^, 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OP 
 
 CALIFORNIA 
 
 SAN DIEGO
 
 SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 B 
 /4oi 
 
 Ss-
 
 Balfour pf}tIo3opf)tcnl Eccturcs, 
 Slnibcrsito of lutjintiurgf) 
 
 SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 A COMPARISON OF THE SCOTTISH AND 
 GERMAN ANSWERS TO HUME 
 
 '^ BY 
 
 ANDEEW 8ETH, M.A. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 IN THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOUTH WALES 
 
 AND MONMOUTHSHIRE 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 MDCCCLXXXV 
 
 All liights reserved
 
 TO 
 
 A. CAMPBELL FEASEE, D.C.L., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF EDINBUROH 
 
 THESE LECTURES ON SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ARE GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY 
 
 DEDICATED.
 
 PEEFATORY NOTE. 
 
 In the winter of 1882-83 the question of estab- 
 lishing Lectureships in different departments of 
 study was several times under the consideration 
 of the Senatus of the University of Edinburgh. 
 It appeared, however, that the Senatus had no 
 legal right to use the University funds for such 
 an experiment in intramural extension. In these 
 circumstances, Mr A. J. Balfour, M.P., most 
 generously offered to supply the endowment of 
 the contemplated Lectureship in Philosophy for 
 the first term of three years. The thanks of 
 all friends of the University, and of philosophical 
 students in particular, are due to Mr Balfour for 
 this act of public spirit. My own are not less
 
 viii Prefatory Note. 
 
 due for the personal kindness implied in the 
 offer. 
 
 In consequence of my removal to Cardiff, these 
 Lectures — forming the first course — were not de- 
 livered till towards the close of last session. They 
 are now published substantially as they were then 
 spoken. Some explanation of the reasons which 
 dictated the choice of subject will be found in the 
 opening of the first Lecture. The mode of treat- 
 ment which I have followed I must leave to justify 
 itself. It was the desire of the founder of the 
 Lectureship, and it has been mine also, that the 
 Lectures should be a contribution to philosophy, 
 I and not merely to the history of systems. 
 
 I hope, in a second course, to treat some aspects 
 of the important question suggested at the close 
 of the last Lecture. 
 
 AXDEEW SETH. 
 
 University Colleoe, Cardiff, 
 October 1885.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS : DESCARTES 
 
 AND LOCKE. 
 
 p 
 The choice of subject explained — Reid's view of Hume 
 as the outcome of "the Cartesian system" — 
 Subjectivity of Modern Philosophy — Defects of 
 Descartes' starting-point — The two-substance doc- 
 trine — Failure of Cartesianism to explain Percejition 
 — Locke's version of the two-substance doctrine — 
 Theory of Representative Perception — Ideas of 
 primary and secondary qualities and of substances — 
 Knowledge limited to our own ideas — Our consequent 
 ignorance of Reality — Locke's account of Self and of 
 God — His account of " sensitive knowledge " — Its 
 limits unduly extended — Logical result of Locke's 
 theory, ....... 
 
 LECTUEE II. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM OF DAVID HUME. 
 
 Berkeley's criticism of Locke's second substance — 
 Knowledge consists of ideas and iwtions — Reid's
 
 X Contents. 
 
 remarks on this addition to "the ideal system"- — 
 Two ways of developing Berkeley's philosophy — His 
 hints of a rational idealism historically without 
 influence — Hume's reduction of Locke and Berkeley 
 to consistency — Perceptions divisible into impres- 
 sions and ideas — Inference to a real cause of impres- 
 sions unwarrantable — Every idea derived from some 
 corresponding impression — Berkeley's (and Locke's) 
 view of the arbitrary nature of natural connection 
 stereotyped by Hume — Though conjoined, our par- 
 ticular perceptions remain entirely "loose " — Hume's 
 account of space and time inconsistent with his 
 sensational atomism — His further explanation of the 
 illusion of causal connection, the illusion of a per- 
 manent world, the illusion of personal identity — His 
 covert reintroduction of the Ego — His admissions 
 in the Appendix — Necessity for a reconsideration of 
 the two principles there laid down — Hume's real sig- 
 nificance — Current misconceptions of his position, . 33 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 THOMAS REID : SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 Reid answers Hume by attacking his presuppositions — 
 Fresh analysis of Perception undertaken by Reid and 
 Kant — Reid's account of Sensation and Perception in 
 the ' Inquiry ' — Perception involves " natural judg- 
 ments " — Sensations as suggesting " signs " — Impos- 
 sibility of deriving Space from feelings — Reid's error 
 in admitting a separate knowledge of sensational signs 
 — Reid's agreement with Kant (1) in vindicating 
 Space as a percept impossible of derivation from sense ; 
 and (2) in making Judgment the unit of knowledge 
 — Mutual implication of " natural judgments " — The 
 meaning and limits of explanation, . . .72
 
 Contents. xi 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 REID AND KANT. 
 
 Misconceptions due to the unfortunate nomenclature 
 adopted by Scottish philosophers — Comparison of 
 Reid and Kant as to the 'proof which they offer of 
 their " principles " — The transcendental deduction — 
 Reid's defects here — The proof from the structure of 
 language — General estimate of Reid's work — Kant's 
 system as a whole— His conclusions depend on his 
 previous admissions to Hume — Necessary connection, 
 not being derivable from sense, must have a subjec- 
 tive source — Consequences of the consistent develop- 
 ment of this view — Kant's unfaithfulness to his own 
 principles — Statement of his conclusions — Useless in- 
 vention of subjective machinery — The Categories al- 
 ready in things — The proper attitude towards Exper- 
 ientialism — Comparison of Kant with Reid in this 
 respect, . . . . . .106 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE : KANT AND 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 The Kantian theory leaves us ignorant of reality — The 
 doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge as stated by 
 Kant and Hamilton — Different lines of thought in the 
 Relativistic argument — Argument from the numeri- 
 cal paucity and peculiar character of our avenues of 
 knowledge — The argument rests on an unwarrantable 
 isolation of the senses — Human reason as a peculiar 
 psychical organisation — Abstract character of the doubt 
 thus suggested — Argument from the relation essen- 
 tially involved in all knowledge — This view refutes
 
 xii Co7itents. 
 
 itself — Dependence of the doctrine on a false meta- 
 physic of substance and quality — The logic of abstract 
 identity — True use of the terms phenomenon and 
 noumenon — • " The Unknown and Unknowable " — 
 Reason and Faith — Departure of Hamilton and Han- 
 sel from the catholic doctrine of Scottish Philosophy, 146 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 THK POSSIBILITY OF PHILOSOPHY AS SYSTEM: SCOT- 
 TISH PHILOSOPHY AND HEGEL. 
 
 Is an absolute or completed system possible ? — Hamilton's 
 treatment of a similar question — His misconception 
 of Hegel — General estimate of Hamilton — Prejudice 
 against system to be avoided — The idea of system in 
 Kant and Hegel — The Dialectic Method — True scope 
 of Absolute Idealism — -Misconceptions due to Hegel's 
 mode of statement — The abstract universal no more 
 real than the abstract particular — The Real as indivi- 
 dual, and consequently inexhaustible — Unknown but 
 not Unknowable — Knowledge and Faith — The com- 
 pleted system must remain for us an ideal, but an 
 ideal in which we cannot but believe — The Natural 
 Dualism of Scottish Philosophy not inconsistent with 
 Absolute Idealism — Faults of German Idealism which 
 might have been avoided by a national metaphysic, . 184
 
 SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 LECTUEE I. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS : 
 DESCARTES AND LOCKE. 
 
 For the inauguration of a philosophical Lec- 
 tureship — the first of its kind in a Scottish Uni- 
 versity — no subject appeared, for various reasons, 
 more appropriate than a critical review of Scot- 
 tish philosophy. Other grounds than the obvious 
 one of national patriotism were present to my 
 mind in choosing this subject ; for at the first 
 blush there is a savour of superfluity in discours- 
 ing on Scottish philosophy to a Scottish audience. 
 This, however, is perhaps hardly so much the case 
 as might be supposed. The thread of national 
 tradition, it is tolerably well known, has been 
 A
 
 2 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 Imt loosely held of late by many of our best 
 Scottish students of philosophy. It will hardly 
 be denied that the philosophical productions of 
 the younger generation of our University men 
 are more strongly impressed with a German than 
 with a native stamp. Against these productions 
 we frequently hear the charge brought, that they 
 represent an exotic culture, which is destined to 
 pass like the fashion of a day. This new way 
 of ideas labours, it is said, under a mortal weak- 
 ness, in the cumbrous jargon in which its pro- 
 positions are enunciated ; and its representatives 
 are taunted with a slavish adherence to set 
 phrases and formula, and with a general inability 
 to interpret and apply them in an intelligent and 
 living way. Along with a certain amount of 
 exaggeration, there is an admixture of truth in 
 this account of the English and Scottish thinkers 
 who derive their impulse from the German ideal- 
 ists. In spite of their large following — a follow- 
 ing second only to that of Agnost ic Empiricism — 
 their doctrines have still a certain esoteric char- 
 acter. They appear to remain without influence 
 ' upon the opposing school, and with but a limited 
 influence upon the main course of English thought. 
 Though the Idealists are constantly discharging 
 their heavy artillery against the Empiricists and
 
 The Philosophical Presuppositions. 3 
 
 Agnostics, the matter does not seem, somehow, to 
 be brought to a vital issue ; the cannonade appears 
 to pass harmlessly over the enemy's head. Now, 
 as nothing can be clearer, superficially at least, 
 than the language in which Agnosticism lays 
 down its positions, it is natural for candid critics 
 to explain this lack of result, in part at all events, 
 by pointing to the defects of exposition on the 
 part of the Idealists. If this were the sole cause, 
 it would be presumptuous in me to hope for better 
 success than those who have gone before. But 
 there can be no doubt, I think, that the difficulty 
 which exists of coming to a common understand- 
 ing is aggravated by the too exclusive attention 
 which the idealistic school has been in the habit 
 of bestowing upon a single group of foreign 
 thinkers. I, for one, do not intend to deny that, of 
 all modern philosophers, Kant and Hegel are those 
 who deserve, and who at the same time demand, 
 most study. But to this exclusiveness of spirit 
 I think we may partly trace the isolation of 
 parties which is one mark of the philosophic 
 world at present. Some progress may be made, 
 accordingly, towards bringing the opposing armies 
 within fighting range of one another, if we turn 
 our attention nearer home. With this idea the 
 subject of these Lectures has been chosen.
 
 4 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 Modern Empiricism builds upon Hume, and 
 German philosophy claims to be, in the first 
 instance, an ansvjcr to Hume. But there was 
 another answer made to Hume — an answer made 
 seventeen years before Kant's, in Hume's own 
 country. Eeid's answer, thought out at Aber- 
 deen, and published in 1764, in the year of his 
 translation to Glasgow, is but vaguely referred 
 to in the histories of philosophy. The best of 
 these are German ; and for the Germans certainly 
 Eeid is not of decisive imjDortance. In cosmo- 
 politan influence, and, there is no injustice in 
 adding, in speculative genius, he will not bear 
 comparison for a moment with Kant. But that 
 by no means proves that he may not be, for us 
 in Scotland, a most valuable instrument in philo- 
 sophising — perhaps, after long listening to Ger- 
 man ways of putting things, as valuable an 
 instrument as we could find. I mean, therefore, 
 to try to seize the main drift of Eeid's contention 
 against Hume — a drift which seems frequently 
 misunderstood — and to compare this " answer " 
 with the answer of Kant and the amended answer 
 of German Idealism since Kant's time. We shall 
 thus see the mutual relations of the Scottish and 
 the German answers, and be able to discover 
 where the one is defective when judged by the
 
 The PJiilosophical Pres2ipposi^ions. 5 
 
 standard of the other. As no one has pretended 
 that Eeid is unintelligible, the placing of his 
 simjDle statement alongside of what people call 
 the crabbed statement of German philosophy, may 
 at least have the effect of elucidating the true 
 bearings of the latter. Perhaps we may find 
 even higher merits than this in Eeid's straight- 
 forward and plain - spoken attempt. Such an 
 undertaking, if carried out with any measure of 
 success, cannot but lead to advantageous results, 
 and must of necessity involve a treatment of some 
 of the fundamental questions of philosophical 
 debate. 
 
 For this purpose, it will be necessary to state, 
 in as summary fashion as may be, the philo- 
 sophical question which Eeid set himself to 
 answer, and the form in which he received it 
 from the hands of his predecessor. If we do 
 not see the problem, the solution offered will 
 necessarily be without meaning for us ; and if 
 we do not see it as Eeid saw it, we shall be 
 unable to appreciate Eeid's method of approach- 
 ing it. Eeid himself forces us to carry back our 
 historical review as far as Descartes. In the dedi- 
 cation and introductory sections of the ' Inquiry 
 into the Human Mind,' he speaks with as clear 
 a consciousness as Kant of the new departure he
 
 6 Scoitis/i Philosophy. 
 
 is making in philosophy, and the antagonism it 
 involves to all his predecessors. He passes in 
 review Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, 
 and Hume, exhibiting a very fair perception of 
 the historic continuity of their speculations. The 
 conclusion which he draws is, that " the system 
 of all these authors is the same, and leads to 
 scepticism." ^ Merging minor differences, he even 
 goes the length of calling this common system by 
 Descartes' name. "The system which is now 
 generally received with regard to the mind and 
 its operations, derives not only its spirit from 
 Descartes, but its fundamental principles ; and 
 after all the improvements made by Malebranche, 
 Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, may still be called 
 the Cartesian system." - The universal scepticism 
 to which this philosophy has step by step, slowly 
 but surely, led, is presumptive proof, he says 
 again, "that Descartes' system of the human 
 understanding, which I shall beg leave to call 
 the ideal system, and which, with some improve- 
 ments made by later writers, is now generally 
 received, hath some original defect ; that this 
 scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with 
 it ; and, therefore, that we must lay it open to the 
 foundation, and examine the materials, before we 
 
 1 Works, p. 103 (ed. Hamilton). « Hjjj^ p_ -204.
 
 The Philosophical Presuppositions. 7 
 
 can expect to raise any solid and useful fabric of 
 knowledge on this subject." ^ In the Dedication 
 he expresses the same thought in semi-Kantian 
 phraseology, when he says that all the pliilo- 
 sopliical systems with which he was acquainted 
 were built upon a certain " hypothesis " — a hypo- 
 thesis of which he could find no solid proof, and 
 which ]ie therefore felt at liberty to discard. This 
 hypothesis, which Eeid felt it to be his mission 
 to combat, has been already named. He gener- 
 ally speaks of it as " the ideal system," or " the 
 theory of ideas " — that is to say, as he explains 
 elsewhere, "the doctrine that all the objects of 
 our knowledge are ideas in our own minds." - 
 Let us now see in our own way, by reference 
 to history, the full scope and meaning of Eeid's 
 contention. 
 
 It is usual to say that modern, as compared 
 with ancient, philosophy has a predominatingly 
 subjective character. And, though exceptions 
 might be picked out on both sides, it is true that 
 the stress laid upon the individual and the in- 
 dividual's consciousness is much more marked 
 in modern than in ancient times. Whereas 
 ancient philosophy chiefly investigated the nature 
 of Being, modern philosophy has more and more 
 ^ Works, p. 103. - Ibid., p. 283.
 
 8 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 concentrated its attention upon the nature of 
 Knowing. The most typical modern philosophers 
 attack the former question only through the latter. 
 This difference of point of view is evident even in 
 the case of writers like Plato and Aristotle, whose 
 works consist mainly in the discussion of ideas or 
 conceptions. What is investigated is an objective 
 ideal content, — the relation of Ideas to one an- 
 other in an objective or cosmic system ; the re- 
 lation of the individual mind to this system, and 
 the manner of the realisation of these Ideas in the 
 individual consciousness, seemed to the ancients 
 of less interest or importance. They have no 
 definite answer to give to our modern ques- 
 tions, because, not separating man initially from 
 the objective system they are considering, they do 
 I not see our difficulties, and naturally take for 
 : granted that he is somehow related to, and par- 
 ; ticipant in, the universal reason. It is part both 
 of the strength and the weakness of modern 
 philosophy that it cannot satisfy itself so easily 
 here. 
 
 Modern philosophy may be said to open, in 
 Descartes, with a subjective note. This is true 
 even of the emphatic announcement which he 
 makes of his determination to cut himself adrift 
 from the world of received opinion and custom,
 
 The Philosopkical Pres2ippositions. 9 
 
 and to bring every belief before the bar of his 
 individual reason. It has been pointed out a 
 hundred times, how this is of the essence of the 
 modern, the Protestant, the rational spirit; and 
 it is not intended here to depreciate the import- 
 ance of the step which Descartes took. But it 
 is equally true that the individual, emptied in 
 this way of all content, rational or otherwise, 
 tends to become a mere atom or unqualified unit. 
 He is thrust into a self-centred and merely self- 
 dependent isolation from which it may become 
 difficult to deliver him. For if a being be con- 
 ceived as mcrchj self-dependent — with no neces- 
 sary relations liejond the relation to self — it is 
 not easy to establish the existence of those rela- 
 tions at a later stage. This is exemplified in the 
 further progress of Descartes' thought. The cele- 
 brated and much -praised starting-point of his 
 system is in reality a false, or at all events an 
 inadequate, foundation for philosophy ; for it ap- 
 parently affirms the independent existence of I 
 that which, when separated from the world, 
 cannot be otherwise regarded than as a mere 
 abstraction. " I exist ; " but, as Descartes him- 
 self says, " how often ? As often as I think. For 
 perhaps it w^ould even happen, if I should wholly 
 cease to think, that I should at the same time
 
 lo Sc'o/^is/i Philosophy. 
 
 altogether cease to be." ^ Thinking, then, is that 
 whereby I exist ; or, as Descartes expressed it, I 
 am a being whose essence consists in thinking. 
 But if this is so, it is necessary that the " I " 
 shouhl think something. As Kant afterwards 
 expressed it, the unity of tlie Ego is not an 
 abstract but a synthetic unity ; it is realised, or 
 is actual, only through a real or actual synthesis. 
 In other words, a thinking being can become 
 conscious of its existence and identity as a sub- 
 ject only by knowing objects — that is, a system of 
 facts of some kind with which it is set in relation. 
 Nor is it possible to defend Descartes by suggest- 
 ing that the Ego, without going beyond the circle 
 of its own individuality, may come to self-con- 
 sciousness by thinking its own thoughts, recog- 
 nised as different from one another, and in a sense 
 distinguishable from the thinking Ego. This is, 
 of course, the conception which lends colour to 
 the ordinary forms of subjective idealism. But 
 simply to place the whole system of facts within 
 the individual consciousness in this way, is no 
 solution of the real difficulty. Such an Ego, with 
 its internal duality of subject and object, is itself 
 " a little world," involving all the relations which, 
 it has just been insisted, are essential to self- 
 
 1 Second Meditation.
 
 T/ie Philosophical Presuppositions, i i 
 
 consciousness. It is not the bare unit which, 
 having no relation to others, has no relation to 
 self, and is therefore not a self at all. 
 
 As thinking, accordingly, in whatever form we 
 take it, implies this duality, it must be fallacious 
 to start as if one side of the antithesis could 
 enjoy an independent existence. In terms of his 
 own definition, already quoted, Descartes might 
 have sought, in an analysis of the nature of 
 thought, for some clue to the nature of the exist- 
 ence which he was entitled to attribute to the 
 Ego. But, resting satisfied instead with the 
 materialised conception of existence which is 
 most natural to the human mind, he proceeds 
 forthwith to define the Ego as a thinking sub-| 
 stance. The stress falling ultimately on thej 
 " substance," the implicative nature of thought, 
 which we have just been maintaining, is ignored, 
 and thought becomes no better than any other 
 quality of a thing, which belongs to the thing as 
 its private property. Thus the thinking being is( 
 supposed to be shut up — like Lucretius's atoms,' 
 strong in solid singleness — within the circle of his | 
 own modifications or states. 
 
 Perception, or the knowledge by the Ego of a 
 permanent world, is naturally the crux of a phil- 
 osophy starting thus. Descartes' account is the
 
 1 2 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 result of his premature plunge into ontology, 
 before the way was adequately prepared by a 
 theory of knowledge. Enumerating perception 
 as one species of thinking, he begins by treating 
 
 fit, not as percejition, but simply as the presence 
 of certain states of mind or mental modes. As he 
 says in the opening of the Third Meditation : 
 " The things which I perceive or imagine are 
 perhaps nothing at all apart from me ; but, in 
 any case, I am assured that those modes of 
 consciousness which I call perceptions and im- 
 aginations, in so far only as they are modes of 
 consciousness, exist in me." But beyond their 
 purely subjective or factual character as states of 
 consciousness, our perceptions possess, according 
 ■ to Descartes, a represe ntative character, as re- 
 ferred to objects beyond themselves — as images 
 and effects, indeed, of things existing outside the 
 thinking substance. It is only in this latter 
 aspect — as symbolic of sometliing beyond them- 
 selves — that they are ideas or knowledge, and that 
 truth or falsity belongs to them. Otherwise they 
 are merely internal facts, that come and go and 
 have no meaning.^ But if we start with mental 
 modes unreferred, this subsequent reference of 
 ideas to objects, is evidently an inference which 
 1 Cf. Bradley's Principles of Logic, Book I. chap. i.
 
 The Philosophical Prestippositions. 1 3 
 
 may or may not be false. Nor does Descartes 
 deny its j^roblematical character. But he defends 
 its truth, in the case of extension and its deriva- 
 tive notions, by reference to the truthfulness or 
 trustworthiness of God. God cannot be supposed I 
 to deceive us in the case of ideas which are 
 clearly and distinctly realised, lieid points out, 
 however, the weakness of this argument ; for, 
 according to Descartes' principles, " our senses 
 testify no more but that we have certain ideas, 
 and if we draw conclusions from this testunony, 
 which the premisses will not support, we de- 
 ceive ourselves." ^ If we had a clear conscious- 
 ness of extended substance as a permanent and 
 relatively independent existence, the whole posi- 
 tion would be changed ; but, as it is, our fallacy 
 lies at our own door. If we start with a seK- 
 contained subject, the time can never arrive when 
 such a being would have any justification for 
 referring its states beyond itself. Descartes, how- 
 ever, is here under the shadow of his own pre- 
 suppositions. The abstraction of the thinking 
 substance has its necessary counterpart in the 
 abstraction of the extended substance. These are 
 the two dead entities into which, as we may say, 
 Descartes broke up the living whole of know- 
 1 Works, p. 286.
 
 14 Scottish PhiiosopJiy. 
 
 ledge. Modern philosophy tlius starts with two 
 self-contained substances, each with its proper 
 ' quality. The knowledge which the one acquires 
 of the other is the result of the mec hanical action 
 of the other upon it. The ideas which represent 
 ".material things are produced by the action of 
 ^extended substance upon the thliikmg_ substance 
 [at the single point of location in the brain. 
 
 It w^ould be needless to emphasise the diffi- 
 culties which such a theory has to contend with. 
 It is sufficient to point to the history of the 
 Cartesian school for its immediate consequences. 
 Occasionalism, which is simply logical Cartesian- 
 ism, denies the possibility of any such interaction 
 between the two substances as Descartes had 
 admitted. Between mind and matter — tho ught 
 and extension — an impassable gulf is fixed ; the 
 miraculously exerted will of God forms the only 
 intermediary between the two worlds. Even in 
 Spmoza, where the two finite substances jDass into 
 two sides of the divine nature, the existence of 
 the two sides is empirically assumed, and their 
 parallelism is also matter of dogmatic assertion. 
 Malebran che, taking up the question from tlie 
 point of view of knowledge, goes even further 
 than Occasionalism. So far as the material world 
 is concerned, the sole object of knowledge for
 
 The P/iilosophical Prestippositions. i 5 
 
 Malebranclie is the ulca of extcnsiou with itsi 
 implications, or, as he calls it, iiitelli,!4ible exten-j 
 sion. Tliis, which is an ideal world, we know . 
 through our union with God, who illumines our 
 minds. The existence of a real extended world, 
 on the other hand — that is to say, Descartes' 
 second substance — is not known at all, but is 
 beHeyed by Malebranclie on grounds of super- 
 natural revelation. In other words, it is main- 
 tained that our clear and distinct ideas do not, as 
 Descartes had said, ground any inference to a 
 non-ideal archetype or cause. 
 
 In English philosophy we can trace on a larger 
 scale the evolution and self-refutation of th e two- 
 substance doctrine and the complementary theory 
 of Eepresentative Perception. To it, then, we 
 now turn. 
 
 It was Locke who made the terms and distinc- 
 tions of modern philosophy current coin in 
 England. Locke's philosophy is also peculiarly 
 interesting, because in it " the tlieor;y of ideas " 
 is seen just detaching itself, as it were, from the 
 groundwork of common-sense and ordinary belief. 
 Analysis has only begun to do its work, and as 
 yet we are but a single remove from the conscious- 
 ness of the ordinary man. The account given of 
 the human understanding' commends itself as
 
 1 6 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 eminently credible, and not even very new. Only 
 on looking closer do we see how far the first step 
 in analysis has in reality carried us, and to what 
 strange conclusions it has occasionally conducted 
 Locke. In the course of his theorising, as Eeid 
 truly remarks, " the author is led into some para- 
 doxes, although in general he is not fond of para- 
 doxes." ^ Let us look, then, with some care at 
 the main features of the system elaborated in 
 the Essay, 
 
 First, then, it may be noted that Locke took 
 for granted the independent existence, on the one 
 hand, of a system of material substances, which 
 we may call the material world ; and, on the other 
 hand, of a number of separate minds or substances 
 with the power of thinking. He also took for 
 granted the interaction of these substances, sup- 
 posing that, in perception, the material object 
 perceived communicates a knowledge of itself 
 to the perceiving mind by a species of impact, 
 or mechanical impression. " Bodies," he says, 
 " produce ideas in us . . . manifestly by im- 
 pulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies 
 operate in." ^ So much he found warrant for 
 alike in the common consciousness of mankind, 
 and in the philosophy with which he was 
 1 Works, p. 294. - Essay, ii. 8, 11,
 
 The Philosophical Presuppositions, i 7 
 
 acquainted, whether the Aristotelianism of the 
 schools or the new philosophy of Descartes. As 
 regarded the nature of mind or the thinking suh- 
 stance , he declined to commit himself on the 
 question of its material or immaterial nature ; but 
 he was explicit as to its characterlessness previous \ 
 to experience. Whether material or immaterial, ! 
 the mind may be compared to " white paper, void 
 of all characters, without any ideas." ^ On this 
 white paper or tabula rasa external things leave 
 their mark or impression, in the shape of what 
 Locke calls " ideas of sen sation." Or, adopting 
 another metaphor, Locke tells us that " the senses 
 at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet 
 empty cabinet." ^ " External and_internal sensa- 
 Jbions. are the only passages that I can find of 
 knowledge to the understanding. These alone, 
 as far as I can discover, are the windows by 
 which light is let into this dark room. For 
 methinks the understanding is not much unlike 
 a closet wholly shut from light, with only some 
 little opening left to let in external visible re- 
 semblances or ideas of things without." ^ Percep- 
 tion, he puts it again, is "the inlet of all knowledge 
 into our minds ; " or, more properly, " of all the 
 materials of it"* — the remaining operations of 
 
 1 Essay, ii. 1, 2. '- I. 2, 15. » jj ^^ j;^ 4 n 9^ 15, 
 B
 
 1 8 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the mind being merely to compare and variously 
 combine or separate the simple ideas thus pas- 
 sively received. " All that man can do is either 
 to unite them together, or to set them by one 
 another, or wholly separate them." ^ 
 
 Secondly, as implied in some of the passages 
 just quoted, Locke took for granted, in regard to 
 the knowledge which the mind has of the world, 
 the theory of Eepresentative Perception which he 
 found current in the schools. " It is evident," he 
 says, " the mind knows not things immediately, 
 but only by the intervention of the kleas it has 
 of them." ^ All our knowledge, he repeats, con- 
 sists " in the view the mind has of its own ideas." ^ 
 
 r " Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reason- 
 ings, hath no other immediate object but its own 
 ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it 
 is evident that our knowledge is only conversant 
 about them." * This is what Eeid means by " the 
 
 L- common theory of ideas," or " the ideal system." 
 To each idea there corresponds some modification 
 of the material thing of which it is an idea ; but 
 the latter — -the modification or property of the 
 thing — is not itself known to us. We know only 
 the idea which it causes. The name " idea " being 
 
 1 Essay, ii. 12, 1. - IV. 4, 3. 
 
 3 IV. 2, 1. " IV. 1, 1.
 
 TJie Philosophical Prcs7ipposil ions. 19 
 
 thus restricted to " whatsoever the mmd perceives 
 in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, 
 thought, or understanding," ^ its correlative or 
 cause in the material substance receives from 
 Locke the name " eq uality, " A quality in an i 
 object is "the power to produce any idea in my| 
 mind." " Tims," he adds, " a snowball having the 1 
 power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, 
 and round, the powers to produce those ideas in 
 us, as they are in the snowball, I call ' qualities ' ; 
 and as they are sensations or perceptions in our 
 understandings, I call them ' ideas.' " ^ Strictly 
 speaking, however, we have no knowledge of the 
 qualities as qualities ; we merely infer some cor- 
 relative of our ideas. For ideas are a kind of 
 tertium quid — an intermediary between the mind 
 and things, which cuts us off from a knowledge 
 of the actual things. They are like images pro- 
 jected upon a mental screen ; and the screen is 
 the limit of our vision, immediate knowledge 
 being what the mind " perceives in itself." We 
 cannot see, therefore, what is behind the screen 
 and throws the image. Hence, Locke immedi- 
 ately apologises for his loose way of speaking, 
 and adds that, if he sometimes speaks of ideas 
 as in the things themselves, he " would be under- 
 ' Essay, ii. 8, 8. - 11. 8, 8.
 
 20 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 stood to mean those qualities in the ol)jects which 
 produce them in us." ^ 
 
 Some of our ideas are " representati ve," in the 
 strict sense of the word ; that is to say, " the ideas 
 or perceptions in our minds" exactly resemble the 
 " modifications of matter in the bodies that cause 
 such perceptions in us." These Locke calls 
 primary qualitie s ; and he enumerates as such 
 solidity, extension, figure, and mobility, which 
 may be reduced to solidity or impenetrability and 
 extension with its derivative qualities. In the 
 case of these, the idea is simply the duplicate — 
 the accurate image — of the quality. The "pat- 
 terns " of the primary qualities " do really exist 
 in the bodies themselves." ^ But in the case of 
 such ideas as those of colour, taste, sound, &c., 
 only an uninstructed mind can suppose that there 
 is anything like our ideas existing in the bodies 
 themselves. The qualities of body which produce 
 ideas of this sort Locke calls secondary qualities. 
 ! He points out that they are in truth " nothing in 
 : the objects themselves but powers to produce 
 ' various sensations in us " by different modifica- 
 tions of their primary qualities — that is, by a 
 certain " bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their 
 insensible parts." ^ To take an illustration : " A 
 1 Essay, ii. 8, 8. - II. 8, 15. =^ II. 8, 10.
 
 The Philosophical Presuppositions. 2 i 
 
 piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to pro- 
 duce in us the idea of a round or square figure ; 
 and, by being removed from one place to another, 
 the idea of motion. Tliis idea of motion repre- 
 sents it as it really is in the manna moving; a 
 circle or square are the same, whether in idea or 
 existence, in the mind or in the manna ; and thus 
 both motion and figure are really in the manna, 
 whether we take notice of them or no : this every- 
 body is ready to agree to. Besides, manna, by 
 the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, 
 has a power to produce the sensations of sickness, 
 and sometimes of acute pains or gripings, in us. 
 That these ideas of sickness and pain are not in 
 the manna, but effects of its operations upon us, 
 and are nowhere when we feel them not; this 
 also every one readily agrees to," In exactly the 
 same way, sweetness and whiteness "are not 
 really in manna ; " they are " but the effects of 
 the operations of manna by the motion, size, and 
 figure of its particles on the eyes and palate." ^ 
 In short, as regards the secondary qualities : 
 "Take away the sensation of them; let not the 
 eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds ; 
 let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell ; and 
 all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are 
 
 1 Essay, ii. 8, 18.
 
 2 2 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are 
 reduced to their causes — i.e., bulk, figure, and 
 motion of parts." ^ 
 
 But if our ideas are to give a full representation 
 or account of the material world, they must em- 
 brace not only ideas of the primary and secondary 
 qualities, but also ideas of the siibstances to which 
 these qualities belong. Locke has assumed the 
 existence of material substances, and therefore he 
 recognises the reasonableness of this demand. 
 But the idea of s ubstance costs him much trouble. 
 " We have no such clear idea at all," ^ he says ; 
 but the mind, taking notice that a certain number 
 of its ideas go constantly together, falls into the 
 habit of calling the combination by a single name. 
 " Not imagining how these simple ideas can sub- 
 sist of themselves, we accustom ourselves to sup- 
 pose some substratum wherein they do subsist, 
 and from which they do result ; which, therefore, 
 we call substa nce." ^ The word signifies no more 
 than this " supposition of we know not what sup- 
 . port of such qualities which are capable of pro- 
 jducing simple ideas in us." Locke takes the 
 examples of "a man, horse, gold, water," and 
 appeals to every one's own experience whether 
 he has any other clear idea of these substances 
 1 Essay, ii. 8, 17. - I. 4, 18. » ii_ 03, 1.
 
 The Philosophical Prcs2ippositions. 23 
 
 farther than of certain simple ideas coexisting 
 together. " Only," he adds, " we must take notice 
 that our complex ideas of substances, besides all 
 these simple ideas they are made up of, have 
 always the confused idea of something to which 
 they belong, and in which they subsist; and 
 therefore, when we speak of any sort of sub- 
 stance, we say it is a thing having such or such 
 qualities." -^ To sum up the difficulty, the idea 
 of subst ance is, according to his own explicit 
 statement, one " which we neither have nor can 
 have by sensation or reflection ; " ^ yet external 
 and internal sensation, as we have seen, are main- 
 tained by Locke to be "the only passages that 
 [he] can find of knowledge to the understanding." 
 But in spite of this embarrassing result as regards 
 the idea of substance, Locke never wavered for 
 an instant in his belief that substances exist. 
 When taken to task by the Bishop of Worcester 
 because, by his new way of ideas, lie had " almost 
 discarded substance out of the reasonable part of 
 the world," he was able to answer complacently 
 that "the being of things in the world depends 
 not on our ideas," ^ Locke stood too firmly rooted 
 in the everyday practical consciousness of man- 
 kind to be disturbed in his assumptions by the 
 1 Essay, ii. 23, 3. - I. 4, 18. ^ First Letter.
 
 24 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 negative results to which his own theory seemed 
 to be leading. 
 
 These results come most clearly to light in the 
 Fourth Book of the Essay, which deals specifically 
 with ' Knowledge,' As Eeid shrewdly remarks, " a 
 great part of that Book is an evident refutation of 
 the principles laid down in the beginning of it." ^ 
 For kn owledg e being, according to Locke, only 
 " conversant about our ideas " — being defined, in 
 fact, as the perception of the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of any of our ideas — it follows that we 
 have no knowledge whatever of reality or exist- 
 ence, which is something different from ideas. 
 But Locke breaks through his own definition at 
 three points. First, in reference to his own sub- 
 gt antia l existence. Of this he says, following 
 Descartes almost verbally, that he has an mtuitive 
 knowledge. " We perceive it so plainly and so 
 certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of 
 any proof. ... In every act of sensation, 
 reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to our- 
 selves of our own being ; and in this matter come 
 not short of the highest degree of certainty."^ 
 Secondly, in regard to the existence of God. 
 Knowledge of this may be reached, according 
 to Locke, by a process of a posteriori reasoning, 
 1 Works, p. 432. - Essay, iv. 9, 3.
 
 The Philosophical Prcs2ipposit ions. 25 
 
 starting from the intuitively known fact of luy 
 own existence. This is demonstrative knowledge ; 
 and if the chain of proof is cogent, it stands on 
 the same level of certainty as intuitive know- 
 ledge.^ It does not belong to our purpose to 
 dwell further at present on these instances of 
 knowledge of existence admitted by Locke. It 
 is enough, in the meantime, to point out that the 
 knowledge of Self thus assumed is at variance 
 with the principles of his own philosophy. For 
 Self is not maintained to be an idea either of 
 sensation or reflection ; it is a consciousiiess which 
 accompanies " every act of sensation, reasoning, 
 or thinking." The admission of such an element 
 in knowledge points, therefore, to the inadequacy 
 of any theory which makes knowledge consist 
 entirely of simple or particular ideas variously 
 combined. The third point at which Locke 
 breaks down his definition of knowledge is in 
 what he calls sensitive knowledge. " The know- 
 ledge of the existence of any other thing [beyond 
 Self and God] we can have," says Locke, " only 
 by sensation." - Now this is of course true, if it 
 merely means that we can become aware of the 
 existence of external things only through the 
 process of perception. But it hardly appears 
 1 See Essay, iv. 10, 1-6. 2 IV. 11, 1.
 
 26 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 how this knowledge of existence is contained in 
 Locke's ideas of sensation. Such ideas are simple ; 
 they are themselves, and in consistency they 
 testify only to their own existence. Granted 
 that I know my own ideas of sensation, what 
 advance have I made, on Locke's principles, to 
 a knowledge of the real objects — their external 
 causes and correlates ? Locke himself admits 
 that the two cases stand upon a different platform 
 of certainty. The knowledge of the idea is in- 
 tuitive knowledge ; " but whether there be any- 
 thing more than barely that idea in our minds, 
 whether we can thence certainly infer the exist- 
 ence of anything without us which corresponds 
 to that idea, is that whereof some men think 
 there may be a question made." ^ But he gets 
 over the doubt by a reference to the difference 
 between ideas of sensation and the ideas of 
 memory or of dreams. He admits, however, 
 that, though " going beyond bare probability," sen- 
 sation is not to be placed on the same level of 
 certainty as the kinds of knowledge already men- 
 tioned (intuitive and demonstrative). Sensitive 
 knowledge " passes under the name of know- 
 ledge ; " ^ it is " an assurance that deserves the 
 name of knowledge ; " ^ and, as Locke character- 
 1 Essaj-, iv. 2, 14. ^ IV. 2, 14. '^ IV. 11, 3.
 
 The Philosophical PrcsiLpposit ions. 27 
 
 istically observes, it is " fully to expect demon- 
 stration in everything." ^ " This certainty is 
 as great as our happiness or misery, beyond 
 which we have no concernment to know or 
 to be."--^ 
 
 In any case, this sensitive knowledge could 
 only be, as Locke puts it, a knowledge " that 
 something doth exist at that time without us 
 which causes that idea in us " ^ — that is to say, 
 an indefinite reference to some cause, not a definite 
 reference to an individually determinate thing. 
 But it does not appear how even this amount of 
 knowledge is contained in Locke's simple ideas. 
 If they do carry with them a causal reference to 
 an independently existing substance, that is a 
 fact which ought to be most carefully noted in 
 our analysis of perception ; for it at once disposes 
 of the supposition that knowledge is built up 
 entirely of independent sensational units called 
 simple idea s, Locke himself did not follow out 
 this consequence, mainly because he was so sure 
 of the two-substance doctrine which he assumes 
 throughout, partly also because he imported the 
 doctrine unwarrantably into the phraseology he 
 employs. Thus, in one of the passages already 
 referred to, he says : " There can be nothing 
 1 Essay, iv. 11. 10. - IV. 2, 14. s IV. 11, 2.
 
 28 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 more certain than that the idea we receive from cm 
 external ohjeet is in our minds ; this is iiituitive 
 knowledge." ^ If this were true, all that he goes 
 on to say abovit the inferior certainty of sensitive 
 knowledge would be manifestly out of place. 
 But, by his own admissions, it is only the exist- 
 ence of the idea in the mind, as a mental fact, 
 that can be designated intuitive knowledge ; and 
 he has no right, therefore, to qualify the idea at 
 this stage as an " idea which we receive from an 
 external object." 
 
 Besides placing sensitive knowledge on a lower 
 level as regards certainty, and admitting it, so to 
 speak, only by courtesy to the title of knowledge, 
 Locke proceeds to limit the range of this know- 
 ledge. It "extends as far as the present testi- 
 mony of our senses, employed about particular 
 [objects that do then affect them, and no farther.- 
 The present existence of certain particular ideas 
 of sensation, therefore, or, on the testimony of 
 memory, the past existence of such sensations at 
 such and such a moment: that is alL^ Tceum 
 hcibita, et noris qiiain sit tihi curta suppellex. 
 
 1 Essay, iv. 2, 14. = JV. 11, 9. 
 
 3 " Concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as sev- 
 eral other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence 
 of faith. . . . We have ground from revelation, and several 
 other reasons, to believe with assurance that there are such
 
 The Philosophical Prestipposilioits. 29 
 
 Locke's cloak is becoming very scanty — hardly 
 sufficient for everyday needs. But there is no 
 possibility of mistaking Locke on this point. 
 He repeatedly insists that propositions about 
 nature, if general, cannot be certain, and if 
 certain, cannot be general. General proposi- 
 tions of whose truth we can be certain have to 
 do exclusively witli abstractions of our own 
 making, as in the sciences of mathematics and 
 morals. The ideas being there framed and defined 
 by ourselves, we can of course draw consequences 
 from them that will be universally true. But it 
 is not so in matters of fact, where the collections 
 of ideas we receive are not of our own framing, 
 and where consequently, being ignorant of the 
 constitution of the things which the ideas repre- 
 sent, and on which they depend, we do not know 
 the actual connections of ideas or qualities. He 
 suspects, accordingly, that " natural philosophy is 
 not capable of being made a science. . . . Ex- 
 periments and historical observations we may 
 have, from which we may draw advantages of 
 ease and health, and thereby increase our stock 
 of conveniences for this life ; but beyond this, I 
 
 creatures ; but, our senses not being able to discover them, we 
 want the means of knowing their particular existences." — 
 Essay, iv. 11, 12.
 
 jO Sco///s// Philosophy. 
 
 fear our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, 
 as I guess, able to advance." ^ " All general 
 knowledge," he repeats and emphasises, " lies 
 only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in 
 the contemplation of our own abstract ideas." ^ 
 Having reached this conclusion, Locke proceeds 
 to remark in his pithy English that " our know- 
 ledge being short, we want something else."^ 
 This " something else " he calls Judgment, which 
 is defined as " the presuming things to be so 
 without perceiving it." It may be, as Locke is 
 fond of reminding us, that this certainty is suffi- 
 cient for our happiness or misery, and for the 
 business we have to do here ; but it is evident, 
 at least, that by far the greater part of what is 
 ordinarily spoken of as human knowledge is 
 enveloped, according to Locke's theory and his 
 own express statement, in " the twilight of pro- 
 bability." ^ 
 
 It only requires to be noted further, that in the 
 foregoing account Locke allows himself more 
 licence than he is fairly entitled to. In speaking 
 of the present testimony of our senses, he ex- 
 tends this testimony so as to make it cover the 
 
 1 Essay, iv. 12, 10. 
 
 2 IV. 6, 13. See also iv. 6, 16 ; iv. 9, 1 ; iv. 12, 7, &c. 
 
 3 IV. U, 1. ■* IV. 14, 2.
 
 The Philosophical Presuppositions. 3 1 
 
 perception of " such collections of simple ideas I 
 as we have observed by our senses to be united | 
 together" — such a collection, for example, as is) 
 wont to be called " man." But if simple ideas 
 or detached sensational atoms are the sole mate- 
 rials of knowledge, each of these must be im- 
 pressed upon us in its own moment of time ; and 
 the testimony of the senses to an existent reality 
 holds only for that moment. When we have 
 passed on to the second idea of the collec- 
 tion, the testimony of the senses holds for the 
 second but no longer for the first. We are never, 
 therefore, in the possession of such testimony to 
 the existence of a real object combining in itself 
 the qualities represented by such a series of ideas 
 as is implied in the collections instanced. 
 
 The logical consummation of Locke's theory 
 thus leaves him nothing but the unrelated atoms j 
 of sense, the simple or particular ideas with which | 
 he set out as the materials of all our knowledge. { 
 But this consummation is evaded by Locke him- 
 self, partly through open departure from his own 
 principles, and partly through the looseness of his 
 language. The Ego we have seen him simply 
 transfer from Descartes' system to his own. 
 Other importations are covered by the ambiguity 
 of his terminology, more particularly by the liberal
 
 32 Scottish PhilosopJiy. 
 
 scope assigned to the term sensation. It is his 
 usual practice, for example, to interchange " sen- 
 sation " and " perception " at will ; to treat space 
 as a simple idea — i.e., as a sensation of touch or 
 of sight ; and to speak vaguely of " power " or 
 cause as a simple idea received both from sensa- 
 tion and reflection. It was great part of the 
 work of the philosophers and psychologists who 
 followed Locke to define these terms more exactly. 
 Just in proportion as they did so, the Lockian 
 theory became more consistent in their hands, 
 but at the same time very much less plausible 
 than it had been in Locke's. It becomes our 
 duty to describe shortly the process by which 
 Locke's theory passed — in virtue of elements 
 initially omitted — by a perfectly logical and in- 
 evitable development, into the thorough - going 
 Scepticism which roused Eeid, like Kant, from his 
 dogmatic slumber.
 
