THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
,
\
LETTER
T O
The Rev. Mr. JOHN PALMER,
IN DEFENCE OF THE
Illuftrations of Philofophical Neceffity,
B y .
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.
Refpeftihg Man, whatever wrong we call
May, muft be right, as iclative to all.
POPE.
BATH: miNTiD BY R. CRUTTWELL;
AND SOLD BY
J. JOHNSON, No. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD, LONDON.
MDCCLXXIX.
Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.
[ ' I
To the Rev. Mr. PALMER.
DEAR SIR,
XTOTWITHSTANDING my unwilling-
-** ^" nefs to engage any farther in metaphy-
lical controverfy, there are fome circumftan-
ces attending your Obfervatioru on my Yreatife
on Pbilofopbical Neceffity, that make me in
this cafe lefs averfe to it. You are an old
acquaintance, whom I refpect, and whom I
believe to be aduated by the beft views ; you
are thought to be a mafter of this fubjedt,
and have certainly given very particular at-
tention to it j thinking, as I myfelf do, that
B it
2 A DEFENCE OF THE
it is of the greater! importance ; and now, in
a work of confiderable extent, you confine
your obfervations to it.
Your publication has alfo been a work of
great expectation among our common friends,
who were apprized of your intentions. By
yoUr own account, in your Preface, it muft
have been compofed more than a year ago.
In this time it has been fubmitted to the
perulal of perfons of great learning and
worth, who, I am informed, think highly of
it, and have recommended the publication,
not only as excellent in itfelf, but as very
proper to follow that of Dr. Price, who was
thought by them to have been too tender of
me, in our amicable difcuffion, and to have
made fome imprudent conceffions. Your
work, it. is thought, will fupply the defici-
ency in his.
You had the generofity to propofe fubmit-
ting your work to my own private perufal ;
and though, for reafons of delicacy and pro-
priety,
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 3
priety, I thought proper to decline it, I en-
couraged you in your defign of publication.
Alfo, though I did not, I believe, make you
any particular promife, you will probably ex-
ped: that, all things confidered, I mall give
you an anfwer. I therefore do it, and with
the fame freedom with which you yourfelf
have written. But, I mail confine myfelf
chiefly to the difcuffion of thofe points on
which the real merits of the queftion turn, with-
out replying at large to what you have ad-
vanced with refpedt to the conferences of the
doctrine. Indeed, if the doctrine itfelf be
true, we muft take all the genuine confequen-
ces, whether we relifh them or not. I pro-
ceed, therefore, to a ftate of the controverfy
between us, and the confideration of the na-
ture and weight of what you urge with re-
fped: to it.
principal argument for the doctrine of
Neceffity is briefly this : If, in two precifely
equal filiations of mind, with refpecT: both to
difpofition and motives, two different deter-
6 2 minations
4 A DEFENCE OF THE
minations of the will be poflible, one of them
muft be an effect without a caufe. Confe-
quently, only one of them is poflible.^
.
Now all that the ingenuity of man can re-
ply to this is, either that, though the deter-
mination be uncertain, or contingent (de-
pending neither upon the previous difpofition
of mind, nor the motives prefented to it) it
will {till, on fome account or other, not pro-
perly be an eff'eft without a caufe. For that
there can be any effecT: without a caufe, no
advocate for the doctrine of liberty has, I be-
lieve, ever afTerted. Or, in the next place, it
may be faid, that the above is not a fair flating
of the queftion in debate ; for that the deter-
minations may be invariably the fame in the
fame circumftances, being agreeable to fome
conftant law or rule, and yet, not being necef-
farily fo, the necefTarian, in facl, gains no ad-
vantage by the conceffion.
You, Sir, have combated the neceffarians on
both thefe grounds ; maintaining that what-
ever
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 5
ever be the ftate of mind, or the motives pre-
fent to it, it has within itfelf a power of de-
termining without any regard to them, the
f elf- deter mining power being itfelf the proper
caufe of the determination. You likewife af-
fert that, though there mould be the greateft
certainty in all the determinations of the will,
yet becaufe it is not Kphyfical, but only a mo-
ral certainty, it is not a proper neceffity. I
mail confider diftindtly what you have ad-
vanced on both thefe views of the fubject, in
the order in which J have mentioned them.
B 3 SECTION I,
A DEFENCE OF THE
SECTION I.
Of the Argument for the Dottrine of Neceffity
from the Confederation of the Nature of Caufe
and Effeft.
"TN the very fame circumftances," you fay,
* p. 17, " in which the choice or deter-
" mination was directed to one objedl of pur-
" fuit, it might have brought itfelf to will, or
" determine on the purfuit of a different, or
" contrary one. In other words, the mind
" is free to deliberate upon, and, in confe-
" quence of this, to chufe, and determine the
" motives of its condudt."
This ftate of the cafe, I would obferve in
the firft place, evidently implies that the mind
cannot determine itfelf without fome motive;
but you think that, becaufe it is capable of
deliberating
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, 7
deliberating upon motives, it can chufe what
motive it will be determined by. But if the
mind cannot finally determine without a mo-
tive, neither, furely, can it deliberate, that is,
determine to deliberate, without a motive. Be-
caufe the volition to deliberate cannot be of a
different nature from the volition that is con-
fequent to the deliberation. A volition, or
a decifion of the mind, by whatever name it
be denominated, or whatever be its nature,
muft be one and the fame thing. It muft, in
all cafes, be fubjecl: to the fame rule, if it be
fubje<fl to rule, or elfe be equally fubjecl: to
no rule at all. You had better, therefore, fay
at once, that every determination of the mind,
even the final one, may proceed on no mo-
tive at all. And your next retreat will equally
ferve you here : for you {till maintain that,
though there be nothing, either in the difpo-
fition of mind, or the motives prefent to it,
that was at all the caufe of the determination,
it will not be an efFe<ft without a caufe, be-
caufe the felf-determining power is, itfelf, a
proper and adequate caufe.
B 4 " There
8 A DEFENCE OF THE
" There remains a proper caufe," you fay,
" p. 24, a fufficient and adequate caufe, for
" every volition or determination which is
" formed. This caufe is that felf-determin-
" ing power, which is eflential to agency, and
" in the exercife of which motion begins."
Again, p. 36, " One principle of freedom in
" the human mind will fufficiently account
" for all their actions, and to feek after other
" caufes, muft, therefore, in his own way of
" reafoning, be wholly unneceffary."
Now to every thing that can be advanced
to this purpofe, I think I have given a fatis-
factory reply in the additional illuftrations,
printed in my Correfpondence with Dr. Price,
p. 288, in which I mew that the felf-deter-
mining power, bearing an equal relation to
any two different decifions, cannot be faid to
be a proper and adequate caufe with refpedt
to them both. But this fection, I fuppofe,
you muft have overlooked, otherwife you
could not but have thought it peculiarly ne-
ceflary to reply to my obfervations on that
fubject,
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 9
fubject, which fo very materially affect your
argument. I muft, therefore, take the liberty
to requeft that you would confider it, and re-
ply to it.
To argue as you do here, in any other cafe,
would be thought very extraordinary. If I
afk the caufe of what is called the 'wind, it is
a fufficient anfwer to fay, in the firft inftance,
that it is caufed by the motion of the air, and
this by its partial rarefaction, &c. &c. &c. ;
but if I afk why it blows north rather than
fouthy will it be fufficient to fay that, this is
caufed by the motion of the air ? The mo-
tion of the air being equally concerned in
north and fouth winds, can never be deemed
an adequate caufe of one of them in preference
to the other.
In like manner, the felf-determining power,
allowing that man has fuch a thing, and that
it may be the caufe of determining in general,
can never be deemed a fufficient caufe of any
one particular determination, in preference to
another.
10 A DEFENCE OF THE
another. Suppofing, therefore, two determi-
nations to be poffible, and there be nothing
but the mere felf-determining power to de-
cide between them, the difpofition of mind
and motives being all exactly equal, one of
them muft want a proper caufe, juft as much
as the north or the fouth wind would be
without a proper caufe, if nothing could be
affigned but the motion of the air in general,
without fomething to determine why it mould
move this way rather than that.
Befides, abftractedly and ftrictly fpeaking,
no mere power can ever be faid to be an ade-
quate caufe of its own acts. It is true that
no effect can be produced without a power
capable of producing it ; but power, univer-
fally, requires both objetts and proper circum-
Jlances. What, for inftance, can be done with
a power of burning, without fomething to
burn, and this being placed within its fphere
of action ? What is a power of thinking, or
judging, without ideas, or objects, to think
and form a judgment upon ? What, there-
fore,
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. II
fore, can be done with a power of 'willing,
without fomething to call it forth ? and it is
impoffible to ftate any cafe in which it can
be called forth, without implying fuch circum-
Jiances, as will come under the defcription of
motives, or reafom for its being exerted one
way rather than another, exactly fimilar to
any other power, that is, power univerfally and
abftrattedly conjidered, corporeal or intellec-
tual, &c. &c. &c.
SECTION II.
How far the Arguments for the "Doffirine of
Necejfity are offered by tlie Conjideration- of
the Soul being material or immaterial.
T> UT you have another refource befides that
*~* which I have confidered in the prece-
ding fedtion j which is, that though it be true
that, fuppofmg the foul to be material, and
fubjeft to phylical laws, every determination
requires a foreign caufe, yet if the foul be im-
material,
12 A DEFENCE OF THE
material) no fuch caufe is necefTary. It may
then determine itfelf in whatever manner it
pleafes.
" The whole of it" (viz. the fedion con-
cerning the argument from caufe and effecl:)
you fay, p. 20, " fuppofes a fimilarity in the
" conftituent principles of matter and fpirit;
" for by thofe only who confefs that fimila-
" rity, will it be acknowledged that the fame
" general maxims will apply, both to effeds
" mechanically produced, and thofe which
' depend upon will and choice." Again, you
fay, p. 22, " To a principle of thought con-
" ceived to be material, a change of circum-
<c fiances may be effential to a difference of
" volition ; but when the mind is conlidered
" as being in its own nature immaterial, and
" therefore not fubjedt to the laws of matter,
" but as endued with a felf-determining pow-
" er, a variety of volition or determination
" in the fame fituation or circumftances may
" be admitted as poffible, without any contra*
" didlion, or feeming difficulty at all."
Now
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 13
Now I really cannot conceive that the con-
tradiction is at all the lefs glaring, or the dif-
ficulty more furmountable, on the hypothecs
of the mind being immaterial. It does, in-
deed, follow that the mind, being immaterial,
is not fubjecl: to the laws of matter j but it
does not, therefore, follow that it is fubjecl to
no laws at all, and confequently has a felf- de-
termining power, independent of all laws, "or
rule of its determinations. In fact, there is
the very fame reafon to conclude that the mind
is fubjecl: to laws as the body. Perception,
judgment, and the pajfions, you allow to be fo,
why then mould the will be exempt from all
law ? Do not perception, judgment, and the
paflions, belong to the mind, jufl as much as
the will 5 yet, notwithstanding this, it is only
in certain cafes that the powers of perception,
judgment, or the paffions, can be exerted.;
Admitting the mind, therefore, to be imma-
terial, it may only be in certain cafes that a
determination of the will can take place. You
muft find fome other fubftance to which the
will is to be afcribed, entirely different from
that
14 A DEFENCE OF THE
that in which perception and judgment inhere,
before you can conclude that its affections and
acts are not invariable, and even necefiary.
Befides, according to all appcarances y from
which alone we can be authorized to conclude
any thing, the decifions of the will as invari-
ably follow the difpofition of mind, and the
motives, as the perception follows the prefen-
tation of a proper object, or the judgment fol-
lows the perceived agreement or difagreement
of two ideas. This, at leaft, is aflerted by ne-
cefTirians^ and it does not depend upon the
mind being material or immaterial whether
the obfervation be jufl or not. If it be inva-
lidated, it muft be on fome other ground than
this. I am willing, however, to follow you
through all that you alledge in fupport of this
argument.
" Moral neceflity," you fay, p. 45, " arifes
" from the influence of motives ; which, as
" they are not phyfical beings or fubftances,
" cannot pofiibly adt as one phyiical being
" or
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. * 15
* f or fubftance does upon another." Again,
p. 82, "where there is the greateft certainty,
<t or neceffity of a moral kind, there is always
" a poflibility of a different choice." And,
p. 46, " In the ftricl: philofophical fenfe, no-
" thing can be neceffary, which is not phy-
" lically fo, or which it would not be a con-
" tradiclion to the nature of things to fuppofe
" not to be, or to be otherwife than it
" is. Now this kind of neceffity we clearly
" perceive in the cafe of one body adling upon
" another, and giving motion to it. But do
<( arguments and motives bear the fame phy-
*' fical relation to the determinations of the
" mind ?"
I own I am rather furprized at the confi-
dence with which you urge this argument,
when it is maintained, and infifted on by ne-
ceflarians, that arguments and motives do bear
as ftricl a relation (call it phyfical or moral,
or by whatever name you pleafe) to determina-
tions of the mind, as any other caufes in nature
to their proper effects -, becaufe, according to
manifefl
l6 A DEFENCE OF THE
manifeft appearances, the determinations of
the will do, in fact, as certainly follow the
apprehenfion of arguments and motives, as
any one thing is ever obferved to follow ano-
ther in the whole courfe of nature; and it is
juft as much a contradiction to fuppofe the
contrary in the one cafe as in the other, that
is, a contradiction to the known and obferved
laws of nature ; fo that they muft have been
otherwife than they are now eftablifhed, if
any thing elfe mould follow in thofe cafes.
No other kind of contradiction would follow
in any cafe.
You fay, however, p. 43, " Phyfical necef-
" fity is a neceffity arifing out of the nature
" of things, and immediately depending upon
" it; fo that while things remain to be what
*' they are, it would be a contradiction to fup-
" pofe, that the confequences flowing from
" this kind of neceffity can be different from
" thofe which do actually refult from it. To
" fay that any thing is neceffary, in this fenfe,
" is the fame as faying that it is a natural
" impoffibility
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 1J
" impoflibility for it not to be, or to be dif-
" ferent from what it is." And, p. 44, you
" fay, " The fall of a ftone is the necefTary
" effect of that law of gravity which is im-
" preffed upon it."
Now I do maintain, and all appearances
will juftify me in it, that a determination
of the mind according to motives is, ufing
your own words, that which arifes from the
very nature of the mind, and immediately
dependent upon it -, fo that the mind remain-
ing what it is, and motives what they are,
it would be a contradiction to fuppofe that
they mould be different from what they are
in the fame circumftances. The parallel be-
tween material and immaterial natures is
here moft ftrict, and the inference the very
fame in the one cafe as in the other. ^If the
fall of a ftone be the neceffary effect of gra-
vity impreffed upon it, or upon body, in the
very fame fenfe (becaufe for the very fame
reafon) the determination of the will is the
neceffary effect of the laws impreffed upon it,
C or
l8 A DEFENCE OF THE
or upon mind. ' This conclufion is as much
grounded on facts and appearances as the
other.
Nay, beginning with mind, I might, ac-
cording to your mode of feafoning, fay firft,
that, according to all appearances, the mind
is neceflarily determined by motives, for every
thing we fee in human nature confirms it.
Mind is, therefore, fubject to fixed laws, but
matter is a thing totally different from mind.
It cannot, therefore (whatever appearances
may be) refemble mind in this, or any other
refpeft, and confequently muft be free from
all fixed laws whatever. Thus might your
own arguments be retorted upon you, and
bring you to an evident abfurdity; but, in
my opinion, not a greater abfurdity, or more
contrary to fact, than that the mind is free
from all fixed laws, and endued with a power
of felf-determination.
\I wifh, however, you would explain in
what fenfe it would be a contradiction for a
flone
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 19
ftone not to fall to the ground. It is only
from the obfervation of thefatf that we find
it does tend to the ground. A priori, it would
have been juft as probable that it might have
tended to recede from the ground, and to rife
upwards. Where alfo would be the contra-
diction, in any proper fenfe of the word, if
acids did not unite with alkalies, or if water
mould take fire and burn, like fpirit of wine?
No perfon, I prefume, is fufficiently acquaint-
ed with the nature of things, to pronounce,
that there would be any thing that could be
called a contradiction in refults the very oppo-
fite of what we fee do take place/
That which approaches the neareft to a
properly neceiTary efFecl:, is the receding of bo-
dies after impulfe, which you alfo maintain.
