A MILITARY 
 PRIMER 
 
EXLlBRISlI 
 
A MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 An Outline of the Duties and Responsibilities 
 of the Military Profession 
 
 AND 
 
 An Elementary Discussion of the Principles 
 
 and Practice of the Service of 
 
 Security and Information 
 
 FOURTH EDITION Revised 
 
 By 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Francis C. Marshall, 16th Cavalry. 
 
 and 
 Captain George S- Stfnjonfe, 2Zd [Infantry 
 
 1916 
 
 THE EDWARD T. MILLER COMPANY 
 COLUMBUS, OHIO 
 
/vf 
 
 FIRST EDITION Printed January, 1907 
 
 SECOND EDITION Printed September, 1908 
 
 THIRD EDITION , . Printed October, 1913 
 
 COPYRIGHT 1907, 1908, 1913 and 1916 
 By 
 
 Francis C. Marshall 
 
 and 
 
 George S. Simonds 
 PUBLISHED, December, 1916 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTERS PAGE 
 
 I. The Objects of a Military Training, - 9 
 
 II. Notes on the Organization of the Army of the 
 
 United States, - - 19 
 
 III. Map Reading, 24 
 
 IV. Orientation, - 40 
 V. The Duties of Patrols, - 46 
 
 VI. The Solution of Tactical Problems, - 67 
 
 VII. Messages, 77 
 
 VIII. Outposts, 91 
 
 IX. Advance Guards, - - 110 
 
 X. The Advance Guard, Continued, - - 125 
 
 XL Flank Guards, - 138 
 
 XII. Rear Guards, - - 146 
 
 XIII. Patrolling, Reviewed, - - 150 
 
 XIV. Measures of Securtiy for Small Commands, - - 162 
 XV. Field Sanitation, Individual Cooking, - 177 
 
 APPENDIX, --------- 185 
 
 (iii) 
 
 359185 
 
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 This book is in no sense a textbook for advanced students 
 of military science, but a book for the beginner, designed to 
 teach the cadets of the Military Academy, at the very begin- 
 ning of their military education, the objects of the profession 
 for which they are preparing themselves, to show them the 
 reason for the discipline to which they are subjected, and to 
 define some of the independent duties of subaltern officers, in 
 time of war in connection with the service of security and 
 information. 
 
 In this service they must be trained, first, by thorough 
 theoretical study of the general principles involved, and then 
 by such practical applications of those principles as can be 
 made when the enemy is imaginary, and all danger, save that 
 of criticism, is absent. 
 
 Whether an officer so trained will prove valuable under the 
 conditions attending actual hostilities, will always remain 
 more or less of a problem, until tested by those conditions; 
 but it can be asserted positively that in the present state of the 
 military profession, no one can hope to really succeed, as an 
 officer, who does not combine courage and loyalty with a 
 thorough knowledge of the principles of strategy and tactics 
 that can only come from exhaustive study. 
 
 The game of chess is the most complex game that is played 
 with inanimate tools. The game of war possesses all the 
 intricacies of chess, with the infinite added tangles caused by 
 having the chess-men equipped with human minds, moved by 
 the will, and not by the hand, of the master player, and by 
 having the smooth squares of the chessboard replaced by the 
 ever changing terrain of the theater of operations, where the 
 weather often conspires with the enemy to change, and often 
 to defeat, the most carefully laid plans. 
 
 An appreciation of the difficulties of his profession should 
 make clear to the military student that he should hasten to 
 prepare himself for its duties, for there will be no time to do 
 so when war is declared. 
 
 West Point, New York, January 1, 1907. 
 
 (v) 
 
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 
 
 The United States is geographically isolated from the othei 
 great powers of the world. In Europe, Germany, Russia, 
 France, Austria, Italy, and the Balkan States, maintain at all 
 times enormous armies, trained and equipped in instant readi- 
 ness for war. The British Empire relies mainly on a very 
 large naval establishment for its home protection. In Asia, 
 Japan is the only nation that maintains a modern military and 
 naval force. The necessity for this comes from the fact that 
 both Russia and Japan include, in their policies of expansion, 
 the occupation of Korea and Manchuria. One great war, 
 fought in 1904, between these two nations, resulted favorably 
 for Japan. Her sovereignty has since extended completely 
 over Korea, and her influence in the political and commercial 
 affairs of Manchuria is very great. These advantages can, 
 however, be held only by military superiority, and Japan must 
 maintain a large army and navy in a state of high efficiency to 
 keep what she has fought for. 
 
 The United States, set between two great oceans, and 
 separated from her only two neighbors on the American con- 
 tinent, Canada and Mexico by natural boundaries at all points 
 where the density of population is enough to require any 
 boundaries at all, has no such need for excessive protection 
 as influences Japan or the European States. 
 
 The policy of the government of the United States is 
 announced in the Constitution as opposed to large standing 
 armies. Acting on this policy, the Congress of the United 
 States has built up a military system based on a small Regular 
 Army, with a first reserve of National Guard troops, organized 
 by the governments of the several States, and supported, partly 
 by the States, and partly by the United States. 
 
 The program of field instruction of these troops culminates 
 in maneuver exercises held from time to time in various parts 
 of the country. The forces engaged in these maneuvers are 
 usually very small. This book is intended to illustrate the 
 application of the Field Service Regulations to these small 
 forces, during the period of the maneuver exercises that pre- 
 cedes actual contact, 
 (vi) 
 
The problems discussed are little more than map-reading 
 problems, and if, when the student has completed the book, he 
 can read the maps readily, and, at the same time he has learned 
 the relations the various covering detachments bear to the 
 larger forces they protect, the purpose of the book will be 
 accomplished. 
 
 The art of war is no less an art than the art of painting. 
 Neither can be reduced to rule, or learned from formulas. 
 But the student of the art of painting must first learn to hold 
 his brush and to mix his colors. So the student of the art of 
 war must learn to read his maps, and the meaning of his 
 vocabulary before he can progress in the knowledge of the art. 
 
 The first and second editions of this book were designed 
 for the use of the Cadets at the U. S. Military Academy. 
 This edition is made with a view of meeting the particular 
 needs of the students in other military schools and of the 
 officers and non-commissioned officers of the National Guard. 
 Hartford, Conn., September 1, 1913. 
 
 (vii) 
 
"Direction by the higher leaders will always be lacking, 
 where those leaders, in peace time, are unable to divorce 
 themselves from the surroundings and prejudices of their 
 particular arm, whatever it may be, and to enter whole- 
 heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit of the Napoleonic 
 maxim: INFANTRY, CAVALRY, AND ARTILLERY 
 ARE NOTHING WITHOUT EACH OTHER." General 
 M. F. Rimington, British Army. 
 
 (viii) 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE OBJECTS OF A MILITARY TRAINING. 
 
 "The responsibility resting on an offcer in war is great. His 
 mistakes are paid for in blood. To seek a command in war beyond 
 his capabilities is no less criminal than for a man with no knowledge 
 of a locomotive or railroading to attempt to run the engine of an 
 express on a busy line." Colonel J. F. Morrison, U. S. Army. 
 
 The prosecution of a war on land has for its object the 
 destruction of an enemy's army or its expulsion from coveted 
 or disputed territory. To accomplish this it is necessary for 
 one force to overwhelm the other by a marked superiority. 
 This superiority may be in strength, armament, supply, 
 methods of attack, quality of the troops, or some combination 
 of these elements, but a marked superiority there must be. 
 
 Any military establishment has for its object the training 
 of a mass of enlisted men so that at a given moment their 
 energy and intelligence can be concentrated to overwhelm the 
 enemy. THE ENLISTED MEN ARE THE ARMY. In 
 order to train them to use their strength and minds and wills 
 together, they are united in small groups companies of 
 Infanty, troops of Cavalry, batteries of Field Artillery, etc., 
 that are commanded by non-commissioned officers, chosen 
 from among their own numbers, and by commissioned officers, 
 selected and educated, usually, elsewhere than among their 
 ranks. 
 
 The functions of the non-commissioned officer are mainly 
 executive. He remains throughout his military life an enlisted 
 man, except in those instances where, by his conspicuous merit, 
 he is promoted to a commission. His education and training 
 are limited to that necessary to carry out intelligently the 
 orders of his officers, and to control the few men placed in 
 his charge. As a rule, his term of service is a brief one. 
 
 The commissioned officer, on the contrary, must prepare 
 himself to fulfill every function of peace and war. In the 
 ordinary course of his daily duties, he must combine profes- 
 sional, commercial and mechanical talents. He must instruct 
 
10 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 officers and enlisted men, both theoretically and practically, in 
 their duties. He must be an engineer of a sort, a machinist, 
 an electrician, a telegrapher. He must know how to instruct 
 in the care, preparation, and preservation of foods. His 
 knowledge of horses must be more than amateurish. He must 
 possess a practical knowledge of sanitary science. He should 
 be a good topographer and should possess an intimate knowl- 
 edge of the scheme of nature and be able to traverse unknown 
 country by day or night, without losing his direction, or over- 
 looking, or failing rightly to interpret the signs of travel. He 
 frequently must perform services both executive and judicial. 
 In time of war, or other great disturbance, when the ordinary 
 functions of government are suspended, he must be able to 
 step in and administer the civil affairs of his own or an alien 
 people, justly, honestly, and intelligently. 
 
 In all of these varied duties he must, for the honor of his pro- 
 fession, be a gentleman : a man distinguished for fine sense of 
 honor, strict regard for his obligations, and consideration for the 
 rights and feelings of others. 
 
 The officer serves a long probation as a lieutenant, and 
 another long period as a company commander. As a field 
 officer major, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel he is removed 
 from immediate contact with the enlisted men, and usually issues 
 his orders to officers only. 
 
 From the field officers the general officers are usually 
 chosen. They are still farther removed from the rank and 
 file, and they deal, through their staff officers, only with the 
 colonels of regiments, or commanders of brigades, divisions, 
 or field armies. 
 
 It is, therefore, to be seen that it is upon the officers and 
 non-commissioned officers of the company that the real re- 
 sponsibility for the merit of the army rests. Their work is 
 planned for them, and they are held to it, by the officers in 
 higher grades, but it is only when they themselves are well 
 equipped, industrious, and loyal that their men are well trained. 
 
 Equally important, in a very different way, to the efficiency 
 of the army are the officers of the staff corps and departments. 
 
OBJECTS OF A MILITARY TRAINING 11 
 
 It is their function to see to the organization and administration 
 of the army, and that food, clothing, arms, ammunition, and 
 transportation are at hand and available at the proper times for 
 the use of the enlisted men, in order that they may confront 
 the enemy, vigorous and well prepared, in every way, for the 
 work before them. 
 
 An army properly composed includes in its organization all 
 the elements necessary for its defense, offense, transportation, 
 and maintenance: infantry, cavalry, field artillery of all sorts, 
 engineers, signal corps, field and base hospitals, bridge trains, 
 rail, water, wagon, and pack transportation, ammunition and 
 supply trains. Stores of all sorts must be collected at depots 
 convenient of access to the army, yet sufficiently remote from the 
 actual scene of hostilities, or strongly enough defended, to be 
 guarded against attack by any force less strong than the mass 
 of the enemy's army itself. These depots are called bases of 
 supply. 
 
 The directing head of the armies and the chiefs of the 
 various corps and departments that have to do with the organ- 
 izing, administering, and supplying of the forces in the field, 
 are located at the capital of the nation. These departments, in 
 time of peace, besides administering the affairs of the army, 
 lay plans and provide methods to meet the contingencies of 
 hostile movements on the part of any nation. Combined, they 
 form the War Department, whose head in the United States, 
 the President, ex-officio the Commander-in-Chief, directs and 
 governs through the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. 
 
 When officers receive and accept their commissions in the 
 Army, or non-commissioned officers their warrants, they are 
 obligated to obey faithfully all lawful orders of their superiors. 
 At the same time all persons in their commands are warned that 
 they must be obeyed. The private soldier subscribes to a similar 
 oath on his enlistment that he will serve honestly and faithfully 
 the United States of America, and will obey the orders of the 
 officers appointed over him. 
 
 The first lesson to be learned by any military person is that 
 of obedience to legitimate authority. Not obedience because the 
 thing ordered agrees with his views of what is correct, but be- 
 
12 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 cause it is ordered. This is discipline. No permanent system 
 of discipline can be built up, however, that is not based upon a 
 proper use of authority. An officer who is capricious, or unrea- 
 sonable, or unjust, cannot maintain it. 
 
 The art of making war has kept pace with the progress of 
 civilization since the earliest times, but as regards the necessity 
 for obedience to military superiors, and its battle value, the les- 
 son was learned centuries ago. Discipline is not solely the pro- 
 duct of a system of rules for the government of soldiers; it is 
 not necessary merely to control them, but also to instill into 
 them the instinct of obedience so that an order received is 
 executed at once, unhesitatingly, without pausing to reason out 
 its propriety or its necessity. 
 
 Why is discipline, of the sort striven for in military training, 
 necessary? To understand the reason you must consider the 
 purpose of military establishments. Armies and navies are to 
 preserve peace in the world. They do this by making war ter- 
 rible. The results of battles are obtained by killing and disabling 
 men. The fear of death is the most demoralizing influence men 
 can be subjected to, and yet, in battle, soldiers must face death, 
 and overcome its fear. Discipline is the only means that has 
 been discovered by which this fear can be neutralized. 
 
 The uninformed often wonder why the officer is placed in 
 his unique position ; why soldiers must rise in his presence, and 
 salute him; why so much formality in their relations, one with 
 another. It is difficult to explain, and yet there are many rea- 
 sons. Soldiers are usually young men, fresh from the restraints 
 and refining influences of home. Grouped together in barracks, 
 or in camp, deprived of those familiar restraining influences, 
 the ethical reasons for being good are not sufficient to make 
 young men subordinate, orderly, industrious. A positive re- 
 straining influence must be felt, or the military group becomes 
 a mob. This is found in the officer. He it is who keeps them 
 at work, who preserves order by punishing disorder, impartially 
 and severely. 
 
 The men look to their officers for all material necessities 
 food, shelter, clothing. The officers must know the wants of 
 their men and anticipate them. The officer represents authority. 
 
OBJECTS OP A MILITARY TRAINING 13 
 
 the men, obedience. It is for this that the Articles of War pre- 
 scribe that any soldier who behaves himself with disrespect 
 towards his officers shall be punished. However, an officer who 
 is capricious, or unreasonable, or unjust, can command only the 
 husk of respect; he will fail utterly to enforce discipline. 
 
 A soldier should be made to understand that when he rises 
 in the presence of an officer, when he salutes him, while he 
 stands at attention while addressing him, that it is to the office 
 he is paying respect, not to the individual man. 
 
 An English officer aptly defines discipline to be "that long 
 continued habit by which the very muscles of the soldier in- 
 stinctively obey the word of command, so that under whatever 
 stress of circumstances, danger, and death, he hears that word 
 of command, even if his mind be too confused and astounded 
 to attend, yet his muscles will obey."* 
 
 There is no example of a successful general of the first rank 
 in the world's modern history who was not a good disciplinarian. 
 
 In the character of an officer no quality is so important as 
 loyalty. Without it he loses both the respect of his superiors 
 and the confidence of his inferiors. Loyalty to the trust im- 
 posed upon him by his superiors and equal loyalty to support his 
 subordinates while they are carrying out his orders are de- 
 manded of the officer who would be successful. 
 
 Loyalty and discipline go hand in hand, and are the para- 
 mount military qualities. Without them, genius, high courage, 
 ability to seize quickly and to take full advantage of opportunities, 
 and thorough knowledge of the art of war, avail nothing in the 
 career of an officer. Absolute loyalty and sympathy should be 
 given to the company commander and to the commanding officer. 
 It is rarely that their efforts are not honest and well directed and 
 their intentions for the good of the service and in the interest of 
 the Government. In active field service, not one officer in one 
 hundred can succeed without the loyal and sympathetic support 
 of his subordinates. There will come a time in the career of 
 every officer when the exact importance of this statement will be 
 appreciated: that is when he himself becomes a commanding 
 
 * From Discipline, by Lieut. Stewart Murray, 1st Battalion Gordon 
 Highlanders, British Army. 
 
14 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 officer. Loyal and sympathetic support should always be given 
 by subordinates to those in authority, so that when the time 
 comes for the subordinate to become the commander he can 
 demand the same of his own subordinates, strengthening his 
 demand by his own example. 
 
 Discipline must be acquired; loyalty is an inherent quality. 
 That tendency that leads an officer to disregard the orders of his 
 superiors in minor matters, and to undermine his superior's 
 authority by innuendo or disrespect, renders him an unsuitable 
 person to command others. Such a quality in any person is dis- 
 loyalty. It presents many aspects in different natures. In one it 
 will be manifested by a grudging, sullen unwillingness to perform 
 his ordinary duties. Nothing that he does is done cheerfully. 
 He surrounds himself with an atmosphere of discontent and dis- 
 satisfaction. Instead of doing things, he seeks excuses for not 
 doing them. Another will display his disloyalty by open neglect 
 of his duties, doing only so much as he is compelled to do, and 
 so will instill a spirit of worthlessness and neglect into the com- 
 mand. Another will be defiant of authority, disobeying his su- 
 periors openly before his men. They take their cue from him, 
 and are themselves defiant of him and of his authority. 
 
 Officers who are disloyal subalterns seldom make efficient 
 commanders. That flaw of character that leads them to disobey 
 or to give grudging service while in unimportant stations will, in 
 after life, prevent them from taking full advantage of great 
 crises. On the other hand, the officer or soldier who gives 
 prompt, faithful, and enthusiastic service in all his duties, how- 
 ever small and unimportant they may be, may be sure that he will 
 be sought to fill spheres of wider usefulness, up to the very limit 
 of his powers. 
 
 From the moment an officer enters the service of the United 
 States, his career is carefully and constantly watched. His man- 
 ner of performing his duties, his abilities in special fields of work, 
 his personal habits, are frequently reported on by his command- 
 ing officers. These reports are kept and consolidated in the War 
 Department, and constitute what is termed the record of the 
 
OBJECTS OF A MILITARY TRAINING 15 
 
 officer. It is in the highest degree important to his career that 
 this record should show him to be industrious, loyal, and faithful. 
 
 War is an abnormal situation. It is only through the arts of 
 peace that nations are built up, but, to preserve that peace, armies 
 are as necessary to nations as strength of character and courage 
 to resent injury are to individuals to protect them from oppres- 
 sion at the hands of aggressive neighbors. 
 
 A good army commands respect and insures fair treatment 
 for the nation possessing it. For this reason it is essential that 
 the officers of any military establishment use every effort to keep 
 in the highest state of efficiency the troops and material upon 
 which the dignity and peace of the nation rest. 
 
 Not only are the officers of the army responsible for the 
 instruction of the men of their command, but they are equally 
 responsible for their health and comfort. Food must be of a 
 suitable quality and well prepared. Camps and barracks must be 
 kept in a sanitary condition. To keep them so, cleanliness must 
 be enforced, among the enlisted men as to their persons, clothing, 
 and quarters. In barracks, care must be taken as to their heating 
 and ventilation, the distribution of the men in the squad-rooms 
 without overcrowding, the handling of the company kitchens, the 
 proper disposition of slops and refuse, the cleanliness of water- 
 closets and bathrooms. 
 
 In camp, the selection of the sites, their proper drainage, the 
 location of kitchens and sinks, and their proper care, are sanitary 
 points of even greater importance than in barracks. All of these 
 duties are but few of the many which must be supervised by the 
 company officers, and their 'details must be learned largely by 
 experience. In times of peace, with trained non-commissioned 
 officers in charge, with the food supply bountiful, of good quality 
 and never- failing, with clothing and equipment ample for every 
 need, the performance of these duties becomes largely automatic, 
 and the serious problem of supplying men in the field under war 
 conditions and of keeping them in vigorous health is apt to be lost 
 sight of. 
 
 The heavy loss from camp diseases at the outbreak of all our 
 wars was largely the result of the ignorance of the officers who 
 
16 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 were suddenly called from civil pursuits to take up the grave 
 responsibilities attached to the care and command of men new to 
 military life. 
 
 To lose men in battle is necessary and expected ; to lose them 
 of disease, in large numbers, is due, in the vast majority of cases, 
 to preventable causes. Discipline, sanitation, and good food are 
 the preventives of disease. It is the duty of every officer, par- 
 amount to everything else, to learn how to enforce discipline 
 among his men, how to secure sanitary surroundings, and how 
 properly to prepare food for troops in the field. 
 
 Milton says : "I call a complete and generous education one 
 which fits a man to perform, justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, 
 all the offices, both public and private, of peace and war." This 
 is the education that the army officer should aim for ; not for sel- 
 fish reasons, but in order that he may reflect credit on that pro- 
 fession which has for its object the preservation of the nation's 
 dignity, honor, and very existence. 
 
 In preparing himself for a military career, every young man 
 should bear in mind, and strive to fulfill as his ideal, Alexander 
 Hamilton's definition of a perfect officer: "He who combines 
 the genius of the general with the patient endurance, both mental 
 and physical, of the private; who inspires confidence in himself 
 and in all under him; who is at all times the gentleman, cour- 
 teous alike to inferior, equal, and superior; who is strong and 
 firm in discipline, without arrogance or harshness, and never 
 familiar towards subordinate, but to all is the soul of courtesy, 
 kind, considerate and just." 
 
 During peace the military forces of most nations are main- 
 tained on a peace footing, with numbers greatly smaller than is 
 contemplated for a war footing. Troops are scattered widely 
 over the country in large or small garrisons, while the reserves 
 necessary to place the various units on a war footing are at their 
 homes, engaged in peaceful pursuits. At the outbreak of hostil- 
 ities these scattered garrisons are assembled, the reserves are 
 called out, equipped and organized, and recruits are enlisted and 
 instructed. 
 
OBJECTS OP A MILITARY TRAINING 17 
 
 At the outbreak of hostilities between two nations, troops are 
 hastened towards some vulnerable frontier by both parties to the 
 quarrel. This process of collecting and organizing the tactical 
 units of large armies is called mobilizing. When the mobilization 
 is completed, the armies are concentrated at suitable points and 
 moved towards their objective. This is usually the army of the 
 enemy. 
 
 For the present we will not concern ourselves with the func- 
 tions of an army as a mass, its maintenance and transportation, 
 or the methods to be used to maneuver it in the presence of the 
 enemy. It is enough at this stage of the student's training to 
 know that an army is a vast, complicated structure, slow-moving, 
 enormously costly to keep in the field, and absolutely dependent 
 upon an uninterrupted supply of food. for men and animals, and 
 a constant flow of recruits and remounts to fill the places made 
 vacant by casualties. 
 
 The mass of the army, with its line of communications, is 
 protected by groups of men that screen its operations from obser- 
 vation by small parties of the enemy, and give warning of the 
 approach of his larger forces. Other men go beyond these 
 groups to observe the enemy as far as possible, and to report on 
 his strength, the disposition of his forces, his movements, and his 
 probable intentions. 
 
 Men engaged in the former duties, the service of security, 
 are called advance, rear, or flank guards, when on the march 
 outposts, when in camp. Those engaged in the latter duties, the 
 service of information, are known as spies, scouts, or patrols. 
 
 Until the enemy's army is encountered, the two services are 
 more or less distinct ; when it is met, the scouts and patrols merge 
 with the guards or outposts, and their duties are, where contact 
 is maintained, identical. Then, as the masses of the armies 
 approach more nearly, the screening groups of men on both sides 
 merge with the lines of battle, and the struggle for the mastery 
 goes on until one side gives way. In its withdrawal, unless the 
 defeat is overwhelming, the defeated army immediately covers its 
 movements and hides its condition behind its rear guard. Scouts 
 and patrols are sent out as before, to feel for the enemy, and to 
 report his movements and probable plans. The armies are rested, 
 
18 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 recuperated, and strengthened in every possible way, to meet 
 again on another battlefield, where the struggle is repeated. 
 
 This process goes on until one or the other, worn out, depleted 
 of men, and exhausted of resources, gives up the struggle, and 
 the war is ended. 
 
 All other things being equal, the advantage will lie with 
 that general whose information concerning the enemy's army 
 and the topography and resources of the field of operations, is 
 most complete. 
 
 Much of the last named information can be obtained and made 
 available in peace times, but not all of it, by any means. The 
 greater portion of the information concerning the enemy must be 
 obtained on the spot, and the commanding general must depend 
 on the line of his army especially on his cavalry and infantry 
 to obtain it. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 NOTES ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF 
 THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 During peace the Regular Army of the United States consists 
 of regiments of infantry, regiments of cavalry, regiments of field 
 artillery, companies of coast artillery, and regiments of engineers. 
 These constitute the line of the Army, and form the nucleus of 
 the nation's land forces. To administer the affairs of the line of 
 the Army, to supply it with the necessary equipment, pay, food, 
 clothing, transportation, shelter, and medical attendance, general 
 officers and officers of the staff corps and departments are ap- 
 pointed and maintained. 
 
 For purposes of administration and supply, the country, in 
 time of peace, is divided into territorial departments, each in 
 command of a major-general or a brigadier-general. Each de- 
 partment commander has a staff, composed of officers of the 
 administrative departments, who issue his orders to the troops 
 of his command, and who supply them with everything necessary 
 for their efficiency. 
 
 The troops, organized into brigades and divisions, are quar- 
 tered in posts, scattered about the country, and their duties are 
 limited to such as are necessary for their care, maintenance, and 
 training. 
 
 The administrative and tactical unit, in time of peace, in the 
 mobile part of the Army, is the regiment of infantry, cavalry, 
 field artillery, and engineers. 
 
 The regiment of infantry consists of one headquarters com- 
 pany, one machine gun company, one supply company, and twelve 
 infantry companies. The twelve infantry companies are organ- 
 ized into three battalions of four companies each. The regiment 
 is commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant colonel as second 
 in command. 
 
 The headquarters company consists of certain non-commis- 
 sioned officers who have duties connected with the administration 
 of the headquarters of the regiment, the band, and a detachment 
 
20 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 of mounted orderlies. It is commanded by a captain (mounted) 
 who is also adjutant of the regiment. He has charge of the 
 records of the regiment, and is the person through whom the 
 colonel communicates his orders. 
 
 The supply company has two officers, a captain (mounted) 
 in command, assisted by a second lieutenant (mounted). Belong- 
 ing to it are the non-commissioned officers, saddler, horseshoer, 
 and wagoners whose duties are concerned with the supply of the 
 regiment with clothing, equipment, armament, shelter and food. 
 
 The machine gun company is charged with the care and ser- 
 vice of the machine guns belonging to the regiment. Its per- 
 sonnel consists of one captain in command, assisted by one first 
 lieutenant and two second lieutenants, all mounted, and fifty-three 
 enlisted men. In time of war or other necessity, this number 
 may be increased by order of the President by twenty-one 
 enlisted men. 
 
 The infantry battalion has four companies. It is commanded 
 by a major who has a first lieutenant (mounted) as a battalion 
 adjutant. The major's functions are purely executive. He sees 
 that the orders of the colonel are carried out, superintends the 
 instruction of the companies of his battalion, and is generally 
 responsible for the tactical efficiency of his command. 
 
 The infantry company has three commissioned officers ; a 
 captain in command, assisted by one first lieutenant and one 
 second lieutenant. Its enlisted personnel consists of one hundred 
 men, which number may, in time of war or other necessity, be 
 increased, by order of the President of the United States, by fifty 
 men. 
 
 A regiment of cavalry has practically the same organization 
 as a regiment of infantry, except that the companies are called 
 troops and the battalions squadrons. The enlisted personnel of a 
 troop consists of seventy men, which number may, in time of war 
 or other necessity, be increased by order of the President by 
 thirty-five men. 
 
 The field artillery of the regular army includes mountain 
 artillery, light artillery, horse artillery, and heavy artillery (field 
 and siege types); and consists of one hundred and twenty-six 
 gun or howitzer batteries organized into twenty-one regiments. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE U. S. 21 
 
 A regiment of field artillery is commanded by a colonel, with a 
 lieutenant colonel as second in command. It has a headquarters 
 and supply company, organized for the fulfillment of the same 
 functions as the corresponding companies of an infantry regi- 
 ment. It consists of such number of battalions as may be pre- 
 scribed by the President; generally two or three. The battalion 
 consists of two or three batteries as may be prescribed by the War 
 Department, depending upon the kind of guns and nature and 
 requirements of the service. The battery of field artillery cor- 
 responds to the company of infantry. Each gun or howitzer bat- 
 tery has five commissioned officers; a captain in command, 
 assisted by two first lieutenants and two second lieutenants. Its 
 enlisted personnel consists normally of one hundred and twenty- 
 six enlisted men. This number may be varied somewhat to obtain 
 necessary packers in the mountain artillery, and is increased by 
 sixty-four in time of war or other necessity, when so directed 
 by the President. Each battery has four guns. The light and 
 horse batteries have guns of three-inch calibre. The cannoneers 
 of light batteries are mounted on the carriages. The cannoneers 
 of horse batteries are mounted on horses. Horse batteries, on ac- 
 count of their greater mobility, are designed especially to accom- 
 pany cavalry commands. Mountain batteries have lighter guns 
 that can readily be taken apart. They are carried on pack mules. 
 The cannoneers usually march on foot. Mountain artillery is for 
 use in rough country, where the lack of roads prevents the use 
 of other artillery. The heavy artillery consists of guns of a 
 larger calibre, and which throw a heavier projectile. They are, 
 on account of their weight and size more dependent upon good 
 roads and good means of transportation, and consequently lack 
 the mobility of the other types mentioned. 
 
 The regiment of engineers consists of two battalions of three 
 companies each. Otherwise its organization with that of the bat- 
 talions and companies is quite similar to that of the correspond- 
 ing units of infantry. There are also in our regular army two 
 mounted battalions of engineers, consisting of three companies 
 each. 
 
 Those functions of a commander that relate to the instruc- 
 tion of his command, and to its control in maneuver and in 
 
22 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 battle, are termed tactical. An administrative unit, as distin- 
 guished from a tactical unit, is one that contains among its 
 members, officers authorized to perform all necessary govern- 
 mental acts one that is, under the authority of the next 
 higher administrative commander, self-supporting and self- 
 governing. 
 
 The Field Service Regulations (1914) for the United States 
 Army provide that "the company and regiment are both 
 administrative and tactical units; the battalion and brigade 
 are, as a rule, tactical only. The division is the great adminis- 
 trative and tactical unit, and forms the basis for army organi- 
 zation." 
 
 An infantry brigade normally consists of its headquarters 
 and three regiments of infantry. 
 
 A cavalry brigade normally consists of its headquarters and 
 three regiments of cavalry. A field artilley brigade normally 
 consists of its headquarters and three regiments of field artil- 
 lery. A brigade is the appropriate command of a brigadier 
 general. 
 
 An infantry division normally consists of its headquarters, 
 three infantry brigades, one regiment of cavalry, one field 
 artillery brigade, one regiment of engineers, certain signal troops 
 including an areo squadron, and its trains. A cavalry division 
 normally consists of its headquarters, three cavalry brigades, one 
 regiment of field artillery (horse), one battalion of mounted engi- 
 neers, certain signal troops including an areo squadron, and its 
 trains. A division is the appropriate command of a major gen- 
 eral. 
 
 A still larger unit is the army corps, which normally con- 
 sists of its headquarters, two or more infantry divisions, one or 
 more cavalry brigades or a cavalry division, one field artillery 
 brigade, certain signal troops, and its trains. 
 
 When army corps and separate divisions and brigades not 
 organized into army corps are grouped together under one 
 command such a unit is called a field army or an army. The 
 President may, in his discretion, increase or decrease the num- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE U. S. 23 
 
 her of organizations for the typical brigades, divisions, and 
 army corps. 
 
 An infantry division, consisting in round numbers of twenty 
 to twenty-five thousand men, marching on a single road, with- 
 out allowing for elongation due to imperfect marching, and 
 including its combat trains,* occupies in road space over ten 
 miles. With its field trainsf added, it will occupy about twelve 
 miles. 
 
 * Combat trains are composed of those wagons, or other vehicles, 
 used for carrying the extra ammunition and entrenching tools that 
 would be needed at once, in the event of battle. They are usually 
 assigned to battalions, or squadrons, and at all times march as near 
 the organizations to which they are assigned as circumstances will 
 permit. 
 
 f The field train includes the wagons, etc., that carry the rest of 
 the stores and material necessary for the well being of the command. 
 The field train is assembled, usually as a unit, and marches where it 
 will be best protected and, at the same time, where it will be avail- 
 able when the command goes into camp or bivouac. The stores it 
 carries are not, usually, needed in battle. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 MAP READING. 
 
 "Map reading is the ability to grasp by careful study not only 
 the general features of the map, but to form a clear conception or 
 mental picture of the appearance of the ground represented." 
 Sherrill, Military Topography, Page 2. 
 
 From the time an army enters the scene of active opera- 
 tions, part of its strength must be devoted to getting informa- 
 tion of the enemy, and of the country in which operations are 
 expected to take place. Beginning at the same time, and in- 
 separably connected with this work, is that of preventing the 
 enemy, as far as possible, from getting similar information, and 
 of guarding against surprise by his forces. These objects are 
 accomplished by the use of spies, scouts, patrols, and covering 
 detachments of various kinds : advance, rear, and flank guards, 
 and outposts, the special duties and functions of which are to 
 be hereinafter explained. 
 
 Reconnoissance by areoplane and dirigible balloon has 
 practically replaced distant terrestrial reconnoissance. It 
 cannot replace close reconnaissance. Since there are many 
 occasions when aerial reconnoissance cannot be made at 
 night, in fog, and during storms men must still be trained for 
 distant reconnoissance, to supplement or replace aero scouts, 
 The subject of aerial reconnoissance will not be considered in 
 this book. 
 
 The commander of an army should have in his possession, 
 before beginning an active campaign, a mass of information 
 in regard to the enemy, and the territory the army proposes to 
 invade. The greater part of this information will be in the 
 form of maps, showing in a general way the geography and 
 topography of the country, where the routes of travel are 
 located, where natural difficulties will assist the enemy, and 
 where they can be used to his disadvantage. Information is 
 also secured and tabulated showing the natural resources, 
 climate, etc., of the country. The maps will necessarily be on 
 a compartively small scale, and, while sufficient to be used as 
 
MAP READING 25 
 
 guides for the movements of large forces, will fail utterly to 
 show the smaller topographical features that are necessary to 
 be known for the proper placing troops in battle formation. 
 
 This latter information, and that concerning the strength, 
 dispositions, and movements of the enemy in the field, must 
 be obtained on the spot. 
 
 To secure this information, and at the same time to provide 
 for the security of the army from day to day, the greatest 
 use is made of the maps already on hand. These, made by 
 expert surveyors with accurate instruments, form the basis 
 for special maps, useful only for immediate military use. The 
 men who make these special maps are the scouts, or members 
 of the patrols and guards referred to above officers, non- 
 commissioned officers, and, in some cases, privates, of the army 
 itself. It is therefore necessary that all men liable to be 
 selected for such duties should understand what maps are, and 
 how they are to be used. 
 
 In general, a map is a proportionally correct representation 
 of some part of the earth's surface. Maps are of many kinds, 
 and show varying features, depending upon the purposes for 
 which each was made. A map for military purposes shows 
 features of military importance : roads, mountains, hills, val- 
 leys, streams and other bodies of water, woods, houses, bridges, 
 etc. Nearly all maps have some military value, but those that 
 are the most useful in the field are military topographical 
 maps, maps that are specially made to show things of military 
 importance. 
 
 The civil maps that we ordinarily find lack much of the 
 information necessary to a good military map. It will be 
 found, however, that they frequently indicate roads, villages, 
 woods, important streams, etc., and in the field may be used 
 to obtain a general idea of the country, thus making an invalu- 
 able aid in the construction of purely military maps. 
 
 In the pocket on the back cover of this book will be found 
 four maps. These maps are named, respectively, Guide Map, 
 Strategic Map, Topographical Map, and War Game Map. 
 
26 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 Refer now to the Guide Map. It is known to be thirty 
 miles, on the ground, in a straight line, from Middletown to 
 Hanover (near the center of the map). The line connecting 
 these towns on the map is three inches long, and, since all the 
 places on a correctly made map are shown in their relative 
 positions, we know that a line three inches long, drawn any- 
 where on the map, will represent thirty miles on the ground, 
 and from this, that one inch on the map represents ten miles 
 on the ground. This definite relation between distances on 
 the ground and corresponding distances on the map is called 
 the scale of the map. 
 
 At the bottom of the map we are discussing you will see : 
 1 inch=lO miles. That is one way of expressing the scale. 
 Another way is shown directly below it, where a line is divided 
 into equal subdivisions in both directions from a point marked 
 0. This scale shows graphically map distances in miles, and 
 is called a graphic scale. Its use is apparent. 
 
 A third scale, called the fractional scale, is sometimes 
 used. We find one on the Strategic Map : 1 /62soo. This scale 
 means that any distance on the ground is 62500 times as long 
 as the corresponding ditsance on the map. The fractional 
 scale is of use only in reading maps of foreign countries where 
 the measures of length, that the person reading the map is 
 accustomed to, are not used. It bears the same relation to the 
 graphic scale that the Latin name of a plant or animal bears 
 to its name in the vernacular of the place where it is found. 
 In the case of the Strategic Map, an American or an English- 
 man reading it would say : "One inch on this map is equal to 
 62500 inches on the ground; that is (since there are 63360 
 inches in a mile) one inch is nearly equal to one mile. It will 
 do to call the scale one inch is equal to one mile for my pur- 
 poses." A Frenchman would say: "One centimeter on this 
 map is equal to 62500 centimers on the ground," and, unless 
 he were accustomed to thinking of distances in miles, he would 
 probably have to construct a graphic scale reading meters and 
 kilometers, bearing this relation, before he could use the map 
 readily. It is only for such purposes that the fractional scale, 
 
MAP READING 27 
 
 or representative fraction abbreviated usually to R. F. is 
 put on a map. The graphic scale is the useful one.* 
 
 Another essential to the proper understanding of a map is 
 a line of known direction with reference to which other direc- 
 tions may be detemined. This is often provided for, in the 
 construction of a map, by drawing a north-and-south line on 
 it, the north end of its being indicated by an arrowhead and 
 the letter N. 
 
 Frequently, especially on the maps of the Geological Sur- 
 vey, a diagram will be drawn, near the scale, as in the Strat- 
 egic and Topographical Maps, showing difference between the 
 true, or astronomical, north-and-south line, and the line 
 marked by the magnetic needle. This has a wide divergence 
 in the United States. In the vicinity of Boston the needle 
 points about 12y 2 degrees west of the true meridian, while at 
 Portland, Oregon, the variation is about 19^ degrees east. It 
 is important, for military purposes, that this variation (known 
 as the declination of the magnetic needle) be known for the 
 locality where operations are being conducted. 
 
 It is a recognized convention that the top of the map is 
 north, unless otherwise specified, and in maps intended for 
 purely non-military purposes the north point is seldom indi- 
 cated. The sides of the map, in such cases, are recognized 
 north-and-south lines, and, if the magnetic north is not shown, 
 the variation is so slight as to be negligible. 
 
 Certain signs are ordered used on maps, by the War De- 
 partment, to represent, arbitrarily, natural and artificial fea- 
 tures of the landscape. As a rule these signs are the same as 
 those used by the map makers of all civilized countries. They 
 are known as conventional signs. 
 
 * This is all the student needs to know of scales to work the 
 problems on the maps that accompany this book. If he wishes to 
 investigate this important subject farther, he should consult Sher- 
 rill's Military Topography, pages 3 to 20, inclusive, or any other 
 standard text book on the subject. 
 
 Instructors should require students to measure distances on the 
 various maps herewith until certain that they understand the use 
 of the graphic scale thoroughly. 
 
28 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The Guide Map, herewith, should be very easily read by 
 everyone. It resembles in all respects the ordinary black and 
 white maps with which all are familiar. 
 
 The Strategic Map shows a few departures. Roads, that 
 on the Guide Map were represented by single, smoothly drawn 
 lines, are here represented by parallel lines. Two classes of 
 roads are recognized in this map : the better class of public 
 roads by solid lines, and the poorer public roads and private 
 roads by broken lines. Streams are colored blue. 
 
 Going next to the Topographical Map we find a number of 
 new signs. Here the character of the crops grown on culti- 
 vated areas is shown, but only enough to tell the reader 
 whether or not the crop will furnish cover for troops. Small 
 grains oats, barley, wheat, and the like that give no cover 
 for horses or men standing, are shown by rows or double 
 dots. Corn, that in certain seasons does give cover, is repre- 
 sented by the convention surrounding the words BERLIN 
 JUNC. in the southeast corner of the Topographical Map. 
 Grass, or pasture land, is shown in white. Orchards are 
 shown by drawing the tree convention regularly spaced, as 
 shown just east of Brush Run, near the center of the south 
 edges of the Topographical Map. Roads are colored yellow 
 and streams blue. 
 
 Woods that have been cleared of their underbrush are 
 shown by the convention just west of the words BERLIN 
 JUNC. If the woods have not been so cleared it is indicated 
 as shown \y 2 inches north of the word BERLIN. 
 
 Land forms are shown by the smoothly curved lines that 
 cover the entire map. Here we touch upon the most important 
 feature of a military map, and the only one that presents any 
 difficulty to the student. 
 
 An observer, looking at an unfamiliar stretch of country, 
 is limited in his knowledge of it to what he can see. His field 
 of view is interrupted by hills, woods, buildings. He can 
 judge the distances separating any two spots on the land- 
 scape only very approximately. He can, if no enemy is there 
 to prevent and he has the time, ride or walk over the country, 
 
MAP READING 29 
 
 and so learn its configuration, and correct his estimate of the 
 distances. In time of war, however, the part of the country 
 he is most anxious to know about is the part occupied by the 
 enemy, and to learn anything about this by inspection is 
 attended by difficulty and danger. 
 
 The observer without a map is limited to the small area 
 he can see, or to his memory of places where he has been, 
 while by the use of the map, if by study and practice he has 
 become proficient in an understanding of what is represented 
 by it, he can comprehend a much larger territory than he can 
 see, and where he has never been. If the map has been prop- 
 erly made for military purposes he can know absolutely the 
 relative positions of objects of importance too far apart to be 
 comprehended by a personal inspection ; he can get an idea of 
 the means of communication ; he can determine elevations and 
 depressions, and can select, mentally, possible positions of 
 military value. In general, he is able to learn much of the 
 country he is working in from the map, while in a secure 
 place. He can get a mental picture of the roads and trails, 
 the hills and valleys, the inaccessible places, where to post his 
 own troops, where to prevent the enemy from posting his. 
 He can select those spots, on the map, that are probably the 
 best to observe the working out of his plans, or to verify the 
 estimate he has made of their military value, and then, with 
 the map as a guide, he can go to those places, unerringly, 
 although he may never have seen them. 
 
 It is not on level plains that the battles of the future will 
 be fought, but in rough places, where, under cover of the 
 woods and hills and folds in the ground, bodies of troops and 
 individuals may move, out of sight of the enemy, protected 
 both from his view and from his fire. Advantage may be 
 taken of commanding positions to deliver an effective fire 
 against the enemy, and at the same time, to enjoy protection 
 from his fire. The steepness and length of the hills, as well 
 as the general direction of the slopes on the roads, have an 
 important bearing on the rate of progress that an army can 
 make in maching, and they may prevent altogether the passage 
 
30 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 over them of gun carriages and heavily loaded wagons. Hence 
 the paramount importance of representing clearly all irregu- 
 larities of the ground in military maps. 
 
 This is accomplished by the use of contours, the series of 
 smoothly curving lines covering the Strategic and Topogra- 
 phical Maps that accompany this book. 
 
 To appreciate the contour idea of representing variations 
 in the surface of the ground, conceive an island thirty-five feet 
 high, rising from the ocean. The surface of the ocean is the 
 level from which all land heights are measured, because the 
 sea level, except for tidal variations that are thoroughly under- 
 stood, is invariable. The contours indicate those points that 
 are at equal heights above the ocean. 
 
 Our island, as it appears at the average sea level, might be 
 drawn as follows : 
 
 FIG l. 
 
