^ LlfeKAKY ■ UNlVaifSlTY OP . SAN DtCOO „„e.s,,v«c;u™fa,|||Sl llll»*S'i'96l5442 4^ 4- \fj 3 Gen. Von Moltke. From a photograph taken in 1866. \ THE Campaign of Koniggratz, A STUDY OF THE AUSTRO - PRUSSIAN CONFLICT IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR. By LIEUT.-COL. ARTHUR L. WAGNER, Assistant Adjt.-Gen. U. S. ArkTV', Late Instructor in the Art of War, at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.; Gold Medalist of the Military Service Institution of the United States; Member of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts; Author of "The Service of Security and Information," "Organization and Tactics," etc. SECOND EDITION. HuDSON-KlMBERLY PUBLISHING Co. 1014-1016 Wyandottb St. Kansas City, Mo. 1899. Copyright 1889, ARTHUR L. WAGNER. Copyright 1899, By HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO. TO JOHN CODMAN ROPES, AMERICA'S GREATEST MILITARY HISTORIAN, THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED. CONTENTS. Page. Preface 7 Chapter I. The Military Strength of the Opposing Nations. . . 11 Chapter II. The Geographical Situation, the Plans of the Oppos- ing Commanders, and the Dispositions of Their Armies 21 Chapter III. Operations against the Hessians and Hanoverians, and the Invasion of Saxony 26 Chapter IV. The Invasion of Bohemia 36 Chapter V. The Battle of Koniggratz 69 Chapter VI. Comments on the Campaign and Battle 89 Chapter VII. The Prussian Advance from Koniggratz to the Danube 121 Chapter VIII. The Campaign in Western Germany and in Italy . 130 Appendix 148 LIST OF MAPS IN ATLAS. 1. Map of Germany Previous to the War of 1866. 2. Position of the First Army on the 22d, 23d, and 24th of June. 3. Proposed Advance of the Second Army from 25th to 28th of June. 4. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 25th of June. 5. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 26th of June, 6. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 27th of June. 7. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 28th of June. 8. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 29th of June. 9. Position of Both Armies on the Evening of the 2d of July. 10. Battlefield of Koniggriitz. 11. Koniggriitz to the Danube. 12. Valley of the Main. PREFACE. The greater part of the subject-matter of this volume was originally given as a lecture to the officers at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. The kindly reception accorded to the lecture encouraged the author to revise and amplify it, and to publish it in a small volume, which made its appearance ten years ago. Though the first edition was exhausted soon after it issued from the press, a gratifying demand for the book has continued and has prompted the author to revise the work and to present it again to the public. As to the narrative portion of the book, no other claim is made than that it is based upon the story of the campaign as given in the Prussian Official History of the Campaign of 1866, Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War," Derrecagaix's "La Guerre Moderne," and Adams' "Great Campaigns in Europe." It has not been deemed necessary to cumber the pages with notes of reference, but the author desires here to express his indebted- ness to these works, giving precedence to them in the order stated. Other books consulted are mentioned in foot-notes. The author has personally visited the scene of the opera- tions described, and, especially in regard to the topography of the battle-field of Koniggratz, he is able to speak from his own observation. The object of this volume is two- fold: 1. To present a brief, but accurate, historical sketch of a great campaign, 8 Preface. to which but little attention has been given in this country. 2. To make a comparison of some of the militarj- develop- ments of the War of Secession with corresponding features of the European conflict which occurred one year later. European critics have generally been loath to acknowl- edge the military efficiency displayed in the last two years of the Great Civil War; and, even when giving full credit for the valor exhibited by our soldiers, have too often regarded our veteran armies as mere "armed mobs." Chesney, Adams, Trench, and Maude have recognized the value of the lessons taught by the great American contest; but European military writers generally, and those of the Continent especially, still fail to recognize in the developments of our war the germ, if not the prototype, of military features which are regarded as new in Europe. The remarks of Colonel Chesney still hold true: "There is a disposition to regard the American gener- als, and the troops they led, as altogether inferior to regular soldiers. This prejudice was born out of the blunders and want of coherence exhibited by undisciplined volunteers at the outset — faults amply atoned for by the stubborn cour- age displayed by both sides throughout the rest of the strug- gle; while, if a man's claims to be regarded as a veteran are to be measured by the amount of actual fighting he has gone through, the most seasoned soldiers of Europe are but as con- scripts compared with the survivors of that conflict. The conditions of war on a grand scale were illustrated to the full as much in the contest in America, as in those more recently waged on the Continent." There is no claim set forth by the author for military efficiency on the part of our soldiers in the early"days of the Civil War. Our inexperienced troops were as inefficient then Preface. 9 as raw levies always are; as unreliable as the French impro- vised armies in 1871, and as uncertain in their action as the small force of newly raised volunteers that accompanied our regular troops in the Santiago campaign. The claim is made, however, that when our volunteers in the Great War had thoroughly learned their trade, and had become regulars in everything but name, they displayed a degree of courage and war-like skill unequalled in the contemporary armies of the Old World; and the Austro-Prussian conflict occurred so soon after the War of Secession as to enable a comparison between the European and American military conditions to be made with fairness. THH CAMPAIGN OF KONIGGRATZ. Chapter I. THE MIIvITARY vSTRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING NATIONS. The German conflict of 1866, generally known as "The Seven Weeks' War," presents many features of interest to the student, the statesman, and the soldier. It closed a strife of centuries between opposing nations and antagonistic political ideas. It resulted in the formation of the North German Con- federation, and thus planted the seeds of a nation which germ- inated four years later, during the bloody war with France. It banished Austria from all participation in the affairs of Ger- many, expelled her from Italy, and deflected her policy thence- forth towards the east and south. It demonstrated that mili- tary preparation is a more potent factor than mere numbers in computing the strength of a nation; and it gave an illustra- tion on a grand scale of the new conditions of war resulting from the use of the telegraph, the railroad, and breech-loading firearms. It is not the intention here to consider any but the mili- tary features of the great Germanic contest. Beginning the subject at the period when the quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the provinces that they had wrested from Den- mark passed from the tortuous paths of diplomacy to the 12 The Campaign of Kbniggrdtz. direct road of war, we will consider the relative strength of the combatant nations. As the advocate of the admission of Schleswig Holstein as a sovereign State in the Germanic Confederation, Austria gained first the sympathy, and then the active alliance, of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau. Prussia aimed at the incorpo- ration of the duchies with her own territory; and, though loudly championing the cause of German unity, her course was so manifestly inspired by designs for her own aggrandize- ment that she could count on the support of only a few petty duchies, whose aggregate military strength did not exceed 28,000 men. As an ofi"set to Austria's formidable German allies, Prussia had concluded an offensive and defensive alli- ance with Italy, whose army, though new and inferior in organization, armament, and equipment to that of her antag- onist, might be relied upon to "contain"* at least three Aus- trian army corps in Venetia. The main struggle was certain to be between the two great Germanic nations. At a first glance Prussia would seem to be almost hope- lessly overmatched in her contest with Austria. The latter nation possessed an area more than twice as great as the for- mer, and in contrast with the Prussian population of less than 20,000,000, it could show an aggregate of 35,000,000 people. But a more careful examination discloses the great superiority of the Prussian kingdom. The population of Prussia was almost exclusively German; that of Austria was a heteroge- neous aggregation of Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Croats^ and Italians, bound together in a purely artificial nationality. ••'To "contain" means to hold in check a hostile force superior in numbers or morale •while more important op9rations are conducted in another part of the theater. The MUilary Strength of the Opposing Nations. 13 The Austrian national debtamonnted to nearly $1,550,000,000; the annual expenditures so far exceeded the revenue as to cause a yearly deficit of more than $16,000,000, and the nation was threatened with bankruptcy. On the other hand, the Prussian national debt was only $210,000,000, the revenue exceeded the expenditures, and the finances were in a healthy condition. But the great superioiity of the northern kingdom over its opponent lay in the organization, armament, equip- ment, and perso7inel of its army. The old adage, "Experience is a severe, but good, school- master," is true of nations as well as individuals. A crushing disaster, bringing with it humiliatiation, sorrow, and disgrace, is often the birth of a stronger, better life in the apparent vic- tim of misfortune. The greatness of Prussia was not born in the brilliant victories of Rossbach, Leuthen, and Zorndorf. It was in the bitter travail of Jena and the treaty of Tilsit that birth was given to the power of the kingdom. Forbidden by Napoleon to maintain an army of more than 42,000 men, the great Prussian war minister, Scharnhorst, determined to create an army while obeying the commands of the conqueror. There was no stipulation in the treaty as to the length of service of the soldiers; and after a few months of careful instruction and almost incessant drill, they were quietly discharged, and their places were taken by recruits, who were soon replaced in the same manner. Thus the little army became, as it were, a lake of military training, into which flowed a continuous stream of recruits, and from which there came a steady current of effi- cient soldiers. When the army of Napoleon returned from its disastrous campaign in Russia, there arose, as by magic, a formidable Prussian army, of which nearly 100,000 men were trained warriors. 14 Tlic Campaign of Kiniii/f/riifz. The success of the Prussian arms iu the final struggle with Napoleon was so manifestly due to the measures adopted by Scharnhorst, that his system was made the permanent basis of the national military policy. The "Reorganization of 1859" nearly doubled the standing army, and made some important changes in the length of service required with the colors and in the Landwehr; but the essential features of the Prussian system are the same now as in the days of Leipsic and Waterloo. Ever)' Prussian twenty years of age is subject to military duty. The term of military service is divided into periods of two years with the colors,* four with the reserve, and five in the first levy of the Landwehr. The soldier then passes into the second levy of the lyandwehr, in which he remains until the completion of his thirty-ninth year of age, w^hen he passes into the lyandsturm, in which he remains six years. But, though every Prussian is liable to military duty, all are not passed through the full and complete term of military service and instruction. The number of soldiers in the active army is definitely fixed at a little more than 1 per cent, of the pop- ulation, and the number of recruits annually required is regu- lated by the number of men necessary to keep the regular force on its authorized peace footing. A list of the young men available for military service is annually made out, and the selection of recruits is made by lot. There are but few exceptions; such, for instance, as young men who are the sole support of indigent parents. Students who are preparing for the learned professions are permitted to serve as "one-year volunteers," on condition of passing certain examinations sat- *The term of service with the colors is two years for the infantry, and three years for the cavalry and artillery. From 1859 un.il a recent time the term of service was three years for all arms. Tlie Military Sircnglh of fJic Opposing Katiofis. 15 isfactorily, and furnishing their own clothing and equipments. Voluntary enlistment in the army is permitted at the age of seventeen, the volunteers having the privilege of selecting their own regiment and garrison. Some of the e/i/e regiments are recruited chiefly from such volunteers. The name of a man convicted of crime is never placed on the list of available recruits; and however humble the position of a private soldier maybe, his uniform is the honorable badge of an honest man. Every young man may be called up for draft three years in succession. Those who are not drawn for service at the end of the third year are passed into the Ersatz reserve, in which are also men whose physical imperfections are not sufficient to exempt them entirely, where they are free from service in time of peace, but from which they may be called in time of war to replace drafts from the reserve. In time of peace the military demands upon the soldiers of the reserve or Landwehr are very light. A. soldier participates in at least two field maneuvers, aggregating about sixteen weeks, during his four years of service in the reserve. He is also required to attend muster once every spring and autumn. During his five years in the first levy of the L^andwehr the soldier is called out for duty only twice, each time for a field exercise of two weeks' duration. The men of the Ersatz reserve have three periods of field training, aggregating twenty weeks. Neither the second levy of the Landwehr nor the Landsturm is called out in time of peace. The active or regular army consists of the troops with the colors under regular officers. When the decree for the mobil- ization of the army is promulgated, this force is at once put upon its war footing by drafts from the reserve. The depots are immediately formed, and one-half of the troops stationed 16 Tlie Camjiaign of K'unifjqriUz. therein are drawn from the reserve; the other half being re- cruits from the Ersatz reserve. As these two classes become exhausted, the depot battalions are filled from the Landwehr, the youngest classes being taken first ; or, if needs be, the entire I^andwehr is called out in battalions, regiments, brigades, divi- sions, or even army corps, and sent into the field. After exhaust- ing the Landwehr, there still remains the Landsturm, which embraces all able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty-nine years who do not belong to the active army, the reserve, or the lyandwehr. Though the calling out of the I^and- sturm would imply the exhaustion of the organized forces of the nation, it would be more than a mere levy ^« masse, as it would bring back into the army many soldiers whose years of mili- tary training would not have been completely forgotten in the midst of civil vocations. The machinery for the rapid mobilization of the army is kept in perfect order. Each array corps, except the Guards, is assigned to a particular province. The province is divided into divisional districts, which are again subdivided so that each brigade, regiment, and battalion has its own district, from which it draws its recruits both in peace and war. A register is kept of every man available for military duty, and in time of peace every officer knows just what part he is to perform the minute mobilization is decreed, and each soldier knows where he is to report for duty. The secret of the efficiency of the German military system lies in the division of responsi- bility and the thorough decentralization, by which every man, from the monarch to the private soldier, has his own especial part to perform. In 1866 the active army, on a war footing, consisted of nine army corps and four cavalry divisions. Each army corps The Military Strenglh of llir Opposinrj Nations. 