ocj 3S55I31 
 
 
 o
 
 WAR INFORMATION SERIES 
 
 No. 
 
 September, 1 9 i 7 
 
 AMERICAN INTEREST IN 
 
 POPULAR GOVERNMENT 
 
 ABROAD 
 
 By 
 EVARTS B. GREENE 
 
 PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS ,: V ,-$* 
 
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 AMERICAN INTEREST IN POPULAR GOV- 
 ERNMENT ABROAD. 
 
 By Evarts B. Greene, Professor of History, University of 
 
 Illinois. 
 
 In his memorable message to Congress of April 2, 1917, 
 President Wilson, after describing at some length the recent 
 proceedings of the German Government, declared that 'in 
 the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait 
 to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no 
 assured security for the democratic governments of the 
 world." "We are glad," he continues, "to fight thus for 
 the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its 
 peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of 
 nations, great and small, and the privilege of men every- 
 where to choose their way of life and of obedience. The 
 world must be made safe for democracy; its peace must be 
 planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." 
 In this passage the President has asserted for himself and 
 the Government of which he is the authorized spokesman two 
 important propositions: The first is that sympathy with 
 democracy, with "government of the people, by the people, 
 for the people," may properly be expressed not only in the 
 private utterances of individual Americans, but even in the 
 official and public utterances of our Government; that these 
 democratic ideals of the American people may properly be 
 taken into account in the conduct of their foreign relations. 
 The second principle clearly implied is that this associa- 
 tion of democracy at home with democracy abroad rests not 
 merely upon sentiment but upon an essential element of 
 common interest — a common interest among democracies as 
 such for mutual protection against states whose authority 
 is secured largely by military force in the hands of heredi- 
 tary rulers. With the increasing interdependence of all the 
 nations upon each other, the dominance of one type of 
 government or the other is a matter of vital concern to the 
 world at large. To those who think democracy worth 
 saving in America, its fate in Europe or Asia can no longer 
 be an indifferent matter. "The world must be made safe for 
 democracy. ' ' 
 
 For the defense of these principles, the American people 
 are now engaged in a great war whose demands upon us no 
 man can measure; and when diplomacy takes the place of 
 
 9S00°— 17 
 
 (3)
 
 ' 
 
 war we shall have new problems hardly less perplexing. As 
 we assume these larger responsibilities we may naturally ask, 
 as the President himself has done in his Flag Day speech, 
 whether we are making a radical departure from the historic 
 traditions of the Republic, or whether we are seeking to 
 secure for these old ideals a new and more complete realization. 
 In trying to answer this question it seems best, so far as possible, 
 to let the fathers speak for themselves. 
 
 Going back to the first days of the Republic, we must 
 remember that the leaders in our struggle for independence 
 themselves appealed to the sympathy of European liberals 
 not only in France and Holland but even in England itself. 
 That is an outstanding fact in the correspondence of such 
 men as Franklin and Adams, who represented us in France 
 and the Netherlands, respectively. There is no question, 
 either, that this appeal met with a generous response and 
 that it was one of the factors, not the only one, of course, in 
 bringing about that French alliance which finally secured 
 American independence. The policies of the Freneh minis- 
 ters were, indeed, mainly determined by considerations of 
 national interest. The Seven Years "War had disturbed the 
 balance of European power; French support of the American 
 rebels would weaken England and restore France to some- 
 thing like its old prestige. But the French court was not 
 agreed on the soundness of this policy and in the delicate 
 balance of official opinions, the sympathy of liberal French 
 thinkers unquestionably helped to tip the scales in favor of 
 American freedom. Franklin felt this so keenly that he 
 deprecated the appeals frequently made to the Freneh on the 
 basis of their economic self-interest. "This," he wrote to 
 Livingston in 1782, "is really a geuerous Nation, fond of glory, 
 and particularly that of protecting the oppressed." 1 
 
 The great French economist and statesman, Turgot, was 
 not in favor of French intervention, but shortly after the 
 treaty of alliance was signed he expressed in striking lan- 
 guage the conviction shared by many forward-looking Euro- 
 peans that the significance of American liberty was not con- 
 fined to the New World. The American people, he said, "is 
 the hope of mankind. It must show to the world by its ex- 
 ample that men can be free and tranquil and can do without 
 the chains that tyrants and cheats of all garbs have tried 
 to lay on them under pretense of public good. It must give 
 the example of political liberty, religious liberty, commercial 
 and industrial liberty. The shelter which it is going to 
 offer to the oppressed of all nations will console the earth. 
 The ease with which men will be able to avail themselves 
 of it and escape the effects of a bad government will oblige 
 
 1 Franklin, Writings (Smyth Ed.), VIII, 301.
 
 governments to open their eyes and to be just." 2 Thus Tur- 
 cot, like other European liberals, thought of America as a 
 laboratory where a new political experiment was being 
 worked out not only for the western world but for Europe as 
 well. 
 