 It has been said that this line represents an island, but 
 there is nothing yet to show it in the map itself. Since it is 
 assumed that the line represents the outline of an island, it 
 simply indicates the division between land and water at the 
 average sea level ; it does not indicate any height at all. Inside 
 the line is land ; outside is water. Nothing more is expressed 
 by this line. 
 
 If all points on the island that are exactly ten feet above 
 the water were connected by a line, its representation on the 
 map would be as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 The shape of the island now begins to show. At A it is 
 a very short distance, relatively, between the mean water 
 
MAP READING 
 
 31 
 
 mark and the ten-foot line; the land rises abruptly, while at 
 B it is much farther between the lines, there the rise is much 
 more gentle. 
 
 Pro 2. 
 
 To show this graphically, draw a horizontal line, 0, to rep- 
 resent the water level. Above it a parallel line, 10, represents 
 the ten-foot level. Dropping dotted lines perpendicularly 
 from each contour near A and B, and stopping the dotted line 
 from the 10- foot contour at the upper horizontal line, and the 
 one from the sea level contour at the lower one, and con- 
 necting the points where they intersect by the lines A' A" and 
 B' B", these last lines will show the relative slope of the 
 ground at A and B. 
 
 All that is known of the shape of the island is that every- 
 thing within the line marked 10 is more than ten feet above 
 the sea, because all points that were just ten feet above it were 
 connected by that line. It is also known that everything be- 
 tween the two lines is land, at the mean tide, and is less than 
 ten feet above the water. 
 
 A third contour, marking all points twenty feet above the 
 water shows still more about the shape of the island. Treating 
 
32 
 
 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 the added contour as we did the first one, we see that the gentle 
 slope is still maintained at B, and the abrupt slope at A. 
 
 FIG 3. 
 
 A fourth contour shows the points that are thirty feet above 
 the water, and, if there are no more contours, locates the highest 
 part of the island within that contour, and limits it to between 
 thirty and forty feet above the water. 
 
 Continuing the processes begun in Figs. 2 and 3, we have 
 Fig. 4. 
 
 The heavy line, uniting the intersections of the horizontal and 
 vertical lines is called a profile. The vertical height assumed to 
 separate the contours is called the vertical, or contour, interval. 
 
 At the bottom of the Strategic Map we find, under the graphic 
 scale of miles : "Contour interval 20 feet." That means that for 
 that map the contours represents levels separated vertically by 
 twenty feet. Beneath, again, is found: "Datum is mean sea 
 level," meaning that the elevations marked on the map show ver- 
 tical heights, in feet, above the sea. Not all the contours are 
 numbered. The hundred-foot contours, on this map, are drawn 
 
MAP READING 
 
 33 
 
 with heavier lines than the others, and their elevations are given 
 in figures, in gaps in the contours. 
 
 In the Topographic Map the contour interval is 5 feet, and 
 every fourth contour is drawn heavier than the others, and is 
 numbered. At most of the road intersections numbers will also 
 
 FIG 4. 
 
 be found. These serve a double purpose ; they not only give the 
 student the elevation of the marked spot, but they serve to iden- 
 tify it on the map. For instance, the road from New Oxford to 
 Newchester (3*^ miles northwest from New Oxford), would be 
 described as the road New Oxford 491 494 520 480 
 Newchester. 
 
 To determine in a general way what points are visible from 
 any point on a contoured map, it is necessary to get the elevation 
 of the point in question and then to search for higher points that 
 will cut out all view in any direction, or for less elevated points 
 that will hide places still lower. In order to do that easily, the 
 student must practice reading contours, at first by making pro- 
 
34 
 
 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 files. Soon he will become sufficiently familiar with them to 
 render the making of profiles unnecessary. 
 
 In the appendix to this book you will find a number of sheets 
 of paper ruled in squares. The heavier lined squares are one inch 
 on a side ; the lighter ones, one-eighth of an inch on a side. This 
 paper is called profile paper. 
 
 Its use is as follows: You wish to draw a profile along the 
 line AB in the little map, Fig. 5. 
 
 4fl 
 
 
 ; 
 
 (i 
 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 3 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 '4v 
 
 1 
 
 
 \ 
 
 tn 
 
 3 
 
 ^ 
 
 '0 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 ?rt 
 
 rt 
 
 
 
 *0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 /< 
 
 o 
 
 7\ 
 
 J 
 
 /< 
 
 
 
 Jk 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 S. 
 
 fa 
 
 /i 
 
 i 
 
 ^ 
 
 & 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 <x> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 s 
 
 s^ 
 
 X 
 
 ^ 
 
 x 
 
 ** 
 
 
 
 -_^ 
 
 A 
 
 ^. 
 
 -*, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 s 
 
 ^ 
 
 / 
 
 
 - 
 
 fa 
 
 
 
 ** 
 
 
 
 **^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 lc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -^. 
 
 -, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 U 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ... 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 / 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 w 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. 
 
 Tear out a sheet of profile paper, and then lay its edge along 
 the line AB, and check off the places, on the profile paper, where 
 the contour lines intersect its edge. Write the number of each 
 
MAP READING 3i 
 
 contour crossed below the check mark. By inspection it is seen 
 that the highest contour is 220, the lowest 120. Now mark your 
 vertical scale to the left, on the profile paper, as indicated. 
 
 Beginning at the right of the profile paper it is seen that the 
 first contour 200 is checked off between the fourth and fifth 
 vertical lines from the right edge of the paper. Directly under 
 this check mark, and on the line marked 200 in the vertical scale 
 to the left, make a cross. 
 
 In the second space to the left is the check indicating where 
 the 180 contour was cut by the edge of the profile paper. Make 
 a cross directly under this check mark on the 180 line. This line 
 is not marked on the vertical scale, in Figure 5, because the letter 
 A happened to fall in the spot where it normally would be placed. 
 So it was omitted to avoid confusion. 
 
 The next check is also marked 180. Its cross is on the same 
 horizontal line as the last one. Crosses made on the proper hor- 
 izontal lines, directly under all the other check marks, will indi- 
 cate the intersections of the horizontal planes of the contours, 
 with the vertical plane of the profile. By connecting these 
 crosses with the smoothly curving line, A B, the general slope 
 of the surface along the line A B is approximated. This line 
 is called a profile. 
 
 In making profiles it is customary to regard the ground as 
 sloping uniformly between the contours a condition that rarely 
 exists. When, as happens between the second and third contours 
 from the right, and again when the fifth 220 contour from the 
 right is twice crossed by the line A B, the depth or height of the 
 slope between the contours can only be estimated. 
 
 The top of the little hill between B and the river is more than 
 220 and less than 240, and is the highest point on the profile. The 
 intersection with the river is the lowest point, and it is more than 
 100, because that contour crosses the stream lower down in its 
 course. 
 
 To distinguish between a hill and a valley, when the valley 
 is not marked by a water course, it should be remembered that 
 both are marked by a concavity in the contours, but that the con- 
 tours of a watercourse are generally the more pointed. The apex 
 
36 
 
 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 of a contour that points towards a lower contour, points down 
 hill. One pointing towards a higher contour, points up hill. 
 For example: 
 
 FIG 6. 
 
 The sharper curves to the left point down hill ; those to the 
 right, up hill. The formation to the left is called a nose. 
 
 If the contour numbers were omitted the contours would be 
 meaningless. 
 
 A profile on AB would show : 
 
 /o 
 
 FIG 7. 
 
 A level plain is marked by an absence of contours, or by wide 
 spaces between them. 
 
 Open your topographical map. You will find the village of 
 Hampton straggling along a slanting crossroad in the northeast 
 corner of the map. I am going to describe the country visible 
 
MAP READING 37 
 
 from the road between Hampton and Newchester, nearly three 
 miles to the southwest. 
 
 The village is near the crest of a little ridge that falls away, 
 gradually, towards the south. To the north, a hundred yards 
 or so," is a small cemetery, and beyond it, an orchard. West of 
 these the ground slopes to the westward, cultivated fields, small 
 grain first, then corn. As you leave the village you see, 250 
 yards to the right, a little grove, and, beyond it, 500 yards away, 
 a much larger one ; both are clear of underbrush. To the left the 
 land is cultivated: first, small grain, as far as Stevens' private 
 road, then corn to the bend in the road. A little valley is in front 
 of you, with a brook in it. The road drops 25 feet from the last 
 houses in the village to the brook. A road leads off to the right, 
 in front of Stevens' house. A farm house, with a little orchard 
 by it, is a hundred yards from the corner, on the west side of this 
 road, between it and the brook. As you stand at the corner you 
 can see the road sloping gradually down, four or five feet, to the 
 brook, then, rising abruptly thirty feet, it bends to the right 
 around the corner of the woods and disappears from view. 
 
 You go on, cross the brook, and go up a slight rise, between 
 corn fields enclosed in wire fences, to the bend of the road, where 
 you stop. A little grove, with underbrush, is up the little valley 
 to your right, four hundred yards away. If the trees in the 
 extreme right edge of this grove, as you face it, are less than thirty 
 feet high you will see the little nose the road leading northwest 
 from Stevens' is on, see the road between the pasture and the 
 woods, see the two barns, and the farm house beyond them, and, 
 if you can see between the buildings, two miles to the north you 
 can see about forty feet of the top of Round Hill. Four hundred 
 yards to the southeast is a large pasture, or meadow, with a 
 stream bordered with trees running through it. Eight hundred 
 yards to the south is a long strip of timber that hides everything 
 to the south for several miles. To the right front is a little 
 valley, trees along a stream at the bottom of it. Looking up the 
 ridge, to the northwest, is a clear vista for about 1200 yards. 
 The barn across the road just north of the 580 contour stands 
 out on the sky line, and, a little to the west of it, the tops of the 
 
38 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 farm buildings and the trees of the orchard may be seen above 
 the horizon. 
 
 Going on, there is a slight drop, to the little brook, across that 
 there is a pasture to the left, small grain to the right. In the 
 pasture is a little thicket trees with underbrush and beyond 
 the grain field is an open grove, then a barn, behind it an orchard, 
 and a farm house further on, by another little brook. Then a 
 corn field to the right, small grain to the left as the road climbs a 
 steep little hill, thirty feet high, with a cut at the top. 
 
 Note that the sign for a cut is made by drawing teeth pro- 
 jecting towards the road from a line drawn parallel to it, while 
 a fill (see along the railroad northwest of Berlin Junction, in the 
 southeast corner of the map) is made by drawing the teeth pro- 
 jecting away from the road.* From the cut the road drops down 
 a side hill to the crossroad at Oakwood School House, and from 
 there, for nearly 900 yards, it runs along a ridge, nearly level. 
 Note the contours, numbered alike (520-525) that are nearly 
 parellel to the road, marking the ridge. 
 
 At the western end of this level stretch the road turns half 
 right, and goes down a hill, dropping 65 feet in 350 yards a 
 slope of about one to sixteen, not a very steep slope. The road 
 crosses the river on a bridge with a single span. The river runs 
 between steep, bluffy banks. A dam is just around the bend, to 
 the north, and a sluice carries the water to a mill (probably) 
 near the western end of the bridge. The road rises twenty feet 
 abruptly (on the scale this map is drawn it is difficult to estimate 
 how steep, when contours are as close together as shown at this 
 spot), and then runs along the eastern slope of the little ridge 
 around which the river bends, and, reaching the top, bends along 
 the crest of the ridge to the village of Newchester. 
 
 Under the graphic scale of yards on this map is a scale of 
 slopes for 20-foot contours. This is used as follows: Cut 
 out the scale, and paste it on a card, with the horizontal line 
 
 * Notice an error in the map. The railroad crosses Brush Run, 
 near the south edge of the map, west of the center, on a fill and 
 bridge. It is carried on grade from the 515 to the 525 contours, west 
 of Brush Run, and then is shown crossing the ridge west of that 
 point to the 535 contour on a fill a plain absurdity. There must 
 be a cut there, fifteen or twenty feet deep. 
 
MAP READING 39 
 
 at the edge of the card. Place the scale at right angles to the 
 20-foot contours the heavy ones and slide it along until 
 two adjacent vertical lines of the scale prolong the contour 
 lines. The reading between the lines will tell you the degree 
 of slope at that spot, and, by reference to a table of natural 
 sines, the actual rise per horizontal foot can be got directly. 
 
 Consider now the War Game Map, the fourth map in the 
 pocket in the back cover of this book. Its scale is 12 inches 
 to the mile. It is recommended that students make a scale 
 of yards, at the bottom of the map. For your purposes it will 
 be near enough to make your scale 1 inch equals 150 yards. 
 The scale really is 1 inch equals l46 2 /3 yards. 
 
 The vertical interval is 5 feet, and the 20-foot contours are 
 drawn heavier than the others, as in the Topographical Map. 
 
 The highest point 620 is at the southeast corner; the 
 lowest 495 is at the southwest. A ridge runs from the 
 southeast corner to New Oxford. 
 
 There is nothing about this map that you should not know 
 from your study of the other maps. 
 
 For problems, and for suggestions to instructors, see the 
 Appendix to this book. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 ORIENTATION. 
 
 DO NOT GET LOST! 
 
 Orientation is the process of determining, in the field, 
 direction or relative position. In a strict sense the word 
 means the determination of the east point, but, used in a 
 military sense, it means the process of keeping track of one's 
 movements so as to keep from getting lost. Technically, 
 orientation means holding a map so that a point thereon is 
 over the corresponding point on the ground, and the lines of 
 the map are parellel to the corresponding lines on the gound. 
 
 The fundamental pinciple of the art of scouting is : do 
 not get lost. A scout, a patrol, a raiding party, any body of 
 troops, large or small, sent out with instructions to go to a 
 certain place; or to do a certain thing, must keep constantly 
 oriented with respect to two places : the starting place and the 
 objective. This orientation must be preserved at all times, in 
 daylight or dark, in fair weather or foul, when in the presence 
 of the enemy and when far from him. 
 
 The simplest and surest way to keep oriented is by means 
 of a compass and a map. Every officer should invariably have 
 a pocket compass in his possession when campaigning, in peace 
 or in war. He should guard it as carefully as he does his 
 revolver and its ammunition or his watch. Every non-com- 
 missioned officer sent on patrol duty, not under an officer, and 
 every scout and the leader of every scouting party should be 
 issued a reliable compass before starting on their duty. 
 
 If the leader possesses a good map and compass, he can 
 preserve his orientation perfectly and without any question, 
 provided he uses his map constantly. He should have it 
 folded to convenient size, and should carry it in an outside 
 pocket. When he reaches a point where his knowledge of the 
 country ceases to be of use to him, he looks at his compass, 
 establishes the direction of the magnetic north, opens his map 
 
ORIENTATION 41 
 
 and refolds it so that the part of it he is to use is in sight, 
 stands so that he is facing the road he proposes first to travel 
 on, and then turns his map, holding it directly in front of the 
 center of his body, so that the magnetic north of the map is 
 towards the north as indicated by his compass. 
 
 He then locates his position on the map, looks ahead along 
 the direction his road points, on the map, to see that this 
 direction, prolonged, follows the direction of the real road, 
 looks to the right and left to see if natural or artificial features 
 noted on the map, and within his horizon, are as represented 
 on the map. These points verified, he knows that he is 
 oriented. He goes ahead, sure of himself, holding the map 
 so he can constantly see it, and turned so that the lines indicat- 
 ing the road on the map point towards the road ahead of him. 
 He notes the distances he travels, either by a time scale, by 
 counting telephone poles about 40 to the mile or by esti- 
 mating with the eye. He finally comes to a turn in the road, 
 a crossroad, a bridge, a railway track anything of import- 
 ance enough to be noted on his map where he re-orients 
 himself and resumes his march, sure that he knows where he 
 is, and where he has come from. 
 
 To illustrate : A mile and a half due west from New 
 Oxford, on the Topographical Map, in a slanting crossroad, 
 marked 557. A patrol leader is there, with his patrol. The 
 country is strange to him. He is directed to take his patrol, 
 by the road to the northeast, to 491, and thence to Newchester, 
 returning by the School House (S.H.) 530 568. He is 
 given a copy of the map you are looking at. We will leave 
 aside all consideration of his mission, and his method of lead- 
 ing his patrol, and discuss simply the question of his orienta- 
 tion. 
 
 He stands in the center of the crossroad, looking up the 
 northeast road. He opens his map, folds it once, backwards, 
 across the middle, from east to west, then, bellows fashion, 
 into four north and south folds. He opens the middle fold, 
 holds it flat in front of him, the top of the map to the north. 
 The road, as marked on the map, towards the northeast, points 
 
42 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 along a road down a gentle slope to a bend four or five hun- 
 dred yards away, where, directly in front of the road, he sees 
 a grove of trees, without any underbrush. A barn is in the 
 angle of the road in front of him, and to his left; a house to 
 his right front. A road leads off to the left, up a slight incline, 
 with a hedge on its left side. Cultivated fields, small grain 
 growing in them, are on both sides of the road in front of 
 him ; a wood, with underbrush (note the dotted lines in the 
 tree convention there that means underbrush ; without the 
 dots, you read an open grove), is beyond the fields, to the right, 
 and cuts off his view in that direction. Everything in the 
 landscape tallies with the map. He is oriented. 
 
 He goes to the bend of the road, turns the map in his 
 hands to the left as his road turns to the right. A hundred 
 yards or so farther on, the road bends back to the left again, 
 and he turns his map to the right, so that the roads in front 
 of him, on the map and on the ground, both point in the same 
 direction. A little farther on and he is out of the woods. 
 He has a new horizon. He stops, sees the fields of small 
 grain to the right and left; the road bordered with smooth 
 wire fences. (If they had been barbed wire they would have 
 been drawn: x x , whereas they are drawn: o o .) 
 The road goes down a gentle slope. Half way to the railroad 
 the small grain on the right gives way to a pasture ; to the left, 
 to a cornfield. Then comes a railroad crossing, where the 
 road, still down hill, bends to the left and is lost behind a little 
 open grove. The railroad is carried for two to three hundred 
 yards on a fill to his left front, and through a cut just to the 
 right of the road in front. 
 
 He resumes his march and reaches the T in the road near 
 the foot of the hill. Here, exactly as drawn in the map, he 
 sees a road, little used, leading to the left into the woods. A 
 stream, fringed with trees and underbrush, is in front of him. 
 His own road goes to the right, down a side hill, and he fol- 
 lows it, passing two barns to the right, a house to the left, a 
 canal, a house to the left, across the canal, and then he crosses 
 
ORIENTATION 43 
 
 the creek on a steel truss bridge, with a single span. He goes 
 on, up a steep little hill, twenty-five feet up, to 491. 
 
 This is the process. He may have studied his map very 
 carefully before starting, at 557, memorizing the turns he must 
 take, and then, having returned it to his pocket, he may have 
 trusted to his memory. The latter method is all right, until 
 a mistake is made. Then the magnitude of the consequences 
 of the mistake will depend upon the importance of the mission. 
 Remember this: the scout or patrol leader who gets lost, de- 
 stroys at once the confidence of his companions and of his 
 superiors. It is the unforgivable offense. 
 
 The scout is not always, nor, indeed, often, so fortunate 
 as to have a reliable map to travel by, so, while the use of the 
 map and compass is the best way to keep oriented, they are 
 not always available, and other ways must be learned. 
 
 If the scout has no compass, but has a watch (he is very 
 negligent if he does not have both, and in good order), he can 
 find the north point, when the sun is shining, by pointing the 
 hour hand towards the sun, so that its shadow lies directly 
 under itself. A line drawn, bisecting the angle made by the 
 hour hand with a line drawn through twelve and the center of 
 the watch, will be the north-and-south line. Midway between 
 the end of the hour hand and the numeral twelve is towards 
 the south. 
 
 At night, if it is clear, the north star gives a sure indication 
 in the northern hemisphere. This star is found midway be- 
 tween the Great Dipper and Cassiopeia's Chair, and ought to 
 be perfectly familiar to everyone. 
 
 The Pointers help to fix the position of the star as indi- 
 cated in Figure 8. 
 
 The Great Dipper and Cassiopeia's Chair should be well 
 learned, for, in southern latitudes, where the North Star is near 
 the horizon and hard to distinguish, one or the other of these con- 
 stellations is always visible, on clear nights. 
 
44 
 
 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 SWEAT 
 0PPCR 
 
 POINTERS 
 
 FIG 8. THE NORTHERN SKY. 
 
 The Southern Cross is nearly as far from the south pole as 
 the Dipper and Cassiopeia's Chair are from the north ; it is not 
 as easily found, and is visible, on clear nights, only half the time, 
 in the tropics north of the equator. The two stars, the Com- 
 passes, are as bright as the brightest star in the Southern Cross, 
 and help to locate it. It will be noticed that the stars form an 
 oblique cross. 
 
 In every climate the keen observer will find indications that 
 serve to orient him, when other means are not at hand. For 
 example, in dry countries the vegetation is usually more luxuriant 
 on northern slopes than on southern ones. In cold climates shel- 
 ters for stock usually open towards the south. A greenhouse is 
 
ORIENTATION 45 
 
 usually placed with its axis east and west. Moss will grow better 
 in places protected from the sun, as on the north side of stones 
 exposed to the sunlight. 
 
 Weather vanes usually have the points of the compass marked 
 on them. They should be used with caution, however, as they are 
 very apt to be bent, or blown out of adjustment, by the wind. 
 
 See Appendix, page 184- A, for instructions to instructors 
 teaching orientation. 
 
 PIG 9. THE SOUTHERN SKY. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 
 
 A GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 "Give me news of the enemy, to relieve my anxiety!" Louis 
 Napoleon. 
 
 In order to learn of the wherabouts, movements, and probable 
 intentions of an enemy, small groups of men, or more rarely, 
 single soldiers, are often sent out from an army, as far as it is 
 prudent, or possible, who endeavor to hide their own movements, 
 all the while keeping a sharp lookout for the enemy, and keenly 
 observing every indication of his movements. 
 
 These men are called spies if they discard their own uniform 
 and put on a disguise, endeavoring thereby to gain their ends by 
 deceiving the enemy as to their identity. A spy, by the law of 
 war, if captured by the enemy within the zone of their operations, 
 while on such expeditions, is liable to suffer death by hanging. 
 This extreme penalty is not imposed because the offense of the 
 spy is in any way shameful, but in order to discourage the obtain- 
 ing of information in that way. The necessity of concealing the 
 condition and disposition of an army, and the more vulnerable 
 avenues of approach to its position is so great, that it is gen- 
 erally recognized by all the leading nations of the world that this 
 extreme penalty is justifiable. Nevertheless, the use of spies is 
 constant and universal. The methods employed by spies to ac- 
 complish their purposes are so varied that it is impossible to 
 attempt to even outline them. The duties of the spy cannot be 
 taught ; they must be instinctive in the individual. 
 
 Scouts are individual officers or soldiers who seek informa- 
 tion of the enemy by approaching his position while in proper 
 uniform, who conceal themselves from observation as much as 
 is consistent with the end they have in view, and who should be 
 carefully trained in peace time so that they not only can rightly 
 interpret what they see, but so they can report on it rapidly, 
 clearly, and intelligently. 
 
ORIENTATION 47 
 
 In order for a man to make a good scout he must, first of all, 
 be a man of high courage, strong self-reliance and common 
 sense. He should possess excellent sight and hearing. He should 
 be a fine marksman, both with rifle and revolver. He must pos- 
 sess strength and endurance of a high order. He should be 
 equally at home on foot or horseback. He should be a strong 
 swimmer. 
 
 Possessing these mental and physical requisites, the scout 
 must first learn how to traverse unknown country by day or night, 
 without getting lost. In a strange country one never knows what 
 is ahead, beyond the horizon. The way back to the starting point 
 should always be known. The faculty of being able to return to 
 a starting point by a sure sense of direction, is sometimes called 
 the "homing instinct." Some of the lower animals possess this 
 to a surprising degree, but men accustomed from childhood to the 
 conveniences of civilized travel rely more on the guidance of 
 time-tables and sign-posts to reach their destination than to this 
 sense of direction ; they have, therefore, to learn it by practice. 
 It is the most essential thing in the training of a scout. 
 
 The next most important step is to train the scout to use his 
 eyes and ears to good purpose; to observe everything within 
 sight and hearing, to interpret what he observes, and to remember 
 it correctly. The eye and ear should, for any military man, be 
 in constant training. A mental photograph should be quickly 
 taken of everything seen. A good practice is to take a thirty 
 seconds' scrutiny of the contents of a room, then leave it and 
 make a list of the things seen. After this list is made, go back 
 and see how many of the prominent objects in the room have 
 been omitted. Similar practice should be indulged in whenever 
 practicable. Another good practice is for two men who are out 
 walking or riding together. On reaching the crest of a hill, each 
 should take an observation of as much of the country as he can 
 see clearly, independently of the other. After a limit of time 
 agreed upon, they withdraw behind the crest, and each makes a 
 list of the things seen, noting what might be termed military fea- 
 tures roads, rivers, houses, hills, valleys, forests, pastures, cul- 
 tivated fields, and the like. It is amazing how many important 
 
48 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 details will be overlooked at first, and how rapidly this faculty can 
 be cultivated. 
 
 An officer or soldier should, whenever he is in the open, be 
 constantly glancing about, noting the features of the landscape, 
 and especially noting every moving thing in order to cultivate 
 quickness of eye. It is not enough to look ahead and to the right 
 and left; the scout must frequently glance to the rear, in order 
 that he may recognize the landscape when he retraces his steps. 
 It must be remembered that every landscape looks entirely dif- 
 ferent when viewed from different directions. 
 
 Practice in observing things by day is of little value after 
 dark. Darkness changes almost every condition. Quickness of 
 ear is now of first importance. During the day the eye is relied 
 upon almost exclusively. Sounds multiply so that it is difficult 
 to locate the origin of any particular sound. At night there is a 
 general stillness; noises that would be indistinguishable by day, 
 sound loud and clear over considerable distances. Efforts have 
 been made to formulate scales for estimating distances at night, 
 but never satisfactorily to many persons other than the one 
 making the estimate. Each scout should make his own scale; 
 verifying his estimate whenever possible, and never missing a 
 chance to practice the art. The most valuable work of good 
 scouts is done at night, and if we remember that, other things 
 being equal, victory lies with the best-informed general, the im- 
 portance of night training can be seen. 
 
 There is no sport that develops quickness of ear, and the sense 
 of position and direction better than hunting coons or 'possums. 
 This is always done at night, in the timber; and since the quarry 
 sets the pace and lays the course, it requires much skill to keep 
 from losing one's way. The baying of the dogs is often difficult 
 to locate, and excellent practice in estimating distance and direc- 
 tion in the forest is the result. In the excitement of the chase, 
 especially if it ends in a kill, one need not be surprised to find 
 one's self in a strange spot, with all idea of direction gone. Then 
 comes the skill of the woodsman to find some object to orient on, 
 and to get home by the least fatiguing route. After a few long, 
 roundabout walks home the coon-hunter learns to keep oriented, 
 
THE DUTIES OP PATROLS 49 
 
 and to study the scheme of nature as it appears at night. This 
 also is something that cannot be taught from books, but must be 
 worked out by each individual for himself. 
 
 In the training of the scout there should be at least as much 
 work done at night as in the daylight. For the enthusiastic sol- 
 dier this practice is no hardship ; it entails no special preparation ; 
 it is so easy to find opportunities, and it seems so simple that most 
 men neglect it altogether. 
 
 Having learned not to get lost, and how to observe everything 
 by day or night, the next thing for the scout to learn is to do this 
 without being observed by others. We must remember that, if 
 seen, the enemy will do all in his power to prevent him from 
 making his observations, to capture or to kill him. 
 
 To this end, all the scout's movements must be under cover 
 whenever it does not interfere with his mission. The most 
 direct way is no longer the best way. - The scout, when he has 
 reached a good position for observation, as soon as he has 
 comprehended the landscape and its features, must select the 
 next observation point and how to get there. Between the 
 two points his progress should be as rapid as possible, consis- 
 tent with his remaining hidden. If between these two points, 
 he finds a place well adapted for observation, he should go to 
 it, repeat his scrutiny of the landscape, note carefully his sur- 
 roundings, see if a better place than the one selected before is 
 available, and in general, use every safe means to obtain com- 
 plete knowledge of the country he is scouting over. If he 
 discovers the enemy, and believes himself not discovered, he 
 should redouble his precautions, carefully plan his own line 
 of retreat, and take every advantage of their ignorance of his 
 being there, remembering that they will exhibit real conditions 
 much more perfectly if they believe they are not watched. If 
 he is satisfied that they have discovered his position, he should 
 act as if he did not think himself seen and so increase his 
 chance of getting away altogether, or of gaining a new posi- 
 tion without being seen, where he can go on wth his observa- 
 tions. 
 
 Scouting in the presence of the enemy is a hazardous 
 undertaking; it should not be hurried or ill-considered. It 
 
SO MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 must be constantly borne in mind that the scout is of no value 
 unless he returns to his commander, and although he should 
 not return without making every effort to accomplish his mis- 
 sion, extra-hazardous risks should be taken only when infor- 
 mation can be obtained in no other way. 
 
 Intelligent hunting, of big game preferably, is the best 
 peace-time training to develop the faculty of keeping out of 
 sight. The greatest patience and self-possession and abso- 
 lutely steady nerves are necessary. It was their development 
 of the art of scouting that enabled a few thousand Boer 
 farmers to tax to their utmost the military resources of the 
 British Empire for three years. 
 
 The scout does not play to the gallery; his work is done 
 under cover, alone, in the midst of danger. No one is near 
 him to help him out of difficulties, no one to know the heroism 
 he has displayed. After his work is done, he comes in with 
 his report, quietly, without parade of any sort; after his rest 
 is taken he disappears to again take up his dangerous trade. 
 To make a first-class scout, courage, pluck, and enthusiasm of 
 the highest order must be combined with resourcefulness, self- 
 reliance, and steady nerve. 
 
 So far, the scout has been trained to travel by night, or 
 day, without getting lost, and hidden from observation. He 
 is to observe narrowly the country and its occupants as he 
 passes over it. In order to be fully able to inform his supe- 
 riors concerning this country, he should learn to interpret the 
 signs of travel, and here he undertakes a task that will require 
 long practice and the use of all the faculties he possesses. 
 Trailing is the highest application of the art of scouting, and 
 includes not merely the connecting of the trail made by any 
 moving thing with the thing itself, but the deducing there- 
 from the reasons why the thing moved, its rate of motion, how 
 long since the trail was made, and where next to look for it. 
 
 Trailing is much more easily accomplished in less fre- 
 quented places than in populous districts. In a city, or along 
 a public highway during the working hours, tracks multiply 
 so that it is out of the question to follow anything by the 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 51 
 
 tracks left by it in the dust or on the pavements. In less fre- 
 quented districts, in the forest, and in the fields, and especially 
 in the regions near the operations of great armies hostile to 
 each other, tracks mean much more, and quite accurate deduc- 
 tions can be made from them by those who have learned to 
 read them. 
 
 If a scout, well out in front of his own forces, finds roads 
 devoid of fresh foot-prints, or wagon-tracks, or the like, he 
 at once knows that no one has recently preceded him, and if 
 he is wise, he will avoid going where his own tracks will tell 
 of his having been there. If he comes to a road crossing the 
 direction of his march, and finds many tracks of men and 
 horses, mules, wagons, and the like, all pointing in the same 
 direction, he reasons that a body of troops has passed in that 
 direction, and that his own path, in his search for informa- 
 tion, should be in their wake. If the marks are fresh, and 
 point towards both directions, he must search farther to see 
 what sort of tracks predominate, and what made them, and 
 so determine whether they were made by troops, or by their 
 trains, going to or returning from some temporary base of 
 supplies, or simply by the people of the country. 
 
 Once a scout has discovered a trail that seems to indicate 
 the passage of an enemy, he should try to follow it, and to 
 learn from it as much as possible about the person or persons 
 making it. 
 
 The reading of trails, and the following of them, is an 
 education in itself that requires long practice. Everywhere 
 are opportunities to practice it, and officers and non-commis- 
 sioned officers should take advantage of them frequently. It 
 is a study that admits of easy practice. One does not need 
 to go out of one's way to find signs of travel. It is only by 
 the constant cultivation of the faculties of observation and 
 deduction that it is possible to become a good scout. 
 
 Scouts often work in pairs, and with good results. Two 
 men, however, can keep concealed less easily than one. 
 
 The scout, if mounted, should have a good horse, better 
 than the average, and trained to stand without being tied. 
 
52 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 He should carry a set of shoes for him, the tools and nails 
 necessary to replace them, and he should know how to put 
 them on, to be perfectly independent and of maximum value. 
 He should also carry a revolver with plenty of ammunition, a 
 watch, a compass, a pair of good field-glasses, a pair of wire- 
 nippers, and the best map of the country that is available.* 
 
 He should have a poncho, or raincoat, and his clothing 
 should be strong and serviceable. He should carry concen- 
 trated rations of some sort, and, if possible, ten or fifteen 
 pounds of grain for his horse. 
 
 While scouting he should give his horse every opportunity 
 to feed, if only two or three nibbles at a time. This is man- 
 datory. His horse should be watered whenever he will drink, 
 if cool. The scout should fill his canteen whenever he can. 
 He can never tell how far it may be to the next good water, 
 nor how badly it may be needed. 
 
 All officers and soldiers should study the capabilities of 
 horses, and how to care for them, so that they can get the 
 best results, when needed, from their horses, without disabling 
 them. 
 
 These remarks concerning scouts apply equally to cavalry 
 or infantry scouts. The horse is of value, in scouting, merely 
 on account of the mobility gained by his use and because the 
 scout's eyes are about three feet higher than when on foot. 
 
 PATROLS 
 
 A patrol is a small group of soldiers sent on any special 
 purpose connected with the service of security or informa- 
 tion. While the patrol should, and usually does, accomplish 
 its purpose without resorting to offensive tactics, still it 
 should be strong enough, in numbers and equipment, to do 
 so if necessary to carry out its mission. In addition, it pos- 
 
 * Nearly all parts of the civilized world are now mapped fairly 
 well, and the best roads indicated plainly, for the use of automo- 
 bilists and bicylists; these maps are everywhere available. 
 
 i 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 53 
 
 sesses the ability of examining the ground it passes over more 
 thoroughly than a single scout could do, and its formation 
 should be such that, if surprised, at least one member of it is 
 able to get away. 
 
 A single scout moves rapidly, keeping hidden, or not, 
 depending on his surroundings, and his mission, preserving 
 always his orientation and a line of retreat. A small patrol 
 moves less rapidly, and its mobility decreases as the patrol 
 increases in size. 
 
 Cavalry and infantry are the arms used for patrolling; 
 cavalry preferably in open country, or on roads, where greater 
 mobility is demanded, infantry in close country or when 
 resistance is to be more stubborn. The commander of a small 
 patrol should be where he can best control the movements of 
 his men. In small patrols with a narrow front, this would be 
 at the head, and here he should be when the patrol has four 
 men, or less ; and when it is moving with its flanks protected by 
 natural obstacles only, or with one flank so protected. 
 
 In very open country a large patrol may open out very 
 extensively, preserving contact and communication as ex- 
 plained, and so cover a wide front, with little danger of all 
 being cut off. As the country becomes rougher, or more tim- 
 bered, and provides more hiding places for hostile detach- 
 ments, the necessity for diminishing the front and increasing 
 the depth of the formation increases, until, in very close situa- 
 tions indeed, the formation becomes very nearly that of a 
 column of files, strengthened by a central group. 
 
 Whether cavalry or infantry is to be used depends entirely 
 upon the extent of the country to be patrolled, and its charac- 
 ter. In open country, cavalry can, on account of its greater 
 mobility, and its increased field of vision, investigate very 
 much more ground than infantry could in the same time, and 
 they can take chances, when having a good line of retreat, that 
 would be suicidal for infantry to assume. In close country, 
 timbered, or rocky, or marshy, the horses, from being a help, 
 become a hindrance, and infantry is much to be preferred. 
 The cavalryman's advantage lies only in his horse's speed, and 
 
54 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 the fact that his eyes are higher above the ground than the 
 infantryman's. 
 
 The function of a patrol is, usually, to get information. 
 When this is the case, the commander should always bear in 
 mind that at least one man of the patrol must get back with 
 the information secured, and he must so dispose his men as 
 to make this possible. 
 
 Distances between members of a patrol cannot be laid 
 down, except that, in the case of infantry patrols, they should 
 not often exceed one hundred yards. (Paragraph 611, Infan- 
 try Drill Regulations.) Cavalry patrols can separate much 
 farther, the limit being that of easy communication by pre- 
 arranged signals. 
 
 Since the chief duty of small patrols is to get information 
 concerning the enemy, and to transmit it to their commander, 
 they habitually seek safety in concealment or flight, fighting 
 only when their mission demands it. The most skillful recon- 
 noissance patrolling is where the patrols accomplish their 
 mission without being discovered by the enemy. 
 
 Reconnoitering patrols are, habitually, small. Small patrols 
 have greater mobility than larger ones, and are more 
 easily concealed. In hostile territory, small patrols, whose 
 mission requires them to go several miles from the main body, 
 are usually supported by larger bodies, nearer to them than 
 the main body. These supports give confidence to the patrols, 
 and add to the probability that information about the enemy, 
 secured by the patrols, will be transmitted to the main body, 
 where only, in the general case, is it of value. 
 
 When a commander decides to send a patrol for any pur- 
 pose, he first decides on its strength. This should be large 
 enough to insure that its mission will be accomplished, and no 
 larger. The rule is: "Detach for a patrol as few men as 
 can be made to serve its purpose." He then selects its leader. 
 This, in certain cases, is of much importance. 
 
 When a patrol is given a mission that requires it to 
 go quite a distance from the body that sent it out, it is some- 
 times called a distant, or strategic patrol. A strategic patrol 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 55 
 
 is usually a mounted patrol that is sent out to gain informa- 
 tion of the hostile main body. Its commander, always an officer, is 
 given as much information as is known of the enemy, and the 
 plans of the commander sending him out. The members of 
 such a patrol are specially selected as to men and horses. The 
 patrol will avoid all conflict not essential to its own safety. It 
 is charged with one mission that of obtaining important in- 
 formation of the enemy, and of transmitting it at the earliest 
 moment to the commander who sent it out. It neglects all 
 other considerations. 
 
 The aeroplane, or dirigible balloon, is now used to do most 
 all of this distant reconnoissance. 
 
 Other patrols, whose missions do not carry them so far 
 afield, are given many names, each descriptive of the mission 
 demanded of the patrol. They are called visiting, connecting, 
 combat, exploring, reconnoitering, flanking, harassing, pursu- 
 ing patrols, etc., but their mission, in any case, is either pro- 
 tective, or is to seek information. Patrols that seek informa- 
 tion, by far the greatest number of all patrols do this, are called, 
 generally, reconnoitering patrols. 
 
 Reconnoitering patrols, while seeking information of the 
 main body, in a general way, also seek all information that 
 may be of value to the larger bodies in their rear. A strategic 
 patrol, sent out by the supreme commander, sends its reports 
 rapidly and directly to him. It is seldom possible for such a 
 patrol to send more than one or two reports a day, while an 
 ordinary reconnoitering patrol sends its information to the 
 particlar officer who sent it out, and who, being generally not 
 far from the patrol, may receive frequent messages. Such a 
 commander, if of no more rank than captain, often has out sev- 
 eral patrols. He tabulates the reports received by him, from 
 all his patrols, and sends the consolidated report to his imme- 
 diate commander. 
 
 The information sent in by a strategic patrol is usually not 
 received by the commander early enough to be used by him 
 the day it is collected. Several strategic patrols usually pre- 
 cede an army that seeks an engagement with its enemy. The 
 
56 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 commander bases his plans for each day, as a rule, on the in- 
 formation received by him from all sources up to ten or eleven 
 o'clock the night before, when he issues his order for the fol- 
 lowing day's movements. 
 
 The information sent in by ordinary reconnoitering patrols 
 is, on the other hand, often used immediately by the com- 
 mander getting it. 
 
 The leader of a strategic patrol is always an officer; the 
 leader of a reconnoitering patrol may be an officer, a non- 
 commissioned officer, or, in many cases, a private soldier. 
 Efficient reconnoisance can only be secured by skillful patrol- 
 ling, hence the leader and members of each patrol should be 
 selected with care, consideration always being taken of the 
 mission of the particular patrol. The qualifications described 
 for the scout are necessary for the members of all important 
 patrols good health, strong physique, keen eyesight, good 
 judgment, presence of mind and courage, combined with mili- 
 tary experience and training, are the essential qualities. Patrol 
 leaders, especially, must be able to read maps accurately and 
 rapidly, and to prepare clear and concise reports and messages. 
 
 The leader of the patrol should be equipped with a map, 
 watch, field glass, compass, message blanks, and pencils. 
 
 The officer sending out a patrol should be very clear and 
 explicit in his instructions, and should be certain that the 
 leader of the patrol understands them fully. These instruc- 
 tions should state, first, what is known of the whereabouts of 
 the enemy, and of neighboring friendly troops. This infor- 
 mation is necessary for the patrol leader to possess in order to 
 allow him to work with intelligence and confidence. The 
 leader must know his own mission that is, what it is expected 
 he will do, what information is desired, what duty performed, 
 the general direction to be followed, when he is to return to 
 his command, and where he will find it. He is also told un- 
 mistakably where he is to send his messages. 
 
 His instructions should be general, not, except in special 
 cases, limiting his conduct too much. He is, in general, told 
 what he is expected to do, not how to do it. 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 57 
 
 In general, a patrol should be sent out for one definite pur- 
 pose only. 
 
 Having thoroughly understood his mission and it is 
 always wise to require a patrol leader to repeat his mission 
 to the officer who sends him out the leader then should 
 thoroughly inspect the members of his patrol, to see that they 
 are fully equipped for the duty required of them, and that, in 
 the case of mounted patrols, each horse is in fit condition for 
 the work expected of it. 
 
 The patrol leader, satisfied with the personnel and equip- 
 ment of his patrol, next should orient his map, assemble his 
 men around it, and go over the situation and his orders, so 
 that each man may go about his task intelligently. 
 
 No rules can be laid down as to how the march of a patrol 
 should be conducted. Each situation must be solved as it 
 arises, but, whatever formation adopted, it should favor the 
 escape of at least one man in case of surprise. 
 
 No normal formation can be prescribed, nor should an 
 attempt be made to prescribe one. Every patrol should march 
 so as to guard against surprise, however, and to insure this a 
 certain amount of dispersion must be obtained. Men marcji- 
 ing in front of a deployed patrol are termed the point. Men, 
 or groups, marching to the right or left, are called flankers. 
 Those following in rear constitute the rear point. 
 
 As stated before, the distances separating the parts of a 
 dismounted patrol should ordinarily not exceed fifty yards 
 seldom a hundred. If it is necessary to investigate a place 
 more distant than this it is best to send at least two men for 
 the duty. 
 
 In small patrols the commander usually leads, the men 
 following at such distances as he prescribes. 
 
 Small patrols usually avoid cities and the larger villages. 
 They enter small villages and even farm enclosures with great 
 caution. To reconnoiter such places, the patrol usually halts 
 outside the village, or enclosure, at a commanding point, and 
 a man or two is sent to investigate the place. If it is occupied 
 the whole patrol is not involved ; if empty of hostile troops, 
 
58 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 the reconnoissance of the place can be completed by the 
 smaller patrol, and, afterwards, the entire patrol can, by a 
 detour, completely avoid the possibility of an ambuscade. 
 
 When it becomes necessary for a patrol to be scattered, 
 the leader should designate a place of assembly, or, in certain 
 cases a second rendezvous, when the first is found impossible 
 to be reached. The members should be instructed that, in 
 case the patrol becomes badly scattered, they should attempt 
 to rejoin their command as best they can ; AT LEAST ONE MAN 
 
 SHOULD GET BACK WITH THE INFORMATION OBTAINED. 
 
 While advancing, the patrol halts on commanding points, 
 and scans the country closely in all directions. The map 
 should be oriented, and important landmarks located. It is 
 especially important to look frequently to the rear, so that the 
 way back may be found without difficulty. A mounted patrol, 
 having greater mobility than a dismounted one, often finds it 
 advisable, in making rapid reconnoissance, to gallop from one 
 high point to another, approaching each crest with caution, 
 and examining each succeeding valley carefully, with the field 
 glasses, before crossing it. Such a patrol will usually find it 
 safer to return by a different route. This route should be 
 determined on during the forward movement. 
 
