whose 
 troops were killed by us on the barricades opposed to us during the 
 siege." Furthermore, " one of Ching's standards was also captured by 
 us," yet to Prince Ching there seemed to be no objection on the part 
 of the British Minister. Li came to the rescue with the suggestion 
 that Jung Lu " confess his complicity " in the Legation attacks and 
 then see whether the Powers would have him. 
 
 By the Edict of September 12, Prince Ching was made Plenipotentiary 
 with full powers, the same as with Li, while the Yangtse Viceroys were 
 made Ministers Plenipotentiary, the same as Jung Lu. These were all 
 admonished to ** loyally cooperate one with the other, and to have no 
 differences." 
 
 See China No. i (1901), nos. 323, 331 ; China No. 5 (1901), no. 112. 
 
154 THE BOXER REBELLION [566 
 
 ters, and then he asked '' that they might be examined and 
 returned to him ". After that was done, Prince Ching 
 naturally demanded their powers in return and a curious 
 situation developed, a situation almost laughable when we 
 consider the ado the Powers had made over the credentials 
 of the Chinese commissioners. All of the foreign repre- 
 sentatives, with the sole exception of the German Minister, 
 were '' equally unprepared ", in other words, had neglected 
 to bring their papers with them. The following interesting 
 predicament was brought to light : 
 
 The French and Russian Ministers have received telegraphic 
 full powers, and documentary full powers are on their way to 
 the Italian Minister; the others seem disposed to rely on the 
 fact that they have formerly presented letters of credence in the 
 usual manner.^ 
 
 However, as this was but a preliminary meeting, with no 
 treaty to sign, the conclusion was reached that the matter 
 did " not seem to press for a solution ", although there is 
 no denying the fact that the Diplomatic Body was at fault 
 for the very thing for which they had been holding China 
 " to a strict accountability ". And so ended, at the last 
 moment to the advantage of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, 
 the long and wearisome dispute over credentials, in which it 
 seemed throughout that the Powers were as much sparring 
 for time in formulating their demands as they were con- 
 cerned over the authority of Prince Ching and Li Hung- 
 chang to negotiate with them.^ 
 
 ^ China No. 6 (1901), no. 91. 
 
 ' On the question of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, see China No. i 
 (1901), nos. 31, 35, 4'5, 46, 99, 108, 132, 166, 167, 173, 176, 190, 192, 202, 
 209, 213, 225, 230, 238-240, 245, 254, 268, 276, 292, 302, 313. 314, 318-320, 
 323, 326, 328, 331, 333, 341, 356, 357, 371, 372, 374, 382, 385, 39^; China 
 No. 5 (1901), nos. 31, 68, iii, 112, 125, 126, 200, 207, 209, 216, 226, 252; 
 China No. 6 (1901), no. 91 ; U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 161, 200, 202, 259, 
 285, 286, 291-293. 
 
c^Sy] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 155 
 
 With the two leading Chinese Plenipotentiaries now at 
 Peking ready for business, it was felt that at last the nego- 
 tiations for settlement could begin in earnest. But such 
 was not to be the case. North China was yet far from paci- 
 fied, and proposals for peace were temporarily sidetracked 
 by the renewal of punitive expeditions in the neighborhood 
 of the capital. Most prominent of these was the military 
 excursion of the Allied troops to Paotingfu and Cheng- 
 tingfu,^ October 12, 1900. Some 4,000 soldiers partici- 
 pated, under the command of von Waldersee, the German 
 Commander-in-chief of the international forces in China. 
 At first Li Hung-chang could not do otherwise than order 
 the Imperial troops " not to oppose the advance on any ac- 
 count ".^ Later, November 5th, he changed his attitude 
 and complained of the ''conduct of the international troops", 
 alleging that the " villages had been attacked by Chinese 
 Christians " and that these primarily were to blame for the 
 initial disturbances. This note of remonstrance was re- 
 turned by the German, British and Italian Ministers with 
 the answer that they " were unable to accept it ".® The 
 French Minister followed with similar action.* The other 
 representatives contented themselves with stating that they 
 would " merely refrain from acknowledging its receipt ".'^ 
 The expedition itself was of course a huge success. The 
 
 * In Chihli province, southwest of Peking. 
 
 L ^ China No. 5 {190 1), no. 80. 
 
 3 Minister Congee, though acting in unison with the other diplomats, 
 feared that "negotiations will be delayed" by the expedition. U. S. 
 For. Rel., 1900, p. 213. 
 
 * The news that the French Minister agreed in being " unable to 
 accept" the note was sent by Lord Salisbury in a Circular to the 
 British Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, St. Petersburg 
 and Washington. 
 
 * The Russian Minister seems at first to have objected to the expedition. 
 
156 THE BOXER REBELLION [^6g 
 
 imperiled Christians were relieved; a fine of 100,000 taels 
 was levied on Paotingfu with a month to pay it in; and it 
 was decided to execute three officials of high rank and to 
 quarter German and French troops upon the town for the 
 duration of the winter/ 
 
 This expedition and others either following or contem- 
 plated were not regarded with any excess of favor by the 
 I Powers. It was well known that the United States was 
 I disinclined towards further punitive measures ; and as re- 
 vgarded Great Britain, the Marquis of Lansdowne, who 
 had succeeded Lord Salisbury as head of the Foreign 
 Office, judged it highly desirable that " pending negotia- 
 tions, no further expeditions should take place unless the 
 conduct of the Chinese should render them necessary ".^ 
 Count Lamsdorff deprecated the advance into Chihli, as it 
 offered the *' danger of utterly destroying the independence 
 and traditional prestige of the only central authority which 
 the Chinese recognized, and of putting in its place a titular 
 puppet Government acting under foreign dictation and com- 
 pulsion, and imposed by foreign bayonets ",^ which was a 
 strikingly apt observation. Great Britain agreed with 
 Lamsdorff in " deprecating the renewal of military activity 
 in Pechihli, unless there be urgent reasons ". The British 
 Foreign Office also called attention to the fact that since 
 October no British troops had taken part in any punitive 
 expeditions.* 
 
 Still more serious than in the north was the situation at 
 Chuchow, south of Shanghai in Chekiang province. In a 
 
 ^ See China No. 5 (iQOi), nos. 29, 54, 80, 118, 119, 123, 210, 257; 
 China No. 6 (igoi), no. 40. 
 
 ^ Ibid., no. I. 
 
 ' China No. 6 (rgoi), nos. 60, 61. 
 
 * Which was slightly incorrect. A small military surveying party had 
 been sent by Gen. Gaselee with the Paotingfu expedition. 
 
569] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 157 
 
 Boxer outbreak which occurred as far back as July 28, 
 1900, nine British subjects had been killed/ in addition to 
 the magistrate of Hsinan, who met his death in attempting 
 to pacify the mob. The British Foreign Office immediately 
 demanded redress of Li Hung-chang, while Sir Ernest 
 Satow informed the Chinese Plenipotentiary that " such 
 misdeeds should be wiped out by a fitting expiation ". The 
 Yamen acted quickly enough in dismissing the Governor 
 from office, removing him on November 30th, and thus 
 getting rid of the " prime cause of the massacres ". China 
 did not seem inclined to do more, however, and the result 
 was that the " gentry and other ill-disposed people " in the 
 province, so Acting Consul-General Warren informed the 
 Home Office, " are being encouraged to further acts of vio- 
 lence by the delay which has taken place in punishing the 
 officials and others who are responsible for the murders ". 
 It was made clear to the Chinese authorities that drastic 
 action was necessary. Final British demands took the form 
 of the " banishment and degradation of the ex-Governor 
 (Liu Shu-tang) and the ex-Provincial Judge; their prop- 
 erty to be confiscated " ; and in addition the confinement of 
 the Brigadier, " who is out of his mind ", the execution of 
 the Taotai and of the Commandant of the Volunteers, the 
 degradation and imprisonment of the Prefect, and finally 
 the degradation and banishment of three gentry concerned 
 and the confiscation of their property. Though the out- 
 break was deplorable enough, possibly Great Britain was 
 demanding too much at this stage of affairs. The Chinese 
 peace commissioners were exerting their utmost to readjust 
 the entire situation, and in consequence were overwhelmed 
 with the demands, notes, and opinions of the foreign repre- 
 
 * Total victims were eleven in number ; two men, six women and 
 three children. Nine of these were British and two American. 
 
 / 
 
158 THE BOXER REBELLION [^70 
 
 sentatives. In this mass of correspondence the items for 
 punishment were considerable, and these further formed 
 the prelude for extension of these same negotiations. Also, 
 each new or recent disturbance added a fresh quota of vic- 
 tims to the long list of Chinese already indicted, which list, 
 steadily growing, all the more delayed the final settlement. 
 At any rate, the " fitting expiation " which China paid for 
 the Chuchow grievances was a long time in coming, and 
 this through no fault of Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang, 
 laboring as they did under great disadvantages.^ 
 
 Shanghai at this time similarly exhibited a lack of tran- 
 quility. The alarm had been general throughout the re- 
 volt because of ominous reports that Boxer influence was 
 spreading southward, and during the reconstruction these 
 fears remained manifest. It was felt in middle 1900 that 
 troops would have to be sent by the Powers to keep the 
 Yangtse region in order. Fortunately, Viceroy Chang 
 Chih-tung saw no reason for a large force but agreed to a 
 moderate one from Great Britain, say about 3,000. At the 
 same time, as has previously been noted, the Yangtse Vice- 
 roys vigorously opposed the idea of sending troops inland, 
 or stationing warships on the Yangtse or at the riverine 
 ports. In this contention they received the support of Ad- 
 miral Seymour of the China Station. As regarded Shang- 
 hai, the British were in favor of garrisoning that city, as 
 such a concentration of military power would be far better 
 *' than keeping a force at a distant spot such as Weihaiwei", 
 which was in reality entirely outside British influence and 
 had been leased only as a check on Russia at Port Arthur, 
 directly opposite. The Powers finally arrived at a sort of 
 international agreement in sending troops and warships to 
 
 ^ On the Chuchow massacre and negotiations, see China No. i {igoi), 
 nos. 82, 119, 127, 329, 393; China No. 5 (1901), nos. 12, 20, 132, 145, 
 190, 218, 219, 221 ; China No. 6 (igoi), nos. 36, 38, 86, 146, 147, 223, 229. 
 
571 ] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 59 
 
 Shanghai, though none to the riverine ports/ and these, 
 the majority of which were British ships and a regiment 
 of native Indian soldiers, produced that wholesome effect 
 needed to prevent entire Chekiang, in spite of the Chuchow 
 massacre, from following the example of the northern prov- 
 inces/ 
 
 The Rebellion, it will be remembered, had early been 
 kept under control in Shantung, which province, under the 
 discipline of the energetic Yuan Shih-kai, was kept in a fair 
 state of order during the remaining period of the disturb- 
 ances. However, the Powers for the sake of security de- 
 cided to hold Tientsin and seven districts to the south, all 
 bordering on Shantung. This led to the belief that Shan- 
 tung itself was again to be invaded and occupied by Allied 
 troops. The Consular Body at Shanghai was quick in its 
 disapproval. So also the Yangtse Viceroys, who said : 
 
 Yuan Shih-kai frequently memorialized the Throne to sup- 
 press the rebels and rescue the Ministers, and joined with them- 
 selves (the Viceroys of Nanking and Wuchang) in refusing 
 to be a party to the Rebellion, so that they are unable to sit by 
 and see his dominions endangered without speaking on his 
 behalf.^ 
 
 ^ Vice-Admiral Seymour intimated to the Foreign Office that if ships 
 and troops were sent through the Yangtse region, the Chinese popu- 
 lation " might think foreigners had come to seize their country," and 
 if such fears were once aroused, " the Chinese would fight to prevent 
 their country being taken away from them." This was also the view 
 of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung. 
 
 See China No. i (1901), no. no. 
 
 ^ Ibid., nos. 50, 68, 72, 89, 94, 104, 106, 109, no, 117, 125, 137, 145, 
 162, 177, 178, 198, 201, 205, 208, 214, 273, 283, 286, 295, 366; China No. 5 
 (790/), nos. 30, 148. 
 
 * Acting Consul-General Warren to Marquis of Salisbury, October 
 10, 1900, China No. 5 {igoi), no. 27- 
 
l6o THE BOXER REBELLION [572 
 
 Fortunately, no such move was made, or even contemplated 
 by the Allies, as it was clearly recognized that Yua/i Shih- 
 kai had accomplished all that was possible at the tii 
 
 The province of Shansi likewise was in doubt, ilue par- 
 ticularly to the brutality and unconcealed hostilitk^ of the 
 Governor, the infamous Yu Hsien, toward the mission- 
 aries and foreigners. In Shansi alone, up to October 2, 
 1900, the foreign death list had reached 140, mainly British. 
 As the disturbances seemed to continue, an expedition to 
 Shansi was contemplated late in the year. To this the 
 Viceroys of Nanking and Hankow strongly objected, and 
 wrote, November 28th, to Sir Chihchen Lofenglu, the 
 Chinese Minister at London, deprecating the intention of 
 the Allies, as they " feared that new difficulties might crop 
 up at any time ". At this opportune moment they\further 
 advised the British Foreign Office to " stick to the peace 
 agreement of the southern and eastern provinces V, and 
 better yet, " to hasten the opening and conclusion of peace 
 negotiations ". They explained that the new Governor ( Yu 
 Hsien had been removed, soon to be decapitated) was doing 
 all he could and already had *' executed more than eighty 
 of the Boxer insurrectionists ". Lord Lansdowna was able 
 to assure the Viceroys that he was " not aware of Vny pro- 
 posal for an expedition to Shansi ", and in case ohe was 
 contemplated, he would use British influence to the\con- 
 trary.^ i 
 
 Thus it can be seen that affairs in China were far trom 
 tranquil for a long time after the Legations had been re- 
 lieved and China apparently had been crushed. B/^cause 
 of these punitive expeditions and their inevitable ^conse- 
 
 1 China No. 5 {1901), nos. 37, 5^, 53, 95, I59, 217. 
 
 ^ China No. i {igoi), nos. 220, 344; China No. 5 {1901), nos. 4, 15, 
 28, 62, 179, 183^ 184. See also ibid., Inc. 2 and Subinc. 1-5 in no. 62. 
 
573] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER l6l 
 
 quences, namely, prolonging the period of uncertainty and 1 
 unrest and delaying the peace negotiations, China remained 
 in an unsatisfactory state even after the year 1901 was 
 well advanced. So serious was the outlook that it was 
 deemed possible by some to alleviate the situation only by a 
 renewal of hostiHties. This impression was intensified as 
 the months flew past with little or nothing accomplished. 
 The most critical period was apparently the middle of Feb- 
 ruary, 1 901. At that time it became known that Field- 
 Marshal von Waldersee, " in view of the dilatory and ob- 
 structive tactics of the Chinese ", considered that " renewal 
 of operations on a large scale may become necessary ", and 
 General Sir A. Gaselee telegraphed to Downing Street for 
 instructions/ 
 
 Minister Conger did not take kindly to the proposed re- 
 newal of punitive expeditions, and came out with the fol- 
 lowing declaration : 
 
 A report is current that the possibility of an early active 
 
 * See despatch of Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Gaselee to Lord Hamilton of the 
 India Office, Feb. 18, 1901, China No. 6 {1901), no. 100. 
 
 Following is the Army Order of Feb. 15, issued by Field Marshal 
 von Waldersee : 
 
 "Although the peace negotiations still continue to be carried on, their 
 course, up to the present, induces me to point out that a resumption 
 of larger operations may shortly become necessary. I request, there- 
 fore, that, as the favorable season is approaching, such prompt measures 
 be taken as to insure the mobilization of all the troops by the end of the 
 month. It will be necessary in the first place to take care that the 
 troops possess sufficient means of transport to carry with them about 
 eight days' military stores and provisions on difficult mountain roads. 
 
 "Although the greater portion of the Commissariat can be supplied 
 from the field of operations, the circumstances are not sufficiently 
 known to allow of this being counted on with certainty. Transport 
 columns for sending on the necessary additional supplies should there- 
 fore be formed and fitted out, such as will be capable of surmounting 
 considerable difficulties of ground." 
 
 Ibid., no. 105. 
 
1 62 THE BOXER REBELLION [574 
 
 resumption of operations by the military on a large scale, on 
 account of the course taken by the peace negotiations, is being 
 discussed by some of the military commanders, and that pre- 
 parations are being made. Criticism of the military authori- 
 ties is far from my intention, but it is hardly competent that 
 any of the Powers should, seeing that negotiations for a peace- 
 ful settlement have been jointly commenced by all the Govern- 
 ments, take such action as to endanger the concert, disturb the 
 harmony, or place the result of the peace negotiations in 
 jeopardy — i. c, by the resumption of military operations with- 
 out the consent of all parties. 
 
 At the time of the signature of the joint note formulating 
 our demands, I made, in signing it, an express stipulation that 
 my Government should thereby in no way be committed to 
 undertake further military operations. When our British col- 
 league's addition to the last clause was adopted on the declared 
 understanding that it limited the military operations to the 
 occupation of Peking and this province (Chihli), the note was 
 finally agreed to. 
 
 I would propose, supposing that the report I have heard 
 proves true with regard to the proposed military operations, 
 and if my colleagues agree with me, that we should recommend 
 either to our Governments or to our respective military com- 
 manders to wait till the peace negotiations have arrived at 
 such a stage as to warrant, in the united opinion of the Gov- 
 ernments, the resumption of military operations as now 
 contemplated.^ 
 
 Sir Ernest Satow informed Minister Conger that " no 
 official information " of this extreme step had reached him. 
 However, he found it necessary first, as Conger had inti- 
 mated, to consult the Foreign Office at home. M. Pichon, 
 the French Minister, seemed decidedly in favor of an 
 avowed resumption of military operations, and thought that 
 
 ^ China No. 6 {1901), no. 105. 
 
575] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 163 
 
 " such a warning might be of assistance to the negotia- 
 tions ". Furthermore, he discovered that some 35,000 
 Chinese '' were threatening the French troops in the south 
 of the province", and that their advance (from Shansi 
 presumably, for in that neighboring province von Wal- 
 dersee seemed disposed to renew hostihties) has to be kept 
 in check ". The idea of a punitive expedition appealed to 
 him, and he did not think that " we ought to make any en- 
 gagements not to take military movements, and thus tie our 
 hands ". The Russian Minister agreed that the situation 
 was '' a grave one ", yet was of the opinion that *' the Gov- 
 ernments ought to arrive at an understanding with regard 
 to the question now raised ", thus placing himself in favor 
 of the fundamental idea underlying Minister Conger's dec- 
 laration/ 
 
 This serious difficulty seems to have arisen mainly from 
 the exasperation of the military at the way in which nego- 
 tiations were being dragged out, although this cannot be 
 considered a sufficient provocation. The final stand of 
 Downing Street was in opposition, although it was inti- 
 mated that " we were sincerely anxious to give Count Wal- 
 dersee all the support in our power ", and for this reason 
 the Foreign Office would " regret very much to spoil the 
 effect of any demonstration which he might deem neces- 
 sary by an appearance of disapproval ". But Lord Lans- 
 downe made it clear that Great Britain was " not prepared 
 to sanction employment of force under your (Gaselee's) 
 command on expeditions to places remote from the capi- 
 tal ".^ It soon developed that Count von Waldersee " acted 
 without special instructions from the German Government". 
 But Count Hatzfeldt informed Lord Lansdowne that the 
 object of the Commander-in-Chief " was to induce the 
 
 1 China No. 6 (1901), no. 105. ^ Ibid., nos. no, 118. 
 
 I ^ 
 
1 64 THE BOXER REBELLION [576 
 
 Chinese Government to comply with the demands of the 
 Powers ", and he " earnestly trusted " that the British For- 
 eign Office would not refuse support if such action became 
 necessary. Lord Lansdowne replied that " His Majesty's 
 Government was most anxious to avoid any appearance of 
 reluctance to support Count Waldersee ", yet was disin- 
 clined to join and did not desire to join unless no other 
 course were possible/ 
 
 No doubt the German Commander-in-Chief intended his 
 order as nothing more than a threat to China, to make it 
 clear to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries that the patience of 
 the Powers, both diplomatic and military, was well-nigh 
 exhausted. If such were the case, a *' good effect " was 
 immediately produced by the proposal, " to which pub- 
 licity was given, and by the movement of troops, for a tele- 
 gram urging prompt acceptance of our demands with re- 
 gard to punishment (of officials and Boxers) has been sent 
 by the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to Hsi-an " (Sianfu),^ the 
 city in Shensi where the Imperial Court was sojourning 
 during the occupation of Peking. 
 
