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■ REESE LIBRARY ■ 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 ^icessioiis No. SP'^'Vi. C/js.s' No. 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/drillregulationsOOordwrich 
 
DRILL REGULATIONS 
 
 FOR 
 
 STREET RIOT DUTY, 
 
 INCIvUDING IvECTURE ON 
 
 RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL ^ 
 
 AUTHORITY; RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
 OF MILITARY OFFICERS; AND 
 
 METHODS OF DEALING 
 
 WITH RIOTS. 
 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBERT ORDWAY, 
 
 District of Columbia Militia. 
 
 J ARMIES .T. CH:A.T»M:^IS-, FulDlislier, 
 
 916 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, • 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 JuDD & Detwe:iIvER, Printers. 
 
 COPYRIGHTED 1891. 
 
G9S 
 
DRILL REGULATIONS 
 
 FOR 
 
 STREET-RIOT DUTY. 
 
 1. The movements herein described for a battalion of four 
 companies may be readily applied to a battalion of any number 
 of companies, 
 
 IN the; armory. 
 
 2. Not less than sixteen sharpshooters will be selected and 
 placed under the command of the battalion Inspector of Small 
 Arms Firing, who will post them in equal numbers in the line 
 of file-closers of each company. These sharpshooters should 
 be designated by a handkerchief tied around their left arm, or 
 b}' any other device by which they may be readily distinguished. 
 
 Non-combatant staff officers, colors and color guard, musi- 
 cians, uninstructed recruits, convalescents, and a suitable detail 
 for guard duty, will l>e designated to remain in the armory. 
 
 Companies will be equalized. 
 
 3. If a crowd is assembled in front of the armory the com- 
 manding officer will adopt such methods of egress as the situa- 
 tion of the armor}^ and the disposition of the crowd may indicate 
 as best. As a general rule, if the crowd is not aggressively 
 hostile, the front and rear subdivisions of the battalion should 
 move out from the arnior}^ door in parallel columns of twos or 
 fours and force their way through the crowd to the opposite 
 side of the street ; then, facing in opposite directions, force the 
 crowd back until space is made for the next interior subdivision 
 to march out in the same wa}-, and so on until the whole bat- 
 talion is formed in column in the street. If the crowd is hostile 
 and attempts to prevent the egress of the troops, proper and 
 extreme offensive measures should be resorted to at once. 
 
IN Tun STREKT. 
 
 4. The posts assigned to field aud staff officers in ordinary 
 drill manoeuvres being impracticable in street parades, and in- 
 admissible when on street-riot duty, will be modified as follows : 
 
 In line, the major, adjutant, and sergeant-major will post 
 themselves at so much less than their prescribed distances as the 
 width of the street may indicate as proper ; or, if necessary, 
 may even retain positions corresponding to those assigned to 
 them in column. 
 
 Tn column, the major will take post at the head of the 
 column ; the adjutant on the right of the commissioned staff; 
 and the sergeant-major on the right of the non-commissioned 
 staff. 
 
 In columns of platoons, if the width of the street does not 
 permit captains to take post th^-ee paces from the flank of the 
 column, they will take such less distance as may be necessary. 
 
 When a battalion on street-riot duty marches in column of 
 companies or platoons, it wdll invariably form in " street- 
 column " order, no matter how remote it may be from the scene 
 of riot or apprehended danger. 
 
 TO FORM STREET COI^UMN OF COMPANIES OR PI^ATOONS. 
 
 5. Being in line, or in columns of fours, the battalion will be 
 formed into column of companies, or column of platoons, by 
 the same commands as prescribed in the SCHOOi^ OF THE 
 BatTai^ion, except that they will be prefixed by the command 
 J^orm street column ■; and the movement will be executed in 
 the same manner, except that the sharpshooters in the line 
 of file-closers will pass around the flanks of their respective 
 subdivisions and take post three paces from the flanks of 
 the column, the leading sharpshooter of each flank on a line 
 with the major, the rear sharpshooter of each flank on a line 
 with the non-commissioned staff, and the others at equal in- 
 tervals from front to rear. 
 
 Being in street column of companies or platoons, to form line 
 or column of fours. 
 
 6. The movements will be executed by the same commands 
 and in the same manner as prescribed in the ScHOOi^ OF THE 
 BatTaIvION, except that the sharpshooters will resume their 
 posts in the line of file-closers. 
 
7- Oil approachiug the scene of riot, or on the first symptoms 
 of danger, and in marching through the streets during a general 
 riot or uprising, troops will be moved habitually in the forma- 
 tion of ' ' street square. ' ' 
 
 TO FORM STREET SQUARE. 
 
 From a street column of companies at full distance. 
 
 8. Being at a halt, the major commands : 
 
 I. Form street square, 2. March. 
 
 At the first command, the captain of the first company cau- 
 tions it to stand fast. ^ 
 The captain of the second company commands : 
 1. Right forward, 2. Twos right. 
 
 The captain of the third company commands : 
 I. Left forward, 2. Twos left. 
 
 The captain of the fourth company commands : 
 I. Forward. 
 
 At the command march, which is repeated by the captains of 
 second, third and fourth companies, the major and staff and the 
 captain of the first company will pass around the flanks of that 
 company and take post in the rear of it ; the non-commissioned 
 staff and the file-closers of the fourth company will pass around 
 the flanks of that company and take post in front of it ; the 
 file-closers of the second and third companies will pass around 
 the rear of their companies and take post on their inner flanks. 
 The captain of the second and third companies will halt their 
 companies two paces in rear of the right and left twos of the 
 first company, and will then take post opposite the center of the 
 inner flanks of their companies ; the captain of the fourth com- 
 pany will halt his company two paces in rear of the first and 
 second companies. A sufficient number of leading and rear 
 sharpshooters on each flank will take posts, with two paces 
 intervals, to prolong the lines of the first and fourth companies 
 from the flanks of the square to the building lines. The re- 
 maining sharpshooters will continue in their positions on the 
 flanks, preferably on the sidewalks. 
 
g. If the column is marching, the captain of the first com- 
 pany halts it at the command march, and the captains of the 
 other companies halt them on completing the movement as 
 described. 
 
 10. If the column is marching in quick time, and the major 
 commands double time^ the captain of the first company cau- 
 tions it to continue the march in quick time, and the captains of 
 the other companies bring them to quick time on completing 
 the movement as described. 
 
 11. If the column is marching in double time, the movement 
 is executed in the same manner as if marching in quick time, 
 except that the captain of the first company commands : Quick 
 time at the first command of the major, and repeats the com- 
 mand m,arch. 
 
 12. A battalion of three companies will execute the move- 
 ment in the same manner as a battalion of four companies, 
 except that the first and second platoons of the second com- 
 pany will respectively execute the movements prescribed for 
 the second and third companies, and the third company the 
 movement prescribed for the fourth company, in a battalion of 
 four companies. 
 
 13. A battalion of two companies will first form column of 
 platoons, and then execute the movement as described in par. 
 
 17. 
 
 From a street column of platoons at full distance. 
 
 14. Being at a halt, the major commands : 
 
 I. Form street square, 2. March. 
 At the first command the chief of the first platoon of the 
 first company cautions it to stand fast ; the chief of the second 
 platoon of the first company, and the chiefs of the two platoons 
 of the second company, command : i. Right forward ; 2. Twos 
 right ; the chiefs of the two platoons of the third companj', and 
 of the first platoon of the fourth company, command : i. Left 
 forward ; 2. Twos left ; the chief of the second platoon of the 
 fourth company commands : Forward. At the command 
 march, the movement is executed, and officers, file-closers, and 
 sharpshooters take their positions in a manner similar to that 
 described in par. 8. 
 
 15. If the column of platoons is marching, the movements 
 will be executed in manner similar to that described in pars. 9, 
 10, and II. 
 
i6. A battalion of three companies in column of platoons 
 will execute the movement in a manner similar to that described 
 in par. 12. 
 
 17. A battalion of two companies in column of platoons will 
 execute the movement in the same manner as the first and 
 fourth companies in a battalion of four companies in column 
 of platoons, the commands and movements for a second and 
 third company being omitted. 
 
 From a column of fours. 
 
 18. First form column of companies or platoons, according to 
 the width of front desired for the square, and then execute the 
 movement as described in pars. 8 or 14. 
 
 GENERAL RUIyES FOR STREET SQUARES. 
 
 19. A street square will halt^ advance oblique, march to the 
 rear or by the flank by the same commands and means as a 
 column. It will change direction by moving by the flank in 
 the desired direction, thereby making the previous flanks of the 
 square the front and rear of the square. 
 
 20. The width of a square may be increased by reinforcing 
 the front and rear lines of sharpshooters by sharpshooters taken 
 from the flanks. It may be slightly reduced by breaking files 
 from the right and left of the first company to the rear, and 
 from the right and left of the fourth company to the front. If, 
 however, the small size of the companies, or the narrowness of 
 the streets, makes it necessary, the battalion should be formed 
 in street column of platoons instead of street column of com- 
 panies. 
 
 21. The flanks of a square may be faced inward or outward, 
 as occasion may require, by the command : Tzvos right {or 
 left). In passing intersecting streets the flanks of the square 
 may be faced outward and cross the .space by side step if cir- 
 cumstances require. 
 
 TO REDUCE STREET SQUARE 
 
 From, square of company front to street column of companies. 
 
 22. Being at a halt, the major commands : 
 
 I. Form street column, 2. March. 
 At the first command the captain of the first company com- 
 mands, Foi^mrd ; the captains of the other companies caution 
 
their companies to stand fast. At the command inarch, the 
 major and staff and the captain of the first company will pass 
 around the flanks of that company and take their posts in front 
 of it ; the non-commissioned staff and the file-closers of the 
 fovirth company will pass around the flanks of that company 
 and take their posts in rear of it ; the sharpshooters will resume 
 the positions assigned them in par. 5. When the first company 
 has advanced company distance, the second company will exe- 
 cute, Left front into line -the left files lessening their oblique 
 suflSciently to clear the flank of the third company ; when the 
 second company has advanced company distance, the third com- 
 pau}' will execute Right front into line, and at the same instant 
 the fourth company will execute Forward. 
 
 23. If the square is marching, the captains of the second, 
 third, and fourth companies halt them at the command, march, 
 and the captain of the first company halts it on completing the 
 movement as described. 
 
 24. If the square is marching in quick tiine^ and the major 
 commands double time, the captains of the second, third, and 
 fourth companies caution them to continue the march in quick 
 time, and the captain of the first company brings it to quick 
 time on completing the movement as described. 
 
 25. If the sqiiare is marching in double time, the movement 
 is executed in the same manner as if marching in quick time, 
 except that the captains of the second, third, and fourth com- 
 panies, command : Quick ihne at the first command of the 
 major, and repeat the command march. 
 