 A few years later this idea found a partial realization in 
 the great French Revolution, many of whose leaders, espe- 
 cially in its earlier and more moderate stages, had seen service 
 in America. The first attitude of most Americans was one of 
 enthusiastic sympathy with the French reformers, but as the 
 movement became more violent the sympathies of our people 
 were divided. When the revolutionary Republic became 
 involved in a general European war our Government adopted 
 a strictly neutral policy and ultimately abrogated the old 
 treaty of alliance. The Farewell Address, in which Wash- 
 ington defended this policy, is frequently but not always 
 fairly quoted. It is not usually remembered, for instance, 
 that Washington did not object to "temporary alliances for 
 extraordinary emergencies. " :i In another formal public ad- 
 dress delivered in the same year, he expressed his own sym- 
 pathy and that of the American people with the cause of 
 popular government abroad. In accepting from the French 
 minister the colors of the new Republic Washington spoke of 
 having given his best years to secure the establishment of 
 political liberty in his own country, and added: 'My anxious 
 recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes 
 are irresistibly excited whensoever, in any country, I see an 
 oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom * . 
 
 In delivering to you these sentiments I express not my own 
 feelings only but those of my fellow citizens in relation to 
 the commencement, the progress, and the issue of the French 
 Revolution." 4 
 
 The unhappy developments of the next few years disap- 
 pointed the hopes of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 The ideals of republican France were repressed and almost 
 forgotten in the ruthless militarism of Napoleon. Even 
 Thomas Jefferson, the most ardent friend of French ralical- 
 ism, was disillusioned — so much so that in 1802 his adminis- 
 tration was ready to "marry" the "British fleet and 
 nation," if necessarj^ to prevent the spread of imperialism 
 to the New World. W r hen, in defending ourselves against 
 aggressions on neutral rights, we finally fought with Eng- 
 land instead of France, in the War of 1812, we did so not 
 because of any special tenderness for Napoleon's govern- 
 ment, but largely because the dignity of American citizen- 
 
 2 Translation in Jusserand, Americans of Past and Present Day, 14. 
 
 'American state Papers, Foreign Relations. I, 37. 
 
 * Moore, l»i?rest of Internationa] Law, VI, !•">. This passage was quoted by 
 Henry Clay in his speech of Mar. 24, IMS. in the House of Representatives, 
 on the emancipation of the South American States, Works (ed. 1!)04), VI-142.
 
 ship and the sanctity of human life seemed to us then, as 
 they do now, more important than the mere infringement of 
 property rights. 
 
 The War of 1812 had hardly come to an end when our 
 interest in popular government received a new test. After 
 the fall of Napoleon the great sovereigns of Europe under- 
 took to organize a mutual insurance society against militant 
 imperialism on the one side and revolutionary idealism on 
 the other. The most consistent defender of hereditary au- 
 tocracy was the Austrian house of Hapsburg, and its high 
 priest was the Austrian minister, Prince Metternich. 
 Closely associated with the Hapsburgs, then, as now, was 
 the Prussian house of Hohenzollern ; then, however, the 
 "great headquarters" of the combination was at Vienna 
 instead of Berlin. For 15 years after Waterloo the people 
 of continental Europe lived under a regime of Prussian- 
 Austrian-Russian military autocracy, which, with the help 
 of a most elaborate system of espionage, threatened to stifle 
 altogether the freer spirit of the revolutionary era. Popu- 
 lar movements in the German States, in Spain and Portugal, 
 and in the Italian States were ruthlessly put clown with the 
 help of foreign troops. So far as the Continent of Europe 
 was concerned, the system of Metternich and his associates 
 seemed to be effective. 
 