 It frequently becomes necessary, when approaching the 
 hostile troops more nearly, for the leader of the patrol to con- 
 ceal the bulk of his patrol, and continue the reconnoissance 
 alone, or with one or two companions. A new leader for the 
 men concealed is then designated, and general instructions are 
 given him what to do in case the leader does not come back 
 by a specified time; whether to continue the reconnoissance, 
 to return to his command, or to go to an appointed rendezvous. 
 These instructions must be given liberally, and the new leader 
 must be allowed to use his judgment freely. Any instructions 
 given in such cases must always be given subject to interfer- 
 ence by the enemy. 
 
 If a patrol finds it necessary to remain out over night, it 
 should select the place of bivouac before dark, but should go 
 to it after dark. 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 59 
 
 A mounted patrol must never neglect opportunities for 
 watering and feeding the horses. During a campaign, under 
 the best conditions, a horse remains serviceable but a short 
 time. His well-being should be his rider's greatest concern. 
 So, at each halt, allow the horse to graze. Water him fre- 
 quently. One never knows how far it may be to the next 
 watering place. Hay or grain taken is always receipted for 
 to the owner, so that, if loyal, he may recover its value later on. 
 
 In questioning civilians, in hostile country, members of a 
 patrol must be careful to give no correct information concern- 
 ing their own forces. In friendly territory care must be taken 
 to disclose nothing that it would be of advantage to the enemy 
 to learn. 
 
 All military persons are authorized to make arrest of per- 
 sons, during actual hostilities, whenever necessary, reporting 
 the facts at the earliest opportunity. Mail matter and tele- 
 grams may be seized, examined, and even destroyed, if it is 
 believed that such a course will be of benefit to the State or 
 will injure the enemy. 
 
 When returning to their own command, and if there is no 
 immediate reason for haste, patrols march quietly, not only to 
 avoid causing alarm to their own forces, but on the general 
 principle that the strength of men and horses should never be 
 needlessly wasted. 
 
 "INDICATIONS OF THE ENEMY. Nothing should escape the 
 observation of the patrol. The slightest indication of the 
 enemy should be reported to the leader at once. On roads 
 and in abandoned camps, signs are often found which indicate 
 the number, character, and condition of the enemy, and the 
 direction in which he is marching. Abandoned clothing or 
 equipage may bear marks indicating organizations. 
 
 "A thick and low cloud of dust indicates infantry; a high 
 and thin cloud, cavalry; a broken cloud, artillery or wagon 
 trains. The size of the command and direction of march may 
 be roughly estimated by the dust, but the effect of wind must 
 be considered. 
 
60 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 "The strength of a body of troops may be estimated from 
 the length of time it takes to pass a given point. Assuming 
 that infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, 
 cavalry 1 yard per trooper, and artillery in single column 20 
 yards per gun or caisson, a given point would be passed in 
 one minute by about 
 
 "175 infantry. 
 "110 cavalry, at walk. 
 "200 cavalry, at trot. 
 " 5 guns or caissons. 
 
 "For troops in column of twos, take one-half of the above 
 estimates."* 
 
 The number of camp fires and the area over which they 
 are spread affords an estimate of the strength and position of 
 the enemy. An increase in the number or area of fires indi- 
 cates new arrivals. Much smoke at unusual hours indicates 
 movement. Such signs, however, are accepted with caution. 
 
 Tracks in the road indicate the number and kind of troops 
 and the direction of march. Broad trails parallel to the roads 
 or across country indicate a concentrated march. 
 
 The following rule is emphasized in our Field Service 
 Regulations: "When it is certain that the enemy has been 
 discovered, that fact is promptly reported." This does not 
 mean that at the first sight of a hostile soldier a messenger is 
 at once dispatched with the information that an enemy has 
 been seen. On the contrary. When such a discovery is 
 made, it is the duty of the patrol leader to determine the 
 strength of the immediate party to which the man, or men, 
 belongs whether a single scout, a reconnoitering patrol, a 
 foraging party, a patrol of an advance, rear, or flank guard ; 
 a patrol from an outpost, etc. The patrol leader should 
 exhaust every effort to learn all he can about the other forces 
 that may be in the vicinity. The time consumed in making 
 this investigation is well spent, if he can inform his com- 
 mander with certainty on the points mentioned. Information 
 about the main body of the enemy is what is especially desired. 
 
 * Paragraph 27, Field Service Regulations, U. S. Army, 1914. 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 61 
 
 When a hostile party is discovered approaching a patrol, 
 it is necessary to withdraw to a flank of his line of advance, 
 to be able to observe what is following him. To gain this 
 information it is necessary to remain concealed. If the patrol 
 leader is convinced that part of his patrol has been seen, but 
 not all of it, it may be good tactics to withdraw the part he 
 feels sure has been seen, and to try, with the remainder of the 
 patrol, to continue the reconnoissance unseen. It is on such 
 occasions that the ingenuity and skill of the leader is especially 
 tested. 
 
 The following signals are prescribed in Paragraph 29, F. S. 
 R., 1914. 
 
 "In addition to the usual signals prescribed in drill regu- 
 lations, the following should be clearly understood by members 
 of a patrol : 
 
 "Enemy in sight in small numbers, hold the rifle above the 
 head horizontally; enemy in force, same as preceding, raising 
 and lowering the rifle several times ; take cover, a downward 
 motion of the hand. 
 
 "Other signals may be agreed upon before starting, but 
 they must be familiar to the men; complicated signals are 
 avoided." Signals must be used cautiously, so as not to con- 
 vey information to the enemy. 
 
 A wood, if open enough, is reconnoitered by passing 
 through in line of skirmishers, with as wide intervals as pos- 
 sible. If the underbrush is very dense, the patrol will go 
 through the woods by a path, or a road, in column of files : 
 If a cross-road is met in the wood, the patrol is halted, and the 
 lateral branches are examined before proceeding. 
 
 In approaching the crest of a hill, one man only, usually 
 the leader, creeps up to the crest, and looks over it, while the 
 others remain concealed. He decides on his line of action, and 
 then signals his instructions to the rest of the patrol. 
 
 Enclosures surrounded with high walls should be very 
 cautiously reconnoitered by a small part of the patrol, the rest 
 coming up when the reconnoissance is completed. Houses 
 
62 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 should be reconnoitered by surrounding them, and approach- 
 ing them from opposite directions. Only one man should 
 enter. 
 
 The terrain in the vicinity of an army should be constantly 
 and thoroughly patrolled, whether the enemy is at hand or 
 not. Vigilance should be redoubled when contact with the 
 enemy is lost. 
 
 Patrolling by night should be undertaken, as a rule, only 
 with special objects in view. Information is secured with 
 difficulty in the dark, and is apt to be distorted and unreliable. 
 While the danger of discovery is less than by day, the results 
 secured are also less. 
 
 Night work, in the service of information, is usually con- 
 fined to traversing country where discovery by day would be 
 certain, in order to obtain information when daylight comes. 
 
 Night patrolling over ground that has been patrolled by 
 day, should be done by the same men that patrolled it in the 
 daytime. In general, the men should be selected for patrol- 
 ling who are most familiar with the ground to be patrolled. 
 
 If a patrol has gone as far as its orders contemplate, and 
 discovers nothing of the enemy, it should return, and the 
 leader should report fully the result of his reconnoissance. 
 Patrol leaders must remember that this is expected of them by 
 their commanders, who might infer, if a patrol stayed out 
 too long, due to the anxiety of its leader not to return without 
 definite news of the enemy, that he had met the enemy and 
 been captured, or otherwise prevented from returning. There 
 are many patrols out exploring at the same time, and it is 
 often of more importance to a commander to know that the 
 enemy is not in a certain place, than to get no report because 
 the patrol leader was hunting for the enemy farther out than 
 he was expected to go. 
 
 Patrols should exercise the same caution in returning as in 
 going out. 
 
 Members of small reconnoitering patrols must remember that 
 their function is to get information for their commander, not to 
 fight ; that a few men killed by them will not affect the issue of 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 63 
 
 the war, one way or the other, and unless ordered to the contrary, 
 they should avoid engagements. Their duty is best performed 
 when information is secured without letting the enemy know of 
 their existence. 
 
 The information secured by members of a patrol must be put 
 in shape so that it can be used by other persons. This is their 
 report, and, if possible, it should be in writing, and accompanied 
 by a map. 
 
 A patrol leader, during the course of his reconnoissance, may 
 have occasion to send several messages to his commander, keep- 
 ing him informed of his movements, and of the results of his 
 observations. After he has returned from his reconnnoissance, 
 he should, in the general case, make his report at once, describing 
 in detail everything of importance that he has learned. 
 
 An excellent and comprehensive memorandum for the use of 
 cavalry scouts and vedettes (outpost sentinels) is printed on 
 waterproof faced linen, "to be carried inside the head-dress" of 
 the British soldier. It reads as follows : 
 
 MEMORANDA FOR 
 
 CAVALRY SCOUTS AND VEDETTES 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, F. R. G. S. 
 
 SCOUTS 
 
 When scouting alone, or as one of the patrol, always (1) 
 notice the direction in which you are to work (by compass, watch, 
 sun, stars, wind, or landmarks) ; (2) see that a proper lookout is 
 kept for enemy near and far, footprints or dustclouds and (3) 
 remember your way back by noticing landmarks, making marks, 
 etc. 
 
 When ordered to report on any point, give the information 
 about it as stated below. Make your report, 1st, as short as if it 
 were a telegram; 2nd, full information as for an officer who 
 has never seen the object you are reporting on. 
 
 AMBUSH Place for ambush should be near road, well hidden, 
 with line of escape. BIVOUAC Ditto, ditto, ditto. 
 
64 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 BRIDGE State material, length, breadth, height, parapet, num- 
 ber of arches, repairing materials. 
 
 BUILDING State situation, height, size, material, roof, en- 
 closures. 
 
 COUNTRY State open, close, or wooded; flat, undulating, or 
 hilly; fences, cultivation. 
 
 ENEMY State number, arm, what doing, whereabouts. 
 
 FERRY, FORD State width, depth, bottom, banks, boats. 
 
 LAKE OR POND State width and length, depth, boats. 
 
 LOOK-OUT Note look-out places, good signalling stations, etc. 
 
 HILLS OR MOUNTAINS State height, steepness, surface. 
 
 POSITIONS for defense, open ground to front, cover for de- 
 fenders' line of retreat. 
 
 RAILWAY State single or double, width, embanked or sunk, 
 sleepers, etc. 
 
 RIVER OR STREAM State width, depth, bottom, banks, current, 
 bridges, boats. 
 
 ROAD State whether metalled, fenced, condition, width, sur- 
 rounding country. 
 
 STATIONS State length and number of platforms, coal, water, 
 rolling stock, stores, telegraphs. 
 
 SUPPLIES State amount of food, forage, cattle, crops, ovens, 
 carts, and horses. 
 
 TELEGRAPH State number of wires, height and material of 
 posts. 
 
 TOWN OR VILLAGE State size, situation, defensibility, large 
 buildings, supplies. 
 
 WATER State how obtained, how much in dry weather, size 
 of watering places. 
 
 WOODS State size, density, undergrowth, height of trees, 
 roads through. 
 
 These memoranda are very much condensed, and are to be 
 used to remind the scout of what is expected in his report. He 
 has, of course, been thoroughly taught, in school, and on the drill 
 ground, what these abbreviated suggestions mean. 
 
 All reports should be clearly stated, "as short as if it were a 
 telegram," but, like a telegram, with no necessary word left out. 
 
THE DUTIES OF PATROLS 65 
 
 The art of scouting can be outlined only, in books. It cannot 
 be learned from them, but must be learned in the open air, each 
 man for himself. The principles are few, and can be quickly 
 stated ; their application will show their elasticity, and the impos- 
 sibility of confining them to definite terms. 
 
 A lecture on Patrolling, delivered several years ago, by Gen- 
 eral J. F. Morrison, U. S. Army, concludes as follows : 
 
 "Bear in mind that, as a general rule, patrols are sent out to 
 gain information not to fight. Little combats between individ- 
 uals, or patrols, can have no real effect on the greater issue; so 
 as a rule you should avoid fighting. But don't apply this rule too 
 generally; it has numerous exceptions. 
 
 " Patrols, sent out to gain some specific and important infor- 
 mation, should, as a rule, avoid fighting. The enemy's patrols, 
 however, cannot be allowed to roam without danger, but even so 
 it will generally be better to entrust their intimidation to others 
 than the special patrols sent out after information. 
 
 "A patrol, seeking some special and important information, 
 comes near to a point where, from a certain position, it can see 
 and gain the information desired, but the position is found to be 
 occupied by the enemy. Careful reconnoissance leads the patrol 
 leader to believe he is at least equal to the enemy in this locality. 
 A vigorous attack is justified in order to gain the view. 
 
 "A great number of situations can be drawn but it is not neces- 
 sary. For, after you have had them all presented, it is probable 
 that the first o$ coming up in the field would be different. But 
 if you have grasped the principles, you can solve it. Practice is 
 the only sure help. Make problems for yourself and reason out 
 what you should do and why, and soon you will acquire facility. 
 Practice on the ground with men is still more valuable. 
 
 "One important point I want to impress upon you. Get in- 
 formation back to headquarters if you get any. At many maneu- 
 vers, I have known patrols to go out, see the enemy and never 
 report the fact until long after. There is no good in a patrol 
 gaining information if it is not sent in or is sent in after th 
 enemy attacks. 
 
66 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 "The necessity and importance of efficient patrolling and re- 
 connoissance are taught by the history of war. In the Civil War 
 it was neglected in many cases at heavy cost. 
 
 "Such was the case, not alone in this war, but in many others. 
 \Ye have not been the only offenders. 
 
 "The problems presented are varied and require for their 
 solution men varying in capacity, from the average private to the 
 best trained staff officer. 
 
 "For the higher class of patrol leading the requirements can- 
 not be learned entirely from books. The leader must be cool, 
 determined, and persistent. He must grasp the situation, under- 
 stand the significance of what he sees and hears, must be pos- 
 sessed of good judgment and not afraid to take responsibility. 
 
 "For the greater part of the many patrols required, only phys- 
 ical strength and good average intelligence are necessary." 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 
 
 Before you commit your troops to any definite action, make up 
 your mind, what is to be done, what obstacles there are to its fulfill- 
 ment, and the best way to overcome these obstacles. Then push it 
 for all you are worth. The Japanese Field Service Regulations say:\ 
 "To act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to 
 remain inactive and irresolute" 
 
 In war every commander, from the leader of a patrol to the 
 general commanding an army is compelled to go through certain 
 mental processes as he advances from step to step in the solution 
 of his problems. 
 
 These mental processes may be concisely stated to be three 
 in number first comes the estimate of the situation, sizing up 
 the situation you are in, viewed from all its angles. This pro- 
 cess is like that of the physician who visits a patient for the first 
 time. He wishes to know all that can be learned about the con- 
 dition of the patient before he attempts to prescribe for him. 
 This preliminary survey the physician calls his diagnosis ; the 
 soldier, his estimate of the situation. 
 
 The next mental process is the commander's decision what 
 he decides to do to overcome the forces opposed to him by the 
 enemy in the situation in which he finds himself. 
 
 The final step is the issuing of an order carrying this decision 
 into effect. 
 
 This seems to be a formidable process, but it is not, except to 
 the beginner. At first it will require time and what would seem 
 to be considerable laborious thought to work out a solution along 
 these lines. It is good practice for the student, inexperienced in 
 solving problems, to actually write out his estimate, his decision, 
 and finally his order to put the decision into effect. This of course 
 will require much more time than will ordinarily be at a com- 
 mander's disposal in solving a problem presented by actual war 
 conditions. But the value is in the training it gives in thinking 
 along the right lines, and toward the correct objectives. What at 
 first seems to be difficult and to consume a prohibitive amount of 
 time comes with practice to be an action quickly and effectively 
 
68 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 consummated, and an estimate of the situation, instead of being 
 a long drawn out written process, becomes a rapid turning 
 over in the mind, trained to do that very thing, of the proper con- 
 siderations in the proper order. After solving a few simple prob- 
 lems following this sequence, it becomes evident to the student 
 that this is the logical and natural way to go about it. This 
 sequence is that laid down for its students by the Department of 
 Military Art, at the U. S. Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, 
 Kansas, and applies, as said above, with equal force to the single 
 scout, the leader of a patrol, or the commander of army. 
 In this mental process consider : 
 
 1. YOUR MISSION What special thing are you to do? 
 What does your superior expect of you? You must have a mis- 
 sion, and it must be kept clearly in your mind. 
 
 2. FORCES The strength and location of your own and the 
 enemy's forces, and all that you can learn of the latter. 
 
 3. CONDITIONS Consider all the conditions surrounding 
 your problem. The weather and condition of the roads; the 
 morale, activity and aggressiveness of the enemy; the state of 
 efficiency of your own command ; in short, everything that will 
 affect your problem either favorably or unfavorably. 
 
 4. WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY Do? What would 
 you do if you were in his place, under existing circumstances? 
 
 5. THE TERRAIN How does the terrain you must work over 
 affect your problem ? 
 
 6. COURSES OPEN In how many and what different ways 
 may you accomplish your mission? Go over them all, considering 
 the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
 
 THEN COME TO YOUR DECISION Decide which of the courses 
 considered is best calculated to enable you to successfully execute 
 your mission, and having come to a decision, do not change it; 
 forget all the other courses open to you, and concentrate all your 
 energies on the one adopted. 
 
 AND THEN ISSUE YOUR ORDERS TO CARRY OUT THE PLAN YOU 
 HAVE ADOPTED. 
 
 The art of war may be studied in several ways. By the care- 
 ful study of military history you can learn how wars in the past 
 
THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 69 
 
 have been lost and won ; what tactical combinations have been 
 successful and what have failed. But no student will ever arrive 
 at a correct knowledge of tactics by this sort of study alone. It 
 must be supplemented by practical applications of the principles 
 of tactics to concrete cases. 
 
 These practical applications may be in the form (a) of map 
 problems, where certain situations are imposed, as to the strength 
 and location of troops, the weather, and so forth. The student, 
 with these data in mind, is given a mission, and, with the help of 
 a map, he writes his solution of the problem. 
 
 (b) The application may take the form of a war game, 
 where the solutions are made directly on the map, using bits of 
 colored paper to represent the troops involved in the problem, 
 moving them under the supervision of a director, who acts also 
 as an umpire. 
 
 (c) Another application takes the form of a tactical walk 
 or ride, where the terrain for the problem is real, but the troops 
 are all imaginary. 
 
 (d) The field maneuver is the completest practicable form 
 of applying tactical principles to concrete cases. Here not only 
 the terrain, but the troops employed as well, are real. 
 
 In all these applicatory methods of studying tactics, certain 
 situations are imagined. These are called general and spe- 
 cial situations. 
 
 General situations contain only such information as would 
 naturally be in the possession of both sides in a war, while 
 special situations give out such information as, in war, would 
 ordinarily be possessed by only one side. 
 
 To illustrate this method of estimating a situation, consider 
 the following problem : 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION : 
 
 Guide Map. 
 
 The Susquehanna River separates two warring States. Blue, 
 Eastern, forces have invaded Red, Western, territory. Blue main 
 forces are in the vicinity of Carlisle. The main Red advance is 
 
70 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 from Chambersburg on Carlisle, but the country is intensely 
 hostile ; partisan and guerrilla bands are hanging on the flanks of 
 the Blue army. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION 
 Guide, Strategic, and Topographical Maps. 
 
 You command a Blue officer's patrol (strategic) of eight men. 
 Your mission is to locate the main body of the enemy's cavalry, 
 reported to be in the vicinity of Hanover, to inform your com- 
 mander at York Springs (Guide Map) when you have located 
 him, and to keep in touch with him until relieved. You sent two 
 identical messages to York Springs last night, by two pairs of 
 messengers, that you had located a large cavalry command that 
 camped last night near McSherrytown, on the south branch of the 
 Conewago river (Strategic Map). 
 
 From a hidden spot on the ridge southwest of Centennial you 
 saw them break camp this morning, and march north towards 
 Irishtown. You started to follow along their flank, in an effort 
 to keep in touch with them. Their flanking groups were very 
 active, and kept pushing your patrol to the west. A large Red 
 patrol has pursued you to 593, one mile southeast of Cedar Ridge, 
 where you shake off pursuit, and, by the roads to the north, you 
 reach 584, one-half mile east of Brush Run on the York Turn- 
 pike, where all trace of the enemy is lost. It is 8 :00 a. m., July 
 llth. 
 
 Now to estimate the situation : 
 
 1. MISSION You have accomplished the first part of your 
 mission you have located the hostile cavalry, and have notified 
 your commander. There is left of your original mission to re- 
 gain touch and to keep it until you are relieved. 
 
 2. FORCES You are ten miles south of your own command ; 
 you have eight men, and can count on no help nearer than York 
 Springs. The enemy is in force near you, and is well screened 
 (witness how his patrols forced you away from his flank this 
 morning), the country is bitterly hostile, and overrun with par- 
 tisan and guerrilla bands. It is a fair presumption that they are 
 
THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 71 
 
 nearer the main Blue forces than your 'vicinity, but it is possible 
 that you may meet hostile forces anywhere. You know of no 
 other Red forces anywhere near. 
 
 3. CONDITIONS Few conditions favorable to your mission 
 exist. Assume the day to be bright, the roads not very dusty, 
 and that you have a copy of the Strategic Map. The enemy is 
 aggressive and apparently in good morale. Your own patrol has 
 been out all night, and men and horses are not as fresh and vig- 
 orous as they should be. The country is 'pen and unfavorable 
 for concealment ; this works more in your favor than in the 
 enemy's, because there is so much more of him to be seen. 
 
 4. WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY Do ? He knows all 
 about the Blue forces and movements because the people of the 
 country will tell him ; he is looking for a fight, and your main body 
 is at York Springs. So he is probably headed for that place, and 
 probably by the New Oxford Newchester road, or by the Car- 
 lisle and Baltimore Pike. 
 
 5. TERRAIN The country is generally rolling, with two 
 stream valleys the Conewago and Little Conewago cutting it 
 at right angles to each other. There are small patches of timber 
 here and there, and the roads generally run along the higher 
 ground. 
 
 6. COURSES OPEN (a) You may go back towards Irish- 
 town, by the road to the southeast. Just east of 532 is an open 
 nose, between 540 and 560 elevation. Here you would get a view 
 of the roads leading towards New Oxford from the south. You 
 could cross the Little Conewago, but your line of retreat would 
 then lie back over the road you came, or else through New Ox- 
 ford. Considering the temper of the people, would it be wise to 
 enter New Oxford with so small a patrol ? 
 
 (b) You may go to 546, six hundred yards to the east of 
 your present position, on the military crest. Here you would get 
 a view of the valley of the Little Conewago, and of the roads 
 leading from the south into New Oxford, and of the roads from 
 New Oxford to Newchester and to the Carlisle Baltimore Pike. 
 Your line of retreat is open. But here you would have to wait 
 for the Red column to appear. This would be a 'passive recon- 
 noissance. Suppose the Red cavalry did not come to New Oxford 
 
72 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 at all, but swung off to the northeast from Irishtown, by the Red 
 Hill School, and thence paralleling the East Berlin Railway ? 
 
 (c) You might go, by 568 520, to the north, cross the Con- 
 ewago at the ford at the mouth of the Little Conewago, and take 
 a position of observation on the high ground near by a place 
 with a good view to the south and southeast. If the Reds go by 
 Newchester you can observe them easily if by the Baltimore 
 Pike you can follow by the roads to the north. But, suppose 
 they did not go north of Irishtown at all, but swung northwest 
 by Cedar Ridge towards Hunterstown, or to the northeast along 
 the East Berlin Railway? You would miss them altogether in 
 that case. 
 
 PROBLEM What would be your decision ? 
 
 NOTE: Before proceeding, the student should come to a decision 
 as to what plan he would pursue, under the conditions existing at 
 this moment. 
 
 At 8 :10 a. m., just as the patrol leader had made the decision 
 that he would go southeast to 532, and, if he saw nothing of the 
 enemy from there, would go to Kohler School and then to the 
 shelter of some woods near 596, a Blue patrol of a lieutenant 
 and six men was seen coming from Brush Run. The lieutenant 
 made this report : "Your message of last night reached the Gen- 
 eral at about 11 o'clock. He ordered me to assist in the recon- 
 noissance of the Blue cavalry. He will move with his entire com- 
 mand to the vicinity of Round Hill, where he should be now. I 
 came by Guernsey and crossed the Conewago at the Bridge 
 School, avoiding Hunterstown to the north, and saw no Red 
 troops." 
 
 The commander of the first patrol was the senior of the two 
 officers. He now had a command large enough to split, and so 
 should be able to decide on a sure plan to regain touch with the 
 Red cavalry. This plan he would express to the other officer in 
 the form of an order. 
 
 We are expressly warned by all authoritative military writers 
 to avoid adherence to fixed forms in issuing orders. General von 
 Schellendorf, German Army, on pages 566 and 567 of his book, 
 The Duties of the General Staff, says : 
 
 "Though in peace the adherance to 'approved models' does not 
 lead to any very serious or irreparable mistakes, there is always 
 
THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 73 
 
 the danger of acquiring habits which are unsuitable on active ser- 
 vice, and of discouraging originality of thought. For this reason 
 the 'normal orders,' 'normal formations' and 'normal forms of 
 attack' which are to be found in many textbooks and pocketbooks 
 for every possible case which may arise, should be expressly dis- 
 couraged, for the right form to meet any particular case will only 
 be lighted on by chance. 
 
 "A commander will only issue satisfactory orders when he 
 sees clearly the objective required by the situation, and when he 
 has made up his mind how the objective can be attained in the 
 simplest and best way. But the duties to be carried out in war 
 are often full of responsibility, usually the most difficult which 
 fall to the lot of mortal man. For it is not the weal or woe of the 
 individual which is at stake, but the lives of hundreds of thou- 
 sands of men, and the fate of the nation. The man who attempts 
 to remember the model which he has so often tested in peace will 
 surely fail in the hour of trial. 
 
 "The ceaseless progress of the Art of War in all its aspects 
 is continually rendering it necessary to discard as obsolete and 
 impracticable many methods which but a short time before 
 seemed to guarantee success. Every fresh campaign brings with 
 it astonishing phenomena not previously dreamt of, in face of 
 which a commander who is not accustomed to think for himself 
 in peace stands confounded. But the man who has learnt by 
 ceaseless toil in time of peace to rely upon his own judgment, and 
 has altogether abstained from the use of 'normal formations' and 
 'models,' will be able to deal effectively in war with unexpected 
 and unprecedented incidents." 
 
 To the campaigns of the great war which began in August of 
 1914 does this last paragraph particularly apply. Commanders 
 have met new weapons, new methods of fighting, new conditions 
 of warfare, and, in times of greatest stress and danger, have had 
 to devise the means to contend with them or go down to defeat. 
 There has been no place for those who have been trained to rule 
 of thumb. 
 
 However, it has been agreed that certain things are essential 
 to an intelligent comprehension of an order, and it has become a 
 common practice to establish the sequence of these things in a 
 
74 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 certain way, so that none of the essentials shall be left out of the 
 order, and, as you shall see, this sequence of expression in no way 
 violates General von Schellendorf's rule. All orders can be ex- 
 pressed in five paragraphs. 
 
 Paragraph 1 should give what information is in the possession 
 of the officer issuing the order about the enemy and his own 
 supporting troops. 
 
 Paragraph 2 gives the plan of the commander. 
 Paragraph 3 indicates what troops are to execute this plan, 
 and the mission of each unit. 
 
 Paragraph 4 concerns the baggage trains and such other aux- 
 iliaries as do not accompany the combatant troops. 
 
 Paragraph 5 contains directions where to send messages or to 
 ask for farther orders or instructions usually where the com- 
 mander can be found. 
 
 Fixing this sequence in mind it soon becomes automatic, and 
 correctly worded orders follow naturally, once a decision is 
 reached. 
 
 Now to go back to our situation : The senior lieutenant said 
 to the other one, in the hearing of the whole patrol paragraph 
 1 of his order "A large Red cavalry command camped list 
 night near McSherrystown." (Indicating on the map the spot 
 where he saw them.) "They moved north towards Irishtown this 
 morning. I lost track of them an hour ago was chased from 
 here" (pointing) "to here, where I escaped through these woods. 
 You say our main body is near Round Hill now. 
 
 "I shall" (paragraph 2 of the order) "seek to regain touch 
 with the Red cavalry at once. 
 
 "Go" (paragraph 3) "south along this ridge" (pointing along 
 the ridge towards Square Corner) "keeping a sharp lookout for 
 traces of the enemy. I shall swing around to the northeast with 
 the same object in view. Do not attempt to rejoin me." 
 
 There are no impedimenta, so no paragraph 4 concerning 
 them. 
 
 "Send messages" (paragraph 5) "to the main body near 
 Round Hill." 
 
THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS 75 
 
 It is necessary to learn the sequence of this order thoroughly. 
 It is a device to insure that all the essentials of an order are in- 
 cluded in it. It has been seen that the form is appropriate for 
 use in directing the movements of a patrol ; it is equally appro- 
 priate to direct a field army. Learn it well. 
 
 See Applied Minor Tactics, p. 184-C, and Estimating the Sit- 
 uation, page 189, Appendix, for a continuation of this subject. 
 
76 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 SEQUENCE OF ORDERS 
 
 Paragraph 1 
 
 Give what information you wish your subordinate to have 
 concerning the enemy and your own supporting troops. 
 Usually you will give him all the information you have. 
 
 Paragraph 2 
 
 Give your plan of operations. 
 
 Paragraph 3 
 
 Indicate what troops are to carry out this plan, and the 
 mission of each unit. 
 
 Paragraph 4 
 
 Tell what is to be done with the baggage trains and non- 
 combatant troops. 
 
 Paragraph 5 
 
 Tell where to send messages or to ask for future orders or 
 instructions. This is usually done by indicating where the 
 commander may be found. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 MESSAGES. 
 
 "The first contact with the hostile infantry must always be re- 
 ported." Von Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and Peace^ page 60. 
 
 Not only must a scout or patrol leader collect information 
 desired by the officer who sends him out, but he must get that 
 information to that officer in time for him to use it in the de- 
 velopment of his plans. 
 
 Information is transmitted in the form of a message, either 
 verbal or written, sent by messenger, by visual signals, by tele- 
 phone or telegraph. 
 
 The message itself must be brief and clear. The source of 
 the information contained in it must always be stated, and the 
 sender must carefully separate what he has actually seen from 
 that he has received second hand. 
 
 "Written messages must be clear and definite. Expres- 
 sions depending upon the viewpoint of the observer, such as 
 right, left, in front of, behind, on this side, beyond, etc., are 
 avoided, reference being made to points of the compass instead. 
 The terms right and left, however, may be applied to indi- 
 viduals or bodies of men, or to the banks of a stream ; in the 
 latter case the observer is supposed to be facing down stream. 
 The terms right flank and left flank are fixed designations. 
 They apply primarily to the right and left of a command 
 when facing the enemy and do not change when the command 
 is retreating. The head of a column is its leading element, 
 no matter in what direction the column is facing; the other 
 extremity is the tail. 
 
 "To minimize the possibility of error, geographical names 
 are written or printed in ROMAN CAPITALS; when the spelling 
 does not conform to the pronunciation, the latter is shown 
 phonetically in parentheses, thus: BICESTER (Bister), GILA 
 (Hee-la). 
 
7S MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 "When two or more places or features on the map have 
 the same name they are distinguished by referene to other 
 points. 
 
 "A road is designated by connecting two or more names 
 or places on the road with dashes, thus : LEAVENWORTH LOWE- 
 MONT ATCHISON road. 
 
 "Write all messages in a clear, round hand, so distinct as 
 to be clearly legible even in a bad light. 
 
 "When a message is to be sent by telegraph it should be 
 written and handed to the operator, not dictated to him. 
 When a telephone is used, the person to whom the message is 
 addressed should, if possible, be called to the receiving end of 
 the wire. The telephone is less reliable than the telegraph, 
 and, on a busy wire, the receiving operator is apt to distort the 
 message. 
 
 "Messages carried by messenger are usually enclosed in 
 envelopes, properly addressed. When the message is regarded 
 as confidential it is sealed, marked confidential, and hastened 
 directly to its destination. If not a confidential message, it 
 should be unsealed, the messenger should know its contents, 
 verbatim, and it is proper that commanders along the line 
 should know its contents., 
 
 "Upon the envelope is written the name of the messenger, 
 his time of departure and rate of speed. The latter is indi- 
 cated as follows: Ordinary, rapid, urgent. Ordinary means 
 about five miles an hour for a mounted man; rapid, about 
 seven or eight miles an hour; and urgent, the highest speed 
 consistent with certainty of arrival at destination. 
 
 "Important information is sent by two or more messengers, 
 depending on the dangers of the road. A single messenger is 
 not so confident, and something may happen to him, or to his 
 horse. It may also be advisable to send duplicate messages 
 by different routes. Messengers are informed, before start- 
 ing, of the purport of the message, and where they are to 
 report after it is delivered. A messenger need not alter his 
 pace when passing superiors." 
 
MESSAGES 79 
 
 The above quotations are taken from the Field Service 
 Regulations, and are, like everything else in that manual, much 
 condensed. Certain very important matters are not touched 
 on at all. The patrol leader who has to send a message should 
 answer these two questions before he writes it: "What is it 
 that my chief wants to know? How can I write the knowl- 
 edge that I possess briefly and yet make it unmistakably 
 clear?" 
 
 Return now to the situation discussed in the last Chapter. 
 Consider the message sent the night before the problem opens, 
 when the camp of the Red cavalry near McSherrystown had 
 been discovered. 
 
 To simplify the discussion, the student will now consider 
 himself the leader of this patrol. 
 
 You have discovered a "large cavalry command" in camp. 
 You want to tell your chief, at York Springs, about it. He is 
 a busy man, and does not want to waste time over your mes- 
 sage. So, in the first place, you must write your message in a 
 clear, round hand. He may be awakened from a profound 
 sleep by your messenger, and may have only a match or a 
 candle to read it by, so use large characters, making each letter 
 distinct and ALWAYS WRITE GEOGRAPHICAL 
 NAMES, IN MESSAGES OR ORDERS, IN ROMAN 
 CAPITALS. If two places near by have the same or similar 
 names, identify the one you mean by some other neighboring 
 place. 
 
 Give the location where the message was written unmis- 
 takably, and the date and hour the messenger started with it. 
 Put nothing in the message that will not be of value to your 
 chief. 
 
 Certain of the details of the things you have seen may be 
 of tremendous interest to you you may have had a fight; 
 perhaps some of your men and horses were killed ; you, your- 
 self, may have been wounded but unless these incidents have 
 a direct bearing on your mission, do not recount them in your 
 message. Limit that to such facts as will be of value to your 
 chief in the development of his plans. 
 
80 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 What is it, in this instance that your chief wants you to 
 find out? It is this: "Where is the Red cavalry? How 
 strong are they? Where are they going?" You have found 
 them. Then went into camp this afternoon at McSherrys- 
 town. 
 
 "Where did they come from ?" That is not material. 
 "How many of them are there?" That is most material. 
 How are you going to find it out? Their outposts prevent you 
 from getting any nearer. You must, since you cannot count 
 them, find out how large their camp is, tell him, and let your 
 chief estimate their numbers. Assume that they are camp- 
 ing in the fields on both sides of the McSherrystown-Centen- 
 nial road, along the South Conewago, and that their camps 
 stretch along the river for a mile. You can see and be sure of 
 that much. Their wagons were coming in at dark; you 
 counted some of them, but they were still coming when it 
 became too dark to see more, so your count is worth little. In 
 the last sentence of your message tell your chief your own 
 plans. 
 
 Your message would then read : 
 
 From Lieut. A 's patrol. 
 
 At hill 1 mile southwest of CENTENNIAL. 
 Date: 14 Nov., 1912. 5:15 P. M. No. 1 
 To: C. O. Blue Detachment. 
 
 YORK SPRINGS, PA. 
 
 There is a Red cavalry camp on the right bank of the SOUTH 
 CONEWAGO River, one mile northwest of McSHERRYSTOWN. Camp 
 extends along the stream for about one mile. I remain in observation 
 
 (Signed) A , 
 
 Lieutenant. 
 
 This is enclosed in an envelope, addressed to the Com- 
 manding Officer, Blue Detachment, York Springs, and the 
 name of the messenger, the hour he left, and the authorized 
 rate of speed ordinary, rapid, or urgent are noted on the 
 envelope. 
 
 In order that this very important message may surely 
 reach your chief, you send it in duplicate, by two pairs of 
 messengers. You direct one pair to use the Carlisle and Bal- 
 timore Pike; the other to take the roads to the west of New 
 
MESSAGES 81 
 
 Oxford and Newchester. All the messengers are told what 
 the message contains. 
 
 Here is another problem. 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 
 The boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland (Guide 
 Map) is the frontier between two nations at war. Blue 
 forces coming from the south are approaching this frontier. Red 
 forces of considerable strength are advancing on Gettysburg 
 from the north. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 Desiring to locate the main Red forces, and to determine 
 their strength, the Blue commander sends out a number of 
 strategic patrols. One such patrol is ordered to go by Lit- 
 tlestown (the northern edge of Littlestown, is cut by ths south- 
 ern edge of the Strategic Map, four miles from its southeast 
 corner) towards Round Hill (on the northern edge of the 
 Topographical Map) with instructions 'to seek for informa- 
 tion of movements of Red troops in that vicinity." 
 
 To support these strategic patrols, the Blue commander 
 followed them up with a squadron of cavalry that was ordered 
 to go to Littlestown. The patrol leaders were directed to send 
 all messages to the commander of this squadron. 
 
 The patrol consists of eight men. The leader is an officer. 
 The patrol has reached 584, Topographical Map, on the York 
 Turnpike, without incident. The weather is fine, clear, and 
 warm. It is ten o'clock in the morning of a summer day. 
 The York Turnpike is the main road between York and 
 Gettysburg. In approaching it the patrol has been led from 
 532, and the ridge running a little west of south from 584 was 
 the western horizon until just before the crossroad was 
 reached. Here the orchards obstruct the view to the west, 
 except along the road itself. The road to the east is in plain 
 view, except that a part of the valley of the Little Conewago 
 is hidden by the military crest, which should be found (by 
 profiling, see page 35) about the 540 contour. New Oxford 
 is entirely in view. 
 
82 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The leader dismounts his patrol, except three men, one of 
 when he takes to the western edge of the orchard, a quarter 
 of a mile away, for an inspection of the country to the west. 
 After a careful survey in that direction he leaves the man there 
 to give warning of the approach of hostile parties, directs him 
 to rejoin the patrol at the walk in ten minutes, and then 
 returns to 584. The other two men had trotted to the north- 
 eastern corner of the northern orchard, when the patrol halted. 
 They inspected the country to the north, then dismounted, 
 removed their horses' bridles to permit them to graze, loosened 
 the cinchas, and remained in observation, one man holding the 
 horses, the other standing at the end of the hedge, where he 
 had a good view to the north. 
 
 The leader, at 584, studies his Strategic Map, sees that the 
 next important east and west road is the one through Hamp- 
 ton, Newchester, and Hunterstown, and decides to go next 
 to 568, on the long ridge to the north, across the railroad and 
 about a mile away. 
 
 After a rest of fifteen or twenty minutes, during which time 
 the horses had been unbridled, cinchas loosened, watered at a 
 trough in the farmyard near by, and then allowed to graze, 
 the patrol prepared to go ahead with its mission. The man 
 posted to the west came in. The patrol was mounted, and, as 
 soon as they appeared on the road to the northeast, the two 
 men in observation there bridled their horses, tightened the 
 cinchas, mounted, and remained in observation. As the patrol 
 came up they joined it. The patrol leader took out his glasses, 
 swept the country in his front with them, oriented himself, and 
 then gave the following instructions : 
 
 "We will proceed, at the trot, to the knoll over there." 
 (Pointing to the knoll 573, to the north.) "I will take the 
 lead with Trooper Burns. As long as we ride boot to boot, 
 follow us at about a hundred yards distance. When we sepa- 
 rate, halt. One of us will ride forward at each halt. When 
 the other one rides forward, you will advance without other 
 instructions. If I wave my hat, come up at top speed. If I 
 
MESSAGES 83 
 
 spread my arms, take cover." These signals are improvised 
 ones any agreed upon would do as well. 
 
 In this manner they advanced ; when a hundred yards 
 from the crossroad 557, the pair in front separated. The man 
 on the right halted, the other trotted forward to the cross- 
 road, inspected it, saw nothing suspicious, and waved his right 
 hand, low down a signal to his partner to come up. This he 
 did ; the rest of the patrol followed. 
 
 The man on the right halted, when near 557, because the 
 cover was better on the left side of the road, and the other 
 man advanced near the left side of the road. This is a good 
 rule : Advance under cover, but observe from where the best 
 view can be had. With the arrangement described, the patrol 
 advances without signals. The point does not need to look 
 back at all, but can concentrate on its particular duty.* 
 
 Arrived at the farmyard near 568 the patrol was led into 
 shelter of the buildings, and, from an upper window of the 
 house, the leader had an excellent view to the west, north- 
 west, north, and east. His view to the northeast was stopped 
 at the grove, half a mile away. The valley of Swift Run was 
 hidden. 
 
 A movement in the road just west of the orchard near 594, 
 two miles to the northwest, attracted the leader's attention. 
 Observing closely with his glasses, he saw that a column of 
 infantry was marching towards the west. He did not see the 
 head of it, but it passed while he watched it, for eight minutes. 
 Then came an artillery column that took fifteen minutes to 
 pass, and it was followed by infantry for twenty-two minutes 
 Then a column of wagons. Their tops were easily seen ; there 
 were 89 of them, and they were eighteen minutes in passing. 
 They were followed by a short infantry column about a com- 
 pany. 
 
 * I saw a patrol of a corporal and three troopers of the Tentfe 
 Cavalry work in this way during the Danbury maneuvers of 1911. 
 I watched their work for several miles, and it was perfect rapid, 
 silent, without a hitch. I questioned the officers of the regiment 
 afterwards, but could not learn that this method had been a matter 
 of instruction. It seemed to have been worked out by the corporal 
 and the members of the patrol. P. C. M. 
 
4 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The patrol leader then wrote this message : 
 
 From Lieut. N 's patrol. 
 
 AT SWIFT RUN, S. H., 2 miles northwest of 
 
 NEW OXFORD. 
 
 July 17, 1912. 10:27 A. M. No. 1. 
 To: The C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Blue Cavalry, 
 LITTLESTOWN, PA. 
 
 Just saw column Red troops on road NEWCHESTER HUNTERS- 
 TOWN, at crosscroad 594 about 1% miles west of NEWCHESTER, 
 marching west. Did not see the head of it, but saw about one infantry 
 regiment followed by a battalion of field artillery, two regiments of 
 infantry, and 89 field wagons. I shall keep in touch with them. 
 
 (Signed)N , 
 
 Lieutenant. 
 
 This was enclosed in an envelope addressed to C. O., 1st 
 Sq., 1st Blue Cav., Littlestown, Pa. Sent at 10:30 a. m., 17 
 July, 1912. Rate of speed : rapid. Names of messengers : 
 Burns and Stephens. 
 
 It was read to the two messengers, repeated back by them, 
 and they were directed to proceed to Littlestown at once, by 
 the most direct road, and not to attempt to rejoin the patrol 
 unless ordered by the commanding officer there. 
 
 The patrol leader then assembled his patrol, told them what 
 he had seen, and said that his plan was to follow the Red 
 command, keeping on its left flank, until relieved. He decided 
 to go across Swift Run at 466 W, then around the hill 571 to 
 506 and 606 and thence west, guided by circumstances. He 
 used the same formation as before. The horses had been fed 
 well rested by the hour's wait on the hill and could be relied 
 on for fast work until contact with the Red troops was ob- 
 tained. They went rapidly into Swift Run Valley. At the 
 bend in the cut just across the bridge the point halted sud- 
 denly and dropped back under the crest ; the leader waved his 
 hat and the patrol came up rapidly. The leader cried : "The 
 enemy ! Draw saber ! Charge !" and they dashed around the 
 turn, surprising a Red mounted patrol of four troopers, 
 charged through them, killing or wounding two and captur- 
 ing the others. They were quickly disarmed, the wounded 
 men cared for by one of the Blue troopers, while the two cap- 
 
MESSAGES 85 
 
 tured men were separated at once, and questioned one by one, 
 each out of hearing of the other, by the lieutenant. One man 
 rode to the north, beyond the edge of the woods to guard 
 against surprise. 
 