But, though you fay you clearly perceive this
neceflity, even this is a cafe in which, I will
take upon me to fay, you cannot demon/Irate
the confequence to be necefTary. For, as I
prefume I have fhewn at large, there is not
attual contact in all cafes of feeming impulfe,
C 2 and,
20 A DEFENCE OF THE
and, therefore, the receding of one body from
another, in thofe circumftances, is owing to a
real repulfion, which we can no more refolve
into a mechanical effect, than we can thofe of
gravity, becaufe they both take place at a dif-
tance from the bodies concerned.
Now, as it is fimply in confequence of the
obferved uniformity of the f aft t that I conclude
a ftone will fall to the ground, it is equally
in confequence of the obferved uniformity of
the fact, that I conclude the determination
of the mind will follow the motive. An in-
ference from obfervation is furely as decifive
in one cafe as in the other; and this is clearly
independent of all confideration of the mind
being material or immaterial.
SECTION III.
21
SECTION III.
Of Certainty and Neceffify.
"VT'OU feem fometimes willing to allow that
* the determination of the will may be
certain, that is, a definite thing in definite cir-
cumftances, and yet you maintain that it is
not necejjary ; fo that the arguments in favour
of liberty are not afFe<5ted by the conceffion.
" The argument itfelf," you fay, p. 74,
*' may be refolved into this fhort queftion^
" whether certainty implies neceffity, or,
" whether that which is morally certain, is,
" therefore, phyfically necelTary?" And, p. 23,
" it is not the influence of motives, but their
" neceffary influence, that is denied."
C 3 Now,
22 A DEFENCE OF THE
Now, this is a cafe that I had confidered
fo fully in my late Treatife, in my Corre/pon-
dence with Dr. Price, and in my Letters to
Dr. Horjley and Mr. Eermgton y that I did
not think I mould have heard any more of it ;
and yet it feems you have read part, at leaft,
of what I have advanced on that fubject; for
you fay, p. 40, " The beft reafon that I can
" colled: from all that the Doctor has advan-
" cedon this fubject, in favour of fuch aphy-
* c fical connection refpecting the operations of
the mind, is the univerfality or certainty
" of the effects, that is, of the determination
" which takes place in any given circumftan-
<c ces. But though it be allowed that any
" particular effect would ever fo certainly
" follow on a ftate of mind, and a fituation
of external objects correfponding with it,
" this will not prove the effect to be necef-
" fary. A moral certainty, and a phyfical
" neceffity, or a neceffity arifmg out of the
" nature of things, cannot but imply in them
" very different ideas \ nor is the latter by
" any means the confequence of the former."
You
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 23
You have, indeed, been able to collect,
which was not difficult, (for I had ^occa-
fion to repeat it feveral times) that, in fa-
vour of the neceflary determination of the
mind according to motives, I have urged
the certainty and univerfality of fuch a deter-
mination ; but I wonder you mould not like-
wife have obferved, that, in farther fupport
of this, I added, that certainty or um'ver-
fality is the only pojible ground of concluding^
that there is a necejjity in any cafe whatever ;
and to this, which you have not fo much as
noticed, you ought principally to have replied.
Pleafe, Sir, to reflect a moment, and tell
me diftinctly, why you believe that there is
a neceffity that a ftone muft fall to the ground ?
Can it be any thing elfe than its having been
obferved that it conftantly and univerfally does
fo ? If, therefore, the determination follows
the motives as certainly as a ftone falls to the
ground, there muft be the very fame reafon to
conclude, that, whether we fee why it is fo or
not (which, indeed, we do not in the cafe of
C 4 the
24 A DEFENCE OF THE
the falling of the flone) there is a necejfity for
its doing fo. The difference cannot be in the
reality, but only in the kindoi neceffity. The
neceffity mufl be the fame, or equally ftrict
and abfolute in both, let the caufes of the ne-
ceffity in the two be ever fo different.
^As I have told Dr. Horfley, but which you
feem not to have attended to, (fee Correfpon-
dence with Dr. Price, p. 223,) " I will allow
" as much difference as you can between mo-
" ral and phyfical caufes. Inanimate mat-
" ter, or the pen that I write with, is riot ca-
" pable of being influenced by motives, nor
'* is the hand that directs the pen, but the
<f mind that directs both.) I think I diftin-
" guifh thefe things better by the terms vo-
" luntary and involuntary, but thefe are mere
" words, and I make no comparifon between
" them, or between moral and phyfical caufes,
" but in that very refpect in which you your-
*' felf acknowledge that they agree, /. e. the
" certainty with which they produce their
*' refpective effects. And this is the proper
" foundation
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 25
" foundation of all the neceffity that I afcribe
" to human actions.! My conclusion, that men
" could not, in any given cafe, act otherwife
" than they do, is not at all affected by the
" terms by which we diftinguifh the laws and
" caufes that refpect the mind from thofe
" which refpect the external world. That
" there are any laws, and that there are any
" caufes, to which the mind is fubject, is all
" that my argument requires. Give me the
" thing, and I will readily give you the name/*^)
" If" (as I obferved to Mr. Berington,
Treatife on Neceffity , p. 174,) " the mind
'< be, in facT:, conflantly determined by mo-
" lives, I defire you would fay candidly why
" you object to the mere term nectffify, by
" which nothing is ever meant but the caufe '
" of conftancy. It is only becaufe I fee a (lone
<( fall to the ground constantly, that I in-
" fer it does fo neceflarily, or according to
" fome fixed law of nature. N And, pleafe to
t fay, whether you think it could happen,
that the mind ihould be conflantly deter-
'* mined
26 ,vA DEFENCE OF THE
" mined by motives, if there was not a fixed
" law of nature from which that conftant de-
" termination refults."
Thefe paflages, I prefume, you have over-
looked. You certainly have not noticed
them, or given due attention to them.
You muft give me leave to obferve, on this
fubjedl si moral certainty, that you feem fome-
times to have deceived yourfelf, by an ambi-
guous ufe of that term. Becaufe we are apt
to be deceived in our judgments concerning
the fentiments and conduct of men, fo that
the greateft certainty we can attain to with
refpect to them is frequently imperfect, we
diftinguifh it from abfolute certainty, by call-
ing it moral, and then apply the fame term
to other things, calling that a moral certainty,
which is only a great probability. Thus, in
the docTrine of chances, if there be a thoufand
to one in my favour, I fay there is a moral
certainty that I mall fucceed. But it does not
follow that, becaufe the term moral certainty
has
POCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 7
has by this means come to mean the fame
thing with a high degree of probability y nothing
relating to the mind can have any thing more
than a moral certainty, that is, a probability ',
attending it. Many propolitions relating to
the mind are as abfolutely certain as any re-
lating to the body. That the will conftantly
and invariably decides according to motives,
muft not, therefore, be concluded to have no-
thing more than a moral certainty attending
it, merely becaufe it is a truth relating to the
mind, or to morals. It may be as abfolutely
certain as any truth in natural philofophy.
It is the evidence of the fafl that mould be
confidered, and not the mere nominal diftinc-
tions.of things.
For the farther illuflration of this fubjedt,
I hope to fatisfy you, that even all that you
defcribe as moft horrid and frightful in the
doctrine of necejflty, follows as evidently from
your dodtrine of certainty, provided it be a real
certainty, though not fuch as you would chufe
to call a phyfical one ; and, therefore, that it
can
28 A DEFENCE OF THE
can be nothing more than the mere name that
you objedlto.
/ We will fuppofe that a child of yours has
committed an offence, to which his mind was
certainly, though not necejjartiy> determined by
motives. He was not made, we will fay, in
fuch a manner as that motives had a necef-
fary effedt upon his mind, and pbyfically or
mechanically determined his actions, but only
that his mind would in all cafes determine it-
Je/f, according to the fame motives. You hear
of the offence, and prepare for inftant correc-
tion, not, however, on the idea that punifh-
ment is juftifiable whenever it will reform the
offender, or prevent the offences of others ;
but fimply on your own idea, of its having
.been in the power of the moral agent to acl:
otherwife than he had done.
Your fon, aware of your principles, fays,
dear father, you ought not to be angry with
me, or punim me, when you knew that I
could not help doing as I have done. You
placed
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 29
placed the apples within my reach, and knew
that my fondnefs for them was irrefiftible. No,
you reply, that is not a juft ftate of the cafe,
you were not under any necejfity to take them,
you were only .fo conftituted as that you cer-
tainly would take them. But, fays your fon,
what am I the better for this freedom from,
neceffity ? I wim I had been necejfarily deter-
mined, for then you would not punim me $
whereas now that I only certainly determine
myfelf, I find that I offend juft as much, and
you always correct me for it.
A man muft be peculiarly conftituted, if,
upon this poor diftindtion, he could fatisfy
himfelf with punifhing his fon in the one
cafe, and not in the other. The offence he
clearly forefaw would take place : for by the
hypothecs, it was acknowledged to be certain ,
arifing from his difpofition and motives ; and
yet merely becaufe he will not term it necejfa*
ry> he thinks him a proper objedl of punifh-
ment. Befides, pleafe to confider whether,
if the child never did refrain from the offence
in
30 A DEFENCE OF THE
in thofe circumftances, there be any reafon to
think that he properly could have refrained.
We judge of all powers only by their effe&s,
and in all philofophy we conclude, that if
any thing never has happened, and never will
happen, there is a fufficient caufe, though it
may be unknown to us, why it never could
happen. This is our only ground of conclu-
ding concerning what is poffible or impoffi-
ble in any cafe.
SECTION IV.
Of the Argument for the Doctrine ofNeceJfity,
from the Confederation of Divine Prefcience.
IF there be any propolition flridlly demon-
Jlrabky it is, as it appears to me, that a
contingent event is no objett of prefcience, or
that a thing which, in its own nature, may,
or
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 3!
or may not be, cannot be certainly known to
be future ; for then it might be certainly
known to be what it confefledly may not be,
If, therefore, the mind of man be fo conftitu-
ted, as that any particular determination of his
will may or may not take place, notwithftand-
ing his previous circumflances, the Divine
Being himfelf cannot tell whether that deter-
mination will take place or not. The thing
itfelf is not fubject to his controul, nor can
be the object of his fore-knowledge.
To fay, as you quote from fome other per-
fon, p. 33, but without any declared appro-
bation, that " fore-knowledge, if it does im-
" ply certainty, does yet by no means imply
" necejjity, and that no other certainty is im-
" plied in it than fuch a certainty as would
" be equally in the things, though there was
" no fore-knowledge of them," is too trifling
to deferve the leaft attention. You, there-
Core, in fact, give it up, and as, according to
your fyftem, the Divine Being cannot have
this fore- knowledge, you take a good deal of
pains
32 A DEFENCE OF THE
pains to mew that he may do very well with-
out it.
" Prefcience," you fay, p. 31, "is by no
" means effential to the government of free
" beings, and a government of this na-
" ture, though prefcience mould be deemed
" inadmiffible, as a contrariety to contin-
" gency in the event, may, notwithftand-
" ing, be as complete in its defigns and ope-
" rations, as the utmoft poflible extent of
" knowledge, that is, the moil perfect know-
" ledge united with almighty power, can
" make it." This, however, in thefe cir-
cumftances, may be very incomplete, and in-
adequate for its purpofe. You add, p. 30,
" it cannot be impoflible to almighty power,
when the charadters of men are known,
" becaufe really exifling, to bring about by
" means, which, previous to their operation,
" we cannot forefee, thofe events which he
" judges fit, and proper, for the maintainence
" and promotion of the well-being of his
" rational creation. And, after all, whatever
prefent
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 33
" prefent irregularities may be permitted to
" take place in the allotments of Providence
" to the fons of men, the grand and ultimate
" part of the plan of God's moral govern-
" ment, in the exacT: and equal diftribution
" of rewards and punifhments in a future
" fcene of exiftence, /lands on the fame
" firm and immovable grounds, whether
" the contingent actions of men be fqrefeen
" or not."
This, and what you farther advance on
the fame fubject, I really am not able to read
without pain and concern. You fay, p. 32,
that " the prophecies of fcriptures do im-
(t ply divine preference in certain instances
" mufl be allowed." Now, unable as you
evidently are to defend the very pojjibitity of
this prefcience; this conceffion is rather ex-
traordinary. To be truly confident, and, at
the fame time, a believer in revelation, you
ought to aflert, how embarrafTed foever you
might be in making out the proof of it, that
D there
34 A
there is no real fore- knowledge where a di-
rect interference is not to be underftood.
To leflen this difficulty, you fay, p. 27,
that, " by denying that prefcience to God,
" which is inconfiftent with the idea of li-
" berty or agency in man, we only deny that
" to belong to the fupreme mind, which is,
" in truth, no perfection at all. For, if it be
" really impofiible that even infinite know-
" ledge mould extend to actions or events in
" their own nature contingent, that is, where
"proper liberty or agency is fuppofed, we no
" more derogate from the perfection of the di
" vine knowledge, by maintaining that God
" cannot know fuch actions or events, than we
tf diminim his power by aflerting that it can-
" not work contradictions, or what is really
" no object of power at all. Equally muft
" it confift with the omnifcience of the di-
vine being, to fay he cannot know that
" which is impoffible to be known, as it
*' does with his omnipotence to afTert that
he
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 35
" he cannot do that which is impoflible to
" be done."
I mould think, however, that it muft be
a matter of deep regret to the human race,
that the object of our fupreme veneration and
worfhip, on whom we conftantly depend for
life, breath, and all things, mould want fuch
an attribute as that of prefcience, though it
mould be impoffible that he could be poffefTed
of it. It would certainly be more fatisfac-
tory to us to be dependent upon a being
who had planned, and provided for the whole
courfe of our exiftence, before we came into
being, than en one who could not tell what
turn things would take with refpect to us the
next moment of our lives, and who muft,
therefore, either interpofe by a proper mira-
cle when we fall into any unforefeen misfor-
tune, or leave us to ftruggle with it, and
be overwhelmed by it.
It is certainly no reflection upon me that
I cannot fee into the table I write on, and
difcover
36 A DEFENCE OF THE
difcover the internal texture of it; but I know
that, as a philofopher, it would be a great
perfection and advantage to me if I occafion-
ally could.' I cannot help thinking that,
with lefs ingenuity than you have employed
to (hew how the Divine Being might do
without prefcience, that is, without omnifci-
ence, you might prove that a power much
fhort of omnipotence, and a degree of goodnefs
much lefs than infinite, might fuffice for him ;
and you might fay it would be no reflection
upon him at all to be lefs the objeft of love
and reverence than we now conceive him to
be. It can be no detraction, you might fay,
from any being, or degradation, to deny him
what he never could have.
I rejoice that my opinions, whether true or
falfe, oblige me to think with more reverence
of the Supreme Being. It gives me a higher
idea of my own dignity and importance, from
a fenfe of my relation to him, and depend-
ance upon him. You fay, however, p. 216,
that " the only character which the necefla-
rian
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 37
rian tenet, if confidered in its due extent,
will admit of, as belonging to the uncreated
mind, is a mixed one, in which, if I may fo
fpeak, matchlefs virtues and matchlefs vices
are blended together." And again, p. 188,
he cannot but appear to be (horrid thought)
" the moft finful of all beings." Horrid
thought indeed. But remember, it is not the
neceffarian who has himfelf this idea of the
object of his worfhip. , This is only what
you think for him ; whereas it is yourfelf that
deprive the Divine Being of his prefcience ;
which makes no fmall difference in*the cafe.
It is of little confequence to me what you
think of the God that I wormip, though it
hurts me to hear him reproached in this
manner. It is as little to you what / think
of him whom you, or any other perfon, pro-
fefles to wormip; but what we ottrfe/ves think
of him is a very ferious bufinefs.
Being aware of the impoffibility of carry-
ing on a fcheme of perfect moral government
on your principles, without having recourfe
D 3 to
38 A DEFENCE OF THE
to a future ftate, you, however, make yourfelf
eafy about any irregularities that cannot be
remedied here, on the idea that every thing
that unavoidably goes wrong in this life,
will be fet to rights in another. But will not
the fame irregularities unavoidably arife from
the fame caufe, the fame felf-determining
power, in a future life as well as in this ?
You will hardly fuppofe that men will ever
be deprived of a privilege which, in your ef-
timation, is of fo much importance to them.