 LECTURE IL 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM OF DAVID HUME. 
 
 We saw in the first lecture how Eeid recognised 
 Hume's' scepticism as ^he necessary issue of prin- 
 ciples inherent in the modern or Cartesian philo- 
 sophy, and, more particularly, as the outcome of 
 the avowed principles of Locke. This led us to 
 review the philosophical presuppositions, as they 
 exist in the systems of Descartes and Locke. "We 
 have now to consider the final form of "the 
 theory of ideas" in Hume. A few words on 
 Berkeley will suffice by way of transition and in- 
 troduction ; for we have only to do with Berke- 
 ley here so far as he puts his hand to the lever 
 in the work of disintegration referred to at the 
 close of last lecture. 
 
 Berkeley's first task was to expose the baseless, 
 useless, and self-contradictory character of the un- 
 c
 
 34 ScottisJi Philosophy. 
 
 perceived absolute matter of Locke and other 
 philosopliers. And here, as Keid says, Berkeley's 
 system follows from Locke's by very obvious con- 
 sequence; "in the new philosophy, the pillars by 
 which the existence of a material world was sup- 
 ported were so feeble that it did not require the 
 force of a Samson to bring them down." ^ Locke's 
 assumption of a resemblance between the prirn- 
 ary qualities and the ideas which they cause in 
 us was, even on his own principles, so perfectly 
 arbitrary, that the knowledge we have of external 
 things had dwindled down under his hands, as 
 
 E"ve have seen, to the momentary consciousness of 
 some exterior cause " — " something at that time 
 eally existing without us which doth affect our 
 enses." But if this is so, what warrant have we 
 for supposing that this cause is material sub- 
 stance ? We mean by that phrase either — as 
 ordinary men — the so-called primary qualities , 
 i.e., a collection of certain ideas ; or we mean — as 
 philosophers — the substance supp o rting these 
 qualities, i.e., something we know not what. In 
 the first case, it is absurd to speak of the ideas 
 which constitute matter as existing otherwise 
 than in a mind ; in the second case, we have need 
 to consider what we mean by causality, before we 
 
 1 Works, p. 282.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hume. 35 
 
 attribute it to an abstraction of our own making. 
 
 On Lockian princij^les, Berkeley thus resolves 
 
 matter into simple ideas jj/ms the notion of some 
 
 cause. The ideas or sensations, strictly mind- 
 
 ■ , 11 11 
 
 dependent in their nature, are variously clustered 
 
 together, and, as such clusters, constitute " things. " 
 And as they, moreover, succeed or introduce one 
 another in an orderly and coherent way, we grad- 
 ually learn to recognise constant conjunctions, to 
 which we give the name of laws of nature. 
 
 How closely this reproduces Locke on the one 
 hand, and how nearly it anticipates Hume on the 
 other, hardly needs to be pointed out. In fact, 
 Berkeley hardly professes to reach his position 
 by a process of argument at all. He simply states 
 it. " Some truths there are so near and obvious 
 to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes 
 to see them." Eeid points out that the whole 
 theory is virtually contained in the opening 
 sentences of the ' Principles of Human Know- 
 ledge': "It is evident to any one who takes a 
 survey of the objects of human knowledge, that 
 they are either ideas actually imprinted on the' 
 senses ; or else such as are perceived by attending . 
 to the passions and operations of the mind " I 
 [Locke's simple ideas of sensation and reflection — 
 the materials of all our knowledge] ; or lastly.
 
 36 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 \ ideas formed by help of memory and imagination 
 — either compounding, dividing, or barely repre- 
 .senting those originally perceived in the aforesaid 
 ways " [Locke's complex ideas, combinations of 
 the simple ones by the same mechanical methods 
 here enumerated]. Eeid remarks that, if the 
 identification of objects of knowledge with ideas 
 be admitted, " Berkeley's system is impreg- 
 nable." ^ But it was precisely the issue raised 
 by Eeid, in reference to the Cartesian system 
 
 * generally, that perception is in no case to be 
 
 ! identified with relationless impressions, or any 
 combination of them, but involves other elements 
 or principles which alone give it objective sig- 
 
 , nificance. 
 
 In the remainder of his system, Berkeley 
 follows Locke in his assumptions rather than in 
 the strict logic of his theory. He reaches his 
 construction of the universe really through un- 
 faithfulness to their common principles. At one 
 stage in his career, it is true, in the early days of 
 the Commonplace Book, Berkeley seemed inclined 
 to follow out his analysis to the same conclusions 
 
 ; as Hume. " The very existence of ideas consti- 
 
 j tutes the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. 
 
 I Take away perception, and you take away mind. 
 
 1 Works, p. 283.
 
 Philosophical Sccpticisvi of Hume. 3 7 
 
 Put the perceptions, and you put the mind." ^ 
 But although ideas (according to the definition 
 common to himself and Locke) exhaust the objects 
 of knowledge, he everywhere adds to them, in his 
 published works, what he calls a notion of self. 
 And from this he passes, by analogy and by the 
 help of the principle of causality, to other spirits, 
 and, in particular, to tlie Divine Spirit, who is 
 the sustaining and co-ordinating principle of the 
 Berkeleian universe. Berkeley has the merit, as 
 compared with Locke, of making this additional 
 postulate consciously, and putting it in the fore- 
 front of his system. " Thing or Being," he says, 
 " is the most general name of all ; it comprehends 
 under it two kinds entirely distinct and hetero- 
 geneous, and which have nothing common but the 
 name — viz.. Spirits and Ideas. The former are 
 active, indivisible substances ; the latter are inert, 
 fleeting, or dependent beings, which subsist not 
 by themselves, but are supported by or exist in 
 minds or spiritual substances. . . . We may 
 not, I think, strictly be said to have an iclut of an 
 active being or of an action, although we may be 
 said to have a notion of them. I have some know- 
 ledge or notion of my mind and its acts about 
 ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is 
 ^ Life and Letters of Berkeley (Clarendon Press), p. 438.
 
 38 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 meant by these words. ... It is also to be 
 remarked that, all relations including an act of 
 the mindj, we cannot so properly be said to have 
 an idea^ but rather a notion of the relations and 
 habitudes between things." ^ And elsewhere he 
 combats " the opinion that spirits are to be known 
 after the manner of an idea or sensation" as 
 having given rise to many absurd and heterodox 
 tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of 
 the soul." "^ He himself holds it to be " evidently 
 absurd" that the "substance which supports or 
 perceives idea^ should itself be an idea or like an 
 idea " ; and " to expect that by any multiplication 
 or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled 
 to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as 
 absurd as if we should hope to see a sound." ^ 
 Eeid at once put his finger on the important 
 deviation of principle which these passages con- 
 tain. " This account of ideas," he says, " is very 
 different from that which Locke has given. In 
 his system we have no knowledge where we have 
 no ideas. Every thought must have an idea for its 
 immediate object. In Berkeley's, the most import- 
 ant objects are known without ideas." Whether, 
 continues Eeid, he " foresaw the consequences that 
 
 1 Principles, sections 89 and 142. - Section 137. 
 
 ^ Sections 135 and 142.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of H time. 39 
 
 may l)e drawn from the system of ideas, taken in 
 its full extent, and which were afterwards drawn 
 by Mr Hume, I cannot pretend to say. . . . 
 However this may be, if there be so many things 
 that may be apprehended and known without 
 ideas, this very naturally suggests a scruple with 
 regard to those that are left ; for it may be said, 
 If we can apprehend and reason about the worJc[ 
 of spirits, without ideas, is it not possible that we 
 may apprehend and reason about a material world, 
 without ideas ? " ^ In another passage, he ex- 
 pressly attributes Berkeley's action here to " his 
 great aversion to Scepticism." " In order to 
 avoid Scepticism, he fairly starts out of the 
 Cartesian system, without giving any reason 
 why he did so in this instance, and in no 
 other." ^ Whether unexceptionably expressed or 
 not, the criticism urged here by Eeid is a true 
 one, and goes to the heart of the matter. If 
 the existence of ideas involves, in one aspect, a 
 permanent combining principle called Selt which 
 is not an idea or impression, may not a similar 
 principle or similar principles be involved in that 
 coherence of the ideas which constitutes the 
 material universe ? Does not the perception of 
 ideas, on Berkeley's own theory, depend on the 
 1 AVorks, p. 288. - Ibid., p. 207.
 
 40 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 unacknowledged presence of such an element ? 
 Evidently it does ; Berkeley's theory of divine 
 causation and intelligible connection is entirely 
 dependent on such a principle. Quite as much 
 as Locke, he takes the ideas of sense, not as 
 mere ideas, but as ideas referred to each other 
 and to some cause — though the cause assigned 
 by the two philosophers is different. It is not 
 ideas ^er se, but ideas as interpretable, as sig- 
 nificant of a permanent order, that supply him 
 with the foundation for his system. 
 
 Indeed, if Berkeley had set himself to an 
 analysis of the elements wliich his constructive 
 theory involved over and above sense-ideas, and 
 not derivable from them, there might perhaps 
 have been no Hume ; for we should have had, at 
 one step, a rational instead of a sensational ideal- 
 ism. "What is this explicit addition of intellectual^ 
 nations to the data of sense but, in germ, Eeid's 
 principles of common-sense, or Kant's system of 
 the categories ? If Berkeley had asked himself 
 what extent he was prepared to give to his after- 
 thought that relations, as involving a mental 
 activity, are therefore to be distinguished from 
 the ideas or data of mere sense, and if he had at 
 the same time continued his analysis of such 
 supposed data into their primitive elements, he
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hmne. 4 1 
 
 might have found that the relations tended to 
 swallow up the ideas, to such an extent that it 
 ultimately hecame impossihle to point to anything 
 at all that could be considered as a mere "given," 
 as a relationless or atomic datum. For spatial 
 distance and temporal succession are both rela- 
 tions; and can we have ;iu idea not so qualified ? 
 So is also that relation of sicn and thiiii! siiinitied, 
 which constitutes for Berkeley physical causation, 
 and which is the basis of the interpretability of 
 the universe. If a sensation is not referred to 
 something, what can be said of it ? In what does 
 its existence consist ? Berkeley would have been 
 ready to admit that it must at least be referred to 
 me as mine — that this relation, therefore, at the 
 lowest is necessary to render it knowable. But 
 the unknowableness of sense-atoms or mere data, 
 except as somehow related to one another, had 
 not forced itself upon him at the date of his 
 epoch-making works. He says unhesitatingly in 
 the ' Principles ' ^ that " relations are distinct from 
 the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter 
 may be perceived by us without perceiving the 
 former." He is thinking, of course, of the un- 
 doubted truth that we may first consider an 
 object by itself, as we say, and then add to this 
 1 Section 89.
 
 42 Scottish P kilos op /ly. 
 
 survey a consideration of its relations to other 
 things — to its environment, for example, or the 
 past of which it is the outcome. But is the thing, 
 as originally considered, absolutely without rela- 
 tions ? On the contrary, it is simply impossible 
 to consider anything in sheer isolation from its 
 temporal and spatial environment ; every quality 
 which we recognise involves relations to other 
 things, and it is as a complex of such relations 
 that the " thing " in question receives its name 
 and place in the universe. Berkeley had not 
 carried his analysis as far as this when he wrote 
 the ' Principles ' ; but in ' Siris ' we find that he 
 has left his early positions far behind him. " We 
 know a thing," he says, " when we understand it ; 
 and we understand it when we can interpret or 
 tell what it signifies. Strictly, the Sense knows 
 nothing." ^ And, in words that almost recall 
 Kant's often-quoted statement about the mutual 
 dependence of sense and understanding, he says 
 again : " As understanding perceiveth not, so 
 sense knoweth not ; and although the mind may 
 use sense and fancy, as means whereby to arrive 
 at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as 
 sensitive, knoweth nothing." - 
 
 But ' Siris ' was without influence upon English 
 1 Section 253. ^ Section 305.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hume. 43 
 
 thought — at all events till the present generation, 
 which has reaped the fruit of Professor Eraser's 
 loving care. It is enough for us here, therefore, to 
 recognise the fact that Berkeley's philosophy may 
 be developed in two directions. Berkeley seems, 
 as we have seen, to have recognised the inev'it- 
 able consequences of mere Lockianism — I mean, 
 of consistent adherence to "the ideal system" — 
 and to have consciously shifted his ground in 
 consequence. He introduced into knowledge, be- 
 sides the da,ta of sense, other e lements — elements 
 which legitimated to his own mind his construc- 
 tive theory of the universe. Accordingly, if we 
 develop his theory of "notions," we arrive at a 
 philosophy which bears a striking resemblance 
 to the rational or spiritual Idealism of to-day, 
 whether that is founded on Kant and Hegel, 
 or has its origin nearer home. In proportion, 
 however, as this side is developed, Berkeley 
 ceases to be liable to the censures which Eeid 
 levels at the Cartesian system, and becomes his 
 fellow-combatant against it. In this aspect of 
 his system, we have therefore no right to follow 
 Berkeley at present. And inasmuch as these 
 elements were left undeveloped by Berkeley 
 himself in his influential works ; inasmuch as 
 the necessity of their introduction was not con-
 
 44 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 vincingly reasoned out ; and they appear, there- 
 fore, rather as unauthorised assumptions — in- 
 congruous patches upon the unrepudiated gar- 
 ment of Lockian principles, — we cannot help 
 recognising in Hume the legitimate development 
 of Berkeley's youthful metaphysics. It was 
 natural for Hume to ignore the new and frag- 
 mentary constructive suggestions, and to carry 
 further that negative criticism of Locke, which 
 commended itself so highly to his passionless 
 intellect. He was not concerned with Berkeley's 
 individual philosophy, but he was keenly inter- 
 ested in drawing the ultimate consequences of 
 philosophical principles generally accepted. He 
 found that Berkeley helped him on his way, and 
 he did not forget to acknowledge the debt. 
 
 On the whole, it is merely aid and suggestion 
 which Hume derives from Berkeley. In his main 
 positions he attaches himself directly to Locke, and 
 works out his results independently. It is often 
 wonderful to see how little transformation requires 
 to be made in Locke's theory. His sentences are 
 simply placed in another setting, and the theory 
 reappears with an entirely new face upon it. 
 
 For the term "idea," which plays so great a 
 part in Locke and Berkeley, Hume substitutes 
 the term " perception," to denote the mental
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hume. 45 
 
 units or " distinct existences " ^ which form his 
 sole assumptions. Perceptions are then divided 
 into two classes, impressions and kleas. " The 
 difference betwixt these consists in the degrees 
 of force and liveliness with wliich they strike 
 upon the mind. . . . Those perceptions which 
 enter with most force and violence we may name 
 impressions . ... By ideas I mean the faint 
 images of these in tliinking and reasoning." ^ 
 Hume adds a note to say that by the term "im^ 
 pression " he does not mean "to express the 
 manner in which our lively perceptions are pro- 
 duced in the soul, but merely the perceptions 
 themselves." Locke, on the other hand, had 
 generally assumed, in a vague way, that each! 
 simple idea carried the theory of its origin with 
 it, and announced itself as the idea, or quality, 
 of a thing. Berkeley had denied this inference! 
 in words, and had made an effort to treat the 
 ideas as mere ideas. But in a less naive way 
 he found the same causal reference implied ; he 
 made it matter of explicit inference from the 
 involuntary character of our sense-idea s and 
 from their o rderly connection. In itself, how- 
 ever, the involuntariness of sense-ideas would 
 
 ^ Treatise of Human Nature (Green's edition), i. 559. 
 2 Ibid., i. 311.
 
 46 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 be only one feeling more, and would not ground 
 any causal judgment, except to one who assumed 
 the relation of causality as known and valid. Not 
 being prepared for such an assumption at the out- 
 set, Hume cuts short the question of the cause 
 of our impressions as a transcendent inquiry, 
 which does not arise so long as we are content, 
 in the genuine spirit of " the experimental 
 method," simply to investigate the facts before 
 us — " the perceptions themselves." " To form the 
 idea of an object, and to form an idea simply, 
 is the same thing ; the reference of the idea to 
 an object being an extraneous denomination, of 
 which in itself it bears no mark or character." ^ 
 Here, then, at last we have the law laid down 
 on the subject without ambiguity. 
 
 At other times, it is true, when he is not 
 
 thinking of his own analysis of causation, Hume 
 
 : involuntarily assumes some cause of our " im- 
 
 ' pressions of sensation, " only msisting that the 
 
 nature of the cause must inevitably remain ob- 
 
 . scure.^ " By what argument can it be proved," 
 
 he asks in the ' Inquiry,' arguing more popularly 
 
 and polemically with Locke and common - sense 
 
 in view, " that the perceptions of the mind must 
 
 be caused by external objects entirely different 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 327. = cf. ibid., i. 383.
 
 PJiilosophical Scepticism of Hume. 4 7 
 
 from them, though resembling them (if that be 
 possible), and could not arise either from tlie 
 energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion 
 of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from 
 some other cause still more unknown to us ? . . . 
 Here experience is and must be entirely silent. 
 The mind has never anything present to it but' 
 the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach the' 
 experience of their connection with objects. 
 The supposition of such a connection is there- 
 fore without any foundation in reasoning." ^ As 
 for Berkeley's hypothesis, we may read Hume's 
 answer from the remarks which he makes in a 
 different connection upon the " theory of the 
 universal energy and operation of the Supreme 
 Being." " It is too bold," he says, " ever to 
 carry conviction with it to a man sufficiently 
 apprised of the weakness of human reason. 
 Though the chain of arguments which conduct 
 to it were ever so logical, there must arise a 
 strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, 
 that it has carried us quite beyond the reach 
 of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions 
 so extraordinary and so remote from common 
 life and experience. We are got into fairyland 
 long ere we have reached the last steps of our 
 
 1 Inquiry, section 12.
 
 48 Scottish Philosophy, 
 
 theory ; and there we have no reason to trust 
 our common methods of argument. . . . Our Kne 
 is too short to fathom such immense abysses." ^ 
 In other words, he returns to the conclusion 
 alone consonant with his own philosophy : The 
 reference of an idea to an object is an extraneous 
 denomination ; the mind, having never anything 
 present to it but the perceptions, cannot possibly 
 reach the experience of their connection with 
 objects. The expectation of causal connection^ 
 being furthermore, in the strictest sense, a 
 growth of experience, we have no right to apply 
 it transcendently, as Kant would have said — that 
 is, to matters that lie entirely out of the sphere 
 of experience. The real background of the ideas 
 or perceptions, whether material as with Locke, 
 or theological as with Berkeley, is simply wiped 
 out by Hume from his theory. 
 
 It follows from the definition of impressions 
 and ideas, that we can have ideas only when we 
 have previously had the relative impressions ; for 
 ideas are the faint images of impressions. Where 
 the opportunity of having the impressions is ab- 
 sent, as in the case of one born blind, there we 
 find that the corresponding ideas — the ideas of 
 sight — are likewise absent. Iinpre ssions, then, 
 
 ^ Inquiry, section 7.
 
 Philosophical Sccplicisni of Htuuc. 49 
 
 are the ultimate standard of reality; and tliis 
 furnishes Hume with what lieid humorously calls 
 his " articles of inquisition." " It must be some 
 one impression which gives rise to every real 
 idea. . . . When we entertain any suspicion that 
 a jDliilosophical term is employed without any 
 meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need 
 but inquire from what impressio7i is that supposed 
 idea derived? . . . Does it arise from an impres- 
 sion of sensation or of reflection ? Point it out 
 distinctly to us, that we may know its nature and 
 qualities. But if you cannot point out any such 
 impression, you may be certain you are mistaken 
 when you imagine you have ani/ such idecc."'^ 
 "■ Without being allowed to offer anything in 
 arrest of judgment," says Eeid, " the prisoner is 
 sentenced to pass out of existence, and to be, in 
 all time to come, an empty unmeaning sound or 
 the ghost of a departed entity." ^ In adopting this 
 touchstone, Hume merely emphasises the avowed 
 principles of Locke ; but from its announcement 
 in this explicit fashion, it is easy to see that we 
 may expect a far more vigorous sifting of the con- 
 tents of the mind than we found in either Locke 
 
 ^ Treatise, i. 533 and 369. Inquiry, section 2 ; cf. also sec- 
 tion 7. 
 
 - Works, p. 144. 
 
 D
 
 50 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 or Berkeley. And one result will be that those 
 conceptions for which no impression is forth- 
 coming — which are different from impressions, 
 and which never existed as impressions — will 
 have to be explained as illusions. It will have 
 to be shown how they would naturally arise, 
 even in the absence of any corresponding reality. 
 When we pass from the particular perceptions 
 as so many distinct existences, to their co mbina- 
 tions and conjunctions, we find Hume still 
 following closely in the footsteps of Locke and 
 Berkeley. The line of thought which he pursues 
 is contained in the account of substaiice and 
 clause given by his predecessors. " We come," 
 says Locke, " to have the ideas of particular sorts 
 of substances by collecting such combinations of 
 simple ideas as are, by experience and observa- 
 tion of men's senses, taken notice of to exist 
 together. . . . [Such] simple ideas . . . carry with 
 them in their own nature no visible necessary con- 
 nection or inconsistency with any other simple 
 ideas." ^ Of the closely related idea of cause, he 
 says : " We cannot with certainty affirm that no 
 man can be nourished by wood or stones, that all 
 men will be poisoned by hemlock. . . . We can- 
 not tell what effects [bodies] will produce ; nor 
 1 Essay, ii. 23, 3 ; and iv. 3, 10.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hiuiie. 51 
 
 when we see tliose eifects can we so raucli as 
 guess, much less know, their manner of produc- 
 tion. . . . The things that, as far as our obser- 
 vation reaches, we constantly find to proceed 
 regularly, we may conclude to act by a law set 
 them, but yet by a law that we know not. . . . We 
 cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and 
 good pleasure of the wise Architect." ^ This is 
 the very conception of the order of nature wliich 
 Berkeley p ressed home. There is no word oftener 
 in his mouth than "arbitrary," to designate the con- 
 nections we discover between the ideas of sense. 
 The judgments we make in such matters, he 
 declares (to quote only a single passage), " do not 
 arise from any essential or necessary, but only 
 a customary tie whicli has been observed betwixt 
 [the ideas]." '^ Berkeley, as we know, after empty- 
 ing sense-phenomena altogether of real causality, 
 refunded all efficient power or agency into spirit; 
 ual Will. When contemplated, therefore, from the 
 objective side, the " customary tie " between sense- 
 ideas becomes, for him as for Locke, " the arbitrary 
 imposition of Providence."^ The laws of nature, 
 
 1 Essay, iv. 6, 15 : iv. 3, 26-28. A great number of passages 
 to the same effect will be found collected in an article by Dr 
 Hutchison Stirling, Mind, ix. pp. 534-536. 
 
 - New Theory of Vision, section 62. 
 
 ^ Alciphron, Fourth Dialogue, section 10.
 
 52 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 or the so-called causal relations of ideas to each 
 other, become " the set rules or established methods 
 wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the 
 ideas of sense." ^ But it may fairly be argued 
 that this is a point to which experience, conceived 
 as Locke and Berkeley conceived it, cannot tes- 
 • tify. Experience, as we know it, is, according 
 to Berkeley, a series of independent states, ideas, 
 or perceptions, which, by the non-rational force of 
 custom, we come in course of time to associate with 
 one another in various ways. Now, unless wc 
 start with the presu23position of the rationality of the 
 universe, we are not justified in assuming that 
 this custom-bred association on our part corre- 
 sponds to the modes of operation of an objective 
 Will which we were intended to learn. Berkeley 
 certainly makes this tacit presupposition, or takes 
 the rationality of the universe as implied in his 
 own conscious existence. And as he has already 
 satisfied himself, arguing from the same datum, 
 that the only possible cause of our sense-ideas is 
 Spirit, so here the subjective view-point — custom- 
 ary association — is never severed by him from the 
 objective view-point of a divine sense-symbolism. 
 But Hume, having already wiped out the spiritual 
 cause or originator of our perceptions, naturally 
 1 Principles, section 30.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hume. 
 
 DO 
 
 declines to call in such an explanation of the 
 arbitrary connections which the perceptions ex- 
 hibit. In his character as consistent sceptic, he 
 is not prepared to yield Berkeley his implied 
 postulate of the rationality of existence, and is 
 even prepared, as we shall see, to derationalise 
 the citadel of Self, which forms Berkeley's basis of 
 operation. Accordingly, in the present case, he 
 has merely to point out that we are gratuitously 
 going beyond our record, and unnecessarily gi\dng 
 a double explanation of the same fact. The fact 
 of the coherence of perceptions — or, more strictly, 
 the association of certain ini£ressions \yith cer- 
 tain ideas — is sufficiently explained, so far as we 
 are concerned, by the operation of custom. Why 
 should we suppose that any other explanation is 
 required ? 
 
 Hume, therefore, stereotyped Berkeley's view 
 of the arbitrariness of natural connections in his 
 famous distinction between relations of ideas wii\.Si^.tMX^.^.Jf. 
 matters of fact . The quotations I have given 
 might be multiplied tenfold ; but they are enough 
 to prove that, to an attentive reader of Locke and 
 Berkeley, Hume's celebrated account of ca usal ity 
 really contains nothing new. It is simply de- 
 tached from all that accompanies it and modifies 
 its force in Berkeley. It is put in the fore-
 
 54 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 ground, and is made to engross the reader's at- 
 tention ; and finally, it is applied to dissolve every 
 permanent reality completely away. But the 
 theory itself is perfectly inevitable, if we start 
 with relationless units of impression. Each unit 
 exists on its own account, and is independent of 
 all the rest. " Every effect," as Hume says, " is 
 a distinct event from its cause. It could not, 
 
 ^therefore, be discovered in the cause. . . . There 
 is nothing in any object, considered in itself, 
 which can afford us a reason for drawing a con- 
 
 1 elusion beyond it." ^ We have started, in other 
 words, with indifferent side-by-sideness or indif- 
 ferent sequence ; and indifferent sequence it will 
 
 , remain till the end of the chapter. " All events," 
 as Hume puts it, " seem entirely loose and 
 separate. One event follows another, but we 
 never can observe any tie between them. They 
 
 jSeem conjoined, but never connected^ - 
 
 It is Hume's merit to have made this sensay 
 tional atomism as plain as it was possible to make 
 it. True, he does not strip his impressions quite 
 bare of relations. Eeferring only to his own list, 
 we find him taking four " relations of ideas " for 
 granted, as intuitively perceived — viz., resem- 
 
 1 Inquiry, section 4 ; and Treatise, i. 436. 
 - Inquiry, section 7.
 
 PJiilosophical Sccplicisiu of Hume. 55 
 
 l^lance. cont rariety, arithmetical relations , and 
 deOTees of ciualitv.^ He is, of course, not entitled 
 to these on his own principles ; but the total 
 absence of relations would evidently jn-event his 
 getting under way at all. We may, therefore, 
 merely note the assumptions. But Hume further 
 illegitimately adds to them time and ^£ace. That, 
 at least, is the result of his shuffling account of 
 these ideas. He would apparently have us believe 
 that he has shown the idea of extension to be 
 identical with impressions of colour. But he has 
 before treated it as derivable from " the impres- 
 sions of coloured points disposed in a certain 
 manner." ^ And of time he says similarly that 
 the idea " is not derived from a particular im- 
 pression, but arises altogether from the manner 
 in which impressions appear to the mind, without 
 making one of the number." ^ And he concludesS 
 in regard to both : " The ideas of space and time I 
 are therefore no separate or distinct ideas, but- ^ 
 merely those of the manner or order in which | ^ 
 objects exist." ^ These passages are of great im- 1 
 portance, in view of wdiat was afterwards con- 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 373. 
 
 - Ibid., i. 341. Cf. Green's criticism in the Introduction, 
 p. 201. 
 
 3 Treatise, i. 343. "* Ibid., i. 346.
 
 56 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 tended Ijotli by Kant and lleid. They exliibit 
 Hume himself obliged to call in more than un- 
 related particulars — obliged to admit ideas for 
 which no corresponding impression can be shown. 
 Time and space are, by his own showing, two dif- 
 ferent manners in which perceptions are disposed, 
 » and in virtue of which they necessarily lose their 
 I character of isolated particulars. Every moment 
 of time, every point of space, refers itself in- 
 finitely to other moments or points. We may go 
 further, and make the statement quite general. 
 So far is it from being true, as Hume says, that 
 there is nothing in any object, considered in 
 itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing 
 a conclusion beyond it, that the exact contrary 
 might be formulated and defended. The mind 
 is incapable of considering any object in itself; 
 every object carries us necessarily beyond itself, 
 and forces us to recognise its connection with 
 other objects. As regards causality^ it is surely 
 time that we emancipated ourselves from the 
 philosophic superstition that connection is simply 
 collocation or succession. As an event, the effect 
 may be regarded as, in a sense, " distinct from its 
 cause." But to treat it merely as an event is to 
 look only at its particularity — to take it as an 
 empty characterless point. No effect, however,
 
 
 PJiilosophical Scepticism of Hume. 5 7 
 
 is merely an event ; every event has a character, 
 is such-and-such an event. It is at its such-and- 
 suchness, at its character — in other words, at the 
 universal in it — that we have to look. As soon| 
 as we do so, we see that it is the same universal, 
 present in both cause and effect, which locks 
 them together into a single fact. So far from; 
 its being true that " we are never able to discover 
 any quality which binds the effect to the cause," 
 it is precisely the same fact which is present in 
 the two particulars and reduces them to intelli 
 gibility. Causes and effects are not merely re-; 
 peated conjunctions of loose and separate events ; 
 it would be truer to say, as science itself now 
 says, that the effect is the cause. 
 
 But we must follow Hume a little further, in 
 order to gain a complete view of the consequences 
 to which he leads us. His whole system was 
 already contained, as has been remarked, in the 
 initial assumption of particular perception s inher- 
 ited by him from Locke and Berkeley. Hume's 
 whole task was, not to prove that things ore ab- 
 stract or unrelated particulars, but, assuming them i 
 to be such, to show how tlu illusion of real con- 
 nection between mutually indifferent units might! 
 arise. This is the meaning and scope of hisj 
 analysis of the idea of causality. "Necessity,"
 
 58 Sco^^is/i Philosophy. 
 
 he concludes, " is something that exists in the 
 mind, not in the objects. . . . The idea arises 
 from the repetition of their union ; the repetition 
 neither discovers nor causes anything in the ob- 
 jects, but has an influence only on the mind by 
 that customary transition it produces." ^ And he 
 does not stop short at the confines of the material 
 world, as Berkeley had done ; he extends his 
 analysis with rigorous consistency to the action 
 of S£irit or Wilh " So far from perceiving the 
 connection betwixt an act of volition and a 
 motion of the body, 'tis allowed that no effect 
 is more inexplicable from the powers and essence 
 of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the 
 will over the mind more intelligible. The effect 
 is there distinguishable and separable from the 
 cause, and could not be foreseen without the 
 experience of their constant conjunction." ^ Here, 
 as elsewhere, it is custom which produces a vivid 
 imaginative transition ; and this, again, is identi- 
 cal with Belief. 
 
 This custom-bre d transition being established as 
 the sole origin of the connections commonly sup- 
 posed to exist between matters of fact, it is next 
 applied to explain the illusio n of identit y in ob^ 
 |ects — that is, the illusion of a p erman ent material 
 1 Treatise, i. 461. '- Ibid., p. 455.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of IIiujic. 59 
 
 world, or, as Hume puts it, of a continued and dis- 
 tinct existence of our perceptions. The notion of 
 the identity of objects is due, he maintains, to 
 " the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the 
 imagination " along a series of closely resembling 
 perceptions. " The imagination, when set into 
 any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even 
 wlien its object fails it, and, like a galley put in 
 motion by the oars, carries on its course without 
 any new impulse." ^ In this way, it first converts 
 resemblance into numerical identity;^ and then, 
 being uneasy on account of the interruptions 
 which the existence of this identical object suffers 
 during the intervals of non-perception, it com- 
 pletes its constructive work by the fiction of a 
 continued existence, during these uncomfortable 
 gaps. This is the point at which the vulgar 
 stand. But here the imagination is brought to 
 book by reason. Eeason points out the absurdity 
 of attributing independent existence to percep- 
 tions : an unperceived perception is a contradic- 
 tion in terms. Hence arises the yliilosoijhical 
 hypothesis of a " double ex;isten.C£ of jDerceptions 
 ^^^ obje cts •. which pleases our reason in allowing 
 that our dependent perceptions are inter rupted 
 and different ; and at the same time is agreeable 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 487.
 
 6o Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 to the imagination, in attributing a continued 
 existence to something else, which we call ob-_ 
 iects." ^ The philosophical system, therefore, 
 has nothing in the facts to recommend it. It is 
 only a patch upon the errors of the imagina- 
 tion, and but for these errors would never have 
 been devised. As Hume says, it derives all its 
 authority from the vulgar system. The logical 
 consequence to which philosophical reflection 
 'leads, is that our perceptions have no more a 
 ; continued than an independent existence. If 
 we resist the irrational promptings of the imagin- 
 ation at the outset, we shall then rest content 
 with our perceptions as they are. " Since all our 
 perceptions are different from each other, and 
 from everything else in the universe, they are 
 also distinct and separable, and may be considered 
 separately existent, and may exi st separately , and 
 ha^•t' nil need of anything- else to support their 
 existtencc." ^ 
 
 But if this is really so, why should we continue 
 to treat them as the perceptions of a Self ? Wliy 
 should we speak as if they required a self or 
 mind for their subsistence ? This is the one no- 
 tion still awaiting dissolution at Hume's hands ; 
 and at the end of the first volume of the ' Treatise,' 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 502. 2 [i^ij^^ j 5i3_ cf. also i. 495.
 
 Philosophical Sccpticisvi of Hume. 6 r 
 
 he brings his ohi battery to bear upon it. " rroni 
 what impression could this idea be derived ? . . . 
 If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, I 
 that impression must continue invariably the 
 same through the whole course of our lives ; since ' 
 self is supposed to exist after that manner. But \ 
 there is no impression constant and invariable. 
 Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and 
 sensations, succeed each other, and never all exist 
 at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from 
 any of these impressions, or from any other, that 
 the idea of self is derived ; and, consequently, 
 there is no such idea." ^ The illusion arises from 
 the same propensity of the imagination which has 
 been noted in the case of material things. It 
 proceeds " entirely from the smooth and uninter- 
 rupted progress of the thought along a train of 
 connected ideas." The principles of association, 
 more particularly those of resemblance and cauj; 
 sation, " convey the imagination . . . from one 
 link to another ; " and from this, the passage is 
 easy to " some fiction or imaginary principle of 
 union." - 
 
 It is perhaps noteworthy that this analysis of 
 the Self is mtroduced at the end of the whole 
 discussion, and that in Hume's easier version of 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 533. - Ibid., i. 541-543.
 
 62 Scott is Jl Philosophy. 
 
 his doctrine, in the ' Inquiry/ it is dropped al- 
 together. In resolving the world of things into 
 inter mittent mind-dependent perceptions, and in 
 resolving ca iisati oii. into fre q uently observed con-_ 
 tiguity and the mental habit thence arising , it 
 was almost necessary to suppose a mind present 
 to undertake these manifold functions. It might 
 liave been embarrassing, at that stage, to have 
 been obliged to reflect that the Self too, like the 
 other principles of real connection, is a fiction. 
 And this is not the only instance in which Hume 
 has chosen his order of discussion most adroitly 
 for his own purposes. But here even Hume's 
 ingenuity and passion for consistency are not 
 enough to carry his thesis through. For what do 
 we mean by saying that the perceptions which 
 constitute the mind naturally introduce each 
 other ? "VVe mean, according to Hume himself, 
 that memory, in reviewing the " system of differ- 
 ent perceptions or different existences," to which 
 we erroneously ascribe an identity, is constantly 
 led on by the associative tendency from one mem- 
 ber of the system to another. Association does 
 its work, therefore, for the reviewing eye of 
 memory ; so that memory, as Hume truly says, 
 is the real source of personal identity.-^ But 
 1 Treatise, i. 542.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Ihime. 6 
 
 J 
 
 what is this memory but a second Ego, raising its 
 head resistlessly behind the first which we dis- 
 carded ? Or what is the imaginati on, which plays 
 so great a part in the Humian system, but the 
 same hardly veiled reintroduction of the Ego ? 
 " I^ltintity ," it is said, " is nothing really belonging 
 to the different perceptions, and uniting them 
 together ; but is merely a quality , which we 
 attribute to them, becaicse of the union of their 
 ideas in the ima(ji7iation, when v:e rcfieet upon 
 them." ^ They arc united, then, somewhere, in 
 spite of all disclaimers ; and whether the prin- 
 ciple of union be called Memory, or Imagination, 
 or Self, is of comparatively little account. 
 
 It has thus been shown incidentally that even 
 Hume is not perfectly faithful to his philosophical 
 principles. The Ego- — the central principle of 
 connection — is found to resist his efforts. Time 
 and Space are also principles of connection which 
 he first tries to ignore or explain away, and then 
 unwarrantably assumes. The four relations of 
 ideas which he assumes as intuitively perceived, 
 are likewise inconsistent additions to a theory 
 which professes to found on pure particulars. 
 But such inconsequences, it must be repeated, 
 -were necessary, if the theory was to come to 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 540.
 
 64 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 speech at all. And we are less concerned with 
 Hume's inconsequences than with the drift of his 
 whole argument — the goal which, it must be al- 
 lowed, he did his best to reach, and which lie 
 points out with singular clearness to be the in- 
 evitable implication of the principles which he 
 inherited, and which he assumes throughout. 
 
 In the short Appendix which he added to the 
 third volume of the 'Treatise' in 1740, Hume 
 expressly connects himself with the preceding 
 development of philosophy. " Philosophers begin 
 to be reconciled," he says, " to the principle that 
 we have no idea of external substan ce, distinct 
 from the ideas of jDfirticular qualities. This must 
 pave the way for a like principle with regard to 
 the mind, that we have no notion of it distinct 
 from the particula r perceptions." ^ This consum- 
 mation has been attained, he means to say, in his 
 own philosophy. He claims, in his own admir- 
 able phrase, to have " loosened all our particular 
 perceptions." Two principles, as he points out, 
 constitute the Alpha and the Omega of his phil- 
 osophy. The first is, that " perceptions are dis- 
 tinc t e£iste^nces_; " and the second is, that " the_ 
 mind never perc eives any real connect ion among 
 distinct existences. " The second is the immedi- 
 
 1 Treatise, i. 559.
 
 Philosophical Scepticism of Hume. 65 
 
 ate consequence of the first ; and between the two 
 lies the rationale of Hume's whole industry. If 
 it be true that all our perceptions are distinct, or, 
 as we have seen him put it in another passage, 
 " different from each other and from everything 
 else in the universe," then the possibility of real 
 connection is excluded ah initio; it would con- 
 tradict our own definition. The units are in- 
 different, and they merely remain so ; they are so 
 many distinct mental events — and " all events," 
 Hume tells us, " are entirely loose and separate." 
 There remains only the plausible explanation of 
 the way in which the illusion of connection, in 
 its different forms, grows upon us. Here Hume 
 is free to confess that he is not thoroughly satis- 
 fied with his own constructive theory, and he 
 does so in a remarkable passage of this Appendix. 
 It is in connection with personal identity that 
 the difficulty chiefly comes home to him. Others 
 may solve the difficulty, he says, and produce a 
 system more satisfactory to reason ; but for him- 
 self he pleads " the privilege of a sceptic." The 
 inability which he here acknowledges to recon- 
 struct without some principle of real connection, 
 does not, however, lead him to reconsider the 
 twin principles or assumptions on which his 
 philosophy depends. It is not in his power, he 
 
 E
 
 66 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 says, to renounce either of them. This renuncia- 
 tion was left for Reid and Kant ; and Hume's 
 system remains, therefore, the apotheosis, or, we 
 might better say, the self-refutation of the doc- 
 trine of the abstract particular. 
 
 Philosophy could go no further without a re- 
 consideration of this fundamental dogma of the 
 Lockian philosophy. This was clearly seen both 
 by Reid and Kant. " Ideas," says Reid, " were 
 first introduced into philosophy in the humble 
 character of images or representatives of things ; 
 and in this character they seemed not only to 
 be inoffensive, but to serve admirably well for 
 explaining the operations of the human under- 
 standing. But since men began to reason clearly 
 and distinctly about them, they have, by degrees, 
 supplanted their constituents, and undermined 
 the existence of everything but themselves. . . . 
 These ideas are as free and independent as the 
 birds of the air. . . . Yet, after all, these self- 
 existent and independent ideas look pitifully 
 naked and destitute, when left thus alone in 
 the universe, set adrift without a rag to cover 
 their nakedness." ^ Reid shares with Kant the 
 merit of taking Hume always in his true charac- 
 1 Works, p. 109.
 
 PhilosopJiical Scepticism of H tune. 67 
 
 ter as a sceptic, and treating liis system strictly 
 as a reductio ad impossihile of accepted philo- 
 sophical principles. " I acknowledge," he says, 
 in the Dedication of his first work, " that I never 
 thought of calling in question the principles 
 commonly received with regard to the human 
 understanding, until the ' Treatise of Human 
 Nature' was published in the year 1739. The 
 ingenious author of that treatise upon the prin- 
 ciples of Locke — who was no sceptic — hath built 
 a system of scepticism which leaves no ground 
 to believe any one thing rather than its contrary. 
 His reasoning appeared to me to be just; there 
 was therefore a necessity to call in question the 
 principles upon which it was founded, or to 
 admit the conclusion." ^ That the conclusion 
 could be admitted by sober men as a reason- 
 able, credible, or even plausible theory of the 
 facts, does not seem to have occurred to him. 
 He would simply have stared, if he had been 
 told that generations of English thinkers would 
 take Hume mo grand sdrieux, and adopt his 
 speculations as a constructive theory of know- 
 ledge. In this, Eeid shows a far truer instinct 
 than is shown, for example, in Professor Huxley's 
 able and brilliant, but extremely unsatisfactory, 
 1 Works, p. 95.
 
 68 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 study of the great sceptic. His scepticism disap- 
 pears altogether in Professor Huxley's account, 
 and he is made the pioneer of scientific method. 
 This is a strange distinction for the man who 
 sums up his position by saying that " if we 
 believe that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis 
 only because it costs us too much pains to think 
 otherwise." ^ 
 
 In treating Hume as such a reductio, it is not, 
 of course, maintained that he saw, so to speak, 
 beyond himself. No man is two personalities 
 in this way. Nor are we to suppose that Hume 
 saw the fallacy or insufficiency of the principles 
 he adopted from Locke, and that he therefore, 
 of deliberate purpose, set about a laborious re- 
 futation of them by reducing them to their 
 ultimate consequences. His philosophy is not 
 a prolonged and conscious irony of this descrip- 
 tion. On the contrary, there is no reason to 
 doubt that he accepted in perfect good faith the 
 fundamental positions from which he argued. 
 He saw no others equally plausible ; and when 
 he had given free scope to his logical acuteness, 
 he stranded himself equally with his masters on 
 the consequences he arrived at. As a phil- 
 osopher, he had no city of refuge to which he 
 1 Treatise, i. 549.
 
 PhilosopJiical Scepticism of Hume. 69 
 
 could flee from the results of his own reasoning, 
 though, as a man of the world, he was not with- 
 out resource. To begin again at the beginning, 
 and re-examine his premisses, as Eeid called upon 
 him to do, might have " cost him too much pains," 
 after he had already worked out his metaphysical 
 vein in three large volumes. But (however much 
 we may be willing, as agnostics, to narrow our 
 horizon), we are surely precluded by Hume's own 
 language, not to speak of his manner, from imag- 
 ining, as Professor Huxley seems to suppose, that, 
 on reviewing his conclusions as a whole, he re- 
 garded them as a tenable theory of the facts. No 
 doubt Hume thought, especially as his life wore 
 on, that an important indirect advantage was to 
 be gained from his speculations in the blow they 
 administered to the old giant Superstition ; and 
 it may readily be admitted that this was a main 
 motive with him in the reproduction or new 
 version of his philosophy which he gave in the 
 ' Inquiry,' and from which, it should be remarked, 
 Professor Huxley mainly quotes. But in his 
 youthful work his philosophical ardour was purer ; 
 he was sustained there by an unselfish intellectual 
 enthusiasm, which aimed at thoroughness and 
 completeness for their own sakes. And at the 
 end of his comprehensive survey, he found that
 
 70 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 his results, if taken seriously, were anything but 
 consolatory. " A malady to be cured," " clouds to 
 be dispelled," " philosophical melancholy and deli- 
 rium " — these are some of the names he applies 
 to his speculations. " This sceptical doubt," he 
 says, " is a malady which can never be radically 
 cured ; it always increases, the further we carry 
 our reflections. Carelessness and inattention 
 alone can afford us any remedy. ... I dine, 
 I play a game of backgammon, I converse and 
 am merry with my friends ; and when, after 
 three or four hours' amusement, I would return 
 to these speculations, they appear so cold, and 
 strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in 
 my heart to enter into them any further." ^ Is 
 this the language of one who puts forward his 
 system as a theory to be believed and acted upon, 
 seriously lived up to, as Professor Huxley would 
 have us believe ? A philosophy which must be 
 abandoned in order to perform the most ordinary 
 offices of life can hardly be the satisfactory foun- 
 dation of science and conduct which some have 
 professed to find it. 
 