17 comprised two divisons, a battalion of jagers,'^' and a battalion of engineers. Each division consisted of two brigades of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, four batteries of light artil- lery, one field hospital, and one section of "krankentragers," or sick-bearers. Each brigade of infantry contained two regi- ments, each composed of three battalions, each battalion con- sisting of four companies of a strength of 250 men each. Each battery contained six guns. Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, each numbering 140 sabers. Two regiments formed a brigade, and three brigades a "cavalry division." Two such divisions constituted a cavalry corps. Two batter- ies of horse artillery were attached to each cavalry division. In the campaign under consideration, the artillery not assigned to the divisions was, in the First Army, organized as an artil- lery reserve; in the vSecond Army it was used as corps artil- lery. The artillery reserve of the First Army consisted of sixteen batteries. In the Second Army the corps artillery consisted of from five to seven batteries to each corps. The corps artillery was independent of the divisions and was under the command of the corps commander. Each corps numbered about 31,000 combatants, except the Guards, which numbered 36,000. The active army at a war strength aggregated 335,000 men. The depot troops consisted of a battalion for each regi- ment of infantr.y, a squadron for each regiment of cavalry, an abtheilic7ig (3 or 4 batteries) for the artillery of each corps, and a company for each rifle battalion, engineer battalion, and train battalion. The army in the field was constantly kept up to a full war strength by men drawn from the depots. The fortresses %vere garrisoned by Landwehr; and on troops of the *The jJigers, as the name implies, were sharpshooters, recruited mainly from foresters and huntsmen. 18 T//C Cdinpaiijn of KunujiiriUz. same class devolved the duty of pushing forward to occupy invaded territory, and to relieve the active armj^ from the necessity of leaving detachments to guard its communications. This is a brief outline of the organization that enabled a nation of less than 20,000,000 people eventually to bring 600,000 soldiers upon the theater of war, and to place a quar- ter of a million of them upon the decisive field of Koniggriitz. The Austrian regular army, when placed upon its war footing, numbered about 384,000 men; and by calling out all of the reserve, this force could be raised to a formidable total of 700,000. But in organization and system of recruitment the Austrian army was inferior to its antagonist, notwithstanding its war experience in 1849 and in the struggle with France and Sardinia ten years later. The superb system by which Prussia was enabled to send forth a steady stream of trained soldiers to replace the losses of battle was wanting in Austria; and the machinery of military administration seemed deranged by the effort required to place the first gigantic armies in the field. The difference between the two military systems is shown in a striking manner by the fact that the mobilization of the Prussian army of 490,000 men, decreed early in May, was completed in fourteen days, and by the 5th of June 325,000 were massed on the hostile frontiers; while the mobil- ization of the Austrian army, begun ten weeks earlier than that of Prussia, was far from complete on that date. The organization of the Austrian army differed consider- ably from that of its antagonist. The divisional organization did not exist, but each army coips consisted of four brigades (each composed of three regiments of infantry, one squadron, and one field battery), and one sanitary company, one field hos- pital, one company of pioneers, four field batteries, two batter- The Militarij SlreiifjIJi of lite Opposing Nalions. 19 ies of horse artillery, and one rocket battery. Each regiment of infantry was composed of four battalions, each consisting of six companies. The infantry companies at full strength averaged 160 men. The army comprised ten army corps and five cavalry divisions, each of the latter consisting of three brigades, each composed of two (in some cases three) regi- ments, a ad one battery of horse artillery. There was an army artillery reserve, consisting of sixteen batteries. The regimental organization of the Austrian cavalry was similar to that in the Prussian army. The superiority of the Prussian to the Austrian army, as a collective body, was not greater than the individual superi- ority of the Prussian soldier to his antagonist. As a result of the admirable Prussian school system, every Prussian soldier was in some degree an educated man. Baron Stofifel, the French military attache at Berlin from 1866 to 1870, says: " 'When,' said the Prussian officers, 'our men came in contact with the Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them found that they hardly knew their right hand from their left, there was not one who did not look upon himself as a god in com- parison witl] such ignorant beings, and this conviction increased our strength tenfold.'"''- The Prussian army was the first that ever took the field armed entirely with breech-loading firearms. In the War of Secession a portion of the Federal troops were, towards the end of the struggle, armed with breech-loading rifles; but now the entire Prussian army marched forth with breech-loaders, to battle against an army which still retained the muzzle-load- ing rifle. Great as was the superiority of the needle-gun over the Austrian musket, it would seem but a sorry weapon at the *"MilitaiT Reports," translated by Captain Home, R.E. 20 The Campnign of Kiinifii/riifz. present day. The breech mechanism was clumsy, the cart- ridge-case was made of paper, the accuracy of the rifle did not extend beyond 300 yards, and its extreme range was scarcely more than twice that distance. Yet this rifle, though inferior to the Spencer carbine and other breech-loading weapons that had been used in America, was the best infantry weapon in Europe, and it contributed greatly to the success of the Prus- sians. The Prussian artillery was armed mainly with steel breech-loading rifled guns, which were classed as 0-pounders and 4-pounders, though the larger piece fired a shell weighing 15 lbs., and the smaller one used a similar projectile weighing 9 lbs.* Shell fire was exclusively used, and the shells were uniformly provided with percussion fuses. In the Austrian army the artillery was provided with bronze muzzle-loading rifled guns, classed as 8-pdrs. and 4pdrs. The infantry was armed with the muzzle-loading Lorenz rifle. The German allies of Austria could place about 150,000 men in the field; on the other hand, Italy could put about 200,000 men in the scale against her. ••'These guns were classed, ;not according to the weight of the projectile, but according to the diameter of the bore. Thus the gun firing a 15-lb. shell was rated as a 6-pdr., because the diameter of its bore was the same as that of a 6-pdr. smooth bore gun. The iSil iKil ion, rians, and iJispasll inns. 21 Chapter II. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION, THE PLANS OF THE OPPOSING COMMANDERS, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THEIR ARMIES. The geographical situation was unfavorable to Prussia. The map of Germany, as it existed before the Austro-Prussian War, shows Rhineland and Westphalia completely separated from the other provinces of Prussia by the hostile territory of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which, extending from the north, joined the South German States which were in arms against the northern kingdom.* The Austrian province of Bohemia, with the adjacent kingdom of Saxony, formed a salient, push- ing forward, as it were, into the Prussian dominions, and fur- nishing a base from which either Silesia or I^usatia might be invaded. In the language of the Prussian Staff History of the Campaign of 1866: "In one direction stood the Saxon army as a powerful advance guard only six or seven marches dis- tant from the Prussian capital, which is protected from the south by no considerable vantage-ground; in the other Breslau could the more easily be reached in five marches, because, trusting to a former federal compact with Austria, Schweid- nitz had been given up as a fortress." The forces of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, numbering 25,000 men, could operate against the communications of the Prussian armies, or withdraw to the south and unite with the Austrians or Bavarians. The South German armies might form a junction in Saxony or Bohemia with the Austro-Saxon army. *See Map No. 1. 22 The CciDipdifiii of Koiti(j(/ratz. The Prussian army was commanded by the King. His chief of staff was Baron Hehnuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, a great soldier, but as yet almost unknown beyond the bound- aries of his own country. He had a ju.stly high reputation as an accomplished .staff officer, and was known as the author of "Letters on the Conditions in Turkey" and "The Russian Campaign of 1828-9 in Turkey"; the former published in 1841 and the latter in 1845. He was the chief strategi.st in the brief war of 1864 between Denmark and the allied Prussians and Austrians. A deep military student, and a man of great exec- utive abilit}^ he had nevertheless never been in command of troops, and his actual service in the field had been limited to his duties as military attache with the Turkish army in the unsuccessful campaign against Ibrahim Pasha in 1832, and as chief of staff in the Danish campaign. At the opening of the war with Austria he was sixty-six years old. The object of Moltke was to protect the Prussian rear by defeating the Hanoverian and Hessian troops; to prevent a junction of these troops with their South German allies; to "contain" the latter with as small a force as possible, and to hurl the crushing weight of the Prussian forces upon the Austro-Saxon army. On the 14th of June the Prussian armies were stationed as follows:''- The Army of the Elbe, consisting of three divisions, two cavalry brigades and 144 guns, in cantonments round Torgau, under command of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld; The First Army, consisting of three army corps, a ca\ - airy corps, and 300 guns, near Gorlitz, under command of Prince Frederick Charles; '■'See Map No. 1. The Silualion, Pldiis, avd Dispofii/ions. 23 The Second Army, consisting of four army corps, a cavalry division of three brigades, and 336 guns, in the vicin- ity of Neisse, under command of the Crown Prince. Besides the three main armies, there were other forces stationed as follows : One division at Altona, in Holstein, under Manteuffel; One division at Minden, under Vogel von Falckenstein ; One division (made up principally of the Prussian garri- sons withdrawn from the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Ra- stadt, and Frankfort) at Wetzlar, under Beyer. The Austrian Army of the North was posted as follows: 1st Corps, at Prague, Teplitz,* Theresienstadt, and Jo- sephstadt; lid Corps, near Bomisch Triibau; IVth Corps, near Teschen; Vlth Corps, at Olmiitz; Hid Corps, at Briinn; Xth Corps, at Briinn; Vlllth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz. To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry and more than 750 guns. This army was under the command of Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek, an officer of great experience and high reputation. Unlike his opponent, he had commanded troops in a number of important campaigns. He had served in the Hungarian and Italian campaigns, and at Novara, in 1849, he had won great distinction. As a corps commander at Solferino, a decade later, his courage and tactical ability had been so con- spicuous as to gain for him increased renown, though the day had gone so sorely against the Austrians. His chief of staflF ♦Teplitz is 46 miles north-west of Prague. 24 The Catnonign of K'uniijijriHz. in the campaign now opening was Lieutenant-Field Marshal von Heuikstein. The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, was at Dresden, under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of the Main between Amberg and Wiirzburg. It numbered 52,000 men, and was under command of Prince Charles of Bavaria. The Vlllth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. It consisted of the contingents of Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse- Darmstadt, and Nassau, and an Austrian division drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about 42,000 men, and " was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse. The Vth, Vllth, and IXth Austrian corps, under the Arch- duke Albrecht, were in Venetia, opposed to an Italian army of four corps. Benedek expected to assume the offensive and invade Prussia. He had announced this intention before the begin- ning of hostilities, even going so far as to prescribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers while in the enemy's country. It is hard to understand, in the light of subsequent events, the slight esteem in which the Austrians held their opponents before the commencement of hostilities. In a general order issued to his army on June 17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: "We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the Line and partly of Landwehr. The first com- prises young men not accustomed to privations and fatigue, and who have never yet made an important campaign ; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their Government. In consequence of a long course of years of 'Ilic tSilnalioii, Plans, and J^isposiliuns. 25 peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle." Benedek's unfavorable opinion of his adversaries was probably shared by many other prominent European soldiers; for the excellence of the military system of Prussia was, as yet, not appreciated by other nations. Absurd as the Feld- zeugmeister's order now appears, it seems to have excited no unfavorable comment at the time; and, in fact, the expecta- tion of Austrian success was quite general in Europe. On the 15th of June the Austrian outposts were notified of the intention of the Prussians to begin hostilities, and war was formally declared against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel.and Sax- ony. Within twenty-foui hours after the declaration of war, the invasion of each of these minor States was begun. 26 The Campaif/n oj Kiinif/r/riifz. Chapter III. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HESSIANS AND HANOVERIANS, AND THE INVASION OF SAXONY.