 26. A battalion of three companies will execute the move- 
 ment in the same manner as a battalion of four companies, 
 except that the first and second platoons of the second com- 
 pany will respectively execute the movements prescribed for 
 the second and third companies, and the third company the 
 movement prescribed for the fourth company, in a battalion of 
 four companies. 
 
 From, square of platoon front to street cohcmn of platoons. 
 
 27. Being at a halt, the major commands : 
 
 I. Fonn street colum,n, 2. March. 
 
 At the first command the chief of the first platoon of the first 
 company commands Forward ; the chiefs of all other platoons 
 caution them to stand fast. At the command march, officers. 
 
file-closers, and shaipshooters take their position iu the man- 
 ner described in par. 22. When the first platoon has advanced 
 platoon distance, the second platoon of the first company and 
 the two platoons of the second company will execute Left front 
 into line — the left files lessening their oblique sufficiently to 
 clear the flank of the third company ; when the second platoon 
 of the second company has advanced platoon distance beyond 
 them the two platoons of the third company and the first platoon 
 of the fourth company will execute Right f'ont into line, and the 
 second platoon of the fourth company will execute Forward 
 
 28. If the square is marching the movements will be executed 
 in manner similar to those described in pars. 23, 24, and 25. 
 
 From square of company or platoo7i front to column of fours. 
 
 29. First form street column of companies or platoons as 
 described in pars. 22 or 27, and then column of fours as pre- 
 scribed in School of Battai^ion. 
 
 FIRE DISCIPI.INE. 
 
 30. Control of firing, which is important in all actions, is 
 absolutely essential in street fighting. The sharpshooters will 
 fire independently and in obedience to whatever spepal direc- 
 tions may be given them either individually or collectivelj\ 
 Troops must be trained to pay no attention to the firing by 
 sharpshooters, and to fire only when and in such manner as 
 directly ordered, and to immediately cease firing when ordered. 
 Firing in a street should invariably be delivered kneeling and 
 preferably by volleys. The orders to begin firing and cease 
 firing should be given by the bugle or whistle. 
 
APPLICATION OF STREET-RIOT DRILL 
 
 TO A 
 
 THEEE-B ATT ALIO isr BEGIMEI^T. 
 
 31. In a three-battalion regiment each battalion will execute 
 the movements independently. When formed in street squares 
 the Colonel and Adjutant will take post within the square of 
 the First Battalion, the Surgeon and the Ambulance Corps 
 within the square of the Second Battalion, the Lieutenant 
 Colonel and Sergeant Major within the square of the Third 
 Battalion. Two files may be broken in the center of the interior 
 fronts and rears oif the squares to allow ready communication 
 from front to rear of the column. 
 
 32. If the regiment is accompanied by Artillery, or by Engi- 
 neers, they will be posted between the First and Second Bat- 
 talions, the interval between these battalions being increased 
 for that purpose. To bring the artillery into action it should 
 be unlimbered in its position, so that the horses may not disturb 
 the infantry, and the guns run forward by hand through the 
 square, the front and rear of the square moving to the right 
 and left by the flanks of platoons so as to leave the square 
 open and the front of the square into proper position to support 
 the artillery. 
 
 33. In changing direction, when moving in column of squares, 
 each battalion will advance to the point at which the first bat- 
 talion changed, and will then change direction by the flank. 
 
 (8) 
 
• \ 
 
 LECTURE ON STREET RIOTS, 
 
LECTURE NO. 13. 
 
 BY BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBERT ORDWAY, D. C. MILITIA. 
 
 Street Riots. 
 
 The lectures which have been dehvered to you in the 
 regular course of instruction for this year were instituted 
 for the purpose of instructing you in the practical duties 
 of officers in field service, and assumed that you had 
 been called into service by the United States to meet 
 apprehended invasion or insurrection. There is, how- 
 ever, another kind of service that you are more likely 
 to be called upon to perform, and that is to aid and 
 support civil authority in the enforcement of law or the 
 suppression of disorder. As the performance of such 
 duty imposes greater individual responsibility, and in- 
 volves the necessity of knowledge of the limitations 
 placed on military power while acting in subordination 
 to civil authority, as well as the study of means of ap- 
 plying military force and tactics in modes entirely differ- 
 ent from those used in the field, it is proper to make it 
 the subject of a separate and additional lecture. 
 
 It'is the proud boast of a free people, and is the 
 actual fact in our own country and in England, that 
 military authority is at all times subordinate to civil 
 authority. The reason for this may be found in the 
 fact that it is civil authority that creates the military 
 force; civil authoritj'' that taxes the people to sup- 
 port it ; and that civil authority creates and maintains 
 it for its own protection. The same reasons that make 
 it necessary for man to hold in subjection the forces of 
 
 (290) 
 
^ OF TBE ' 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 291 
 
 " .^LIFORH^ 
 
 nature that he summons to his assistance— like steam 
 and electricity — ^make it essential that the civil authority- 
 should hold in subjection the military force that it 
 creates, as otherwise, in either case, the force may rend 
 or destroy the power that called it into existence. 
 
 The general enunciation of the constitutional princi- 
 ple of the subordination of military power is often 
 made, but seldom explained. I take it to mean that 
 the military power, being subordinate, can neither in- 
 itiate nor determine any matter ; that military power 
 cannot declare or initiate war, nor make peace ; that 
 civil authority alone can direct military force when it 
 may fight, and that civil authority by declaring peace 
 can remand the military force to its normal condition. 
 So far as the individuals of which the military force is 
 composed, it means that by taking on the additional 
 character of a soldier they do not divest themselves of 
 any of their responsibilities or duties as citizens; it 
 ■ means that a soldier can be arrested by civil authority 
 for the violation of criminal law^, and is only exempt 
 from arrest by civil process under the same general 
 principle that exempts civic officers. 
 
 There are occasions, however, on which this funda- 
 mental principle of subordination of military power is 
 either modified or suspended. It is modified when 
 civil authority calls military force to its aid. to the ex- 
 tent that civil authority then limits itself to instructing 
 the military force what it desires to have done, but does 
 not interfere with the manner of doing it. It is sus- 
 pended when civil authority declares martial law, and 
 thereb}'' voluntarily surrenders for a limited time every 
 function and power it possesses to the control of the 
 military authority. 
 
 It being evidently essential that all military officers 
 should study the laws and precedents governing the re- 
 
292 ^ 
 
 lations between military and civil authority, and more 
 especially necessary that officers of the volunteer militia 
 should understand the special relations that exist when 
 military force is called upon by civil authority to aid in 
 the enforcement of law or the preservation of peace, I 
 will briefly review the subject. 
 
 CALLING OUT THP] MILITIA. 
 
 The militia may be called out for service within its 
 own State by such civic officers of the State as may be 
 authorized by its laws to do so. It may be called into 
 the service of the United States, for service in its own or 
 any other State, by the President, in such cases as the 
 law authorizes him to do so. 
 
 The subject of this lecture does not require a detailed 
 consideration of the questions involved in the laws au- 
 thorizing the President to call the militia of the States 
 into the service of the United States. The numerous 
 statutes governing the action of the President may be 
 summarized into three general principles : 
 
 1st. That he may call out the militia of any or all the 
 States in case of threatened invasion. 
 
 2d. That he may call out the militia of any or all 
 the States in case of a rebellion against the authority of 
 of the United States, or to enforce the laws of the United 
 States within any State. 
 
 3rd. That in case anj^ State shall apply to the Presi- 
 dent for assistance to enforce its own laws, or, as ex- 
 pressed in the Constitution, for protection " against do- 
 mestic violence,'' he may call out the militia of any 
 State or States except that of the State making the ap- 
 plication. 
 
 So far as the regular troops of the United States are 
 concerned, they cannot act in aid of the civil authorities 
 of a State except by the order of the President. It is 
 
293 
 
 carefully stated in the Digest of Opinions of the Judge 
 Advocate General that " In a case of civil disturbance 
 in violation of the laws of a State a military commander 
 cannot volunteer to intervene with his command with- 
 out incurring a personal responsibility for his acts. In 
 the absence of the requisite orders he may not even 
 march or array his command for the purpose of exerting 
 a moral effect or an effect in terrorem; such a demon- 
 stration, indeed, could only compromise the authority 
 of the United States while insulting the sovereignty of 
 the State." 
 
 Within the States their respective laws provide the 
 mode by which and, with more or less detail, prescribe the 
 occ8.sions on which, the civil authorities may call on the 
 militia for aid. In some of the States only the com- 
 mander-in-chief, the governor, can call out the militia ; 
 in others, various county, city, or town authorities, civil 
 magistrates, sheriffs, and other civil officers may do so ; 
 in others, the local military commander may call out 
 the troops if, in his own judgment, the danger appears 
 imminent. 
 
 On these points it is only necessary for officers to 
 familiarize themselves with the laws of their respective 
 States, so that they may know when called upon that 
 the call is made by a legally authorized civic officer and 
 in a legal manner. The military officer called upon 
 cannot question the reason or the necessity for the call ; 
 he has no alternative except to respond to it. If the offi- 
 cer called upon by the civil authority orders the troops 
 of his command to parade in obedience to such call, the 
 subordinate officers and the soldiers of his command 
 have nothing whatever to do with or question whether 
 the call was made by a legally authorized civic officer 
 in a legal manner. The order to them is purely a mili- 
 tary order, and must be obeyed without question. 
 
294 
 
 The law of the District of Columbia is short and ex- 
 plicit. You will find it in section 45 of the Militia 
 Law, as follows : 
 
 " That when there is in the District of Columbia a 
 tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men acting together by 
 force with attempt to commit a felony, or to offer violence 
 to persons or propert3^ or by force and violence to break 
 and ' resist the laws, or when such tumult, riot, or mob 
 is threatened, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners 
 of the District of Columbia, or for the United States 
 Marshal for the District of Columbia, to call on the com- 
 mander-in-chief to aid them in suppressing such violence 
 and enforcing the laws ; the commander-in-chief shall 
 thereupon order out so much and such portion of the 
 militia as he may deem necessary to suppress the same, 
 and no member thereof who shall be thus ordered out 
 by proper authority for any such duty shall be liable to 
 civil or criminal prosecution for any act done in the dis- 
 charge of his military duty." 
 
 CIVIC CONTROL OF MILITIA CALLED OUT. 
 
 It is important for officers to study the law and the 
 precedents governing their relations with, and the extent 
 or limits of their subordination to, the civil authorities, 
 after being legally called out and having reported to 
 them for duty. 
 
 When called into the service of the United States, 
 the third case I have previously specified is the only 
 one which specially concerns us in discussing the sub- 
 ject of this lecture, and that only concerns us so far as 
 to know what relations the troops of the United States 
 would hold, that is, what subordination they would be 
 under, to the civil authorities of the State which had 
 invoked their aid. 
 