 Europe was then infinitely farther away from America 
 than it is now, and yet not too far away to escape American 
 interest. President Monroe's annual message to Congress in 
 1822 contained several references to popular movements in 
 Europe. He did not propose American intervention; indeed, 
 any such right of intervention was specifically rejected. 
 Nevertheless, the President did not hesitate to express in 
 unmistakable language American sympathy with these lib- 
 eral movements. He mentioned the Greek struggle for lib- 
 erty against the Turks with special enthusiasm and referred 
 to "that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which 
 have been so signally displayed throughout the United 
 States." The message also touched briefly upon the reform 
 movements in Spain and Portugal and praised the "extraor- 
 dinary moderation" with which they had been conducted. 
 Monroe went on, however, to express his anxiety about the 
 "menacing symptoms" then appearing in Europe. If a 
 "convulsion" should take place there, it would "proceed 
 from causes which have no existence and are utterly unknown 
 in these States, in which there is but one order, that of the 
 people to which the sovereignty exclusively belongs." 
 Happy as the American people were in their isolation, he 
 feared that even they might be drawn in against their will 
 by some act of aggression. 5 
 
 5 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 193-195.
 
 On these perplexing subjects Monroe carried on an active 
 correspondence with his two predecessors — fefferson and 
 Madison. Jefferson believed that America should have a 
 separate system of its own, but he was willing to enter into 
 
 an agreement with Great Britain which would "bring her 
 mighty weight into the scale of \'ri^- government' and so 
 prevent the extension of the European system to the New 
 World. Jefferson had in mind a proposal that the European 
 alliance should intervene for the purpose of suppressing 
 the revolutions in the Spanish-American colonies. .Madison 
 WIS less cautious than Jefferson about' confining American 
 interest to the Xew World. The British Groveramenl hav- 
 ing declared its disapproval of European intervention in 
 South America, Madison asked whether it might not be 
 "honorable" for the United States to invite Great Britain 
 to extend its "avowed disapprobation" to the action of the 
 European alliance in Spain, and even to join in some expres- 
 sions of sympathy for the Greeks. Even if such a declara- 
 tion should lead to war the United States would not be in 
 serious danger in view of the British power on the sea. 
 Madison expressed the same general idea in a letter to Jef- 
 ferson: "With the British power and navy combined with 
 our own we have nothing to fear from the rest of the world, 
 and in the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and 
 despotism we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former in 
 this hemisphere at least." ".Monroe himself evidently 
 had a certain amount of sympathy with these suggestions of 
 Madison's, for the first draft of his famous message to Con- 
 gress contained, according to John Quincy Adams, an ex- 
 plicit condemnation of the French intervention in Spain 
 and a "broad acknowledgment of the Greeks as an inde- 
 pendent nation." 7 The determined opposition of his Secre- 
 tary of State, John Quincy Adams, forced him to confine 
 his annual message more closely to American affairs; but it 
 still contained a strong expression of sympathy with the 
 aspirations of the Greeks for independence. There was, he 
 said, good reason to suppose "that Greece will become again 
 an independent nation. That she may obtain that rank is the 
 object of our most ardent wishes." 8 
 
 Monroe's sympathy for Greece as a small people trying to 
 gain liberty and self-government was shared by a number of 
 prominent public men. The greai financier, Albert Gallatin,* 
 proposed that vessels of the United States Navy should co- 
 operate with the Greeks, and when the matter was discussed 
 in the Presidents Cabinet two of its members, Calhoun and 
 Crawford, expressed some sympathy with the idea. Even 
 
 "This correspondence <>f Madison and Jefferson is brought together in Moore, 
 Digest of International Law, VI, § 933. 
 
 *J. Q. Adams, Diary, VI. 194. 
 
 4 \V. C. Ford in American Historical Review, VII, 070 ff.; VIII. us ff. ; Mes- 
 sages and Papers, II, 217.
 
 Adams himself, in a note sent to the Greek agent Luriottis, 
 in 1823, explaining that the United States could not take part 
 in the war, spoke of "cheering with their best wishes the 
 cause of the Greeks. " 9 In Congress, Daniel "Webster and 
 Henry Clay were in favor of following up Monroe's declara- 
 tion of sympathy by some more definite action. 
 
 In January, 1824, Webster made a long and impassioned 
 speech in support of a resolution authorizing the President 
 to appoint a commissioner to Greece, with the avowed pur- 
 pose of giving congressional indorsement to the President's 
 views. 10 He maintained that such an expression of sym- 
 pathy involved no essential departure from the established 
 policy of the United States. 
 