- Falkenstein from Minden, and Manteuflfel from Alton a, moved upon Hanover, and Beyer invaded Hesse- Cassel from Wetzlar. On the night of the 15th the Hanoverian army, acccompanied by the blind monarch, King George, retreated, chiefly by rail, to Gottingen; the movement being conducted in such haste that even the reserve ammunition and hospital supplies w^eie left behind. On the 17th Falckenstein entered the Hanoverian capital ; on the 19th Manteuflfel marched into the city; and by the 22d all Hanover, except Gottingen, was in the possession of the Prussians. Beyer pushed into Hesse-Cassel, the Hessian army retir- ing before him, by way of Fulda, upon Hanau, where it formed a junction with the Federal forces. On the 19th the Prus- sians entered Cassel, and an army was thus placed across the path of the retreating Hanoverians. The Hanoverian army, which had been compelled to wait several days at Gottingen to complete its organization, resumed its march on the 21st, intending to cross a portion of the Prus- sian territory vm Heiligenstadt and Langensalza, and thence through Eisenach or Gotha, to form a junction with the Bava- rians in the neighborhood of Fulda. Falckenstein pursued from Hanover, detachments were sent from Magdeburg and Erfurt to Bleicherode and Eisenach, and Beyer occupied the *See Map No. 1. The Hessians and Hanoverians. 27 line of the Werra between Allendorf and Eisenach. Though the route through Eisenach was thus blocked, energetic meas ures on the part of the Allies might easily have extricated the Hanoverian army from the constricting grasp of the Prussians. Gotha was occupied by a weak force of six battalions, two squadrons, and three batteries, while the retreating army num- bered 20,500 men. Had the Bavarian army been well prepared and ably led, a junction might have been formed with the Han- overians, and the Prussian force at Gotha captured. But the • Bavarian commander was inefficient, and the over-estimate placed by King George upon the number of his enemies at Gotha was strengthened by the receipt, from the commander of the petty force, of an audacious summons to surrender. Negotiations were entered upon b}^ the Prussian and Hano- verian representatives ; but the armistice (begun on the 24th and continued until the 2(3th) produced no other result than the reinforcement of the force at Gotha ; General Flies, with five battalions, being detached from Falckenstein's armj', and sent by rail, via Magdeburg and Halle, to Gotha. At TreflFurt, Kreutzberg, Eisenach, and Gotha, points on a semi-circle in front of the Hanoverians, and within a day's march of them, were nearly 80,000 Prussians. On the 27th, General Flies, advancing through Warza upon Langensalza, with about 90U0 men, struck the army of King George, which was well posted on the left bank of the Unstrut river. A battle followed, in which the Hanoverians defeated Flies, and drove his army several miles towards Warza. But the Hanoverian victory was a barren one. Flies was reinforced at Warza by a strong detachment from Goeben's division at Eisenach. Goeben and Beyer advanced from 28 The Campaifjit of KlJniggrdtz. Eisenach upon Langensalza, and Manteuffel, moving via Heil- igenstadt, Worbis, Dingelstadt, Miihlhausen, and Gross Got- tern, closed upon the Hanoverians from the north. The army of King George was now surrounded by 40,000 Prussians, united under the command of Falckenstein. Further resist- ance was hopeless, and on the 21)th of June the Hanoverians surrendered. The men were dismissed to their homes, the officers were paroled, and King George was banished from his kingdom. THE INVASION OF SAXONY, AND ITS RESULTS. In the meantime the main armies had not been idle. The invasion of Saxony was begun on the 16th of June by the Army of the Elbe and the First Army. On the night of the loth of June the Saxon army began its retreat to Bohemia, detachments of pioneers tearing up the railroad track between Rieza and Dresden, and between the latter city and Bautzen. The work of destruction, except the burning of the bridge at Rieza, was hurriedly and imperfectly done, and did not appre- ciably delay the Prussian advance. The Army of the Elbe advanced from Torgau, via Wurzen, Dahlen, and Strehla; a division to each road, and a detachment from the right division moving via Ostrau and Dobeln to cover the right flank. The First Armyadva'iced from the neighborhood of Gorlitz, through Ivobau and Bautzen, a strong detachment being sent out on the Zittau road, beyond Ostritz, to observe the passes of Reich- enberg and Gabel, for the army was making a flank march, and the Austrians might attack through these passes. A cav- alry detachment was pushed out through Bischofswerda to feel the left of the Army of the Elbe. On the 18th of June the Army of the Elbe occupied Dres- The Invasion of Saxoni/. ' 29 den, and pushed its outposts beyond the city as far as Lock- witz and PiHnitz. On the following day the junction of the two armies was eflfected. The 1st Reserve Division was sent from Berlin to reinforce Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and the combined forces of the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. To guard against a possible invasion of Saxony by the Bava- rians, measures were at once taken to fortify Dresden, which was occupied by the 2d Reserve Division from Berlin; Leipsic and Chemnitz were occupied by Landwehr; and the Leipsic- Plauen railway beyond Werdau was destroj-ed. On the 17th of June the Emperor of Austria issued a man- ifesto, in which he fornially announced to his subjects the state of war existing between Austria and Prussia. ■ Italy declared war against Au&tria three days later. We can now see the immense results following from the thorough military preparation of Prussia. Launching, as it w^ere, a thunderbolt of military force upon her enemies at the first moment of war, less than two weeks sufficed for the com- plete conquest of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. Indeed, four days had sufficed for the seizure of the last two. The King of Hanover had been dethroned, the Elector of Hesse- Cassel was a prisoner, and the King of Saxony was a fugitive w^ith his army in Bohemia. The military results were even greater than the political consequences. The severed portions of the Prussian kingdom were united. The Hanoverian army had been eliminated from the military problem, and there was no longer any menace to Prussia from the rear. Falckenstein was now free to turn his undivided attention to the Bavarians and the Federal Corps, and the occupation of Saxony pre- vented all possibility of a junction of the Bavarian and Saxon 30 The Campaign of Kdniggriltz. armies. But the strategical advantages gained in regard to operations in Bohemia were the grandest result of the occupa- tion of Saxony. We have seen that on the 14th of June the Army of the Elbe was around Torgau, the First Army near Gorlitz, and the Second Army in the vicinity of Neisse ; being thus sepa- rated from each other by from 100 to 125 miles. The Second Army covered Breslau, the Army of the Elbe covered Berlin, and the First Army was in a position to support either of the others. Geographical circumstances thus compelled the sepa- ration of the Prussian armies, and only two of them were avail- able for the invasion of Bohemia. The occupation of Saxony changed matters for the better. The distance between the Army of the Elbe and the First Army was reduced to the extent of actual junction, and these combined armies were only about 120 miles from Landshut, where the right of the Second Army now rested, and with which there was commu- nication by means of the hill road of Schreiberschau. The entire force was now available for the invasion of Bohemia ; the northern passes of the Bohemian frontier were secured ; and if compelled to act upon the defensive, Frederick Charles could find in the mountains of Southern Saxony many advan- tageous positions for defensive battle. The Prussian plan of operations required an advance of Frederick Charles' armies from Saxony into Bohemia, and an invasion of that province by the Second Army, advancing from Silesia; both armies to unite at Gitschin, or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus advancing from divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary the advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a serious military error, as the general operating by interior lines, holding one of the oppo- The Invasion of Saxon i/. 81 nent's armies by a containing force, and falling with superior numbers upon the other, may defeat both in succession. Moltke's plan was, however, sound and proper, for the follow- ing reasons : 1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian fron- tier compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, in order that Lusatia and Silesia might both be protected from Aus- trian invasion; and the only possible concentration that would not yield to the enemy the advantage of the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a concentration to the front, in the hostile territory. 2. Owing to the limited number and difficult nature of the mountain roads leading into Bohemia, the entire army could not have advanced by a single route or set of roads without being extended in columns of such length as to make it impossible to deploy promptly or on a front commensurate with its numbers. 3. The reentering base of the Prussians would enable each of their armies to cover its communications with its base, while either would surely menace the communications of the Austrians, if Benedek should advance against the other. 4. It was certain that the Pru5sian forces could act promptly and with celerity, and it was known by Moltke that the Austrian army was not yet fully prepared for prompt offensive maneuvers. The distance from G5rlitz and Neisse to Gitschin being less than that from Olmiitz, Briian, and Bomisch Triibau to the same point, there was, then, good rea- son to believe that the junction of the Prussian armies could be effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy's 32 The Ccunpaigii of Kiiinf/i/ratz. lute, and before Benedek could get his own forces well iu hand. 5. By keeping up telegraphic communication between the two separated armies, their cooperation and simultaneous action could be assured. 6. If the Prussians could reach the Iser and the Elbe without serious check, the contracted theatre of operations would render Benedek's interior position one of danger, rather than one of advantage. Moltke himself, in commenting upon his strategical combination, says: "If it is advantageous for a general to place his army on an anterior line of operation, it is necessary, in order that he may profit by it, to have suffi- cient space to enable him to move against one of his adver- saries at a distance of several days' march, and to have time enough then to return against the other. If this space is very contracted, he will run the risk of having both adversaries on his liands at once. When an army, on the field of battle, is attacked in front and on the flank, it avails nothing that it is on an interior line of operations. That which was a strate- gical advantage becomes a tactical disadvantage. If the Prussians were allowed to advance to the Iser and to the Elbe; if the several defiles which it was necessary to pass fell into their power — it is evident that it would be extremely per- ilous to advance between their two armies. In attacking one, the risk would be incurred of being attacked in rear by the other." The combination, on the field of battle, of the two armies operating from divergent bases would admit of just such a front and flank attack as would convert Benedek's strategical advantage into a serious tactical disadvantage. It would be a repetition of Waterloo. 7. A failure to unite before encountering the main force The Invasion of Sa.roni/. 38 of the enemy, though unfortunate, would not necessarily have been disastrous. According to Jomini, the advantages of an interior position diminish as the armies operating increase in size; for the following reasons: (a) "Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle, an army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger force. (d) "If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies. (r) " The central army * * * requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and materiel of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers. {d) "The bodies of observation detached from the cen- tral mass to hold in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong (from 80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a. serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, the effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army."* Finally, the increased defensive power given to infantry by the introduction of breech-loading rifles might be counted upon to increase greatly the probability of either of the Prus- sian armies being able to fight successfully a purely defensive battle against the entire army of Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders. *Jomini's "Art of War," translated by Mendell and Craigbill, p. 126. 34 The Campaifjii of Kniiigf/rtitz. In view of these reasons, Moltke's strategy was not only- justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective was the Aus- trian army, wherever it might be. Before the commencement of hostilities Benedek had, as we have seen, announced his intention of invading Prussia. Two routes ofiFered themselves to his choice: one by way of Gorlitz and Bautzen to Berlin; the other by way of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter route was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, and Kosel; the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation of Saxony, and would have enabled the Bavarian army to concentrate, via the passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, with the Austrians and Saxons. But, at a time when minutes were worth millions, Benedek was slow, and the preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to take the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the defensive in Bohemia. The Feldzeugmeister then decided to concentrate his army in the vicinity of Josephstadt and Koniginhof; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or the Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw his main army upon the Crown Prince or Frederick Charles, as circumstances might decide. The concentration of the Austrian army began on the 18th of June, and on the 25th it stood as follows: The 1st Corps, with one brigade of the Illd Corps and a cavalry division, on the left bank of the Iser, from Turnau, through Miinchengratz to Jung Buntzlau, wherethe retreating Saxons formed on the left; The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir; The IVth Corps at Opocno; The Vlth Corps at Solnitz; The Hid Corps on the left of the Vlth, at Tynist; The Invasion of Saxony. 