 In refusing to look upon Hume's system as 
 a substantive or serious account of the nature 
 of things, we are simply taking him at his own 
 1 Treatise, i. 501, 548.
 
 PhilosopJiical Scepticism of Hiune. 7 1 
 
 valuation. Universal scepticism is, indeed, a 
 malady which cannot be cured. pjut it is 
 equally a position in which reason finds it 
 impossible for a moment to rest. Universal 
 scepticism would be justified only on the sup- 
 position that the world is ahsolutcly incapable 
 of being rationalised — incapable, that is to say, 
 in any degree or to any, however small an 
 extent. PJut the confidence, or, if we like to I 
 call it so, the faith of reason in itself is inde- 
 structible and inexhaustible ; and faith in itself 
 means faith also in the ultimate rationality of 
 the universe. Scepticism, therefore, can never, 
 as Kant puts it, be a permanent state for human 
 reason. It is the transition from one constructive 
 system to another. Systems will never fail, as 
 long as man retains at once his reason and his 
 tinitude. Scepticism is the bridge by which we 
 pass from one system, or family of systems, 
 found wanting, to another age with its fuller 
 grasp of truth.
 
 72 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 THOMAS KEID: SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
 
 In the two preceding lectures, we have traced in 
 some detail the development of what Eeid calls 
 the ideal scepticism. We have now to consider 
 the main drift of Keid's answer to Hume. Quo- 
 tations have already abundantly shown that Eeid 
 had a perfectly clear consciousness of Hume's 
 relation to his philosophical progenitors. He 
 explicitly recognised the necessity of combating 
 the ' Treatise of Human Nature ' by striking at its 
 root- assumptions. As Hume's conclusions could 
 not be seriously proposed for acceptance, the only 
 alternative remaining was to attack the irputTov 
 il/euSos of the theory — the assumption, namely, that 
 I experience yields as its ultimate data such self- 
 subsistent, " loose," or relationless units of sensa- 
 Ition as Hume begins and ends with. It had to 
 be shown that, so far from being the ultimate
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. ']2, 
 
 elements of knowledge, such ideas or perceptions, 
 " entirely loosened," are not really elements at all, 
 in the sense of being themselves knowable ; and 
 that they cannot, therefore, be a possible substruc- 
 ture for the subsequent growth of fictitious rela- 
 tions. Whatever view might ultimately be taken 
 of the function of sense in knowledge, it had to be 
 shown that by themselves such sensational units, 
 instead of being the ultimately real, are only 
 abstractions of the mind. This could evidently 
 be done only by a renewed and more careful 
 analysis of the percipient act ; and it was simply 
 such an analysis that Eeid and Kant alike under- 
 took. The difficulties of the Lockian account of 
 perception arose, in the main, from the vagueness 
 and looseness with which it employed the term 
 sensation. Sensation was supposed by Locke 
 himself to give most of the relations by which we 
 construe the world. The fact that ideas of sensa- 
 tion are often changed by the judgment ; or, in 
 more modern phraseology, that the greater part 
 of our adult perception is really acquired percep- 
 tion- — that is to say, a mass of judgments grown 
 automatic through habit — seems only to have 
 dawned on him as an afterthought, due to Mr 
 Molyneux, the " thinking gentleman " of Dublin.^ 
 ^ See Essay, ii. 9, 8.
 
 74 ScottisJi Philosophy. 
 
 In Berkeley and Hume, as the term sensation 
 was progressively defined with a nearer approach 
 to accuracy, the relations which Locke had 
 vaguely included under the term were gradually 
 found to be separable from sensation. They 
 were discovered to be something over and above 
 sensation proper — something, in Hume's phrase, 
 " belonging to the mind." They might be set 
 down either as due to its spontaneous action 
 about its ideas or as generated in it by the flow 
 of the ideas ; but in either case they were dis- 
 tinguished from the sense-ideas or the original 
 data themselves. In Eeid this process of defini- 
 tion is carried further. 
 
 But here at the outset a few words of explan- 
 ation may be advisable. Scottish philosophy is 
 frequently supposed to be nothing more than an 
 unanalysed and somewhat gross assertion of the 
 dual existence of mind and matter, and the im- 
 mediate presence of the one to the other. And 
 it is true that if we turn over the pages of the 
 Scottish ^^liilosophers, we find what seems a 
 disproportionate amount of talk about the theory 
 of Representative Perception, and about the doc- 
 trine of Natural Eealism which they oppose to it. 
 This is not, for us, the most vital point from which 
 to attack the general philosophical question. Nev-
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 75 
 
 ertheless, the instinct of lieid and his followers 
 did not lead them very far astray. For the 
 theory of Eepresentative Perception implies 
 what I have called the two-substance doctrine ; 
 and, conversely, if mind and matter are conceived 
 as two self-subsistent substances, essentially dis- 
 tinct the one from the other, the intercourse i;|e€yt«.iv;--u,-,o: 
 between the two is of necessity conceived me- 
 chanically. The process of knowledge is supposed 
 ultimately to rest upon the repeated momentary 
 contact of the two substances. Each such contact 
 or impact makes its mark upon the mind in the 
 shape of what is called an impression. The 
 detached impressions of the Humian theory are 
 therefore directly connected with the doctrine of 
 two alien substances and the theory of Eepre- 
 sentative Perception ; and accordingly, in attack- 
 ing Eepresentative Perception, the Scottish phil- 
 osophers are contributing to the refutation 
 of the fallacies with which it is bound up. I 
 am ready to admit that, in their zeal against a 
 subjective idealism, they have often over-stated 
 their case, and maintained the independence of 
 the material world in terms which imply the old 
 two-substance doctrine. But the Natural Dualism 
 of the school, as it is sometimes called, certainly 
 does not in itself involve this doctrine. On the
 
 76 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 contrary, by maintaining a theory of Immediate 
 Perception, Scottish philosophy destroys the for- 
 eignness of matter to mind, and thus implicitly 
 removes the only foundation of a real dualism. 
 But to approach Scottish philosophy from this 
 side would be to begin at the end rather than at 
 the beginning. We shall best see the importance 
 of Eeid's work, and its relation to the work of 
 Kant and German philosophy, by concentrating 
 our attention upon his analysis of Sensation and 
 Perception. Eeid's theory here is so admirable, 
 and has been, comparatively speaking, so little 
 attended to, that I will take the liberty of stating 
 it in some detail. We may begin by following 
 Eeid for a little in his own method of attacking 
 the question, and then proceed to gather up the 
 results in our own way. 
 
 The ' Inquiry ' ^ is confined to the five external 
 senses ; and Eeid begins with the simplest and 
 least intellectual of these — with Smell and Taste 
 — by way of working gradually towards the more 
 
 ^ The full title of the book is 'An Inquirj' into the Human 
 Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.' It was published in 
 1764. The 'Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man' (1785) 
 and the ' Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind ' 
 (1788) contain a fuller and more systematic account of Reid's 
 philosophy ; but in some respects there is more freshness about 
 the earlier work. In what follows, quotations are made in- 
 differently from the ' In(^uiry ' and the ' Essays.'
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. Jj 
 
 complex phenomena of the primary qualities 
 which form the heart of the problem. He joins 
 issue, however, with the ideal system on the very 
 threshold of his investigation. That system 
 started, as we have seen, from unreferred per- 
 ceptions, ideas pure and simple. To Hume's 
 supposed knowledge of " the perceptions them- 
 selves," Eeid applies the scholastic term Simple c^W.o^/c:^: 
 Apprehension ; and he takes up position at once, 
 by denying that the process of perception is truly 
 described as beginning thus. We do not start, he 
 insists, with ideas, but with judgments. So far 
 from being the primitive act of mind, Simples ^** 
 Apprehension, or the knowledge of sensations 
 per se, is a species of abstract contemplation only 
 attainable at a later stage " by resolving and 
 analysing a natural and original judgment."|>ps 
 "Apprehension accompanied with belief and 
 knowledge must go before simple apprehension." |o^. 
 In other words, we do not have sensations first, | 
 and refer them afterwards to a subject and an ' 
 oliject ; our first having of a sensation is at the 
 same time the knowledge of it as objective and^ 
 the knowledge of it as mine. Locke's definition! 
 of knowledge, therefore, as consisting in a percep- 
 tion of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
 is entirely false. We are never restricted to our
 
 78 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 own ideas ; at the very first step we pass beyond 
 our sensations into a real and permanent world 
 on which they depend, and of wliich they are 
 merely the signs. " It is not." says Reid, " by 
 
 'first having the notions of mind and sensation, 
 jand then comparing them together, that we per- 
 iceive the one to have the relation of a subject or 
 substratum, and the other that of an act or 
 (Operation ; on the contrary, one of the related 
 ithings — to wit, sensation — suggests to us both 
 the correlate and the relation."^ 
 
 The word suggestion is an important one in 
 Reid's philosophy. Eeid borrows the word from 
 Berkeley, but he gives it a difierent application. 
 Berkeley's " suggestions " were the teachings of 
 experience as to the interconnections of sense- 
 
 ; phenomena. Eeid applies the term especially to 
 denote those "natural suggestions," as he calls 
 them, or "judgments of nature," which are im- 
 plied in the existence of phenomena at all — • 
 relations, in other words, which are necessary to 
 
 ! the constitution of experience, yet which cannot 
 
 I be said to be given in impressions or sensations 
 as such, but only to be given along with the data 
 
 i of sense proper. The first of these natural sugges- 
 tions or judgments, as was to be expected, is the 
 
 1 Works, pp. 106-111.
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 79 
 
 reference of sensations to an Ego or permanent! 
 subject. " Thouf(ht must have a subject, and be | 
 the act of some thinking being. . . . Our sensa- 
 tions and thoughts suggest tlie notion of a mind, 
 and the belief of its e xistciicc, and its relation to 
 our thoughts. " This particular notion and belief 
 Berkeley had also held, but without resting it on 
 such broad grounds as those now put forward by 
 Eeid. Sensation, according to Eeid, suggests the 
 notion and' belief j or on the occasion of sensation, 
 we may say, such a judgment is necessarily " sug- 
 gested by our constitution." " By what principles 
 of logic we make these inferences it is impossible 
 to show." Indeed, we do not make them by any 
 explicit process of reasoning over wdiich logic 
 could claim control ; as " first principles," they 
 fall not within the province of reasoning, but 
 of common-sense, Nor is it possible to show how 
 our sensations can give us the notions ; all that 
 can be said is what has been said already, that 
 "they are judgments of nature — judgments noti 
 got by comparing ideas and perceiving agreementsl 
 and disagreements, but immediately inspired by'^ 
 our constitution." ^ 
 
 This is not the place to enter into a general 
 enumeration and vindication of these first princi- 
 1 Works, p. no.
 
 8o Scottish P kilo sop Jiy. 
 
 pies or natural judgments. Those only concern 
 us at present which are necessary for the under- 
 standing of Eeid's account of Sensation and Per- 
 (Ception. A second judgment which every sen- 
 sation carries with it, so far as it is a possible 
 constituent of knowledge, is that of Existence. 
 Hume, indeed, in a section of his ' Treatise,' had 
 attempted to explain away the involved judgment 
 as nothing beyond the perceptions themselves ; 
 but Eeid wisely treats this as an insufficient or 
 disingenuous analysis. According to a third of 
 these natural principles, " a beginning of exist- 
 ence, or any change in nature, suggests to us 
 the notion of a cause ; " and this judgment also 
 is involved in the perceptive process from the 
 beginning. Any sensation recognised as exist- 
 ing and as beginning to exist is a change in 
 nature which calls for the application of the 
 principle. Experience presently teaches us that 
 the sensation of smell (with which Eeid starts) is 
 connected, let us say, with the presence of a rose 
 which our other senses reveal to us. Hence we 
 conclude that there is a quality or virtue in the 
 rose which we call its smell. Not that even the 
 vulgar, Eeid continues, imagine " the smell in the 
 rose to be something like to the sensation of 
 smelling;" they are unjustly charged with this
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 8i 
 
 absurdity by philosophers, who pahii off their 
 paradoxes as profound discoveries. In point of 
 fact, the smell of a rose signifies two things, which 
 only the philosophers show any disposition to 
 confound. " First, a sensation^ which can have 
 no existence but when it is perceived, and can 
 only be in a sentient being or mind ; secondly, it 
 signifies s ome po wer, quality^ or virtue in the rose, 
 or in effluvia proceeding from it, which hatli a 
 permanent existence, independent of the mind, 
 and which, by the constitution of nature, produces 
 the sensation in us. By the original constitution 
 of our nature, we are both led to believe that 
 there is a permanent cause of the sensation, and 
 prompted to seek after it ; and experience deter- 
 mines us to place it in the rose." ^ 
 
 But in this, Eeid evidently anticipates his own 
 account of the data of the other senses, and, in 
 particular, his account of the natural judgments 
 which accompany the senses of sight and touch. 
 Meanwhile, in dealing with the so-called second- 
 ary qualities, he contents himself with pointing 
 out the ambiguity which attaches to the names of 
 all smells, tastes, sounds, as well as heat and 
 cold, inasmuch as there is but one word to cover 
 both the sensations themselves and "the exter- 
 
 1 Works, p. 114. 
 F
 
 82 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 nal qualities which are indicated by them." He 
 adds, however, that, most properly and commonly, 
 the name is applied to the thing indicated by the 
 sensation. For it is only in certain cases, where 
 sensations " are so quick and lively as to give us 
 a great deal either of pleasure or of uneasiness," 
 that " we are compelled to attend to the sensation 
 itself, and to make it an object of thought and 
 discourse." In such cases (as, for example, in 
 " the various kinds of pain, sickness, and the 
 sensations of hunger and other appetites"), we 
 give a name which signifies nothing but the 
 sensation itself, and about wliich, therefore, there 
 can be no confusion. In the majority of cases, 
 however, the sensation is not interesting enough 
 in itself to be made an object of thought, and so 
 we pass at once beyond it to the reality which it 
 reveals. " Our constitution," says Eeid, " leads 
 us to consider it as a sign of something external 
 which hath a constant conjunction with it." ^ 
 
 The distinction thus drawn between the sensa- 
 tion and its objective cause becomes of funda- 
 mental importance when we pass to the primary 
 qualities. For in their case we have, according 
 to Eeid, not only the belief or knowledge of some, 
 power, quality, or virtue in tlie object, which, 
 
 1 Works, p. 114.
 
 Reid : Seiisation and Perception. 83 
 
 itself permanent and independent of the mind, 
 produces the sensation in us : we have a perfectly 
 distinct conception of what the cause is. In other 
 words, we have an immediate perception of a 
 certain quality of matter, which has to l)e care- 
 fully distinguished from the sensation, on occa- 
 sion of which this perception takes place. The 
 risk of confounding the two is, however, greatly 
 increased in the new set of cases. When we 
 come to the sense of Touch, for example, we find 
 that, by its means, we perceive not one quality 
 only but many, and these of diflerent kinds. The 
 chief of them, according to Eeid, are heat and cold, 
 hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, 
 figure, solidity, motion, and extension. We may 
 leave heat and cold aside here, as ranking with 
 secondary qualities ; and, of the others, we may 
 select hardness for consideration in the mean- 
 time. There is no doubt a sensation, Reid begins, 
 by which we perceive a body to be hard or soft. 
 This is seen when contact is so violent as to cause 
 pain ; our attention is then at once turned to the 
 subjective feeling. But by pressing the hand 
 moderately against the table, and attending to the 
 feeling which ensues, while abstracting as much 
 as possible from all thought of the table and its 
 qualities, we may also, he says, make the sensation
 
 84 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 of hardness a distinct object of reflection — though 
 with difficulty. Apart, however, from such a re- 
 flective effort, the sensation " is never attended to, 
 but passes through the mind instantaneously, and 
 serves only to introduce that quality in bodies, 
 which, by a law of our constitution, it suggests," ^ 
 "VVe are so accustomed to use the sensation merely 
 as a sign, that it has no name in any language. 
 This must not blind us, however, to the distinc- 
 tion which exists between the sensation and the 
 percept. The sensation we have when touching a 
 hard body, and the perceived hardness of the 
 body, so far from being identical, have not even 
 the slightest resemblance. Upon accurate reflec- 
 tion, they appear, says Eeid, " not only to be 
 different things, but as unlike as pain is to the 
 point of a sword." ^ 
 
 Now we have " as clear and distinct a concep- 
 tion " of hardness as of anything whatsoever. 
 Accordingly it is a quality of quite a different 
 order from those secondary qualities which we 
 only know as the causes of certain sensations. 
 Though Berkeley, following out the received doc- 
 trine of ideas, discarded the distinction between 
 the primary and the secondary qualities, " yet 
 after all," says Eeid, " there appears to be a real 
 
 1 Works, p. 120. ' Ibid., p. 122.
 
 Reid : Sejisation and Perception. 85 
 
 foundation for it in the principles of our nature." 
 Having made this weighty observation, he goes 
 on, with a " similarly," to extend his argument to 
 roughness and smoothness, figure and motion, and 
 what these "do all suppose" — extension. "All 
 these, hy means of certain corrcsjionding sensations 
 of touch, arc presented to the mind as real external 
 qualities ; the conception and the belief of them 
 are invariably connected with the corresponding 
 sensations by an original principle of human 
 nature." ^ " When I grasp a ball in my hand, I 
 perceive it at once hard, figured, and extended. 
 The feeling is very simple, and hath not the least 
 resemblance to any quality of body. Yet it sug- 
 gests to us three primary qualities perfectly dis- 
 tinct from one another, as well as from the sen- 
 sation which indicates them." In language which 
 is perfectly applicable to the Sensationalists of 
 to-day, he proceeds : " We are commonly told by 
 pliilosophers that we get the idea of extension by 
 feeling along the extremities of a body, as if there 
 were no manner of difficulty in the matter. I 
 have sought, with great pains I confess, to find 
 out how this idea can be got by feeling; but I 
 have sought in vain. ... It is true we have feel- 
 ings of touch, which every moment present exten- 
 1 Works, p. 123.
 
 86 Scottish PJiUosophy. 
 
 sion to the mind ; l)ut how they come to do so is 
 the question." ^ In a separate section lie takes 
 some account of the various ways in wliich such 
 philosophers suppose us to collect the notion of 
 extension from sensations alone, — e.g., the appli- 
 cation of an object to a larger or smaller part 
 of the body, the drawing of an object across the 
 hands or face, or the instinctive movements of the 
 limbs. Can this, he asks, give a man any notion of 
 space or motion ? " It no doubt gives a new feel- 
 ing ; but how it should convey a notion of space 
 or motion to one who had none before, I cannot 
 conceive. . . . Such a motion may give a certain 
 succession of feelings, as the colic may do, but no 
 feelings nor any combination of feelings can ever 
 resemble space or motion," " What hath imposed 
 upon philosophers," he concludes, " is that the 
 feelings of touch which suggest primary qualities, 
 have no names. . . . They are natural signs, and 
 the mind immediately passes to the thing signi- 
 fied, without making the least reflection upon 
 the sign, or observing that there was any such 
 thing." 2 
 
 Eeid cautiously disentangles himself from the 
 historical question whether " the sensations of 
 touch do, from the very first, suggest the same 
 
 1 Works, ]). 124. - Ibid., pp. 124, 126.
 
 Re id: Sensation and Perception. Z^j 
 
 notions of body and its qualities which they do 
 when we are grown up." " Perhaps," he suggests, 
 " a child in the womb, or for some short period 
 of its existence, is merely a sentient being." ^ 
 But that is really a question which does not 
 concern us. The philosophical point is the 
 complete or generic distinction l^etween Per- 
 ception and Sensation — between Knowledge and 
 Feeling — which for ever precludes any derivation 
 of the one from the other. On this distinction 
 Eeid is prepared to stake the whole question 
 between himself and the ideal scepticism.^ It 
 is the same issue by which Kant also chooses to 
 abide. 
 
 There is just one point in the above analysis 
 which is open to criticism, and that is Eeid's 
 assertion that we have, or may have, a know- 
 ledge of the sensational signs apart from any 
 perceptive reference to an external object. He 
 makes this statement again, unreservedly, and 
 indeed emphatically, in distinguishing between 
 the material impression and the sensation, both 
 of which are, according to his theory, antecedent 
 conditions of perception. " Nature carries on the 
 first part of the process of perception witliout our 
 consciousness or concurrence. But we cannot be 
 1 Works, p. 130. "- See ibid., p. 128.
 
 88 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 unconscious of the next step in this process — the 
 sensation of the mind, which always immediately 
 follows the impression made upon the body. It 
 is essential to a sensation to be felt, and it can be 
 nothing more than we feel it to be. If we can 
 only acquire the habit of attending to our sensa- 
 tions, we may know them perfectly." ^ Such 
 sensations would seem to bear a suspicious re- 
 semblance to the unreferred ideas which he 
 combats. It is true, as may be proved from 
 other passages, that Eeid does not mean to assert 
 the possibility of sensations apart from the refer- 
 ence to a subject ; so that, to that extent, he pre- 
 serves the element of judgment. But he dis- 
 tinctly denies the necessary reference to an 
 object. " Sensation," he says, " taken by itself, 
 implies neither the conception nor belief of any 
 external object. It supposes a sentient being 
 and a certain manner in which that being is 
 affected ; but it supposes no more." ^ But if this 
 is so (even in the case of the secondary qualities), 
 then we really begin as subjective idealists, with 
 a fleeting internal world, which we only after- 
 wards refer to an external and permanent one. 
 Eeid's statement, therefore, sublates his own 
 position, if it be taken to refer to the original 
 1 Works, p. 187. - Ibid., p. 312.
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 89 
 
 act of perception. I>ut, in all probability, he was 
 thinking of a subsequent act of analysis or ab- 
 straction, to which the name " simple apprehen- 
 sion " might be given. " With some pains and 
 praxitice," he says, " I can form as clear a notion 
 of the other sensations of touch as I have of pain." 
 Evidently what he means here is a certain local- 
 ised affection of the bodily organism, recognised 
 as such. But this already involves extension and 
 all its consequences. It has all the determina- 
 tions of the object ; it is a percept, and not by 
 any means the original sensational sign of which 
 we are in quest. In the case Eeid refers to, all 
 that we do is to abstract from certain relations, 
 in order to concentrate our attention upon others 
 which are normally less prominent. It is mis- 
 leading, therefore, to speak as if we ever reached, 
 in actual life, the sensations which w^e postulate 
 as the signs or occasions of our perceptions. 
 
 This is borne out by Eeid's embarrassment 
 when he comes to treat of the sense of Sight. 
 The optical sensation of the eye per se is colour ; 
 but we never see colour without seeing it ex- 
 tended. Wliat we see is a coloured expanse of 
 uncertain limits, which we call the field of vision. 
 This is true of the eye at rest, and would be true 
 even of an hypothetical eye which had never
 
 90 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 moved. So mucli is recognised by modern 
 psychology, which makes no distinction in prin- 
 cij)le between the case of impact upon the retina 
 and impact upon the skin or ordinary touch. In 
 both cases, every part of the sensitive surface 
 must possess what is called a " local colouring " 
 or a " local sign " of its own, which yields, on 
 interpretation, the position in space of the object 
 (or relative part of the object) causing the affec- 
 tion. This is the conclusion of the most exact 
 modern psychology, as we find it in Lotze, in 
 Wundt, or in Sully. Our sensations of sight and 
 touch are, in adult life, immediately and autom- 
 atically localised, or referred to objects in space. 
 But the sensations must carry with them some 
 qualitative difference, in virtue of which the local- 
 isation takes place at one point rather than at 
 another. In our conscious life, however, the 
 extensional reference is everywhere present; we 
 are unable to speak or to think without it. And 
 hence we never reach in knowledge what Sully 
 advisedly calls " this unknown original differ- 
 ence." ^ In the case of the local signs of the 
 retinal surface, it is, if possible, more evident 
 than in the similar local signs of the tactual 
 surface, that they are quite incognisable for us, 
 1 Outlines of Psychology, p. 119.
 
 Reici : Sensation and Pe7'ception. 91 
 
 save as objectively interpreted in terms of per- 
 ception. Translated into lieid's language, this 
 means that, in the case of visible figure, the 
 sensational sign which suggests it is not in itself 
 an object of knowledge. Tliis Reid sees very 
 clearly ; but he overleaps himself in stating the 
 fact, and, in this one case, denies the presence of 
 any sensational sign at all. " The position of the 
 coloured thing is no sensation ; but it is, by the 
 laws of my constitution, presented to the mind 
 along with the colour, vnthout any additional 
 sensation." And again : " There seems to be no 
 sensation that is appropriated to visible figure or 
 whose office it is to suggest it. It seems to be 
 suggested immediately by the material impression 
 upon the organ, of which we are not conscious." ^ 
 Visible figure is once more expressly mentioned 
 in a later section as an exception to the general 
 rule.^ But enough has been said to show that, 
 in point of unknowableness, all sensations as such 
 stand upon the same footing. On the other hand, 
 such unknowableness being admitted of all, there 
 is no reason for denying, in this particular case, 
 the presence of some local sign — some extra- 
 sensation besides colour — which yields on inter- 
 pretation the position and visible size of an 
 1 Works, pp. 14.5, 146. - Ibid., p. 187.
 
 92 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 object. Visible and tangible extension stand 
 here on precisely the same footing; the sensa- 
 tions must contain some specific indication or 
 hint as to the whereabouts of the object, if our 
 location of the latter is not to be purely arbitrary. 
 From the psychological side, we are bound to 
 regard such an indication as itself a sensation ; 
 from the physiological side, we naturally look on 
 the sign as inherent in the organic impression 
 or stimulus, and we speak, in this particular in- 
 stance, of a retinal sign. Both ways of speaking 
 are equally legitimate ; the psychological is real- 
 ly simply a translation of the physiological. For 
 every shade of difference in the material facts 
 must have its mental correlate ; differences in the 
 stimuli must have corresponding differences in 
 the sensations. It is therefore in deference to 
 physiological results that we assume psychological 
 elements which, in themselves, we cannot be said 
 to know, and which psychology by its method of 
 introspection alone could never have reached.^ 
 
 The essence of Scottish philosophy, as it ap- 
 pears in Eeid, is accordingly a vindication of per- 
 
 1 Altogether, the language in which tlie most accurate psy- 
 chologists have come to speak of sensation is sufficiently 
 instructive. "Pure sensation," says Wundt (Physiologische
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 93 
 
 ception, as perception, in contradistinction to the 
 vague sensational idealism, which had ended in 
 the disintegration of knowledge. Sensation is 
 the condition of Perception ; but so far from 
 the two terms being interchangeable, sensation, 
 as sensation, does not enter into perception at 
 all. It is significant that the two points on 
 which Eeid takes his stand should be (1) the 
 reassertion of the essential difference between 
 the primary and the secondary qualities, or, in 
 other words, the proclamation of the impassable 
 gulf between extension, as a percept, and any 
 feeling or series of feelings ; and (2) the assertion 
 that the unit of knowledge is an act of judgment. 
 These are the hinges, it is hardly necessary to 
 add, upon which Kant's philosophy also turns — 
 in the Esthetic and the Analytic. 
 
 As regards the jirst point, it will be remem- 
 bered that the main drift of the philosophy of 
 Berkeley and Hume was to obliterate the tradi- 
 
 Psydiologie, ii. 196), "is an abstraction which never occurs 
 in consciousness. None the less, we are forced to assume that 
 our ideas (Vorstellungen) are everywhere formed out of sensa- 
 tions by a psychological synthesis. " We might perhaps com- 
 pare Hamilton's at first sight paradoxical statement (Lectures 
 on Metaphysics, i. 348) : " I do not hesitate to maintain that 
 Avhat we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not 
 conscious of — that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of 
 the unknown and the incognisable."
 
 94 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 tional and common-sense distinction between the 
 primary and secondary qualities, which Locke 
 had still maintained. By separating tangible 
 from visible extension, and dwelling almost ex- 
 clusively on the perception of distance, Berkeley 
 had seemed to resolve space altogether into a 
 series of sensations of locomotive efibrt. But it 
 gradually becomes apparent that this is really 
 an analysis of space into time — i.e., there is 
 dropped out in the process the distinguishing 
 characteristic of space — the coexistence of points. 
 We have already mentioned Hume's equivocation 
 between impressions of colour and " coloured 
 points " or " coloured points disposed in a certain 
 order." The use of the word point, and still 
 more of the longer phrase, assumes everything. 
 But any number of minima sensihilia, or units 
 of sense, remain, as such, discrete and separate — 
 perishing existences. Without time, there is no 
 continuous element in which we can in any wise 
 pass from the one to the other ; and without 
 space there is no order of coexistence in which 
 they may be disposed in reference to one another. 
 Time and space, it is true, are nothing to us 
 without the minima sensihilia — without their 
 contents — but it is equally true that the minima 
 sensibilia cannot exist as such, except as pre-
 
 Rcid : Sensation and Perception. 95 
 
 sented in time and space. In virtue of such 
 presentation, they become capable of reference to 
 other contents of time and space, and are thereby 
 recognised as members of a permanent world. 
 It is impossible, therefore, either to eliminate 
 space or to reduce it to simpler elements. And, 
 as we have just seen, the more closely psycho- 
 logists and physiologists have investigated the 
 problem, the more clearly has this l)een estab- 
 lished. Professor Bain did good service to psy- 
 chology by insisting on the importance of sen- 
 sations of movement in the development of our 
 idea of space. But motor sensations fins sensa- 
 tions of touch are not enough, it is now admitted, 
 unless the tactual sensations, as depending on 
 the stimulation of distinct nerve-fibres, have each 
 a peculiar local colouring of their own. What 
 is this but to give up the problem, and to end by 
 explaining space by itself ? Space, according to 
 Wundt, is the result of a psychical synthesis, 
 which does not admit of being again resolved 
 into its elements. The elements are never known 
 separately ; but, so far as our research carries us, 
 they may be taken as sensations of movement or 
 innervation, ^jZ2is sensations of touch, ^j/^is the local 
 characteristics which attach to the latter. Thus 
 the researches of the physiological psychologists
 
 96 Scottish Philosophy, 
 
 have been useful in pointing out the several 
 elements by the help of which, or on occasion of 
 which, the mind conies to perceive space. But 
 the distinctive element in the synthesis — or, in 
 other words. Space, the synthesis itself — remains 
 after the analysis just where it was. It cannot 
 be explained into anything else ; it can only be 
 named. It is a fact not without significance 
 when the editor of ' Mind ' (at the close of a very 
 careful article on the respective functions of Psy- 
 chology and Philosophy) is found laying it down as 
 one of the " points in the philosophical theory of 
 knowledge which, since the time of Kant, may be 
 regarded as placed beyond reasonable question, 
 that we know Space, abstractly, as a ' form ' 
 inclusive of sensation, and, actually, as one great 
 continuum (percept not concept) within which 
 all sensible objects are ordered." ^ 
 
 The fact is stated in Kantian language ; and 
 this is no more than justice, seeing that it was 
 in Kant's hands that the distinction between 
 sensation and the form or element which is ne- 
 cessary to its perceptive reality, first acquired 
 world-wide celebrity. Kant made the distinction 
 with a sharpness and a clearness which no one 
 had shown before. But the substantial fact was 
 1 Mind, viii. 21.
 
 Reid : Se^isation and Perceptioji. 97 
 
 stated by Eeid, though he lacked the art to make 
 his discoveries as impressive and prominent as 
 they became in the hands of his German contem- 
 porary. " Space," he says, " whether tangible or 
 visible, is not so properly an object \i.e., in the 
 present connection, matter of sensation] as a 
 necessary concomitant of the objects both of 
 sight and touch." Space, it is true, " seems not 
 to enter at first into the mind until it is intro- 
 duced by the proper objects of sense ; " it is " not 
 perceived by any of our senses when all matter 
 is removed." But " when we perceive any of the 
 primary qualities, si^acc, presents itself as a neces- 
 sary concomitant." ^ Eeid also recognises space 
 as the source of a necessity which sense cannot 
 give. Kant's statements on this point have 
 their parallels in passages like the following : 
 " Some of the determinations we form concern- 
 ing matter cannot be deduced solely from the 
 testimony of sense, but must be referred to some 
 other source. There seems to be nothing more 
 evident than that all bodies must consist of parts ; 
 and that every part of a body is a body, and a 
 distinct being, which may exist without the other 
 parts ; and yet I apprehend this conclusion is not 
 deduced solely from the testimony of sense ; for, 
 1 Works, p. 324, 
 G
 
 98 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 besides that it is a necessary truth, and tlierefore 
 no object of sense, there is a limit beyond which 
 we cannot perceive any division of a body. The 
 parts become too small to be perceived liy our 
 senses ; but we cannot believe that it becomes 
 then incajDable of being further divided, or that 
 such a division would make it not to be a body." 
 " There are other determinations concerning 
 matter, which, I think, are not solely founded 
 upon the testimony of sense : such as, that it 
 is impossible that two bodies should occupy the 
 same place at the same time ; or that the same 
 body should be in different places at the same 
 time ; or that a body can be moved from one 
 place to another without passing through the in- 
 termediate places, either in a straight course or by 
 some circuit. Tliese appear to be necessary truths, 
 and therefore cannot be conclusions of our senses ; 
 for our senses testify only what is, and not what 
 must necessarily be." ^ 
 
 On the second point — his insistence on judg- 
 ment as the unit of knowledge — Eeid again occu- 
 pies the same position as Kant, who, it will be 
 remembered, makes judgment the badge of ob- 
 jectivity in cognition, and professes accordingly 
 to deduce his table of the categories from an 
 
 1 Works, pp. 323, 324.
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 99 
 
 analysis of the act of judgment. lieid's unguarded 
 talk about a knowledge of the sensations i:)cr sc 
 may be pardoned in view of still more serious 
 lapses on Kant's part. For the rest, Reid states 
 his position in the broadest possible way. He 
 denies, as we have seen, the possibility of a start 
 with subjective sensations, or what he calls 
 " simple apprehension." We do not begin by 
 studying the contents of our own minds, and 
 afterwards proceed by inference to realities be- 
 yond. This course, he sees clearly, leads inevi- 
 tably to scepticism. Once cooped up within these 
 limits, we only wait for Hume to make us logical. 
 But the correct " anatomy of the mind " does not 
 bear out such presuppositions. We are never 
 restricted to our own ideas ; from the first, we are 
 in the presence of reality. " Every operation of 
 the senses, in its very nature, implies judgment 
 or belief, as well as simple apprehension." ^ First 
 of these judgments of nature must be taken the 
 implication in every thought or sensation of a 
 permanent subject of thought. But the natural 
 judgments which constitute the apparently simple 
 sensation are not exhausted by this single refer- 
 ence. " Sensation suggests the notion of present 
 existence." " When I perceive a tree before me, 
 Works, p. 209.
 
 lOO Scottish PhilosopJiy. 
 
 my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion 
 or simple apprehension of the tree, but a belief of 
 its existence ; and this judgment or belief is not 
 got by comparing ideas, it is included in the very 
 nature of the perception."^ This judgment of 
 existence, seemingly too obvious to require men- 
 tion, and which Hume, as already remarked, 
 endeavoured to confound with the impressions 
 themselves, is yet found, on analysis and careful 
 consideration, to be the root of the whole matter. 
 The definite judgment of existence by wliich any 
 impression is, so to speak, transfixed, and stopped 
 in its fleeting course, carries with it the idea of 
 an object — that is, in germ, a real world to which 
 we are related, and of which we have, in Eeid's 
 language, an irresistible and necessary belief, or, 
 as we might say without harm, an immediate 
 consciousness or perception. Ego and Non-Ego 
 both emerge in that judgment, and are locked 
 together by it. For we must not suppose that 
 the judgment of existence comes after the refer- 
 ence to a subject. Eeid himself binds us to no 
 such order ; and we ought to guard ourselves, 
 above all things, against importing the idea of 
 chronological succession into an analysis of 
 knowledge. For in a real sense, it may be 
 
 1 Works, p. 209.
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception, i o i 
 
 said that one sucli judgment involves and eon- 
 tains all. 
 
 Recognition of existence, then, means fixation. 
 The sensation, if we still call it so, has become 
 invested with permanency ; it is a percept, an 
 object. Though it is mine, yet it is not me, in 
 that it has relations to a whole real world, of 
 which it is the result, and of which I as yet know 
 nothing, excej)t the fact that I am somehow re- 
 lated to it. A knowledge of what the further 
 relations of the real are, is acquired by the appli- 
 cation of further judgments which are latent in 
 the first or primary judgment. It was the new- 
 ness and unusualness of my state, it may be sur- 
 mised, which first led me to concentrate attention 
 upon it and fix it as existent. But this very 
 curiosity involved the desire to know whence it 
 came, how it came to pass — in other words, its 
 cause. By a more explicit application of the 
 causal judgment, therefore, I seek to connect my 
 sensation with some change in the objects around 
 me ; I connect the smell (to take Reid's former 
 example) with the presence of a visible and tac- 
 tual object called a rose. Here, again, I am 
 employing a principle which is not derivable from 
 experience or comparison of ideas, but is involved 
 in the genesis of experience as such. In course
 
 I02 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 of time, as my thinking becomes more capable 
 of abstract distinctions, I separate the different 
 aspects of the rose in thought, and affirm them 
 all, as qualities, of the rose, as substance. Once 
 more, however, we may note that the determin- 
 ation of any quality as a quality is implicit in the 
 first challenge of the sensation — in the refusal to 
 let it pursue its own transitory existence, floating 
 over the surface of an animal sentiency, unexplain- 
 ing and unexplained. By that challenge, the 
 notion of reality is once for all constituted for the 
 mind ; there emerges for consciousness the notion 
 of a real world — the notion of permanence and 
 change. This contrast lies in the most elemen- 
 tary judgment of differentiation, in which con- 
 sciousness might be figured as arising. It is 
 because we cannot regard each moment as sufii- 
 cient unto itself, that we are betrayed into ex- 
 planation — into connecting the sensitive and 
 transient content with an existence at least 
 relatively permanent and self-subsistent. Such 
 a reference is, in slightly different forms, the 
 judgment of substantiality and the judgment of 
 causality ; and these are the chief levers in the 
 interpretation of nature. In very deed, and per- 
 haps in a deeper sense than Eeid meant his 
 words, these are "natural judgments" — "judg-
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perceptio7i. 103 
 
 ments immediately inspired by our constitu- 
 tion" — for the self-conscious l)eing does simply 
 convey into such judgments his own " constitu- 
 tion" — the self-explaining contrasts of his own 
 nature — unity in multiplicity and permanence 
 in change. 
 
 The last sentence suggests a word or two in 
 conclusion as to the ultimate nature of explana- 
 tion, in regard to which a good deal of misconcep- 
 tion seems current. Eeid says on one occasion 
 that, in the last resort, " we know as little how 
 we perceive as liow we are made," ^ He is 
 combating certain metaphorical explanations of 
 the perceptive process, which in reality explain 
 nothing ; and his curt words convey a truth 
 which may be more generally expressed. We 
 are what we are, as Butler says, and we can give 
 no reason for our own nature — i.e., for the nature 
 of self-consciousness ; we can simply analyse it, 
 and state its constitution, as accurately as may 
 be. Accordingly, when we have placed any con- 
 nection of matter of fact on the same footing as 
 the fundamental relations in wliich our own life 
 consists, we have done all that we can be expected 
 to do. Yet the views which are perhaps most 
 widely current almost exactly reverse what has just 
 1 AVorks, p. 302.
 
 104 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 been said. There are many, like Mill, who, when 
 driven, by innate candour and the stress of logic 
 combined, to admit certain undeniable facts of 
 our conscious life,^ still insist upon treating that 
 life as (in their own words) a final inexplicability 
 — that is to say, a solitary riddle left unread 
 among the generally well-explained phenomena 
 of nature. Self-consciousness is presented by 
 such thinkers as the exception to the general 
 course of things — the one lock that cannot be 
 fitted, instead of being itself the key which opens 
 to us all the wards of the universe. Its essential 
 nature is spoken of by one writer as a " peculi- 
 arity," which makes it hopelessly "intractable 
 and puzzling " to deal with ; another refers to its 
 leading characteristic as a " curious fact." Mys- 
 terious enough, if you will, but not curious, A 
 curious fact is something out of the way, some- 
 thing unexpectedly stumbled upon in the midst 
 of a smoothly-going scheme of things ; and such 
 a phrase implies a fundamental misconception of 
 the nature of explanation and the limits of its 
 possibility. And a similar confusion is observable 
 in all the attempts, so widely current, to explain 
 higher or more complex facts by exhibiting their 
 genesis out of simpler conditions. As science, 
 1 Examination of Hamilton, chap. xii.
 
 Reid : Sensation and Perception. 105 
 
 such explanations are in tlieir proper place, and 
 are at once interesting and valuable ; but, when 
 put forward as philosophy, they simply invert 
 the true point of view. Philosophical explana- 
 tion must always set out from the highest term 
 of the series ; in any ultimate statement of 
 the nature of that which is, the lower must be 
 explained by the higher, and not vice vcrsd. All 
 other explanation explains away, and is no better 
 than the attempt to get something out of nothing. 
 All principles of explanation, accordingly, are 
 derived, and must be derived, from the nature of 
 the explaining Self; they are transcripts, so to 
 speak, of its own constitution. To seek to pene- 
 trate beyond this is really, as Lotze sometimes 
 quaintly puts it, wishing to know how being is 
 made.
 
 io6 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 REID AND KANT. 
 
 In the preceding Lecture, two points were sig- 
 nalised in which a parallel might be drawn 
 between Eeid's work and the work of Kant. It 
 remains for us to see how far, having regard to 
 other aspects of Eeid's philosophy, we are justified 
 in maintaining a comparison between the two 
 men. 
 
 We may best begin by considering Eeid's 
 account of the principles which he declares to 
 be essential to the very existence of knowledge. 
 As regards the nomenclature which he adopts, 
 it may be admitted, at the outset, that the name 
 " Principles of Common Sense " is unfortunate on 
 account of its misleading associations — associa- 
 tions which have been strengthened rather than 
 weakened by the unguarded utterances of its
 
 Reid and Kant. 107 
 
 champions. The term is misleading, because it 
 confounds philosophy and life. No doubt the 
 end of a true philosophy is to justify ordinary 
 knowledge and practice — that is, to state and 
 harmonise the principles on which they rest. So 
 far as a philosophy fails to do this — so far as 
 it abolishes distinctions and principles that are 
 actually present in life — we must agree with 
 Reid that such a system is "at war with the 
 common-sense of mankind." We must conclude 
 that it is an inadequate, one-sided, and therefore 
 fallacious, system. But though philosophy is 
 thus ultimately to be judged by its accordance 
 with life, the two must always remain essentially 
 separate. They move on different planes. Life, 
 whether knowing or doing, is a direct process. It 
 is the primary fact — the object under examination. 
 Philosophy is reflection upon life — a process 
 wholly secondary and indirect. They differ as 
 any process differs from the theory of the process. 
 We may do without philosophy, if we will ; but 
 we cannot make common-sense, in the ordinary 
 acceptation of the term, take its place and do its 
 work. Now this fundamental distinction is often 
 obscured by the language of the Scottish philoso- 
 phers. This is fully admitted by Hamilton, 
 even in the act of defending the argument from
 
 io8 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 Common Sense as truly philosophical. " It must 
 be allowed," he says, " that the way in which it 
 has been sometimes applied was calculated to 
 l)ring it into not unreasonable disfavour with the 
 learned. . . . Some of those who opposed it to 
 the sceptical conclusions of Hume did not suffi- 
 ciently counteract the notion which the name 
 might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatic- 
 ally proclaim that it was no appeal to the unde- 
 veloped beliefs of the unreflective many ; and 
 they did not inculcate that it presupposed a 
 critical analysis of these beliefs by the philoso- 
 phers themselves. On the contrary, their language 
 and procedure might even sometimes warrant an 
 opposite conclusion." ^ But when this is once said, 
 perhaps there is nothing to be got Ijy harping 
 further upon it; for, in spite of some almost 
 inexcusable passages, there is no doubt that 
 Eeid would have admitted the truth of the dis- 
 tinction that has just been made. He is much 
 too fond of opposing " the vulgar " to the tribe of 
 philosophers — to "all philosophers, ancient and 
 modern," as he goes the length of saying on one 
 occasion. But it is always, more or less, a point 
 with philosophers to demonstrate the harmony of 
 their doctrine with the common beliefs of men. 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 752.
 