The nature of man will not be fundamentally
changed, nor the nature of his will} and if
this faculty retain the fame character, it muft
be as much as ever perfectly uncontrolled ei-
ther by the influence of motives, or by the
deity himfelf. It will ftill, then, for reafons
of its own, or for no reafon at all, pay juft as
much or as little regard to every thing foreign
fo itfelf, as it pleafes. Even habits, which
may be acquired in this life, operate only as
motives, or biafes, inclining the mind to this
or that choice, and nothing coming under that
defcription has any decifive influence.
Here
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 39
Here is, therefore, from the unalterable
nature of things, an everlafting fource of ir-
regularity, which muft always be fufferad
for the prefent, and which can only be reme-
died in fome future ftate. Thus periods of
diforder, and periods of rectification, muft fuc-
ceed one another to all eternity. What a
profpedl does this view of things place be-
fore us !
You afk me, p. 33, " how far it would be
" agreeable to my ideas of civility and can-
" dour, had any writer on the fide of liberty,
" under the warm impreffions of an honeft
" zeal againft the manifeil tendency of my
" Illuftrations ofPhihfophicaINeceffity> adopted
" the fame fatirical ftrain that I myfelf, in a
" quotation you make from my treatife, ufed
" with refpect to Dr. Beattie," and then you
proceed to parody my own words, inferting
my entire paragraph in a note.
" Thus," you fay, p. 34, " our author, in
" the blind rage of difputation, hefitates not
4 "to
40 A DEFENCE OF THE
" to deprive the ever-bleffed God of the
" poffibility of creating, what in revelation
" is reprefented as the nobleft of his works,
" a being formed in his own likenefs, that is
4 ' intelligent, and free , fubverting that great
" principle of liberty, than which nothing
" can be more eflential to every juft idea
" of a moral government -, which yet we are
" everywhere throughout the books of fcrip-
" ture taught, that the deity conftantly ex-
" ercifes over mankind. This he has done
" rather than relinquim his fond attach-
" ment to the doctrines of materialifm and
" neceffity; doctrines which feem to draw
" after them an univerfal fatalifm, through
" the whole extent of nature, and which, if
" really true, it muft be unfpeakably injurious
" both to the virtue and happinefs of the ge-
" nerality of mankind to make public."
I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity you
have given me of trying how I mould feel on
this ocean* on. For, other wife, we are fo apt
to overlook beams in our own eyes, while we
can
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 4!
can difcover motes in the eyes of others, that
I might not have attended to it ; and I will
tell you frankly how it is with me. Had I
thought the reflection juft, I mould have felt
it; though feeing it to proceed from an hontft
zeal, mould not have thought it contrary to
any thing that ought to be termed civility, or
candour. But becaufe I confider it as altoge-
ther founded on a miftake, I think it injurious
to me, and unworthy of you.
I really fufpecl: that neither you nor Dr.
Beattie have fufficiently attended to the proofs
of the divine prefcience, either from reafon
or revelation. For they appear to me really
ftronger, and more ftri&ly conclufive, than the
arguments we have for his omnipotence or his
infinite goodnefs ; and the Divine Being him-
felf propofes this as the very teft and touch-
ftone of divinity itfelf, fo that a being not
poffefTed of it is not, in a ftridt and proper
fenfe, intitled to the appellation of God.
'* Thus faith the Lord," Ifa. xli. 22, con-
cerning idols, "Let them mew us what fhall
" happen
42 A DEFENCE OF THE
*
'* happen. Let them (hew the former things
" what they be, or declare us things to come.
" Lei them mew the things that are to
" come hereafter, that we may know that they
" are Gods."
This, I own, is preaching to one whofe of-
fice it is to preach to others; but I muft preach
on, and obferve, that if you will only attend
to the amazing variety and extent of the fcrip-
ture prophecies, comprizing the fate of all the
great empires in the world, the very minutice
of the Jewifh hiftory, and all that is to befall
the chriftian church to the very end of the
world, you cannot entertain a doubt, but that
every thought in the mind of every man
(aftoniming as the idea is) muft have been
diftin&ly perceived by the fupreme ruler of
all things from the beginning of the world.
You fay, "the prophecies of fcripture im-
" ply prefcience in certain inftances" This
is greatly narrowing the matter, and giving
an idea of it far below the truth. They not
only
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY* 43
only imply y but directly ajfert it in numberlefs
inftances ; and it is implied, I may fay, in an
infinity of inftances. Confider only, for I
think it very poffible that you may never have
attended to it at all (as your principles -will
naturally incline you to look another way)
confider, I fay, how many millions of human
volitions muft have taken place from the be-
ginning of the world, that really (directly or
indirectly) contributed to the death ofCbrift, in
the very peculiar circumftances in which it was
actually foretold ; volitions which, according
to all appearance (from which alone we are
authorized to form any conclufion) were per-
fectly natural, and uncontrolled by fuperna-
tural influence; and you cannot think it ex-
travagant to fay, that all the volitions of the
minds of all men muft have been known
to him that could foretel that one event, in
its proper circumftances. Not only muft he
have forefeen the tempers and difpofitions
of the rulers and common people of the Jews,
the peculiar character of Pilate, Herod, and
of every man immediately concerned in the
tranf-
44 A DEFENCE OF THE
tranfa&ion, and the peculiar manners and
cuftoms of the Romans, but all that had prece-
ded, to give the Romans theirpower, and form
their manners and cuftoms, as well as thofe
of the Jews and other nations. Think but a
few minutes on the fubject, and it will fwell
far beyond your power of conception, and
overwhelm you with conviction. It impreiTes
my mind in fuch a manner, that, I own, I
cannot help being extremely mocked at the
feeming levity with which you treat this moil
ferious of all fubjects.
Such is the evidence of the divine prefci-
cnce from the consideration of the fcripture
prophecies, that, if they be duly confidered,
I do not think it in the power of the human
mind to refift it ; and without regard to any
confequencesy that metaphyfical fyftem which
implies it, and is implied by it, muft be true:
And when the whole fcheme is feen in its true
colour and form, nothing can appear more
admirable and glorious, more honourable to
God, or more happy for man. But I will not
enlarge
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 45
enlarge on the fubjeft, though I can hardly
forbear doing it.
Compared with this, how exceedingly low
and poor muft be their idea of the moral go-
vernment of God, who hold him to have no
fore- knowledge of the actions of men; and
with what little fatisfa&ion can they contem-
plate it ? Only confider on that hypothefis,
the millions, and millions of millions of vo-
litions that take place every moment, on the
face of this earth only, which the Divine
Being, having no proper forefight of, can-
not poffibly control. For the mind of man
is held to be as abfolute, and uncontrolled,
within its proper fphere, as the Divine Being
is in his. The unknown effects of all thefe
volitions he muft always be anxioufly watch-
ing, in order to remedy the inconveniencies
that may ariie from them as foon as poffible ;
and he muft have a diftinct expedient provided
for every contingency. What regularity or
harmony can there be on fuch a Icheme as
this ? What'ftrange uncertainty, confufion,
and
46 A DEFENCE OF THE
and perplexity, muft reign every where ! I
am unable to proceed any farther with the
fhocking picture. I thank God that fuch is
not my idea of the government under which
I really live.
To give our common readers an opportu-
nity of judging of the paragraph which you
think fo obnoxious, and which you have ta-
ken care to bring into their view more than
once, I mall myfelf recite the whole, with
fome things that precede and follow it.
" Among other things, our author gently
" touches upon the objection to the contin-
" gency of human actions from the doctrine
" of the divine prefcience. In anfwer to
" which, or rather in defcanting upon which
" (thinking, I fuppofe, to chufe the iefs of
" two evils) he feems to make no great diffi-
" culty of rejecting that moft eflential prero-
" gative of the divine nature, though nothing
" can be more fully afcertained by indepen-
" dent evidence from revelation, rather than
" give
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 47
'* give up his darling hypothelis of human
" liberty j fatisfying himfelf with obferving,
" that it implies no reflexion on the divine power
" that it cannot perform impojpbilities* In the
" very fame manner he might make himfelf
" perfe&ly eafy if his hypothecs fhould com-
" pel him to deny any other of the attributes
" of God, or even his very being -, for what
" reflection is it upon any perfon, or thing,
" that things impoflible cannot be ? Thus
" our author, in the blind rage of difputa-
" tion, hefitates not to deprive the ever.blefled
" God of that very attribute, by which, in
" the books of fcripture, he exprefsly diilin-
".guifhes himfelf from all falfe Gods, and
" than which nothing can be more efTentially
" neceffary to the government of the univerfe,
" rather than relinquish his fond claim to the
" fancied privilege of f elf -determination -, a
" claim which appears to me to be juft as
*' abfurd as that of felf-exiftence y and which
" could not poffibly do him any good if he
" had it.
" Terrified,
48 A DEFENCE OF THE
" Terrified, however, as I am willing to
" fuppofe (though he does not exprefs any
" fuch thing) at this confequence of his fyf-
" tern, he thinks, with thofe who maintain
" a trinity of perfons in the unity of the di-
" vine eflence, and with thofe who aflert
" the doftrine of tranfubftantiation, to fhelter
" himfelf in the obfcurity of his fubjeft ;
" faying, that we cannot comprehend the
" manner in which the Divine Being operates.
"But this refuge is equally untenable in
" all the cafes, becaufe the things them-
' felves are, in their own nature, impoffi-
" blej and imply a contradi&ion. I might
" juft as well fay that, though to us, whofe
" underftandings are fo limited, two and two
appear to make no more than four, yet
in the divine mind, the comprehenlion of
which is infinite, into which, however,
we cannot look, and concerning which it
is impoffible, and even dangerous, to form
conjectures, they may make five"
tt
Were
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 49
" Were I pofleffed of Dr. Beattie's talent
" of declamation, and had as little fcruple to
ft make uie of it, what might I not fay of
" the abfurdity of this way of talking, and
" of the horrible immoral confequences of
f( denying the fore-Jcnowledge of God ? I
" mould foon make our author, and all his
adherents, as black as Atheifls. The very
" admiffion of fo untradtable a principle as
" contingency into the univerfe, would be no
*' better than admitting the Manichaean doc-
" trine of an independent evil principle. Nay,
" it would be really of worfe confequence,
" for the one might be controlled, but the
" other could not. But, I thank God, my
" principles are more generous, and I am as
" far from afcribing to Dr. Beattie all the
" real confequences of his do&rine (which,
" if he could fee with my eyes, he would
" reprobate as heartily as I do myfelf ) as I
*' am from admitting his injurious imputatj-
f( ons with refpecT: to mine,"
50 A DEFENCE OF THE
I do aflure you, Sir, I fee nothing to retracl:
in all this, though it is in the firft of my
works in which I mentioned the fubjec~t of
Necejity 5 and I do not at all envy you the
difcovery, that, for the purpofes of the moral
government of God, fore -know ledge is a fu-
perfluous attribute.
SECTION V.
Of the MORAL TENDENCY of the Doftrine
of Ntcejpty.
TT is on the fubjecl: of the moral tendency of
** the do&rine of neceffity, that you ima-
gine your arguments the ftrongeft, and that
you declaim with the greateft warmth and
confidence. To all this, however, I think it
unneceflary for me to reply. For, notwith-
ftanding all you have written on this fa-
vourite
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 5!
vourite theme, I am perfectly fatisfied with
what I have already advanced, and think it
altogether unaffected by your reply. Befides,
it behoves you, in the firft place, to prove the
doctrine to be falfe. For if it be true, the
confequences will follow, and you as well as
myfelf, muft make the beft we can of them.
And I befeech you, for your own fake, that
you would not reprefent them as fo very
frightful, left, after all, they jhould prove
true.
In the mean time, have fome little tender-
nefs for me, and confider with what fentiments,
one who firmly believes the doctrine of ne-
ceffity to be true, and at the fame time to
abound with the moft glorious confequences,
who imagines he feels it favourable to true
elevation of mind, leading, in an eminent
manner, to piety, benevolence, and felf-go-
vernmcnt, muft perufe the account you have
been pleafed to draw of his principles. *The
following are but a few of the features :
E a " lean-
2 A DEFENCE OF THE
" I cannot but think," you fay, p. 242,
f that the doctrine of neceffity looks very
* f much like a refinement on the old Mani-
?' chaean notion of two independent princi-
'* pies of good and evil, which, in this fyftem,
*' are blended in one." " I cannot butthink/'
you fay, p. 183, (< fuch fentiments as danger-
f ' ous in their tendency, as they are falfe and
" abfurd in themfelves. They fecm very ma-
" terially, though undefignedly, to affecl: the
" moral character of the deity, and to be big
* f with confequences the mofl fatal to the
'.5 virtue and happinefs of mankind. I can-
" not but look upon the promulgation of the
" fcheme of neceffity," p. 175, "as highly
" exceptionable, becaufe it is likely to do
" unfpeakable mifchief. In the moft ex-
" ceptionable and dangerous principles of
" Calvinifm, p. 238, the doctrine of ne-
" ceffity, when examined to the bottom,
V is really the very fame." And in your
preface, p. 4, you fay, " nor can I help
" expreiling very flrong apprehenfions of
f the dangerous tendency of the neceiTarian
" tenet
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. $3
" tenet as a practical principle ; for that the
tf generality of mankind would think them-
" felves fully warranted in concluding that
" they could not, on any account, defervc
" punimment, and had therefore nothing
" to fear."
Before you had concluded, as you have
done, that the publication of the doctrine of
neceffity muft do fuch unfpeakable mifchief
to the generality of mankind* you would have
done well, I think, to have confidered the
flate of thefafl. Caft your eye over thofe
of your acquaintance, and whom you know
to be necelTarians, efpecially thofe who have
been fo in early life, and who are the moft
attached to the doctrine. They are nume-
rous enough to enable you to form fomc
judgment of the practical tendency of their
principles. Are their minds more depraved,
their objects of purfuit lefs noble, or their
exertions lefs ftrenuous, than you have reafon
to think they would have been if they had
pot been necelTarians ?
Had
54 ADEFENCEOFTHE
Had I not been engaged, in this contro-
verfy, you would probably have thought my
own evidence as unexceptionable as that of
any other perfon. But on this I lay no
Jftrefs, though the compliments you pay me
would give me fomc advantage in this cafe.
If you fay that principles in general have but
an inconfiderable- influence on practice, v/hy
fhould you fufFer your fears to get the better
of your reafon in this particular cafe, and
why mould you urge what is, in fadl, no
proper argument at all, with more force, than
every other confideration, refpecting the real
merits of the queftion ?
However, light as I ihould be difpofed
to make of your accufation, I mall now treat
it with the gravity that yourfelf will think
it intitled to ; and I think I may undertake
to fatisfy you, from your own mode of ar-
guing, that there is no evil whatever to be
apprehended from the doclrine of neceffity,
but, on the contrary, the greateft good, and
that you evidently argue on principles in-
confiftent with each other when you throw
fo much odium on the fcheme.
In
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 55
In the firft place, you fay, p. 149, that
" on the fcheme of neceflity all is refolved
" into a divine conftitution, which is unal-
" terably fixed. If any, therefore, are to
" fucceed better, or be happier, in any part
" of their exiftence than others, their fupe-
" rior profperity and happinefs will be infal-
" libly fecured to them ; and though there
" is a certain difpofition of mind, and courfe
" of action, which are infeparably connected
" with their fuccefs and happinefs, as means
" to bring about thofe events, yet the means
" as well as the end are alike neceffary ; and
" having no power to make either the one
" or the other at all different from what
" they are, or are to be, their lot, through
" the whole of their being, is by them abfo-
" lutely unalterable. What, again, I fay,
can have a ftronger tendency to relax the
" mind, and fink it into a ftate of indolence
" and inactivity?"
Here then you reduce the neceflarian to a
ftate of abfolute inattmity, that is, indifpofed
4 to
56 A DEFENCE OF THE
to any purfuits, virtuous or vicious. For
your argument, if it goes to any thing, goes
to both alike.
But, on the other hand, you conftantly
fuppofe, fo that I have no occafion to quote
particular paflages, that the neceflarian wilJ,
of courfe, give himfelf up to the gratifica-
tion of all his paflions, and purfue without
reftraint whatever he apprehends to be his
intereft or happinefs.