 The lieutenant learned that this patrol was sent, from the 
 infantry command they had seen, to go to New Oxford, but 
 could not learn their mission there. They (the patrol) had 
 stopped at the farmhouse near by to get some food. They said 
 that the command was a brigade of infantry, a battalion of 
 field artillery, and a squadron of cavalry that was acting as 
 advance guard for a division of infantry that should be pass- 
 ing through Newchester now. This last information was 
 given by only one member of the Red patrol. The other 
 denied all knowledge of any other Red troops in the vicinity. 
 
 It should be observed here that had the Red patrol been 
 properly led, it would not have been possible for the Blue men 
 to have captured and put out of action the entire patrol. One 
 man at least should have been on watch to prevent just exactly 
 what happened, and the Red patrol should have been so dis- 
 posed that, in case of attack at this place, at least one man 
 would stand some chance of getting away. Unless Lieutenant 
 N - discovered the Red patrol without his own men being 
 seen, and he was quite sure that he could get away with the 
 whole patrol, his action in this case would have been of 
 doubtful advisability. In the fight to occur, shots were likely 
 to be fired, and if the Red patrol were properly handled, one or 
 more of its members were likely to escape ; either of which con- 
 tingncy might give warning to other hostile t roops in the 
 vicinity, of the proximity of the Blue patrol, resulting in a 
 hampering of its efforts to fulfill its mission, i. e., to obtain in- 
 formation. The only advantages to be obtained by this action 
 were the destruction of the Red patrol, thus preventing it from 
 obtaining information of the Blues which was not the mission 
 of the Blue patrol, and the obtaining of such information of the 
 Reds as might be disclosed by the questioning of the prisoners 
 and by the indications as to the organizations to which they 
 belonged. The information to be obtained from the prisoners 
 
86 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 if they are trained men, will be of doubtful value, as they may 
 give false information or refuse to give any at all. However, 
 the situation here given is not impossible nor improbable. 
 The enemy's patrols will not always be properly conducted 
 and a patrol leader must always be on the alert to take ad- 
 vantage of his adversary's errors. By skillful handling of the 
 prisoners, he may be able to obtain valuable information from 
 them; and if it is his judgment that the possible results of 
 attacking the enemy's patrol are worth the risks, he should 
 not hesitate to do so vigorously. 
 
 The thing to be done by Lieutenant N immediately 
 
 upon the completion of the questioning of his prisoners was 
 to write a message. 
 
 This might be done as follows : 
 
 From Lieut. N 's patrol. 
 
 At SWIFT RUN, 1M> miles southwest of 
 
 NEWCHESTER. 
 17 July. 10:50 A. M. No. 2. 
 
 To: The C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Blue Cavalry, 
 LITTLETOWN, PA. 
 
 The body of troops reported to be on the NEWCHESTER 
 HUNTERSTOWN road by me in my message No. 1* is said by some 
 prisoners just captured to be a reinforced brigade acting as advance 
 guard to a Red division. Prisoners belong to Troop H, 6th Red 
 Cavalry.** I remain in observation. 
 
 (Signed) N , 
 
 Lieutenant. 
 
 This message was given to two well-mounted troopers, 
 with these instructions : "You know what has occurred. It is 
 twelve miles to Littlestown, and you should reach there in an 
 hour. Spare your horses on the steep hills, but make good 
 time on the level places. Unless directed to do so, do not at- 
 tempt to rejoin me. 
 
 * It is always a good plan to repeat the contents of previous mes- 
 sages in later ones. This helps to an understanding of the ones re- 
 ceived if others, sent before, are intercepted. 
 
 ** This information is valuable to your commander, who, from his 
 information of the Red organizations, can find out what division the 
 6th Red Cavalry is attached to, its strength, who is its commander, 
 and much other data of great value. 
 
MESSAGES 87 
 
 What would be the patrol's next move? It would be folly 
 to attempt to get nearer to the Newchester-Hunterstown 
 road. In fact it would be well for it to get out of its present 
 position as quickly as possible. It appears that the best thing 
 to do is to go back to Hill 573, and for these reasons: The 
 patrol that was captured was undoubtedly either a flank patrol, 
 that attempted to mislead its captors by claiming a mission 
 towards New Oxford, or a connecting patrol, sent with verbal 
 instructions (since no writing was found an any of them), or 
 information for a second column marching west, possibly on 
 the York Turnpike. 
 
 This would be natural, because a division would never 
 execute a flank march across a hostile front without a flank 
 guard, and a strong one. Hill 573 affords a good position to 
 watch the roads leading west and south from Newchester, and 
 an extra line of retreat could be made by cutting gaps in the 
 fences west of 568 to the brook. From there hiding places 
 might be found in the dense fringe of trees bordering Swift Run. 
 This line of retreat would be used only in case retreat by any of 
 the roads leading from 568 became impossible. 
 
 How to get there ? By the road ? Hardly. It would be better 
 to take a little longer and follow the cover to Swift Run and 
 Brush Run, thence up the little wooded valley to Swift Run 
 School House. 
 
 What shall be done with the prisoners? Make the wounded 
 as comfortable as possible in the very few minutes you can spare 
 for such a duty. Turn their horses loose. Take the other two 
 prisoners, and their horses along. Humanitarian impulses must 
 be controlled at certain times in warfare. It is hard to leave 
 wounded men suffering for lack of attention, along the road side, 
 but, if the success of your mission depends on it, you must do it. 
 
 After the reconnoissance from Hill 573 is completed the pris- 
 oners might be got rid of by dismounting them, and directing 
 them to go in the opposite direction to that the patrol intends 
 taking. If their horses are better than those of the patrol, they 
 should be exchanged. The extra horses should be led for a dis- 
 tance, far enough to be sure that the prisoners will not get them 
 again, and then turned loose. They may be shot. 
 
88 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 When this patrol reached 568 the leader dismounted it in the 
 farmyard, as much out of sight as possible. He took one man 
 and climbed to the cupola of the barn, a sort of ventilator with 
 openings on all sides. From there he saw a column of Red cav- 
 alry entering New Oxford from the north, some Red infantry 
 on the road near 520, to the northeast, and about a platoon of 
 Red infantry approaching the bridge at 466W, coming from the 
 north. 
 
 As will be shown later on, an advance guard consists of ad- 
 vance cavalry, a support and a reserve. The advance cavalry 
 precedes the column by enough distance to protect it from artil- 
 lery fire about two miles in advance of the support. That body, 
 in turn, is in the neighborhood of a mile in front of the leading 
 elements of the main body. 
 
 Only fragments of the Newchester New Oxford road can 
 be seen from the cupola of the barn near 568, but the leader of 
 the patrol there can see enough to convince him that a body of 
 cavalry, marching south into New Oxford, is followed at a dis- 
 tance of about two miles by infantry. Also that an infantry col- 
 umn at least a platoon is marching towards him at a rate of 
 about 88 yards a minute, and that it is not much more than a 
 thousand yards away. In twelve or thirteen minutes they will 
 be where he is now, but he can afford to wait at his post of obser- 
 vation, provided he has the other members of his patrol mounted 
 and ready to start, until the approaching infantry reaches the 
 orchard 400 yards away. So he tells the man with him to go 
 down and have everything ready for a sudden start, while he 
 remains watching New Oxford, the bit of road he can see near 
 520, to the northeast, and the approaching infantry. 
 
 Looking across Swift Run he now sees masses of infantry 
 filling the road from 530 to Snyder's, and beyond to the horizon. 
 The head of another column of infantry is nearing 520, to the 
 northeast. The cavalry is raising a cloud of dust south of New 
 Oxford; his nearer danger the infantry platoon has reached 
 the orchard. He hurries down from his post of observation, 
 mounts, and, galloping at top speed, leads his patrol by 557 and 
 584 to the farmhouse just west of the word YORK, on the York 
 
MESSAGES 89 
 
 Turnpike, from which place he has a good view of the roads 
 leading to New Oxford, and can watch the Red cavalry. 
 
 It keeps on marching towards the south. He infers from that 
 that the infantry following it is going on, and he resumes his 
 march south, paralleling their march, to search for some point 
 where he can afford to wait to see if the Red infantry is really 
 following. Such a place might be found near the Kohler School 
 (Strategic Map). When he has verified the fact that the infantry 
 is really marching south of New Oxford is the time to send 
 another message. He has not enough men left to send any in- 
 complete mssages. 
 
 Two messages have been sent, one when the first large body 
 of Red troops was seen, the second when information had been 
 discovered concerning their identity, and the larger Red forces 
 near by. If a message were sent from 568 it could add but little 
 to the information already sent in. By waiting until it is pos- 
 itively known where the bodies of approaching troops are going, 
 the patrol leader will have more important news to send, and he 
 cannot afford to deplete his patrol entirely of messengers. 
 
 Before the subject of messages is carried any farther, it is 
 necessary to consider the duties of those protective groups 
 outposts, advance, rear, and flank guards that all bodies of 
 troops throw out, to keep off hostile patrols, and to prevent 
 surprise. See Messages, p. 198, Appendix. 
 
90 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 MESSAGES 
 
 A MESSAGE CONTAINS FOUR PARTS: 
 
 1. The Heading 
 
 This should indicate, clearly and unmistakably : 
 
 a. From whom it is sent. 
 
 b. The place from which it is sent. 
 
 c. The date and hour of starting. 
 
 d. Its number in the sequence of messages for that day. 
 
 2. The Address 
 
 This should include: 
 
 a. The title of the commander for whom the message 
 is intended. 
 
 b. The place where he will probably be found. 
 
 3. The Body 
 
 This should be framed in answer to these two questions : 
 
 a. What is it that my chief wants to know ? 
 
 b. How can I write any desired knowledge that I pos- 
 sess briefly, and yet make it unmistakably clear? 
 
 After writing the message, it should be submitted to these 
 tests : 
 
 a. Does it contain all the information that I have col- 
 lected that is of use to my commander? 
 
 b. Does it contain anything that will not be of use to 
 him? 
 
 c. Is it limited to facts that I have verified? If any 
 unverified reports are included, does it clearly show the 
 source of such reports and the fact that they have not 
 been verified? 
 
 d. Is it legibly written, and without ambiguities, so 
 that it may be quickly read and instantly and accurately 
 comprehended ? 
 
 4. The Signature 
 
 This should be legible and in some sure way indicate the 
 authenticity of the message. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 OUTPOSTS 
 
 "The outpost is a covering detachment detailed to secure the 
 camp or bivouac against surprise, and to prevent an attack upon it 
 before the troops can prepare to resist!' Paragraph 678, In- 
 fantry Drill Regulations. 
 
 Troops marching are protected by advance, rear, and flank 
 guards, but when a halt is made, in addition to these groups, the 
 commanding points near the column are at once occupied by other 
 groups, sent out from each unit, to add to its protection while it 
 rests. These groups are called march outposts. 
 
 An example of a march outpost for a patrol was given on 
 page 82, ante. In that case the patrol had come from the south, 
 on the east side of a ridge that, on that side, was open to the 
 patrol's view. The leader decided to rest on the top of this ridge 
 for a few minutes, to water his horses and to let them graze. It 
 would not be safe to do this without first inspecting the country 
 he had not been over, so the leader, and one man with him, went 
 to the west, while two men went to the north, in which latter 
 direction the leader planned to go on resuming his march. 
 
 He selected for his halt a ridge with a wide view on every 
 side and roads available for retreat leading in all directions. The 
 orchards limited his view to the west and north ; if they had not 
 been there there would have been no need of march outposts at 
 all, as these groups are only sent to places threateningly near 
 the command that hide routes by which an enemy might 
 come up unobserved. 
 
 When he halts at 568 he will need no march outposts at all ; 
 at 594 he will need them on all the roads, in case he decides to 
 stop there, for, although on top of a ridge, the cross-road happens 
 to be in a small depression screened by trees or higher ground 
 in every direction except the northwest. 
 
 So with a larger body having out advance, flank and rear 
 guards. For all those units that happen to halt where hiding 
 places are near by, and not occupied by any of the groups of the 
 
92 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 protective bodies, march outposts should be at once sent out to 
 occupy them during the halt. 
 
 In the French system of tactics it is provided that certain 
 units of every marching body shall be designated to provide 
 march outposts for that body at each halt. The commander, 
 when ordering a halt, to rest during the march, commands: 
 "Halt! March Outposts!" Then the officers commanding the 
 designated march outpost units at once become responsible for 
 the protection of the portion of the command his unit is selected 
 from. Field Service Regulations and Drill Regulations are silent 
 on this point. 
 
 When a halt for the night is made, or a camp is pitched for 
 a longer period than a single night, the command is surrounded 
 by protective groups also called outposts, that remain on the alert 
 in order that the bulk of the command may get its necessary rest. 
 
 The size of the outposts and the extent of country they cover 
 should depend entirely on the proximity and character of the 
 enemy. When the enemy is known to be a full day's march away 
 or more, and the people of the country are friendly, a few senti- 
 nels, more for police purposes than for any other reason, usually 
 can give sufficient protection. 
 
 If the enemy is retreating, or is in bad morale, an outpost is 
 needed, to be sure, but not necessarily a strong one. But when 
 the forces opposing each other are nearly equal in strength, 
 and are getting within striking distance of each other, then the 
 outposts must be strong, well posted, and ably commanded. With 
 the modern arms of precision and rapidity of fire, after opposing 
 forces come together, and before the superiority of one over the 
 other has been determined, they cannot, in many cases, advance 
 over open ground in the day time, but must do so at night. Then 
 it is that the outpost reaches almost its greatest value. 
 
 But each separate body of troops in war time must have its 
 outposts. Three men, on patrol duty, when overtaken by night 
 away from their command and compelled to bivouac, should have 
 one man on watch while the others sleep, and this man is an out- 
 post. A company of infantry guarding a bridge or a railway 
 station on the line of communications must have its outposts, 
 to warn it of threatened raids, standing off the hostile body while 
 
OUTPOSTS 92 
 
 the rest of the company prepares to defend its charge. Day and 
 night and week after week, during the conduct of hostilities, every 
 military group in the theater of operations must be protected by 
 outposts. No duty is more important, no duty requires greater 
 fidelity, greater courage, better judgment. 
 
 The principles governing the posting of outposts are the same 
 as those that govern the formation of all protective bodies. 
 "There is (1) the cavalry covering the front; next (2) a group 
 or line of groups in observation; then (3) the support or line of 
 supports, whose duty is to furnish the observation groups, and 
 check the enemy pending the arrival of reinforcements ; still far- 
 ther in the rear is (4) the reserve." (Paragraph 37 Field Service 
 Regulations. ) 
 
 The advance cavalry of the outpost is in front, reconnoitering 
 towards the enemy. Its patrols cover the front, and, in fact, all 
 directions from which the enemy might come, far enough to 
 protect the camp from possibility of surprise by artillery fire. 
 
 But it is not only to protect its main body from artillery fire 
 that the advance cavalry goes out, but to give ample warning of 
 the approach of all dangerously large hostile bodies. Artillery 
 must not be allowed to come within its extreme range about 
 three miles but even if there were no artillery to be reckoned 
 with, the advance cavalry would still be sent out to watch, from 
 commanding points, all the directions from which the enemy 
 might possibly come. 
 
 The advance cavalry can not be expected to exclude all 
 reconnoitering patrols of the enemy, especially in country that 
 is at all rough or where cover for those small groups is abun- 
 dant. It can, and must, be so posted as to give warning of the 
 approach of all considerable bodies of the enemy. Incidentally 
 it drives away all small patrols that are seen, provided that, in 
 so doing it is not drawn entirely away from the commanding 
 points it is set to watch. 
 
 The outpost consists essentially of two parts : the advance 
 cavalry, just described, which protects the larger units behind it 
 from surprise by artillery fire, and warns them of the dangerous 
 nearness of large hostile bodies, and the infantry of the outpost, 
 the reserve, supports, and outguards, that protects the large units 
 
94 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 of the army from surprise by infantry fire, and which must hold, 
 at all cost to itself, the ground selected for the defensive position 
 to be occupied in the event of a serious attack. This line is called 
 the line of resistance. 
 
 "The reserve constitutes the main body of the outpost and is 
 held at some central point from which it can readily support the 
 troops in front or hold a rallying position on which they may 
 retire. The reserve may be omitted when the outpost consists 
 of less than two companies. 
 
 "The reserve may comprise one-fourth to two-thirds of the 
 strength of the outpost. 
 
 "The supports constitute a line of supporting and resisting 
 detachments, varying in size from a half company to a battalion. 
 They furnish the line of outguards. 
 
 "The supports are numbered consecutively from right to left. 
 They are placed at the more important points on the outpost line, 
 usually in the line on which resistance is to be made in case of 
 attack. 
 
 "As a general rule, roads exercise the greatest influence on 
 the location of supports, and a support will generally be placed 
 on or near a road. The section which it is to cover should be 
 clearly defined by means of tangible lines on the ground and 
 should be such that the support is centrally located therein. 
 
 ''The outguards constitute the line of small detachments 
 farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy. For convenience 
 they are classified as pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts. 
 They are numbered consecutively from right to left in each 
 support. 
 
 "A picket is a group consisting of two or more squads, ordi- 
 narily not exceeding half a company, posted in the line of out- 
 guards to cover a given sector . It furnishes patrols, and one or 
 more sentinels, double sentinels, sentry squads, or cossack posts, 
 for observation. 
 
 "Pickets are placed at the more important points in the line of 
 outguards, such as road forks. The strength of each depends 
 upon the number of small groups required to observe properly 
 its sector. 
 
OUTPOSTS 95 
 
 "A sentry squad is a squad posted in observation at an indi- 
 cated point. It posts a double sentinel in observation, the remain- 
 ing men resting near by and furnishing the reliefs of sentinels. 
 In some cases it may be required to furnish a patrol. 
 
 "A cossack post consists of four men. It is an observation 
 group similar to a sentry squad, but employs a single sentinel. 
 At night it will sometimes be advisable to place some of the 
 outguards or their sentinels in a position different from that which 
 they occupy in the daytime. In such case the ground should be 
 carefully studied before dark and the change made at dusk. 
 However, a change in the position of the outguard will be excep- 
 tional. 
 
 "Sentinels are generally used singly in daytime, but at night 
 double sentinels will be required in most cases. Sentinels fur- 
 nished by cossack posts or sentry squads are kept near their 
 group. Those furnished by pickets may be as far as one hundred 
 yards away. 
 
 "Every sentinel should be able to communicate readily with 
 the body to which he belongs. 
 
 "Sentinel posts are numbered consecutively from right to left 
 in each outguard. Sentry squads and cossack posts furnished by 
 pickets are counted as sentinel posts." 
 
 The paragraphs quoted from the Field Service Regulations, 
 above, describe in general terms the duties of these bodies, and 
 the general aspect of the outpost fabric. 
 
 The line of outguards occupies what is called the line of 
 observation. They are the real antennae of the outpost. Sen- 
 tinels from the outguards are posted to observe every avenue 
 of approach, covering the front and flanks of the main body, giv- 
 ing warning of the approach of hostile forces, and resisting their 
 advance to the limit of their ability. When resistance ceases to 
 avail farther, these observing groups, called outguards, fall back 
 on larger groups in their rear, the supports. These supports 
 usually supply two or more outguards. Numerically they are 
 usually twice as large as all the outguards that are detached 
 form them, and they are posted in good defensive positions. 
 
 These support positions are, when possible, the strongest, tac- 
 tically, to be found near the camp of the main body, and as a rule 
 
96 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 are selected as the place where the main body expects to make its 
 greatest resistance. The line of supports is therefore frequently 
 called the line of resistance. 
 
 For small commands these two lines usually give sufficient 
 protection, but larger commands may add a third group, or line 
 of groups, posted between the support and the main body, called 
 the reserve. 
 
 In the case of a marching body that halts for the night, the 
 advance guard of the day becomes the outpost for that night 
 It, as will be seen, is more familiar with the situation than any 
 other part of the command. It is already in position, or nearly 
 so. On the day following, the outposts remain at their posts 
 until the new advance guard passes them, when the march is re- 
 sumed. Then they usually fall in with the main body, as it comes 
 up. 
 
 The advance cavalry of the outpost remains out, a mile or 
 more, beyond the outguards, in observation of the country until 
 dark, when it comes in and goes into camp between the supports 
 and the main body. If there is a reserve to the outposts, the 
 advance cavalry may spend the night near it. 
 
 Cavalry is less useful at night than in the daytime. Horses 
 must have rest, and they rest better at night than in the daytime. 
 The outpost of a cavalry command is usually dismounted at night, 
 and the horses sent to the rear as soon as darkness closes in. 
 
 A few mounted men, when available, are, however, frequently 
 attached to the supports for night patrolling beyond the out- 
 guards, when such patrolling is thought to be necessary or 
 effective. 
 
 The cossack post, consisting of three men and a non-commis- 
 sioned officer, is the smallest outguard. This group, placed in 
 concealment, posts a sentinel near it ten to twenty yards 
 away. He watches for a while, not longer than two hours, and 
 then is relieved by one of the others, who watches for the same 
 period in his turn, when he is relieved by the third. The senti- 
 nel gets moral support from the proximity of the others of the 
 group. 
 
 The sentry squad is the next in size. It consists of an infantry 
 squad, eight men, one of whom is a corporal. The sentry squad 
 
OUTPOSTS 97 
 
 usually furnishes one double sentinel post, with its two reliefs. 
 These sentinels should be posted near the rest of the squad, which 
 is concealed. They too are relieved every two hours, in the usual 
 case ; six of the seven privates being used in this way, the seventh 
 being available for use as a messenger, or to replace any man who 
 is incapacitated for any reason. 
 
 The picket may post its sentinels as far away from it as one 
 hundred yards ; its cossack posts and sentry squads may be even 
 farther away. 
 
 Whether a picket, a sentry squad, or a cossack post shall be 
 used to observe any sector of the line of observation will always 
 depend on the answer to this question : What is the smallest 
 number of men that can be safely depended on to watch this 
 sector efficiently? 
 
 The reserve, on outpost duty, may stack its arms; the men 
 may remove their equipments and fall out of ranks. Cooking is 
 usually done at the reserve for the rest of the outpost. Commu- 
 nication from the reserve to the supports is usually maintained 
 by visiting patrols and by messengers. When allowed at the 
 support meals are prepared there for the outguards. Except 
 when the camp is attacked, duty with the reserve consists simply 
 in being ready and available to reinforce the supports. 
 
 The support also stacks arms ; the men fall out of ranks and 
 remove their equipments, except the belts. Sentinels are then 
 posted to warn the supports of any unusual happenings in the 
 direction of the outguards. Cooking may or may not be allowed 
 at the supports. This is determined by the outpost commander, 
 not by the support commander. 
 
 Outguard duty is either sentinel duty or combat. Until the 
 enemy has actually attacked them, the sentinels remain at their 
 posts, alert, keenly observant of the ground assigned them to 
 watch. They, and the outguards that sent them out, remain con- 
 stantly on the alert, fully equipped and ready for instant action. 
 
 It must be understood that mobility counts for little with an 
 outpost. Observation and resistance are the functions of 
 outposts. The greater part of every outpost consists of in- 
 fantry. Even the outposts of cavalry commands perform most 
 of their night duties dismounted. (Paragraph 72, Field Service 
 
98 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 Regulations. ) By day cavalry patrols can go to prominent points 
 well in advance of the line of infantry outguards, where a good 
 view may be had of the surrounding country, and so can be of 
 great assistance to the infantry. The Field Service Regulations 
 say (Paragraph 72) : "With efficient cavalry in front, the work 
 of the infantry on the line of observation is reduced to a min- 
 imum." But the cavalry must be efficient here as elsewhere to 
 be of value. 
 
 At night mounted men are of very little value to an outpost. 
 It is impossible for them to move without making noise. Their 
 bulk makes them easily seen, and it is comparatively easy to way- 
 lay them and destroy them. More than that, cavalry that is prop- 
 erly used is of great value. Horses are creatures of habit, and 
 are without that patriotic sentiment that keeps men going, in 
 spite of weariness and lack of food. Horses rest best between 
 midnight and morning, and nothing but the gravest emergency 
 should deprive them of their rest. So, at dark, the cavalry of 
 the outpost should come in. It is quite proper to use the men, 
 dismounted, on night outpost duty when the occasion demands 
 it, but the horses should not be so used. 
 
 The orders for outpost sentinels discussed below have re- 
 ceived the approval of the Secretary of War. Every military 
 person who is liable to be called on to act either as a sentinel 
 of the outpost, or in any capacity to instruct or inspect such 
 sentinels, should learn them verbatim, and know how to apply 
 them. 
 
 FIRST: ABOUT MYSELF AND FRIENDLY NEIGH- 
 BORS. 
 
 My post is number , outguard number The 
 
 outguard is There. The post on my right is number , 
 
 outguard number , and is There. The post on my left 
 
 is number , outguard number , and is There. 
 
 The support is There. Other detachments are There and 
 There. Such and Such patrols are operating in my front. 
 This road leads to 
 
 No outguard sentinel should permit himself to be posted 
 
OUTPOSTS 99 
 
 without receiving the necessary information to enable him to 
 fill the gaps in this paragraph of his orders. 
 
 He cannot be expected, in these days of neutral-colored, 
 non-distinctive uniforms, to be able to tell friend from foe 
 unless he knows exactly where every friendly group is posted, 
 where every friendly patrol may be looked for in his sector. 
 
 SECOND : ABOUT THE ENEMY. 
 
 The enemy is reported to be There. I have seen Him, 
 (describing exactly what hostile bodies I have seen) There; 
 or, I have not seen him. I am to watch for him between 
 There and There. If I see any unusual movement I am to 
 report it at once to my outguard commander, who is There. 
 If suddenly attacked and forced to retire or threatened with 
 capture, I shall rejoin my outguard by going around That 
 Way so as not to disclose the position of my outguard to the 
 enemy, or to mask its fire. 
 
 The first paragraph shows that the sentinel knows where 
 his friends are; the second shows that he knows everything 
 he should know about the enemy, and what to do if he observes 
 new conditions in his front, or is suddenly attacked. 
 
 THIRD : HOW TO CONDUCT MYSELF ON MY POST. 
 
 By day I shall make the best use possible of such cover as 
 is available, standing, crouching or lying down, and remaining 
 stationary or moving about as will enable me to observe the 
 sector assigned me to watch in the most efficient manner. 
 
 I shall carry my piece at will, loaded and locked. 
 
 I shall inform friendly patrols of what I have seen. 
 
 At night I shall remain standing, habitually stationary, 
 moving about only for the purposes of observation. I will not 
 sit or lie down unless authorized to do so. 
 
 This paragraph, properly recited, proves to the inspector 
 that the sentinel knows how to conduct himself while on post. 
 He should be required to explain how he applies the first par- 
 agraph to his particular problem. He is required to remain 
 standing at night because he will keep awake if he stands up. 
 
100 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 He should not be authorized to sit, or lie down, unless it be 
 necessary to do so in order to remain concealed. 
 
 FOURTH : WHEN TO FIRE ON THE ENEMY. 
 
 Unless specially ordered to fire on the enemy whenever 
 seen I shall fire only under the following circumstances: (a) 
 when suddenly attacked and there is no time to call the out- 
 guard commander, I shall fire rapidly, but with careful aim. 
 (b) When a person approaching my post is ordered to halt 
 and fails to do so, or otherwise disobeys me, I shall fire delib- 
 erately, taking careful aim, so as to be sure and stop him. 
 
 Training in the matter of when to fire on the enemy is espe- 
 cially important. It is always noticed that green troops are 
 unnecessarily alarmed by their outposts. Sentinels are per- 
 mitted, or ordered, to fire at every moving thing in their front. 
 Innumerable instances occur where the supports, or reserves, 
 or even the main body itself, are rushed to the line of resist- 
 ance by the nervousness or apprehension of the outguard 
 sentinels, when there was no occasion for alarm. The provi- 
 sions of the above paragraph should be rigidly enforced. 
 
 FIFTH: TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AP- 
 PROACHING MY POST. 
 
 By day I shall allow only officers, non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, and detachments recognized as part of the outpost and 
 officers known to have authority to do so, to pass my post 
 either in or out. I shall detain all others and notify my out- 
 guard commander. 
 
 At night, when any persons approach my post, I shall come 
 to a ready, halt them, and notify the outguard commander. 
 
 Persons claiming to be deserters from the enemy are re- 
 quired to lay down their arms. If they are pursued by the 
 enemy I shall order them to drop their arms, and I shall give 
 the alarm. If they fail to obey me at once I shall fire on them. 
 
 I shall halt bearers of flags of truce and their escorts, re- 
 quire them to face outwards, and at once notify the commander 
 of the outguard. 
 
OUTPOSTS 101 
 
 This paragraph, if properly put in execution, will prevent 
 unnecessary firing by sentinels. It tells who are permitted to 
 pass the sentinels, in or out. It should be rigidly followed. 
 The sentinel must be sure that he recognizes every person or 
 group that approaches his post before he allows them to pro- 
 ced, even in the day time. If he has the least doubt as to 
 their identity, he must call his outguard commander, keeping 
 the suspected person or group at a safe distance from him until 
 the outguard commander comes up and relieves him of his re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 In the ordinary case there is only one group on the outpost 
 line that is authorized to pass strangers. This group is called 
 an examining post. Its commander is usually an officer. 
 Strangers positively identified as not part of the outpost, 
 should be passed along the front of the line of observation to 
 the examining post, and never allowed to go in rear of it. It 
 is no part of the duty of outguard commanders to permit 
 strangers to visit the support, unless the support commander 
 should authorize it in person. 
 
 At night the sentinel must pass no one, except his own out- 
 guard commander. The latter is called in every case, and on 
 him rests the responsibility of identification. 
 
 Sentinels, when possible, are posted (a) so as to have a 
 good, clear view to the front ; (b) so as to be able to communi- 
 cate easily with the group that sent them out ; (c) so as to be 
 concealed from observation to the front; (d) so as to see the 
 sentinels of adjoining outguards. If any of these conditions 
 are impossible to realize, they should be sacrified in inverse 
 order, the last first. 
 
 It is absolutely essential that the sentinel should have a 
 good clear view to the front, because otherwise the enemy 
 would be able to move about in his sector without his seeing 
 him. He must be able to communicate easily and at all times 
 with the group that sent him out. This communication must 
 never be broken. It is imperative that every signal of the 
 sentinel be instantly observed and repeated to the outguard 
 commander. 
 
102 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 If the sentinel, in order to see unobstructedly to the front 
 of his post, has to show himself, he must do so. It is his para- 
 mount duty to observe. He should use his ingenuity to screen 
 himself as much as possible from hostile observation, but he 
 must not abandon or neglect his mission as an observer to do 
 this. 
 
 When it is possible, with the men available, to post the 
 sentinels so that each one can see those to the right and left 
 of his post, it should be done. It is often not possible. In 
 such cases connection is kept up by means of visiting patrols. 
 In every case, whether or not the sentinel can see his imme- 
 diate neighbors on the line of observation, he must know where 
 they are. 
 
 Whether a cossack post, a sentry squad, or a picket is to 
 be used at any particular spot will depend on its importance 
 in the scheme of security. A prominent spot the top of a 
 bald hill or the crest of an open ridge that is off a road and 
 not likely to be used as an avenue of hostile approach, could, 
 perhaps, be effectully covered by a cossack post, while an im- 
 portant road, a road fork or crossroad, a bridge, a ford any 
 place where the enemy is liable to come in force would be an 
 appropriate place for a picket. 
 
 The decision as to the strength, composition and location 
 of the outpost rests with the Commanding Officer of the forces, 
 no matter the size of the command, up to and including the 
 division. 
 
 NOTE. The Field Service Regulations, Paragraphs 60 to 83, and 
 the Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraph 678 to 707, prescribe the 
 general rules for the formation and duties of outposts. The student 
 is advised to study these paragraphs closely. Instructors should 
 include them in assigning lessons to students. 
 
 The duties of the outguards can scarcely be taught from maps of 
 as small scale as those accompanying this txet. They should be 
 taught from the War Game Map, or, far better and easier, on the 
 ground. 
 
 The problem below is to show the relation of an outpost to 
 its main body, in the case of a small isolated command, in un- 
 friendly country: 
 
OUTPOSTS 103 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 Guide Map. 
 
 War exists between two States separated by the Susquehanna 
 River. Eastern, Blue, forces have crossed the frontier, and, on 
 July 20th, were massed at Gettysburg, using the Western Mary- 
 land Railway as a line of communication and supply. 
 
 Western, Red, forces are concentrating to the west of 
 Gettysburg. 
 
 The Blue cavalry is to the south, towards Libertytown. The 
 people are hostile to the Blues. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION BLUE. 
 Topographical Map. 
 
 The 1st Battalion, 1st Blue Infantry, to which 14 mounted 
 scouts and a machine gun are attached, is posted at New Oxford, 
 guarding the railroad from the bridge at Brush Run to Berlin 
 Junction, both inclusive, and a lot of supplies that have been col- 
 lected at New Oxford, which will be forwarded to Gettysburg as 
 opportunity offers. 
 
 The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, is at Guldens, and the Head- 
 quarters and 3d Battalion are at Hanover (Guide Map). 
 
 Early on the morning of July 20th spies report that a regiment 
 of Red cavalry camped at York Springs the night before. 
 
 Major A , commanding the battalion at New Oxford, 
 
 estimates the situation as follows : 
 
 MISSION : To guard the railroad, the stores at New Oxford, 
 and to prevent the surprise of his command by any Red force. 
 
 FORCE: Blue. A large force is at Gettysburg, 10 miles to 
 the west; one battalion of his regiment is at Guldens, 4^ miles 
 to the west ; the rest of the regiment is at Hanover, 6 miles to the 
 southeast. 
 
 Red. The only Red force known to be in the vicinity is at 
 York Springs, 10 miles to the north. 
 
 CONDITIONS: The weather is fine, and the country open. 
 The only obstacles to the free movement of troops in the vi- 
 
104 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 cinity are the Conewago and Little Conewago Creeks, small 
 streams that are crossed by numerous bridges and fords. The 
 railway to be defended is vulnerable only at the bridges at 
 Brush Run, and across the Little Conewago below Diehl's 
 Mill. A train of flat cars, the engine with steam kept up, is on 
 the siding at New Oxford, available for instant use- The bat- 
 talion is camped in the pasture in the northwest quarter of the 
 village. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY DO? If he attacks the 
 battalion at all it will probably be merely a feint to divert atten- 
 tion from the bridges, which are vital to the continued operation 
 of the railroad. He may attempt to draw the garrison at New 
 Oxford away from there by an attack with part of his force on 
 the bridge at Brush Run, while the rest makes an attempt to de- 
 stroy the stores there. This contingency must be met by ample 
 information concerning his movements. 
 
 TERRAIN : New Oxford is on the western crest of a ridge 
 sloping from Berlin Junction towards the northwest. Another 
 ridge to the west separates the valley of the Little Conewago from 
 those of Brush Run and Swift Run. To the northeast is a little 
 valley, and beyond it the ground rises gradually, with two par- 
 tially wooded little knolls crowning the horizon in that direction. 
 The Conewago flows through a narrow, irregular valley. To the 
 north of this valley is fairly undulating country, with a few 
 broken patches of woods.* 
 
 The railway bridge across the Little Conewago is fifteen hun- 
 dred yards from the camp. The military crest hides the bridge 
 itself from the camp, but the approaches to it from the north 
 and west are in plain view. The bridge at Brush Run, and its 
 approaches, are completely hidden from view from the camp. 
 
 COURSES OPEN : Major A has but fourteen men avail- 
 able for mounted reconnoissance. The cavalry reported at York 
 Springs is the only Red force known to be in the vicinity. 
 
 The roads by which this enemy might advance are: (1) the 
 
 * All consideration of the phases of the problem concerning the 
 country to the east and south is omitted on account of the limita- 
 tions of the map. 
 
OUTPOSTS 105 
 
 Carlisle and Baltimore Turnpike; (2) from the north, passing 
 through Oakwood School House and Waldheim; (3) through 
 Newchester; (4) from the northwest through 594, and passing 
 Swift Run School House. 
 
 The mounted scouts may be used either as moving or as sta- 
 tionary patrols. In the former case they would cover a greater 
 extent of country, but would necessarily, at times, leave portions 
 of the front unobserved. In the latter case the whole front could 
 be kept under constant observation. 
 
 From the camp itself a sentinel could, with a good pair of 
 glasses, keep under his own observation the roads at 568, two 
 miles west-northwest; 520, nearly as far north-northwest, and 
 502, on the hill in the bend of the Conewago, opposite the mouth 
 of the Little Conewago. 
 
 There is a farm house about 800 yards west of 548 (on the 
 Baltimore Pike, south of Greenridge School House) that com- 
 mands a view of the roads leading south towards the Conewago 
 at 423, and at Waldheim. 
 
 568, near Swift Run School House, commands a good view 
 to the west and north, but is cut off from a view to the north- 
 east by the woods 600 yards away in that direction. The nose 
 northwest of 520 affords a limited view, not quite a mile, towards 
 Newchester, while from the ridge just east of 594 (1^2 miles 
 southwest of Newchester) an extended view is had of the roads 
 leading into Newchester from the north. 
 
 It would hardly be prudent for a small patrol to enter New- 
 chester, considering the temper of the inhabitants, unless it were 
 absolutely necessary. 
 
 During the daytime it would scarcely be necessary to have 
 any infantry outposts around the main camp, in consideration 
 of the excellent view to be had from the camp itself, and in view 
 of the fact that all available approaches from the north can be 
 watched so easily and so completely from two or three observa- 
 tion points within four miles of the camp. 
 
 The western edge of the orchard 600 yards east of Brush Run 
 affords an excellent place to watch the railway bridge there, and, 
 at the same time an excellent field of fire on the approach to the 
 
106 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 bridge. A few men posted near there would make any attempt 
 on that bridge futile until they had been driven away. 
 
 DECISION : Major A decides to send a platoon of in- 
 fantry 32 men, commanded by a lieutenant with a machine 
 gun, to the vicinity of Brush Run, and three mounted patrols to 
 station themselves, one near 548, to observe the Baltimore Pike 
 and the road leading to Waldheim from the north ; a second near 
 520, to watch the road from Newchester, and the third to 594, to 
 observe the roads leading to the Conewago from the north. Sen- 
 tinels at the camp, or on the roofs of the higher buildings in New 
 Oxford could supplement these patrols. 
 
 ORDERS: Major A sends for the officer commanding 
 
 the mounted scouts, and the captain and first lieutenant of Com- 
 pany B, and says: 
 
 1. "As you know, the 2d battalion of our regiment is at 
 Guldens; the headquarters and the 3d battalion are at Hanover. 
 I have just received information that a regiment of Red cavalry 
 was at York Springs last night. 
 
 2. "To anticipate any possible attack on our position, I shall 
 have the country to the north kept under constant observation, 
 and shall send a detached post to Brush Run. 
 
 3. "Captain B , send a platoon of your company, with 
 
 one machine gun, under Lieutenant C , to take a position 
 
 east of the station" (pointing to it on the map) "to hold the rail- 
 way bridge at Brush Run. Lieut. N , send three patrols of 
 
 four mounted scouts each, one to the vicinity of 548, one to the 
 vicinity of 520 and one to the vicinity of 594, instructing their 
 leaders to station them where they can best observe the roads 
 leading south across the Conewago. 
 
 5. "Send all reports to me here in New Oxford." 
 
 During the day these precautions were all that were neces- 
 sary, under the conditions imposed. The arrangements for the 
 night would depend entirely on the information received by the 
 Commanding Officer during the day. Towards evening he again 
 estimates the situation, and issues his outpost order for the night 
 so that it will fully protect his camp, and with a minimum of 
 men. 
 
OUTPOSTS 107 
 
 The above illustration is given to show that the real problem 
 for the outpost, its strength, composition, and the positions to be 
 occupied, is for the commander himself to solve. After he 
 assigns the troops, and directs them to their stations, their work 
 is determined by the local commanders, within the scope of the 
 limits prescribed for them. 
 
 For instance : Lieut. C was directed to hold the railway 
 
 bridge at Brush Run with his platoon, assisted by a machine gun. 
 His only limitation was that his position was to be selected east 
 of Brush Run Station. Major A , in estimating the situa- 
 tion from the map concluded that the best position to defend the 
 bridge from would be found at the western edge of the orchard, 
 six hundred yards east of it, but he wisely refrained from direct- 
 ing Lieutenant C to take that exact position, because, when 
 
 the latter got there, he might find that it was not so well suited 
 to his mission as some other position might be. In doing this 
 
 Major A followed the rule laid down in Paragraph 89 of 
 
 the Field Service Regulations : "An order should not trespass 
 upon the province of a subordinate. It should contain every- 
 thing beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but 
 nothing more." 
 
 So in his orders to the mounted scouts, Major A laid 
 
 down the approximate posts he wished them to occupy but their 
 mission was to observe the roads to the front, and he did not and 
 should not restrict them by prescribing the exact spots where they 
 were to post themselves. 
 
 Later on Major A should go to Brush Run and inspect 
 
 Lieutenant C 's position. Then, and not until then, if he 
 
 found it not well selected, he would be justified in changing it. 
 
 So, too, Lieutenant N should visit the posts of his patrols, 
 
 and personally verify that they had selected the best points to 
 observe the roads to the front that could be found in the places 
 they were directed to go. 
 
 When an enemy approaches a defensive position, with the 
 intention of attacking it, the advance cavalry of the outpost meets 
 the first attack. Its delaying strength is small, and it retires 
 slowly, gradually withdrawing to a flank as it gets nearer to the 
 outguards. These, deploying, delay the hostile advance as long 
 as they can, when they retire on the supports. Their withdrawal 
 
108 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 should be deliberate, and never directly on the supports, but in 
 such a direction as not to disclose the position of the supports, 
 nor to mask their fire. 
 
 The outguards should not retire until it is absolutely certain 
 that they can delay the hostile advance no longer. 
 
 The supports, in the event that a stubborn defense is planned, 
 should occupy an intrenched position, and the reserve, when 
 needed, is moved up to that line. If the supports are expected 
 merely to delay the enemy, while the main body withdraws, they 
 fight a delaying action, compelling the enemy to deploy and attack 
 deliberately, then, while it is still possible, they retire on the 
 reserve, and a rear guard action commences. The outposts, be- 
 come now a rear guard, strengthened if necessary, continues its 
 series of delaying actions, retiring from position to position as it 
 is driven back. 
 
 In any case, the advance cavalry and the outguards on the 
 flanks of the line of observation, do not join the line of resistance 
 at all, but remain on the flanks, as far advanced as possible, and 
 act as combat patrols. 
 
 It is a psychological fact that troops once engaged can see 
 only the hostile forces they are firing at. These individuals 
 absorb their entire attention. Their nerves are tense, strained 
 to the utmost with the excitement of the moment. The sud- 
 den appearance of an enemy on their flank or rear will throw 
 the best seasoned troops into a momentary panic, and it is the 
 duty of combat patrols to prevent this. A panic once started is 
 desperately hard to control. 
 
 A combat patrol is an outpost to a line of battle. In modern 
 warfare other than trench warfare when hostile forces meet 
 one another they at once deploy into line of battle. Each com- 
 mander seeks to discover the weak spot in the other's line, and, 
 massing his troops there, attacks in the hope that he may pierce 
 the line. A skillful commander will post his supports and re- 
 serves so as to quickly reinforce any part of his line. He leaves 
 no weak spots. However, there are always flanks to every line, 
 and it is the flank that the skillful general seeks to attack. 
 
 If he is successful in this, and can reach his enemy's flank with 
 a powerful attack, the enemy must retire, or be overwhelmed, 
 
OUTPOSTS 109 
 
 unless he has been warned of the impending attack and is pre- 
 pared to meet it with sufficient troops to beat it off. 
 