 That policy, "springing from the nature of our Government and the 
 spirit of all our institutions, is so far as it respects the interesting 
 questions which agitate the present age, on the side of liberal and en- 
 lightened sentiments. * * * As one of the free States among the 
 nations, as a great and rapidly rising Eepublic, it would be impossible 
 for us, if we were so disposed, to prevent our principles, our senti- 
 ments, and our example from producing some effect upon the opinions 
 and hopes of society throughout the civilized world * * * the 
 great political question of this age is that between absolute and regu- 
 lated Governments * * * whether society shall have any part in 
 its own government * * * our side of this question is settled for 
 us even without our volition * * * our place is on the side of free 
 institutions. ' ' 
 
 Webster did not advocate armed intervention by the United 
 States in support of Greek independence, but he insisted 
 that such moral support as could be given by a public decla- 
 ration ought not to be withheld. Two paragraphs of this 
 speech have a peculiar interest in this present crisis of our 
 history : 
 
 It may now be required of me to show what interest we have in re- 
 sisting this new system. What is it to us, it may be asked, upon 
 what principles or what pretenses the European Governments assert 
 a right of interfering in the affairs of their neighbors? The thunder, 
 it may be said, rolls at a distance. The wide Atlantic is between us 
 and danger; and, however others may suffer, we shall remain safe. 
 
 I think it is a sufficient answer to this to say that we are one of the 
 nations of the earth ; that we have an interest, therefore, in the pres- 
 ervation of that system of national law and national intercourse 
 which h <3 heretofore subsisted so beneficially for us all. * * * 
 The enterprising character of the age, our own active, commercial 
 spirit, the great increase which has taken place in the intercourse 
 among civilized and commercial States, have necessarily connected us 
 with other nations and given us a high concern in the preservation of 
 those salutary principles upon which that intercourse is founded 
 We have as clear an interest in international law as individuals have 
 in the la-\ s of society. 11 
 
 9 J. Q. Adams, Diary. VI. 173, 108; American State Papers, Foreign Rela- 
 tion*, V, -57. 
 
 "•Writings and Speeches (Ed. 1903), V, 61-93. Cf. his Private Correspond- 
 ence, ibid., XVII, 328, 332, 338. 
 
 iJ Writings and Speeches (Ed. 1003), V, 75.
 
 9 
 
 Finally, Webster declared that this expression of sympathy- 
 should be given at a time when it would do some good. ' I am 
 not of those who would, in the hour of national peril, withhold 
 such encouragement as might be properly and lawfully given, 
 and, when the crisis should be passed, overwhelm the rescued 
 sufferer with kindness and caresses." 
 
 Webster's resolution, though supported by the eloquence 
 of Henry Clay, was not adopted, but it doubtless helped to 
 stimulate interest in the Greek cause. Some Americans en- 
 listed in the revolutionary army and funds were sent over 
 by "Philhellenic" committees. European liberals were in- 
 clined to attach some significance in this connection to the 
 cruise of an American squadron in the Mediterranean under 
 the command of Commodore John Rodgers; but, though 
 there was some exchange of social courtesies between Rodgers 
 and the officials of the Greek revolutionary government, 
 there is no evidence of any departure from the rules of 
 neutrality. 12 American interest in the Greek cause was suf- 
 ficient to bring out a letter of thanks from the President of 
 their National Assembly to President John Quincy Adams, 
 which he transmitted to Congress with his annual message of 
 1827. In this letter the Greek President declared that "In 
 extending a helping hand toward the Old World and en- 
 couraging it in its march toward freedom and civilization, 
 the New World covers itself with increased glory and does 
 honor to humanity. ' ' 13 
 
 The attitude of the United States toward the Spanish- 
 American revolutions was the outcome of various motives, 
 and there was at first sharp difference of opinion as to the 
 stand which the Government should take. Henry Clay 
 spoke for those who sympathized most strongly with the 
 South American Republics. He suggested the possibility 
 of intervention in their favor as early as 1816, and in the 
 following year he opposed a bill to prohibit the building of 
 ships in American ports for the Spanish-American insur- 
 gents. In some of his most impassioned oratory he de- 
 scribed "the glorious spectacle of 18,000,000 of people 
 struggling to burst their chains and be free." 14 The com- 
 paratively conservative attitude of the administration, 
 guided by Secretary Adams, delayed our recognition of the 
 South American Republics until 1822, when it had become 
 reasonably sure that they would be able to maintain their 
 independence against Spain. After their independence had 
 been recognized, Clay and Adams were as one in opposing any 
 increase of European interference in the New World. When 
 