 Reid and Kant. 109 
 
 We need only recall Berkeley's very similar 
 references to philosophers as a body, and his 
 assurances, for example, that since his " revolt 
 from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates 
 of nature and common-sense, he found his under- 
 standing strangely enlightened " ^ — in order to 
 judge Eeid's utterances more leniently. But even 
 if we put the worst possible construction upon 
 his words, his own action sufficiently belies them. 
 He proceeds to ^undertake that very critical 
 analysis of consciousness which, according to his 
 supposed principles, would have been unnecessary. 
 Does he apologise for doing so ? On the contrary, 
 he undertakes the analysis unhesitatingly, as a 
 matter of course ; and, in spite of his hard words 
 about philosophers, he claims to take his place as 
 one of them. In writing to Hume about his own 
 ' Inquiry,' for example, he avows himself Hume's 
 " disciple in metaphysics," and speaks of himself 
 as " attempting to throw some new light on these 
 abstruse subjects." These are not the words of a 
 man who deems philosophy superfluous, inasmuch 
 as it may be picked up from every rustic. In 
 truth, the opposition .emphasised by Eeid is not 
 
 1 A number of similar expressions ai'e quoted from Berkeley 
 by Reid (Works, p. 283), and every reader of Berkeley will recall 
 many more.
 
 no Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 properly between Common Sense and Philosophy, 
 but between the " Philosophy of Common Sense " 
 and all previous philosophies. More particularly, 
 the antagonism lies between the Philosophy of 
 Common Sense and the prevailing drift of modern 
 philosophy, which Eeid named the ideal system. 
 It is because philosophers in general seemed to 
 him, in adopting that system, to have divorced 
 themselves from reality, that we hear so much in 
 Eeid of the opposition between philosophy and 
 the common consciousness of man. As Hamilton 
 puts it, the argument from common-sense, in 
 Eeid's hands, "is only an appeal from the her- 
 etical conclusions of particular philosophers to 
 the catholic principles of all philosophy." ^ 
 
 But in order to be convinced of the close 
 relationship which subsists between Eeid's prin- 
 ciples and those which are elsewhere offered, 
 under more imposing titles, for our acceptance, 
 it is only necessary to turn to some of the other 
 names and descriptions of them which he gives 
 in difierent parts of his writings. In the preface 
 to the ' Inquiry,' he couples common-sense at once 
 with reason (" tlie common-sense and reason of 
 mankind ") ; and this is never retracted. If, at 
 one point,- first principles are expressly excluded 
 1 Reid's Works, p. 751. 2 Hji^i., p. 108.
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 1 1 
 
 from the province of reason, that is because, in 
 the context, " reason " is equivalent to the modern 
 " reasoning " or the discursive faculty ; and what 
 is intended is simply to assert the self-evident 
 character of first principles, which renders them 
 incapable of proof.^ Throughout the ' Inquiry ' 
 there is no special account of the nature of the 
 principles beyond their designation — and that is 
 highly important— as judgments. They are re- 
 ferred to as original and natural judgments, as 
 judgments of nature, as simple and original prin- 
 ciples of our constitution, and so forth — the term 
 principles of common-sense remaining the favour- 
 ite. In the ' Essays,' however, there is a fuller and 
 maturer treatment of this point. Here there is 
 less frequent use of the term common-sense, the 
 principles being generally spoken of simply as 
 
 ^ In a fine passage of the ' Essays,' Reid repeats this very dis- 
 tinction, while emphatically asserting, in the same breath, the 
 inseparable union of the two. " It is absurd to conceive that 
 there can be any opposition between reason and common- 
 sense. It is indeed the first-born of Reason ; and as they are 
 commonly joined together in speech and in writing, they are 
 inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to reason two offices, 
 or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident ; 
 the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from 
 those that are. The first of these is the province, and the 
 sole province, of common-sense ; and, therefoi'e, it coincides 
 with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for 
 one branch or one degree of reason." — Works, p. 425.
 
 1 1 2 ScottisJi Philosophy. 
 
 " first principles " or " common principles." In 
 his official chapter on " First Principles in Gen- 
 eral," in the Essay on Judgment, Eeid describes 
 them as " intuitive judgments," " self - evident 
 principles," " propositions which are no sooner 
 understood than they are believed." Each " has 
 the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion 
 to borrow it from another " ; and he quotes with 
 approbation Shaftesbury's incidental designation 
 of them as " natural knowledge, fundamental 
 reason, and common-sense." These terms may 
 take their place without shame alongside of 
 Kant's pure reason, his principles of pure under- 
 standing, his categories or root-conceptions, his 
 principles of synthesis a priori. 
 
 To Eeid, as to Kant, his principles are the 
 source of a necessity which sense, as sense, can- 
 not give. But if we ask any further reason for 
 the principles themselves, Reid wisely answers 
 that they are " a part of our constitution," " a 
 part of that furniture which nature hath given 
 to the human understanding " ; or, if we prefer 
 the term, we may justly call them " the inspiration 
 of the Almighty." " No reasons can be given for 
 original principles but the Will of our Maker." 
 Neither does Kant profess to prove why our pure 
 perceptions and categories are what they are.
 
 Reid and Kant. 113 
 
 The transcendental proof of the principles faces 
 entirely towards experience ; it proves that, if 
 we take any portion of actual experience to 
 pieces, we shall find that it is held together, so to 
 speak, by the presence of these elements. But 
 if we care to raise a further question, no proof 
 can possibly be offered why experience, or, to put 
 it more broadly, why reason, why God, should not 
 have had a totally different nature. The question 
 itself is idle. 
 
 But the mention of the transcendental deduc- 
 tion suggests an important point in which Eeid 
 is usually thought — and, as we shall see, not with- 
 out reason — to compare unfavourably with Kant. 
 Wliat proof does Eeid offer of the necessity — i.e., 
 the indispensahleness — of these principles, which 
 he adduces as ultimate, and refers to the constitu- 
 tion of the mind ? It is commonly said, to his 
 discredit, that he offers none, — that it is simply 
 matter of assertion with him, an appeal to in- 
 tuition — that is, to an un verifiable subjective con- 
 sciousness. Hume had shown, by a deduction 
 from principles accepted among philosophers, that 
 certain beliefs had no warrant, and had thereby 
 explained away certain existences, such as mind 
 and matter, which are usually taken for granted. 
 In answer to this, it would seem, according to a 
 
 H
 
 1 1 4 ScottisJi Philosophy. 
 
 current account of the afi'air, as if Reid had 
 simply cried in the streets, so to speak, asseverat- 
 ing that, in spite of fliilowinliy, he found a guaran- 
 tee of these realities and principles within his 
 breast, and that lie was determined to hold to them. 
 To which Hume, of course, could always answer, 
 with a tinge of compassion, that certainly there 
 was no harm in keeping the beliefs, and acting 
 upon them — as he himself, for the matter of that, 
 was fully prepared to do — but that really, so far 
 as philosophy was concerned, this was in no 
 sense a relevant answer, so lonf^ as the reasoning 
 remained unattacked, which, by laying bare their 
 origin, had destroyed their warrant. This is sub- 
 stantially the idea which Kant had of Eeid and 
 the Scottish philosophers, and it has been too 
 readily accepted by those who represent the Ger- 
 man influence in British philosophy. Eeid has 
 doubtless had to suffer in part for the sins of the 
 lesser men who took up the cry against Hume. 
 Undoubtedly, too, he frequently gives occasion 
 himself to the enemy, by the way in which he 
 parades the opposition between philosophy and 
 common-sense. For although we may grant to 
 Eeid that, in a certain sense, ridicule, as he often 
 says, may be a test of truth, yet the clumsy and 
 ineffective ridicule with which he sometimes
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 1 5 
 
 assails the sceptical position resembles too closely 
 Dr Johnson's rough - and - ready refutation of 
 Berkeley, and inevitably suggests to unfriendly 
 readers a misapprehension of the philosophic 
 position. Eidicule is a weapon which should 
 be sparingly used in philosophical discussion. 
 It is so easy to make sport for the Philistines, see- 
 ing that any philosophic position whatever must 
 wear a look of unreality to those who are content 
 to live among the things of sense. Thought, as 
 such, or the ultimate statement of any fact, has 
 a flavour of absurdity to the man who does not 
 think. Eeid is not to be defended, therefore, so 
 far as he resorts to this unworthy philosophical 
 horse-play. But such passages are not the essen- 
 tial parts of Eeid. It has been seen that, so far 
 from meeting Hume's conclusion by an unsup- 
 ported reassertion of what was there sceptically 
 explained away, Eeid, admitting the formal cor- 
 rectness of the reasoning, set on foot a rigorous 
 investigation into the premisses or assumptions 
 on which the conclusion depended, by way of 
 discovering whether there did not lurk in these 
 some root of falsity, which vitiated all that fol- 
 lowed. No procedure could be more distinctively 
 philosophical than this. And we have seen that 
 he found this root of falsity in the ideal system.
 
 1 1 6 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 The ultimate elements of knowledge are not de- 
 tached ideas or states of consciousness ; " natural 
 and original judgments " alone make experience 
 possible. In Kantian language, mere sense is an 
 abstraction ; and therefore we cannot make a 
 start with it in explaining knowledge. 
 
 Yet it must be admitted that, in this matter 
 of proof, Eeid does fall short of Kant. " By 
 attending to the operations of thinking, memory, 
 reasoning, we perceive or judge," he says, "■ that 
 there must be something which thinks, remem- 
 bers, and reasons, which we call the mind." ^ 
 But he never fairly explains the reason of this 
 "must." We need only compare Reid's state- 
 ment with Kant's deduction of the unity of 
 apperception, in order to be aware of the differ- 
 ence. A permanent subject, Kant argues, is 
 necessary even for the comparison of two sen- 
 sations, even for the passage from one moment 
 of time to the next ; experience would fall to 
 pieces without it. To draw a line, even, implies 
 consciousness of the first parts as we go on to 
 the next. Without the reference to a permanent 
 Self, as principle of synthesis, the line would fall 
 asunder into numberless punctual dots ; the first 
 being forgotten before the second came on the 
 
 Works, p. 421.
 
 Reid and Kant. i i 7 
 
 scene, so that each, in its turn, would he for us 
 a perpetual first. But experience is not of this 
 sieve-like character; accordingly, to explain our 
 actual experience — i.e., to account for its being 
 what it is — a permanent Self becomes a necessary 
 assumption. Such is the essence of the tran- 
 scendental deduction — the proof by reference to 
 the possibility of experience. It essays no ab- 
 solute (or abstract) proof of the principles or 
 categories. It does not profess to show that 
 experience must be as it is ; but, taking ex- 
 perience as a fact, it proves that we could not 
 have such an experience without the presence 
 of certain principles. There is nothing difficult, 
 and surely nothing mystical, about the proof. 
 It is the time-honoured logical reductio ])cr iin- 
 possibile. Withdraw the rivets, it says, and ex- 
 perience tumbles to pieces. Suppose the prin- 
 ciples absent, and follow up the supposition into 
 its consequences ; you will find that the result 
 does not tally with reality, and cannot, indeed, 
 be stated in terms of thought. How very near 
 Eeid came to the spirit of such an argument, may 
 be seen from his remarks (Sixth Essay, c. 4) 
 on first principles, and the nature of the proof 
 they admit of. " It may be ol »served," he says, 
 " that although it is contrary to the nature of
 
 ii8 ScottisJi PliilosopJiy. 
 
 first principles to admit of direct or apodictical 
 proof, yet there are certain ways of reasoning 
 even about them, by which those that are just 
 and solid may be confirmed, and those that are 
 false may be detected. First, it is a good argu- 
 ment ad Jiominem, if it can be shown that a first 
 principle which a man rejects, stands upon the 
 same footing with others which he admits. . , . 
 Secondly, a first principle may admit of a proof 
 ad ahsurdum. In this kind of proof, which is 
 very common in mathematics, we suppose the 
 contradictory proposition to be true. "We trace 
 the consequences of that supposition in a train 
 of reasoning ; and if we find any of its necessary 
 consequences to be manifestly absurd, we con- 
 clude the supposition from which it followed to 
 be false, and therefore its contradictory to be 
 true." ^ The general statement of the argument 
 is there, but there is wanting the luminous ap- 
 plication of it, which alone constitutes the real 
 discovery of a method. We look in vain in Eeid 
 for anything that could, with any strictness of 
 language, be called an application of the method 
 of proof here enunciated. Certainly he does not, 
 like Kant, make it the point on which his entire 
 system turns. 
 
 1 Works, p. 439.
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 19 
 
 When Eeid does offer any proof of his prin- 
 ciples, he has recourse by predilection to the 
 argument from universality of acceptance — the 
 riidd fadi, which Kant stigmatises as carrying 
 with it no certificate of validity. His favourite 
 appeal is to common-sense, "where every man 
 is a competent judge" — to "the consent of ages 
 and nations, of the learned and unlearned." ^ 
 As regards this argument, however, which has 
 drawn upon Eeid so much opprobrium from 
 succeeding philosophers, it is only fair to add 
 that his way of putting it is not always so un- 
 philosophical as is generally supposed. The ob- 
 jections to this mode of arguing are, in the first 
 place, that it is the acceptance of a verdict from 
 those who have never learned to reflect; and 
 secondly, that it is impossible to get at anything 
 like a really universal consensus of opinion, or 
 to reach, with any certainty, the actual contents 
 and structure of the uucorrupted consciousness. 
 Eeid, however, does not leave his authority so 
 vague ; he provides his scattered and inarticulate 
 multitude with an accredited spokesman and in- 
 terpreter. "We shall frequently have occasion," 
 he says in the beginning of the ' Essays,' " to argue 
 from the sense of mankind eoqjrcsscd in the struc- 
 
 ' AVoiks, p. 439.
 
 1 20 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 ture of language." ^ This line of argument does 
 not occur in the ' Inquiry,' but throughout the 
 ' Essays ' the argument from common-sense is al- 
 most identified with this appeal to " the structure 
 and grammar of all languages." " The structure 
 of all languages," he says, " is grounded upon 
 common notions." The distinction, for example, 
 " between sensible qualities and the substance, 
 to which they belong, and between thought and 
 the mind that thinks, is not the invention of 
 philosophers ; it is found in the structure of all 
 languasfes, and therefore must be common to all 
 men who speak with understanding." - Here 
 we have, at all events, an incorruptible witness, 
 and one that will abide our questions. And if 
 we reflect upon the closeness of the connection 
 between grammar and the Aristotelian logic, the 
 argument has manifest affinities with Kant's 
 deduction of the categories from the forms of 
 judgment. In neither case have we, strictly 
 speaking, a proof of the principles. What we 
 have is, in Kant's language, rather a clue to the 
 discovery of principles, which require afterwards 
 the transcendental proof. 
 
 It is the presence and conscious application 
 of this latter proof that gives Kant his chief 
 
 ^ Works, p. 233. •' Ibid., pp. 229, 454.
 
 Reid and Kant. 121 
 
 advantage over his Scottish contemporary. At 
 all events, it is the transcendental deduction 
 that has played the most important part in 
 the arguments of the English Kantio-Hegelians. 
 This is the pivot on which Green's famous ' Intro- 
 duction to Hume ' turns ; and it is beyond doubt 
 that the vital part of Kant's achievement may 
 be all gathered round this one centre. What- 
 ever is not covered by this proof is mere padding, 
 or architectonic display. But, in comparing Kant 
 with Eeid, it must not be forgotten that Kant's 
 followers — his English followers especially — have 
 transformed his doctrine. It is a serious mistake 
 to suppose that, in Green, for example, we have 
 simply a revival of Kant, or a revival of Hegel, 
 or a combination of the two. Materials certainly 
 have been drawn from both these thinkers ; but 
 the result is a type of thought which has never 
 existed before, and of which it is absurd, there- 
 fore, to speak as an importation from Germany. 
 It has been developed within the shadow of, and 
 with special reference to, the ' Treatise of Human 
 Nature ' — a book which was practically unknown 
 to the great German thinkers. Its method is 
 Kantian, and it uses Hegel only as a means of 
 surmounting Kant's subjective presuppositions, 
 leaving on one side the technicalities of the
 
 I 2 2 Scof^is/i PJiilosophy. 
 
 Hegelian system. But it is far more thorough- 
 going than Kant ; and it is hardly paradoxical 
 to say that, if we take Reid at his strongest and 
 best, the broad sweep of his protest against in- 
 dependent ideas bears a very close resemblance to 
 Green's massive argument against unrelated im- 
 pressions. The resemblance is even closer, one 
 might almost say, than that which exists be- 
 tween Green and the general tenor of the 
 ' Critique of Pure Reason.' For Kant had only 
 Hume's ' Inquiry ' before him, and we know that 
 it was simply Hume's analysis of causality 
 which first roused his critical reflection. More- 
 over, if the truth must be confessed, Kant does 
 not himself consistently employ the i^roof which 
 he so brilliantly states, and which he ostensibly 
 makes the lever of his whole investigation. 
 Even in the very section in which he states 
 the principle of a transcendental deduction, he 
 excepts the categories from its operation, and 
 thereby deprives his theory of its only solid 
 foundation. The evidence of this will occupy 
 us presently. 
 
 Meanwhile it only remains to sum up the 
 general results of this survey of Reid's work, un- 
 dertaken in view of the parallel achievement of 
 Kant. Besides the defective proof, it must be
 
 Re id and Kant. i 2 3 
 
 freely admitted that Reid's enumeration of prin- 
 ciples is neither so full nor so methodical as 
 Kant's, He had not the latter's passion for 
 architectonics and finality. Not that there did 
 not hover hefore Keid's eyes too the ideal of " a 
 system of the mind," which should consist, in 
 Kant's language, of " an inventory, systematically 
 arranged, of all that is given us by pure reason." ^ 
 "A clear explication and enumeration of the 
 principles of common-sense," he says, in conclud- 
 ing his first work, " is one of the chief desiderata 
 in logic." ^ But his estimate of his own achieve- 
 ment, both then and in his later work, was char- 
 acteristically modest : " If the enumeration should 
 appear to some redundant, to others deficient, and 
 to others both — if things which I conceive to be 
 first principles should to others appear to be vul- 
 gar errors, or to be truths which derive their 
 evidence from other truths, and therefore not first 
 principles, — in these things every man must judge 
 for himself. I shall rejoice to see an enumeration 
 more perfect in any or in all of these respects." ^ 
 These are not altogether suitable words in a phi- 
 losopher's mouth; but I fear no one can read over 
 what Reid calls " first principles of contingent 
 
 ^ Critique of Pure Reason, First Preface. 
 
 - Works, p. 209. 3 Ibid., p. 441.
 
 1 24 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 truth," without judgin^ii; that he has really fallen 
 into both the faults he mentions, and into the addi- 
 tional one of bad arrangement. The truth is, Eeid's 
 lack of form, and his frequent want of precision 
 in statement, have militated fatally, from the first, 
 against his being ranked as a philosophical classic. 
 The difference between Eeid and Kant in this 
 respect is striking. Though Kant's style is in- 
 volved, his terminology often cumbrous, and his 
 works abounding in repetitions, yet he mingles no 
 extraneous and strictly indifferent matter with 
 his argument. In each of his great works there 
 is the sense of a unity of aim which the repetitions 
 only serve to make more prominent. On the 
 other hand, Eeid's properly philosophical positions 
 are imbedded in a mass of irrelevant psychologi- 
 cal matter-of-fact, which obscures their bearing 
 and impairs their force. Kant and Eeid were 
 both university professors, but their method of 
 working was different. Eeid's books, especially 
 his later ' Essays,' are in the main his lectures 
 prepared for publication ; and they are marked, 
 therefore, by a greater diffuseness and by a more 
 popular character than we have a right to expect 
 in a written treatise. Kant, on the other hand, 
 appears to have made a rigid distinction between 
 his work as a university teacher, and his work as
 
 Reid and Kant. i 2 5 
 
 a regenerator of philosophy. The latter was ail- 
 dressed not to students and general readers, Ijut 
 to teachers and to a learned public. If, as the 
 story goes, not actually written down with the 
 care which a magmim opus might be supposed to 
 demand, no labour had been spared in working 
 out the plan and phraseology of the ' Critique ' 
 with a precision worthy of its destination. Eeid 
 wrote no magnum optts, in the sense in which 
 Kant wrote several. He had no learned class to 
 whom he could have appealed, if lie had written 
 with the elaborate technicality of Kant. His 
 works were addressed to the reading portion of 
 his countrymen generally — to his old students, in 
 great part, and the ministers of religion, into 
 whose ranks many of them had doubtless passed. 
 The Faclimann, or specialist, has hitherto not 
 flourished among us, and the disadvantages of his 
 absence are obvious. But it is possible that what 
 Scottish philosophy has lost in scientific precision 
 may have been compensated for, in part, by the 
 greater influence which it has exerted upon the 
 body of the people — an influence which has made 
 it a factor, so to speak, in the national life. It is 
 matter of history, on the other hand, that the great 
 idealistic movement in Germany in the beginning 
 of this century passed entirely over the heads of
 
 126 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the German people. It passed away, leaving the 
 ground clear for a variety of crude materialistic 
 theories. The so-called Kantian revival, of whicli 
 so much has been heard of late, where not merely 
 philological, has been for the most part a popular- 
 ising of Kant's Agnostic results. Hegel's philo- 
 sophy has had a wide, and frequently unobserved, 
 influence in moulding many departments of 
 thought ; but, as 'pli%losoi)liy , it never lived in Ger- 
 many beyond the confines of the schools. It 
 spoke in an unknown tongue, and the people 
 were not edified ; it may be said to have died of 
 its technical dialect. Of course the mass of the 
 people cannot be philosophers, any more than 
 they can be experts in any science. But philoso- 
 phy, just because it discusses subjects of such 
 momentous import, lies nearer to their hearts 
 than any science of detail can do ; and therefore 
 things cannot be altogether healthy, when there 
 is no manner of touch whatever between the 
 many and the few. The many are sure in that 
 case to be left a prey to superficial crudities, or to 
 practical materialism. 
 
 But be that as it may, Eeid's candid acknow- 
 ledgment of his imperfections may be accepted 
 in good part. His deficiencies and redundancies 
 ought not to make us overlook what is really to
 
 Rcid and Kant. 127 
 
 be found in liis works. It behoves us rather to 
 gather toaether what is valuable, and to ftive it 
 its proper setting. This is partly what we have 
 been trying to do. We have now to turn to Kant, 
 in order to consider his system shortly as a whole. 
 
 The leverage hero also was supplied by Hume ; 
 and the form in which the question was taken up 
 by Kant was that of the possibility of necessary 
 connection. Kant could not doubt that necessary 
 connection is a fact. But Hume had just shown 
 that this necessity could not be given by sense ; 
 and following up this proof, he had dissolved 
 our knowledge into particular perceptions, wdiose 
 connections were purely contingent and custom- 
 ary. Kant adopts Hume's position on the first 
 point. Sense, he argues, cannot give necessity ; 
 and he identifies sense with that of which we are 
 passively recipient — with that which comes to us 
 from the object. From this Kant concludes that, 
 if our perceptions are wholly due to sense — if 
 we are wholly limited to contributions from the 
 object, — there can be no other necessity than the 
 custom-bred semblance of it which Hume offers. 
 If, on the contrary, we hold by necessity (as the 
 facts compel us to do), it must come from some 
 other source — from the only other possible source,
 
 128 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the subject. This is Kant's Coperuican idea. 
 Granted that a world of mere sense would be a 
 huddle of contingent units, this unlimited contin- 
 gency is not the world we know. The world we 
 know must, therefore, be dependent for its prin- 
 ciples of necessary connection — i.e., for its most 
 important determinations or characteristics — upon 
 the knowing mind. The human mind is not the 
 humble satellite of things that it was formerly sup- 
 posed to be ; on the contrary, objects, as we know 
 them, draw from the mind, as from a central 
 source, those principles of rational connection that 
 make them knowable. For example, it is beyond 
 doubt that we recognise objects in space — i.e., as 
 outside of one another, and as consisting of parts 
 that are outside of one another ; and the extension 
 of bodies is, so to s]3eak, the basal quality on 
 which the other qualities are superimposed. The 
 placedness of objects, moreover, is something over 
 and above the qualitative difference of one sen- 
 sation from another; it is something different in 
 kind, and cannot be given by any series of 
 sensations as such. We must not speak, there- 
 fore, of generating space out of impressions. No 
 cunning mixture of impressions, with whatever 
 rapidity and regularity they may follow one 
 another, could give us more than just so many
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 29 
 
 impressions. Space or externality, accordingly, 
 is a condition of the possibility of objects, to be 
 carefully distinguished from the prick of sense, 
 on occasion of which it is presented to the mind. 
 And, as the prick of sense is all tliat is attributed 
 by Kant to the object, he naturally concludes 
 that space must be presented to the mind by the 
 mind's self, of its own initiative and on its own 
 authority. Space is the mind's " form " or mode of 
 perception. In other words, the fundamental de- 
 termination of the external world, as such, is due 
 to a subjective projection from the perceiving mind 
 — a subjective net, in Dr Stirling's phrase, thrown, 
 as it were, by the mind to catch impressions. 
 
 When we pass to the categories, or connective 
 principles of the understanding, the procedure is 
 the same, or at least it is the same in one aspect 
 of Kant's teaching. Prominent among these no- 
 tions or principles, it will be remembered, are 
 those of substance and cause, which Hume had 
 left as a problem, and with which we found 
 Eeid also busying himself. Without these prin- 
 ciples and others, it is impossible to construct 
 experience as we know it. Objects are objects 
 solely in virtue of their presence ; or, in Kant's 
 language, perceptions without notions are blind. 
 But the principles or notions cannot be given
 
 1 30 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 by sense ; therefore they must be infused into 
 sense by the mind. A chaos (Gewiihl) of phe- 
 nomena might fill the sense - dependent soul, 
 but without notions no cognition could arise : 
 notions are, as it were, the threads of connec- 
 tion which the mind shoots through the chaos. 
 Sense, as sense, would, according to Kant, be a 
 mere blur — a manifold, not even recognised as 
 a manifold. In short, to have the cognition of 
 objects in space, as we do in point of fact per- 
 ceive them, we must add to sense the pure forms 
 of perception (time and space), the judgments 
 or principles of pure understanding (the cate- 
 gories), and, as presupposed in all, the unity of 
 apperception, which grasps everything in one 
 consciousness or one world. Each of these ele- 
 ments is an abstraction without the other — 
 that is, they are incapable of separate realisation. 
 You cannot have impressions without simultane- 
 ously proceeding to arrange them in space and 
 time ; and you cannot have space and time 
 without the categories, for you construct space 
 and time by means of active synthesis, and the 
 categories are the principles of that synthesis. 
 Nor can you have the Ego apart from its act of 
 synthesis : to speak paradoxically, it creates itself 
 and its object by, and in the course of, the same
 
 Reid mid Kant. 131 
 
 synthetical act. At no point can tliis circle of 
 mutual presupposition be broken. 
 
 The synthesis effected by the unity of ap- 
 perception in tlie jumble of particulars, is 
 what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension 
 or of imagination — synthesis speciosa. And he 
 says at one point explicitly that all synthesis, — 
 such, even, as makes perception or apprehension 
 (Wahrnehmung) possible, — must be subjected to 
 the conditions of the categories (unter den Kate- 
 gorien) ; and again, the imaginative synthesis is 
 expressly said to take place according to the 
 categories (den Kategorien gemass).^ The syn- 
 thesis of the imagination must be, indeed, in 
 consistency, just the synthesis of the understand- 
 ing in action. The categories are the Ego's modes 
 of judgment, its forms of connection. Its nature 
 is expressed in them, or reflected into them ; and 
 through them it realises itself. It cannot com- 
 bine and connect except through its own forms 
 of combination and connection ; and, as it is 
 only through such synthesis that it is itself ac- 
 tual, the Ego is manifestly inseparable from the 
 categories. This is what Kant would seem 
 bound by his own principles to say ; and at 
 some points — as in the passages quoted above 
 
 ^ Werke, iii. 127 (ed, Hartenstein, 1868).
 
 132 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 — he certainly does appear to say it. According- 
 ly some of his interpreters have presented this 
 as the consistent Kantian doctrine, treating irre- 
 concilable utterances as mere incidental fallings- 
 away on Kant's part. But the mass of irrecon- 
 cilable statements is too great to be so treated, 
 and Kant's final deliverances are, unfortunately, 
 directly opposed to the consistent theory out- 
 lined above. The reason of this failure in con- 
 sistency will probably become apparent, if we 
 keep the theory steadily in view, and examine the 
 consequences in which it involves us. 
 
 We must remember, then, that the constructive 
 elements of the world, not being found in sense 
 as sense, have been referred to a mental or sub- 
 jective source. Therefore, although we have a 
 cosmos or world before us, that world is not the 
 real world ; it is not the world we set out to 
 know. It is, in part, an effect of the world of 
 real existence ; but we cannot by any conceivable 
 possibility tell how the world of knowledge — 
 which we may henceforth call the phenomenal 
 world — stands related to the world of reality, 
 or, as Kant calls it, the noumenal world. We 
 have vindicated rationality and necessity of con- 
 nection for our universe ; and we have now a 
 cosmos, or nature, in which science can work.
 
 Rcid and Kant. 1 3 3 
 
 But this lias been achieved at a terrible cost. 
 For we have to bear in mind that, without ex- 
 ception, as Kant puts it, the objects we are 
 dealing with are "not things-in-themselves, but 
 the mere play of our ideas, which in the end are 
 merely determinations of the internal sense." ^ 
 "All objects without exception with which we 
 busy ourselves are in me — that is, are determina- 
 tions or modes of my identical self." ^ Hence, 
 though it seems paradoxical and absurd to speak 
 of the understanding as prescribing laws a priori 
 to nature, the wonder ceases, according to Kant, 
 if w^e reflect "that this nature is itself nothing 
 but a sum of phenomena — not a thing-in-itself, 
 therefore, but only a number of subjective ideas 
 (eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemiiths).^ 
 The subjective derivation of law is, indeed, a 
 matter of course ; for Kant explicitly tells us 
 that, " as mere ideas, [phenomena] are subject 
 to no law of connection except that which the 
 connecting or synthetic faculty prescribes."^ 
 
 " As mere ideas — ' Vorstellungen ' or mental 
 facts — they are subject to no law of their own" 
 Is this true ? Is the contribution from the 
 side of the object this mere manifold or chaos 
 
 1 Werke, iii. 569. - Ibid., p. 585. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 576. •* Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
 
 1 34 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 — this jumble of unconnected and mutually in- 
 difierent particulars ? Do we really introduce 
 a subjective, and to that extent arbitrary, order 
 into this objective chaos, thus working up a 
 formless material into a coherent world ? Evi- 
 dently, such a conception of the attitude of the 
 individual subject to the influences which reality 
 brings to bear upon him is not tenable for a 
 moment. Nor does Kant himself attempt to 
 maintain that the given " matter " is pure matter 
 or unlimited contingency. He admits that " em- 
 pirical laws as such can in no wise derive their 
 origin from the pure understanding — as little, 
 indeed, as the boundless multiplicity of pheno- 
 mena can be sufficiently understood from the 
 pure form of sense-perception." ^ In other words, 
 the given matter has laws of its own, to begin 
 with. We cannot weave it into any phantasma- 
 goria we please ; we are determined in its regard 
 — bound down to follow a certain course in our 
 construction of sense-objects. To a large extent, 
 at all events, our task is merely to read off what 
 is there in the material, waiting to be deciphered. 
 " But all empirical laws," Kant proceeds, " are 
 only particular determinations or applications 
 of the pure laws of the understanding."- If 
 1 Werke, iii. 583. ^ Hjjj^ p, 534.
 
 Re id and Kant. 1 3 5 
 
 this is the case, as reflection shows it must be, 
 why may we not go a step further, and evolve the 
 general law from the particular cases of it fur- 
 nished by the empirical data ? What necessity is 
 there for the appeal to a subjective source at all? 
 This point is admirably pressed home by Dr 
 Stirling in his ' Text-book to Kant,' and else- 
 where.^ I have stated above the view of Kant's 
 theory, which makes him, in a way, consistent with 
 himself. This view has been worked out more 
 particularly by English thinkers, who use Kant as 
 an instrument of philosophy rather than exactly 
 state the Kantian system. The few passages 
 which, if rigorously interpreted, may be taken as 
 supporting such a view, are put completely out of 
 sight by the mass of evidence which proves Kant 
 himself to have held a very different-complexioned 
 theory. Objects, Kant says, may quite well be 
 given to us in space and time independently of 
 the action of the categories ; they may certainly 
 appear to us without any necessary reference to 
 
 1 I hardly require to point out how much I am indebted to 
 Dr Stirling throughout this account of Kant. ]\Io.st of my 
 readers will be aware of what I may call the Kantian campaign 
 recently undertaken by our veteran metaphysician. Opened 
 in the 'Journal of Speculative Philosophy,' it may be said to 
 have been successfully concluded in the 'Text-book to Kant.' 
 This has recently been followed by two articles in ' Mind,' under 
 the title, " Kant has not answered Hume."
 
 136 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the functions of the understandmg. Perception 
 or intuition, merely as such, he says, has no need 
 whatever of the functions of thought. In short, 
 Kant does not take his own dictum rigorous- 
 ly, that perceptions without notions are hlind. 
 They are blind only in so far as they are, so to 
 speak, not focussed. The intelligence, we might 
 say, has not exerted itself aLout tliem — has not 
 thrown itself upon them, and fixed them as such 
 and such. It remains a kind of mirror for reality, 
 much as the field of vision in the retina receives 
 images — which, however, are only vaguely present 
 till they are actively focussed or fixed at the 
 centre of the field. Kant, as is his wont, has a 
 special function to account for the information 
 or perception so acquired. The synthesis of im- 
 agination, he says, " as a blind but indispensable 
 function of the soul," must be held to precede the 
 action of the understanding. Elsewhere he calls 
 it the first synthesis of apprehension, which, as it 
 were, runs through the units of sense, giving them 
 continuity, and bringing to light, as we must sup- 
 pose, the connections which really exist in the 
 matter submitted. It is only when recognition 
 is added to apprehension, he seems to say, that 
 notions or categories come in. To this uncate- 
 gorised perception — crude perception Dr Stirling
 
 Reid and Kant. 137 
 
 calls it — Kaiit allows a wide range. Xot only 
 lias imagination the preparatory work of laying 
 out the units as a spatial and temporal manifold, 
 ready for the action of the category, which is to 
 strike them into unities or ohjects, and to Ijind 
 these ohjects together in necessary honds ; Kant 
 speaks, and speaks advisedly, of ohjects as already 
 present to the mind hefore the categories act. 
 We may perceive objects, and also connections 
 between objects ; but, he adds, it is only inrcdv- 
 ing, in a narrower sense of that word. The result 
 is only a judgment of perception — a statement of 
 matter of fact, devoid of necessity. I have, for 
 example, the perception of the sun and the per- 
 ception of warmth in a stone, and I find that, as 
 matter of fact, the second follows the first. So 
 much I find by merely adding to the empirical 
 data the perceptional forms of space and time ; 
 but the assertion of a dynamic or necessary con- 
 nection between the two — the judgment that the 
 one is actually the cause of the other — is only to 
 be made, according to Kant, by bringing out the 
 category, and stamping therewith this particular 
 case of succession. Only thus do I reach cogni- 
 tion or experience in the narrower sense of that 
 word, as opposed to perception. When I say, " the 
 sun warms the stone," I have formulated a scien-
 
 J 
 
 8 Scottish Philosophy 
 
 tific or universally valid statement ; in Kantian 
 language, I have made a judgment of experience. 
 This is a most lame and impotent conclusion ; 
 l.)ut it has apparently been the result of much 
 anxious thought on Kant's part. After the iirst 
 publication of the ' Critique/ the question of 
 causality in particular was evidently, as Dr 
 Stirling puts it, the cause of many cold sweats 
 to Kant. Between the first and the second edi- 
 tion, the consideration forced itself irresistibly 
 upon him that there must be some reason why in 
 tills case of succession I bring forward the cate- 
 gory of causality, whereas in another case I single 
 out reciprocity, and in another, perhaps, am con- 
 tent with the categories of quantity. What guid- 
 ance have I in employing now one category, now 
 another ? Evidently there is none in the catego- 
 ries themselves. They are ready, but indifferent ; 
 they await their summons. Whence does the 
 summons come then ? Whence can it come but 
 from the sense-elements themselves — from the 
 apprehended data ? If, on perceiving the suc- 
 cession of the sun and the warm stone, I employ 
 Causality, whereas, when I perceive in succession 
 the top and the bottom of the faqade of a house, 
 I prefer to use Quantity, my choice must be due 
 to some difference in the facts before me — a differ-
 
 Reid and Kant. 139 
 
 eiice which I perceive, and which induces me to 
 say that the one is a case of causaHty, the other 
 of quantity. I see, a causal order in the one case, 
 a merely quantitative order in tlie other. But if 
 the order is already there, why pretend to intro- 
 duce it, as something entirely new, from the side 
 of the subject ? As Dr Stirling graphically puts 
 it : " The category that is to be called out must 
 liave its appropriate cue. . . . The empirical 
 variety itself must, ... as it were, blow its own 
 prompter's whistle before my judgment can be 
 expected duly to subsume it into the appointed 
 checker." The use to which Kant eventually 
 puts the categories is, therefore, simply to add the 
 mind's stamp of necessity to connections which 
 exist independently, but which, as so existing, are 
 said to be merely contingent. But it is no more 
 than saying in both cases. If the connection is 
 contingent, how can any action of mine make 
 it necessary ? If not because I see that the 
 connection is necessary, how am I entitled to call 
 it so ? There seems, indeed, no reason whatever 
 for saying that it is first contingent, and only after- 
 wards necessary, except that otherwise the cate- 
 gories would find their occupation too palpably 
 gone. Accordingly they have this ceremonial 
 office conferred upon them.
 
 140 ScottisJi Philosophy. 
 
 The truth seems to be, as I have tried to put it 
 elsewhere,^ that Kant wavered between the view 
 of sense as a chaotic manifold compelled into 
 order Ijy tlie individual's forms and categories, and 
 the view of it as an empirically ordered manifold 
 in which all determination belongs to the object, 
 and is simply recognised by the subject. Only 
 on the former view could the sul jjective machinery 
 of the categories be of real use ; and Kant's first 
 thought apparently was that they functioned in 
 that way. But the pressure of facts — nothing 
 less than an incorrigible world of real connections 
 — drove him speedily into the second position, 
 which is summed up in the distinction already 
 quoted from the ' Prolegomena' between judgments 
 of perception and judgments of experience. 
 
 The categories, then, are useless, because they 
 simply do over again what is already sufficiently 
 done in the objects themselves ; they merely auto- 
 matically register what is there before them. May 
 not the argument, however, have another turn 
 oiven to it ? Is not this demonstration of their use- 
 lessness and superfluity just another way of saying 
 that, hccause the categories are already in tilings, 
 we do not require subjectively to supply them ? 
 
 1 In a review of Dr Stirling's ' Text-book to Kant,' in ' Mind,' 
 vii. 275.
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 4 1 
 
 Or, to put it otherwise, the data presented to us 
 already involve the different forms of necessary 
 and rational relatedness which the categories, as 
 subjective functions, were invoked to supply. If 
 this is so, Kant's work has not been altogether in 
 vain. It is the old story of The, Icing is dead : long 
 live the king ! As subjective functions, the cate- 
 gories are superfluous, but only because they live 
 in the object. In this case, however, the given 
 element must be something very different from 
 what Kant supposed at the outset ; reason and 
 necessity enter into its very structure. Indeed, 
 if we but reflect, it must strike us as an incongru- 
 ous idea that this human mind of ours should, as it 
 were, supply the defects of the world, and breathe 
 into it principles of which it contains itself no 
 hint. This is the fatal weakness of all theories 
 which rest on innate ideas or intuitions of the 
 mind ; and the same subjective suggestion has 
 obstinately clung to the term categories also, and 
 even yet discredits those who use it. There is, 
 it must unfortunately be admitted, too much 
 reason for the bad odour it enjoys, when we 
 consider its source in Kant. But as against all 
 such conceptions of a subjective reason, experi- 
 ence is great, and will prevail. We must get 
 rid, once for all, of the notion that the mind adds
 
 142 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 anything to things. To add is to disfigure, to 
 distort, to betray. But the function of mind is 
 to know things, and to know them as they are. 
 
 Our attitude, in short, towards the philosophy 
 of Experience must entirely depend upon the 
 meaning we put into the term Experience. Kant, 
 it will have been observed, in joining issue with 
 the Empiricists, accepts the Humian position on 
 two important points : first, that the given ele- 
 ment in knowledge is sensation ; and secondly, 
 that sensation is a mere contingent manifold, and 
 can give no necessity. Hence, of course, there 
 follows, in the third place, Kant's own expedien 
 to save necessity ; it must, on these terms, be the 
 contribution of the mind in the process of know- 
 ing. But the attempt to carry out this new 
 conception has had for Kant (or at least for us, 
 viewing the spectacle of Kant's hopeless plung- 
 ings) the result of refuting one of the premisses 
 on which it depends. The given element is not 
 to be identified with mere sensation or contin- 
 gency. It yields to the knower objects and 
 relations of objects, which are, to begin with, 
 just what the categories are supposed afterwards 
 to make them, and which, but for the shame of 
 the thing, Kant would call rational and necessary.
 
 Reid and Kant. 143 
 
 And the argument formerly pressed home apphcs, 
 it need hardly he added, along the whole line — to 
 the pure perceptions of space and time no less 
 than to the categories,^ But if we make Experi- 
 ence, in this way, simply equivalent to the 
 contribution of the object, then derivation from 
 experience does not imply the absence of reason. 
 It is a mistake to make any divorce, such as Kant 
 makes, and timorous idealists are ever fond of 
 making, between the contributions of the oljject 
 and those of the subject, and to speak as if the 
 latter possessed a higher value. To do so is to 
 invite misconception ; for the disproof of sub- 
 jective origin, which is usually easy enough, is 
 apt to be taken lightly as a disproof of the 
 reason -constituted cliaracter of the facts in 
 question. We ought to have no hesitation in 
 proclaiming that we are all Experientialists, all 
 Evolutionists. The point on which issue should 
 be joined is the identification of Experience with 
 mere sense. If we prove that this is not so, and 
 that, on the contrary, mere sense is an abstraction 
 impossible in rcrum naturd, Experientialism is at 
 once shorn of all its supposed terrors. 
 
 ^ For, as definite location in space must be somehow given, if 
 it is not to be purely arbitrary, there is prima facie no reason 
 for supposing Space as a whole to be merely a subjective form.
 
 144 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 And this, in my view, is the important point 
 proved by the speculations of Kant and Ileid 
 alike. By neither is it stated with perfect clear- 
 ness and consistency. But the proof is contained 
 for us in Eeid's distinction Ijetween Perception 
 and Sensation, in his denial of a possible evolu- 
 tion of the one from the other, and in his ex- 
 hiliition of some at least of the Principles or 
 Judgments involved in the former. It is also 
 contained for us in Kant's demonstration that 
 the essential constitution of objects involves the 
 elements of space and time and the connections 
 expressed by the categories, all of which are 
 incapable of being given, by sense as sense. In 
 agreement so far, Eeid and Kant part company 
 entirely on the question of the reality of our 
 knowledge, or what it is that we know. Having 
 shown the baselessness of the accepted theory of 
 ideas, which evolved an illusory objectivity out of 
 subjective units, Pieid felt that he had broken 
 down the middle wall of partition which cut us 
 off from reality ; he felt entitled to claim an im- 
 mediate knowledge of the real world. In Hamil- 
 ton's phraseology, he was a Natural Eealist. 
 Kant, on the other hand, having rashly accepted 
 from Hume the principle or prejudice that mere 
 sense is all that can come from the object, took a
 
 Reid and Kant. 1 45 
 
 very different course. Instead of, like Ileid, al)an- 
 doning " the ideal system," he elahorately recon- 
 structed it, endeavouring to give it a more rational 
 and tenable form. Kant is, indeed, the very prince 
 of Eepresentationists, and the Representationism 
 of the present day has its roots almost entirely in 
 the Kantian theory. But, in this respect, Kant 
 must be considered to be ultiimis JRomanorum. 
 The tlieory reached its final shape in his hands, 
 and that shape dissolves away before a touch of 
 criticism.
 
 146 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE: 
 KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 In agreement as to the reason-constituted char- 
 acter of our experience, Eeid and Kant part 
 company, as we have just seen, on the question 
 of its relation to reality. And if the Scottish 
 philosopher seems here in advance of the Ger- 
 man, so far as the soundness and ultimate ten- 
 ability of his position is concerned, the reason 
 is that Eeid had gone further than Kant in 
 questioning the ideal system. In constructing 
 his theory, Kant never questioned the fundamen- 
 tal assumption of that system, that we can know 
 only our own ideas — Vorstellungen — or mental 
 states. With Kant, then, as with Locke, our 
 ideas, instead of bringing us into connection with 
 things, really shut us off' from them. But, with the
 
 The Relativity of Knozuledge. 147 
 
 analysis of Locke's successors in view, Kant does 
 not find it possible to retain Locke's belief that 
 the mental images literally represent or picture 
 the nature of the real things. Extension, which 
 was to Locke the clearest example of this mirror- 
 ing of reality in the idea, is adduced by Kant as 
 a demonstrative instance of that which cannot be 
 derived from sensation at all, and which reflects, 
 therefore, not the nature of things but only the 
 nature of the mind. In proportion as Kant, 
 having accepted Hume's proof of the impotence of 
 sensation to yield connection, denudes the objective 
 contribution of its permanent elements, and trans- 
 fers them to the subject's side of the account — in 
 the same proportion do the real things, which form 
 the background in Locke's theory, become more 
 and more shadowy. They become, indeed, in all 
 strictness, an x — an unknown power to produce 
 certain effects in us. The objectivity which Kant 
 secures for experience is, therefore, only a qwisi 
 objectivity ; it is a subjective objectivity, or an 
 objectivity without reality. Kant's world is ob- 
 jective as compared with Hume's, in that it is 
 lifted out of the flux of sensation and the acci- 
 dent of association by the presence of rational 
 elements. But these elements (because they are 
 not sensation, according to Kant's way of arguing)
 
 148 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 are merely subjective or mental. So that Kant's 
 world is, after all, as little the real world we 
 desiderate as Hume's ; with either we remain* 
 Agnostics. And if that is so, it is comparative- 
 ly indifferent whether our subjective world be 
 Imtched by the heating power of custom out of 
 sense alone, or whether it is begotten of the union 
 of sense with certain subjective forms of reason- 
 This practical indifterence is exemplified by many 
 a would-be j)bilosopher at the present day. In 
 repudiating metaphysics, the sceptic or Agnostic 
 finds it equally convenient to swear Ijy Hume or 
 by Kant ; and it is almost a matter of accident 
 which comes uppermost. 
 