35 The Vlllth Corps at Wamberg; The lid Corps at Geyersberg; Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, Abts- dorf, and Policzka, respectively. The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was thus opposed to the entire army of Frederick Charles; while Benedek confronted the Crown Prince with six corps. The Austrian line extended beyond Gitschin, the point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate. 36 The Carii/)ai(/n of h'niiifjr/ralz. Chapter IV. THE INVASION OF BOHEMIA. It was now certain that Bohemia was to be the theater of war. This province of the Austrian Empire may be described as a huge basin, whose rim is composed of mountains. It is separated from Silesia by the Riesengebirge (Giant Moun- tains), from Saxony by the Erzgebirge (Iron Mountains), from Moravia by the Moravian Hills, and from Bavaria by.the Fichtelgebirge and the Bohmerwald; the Moravian Hills and the Bohmerwald separating it from the valley of the Danube. This great basin is drained by the Elbe river, which, rising in the Riesengebirge, makes a huge loop, flowing first south, then west, and finally north, and receives the waters of the Iser, Adler, Moldau, and Eger rivers before it issues forth from the Bohemian frontier into Saxony. This theater is well suite 1 to defensive operations, as the mountain frontiers are penetrated by few passes, and the forests and rivers con- stitute additional obstacles. On the Silesian frontier the only issues by which an invader can enter Bohemia are the passes of Trautenau, Eypel, Kosteletz, Nachod, and Neustadt. These could all be easily defended, while on the Saxon frontier the defiles of Reichenberg, Gabsl, and Konigstein-Tetschen could bs used by retarding forces, which could afterwards find a btrong defensive line on the Iser. Two railway lines lay in the theater of war, and were of great importance to the contending armies. One line ran from Vienna, via Kosel, Breslau, and G6rlitz,to Dresden. The The Invasion of Bohemia. ' 37 other connected the Austrian capital with Prague, via Olmiitz (or Briinn) and Bomisch Triibau. The two lines were joined by a railway from Dresden to Prague, and by one which, run- ning from lyobau to Turnau, branched from the latter point to Prague and Pardubitz. These railways connected with others leading to all the important cities of Prussia. The two Prussian armies could cover their railway communications while adv^ancing; but the Prague-Olmiitz line, which was of vital importance to the Austrian army, ran parallel to, and dangerously near, the Silesian frontier, and was not covered by the Austrian front during the operations in Bohemia. The Prussian advance began on the 20th of June. The Army of the Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dresden, via Stolpen, Neustadt, Schluckenau, and Rumburg, to Gabel.* As the greater part of this march had to be made by one road, it required six days, though the distance was only 65 miles. The First Army had concentrated at Zittau, Herrnhut, Hirsch- felde, Seidenberg, and Marklissa. From these points it began its march on the 22d of June, each division taking a separate road, and on the 25th it was closely concentrated around Reichenberg. The entire Prussian front was now reduced to about 100 miles, and Herwarth von Bittenfeld was only twelve miles from Frederick Charles. It would have been dangerous in the extreme for the Crown Prince to begin his march while Benedek held six corps in hand to hurl upon him. The passage of the Second Army through the defiles depended on surprise; and in the face of a superior and concentrated army, it would have been- a desperate undertaking. It was necessary, therefore, to dis- tract the plans of the enemy by false maneuvers, and to wait *See Map No. 2. 38 The Campaif/ii of K(i»iii;/ratz. for Frederick Charles to menace the Austrian left, on the Iser, before beginning the forward movement with the Second Army. With these objects in view, the Vlth Corps was ordered to push forward towards Olmiitz, and Frederick Charles received the following instructions from Moltke: "Since the difficult task of debouching from, the mountains falls upon the Second, weaker, Army, so, as soon as the junc- tion with Herwarth's corps is effected, the First Army must, by its rapid advance, shorten the crisis." The Vlth Corps moved from Neisse into the Austrian dominions as far as Frei- waldaa, where its advance guard had a successful skirmish with a party of Austrian cavalry. This corps was supposed by the Austrians to be the advance guard of the Crown Prince's army marching upon Olmiitz; and the demonstration had the effect of holding a large force of Austrians between Hohenmauth and Bomisch Triibau, where it could not be used to oppose the real advance of the Second Army. The Crown Prince's army was to move as follows:'-'^ The 1st Corpsf via Liebau and Trautenau, to Arnau; The Guards, via'Nenrode, Braunau, Eypel, to Koniginhof; The Vth Corps, v/a Glatz, Reinerz, Nachod, to Gradlitz; The cavalry, from Waldenburg, via Trautenau, to Kou- niginhof. The Vlth Corps, having made the diversion to Frei- waldau, was withdrawn to Glatz and Patschkau,+ from which points it was to follow the Vth. A corps of observation, con- *See Map No. 3. tit may be of assistance to the reader, in the following pages, to note that the divisions in the Prussian army are numbered consecutively throughout the several army corps. Thus, the 1st Corps consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions ; the lid Corps, of the 3d and 4th Divisions ; the Vlth Corps, of the 11th and 12th Divisions, and so on. JPatsclikau is 46 miles south from Breslau. The Invasion of Bohemia. 39 sisting of two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a light battery, was detached at Ratibor* to make demonstrations against Austrian Silesia. In case this detachment should en- counter a large force of the enemy, it was to fall back upon the fortress of Kosel. During the campaign an unimportant war of detachments was carried on in this region generally to the advantage of the Prussians. JUNE 26th. t On the 26th of June the Army of the Elbe marched upon Niemes and Oschitz. The advance guard encountered an Austrian outpost near Hiihnerwasser, and drove it back after a sharp skirmish. The main body of the Army of the Elbe bivouacked at Hiihnerwasser, with outposts towards Weisswasser, Miinchengratz, and Gablonz. In the evening there was another brisk outpost fight in the direction of Miin- chengratz, in which the Austrians were again worsted. In the First Army the advance on this day was begun by General Horn, whose division had held the outposts the night before. At Liebenau, Horn struck the Austrians, whose force consisted of a small body of infantry, four regiments of cav- alry, and two batteries of horse artillery. Driven out of the village, and from the field where they next made a stand, the Austrians retreated across the Iser, i7/«Turnau, to Podol. The First Army now occupied a position extending through Reich- enberg, Gablonz, I,iebenau, and Turnau ; Horn's division ex- tending down the Iser from Turnau, with outposts near Podol. Free communication — in fact, a junction — was now established with the Army of the Elbe, one division of which occupied Bomisch Aicha. '■'Ratibor is 50 miles east-south-east from Xeisse. tSee Maps 4 and 5. 40 The Campaign of Koniggrdtz. An attempt made by a company of Prussian riflemen to seize the bridges at Podol, about dusk in the evening, brought on a sharp fight. The forces on each side were reinforced until parts of two Prussian and two Austrian brigades were engaged. A stubborn infantry battle was carried on by moonlight until 1 o'clock in the morning, when the Austrians retreated towards Miinchengratz. By this victory the Prussians secured the passage of the Iser at Podol; the shortest line toGitschin was opened to them; the communications of Count Clam-(jallas with the main ar^ny were threatened; and a plan which he had formed to riposte upon the Prussians at Turnau was thwarted. We will now turn to the Second Array. On this day the 1st Corps concentrated at lyiebau and Schomberg, ready to cross the frontier. The Vth Corps was at Reinerz, about twenty miles from the 1st. The Guard Corps, which had just crossed the frontier, in front of Neurode, midway between the two corps, was in a position to support either. The Vlth Corps was at Landeck and Glatz, part of its cavalry being sent for- ward to cover the left of the Vth Corps and maintain commu- nication between the two. After passing the mountains, the entire army, pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, was to wheel to the left, seize the Josephstadt-Turnau railway, and form a junction along that line with the armies of Frederick Charles. On the evening of the 26th the advance guard of the Vth Corps occupied Nachod. The distance between the Crown Prince and Frederick Charles had now been reduced to about fifty miles, while that between the extreme corps of the Austrian army was about the same. Benedek's strate- gical advantages were already beginning to disappear. The Prussian demonstrations towards Olmiitz had caused the Aus- trian lid Corps to be retained dangeously far to the right; The Invasion of Bohemia. 41 Count Clam-Gallas was struggling against superior numbers on the Iser, and Benedek had only four corps with which he could immediately oppose the four corps of the Crown Prince. The Austrian commander ordered the following move- ments for the next day : The Xth Corps, from Josephstadt and Schurz, upon Trautenau; The Vlth Corps, from Opocno to Skalitz; The IVth Corps, from I^anzow to Jaromir; The Vlllth Corps, from Tynist to beyond Jaromir, to support the Vlth ; The Hid Corps, from Koniggratz to Miletin; The lid Corps, from Senftenberg to Solnitz; The Reserve Cavalry, from Hohenraauth and Wilden- schwerdt to Hohenbriick; The Light Cavalry to accompany the lid Corps. JUNE 27th. On the 27th of June the Crown Prince pushed forward the 1st Corps against Trautenau, and the main body of the Vth Corps upon Nachod. One division of the Guard sup- ported each corps. The 1st Corps, under Bonin , marched in two columns from Liebau and Schomberg, and was to concentrate at Par- schnitz, about .two miles east of Trautenau, where it was to rest two hours before moving upon the latter place. Contrary to expectation, the left column arrived first at Parschnitz, the right (with the advance guard) being delayed by bad roads. Trautenau was as yet unoccupied by the Aus- trians; but, instead of seizing the town and the heights which overlooked it, on the farther bank of the Aupa river. Clause- 42 Tlw Caiiipdii/ii oj h'lhili/i/n'ilz. witz (commanding the left column) obeyed the strict letter of his orders, and waited at Parschnitz two hours, from 8 to l<> A. M., until the advance guard of the right column arrived. While Clausewitz was thus idly waiting, Mondl's brigade of the Xtli Austrian Corps arrived, and took up a strong posi- tion in the town and on the heights which commanded it. A stubborn fight took place before the Austrians could be dis- lodged; and Mondl fell back in good order upon the main body of the Xth Corps, which was hurrying towards Traut- enau. Believing himself in complete possession of the field, Bonin, at I o'clock, declined the assistance of the 1st Division of Guards, which had hurried up to Parschnitz; and this divis- ion, after a halt of two hours, marched off" to the left, towards Eypel. About half past 3 o'clock the entire Xth Corps, under Gablentz, arrived on the field, and made a vigorous attack upon the Prussians. Bonin's left wing was turned; and, after fighting six hours, the Prussians were driven from the field, and retreated to the positions from which they had begun their march in the morning. The Prussian defeat was due to two causes: 1. The dela)' of Clausewitz at Parschnitz, when common sense should have prompted him to exceed his orders, and seize the unoccupied town and heights of Trautenau. For two hours these positions were completely undefended by the Austrians, and could have been occupied by Clausewitz with- out firing a shot.* *Derr^cagaix and the Prussian Official History both condemn Clausewitz's delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says : " The first question that arises is, Should Clausewitz have occupied Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all prob- ability, and he would have been deeply engaged before Grossmanu [commanding the right column] came up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann's delay is said to have been the hilly character of the The Invasion of Bohemia. 43 2. The fatuity of Bonin in declining the assistance of the Guards. Bonin knew that Mondl had not been routed, that he had fallen back "slowly and fighting," and he did not know what other force might be in his immediate front. He had no reason to expect that he would be allowed to pass through the defile without the most stubborn opposition. He knew that he had been opposed by a single brigade, and the plucky resistance of that small body should have made him suspicious that it had stronger forces at its back. His orders were to push on to Arnau, some twelve miles from Trautenau, and to carry out these orders it was necessary to sweep aside the opposition in his front. His declination of assistance when the firing had scarcely ceased, and when the aid of the Guards would have enabled him to clinch his success, was inexcus- road. Moudl, on the other hand, reaching Hohenbriick about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form. The Austrian Official Account states that he had occupied the heights since 9:15, and before this he had reached Hohenbriick at 7:45. When he had formed— that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before deploying— the posi- tion must have been taken up by him between 8:30 and 9:15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken tliree-quarters of an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on the very strong ground he, by that time, had fully occupied. Probably the latter was informed * * * * ^^^^ ^^ immediate danger was impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first duty of the advance, on coming into collision wi.h the enemy, is to occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending action." Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when Clause- witz arrived at Parschnitz ; and it was his duty, as well as that of Mondl, on coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy rapidly such localities as might have proved of use in the impending action. As to engaging Mondl " on the very strong ground lie, by that time, had fully occupied," it is sufficient to state that he had only a brigade, while Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate commander assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders ; but it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will fetter himself by observing the strict letter of an order, when he knows, and his superior does not know, that the condi- tion of affairs in his front is such as to offer an opportunity for a successful and val- uable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated in tlie orders of his chief. Alvensleben understood matters better when he marched without orders to assist Fransecky at Koniggratz. If a division commander were never expected to act upon his own responsibility when a movement is urged by his own common sense, it is evident that the position of general of division could be filled by a man of very limited abilities. 44 The Campaign of Koniggrdtz. able. Like Beauregard at Shiloh, Bonin seems to have la- bored under the delusion that a victory could be sufficiently complete while the enemy's army still remained in his front.* The Austrians had certainly gained a brilliant victory. With a force of 83,600 men, they had defeated 35,000 Prus- sians, armed, too, with breech-loaders, while the victors had only muzzle-loading rifles. The loss of the Prussians was 56 officers and 1282 men, while the Austrians lost 196 officers and more than 5000 men. This disparity of loss illustrates the difference in the power of the old and the new rifles; it also speaks volumes for the pluck of the Austrian soldiers. But the Austrian victory was doomed to be as fruitless as it was costly; for Prussian skill and valor on other fields oblit- erated all that was gained by Gablentz in the bloody combat of Trautenau. The march of the Vth Corps, under Steinmetz, lay through the defile of Nachod, five miles in length, in which the entire corps was obliged to march in a single column. The advance guard, which had seized Nachod the night before, pushed for- ward rapidly, beyond the outlet of the defile, to the junction of the roads leading to Skalitz and Neustadt, where it received orders to halt, and thus cover the issue of the main body through the defile. While the advance guard was making preparations for bivouacking, its commander, General Loew- enfeldt, received news of the approach of the Austrian Vlth Corps, which, as we have seen, had been ordered upon Nachod. Hastily forming for action, the Prussian advance *" While this was goins on, a staff-officer of General Beauregard's headquarters * * came up to General Bragg and said : ' The general directs that the pursuit be stopped ; the victory is sufficiently complete ; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats.' General Bragg said, 'My God! was a victory ever sufficiently complete? ' "—Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I., p. 605. The Invasion of Bohemia. 