 Combat patrols are groups of men, mounted whenever pos- 
 sible, stationed on the flanks of a battle line to give warning of 
 the approach of hostile forces that threaten the flank or rear. 
 They should be posted so as to have an extended view to the 
 front and flanks, and to be in quick communication with the 
 commander of the forces. They should not allow themselves to 
 be drawn into the action, nor away from their post by small hos- 
 tile groups. They should be constantly observed by men detailed 
 for this purpose from the flank units, so that in the event of 
 disaster to the patrol it may be quickly replaced, and so that their 
 signals may be seen at once and quickly transmitted to the 
 commander. 
 
 "When cavalry attacks infantry, material effect is nothing 
 moral effect everything. In the case of infantry directly engaged 
 with infantry of the other side, this moral effect may be produced 
 by the smallest units, especially if they attack it, with surprise, 
 in the flank or rear." 
 
 Combat patrols are posted to prevent these surprise attacks 
 by cavalry as well as the more deliberate turning movements 
 made by infantry. Every commander must, without fail, remem- 
 ber to post his combat patrols in every action, whether he is acting 
 offensively or defensively. The annals of warfare are full of the 
 records of disasters that small combat patrols, intelligently con- 
 ducted, might have averted. 
 
 See OUTPOSTS, page 200, Appendix, for a continuation of 
 this subject. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 ADVANCE GUARDS. 
 
 "The primary duty of an advance guard is to insure the safe and 
 uninterrupted advance of the main body." Paragraph 97, Field Ser. 
 vice Regulations, 1913. 
 
 Modern field artillery, using shrapnel, is effective up to ranges 
 of about 2J^ miles. Colonel Balck (German Army)., in his recent 
 book on Tactics, says : "Field guns may be effectively employed 
 up to a range of 4,000 metres ; under 3,000 metres their fire is 
 so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short 
 time."* 
 
 The modern infantry rifle is effective, if the range is accu- 
 rately known, up to 2,000 yards ; if the range is estimated, its fire 
 is of comparatively little effect beyond 1500 yards. At 1200 
 yards its bullet will penetrate two men, one behind the other. 
 
 For effective work with field artillery it is necessary for only 
 one man to see the target. He can supply the data needed for 
 the men working the pieces so that they need not see the target 
 at all. Each individual using the infantry rifle must see his 
 target. 
 
 The shrapnel used in the modern field gun, having a calibre 
 ranging from 3" to 3.4" and containing upwards of 250 round 
 bullets, bursts over a beaten zone 25 yards in width, and from 
 200 to 300 yards in depth. 
 
 The shrapnel bullet has a much less penetrating effect than 
 the rifle bullet, within their effective ranges, but "in comparison, 
 artillery projectiles produce a greater number of fatal wounds 
 than infantry projectiles." (Balck.) 
 
 * This sentence, written only a few years ago, is still true for the 
 smaller field guns. Field ordnance has increased enormously in 
 calibre and range during the short time that has elapsed since it was 
 written, but the general principles involved are still true. For ranges 
 beyond 4000 metres the target must be accurately located, and im- 
 mobile, for artillery to be effectively used against it, no matter what 
 the calibre or range of the gun may be. 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 111 
 
 In order to advance under artillery fire, infantry must be 
 deployed as skirmishers, advancing with thin lines; succeeding 
 lines following each other at distances of at least 300 yards. If 
 the distances are less than that, two lines may come under the 
 "burst" of a single shrapnel, thus doubling its effectiveness. 
 
 Large bodies of infantry march best on the roads, in column 
 of squads. To expose such a column to the sudden fire of either 
 infantry or artillery, within their effective ranges, would result 
 in an enormous number of casualties, and it would require the 
 sternest discipline to prevent a panic. 
 
 "Under modern conditions the haphazard throwing of troops 
 into action has every chance of resulting in a disaster. If you 
 expect to win in a battle you must have an understanding of the 
 situation and must so put in your troops as to best meet condi- 
 tions; remembering that troops once engaged can only go for- 
 ward, stay where they are, or retreat. This requires that enough 
 troops be told off for the advance guard to enable it to be the 
 first to strike the enemy and then be strong enough to hold him 
 until the commander can size up the situation, form his plan, and 
 properly deploy his main body to best meet the situation. On the 
 other hand, it should be no larger than necessary, following the 
 rule that all detachments from the main body should be as small 
 as practicable. 
 
 "The march of the main body must not be delayed by small 
 bodies of the enemy; these must be brushed aside." (Morrison.) 
 
 For these reasons, columns of troops are protected, when on 
 the march, by advance, rear, and flank guards, who precede or 
 follow the main body, to give warning of the nearness of the 
 enemy, to prevent him from firing on the main body, to allow the 
 commander time to mature his plans, and to prevent the delay 
 of the march of the main body by skilfully handled hostile 
 patrols. 
 
 "The formation of the advance guard must be such that the 
 enemy will be met first by a patrol, then in turn by one or more 
 larger detachments, each capable of holding the enemy until the 
 next in rear has time to deploy before coming under effective 
 fire." (Paragraph 642, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 
 
112 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The complete advance guard consists of a reserve and a 
 support. The reserve is nearer the main body. The support 
 sends forward an advance party that, in turn, sends forward a 
 small patrol, called the point, still farther to the front. 
 
 These bodies arrange their march so that they shall protect 
 the main column from attack by infantry fire before it shall have 
 deployed to meet it. 
 
 In advance of the infantry point is the advance cavalry, 
 also preceded by a point, and, if necessary, by an advance party. 
 It reconnoiters far enough to the front and flanks to protect the 
 main body, before it is deployed, from artillery fire. 
 
 As can be seen by the study of the Field Service Regulations, 
 the matter of the composition and size of the advance guards of 
 large columns are matters to be determined by the supreme com- 
 mander. He studies the situation with care, and determines on 
 the size and composition of the advance guard, selects its com- 
 mander, and then issues his orders for the march. This order, 
 either written or dictated, is usually issued the night before the 
 contemplated movement takes place. Copies of this order (in the 
 case of dictated orders, officers are sent to headquarters from each 
 of the larger units to write the order from dictation) reach the 
 subordinate commanding officers. They then issue orders to 
 their subordinate commanders concerning their share in the 
 movement, and so on down, each commander receiving general 
 instructions from above, and issuing more and more closely de- 
 fined orders as the commands affected become smaller and 
 smaller, but, if properly worded, never trespassing upon the 
 province of a subordinate. 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 
 Pennsylvania, Red, and Maryland and the Virginias, Blue, 
 are at war. A Blue field army has crossed the frontier; one 
 division is encamped at Barlow (Strategic Map), five miles south 
 of Gettysburg. Red forces are advancing on Gettysburg. 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 113 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 At 9:00 P. M., Sept. 10, 1913, General F , command- 
 ing the 1st Blue Division, receives this letter from his commander, 
 Lieut. General H , at Taneytown : 
 
 Headquarters 1st Field Army. 
 Taneytown, Md., Sept. 10, 1913. 8:00 P. M. 
 
 Prom: Lt. Gen. H , Taneytown, Md. 
 
 To: Maj. Gen. F , Barlow, Pa. 
 
 Subject: Orders for tomorrow. 
 
 1. The Red situation remains unchanged. 
 
 2. Move your division by GETTYSBURG on PLAINVIEW to- 
 morrow. 
 
 3. The Second Division will march from LITTLESTOWN on NEW- 
 CHESTER and the Third Division will march on GETTYSBURG to- 
 morrow. 
 
 4. I will be with the Third Division. 
 
 H 
 
 The first Division consists of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades 
 of Infantry, the 4th Cavalry, the 5th Brigade of Field Artil- 
 lery, the 1st Battalion of Engineers, the 1st Battalion Signal 
 Corps, Sanitary troops, and trains. 
 
 General F estimates the situation, comes to a deci- 
 sion, and issues the following order : 
 
 Field Orders, 1st Blue Division, 
 
 No Barlow, Pa., 10 Sept., '13. 10:00 P. M. 
 
 (a) Ind. Cav., 1. Red cavalry detachments are observing 
 
 Col. H. the advance of the Blue divisions. The Red 
 
 4th Cav. (less main body is reported on the line DILLSBURG 
 
 Troop M). Mt. HOLLY (Guide Map,) an advance detach- 
 
 1 Sec. Sig. Corps, ment, about a brigade, is at YORK SPRINGS. 
 
 Our Second Division is at LITTLESTOWN, and 
 
 (b) Adv. Guard.' will march tomorrow on NEWCHESTER. Our 
 Brig. Gen. I Third Division is at TANEYTOWN, and will ad- 
 Troop M, 4th vance on GETTYSBURG tomorrow. 
 
 Cav. (less 1 
 
 plat.) 2. This division is ordered to advance on the 
 
 1st Brigade. CONEWAGO, at PLAINVIEW, and will begin 
 
 1st Bn. 3rd F. A. " the march tomorrow, July 11. 
 
 Co. A, Engn'rs. 
 
114 
 
 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 1st Amb. Co. 
 
 1 Sec. Sig. Corps. 
 
 (c) Main Body 
 1 plat. Tp. M., 
 4th Cav. 
 
 1 Sec. Sig. Corps. 
 1st Bn. 4th Inf. 
 Field. Art. Bgd. 
 (less 1 Bn. and 
 combat train.) 
 2nd Brigade, 
 (less 1 Bn.) 
 3d Brigade. 
 1st Bn. Bngn'rs. 
 (less 1 Co.) 
 1st Bn. Sig. 
 Corps, (less de- 
 tachments.) 
 Artillery combat 
 trains. 
 3 Amb. Cos. 
 
 3. (a) The independent cavalry will start 
 at 5:30 A. M., and cover the movement, towards 
 CENTER MILLS, HEIDLERSBURG, and BOWL- 
 DER. 
 
 (b) The advance guard will march on the 
 TANEYTOWN ROAD, clearing 450 (1% miles 
 north of BARLOW) at 7:00 A. M. 
 
 (c) The head of the main body will start 
 from WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL at 6:45 A. M., 
 and will follow the advance guard at about 1^ 
 miles. 
 
 Each brigade will protect its own left flank. 
 
 4. The field trains will assemble at the north 
 end of the present camp of the 1st Brigade as 
 soon as all the troops have left camp. 
 
 5. The division commander 
 head of the main body. 
 
 will be at the 
 
 (Signed) P , 
 
 Major General. 
 
 Copies to brigade and independent commanders (cavalry, 
 field artillery, engineers, signal corps, etc.) 
 
 This order is delivered to General I , commanding 
 
 the advance guard, by the staff officer he sent to receive it, at, 
 say, 10 :20 P. M. He at once began his estimate of the situa- 
 tion, came to his decision, and issued this order : 
 
 Field Orders, Advance Guard, 1st Blue Division. 
 
 No. 1. Near Barlow, Pa. 
 
 10 Sept., '13. 11:00 P. M. 
 
 (a) Adv. Cav. 1. The main Red forces are reported, etc. 
 Capt. M (Copying Par. 1 of the above order.) 
 
 Tp. M,4th Cav. 2. This advance guard will march on PLAIN- 
 
 (less 1 plat.) VIEW via the TANEYTOWN ROAD and GETTYS- 
 
 BURG. 
 
 (b) Support. 3. (a) The advance cavalry will start at 
 Col. N.... 6:40 A. M. 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 115 
 
 1st Bn., 1st Inf. (b) The point of the support will march on 
 
 Co. A, Eng. the TANEYTOWN ROAD, leaving WILLOW 
 
 1st Inf. (less 1 GROVE SCHOOL at 5:50 A. M. 
 Bn.) (c) The reserve will follow the support at 
 
 800 yards. 
 
 (c) Reserve. 4. The combat trains will march in rear of 
 
 1st Bn. 2 Inf. the reserve. 
 
 1st Bn. 3d F. A. 
 
 2nd Inf. (less 1 5. I shall be at the head of the reserve. 
 
 Bn.) I , 
 
 3d Inf. Brigadier General. 
 
 This order was issued verbally to the assembled officers 
 who had been designated to receive orders by their respective 
 commanders, and was written down by them. 
 
 It is now with the cavalry commander, Captain M , 
 
 that we are especially interested. He gets this order at, say, 
 11 :20 P. M., and at once gets his map and goes over the situa- 
 tion, making his plans for the next day. Hs is to march at 
 5 :40, ten minutes after the rest of his regiment leaves on its 
 independent mission. The cavalry and field artillery will be 
 camped below the infantry, along the stream, perhaps near the 
 crossroad 386. 
 
 He can have his men aroused at the same time the rest of 
 the regiment is aroused, so the orders already given for getting 
 breakfast, watering, feeding, and saddling need not be changed. 
 There is no necessity for further preparation until the morn- 
 ing. 
 
 In the morning Captain M directed his 1st Sergeant : 
 
 "The troop will march at 5 :40. Have it formed at 5 :35." At 
 breakfast, with his lieutenants, he went over the situation 
 carefully. The troop broke camp, assembled as ordered, and 
 started on its day's march. Going by the road, walking and 
 trotting so as to reach 450 a little before six o'clock, Captain 
 M estimates the situation as follows : 
 
 His MISSION is "to reconnoiter far enough to the front and 
 flanks to guard the column against surprise by artillery fire, 
 and to enable timely information to be sent to the advance 
 guard commander." (Par. 45, F. S. R.) His troop is pre- 
 
116 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 ceded by independent cavalry the rest of his regiment and 
 therefore he must "maintain connection therewith." (Ibid.) 
 
 FORCES. To accomplish this mission, Captain M has 
 
 three platoons of his own troop say 60 men. He is followed 
 by a very strong support. He is preceded by the independent 
 cavalry, that must cover a wide sector six miles of front at 
 its outer limit and to the right should be the advance guafH 
 groups of the 2d Division. He must look out for his own left 
 flank, which is unprotected by other troops. 
 
 The Red forces are reported to be 25 miles to the north, 
 but Red cavalry detachments of unknown strength are said to 
 be in observation of the Blue forces. 
 
 CONDITIONS. It is the fall of the year, and roads are 
 usually dusty at this season. The trees are in full leaf. The 
 crops, except corn, are all gathered. Streams are rarely in 
 flood at this season. The enemy is on the defensive. His 
 cavalry should be aggressive, and resort to obstructive tactics. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY DO? It would seem most natural 
 that the Red forces would contest the line of Conewago Creek, 
 which offers good defensive positions on the north side, with 
 still better ones in the rear, at the passes in the hills. The 
 Blue independent cavalry should not be allowed by them to 
 cross the creek without a fight. 
 
 THE TERRAIN. With the advantages of proximity in the 
 Blue favor, there should be no difficulty in passing the hills to 
 the east and south of Gettysburg, but the ridges to the north 
 of that town, slanting across the front of the line of march, 
 offer a series of excellent defensive positions for delaying 
 actions 
 
 COURSES OPEN. There is really no course open but to 
 actively patrol the front of the division, two or three miles 
 to its front, and for two or three miles to the right and left 
 of the Taneytown and Harrisburg Roads. This can be done 
 better by sending out large, independent patrols to right and 
 left, than by small patrols that, fanning out from the main 
 body of the troop, attempt to keep in constant connection with 
 it. These must cover parallel roads, advance rapidly over 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 117 
 
 valleys, and, stationing themselves at good observation points, 
 remain there until the infantry patrols come up to relieve them. 
 
 How is connection to be maintained with the independent 
 cavalry? By a series of connecting files? Not at all. It is 
 not meant that constant, uninterrupted communication be 
 maintained, but that, at reasonable intervals, connecting 
 patrols be sent for enough to the front to observe the march 
 of the main body of the independent cavalry. If it is march- 
 ing along without interference it is not necessary to get any 
 other evidence that all is well in front. These patrols need 
 only to observe the cavalry from a distance, watching its dust 
 cloud, listening for sounds of firing. The flank patrols, too, 
 should not be constantly sending in reports to the effect that 
 they see nothing. It is enough for them to watch, now and 
 then for indications that the march of the advance guard is 
 progressing normally, reserving their messengers for use when 
 there is something to report, remembering always to so con- 
 duct their march that, in case of surprise, at least one man can 
 escape to bear news of it to the rest of the advance guard. 
 
 So Captain M , on reaching 450, calls his lieutenants 
 
 and one sergeant to him, and orders, verbally : 
 
 "Red cavalry detachments are reported in the vicinity, in 
 observation of our movements. The main Red forces are 25 
 miles to the north. 
 
 "The division will march on Plainview today, via the 
 Taneytown Road and Gettysburg. The regiment, less my 
 troop, will act as independent cavalry for the division in its 
 advance. Troop M is to act as advance cavalry to the advance 
 guard. 
 
 "Lieut. R , take the 3d platoon by the road west of 
 
 the Round Tops, and along these ridges" (indicating, on the 
 map, McPherson Ridge, Oak Ridge, and the ridges east of 
 Goldenville and Table Rock) "towards Bridge School. I shall 
 march on the Taneytown-Harrisburg Roads on Plainview, 
 averaging 2^2 miles per hour. Send messages to me, or in 
 emergencies, to the support commander." 
 
118 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 To Sergeant S , who heard the orders just given: 
 
 "Take the 1st squad of the 1st platoon, and go by Wolf Hill, 
 Granite Hill and Hunterstown, on Belmont School. Reports 
 will be sent to me, or in emergencies, to the support com- 
 mander." 
 
 To Lieut. T , who heard the previous instructions, he 
 
 said : "Take command of the point the leading eight troopers 
 and the right principle guide. I will follow with the re- 
 mainder of the troop at about 200 yards." 
 
 Consider next the duties of the support commander. 
 
 Colonel N has his own regiment, and one company of 
 
 engineer troops. The duties of the advance guard are (Para- 
 graph 40, Field Service Regulations) : 
 
 "An advance guard is a detachment of the main body which 
 precedes and covers it on the march. 
 
 "Its duties are : 
 
 "1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by 
 reconnoitering to the front and flanks. 
 
 "2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent 
 their observing, firing upon, or delaying the main body. 
 
 "3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to 
 permit the main body to prepare for action. 
 
 "4. When the enemy is encountered on the defensive, to 
 seize a good position and locate his lines, care being taken not 
 to bring on a general engagement unless the advance guard 
 commander is empowered to do so. 
 
 "5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in 
 every way possible the steady march of the column." 
 
 Colonel N got his order about 11 :20 P. M. He esti- 
 mated the situation as follows : 
 
 MISSION. To insure the safe and uninterrupted march of 
 the division in its march from its present camp towards Plain- 
 view. 
 
 FORCES. Colonel N has his own regiment, to which 
 
 a company of engineers is attached, to make such repairs in 
 the road as are found to be necessary. He is preceded, (1) 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 119 
 
 by the independent cavalry a regiment, less one troop and 
 (2) by the advance cavalry one troop. 
 
 The support is followed by the rest of the 1st Brigade as 
 a reserve, at 800 yards, and it, in turn, by the main body of 
 the 1st Division. 
 
 There are no Red forces, except cavalry detachments, 
 within 25 miles. 
 
 CONDITIONS. Colonel N estimated the conditions as 
 
 Captain M has done above. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY DO? Cavalry detach- 
 ments will hardly seriously attack an infantry division on the 
 march. They will undoubtedly make every effort to observe 
 its march. If they are allowed to come within rifle range with- 
 out discovery, they could delay the march considerably. 
 These possibilities must be prevented. A stubborn effort 
 should be made by the Reds to prevent us from crossing the 
 Conewago. No serious attack should be expected south of 
 Gettysburg. 
 
 TERRAIN. As estimated by Captain M 
 
 COURSES OPEN. The first problem for Colonel N is 
 
 the size of his advance party. Under the rule already laid 
 down it must be strong enough to hold the enemy until the 
 next body in rear the support proper can deploy. It will 
 take the support about ten minutes to deploy. A company of 
 infantry cannot be brushed aside in that time by any force that 
 could sift through the independent and advance cavalry that 
 precede the support. In fact, a platoon could probably hold 
 any such force in check long enough for the support to form 
 to defeat it, but it is always best not to break tactical units 
 when it is not necessary. 
 
 One squad is sufifcient as a point, and it should precede the 
 advance party by 200 or 300 yards. The advance party, if 600 
 to 800 yards in advance of the support, should be far enough 
 ahead of it to insure it from being fired into. 
 
 Six of the mounted orderlies of the regiment might be 
 assigned for scout duty to the advance party for flank recon- 
 noissance within, say, a radius of 1200 yards to right and left 
 of the column. 
 
120 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The engineer company is to assist in the duty of making 
 repairs to the bridges and generally to aid in any material way 
 possible to expedite the march. It should march near the 
 head of the support, where, indeed, its place has been desig- 
 nated by the advance guard order. 
 
 The rest of the support will march as a unit. The support 
 sets the pace for the column, since the advance guard com- 
 mander directs the reserve to follow it at 800 yards, and the 
 division commander directs the main body to follow the ad- 
 vance guard at \ l /2 miles. The rate of march for a column of 
 this size is 2 to 2 T / 2 miles per hour (paragraph 633, Infantry 
 
 Drill Regulations). Captain M prescribed %*/> miles 
 
 per hour as the rate of march for the advance cavalry. That 
 rate could be easily maintained by the support, and, if the ad- 
 vance guard commander found it too fast for the reserve, he 
 could easily send forward and order an extra halt for the sup- 
 port of ten or fifteen minutes to allow the reserve to close up. 
 
 Distances in a column of this sort are only approximate. 
 No effort should be made to make them exact. 
 
 With six mounted scouts attached to his company, Captain 
 
 G , commanding the advance party, could spare the 
 
 members of his company all concern for the flank reconnois- 
 sance. 
 
 In spite of the fact that the independent cavalry and the 
 
 advance cavalry both precede his support, Colonel N 
 
 cannot neglect local reconnoissance. These two cavalry 
 bodies should comb the country to the right and left so effect- 
 ively that no body of troops of threatening size could sift 
 through unobserved, and so practically eliminate all danger of 
 surprise. Still, (Paragraph 649, Infantry Drill Regulations) 
 "this does not relieve the advance guard commander from the 
 duty of local reconnoissance." His would be the burden of 
 blame if a hostile body should get within rifle shot of the main 
 body undiscovered. 
 
 This local reconnoissance can best be done (Paragraph 48, 
 Field Service Regulations) by sending patrols of 2 to 4 men 
 "to high places along the line of march to overlook the coun- 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 121 
 
 try and examine the danger points." One company of the 
 support might well be assigned this duty throughout the day. 
 The mounted scouts attached to the advance party would first 
 occupy these high spots. As the support comes up, a patrol 
 could be detached from the designated company to relieve the 
 mounted scouts, who could then trot forward to a more ad- 
 vanced position. The infantry patrol that relieved them might 
 then be left in observation during the entire time the division 
 is marching by, when it could join the rear guard, and, at the 
 end of the day's march, all these patrols could be united and 
 marched to the camp of the regiment. In this way a maxi- 
 mum of safety would be secured with a minimum of effort. 
 
 It is often possible to have these flanking patrols march 
 parallel to the column, but generally such marching would be 
 off the roads and be difficult and wearying. Often such 
 marching patrols would find it impossible to keep up abreast 
 of their own units. Even mounted patrols will find that their 
 work is easier and better done by remaining stationary on 
 good observation points, than by attempting to perform the 
 duty by marching. 
 
 DECISION. Colonel N decides to detach one company 
 
 as advance party ; to attach six mounted scouts to the advance 
 party ; to follow the advance party at 600 yards with the support, 
 and to designate the leading company of the support as the one 
 to furnish the flanking patrols. 
 
 ORDERS. Colonel N assembles his field and staff 
 
 officers and the captains when he reaches Willow Grove School 
 House at 5 :40 A. M., and, after repeating the information con- 
 cerning the enemy and supporting troops, and the plans of the 
 commander, as found in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the advance guard 
 order, says: "Company A is assigned as advance party. Sergt. 
 
 H ," (who commands the mounted scouts) "take five men 
 
 and report to Captain A I will follow with the rest of the 
 
 support, 600 yards behind the advance party. Company B is des- 
 ignated to furnish flank patrols throughout the day." 
 
 Captain A at once rejoined his company, sent one 
 
 squad, under his 1st lieutenant, as point. He directed the rest of 
 
122 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 the company to follow at 200 yards' distance, and, joining the 1st 
 lieutenant, at the point, gave him what information he possessed, 
 and his instructions, as the point marched along the road. 
 
 When the division is all on the march it is twenty miles from 
 the point of the infantry advance guard to the rear of the main 
 body, assuming that the field trains follow closely on one road 
 in rear of the 3 ambulance companies. This road space is occu- 
 pied as follows : 
 
 Infantry point to advance party 300 yards 
 
 Advance party, including 20% for elongation 48 " 
 
 Total for advance party 348 
 
 Advance party to support 800 
 
 Support: 1 battal'n infantry, less 1 company 140 
 
 Co. A, Engineers 100 
 
 1st Inf., less 1 battalion 600 
 
 Elongation, 20% 328 
 
 Total for support 1968 
 
 Support to reserve 800 
 
 Reserve: 1 battalion infantry 180 
 
 1 battalion field artillery 620 
 
 2d Inf., less 1 battalion 600 
 
 3d Infantry 780 
 
 Combat trains, infantry 300 yards 
 
 Engineers 100 " 
 
 F. A ...410 " 810 
 
 Elongation, 20% 598 
 
 Total for support ..3588 
 
 Total for advance guard 7504 
 
 *The figures used in the following illustration are based on the 
 Field Service Regulations of 1914, which are based on the organization 
 of the army as provided in law existing prior to the army bill of 
 1916. The new law increases somewhat the number of men in the 
 organization, but the approximation in the illustration is close enough 
 to fulfill its object, which is to enable the student to get a mental 
 picture of a large force on the march. 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 123 
 
 This is practically 4.3 miles. Adding 1.5 miles for the distance 
 from the reserve to the main body, laid down in the march 
 order of the division, it is, from the infantry point to the head 
 of the main body 5.8 miles. 
 
 The road space of a division is, (page 172, Field Service 
 Regulations, 1914), 10.3 miles. 1688 yards of this distance, 
 approximately one mile, should be deducted for the troops in 
 the advance guard, leaving 9.3 miles for the length of the divi- 
 sion ; adding 20 per cent for elongation lengthening of the 
 column due to imperfect marching would make the road 
 space for the main body 11.2 miles. 
 
 The field trains for combatant troops cover 2.5 miles, and 
 for the division sanitary troops, ammunition, supply and pack 
 trains, 3.6 miles more, making the total length of the column : 
 
 Point of advance guard to main body 5.8 miles 
 
 Main body 11.2 miles 
 
 Trains 6.1 miles 
 
 Total 23.1 miles 
 
 It is 13 miles from Barlow to Plainview. This is a good 
 day's march for a body of this size: "In extensive opera 
 tions, involving large bodies of troops, the average (march) 
 is about 12 miles a day." (Paragraph 101, Field Service Reg- 
 ulations.) "For a complete division the distance (marched) 
 can seldom exceed 12^ miles per day * * * ." (Para- 
 graph 634, Infantry Drill Regulations.) 
 
 Assuming a rate of march at 2.5 miles per hour which 
 means an absolutely uninterrupted march for well-disciplined 
 troops it will be nine hours after the advance guard started 
 before the last wagons start to leave the camp at Barlow. 
 That will be 4:00 P. M. The trains march at the same rate 
 as the troops, and it will be five hours and twelve minutes 
 later, or 9 :12 P. M., before the last wagons reach Plainview, 
 assuming still that nothing prevents them from marching 
 steadily, and that only one road is used.* 
 
 *Of course if all was found to be safe, one or more of the parallel 
 roads to the east of that used by the troops would be used by the 
 trains, so that they would actually get to camp soon after the troops 
 did. For the purposes of illustration it is supposed that all use the 
 same road. 
 
124 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 All this time this slender column of marching troops and 
 wagons must be protected throughout its length, from the 
 aggressiveness of the enemy. The wagon trains are especially 
 vulnerable, and absolutely vital to the success of the campaign. 
 They are helpless. An attack on the troops can be met by a 
 counter attack, but the wagons must be defended. They can- 
 not deploy, nor, on the roads, can they close up much to 
 shorten the column. 
 
 It is the hostile cavalry that is especially dreaded along the 
 line of communications of an army. The enemy's cavalry 
 must be located, and neutralized or destroyed, before the line 
 of supply can be made secure. 
 
 It was a maxim of Napoleon's that "an army whose com- 
 munications are threatened will almost invariably devote its 
 whole attention to protecting them." 
 
 The foregoing illustration is given to enable the student 
 to get a mental picture of a large army on the march. The 
 1st Field Army, above, consisted of three infantry divisions. 
 To them, in the armies of the military nations, a division of 
 cavalry would be attached. If such a division had been 
 attached to this field army, it would have been operating in 
 search of the hostile cavalry, on one flank or the other of the 
 infantry divisions, or out in front. Once it has met and over- 
 come the hostile cavalry, it is free to operate against the hostile 
 communications, or against his weaker flank. 
 
 Without such a cavalry force, and assuming that the Red 
 army had a considerable force of cavalry, much greater pre- 
 cautions would have to be taken to protect the left flank of 
 the 1st Blue Division that has been outlined. 
 
 See ADVANCE REAR AND FLANK GUARDS, page 204, Appen- 
 dix. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 THE ADVANCE GUARD (CONTINUED) 
 
 "The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnoissance 
 it can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of 
 cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting 
 alone therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted 
 men for reconnoissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnois- 
 sance, infantry is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard 
 against collisions only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way." 
 Balck, Infantry Tactics, page 20. 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 Guide Map. 
 
 The boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland may be 
 taken as the frontier between two nations at war. Blue, South- 
 ern, forces have crossed the frontier at Littlestown. Red, North- 
 ern, forces are advancing to meet them from the north. 
 
 FIRST SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 Topographical Map. 
 
 A regiment of infantry and a detachment of 21 mounted men, 
 without trains, has reached New Oxford at 10:00 A. M., August 
 26th. Its mission is to secure the crossings of the Conewago 
 at Newchester, and to reconnoiter to the north of that stream. 
 The country is hostile. No information of the enemy can be 
 obtained from the inhabitants. Information from Blue sources 
 sources indicates the probability of meeting hostile forces at any 
 moment. The weather is warm and clear. 
 
 The formation of the column, as the main body leaves New 
 Oxford, is : The head of the main body is leaving the last 
 houses in the village, 700 yards north of the town. The sup- 
 port, two companies, is at 494. The advance party, one pla- 
 toon, is 500 yards ahead, at the little private road leading to 
 the right towards hill 536. The point, one squad, is at the 
 bridge. The main body is marching at 3 miles per hour. 
 
126 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 You are in command of the point. Just as you get to the 
 farther end of the bridge a group of Red soldiers fire at you 
 from the direction of the church, 325 yards ahead to the right 
 of the road. You cannot see how many there are. (1) What 
 do you do (2) What would you do if you were in command 
 of the advance party ? 
 
 Before proceeding intelligently with problems of this sort, 
 we must consider the sort of an enemy that is confronting us. 
 Are the men good shots? Are they fearless, resourceful? Or 
 are they poor shots, and of the sort that fire a volley or two, 
 and then retreat? Are they liable to be closely supported, or 
 may they be simply the members of a reconnoitering patrol 
 seeking only to cause a deployment, and so to discover some- 
 thing of the strength and morale of our forces? 
 
 The first three questions can be answered only after war 
 has been declared, and we know who our enemy is. Then we 
 shall know the sort of fighters we have to deal with. Until 
 that time, in our studies, we must assume an ideal enemy, brave, 
 well instructed, good marksmen, intelligent, and generally for- 
 midable. If we know how to deal with such an enemy, knowl- 
 edge of the tactics to use against a lesser one will readily follow. 
 However, the mere fact that our enemy is not disciplined and 
 instructed in the art of war according to the standards of the 
 armies of the principal nations of the world, or that he will not 
 stand before well disciplined troops and a well directed fire, does 
 not necessarily mean that he is not a resourceful enemy. He 
 may, in spite of his lack of tactical training, be possessed of 
 natural abilities and special cunning in certain kinds of minor 
 warfare, as were our American Indians, and as are some of the 
 partly civilized and barbarous peoples with which we are often 
 thrown in contact. And, if such be our enemy, we must con- 
 sider those conditions and learn how to best meet them. 
 
 The last question deals only with this particular problem. 
 If this hostile group has come from the north they may not 
 have seen the command behind our point. The advance party, 
 at the moment under discussion, has not come in sight of them, 
 and they have, perhaps, seen nothing of the rest of the column. 
 Of course they know much about it, from the fleeing inhabi- 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 127 
 
 tants. But reports from such a source are sure to be misleading. 
 
 The head of the main body is 1400 yards from the place 
 where, if the Red troops remain near the church, it will be 
 under their fire. It is marching at such a rate that it will be 
 about sixteen minutes, roughly, before it reaches the danger 
 zone. In that time the advance guard, to properly fulfill its 
 mission, must drive them away, if weak; must develop their 
 strength, if strong. 
 
 It is 800 yards from the church to the crest of the ridge north- 
 west of 520. From the church to this ridge the road will be in 
 full view of the advance party when it reaches the next rise in 
 the road. The northwestern horizon for the advance party will 
 then be at this ridge's crest. It hides everything beyond. 
 
 Nothing is known of the strength of the Red force at the 
 church. The point, at the bridge, although much nearer than 
 the advance party, has not as good a view. There is no cover, 
 except the creek bank, to protect the point in case it should at- 
 tempt to advance. The range is very close, and the Red soldiers, 
 under cover, in full knowledge of the Blue point's strength, have 
 every advantage. 
 
 Besides, there is no need for hurry. The advance party is 
 there to support the point, and a few minutes' delay, more or 
 less, will not work any harm. Of course, the point should fire 
 on the group at the church, if they can see any Red soldiers to 
 aim at. The point should not advance to attack yet. Men should 
 not be sacrificed uselessly in prematurely attacking a force whose 
 strength is entirely unknown. 
 
 There are 21 mounted scouts with the regiment. 15 of these 
 are acting as a flank patrol on the road next west, running past 
 Swift Run School House. The other 6 have just joined the 
 advance party, coming in from Hill 587, where they have been 
 stationed in observation of the country to the east and north. 
 If they should trot down the hill to the west, cross the creek at the 
 ford, and then, under cover of the woods to the north, threaten 
 the Red group at the church, they will, if the latter is weak, cause 
 it to retreat while it can get away; if it be strong, or is strongly 
 supported, that fact will also be developed, and disclosed to the 
 rest 6f the advance party, waiting in observation where we first 
 
128 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 placed it. In the meantime the point, which took cover at once 
 when fired on, can afford to await developments. 
 
 Why did the Red group at the church wait so long before 
 disclosing its presence there by firing on the point? Because 
 they hoped to discover, perhaps, by waiting, whether the point 
 was really the point of an advance guard, or merely a patrol, 
 but they could not afford to wait any longer; 325 yards is not 
 far, and the point was coming right along, in a very open for- 
 mation. The Red group has not seen any other Blue groups. 
 If it wishes to remain there any longer in observation it must 
 delay the point. So it fires on it, and the point, very properly, 
 scuttles to cover. 
 
 Very soon afterwards the advance party comes in sight. 
 Six mounted men, a moment later, are seen by the Red look- 
 outs to leave the advance party. They trot down the hill towards 
 the ford. The rest of the advance party halts and takes cover. 
 Now is the moment for the Red group, if a patrol, as is the case, 
 to escape. This they do by galloping, as foragers well spread out, 
 towards the north, across the fields. They disappear in the 
 woods north of the church. 
 
 Now, you ask, why did they go to the church at all? They 
 could get a better view of the country towards New Oxford 
 from the crest northwest of 520 than from the church, unless 
 the latter is more than 60 feet high an unlikely assumption. 
 
 Is it a ruse, to lead the advance guard into a trap on top of 
 the hill? Or had the Red patrol missed the Blue groups to the 
 south, in their advance from 520 to the church, and only dis- 
 covered their presence when they saw the Blue point coming 
 down the hill towards the bridge? That can only be con- 
 jectured. 
 
 The advance party commander, when he saw the Red patrol 
 gallop off to the north, went down the hill to the point, and ad- 
 vanced with it to the church. Here he signalled to the mounted 
 scouts at the northern edge of the woods to the left to advance. 
 
 You should be cautious about the matter of signals when you 
 are where you suspect the enemy may be watching you. If you 
 were in action with a hostile group, and saw one member of it 
 moving about, swinging his arms wildly, you would at once mark 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 1M 
 
 him as a leader, and your fire would concentrate on him. No 
 order to do so would be necessary. Instinctively your men 
 would select him as a target. It is a psychological fact that as 
 long as a group of men is under fire, and no one of them makes 
 himself conspicuous in any way, men will fire at the group, and 
 not at an individual. The result is that casualties will be few. 
 But let one man become prominent in any way, and he attracts 
 all the attention. Not only is the one making signals very likely 
 to be hit, but the shooting at the group becomes more accurate, 
 because the men have a definite target to fix their attention on. 
 
 The British learned this lesson from the Boers : "If you do 
 not wish to be singled out as the patrol commander, refrain from 
 making signals ; you can shout any orders you like as loud as you 
 like ; but as soon as you make any movement with your arm you 
 are pretty sure to be spotted. The casualities among officers, 
 compared with those among the men, have become far greater 
 in modern warfare than formerly. 
 
 "The reason for this appears to be that improvements in 
 modern rifles and in field glasses have made it far more easy to 
 pick out individuals at distant ranges; and with the present 
 weapons of precision it has become a far easier matter to hit a 
 solitary individual, even when he is a long way off, than it was 
 formerly." (Capt. Vander Byl, Patrolling in South Africa, 
 1902.) 
 
 So, in this case, do not give conspicuous signals. Your use- 
 fulness will be greatly prolonged thereby. 
 
 It is 500 yards from the church to the northwest corner of 
 the woods where the group from the advance party should now 
 be. How would you signal them to go forward, over this dis- 
 tance, and not make a conspicuous signal? It should have been 
 prearranged. The advance party commander, in sending out 
 this group of mounted scouts, should have called the leader to 
 him, and instructed him in somewhat this way: ''There is a 
 Red group at that church. Take your men, by this road, across 
 the ford, and then, under cover of those woods over there, make 
 a feint on the church. If the Reds retire, do not follow them, 
 but as I advance with the point, from the church, skirmish up to 
 the ridge, through that cornfield." 
 
130 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 Having these instructions in mind, when the leader of the 
 flanking group, from the cover of the woods, at the 495 con- 
 tour, saw the point advance from the church, he commanded: 
 "As foragers, at twenty yards, MARCH/' (Paragraph 348, Cav- 
 alry Service Regulations, and Paragraph 621, Infantry Drill 
 Regulations.) The leader of the patrol trotted up towards the 
 cornfield. 
 
 Now let us consider another assumption : The leader of the 
 advance party, on first seeing the group at the church, mused 
 thus: "What are those Reds doing way down there? They 
 must have seen us as we came down the hill out of New Oxford. 
 Is it a trick to coax the support into an ambush set for it up 
 there in that cornfield? I'll investigate." So he calls a sergeant 
 to him, and says: "I am going to take a few men across this 
 ford here, and go up behind those woods, to run those Reds out 
 of there. If they pull out, go ahead with the rest of the advance 
 party and the point. Halt the point at the church. I shall go on 
 and investigate that ridge over there. That cornfield looks like 
 a pretty good place for a Red position." 
 
 The Red group at the church retires as before on seeing this 
 group detach itself from the advance party. The mounted scouts 
 were directed, when they were detached, to halt at the north- 
 west corner of the woods across the Conewago, instead of skir- 
 mishing up to the cornfield, as in the other case, and to wait there 
 for the group from the advance party to come up. When the 
 leader of the advance party reached the corner of the woods, 
 with his group, he found the mounted scouts there. They had 
 seen nothing. The officer selects three mounted scouts, and says 
 to them: "There may be Reds hidden in that cornfield, and I 
 want you to investigate it. It is dangerous duty, but I have con- 
 fidence in you. Keep your wits about you, and do this: Trot, 
 in open order, directly towards that cornfield. When you have 
 nearly reached the fence, halt, and then suddenly turn about and 
 gallop back . If there are Reds there, one or more of the nervous 
 ones will surely fire at you. Don't gallop straight back zigzag 
 a little." 
 
 Such tactics sound dangerous, but they really are not. The 
 men who cannot resist the impulse to shoot without orders at 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 131 
 
 a retreating enemy will invariably be the younger, less steady 
 soldiers ; inexperienced and undisciplined, their aim will certainly 
 be bad. It is notable that when one or two men of a firing line 
 fire, through nervousness and without command, they will be 
 followed by a ragged volley, each shot pulled off without aiming, 
 often without the rifle at the shoulder, and in the resulting con- 
 fusion, a very fair estimate of the length of the firing line can be 
 got. Another thing that will add to the chances of not being 
 hit is that our three troopers are galloping down hill, and men 
 firing down hill almost invariably fire high 
 
 Suppose, in this instance, that the three men do develop the 
 fact that there is a Red firing line in the edge of the cornfield. 
 What should the commander of the advance party do ? Should 
 he attack ? By no means. It is not the function of the advance 
 party commander to bring on a general engagement, or that of the 
 support commander, nor of the advance guard commander even. 
 It is the commander of the main body who must decide whether 
 or not he wishes to give battle. The advance guard commander 
 who commits his command to an engagement, unless specifically 
 ordered "to attack the enemy wherever found," or, after having 
 reported the enemy in a certain place in force, to his commander, 
 is ordered to engage him, is an unsafe man for such duty. His 
 duty is protective; his duty is to ward off attacks of the enemy, 
 or to warn his commander of his presence, not to bring on a 
 battle. He must resist, of course, if attacked. He must deter- 
 mine the strength of the enemy, when he is discovered, and not 
 allow the march of the main body to be delayed by small hostile 
 bodies, but he must not commit his superior to a general engage- 
 ment without specific instructions to do so. 
 
 Should the commander of the advance party then simply 
 wait for orders? Again by no means. He should now try 
 to determine the extent of the hostile line, by seeking to dis- 
 cover its flanks. The cornfield is a small one ; to the west is 
 the stubble of a grain field, and beyond that some woods. Be- 
 yond these woods is another stubble field. It is beyond the 
 woods that the mounted patrol southwest of the church should 
 go, after locating the hostile line in the cornfield. If that 
 stubble, which affords no cover at all, is clear, it should next 
 
152 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 examine the woods. And, in doing this it should not halt two 
 or three hundred yards from the woods. Here it must take 
 a chance: trot right up to them and into them, in open order, 
 over a wide front. It should go to the eastern edge of the 
 woods, if they are clear, leaving a man or two at the western 
 edge, to watch in that direction. In this position it can afford 
 to await developments. It is beyond the right flank of the 
 Red line. Its leader can quickly give warning if the Red line 
 is strengthened on that flank, or of any movement of troops 
 in that vicinity. 
 
 SECOND SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 The Red group at the church has disappeared. The sup- 
 port is at the bridge. The advance party is at 520. You still 
 command the point, and you are at the farm house at the right 
 of the road 400 yards ahead. How would you reconnoiter the 
 valley of Swift Run? 
 
 The Red group at the church disappeared in the woods to 
 the east of your present position. It has not been seen since. 
 Where did it go? You do not see it on the hill to the north, 
 across the Conewago. The valley of Swift Run is hidden 
 behind the military crest; the trees and the little knoll north 
 of the bridge 448W hide the road, to the north of the bend 
 in it, across the Run. You can see but little of the country 
 beyond, where you must go. How are you going to advance? 
 There is nothing to do but to advance. You must either take 
 a chance, and go ahead rapidly to the crest of the little knoll 
 across the Run, or you may send two or three mounted scouts 
 ahead, at the trot, while you watch them as they go. If they 
 get to the bend a hundred yards beyond the cut in the road 
 without incident they should halt, signal "all clear," (and the 
 fact that they do halt, and remain steadily in observation 
 should be sufficient signal to you that all is clear) and wait for 
 the rest of the point to come up, and then go ahead to the 
 crest of the knoll. Nothing would be gained by their going 
 ahead before the dismounted point reached their own present 
 position. When the point has come up, and is in a position 
 to watch them, the scouts could trot to the top of the little 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 158 
 
 knoll ahead, wait there for the point again, and then trot across 
 the little valley to the next rise in the road, always keeping 
 on the horizon ahead, effectually preventing any surprise of the 
 point. 
 