 12 Letters of Lafayette, in Clay, Works (ed. 1004), VI. 24.1; in Webster, 
 Works. XVII, 404. 40S ; in Lafayette, Memoires, Correspondanoe. etc., VI. 
 222, 22.">; Cf. I'anllin. Commodore John Rodgers, ch. 13; Richards, Journals 
 and Letters of Samuel (Jridlev Howe. I. passim. 
 
 "American State Papers, Foreisrn Relations, VI, G27, G3fi, 037. 
 
 14 Clay, Works (ed. 1004), VI, 96; 100 ff., 140.
 
 10 
 
 the Russian minister read to Adams a note extolling the 
 principles of the European system of intervention against 
 revolutionary movements, our Secretary drafted in reply a 
 statement so aggressive in its defense of the republican 
 ideals of his own Government that Monroe asked him to 
 tone it down for fear of giving unnecessary offense to 
 the Russian Czar. 15 In one passage, which was struck out 
 of this rough draft, Adams proposed to refer to "the great 
 satisfaction with which the President had noticed that para- 
 graph [of the Russian note] which contains the frank and 
 solemn admissions that the undertaking of the allies [against 
 liberalism in Portugal and Spain], yet demands a last apol- 
 ogy to the eyes of Europe. ' ' 
 
 What Adams stood out for in 1823 was the idea of 
 defending the western world from European aggression, 
 and that was, in substance, accepted by Monroe. Un- 
 doubtedly we feared the possibility of European conquests 
 in South America and in the "West Indies; but the great 
 message of December, 1823, the starting point, if not the 
 complete expression, of our present Monroe doctrine, is 
 charged through and through with the idea that the funda- 
 mental difference between American policy and that of the 
 continental powers of Europe resulted from the nature of 
 their political institutions: "The political system of the 
 allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that 
 of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists 
 in their respective Governments"; therefore "we should 
 consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to 
 any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace 
 and safety. " ir ' In short, the American Government of 1823, 
 before the days of the steamship and the ocean cable — not 
 to speak of the wireless telegraph, the submarine, and the 
 airship — at a time when America seemed a world by itself, 
 thought it sufficient to say that the Western Hemisphere 
 must be made safe for democracy. 
 
 Seven years after the Monroe doctrine was promulgated 
 the European revolution of 1830 materially weakened the 
 autocratic governments against which that doctrine was 
 directed; but a still greater upheaval came in the "earth- 
 quake year" of 1848. France returned for a time to re- 
 publican government, and German liberals joined in a prom- 
 ising movement which seemed likely to transform, if not 
 to overthrow, the divine-right monarchies of Vienna and 
 Berlin. These hopes were for the most part doomed to 
 disappointment, and America became the refuge of those 
 German liberals who preferred liberty in a new home to 
 autocratic militarism in the old. Again Americans listened 
 
 15 W. C. Ford in American Historical Review, VIII. 28-46, 
 "Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 217-219.
 
 11 
 
 with the keenest interest to the great debate between abso- 
 lute and "regulated''' government, between the advocates 
 of ultimate control by the people and those who, as Webster 
 said, believed "that all popular or constitutional rights are held 
 no otherwise than as grants from the crown." 
 
 The diplomatic correspondence of the United States for 
 that period shows that these popular movements in Germany 
 were given careful attention by our Government. The re- 
 ports of Mr. Donelson, our minister in Berlin, described the 
 progress of the movement to liberalize the Prussian Govern- 
 ment, then entirely without a constitution, and referred to 
 the interest shown by the popular leaders in the Federal and 
 State Constitutions of the United States. Finally, when 
 representatives from the various German States met at 
 Frankfort to organize a new federal government, based on 
 the authority of the German people rather than of the reign- 
 ing princes, Mr. Donelson was authorized by the President 
 "to proceed to Frankfort and there, as the diplomatic repre- 
 sentative of the United States, recognize the provisional 
 government of the new German confederation ; provided, 
 you shall find such a government in successful operation." 
 These instructions were issued on July 24, 1848; and in 
 August of that year Donelson was appointed envoy extraordi- 
 nary and minister plenipotentiary to the Frankfort Govern- 
 ment. In March, 1849, Zachary Taylor became President, and 
 his Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, took up the correspondence 
 with Donelson at Frankfort. 17 
 