Here then, notwithftanding the natural
mdolence of the neceflarian, you are able,
when your argument requires it, to find a
conliderable fource of a&itoity in him 3 be-
caufe you have difcovered, that, like other
men, he has pajfions, and a regard to his inte-
reft and bappinefs.
But, furely, it is not difficult to conceive,
that this activity, from whatever fource it
arifes, may take a good as well as a bad turn,
and lead to virtue or vice, according as it is
directed.
bod TRINE oF NECESSITY, $j
directed. If the gratification of our lower
appetites leads to evil, the gratification of
the higher ones, as benevolence, &c. (of
which, I hope, you will admit that a necef-
farian, being a man in other refpects, may be
pofTeffed) muft lead to good; and that, if
falfe notions of intereft and happinefs in-
ftigate a man to vice, juft notions of his in-
tereft and happinefs muft lead to virtue. In
fact, therefore, upon your own principles,
nothing is requifite to convert even a necef-
farian from vice to virtue, but the better in-
forming his underftanding and judgment,
which you exprefsly allow to be mechanical
things, being always determined by a view
of the objects prefented to them, and to have
nothing of felf-determination belonging to
them.
This, if there be any force in your own
reafoning, muft be a fufficient anfwer to
every thing that you fo pathetically and re-
peatedly urge concerning the mifchiefs to be
dreaded from the doctrine of necefiity. It
would
$8 A DEFENCE OF THE
would be very difagreeable to me to go over
all that you fay on this fubjec"t, and, there-
fore, I am glad to find that I have no oc-
cafion to do it.
I am forry to find that, in purfuing your
fuppofed advantage fo inconfiderately as you
do, you, in fact, plead the caufe of vice, and
reprefent it as triumphing over every confi-
deration drawn from the prefent or a fu-
ture flate. " How is a vicious man," you
fay, p. 185, " who finds that the prefent
" natural good of pleafure or profit refults
*' from the gratification of his appetites,
" and from defrauding or over-reaching his
" neighbour, to be perfuaded to think that
" vice is productive of evil to him here ? On
" the fuppofition that there is no moral dif-
" ference in things, all moral arguments
" againft the courfe of conduct to which his
" appetites or inclinations prompt him, im-
" mediately vanim. As long, therefore, as
" he can make his prefent conduct confident
*' with what is his natural good, or which
"he
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 59
*' he looks upon to be fo, that is, with fenfi-
" tive pleafure, or his worldly advantage, all
" is right and well, fo far as regards the pre-
" fent fcene of things."
Now I am really furprized that you, who
have been fo long a preacher, could not, on
this occafion, recollect any thing in ahfwer
to fuch a libertine as this, without having
recourfe to arguments drawn from a future
flate, and even independent of moral confi-
derations, of which it is but too apparent
that mere fenfualifts and worldly-minded per-
fons make little account. Do no evils arifc
to the bodily conftitution, to the mental fa-
culties, or to fociety, from habitual ex-
cefs in eating or drinking, or from the irre-
gular indulgence of other natural appetites ?
And fhort of excefs we are within the bounds
of virtue ; for in fact, nothing is ever pro-
perly termed excefs, but what does terminate
(and it is fo called becaufe it terminates) in
pain and milery. Is it not poffible that a,
man may both morten his life, and make his
(hort
60 A DEFENCE OF THE
fhort life miferable, by his vices ? Only re-
perufe your own excellent fermon, intitled,
The infanity of the Senfualtft, written long be-
fore this controverfy, and you will find many
valuable obfervations to this purpofe.
Suppofing confclence entirely out of the
queftion, are injustice and oppreffion always
fuccefsful, and are there not many proverbs
founded on general experience, teaching even
the vulgar, in a variety of expreffion, that,
fome how or other, ill-gotten wealth does
not contribute to happinefs ? Or, excluiive
of the natural courfe of things, are there no
fuch things as laws and rnagiftrates in human
fociety ? Are there no gallows, gibbets, or
wheels, to which flagrant wickednefs may
bring a man ? Now may not a necelTarian
fee the neceffary connection of thefe natural
evils with a courfe of vicious indulgence, as
well as. any other perfon - y and, fully appre-
hending this, can he purfue the one without
chufing his own deftruction, of which I fancy
you will allow that he is juft as incapable as
any perfon whatever.
6i
Befides, it is very unfair to fay that becaufe
a neceffarian confiders thofe things which are
generally termed moral, as coming ultimately
under the fame defcription with things na-
tural, that, therefore, he believes there are no
fuch things at all. You well know that he
does not confider thefe things as at all the lefs
real, though, as a philofopher, he chufes to
give them another name. A fenfe of right and
wrong, the flings of confcience, See. (which,
however, will not, in general, be fo much
felt by thofe who believe no future flate) are
things that actually exift, by whatever names
they be fignified, and will be felt in a greater
or lefs degree by the moft hardened tranf-
grefTor.
(Dr. Hartley and myfelf have endeavoured
to mew that the peculiar feeling of remorfe,
arifing from afcribing our actions to our-
felves, can never vanim, or ceafe to influ-
ence us, till we arrive at fuch a comprehen-
lion of mind, as will enable us habitually to
afcribe every thing to God, and that when
we
62 -A DEFENCE OF THE
we are arrived at this ftate, we mall live in
communion with God, and mall ftand in no
need of fuch a motive to virtue. Before this
period, let a man be fpeculatively a necefTa-
rian, or whatever he will, and let him pre-
tend what he pleafes, it will be naturally im-
pojjible for him not to feel all the pungency
of remorfe, whenever even yourfelf would
fay that he ought to feel it. ) You muft in-
validate our reafoning on this fubjecl:, from
the confideration of the nature of the human
mind, before you can make it appear that a
neceflarian, as fuch <, will be a bad man. But
as you lay fo very much ftrefs on this fub-
jecl: of remorfe of confcience, I will difcufs
the matter a little farther with you.
You fay that remorfe of confcience implies
that a man thinks he could have acted other-
wife than he did. I have no objection to
admit this, at the fame time, that I fay he
deceives himfelf in that fuppofition. I be-
lieve, however, there are few perfons, even
thofe who blame themfelves with the great-
eft
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 63
eft pungency, but, if they will reflect, will
acknowledge, that in fo fuppofing, they leave
out the confideration of the lituation they
were in at the time of the tranfaction, and
that with the fame difpofition of mind that
they had then, and the fame motives, they
mould certainly have acted the fame part
over again ; but that having, fince that time,
acquired a different difpofition, and different
views of things, they unawares carry them
back, and coniider how they would have
acted with their prefent acquired difpofiti-
ons. However, their difpofition being really
altered by what has occurred to them fince,
they would not now act the fame part over
again, and therefore, all the proper ends of
remorfe are fufficiently anfwered.
If you fay that the peculiar feeling of re-
morfe is founded on a miftake, I anfwer, fo
are the peculiar feelings of anger in moft
cafes, and likewife the peculiar feelings of
all our paffions, and that a philofopher, who
mould have flrength of mind to confider his
fituation,
64 A DEFENCE OF THE
fituatJon, would do the fame things coolly
and effectually without thztftimulus, that the
vu'gir do with it. He would puniih an of-
fender without anger, and he would reform
his own conduct without remorfe. But nei-
ther you nor myfelf, neceffarian as I am, can
pretend to this degree of perfection. It is
acquired by experience ; and the firmeft be-
lief of the doctrine of neceflity can only ac-
celerate our progrefs towards it to a certain
degree. All this I have endeavoured to ex-
plain in my Additional Illujlrations, but you
have not noticed it.
What you fay of the little influence of the
motives to virtue which the neceiTarian can
draw from the confideration of a future life,
by no means concerns the neceffarian as fuch.
" In relation to futurity," you fay, p. 185,
" it is naturally to be fuppofed, that a man
" of this difpofition" (;. e. a vicious neceffa-
rian) " will not concern himfelf about it, or
"if he does, his neceiTarian principle, by
<( holding up to his view his future moral
cc good
DOCTRINE OP NECESSITY. 65
*' good or happinefs, as fecured to him by
" his omnipotent Creator, will lead him ha-
" ftily to pafs over all intermediate fufferings
" with which he is threatened, how long or
" fevere foever, confidering them only as na-
" tural evils, which he can no more avoid
" than the courfe of adlion which is connected
" with them."
You know very well that they are not ne-
ceflarians only who believe, that all the fuf-
ferings of a future life are corrective, and
will terminate in the reformation of thofe
who are expofed to them. And a man muft
not be a neceflarian, but the reverfe of one,
and the reverfe of every thing that man is,
before he can be made to flight the confide-
ration either of prefent or future evils, efpeci-
ally long and fevere ones, provided he really
believes them, and gives proper attention to
them. But with this belief and attention
they cannot but influence any man who re-
gards his own happinefs, and who believes
the infeparable connection between virtue
F and
66 A DEFENCE OF THE
and happinefs (which no man believes more
firmly than the necefTarian) to have recourfe
to a life of virtue, as the only road to happi-
nefs, here or hereafter. And having, from
whatever motive, begun to tread this path,
he will perfift in it from a variety of other
and better principles.
That you mould prefer the Calviniftic
doctrine of eternal pumjhments, horrible as
you fay it is, to that of univerfal rejloration
to virtue and happinefs, could furely be dic-
tated by nothing but your abhorrence of the
doctrine of neceffity in general, to which it
is ufually, but not neceffarily, an appendage.
" I cannot but be of opinion," you fay,
p. 239, " that the perfualion of the final
4 ' reftoration of all the wicked to virtue and
" happinefs, which it" (the doctrine of ne-
ceflity) " fupports, will, in its natural ope-
" ration, have a very pernicious influence on
" the unfettled minds of the generality of
" mankind : while the doctrine of eternal re-
" medilefs torments for the non-elect, taught
" by
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY* 6?
by Calvinifm, horrible as it is in itfelf,
may, in the way of reftraint, have a con-
fiderable effed:, and in fome inftances may
probably produce an external reformation
of life."
You may juft as well fay, that a civil ma-
giflrate who punimes without reafon, mercy,
or bounds, will be more refpe&ed than an
equitable j udge, who exacts an adequate pu-
nifhment for every offence. Befides, the doc-
trine of eternal punifhments for the offences
of a mort life is fo very abfurd, that it muft
ever be attended with a fecret incredulity.
At leaft, a man, though wicked, yet think-
ing he does not deferve the everlafting pains
of hell, will not believe that he mail be
fent thither, and therefore will indulge a no-
tion that he mall go to heaven, and efcape
punimment altogether. But I need not ar-
gue this point, as it does not belong to me
as a neceflarian to do it. I have already
argued in my Inftitutes of natural and re-
vealed Religion.
F 2 SECTION
68 A DEFENCE OF THE
SECTION VI.
What makes Attiom a MAN'S OWN, and
DEPENDING ON HIMSELF.
nr^O what I have already advanced in reply
"* to your remarks on the moral influence
of the doctrine of neceffity, and the compari-
fon of it with the Calviniftic doctrine of pre-
defHnation, I mall add, in a fcparate fection,
fome conliderations on men's actions as de-
pending on themfehes, and being their own, on
which you lay fo much flrefs, and which runs
through your whole book. Now I am con-
fident that, in what you fay on this fubject,
you deceive yourfelf by the ufe of words, or
you could not draw the confequences that
you do from what you fuppofe to be my
doctrine on this fubject.
Strictly
DOCTRINE OP NECESSITY. 69
J
Strictly and philofophically fpeaking, my
fuccefs in any thing I wifh to accomplish*
depends upon myfelf, if my own exertions
and actions are neceffary links in that chain
of events by which alone it can be brought
about. And, certainly, if I do know this,
and the object or end be defirable to me, this
defire (if it be of fufficient ftrength) cannot
but produce the exertion that is neceflary to
gain my end. ^This reafoning appears to me
extremely eafy, and perfectly conclufive, and
yet, though I have repeated it feveral times,
and have placed it in a variety of lights, you
do not feem to have confidered it. I mall*
therefore, give another inftance, and add fome
farther illuftrations.
Can I have a fufficiently ftrong wifh to
anfwer your book, and not of courfe read it,
mark proper extracts from it, arrange them,
write my remarks upon them, then tranfcribe
them for the prefs, and put them into the
hands of a bookfeller or printer, &c. when I
know, that if all this be not done, the book
F 3 will
70 A DEFENCE OF THE
will never be anfwered ? Surely my firm be-
lief that all thefe things are neceffarily con-
nected, muft convince me of the neceffity of
fetting about the work, if I wifh to do it at
all j and my <wijh to have it done is here to
be fuppofed, as having arifen from a variety
of previous circumftances.
If, therefore, I mall certainly find myfelf
difpofed to a<5t juft as I n6w do, believing my
actions to be necefTary, your objection to my
doctrine on this account cannot have a furfi-
cient foundation. You fay, that if the thing
fnuft be, it muft be\ if your book is to be
anfwered by me, it will be anfwered by me;
and that I may, therefore, make myfelf eafy
about it, and do nothing. I anfwer, that fo
I mould, either if I had no defire to have it
done, which happens not to be the cafe, or
if I thought that no exertions of mine were
neceffary to gain my end, which is not the
cafe neither. On this confideration depends
the capital diftinction that I make between
the
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. Jl
the doctrines of philofophical neceffity and
Calviniftic predeftination.
The Calvinifts make the work of conver-
fion to be wholly of God's free and fovereign
grace, independent of every thing in the perfon
thus regenerated or renovated, and to which
he cannot in the leaft contribute. In this
work, they fay, God is the fole agent, and men
altogether pafiive ; that both to will and to do
is of God's pleafure; and fo much fo, that
without his immediate agency, to which no-
thing on the part of man can contribute, let
a man exert himfelf ever fo much, in the ufe
of all poffible means, yet all his volitions and
all his actions would be only finful, and de-
ferving of the wrath and curfe of God to all
eternity.
In this cafe I do not fee what a man can
have to do, becaufe his doing, or his not do-
ing, is equally unconnected with the end he
has in view. But this is the very reverfe of
the doctrine of philofpphical neceffity, which
F 4 fuppofes
72 A DEFENCE OF THE
fuppofes a neceflary connection between our
endeavours and our fuccefs -, fo that if only
the defire of fuccefs > the firft link in this chain,
be fufficiently ftrong, all the reft will follow
of courfe, and the end will be certainly ac-
complifhed.
According to the Calvinifts, there may be
the moft earneft defire, without a man's being
at all the nearer to his end, becaufe the defire
and the end have no neceflary connection, by
means of intermediate links, as we may fay,
in the chain that joins them.
It is on this ground that Dr. Hartley juftly
fuppofes that the doctrine of neceflity has a
tendency to make men exert themfelves,
which he makes the fifth advantage attending
the fcheme. " It has a tendency," he fays,
p. 344, of my edition, " to make us labour
" more earnestly with ourfelves and others,
" particularly children, from the greater cer-
" tainty attending all endeavours that operate
" in a mechanical way.-'
Another
DOCTRINE Of HECtfSSITY. 7$
Another of your arguments relating to this
fubjeft, I really cannot treat with fo much fe-
rioufnefs as you will probably expeft. I fhall
not, however, dwell long upon it, and with
this I fhall clofe the fe&ion.
I had obferved, that a volition may be
termed mine, if it takes place in my mind.
Animadverting on this, you fay, p. So," Can
" that be truly faid to be my volition , my ad,
" which is produced by fomething over
" which I had no power. On that ground
" every thing that takes place in my body,
" as well as in my mind*, may with equal
" propriety be called my aft or volition ;
" and fo the circulation of the blood, and
" the pulfation of the heart, may with equal
<( reafon be called my volitions."
Now, Sir, is not judgment always called an
aft of the mind, as well as volition ? But has
any man power over this ? Is not this ne-
ceffarily determined by the view of argu-*
ments, &c. ? You will not deny it. Does it
not,
74 A DEFENCE OF THE
not, therefore, follow, on your own principles,
that whatever paffes in your body, as well as in
your mind, may with equal propriety be
called an ad: of your judgment , and fo
the circulation of your blood, and the pul-
fation of your heart, may with equal reafon
be called your judgment. But the very fame
things were before proved to be volitions.
"Ergo, judgments and volitions are the fame
things. By the fame mode of reafoning, it
would be eafy to prove your head to be your
feet, and your feet your head, and both of
them to be the fame with your underftand-
ing, or any thing elfe belonging to you.