45 guard received the attack of a brigade, which was reinforced until nearly the whole Austrian corps was engaged. It was a desperate struggle of six and one half battalions, five squadrons, and 12 guns, against twentj'-one battalions, 80 guns, and a greatly superior force of cavalry. For three hours the advance guard sustained the unequal conflict, with no other reinforcement than Wnuck's cavalry brigade. The Prussian force, in one line, 3000 paces long, without reserves, was sorely pressed, until the main body began to issue from the defile and deploy upon the field. The entire Austrian corps was now engaged. Finally, after a successful charge of Wnuck's cavalry brigade upon the Austrian cuirassiers, and the repulse of a heavy infantry attack, Steinmetz assumed . the offensive, and the Austrians, defeated with great loss, retreated to Skalitz. In the latter part of this action the Prussians were under the immediate command of the Crown Prince. The Prussian loss was 1122, killed and wounded; the Austrians lost 7510, of which number about 2500 were prisoners. The 1st Division of the Guards halted this night at Eypel; the 2d Division at Kosteletz. This day, which had seen iwo bloody actions fought by the Second Army, was one of inaction on the part of the armies of Frederick Charles. The daj' was consumed in con- structing bridges across the Iser, at Turnau and Podol, and in concentrating the main body of the army on the plateau of Sichrow, preparatory to an attack upon the Austrian position at Miinchengratz. JUNE 28th.* The First Army and the Army of the Elbe made a com- * See Map No. 7. 46 The Campaign of Koniggrdtz. bined attack upon Count Clam-Gallas at Miincheugratz, the Austrians being assailed in front and on both flanks. The Austrian commander had begun his retreat before the Prus- sian attack commenced; and, after a brief resistance, he fell back upon Gitschin, with a loss of about 2000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Prussian loss was only 341. The armies of Frederick Charles were now completely united. One division was pushed forward to Rowensko, and the remaining eight, numbering, with the cavalry, upwards of 100,000 men, were concentrated upon an area of about twenty square miles. Some distress began to be felt because of the short supply of food and the difficulty of getting water; for only part of the provision trains had come up, and the Aus- trian inhabitants, when they ab^jUdoned their homes, had filled up the wells. Two roads led east from the Prussian position, but both, united at Sobotka. The Austrian rear guard was driven back during the night, and both roads were open for the Prussian advance on the following morning. Frederick Charles has been severely (and it would seem justly) criticised for his inaction on the 27th of June. His explicit instructions from Moltke should have been enough to cause him to hasten forward, and so threaten the Austrian left as to relieve the pressure on the Crown Prince. And there was another reason for prompt action. As already mentioned, the victory of Podol had opened to Frederick Charles the shortest line to Gitschin, from which place he was now distant only fifteen miles, while Clam-Gallas, at Miincheu- gratz, was twenty miles away from the same point. The town of Gitschin, like Ivrea in 1800, or Sombref and Quatre-Bras in 1815, had accidentally become a strategic point of the first importance by reason of the relative positions of the opposing Tlic Incasinn of Bohemia. 47 armies and the direction of the roads necessary for the con- centration of each. All the roads leading from the Iser, from Turnau to Jung Buntzlau, center at Gitschin, whence other roads branch out to Neu Bidsow, Koniggratz, Josephstadt, Koniginhof, and other important points. The possession of Gitschin by either army would seriously delay, and perhaps eventually prevent, the concentration of the other. A prompt movement to Gitschin by Frederick Charles would have cut off Clam-Gallas, who could then have eflfected a junction with Benedek only by a circuitous march of such length as to make it probable that his two corps would have been eliminated altogether from the problem solved on the field of Koniggratz. As the AustroSaxons at Miinchengratz, covering the roads to Prague, could have protected their communications with that city, while menacing the communications of the Prus- sians with their base, it was doubtless necessary to dislodge them from that position; but Frederick Charles might have promptly pushed to Gitschin a force sufficient to seize and hold the place, and still have kept in hand enough troops to defeat Clam-Gallas so heavily as to drive him back in com- plete rout; for Frederick Charles' army numbered, at this time, nearly 140,000 men, while Clam-Gallas had not more than 60,000. This movement would not have really divided Frederick Charles' army, for the force at Gitschin and the one attacking at Miinchengratz would have been practically within support- ing distance, and in direct and unimpeded communication with each other. Moreover, the nearest troops available to oppose such" a force thrust forward to Gitschin would have been the single Austrian corps (the Hid) which was at Mile- tin, quite as far from Gitschin as the main body of Frederick 48 The Campaign of Koniggrdtz. Charles' army would have been. Frederick Charles' entire army could have been at Gitschin quite as soon as Benedek could have sent thither any force large enough to offer respect- able opposition; and the necessity of hurrying troops to that point would have caused the Austrian commander to relax materially the pressure upon the Crown Prince ; a pressure which Frederick Charles had every reason to believe greater than it really was. Hozier states that the Prussian comman- der had formed a plan to capture the entire army of Clani- Gallas; but Adams truly remarks that the destruction of the Austro-Saxons at Miinchengratz would not have compensated for a severe defeat of the Crown Prince. Moreover, as we have seen, Clam-Gallas was not captured, but fell back upon Gitschin, whence he was able to form a junction with the main army. Had Frederick Charles pushed a force to Git- schin, and with the rest of his army dealt Clam-Gallas such a blow as to send him reeling back towards Prague, the Prus- sian general would have reaped the double advantage of inter- posing between the divided forces of the enemy and facilitat- ing his own junction with the Crown Prince. Adams correctly says of Frederick Charles: "The fault attributable to the Prince is, that with a superiority of force at his command, which gave him unbounded advantage over his enemy, he refused to incur risks which that fact reduced' to a minimum, in the general interests of the campaign."* *The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based mainly on the comments of Major Adams, in his "Great Campaigns in Europe." Hozier, who, in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History of the war, has nothing but praise for the Prince. The absence of adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles in the Prussian Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and social position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward movement by Fred- erick Charles would have caused Clam-Gallas to abandon Miinchengratz at once, and does not seem to consider that if the Austro-Saxons had not been dislodged, Clam- Gallas would have had the Prussian communications by the throat, while covering TJie Invasion of Hohemia. 49 To return to the Second Army: The Crown Prince received information, at 1 o'clock in the morning, of the defeat of the 1st Corps at Trautenau. The 1st Division of the Guards was at once ordered to move against Gablentz from Eypel,and the 2d Division (which had been intended to support the Vth Corps) was ordered from Kosteletz to support the 1st Division. The movement was begun at 4 a. m. Anticipating the attack, Gablentz took up a position facing east, with his left in Trautenau and his right at Prausnitz, about five miles south of the former village. A brigade of the Austrian I Vth Corps, ordered to his assistance from Jaromir, mistook the route, and did not arrive in time to participate in the action. The Prussian attack was begun by the 1st Division of the Guards at 9:30 a. m. The Austrian center and right were forced back upon Soor and Altenbach. The brigade on the Austrian left w^as "contained" by two Prussian battalions until thearival of the 2d Division, at 12:30 p. m., when it was driven back upon Trautenau, and the greater part of it captured. The main body of the Austrians was driven from the field, and retreated upon Neustadt and Neuschloss.* The Prussian loss was 713, killed and wounded; the Austrian loss 3674, killed, wounded, and prisoners. his own, and that this advantage might have compensated him for his separation from Benedek. It may ba urged in objection to these comments, that Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his front at the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate a strategical advantage, and power to form a correct estimate of the enemy's dispositions, are tests of a general's merits as a strategist. McClellan is not excused for believing that, when Lee was attacking his right at Gaines' Mill, the enemy was in strong force between the Federal army and Richmond; and Hamley is not gentle in his comments on Napoleon's failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions of the Prussians at Jena ; though he does not hesitate to adopt another standard of criticism when he finds it necessary to defend Wellington for his error in leaving at Hal 17,000 men so sorely needed at Waterloo. (See Hamley's " Operations of War," p. 94 et seq., and p. 198. ) ♦Neustadt is about 2 miles south from Neuschloss. 4 50 Tlie Caiit/iatijii. of Koiilt/i/'riUz. While the Guards were thus engaged in repairing the defeat of the 1st Corps, the Vth Corps was battling with the Austrians at Skalitz. Baron Ramming, commanding the Aus- trian Vlth Corps, having called for reinforcements, Benedek ordered the Vlllth Corps to Dolan, about four miles west of Skalitz, and gave the command of both corps to the Archduke Leopold. Early on the morning of the 28th the Vlllth Corps relieved the Vlth in its position on the east bank of the Aupa, in front of Skalitz, and the latter took up a position as a reserve in rear of the right wing. The IVth Corps was stationed at Dolan. On the Prussian side, Steinmetz had been reinforced by a brigade of the Vlth Corps. The Austrians had begun a retrograde movement before the Prussian attack commenced ; and the corps of Baron Ramming was already too far to the rear to give efficient support to the Vlllth Corps. After a severe action, the Austrians were driven from their position, and retreated upon Lanzow and Salney; the IVth Corps, as a rear guard, holding Dolan. The Prussian loss in the battle of Skalitz was 1365 killed, wounded, and missing; the Austrians lost nearly 6000 men, of whom 2500 were prisoners. The battles of Soor and Skalitz opened the passes qf Trautenau and Nachod to the unimpeded advance of the 1st and Vlth Corps. During these battles the Crown Prince was stationed at Kosteletz, from which point he might easily reach either battle-field, if his presence should become necessary. In the night he went to Trautenau. The distance between the advance guard of Frederick Charles, at Ztowa, and that of the Crown Prince, at Burkers- dorf (near Soor), was only twenty-seven miles. The J iifa-'^ioii of lloh&mia. 51 JUNE 29th.* Intelligence received at the Prussian headquarters of the battles in which the armies had been engaged, rendered it certain that of the seven Austrian army corps, the IVth, Vlth, Vlllth, and Xth were opposed to the Crown Prince, and that only the 1st Corps and the Saxons were arrayed against Fred- erick Charles. The position of the Illd Corps was unknown ; but it was clear that it was the only one that could come to the assistance of Count Clam-Gallas, as the lid Corps was known to be far to the rear. The necessity of relieving the Crown Piince from the overwhelming numbers of Benedek,t and the prospect of being able to deliver a crushing blow upon the inferior force in his front,'alike rendered it of the ut- most importance that Frederick Charles should move promptly upon Gitschin. Apparently impatient at the Prince's delay, Moltke reiterated the instructions already given him, saying, in a telegram from Berlin on June 29th: "His Majesty ex- pects that a speedy advance of the First Army will disengage the Second Army, which, notwithstanding a series of success- ful actions, is still momentarily in a precarious situation." Frederick Charles, who had already decided to advance without further delay, at once moved as follows: The Left, from Turnau, via Rowensko; The Center, from Podol, via Sobotka; The Right, from Miinchengratz, via Ober Bautzen and Sobotka; The Army of the Elbe, from Miinchengratz, via Unter Bautzen and lyibau. *See Maps 7 and S. fit should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps immediately op- posed to the Crown Prince, the Hid and lid Austrian Corps were at Benedek's dis- posal; the latter being scarcely more than two marches distant from Josephstadt. 52 The Cainpdigii of Kuniggrdtz. The adv'auce of the army was rendered difficult by the small number of roads available. The leading divisions were started as early as possible, to make a long march, in order that the other divisions might proceed in the evening on the same routes. It was, even then, necessary for the Army of the Elbe to make a long detour. Count Clam-Gallas, having been promised the assistance of the Illd Corps, resolved to make a stand near Gitschin. His position was on a range of hills west and north of that village, his right resting upon the village of Eisenstadl, his left on the Anna Berg, near Lochow. In front of the center were the rocky heights of Prywicin," which, being almost impassable for ordinary pedestrians, would isolate the attacks of the enemy, while, terminating in front of the Austrian po- sition, they could not interfere with the free movements of the troops on the defensive. In front of the hills were ravines, gullies and broken ground. The position was thus very strong for an army whose role was a purely defensive one. Tiimpling's division (5th), leaving Rowensko at 1:30 p.m., came in contact with the enemy shortly after 3 o'clock. Wer- der's division (3d) left Zehrow at noon; but, having a greater distance to march, did not strike the enemy until 5:30. Tiimp- ling immediately attacked the Austrian right, with a view to cutting off Count Clam-Gallas from the main armyof Benedek. The action continued, with varying fortune, until 7:80, when, Tiimpling having carried the villageof Dielitz, in the center of the Austrian right wnng, Werder having gained ground on the left, and Benedek having sent word that the assistance of the I lid Corps could not be given. Count Clam-Gallas ordered a retreat. The Austrians retired in good order upon Gitschin; the retreat of the right wing being covered by an attack of a The lurasion of Boliemia. 53 brigade upon the Prussians at Dielitz; that of the left by an attack of a regiment of infantry and a battalion of rifles. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. Following the enemy, the Prussians, after a sharp fight with the Austrian rear guard in the streets, occupied Gitschin after midnight. The Prussian I0.SS was 2612 killed, wounded, and missing; the Austrians lost about 7000 men, of whom 4000 were prisoners. Count Clam- Gallas reported to Benedek that he had been defeated, that he was no longer able to oppose Frederick Charles, and that he was retreating upon Koniggratz. Benedek now determined to throw his main force on Frederick Charles, leaving a "containing" force to oppose the Crown Prince. But, with this object in view, his dispositions were faulty. Strangely ignoring the results of the battles of Nachod, Soor, and Skalitz, he seems to have thought that one corps would suffice to hold the Crown Prince in check; and on the morning of the 29th he issued orders for the advance of the Hid Corps to Gitschin, and the Reserve Cavalry to Hor- zitz. The lid, Vlth, Vlllth, and Xth were to follow on the next day in the direction of lyomnitz and Turnau. But during the day events occurred which necessitated a complete change of plan. In the Second Army the 1st Corps marched via Trautenau to Pilnikau, and the cavalry division following it halted at Kaile, where the Crown Prince established his headquarters. The Guards advanced upon Koniginhof, from which place they drove out a brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, captur- ing about 400 prisoners. The Vth Corps (with one brigade of the Vlth), marching upon Gradlitz, encountered the other brigades of the Austrian IVth Corps at Schweinschadel, and, after an action of three, 54 The Cam jiiiujii of KihiujuriUz. hours, drove them from the field with a loss of nearly 7)000 meu, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Austrians retreated to Salney. The Crown Prince had now reached the Elbe. During the day Benedek, becoming alarmed at the prog- ress of the Second Army, countermanded the order for the Hid Corps to move upon Oitschin, and directed it to remain at Miletin. The 1st Corps and the Saxons were ordered to join the main army via Horzitz and Miletin; but the orders, as we have seen, came too late to save them from their defeat at Gitschin. The rest of the army was concentrated before night upon the plateau of Dubenetz, against the army of the Crown Prince, as follows: The IVth Corps at Salney, with the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, and the 2d Light Cavalry Division on its right and rear; The lid Corps at Kukus, on the left of the IVth; The Vlllth Corps near Kasow (one brigade in line on the left of the lid Corps, the other brigades as reserve); The Vlth Corps on the left of the Vlllth; The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division on the left of the Vlth Corps; The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division on the extreme left wing; The Xth Corps, in reserve, between Stern and Liebthal. Five army corps and four cavalry divisions were thus concentrated on a line five and one-half miles long. The nature of the ground was unfavorable to the interior com- munications of the line, but it was, in the main, a strong posi- tion, with the Elbe on its front and the fortress of Josephstadt protecting its right flank. Tlte Invasion of Bohemia. 55 The junction of the Prussian armies now seemed assured, and the strategical situation was decidedly against Benedek. His great fault was his failure to decide promptly in regard to the army which he should "contain" while throwing his weight upon the other. Placing an exaggerated value upon his interior position, he does not seem to have considered that every hour of Prussian advance diminished his advantages; and he was, apparently, unable to make his choice of the two plans of operations which presented themselves. His best move, if made in time, w^ould have been against Frederick Charles. True, his communications could have been quickly cut, in this case, by a successful advance of the Second Army across the Elbe: while in moving against the Crown Prince, his communications could not so readily have been seized bj^ Frederick Charles. But, on the other hand, topographical features made it an easier matter to "contain" the Second Army than the B'irst Army and the Army of the Elbe. If the Feld- zeugmeister had learned the lesson taught at Atlanta, Frank- lin, and Petersburg, he would have made use of hasty intrench- ments. The Xth Corps and Vlth Corps, strongly intrenched, could certainly have held the passes against the assaults of the Crown Prince. The ground was admirably adapted to defense, and the intrenchments would have more than neu- tralized the superiority of the needle-gun over the Lorenz rifle. To have invested and reduced the intrenched camps, if possible at all, would have required much more time than Benedek would have needed for disposing of Frederick Charles. To have advanced by the road leading to Olmiitz or Bomisch Triibau, the Crown Prince would have been com- pelled to mask the passes with at least as many troops as gar- risoned the camps at their outlets, or his own communications 56 The Campaign of Koniggrdtz. would have been at the mercy of the Austrians. This would have left him only two corps; and an invasion of Moravia with this small force, every step of the advance carrying him farther away from Frederick Charles, would have been an act of suicidal madness, which he would not have seriously con- templated for a moment. When Osman Pasha, eleven years later, paralyzed the advance of 110,000 Russians, by placing 40,000 Turks in a hastily intrenched position on their right, at Plevna, he showed plainly how Benedek might have baulked the Second Army with intrenched positions at the Silesian passes. lyeaviug, then, two corps to take care of the Crown Prince, the Austrian commander would have had (including the Sax- ons) six corps, and nearly all of the reserve cavalry and artil- lery, to use against Frederick Charles. Count Clam Gallas, instead of undertaking the task of holding the line of the Iser, should have destroyed the bridges; and, opposing the Prus- sians with a strong rear guard at the different crossings, obstructing the roads, offering just enough resistance to com- pel his adversary to deploy and thus lose time, but avoiding anything like a serious action, he should have fallen back via Gitschin to form a junction with Benedek. He could thus have gained sufiScient time for his chief to arrive at Gitschin as soon as Frederick Charles; and the army of the latter, num- bering not more than 130,000 men,* would have been opposed by an army of fully 200,000 Austrians. What the result would have been we can best judge from the course of the *At the battle of Koniggratz, Frederick Charles had 128,918 men. His losses at Gitschin aggregated 2612 men. It seems, therefore, that 130,000 men is a high esti- mate of the maximum force which he would have been able to oppose to Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a junction with Clam-Gallas at that point. The Invasion of Bohemia. 57 battle of Koniggratz before the Crown Prince arrived upon the field. Hozier, Adams, Derrecagaix, and (above all) the Prus- sian Official History of the Campaign of 1866, claim tl at the best move of Benedek would have been against the Crown Prince. If we consider the successful passage of the defiles by the Second Army as a thing to be taken for granted in Benedek's plan of campaign, there can be no doubt that the Austrian commander should have turned his attention to the Crown Prince, and that he should have attacked him with six corps, as soon as the Prussians debouched from the defiles of Trautenau and Nachod. The line of action here suggested as one that would probably have resulted in Austrian success is based entirely on the condition that the Second Army should be "contained" at the defiles, by a force strongly intrenched after the American manner of 1864-5; a condition not considered by the eminent authorities mentioned above. After the Crown Prince had safely passed the defiles, Benedek had either to attack him or fall back. The time for a success- ful move against Frederick Charles had passed. The Austrian commander had carefully planned an invasion of Prussia. Had he been able to carry the war into that country, his operations might, perhaps, have been admir- able; but when the superior preparation of the Prussians enabled them to take the initiative, he seems to have been incapable of throwing aside his old plans and promptly adopt- ing new ones suited to the altered condition of affairs. Bene- dek was a good tactician and a stubborn fighter; but when he told the Emperor, "Your Majesty, I am no strategist," and wished to decline the command of the ajmy, he showed a power of correct self-analysis equal to that displayed by Burn- 58 The Cani/xiign (il(jii of KlJitiuf/rdlz. to the attack, the Austrians dislodged the Guards from the village after a bloody struggle; but as they halted at the out- skirts of the town to re-form for another assault, the Guards were reinforced by the advance guard of the 1st Corps. At the same time, the commander of the Prussian Vlth Corps, leaving the 12th Division engaged with the Austrians at Loche- uitz, half-wheeled the 11th Division to the right, and advanced from Nedelist upon Rosberitz. The Austrian lid Corps was already in retreat. A counter-attack of the Guards and the 1st Corps drove the Austrians out of Rosberitz, and the 11th Division, striking them on the flank, routed them with heavy loss. The 11th Division then attacked a brigade of the Aus- trian IVth Corps, which had taken up a position near Sweti to protect the reserve artillery. The brigade and the artillery were driven back to the village, which was carried by assault, many cannon being captured. The Vth Corps reached Hore- nowes at 4 o'clock, and was designated as the general reserve of the army. The full tide of Prussian success had now set in. The 16th Division had not yet crossed at Nechanitz, but the 14th and 15th Divisions had defeated the Saxons and the Austrian Vlllth Corps and the Allies were in retreat. Both of the Aus- trian flanks had been crushed, and the First Army was now actively engaged in an attack upon Benedek's front. The aid-de-camp sent by the Crown Prince to announce his approach had been delayed by the condition of the roads and the necessity of making a long detour, and did not arrive at the royal headquarters until late in the afternoon. The Crown Prince's advance was first made known to the com- mander of the First Army by the flashes of the Prussian guns on the heights of Horenowes. Soon after, the Prussian col- The Hallle of K(jniij;/riilz. 85 umns were seen ascending the heights of Maslowed. The fire of the Austrian guns in front perceptibly diminished, and it was evident that some of the batteries had changed front to the right. It was clear that the Second Army had struck the Austrian flank; and at 3:80 o'clock the King ordered the First Army to "advance all along the line " The retreat of the Aus- trian Xth Corps had begun, but it was concealed by the nature of the ground, and covered by the line of artillery, which devotedly maintained its position, and kept up a heavy fire, until its own existence was imperiled by the advance of the foe. The Xth Corps had passed well beyond the danger of infantry pursuit when the advance of the First Army was ordered. The Austrian artillerists held to their position until the enemy was almost at the muzzle of the cannon, and then withdrawing to Rosnitz and Briza, with all the guns that their stubborn defense had not compelled them to sacrifice, again opened fire upDU the Prussians. The cavalry, too, devoted itself to the task of covering the retreat. The Prussian cav- alry, which had been delayed by the blocking of the bridges by the artillery, and the crowding of the roads by the infantry, now appeared in the front of the pursuers, and fierce cavalry combats took place near I,angenhof, Stresetitz, and Problus. The Austrian cavalry displayed reckless courage, and in many instances beat back its adversary, only to be received by a destructive fire from the Prussian infantry and artillery. It made a noble fight against hopeless odds, and at the sacrifice of its best blood it succeeded in temporarily checking the Prussian advance, and greatly assisted in covering the retreat of the army.'^^ Frederick Charles, bringing up 54 guns to the heights of *See Appendix, Note A. 8() The Campaign of Knnif/i/riilz. Wsestar and Sweti, opened fire upon the new line of Austrian artillery. The Austrian batteries replied with spirit, until the advance of the 11th Division upon Rosnitz and Briza com- pelled them to withdraw, with the loss of 36 guns. Still un- daunted, the artillery took up a new position on the line Stosser-Freihofen-Zeigelshag. Here all available guns were brought into action, and under their fire the Prussian pursuit virtually ended. Withdrawing in excellent order to the line Placitz-Kuklena, the Austrian artillery kept up a duel with the Prussian guns on the line Klacow-Stezerek until long after darkness had set in. The Prussian Stafif History says: "The behavior of the cavalry and the well-sustained fire of the powerful line of artillery at Placitz and Kuklena, proved that part, at least, of the hostile army still retained its full power of resistance. "It is truelhat affairs behind this line of artillery bore a very different aspect. At first the corps had, for the most part, taken the direction of the bridges northward of Konig- gratz, but were prevented from using them by the advance of the Prussian extreme left wing. This caused the different bodies of troops to become promiscuously and confusedly mingled together. The flying cavalry, shells bursting on all sides, still further increased the confusion, which reached its climax when the commandant of Koniggratz, closed the gates of the fortress. "Hundreds of wagons, either overturned or thrust oflf from the highroad, riderless horses, and confused crowds of men trying to escape across the inundated environs of the fortress and the river, many of them up to their necks in water — this spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout, immediately before The Ittilllc of Kdnifjgralz. 87 the gates of Koniggriitz, was naturally hidden from the view of the pursuing enemy." A prompt pursuit would, however, hive been impractica- ble, even if the Prussians had fully appreciated the extent of the Austrian demoralization. The concentric attacks, so magnificently decisive on the field, had produced an almost chaotic confusion on the part of the victors themselves. Ow- ing to the direction of their attacks, the Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were "telescoped" together; and the advance of the First Army had jammed it into the right flank of the former and the left flank of the latter. At noon the front of the combined Prussian armies had been more than sixteen miles long. The front of this great host was now but little more than two miles, and men of different regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and even armies, were indiscriminately min- gled together. Aside from this confusion, the exhaustion of the Prussian soldiers precluded pursuit, ^^ost of them had left their bivouacs long before dawn, and it had been a day of hard marching and hard fighting for all. Many had been entirel)^ without food, all were suffering from extreme fatigue, and several officers had fallen dead on the field from sheer exhaustion. As a result of the exhaustion of the Prussians and the excellent conduct of the Austrian cavalry and artillery, Bene- dek slipped across the Elbe, and gained such a start on his adversaries that for three days the Prussians lost all touch with him, and were in complete ignorance of the direction of his retreat. Thus ended the great battle of Koniggratz. The Prussian losses were : 1935 killed, 6959 wounded, and 278 missing. The Austrians lost 4861 killed, 13,920 wounded, and 25,419 88 The ( 'dill juiKjii (if h'i'iiiii/i/riitz. missing, including in the last classification 19,800 prisoners. They also lost 101 guns, five stands of colors, several thousand muskets, several hundred wagons, and a ponton train. The sum total of the killed and vi^ounded in this battle was 27,675. No sketch of the campaign of Koniggratz could be complete without a consideration of the retreat of the Aus- trian army upon Olmiitz and Vienna, the masterly march of Moltke to the Danube, the Italian disasters of Custozza and lyissa, and the campaign in which the Army of the Main defeated the Bavarians and the Vlllth Federal Corps; but Koniggratz was the decisive battle of the war. Austria could not rally from her disaster, and twenty-three days alter the battle the truce of Nikolsburg virtually ended the contest. Cuinmeiils on (he Cainpavjn and Jlallle. 