 Donelson 's instructions of July 8, 1849 discuss the German 
 situation at length and, though urging the importance of 
 great caution on the part of our representatives abroad and 
 disavowing in particular any intention of intervening be- 
 tween the liberal and reactionary elements, nevertheless 
 emphasize the sympathy of the United States with the 
 popular movement. Donelson was informed that his mission 
 to Frankfort "originated in the strong desire of this Gov- 
 ernment to manifest a proper degree of sympathy for the 
 efforts of the German people to ameliorate their condition, 
 by the adoption of a form of government which should 
 secure their liberties and promote their happiness." It was 
 the cordial desire of the United States that a constitution 
 might be established "for all Germany, which will render 
 the nation great and powerful, and will secure to every 
 German citizen the blessings of liberty and order. 
 Should either a republican form of government, or that of 
 a limited monarchy (founded on a popular and permanent 
 basis), be adopted by any of the States of Germany, we are 
 bound to be the first, if possible, to hail the birth of the new 
 
 17 Ms. "Prussian instructions" in the archives of the Department of State; 
 Buchanan, Writings, III, ISO, 152, 167, Sen. Ex. Doc, 31st Con?:., 2d Sess., No. 1.
 
 12 
 
 government, and to cheer it. in every progressive movement 
 that has for its aim the attainment of the priceless and count- 
 less blessings of freedom." The following passage is worth 
 quoting as illustrating the official American view of the funda- 
 mental issues at stake : 
 
 From what intelligence we have been enabled to gather on this side 
 of the Atlantic we understand that there are, at this time, two parties 
 in Germany, each seeking to establish a constitution for a Germanic 
 Empire ; and that the essential difference between them consists in 
 this — that one of them desires to form a constitution, which has for 
 its basis a recognition of the principle that the people are the true 
 source of all power; and the other, a constitution based on the 
 despotic principle that kings hold their power by divine right, and 
 that the constitutions to be established under their auspices are 
 boons granted to the people, by them, as the only legitimate sources 
 of power. It is hardly necessary for me to say to you that all the 
 sympathies of the Government and the people of the United States are 
 with the former party. 13 
 
 Americans learned of these things not merely by reading 
 the papers but from the lips of political exiles who found a 
 refuge in America. Republican idealists from Germany like 
 Carl Schurz, Friedrich Hecker, and Franz Sigel found 
 here a sympathetic hearing and gave to their adopted 
 country that spirit of free loyalty which was discouraged 
 in their old home. From Hungary, struggling to establish its 
 independence of the Hapsburg dynasty, came the ardent revo- 
 lutionist, Louis Kossuth. 
 
 Kossuth was a man of picturesque personality, and the 
 Hungarian revolt made a strong appeal to American sympa- 
 thies, which found expression even in the official utterances 
 of our leaders. The administration of President Taylor 
 showed its interest in the Hungarian revolution by appoint- 
 ing a special agent, with authority to recognize the independ- 
 ence of the new State "promptly," "in the event of her abil- 
 ity to sustain it. ' ' The language used in the instruction of this 
 agent, which later became public, was strongly resented by the 
 Austrian Government because Hungary was described as "a 
 great people rising superior to the enormous oppression" 
 that had "so long weighed her down." In his annual mes- 
 sage of 1849, President Taylor declared that he had thought 
 it his duty, "in accordance with the general sentiment of the 
 American people, who deeply sympathized with the Magyar 
 patriots, to stand prepared, upon the contingency of the 
 establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the 
 first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of 
 nations." The hopes of Hungary had, he said, been de- 
 feated through the intervention of Russia, and the American 
 Government had not interfered in the contest ; but ' ' the 
 feelings of the [American] Nation were strongly enlisted 
 
 18 Ms. "Prussian instructions" in the archives of the Department of State.
 
 13 
 
 in the cause, and by the sufferings of a brave people, who had 
 made a gallant though unsuccessful effort to be free." 1! ' 
 
 After the collapse of the Hungarian revolution, Congress 
 passed a joint resolution, approved by President Fillmore, 
 March 3, 1851, declaring that "the people of the United States 
 sincerely sympathize with the Hungarian exiles, Kossuth and 
 his associates," and concluding as follows: 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the 
 United States be, and hereby is, requested to authorize the employ- 
 ment of some of the public vessels which may be now crtrising in the 
 Mediterranean to receive and convey to the said United States the 
 said Louis Kossuth and his associates in captivity. 
 