 Before reviewing the final peace negotiations, it is ad- 
 visable to consider the situation at Tientsin and its out- 
 come. With the capture of that city, the Allied army re- 
 mained in possession, and after the fall of Peking still re- 
 mained. Ulterior motives of the European Governments 
 developed about the middle of November, 1900. The fol- 
 lowing month, Minister Conger " confirmed " his previous 
 telegrams that the Powers were seeking permanent exten- 
 sions to the concessions which they already occupied. 
 Conger rightly regarded this action as a *' dangerous prece- 
 dent ", and added his opinion that " all extensions of for- 
 
 1 China No. 6 (1901), no. 120. 
 ^Ibid., no. 105. 
 
^yy-\ THE RESTORATION OF ORDER i6^ 
 
 eign settlements should be international "/ As Russia 
 had started the fracas, Conger directed the United States 
 consul at Tientsin, Mr. Ragsdale, to " enter a protest ", 
 while he himself prepared to remonstrate with the Russian 
 Minister at Peking.^ These proposed extensions of the 
 Russians and Belgians, and those later demanded by the 
 Germans, French, Austrians, and Japanese, were denounced 
 by the American representative as a '' grab game " which 
 was " neither fair nor consistent ". It may be remarked 
 in passing that throughout his tenure of office, in this most 
 difficult period of modern Chinese history. Minister Conger 
 was an able exponent of the American policy, as followed 
 from the beginning and elaborated by Secretary Hay, of 
 friendship for and justice to China, and of unselfish pro- 
 tection of American and Chinese interests, especially at this 
 time when China was practically friendless and knew not 
 what to do or where to turn. Of course, in this Tientsin 
 affair, Conger admitted that, "since there are so many regu- 
 larly established concessions at Tientsin an international 
 one is hardly to be expected ", but he contended that " all 
 action in relation to securing new or extending old conces- 
 sions should be deferred until order is restored, the Chinese 
 Government re-established, and the rights and interests of 
 all can be considered ". 
 
 As regarded the policy of the United States in this mat- 
 ter. Conger remarked : 
 
 It would be advantageous to us in many ways to have an 
 American concession at Tientsin, but we have learned by ex- 
 perience that it takes both money and citizens to own and oper- 
 ate a concession. We have not enough there of either. The 
 Department (of State) is familiar with our former efforts to 
 
 ^ Like the one at Shanghai. 
 ' U. S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 39. 
 
1 66 THE BOXER REBELLION [378 
 
 sustain the desirable concession which had to be abandoned in 
 1896. If, however, the United States Government can in any 
 way take upon itself part of the burden, as the other Govern- 
 ments do, it may be advisable for us to demand consideration 
 of our rights to a concession while the others are taking and 
 dividing up all available territory.^ 
 
 It was plainly Conger's intention to play safe until the 
 matter had been definitely determined. 
 
 The Russian Circular announcing the occupation of the 
 left bank of the Peiho river, opposite the foreign conces- 
 sions already established, was the first to appear, early in 
 November. Said this typically Russian document : 
 
 Since the 17th of June last the Imperial Chinese troops have 
 joined the rioters (Boxers) who attacked the foreign conces- 
 sions and the railway station occupied by the Russian troops, 
 and that on the 23d of June the Russian reinforcements, who 
 came to raise the blockade, swept the left bank of the Peiho 
 . . . and have established themselves there hy right of con- 
 quest ^ in having taken possession by force of arms and at the 
 price of Russian blood spilled, in order to prevent the Chinese 
 from returning to resume the firing. His Excellency (Lieu- 
 tenant-General Linevitch) considers all this tract of land . . . 
 as having become the property of the Russian troops on the 
 23d of June by act of war. 
 
 The Russian flags have been planted, and notice posted upon 
 boards in many places within the territory, which has been 
 occupied and protected by the Russian military authorities. 
 Therefore his Excellency can not and will not recognize, ex- 
 cept by his special authorization, any cession whatever of this 
 territory of which he has taken entire and complete possession,^ 
 
 On November 20th, the French Consul-General, G. du 
 
 1 U. S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 40. 
 ' The italics are the author's. 
 »U. S. For. ReL, 1901, p. 41. 
 
579] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 167 
 
 Chaylard, who also was the president of the municipal coun- 
 cil of Tientsin, undertook " to warn foreign residents 
 against the consequences they would expose themselves to 
 by buying ground in the quarter presently annexed to the 
 French concession ", and declared that he would not ''recog- 
 nize as valid any contract subsequent to June 17th, the 
 date on which hostilities began ". However, " all land 
 holders, bearers of regular titles issued before the 17th of 
 June ", were '* requested to exhibit them at the French Con- 
 sulate, where they shall be duly verified and registered "/ 
 Then followed a designation of the area of the proposed 
 extension. 
 
 Belgium likewise grabbed all in sight that was possible 
 for so small a kingdom, and " appropriated to its sole use 
 and benefit " a large tract east of the Peiho river. Then 
 followed the other Powers, each in every instance with its 
 additions carefully defined and all others solemnly warned 
 not to interfere with its squatter rights.^ Here again we 
 find that Russia was the prime mover and set the example 
 for the rest, and that then as now, when there is any terri- 
 torial complication in the Far East as well as in cer- 
 tain other parts of the world, it is advisable first to ex- 
 amine the Russian attitude. Generally, it will be the key 
 to the whole situation. 
 
 The United States, in its not altogether enviable position 
 as guardia'i of Chinese territorial integrity, soon had its 
 hands full and, rather to its regret, was forced to take a 
 seemingly inconsistent stand which needs careful explana- 
 tion to be seen in the right light. On February 26, 1901, 
 Minister Conger reported to the Department of State that, 
 
 1 U. S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 42. 
 
 'For the Belgian circular see ibid., p. 42; Austrian, p. 46; Italian, 
 p. 47; Ja])anese, p. 47; German, p. 52. 
 
 \ 
 
l68 THE BOXER REBELLION [^go 
 
 notwithstanding his protests, all available territory except 
 the small tract which in 1896 had formed the American 
 concession, had been seized by the land-hungry Powers. 
 With an eye to the future, Conger found it necessary to in- 
 struct Consul Ragsdale to serve notice on the other Consuls 
 that " that tract must be left for part of an international 
 settlement or a United States concession, which will be de- 
 termined when order is restored ". He emulated the Euro- 
 pean notes in finalty of argument by adding, as they had 
 done in every instance, '' that the United States will not 
 recognize seizure or adverse occupation ".^ This was the 
 wisest course, considering the circumstances, and was fully 
 approved by Secretary Hay. 
 
 Minister Conger strengthened his position by submitting 
 to the Department of State a communication solicited from 
 Major-General Chaffee, commanding the American troops 
 in China. The General was of the following opinion : 
 
 Owing to recent events in this section of China and with a 
 view to the future expansion of trade by the United States 
 at Tientsin and adjacent country, I think it not improbable 
 our Government would be willing to recover, if it can be done 
 without friction, its old concession at Tientsin. Further, it 
 might wish or consent to do so for a few yean- at least, as a 
 military necessity, in order to afford undisputel footing for 
 its troops and stores in case of renewal of disturb.ince pending 
 a few years of trial of the Chinese Government ta restore and 
 maintain public order. 
 
 ********* 
 
 It is my opinion that our Government should recover this 
 concession if it can do so at once and without senous diffi- 
 culty. I leave the subject with you (Conger), hovxver, to 
 represent to Washington. As the matter is now in s ich con- 
 dition that delay might bring about the threatened absorption 
 
 1 U. 'S. For. ReL, 1901, p. 58. 
 
 i 
 
^8i] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 169 
 
 before report could be made and received by mail, the dis- 
 position of the Government might be obtained by using the 
 cable. ^ 
 
 Minister Conger v^as careful to inform Consul Ragsdale 
 in regard to this delicate matter : ^ 
 
 * U. S. For. ReL, 1901, p. 49. Major Foote of the American force 
 at Tientsin gives further information, ihid., pp. 49, 50. Reply of 
 Minister Conger to General Chaffee, ihid., pp. 51, 52. 
 
 ' The history of the American " concession " is an interesting one. 
 According to Consul 'Ragsdale (to Major Foote) it is as follows: 
 
 " Sir : With reference to the old American concession at Tientsin, 
 and in compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit that 
 in the year 1869 there was laid out at Tientsin three tracts of land for 
 English, French, and American residents, and that for some years 
 our Government exercised in a way jurisdiction over the same. 
 
 " On October 12, 1880, the concession was relegated to its former 
 status (meaning back to China) "with the understanding that if at 
 some future time it shall become desirable to establish suitable muni- 
 cipal regulations therein it shall be competent for the consular au- 
 thorities to do so." 
 
 " Under date of October 14, 1880, the Taotai Cheng acknowledged 
 receipt of the dispatch sent to him by the Consul two days before, 
 and it stated that if any American consul in future should " desire 
 to have the settlement revert to the present system of administration 
 he must first arrange with the customs taotai as to the mode of admin- 
 istration, and if there be nothing objectionable in same there should 
 be nothing to prevent the settlement from reverting to the original 
 Government." 
 
 " Sometime in the year 1896 a movement was on foot to cede this 
 territory to the Germans, against which action a protest was filed and 
 correspondence in relation thereto with the State Department followed, 
 and finally on April 2, 1896, the Minister (Denby) advised that all 
 jurisdiction over the property be abandoned, and on June 2^ instructed 
 the United States Consul at Tientsin to advise the taotai to that 
 effect." 
 
 Then Consul Ragsdale gives an opinion of his own. " It has never 
 been the policy of our Government to acquire territory abroad, and 
 that policy may be a wise one in most instances, but at Tientsin I 
 think it would be wise for our Government to have some place over 
 which they could exercise some control. The trouble in north China 
 is not over (this was Feb. 15, 1901), and final settlement day is a long 
 ways off, etc." 
 
170 THE BOXER REBELLION [582 
 
 It is against the declared policy of our Government in any way 
 to make the military movement in China a pretext for seizing 
 or obtaining territory; and it is for this reason that I have 
 instructed you to make the protests which you have made 
 against the seizures by other Powers. 
 
 Then came the first definite announcement of the American 
 policy : 
 
 But in order that we may prevent every possible place being 
 occupied by others, so that if the Government desires to apply 
 for a concession after order is restored, we may be able to 
 reoccupy at least the small tract that was formerly the United 
 States concession, or, preferably, have it included in an inter- 
 national settlement, and still be consistent with the position we 
 have already taken (meaning the protests to the other Powers), 
 you may send the enclosed, in the form of a note from your- 
 self, to each of your colleagfues.^ 
 
 The " inclosed " was a brief communication stating that 
 the United States had revived its right to its former con- 
 cession, to be used either as such or as part of an inter- 
 national one.^ 
 
 (Continued from previous page.) See U. S. For, Rel., 1901, p. 50. 
 
 Minister Denby, October 15, 1896, made a pertinent observation: 
 "As there is no record showing that any concession was ever actually 
 made to the United States, and in view of the further fact that we, 
 many years ago, relinquished whatever control we may have been 
 allowed to exercise over the land, it would seem that we are not in a 
 position to maintain that we are entitled to resume jurisdiction over 
 the tract, even if it is considered desirable to do so." Ibid., p. 50. 
 
 1 U. S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 51. 
 
 2 Copy of Notice to be Served on Foreign Consuls by United States 
 
 Consul at Tientsin Relative to Preservation of the Tract of 
 
 Land Known as the United States Concession in Tientsin. 
 
 For the purpose of preserving the tract of land known as the United 
 
 States concession in Tientsin, to be with other tracts organized into an 
 
 international settlement if possible, but, if not, then at the proper time 
 
 whenever it may legally be done, to be reoccupied as a United States 
 
 ^ 
 
583] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 171 
 
 However, the United States seemed disinclined to ap- 
 propriate this ground, ahhough it was occupied temporarily 
 in the hope that it could be converted into an international 
 settlement. As the other Powers did not care for such an 
 arrangement, it was next proposed to come to terms with 
 Great Britain. Immediate action was imperative, as this 
 " no man's land " was " rapidly filling up with bad charac- 
 ters, making some control absolutely necessary ".^ Sir 
 Ernest Satow offered to arrange the matter on these con- 
 ditions to be observed : 
 
 1. The United States Government to reserve the right to 
 exercise exclusive military control over the concession in case 
 of necessity. 
 
 2. The United States Government to reserve the right to 
 moor a gunboat or gunboats at the bund of the United States 
 concession in case of necessity. 
 
 3. At least one American citizen to be on the extra conces- 
 sion council. In the event of there being no American citizen 
 on the extra concession council in the ordinary way, the United 
 States Consul should have the right to nominate one by virtue 
 of this arrangement. 
 
 4. All transfers of land in the United States concession to 
 be registered at the United States Consulate. 
 
 5. No special regulations which apply to the United States 
 concession and not to other parts of the British extra con- 
 cession to be made without the approval of the United States 
 Consul. 
 
 concession, the undersigned, by direction of the United States Legation 
 at Peking, hereby serves this formal notice of such intention on the 
 part of his Government, and requests that it be in every way respected. 
 No adverse seizure or occupancy of any part of this tract can be 
 recognized or allowed. 
 
 James W. Ragsdale, 
 
 United States Consul. 
 
 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1901, p. 53- 
 
1^2 THE BOXER REBELLION [584 
 
 6. The United States Government to reserve the right to 
 terminate the arrangement with the British extra concession 
 on giving one year's notice and assuming any financial Habili- 
 ties which may have been incurred for the development of the 
 concession with the consent of the United States Consul.^ 
 
 -'-'The next step was the formal application of Minister 
 Conger for a retrocession of this land to the United States. 
 Quite unexpectedly, difficulties arose. Foreign interests, 
 Li Hung-chang explained, were in possession; at any rate, 
 it seemed certain that some foreign concerns were decidedly 
 adverse to having the United States resume its former title. 
 Li Hung-chang offered to compromise the matter by urging 
 Conger to " accept a much larger and unoccupied tract a 
 long way down the river ", but this, the American Minister 
 insisted, " would not satisfy us ", since the other tract, even 
 with its present occupants, " exactly suited our purpose and 
 was the only tract we desired ". The " present occupants", 
 according to Li, were " some of the foremost and wealthiest 
 Chinese in the Empire ". However, it seems certain that 
 some foreign investment companies were causing the real 
 difficulty. Minister Conger wore himself out over the 
 matter, and finally Secretary Hay likewise became dis- 
 gusted, as the land after all was of little value. Therefore, 
 November 27th, he notified Conger that " it seems unde- 
 sirable to press the matter further at present ", in view of 
 the difficult situation which had arisen since the United 
 States had relinquished possession.^ It was indeed curious 
 that when the United States, through force of circum- 
 stances, endeavored to deviate just a hair's-breath from its 
 traditional policy, this was found to be impossible. Fate 
 
 *U. S. For. ReL, 1901, pp. 53, 54. 
 
 ' See especially ibid., Inc. no. 769, pp. 54-56, also the correspondence 
 with the Chinese officials, pp. 56-58, and Secretary Hay's reply of 
 November 27, 1901, pp. 58, 59. 
 
 r 
 
585] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 73 
 
 seemed to have decreed that the American Power, to its 
 everlasting credit, should be utterly landless in China. 
 
 We can now turn to Peking and follow the many and 
 complicated issues confronting China and the Powers to 
 their conclusion in the Peace Protocol of September 7, 
 1 90 1. China was now completely cowed into submission, 
 the final touch having been given by the occupation of the 
 Imperial City where the court palaces and grounds were 
 situated, and into which heretofore no ordinary mortal had 
 entered. At first the Allies were a bit dubious about at- 
 tacking this hallowed quarter, and deemed such action be- 
 yond their military instructions. So the Generals left the 
 matter with the Diplomatic Body for settlement, and the 
 latter were " of unanimous conviction that failure to crush 
 the resistance of the Chinese troops, holding the Forbidden 
 City, would have disastrous consequences in prolonging a 
 state of anarchy, and diminishing the chances for peace ". 
 Therefore it was decided to take the Imperial Palace, but 
 before the attempt could be made the Chinese troops evacu- 
 ated it. Nevertheless, the Generals decided to march the 
 Allied army through it, " lest the Chinese, with their in- 
 finite capacity for misrepresentation, should infer that some 
 supernatural power had intervened, so that the Allied forces 
 had been affected by fear of the consequences of invading 
 the sacred precincts ". The final decision was to go through 
 the Imperial Palace in complete military array, then close 
 the gates and keep them closed until the Court, which had 
 gone " westward on a tour ", in other words fled the city, 
 should come back. On August 28th, the impressive cere- 
 mony was gone through, to the infinite humiliation of the 
 Chinese populace, which had never heard of nor witnessed 
 such an act of sacrilege. That the harsh conduct of the 
 Allies was, however, both necessary and desirable is beyond 
 dispute. The British Minister wisely refrained from giv- 
 
 I 
 
174 THE BOXER REBELLION [586 
 
 ing a graphic description of the event, as he would " not 
 attempt to compete with the numerous newspaper corres- 
 pondents who took part in the ceremony "/ 
 ' The Summer Palace of the Emperor, a short distance 
 from the capital, likewise came in for its share of attention. 
 . A report had reached the Russian military authorities that 
 \ the Boxer bands in the neighborhood were using the Pal- 
 ace as a sort of target, firing volleys into it every night. 
 ^ The Russians, by the way, had occupied the Palace imme- 
 j diately after the capture of Peking, but in their policy of 
 j making friends with China they left no stones unturned, 
 I particularly in actions such as these, to bring about desired 
 results. Therefore, on their own initiative and without 
 consulting the Allies, they had marched out and handed 
 over both the Summer and the Winter Palaces to the Chi- 
 nese. Field-Marshal von Waldersee though this the best 
 plan, but the British Minister emphatically objected to it 
 as " most undesirable " at this juncture of affairs. The 
 upshot of the matter was that the British decided to move 
 into the Summer Palace themselves and hold it until order 
 was restored. Probably in order to have some company 
 they extended an invitation to the Italian contingent to join 
 them, and these welcomed the opportunity to take part. 
 That some minor Chinese officials were already in posses- 
 sion might have seemed rather embarrassing at first glance, 
 but it further developed that the native custodians '* were 
 only too glad to hand the Palace over ", as they were " un- 
 armed, and had also nothing to eat ". Minister MacDon- 
 ald considered it his duty to take over the Palace upon 
 evacuation by the Russians " in order to maintain the con- 
 sistent attitude which the combination of western Powers 
 had assumed ", which attitude, so it appeared, would not 
 
 ^ See China No. 5 (1901), no. 209. See also U. S. For. Rel., 1900, 
 p. 198. 
 
I 
 
 IF 
 
 587] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 75 
 
 allow of the abandonment of any action or precedent after' 
 it had once been established/ 
 
 By the acceptance of the credentials of Prince Ching and 
 Li Hung-chang the situation had at last reached the point 
 where definite negotiations could begin. Naturally, the 
 punishment of the guilty was the question uppermost in the 
 earliest stage of settlement. In regard to this, the first at- 
 tempt at solution, the German Government had the honor 
 of making the first move. Count von Biilow was of the 
 conviction that, " before entering into negotiations for 
 peace, public opinion in Germany would require that the 
 Government should obtain some satisfaction for the out- 
 rages committed in China ".^ For argument von Biilow 
 harked back to the times of i860 and said that if the leaders 
 responsible for the outrages of that period had been '* ade- 
 quately punished ", the present lamentable state of affairs 
 would never have occurred. 
 
 Accordingly, September 18, 1900, the Gerg;ian Charge 
 at Washington presented a Circular to the Department of 
 State as follows : 
 
 The Government of His Majesty the Emperor considers as a 
 preliminary condition for entering into diplomatic negotiations 
 with the Chinese Government a surrender of such persons as 
 are determined upon as being the first and real perpetrators of 
 the crimes committed in Peking against international law. The 
 number of perpetrators who served as tools is too great; a 
 wholesale execution would be adverse to the civilized con- 
 science. Furthermore, circumstances would not allow that 
 even the group of leaders could be completely ascertained. 
 But the few among them whose guilt is notorious should be 
 urrendered or punished. The representatives of the Powers 
 
 ^ See China No. 5 (1901), nos. 75, 208, 211 and Inc. i and 2 in no. 211. 
 * China No. i (1901), no. 365. 
 
176 I'HE BOXER REBELLION [^88 
 
 in Peking will be in a position to make or adduce in this in- 
 vestigation fully valid testimony. The number of those pun- 
 ished is of less importance than their character as principal 
 instigators and leaders. The Government of His Majesty the 
 Emperor believes that it can depend in this matter upon the 
 concurrence of all the Cabinets; for indifference toward the 
 idea of a just expiation would be equivalent to indifference 
 toward a repetition of the crime. 
 