89 Chapter VI. COMMENTS ON THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE. It is not only on account of its great and far-reaching results that Koniggratz must be rated as one of the greatest battles of the world. In point of numbers engaged, it was the greatest battle of modern times, for the two contending armies aggregated nearly half a million men. In this respect it ex- ceeded Gravelotte, dwarfed Solferino, and even surpassed the "Battle of Nations," fought on the plains of Leipsic, fifty-two years before. Yet, considering the numbers engaged, the loss of life was not great. The sum total of the killed and wounded was nearly 6000 less than at Gettysburg, though in that sanguinary strug- gle the combined strength of the Union and Confederate armies was less than that of the Austrian army alone at Koniggratz.* In fact, of all the battles of the War of Seces- sion, Fredericksburg, Chattanooga, and Cold Harbor were the only ones in which the losses of the victors, in killed and wounded, did not exceed, in proporiion to the numbers en- gaged, the losses of the defeated army at Koniggratz. A bit of reflection upon these facts might convince ceitain European critics that the failure of victorious American armies to pur- sue their opponents vigorously was due to other causes than inefficient organization or a lack of military skill. In the words of Colonel Chesney: "In order to pursue, there must be some *The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 93,500. The Confederate army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3072 killed, and 14,497 wounded. The Confederates lost 2592 killed, and 12,709 wounded. 90 The Cai)ipiiini(/(initz. of the division. From Schliichtern, Beyer marched direct to the suburbs of Briickenau. Goeben marched through and beyond Briickenau, and Manteuffel, following, occupied the town. The Army of the Main was now clo.sely concentrated within nine miles of the Bavarians, who were extended along the Saale, from Neustadt to Hammelburg, occupying a line 22^ miles long. On July lOth, Falckenstein directed Beyer on Hammel- burg and Goeben on Kissingen. Manteufifel was ordered to move on Waldaschach, and then to follow Goeben. The Bavarians were encountered at Hammelburg and Kissingen and defeated with some loss. Minor actions, with similar results, were fought on the same day at Friedrichshall, Hausen, and Waldaschach, up the river from Kissingen. The Bavari- ans retreated to Schweinfurt and Wiirzburg, and the passes of the Saale remained in the hands of the Prussians. All military principles now dictated an advance against Schweinfurt, for the purpose of giving the Bavarians a crushing defeat and disposing of them altogether. Such a move would, doubtless, have been made by Falckenstein, had not political considerations been at this time paramount. The Prussian victories in Austria rendered it probable that peace confer- ences would soon be held; and, at the request of Bismarck, Falckenstein was notified that it was of political importance to be in actual possession of the country north of the Main, as negotiations would probably soon take place on the s^aiu quo basis. Falckenstein, therefore, decided to move against the Vlllth Corps, for the purpose of clearing the right bank of the Main entirely of the hostile forces. Prince Alexander, thoroughly alarmed at the condition of affairs, now sought to form a junction with the Bavarians at Western Germany and Italy. J 37 Wiirzburg, via Aschaffenburg and Gemiindeu. As a prelim- inary to this movement, a Hessian brigade was sent to Aschaf- fenburg, to secure the passage of the Main at that point and to reconnoiter the Prussians. The contemplated movement was hopeless from the start, unless the Bavarians could render assistance by advancing to Gemiinden; and, after the actions on the Saale, they were not in a condition to do so. As it was, Prince Alexander was endeavoring to cross the difficult moun- tain region between Aschaffenburg and Gemiinden, in the face of a victorious army, superior to his own in numbers and morale, to effect a junction with an ally who was unable to lend him a helping hand. It was the height of folly; for the junction could have been easily and safely made south of the Main. True, this would have necessitated the sacrifice of Frankfort; but defeat north of the Main would compel the evacuation of the city, and defeat was now practically invited. Turning away from the Bavarians, Falckenstein moved down the Main; Goeben in advance, followed by Manttuflfel, while Beyer moved, by way of the Kinzig valley, on Hanau. On July 13th, the Hessian brigade was defeated by Goeben at Laufach, and fell back on Aschaffenburg, to which place rein- forcements were hurried by Prince Alexander. On the follow- ing day the Vlllth Corps was defeated by Goeben at Aschaf- fenburg. The brunt of the battle was borne by an Austrian brigade attached to the Federal Corps, but few troops of the Hessian contingents being engaged, and the Wiirtemberg and Baden troops arriving too late. Had Prince Alexander con- centrated his entire force at Aschaffenburg, the result might have been bad for the Prussians, for their march was so unskill- fully conducted that Goeben was without support; the other detachments of Falckenstein's army being more than thirty 138 77/0 Cainpaif/ii of Kliniggrdtz. miles in rear. The Prussians did not pursue the enemy, l)ut contented themselves with remaining in possession of the field. Prince Alexander was now convinced of the impossibility of effecting a junction at Wiirzburg via Aschaffenburg. He accordingly abandoned the line ot the I^ower Main and con- centrated his force at Dieburg. Frankfort was thus left defenseless, and the remnants of the German Diet fled to Augsburg. Prince Charles now proposed a junction of the Allies in the vicinity of Wiirzburg, the Vlllth Corps to move via Miltenberg and Tauberbischofsheim, and the concentra- tion to be effected on the 20th of July. This movement neces- sitated a march of some ninety miles for the Vlllth Corps, and the uncovering of Southwest Germany, while the Bavari- ans had to march only a few miles, and continued to cover their own territories; but the imminent danger which now threatened the Vlllth Corps caused Prince Alexander to for- get local and personal jealousies, and strive to effect the junc- tion which the military situation imperatively demanded. On the 16th of July the Prussians entered Frankfort, where they remained until the 21st; Goeben's division occu- pying the city, Beyer's division being stationed at Hanau, and Manteuffel's division holding Aschaffenburg. The entire re- gion north of the Main was in the possession of the Prussians, Frankfort had been especially antagonistic to Prussia, and it now felt the full force of the severity of the conquerors. Falckenstein levied a contribution of $3,000,000 on the city, and soon followed this heavy exaction by a demand for a sec- ond enormous contribution of $10,000,000. The King of Prussia, however, remitted the second contribution after hear- ing the appeal and protest of the citizens. Western Germany and Italy. 139 On the 16th of July, Falckeiistein was relieved from the •command of the Army of the Main, and appointed military governor of Bohemia. He was succeded by Manteuffel, whose division was placed under command of Flies. Reinforcements now raised the Army of the Main to a strength of 50,000 men and 121 guns. The capture of Frankfort and the possession of the coun- try north of the Main had been obtained at the sacrifice of the great strategic advantage enjoyed by the Prussians. It was no longer possible to prevent the concentration of the Vlllth Corps and the Bavarians, and on the 22d of July this junction was completed; the former corps holding the line of the Tauber, and the latter occupying a position between that river and Wiirzburg. Although the allied forces now numbered 80,000 men and 286 guns, Manteuffel decided to move against them from Frankfort. The advantage of the Allies was in numbers alone; in morale, and in the strategic situation, the advantage was with the Prussians. Manteuffel now had a line of communi- cation through Frankfort and Cassel. Though he could no longer keep the Allies asunder, he could, by marching to the Tauber, compel them to "form front to a flank," while his own front securely covered his communications. His communica- tions could be intercepted only by a movement of the Allies north of the Main, which would reciprocally expose their own. The Allies had hardly effected their junction when a want of harmony in the views of their commanders again became evident. An offensive movement against the Prussians was agreed upon ; but Prince Charles wished to move by the left bank of the Main on Frankfort, while Prince Alexander pre- 140 The Campaign of h'dnii/i/nil-:. ferred a movemeiil by the right bank on Aschaffenburg. The former was, doubtless, the better move — at all events it was the safer ; for the Allies would have covered their communica- tions better, and a junction might, perhaps, have been effected with the large garrison at Mayence — but, after two days of discussion and deliberation, the latter movement was agreed upon. In the meantime, while the Allies were deliberating,. Manteuffel was acting; and he was now moving rapidly towards the Tauber. On July 23d the Prussians touched the enemy. A slight and indecisive action was fought by a Prussian advance guard with the Baden division at Hundheim, and the advanced troops of the Vlllth Corps were pressed back along their whole line. While the Prussians were thus closing upon the Federal Corps, the Bavarians began the contemplated movement by the right bank of the Main ; one division being sent by rail to Gemiin- den, another to lyohr (on the right bank, farther down), and part of a third to Wertheim. Thus the junction of the Allies, which had been effected with such difficulty, was voluntarily broken at the very moment of contact with the enemy. The line of the allied forces, on the evening of July 28d, was thirty- six miles in extent; while Manteuffel's army was closely con- centrated in their immediate front. Prince Alexander, finding himself beyond the immediate assistance of the Bavarians, withdrew all his detachments behind the Tauber, where his corps was spread over a space seven miles in breadth and nine in depth, in a country full of deep ravines, which rendered prompt movements, especially of cavalry and artillery, quite out of the question. On the 24th, Goeben defeated the Wiirtembergers at Tauberbischofsheim, and the Baden division at Werbach. Western Germany and Italy. 141 The retreat of the Baden troops uncovered Prince Alexander's right flank, and there was now imminent danger of the Prus- sians again pushing in and separating the Vlllth Corps from the Bavarians. Prince Alexander, therefore, fell back to Gerchs- heim, and the Bavarians withdrew to Helmstadt. Prince Charles ordered the Vlllth Corps back to the line of the Tauber, though the Bavarians could render no immediate assistance. Prince Alexander, doubtless appreciating the folly ■of attempting, without reinforcements, to dislodge the victori- ous Prussians from a position which he had been unable to hold against them, seems to have paid no attention to the order, for he proceeded at once to concentrate his scattered divisions at Gerchsheim. On July 25th Goeben formed the right of the Prussian line, Beyer the center, and Flies the left Goeben was to attack the Vlllth Corps in front, while Beyer turned its right and cut it off from Wiirzburg. Flies was to keep his division concentrated on the left; for nothing was known of the where- abouts of the Bavarians, and it was surmised that they might "be somewhere in that direction. Beyer, moving against the Vlllth Corps, unexpectedly encountered a Bavarian division at Helmstadt, and defeated it, after an engagement which lasted some hours. While the Prussians were resting on the field, after the action, a second Bavarian division suddenly appeared on the crest of a hill in the rear of Beyer's left wing. So completely was Beyer without information as to the position of the Bavarians, that he was in doubt whether these troops were friend or foe. The Bavari- ans were in a similar quandary. In fact, they had accidentally stumbled upon the Prussians, and the surprise was mutual. As soon as he discovered that he was in the presence of a 142 The Ciunpaign- of KlJniggrdlz. hostile force, Beyer executed a change of front to the left and succeeded in gaining another victory. While Beyer was engaged with the Bavarians, Goeben was batting with the Vlllth Corps at Gerchsheini. Prince Alexander was again defeated, and driven in rout on Wiirzburg. The night after these actions Prince Charles held a coun- cil of war, and finally decided to attack Flies, who, having ad- vanced, was now on the Prussian left. Ivcarning, however, that his own left had been uncovered by the defeat of the Vlllth Corps, the Bavarian commander resolved to stand on the defensive on the plateau of Waldbiittelbrlinn (in rear of Ross- briinn*), and ordered Prince Alexander to take up a position immediately in front of Wiirzburg, to cover the retreat of the army across the Main, should such a movement be necessary. About 3 o'clock, on the morning of July 26th, a simulta- neous attempt of the Bavarians and Flies to occupy some com- manding ground which lay between the outposts brought on an action at Rossbriinn. While Flies was engaged with the Bavarians, Beyer struck them heavily on the flank, and by 10 o'clock they were in full retreat. The Prussians did not at- tempt a pursuit, and by 1 o'clock p. m. Prince Charles had rallied and concentrated his corps on the plateau of Waldbiit- telbriinn. In the meantime the Vlllth Corps had crossed the Main. The position of the Bavarians was now full of peril. Their allies had been defeated, and were glad to place a river between themselves and the Prussians. The Bavarians were, conse- quently, alone on the left bank of the Main ; their losses had •Rossbriinn is not marked on the map. It is about 7 miles due west of Wiirzburg. Western Germany and Italy. 