 In the railroad riots of 1877 the troops sent by the 
 United States to West Virginia, Maryland, and Penn- 
 sylvania were directed to report to and act under the 
 
295 
 
 orders of the governors of those -States. This direct 
 subordination to local civil authority was strongly- 
 objected to by General Hancock, who suggested to the 
 Secretary of War "that when State governments de- 
 clare their inability to suppress domestic insurrection 
 through the military channels, and call upon the Presi- 
 dent of the United States to intervene, he should not 
 do it through the civil powers of the States, which have 
 already failed, but by the intervention of the Federal 
 authorities by military force, himself exercising the 
 control." In these views the digest of opinions of the 
 Judge Advocate General coincide by the statement 
 that : " A military force employed according to article 
 IV, sec. 4, of the Constitution, is to remain under the 
 direction and orders of the President, as commander- 
 in-chief, and his military subordinates; it .cannot be 
 placed under the direct orders or exclusive disposition 
 of the governor of the State." 
 
 Probably the true solution of the matter is that 
 United States troops, or militia called into the service 
 of the United States, on such occasions should hold the 
 same relation to the supreme civil authorities of the 
 State in which they are operating that in other cases the 
 State troops would hold to the sheriff, or other civil 
 authority of their own State, that had invoked their 
 aid — that is, they should report to the supreme civil 
 authority for information and instruction in the pur- 
 poses to be accomplished ; should co-operate in every 
 way in accomplishing those purposes, but should not 
 and could not recognize any suggestion as orders to 
 govern their military dispositions. 
 
 When called out by the State the laws of some of 
 the States very clearly prescribe the manner in which 
 the civic and military officers shall respectively act 
 when brought into conjunction. In many of the States, 
 
296 
 
 however, their laws are . silent on this point. Where 
 there are specific laws, every officer should become 
 thoroughly familiar with them; where there are no 
 specific laws, every officer should become thoroughly 
 familiar with common law and precedent. In either 
 case officers should not wait for the time of action to 
 inquire what they should or may do; every officer 
 should, by careful thought and study of supposed situ- 
 ations, know what he would do when those situations 
 become realities. 
 
 The body of troops responding in obedience to the 
 call of the civil authorities is not a posse comitatus, of 
 which each individual is called out individually by the 
 civic officers, and in which each individual is subject to 
 the orders of the civic officer. The body of troops, so 
 far as the civic officer is concerned, is a unit, and that 
 unit is represented and controlled by its commanding 
 officer. The civic officer can have no control or rela- 
 tions with the body of troops except through their 
 commanding officer. The only question, therefore, is 
 to what extent the civic officer may direct or control 
 the commanding officer of the military force that he 
 has invoked to aid him. It may be safely accepted as 
 a rule established both by reason and precedent, that 
 the power or control of the civic officer ceases when he has 
 communicated to the commanding officer of the military 
 force the purpose that he desires to be accomplished^ 
 and that he cannot resume control until he distinctly 
 dismisses or remands the military force from further 
 duty. The military officer should, therefore, on report- 
 ing to the civic officer in response to his call or in 
 obedience to orders of higher military authority, de- 
 mand of the civic officer that he give him in writing 
 the purpose or object he requires to be accomplished, 
 and if the civic officer refuses or "is unable to give it in 
 
297 
 
 writing, that he require him ta state it verbally in pres- 
 ence of a proper number of witnesses. From that 
 moment the power of the civic officer ceases, and it is 
 for the military officer alone to determine how he will 
 accomplish the duty required of him. 
 
 General Napier expressed the matter in these words : 
 ^^ How to use this force in his (the soldier's) trade ; but 
 it is not his trade to decide when it should be used against 
 his countrymen. He may play the part of a druggist, 
 but that of the physician appertains to the magistrate." 
 
 The regulations of Massachusetts cover the whole 
 question most thoroughly, and may be safely adopted 
 by any officer called upon to perform duty in a State in 
 which there are no specific laws or regulations to govern 
 his actions : 
 
 " Par. 2298. The civil officer is not authorized to inter- 
 fere in any way with the formation or details of the 
 force, the military officer being held responsible for the 
 success of the operations to be undertaken ; and it is for 
 the latter, and for him alone, to judge in what manner the 
 troops shall effect the object which the civil officer has 
 indicated, and to direct the force in the execution of the 
 service in which it is engaged." 
 
 " Par. 2299. While the instructions of the civil officers 
 are given in general terms to accomplish a particular 
 purpose, and the mode and means are within the dis- 
 cretion of the military commander, the latter, to prevent 
 misunderstanding, should request to have his instruc- 
 tions reduced to writing." 
 
 FIRING UPON A MOB. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that it is discretionary with 
 a military commander how he will dispose of and use 
 his force to accomplish the purpose for which the civil 
 authority has invoked his aid, the act of causing or di- 
 recting the firing on people is sufficiently serious to be 
 worthy of special consideration. 
 
298 
 
 It is a general rule of law that it is the right of any 
 citizen, at any time, to use force to prevent the perpetra- 
 tion of felony, or in endeavoring to arrest a felonious cul- 
 prit. The amount of force he may legally use is meas- 
 ured by the amount of resistance he meets, and if 
 homicide becomes necessary to accomplish the purpose, 
 law justifies the killing. 
 ^ A riot may be defined as an unlawful assemblage of 
 persons who use violence to accomplish their purposes. 
 This constitutes a felony, and therefore the killing of 
 any participant in the riot is clearly justifiable if the 
 riot cannot be suppressed by less violent means. 
 
 It is also a principle of law that '* homicide, or the 
 taking of human life, is justifiable when necessarily 
 committed by public officers and those acting under 
 their command or in their aid and assistance in over- 
 coming resistance to the execution of legal process or 
 the discharge of any other legal duty." One eminent 
 jurist goes so far as to make the broad statement that 
 " if officers of the law, when engaged in the preserva- 
 tion of the peace, find it necessary to take life, such 
 homicide is justifiable." It is further clearly established 
 that homicide committed in dispersing an unlawful 
 \J assembly is justifiable. By an unlawful assembly is 
 meant one which meets for a purpose which, if executed, 
 would make them rioters. Though such an assembly 
 may not have committed any overt act or violence that 
 would constitute felony, yet if the civil authorities deem 
 it necessary or proper to disperse the assembly, and call 
 upon the military authorities to assist them in doing so, 
 the law will regard as justifiable homicide the necessary 
 killing of any participant in the assembly. 
 
 The question whether a person killed was a partici- 
 pant's settled by the rule of law that " those present 
 at the commission of a riotous felony are principals," 
 
299 
 
 and is put beyond all question if the proper officer has 
 commanded the assembly to disperse before the firing 
 was ordered. It is for this reason that in many States 
 the law requires that the civic officer shall order the as- 
 sembly to disperse before he turns them over to the care 
 of the military officer; if he omits to do so, it is well for 
 the military officer to do so before proceeding to extreme 
 measures. It is not necessary to " read the riot act " or 
 law; a notice or command to disperse is all that is 
 requisite, and in emergencies even this formality may 
 be dispensed with. • 
 
 Verbal notices or orders can be heard by only a few 
 in the front ranks of a mob, and I would suggest that it 
 might be well to adopt a universal signal, which would 
 be universally understood as giving notice to a mob to 
 disperse before opening fire on it. Sounding the " long 
 roll " on the drums would make an excellent signal for 
 this purpose. 
 
 From what I have quoted of law and legal decisions, 
 it seems safe to assort, as a legal proposition, that if a 
 military commander in the exercise of his discretionary 
 power as to the means of carrying out the instructions 
 of the civic officer deems it proper to order his troops to 
 fire upon either a riotous or unlawful assembly, and 
 should thereby cause the death of either participants or 
 so-called spectators, he could not be held answerable for 
 such result. 
 
 While the taking of human life does not involve legal 
 responsibility under the conditions I have cited, it always 
 entails moral responsibility, and no military officer 
 should give the fatal order until it is clearly evident that 
 he cannot otherwise carry out the demands and instruc- 
 tions of the civic authorities, or it is made necessary for 
 the security of the troops under his command. When 
 it does become necessary to fire on a mob, it is merciful 
 
300 
 
 to make the fire short, relentless, and effective. Above 
 all,- every soldier must remember that it should make 
 no difference to him whether the mob is composed of 
 millionaires or paupers, capitalists or laborers, aliens or 
 Americans, enemies or friends and neighbors, or even if 
 the riotous assemblage has been caused by well-founded 
 grievances. Our duty is both simple and clear — to main- 
 tain and enforce law without consideration of the class 
 of people that may be resisting it, and without regard to 
 our personal views of the injustice of the law or the jus- 
 tice of the grievances that may arise under it. 
 
 SEIZURE AND USE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. 
 
 In operations against rioters it often becomes nec- 
 essary to convert private property to public use, or to 
 seize and destroy it; as, for instance, to convert the 
 nearest available means to use in making barricades ; 
 to destroy a private building occupied by rioters ; or to 
 seize food for the sustenance of the troops. When the 
 danger is immediate, or the necessity so urgent that no 
 delay is possible, the military commander should not 
 hesitate. While he may render himself liable to civil 
 action, there are so many legal decisions to sustain him 
 that he need have no fear of the results, provided he 
 has not exercised his discretionary power in a corrupt 
 or malicious manner. The law that protects the mil- 
 itary commander in taking human life will surely 
 protect him in taking private property. "The Gov- 
 ernment, not the officer, is responsible for the property 
 taken for public use ; and a subsequent ratification 
 of the act by the Government is equivalent to prior 
 authority to do it." 
 
 GIVING AND OBEYING ORDERS. 
 
 It is prescribed by the Articles of War, and is a mili- 
 tary axiom, that a subordinate must obey all lawful or- 
 
301 
 
 ders of a superior. It is equally true that obedience to an 
 illegal order of a superior will not protect an inferior 
 against military or civil punishment for results that 
 may follow. It is, therefore, important that you should 
 carefully study this distinction, as it is appHcable to all 
 phases of military duty as well as the one we are now 
 considering. 
 
 There have been many trials, both military and civic, 
 in England and in this country involving the question 
 of the extent of the right of a subordinate to judge of 
 the legality or illegality of the order of a superior. Ex- 
 tracts from some of the decisions of the highest courts 
 and from the opinions of eminent jurists may make 
 the point clear to you. One decision says : " The order 
 must expressly and clearly show on its face, or in 
 the body thereof, its illegality ; and this must appear at 
 once to a common mind on hearing it read or given ; nor 
 has the inferior a right to inquire of the superior the 
 object and purpose he has in view." The reason for 
 this is clearly stated in another decision as follows: 
 " The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without 
 this there can be neither discipline nor efficiency in an 
 army. If every subordinate ofiicer and soldier were at 
 liberty to question the legality of the orders of the com- 
 mander and obey them or not as they may consider 
 them valid or invalid, the camp would be turned into a 
 debating school, where the precious moments for action 
 would be lost in wordy conflicts between the advocates 
 of conflicting opinions." Therefore, as clearly stated 
 in another decision, any ofiicer or soldier may safely 
 act as ordered by superior authority without fear of the 
 consequences, " except in plain case of excess of author- 
 ity, where at first blush it is apparent and palpable to 
 the commonest understanding that the order is illegal." 
 