 Germany further proposed that the Diplomatic Body at 
 Peking should " designate the principal Chinese personages 
 whose guilt in the instigation or execution of the crimes is 
 beyond a doubt ".^ 
 
 To which Acting Secretary David J. Hill replied : 
 
 The Government of the United States has from the outset 
 proclaimed its purpose to hold to the uttermost accountability 
 the responsible authors of any wrongs done in China to citizens 
 of the United States and their interests, as was stated in the 
 Government's circular communication to the Powers of July 
 3 last. These wrongs have been committed not only in Peking, 
 but in many parts of the Empire, and their punishment is be- 
 lieved to be an essential element of any effective settlement 
 which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring 
 about permanent safety and peace in China. It is thought, 
 however, that no punitive measures can be effective by way of 
 reparation for wrongs suffered and as deterrent examples for 
 the future as the degradation and punishment of the respon- 
 sible authors by the supreme Imperial authority itself ; and it 
 seems only just to China that she should be afforded in the 
 first instance an opportunity to do this, and thus rehabilitate 
 herself before the world. Believing thus, and without abating 
 in any wise its deliberate purpose to exact the fullest accoun- 
 tability from the responsible authors of the wrongs we have 
 suffered in China, the Government of the United States is not 
 
 ^U. S. For. Re!., 1900, p. 341. See also p. 306. 
 
589] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 77 
 
 disposed, as a preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic 
 negotiations with the Chinese Government, to join in a demand 
 that said Government surrender to the Powers such persons 
 as, according to the determination of the Powers themselves, 
 may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those 
 wrongs. On the other hand, this Government is disposed to 
 hold that the punishment of the high responsible authors of 
 these wrongs, not only in Peking, but throughout China, is 
 essentially a condition to be embraced and provided for in the 
 negotiations for a final settlement. It is the purpose of this 
 Government at the earliest practicable moment to name its 
 plenipotentiaries for negotiating a settlement with China, and 
 in the meantime to authorize its Minister in Peking to enter 
 forthwith into conference with the duly authorized represen- 
 tatives of the Chinese Government with a view to bringing 
 about a preliminary agreement whereby the full exercise of 
 the Imperial power for the preservation of order and the pro- 
 tection of foreign life and property throughout China pending 
 final negotiations with the, Powers shall be assured.^ 
 
 The American reply was the most unfavorable and about 
 the only one out and out opposed to the proposal of the Ger- 
 man Government. This was because the Department of 
 State frankly doubted the advisability, or even the success, 
 of this preliminary diplomatic procedure. 
 
 Replies from the other Powers were more reassuring to 
 the German Government. Austria, as of course everyone 
 expected, accepted the German proposition " without re- 
 serve ".^ Japan also believed that punishment should first 
 take place and so was ready to cooperate in the spirit sug- 
 gested by Germany, although the Tokyo Government anti- 
 cipated " grave difficulties " in this undertaking.^ Count 
 
 ^U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 341, 342. See also China No. i (iQOi), 
 10. 385. 
 'U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 394. * China No. i (1901), no. 370. 
 
178 THE BOXER REBELLION [590 
 
 Lamsdorff answered unofficially for the Russian Govern- 
 ment at one of his famous weekly receptions in St. Peters- 
 burg. The Count intimated that the German proposals 
 were *' somewhat vague " as to whether the prescribed per- 
 sons were to be punished by the Powers or by China. As 
 far as he was concerned, he '' would prefer that the role of 
 executioner, if necessary, should be undertaken by the Chi- 
 nese Government, who appeared to have a special aptitude 
 for such a task ". But no more than Russia, it may be re- 
 marked, in the light of the massacre of Blagovestchensk in 
 July, 1900, when the progress of the Amur was choked by 
 the corpses of 5,000 unoffending civilian Chinese, driven 
 into the river at the point of the bayonet. Count Lams- 
 dorff was of opinion that exile would be sufficient punish- 
 ment for those Boxer leaders and sympathizers of high 
 rank who might be declared guilty. Later, September 26th, 
 the Russian Government agreed " in principle " to the Ger- 
 man proposal, which the United States practically had not 
 done. But Russia asked for more particulars on the subject 
 of surrender of the guilty, whether these were to be handed 
 over to the Diplomatic iJody or were to be punished by 
 China. ^ Italy " accepted the German note in principle 
 and replied to that effect ".^ Naturally, the entire Triple 
 Alliance would adhere to the policy suggested by its leader. 
 Lord Salisbury wanted time '' for a few day's reflec- 
 tion ". He admitted that the proposal awakened * 'profound 
 sympathy" as to contents, and that the retribution sug- 
 gested was " not only richly deserved, but that an element 
 of security for the future will be lost if that punishment 
 cannot be inflicted ". Although France had given an affir- 
 
 '^ China No. i {1901), nos. 376. z^^, 395. 
 2 Ihid., no. 398. 
 
59 1 ] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 79 
 
 mative reply/ Lord Salisbury decided that, while ordinarily 
 he would have given " an unreserved assent ", yet the nature 
 of the proposal was of such consequence that first he wished 
 to communicate with the British Minister at Peking on the 
 following points : 
 
 1. Whether he (Minister MacDonald) and the other foreign 
 representatives could with any certainty and on clear evidence 
 designate those who were really responsible for the recent 
 outrages. 
 
 2. Whether, in the event of the Chinese Government refusing 
 to surrender or to punish these persons, or returning evasive 
 answers, it would be practicable to seize them.^ 
 
 To which MacDonald replied, September 29th: 
 
 1. It is quite possible to designate the guilty with certainty, 
 and is likely that the list of each of my colleagues would be 
 identical with the others. 
 
 2. Prince Tuan, being one of the chief offenders, and seem- 
 ing to be de facto the Chinese Government at the present time, 
 it will be most difficult to seize the guilty.^ 
 
 On the same day that the British Foreign Office received 
 these answers from Peking, the second of which must be re- 
 garded as rather unfavorable to the German proposal, the 
 news also came of a Chinese edict, promulgated September 
 25th, in which punishment was defined and prescribed for a 
 number of the most guilty. Evidently, China was doing 
 the best under the circumstances to anticipate the German 
 action and to propitiate the Powers. The edict read : 
 
 * Delcasse approved " with much satisfaction of the German Circular " 
 
 as it practically coincided with his own views as he had expressed 
 them to the Chinese Government in July last. China No. i (1901), 
 no. 394- 
 
 2 Ibid., nos. 386, 3^7- 
 
 ^Ibid., no. 399. 
 
l8o THE BOXER REBELLION [^^2 
 
 The present troubles have been occasioned against the will 
 of the Throne. The Boxer brigands have been incited by 
 Princes and Ministers, and war with friendly natives (na- 
 tions?) has been the result. The Court has had to flee (to 
 Sianfu), and although the Throne is itself to blame, the Princes 
 and Ministers are largely culpable in various degrees. Ac- 
 cordingly, four Imperial Princes are deprived of office and 
 rank. Prince Tuan is degraded from office, but given the 
 privilege of trial by the Clansmen's Court. Kang Yi and 
 Chao Shu-chiao are handed over to the Censorate for pun- 
 ishment.^ 
 
 1 China No. i (1901), no. 400. See also China No. 5 (1901), no. 9. 
 
 Regarding the Edict of September 25, Lord Salisbury expressed to 
 the Chinese Minister at London his " satisfaction with the results that 
 had so far been attained by the issue of the Edict of the Emperor of 
 China in regard to the most guilty of the Chinese statesmen." But 
 Lord Salisbury admitted that the edict's " real value would ultimately 
 be decided by the practical eflfect which the Chinese Government should 
 give to its provisions." China No. 5 (ipoi), no. 6. 
 
 Sir Claude MacDonald was not so sure. " The various Boards (of 
 the Yamen) are left to decide the penalties to be inflicted." He noticed 
 too that, although punishment of Prince Tuan was included, " Yu 
 Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Tung Fu-hsiang and others are omitted." 
 In criticism of the Edi^t he said: "Although this decree does not in 
 itself prove that the Throne has either the will or the power to inflict 
 adequate punishment, it may be accepted as a step in the right direc- 
 tion." China No. 5 (1901), no. 16. 
 
 Said Acting Consul-General Warren at Shanghai: "This (referring 
 to the Edict of September 25), in the opinion of the Wuchang Viceroy, 
 is the first step in the real policy of the Court." Unfortunately, " the 
 general impression among Chinese here is that these edicts, professing 
 to punish the reactionaries, are really intended only to mislead the 
 foreign Powers as to the sincerity of the Court's regret, and there is 
 evidence to support this idea." Also, " the fact that Yu Hsien should 
 be awarded no punishment, and that Prince Tuan should be replaced 
 by an official equally as bad as, if not worse than, himself, seems to 
 show that the Court has not the power to punish those who deserve 
 punishment most. The immunity from censure enjoyed by Jung Lu 
 and Tung Fu-hsiang, both qf whom are supported by large forces of 
 troops, is also an argument in favor of this conclusion." Ibid., no. 18. 
 
593] -^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER l8i 
 
 The appearance of the above decree altered the situation 
 to an appreciable extent and forced Germany to add to her 
 note the following questions, asking the Powers for a con- 
 sideration and opinion of them: 
 
 1. Whether the list of persons to be punished, as contained 
 in the Chinese edict (the above decree of September 25) is suf- 
 ficient and correct. 
 
 2. Whether the proposed punishments are suitable. 
 
 3. In what manner the Powers will be able to control the 
 execution of these punishments.^ 
 
 As regarded these questions, Italy decided " to accept ", 
 but would " reserve the right of instructing their represen- 
 tative in Peking to come to an agreement with his col- 
 leagues as to the manner of ascertaining these three 
 points".^ France notified her Charge at Berlin "to inform 
 the German Government that the Government of the Re- 
 public accept the proposals made by them in connection with 
 China ".^ The British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir F. Las- 
 celles, was able to inform von Biilow on October 4th, " on 
 the arrival of the Queen's messenger ", that Lord Salis- 
 bury substantially agreed with the German views.* Japan 
 also expressed approval, in fact was very friendly about it, 
 assuring von Biilow that he had " the cordial support and 
 approval of the Imperial Japanese Government '\ which 
 would be " pleased " to have him " accept that assurance as 
 
 1 China No. 5 (7901), Inc. in no. 5, giving French version and trans. 
 For "the same in German and trans., see no. 10, Inc. 
 
 'Further: "The Italian Government do not desire to put themselves 
 in a prominent position in China in view of their slight interests there, 
 but to maintain the concert by giving such replies to proposals of the 
 other Powers (France and Russia up to this date) as nelp in this 
 direction." Ibid., no. 14. 
 
 3 Ibid., no. 19. 
 
 *Ibid., no. 25. 
 
l82 THE BOXER REBELLION [594 
 
 a full and satisfactory response to the proposal ". How- 
 ever, Japan suggested " that the sphere of usefulness of the 
 foreign representatives in Peking would be greatly enlarged 
 if all the questions which are to serve as the basis of nego- 
 tiations with China were to be presented to them for col- 
 lective examination ". In this, it may be remarked, Japan 
 anticipated a later development in the negotiations. But as 
 regarded Germany's efforts, Japan was convinced they were 
 " a step in the right direction ",^ which was comforting to 
 von Billow, as the United States in particular did not re- 
 gard them as such. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Diplomatic Body at Peking held a meet- 
 ing to consider the three German questions, and the follow- 
 ing answers were unanimously ^ adopted : 
 
 1. As far as it goes the list is a correct one, though the 
 names of Tung Fu-hsiang and Yu Hsien should be inserted. 
 
 2. The penalties imposed are not sufficiently severe. 
 
 3. It is advisable that the punishments be carried out in 
 Peking in the presence of the military or civil foreign rep- 
 resentatives.® 
 
 September 27th, Count Lamsdorff gave the definite reply 
 of Russia to the German note. As regards the first two 
 points, these Russia "accepted in principle", but the ^'modus 
 procedendi, as traced in the German Circular, presented, 
 however, certain difficulties ". Lamsdorff did not believe 
 that China would hand over the principal offenders to the 
 Powers for punishment, " since the guilty persons would 
 probably be found to be in the entourage of the Emperor 
 
 1 China No. 5 (1901), no. 60 and Inc. i in no. 60. 
 
 'The Russian Minister was not present, as at this time the Russian 
 Legation staff was sojourning at Tientsin. Germany and Austria were 
 represented by their Charge d' Affaires. 
 
 ' Ibid., no. 35. 
 
595] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 83 
 
 and Dowager Empress ". /\nd so, '' as their surrender 
 would almost certainly be refused, the negotiations would 
 be indefinitely postponed ". As the best way out of the 
 difficulty, in the opinion of Count Lamsdorff : 
 
 The punishment of the leaders of the movement should, during 
 the course of the negotiations, be demanded from the Chinese 
 Plenipotentiaries as one of the guarantees to be exacted from 
 the Emperor of China as security against any further repetition 
 of the attacks on the representatives of foreign Powers, and 
 upon the lives and property of foreigners in China. 
 
 Lamsdorff further remarked : 
 
 Apart from the anomaly of asking China to hand over its sub- 
 jects to the foreign Powers for punishment . . . their punish- 
 ment by the central Imperial authority would have a far greater 
 effect throughout the whole of the Chinese Empire than the 
 infliction by the Allied Powers of just retribution upon the 
 guilty — a task which, to the Russian Government at least, 
 would be extremely distasteful. 
 
 The British Ambassador, Mr. C. Hardinge, then ventured 
 to suggest to Lamsdorff that, '' for all practical purposes, 
 the views of the Russian Government coincided with those 
 of the United States ". This drew from the Count the re- 
 ply that, " the Russian Government had by no means re- 
 jected the German proposal, nor had replied to it in such 
 categorical terms as those in which the American reply had 
 been couched ".^ 
 
 Germany, however, had at least succeeded in starting the 
 negotiations, which was accomplishing not a little; but 
 now the German note was overshadowed in importance by 
 the French proposals. These were more inclusive and to 
 the point than the single proposition advanced by Germany. 
 
 ^ China No. 5 {190 1), no. 22. 
 
184 I^HE BOXER REBELLION [^96 
 
 The suggestions of France as a basis for negotiations read 
 as follows : 
 
 1. Punishment of the principal culprits, to be designated by 
 the representatives of the Powers at Peking. 
 
 2. Maintenance of the prohibition of import of arms. 
 
 3. Equitable indemnities for States, Societies, and in- 
 dividuals. : ' 
 
 4. Establishment of a permanent Legation guard at Peking. 
 
 5. Dismantlement of the Forts at Taku. 
 
 6. Military occupation of two or three points on the road 
 from Tientsin to Taku, which would thus be always open in the 
 event of the Legations wishing to reach the sea, or for forces 
 coming from the sea with the object of proceeding to the 
 capital.^ 
 
 The simplest way of discussing these French proposals 
 would be to run them through to their acceptance by the 
 'Powers ^ and China, and then to take them up in detail, 
 
 ^ China No. 5 (1901), no. 11 and Trans.; U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 322. 
 
 ' Notice the following version of the French note as desired by the 
 Russian Government, given by the Russian Embassy at Washington, 
 September 21 (October 4) to Secretary Hay: 
 
 " In the opinion of the Imperial Government, as well as of the 
 Government of the French Republic, the programme upon which the 
 several Cabinets may succeed in reaching an accord should comprise : 
 
 "First. The punishment of the principal authors or instigators of 
 the outrages committed in China, and notably of Prince Tuan, the 
 dignitaries Tung Fu-hsiang, Kang Yi, Li Ping-heng, and the Governor 
 of Shansi, Yu Hsien. 
 
 " Second. The continued interdiction of the importation of arms 
 into China. 
 
 " Third. The granting to the Governments, corporations, and private 
 individuals of all indemnities, the adjustment of which, in the event 
 of protracted divergence, might be confided to the International Peace 
 Bureau at The Hague. 
 
 " Fourth. Guarantees for the future, as to which it would be per- 
 missible to consult the diplomatic representatives of the Powers in 
 China. My French colleague has doubtless specified in the note he has 
 addressed to you what these guarantees might be." 
 
 M. de Wollant to Secretary Hay, U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 381, 382. 
 
597] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 185 
 
 along with the suggestions and propositions from other 
 nations. 
 
 Said the United States, October loth: 
 
 The President is glad to perceive in the bases of negotiations 
 put forward in the memorandum of October 4 the spirit that 
 has animated the declaration heretofore made by all the Powers 
 interested, and would be pleased to see the negotiations begun 
 immediately upon the usual verification of credentials. 
 
 Regarding clause i, comment was made: "The Chi- 
 nese Government has already indicated its intention to pun- 
 ish a number of those responsible for the recent disorders.^ 
 The representatives of the Powers at Peking may suggest 
 additions to that list when negotiations are entered upon ". 
 As regards clause 2: " It is not understood (by the Depart- 
 ment of State) that this interdiction (against the importa- 
 tion of arms) is to be permanent, and the duration of it and 
 the details of its regulation seem a proper subject of dis- 
 cussion by the negotiators ". As regards clause 3 : 
 
 This (equitable indemnity) is an object desired by all the 
 Powers. The Russian Government has suggested that in case 
 of protracted divergence of views, the matter might be com- 
 mended to the consideration of the International Court of 
 Arbitration of the Hague. The President thinks this sugges- 
 tion worthy the attention of the Powers. 
 
 As regards clause 4 (Legation guards) : " The Government 
 of the United States is unable to make a permanent engage- 
 ment of this nature without the authorization of the legis- 
 lative branch,^ but in the present emergency we have sta- 
 tioned in Peking an adequate Legation guard ". As regards 
 
 * Referring here to the Imperial Edict of September 25. 
 '^This would be an act of a military nature requiring the consent 
 of Congress. '^ 
 
1 86 THE BOXER REBELLION [598 
 
 clause 5 (dismantling the Taku Forts) : " The President 
 reserves the expression of his opinion as to this measure, 
 pending the receipt of further information in regard to the 
 situation in China "/ As regards clause 6 (on military 
 occupation of points between Tientsin and Peking) : The 
 same observation here as in clause 4, i. e., the President ''is 
 unable to commit the United States to a permanent partici- 
 pation in such occupation 'V although it was thought de- 
 sirable that " the Powers shall obtain from the Chinese 
 Government the assurance of their right to guard their 
 Legations in Peking and to have the means of unrestricted 
 access to them whenever required ". 
 
 It must be kept in mind that all of the above was only a 
 detailed criticism of the French note and not a condemna- 
 tion. In fact, Secretary Hay expressed the hope that " the 
 Government of France and the other Powers will see in the 
 reserves we have made here no obstacle to the initiation of 
 negotiations on the lines suggested ".^ A week later the 
 French Government announced at Washington that it 
 " highly appreciated " the attitude of the Department of 
 State, and Secretary Hay replied that he was '* gratified to 
 learn that all the interested Powers have adhered to the es- 
 sential principle of the French note of October 4th ". He 
 trusted that the reservations made by the United States 
 and other nations would " prove no embarrassment to the 
 progress of the negotiations, in the course of which they 
 
 ^The answer of the Department of State to this clause remained un- 
 favorable during the entire negotiations. This was because the Powers 
 later stood for the destruction of the Taku Forts, while the United 
 States only desired their dismantlement. In art. viii of the Final 
 Protocol it was agreed that these famous forts were to be razed. 
 
 2 Again the desire of the United States, as with Minister Reed in 
 1858 and Admiral Kempff at Taku, to avoid all entanglements or tem- 
 porary alliances of a military nature with Europe. 
 
 ' U. S. For. ReL, 1900, pp. 322, 323 ; Chhta No. 5 (1901), Inc. in no. 100. 
 
599] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER ig^ 
 
 can be frankly discussed with a view to a common agree- 
 ment "/ These various reservations had, of course, noth- 
 ing to do with the acceptance by all concerned of the French 
 note as the basis of negotiations. However, M. Delcasse did 
 not count upon unqualified adherence by the Powers. The 
 most he hoped for was their assent in general.^ Delcasse's 
 sole purpose was to embody the " collective ideas of the 
 Powers in a compendious form ". In doing so, he had " no 
 wish to push his country into the foremost place ",^ nor had 
 he " any unavowed objects to serve ". But he " dreaded 
 the mischief that might be caused by allowing events to 
 drag on ", and therefore he was of the opinion that " expe- 
 dition should be used in defining the objects and methods 
 upon which the Powers interested might agree ".* Del- 
 casse's efforts deserved and received the hearty commenda- 
 tion and support of Europe and America. 
 
 Great Britain agreed likewise, excepting the last point. 
 Lord Salisbury was of the opinion, regarding the road from 
 Peking to Taku being held by an international force, that 
 it was " safer and more effective that each Power that 
 wished should hold a fort of its own, which should be within 
 reach of the sea so far as practicable ".^ The Russian views 
 
 ^ U. S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 2,2^, 324. 
 
 ' Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, Paris, Oct. 10, China No. 5 {1901), 
 no. z6. 
 
 ^ Neither had Germany for that matter, although Germany's griev- 
 ances were aggravated out of all proportion to the others by the murder 
 of Minister von Ketteler. American and British policies were also 
 unselfish, but with Russia there is more doubt, as Russia almost always 
 had either ulterior motives in view or an eye to future developments 
 favorable to the Russian Government. It must be remembered that 
 at this period the Government at St. Petersburg was assiduously culti- 
 vating the friendship of China in order to cloak Russian territorial 
 ambitions. 
 
 * China No. 5 (1901), no. 42. 
 
 5 Ibid., no. 43. 
 
1 88 THE BOXER REBELLION [6oo 
 
 were identical with the British, also as regarded the single 
 British objection. Furthermore, Russia " had always con- 
 sidered that each Power should have its own guard for its 
 Legation "/ Italy accepted, " subject to such modifications 
 as may be rendered necessary by the unforeseen in the de- 
 velopment of negotiations with China ".^ Japan expressed 
 " general agreement, observing, however, that in a perma- 
 nent prohibition of arms (clause 2) China might find a dif- 
 ficulty as regards the fulfilment of her treaty obligations to 
 protect foreigners and maintain order,^ or at least an ex- 
 cuse for her failure to do so ". Further, Japan considered 
 " impracticable the organization of an international guard",, 
 but would agree to separate guards ".* 
 
 1 China No. i (igoi), no. 90. ^ Ibid., no. 55. 
 
 ' A very good point. It must be remembered that, because of the 
 Boxer movement, not a single Power believed in China's immediate 
 regeneration, although this actually happened. Therefore the possibil- 
 ity of the Chinese military patterning entirely after Yuan Shih-kai's 
 foreign-drilled and equipped troops was incomprehensible to Europe 
 at this time. Also, Japan's idea for only a temporary prohibition of 
 arms was not an altruistic one regarding China but merely to afford 
 greater security to foreigners. 
 
 * China No. 5 (jpoi), no. 60. 
 
 Mr. Whitehead reported to Lord Salisbury from Tokyo, October 5, 
 that, in an interview with Viscount Aoki, the Japanese statesman in- 
 formed him: "Japan would demur to the second point in the French 
 proposals, viz., the maintenance of the prohibition to import arms and 
 ammunition, because such prohibition, if effective, would deprive the 
 Chinese authorities of the means of maintaining order. 
 
 Mr. Whitehead continued : " His Excellency added, however, that 
 he did not think the prohibition was likely to be effective, because it 
 would be impossible to prevent the Chinese Government from engag- 
 ing foreign instructors and manufacturing what they required in the 
 interior of the country. Viscount Aoki stated further that he agreed 
 to the proposal to destroy the Forts at Taku. As regards the organi- 
 zation of a guard for the Legations at Peking, he thought that if this 
 meant a body of troops recruited from different nationalities, the idea 
 was impracticable, but that there would be no objection if it meant that 
 each Legation was to have its own guard." China No. 5 (1901), no. 196. 
 
6oi] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER jgg 
 
 The Powers having agreed to accept the French pro- 
 posals ^ as bases for negotiations, they were next taken up 
 by the Diplomatic Body at Peking, by whom they were 
 finally to be presented to the Qiinese Plenipotentiaries. A 
 meeting of the foreign representatives was called, October 
 loth, by Sir Claude MacDonald, at which the Russian Min- 
 ister was absent, still at Tientsin, while the Austrian and 
 Netherlands Legations were unrepresented. 
 
 The French proposals were threshed out in a very satis- 
 factory manner. Regarding punishments of the " princi- 
 ple offenders designated by the representatives of the 
 Powers ", it was suggested that the condemnations "should 
 include all officials who took an active part, in country dis- 
 tricts, and in abetting massacres; the foreign representa- 
 tives to ascertain their names subsequently ". Still more 
 important was the proposal that " there should be no offi- 
 cial examinations held during five years in districts and 
 towns where foreigners had suffered maltreatment ". This 
 in itself was felt to afford an effective check on the disaf- 
 fected localities against further outbreaks, as it would strike 
 at the root of the entire Chinese system and public life. 
 
 At the meeting of October i6th, after some discussion, 
 the diplomats reached the following unanimous agreement : 
 
 The penalty to be demanded in the case of the persons guilty 
 of directing the attacks on the Legations and the massacre of 
 foreigners ^ in the interior ought to be capital punishment,^' and 
 
 * On the introduction and acceptance of the French proposals, see 
 China No. 5 (1901), nos. 11, 17, 3<5, 42-45, 55, 60, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73, 81, 
 83, 84, 86, 90, 94, 99, 100, 104, 109, 117, 154-156, 196. 
 
 'At the meeting on October 31 it was decided to add to the above 
 the words " or have suffered cruel treatment " after the phrase " mas- 
 sacre of foreigners." 
 
 ' The italics are the author's. This question of capital punishment 
 later caused a prolonged correspondence among the Powers. 
 
190 THE BOXER REBELLION [5o2 
 
 that the list should include, besides the Princes and officials 
 mentioned in the Imperial edict/ the names of Tung Fu-hsiang 
 and Yu Hsien ^ ... To these we considered it would be neces- 
 sary to add the names of the officials responsible for the murder 
 and cruel treatment of foreigners at Paotingfu, in this pro- 
 vince (Chihli), and Chuchow, in the province of Chekiang, 
 which are gradually being ascertained, as well as others equally 
 guilty that may be authentically reported to us. 
 
 At the meeting of October 31st, Minister Conger of the 
 United States pointed out to the Diplomatic Body : 
 
 Although protection was promised by the treaties to foreigners 
 residing in China, innumerable cases had occurred in recent 
 years of attacks against their lives and property, for which 
 no adequate reparation had been obtained. When the dis- 
 missal of officials, who, by connivance or apathy, had favored 
 such attacks, had been obtained, they had usually been trans- 
 ferred elsewhere, and even promoted. 
 
 Therefore Conger proposed as addition to base no. i the 
 following clause : 
 
 As a further guarantee against future trouble, an Imperial edict 
 shall be issued and published everywhere in the Empire, mak- 
 
 ^ Edict of September 25. 
 
 ^ Sir Qaude MacDonald : " The former of these is the General re- 
 sponsible for the continuance of the bombardment of the Legations 
 at the same time that assurances were being communicated to your 
 Lordship (Salisbury), and to the Governments of the other Powers, 
 that the Chinese Government continued to protect the foreign Minis- 
 ters. The latter is the notorious Governor of Shansi, who is reported 
 to have boasted to the Chinese Government that he had caused fifty- 
 one foreigners to be killed in his Yamen at Tai Yuan-fu." Resent- 
 ment against Yu Hsien was particularly bitter because of the public 
 beheading of many of his victims in this instance cited by MacDonald. 
 
 Sir E. Satow had succeeded MacDonald at the time this dispatch 
 was forwarded (November 8), but he reported it, as he said, almost 
 literally in words of the former Minister. 
 
 I 
 
603] 'THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 191 
 
 ing all Viceroys, provincial and local officials responsible for 
 order in their respective jurisdictions, and, whenever anti- 
 foreign disturbances or any infractions of treaty occur therein, 
 they, the said officials, shall be immediately removed, and for- 
 ever prohibited from holding any office or honor. 
 
 This clause was accepted by the Diplomatic Body/ 
 
 Regarding base no. 2 : It has already been mentioned 
 that the foreign representatives had decided it to be " very 
 necessary to prohibit the importation of arms ". In addi- 
 tion it was unanimously agreed to refer to their respective 
 governments '' to determine subsequently the duration of 
 the prohibition, as we (the Ministers) conceived that it is 
 intended to prevent the importation of ammunition and any 
 substances exclusively intended for use in its manufacture". 
 Regarding base no. 3 : The conclusion reached was that 
 the Powers " should come to a preliminary agreement as to 
 the extent of indemnities ", which should include compen- 
 sation to friendly and Christian Chinese " who have lost by 
 their connection with foreigners ".^ As to the manner of 
 payment and the necessary guarantees, it was suggested that 
 " an institution might be created in the nature of a Caisse 
 de la Dette " , although this need not include all revenues. 
 
 The idea of the indemnity claims " to be investigated by 
 a commission composed of Consuls of each nation con- 
 cerned " did not appeal to Minister MacDonald, who sug- 
 gested instead that the claims " should be entrusted to a 
 commission of persons not resident in China to be sent out 
 
 * Later amended by inserting " which are not forthwith suppressed 
 and the guilty persons punished " after " occur therein." 
 
 "^ " It seemed obviously right to demand compensation in the case of 
 Chinese writers and servants in the employ of the Legations, foreign 
 residents of Peking, or it may be elsewhere, who have suffered, as also 
 for those refugees whose labor on the defences of the Legation so 
 greatly contributed to rendering resistance effectual against the attacks 
 of the besiegers." 
 
192 THE BOXER REBELLION [604 
 
 from neutral countries, such as Switzerland, Denmark, and 
 Sweden ". Such a commission would, of course, work far 
 better. The British Minister evidently was of the opinion 
 that the various Consuls would be too biased in their indi- 
 vidual governmental perspectives. It was then mentioned 
 by Conger that the United States had received a proposal 
 from Russia to send these claims to the Hague Tribunal, 
 and this was received with favor. 
 
 Regarding base no. 4, for permanent Legation guards : 
 It was suggested that " a defensible Legation quarter would 
 be a useful addition ". The formula finally adopted by 
 unanimous vote was the " right of each Power to maintain 
 for its Legation a permanent guard, and of putting the 
 Legation in a defensible position, while the right of resi- 
 dence therein would not be accorded to Chinese ''. It will 
 be noticed that the Diplomatic Body placed itself on record 
 in favor of separate Legation guards. 
 
 As regards base no. 5 : Several of the diplomats were of 
 the opinion that the expression " Taku Forts " should as 
 well include others, as from Taku to Tientsin, and from 
 Tientsin to Peitang (halfway to Peking). This would 
 make secure the entire route of communication from the 
 coast to the capital. The formula was accordingly amended 
 to include the whole distance. 
 
 In regard to keeping the route from Taku to Peking open, 
 etc. : the Diplomatic Body observed : 
 
 Taku is inaccessible from the sea during at least the three 
 months of December, January and February, and that the only 
 practicable landing-places at that season are Chinwangtao and 
 Shanhaikwan. Also that as the distance from Peking to Taku 
 is 107 miles, and of Shanhaikwan 153 miles more, fortified 
 posts in the vicinity of these two places would not help us much. 
 
 Therefore the British Minister offered this opinion, given 
 to him " by a high military authority *' : 
 
6o5] ^^^ RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 93 
 
 The establishment of a garrison at Tientsin and the occupa- 
 tion of some principal railway station from Peking to Shan- 
 haikwan for some months to come would probably meet the 
 case. ... In order, therefore, to have these points entirely 
 free to be determined hereafter by the Governments, the follow- 
 ing alteration was suggested: The Powers may arrange be- 
 tween themselves for the military occupation of certain points 
 for the maintenance of communication between the capital 
 and the sea. 
 
 This suggestion of Sir E. Satow ^ met with unanimous ap- 
 proval. 
 
 So much for the criticism, extension and final adoption 
 of the French proposals by the foreign representatives at 
 Peking. It developed, however, that the Diplomatic Body 
 had certain ideas distinctly its own, as follows : 
 
 Base no. 7 : It should be agreed by the Chinese Government 
 to post for two years in every district an Imperial Edict, pro- 
 hibiting, under pain of death, any membership of " Boxer " 
 Societies, and stating what punishments had been inflicted, in- 
 cluding the suspension of examinations suggested above. 
 
 Base no. 8: A Minister for Foreign Affairs should be ap- 
 pointed, and the Tsung-li Yamen abolished. 
 
 Base no. 9: Relations with the Court on a sensible basis 
 should be established. 
 
 The seventh proposal was agreed to without a dissenting 
 voice. Sir E. Satow reported that, at the meeting of Oc- 
 tober 31st, some of the diplomats were under the impres- 
 sion that a proclamation of religious liberty had been incor- 
 porated, but Satow, in looking through MacDonald's notes, 
 happily found no such suggestion. Therefore the religious 
 
 ^ Sir E. Satow succeeded Sir C. MacDonald, October 25, as British 
 Minister, and himself directed the British policy on Oct. 26, 28, 31, 
 Nov. 5, while MacDonald was present Oct. 10 and 17. 
 
 I 
 
194 THE BOXER REBELLION [606 
 
 idea was not adopted, as the diplomats wisely resolved to 
 steer clear of the missionary question and its many unnec- 
 essary complications. 
 
 The eighth and ninth proposals, originally offered by M. 
 Salvago Raggi, the Italian Minister, were " generally ac- 
 cepted in principle ". There was some doubt, however, as 
 to whether these two provisions should be inserted " in the 
 note which we are to present in the name of our Govern- 
 ments ". Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, Italy 
 and the United States voted for the inclusion, while France, 
 Japan and Russia voted contra. Belgium and Spain did 
 not vote, preferring to recommend their Governments to 
 adopt the view which would ultimately be taken by the ma- 
 jority of the Powers. 
 
 At the meeting of November 5th, A. von Mumm, the 
 German Minister, came forward with the following addi- 
 tional article: 
 
 The dispatch of a special mission to Berlin, headed by an 
 Imperial Prince, in order to express the regret of His 
 Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment with respect to the murder of Baron von Ketteler. 
 
 On the spot where the murder was committed the erection 
 of a monument to the memory of the deceased Minister, appro- 
 priate to his rank, and bearing an inscription in Latin, German 
 and Chinese expressing the regret of the Emperor of China 
 for the murder committed. 
 
 There was no' discussion over the German addition and 
 it was accepted unanimously. 
 
 However, this proposed monument to von Ketteler led 
 the Japanese Minister to make a similar addition to com- 
 memorate the Japanese Chancellor, Mr. Sugiyama, who 
 also lost his life during the siege. It was agreed that the 
 Diplomatic Body would support his request in similar 
 fashion. 
 
6o7] T^HE RESTORATION OF ORDER I95 
 
 Next, Sir E. Satow was of the opinion that an article 
 should be inserted '' which would entitle the Powers to ob- 
 tian a satisfactory revision of the existing treaties of com- 
 merce and navigation, and a settlement of various pending 
 questions of importance to commercial interests "/ The 
 Russian Minister was of the belief that commercial ques- 
 tions did not enter into these negotiations. Satow replied 
 that the Rebellion had resulted in '' the destruction of the 
 foreign settlements at Tientsin and to the complete sever- 
 ance of all foreign commercial relations with every part 
 of the country ". On putting the article to vote, the Min- 
 isters of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
 United States and Great Britain were in favor of it. The 
 Russian Minister maintained his objection, and was sup- 
 ported by the French Secretary of Legation, acting in the 
 absence of the French Minister. 
 
 On October loth, the Italian Minister, recurring to base 
 no. 3, gave it as his opinion that, as China's " existing Cus- 
 toms revenue is almost entirely absorbed by the service of 
 existing foreign loans ", therefore, " in order to provide for 
 the indemnities which China will be called upon to Govern- 
 ments and subjects ", it would be necessary that " other 
 sources of income will have to be appropriated ". To meet 
 this difficulty he proposed : 
 
 China will take financial measures on the lines which will be 
 indicated by the Plenipotentiaries in order to guarantee the 
 payment of the indemnities and the service of the loan. 
 
 The Russian Minister thought that this clause was un- 
 necessary, " considering that the Plenipotentiaries would 
 concert among themselves the means of insuring the pay- 
 
 * This clause explains why so many commercial treaties were entered 
 into by China and other countries in the years immediately following 
 the adoption of the Boxer Peace Protocol. 
 
196 THE BOXER REBELLION [608 
 
 ment of the indemnities when fixed ". The Japanese Gov- 
 ernment " reserved " by its Minister's action '' the expres- 
 sion of an opinion on this point ". All the rest recom- 
 mended M. Raggi's proposal to their respective Foreign 
 Offices as desirable of adoption.^ 
 |\ This ended the discussions of and additions to the French 
 \\ proposals by the Diplomatic Body.^ Lastly, a committee 
 was appointed, consisting of the Ministers of Austria-Hun- 
 gary and Italy and the Secretary of the French Legation, to 
 draft a preamble to this Joint Note which should recount 
 China's violations of international law and their results.^ 
 
 However, it soon developed that there was great differ- 
 ence of opinion among the Powers as to several provisions 
 of this Joint Note to the Chinese Government. It must be 
 remembered that as yet China had not been consulted in 
 the matter. All discussions had been among the various 
 foreign governments and among their representatives at 
 Peking. It had been felt in the beginning by the Diplomatic 
 Body that this Joint Note should be a sort of " ultimatum " 
 with " irrevocable conditions ", which China should be 
 forced to accept unconditionally and without reserve. With 
 such object in view, it was fortunately seen in time that 
 some of the provisions were entirely too severe, in particu- 
 lar as regarded the " irrevocable " nature of the Note and 
 the punishment of the Boxer leaders. The punishment 
 
 * Later, the proposal of the Italian Minister was amended, and "finan- 
 cial measures acceptable to the Powers" was substituted for "on the 
 lines which the Powers will indicate." 
 
 This made a unanimous agreement among the Ministers as to the 
 entire proposals and additions. See China No. 5 (iQOi), no. i73- 
 See also no. 117. 
 
 2 The meeting of the Diplomatic Body for the above discussions and 
 proceedings relative to the French bases for negotiations are re- 
 ported in ibid., nos. 107 and 255. 
 
 3 For the text of the Joint Note see Appendix I, reprinted from 
 China No. 5 {1901), no. 188. 
 
609] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 1 97 
 
 clause especially was overdrawn, the diplomats in their zeal 
 having condemned princes of the blood to death for com- 
 plicity in the Rebellion when calm reflection should have 
 convinced them that China never would have agreed to so 
 drastic a retribution for members of the royal family. In 
 general the tone of the Joint Note was too harsh, and after 
 the various provisions had circulated among the Powers for 
 a few months, this was clearly seen to be the case. Modifi- 
 cations urgently needed were fortunately agreed upon, 
 helped and encouraged, of course, by hints from and dis- 
 cussions with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries. 
 
 Germany was strongly opposed to referring any of the 
 questions involved to the Hague Tribunal for settlement. 
 The United States objected to " irrevocable " conditions 
 and instructed Minister Conger to that effect. The two 
 great Yangtse Viceroys, of Nanking and Hankow, firm 
 friends of the Powers during the darkest days of the Re- 
 bellion, pointed out that the death sentence for members of 
 the Imperial family should be commuted to perpetual ban- 
 ishment, which was punishment enough. Commissioners 
 Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching were not at all disposed 
 to agree to articles no. 6 and 1 1 of the Joint Note relating 
 to indemnities and the amendment of the existing commer- 
 cial treaties. Because of their objection to these two clauses 
 the United States proposed to refer the articles to a con- 
 ference at Washington. This idea found no favor with 
 Germany, who preferred, instead, a commission of financial 
 and commercial experts to meet at Peking. Japan agreed 
 with Germany on this point, and because of this opposition 
 the United States withdrew its proposal.^ Austria was 
 
 1 Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow (Circular), Jan. 11, 1901 : 
 " I am informed by the United States' Ambassador that the President 
 withdraws his proposal for a conference to deal with points 6 and 11 
 of the peace conditions, owing to the decided opposition of the German 
 and Japanese Governments." China No, 6 (1901, no. 27). For the 
 Japanese objections, see ibid., no. 28. 
 
198 THE BOXER REBELLION [610 
 
 loath to see the death penalty of all the Boxer leaders dis- 
 pensed with, while Russia was of the opinion that, in refer- 
 ence to this, the proposed phrase la peine de plus severe 
 might be construed to mean death after all, a construction 
 the connections of which it is a little difficult to see. Ger- 
 many, of course, because of the murder of von Ketteler, 
 wanted the existing phrase la peine de mort to stand with- 
 out change. France, like the United States, " never liked " 
 the word *' irrevocable ", while Great Britain desired it. 
 It was finally agreed that the word " irrevocable " as to the 
 contents of the Joint Note should be withdrawn, only to be 
 replaced afterwards, while the phrase la peine de mort 
 should be changed to la peine de plus severe. 
 
 On December 19, 1900, the Joint Note was signed by all 
 the foreign Ministers at Peking, with the exception of Mr. 
 Conger, who misread the instructions from Washington 
 regarding ^' irrevocable ", but who signed later. 
 