 The Agnosticism, Phenomenalism, or Subjec- 
 tivism, inherent in the Kantian theory, is suffici- 
 ently seen in the fruits it has borne, not only 
 among men of general culture, but among professed 
 adherents of the philosophic doctrine. Lange, 
 the author of the ' History of Materialism,' is a 
 typical example, and he has had a large following 
 among the so-called Neo-Kantians of Germany. 
 To Lange, and those who think with him, the 
 great achievement of the 'Critique' is to have 
 finally sriain the chimeras of metaphysics, by 
 fixing the limits of our necessary ignorance. 
 And, of course, abundant evidence may be adduced
 
 The Relativity of Knoivledge. 149 
 
 to prove liow strongly Kant's own mind was 
 possessed by this view of liis achievements ; 
 though it is only fair to add tliat, in such passages, 
 where he speaks of the utility of the philosophy 
 of pure reason as of an entirely negative character, 
 Kant has usually in his mind the complementary 
 function of the practical reason for which he is 
 "making room." But this completion of the 
 theory is, in general, rejected by the followers in 
 question. They are content to abide by the 
 negative results. 
 
 There is no necessity, however, to go so far 
 afield for instances of the Agnostic tendency of 
 the ' Critique.' Hamiltonianism shows, on the face 
 of it, a mingling of Kantian and Scottish elements. 
 I do not believe that there is any real fusion 
 in Hamilton of these elements ; nor need this 
 astonish us, if we consider the incompatibility of 
 the two doctrines. Any attempt to ingraft the 
 Agnostic relativity of the ' Critique ' upon the 
 Natural Eealism of the Scottish philosophy is, 
 I hope to show, contrary to the genius of the 
 latter. But anything I have to say on this 
 point will be more intelligible and more in place 
 after a consideration, on its merits, of the doctrine 
 of the Eelativity of Knowledge, as we find it both 
 in Kant and Hamilton.
 
 1 50 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 It is easy to trace the genesis of the doctrine in 
 Kant's mind. It arose, as we have abeady seen, 
 from iiis original identification of the "given" with 
 mere sense, from his subsequent discovery that 
 mere sense cannot give rational connection, and 
 his consequent conclusion that such principles 
 of connection must be supplied by the mind, or, 
 in other words, that the fluid and indeterminate 
 data of sense must be poured into certain mental 
 moulds or faculties. The position is generalised 
 by Kant in such passages as the following : — 
 
 " What may be the nature of objects, considered as 
 things in themselves and without reference to the re- 
 ceptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us. 
 We know nothing more than our own mode of 
 perceiving them, which is peculiar to us." 
 
 " Supposing that we should carry our empirical 
 perception even to the very highest degree of clear- 
 ness, we should not thereby advance a step nearer to 
 a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things 
 in themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a 
 complete cognition of our own mode of perception, 
 that is, of our sensibility." 
 
 " This receptivity of our faculty of cognition is 
 called sensibility, and remains toto coelo different 
 from the cognition of an object in itself, and that 
 even though M^e should look the phenomenon through 
 and through to the very bottom." 
 
 " Everything in our knowledge that belongs to per- 
 ception contains nothing more than relations, . . . 
 and by means of mere relations a thing cannot be
 
 The Relativity of Knozvledge. 1 5 1 
 
 known in itself." The external sense gives ns, there- 
 fore, " only the relation of an object to the subject, but 
 not the inward essence {das Innere) which belongs 
 to the object in itself." — Werke, iii. 72, 73, 76. 
 
 A few passages may be quoted from Hamilton, 
 as an example of many more, in which he lays 
 down a similar position. In the opening of his 
 celebrated article on the Philosophy of the Con- 
 ditioned, he refers to Kant's recognition of " the 
 important principle " that " pure reason, as purely 
 subjective, and conscious of nothing hut itself," is 
 " unable to evince the reality of aught beyond the 
 phenomena of its personal modifications." 
 
 Again, in the same article, speaking in his own 
 person, he says : — 
 
 " Our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be 
 nothing more than a knowledge of the relative mani- 
 festations of an existence, which in itself it is our 
 highest wisdom to recognise as beyond the reach of 
 philosophy." — Discussions, p. 1 4. 
 
 " That all knowledge consists in a certain relation 
 of the object known to the subject knowing, is self- 
 evident. . . . All qualities both of mind and of 
 matter are, therefore, only kno'svii to us as relations ; 
 we know nothing in itself." — E-eid's Works, p. 965. 
 
 The same thought is more elaborately expressed 
 in a well-known passage : — 
 
 " Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter is 
 relative — conditioned — relatively conditioned. Of
 
 1 5 2 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 tilings absolutely or in themselves, be tliey external, 
 be they internal, we know nothing, or know them 
 only as incognisahle ; and become aware of their in- 
 comprehensil)lo existence only as this is indirectly 
 and accidentally revealed to us through certain qualities 
 related to our faculties of knowledge. . . . All that we 
 know is, therefore, phenomenal — phenomenal of the 
 unknown. The philosopher, speculating the worlds 
 of matter and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only 
 an ignorant admirer. In his contemplation of the 
 universe, the philosopher, indeed, resembles ^neas 
 contemplating the adumbrations on his shield ; as it 
 may equally be said of the sage and the hero — 
 
 'Miraturque; rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet. ' " 
 — Discussions, p. 608. 
 
 " We may suppose existence to have a thousand 
 modes ; but these thousand modes are all to us as 
 zero, unless we possess faculties accommodated to 
 their apprehension. But were the number of our 
 faculties coextensive with the modes of being — had 
 we for each of these thousand modes a separate 
 organ competent to make it known to us — still would 
 our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of 
 the relative. Of existence absolutely and in itself, 
 we should then be as ignorant as we are now." — 
 Metaphysics, i. 153. 
 
 The Eelati\dstic argument thus exemplified 
 appears to me to combine several lines of thought, 
 from each of which it derives a certain degree of 
 plausibility. The first line of thought makes the 
 argument applicable only to the human faculties 
 of knowledge — to man as a finite being, furnished
 
 The Relativity of Knozu ledge. 1 5 3 
 
 with a certain finite apparatus for tlie acquisition 
 of knowledge. The aro^ument from the limited 
 number of our senses lies on the surface, and 
 Hamilton borrows it from Voltaire's philosophical 
 apologue. With, at present, five or six avenues 
 of knowledge, it is argued, we apprehend, as it 
 were, only so many facets or aspects of existence. 
 But we can conceive the number of the senses 
 indefinitely increased — in which case each new 
 sense would be to us the revelation of a hitherto 
 unknown side of existence. Eeality may be 
 raying out its splendours in countless to us un- 
 known ways, our eyes being holden meanwhile, 
 that we cannot see. In dealing with this mode 
 of argument, it may be readily granted that the 
 conception is an admissible one. It may well be 
 that the revelation of the qualities of existence 
 which we enjoy is not complete ; it may be more 
 complete in other beings, or it may be destined 
 to become more complete in our own case by-and- 
 by. But it has to be noted, first, that this possible 
 limitedness of our apprehension in no way dis- 
 credits our actual apprehension of the qualities 
 of the real, so far as that apprehension goes. 
 Secondly, it has to be observed that such a way 
 of speaking is fundamentally misleading, in so far 
 as it mentions only knowledge got by the special
 
 154 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 senses, and leaves entirely out of view what 
 Aristotle called the common sensibles. In other 
 words, our knowledge is treated as if it were a 
 mere mechanical ranging side by side of the data 
 of the different senses ; reason in sense is com- 
 pletely ignored. But we have seen in these lec- 
 tures, almost to superfluity, that perception is not 
 sensation, even from any conceivable number of 
 senses, but that it is the presence and operation 
 of reason in sense that constitutes knowledge of 
 reaKty, even the most meagre. 
 
 This is the true retort to those also who, with- 
 out enlarging on the numerical paucity of our 
 avenues of knowledge, insist upon their peculiar 
 character. Man, it is said, naturally swears by 
 the truth of his own faculties ; but he is evidently 
 not a judge in the matter, for he has no other 
 means of acquiring information. A creature 
 with difierent faculties would have the same 
 implicit confidence in the record of its faculties. 
 Should the two ever come face to face, and begin 
 to cliampion their respective faculties, who, it is 
 asked, would be able to decide between such dis- 
 putants ? They apprehend reality, as it were, 
 from different angles ; what each apprehends is 
 the truth for him — the only truth he can attain 
 to. But who will say that either of them is in
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 155 
 
 possession of the al)Solute truth — the absolute 
 nature of the fact ? Who will he presumptuous 
 enough to assert that his own angle is the pre- 
 scriptive angle of absolute truth ? An added 
 plausibility is sometimes lent to such arguments 
 by giving them a physiological turn, and pointing 
 in evidence to the varying structure of tbe sense- 
 organs in different creatures. Can we suppose, 
 it is said, that the image of the world wliich these 
 different creatures form is the same for all, or 
 must we not rather hold it to vary with the 
 varying structure of the organs ? But if this is 
 so, who shall decide which is the absolute or 
 normal perception ? Now, as before, we need not 
 deny a certain range of applicability to this sup- 
 position, so far as regards the data of the special 
 senses — the so-called secondary qualities. An 
 eye may be organised, for example, so as not to 
 be cognisant of all the colours of the spectrum. 
 If the eye is coarsely organised, certain of the 
 distinctions may escape discrimination ; or, its 
 fineness bemg retained within certain limits, the 
 spectrum might be shortened for it at one end or 
 at both ends. So much we need have no hesita- 
 tion in admitting. But, when generalised so as 
 to cover the whole process of perception, the 
 argument rests once more upon the uuw^arranted
 
 156 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 isolation of the senses. According to Plato's 
 ever-fresh analogy, we must beware of supposing 
 that we are Trojan horses, in which are perched 
 a certain number of unconnected senses, and that 
 the nature of knowledge may be determined by 
 an inspection of the inlets. Impressions of sense 
 are not knowledge ; knowledge lies, as Plato says, 
 only in the action of reason upon such impres- 
 sions — ev Se Tw TTepi e/ceti/cov (TvWoyuTjXM. Or in OUr 
 Scottish way of putting it, which is also Kant's, 
 perception is perception by the presence of ele- 
 ments which could not possibly be conveyed in 
 by any or all of the special senses. And as it is 
 in these elements — notably in the perception of 
 bodies as extended and as causally connected with 
 one another — that we hold our knowledge of the 
 world to consist, the character of such knowledge 
 is not affected by any arguments which apply, at 
 most, to the senses as senses. 
 
 But the issue may be accepted by the Ptclativist 
 in the form in which it has now been put. A¥hen 
 we talk of reason, it may be said, and of principles 
 involved in perception as such, we are still con- 
 fined within the circle of our own constitution. 
 Wliat is reason or our rational nature but a sort 
 of psychical organisation, which may be peculiar 
 to us as men, and may distort or modify the
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 5 7 
 
 nature of the real in many a way, which it is, 
 of course, impossible for us either to know or to 
 rectify. Our pure percepts of space and time and 
 our categories, objectifying as their influence is 
 upon sense, may yet be merely subjective forms, 
 and may hide from us the real nature of things, 
 instead of revealing it. Our knowledge would 
 then be relative only to ourselves ; it would be 
 a phenomenal knowledge — a knowledge not of 
 things as they are, but as they appear to us. In 
 other words, w^e should perceive to a great extent, 
 if not altogether, not the actual nature of things, 
 but just what we put into them. This, as we 
 have seen, is the position taken up by Kant ; and 
 he was led to it by his idea that what is not 
 given by sense must be given by the subject. 
 What is referred to the subject passes too 
 easily into a faculty which has to be applied to 
 an alien or independent matter. The faculty is 
 then represented as imposing its own constitution 
 upon the foreign matter, and thus compelling it 
 into moulds, which, it may be, are in no way 
 natural to the matter itself. Scottish philosophy 
 was fortunate enough, it seems to me, to escape 
 this danger, by taking up the broad position that, 
 while the principles in question are referable to 
 the constitution of our nature, our nature is, in
 
 158 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 respect of tliem, in complete harmony with the 
 nature of things — so that they may, with equal 
 truth, be spoken of as perceived or recognised in 
 things. A little reflection will perhaps convince 
 us that this is the sounder and more catholic 
 position. For, it may be asked to begin with, 
 where does Kant derive the warrant for his only 
 or merely, when he asserts dogmatically, as he 
 frequently seems to do, that the forms of space 
 and time (to go no further) are merely forms of 
 our intuition, and have no applicability to things 
 in themselves ? He was at most entitled to put 
 the case problematically. It is always possible 
 that our forms of perception 7nay be peculiar to 
 ourselves, and may not represent the actual state 
 of things. But it is at least equally possible that 
 the account they give is perfectly accurate, or, in 
 other words, that we do perceive thmgs as they 
 are. At least equally possible, I have said ; but, 
 in truth, what grounds of any sort exist for the 
 supposition of distortion ? I assume, of course, 
 that the knowledge of the actual constitution 
 of things is a desideratum ; it is what we set 
 out to know. But when we have performed 
 the process — when we do know things in the 
 only way possible to us — the Eelativist steps 
 in and tells us that we are not a step nearer
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 159 
 
 true knowledge than before. We have falsified 
 our own operation, and that in an inevitable and 
 irremediable way. The mechanism of our mental 
 constitution is expressly devised to throw us out, 
 and to cut us off from a knowledge of things as 
 they really are. Is this, I will simply ask, an 
 account which commends itself to a reasonable 
 being? Does it seem likely that everything 
 should be expressly arranged for failure in this 
 fashion ? Surely the presumption, at all events, 
 is all the other way. It may be granted that the 
 abstract doubt is possible, for we see that it has 
 been raised. It is possible that, when we have 
 sated ourselves with knowledge, we ought always 
 to add that, in all probability, the real thmgs are 
 quite different, or, at any rate, that they may be 
 so, for all that we can know to the contrary. If 
 any one finds ease to his conscience in the making 
 of such provisos, I should be sorry to interfere 
 with the satisfaction of a scrupulous nature. 
 Again I admit that his abstract doubt can never 
 be disproved ; but, having said that, I will merely 
 add that, for my own part, I am content to believe 
 that no such pitfalls are laid for us. In the words 
 of a recent writer : " We are entitled to start with 
 the assumption of a harmony between the consci- 
 ous and the non-conscious, perfect equivalence
 
 i6o Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 between the idea and the ideatum. . . . Given 
 an external object, that object becomes to my 
 consciousness. Why should the process vitiate 
 itself ? The onus prolmuii lies on him who sup- 
 poses it does." ^ 
 
 But, secondly, the Agnostic position may be 
 defended by placing it on a broader basis. The 
 reference to tlie human faculties, as in some way 
 possibly special in their nature, may be dropped ; 
 and the relative or merely phenomenal character 
 of knowledge may be deduced from the considera- 
 tion that knowledge is essentially and inevitably 
 a relation. It can contain, therefore, as Kant 
 says, " only the relation of the object to the sub- 
 ject, but not the inward essence which belongs to 
 the object in itself." Kant takes up this ground 
 in many passages, and so does Hamilton, very ex- 
 plicitly. "That all knowledge," says Hamilton, 
 " consists in a certain relation of the object known 
 to the subject knowing is self-evident. . . . 
 All qualities both of mind and of matter are 
 therefore only known to us as relations ; we know 
 nothing in itself." Nor could any remedy be 
 
 1 Metaphj'sica Nova et Vetusta, by Scotus Novanticus, p. 45. 
 Since these Lectures were delivered, Scotus Novanticus lias laid 
 aside his anonymity, and appeared in his own person as Pro- 
 fessor S. S. Laurie.
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 6 r 
 
 found in the nniltiplication of our faculties or 
 in any change wrought upon them. According 
 to the passage already quoted : "Were the num- 
 ber of our faculties coextensive with the modes of 
 being, . . . still would our knowledge be, as it 
 is at present, only of the relative. Of existence 
 absolutely and in itself we should then be as 
 ignorant as we are now." In other words, to put 
 the case quite plainly, we are necessarily cut off 
 from knowing the real constitution of anything, 
 because any intelligence can know only by means 
 of its faculties of knowing. In order to know 
 what things are, we must know them. But, in 
 becoming known, the things we want to know are 
 transformed under our hands. They are sub- 
 mitted to a relation in which they did not stand 
 before ; and thus we never arrive at a knowledge 
 of the pure nature of the object — the thing in 
 itself apart from that relation. The thing we 
 wanted to know has escaped us, and something 
 else lies in our grasp instead. The thing-in-itself 
 is thus unknowable by intelligence on any terms ; 
 it must lurk in some recess of the universe un- 
 known and unknowable even by a Divine Intelli- 
 gence. For divine intelligence itself cannot know 
 without knowing. It can only know by means 
 of its powers of knowing, and its knowledge will 
 L
 
 1 62 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 be a relationing. In short, according to this 
 account, the process of knowledge is everywhere 
 constituted so as eternally to defeat its own end. 
 The defect is inherent in the act as such ; just 
 because we hnow things, we are shut out from 
 knowing the real things. Does not the whole 
 position seem passing into the region of absurdity ? 
 A scathing criticism of the conception may be 
 found in the second part of Dr Stirling's 'As 
 regards Protoplasm.' The conclusion of the 
 whole matter is, as Dr Stirling roundly states 
 it, that " there is no such thing anywhere as this 
 in-itself that is said to be unknown." We have 
 been in pursuit of a phantom of our own creating 
 — a shadow of the real world projected by an 
 imperfect logic. The phantom dissolves into 
 sheer contradiction and absurdity, as soon as 
 we realise the full meaning and scope of the 
 assertions that are made about it. As Terrier 
 puts it, " there can be an ignorance only of that 
 of which there can be a knowledge." That which 
 is absolutely and necessarily unknowable to all 
 intelligence is not a name for a hidden reality, 
 far less the type of all reality ; it is simply 
 another name for a contradiction, for nonsense.^ 
 The doctrine of relativity is thus a condem- 
 
 ^ Cf. Institutes of Metaphysic, Part ii. prop. 3, and 'passim.
 
 TJie Relativity of Knowledge, 163 
 
 nation of our knowledge, and of knowledge in 
 general, because it fails to achieve an impossi- 
 bility. The untenable nature of the doctrine 
 is probably best seen when it is contemplated 
 in its generality, as has just been done. But 
 the widespread acceptance which, in one form 
 or another, it enjoys, is probably due to the 
 existence of certain correlative notions which we 
 are continually employing in experience, and 
 which lend themselves readily to misuse. The 
 notions in question are such as substance and 
 quality, noumenon and phenomenon, the thing- 
 in-itself and its appearance, the essence and its 
 manifestation, the Ego and its actions or states. 
 Correlative notions or conceptions are conceptions 
 each of which exists only through the other ; and 
 where there is nothing expressed but the pure 
 fact of correlation, we may go further, and say 
 with truth that the one correlative actually is 
 the other. But, just because this is so, it is 
 only necessary to separate these inseparables, 
 in order to arrive at the conclusion that one of 
 them is either non-existent, or, as is contended 
 by the thinkers we are dealing with, unknowable. 
 The familiar conjunction of substance and qual- 
 ity is suddenly transformed into the grandiose 
 opposition of the Unknowable and its manifes-
 
 1 64 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 tntion. All that we have to do is to apply the 
 logic of abstract identity, which asserts that a 
 thing is eternally itself, and not another thing. 
 The qualities are the qualities, and the substance 
 is the substance ; the substance is, accordingly, 
 different from the qualities. We may know the 
 qualities ; but it does not therefore follow that, 
 in the qualities, we know the substance. On 
 the contrary, it follows, as we have no extra- 
 knowledge to show, that our knowledge is limi- 
 ted to the qualities or the phenomenal, while 
 substance or the noumenon lurks behind un- 
 known. Hamilton accepts this position in the 
 fullest sense. " There are two opposite series 
 of expressions," he says : " first, those which de- 
 note the relative and the known ; and secondly, 
 those which denote the absolute and the un- 
 known. Of the former class are the words 
 phenomenon, mode, modification, state. Of the 
 latter class — that is, the absolute and the un- 
 known — is the word subject, and its analogous 
 expressions, substance and sub-stratum." ^ Thus 
 " mind and matter, as known or knowable, are 
 only two different series of phenomena or quali- 
 ties ; mind and matter, as unknown and unknow- 
 able, are the two substances in w^hich these two 
 ^ Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 148.
 
 TJic Relativity of Knozuledge. 165 
 
 different series of phenomena or qualities are 
 supposed to inhere." ^ This line of thought 
 (which may perhaps be called a third thread in 
 the relativist argument) conducts Hamilton, as 
 it had conducted Kant before him, to the as- 
 sertion that we are ignorant not only of the 
 real nature of things, but also of the real nature 
 of our own selves. This conclusion might ex- 
 cusably be treated as a reductio ad absicrdum of 
 the doctrine, and of the logic which leads to it; 
 but the doctrine has found favour with so many 
 eminent philosophers, that it demands a fuller 
 and more respectful consideration. It is not 
 altogether easy, however, to discover what these 
 philosophers, who dilate upon our ignorance of 
 substance, would consider to be a knowledge of 
 substance. On the one hand, they seem to fall 
 back into the line of thought already exposed, 
 which virtually challenges us to know without 
 knowing — to take hold of a thing without touch- 
 ing it. On the other hand, it seems as if they 
 insisted on knowing substance, not as we actually 
 do know it, but by sense — that is, as a separate 
 sensation added at the end of the series or com- 
 plex of sensations which constitute its qualities. 
 The truth is, on the contrary, that qualities as 
 ^ Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 138.
 
 1 66 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 qualities are no more given by sense than sub- 
 stance is. The correlative conceptions are given 
 together, being apprehended by reason, and neces- 
 sarily employed by reason for the understanding 
 of the object before it. Their use is to make 
 the object intelligible, not to mystify the observer 
 by surreptitiously doubling the object before his 
 eyes ; and the ordinary man, it may be added, 
 is fully satisfied that he does understand by 
 their means. Yet the question has proved a 
 veritable Serbonian bog, in which whole armies 
 of philosophers have sunk ; and the unknowable- 
 ness of substance- may justly be said to have 
 become a philosophic superstition. Berkeley's 
 delicate irony hits off the situation better than 
 any words of mine could do. " ' We are miser- 
 ably bantered/ say philosophers, ' by our senses, 
 and amused only with the outside and show of 
 things. The real essence — the internal qualities 
 and constitution — of every, the meanest, object is 
 hid from our view ; something there is in every 
 drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is 
 beyond the power of human understanding to 
 fathom or comprehend.' " ^ It is to this idea of 
 an essence, distinct from the qualities, and to be 
 known, if known at all, alongside of the qualities, 
 ^ Principles of Human Knowledge, section 101.
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 6 7 
 
 that philosophers are indebted, he says, " for Ijeing 
 ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly 
 well." 1 
 
 If we go to the root of the matter, I think it 
 will be found that the misconception is due to 
 the influence of a false logic — of what I have 
 called the logic of abstract identity. Though it 
 is not too much to say that this logic is refuted 
 by the whole structure of nature and of reason, it 
 appears to be exceedingly difficult for the human 
 mind to emancipate itself from its trammels. To 
 be sure, there is identity in things, but it is an 
 identity in difference. Identity is only asserted 
 because of difference, and is only cognisable 
 through difference. Difference is stamped every- 
 where upon nature and upon thought ; without it 
 predication would become at once impossible. 
 An affirmative judgment is the assertion of an 
 identity in difference ; a negative judgment asserts 
 
 ^ See the opening of the Third Dialogue between Hylas and 
 Philonous. People speak, he says elsewhere, as if "we might 
 know our soul as we know a triangle" (Principles, § 136). 
 Berkeley's own view of material substance would have been 
 more satisfactorj', if he had extended to it the principle which 
 lie here applies to the mind or the subject of thought ; for 
 the argument proceeds imri passu in the two cases. But 
 however that may be, his impeachment of the bastard mysti- 
 cism of the relativists is as sound and trenchant still as upon 
 the daj^ it was written.
 
 1 68 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 a difference in an underlying identity. The very 
 form of the judgment distinguishes subject and 
 predicate while it unites them. The calling of a 
 thing by its name carries with it the same impli- 
 cation; for names are general terms or universals, 
 and they express certain qualities of the object — 
 certain points of community, that is, with different 
 objects. Were it not that the object does possess 
 qualities, — that it exists, in short, as a living re- 
 futation of the doctrine of abstract identity, — it 
 would be impossible to employ a name in its re- 
 gard. Of course we all know that a name may 
 be given, at first, to a single object, and only 
 afterwards extended by analogy to other objects 
 that resemble the first in certain respects. But, 
 from the moment of its first imposition upon that 
 one object, it is, in Mill's language, potentially 
 the name of a class ; it is from the first a general 
 term — a universal — though it may chance to be 
 applied only to one individual. In a word, the 
 name is not applied to the individual, considered 
 as an abstract point of unity which is nothing 
 but its own undifferentiated self — a mere " one " 
 or " this " in the presence of countless similarly 
 self -identical "ones" or "thises." It is applied 
 to the individual, as the ordinary logic books 
 tell us, to express certain prominent or striking
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 169 
 
 aspects, henceforth called attributes or qualities, 
 of the individual. And accordingly — ^just because 
 it is not a mark put upon a mere particular — it is 
 from tlie beginning capable of extension to other 
 individuals, which are found to possess the same 
 qualities. It is sometimes said, as by Locke for 
 instance, that general names are needed in order 
 " to abridge discourse," seeing tliat it is " beyond 
 the power of human capacity to frame and retain 
 distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet 
 with."i Now it is so far from being true that 
 general names or universals are only makeshifts 
 for an infinite number of proper names, that even 
 the possession of an infinite store of such names 
 would not enable us to think one jot, or to frame 
 a single sentence. Each object being a mere 
 particular, an existential point, no occasion for 
 predication could arise ; for, at the most, we could 
 but say of each that it was itself — that A was A. 
 But, in such a world, this proposition would be 
 "trifling" indeed, and the very form of predica- 
 tion or judgment would be absent. We cannot 
 predicate substances of one another, and there 
 would be no adjectives. The infinite number of 
 proper names would be like so many unmeaning 
 numerical marks put upon absolutely non-resem- 
 1 Essay, iii. 3, 2.
 
 1 70 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 bling objects. We cannot say of five that it is six, 
 or of any one number that it is another number. 
 
 Thus it is that extreme Nominalism refutes 
 itself, as is well seen in the Nominalists of an- 
 tiquity who are brought before us in Plato's 
 ' Thesetetus ' and elsewhere. These Cynic Nom- 
 inalists had the courage of their opinions, and 
 dialectic skill enough to perceive the legitimate 
 conclusions from their principles. They did not 
 hesitate, therefore, to maintain that every com- 
 bination of subject and predicate is impossible, 
 since the conception of the one is different from 
 the conception of the other, and two things thus 
 different can never be declared to be the same. 
 Definition they maintained to be impossible, for 
 all that is real is particular, and can only be 
 explained by the utterance of its proper name. 
 But we have seen that, on the contrary, the 
 particular as particular — the mere self-identical 
 unqualified particular — nowhere exists ; it is the 
 abstraction of a logic not wholly clear about its 
 own procedure. And the thing-in-itself is simply 
 the fallacy of the mere particular in another form. 
 The mere particular and the mere universal are 
 alike abstractions of the mind ; what exists is the 
 individual. All that is real is — not particular but 
 — individual ; and the individual is a particular
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 7 1 
 
 that is also universal, or, from the other side, it is 
 a universal — a set of universals — particularised. 
 Individuality consists, as Bain expresses it, in 
 " a conflux of generalities." The two sides are 
 always there, and each is only through the other. 
 There is no existence which is not determined so- 
 and-so — that is, there is no substance without 
 qualities ; and equally there are no qualities with- 
 out a substance to which they are referred. It is 
 the nature of reality so to be, and it is the nature 
 of thought so to think. But the substance is not 
 an existence distinct from the qualities — some- 
 thing that can be separated from the qualities 
 and known by itself. The substance exists as 
 qualified, and we know it through its qualities. 
 How else should we know it ? The idea of an 
 existence in each thing, beyond the existence 
 which we know and name ; a substance in itself 
 that shall not be known through its qualities ; a 
 cause that has no necessary reference to its effect ; 
 a man that shall not be known by his thoughts 
 and actions ; a God that shall be concealed by his 
 own manifestation, — such is the idea that under- 
 lies all varieties of Agnosticism ; and in truth it 
 is one of the most curious delusions that ever 
 possessed the mind of man. 
 
 Yet it is an idea so common at the present day
 
 172 Scottish Phi/osop/iy. 
 
 as almost to have passed into the structure of 
 language. The very function of the plienomenon 
 would seem to be to expound, express, manifest, 
 or reveal the noumenon ; but the exact contrary 
 is implied in the current use of the terms. It is 
 hardly possible to open a scientific or semi-philo- 
 sophical work, without meeting the complacent 
 admission that our knowledge is " only of pheno- 
 mena." Or the writer tells us that the science in 
 question, so far as he is concerned, treats only of 
 phenomena, the consideration of the correspond- 
 ing noumena being relegated to philosophy or 
 metaphysics. It is true the time never comes 
 for the metaphysical investigation which is thus 
 held over ; and the statement is doubtless often 
 made as a kind of polite conciliation to the " meta- 
 physicians " who still linger in our midst. Those 
 who make it have a shrewd suspicion that nou- 
 mena are things a sensible man need never have 
 anything to do with, and that the science which 
 professes to deal with them is pretty nigh ex- 
 ploded. And so metaphysics well might be, if it 
 were really the science of noumena, as these men 
 understand noumena. But they may rest assured 
 that the best result of this contemned metaphysics 
 in modern times has been just this — to explode 
 the conception of such duplicate entities as they
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 173 
 
 still cannot help half believing in, and to repu- 
 diate, in consequence, the brand of that " only " 
 before phenomena. Certainly the objects of our 
 knowledge are phenomena ; for phenomenon is 
 the name we give to an object in relation to our 
 knowledge of it. But, in knowing the pheno- 
 menon, we know the object itself through and 
 through — so far, of course, as we do know it, so 
 far as it has really become a phenomenon for us. 
 In short, to say that we know phenomena is only 
 to say twice over that we know ; to say that the 
 noumenon becomes a phenomenon is only to say 
 that the noumenon is known. 
 
 It is true that we do not know the wliole 
 nature, probably, of anything ; and the term 
 noumenon is useful, therefore, as contrasting the 
 object, in all the completeness of the qualities 
 which really belong to it, with the comparatively 
 imperfect knowledge of its qualities which we 
 have yet attained. The noumenon is the object 
 •from the point of ^dew of the universe ; the 
 phenomenon is the same object from the point 
 of view of human knowledge. The noumenon 
 embraces, in this way, the qualities yet to be 
 discovered as well as those already known ; while 
 the term phenomenon is necessarily limited to 
 what we actually know. But if, ex hyijothesi,
 
 174 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 a thing were completely to phenomenalise itself 
 to us — i.e., if we had an exhaustive knowledge of 
 the qualities of any single thing — then the know- 
 ledge of the phenomenon would be, in that case, 
 in the strictest sense the knowledge of the nou- 
 menon. The noumenon is nothing but the mani- 
 fold and different qualities reflected into unity. 
 Qualities do not fly loose, and afterwards get 
 " collected " ; they cannot be known otherwise 
 than as unified and centred in a thing. You 
 have never, in short, either bare subjects or bare 
 attributes, but always attributes referred to sub- 
 jects, always subjects clothed with attributes — 
 that is, always identity through difference, and 
 difference subsumed into identity. 
 
 It is perfectly evident that the line of thought 
 which separates the noumenon from the pheno- 
 menon must inevitably end in the assertion of 
 an Unknown and Unknowable as the ultimate 
 reality of the universe. For, as we have seen, 
 there is nothing to know in the noumenon, if it 
 be separated from the phenomenon. It is simply 
 an abstraction which we have converted into a 
 fetish. Kant and Hamilton are, accordingly, the 
 fathers of all such, in modern times, as traffic in 
 the Unknowable, The ' Critique ' denies us all 
 knowledge of reality, whether of the world, of
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 175 
 
 Self, or of God ; and Hamilton tells us the same 
 thing again and again. He has already been 
 quoted on our ignorance both of mind and matter ; 
 and I need do no more than recall his favour- 
 ite utterances in regard to the Unknown God. 
 " The last and highest consecration of all true 
 religion must be an altar — dyi-ajo-TO) ^ew — ' To the 
 unknown and unknowable God.' " A learned 
 ignorance, he tells us, is the consummation of 
 knowledge.^ To be sure, both Kant and Hamil- 
 ton profess to repair the breaches of their 
 knowledge by the aid of Faith or Belief. Kant 
 represents his whole industry in the speculative 
 sphere as undertaken in the interests of a moral 
 faith. In his own words, he abolishes know- 
 ledge to make room for belief. The Practical 
 Reason is to heal the wounds inflicted by the 
 Speculative ; and the first ' Critique ' is according- 
 ly only a necessary negative preliminary to the 
 second.^ In like manner, Hamilton is reproached 
 by Mill with bringing back under the name of 
 Belief the very things he had rejected as Know- 
 ledge. " When I deny that the Infinite can by 
 us be Icnown" writes Hamilton, " I am far from 
 
 ^ Cf. Discussions, pp. 15, 36. 
 
 ^ See the preface to the second edition of the Critique of 
 Pure Reason.
 
 I "^^ Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be 
 helieved. This I have indeed anxiously evinced, 
 both by reasoning and authority." ^ This is, indeed, 
 the very purport of the Philosophy of the Con- 
 ditioned. Of the contradictories, which are both 
 inconceivable, one must nevertheless be true — i.e., 
 must be believed in as existing. The "learned 
 ignorance " which is " the end of philosophy," is 
 declared in one place to be " the beginning of 
 theology." - The philosophy of the Conditioned, 
 he says again, " is professedly a scientific demon- 
 stration of the impossibility of that 'wisdom in 
 high matters ' which the Apostle prohibits us 
 even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the limi- 
 tation of the human powers, from our impotence 
 to comprehend what, however, we must admit, to 
 show articulately why the secret things of God 
 cannot but be to man past finding out."^ 
 
 We know how this was developed in a theological 
 reference by Mansel in his famous Bampton Lec- 
 tures on the Limits of Eeligious Thought. " In 
 the impotence of reason," as he says in his ' Meta- 
 physics,' " we are compelled to take refuge in 
 faith." Hence reason has to be shown to be im- 
 potent, in order to make room for faith. Time 
 
 ^ Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 530. - Ibid., i. 34. 
 
 ^ Discussions, p. 598.
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 7 7 
 
 may perhaps be said to have ah-eady pronounced 
 upon this new presentation of a well-worn argu- 
 ment ; and it is perhaps not necessary now to do 
 more than allude to the equivocal character of 
 the position. Eeason has often enough been 
 abased, in order that Faith might be exalted ; but 
 only too frequently there is the ring of insincerity 
 in the voice that pleads. It insinuates an infer- 
 ence which it does not draw. In Hamilton and 
 Mansel, of course, there is no suspicion of such 
 disingenuous dealing ; yet the whole argument is 
 like playing with edged tools. If the inventors 
 of the tools remain unharmed, the next to handle 
 them will surely cut their fingers. When reason 
 is sapped, we may depend upon it that, in the 
 long-run, men will pass over, not to theological 
 faith, but to complete Agnosticism, We see this 
 exemplified for us by the actual course of events. 
 We see Kant's deductions from the practical 
 reason entirely disregarded by the vast majority 
 of those who invoke his name. Kant is, as has 
 been said, the fons et origo of the most cultured 
 Agnosticism of the day. His negative criticism 
 has lived; his positive reconstruction is, for the 
 majority, as if it had never been. And as for 
 Hamilton, Hamilton's arguments stand in the 
 forefront of Herbert Spencer's ' First Principles.' 
 M
 
 1 "jS Scottish Philosophy, 
 
 These examples should he enough to prove the 
 treacherous nature of any argument which bases 
 religion upon ignorance. The faith bred of ignor- 
 ance is neither stable nor is it likely to be en- 
 lightened. It will either be a completely empty 
 acknowledgment, as we see in the belief in the 
 Unknowable, or it will be an arbitrary play of 
 poetic fancy, such as is proposed by Lange for our 
 consolation. Our phenomenal world, says Lange, 
 is a world of materialism ; but still the Beyond of 
 the Unknowable remains to us. There we may 
 figure to ourselves an ampler and di\dner air, and 
 may construct a more perfect justness and good- 
 ness than we find upon earth. The poets — in word 
 and music and painting — are the chief interpreters 
 of this land of the Ideal. To them we must go, 
 if we would restore our jaded spirits. But we 
 may not ask — or if we do, we cannot learn — 
 whether this fairy - land exists, or whether it 
 has any relation to the world of fact. To all 
 which it may be confidently replied, that such 
 an empty play of fancy can discharge the func- 
 tions neither of philosophy nor of religion. The 
 synthesis of philosophy and the clear confidence 
 of religion may both, in a sense, transcend the 
 actual data before us, and may both, therefore, 
 have a certain affinity with poetry ; but the syn-
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 79 
 
 thesis is valueless and the confidence ill-based 
 if they do not express our deepest insight into 
 facts, and our deepest belief as to the ultimate 
 nature of things. Religion, therefore, if it is 
 to retain the place whi(;h it has always held 
 in human life and thought, must be based on 
 reason, as it has been based heretofore by all 
 the great philosophic doctors and the masters of 
 theology. It must be shown to be our reasonable 
 service. 
 
 In all this, Hamilton and Mansel must be held, 
 I think, to depart from the catholic doctrine and 
 traditional tendency of Scottish philosophy, as 
 observable before their time and since. Reid 
 expresses his repugnance to such a mode of argu- 
 ment, in words which might almost have been 
 written in view of the subsequent development. 
 " Some good men," he says, "have been led to 
 depreciate the human understanding, and to put 
 out the light of nature and reason, in order to 
 exalt that of revelation. Those weapons which 
 were taken up in support of religion, are now 
 employed to overturn it ; and what was by some 
 accounted the buhvark of orthodoxy, is become 
 the stronghold of atheism and infidelity. Atheists 
 . . . join hands with theologians in depreciating
 
 i8o Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the liiiinan understanding, that they may lead us 
 into absolute scepticism." ^ And with special ap- 
 plicability to Mansel's depreciation of the moral 
 or practical reason, he says in another place: 
 " If moral judgment be a true and real judgment, 
 the principles of morals stand upon the immut- 
 able foundation of truth, and can undergo no 
 change by any difference of fabric or structure of 
 those who judge of them. There may be, and 
 there are, beings who have not the faculty of 
 conceiving moral truths, or perceiving the excel- 
 lence of moral worth [as there are beings incapable 
 of perceiving the truths of mathematics] ; but no 
 defect, no error of understanding, can make what 
 is true to be false." ^ 
 
 In spite of these brave words, however, the 
 little rift within the lute may be detected even 
 in Eeid. It lurks wherever the metaphysic 
 of substance and quality is imperfectly or care- 
 lessly apprehended. There are not more than 
 one or two passages in Eeid which could be fixed 
 upon a Eelativist ; but one of them is so explicit 
 as to be sufficient. " By the mind of man," it is 
 said, " we understand that in him which thinks, 
 remembers, reasons, wills. The essence both of 
 body and of mind is unknown to us. We know 
 
 1 Works, p. 636. - Ibid., p. 679.
 
 The Relativity of Knowledge. 1 8 r 
 
 certain properties of the first and certain oper- 
 ations of the last, and by these only we can define 
 or describe them." ^ But as there is nowhere any 
 further reference to this unknown entity, and as 
 the argument is nowhere coloured by its existence, 
 the statement here sounds in Eeid almost like an 
 echo — an echo perhaps from his studies of Locke 
 — a current phrase accepted without much thought. 
 At all events, it is certain that the doctrine is in 
 no way peculiar to Eeid or prominent in his sys- 
 tem ; there is not a word of Phenomenalism or 
 Agnosticism throughout his writings. It may be 
 said that, at one point, he directly asserts that we 
 have only relative notions of body and mind. 
 But when he goes on to explain himself, he turns 
 out to mean no more than that our " notion of 
 body is not direct, but relative to its qimlities. 
 We know that it is something extended, solid, and 
 divisible, but we know no more." Similarly our 
 notion of mind is "relative to its operations."^ 
 That is, neither is known by immediate presenta- 
 tion in sense or in internal consciousness, but 
 both are known through these presentations, and 
 only in relation to them. In itself, this statement 
 is quite consistent with the doctrine laid down in 
 this Lecture ; and if Eeid meant no more than 
 1 Works, p. 220. ^ ij^jd,^ p_ 513.
 
 1 82 Scoifis/i PhilosopJiy. 
 
 tliis by his previous assertion about the essence of 
 body and mind, the phrase would be shorn of its 
 dangers. Taken together, however, v/e may prob- 
 ably admit that the two passages do insinuate an 
 unknown existence behind, though Eeid evi- 
 dent!}' had not thought out the question for 
 himself. But when we come to Dugald Stewart, 
 we have the Hamiltonian theory already pretty 
 definitely foreshadowed. Stewart expressly asserts 
 tlie knowledge of qualities and the accompanying 
 ignorance of substance, and bases philosophical 
 arguments upon the position.^ As l)r M'Cosli 
 points out, it oidy remained for Hamilton to 
 connect the qualitative theory of Stewart with 
 the phenomenal theory of Kant. But it is doubt- 
 less true, as the same writer maintains,^ that 
 Stewart himself would not have accepted the iden- 
 tification. At all events, he was not aware of 
 what was afterwards to be deduced from his 
 theory, or grafted upon it. As soon as Hamilton 
 and Mansel had brought full-blown relativity to 
 light, the instinct of the school shrank back from 
 such conclusions ; and Scottish philosophers set 
 about a more careful revision of their premisses. 
 
 1 Cf. the opening chapter of the Outlines of the Philosophy 
 of the Human Mind. 
 
 2 Scottish Philosophy, p. 289.
 
 The Relativity of Knozuledge. iS 
 
 o 
 
 Even Mansel receded from the Kantio-Hauiilton- 
 ian doctrine of a merely plienomenal knowledge 
 of Self ; and the most typical writers of the school 
 have only been driven by the Kantian doctrine 
 into a clearer assertion of our direct knowledge of 
 reality. In this respect, the true tradition of the 
 school is upheld by writers like Professor Calder- 
 wood, Professor Flint, and Dr M'Cosh of Princeton, 
 in each of whom, I think, we may trace the same 
 reaction against Eelativism. Differing widely from 
 Hegel in many respects, such Scottish thinkers 
 are at one with him in their repudiation of the 
 Phenomenalistic doctrine which has been ex- 
 amined in the present lecture. To me it seems 
 that, whatever we may think of the Hegelian 
 system in other respects, we have here one great 
 gift which it has bestowed on the world — the 
 insight into the logic of this pervasive fallacy. 
 So far as I can see, Hegel alone of all metaphy- 
 sicians lifts us completely clear of Eelativism. 
 He alone has gone systematically to work to lay 
 bare the abstractions on which it depends ; and, 
 in so doing, he has to a great extent transformed 
 the character of metaphysics, and so rendered un- 
 just many of the epithets which popular phrase- 
 ology still associates with the science.
 
 1 84 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 THE POSSIBILITY OF PHILOSOPHY AS SYSTEM: 
 SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY AND IIEGEL. 
 
 Our position l3eing thus defined in reference to 
 Eelativism and Agnosticism, there remains the 
 important question of the relation of Scottish 
 philosophy, or at least of what we hold to be 
 the legitimate outcome of Scottish philosophy, 
 to what has been called by Professor Eraser 
 " Gnosticism " — i.e., to philosophy as a closed 
 circle or completed system, in some such form 
 as it is presented, for example, by Hegel. If 
 we repudiate Eelativism, are we prepared to be 
 called Absolutists ? 
 