 It being thus evident that if any one can be held re- 
 
302 
 
 sponsible for acts done it must be to the superior mili- 
 tary authority that gives the order for doing them, it 
 becomes interesting to study the precedents from which 
 rules may be drawn by which the superior may safely 
 govern his action ; and as a subaltern officer may at 
 any. time be placed in a position which he will be the 
 superior military authority present, and therefore in- 
 . vested with the responsibility of giving orders, it is 
 important that officers of all grades should study the 
 questions we are now discussing. 
 
 I have stated that a subordinate will not be held re- 
 sponsible for executing the lawful orders of his superior. 
 It is also equally true that a superior will not be held 
 responsible for any of the unauthorized acts of his sub- 
 ordinates. The liability of a superior officer was broadly 
 stated by Lord Mansfield to be, that " a public officer 
 who acts without authority, or exceeds his authority, is 
 liable ^ * * for the act done without or in excess 
 of his authority." The measure of an officer's author- 
 ity may be accepted as definitely settled by the results 
 of numerous trials in England, beginning as far back as 
 the time of Charles II, and by many decisions of our 
 own courts. 
 
 There are two kinds of duties that a military officer 
 may be called upon to perform — ministerial duties and 
 discretionary duties. Ministerial duty is simply definite 
 duty ; duty imposed by law ; duty in respect to which 
 nothing is left to discretion ; duty which allows the offi- 
 cer no power to judge of the matter to be done. Dis- 
 cretionary duty has been defined by the courts to be, 
 " when applied to public functionaries, a power or right 
 conferred upon them by law of acting officially in cer- 
 tain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own 
 judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment 
 or conscience of another." It has been clearly settled 
 
303 
 
 by numerous decisions that an officer in the discharge 
 of discretionary duties " is not responsible to any one 
 receiving an injury from such act, unless the officer act 
 maliciously and willfully wrong." It has also been set- 
 tled by judicial decision that the duties of an officer in 
 suppressing a mob are discretionary duties — that is, that 
 while the law requires him to discharge the duty, it 
 invests him with discretionary authority in doing it. 
 While it is true, as said by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, that there is no case in which a public 
 officer acting from a sense of duty, in a matter where he 
 is required to exercise discretion, is not liable to an action 
 for error of judgment, it is equally true, as stated by 
 the same court, that " a public officer, invested with 
 certain discretionary power, never has been and never 
 should be made answerable for any injury when acting 
 within the scope of his authority and not influenced by 
 malice, corruption, or cruelty." This decision practi- 
 cally covers the whole point and makes it unnecessary 
 to quote from numerous other decisions bearing on it. 
 The consensus of all decisions is that when an officer is 
 placed in a position that requires him to exercise dis- 
 cretionary power his acts "are to be presumed legal 
 till shown by others to be unjustifiable," and that he 
 cannot be held answerable for the effect of any act done 
 by him through mistake of law or error of judgment. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES. 
 
 It may seem somewhat hazardous to differ from com- 
 monly accepted theories, but my convictions are so 
 strong that I do not hesitate to express them, and I 
 believe that what I have quoted from accepted princi- 
 ples of law and from legal decisions sustain my conclu- 
 sions. 
 
 I have seen it stated by one writer that, " if assailed 
 by force too strong for its ordinary processes, the law 
 
304 
 
 calls force to its defense, but from its exalted throne it 
 judges both its assailants and its defenders." I cannot 
 agree with this writer. I believe that when law calls 
 upon force to defend it, that law will protect those it calls 
 to its defense so long as the means employed by force 
 and the results of employing those means are kept within 
 the pre-established precepts laid down by law itself. 
 
 The impression is too general and has been too long 
 uncontradicted, that a military officer puts himself in 
 great jeopardy of civil or criminal punishment on the 
 one hand or court-martial on the other in the discharge 
 of duties imposed upon him by law. I cannot assent to 
 this doctrine — ^in fact, I venture to contradict it. To 
 admit it would paralyze the efficiency of the military 
 force and make all their efforts weak and vacillating. 
 The theory and tendency of all modern legislation is 
 directly the reverse, and there are few, if any, judicial 
 decisions to support it. 
 
 The laws of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
 Wisconsin, Alabama, the District of Columbia, and 
 several of the other States distinctly provide that a 
 military officer shall not be held liable to civil or crim- 
 inal punishment for acts done in the discharge of his 
 duty in rendering aid to the civil authorities. Undoubt- 
 edly the laws of all the States will make similar provis- 
 ions whenever they are revised. In those States in which 
 no specific laws are as yet enacted the common law and 
 legal precedent afford ample security to all officers in 
 the discharge of their duties, and especially no subor- 
 dinate officer or soldier need give himself the slightest 
 concern in obeying the lawful orders of his superior. 
 Every citizen in the ordinary routine of life is liable to 
 arrest and trial on civil and criminal charges of which 
 he is wholly innocent. We see this exemplified every 
 day in the courts. What I affirm is that a military 
 
305 ' 
 
 officer is subject to no greater hazard or jeopardy in the 
 performance of his duty than any citizen is subject to in 
 the discharge of the ordinary duties of life. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 To impress upon your minds the principal points I 
 have endeavored to illustrate in the preceding remarks, 
 I will briefly summarize the following as the most im- 
 portant for you to consider and remember in determin- 
 ing your conduct when called into service by local civil 
 authority : 
 
 First. That a military officer upon whom demand is 
 made by a civic officer for aid is obhged to respond to 
 it if the demand is made in a legal manner by a civic 
 officer authorized by law to make it. * 
 
 Second. That subordinate officers and soldiers receiv- 
 ing orders from their superiors to assemble for the pur- 
 pose of aiding the civil authorities cannot question the 
 legality of the call made upon their superior, but must 
 obey the order as a military order. 
 
 Third. That the military officer called upon by the 
 civil authority or ordered by superior military author- 
 ity, having assembled his force and reported it to the 
 designated civic officer, should require from that officer 
 specific information, in writing if possible, of the duty 
 required of him. Having received that information he 
 should, from that moment, assume supreme control of 
 the situation, and in no event allow the civic officer to 
 control his dispositions or permit him to give any orders 
 or directions to the force under his command. 
 
 Fourth. That superior or commanding officers will 
 not be held responsible for any act done or order given 
 by them, or the results following from any such act or 
 order, provided they act according to their best judg- 
 ment on what they suppose to be the actual facts and 
 20 
 
306 
 
 are not governed by malice or corruption ; nor will they 
 be held responsible for any unauthorized act of their 
 subordinates. 
 
 Fifth. Subordinates will not be held responsible for 
 any act done by them under the lawful orders of their 
 superiors. They may kill, burn, or destroy with abso- 
 lute impunity if their superiors lawfully order them to 
 do so. In such case the superior will be held respon- 
 sible for the legality of his orders and the results of 
 them. If a subordinate does an act not authorized or 
 directed by his superior, or under an unlawful order of 
 his superior, he may be held responsible for its results. 
 
 Sixth. Remember, however, that it is better to err on 
 the side of yielding subordination to civil authority 
 jjather than insist on the military rights I have indi- 
 cated, if the occasion should seem to require it, and you 
 would not thereby jeopardize the safety of your com- 
 mand. 
 
 MILITARY VIEW OF RIOTS. 
 
 Having considered the legal aspect of riots and the re- 
 lations that exist between the military and civil author- 
 ities in suppressing them, it remains for us to con- 
 sider the equally important military questions involved 
 in the methods of applying military force to this pur- 
 pose. 
 
 It is fully as important in this country to prepare for 
 internal disorder as for external danger ; as much reason 
 to provide for suppressing riots as to provide for coast 
 defense. 
 
 Our people seem to be wholly blind to the lessons of 
 the past, the dangers of the present, or the possibilities 
 of the future 
 
 In 1877 an insignificant trouble at the small town of 
 Martinsburg, in West Virginia, suddenly developed 
 
307 
 
 proportions that overshadowed the whole country. In 
 less than forty-eight hours fifty thousand miles of 
 railway were inoperative and sovereign States were 
 appealing in the most abject manner to the Federal 
 Government for protection. Millions of dollars' worth 
 of property were destroyed, millions of dollars' worth of 
 human labor lost, and the fabric of lawful order re- 
 ceived a severe blow. If all of this was done in 1877 
 without premeditation, and without a definite purpose in 
 view, for which previous organization under competent 
 leaders had been made, it is fearful to contemplate what 
 might occur in the future. Since that time our country 
 has been overrun by hundreds of thousands of the 
 most criminal and ignorant classes of Europe, who can 
 neither assimilate with our people nor appreciate or 
 understand the meaning of our institutions or the force 
 of our laws — men who know no law but force and can 
 appreciate no punishment less than death. Following 
 in the wake of this horde of immigrants have come the 
 professional agitators, who may be called the pimps of 
 the professional leaders, who have come to live on the 
 tolls they levy on these ignorant people while they 
 organize and train them for their own diabolical pur- 
 poses. These professional leaders are by no means to 
 be despised. They are generally men who have had a 
 military education, have held rank and position in 
 various armies, have had experience in war, but who 
 through their own vices have been dismissed from all 
 honorable service and ostracised from respectable society, 
 and though having been reared to despise those who 
 labor, make dupes of them that they may live upon 
 their contributions and the possibilities of the future. 
 If you ever have occasion to meet these men you will 
 find that they are no tyros in the art of war and will 
 be a match for the best intelligence we can bring 
 
308 
 
 against them. The hand of these people is not shown 
 in ordinary affairs, but we know enough of them, of the 
 organizations they control, of their purposes, and of 
 their means of accomplishing these purposes, to know 
 that when the time comes that they consider favorable 
 the riots of 1877 will be remembered as trifling affairs 
 compared with what will then confront us. 
 
 Any thoughtful person, and especially a military ob- 
 server, must realize the fact that riots in the future will 
 be more frequent and more formidable than in the past, 
 ^ inasmuch as when honest but misguided men may be 
 brought to the sudden frenz}^ of resisting lawful govern- 
 ment the opportunity will be seized by the professional 
 rioter and anarchist to accomplish their own purposes. 
 This view is amply sustained by many facts known to 
 the police authorities, and is clearly indicated in the 
 brief cablegrams contained in our newspapers describ- 
 ing recent riots in Europe. 
 
 A few weeks ago the cable account of a riot in Brad- 
 ford, England, said that the rioters not only barricaded 
 the streets on their front, but that they also barricaded 
 all the side streets on their flanks, and were only routed 
 by a vigorous attack on their rear. It was certainly no 
 novice who conducted that defense. 
 
 The cablegrams of the past few days, describing riots 
 that occurred in various cities in Europe on the first of 
 May, though meagre in detail, contain enough to justify 
 the same conclusion. 
 