SECTION
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 75
.;.: :v . -: : ill- -
S EC T I O N VII.
"
O/* //fo proper Qbjett of this Controverjy, and
a fummary View of the principal Sources of
Miftake with refpeft to />.
A S I take it for granted you would not
-*- ^- have engaged in this controverfy, efpe-
cially after a perfon for whom you profefs
fo great an efteem as Dr. Price, without
thinking you felt yourfelf fully equal to it,
and without being determined to fee it fairly
out, I {hall take the liberty, which I hope
you will alfo do with refpeft to me, (that we
may fave ourfelves as much trouble as poffi-
ble) to point out what I think will be of
ufe to us in conducting it. And in doing
this, I mail purpofely go over fome of the
ground I have already trod, but in a different
direction,
^6 A DEFENCE OF THE
dire&ion, hoping that different views of the
fame objedts may be both pleafing and ufeful.
In general, I think, we mail do well to
confider things as much as poflible without
the ufe of words, at leaft fuch words as are, on
either fide, charged with being the caufes of
miftake. I mall treat of the principal of
them feparately.
ift. Of the Term AGENT.
IN the farther profecution of this debate,
do not begin, as you have done now, with
affuming that man, in confequence of having
a power of choice, is an agent, and that be-
ing an agent, he cannot be a mere paffive
being, adted upon by motives, &c. but mufl
be pofferfed of a power of proper felf-deter-
mination. In facl, this is no better than ta-
king for granted the very thing in difpute,
and therefore you might as well, with Dr.
Beattie, difclaim all reafoning on the fubjeft,
and affert your liberty on the footing of com-
mon fenfe, or inftintf only.
The
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. JJ
The only unexceptionable method is, to at-
tend to the real phenomena of human nature,
and to confider the known actions of men in
known foliations, in order to determine whe-
ther our volitions, which precede all our acti-
ons, and direct them, be not always definite in
definite circ umftances. If you admit this, and
I think it almoft impoflible not to admit it,
you admit all that I contend for ; becaufe it
will then follow, that from a man's birth to
his death, there is an unalterable chain of
Jituations and iiolitionsy invariably depending
on one another. Your faying that, if this be
the cafe, man is no agent, will avail nothing ;
for if that word imply more than the adlual
phenomena will authorize, the agency of
man, in that fenfe of the word, flattering as
it may found, muft be given up.
: .4
Dr. Price does, in fadr, allow that men's
volitions are definite in definite circumftan-
ces, for he fays it is the greateft abfurdity to
fuppofe that men ever aft either without or
againft motives, but that the /elf-determin-
ing
78 A DEFENCE OF THE
ing power is wanted only when the motives
are equal ; which, confidering how very fel-
dom this can be fuppofed to be the cafe,
reduces this boafted liberty of man, in my
opinion, to a very fmall matter, hardly worth
contending for,
In this you differ from him. For you
carefully avoid making that conceffion, and
always, at leait generally, fuppofe the mind
capable of acting contrary to any motive
whatever. But then you will do well to con-
fider whether, confiftently with the pheno-
mena, Dr. Price could avoid making that
conceflion, alarming as you may think it;
and whether it be probable that, in fadt, men
ever do aft either without, or contrary to
motives. And if he never does, you will not
eafily prove that he can.
If man be an agent, in your fenfe of the
word, that is, if his will be properly felf-
determined, you muft mew that nothing fo-
reign to the will itfelf, nothing that can come
under
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 79
under the defcription of motive, or the cir-
cumilances in which the mind is, regularly
precedes the determination. For if any fuch
foreign circumftances, any thing that is not
mere will, does conftantly precede every de-
termination, we are certainly authorized, by
the eftablifhed rules of philofophizing, to
confider thefe circumftances as the proper
caufes of the determination, and may, there-
fore, fay that the will is influenced or acted
upon by them, and fo, going backwards in
the fame train, we mall conclude that there
can be no more than one proper agent in
the univerfe.
2. Of ' Refponfibitity \
LET us likewife confider the nature and
ufe of moral government, as much as poflible,
without the ufe of fuch words as refponfibility,
pralfe, blame, &c. and only confider how a
wife governor would treat beings whofe wills
mould be invariably influenced by motives;
and if the proper ends of government would,
in
A DEFENCE OF THE
in fad:, be anfwered by annexing happinefs
to fuch actions as we call virtuous, and mi-
fery to fuch as we call vicious, (fo that every
thing we now fee or expect would be done)
it will follow, that, for any thing that appears
to the contrary, we may be fo conflituted.
If the word refponjibility, as you arbitrarily
define it, will not apply to fuch a fyftem, it
ought to be difcarded from the language of
philofophers.
Take the fame courfe with the words me-
rit and demerit, virtue and vice, &c. and on
this fubject, attend particularly to what Dr.
Hartley, in a very fhort compafs, moft ex-
cellently obferves. " It may be faid," fays
he, p. 343, " that the denial of free will
" deftroys the diftindion between virtue and
" vice. I anfwer, that this is according as
<f thefe words are defined. If free will be
" included in the definition of virtue, then
" there can be no virtue without free will.
" But if virtue be defined obedience to the 'will
" of God, a courfe of aSlion proceeding from the
" love
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 8l
" love of God, or from benevolence, &c. free
" will is not at all neceflary; fince thefe af-
" fedtions and actions may be brought about
" mechanically.
" A folution analogous to this may be
" given to the objection from the notions of
" merit and demerit. Let the words be de-
" fined, and they will either include free
" will, or, not including it, will not require
" it; fo that the propofition, merit implies free
" will, will either be identical or falfe."
In all that you have faid on the fubjedt of
refponfibility, you take your own principles
for granted, and then it can be no wonder
that all your conclufions follow. You make
it effential to refponfibility that man has a
power, independent of his difpofition of mind
at the particular time, and of all motives, of
acting otherwife than he did, and you take
not the leafl notice of what I have advanced
on that fubject in the Correfpondence vsith Dr.
Price, p. 150, &c. where I mow that, not-
G withftanding
82 A DEFENCE OF THE
withftanding it be not in the power of moral
agents to ad: othenvife than they do, yet that
a moral governor, who confults the good of
his fubjects (whofe minds and whofe conduct
he knows to be influenced by motives) muft
treat them in the very fame manner that you
yourfelf acknowledge he ought to do. He will
apply fufFering with propriety, and, with good
effect in any cafe in which the apprehenfion
of it will fo imprefs the minds of his fubjects,
offenders and others, as to influence their wills
to right conduct. So that, as I have obfer-
ved, p. 151, " though the vulgar and philo-
<c fophers may ufe different language, they
" will always fee reafon to act in the very
" fame manner. The governor will rule vo-
" luntary agents by means of rewards and
" punifhments ; and the governed, being vo-
" luntary agents, will be influenced by the
" apprehenfion of them. It is confequently
" a matter of indifference in what language
" we defcribe actions and characters." This
you mould have particularly confidered and
have replied to. You muft not tell me what
the
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 83
the word refponjibility requires ; but you muft
{how that, fuppofing men to be what I fup-
pofe them, the fupreme ruler ought to have
treated them otherwife than he actually has
done. If not, every fad: exactly correfponds
with my hypothecs, and then on what can
your objection be founded, except on fome-
thing that is merely verbal.
3 . Of the Prejudice arljing from the terms
MACHINE and NECESSITY.
YOU miflead and deceive yourfelf, I am
perfuaded, not a little, by the frequent ufe
of the opprobrious term machine, faying, in
the firft place that, becaufe a man wills ne-
cej/arily, that is, definitely in definite circum-
ftances, he wills mechanically -, and then hav-
ing made a man into a machine, you, unknown
to yourfelf, conned: with it every thing op-
probrious and degrading belonging to a com-
mon clock, or a fulling-mill.
G 2 But
84 A DEFENCE OF THE
But you might eafily correct this by only
confidering what you yourfelf allow to be
necefTary relating to the mind of man, viz.
perception and judgment. Is there not fome-
thing inconceivably more excellent in thefe
powers than in thofe of common machines,
or mills, and even fomething that bears no
refemblance to any thing belonging to them,
though they all agree in this one circum-
ftance, that their refpe&ive affections are ne-
ceffary ? Now fuffer your mind to be fuffi-
ciently imprefled with the wonderful nature
and excellence of the powers of perception
and judgment, and you cannot think the will
at all degraded by being put on a level with
them, even in the fame refpedl in which
they all agree with any common machine,
or a mill, viz. that all its affections are de-
finite in definite circumstances, though this
property be beft expreffed by the term ne-
ce/ary.
If you fuffer your mind to be affected by
fuch prejudices as thefe, you may decline
applying
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 85
applying the term fubjtance to the mind, be-
caufe it is likewife applied to wood and flone,
and oblige yourfelf to invent fome other term
by which to diftinguifh it from them.
With refpect to the Divine Being, you
will not fcruple to fay, that his adtions are
always definite in definite circumftances, and
if you decline applying the term neceffary to
them, it is only becaufe you conceive that
it implies fomething more than definite in de-
finite circumftanceSj whereas the two phrafes
are perfectly fynonymous, and it is nothing
but the word that you can diflike. The
reafons why we fay that any affection or ac-
tion is neceflary, and why it is definite in
definite circumftances, are the very fame, and
cannot be diftinguimed in the mind. It is
the conjlant obfervation of its taking place in
thofe circumftances.
It is becaufe we fee that a clock always
ftrikes when the hands are in certain pofiti-
G 3 ons,
86 A DEFENCE OF THE
ons, that we conclude it always will do fo,
and, therefore, neceffarily muft do fo, or that
(whether it be known or unknown to us)
there is a caufe why it cannot be otherwife.
Now, can you help applying this mode of
reafoning, and, confequently, this phrafeo-
logy, to the mind, and even the divine mind,
and, at the fame time, be free from weak
and unworthy prejudices ? For, if the will
cannot aft but when motives are prefent to
it, and if it always determines definitely in
definite circumftances with refpecl: to mo-
tives, you cannot but conclude that there is
a fufficient reafon, known or unknown to
you, why it muft be fo, and you can have no
reafon to fuppofe that it ever can be other-
wife. ; And, in this cafe, whether you fcru-
ple to fay, that fuch a determination can be
called atfion, or be faid to be neceffary, your
ideas of the things are the fame. (If any thing
always will be fo, there can be no good rea-
fon why we ftiould fcruple to fay that it
muft, and mujl neceffarily be foA
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 87
The Divine Being, you will allow, not-
withftanding the incomprehenfibility of his
nature, always adls definitely in definite cir-
cumitances. It would be a weaknefs and
imperfection to do otherwise. In fact, it is
no more a degradation of him to fay that
he acts neceffhrily, than that his eflence may
be termed fubftance, or being, in common
with that of the human mind, or even that
of wood and ftone.
You will fay, and juftly enough, that this
obfervation applies to the Divine Being only
as actually exifting y and operating; and that
originally, and befo/e the creation, when
there were no external circumftances by
which his actions could be determined, his
volitions mud have been, in the proper and
flrict philofophical fenfe of the word, free.
But then there never can have been a time,
to which that obfervation applies, becaufe
there never can have been any time in which
the Deity did not exift, and confequently a&.
G 4 For,
88 A DEFENCE OF THE
For, fuppofing him not to have been em-
ployed in creation, &c. (which, however, I
think we can hardly avoid fuppofmg) he
muft at leaft have thought , and thinking, you
will not deny to be the adding of the mind.
The origin of adlion, therefore, in your fenfe
of the word, that is, the origin of felf-de-
termination, is the fame as the origin of the
Deity, concerning which we know nothing
at all.
Befides, how can you, or any of Dr.
Clark's admirers, think it any degradation to
tf
the Deity, that he mould aft necefTarily,
when you allow that he exifts neceflarily ? Is
not the term juftas opprobrious in the one
cafe as in the other ? ) Nay, might it not ra-
ther be fuppofed, by analogy, that the actions
of the being whofe existence is necefTary,
muft be necefTary too. With refpecl: to your
notion of dignity and honour, I would afk, Is
not the exigence of any being or thing, of as
much importance to him, as his afting? Is
not
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 89
not then his being fubject to neceflity as great
a reflexion upon him in the former cafe as in
the latter ? In mort, every thing that you
conlider as degrading and vilifying' \n man, on
account of his being fubject to neceflity, in
his exiftence or a&ions, might, if I were dif-
pofed to retort fo trifling and miftaken a con-
fideration, be applied to the Divine Being
himfelf. What I now obferve is only to
take off the force of your prejudice againft
the doftrine of neceflity, on account of its
exhibiting man, as you fuppofe, in a degra-
ding and unimportant light.
THE
90 A DEFENCE- OF THE
THE CONCLUSION.
DEAR SIR,
1HAVE now gone over all the topicks that
I think of much importance to difcufs
with you. I might have taken a much larger
compafs ; but I was unwilling to take in
more objedts than fuch as I thought I might
poffibly throw fome new light upon. As to
what you fay concerning the doctrine of the
fcriptures, and feveral other articles, I leave
the field open to you, being fully fatisfied
with what I have already advanced, and ha-
ving nothing material to add to it.
You will probably think there is an ap-
pearance of arrogance in the tone of this let-
ter.
'DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 91
ter. But in this, I think, you will do me
injuftice; my manner of writing being no-
thing more than what neceiTarily arifes from
the fullnefs of my perfuafion concerning the
truth and importance of the doctrine I con-
tend for ; and this, I think, is not greater
than your own. But in this I muft appeal
to indifferent perfons, if any fuch there be,
who will give themfelves the trouble to read
what we have written.
We all fee feme things in fo clear and
flrong a light, that, without having any high
opinion of our own understandings, we think
we may challenge all the world upon them.
Such all perfons will think to be moft of the
proportions of Euclid, and fuch, I dare fay,
with you are many tenets in theology. You
would not helitate, I prefume, to maintain
that bread and wine cannot be Jlejh and blood,
againft even a Bofluet, or a Thomas Aquinas,
than whom, it is probable, the world never
produced a greater man ; and that three per-
Jons,
92 A DEFENCE OF THE
fonsy each pofTeffed of all the attributes of God,
muft make more in number than one God,
againft all the divines that the three churches
of Rome, England, and Scotland, could name
to hold the difputation with you. And,
though it fhould be deemed, as by them it
certainly would be, the height of arrogance
in you to hold out this challenge, it would
not give you any difturbance ; nor, in fad:,
would you think very highly of yourfelf,
though you mould gain a decided victory in
fuch a conteft.
Now, this happens to be my cafe with re-
fpect to^the doctrine of Neceffity. I really
think it the cleareft of all queftions, the truth
of it being as indubitable as that the three an-
gles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two
right angles, or that two and two make four,
and, therefore, I have no feeling either of
fear or arrogance, in challenging the whole
world in the defence of it/) This argument
I compare to fuch ground as one man may
defend
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 93
defend againft an army. It is, therefore, ab-
folutely indifferent to me by whom, or by
how many, I be affailed. You would, proba-
bly, fay the fame with refpect to the doctrine
of Liberty, at leaft the ftyle in which your
book is written feems to fpeak as much ; and
yet I by no means think you deficient in
modefty, any more than I do in underftand-
ing and ability. I only wifh, therefore, that,
notwithftanding the confidence with which
I have written, you would put the fame
candid conftruction on my conduct, that I
do on yours.
I make allowance for our difference of
opinion, on account of the different lights in
which we happen to fee things, or in which
they have been reprefented to us ; nor do I
at all expect that any thing I have now ad-
vanced, or am capable of advancing, will
make the leaft change in your view of things.
A change in things of fo much moment,
which would draw after it a thoufand other
changes,
94 A DEFENCE OF THE
changes, is not to be expected either in you
or myfelf, who are both of us turned forty,
and who were, I fuppofe, metaphyficians be-
fore twenty. Judging of ourfelves by other
men, we mud conclude that our prefent
general fyftem of opinions, whether right or
wrong, is that which we {hall carry to our
graves. Thofe who are younger than we are,
and whofe principles are not yet formed, are
alone capable of judging between us, and of
forming their opinions accordingly -, and in
that refpeft, they may derive an advantage
from thefe publications that we cannot de-
rive from them ourfelves.
We fee every day fuch inftances of con-
jinned judgments in things of the greater!, as
well as of the leaft moment, as ought to make
the moil confident of us to paufe, though
every man is neceflarily determined by his
own view of the evidence that is before him.