 A question, similar in its terms, was essayed by 
 Hamilton in his celebrated article on the Philo- 
 sophy of the Conditioned, and in his repeated 
 attacks upon the doctrines of the Absolute, I do
 
 S CO f fish Philosophy and Hegel. 1S5 
 
 not propose to traverse once more that deserted 
 field of battle ; but as the very term Absolute 
 associates itself to Scottish ears with Hamilton, 
 a few words of explanation may serve to remove 
 misapprehensions. In regard to this particular 
 controversy, time has brought us nearer to the 
 Continent than we were in the beginning of the 
 century, and has enabled us to see that, in the 
 case of Hegel at least, the issue raised by Sir "W. 
 Hamilton is an entirely false one. The point 
 which Hamilton makes, Hegel would be the last 
 man in the world to deny. The Absolute, whose 
 unknowableness Hamilton maintains, is, in his 
 own words, a thing existing " not under relation " 
 — " the absolute negation of all relation." It is 
 " absolutely one," and " absolute unity is con- 
 vertible with the absolute negation of plurality 
 and difference." Hence "intelligence whose 
 essence is plurality — the plurality of subject and 
 object — cannot be identified with tlie Absolute." ^ 
 In other words, the Absolute against which 
 Hamilton contends is precisely the abstraction of 
 a wholly relationless thing-in-itself which we 
 have demolished — the very abstraction against 
 which we find Hegel inveighing at every turn. 
 Hegel's system, indeed, may not inaptly be styled 
 
 1 Cf. Discussions, pp. 32, 33.
 
 I S6 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 the reasoned refutation of this delusive abstrac- 
 tion. The real difference between Hegel and 
 Hamilton is that Hamilton, blinded by his doc- 
 trine of Kelativity, still believes in the existence 
 of what is demonstrably unknowable ; while Hegel 
 holds it to be at once unknowable and non-ex- 
 istent. And Intelligence, which, on account of its 
 inherent difference, is pronounced by Hamilton 
 incompetent to his own abstract Absolute, is itself 
 Hegel's Absolute. Intelligence qua intelligence, 
 knowledge qua knowledge, is, so to speak, a 
 transparent relation — a relation in which, as 
 Aristotle long ago said, the two sides are one. 
 It is a relation, therefore, in which a real identity 
 is reached through plurality or difference. In 
 the act of knowledge, so far forth as there is 
 perfect knowledge, the difference of subject and 
 object is, in the current phrase, transcended or 
 overcome. But this does not mean that it dis- 
 appears, and that the two sides fall together in 
 a blank or pure identity. Pure identity — Ham- 
 ilton's Absolute — is coma or annihilation. 
 
 And this is what we find too in Mysticism, for 
 example, when it runs itself out to its legitimate 
 conclusion. Mysticism is, in great part, a blind 
 revolt against the fact of difference, the fact of re- 
 latedness, which meets us inevitably in every in-
 
 Scottish riiilosophy and Ilcgcl. 187 
 
 stance of knowledge. It is the logic of identity 
 applied in religion. The mystic pines for the 
 abolition of all distinction between himself and 
 the object of his desire. It is a mood more or less 
 natural to us all. The fact of relation seems to 
 bring separation with it ; it seems to cleave exist- 
 ence as by a sheer chasm, and to cut us off from 
 perfect union with God, as well as from communion 
 with the vast inarticulate life of nature in which 
 we are rooted. Who has not felt the sense of 
 strangeness and deep longing in his heart, on the 
 hillside or in the glen, perhaps, on a sweet day of 
 spring — deep tear-begetting longing toward the 
 ancestral mother — longing, as it were, to burst our 
 individual bounds, and close with " all we flow 
 from, soul in soul " ? But in truth we know not 
 what we ask in such moments of dim craving in 
 the blood. To be made one with nature would be 
 to resign our knowledge and our consciousness, to 
 merge in the dumb being of natural forces, to be 
 no more as we have been, and to lose, therefore, the 
 very penetrative sense of life and enjoyment that 
 prompts the desire. In like manner, the religious 
 feeling overleaps itself in its desire for closer 
 union with God — the object of its intensest 
 aspiration and love. Knowledge seems to divide 
 while it unites ; it seems, therefore, as if know-
 
 i88 Scottish Philosophy, 
 
 ledge must be transcended and left behind, if 
 supreme communion is to be attained. Hence 
 the hungering and thirsting of men's hearts after 
 some immediate perception or intuition of the 
 Godhead — some supra-intellectual union, nay, 
 contact or fusion with the source of all. But 
 such fusing of the skirts of self is not rising but 
 sinking in the scale of existence. The abnegation 
 of Self is the abnegation of intelligence and con- 
 sciousness, for which it substitutes either a total 
 blank, or, at most, a state resembling the dull 
 sensation of the lowest organism. It is a curious 
 irony of logic which leads those who would most 
 highly exalt the divine to degrade it so low. But 
 if we object to relation, and do away with differ- 
 ence, this is the goal at which we must ultimately 
 arrive. If God is to be God in any real sense. 
 His life cannot be the pulseless identity of a 
 Spinozistic substance, but must realise itself in 
 such a " kingdom of grace " as Leibnitz spoke of — a 
 divine polity of spirits, each of whom intelligence, 
 infinitely dividing and infinitely uniting, raises 
 into a fresh image of God, a new focus of the life 
 of things. 
 
 Intelligence, then, bears difference eternally in 
 its heart. Thereby alone does it exist as intelli- 
 gence. We need, therefore, follow out this argu-
 
 Scottish Philosophy and Ilcgcl. 1 89 
 
 ment about the Absolute no further upon the 
 Hamiltonian track. Hamilton's Absolute is not 
 asserted by Hegel, and the existence of Hegel's 
 Absolute — that is, of tlie fact whicli Hegel names 
 the Absolute — cannot be denied by Hamilton. 
 What has been said so far, has been said only to 
 guard against possible misconception, and against 
 the possible accusation of neglect ; and we have 
 seen that Hamilton's discussion only serves to 
 confuse the issues. This, unfortunately, must be 
 our verdict upon great part of those speculations 
 which were most distinctively Hamilton's own. 
 Eeasons have been adduced to show that they 
 are no genuine development of Scottish philo- 
 sophy ; and what Hamilton adopted from Kant 
 consisted of the most questionable parts of that 
 philosopher's theory. He nowhere brings us 
 into contact with the full doctrine of Kant ; and 
 his refutation of Hegel, by proving against Hegel 
 the very thing that Hegel himself insisted on, is 
 a specimen of misrepresentation that hardly ad- 
 mits of excuse. Hamilton had a great personal 
 influence, and, by his marvellous erudition and 
 his great powers of mind, he dignified the study 
 of philosophy in these islands. He may almost be 
 said to have lifted it to a higher plane. By his 
 constant references to the great German think-
 
 I go Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 ers he excited curiosity, and, as it were, brought 
 our island philosophy into contact with the phil- 
 osophy of the Continent — a contact which was 
 destined to bear much fruit at a later date, as 
 the distinctive tenets of Hamiltonianism began 
 to fall into forgetfulness. Hamilton made valu- 
 able contributions to psychology, and he also gave 
 an impetus to the study of formal logic. On these 
 departments of his activity, on his contributions 
 to the literature of philosophy, and on the per- 
 sonal influence which he exerted upon a large 
 number of thinkers — and not upon his properly 
 philosophical speculations — I am persuaded that 
 his fame will ultimately rest. 
 
 Let us avoid, then, all discussions in which the 
 Absolute is used as equivalent to the thing-in- 
 itself. Absolutism is the true doctrine, if by that 
 is meant only that our knowledge, so far as it 
 goes, is a knowledge of reality. But when the 
 spectre of Eelativity has been finally laid, the 
 only instructive sense in which the term Absolute 
 can be used, is as applied to the system. An 
 absolute system is one which claims to demon- 
 strate the rationality of existence. And the only 
 way in which such a demonstration can be given, 
 is by embracing all the elements of existence in 
 the final svntliesis. We must assign to all their
 
 Scottish Philosophy and Hegel. 1 9 1 
 
 place witliin the system ; or, what is the same 
 thing, we must show their relation to the harmony 
 of the whole. The question is, therefore, Do we 
 possess such a system ? Have we tliis insight 
 into the connection and harmony of the whole ? 
 
 And here, at the outset, it seems desirable to 
 say a few words upon the remarkable contrast 
 which exists, in reference to this question, be- 
 tween the philosophers of this country and the 
 philosophers of Germany — words which may be, 
 to a certain extent, a palinode, inasmuch as they 
 must modify in some degree the high praise tliat 
 has been bestowed, and bestowed justly, on the 
 achievement of Eeid. Germany may be system - 
 ridden ; and in the old days, when every univer- 
 sity professor was said to carry a scheme of the 
 universe in his pocket, no doubt this system- 
 mongering was carried to a pitch of absurdity. 
 But, on the other hand, it is possible to imbibe a 
 prejudice against system which may be, in tlie 
 end, to the full as dangerous. We may be justly 
 repelled by the premature syntheses and the 
 jaunty confidence of many of these system-makers, 
 but we ought to beware lest our reaction from 
 their error crystallise into a settled repugnance to 
 everything in systematic form. The natural man 
 within us is only too ready to believe that there
 
 192 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 is no harmony discoverable in things, because we 
 are thereby absolved from the labour of seeking it. 
 It is important to rememl)er that despair of sys- 
 tem is despair of philosophy, for philosophy just 
 is system. As in the old Eoman days, therefore, 
 men honoured the general, inefficient though he 
 was, who had not despaired of the Eepublic, so 
 we ought to honour the indomitable confidence 
 in reason which continually impels men afresh to 
 organise their knowledge and make it a whole. 
 The spirit of philosophy lives more in such 
 attempts than in a cherished distrust of the pos- 
 sibility of success. There is one doom which 
 Plato pronounces to be the worst of all : " Let us 
 above all things take heed," he says in the 
 ' Phffido,' " that one misfortune does not befall us. 
 Let us not become misologues (/^lo-oAoyot), as some 
 people become misanthropes ; for no greater evil 
 can befall men than to become haters of reason." 
 The earlier Scottish philosophers were not so 
 much liable to this danger. Their warfare was 
 not with the system-builder, but with the sceptic. 
 But there can be no question that they exhibit a 
 regrettable indifference to considerations of system 
 and completeness. In their matter, as we might 
 put it, they coincide, so far as they go, with Kant 
 and Hegel ; but the matter has not received at
 
 Scottish Philosophy and Hegel. 193 
 
 their hands the form that properly belongs to it. 
 Their principles are not connected with one an- 
 other ; and they have the appearance, conse- 
 quently, of hanging in the air without mutual 
 support. They remain isolated intuitions, instead 
 of constituting a system of principles. Eeid is in 
 the main at the Intuitional point of view, where 
 a certain number of " loose " or isolated proposi- 
 tions are accepted as self-evident, and treated as 
 principles. Kant, on the other hand, was deeply 
 impressed wdth the idea of system. Though he 
 sometimes carried it to extreme lengths, and 
 though his own systematic principle is vitiated 
 by the implicit trust it implies in the soundness 
 and sufficiency of formal logic — though it exliibits 
 ingenuity rather than far-reaching insight — yet 
 Kant's ideal of the conceptions of reason as 
 springing from the absolute unity of the under- 
 standing was of all-important influence upon the 
 further development of philosophy in Germany. 
 When we come to Hegel, we find a Method put 
 into our hands, which professes to guarantee both 
 the inter-connectedness of all the conceptions, 
 and the self-completing integrity of the result- 
 ing scheme. Now, no one will deny that 
 Hegel's analysis of the conceptions of reason as 
 reason is the product of infinite industry, and 
 
 N
 
 194 Scottish PJiilosophy. 
 
 of a metaphysical insight at once subtle and pro- 
 found. It is an indefinite advance on anything 
 that had gone before it in modern philosophy. 
 Compared with Hegel's ' Science of Logic,' Kant's 
 scheme of the categories is but a meagre sketch. 
 But though we may admit all this, what are we 
 to say of the claim to completeness, and of the 
 dialectic method on wliich it is based ? The an- 
 swer will depend upon the meaning we put into 
 the term method. 
 
 The Method, so far as that means an invariable 
 self-repeating formula, has been quietly shelved 
 of late, even by those whose thoughts have been 
 most plainly moulded by Hegel. Evidently there 
 is no royal road to philosophical completeness, any 
 more than to any other result worth having. 
 Hegel would not have spoken as he does of " the 
 labour of the Notion," if he had had nothing 
 to do but to set his apparatus at Being and 
 Nothing, and let it unwind itself of its own 
 accord. It is not unnatural for a man to be 
 overridden by an important principle which he 
 has brought to light ; and Hegel is not free from 
 this failing. But it was only, I think, with the 
 rank and file of the Hegelian army that the dia- 
 lectic method actually became a fetish. For a 
 fetish it has become to any one who supposes that.
 
 Scotlis/i Philosophy and Hco^cl. 195 
 
 for the tiiial and satisfying account of any suljject, 
 a mechanical application of the formula suffices. 
 Philosophical work cannot yeb be done by machin- 
 ery, A metliod or formula wouid lead to notliin^ 
 but a barren repetition of itself, unless it were fed 
 continually from the looms of fact. We have 
 Hegel's own word for it, that the Method is 
 nothing, unless we liring the whole nature of 
 thought with us. The ]\Iethod is no magic for- 
 mula, then, and it will open no doors save in a 
 master's hand. Yet the significance of the thought 
 that inspires it cannot lightly be over-estimated ; 
 and we may easily do scant justice to the depth 
 and the reach of Hegel's insight. The Method 
 sums up a thought which may almost be said to 
 constitute Hegel's philosophy, and one which, in 
 my opinion, gives him a signal advantage over all 
 his modern predecessors. 
 
 The thought in question is primarily a logical 
 principle ; a fact, which may partly explain why 
 Hegel made his ' Logik ' the centre of his system. 
 It is the principle to which we have already 
 referred so often, the systematic recognition of 
 the fact that thought is founded upon difference ; 
 whereas identity had hitherto been the god of the 
 logician's idolatry. I do not profess to follow, or 
 even to indicate, all Hegel's applications of his
 
 196 Sco//is// PhilosopJiy. 
 
 principle;, nor should I care to (Ici'end them all. 
 I>ut I do believe tliat here we have a principle, 
 not of arbitrary invention, but drawn from the 
 heart of things — from the nature of the self-con- 
 scious spirit itself. It is no unreasonable expec- 
 tation, then, that a principle drawn from such a 
 source will be found verifying itself in an infinite 
 variety of directions. Barely logical as the prin- 
 ciple seems, it is matter of biography that Hegel 
 formulated it in its breadth only after the pro- 
 foundest study of man and history, and, in par- 
 ticular, of the religious consciousness. His text, 
 too, is being proclaimed from the house-tops to- 
 day by those to whom his name, if know^n at all, 
 is known only as a byword and a reproach. 
 What is the biological explanation of life and 
 the organism but a denial of dead identity ? 
 What is development but the same denial of 
 static sameness, along with the assertion of iden- 
 tity in difference ? But though the principle 
 meets us everywhere, Hegel alone has been con- 
 sistent in his metaphysical applications of it, 
 and clear as to his own procedure. And it is 
 because the principle of his Method is derived 
 directly from the nature of self-consciousness, 
 that Hegel's results are so marvellously richer 
 than those of Kant. Because the direct relation
 
 Scott is Ji Philosophy and Hcgcl. 197 
 
 of all principles of explanation to the nature of 
 the explaining self was not adequately grasped 
 either by Kant or Eeid, their enumerations of 
 principles have unavoidaI)ly the appearance of 
 being, as it were, in the air. The mutual connec- 
 tion of the principles is not displayed, and they 
 do not lead up, as in Hegel they necessarily do, to 
 the central principle from which they hold tlieir 
 own existence in fee. I do not for a moment 
 believe that the ]\Iethod guarantees Hegel's list 
 of the conceptions of reason to be the best pos- 
 sible, either in point of completeness or in point 
 of order. The working out of such a grammar 
 of thought is necessarily a case of progressive 
 approximation towards an unattained ideal ; and 
 I do not think that Hegel himself contemplated 
 any finality as regards the filling-in of his scheme. 
 The essential point in a systematic philosophy is 
 simply the possession of some outline or schema, 
 by reference to which each conception may be 
 judged, and receive its place and meaning. In 
 Self-consciousness, Hegel seems to hold a position 
 from which, in the nature of the case, it is im- 
 possible to dislodge him. 
 
 But there may be a misconception fostered by 
 Hegel's way of j)utting things — a misconception 
 which seems to cling persistently to all forms
 
 198 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 of Idealism. Idealism is almost invariably con- 
 ceived as if it had some design upon the reality 
 of the world. It is supposed to consist in robbing 
 the object of its substantiality in order to enrich 
 the sul)ject ; or, as absolute idealism, it is sup- 
 posed to sap reality altogether by depriving it of 
 its solid consistency, and reducing it to a dance of 
 ideas or thought-relations. But we may readily 
 believe that this cannot be any man's serious in- 
 tention ; and the true scope of absolute idealism 
 is quite different. It denies reality neither in the 
 subject nor in the object, neither here nor there. 
 Its sole thesis is, that the real is ultimately 
 rational — i.e., that its different elements consti- 
 tute a system, in which, and in which alone, they 
 can be understood. To assert their existence out- 
 side of the system — apart from the mutual refer- 
 ence of each to all — is certainly, according to 
 such a philosophy, inadmissible ; but it is inad- 
 missible, simply because it is unmeaning. Phil- 
 osophy, as such, is a war against abstractions, 
 against stopping too soon, against treatmg parts 
 as wholes, against isolating things from their con- 
 nections. And in this sense, absolute idealism 
 certainly does deprive the parts of their supposed 
 independent substantiality. But it is inexorably 
 just in that it metes to all with the same measure ;
 
 Scottish Philosophy and Hegel. 199 
 
 all members of the system alike are real, but all 
 alike hold their reality in fee from the system to 
 which they belong. They exist as parts and not 
 otherwise ; the whole alone can be said to exist 
 absolutely or in its own right. 
 
 But perhaps, as I have said, Hegel is himself 
 partly to blame. His method of presentation may 
 be partly responsible for the idea that he reduces 
 the universe, in Mr Bradley's vivid phrase, to " an 
 unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." It seems 
 as if we were asked to believe that the chain of 
 thought -determinations unfolded in the ' Logic ' 
 really is the life of the world — as if the reality 
 of God and man and things veritably consisted in 
 these abstractions. What wonder if we are told, 
 that to offer us this organisation of thought as 
 the ultimate account of the world is to give us 
 a stone when we ask for bread. It is this that 
 lends force, for example, to Lotze's strictures upon 
 the Hegelian system. The system seems, if this 
 be true, to eviscerate reality of all inner content, 
 and to present us with a set of labels or for- 
 mula3 instead. Or as Mr Bradley puts it, " The 
 notion that existence could be the same as un- 
 derstanding, strikes as cold and ghost - like as 
 the dreariest materialism. . . . Though dragged 
 to such conclusions, we cannot embrace them.
 
 200 Scottish PJiilosopJiy. 
 
 Our principles may be true, but they are not 
 reality. They no more make that Whole which 
 commands our devotion, than some shredded 
 dissection of human tatters is that warm and 
 breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found 
 delightful."^ But indeed, knowledge, as Fichte 
 said, just because it is knowledge, is not reality. 
 It is an account of reality. To speak as if the 
 categories of the Hegelian Logic were real exist- 
 ences, is not less absurd than it would be to 
 identify the planetary system with the mathe- 
 matical and mechanical laws of its operation, 
 which are contained in a text-book on Astronomy. 
 Existence must consist in a Life of some sort, with 
 those possibilities of feeling, of internal reflection 
 and enjoyment, which alone, as Lotze insists, give 
 worth or value to the universe, and make it more 
 than a species of binomial theorem. 
 
 "We may be helped here, I think, in reaching a 
 true conclusion, by recurring to a position which 
 we found important in the preceding lecture — 
 the position, namely, that the real, or what ac- 
 tually exists, is the individual. This thesis we 
 were there engaged in defending against the sup- 
 position of the abstract particular, the unqualified 
 thmg-in-itself. But it has equally to be defended 
 ^ Principles of Logic, p. 533.
 
 Scottish PJiilosophy and He gel. 201 
 
 against the supposition that the real can consist 
 of abstract universals. It seems difficult to main- 
 tain the just mean between these two extremes. 
 On the one hand, men fall into the belief that, in 
 the heart of reality, behind all that we know of it, 
 there lurks an unknowable kernel or substance, 
 which, as it were, makes the qualities exist. This 
 supposed skeleton of the world must be admitted 
 to be, as the Hegelians contend, a ca])ut mortuum 
 or mere abstraction. It is the abstract particular, 
 the predicateless subject, the unrelated unit. But, 
 on the other hand, empty generals can no more 
 exist as such than empty particulars. Predicates, 
 unref erred to a subject, would be as bad as Hume's 
 "entirely loose" ideas. Now Hegel's 'Logic' is a 
 system of predicates. Accordingly the categories 
 which he there unrolls must be regarded as de- 
 scriptions of the world, not the world itself. The 
 universe must exist as a real Being, or system of 
 beings, whose life may be interpreted according 
 to these logical formulie, but is certainly not 
 exhausted in their exemplification. 
 
 Indeed, from a logical point of view, the uni- 
 verse may be usefully regarded as one vast indi- 
 vidual. Now, it is of the nature of an individual 
 to be inexhaustible in its qualities or predicates. 
 This is true even of a finite individual. For it
 
 202 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 may be said that, if we could thoroughly know 
 any single thing, we should in the same act 
 thoroughly know all things. According to the 
 Leibnitian phrase, " eyes as piercing as those of 
 God " would be able to read in the changes of a 
 single monad all the changes of the universe. But 
 when the same point of view is extended to the 
 universe, the necessary inexhaustibleness of the 
 individual becomes still more apparent ; and this 
 consideration may help us to a true position as 
 between the abstract particular and the abstract 
 universal — as between Agnosticism and Gnosti- 
 cism. Our knowledge of the universe we must 
 hold to be true and valid. So far as it goes, it 
 expresses the actual nature of the fact, and there 
 is nothing in the fact that is essentially unknow- 
 able. But, on the other hand, there is a great 
 deal which is unknown, and which, we may predict, 
 will always remain unknown to the finite intelli- 
 gence. We know the universe truly so far as 
 we do know it, but we can never know it fully or 
 adequately. It is this background of ignorance, 
 this unexhausted remainder always present to 
 our feeling, that partly explains, as was suggested 
 in the preceding lecture, the contrast we draw 
 between the phenomenon, or the object as known, 
 and the noumenon, or the object as it exists.
 
 Scottish PJiilosophy and Hegel. 203 
 
 The noumenon is, in this sense, an ideal to which 
 we are always approximating, but to which we 
 never attain. It is this also which lends a 
 certain dynamic impulse even to an abstraction 
 apparently so barren as the Unknowable. The 
 Unknoioalle would, indeed, be absolutely barren. 
 But there mingles subtly with the conception the 
 feeling of the Unknown, the not yet known, the 
 vast unexplored possibilities of the universe ; and 
 thus the notion is half redeemed in spite of itself. 
 It is to this fact, also, of the vast unknown, and 
 not to the other supposed fact of unknowableness, 
 that most of Hamilton's "cloud of witnesses" really 
 refer. And Hamilton himself apparently does not 
 observe tlie essential difference between the two 
 positions ; for he sums up at one point by saying 
 that " the grand result of human wisdom is thus 
 only a consciousness that what we know is as 
 nothing to what we know not" — a confession 
 which, it is to be hoped, we are all prepared to 
 make with befitting humility. 
 
 What has been said of the inexhaustible nature 
 of reality, and of the relation which our concep- 
 tions bear to things, ought to prepare even those 
 who move on Hegelian lines for the admission, 
 that the idea of an absolute Self-consciousness, in 
 which thought achieves a view of the systematic
 
 204 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 unity of things, is to a certain extent an ideal. 
 Tliat is to say, it is sometliing in which we can- 
 not but believe, rather than something we actually 
 8ce. It is not sufficient, in dealing with a point 
 like this, merely to announce our adherence to 
 one side or another. It is not enough to say, for 
 example, that we are Hegelians or " Gnostics," 
 simply because we accept the idea of an eternal 
 self - realising consciousness as that in which 
 alone philosophy can rest. It is essential to 
 make explicit the precise sense in which we 
 understand our own position, and the measure, 
 or rather the manner, of certainty which we 
 conceive to belong to it. Is our insight the 
 insight that comes from complete review, from 
 actual seeing ? In other words, is it knowledge 
 in the strict sense of that term ? Or does it 
 partake of the nature of divination and faith — 
 divination through the application of principles 
 which themselves lie within our grasp, and which 
 (in spite of difficulties which we cannot personally 
 resolve) we cannot but believe to supply the key 
 to all the locks in Doubting Castle ? This is the 
 c[uestion, as between Gnosticism and the Philo- 
 sophy of Faith, which is pressed home in the con- 
 cluding chapter of a book which I hope it is not 
 unbecoming in me to refer to here as being, to
 
 ScottisJi Philosophy ami Hcgci. 205 
 
 my mind, the ripest and most catholic expression 
 of the national tendency in pliilosophy — I mean 
 Professor Fraser's recent volume on Berkeley.^ 
 
 The term Faith or Belief is one which is suscep- 
 tible of many meanings and applications. I have 
 already expressed my strong- sense of tlie mischief 
 which often attends it when introduced into 
 philosophical discussion. We may go further, 
 and say that wherever faith is pitted against 
 reason, wherever an opposition is set up between 
 the two — we might even say, wherever they are 
 treated as separate or distinct organs — w^e are 
 upon unsound ground, and mischief lurks not far 
 distant. Faith is not used here, of course, in a 
 distinctively theological sense ; but in that refer- 
 ence also we found it impossible to treat theology 
 as a back-door by which we might escape, in a 
 trice, from all our philosophical difficulties. I 
 hold it certain that a faith built upon wliat 
 Hamilton calls the impotence — the imbecility — 
 of reason, is built upon a foundation of sand ; 
 experience has shown us again and again that 
 great is the fall thereof. Let us mistrust, there- 
 fore, let us deeply mistrust, any one who endea- 
 vours to set the apple of discord rolling between 
 these two — any one who seeks to make capital 
 ^ In Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.
 
 2o6 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 for the one out of the discomfiture of tlie otlier. 
 Let us beware, as Plato says, of becoming miso- 
 logues. 
 
 But we have now reached a point where faith 
 and reason join hands on the utmost confines of 
 speculation ; and some further elucidation of terms 
 is therefore desiraljle. The true antithesis is not 
 so much between Faith and Eeason as between 
 Faith and Knowledge. Indeed the term Reason 
 has sometimes been used — by Jacobi, for example 
 — as equivalent to Faith, and as opposed, in that 
 sense, to the Understanding, which then corre- 
 sponds to our use of the term Knowledge. What 
 the opposition really expresses is the difference 
 between the attitude of the human mind towards 
 the universe as a whole, and its attitude towards 
 any definite part of it. In what sense can we 
 say that we hnow the harmony of the whole, 
 that we know the universe as a system ? No 
 one, I think, will say that we know or see it — 
 that we have it actually before us — in the same 
 sense in which we know some individual object, 
 some particular tract of experience. We see, it 
 will be said, that it must be so, that the system 
 must complete itself in the manner indicated ; we 
 see that certain presuppositions are involved in or 
 demanded by the facts under our hands, in such
 
 Scottish Philosophy and /lege L 207 
 
 a way that our knowledge of tliese facts involves 
 a knowledge of the synthesis which makes tlieni 
 intelligible. But this implies — may it not be 
 answered — that the system does not complete it- 
 self for me ; that I have not the harmonious plan 
 outspread before me ? Only by actually heiiig 
 God, could we have such a view of the universe 
 as would entitle us to speak here of knowledge 
 in the strict sense. If, then, I am ignorant (as 
 I surely am in many cases) of the precise manner 
 in which seemingly discordant elements are sub- 
 ordinated to the ultimate harmony, then the har- 
 mony itself may justifiably be spoken of as an ob- 
 ject of faith — something which I am constrained 
 to believe, even though I do not fully see it. If 
 any one wishes to hear a full acknowledgment 
 of this on the lips of one who certainly worked 
 on the lines of Absolute Idealism, he has only 
 to turn to passages like the following from 
 Green's 'Prolegomena to Ethics,' or to many 
 others in his Sermon on Faith : " There never 
 can be that actual wholeness of the world for 
 us, which there must be for the mind that ren- 
 ders the world one. But though the conditions 
 under which the eternal consciousness reproduces 
 itself in our knowledge are thus incompatible 
 with finality in that knowledge, there is that
 
 2o8 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 element of identity between the first stage of 
 intelligent experience and the eternal conscious- 
 ness reproducing itself in it, which consists in 
 the presentation of a many in one, in the appre- 
 hension of facts related in a single system, in the 
 conception of there being an order of things, what- 
 ever that order may tiirn out to he. . . . It is only 
 as governed by the forecast of there being a related 
 vjhole, that the processes of sensuous experience 
 can yield a growing, though for ever incomplete, 
 knowledge of what in detail the whole is." ^ 
 Here we have at once the fullest acknowledgment 
 of the absence of perfect insight, and an insist- 
 ence on the necessity of the faith. It is doubt- 
 less the prominence usually given by Absolute 
 Idealists to the latter element, which has caused 
 their position to be understood as if it implied a 
 claim to personal omniscience. Many Hegelians 
 talk and write as if they were in the happy 
 position of having no difficulties. But this is 
 not Green's tone. Passages like the foregoing, 
 I cannot but think, go far to show that the 
 difference between the Gnostics and the Faith- 
 Philosophers is not so great as it at first sight 
 appears, provided that both aim at sobriety of 
 statement, and agree to define their terms. For 
 ^ Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 77.
 
 Scottish PJiilosophy and Hegel. 209 
 
 we cannot atford to omit the " necessity " from 
 our account of the faith ; we must have grounds 
 for our faith. There may be incongruities which 
 we cannot weave into a consistent scheme ; 1 >ut 
 we nmst have certain facts before us which 
 necessitate us to adopt a certain hypothesis, even 
 though we cannot see as yet how certain other 
 refractory facts are to be reconciled with it. 
 The facts for the explanation of which the hy- 
 pothesis is required must be of so central and 
 dominating a nature, that they justify our ad- 
 hesion to it, even in spite of temporary anomalies. 
 Such facts Green found in the necessary presence 
 of a connective self-consciousness in order to 
 constitute facts, and in the ethical " Thou shalt " 
 which transforms the animal impulses into the 
 organs of a reasonable life. 
 
 Scottish philosophy has hardly anything to say 
 on this question of the possibility of systematic 
 philosophy, or, to give it its old name, the possi- 
 bility of Ontology. Not that it has anything to 
 urge in limine against its possibility; for the 
 Dualism, which is often put forward as the watch- 
 word and characteristic tenet of the school, has 
 no direct bearing upon the question we are con- 
 sidering. The doctrine was not elaborated in 
 view of the ultimate problem of the rational unity 

 
 2IO Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 of the universe. It does not, tlierefore, denote 
 the existence of an irrational surd in the problem 
 — that is to say, the presence of some element 
 impenetrable by reason, some element that refuses 
 to be worked into the ultimate synthesis. In that 
 sense, of course. Dualism would be simply another 
 name for the paralysis of reason. But the Scot- 
 tish doctrine was elaborated, we must remember, 
 merely in reference to perception, and in the face 
 of the ideal system and the theory of representa- 
 tionism. Only in that reference, therefore, can 
 its statements be fairly interpreted. So taken, 
 they are more pliable in the interests of rational- 
 ism than those of the theory to which they are 
 opposed. For such dualism, as is asserted, is an 
 opposition in which both the factors are known ; 
 whereas the representationists and relativists 
 everywhere assert an opposition between mind 
 and something which is essentially unapproach- 
 able by mind, and which might, therefore, be 
 plausibly cited as an irreducible surd in the 
 universe of being. This would be a really em- 
 barrassing dualism. The doctrine of Scottish 
 philosophy, on the other hand, is better charac- 
 terised by its other name of Natural Eealism. 
 What it asserts is a known reality on the one side
 
 Scottish P/iHosopJiy and Hegel. 2 i i 
 
 and on the other. " I maintain," says Dr M'Cosh, 
 " that just as, by self-consciousness, we know self 
 as exercising such and such a quality — say, think- 
 ing or feeling — so, by sense-perception, we know 
 a body as extended and exercising power or 
 energy. This is the simplest doctrine, . . . and 
 is the proper doctrine of natural realism as dis- 
 tinguished from an artificial system of relativity." ^ 
 Unless this be all too grossly interpreted, it states 
 a fact which only a weak-minded idealism would 
 attempt to explain away. Hegel, at all events, 
 rather delights in emphasising the fact of " other- 
 ness " or difference ; he is fond of pointing out 
 the relative independence of nature — the full 
 swing, so to speak, in which it is indulged — as 
 removing any suspicion of subjective idealism. 
 He only adds that, ultimately or ontologically, 
 the world is every way, as the poet says, " bound 
 by gold chains about the feet of God " : a position 
 which the Scottish philosophers, in turn, would 
 not have thought of questioning. 
 
 The Scottish philosophers, however, though 
 
 their metaphysic of perception leaves them quite 
 
 free, certainly do not occupy themselves to any 
 
 large extent with the problems of Ontology — the 
 
 ^ Scottish Philosophy, p. 290.
 
 212 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 problems, that is to say, of the ultimate nature 
 and mutual relations of Self, the World, and God. 
 Scottish philosophy, to borrow a phrase skilfully 
 applied by Professor Masson,^ has been almost 
 entirely cosmological in character. It has stated, 
 for example, the fact of dualism between subject 
 and object as actually found in experience, with- 
 out caring to attempt the further task of ontologic- 
 ally relating this dualism, if possible, to a principle 
 of ultimate unity. For their personal ontology, 
 if we may so speak, they simply fell l)ack upon 
 the language of religion, which relates God to the 
 world as its Creator, and to man also as his 
 Creator, and, in a special sense, his Father and 
 his God. On that ground — the ground of religion 
 — the Scottish philosophers are, therefore, as 
 much Absolute Idealists as Hegel himself ; for 
 what is created enjoys only a dependent or de- 
 rived existence. Eeligion, indeed, as Hegel says, 
 is everywhere Idealism. It is the Sabbath of the 
 spirit, the denial or correction of the crass realism 
 of the workaday consciousness, the restoring of 
 things to their true proportions by setting them 
 in the light of the eternal and the Whole. But 
 the religious treatment of such questions and the 
 
 1 In his Recent British Philosophy.
 
 Scottish PJiilosophy and Hegel. 2 1 3 
 
 philosophical treat lueut are not to be immediately 
 identified. The organ of religion is faith ; and 
 whatever else faith may be, it is not completed 
 insight, completed proof. It is tlie evidence of 
 things not seen, A man may feel himself justi- 
 fied, therefore, in stating certain things when he 
 is speaking within the sphere of religion, and 
 yet shrink from incorporating them with his ex 
 cathedra philosophical utterances. For philosophy, 
 as philosophy, demands proof ; it insists on having 
 its statements thought out. It is not enough for 
 the philosopher to believe that things arc so ; he 
 must also see Iwio they are so. He must be able 
 to give some rationale of the process. Very pro- 
 bably, therefore, the neglect of the philosophers 
 of our country to carry up their theories of the 
 mind into an Ontology may be partly explained 
 by an underlying conviction on their part that 
 the problem of ontology carries us beyond the 
 limits of knowledge in the strict sense of that 
 word. 
 
 In any case, however, the omission proves 
 clearly enough that they were not inspired by 
 that unquenchable speculative ardour which has 
 sent forth so many knights in quest of the philo- 
 sophic Grail. And, look at it how we may, the
 
 2 1 4 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 absence of a native Ontology is a thing to lie 
 regretted. For the intellectual caution of our 
 country might have helped us to step more 
 warily, and to talk less pretentiously, than is 
 sometimes the custom of the Germans from 
 whom we have been compelled to borrow. Such 
 a spirit of intellectual modesty and candour I 
 recognise, for example, in the conclusion of an 
 able book from which I have already quoted, 
 — ' Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta,' — published 
 anonymously last year by an author who calls 
 himself Scotus Novanticus.^ " Change and pain, 
 decay and death," he says, " these stern facts of 
 Nature, have to be sublated into the idea of the 
 universal law of God's working, and in that sub- 
 lation, if not explained, yet so conceived from 
 a universal standpoint, as to yield, to the eye of 
 Faith at least, a possible harmony. To the eye 
 of Eeason, in the sphere of exact knowledge, evil 
 will ever remain a mystery. We may state the 
 fact of evil in terms which seem to explain it — 
 the more abstract the better, of course, if we 
 desire to seem to know ; but, in whatever terms 
 rendered, it is evil. ... It certainly is not 
 given to us, in this mortal state, ' to know even 
 ^ See note on p. 160.
 
 Scottish Philosophy and Hegel. 2 1 5 
 
 as we are known,' and there will always be room 
 for the faith that ' all thmgs work together f < )r 
 good to them that love God.' " 
 
 Such a close is more human than professed 
 demonstrations, which sometimes strike us, after 
 all, as only what this writer calls "seeming to 
 know." In general, I think a Scottish meta- 
 physic would have agreed with Lotze that, while 
 holding with indestructible confidence to the 
 belief that the universe has a meaning, on which 
 its existence ultimately depends, " we do not know 
 this meaning in its fulness, and therefore we can- 
 not deduce from it, what we can only attempt, in 
 one universal conviction, to retrace to it." ^ In 
 other words, it would have reversed the deductive 
 method which we find in Fichte and Hegel. The 
 ultimate unity of things is what we stretch for- 
 ward to, what we divine, but what we never fully 
 attain. It is our terminus ad quem ; it is never 
 so fully within our gi'asp that we can make it 
 in turn our terminus a quo, and, placing our- 
 selves, as it were, at the crisis of creation, proceed 
 to deduce step by step the characteristics of actual 
 existence in nature and in man. Wlierever Hegel 
 or any one else appears to adopt such a method 
 1 Metaphysics, p. 536 (English translation).
 
 2i6 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 of procedure, we find, I think, tliat the sliow of 
 explanation is wholly illusory. Hegel carries us 
 almost always with him except at such points — 
 except where he seems to imply a perfect know- 
 ledge of a perfect world. The oidy liuman atti- 
 tude, on the contrary, must be, starting from 
 experience, amid much apparent imperfection 
 and evil, to work towards a solution or satisfy- 
 ing explanation. Such a schema of explanation 
 is to be found, as our examination of these two 
 lines of philosophical thought has taught us, in 
 the Self-consciousness which exhibits itself as a 
 necessary principle of unity in all knowledge, and 
 as a necessary form of law in all action. 
 
 But when we have said this, we must admit 
 that many things have been left vague. AVliat 
 are we to say of the nature of this Self-conscious- 
 ness which we call eternal ? Has it an existence 
 for itself, or is it realised only in the individuals 
 whose thought it co-ordinates ? And what of my 
 own individual existence, and its relation to this 
 eternal or universal consciousness ? Hegelianism 
 treats man simply as he is a universal or per- 
 ceptive consciousness, gazing at the spectacle of 
 things. In that process, the individual is, as it 
 were, merged in the universal ; we occupy, for the 
 time, a universal standpoint, and it is quite in-
 
 Scottish PJiilosophy and Hegel. 2 1 7 
 
 different wlietlier it is my Ego or another that 
 surveys the world. But a philosophy which goes 
 no further than this in its treatment of the indi- 
 vidual, lea\'es untouched what we may call tlie 
 individual in the individual — those subjective 
 memories, thoughts, and plans which make each 
 of us a separate soul. The vague answers of 
 Hegelianism on such points, and on the connected 
 question of immortality, are proofs that, in many 
 respects, it belies its name of Gnosticism ; there 
 is a great deal which it does not know. If it 
 tries, as it does in some of its representatives, to 
 ignore these questions as unimportant, it is to be 
 strenuously resisted ; for there it makes common 
 cause with dogmatic Materialism and Positivism, 
 and is included, therefore, in Lotze's censure of 
 the spirit of negative resignation current in cer- 
 tain circles — that heroism, spurious as it is frail, 
 which prides itself on being able to renounce 
 what never oiujlit to be renounced.^ Here, with- 
 out doubt, in the questions of individual destiny, 
 will always be found the great sphere of philo- 
 sophic faith — a faith which can no longer depend 
 on any consideration of the soul as an indivisible 
 substance, but must rest ultimately on our doc- 
 trine of God. But the record of philosophy is 
 ^ Preface to the Mikrokosmos.
 
 2i8 Scottish Philosophy. 
 
 not closed ; and an advance may yet be made 
 towards greater philosopliical precision, by any 
 one who will endeavour to repair the omissions 
 of Hegelian iiniversalism in respect of the in- 
 dividual, and the nature of the existence that 
 belonus to it. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 rRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. 
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. By Sir William Hamilton, 
 Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edin- 
 burgh. Seventh Edition. Edited by the Very llov. H. L. Mansell, 
 LL.D., Dean of St Paul's, and John Veitch, M.A., Professor of Logic 
 and Rhetoric, Glasgow. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. 
 
 LECTURES ON LOGIC. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. 
 Third Edition. Edited by the Same. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. 
 
 DISCUSSIONS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE, 
 EDUCATION AND UNIVERSITY REFORM. By Sir Williaji 
 HAMILTON, Bart. Third Edition. 8vo. 21s. 
 
 METHOD, MEDITATIONS, AND PRINCIPLES OF PHILO- 
 SOPHY OF DESCARTES. Translated from the original French and 
 Latin. With a New Introductory Essay, Historical and Critical, on the 
 Cartesian Philosophy. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic 
 and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Eighth Edition. 12mo. 
 6s. 6d. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS of the late James Frederick 
 FERRIER, B.A. Oxon., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Poli- 
 tical Economy in the University of St Andrews. New Edition. 3 vols. 
 crown Svo. 34s. 6d. 
 
 The following are sold Separately : — 
 INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC. Third Edition. 10s. 6d. 
 
 LECTURES ON THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. New Edi- 
 tion. lOs. 6d. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REMAINS, including the Lectures on Early 
 Greek Philosophy. Edited by Sir Alex. Grant, Bart., D.C.L., 
 and Professor Lushington. 2 vols. 24s. 
 
 IN COURSE OF PUBLICATION. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. 
 
 Edited by Professor KNIGHT, LL.D., St Andrews. In crown Svo 
 Volumes, with Portraits, jirice 3s. 6d. 
 
 Noxo ready — 
 
 1. DESCARTES. By Professor Mahafky, Dublin. 
 
 2. BUTLER. By Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. 
 
 3. BERKELEY. By Professor Campbell Fraser, Edinburgh. 
 
 4. FICHTE. By Professor Adamson, Owens College, Manchester. 
 
 5. KANT. By Professor Wallace, O.xford. 
 
 6. HAMILTON. By Professor Veitch, Glasgow. 
 
 7. HEGEL. By Professor Edward Caird, Glasgow. 
 
 8. LEIBNIZ. By John Theodore Merz. 
 
 9. VICO. By Professor Flint, Edinburgh. 
 
 10. HOBBES. By Professor Croom Robertson, London. 
 
 In lireparation — 
 Hume. By the Editor. l Spinoza. By the Very Rev. Principal 
 
 Bacon. By Prof. Nichol, Glasgow. | Caird, Glasgow. 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, Edinburgh and London.
 
 NEW PUBLICATIOISrS. 
 
 ON THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM. Being the Shaw Fel- 
 lowship Lkctures, 1884. By W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Fellow of 
 Trinity College, Cambridge ; and Examiner in Philosophy in the Univer- 
 sity of Edinburgh. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MODERN THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. 
 
 By JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., LL.D., Principal of St Mary's College in 
 the University of St Andrews ; and one of her Majesty's Chaplains in 
 Ordinary in Scotland. 8vo, 15s. 
 
 CAN THE OLD FAITH LIVE WITH THE NEW 1 Or, the 
 Problem of Evolution and Revelation. By the Rev. GEORGE 
 MATHESON, D.D., Innellan. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 A New Edition, Revised. 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF ENGLISH POETS FROM CHAUCER 
 
 TO SHIRLEY. By WILLIAM MINTO, M.A., Professor of Logic and 
 English Literature in the University of Aberdeen. Second Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 A MANUAL OF ENGLISH PROSE LITERATURE, BIO- 
 GRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL. Designed mainly to show Charac- 
 teristics of Style. By the Same. New and Cheaper Edition, Revised. 
 
 Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 GREEK TESTAMENT LESSONS for Colleges, Schools, 
 AND Private Students, consisting chiefly of The Sermon on the Mount, 
 and the Parables of our Lord. With Notes and Essays. By the Rev. 
 J. HUNTER SMITH, M.A., King Edward's School, Birmingham ; 
 formerly Scholar of Merton College", Oxford. With 4 Maps. Crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 IN ONE VOLUME, THE LIBRARY EDITION. 
 
 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Pronounc- 
 ing, Etymological, and Explanatory, Embracing Scientific and 
 other Terms. Numerous Familiar Terms, and a Copious Selection of Old 
 Engli.sh Words. By the Rev. JAMES STORMONTH. The Pronun- 
 ciation carefully revised by the Rev. P. H. Phelp, M.A., Cantal>. 
 Royal 8vo. Handsomely bound in half-morocco, 31s. 6d. 
 
 " May serve in a great measure the purposes of an English cyclopedia." — 
 Times. 
 
 "One of the best and most serviceable works of reference of its class." — 
 Scotsman. 
 
 "The work exhibits all the freshness and best results of modern lexico- 
 graphic scholarship." — New Vork Tribune. 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, Edinburgh and London.
 
 CATALOGUE 
 
 OF 
 
 MESSRS BLACKWOOD & SONS' 
 
 PUBLICATIONS.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. 
 
 Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D., 
 
 Professor of Moral Philosophy In the University of St Andrews. 
 
 In crown 8vo Volumes, witli Portraits, price 3s. 6d. 
 
 Noiu ready— 
 
 1. Descartes. By Professor Mahaffy, Dublin. 
 
 2. Butler. By Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. 
 
 3. Berkeley. By Professor Fraser, Edinburgh. 
 
 4. Fiehte. By Professor Adamson, Owens College, Manchester 
 
 5. Kant. By Professor Wallace, Oxford. 
 
 6. Hamilton. By Professor Veitch, Glasgow. 
 
 7. Hegel. By Professor Edward Caird, Glasgow. 
 
 8. Leibniz. By J. Theodore Merz. 
 
 9. Vico. By Professor Flint, Edinburgh. 
 
 10. Hobbes. By Professor Groom Eobertson, London. 
 
 The Volumes in preparation are — 
 
 Hume. By the Editor. 
 
 Bacon. By Professor Nichol, Glasgow. 
 
 Spinoza. By the Very Rev. Principal 
 Caird, Glasgow. 
 
 In course of Publication. 
 
 FOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. 
 
 Edited by Mrs OLIPHANT. 
 
 In Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 The Volumes inMished are — 
 
 Dante. By the Editor. , 
 
 Voltaire. By Major-General Sir E. B. ] 
 
 Hamley, K.C.M.G. 
 Pascal. By Principal Tulloch. 
 Petrarch. By Henry Reeve, C. B. i 
 
 Goethe. By A. Hay ward, Q.C. < 
 
 MoLiERE. By the Editor and F. Tarver, 
 
 M.A. 
 Montaigne. By Rev. W. L. Collins, M.A. 
 Rabelais. By Walter Besant, M.A. 
 Calderon. By E. J. HaseU. 
 
 In preparation — Leop. 
 
 Saint Simon. By Clifton W. Collin.s, M.A. 
 
 Cervantes. By the Editor. 
 
 CoRNEiLLE and Racine. By Henry M. 
 Trollope. 
 
 Madame de S^vigne. By Miss Thackeray. 
 
 La Fontaine, and other French Fabu- 
 lists. By Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. 
 
 Schiller. By James Siine, M.A., Author 
 of ' Lessing : his Life and Writings.' 
 
 Tasso. By E. J. Hasell. 
 
 Rousseau. By Henry Grey Graham. 
 
 ARDi, by the Editor. 
 
 Now Complete, 
 
 ANCIENT CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. 
 
 Edited by the Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. 
 
 Complete in 28 Vols, crown 8vo, cloth, price 2s. 6d. each. And may also be had in 
 14 Volumes, strongly and neatly bound, with calf or vellum back, £2, los. 
 Saturday Revieio. — "It is difficult to estimate too highly the value of such a series 
 as this in giving ' English readers ' an insight, exact as far as it goes, into those 
 olden times which are so remote and yet to many of us so close."
 
 CATALOGUE 
 
 OF 
 
 MESSRS BLACKWOOD & SONS' 
 P U B Lie A T I N S. 
 
 ALISON. History of Europe. By Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., 
 
 D.C.L. 
 
 1. From the Commencement of the French Revolution to the 
 
 Battle of Waterloo. 
 
 Library Edition, 14 vols., with Portraits. Demy 8vo, ;{Jio, los. 
 Another Edition, in 20 vols, crown 8vo, £6. 
 People's Edition, 13 vols, crown 8vo, £2, iis. 
 
 2. Continnation to the Accession of Louis Napoleon. 
 
 Library Edition, 8 vols. 8vo, £6, 7s. 6d. 
 People's Edition, 8 vols, crown 8vo, 34s. 
 
 3. Epitome of Alison's History of Europe. Twenty -ninth 
 
 Thousand, 7s. 6d. 
 
 4. Atlas to Alison's History of Europe. By A. Keith Johnston. 
 
 Library Edition, demy 4to, £^, 3s. 
 People's Edition, 31s. 6d. 
 
 Life of John Duke of Marlborouoh. With some Account 
 
 of his Contemporaries, and of the War of the Succession. Third Edition, 
 2 vols. 8vo. Portraits and Slaps, 30s. 
 
 Essays : Historical, Political, and Miscellaneous. 3 vols. 
 
 demy Svo, 4';s. 
 
 Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart, 
 
 Second and Third Marquesses of Londonderry. From the Original Paper of 
 the Family. 3 vols. 8vo, £2, 2s. 
 
 ADAMS. Great Campaigns. A Succinct Account of the Principal 
 
 Military Operations which have taken place in Eurojie from 1796 to 1870. By 
 Major C. Adams, Professor of MiUtary History at the Staff College. Edited by 
 Captain C. Cooper King, R.M. Artillery, Instructor of Tactics, Royal Military 
 College. 8vo, with Maps. i6s. 
 
 AIRD. Poetical Works of Thomas Aird. Fifth Edition, with 
 Memoir of the Author by the Rev. Jardine Wallace, and Portrait. 
 Crown 8vo, 7S. 6d. 
 
 ALLARDYCE. The City of Sunshine. By Alexander Allar- 
 
 dyce. Three vols, post Svo, £1, 5s. 6d. 
 
 - Memoir of the Honourable George Keith Elphin.«tone, 
 
 K.B., Viscount Keith of Stonehaven Mariscbal, Admii-al of the Red. One 
 vol. 8vo, with Portrait, Illustrations, and Maps. 21s.
 
 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 ANCIENT CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited by 
 
 Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. Comjilete in 28 vols., cloth, 2s. 6d. each; or in 
 14 vols., tastefully bound, with calf or vellum back, ^3, los. 
 
 Contents of the Series. 
 
 Homer : The Iliad. By the Editor. 
 Homer : The Ody.ssey. By the Editor. 
 Herodotus. By George C. Swayne, 
 
 M.A. 
 Xenophon. By Sir Alexander Grant, 
 
 Bart., LL.D. 
 Euripides. By W. B. Donne. 
 Arlstophanes. By the Editor. 
 Plato. By Clifton W. Collins, M.A, 
 LuciAN. By the Editor. 
 .ffiscHYLUS. By the Right Rev. the Bisliop 
 
 of Colombo. 
 Sophocles. By Clifton W. Collins, M.A. 
 Hesiod and Theoonis. By the Rev. J. 
 
 Davies, M.A. 
 Greek Anthology. By Lord Neaves. 
 Virgil. By the Editor. 
 Horace. By Sir Theodore Martin, K.C.B. 
 Juvenal. By Edward Walford, M.A. 
 
 Plautus and Terence. By the Editor. 
 
 The Commentaries of Caesar. By An- 
 thony Trollope. 
 
 Tacitus. By W. B. Donne. 
 
 Cicero. By the Editor. 
 
 Pliny's Letters. By the Rev. Alfred 
 Church, M.A., and the Rev. W. J. Brod- 
 ribb, M.A. 
 
 Livy. By the Editor. 
 
 Ovid. By the Rev. A. Church, M.A. 
 
 Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius. 
 By the Rev. Jas. Davies, M.A. 
 
 Demosthenes. By the Rev. W. J. Brod- 
 ribb, M.A. 
 
 Aristotle. By Sir Alexander Grant, 
 Bart., LL.D. 
 
 Thucydides. By the Editor. 
 
 Lucretius. By W. H. Mallock, M.A. 
 
 Pindar. By the Rev. F. D. Morice, M.A. 
 
 AYLWARD. The Transvaal of To - day : War, Witchcraft, 
 Sports, and Spoils in South Africa. By Alfred Aylward, Commandant, 
 Transvaal Republic ; Captain (late) Lydenberg Volunteer Corps. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, with a Map, 6s. 
 
 AYTOUN. Lays of the Scotti.'^h Cavaliers, and other Poems. By 
 
 W. Edmond.stoune Aytoun, D.C.K, Professor of Rlietoric and Belles-Lettres 
 in the University of Edinburgh. Twenty-ninth Edition. Fcap. Bvo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 An Illustrated Edition of the Lays of the Scottish Cavaliers. 
 
 From designs by Sir Noel Paton. Small 4to, 21s. , in gilt cloth. 
 
 Bothwell : a Poem. Third Edition. Fcap., 7s. 6d. 
 
 Firmilian ; or, The Student of Badajoz. A Spasmodic 
 
 Tragedy. Fcap., 5s. 
 
 Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated by Professor 
 
 Aytoun and Sir Theodore Martin, K.C.B. Third Edition. Fcap., 6s. 
 
 Bon Gaultier's Book of Ballads. Bv the Same. Fourteenth 
 
 and Cheaper Edition. With Illustrations by Doyle, Leech, and CrowquilL 
 Fcap. 8vo, 5s. 
 
 The Ballads of Scotland. Edited by Professor Aytoun. 
 
 Fourth Edition. 2 vols. fcap. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 Memoir of William E. Aytoun, D.C.L. By Sir Theodore 
 
 Martin, K.C.B. With Portrait. Po.st 8vo, 12s. 
 
 BACH. On Musical Education and Vocal Culture. By Albert 
 
 B. Bach. Fourth Edition. 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 The Princijjles and Practice of Singing. With numerous 
 
 Vocal Exercises. In one volume. Crown 8vo. [In the press. 
 
 BALLADS AND POEMS. By Members of the Glasgow 
 
 Ballad Club. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 BATTLE OF DORKING. Reminiscences of a Volunteer. From 
 
 'Blackwood's Magazine. ' Second Hundredth Thousand. 6d. 
 
 BEDFORD. The Regulations of the Old Hospital of the Knights 
 
 of St John at Valetta. From a Copy Printed at Rome, and preserved in the 
 Archives of Malta; with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes Explanatory 
 of the Ho.spital Work of the Order. By the Rev. W. K. R. Bedford, one of 
 the Chaplains of the Order of St John in England. Royal 8vo, with Frontis- 
 piece, Plans, &c., 7s. 6U.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 
 
 BELLAIRS. The Transvaal War, 1880-8L Edited by Lady Bel- 
 lairs. With a Fiontispieee and Map. 8vo, 15s. 
 
 BESANT. The Revolt of Man. By Walter Besant, M.A. 
 
 Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo, 33. 6d. 
 
 Readings in Rabelais. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 BEVERIDGE. Culross and Tulliallan; or Rerthshire on Forth. Its 
 
 History and Antiquities With Klueidations of Scottisli Lifc and Character 
 from tlie Burgli and Kirk-Session Records of that District. By David 
 Bevkridoe. 2 vols. 8vo, witli Illustrations, 42s. 
 
 BLACKIE. Lays and Legends of Ancient Greece. By John 
 
 Stuart Blackie, Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of Edin- 
 burgh. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 5s. 
 
 ■ The Wisdom of Goetlie. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, extra gilt, 6s. 
 
 BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE, from Commencement in 1817 to 
 
 December 18S3. Nos. i to 818, forming 134 Volumes. 
 
 Index to Blackwood's Magazine. Vols, i to 50. 8vo, 15s. 
 
 Tales from Blackwood. Forming Twelve Volumes of 
 
 Interesting and Amusing Railway Reading. Price One Shilling each in Paper 
 Cover. Sold separately at all Railway Bookstalls. 
 They may also be had bound in clotli, i8s., and in half calf, richly gilt, 30s. 
 or 12 volumes in 6, Roxburglie, 21s., and half red morocco, 28s. 
 
 Tales from Blackwood. New Series. Complete in Twenty- 
 four Shilling Parts. Handsomely bound in 12 vols., cloth, 30s. In leather 
 back, Roxburghe style, 37s. 6d. In half calf, gilt, 52s. 6d. Inhalf morocco, 55s. 
 
 Standard Novels. Uniform in size and legibly Printed. 
 
 Each Novel complete in one volume. 
 
 Florin Series, Illustrated Boards. 
 Tom Cringle's Loo. By Michael Scott. Pen Owen. By Dean Hook. 
 The Cruise of the Midge. By the Same. ^ Adam Blair. By J. G. Lockhart. 
 Cyril Thornton. By Captain Hamilton, 
 Annals of the Parish. By Jolni Gait. 
 The Provost, &c. By Jolm Gait. 
 Sir Andrew Wylie. By Jolm Gait. 
 The Entail. By John Gait. 
 Miss iMolly. By Beatrice May Butt. 
 Reginald Dalton. By J. G. Lockhart 
 
 Lady Lee's Widowhood. By General 
 
 Sir E. B. Hamley. 
 Salem Chapel. By Mrs Oliphant. 
 The Perpetual Curate. By Mrs Oli- 
 
 pliant. 
 Miss Marjoribanks. By Mrs Oliphant. 
 John : A Love Story. By Mrs Oliphant. 
 
 Or in Cloth Boards, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Shilling Series, Illustrated Cover. 
 The Rector, and The Doctor's Family. Sir Frizzle Pumpkin, Nights at Mess, 
 
 By Mrs Oliphant. i &c. 
 
 The Life of Mansie Wauch. By D. M. The Subaltern. 
 
 Moir. , Life in the Far West. By G. F. Ruxton, 
 
 Peninsular Scenes and Sketches. By Valerius : A Roman Story. By J. G. 
 F. Hardman. Lockhart. 
 
 Or in Cloth Boards, is. 6d. 
 
 BLACKMORE. The Maid of Sker. By R. D. Blackmore, Author 
 
 of ' Lorna Doone,' &c. Tenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 BOSCOBEL TRACTS. Relating to the Escape of Charles the 
 
 Second after the Battle of Worcester, and his subsequent Adventures. Edited 
 by J. Hughes, Esq., A.M. A New Edition, with additional Notes and Illus- 
 trations, including Communications from the Rev. R. H. Barham, Author of 
 the ' lugoldsby Legends." 8vo, with Engravings, i6s. 
 
 BRACKENBURY. A Narrative of the Ashanti War. Prepared 
 
 from the official documents, by permission of General Lord Vr''olseley, G.C.B., 
 G.C.M.G. By Major-General H. Brackenbury, C.B. Witli Maps from the 
 latest Sui'veys made by the Stall' of the Expedition. 2 vols. 8vo, 2ss.
 
 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 BEACKENBURY. The River Column : A Narrative of the Ad- 
 
 Vance of the River Colniiin of tlie Nile Expeditionary Force, and its Return 
 down the Rai>ids. By Major-General Hknry Brackenbury, C.B., Late Com- 
 manding tlie River Column With Mai)s by Major the Hon. F. L. L. Col- 
 borne, Royal Irish Killes. Ciown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 BROADLEY. Tunis, Past and Present. With a Narrative of the 
 
 French Conquest of the Regency. By A. M. Beoadley. With numerous 
 Illustrations and Maps. 2 vols, post 8vo. 25s. 
 
 BROOKE, Life of Sir James, Rajah of Sarawak. From his Personal 
 
 Papers and Corresjiondence. By Spenser St John, H. M.'s Minister-Resident 
 and Consul-General Peruvian Republic ; formerly Secretary to the R;yah. 
 With Portrait and a Map. Post 8vo, 12s. 6d. 
 
 BROUGHAM. Memoirs of the Life and Times of Henry Lord 
 
 Brougham. Written by Himself. 3 vols. Svo, £1, 8s. The Volumes are sold 
 separately, price i6s. each. 
 
 BROWN. The Forester : A Practical Treatise on the Planting, 
 
 Rearing, and General Management of Forest-trees. By James Brown, LL.D., 
 Inspector of and Reporter on Woods and Forests, Benmore House, Port Elgin, 
 Ontario. Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged. Royal Svo, with Engravings. 
 36s. 
 
 BROWN. The Ethics of George Eliot's Works. By John Crombie 
 
 Brown. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 BROWN. A Manual of Botany, Anatomical and Phj'siological. 
 
 For the Use of Students. By Robert Brown, M.A., Ph.D. Crown 8vo, with 
 numerous Illustrations, 12s. 6d. 
 
 BUCHAN. Introductory Text-Book of Meteorology. By Alex- 
 ander Bl'ciian, M.A., F.R.S.E., Secretary of the Scottish Meteorological 
 Society, &c. Crown Svo, with 8 Coloui-ed Charts and other Engravings, 
 pp. 218. 4s. 6d. 
 
 BURBIDGE. Domestic Floriculture, Window Gardening, and 
 
 Floral Decorations. Being practical directions for the Propagation, Culture, 
 and Arrangement of Plants and Flowers as Domestic Ornaments. I5y F. W. 
 Burbidge. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, with numerous Illustrations, 
 7s. 6d. 
 
 Cultivated Plants : Their Propagation and Improvement. 
 
 Including Natural and Artificial Hybridisation, Raising from Seed, Cuttings, 
 and Layers, Grafting and Budding, as ajiplied to the Families and Genera in 
 Cultivation. Crown Svo, with numerous Illustrations, 12s. 6d. 
 
 BURTON. The History of Scotland : From Agricola's Invasion to 
 
 the Extinction of the last Jacobite Insurrection. By John Hill Burton, 
 D.C.L., Historiographer- Royal for Scotland. New and Enlarged Edition, 
 8 vols., and Index. Crown 8vo, £,■>,, 3s. 
 
 History of the British Empire during the Reign of Queen 
 
 Anne. In 3 vols. Svo. 36s, 
 
 The Scot Abroad. New Edition. Crown Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 The Book-Hunter. New Edition. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 BUTE. The Roman Breviary : Reformed by Order of the Holy 
 
 fficumenical Council of Trent; Published by Order of Po])e St Pius V.; and 
 Revised by Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; together with the Offices since 
 granted. Translated out of Latin into English by John, Marquess of Bute, 
 K.T. In 2 vols, crown Svo, cloth boards, edges uncut. £1, 2s. 
 
 The Altus of St Columba. With a Prose Paraphrase and 
 
 Notes. In paper cover, 2s. 6d. 
 
 BUTT. Miss Molly. By Beatrice May Butt. Cheap Edition, 2s. 
 
 Geraldine Hawthorne : A Sketch. By the Author of ' Miss 
 
 Molly.' Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 
 
 BUTT. Alison. By the Author of ' Mi.ss Molly.' 3 vols, crown 8vo, 
 
 25s. 6d. 
 
 CAIRD. Sermons. By John Caird, D.D., Principal of the Uni- 
 versity of Glasgow. Sixteenth Tliousand. Fuap. 8vo, 5s. 
 Religion in Common Life. A Sermon preached in Crathie 
 
 Churcli, Oetober 14, 1855, before Her Majesty tlie Queen and Prince Albert. 
 Published bv Her Majesty's Command. Cheap Edition, 3d. 
 
 CAMERON. Gaelic Names of Plants (Scottish and Irish). Col- 
 
 leoted and Arranged in Scientilic Order, with Notes on their Etymology, their 
 Uses, Plant Superstitions, &(;., among the Celts, with copious Gaelic, Englisli, 
 and Scientific Indices. By John Cameron, Sunderland. 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 CAMPBELL. Sermons Preached before the Queen at Balmoral. 
 
 By tlie Rev. A. A. Campbell, Minister of Crathie. Published by Command 
 of Her Majesty. Crown Svo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 CAMPBELL. Records of Argyll. Legends, Traditions, and Re- 
 collections of Argyllshire Highlanders, collected chitlly from the Gaelic. 
 With Notes on the Antiquity of the Dress, Clan Colours or Tartans of the 
 Hiylilanders. By Lord Archibald Campbell. Illustrated with Nineteen 
 full-page Etchings. 4to, printed on hand-made paper, ^3, 3s. 
 
 CAPPON. Victor Hugo. A Memoir and a Study. By James 
 
 Cappon, M.A. Post 8vo, IDS 6d. 
 
 CARRICK. Koumiss ; or. Fermented ]\Iare's Milk : and its Uses 
 
 in the Treatment and Cure of Pulmonary Consumjition, and other Wasting 
 Diseases. With an Appendix on tlie best Methods of Fermenting Cow's Milk. 
 By George L. Cakrick, M.D., L.R.C.S.E. and L.R.C.P.E., Physician to the 
 British Embassy, St Petersburg, &c. Crown Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 CAUVIN. A Treasury of the English and German Languages. 
 
 Compiled from the best Authors and Lexicographers in both Languages. 
 Ada]ited to the Use of Schools, Students, Travellers, and Men of Business; 
 and forming a Companion to all German-English Dictionaries. By Joseph 
 Cauvin, LL.D. & Ph.D., of the University of Gottingen, &c. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 CAVE-BROWN. Lambeth Palace and its Associations. By J. 
 
 Cave-Brown, M.A., Vicar of Detling, Kent, and for many years Curate of Lam- 
 beth Parish Church. With an Introduction by the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
 Second Edition, containing an additional Chapter on Medieval Life in the 
 Old Palaces. Svo, with Illustrations, 21s. 
 
 CHARTERIS. Canonicity ; or, Early Testimonies to the Existence 
 
 and Use of the Books of the New Testament. Based on Kirchhoffer's ' Quel- 
 leusanimlung. ' Edited by A. H. Charterls, D.D., Professor of Biblical 
 Criticism in the University of Edinbiu'gh. Svo, 18s. 
 
 CHEVELEY NOVELS, THE. 
 
 1. A Modern Minister. 2 vols. With Twenty-six Illustrations. 17s. 
 II. Saul Weir. 2 vols. With Twelve Illustrations by F. Barnard. i6s. 
 
 CHIROL. 'Twixt Greek and Turk. By M. Valentine Chirol. 
 
 Post Svo. With Frontispiece and Map, los. 6d. 
 
 CHRISTISON. Life of Sir Robert Christison, Bart, M.D., D.C.L. 
 
 Oxon., Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in the University of Edinburgh. 
 Edited by his Sons. In two vols. Svo. Vol. I — Autobiography. Vol. II. — 
 Memoirs. [In the jwess. 
 
 CHURCH SERVICE SOCIETY. A Book on Common Order : 
 
 Being Forms of Worship issued by the Church Service Society. Fourth Edi- 
 tion, 6s. 
 
 COCHRAN. A Handy Text-Book of Military Law. Compiled 
 
 chiefly to assist Officers "preparing for Examination ; also for all Officers of 
 the Regular and Auxiliary Forces. Specially arranged according to the Syl- 
 labus of Subjects of Examination for Promotion, Queen's Regulations, 1883. 
 Comprising also a Synopsis of part of the Army Act. By Major F. Cochran, 
 Hampshire Regiment, Garrison Instructor, North British District. Crown 
 Svo, 7S. 6d.
 
 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 COLQUHOUN. The Moor and the Loch. Containing Minute 
 
 Instructions in all Higliland Sports, with Wanderings over Crag and Corrie, 
 Flood and Fell. By John Colquhoun. Sixth Edition, greatly enlarged. 
 With Illustrations. 2 vols, post 8vo, 26s. 
 
 COTTERILL. The Genesis of the Church. By the Right. Rev. 
 
 Henry Cotterill, D.D., Bishop of Edinburgh. Demy 8vo, i6s. 
 
 COTTERILL. Suggested Reforms in Public Schools. By C. C. 
 
 Cotterill, jM. A., Assistant Master at Fettes College, Edin. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 CRANSTOUN. The Elegies of Albius Tibullus. Translated into 
 
 English Verse, with Life of the Poet, and Illu.strative Notes. By James Crak- 
 STOUN, LL.D., Author of a Translation of ' Catullus.' Crown Svo, 6s. 6d. 
 
 The Elegies of Sextus Propertius. Translated into English 
 
 Verse, with Life of the Poet, and Illustrative Notes. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 CRAWFORD. The Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the 
 
 Atonement. By the late Thomas J. Crawford, D.D. , Professor of Divinity in 
 the University of Edinburgh. Third Edition. Svo, 12s. 
 
 The Fatherhood of God, Considered in its General and 
 
 Special Aspects, and particularly in relation to the Atonement, with a 
 Review of Recent Speculations on the Subject. Third Edition, Revised and 
 Enlarged. Svo, 9s. 
 
 The Preaching of the Cross, and other Sermons, Svo, 
 
 7S. 6d. 
 
 The Mysteries of Christianity. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 DAVIES. A Book of Thoughts for every Day in the Year. Se- 
 lected from the Writings of the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies, M.A. By Two 
 Clergymen. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 DAVIES. Norfolk Broads and Rivers ; or, The Waterways, Lagoons, 
 and Decoys of East Anglia. By G. Christopher Davies, Author of 'The 
 Swan and her Crew.' Illustrated with Seven full-page Plates. New and 
 Cheaper Edition. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 DE AINSLIE. Life as I have Found It. By General De Ainslie. 
 
 Post Svo, 12S. 6d. 
 
 DESCARTES. The Method, Meditations, and Principles of Philo- 
 sophy of Descartes. Translated from the Original French and Latin. With a 
 New Introductory Essay, Historical and Critical, on the Cartesian Philosophy. 
 By John Veitch, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of 
 Glasgow. A New Edition, being the Eighth. Price 6s. 6d. 
 
 DIDON. Tlie Germans. By the Rev. Father Didon, of the Order 
 
 of Preaching Friars. Translated into English by Raphael Ledos de Beau- 
 fort. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 DOGS, OUR DOMESTICATED : Their Treatment in reference 
 to Food, Diseases, Habits, Punishment, Accomplishments. By ' Magenta." 
 Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 DU CANE. The Odyssey of Homer, Books I.-XII. Translated into 
 
 English Verse. By Sir Charles Du Cane, K.C.M.G. Svo, ios. 6d. 
 
 DUDGEON. History of the Edinburgh or Queen's Regiment 
 
 Light Infantry Militia, now 3rd Battalion The Royal Scots ; with an 
 Account of the Origin and Progress of the Militia, and a Brief Sketch of the 
 old Royal Scots. By Major R. C. Dudgeon, Adjutant 3rd Battalion The Royal 
 Scots. Post Svo, with illustrations, los. 6d. 
 
 DUNSMORE. Manual of the Law of Scotland, as to the Relations 
 
 between Agricultural Tenants and their Landlords, Servants, Merchants, and 
 Bowers. By W. Dunsmore, Advocate. In one vol. Svo. [In the press. 
 
 DUPRE. Thoughts on Art, and Autobiographical Memoirs of 
 
 Giovanni Dupre. Translated from the Italian by E. M. Peruzzi, with the 
 permission of the Author. Crown Svo, los. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 
 
 ELIOT. George Eliot's Life, Related in lier Letters and Journals. 
 Arranged and Edited by her husband, J. W. C'ku.s.s. With Portrait and otlier 
 
 Illustrations. Third Edition. 3 vols, post 8vn, 42s. 
 
 Ei^says. By George Eliot. lievised by the Author 
 
 for publication. Post 8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 Xoveis by George Eliot. Clieap Edition. Adam Bede. 11 
 
 liLstrated. 3s. 6d., cloth. — The Mill on the Floss. Illus- 
 trated. 3s. 6d., cloth. — Scenes of Clerical Life. Illustrated. 
 3s., cloth. — Silas Marner : The Weaver of Kaveloe. Illus- 
 trated. 2s. 6d., cloth. — Felix Holt, the Radical. Illustrated. 
 3s. 6d., cloth. — Eoinola. With Vignette. 3s. 6d., cloth. 
 
 ]\Iiddlemarcli. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Daniel Deronda. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Works of George Eliot (Cabinet Edition). Hand.somely 
 
 jirinted in a ncnv type, 20 volumes, crown 8vo, price ^5. The Volumes are 
 
 also sold separately, price 5s. eacli, viz.: — 
 
 Romola. 2 vols.— Silas Marner, The Lifted Veil, Brother Jacob, i vol.— 
 Adam Bede. 2 vols. — Scenes of Clerical Life. 2 vols.— The Mill on 
 the Floss. 2 vols. — Felix Holt. 2 vols. — Middleniarch. 3 vols. — 
 Daniel Deronda. 3 vols. — The Spanish Gypsy, i vol. — Jul>al, and 
 other Poems, Old and New. 1 vol. — Theophrastus Such, i vol. 
 
 Life of George Eliot. Cabinet Edition. With Portrait and 
 
 other Illustrations. 3 vols, crown Svo, 15s. 
 
 The Spanish Gypsy. Crown Svo, 5s. 
 
 The Legend of Jubal, and other Poems, Old and New. 
 
 New Edition. Fcap. Svo, 5s., cloth. 
 
 — Impressions of Theophrastus Such. New Edition. Crown 
 
 Svo, ss. 
 
 Wise, Witty, and Tender Sayings, in Prose and Verse. 
 
 Selected from the Works of George Ei.iot. Sixth Edition. Fcap. Svo, 6s. 
 
 The George Eliot Birthday Book. Printed on fine paper, 
 
 with red border, and handsomely bound in cloth, gilt. Fcap. Svo, cloth, 3s. 6d. 
 And in French morocco or Russia, =;s. 
 
 ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SUBJECTS. Originally published m 
 
 the ' Saturday Review.' A New Edition. First and Second Series. 2 vols. 
 crown Svo, 6s. each. 
 EWALD. The Crown and its Advisers ; or, Queen, Ministers, 
 Lords, and Commons. By Alexander Charles Ewald, F.S.A. Crown Svo, 
 
 FAITHS OF THE WORLD, The. A Concise History of the 
 
 Great Religious Systems of the World. By various Authors. Being the St 
 Giles' Lectures — Second Series. Complete in one volume, crown Svo, 5s 
 
 FARRER. A Tour in Greece in 1880. By Richard Ridley 
 
 Farrer. With Twenty -seven full -page Illustrations by Lord Windsor. 
 Royal Svo, with a Map, 21s. 
 
 FAUCIT. Some of Shakespeare's Female Characters. In a Series 
 
 of Letters. By Helena Faucit, Lady Martin. With Portraits engraved by 
 the late F. Holl. Dedicated by Special Permission to Her Most Gracious 
 Majesty the Queen. 4to, printed on hand-made ])aper. 21.S. 
 
 FERRIER. Philosophical Works of the late James F. Ferrier, 
 
 B. A. Oxon. , Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St Andrews. 
 New Edition. Edited by Sir Alex. Grant, Bart., D.C.L., and Professor 
 LusHiNGTON. 3 vols, crown Svo, 34s. 6d. 
 
 Institutes of Metaphysic. Third Edition. los. 6d. 
 
 Lectures on the Early Greek Philosophy. Third Edition, 
 
 los. 6d. 
 
 Philosophical Remains, including the Lectitres on Early 
 
 Greek Philosophy. 2 vols., 24s.
 
 10 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 FLETCHER. Lectures on the Opening Clauses of the Litany- 
 delivered in St Paul's Church, Edinburgh. By John B. Fletcher, M.A. 
 Crown 8vo, 4s. 
 
 FLINT. The Philosophy of History in Europe. Vol. I., contain- 
 ing the History of that Philosophy in France and Germany. By Robert Flint, 
 D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity, University of Edinlmrgh. 8vo. 
 
 [New Edition in preparation. 
 
 Theism. Being the Baird Lecture for 1876. Fourth Edition. 
 
 Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Anti-Theistic Theories. Being the Baird Lecture for 1877. 
 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 FORBES. Tlie Campaign of Garilialdi in the Two Sicilies : A Per- 
 sonal Narrative. By Charles Stuart P^orbes, Conmiaudur, R.N. Post 8vo, 
 with Portraits, 12s. 
 
 FOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited 
 
 by Mrs Oliphant. Price 2s. 6d. For List of Volumes issried, see p. 2. 
 
 FRANZOS. The Jews of Barnow. Stories by Karl Emil Fran- 
 
 zos. Translated by M. W. Macdowall. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 GALT. Annals of the Parish. By John Galt. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 
 
 The Provost. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 
 
 Sir Andrew Wylie. Fcap. 8vo, 2S. 
 
 The Entail ; or, The Laird of Grippy. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 
 
 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. 
 
 Family Prayers. Authorised by the General Assembly of 
 
 the Church of Scotland. A New Edition, crown Svo, in large type, 4s. 6d. 
 Another Edition, crown Svo, 2s. 
 
 ■ Prayers for Social and Family Worship. For the Use of 
 
 Soldiers, Sailors, Colonists, and Sojourners in India, and other Persons, at 
 home and' abroad, who are dejirived of the ordinary services of a Christian 
 Ministry. Cheap Edition, is. 6d. 
 
 The Scottish Hymnal. Hymns for Public Worship. Pub- 
 lished for Use in Churches by Authority of the General Assembly. Various 
 sizes — viz. : i. Large type, for Pulpit use, cloth, 3s. 6d. 2. Longprimer type, 
 cloth, red edges, is. 6d. ; French morocco, 2s. 6d. ; calf, 6s. 3. Boui-geois 
 tyjie, cloth, red edges, is. ; French morocco, 2s. 4. Minion type, limp cloth, 
 6d. ; French morocco, is. 6d. 5. School Edition, in paper cover, ad. 6. Chil- 
 dren's Hymnal, paper cover, id. No. 2, bound with the Psalms and Para- 
 plirases, cloth, 3s. ; French morocco, 4s, 6d. ; calf, 7s. 6d. No. 3, bound with 
 the Psalms and Paraphrases, cloth, 2s. ; French morocco, 3s. 
 
 The Scottish Hymnal, with Music. Selected bj' the Com- 
 mittees on Hymns and on P.salmody. The harmonics arranged by W. H. Monk. 
 Cloth, IS. 6d. : Frenc.h morocco, 3s. 6d. The same in the Tonic Sol-fa Notation, 
 IS. 6d. and 3s. 6d. 
 
 The Scottish Hymnal, with Fixed Tune for each Hymn. 
 
 Longprimer type, 3s. 6d. 
 
 The Scottish Hymnal Ajipendix. i. Longprimer type, is. 
 
 2. Nonpareil type, cloth limp, 4d.; paper cover, 2d. 
 
 Scottish Hymnal with Ajipendix Incorporated. Bourgeois 
 
 type, limp cloth, is. Large type, cloth, red edges, 2s. 6d. Nonpareil type, 
 paper covers, 3d. ; cloth, red edges, 6d. 
 
 GERARD. Reata: What's in a Name. By E. D. Gerard. 
 
 New Edition. In one volume, crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 Beggar my Neighbour. New Edition. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 The Waters of Hercules. 3 vols. Post Svo, 25s. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 11 
 
 GOETHE'S FAUST. Translated into English Verse by Sir Theo- 
 
 DURE Martin, K.C.B. Seuoud Edition, post 8vo, 6s. Chcai) Edition, fcaii., 
 
 3S. 6d. 
 
 GOETHE. Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated Ly Professor 
 
 Aytoun and Sir Tih-ouore Martin, K.C.B. Tliird Edition, fcap. 8vo, 6s. 
 
 GORDON CUMJMING. At Home in Fiji. By C. F. Gordon 
 
 Cli.mmino, Autlidi' (iT ' From tliC Ilobrides to the Himalayas.' Fourth Edition, 
 post 8vo. Witli Illustrations and Map. 7s. 6d. 
 
 A Lad3''s Cruise in a French Man-of-War. New and 
 
 Cheaper Edition. 8vo. With Illustrations and Maj). 12s. 6d. 
 
 Fire-Fountains. The Kingdom of Hawaii : Its Volcanoes, 
 
 and the History of its Missions. With Map and nunit-rous Illustrations. 2 
 vols. 8vo, 25s. 
 
 Granite Crags : Tlie Yo-semite Region of California. Illus- 
 trated with 8 Engravings. One vol. 8vo, i6s. 
 Wanderings in China. 2 vols. &yo, with Illustrations. 
 
 GRAHAM. The Life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan, cSt 
 
 By Lieut-Colonel G. P. I. Graham, B.S.C. In one vol. 8vo. [Immediately, 
 
 GRANT. Bush-Life in Queensland. By A. C. Grant. New 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 HAMERTON. Wenderholme : A Story of Lancashire and York- 
 shire Life. By Philip Gilbert Hajierton, Author of 'A Painter's Camp.' A 
 New Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir William Hamil- 
 ton, Bart, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 
 Edited by the Rev. H. L. Mansel, B. D., LiL.D., Dean of St Paul's ; and John 
 Veitch, M.A., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, Glasgow. Sixth Edition. 2 
 vols. 8vo, 24s. 
 
 Lectures on Logic. Edited by the Same. Third Edition. 
 
 2 vols., 24S. 
 
 Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and 
 
 University Reform. Third Edition, 8vo, 21s. 
 
 Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic 
 
 and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. By Professor Veitch of the 
 University of Glasgow. 8vo, with Portrait, i8s. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton : The Man and his Philosophy. 
 
 Two Lectures Delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, 
 January and February 18S3. By the Same. Crown 8vo, 2s. 
 
 HAMILTON. Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns. By Captain 
 
 Thomas Hamilton. Edited by F. Hardman. 8vo, i6s. Atlas of Maps to 
 
 illustrate the Campaigns, 12s. 
 
 HAMILTON. Mr Montenello. A Romance of the Civil Service. 
 
 By W. A, Baillie Hamilton. In 3 vols, post Svo, 25s. 6d 
 
 HAMLEY. The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated. By 
 
 Major- General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, K C.M.G. Fourth Edition, 
 revised throughout. 4to, with numerous Illustrations, 30s. 
 
 Thomas Carlyle : An Essay. Second Edition. Crown 
 
 Svo. 2S. 6d. 
 
 The Story of the Campaign of Sebastopol. Written in the 
 
 Camp. With Illustrations drawn in Camp by the Author. Svo, 21s. 
 
 On Outposts. Second Edition. Svo, 2s. 
 
 • Wellington's Career ; A Military and Political Summary. 
 
 Crown Svo, 2s. 
 
 Lady Lee's Widowhood. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Our Poor Relations. A Philozoic Essav. With Illus- 
 
 trations, chiefly by Ernest Griset. Crown Svo, cloth giltj 3s. 6d.
 
 12 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 HAMLEY. Guilty, or Not Guilty ? A Tale. By Major-General 
 
 W. G. Hamley, late of the Royal Engineers. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Traseaden Hall. "Wlieu George the Third was King." 
 
 New and Cheaper Edition, crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 HAKBORD. Definitions and Diagrams in Astronomy and Navi- 
 gation. By the Uev. J. B. Harbord, M.A., Assistant Director of Education, 
 
 Admiralty, is. 
 
 Short Sermons for Hospitals and Sick Seamen. Fcap. 8vo, 
 
 cloth, 4s. 6d. 
 
 HARDMAN. Sceiies and Adventures in Central America. Edited 
 
 by Frederick Hardman. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 HARRISON. Oure Tounis Colledge. Sketches of the History of 
 the Old College of Edinburgh, with an Appendix of Historical Documents. 
 By John Harrison. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 HASELL. Bible Partings. By E. J. Hasell. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Short Family Prayers. By Miss Hasell. Cloth, is. 
 
 HAY. The Works of the Eight Rev. Dr George Hay, Bishop ot 
 
 EdiiiTmrgh. Edited under the Supervision of the Right Rev. ]3ishop Strain. 
 
 With Memoir and Portrait of the Author. 5 vols, crown Svo, bound in extra 
 
 cloth, £i, IS. Or, sold separately — viz. : 
 The Sincere Christian Instructed in the Faith of Christ from the Written Word. 
 2 vols., 8s. — The Devout Christian Instructed in the Law of Christ from the Written 
 Word. 2 vols., 8s. — The Pious Christian Instructed in the Nature and Practice of the 
 Principal Exercises of Piety, i vol., 43. 
 
 HEATLEY. The Horse-Owner's Safeguard. A Handy IVIedical 
 Guide for every Man who owns a Horse. By G. S. Heatley, M.R.C, V.S. 
 Crown Svo, 5s. 
 
 The Stock-Owner's Guide. A Handy Medical Treatise for 
 
 every Man who owns an Ox or a Cow. Crown Svo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 HEMANS. The Poetical Works of Mrs Hemans. Copyright Edi- 
 tions.— One Volume, royal Svo, 5s.— The Same, with Illustrations engraved on 
 Steel, bound in cloth, gilt edges, 7s. 6d. — Six Vokimes in Three, fcap., 12s. 6d. 
 Select Poems of Mrs Hemans. Fcap., cloth, gilt edges, 3s. 
 
 HOBART PACHA. The Torpedo Scare ; Experiences during the 
 
 Turco-Russian War. By Hobart Pacha. Reprinted from 'Blackwood's 
 Magazine,' with additional matter. Crown Svo., is. 
 
 HOLE. A Book about Ro.'jes : How to Grow and Show Them. By 
 
 the Rev. Canon Hole. Eighth and Cheaper Edition, revised. Crown Svo, 
 3S. 6d. 
 
 HOME PRAYERS. By Ministers of the Church of Scotland and 
 Members of the Church Service Society. Second Edition. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 
 
 HOMER. The Odyssey. Translated into English Verse in the 
 
 Spenserian Stanza. By Philip Stanhope Worsley. Third Edition, 2 vols. 
 fcap., 12S. 
 
 The Iliad. Translated by P. S. Worsley and Professor 
 
 CoNiNGTON. 2 vols. crowu 8vo, 2IS. 
 
 HOSACK. Mary Queen of Scots and Her Accusers. Containing a 
 
 Variety of Documents never before jiublished. By John Hosack, Barrister- 
 at-Law. A New and Enlarged Edition, with a Photograph from the Bust on 
 the Tomb in Westminster Abbey. 2 vols. Svo, £1, is. 
 
 HYDE. The Royal Mail ; its Curiosities and Romance. By James 
 
 Wilson Hyde, Superintendent in the General Post Office, Edinburgh. Second 
 Edition, enlarged. Crown Svo, with Illustrations, 6s.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 13 
 
 INDEX GEOGRAPHICUS : Being a Li^^t, alphabetically arranged, 
 
 of the Principal Places on the Globe, with tlie Countries and Siibclivisions of 
 the Countries in which they are situated, and tlieir Latitudes and Loiij,'itudea. 
 Applicable to all Modern Atlases and Maps. Iniiierial 8vo, pp. 676, 2js. 
 
 JEAN JAMBON. Our Trip to Blundcrland ; or, Grand Excursion 
 
 to Blundertown and Back. By Jkan Jamkon. With Sixty Illustrations 
 desiijned by Charles Doyle, engraved by Dai.zikl. Fourth Tliousand. 
 Handsomely bound in cloth, gilt edyes, 6s. 6d. Cheap Edition, cloth, 3s. 6d. 
 In boards, 2s. 6d. 
 
 JOHNSON. The Scots Musical Museum. Consisting of upwards 
 
 of Six Hundred Songs, with proper Basses for the Pianoforte. Originally pul>- 
 lished by James Johnson ; and now accompanied with Copiou.s Notes and 
 Illustrations of the Lyric Poetry and Music of Scotland, by the late William 
 Stenhouse; with additional Notes and Illustrations, by David Laino and 
 C. K. Sharpe. 4 vols. 8vo, Roxburghe binding, ^■z, 12s. 6d. 
 
 JOHNSTON. The Chemistry of Common Life. By Professor 
 
 J. F. W. Johnston. New Edition, Revised, and brought down to date. By 
 Arthur Herbert Church, M.A. Oxon. ; Author of 'Food: its Sources, 
 Constituents, and Uses ; ' ' The Laboratory Guide for Agricultural Students ; ' 
 'Plain Words about Water,' &c. Illustrated with Maps and 102 Engravings 
 on Wood. Complete in one volume, crown 8vo, pp. 618, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Elements of Agricultural Chemistry and Geology. Thir- 
 teenth Edition, Revised, and bronght down to date. By Sir Charles A. 
 Cameron, M.D., F.R.C.S.I., &c. Fcap. 8vo, 6s. 6d. 
 
 Catechism of Agricttltural Chemistry and Geology. An 
 
 entirely New Edition, revised and enlarged, by Sir Charles A. Cameron, 
 M.D., F.R. C.S.I. , &c. Eighty-first Thousand, with numerous Illustrations, is. 
 
 JOHNSTON. Patrick Hamilton : a Tragedy of the Reformation 
 
 in Scotland, 152S. By T. P. Johnston. Crown Svo, with Two Etchings by 
 
 the Author, 5s. 
 KENNEDY. Sport, Travel, and Adventures in Newfoundland 
 
 and the West Indies. By Captain W. R. Kennedy, R.N. With Illustrations 
 
 by the Author. Post Svo, 14s. 
 
 KING. The Metamorphoses of Ovid. Translated in English Blank 
 
 Verse. By Henry Kino, M.A., Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford, and of 
 the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Crown Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 KINGLAKE. History of the Invasion of the Crimea. By A. W. 
 KiNGLAKE. Cabinet Edition. Seven Volumes, crown 8vo, at 6s. each. The 
 Volumes respectively contain :^ 
 
 I. The Origin of the War between the Czar and the Sultan. 
 II. Russia Met and Invaded. With 4 Maps and Plans. 
 
 III. The Battle of the Alma. With 14 Majis and Plans. 
 
 IV. Sebastopol at Bay. With 10 Maps and Plans. 
 
 V. The Battle of Balaclava. With 10 Maps and Plans. 
 VI. The Battle of Inkerman. With 11 Maps and Plans. 
 VII. Winter Troubles. With Map. 
 
 History of the Invasion of the Crimea. Vol. VI. Winter 
 
 Troubles. Demy Svo, with a Map, 16s. 
 
 History of the Invasion of the Crimea. Vol. VII. Demy 
 
 Svo. [/'I pre^Kiration. 
 
 Eothen. A New Edition, tmiform with the Cabinet Edition 
 
 of the 'History of the Crimean War,' jiriee 6s. 
 