 The fearful slaughter of the brave policemen of Chi- 
 cago in Haymarket square was only one feature of a 
 prearranged plan that failed simply by lack of coopera- 
 tion, and the single dynamite bomb that caused their 
 death y^sls only one of many that had been prepared for 
 far more serious work. Are we to hope or expect that 
 such an attempt will never be made again, or that when 
 
309 
 
 made the anarchists will not profit by their former 
 failure, while we pay not the slightest attention to the 
 lessons that the attempt should have taught us. 
 
 Riots originate from various causses. They have been 
 caused by religion, politics, race prejudices, and in later 
 years by labor agitators. They may be either sponta- 
 neous or incited. Nearly all the riots of former years 
 have been spontaneous ; those of the future we may ex- 
 pect to be premeditated and incited. From whatever 
 cause they may originate, or whatever class of people 
 may compose them, all riots result in forcibly resisting 
 the enforcement of law, and therefore we can make no 
 distinction in our treatment of them, no matter what 
 our own religion, politics, or condition of life may be. 
 
 In considering the elements of society most likely to 
 be involved in riotous assemblages, distinction should 
 be made between labor organizations, socialists, and an- 
 archists. All of these terms seem foreign to our institu- 
 tions, but nevertheless they are transplanted to our 
 midst, and we must learn their purposes and under- 
 stand their meaning. 
 
 Labor organizations are formed with the praiseworthy 
 purpose of ameliorating or improving the condition of 
 laborers by peaceable and legal organizations. The good 
 intentions of such organizations are one thing, the results 
 that may follow are another. The power in the hands 
 of these organizations is tremendous. It would be neces- 
 sary to assert human infallibility to assume that this 
 power will never be exercised to promote the fortunes 
 or purposes of unscrupulous leaders who may get con- 
 trol of it. We know that it has been done on some oc- 
 casions in the past and we know that it will be more 
 likely to occur in the future in proportion to the intro- 
 duction of foreign labor and foreign ideas. This is indi- 
 cated by the fact that the labor organizations, after fail- 
 
310 
 
 ing in any other way to accomplish a declared purpose, 
 such as increase of wages, fewer hours of work, the 
 restoration of a discharged laboi'or, resort to a " strike " to 
 accomplish it. Unfortunately " strikes " generally result 
 in the employment and exercise of force. It forces the 
 unwilling to cease labor and forcibly prevents the will- 
 ing from assuming labor. It says to the contented 
 laborer, who has his pleasant home that shelters his 
 happy family partly paid for, and who is cheerfully 
 laboring to discharge the balance of his payments, you 
 shall not work ; and it says to the skilled laborer, who may 
 have expended the last dollar of his savings in endeavor- 
 ing to prolong the life of an invalid wife and in the care 
 of his helpless children, your wife may die, your children 
 may starve, and you may become a convict for resisting 
 us, but you shall not work. These are not labor organi- 
 zations or methods that any free-born American laborer 
 can tolerate or sympathize with. They are cruel and 
 tyrannical powers enforcing the worst form of human 
 slavery by the exercise of brutal force. Force begets 
 force. If the workingmen are led by unscrupulous men 
 to adopt the methods of anarchy they should know that 
 the elements of anarchy will seek to cooperate with 
 them, and that they would thereby be involved in the 
 fate that must always finally come to anarchy — ruin or 
 despotism. It has, however, been greatly to the credit 
 of American labor, and a hopeful sign for the future, that 
 they are seldom found in the ranks of a mob, no matter 
 for what grievances they may be endeavoring to procure 
 redress. It was stated by one officer, in reference to the 
 riots of 1877 in Pennsylvania, " that not fifteen per cent, 
 of the railroad employes were participants or sympa- 
 thizers." It was stated still more strongly by another 
 officer that the mobs were " composed of roughs, tramps, 
 unknown men, from where no one knew, and a few 
 
311 
 
 striking railroad men." These facts should teach the 
 lawless element among the workingmen that if they 
 listen to the specious arguments of the anarchist they will 
 not have the support of their intelligent fellow-workmen, 
 and should also convince the soldier that any mob he 
 may be called upon to face which has been organized 
 under the plea of wrongs of labor to be redressed, in- 
 stead of being composed of workingmen is in reality 
 composed of at least eighty-five per cent, of roughs, 
 tramps, thieves, convicts, and anarchists, whom he need 
 have no compunctions in effectually eradicating. 
 
 The socialists should not be confounded with the 
 anarchists. The socialist is generally a mild sort of 
 being, who indulges in vague theories of the proper con- r/ 
 struction of human society. He is a dreamer, and no 
 more to be feared than any other harmless lunatic, 
 except so far as he may lend aid and countenance to 
 putting his theories into active opposition to legally 
 established government. 
 
 The anarchist is the natural product of socialistic 
 theories practically applied. He believes or asserts a 
 belief in a condition of society in which there shall be 
 no law or no supreme power, and in which every in- 
 dividual shall do whatever he pleases with perfect im- 
 punity. Even hell is assumed to have a ruler, and 
 he is generally pictured as not only a most powerful, 
 but a most adroit ruler. If one could imagine hell 
 without a ruler he might form a slight conception of 
 what this earth would be if anarchy should prevail. 
 The anarchist is a professional rioter, and he brings to 
 his profession all of the arts of diplomacy, the skill of 
 science, and the knowledge of experience. If you are 
 ever brought in contact with a mob, let us hope that 
 the anarchists will constitute the front ranks, if not the 
 entire body of it. What otherwise might be a duty will- 
 then become a pleasure. 
 
312 
 
 To solve any problem requires a statement of the defi- 
 nite propositions on which the problem is based. The 
 military problems arising from street riots do not admit 
 of preconceived definite propositions, for the reason 
 that every riot will differ in cause, composition, and pur- 
 pose, and each of these points must be considered in 
 determining how to deal with a riot. We might fill 
 volumes in assuming almost every condition and com- 
 bination of conditions that we could conceive, and then, 
 in fact, an officer would probably be confronted by a 
 condition wholly diff'erent from any he had studied. 
 
 CHARACTER OF RIOTS. 
 
 Primarily, riots may be divided into two types : 
 One type is a spontaneous riotous assemblage, con- 
 fined to a single locality or limited district in a city, 
 lacking organization, and without definite purposes or 
 recognized leadership. Such riots may be quickly sup- 
 pressed and easily dispersed by inferior military force ; 
 and, if the military force is under a proper and compe- 
 tent commander, with little or no bloodshed. Fortun- 
 ately nearly all the riots that have occurred in our 
 country have been of this type. 
 
 The other type is a premeditated and general uprising, 
 covering, or liable to cover, the whole territory of a city ; 
 with definite purposes and definite plans for accomplish- 
 ing those purposes, and with its forces carefully organ- 
 ized and skillfully led. If such a riot should assume 
 the off'ensive, the methods of defeating it would be 
 quickly perceptible to any military mind; but if it 
 should assume the defensive, barricade strategic points 
 in various parts of a large city, and occupy houses on 
 the streets leading to its strongholds with riflemen and 
 dynamite bomb throwers, it would task an overwhelm- 
 ing force and great military genius to subdue it. The 
 nearest approach in our country to this type of riots 
 
313 
 
 have been the " draft riots " in New York city in 1863, 
 and the " railroad riots " in 1877, which extended over 
 many States. Fortunately, in both cases, the uprisings 
 being either unpremeditated or prematurely begun, 
 lacked organization and leadership. 
 
 The local riot may lead to the general riot, or riots 
 may occur which combine in all possible proportions 
 the various elements of both. It being, therefore, evi- 
 dently impossible to prescribe definite methods for 
 dealing with all riots, I will limit myself to the con- 
 sideration of a few general principles covering the two 
 types of riot I have indicated, simply as suggestive for 
 application according to the combination of conditions 
 and circumstances that may confront you. 
 
 THE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 If the public peace is being disturbed or threatened 
 to an extent that makes it apparently possible that the 
 civil authorities may finally be obliged to call on the 
 military authorities for aid, a prudent local commander 
 will quietly, and if possible secretly, keep a sufficient 
 force constantly on duty in the armories of his com- 
 mand to guard them against sudden surprise and to pro- 
 tect the assembly of his troops if call should be made. 
 
 If the call for troops is made, this armory guard 
 should at once be deployed a sufficient distance from 
 the building to protect it on every side and prevent 
 persons from approaching the building, except recog- 
 nized members of the command reporting for duty. If 
 a crowd of idle or curious citizens collects, this small 
 guard would be sufficient ; but if it is a hostile or threat- 
 ening crowd, the guard should be reinforced as rapidly 
 as men reach the armory and are uniformed and armed, 
 until it becomes sufficiently strong to hold the surround- 
 ings of the armory up to the time that the command 
 
 ^ 
 
314 
 
 has fully assembled, made all of its preparations, and 
 is ready to move out. 
 
 In case the " call to arms " is unexpected and unpro- 
 vided for, the police authorities should immediately 
 send to every armory in the city detachments of police 
 to protect them, as above described, until a sufficient 
 number of soldiers have arrived and can be posted to 
 relieve them. 
 
 In all cities there should be two methods of calling 
 out the troops : one, by verbal orders sent to the men 
 individually through the non-commissioned officers of 
 their respective squads ; the other, by a prescribed sig- 
 nal on the fire-alarm bells, to be used in cases of sudden 
 emergency. 
 
 Uniforms, arms, and equipments should always be 
 kept irj the armories ; otherwise individual men in uni- 
 form, attempting to reach their armories, would be 
 waylaid and forcibly detained or killed by the rioters. 
 Fatigue or field dress should invariably be assumed 
 for street-riot duty, and the commanding officer at the 
 armory will indicate whether blankets, overcoats, haver- 
 sacks, canteens, knapsacks, or which of them are to be 
 worn. 
 
 Every man suddenly summoned for duty should 
 take with him from home sufficient bread and meat for 
 one day's rations, in order to provide against the con- 
 tingency of lack of time for the commissary officers to 
 provide for feeding them immediately. 
 
 After the troops have been assembled in the armory 
 they should be minutely inspected to see that every 
 man is thoroughly equipped and every rifle in perfect 
 order. Ball cartridges should then be issued to the 
 men. The commanding officer should also outline to 
 his officers the nature of the duty he has been ordered 
 to perform and the manner in which he intends to ex- 
 
315 
 
 ecute his orders, and should give to his men some gen- 
 eral instructions and cautions. A capable officer and 
 such number of men as circumstances may seem to re- 
 quire should then be detailed to remain at the armory. 
 If a guard has been maintained at a distance from 
 the armory, as indicated, there will be no difficulty in 
 moving the command out of the armory and forming 
 it on the street; but if such a guard has not been 
 maintained, or has been forced by a hostile crowd 
 that shows a disposition to dispute the egress of the 
 troops from the armory , there are many expedients which 
 will suggest themselves to any officer by which he may 
 force the passage. Do not temporize with such a crowd 
 or seek to evade it by some back-alley egress. Con- 
 front the danger at once, as determined action and a 
 severe lesson to the would-be rioters at this juncture 
 may prevent much further trouble. 
 