 So much for the Joint Note,^ as far as its composition 
 was concerned. Several of its provisions were carried 
 through readily enough with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, 
 but with others there was much difficulty, as was to be ex- 
 pected. From the first, the Powers were united on pre- 
 senting the Note jointly, and solemnly warned the Chinese 
 commissioners against concluding any separate agreements.^ 
 The understanding as to the prohibition of import of arms 
 gave trouble until it was decided that the clause should be 
 only temporay in nature. To have made it permanent 
 
 * On the Joint Note, see China No. 5 (1901), nos. 69, 88, 137, I53, i77, 
 188, 192-194, 198, 199, 201-206, 220, 224, 225, 227-229, 231-234, 236-244, 
 258, 261, 265, 266; China No. 6 (1901), nos. 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 18-28, 32, 
 33, 37, 39, 47, 49, 5i, 54. 56, 63, 70-73, 82, 90, 91, 96, 98, 117, U3, US, 
 178, 180, 185, 201, 234; China No. i (1902), nos. 41, 114, 172; U. S. 
 For. ReL, 1900, pp. 235, 237, 238, 240-243, 246, 248. 
 
 * On the warnings to China against concluding separate agreements, 
 see China No. 6 (1901), nos. 79, 80, loi, 106, 153, 164, 197, 202, 213. 
 
6 1 1 ] THE RESTORA TION OF ORDER 1 99 
 
 would have been nonsensical, an utter impossibility in the 
 nature of things/ 
 
 The demands for punishment and the indemnity ques- 
 tion caused the greatest difficulties. It will be remembered 
 that the decree of September 25th, visiting punishment 
 upon several of the Boxer leaders, was regarded by the 
 Powers as inadequate and incomplete. Therefore a new 
 edict appeared on November 13th, which was more strin- 
 gent in tone than the preceding. According to its com- 
 mands, Prince Tuan and Prince Chuan were to be deprived 
 of their offices and rank and immured for life at Moukden. 
 Prince Yi and Secondary Prince Tsai Yin were likewise 
 to suffer life imprisonment. Secondary Prince Tsai Lien 
 was to be deprived of his hereditary rank and confined to 
 his house. Duke Tsai Lan was to be degraded one step in 
 rank and was to lose all his emoluments. Kang Yi was 
 dead, therefore penalty was waived in his case. Ying Nien 
 was to be degraded, likewise Chao Shu-chiao, who was to 
 lose his nominal rank but was to remain in office. Yu 
 Hsien was to be banished to the most remote frontier and 
 put to work on the most distant military post road. The 
 punishment of Tung Fu-hsiang, " on account of his being 
 in command of Imperial troops ", was to be reserved for 
 future consideration.^ 
 
 But this new decree gave little satisfaction to Europe, 
 
 ^ It had early been recognized that it would have been undesirable 
 to have allowed an unrestricted importation of arms into China for 
 some period after the Boxer troubles. Of course the Powers realized 
 that they could not prevent China from manufacturing arms and 
 ammunition, but all outside supplies were to be cut off until the entire 
 Empire again was in a state of peaceful intercourse with the world. 
 
 See China No. i (1901), nos. 97, 115, 116, 129, 142, 186, 206, 345; 
 China No. 5 (iQOi), nos. 73, 151; China No. 6 (iQoi), no. 131; China 
 No. I {1902), nos. 12, 145, 159, 210, 220. 
 
 "^ China No. 5 (/poj), nos. 140, 142. 
 
200 THE BOXER REBELLION [612 
 
 and the Diplomatic Body pronounced it '' inadequate and 
 absurd ". Particularly was criticism directed against the 
 alleged mild sentences of Prince Tuan, the arch-conspira- 
 tor, and the infamous Yu Hsien, Governor of Shansi, 
 whose acts during the Rebellion had been peculiarly atro- 
 cious. An ultimatum was contemplated by the represen- 
 tatives at Peking, by which they would refuse to consider 
 further negotiations until the death sentence had been pro- 
 nounced against all the Boxer leaders, including Yu Hsien 
 and Tung Fu-hsiang. Japan was strongly opposed to this 
 ultimatum idea, and doubted whether China would sanction 
 such wholesale penalties. Further, if China were to refuse, 
 the Powers by virtue of the ultimatum would be placed in 
 an embarrassing position. Less eager than Japan for these 
 extreme punishments was the United States, in fact, had 
 declared so throughout the negotiations. Russia was also 
 opposed, to extreme punishment and to the ultimatum, *'for 
 how was such a demand to be enforced?". The Triple 
 Alliance Ministers were in favor of punishment as outlined, 
 although willing to compromise. The situation was some- 
 what relieved when it was reported that Yu Hsien had 
 committed suicide by '' swallowing gold ".^ But concern- 
 ing the guilty Princes, Li Hung-chang made it clear that 
 the Empress Dowager would never consent to their death 
 because of their rank, much less those who were in command 
 of the Imperial troops. Li was frank in admitting that per- 
 sonally he had suffered risk by denouncing them to the 
 Throne at the behest of the Diplomatic Body. 
 
 The final agreement was a compromise, as follows : ^ 
 
 Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st of February, 190 1 
 
 * The report of the death of Yu Hsien was untrue; he was finally 
 executed February 22, 1901. 
 2 Article II of the Protocol of September 7, 1901. 
 
 I 
 
613] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 201 
 
 (Annexes nos. 4, 5 and 6 to the Peace Protocol), inflicted the 
 following punishments on the principal authors of the outrages 
 and crimes committed against the foreign Governments and 
 their nationals : 
 
 Tsai-I Prince Tuan and Tsai Lan Duke Fu-kuo were sen- 
 tenced to be brought before the autumnal court of assize for 
 execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to 
 grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan and 
 there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commuta- 
 tion of these punishments.^ 
 
 Tsai Hsun Prince Chuang, Ying Nien, President of the 
 Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board 
 of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide. 
 
 Yu Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the 
 Board of Rites, and Hsu Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice- 
 President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to 
 death. 
 
 Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant 
 Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsu Tung, 
 Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, formerly Governor-Gen- 
 eral of Szechwan. 
 
 An Imperial Edict of February 13th, 1901 (Annex no. 7), 
 rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the 
 Board of War, Li Shan, President of the Board of Works, Hsu 
 Ching-cheng, Senior President of the Board of Works, Lien 
 Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council, and Yuan Chang, 
 Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put 
 to death for having protested against the outrageous breaches 
 of international law of last year. 
 
 Prince Chang committed suicide the 21st of February, 1901, 
 Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao the 24th, Yu Hsien was exe- 
 cuted the 22nd, Chi Hsiu and Hsu Cheng-yu on the 26th. 
 Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kansu, has been deprived of his 
 
 * Prince Tuan went no farther than Manchuria for exile, and was 
 heard of there in 1908. Tung Fu-hsiang*s sentence was made banish- 
 ment (to Turkestan, presumably), but he came back to Kansu province 
 in 1906, and lived there in harmless old age. 
 
202 THE BOXER REBELLION [614 
 
 office by Imperial Edict on the 13th of February, 1901, pend- 
 ing the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted 
 on him. 
 
 Imperial Edicts dated the 20th of April and 19th of August, 
 190 1, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial 
 officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer.^ 
 
 / Now as to the indemnity v^hich China was to pay for 
 I her brief excursion into lawlessness. The Powers early 
 j decided that this was to be paid in a lump sum, which the 
 f various Governments would later divide among themselves. 
 The United States, from information gathered at Wash- 
 ington, was of the opinion that China could not possibly 
 pay more than around $150,000,000, and Special Commis- 
 sioner Rockhill ^ was instructed to demand $25,000,000 as 
 the share of the American Government.^ Instead of this 
 severe enough indemnity, the total for all the Powers leaped 
 to 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, or $333,900,000.* This in- 
 
 * On the question of punishments, see China No. 5 {1901), nos. 6, 
 9, 16, 18, 6^, 96, 98, 102, 105, 106, 121, 122, 140-142, 144, 150, 151, 157, 
 158, 163-167, 172, 180-182, 186, 187, 207, 220, 22(>, 248, 251 ; China No. 
 6 {1901), nos. 16, 42, 48, 49, 52, 55, 57. ^3, 64, 67, 69, 77, 78, 83, 103, 
 104, 108, 114, 119, 121-123, 126, 127, 135, 232-234; China No. 1 (1902), 
 no. 21, 39, 40, 42, 88, 112, 146, 186, 243, 245, 246, 256, 257, 259; U. S. 
 For. ReL, 1900, pp. 210, 211, 213, 214, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226-229, 232, 
 297, 298. 
 
 ^ Commissioner Rockhill's Report is contained in U. S. For. ReL, 
 1901, Appendix I. 
 
 * The United States remitted about $10,000,000 of its share of the 
 Boxer indemnity, and China as a mark of gratitude agreed to use the 
 funds in sending Chinese students to this country every year for edu- 
 cation. See U. S. 6oth Cong., ist Sess., Hse. Kept., no. 1107; U. S. 
 60th Cong., 2d Sess., Hse. Doc, no. 1275. 
 
 * Gardner L. Harding, in his "The Peril of China," Century, July, 
 1915, estimates that the Boxer indemnity " will have swelled to some- 
 thing between $650,000,000 and $700,000,000 by the time the usurious 
 methods of juggling its deferred interest by annual payments stretch- 
 ing to 1939 are fully worked out." P. 459. 
 
6i5] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 203 
 
 eluded everything due to the foreign Governments, to com- 
 panies, societies, private individuals, missionaries and na- 
 tive Chinese. The interest to be paid was fixed at 4 per 
 cent per annum, capital and interest to be paid by China in 
 thirty-nine years, with amortization beginning January i, 
 1902, and ending in the year 1940. The amortizations were 
 to be paid annually, the first payment to be made on Janu- 
 ary I, 1903/ The revenues set aside as security for China's 
 bond were the following : 
 
 1. The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime 
 Customs, after the payment of the interest and amortization 
 of preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the pro- 
 ceeds of the raising of five per cent effective of the present 
 tariff, on maritime imports, including articles until now on 
 the free list but exempting foreign rice, cereals, flour, gold 
 and silver bullion and coin. 
 
 2. The revenues of the native customs, administered in 
 the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs. 
 
 3. The total revenue of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the 
 fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans. 
 
 With punishment and indemnity out of the way the great- 
 est difficulties were removed. All the other provisions of 
 the bases for negotiations, built up by the Diplomatic Body 
 from the French proposals, were agreed to in their en- 
 tirety. In addition to the mission to Germany to apologize 
 for the murder of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, 
 a like mission of regret was despatched to Japan to offer 
 reparation for the death of Mr. Sugiyama, the Japanese 
 Chancellor of Legation at Peking. It was also arranged 
 that the Forts of Taku were to be razed. On this point 
 the United States had objected, having stood merely for 
 
 * On amortization, see China No. i {1902), nos. 107, 124. 175, 176, 
 180, 183-185, 187, 189, 199. 
 
204 * ^^^ BOXER REBELLION [6i6 
 
 dismantlement, but without success. Lastly, the famous 
 Tsung-li Yamen, a sort of -foreign council established 
 through the pressure of the Powers in i860, was trans- 
 formed into a Ministry for Foreign Affairs called the Wai- 
 wupu (now the Waichiaopu), which has at last become a 
 most important division of the Chinese Government. At- 
 tached to the final Protocol were nineteen annexes, fully 
 explaining the preceding articles and also containing the 
 various decrees on punishment, etc., referred to in the main 
 body of the document. 
 
 In consideration of the above, the Powers agreed that, 
 with the exception of the new Legation guards provided 
 for in article VIII of the Protocol, the international troops 
 would evacuate Peking on September 17, 1901, and also 
 from the other points which they were holding, with the ex- 
 ception of those mentioned in article IX, where they were 
 to maintain open communication between the capital and 
 the sea until order was completely restored. 
 
 iThe Boxer Rebellion was the last protest of China 
 against the inevitable, and, in the completeness of its fail- 
 ure, was the final lesson necessary in that series of inter- 
 national events ever since 1840 to teach China that, how- 
 ever excellent her civilization may be in some respects, it 
 was inadequate when judged by the spirit and achievements 
 of the XXth century. Through the agency of unparalleled 
 national disasters, it was finally brought home to the intel- 
 ligent classes and in a lesser degree to the entire people that, 
 successfully to withstand European aggression, it was nec- 
 essary to have recourse to Europe's ways, to adopt in the 
 new scheme of things whatever heretofore had been lack- 
 ing, whether for good or for evil.( The awakening did not 
 come all at once. For the ensuing two or three years China 
 remained crushed by the succession of humiliations heaped 
 upon her since 1895. It even fell to other nations, notably 
 
6i7] THE RESTORATION OF ORDER 205 
 
 Japan, to save China from Russian ambitions, the result of 
 which was the Russo-Japanese war, fought equally in Chi- 
 nese interests, on Chinese territory, and with the violation 
 of Chinese integrity and neutrality. This momentous con- 
 flict, in which an Oriental race triumphed over one of the 
 greatest of European Powers, besides changing the course 
 of history in the Far East, left an indelible impression upon 
 the Chinese national consciousness, and from then on the 
 awakening: of China began in a truly nationalized ^forui. 
 Once fairly started, the advance was rapid enough, too 
 rapid in some respects to suit the convenience of Europe. 
 What part the modern China will play in the international 
 economics, politics and diplomacy of the future it would be 
 presumptuous to predict. China is not yet ready for such 
 a role, nor will be ready for many years to come. But the 
 possibilities of China are almost limitless, considering the 
 wealth and resources of the country and the national char- 
 acteristics of the Chinese themselves. However, the future 
 historian, in examining and estimating the causes and events 
 which gave rise to this new Far Eastern power, will look 
 back to the period from 1895 to 1902 and the subsequent 
 years to trace those ideals, ambitions and sacrifices which 
 took the world by surprise in the revolution of 191 1, a revo- 
 lution which resulted in the establishment of the present 
 Republic, and which, most significant fact of all, was 
 pressed by Chinese arms alone to a successful conclusion. 
 
I 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 The Joint Note ^ 
 
 During the months of May, June, July, and August of the 
 present year, serious disturbances broke out in the northern 
 provinces of China, and crimes unprecedented in human his- 
 tory, crimes against the law of nations, against the laws of 
 humanity and civilization, were committed under peculiarly 
 odious circumstances. The principal of these crimes were the 
 following ; 
 
 1. On the 20th of June, His Excellency Baron von Ketteler, 
 German Minister, proceeding to the Tsung-li Yamen, was mur- 
 dered while in the exercise of his official duties by soldiers of 
 the regular army acting under orders of their chiefs. 
 
 2. The same day the foreign Legations were attacked and 
 besieged. These attacks continued without intermission until 
 the 14th of August, on which date the arrival of foreign 
 troops put an end to them. These attacks were made by 
 regular troops who joined the Boxers and who obeyed orders 
 of the Court, emanating from the Imperial Palace. At the 
 same time the Chinese Government officially declared by its 
 representatives abroad that it guaranteed the security of the 
 Legations. 
 
 3. The nth of June, Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Lega- 
 tion of Japan, in the discharge of an official mission, was killed 
 by regulars at the gates of the city. At Peking and in several 
 provinces foreigners were murdered, tortured, or attacked by 
 Boxers and regular troops, and only owed their safety to their 
 determined resistance. Their establishments were pillaged 
 and destroyed. 
 
 1 Version in English agreed upon by the British and American Min- 
 isters. See U. S. For. ReL, 1900, p. 244; Moore's Digest, vol. v. 
 pp. 514-516; China No. 5 (1901), no. 188; iRockhill, op. cit., pp. 63-65. 
 619] 207 
 
208 APPENDIX I [620 
 
 4. Foreign cemeteries, at Peking especially, were desecrated, 
 the graves opened, the remains scattered abroad. 
 
 These events led the foreign Powers to send their troops 
 to China in order to protect the lives of their representatives 
 and their nationals, and to restore order. During their march 
 to Peking the Allied forces met with the resistance of the 
 Chinese armies, and had to overcome it by force. China hav- 
 ing recognized her responsibility, expressed her regrets, and 
 manifested the desire to see an end put to the situation created 
 by the disturbances referred to, the Powers have decided to 
 accede to her request on the irrevocable conditions enumerated 
 below, which they deem indispensible to expiate the crimes com- 
 mitted and to prevent their recurrence : 
 
 I. (A) Dispatch to Berlin of an extraordinary mission, 
 headed by an Imperial Prince, to express the regrets of His 
 Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment, for the murder of his Excellency the late Baron von 
 Ketteler, German Minister. 
 
 (B) Erection on the place whjsre the murder was committed 
 of a commemorative monument suitable to the rank of the de- 
 ceased, bearing an inscription in the Latin, German, and 
 'Chinese languages, expressing the regrets of the Emperor of 
 China for the murder. 
 
 II. (A) The severest punishment in proportion to their 
 crimes for the persons designated in the Imperial Decree of 
 September 25, 1900, and for those whom the representatives of 
 the Powers shall subsequently designate. 
 
 (B) Suspension of all official examinations for five years 
 in all the towns where foreigners have been massacred or have 
 been subjected to cruel treatment. 
 
 III. Honorable reparation shall be made by the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment to the Japanese Government for the murder of Mr. 
 Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation. 
 
 IV. An expiatory monument shall be erected by the Im- 
 perial Chinese Government in each of the foreign or interna- 
 tional cemeteries which have been desecrated, and in which the 
 graves have been destroyed. 
 
621] APPENDIX I 209 
 
 V. Maintenance, under conditions to be settled between the 
 Powers, of the prohibition of the importation of arms, as well 
 as if material used exclusively for the manufacture of arms 
 and ammunition. 
 
 VI. Equitable indemnities for governments, societies, com- 
 panies, and private individuals, as well as for Chinese who 
 have suffered during the late events in person or in property 
 in consequence of their being in the service of foreigners. 
 China shall adopt financial measures acceptable to the Powers 
 for the purpose of guaranteeing the payment of said indemni- 
 ties and the interest and amortization of the loans. 
 
 VII. Right for each Power to maintain a permanent guard/ 
 for its Legation and to have the Legation quarter in a de- 
 fensible condition. Chinese shall not have the right to reside 
 in this quarter. 
 
 VIIL The Taku and other forts which might impede free 
 communication between Peking and the sea shall be razed. 
 
 IX. Right of military occupation of certain points, to be / 
 determined by an understanding between the Powers, for keep- 
 ing open communication between the capital and the sea. 
 
 X. (A) The Chinese Government shall cause to be pub- 
 lished during two years in all subprefectures an Imperial 
 decree embodying — 
 
 Perpetual prohibition, under pain of death, of membership 
 in any anti-foreign society. 
 
 Enumeration of the punishments which shall have been in- 
 flicted on the guilty, together with the suspension of all official 
 examinations in the towns where foreigners have been mur- 
 dered or have been subjected to cruel treatment. 
 
 (B) An Imperial decree shall be issued and published every- 
 where in the Empire, declaring that all governors-general, gov- 
 ernors, and provincial or local officials shall be responsible for 
 order in their respective jurisdictions, and that whenever fresh 
 anti- foreign disturbances or any other treaty infractions occur, 
 which are not forthwith suppressed and the guilty persons pun- 
 ished, they, the said officials, shall be immediately removed and 
 forever prohibited from holding any office or honors. 
 
2IO 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 [622 
 
 XL The Chinese Government shall undertake to reform 
 the Office of Foreign Affairs, and to modify the Court cere- 
 monial relative to the reception of foreign representatives in 
 the manner which the Powers shall indicate. 
 
 Until the Chinese Government have complied with the above 
 to the satisfaction of the Powers the undersigned can hold out 
 no expectation that the occupation of Peking and the province 
 of Chihli by the general forces can be brought to a conclusion. 
 
 Peking, December 22, ipoo. 
 
 For Germany: 
 
 For Austria-Hungary: 
 
 For Belgium: 
 
 For Spain: 
 
 For United States of America: 
 
 For France: 
 
 For Great Britain: 
 
 For Italy: 
 
 For Japan: 
 
 For Netherlands: 
 
 For Russia: 
 
 A. MUMM. 
 M. CZIKANN. 
 JOOSTENS. 
 
 B. F. De Cologan. 
 
 E. H. Conger. 
 
 S. PiCHON. 
 
 Ernest Satow. 
 Salvago Raggi, 
 T. Nissi. 
 
 F. M. Knobel. 
 Michel De Giers. 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 Reply of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to the Joint 
 Note of December 22, 1900 ^ 
 
 peking^ january l6, i9oi 
 
 \Translation\ 
 
 Under date of December 24, 1900, the Plenipotentiaries of 
 Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the United States, 
 France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
 Russia, have sent Us the following Note : 
 
 (The Joint Note is here quoted textually and in its entirety) : 
 
 We hastened to transmit the full text of this note to His 
 Majesty the Emperor who, having taken cognizance of it, ren- 
 dered the following decree: 
 
 " We have taken cognizance of the whole of the telegram of 
 Yi Kuang (Prince Ching) and Li Hung-chang. It behooves 
 Us to accept, in their entirety, the twelve articles which they 
 have submitted to Us." 
 