I am well aware that, let me place the evi-
dence for the doctrine of neceffity in the
ilrongefl
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 95
ftrongeft anJ tleareft light that I poffibly can,
arguing either from the nature of the will, ob-
fervations on human life, or the conlideration
of the divine prefcience ; let me defcribe the
doctrine of imaginary liberty as a thing ever
fo abfurd, and impoffible in itfelf, as totally
foreign to, and inconfiftent with all princi-
ples of juft and moral government, and fup-
plying no foundation whatever for praife or
blame, reward or punimment -, the generality
of my readers will never get beyond the very
threfhold of the bufmefs. They will flill fay,
" Are we not confcious of our freedom, can-
" not we do whatever we pleafe -, fit ftill, walk
" about, converfe, or write, juft as we are dif-
" pofed ?" and they will fancy that all my
reafoning, plaufible as it may feem, cannot, in
fact, deferve any attention ; and even though
they mould be iilenced by it, they will not be
the nearer to being convinced.
But juft fo we fee it to be in politics. Let
fuch writers as Dr. Price explain ever fo
clearlv
.
96 A DEFENCE ff, Hr H E
clearly the injuftice of taxii:- an 7 P e j
without their confent, (hewing ~ .ii a ,
power that can compel the p t * it of one
penny, may compel the payment of the laft
penny they have, and that a foreign people
or nation, eafing themfelves by laying the
burthen upon others, will be difpofed to pro-
ceed as far as poflible in this way; ftill he will
never fatisfy many perfons of landed property
in this country, who will anfwer all he can
fay by one fhort argument, the force of which
they feel and comprehend, faying, " What,
" mall we pay taxes, and the Americans
" none ?" The Doctor may repeat his ar-
guments, and exhibit them in every pomble
light, he will get no fufficient attention to
them from a perfon whole whole mind is
occupied with the Jingle idea, of his paying
taxes, and the Americans paying none.
Notwithftanding, therefore, all that I mall
ever be able to write in favour of the doc-
trine of neceffity, your fuppofed confcioujnefi of
liberty,
r
DOCTRI* 41 *'" p NECESSITY. 97
*
'"ty, and o'- -r popular arguments (though
-!&i ana ut k ^hey really make againftyour
hypothecs , i always fecure you nine out of
^;z of the generality of our readers. All that
I can do muft be to make the moft of my
tenth man-, and, if I poffibly can, fancy his
fuffrage equivalent to that of your nine. And
to allay your fears of another kind, be af-
fured that this tenth man will generally be
of fo quiet and fpeculative a turn, that you
need be under no apprehenfion of his enga-
ging in riots or rebellions. He will nei-
ther murder you in your bed, nor fubvert
the ftate.
x -
\ I think, therefore, now that I have ad-
vanced, I verily believe, all that I can, in
fupport of my opinion, I ought to acquiefce
in the fuccefs of my labours, be it more or
lefs. I fee nothing new in any thing that
you have advanced, and you will fee nothing
new, at leaft more forcible, in this reply. I
do not, however, make any fixed refolutions.
H If
98 A DEFENCE OF THE
If you make a rejoinder, as I think you ought,
and will be advifed to do, I, true to my prin-
ciples as a neceffarian, Jhall att as circum*
Jiances Jhall determine me.
I am, with much refpecl:,
DEAR SIR,
Your's fmcerely,
J. PRIESTLEY.
Calnc> Aug. 1779.
CONTENTS.
SECT. I. Of the Argument for the Doffrine of
NECESSITY from the Confederation of the Nature of
CAUSE and EFFECT. - p. 6
. II. How far the ARGUMENTS for the
Doftrine of NECESSITY are affefted by the Confedera-
tion of the SOUL being material or immaterial, p. 1 1
SECT. III. Of CERTAINTY and NECESSITY, p. 21
SECT. IV. Of the ARGUMENT for the Dottrine
of NECESSITY, from the Confederation of DIVINE
PRESCIENCE. ~ p. 30
SECT. V. Of the MORAL TENDENCY of the
Doftrine of NECESSITY. p. 50
SECT. VI. What makes ACTIONS a MAN'S OWN,
and DEPENDING ON HIMSELF. p. 68
SECT. VII. Of the proper OBJECT of this Con-
trover -Jy, and afummary View of the principal Sources
of Mftake with refpeft to it. p. 75
The CONCLUSION. p. 90
ERRATA.
Page 4, line 8, for prefented read prefent.
P. 33 1. 14, foT/criffuretK&d/crifture.
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A SECOND
LETTER
TO THE
Rev. Mr. JOHN PALMER, &c
Six - Pence. ]
A SECOND
T O
The Rev. Mr. JOHN PALMER,
IN DEFENCE OF THE
Do&rine of Philofophical Neceffity,
E y
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. F.R.S.
I love to pour out all myfelf, as plain
As downright Shippcn, or as old Montaigne.
POPE.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY H. BALDWIN,
FOR J. JOHNSON, NO. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.
M DCC LXXX.
,ij-
[ I ]
To the Rev. Mr* PALME R.
DEAR SIR,
YOU, as I foretold, have thought pro-
per to reply to my letter, and, as I fuf-
pe&ed, circumjiances have determined me to
write you a fecond letter ; and my motives
have, I fuppofe, been the fame with thofe
that determined you to reply to the firfl.
For I by no means think your reply to be
fatisfa&ory, and I am willing to try whe-
ther I cannot convince you, or at leaft
our readers, that this opinion is well
founded.
B Your
2 A DEFENCE QF THE
Your treatife, I perceive, is deemed to con-
tain the ftrength of the caufe you have
efpoufed j and I think I mould do wrong to
fhrink from the difcufiion, while I have
any hope of prevailing upon a perfon fo
fully equal to it, to canvafs it with me, and
while I think there is any reafonable prof-
pedt, that, by continuing a friendly contro-
verfy, any of the difficulties attending the
fubjecl: may be cleared up. The queftion
.before us is truely momentous, the argu-
ments that decide in my favour I think to
be very plain, your objections appear to me
to admit of fufficiently eafy anfwers *, and,
in my opinion, it is nothing but imaginary
confequeaces, pr fuch as are grofsly mifun-
derftpod, at which, th^ mind of any man
can revolt,
T ci ;-)- QJ ;^ f c' f
You, who know me pretty well, will not
fay that I would flur over a difficulty by
whiph I was really preffed ; and arrogant as
you may fuppofe me to be, you will think
me Jinccre* and that my confidence is de-
rived
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. $
rived from a full perfuafion, well or ill
founded, on a fubject which I have long
coiifidered, and with refpect to which I have
formed fo deliberate and decided a judge-
ment.
I mail divide my preferit letter, ad I did
my former, into diftincT: heads, and mall
difcufs them in what appears to me to be
their moft natural order. I wifh you had
divided your Appendix in the fame manner,
as it contributes much to perfpicuity, and
relieves the attention of the reader.
B 2 SECTION I.
4 A DEFENCE OF THE
". .
SECTION I.
Of the ftating of the ^ eft ion.
"yOU complain of me for having mifre-
prefented your meaning, when what
you affert on the occafion, in my opinion,
confirms my reprefentation. I faid that you
fuppofed the mind capable of determining
contrary to any motive whatever, or, as I af-
terwards exprefs it, either without, or con-
trary to motives. You reply, p. 24, " I ne-
" ver faid, or fuppofed, that a rational being
*' can acl: without any motive, good or
f< bad 5 but the moft that I ever faid was,
" that, in the very fame circumftances, in
" which the choice, or determination of
"-the mind, was directed to one objed: of
" purfuit, it might have brought itfelf to
" will or determine on the purfuit of a
" different and contrary one."
Now
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. $
No"w where is the real difference between
my ftating of the cafe and yours ? You fay
you make choice of one object of purfuit,
for which, by your prefent confeffion, you
mult have "h^fome motive; and yet might
have taken a different and contrary one.
But how could you do this, without adt-
ing againft the motives which led you to
prefer the other ? If you admit that we ne-
ver aft but with the ftrongeft motives, as
well as never without fome motive (and
one of thefe feems to be the neceflary confe-
quence of the other) you muft, in this cafe,
have adted againft the ftrongeft motive. And,
if for this poflible determination there was
no motive at all (and if it was overbalanced
by other motives, it was, in fact* no mo-
tive at all) you muft have aclicd without any
motive for what you did, as well as againft
motives to the contrary.
^Befides, what is the boafted power offe/f
determination, if the mind cannot actually
determine itfelf without any motive at all,
B 3 or
.-/A DEFENCE OF THE
or contrary to any motives, at pleafure. If
this be not the cafe, it is very improperly
called/^ dettrmwatiote
, - .MM i . _ i r.
.r: rr; .- :fj
Oflo vintner? Jvrn jftOT^ih r fj -. : :
1J&/E C T.I ON II. W ori j
O/ CERTAINTY, <?r UNIVERSALITY, as
*~ rs ^x '""^i tr* Tfrt v j
//^ Ground of concluding, that ajiy 'Thing
": Jt^*
iJ NECESSARY.
, *1 , i. k. -,
TN order to fhew that the diftindtion be-
*- twee^ri 'certainty and necPfflfy, on which
you and others lay fo much ftrefs, is nothing
to your purpofe, I obferved that all that we
mean by necejfity, in any cafe, is the caufe
of certainty, or of univerfality ; and that
this is applicable to things cerporeal or men-
tal, without distinction j that the reafon,
and the only reafon, why we fay a ftone
falls to the ground necejfarily, is that it con-
ftantly and universally does fb ; and there-
fore that, if the determination of the mind
'be always according to motives, the dif-
ference
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 7
ference as I faid p. 23, cannot be in the
reality, but in the kind of the neceffity.
" The neceffity rauft be equally ftrict and
i* abfolute in both cafes, let the caufes of
" the neceffity 'by ever fo different."
This argument I faid you had not
given fufficient attention to. But you now
tell me, p. 7, " You were fo far from over-
" looking it, that you regarded it as the
" bafis on which my argument for the ne-
" ceflary determination of the mind refled,
" but that you confidered," p. 8. " that
" what you had infifted on to eftablifh the
*' diftinclion between phyfical and moral
" neceffity, as really replying to this very
" argument," and you refer me to p. 49,
&c. of your treatife.
Now I have carefully read over thofe
pages, but I am very far from finding in
them any thing to juftify your reference.
Becaufe, admitting the diftindion you con-
tend for between phyjical and moral necef-
B 4
$ A DEFENCE OF THE
fity, ftill it is a neceflity, and if neceffity
have any meaning at all, it is that, while
the laws of nature are what they are, the
event denominated necefTary could not have
been otherwife.
You fay, p. 50, " We may multiply ever
" fo many other caufes, or circumftances,
" concurring with and leading to the choice
" that is made, it is plain they can only
" operate as moral, not as pbyjical caufes."
But to what purpofe is the diftin$:ion of
phyfical and moral, if they be real caufes,
when all real caufes muft, in given circum-
ftances; produce real and conftant effeds ?
yliY nrfb ol ^^ViH'i ^fitr: ?
" They may "be," you fay, " occafions,
" or grounds, of determination, but they
" do not form, or necejjitate the determi-
*' nation." I will allow your language ;
but if, in fact, the mind never does deter-
mine otherwife than according to theie fame
motives, occafions, or grounds, there is no-
thing in any received mode of reafoning
that
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. f
that will- juftify you in faying, that the
mind, even could, in thofe circumftances,
have determined otherwife, or that, ac*.
cording --'-til ^he ppefent laws of nature
refpecling the mind* the determination was
not, in the ftridteft fenfe of the word,
neceffary. For there cannot be any evidence
of the exiftence of a 'power independent of
its known effetts, J '* " ]:>w
**/
>ii '>Vr>tfii *" 7iIQL333UL 19. ^i'--! Jl>*J$
v\ "XA rf* i ">*'''^T T'^'i''! jL?'f
at manner d6 we prove the exifl-
ence of a// powers but by their actual opera-
tion ? Give jne, in the whole compafsr of
nature, any other cafe fimilar to this of your
felf determining power, that is, a cafe in
which we admit a real power without hav-
ing ever feen its effefts. All our rules of
reafoning in philofophy would be violated
by fuch a proceeding. Effects are the only
evidences of powers, of caufes -, and the
immediate confequence of t)iis is, that if
no event ever does take place, we . can have
no reafon to believe that it can take place.
This is as eaiily applicable to the cafe be-
fore
JO .V A DEFENCE OF THE
fore us as any whatever. Produce a cafe in
which the mind incjifputably determines it*
y^without any motive whatever, and then,
but then only, fhall I admit that motives
have no neceiTary influence over its deter-
mination.
I muflflill maintain, therefore, that you
have given no anfwer at all to my argument
for the doctrine of necefiity, as inferred from
the confideration of conjiancy and univer/a-
-JJJU
Wk sbfinSfeifc^xtf r^'fe
a bdi iii - r a
There is, I repeat It, jufl the fame pro-
priety in calling the determinations of the
mind, as there is in 'calling the falling of
a ftone, necejjary. It is not tiitfame law,
or power, in nature,, that caufes both, and
therefore they may be diftinguifhed by
what names you pleafe ; but they equally
enfure the event -, and the courfe of nature
muft be changed before the refults, in
either cafe, can be otherwife than they are
^ , J
obferved to be.)
SECTION III.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 4*
i ' f nf ' ' T "ii^f* *^
:.;? : v n-J" ''':'') ::;'').. y..^ ". j.^.'iilv ?R fei '"*
SECTION imbfi
'"i 'i t ii ;\j::'" ' - (:>t ;*'...
O/~ //* Confequenw of admitting the CER--
,. :T ,AiNTy / ; Bttfrmitativ,.
.* " , -
}ori Linos ucv "> t r:oilTi9iJJj 5 r .!:, HiJi rravr'
"HAT you reply, to my pbfervations
. concerning certainty, and thefeveral
diftindtions of it, is -fo- manifestly unfatisfac-
tory, that I muft beg leave to recall your atten-
tion to the argument. <T afferted that if the
determination of the mind be, in any proper
fenfe of the word, certain y all the fame
confequences, even the very frightful ones
that you defcribe, will follow, juil as
on the fuppofition of its being neceffhry -,
for that, in this cafe, the two words can-
not but mean the very fame thing.
You now acknowledge, p. 9, " that rno-
* ral certainty may be a real one, though
" not
not phyfical," and, p. 8, " that certainty
" is as different as the different caufes or
" occafions of it." Now I really can-
not fee what thefe differences (which
I will admit to be as many as you
plcafe) can fignifyj if, as you allow, the
refuti," ' invariably the fame. This is
certainly a cafe to which you cannot have
given fufficient attention, or you could not
treat it fo lightly as you do. I (hall, therefore
open, and expand it a little for you, to
give you an opportunity of feeing more
diflinctly what it is that you do admit, when
you allow, under whatever diftin&ion you
pleafe, that the determination of the mind
is certain, or, in other words,- definite in
definite circumftances^ fj> ,
: ."iiurj.. ^fcflot. fir// <3cfh->V-;) no/
Every man, you mufl allow, is born
with a certain constitution of body and
mind, intirely independent of his own
choice. The circumftances in which he is
born, with refpect to country, parents,
education, and advantages or difadvantages
of
POCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 13
of all kinds, are, likewife altogether in-
dependent of himfelf. It is no matter
when, you fay, that his frft proper volition
takes place, for you muft admit it is, in cer-
tain definite circumftances, independent of
himfelf. His determination, therefore, be-
ing by the hypothefis, certain, or definite in
thofe circumstances, whatever it be, it
brings him into other, but definite, circum-
ftances ,- whether forefeen or . unforefeen
by himfelf depends upon his judgment or
fagacity. In thefe new circumftances, he
makes another definite choice, or de-
/
termination, concerning the new objects
that are now before him ; and this new
determination brings him into other new
circumftances. And thus his whole life
paffes in a conftant fucceffion of circum-
ftances and determinations, all infeparably
connected, till you come to the laft de-
termination of all, immediately preceed-
ing the extinction of all his powers by
death.