 STREET TACTICS. 
 
 You have been accustomed to apply the word 
 " tactics " to your drill book. This application of the 
 word is erroneous, and it is therefore necessary for me 
 to say that on this branch of my subject I shall use the 
 word in its proper and broader significance, in which it 
 may be defined as " the art of handling troops in the 
 presence of an enemy," or the "disposition and move- 
 ments of troops for attack and defense when in the 
 presence of the enemy." 
 
 The maneuvering of troops in the streets of a city 
 requires some special formations not prescribed in the 
 drill books for maneuvering troops in the open field. 
 Many systems have been devised and advocated, but 
 all of them are too complicated. It should be borne in 
 mind that the troops most likely to be used in sup- 
 pressing riots will be " raw troops," unaccustomed to 
 
316 
 
 vi scenes of dangerous excitement or to the sensation of 
 being fired on. To attempt complicated maneuvers 
 with such troops would result in confusion and conse- 
 quent disaster. There should be only one formation 
 used in street-riot duty, and that the most simple 
 possible, both in its ployment and deployment. 
 
 The system of street drill devised by the late General 
 W. H. Brownell, of the New York National Guard, 
 has heretofore been the most generally adopted and 
 accepted system. His system may be briefly outlined 
 
 \J as having two principal formations. His first forma- 
 tion is a hollow square, with the front and rear sub- 
 divisions extending the width of the street, from build- 
 ing line to building line; the flank subdivisions in 
 column of fours, and with sharpshooters in the line 
 of file-closers inside the square. His second forma- 
 tion is simply a column of divisions with the division 
 fronts extended or contracted so as to exactly cover 
 the width of the street from building line to build- 
 ing line, and with sharpshooters on the flanks in the 
 intervals between divisions. The methods of chang- 
 ing from one of those formations to the other, or of 
 assuming them either from column of fours or from 
 column of companies, and of extending or contract- 
 ing the front, are minutely prescribed. The forma-, 
 tion of a hollow square he describes as " simply pre- 
 cautionary for defense while marching to the scene of 
 trouble, and prepared for any emergency." The other 
 formation, an ordinary column of divisions, he calls 
 the " assaulting or fighting formation." I have already 
 stated my objection to having more than one formation 
 for street-riot duty ; but if we should admit that two or 
 more formations, with all the complicated maneuvers 
 arising from them, might be desirable, it is impossible 
 to conceive on what reasons the application of the two 
 
317 
 
 formations above described have been based. It seems to 
 me that their appUcation should have been reversed, and 
 the hollow square made the fighting formation, as it is 
 unquestionably the stronger formation, either for defense 
 or offense. A radical defect in both formations is that 
 in one the sharpshooters are inside the square, and in 
 the otlier inside the flanks of the column — in both 
 cases about as inappropriate as would be a skirmish 
 line in rear of a line of battle. The system further 
 prescribes that, being in column of fighting order 
 and pressing the mob back closely, on reaching inter- 
 vening streets the subdivisions of the leading division 
 will vigorously execute the '' right and left turn " re- 
 spectively, and thereby sweep away and detach from 
 the mob its front ranks and drive them down the side 
 streets. Even theoretically this seems rather a weak 
 maneuver, and I would not hesitate to predict that if 
 attempted would result in disaster, and that the sub- 
 divisions making the " turn," with their flanks exposed 
 to the pressure of the mob, would be those swept away. 
 
 Another system of street drill has been published by 
 Major E. G. Sprowl, of the California National Guard. 
 Like Brownell's tactics, it shows infinite care and prac- 
 tical knowledge in the most minute details of drill; 
 in fact, it is most elaborate in details. Xt provides 
 for " street-marching order," " double-column order," 
 "street-tcorner order," "street-fighting order," and " build- 
 ing-attack order." 
 
 These and all similar systems of street drill are ex- 
 cellent studies for professional soldiers in the methods 
 of attack and defense of towns and villages, and veteran 
 troops could probably be maneuvered by them under 
 severe fire, but they are too complicated to use in hand- 
 ling militia the first time it is brought under fire or 
 into the pres3nce of danger. 
 
318 
 
 I do not claim any originality for the street drill I 
 have prescribed for you, and it may have even more 
 faults than I have pointed out in other systems. I 
 am, however, somewhat confirmed in my views by 
 the fact that while they were in manuscript, and had 
 not been made public, the U. S. Army Tactical Board 
 adopted almost identically the same system. 
 
 In our street drill I have prescribed but one forma- 
 tion, and that is a modification of Brownell's hollow 
 square formation, and have made a different application 
 of it. The modifications consist in giving the square 
 whatever front the number of men in the leading com- 
 pany might happen to give it, except that in no case 
 should the front exceed the width between curb-lines of 
 the street, and in placing the sharpshooters oustide the 
 square instead of inside. My reasons for these modifi- 
 cations are: that it makes no difference whether the 
 front of the squar§ reaches the building lines or not, 
 for it may be extended from the flanks of the leading 
 and rear subdivisions to the building lines by sharp- 
 shooters, who would then be available and in position 
 for effective work ; that the front of the square should 
 not extend beyond the curb-lines for the reason that 
 trees, lamp-posts, projecting steps, areas, fences, and 
 other obstructions would often make it impracticable 
 to march the flanks of the square in column of fours on 
 the sidewalk ; that the sharpshooters, being placed out- 
 side the square, would naturally occupy the sidewalk, 
 and what would prove obstructions to a column of 
 fours would serve as a cover for them, and they could 
 more readily cover the windows on the side of the 
 street opposite to them or reinforce the sharpshooters 
 in front. The formation I have described obviates all 
 maneuvering or change of formation ; it can be used 
 first, last, and all the time ; it is the best formation in 
 
319 
 
 which to march through riotous districts, as it is ready 
 for instant work; it is tlie best for fighting, as it is 
 equally effective for attack or defense, and is equally 
 ' ready on every side for either. Intersecting streets or 
 open parks, on one or both sides, are easily provided 
 for by wheeling the flanking columns of the square 
 into line ; and above all, the formation having been 
 once taken, there is no liability of the troops being 
 thrown into confusion by attempts to execute compli- 
 cated maneuvers. 
 
 Troops on riot duty should move through the streets 
 without music or colors. If the riot is local, and a con- 
 siderable distance from the armory, the troops should 
 be moved by the least frequented streets and in column 
 of fours, so that they will not interrupt public traffic or 
 create excitement. If, however, the riot is a general 
 uprising, the troops should be moved upon whatever 
 streets military policy may indicate, and in the forma- 
 tion of hollow square, as described. 
 
 Sharpshooters should be considered as detached from 
 their companies, and should be placed under the imm e- 
 diate command of an inspector of rifle practice, who 
 will receive his instructions and orders direct from the 
 commanding officer. 
 
 The essential quality in troops that are to be used 
 against a mob is fire discipline, and in this quality the 
 troops of the National Guard are sadly lacking. You 
 should make it the most important feature of your in- 
 struction and drills. Firing must be completely under 
 the control of the commanding officer, both as to its be- 
 ginning and ceasing. A single shot prematurely fired is 
 an error ; a single life unnecessarily taken is a crime. 
 With the exception of the sharpshooters, the fire should 
 be by volleys and delivered by ranks. As the men are 
 trained at much longer range than would be used in the 
 
320 
 
 streets, the fire should invariably be delivered kneeling, 
 to avoid the tendency to fire too high. It is unneces- 
 sary to say that blank cartridges and harmless volleys 
 over the heads of a mob should be absolutely prohibited. 
 
 The sharpshooters should fire individually and only 
 as directed by their commanding officer. The use of 
 sharpshooters and their desultory firing makes it still 
 more essential that the body of the troops should be 
 held under stringent fire discipline. 
 
 Having considered the modes of forming and moving 
 troops, we may now properly consider the modes of 
 dispersing or attacking a mob when finally brought in 
 contact with it. 
 
 If the mob is in an open street, without barricades, 
 and does not occupy the houses on either side of it, 
 while its offensive strength is reduced to its limited front 
 its defensive strength must be measured by the depth of 
 the surging mass of impassioned rioters constituting the 
 body of it. The appearance of a strong military force 
 O on its front may induce the leaders of a mob to listen 
 and heed the demands to disperse, or to endeavor to 
 escape from the threatening Gatling guns and levelled 
 rifles confronting them. The dense crowd in the rear, 
 hearing and seeing nothing of what is going on in front, 
 are heedless of danger and pressing forward, so that it 
 is impossible for the front to give way, whether desirous 
 or forced to do so. Even after a deadly volley is fired 
 by the troops, the rear of the mob is still unawed and 
 presses forward. 
 
 The troops should in no case be brought into imme- 
 diate contact with such a mob. Bayonets and " butts 
 to the front " would be of no avail, as in such hand-to- 
 hand fighting the troops would quickly be overwhelmed 
 by mere weight of numbers. The offensive and de- 
 fensive power of the inferior number of troops rests in 
 
321 
 
 discipline and in the bullet; two hundred troops in 
 an ordinary street would hold the defensive against 
 a mob of any size as effectually as two thousand. The 
 commanding officer should therefore halt his troops a 
 suitable distance from the mob, determine what number 
 may be necessary to hold the mob in check, and divide 
 the balance into two detacTiments to move down the 
 streets parallel to the one held by the mob on each of 
 its flanks, with instructions to come in on the flanks 
 and, if possible, the rear of the mob by alternate side 
 streets, so as not to fire on each other. The flanking 
 and rear detachments should begin their work first, and, 
 when they have disintegrated the mass of the mob so 
 that its front may be able to give way, a determined ad- 
 vance or a single volley on its front may quickly termi- 
 nate the work, and with much less loss of life than would 
 otherwise be entailed. An example of the value and 
 effectiveness of this method of attacking a mob occurred 
 in the draft riots in New York city in 1863. On the 
 second day of the nots an immense mob moved down 
 Broadway with the avowed purpose of attacking police 
 headquarters. Less than two hundred policemen were 
 available to meet the mob, and they were placed under 
 the command of Sergeant Carpenter, with the signifi- 
 cant order to " make no arrests," and were sent out as 
 a " forlorn hope." The fight is thus described : " They 
 moved down Bleecker street towards Broadway. As 
 they turned into the latter street, only a block and a 
 half away, they saw the mob, which filled the street as 
 far as the eye could reach, moving t'lmultuously for- 
 ward. ^ * ^ The less than two hundred policemen, 
 compact and firm, now halted, while Carpenter detached 
 two companies of fifty each up the parallel streets to 
 the right and left as far as Fourth street. Coming down 
 this street from both directions, they were to strike the 
 21 
 
322 
 
 mob on both flanks at the same time he charged them 
 in front. * * * The mob, just before so confident 
 and bold, quailed in terror and would have broke and 
 fled at once but for the mass behind, which kept bear- 
 ing down on them. This, however, soon gave away 
 before the side attacks, and the 'panic that followed * * * 
 ^ It was a great victory and decisive of all future contests." 
 