 This is nerve-racking work. You know that the enemy is 
 near; you have seen him disappear, and in the direction you 
 must go, and you must follow him. For such duties it takes 
 men of steady nerve, full of courage, resourceful. Men who 
 are sent on it should be warned of its danger, and assured of 
 its necessity. 
 
 THIRD SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 You are now in command of the fifteen mounted scouts 
 that are acting as a left flanking patrol on the road paralleling 
 the one the main body is on, 1% miles to the west. As the 
 head of the main body leaves New Oxford you have nearly 
 reached the crossroad 557, 1% miles west of New Oxford. 
 
 How do you conduct the march of your patrol? What 
 advance guard do you have out? Where do you make your 
 halts between 557 and the Conewago crossing four miles to 
 the northwest. 
 
 From the head of the support to the rear of the main body 
 the column whose left flank you are protecting from surprise is 
 about a mile long. In view of its mission and the length of 
 the column, it should march at the rate of three miles per hour ; 
 it should pass a given point in about twenty minutes. You 
 must dispose your fifteen men so that they will cover this 
 length of column from an unexpected attack. The colonel, you 
 are told, is to march through New Oxford on Newchester and 
 across the Conewago, to secure the crossings of that stream. 
 You are to protect the regiment from surprise from the west. 
 Whence might come that surprise? Manifestly it must come 
 from the direction of the roads, unless an ambush has been laid, 
 in anticipation that the regiment would march by that special 
 road. 
 
 You crossed the York Turnpike without seeing the trail of 
 a hostile body, or any indications of his presence. The roads 
 by which an enemy might reach the regiment run northeast from 
 
134 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 557, 568, 530, and 594. These are the roads you must watch. 
 If you send a patrol to 568, and remain, yourself, at 557, with 
 a couple of men watching from the nose 200 yards to the south- 
 east, through the gap in the trees to the east, until the head 
 of the column leaves New Oxford, you will know that it is 
 safe from an attack coming east from 557. You may then ride 
 forward to 568, where you wait for the head of the main body 
 to reach the ridge 400 yards northwest of 520, when you trot, 
 with your patrol, less the group ahead, towards 594. 
 
 You do not leave anyone at 530. This crossroad can be 
 as well watched from the crest 300 yards to the northwest, so 
 you leave two men there and two at Snyder's, while you go on 
 with the rest to 594. 
 
 Let us now go back to the patrol that went ahead from 557. 
 It was composed of a sergeant and six men. It went forward 
 as described on page 83. The same precautions taken by the 
 point of the advance guard, described above, must be taken 
 by this patrol, which will act as advance guard for the partol 
 in rear. The sergeant, riding in advance with one of the troop- 
 ers, has the other five men follow at 200 yards. When he 
 reaches Swift Run School House, he and the man with him 
 separate. He rides forward to the edge of the woods ahead, 
 keeping on the right side of the road. As he reaches it he 
 halts, looks north along the road northeast from 568. finds all 
 clear, and then, keeping on the left side of the road, rides up 
 to the farm house just beyond. From the shelter of the trees 
 and shrubbery at the northern edge of the farmyard he sees 
 that the horizon is just beyond 568, in that direction. 
 
 His view is the same to the northeast it was from the corner 
 of the woods, but to the northwest he can now see the hills across 
 Swift Run valley, and here and there to the west he gets glimpses 
 of the road 506 606 up to 632, where it drops over the ridge 
 and out of sight. There is no sign of movement anywhere. He 
 signals, with his hand low down, to the trooper to join him. 
 As he does so they ride, boot to boot, straight up the road to 
 the farm house at 568. The rest of the patrol follows, and 
 closes up at the farm buildings. A man dismounts and walks 
 forward, keeping close to the fence, to the crest a hundred yards 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 135 
 
 beyond, where the best view in this part of the terrain can be 
 had. He signals "all clear" by leaning against a fence post, or 
 by using any other prearranged and inconspicuous signal. The 
 men all dismount, drop out their horses' bits, water them at the 
 trough, and then let them graze. 
 
 As the rest of the patrol comes up, a little later, bridles are 
 adjusted, the men mount and await instructions. The ser- 
 geant's patrol is ordered to go ahead to 530, and the ridge at 
 Snyder's, while the patrol will wait here for the main body to 
 pass the ridge just beyond 520, to the northeast. The advance 
 patrol goes ahead, using the same formation as before; one, 
 man is dropped off at 530, one more at the private road leading 
 to the farmhouse to the left, 350 yards beyond; the rest ride* 
 on and halt, one at Snyder's, the others at the edge of the woods 
 beyond. 
 
 This disperses the patrol over nearly a half mile of road, 
 but it is necessary. Here is a broad ridge, with roads on both 
 sides of it, leading across the one the main body must take. 
 Both these roads must be watched, and the patrol must not 
 be broken i. e., each group of it must be able to see at least 
 one group towards the leader. When the rest of the flank 
 patrol comes up, the group near 530 trots up and is joined by 
 the next group ; together they pick up the man at Snyder's, and 
 advance. Then the sergeant, at the northern edge of the woods, 
 knows it is time to go on, and he rides up to 594, where he halts, 
 sending one man west of the orchard to watch the road towards 
 Rupp's and beyond, leaves one man on the ridge 100 yards south- 
 east of the crossroad, and halts with the rest of the patrol, at 
 the crossroad. The commander of the flank patrol now rides 
 up and joins him. 
 
 Until the main body reaches Newchester the roads at 530 
 and 594 must both be watched. The patrol is not strong enough 
 to keep in touch with the main body, using connecting files, 
 in this rough country. How, then, is the patrol commander 
 to know when to move ahead? There is a stretch of road about 
 700 yards long, leading southeast from Oak Grove School House, 
 that is visible from the top of the ridge near 594. If this road 
 
136 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 is watched, the advance guard, after crossing the Conewago, 
 will be seen moving on it, and until the advance guard does 
 appear there, the flank patrol should remain where it is, unless 
 something should occur to give it duties elsewhere. 
 
 FOURTH SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 
 Soon after you reach 594 you hear heavy firing to the east 
 (you are still commanding the left flank patrol) ; the woods 
 hide everything in that direction. What do you do now, and 
 why? 
 
 Let us look at the terrain for a moment. At Newchester 
 the Conewago makes an abrupt bend, and is crossed by two 
 bridges, one to the north, one to the east. To the south of the 
 village is a semi-circular ridge that commands all the roads 
 leading to the village from the south. This ridge begins at the 
 nose east of the cut in the road leading to New Oxford, runs 
 across that cut, and bending at hill 572, ends at hill 573. The 
 ridge is about a mile long, and is so placed that reserves sent 
 from behind its center could quickly reinforce any part of a 
 line occupying it. 
 
 The left flank patrol has seen no indications of the passage 
 of hostile troops from the west or southwest into Newchester, 
 so they might have come from the north. You have sent no 
 messages to the advance guard commander. The latter, and 
 the colonel of the regiment, must now be most anxious to know 
 the strength of the Red force occupying Newchester. The 
 need of watching crossroad 530 has now disappeared, but 594 
 must still be watched. You are there now. You say to the 
 sergeant: "Hear that firing! Remain here, with your patrol, 
 for the present in observation. I will take the rest of the patrol 
 and try and locate the right of the Red line that must be in 
 front of Newchester, and get in touch with the left of our line. 
 I will leave a small patrol on the road here" (pointing, on the 
 map, to the Y in the road 650 yards east of Snyder's, where a 
 private road leads from the main road to a farm house) ''and 
 will instruct the leader of that patrol as to my farther move- 
 ments. Send messages through that patrol." 
 
ADVANCE GUARDS 137 
 
 You then return to 530 at the gallop, picking up the mem- 
 bers of your patrol as you go ; you reach 530, turn there to the 
 north, and halt at the farm road, where you leave three men. 
 This leaves you five men; seven are at 594, three are here. To 
 the leader of this group you say: "Stay here for the present. 
 Watch well in all directions. I am going to reconnoiter from 
 the farther edge of those woods, towards Newchester. Send 
 messages to our main body, which must be to the east." 
 
 So far you have seen no Red troops. You lead your patrol 
 into the woods, bend northeast through them, and the woods 
 to the northeast of them, to the edge of the pasture on the 
 southern edge of hill 573. Here you halt. You see a few Red 
 mounted men on the road at the northeast corner of the pasture. 
 Looking through the trees to the east you see a column of 
 infantry filling the road leading south from the school house. 
 They are halted. The firing is heavy to the east. You cannot 
 see your own troops. You divide your patrol quickly, leaving 
 three men and a corporal here in the edge of the woods, with 
 these instructions: "Watch that infantry. If they advance 
 to the south, follow them. Keep on their flank, and warn 
 the regiment if they attempt to flank it by slipping down any 
 of these ravines to the south. You are now on your own re- 
 sources. I shall join the regiment and report what I have seen." 
 
 Taking the remaining men you ride through the woods as 
 rapidly as you can to the valley of the little stream to the south- 
 west, then down that stream, and up its eastern branch to the 
 private road leading to 480. Here you find the colonel, and 
 you report what you have seen to him. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 FLANK GUARDS. 
 
 "The flanks of a column are protected in part by the advance 
 guard, which carefully examines the ground on both sides of the 
 line of march. It may be necessary, however, to provide additional 
 security for flank threatened by an enemy. This is done by sending 
 a detachment, called a FLANK GUARD, to cover the exposed flank." 
 Paragraph 53, Field Service Regulations. 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 Guide Map. 
 
 The boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland sepa- 
 rates two States that are at war. Blue, Southern, forces have 
 crossed the frontier, and are in the vicinity of Littlestown. Red, 
 Northern, forces are advancing from the North. Gettysburg 
 is fortified, and held by a small garrison. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 Topographical Map. 
 
 A reinforced brigade (a brigade of infantry to which de- 
 tachments of cavalry and field artillery are attached) is sent 
 from Littlestown to the north, through New Oxford and New- 
 chester, on a special mission. 
 
 At noon, July 26th, the formation of the column is as fol- 
 lows: The advance cavalry, one troop, has crossed the South 
 Conewago; the infantry point, one squad, is at the center of 
 New Oxford; the advance party, one company, less one squad, 
 is at the railroad crossing, near the southern edge of the town ; 
 the support, one battalion, less one company, marches 800 yards 
 in rear of the advance party; the reserve, one regiment, less 
 two battalions *, 800 yards in rear of the support. The main 
 
 * This expression, one regiment, less two battalions, indicates that 
 the headquarters of the regiment is here; only one battalion is with 
 the headquarters. 
 
FLANK GUARDS 139 
 
 body, 800 yards in rear of the reserve, is 5,740 yards long, com- 
 posed as follows: Each regiment of infantry, with its combat 
 trains, covers 1500 yards of road space; the field artillery bat- 
 talion covers 1030 yards; the field trains, 1710 yards. The com- 
 bat train of the regiment in advance marches in rear of the 
 reserve of the advance guard. The field and combat train of 
 the cavalry squadron are with the field train of the brigade. 
 
 The squadron, less one troop, is acting as a flank guard on 
 the right flank, and the 3d battalion of the advance guard 
 regiment is acting as left flank guard. 
 
 The main body that is covered by these two flank guards is 
 5740 yards long 3*/2 miles. It takes it, marching at 2^ miles 
 per hour, an hour and twenty minutes to pass a given point. 
 
 The latest information that the Blue commanding officer 
 has, concerning the Red forces, is to the effect that heavy in- 
 fantry reinforcements are being rushed, by train, into Gettys- 
 burg, and that a brigade of Red cavalry was at York, 16 miles 
 east of New Oxford, last night. 
 
 Major B , commanding the left flank guard, had brought 
 
 his battalion by the roads on the ridge west of Brush Run from 
 Bonneauville as far as Cedar Ridge (Strategic Map), where 
 he crossed to the east side, and, at noon, his most advanced 
 group was at 584, ^ mile east of Brush Run Station, on the 
 York Turnpike. 
 
 He estimates the situation as follows: 
 
 MISSION : To protect the brigade he is covering from sur- 
 prise from the west. 
 
 FORCES: The brigade he is covering is the most advanced 
 Blue force in the vicinity. The rest of its division is at Littles- 
 town, 9 miles to the south. A strong Red infantry force is 
 intrenched at Gettysburg. Other Red forces are advancing 
 from the north, but none of them are reported as being within 
 striking distance from this side. A Red cavalry brigade was 
 reported to be at York, 16 miles to the east, last night. 
 
 CONDITIONS: The country is hostile. The Blue brigade is 
 wedging itself between two hostile forces, which, combined, are 
 
140 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 stronger than the Blue brigade. Its mission is independent, and 
 it can hope for no assistance from Littlestown before tomorrow. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY DO? From the Stra- 
 tegic Map it is evident that if a force comes from Gettysburg 
 to intercept the Blue brigade it will probably use the York 
 Turnpike, the road through Hunterstown, or the Harrisburg 
 Road. It is with the two former roads that his problem now 
 concerns. The Red cavalry may ride around the head of the 
 Blue column, and attack from the left flank. If the attack comes 
 by way of the York Turnpike it will probably be delivered at 
 the crossing of the Little Conewago or at Brush Run. It may 
 be delivered in the direction of Irishtown, (Strategic Map) 
 as the main body is now marching northeast from Square Corner 
 by 551, 489, and 521 towards New Oxford. 
 
 If the road towards Irishtown, from 584, York Turnpike, 
 where the leading group of the flank guard now is, is not used, 
 the Reds may advance northeast from 584, or, turning north- 
 east from 552, a little more than a mile west of Brush Run 
 Station, marching on Newchester. They may advance on the 
 York Turnpike to the shelter of the ridge between Brush Run 
 and Swift Run, thence across the fields, sheltered from view 
 by that ridge, and the ridge next east, to a position across the 
 New Oxford-Newchester road, south of Swift Run. 
 
 If they use the road through Hunterstown, they may seek 
 a position across the Blue line of advance at Newchester. 
 
 THE TERRAIN: The general trend of the ridges, south of 
 the Conewago, is north and south. The stream valleys are 
 from 100 to 200 feet below the ridge levels, and good defen- 
 sive positions, with easy lines of retreat, can be found on the 
 crests of the ridges on both sides of each little valley. 
 
 COURSES OPEN : The battalion has a column 3% miles long 
 to protect from surprise. It must be strong enough at any 
 point of that long line to delay the advance groups of a Red 
 attacking force to enable the Blue main body to select a de- 
 fensive position, and to deploy on that position. If the threaten- 
 ing body is not too strong, it must hold it in check while the 
 Blue main body passes, and not allow the latter's march to be 
 
FLANK GUARDS 141 
 
 delayed by it. It cannot hope to stop small hostile reconnoitering 
 patrols from sifting through here and there to observe the main 
 body, nor, indeed, should that be attempted. The Red military 
 authorities should know, from the friendly inhabitants of the 
 country, all about the Blue strength and direction of march. 
 
 The flank guard's field of action is limited to a lateral dis- 
 tance of a mile and a half from the main body. (Paragraph 
 658, Infantry Drill Regulations.) Patrols of the advance cav- 
 alry should cover the front of the line of march over a front 
 of about three miles. There should be such a patrol now at 668, 
 just beyond Swift Run School House. 
 
 (a) Major B may secure his flank of the main body 
 
 by marching his battalion as an attenuated column of small 
 groups, marching on the road, paralleling the whole length of 
 the main body. This arrangement could effectively warn the 
 main body of a hostile approach, but would entirely destroy 
 the offensive value of the flank guard. 
 
 (b) He might divide his battalion into two groups of two 
 companies each. One of these groups might start at the same 
 time as the advance guard of the main body, and keep abreast 
 of the support, preceded by an advance party and point. The 
 other group, starting at the same time the main body starts, 
 might keep abreast of its head during the march. 
 
 Applying the principles of Paragraph 48, Field Service Regu- 
 lations, patrols could be detached from the leading group, to 
 station themselves on points having a commanding view to the 
 west. There they could remain until the rear of the wagon 
 train had passed, when they could resume the march, picking 
 up succeeding patrols as they advance, and joining their proper 
 command at the end of the day's march. This method pre- 
 serves the offensive strength of the flank guard where it is most 
 needed, maintains a constant watch over the country to the west, 
 and all with a minimum of marching on the part of the men 
 employed. 
 
 DECISION : Major B decides to use the latter method, 
 
 and issues instructions accordingly. 
 
142 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The plan works out as follows : The patrol of the advance 
 cavalry reported above as at 568, remains there until relieved 
 by the flank guard. At the moment the problem opens, the 
 point of the advance party of the leading group has reached 
 584, and marches on toward 557; the advance party, 150 yards 
 in rear, reaches 584 about two minutes later, and stations two 
 men at this crossroad to wait for its main body that is 600 
 yards in its rear. When this group comes up, it detaches a 
 patrol of a corporal and four men, who go to the western edge 
 of the orchard, 450 yards to the west. Two men are left at 584. 
 There they are instructed to wait until the rear of the wagon 
 train enters New Oxford, when they are to join the rearmost 
 group of the flank guard. 
 
 The next important observation point is 568. The point of 
 the flank guard reaches there, and finds there the patrol of the 
 advance cavalry referred to above. This patrol gives them all 
 the information it has concerning the enemy, and it then trots 
 ahead, observing the usual precautions, to Hill 571, just across 
 Swift Run, where it resumes its observation duties. 
 
 A second stationary patrol is posted at 568, where it waits 
 until the rearmost group of the flank guard comes up, which 
 it joins. 
 
 Succeeding stationary patrols are left on Hill 571; on the 
 nose 300 yards northwest of 530; at the edge of the woods 
 beyond Snyder's; and at 594, at each of which places the point 
 of the advance guard relieves the patrol of the advance cavalry, 
 which, in turn, trots forward to the next place, where it again 
 waits in observation until relieved. 
 
 Paragraph 568, Infantry Drill Regulations, provides that 
 "practicable communication must exist between it (the flank 
 guard) and the main body." This does not mean that constant 
 visual communication must be kept up. That would be often 
 impossible, without a great expenditure of men, and it is not 
 necessary. What is necessary is that each patrol should be so 
 posted that it can see at least one other patrol towards the 
 nucleus, whatever that nucleus may be. The paragraph quoted 
 also insists that physical communication between the two bodies 
 
FLANK GUARDS 143 
 
 must be always possible ; that is, the flank guard must not allow 
 any obstacle between it and the main body that could make it 
 impossible for the flank guard to join the main body, if it be- 
 came necessary. 
 
 In this case the patrol west of the orchard can see the two 
 men at 584, who can see the main body across the Little Cone- 
 wago. The patrol at 568 can see the one west of the orchard; 
 that at 571, the one at 568; that northwest of 530, the one on 
 571 ; the one beyond Snyder's should, by connecting files, or 
 otherwise, as the terrain permits, see the one south of Sny- 
 der's, and the one at 594, the one northwest of Snyder's. 
 
 The right flank guard, a squadron of cavalry, less the troop 
 in the advance guards, has marched, (Strategic Map) through 
 Germantown, Whitehall, Mount Rock School, Irishtown, to the 
 Baltimore Pike. 
 
 A series of patrols strung along the line of march, as de- 
 scribed in the case of the infantry flank guard above, would 
 give the same measure of protection against surprise, but it 
 would be impossible to give the same amount of physical pro- 
 tection, because of the inferior strength of the cavalry 258 
 sabres to 432 rifles. The cavalry is farther weakened by the 
 necessity of subtracting one-fourth of its number to hold the 
 horses of the others when they dismount to take the defensive. 
 That reduces the effective dismounted strength of this flank 
 guard to 192 rifles. To make up for this weakness in numbers, 
 the cavalry reconnoissance must be over a wider area. 
 
 Due to the limitations of the map, we can only conjecture 
 what the terrain to the east is like. It is safe to assume that 
 Pigeon Hills gave a very extensive view to the east. The Red 
 cavalry at York was almost as near to Pigeon Hills, when at 
 its camp there, as the Blue cavalry was in its camp at Littles- 
 town. So, if Major C expects to occupy those heights 
 
 in advance of the Red cavalry, he must send a detachment there 
 early, and at a rapid gait. It is nine miles from the cavalry 
 camp at Littlestown to Pigeon Hills, and Major C de- 
 tached one of his troops early in the morning, directing its 
 commander to go rapidly there. A smaller force might be sent, 
 
144 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 but it might not be able to hold the position there. That reduces 
 
 Major C 's flank guard proper to two troops. 
 
 When he arrived, at noon, at 581, 1J4 miles east of New 
 Oxford on the York Turnpike (Strategic Map) he learned from 
 a messenger from the troop on Pigeon Hills that atmospheric 
 conditions were such that the view from the hill was limited 
 to about three miles, and that there were no signs of hostile 
 troops within that radius. 
 
 Major C then estimated the situation as follows: 
 
 MISSION : To protect the right flank of the brigade from 
 surprise. 
 
 FORCES: The Red cavalry brigade, and the Blue brigade 
 he is screening, are the only known forces to be considered. 
 However, the information received may be deceptive, and he 
 must take no chances. 
 
 CONDITIONS: He is so weak that the most he can hope to 
 be able to do is to warn the main body of the approach of the 
 hostile cavalry, and, having discovered it, to keep in contact 
 with it, holding his small force between it and the main body, 
 during the latter's deployment. The thick atmosphere limits him 
 in his work in a measure. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY DO? The enemy will 
 undoubtedly advance until near New Oxford by the York Turn- 
 pike. He may turn off to the northwest, when within a few 
 miles of that village, and seek to ride around the head of the 
 Blue column, attacking it in front or near its head, while the 
 troops from Gettysburg attack it in flank. He may turn south- 
 west, east of Pigeon Hills, and seek to attack the trains, while 
 the troops from Gettysburg attack in flank. 
 
 TERRAIN : The terrain may be assumed to be similar, east 
 of the map we have, to that the Blue troops are working on. 
 It is favorable for rapid marching, and the number of parallel 
 roads available will permit the Red brigade to advance with a 
 number of short columns, thus increasing considerably the rate 
 of march. He is probably unhampered by his trains. 
 
 COURSES OPEN: Major C must give the brigade com- 
 mander ample time to prepare for a cavalry attack, since he is 
 
PLANK GUARDS 14i 
 
 not strong enough to delay the hostile command materially. His 
 plan is stated above. 
 
 At noon the right flank guard was in this position: One 
 troop in observation on Pigeon Hills; two troops at the inter- 
 section of the York and Baltimore Turnpike, 1^ miles east of 
 New Oxford. Patrols are scattered along parallel to the Blue 
 line of march, and two to three miles distant from it. A patrol 
 is on Hill 586 (Topographical Map), two miles northeast of 
 New Oxford; and a patrol is on the ridge crossed by the Balti- 
 more Pike, two-thirds of a mile south of the bridge where the 
 Baltimore Pike crosses the Conewago. This patrol could see 
 the patrol of the advance cavalry that was stationed near the 
 cut, 400 yards northeast of Oakwood School House. 
 
 Instead of having his patrols remain in position until the 
 
 rear of the wagon train had passed, Major C has them 
 
 move up progressively. Thus: when the rearmost patrol saw 
 the rear of the wagon train had come opposite his position, it 
 walked and trotted leisurely up to the next patrol ahead, which 
 it relieved. The patrol so relieved, relieved the one ahead, and 
 so on throughout the column. In this way each patrol marched 
 the same distance that every other one did, and every patrol 
 was constantly in observation, except one. This one was al- 
 ways the one that was not at the moment needed. 
 
 The patrols could relieve each other at very moderate gaits 
 indeed, since the main column was marching at only 2% miles 
 per hour. 
 
 The patrol of the advance cavalry was the only one whose 
 duty was particularly hazardous. 
 
 Flank protection for this column might have been secured 
 by requiring each regiment to provide its own flank guards. 
 In that case each flank guard would march with flanking groups 
 thrown out to the side away from the column, at the same rate 
 as the column itself did. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 REAR GUARDS. 
 
 "The rear guard is charged with the important duty of covering 
 the retreat." Paragraph 55, Field Service Regulations. 
 
 Students are advised to study Paragraphs 55 to 58, Field 
 Service Regulations, which describe the duties of the rear 
 guard, and need but little comment in explanation. 
 
 The formation and nomenclature of the rear guard is very 
 similar to that of the advance guard, but its mission is very 
 different- The advance guard is seeking the enemy, so that 
 the main body may attack him to advantage; the rear guard is 
 delaying the enemy so that he may not attack the main body. 
 
 It often happens that a detachment of troops finds itself 
 in a situation where it would be folly to give battle. The 
 enemy, superior in numbers, or in the advantage of position, 
 should not be met. The detachment must retreat until it is 
 reinforced, or until it reaches a position where the advantage 
 would be on its side. In such cases the work of the rear guard 
 is very important. The force it protects must not be hurried, 
 or it may, instead of retiring in good order, under the control 
 of its officers, suddenly be stampeded. 
 
 The patrols from the rear guard cavalry cover the country 
 over a broad sector in rear of the column they are protecting. 
 They must be vigilant and tenacious, hanging on to good points 
 of observation to the last moment, always with a good line of 
 retreat selected, and with a clear idea of where their next halt 
 is to be made. They send their information in to the rear 
 guard by visual signals, with flags, or by verbal messages. As 
 the enemy presses the rear guard closer, these patrols become 
 combat patrols, hanging on to the hostile flanks and watching 
 and promptly reporting every hostile move. 
 
 Defeated troops may easily become demoralized, and their 
 orderly retreat easily turned into a rout. It is this calamity 
 that the rear guard seeks to prevent. The march of the main 
 
REAR GUARD 147 
 
 body must not be hurried. The victor should do all in his 
 power to gather the full fruits of his victory by destroying 
 his defeated enemy utterly, by spreading panic among his 
 troops, by creating in their minds the idea that he cannot be 
 stopped. This effect can be easiest produced at the beginning 
 of the retreat. When an army has been driven out of its 
 position by a superior enemy its morale is very low, and the 
 troops that have suffered most in the battle need the longer 
 time to recover their confidence, to have their tactical units 
 reorganized. Confusion reigns at first, but, after a time, this 
 condition is improved, and the army may again become a for- 
 midable body- 
 When a large army has been driven from a position that 
 it has stubbornly defended up to the point where it has been 
 overwhelmed by the enemy, the resulting confusion in the 
 defeated troops is usually complete. The wise general has 
 saved strong reserves that are placed in commanding positions 
 to check the enemy while this confusion is reduced to order. 
 
 These reserves, to which are added the least demoralized 
 of the defeated troops, fight delaying actions, retreating from 
 one defensive position to another, holding east just long 
 enough to force the enemy to a wide deployment, but not long 
 enough to become so involved as not to be able to retreat to 
 the next selected position. 
 
 The enemy will attempt to hold the" rear guard in its posi- 
 tion as long as possible, in order to make a detour with his 
 cavalry and horse artillery, clear around the flank of the rear 
 guard, to reach and strike the confused mass of fugitives it is 
 protecting, and whose officers are straining every nerve, to 
 reorganize into efficient fighting units. 
 
 For instance, suppose a Blue army has been defeated at 
 Gettysburg, (Strategic Map) and the disorganized units that 
 bore the brunt of the fighting are retreating towards the pass 
 in South Mountain west of Cashtown. A rear guard has been 
 organized, that successfully holds the Red pursuing force in 
 check along the Chambersburg Pike. A force of Red cav- 
 alry and horse artillery makes a detour by Arendtsville and 
 
148 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 the roads running south and southwest from there. A por- 
 tion, dismounted, supporting the guns, suddenly appears on 
 Rock Top just as the roads in the pass are choked with 
 wagons, ambulances, troops without officers or organization, 
 discouraged, disheartened. The panic heightens and spreads. 
 
 Other portions of the Red cavalry attack the column, 
 reaching it by the roads from the north, and, striking the dis- 
 organized column in flank in several places, complete the de- 
 moralization. It is not difficult to predict what might happen 
 to the Blue command under such a condition of affairs. 
 Already beaten, threatened in front and flank and rear by 
 superior troops, already flushed by victory, it would require a 
 strong hand indeed to save anything from the wreck. 
 
 Such a catastrophe must be prevented by covering the 
 country that could possibly be used by the enemy, with a mass 
 of patrols so that such an unexpected attack as that described 
 could not be given. It is the suddenness of the attack, its 
 entirely unexpected quality, that makes such an attack success- 
 ful. If the fugitive troops had an hour's warning even, that 
 a cavalry attack from the north was impending, they could 
 have partially organized, at .least, to meet it; the element of 
 surprise would be wanting. It is the moral, and not the 
 physical effect of cavalry attacking infantry that is to be 
 feared- 
 
 "The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who 
 knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the 
 individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he 
 remains cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle 
 properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is 
 even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which re- 
 tains its steadiness has nothing to fear, ever when outnum- 
 bered by cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered 
 fire, while cavalry relies on the possibility of making an un- 
 expected rapid charge, on quickly covering great distances, and 
 on the moral effect which its irresistible onslaught undoutedly 
 produces upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of 
 surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to 
 
REAR GUARD 149 
 
 become discouraged, and of the individual soldier becoming 
 exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is 
 energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories." (Page 
 301, Infantry Tactics, Balck.) 
 
 Rear guard problems are essentially combat problems, and 
 are studies for officers of higher training than it is expected 
 will use this book, but the duties of the patrols of the rear 
 guard are most important. It is necessary for young students 
 in the Art of War to know their importance. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PATROLING, REVIEWED. 
 
 "From the standpoint of training, scouting detachments give 
 young infantry officers, who are tied to a command, an opportunity 
 to develop self -confidence, decision and tactical judgment; to cope 
 with hardships and difficulties on their own responsibility. In this 
 manner characteristics may be developed in the young officers which 
 will be of benefit to them in a large battle." Balck, Infantry Tac- 
 tics, page 28. 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 Guide Map. 
 
 The Susquehanna River separates two States that are at 
 war. Blue, Western, forces are defending Gettysburg. Red, 
 Eastern, forces have crossed the frontier, and are advancing 
 on Gettysburg. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 Strategic and Topographical Maps. 
 
 You are the leader of a Blue officer's strategic patrol, 
 mounted, that has come this morning from Gettysburg by way 
 of Hunterstown, whose mission is to search the country from 
 Round Hill to New Oxford for hostile troops. The people 
 of the country are in rebellion against their own government, 
 and are friendly to the Reds. 
 
 Your patrol has reached crossroad 594, about \y 2 miles 
 southwest of Newchester. You halt it there, and send one 
 man to the top of the ridge on the road a hundred yards to the 
 southeast, to see what may be on the southern slope of the 
 ridge, and in the valley beyond- 
 
 While waiting for a report from this man a Red cavalry 
 patrol comes suddenly out from the shelter of the farm build- 
 ings northeast of the crossroad, charges your patrol and cap- 
 tures it. 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED 151 
 
 What was defective in the way you handled your patrol? 
 How could it have escaped the disaster that overtook it? 
 
 The patrol had come from the southwest, along the 
 northern slope of a long ridge. Your southern and eastern 
 horizon, up to the moment you were jumped, had been along 
 the crest of that ridge, except for the moment you were pass- 
 ing the high spot in the road to the west of the orchard. 
 When the patrol reached Rupp's house, the road could be seen 
 (by observation, and with the help of the map) to cross the 
 northern end of that ridge, and to drop down a long, gentle 
 slope towards the east. 594 is at the crossing of two quite 
 important roads, and a patch of timber, with underbrush, is 
 in the northern angle of the crossroad. Just west of the 
 crossroad, as just mentioned, near 594, the road reaches the 
 top of the ridge, where the view to the south suddenly becomes 
 more extended. Here is where the patrol should have halted, 
 while two men went forward to the bend in the road, 100 
 yards east of 594. 
 
 Now let us consider the different ways the patrol should 
 have been handled, depending on whether it was a strategic 
 patrol, the point of an advance guard, the point of a flank 
 guard, or the rear point of a rear guard. 
 
 Of all these patrols, the strategic patrol needs to act with 
 greatest caution. It is alone, far from support, on a most 
 important mission. The country is hostile, and the people 
 will use every means at their disposal to warn your enemy of 
 your approach. If the Red forces are near, you may be sure 
 that they will know you are in the neighborhood, and they will 
 certainly seek to destroy or capture you. 
 
 You must constantly bear this in mind, and must make 
 your halts only in places where you cannot be surprised. You 
 must, too, have you lines of retreat constantly worked out. 
 Move rapidly over suspicious places, never giving a possible 
 enemy time to plan your capture. 
 
 With this idea in mind, should you have taken your patrol 
 to 594 at all? Hardly. The woods west of Rupp's would 
 be an unlikely place for an ambush. You might stumble on 
 
152 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 a Red group marching on the road there, but 594 would be a 
 much more likely place for a Red group to wait for you- 
 
 A strategic patrol should avoid important crossroads, 
 unless the country is very open around them in all directions, 
 and the view better there than can be obtained elsewhere. 
 
 This patrol might have trotted up to Rupp's his house 
 is in the open and is a most unlikely place for an ambush. 
 A pair of men then would probably have ridden up to the 
 crest of the ridge, in the cornfield, for a look around to the 
 south ; if that is clear, the whole patrol might take the private 
 road to the north, thence across the fields to the northeast, 
 where you have an excellent view in the direction you are to 
 go, then by Cashman's to 513, thence by the little used road 
 across the ford to the northeast to 527 and the open country 
 beyond. 
 
 Suppose you were the point of an advance guard. The 
 body you are protecting is marching from Hunterstown on 
 Newchester and Hampton. You are followed at 200 yards 
 by an advance party, and, it at 700 yards, by a support. In 
 such a case, do you imagine the Reds would lay an ambush 
 at 594 to pick you off? By no means. That would be a bad 
 place for a large force to put up a fight, and a small one would 
 stand a small chance of getting away from the rest of the 
 advance guard. Besides, nothing is gained by picking off the 
 point of an advance guard. It is quite the reverse with a 
 strategic patrol. In the former case, the point would simply 
 be replaced by another one. In the latter, the entire purpose 
 of the patrol would be defeated. The commander who sent it 
 out would get no benefit from it at all. 
 
 The point of an advance guard would have no reason to 
 look for trouble at 594. Where, then, would he look for 
 trouble? At 573, a little farther on, if anywhere on the south 
 side of the Conewago. Here is a commanding position ; good 
 cover and good lines of retreat are also here, protected by 
 excellent covering positions in rear. So the point of an ad- 
 vance guard could go right on through 594, without any 
 hesitation- 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED 153 
 
 Suppose the Blue force marching from Hunterstown on 
 Newchester were a flank guard for a larger force marching 
 on the York Turnpike. How would its march be conducted? 
 What would it look for? In many respects its methods of 
 advancing would be the same as those of the advance guard 
 just considered. It must protect itself from surprise. But 
 its mission, in addition to the ever-present one of self-protec- 
 tion, is now to protect another body, marching on a parallel 
 road. How might that body be reached from the north? 
 Only by the roads. Small groups, easily brushed aside, if 
 seen, might break through the flank guard to observe the main 
 body. The flank guard can hardly hope to prevent that alto- 
 gether. Such Red groups would never waylay the point of 
 the flank guard. Their only salvation is secrecy. Their re- 
 connoissance must be a stealthy one. So 594 in this case, as 
 well as in that of the advance guard, could hardly conceal an 
 ambush. 
 
 The patrol we are considering, after a glance up the road 
 594 613 529, to see that it was clear, after a glance at the 
 dust in the road at 594, to see if any tracks indicated the 
 recent passage of troops on the roads meeting there, would 
 go on through 594, pausing at the cemetery 500 yards 
 farther on to look towards Oak Grove School House to see if 
 that road, too, were clear, and then on to the hill 573. 
 
 Suppose our patrol were the rear point of a rear guard. 
 How would its problem differ from the ones we have been 
 considering? As the main body, in its retreat, passed along 
 over the road, the rear guard halted, from time to time, wher- 
 ever it found a good position to put up a delaying action. 
 The last such position was at 575, 2,000 yards southwest of 
 594, and here and at 632, to the south, the rear party and its 
 rear points would remain in observation, watching the roads 
 to the west and the country to the north and south, until the 
 larger units of the rear guard had reached the fine covering 
 position at the hills 573 and 572, on the edge of Newchester. 
 This they would seek to hold until the retreating forces had 
 all crossed the Conewago safely. As soon as the rear party 
 
154 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 was convinced that the rear guard had reached this position, 
 they would follow to 594 and the hill near Snyder's, to the 
 southeast, taking no precautions whatever in regard to 594, 
 but watching keenly to the rear and to the flanks for indica- 
 tions of the enemy 
 
 So, it is seen, in the methods used in the reconnoissance of a 
 crossroad depend entirely on the mission of the patrol making 
 it. The same is true of all other forms of tactical duties. 
 When the time comes to apply the tactical principles learned 
 from theoretical studies, to maneuvers, or, in that unhappy 
 event, to war, this thought should be kept foremost in mind : 
 "Nothing that I have studied hitherto will apply exactly to 
 the situation that I may meet over the next hill, but if I keep 
 my mission clearly in mind, and keep my head, I ought to be 
 able to apply the correct principle to 'the changed conditions." 
 
 Above all, it must be remembered that the function of 
 mounted patrols, whether of cavalry or mounted scouts, is to 
 help its infantry; that it is the infantry that must bear the 
 brunt of the battle, and that the success of the infantry, in 
 great measure, will depend on the constant stream of infor- 
 mation that it should get from its mounted auxiliaries. 
 
 To go back to the situation on page 145: Consider, now, 
 that you are the one man sent southeast to observe the valley 
 to the south. When you saw your patrol had been surprised 
 and captured, you galloped towards Snyder's across the pas- 
 ture to the east of his house and into the woods beyond. Two 
 men pursue you ; you shoot one of them and the other turns 
 back, evidently to join his patrol. What is your mission now ? 
 How do you go about it ? 
 
 Should you obey the impulse to go back to Gettysburg, and 
 report that your patrol had been overwhelmed. The manu- 
 als say: "When it is certain that the enemy has been discov- 
 ered, that fact is promptly reported." Paragraph 28, Field 
 Service Regulations. "Whether the information gained is of 
 sufficient importance to be reported at once * * * is a 
 question which must be decided in each case." Paragraph 
 619, Infantry Drill Regulations. 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED 155 
 
 Is the information now possessed by you that a Red 
 patrol had captured all of your patrol except yourself, at the 
 crossroad l*/2 miles southwest of Newchester important 
 enough to be reported at once? It is of tremendous impor- 
 tance to you, and still more to your recent companions, but 
 does it possess more than human interest to your commander? 
 Decidedly not. He wants to know more about the situation. 
 Was that patrol you saw a strategic patrol, a reconnoitering 
 patrol, the point of an advance guard, an outpost patrol? 
 Was it followed by other troops, or was it alone? You are 
 under cover; you can go, still under cover, to where you can 
 observe the road leading eastward from where the Red patrol 
 was seen, and it is your duty to try and get some information 
 that will be of real value to your commander. If you were 
 to go back now he would learn nothing of real value to him. 
 He already knows that the Reds are advancing from the east ; 
 the fact that a Red cavalry patrol was at the crossroad 594 
 at the hour that disaster overtook your leader, of itself means 
 nothing to him, but if you can discover what larger bodies 
 this patrol is screening, and you can give him definite infor- 
 mation as to where they are, the risk you run will be well 
 compensated for. 
 
 So you ride through the open woods, west of the brook, 
 and into the thicker, brushy woods beyond- From its south- 
 ern edge you see a column of Red infantry march down the 
 road leading southwest from the Newchester School House. 
 It takes them three minutes to pass. They are preceded by 
 about half a company, and it by a patrol. You watch this 
 road for ten or fifteen minutes, and no more troops pass. You 
 work your way cautiously to the southern angle of the thick 
 woods you are in, and you see that the infantry has halted near 
 the farmhouse in the little valley beyond, directly in your front. 
 They have stacked arms, taken off their equipments, and are 
 cooking food at many little fires. Men are lounging about; 
 evidently they are not intending to move on. You slip back 
 into the woods, work through them to the northern edge of 
 them, and along the western edge of the pasture to the north, 
 
15 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 screened from view by a little ridge to the cast, and by a fringe 
 of trees to the west. You reach the northwest corner of the 
 pasture, where there is a gate. You pass through this gate, 
 and, from the road, you see a group of fifteen or twenty infan- 
 try at the farmhouse about 400 yards to the west. They sec 
 you, but you gallop down the little private road to the north, 
 and through the fields to Cashman's. You have escaped. Is 
 it now appropriate for you to start for Gettysburg? By all 
 means. You have located a battalion of infantry that is 
 probably a support of an outpost line supplying a line of out- 
 guards to the south and southwest. A second, smaller group 
 has also been seen, probably a picket of the same outpost. 
 This is information of value, and it would be decidedly wrong 
 for you to jeopardize your own safety by trying to get more 
 definite information, alone and unsupported, especially as you 
 seem to be clear of the Reds, and escape seems possible. 
 
 When you get back would you tell your commander that 
 you had seen a support and a picket of an outpost line? No. 
 Show him, on the map, where you have been and what you 
 have seen. Let him draw his own inferences. Perhaps other 
 Blue patrols have also secured information of this same Red 
 command, and what you tell him, added to what he learns 
 from them, may be just the bit of information he needs to 
 complete his knowledge of the situation in that quarter. 
 
 The above discussion should prove the correctness of 
 General von Bernhardi's assertion : "The first contact witk 
 the hostile infantry should always be reported." Aggressive 
 and well led cavalry will send patrols all over the country in 
 the neighborhood of its own army and that of its enemy. In- 
 fantry patrols, however, are seldom sent far from their own 
 command, (paragraph 620, Infantry Drill Regulations) and 
 the fact that even a patrol of infantry is seen, if it is the first 
 infantry group to be seen, is usually important enough to be 
 reported. 
 
 Strategic patrols should not attempt too close reconnois- 
 sance of a hostile force. Distant reconnoissance made through 
 glasses, when possible, is best. A nearer view will undoubt- 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED ISf 
 
 edly give the patrol leader more accurate information, but 
 the chance of getting messages through to supporting bodies 
 is greatly lessened when the reconnoissance is made by break- 
 ing through the hostile protective groups. Especially is it 
 mandatory that a patrol "back out" when the leader discovers 
 that he is between hostile columns. Reconnoissance is usually 
 best made from a flank, and the surest results are apt to fol- 
 low if the reconnoissance is made from the flank that is near- 
 est the supporting group. 
 
 Von Bernhardi says : (pp. 52 and 53, Cavalry in War and 
 Peace) "We must lay down here, once and for all, that the 
 distant observation with the glass is by far the most important ; 
 it affords the best survey over the general conditions, and a 
 better possibility of sending back a report safely and quickly. 
 It is just in this method of observation that, in consequence 
 of our peace conditions, patrols are generally so badly trained. 
 Again and again they fall into the error of approaching too 
 close to the enemy, and, in order to see as much of him as 
 possible, let him march past them. They are then compelled 
 to send in their reports from places which lie behind the belt 
 of the hostile service of security. The despatch riders have 
 then to ride from the rear through the hostile advance guard, 
 outposts, and patrol system. 
 
 "In peace, where there are no bullets, and prisoners may 
 not be made, these methods lead to the best results, and to 
 their being employed agai^ and again, particularly if the 
 superior commanders are in ^ined to praise such too complete 
 information instead of condemning it. In truth, it is the 
 worst system that could be conceived." 
 
 The leaders of patrols must be familiar with the tactics of 
 all the arms. Not only should they report on the presence of 
 the enemy, his position, strength, the direction of his march 
 and his tactical dispositions, but they should also be able to 
 report on the character of the country they explore, artillery 
 positions found there, important localities or points to be held 
 or avoided. This latter information is especially valuable as 
 the forces approach nearer to each other, and battle seems 
 near. 
 