 Consequently, we, Ching, Prince of the first rank. Plenipo- 
 tentiary, President of the Council of Foreign Affairs, and Li, 
 Earl of the first rank, Su-yi, Plenipotentiary, Tutor to the 
 Heir Apparent, Grand Secretary of the Wen-hua Tien Throne 
 Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superintendent of trade for the 
 northern ports, Governor-General of Chihli, 
 
 Declare that we accept in their entirety the twelve articles 
 which we have been requested to insure the transmission of 
 to His Majesty the Emperor. 
 
 In witness of which we have signed the present protocol 
 
 1 Rockhill, op. cit., p. (£. 
 ^Z\ 211 
 
212 APPENDIX II [624 
 
 and we transmit to the foreign Plenipotentiaries a copy of the 
 Edict of His Majesty the Emperor, bearing the Imperial Seal. 
 It is understood that in case of disagreement, the French 
 text shall be authoritative. 
 Peking, 16 January, ipoi. 
 
 (Signed) Yi Kuang 
 
 (Prince Ching). 
 [L. S.] Li. 
 
APPENDIX III 
 Peace Protocol of September 7, 1901 ^ 
 
 The Plenipotentiaries of Germany, His Excellency M. A. 
 Mumm von Schwarzenstein ; of Austria-Hungary, His Excel- 
 lency M. M. Czikann von Wahlborn; of Belgium, His Ex- 
 cellency M. Joostens; of Spain, M. B. J. de Cologan; of the 
 United States, His Excellency M. W. W. Rockhill ; of France, 
 His Excellency M. Paul Beau; of Great Britain, His Excel- 
 lency Sir Ernest Satow; of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi; of 
 Japan, His Excellency M. Jutaro Komura ; of the Netherlands, 
 His Excellency M. F. M. Knobel; of Russia, His Excellency 
 M. M. de Giers ; and of China, His Highness Yi-Kuang Prince 
 Ching of the first rank. President of the Ministry of Foreign 
 Affairs, and His Excellency Li Hung-chang, Earl of Su-i of the 
 first rank, Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Grand Secretary of 
 the Wen-hua Throne Hall, Minister of Commerce, Superin- 
 tendent of the northern trade, Governor-General of Chihli, 
 have met for the purpose of declaring that China has complied 
 to the satisfaction of the Powers with the conditions laid down 
 in the note of the 226. of December, 1900 (the Joint Note), 
 and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the 
 Emperor of China in a decree dated the 27th of December. 
 (Annex No. i). 
 
 1 U. S. For. ReL, 1901, Appendix I, pp. 306-312 for official French 
 version and pp. 312-339 for English with the 19 Annexes; Chines? 
 Maritime Customs, III, no. 30, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 1-49 for French and 
 Chinese texts ; Cordier, Histoire des Relations, etc., vol. iii, pp. 537-545 
 for official French copy; Moore's Digest, vol. v, pp. 517-524; Rockhill, 
 op. cit., pp. 66-96 for text and Annexes; U. S. Consular Reports, vol. 
 Ixviii (Washington, 1902), pp. 19-26. 
 
 625] 213 
 
214 APPENDIX III [626 
 
 ARTICLE I^ 
 
 By an Imperial Edict of the 9th of June last (Annex no. 2), 
 Tsai Feng, Prince Chun, was appointed Ambassador of His 
 Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in that capacity 
 to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression 
 of the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the 
 Chinese Government for the assassination of his Excellency 
 the late Baron von Ketteler, German Minister. 
 
 Prince Chun left Peking the 12th of July last to carry out 
 the orders which had been given him. 
 
 ARTICLE i^ 
 
 The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on 
 the spot of the assassination of his Excellency the late Baron 
 von Ketteler a commemorative monument, worthy of the rank 
 of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the Latin, Ger- 
 man, and Chinese languages, which shall express the regrets 
 of His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder com- 
 mitted. 
 
 Their Excellencies the Chinese Plenipotentiaries have in- 
 formed his Excellency the German Plenipotentiary, in a letter 
 dated the 22nd of July last (Annex No. 3) that an arch of the 
 whole width of the street would be erected on the said spot, 
 and that work on it was begun the 25th of July last. 
 
 ARTICLE 11^ 
 
 Imperial Edicts of. the 13th and 21st of February, 1901 
 (Annexes nos. 4, 5, and 6), inflicted the following punish- 
 ments on the principal authors of the outrages and crimes 
 committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals : 
 
 Tsai-I Prince Tuan and Tsai Lan Duke Fu-kuo were sen- 
 tenced to be brought before the autumnal court of assize for 
 execution, and it was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to 
 grant them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkestan 
 and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of com- 
 mutation of these punishments. 
 
 Tsai Hsun Prince Chuang, Ying Nien, President of the 
 
627] APPENDIX III 215 
 
 Court of Censors, and Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board 
 of Punishments, were condemned to commit suicide. 
 
 Yu Hsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the 
 Board of Rites, and Hsu Cheng-yu, formerly senior Vice- 
 President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to 
 death. 
 
 Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assis- 
 tant Grand Secretary, President of the Board of Works, Hsu 
 Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-heng, formerly Governor- 
 General of Szechwan. 
 
 An Imperial Edict of February 13th, 1901 (Annex no. 7), 
 rehabilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, President of the 
 Board of War, Li Shan, President of the Board of Works, Hsu 
 Ching-cheng, senior Vice-President of the Board of Works, 
 Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council, and Yuan 
 Chang, Vice-President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had 
 been put to death for having protested against the outrageous 
 breaches of international law of last year. 
 
 Prince Chuang committed suicide the 21st of February, 1901, 
 Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao the 24th, Yu Hsien was exe- 
 cuted the 22nd, Chi Hsiu and Hsu Cheng-yu on the 26th. 
 Tung Fu-hsiang, General in Kansu, has been deprived of his 
 office by Imperial Edict of the 13th of February, 1901, pend- 
 ing the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted 
 on him. 
 
 Imperial Edicts dated the 29th of April and 19th of August, 
 1 90 1, have inflicted various punishments on the provincial 
 officials convicted of the crimes and outrages of last summer. 
 
 ARTICLE 11^ 
 An Imperial Edict promulgated the 19th of August, 1901 
 (Annex no. 8), ordered the suspension of official examinations 
 for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred 
 or submitted to cruel treatment. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 So as to make honorable reparation for the assassination of 
 
2l6 APPENDIX III [628 
 
 Mr. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His 
 Majesty the Emperor of China by an Imperial Edict of the 
 i8th of June, 1901 (Annex no. 9), appointed Na Tung, Vice- 
 President of the Board of Revenue, to be his Envoy Extra- 
 ordinary, and specially directed him to convey to His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Japan the expression of the regrets of His 
 Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the 
 assassination of the late Mr. Sugiyama. 
 
 ARTICLE IV 
 
 The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory 
 monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries 
 which were desecrated and in which the tombs were destroyed. 
 
 It has been agreed with the representatives of the Powers 
 that the Legations interested shall settle the details for the 
 erection of these monuments, China bearing all the expenses 
 thereof, estimated at ten thousand taels for the cemeteries at 
 Peking and within its neighborhood, and at five thousand 
 taels for the cemeteries in the provinces. The amounts have 
 been paid and the list of these cemeteries is enclosed here- 
 with. (Annex no. 10.) 
 
 ARTICLE v 
 
 China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its ter- 
 ritory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials ex- 
 clusively used for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. 
 
 An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th of August, 
 1901 (Annex.no. 11), forbidding said importation for a term 
 of two years. New Edicts may be issued subsequently extend- 
 ing this by other successive terms of two years in case of 
 necessity recognized by the Powers. 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 
 By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th of May, 1901 (Annex 
 no. 12), His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed to pay the 
 Powers an indemnity of four hundred and fifty millions of 
 Haikwan Taels. This sum represents the total amount of the 
 indemnities for States, companies or societies, private individ- 
 
629] APPENDIX III 217 
 
 uals, and Chinese referred to in Article VI of the note of 
 December 22nd, 1900. 
 
 (a) These four hundred and fifty millions constitute a gold 
 debt calculated at the rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold 
 currency of each country, as indicated below : 
 
 Haikwan tael = marks 3-055 
 
 = Austro-Hungary crown 3-595 
 
 = gold dollar 0.742 
 
 = francs 3-750 
 
 = pound sterling 3s. od. 
 
 = yen 1.407 
 
 =: Netherlands florin 1-796 
 
 = gold rouble ( 17.424 dolias fine) . . . 1.412 
 
 This sum in gold shall bear interest in 4 per cent per annum, 
 and the capital shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine 
 years in the manner indicated in the annexed plan of amortiza- 
 tion. (Annex no. 13.) 
 
 Capital and interest shall be payable in gold at the rates 
 of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the differ- 
 ent payments fall due. 
 
 The amortization shall commence the ist of January, 1902, 
 and shall finish at the end of the year 1940. The amortiza- 
 tions are payable annually, the first payment being fixed on 
 the 1st of January, 1903. 
 
 Interest shall run from the ist of July, 190 1, but the Chinese 
 Government shall have the right to pay off within a term of 
 three years, beginning January, 1902, the arrears of the first 
 six months, ending the 31st of December, 1901, on condition, 
 however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of four 
 per cent per annum on the sums the payment of which shall 
 have thus been deferred. Interest shall be payable semi- 
 annually, the first payment being fixed on the ist of July, 1902. 
 
 (b) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai, in 
 the following manner : 
 
 Each Power shall be represented by a delegate on a com- 
 mission of bankers authorized to receive the amount of inter- 
 
2l8 APPENDIX III [630 
 
 est and amortization which shall be paid to it by the Chinese 
 authorities designated for that purpose, to divide it among the 
 interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same. 
 
 (c) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen 
 of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, 
 which shall subsequently be converted into fractional bonds 
 bearing the signatures of the delegates of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment designated for that purpose. This operation and all those 
 relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the 
 above-mentioned commission, in accordance with the instruc- 
 tions which the Powers shall send their delegates. 
 
 (d) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment 
 of the bonds shall be paid monthly to the commission. 
 
 (e) The revenues assigned as security for the bonds are 
 the following: 
 
 1. The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime 
 Customs after payment of the interest and amortization of 
 preceding loans secured on these revenues, plus the proceeds 
 of the raising to five per cent effective of the present tariff on 
 maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, 
 but exempting foreign rice, cereals, and flour, gold and silver 
 bullion and coin. 
 
 2. The revenues of the native customs, administered in the 
 open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs. 
 
 3. The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the 
 fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans. 
 
 The raising of the present tariff on imports to five per cent 
 effective is agreed to on the conditions mentioned below. 
 
 It shall be put in force two months after the signing of the 
 present protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except for 
 merchandise shipped not more than ten days after the said 
 signing. 
 
 I. All duties levied on imports " ad valorem " shall be con- 
 verted as far as possible and as soon as may be into specific 
 duties. This conversion shall be made in the following man- 
 ner: The average value of merchandise at the time of their 
 landing during the three years 1897, 1898, and 1899, that is to 
 
631] APPENDIX III 219 
 
 say, the market price less the amount of import duties and in- 
 cidental expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the valuation 
 of merchandise. Pending the result of the work of conversion, 
 duties shall be levied " ad valorem." 
 
 2. The beds of the rivers Peiho and Whangpu shall be im- 
 proved with the financial participation of China. 
 
 ARTICLE VII 
 
 The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occu- 
 pied by the Legations shall be considered as one specially re- 
 served for their use and placed under their exclusive control, 
 in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which 
 may be made defensible. 
 
 The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on 
 the annexed plan (Annex no. 14) : 
 
 On the west, the line i, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
 On the north, the line 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. 
 
 On the east, Ketteler street (10, 11, 12). 
 
 Drawn along the exterior base of the Tatar wall and follow- 
 ing the line of the bastions, on the south the line 12. i. 
 
 In the protocol annexed to the letter of the i6th of January, 
 190 1, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain 
 a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defence of its 
 Legation. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII 
 
 The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of 
 Taku and those which might impede free communication be- 
 tween Peking and the sea ; steps haVe been taken for carrying 
 this out. 
 
 ARTICLE IX 
 
 The Chinese Government has conceded the right of the 
 Powers in the protocol annexed to the letter of the i6th of 
 January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by 
 an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open 
 communication between the capital and the sea. The points 
 occupied by the Powers are: 
 
220 APPENDIX III [632 
 
 Huangtsun, Langfang, Yangtsun, Tientsin, Chunliangcheng, 
 Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan, Lanchou, Changli, Chinwangtao, 
 Shanhaikwan. 
 
 ARTICLE X 
 
 The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have 
 pubHshed during two years in all district cities the following 
 Imperial Edicts: 
 
 (a) Edict of the ist of February (Annex no. 15), prohibit- 
 ing forever, under pain of death, membership in any anti- 
 foreign society. 
 
 (b) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29 April, and 
 19th August, enumerating the punishments inflicted on the 
 guilty. 
 
 (c) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examin- 
 ations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or sub- 
 jected to cruel treatment. 
 
 (d) Edict of the ist of February, 1901 (Annex no. 16), de- 
 claring all governors-general, governors, and provincial or local 
 officials responsible for order in their respective districts, and 
 that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions 
 of the treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and 
 the authors of which shall not have been punished, these offi- 
 cials shall be immediately dismissed, without possibility of be- 
 ing given new functions or new honors. 
 
 ARTICLE XI 
 
 The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amend- 
 ments deemed necessary by the foreign Governments to the 
 treaties of commerce and navigation and the other subjects 
 concerning commercial relations, with the object of facilitat- 
 ing them. 
 
 At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained 
 in Article VI, concerning the indemnity, the Chinese Govern- 
 ment agrees to assist in the improvement of the courses of 
 the rivers Peiho and Whangpu, as stated below. 
 
 (a) The works for the improvement of the navigability of 
 the Peiho, begun in 1898 with the cooperation of the Chinese 
 
633] APPENDIX III 221 
 
 Government, have been resumed under the direction of an inter- 
 national commission. As soon as the administration of Tien- 
 tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government, 
 it will be in a position to be represented on this commission, 
 and will pay each year a sum of sixty thousand Haikwan taels 
 for maintaining the works. 
 
 (b) A conservancy board, charged with the management and 
 control of the works for straightening the Whangpu and the 
 improvement of the course of that river, is hereby created. 
 
 This board shall consist of members representing the inter- 
 ests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the 
 shipping trade of Shanghai. The expenses incurred for the 
 works and the general management of the undertaking are 
 estimated at the annual sum of four hundred and sixty thous- 
 and Haikwan taels for the first twenty years. This sum 
 shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese Govern- 
 ment and the foreign interests concerned. Detailed stipula- 
 tions concerning the composition, duties, and revenues of the 
 conservancy boards are embodied in Annex no. 17. 
 
 ARTICLE XII 
 
 An Imperial Edict of the 24th of July, 1901 (Annex no. 18), 
 reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs (Tsung-li Yamen), 
 on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed 
 it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waiwupu, and now 
 called the Waichiaopu), which takes precedence over the six 
 other Ministries of State. The same Edict appointed the 
 principal members of this Ministry. 
 
 An agreement has also been reached concerning the modifi- 
 cation of Court ceremonial as regards the reception of for- 
 eign representatives, and has been the subject of several notes 
 from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of which is 
 embodied in a memorandum herewith annexed (Annex no. 19). 
 
 Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the de- 
 clarations specified above and the annexed documents originat- 
 ing with the foreign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only 
 is authoritative. 
 
222 APPENDIX III [634 
 
 The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satis- 
 faction of the Powers with the conditions laid down in the 
 above-mentioned note on December 22nd, 1900 (the Joint 
 Note), the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China 
 to terminate the situation created by the disorders of the sum- 
 mer of 1900. In consequence thereof the foreign Plenipoten- 
 tiaries are authorized to declare in the names of their Gov- 
 ernments that, with the exception of the Legation guards men- 
 tioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely 
 evacuate the city of Peking on the 17th of September, 1901, 
 and with the exception of the localities mentioned in Article 
 IX, will withdraw from the province of Chihli on the 22d of 
 September. 
 
 The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve 
 identical copies and signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the 
 conteacting countries. One copy shall be given to each of the 
 foreign Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to the 
 Chinese Plenipotentiaries. 
 
 Peking, yth September ipoi. 
 
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 \ Uji"' Maurer, J. H., The Far East. Reading, 1912. 
 ^ Meadows, T. T., The Chinese and their Rebellions . . . with . . . an 
 
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 Meritens, Baron de, A Sketch of our Relations with China during Three 
 
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 Millard, Thomas F., The New Far East. New York, 1906. 
 
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INDEX 
 
 Abolition of queue, proposed by Wang 
 Chao, 52 
 
 Adee, A. A., to Min. Conger, 79 n., 80 n. 
 
 Amoy, 21 n., 34 and n. 
 
 Anhwei, 119 
 
 Anting, 133 
 
 Annam, 34 
 
 Aoki, Viscount, reply to Kuang Hsu's 
 letter, 143; objections to Li's creden- 
 tials, 152; interview of Mr. White- 
 head with, 188 n. 
 
 " Arrow " war, 23 
 
 Austria, concession at Tientsin, 165, 
 167 n.; accepts German proposal for 
 punishment, 177; on proposals of 
 Diplomatic Body, 194, 195 
 
 Balfour, Mr., on Russia's efforts for ice- 
 free harbor, 30 
 
 Beau, Paul, 213 
 
 Belgium, concession at Tientsin, 167 
 and n.; on proposals of Diplomatic 
 Body, 194, 195 
 
 Berlin, 29, 32 n., 38, 123, 126, 142, 
 155 n., 181, 194, 208 
 
 Berlin Post, 84, 85 
 
 " Big Sword " Society. See Boxer Re- 
 bellion. 
 
 Biagovestchensk, Russian massacre of 
 Chinese at, 178 
 
 Boxer indemnity, in French proposals, 
 184 and n.; United States to France 
 regarding, 185; discussion of by 
 Diplomatic Body, 191 and n., 192; 
 final agreement, 202 and n., 203, 209, 
 216-219 
 
 Boxer Rebellion, meaning of, 15, 16; 
 overthrow of reform a vital cause of, 
 69, 70; other causes, 70-72; mission- 
 ary question, 72-75; initial disturb- 
 ances in Shantung, 76-82; in Pe- 
 king, 83, 84; four parts to, 89; ques- 
 tion of Legation guards, 92-100; 
 edicts and decrees concerning Boxers, 
 101-112; dynastic succession, 114- 
 116, situation in South China, at 
 
 647] 
 
 Shanghai, 1 18, 1 19, in Yangtse region, 
 120-124; policy of United States 
 during, 125-129; attack on Taku 
 Forts, 129-132; Seymour expedition, 
 132, 134; siege of Tientsin, 134, 135; 
 second Allied expedition, 135, 136; 
 renewal of punitive expeditions, 155, 
 156, 160-164; version of in edict of 
 September 25, 1900, 180; in preamble 
 to Joint Note, 207, 208. See China 
 
 Brooks, murder of, 81 
 
 Billow, Count von, on the German pol- 
 icy, 128 n.; note verbale in answer to 
 Kuang Hsu's letter, 142, 143; on 
 German proposal for punishment, 
 175,182 
 
 Burlingame, Anson, mission of 1868, 
 2Ty and n.; criticism of, 24 
 
 Cambodia, 34 
 
 Campbell, Mr., assault on, 89 
 
 Canton, 18, 21 n., 35, 47, 70 n., 147 
 
 Catholics in China, 72 and n. 
 