 STREET STRATEGY. 
 
 In the sense in which used in connection with the 
 operations of War, strategy has but a limited application 
 to the problems arising from street-riot duty, and none 
 whatever in what I have designated as local riots. In 
 general riots the same principles that govern the move- 
 ments and disposition of large armies in the field may 
 be applied, with such modifications as the contracted 
 field of operations would naturally suggest. 
 
 If we consider strategy to be '' the general disposition 
 and movement of troops with the view of compassing 
 the enemy's overthrow under conditions that will secure 
 the most decisive results," we may accept the orders 
 issued by General St. Arnaud to his troops during the 
 riots in Paris in 1851 as the best instruction we have on 
 the subject : " Concentrate the troops in masses, care for 
 them, feed them well, keep them from contact with the 
 people, withdraw the too feeble posts, dispense with 
 patrols, allow barricades to be constructed ; then, the 
 moment for action being carefully chosen, attack unex- 
 pectedly with compact force and crush all resistance." 
 
 In the few cases of general riots we have had in this 
 country the common error has been using small bodies 
 of troops in attempts to quell disorder at many scat- 
 tered points. Detached combats without decisive or 
 material results exhaust the troops and encourage the 
 rioters. During the first days of the " draft riots " in 
 
New York city in 1863 the small available force of 
 military and police were completely exhausted by- being 
 sent in small detachments to every point from which 
 rioting or disorder was reported. A crowd dispersed, a 
 few men killed, the troops withdrawn, and the rioters 
 immediately reoccupying the ground were the only re- . 
 suits gained. 
 
 In all large cities the strategic points in the city 
 should be determined, studied, and known beforehand, 
 and in case of a general uprising the troops should be 
 concentrated at these points as rapidly as they can be as- 
 sembled, instead of being scattered throughout the city 
 wherever rioting may happen to be going on at the 
 moment. By strategic points I mean those points by 
 which, or from which, the various districts of the city 
 can be completely isolated from each other. These 
 points having been thus occupied, a simultaneous move- 
 ment, with each part supporting the others, and an over- 
 whelming attack on the most important stronghold of 
 the rioters would probably crush the uprising com- 
 pletely or make further operations simply similar to the 
 pursuit and breaking up of a defeated and demoralized 
 army. 
 
 It is a common error to regard a street as a defile, and 
 to attempt to apply the rules of war relative to the at- 
 tack and passage of defiles. In determining the selec- 
 tion of strategic points and the movements of troops in 
 a general uprising, a city should rather be regarded as a 
 broken or mountainous country, with innumerable de- 
 files, which make parallel, flanking, and rear movements 
 possible and easy. 
 
 In occupying the strategic points selected it is well to . 
 keep the mass of the troops concealed as much as prac- 
 ticable until the time for action arrives, so that, their 
 sudden appearance may be an overwhelming surprise. ^ 
 
324 
 
 It is a commonly accepted theory that armories in 
 cities should be constructed as fortresses. If the ar- 
 mories were located at strategic points, this theory might 
 be correct ; but as they are generally located by the acci- 
 dent of convenience or value of ground, I can perceive 
 no practical or military reason in such theory. The 
 armories of militia are simply places of meeting, and 
 repositories for arms and equipments. 
 
 Rioters have no incentive or desire to attack or be- 
 siege armories; their plunder lies elsewhere. They 
 might attempt to prevent the egress of troops assembled 
 in an armory, but in such event a fortress would be of 
 no more account than an ordinary building. 
 
 The only attempt that rioters would make on an 
 armory would be secretly and suddenly, with a view of 
 obtaining or destroying the arms in it before the troops 
 assembled. Against such an attempt a fortress guarded 
 by a janitor would be no more secure than any ordi- 
 nary building. If the militia are in the armory, with 
 the arms in their hands, the rioters will not attack 
 the armory with a view of obtaining the arms. If the 
 militia have secured their arms and left the armory, it is 
 of no more use to the rioters than any other unoccupied 
 building. If the rioters were defeated in the open streets 
 and could reach these deserted fortress armories before 
 the troops returned to them, the tables might be turned 
 and necessitate the troops besieging them. 
 
 The militia are supposed to act on the offensive and 
 not to shut themselves up in armories to act on the de- 
 fensive. Their offensive operations should not be weak- 
 ened by the thought that they have convenient and safe 
 places within which to retire if they are defeated. 
 This point is well illustrated by the disastrous results 
 that followed from the militia allowing themselves to be 
 shut up in the " round-house " at Pittsburg during the 
 
325 
 
 riots of 1877. In case of defeat they should be with- 
 drawn to public parks and open spaces, in which they 
 can be concentrated, easily defend themselves on all 
 sides, and be in position to resume the offensive at the 
 first favorable opportunity. 
 
 An armory should more properly be regarded simply 
 as a secure place to keep arms, and that security can 
 best be obtained by heavy iron gratings to doors and 
 windows, and by keeping the arms in a special room 
 with heavy brick walls, floor, and ceiling, and double 
 steel doors, constructed with a view of resisting the 
 efforts of rioters sufficiently long to allow the alarm 
 to be given, instead of keeping the arms in ornamental 
 and insecure racks in the open drill-hall. 
 
 In all riots the commanding officer of the military force 
 should keep himself constantly advised of the move- 
 ments and purposes of the rioters by means of detec- 
 tives, or scouts in civilian's clothing. 
 
 It may be assumed that the civil authorities before 
 calling for military aid will have provided for the pro- 
 tection of the gas and electric light works, water works, 
 fire department houses, telegraph and telephone lines ; 
 will have closed all liquor saloons, and will have closed 
 and guarded all gun stores. It should be the first care 
 of the military commander to ascertain if these pre- 
 cautions have been taken, and if not already provided 
 for, he should suggest that the civil force he relieves be 
 immediately disposed for that purpose ; or, if the civil 
 authorities are inert and inefficient, should immediately 
 assign the necessary military force to do it. 
 
 When military force has been called to aid the civil 
 authorities, the troops should never assume the functions 
 of the 'police unless the civil authority is completely 
 paralyzed. The functions of the police and the mili- 
 tary are entirely distinct, and should be kept so. As a 
 
326 
 
 rule, it may be said that the troops should on no occa- 
 sion act as auxiliary to the police, while the police should 
 constantly act as auxiliary to the military for the pur- 
 pose of making arrests or taking into custody rioters that 
 have been seized by or surrendered to the military. 
 
 ATTACK or BARRICADES. 
 
 If the rioters instead of being in an open street, 
 have been forced into or taken a purely defensive atti- 
 tude, and entrench themselves by means of barricades, 
 a direct attack on such barricades should never be at- 
 tempted until all other methods of capturing them have 
 been tried and failed, or are evidently useless to attempt. 
 
 A thorough reconnoissance of the surroundings of the 
 barricaded position should be made to determine if it 
 is possible to attack it on the rear or flanks. It is 
 difficult to conceive of any position in which this would 
 not be possible ; for, if the situation demanded such ex- 
 treme methods, houses could be destroyed to open a 
 direct access to the flank of the position. In some cases 
 the position might be such that, if the number of troops 
 were sufficient to warrant it, the whole entrenched 
 position could be cut off and isolated while the work 
 of suppressing the riot in other portions of the city pro- 
 ceeded. 
 
 If, however, all other methods fail and a direct attack 
 on a barricade becomes necessar}^, artillery is indispen- 
 sable, and the rapid fire or revolving cannon, capable of 
 an unremitting fire of small shells, are best adapted to 
 the work. The artillery should be run as far to the 
 front as practicable and supported by the infantry des- 
 ignated to make the assault, who in the meantime 
 should be kept as much under cover as possible. The 
 artillerymen should be protected from the fire of rioters 
 occupying overlooking houses by epaulements impro- 
 
327 
 
 vised from the nearest available material. Sharpshoot- 
 ers of the infantry, acting as skirmishers, should prevent 
 any return fire from the barricade and any attempt by 
 its defenders to repair breaches made in it. Suitable 
 forces of infantry should then start from the first avail- 
 able house on each side of the street and fight their way 
 from house to house until they reach the houses flanking 
 and overlooking the barricade. When they have reached 
 that point the infantry that has been held in support of 
 the artillery should make a direct assault on the barri- 
 cade, unless it shall have been already abandoned. 
 
 When barricades have been carried, the pioneers or 
 engineer troops should immediately remove or destroy 
 them. 
 
 An enterprising commander, with a very small force 
 of courageous men, may surprise and capture a barri- 
 cade in the night by watching the opportunities ofi'ered 
 through want of discipline and proper guard duty on the 
 part of its defenders, as they might generally be caught 
 in a condition of drunken stupor. 
 
 ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF HOUSES. 
 
 If rioters have occupied houses, the first question in 
 the mind of the commander of a military force should 
 be whether to avoid, to isolate, or to attack them ; and 
 an attack for the purpose of dislodging the rioters should 
 not be made unless imperatively necessary. 
 
 The houses may have been occupied by the rioters 
 without forethought or plan, simply on the impulse of 
 the moment, as a vantage ground frorti which to impede 
 or annoy the passage of troops through a street when the 
 rioters are not in sufficient force to resist their passage 
 in the open street. In such cases, if troops are under 
 orders to proceed to a designated point for a specific pur- 
 pose, it would generally be best to avoid these locations 
 
328 
 
 by taking a circuitous route. If, however, houses so 
 occupied would remain as a menace in the rear of the 
 advancing troops, or as an obstacle to their retreat in case 
 of disaster, it would be better to isolate or blockade the 
 square in which the houses are located, so that the occu- 
 pants would be held in a trap from which escape would 
 be impossible, and in which they might be held and 
 dealt with at the proper time. 
 
 If houses have been occupied as a place of refuge and 
 defense by rioters who have been defeated in the open 
 streets, or under the directions of competent leaders as 
 flank defenses of barricaded positions or vantage grounds 
 for fighting ; or if, for any reason, it becomes necessary 
 to dislodge the rioters, the attack on such houses must 
 be made systematically and with thorough preparation 
 of all the appliances needed to make an attack suc- 
 cessful. 
 
 A direct attack on a house that has been barricaded 
 for defense should never be made unless it is demon- 
 strated that all other methods would be useless, and 
 when made should be preceded by artillery fire that will 
 destroy the interior defenses. The better method of at- 
 tack, however, is the indirect. 
 