Now it is obvious to afk, if all this
be really certain, one thing ftrictly depend-
ing
H A D&FfcNCE OF ttftf
ing upon another, fo that there is nevef
known to be any variation from it, in
what does it, or can it, differ from what is
contended for by the necefTarian. If I know
my .own principles, it is all that I want,
call it by what name you pleafe. You
happen to like the word certain, whereas
I prefer the word neceffary-, but our ideas
muft be the very fame. We both chalk
*fcut a definite path .for every man to walk
in, from the commencement of his life to
the termination of it. The path is the
fame, drawn by the fame line, and by the
fame rule. It is a path that you admit
no man ever gets out of j and this, I do
allure you, is all that I mean, if I know
my own meaning, when I fay he never can
get out of it : for the laws of his na-
ture muft be changed, fo that his deter-
minations muft (contrary to the prefent
hypothecs) not be definite in definite cir-
cumftances, before he can get out of it,
from his birth to his death.
But
BOCTRINE OF NECESSITY: IJ
But you fay, p. 9, " the power of agency
t ftill remains, if the certainty with which
" he acts be only a moral certainty, where-
" as by that which is phyjkal'tf. isdsftroy-
" ed." But if you reflect a moment, you
will perceive, that this is inconliftent with
what you jufl before granted. Becauie if,
in any cafe, the determination might have
been otherwife than it is, it would not
have been certain, but contingent. Cer-
tainty undoubtedly excludes all pojjibk va-
riety, for that implies uncertainty. Belides,
as I obferved before, and I cannot repeat it
too often, till I enfure your attention to it,
what proof or evidence can you produce of
the reality or exiftence of any power > that
is never exerted. If, therefore, you allow
that all determinations whatever are certain,
being directed by motives, what evidence
can there be of a power to act contrary to
motives ?
How unreafonable, then, is it to reply,
as you do, p. 13, to your child " Do not
I " you,
l6 A DEFENCE OF THE
" you, my fon, fee a vaft difference between
" determining yourfclf, call it certainly,
" if you pleafe, and being neceflarily deter-
cc mined by fomcthing elfe." Becaufe
knowing the abfolute certainty (though not
neceffity) of his determination, in the cir-
cumflances in which you placed him, you
ftiould not have placed him in them, lin-
lefs you really cbofe that he mould make the
determination that you knew he certainly
would make ; and therefore, on your own
maxims, you would do wrong to blame, or
punifh him.
You afk him whether " he was not
" fcious he had a power of refufing the
" apples j" whereas, by your own concef-
iion, that power could not poffibly be exert-
ed, fo as to be of any ufe to him, but on the
fuppofition of what you previoufly knew
did not exiil,viz. a different difpojition of mind,
in confequence of which his love of apples
would have been lefs, or his fear of punifh-
ment greater, than you knew it to be.
SECTION IV.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. IJ
SECTION IV.
Of the fuppofed CONSCIOUSNESS OF
LIBERTY.
T Defired you to attend to the phenomena
of human nature, to conlider whether
it be not &faft> that human volitions depend
upon the previous difpolition of their minds
and the circumftances in which they are
placed, in order to determine whether their
volitions are not invariably according to thofe
circumftances; and therefore whether, in
propriety of language, it mould not be faid
that they are always, and neceflarily, de-
termined by thofe circumftances, or motives.
You reply, p. 22, "if the phenomena of
*' human nature are to determine the quef-
" tion, we muft certainly include the
" whole phenomena, one of which is, that
C " let
l8 A DEFENCE OF THE
" let actions be ever fo definite in definite
" circum fiances, they are flill confcious
" of having it in their power to deter-
" mine otherwife than they actually did,"
now I am furprifed that you mould not have
been aware, that this is directly inconfiftent
with your own fuppofition, viz. the deter-
mination being definite ; for if it might
have been otberivife, it would have been
indefinite. No man can be confcious of an
impeffibility . If, therefore, the real phe-
nomena, exclufive of all pretended confci-
oufnefs, are in favour of our volitions being
definite, all pojfibility of their being inde-
finite is heceilarily excluded; fo that they
could not have been different from what
they actually are, in any given circum-
ftances.
Befides, reflect a little what is it of which
we can be confcious; for confcioufnefs has
its limits, as well as other things. It is
not that, with the fame difpofition of mind
and in the fame circumftances, the deter-
\
mination
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. I
mination might have been different. This
is a manifeft fallacy. All that, in the nature
of things, we can be confcious of, is that had
we been differently difpofed, we might have
acted differently ; that nothing but our
o\yn willy or pleafure, prevented our acting
differently j which you know is not at all
contrary to any thing contended for by
neceffarians. Confider particularly my
Additional Illuftrations, p. 286, &c.
SECTION V.
Of the Difference between the WILL and the
JUDGMENT.
IN the paffage to which you have no,w
referred me, in your former treatife, p. 50,
you lay great flrefs on the effential differ-
ence between the nature of the will, and
that of the judgment. " The will, you fay,
C 2 " implies
2O A DEFENCE OF THE
" implies, in its very nature, a freedom
" from all controlling necelTary influence.
" It is the power of felf determination be-
" longing to an agent, the phyfical inde-
" pendency of which on any thing foreign
" to itfelf makes it to be what it is, or
" conftitutes its very eflence. The differ-
ft ent mode of operation belonging to the
" will," p. 52, " as diftincl: from the
" other faculties of the mind, arifes out
" of its different nature. The will is an
" independent, active principle, or faculty.
" The other faculties are dependent and
" merely paffive, &c."
.V XI : O'I'T' "^2"
Now I rather wonder that, in all this
loftinefs of language, you mould not have
perceived, that you are taking for granted
the very thing in difpute. If we judge of
the powers and faculties of man by his
attions (and what can we reafon but from
what we know) we muft conclude that he
is not pofleiTed of any fuch faculty as you
defcribe. On the contrary, we fee all men
without
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 21
without exception, driven to and fro, juft
as their circumftances and motives impel
,them, without ever once exerting (as far
as appears) a fingle act of proper felf de-
termination. In all cafes of fufficient mag-
nitude, and in which there is fufficient op-
portunity given us to examine them, we
fee very plainly, that men are actuated by
very determinate motives , and we are here,
as in other fimilar cafes, authorized to
judge of obfcure cafes by thofe which are
more diftinet and evident, of the fame kind.
Befides, fo far am I from perceiving any
fuch eifential difference as you defcribe be-
X/ *
tween the 'will and the judgment, that I
perceive a remarkable refemblance between
them, and in that very refpect in which
you flate them to differ the moft. Does
the judgment decide according to the ap-
pearance of objects ? So does the will; and
if we confult fact, in no other way ; info-
much, that the will itfelf, exclufive of the
actions, or motions, that follow the will, may
C 3 not
22 A DEFENCE OF. THE
not be improperly called z particular judg-
ment, deciding on the preferablenefs of ob-
jects, according to their appearances, which
are often very deceitful. For, judging by
whatever rule you pleafe, whatever object,
at the moment of determination, appears
preferable, that we always chufe. If, there-
fore, as I have faid before, there be a
power of felf determination in the will, I
I fhould expect to find the fame in the
judgment alfo, and if you will diftinguifh
them, in the judgment preferably to the
will ; if that may be called judgment which
decides, tho' concerning the preferablenefs of
objects. And there is no reafon why this
fhould not be the province of judgment,
properly fo called, as well as that of decid-
ing concerning the truth of objects.
You object to the conclufivenefs of my
reafoning, p. 18, to prove that from one
of your arguments it would follow that
judgment and volition were the fame thing,
and the fame with the circulation of tht
l blood,
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 23
bloed, &c. fuppoling that it goes on the idea
of judgment being an aft of the mind, only
in the popular fenfe of the word. Now I
will (hew you that my inference was truly
drawn, independent of any fuch definition
of the word, as will appear by leaving out
the word aft altogether. You will then fay,
p. 80, " Can that be truly faid to be my
'* 'volition, which is produced \syjbmetbing
" over 'which I had no power. On that
" ground, every thing that takes place in
" my body, as well as in my mind, may,
" with equal propriety, be called my yo-
" lition ; and fo the circulation of the blood,
" and \hepulfation of the heart, may, with
<e equal reafon, be called my volitions."
The medium of your proof, or the mid-
dle term in your fyllogifm, is not an aft,
but fomet king over which we have no power.
But, though the circulation of the blood, &c.
mould, upon the doctrine of neceliity, agree
with volition, in being a thing over which
we have no power, it does not, in that
C 4 refpect,
24 ADEFENCEOFTHE
refpeft, agree .with volition only, but with
judgment alfo, and every other affection of
the mind.
I may perhaps make the inconclufivenefs
of your argument more apparent, by reduc-
ing it to the form of zfyllogifm, and framing
another exactly fimilar to it. Your argument
will then fland as follows. " According to
" the neceiTarians, .
" Volition is a thing over which a man
" has no power.
" But the pulfation of the heart is a
*' thing over which a man has no
" power.
" Ergo, The pulfation of the heart is a
volition."
A fyllogifm exactly parallel to this of
yours is the following :
A goofe is an animal that has two feet.
But a man is an animal that has two
feet.
Ergo, A man is a goofe.
But
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.'
I am forry to have occafion to recall
to your attention the firil principles of
logick, but it is plain you had over-
looked them, when you thought you had
reduced the neceffarian to acknowledge that,
on his principles, the circulation of the blood,
and \hzpulfationof the heart, muft be termed
volitions. You meant to turn our princi-
ples into ridicule, and muft take the con-
fequence if the ridicule rebound upon your-
felf. You certainly had the merit of
attempting fomething new in this, but
there is always fome hazard in attempting
novelties.
SECTION VI.
ADEFENCEOF THE
SECTION VI.
Of the Argument from the fuppofed CONSE-
QUENCES of the Doftrine of NeceJ/ity.
TO my objection to your reafoning
from the confequences of the dodtrine
of neceflity, you reply, p. 4, " There are con-
" fequences that feem greatly to out weigh
" all fpeculative reafonings of every fort
" which can be thought of, and incon-
ce teftably prove that the dodrine which
" fuch confequences attend is not and
" cannot be, true." You add, that Dr.
Watts recommends the mode of arguing
from confequences, and that I myfelf have
adopted it.
Now this, fir, you do without making
proper diftin&ions, which Dr. Watts, in
the
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
the very pafTage which you have quoted,
might have taught you to make. He fays,
that " the falfe proportion muft be re-
" futed by mewing that an evident falfe-
" hood, or abfurdity, will follow from it,"
which is the very thing that I did, when
I mewed that, in confequence of ad-
mitting your doctrine of liberty, you muft
fuppofe that effects take place without ade-
quate caufes, and that the Divine Being
could have no prefcience of human actions,
which the fcriptures every where fuppofe.
On the other hand, the confequences that
you draw from the doctrine of neceflity
only relate to things that you dijlike, and
abhor, and which have nothing to do with
truth.
Shew me that any falfehood, or abfur-
dity, as Dr. Watts fays, follows from the
doctrine of neceffity, and I mall not then
fay, that we muft acqiiiefce in it, and make the
beft we can of it. For it is abfolutely im-
poilible to acquiefce in an acknowledged
falfehood
28 A DEFENCE OF THE
falfehood, as we may in a thing that we
merely cannot relijh. With refpedt to all
things that merely exite difgujl y befides that
it may be conceived, that the difguft may be
ill founded (and in this cafe it appears to
me to be manifeftly fo) it is well known
that there are many truths, and valuable
ones too, that are ungrateful, efpecially at
the firft propofal.
Now I challenge you to mew that any
proper falfehcod, or abjurdity, will follow
from the principles of neceffity, a thing
that I do pretend to with refpect to the
doclrine of liberty. And do not any more
fay, as you do now, p. 6, that " it is in
" the fame way of reafoning with that
" which I have ufed," that you have en-
deavoured to fupport the doctrine of li-
berty. By this time, I hope, you fee there
is a great difference between the two cafes.
SECTION VII,
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 29
SECTION VII.
Of the MORAL INFLUENCE eftbeDo&rint
of Necejfity.
"\7*OU complain, but very unjuflly, of
-* my mode of reafoning, when I en-
deavour to undermine all that you have urged
on the fubjedtof the dangerous confequences
of the docTrine of neceffity. Your meaning,
you fay, p. 17, was " that it tends to in-
'* difpofe a perfon for virtuous activity,
" and felf command, but that you fup-
" pofe the neceffarian to be a&ive enough
" in gratifying his irregular and vicious
" inclinations." Now I had no doubt of
your ivillingnefs to make a diflincl:ion in
this cafe, that is, to make the necelTarian
indolent to good, and at the fame time afifive
to
A D-EF&NCE OF THE
to evil-, but nature, not being of the party,
makes no fuch diftinction ; fo that the cafe
you fuppofe is an impoffibility.
If the belief of the doctrine of necef-
fity has any operation at all, either to ac-
tivity, or ina&tvity, it muft refpedt all ends,
or objftts, asfucf>,'&nd without diftmdtion,
whatever they be, and can never operate
one way if a man's inclinations be virtu-
ous and another way if they be vicious. If
on the one hand, I believe that my ob-
ject will be accomplished, and my belief
lead me to overlook all means, and therefore
I give myfelf no trouble about it -, or if, on
the other, my belief of the neceffary con-
nection of means and ends be fuch as that
my exertions are redoubled ; ftill thefe dif-
ferent confequences refpect all objects alike,
and can never operate to the difadvantage
of virtue, but on the fuppofition that all
neceffarians, as fucb, either are more indif-
ferent to their own happinefs than other
men, or have lefs knowledge of the necef-
fary
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 31
fary connexion between virtue and happi-
nefs.
\If this was the cafe, furely you might,
confidering the length of time that has
elapfed lince the doctrine of neceflity was
firft propofed by Mr. Hobbes, and even
lince it has been fully eftablimed, as 1
may fay, by Dr. Hartley' (and before my
recollection, or yours, it had nume-
rous advocates among men of letters)
have been able to colledl: fomething like
pdfifive evidence -, and you certainly mould
not have raifed all this outcry without fome
better foundation than your own fufpicious
imagination.
SECTION VIII.
ADEFENCEOFTHE
SECTION VIII.
;
Mifcellaneous Obfervations.
.T" V v b u & '- .' -."' <''!: . 'jio -^ G" f *
YOU eagerly catch, p. 27, at a cafual,
and as you think, an improper expref-
fion of mine, when I faid that " the origin
" of action, or of felf determination, is
Sf the fame as the origin of the deity, con-
" cerning which we know nothing at all,'*
as if I really fuppofed the deity to have had
an origin, or a beginning. Whereas, be-
iides that you well know that I fuppofe,
juftas much as yourfelf, that the deity is
properly uncaufed, and confequently had no
origin, and therefore that it could be no
more than an inadvertent expreffion that you
had got hold of, I have, in fad:, faid the fame
thing in this very place, viz. that proper
adtion, or felf determination, can have no
beginning, becaufe it muft have commenced
with the deity, who had none. This triumph
of
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 33
yours, of which you feem willing to make
fo much, is, indeed premature.
If, in maintaining an opinion common to
rnyfelf and Dr. Price, I mould have faid,
that " the commencement of the creation
" was the fame with that of the deity him-
" felf ;" would not the obvious construction
have been, not that they both had a begin-
ning, but that neither of them had any?
In this cafe, alfo, I am juft as far from in-
timating, in the moft diftant manner, that
it was even pojjible for the deity to have
had any origin. I muft fay that this con-
ftruction of my words is very extraor-
dinary.
You charge me, p. 33, with having
mif-ftated Dr. Price's opinion on the fub-
ject of liberty, as well as your own $ but,
though I am not fenfible of having made
any miftake in this refpect, it is not a point
that I choofe to difcufs with you. It is fuf-
ficient for my prefent purpofe, if I truly
D ilate,
34 ADEFENCEOFTHE
ftate, and fully refute, your opinion on the
fubjed.
v Here you muft give me leave to obferve,
tnat it was very improper, on feveral ac-
counts, to add the name of Dr. Price to
thofe of Locke, Wollafton, Clarke, and
Fofter, as authorities in favour of the doc-
trine of liberty, for whom I ought to have
had a greater reverence. I alfo could muf-
ter up a lift of very refpe&able authorities,
fuch as Collins, Leibnitz, Hutchefon, Ed-
wards, Hartley, &c. but, for obvious rea-
fons, I mould have chofen to have confined
it to the dead, and mould have omitted the
Jiving, efpecially the man with whom my
antagonift had a public and truly amicable
controverfy on the fubjedl:. Dr. Price,
however, I am well perfuaded, believes that
my refpect for him is not lefs than yours,
notwithftanding I may imagine that his
eye, though much ftronger than mine, is
not able to fee through fome little cloud
that happens to hang between it and this
particular fubjecT:.