 Cassini Convention, provisions of, 27, 
 
 28, 28 n. 
 Chaffee, Maj.-Gen., 168, 169 and n. 
 Chang Chih-tung, 119, 123, 158, 159 n. 
 Chang In-huan, decree denouncing, 62; 
 
 efforts in his behalf, 63 
 Changli, 220 
 
 Chao Shu-chiao, 180, 199, 201, 215 
 Chaylard, G. du, 166, 167 
 Chefoo, 26, 78 n. 
 Chekiang, proclamation of Viceroys 
 
 concerning, 123 and n.; Chuchow 
 
 outbreak in, 156-159 
 Cheng (Tientsin Taotai), 169 n. 
 Chengtingfu, 155 and n. 
 Chen Kung-liang, 77 
 Chichow, 91 
 Chihli, 91, 92,94, 112, 120, 121, 155 n., 
 
 162, 190, 210, 213, 222 
 Chi Hsiu, 116, 201, 215 
 China, meaning of Boxer Rebellion, 15, 
 
 16; early relations with Europe, 17- 
 
 19; Opium war, 20, 21; policy after 
 
 235 
 
236 
 
 INDEX 
 
 [648 
 
 Opium war, 22; "Arrow" war and ! 
 Allied expedition to Peking, 23; Bur- 
 lingame, 23, 24; China to 1895, 24, 
 25; view of Chino-Japanese war, 25, 
 26, territorial aggressions of the 
 Powers, 26-36; Hay note of Sep- | 
 tember, 1899, 37, 38; China in 1899, 
 38, 39; reforms of Kuang Hsu, 39-54; 
 Coup a" Etat^ 54-56; criticism of i 
 reformers, 56-60; reaction against \ 
 reform, 60-66: reception to wives of ! 
 diplomats, 66, 67; health of Emperor, j 
 67, 68; overthrow of reform a vital 
 cause of rebellion, 69, 70; other im- ; 
 mediate causes, 70-72; missionary 
 question, 72 75; results of European ' 
 aggressions, 75, 76; first Boxer dis- \ 
 turbances, 76-84; Kangsu troops, i 
 89-92; Legation guards, 92-100; ' 
 edicts and decrees concerning Boxers, ! 
 IOI-II2; dynastic succession, 114- ' 
 116; situation in South China, 118- | 
 125; policy of United States, 125- 
 129; Allied attack on Taku, 129-132; 
 Seymour expedition, 132-134; siege 
 of Tientsin, 134, 135; second Allied 
 expedition, 135, 136; letters to i 
 Powers and replies, 139-144; question i 
 of plenipotentiaries, 145-154; re- j 
 newal of punitive expeditions, 155, ; 
 156; Chuchow, 156-158; Shanghai, j 
 158, 159; Shantung, 159, 160; Shansi j 
 160; aggressions of Powers at Tien- ! 
 tsin, 164-173; occupation of Peking, i 
 173-175; German proposal for pun- I 
 ishment of Boxers, 175-183; French ! 
 proposals, 183-189; discussions by ; 
 Diplomatic Body, 189-196; Joint ' 
 Note, 196-198; final punishments, I 
 199-202; indemnity, 202, 203; other j 
 provisions, 203, 204; China after the | 
 Rebellion, 204, 205 
 
 Chinanfu, 78 | 
 
 Ching, Prmce, as apologist for Tzu Hsi, ^ 
 68; concerning Kangsu troops, 92; 1 
 concerning Legation guards, 94, 98, i 
 succeeded as President of Tsungli 
 Yamen by Prince Tuan, 116; ap- 
 pointed peace commissioner, 150- 
 154, 175; objection to part of Joint 
 Note, 197, 198; reply to Joint Note, 
 211, 212 
 
 Chino-Japanese war, 25, 26, 85, 92, 100 
 
 Chinwangtao, 192, 220 
 
 Choate, Rufus, 147 
 
 Christianity, decrees protecting, 41; 
 
 Wang Chao's proposal, 52; the mis- 
 sionary question, 72-75; decrees con- 
 cerning missionaries, 101-103, no n, 
 
 Chuchow, 156 and n., 158 and n., 190 
 
 Chun, Prince, 214 
 
 Chunliangcheng, 220 
 
 Cochin-China, 34 
 
 Cockburn, Henry, estimate of Kang Yu- 
 wei, 59, 60 
 
 Cologan, M., on beginning trouble in 
 Peking, 83 ; on Kangsu troops, 90-92 ; 
 regarding first Legation guards, 94, 95 
 
 Confucius, 15, 66 
 
 Conger, E. H., opinion of Tzu Hsi's 
 reception to wives of diplomats, 67; 
 negotiations with Yamen concerning 
 Ichoufu disturbances, 79 and n., 80; 
 estimate of Yuan Shih-kai, 81; on 
 Boxer outbreak near Peking, 97; to 
 Hay on policy of Court, loi n. ; esti- 
 mate of Prince Tuan, 116; interview 
 with Yamen Ministers, 117 and n.; 
 his instructions during Rebellion, 1 26, 
 127; concerning Seymour expedition, 
 133 n.; on renewal of punitive expe- 
 ditions, 155; Satow to Conger, 162; 
 on Tientsin aggressions, 164-166; 
 regarding a U. S. concession at Tien- 
 tsin, 168, 169 and n., 171 and n.; ar- 
 rangement with Satow, 171, 172; 
 failure to obtain concession, 172, 
 173; proposed addition to French 
 proposals, 190, 191 ; indemnity to 
 Hague tribunal, 192; to object to 
 " irrevocable " conditions of Joint 
 Note, 197, 198 
 
 Constantinople, 16, 30 
 
 Coup d'' Etat, 54-56 
 
 Cushing, Caleb, negotiations with China, 
 21 n., 22 n., 125 
 
 Czikann, M., 210 
 
 Dairen (Dalny), and Cassini Conven- 
 tion, 27, 28; leased to Russia, 30, 31, 
 36 
 
 Decrees, for protection of Christianity, 
 41 ; dismissing Weng Tung-ho, 43 
 and n.; reform decree of June ii, 
 1898, 44; to '* Viceroys and Govern- 
 ors of the Empire," 46; on commerce, 
 etc., 47; other reform decrees, 48, 
 df<'\ decree of Sept. 5, 1898,49-51; 
 denouncing Kang Yu-wei, 61; 
 against reforms, 63-65; edict of Sept. 
 25 concerning Kuang Hsu's illness, 
 68; on Shantung disturbances, loi- 
 
649J 
 
 INDEX 
 
 ^2>7 
 
 103; criticism of decrees, 103, 104; 
 edict concerning Italy, France, etc., 
 104, 105; edict of Nov. 21, 1899, 105, 
 106; distinction between "good and 
 bad" societies, 108, 109; concerning 
 Boxers, no, 1 1 1 ; supporting Boxers, 
 112, 130 n.; dynastic succession, 115; 
 on bombardment of Taku Forts, 129 
 n.; appointing l.i peace commis- 
 sioner, 145 and n., 150; additional 
 peace commissioners, 153 n.; edict 
 of Sept. 25, for punishment, 178, i 
 
 and n . , 208; decree of Nov. 13 
 punisiimen?i' 199; of Feb. 13 and 21, 
 1901, 200-202, 215, 220; April 20 
 and Aug. 19, 202, 210, 220; on pub- 
 lication of punishment decree, 209; 
 Feb. I, 1901, prohibiting membership 
 in Boxer societies, 220; May 29, 1901, 
 on indemnity, 216-219 
 
 Delcasse, Theophile, defines French 
 policy, 127 n., 128 n.; on appoint- 
 ment of Li, 146; on removal of Le- 
 gation to Tientsin, 158; on German 
 proposal for punishment, 179 n.; on 
 French proposals, 187 
 
 Denby, Charles, as to Legation guards 
 in 1895, 92> 93 and n., Tientsin con- 
 cession, 169 n., 170 n 
 
 Denmark, 192 
 
 Detheve, Dr., to examine Kuang Hsu, 
 69 
 
 Embassies to China, 18; sources on, 19 
 n. 
 
 Europe, first contact with China, 16; 
 renewed intercourse, 18, 19; policy 
 after Opium war, 24; at period of Re- 
 bellion, 75, 79; erroneous ideas con- 
 cerning China before Rebellion, 84, 
 85, 107, 108; condition of Legations 
 after siege, 136 n,; replies to Kuang 
 Hsu's letters, 142-144; agreement as 
 to Shanghai, 158, 159 and n.; exten- 
 sion of settlements at Tientsin, 164- 
 168; ideas as to indemnity, 202, 203 
 
 ■** Fists of Righteous Harmony " Society. 
 See Boxer Rebellion 
 
 Fleming, murder of, 82 and n. 
 
 Foochow, 21 n., 82 and n. 
 
 Fowler, Consul (U. S.)j 78, 79 n. 
 
 France, first treaty with China, 21; ex- 
 pedition of i860 to Peking, 23; 
 Tongking war, 24; demands and 
 leases Kwangchouwan, etc., 34, 35; 
 
 extension of settlement at Shanghai, 
 35, 36; agrees to Hay Note of Sept., 
 1899, 38; aid to Catholic clergy, 72 
 and n.; second Legation guards, 99; 
 Chinese edict denouncing France, 
 104, 105; policy in China, 127 n., 
 128 n.; reply to letter of Kuang Hsu, 
 142 and n.; on removal of Legation 
 to Tientsin, 148; Tientsin extension, 
 165-167; reply to German proposals 
 for punishment, 179 and n., 181 and 
 n.; French proposals, 1 83- 189; re- 
 viewed by Diplomatic Body, 189-193; 
 additions to, 193-196; acceptance of, 
 203, 204 
 
 Fukien, 34, 36 
 
 Fung-Shui, 71 
 
 Fu Shang )tinq army corps, 30 n. 
 
 Gaselee, Gen., 156 n., 161 and n., 163 
 
 Germany, seizure and lease of Kiaochau, 
 28, 29, 29 n.; agreement with Great 
 Britain, 32 n.; accepts Hay Note of 
 Sept., 1899, 38; punitive expedition 
 into Shantung province, 80 ; first Le- 
 gation guards, 99; pohcy in China, 
 128 n.; reply to Kuang Hsu's letter, 
 142, 143; Tientsin extension, 165, 
 167 n.; proposal for punishment of 
 Boxer officials, 1 75-183; mission of 
 regret and monument to Ketteler by 
 China, 194, 208, 214; opposition to 
 Hague referendum, 197 and n 
 
 Giers, M. de, opposed to attack on Taku 
 Forts, 113; Russian Legation at 
 Tientsin, 148, 149; objection to re- 
 newal of punitive expeditions, 155; 
 objection to M. Raggi's proposal, 195, 
 196 
 
 Gordon, General, 23 n. 
 
 Great Britain, Opium war with China, 
 19-22; " Arrow " war and expedition 
 to Peking in i860, 23; leases Wei- 
 haiwei, 31, 32; agreement with Ger- 
 many regarding Shantung. 32 n.; 
 Hong Kong (Kowloon) Extension, 
 33; Yangtse Valley pledge, 34; op- 
 position to extension of French settle- 
 ment at Shanghai, 35, 36; accepts 
 Hay Note of Sept., 1899, 38; offers 
 of help to China against pirates and 
 Yellow river floods, 71 n.; first Lega- 
 tion guards, 94, 95 ; second Legation 
 guards, 99; accepts von Waldersee, 
 136 n.; on Li's appointment as com- 
 missioner, 146; on removal of Lega- 
 
238 
 
 INDEX 
 
 [650 
 
 tion to Tientsin, 148, 149; against 
 renewal of punitive expeditions, 156 
 and n.; Chuchow demands, 157 and 
 11., 158; reply to German proposal 
 for punishment, 179, 181 ; on French 
 proposals, 187; Satow's proposal for 
 revision of commercial treaties, 195 
 and n. 
 Gresham, Sec. of State, as to Legation 
 guards in 1895, 92> 93 and n. 
 
 Hague Court, proposal to refer indem- 
 nity to, 185, 192, 197 and n. 
 
 Hainan, 34, 35 
 
 Hamilton, Lord, 161 n. 
 
 Hankow, 49, 72 n., 160, 197 
 
 Hanlin College, 45 
 
 Hanneken, von, 54 n. 
 
 Hanotaux, M., announces acceptance of 
 French demands by China, 35 
 
 Hardinge, Sir Charles, 183 
 
 Hart, Sir Robert, provision against 
 opium by, 33; safe conduct to Li, 151 
 
 Hatzfeldt, Count, 163 
 
 Hay, John, Note of September, 1899, 
 37~39; to Wu Ting-fang concerning 
 American forces to China, 123; Cir- 
 cular of July 3, 126, 127; on question 
 of war existing, 130 n; on Li's pro- 
 posed armistice, 146, 147; policy of, 
 165; failure to obtain Tientsin con- 
 cession, 172, 173; reply to French 
 proposals, 186 and n., 187 
 
 Henry of Prussia, Prince, interview with 
 Tzu Hsi, 66 
 
 Heyking, Baron von, leases Kiaochau, 
 29 
 
 Hill, David J., Act.-Sec, reply to Ger- 
 man proposal for punishment, 176, 
 177 
 
 Hochialou, 78 
 
 Honan, 121 
 
 Hong Kong, ceded to Great Britain, 21 
 n,; Extension, 33 and n. 
 
 Hottinguer and Co., 27 n. 
 
 Hou Chen Yingy camp of Prince Tuan, 
 98 
 
 Hsi-an. See Sianfu 
 
 Hsiku Arsenal, 133 and n. 
 
 Hsu Cheng-yu, 20 r, 215 
 
 Hsu Chingcheng, 99, 201, 215 
 
 Hsu Tung, 201, 215 
 
 Hsu Yung-yi, 99, 201, 215 
 
 Huangtsun, 220 
 
 Hunan, 119 
 
 Hung Sui-tsuen, 23 
 
 Hupeh, 119 
 
 Ichoufu, disturbances at, 77-78, 79 n. 
 
 Imperial (Forbidden) City (Peking), 
 
 parade of Alhed army through, 173, 
 
 Imperial Maritime Customs (now Chi- 
 nese Maritime Customs), 72 n.; 203, 
 218 
 
 Imperial Palace, 173, 207 
 
 India, 16, 161 n. 
 
 Italy, accepts Hay Note of Sept., 1899, 
 37, 38; second Legation guards, 99; 
 failure to obtain lease, 104, 105; ac- 
 cepts von Waldersee, 136 n.; on 
 removal of Legation to Tientsin, 149; 
 extension at Tientsin, 167 n.; accepts 
 German proposal for punishment, 
 278, r8i and n.; accepts French pro- 
 posals, 188; Min. Raggi's proposals, 
 193. 194 
 
 Japan, war with China, 25, 26; agrees 
 I to Hay Note of Sept., 1899, 38: sec- 
 ] ond Legation guards, 99; policy in 
 China during Rebellion, 128 n.; reply 
 j of Aoki to Kuang Hsu's letter, 143; 
 opposition to Li's credentials, 150- 
 152; Tientsin extension, 165, 167 n.; 
 ; on German proposal for punishment, 
 177, 181, 182; "general agreement'* 
 with French proposals, 188 n.; mis- 
 sion of regret demanded for murder 
 of Sugiyama, 794; against Hague re- 
 ferendum, 197; opposition to punish- 
 ment ultimatum, 200 
 
 Jardine, Matheson and Co., 82 
 
 Jihchao, German expedition to, 80 
 
 Joint Note, 196 and n., 197-199, 207- 
 210, 222 
 
 Joostens, M., 213 
 
 Journal de Saint- Petersbourg, 149 n. 
 
 Jung Lu, interview with Yuan Shih- 
 kai, 54, 55; his army, 98; appointed 
 Min. Plen., 153 n.; Warren concern- 
 ing, 180 n. 
 
 Kang Hi, 40 
 
 Kangsu troops, 83, 84 ; discussions over, 
 89-92 
 
 Kansu, 201 and n.; 215 
 
 Yi, 121, 152, 180, I 
 201, 215 
 
 Kang 
 
 84 n., 199, 
 
 Kang Yu-wei, interview with Yamen 
 and Emperor, 43-47; reform decrees 
 of, 44-55; hostility to Tzu Hsi, 54, 
 
651] 
 
 INDEX 
 
 239 
 
 100; failure of plot against Tzu Hsi, 
 criticism of Kang and reform, 56-51; 
 estimate of by Cockburn, 59, 60; de- 
 nounced by Tzu Hsi, 61, 62 
 
 Kempff, Admiral, opposed to attack on 
 Taku Forts, 113, 114, 129, 130, 186 n. 
 
 Ketteler, Baron von, murder of, 125, 
 126 n., 136 n., 187 n., 194, 198, 203, 
 207, 208, 214 
 
 Khartoum, 85 
 
 Kiangsi, 119 
 
 Kiangsu, 79 n., 119 
 
 Kiaochau (Tsingtao , leased to Russia 
 in Cassini Convention, 27; seized by 
 Germany, 28; and leased, 29 and n., 
 36,76 
 
 Kienning riots, 82 and n. 
 
 Killie, Faris and Chalfant, report of, 76- 
 79, 79 n. 
 
 Knobel, F. M., 210, 213 
 
 Kolnische Zeitung, on lease of Weihai- 
 wei to Great Britain, 32 n. 
 
 Komura, Jutaro, 213 
 
 Kowloon (Hong Kong) Extension, 33 
 
 Kuang Hsu, estimate of, 40, 41; decree 
 protecting Christianity, 51 ; dismisses 
 Weng Tung-ho, 42; appoints Kang 
 Yu-wei adviser, 43; reform decrees 
 of, 44-55; abolishes six Government 
 Boards, 52 and n.; action on memor- 
 ial of Wang Chao, 53 and n.; plan 
 to seize Tzu Hsi, 54; failure of plot, 
 55; decree of Sept. 21, 1898, 56; 
 illness of, 67-69; arrangement for 
 succession, 114-116; letter to McKin- 
 ley, 139, 140; letters to Europe, 142- 
 144; second letter to McKinley and 
 reply, 144 n. 
 
 Kulturkampf, 75 
 
 Kwangcbouwan, leased to France, 34, 
 35; seizure denounced, 104 
 
 Kwangsi, 34, 35, 82 and n., 119 
 
 Kwantung, 34, 35> "9 
 
 Lamsdorff, Count, on state of war in 
 China, 131, 132 and n.; against re- 
 newal of punitive expeditions, 156; 
 on German proposal for punishment, 
 178; opinion on China's power to 
 punish, 182, 183 
 
 Lanchou, 220 
 
 Lanfang, 133, 220 
 
 Lansdowne, Marquis of, against renewal 
 of punitive expeditions, 150, 160, 
 163, 164; to Satow, 197 
 
 Lascelles, Sir F., 181 
 
 Legation guards, Sec. Gresham concern- 
 ing, 92, 93; first guards, 93-96; sec- 
 ond guards, 97-100; permanent 
 guards proposed by France, 184; 
 discussion of by Diplomatic Body, 
 J92; permanent guards, 219, 222 
 
 Liao Shou-heng, 99 
 
 Lien Yuan, 99, 201, 215 
 
 Li Hung-chang, criticism of by Mac- 
 Donald, 53 n.; opposition to Kuang 
 Hsu, 59; enmity to Chang In-huan, 
 62, 63; to aid against Yellow river 
 floods, 71 n.; appointed peace com- 
 missioner, 145 and n., 146,175; his 
 proposed armistice, 146; reply of Hay 
 to, 147; message to Sir Chihchen 
 Lofenglu, 147, 148; failure of armis- 
 tice, 148; on removal of Legations 
 to Tientsin, 148, 149; dispute over 
 his powers to negotiate, 150-154; 
 journey to Peking, 150, 151; objects 
 to renewal of punitive expeditions, 
 155; opposition to United States con- 
 cession at Tientsin, 172, 173; objec- 
 tion to part of Joint Note, 197, 198; 
 objection to extreme punishments, 
 200; reply to Joint Note, 211, 212 
 
 Likin, 71, 72, 45 
 
 Lin (Commissioner Lin), 21 n. 
 
 Li Ping-heng, 184 n.. 201, 215 
 
 Li Shan, 201, 215 
 
 Literati, discredited by reform, 48, 57; 
 affiliation with Boxers, 108 
 
 Liu Kun-yi, 118, 120-122 
 
 Liu Shu-tang, 157 
 
 Li Ying, 77 
 
 Lofa Station, 133 
 
 Lofenglu, Sir Chihchen, opinion as to 
 Legation guards, 93; memorandum 
 to British Foreign Office, 121; re- 
 ceives Li's proposed armistice, 147; 
 message from Yangtse Viceroys, 160 
 
 Lo Jung-kwang, 129 n. 
 
 London, 2)% 121, 123, 126, 147, 160, 
 180 n. 
 
 London Times on German seizure of 
 Kiaochau, 29 n. 
 
 Louis XVI, 40 
 
 Lukouchiao, 89 
 
 Lutai, 220 
 
 McCalla, Capt., 132 n., 133 n. 
 
 McKinley, President, policy during Re- 
 bellion, 127; letter of Emperor to, 
 139, 140; reply, 140, 14I; second 
 letter and reply, 144 n. 
 