 If the houses occupied by the rioters are part of a 
 block of houses, the troops should take possession of the 
 first house in the block not so occupied. If the roofs are' 
 flat, the troops should attack the first occupied house by 
 way of the roof, gaining access through the scuttles or 
 by cutting holes in the roof. If the roofs are steep, ac- 
 cess should be gained by breaking through the walls in 
 the top story. It is infinitely better to fight downwards 
 in a house than to fight upwards, and the latter should 
 not be attempted if there is any possible way of avoid- 
 ing it. Hand grenades or light dynamite bombs dropped 
 down the roof scuttles or chimneys are good prelimi- 
 
329 
 
 naries to the descent of the troops. After getting into a 
 house no pause should be allowed in the attack ; the de- 
 fenders should be followed closely from room to room and 
 floor to floor until resistance ceases or they are driven 
 from the lower floor into the hands of the troops in 
 the streets. The first house in the block having been 
 cleared, the next adjoining should be attacked in the 
 same manner, and so on until the whole block is cleared. 
 
 If all of the houses in a block are occupied by the riot- 
 ers and it becomes necessary to make a direct attack on 
 one of them in order to obtain a foothold from which to 
 attack the others in the method I have described, the 
 mode of attack must be determined by circumstances. 
 
 If the houses on both sides of the street are occupied 
 by rioters it may be found best to make the attack on 
 the rear of the house, as less likely to be well guarded 
 and protected. In such case, if the houses on the 
 parallel street are not occupied by the rioters, sharp- 
 shooters should be stationed in their rear windows to 
 cover the attacking party while they are forcing en- 
 trance into the opposite house. 
 
 In the same way if the rioters only occupy the houses 
 on one side of a street and it becomes necessary to make 
 the attack on the front of a house, it may be covered by 
 sharpshooters from the windows of the houses on the 
 opposite side of the street, and the detachment of troops 
 detailed for the attack should, if possible, approach from 
 the right and keep close to the building line, for the 
 reason that the defenders would be obliged to lean far 
 out of the windows to fire upon them, and would thereby 
 expose a large part of their own bodies to the fire of 
 the sharpshooters. To force an entrance into a house 
 under these conditions, small bags of gunpowder nailed 
 against barricaded doors or windows, and exploded, will 
 be found very eff'ective. 
 
330 
 
 Artillery, however, is the best instrument with which 
 to open passage into a block of houses occupied by riot- 
 ers. A foothold once gained in one house of a blockj 
 the balance is easy. 
 
 The methods of defending buildings entrusted to your 
 care are as important for you to study as the methods 
 of attacking buildings occupied by rioters. What I have 
 outlined to you as methods of attack may be suggestive 
 of the proper methods of defense. 
 
 I would assert, as a general principle, that no build- 
 ing should be defended from within itself until all its 
 outlying defenses have been forced. The first defense 
 should be outside of and at a considerable distance from 
 the building. The building should be regarded solely 
 as the citadel of the defense, the last refuge of the de- 
 fenders. 
 
 Given the defense of an important building, the de- 
 fenders should erect and occupy barricades on all pos- 
 sible avenues of approach to the building, and at such 
 distances that neither dynamite nor fire could be used 
 against the building by the rioters; these barricades 
 may be designated the outer line of defense. All sur- 
 rounding buildings that command the fronts and 
 entrances to the building should be simultaneously 
 occupied as a second or interior line of defense. In 
 anticipation of the possibility of both the outer and 
 inner lines of defense being carried, a reserve of troops 
 should be posted within the building with instructions 
 to prepare it for resisting assault and to protect the re- 
 treat of the outlying troops if they should be forced to 
 seek refuge in it. 
 
 In preparing a building to resist assault, as many 
 entrances as possible should be closed, and all the outer 
 doors and windows of the basement and first story care- 
 fully barricaded with furniture, rolls of carpet, mat- 
 
331 
 
 tresses, piles of books, or any available material. Loojd- 
 holes should invariably be made so high that the assail- 
 ants cannot use them from the outside, boxes and chairs 
 being provided to enable the defenders to use them from 
 the inside. Supplies of food, water, means of lighting, 
 and facilities for extinguishing fire should be provided. 
 If the building is accessible from adjoining buildings, 
 the roof should be occupied, and partition walls on each 
 story loopholed. If the situation seems to demand ex- 
 treme precautions for defense, the stairways should be 
 demolished and ladders substituted, all interior doors 
 and partitions loopholed, and long halls or passage-ways 
 barricaded. If the building is assaulted the defense 
 must be obstinate, as defeat would probably mean an- 
 nihilation. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 DEFENSE OF RAILWAYS. 
 
 The defense of railways running through insurgent 
 districts may be governed by the ordinary rules of war. 
 The embarking, movement, and debarking of troops, 
 covering bridges and culverts from destruction, and pro- 
 tecting tracks from being torn up do not properlj^ come 
 within the scope of this lecture. The defense of rail- 
 road property within a city, especially when its tracks 
 traverse the city or penetrate nearly to its center, is a 
 difficult problem, and the only one that we need now 
 consider. 
 
 Passenger stations and freight depots in a city may 
 be protected and defended in the same way that I have 
 described for the defense of other buildings. The rolling 
 stock of the railroad, and especially the loaded freight 
 cars, should be collected at one point and placed in 
 a solid mass on parallel tracks, in which condition they 
 may be treated as a building and defended in the same 
 manner — that is, the first defense should be at a distance 
 
332 
 
 from the mass of cars. In parking the cars, open or 
 " flat " cars should be placed on the outer tracks and at 
 the ends of each line of cars, with bales of hay or barrels 
 of merchandise arranged on them to constitute a bul- 
 wark for final defense against assault. 
 
 Keeping the railway tracks open withm the limits of 
 a city and preventing their being tampered with or de- 
 stroyed should not be attempted by guards or a line of 
 sentinels. It may be better accomplished by the con- 
 stant running back and forth of a locomotive with open 
 cars attached to its front and rear, carrying picked rifle- 
 men and a strong detachment of troops. 
 
 What I have already indicated to you in regard to all 
 street-riot duty is particularly applicable to railways 
 and railroad property within a city — keep the mob at 
 a distance; do not plant yourselves on, within, or im- 
 mediately about, the property to be defended ; make 
 your defense at such distance from it that the property 
 cannot be molested while you maintain your outer 
 defense. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 You probably think that I have exaggerated the 
 dangers which threaten our country from mob violence 
 in the future, and that I u;ge too strongly such prepara- 
 tions to suppress lawlessness as will prevent it from ever 
 asserting itself Few of you are aware, and probably 
 the mass of unthinking and law-abiding citizens may be 
 startled to know, that within the last two years the 
 militia have been called into service thirty-seven times 
 in twenty-six different States. If that is the record for the 
 last two years, what may you expect in the future ?LIs it 
 not time for the civil authorities to study the causes of 
 these outbreaks and to ameliorate the conditions that 
 give rise to them ; and is it not time for the military 
 
333 
 
 authorities to study the best methods of suppressing 
 them if civil authority fails to remove the causes and 
 prevent them ?j 
 
 The quelling of riots is not an easy matter. Com- 
 pared with the excitement and honors of war against a 
 national foe, there is little of the heroic in defending the 
 integrity of the law and the safety of property ; and yet 
 there is no duty that can fall to the lot of a soldier that 
 is so vitally important to the future of our country. 
 
 In dealing with a riot there must be no apparent 
 hesitation. vEhe lawless elements that would reduce 
 the Republic to anarchy must be taught that so long as 
 law exists there are men who will defend and enforce 
 it, no matter how obnoxious or unjust the law may be ; 
 and that those who forcibly resist it will be treated for 
 the time not as American citizens, but as felons^ For- 
 tunately most mobs in this country contain very few 
 Amercan citizens, and those few are generally criminals 
 and vagabonds. 
 
 The questions involved in street warfare are declared 
 by the ablest French military writers to be the most 
 difficult problems that a soldier is called upon to solve. 
 
 General Molineux, of New York, says : " While 
 every other branch of the art has received serious and 
 exhaustive consideration, while marked advancement 
 has been made in military arms and methods during 
 the past twenty years, the subject of the suppression of 
 street riots and civil disturbances has failed to enlist 
 that attention which its importance merits and de- 
 mands." He further gives some valuable suggestions 
 in regard to the duties of officers in street-riot duties, 
 with which I so fully agree that I cannot do better than 
 quote them fox your consideration : 
 
 " As in all operations of war the closest attention is 
 paid by commanding officers to the topography and 
 
 <r 
 
334 
 
 characteristics of the country in which a campaign is 
 conducted, so the officers of the National Guard should 
 apply themselves to a close study of their respective 
 cities ; acquaint themselves with diff'erent routes to vari- 
 ous points; the character of the houses and stores on 
 those routes ; the obstacles to be overcome ; the location 
 of armories, police stations, ferries, docks on the river 
 front, churches, and parks — important factors, all in the 
 problem of street warfare — so that they may know at 
 each step of the way, by day t)r by night, the surround- 
 ings, the quickest and safest way to pass or move around 
 obstructions, from what direction attacks are likely to 
 come, and the most desirable points at which to make 
 a stand. Accurate personal knowledge of this kind will 
 be found invaluable in times of emergency." 
 
 " There is a great deal in the way that soldiers, whether 
 militia or regulars, are led. Courage is a relative attri- 
 bute with men. It can be developed by example, en- 
 couragement, and tact on the part of the officer. A 
 cheerful, lively spirit inspires troops when under fire or 
 in difficulties, and soldiers will cheerfully obey an offi- 
 cer if he is resolute, understands his business, and ap- 
 pears confident of success. Confusing and contradictory 
 orders are mischievous ; and, though promptness is al- 
 ways essential, it is better to be too slow than too hasty. 
 Nervousness is not by any means lack of courage, but 
 it is a quality which the officer must control in himself; 
 for, if communicated to a body of troops, it leads to dis- 
 order, and sometimes to panic. Many conscientious 
 officers find the responsibility weigh heavy upon them 
 when friends and comrades are rapidly falling ; but it is 
 preciselvat such a moment that the officer should be 
 firmest/ Let him plan to prevent loss as much as pos- 
 sible, but in action the necessity for it should no more__^ 
 aff'ect him than the wiping out of figures from a slate." ^ 
 
335 
 
 " What is wanted in riots is a cool, calm exercise of 
 common sense, confidence in one's own ability, and an 
 intimate knowledge of the surroundings, rather than an 
 unreasoning adherence to certain tactical movements. 
 Tactics are correct in theory, and have been demon- 
 strated so in practice ; they have been prepared by the 
 best military talent, in accordance with certain well de- 
 fined and understood principles. But the circumstances 
 must decide what movement is best, just as the patient's 
 symptoms justify the physician in determining upon 
 the remedy." 
 
 After all, you must realize that whatever time you 
 may devote to the study of these problems, the actual 
 conditions you may meet will not corrrespond exactly 
 to the problems you have studied ; but the training of 
 your minds by such study will fit you for any emergency, 
 and when you stand in the streets in command of men 
 who represent law and order, and whose confidence you 
 have earned, and direct their efi*orts to uphold the laws 
 of your country and defend lives and property against 
 the attacks of lawlessness and anarchy, you will not 
 regret the time you have spent in preparing for the in- 
 evitable and will win the gratitude of your fellow-coun- 
 trymen, to whom that inevitable now seems impossible. 
 
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