 KNOLL YS. The Elements of Field-Artillery. Designed for the 
 
 Use of Infantry and Cavalry Officers. By Henry Knolly's, Captain Royal 
 Artillery; Author of 'From Sedan to Saarbriick,' Editor of 'Incidents in the 
 Sepoy War,' &c. With Engravings. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 LAING. Select Remains of the Ancient Popular and Romance 
 
 Poetry of Scotland. Originally Collected and Edited by David Laino, LL.D. 
 Re-edited, with Memorial-Introduction, by John Small, M.A. With a Por- 
 trait of Dr Laing. 4to, 25s. The Edition lias been limited to 350 copies, and 
 when one-half of the Edition is disposed of, the price will be increased.
 
 U LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 LAVERGNE. The Rural Economy of England, Scotland, and Ire- 
 land. By Leonce de Lavergne. Translated from the French. With Notes 
 by a Scottish Fanner. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 LEE. Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland, from the 
 Reformation to the Revolution Settlement. Ry the late Very Rev. John Lee, 
 D.D., LL.D., Rrineipal of the University of EdinliurKli. With Notes and Ap- 
 pendices from the Author's Tapers. Edited by the Rev. William Lee, D.D. 
 2 vols. 8vo, 21S. 
 
 LEE. Miss Brown : A Novel. By Vernon Lee. 3 vols, post 8vo, 
 
 25s. 6d. 
 
 LEE. Glimpses in the Twilight. Being various Notes, Records, 
 
 and Examples of the Supernatural. By the Rev. Georoe F. Lee, D.C.L. 
 Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d. 
 
 LEE-HAMILTON. Poems and Transcripts. By Eugene Lee- 
 Hamilton. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 LEES. A Handbook of Sheriff Court Styles. By J. M. Lees, 
 
 M.A., LL.B., Advocate, Sheriff- Substitute of Lanarkshire. 8vo, 163. 
 
 A Handbook of the Sheriff and Justice of Peace Small 
 
 Debt Courts. Svo, ys 6d. 
 
 LETTERS FROM THE HIGHLANDS. Reprinted from 'The 
 
 Times.' Fcap. Svo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 LINDAU. The Philosopher's Pendulum and other Stories. By 
 
 Rudolph Lindau. Crown Svo, ys. 6d. 
 
 LITTLE. Madagascar: Its History and People. By the Rev. 
 Henry W. Little, some years Missionary in East Madagascar. Post Svo, 
 los. 6d. 
 
 LOCKHART. Doubles and Quits. By Laurence W. M. Lock- 
 hart. With Twelve Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 Fair to See : a Novel. Eighth Edition, crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Mine is Thine : a Novel. Seventh Edition, crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 LORIMER. The Institutes of Law : A Treatise of the Principles 
 
 of Jurisprudence as determined by Nature. By James Lorimer, Regius 
 Professor of Public Law and of the Law of Nature and Nations in the Uni- 
 versity of Edinburgh. New Edition, revised throughout, and miicli enlarged. 
 Svo, iSs. 
 
 The Institutes of the Law of Nations. A Treatise of the 
 
 Jural Relation of Sei>arate Political Communities. In 2 vols. Svo. Volume I., 
 price i6s. Volume IL, price 20s. 
 
 M'COMBIE. Cattle and Cattle-Breeders. By William M'Combie, 
 
 Tillyfour. A New and Cheaper Edition, 2s. 6d., cloth. 
 
 MACRAE. A Handbook of Deer -Stalking. By Alexander 
 
 Macrae, late Forester to Lord Henry Bentinck. With Introduction by 
 Horatio Ross, Esq. Fcap. Svo, with two Photographs from Life. 3s. 6d. 
 
 M'CRIE. Works of the Rev. Thomas M'Crie, D.D. Uniform Edi- 
 
 tion. Four vols, crown Svo, 24s. 
 
 . Life of John Knox. Containing Illustrations of the His- 
 tory of the Reformation in Scotland. Crown Svo, 6s. Another Edition, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Life of Andrew Melville. Containing Illustrations of the 
 
 Ecclesiastical and Literary History of Scotland in the Sixteenth and Seven- 
 teenth Centuries. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reforma- 
 tion in Italy in the Sixteenth Century. Crown Svo, 4s. 
 
 History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reforma- 
 
 tion in Spain in the Sixteenth Century. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 - Lectures on the Book of Esther. Fcap. Svo, 5s.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SUxNS. 15 
 
 M'INTOSH. The Book of the Garden. By Charlks M'Intosh, 
 
 fornioily Cunitor of the Royal Ganloiis of liis Majesty tli<; Kiiifj of tlie Belgians, 
 and lately of those of his Gvnce the Diiko of liiu'cltMich, K.O., at Ualkeitli Pal- 
 ace. Two largo vols, royal 8vo, embellished witli 1350 Engravings. ^4, 73. 6<1. 
 
 Vol. I. On the Formation of Gardi'n.s and Construction of Garden Editicos. 77G 
 pages, and 1073 Kngravings, £2, los. 
 
 Vol. II. Practical Gardening. 868 pages, and 279 Engravings, £1, 17s. 6d. 
 
 MACKAY. A Manual of Modern Geoi^raphy ; Mathematical, Phys- 
 ical, and Political. By the Rev. Ar.K.x.w'nKR m'ackav, LL.D., F.R.G.S. iitli 
 
 Edition, revised to the jiresent time. Crown 8vo, \i\>. 688. 7s. 6d. 
 
 I*]Ii'inents of Modern Geo^'ra])hy. 5i,st Tliou.sand, re- 
 
 vist'd to the present time. Crown 8vo, jip. 300, 3s. 
 
 The Intermediate Geography. Intended a.s an Interme- 
 diate Book between the Autlior's 'Outlines of Geography' and ' Elements of 
 Geography.' Tenth Edition, revised. Crown 8vo, pp. 224, 2S. 
 
 Outlines of Modern Geograjjliy. 170th Thousand, re- 
 vised to the present time. i8mo, ]ip. 118, is. 
 
 First Steps in Geography. 82d Thousand. i8mo, pp. 
 
 56. Sewed, 4d. ; cloth, 6d. 
 
 Elements of Phy.siograpliy and Pliysical Geography. 
 
 With Exju-ess Reference to the Instructions recently issued by tlie Science and 
 Art Department. 25th Thousand, revi.'ied. Crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 Facts and Dates ; or, the Leading Events in Sacred and 
 
 Profane History, and the Principal Facts in the various Physical Sciences. 
 The Memory being aided throughout by a Simple and Natural Method. For 
 Schools and Private Reference. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 MACKAY. An Old Scots Brigade. Being the History of afackay's 
 
 Regiment, now incorporated with the Royal Scots. With an Appendix con- 
 taining many Original Documents connected with the History of the Regi- 
 ment. By John Mackay (late) OF Hkrrie.sdale. Crown 8vo. [In the press. 
 
 MACKAY. The Founders of the American Republic. A History 
 
 of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Franklin, and Madison. With a Sujiple- 
 mentary Chapter on the Inherent Causes of the Ultimate Failure of American 
 Democracy. By Charles Mackay, LL.D. Post 8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 MACKELLAR. More Leaves from the Journal of a Life in the 
 
 Highlands, from 1862 to 1882. Translated into Gaelic by Mrs Mary Mackel- 
 LAR. By command of Her Majesty the Queen. In one vol. crown 8vo, with 
 Illustrations. [In the press. 
 
 MACKENZIE. Studies in Roman Law. With Comparative Views 
 
 of the Laws of Franco, England, and Scotland. By Lord Mackenzie, one of 
 the Judges of the Court of Session in Scotland. Fifth Edition, Edited by 
 John Kirkp.\trick, Esq., M.A. Cantab.; Dr Jur. Heidelb. ; LL.B., Edin. ; 
 Advocate. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 MADOC. Thereby. A Novel. By Fayr Madoc. Two vols. 
 Post 8vo, 17S. 
 
 MAIN. Three Hundred English Sonnets. Chosen and Edited by 
 
 David M. Main. Fcap. 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MANNERS. Notes of an Irish Tour in 1846. By Lord John 
 
 Manners, M.P., G.C.B. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 MANNERS. Gems of German Poetry. Translated by Lady John 
 
 Manners. Small quarto, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Impressions of Bad-Homburg. Comprising a Short Ac- 
 count of the Women's Associations of Germany under the Red Cross. By 
 Lady John Manners. Crown Svo, is. 6d. 
 
 Some Personal Recollections of the Later Years of the Earl 
 
 of Beaconsfield, K G. Fifth Edition, 6d.
 
 16 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 MANNERS. Employment of Women in tlie Public Service. By 
 
 Lady John Manners. 6c1. 
 
 Some of tlie Advantages of Easily Accessible Eeading and 
 
 Recreation Rooms, and Free Libraries. Wifli Remarks on Starting and 
 Maintaining Them. Reprinted from 'The Queen.' Dedicated by Special 
 Permission to Her Majesty the Queen. Crown 8vo, is. 
 
 A Sequel to Rich Men's Dwellings, and other Occasional 
 
 Papers. In one vol. crown 8vo. [Shortly. 
 
 MARMORNE. The Story is told by Adolphus Segrave, the 
 
 youngest of three Brothers. Tliird Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MARSHALL. French Home Life. By Frederic Marshall, 
 
 Second Edition. 5s. 
 
 MARSHMAN. History of India. From the Earliest Period to the 
 
 Close of the India Company'.s Government ; with an Ejiitome of Subsequent 
 Events. By John Claek Marshman, C.S.I. Abridged from the Author's 
 larger work. Second Edition, revised. Crown Svo, with Map, 6s. 6d. 
 
 MARTIN. Goethe's Faust. Translated by Sir Theodore Martin, 
 
 K.C.B. Second Edition, crown Svo, 6s. Cheap Edition, 3s. 6d. 
 
 The Works of Horace. Translated into English Verse, 
 
 with Life and Notes. In 2 vols, crown Svo, printed on hand-made paper, 21s. 
 
 Poems and Ballads of Heinrich Heine. Done into Eng- 
 lish Verse. Second Edition. Printed on papier verge, crown Svo, 8s. 
 
 Catullus. With Life and Notes. Second Edition, post Svo, 
 
 7S. 6d. , 
 
 . The Vita Nuova of Dante, With an Introduction and 
 
 Notes. Second Edition, crown Svo, 53. 
 
 Aladdin : A Dramatic Poem. By Adam Oehlenschlae- 
 
 GER. Fcap. Svo, 5s. 
 
 Correggio : A Tragedy. By Oehlenschlaeger. With 
 
 Notes. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 
 
 King Rene's Daughter : A Danish Lyrical Drama. By 
 
 Henrik JBertz. Second Edition, fcap., 2s. 6d. 
 
 MARTIN. Some of Shakespeare's Female Characters. In a Series 
 
 of Letters. By Helena Faucit, Lady Martin. With Portraits engraved by 
 the late F. Holl. Dedicated by Special Permission to Her Most Gracious 
 Majesty the Queen. 4to, printed on hand-made paper, 21s. 
 
 MATHESON. Can the Old Faith Live with the New ? or the 
 Problem of Evolution and Revelation. By the Rev. George Matheson, D.D., 
 Innellan. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 MEIKLEJOHN, An Old Educational Reformer— Dr Bell. By 
 J. M. D. Meiklejohn, M.A., Professor of the Theory, History, and Practice 
 of Education in the University of St Andrews. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 MICHEL. A Critical Inquiry into the Scottish Language. With 
 
 the view of Illustrating the Rise and Progress of Civilisation in Scotland. By 
 Prancisque-Michel, F.S.A. Lond. and Scot., Correspondant de I'lnstitut de 
 France, &c. In One handsome Quarto Volume, printed on hand-made paper, 
 and appropriately bound in Roxljurghe style. Price 66s. 
 
 MICHIE. The Larch : Being a Practical Treatise on its Culture 
 and General Management. By Christopher Young Michie, Forester, Cullen 
 House. Crown Svo, with Illustrations. New and Cheaper ISdition, enlarged, 
 
 MILLIONAIRE, THE. By Louis J. Jennings, Author of ' Field 
 
 Paths and Green Lanes,' ' Rambles among the Hills,' (&c. Second Edition. 
 3 vols, crown Svo, 253. 6d. 
 
 MILNE. The Problem of the Churchless and Poor in our Large 
 Towns. With special reference to the Home Mission Work of the Church of 
 Scotland. By the Rev. Rout. Milne, M A., Towie. Crown Svo, 5s.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. l7 
 
 MINTO. A Manual of English Prose Literature, Biographical 
 
 and Critical : designed mainly to show Characteristics of Style. By W. Minto, 
 M.A., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. Second Edition, 
 revised. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Characteristics of English Poets, from Chaucer to Shirley. 
 
 New lOdition, revise<l. Crown 8vo, 7s. Od. 
 
 MITCHELL. Biographies of Eminent Soldiers of the last Four 
 Centuries. By Ma.jor-General John Mitchell, Author of 'Life of Wallcnstein." 
 With a Memoir of the Author. 8vo, 9s. 
 
 MOIR. Life of Mansie Wauch, Tailor in Dalkeith. With 8 
 
 Illustrations on Steel, by the late George Cruikshank. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 Another Edition, fcap. Bvn, is. 6d. 
 
 MOMERIE. Defects of Modern Christianity, and other Sermons. 
 
 By the Uev. A. W. Momerie, M.A.. Sc, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics 
 in King's College, London. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 The Basis of Religion. Being an Examination of Natural 
 
 Religion. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 The Origin of Evil, and other Sermons. Fourth Edition, 
 
 enlarged. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 Personality. The Beginning and End of Metaphysics, and 
 
 a Necessary Assumption in all Positive Philosophy. Second Edition. Crown 
 Svo, 3S. 
 
 Agnosticism, and other Sermons. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 MONTAGUE. Campaigning in South Africa. Reminiscences of 
 
 an Officer in 1879. By Captain W. E. Montague, 94th Regiment, Author of 
 'Claude Meadowleigh,' &c. Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 MONTALEMBERT. Memoir of Count de Montalembert. A 
 
 Chapter of Recent French History. By Mrs Oliphant, Author of the 'Life 
 of Edward Irving,' &c. 2 vols, crown Svo, £1, 4s. 
 
 MURDOCH. Manual of the Law of Insolvencj^ and Bankruptcy : 
 
 Comprehending a Summary of the Law of Insolvency, Notour Bankruptcy, 
 Composition - contracts. Trust-deeds, Cessios, and Sequestrations; and the 
 Winding-up of Joint-Stock Companies in Scotland ; with Annotations on the 
 various Insolvency and Bankruptcy Statutes ; and with Forms of Procedure 
 applicable to these Subjects. By James Murdoch, Member of the Faculty of 
 Procurators in Glasgow. Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged, Svo, £1. 
 
 MY TRIVIAL LIFE AND MISFORTUNE : A Gossip with 
 
 no Plot in Particular By A Plain Woman. New Edition, crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 NASEBY. Oaks and Birches. A Novel. By Naseby. 3 vols. 
 
 crown Svo, 25s. 6d. 
 NEAVES. Songs and Verses, Social and Scientific. By an Old 
 
 Contributor to 'Maga.' By the Hon. Lord Neaves. Fifth Edition, fcap. Svo, 
 
 4S. 
 
 The Greek Anthology. Being Vol. XX. of ' Ancient Clas- 
 sics for English Readers.' Crown Svo, 2s. fid. 
 
 NICHOLSON. A Manual of Zoology, for the Use of Students. 
 
 With a General Introduction on the Principles of Zoology. By Henrv Al- 
 LEYNE Nicholson, M.D., U.Sc, F.L.S., F.G.S., Regius Professor of Natural 
 History in the University of Aberdeen. Sixth Edition, revised and enlarged. 
 Crown Svo, pp. S16, with ^94 Engravings on Wood, 14s. 
 
 Text-Book of Zoology, for the Use of Schools. Third Edi- 
 tion, enlarged. Cro\vn 8vo, with 188 Engravings on Wood, 6s. 
 
 Introductory Text-Book of Zoology, for the Use of Junior 
 
 Classes. Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged, with 156 Engravings, 3s. 
 
 Outlines of Natural History, for Beginners ; being Descrip- 
 tions of a Progressive Series of Zoological Tyjies. Third Edition, with 
 Engravings, is. fid. 
 
 A Manual of Palaeontology, for the Use of Students. 
 
 With a General Introduction on the Principles of Palaeontology. Second 
 Edition. Revised and greatly enlai'ged. 2 vols. Svo, with 722 Engravings, 
 
 £2, 2S.
 
 18 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 NICHOLSON. The Ancient Life-History of the Earth. An Out- 
 line of the Principles and Leading Facts of Palceontological Science. By 
 Henry Alleyne Nicholson, M.U., D.Sc, F.L.S., F G.S , Regius Profes.sor 
 of Natural History in tlie University of Aberdeen. Crown 8vo, with numerous 
 Engravings, los. 6d. 
 
 On the " Tabulate Corals " of the Palseozoic Period, with 
 
 Critical Descriptions of Illustrative Species. Illustrated with 15 Lithograph 
 Plates and numerous Engravings. Super-royal 8vo, 21s. 
 
 On the Structure and Affinities of the Genus Monticulipora 
 
 and its Sub-Genera, with Critical Descriptions of Illustrative Species. Illus- 
 trated witli numerous Engravings on wood and lithographed Plates. Super- 
 royal 8vo, iSs. 
 
 Synopsis of the Classification of the Animal Kingdom 
 
 Svo, with 106 Illustrations, 6s. 
 
 NICHOLSON. Communion with Heaven, and other Sermons. 
 By the late Maxwell Nicholson, D.D., Minister of St Stephen's, Edinburgh. 
 Crown Svo, 5s. 6d. 
 
 Rest in Jesus. Sixth Edition. Fcap. Svo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 OLIPHANT. The Land of Gilead. With Excursions in the 
 
 Lebanon. By Laurence Oliphant, Author of ' Lord Elgin's Mission to 
 China and Japan,' &c. With Illustrations and Maps. Demy Svo, 21s. 
 
 Tlie Land of Khemi. Post Svo, with Illustrations, los. 6d. 
 
 Sympneumata : or, Evolutionary Functions now Active in 
 
 Man Post Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 AltioraPeto. Seventh Edition, Illustrated. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 Traits and Travesties ; Social and Political. Post Svo, ios.6d. 
 
 Piccadilly : A Fragment of Contemporary Biography, With 
 
 Eight Illustrations by Richard Doyle. Fifth Edition, 4s. 6d. Cheap Edition, 
 in payier cover, 2s. 6d. 
 
 OLIPHANT. The Ladies Lindores. By Mrs Oliphant. 3 vols., 
 
 25S. 6d. 
 
 The Story of Valentine ; and his Brother. 5s., cloth. 
 
 Katie Stewart. 2s. 6d. 
 
 Salem Chapel. 2S. 6d., cloth. 
 
 The Perpetual Curate. 2s. 6d., cloth. 
 
 Miss Marjoribanks. 2s. 6d., cloth. 
 
 ■ The Rector, and the Doctor's Family, is. 6d., cloth. 
 
 John : A Love Story. 2s. 6d., cloth. 
 
 OSBORN. Narratives of Voyage and Adventure. By Admiral 
 
 Sherard Osborn, C.B. 3 vols, crown Svo, 12s. 
 
 OSSIAN. The Poems of Ossian in the Original Gaelic. With a 
 
 Literal Translation into English, and a Dissertation on the Authenticity of the 
 Poems. By the Rev. Archibald Clerk. 2 vols, imperial Svo, £1, iis. 6d. 
 
 OSWALD. By Fell and Fjord ; or, Scenes and Studies in Iceland, 
 
 By E. J. Oswald. Post Svo, with Illustrations. 7s. 6d. 
 
 PAGE. Introductory Te.xt-Book of Geology. By David Page, 
 
 LL.D. , Professor of Geology in the Durham University of Pliysical Science, 
 Newcastle. With Engravings on Wood and Glossarial Index. Eleventh 
 Edition, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Advanced Text-Book of Geology, Descriptive and Indus- 
 trial. With Engravings, and Glossary of Scientific Terms. Sixth Edition, re- 
 vised and enlarged, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Geology for General Readers. A Series of Popular Sketches 
 
 in Geology and Paleontology. Third Edition, enlarged, 6s. 
 
 Introductory Text -Book of Physical Geography. With 
 
 Sketch-Maps and illustrations. Edited by Charles Lapworth, F.G.S., &c., 
 Professor of Geology and Mineralogy in the Mason Science College, Birming- 
 ham, nth Edition. 2s. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 19 
 
 PAGE. Advanced Text-Book of Physical Geography. By David 
 
 Paok, LL.D., Professor of Geology in the Durham University of Physical 
 Science, Newcastle. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged by Professor Lap- 
 worth. With Engravings. 5s. 
 
 BATON. Spindrift. By Sir J. Noel Baton. Fcap., cloth, 5s. 
 
 Poems by a Painter. Fcap., cloth, 5s. 
 
 PATTERSON. Essays in History and Art. By B. Hogarth 
 
 Paiterson. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 The New Golden Age, and Influence of the Precious Metals 
 
 upon the World. 2 vols. ?vo, 31s. 6d. 
 
 PAUL. History of the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen's 
 Body-Guard for Scotland. By James Balfour Paul, Advocate of the Scottish 
 Bar. Crown 4to, with Portraits and other Illustrations. j^2, 2s. 
 
 PAUL. Analysis and Critical Interpretation of the Hebrew Text of 
 the Book of Genesis. Preceded by a Hebrew Grammar, and Dissertations on 
 the Genuineness of the Pentateuch, and on the Structure of the Hebrew Lan- 
 guage. By tlie Rev. William Paul, A.M. 8vo, i8s. 
 
 PETTIGREW. The Handy Book of Bees, and their Profitable 
 
 Management. By A. Pettigrew. Fourth Edition, Enlarged, with Engrav- 
 ings. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. 
 
 Comjianion Series to Ancient and Foreign Classics for English Readers. 
 Edited by William Knight, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, Uni- 
 versity of St Andrews. In crown Svo volumes, with portraits, price 3s. 6d. 
 
 1. Descartes. By Professor Maliaffy, Dublin. 
 
 2. Butler. By the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M. A., Honorary Canon of Peterborough. 
 
 3. Berkeley. By Professor A. Campbell Eraser, Edinburgh. 
 
 4. FiCHTE. By Professor Adamson, Owens College, Manchester. 
 
 5. Kant. By Professor Wallace, O.xford. 
 
 G. Hamilton. By Professor Veitch, Glastrow. 
 
 7. Heoel. By Professor Edward Caird, Glasgow. 
 
 8. Leibniz. By J. Theodore Merz. 
 
 9. Vico. By Professor Flint, Edinburgh. 
 
 10. Hobbes. By Professor Croom Robertson, London. 
 
 POLLOK. The Course of Time : A Poem. By Egbert Pollok, 
 
 A.M. Small fcap. Svo, cloth gilt, 2s. 6d. The Cottage Edition, 32mo, sewed, 
 8d. The Same, cloth, gilt edges, is. 6d. Another Edition, with Illustrations 
 by Birket Foster and others, fcap., gilt cloth, 3s. 6d., or with edges gilt, 4s. 
 
 PORT ROYAL LOGIC. Translated from the French : with Intro- 
 duction, Notes, and Appendix. By Thomas Spencer Baynes, LL.D., Pro- 
 fessor in the University of St Andrews. Eighth Edition, i2mo, 4s. 
 
 POST-MORTEM. Third Edition, is. 
 
 By the same Author. 
 The Autobiography of Thomas Allen. 3 vols, post Svo, 
 
 25s. 6d. 
 
 The Apparition. Crown Svo, with Frontispiece, 5s. 
 Simiocracy: A Fragment from Future History. Crown Svo. 
 
 IS. 6d. 
 
 POTTS AND DARNELL. Aditus Faciliores : An ea.sy Latin Con- 
 struing Book, with Complete Vocabulary. By A. W. Potts, M.A., LL.D., 
 Head-Master of the Fettes College, Edinburgh, and sometime Fellow of St 
 John's College, Cambridge; and the Rev. C. Darnell, M.A., Head-Master ol 
 Cargilfield Preparatory School, Edinburgh, and late Scholar of Pembroke and 
 Downin.t; Colleges, Cambridge. Eighth Edition, fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Aditus Faciliores Graeci. An easy Greek Construing Book, 
 
 with Conijilete Vocabulary. Third Edition, fcap. 8vo, 3s. 
 
 PRINGLE. The Live-Stock of the Farm. By Robert 0. Pringle. 
 
 Third Edition, crown Svo. [In the pref^s. 
 
 PRINGLE. Towards the Mountains of the Moon. A Journey in 
 
 East Africa. By Mrs Pringle of Whytbank, Yair. With a Map, Svo, 12s. 6d.
 
 20 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES AFFECTING SCOTLAND, 
 
 from 1707 to 1847, with ChronoloKieal Table and Index. 3 vols, lar^e 8vo, £2, 3s. 
 
 PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES AFFECTING SCOTLAND, 
 
 COLLECTION OF. Pul.lished Annually with General Index. 
 
 RAMSAY. Rough Recollectioii-s of Military Service and Society. 
 
 By Lieut.-Col. Balcarres D. Wardlaw Ramsay. Two vols, po.st 8vo, 21s. 
 
 EANKINE. A Treatise on the Rights and Burdens incident to 
 
 the Ownership of Lands and other Heritages in Scotland. By John Eankine, 
 M.A., Advocate. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. In One large 
 Volnnie, 8vo, 45s. 
 
 RECORDS OF THE TERCENTENARY FESTIVAL OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OP EDINBURGH. Celebrated in April 18S4. Published 
 under the Sanction of the Senatus Acadeniicus. Large 4to, £2, 12s. 6d. Only 
 150 copies printed for sale to the pnhlic. 
 
 KEID. A Handy Manual of German Literature. By M. F. Reid. 
 
 For Schools, Civil Service Competitions, and University Local Examinations. 
 Fcap. Svo. 3s. 
 RIMMER. The Early Homes of Prince Albert. By Alfred 
 
 RiMMER, Author of ' Our Old Country Towns,' &c. Beautifully Illustrated 
 with Tinted Plates and numerous Engravings on Wood. Svo, 21s. 
 
 ROBERTSON. Orellana, and other Poems. By J. Logie Robert- 
 son. Fcap. Svo. Printed on hand-made paper. 6s. 
 
 Our Holiday Among the Hills. By James and Janet 
 
 Logie Robertson. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 ROSCOE. Rambles with a Fishing-rod. By E. S. Roscoe. Crown 
 
 Svo, 4S. 6d. 
 
 ROSS. Old Scottish Regimental Colours. By Andrew Ross, 
 
 S S.C., Hon. Secretary Old Scottish Regimental Colours Committee. Dedi- 
 cated by Special Permission to Her Majesty the Queen. In one vol. folio, 
 handsomely bound in cloth, £2, 12s. 6d. 
 
 RUSSELL. The Haigs of Bemersyde. A Family History. By 
 
 John Russell. Large octavo, with Illustrations. 21s. 
 
 RUSTOW. The War for the Rhine Frontier, 1870: Its Political 
 
 and Jlilitary History. By Col. W. Rustow. Translated from the German, 
 by John Ijavland Needham, Lieutenant R.M. Artilleiy. 3 vols. Svo, with 
 Maps and Plans, ^i. iis. 6d. 
 
 SCHETKY. Ninety Years of Work and Play. Sketches from the 
 Public and Private Career of John Chri.stian Schetky, late Marine Painter in 
 Orilinarv to the Queen, Bv his Daughter. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d 
 
 SCOTCH LOCH FISHING. By "Black Palmer." Crown Svo, 
 
 interleaved with blank iiatres, 48. 
 
 SELLER AND STEPHENS. Physiology at the Farm ; in Aid of 
 
 Rearing and Feeding the Live Stock. By William Seller, M.D., F.R.S.E., 
 Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, Edinburgh, formerly Lecturer on 
 Materia Medica and Dietetics ; and Henry Stephens, P.R.S.E., Author of ' The 
 Book of the Farm,' &c. Post Svo, with Engravings, i6s. 
 
 SETON. Memoir of Alexander Seton, Earl of Dunfermline, Seventh 
 
 President of the Court of Session, and Lord Chancellor of Scotland. By 
 George Seton, M.A. Oxon. ; Author of the 'Law and Practice of Heraldry in 
 Scotland,' &c. Crown 4to, 21s. 
 
 SHADWELL. The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde. Illus- 
 
 trated by Extracts from his Diary and Correspondence. By Lieutenant- 
 General Shadwell, C.E. 2 vols. Svo. With Portrait. Maps, and Plans. 36s. 
 
 SIIAND. Letters from the West of Ireland. Reprinted from the 
 'Times.' By Alexander Innes Shand, Author of 'Letters from the West 
 Highlands.' Crown Svo, 5s. 
 
 SIM. Margaret Sim's Cookery. With an Introduction by L. B. 
 
 Walfoed, Author of ' Mr Smith : A Part of His Life,' &c. Crown Svo, 5s 
 
 SIMPSON. Dogs of other Days : Nelson and Puck. By Eve 
 Blantyre Simpson. Fcap. Svo, with Illustrations, 2s. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 21 
 
 SMITH. Italian Irrigation : A Report on the Agricultural Canals 
 
 of Piedmont and Lonibardy, addressed to tlie lion, tlie Directors of tlie Kast 
 India Cnmiiaiiy ; witli an Aiijiendix, eontaininga Sketch of the Irrigation Sys- 
 tem of Nort}iern and Central India. By Lieul.-Col. U. IJAiFtD Smith, F.G.H., 
 Captain, Bengal Engineers. Second Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, with Atlas in folio, 
 30s. 
 
 SMITH. Tharndale ; or, The Conflict of Opinions. By William 
 
 Smith, Author of 'A Discourse on Ethics,' &c. A New Edition. Crown 
 8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 Gravenliurst ; or, Thoughts on Good and Evil. Second 
 
 Edition, with Memoir of the Author. Crown 8vo, 8s. 
 
 A Discourse on Ethics of the School of Paley. 8vo, 4s. 
 
 Dramas, i. Sir William Crichton. 2. Athehvold. 3. 
 
 Guidone. 24mo, boards, 3s. 
 
 SMITH. Greek Testament Lessons for Colleges, Schools, and 
 
 Private Students, consisting chiefly of the Sermon on the Mount and the 
 Parables of our Ijord. With Notes and Essays. By the Rev. J. Huntkr 
 Smith, M.A., First Assistant Master at Kins; Edward's School, Birmingham. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SMITH. Writings by the Way. By John Campbell Smith, 
 
 M.A., Advocate. Crown 8vo, gs. 
 
 SOLTERA. A Lady's Ride Across Spanish Honduras. By Maria 
 
 Soi.tera. With Illustrations. Post 8vo, 12s. 6d. 
 
 SOUTHEY. The Birthday, and other Poems. Second Edition, 5s. 
 
 • Chapters on Churchyards. Fcap., 2s. 6d. 
 
 SPEEDY. Sport in the Highlands and Lowlands of Scotland witli 
 
 Rod and Gun. By T. Speedy. 8vo, with Illustration^:, 15s. 
 
 SPEKE. What led to the Discovery of the Nile Source. By John 
 
 Hanning Speke, Captain H.M. Indian Army. 8vo, with Maps, &c., 14s. 
 
 SPROTT. Tlie Worsliip and Offices of the Church of Scotland ; 
 
 or, the Celebration of Public Worshij), the Administration of the Sacraments, 
 and other Divine Offices, according to the Order of the Church of Scotland. 
 By Georoe W. Sprott, D.D., Minister of North Berwick Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 STARFORTH. Villa Residences and Farm Architecture : A Series 
 
 of Designs. By John Starforth, Architect. 102 Engravings. Second Edi- 
 tion, medium 4to, £1, 17s. 6d. 
 
 STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF SCOTLAND. Complete, with 
 
 Index, 15 vols. 8vo, £1(3, i6s. 
 Each County sold separate! v, with Title, Index, and Map, neatly bound in clotli, 
 forming a very valuable Manual to the Landowner, the Tenant, the Manufac- 
 turer, the Naturalist, the Tourist, &c. 
 
 STEPHENS. The Book of the Farm ; detailing the Labours of the 
 
 Farmer, Farm-Steward, Ploughman, Shepherd, Hedt;er, Farm-Labourer, Field- 
 Worker, and Cattleman. By Henry Stephens, F.R.S.E. Illustrated with 
 Portraits of Animals painted from the life ; and with 557 Engravin.ss on Wood, 
 representing the principal Field Operations, Implements, and Animals treated 
 of in the Work. A New and Revised Edition, the third, in great part Re- 
 ■written. 2 vols, large 8vo, £■2, los. 
 
 The Book of Farm Buildings ; their Arrangement and 
 
 Construction. By Henry Stephens, F.R.S.E., Author of 'The Book of the 
 Farm;' .and Robert Scott Burn. Illustrated with 1045 Plates and En- 
 gravings. Large 8vo, uniform with ' The Book of the Farm,' &c. £\, us. 6d. 
 
 The Book of Farm Implements and Machines. By J. 
 
 Slight and R. Scott Burn, Engineers. Edited by Henry Stephens. Large 
 Svo, uniform with 'The Book of the Farm,' £1, 2s. 
 
 Catechism of Practical Agriculture. With Engravings, is. 
 
 STEWART. Advice to Purchasers of Horses. By John Stewart, 
 
 V.S., Author of 'Stable Economy.' 2s. 6d. 
 
 Stable Economy. A Treatise on the Management of 
 
 Horses in relation to Stabling, Grooming, Feeding, Watering, and Working. 
 Seventh Edition, fcap. 8vo, 6s. 6d.
 
 22 LIST OF BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 
 STONE. Hugh Moore : a NoveL By Evelyn Stone. 2 vols, 
 
 crown Svo, 17s. 
 
 STORMONTH. Etymological and Pronouncing Dictionary of the 
 
 English Language. Inclnding a very Copious Selection of Scientific Terms. 
 For Use in Schools and Colleges, and as a Book of General Reference. By the 
 Rev. J.\MES Stormonth. The Pronunciation carefully Revised by the Rev. 
 P. H. Phelp, M.A. Cantab. Eighth Edition, Revised throughout, contain- 
 ing many words not to be found in any other Dictionary. Crown Svo, pp. 
 800. 7S. 6d. 
 
 Dictionary of the English Lanc^mage, Pronouncing, 
 
 Etymological, and Explanatory. Revised by the Rev. P. H. Phelp. Library 
 Edition. Imperial Svo, handsomely bound in half morocco, 31s. 6d. 
 
 The School Etymological Dictionary and Word-Book. 
 
 Combining the advantages of an ordinary pronouncing School Dictionary 
 and an Etymological Spelling-book. Fcap. Svo, pp. 254. 2S. 
 
 STORY. Nero ; A Historical Play. By W. W. Story, Author of 
 
 'Roba di Roma.' Fcap. Svo, 6s. 
 
 Vallombrosa. Post Svo, 5s. 
 
 He and She ; or, A Poet's Portfolio. Fcap. Svo, in parch- 
 ment, 3s. 6d. 
 
 STRICKLAND. Lives of the Queens of Scotland, and English 
 
 Princesses connected with the Regal Succession of Great Britain. By Agnes 
 Strickland. With Portraits anil Historical Vignettes. 8 vols, post Svo, 
 £4, 4S- 
 
 STURGIS. John - a - Dreams. A Tale. By Julian Sturgis. 
 
 New Edition, crown Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Little Comedies, Old and New. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 SUTHERLAND. Handbook of Hardy Herbaceous and Alpine 
 
 Flowers, for general Garden Decoration. Containing Descriptions, in Plain 
 Language, of upwards of 1000 Sjiecies of Ornamental Hardy Perennial and 
 Alpine Plants, ada]ited to all classes of Flower-Gardens, Rockwork, and 
 Waters ; along with Concise and Plain Instructions for their Propagation and 
 Culture. By Willi.\m Sutherland, Gardener to the Earl of Minto ; formerly 
 Manager of the Herbaceous Department at Kew. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 TAYLOR. De.struction and Reconstruction : Personal Experi- 
 ences of the Late War in the United States. By Richard Taylor, Lieutenaut- 
 General in the Confederate Army. Svo, los. 6d. 
 
 TAYLOR. The Story of My Life. By the late Colonel Meadows 
 
 Taylor, Author of 'The Confessions of a Thug,' &c. &c. Edited by his 
 Daughter. New and cheaper Edition, being the Fourth. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 TEMPLE. Lancelot Ward, M.P. A Love-Story. By George 
 
 Temple. Crown Svo. 7s. 6d. 
 
 THOLUCK. Hours of Christian Devotion. Translated from the 
 
 German of A. Tholuck, D. D. , Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. 
 By the Rev. Rop.ert Menzies, D. D. With a Preface written for this Transla- 
 tion by the Author. Second Edition, crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 THOMSON. Handy Book of the Flower-Garden : being Practical 
 
 Directions for the Propagation, Culture, and Arrangement of Plants in Flower- 
 Gardens all the year round. Embracing all classes of Gardens, from the largest 
 to the smallest. With Engraved and Coloui'ed Plans, illustrative of the various 
 systems of Grouping in Beds and Borders. By David Thomson, Gardener to 
 his Grace the Duke of Buccleuch, K.G., at Drunilani'ig. Third Edition, crown 
 Svo, 7S. 6d. 
 
 The Handy Book of Fruit-Culture under Glass : being a 
 
 series of Elaborate Practical Treatises on the Cultivation and Forcing of Pines, 
 Vines, Peaches, Figs, Melons, Strawberries, and Cucumbers. With Engravings 
 of Hothouses, &c., most suitable for the Cultivation and Forcing of these 
 Fruits. Second Edition. Crown Svo, with Engravings, 7s. 6d.
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS. 23 
 
 THOMSON. A Practical Treatise on the Cultivation of the Grape- 
 vine. By William Thomson, Tweed Vineyards. Tenth Edition, 8vo, 53. 
 
 TOM CRINGLE'S LOG. A New Edition, with Illustrations. 
 
 Crown 8vo, cloth gilt, 5s. Cheap Edition, 2.s. 
 
 TRAILL. Eecaptured Rliynie.s. Beinf^ a Batch of Political and 
 other Fugitives arrested and brought to Book. By H. D. Tiiaill. Crown 
 
 TRANSACTIONS OF THE HIGHLAND AND AGRICUL- 
 TURAL SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND. Published annually, priee 5s. 
 
 TROLLOPE. An Autobiography hy Antliony Trollope. Two 
 
 Volumes, post 8vo, with Tortrait. Second Edition. Price 2is. 
 
 The Fixed Period. 2 vols. fcap. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 An Old Man's Love. 2 vols, crown 8vo, 12s. 
 
 TQLLOCH. Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in Eng- 
 land in the Seventeenth Century. By John Tdlloch, D.D., Princijial of St 
 Mary's College in the University of St Andrews; and one of her Majesty's 
 Chajilains in Ordinary in Scotland. Second Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, 28s. 
 
 Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion. 8vo, 15s. 
 
 The Christian Doctrine of Sin ; being the Croall Lecture 
 
 for 1876. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Theism. The Witness of Reason and Nature to an All- 
 wise and Beneficent Creator. 8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 Luther, and other Leaders of the Reformation. Third 
 
 Edition, enlarged. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 TWO STORIES OF THE SEEN AND THE UNSEEN. 'The 
 
 Open Door,' 'Old Lady Mary.' Crown 8vo, cloth, zs. 6d. 
 
 VEITCH. Institutes of Logic. By John Veitch, LL.D., Pro- 
 fessor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Post 8vo. 
 
 [In the press. 
 
 VIRGIL. The ^neid of Virgil. Translated in English Blank 
 Verse by G. K. Rickabds, M.A., and Lord Ravensworth. 2 vols. fcap. 8vo, 
 los. 
 
 WALFORD. The Novels of L. B. Walford. New and Uniform 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, each 5s. 
 
 Mr Smith : A Part of his Life. 
 
 Cousins. 
 
 Pauline. 
 
 Troublesome Daughters. 
 
 Dick Netherby. 
 
 The Baby's Grandmother. 
 
 Nan, and other Stories. 2 vols, crown 8vo, 12s. 
 WARDEN. Poems. By Francis Heywood Warden. With a 
 
 Notice by Dr Vanroth. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 WARREN'S (SAMUEL) WORKS. People's Edition, 4 vols, crown 
 
 8vo, cloth, 15s. 6d. Or separately :— 
 
 Diary of a Late Physician. Cloth, 2s. 6d. ; boards, 2s. Illus- 
 trated, crown 8vo, 7s 6d. 
 Ten Thousand A- Year. Cloth, 3s. 6d. ; boards, 2s. 6d. 
 Now and Then. The Lily and the Bee. Intellectual and Moral 
 
 Development of the Present Age. 4s. 6d. 
 
 Essays : Critical, Imaginative, and Juridical. 5s. 
 WARREN. The Five Books of the Psalms. With Marginal 
 
 Notes. By Rev. Samuel L. Warren, Rector of Esher, Surrey ; late Fellow, 
 Dean, andDivinity Lecturer, Wadham College, Oxford. Crown Svo, 5s. 
 
 WATSON. Christ's Authority ; and other Sermons. By the late 
 
 Archibald Watson, D.D., Minister of the Parish of Dundee, and one of 
 Her Majesty's Chaplains for Scotland. With Introduction by the Very 
 Rev. Principal Cairo, Glasgow. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
 
 24 LIST OF BOOKS, ETC. 
 
 WEBSTER. The Angler and the Loop-Rod. By David Webster. 
 
 Crown 8vo, with Illustrations, 7s. 6d. 
 WELLINGTON. Wellington Prize Essays on "the System of Field 
 
 Manoeuvres best adapted for enabling our Troojis to meet a Continental Army." 
 Edited by Major-General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, K.C.M.G. 8vo, 12s. 6d. 
 
 WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY. Minutes of the Westminster As- 
 
 sembly, while engaged in preparing their Directory for Church Government, 
 Confession of Faith, and Catechisms (November 1644 to March 1649). Edited 
 by the Rev. Professor Alex. T. Mitchell, of St Andrews, and the Rev. Johk 
 Struthers, LL.D. With a Historical and Critical Introduction by Professor 
 Mitchell. 8vo, 15s. 
 
 WHITE. The Eighteen Christian Centuries. By the Rev. James 
 
 White, Author of 'The Ilistory of France.' Seventh Edition, postSvo, with 
 Index, 6s. 
 
 History of France, from the Earliest Times. Sixth Thou- 
 sand, post 8vo, with Index, 6s. 
 
 WHITE. Archaeological Sketches in Scotland — Kintyre and Knap- 
 dale. By Captain T. P. White, R.E., of the Ordnance Survey. With numer- 
 ous Illustrations. 2 vols, folio, £,i„ 4s. Vol. I., Kintyre, sold separately, 
 
 £,2., 2S. 
 
 WILLS AND GREENE. Drawing-room Dramas for Children. By 
 
 W. G. Wills and the Hon. Mrs Greeke. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 WILSON. Works of Professor Wilson. Edited by his Son-in-Law 
 
 Professor Ferrier. 12 vols, crown 8vo, £1, 8s. 
 
 Christopher in his Sporting-Jacket. 2 vols., 8s. 
 
 Isle of Palms, City of the Plague, and other Poems. 4s. 
 
 Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life, and other Tales. 4s. 
 
 Essays, Critical and Imaginative. 4 vols., i6s. 
 
 The Noctes Ambrosianse. Complete, 4 vols., 14s. 
 
 The Comedy of the Noctes Ambrosianoe. By Christopher 
 
 North. Edited by John Skelton, Advocate. With a Portrait of Professor 
 Wilson and of the Elttrick Sheiiherd, engraved on Steel. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 Homer and his Translators, and the Greek Di'ama. Crown 
 
 8vo, 4s. 
 
 WINGATE. Annie Weir, and other Poems. By David Wingate. 
 
 Fcap. Bvo, 5s. 
 Lily Neil. A Poem. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 WORDSWORTH. The Historical Plays of Shakspeare. With 
 Introductions and Notes. By Charles Wordsworth, D.C.L., Bishop of S. 
 Andrews. 3 vols, post 8vo, each price 7s. 6d. 
 
 A Discourse on Scottish Church History. From the Refor- 
 mation to the Present Time. With Prefatory Remarks on the St Giles' Lec- 
 tures, and Appendix of Notes and References. Crown 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d 
 
 WORSLEY. Poems and Translations. By Philip Stanhope 
 
 WoRSLEY, M.A. Edited by Edward Worsley. Second Edition, enlarged. 
 Fcap. 8vo, 6s. 
 
 WYLDE. An 111 -Regulated Mind. A Novel. By Katharine 
 
 Wylde, Author of ' A Dreamer.' Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 YOUNG. Songs of Beranger done into English Verse. By William 
 Young. New Edition, revised. Fcap. 8vo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 YULE. Fortification : for the Use of Officers in the Army, and 
 Readers of Military History. By Col. Yule, Bengal Engineers. Svo, with 
 numerous Illustrations, 10s. 6d.
 
 AA 000 819 2866 
 
 CENTRAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 University of California, San Diego 
 
 DATE DUE 
 
 
 
 SEP 1 8 1972 "" 
 
 
 juH^W 
 
 
 JUL U ... liiib 
 JUL 1 R ly^F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CI 39 
 
 UCSD Lihr.