158 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 The local reconnoissance of the infantry during or preced- 
 ing an engagement is described by Balck (Infantry Tactics, 
 pp. 248 et seq.) as follows: 
 
 "It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done 
 in strategic reconnoissance in the large maneuvers of recent 
 years, not only in Germany but also in France, the local, tac- 
 tical reconnoissance was less good and often deficient, so that 
 in consequence thereof surprises were not rare. Frequently a 
 gap occurred in the reconnoitering line when the cavalry in 
 front of the various parts of the army was brushed aside and 
 the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom 
 of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this hap- 
 pened, cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report 
 directly to the infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile 
 route column, but this expedient was only partially successful. 
 It must be remembered that troopers cannot ride close enough 
 to the enemy to see anything of importance, and that they 
 frequently are in ignorance of the very things that are of value 
 to the infantry. In addition, the divisional cavalry is entirely 
 too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to it. Therefore 
 infantry and artillery should not rely on cavalry reconnois- 
 sanct. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry 
 patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty 
 of providing for its own reconnoissance. 
 
 "The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnoissance lies in 
 the fact that its cyclists" (cyclists are attached to infantry 
 regiments in the German army, for messenger duties) "are 
 confined to good roads ; that its mounted officers cannot be 
 withdrawn from their appropriate duties except for short 
 periods ; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for carrying 
 messages ; and that, if officers cafry messages in person, the 
 reconnoissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account 
 of the slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages 
 quickly, and, as a result, such messages frequently arrive too 
 late to be of value- On the other hand, infantry patrols pos- 
 sess an advantage in that, by utilizing cover, they can get close 
 to the enemy without being observed. The need of local 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED 159 
 
 reconnoissance is greater now than it was in the past, because 
 troops can no longer change front when deployed and because 
 those which come under hostile fire while in close order forma- 
 tions may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses. 
 
 "The Japanese attached much importance to local recon- 
 noissance, whereas the Russian leaders considered it as some- 
 thing unusual, so that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to pre- 
 scribe it in orders. 'Local reconnoissance was performed by 
 20 to 30 infantrymen. These carefully approached our posi- 
 tions in small groups. One man of each group laid his rifle 
 aside and crawled close up to our trenches, raised his head 
 and observed, while three or four of his companions, whom 
 he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches. 
 Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the 
 ground for protection. This method of procedure continued 
 for seven hours.' ' 
 
 "The thoroughness of the reconnoissance generally made 
 a timely deployment possible, even when the enemy was well 
 concealed, but that neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out 
 by the advance of the Japanese 2d Division at Fuchau and 
 Kapukai on March 10th, 1905. The division advanced with- 
 out reconnoitering, struck the fortified Russian position, was 
 unable to move forward or to the rear, and had to fight under 
 unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy losses, from 
 early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation com- 
 pelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of 
 the Russian 54th Division during the battle of Liao Yang (2d 
 Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater im- 
 portance, and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle 
 at Sykwantun caused the commander of the 54th Division to 
 leave the position assigned to him and to march towards the 
 sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over cov- 
 ered terrain without adequate reconnoissance, was taken in 
 flank and rear by the Japanese 12th Brigade and thrown back 
 in utter rout on its former position, carrying with it the troops 
 which had been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into 
 the possession of the Japanese. 
 
160 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 "The primary object of local reconnoissance is to protect 
 a force from surprise. This may be accomplished by sending 
 out combat patrols, and by company commanders" (mounted 
 in the German army) "riding ahead in time. The latter are 
 likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to 
 selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the recon- 
 noissance the better, for the accidents of the ground can then 
 be utilized to the best advantage. 
 
 "The difficulties of the reconnoissance are increased when 
 we have to reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to 
 screen his force. 
 
 "Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this re- 
 sistance nor create the necessary openings through which the 
 leaders can reconnoiter in person. * * * 
 
 "If the cavalry reconnoissance has determined that the 
 enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the 
 details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnois- 
 sance. Then the commander will wish to know whether or 
 not an immediate attack is feasible, or whether it is advisable 
 to wait until nightfall for bringing up his infantry. The local 
 reconnoissance determines where the flanks of the enemy are 
 located ; whether the position in front is the hostile main posi- 
 tion or only an advanced post; whether the enemy has made 
 preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is 
 posted. As a rule it will be impossible, until after the engage- 
 ment has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified 
 position, to distinguish between the real and the dummy 
 trenches, determine the position of obstacles and estimate 
 whether they can be surmounted with or without adequate 
 apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary to find and 
 mark covered avenues of approach. In moving to new firing 
 positions it is important that advanced positions, masks, and 
 dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of 
 a unit on the flank should make dispositions for observation 
 on his flank, and for permanent communication with neighbor- 
 ing units, even though no specific orders have been received 
 by him to that effect. Strange as it may seem, the troops 
 
PATROLLING REVIEWED 161 
 
 deployed on the road Gorze-Rezonville (battle of Vionville), 
 by their failure to get into early communication with the 
 troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected 
 to take advantage of the information gained by those troops. 
 "The enumeration of these tasks shows that local recon- 
 noissance should not be restricted to the preparatory stage of 
 the combat alone, but that it must be kept up during the whole 
 course of the action. To the duties enumerated, we may add 
 occasional tasks, such as picking off staffs and signal men ; 
 sneaking up on artillery that has been incautiously pushed for- 
 ward ; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. For such 
 tasks so-called 'scouting detachments/ after the Russian pat- 
 tern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness 
 in difficult country and in operations against the enemy's flank 
 and rear cannot be denied- In minor operations, if provided 
 with ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can 
 hamper the reconnoissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of 
 their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospec- 
 tive battlefield, and, finally, having made a skillful lodgement, 
 they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a 
 large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is 
 lacking." 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 MEASURES OF SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 Guide Map. 
 
 The Susquehanna River separates two States that are at 
 war. Blue, Eastern, forces have invaded Red, Western, terri- 
 tory. Blue main forces are in the vicinity of Carlisle. The 
 main Red forces are advancing on Carlisle from the direction 
 of Chambersburg. The country is bitterly hostile to . the 
 Blues. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION. BLUE. 
 Topographical Map, 
 
 A squadron of Blue cavalry reached New Oxford on the 
 afternoon of September 19th, and went into bivouac near the 
 village. Cattle and grain are being collected from the farmers 
 in the vicinity. The grain is collected in wagons ; the cattle, 
 as they are brought in, are assembled in the pastures 1,200 
 yards northeast of New Oxford. 
 
 At daylight, September 20th, Lieut. N , who has been 
 
 detailed by his captain to report, with a platoon of 24 men, to 
 
 Major B , commanding the squadron, for detached 
 
 service, so reports, and received this order : 
 
 "Our regiment is expected to reach York Springs today. 
 A battalion of infantry will be here during the day, coming by 
 rail from the east, to take charge of the supplies we are col- 
 lecting. Red infantry garrisons are known to be at Fairfield 
 (8 miles southwest of Gettysburg, Strategic Map) and 
 Arendtsville (7 miles northwest of Gettysburg). Cavalry 
 detachments of undetermined strength are reported in the 
 vicinity. No other troops of either side are near. 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 163 
 
 "I shall continue to use the squadron today collecting sup- 
 plies. You, with your platoon, are assigned to watch the 
 sector Hampton, inclusive, to Plainview, (Strategic Map) 
 inclusive. Lieut. A will have the sector Plainview, ex- 
 clusive, to Gettysburg, inclusive. 
 
 "Report all movements of Red troops larger than patrols 
 in your sector to me at the earliest moment. 
 
 "I shall remain at the post-office in Hampton all day." 
 
 Lieut. N estimates the situation, and acts as follows : 
 
 MISSION : To so cover the approaches to New Oxford 
 within my sector with a platoon of 24 men that I can surely 
 discover the approach of any hostile force in that sector in 
 time to warn my commander at New Oxford before he can 
 be attacked. 
 
 FORCES: The only help our squadron can expect is the 
 battalion of infantry that is due to arrive today, by rail from 
 the east. I know of no hostile troops near except the Red 
 infantry garrisons at Fairfield and Arendtsville, which are 
 evidently kept there to guard the eastern approaches to the 
 passes leading west and south, respectively, through South 
 Mountain, and cavalry detachments of unknown strength and 
 location that are reported to be near here. The other two 
 squadrons of our regiment are marching on York Springs 
 today. (York Springs is about a mile north of the north- 
 west corner of the Topographical Map.) 
 
 CONDITION : : The Red military authorities must know of 
 our presence and mission at New Oxford. It is a mile, by 
 the road, from where messages must be sent, to the bivouac 
 of the squadron in the pasture, one mile northeast of New 
 Oxford. The squadron outposts are as follows : In the 
 northeast edge of the woods on hill 587 ; at the forks 490, 
 near Klinger's ; at the northeast exit of New Oxford. A de- 
 tached post is on hill 536. With only 24 troopers at my 
 disposal I cannot send more than three patrols. 
 
 WHAT WILL THE ENEMY PROBABLY DO? He will, if he attacks 
 at all, use cavalry, or cavalry and infantry combined. If he 
 attacks over my sector, coming from the northwest, where 
 his forces would naturally be, he will probably advance by 
 
164 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 Waldheim, since in that way he would have but one stream to 
 cross, and he will be between our squadron and its supporting 
 bodies to the north. A very small force could delay him 
 seriously if he attempted to use the Newchester-New Oxford 
 road, at the crossings of the Conewago, Swift Run, and the 
 Little Conewago- The road next west, passing Swift Run 
 School House, might be used, but he can get nearer to our 
 camp by the Oakwood School House- Walheim route, under 
 cover, than by any other road. He might use the Baltimore 
 Turnpike. The least likely route is by Newchester. 
 
 TERRAIN : The country is rolling, lightly forested. The 
 general level is broken by Conewago Creek and its branches. 
 
 COURSES OPENS (a) The terrain may be covered by a 
 system of marching patrols. These may cover the road past 
 Swift Run School House, the one through Newchester, and 
 the Baltimore Pike. Marching patrols can cover a greater 
 extent of country than stationary patrols, but the question of 
 how much time will be needed to prepare the squadron for 
 action will determine the distance the patrols should go. The 
 action should be fought at the crossings of the Conewago or 
 Little Conewago. Selection of positions to meet hostile forces 
 coming from any direction should already have been made. 
 The troops should be ready for instant action. If the patrols 
 go out too far, the spaces between them will be increased be- 
 yond the range of inter-communication, and a hostile body 
 might get between them unobserved. 
 
 (b) Places for stationary patrols should be found that 
 will cover the sector completely, that are visible from a com- 
 mon point nearer camp, and that afford lines of retreat 
 towards that central point. 
 
 Such places are : For the central group, the roof of a two- 
 story building at the crossroad at Newchester. The ground 
 elevation there is 530 ; the building is 30 feet high, giving the 
 observer an altitude of 560 sufficient for him to see over 
 the tops of the trees to the north of the village. For the 
 patrols, the hill 602, north of Hampton, and 584,, west of 
 Belmont School, are well located, are visible from the roofs 
 of Newchester, and, indeed, with glasses, from each other. 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 166 
 
 Both have good fields of view to the front, and lines of quick 
 retreat out of sight from the front can be easily prepared by 
 making gaps in the fences- 
 
 DECISION : Lieut. N decides to take his platoon, less 
 
 two patrols of six men, to Newchester at the trot. To send 
 one of the detached patrols by the mst direct road to the hill 
 602. This patrol will accompany the lieutenant (the squadron 
 is camped in the pasture along the stream west of the hill 587, 
 northeast of New Oxford) as far as the northern end of the 
 private road leading north through the pasture. He will also 
 detach a second patrol, of equal size, to go to Belmont School 
 House. 
 
 ORDERS: "Sergeant F , you know the situation. 
 
 Take your patrol by the Baltimore Pike towards Hampton and 
 the hill 602. If not prevented, occupy this hill and keep an 
 active lookout for troops approaching from the front. I shall 
 be at the crossroad in Newchester. Send messages there at 
 top speed. Make a smoke ball * if the enemy is advancing 
 rapidly in force." 
 
 To the other patrol leader, Corporal G , who rode 
 
 along with the lieutenant, he said : "You know the situation. 
 Go rapidly, with your patrol of six men, towards the hill 584, 
 near Belmont School House. If not prevented, occupy this 
 hill, and watch for hostile movements from the north and 
 west. Send messages to me at the crossroad in Newchester." 
 
 Sergeant F , as soon as he left Lieut. N , trotted 
 
 to the outpost near Klinger's, who reported nothing unusual. 
 He then trotted to the farmhouse on the eastern slope of 
 hill 586. This much of his road was under the observation 
 of the outguard on hill 587. Here he turned to the left on the 
 private road leading over the hill to the north, halting a mo- 
 
 *To make a smoke ball, have a small, clear fire burning, with a 
 pile of damp grass, weeds, ferns, or the like, near it. When the 
 signal is to be made, drive a green stake in the center of the fire 
 and throw a dampened blanket over it, supported by the stake. 
 Throw the smoke-producing material on the fire and then hold the 
 edges of the blanket low down until the smoke begins to leak out 
 around them; then jerk the blanket off quickly, and if the wind is 
 not too strong, a ball of smoke will rise that will be visible for miles 
 on a clear day. The fire should be put out or smothered at once. 
 
166 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 ment there, when he got to where he could see over the crest 
 towards the north. Seeing nothing unusual, he led his patrol, 
 riding with a trooper by his side, the rest of the patrol 100 
 yards in rear, by the private road north and east to 5481; a 
 little to the north of here is another crest, near the farmhouses 
 on the left. Halting here, he could see ahead to the next 
 crest in the road, (at the letter T in BALTIMORE) 1200 
 yards ahead. The woods crowning this ridge, east of the 
 Pike, prevented him from seeing any farther on the road he 
 must take, and the ridge paralleling the road, to the west, 300 
 yards away, cut off his view in that direction. 
 
 He trotted to the next horizon, and here the valley of the 
 Conewago, and the opposite slopes, spread out to his view. 
 There is practically no cover for him the rest of the way to 
 his station on hill 602, so there can be no more effort at con- 
 cealment. 
 
 He assembles his patrol, directs two of the five men who 
 have been with the second group, to follow the other three at 
 200 yards, and directs the second group to increase the dis- 
 tance between them and him, when they advance again, to 
 200 yards. He explains his mission to the patrol, and tells 
 them that the thing of greatest importance to them on this 
 occasion is to get information of the approach of any large 
 body of hostile troops to the commanding officer at the earliest 
 moment. He then proceeds, at the trot and gallop, to his 
 station on hill 602- 
 
 He left Lieut. N at 5:50 A. M. ; he reached hill 602 
 
 at 6 :20. He went at once to the crest of the hill, crawling to 
 the top, to make himself as little conspicuous as possible- He 
 looked through his glasses in all directions, saw no signs of 
 movements of troops, and then stationed two men, hiding them 
 as best he could, to act as sentinels. He had a small fire built 
 on the southern slope of the hill ; he sent a man to get some 
 green grass and ferns to make a smudge of; he sent another 
 to cut gaps in the fences to the south, in case it should become 
 necessary to retreat suddenly in that direction ; he had the 
 horses put out of sight from the west and north, on the south- 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 167 
 
 ern slope of the hill, and then he joined the sentinels, where 
 he remained in observation. 
 
 Corporal G , adopting much the same tactics, pro- 
 ceeded more slowly until he neared Newchester. He could 
 
 get no such view of this village as Sergeant F could of 
 
 Hampton, because of the woods and hills that screen it from 
 the south. But he had to get through it, so, assembling his 
 patrol at the bend in the road on the southern outskirts of the 
 village, and after he had looked up the main street and seen 
 that it was practically deserted, he took the gallop, and, with 
 pistols raised, he and his men dashed in one group through 
 the village, looking to right and left for signs of hostile occu- 
 pation as they passed. At the northern exit of the town he 
 got a momentary glimpse of the road across the creek, near 
 Oak Grove School House, but here his view stopped, on ac- 
 count of the woods and orchards there. He slackened his pace 
 going down the hill, had five members of the patrol drop back 
 to 100 yards' distance, and continued to his post, observing 
 the usual precautions. 
 
 Arriving there he found that at hill 584 his view to the 
 northeast was cut off by the woods a half mile away in that 
 direction, so he was forced to send two men to the farmhouse 
 east of Belmont School House, directing them to find a place 
 where they could observe the roads to the east, particularly 
 the one leading southeast from Bowlder. 
 
 He made similar preparations on hill 584 to those described 
 
 as made by Sergeant F He was in position on the hill 
 
 at 6:35 A. M. 
 
 Lieut. N used Corporal G 's patrol as an ad- 
 vance guard for his own party, now reduced to ten troopers. 
 On reaching Newchester he sent two troopers at once, at a trot, 
 to station themselves on Hill 573, to observe the country to 
 the west; had the horses of the rest held, kept saddled and 
 bridled, in the center of the town, and, with two men, went to 
 the top of the building referred to 'above. Here he had one 
 man watch the country to the north and east, the other to the 
 north and west, while he, from time to time swept with his 
 glasses the whole terrain in his sector. 
 
168 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 RED. Meanwhile a squadron of Red cavalry had camped 
 the night of September 19th and 20th at Bendersville (Strate- 
 gic Map), 13 miles northwest of New Oxford. Its comman- 
 der learned of the Blue cavalry at the latter place, and its mis- 
 sion there. He determined to attack this Blue squadron, hoping 
 to find it so dispersed in its search for military supplies that 
 he might destroy it. From his knowledge of the terrain, and 
 from the map, he estimated that he should be able to reach 
 Oakwood School House, one mile northwest of Waldheim, 
 marching by way of Center Mills, Heidlersburg, and Bowlder, 
 without being discovered by the Blue outposts, and that he 
 could then make a dash across the Conewago before the Blue 
 cavalry could be informed of his approach. 
 
 After reaching Waldheim he would be guided by circum- 
 stances. He determined to march with only a point; to go at 
 a walk until he saw he was discovered, and then to take the trot. 
 
 He reached crossroad 601, in the woods lj^ miles north of 
 Belmont School House, at 7 :00 A. M. Here he was met by 
 a farmer boy riding a barebacked horse, who said that he lived 
 in the bend of the road a mile below, and that "some Blue 
 soldiers, on horses, were on the hill near the school house." 
 When asked what they were doing there, he said he didn't 
 know ; he was frightened and ran away. 
 
 The Red commander, Major R , then led his squadron 
 
 through the fields north of the ridge the road to Bowlder is 
 carried on, reaching Bowlder at 7 :20. 
 
 There is a store at Bowlder, with a telephone. Here Major 
 
 R got into communication with the information division 
 
 (paragraph 9, Field Service Regulations) of the Red army, at 
 Chambersburg, and learned of the advance of the rest of the 
 Blue cavalry regiment towards York Springs, and also that 
 several car loads probably a battalion of Blue infantry had 
 left York that morning, by train, for the west. He telephoned 
 the commanding officer at Arendtsville, asking that some in- 
 fantry be started at once for Hampton, that he thought with 
 their help he could bag the Blue command. The commanding 
 officer at Arendtsville could spare only a battalion, but he would 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 169 
 
 send it at once. He also learned that the Blue cavalry was em- 
 ployed to the west and south of New Oxford, and that no part 
 of it had been seen to cross the Conewago that morning. 
 
 At 7:40, Major R started again with his command, 
 
 preceded by only a point, and, marching at the trot, soon came 
 into view of the Blue patrol on hill 602. It is four miles from 
 Bowlder to Waldheim, and the point of Major R 's com- 
 mand reached the latter place at 8:20 A. M. The Major sent 
 his leading troop across the ford first, directing its captain to 
 gallop up to Seven-hundred School House, and, from there to 
 throw out several patrols to the south to locate the Blue out- 
 posts. The other three troops were to follow closely, and halt 
 at 542, 600 yards north of the school house. 
 
 Major R , accompanying the leading troop, went to 
 
 the school house, climbed to its belfry, from which place he 
 could see over the tops of the trees to the south. It was now 
 8:40 A. M., and he could see, coming from the northern edge 
 of the village, a column of infantry that turned and marched 
 northeast toward the camp of the Blue cavalry. 
 
 The Red position, at this moment, was as follows: The 
 head of the main body, three troops, was at 542; the support 
 of the advance guard, one troop, less detachments, was at Seven- 
 hundred School House; one platoon was 600 yards south of 
 the school house, stopped there by the fire from a Blue outpost 
 at 552 ; a patrol of eight men was at the farmhouse north of 
 Klinger's, where they were held by the fire of the Blue outpost 
 at 490; one patrol of eight men was approaching hill 586 from 
 the north. 
 
 BLUE. The patrol at hill 584, near Belmont School House, 
 
 missed Major R 's squadron, but the two men on the 
 
 ridge to the east of the school house saw him as he came trot- 
 ting out of the woods south of Bowlder. One of the two men, 
 waiting only long enough to be sure that the command was 
 larger than one troop, galloped down the farm road towards 
 
 the school house. Corporal G , with one man, galloped 
 
 to meet him. The man reported: "The head of a Red cavalry 
 column larger than one troop just came out of the woods south 
 
170 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 of Bowlder, about two miles from here. It is going at a trot 
 towards New Oxford." 
 
 The corporal saw a smoke ball rising from hill 602, and 
 
 knew from that that Sergeant F had seen the Red column 
 
 too, so he said to the man who made the report : "Go rapidly 
 to Newchester and report what you have seen." It was now 
 7:52 A. M. It is three miles from Belmont School House to 
 Newchester, and riding at the trot and gallop, it took the mes- 
 senger 15 minutes to reach Newchester. 
 
 Lieut. N ordered a fresh horse for the messenger, 
 
 and, while saddles were being shifted, he got the report of the 
 messenger. It was 8:10 when he started again, and 8:28 when 
 he reached the Y in the road just north of New Oxford. A 
 trooper there directed him to go to camp with his message; he 
 went there, reporting to the Major at 8 :35 A. M. 
 
 Corporal G , after dispatching his messenger, went at 
 
 once to the place whence the Red column had been discovered. 
 When he got there it was crossing the ridge 1,000 yards north- 
 west of Chromis' house. Nothing was following it. The cor- 
 poral withdrew his sentinel here, went rapidly back towards 
 the school house, signalling to his patrol on the hill to come in; 
 when it joined him, he trotted back to Newchester. 
 
 He found that Lieut. N had taken his patrol to the 
 
 ridge 600 yards southeast of Newchester, and learned that the 
 dust of the Red squadron had just been seen near Oakwood 
 School House. The lieutenant, estimating the situation, decided 
 that he could now be of more service closer in, so he withdrew 
 
 to the nose 400 yards northwest of 520, sending Corporal G , 
 
 with his patrol, to 568, 1% miles to the southwest. 
 
 Sergeant F also saw the Red cavalry at 7:43 A. M. 
 
 He waited long enough to see the rest of the column. At 7 :48 
 he sent up a smoke ball. He saw he could accomplish no more 
 by staying at 602 than by crossing to the south side of the creek. 
 Here was an enemy large enough to be formidable, and his 
 place was on its flank. So he assembled his patrol, and led it, 
 at the trot and gallop, to the nose on the Baltimore Pike 1200 
 yards south of the Conewago. He reached there at 8:10. He 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 171 
 
 saw the Red cavalry just coming out of the woods southeast 
 of Oakwood School House, and sent the best mounted trooper 
 of his patrol in to camp with these instructions : "You know the 
 situation. Go in at your best speed, and tell the senior officer 
 in camp about it. Tell him where you left me, and that I will 
 remain on this flank of the enemy." 
 
 The outpost on hill 536 also, at 8:10 A. M., saw the Red 
 cavalry as it came out of the woods southeast of the Oakwood 
 School House, and it signalled to camp: ''Enemy in sight," 
 and, as soon as the rear of the squadron came in sight, sent 
 a messenger at the gallop to camp, to give them the direction 
 of the enemy, and his estimated strength. 
 
 The smoke ball sent up from hill 602 was seen at camp at 
 7 :48. Only two troops were in camp. They assembled as 
 rapidly as they could. The senior officer in camp called Major 
 
 B to the telephone and told him that a smoke signal had 
 
 been seen from hill 602, and that he was assembling the troops 
 in camp. 
 
 Major B sent out messengers to call in the foraging 
 
 parties and left a small patrol, under a sergeant, to meet the 
 Blue infantry battalion that was momentarily expected, and, 
 then, with the rest of the troopers in New Oxford, he galloped 
 to camp. He left a trooper at the northern exit of the village 
 to direct messengers where to find him. 
 
 The troops at camp were assembled at the northern edge 
 of the pasture where they had been camped, in readiness for a 
 move. At 8:10 the signal from the outpost on hill 536 was 
 seen, and, about the same time, the whistle of an engine was 
 heard. 
 
 Major B , realizing that the Red squadron would be 
 
 across the Conewago before he could oppose it, estimated that 
 it would be better tactics for him to allow the Red squadron 
 to get nearer to New Oxford, to wait for the Blue infantry to 
 come up, then to attack the Red squadron on its left flank and 
 rear, holding it south of the Conewago while the Blue infantry, 
 attacking it in front, might destroy it. So he moved his troops 
 up to hill 586, massed them on the south side of that hill, left 
 
172 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 his outposts as they were, adding one group of ten men at 552, 
 and awaited developments. 
 
 The Blue infantry reached the station at 8:20, and, unload- 
 ing rapidly, was soon on the march. The head of the column 
 left the northern exit of the village at 8:40 A. M. 
 
 RED. The patrol of eight men sent to occupy hill 586 was 
 fired on from that hill and forced to take cover in the woods 
 
 to the northwest. Major R , realizing that his chance 
 
 to attack the Blue squadron successfully had passed, gave orders 
 to retire at once. He directed the captain of the leading troop 
 to retire slowly, joined his squadron at 542, and led it, at the 
 trot, to the northwest, across the bridge at 434W, and then, by 
 hill 526, he retreated to Oakwood School House. His fourth 
 troop retired a few minutes later, joined him, and the Red 
 squadron was then massed behind the screen of woods a half 
 mile east of Oakwood School House. 
 
 Major R estimated now that the Blue forces would 
 
 attempt to reach York Springs with their convoy, using the 
 Baltimore Pike, and he decided to dismount his squadron, and 
 move the dismounted men to the southern margin of the woods, 
 to contest the crossing of the Conewago. 
 
 BLUE. The Blue infantry commander, who was the senior 
 officer present, decided to start at once, with the supplies already 
 collected, for York Springs. Estimating the situation, he de- 
 cided to advance immediately with three companies, directly 
 towards the bridge 423, on the Baltimore Pike, and to send so 
 
 much of Major B 's squadron as was already assembled, 
 
 by Greenridge School House, thence around the bend in the 
 Conewago, where the road is completely screened, by the fringe 
 of trees along the river, from view to the north, thence across 
 the ford north of hill 466, to attack the Red left flank, in case 
 he contested the crossing of the bridge. 
 
 Major B delayed crossing the ford until he heard the 
 
 firing of the infantry, when he led his squadron across the 
 fields, towards the little patch of woods east of Miller's. While 
 
 doing so he was discovered by Major R 's combat patrol, 
 
 posted at the farmhouse 600 yards southeast of Miller's, who 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 173 
 
 at once gave warning. The Red line withdrew, mounted up, 
 and retired slowly to the southern edge of Round Hill. Major 
 
 B followed, and, at noon, both forces were posted as 
 
 follows : The Red squadron on Round Hill. The Blue squadron, 
 now completely assembled, on the Baltimore Pike, with march 
 outposts on 602, at the orchard on the Pike 1200 yards north- 
 west of 564, and at 548, nearly a mile to the east of 564. 
 
 Lieut. N 's patrol, which had kept on the Red right 
 
 flank all the morning, was at the orchard nearly a mile north- 
 west of Chromis', towards Bowlder. 
 
 The Blue infantry had three companies at Miller's, while 
 the other one was in rear of the convoy, which stretched along 
 for about a mile, its head in rear of the leading three com- 
 panies. 
 
 At about noon an infantry column was seen by the outpost 
 on 602, coming down the hill east of Bowlder. His appearance 
 
 was signaled, and Major B rode up to the hilltop. He 
 
 saw what appeared to be a battalion of Red infantry, marching 
 east, and at the same time, the Red cavalry squadron marched 
 down the slope of Round Hill to meet it. 
 
 A little later Lieut. N 's patrol was seen to leave the 
 
 orchard where it had been stationed to take a position in the 
 cut 800 yards southeast of there, and open fire, its target evi- 
 dently to the north. 
 
 Major B sent his adjutant to Major I , com- 
 manding the Blue infantry, directing him to point out to the 
 Major the advantages of the ridge that hill 602 is on as a de- 
 fensive position, to inform him that he, Major B , would 
 
 hold the ridge with a dismounted line until he could be re- 
 lieved, and that he believed that the Red Cavalry was working 
 around on his left flank. 
 
 Major B dismounted Troop A at once, holding the 
 
 horses in the little ravine just east of 602, and led his other 
 three troops, with no other advance protection than ground 
 scouts, at the gallop across the fields to the orchards, half a 
 mile southwest of 602, keeping out of sight behind the ridge. 
 There they dismounted, and deployed on the crest. Gaps were 
 
174 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 cut in the fences. The outpost at the orchard was brought in 
 
 a little nearer, and left there as a combat patrol. Lieut. N 
 
 took his patrol, which had been firing on the advancing Red 
 squadron, to the rectangle of woods southeast of Chromis' house, 
 where he remained as a combat patrol. The march outpost at 
 548 was left in observation there. 
 
 The Blue infantry came up and deployed in about twenty 
 minutes. Troop A, when relieved, mounted, and remained in 
 the little valley where the horses had been held. The other 
 three troops, when relieved, mounted and went to the eastern 
 
 edge of the woods where Lieut. N !s patrol was, to await 
 
 the appearance of the Red squadron, and to assist in the de- 
 fense of the convoy. 
 
 The convoy, meanwhile, has been brought! up to Hampton, 
 and is held in the pasture east of the village. The Blue com- 
 pany guarding it is held in the center of the village, with march 
 outposts at the northern and western exits of the town. 
 
 With the positions and forces as indicated, the Red chance 
 of success, everything else being equal, in attacking the Blues, 
 is entirely hopeless. At the same time, it would be a hazardous 
 undertaking for the Blues to attempt to move the convoy in 
 the face of Red forces of equal strength. It could only be done 
 by sending the convoy ahead, using the troops as a rear guard. 
 
 In the situations just described, many problems confronted 
 the Blue commander. He had to conduct foraging operations 
 in a hostile country, where all local sources of information, 
 open to his enemy, were closed to him. His first concern was 
 to get information of the hostile advance in time to prepare 
 for it. His camp outposts could not do this for him- He must 
 have more distant patrols. Then, having learned of the hos- 
 tile advance, he must be kept advised of the probable direction 
 of the Red attack. This was given him by the reconnoitering 
 patrols, assisted by the camp outposts. Having secured the 
 advantage, by the arrival of the Blue battalion, he must keep 
 contact with the Red cavalry, so as to guard against possible 
 surprise. This was done by means of contact patrols, backed 
 up by the whole squadron. When the Red battalion arrived 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 175 
 
 on the scene, it, too, must be kept in check, and under observa- 
 tion. This was done by deploying the cavalry, dismounted, in 
 a good position, and by the use of combat patrols. The cav- 
 alry line was not strong enough to hold the position selected, 
 so the infantry relieved it, and, by so doing, enabled three of 
 the cavalry troops to mass themselves on the left of the in- 
 fantry, and prevent any flank attack by the Red cavalry, which 
 had moved so as to threaten this flank, while the fourth troop, 
 assembled under cover of the right flank, could quickly move 
 to the flank or rear of any part of the Red infantry that threat- 
 ened an attack on that flank. 
 
 This troop, too, in case the Red infantry should be suc- 
 cessful, might, at the critical moment, charge the Red infantry 
 lines in flank, in column of platoons, creating such a condition 
 of momentary panic in their ranks that the Blue line, pouring 
 rapid fire into their disordered lines, might easily turn defeat 
 into victory. This would be an excellent application of the 
 principle : "When cavalry attacks infantry, material effect is 
 nothing, moral effect everything. In the case of infantry 
 directly engaged with infantry of the other side, this moral 
 effect may be produced with the smallest units, especially if 
 they attack it in flank or in rear." 
 
 Infantry is the backbone of all armies. All the other arms 
 are auxiliary subsidiary to the infantry, and all their ener- 
 gies, all their talents, should be devoted to futher the success 
 of the infantry programme. 
 
 When cavalry attacks hostile cavalry to destroy it, its com- 
 mander hopes thereby to secure two ends : first, to relieve his 
 own infantry of the necessity of dissipating its strength in 
 closely guarding its line of communications, and, second, to be 
 himself free to attack the hostile line of communications, and 
 so to reduce the number of infantry rifles opposed to those of 
 the infantry of his own side. 
 
 So with artillery; in its action with the hostile artillery it 
 seeks to destroy it, not so that it, the artillery, may win the 
 battle that decides the war. It purposes also are two-fold: 
 First, to put the hostile artillery out of action, so that it may 
 no longer hinder the movements of the attacking infantry; 
 
17 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 and, second, that it may turn its guns on the hostile infantry, 
 so assisting its own infantry in gaining that superiority of fire 
 that is essential to the winning of every victory. 
 
 It is the infantry, the men on foot, carrying their weapons 
 in their hands, that must do the decisive fighting in every 
 battle, but the infantry cannot gain decisive victories unas- 
 sisted. All officers, of whatever arm and grade, should study 
 the uses and tactics of the other mobile arms, and should 
 "divorce themselves from the surroundings and prejudices of 
 their particullar arm, whatever it may be, and to enter whole- 
 heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit of the Napoleonic 
 maxim: 'Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without 
 each other.' " (General Rimington, British Army.) 
 
 To return to our problem : Darkness found the Blue 
 troops as follows : Three companies of infantry were de- 
 ployed on the ridge 602. Outguards were posted, without sup- 
 ports, directly from this line ; No. 1, a picket of 16 men, in 
 the orchard 600 yards northwest of crossroad 564; No. 2, a 
 picket of 16 men, at the western end of the fringe of trees on 
 the road running west from 564 ; No. 3, a sentry squad in the 
 orchard west from hill 602 ; No. 4, a sentry squad, at the farm 
 buildings at the northern end of the private road 800 yards 
 southwest of Outguard No. 3 ; No. 5, a picket of 16 men, 350 
 yards south of No. 4. 
 
 Troop A furnished four mounted men for patrol duty to 
 Outguards Nos. 1 and 2, and then moved to crossroad 548, 
 three-fourths of a mile northeast of Hampton. The rest of 
 the Blue squadron withdrew to the farm 700 yards northeast 
 of Oakwood School House, furnishing 6 mounted men for 
 Outguard No. 5, and establishing pickets of 24 men each at 
 Oakwood School House and at Miller's- 
 
 The Red infantry withdrew to the woods south of 532, 
 near Plum Run, leaving one company in the eastern edge of 
 the woods to the east as a support for a line of sentry squads 
 paralleling the Blue outpost line, and about 600 yards distant 
 from them. 
 
 One troop of the Red cavalry was at Waldheim, with 
 detached posts on the bridges at 434W and 423. The rest of 
 
SECURITY FOR SMALL COMMANDS 177 
 
 the Red squadron was at the crossroad 452, 1^4 miles south- 
 east of Hampton, with a platoon at Hafer's Mill and a squad 
 at the ford to the west. The Blue cavalry, using its patrols, 
 kept in touch with the Red cavalry until it crossed the bridge 
 at 434W. Here contact was lost, as the patrols were stopped 
 from crossing the Conewago by detachments from the Red 
 cavalry at all the bridges and fords. 
 
 The captain of Troop A, Blue cavalry, posted a detached 
 post on the hill north of Hafer's Mill. This detachment 
 found the Red outguard on the bridge, but could not determine 
 the strength of the body behind it. Similarly the pickets at 
 Miller's and Oakwood School House sent patrols to the cross- 
 ings of the Conewago south of their positions, and found them 
 both occupied. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 FIELD SANITATION. INDIVIDUAL COOKING. 
 
 To keep well, to preserve your strength, is your first duty. 
 
 Sick men not only reduce the effective strength of an army; they 
 divert the resources of the State from useful channels, and so weaken 
 it doubly. 
 
 Nearly all camp diseases are preventible, but all men must co- 
 operate to prevent them. 
 
 On going into camp tents should always be ditched and 
 drains dug so that the water will be carried away from the 
 tents rapidly. This should be done at the same time the tents 
 are pitched, unless the camp is for only one night, and the 
 weather signs point unmistakably to fair weather. To do this 
 will take only a very few minutes, and will insure dry bedding 
 and tent floors. The dirt from the ditches should be scattered, 
 and the pins for the skirts of the tents should be driven in the 
 bottom of the ditches. 
 
 When a camp is made that will be occupied for some time, 
 and the soil is at all light or sandy, great care should be taken 
 to distribute the sod and leaves or dried grass already on the 
 ground as little as possible. Dust is one of the greatest nui- 
 sances in a permanent camp, and anything that will hold the 
 soil in place should remain undisturbed. 
 
 The following rules concerning Field Sanitation are taken 
 from Notes on Sanitation in the Field, by Major James S. Wil- 
 son, Medical Corps, U. S. Army. 
 
 PERSONAL HYGIENE, a. The body must be kept clean in 
 order that boils, lice, and various skin diseases may be pre- 
 vented. It is important, particularly with mounted troops, that 
 the inside and back of the thighs and buttocks be clean, to pre- 
 vent chafing. 
 
 b. The hair of the head should be trimmed close to pre- 
 vent diseases of the scalp. 
 
FIELD SANITATION 179 
 
 c. The tooth brush should be used daily to prevent decay 
 of the teeth. 
 
 d. The hands must be washed before each meal, and after 
 returning from the sink. Disregard of this custom resulted 
 in many cases of typhoid fever in our recent war with Spain. 
 
 e. The feet of dismounted troops should be cleaned daily 
 on arrival in camp, and clean socks should replace the ones 
 used on the march. If the feet? are tender, apply to the surgeon 
 for the foot powder provided for such a condition. Ingrowing 
 toe nails are prevented by keeping the nails constantly trimmed 
 squarely across. If the feet become blistered they must be given 
 the most careful attention. Observe the following rules: Use 
 only a needle to open a blister. Never open it at the top, but 
 as follows : first heat the needle in the flame of a match to kill 
 the germs on it; then run the needle through the base of the 
 blister and gently express the water. Another method not 
 generally known or practiced is to place over the blister thus 
 treated a small piece of ordinary surgeon's adhesive, or, as it 
 is generally called, "sticking" plaster; this prevents the blister 
 from refilling and permits it to heal. 
 
 /. Do not drink or eat food prepared or sold from an un- 
 authorized source. One of the most serious contributing causes 
 of intestinal ills and kindred diseases in camps of concentration, 
 is the unauthorized sale of alleged "ripe fruit," "digestible pas- 
 try" and "pure beverages," which are usually the reverse. 
 
 g. The necessity of the daily bath, when practicable, can 
 not be overestimated, not only for the purpose of cleanliness, 
 but because such a bath greatly refreshes one after a long and 
 tiresome march. 
 
 CARE OF THE TENT. a. Air the ground covered by the tent 
 daily, also raise the walls so that as much sunlight as possible 
 will enter it. Do this not only to dry the tent floor, but also 
 to obtain the disinfectant action of the sun. 
 
 b. Air the bed sacks and blankets on the tent) guys not 
 on the ground, on account of its dampness. Do this daily, if 
 possible, as the bed clothes absorb the odors of the body very 
 much more rapidly than when sheets are used. 
 
180 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 c. Do not close the tent door entirely at night, as it is not 
 generally appreciated that the fibres of the canvas swell at 
 night after the dew falls, to a degree that makes the tent almost 
 airtight, and vitiation of the air in the tent results. 
 
 DISEASES OF THE INTESTINES. One of the most common 
 diseases of the young soldier is some disorder of the bowels, 
 and the most frequent is constipation and its attendant ills. A 
 daily stool is necessary for health. A most important point in 
 this connection is to designate a place immediately on arrival 
 in camp for the men who wish to relieve themselves at once, 
 and to construct at least a shallow pit. Nothing is more de- 
 moralizing to troops on going into camp, than to permit the 
 men of the command to relieve themselves in the nearest place 
 available regardless of the purpose for which the ground may 
 be used later. 
 
 MOSQUITOES. The use of the mosquito bar is not always 
 enforced as strictly as it should be. If not used in countries 
 where malaria-carrying mosquitoes are found, the result is 
 malarial fever. A report should be promptly made if, in a per- 
 manent camp, a place is found where mosquitoes are breeding. 
 The breeding place should be immediately destroyed. Mosqui- 
 toes will breed in old tin cans, bottles or anything that will hold 
 a little stagnant water. 
 
 WASHING WOOLEN CLOTHING. Inasmuch as the ordinary 
 woolen underclothing can be easily rendered almost unservice- 
 able by improper washing, it is suggested that they be laundered 
 as follows: 
 
 1. Put the clothes in warm soapsuds and move them about 
 freely. 
 
 t. Next, place in clean cold water. 
 
 3. Hang them out to dry, and on no account dring them. 
 
 Many times in the field it will be found impossible to wash 
 underclothes, and have them dry in .time for the next day's 
 march. In this event they can be freshened materially by 
 thorough brushing, shaking, and sunning. 
 
 BUTTONS. A point that is often overlooked because of its 
 apparent unimportance, is to see that the buttons on the cloth- 
 
FIELD SANITATION 181 
 
 ing are replaced when lost, for if this is not done, particularly 
 with underclothing, chafing or blistering may result from an 
 improperly fitting garment. 
 
 CHOLERA BELT. For many years it has been recommended 
 that in the field the "Cholera belt" be worn around the waist. 
 This belt consists usually of a band of woolen material. It 
 frequently rolls up into a rope-like mass, and ceases to exercise 
 the function for which it is intended, viz: to protect the deli- 
 cate organs of the abdomen. A much better, simpler, more 
 economical and satisfactory appliance is the "Cholera apron," 
 which covers the front of the lower part of the abdomen, fasten- 
 ing around the waist by two pieces of tape. This accomplishes 
 all the cholera belt does, and has none of its disadvantages. 
 
 FIT OF CLOTHING. Clothing, especially for the field, should 
 be loose and comfortable. No construction of the chest is per- 
 missible, in order that the movement of the body, and par- 
 ticularly those of respiration, may be free from restraint. 
 
 WAIST BELT. Many men use a belt to hold up the trousers, 
 suspenders are better, as the belt places too much pressure on 
 the abdomen. 
 
 SHOES. The importance of correctly fitting shoes is fre- 
 quently overlooked or disregarded by the inexperienced soldier. 
 The result is always readily seen in commands where this im- 
 portant feature is disregarded. As an example of the importance 
 of the proper care of the feet, it might be noted that in the 
 early part of the Franco-Prussian War, the German Army, 
 during a given period lost from killed and wounded, 60,000 
 men, and during the same period 30,000 men were incapacitated 
 for duty by injuries to their feet. It is recommended that two 
 pairs of properly fitting shoes be obtained and well broken 
 in before leaving for a campaign, and that they be given a 
 thorough coating of neatsfoot oil several days before taking the 
 field. On the march when shoes become wet, fill them with 
 dry hay or straw, and do not place them too near a fire to dry. 
 When dry, give them a good coating of oil, or of any available 
 form of grease. 
 
 SELECTION OF SHOES, a. Avoid selecting a shoe with too 
 
182 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 low an instep, or too loose an instep ; the former defect is fre- 
 quently noticed in the "issue" shoe. 
 
 b. Remember that the feet swell after a long march ; there- 
 fore have the shoes roomy. 
 
 c. Remember that when the weight of the body is thrown 
 on the foot in walking, there is a considerable widening of the 
 foot, and also a slight lengthening. A marching shoe, there- 
 fore, must be comfortable when the entire weight of the body 
 is thrown on either foot. 
 
 d. In getting a shoe for use on foreign service, select one 
 a quarter to a half size larger than usual, as the feet of an 
 individual either enlarge, or seem to, in the tropics. In cold 
 countries a heavier sock is usually worn. 
 
 e- Be careful, however, not to choose a shoe too large, as 
 it is likely to produce a blister from rubbing. 
 
 /. Recently the French adopted a method of treating feet 
 blistered while on the march. It is as follows : Take a strap 
 half an inch broad, (the ordinary coat strap from the regula- 
 tion saddle answers very well) and spread it on the ground. 
 Place the instep of the foot over its center ; bring up each end 
 of the strap over the top of the instep, cross and bring around 
 the ankle and buckle. 
 