 An American ship was accordingly sent to bring the 
 exiles from Turkey. On his arrival in Washington, Kos- 
 suth was formally received by the President and by both 
 Houses of Congress, and was the guest of honor at a con- 
 gressional dinner presided over by the President of the 
 Senate. 20 
 
 Against all this official and semiofficial recognition of a 
 revolutionary leader the Austrian Government protested 
 through its charge d 'affairs in Washington. To this pro- 
 test Webster, then Secretary of State, made a vigorous reply 
 in the so-called Hiilsemann letter, which went somewhat 
 beyond the bounds of conventional diplomacy and has since 
 been severely criticized. It is nevertheless interesting be- 
 cause it contains another emphatic expression of American 
 interest in popular government abroad. The United States, 
 Webster declared, would not take a direct part in the strug- 
 gles of foreign peoples for constitutional government. 
 "But," he continued, "when the United States behold the 
 people of foreign countries without any such interference 
 spontaneously moving toward the adoption of institutions 
 like their own, it surely can not be expected of them to 
 remain wholly indifferent spectators." Not only the Ameri- 
 can people but their Government had, he declared, the right 
 to express their own opinions "upon the great political 
 events which may transpire among the civilized nations of 
 the earth. " 21 
 
 Webster's ardent defense of American political ideals was 
 doubtless influenced by his desire to stimulate patriotism 
 and so check the rising tide of sectional feeling which had 
 developed out of the slavery controversy. A few years later, 
 the Government whose principles Webster had so eloquently 
 expounded was fighting for its own existence, and obliged to 
 look on helplessly while the same Napoleon who had over- 
 thrown the second French Republic proceeded to set up a 
 vassal monarchy in Mexico with an Austrian prince at its 
 
 19 Moore. Digest, International Law, I. § 72. 
 
 20 Ibid., VS. S »05; TJ. S. Statutes at Large. IX, G47. 
 
 21 Moore, Digest, International Law, I, § 7-.
 
 14 
 
 head Once more, as in the days of our struggle for inde- 
 pendence, a leader of American democracy appealed to Euro- 
 pean liberals for their sympathy and moral support. In his 
 great message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the war 
 for the Union was essentially a "people's contest." "This 
 issue," he said, "embraces more than the fate of these United 
 States. It presents to the whole family of man the question 
 whether a constitutional republic or democracy — a government 
 of the people by the same people — can or can not maintain its 
 territorial integrity against its own domestic foes." 22 
 
 In 1863, after the emancipation proclamation, Lincoln was 
 able to make a still stronger appeal to European liberals, and 
 this appeal met with a hearty response, especially from the 
 "plain people" of England. In one of the most notable let- 
 ters he ever wrote, he acknowledged a sympathetic address 
 from the workingmen of London and thanked them for the 
 ' ' exalted and humane sentiments by which it was inspired. ' ' 23 
 He went on to declare his faith in the community of democratic 
 interests on both sides of the Atlantic : 
 
 As these sentiments are manifestly the enduring support of the free 
 institutions of England, so I am sure also that they constitute the only 
 reliable basis for free institutions throughout the world. 
 
 The resources, advantages, and powers of the American people are 
 very great, and they have consequently succeeded to equally great 
 responsibilities. 
 
 It seems to have devolved upon them to test whether a government 
 established on the principles of human freedom can be maintained 
 against an effort to build one upon the exclusive foundation of human 
 bondage. They will rejoice with me in the new evidences which your 
 proceedings furnish that the magnanimity they are exhibiting is justly 
 estimated by the true friends of freedom and humanity in foreign 
 countries. 
 
 At a time when a strong section of the English ruling class 
 were ready to recognize the Southern Confederacy and so 
 prevent the restoration of the Union, the ability of the 
 British workingmen to recognize this solidarity of democratic 
 interests was a political fact of great importance. 
 