240 
 
 INDEX 
 
 [652 
 
 MacDonald, Sir Claude, estimate of 
 Weng Tung-ho, 42 : criticism of reform 
 decree of June ii, 189S, 44; on de- 
 cree reforming Government examina- 
 tions, 48 n.; criticism of Li Hung 
 chang, 53 n,; criticism of reform 
 movement, 58 n.: efforts in behalf of 
 Chang In-huan, 62, 63; advice con- 
 cerning Emperor's illness, 68, 69: 
 on first disturbances in Peking, 83, 
 84; protests against presence of 
 Kangsu troops, 89, 90; interview 
 with Ching, 94; opinion as to Lega- 
 tion guards, 95; interview with 
 Yamen, 98, 99; term for Boxers, 113 
 n.; his instructions, 114; observa- 
 tions on von Ketteler's murder, 130 
 n.; on Li's appointment, 146, 152, 
 153; opposed to removal of Legation 
 to Tientsin, 148; on occupation of 
 Summer Palace, 174, 175; regarding 
 Prince luan et al., 179; on edict of 
 Sept. 25, 180 n.; calls meeting for 
 French proposals, 189; on Boxer 
 leaders, 190 n.j succeeded by Satow, 
 190 n., 193 n.; regarding indemnity 
 claims, 191 and n., 192 
 
 MacDonald, Lady, address at reception 
 of Tzu Hsi, 66 
 
 Manchu " Banners," 46, 48 
 
 Manchuria, Russian policy in, 128 n.; 
 Prince Tuan in, 201 n. 
 
 Manchus, policy of, 17, 18; after Tai- 
 ping Rebellion, 24, 25; their war with 
 Japan, 25, 26; permission to settle in 
 provinces, 49 
 
 Mansfield, Consul (Br.), on piracy, 70 
 n., 71 n. 
 
 Marco Polo, 16 
 
 Ming dynasty, 17, 45 
 
 Missionaries, discussion of, 72-75; de- 
 crees for protection of, 41, 101-103 
 
 Monson, Sir E., 187 n. 
 
 Moukden, 199 j 
 
 Mumm von Schwarzenstein, A., 194, j 
 210, 213 j 
 
 Mu Tsung Yi. See Tung Chih 
 
 Nanking, 21 n., 120, 121, 122, 153 n., ; 
 
 159, 160, 197; treaty of and compari- I 
 
 son with treaty of Wang-hia, 21 n. , 
 
 Napier embassy, 20 n. j 
 
 Na Tung, 116, 216 I 
 
 Netherlands, first arrival of Dutch in 
 
 China, 18; mission of 1656, 19; at 
 
 Deshima " factory," 19 n. j 
 
 Nestorian Tablet, 16 
 
 Ngantungwei, 77 
 
 Nicholas II, 136 11. 
 
 Ningpo, 21 n. 
 
 Nissi, T., 210 
 
 Norddeutsche Zeitung, on lease of Wei- 
 
 haiwei to Great Britain, 32 
 Norman, murder of, 83 and n. 
 North China Herald, 28 
 Novoe Vremya, regarding lease of Port 
 
 Arthur, 31 and n. 
 
 Official Gazette {V^MS&vx), reply to Kuang 
 Hsu's letter in, 143 
 
 Opium, provision against, 33; contra- 
 band trade in, 72 
 
 Opium war, 19-22 
 
 Ost Asiatisches Lloyd, 84, 85 
 
 " Palace revolution," term for Coup d^ 
 Etat, 60 
 
 Paotingfu, outbreaks at, 82 and n.; 
 Boxers at, 97, 112; punitive expedi- 
 tion to, 155, 156, 190 
 
 Paris, 38, 123, 126, 127 n., 155 n. 
 
 Pauncefote, Lord, 130 n. 
 
 Peace Protocol of September 7, 1901, 
 173, 195 n., 200 n., 201,204, 213-222 
 
 Pechihli. See Chihli 
 
 Peiho, 167, 219, 220 
 
 Peitang (Catholic Cathedral), 136 n. 
 
 Peking, 16, 23, 25, 29 and n., 32, 44, 
 54, 55» 59, 62, 64, 65, 68, 77, 81, 2>z, 
 85, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 
 100, 104, 107, no, III, 112, 113, 
 114, 117, 118, 120, 124 n., 125, 126, 
 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 
 141, 143, »44 and n., 145 n., 146, 147, 
 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 162, 
 164, 165, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 181, 
 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188 n., 189, 
 192, 193, 197, 198, 200, 203, 204, 207, 
 208, 209, 210, 21 1, 212, 214, 216, 218, 
 219, 222 
 
 Peking Gazette, 59 
 
 Peking-Hankow Railway, 49 
 
 Peking University, establishment of, 45 ; 
 aids to, 48; allowed by Tzu Hsi to 
 continue, 65 
 
 Peter the Great, 40 
 
 Petrograd. See St. Petersburg 
 
 Persia, 16 
 
 Peytang, 136, 192 
 
 Pichon, M.,in favor of renewal of puni- 
 tive expeditions, 162, 163 
 
653] 
 
 INDEX 
 
 241 
 
 Piracy, prevalence of before Rebellion, 
 70 and n., 71 n. 
 
 Port Arthur, Russian assurances con- 
 cerning, 29; demands, 30; and leases, 
 31, 36 
 
 Porter, Horace, 127 n. 
 
 Portugal, 18, 119 
 
 Prohibition of import of arms, proposed 
 by France, 184 and n.; Aoki on, 188 
 and n., 191 ; in Joint Note, 198, 199 
 and n., 209; in Peace Protocol, 216 
 
 Prohibition of membership in Boxer 
 Societies, 193, 220 
 
 Protestants in China, 73, 74. See Mis- 
 sionaries 
 
 Pu Chun, Heir Apparent, 115 and n. 
 
 Pu Hsing, 116 
 
 Punishment of Boxer officials, German 
 proposal for, 175 et seq., decree of 
 Sept. 25, 180 and n., i8i; reception 
 of German proposals by Powers, 182, 
 183; in French proposals, \Z\etseq,\ 
 ideas of Diplomatic Body concerning, 
 189-191; final discussion of, 11,7, 
 198; decree of Nov. 13, 199, 200 ; 
 final compromise, 200 and n., 201 and 
 n., 202 and n., 214, 215, 220 
 
 Punitive expenditions, to Paotingfu and 
 Chengtingfu, 155, 156; opposition to 
 renewal of, 156; Shansi, 160; Con- 
 ger's attitude, 161, 162; other diplo- 
 mats, 162-164 
 
 Raggi, M. Salvago, proposals of, 193, 
 194 
 
 Ragsdale, Consul (U. S.), 135 n., 165, 
 168, 169 and n., 170 n., 171 n. 
 
 Reception to wives of diplomats, 66, 
 67; second reception, 67 n. 
 
 Reed treaty of 1858, 126 
 
 Reform Gazette, 61 
 
 Reform movement, 1898, reform de- 
 crees, 44, 46-51; criticism of, 56-60, 
 overthrow of, 63-66; popular inter- 
 pretation in China of overthrow, 69, 
 70 
 
 Rites, Board of, interview of dismissed 
 officials with Tzu Hsi, 52, 54 
 
 Rites, question of, 72 and n. 
 
 Robinson, murder of, 82, 83 n 
 
 Rockhill, W. W., 202 and n., 213 
 
 Rome, 38, 126, 155 n. 
 
 Russia, missions of i68q and after, 19; 
 character of Russo-Japanese war 25, 
 26; loan to China, 27; Russo-Chinese 
 Bank, 27; Cassini Convention, 27, 
 
 28; demands and leases Port Arthur 
 and Dalny, 29-31; opposition to 
 British demand for Weihaiwei, 32; 
 reply to Hay Note of Sept., 1899, 38; 
 first Legation guards, 94, 95 ; second 
 Legation guards, 9); policy in Man- 
 churia, 128 n.; reply to Kuang Hsu's 
 letter, 143, 144; on removal of Lega- 
 tion to Tientsin, 148, 149; on renewal 
 of punitive expeditions, 163; exten- 
 sion at Tientsin, 165, 166; policy of, 
 167, 187 n.; on German proposal for 
 punishment, 178, 183; version of 
 French proposals, 184 n.; views of 
 French proposals, 185, 187, 188; pro- 
 poses indemnity to Hague, 192; 
 opposition to punishment ultimatum, 
 200. 
 
 Russo-Chinese Bank, 27 and n. 
 
 Russo-Japanese war, 25, 26, 205. 
 
 St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 29, 38, 123, 
 126, 132, 155 n., 178, 187 n. 
 
 Salisbury, Marquis of, opinion of Rus- 
 sian demand for Port Arthur and 
 Dalny, 30; regarding Yangtse Vice- 
 roys, 122; on question of state of 
 war, 131 ; reply to Kuang Hsu's letter, 
 142; on Li's proposed armistice, 147; 
 on proposal to remove Legation to 
 Tientsin, 148; regarding Li's creden- 
 tials, 153; on punishment of Chinese 
 officials, 179, 181; on edict of Sept. 
 25, 1900, 180 n.; on French proposals, 
 187 
 
 Sanmen Bay, refused to Italy, 104 
 
 Satow, Sir Ernest, on Chuchow disturb- 
 ances, 157; to Conger, 162; Tien- 
 tsin arrangement with Conger, 171, 
 172; succeeds MacDonald, 190 n,, 
 193 ^'y proposals for garrison at 
 Tientsin, 193, 194; opposition to re- 
 ligious clause, 193, 194; proposes 
 revision of commercial treaties, 195 
 and n. 
 
 Scott, Sir C, 132 and n. 
 
 Seljuk Turks, 17 
 
 Seymour, Admiral, opinion on means 
 for eradicating piracy, 71 n.; arrives 
 with fleet at Taku, 113, 114; expedi- 
 tion of, 129, 132-135; supports 
 Yangtse Viceroys, 158, 159 n. 
 
 Shanhaikwan, 192, 193, 200, 220 
 
 Shanghai, 60 n., 61, 145 n., 146, 147, 
 149, 150, 156, 158, 159, 180 n., 217: 
 one of first open ports, 21 n.; French 
 
242 
 
 INDEX 
 
 [654 
 
 settlement at 35, 36 and n.; situation 
 during Rebellion, 118, 119 
 Shansi, 121, 160, 163, 190 n., 200, 201, 
 
 215 
 
 Shantung, German lease and concessions 
 in, 29; first disturbances in, 76-79, 
 79 n., 80 n.; German punitive expe- 
 dition in, 80; Yuan Shih-kai Gov- 
 ernor, 81, 81; decrees concerning 
 disturbances in, 101-103; position of 
 Yuan Shih-kai in, 120 
 
 Shashih, riot at, 82 and n. 
 
 Sheng Tzu Ying zxvfxy corps, 130 n. 
 
 Shansi, 164 
 
 Shimonoseki, 145 
 
 Shirinsky, Lieut.-Col., 134 
 
 Sianfu (Hsi-an), 150, 157, 164, 180 
 
 Smithfield, 75 
 
 Spain, first arrivals of Spaniards in 
 China, 18, 19 
 
 " Spheres of influence ", 36 
 
 Sugiyama, Mr., Japanese Chancellor, 
 murder of, 125, 194, 203, 207, 208, 
 215, 216 
 
 Summer Palace, burned in i860, 23; 
 occupied by Allies, 174, 175 
 
 Sung dynasty, 45 
 
 Suspension of official examinations, 189, 
 
 208, 215 
 Sweden, 192 
 Switzerland, 192 
 
 Szechwan, anti-Christian riot in, 82 
 and n. 
 
 Taiping Rebellion, 23 and n.; overcome 
 by monarchy, 24, 70 
 
 Tai Shou-li, Brig.-Gen., 78 
 
 Taiyuanfu, 190 n. 
 
 Taku, 113, 114, 120, 123, 124, 128, 
 129 n., 130, 131, 135 n., 184 and n., 
 186 n., 192 
 
 Taku Forts, bombardment and capture 
 of, 1 28-1 3 1, 140; dismantlement of 
 proposed by France, 184 and n., 186 
 and n.; discussion of by Diplomatic 
 Body, 192; to be razed, 203, 204, 
 
 209, 219 
 
 Talienwan, (Dalny or Dairen). See 
 Dairen. 
 
 Tan, Viceroy, 70 n. 
 
 Tangku, 220 
 
 Tangshan, 220 
 
 Tientsin, 54, 94, 95, 97, 100, 112, 118, 
 123 n., 124, 132, 133 n., 134, 135, 
 146, 148, 150, 151, 159, 164-173, 
 182 n., 184 and n., 186, 189, 192, 193, 
 195, 220 
 
 Ting Cheng, 77 
 
 Tokyo, 38. 123, 152, 188 n. 
 
 Tongking, 24, 34, 35, 36 
 
 Triple Alliance, 104, 178, 200 
 
 Tsai Hsun, Prince Chuang, 199, 201, 
 214, 215 
 
 Tsai Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, 201, 214 
 
 Tsai Lien, 199 
 
 Tsai Yin, Secondary Prince, 199 
 
 Tsinan, 145 
 
 Tsingtao. See Kiaochau 
 
 Tsung-li Yamen, leases Kiaochau to 
 Germany, 29; Port Arthur and Dairen 
 to Russia, 31; Weihaiwei to Great 
 Britain, 31, 32; grants French de- 
 mands, 34, 35; interview with Kang 
 Yu-wei, 43; with Wang Chao, 52, 
 53; concerning reports of Kuang 
 Hsu's illness, 68; negotiations over 
 Ichoufu disturbances, 79 and n., 
 80 n.; question of Kangsu troops, 
 89-92; notes concerning first Lega- 
 tion guards, 93-95; letter from Dip- 
 lomatic Body for second Legation 
 guards, 97, 98; interview for guards, 
 98-100; interview with Conger, 117; 
 proposed abolition of, 193; trans- 
 formed into Waiwupu (now Wai- 
 cbiaopu), 204, 210, 221 
 
 Tuan, Tsai-I, Prince, army of, 98; in 
 power at Court, loi, iii; son 
 appointed Heir Apparent, 115 and 
 n.; estimate of by Conger, 116; 
 opposition to Liu Kun-yi, 121; edict, 
 123 n.; opposition of Aoki to, 152; 
 denounced in edict of Sept. 25, 179, 
 180 n., and in edict of Nov. 13, 199, 
 200; punishment of, 201 and n,, 2x4 
 
 Tung, General, 152 
 
 Tung Chih, 40, 115 
 
 Tungchow, 148 
 
 Tung Fu-hsiang, 180 n., 182, 184 n., 
 190 and n., 199, 200, 201 and n., 215 
 
 Turkestan, 63, 201 and n., 214 
 
 "Two Kwangs " (Kwangtung and 
 Kwangsi provinces), 119 
 
 Tyler, President, report on Far East, 21 
 n.; letter to Emperor, 2i n., 22 n 
 
 Tzu Hsi, Empress Dowager, hostility to 
 Kang Yu-wei, 51, 52, loo; interview 
 with officials of Board of Rites. 53, 
 54; overthrows Emperor, 55; decree 
 denouncing Kang Yu-wei, 61, 62; 
 measures against reform, 63-66; re- 
 ception to wives of diplomats, 66, 67; 
 resentment over warniug from Mac- 
 Donald as to Kuang Hsu, 69; esti- 
 
655J 
 
 INDEX 
 
 mate of policy at outbreak of Rebel- 
 lion, ICO, loi; appoints Heir 
 Apparent, 114-116; opposed to 
 extreme punishments, 200 
 
 United States, treaty of Wang-hia, 21 
 and n., 22; interested in Amoy, 34 
 n.; opposition to French extension 
 at Shanghai, 35, 36; opposition to 
 European aggressions, 37; Hay Note 
 of Sept., 1899, 37 39; fifst Legation 
 guards, 95; second guards, 99; atti- 
 tude concerning bombardment of 
 Taku Forts, 113, 114; policy during 
 Rebellion, 125, 126; Hay Circular of 
 July 3, 126, 1 27; McKinley to Kuang 
 Hsu, 140, 141, 144 n.; on Li's ap- 
 pointment, 146; on removal of Lega- 
 tion to Tientsin, 148, 149; opposed 
 to renewal of punitive expeditions, 
 156; regarding Tientsin extensions, 
 164-170; on German proposal for 
 punishment, 176, 177, 182, 183; 
 reply to French proposals, 185-187; 
 proposes indemnity claims to Hague, 
 192; withdraws proposal for Hague 
 referendum, 197 and n.; opposition 
 to punishment ultimatum, 200 ; ideas 
 as to indemnity, 202 and n. 
 
 Valdez, J. M. T., 119 
 Vienna, 126, 155 n. 
 
 Waldersee, Count von, appointment of, 
 136 and n.; expedition to Paotingfu 
 and Chengtingfu, 155, 156; army or- 
 der of, 161 n.; on renewal of punitive 
 expeditions, 161, 162, 163, 164 
 
 Wang Chao, activities of, 52, 53 and n. 
 
 Wang Chih-chun, 120 
 
 Wang-hia, treaty of and comparison 
 with treaty of Nanking, 21 n. 
 
 Ward, General. 23 n. 
 
 Warren, Act. Consul-Gen. (Br.), on 
 Chuchow disturbances, 157, 159 n.; 
 on edict of Sept. 25, 180 n. 
 
 Washington, 96, 123, 126, 145 n., 155 
 n., 175, 184 n., 186, 202 
 
 Webster, Daniel, report on Far East, 
 21 n.; instructions to Gushing, 21 n., 
 125 
 
 Weihaiwei, leased to Great Britain, 31, 
 32; British declaration to Germany 
 concerning, 32 n.: attitude of Russia 
 concerning, 32, 33 
 
 Weng Tung-ho, estimate of, 42, 43; 
 
 dismissed, 43, 47 
 Whangpu, 219, 220, 221 
 Whitehead, Mr., conversation with 
 
 Aoki, 188 n. 
 Winter Palace, 174 
 Witte, M., 27 n. 
 Wollant, M. de, 184 
 Wolseley, Lord, 85 
 Woosung, 122 
 
 Wuchang, 153 n., 159, 180 n. 
 Wu Cheng, no 
 Wu Ting-fang, Hay to Wu concerning 
 
 American forces to China, 123; in 
 
 connection with Kuang Hsu's letter, 
 
 140, 144 
 Wu Wei Kutty army of Jung Lu, 98 
 
 Yangtse Valley, British pledge over, 34, 
 36 
 
 Yangtse Viceroys, orders to, 1 12; pledge 
 of, 123 and n.; results of attitude, 
 124, 125; appointed peace negoti- 
 ators, 153 n.; defense of Yuan Shih- 
 kai, 159; on Shansi punitive expedi- 
 tion, 160; opposed to extreme pun- 
 ishments, 197 
 
 Yangtsung, 126, 220 
 
 Yellow river (Hoangho) 71 and n. 
 
 Yi, Prince, 199 
 
 Ying Nien, 199, 201, 213, 214 
 
 Yuan Chang, 99, 201, 215 
 
 Yuan Shih-kai, opinion of reform move- 
 ment of 1898, 54, 55; interview with 
 Jung Lu, 55 and n.; Governor of 
 Shantung, 81, 82, 96; hampered by 
 Court, 103, 104; conduct during Re- 
 bellion, 120; ability of, 145, 146; 
 defended by Yangtse Viceroys, 159, 
 160 
 
 Yu Hsien, removed as Governor of 
 Shantung, 81 ; Governor of Shansi, 
 81, 160; omitted in edict of Sep- 
 tember 25, 180 n.; denounced by 
 Diplomatic Body, 182, and Russia, 
 184 n., 190 and n.; in decree of No- 
 vember 13, 199, 200 n.; final punish- 
 ment of, 201, 215 
 
 Yu Lien-san, 120 
 
 Yu Lien-yuen, 123, 145 
 
 Yu Lu, no 
 
 Yunnan, non-alienation of demanded 
 by France, 34, 35 
 
 Yunnanfu, 34, 35; trouble in, 82 and n. 
 
VITA 
 
 The author was born at Davenport, Iowa, 1884. For 
 his undergraduate studies he attended Leland Stanford 
 University, the University of Cahfornia, and Indiana Uni- 
 versity; A.B., Indiana, 191 1. Graduate work: Indiana 
 University, A.M., 1912; Harrison Fellow in Political Sci- 
 ence, University of Pennsylvania, 1912-1913; University 
 Fellow in International Law, Columbia University, 191 3- 
 19 14. At Columbia University, in the Faculty of Political 
 Science, he studied under Professors John Bassett Moore, 
 Ellery C. Stowell, Munroe Smith, and James Harvey Robin- 
 son. He attended the International Law Seminars of Pro- 
 fessors Moore and Stowell. His investigations in Far 
 Eastern history, politics and economics were directed by 
 Professor Friedrich Hirth of the Department of Chinese. 
 Contributor of articles on the Far East to The New In- 
 ternational EncydopcFdia, 24 vols., 2d ed. (New York, 
 1914 — ). Lecturer on "The Politics and Diplomacy of 
 China and the Powers since 1840 " at Columbia University^ 
 Department of Extension, 1915-1916. 
 
 245 
 
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