 So satisfactory is this method that it is claimed that men 
 who were suffering with blistered feet were cured by wearing 
 this appliance, even though marching fifteen to twenty miles 
 a day. 
 
 SOCKS. Under ordinary circumstances the light woolen sock, 
 that is now issued in our Army, owing to its elasticity and 
 absorbent qualities, furnishes a most excellent foot covering. 
 It is, however, imperative, particularly for foot troops, that a 
 clean, or at least, a fresh pair of socks be put on each day. It 
 may sometimes happen that it is impossible to wash or to 
 change the socks. In this event it is recommended that they 
 be aired and sunned, turned inside out, and replaced on the 
 feet. 
 
 CARE OF THE CANTEEN, a. Scald a new canteen inside 
 and out before using it. This is important in all cases ; it re- 
 
INDIVIDUAL COOKING 183 
 
 moves the sizing on the cloth on the outside, making the cover- 
 ing more absorbent, and sterilizes the interior. 
 
 b. Fill the canteen only from authorized sources. 
 
 c. In order to cool the contents of the canteen for the next 
 day fill it at night, wet the outside covering, and hang in the 
 breeze until morning- 
 
 d. Avoid the bad habit frequently seen among the un- 
 trained of drinking too much water on the march. This type 
 of man empties his canteen early in the day, and is likely to 
 drink water from an unauthorized source on the march or in 
 camp, before a suitable supply can be obtained for him. 
 
 e. Make it a rule to scald the inside of the canteen at least 
 once a week while in the field. 
 
 INDIVIDUAL COOKING. 
 
 The soldier's mess kit meat can, with its top, tin cup, 
 knife, fork and spoon furnishes him with every needed 
 utensil for cooking the raw materials he is liable to get for 
 his ration in the field. 
 
 Three times a day a man must eat to sustain his physical 
 forces so he is capable of a maximum of effort, and no calling 
 that men engage in requires such strength to withstand fatigue 
 as does the life of a soldier in a campaign. Without proper 
 food, properly cooked, his strength dwindles and his efficiency 
 is reduced. No part of his training is so necessary as is the 
 knowledge of how to prepare his food so as to receive from it 
 the greatest amount of benefit. Food and sleep are the great 
 restorers of exhausted physical strength. To sleep needs no 
 training; the proper preparation of suitable food does need 
 and should receive most careful attention in the training of a 
 soldier. 
 
 THE FIRE. Do not have too big a fire, but have it burning 
 well, with a good bed of coals before beginning to cook. Do 
 not cool the fire by adding fuel while cooking is actually in 
 progress. 
 
 Make the fire in a little trench, or between two stones or 
 bricks or pieces of wood. Supports should be made for the 
 
184 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 frying pan the deeper part of the meat can and the tin 
 cup, so that it will not be necessary to hold them over the fire 
 by hand. 
 
 COFFEE. Fill the tin cup two-thirds full of clean water; 
 bring it to a boil, then add a heaping spoonful of roasted and 
 ground coffee, stirring gently while adding it. Let it boil 
 slowly for five minutes, then add sugar to taste. Stir the 
 sugar in, and add a dash of cold water to settle. Let it now 
 rest without moving until it is cool enough to drink ; it will 
 then be clear. 
 
 BACON. Cut a side of bacon in half lengthwise. Then 
 cut slices about five to the inch; three of these should be 
 enough for one man for one meal. Place them in the frying 
 pan with about half an inch of cold water. Let it come to a 
 boil, and then pour the water off. Fry over a brisk fire, turn- 
 ing the bacon once and quickly browning it. Remove the 
 bacon to the lid of the meat can, leaving the bacon grease for 
 frying other parts of the meal. 
 
 FRESH MEAT. To Fry. A small amount of grease (one 
 to two spoonfuls) is necessary. Put this in the frying pan 
 and heat it until it smokes, then drop the meat in it. If the 
 meat is about half an inch thick, let it fry for about a minute, 
 more or less, depending on whether it is wished rare, medium, 
 or well done- If the grease is smoking hot, and the fire is kept 
 up, the meat will be not at all greasy. Salt and pepper to taste, 
 after it is cooked. 
 
 POTATOES or ONIONS. To Fry : Peel and cut into slices 
 about a quarter of an inch thick, and scatter well in the frying 
 pan in which the grease remains after cooking the bacon or 
 meat. Add enough water to half cover the potatoes or onions, 
 cover with the lid to keep the moisture in, and let come to a 
 boil from fifteen to twenty minutes. Remove the cover and 
 dry as desired. Salt and pepper to taste. During the cooking 
 the bacon may be kept on the cover, which is most conveniently 
 placed bottom side up, over the cooking vegetables. 
 
 (The above receipts are adapted from the Manual for 
 Army Cooks. Other receipts are found on pages 167 to 173 
 of that Manual.) 
 
INDIVIDUAL COOKING 185 
 
 From the chapters that precede it should be plain to the 
 young student of the Art of War that an army is a very large 
 aggregation of men, commanded by one man on whom, in bat- 
 tle, devolves the fate of the nation his army is defending. 
 He must, with the advice and assistance of a few men, plan 
 his campaigns, and he must keep his plans secret. To tell 
 everyone in his army what he proposes to do would surely 
 result in putting his enemy in possession of his plans, and so 
 lead to the defeat of them. To each of his principal subordiA 
 nates he assigns a task, confiding so much of his plans as is; 
 necessary to a proper performance of the task assigned. The 
 success of the campaign depends upon the zeal and willingness 
 of these principal subordinates- 
 
 In turn they assign to their immediate subordinates the 
 share each is to take in the undertaking, and so the orders are 
 transmitted from superior to subordinate, until finally they 
 reach the colonels of regiments, the majors of battalions, the 
 captains of companies, the individual soldiers who are to do 
 the work- In a general engagement these men can know but 
 little of the reasons why they are moved from position to posi- 
 tion, why they are ordered to the attack, often where it seems 
 to them a hopeless effort ; why they are sacrified, to them ap- 
 parently to no purpose, or why they are sometimes withdrawn 
 when they seem to be victorious. It is the business of each 
 to do this thing he is told to do,when told to do it, and only 
 by so doing can victory be secured. 
 
 These are some of the reasons for a military education, for 
 exacting obedience in every detail of daily life, until obedience 
 becomes instinctive. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 The elementary training of all soldiers may be said to 
 extend in three directions ; first, towards a condition of perfect 
 discipline, so that they may be controlled by their officers, 
 automatically controlled, by instinct rather than by an effort 
 of the will. 
 
 The second direction in which a soldier's training should 
 extend is towards excellence in marksmanship, so that the 
 machine of which he is a member may be a greater menace 
 to the enemies of his country, and, in exact ratio, a better 
 guarantee of his country's peace. The third direction is to- 
 wards a knowledge of field sanitation, that the efficiency of the 
 machine may not be impaired by the ignorant violation of the 
 laws governing his own and his comrade's health. 
 
 Given thorough training in these three directions the sol- 
 dier is a powerful member of the machine ; give all its members 
 this training, and to the officers a thorough knowledge of tac- 
 tics, and the machine becomes well-nigh invincible ; its size is 
 its only limiting factor. 
 
 Discipline is taught by drill, by the constant insistance that 
 certain things be done in a certain way, and in no other way ; 
 by the constant repetition of familiar acts in response to 
 familiar orders, until the soldier's obedience is inevitable, sub- 
 conscious; so that "under whatever stress of circumstances, 
 danger, and death, he hears that word of command, even if his 
 mind be too confused and astounded to understand, yet his 
 muscles will obey." 
 
 After being disciplined, trained to shoot well, and 
 familiar with the laws of health and the necessity of their 
 observance, soldiers need further and explicit training in the 
 art of scouting. Nowhere can young officers and enlisted 
 men of all grades get that independence of action, that sense 
 of personal responsibility so necessary to good soldiers, as 
 in the conduct of patrols. Here is a chance for all to excel, 
 and here is a study that will compel your interest. 
 
APPENDIX 187 
 
 rhe first three departments of a soldier's training can be 
 taught exactly, on a limited field of operations. The last can 
 only be learned by applying its laws to a multitude of differ- 
 ent fields of operations, as has already been sufficiently shown 
 
 The problems discussed are typical of thousands of others 
 that the progressive student should work out for himself. 
 Map problems are poor substitutes for properly conducted 
 field maneuvers. The latter are equally poor substitutes for 
 the school of actual war, but the problems of war can be bet- 
 ter solved by students well schooled in maneuver duties, and 
 good preparation for the latter can be gained from a careful 
 study of maps and map problems. For these reasons every 
 military student should perfect himself in map reading until 
 a map is as easily read as a printed page. 
 
 SUGGESTIONS FOR PROBLEMS 
 
 MAP READING. 
 
 In all map problems, unless otherwise stated, neglect all 
 consideration of trees, houses and standing crops. Consider 
 only the bare surface of the ground. Assume the observer's 
 eyes to be five feet above the ground on the Topographical 
 Map one contour interval and neglect the height of the 
 observer's eyes when using the Strategic Map. 
 
 1. If you were standing at the Y in the road at Oak Grove 
 School House, Topographical Map: 
 
 REQUIRED: a. Could you see crossroad 529, to the west? 
 
 b. Could you see Belmont School House? 
 
 c. Could you see Chromis' house, to the northeast? 
 
 d. Could you see Oakwood School House, to the east? 
 
 e. Could you see Crossroad 594, to the southwest? 
 
 f. Could you see Husbach's house, in the bend of the 
 Conewago, to the east? 
 
 Note. Require proof of these and all similar problems by draw- 
 ing profiles. 
 
 2. Draw lines to the north, east, south, and west from Oak 
 Grove School House, and then erase all parts of them that are 
 invisible from the school house. 
 
188 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 3. You are a patrol leader; you are at Bowlder, near the 
 central part of the northern part of the Topographical Map. 
 You plan to lead your patrol by 574, southwest, to Newchester, 
 thence to Oakwood School House and back to Bowlder. 
 
 Consider in this problem that the trees are in full leaf, and 
 not more than 25 feet high. 
 
 REQUIRED : a. How far can you see in the direction you 
 are to go? 
 
 b. Describe the road from Bowlder to 565. 
 
 c. When you get to the western edge of the woods between 
 565 and 574 you see that there is a hostile patrol on hill 584. 
 How do you lead your patrol, following your originally planned 
 route as closely as possible, so that this hostile patrol can not 
 see it? 
 
 d. Describe the country for half a mile to the right of the 
 road as you go from Oak Grove School House to Newchester. 
 
 e. What parts of the road from Oakwood School House 
 to Bowlder are visible to a sentinel on hill 602, northwest of 
 Hampton ? 
 
 f. What is the lowest point on the road this patrol planned 
 to take? The highest? 
 
 g. Where, within a half mile of the road this patrol planned 
 to take would the leader get the most comprehensive view of the 
 valley of the Conewago? 
 
 h. Where, from the road, does the leader get the most ex- 
 tended view to the northeast? The southeast? The southwest? 
 The northwest? 
 
 4. How far up each of the four roads radiating from Oak- 
 wood School House would a man walking away from the corners 
 be seen by a man standing there ? Assume for this problem that 
 there are no trees to obstruct the view. 
 
 NOTE TO INSTRUCTORS: The above are suggestions of classes of 
 questions that can be multiplied indefinitely. 
 
 Students should be provided with contoured maps of their own 
 neighborhood, where such maps are available, and learn from them 
 how a familiar landscape looks on a map. 
 
 By application to the Director, U. 8. Geological Survey, WashJ 
 ington, D. C., information can be secured a to whether or not any 
 particular portion of the United States has been mapped by the Survey. 
 
APPENDIX 18f 
 
 ORIENTATION. 
 
 Instruction in this most important part of the soldier's train- 
 ing can only be given in the field. Students can be taught to 
 read maps in the class room. This instruction must be thorough 
 and constant; until students can read maps readily and ac- 
 curately, all tactical instruction involving the use of maps will 
 be nearly usless. Map reading is to the study of tactics what 
 reading is to the study of a language or any of the arts and 
 sciences. Having learned the meaning of the conventional signs 
 of maps, and how to vizualize the terrain represented on them, 
 the student should be given a local map, taken out into the country 
 represented on it, and taught to "find himself" on the map. 
 
 Another method is to put the open map on the ground. 
 
 Better results can be made if an automobile is available, be- 
 cause so much more country can be covered by it, in a given 
 time, than in any other way. 
 
 In the chapter on Orientation, pages 41 and 42, ante, one 
 method to be followed is described in detail. 
 
 Onother method is to put the open map on the ground. 
 Place a compass on the map, and slowly turn the map until the 
 needle of the compass lies parallel to the north and south lines 
 of the map the north point of the needle pointing to the north end 
 of the map. 
 
 No matter how unfamiliar the student may be with the ter- 
 rain shown on the map he is working with, there will always be 
 one or two points on it whose location is known. 
 
 For instance: a party of students has been taken, by rail, to 
 Gettysburg, where none of them have ever been before. They 
 are provided with a copy of the Strategic Map. An automobile 
 is provided for the party. They set out on the Harrisburg Road, 
 and, after a while, the car is stopped and they get out. Except 
 the instructor, no one had paid any attention whatever to the 
 direction they have come. 
 
 The map is spread, and oriented as described above. The 
 position of Gettysburg is indicated to the students, on the map. 
 They are assembled on the north side of the map (beyond 
 Gettysburg, so that they may look towards it). The instructor 
 
190 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 points to Gettysburg on the map, and then towards its actual 
 direction on the ground. The students, following the direction 
 opposite to that in which he is pointing, run out from Gettys- 
 burg, on the map. This fixes one line on their map for them : 
 the line from Gettysburg to their present position. 
 
 Looking about them, the see that the most prominent 
 physical features of the ground near them are these: they are 
 standing on a slanting crossroad, one road runs from southwest 
 to northeast, the other from southeast to northwest. Three or 
 four miles away, to the east, is a little round-topped hill, and 
 towards the west, a couple of miles away, is another hill, that 
 seems much larger and higher. 
 
 The problem now is : where, on the map line they have lo- 
 cated through Gettysburg and their present position is a spot 
 where a slanting crossroad lies between two prominent hills, 
 one to the east, the other, nearer, larger and higher, to the west ? 
 It must be the point 617; no other point on the map fits all of 
 these conditions. To verify this still closer, they remember 
 that, about a mile back on the road they went through a little 
 village there it is, Heidlersburg, on the map, about an inch 
 southwest of 617. 
 
 It is essential, in order to orient oneself on the map to know 
 definitely two lines. The compass gives the north and south 
 line; one other line must be known. The intersection of these 
 two lines, on the map, fixes the position of the observer. There 
 remains only to verify this intersection by comparing the topo- 
 graphical features shown on the map in the vicinity of the 
 intersection with the actual physical features of the ground in 
 the vicinity of the observer. If they agree, the orientation is com- 
 plete; the observer knows to a certainty exactly where he is, on 
 the map. 
 
 APPLIED MINOR TACTICS. 
 
 The following suggestions for the preparation of problems 
 in applied minor tactics, whether map problems, war game 
 problems, or problems for field maneuvers, are issued by the 
 Department of Military Art, at the Service Schools, Fort 
 Leavenworth : 
 
APPENDIX 191 
 
 1. Give them a semblance of reality. 
 
 2. Make them simple and as brief as possible. 
 
 3. Make them illustrate some tactical idea or principle. 
 
 4. Make them as instructive as possible. 
 
 5. Adapt the problem to the number and quality of troops 
 involved. 
 
 6. Have them contain only such information as in war the 
 commander might be supposed to have, and require, where 
 practicable, the gaining of necessary information by military 
 means, as reconnoissance. 
 
 7. Make the desired contact certain to result and on ground 
 where it is permissible. 
 
 8. Introduce as few unnatural conditions as possible. 
 
 9. Give the necessary instructions for placing the troops to 
 solve the problem. 
 
 To apply these suggestions, let us assume that you are going 
 to prepare a one-side war game problem for your non-commis- 
 sioned officers, or class of students. 
 
 How are you going to give your problem the semblance of 
 reality? You must assume a state of war, two belligerents, a 
 frontier, one side invading, one defending. You must give your 
 students a mental picture of the location of the larger masses. 
 You should assume the state of the weather, the condition of 
 the roads, the attitude of the inhabitants. 
 
 The second suggestion simplicity and brevity is neces- 
 sary in order not to introduce so many preliminaries for the 
 student to remember that he will not have his own mission stand 
 out clearly in his mind. 
 
 The third suggestion hardly needs comment. Decide on the 
 tactical principle you wish to illustrate, and keep that foremost 
 in your mind let everything lead up to that principle. 
 
 In carrying out the fourth suggestion, have your problem 
 illustrate as many different phases of the tactical principle you 
 are teaching as possible. This will tax your ingenuity more than 
 any other part of the problem. 
 
 If, in considering the fifth suggestion, you are dealing with 
 a problem in reconnoissance, do not give your students enough 
 troops to lead to combats. If an advance guard problem, give 
 
192 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 them enough troops, and make the enemy weak enough so that 
 they may advance really may overcome, if they properly 
 handle the troops given them, any opposition offered them. In 
 an outpost problem, give them enough men to cover the front 
 assigned them, but not enough to permit that they solve the 
 problem by posting a cordon of sentinels. If you wish to illus- 
 trate a combat, make them strong enough so that they do not 
 attempt a rear guard action in other words, lead them so 
 that the thing you wish to illustrate is manifestly the only thing 
 to do. 
 
 Once, at maneuvers, a problem was anounced as a rear-guard 
 problem, and its situations were so worded that each commander 
 thought he commanded the rear guard. That would not have 
 happened if one side had been told his mission was to advance, 
 the other to cover a retreat. 
 
 The sixth suggestion is excellent, and self-explanatory. 
 
 The seventh suggestion is met by working backwards. De- 
 cide where your contact is to take place, and then work back 
 from that, in your preparatory work, to the point where you 
 are going to begin the problem. 
 
 The eighth suggestion is inserted to prevent your students 
 from being led away from the principle you wish to teach by 
 arguments on manifest absurdities. 
 
 The^ ninth suggestion is a very important one. Place the 
 troops in logical positions, and tell your students how to open 
 the problem. Then, after starting their particular units on their 
 mission, try to keep their minds away from the fabric you have 
 woven in complying with previous suggestions, particularly the 
 first, fifth, and sixth, and concentrate on their own mission. 
 Of course they must keep the idea of team work constantly in 
 mind. 
 
 To illustrate: You wish to show, in a one-side war game 
 problem, the methods of reconnoissance to be employed in ob- 
 serving the march of a hostile column, using several small 
 patrols. 
 
 You have the Guide Map, Strategic Map, and Topographical 
 Map to use in the preparation of the problem. It is a good plan 
 to mark a rectangle on the Guide Map to show the terrain cov- 
 
APPENDIX 193 
 
 ered by the other two, and on the Strategic Map to show that 
 covered by the Topographical Map. On the margin of the 
 Strategic Map it is well to draw arrows indicating the direction 
 to the towns named on the Guide Map, and the distances to 
 them. 
 
 Then take two lines that might be assumed as frontiers 
 the Susquehanna River and the line between Pennsylvania and 
 Maryland. If you wish your movement to be east and west, 
 choose the former; if north and south, the latter. Take the lat- 
 ter as our assumption. Troops from both sides are hastening to 
 the frontier. Blue cavalry has preceded its infantry masses, and 
 is searching for information of movements of the Red troops. 
 If you have the body sending out the patrols located at Hanover 
 (Guide Map; Midway, Strategic Map) it would be natural for 
 one of the secondary groups to have assigned to it the sector 
 between the Baltimore Pike (Strategic Map) and the road from 
 McSherrystown and Hunterstown. To make the patrols small 
 enough, make the group at Hanover a squadron and the sec- 
 ondary group a platoon. Now you must arrange for the contact 
 near the center of your Topographical Map so have a Red 
 force march past the Belmont School, through Newchester, 
 thence southwest to Moritz School. Decide on its composition, 
 rate of march, and protective groups. 
 
 Give the Blue side enough information so that they may be 
 cautious in all their movements, not enough to cause them to 
 make a break for the strategical points, ignoring the precautions 
 that should always be taken when in the proximity of the enemy. 
 Remember that the "fog of war" always makes it uncertain as 
 to what is beyond the immediate horizon. 
 
 The problem might then take this form: 
 
 GENERAL SITUATION : War exists between Pennsylvania, 
 Red, and Maryland, Blue. Red forces have been concentrating 
 at Carlisle, and are reporting as advancing towards the frontier 
 Blue troops are advancing from Frederick and Baltimore to- 
 wards Gettysburg. Advanced Blue forces are reported at West- 
 minster. 
 
 SPECIAL SITUATION BLUE: On the evening of June 20th 
 
194 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 a squadron of the 1st Blue Cavalry reached Midway, and went 
 into camp on Plum Creek, near Edgegrove. 
 
 At 5:00 A. M., Major A , commanding, sent for Lieu- 
 tenants B and C , and ordered: "Spies report a 
 
 mixed Red command as advancing from the north towards York 
 Springs and Gettysburg. Reports conflict, but indicate about a 
 division (20,000 men). The rest of our regiment is at Littles- 
 town, 6 miles southwest of here. 
 
 "I have directed Captain D to have 25 of his men 
 
 reported to each of you. Lieut. B , you will have the sec- 
 tor : road through Cedar Ridge and Hunterstown, inclusive 
 Baltimore Pike, inclusive. Patrols from Littlestown will be 
 responsible for the territory to the west of your sector. Lieut. 
 
 C , your sector is from Baltimore Pike, inclusive, etc. 
 
 Start at six o'clock. 
 
 'The regiment will march on Gettysburg today. I shall 
 march on Berlin Junction, with the intention of remaining there 
 throughout the day. Send reports, after eight o'clock, to me 
 there." 
 
 The weather is warm and clear. The people are hostile to 
 the Blues. 
 
 There is the data for the student. In order to have them 
 familiar with its conditions and the terrain, and to be sure that 
 they work out a plan beforehand, it is a good plan to have the 
 problem first worked out in writing, as a map problem. So you 
 might add this to the problem : 
 
 REQUIRED: a. How many patrols would Lieut. B 
 
 use? 
 
 b. How would he divide his sector for the various patrols, 
 and why? 
 
 It is not enough that you anounce the Blue situation and in- 
 dicate the problems to be solved. You must work out a Red 
 plan, and determine how you will employ the Red forces. 
 
 In this problem it might be well to assume that the Red 
 force marching on Gettysburg is a division, and that the one 
 marching on York Springs is a flank guard for it. It, the latter, 
 is composed of a brigade of infantry, with a troop of cavalry, 
 a battery, and a company of engineers attached. 
 
APPENDIX 195 
 
 You decide on the size of its advance guard, the way the 
 advance guard cavalry is conducted, the rate of march, where 
 halts shall be made, and the hour the head of the advance guard 
 reaches Belmont School. 
 
 It is always well to draw, to the scale of the war game map 
 12 inches to the mile a diagram showing the road spaces 
 and relative positions of the advance cavalry, the infantry sup- 
 port and reserve, and the main body. Tables of road space will 
 be found on pages 172 and 173, Field Service Regulations. This 
 diagram may be laid on the map, and the positions of all the 
 various elements shown graphicaly for any given moment with 
 practically no delay. 
 
 In drawing up your problems, always give the Blues the 
 student's side a little the best of the bargain. Make loop 
 holes so they can get through the Red protective groups if they 
 are active and thorough, and so give them an occasional glimpse 
 of the Red masses. Nothing will so soon destroy interest in war 
 games as subjecting your students to continual defeat. Don't 
 make it too easy, but give them a chance. 
 
 ESTIMATING THE SITUATION. 
 
 Problems exercising the student in this subject can be readily 
 improvised from the discussions of the various situations in the 
 preceding text. Thus: 
 
 On page 126 a situation is described. This point of an 
 advance guard is fired on, just as it has crossed the bridge. 
 An instructor might say to a student: "Take the conditions 
 given in this situation. You are in command of the point. How 
 do you estimate the situation?" 
 
 The student should be required to go formally through each 
 step, writing it out as described in Chapter VI. He should be 
 required to do this even if he should object on the ground that 
 such an estimate is an absurdity; that, long before the leader 
 of this point could have estimated the situation with so much 
 elaboration his point would be shot to pieces. 
 
 This is apparently very true, provided the leader had not 
 been trained to think quickly and to estimate situations auto- 
 
196 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 matically. Actually, when the situation described arose, the 
 commander of the point knew (1) his mission; he knew (2) 
 that the enemy was in his front and liable to be met at any 
 moment, and he knew where supporting troops were. He knew 
 (3) that he was approaching the crest of a hill that hid every- 
 thing beyond it from his view ; that every step took him nearer 
 his enemy; that he had just crossed a stream, and he had a 
 defile the bridge at his back; he knew all the attendant 
 conditions. He knew (4) that if the enemy we're met with he 
 would probably fire at his command, the point; that he would 
 conceal his own strength and seek to appear as formidable as 
 possible. He knew (5) the nature of the terrain, where he must 
 go, where his line of retreat was. He had been attacked, and 
 now all the commander of the point really has to do is to con- 
 sider the question : "What courses are open to me ? What shall 
 I do now ?" and to decide on his course. 
 
 The student has not been in possession of the data that has 
 been gradually accumulated by the leader of this point all the 
 morning, and the days preceding. He is not actuated by the 
 need of being ready for whatever may come that was the 
 strongest motive in that leader's life at that particular moment, 
 so, what in the commander of the point would be sound judg- 
 ment, anticipated by mature study of the tactical possibilities of 
 the ever-changing landscape in his front, in the case of the stu- 
 dent who did not consider all the phases of the problem in 
 arriving at his estimate, would be snap judgment, mere guess- 
 work. 
 
 The leader of the advance party, too, when he comes where 
 he can see what is going on at the bridge, must estimate the 
 situation before he decides on a line of action to be followed. 
 He is an officer of more rank and experience than the com- 
 mander of the point. He has a larger command, and propor- 
 tionally larger responsibilities. 
 
 He has been studying his map, and he realized, before reach- 
 ing the vicinity of the stream, that the crossing of the Little 
 Conewago might be contested. He had solved the various steps 
 in making his estimate before the first shot had been fired. But 
 it was only by study in peace time, by estimating many situations, 
 
APPENDIX 197 
 
 that he was able to do this. So it is with all students. No divine 
 spark of genius can replace study in any art; it will reward 
 study with success, but it will never replace it. 
 
 The commander of the support has also planned just what 
 he would do, in case the Red forces should oppose his crossing 
 of the. Little Conewago, and so has the commander of the main 
 body, and each is now waiting for information from the patrols 
 of the advance guard in order to know which plan of several 
 already conceived shall be adopted, what plans shall be rejected. 
 
 It is, therefore, recommended that all instructors place the 
 highest value on thorough training in the estimation of every 
 situation with which the student may be confronted. 
 
ESTIMATING THE SITUATION 
 
 1. Your Mission. 
 
 What special thing are you going to do ? What does your 
 superior expect of you? 
 
 You must have a mission and it must be kept clearly 
 in mind. 
 
 2- The Forces. 
 
 What is the strength and what the location of your own 
 forces ? 
 
 What of the enemy's forces? Consider all you can learn 
 of them? 
 
 3. Conditions. 
 
 Consider all the conditions surrounding your problem. 
 What of the weather? What is the condition of the roads? 
 What of the morale, activity and aggressiveness of the enemy? 
 What is the state of efficiency of your own command? In short 
 consider everthing that will affect your problem either favor- 
 ably or unfavorably. 
 
 4. What will the Enemy probably do? 
 
 What would you do if you were in his place, under exist- 
 ing conditions? 
 
 5. What of the Terrain? 
 
 How does the terrain you are to work over affect your 
 problem ? 
 
 6. What Courses are Open? 
 
 In how many and what different ways may you accomplish 
 your mission? Go over them all, considering the advantages 
 and disadvantages of each. 
 
 7. Decision. 
 
 Decide which of the courses considered is best calculated 
 to enable you to successfully execute your mission, and having 
 come to a decision do not change it. Forget all the other 
 
APPENDIX 199 
 
 courses open to you, and concentrate all your energies on the 
 one adopted. 
 8. Orders. 
 
 After you have taken all the steps indicated in the fore- 
 going, and not until then, issue your orders to carry out the plan 
 you have adopted. 
 
 MESSAGES. 
 
 Exercises in writing messages are very important, and in- 
 structors should give their students as complete data as is logical 
 on which to base them. 
 
 It is necessary to distinguish between the carefully written, 
 detailed message of the leader of a strategic patrol, who can at 
 best send in but two or three messages a day, and the frequent 
 messages sent in by leaders of combat patrols, of advance, flank, 
 and rear guards, and by commanders of outguards. The 
 strategic patrol leader's message cannot be quickly verified; the 
 others admit of immediate verification. The information sent 
 by the various strategic patrols, tabulated and digested by the 
 supreme commander, forms the basis of his plans for the fol- 
 lowing day; that sent in by the protective patrols is for im- 
 mediate tactical use. 
 
 PROBLEM. 
 GENERAL SITUATION. 
 
 The Susquehanna River divides two States at war. Blue, 
 Eastern, forces have invaded Pennsylvania and Maryland, and 
 are advancing from Havre de Grace, on Gettysburg. A regi- 
 ment of Blue cavalry is at Manchester (Guide Map), whose 
 mission is to back up strategic reconnoissance in the sector: 
 Manchester-Chambersburg-Carlisle. 
 
 Red forces are reported to be concentrating on Gettysburg. 
 The people are bitterly hostile to the Blues. 
 
200 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 FIRST SPECIAL SITUATION. 
 
 You command a patrol of two non-commissioned officers and 
 six men. Yesterday morning you received this verbal order 
 from the Adjutant of your regiment : 
 
 "Red troops are reported concentrating on Gettysburg. This 
 regiment will remain here today and tomorrow. One troop will 
 be sent to Sell's Station today. Day after tomorrow the regi- 
 ment will advance to Abbottstown. Our main forces are ad- 
 vancing on Gettysburg, but will not reach this place until 
 tomorrow. 
 
 "You will take your patrol and reconnoiter towards Round 
 Hill. Lieut. B will reconnoiter towards Chestnut Hill. 
 
 "Take three days' haversack rations for your patrol. 
 
 "Messages will be relayed through Sell's Station (southeast 
 corner, Strategic Map) after this afternoon; before then send 
 them directly here." 
 
 Last night you hid for the night on Pigeon Hill (east of 
 Berlin Junction). 
 
 REQUIRED: You reach 561, 1% miles northeast of New 
 Oxford (Topographical Map) at 6:00 A. M., and you wish 
 to reconnoiter the vicinity of Newchester. How do you go 
 about it? 
 
 SECOND SPECIAL SITUATION. 
 
 It is early the following morning. You spent the night on 
 Round Hill, hidden in the woods. You are in the southwest edge 
 of the woods, on the 740 contour, with a pair of good glasses. 
 
 You see a troop of Red cavalry march southeast through 
 Bowlder, from the north. As you are watching them one of 
 the men you left in observation in a tree on top of the hill 
 comes to you and says : "A platoon of Red cavalry is march- 
 ing south on the Carlisle-Baltimore Pike. It is followed by 
 a mass of infantry. The road is full of them as far as we 
 
 i see." 
 
 REQUIRED : What do you do ? 
 
APPENDIX 201 
 
 THIRD SPECIAL SITUATION. 
 
 The Red troops referred to above took three hours to pass a 
 given point. The Red cavalry disappeared to the south. The 
 infantry turned southwest when it reached Hampton. 
 
 REQUIRED: How did you continue your reconnoissance, and 
 what message did you send? 
 
 Here is an example of the two classes of messages. The 
 leader of the first mentioned patrol got a verbal message in the 
 second situation, from one of his protective patrols. On the in- 
 formation contained in that message he took immediate steps 
 
 (1) to secure the safety of his patrol, and (2) to enable him to 
 observe the enemy. Later, his observations safely made, he 
 wrote a message, detailing to his chief what had been seen. The 
 latter had no interest in the first message. He is not interested 
 in how the information was obtained; what he wants is news 
 of the enemy. 
 
 Instructors should submit every message written by their 
 students to these tests : (1) Does it contain all the informa- 
 tion collected by the patrol that is of value to the commander? 
 
 (2) Does it contain anything that will not be of use to him? 
 
 (3) Is it limited to facts that have been verified by the patrol 
 leader? (4) Is it legibly written, and without ambiguities, 
 so that it may be quickly read and instantly and accurately 
 comprehended? 
 
 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 Continuing the situations of the above problem. 
 FOURTH SPECIAL SITUATION. 
 
 The Red troops referred to marched towards Gettysburg. It 
 is the following day. Your regiment is camped in the fields 
 northwest of New Oxford, in the bend of the river (Topo- 
 graphical Map). An outpost support of one troop is at 557. 
 You command a picket of 18 men sent from this support to 584. 
 
 No Blue troops are within twenty miles of Gettysburg ex- 
 cept your regiment. The only Red troops known to be nearer 
 
202 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 than Gettysburg are cavalry patrols. These have been very 
 active, and have prevented your own patrols from making a 
 close reconnoissance to the west. 
 
 REQUIRED: a. Where do you post your sentinels, and 
 what orders do you give them? 
 
 b. What patrols do you use in the daytime? In the night? 
 
 Instructors would do well, in prescribing requirements for 
 their problems to vary the conditions that surround each of 
 them. In this case, the student is required to post the sentinels 
 of an outguard in the outpost line of a regiment of cavalry 
 operating in enemy country, near a greatly superior hostile in- 
 fantry force. He is also required to indicate his patrol system 
 for this outguard. 
 
 Take the same situation except that the country is friendly 
 to the Blues, and the command in camp near New Oxford is a 
 regiment of Blue infantry. What changes would be made in 
 the solutions 
 
 Cavalry, in camp at night, is nearly immobile. If surprised 
 at night it must lose its horses, if the surprising force is equal 
 in size, or greater. If warned of the menace of attack at night 
 it must have ample time to prepare either for retreat or defense. 
 Infantry in camp needs much less time to prepare for similar 
 emergencies, but, by the very nature of the two arms, cavalry 
 can spread its outpost and patrol systems much farther from 
 its camp. 
 
 It is inconceivable that the United States should ever engage 
 in a war of invasion against a first-class military power. Its 
 wars must be fought, if at all, defensively on its own soil. For 
 this reason, more problems should be proposed where the stu- 
 dents' troops, the Blues, operate in friendly territory, than where 
 they operate in hostile territory. However, both aspects of the 
 problem must be studied, for the students may become in- 
 structors themselves later on, and they should know how to 
 handle troops under both conditions. 
 
 The last problem is introduced here to give instructors a hint 
 as to how outguard problems might be worded. Very few out- 
 guard problems should be solved on the map. They are dis- 
 tinctly field problems, and, since every private soldier, every 
 
APPENDIX 203 
 
 non-commissioned officer, every subaltern officer will be fre- 
 quently called on, in campaign, to do outpost duty, under con-' 
 ditions that place a heavy individual responsibility on them, they 
 cannot be too thoroughly grounded in the duties of outguard 
 commanders, of leaders of outpost patrols, or outguard senti- 
 nels. 
 
 No soldier should allow himself to be posted as an outguard 
 sentinel without receiving full data as to the situation in front 
 of and behind him. He must know what friendly groups are 
 on his right and left, where his outguard is, where his support 
 is. He must know what friendly patrols are working in his 
 sector. He must know where all friendly detachments within 
 his horizon are located. He must know everything that is known 
 about the enemy in his immediate front, as far as he can see. 
 
 These things must be told him, and he must not be satisfied 
 until he knows that his information is complete in these regards. 
 His own safety depends on this information, and his duty can- 
 not be satisfactorily performed without it. 
 
 Having this information in his possession, he should be re- 
 quired to tell how he proposes to conduct himself on his post, 
 under what circumstances he is to use his arms, what he is to do 
 with all persons who come near his post. 
 
 In the years that have passed much stress has been laid on 
 the verbatim knowldge of the General Orders for Sentinels, none 
 on the knowledge of the orders for outpost sentinels. The 
 former, prescribed in the Manual of Guard Duty, do not fit out- 
 post duty in any spot. The latter sentinel does not walk his 
 post in a military manner he does not walk it at all, and his 
 manner is such that he may see without being seen. He carries 
 his piece at will, loaded and locked ; he salutes no one, et cetera, 
 et cetera. The General Orders for Sentinels bear the same rela- 
 tion to the orders for outpost sentinels, as far as their applica- 
 tion in war is concerned, that full dress parade does to the evolu- 
 tions necessary to adopt under an enemy's fire. 
 
 Instructors are urged to train their men thoroughly in out- 
 guard duty. It will be the first duty required of them in war, 
 and the last. Nothing is more important; nothing is equally 
 
204 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 so, for the infantry or cavalry soldier, except the principles of 
 infantry combat. 
 
 ORDERS FOR OUTPOST SENTINELS. 
 FIRST: About myself and friendly neighbors. 
 
 My post is number, , outguard number The 
 
 outguard is there The post on my right is number , 
 
 outguard number , and is there. The post on my left 
 
 is number , outguard number , and is there. The 
 
 support is there. Other detachments are there and there. 
 Such and such patrols are operating in my front. This road 
 
 leads to 
 
 SECOND : About the enemy. 
 
 The enemy is reported to be there. I have seen him (de- 
 scribing exactly what hostile bodies I have seen) there; or, I 
 have not seen him. I am to watch for him between there 
 and there* If I see any unusual movement I am to report it 
 at once to my outguard commander who is there. If suddenly 
 attacked and forced to retire or threatened with capture, I 
 shall rejoin my outguard by going around that way so as not 
 to disclose the position of my outguard to the enemy or to 
 mask its fire. 
 THIRD : How to conduct myself on my post. 
 
 By day I shall make the best use possible of such natural 
 or artificial cover as is available, standing, crouching or lying 
 down, and remaining stationary or moving about as will en- 
 able me to observe the sector assigned me to watch in the most 
 efficient manner. I shall carry my piece at will, loaded and 
 locked. I shall inform passing friendly patrols of what I have 
 seen. 
 
 At night I shall remain standing, habitually stationary, 
 moving about only for the purposes of observation. I shall 
 not sit or lie down unless authorized to do so. 
 
 FOURTH When to open fire on the enemy. 
 
 Unless specially ordered to fire on the enemy whenever 
 seen I shall fire only under the following circumstances : (a) 
 
APPENDIX 205 
 
 when suddenly attacked and there is no time to call the out- 
 guard commander, I shall fire rapidly, but with careful aim. 
 (b)When a person approaching my post is ordered to halt and 
 fails to do so, or otherwise disobeys me, I shall fire deliber- 
 ately, taking careful aim, so as to be sure to stop him. 
 FIFTH : Treatment of individuals approaching my post. 
 
 By day I shall allow only officers, non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, and detachments recognized as part of the outpost, and 
 officers known to have authority to do so, to pass my post 
 either in or out. I shall detain all others and notify my out- 
 guard commander. 
 
 At night when any persons approach my post, I shall come 
 to a ready, halt them, and notify the outguard commander- 
 Persons claiming to be deserters from the enemy are required 
 to lay down their arms. If they are pursued by the enemy, 
 I shall order them to drop their arms and I shall give the 
 alarm. If they fail to obey me at once I shall fire on them. 
 I shall halt bearers of flags of truce and their escorts, require 
 them to face outwards, and at once notify the commander of 
 the outguard. 
 
 ADVANCE, FLANK AND REAR GUARDS 
 
 In teaching applied minor tactics to any class of students, 
 it is a good plan to adopt one general situation for a series of 
 problems, covering several days of the course. As explained 
 on page 201 of this book, the student should be given, usually, 
 the Blue side, and the theatre of operations should be laid in 
 Blue territory. 
 
 The problem propounded for any one session should, as 
 stated in rule 3, Suggestions for the Preparation of Problems, 
 be planned to especially illustrate one tactical principle, and but 
 one. So, if it is proposed to begin the course with an applica- 
 tion of the rules governing the conduct of distant patrols, place 
 the forces far enough apart *o make patrolling the most evident 
 thing to be done. 
 
 The data for starting the series of problems would then be 
 contained in the first special situation. The instructor, as ex- 
 plained before, must adhere to the plan he has decided on as to 
 
206 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 how the Red troops are to be moved, and he must take care to 
 leave open certain routes to the Blue patrols, so that they may 
 actually observe the Red columns as they are moved. Often it 
 will be necessary for the instructor to guide the patrols (as 
 tactfully as possible, so as not to seem to be helping the stu- 
 dents) so that they may make the necessary discoveries. 
 
 Successive special situations should be constructed from the 
 data these patrols obtain. At this first session much valuable 
 instruction can be given both in the conduct of patrols and in 
 the preparation of messages. 
 
 Having satisfactorily led the student to a clear idea of the 
 location of the hostile groups and the direction of their advance, 
 they may next be brought to the discussion of the duties of the 
 advance guard. This might take one or more sessions of the 
 class. All the time they should be made to grasp exactly as 
 happens in war a picture of what is happening in their front ; 
 in this way successive estimates of the situation are easier and 
 more quickly made. 
 
 Having got the advance guard fabric well in hand, a new 
 Red force now might threaten a flank, and at least one session 
 of the school devoted to this important study. 
 
 The students now might see the two main bodies brought so 
 close together that combat is inevitable. For this phase of the 
 instruction, more than any other, the instructor should proceed 
 slowly. He should compel careful reconnoissance, and require 
 explicit orders concerning the deployment into line of battle. 
 Here would come the instruction in estimating ranges, in assign- 
 ing targets and sectors, in sight setting, and in fire control. A 
 constant watch should be kept of the way the students cover 
 their flanks and dispose of their supports and reserves. 
 
 Having started the fire fight, it is generally useless to con- 
 tinue the phases of the combat. Map problems, and, indeed, 
 field maneuvers, are very difficult to manage in the final stages 
 of combat, and more often than not lead to absurdities. It is 
 thought best to break the continuity of the problem here, and 
 jump to the next phase the retreat and the pursuit. 
 
 If it is thought best to discuss rear guard actions, it is 
 believed to be more satisfactory to have the student take the 
 
APPENDIX 207 
 
 beaten side, provided the instructor will fully and clearly ex- 
 plain the formations he adopts in the pursuit and the reasons 
 for each. 
 
 If instructors attempt to illustrate each tactical principle 
 by an entirely new problem much time will be lost by the stu- 
 dents in vizualizing the situations that is saved where each 
 situation follows naturally the ones that have preceded. 
 
 Instructors should be careful, in map problems as in field 
 exercises, not to violate the principle contained in the last para- 
 graph of Paragraph 357, Infantry Drill Regulations: "The 
 same exercise should not be repeated over the same ground and 
 under the same situation. Such repetitions lead to the adoption 
 of a fixed mode of attack or defense and develop mere drill 
 masters. Fixed or prearranged systems are prohibited." 
 
 In all these problems instructors should require students to 
 give all their orders accurately, and formally correct. Do not 
 permit them to slur their orders, for it is vital to the training 
 of an officer that he should be thoroughly grounded in the art 
 of estimating situations and in giving orders. No amount of 
 inspiration will enable an officer to give orders that express his 
 will definitely, clearly, and simply. He must learn it by tireless 
 practice. 
 
 Remembering that it is the officer's function to interpret the 
 orders of his superiors, and apply them by issuing orders to his 
 own officers and men, the importance of knowing how is quickly 
 seen. 
 
 In preparing problems for war games, it is well to use other 
 maps than those of this text. Students' interest will be better 
 maintained if they are not required to work all their problems 
 on the same ground. 
 
 General situations should be described on small scale maps ; 
 special situations from maps of larger scales. Sections of the 
 three-inch maps (three inches to the mile) of the entire Gettys- 
 burg-Antietam region and also of a large area in the vicinity of 
 Fort Leavenworth can be bought from the Officer in Charge, 
 Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort Levenworth, 
 Kansas, Guide (ten miles to the inch) and Strategic (one mile 
 to the inch) maps of this region can also be obtained. 
 
208 MILITARY PRIMER 
 
 It is recommended that problems be first solved as map 
 problems, and then played as war games. Major Farrand 
 Sayre's book, Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides, is the best 
 text-book available for giving instruction in the war game. It 
 too can be bought very cheaply from the Book Department. 
 
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