 The closing years of this warlike decade brought some 
 notable victories for democracy in both hemispheres, despite 
 the military methods which made Prussia a world power. 
 The Federal Republic of the United States was saved from 
 disintegration and established on a more democratic basis. 
 Under pressure from the United States Napoleon III with- 
 drew his troops from Mexico in 1867, and the imperial gov- 
 ernment which he had set up there collapsed at once. Three 
 years later Napoleon's Empire at home also broke down under 
 the stress of war and the third French Republic was estab- 
 lished. This was also a victorious time for the British de- 
 
 r ■ ■ ■■ ■ — ■ - .... - .-ii ■ — ^^ 
 
 2 - Works (Nicolay and Hav ed. 1S04), II. 57. 58, CA. 
 
 23 Works (Nicolay and Hay ed. 1S94), II, .".OS, ?,0!i. See also a similar let- 
 ter to the workingmen of Manchester. Ibid., 301-302.
 
 M III II 
 
 15 AA 000 637 992 9 
 
 mocracy. In 1867 the voting privilege was given for the firsl 
 time to a large section of the working classes in the industrial 
 centers of England and in the same year Canada secured a 
 new constitution with almost complete freedom for the man- 
 agement of her own affairs. And with all these changes came 
 a better understanding between the United States and the two 
 great liberal States of western Europe. 
 
 The reestablishment of the French Republic gave the 
 United States an opportunity to illustrate one of the inter- 
 esting traditions of our diplomacy, namely, that of giving 
 prompt recognition to a new republican government. 
 Twenty-two years before, in 1848, the American minister in 
 Paris was the first to recognize the second French Republic, 
 and our Secretary of State, approving this step, declared 
 that if he had allowed the representative of any other nation 
 to precede him "in this good work it would have been 
 regretted by the President." When Napoleon III over- 
 threw this republican government our minister refused for a 
 time to attend his weekly receptions, because he did not 
 wish to give sanction to a step by which the safeguards of 
 civil and political liberty had been "trodden underfoot." 
 
 In 1870, when the present republic was founded, the trans- 
 Atlantic cable was already in operation, and in accordance 
 with telegraphic instructions from President Grant, the 
 American minister was again the first to recognize it and 
 extend congratulations to the French people on establishing 
 a government "disconnected with the dynastic traditions of 
 Europe." 24 When, therefore, during the past year our Gov- 
 ernment took the lead in recognizing the Republic of Russia it 
 was following definite American precedents. 
 
 A study of this record clearly establishes two features 
 of American policy during the life of our Republic : First, 
 that the traditional sympathy of the American people with 
 popular government abroad has repeatedly been declared 
 in the public utterances of our official representatives. We 
 have not felt bound to suppress even in the formal docu- 
 ments of our Government our inveterate prejudice in favor 
 of free institutions and our sense of the essential unity of 
 the cause of liberalism and self-government throughout the 
 world. Secondly, we have declared with special emphasis 
 not only our sympathy with, but our practical interest in, 
 the defense of other American republics against efforts to 
 extend the European system to this hemisphere. We have 
 done this, partly at least, on the ground that there was a 
 difference between our system and that of Europe, resulting 
 from the difference in our political institutions; that States 
 founded upon liberal or democratic institutions have a com- 
 
 24 Moore, Digest of International Law, I. S 43,
 
 16 
 
 mon interest as against those which are based upon dynastic 
 and reactionary principles. 
 
 Until recently we have limited our actual intervention in 
 defense of these principles to the American hemisphere. As 
 Mr. Olney said in his famous note to Lord Salisbury during 
 the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895, we have desired to 
 keep free from the system which has converted Europe into a 
 group of armed camps. We have believed in the possibility 
 of American isolation from the dominant forces of the Old 
 AVorld. During the last quarter century, however, the world 
 has undergone enormous changes. The great military power 
 which has threatened to dominate Europe has extended its 
 formidable system of espionage to the New World; it has at- 
 tempted to draw one of our Latin- American neighbors into a 
 conspiracy against our territory; its submarines have at- 
 tacked American commerce within a few miles of our coast. 
 To the ocean steamship and the ocean cable have now been 
 added the airship and the wireless telegraph. It is these 
 hard facts which have put an end to the "splendid isolation" 
 of our earlier days. It is only in a world made safe for democ- 
 racy that America herself can be safe and free.
 
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