&< Were
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 35
Were I to fet about it, I fhould not
doubt but that, though I cannot fay nos
turbafumus, I could draw out a very decent
lift of living authorities in favour of the
doctrine of neceffity, j:onfifting of perfons
whofe ability, virtue, and I will add aftivity
too, yeu would not queftion. And were
we to leave out thofe who would not pre-
tend to have properly Jhtdied the fubjecl:,
and therefore could not be faid to give a
vote, except by proxy, my lift, among meii
of letters, might perhaps be not only as
refpe&able, but even as numerous as yours.
But this is a queftion that is not to be
decided by vste or authority, but by argu-
ment -, and it is on this ground that we are
. j . ju..- ,, ., ...>
now engaged.
L i - -' * P > '
Ol li ^r.ri.'J
^ofj I .;v v s\i '1-%^'ir: :; :rA\\ ." ' : ;' ;.f-;.;r
Ikili ucv ~^j'\
^Hi^ue-x '\(iv :-.-..<:-.? :
,.li ^y3,\y* t fKj>j rs;i-^' '-;,o'>
D 2 SECTION IX.
mm
SECTION IX.
tifi Iuy; T 1 1:112 ^v.Vv/j. ,"
Aeries addreffed to Mr. PALMER.
-*>iq ion .buojff.oftw 9i$H> !|.
US, Sir, I have diftin&ly replied
to every thing that I imagine your-
felf can think material in your Appendix,
in which yon fay you have " noticed
" thofe parts of my Letter to you which
'* were deemed mod material." Now, as
you would not have voluntarily undertaken
the difcuilion of this argument with me,
without having well weighed your force in
it, and being determined to bring it to
fomething more like a proper dofe ; I hope
that, notwithftanding you fay you mall
now " decline the controverfy," you will,
on more mature confideration, refume it,
and give me, as the Spectator pleafantly
fays, .pore hift words of Rkbard Baxter. I
& /Avyx t. _>4Li>>
mall
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 3?
(hall therefore tell you what I think you
have omitted, and what it behoved you
more particularly to have replied to in my
Letter. And, farther, to make the conti-
nuation of the correfpondence more eafy to
you, I mall ftate thofe matters in diftindl
queries, to which, if you pleafe, you may
reply in order.
.1CjTi'p C ' /ig brffc' V*-
i . You had faid that a determination of
the mind is not an effect 'without a caufe,
though it be not produced by any motive,
becaufe \hzfelf -deter mining power itfelfis the
caufe. I replied, that, allowing this fuppofed
power to be the caufe of choice in general,
it can no more be confidered as the caufe of
any particular -choice, than the motion of the
air in general can be faid to be the caufe
of any particular wind -, becaufe all winds
are equally motions of the air, and there-
fore, that there muil be fomefarf&er caufe
of any particular wind. I defire you to
point. out the infufficiency of this anfwer.
This it the more behoves you to do, be-
D 3 caufe
38 A DEFENCE OF THE
caufe it refpefts not the outworks, But the
very inmoft retreat of your doctrine of
liberty. If you cannot defend yourfelf
againfl this attack, you muft furrender at
difcretion. Neceffity, with all its horrid
confequences, will enter in at the breach ;
and you know that necerlarians, though
flothful to good, are active enough in mif-
chief, and give no quarter.
That you mould fay you had not parTed
over any thing of the argumentative kind in
my Letter, which feemed to require a reply,
and yet have overlooked this moft material
article, as well as many others, furprifes
me not a little.
On this fubjecl:, I alfo beg you would
not fail to give particular attention to the
fifth article of my Additional Illujirations,
printed in the correfpondence with Dr. Price,
p. 288, in which, I think I have proved
decifivdy, that the mind itfe/fc&n never be
confidered as a proper and fufficient caufe
of particular determinations.
It
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.* 39
It was unfortunate for thefe Illuftratlons,
that they did not appear till after the great-
eft part of your firft treatife was written,
and yet fo long before your appendix, that
I fuppofe they were forgotten. Though, as
you had feen them before you wrote the
preface, and confequently fome time before
the publication of your firft piece, you had
a good opportunity of animadverting upon
them, and might be expected to do it in a
cafe that fo materially affected your main
argument.
You now fay, in general, that " now
" I have read them, they appear as little
" fatisfactory as the former ; and that to
" all which Dr. Prieftley has advanced in
" the correfpondence, Dr. Price appears
" to have given a very clear and fufficient
*' reply." But this particular article, not
being a proper part of the correfpondence,
you will find, that Dr. Price has not re-
plied to it at all, and therefore your anfwer
to it is not precluded. J particularly
D 4 intreat
40 A DEFENCE OF THE
intreat you to refute what is there ad-
vanced. Point out to me any thing in your
work, which you think I have not fuffi-
ciently considered, and I promife to be as
particular in my difcuflion of it as you
pleafe.
- -^ . *f ;" " ** r r \ - * > -
2. I endeavoured to fhew, in my fecond
Section, that the argument, from the con-
fideration of caufe and effect does not, as
you fay, go on the fuppofition of a Jimi-
larity of the conftituent principles of matter
and fpirit, but only on the determination
of the mind being fubjecl: to any laws at
all > and therefore that the caufe of liberty
can derive no advantage from the com-
monly received principles of the immate-
riality of the human foul. You mould have
faid, whether my reply was fatisfactory to
you, or not. But perhaps I am to inter-
pret your Jilence on any fubjecT: to be an
acquiefcence in what I obferved concerning
it, and not as an article that you thought too
obvioufly inconclufive to demand any reply.
, 3. Pkafe
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 41
3. Pleafe to produce fome direct proof of
the existence of the felf determining power
you boaft fo much of, . I mean a proof
fromfatfj and not from a merely imagined
feeling, or confcioufnefs of it, which one
perfon may affert, and another, who is cer-
tainly constituted in the fame manner, may
deny. What I affert is, that all we can feel,
or be confcious of, in the cafe, is that our
actions, corporeal or mental, depend upon
our will, or pleafure ; but to fay that our
wills are not always influenced by motives,
is fo far from being agreeable, that it is
directly contrary to all experience in our-
felves, and all obfervation of others.
4. You have faid nothing to explain, or
foften your denial of the doctrine of divine
prefcience, which, as a chriftian, and a
chriftian minifter, it greatly behoves you
to do. You pretend to be mocked at the
confequences of the doctrine of neceffity,
which exift only in your own imagination ;
but here is a confequence of your doctrine
of
42 ADEFENCEOFTHE
of liberty, dire&ly repugnant to the whole
tenor of revelation, as it has been under-
ftood by all who have ever pretended
to any faith in it, though they have dif-
fered ever fo much in other things. It
will be well worth your while to make
another appendix to your book, if it were
only to give fome little plaufibility t this
bufinefs, and either to mew, if you can,
that the divine prefcience is not a doctrine
of the fcriptures, or that the facred writers
were miftaken with refpect to it. Betides,
it is incumbent upon you to hew,' inde-
pendent of your profeiiion as a chriftian,
how, on your own principles, any fuch
government of the 'world as we fee to take
place could exiil. To fay, as you do, that
God, notwithftanding his want of prefci-
ence, may yet govern free beings in the
befl manner that free beings can be go-
verned, will avail you nothing j oecaufe I
maintain, that if liberty be what you de-
fine it to be, a power of proper felf-deter-
minatipn* fuch beings.omTwtf be governed at
all
DOCTRINE OF; NECESSITY. 43
all. I have fhewn that it is impoffible they
mould ever be proper, fubj efts of moral
government. The Divine Being cannot
controul their actions ; the influence of all
motives (the only inftruments of moral
government) will be altogether uncertain ;
he can, form no judgment of their .effect ^
and, in confequence, all. mufl be anarchy
and confuiion.
But I would rather advife you t
what you have too hafiily advanced. If
poffible, think of fome method of recon-
ciling prefcience with liberty ; and by no
means purchafe your liberty at fo very great
a price. At leaft be very Jure, in the firft
place, that it is worth fo much.
If, as I fuppofe will be the cafe, you
mould not be able to reconcile prefcience
with your more favourite dodrine of free-
will, be advifed bv me, rather than give
up the former fo lightly as you do, to keep
it at all events -, even though, in order to
do
44 'A DEFENCE OF THE
do it, you fhould be obliged to rank it (as
many truly pious chriftians do the do&rines
of tranfubjlantiatkn and the trinity] among
the myfteries of faith, things to be held
facred, and not to be fubmitted to rational
inquiry. On no account would I abandon
fuch a doctrine as that of Divine preftienc e y
while I retained the leaft refpect for reve-
lation, or wilhed to look with any fatis-
faction on the moral government under
which I live.
-. \L Lr: *{IL
Left you mould think all this to be no-
thing more than affqcled ferioumefs, and the
language of a mere con trover fialift, pufh-
ing his adverfary on a precipice, I mall quote
what a brother of yours in this very ton-
troverfy \vith me obferves ; and it is no lefs
a period than tli< celebrated Mr. Bryant.
And when- he .(after- .Dr. Pr-ice and your-
felf ) mall have advanced all that he is
able, I mould think the public will be
fatisfied that the moft ample jurtice niuft
have been done to that fide of the queftion.
t/h" Speaking
DOCTRINE , OF .NECESSITY, 45
Speaking of thofe who fcruple not to give
up the doctrine . of divine prefcience, rather
than abandon that of liberty, he fays, in his
Addrefsto me, p. 36, "They muft then give
" up the fcriptures at the fame time, and
" with the fcriptures, their religion and
" faith. ' For in the facred writings the
" foreknowledge of the deity is not only
*' inculcated as a doctrine, but proved by a
" variety of events." If, fir, the earnefl
language of what you may fuppofe (though
very unjuflly) to be enmity fail to move you,
let that Qi friendjhip prevail.
If after this repeated warning, you fhoulcf
perfift in treating the doctrine of divine
prefcience as a thing of fo little confequence,
the molt, truly candid thing I can fay is what
you have quoted, and endeavoured to expofe,
as the extreme of uncharitabhnefs when firft
advanced Jn my controverfy with Dr.
Beattie, on the fame ocean" on. . But becaufc
you. may think the figurative expreffion too
ftrong (though," in fd:d:, the ftronger it is
the
46 A DEFENCE OF THE
the better apology it makes) I fhall fay the
fame thing in other words. " It is what
" the heat of difputation has betrayed you
" into. You are blind to the confequences,
" and therefore you know not what you do"
' r *- .
- < - -'r - > ->^'t rf *r~ T 7'"i Of 1 * rttl' '"
j - . *-. - * ii/i.A.J - -- **^ j ' j l IV'
5. I particularly defire you would once
more go over with me the fubjed of the
practical influence of the doctrine of necef-
lity. This is far from being, in my opinion,
the dark fide of my argument. I love,
and rejoice in this view of it; confident,
and I hope I may add, feeling, that, when
rightly underftood, it is highly favourable
to every thing that is great and good in
man. Tell me whether the belief of the
certainty of the end, without any idea of
the nejcefTary connection of the means by
which it is brought about (which is the
doctrine of Cajvinifrn) does not work one
way, and the belief of the certainty of the
end, only as a confequence of its neceflary
connection with the previous means (which
is the doctrine ^T 'philosophical ncccflity)
:; ':; ::--:: " .^*/- r.V * . *
does
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 47
does not work another way. Re-perufe
my account of their different influences,
and mew, from a jufter view of the princi-
ples of human nature, that, with thofe
apprehenfions, men muft feel and atft dif-
ferently from what I have fuppofed they
naturally would do.
6. I like wife defire you would particu-
larly attend to what I have obferved in my
feventh feftion, with refpedt to the ufe of
the term agency and refponjibillty -, becaufe,
if what I have there obferved be juft, you,
and other defenders of the doctrine of
liberty can derive no advantage whatever
from any argument in which it is taken
for granted, that man, in your fenfe of the
terms, is an agent, and a refponjible being ;
as I mew, that the ftate of moral govern-
ment in which we are, is perfectly confift-
ent with, nay, pre-fuppofes the doclrine
of neceffity - y that for this purpofe it is fuf-
ficient that man be, in the popular fenfe of
the word only, and no.t in a fenfe that pre-
fuppofes
48 ADEFENCEOFTHE
fuppofes the doctrine of liberty, an agent*
and refponjibk. Nay, I beg you would
fhew how man, conftituted as you fuppofe
him to be, can be a fubjecSt of moral govern-
ment at all.
7. As you lay great ftrefs on the feeling
of remorfe, I beg you would confider, and
reply to what I have urged on that fubje<5t,
in my letter to you, p. 62, and my addi-
tional illuftrations, p. 296. If my ftate of
the fad: be juft, no argument from that
topic can avail you any thing; every juft
view of that fubje<3: being extremely fa-
vourable, rather than unfavourable, to the
dodtrine of neceflity.
Pleafe to obferve that all thefe queries
relate to matters ftri&ly argumentative, or
that muft be allowed to have weight in
forming our judgment on the fubjecl: in
debate -, and do not pafs them over a fecond
time, as if they were things of another
nature, and fuch as you are under no obli-
gation
DOCTRIN'E OF NECESSITY. 49
gation to notice. Say, if you pleafe, and
prove it, if you can, that what I have ad-
vanced with refpecl: to them is inconchifive ;
but do not pafs them over in filence, as if
they were not of an argumentative nature,
or indeed, not very materially fo.
THE CONCLUSION.
DEAR SIR,
I Do not know that it is neceflary for me
to call your attention particularly to any
other points in con teft between us; but I
earneftly beg your explicit reply to thefe
few. Many controverfies have terminated
without effect, and without any advantage
to the caufe of truth, merely becaufe the
parties have not come to a fair iffue, but
have left their readers wihing to know
what the one or the other of them would
have replied to this or that argument, or to
E this
$0 A DEFENCE OF THE
this or that ftate, or view of it. I wifh to
carry this controverfy to improper conchifion.
For my part, I will readily anfwer any
queftion you fhall think proper to propofe
to me, and mall do it without the lead
referve or evafion. You believe that I would.
I only beg that you would, in like manner,
reply to me. More, I think, is to be done
by diftindt interrogatories, and categorical
anfwer -s, than in any other manner. Let
us, however, try this method. A very few
more fhort pieces, which, with what we
have already published, would not make too
bulky afingle volume for each of us, might,
I think, exhaiiil all that we can now have
to fay that is material. Why then, when
the trouble will be fo little, and the ad-
vantage may be fo great, mould you decline
this bufinefs prematurely ? You have cer-
tainly as much leifure for the difcuffion as
I have ; and as it was you that called me
out, and not I that called upon you, I
mould imagine you have not lefs zeal in,
the caufe than myfelf,
I You
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, 51
You cannot apprehend from me any thing
offenfive to you in my manner of writing,
any more than I can with refpect to you;
nor mall I take oTrencc~air little things*
You may make what reflections you^pleafe
on my temper or manner, and there are
points enow to hit in both, if you be fo
difpofed. You have my leave beforehand*
to fay that I am mfolent in one place, and
arrogant in another j and you may parody
my moft obnoxious paragraphs, whether
in the work you are anfwering, or out of it \
if it will ferve to amufe yourfelf or your,
readers. If there be more of pleafantry
than ill-nature in your ftrictures, I wiU
chearfully bear it all, and with Themifto-
cles to Paufanias, fay, ftrike me, and as
often as you pleafe, but hear me> and an-
fwer me.
>.
Whatever I have been, or may be to
others, you mall have nothing to complain
of with refpect to yourfelf per finally -, and
I am fo happy to find myfelf engaged with
, a perfon
A DEFENCE, &C.
a perfon of undoubted judgment in the
controverfy, that, I own, I am ve"ry un-
willing to part with you fo foon. I fhall be
like Horace's friend, and you mufl have
recourfe to as manymifts to get quit of me.
Hoping, therefore, to have the fatif-
fadlion of hearing from you again on the
fubject, and wiming your reply may be as
fpeedy as will be confident with its being
'well weighed, I am,
DEAR SIR,
Your very humble fervant,
J. PRIESTLEY.
April ^7 So.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
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