148 been considerable; their morale was shattered; their retreat across the defiles of the Main was insecure; and a defeat in their present position meant absolute ruin. The Prussian Official History says: "A renewed attack on the part of the Prussian main forces would necessarily have forced it (the Bavarian Corps) to a struggle for life or death. The political situation of affairs showed no reason for bringing on so des- perate a combat. The only object henceforth was to occupy as much territory of the Allies as possible, in order to facilitate peace negotiations with them, and maneuvering against the enemy's left flank would oblige him to retreat without any hard struggle." This apology for a failure to complete the defeat of a shattered and unsupported hostile force seems some- what disingenuous. A complete defeat and surrender of the Bavarians would have been quickly followed by the capture or dispersion of the Vlllth Corps, and the entire South-German territory would have been at the mercy of the Prussians. Certainly such a condition of affairs would have "facilitated peace negotiations" by rendering further resistance hopeless. Moreover, the same history states that the retreat of the Vllltli Corps behind the Main was not known at the Prussian head- quarters; and it seems probable that inefficient performance of outpost and reconnaissance duties on the part of the Prussians, rather than any considerations of politics or magnanimity, saved the Bavarians from destruction. Late in the day, Prince Charles withdrew across the Main. On July 27th the Prussians moved on Wtirzburg. Their artillery exchanged shots with the citadel of Marienberg (on the left bank of the Main, opposite Wiirzburg), and succeeded in setting fire to the arsenal, but withdrew without effecting anything of moment. 144 The Campaign of Koninqrlilz. The contending armies now faced each other; each in an almost impregnable position. The situation was, however, altogether in favor of the Prussians. Their communications were secure, while the communications of the Allies with Hesse, Baden, and Wiirtemberg were intercepted, and those with Bavaria were endangered, by the position of the Army of the Main. Moreover, the Prussian lid Reserve Corps had moved from Saxony via Leipsic, Plauen, and Hof, and was now approaching Baireuth. In the language of thePrussianOfficial History: "The position of the Bavarian army at Wiirzburg had now become untenable. It could only extricate itself from its present position either by assuming the offensive against the Prussian army — which was scarcely possible at this point — or by a retrograde movement up the Main, so as to face the army to the north and re establish its base on the Bavarian territory in its rear." But the bitterness of extreme defeat was not pushed home to the Allies; for on July 28th news of the peace preliminaries between Prussia and Austria, and of an armistice with Bava- ria, was received. Though the truce with Bavaria was not to go into effect until August 2d, hostilities were suspended, the only movement of importance being the occupation of Nurem- berg by the Prussian lid Reserve Corps. Peace was concluded on August 13ih with Wiirtemberg, on the 1 7th with Baden, and on the 22d with Bavaria. It is hardly possible to contemplate the operations of the armies in Western Germany, in 1866, with au}^ feeling of ad- miration. In the strategical operations of Falckenstein and Manteuffel are found the only redeeming features of the cam- paign. Falckenstein especially, in pushing in between the two armies of the Allies, and defeating them in succession, Western Germany and Italy. 145 displayed generalship of no mean order; but the want of harmony between the allied leaders removed every obstacle from the path of Prussian success. The Prussians seem to have been often completely in the dark as to the designs, and even in regard to the positions, of the Allies. We find the Army of the Main waiting, in a defensive position, nearly two days, in ignorance of its own victor}' at Wiesenthal. We find the Prussians winning a victory at Aschafienburg, when their own unskillful march invited a defeat, and their success was due solely to the greater blunders of their opponents. Before, and even during, the battle of Helmstadt, the Prussians seem to have been in complete ignorance of the position and movements of Prince Charles, and Beyer's escape from disas- ter when surprised by the Bavarians was due solely to the fact that the surprise was accidental and mutual Advance guard, outpost, and reconnaissance duties seem to have been performed with the grossest ineflSciency. In almost every action the Prussians seem to have been unaware of the extent of their victory, or to have shown an incapacity to organize a pursuit. Gneisenau and his famous order to "pursue to the last breath of horse and man" seem to have been forgotten in the Army of the Main; and we find Prince Charles, after the battle of Rossbriinn, quietly slipping back, without molesta- tion, to an almost impregnable position, when a simple frontal attack by the Prussians would have completed the discomfit- ure and insured the destruction of the Bavarian army. As to the Allies, every adverse criticism that can be made on their opponents applies to them in a still higher degree. Their leaders rarely rose to the level of respectable medioc- rity. The junction of the allied corps, which was imperative from the first, was made only when they were practically 146 The Cnmpairjn nf Kmiiqqrdtz. herded together by the movements of the Prussians- As soon as they had been forced into the long desired junction, they voluntarily undertook an ill-advised movement which sepa- rated them again, at the very moment of their contact with the enemy. Incapacity and jealousy were characteristics of both the allied commanders; and to these defects Prince Alexander added the greater fault of insubordination. It would be hard to find among the improvised "political generals" who ap- peared on the stage of war in the earlier part of the American conflict a single one who possessed in a greater degree than Prince Charles or Prince Alexander a genius for blundering — an eminent capacity for invariably doing the wrong thing. It may be said of the two generals of the allied armies, that their operations afford a fine demonstration of the principles of war by the method of rediicHo ad absurdmn. THE OPERATIONS IN ITALY. Only a brief mention of the operations in Italy is here necessary. On the night of the 23d of June, 1866, the Ital- ian army crossed the Mincio, and encountered the Austrians at Custozza on the next day. The Italian army, numbering about 120,000 men, was under the nominal command of King Victor Emmanuel, the real commander being General La Marmora. The Austrians, numbering about 72,000, were commanded by Archduke Albrecht. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Italians, who withdrew across the Mincio. The Austrian commander remained on the defensive. Garibaldi, with about 6,000 volunteers, invaded the Tyrol, but was defeated in two small actions. Though he finally succeeded in gaining a foothold on Austrian soil, his opera- tions were of no importance. Western (Icrnunuj and fhtlij. 147 On the 20th of July, the Austrian fleet, under Tegethoff, defeated the Italian fleet in the great naval battle of Lissa, in which the Italians lost three iron-clads. Immediately after the battle of Koniggratz, Venetia was offered by Austria to the French Emperor, and the Vth and IXth Corps were recalled to the Danube. The Italians, under the command of Cialdiiii, again advanced, and the Austrians (now numbering scarcely HO, 000) fell back to the neighborhood of Venice. On the 25th of July all military operations were stopped by the conclusion of an armistice. The Italians had everywhere suffered defeat. Yet their alliance was of the utmost advantage to Prussia; for they neu- tralized three army cops, which would have been of priceless value to the Austrians in Bohemia. 148 The Campaign of Knnu/griitz. APPENDIX. Note A. The Prussian Staff History seems .reluctant to give full meed of praise to the Austrian cavalry for its gallantry in covering the retreat of the defeated army. Yet it is evident, even from the Prussian narrative, that the Austrian cavalry was not driven back in a single instance, until after it had encountered infantry or artillery, or both. The Staff History acknowledges that in one of the cavalry attacks 60 or 100 horse- men of the "Emperor Alexander Lancers" in the course of the charge dashed past Stresetitz and pushed straight in the direc- tion of the King, who had now reached a position about 400 paces to the northwest of that village. The King's personal escort were compelled to draw .saber in defense of their sover- eign, and were on fhe point of charging the hostile horsemen, when the latter came under the fire of the Both Infantry, which practically annihilated them, but few of the troopers escaping. The rest of the regiment met a similar fate, and w'as so badly mauled by the infantry and artillery fire as to be compelled to retire in great disorder. The history of the charges by the other bodies of Austrian «avalry in covering the retreat is essentially the same as that of the Emperor Alexander Lan- cers — a gallant charge, annihilating losses from infantry and artillery fire, and a retreat in confusion and disorder. It is evident, however, that the Prussian cavalry must, in every instance, have been driven back, before its adversary could Appendix. 14*.* encounter the infantry fire; and it is equally plain that the artillery could not have pounded the retreating Austrian horsemen with its fire if the Prussian cavalry had been mingled with them in vigorous pursuit. It can not admit of doubt that in the purely cavalry contests the honors of the day were with the horsemen of the defeated army; and the Austrian writers, in fact, claim greater achievements for their cavalry than the Prussian Stafi" History seems willing to grant. Perhaps the best authority among those who praise the Imperial cavalry for its conduct in this battle is Hoenig, him- self a Prussian officer, who writes with a rare freedom from national prejudice. In his work entitled "The Cavalry Divis- ion as a Body in the Fight" he says: "It is beyond a doubt that this cavalry knew the fate which awaited it, .surrounded as it was on three sides by the fire zone of breech-loaders. It was sure to be defeated at last, but the well-delivered stroke had a tremendous tactical eflFect. It relieved the pressure on the retreating army and saved it from the utter rout which would undoubtedly have followed if the Prussian cavalry had remained master of the field, or had not been attacked as it was. This is not a ca.se for flattering national sentiment, but for reviewing the events calmly, truthfully, and justly, and anyone who considers the attacks of the Austrian cavalry in this way will unhesitatingly conclude that it carried out most successfully one of the most difficult tactical duties which has ever fallen to the lot of cavalry. Cramped and shut in, it attacked the Prussian cavalry, in spite of a ceaseless flank fire of breech-loaders, forced its way right up to the infantry line of an army already intoxicated with the assurance of its great victory, and brought the whole Prussian line to a .standstill." 150 The Crnnptiif/ii of K'nniggrdtz. Note B. The following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R.K., on "The Tactics of the American War," are interesting as show- ing an able English military critic's appreciation of the ad- vanced tactical development of the American armies: "It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the study of the fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it would seem that the records of these cam- paigns fought out to the bitter end by men of our own Anglo- Saxon races, would be a far more likely source of information, from which to deduce the theory of an attack formation specially designed to meet our needs, than the histories of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and Turks. Von Moltke is reported to have said that 'nothing was to be learned from the struggle of two armed mobs.' If that is really the case, which we venture to doubt exceedingly, the great strategist must ere this have been sorry he ever spoke, for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and Northern troops bore, and bore victoriously, a percentage of loss before which even the best disciplined troops in Germany, the Prussian Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance to the argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man is hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters his head to consider whether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or breech-loader; the fact itself, that he or the other man is down, is the only one he concerns himself with, and when the percentage of hits in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses equally, no matter against what weapon it may be delivered. "Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per- centage of hits was frequently far higher than in breech-load- Appendix. ' 151 ing campaigns. There is no action on record in recent years in which the losses rose so high, and in so short a time, as in the American fights." After a brief description of Meagher's attack at Freder- icksburg, and Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, Captain Maude continues: " Surel3', Moltke never spoke of such gallant soldiers as an armed mob, seeing that they succeded in driving an attack home against four times the percentage of loss that stopped the Prussian guard at St. Privat. And, assuming for the mo- ment that the saying attributed to him is really true, we can- not help fancying that he must have often bitterly regretted it when watching his own men in the maneuvers of late years, attacking in what is really, practically the sajne formation which the armed mobs worked out for themselves. "The points of contrast between ourselves and the Ameri- cans are far too numerous to be dismissed without comment. They began the war with a drill-book and system modeled on our own, and they carried it out to its conclusion, with only a few modifications of detail, but none of principle. The nor- mal prescribed idea of an attack appears to have been as fol- lows: A line of scouts, thickened to skirmishers according to the requirements of the ground ; from 200 to 300 paces in rear, the first line two deep, precisely like our own, then in rear a second line and reserve. Of course their lines did not advance with the steady precision of our old peninsular battalions. Their level of instruction was altogether too low, and besides, the extent of fire-swept ground had greatly increased. Eye- witnesses say that after the first few yards, the line practically dissolved itself into a dense line of skirmishers, who threw themselves forward, generally at a run, as far as their momen- 152 The, Campai(]7i, of Kiiniggrdtz. tuin would carry them ; sometimes, if the distance was short, carrying the position at the first rush, but more generally the heavy losses brought them to a halt and a standing fire fight ensued. They knew nothing of Scherff's great principle, on which the Treffen Abstdnde or distances between the lines are based, but they generally worked it out in practice pretty successfully. The second line came up in the best order they could and carried the wreck of the first on with them ; if they were stopped, the reserve did the same for them, and either broke too, or succeeded. " It will be seen that, except in its being more scientifically put together, this German attack is, practically, precisely sim- ilar to that employed by the Americans, with the sole differ- ence that the breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the advantage of being able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has reduced to a certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt. "Had we, in 1871, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods employed across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new weapons did not necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our drill book, and, with a little alteration in detail, have attained at one bound to a point of efficiency not reached even in Germany till several years after the war." DC SOUTHI m HI (.lONAl I H'^'^'^^ ' f '']' '.'L AA 000 908 540 8